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BREACHES OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN TREATIES
A Study in History and Diplomacy
BY
JOHN BIGELOW
Major U. S. Army, retired
Author of American Policy, World Peace, etc.
WITH THREE MAPS
Iftcw Korft
STURGIS & WALTON
COMPANY
1917
.^■■'ViSKAi^;;
^syrv OF TO^^
COPTKIGHT, 1917
Bt JOHN BIGELOW
S«t up and electrotyped. Published. February, 1917.
Jx
k:
?7<5i
PEEFACE
**A declaration by the Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled, ' '
commonly known as THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE, proclaimed to the world the
first quickening of that sovereign power which was
to develop through inorganic association, and loose
confederation, into the firm, indissoluble union
now constituting the Republic of the United States
of America. In that famous document the new
infant nation attested its "decent respect to the
opinions of mankind" by specifying the several
causes which impelled it *'to the separation."
From that day to this, through a singular variety
of vicissitudes, it has conducted its affairs with a
regard for the opinion of other nations at least
equal to that shown by its mother country. Yet
only a few years ago, incidentally to the public dis-
cussion of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, the United
States was arraigned by the British press as lack-
ing in the sense of honor that holds a nation to its
promise. The Saturday Review could not expect
''to find President Taft acting like a gentleman."
''To imagine," it said, "that American politicians
V
Preface
would be bound by any feeling of honor or respect
for treaties, if it would pay to violate them, was
to delude ourselves. The whole course of history
proves this. " The London Morning Post charged
the United States with various infractions of the
Treaty and said: ''This is surely a record even
in American foreign policy; but the whole treat-
ment of this matter serves to remind us that we
had a long series of similar incidents in our rela-
tions with the United States. Americans might
ask themselves if it is really good foreign policy
to lower the value of their written word in such a
way as to make negotiations with other powers
difficult or impossible. The ultimate loss may be
greater than the immediate gain. There might
come a time when the United States might desire
to establish a certain position by treaty, and might
find her past conduct a serious difficulty in the
way.'' More recently and presumably with more
deliberation, a British author says : ' ' Treaties, in
fact, only bind the policy of the United States as
long as they are convenient. They are not really
worth the labour their negotiation entails or the
paper they are written on. It is well that this po-
sition should be realised, as it may save a great
deal of fuss and disappointment in the future." ^
Other organs of the European press, taking their
1 Common Sense in Foreign Policy by Sir Harry Johnston, p.
89.
vi
Preface
cue apparently from such deliverances as these,
expressed themselves to the same effect.
The standing of a nation as to integrity is in-
deed of the greatest practical importance, not only
to itself, but also to other nations. Eegard for
treaties is essentially a matter of fact, and should
therefore be ascertainable from history or from
the material of which history is made. The fol-
lowing study is devoted to determining the rela-
tive trustworthiness of two great nations as indi-
cated in their conventional intercourse with each
other. Beginning with the treaty of peace at the
end of our war of independence, it considers all
the treaties, conventions, and similar agreements
negotiated between Great Britain and the United
States that may be regarded as broken by either
of the contracting parties, sets forth and discusses
the infraction in each case, and ends with a sum-
marising of the records on both sides and a bal-
ancing of the accounts.
About two-thirds of the work is taken up with
the treaty negotiated in 1850 by our Secretary of
State John M. Clayton with the British minister
to the United States, Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer.
This apportionment of space seems justified by
the preeminent importance of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, by the complexity and intrinsic interest of
the questions to which it gave rise, and by the cir-
cumstance that the author has new light to shed
vii
Preface
upon the negotiations and upon the personality of
Sir Henry Bulwer, obtained from the Clayton
Papers, in the Library of Congress.
This work is not what is called a **war book";
that is, it was not written with a view to forming
public opinion on any phase or feature of the pres-
ent world war. It was begun and, but for some
revision and amplification, was finished before this
unprecedented contest commenced.
The enactment of a treaty consists of a number
of distinct steps or stages: (1) the preparation of
a draft, or protocol, (2) the signing, (3) the rati-
fication, and (4) the exchange of ratifications.
Being thus completed and sanctioned, the treaty is
proclaimed or published. This may be necessary
to its going into effect, but ordinarily a treaty be-
comes effective on the exchange of ratifications.
A treaty is said to be concluded when it is signed.
It is customary to designate treaties by the date of
their signing, but in these pages they are desig-
nated by the date of the exchange of their ratifica-
tions, when known.
Besides the three maps accompanying the work,
an ordinary map of Central America may be found
helpful in the perusal of Chapters III, IV and V.
John Bigelow.
125 E. 57 street,
New York,
January 23, 1917.
viii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTEB PAGE
Pbeface V
I FiEST Tbeaty of Peace (1783 and 1784). Treaty of
Amity, Commebce and Navigation (Jay Tbeaty,
1795) 3
II Second Tbeaty of Peace (Tbeaty of Ghent, 1815).
Convention fob Indemnity Undeb the Awabd of
THE Emperob of RUSSIA (1823). Rush-Bagot
Agreement (1818). Convention Respecting Fish-
eries (1819) 22
III The Clayton-Bulweb Treaty (1850). Introduction.
The Mosquito Coast. The Negotiations ... 37
IV The Protectorate Under the Clayton-Bulweb
Treaty 91
V The Clayton-Bulweb Treaty (Concluded). Belize,
OR British Honduras. The Bay Islands . . . 109
VI The Treaty of Washington (1871). General Con-
clusion 165
Appendices 187
BiBLIOGBAPHY 231
Index 237
MAPS AT BACK OF BOOK
1. British settlements and dominions in the Caribbean Sea
in 1850 and in 1852
2. .The Mosquito Shore before and after it ceased to be a
British Protectorate
3. .British Honduras before and after it became a British
Possession
zi
BREACHES OF
ANGLO-AMERICAN TREATIES
BREACHES OF ANGLO-
AMERICAN TREATIES
FiBST Treaty of Peace (1783 and 1784)
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation
(Jay Treaty, 1795)
Provisional Articles and Definitive Treaty of
Peace, 1783 and 1784
The termination of our Eevolutionary "War was
effected by two successive treaties :
1. Provisional articles concluded in 1782 and
proclaimed in 1783.
2. A definitive Treaty of Peace, signed in 1783
and ratified in 1784.
In each of these treaties was an Article VII con-
taining the stipulation:
His Britannic Majesty shall with all convenient speed,
. . . withdraw all his armies, garrisons, and fleets from
the said United States, and from every post, place, and
harbor within the same.
3
Chapter I
On the 25tli of December, 1784, Benjamin Frank-
lin wrote from Passy to the President of Congress :
With respect to the British court, we should, I think,
be constantly upon our guard, and impress strongly upon
our minds that, though it has made peace with us, it
is not in truth reconciled either to us or to its loss of us,
but still flatters itself with hopes that some change in
the affairs of Europe, or some disunion among our-
selves, may afford them an opportunity of recovering
their dominion, punishing those who have most offended,
and securing our future dependence. ... In these cir-
cumstances we cannot be too careful to preserve the
friendships we have acquired abroad, and the union we
have established at home, to secure our credit by a
punctual discharge of our obligations of every kind, and
our reputation by the wisdom of our councils, since we
know not how soon we may have a fresh occasion for
friends, for credit, and for reputation.
Never did old Ben Franklin give more signal
evidence of his sagacity. Nearly ten years later,
on the 28th of October, 1795, another treaty was
ratified with Great Britain. It contained the fol-
lowing provision (Article II) :
His Majesty will withdraw all his troops and garrisons
from all posts and places within the boundary lines as-
signed by the Treaty of Peace [1784] to the United
States. This evacuation shall take place on or before
the first day of June, one thousand seven hundred and
ninety six.
The delay in carrying out the original stipula-
4
First Treaty of Peace (17 88 and 17 8 A)
tion, Great Britain sought to justify by charging
the United States with violating the following
Article contained in both treaties.^
Article IV. That creditors on either side shall meet
with no lawful impediment to the recovery of the full
value in Sterling money of all bona fide debts heretofore
contracted.
Article VII allowed Great Britain a ''conven-
ient ' ' period in which to withdraw its troops. Ar-
ticle IV allowed the United States no time in which
to remove lawful impediments to the recovery of
debts. The reason was that these did not have
to be removed. They were simply to be disre-
garded or passed by. The provision was, not that
there should be no such lawful impediments, but
that creditors should not meet with any. To meet
with one it was necessary to bring suit and to have
some law admitted in bar of trial.^ All that was
necessary to prevent this was to have the courts
recognize the treaty^ as binding upon them.
This if it could be done at all, would have been
iGrenville to King, April 19, 1800. Am. State Papers, For.
Bel., II, 398. The violation as originally charged embraced the
IV, V, and VI Articles of the two treaties (Hammond to Jeffer-
son, Nov. 30, 1791, and Mch. 5, 1792, Id., 189, 197). The last
two articles were dropped, it would seem, upon Jefferson's dem-
onstration of their observance (Jefferson to Hammond, May 29,
1792, Id., 202-205).
2 Ware vs. Hamilton, 3 Dallas, 218.
s Either of the treaties mentioned. They are alike so far as
we consider them.
5
Chapter I
accomplished by the proclamation of the treaty.
Owing to the feebleness of the central government,
it was not so accomplished, and for this reason the
Constitution adopted in 1789 provided that trea-
ties then made or which should be made under the
authority of the United States, should be the su-
preme law of the land, binding on the judges in
every State, anything in the constitution or laws
of any State to the contrary notwithstanding. The
words that "creditors shall meet with no lawful
impediment in the recovery of all such debts"
mean that ''when the creditors apply to a court
of justice, no law shall be pleaded in bar to a judg-
ment for their debts." ^ Even this constitutional
provision, though construed by the Supreme Court
of the United States in favor of the creditors, as
giving them the right to sue without regard to
the validity or invalidity of a state law,^ did not
wholly repair the fault of the Government in mak-
ing the indiscreet engagement. The Constitution
put the treaty above the laws or constitution of a
State, but not above the laws or Constitution of
the United States. The latter reserved to the sev-
eral States certain rights. Alleging these reser-
vations as their justification, the States, in sev-
eral cases, repudiated the treaty as law and
thereby put the central government in the posi-
tion of having broken it.
1 Ware vs. Eamilion, 3 Dallas, 218.
2/d., 199.
6
First Treaty of Peace (1783 and 1784)
When the treaty was made, its observance by
the United States depended on the voluntary com-
pliance with it by all the States or such a change
in the Constitution of the United States as would
empower the central government to compel them to
comply with it. There was little or no ground for
counting upon either of these alternatives. This
circumstance was accepted by Great Britain as a
condition of the compact when she ratified it. For
its consequences, however injurious to her, she had
no legal redress.^ If she meant to guarantee the
execution of Article IV by retaining possession of
certain posts, or otherwise, she should have so
stipulated in the treaty. As she did not so stip-
ulate, she was obligated to withdraw all her garri-
sons from the United States ''with all convenient
speed." The orders for evacuating New York,
the largest post she had, were received in that
place in April, 1783. The operation was com-
pleted by the end of November. The smaller
Western posts might have been evacuated in much
less time. Allowing a month for the transmission
of the necessary orders from New York, in case
the orders had to go through there, and a few
weeks for their execution, all the posts might have
1 Referring hereto, Gouverneur Morris said to Pitt (May 21,
1789) : "Your natural and proper course was to comply fully on
your part, and if then we had refused a compliance, you might
rightfully have issued letters of marque and reprisal to such of
your subjects as were injured by your refusal." (Am. State
Papers, For. Bel, I, 124).'
.7
Chapter I
been evacuated by the end of May, 1783.^ It was
October, 1796, when at Michilimackinac, later
Mackinac, the last post to be evacuated, the Brit-
ish Union Jack was hauled down and replaced
by the Stars and Stripes.^ This was thirteen
years after the date stipulated in the Treaty of
1783, and at least three months after the one
agreed upon in the Treaty of 1795. The date of
Great Britain's violation of the treaty may be
considered as June, 1783, when Mackinac should
have been evacuated and was not.
Great Britain held back to await the execution
of the treaty by the United States. This she had
no more right to do than the United States had
to await its execution by Great Britain. The re-
moval of impediments to the payment of debts was
not a condition precedent to the withdrawal of
the British troops.
But quite independently of the treaty. Great
Britain was loth to loosen her last hold on the ter-
ritory of her revolted colonies. As Benjamin
Franklin had anticipated, she desired to postpone
as long as possible the final surrender of a val-
uable region. She hoped that the new Union
would not hold together and that a coveted terri-
tory would thus revert to her.^ There was every
1 Jefferson to Hammond, May 29, 1792.
2 The British Evacuation of the United States by H. C. Osgood,
and University of Toronto Studies in History, I, 100.
3 University Studies, University of Toronto, I Series, Vol. 2.
See also same, vol. i, 1896, pp. 100, 101.
8
First Treaty of Peace (1783 and 1784)
prospect, for a time, that the scattered inhabitants
residing in the country west and north of the AUe-
ghanies would again seek British political con-
nection. When the boundaries of Upper Canada
came to be stated it was thought best to make
them as indefinite as possible, so that, without any
alteration in their description, the whole of that
portion of the Province of Quebec which had been
surrendered to the United States by the Treaty
of 1783 might again be acquired and incorporated
in the Province of Upper Canada.^
Great Britain did not content herself with re-
taining the posts which she held at the date of
the treaty. Not only did she fail to return them
as she had engaged to do, she aggravated this
breach of faith by the lawless acquisition of an-
other one. In April, 1794, three companies of
British regulars stole into the territory of the
United States, penetrated to the rapids of the
Miami in the southern part of what is now the
State of Ohio, and built a fort there which was
called Fort Miami. This flagrant violation of the
sovereignty of the United States was maintained
until the general abandonment of the Western
posts in 1796.
The withdrawal of his Majesty's forces was to
be executed ** without causing any destruction or
1 University of Toronto Studies in History, I, 100, 101.
9
Chapter I
carrying away any negroes or other property of
the American inhabitants" (Art. VII, both trea-
ties). It was a part of the system of warfare
adopted by the British when operating in the
slave States, to encourage the slaves to desert
from their owners, promising them freedom. The
conclusion of peace found them with many of these
helpless people on their hands. Having to choose
between breaking the promise that they had made
them and violating their treaty with the United
States, they chose the latter and carried away
with their troops a considerable number of slaves.
They refused to compensate the owners on the
ground that slaves were legitimate captures and,
as such, the property of the captors, to be dis-
posed of as they saw fit ; that in accordance with
this principle they had been set free; that, being
free, they belonged to no one and consequently it
was no breach of treaty to carry them away.*
The exportation of slaves commenced at New
York, as early at least as May, 1783.
What was the earliest case of violation of the
treaty on the part of the United States? Under
date of March 5, 1792, Mr. Hammond, the British
minister at Philadelphia, addressed a long com-
munication to Thomas Jefferson, Secretary of
1 Benton's Thirty Tears' View, pp. 89, 90. The number of these
slaves is not accurately known. It is given by Benton as 3,000.
Jefferson gives the number of negroes carried away as more than
3,000 (Jefferson to Hammond, May 29, 1792).
10
First Treaty of Peace (1783 and 1784)
State, setting forth alleged infractions of Articles
IV, V, VI. Article V, so far as it differed ma-
terially from Article IV, was recommendatory.
It only required the Congress to recommend to
the States certain measures looking to the protec-
tion of British subjects in their persons and prop-
erty. These measures the Congress recommended
earnestly and in bona fide. That such recommend-
ations were not invariably adopted and carried
out was not the fault of the Congress nor was it
a violation of the treaty.^ Charges under Article
V may therefore be omitted from consideration.
Article VI prohibited the persecution of British
subjects by confiscation or confinement, on ac-
count of participation in the war.^ Violations of
either Article IV or Article VI could be substan-
tiated only by legal decisions. Mr. Hammond
cited but six.^ The earliest of these was the case
1 Jefferson to Hammond, May 29, 1792.
^Art. VI. That there shall be no future confiscations made,
nor any prosecutions commenced, against any person or persona
for or by reasons of, the part which he or they may have taken
in the present war; and that no person shall, on that account,
suffer any future loss or damage, either in his person, liberty, or
property; and that those who may be in confinement on such
charges, at the time of the ratification of the Treaty in America,
shall be immediately set at liberty, and the prosecution so com-
menced be discontinued.
3 1. William Neale's Executors vs. Comfort Sands. Decided in
the Supreme Court of New York [January term, 1785].
2. Osborne vs. Mifflin's Executors. Decided in the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania [9 Oct., 1786].
3. Hoare vs. Allen. Decided in the same court [April term.
1789]. ^
11
Chapter I
of a British subject, Waddington, who during the
British occupation of New York tenanted a brew-
house in that city belonging to an American, Eut-
gers, who resided without the British lines. Be-
ing sued for trespass in an inferior court of New
York, Waddington, defended by Alexander Ham-
ilton, pleaded Article VI of the treaty and pro-
duced orders from the Commanding-General and
from the Quartermaster-General, authorizing his
occupation of the premises. The court found him
not guilty for the period covered by the order of
the Commanding-General, but guilty for the time
covered only by that of the Quartermaster-Gen-
eral. From this decision he appealed, but before
a final decision was rendered, he agreed with the
plaintiff on a compromise involving the payment
of a sum of money. The suit was thus disposed
of. It is perhaps debatable whether such issue
of an incomplete process of law and voluntary
compromise was a violation of the treaty; but,
admitting that it was, it took place on the 17th of
August, 1784, more than a year after the violation
4. Stewardson, administrator of Mildred vs. Dorsey. Decided
in the General Court of Maryland [after 1 May, 1785].
5. Rutgers vs. Waddington. Decided in the Mayor's Court
of New York [17 August, 1784].
6. John Smith Hatfield, at a court of oyer and terminer at
Bergen, New Jersey, August, 1789.
The dates inserted in brackets are obtained from the judicial
records of the cases. The item inserted in case 4, is determined
from the report of the case {Md. Rep., Harris and McHenry, III,
453).
12
First Treaty of Peace (1783 and 1784.)
of the treaty by Great Britain. Had there been
any valid case prior to this one, it is at least prob-
able that Mr. Hammond would have included it
in his list with its date.
Jefferson dated the breach of the treaty by
Great Britain from April, 1783, when orders were
received in New York for the evacuation of that
place, and orders should have been received, but,
were not, for the evacuation of the Western posts.
He dates the breach of it by the United States
from the passage of a certain law by the State of
Virginia in December, 1783, ''nine months after
the infractions committed by the other party." ^
Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation
(Jay Treaty, 1795)
In 1795 we ratified a treaty, the first Article of
which declared:
There shall be a firm, inviolable and universal peace
and a true and sincere friendship, between his Britannic
]\Iajesty and his heirs and successors, and the United
States of America, and between their respective coun-
tries, territories, cities, towns, and people of every de-
gree, without exception of persons or places.
His Majesty violated the ** inviolable and univer-
sal peace," mocked and converted into hatred the
''true and sincere friendship" of these profes-
1 Jefferson to Hammond, May 29, 1792. Arrv, State Papers,
For. Rel, I, 215.
13
Chapter I
sions, by his outrageous treatment of American
seamen. This reached its climax when in 1807 a
United States warship, the Chesapeake, was sum-
moned by the British ship, Leopard, to submit to
search for British deserters. Taken by surprise,
the Chesapeake received three full broadsides
without being able to reply ; and in fifteen minutes
was reduced to a helpless condition. The boats
of the Leopard came over, bringing several Brit-
ish officers, who mustered the ship 's company and
took from it three sailors.
"Disgraced, degraded, with officers and crew
smarting under a humiliation that was never for-
gotten nor forgiven, the unlucky Chesapeake
dragged her way back to Norfolk. ' ' ^ But the war
of 1812 was only a few years off. The indignity
was then to be effaced, so far as that was possible,
by a succession of naval victories, which, together
with New Orleans and Saratoga and Yorktown,
were to give to the United States the distinction
of having done more to lower the military and
naval prestige of Great Britain than all other
nations of the world together.
Article II of the Jay Treaty required that Great
Britain withdraw her garrisons from the Western
posts by the 1st of June, 1796. On account of
opposition to the treaty in Congress, the bill ap-
propriating the funds necessary to the occupation
1 Eist. of the United States by H. Adams, IV, 1920.
14
Jay Treaty (1795)
of the posts by the United States was not signed
by the President until the 6th of May, and there
was not time between then and the 1st of June for
the Department of War to get officers with troops
and supplies to those distant points. On the 10th
of May, Captain Lewis of the United States army
was sent to Quebec to make arrangements with
Lord Dorchester, commanding the British forces
in Canada, for the reception of the posts. At the
end of May orders were issued to the British
commandants to evacuate them; but Lewis, now
in Quebec, represented that the American troops
were not ready for their reception. Lord Dor-
chester agreed to await their coming and on the
1st and 2nd of June issued orders for the trans-
fer to take place on the arrival of the American
troops.^ The small posts, Dutchman's Point and
Oswegatchie, were abandoned without formal
transfer about the 1st of July. The larger posts
were delivered to American officers in the follow-
ing order:
Miami 11 July, 1796.
Detroit 11 July, 1796.
Niagara 11 August, 1796.^
Michilimackinac 2 October, 1796.2
"i- Michigan Pioneer and Hist. Collection, XXV, 121; The Weat-
ward Movement by Justin Winsor, pp. 482, 483.
2 The British Evacuation of the United States by H. C. Osgood.
3 Letter to the author, Feb. 20, 1914, from the assistant editor
of the Michigan Historical Commission.
15
Chapter I
If the United States officers had been ready to
receive the posts on the 1st of June, the transfer
could not have been made then, for the British
orders were not issued in the first instance until
the end of May and weeks must be allowed for
their transmission. To account for this tardiness
on the part of the British it is necessary to con-
sider a particular stipulation of the Jay Treaty
and another treaty. Article III of the Jay Treaty
gave to British subjects as well as to citizens of
the United States, the right to trade freely with
the Indians on either side of the boundary line
between Canada and the United States. A treaty
subsequently concluded between the United States
and certain tribes of Indians debarred those In-
dians from trading with persons not provided
with a license from the Government of the United
States.i
Great Britain naturally considered this Indian
Treaty as repugnant to Article III of the Jay
Treaty. She believed that the United States had
ratified the Indian Treaty without knowing the
terms of the previously ratified Jay Treaty, as in
fact it had,2 and that it had no intention of violat-
ing the latter treaty; at the same time she pro-
1 Treaty of Greenville, concluded Aug. 3, communicated to
Senate, Dec. 9, ratified Dec. 22, 1795. The Jay Treaty was con-
cluded Nov. 19, 1794, ratified by the President, and its ratified'
tions exchanged, Oct. 28, 1795.
? Hist, of the United States, Hildreth, I, 598, 699,
16
Jay Treaty (1795)
posed the negotiation of an additional article
declaring that no stipulation entered into subse-
quently to the Jay Treaty should be understood
as derogating in any manner from the rights of
free intercourse and commerce secured by Article
III of that treaty.^ This article was concluded
on the 4th of May, 1796.^ Information of the fact
could not have reached Quebec before the latter
part of May, and, until it did, orders for the evac-
uation were not to issue.^ Taking these circum-
stances into account, it appears that the original
tardiness of Great Britain in providing for the
surrender of the posts was another case of her
holding them as security for the observance of the
treaty by the United States; another attempt to
enforce the treaty by violating it herself. The
remissness of the United States in not being pre-
pared to receive the posts by the 1st of June was
not contrary to any stipulation. The treaty did
not call for a transfer; it provided only for
a withdrawal. Grateful acknowledgment is due
therefore to the British officers for favoring the
United States, as they generally did by executing
1 Bond, British Minister, to Pickering, Secretary of State, Mch.
26, 1796. B, y ,
2 Its ratification was advised by the Senate on the 9th of the
same month. Whether afterwards ratified or not does not appear
in the official publication of treaties, etc., compiled by M. C.
Mallory.
3 Eist. of the United States, Hildreth I, 598 5 British Evacuation
of the United States, Osgood.
17
Chapter I
it as a transfer. The only one of tlie larger posts
that was found to be evacuated when the Ameri-
cans entered it, was Detroit. The American force
that occupied it was so poorly supplied that to
maintain itself till succored, it had to borrow pro-
visions from the British force beyond the river.^
The forementioned Indian Treaty cannot be re-
garded as a violation of the Jay Treaty unless
its contravention of it was intentional and was
carried into effect. The British Government,
through its minister, admitted that it was unin-
tentional, and there being no evidence that it was
carried into effect, it may be safely asserted that
it was not. It was, moreover, formally repudiated
by the United States in the manner proposed by
the British Government.
To dispose of the long standing claims of debts
which should have been settled under Article IV
of the Treaty of 1783, Article VI of the Jay
Treaty provided for the arbitration of claims of
** British merchants and others" against ''citizens
or inhabitants of the United States" for hona fide
debts ** contracted before the peace." For the
losses and damages resulting from the nonpay-
ment of such debts the United States Government
was to make full and complete compensation. To
determine the amount of such losses and damages,
1 The Westward Movement by Justin Winsor, p. 483.
18
Jay Treaty (1795)
five commissioners were to be appointed as fol-
lows: two by the King of Great Britain, two by
the President of the United States, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, and one ' * by
the unanimous voice of the other four." The
commissioners were accordingly appointed as
follows :
By the United States
Thomas Fitzsimmons of Pennsylvania
James Innes of Virginia ^
By Great Britain
Thomas Macdonald
Henry Pye Rich
By the Commission
John Guillemard
Three of the commissioners were to constitute
a quorum with ''power to do any act appertain-
ing to the said commission, provided that one of
the commissioners named on each side and the
fifth commissioner shall be present."
The commission met on the 29th of May, 1797.
Its discussions developed the fact that the fifth
member and one of the British members were
completely under the influence of the other Brit-
ish member, Mr. Macdonald, of a domineering
temper and uncompromisingly British or anti-
American. By his control of the majority he be-
iDied; succeeded by Samuel Sitgr eaves.
19
Chapter I
came practically tlie commission, and established
for his government a system of rules which, in the
opinion of the Government of the United States,
clearly comprehended a vast mass of cases never
submitted to its consideration.^ Was this a vio-
lation of the treaty? Was the commission com-
petent to determine its own jurisdiction under the
treaty? No other body or person was formally
empowered to do this and the treaty itself de-
clared that the award of the commission should
*'in all cases, be final and conclusive, both as to
the justice of the claim and [as] to the amount of
the sum to be paid." It would seem therefore,
that the commission had at least as much right as
the Government of the United States to decide
what cases came within its jurisdiction and that
its exercise of such right in the manner stated,
however disagreeable arid even unfair to the
United States, was not a violation of the treaty.
But together with the offensive demeanor of Mr.
Macdonald, it proved too exasperating for the
United States commissioners. These consequently
withdrew from the board, on the 31st of July,
1798. This action, if not dictated by the United
States Government, was unqualifiedly approved
by it. Great Britain called in vain upon the
United States to replace the seceding members
by the appointment of new ones, offering to re-
1 John Marshall, Secretary of State, to Grenville, Aug. 23, 1800.
20
Jay Treaty (1795)
place its own.^ The United States refused to do
so, insisting upon one of two measures :
1. Negotiation of an additional article, defin-
ing, to the satisfaction of the United States, the
classes of cases to be arbitrated ; or,
2. Agreement upon a lump sum as full compen-
sation for all the claims of the creditors.^
It thus repudiated its obligation to arbitrate.
Its excuse, at the best, was that the arbitration
was proving unjust. It had no right to expect
justice. A tribunal of arbitration is not a court
of justice. Its function is to settle differences by
arbitrary judgment, which, even if unjust, is pref-
erable to discord, contention, or war. The with-
drawal of the United States must be adjudged a
violation of the treaty. Great Britain, after some
demurring, consented to compromise on a lump
sum, and the two governments agreed upon £600,-
000, or $2,664,000, which was duly paid by the
United States, under the provisions of a separate
convention ratified in 1802.
iGrenville to King, April 19, 1800, Am. State Papers, For.
Rel, II, 398.
2 Marshall, Secretary of State, to Grenville, Aug. 23, 1800.
21
n
Second Treaty of Peace (Teeaty of Ghent, 1815)
Convention fob Indemnity Under the Award of
THE Emperor of Eussia (1823)
Eush-Bagot Agreement (1818)
Convention Eespecting Fisheries (1819)
The Treaty of Ghent, 1815
Article I of this treaty, which closed the War
of 1812, commenced as follows :
There shall be a firm and universal peace between his
Britannic Majesty and the United States, and between
their respective countries, territories, cities, towns, and
people of every degree, without exception of places or
persons.
This was followed before our Civil War by of-
fenses against -the Monroe Doctrine, and during
the war by violations of professed neutrality,
which may be regarded as challenges to war, if not
as acts of war, and certainly as violations of the
foregoing stipulation.
22
Second Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Ghent, 1815)
The Treaty of Ghent found the British in
possession of Fort Mackinac (Michilimackinac),
which they had captured during the War of 1812,
but, as provided also in the first article, the place
was returned to the United States in 1815.^ The
British garrison withdrew to the mouth of the
St. Mary's Eiver and established itself on Drum-
mond Island, which was believed, at least by the
British commander, to be British territory. But
at this time the boundary between Canada and
the United States was still undefined, as left in the
Treaty of 1783. The Treaty of Ghent provided
for its definition by a commission of two members,
one to be appointed by his Britannic Majesty and
one by the President of the United States, by and
with the advice and consent of the Senate. The
commission was duly appointed, and decided,
among other questions, that Drummond Island
was not British but United States territory. This
took place at Utica, New York, on the 18th of
June, 1822. The decision was known to the com-
mander at Drummond Island before the end of
the year, but the post was not finally surrendered
1 . . . All territory, places, and possessions whatsoever, taken
by either party from the other during the war or which may be
taken after the signing of this treaty, . . . shall be restored
without delay, and without causing any destruction or carrying
away any of the artillery or other public property originally cap-
tured in the said forts or places and which shall remain therein
upon the exchange of the ratifications of this treaty, or any slaves
or other private property {Art. I, Treaty of Ghent).
23
Chapter II
to the United States until the 14th of November,
1828. The intervening delay of six years and five
months is a story of leisurely, formal procedure
on the part of Great Britain to decide upon a sub-
stitute for Drummond Island as a stronghold of
British influence among the Indians of the North-
west. By such procrastination she violated the
stipulation in Article I of the treaty, that all ter-
ritory, places, and possessions, taken by either
party from the other during the war, or which
might be taken after the signing of the treaty,
should be ** restored without delay." ^
By Article I of the treaty it was stipulated that
the British troops, in withdrawing from the
United States, should not carry away any slaves
or other private property whatever or any artil-
lery or other public property originally captured
in, and remaining in, any fort or place which the
treaty required to be restored to the United States,
Slaves were thus recognized as private property.
The prohibition against carrying away private
property was general, that against carrying away
public property was limited to captures made in
*'said forts or places." The British contended
that the prohibition as to private property was
also limited; that slaves not captured in any
I Drummond Island by S. F. Cook; The United States and Int.
Arhitr. by J. B. Moore; Treaties, Conventions, etc., by W. M.
Malloy.
24
Second Treaty of Peace (Treaty of Ghent, 1815)
fort or place which had to be restored to the
United States, or who were not in such fort or
place upon the exchange of ratifications, might be
carried away without violating the treaty, and
they accordingly carried away more slaves, it
would seem, than they did in 1783.^
By a convention which was ratified in 1819,2 it
was agreed to refer this question of interpreta-
tion ''to some friendly sovereign or state to be
named for that purpose and ... to consider the
decision of such friendly sovereign or state to be
final and conclusive on all the matter referred."
The arbiter selected was Emperor Alexander of
Eussia. He decided "that the United States of
America are entitled to a just indemnification
from Great Britain for all private property car-
ried away by the British forces ; and, as the ques-
tion regards slaves more especially, for all such
slaves as were carried away by the British forces,
from the places and territories of which the resti-
tution was stipulated by the treaty, in quitting the
said places and territories." The British min-
ister raised the question whether it applied to
slaves who, coming from places which had never
1 The United States was refunded for them in the sum of
$1,204,960 and the average value of slaves was fixed by an inter-
national commission at $280. This would make the number of
them over 4,000. (Convention of 1826 with Great Britain; Am.
Hist. Rev., July, 1914, p. 83).
2 Convention respecting Fisheries, Boundary, and the Eeetora-
tion of Slaves, Art. V.
25
Chapter II
been occupied by British troops, voluntarily.joined
the British forces. It was argued that these
slaves, though taken along, were not being carried
away from places or territories *'of which the
restitution was stipulated by the treaty." The
answer was expressed as follows: ''. . . ever
faithful to the grammatical interpretation of the
first article of the Treaty of Ghent, his Imperial
Majesty declares a second time that it appears to
him, according to this interpretation ; that in quit-
ting the places and territories of which the Treaty
of Ghent stipulates the restitution to the United
States, his Britannic Majesty's forces had no
right to carry away from these same places and
territories, any slave whatever, by whatever
means he may have fallen or come into their
power. ' '
The Emperor, besides rendering this decision,
offered to use his good offices as mediator in the
negotiations which must be undertaken to carry
it into effect. His offer was accepted and a con-
vention was concluded under his mediation.^
Convention for Indemnity Under Award of the
Emperor of Russia (1823)
The ratifications of this compact were exchanged
on the 10th of January, 1823. It provided for
iMoore'8 Digest of Intern. Law, V, 717.
26
Convention for Indemnity (1823)
the appointment of two commissioners and two
arbitrators; one commissioner and one arbitrator
to be appointed by the President of the United
States, by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate, and one commissioner and one arbitrator
to be appointed by his Britannic Majesty. The
resulting appointments were the following:
Commissioners
Great Britain George Jackson
United States Langdon Cheves
Arbitrators
Great Britain John MeTavish
United States Henry Seawell
The commissioners and arbitrators, acting as a
joint board, were to agree upon an average value
to be allowed for each sJayjB,--ior JsyiiLcli^ ind^^
cation miglit be due; thereupon the commissioners,
forming a board by themselves, or commission,
were to examine the claims for such indemnifica-
tion. The Secretary of State of the United States
was to furnish the commission a definite list of the
slaves and other private property for which the
citizens of the United States claimed indemnifi-
cation; it being understood and agreed that the
commission should not take cognizance of, nor re-
ceive any claims for, private property not con-
tained in said list, and that his Britannic Majesty
should not be required to compensate for any
27
Chapter II
claims not in said list. His Britannic Majesty-
engaged to have produced before the commission,
as material towards ascertaining the facts, all the
evidence of which his Majesty's government might
be in possession, by returns from his Majesty's
officers or otherwise, of the number of slaves car-
ried away.
The commission was ''required to go into an
examination of all the claims submitted, through
the above mentioned list, by the owners of slaves
or other property or by their lawful attorneys or
representatives, and to determine the same, re-
spectively, according to the merits of the several
cases." Article V read in part as follows: *'In
the event of the two commissioners not agreeing
in any particular case under examination, or of
their disagreement upon any question which may
result from the stipulations of this convention,
then and in that case, they shall draw by lot the
name of one of the two arbitrators, who after
having given due consideration to the matter con-
tested, shall consult with the commissioners; and
a final decision shall be given, conformably to the
opinion of the majority of the two commissioners
and of the arbitrator so drawn by lot. ..."
The joint board met and settled the value of the
average slave as $280.^ The two commissioners
proceeded to consider the several claims, but, in-
ilm. Hist. Rev., July, 1914, p. 837.
28
Convention for Indemnity (1828)
stead of agreeing, they developed irreconcilable
differences on the following points:
1. As to whether certain cases which had been
accidentally omitted from the stipulated list might
be added to it. These cases were not after-
thoughts. They had accompanied the list, but
through the inadvertence or misunderstanding of
the person who prepared it, were not entered on it.
2. As to the right of the claimants to interest
on the value of their slaves. Mr. Cheves held that
reasonable damages for the withholdment of a
right were necessary to compensate the sufferer
and that such damages were measured in the pres-
ent case by interest at the legal rate. Mr. Jack-
son contended that the value of the slaves was the
compensation to be made. This sum being fixed,
the only duty of the commissioners was to ex-
amine persons or receive depositions, as to the
number of them.
3. As to the right of the United States claim-
ants to examine documents introduced as evidence
by the British commissioner. Mr. Jackson re-
ceived from his government a mass of papers,
consisting of extracts from the log-books of the
vessels which had carried slaves away and other
documentary evidence. He refused to deliver
them to the commission, except on condition that
claimants should be denied inspection of them un-
til the testimony in their respective" cases should
29
Chapter 11
be closed. Mr. Cheves maintained that the claim-
ants were clearly entitled to inspect such evidence.
4. As to whether compensation was due for
slaves carried away from Dauphin Island, in Mo-
bile Bay. Mr. Jackson denied such obligation on
the ground that this territory was not lawfully
a part of the United States at the time of its evac-
uation, that it belonged to West Florida, which
was not ceded to the United States until 1819.
It will be seen from these differences that Mr.
Jackson, unlike his government in its construction
of the Treaty of Ghent, was for a strict, literal
interpretation of the Convention of 1823. Agree-
ing thereto, we may say, with respect to the points
of difference, that the first two seem to be de-
batable, that the last two are clearly against him,
and that they are all subject to arbitration under
the provisions of Article V. Mr. Cheves wished
to refer them to arbitration. Mr. Jackson may
have consented to settle the first two points in
this way, but he stood out against such settle-
ment as to the last two, on the grounds,
1. That the question of interest did not result
from the stipulations of the convention;
2. That Dauphin Island was not lawful territory
of the United States before 1819.
*'By the refusal of the British commissioner to
refer questions to the arbitrators, the provisions
of the convention for the settlement of differences
30
Convention for Indemnity (1823)
between the commissioners were rendered wholly
nugatory."^ The questions thus excluded from
arbitration did result from the stipulations of the
convention; their exclusion constituted therefore
a violation of that instrument.
The title of the United States to Dauphin Is-
land was derived, not from the treaty concluded
with Spain in 1819, for the cession of the Floridas,
but from the one concluded with France in 1803,
for the cession of Louisiana.^ Great Britain ques-
tioned its validity and refused to arbitrate it.
The matter, however, was unimportant, for the
question turned, not upon title, but upon posses-
sion. The provisions of the Treaty of Ghent ap-
plied to ''all territory, places and possessions,
taken by either party from the other during the
war.'* That Dauphin Island was in the posses-
sion of the United States and taken from them by
the British does not admit of any question.
