^/' ^ Xjk/y^ ' ._. ^t...^
A DUIEF KECORD OF
THE ADVANCE OF THE
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
UNDER THE COMMAND OF
GENERAL SIR EDMUND H. H. ALLENBY, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
JULY 1917 TO OCTOBER 1918.
Compiled from Official Sources and f>ublished by
CAIRO.
Produced