Secretary Clay proposed that Great Britain
either compromise with the United States on a
lump sum, covering all items and all claims, or
instruct her commissioners "to execute the fifth
article of the Convention according to its true
intent and meaning." A refusal of this proposal
meant an appeal to the Emperor of Russia. Im-
pelled probably by distaste for the latter course,
1 Moore's Digest of Intern. Law.
2 Clay to Vaughn, Oct. 12, 1826.
31
Chapter II
she decided on a compromise. This was arranged
by another convention ratified in 1826, which fixed
the sum allowed at $1,204,960. It was carried into
effect by a commission, created by act of Congress
in 1827, twelve years after the original agreement,
within a year of the period in the case of the
Western posts, "after two treaties had been made,
and two arbitrations rendered, to explain the
meaning of the first treaty, and which fully ex-
plained itself. ' ' ^
The commission completed its labors and finally
adjourned on the 31st of August, 1828.
Rush-Bagot Agreement (1818)
With a view of preventing a recurrence of such
fighting and destruction of property as took place
on the Great Lakes between Canada and the
United States during the War of 1812, the United
States concluded with Great Britain an agreement
known as the Eush-Bagot Agreement. It limited
the vessels, on each side, allowed on the lakes to
the following:
On Lake Ontario — One vessel not exceeding 100
tons burden and armed with one 18-lb, cannon;
On the Upper Lakes — Two vessels not exceed-
ing like burden and armament;
On Lake Champlain — One vessel not exceeding
like burden and armament.
1 Benton's Thirty Tears' Tieiv, I, 90.
32
Rush-Bagot Agreement (1818)
All other armed vessels on these lakes were to
be forthwith dismantled and no other vessels were
to be built or armed on them.
This agreement was effected by an exchange of
notes, and was therefore not strictly a treaty. It
was, however, approved by the Senate on the 16th,
and proclaimed by President Monroe on the 28th
of April, 1818. It was observed by both parties
until 1838. From 1838, until about 1843, it was
violated by Great Britain. At first, this violation
seemed to the United States excusable, if not jus-
tifiable. Canada had an insurrection on her
hands with which an element of our population
on the Canadian border showed considerable sym-
pathy, going so far as to cooperate with the in-
surgents. But, as these troubles subsided, the |
British preparations made to meet them did not |
seem to our Government to be proportionately |
diminished. The United States consequently de- \
cided on retaliation. A sidewheel bark, with a \
registered tonnage of 498 tons and carrying six |
pieces of cannon (two 52-pounders and four 32- f
pounders) was built in parts at Pittsburgh, Penn- |
sylvania, taken across country by mule teams and I
canal boats to Erie, Pennsylvania, and put to-
gether and launched there on Lake Erie in 1843. |
This vessel has been on the lakes ever since. She |
was first named the Michigan, but on the construe- i
tion of a modern battleship of that name, was re- i
33 I
Chapter 11
named the Wolverine. On the 6th of May, 1912,
she was placed out of commission and assigned to
duty with the naval militia of Pennsylvania.
Since 1865 it seems to have been admitted that
the agreement did not preclude the maintenance
of a revenue service.^ In the winter of 1911-12,
the United States had on the lakes, besides reve-
nue cutters, six vessels. Only four were allowed.
The smallest of these numbered 542 and the larg-
est 1130 tons displacement. The largest tonnage
allowed was 100 tons burden or, say roughly, 140
tons displacement. All mounted more than one
gun, the number allowed. One of them, the Du-
buque, a gunboat, built in 1904, mounted six 4-inch
guns. The largest caliber allowed was 3.2 inches
(18-pounder). Most of these vessels went into the
lakes by way of the St. Lawrence River and the
Welland Canal, with the permission of the Cana-
dian Government and without armament, the lat-
ter being removed for the voyage and replaced
afterwards. But their presence on the lakes can-
not be reconciled with the terms of the Rush-
Bagot Agreement.
Convention Respecting Fisheries (1819)
In 1819 Great Britain concluded with the United
States a treaty allowing the inhabitants of the
United States to fish and dry and cure fish, on
1 Moore's Digest of Intern. Law, I, 696.
34
Convention Respecting Fisheries (1819)
certain parts of the coast of Newfoundland and
Labrador. When this treaty had been in satisfac-
tory operation about twenty years, it was inter-
preted so as not to allow of our fishing inside of
the bays or indents of the coast measured from
headland to headland. An armed naval force was
sent to sustain this claim and the United States
sent two war steamers to protect the rights of
American fishermen. The nations were thus on
the verge of war when their difference w;as settled
by a compromise effected by another treaty
(1854). But the provisions of the latter were
subject to termination after the expiration of ten
years, and they expired accordingly on the 17th
of March, 1866. New arrangements were made
by the Treaty of Washington, 1871, and subse-
quent agreements, but they gave rise to repeated
controversy. The matter was not settled to the
satisfaction of both countries until it was sub-
mitted to arbitration at The Hague in 1910.
Of the seven distinct questions into which it was
resolved, two were decided in part according to
the contentions of Great Britain and in part ac-
cording to those of the United States ; the remain-
ing five questions were decided according to the
contentions of the United States.^ The case of
the United States thus proved on the whole a con-
1 J. H. Latan^, Am. Journal of Int. Law, Jan., 1913, p. 19.
The last diplomatic step necessary to the completion and per-
fection of this award was taken in 1912.
35
Chapter II
siderably better one than that of Great Britain.
But the award seems to show violation of the
treaty by both parties.
36
Ill
The Clayton-Bulwee Treaty (1850)
Introduction. The Mosquito Coast
The Negotiations
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was primarily a
treaty of alliance between Great Britain and the
United States for the protection of a ship canal
to be constructed across Central America, as a line
of rapid transit between the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans. Each of the contracting nations had an
interest in such communication, but not the same
or an equal one. Great Britain could reach her
East Indian dependency, then under the govern-
ment of the East Indian Company, by the route
around Cape Good Hope in less time than she
could have done so by a canal through Central
America. She did have possessions on the west-
ern coast of North America, in China, and in the
Pacific Ocean, which would have been brought
nearer to her by such a waterway. But at that
time and for many years afterwards, she attached
little value to Canada, and, for the rest, she was
more than willing to trust to her command of the
37
Chapter III
seas, irrespectively of any transisthmian commu-
nication, for the security of her overseas posses-
sions. In California, the United States had not
an overseas but a continental possession, a coast
line, making the country a power on the Pacific as
it already was on the Atlantic. Its newly discov-
ered gold fields were attracting to it the adventur-
ous, enterprising spirits of the world. The dis-
tance between New York and San Francisco by
way of the Nicaraguan Canal would have been less
than half as long as it was by the usual route
around Cape Horn. The canal would have been
veryjmuchmore useful to the United States than
to Great Britain. Our ability to maintain the in-
tegrity of the national domain and secure the
legitimate advantages of our newly acquired pos-
sessions, seemed to depend upon water communi-
cation across the isthmus. That such should have
been the common belief of the people of that gen-
eration may seem strange to us in these days of
transcontinental railroads and telegraph lines, but
we must remember that to the people of that pe-
riod it was a grave question whether a railroad
could be constructed across the Eocky Mountains
and the Mississippi River. Many believed that, if
it were possible to build it, a railroad could not be
successfully operated over **The Great American
Desert, ' ' lying beyond the Mississippi River.*
1 Travis.
38
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850)
On the 25th of October, 1849, Colonel G. W.
Hughes, of the United States Topographical En-
gineers, chief engineer of the Panama Railroad,
said in answer to a request from John M. Clayton,
Secretary of State, for his views ''in reference to
the different projects which have been presented
to the public for a railroad from the Mississippi to
the Pacific, exclusively within the territories of the
United States":
I do not believe that such a road can ever become a
great commercial thoroughfare, and I much doubt if it
would, when completed, for a century to come, more than
pay for its expense.
Fourteen years after this the Union Pacific Rail-
road was begun and six years later it was com- 1
pleted. The money invested in its construction^
yielded a profit of 50 per cent.^ During the first
year of its operation, its operating expenses, in-
cluding taxes, consumed but 61.34 per cent, of its
gross earnings. The ratio of such expense to its
earnings during the first ten years of its opera-
tion was on an average 47 per cent.^
To understand the different views taken of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the questions of in-
terpretation to which it gave rise, it is necessary
to consider the course of events which led up to
1 The Union Pacific Railway by J. P. Davis.
2 iff is*, of Union Pac. Railway by H. K. White, p. 116.
39
Chapter HI
its negotiation. We may begin with the conquest
of the Aztecs by Fernando Cortez between 1519
and 1522.^ The domain of the Montezumas com-
prised a large part, but not all, of the territory
included in the present Republic of Mexico. It
did not include Yucatan. This and other prov-
inces south of Old Mexico were overcome sepa-
rately by lieutenants of Cortez. In 1527 they
were united to form the captain-generalcy of Gua-
temala, comprising the five provinces of Yucatan,
Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica,
and the former Mexican provinces of Chiapas and
Soconusco. In 1540 this captain-generalcy was
united with that of Mexico to form the vice-royalty
of New Spain, but it remained virtually independ-
ent of the latter under the direct control of the
Council of the Indies at Seville.
Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centu-
ries the waters and coasts of the Caribbean Sea
were infested with pirates and freebooters of
nearly every nationality, but predominantly Brit-
lish. These outlaws usually made common cause
against Spain, then sovereign on those coasts ; and
the injuries they inflicted on her were a source of
1 In the preparation of this historical sketch of Central Amer-
ica, I have drawn upon the Orande EncyclopMie ; Les Cinq Ri-
publiques latines de VAmerique Centrale, by Count Maurice de
P6rigny; Resena histdrica de Centra- America by Lorenzo Mon-
ttifar, and the admirable studies: British Rule in Central Amer-
ica and History of the Clnyton-Bulwer Treaty, by I. D. Travis
and Anglo-American Isthmdan Diplomacy by Mary W. Williams.
40
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1850)
ill-disguised satisfaction to the nations jealous of
the wealth and power she derived from her ex-
tensive possessions in the New World.
In harmony with the universal policy of the
time, Spain sought to maintain a rigid monopoly
iof the resources of her American possessions. In
opposition to this purpose, the buccaneers estab-
lished permanent stations on the mainland and
within the territory held by Indian tribes that
were friendly to them and hostile to Spain. These
furnished them food and assisted them in their
depredations.
Prior to the conquest of Jamaica by the English
in 1655, the buccaneers operated on their own
responsibility. After that the Government of
England not only connived at their lawless ag-
gressions, but through the governors of Jamaica
became in a measure responsible for them. Fre-
quently the governors gave aid to the expeditions
and shared in their profits. As the wealth of
Spain diminished and her power declined, this
state of affairs gradually passed away. The
rights of peaceful commerce received more con-
sideration. It was no longer possible for gov-
ernors of Jamaica to openly abet piratical raids.
It became necessary for the buccaneers to change
their vocation. Many of them settled down to
wood cutting. But they were not suddenly trans-
formed from pirates into peaceful, law-abiding
41
Chapter III
settlers. One of the stages of development
through which they passed in their evolution from
the outlaw, pure and simple, to the more or less
civilized and peaceful frontiersman, was that of
smuggler. To get around the law by which this
vocation was prohibited and penalized, they re-
sorted to various expedients. One of these was
to take some tribe, within the Spanish territory,
under British protection. In the territory of a
people thus allied to England, British subjects
could carry on an extensive trade in the name of
their chief or king. When once this relation was
established there was no redress for Spain but by
force of arms.
The Mosquito Coast
There is on the eastern coast of Central Amer-
ica between Cape Honduras on the north and a
point of indefinite location on the south, a tract
of low, swampy, unhealthy ground, which perhaps
for three hundred years has borne the name of
Mosquitia, Mosquito, or the Mosquito Coast or
Shore (Map 1). The name is derived from a tribe
of Indians called Moscos by the Spaniards, Mous-
tica by the buccaneers, and Mosquitos by the
British.!
The Mosquitos were composed chiefly of Sam-
1 This name has no relation to the insect Mosquito. It is
thought to have originated in the Spanish word moaca, fly.
42
The Mosquito Coast
bos (Negroes crossed with Indians) and the off-
spring of whites by Indian, Negro, or Sambo
women. They may under primitive conditions
have numbered about 5000. They occupied but a
small portion of the Mosquito Shore, extending
little if at all below the Eiver Mico. In 1687 their
head man submitted himself to the governor of
Jamaica and in 1720 signed a convention or treaty
with that official. In 1740 British forces, in vio-
lation of the sovereignty of Spain, occupied the
Mosquito Coast, for his protection. In the mean-
time he had been commissioned king by the gov-i
ernor of Jamaica. British officers were sent to
Bluefields,^ the capital of the Mosquito Coast, to
look after the interests of the British and give
counsel to the Indian Government ; in other words,
to rule in the name of the so-called king for the
benefit of Great Britain.
Spain remonstrated against these usurpations,
but to little purpose. Great Britain promised to
remedy them, but under one pretext or another
managed not to do so. More frequently she de-
nied the right of Spain to any dominion on the
coast, on the ground that the Mosquitos consti-
tuted an independent nation which had never been
subject to the crown of Spain. Spain always in-
sisted that the Mosquito Coast was a part of her
lawful possessions in Central America. Thus
1 Spelt also Blewfields.
43
Chapter III
the dispute continued until it constituted one of
the causes of the war between England and Spain
about the middle of the eighteenth century (Seven
Years' War). By the treaty of peace, concluded
in 1763, it was stipulated that Great Britain should
abandon the Mosquito Coast, withdrawing her
settlers from it. But she did not withdraw them.
Her violation of this treaty was a factor in de-
termining Spain to take up arms against her dur-
ing the,.Aniej?ican War of Independence. ByThe
Treaty of 1783 it was stipulated that within eight-
een months from its ratification, the British set-
tlers should retire to the territory assigned to
the settlement of Belize (British Honduras), with-
drawing from the Spanish continent and islands.^
But the eighteen months passed away and neither
stipulation was carried out.
On the 5th of January, 1785, the king of Spain
issued the following declaration :
The Mosquito Indians situated in one of the provinces
of Guatemala have been vassals of the crown of Spain
since the conquest and subjection of those dominions,
and although at times they rebelled with the aid and in-
stigation of various English adventurers who were sur-
reptitiously establishing themselves therein, . . . they
1 . . . tous les Anglais qui pourraient se trouver disperses par-
tout ailleurs, soit sur le continent espagnol, soit sur les ties
quelconques, d^pendantes du susdit continent espaanol, et par
telle raison quo ce fut, sans exception, se r4uniront dans le can-
ton qui vient d' etre circonscrit [Belize] dans le terme de dix-
huit mois, a compter de V^change des ratifications.
44
The Mosquito Coast
have repeatedly petitioned to return to the dominion of
Spain and it was finally conceded to them that they be
graciously admitted to the reconciliation which they de-
sired.^
But Great Britain would not admit that the Mos-
quito Coast was included in the definition ''Span-
ish Continent. ' ' ^ The consequence was a treaty
concluded in 1786, which provided that all British
subjects and other settlers who had enjoyed the
protection of Great Britain should ''evacuate the
country of the Mosquitos" and the "Continent in
general," beyond the boundary agreed upon for
British Honduras, within a period of six months.^
About the middle of 1787 this evacuation was\
nearly accomplished, but it was never completed. J
With the assistance of the few Englishmen who'
remained, the British Government easily con-
trived to preserve and even strengthen its hold
on the country. A Mosquito flag was formed
with the British Union Jack in the upper canton,
the remainder consisting of alternate blue and
white horizontal stripes, with a crown in the lower
canton.
One of the foremost authorities on Central
America says;
The name (Mosquito Shore) was always purely geo-
1 Montufar, opus cit., IV, 99.
2 Hist, of Cent. Am., II, 606. Bancroft.
3 These treaties, 1763, 1783, 1786 or extracts thereof, are pub-
lished in Sen. Ex. Doc. IH, 47 Cong., 1 sess. (1882).
45
Chapter III
graphical and never conveyed or was intended to convey
any idea of political separation from the rest of Central
America. From the frequent mention of late years, of a
personage styled the King of the j\Iosquitos, some portion
of the public may have fallen into the error of supposing
that what are called the Mosquito Indians do really rec-
ognize and obey some such potentate. Nothing could be
farther from the truth. No form of government ewer ex-
isted among these people, except such as was vested in
their local head men, or chiefs, who have often been at
variance and in open hostility among themselves. Some
of these have assumed the title of governor, others of
general, admiral, etc. . . . without however, having the
slightest comprehension of the meaning of the terms.
When the English superintendent of Belize found it con-
venient to manufacture a King on the Mosquito Shore, a
number of these head men were got together and by lib-
eral appliance of rum, induced to fix their marks to a
paper, which was afterward produced as an "act of al-
legiance" to a Sambo selected for the purpose by the
English agents. But the chiefs neither understood what
they did nor regarded it afterwards. The fiction, how-
ever, answered its purpose.^
The following text may be taken as typical of
such acts of allegiance:
Sire:
Whereas by an appointed meeting of the most princi-
pal inhabitants commanding the different townships of
Southeastern Mosquito Shore, from the confines of Wanks
River to Buckatora Lagoon inclusive, commanded by
Prince Stephen, King regent of the above shore, held at
Woolang on the 14th of November and year of our Lord
X Notes on Central America, etc., by E. G. Squier, pp. 361, 365.
46
The Mosquito Coast
1815, in behalf of giving our assent, consent, choice and
declaration to, for and of, the said hereditary prince
Frederic, to be our lawful King and Sovereign, and we
whose names are hereunto subscribed do give our assent,
consent, choice and declaration to, for and of, the said
hereditary Prince Frederic, to be our lawful King and
sovereign.
The Mosquito kings were crowned at Belize or
Jamaica. British officials annually visited the
Mosquito Coast and distributed presents among
the Indian inhabitants.
By a treaty of 1814 with Spain, Great Britain
was expressly excluded from the country of the
Mosquitos, the continent in general, and the islands
adjacent without exception. This treaty was in
force when Mexico and Guatemala declared their
independence from Spain, Mexico on the 24th of
February and Guatemala on the 14th of Septem-
ber, 1821. Guatemala consisted at this time of
the five provinces of Guatemala, Honduras, Sal-
vador, Nicaragua, and Costa Eica, and the former
Mexican provinces of Chiapas and Soconusco.
She soon lost the province of Salvador, and, thus
reduced, united herself with Mexico. On the 1st
of July, 1823, she separated from Mexico, in which
act she was joined by Salvador. On the 17th of
December, 1823, she became a, republic.^ On the
22nd of November, 1824, her national assembly
1 Resena, hist6rica de Centra- America by Lorenzo Montlifar,
Vol. I., Dedication.
47
Chapter 111
completed the task of framing a constitution, but
in the meantime, the province of Chiapas had re-
united itself to Mexico.^ The new republic took
the name of La Federacion de Centro- America,
, which literally translated would be The Federa-
\tion of Center America. Our Government dealt
with it originally as the ** Federation of the Cen-
tre of America. " ^ It later applied other desig-
nations to it until its dissolution, which may be
considered as taking place on the 1st of February,
1839.^
The province, afterwards state, of Los Altos,
was formed in 1838 by secession from Guatemala,
but was reunited with the latter on the 8th of
May, 1849. Except for the brief period covered
by the separate existence of Los Altos, during
which there were six component provinces, the
federation consisted of the five provinces of Guate-
mala, Honduras, Salvador, Nicaragua, and Costa
Rica.
During the existence of the federation, the term
Guatemala should have been applied only to the
province of that name, and after its dissolution
only to the independent State which that province
became. But the federation itself was not un-
1 Fullarton's Gazetteer of the World. Article "Central Amer-
ica." Soconiisco was taken possession of by Mexico in 1843,
under protest from Guatemala (Baily).
2 Treaty signed Dec. 5, 1825.
^ Efemkrides, etc., by Alejandro Marure, p. 48.
48
The Mosquito Coast
commonly designated on maps as Guatemala or
.Guatimala, and after its dissolution that designa-
tion was occasionally applied to the territory
which it had occupied.
Other names applied to the federation or to
the territory pertaining or which had pertained,
to it were : Central Provinces of America (Lon-
don, 1825) ; Republic of the Centre (Clay to Wil-
liams, Feb. 10, 1826) ; Republic of Central America
(Clay to House, Mch. 14, 1826) ; Federal Repub-
lic of Central America (Canal Contract, June 14,
1826) ; Central Government of America (De Witt
Clinton to Gr. Van Rensselaer and others, Oct. 6,
1826) ; United Provinces of Central A^nerica
(New York, 1828); United States of Central
America (Guatemala, 1834) ; ^ Central States of
America (London, 1836, 1838) ; Confederacy of
Central America (Clayton to Lawrence, Oct. 20th,
1849).
The term ''Central America" by itself was
rarely used to designate the political unit, the
federation of Centre America. It was taken or-
dinarily in a geographical sense and applied to a
section of America extending, as commonly un-
derstood, from the Isthmus of Tehuantepec on the
north to the Isthmus of Panama or of Darien on
the south. Other geographical names for this re-
gion were the American Isthmus, the Isthmus of
America, the Great American Isthmus, the Great
iBy Frederick Chatfield, British Consul-General.
49
Chapter III
Central American Isthmus. Central America
was commonly included in North America and
yet referred to as 'Hhe isthmus which connects
North and South America."^ The Isthmus of
Panama was also, but exceptionally, represented
as connecting North and South America.^
The Spanish for Central America is not Cen-
tro-America, but America Central, which was more
or less used in distinction from Centro- America,
as Central America was or should have been used,
in distinction from Centre America.^
By 1830 Great Britain's nominal protectorate
over the Mosquitos had developed into a practical
control of their affairs.
From about this time — out of respect, it would
seem, for the Central American republic — her in-
terference in the affairs of the Mosquitos became
less active. But with the dissolution of the fed-
eral republic came a series of encroachments, more
iSen. Resol, Mch. 3, 1835; Hughes to Clayton, Oct. 25, 1849;
Taylor's Mess, to Cong., Dec. 4, 1849; Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
Art. VIII.
2 Chambers's Information for the People, Edinburgh, 1842, p.
337.
3 This may be illustrated by the following quotation from a
work published in 1851: El pais que lleva actualmente el nombre
de Republica de Costa Rica, es aquella porcion de la America
Central qve se extiende entre Nicaragva y Panama; banandola
de un lado el Oceano Pacifico y del orto el Oceana Atldntico.
Provincia en un tiempo del Reino de Guatemala, y luego Estado
de la Federacion de Centro- America, se hizo enteramente inde-
pendiente desde que se extinguid el Gobierno General de aquella
Federacion por los atlos 1838 a ISJfO. . . . {Bosquejo de la
Republica de Costa Rica by Felipe Molino, p. 9.)
50
The Mosquito Coast
arrogant and offensive than those of any former
period. On the 12th of August, 1841, the super-
intendent of the British settlement at Belize landed
at San Juan del Norte accompanied by the King
of the Mosquitos, dragged from his office the
Nicaraguan commandant of the port. Colonel
Quijano, carried him off, and abandoned him on
an uninhabited coast. The object of this outrage
was to assert the majesty of the Indian King as
sovereign over the Mosquito Coast, including the
mouths of the San Juan.^
Mr. Chatfield, the British consul-general in Cen-
tral America, wrote to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs of Nicaragua (October 24, 1843) :
About the year 1687, the Duke of Albemarle being
governor of Jamaica, the Mosquito Indians made formal
cession of their territory to the King of England.^
In this pretention Mr, Chatfield was not sup-
ported by his Government. Great Britain did not
claim the Mosquito Territory as belonging to her.
She held that it belonged to the Mosquitos as an
independent people and even this point she did
not press unless it was contested.
In the same letter, Chatfield alleged that the
place from which Colonel Quijano had been re-
moved was not Nicaraguan, but Mosquito Terri-
tory; that he, Chatfield, had represented to the
1 Montfifar, opus oit., IV, 93.
2 Translated from the Spanish. MontGfar, opus cit., IV, 102.
51
Chapter III
governor-general of Central America the exist-
ence of the Mosquito nation and the circumstance
that Great Britain would not view with indiffer-
ence the usurpation of the territory of a monarch
with which she was in close relation, and that
Spain herself had recognized the Mosquito nation
on the occasion of a visit made by Prince Esteban
to San Salvador and Guatemala.^
The Nicaraguan minister contested that Mos-
quito was not a State, that to be a State it would
have to be sovereign, and that the Mosquitos had
not that quality .2 . . .
He quoted the following paragraphs from the
Constitution of Nicaragua :
Article 5, Constitution of 1824,
The territory of the Republic [of Center America] is
the same as that formerly constituting the old kingdom
of Guatemala, excepting for the present, the province of
Chiapas.
Article 2, Constitution of 1838.
The territory of the State [of Nicaragua] is the same
as that which formerly constituted the Province of Nic-
aragua, Its limits are: on the East and Northeast, the
Sea of the Antilles [Caribbean Sea] ; on the North and
Northwest, the State of Honduras; on the East and
South, the Pacific Ocean ; and on the Southeast, the State
of Costa Rica. The lines of demarcation between the
adjoining states shall be defined by a law which shall
form part of the constitution.
iChatfield to Orosco, Oct. 24, 1842.
2 Montfifar, opus cit., IV, 99.
52
The Mosquito Coast
*'It is thus proved," said the minister, **that
neither Spain, nor Central America, nor Nicara-
gua has ever recognized a Mosquito State or ter-
ritory, with the people and States of which they
cultivated harmony with a view to civilizing
them, for which reason the courtesies paid the
Spanish authorities to the Mosquito whom you
call Prince, cannot be construed as a recognition
of him. ..."
The relation established between the Mosquito
Indians and the British Government *' could not
have secured to England more than the paltry
trade she might have carried on with a horde of
savages whose purchases consisted at the most of
a few rustic implements, and could by no means
have given her the preeminent rights of a close alli-
ance. ' ' ^
In 1843 a British diplomatic and consular agent
was accredited to Mosquito.^ This functionary,
as adviser of the alleged sovereign, was the power
behind the throne. The reestablishment of British
dominion over the Mosquito Coast may be consid-
ered as dating from his appointment.
In 1845, Lord Aberdeen, on behalf of Sir Eobert
1 Orosco to Chatfield. Monttifar, op. cit., IV, 100-106.
2 When Great Britain determined to resume her dominion over
the Mosquito Shore, in the name of a protectorate, is not known
with any degree of certainty in the United States. The first
information on the subject in the Department of State at Wash-
ington was contained in a despatch of the 20th January, 1842
(Buchanan to Clarendon, Jan. 6, 1854).
53
Chapter III
Peel's Government, set up a claim to San Juan
as belonging to the Mosquitos.^ It was probably
in answer thereto that Nicaragua took forcible
possession of the place in 1846. She declined to
participate with Great Britain in the determina-
tion of the territory pertaining to the Mosquitos.
As a consequence Lord Palmerston, in 1847, sent
an instruction to all the diplomatic and other
agents of the Crown in Central America and the
adjacent countries, requiring them to report * ' what
authentic information they could obtain as to the
boundaries claimed by the King of Mosquito" and
also what in their opinion was ' ' the line of bound-
ary which her Majesty's Government should insist
upon as essential for the security and well-being
of the Mosquito State." The two resulting
boundaries, one claimed by the King of the Mos-
quitos and one asserted by the British Govern-
ment, are shown on the Map of Central America
by James Wyld, which is reproduced in Senate
Executive Documents, No. 75, First Session, Fifty-
first Congress. Among the few other authentic
maps showing either of these boundaries are
Baily's and one published by the United States
Coast Survey, in March, 1856. The Mosquito
Shore, with a western boundary line, appears in
a map by Desmadryle Juc, published in Paris in
1830.
1 Quart. Bev., XCIX. Article by H. L. Bulwer.
54
The Mosquito Coast
There are several maps of the Mosquito country
(about 1758) in the Spanish Archives at Madrid;
on one of these (No. 49 in the Catalogue) the in-
land boundary is traced in a yellow line.^
Great Britain informed Nicaragua and the other
States bordering on the '^ Kingdom of Mosquito"
that she considered the King of Mosquito to be
entitled to the extent of coast reaching from Cape
Honduras to the River San Juan.^
Up to that period, however, and among geographers
generally, the Mosquito Shore was understood only as
comprehending the coast lying between Cape Gracias
a Dios and Bluefields Lagoon, including the latter; that
is to say, between the 12th and 15th degrees of north
latitude, a distance of about 200 miles. The attempts
which have been made to apply the name to a greater
extent of shore have had their origin in strictly political
considerations.^
In October, 1847, the Nicaraguan Government
replied to the British communication that it did
not recognize any king of Mosquito, or any such
territorial pretensions ; and formally laid claim to
the northern coast and the port of San Juan as
a part of its own dominion, declaring that it would
regard as war on the part of the British any oc-
1 Relacion descriptiva, de los Mapas, Pianos, etc., de la Audi-
eneia y Capitania general de Guatemala (Guatemala, San Sal-
vador, Honduras, Nicaragua, y Costa Rica) existentes en el
Archive general de Indias by P. T. Lanzas, Chief of Archives.
2 Appendix A.
3 The States of Central America by E. G. Squier, pp. 629, 630.
55
Chapter III
cupation of the port of San Juan effected by the
Mosquitos under British protection. The council
of state of Mosquito responded to this defiance
by a resolution to establish the rights of sover-
eignty of the King of Mosquito over all the mouths
of San Juan and over the navigation of the lower
part of that river, on the appearance of the first
British ship of war having orders to cooperate
with the Mosquito Government. On the 8th of De-
cember, 1847, the name San Juan was anglicized
as Greytown after Sir Charles Grey, Governor
of Jamaica, by direction of the King in Council.^
Soon after this her Majesty's ships Alarm and
Vixen arrived off Bluefields, and on the 1st of
January, 1848, a British force proceeded to oc-
cupy San Juan.2 It met with no resistance, but
its action gave rise, two days later, to the follow-
ing protest :
The supreme government of the sovereign State of
Nicaragua has done me the honor to entrust me with a
commission to enter upon friendly communication with
the British Agent who may present himself at this port,
for the purpose of avoiding the violent occupation of it
by the troops under his command, under the pretended
right which is sought to be alleged in favor of a chief
of the tribes of Mosquitos, who under the title of King,
without being recognized, is supported by the English
force to which at present there is no equal force in this
port to offer opposition, ... I protest against the viola-
1 The Gate of the Pacific by Bedford Pim, p. 61.
2 FuUarton's Gazetteer, Article "Mosquito Territory."
56
The Mosquito Coast
tion and outrage inflicted on the rights of the state, and
I make its authors responsible in the face of the civilized
world, for the effusion of blood which such an act must
cause, as well as for the loss, damage, and injury which
public and mercantile interests, national and foreign,
may suffer, the loss of vessels, cattle, and other agricul-
tural produce, goods, etc.
To this communication the British agent and
consul-general sent the following reply:
Vixen, St. John's,
Jan. 3, 1848.
Sir:
As your government had invested you with no power
to recognize the authority of the King of Mosquito at the
mouth of the St. John's or to enter into any amicable
arrangements for a mutual and beneficial intercourse be-
tween the port and the interior, and more particularly as
you refused to admit the right of the King to be recog-
nized as an independent Prince, you removed all basis
for negotiations.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the King's
right could be disputed and that the Spanish Sovereigns
had a right of dominion, from absolute possession, over
the territory in question, it would appear that that right
devolved upon New Granada ^ rather than upon Central
America, for under the colonial regime, the jurisdiction
over this territory . . . was finally restored to New
Granada by Royal letters patent dated 30th November,
1803.2
1 Present Colombia.
2 Order of the King of Spain, Nov. 30, 1803. "The King has
57
Chapter III
Therefore if the right of the Spanish sovereigns was
valid, so also is that of New Granada; and consequently
the pretension of Central America is arbitrary and
null.
The jurisdiction of the Mosquito Coast was not'
''restored" to New Granada, but was for the first
time vested in that vice-royalty, by the royal order
of 1803 ; and the object of this transfer was better
to secure the country against the very thing which
Great Britain was trying to fasten upon it, British
dominion. Whether the Mosquito Coast belonged
to New Granada or to Nicaragua, it did not be-
long either to Great Britain or to the Mosquitos.
Its later history and present status would seem
to justify the claims of ownership made by Nicara-
gua.
On the 8th of January, 1848, the Nicaraguan
forces retook the port of San Juan. They might
then have been left in possession of it, but for
the apprehension of another danger. On the day
that it became known at Vera Cruz that a treaty
of peace had been signed by which California and
New Mexico were transferred to the United
States,^ a British fleet set sail from Vera Cruz, and
resolved that the Islands of Saint Andrg and the part of the
Mosquito Shore comprised between Cape Gracias t Dios and the
Chagres River [boundary between Guatemala and Santa F4, or
New Mexico! shall be separated from the government of Guate-
mala and incorporated in the vice-royalty of Santa F6."
1 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, concluded Feb. 2, 1848; rati-
fication exchanged May 30, 1848.
58
The Mosquito Coast
proceeded to the mouth of the San Juan River.
On the 12th of January it took possession of the
town and established British authority over it in
the name of the Mosquito Indians. A force
marched inland to the Lake of Nicaragua, where,
on the 7th of March, a treaty was concluded be-
tween Great Britain and Nicaragua. The first
article provided for the return of the prisoners
taken by the Nicaraguan forces on the 8th of
January. Article III was worded as follows :
The Mosquito flag and other effects taken in the same
port on the same day shall be returned immediately ; and
as the officer commanding His Majesty's forces desires
to obtain from the government of Nicaragua a satisfac-
tory explanation of the outrage which the said com-
mander thinks to have been perpetrated upon the British
flag by the lowering of the Mosquito flag which is under
its protection, the government of Nicaragua declares,
"that it did not know that the Mosquito flag stood in
such relation to that of England that an outrage upon
the former involved an outrage upon the English flag;
and that far from intending to insult the latter power,
it earnestly desires to cultivate the most amicable rela-
tions with that government."
In Articles III and IV, Nicaragua promised not
to disturb the peaceful inhabitants of San Juan
and that no custom house should be established
in the neighborhood of that port. But the treaty
did not cede to Great Britain any Nicaraguan
territory or acknowledge her title or that of the
Mosquito King to any part of it.
59
Chapter III
In the meantime the United States had taken
action in anticipation of British encroachment for
increasing its political influence in Central Amer-
ica.
In 1846 it signed with New Granada a treaty
looking to the construction of a canal across the
Isthmus of Panama, which was ratified in 1848.
This was the first diplomatic transaction by which
the Government of the United States acquired
treaty rights and assumed treaty obligations in
reference to an isthmian canal. It contained
among others the following provisions :
Article XXXV. . . . The government of New Gra-
nada guarantees to the government of the United States
that the right of way of transit across the Isthmus of
Panama upon any modes of communication that may now
exist, or that may be hereafter constructed, shall be
open and free to the government and citizens of the
United States . . . the United States guarantee, posi-
tively and efficaciously, to New Granada, by the present
stipulation, the perfect neutrality of the before-men-
tioned isthmus, with the view that the free transit from
the one to the other sea may not be interrupted or em-
barrassed in any future time while this treaty exists;
and in consequence, the United States also guarantee,
in the same manner, the rights of sovereignty and prop-
erty with New Granada has and possesses over the said
territory.
In 1849 the United States obtained a concession
from New Granada for the construction of the
Panama Kailroad.
60
The Mosquito Coast
The British took alarm, fearing that the active,
audacious, and enterprising Yankees would ac-
quire other privileges in the strip of land uniting
the two continents.^ For the piercing, however,
of the latter, the most practicable route seemed
to be not the Isthmus of Panama but the system
of rivers, lakes, and lowlands which connected
the harbor of San Juan on the Atlantic with the
Bay of Fonseca or the harbor of Eealejo on the
Pacific. From the sea up to the Machuca Rap-
ids, about thirty miles, the San Juan River was
in dispute between Nicaragua on one side and
Great Britain (or the Mosquitos) and New Gra-
nada on the other. Another portion of it was in
dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The
Bay of Fonseca was partly under the jurisdiction
of Honduras and partly under that of Nicaragua.
So in negotiating for this canal the United States
would or might have to deal with the following
States: New Granada, Nicaragua, Costa Rica,
and Honduras, to say nothing of the Mosquitos
and Great Britain.
The British-Mosquito occupation of San Juan
made that place virtually a British dependency,
blocking the western terminus of the interoceanic
transit. In the negotiation of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, the United States and Great Britain aimed
primarily at two different objects: the United
1 Union latino-americana by Torres-Caicedo, p. 74.
61
Chapter III
States at the realization of interoceanic water com-
munication and Great Britain at the obstruction
of the apprehended expansion of the United
States in Central America. By force of arms
Great Britain held the key to the situation at
San Juan, and by her position in the Mosquito
country, in British Honduras, in the Bay Islands,
and in Jamaica was capable of prompt and vig-
orous action in the retention and utilization of
that advantage. For the problem thus presented
to the United States there were two natural solu-
tions: the complete and absolute withdrawal by
Great Britain from every position that she held
in those territories, or her effectual inhibition from
using any such position to oppose the free, un-
obstructed use of the canal or the expansion of the
United States.
The solution which President Polk decided upon
and sought through his secretary of state, James
Buchanan, to bring about was a sort of compro-
mise. It was to induce or compel the British to
abandon their protectorate over the Mosquito In-
dians, thereby ceasing to obstruct the construc-
tion of the canal and surrendering much of their
power to command or threaten the route adopted
for it. Whether to act directly upon Great Brit-
ain or to influence her indirectly through the
States of Central America, was still a question
when, on the 3d of June, 1848, Buchanan wrote to
62
The Mosquito Coast
the United States agent in Central America, Mr.
Elijah Hise, charge d'affaires:
Whilst it is our intention to maintain our established
policy of non-intervention in the concerns of foreign na-
tions, you are instructed, by your counsel and advice,
should suitable occasions offer, to promote the reunion
of the states which formed the federation of Central
America. In a federal union among themselves consist
their strength. They will thus avoid domestic dissen-
tions and render themselves respected by the world.
These truths you can impress upon them by the most
powerful argument. . . .
I have no doubt that the dissolution of the Confed-
eracy of Central America has encouraged Great Britain
in her encroachments upon the territories of Honduras,
Nicaragua and Costa Kica, under the mask of protect-
ing the so-called Kingdom of the Mosquitos. . . . Her
purpose is probably to obtain the control of the route for
a railroad and canal between the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans by the way of Lake Nicaragua. . . .
The government of the United States has not yet de-
termined what course it will pursue in regard to the en-
croachments of the British government as protector of
the King and Kingdom of the Mosquitos, but you are in-
structed to obtain all the information within your power
upon the nature and extent of these encroachments and
communicate it with the least possible delay to this de-
partment. We are also desirous to learn the number
of the Mosquito tribe, the degree of civilization they
have attained and everything else concerning them.
. . . you may inform the secretary of state of Guate-
mala that you are empowered to negotiate a treaty with
his government, . . .
63
Chapter III
You are herewith furnished with a full power to con-
clude a treaty of commerce with the Republic of San
Salvador, Similar treaties with the other states of Cen-
tral America would probably be useful in fostering our
trade with them, and in protecting our citizens who may
visit or reside in their territories. It is not, however,
deemed advisable to empower you to conclude a treaty
with either Nicaragua, Honduras or Costa Rica, until
you shall have communicated to the department more full
and authentic information in regard to those states than
that which it now possesses. You will accordingly be
diligent in collecting this information, which it would be
desirable that the department should receive without any
delay which can be avoided.
In spite of the injunction not to treat with Hon-
duras, Nicaragua, or Costa Eica, Hise took it on
himself to negotiate a commercial treaty with
Honduras and both a commercial and a canal
treaty with Nicaragua. The canal treaty, which
became known as the Hise-Selva Treaty, guaran-
teed the neutrality of Nicaragua. It was signed
on the 21st of June, 1849.i
In the meantime a new administration under
President Taylor, with John M. Clayton as Sec-
retary of State, had been inaugurated at Wash-
ington.
In his first annual message to Congress, De-
cember 4, 1848, President Taylor said:
Having ascertained that there is no prospect of the
i/Sfe». Ex. Doo. 194, 47 cong. 1 sees., p. 41.
64
The Mosquito Coast
reunion of the five states of Central America which
formerly composed the Republic of that name, we have
separately negotiated with some of them, treaties of
amity and commerce which will be laid before the senate.
A contract having been concluded by a company com-
posed of American citizens for the purpose of construct-
ing a ship canal through the territory of that state to
connect the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, I have directed
the negotiation of a treaty with Nicaragua, pledging both
governments to protect those who shall engage in and
perfect the work. . . .
The Hise-Selva Treaty was never submitted to
the Senate. Mr. Hise was recalled, and Mr. E.
G. Squier was appointed as his successor. On
the 3rd of September, 1849, Mr. Squier, acting
under instructions from the Department of State,
concluded a new treaty, by which the United
States guaranteed, not the sovereignty of Nicara-
gua, but the neutrality of the canal; and secured
for the citizens of the United States the exclu-
sive right of its construction and operation. The
treaty recognized Nicaragua as sovereign of the
route chosen for the canal, thus contravening the
contention of Great Britain that a considerable
and vitally important part of it was under the
sovereignty of the Mosquitos. This treaty was
subsequently (March 19, 1850) sent to the Sen-
ate for its advice and consent as to ratification,
but it was never acted 6n.
Mr. Squier sought also by timely negotiation
65
Chapter III
to anticipate any attempt on the part of Great
Britain to close the western as she had closed
the eastern end of the route. By a protocol signed
the 28th of September, 1849, with the plenipoten-
tiary of Honduras,^ he obtained from that State
an option on Tigre Island, a commanding posi-
tion in the Bay of Fonseca. The British agent
in Central America, Mr. Frederick Chatfield, tried
to counter this diplomacy with violence. On the
16th of October he had the island occupied by a
British force. Squier protested. The British
force was withdrawn and the island restored to
Honduras, by order of Admiral Hornby, com-
manding the British fleets in the West Indies.
Later both Chatfield and Squier were rebuked by
their Governments for the parts which they had
played in the affair. Clayton, through the United
States minister in London, demanded a disavowal
of the act of occupation, which, after some delay,
was given, but not in a satisfactory manner.^
Had Chatfield left the United States in its op-
tional control of Tigre Island, the effect would
have been at the most to prevent Great Britain
from constructing the canal herself, which she
did not want to do. It would not have removed
the British obstruction at San Juan or have made
it possible for the United States to construct the
1 Appendix B.
2 Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy bv M. W. Williams, p.
66.
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
canal itself, which the United States did Want
to do. Blocking the work was more disconcerting
to the United States than it was to Great Britain.
The latter, as mistress of San Juan, had nothing
to fear from any obstruction of the route else-
where. She could confidently look forward to a
proposal from the United States for a joint un-
dertaking. This would furnish her the opportu-
nity she wanted to impose conditions on the United
States, preventing or restricting its expansion in
Central America.
Mr. Clayton was willing to accept war with
Great Britain if that were necessary to the con-
struction and use of an interoceanic railroad or
canal, but he would not go that length to have it
a purely American one. He accordingly proposed
to the British Government through our minister
at London, a joint enterprise under joint control,
indicating in the following terms that, if his propo-
sition were declined, the United States would pro-
ceed with the enterprise independently of Great
Britain.
If however, the British Government shall reject these
overtures on our part and shall refuse to cooperate with
us in the generous and philanthropic scheme of rendering
the interoceanic communication by way of the port and
river San Juan, free to all nations upon the same terms,
we shall deem ourselves justified in protecting our in-
terests independently of her aid and despite her opposi-
tion and hostility. With a view to this alternative we
67
Chapter III
have a treaty with the State of Nicaragua, a copy of
which has been sent to you, and the stipulations of which
you should unreservedly impart to Lord Palmerston.
You will inform him, however, that this treaty was
concluded without a power or instructions from this gov-
ernment; that the President had no knowledge of its
existence or of the intention to form it, until it was pre-
sented to him by Mr. Hise, our late charge d'affaires to
Guatemala, about the first of September last, and that
consequently we are not bound to ratify it, and will take
no step for that purpose, if we can by arrangement with
the British government place our interests upon a just
and satisfactory foundation. But if our efforts to this
end should be abortive, the president will not hesitate to
submit this or some other treaty which may be concluded
by the present charge d'affaires to Guatamala [E, G.
Squier] to the Senate of the United States for their ad-
vice and consent, with a view to its ratification, and if
that enlightened body should approve it he [the Presi-
dent] also will give it his hearty sanction, and will exert
all his constitutional power to execute its provisions in
good faith, a determination in which he may confidently
count on the good will of the people of the United States.^
With a view to such negotiation Mr. Abbott
Lawrence had been sent as United States minister
to London, where he arrived in November, 1849.
Mr. Lawrence was a Boston merchant who, in
partnership with his brother Amos, had amassed
a vast fortune. He was also a philanthropist and
something of a politician. He founded the Law-
rence Scientific School and sat in Congress during
the session of 1839-40. But he had no experience
1 Clayton to Lawrence, Oct. 20, 1849.
68
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
in diplomacy, and his health, as we shall see, was
to fail him at an early stage of his mission.
About the time when he arrived in London, Sir
Henry Lytton Bulwer sailed from England with
credentials as minister to the United States. On
the 24th of December he was formally presented
to President Taylor. Sir Henry Bulwer was at
this time at the zenith of his career, having passed
twenty-two of the thirty-eight years which he was
to devote to diplomatic service. A review of his
past life may help us to understand and follow
his course of action in the United States.
He left Cambridge University without taking a
degree, and purchased the position of cornet in
the army, but this did not suit him. He sold out
and had himself attached to the British legation at
Berlin. On his way to his post (1827) he managed
to carry away with him in a few days from thirty
to forty thousand dollars won at play. With this
capital he gained admission to a whist club at Ber-
lin which was in the habit of meeting at Prince
Wittgenstein's, and included among its members
the most notable people about the Court. Bulwer
not only came off winner, but also picked up impor-
tant information to which his official superiors
had not access. With this advantage he built up
a reputation in the British Foreign Office, which
insured him rapid promotion. He was soon sent
as attache to Vienna and then to The Hague. ^
1 Retrospections of an Active Life by J. Bigelow, II, 404.
69
Chapter III
In 1830 he was detached from The Hague to
watch the progress of the revolution in Belgium.
Lord Palmerston was so well pleased with his
reports that he brought him into Parliament. In
1837 he went, as secretary of the British em-
bassy to Constantinople, where he negotiated a
commercial treaty of great importance for Eng-
land. In 1839 and 1840 he was secretary at Paris
and in 1843 was sent as ambassador to Madrid.
In this position his sympathy with the liberal in-
surgents and his consequent intrigues brought
him into such ill favor with the Government that
on the 12th of June, 1848, he was summarily re-
quired to quit Madrid within twenty-four hours
and Spain within forty-eight. Before his return
to England he was gazetted Knight in the Com-
panion of the Bath. The coincidence in time be-
tween this distinction and the termination of his
mission to Spain has been represented as purely
accidental, but it may be reasonably attributed to
approval in high quarters of his machinations in
Spain. It was at this juncture that he was se-
lected to represent Great Britain in the United
States.
By art and nature he was peculiarly fitted for
the task which he was about to undertake. He
had associated with very remarkable men — ^with
Prince Talleyrand, Prince Lieven, Count d'Orsay,
Lord Palmerston, Lord Beaconsfield, Lord Mel-
70
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
bourne, besides many other English statesmen.
Under their influence, it would seem, he had codi-
fied his life in fixed rules or maxims. Among
these canons of his worldly wisdom were the fol-
lowing :
Never discuss, because neither you nor your adversary
will give in to the other, and he will ever consider you
a stupid fellow for not agreeing with him.
It is very difficult to get stupid people to change their
opinions, for they find it so hard to get an idea that they
don't like to lose one.
Nothing is so common as to make a great blunder in
order to remedy a small one.
Nothing is so foolish as to be wise out of season.^
An American diplomat from whom I have al-
ready quoted, speaking from personal recollection,
says :
He was a singularly fascinating man ; fascinating with-
out being lovable. . . . His talk was always well in-
formed without being in the least pedantic or intensive.
Every word was most skillfully adapted to his purpose,
whatever that purpose might be. The wish to please and
win you was artfully concealed under a languid, tired-
out, valetudinarian manner, which conveyed an impres-
sion of the most perfect indifference about the effect he
was trying to produce. This was the wooden horse in
which he entered the citadels he wished to hold. ...
He was never bavard; he never talked apparently to
gratify his vanity, nor did wine or stimulants of any kind,
1 Some Maxims of the late Lord DalUng and Bulwer, Vine-
teenth Cent. vol. 56, p. 262.
71
Chapter III
in the use of which he was anything but abstemious, seem
to increase his loquacity a particle. Silence with him
was not infrequently as effective an instrument as speech.
It would not do to put too much trust in his sincerity,
nor any at all in his sentimental professions. He was an
Epicurean from head to foot; the world was his oyster,
which with any weapon that would best serve his pur-
pose, he would open. His languor of manner was not,
however, altogether artificial. His health was delicate,
and he was a fearful consumer of drugs. ... To this
destructive habit was to be attributed, no doubt his
cadaverous and utterly colorless complexion, — in this as
in many other respects suggesting a comparison with
Talleyrand, whom of all modern Europeans, I think, he
would have most wished to be thought to resemble. . . .
He was unusually well acquainted with all classes and
every rank of French society, not even excepting the
demi-monde, in which, as everywhere else, he knew how
to make himself acceptable at a minimum cost of self
respect. ... he knew George Sand intimatel.y, and one
of her most famous novels, Mauprat, is said to have been
inspired by him.^
John M. Clayton, who was to measure himself
with Sir Henry Bulwer as co-negotiator of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, had an advantage over
Sir Henry in being an accomplished lawyer, equit-
able, civil, and criminal. He had, like Bulwer,
served his country as a legislator, having sat in
the Senate with Daniel Webster, Henry Clay, T.
H. Benton, J. C. Calhoun, Edward Livingston,
and R. Y. Hayne. During the Presidency of Gen-
1 Bigelow, opus cit., II, pp. 386, 387, 403, 404. See also London
Times, 1872— June 3, p. 6; June 6, p. 10; June 7, p. 8.
72
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
eral Jackson, at an executive session, held on the
3rd of March, 1835, he introduced the following
resolution which was carried:
Resolved, That the President of the United States be
respectfully requested to consider the expediency of open-
ing negotiations with the governments of other nations,
and particularly with the governments of Central Amer-
ica and New Granada, for the purpose of effectually pro-
tecting, by suitable treaty stipulations with them, such
individuals or companies as may undertake to open a
communication between the Atlantic and Pacific oceans
by the construction of a ship canal across the isthmus
which connects North and South America, and of se-
curing forever by such stipulations, the free and equal
right to navigate such canal to all such nations, on the
payment of such reasonable tolls as may be established
to compensate the capitalists who may engage in such
undertaking, and complete the work.
As Secretary of State he wrote on the 4th of
September, 1849, the letter to Colonel Hughes of
the topographical engineers, to which reference
has already been made:
In the conversation I had with you last evening on
several topics of deep concern to the present and future
interests of our country, I was struck by your judicious
and intelligent observations on the subject of the various
routes for connecting the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans
which have so long been discussed before the world, and
which have now assumed an extraordinary importance.
The subject is one which attracted my attention twenty
years ago, since which time it has never ceased to occupy
73
Chapter III
my mind; and I have neglected no occasion of seeking
from well informed persons, accurate, reliable and use-
ful information in regard to it, such as might be cal-
culated to diffuse light among our citizens and serve as a
safe guide to the public councils of the nation. With
these objects very much at heart, I made a verbal re-
quest that you would do me the favor to address a com-
munication to me upon these points we conversed about,
entering fully into the questions they involve, and giv-
ing in detail your views and opinions thereon, and the
considerations and facts upon which they are based, and
presenting such information and suggestions as your ex-
perience and knowledge will enable you to submit.
Your attention is specially invited to the importance
of a ship canal, of such dimensions as to admit vessels
of the largest class, connecting the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans ; and you are requested to state whether there is
reason to believe that such a route or routes may be
found across the American Isthmus, and if so where? —
the length, capacity, supply of water dimensions, and
probable cost of the construction, of a work on the most
eligible line that is known to exist, best calculated to
subserve the great ends of commerce of the civilized
world, and of the present and prospective trade of the
Pacific and Indian Oceans. You are also requested to
present your views at large in reference to the different
projects which have been presented to the public for a
railroad from the Mississippi to the Pacific exclusively
within the territories of the United States ; and you will
be pleased to submit all the information you may be able
to collect touching this important question.^
While not as entertaining perhaps as Bulwer,
Clayton had ** exceeding powers of conversation"
1 Letter in answer to the Hon. John M. Clayton, etc., p. 3.
74
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
and an amiable disposition, by which he became
very popular in Washington society.^
So far as interest in one's work is a factor of
efficiency, the foregoing resolution and communi-
cation augur well for the success of Secretary
Clayton in any mission he might undertake for the
establishment of transcontinental or transisth-
mian communication. But he had never held any
diplomatic office. He had not the insight into
human character, the political sense, or the states-
manlike vision of Sir Henry Bulwer.
In 1868 Bulwer published a work entitled His-
torical Characters : Mackintosh, Canning, Talley-
rand, Corhett, Peel. Treating of the great French
diplomat, he says:
**The particular and especial talent of M. de
Talleyrand was, as I have more than once exemp-
lified, his tact, the art of seizing the important
point in an affair, the peculiar characteristic of
an individual, the genius and tendency of an
epoch. ' '
Bulwer must have felt as he wrote this passage,
that he was describing himself or ideals of his, for
the faculties which he here ascribes to Talleyrand
were eminently his own.
When the United States thought of undertaking
or promoting a work of such world-wide interest
• 1 Memoirs of John M. Clayton by J. P. Comegys.
75
Chapter III
and importance as the construction of an inter-
oceanic waterway, it occurred to Great Britain, or
at least to Sir Henry Bulwer, that this might be
an opportunity to entice the United States into
an association that would commit it to participat-
ing in the international politics of the Old World
and admit Great Britain to participation in the
affairs of the New. The cooperation of Great
Britain and the United States in the grand task
of enlightening and uplifting humanity, of reform-
ing the world according to Anglo-Saxon patterns
and ideals, was the form in which the new Brit-
ish minister presented his designs in after-dinner
speeches to the American public. The idea of
Anglo-American community of interest and duty
was the topic of his address to the President on
the occasion of his presentation.
Sir: I need not say that it gives me the sineerest
gratification to be the bearer of the credentials which I
have just had the honor of placing in your hands. Per-
mit me to say that in coming to your country I do not
feel that I come as a foreigner to a foreign land. Our
nations speak the same language, spring from the same
race and seem especially entrusted by Providence with
the same glorious task of illustrating the Anglo-Saxon
name by extending the best interests of civilization
through two great divisions of the world. I have an en-
tire confidence, Sir, that our two governments will act
with the most perfect concord in carrying out this great
design, and for my own part I unfeignedly assure you
that I could not have a duty more congenial to my feel-
76
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
ings than that of cultivating the most intimate and
friendly relations between the Queen, my sovereign and
that great Republic of which you are the worthy and
distinguished President.^
In the original form of the speech, that is, as
Bulwer had prepared it, or as it had been prepared
for him, the words in italics read ''through both
hemispheres;" in other words, throughout the
world. That was too much for a President of the
United States to accede to, even in the perfunc-
tory course of a presentation. Fortunately for
both parties, a draft of the speech had been sub-
mitted to Clayton, in advance, for his approval;
and as a consequence the scope of the imaginary
Anglo-American crusade was cut down from the
territories of the habitable globe to the confines
of the two continents of America.
To Bulwer 's address the President replied:
I am much pleased to receive from your hands the let-
ter of her Majesty, your Sovereign, which accredits you,
as the Envoy, Extraordinary and Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of Great Britain near the Government of the United
States, and I cordially welcome you in that high char-
acter as a friend.
Beyond the identity of origin, language, and duties, so
appropriately alluded to by you, as connecting our re-
spective countries, there is much. Sir, in their present
relations calculated to impart unusual interest to your
mission. That the best plans for extending the bless-
'i-lndea and Archives, Dept. of State.
77
Chapter III
ings of peace, commerce, and civilization, may be exe-
cuted by our perfect concord is my most earnest wish;
and the confidence you have expressed ; that the two na-
tions will act in concert and harmony in all wise and
well directed efforts for the accomplishment of such ob-
jects, is accepted by me in the cordial and sincere spirit
in which it has been proposed by you.
I hope, Sir, that your residence in this country may
prove as agreeable to you personally as you have given
me reason for believing that it will be honorable and ad-
vantageous, both to Great Britain and America.^
But this cautious reply and Clayton's correc-
tion, were lost on the British minister. A few
days before he put his signature to the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, he said, speaking for publication :
. . . The glorious spectacle of two great states, both
powerful and flourishing, the one in the prime of youth,
the other in the vigor of manhood ; two states, the same
in origin, in language, and above all, in character, stand-
ing side by side, hand in hand, in the van of mankind:
the first [foremost states] wherever true glory is to be
gained, justice and mercy to be vindicated, commerce,
civilization, and religion to be spread. The past hallows
our union; the future smiles on it, and Heaven cannot
but bless it, — for it is the union of one family and has
for its object the benefit of the whole world.-
When Bulwer arrived in the United States
neither he nor Clayton had instructions for the
negotiation of a treaty. But on Clayton's invi-
tation, Bulwer entered into conference with him
1 Index and Archives, Dept. of State.
2 Speech at Dinner of Maryland Hist. Soc, Bait., Apl. 6, 1850.
' 78
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
on the subject of an interoceanic waterway.^
They soon found themselves in agreement on the
general proposition that one should be constructed
without interfering with the status quo in Central
America, any more than was necessary in its
realization and the insurance of its neutrality.
The Mosquito question was not to be considered,
except to the limited extent determined by these
purposes. On the 13th of February, 1850, Sir
Henry Bulwer forwarded for Lord Palmerston's
criticism the projet of a treaty drawn up by him-
self and Clayton. This document is here pre-
sented with the amendments that were made in it
prior to its ratification.
Tex^ of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
Italics indicate parts replaced by others, and
brackets parts omitted. The matter in the right-
hand column was substituted for the parts in ital-
ics or was inserted in the vacant spaces, in the
left-hand column. The two columns, read to-
gether, furnish the treaty in its original form, or
as projected, and in its final form, or as ratified.
As projected 2 Addenda
PREAMBLE
The United States of Amer-
ica and Her Britannic Majes-
ty, being desirous of consoli-
1 Memoir of J. M. Clayton, Coraegya, p. 192.
2 The text of this column is taken from the Clayton Papers in
79
Chapter III
dating the relations of amity
which so happily subsist be-
tween them, by setting forth
and fixing in a convention
their views and intentions \vith
reference to any means of
communication by ship-canal
which may be constructed be-
tween the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans by the way of the
River San Juan de Nicaragua
and either (or both) of the
lakes of Nicaragua or Mana-
gua, to any port or place on
the Pacific Ocean, the Presi-
dent of the United States has
conferred full powers on John
M. Clayton, Secretary of State
of the United States, and Her
Britannic Majesty on the
Right Hon. Sir Henry Lytton
Bulwer,
envoy extraordinary and min-
ister plenipotentiary of Her
Britannic Majesty to the
United States, for the afore-
said purpose; and the said
plenipotentiaries having ex-
changed their full powers,
which were found to be in
proper form, have agreed to
the following articles:
a member of Her Majesty's
most honorable privy council,
Knight commander of the most
honorable order of the Bath,
and
the Library of Congress (IX, 1640-1649). It was published with-
out the signatures in Sen. Ex. Doc. 19Jf, 47 Cong., 1 Sess., pp. 64,
65, and with the signatures, in Brit, and For. State Papers, vol.
40, pp. 1008 et seq. In these two publications the words "or
both" in the preamble are not in parentheses.
80
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
ARTICLE I
The governments of
Great Britain and the United
States
hereby declare that neither the
one nor the other will ever
obtain or maintain for itself
any exclusive control over the
said ship-canal, agreeing that
neither will ever erect or main-
tain any fortifications com-
manding the same or in the
vicinity thereof, or occupy
or colonize
either
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the
Mosquito Coast, or any part of
Central America; nor will
Oreat Britain or the United
States assume or exercise any
dominion over the same;
The United States and Great
Britain
or fortify
assume or exercise any domin-
ion over
either make use of any protec-
tion which either affords or
may afford, or any alliance
Avhich either has or may have
to or with any state or people,
for the purpose of erecting or
maintaining any such fortifica-
tions, or of occupying, fortify-
ing, or colonizing, Nicaragua,
Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast,
or any part of Central America
or of assuming or exercising
nor will the United States or
Great Britain
81
Chapter III
take advantage of any inti-
macy, or use any alliance, con-
nection or influence that either
may possess with any state or
people government
through [or by] whose terri-
tory the said canal may pass,
for the purpose of acquiring or
holding, directly or indirectly,
for the
subjects or citizens citizens or subjects
of the one any rights or advan-
tages in regard to [the] com-
merce or navigation through
the said canal, which shall not
be offered on the same terms to
the
subjects or citieens citizens or subjects
of the other.
ABTICLE II
Vessels of
Oreat Britai/n or The United The United States or Great
States Britain
traversing the said canal shall,
in case of war between the con-
tracting parties, be exempted
from
detention, or capture, by either
of the belligerents, and this
provision shall extend to such
a distance from the two ends
of the said canal as [it] may
hereafter be found expedient to
establish.
82
blockade,
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
ARTICLE III
In order to secure the con-
struction of the said canal, the
contracting parties engage that,
if any such canal shall be un-
dertaken upon fair and equit-
able terms by any parties hav-
ing the authority of the local
government or governments
through whose territory the
same may pass, then the per-
sons employed in making the
said canal and their property,
used or to be used for that ob-
ject, shall be protected, from
the commencement of
the
said canal to its completion,
by the governments of the
United States and Great Brit-
ain, from unjust detention,
confiscation, seizure or any
violence
tohatever. whatsoever.
ARTICLE IV
The contracting parties will
use whatever influence they re-
spectively exercise with any
state, [or] states, or
toith any people governments
possessing or claiming to pos-
sess, any jurisdiction or right
over the territory which the
said canal shall traverse, or
which shall be near the waters
applicable thereto, in order to
induce such states or
people governments
83
Chapter III
to facilitate
its .
construction
by every means in their power,
^d furthermore,
Oreat Britain and The United
States
agree to use their good offices
wherever or however it may be
most expedient, in order to pro-
cure the establishment of two
free ports, one at each end of
the said canal.
ARTICLE V
The contracting parties fur-
ther engage that when
any such the said
canal shall have been com-
pleted, they will protect it from
interruption, seizure, or unjust
confiscation, and that they will
guarantee the neutrality there-
of, so that the said canal may
forever be open and free, and
the capital invested therein se-
cure. Nevertheless the govern-
ments of the United States and
Great Britain, in according
their protection to the con-
struction of the
canal [which this treaty speci-
fies! and guaranteeing its neu-
trality and security when com-
pleted, always understand that
this protection and guarantee
are granted conditionally, and
may be withdrawn by both
governments or either govern-
the
of the Baid canal
The United States and Great
Britain
said
84
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
ment, if both governments or
either government should deem
that the persons or company
undertaking or managing the
same adopt or establish such
regulations concerning the
traffic thereupon as are con-
trary to the spirit and inten-
tion of this convention;
either by making unfair dis-
criminations in favor of the
commerce of one of the con-
tracting parties over the com-
merce of the other, or by
inflicting
oppressive exactions
and
unreasonable tolls upon pas-
sengers,
ships or
merchandise,
Neither party, however, shall
withdraw the aforesaid protec-
tion and guarantee without
first giving six months' notice
to the other.
imposing
vessels, goods, wares,
or other articles.
AETICLB VI
The contracting parties in
this convention engage to in-
vite every [nation], state [or
people] with
whom
both or either have friendly in-
tercourse, to enter into stipu-
which
85
Chapter III
lations with them similar to
those which they have entered
into with each other, to the end
that
the whole world
may share in the honor and
advantage of having contrib-
uted to a work of such general
interest and importance
and the contracting parties
likewise agree that each shall
enter into treaty stipulations
with such of the Central Amer-
ican [nations], states, [or peo-
ple] as they may deem advis-
able for the purpose of more
effectually carrying out the
great design of this conven-
tion; namely that of construct-
ing and maintaining the
proposed
ship - commimication between
the two oceans for the benefit
of mankind, on equal terms to
all, and of protecting the same ;
and they also agree that the
good offices of either shall be
employed when requested by
the other, in aiding and assist-
ing the negotiation of such
treaty stipulations;
all other states
as the canal herein
plated;
contem-
said canal as a
86
and should any differences artse
as to right or property over
the territory through which the
said canal shall pass, between
the states or governments of
Central America, and such dif-
ferences should in any way im-
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
pede or obstruct the execution
of the said canal, the govern-
ments of the United States and
Great Britain will use their
good offices to settle such dif-
ferences in the manner best
suited to promote the interests
of the said canal, and to
strengthen the bonds of friend-
ship and alliance which exist
between the contracting par-
ties.
ABTICLE vn
It being desirable that no
time should be imnecessarily
lost in commencing
the
and constructing
great undertaking herein con-
templated,
said canal
the governments of the United
States and Great Britain de-
termine to give their support
and encouragement to such
persons or company as may
first oflfer to commence the
same, with the necessary capi-
tal, the consent of the local
authorities, and on such prin-
ciples as accord with the spirit
and intention of this conven-
tion;
87
and if any persons or company
should already have with any
state through which the pro-
posed ship-canal may pass, a
contract for the construction of
such a canal as that specified
in this convention, to the stip-
ulations of which contract
Chapter III
neither of the contracting
parties in this convention have
any just cause to object, and
the said persons or company
shall, moreover, have made
preparations, and expended
time, money, and trouble, on
the faith of such contract, it
is hereby agreed that such per-
sons or company shall have a
priority of claim over every
other person, persons, or com-
pany to the protection of the
governments of the United
States and Great Britain, and
be allowed a year from the date
of the exchange of the ratifica-
tions of this convention for
concluding their arrangements,
and presenting evidence of suffi-
cient capital subscribed to ac-
complish the contemplated un-
dertaking; it being understood
that if, at the expiration of
the aforesaid period, such per-
sons or company be not able
to commence and carry out the
proposed enterprise, then the
governments of the United
States and Great Britain shall
be free to afford their protec-
tion to any other persons or
company that shall be prepared
to commence and proceed with
the construction of the canal
in question.
ARTICLE VIII
The governments of the
United States and Great Brit-
ain,
M» entering into the present having not only desired, in en-
The Clayton-Bulwer Negotiations
convention, have not only de-
sired
to accomplish a particular ob-
ject, but also to establish a
general principle; they [there-
fore] hereby agree to
take under their consideration
any project for a
canal or railway,
which may he submitted to
them, and which may have for
its purpose to connect the At-
lantic and Pacific, or to short-
en and expedite the transit of
persons, ships, or merchandise,
between the two great oceans;
and should either of the two
governments deem it to be bene-
ficial to the general interests
of commerce and civilization to
extend its support, encourage-
ment, or protection to such
railway or canal, it will forth-
with invite the other of the
two governments to be a joint
party in affording such pro-
tection, support, or encourage-
ment; and will neither request
nor accept from any persons,
company, or state any advan-
tages or privileges for its own
citizens or subjects with re-
spect to such railway or canal
which shall not be open for all
other governments to obtain
for their citizens or subjects
upon the same terms as those
ichich are proposed to or ac-
cepted by itself.
tering into this convention.
extend their protection, by
treaty stipulations, to any
other practicable communica-
tions, whether by
across the isthmus which con-
nects North and South Amer-
ica, and especially to the inter-
oceanic communications, should
the same prove to be practica-
ble, whether by canal or rail-
way, which are now proposed
to be established by the way
of Tehuantepee or Panama.
In granting, however, their
joint protection to any such
canals or railways as are by
this article specified, it is al-
ways understood by the United
States and Great Britain that
the parties constructing or
owning the same shall impose
no other charges or conditions
of traffic thereupon than the
aforesaid governments shall ap-
prove of as just and equitable;
and that the same canals or
railways, being open to the cit-
izens and subjects of the
United States and Great Brit-
ain on equal terms, shall also be
open on like terms to the citi-
zens and subjects of every other
state which is willing to grant
thereto such protection as the
United States engage to afford.
S9
Chapter III
ARTICLE IX
The ratifications of this con-
vention shall be exchanged at
Washington within six months
from this day, or sooner if pos-
sible.
In faith whereof we, the re-
spective Plenipotentiaries, have
signed this convention, and
have hereunto affixed our seals.
Done at Washington, the
nineteenth day of April, anno
Domini one thousand eight
hundred and fifty.
J. M. Clayton, John M. Clayton,
H. L. BuLWEB. Henby Lytton Bulweb.
With the project of the treaty, Bulwer for-
warded to Lord Palmerston the following agree-
ment:
If this project be approved of by the government of
her Britannic Majesty and the Government of the United
States on or before the tenth of April next (1850), it
shall then forthwith be converted into a solemn treaty
binding between the two states.
But if, on the contrary, it should not be fully approved
of by either or both these governments on or before the
10th of April, 1850, it is then fully agreed, understood
and declared by the undersigned that the said project is
to be considered as altogether null and void; and that
all that has passed relative thereto shall be held as if it
had never taken place.
J. M. Clayton.
H. L. Bulweb.
90
IV
The Protectorate Under the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
In his letter transmitting the treaty to Palmer-
ston, Sir Henry Bulwer said :
. . . having heard of the very serious illness of Mr.
Lawrence and been informed by Mr. Clayton that, if this
gentleman recovers, he will not be able to transact pub-
lic business for a considerable time, I deemed that I stood
in one of those positions in which it is necessary for a
public agent to take upon himself a certain degree of
responsibility for the sake of the public service ; and con-
sequently when Mr. Clayton after informing me of Mr.
Lawrence's severe indisposition and explaining to me
the very critical position in which he himself stood, added
that he must either deliver up the whole subject to
popular discussion and determination or come to some
immediate settlement upon it, I entered with him into a
full consideration of the affair, and finally agreed to sub-
mit to your Lordship's sanction the enclosed project of
convention ... its object being to exclude all questions
of the disputes between Nicaragua and the Mosquitos;
but to settle in fact all that it was essential to settle
with regard to these disputes as far as the ship com-
munication between the Atlantic and Pacific and the
navigation of the River San Juan were concerned.^
1 The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was thus purely commercial. It
was not formed to settle the Mosquito question, but to prevent
the Mosquito question being an obstacle to the completion of the
American canal. (Quart. Rev. Vol. XCIX, 1856, Article by H. L.
Bulwer. )
91
Chapter IV
Thus Bulwer and Clayton agreed to concentrate
their attention on the requirements of the canal.
The problem of ousting Great Britain from ob-
jectionable occupancy in Central America irre-
spectively of the canal, was to be put off to an in-
definite future. The different attitude taken to-
ward this matter by Abbot Lawrence was probably
of more weight than the state of Lawrence's
health in determining Clayton to transfer the ne-
gotiations from London to Washington.
Before the project of the treaty could have
reached England its provisions became known in
the United States, and Clayton was given reason
to believe that the Senate would not approve of
his attitude toward the general question of Mos-
quito sovereignty. On that subject it agreed with
Lawrence rather than with Clayton. As a con-
sequence Clayton perforce adopted the view of the
Senate, that British influence was to be abolished
throughout the Mosquito Coast, and he applied
himself to prevailing upon Bulwer to do likewise.
This was to propose that Bulwer do the very thing
which he was bent on preventing — that he commit
himself to failing in his mission. Clayton was
insistent. Bulwer was immovable. In vain did
Clayton threaten to defeat what he supposed was
the common object of the negotiators. Bulwer
with an air of injured innocence, protested against
Clayton's inconstancy. It ended in Clayton's
leaving the Mosquito question unsettled as be-
92
The British Protectorate
tween him and Bulwer, but settled in his own mind
to his satisfaction. Great Britain was to retain
her protectorate over the Mosquito Coast, but in
name only. She was to be the merely nominal or
titular protector of the Mosquitos, renouncing all
right to the use of force. This was accomplished,
he thought, by the provisions, as finally worded,
of Article I.^ Elated with this flattering delusion,
he wrote privately to Lawrence :
April 22, 1850.
Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer concluded a treaty with me
on the 19th instant, which you will remember, was the
anniversary of the Lexington and Concord affair. The
treaty is honorable to both countries. It is very like the
pro jet I sent to you; but it additionally provides that
neither party shall make use of any protection or al-
liance for the purpose of occupying, fortifying, coloniz-
ing, or assuming or exercising any dominion whatsoever,
over any part of Central America or the Mosquito
Coast, so that our friends over the water can neither
occupy, etc. to protect nor protect to occupy etc. You
will ask what becomes of the protectorate? I answer
"stat nominis umbra/' it stands the shadow of a name.
Use all your good offices to persuade Lord Palmerston to
agree to the treaty. My friend Bulwer is evidently
somewhat uneasy lest Palmerston should censure him for
consenting to so much, but Bulwer could not have possi-
bly made any treaty with me on any better terms for
England. 2
According to Sir Henry Bulwer, **the treaty
1 For correspondence, etc., on this point see Appendix C.
2 Clayton Paper*, IX, 1661.
93
Chapter IF
left the protection existing, but forbade it to be
used for the purpose of dominion." He held that
it could be used to protect the Mosquitos in the
maintenance of their sovereignty, should it ever
be assailed or contested, that the employment of
British troops in Central America for that pur-
pose would not constitute either occupation or
dominion as understood in the treaty.
American statesmen generally did not agree,
either with Sir Henry Bulwer or with Clayton.
They understood that Great Britain was required
to abandon her protectorate altogether, in name
as well as in substance, leaving the Mosquitos to
take care of themselves, under the sovereignty of
Nicaragua and of Honduras. Both parties to the
treaty agreed never to "exercise any dominion
over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast,
or any part of Central America." The United
States held that the so-called protectorate of the
Mosquito Coast was *' dominion." The question
then was this: Does a prohibition to exercise
dominion prohibit continuing to exercise it; does
it require the abandonment of actual dominion?
It may be admitted as a general principle that
sovereignty or dominion cannot be surrendered
by implication, that it cannot be renounced except
in express terms. But this principle contem-
plates bona fide, legitimate sovereignty or do-
minion ; it is at least a debatable question whether
it applies to such irregular, illegitimate influence
94
The British Protectorate
as that exercised by Great Britain on the Mos-
quito Coast, which she did not pretend herself to
be sovereignty, which she denied to be dominion,
which she called a protectorate.
The political relation of protector and protected is not
a new one. It grows out of contract. It implies sov-
ereignty in each party, for when the sovereignty of the
lesser merges in that of the greater the peculiar relation
ceases.^
One reason why the United States would not
recognize Mosquito sovereignty was that it in-
volved Indian rights of eminent domain, of land
ownership. Great Britain might have a title
which extinguished or excluded that of an Ameri-
can Eepublic, but no American statesman would
admit that such title could be held by a tribe of
Indians.
As to the Mosquito title, the United States could not
possibly recognize that, without abandoning a principle
as old as their existence, for you know, we never acknowl-
edge any right in an Indian in any part of America, ex-
cept a mere right of occupancy, always liable to be ex-
tinguished (that's our technical word for it) at the will
of the discoverers. We could not recognize such a title
in any case without admitting the illegality of the tenure
by which we hold all the lands in our country.^
Lord Palmerston, while admitting the general
doctrine for which the United States contended,
1 Lawrence to Clayton, April 19, 1850.
2 Clayton to Lawrence, May 2, 1850.
95
Chapter IV
held that the case of the Mosquitos was sui
generis and stood upon its own peculiar circum-
stances/ Clayton took little or no account of this
attitude of the British Government. About a year
after he had been informed of it he wrote :
Having always regarded an Indian title as a mere right
of occupancy, we can never agree that such a title should
be treated otherwise than as a thing to be extinguished
at the will of the discoverer of the country. Upon the
ratification of the treaty Great Britain will no longer
have any interest to deny this principle which she has
recognized in every case in common with us. '^'Stat
nominis umbra," for she can neither occupy, fortify or
colonize, nor exercise dominion or control, in any part
of the Mosquito Coast or Central America. To attempt
to do either of these things after the exchange of ratifi-
cations, would inevitably produce a rupture with the
United States.^
Great Britain's policy in the Mosquito country
was really intervention, the essence of which is
illegality, even when acceptable to the party in
whose behalf it is carried out. But the interven-
tion in this case w^as a form of dominion.
This government [Mosquito] was not only British in
personnel, but was administered according to British
customs. It was also dependent upon Great Britain for
the maintenance of its authority. If that did not amount
1 Rives to Clayton, Sept. 25, 1849.
2 Clayton to Squier, May 7, 1850.
96
The British Protectorate
to an occupation with the exercise of dominion, it is dif-
ficult to understand what could.^
Neither Great Britain nor the United States
was to "assume or exercise dominion." What
is the meaning of this phrase? If it were ** as-
sume and exercise dominion" it might be inter-
preted as a single idea comprehending both the
initiation and the maintenance of dominion. But
the connective or indicates that there are two ideas
which are to be distinguished from each other.
The natural distinction to be made between as-
suming dominion and exercising dominion is that
assuming means to begin and exercising means
to continue. It would thus seem that continuing
to exercise dominion is as explicitly prohibited
as beginning to exercise it; that the prohibition
applies to existing as well as to impending domin-
ion; that it is meant to be present or immediate,
not merely prospective, in its operation. Great
Britain held that as regards occupation, dominion,
1 Travis.
It is alleged that a British consul or agent resides in Mosquito
who "may oftentimes be called upon to give his opinion or advice
to the Mosquito Government." But it is notorious and from the
degraded character of the Indians it cannot be otherwise, that
the Mosquito Government is exclusively the British Government
exercised through the agency of this Consul residing in Mosquito.
Is is through him that the British Government, in the name of
this mere shadow of a king, captured the seaports of his neighbors
by the employment of British forces alone, and exercises domin-
ion over the entire so-called Mosquito Coast. (Buchanan to Clar-
endon, July 22, 1854.)
97
Chapter IV
fortification, colonization, etc., the treaty was
prospective, having no application to the state of
affairs existing at the time of its negotiation.
She would not admit that it debarred her from
such military operation as might be necessary to
preserve the status quo. The United States per-
sistently refused to recognize the sovereignty of
the Mosquitos and insisted on the actuality and
illegality of British dominion over the Mosquito
country, but as already stated, did not bring Great
Britain to agree with it on either of these points.
On the 22nd of April, 1850, three days after the
treaty was signed, it was sent by President Taylor
to the Senate for approval. Here was an occa-
sion for the President to state that it would cause
the withdrawal of Great Britain from Central
America, but he did not make that statement ; and
the guarded language which he used indicated
that he could not make it. He said:
... I found Great Britain in possession of nearly half
of Central America, as the ally and protector of the Mos-
quito King. It has been my object, in negotiating this
treaty, not only to secure the passage across the isthmus
. . . but to maintain the independence and sovereignty
of all Central American republics. The Senate will
judge how far these objects have been effected.
Three years later our Secretary of State wrote
to the President:
. . . the relations of Great Britain to Mosquito and
98
The British Protectorate
the Mosquito Indians, over whom she claims to have
exercised a protectorate for a long course of years, re-
mains under this [Clayton-Bulwer] treaty somewhat in-
determinate.^
About a week after the signing of the treaty
Sir Henry Bulwer explained in a dispatch to Pal-
merston the difference between the original draft
forwarded on the 3rd of February, and the treaty
as signed. He said:
As the case now stands it is clearly understood that
Her Majesty's Government holds by its own opinions al-
ready expressed as to Mosquito, and that the United
States does not depart from its opinions also already ex-
pressed as to the same subject ; but the main question of
the canal being settled on an amicable basis, and the
future relations of the United States and Great Britain
being regulated in all other parts of Central America,
the discussion of this difference, which has lost its great
practical importance, is avoided in an arrangement
meant to be as much as possible of a friendly char-
acter.^
The British representative in Central America
wrote to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of
Nicaragua :
This [Clayton-Bulwer] treaty declares that North
America recognizes the existence of Mosquito, acknowl-
edging it to be as perfectly distinct a state or country
1 Everett to Fillmore, Feb. 16, 1853.
2 Bulwer to Palmerston, April 28, 1850.
99
Chapter IV
with respect to Nicaragua, as Costa Rica or any other
portion of Central America.^
Hardly was the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty ratified
when trading with San Juan brought the United
States into conflict with Great Britain over the
question of local jurisdiction.
On the 21st of November, 1850, the American
steamer Prometheus, with many passengers on
board, was fired upon while going out of the port,
by the British brig-of-war Express, to force it to
pay certain port charges to his Mosquito Majesty.
The British Government recognized that this
was going beyond the function of protection ; that
it was exercising dominion. It consequently dis-
avowed the act. But this did not prevent a re-
currence of friction between United States citi-
zens and the Mosquito authorities. On the 10th
of June, 1854, the place was bombarded by a
United States war vessel and reduced to ruins as
a punishment for alleged affronts on the part of
the San Juan populace and authorities to a United
States minister. This ruthless chastisement was
probably intended to be a blow at the prestige of
Great Britain as the protector of Mosquito sov-
ereignty. Such a motive may be read between the
lines of a reference to ''Greytown" which was
made by President Pierce in his next message to
Congress :
iChatfield to Orosco, Sept. 28, 1850.
100
The British Protectorate
*'It was in fact a marauding establishment, too
dangerous to be disregarded and too guilty to pass
unpunished, and yet incapable of being treated in
another way than as a piratical resort of outlaws
or a camp of savages depredating on emigrant
trains or caravans and the frontier settlements
of civilized states."
The punishment was perhaps unnecessarily se-
vere. It brought loss and suffering upon inno-
cent people, including a number of citizens of the
United States, and left the general situation un-
changed. Great Britain did not relinquish her
control of the Mosquito Coast until 1859, when
she transferred it in part to Honduras. The re-
mainder, including ''Greytown or San Juan del
Norte," she surrendered to Nicaragua by the
Treaty of Managua in 1860. By this treaty San
Juan was regularly constituted and declared a
free port under the sovereign authority of the Re-
public of Nicaragua.^
It was stipulated that a district within the ter-
ritory ceded to Nicaragua should be assigned to
the Mosquito Indians. The limits of this reserva-
tion were defined in the treaty and gave it an area
about one-fourth that of the former dominion of
the nominal King of the Mosquitos (Map 2).
The treaty secured to the Mosquitos the right
1 For text of this treaty and the one with Honduras see Ben.
Bx. Doc. 194, 47th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 148-154.
101
Chapter IV
of self-government under the sovereignty of Nica-
ragua. It required the latter to pay to the Mos-
quitos 50,000 dollars in the course of ten years
and prohibited Nicaragua from ever ceding the
Mosquito district "to any foreign person or
State." The treaty with Honduras bound that
State to the same payment as Nicaragua. The
cession was thus an imperfect one; it subjected
Nicaragua to conditions inconsistent with sover-
eign control and possession of the district. It
might have been expected that failures to observe
them would lead to intervention on the part of
Great Britain and so to trouble with the United
States. But this contingency does not seem to
have been anticipated. The treaty of Managua
was considered by the Government and people of
the United States a satisfactory solution of the
Mosquito difficulty, until events opened their eyes
to its inefficacy. Nineteen years after its conclu-
sion Nicaragua had paid but $20,000 and Hondu-
ras but $25,000 of the $50,000 which each State
had engaged to pay within ten years. It does not
appear that any more of this sum was ever paid.
A disagreement between Great Britain and the
Mosquitos on one side, and Nicaragua on the
other, as to the interpretation of the treaty, was
referred to the Emperor of Austria for arbitra-
tion, and decided by him in 1881. A few years
later, the American Secretary of State wrote to
the American minister at London :
102
The British Protectorate
To this agreement of arbitration the Government of
the United States was not a party, and it is not bound
by the award of the arbitrator, nor committed in any
way to an admission of the right of Great Britain to
interfere in disputes between the Republic of Nicaragua
and the Indians living within her borders. If it had
been supposed by the United States that the Treaty of
Managua was understood by the Government of Great
Britain to give that country a right of influence, direc-
tion, or control over the destinies of the Mosquito terri-
tory as against the State of Nicaragua, that convention,
far from being hailed by this government as a solution
and termination of the disputes concerning the British
protectorate over the Mosquito Indians, would have been
regarded as a serious obstacle to any other settlement.^
In 1894, Great Britain again intervened between
the Mosquito Indians and Nicaragua, and by impli-
cation invited the United States to join with it in
settling the difference. The United States de-
clined, suggesting that Nicaragua and her Indians
be left to settle their differences between them-
selves, and remarked that the United States, in its
dealings with that part of America, recognized
and would recognize no government but that of
Nicaragua.^ As between Great Britain and the
United States, the Mosquito question was prac-
tically where it was when the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty was signed. It would probably have led
to war had it not been permanently disposed of by
1 Bayard to Phelps, Nov. 23, 1888.
2Gresham to Bayard, April 30, and July 19, 1894.
103
Chapter IF
the action of the Mosquito Indians themselves.
By the Treaty of Managua, the Mosquitos were
privileged to surrender their rights as a separate
people and be merged in the population of Nica-
ragua, on condition of their submitting to the laws
and constitution of that State. Availing them-
selves of this privilege, they applied to the Nica-
raguan Government for incorporation as a part of
the republic. Their application was granted, and
their district was accordingly converted into the
Province of Zelaya. A convention, representing
the few hundred souls that were left of the Mos-
quito people, signalized the event by passing the
following resolutions:
Whereas the change which took place on the 12th of
February of the present year (1894) was due to the
efforts of the Nicaraguan authorities to endeavor to free
us from the slavery in which we were :
Whereas we have agreed wholly to submit to the laws
and authorities of Nicaragua for the purpose of form-
ing part of their political and administrative organiza-
tion:
Whereas the lack of a respectable and legitimate gov-
ernment is always the cause of calamity to a people, in
which condition we have been for a long time :
Whereas one of the reasons for the backward condition
in which we live doubtless was the improper use of the
revenues of the Mosquito territory, which were employed
for purposes which had nothing to do with good ad-
ministrative order:
Article 1. The constitution of Nicaragua and its laws
104
The British Protectorate
shall be obeyed by the Mosquito people who shall be under
the protection of the flag of the Eepublic.
The projected Nicaraguan Canal, for reasons
which do not concern us, was never built, nor was
the construction of it even begun. Until the ne-
gotiation of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty in 1901,
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty prevented the United
States from acquiring a coaling station or other
dependency in Central America, while not remov-
ing Great Britain from her positions in that re-
gion. This was not neutralization. The Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty should have provided for, or
permitted, the expansion of the United States to
something like an equivalent to the territory held
in Central America by Great Britain. As it was
it virtually reversed the Monroe Doctrine, estab-
lishing it against the United States rather than
against Europe. '^ At the same time it flew in the
face of Washington's advice against entangling
alliances with European nations. It would be
wrong, however, to think that Great Britain had
no other object in holding on, as she did, to the
Mosquito protectorate than to thwart the United
States. This mistake was at the bottom of Clay-
ton's policy of disarming Great Britain's protec-
torate. Finding herself debarred by the treaty
1 Buchanan to McClernand, April 2, 1850 {Am. Hist. Rev.,
V. 99-101.)
105
Chapter IF
from using the Mosquito Coast as a base for mili-
tary aggression, she would have no use for it at
all, she would not only renounce or relinquish her
protectorate over it, but would withdraw from it
in every sense.
In diplomacy as in war it is hazardous to count
on an opponent's doing what one wants him to do ;
to base a plan on conjectures as to his attitude or
intentions. Clayton's diplomacy failed because
he misjudged the motives of the British cabinet.
Great Britain's interest in the Mosquitos was not
all imperial selfishness. There was in it an ele-
ment of sympathy for a helpless race exposed to
the cruel oppression which Spanish conquerors
and their descendants visited upon aborigines,
especially on those who refused, as the Mosquitos
did, to accept the Eoman Catholic faith. It in-
cluded also a becoming gratitude to those people
for the shelter, assistance, and support which for
over two hundred years they had afforded to Brit-
ish buccaneers, smugglers, squatters, and invaders.
In 1780 the Mosquitos allied themselves with a
British expedition up the San Juan River, in
which Horatio Nelson, the future admiral, com-
manded a detachment of marines, and by their de-
votion saved it from perishing to a man. Such
services Great Britain felt in honor bound to hold
in appreciative remembrance. Her conduct was
actuated by the three motives of policy, humanity,
106
The British Protectorate
and honor. Clayton reckoned only with the first.
In explanation of his diplomacy he said a few
years later:
Whenever the attempt has been made to assert the
Monroe Doctrine in either branch of Congress it has
failed. . . . The reason for which I was particularly
anxious to make the [Clayton-Bulwer] treaty was be-
cause I was conscious of the fact that Congress would
not assert the Monroe Doctrine, and that we must either
give up the country to the British or obtain a treaty
binding Great Britain to abandon it. We have the
treaty.^
If we had not had the treaty, we should have
given up the country to the British in the same
way and perhaps to no greater extent than we
gave it up having the treaty, except that without
the treaty we should have been free to take some
of it ourselves. The treaty did not take any coun-
try from Great Britain. It prevented her from
taking more by preventing us from taking any.
It asserted the Monroe Doctrine by repudiating it.
The question whether Great Britain violated the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty by continuing, after its
ratification, to maintain her quasi protectorate
over the Mosquito Coast, depends as already
stated, upon whether the provisions as to exer-
cising dominion, etc., were purely prospective or
both present and prospective. They seem to have
1 Senate Speech, Dec. 31, 1855.
107
Chapter IV
been both present and prospective, but on this
point there may be room for an honest doubt.
Moreover, it is only just to Great Britain to say
that she offered to submit the question to arbitra-
tion and the United States would not consent to it.
108
,v
The Clayton-Bulwek Teeaty (Concluded)
Belize, ob British Honduras. The Bay Islands
Belize, or British Honduras
The country now known as British Honduras
was discovered by Columbus in 1502.* The first
recorded mention of a settlement at the place now
occupied by its capital, Belize, was made in 1638,
when a few mariners and adventurers established
themselves there.^ In 1696 a horde of English
pirates took possession of the present Island of
Carmen in the Laguno de Terminos. Though
driven from it by the Spaniards in 1717, they re-
tained a foothold on the coast and penetrated to
the vicinity of the Rio Hondo. The rancheria
which they formed took the name of Walix or
Belice, after their captain whose name was Wal-
lace. They were dislodged by the Spanish gov-
ernor in 1733 but immediately returned, retook
the place, and remained thus established upon
1 An account of the British Settlement of Honduras hj Cap-
tain Henderson.
2 Bulletin of Am. Qeog. Soc, XXXII, No. 4, 1900, p. 331 et seq.
109
Chapter V
what was then part of the Spanish-American
province of Mexico.^ The British settlement of
Belize was recognized by Spain in the treaty con-
cluded with Great Britain in 1763, as an estab-
lishment for "cutting, loading, and carrying away
logwood." In this treaty it was provided that
all fortifications which British subjects might
have erected ''in the Bay of Honduras and other
places of the Territory of Spain in that part of
the world" should be demolished, within a period
of four months; but prescribed no limits, either
as to territory or as to governmental power, for
the settlements. The friction and controversy
that came from this omission it was sought to ob-
viate by the treaty of 1783. In this pact the set-
tlement was defined by metes and bounds. The
northern line was described as the Rio Hondo and
the southern as the Rio Belize, but these limits
were not respected by the settlers. Rather than
fight over their infraction, Spain agreed to their
extension. By the treaty of 1786 the settlement
was enlarged by expansion southward to the Rio
Sibun, the boundary between Mexico and Guate-
mala.2 The occupation of the settlers was given
greater scope. From cutting wood for dyeing it
was extended to "cutting all other wood, without
1 Diccionario-enciclop6dico hispano-amerioano by Montauer
and Simon.
2 The boundary was at this time and for years afterwards un-
defined, but seems to have been eventually defined by a prepon-
derance of authority, as the line of the Sibun.
110
British Honduras
even excepting mahogany, as well as gathering
all the fruits of the earth, purely natural and un-
cultivated." According to the eighth article of
the treaty, the settlers were to husband the wood
so as to make the supply inexhaustible or, failing
to do this, they were, upon its exhaustion, to va-
cate the settlement or to supply themselves by
purchase from inhabitants of the surrounding
country. The treaty prohibited the establish-
ment of plantations or factories or any form of
government, except ''such regulations as their
Britannic and Catholic Majesties might see fit to
establish for the maintenance of peace and order
among their respective subjects." The sover-
eignty of the country was- expressly reserved to
Spain.
By 1821, when the Central American States
achieved their independence, the settlers in the
Belize, having failed to husband the wood as con-
templated in the treaty of 1786, had exhausted the
supply. Instead of applying for a new grant or
vacating the settlement or supplying themselves
by purchase from the surrounding country, as re-
quired by the treaty, they spread across the Sibun,
establishing themselves and plying their trade, as
far south as the Eio Sarstoon in Guatemala.
The rights of Spain in Mexico descended,
through the revolution of that dependency, upon
the independent State which Mexico became. In
111
Chapter V
1826 England acquired by treaty with Mexico the
same rights from that republic as she had pre-
viously acquired from Spain, and no more.^ This
treaty (1826) covered her Belize settlement from
the Eio Hondo to the Eio Sibun; in other words
her legitimate settlement, which was in Mexico.
It did not affect her settlement from the Sibun to
the Sarstoon; in other words her squatter settle-
ment, which lay in Guatemala.
On the 14th of August, 1834, the Government of
Guatemala granted a charter to a British corpo-
ration: "The Eastern Coast of Central America
Commercial and Agricultural Company," for the
purpose of colonization. The land assigned to it
was the department of Vera Paz, part of which
constituted the region between the Sibun and
the Sarstoon invaded by the settlers from Belize.
When the authorities of Belize learned of this
grant they declared that this region was within
their jurisdiction as their property and they re-
fused to give any of it up to the claimants under
the Guatemala grant.
1 J. M. Clayton, Sen. Speech, Jan. 16, 1854. About two years
later our secretary of state Avrote as follows: "It is the indis-
putable fact that England possesses no other treaty rights at
the Belize, except the usufruct conceded by Spain, and which as
late as the year 1826, the British government deemed it impor-
tant to have confirmed by England [sre] by the Mexican republic,
as the presumed sovereign at that time, of the country in which
the settlement of the Belize exists.
"It is understood that Guatemala contests the claim of the
Mexican republic in this respect; and it may be that the precise
limits of the two republics on that side are undetermined."
112
British Honduras
On the 16th of September, 1834, they formally-
declared the coasts and lands which they had oc-
cupied since 1821 to be within their jurisdiction
and the following November sent a petition to
London asking that the settlement be declared a
regular British colony.^ The British company
applied to the home government for information
as to the boundaries claimed by it for the Belize
or as to where, in the Department of Vera Paz, the
company might ''found its settlement without
touching on possessions claimed by the Crown of
Great Britain." ^ It was answered in the follow-
ing terms :
Downing Street, 23 November, 1836.
I am directed by the Secretary of State to acknowledge
the receipt of your letter of the 17th ultimo on behalf
of the Eastern Coast of Central America Company, in-
quiring "what are the boundaries claimed by His
Majesty's Government for British Honduras (or Bel-
ise)?" and I am to acquaint you in answer that the
territory claimed by the British Crown as belonging to
the British settlements in the Bay of Honduras, extends
from the River Hondo on the north to the River Sar-
stoon on the south, and as far west as Garbott's Falls
on the River Belise, and a line on the same parallel to
strike on the River Hondo on the north and the River
Sarstoon on the south. The British Crown claims also
the waters, islands and keys, lying between the coast,
1 United States Docs., Ser. No. 660, Doc. 27, p. 4. (Sen. Doc.
27, 32 Cong., 2 Sess. p. 7.)
2 Leonard S. Coxe, Secretary, to Lord Glenelg, Colon. Off..
Nov. 17, 1836.
113
Chapter V
above defined, and the meridian of the easternmost point
of Light-House Reef.
This was but a partial concession to the claims
of the settlers. It gave them the area that they
coveted and seemed to make them owners of the
territory, but it made no pretention to sover-
eignty. In November, 1840, a new superintend-
ent, MacDonald, proclaimed the law of England
to be the law of the ' ' settlement or colony of Brit-
ish Honduras" and sent a new petition to the
home government which was not granted. In
1846 the settlers asked that goods from Belize be
admitted at British ports free from the discrim-
inating duty charged upon foreign goods. But
the Colonial Office replied that the sovereignty of
Belize territory rested, not in Great Britain, but
in Spain, under the treaties of 1783 and 1786.^
The sovereignty passed to Great Britain in 1859,
when in a treaty with Guatemala, "the boundary
between the Eepublic and the British settlement
and possessions in the Bay of Honduras, as they
existed previous to and on the 1st day of January,
1850, and have continued to exist up to the present
time" is described as extending from the Mexican
frontier Hondo Eiver on the north, to the Sars-
toon Eiver, on the south.^ On the 12th of May,
1 Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy by M. W. Williams,
p. 36.
2 The text of this treaty is given in Sen. Ex. Doc. 194, 47 Cong.,
1 Sess., p. 146.
114
British Honduras
1862, British Honduras, with the boundary de-
fined in this treaty ''was declared to be a colony,
the governor of which was to be the governor of
Jamaica, locally represented by a lieutenant-gov-
ernor, who took the place of superintendent. ' ' At
the end of 1870, in answer to a petition by the
legislative assembly, the principle of popular rep-
resentation was abolished and British Honduras
became a crown colony; and finally, in 1884, its
connection with Jamaica, which had for sometime
been nominal, was completely severed, and it was
given a governor under the immediate control of
the colonial office.^ By these acts a settlement
under the sovereignty, first of Spain and then of
an American republic, and numbering about 2500
square miles, was converted into a British pos-
session with an area of 8600 square miles, a little
larger than that of Massachusetts (Map 3).
While the Kingdom of the Mosquitos was dimin-
ished by its transfer as a district to Nicaragua,
the settlement of Belize was enlarged by its es--
tablishment and incorporation as a colony in the
British Empire.
There are Americans as well as Britons, learned
in so-called international law, who allege that the
colonization of Belize was not a violation of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. They contend that the
1 Historical Geography of the British Colonies by C. P. Lucas,
p. 309, 1890.
115
Chapter V
treaty was not intended to apply to this territory.
How was it understood in this respect by the con-
tracting parties? The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
was approved by the Senate on the 22nd of May,
1850, and ratified by President Taylor on the fol-
lowing day. It was then sent to England for rati-
fication by Queen Victoria. Apprehension was
excited in England lest British Honduras should
be embraced in the treaty. The natural and sur-
est way to guard against this was to make a res-
ervation to the contrary in the ratification. This
was not done. The treaty was ratified without
reservation on the 11th of June, 1850, but a res-
ervation was to be attached to the final act of
negotiation, to the exchange of the ratifications.
On the 28th of June, Bulwer was informed that
the President had ratified the treaty and that
Clayton was prepared to exchange the ratifica-
tions. On the following day he conveyed to Clay-
ton the reservation in the form of the following
declaration in writing :
In proceeding to the exchange of ratifications of
the convention signed at Washington on the 19th of
April, 1850, between her Britannic Majesty and the
United States of America, relative to the establishment
of a communication by ship canal between the Atlantic
and Pacific Oceans, the undersigned, her Britannic
Majesty's plenipotentiary, has received her Majesty's in-
structions to declare that her Majesty does not under-
stand the engagements to that convention to apply to her
116
'British Honduras
Majesty's settlement at Honduras [British Honduras]
or to its dependencies. Her Majesty's ratification of
the said convention is exchanged under the explicit dec-
laration above mentioned.
Done at Washington the day of , 1850.
H. L. BULWER.
The ratificatio-ns were not exchanged until sev-
eral days after this. Belize is here referred to
as '*Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras." No
pretention is made to its being under British sov-
ereignty, *'its dependencies" are not described
nor its boundaries specified. This declaration had
been sent to Sir Henry Bulwer from London. In
the letter of transmittal, Lord Palmerston said :
I do not anticipate that the Government of the United
States will raise any objection to receiving and assent-
ing to that declaration, but if they should decline to re-
ceive and assent to it, you will not proceed to the ex-
change of the ratifications until - you shall receive the
further instructions of her Majesty's Government.^
Mr. Clayton did not decline to receive the dec-
laration, but he did decline to assent to it. Before
taking this action he consulted with Senator W.
R. King, chairman of the committee on foreign
relations of the Senate:
Clayton to King, July 4, 1850. I am this morning
writing to Sir. H. L, Bulwer, and while about to decline
altering the treaty at the time of exchanging ratifica-
1 Palmerston to Bulwer, June 14, 1850.
117
Chapter V
tions, I wish to leave no room for a charge of duplicity
against our government, such as that we now pretend
that Central America in the treaty includes British Hon-
duras. I shall therefore say to him in effect that such
construction was not in the contemplation of the nego-
tiators or the Senate at the time of the confirmation.
May I have your permission to add that the true under-
standing was explained by you as chairman of [the com-
mittee on] foreign relations, to the Senate, before the
vote was taken on the treaty? I think it due to frank-
ness on our part.
King to Clayton, July 4, 1850. The Senate perfectly-
understood that the treaty did not include British Hon-
duras. Frankness becomes our government, but you
should be careful not to use any expression which would
seem to recognize the right of England to any portion of
[British] Honduras.*
On the strength of the latter communication Mr.
Clayton addressed to Sir Henry Bulwer the fol-
lowing counter-declaration :
Department of State, Washington,
July 4, 1850.
Sir:
I have received the declaration you were instructed by
your government to make to me respecting Honduras and
its dependencies, a copy of which is hereto subjoined.
The language of Article 1 of the Convention concluded
on the 19th day of April last, between the United States
and Great Britain, describing the country not to be oc-
cupied, etc., by either of the parties, was as you know,
twice approved by your Government, and it was neither
'i- Daily National Intelligencer, Jan. 8, 1853.
118
British Honduras
understood by them, nor by either of us, the negotiators,
to include the British settlement in Honduras (com-
monly called British Honduras, as distinct from the
State of Honduras), nor the small islands in the neigh-
borhood of that settlement, which are known as its de-
pendencies.^ To this settlement and these islands the
treaty we negotiated was not intended by either of us
to apply. The title to them it is now and has been my
intention throughout the whole negotiation, to leave as
the treaty leaves it, without denying, affirming, or in
any way meddling with the same, just as it stood pre-
viously.
The chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations
of the Senate, the Hon. William R. King, informs me
that "the Senate perfectly understood that the treaty
did not include British Honduras." It was understood
to apply to and does include, all the Central American
States of Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, Nica-
ragua, and Costa Rica, with their just limits and proper
dependencies. The difficulty that now arises seems to
spring from the use in our convention of the term ' ' Cen-
tral America," which we adopted because Viscount Pal-
merston had assented to it and used it as the proper
term, we naturally supposing that, on this account, it
would be satisfactory to your government; but if your
government now intends to delay the exchange of rati-
fications until we shall have fixed the precise limit of
Central America, we must defer further action until we
have further information on both sides, to which at
present we have no means of resort, and which it is cer-
tain we could not obtain before the term fixed for ex-
1 British Honduras was never included in the state of Hon-
duras ". . . it is certain that the appellation of 'Honduras' com-
monly applied in England to the settlement of the Belize, is a
misnomer, originating perhaps in local projects of aggrandize-
ment." (Marcy to Dallas, July 26, 1856).
119
Chapter V
changing the ratifications would expire.^ It is not to
be imagined that such is the object of your govern-
ment ; for not only would this cause delay, but absolutely
defeat the convention.
Of course no alteration could be made in the conven-
tion, as it now stands, without referring the same to the
Senate; and I do not understand you as having au-
thority to propose any alteration. But on some future
occasion, a conventional article, clearly stating what are
the limits of Central America, might become advisable.^
In this communication, Mr. Clayton says in sub-
stance that the treaty does not apply to British
Honduras, and that it does apply to it, if that
settlement is included in Central America; and
that the question as to how much, if any, of it is
in Central America is to be left unsettled subject
to future negotiation; he says, in other words,
that the treaty does not apply to the settlement
in question and that it may apply to it. He recog-
nizes the settlement as a fact, but does not recog-
nize any title in it. For all he says, the settlement
may be wholly a trespass on one or more Centr'al
American States. He admits that it is outside of
the treaty, so far and so far only, as it is outside
of Central America. The sequel to the foregoing
correspondence he describes in the following
statements which he endorsed on his copy of the
declaration of Sir Henry Bulwer:
iThe exchange of ratification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty
was to take place within six months of the date of signing, or
by the 19th of October, 1850.
2 Sen. Ex. Doc. 12, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., pp. 2, 3.
120
British Honduras
Memorandum
Department op State,
Washington, July 5, 1850.
The within declaration of Sir H. L. Bulwer was re-
ceived by me on the 29th day of June, 1850. In reply,
I wrote to him my note of the 4th July, acknowledging
that I understood British Honduras was not embraced
in the treaty of the 19th April last, but at the same
time, carefully declining to affirm or deny the British
title in their settlement or its alleged dependencies.
After signing my note last night, I delivered it to Sir
Henry, and we immediately proceeded, without any fur-
ther or other action, to exchange the ratifications of said
treaty. The blank in the declaration was never filled
up.^ The consent of the Senate to the declaration was
not required ^ and the treaty was ratified as it stood
when it was made.
John M. Clayton.
P. S. The rights of no Central American state has
been compromised by the treaty or by any part of the
negotiation.
Sir Henry understood, when he and Mr. Clay-
ton exchanged ratifications, that the treaty, if it
did not include, did not exclude, the settlement of
1 The blanks were filled up subsequently, to read "29th" and
"June."
2 When Sir Henry Bulwer insisted that the treaty should
include what he said were certain islands and dependencies of
Belize, adjacent to Honduras [Bay Islands] Mr. Clayton told
him substantially, "If you are not satisfied with the treaty as
it is and with such explanations as we have made between our-
selves, I must submit it to the Senate and you must take the
consequences." Sir Henry Bulwer declined, and it was not sent
to the Senate in that way. (Senator Butler, Cong. Globe, Feb.
20, 1856, p. 469.)
121
Chapter V
British Honduras and ''its dependencies." By
exchanging ratifications under this condition he
violated the instructions of his government. It
seems probable that he had never read the latter
or had forgotten them until he came to prepare
his report. However this may be, he knew that
Clayton could not be made to accept, as received
before the exchange or, for that matter, after it,
any communication modifying the treaty in any
respect.^ He had either to confess his fault to his
government or to conceal it by falsifying his re-
port. Confession meant the ruin of his career as
a diplomat. Falsification was a forlorn hope, but
might save him. He took his chances on the lat-
ter, and on the 5th of July wrote, under date of
the 4th, as to Mr. Clayton :
British Legation,
July 4th, 1850.
Sir:
I understand the purport of your answer to the dec-
laration dated the 29th of June, which I was instructed
to make to you on behalf of her Majesty's Government,
to be that you do not deem yourself called upon to mark
out at this time the exact limits of Her ]\Iajesty's settle-
ment at Honduras, nor of the different Central American
States, nor to define what are or what are not the de-
pendencies of the said settlement; but that you fully
I I also denied his authority or power even to propose any
alteration [in the treaty] ; and he made no attempt to assert
that he had such a power. (J. M. Clayton, Senate speech, Jan.
12, 1854, Append., Cong. Globe, XXXI, 91). See also Clajrton's
counter-declaration, July 4, 1850, ante.
122
British Honduras
recognize that it was not the intention of our negotiation
to embrace in the treaty of the 19th of April, whatever
is her Majesty's settlement at Honduras, nor whatever
are the dependencies of that settlement, and that Her
Majesty's title thereto subsequent to the said treaty will
remain just as it was prior to that treaty, without under-
going any alteration whatever in consequence thereof.
It was not the intention of Her Majesty's government
to make the declaration I submitted to you more than a
simple affirmation of this fact, and consequently, I deem
myself now authorized to exchange Her Majesty's ratifi-
cation of the treaty of the 19th April for that of the
President of the United States. ...
I wait, etc.
H. L. BULWER.*
Diplomatists are chary of expression. They
are especially backward about committing them-
selves to writing. This formal communication of
the British negotiator would not have been made
had the question to which it relates been settled
before. It is conclusive evidence that Clayton's
reply to the British declaration was not satisfac-
tory to Bulwer ; that it was not an acquiescence in
Bulwer's construction of the treaty. This last
word from Bulwer shows the purpose of reading
into Clayton's language something that was not
there. It refers to ''Her Majesty's title" to Brit-
ish Honduras as if to a credential the scope of
which might be uncertain, but the validity of
which, so far as it went, was unquestionable. Mr,
1 Index and Arch., Dept. of State.
123
Chapter V
Clayton had not questioned this alleged title, but
neither had he given it any recognition. His lan-
guage indicates that neither Mr. King nor the
Senate recognized any British title in British
Honduras, whether within or without Central
America.
Mr. Clayton had clinched the matter by stating
in substance that no other meaning than the one
that he had indicated in his counter-declaration
could be given to the treaty without the concur-
rence of the Senate. But all this was ignored by
her Majesty's plenipotentiary and has been ig-
nored ever since, not only by the British Govern-
ment, but also by American historians. Accord-
ing to both, generally speaking, the negotiators
agreed unreservedly to consider the provisions re-
garding occupation, fortification, dominion, etc.,
as not applying to any part of British Honduras.
To return to the narrative. Having miscon-
strued Clayton's language so as to give to the
treaty the meaning that he wanted it to have, Sir
Henry coolly proposed in his bogus letter of the
4th, that the negotiations, which were already for-
mally concluded, be brought to a conclusion. In
some way that is past finding out, this communi-
cation was smuggled into the archives of our De-
partment of State where it now reposes. It does
not bear the usual office mark or any other nota-
tion giving date of receipt. A copy of it was
124
British Honduras
forwarded by its writer to the British foreign of-
fice, where of course it gave the false impression
that it was part of the understanding on which the
treaty was based. ^ If it was ever seen by Mr.
Clayton, it was only years after the conclusion of
the treaty.
The spurious document was alluded to in an
extract-memorandum of Sir Henry Bulwer's which
he sent privately to Daniel Webster on the 17th
of August, 1850, Webster having succeeded Clay-
ton as Secretary of State. After referring to
Bulwer's declaration and Clayton's counter-dec-
laration, he says :
Sir H, Bulwer's answer states what the intentions of
H. M.'s Gov. really were and accepts Mr. Clayton's as-
sent to the declaration he [Bulwer] was instructed to
make, as satisfactory.^
It was reproduced in full by Sir Henry Bulwer
1 Letter of transmittal :
Bulwer to Palmerston
Washington, July 8, 1850.
My Lord:
1 have the honor to enclose to your Lordship the correspon-
dence which passed between Mr. Clayton and me, after delivering
the declaration inclosed in your Lordship's despatch of the 8th
ultimo, respecting Her Majesty's settlement at Honduras and
its dependencies.
Your Lordship will perceive that the Secretary of State fully
assents to the fact that the rights of her Majesty over the British
settlement at Honduras and its dependencies remain untouched
by the convention of the 19th April. . . .
2 Index and Arch., Dept, of State.
125
Chapter V
in an article which he contributed in 1856 to the
Edinburgh Review.^ It appeared also the same
year in an article published in the Quarterly Re-
view ^ which was attributed to Bulwer. In these
papers one reads :
It was on this note of Sir H. Bulwer and not on the
preceding note of ]\Ir. Clayton, that the subject closed. —
{Edinburgh Review.)
On these words [of Sir Henry Bulwer] without a
single demur, Mr. Clayton exchanges the ratifications
with Sir Henry Bulwer and on this last letter [Sir
Henry's] — not on the previous one [Clayton's] with its
verbal qualification — is the treaty thus based, signed
and completed. — {Quarterly Review.)
Let us recaU here what Clayton, in his endorse-
ment on Sir Henry's original declaration, said
with reference to his own counter-declaration:
*'I delivered it to Sir Henry, and we immediately
proceeded without any further action to exchange
the ratifications of said treaty." If corroboration
of this positive and explicit statement be neces-
sary, it may be got from the following letters,
which so far as known, have never before been
published :
Clayton to Marcy, May 28, 1856
**. . . My attention has been arrested by a doc-
ument published on the 64th page [of British Blue
iVol. CIV, p. 267.
2 Vol. XCIX. The Disputes with America.
126
British Honduras
Book 'laid before Parliament recently'] ^ pur-
porting to be a letter addressed to me by Sir
Henry L. Bulwer dated 'July 4, 1850.'
"I deem it my duty to inform you without delay
that no such letter was ever received by me from
him. It purports to be a reply to my counter-
declaration or letter to him of the same date. I
do not stop to consider whether it could be of any
effect to change the spirit or meaning of my reply
to him of that date, but I assert with perfect con-
fidence that from my own knowledge no such
letter was ever received by me from him. I know
that he was distinctly informed when the ratifica-
tions of the treaty of the 19th of April, 1850, were
exchanged, that he could not be permitted to reply
to my counter-declaration, and that I would not
exchange, if he attempted it.
''It is not possible that I can be deceived or
mistaken on this subject. The memory of the
facts is as fresh in my mind as it was on the morn-
ing of the 5th of July, immediately after the ex-
change ... I never can forget my fixed and un-
alterable purpose at that time to exchange on no
letter he could write in reply to mine of the 4th
of July to him.
' ' The exchange of the ratification occupied us on
the day (4th of July, 1850) and nearly all night
after it. It took place in fact about the break of
^Accounts and Papers, State Papers, LX.
127
Chapter V
day of the 5th of July. Our difficulty came in the
adjustment of my counter-declaration in reply to
his declaration. We disputed about its phrase-
ology. It is well known to others that, when in-
formed that the British declaration was to be
made before the exchange, I refused to exchange
at all until he agreed to receive my reply which
effectually obviated the objections, otherwise in-
superable, which were entertained on the part of
our government. Of this the public has been long
fully apprised by the letter of the Hon. Reverdy
Johnson, attorney-general of the United States at
the time of the exchange, which letter is filed and
published among the documents of the Senate.^
''The only person present during the exchange
1 Reverdy Johnson to Clayton, December 30, 1853.
"... I assisted, by your request, in the arrangement of the
phraseology of the counter-declaration, dated the fourth day of
July, 1850, to Sir Henry L. Bulwer's declaration of the 29th of
June. . . . the exchange of the ratifications on that counter-
declaration was, on the part of the British minister, a complete
waiver of every objection that could be taken to any statement
contained in it.
"In point of law, the declarations of the negotiators, not sub-
mitted to the Senate, were of no validity and could not affect the
treaty. Both understood that. This government had decided that
question in the case of the Mexican protocol, and the British
Government was informed of their decision. The very power to
exchange ratifications gave them the same information, and it
is impossible that the British minister could have been deceived
on that subject." (Append. Cong. Globe, Jan. 28, 1856, p. 75).
For the full powers of the plenipotentiaries, see Appendix D.
That of Mr. Clayton was ''to conclude and sign a convention
touching the premises, for my [President Taylor's] ratification,
with the advice and consent of the Senate of the United States,
if such advice and consent be given."
128
British Honduras
was tlie Librarian of the State Department, now
the attorney-general of the State of Delaware,
George P. Fisher, Esquire — the same gentleman
who was appointed by the President commissioner
to settle and adjust the claims on Brazil. Mr.
Fisher is a man of high standing and unquestioned
character as for morality and honor. He was
present during the whole interview with Sir
Henry when the exchange took place and received
the treaty and all the correspondence at the time
and filed it by my orders in the State Department.
He cannot fail to recollect a fact so important as
that no such letter as Sir Henry's of the 4th of
July was received by me before the exchange. I
have written to him at New Castle [Delaware],
where he is now engaged in the public prosecu-
tions, to give you the information on this subject,
which I know he must be possessed of.
"It will be observed that Sir Henry's declara-
tion is, for some reason unknown to me, omitted
from the [British] Blue Book.^ A copy of the
draft of a declaration appears on the 60th page.
It is well known that I refused to accept this dec-
laration without replying to it; and I could not
have permitted him to reaffirm it again, as is sub-
stantially done by his alleged letter of 4th July,
1850.
1 It is published in Brit, and For. State Papers, XLII, 162, 163
(1864).
129
Chapter V
''On the 3rd of January, 1853, the whole of the
correspondence [was] transmitted to the Senate
by Mr. Everett in a reply to a resolution of the
Senate. He sent the correspondence, of which at
that time it thus appears this letter tvas not a part.
No such letter was then on the files. If it had
been, it must have been sent to the Senate.^ Af-
terwards, by some means unknown to me or to the
clerk who has had charge of these papers, this
letter was placed among the papers and now, I
hear, is to be found on file.
* * The report of Mr. Everett containing the dec-
larations on both sides, with my memorandum in-
dorsed on the declaration of the British minister
in the handwriting of Mr. Fisher and signed by
me, was published in January, 1853 — ^has been
published again and again in the public papers of
this country as well as in Great Britain, has been
often commented upon by myself and other mem-
bers of the Senate and by Lord Clarendon and
Mr. Buchanan, without any [sic] the slightest ref-
erence to or seeming knowledge of, this letter. I
have no doubt it has been fraudulently filed in
the Department of State since the correspondence
was sent to the Senate [1853]. In some comments
1 This reasoning is not conclusive. Whoever was responsible
for its admission to the files was perhaps capable of concealing
it there. It is now in its proper chronological place in a sub-
stantially bound volume, and has apparently been tliere since the
volume was originally bound. When this took place I have been
unable to learn, but it was in all probability before 1853.
130
British Honduras
of mine it clearly appears that I always believed
my own memorandum correct, made at the time,
which substantially denies the existence of such
a letter, appears [sic] by the following extracts
from speeches made by me in the Senate. ' ' ^
G. P. Fisher to Clayton
Washington, May 21, 1856
"In compliance with your wish expressed last
evening at your lodging, I proceed to give you in
writing my recollection of what transpired at your
residence on the night of July 4th and on the
morning of July 5th, 1850, in regard to the ex-
change of ratifications, between yourself and Sir
Henry Bulwer (the British negotiator), of the
treaty of the 19th of April, 1850.
*'I well remember the protracted conference
that took place between you and Sir Henry on that
occasion. He had, some days before, desired you
to accept the declaration which is published on
page 118 of the pamphlet containing the corres-
pondence between Mr. Buchanan and Lord Clar-
endon (a copy of which was kindly forwarded to
me in February last by Doctor Mackie of the De-
partment of State), but which I think you refused
to accept as a state paper, though in fact it was
1 Clayton Papers, Library of Cong. XI, 2199. The memoran-
dum referred to is the one endorsed on the British Declaration,
July 5, 1850.
131
Chapter V
received at the Department — until you had pre-
pared the counter-declaration on the evening of the
4th of July previous to Sir Henry's visit. This
counter-declaration, as stated in the memorandum,
also published on page 118 of the same document,
was, to the best of my recollection, given to Sir
Henry on the evening of the exchange of ratifi-
cations. A long discussion ensued between you
respecting the propriety of his making and your
receiving, another note from him in reply to your
counter-declaration; but I saw none and I knew
of no other at that time. On the morning of the
5th I endorsed the memorandum above mentioned,
on the declaration submitted by Sir Henry. There
was then no such paper as a rejoinder by him to
your counter-declaration among the papers con-
nected with the treaty; otherwise I am sure you
never would have told me to endorse on Sir
Henry's declaration the memorandum which was
dictated by you and written by me on the morning
of the 5th, immediately after Sir Henry's depar-
ture from your house ; and I hope, my dear Sir, you
know me well enough to believe that I never would
have consented to pen that memorandum, had any
such paper, to my knowledge, been in existence.
The words used in the memorandum are: ** After
signing my note last night I delivered it to Sir
Henry and we immediately proceeded without any
further or other action to exchange the ratifica-
132
'British Honduras
tions of said treaty." How could you possibly
have made that statement within a few minutes
after he had delivered you a letter which proved
that you did not immediately proceed without any
further or other action to exchange? If you dic-
tated that memorandum whilst you had such a
letter from Sir Henry, you deliberately put on
record proof which could not fail to convict you
at some future period of deliberate falsehood;
and I, who recorded the statement at your request,
if I had possessed any knowledge of such a paper,
did an act which was certain also in after time to
convict me of a participation in the guilt. What
motive could possibly have influenced us or either
of us, to have been so wicked or so unwise? I
confess I was not a little surprised when I saw in
the British Blue Book such a paper purporting
to have been addressed by Sir Henry to you in
reply to your counter-declaration, prior to the ex-
change of ratifications, and the more so since I
have never seen such a paper in any document
published by our Government on the Central Ame-
rican question or in any newspaper published in
this country or in Great Britain. While I was in
the Department of State I acted as your confiden-
tial clerk. I believe you withheld nothing from
me, but gave me your entire confidence respecting
all matters of diplomacy. I was with you day and
night whilst you were negotiating this convention
133
Chapter V
— sometimes from early breakfast till after mid-
night— you seemed certainly to unbosom to me
every difficulty and every anxious thought con-
cerning it in every stage of its negotiation ; and I
feel sure you would not have intentionally con-
cealed from me any paper relating to it; and un-
less you had done so, I must have seen this re-
joinder to your counter-declaration, had it then
existed, for I had free access at all times, in your
absence as well as in your presence, to all your
papers pertaining to State affairs, I am there-
fore right confident that no such paper could have
been received by you.
''When Mr. Everett communicated these papers
to the Senate, January 3, 1853, he communicated
only the declaration and your counter-declaration.
(See Senate Executive Documents, No. 12, Thirty-
second Congress, Second Session.) * If the pre-
tended letter of Sir Henry was then in the Depart-
ment, it must seem rather strange that the clerk
who had charge of the correspondence with the
British Legation should have overlooked it when
complying with the Senate 's resolution calling for
those papers.
"I ought perhaps further to observe that when
I took the declaration and counter-declaration
from your residence to the Department of State
on the morning of July 5th, the memorandum en-
1 Published in Brit, and For. State Papers, XLII, 160 et aeq.
(1864).
134
British Honduras
dorsed in my handwriting and signed by you con-
tained some words which do not appear in the
published copy. I think you will find on inspec-
tion of the original memorandum at the Depart-
ment that immediately preceding the closing sen-
tence these words occur, viz: "The blank in the
declaration was never filled up" or words sub-
stantially the same.^ By that expression was
meant that the date of the declaration had not
been inserted when it was received ; that sentence
has evidently been omitted since the declaration
was delivered by me in the Department. Why
it has been so omitted I am at a loss to conjecture.
But it would seem that since its delivery, a date
has been inserted in the declaration of Sir Henry
and that a different date from the true one, which
should have been the 4th day of July, 1850.^
1 The words quoted appear in the original memorandum on file
in the State Department. They are stricken out in pencil, but
perfectly legible.
2 The date as originally inserted, may have been the 4th of July,
1850. The words "29" and '"June" appear to have been substi-
tuted for words erased. Clayton states in his Memorandum al-
ready quoted, that he received the Declaration on the 29th of
June. It bears the office mark: "Rec'd 29th June, 1850, at Dept.
State." In the copy transcribed in the Letters Sent Book of
the State Department, it bears the date "29th day of June, 1850"
with every appearance of having been entered with the rest of
the transcription. In the transcription of Clayton's Memorandum,
rnade in the same book, the sentence, "The blank in the declara-
tion was never filled up," does not appear. It could not have
been included and erased. These circumstances show that the
date, "29th" day of "June," was inserted in the declaration be-
tween the 5th of July and the date on which these transcriptions
were made. This date, however, cannot be determined.
135
Chapter V
**It is always difficult, you know, to prove a
negative, but in this case the importance of the
subject demands a rigid scrutiny as to the time
when the declaration of Sir Henry was received
at the Department. The British declaration as
signed by Sir Henry is not inserted in the British
Blue Book, though the form or draft of it is there.
In your counter-declaration you say that ''a copy
of it is hereto subjoined" and we accordingly find
it subjoined to your letter of the 4th of July.^
"The words as set forth in the Blue Book on
page 63 are 'a copy of which is herewith sub-
joined,' but the copy does not therein appear.
Herewith might have been consistent with the sup-
pression of the copy, but hereto could not.
''On this subject, I find by referring to your
speeches in January, 1854, and on the 17th and 19th
of March, 1856, a period anterior to the arrival
of the Blue Book in this country, that in speaking
of these declarations, you always say that the ex-
change of ratifictions took place immediately after
your counter-declaration of the 4th of July, 1850.^
1 Archives of the Department of State. The parts indicated by
italics in the following extract are apparently substituted for
parts erased.
British Legation,
July Jf, 1850
"Sir: ^
1 understand the purport of your anstcer to the declaratioH
dated the 29th June, which I was instructed to make to you in
behalf of Her Majesty's government to be: that you . . .
2 See also speech of March 8, 1853.
136
British Honduras
**This was manifestly the impression fixed upon
your mind whenever you expressed yourself about
it after the exchange took place, and it is remark-
able that Mr. Johnson in his last letter of Decem-
ber, 30, 1853, appended to the Senate's Executive
Document No. 13, Thirty-third Congress, First
Session, uses these words, showing distinctly his
impression to have been the same as your own.
Rather it is not a mere impression, for he states
it as a positive fact that when Sir Henry consented
to receive your counter-declaration of the 4th of
July, you then consented to exchange upon that
counter-declaration. Mr. Johnson, I am sure,
must have been familiar with the fact, as he him-
self states that he assisted you in drafting your
counter-declaration, after you had determined to
break off the negotiation, as I know you at one
time did, after Sir Henry's insisting upon making
the declaration.
''But, my dear Sir, will you not permit me to
suggest, that no matter what may have been the
purpose of those who have inserted this pretended
letter of Sir Henry among the papers in the State
Department, if it should turn out to be found
there, after I had, by your direction filed the gen-
uine papers there, your counter-declaration still
completely annuls the effect and defeats the in-
tention of those who have interpolated this docu-
ment among the records pertaining to this nego-
137
Chapter V
tiation. In your counter-declaration you not only
say what the dependencies of Belize are, but you
expressly state that the treaty 'does include all
the American States with their just limits and
proper dependencies' and you go still further and
inform Sir Henry that 'no alteration could be
made in the convention without referring the same
to the Senate,' by any declaration which he had
made or could make. However important there-
fore it may be to detect fraud, yet so far as re-
gards the treaty, it remains intact and must be
construed by its own provisions and not by any
declaration of the negotiators.^ ..."
As late as December 30, 1882, Sir Henry's pre-
tended answer to Clayton was embodied by Lord
Granville, in an ''instruction" to the British min-
ister at Washington, as bearing on the construc-
tion of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. A copy of
this communication of Lord Granville's was fur-
nished to our Secretary of State, Mr. Freling-
huysen, but so far as can be learned, no exception
was taken to it, and the fraudulence of the Bulwer
paper was never exposed. For more than sixty
years it has been misleading students of history
by appearing without remark in a standard com-
pilation of the treaties of all nations.^
1 Clayton Papers, Library of Cong., XI, 2201.
iRecueil general de Traitis, etc., by de Martens, XV, 194.
138
British Honduras
The mutual declarations of the plenipotentiaries
at the exchange of the ratifications did not and
could not in any way alter the terms or provisions
of the treaty. These included, after that act as
they did before, a prohibition against the establish-
ment of a colony by either of the contracting par-
ties in any part of Central America. According
to Clayton, the term ''Central America" was
adopted by Sir Henry and himself ''because Vis-
count Palmerston had assented to it and used it
as the proper term." ^ The first instance that I
find of its use in the negotiations is in a letter
from Lawrence to Palmerston of November 8th,
1849.2 It had been used, however, by Palmerston
and Clayton before this.^
The President 's understanding of the term was
substantially that expressed by Clayton in his
counter-declaration to Bulwer, as meaning the ter-
ritory of the late Confederate States "with their
just limits and proper dependencies," including
so much of British Honduras as lay within those
limits, and excluding all that lay without them.*
1 Clayton to Bulwer, July 4, 1850.
2 Appendix C.
3 For instance, Palmerston to Castellon, minister of Nicaragua,
April 26, 1849, and Clayton to Squire, May 1, 1849.
4 I most certainly would bear testimony "that the whole sub-
ject was referred to the President and perfectly understood by
every cabinet minister as well as by the President himself," and
until the charge was made against you in the Senate on the 6th
[of] January, which you have now so triumphantly met, I could
139
Chapter V
At this time the federation had been a thing of
the past for about ten years. To exclude British
Honduras from Central America it was necessary
to take this term in an obsolete sense. That such
use of it was intended to mislead cannot be proved
and is therefore not to be asserted or insinuated,
but that it did mislead and, by so doing, was an
important factor in securing for the treaty the
vote which it received in the Senate, may be ac-
cepted as an established fact.
The just limits of the federation of Centro-
America were never determined, as Clayton sug-
gested they should be, by ''a conventional article."
Sir Henry Bulwer wrote to Lord Palmerston
(August 6, 1850) :
not have supposed it possible that any member of the Senate could
have understood the treaty otherwise than we did ( Reverdy John-
son to Clayton, March 17, 1853. Clayton Papers, Library of Con-
gress).
Further evidence on this point may be found in the phrase
"concerning the States of Central America and the Mosquito
Coast," used by the President in the full powers which he issued
to Clayton on the 6th of April, about two weeks before the sign-
ing of the treaty (Appendix D). The term "States of Central
America" is obviously political not geographical. This meaning
is emphasized by the use of the connective "and." If "Central
America" had been used in a geographical sense, the phrase should
have read "Central America, including the Mosquito Coast." It
is true that, taking the term Central America in its political
sense, "including," not "and," was the proper connective, as the
Mosquito Coast was politically included in the Central American
states of Honduras and Nicaragua, but Great Britain denied this
fact and as a consequence this phraseology, both in the full powers
and in the treaty (Article I), inconsistent as it was with the
contentions of the United States, was tolerated as a concession
to the British attitude.
140
British Honduras
The term ** Central America" is used by Mr. Clayton
and myself in our convention.
The usual acceptance given to it would simply em-
brace the five states, viz: Honduras, Guatemala, Salva-
dor, Nicaragua, and Costa Rica, which formerly con-
stituted the Central American Republic.
I think it might be advisable that the two governments
come to a clear understanding as to whether they mean
that the five states in question with their just boundaries,
whatever those boundaries may be, are meant by the
term ** Central America."
Lord Palmerston took the hint thus given him
and retained the diplomatic advantage of imper-
fect definition. He wrote to Bulwer (September
11, 1850) :
... It will be sufficient for the purpose of the conven-
tion to construe the term "Central America" as com-
prising those States which formed the republic formerly
known by that name; that is to say, Guatemala, Costa
Rica, Nicaragua, Salvador and Honduras; and it is not
necessary that their boundaries should be especially de-
fined.
Lord Clarendon, who succeeded Lord Palmer-
ston as Foreign Secretary, being inadequately
posted, it would seem, caused some confusion by
using the term Central America with the mean-
ing which he had been accustomed to give to it.
Writing to the British minister at Washington
(May 27, 1853), he said:
Great Britain has nowhere in the treaty of 1850 re-
141
Chapter V
nounced, nor ever had any intention to renounce, the
full and absolute right which she possesses over her own
lawful territories in Central America, such as that desig-
nation [Central America] was distinctly understood and
declared, by the negotiators of the Treaty.
Great Britain had never claimed any territory
in ' ' Central America " as ' * her own. ' ' Lord Clar-
endon found it easier to leave this language of
his unexplained than to explain that the posses-
sion to which he referred as in Central America
was British Honduras. But he later admitted his
mistake indirectly by saying:
It is generally considered that the term "Central
America" — a term of modern invention — could only ap-
propriately apply to those states at one time united
under the name of the "Central American Kepublic,"
and now existing as five separate republics. (Clarendon
to Buchanan, May 2, 1854.)
With respect to the district of Belize, Her IMajesty's
government consider that the only question to be de-
termined as regards Central America is that of the
boundary between that country and the British Posses-
sions (Clarendon to Dallas, June 26, 1856).
Referring to such lapses as Clarendon's, Cramp-
ton wrote;
... I am at present unable to supply you with an
explicit explanation of the passages of the dispatches
from which it seems to be inferred that Belize is stated
by the British government to be situated in Central
142
British Honduras
America. ... A fair inference, however, from the text
of treaties and other documents to which I have access,
with regard to the title of Great Britain to British
Honduras and its dependencies, would lead me to con-
clude that British Honduras is situated in Mexico and
not in Central America, properly so-called. . • • ^
It occurs to me that in the dispatches in question . . .
the term "Central America" may have been used in some
geographic sense in which it has not unfrequently been
applied to the central part of this continent, and not in
the true political and diplomatic meaning of the term.
I would remark too that the boundaries of Central Amer-
ica, in the political sense, are in some respects, not yet
completely defined, more particularly as regards the
boundary between Costa Rica and New Granada, which
is still in dispute between those states.^
A court of arbitration would probably have de-
cided this question of boundary by a compromise
and have drawn the Belize-Guatemala line some-
where between the Sibun and the Sarstoon rivers,
but this would only show, as did the award in the
Anglo-Venezuelan boundary dispute, how unjust
arbitration can be. There can be no reasonable
doubt that the just limits of Guatemala on the
north were the line of the Sibun River, if not a
line further north. President Taylor was prob-
ably as vague in his idea on this point as Clayton
was, but no more so. It may be concluded that he
understood the line of demarcation to be some-
where between the Sibun and the Sarstoon rivers.
iCrampton to Clayton, Jan. 7, 1854. Cong. Globe, 1855-1856,
p. 1205.
143
Chapter V
How did the Senate see it! In his message
transmitting the treaty to the Senate, President
Taylor said: "Should this treaty be ratified it
will secure in future the liberation of all Central
America from any kind of foreign aggression."
He gave no definition of the term Central America.
Johnson's Gazetteer, published in London in 1851,
contained the following delimitation of the
country :
Central America is the long and comparatively narrow
region between latitude 7° and 22° north and longitude
78° and 94° west, connecting the continents of N. and S.
America, and comprising, besides the Central Amer,
Confed., Yucatan, parts of Mexico and New Granada,
Poyais, the Mosquito Coast, and British Honduras. In
a more limited sense the term is applied to the following
republics. . . .
[mentioning Guatemala, San Salvador, Honduras, Nicar-
agua and Costa Rica]
It was a small portion of the people of Great
Britain or of the United States who ever thought
of British Honduras at all, and during the nego-
tiation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty this terri-
tory was little in the minds of the American pub-
lic, of the plenipotentiaries, or of the Senate. At-
tention was generally fixed upon the Mosquito
Coast. Clayton and Bulwer understood British
Honduras to be wholly or for the greater part,
144
British Honduras
outside of Central America; of the people gen-
erally who gave any thought to the subject, there
were more who thought of it as in Central Ame-
rica than who thought of it as outside of it; there
was thus a sufficient number who thought of it as
within Central America to call for a special under-
standing, if it was to be considered as outside of
it. Unless otherwise defined or explained, the
term Central America would be taken in its geo-
graphical, or usually accepted sense, and so be
understood to include all of British Honduras.
Was there any special definition or explanation
of it given to the Senate ? In his note of July 4th
to Senator King, Clayton asked, *'May I have
your permission to add that the true understand-
ing was explained by you, as chairman of [the
committee on] foreign relations, to the Senate,
before the vote was taken on the treaty?" King
did not give this permission, he did not say that
he or anyone else had explained the matter to
the Senate. He simply asserted, without any ac-
counting for his knowledge or belief : * ' The Sen-
ate perfectly understood that the treaty did not
include British Honduras." He meant that the
Senate understood, as Clayton understood, that
the treaty did not include legitimate British Hon-
duras; but that it did include all the territory
within the late Federation of the Centre of Amer-
ica. But with this meaning the assertion was
145
Chapter V
challenged and denied by a number of senators
who were in the Senate when the treaty was acted
on. Among these were: Borland, Cass, Chase,
Downs, Mason, and Soule,^ who with the possible
exception of Cass, spoke not only for themselves,
but for the Senate generally, to the effect that the
treaty was understood to include all British Hon-
duras. Senator Chase quoted the first sentence
only of the foregoing delimitation {Johnson's
Gazetteer) and said:
*'. . . That is the description which we had a
right to believe was intended by this treaty when
it was presented to the Senate. "^
There is a difference between having a right to
believe and believing. But the former implies the
latter and the actual belief of the Senate was thus
asserted:
Now, Sir, I am perfectly free to say for one that,
doubting greatly as I did at the time the expediency of
the ratification, I should never have voted for it, had I
supposed that any secret construction was put upon it
irreconcilable with the obvious import of its language.
It would have been impossible, in my judgement, to have
secured its ratification, had its language conveyed the
sense which the private interpretation of Mr. Clayton's
letter puts upon it. Indeed I doubt whether any Senator
would have voted for its ratification, had it been sup-
1 Senate speeches: Borland, Jan. 10, 1853; Cass, id,, Jan. 11
and 16, 1854; Chase, Jan. 6, 1853; Domis, Jan. 6 and 10, 1853;
Mason. March 14, 1853; Soiile, Jan. 10 and 12, 1853.
2 Senate Speech, Jan. 6, 1853.
146
British Honduras
posed that at the very time the treaty was under con-
sideration here a correspondence was in progress, of
which the Senate was not apprised, with the view of fix-
ing in advance the construction of the treaty, by impos-
ing upon its terms a sense quite different from their
natural and obvious import.^
But this reminiscing took place a number of
years after the treaty was negotiated, while the
United States was in controversy with Great Brit-
ain over her colonization of the Bay Islands as a
dependency of British Honduras, when the United
States was for this reason interested in making
out a case against Great Britain with regard to
British Honduras. So considering the fallibility
of memory and the force of patriotic bias, it would
not seem judicial to accept the statements of these
half a dozen senators as conclusive against the
testimony borne by Senator King at the time of
the negotiation. Our conclusion then is this.
From the -River Sibun (taking this line as north-
ern boundary of Guatemala), southward to the
Sarstoon River, the colonization of British Hon-
duras fell within the limits of Central Amer-
ica, as that term was used in the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, and was therefore a violation of the
treaty. North of the Sibun as well as south of
that line, it was a contravention of the Monroe
Doctrine;
On the 3rd of December, 1860, President Bu-
1 Cong. Globe, Jan. 6, 1853, p. 238.
147
Chapter V
chanan, in an annual message to Congress, said:
The discordant constructions of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty between the two governments, which at different
periods of the discussion, bore a threatening aspect, have
resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this
government.
About twelve years later, British Honduras
having in the meantime been declared a colony.
Lord Granville wrote to the British ambassador
in Washington :
The points in dispute were practically conceded by this
country [Great Britain] and the controversy terminated
in a manner which was declared by President Buchanan
to be amicable and honorable, resulting in a final settle-
ment entirely satisfactory to the government of the
United States.^
These statements have been extensively quoted
as evidence of the satisfactory settlement of the
Clayton-Bulwer controversy. But they are incor-
rect so far as they refer to British Honduras.
Under the assumption of a protectorate of Mosquito,
British authority was at that time [1850] in actual visible
occupation of one end of the Nicaragua route, whether
with or without title is not now material, and it was in-
tended by this treaty to dispossess Great Britain of this
occupation. This object was accomplished in 1859 and
1860 by treaties between Great Britain, Guatemala, Hon-
1 Granville to West, Jan. 14, 1882.
148
The Bay Islands
duras, and Nicaragua, referred to in Lord Granville's
dispatch of January 14th, 1882. It was to this adjust-
ment, which was one of the prime objects of the treaty
and not to the colonization of British Honduras, that
Mr. Buchanan in his message of December 3, 1860, al-
ludes as an amicable and honorable adjustment of
dangerous questions arising from the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty. . . .
The United States have never given their assent to this
conversion of the British "settlement" in Central Amer-
ica, under Spanish American sovereignty, into a British
possession with British sovereignty.^
The Bay Islands
In the Bay of Honduras, at a distance of from
thirty to fifty miles from the State of Honduras,
is a cluster of islands known in English as the Bay
Islands. The largest one, called Roatan, is about
eighty-four miles in circumference. The others
in order of size are Quanaja,^ Utilla, Barbaretta,
Helena, and Morat. About them, the gulf is
strewn with wooded islets or keys that look like
floating groves. Roatan, which was discovered by
Columbus in 1502, was seized and occupied by
British freebooters in 1642 and held by them until
1650, when the invaders were expelled by the cap-
tain-general of Guatemala. The Indians inhab-
iting the island were transported to the mainland
and the island left uninhabited. A century later
1 Frelinghuysen to Lowell, May 8, 1882.
2 Or Bonacca.
149
Chapter V
the British descended upon it, established and
fortified themselves on it, but in 1780 they were
again expelled. The treaty of peace of 1783 pro-
vided that they should abandon not only the con-
tinent, with the exception of Belize, but also "all
islands whatever dependent upon it." As the
British evaded the stipulations of this treaty more
stringent terms were made by the Treaty of 1786.
These required that they "evacuate the country
of the Mosquitos, as well as the continent in gen-
eral, and the islands adjacent without exception."
This time the agreement was kept. Great Britain
abandoned the island. In 1796, being at war with
Spain, she conquered it again, but in 1797 she had
again to give it up. By her treaty with Spain of
1814, she was excluded "from the country of the
Mosquitos, the continent in general, and the is-
lands adjacent without exception. ' ' When in 1821
the Central American provinces achieved their
independence the Bay Islands were under the
jurisdiction of the province of Honduras. They
remained subject to the government of Honduras
when that province became a State and when that
State entered the Federal Eepublic of Central
America. They so continued until May, 1830,
when the British Superintendent of Belize made
a descent upon Roatan and seized it in behalf of
the British Crown. The Federal Republic made
an immediate and energetic remonstrance, and the
150
The Bay Islands
act was formally disavowed by the British Gov-
ernment and the island again abandoned. In 1838
a party of liberated slaves from the British island
of Gran Cayman came to the island to settle. A
fraction of this party, not conforming to the laws
of Honduras for the government of the island,
had a difference with its commandant. As a con-
sequence the Superintendent of Belize took pos-
session of the island a second time in 1839. The
British Government sanctioned his actions and
continued to support the British settlers. More
Cayman Islanders came to swell the natural in-
crease of the original settlement. The Federal
Eepublic having dissolved, Honduras remonstrated
alone, but in vain. Salvador acted in the matter in
concert with the State of Los Altos. On the 10th
of August, 1839, she signed with the latter a treaty
of amity and alliance containing the following
provisions :
Article 8. The representatives of both contracting
states shall be fully authorized to treat with respect to
the means conducing to the recovery of the Island of
Roatan.
Article 9. It is likewise agreed by the contracting
parties — First: that no agricultural or manufactured
product of any English possession shall be admitted [to
their respective territories], under whatever flag it may
come. Second: that no merchandise coming from an-
other nation, shall be admitted to our territory, if it
comes in an English vessel; and third, that these pro-
151
Chapter V
hibitions shall last as long as England may fail to put
Central America in possession of the said Island of
Roatan.
Chatfield, the British consul-general, considered
these articles an unprovoked indignity to the Brit-
ish Crown and called upon the moribund govern-
ment of Los Altos for humiliating reparation.
He went so far as to send to its Secretary of State
a draft of a retraction for him to sign, worded as
follows : ^
The consul of His Britannic Majesty, having repre-
sented to the sovereign government of Los Altos that
articles 8 and 9 of the treaty of amity and alliance, signed
at Quezaltenango, the 10th of August of last year, be-
tween the sovereign states of Los Altos and Salvador are
an infraction of the principles of amity and good under-
standing which have hitherto happily regulated the in-
tercourse between Great Britain and the States of Cen-
tral America.
The supreme government of Los Altos, desirous of pre-
venting the interruption of friendly relations with Great
Britain, makes the formal declaration that articles 8 and
9 of the forementioned treaty of Quezaltenango, being
offensive to the English Crown, are hereby rescinded.^
The proposition was declined.^ Salvador and
Los Altos held their position, but so did the
British.
In 1841, Macdonald, the superintendent of Bel-
1 Translated from the Spanish.
2Montfifar III, 72, 73, 425.
3 Molina to Chatfield, Jan. 18, 1840.
152
The Bay Islands
ize, with the aid of a naval contingent, occupied
Roatan and continued along the coast in an Eng-
lish frigate, flying the Mosquito flag, stopping at
San Juan and maltreating as already related. Col-
onel Quijano, the commandant of the port.^
The British Government instructed the gov-
ernor of Jamaica in case any foreign power took
possession of Roatan, to order the departure of
the intruders and, if not obeyed, to eject them.
Meanwhile the population was increased by an ad-
dition of English settlers, and Macdonald seeing
his opportunity, offered to appoint magistrates
for them. Sometime later the offer was accepted
and thereafter magistrates were regularly ap-
pointed by the Belize superintendent.^
When the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was con-
cluded. Great Britain was still in possession of
the Island of Roatan, or supporting her squatter
subjects in their unlawful occupation of it. The
thought which she now gave to withdrawing from
the Mosquito Coast magnified the importance to
her of the Bay Islands. She was unwilling to give
up the mouth of the San Juan River without taking
a position from which she could command it. As
such position she chose Roatan, with a number of
other islands in its vicinity. Accordingly, on the
17th of July, 1852, a proclamation was issued by
1 Ocean to Ocecm by J. W. G. Walker.
2 Anglo- Americcm Isthmian Diplomacy by M. W. Williams, p. 39.
153
Chapter T
the acting colonial secretary at Belize declaring
that *'her Most Gracious Majesty the Queen, has
been pleased to constitute and make the islands of
Roatan, Bonacca, Utilla, Barbaretta, Helena, and
Morat to be a colony, to be known and designated
as the Colony of the Bay Islands," and on the
10th of August, 1852, more than two years after
the ratification of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
these islands off the co-ast of Honduras and be-
longing to that country, were formally occupied
and declared annexed to the superintendency of
British Honduras.
In a paper addressed to Lord Clarendon and
dated July 22, 1854, Mr. Buchanan, our minister
in London said :
When the [Clayton-Bulwer] treaty was concluded
Great Britain was simply in the occupation of Euatan,
under the capture made by Colonel McDonald [Governor
of Belize] . She had established no regular form of gov-
ernment over its few inhabitants who, to say the least,
were of a very heterogeneous character. She had then
taken but the first step, and this in the face of the remon-
strance of Honduras, towards the appropriation of the
Island. . . . Her relation towards Ruatan at this time
was merely that of a simple occupant. From this occu-
pancy it was easy to retire . . . Instead, however, of
taking one step backward, the government of Great
Britain has since taken a stride forward, and has pro-
ceeded to establish a regular colonial government over it.
But this is not all. They have not confined themselves
to Ruatan alone, but have embraced within their colony
154
The Bay Islands
five other Central American islands off the coast of the
State of Honduras. One of these, Bonacca, says Bonny-
castle, is an island about sixty miles in circumfer-
ence, ... It was not known however in the United States
that the British government had ever made claim to any
of these five Central American islands previous to the
proclamation announcing their colonization.
Sir Henry Bulwer, in his letter of July 4, 1850,
to Secretary Clayton, alleged that Clayton had
recognized certain islands as dependencies of Bel-
ize and as not included in the treaty. Subse-
quently the British Government contended that
the islands thus recognized were the Bay Islands.
Clayton had recognized as possibly constituting
dependencies of British Honduras ''the small is-
lands in the neighborhood of that settlement'* [of
British Honduras]. But the Bay Islands were in
the vicinity, not of British Honduras, but of Hon-
duras. Even if they were dependencies of British
Honduras, they were not recognized by Clayton,
as outside of the treaty. Clayton's words were:
''To this settlement and these islands" [in the
neighborhood of British Honduras], not to this
settlement and its dependencies, "the treaty we
negotiated was not intended by either of us to
apply. ' ' There was no reference here to the Bay
Islands. Moreover he expressly included the Bay
Islands in the treaty, as he did every other terri-
tory, in case it proved to be comprised in the term
155
'Chapter V
** Central America."^ He quoted from Senator
King that ''the Senate perfectly understood that
the treaty did not include British Honduras," but
not a word did King say about dependencies.
Neither Clayton nor the Senate understood that
the Bay Islands were dependencies of British
Honduras, and both regarded them as included in
the treaty. The British Government, on the other
hand, held that they were dependencies of British
Honduras, and that, British Honduras not being
in Central America, these islands were not in Cen-
tral America, and that not being in Central Amer-
ica, they were not included in the treaty. That
they were not dependencies of British Honduras
is borne out by British as well as by American evi-
dence. In the dispatch already quoted from Sir
George Grey to S. Coxe, Esquire, of November 23,
1836, the limits of British Honduras are defined.
Their most eastern point is given as Light House
Keef, which is about seventy-five miles from
Roatan.
In a letter to Secretary Clayton, dated January
7, 1854, Mr. Crampton, the British minister at
Washington, said:
The dependencies of British Honduras are in my opin-
ion distinctly enumerated in the treaty of 1786.
1 Clayton to Bulwer, July 4, 1850.
156
The Bay Islands
In this treaty, they are delineated as follows :
. . . The point of Cayo Casino [St. George's Key] and
the cluster of small islands which are situated opposite
that part of the coast occupied by the [wood] cutters at
the distance of eight leagues from the Wallis River, seven
from Cayo Casino, and three from the river Siboon.
These are the islands previously referred to as
adjacent to British Honduras. But assuming for
the sake of argument that Clayton and Bulwer
had agreed that the treaty did not apply to her
** Majesty's settlement at Honduras or to its de-
pendencies" [including the Bay Islands] such
agreement would not have bound the United
States, seeing that it was never approved by the
President or the Senate, whose joint approval was
required by the terms of Clayton's full powers.
On the 17th of March, 1856, Clayton, then Sen-
ator from Delaware, remarked in the Senate :
There is no evidence that Great Britain ever had
possession of them [the Bay Islands] before she estab-
lished this colony in open defiance of the Treaty.
Exactly a fortnight later, Mr. Crampton, in a
dispatch to Lord Clarendon, said: . . . *4t will be
within your Lordship 's recollection that Mr. Clay-
ton was informed by Sir Henry Bulwer, before
the Treaty of 1850 was signed, that Euatan was
de jure and de facto a British possession ; and Mr.
Clayton has on various occasions since, in conver-
157
Chapter V
sation with me, stated that he considered Ruatan
as much a British possession as Jamaica or any-
other British West Indian Island." ^ Seeing this
extract in a newspaper, Senator Clayton, on the
following day (May 14, 1856), read it before the
Senate and proceeded:
Now, Sir, I wish to say in reference to this statement
of conversations with me, that it is utterly untrue in
every particular, and that the British minister must
have labored under one of the strangest hallucinations
that ever affected the brain of any man in making such
a statement . . . nothing like what he imputes to me
ever escaped from me to him or to any one else. . . .
He wrote to Mr. Crampton (May 16) :
... In the extract of your letter to Lord Clarendon
you stated that "Mr. Clayton had on various occasions
in conversation with me (you), stated that he considered
Ruatan as much a British possession as Jamaica or any
other British West India Island." In reply to this I
said, in my place in the Senate, as appears by the offi-
cial report of the debate, these words: "Now, Sir, I
wish to say, in reference to this statement of conversa-
tions with me, that it is utterly untrue in every par-
ticular," etc. This I maintain it now to be.-
These assertions of Clayton's were corrobor-
ated by statements of Senators Crittenden, Cass,
and Fish.3
Clayton had recognized the Bay Islands as oc-
1 Crampton to Clarendon, March 31, 1856.
2 Clayton Papers, XI, 2196.
3 Cong. Globe (1855-1856), pp. 1205-1207.
158
TUe Bay Islands
cnpied in fact by Great Britain, but he meant that
the treaty, being immediate in its operation,
should terminate that occupation.
... I have been represented, he said, as denying that
any letter was ever written by Sir Henry L. Bulwer to
me before the Treaty of 1850, claiming Roatan as a
British Island. Sir Henry not only wrote me such a
letter, but in conversation claimed the island as British,
as fully as he claimed the right of Great Britain to the
protectorate of Greytown and the Mosquito Coast. But
I have always considered that the treaty of Great Britain
signed after his claim was presented as effectually de-
prived Great Britain of the right to occupy that island,
if it is within the limits of Central America (as I feel
assured it is), as it disarmed her protectorate or de-
prived her of the right to use it [her protectorate] for
the purpose of occupying any other part of Central
America.^
Here he may have erred. He had perhaps no
right to consider the treaty as retroactive. As
long as British control of the Bay Islands, of the
Mosquito Coast, or of Belize remained what it
was before the conclusion of the treaty, the United
States had possibly no grounds for complaint.
But here was a change made subsequently to that
transaction. Referring to the conversion of the
Bay Islands from a mere settlement into a colony.
Lord Clarendon wrote to Buchanan (May 2,
1854) :
1 Clayton to Crampton, May 16, 1856. {Clayton Papera, XI,
2196).
159
Chapter V
. . .Her Majesty's government cannot admit that an
alteration in the internal form of government of these
islands is a violation of the treaty, or affords a just cause
of remonstrance to the United States.
On this point the United States took issue with
Great Britain. It held that the treaty prohibited
the transformation of a squatter settlement into
a colony. This violation of the Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty and contravention of the Monroe Doctrine
continued until 1859, when in a treaty with Hon-
duras, Great Britain recognized the islands as a
part of that republic, thus returning them to the
country to which they belonged.
That the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was first pro-
posed by the United States is a misleading half
truth, none the less but so much the more mis-
chievous for its approval and propagation by an
eminent publicist.
Let me repeat, says Senator Root, that this treaty was
sought, not by England, but by the United States. Mr.
Clayton, who was Secretary of State at the time, sent
our minister to France (Mr. Rives), to London for the
purpose of urging upon Lord Palmerston the making
of the treaty. The treaty was made by Great Britain as
a concession to the urgent demands of the United States.^
If a bandit places himself in my doorway, the
only way out of my house, and I propose as a con-
dition to his releasing me that he take my purse,
it might be said with equal truth that this trans-
1 Senate Speech, Jan. 21, 1913.
160
The Bay Islands
action was sought, not by the bandit, but by me ;
that the money was accepted as a concession to
my demands. The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was
forced upon the United States. It is hardly an
exaggeration to say that it was made under
duress.
It has been said that the canal could not have
been built without the financial assistance of Great
Britain, and that we made the treaty to secure
that assistance. To quote from our State papers :
The government and people of the United States,
though rich in land and industry, were poor in floating
capital in 1850. The scheme for a canal, even without
the complications of the Mosquito protectorate, was too
vast for the means of the Americans of that day, who
numbered then less than one half of their numbers to-day.
They went to England, which had what they had not,
[they] surrendered their exclusive privileges, offered an
equal share of all they had in those regions, in order, as
expressed in the seventh article of the treaty, "that no
time should be unnecessarily lost in commencing and
constructing the s^id canal " ^ . . . this government . . .
holds, as stated, to you in my instructions of May 8th,
1882, and May 5, 1883, that for the purpose of obtaining
the then needed capital to construct an interoceanic
canal, by the Nicaraguan route, the United States were
willing to surrender a part of their exclusive privileges
in a canal by that route,^ . . .
These views, expressed about thirty years after
1 Frelinghuysen to Lowell, May 8, 1882.
2 Id., Nov. 22, 1883.
161
Chapter V
the negotiation of the treaty, are peculiar to a
single secretary rather than traditional in the De-
partment of State. Comparatively soon after the
negotiation, the then secretary put the matter
thus:
Considering that the United States and Great Britain
have jointly agreed to protect such a canal ... it seems
desirable that the capital required for its construction
should be advanced by the citizens and subjects of both
countries. If, however, English capitalists should not be
disposed to invest their funds in the enterprise, the
means of its construction can easily be obtained in this
country whenever our citizens shall be satisfied of its
practicability and that it would yield a regular and fair
profit.^
If there was any difficulty about raising the nec-
essary money in the United States, it was due to
fear of interruption of the transit and consequent
loss of dividends, as an incident of war forced
upon the United States, and not to the lack of
available capital in the United States. A United
States author said in 1820 :
If Costa Rica were in possession of a liberal govern-
ment, willing to lend its encouragement to this important
object, capital in abundance would speedily be forthcom-
ing, either from Great Britain or from the United States.^
1 Webster to Lawrence, May 14, 1852.
2 Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution, etc., by W. D. Robinson,
p. 349. It should be noted that when this was written the Fed-
eration of Centre America, which included Costa Rica as well as
Nicaragua, had not been formed.
162
The Bay Islands
This language was quoted with approval by a
British writer in 1825.^ In 1850 another British
writer said:
. . . We must look, not only at the traffic which is
even now before us, but we must take into account its
natural increase from the greater cheapness and rapidity
of the new route. We must also look at the growing im-
portance of Oregon and to the certainty of the crowd of
small steamers that will rapidly accumulate on the Pacific
from the smoothness of its waters and the abundance of
the easily worked coal of Vancouver Island.
At the same time, although the view is thus bright,
there is no great likelihood that it will attract any amount
of English money. ... In the United States, however,
the feeling is very different, and every year vast works
are quietly undertaken there and carried to completion
in a way which would surprise those numberless people
who are too apt complacently to believe that all the world
stands still, except when funds are sent from London.
. . ."I would not speak of it," said one of their writers
a few years back, "with sectional or even national feel-
ing, but if Europe is indifferent, it would be glory sur-
passing the conquest of kingdoms to make this greatest
enterprise ever attempted by human force entirely our
own."
We may rely, therefore, that the day is gone by
when the undertaking could be neglected for want of
funds. If carried out entirely by capitalists in the
United States, it will probably be pushed forward with
less rapidity than would otherwise be the case ; but this
will be far more than compensated by the exercise of
greater economy and certainty.^
1 A succinct Vieic and Analysis, etc., by R. B. P. Pitman, p. 110.
i Westminster Rev. (Am. Ed.) April, 1850, pp. 70, 71.
163
Chapter V
When this was written the Erie Canal, built by
the State of New York, was twenty-five years old,
and work on the Panama Railroad was just about
to begin. The latter was completed in 1855.
Each of these enterprises cost from $7,000,000 to
$8,000,000. This money was raised for the Erie
Canal by taxation in the State of New York and
for the Panama Railroad by private subscription,
partly British, but for the greater part United
States. The cost of the prospective canal across
Nicaragua was variously estimated at from $20,-
000,000 to $50,000,000. But the population of the
United States in 1850 was over 23,000,000, while
the people of New York in 1825, when they com-
pleted the Erie Canal, numbered a little over
1,000,000.
That the United States, in its negotiation of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, was actuated by any
sense of financial necessity would seem to be an
after-thought of a few publicists and historians.
Its motive in negotiating the treaty was simply
to remove the obstruction and danger to the canal
constituted by British encroachments and preten-
tions in Central America.
164
VI
The Treaty of Washington (1871). General
Conclusion
The Treaty of Washington
This treaty had several purposes. Its principal
one was to settle the claims of the United States
based on the operations, during the Civil War,
of Confederate commerce destroyers built and
equipped within British jurisdiction. The most
notable of these vessels was the Alabama, and the
claims came consequently to be known collectively
as the Alabama Claims. They were of two kinds :
direct and indirect. The direct claims were based
on the actual destruction and capture of ships and
cargoes by the Confederate vessels, and the indi-
rect on the following forms of damage incidental
to such depredation : the transfer of a large part
of the commercial marine of the United States to
the British flag, the enhanced payment of insur-
ance, the prolongation of the war, and the addi-
tion of a large sum to the cost of it. These were
also called national claims or consequential claims.
The money liability of Great Britain for both di-
rect and indirect damages was estimated by
165
Chapter VI
Charles Sumner as $2,500,000,000 or more. A
joint high commission composed of five British
and five United States commissioners met in
Washington and agreed upon the terms of a treaty
for the arbitration of all the claims. It contained
among others, the following provisions:
Article I. Whereas differences have arisen between
the Government of the United States and the Govern-
ment of Her Britannic I\Iajesty, and still exist, growing
out of the acts committed by the several vessels which
have given rise to the claims generically known as the
"Alabama Claims":
And whereas Her Britannic Majesty has authorized
her High Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries to express
in a friendly spirit, the regret felt by Her Majesty's Gov-
ernment for the escape, under whatever circumstances,
of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports and
for the depredations committed by those vessels.
Now, in order to remove and adjust all complaints and
claims on the part of the United States, and to provide
for the speedy settlement of such claims which are not
admitted by Her Britannic Majesty's Government, the
high contracting parties agree that all the said claims
growing out of acts committed by the aforesaid vessels
and generically known as the "Alabama Claims," shall
be referred to a tribunal of arbitration to be composed
of five Arbitrators, to be appointed in the following
•manner; that is to say: One shall be named by the
President of the United States ; one shall be named by
Her Britannic Majesty; His Majesty the King of Italy
shall be requested to name one ; the President of the Swiss
Confederation shall be requested to name one; and His
Majesty the Emperor of Brazil shall be requested to
name one.
166
The Treaty of Washington (1871)
The ratifications were exchanged at London on
the 17th of June, 1871. The following arbitrators
were appointed:
By President Grant: Charles Francis Adams,
late minister at London.
By Queen Victoria: Sir Alexander Cockburn,
Lord Chief Justice of England.
By the King of Italy : Count Frederic Sclopis,
of Turin, Senator.
By the President of Switzerland: Jacques
Staemfli.
By the Emperor of Brazil : Baron Itajubi, then
his Majesty's minister plenipotentiary at Paris.
Each party had an agent ''to represent it gen-
erally." That of the United States was J. C.
Bancroft Davis ; that of Great Britain, Lord Ten-
terden. The counsel for Great Britain was Sir
Roundell Palmer, who had as assistant, Professor
Montague Bernard. The counsel for the United
States was composed of Caleb Cushing, W. M.
Evarts, B. R. Curtis, and M. R. Waite.
The tribunal assembled at Geneva, Switzerland,
on the 15th of December, 1871. Mr. Davis and
Lord Tenterden presented the cases of their re-
spective governments, and the tribunal directed
that the respective counter cases, additional docu-
ments, correspondence, and evidence called for or
permitted by the treaty be delivered to the sec-
retary of the tribunal on or before the 15th of
167
Chapter VI
April, 1872. The treaty required that within two
months after this date the agents of the opposing
parties should present the arguments of their re-
spective governments to the tribunal.^ In order
that they should have all the time therefor that
the treaty allowed, the tribunal, in adjourning on
the 16th of December, fixed the date of its recon-
vening as the 15th of June, 1872.
Soon after this adjournment the case of the
United States became publicly known through cop-
ies distributed in England and the United States.
In the meantime the British high commissioners
had returned from Washington and created or
confirmed the impression that there would be no
indirect claims. They represented that they had
secured a waiver of them from the United States.
This they had no authority to do.^ There could
hardly be a better judge of the meaning of a treaty
than the astute diplomat who, with Mr. Clayton,
negotiated the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. Refer-
ring to tliis Treaty of Washington, Sir Henry Bul-
wer wrote on the 17th of February, 1872 :
How when our only inducement to make a treaty was
1 It shall be the duty of the Agent of each party within two
months after the expiration of the time limited for the delivery
of the counter-case on both sides, to deliver in duplicate to each
of the said Arbitrators and to the Agent of the other party, a
written or printed argument showing the points and referring to
the evidence, upon which his government relies. . . . (Art. V).
zHackett, Reminiscences of the Geneva Tribunal, p. 1720;
Papers relating to the Treaty of Washington, III, 188.
168
The Treaty of Washington (1871)
to set this claim for indirect damages at rest, we could
frame one which opened it, is to me miraculous. How
they could introduce into such a document the term
"growing out of," which would hardly occur to any one
but a market gardener, is also a marvel.^
The statement of the case of the United States
prepared by its agent in accordance with the views
of its Government, embraced both the direct and
the indirect claims.^ When England fully com-
prehended it, the excitement in the London press
and in both houses of Parliament was intense.^
The air was filled with resentment and protesta-
tion. On the 2nd of February, 1872, General
Schenck, United States minister at London, cabled
to Mr. Fish:
London journals all demand that United States shall
1 Biog. and Crit. Essays by A. H. HayAvard, Esq., p. 328.
2 Davis to Fish, Sec. of State, Nov. 13, 1871 : Herewith I hand
you a printed copy of the Case which I have prepared, to be pre-
sented to the Tribunal at Geneva on behalf of the United States.
The case will be accompanied by seven volumes of Documents,
Evidence, and Correspondence. . . . The seventh volume contains
some miscellaneous matter and full statements of the claims for
losses, national and individual. The former were prepared at
the Navy Department. Their completeness leaves nothing to be
desired. The latter were prepared under my direction by the
clerks in this Department [of State] . . .
Fish to Davis, No. 14, 1871: I have received the copy of the
Case with your accompanying letter of yesterday. The President
approves of your presentation of the Case, and you are instructed
to present it and the seven accompanying volumes, at Geneva in
the manner required by the Treaty, as the case of the United
States, and the documents, official correspondence, and other evi-
dence on which they rely.
3 Rhodes, VI, 366.
160
Chapter VI
withdraw claims for indirect damages, as not within in-
tention of Treaty. . . .
On the following day the Secretary replied :
There must be no withdrawal of any part of the claim
presented. Counsel will argue the Case as prepared,
unless they show to this government reasons for a change.
On the same day the British Foreign Secretary-
wrote to General Schenck:
Her Majesty's Government hold that it is not within
the province of the Tribunal of arbitration at Geneva
to decide upon the claims for indirect losses and in-
juries. . . .
On the 7th of May, Fish cabled to Schenck :
. . . the submission of what are called the indirect
claims is within the province of the Tribunal. The
President alone has not the power to change or alter the
terms or the principles of a treaty. He is . . . anxious
to exhaust all proper efforts to reach a settlement . . .
He will therefore be willing to consider, and if possible,
will present for the consideration of the Senate, any new
article of the Treaty which may be proposed by the
British Government and which, while it settles the prin-
ciple involved in the presentation of what are called in-
direct claims, will remove the differences which have
arisen between the two Governments in their construc-
tion of the Treaty.
In compliance with this suggestion the British
170
The Treaty of Washington (1871)
Government, on the 10th of May, 1872, proposed
through General Schenck the negotiation of an
additional article eliminating the indirect claims.
On the 13th of May this proposed article was com-
municated by President Grant to the Senate, not
as part of a treaty for ratification but as a request
for ''an expression by the Senate of their dispo-
sition in regard to advising and consenting to the
formal adoption of an article" such as the one
proposed. If the reply was favorable, a treaty
was to be prepared and submitted to the Senate
for its regular action. On the 25th of May the
article was returned to the President with amend-
ments by the Senate.^
The important feature of its alteration was the
substitution of a past tense for the present tense
in the contention of the United States respecting
indirect claims. As amended the article said noth-
ing as to the present understanding of the treaty
by the United States. It bound the United States
not to sue for indirect damages, but did this ir-
respectively of the right which it might have under
the treaty or otherwise to bring such suit. This
did not seem to the British Government sufficient
protection against the indirect claims, and the ar-
ticle was never ratified.^
1 Appendix E.
2 . . . the English with an apprehension that was almost comic,
believing that the arbitrators might insist on considering the
indirect claims, although the United States refrained from urg-
171
Chapter VI
When on the 15th of June, 1872, the tribunal
convened at Geneva, the printed argument of the
United States was presented by Mr. Davis. It
was expected that the British agent would there-
upon present the argument on his side. Instead
of that. Lord Tenterden offered a note in which
he asked the Court to grant an adjournment for
a period long enough to enable the two govern-
ments to conclude and ratify a supplementary
convention (the additional article still pending be-
tween the two governments), expressing regret
that he could not present his argument; in other
words, declining to present it. He did not pre-
sent it, and by such failure, violated Article V
of the treaty. When asked how long a period
should be allowed for the negotiations which he
proposed, he replied eight months.
The tribunal adjourned only to the 17th of June.
Understanding rightly that Great Britain was de-
termined to wreck it rather than allow the arbi-
tration of indirect claims, the members agreed
among themselves, extrajudicially, to arrange, if
possible, for the renunciation or withholding of
ing them — Lord Granville absolutely declaring that "an agree-
ment not to press for compensation for these indirect claims is
not sufficient, because the arbitrators in that case might them-
selves proceed to take them into consideration and make them
the subject of an award." How forcible the argimient in favor
of the claims must have seemed to those who feared that the
tribunal would take them up and decide in their favor in spite
of the wish of those who presented them! (Harper's Mag., XLV,
925).
172
The Treaty of Washington (1871)
those claims. They persuaded the counsel of the
United States to express to its Government the
opinion that the claims for indirect damages did
not constitute, **upon the principles of interna-
tional law applicable to such cases, good founda-
tion for an award or computation of damages be-
tween nations," and to advise that the tribunal
be authorized to exclude them from all considera-
tion in making its award.
For the sake, it would seem, of the political
capital to be realized in the next election from a
settlement of the Alabama Claims, President
Grant accepted the advice of the counsel; accord-
ingly Mr, Fish, by his direction, cabled to Mr.
Davis that the indirect claims should be *' wholly
excluded from the consideration of the tribunal in
making its award. ' '
The United States having thus yielded the point,
the British argument was presented, and the ar-
bitration proceeded, with the result that on the
14th of September, 1872, the tribunal awarded
to the United States, on account of direct claims,
including interest, the sum of $15,500,000 in gold.
Of all the principles of international law, the
one preeminently applicable to this case was the
fundamental one that treaties are made to be kept.
Great Britain and the United States had pledged
themselves by the Treaty of Washington to ar-
bitrate the Alabama Claims, both direct and in-
173
Chapter VI
direct. For political reasons certain members
of the tribunal objected to the arbitration of the
indirect claims. All agreed that there was no
precedent for the arbitration of such claims, and
on this ground, with the approval of the Govern-
ments of Great Britain and the United States, but
without modification of the treaty, the indirect
claims were thrown out of Court. Such action
was utterly illegal. The lack of a precedent was
no bar to arbitration. The tribunal had no need
of a precedent. It was convened to make inter-
national law, so far as existing law was inade-
quate. Its failure to arbitrate the indirect claims
was due to political interference from both sides ;
to violation of the treaty by both of the contract-
ing parties.
The Treaty of Washington contained a number
of stipulations as to navigation on both sides of
the frontier line between Canada and the United
States. Among them was the following article
(XXVII) :
TJie Government of her Britannic Majesty engages to
urge upon the Government of the Dominion of Canada to
secure to the citizens of the United States the use of the
Welland, Saint Lawrence, and other canals in the Domin-
ion, on terms of equality with the inhabitants of the
Dominion ; and the Government of the United States en-
gages that the subjects of Her Britannic IMajesty shall
enjoy the use of St. Clair Flats canal on terms of equal-
174
The Treaty of Washington (1871)
ity with the inhabitants of the United States, and further
engages to urge upon the State Governments to secure to
the subjects of Her Britannic Majesty the use of the
several State canals connected with the navigation of the
lakes or rivers traversed by or contiguous to, the bound-
ary line between the possessions of the high contracting
powers on terms of equality with the inhabitants of the
United States.
It will be observed that Great Britain guaran-
tees nothing — she only engages to urge certain
concessions upon the Dominion of Canada; the
United States, on the other hand, guarantees to
Canada the use of the St. Clair Flats Canal,
whether or not the Dominion of Canada grants
the concessions urged upon it by Great Britain;
the United States agrees to urge certain conces-
sions upon certain States, independently of any
concession made or denied by the Dominion of
Canada. It should surprise no one that the
United States was made to suffer for entering
into such a one-sided agreement. Vessels carry-
ing grain from ports west of the Welland Canal
to United States ports east of it were charged a
toll of 20 cents per ton on the grain, while no such
charge was made if the grain was consigned to
Kingston or other Canadian ports.
The fact that the coasting laws of the United
States forbade the carrying by foreign vessels of
domestic merchandise between United States
ports, thus limiting such trade to United States
175
Chapter VI
vessels, made this grain toll practically a discrim-
ination against United States vessels.^
The toll was denounced in our Congress as *'an
open violation, both of the spirit and letter, of
the Treaty of Washington. ' ' ^ But it was not
shown that Great Britain had in any way failed to
keep her agreement. The treaty, literally con-
sidered, was not violated. But the discrimina-
tion against the United States called for retalia-
tion, and the United States responded without
itself departing from the letter of the treaty.
Since the conclusion of the treaty, the United
States Government had assumed control of the
Saint Mary's Falls (Sault Ste. Marie) Canal. To
this waterway, as it was not the ''St. Clair Flats
Canal" nor a lake or river under the control of
a state government, the treaty had no applica-
tion. On the 18th of August, 1892, President
Cleveland, with authority from Congress, imposed
a toll of 20 cents a ton "on all freight passing
through Saint Mary's Falls Canal in transit to
any port of the Dominion of Canada." This ac-
tion had the desired effect. The following Feb-
ruary the Canadian Government made the dues
uniform on all vessels using the Welland Canal
and Saint Lawrence Eiver.
1 Collector of Customs, Detroit, to Commissioner of Naviga-
tion, Washington, June 8, 1888.
2Kep. of Com. of Sen., 1st Sess., 51 Cong.
176
The Treaty of Washington (1871)
The Treaty of Wasliington provided also for
the settlement of long-standing fishery disputes
between Great Britain and the United States.
Certain privileges were accorded by Great Brit-
ain to the citizens of the United States, and cer-
tain others accorded by the United States to the
subjects of her Britannic Majesty. The former
were deemed by Great Britain to be greater than
the latter. As a consequence, it was agreed that
commissioners should be appointed to determine
*'the amount of any compensation which, in their
opinion, ought to be paid by the Government of
the United States to the Government of Her Bri-
tannic Majesty in return for the privileges ac-
corded to the citizens of the United States." ^
One of the commissioners was to be named by the
President of the United States, one by her Bri-
tannic Majesty, and a third by the President of
the United States and her Britannic Majesty con-
jointly; in case the third commissioner should not
be appointed within a period of three months from
the date when this provision should take effect,
he was to be named by the Austrian ambassador
at London.
The agreement to leave an Austrian (under certain
conditions) the choice of a member of this proposed
board was unfortunate. It might reasonably have been
feared that a selection from Vienna would have been
1 Article XXII.
177
Chapter VI
prejudiced, as the ambitions of the house of Hapsburg
had but recently been frustrated by the United States
in the threat to expel IMaximilian and his French army
from the Western continent. The United States govern-
ment realized the blunder too late . . .^
Great Britain was entitled by the treaty to the
advantage of such a selection, provided it resulted
from no fault of hers. The agreement, of course,
did not justify her in delaying the selection of
the third member with the object of having him
appointed by the Austrian ambassador. But this
is precisely what she did. Finding that the
United States entertained objections to Mr. Del-
fosse, the Belgian minister at Washington, she
offered him as her choice.^ Being requested to
name some one else, she did not proceed as the
treaty contemplated, to an agreement between her
Britannic Majesty and the President of the
United States, but through her minister. Earl
Granville, wasted time in proposing that the
choice be referred to the ministers of Great
Britain and the United States at The Hague.
Such a departure from the plain provisions of
the treaty would, as Mr. Fish pointed out, re-
quire the conclusion of a new treaty in con-
stitutional form. By her procrastination. Great
Britain threw the selection of the commission be-
">■ American Diplomatic Questions by J. B. Henderson, Jr., pp.
514-515.
2 Id., p. 515.
178
The Treaty of Washington (1871)
yond the end of three months. It was conse-
quently made by the Austrian ambassador and
fell upon Mr. Delfosse, the representative of a
kingdom that owed its origin to the armed inter-
ference of Great Britain and was ruled over un-
til a few years before, by Leopold I, who was the
son-in-law of George IV, Prince Regent of Eng-
land, and the Uncle of Queen Victoria as well as
of her husband, Prince Albert. King Leopold II
was naturally on the most affectionate terms with
Queen Victoria. This selection made two of the
three commissioners virtually British. The re-
sult of their arbitraton is immaterial. The ac-
tion, or inaction, of Great Britain in this case may
be fairly considered as another violation of the
Treaty of Washington.
General Conclusion
As far back as 1857 President Buchanan, in his
first message to Congress, said:
... It has been our misfortune almost always to have
had some irritating, if not dangerous, outstanding ques-
tion with Great Britain.
Since the origin of the government we have been em-
ployed in negotiating treaties with that power and after-
wards in discussing their true intent and meaning.
Since these words were spoken we have had the
Treaty of Washington, with its dispute as to in-
179
Chapter VI
direct claims, its gwa^i-reciprocal, trouble-breed-
ing provisions as to the use of Canadian and
United States canals and as to the ''transit trade"
through Canada and the United States.^
Upon the passage of the Panama Canal Act in
1912, the governments of Great Britain and the
United States wrestled over the ambiguities
abounding in the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty. This
difference as to the canal tolls is not yet settled in
principle.
With no other nation have we had so much
trouble in under standing-our treaty stipulations as
we have had with Great Britain. It is an' old
stratagem of diplomacy for a powerful state, nego-
tiating mth a comparatively weak one, to make
the terms equivocal, and when the convention is
ratified to impose its own construction of it upon
the other party. In one of the debates over the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, Senator Mason of Vir-
ginia said (February 20, 1856) :
I think whoever has read this correspondence [relative
to the interpretation of the treaty] will have been struck
with the fact that so far as it was conducted on the part
of the American government, plain, ordinary explicit
1 By this arrangement, which still subsists, goods, wares, or
merchandise may go in bond from a point in the United States
by way of Canada to another point in the United States, but not
from a point in Canada by way of the United States to another
point in Canada. (Art. XXIX). It is easy to see how this
favors the railroads of Canada at the expense of those of the
United States.
180
General Conclusion
terms were used to express an explicit and plain mean-
ing; and that the meaning of the American government
cannot be misunderstood, whereas on the part of the
minister who conducted the correspondence on the part
of the British government [Lord Clarendon] if you at-
tempt to get at the meaning of England, you will fail
and find yourself involved in a maze of confused sen-
tences, indeterminate and vague expressions, in which
there is no distinct assertion of title drawn from any
distinct source.
The sixth article of the Treaty of 1783 between
Spain and Great Britain, considered in our dis-
cussion of the Mosquito question, required Great
Britain to withdraw from the Spanish continent,
*'le continent espagnol." This term was under-
stood by Spain to include the Mosquito Coast.
Great Britain knew that Spain so understood it.
But her plenipotentiary signed the treaty as it
stood and her king so ratified it, with the intention
of interpreting it as not including that country.^
Accordingly, Lord Palmerston later declared that
"the Treaty of 1783 did not apply [to the Mos-
quito territory] as that treaty mentioned only the
Spanish possessions in America and said nothing
about Mosquito."
Eeferring to the negotiations over the Suez
Canal, a French authority says :
At the Conference of Paris [1885] England still pre-
serves her aggressive and distrustful attitude. What
1 Anglo-Am. Diplomacy by M. W. Williams, pp. 21, 22.
181
Chapter VI
she fears most is precision. As soon as a question incon-
venient to her policy comes up, she seeks to evade it by
a reservation or, at most, to give it an equivocal construc-
tion, so as to be able later to profit by the uncertainties,
if as she hopes, she succeeds in securing to herself the
definitive interpretation of the Convention.^
In the light of these facts the position taken by-
certain United States publicists that the meaning
of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, because it is de-
batable, ought not to be debated, seems of doubt-
ful sagacity. If we are going to follow that prin-
ciple, we ought to be more careful than we have
been in the training and selection of our diplo-
mats, especially when we have to do with Great
Britain. But Great Britain is not to be blamed
for making the best terms she can in her diplo-
matic bargaining. We should admire the ability
with which she has overreached us. Let us not
waste strength in resenting it, but betake our-
selves to learning how she does it.
Diplomacy is to statesmanship what technique
is to art; expression to conception; or in war,
what tactics is to strategy. Tactics is the execu-
tion of strategy. Diplomacy is the execution of
statesmanship. Statesmanship, like strategy, is
a science, which may be learned, if not mastered,
from books. Diplomacy, like tactics, is an art
which cannot be acquired without practice. While
1 Etude sur le Regime juriddque du Ccmal de Suez by M. L.
Camand, p. 156.
182
General Conclusion
in statesmanship we have little to learn from
Great Britain — not so much perhaps as she has
to learn from us — in diplomacy we cannot do bet-
ter than to go to school to her. We should be
thankful that we have not suffered more from our
inferiority to her than we have. Senator Hitch-
cock was right when he said, ''We have more to
fear from British diplomats than from British
dreadnoughts."^
Now to sum up and balance the accounts of the
treaty violations committed by Great Britain and
the United States against each other. During the
one hundred and thirty years between 1783 and (3 ^
1913, about thirty separate and distinct compacts /
that may be considered as treaties were concluded - v ^ ^
between the two powers. Of these thirty treaties,
the following eight (about one in four) were vio-
lated by Great Britain, several of them in more
than one particular:
1. Definitive Treaty of Peace 1784
2. Jay Treaty 1795
3. Treaty of Ghent 1815
4. Rush-Bagot Agreement 1818
5. Convention respecting Fisheries 1819
6. Convention for Indemnity 1823
7. Clayton-Bulwer Treaty 1850
8. Treaty of Washington 1871
Of these treaties the first, second, fourth, and
1 Senate Speech, Jan. 4, 1912.
183
Chapter VI
fifth may be regarded as violated also by the
United States, but with possible exception of the
fifth, only after violation by Great Britain. No
treaty between Great Britain and the United
States appears to have been violated by the United
States alone.
Regard for treaty rights is not essentially dif-
ferent from regard for other rights. Some idea
therefore of the comparative care of Great Brit-
ain and the United States for such rights may be
formed from a comparison of their records as to
regarding or disregarding each other's rights in
general. Aggregating the injurious acts done, one
to the other, in violation of international law,
since the establishment of our Federal Govern-
ment in 1789, we get, in terms of indemnities
awarded, the following account or balance sheet :
Paid by
United States
to Great
Britain
Cause
Paid by
Great Britain
to United
States
$2,664,000.00
Debts to British Subjects
Treaty of 1802
Illegal captures at sea
Id.
143,428.00
$11,656,000.00
Abduction of slaves
Convention of 182S
British and American Claims
Commission of 1853
1,204,960.00
329,734.00
277,102.88
Alabama Claims
Treaty of Washington, 1871
184
15,500,000.00
General Conclusion
Paid by Paid by
United States Cause Great Britadn
to Great to United
Britain States
Other Civil War Claims
$1,929,000.00 Id.
Claims against U. S.
473,151.26 Convention of 1896
Pecuniary Claims
Hague Convention (1909)
18,646.20 Special Agreement of 1912
$5,505,328.34 $28,690,694.00
The commission appointed to settle the claims
under the special agreement of 1912 is still at
work. It has settled ten claims. The last item
($18,646.20 paid by the United States to Great
Britain) was an indemnity for the capture of the
British schooner, the Lord Nelson, by the United
States naval authorities, on the 5th of June, 1812,
nearly two weeks before the declaration of war.
The vessel was taken by the United States navy,
used against Great Britain in the War of 1812,
and never returned to its owner.^
The other awards of the commission are based
on accidental or unintentional injury and there-
fore not within the scope of this computation.
Considering and comparing the grand totals on
the opposite sides of the account, we may conclude
that th^ United States has more than a safe bal-
ance of good faith to its credit.
1 Am. Journ. of Intern. Law, VIII, 660.
185
APPENDICES
APPENDICES
Chatfield to the Minister
OF THE Supreme Government
OF Nicaragua
Legation of Her B. M.,
Guatemala, Dec. 5, 1850.
The government of Nicaragua having systematically
slighted the frequent propositions which have been made
to the republic of Nicaragua in the name of Her Majesty
the queen of Great Britain, as representing the king of
Mosquito, with a view of determining, by means of some
formal arrangement the boundaries between the domin-
ions of the aforesaid king of Mosquito and the territory
of the Republic of Nicaragua, Her Britannic Majesty has
come to the conclusion that the interest and comfort of
both parties require that the point should not any longer
remain unsettled . . . circumstances require that the
general line of the boundaries which Her Majesty's gov-
ernment is disposed to maintain as Mosquito territory
should be designated, the government of Nicaragua hav-
ing refused to enter into a friendly discussion and to
appoint commissioners to that effect for settling the
boundary line between the two territories. With this
view, the undersigned, Charge d 'Affaires of Her Britan-
nic Majesty in Central America, has the honor of in-
forming the supreme government of Nicaragua, that the
general boundary line of the dominions of Mosquito runs
from the northern extremity of the line which separates
the district of Tegucigalpa in Honduras from the juris-
189
Appendix B
diction of New Segovia in Nicaragua ; and following close
upon the northern frontier of New Segovia, runs off from
the southern boundary of the district of Matagalpa and
Chontales and from thence in an eastern direction as far
as the borders of Machuca in the River of San Juan.
B
Protocol Signed by the Plenipotentiaries of the
United States and Honduras on the 28th of
September, 1849.
The United States of North America and the Republic
of Honduras desiring to secure for the benefit, each of
the other and the general good of mankind, the full and
perfect enjoyment of the proposed grand interoceanic
canal through the isthmus of Nicaragua, and anxious to
remove any causes of apprehension that the Island of
the Tigre in the Gulf of Fonseca and commanding the
same, may fall into the possession of foreign and un-
friendly powers, whereby the free transit of the com-
merce of the world may be obstructed and the useful-
ness of the contemplated great work impaired; for the
accomplishment of these and other important objects,
we the plenipotentiaries of the United States and of the
Republic of Honduras, have agreed and do agree to the
following articles:
Art. I. The republic of Honduras cedes to the United
States of North America the Island of Tigre in the Gulf
of Fonseca, for the time pending the ratification or re-
jection of the general treaty between the two republics,
this day signed by the plenipotentiaries of the same, pro-
vided such time shall not exceed eighteen months.
E. George Squier.
J. Guerrero.
190
Appendix Q
G
1
Clayton to Lawrence
Oct. 20, 1849.
.... say to his Lordship [Palmerston] that we will
gladly enter into a treaty stipulation with her majesty's
government binding both nations never to colonize, an-
nex, settle, or fortify, any part of the ancient territory
of Guatemala, embracing Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Hon-
duras, and indeed the whole Mosquito Coast.
CI. Pap.,"- VI, 1188f .
2
Clayton to Lawrence
Private
Oct. 21, 1849.
If you can procure from England a letter from Lord
P. disavowing all intent to colonize or occupy any part
of Nicaragua or Costa Rica and agreeing to enter into
such a treaty with Nicaragua as ours made by Squier
(marked A), it will save us from a collision with her.
If you could also procure from him a letter disavowing
all intention to colonize or occupy any part of the Mos-
quito Coast that would be still better.
If you could also procure from him an agreement to
guarantee with us the independence and neutrality of
Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Honduras, and the whole British
Mosquito Coast, that would be better than either of the
former.
CI. Pap., VII, 1205.
1 Clayton Papers, Library of Congress.
191
Appendix C
3
Lawrence to Palmerston
Nov. 8, 1849.
.... I have been instructed by the President to in-
quire whether the British government intends to occupy
or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast
(so called) or any part of Central America, I have also
been instructed to inquire whether the British govern-
ment will unite with the United States in guaranteeing
the neutrality of a ship canal, railway, or other com-
munication, to be open to the world and common to all
nations. . . .
4
Palmerston to Lawrence
Nov. 13, 1849.
. . . Her Majesty's government does not intend to
occupy or colonize Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito
Coast, or any part of Central America.
With regard to Mosquito, however, a close political
connexion has existed between the crown of Great Britain
and the state and territory of Mosquito for a period of
about two centuries; but the British government does
not claim dominion in Mosquito . . . with regard to
the Port of Greytown, at the mouth of the river St.
John, Her Majesty's government would fully undertake
to obtain the consent of Mosquito to such arrangements
as would render that port entirely applicable, and on
principles above mentioned, to the purposes of such a
sea-to-sea communication.
192
Appendix C
- Lawrence to Clayton
Private and Confidential
Nov. 15, 1849.
. . . You will observe that Lord Palmerston does not
positively commit himself in regard to guaranteeing the
sovereignty of the Mosquitos. Nor do I intend he shall
come to that poiat. If the British government wishes to
be the protectorate of the Indians, there can, I suppose,
be no objection, provided they will give up their claim
to the territory. I believe Lord Palmerston and Lord
John Russell desire to settle this question, but they know
not what to do with the Indians. . . .
CI. Pap., VII, 1292.
Clayton to Lawrence
Dec. 10, 1849.
... The note of Lord Palmerston to yourself of the
13th ult., upon the subject of the Mosquito question, is
in many respects satisfactory. . . . Lord Palmerston 's
offer, however, to obtain the consent of Mosquito to such
arrangements as would render the Port of Greytown ap-
plicable to the purposes of such a communication is
pregnant with a meaning which materially qualifies the
other parts of his note. This offer implies that the
British ministry persists in regarding the Mosquitos as
a sovereign state and that their consent alone is necessary
for any arrangements involving the use of the port of
Greytown. This government, however, can never ac-
knowledge the independence of the Mosquitos or admit
that they have any rights of sovereignty over the port
of Greytown or the country adjacent thereto. . . .
CI. Pap., VII, 1341.
193
Appendix C
7
Lawrence to Palmerston
Dee. 14, 1849.
The occupation of Greytown and the attempt to es-
tablish a protected independence of Mosquito throw at
once obstacles in the way, excite jealousies and destroy
confidence, without which capital can never flow in this
channel . . . the undersigned can discover no cause that
will insure the accomplishment of this great work except
the extension of Nicaragua from shore to shore, includ-
ing of course, the dedication of Gre3i;own to the pur-
poses of the canal, which Her Majesty's government
have already expressed a willingness to do. . . . The
undersigned has therefore the honor to inquire of Vis-
count Palmerston whether Her Majesty's government
are willing ... to let the protectorate of the Indians
pass to other hands under proper checks and guards
for their humane treatment and let such parts of the
territory (said to be occupied by them) as may be
necessary be dedicated to this great work.^
BuLWER IN Quarterly Review
(Vol. XCIX) 1856
In the foregoing correspondence, dominion is disowned
— close political connection is asserted. What was that
close political connection? The humane protection of
those Indians from aggression and such aid towards civil-
izing and christianizing them as the advice of a super-
intendent at the councils of their chief might afford — in
short the connec,tion distinct from dominion, then actually
1 To this inquiry no answer was received. About this time
the negotiations were transferred to Washington.
194
Appendix C
known to exist. What then do the negociators? — ^they
take the very question of the American minister — they
take the very answer the question receives from the
British government, as the guide and groundwork of
their own negoeiation — ^they shape those words into a
clause of the treaty, and they define the political con-
nection with the Mosquitos claimed by the British gov-
ernment as distinct from dominion, by saying, that
neither Great Britain nor America will make use of any
protection either state affords — any alliance either has
or may have with any people, to fortify, occupy, colon-
ize, or exercise dominion in Central America.^
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was thus purely com-
mercial. It was not framed to- settle the Mosquito ques-
tion, but to prevent the Mosquito question being an ob-
stacle to the completion of the American canal.
""The protectorate is admitted, its continuance is ad-
mitted. You shall not make use of the protection you
afford or may afford, to do so and so : words that imply
a right that might be possessed then, and a right that
might be assumed hereafter . . . occupation in the ter-
ritory of another power has invariably a military or
imperial significance. . . . But take the word according
to its plain sense, in "Johnson's Dictionary" — to "oc-
cupy" is to possess or rather to take possession. In
neither sense of the word, diplomatic or familiar, did
we occupy the Mosquito territory at the time of the
treaty, nor do we so occupy it now [1856] ... Do we
1 In a letter, Sir Henry wrote from Ehoda-on-the-Nile, Febru-
ary 17, 1872: . . . "when I had to make a treaty with them
[Americans] I took the trouble of going over all their old treaties,
and in important passages, I only used such words as they had
used, in the sense in which they had used them. Then wlien they
began their usual disputes about interpretation, I quoted their
own authority." (Biog. and Critical Essays by A. Hayward II,
328.)
195
Appendix C
occupy it by military garrison? Certainly not. Do we
assume dominion over the Indian King? So much the
contrary, that we compel the few English who are in the
territory to acknowledge his soyereignty, and it is the
very acknowledgment of his sovereignty of which the
Americans complain. . . .
9
Clayton to Bulwbr
Private Jan. 1, 1850.
. . . your draft of the proposed convention is here-
with returned . . .
CI. Pap., VIII, 1423.
10
BuLWEB TO Clayton
Sunday
[Feb. 3, 1850] Rec'd 3 p.m.
I enclose you the draft [of the Treaty] as amended
according to your desire.
I have added an article [Article 7] at Mr. White's*
desire and as I understood him, at yours. It can stand
or not as you desire ... H. L. B,
Finis coronat opus!!!
CI Pap., VIII, 1472.
1 Probably J. L. White, a member of the Pacific and Atlantic
Canal Company, organized for the construction and operation of
the canal. Its other members were Cornelius Vanderbilt, N. H.
Wolfe, E. H. Miller, Messrs. Eawden, Grossbeck and Bridgham
(a firm), Hoyt and Heney (do.), Livingston, Wells and Co. (do.),
and O. L. White.
196
Appendix C
11
Clayton to Bulwer
Private & confidential
1/2 past 4 p.m. Feb. 3, 1850.
I have inserted in pencil a few words in the draft on
the 4th page "or assume or exercise any dominion over
the same." See Lord Palmerston's dispatch to Mr. L.
He disclaims expressly any British dominion. We will
do the same. Keep the words.
John M. Clayton.
P.S. If the draft is disapproved by Great Britain, it
is understood between us that it never was made or
thought of.
CI. Pap., VIII, 1474.
12
Clayton to Bulweb
Draft (Private and Confidential)
Feby. 11, 1850.
. . . Our pro jet [of a treaty] signed by us on the 3rd,
which is to be considered as "having never been made"
in case our governments do not approve it, did in my
opinion, bind both parties not to occupy — that is, take
or keep possession — and I did not believe nor do I now
believe that Great Britain would have ever violated the
plain meaning of the word by sending a force to enable
the Mosquito King to drive off the Nicaraguans and keep
the possession by British arms, under any other name.
Others differ with me and insist that Great Britain shall
plainly say "we abandon the protectorate every way."
Could the United States under our projet have sent an
armed force as the ally of Nicaragua to occupy for her
197
Appendix C
the town of San Juan without violating the whole spirit
of the treaty ? Construing our words to have a fair and
honest meaning I thought and still think them sufficient.
But what objection can your government make to ex-
plain our words and exclude, by the explanation, any un-
just inference. I have said to you that, without such an
explanation, our projet is to be held as never having
been made. Pending our private negotiations, without
instructions on either side, I had no opportunity of con-
sulting the President or his cabinet and they were, as I
informed you, entirely ignorant of our doings or inten-
tions, and now, having consulted them, as soon as I
properly could, I have held it a duty to apprise you
frankly and without a moment's delay, of the futility of
our labors. You seem to think the explanations required
impossible. Then let the projet we drew up be consid-
ered as having never been made, according to our writ-
ten agreement. The failure is our private and personal
misfortune, but not the fault of either of our govern-
ments.
Endorsed
... I do hereby certify that the within is the original
draft of a private note addressed by John M. Clayton,,
Secretary of State, on the 11th day of February, A. D.
1850, to Sir H. L. Bulwer, from which I copied the letter
which I know was sent to Sir Henry on the same day
and further that the written draft was copied verba-
tim. . . .
Washington, March 6, 1856,
Geo. p. Fisher.
CI. Pap., VIII, 1481.
198
Appendix C
13
BuLWEB TO Clayton
Feb. 14, 1850.
. . . My opinion undoubtedly is that the project of
convention that we sent to England satisfied the honor
and interests of both parties. If your cabinet however
entertain any doubts upon this matter, I have no wish to
urge a contrary opinion upon you, but at all events, it
would be desirable to know clearly what are the difficul-
ties that exist in order that all parties may as soon as
possible devise the best means (if means there be) for
meeting them. ' ' One never goes so far as when one does
not know where one is going." Our govt is bent, as I
have frequently assured you, upon doing everything
which is honorable & decorous, in order to maintain the
most friendly relations with this country and to promote
a work of general interest to commerce and civilization.
Do not ask from us anything which we cannot grant
without sacrificing some portion of that character which,
after all, it is for your honor and dignity to maintain
unimpaired, because it is the character of your fathers.
Concessions of this kind we can never make to any power
upon earth, nor would we ever like to see you make
them.
Now let me place before you the question as it presents
itself under existing circumstances. "We in consequence
of old engagements, took part with the Mosquito people
against the Nicaraguans and put the former in posses-
sion of a territory which we thought belonged to them;
we were, not in this, doing anything hostile to you ; you
had at that time no peculiar relations with the Nica-
raguans, and we could not suppose that you would take
any part in the quarrel ; ^ but if after this you make a
1 One might think that Bulwer had never heard of the Monroe
Doctrine.
199
Appendix C
treaty with the Nicaraguans recognizing their claim and
agreeing to support their claim, may I not say that you
commit knowingly an act of hostility towards us ? What
would you have said for instance, if we, during the
pending dispute between you and Mexico, had made a
treaty with Mexico, receiving from her a grant within
the boundary which you and she both claimed and
agreeing to support her pretensions? The cases are
nearly parallel, because though the Mosquito territory
is not claimed by us we are, after what has passed, as
much compromised in the Mosquito claim as you were in
the Texan; and, after all, for what reason would you
seek a quarrel with us? for the sake of the canal? We
will do everything to favor it that you can desire; any
proposition for this object, to construct the said work,
to protect its neutrality when made; to deliver our-
selves from the imputation of seeking selfish and exclu-
sive advantages therefrom, I will submit to Lord Palm-
erston with readiness and pleasure; but I am sure you
will perceive that a proposal couched in any form, to
take the territory in question from the Mosquitos, and to
deliver it up to the Nicaraguans would not be a proposal
that we could creditably accept. Moreover such a pro-
posal will have this peculiar character, which is any-
thing but an impartial one, it would be taking a posses-
sion from a people who had been for centuries under our
protection, and who have never given you any offense
in order to make it over to another people whom you
have recently taken under your protection,^ and who by
their language and proceedings towards us of late have
assumed a position of almost quasi hostility.
I wish you, my dear Sir, would think well over the con-
tents of this letter, so that it may lead to some result
1 To this point dictated or copied by an amanuensiB. From
here on in the handwriting of Sir Henry Bulwer.
200
Appendix C
previously to the departure of the next packet. Let me,
at all events, then be able to develop clearly what the
views of your cabinet (if they diifer from those con-
tained in our project) really are. May I beg you, tho'
this letter is but a private one (since I am anxious to
avoid any public controversial correspondence), to lay
it before your colleagues, and if I am not taking a liberty
in such a request, before the President, with whom, were
it agreeable to you and to him, I should be most happy
to converse on the subject, which at this moment is so
near our thoughts. . . .
CI. Pap., VIII, 1490-1493.
14
Clayton to Bulwer
Read to Mr. Bulwer, but not sent to him.
Private and confidential.
Feb. 15, 1850.
I agree with you that "it would be desirable to know
clearly what are the difficulties that exist, in order that
all parties may, as soon as possible, devise the best
means (if means there be) for meeting them." The
chief difficulty, and the only one which I have not yet
been able to overcome, is to be found in the assertion
by your government of the Mosquito title. Your Gov-
ernment does not understand us. So far from seeking
a quarrel with Great Britain the President has been
studious ever since he came into office, to awaken your
Government to the danger to both of us of an approach-
ing quarrel. The Mosquito question was first introduced
into the Congress some years ago, by a Senator from
New York and it has attracted attention through the
country ever since. The deepseated conviction of this
201
Appendix C
nation now is that the British expedition in the name of
the Mosquito King, against the State of Nicaragua was
unjust and in direct opposition, not only to what we
call the Monroe Doctrine, reiterated by Mr. Polk, the
late President, that no European power shall interpose
in the affairs of the American republics, but to the
settled doctrine of the English law, applied by England
and the United States to all savage tribes, than [sic] an
Indian title is but a title by occupancy, liable at all
times to be "extinguished" at the will of the discoverer
of the country. We have applied this doctrine to per-
haps a hundred Indian tribes. We were taught it by
England. She applied it in America, in all cases. It
is true, sound, Anglo-Saxon doctrine, repeatedly sanc-
tioned by the judges of the Supreme Court of the United
States, who have on all occasions expressly declared that
they derived the law from England and English prec-
edents. Nothing could shock the American people more
than the repudiation of this doctrine. They cannot un-
derstand how it can be contested by Englishmen or
Americans. Were England now to claim the protector-
ate in virtue of an ancient alliance made two hundred
years ago, with the Wyandots, the Shawnees, the Root-
diggers, the Blackfeet or the Flatheads of the West or
with the Seminoles and their chief, Billy Bowlegs, such
a pretension would not astonish them more. Your East
Indian princes held a different title. They were sover-
eigns and were recognized as such by England, but no
American sachem or chief within the limits of the United
States or British America was ever regarded as having
any other title than that of mere occupancy, to which
the discoverer had a right of preemption, we call a
right of extinguishment. The Spaniards were not as
just as our ancestors towards the Indians. They did
not acknowledge even an Indian title to occupancy which
202
Appendix C
they were bound to pay for before it could be extin-
guished.
Now do not be alarmed! I am not going to inflict
upon you the sayings of any writer on the law of na-
tions or of any American judge, or even of those English
judges whose great names are held in veneration, not only
in yours, but in my country. I have never thought your
Mosquito title legal or valid. But without taxing your
patience, I will ask your indulgence to permit me to
say to you, as I now do, with equal sincerity and good
feeling, that I have forborne to discuss it with you, be-
cause I thought it unnecessary, when two such nations
were attempting to negotiate for the accomplishment of
the greatest work of the age, that they should quarrel
about such a pretension. My great respect for the
British government restrained me, and I have sought to
appeal to the magnanimity and philanthropy of England,
in such a way, as should not awaken even a suspicion on
her part, that we thought of dishonoring her; and it
has been my wish to prevent such a question from being
made a topic of public discussion in the Congress of the
U. S., because I sincerely desire to strengthen the ties
of respect and amity between the two countries.
Our war with Mexico commenced in May 1846. In the
latter part of 1847 we negotiated with Mexico for the
purchase of California and New Mexico, and in February
1848, we made a treaty with Mexico at Guadalupe
for the cession of those territories. The Nicaragua
route presented us the only chance for a ship canal, a
railroad or any other road or passage across the Isthmus,
and at the very moment of the purchase we were struck
with surprise by the seizure on the part of Great Britain,
in the name of the Mosquito King, of the only outlet for
such a canal or passage.
The territory in the vicinity of the San Juan River was
of little value to England. The Nicaraguans were in
203
Appendix C
peaceable possession of it. The Indians were a miser-
able race, syphilitic and leprous and but few in number.
Their tribe is believed to be more degraded than any
other on the whole American continent. I am assured
that by the laws of Nicaragua, it is death to intermarry
with them on account of the hereditary diseases to which
they are subject. But a few years can elapse before the
whole race will probably be extinct. Their speedy an-
nihilation is believed to be certain from causes which
you and I perfectly understand, and especially the ad-
vance of the white man and the rum bottle. Our ad-
vices from that quarter are that there are not two
thousand of them now on the whole Mosquito Coast and
that between Blewfields and San Juan Rivers there are
but 480 men, women, and children, and they are con-
stantly decreasing in numbers. Now I never knew two
sensible men [to] fight about a blue-bird's skin, and I
think two sensible nations, such as Great Britain and
the United States conceive themselves to be, should have
more brains than to expend life and treasure in a con-
test with friends and kinsmen about these miserable
Indians, and especially if we find on examination that
they will be quite as well taken care of if we let them
alone. Could England lose anything by abandoning
those Indians? Could England possibly lose anything
by omitting to assert their title, for the purpose of con-
structing a work worth more to her and us than a thou-
sand times the value of the whole Mosquito Territory ?
But you ask me, "Why do you seek a quarrel with
us"? I answer we do not; and but for our recent ac-
quisitions on the Pacific, we might have slept in stupid
indifference to the whole project of connecting the two
oceans by a ship canal or other means of passage, an in-
difference which has been a disgrace to the great civilized
nations of the earth for a hundred years. Now in the
middle of the nineteenth century we Yankees have found
204
Appendix C
out that this canal or some other passway must be made
and that there is but one spot yet discovered where such
a passage as we want can be had. We went there to
look at it, and we found that you had taken possession
of the outlet of it at the very moment when it became
indispensable to us. This seemed to us to be unkind, but
we did not want to make a quarrel of it. We examined
the title and found, as we at least thought, that you had
acquired none and we resorted to what we think was
the rightful authority to give us permission to make
the canal. We obtained that permission and we imme-
diately determined to offer you and all other nations
equal advantages with ourselves in case we should make
it, but we asked you, in the kindness of friends, not to
interrupt it, not to control or command it, but to leave
it open for the benefit of the human family — we, your
descendants being among the number.
Now you seem to think that you alone are called upon
to make a sacrifice of something for an object in which
we shall gain equal advantages with yourselves. You
are greatly mistaken. There is not one of these five
Central American states that would not annex them-
selves [sic] to us tomorrow, if they could; and if it be
any secret worth knowing, you are welcome to it — some
of them have offered and asked to be annexed to the
United States already.'^ Your government could not an-
nex one of them with its own consent and in the face of
these facts, we offer to agree with you that we will not
occupy (or interpose to exercise any influence over)
[any of them] if you only consent to give up your al-
liance to your Mosquito King. . . .
In the experimental project [of a treaty] which you
and I have drawn [up] and sent to England, it is pro-
posed that neither nation shall occupy, fortify or colon-
ize. Had our respective governments agreed upon that,
1 Castellon to Bancroft, July 12, 1849.
205
Appendix C
then suppose Great Britain to send down a fleet to San
Juan to occupy or interpose for the Mosquito King as
his ally and protector ; by the same rule we as the allies
of Nicaragua, could send another fleet and would be
bound to do it to help Nicaragua; for we have quite as
good a right to defend Nicaragua as you have to defend
the Mosquito Indians; and with every possible respect
for those who entertain a contrary opinion, I think our
interference would be justifiable on much better prin-
ciples. Nay we should be disgraced if we did not in-
terfere.
The Nicaraguan charge has been, you know, in Wash-
ington. Everybody here who has chosen to inquire of
him knows that the Central American Republics are
ready for annexation to the United States, if we would
admit them. I am not like the farmer who wanted no
outside row to his corn field; but on this subject of an-
nexation, as My Lord Coke sayeth "Note a diversity.'*
Your Anglo-Saxon is everywhere like his ancestors more
than 1700 years ago, "capax, pugnax, rapax." The dis-
ease is hereditary with us, and for that reason our
fathers will more readily excuse us. I shall never
whisper this, my private opinion of our and your pecul-
iar qualities in the ears of any one but an American or an
Englishman. Fitch in the Beggars Opera said "he
would not willingly forget his own honor by betraying
anybody" Que cum ita sint. Do you not plainly see that
in agreeing with you to restrain our appetites, I am en-
titled to more credit for the virtue of abstinence than
even yourself. In sober earnest do you not feel that in
making an arrangement with you, by which both our
countries should be restrained from any influence or con-
trol over the Central American states, we [Americans]
are making that concession which commits us more
against public opinion in America than it commits you
against public opinion in England?
206
Appendix C
I understand your title, and if you desire to enter into
an argument with me on the subject, I will pledge my-
self to lay it before an English audience and show
that your pretension of a rightful alliance with the
Mosquito Indians, for two hundred years or for any
other period is an error. But suppose I succeeded in
such a controversy, should I gain anything more by it
than by a frank appeal to British magnanimity and
British philanthropy ? When we invite Great Britain to
follow us in the progress of commerce and civilization,
her mighty spirit will, I trust, prompt her to lead, not
merely to follow. You know I would have trusted you
[the people and government of Great Britain] upon the
project of a treaty which you and I drafted. Wiser
men think the Senate would refuse to ratify the treaty
without an extinguishment of the Indian title in Central
America, and that though anxious for a friendly settle-
ment of this question with England, they will refuse to
bind us [Americans] by treaty not to occupy, fortify,
colonize, or exercise dominion, over Central America,
unless England will submit to what they consider a
much smaller sacrifice by abandoning the whole British
alliance with the Mosquito King.
I have written to you, my dear Sir, as you wrote to
me, a private and confidential letter. I have shown
your letter confidentially to the President, as you re-
quested. He expressed himself in the kindest manner
towards you and your government, but he is deeply im-
pressed with the conviction that, unless Great Britain
can abandon the protectorate, we cannot abandon our
alliance with Nicaragua. We must and shall attempt
to make the canal.
The result of it all is that we shall vindicate the
Nicaragua title in the least offensive way we can, to-
wards your government; and whenever you shall be
ready to extinguish the Indian title south of Balise [sic]
207,
Appendix C
River or to abandon the protectorate of it south of that
river, we will agree with you not to colonize, fortify, oc-
cupy or exercise dominion over, any part or all of Cen-
tral America. If you refuse to extinguish that Indian
title or to abandon the protectorate, we shall hold our-
selves at liberty to annex any part of the Central Amer-
ican States or to make any other contract with them
which our interests may dictate. The President thinks
we make by far the greatest concessions. If you refuse
to abandon the protectorate now set up at Blewfields and
San Juan, [to abandon it] for the sake of the canal, thus
retaining an influence over other nations in the vicinity
of the work, you may break up the enterprise and
create an excessively bad feeling between our respective
countries.
Nicaragua ought to be held the rightful proprietor
of the country in dispute, with this limitation, that all
private titles to lands made between March 1848 and
this time shall be good and valid. When you abandon
the protectorate set up by you and not recognized by
us, or extinguish the Indian title, then let Mosquito and
Nicaragua settle the difference between themselves, with-
out our interference; but if you will interfere to assist
the Mosquitos, we must and shall interpose in behalf of
Nicaragua. Such are the President's instructions to me.
If our project of a treaty had been adopted, the result
would have been the same, as I have already stated.
I am, my dear Sir,
Sincerely yours
MEMORANDUM
This note [February 15, above] was written in reply to
Sir Henry's private note to me of the 14th of February,
1850. When about to send it to him next evening, he
came to my house, and I repeated its contents to him in
208
Appendix C
a conversation and then read it over to him. He said
it was unnecessary to send it as he fully understood me
and asked me not to send it. Its tone of pleasantry and
frankness, which possibly might be held offensive, in-
duced me to comply with his request, especially as I
sometimes objected to and declined, receiving some of
his private notes. It is therefore preserved as an ac-
curate record of conversation with H. B. M.'s minister
on the night of the 15th of February, 1850.
John M. Clayton.
CI. Pap., VIII, 1496-1501.
15
BuLWER TO Clayton
[Marked Private on Envelope]
February 17, 1850.
I am willing to transmit to Lord Palmerston any pro-
posal from you, the consideration of which you state to
be necessary for the preservation of peace and a good
understanding between the two countries. But I can
only engage to recommend what is according to the
letter and spirit of the instructions I have received, or
what appears to me a perfectly fair and beneficial term-
ination of the difficulties which have arisen.
In this spirit I have already recommended what has
lately appeared to both of us all that was necessary for
the great and primary object, out of which the question
under agitation grew up ; i.e. the construction and pro-
tection of the projected ship communication across the
Isthmus.
The nature of your suggestion of yesterday is that we
should withdraw our protection from the territory
claimed by the Mosquitos within one hundred miles of
the River San Juan and that neither of us should in-
209
Appendix C
terfere with whatever may occur with respect to this
territory.
You would then, I understood you to say, lay the treaty
made by Mr. Squier before Congress, which treaty rec-
ognizes the claims of the Nicaraguans over the whole
line of communication which it is intended to establish.
What follows ? Either the Nicaraguans go back to main-
tain themselves in the territory in question under the
declaration from you that it is their rightful property,
we having withdrawn therefrom the Mosquitos whose
rightful property we declared it to be, or the spot in
question which it is our desire to preserve for the ob-
ject of commerce, in tranquility and peace, become the
scene of confusion and war between a variety of belliger-
ent claimants or a center for any collection of persons,
whatever their pursuits or character, that may therein
assemble, without our having the power to establish
safety, law, or order over the same.
I cannot, indeed, undertake to recommend this plan
as the best that can be proposed, either for fairly set-
tling the Nicaragua-Mosquito claim or for providing for
the safe construction of, and uninterrupted passage
through, the canal which we have in view.
I will, however, I repeat, make this proposal from you
to Lord Palmerston, if you desire it. But if you wish
this, or if you wish — because I cannot recommend the
said proposal — to withdraw, according to an intention
which you seemed to indicate, your sanction to the
arrangement which has been already transmitted to
England, I would then beg of you to state thus much
by a few words in writing, since such an authority
would be required to contradict the contents of a docu-
ment which has our signatures and which is now under
consideration.
I trust, however, that taking advantage of the friendly
210
Appendix C
feelings that subsist between us, you will allow me here-
upon to make two or three observations.
It seems to me perfectly natural that your colleagues
should not desire you to give me any opinion of theirs
as to what has taken place, until I can state what is the
opinion of my own Government. But I confess to you
that it appears to me that you can not in your own
name withdraw with propriety or essentially alter the
project signed by you; and indeed that neither of us
can propose any alteration therein, I to your Government
or you to mine, except when we are able to state that
we do so on account of the opinion of our respective
cabinets; and that consequently no farther formal step
can be taken in this matter until Lord Palmerston's an-
swer arrives.
I may, however, in the meantime make to him, and
you to your colleagues, any representations that we think
calculated to promote the ultimate result which we must
equally desire.
Yours my dear Sir,
Very sincerely,
CI. Pap., VIII, 1509-1511.
16
Clayton to Bulwer
February 18, 1850. 10 o'clock p. m.
... I have at present no hope of success if your Gov-
ernment refuses to withdraw the Mosquito claim from
the country south of Bluefields River, while we are called
upon to abandon all Central America. Your Govern-
ment must act speedily, if at all. If our project of a
treaty should fail in spite of all our efforts, let it then be
buried in oblivion according to our written agreement.
To prevent a controversy I have done that with you
211
Appendix C
which I will never do with any minister again — tried to
make a treaty, without instructions.
CI Pap., VIII, 1512-1513.
17
BuLWER TO Clayton
[Feb. 18, 1850.]
I send you my letter for Lord Palmerston which in
ease you write to Lawrence announcing this change,
send; but, if not, keep back my letter; because I feel
[that] by sending anything of the kind and thus playing
fast and loose, we risk, and this essentially, all chances
of coming to a happy arrangement at all. What can a
Government think of a negociation thus varied within
a week? Moreover, the idea of our ceding the territory
to Nicaragua, is after all, "Moonshine"; the suggestion
of such a pretention is little short (between ourselves) of
a positive declaration of war. You must see all this as
well as I do.
Yours very sincerely,
H. L. B.
Sunday.
CI. Pap., IX, 1676.
18
CliAyrON TO BXJLiWER
April 6, 1850.
Draft [of note]
Nothing in this treaty, should it be entered into by
the United States, shall be construed to be an admission
on the part of this government, of any right or title
whatever in the Mosquito King, to any part of Central
America or of what is called the Mosquito Coast. The
212
Appendix C
British government has long been fully aware that this
government has denied the title claimed for the Mosquito
Indians and of the fact that the United States had nego-
tiated a treaty (now before the senate) recognizing the
title of Nicaragua over the line of the canal.
Private
I have taken great pains to find out on what terms
our project of a treaty can pass the senate.
The President and the cabinet have arranged the fore-
going note of this date, which is addressed to you by
me after full consideration. This note is deemed by the
President indispensable to define his position before
signing the Treaty. He will not suffer it to be signed
on any other terms.
I am well satisfied after diligent inquiry that without
this note, the treaty could not possibly pass the Senate.
It would be useless to attempt to negociate further on
any other terms. You can now notify me of the time
when you will be ready to exchange powers and sign, and
I will immediately prepare to receive you.
CI Pap., VIII, 1594.
19
BuLWER TO Clayton
April 7, 1850.
I should have no insurmountable objection to your
note, if it stopped at "Mosquito Coast," but if you mean
to inform me officially at this time that you intend to
recognize by treaty the rights of Nicaragua over the
Mosquito territory, this seems to me so unnecessary and
unprovoked an act of hostility . . . that I could not
seem to be indifferent thereto in my reply, or appear to
think otherwise than that you had incurred the respons-
213
Appendix C
ibility of breaking off at this last moment, and in no
kindly manner, an arrangement conducted throughout
by me, and hitherto by both, in the most friendly spirit.
CI. Pap., VIII, 1601.
20
Clayton to Bulweb
Private and Confidential
April 8, 1850.
. . . The President cannot conceive how the assertion
of the simple fact in my last official note to you that this
Government, by the Squier treaty, recognized the sov-
ereignty of Nicaragua over the line of the canal could
be offensive to your Government. It was made known
to Lord Palmerston before you came to this country.
. . . We have never sought to conceal it. . . .
I am but the organ of the President and declare his
views to you, and he himself is compelled to negotiate
with a view to the opinions of those who share with him
the treaty-making power. ... If you say that your ob-
ject in making the treaty was to compel us to deny the
Nicaragua title then we may as well abandon the nego-
tiation.
P. S. Rely on it, I send you the Prest's ultimatum.
CI. Pap., VIII, 1603.
21
BuLWER TO Clayton
Private and confidential
Apl. 9, 1850.
.... If you think it absolutely necessary to state
civilly and quietly that it is not understood by you in
214
Appendix C
our treaty that you recognize thereby the title of the
Mosquitos, I shall not on that ground refuse to sign our
treaty and, if instead of stating in your treaty with
Nicaragua, that you recognize the claim of Nicaragua
over the Mosquito Territory, you state that you will do
your utmost to obtain by good offices for her a satisfac-
tory settlement of the differences which have arisen be-
tween her and Great Britain with respect to the said
territory, I do not think that under existing circum-
stances, this would be greatly objectionable, even if it
were not agreeable
Gl. Pap., VIII, 1610.
22
BuLWER TO Clayton
18 April, 1850.
.... It is no use our trying to get round each other
and it is in neither of our characters. . . . The Eng.
Gov. are disposed to do everything they can with honor,
but cannot with honor abandon [their] defensive pro-
tectorate of IMosquito as long as the obligations binding
them thereto are not solved by the Mosquitos, nor if
there be any threat held out to them on this subject.
Anything short of this I have always bad you to [sic]
O. K. and I now agree to all you have asked, although
I deem that your informing us you don't recognize what
we don't ask you to recognize [Note of Ap. 6, 1850] is
unnecessary [and] will for various reasons be inexpe-
dient. . . .
CI. Pap., IX, 1634.
215
Appendix C
23
Clayton to Bulwer
Private and confidential
Retain copy
April 19, 1850,
11 o'clock P. M.
The treaty signed by us today which, when ratified,
will prevent the occupation or annexation of Central
America or the Mosquito Coast to either of our govern-
ments, as we understand it, will make it an imperative
duty to be performed by us, to use our good offices to
settle speedily all questions of territory between the
small governments of Central America. We are both
debarred from governing. Anarchy and war between
the people of that region will probably soon ensue, if we
neglect this subject.
CI. Pap., IX, 1650.
24
Clayton to Lawrence
Draft May 12, 1850.
I hope . . . that the Brit. Ministry will have the
good sense, after the ratification of the treaty, to consent
that Nic^ shall extinguish the Mosq. title. ... I can
see no other way of bringing the country adjoining the
canal under our government, which all nations could
recognize, without a sacrifice of opinion on the part
of any.
CI. Pap., IX, 1708.
25
Lawrence to Clayton
June 7, 1850.
. . . The Treaty will be ratified [by Great Britain],
216
Appendix C
but with a lingering feeling toward maintaining the
rights of the Indians to the Mosquito territory. You
must arrange the details in regard to a supplemental
Treaty with Sir Henry. . . .
CI. Pap., IX, 1725.
26
Granville to Crampton
Feb. 20, 1852.
It would appear as if the United States government
considered that, from the moment of the conclusion of
the convention of the 19th of April, 1850, Great Britain
had renounced all right to interfere in the affairs of
Greytown and the Mosquito Country, and engaged
to relinquish that place and country to the state of
Nicaragua.
Her Majesty's government cannot admit such an in-
terpretation of the convention of the 19th of April, by
which, as understood by Her Majesty's government.
Great Britain is not precluded from protecting the Mos-
quitos, but is only restricted from occupying, fortifying,
or colonizing, or of assuming or exercising any dominion
over, the Mosquito coast or any part of Central America.
27
Clarendon to Crampton
May 27, 1853.
. . . nor has Great Britain renounced by the Treaty
the protection which she has for centuries past afforded
and still affords, to the Mosquito territory ... if either
Nicaragua or Honduras were still to continue to make
aggressions on the Mosquito territory with that object, it
must be at their own peril.
217
Appendix C
28
Marcy to Borland
Dec. 30, 1853.
You will regard it [the Treaty] as meaning what the
American negotiator intended when he entered into it,
and what the Senate must have understood it to mean
when it was ratified, viz : that by it, Great Britain came
under engagements to the United States to recede from
her asserted protectorate of the Mosquito Indians, and
to cease to exercise dominion or control in any part of
Central America. If she had any colonial possessions
therein at the date of the treaty, she was bound to
abandon them and equally bound to abstain from colo-
nial acquisitions in that region.
29
Reverdy Johnson to Clayton
Dec. 30, 1853.
. . . our government had no motive and no desire to
prevent Great Britain from performing any of the duties
which charity or compassion for a fallen race might
dictate to her, or to deprive ourselves of the power to
interfere to the same extent in the cause of humanity.
. . . But we did intend (and the treaty contains every-
thing for that purpose that could be desired) to pre-
vent the British government from using any armed force
without our consent, within the prohibited region, under
pretext or cover of her pretended protectorate. . . . The
moment Great Britain threatens with arms to defend
the Indians, and claims a right to do so in virtue of the
treaty, we may claim by the same instrument, with equal
justice, the right to take arms in defense of Honduras
and Nicaragua.
213
Appendix C
I remember well that you steadily refused every effort
on the part of Sir Henry to induce you to recognize the
title of Nicaragua or any other Central American state,
and left the British government the right to recognize
the title of the Mosquito King. On these points the
parties agreed to disagree. But the right to recognize
is a very different affair from the right to compel others
to recognize. The British protectorate was, I repeat,
entirely disarmed by the treaty. How is it possible for
Great Britain to protect if she cannot occupy, or fortify,
or assume any dominion whatever in any part of the
territory? She is equally prohibited, in my opinion,
from occupying for the purpose of protection, or protect-
ing for the purpose of occupation. If she observes the
treaty, her protectorate stands (as you once well said
in a diplomatic note) "the shadow of a name."
30
Clarendon to Buchanan
May 2, 1854.
''Colonize, fortify, occupy, and assume or exercise do-
minion over, ' ' is there any of these terms which excludes
the right of protection, although each of them limits its
capability? Defending or protecting is a temporary act
of friendship; occupying, colonizing, fortifying, or ac-
quiring sovereignty are acts which have a permanent
result.
31
Buchanan to Clarendon
July 22, 1854.
The government of the United States . . . stands upon
the treaty which it has already concluded, firmly believ-
ing that, under this. Great Britain should more than
four years ago, have ceased to occupy or exercise domin-
ion over the whole and every part of the Mosquito coast.
219
Appendix C
32
Clarendon to Buchanan
Sept. 28, 1855.
[The Treaty] was merely prospective in its operation
and did not in any way interfere with the state of things
existing at the time of its conclusion. If it had been
intended to do so, there can be no question but that in
conformity with what the undersigned believes to be the
universal rule in regard to instruments of this nature,
it would have contained in specific terms a renunciation
on the part of Great Britain of the possessions and rights
which up to the conclusion of the convention, she had
claimed to maintain, and such renunciation would not
have been left as "a mere matter of inference.
33
Buchanan to Clarendon
October 4, 1855.
It appears to the undersigned that an engagement by a
party not "to occupy or exercise any dominion" over
territory of which that party is in actual possession, at
the date of the engagement is equivalent in all respects
to an agreement to withdraw. Under these circum-
stances, this is not "a mere matter of inference"; be-
cause the one proposition is necessarily and inseparably
involved in the other, and they are merely alternative
modes of expressing the same idea. In such a case, to
withdraw is not to occupy, — and not to occupy is nec-
essarily to withdraw.
34
Buchanan to Marcy
Nov. 9, 1855.
[Clarendon said] — about these Central American
220
Appendix C
questions — "the best mode of settling them is arbitra-
tion"— I replied there was nothing to arbitrate. He
said the true construction of the Treaty was a proper
subject for arbitration. I told him I did not consider
it a question for construction at all — the language was
plain and explicit, and I thought this would be the almost
unanimous opinion of the American people.
35
Seward in Senate
Dec. 31, 1855.
.... the British government is now stated by the
President to assume the ground that the stipulation not
to colonize or to occupy was prospective only and not
present or actual. That strikes me as being a new sug-
gestion, a new idea, entirely different from that which
I entertained as a member of the Senate when that treaty
was ratified and when I defended it.
.... there was a criticism made upon the language
of the treaty, in regard to occupation, colonization, and
dominion. The suggestion was barely made that there
might be an equivoke in that treaty; and the moment
that it was made, I remember, the article was read, and
every honorable member of the Senate agreed that it
was impossible that a doubt could ever be raised on that
question.
36
Clayton in Senate
December 31, 1855.
. . . Prospective in its operation ! I never dreamed of
such a thing. Merely prospective ! Does any man sup-
pose that I, in the possession of my senses, could have
entered into a treaty with Great Britain to allow her to
221
Appendix C
remain in possession of the whole of this isthmus, and
to prohibit my own countrymen from taking possession
of it, leaving her there undisturbed? . . . They were
not to exercise dominion thereafter, but they were to
exercise the dominion they had before. How can that
be? The language of the treaty was that they should
thereafter exercise no dominion, and no matter what
dominion they might have had before, they were com-
pelled by the plain terms of the treaty to abandon it.
Sir, it is wonderful that a nation so enlightened and
of such standing in the world as the people of Great
Britain should have consented to permit any ministry
to stand in a controversy upon such points as these. I
do not believe the British people understand their posi-
tion. I know that Lord Palmerston has heretofore car-
ried things there with a high hand; but I think that
when the British people do understand that they are to
be degraded and disgraced by such miserable quibbling
and equivocating as this they will turn their backs on
Lord Palmerston and his cabinet, and any other set of
men that have such an estimate of what is due to British
honor. I do not believe Englishmen have sunk so low.
Depend upon it, there is some misunderstanding among
Englishmen' on this subject. It is impossible that the
people of England can comprehend it. If they do, they
will not suffer such miserable special pleading to dis-
honor them, and force us at last into open war with them.
37
FooTE IN Senate
February 15, 1856.
It was understood by the committee ; it was understood
by the Senate; it was understood by every member of
the Senate, I venture to say, that the effect of the treaty
222
Appendix C
was such as to impose upon England the obligation
forthwith to resign all her possessions in Central Amer-
ica; and with that understanding, and upon that alone,
the treaty was ratified. I submit to any Senator here,
then a member of the body, if it be not so [A general
assent was signified]. The only question which after-
wards arose was whether or not it embraced the British
settlement at the Belize ?
Append. Cong. Globe, Feb. 5, 1856, p. 83.
38
Clayton in Senate
June 19, 1856.
... as a general rule I would rather arbitrate than
go to war; but not in such a case as this unless the
referees should be eminent and impartial civilians se-
lected by ourselves. ... A government which is capable
of so grossly outraging all the rules of interpretation
as they have shown themselves to be, in my judgment
would not hesitate, if the award were made against
them, to declare that they would not abide by the award,
on some technical objection or other, and thus throw us
back precisely where we were before, still more seriously
jeopardizing the relations between the two countries.
39
CliAKENDON TO DALLAS
June 26, 1856.
... The treaty therefore does not require existing
protection to cease, but only forbids using such pro-
tection for certain specified purposes. . . .
223
Appendix C .
40
Marcy to Dallas
June 26, 1856.
It would have been yielding to a delusive expectation
and laying the foundation of future difficulties, to rely
upon a stipulation for the "neutrality" of a ship canal,
as between the United States and Great Britain, if
either of them was to be in the military occupation or
to have political control, under whatever name or form,
of the coast of Nicaragua, on either ocean, or of insular
positions [such as the Bay Islands] capable in a military
sense of commanding the waters adjacent to Nicaragua.
The supposition of the neutrality of the canal in such
circumstances would be just as absurd as to imagine
that any mere words of a treaty could communicate to
Great Britain and the United States equality of rela-
tion, political or military, to the Erie Canal in the state
of New York or to the Bridgewater Canal in England.
41
President Buchanan to Congress
First Message, Dec. 8, 1857
. . . According to their [the British] construction,
the treaty does no more than simply prohibit them from
extending their possessions in Central America beyond
the present limits. It is not too much to assert that,
if in the United States the Treaty had been considered
susceptible of such a construction, it never would have
been negociated under the authority of the President,
nor would it have received the approbation of the
Senate. . . .
224
Appendix D
D
Full Powers op the Negocutors of the Clayton-
BuLWER Treaty
Victoria Eeg.
Victoria, by the Grace of God, Queen of the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Defender of the
Faith &ea &ca &ca. To All and Singular to whom these
Presents shall come, Greeting! Whereas for the better
treating of and arranging certain matters which are
now in discussion, or which may come into discussion,
between Us and Our Good Friends the United States of
America, We have judged it expedient to invest a fit
Person with full Power to conduct such discussion on
Our Part. Know Ye therefore, that We, reposing es-
pecial Trust and Confidence in the Wisdom, Loyalty,
Diligence, and Circumspection of Our Eight Trusty and
Well beloved Councillor Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer,
Knight Commander of the Most Honourable Order of
the Bath, Our Envoy Extraordinary and Minister
Plenipotentiary to Our said Good Friends, have named,
made, constituted, and appointed, as We do by these
Presents name, make, constitute, and appoint him Our
undoubted Commissioner, Procurator and Plenipoten-
tiary : Giving to him all manner of Power and Authority
to treat, adjust, and conclude, with such Minister or
IMinisters as may be vested with similar Power and Au-
thorit.y on the part of Our said Good Friends, any
Treaties, Conventions, or Agreements that may tend to
the attainment of the abovementioned end, and to sign
for Us in our Name, every thing so agreed upon and con-
cluded, and to do and transact all such other matters
as may appertain to the finishing of the aforesaid Work,
in as ample manner and form, and with equal force and
efficacy, as We Ourselves could do, if Personally Present :
225
Appendix D
— Engaging and Promising upon Our Royal Word, that
whatever things shall be so transacted and concluded by
Our said Commissioner, Procurator, and Plenipotentiary,
shall be agreed to, acknowledged, and accepted by Us
in the fullest manner, and that We will never suffer,
either in the whole or in part, any person whatsoever
to infringe the same, or act contrary thereto, as far as
lies in Our Power. In Witness whereof We have caused
the Great Seal of Our United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Ireland to be affixed to these Presents, which We
have signed with our Royal Hand. Given at Our Court
at Buckingham Palace, the Sixth day of March, in the
Year of Our Lord One Thousand Eight Hundred and
Fifty, and in the Thirteenth Year of Our Reign.
(Seal)
Zachart Taylor
pbesroent op the united states of america,
To all to whom these presents shall come, Greeting!
Know Ye, That, for the purpose of confirming between
the United States and Her Britannic Majesty perfect
harmony and good correspondence, I have invested John
M. Clayton, Secretary of State, with full power and
authority, and also with general and special command,
to meet and confer with Sir Henry Lytton Bulwer, ac-
credited to this Government as Envoy Extraordinary
and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her said Majesty, and
with him to agree, treat, consult, and negotiate of and
concerning, a ship canal between the Atlantic and Pa-
cific Oceans by the way of the river San Juan de Nic-
aragua and Lakes Nicaragua and Managua, or either of
them, and communications either by canal or railway
across the Isthmus which connects North and South
226
Appendix E
America, and concerning the States of Central America
and the Mosquito Coast, and all matters and things con-
nected with those subjects, and to conclude and sign a
Convention touching the premises, for my final ratifica-
tion, with the advice and consent of the Senate of the
United States, if such advice and consent be given.
In testimony whereof I have caused the seal of the
United States to be hereunto affixed. Given
under my hand at the City of Washington,
ii.s. the sixth day of April, in the year of our
Lord one thousand eight hundred and fifty,
and of the Independence of the United States
the seventy-fourth. 2 Taylor
By the President :
John M. Clayton,
Secretary of State.
E
TREATY OF WASHINGTON, 1871
Proposed Additional Article With Amendments
The parts in italics were to be replaced by the clauses
appearing opposite to them in brackets.
Original form Amendmerits
Whereas the Government of
her Britannic Majesty has con-
tended, in the recent corre-
spondence with the Government
of the United States, as fol-
lows; namely: that such in-
direct claims as those for the
national losses stated in the
Case presented on the part of
the Government of the United
227
Appendix E
states, to the Tribunal of Ar-
bitration at Geneva, to have
been sustained in the loss in
the transfer of the American
Commercial marine to the
British flag; the enhanced
payments of insurance; the
prolongation of the war, and
the addition of a large sum to
the cost of the war and the
suppression of the rebellion —
firstly were not included in fact
in the Treaty of Washington,
and further, and secondly,
should not be admitted in prin-
ciple as growing out of the acts
committed by particular ves-
sels alleged to have been en-
abled to commit depredations
upon the shipping of a belliger-
ent, by reason of such a uant
of due diligence in the per-
formance of neutral obliga-
tions as that which is imputed
by the United States to Great
Britain, and
Whereas the Government of
Her Britannic Majesty has also
declared that the principle in-
volved in the second of the
contentions, hereinbefore set
forth, icill guide their conduct
in the future; and
Whereas the President of the
United States, while adhering
to his contention that the said
claims were included in the
Treaty, adopts for the future
the principle contained in the
[commercial American]
[payment]
[in]
[want]
[performances of the]
[the United States has con-
tended that the said claims are
included in the treaty; and
Whereas both governments
adopt for the future the prin-
ciple that claims for remote or
indirect losses should not be
admitted as the result of fail-
ure to observe neutral obliga-
tions]
228
Appendix E
second of the said contentions,
so far as to declare that it will
hereafter guide the conduct of
the government of the United
States, and the two countries
are therefore agreed in this re-
spect :
In consideration thereof, the
President of the United States,
by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate thereof,
consents that he will make no
claim on the part of the United
States, in respect of indirect
losses as aforesaid, before the
Tribunal of Arbitration at
Geneva.i
[both governments in their re-
lations with each other; now,
therefore,]
[consent]
^For. Rel. of U. 8., Geneva Arbitration II, 500.
229
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Use of Welland Canal. H. R. Ex. Doc. 118 and 406
1 Sess., 50 Cong. (1888).
Interoceanic Canals. Sen. Rep. 1337, Part 3, 2 Sess.
56 Cong. (1900).
232
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Correspondence . . . Interoceanic Ship Canal. Sen.
Doc. 161, and 237, 1 Sess., 56 Cong. (1900).
Proposed Interoceanic Canal. Sen. Doc. 268, 1 Sess.,
56 Cong. (1900).
History of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty (1899).* I.
D. Travis.
British Rule in Central America, or a Sketch of Mos-
quito History {1S95). Id.
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. M. W. Hazeltine, in N.
Am. Rev., vol. 165 (1899).
Id. J. D. Harding, Queen's advocate, Ex. Doc. 13,
1 Sess., 33 Cong. (1854).
Id. Reverdy Johnson, id.
Id. Sen. Rep. 1649, 1 Sess., 56 Cong. (1900).
Id. Sen. Ex. Doc. 12, 2 Sess., 32 Cong. (1853).
Id. Sen. Ex. Doc. 82, 1 Sess., 34 Cong. (1856).
Id. H. R. Report 1121, 2 Sess., 46 Cong. (1880).
Mosquito Territory. Article in FuUarton's Gazetteer
of the World {ca 1855).
Central America. Id.
Memoir of Abbott Lawrence (1884). H. A. Hill.
Les cinq Republiques latines de VAmerique Centrale
(ca 1912). Maurice de Perigny.
Illustrated History of the Panama Railroad, together
with a Traveler's Guide and Business Man's Handbook
for the Panama Railroad and its Connections with Eu-
rope, the United States, the North and South Atlantic
and Pacific Coasts, Chinu, Australia, and Japan, by Sail
and Steam (1862). F. N. Otis.
Resena historica de Centro- America (1878-1887).
Lorenzo Montufar.
Efemerides de los Hechos notables acaecidos en la
Republica de Centro- America desde el am de 1821 hasta
el de 1842 (1844). Alejandro Marue.
The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Monroe Doctrine
(1882) . Sen. Ex. Doc. 194, 1 Sess., 47 Cong.
233
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The Clayton-Bulwer Treaty and the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty (1901). Cong. Rec. XXXV, Part 1, Page 13
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The Disputes with America (1856). Sir. H. L. Bul-
wer, Quart. Rev., Vol. 99.
Great Britain and the United States (1856). Sir H.
L. Bulwer, Edinh. Rev., Vol. 104.
Biographical and Critical Essays (1858, 1873, 1874).
Abraham Hayward.
History of Central America (1883). H. B. Bancroft.
States of Central America (1858). E. G. Squier.
Notes on Central America (1855). E. G. Squier.
Central America and the Transit between the Oceans
(1850). M, B. Sampson, Westminster Rev., April.
Bosquejo de la Republica de Costa Rica seguido de
Apuntamientos para su Historia (1851). Felipe IMolina.
Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915
( 1916 ) . Mary W. Williams.
An Account of the British Settlement of Honduras,
to which are added Sketches of the Manners and Cus-
toms of the Mosquito Indians, preceded hy a Journal
of a Voyage to the Mosquito Shore (1809). George Hen-
derson.
Bulletin of American Geographical Society, XXXII,
No. 4 (1900).
Historical Geography of the British Colonies (1890).
C. P. Lucas.
Ocean to Ocean: an Account, personal and historical,
of Nicaragua and its People (1902). J. W. G. Walker.
Memoirs of the Mexican Revolution: including a Nar-
rative of the Expedition of General Xavier Mina, with
some Observations on the Practicability of opening a
Commerce between the Pacific and Atlantic Oceans
through the Mexican Isthmus in the Province of Oaxaca,
and at the Lake of Nicaragua, and on the future Im-
portance of such Commerce to the civilized World and
234
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Robinson.
A succinct View and Analysis of authentic Informa-
tion extant in original Works on the Practicability of
joining the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans by a Ship Canal
OAiross the Isthmus of America (1825). R, B. Pitman.
Correspondence in Relation to Central America. H.
R., Ex. Doc. 75, 31 Cong., 1 Sess. (1850) ; Sen. Ex. Doc.
27, 32 Cong., 2 Sess. (1853).
British Policy in Central America. Sen. Ex. Doc. 44,
32 Cong., 2 Sess. (1853) ; Appendix to Cong. Globe, 34
Cong. 3 Sess. (1857), p. 176; Sen. Ex. Doc. 194, 47
Cong., 1 Sess. (1882) ; H. Ex. Doc, 50 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Vol. 1 (1888-1889), p. 759 et seq.; id., 51 Cong., 1 Sess.,
vol. 1, p. 468 et seq.; id., 53 Cong., 2 Sess. (1893-1894),
vol. 1, p. 53.
The Gate of the Pacific (1863). Bedford Pirn.
Eelacion descriptiva de los Mapas, Pianos, etc., de la
Audiencia y Capitania general de Guatemala existentes
en el Archivo general de Indias (1903). P. T. Lanzas.
Moskito (1899). H. G. Schneider.
The Bay Islands. Sen. Ex. Doe. 12, 2 Sess., 32 Cong.
(1853).
Mr. Fish and the Alabama Claims (1893). J. C. B.
Davis.
Reminiscences of the Geneva Tribunal of Arbitration
(1911). F. H. Hackett.
Letters and Diaries of Sir Stafford Northcote (1890).
Andrew Lang.
De rinfluence prochaime des Etats-Unis sur la Poli-
tique de V Europe. A de M.
Letter in Answer to the Hon. John M. Clayton, Sec-
retary of State, on Intermarine Communications (1850).
G. W. Hughes.
Memoir of John M. Clayton (Papers of Hist. Soc. of
Delaware, vol. I, no. IV). J. P. Comegys.
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Some Maxims of the late Lord Dalling and Bulwer
(Nineteenth Century, vol. 56, p. 262),
Retrospections of an active Life (1909-1913). John
Bigelow.
THB END
236
S IN THE
1852
INDEX
Aberdeen, Lord, 53.
Adams, C. F., 167.
Agreement, Rush-Bagot (1818),
32-34, 183.
Alabama, Confederate cruiser,
165.
Alabama Claims, 165; arbitra-
tion of, 166-174.
Alarm, British war vessel, 56.
Albemarle, Duke of, 51.
Albert, Prince, husband of
Queen Victoria, 179.
Alexander, Emperor of Russia,
arbitrator, 25, 31.
American Isthmus. See Isth-
mus.
Anglo- Venezuelan boundary,
143.
Arbitration, Jay Treaty, 18-
21, 184; Treaty of Ghent,
23, 24; convention of 1823,
26-32, 184; convention of
1826, 32; at The Hague in
1910, 35; Mosquito ques-
tion (1881), 102; of inter-
pretation, declined by U.
S., 108, 220, 221, 223; of
Anglo-Venezuelan dispute,
143; Treaty of Washing-
ton (1871), 35, 166-179,
184, 227-229; claims, com-
mission (1853), 184; other
Civil War claims, 185;
claims against U. S.
( 1 896 ) , 1 85 ; pecuniary
elaimi (1912), 185.
Austria, Emperor of, arbitrator,
102; ambassador of, selects
commissioner, 177-179.
Aztecs, conquest of, 40.
Baily, John, his map, 54.
Balise. See British Honduras.
Bancroft, Grcorge, Castellon to,
205.
Barbaretta, Bay Island, 149;
made part of colony, 154.
Bay Islands, a British base, 62,
153; controversy over, 147,
153-160; history of, 149-
154, 157. See Roatan.
Bayard, secretary of state, to
Phelps, 103.
Beaconstield, Lord, 70.
Belise River. See Belize River.
Belize. See British Honduras.
Belize River, 110, 113.
Benton, T. H., 10 n., 72.
Bernard, Professor Montague,
167.
Billy Bowlegs, 202.
Blackfeet, Indians, 202.
Blewfields. See Bluefields.
Bluefields, capital, 43, 204,
208; Lagoon, 55; river,
211.
Bonacca. See Quanaja.
Bonnycastle, on Island of Bon-
acca, 155.
Borland, senator, on Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, 14fl; Mar-
cy to, 218.
237
Index
Brazil, claims on, 129; Em-
peror of, 167.
British America, Indians of,
202. See Canada.
British Honduras, 44, 45, 109-
115; superintendent of, 46,
151, 153; a British base,
62; discovery of country,
109; capital of, 109; sov-
ereignty of. 111, 114, 117,
149; asks to be made a
colony, 113; boimdaries of,
113, 114, 117, 139, 140,
144-147, 156; made a col-
ony, 113,115,148; depend-
encies of, 117, 119, 138,
147, 155-157; title to, 118,
123, 124, 125; partly in
Central America, 147.
Buchanan, to Clarendon, 53 n.,
97 n., 220; to Hise, 62, 63;
to McClernand, 105 n.; sec-
full power of, 213, 225,
226; to Palmerston, 79,90,
91, 99, 125, 140, 141; to
Clayton, 116, 117, 122, 123,
196, 199, 209-211, 212 215;
to Webster, 125; in Edinb.
Rev., 125, 126; in Quarter-
ly Rev., 54 n., 126; Clay-
ton to, 196, 197, 198, 201,
208, 211-214, 216.
Butler, Senator, 121.
Calhoun, J. C, 72.
California, problem of, 38, 39;
acquired by U. S., 58.
Canada, boundaries of, 9 ; trade
of, with Indians, 16; fight-
ing in, 32; British valua-
tion of, 37; treaty dispute
over, 174,
Canal across Central America.
See Trans-isthmian canal.
retary of state, 62, 130; to Caribbean Sea, pirates in, 40;
Marcy, 220, 221; Presi- boundary of Nicaragua, 52.
dent, to Congress, 148, 179, Carmen, island, 109,
224; Clarendon to, 142, Cass, senator, on Clayton-Bul-
219, 220. wer Treaty, 146, 158.
Buckatora Lagoon, 46. Castellon to Bancroft, 205.
Bulwer, H. L., in Quarterly Center America, 48-50, 52. See
Rev., 54 n.; career of, 69- Central America.
72 ; presented to President Central America, Federation of,
Taylor, 69, 76-78; maxims 48-50, 63; use of term, 49,
of, 71, 74; books by, 75; 50, 120, 139-147, 155, 156;
on Talleyrand, 75; purpose governor general of, 51, 52;
in U. S., 76, 78, 92-94;
confers with Clayton, 78,
79; forwards projet of
treaty to Palmerston, 79;
exchanges ratifications with
Clayton, 116-138, 219: un-
derstanding as to British
Honduras, 144, 145; as to
limits of, 52, 140-143; inde-
pendence of, 150. See Gua-
temala.
states, etc., of, 49, 62, 65, 86,
98, 138, 139, 140 n., 150,
152, 216, 219, 227; ready
for annexation to U. S.,
205, 206.
Roatan, 159; on Treaty of Chagres River, as boundary, 58
Washington, 168, 169; and Chase, senator, on Clayton-Bul
Monroe Doctrine, 199 n.; wer Treaty, 146,
258
Index
Chatfield, Frederick, 49 n., 51,
66 ; to Orosco, 100 ; to min-
ister of Nicaragua, 189,
190; to Secretary of State
of Los Altos, 152; Orosco
to, 53 n.
Chesapeake, U. S. warship, 14.
Cheves, Langdon, commissioner,
27, 29, 30.
Chiapas, province of, 40, 47.
China, British possessions in,
37.
Chontales, district, 190.
Claims for debts against Brit-
ish subjects. See Arhitra-
tion.
Clarendon, Lord, 130, 142, 181,
220; to Crampton, British
minister, Washington, 141,
217; to Buchanan, 142,
219, 220; to Dallas, 142,
223; Buchanan to, 53 n.
Clay, Henry, 72; to Vaughn,
31; to Williams, 49; to
House of Rep., 49.
Clayton, J. M., secretary of
state, his career, 64, 72-75;
his canal policy, 67, 92, 93,
105-107; revises Bulwer's
presentation address, 77 ;
invites Bulwer to confer
with him, 78; full power
of, 128 n., 140 n., 157, 213,
226, 227; Senate speech,
112, 157, 158, 221, 223;
said to consider Roatan a
British possession, 157,
158; denies it, id.; views
as to Bay Islands, 158,
159; endorses his counter-
declaration, 120, 121, 126;
understanding as to Brit-
ish Honduras, 144, 145;
endorses his draft of note
to Bulwer, 208, 209; to G.
239.
W. Hughes, 39, 73; to Ab-
bott Lawrence, 49, 66, 67,
68, 93; to Palmerston, 90;
to W. R. King, 117, 145;
to Bulwer, 118, 146, 197,
198, 201-208, 211-214, 210;
to Marcy, 126; to Squier,
139 n. ; to Crampton, 158,
159; to Lawrence, 191, 193,
216; Crampton to, 112,
157, 158; Bulwer to, 116,
117, 122, 123, 196, 199,209-
211, 212-215; Lawrence to,
193, 216, 217; Johnson to,
218, 219.
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. See
Treaty, Clayton Bulwer.
Cleveland, President, 176.
Clinton, DeWitt, to Van Rens-
selaer, 49.
Coasting laws of U. S., 175.
Cockburn, Sir Alexander, 167.
Coke, Lord, 206.
Colombia, 57. See New Grana-
da.
Colonization, 191, 192, 205; vm-
der Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
81, 93, 96, 98, 155, 195,
207, 208, 217, 219-221.
See British Honduras. Bay
Islands.
Columbus, discovers country of
British Honduras, 109;
discovers Island of Roatan,
149.
Commission of 1827, 32.
Concession (1849), by New
Granada to U. S., 60.
Concord ^ffair, 93.
Conference of Paris, 181.
Congress of U. S., recommends
measures to states, 1 1 ; op-
position of, to treaty, 14.
See Senate. United States.
Convention (1802) 21j (1823)
Index
28, 183; (1826) 32; Drummond Island, ?3, 24.
(1819) 34, 183. Dutchman's Point, evacuation
C!ortez, Fernando, 40. of, 15.
Costa Kica, province, 40, 47, 48,
52. East Indian Company, 37.
republic, 50 n.; her title to East Indian princes, 202.
San Juan River, 61; en- Eastern Coast of Central Amer-
croached upon by Great
Britain, 63; treaty with U
S., 64, 141, 144; sovereign
ty of, 192.
Council of the Indies, 40.
Coxe, L. S., Secretary, to Lord
ica Commercial and Agri-
cultural Company, 112,113.
England. See Great Britain.
Erie Canal, finance of, 164, 224.
Esteban, Prince, Mosquito, 52.
Evarts, W. M., 167.
Glenelg, 113 n.; Sir George Everett, to Fillmore, 99 n.; to
Grey to, 113, 114, 156. Senate, 130, 134.
Crampton, J. F., to Clayton, Express, British bri^-of-war.
143, 156, 157; to Claren- '"- °
don, 157, 158; Granville to,
217.
Crittenden, senator, 158.
Curtis, B. R., 167.
Cushing, Caleb, 167.
Dallas, Marcy to, 119, 224;
Clarendon to, 142.
Dauphin Island, 30, 31.
Davis, J. C. B., agent of U. S.,
107, 172; to Fish, 109 n.;
Fish to, 169 n., 173.
Debts, Claims for. See Arbi-
tration.
Delfosse, Belgian minister, 178,
179. ■
Detroit, evacuation of, 15, 18. Fonseca, Bay (or Gulf) of, 61,
100.
Fillmore, Everett to, 99 n.
First Treaty of Peace (1783
and 1784). See Treaty.
Fish, senator, 158; secretary of
state, 178; to Schenck,
170; to Davis, 173;
Schenck to, 169, 170; Davis
to, 169.
Fisher, G. P., 129-131, 198; to
Clayton, 131.
Fishery* disputes, 34-36, 177.
Fitch, in Beggar's Opera, 206.
Fitzsimmons, Thomas, commis-
sioner, 19.
Flatheads, Indians, 202.
Diplomacv, 06; Clayton's, 106,
107; British and U. S.,
180-183.
Dominion, over Mosquito Coast,
45, 53, 58; under Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, 81, 93-101,
66, 190.
Foote. Senator, 222.
Fortification, 191; under Clay-
ton-Bulwer Treaty, 81, 96,
98, 124, 195, 205, 207, 217,
219.
107,124,195,197,207,208, Franklin, Benjamin, on Peace
217-223. of 1783, 4, 8.
D'Orsay, Count, 70. Frederic, Prince, Mosquito, 47.
Downs, senator, on Clayton- Frelinghuysen, Secretary of
Bulwer Treaty, 146. State, 138.
240
Index
Geneva Tribunal, 167-174.
George IV, 179,
Glenelg, Lord, L. S. Coxe to,
113.
Gracias fi Dios, Cape, 55, 58.
Gran Cayman, slaves from, set-
tle on Roatan, 151.
Grant, President, 167, 173.
Granville, Lord, 172 n.; to Brit-
ish representative, Wash-
ington, 138, 148, 149; to
Crampton, 217.
Great American Desert, as an
obstacle, 38, 39.
Great Britain, her policy, 4, 8,
37, 38, 41, 42, 50, 61, 62,
75, 76, 95, 96, 105, 182,
192; to compensate for
losses, 27, 28; treaties, etc.,
broken by (1783) 8-10,
110, 111, 150, 183, (1795)
16, 17, 183, (1815) 24-26,
183, (1823) 31, 183,
(1818) 32, 183, (1819) 35,
36, 183, (1786) 110, 111,
(1826) 112, 113, (1850)
115-149, 154, 157, 183,
(1871) 172, 178, 179, 183;
her indiflFerence to trans-
isthmian communication,
37, 38, 61, 66; conquest of
Jamaica, 41 ; encroachment
of, on Central America, 43-
45, 47, 50, 53, 56, 58, 59,
107, 108-115, 147-153, 159-
164; contests title to San
Juan River, 61; acquires
rights from Mexico, 112;
acquires sovereignty over
British Honduras, 114;
foreign secretary to
Schenck, 170. See Treaty.
Greenville, Treaty of, 16 n.
Grenville to King, 5 n., 21 n.;
marshall to, 20 n., 21 n.
241
Grey, Sir Charles, Governor of
Jamaica, 56.
Sir George, to L. S. Coxe,
Esq., 113, 114, 156.
Greytown. See San Juan.
Guadalupe Hidalgo, Treaty of.
See Treaty.
Guatemala, captain-generalcy,
40, 47.
province, 40, 47, 48, 50.
republic, 47, 48, 50; bound-
aries of, 52, 58, 110, 143,
147 ; treaty between U. S.
and, 63; grants charter to
British Company, 112;
surrenders sovereignty over
British Honduras, 114, 141,
144.
vice-royalty, 50 n.
Guerrero, J., 190.
Guillemard, John, commission-
er, 19.
Hamilton, Alexander, 12,
Hammond, to Jefferson, 5; Jef-
ferson to, 8 n., 10 n., 11 n.,
13 n.
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, 180.
Hayne, R. Y., 72.
Helena, Bay Island, 149; made
part of colony, 154.
Hise, Elijah, U. S. agent in
Central America, 63, 64.
Historical Characters, by H. L.
Bulwer, 75.
Hitchcock, senator, 183.
Hoare vs. Allen, lln.
Hondo River, 109, 112-114.
Honduras, province, 40, 47, 52,
150.
republic, rights of in Bay of
Fonseca, 61 ; encroached
upon by Great Britain, 63;
treaty with U. S., 64, 190;
part of Mosquito Coast
Index
itation of British Hon-
duras, 144, 146.
transferred to, 101 ; to pay
Mosquito Indians $50,000,
141, 144; remonstrates
against British encroach-
ment, 151, 217; under pro-
tection of U. S., 218.
Honduras Bay, 110, 113.
Hornby, Admiral, 66.
Hoyt and Heney, firm, 196.
Hughes, G. W., to Clayton, on Kingston, Canada, 175.
trans-continental railway,
39, 50 n.
King, Rufus, Grenville to, 21 n.
W. R., senator, to Clajton,
118, 124, 147, 156; Clayton
to, 117, 145.
King in Council, changes name
of San Juan, 56.
Indians, American, 16, 17, 24,
41, 42, 202; territorial
rights of, 95, 193, 202, 203.
See Mosquito Indians.
Innes, James, commissioner, 19.
International Law, Alabama
claims, 173, 174; violated,
184, 185.
Interoceanic canal. See Trans-
isthmian canal.
Isthmus, American, 49, 50, 73,
89, 98, 222, 226, 227.
Ikajubi, Baron, 167.
Italy, King of, appoints arbi-
trator, 167.
Jackson, George, commissioner,
27, 29, 30.
Andrew, President, 72, 73.
Jamaica, conquest of, 41 ; gov-
ernors of, 41, 43, 51, 56;
a British base, 62.
Jay Treaty. See Treaty.
Jefferson, Thomas, to Ham-
mond, 5 n., 8, 9 n., 10 n.,
11 n., 13.
John Smith Hatfield, law case,
12 n.
Johnson, Reverdy, 128, 137; to
Clayton, 128, 139 n., 218,
219.
Johnson's Gazetteer, its delim-
Lake Champlain, war vessels
on, 32-34.
Lake Ontario, war vessels on,
32-34.
Lawrence, Abbott, U. S. minis-
ter at London, 68; illness
of, 91 ; his canal policy, 92;
to Palmerston, 192, 194;
to Clayton, 193, 216, 217;
Clayton to, 191, 193; Pal-
merston to, 192, 193, 216.
Amos, 68.
Lawrence Scientific School, 68.
Leopard, British warship, 14.
Leopold I, King of Belgium,
179.
Leopold II, King of Belgium,
179.
Lexington affair, 93.
Lieven, Prince, 70.
Light-House Reef, 114.
Livingston, Edward, 72.
Lord Nelson, British schooner,
185.
Los Altos, province, afterwards
state, 48 ; remonstrates to-
gether with Salvador, 151;
Chatfield to Secretary of
State of, 152.
242
MacDonald, superintendent,
British Honduras, 114; oc-
cupies Roatan, 152, 153.
Indeaj
Macdonald, Thomas, commis- travention of, 147; Bulwer
sioner, 19, 20. and, 199 n.
Machuca Rapids, San Juan Montezumas, domain of, 40.
River, 61
Mackie, Dr., Department of
State, 131.
Mackinac. See Michilimacki-
nac.
Managua, Lake, 80, 226.
Marcy to Borland, 218; to Dal-
las, 224.
Marshall, John, Secretary of
State, to Grenville, 21 n.
Mason, senator, on Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, 'l46;
on British diplomacy,
180.
Mauprat, novel by George Sand,
72.
McClernand, Buchanan to,
105 n.
McTavish, John, arbitrator, 27.
Matagalpa, district, 190.
Maximilian, 178.
Melbourne, Lord, 70, 71.
Mexico, territory of, 40, 48 n.,
110, 112, 114, 144; inde-
pendence of, 47; rights of
Spain descended upon. 111;
rights acquired trom, by
Great Britain, 112; U. S.
and, 200.
Miami, Fort, 9; evacuation of,
15.
Michigan, war vessel, 33, 34.
Michilimackinac, 8; evacuation
of, 15, 23.
Mico River, 43.
Miller, E. H., 196 n.
Mississippi River, as obstacle,
38.
Monroe, President, proclama-
tion by, 33.
Monroe Doctrine, 22, 202;
against the U. S., 105; con-
243
Morat, Bay Island, 149; made
part of colony, 154.
Morris, Gouverneur, to Pitt, 7.
Moscos, 42. See Mosquito In-
dians.
Mosquito Coast, limits of, 42,
51-58, 189, 190; in Central
America, 43, 94, 98, 140 n.;
visited by British officials,
47; sovereignty of, 51-59,
196, 212, 213; dominion
over, 53, 94, 101, 192, 195,
196; 144, 150, 216, 227.
See Dominion Great
Britain.
Mosquito Indians, 42-47, 51, 52,
204; rights in San Juan
River, 61, 91; protectorate
over, 62, 63, 91-108, 148,
159, 161, 192, 193, 194, 195,
197, 199,208,209-215, 217-
219, 223; number of, 63,
204; sovereignty of, 65,
193; territorial rights of,
95, 96, 208, 212-217; self-
government secured to, 101,
102; to be paid $50,000,
102; as allies of Great
Britain, 106. See Mos-
quito Coast. Indians.
Mosquito Kingdom, 99, 100;
flag of, 45, 59, 153; King
of, 46, 47, 59, 101, 196,
197, 203, 204, 207, 212; not
recognized by Nicaragua,
53; maps of, 54, 55; Brit-
ish protection of, 57, 63,
217; reduced to a dis-
trict, 101, 104, 115; dis-
trict abolished, 104. See
Mosquito Coast, Mosquito
IncUa/ns.
Index
Moustiqua, 42. See Mosquito
Indians.
Negroes, carried away by Brit-
ish, 10; crossed with In-
dians, 43. See Slaves.
Nelson, Horatio, in expedition
up San Juan River, 106.
Neutralization, 65, 82, 105, 224.
New Granada, Mosquito Coast
transferred to, 57, 58; her
title to San Juan River,
61; partly in Central
America, 144. See Colom-
bia.
New Mexico, 58 n.
New Segovia, jurisdiction, 190.
New Spain, vice-royalty, 40.
New York, evacuation of, 7;
distance of, from San
Francisco, 38.
Niagara, evacuation of, 15.
Nicaragua, Lake, 59, 63, 226.
province, 40, 47, 51.
republic, constitution of, 52;
takes possession of San
Juan, 54; remonstrates on
British occupation of San
Juan, 56, 57 ; retakes San
Juan, 58; rights in San
Juan River, 61, 91; in Bay
of Fonseca, 61; encroached
upon bv Great Britain, 63;
treaty with U. S., 64, 68;
part of Mosquito Coast
transferred to, 101, 102;
projected canal across, 61,
64-67, 105, 161-164, 190,
194, 203; 190; to pay Mos-
quito Indians $50,000, 102,
141, 144; sovereignty of,
192; under protection of
U. S., 200, 206, 207, 208.
Occupancy, Indian, 95, 96, 202.
2U
Occupation of territory, 55, 56,
153, 154, 191, 192; under
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 81,
92-94, 96, 97, 124, 158, 159,
195, 197, 205-208, 216,
217, 219-221, 224.
Oregon, importance of, 163.
Orosco, to Chatfield, 53 n.;
Chatfield to, 100 n.
Osborne vs. Mifflin Executors,
11 n.
Oswegatchie, evacuation of, 15.
Pacific and Atlantic Canal
Company, 196 n.
Palmer, Sir Houndell, 167.
Palmerston, Lord, defines bound-
ary of Mosquito state, 64;
Lawrence to communicate
w.ith, 68; Bulwer acquaint-
ed with, 70; on rights of
American Indians, 95, 96;
Bulwer to, 79, 90, 91, 99;
assents to term "Central
America," 119; on term
"conti7ient espagnol," 181;
desires settlement of Mos-
quito question, 193; dis-
claims British dominion,
197, 200, 210, 212, 222; to
Bulwer, 117-120, 141; to
Castellon, 139 n.; Lawrence
to, 194.
Panama, Isthmus of, 50, 61;
canal across, 60; railroad,
60, 164.
Panama Canal Act, 180.
Panama railroad, 60; finance
of, 164.
Peel, his government, 54.
Phelps, minister at London,
Bayard to, 103.
Pickering, Bond to, 17.
Pierce, President, message to
Congress, 100, 101.
Index
Political control, over Mos-
quitos, 50; under Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, 81, 103,
218. See Dominion.
Polk, President, his policy in
Central America, 62, 63;
reiterates Monroe Doctrine,
202. See Clayton, J. M.
Possession, British, of Central
American territory, 203,
204; disclaimed, 51, 142,
143 ; seemingly claimed,
141, 142; never claimed,
142; said to be admitted,
157, 158; denied, 158; un-
der Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
197, 220, 223, 224; U. S.,
222. See Dominion.
Poyais, in Central America,
144.
Prometheus, American steamer,
100.
Protectorate, over canal or rail-
way, 83, 89; over Mos-
quitoa, 53, 62, 93, 94; over
U. S. Indians, 202, See
Mosquito Kingdom. In-
dians.
Quanaja, Bay Island, 149;
made part of colony, 154.
Quarterly Review, Bulwer in,
194, 195.
Quebec, 17.
Quezaltenango, treaty of, 152.
Quijano, Colonel, 51.
Railway, feasibility of, across
continent, 38, 39, 74;
across American Isthmus,
89.
Eawden, Grossbeck and Bridg-
ham, firm, 196.
Realejo harbor, 61.
Rich, H. P., commissioner, 19
Roatan, Bay Island, discovered
by Columbus, 149; history
of, 150-154; Crampton
terms it a British posses-
sion, 157.
Rocky Mountains, as obstacle,
38.
Root diggers, Indians, 202.
Ruatan. See Roatan.
Rush-Bagot Agreement. See
Agreem,ent.
Russell, Lord, desires settle-
ment of Mosquito question,
193.
Rutgers vs. Waddington, 11, 12.
Saint Lawrence Canal, 174.
Saint Lawrence River, 176.
Salvador, province, 47, 48.
republic, 52, 141, 144; remon-
strates together with Loa
Altos, 151.
Sambos, 42, 43. See Mosquito
Indians.
San Francisco, distance of,
from New York, 38.
San Juan port, claimed for
Mosquitos, 54; British oc-
cupation of, 55-59, 61, 62,
66, 67, 194, 208; name an-
glicized to Greytown, 56 ;
terminus of canal, 61, 62,
67, 148, 203; conflict at,
100, 203, 204; bombarded
by U. S. vessel, 100; de-
clared a free port, 101;
British interest in, 192,
197, 198, 217.
San Juan River, as boundary,
55, 204; fleet sails to, 58;
as route for canal, 61, 91,
203, 227; British expedi-
tion up, 106.
San Salvador. See Salvador.
Santa F6. See 'New Memco,
245
Index
Sand, George, Bulwer ac-
quainted with, 72.
Sarstoon River, 111-114, 143,
147.
Sault Ste. Marie Canal, 176.
Schenck, U. S. minister, Lon-
don, to Fish, 169, 170;
British foreign secretary
to, 170.
Sclopis, Count Frederic, 167.
Seawell, Henry, arbitrator, 27.
Senate of U. S., 19, 23, 27, 68,
72, 92, 117; Clayton-Bul-
wer Treaty sent to, 98;
not sent again, 121, 128 n.,
138; Clayton's speeches in,
131; resolution of, 130; its
construction of Clavton-
Bulwer Treaty, 144-147,
213, 218, 221, 222, 223; its
non-approval of treaty,
157; and Treaty of Wash-
ington, 170, 171.
Seward, W. H., in senate, 221.
Shawnees, 202.
Sibun River, HO, 112, 143, 147.
Sitgreaves, Samuel, commis-
sioner, 19 n.
Slaves, under Treaty of Ghent,
24, 25, 27 ; value of, 25, 28;
interest on value of, 29, 30.
See Negroes.
Soconusco, province, 40, 47,
48 n.
Soule, senator, on Clayton-Bui-
wer Treaty, 146.
Sovereignty. See Mosquito
Coast. Mosquito Indians.
British Honduras.
Spain, outlaws in war against,
40; policy of, 41; Great
Britain at war with, 43,
44; remonstrates to Great
Britain, 43; declaration by
King of, 44; makes conces-
246
siona to Great Britain,
110; sovereign over Bel-
ize, 111. See Spaniards.
Treaty.
Spaniards, treatment of In-
dians by, 202, 203.
Squier, E. G., charge d'affaires
in Central America, 65, 66,
190.
St. Clair Flats Canal, 174-176.
St. John's. See San Juan.
St. Mary's Falls Canal, 176.
Staemfli, Jacques, arbitrator,
167.
Statesmanship, British and U.
S., 182, 183.
Stephen, King regent of Mos-
quito Shore, 46.
Stewardson administrators of
Mildred vs. Dorsey, 12 n.
Suez Canal, 181.
Sumner, Charles, his estimate
of Alabama damages, 165,
166.
Supreme Court, on the sphere
of treaties, 6; on rights of
Indians, 202.
Switzerland, President of, 167.
Talleyrand, Prince, 70, 72.
Taylor, Zachary, President,
message to Congress, 50 n. ;
his policy in Central
America, 64, 65; replies to
Bulwer, 77; sends Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty to Senate,
98; ratifies it, 116; under-
standing of term "Central
America," 139; as to bound-
ary of Guatemala, 143;
non-approval by, 157; his
full power to Clayton, 226.
Tegucigalpa, district, 190.
Tenterden, Lord, agent of Great
Britain, 167, 172.
Index
Terminos, Laguno de, 109.
Tigre Island, 66, 190.
Trans-isthmian canal, 37, 38,
192, 210, 226 ; route for, 61 ;
192, 203, 214; construction
of, to be protected, 83; to
be protected, 84, 86, 88, 89 ;
Nicaraguan, never built,
105; neutrality of, 84, 224.
See San Juan, San Juan
River, Nicaragua.
Travis, I. D., works of, on Cen-
tral America, 40 n.
Treaties, law of land, 6. See
Treaty. United States. Great
Britain.
Treaty, first, of peace (1783,
1784),3, 11, 18,23, 183; Jay
(1795), 3, 4, 13-18, 183; of
Greenville (1795), 16-18;
of Ghent (1815), 22-25,
' 183; with France (1803),
31; with Spain (1819), 31;
with Great Britain (1854),
35; of Washington (1871),
35, 165-180, 183, 227-229;
Clayton-Bulwer ( 1850) , 37-
108, 183, 194-227; text of
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 79 ;
Great Britain with Spain
(1814), 47, 150; of Gua-
dalupe Hidalgo (1848),
58 n., 203; of Great Brit-
ain with Nicaragua, March
7, 1848, 59; U. S. with
New Granada (1846), 60,
158; Anglo-Guatemalan
(1859), 114, 148; Great
Britain and Honduras
(1859), 101, 148, 149; of
Quezaltenango (1839), 151,
152. See Convention.
Agreement. Concession.
Union Pacific Railway, success
of, 39.
United States, treaties, etc.,
broken by, (1783) 6, 10-13,
183, (1795) 21, 183,
(1818) 34, 183, (1819)
35, 36, 183; union of, 8;
government of, to compen-
sate for losses, 18, 20, 83-
85, 87, 88, 90, 103, 117; its
interest in trans-isthmian
communication, 38, 39, 69-
61, 65-68, 73-75, 161-163,
205 ; declines cooperating
with Great Britain, 103;
said to have proposed Clay-
ton-Bulwer Treaty, 160-
164; President of, 19, 68,
166, 167, 177, 178,198,201,
207, 208, 213, 214, 221;
treaty dispute with Can-
ada, 174; protector of
Nicaragua, 200, 206-208.
See Polk. Taylor. Grant.
Upper Lakes, war vessels on,
32-34.
Utilla, Bay Island, 149; made
part of colony, 154.
73; Hise-Selva (1849), 64,
65, 68; Squier with Nica- Van Rensselaer, G., Clinton to,
ragua (1849), 65, 210, 214; 49.
Squier with Honduras
(1849), 66, 190; of Mana-
gua (1860), 101, 104,
148; Anglo-Spanish (1763-
1783), 110, 181; Anglo
Vancouver Island, coal of, 163.
Vanderbilt, Cornelius, 196 n.
Vera Cruz, British fleet sails
from, 58.
Vera Paz, department, 112.
Spanish (1786), 110, r57, Victoria, Queen of England,
247
Index
ratifies Clayton-Bulwer
Treaty, 116; appoints arbi-
trator, 167, 179.
Vienna, selection of commis-
sioner from, 177.
Vixen, British war vessel, 56,
57; commander of, to com-
mandant of San Juan, 57,
58.
Waite, M. R., 167.
Wanks River, 46.
War, Revolutionary ( 1775-
1783), 3, 44: of 1812, 14,
22, 32, 185; Great Britain
and Spain (1796), 150;
Civil, in U. S. (1861-1865),
165; with Mexico (1846-
1848), 203.
Webster, Daniel, senator, 72;
Bulwer to, 125.
Welland Canal, 174-176.
West, British ambassador,
Granville to, 148.
(Western Posts, 4, 5, 7-9, 14-18,
32.
White, J. L., 196 n.
White, 0. L., 196 n.
William Neale's Executors vs.
Comfort Sands, 11 n.
Williams, Henry Clay to, 49.
Williams, Mary W., Anglo-
American Isthmian Diplo-
macy by, 40 n.
Wittgenstein, Prince, 69.
Wolfe, N. H., 196 n.
Wolverine, war vessel, 34.
Wood cutters, 41, 42.
Woolang, Mosquito Coast, 46.
Wyandots, 202.
Wyld, James, his map of Cen-
tral America, 54.
Yucatan, province, 40, 144.
Zelaya, province, 104,
248
JX Bigelow, John
14-28 Breaches of imglo-iiiaerican
G7B5 treaties
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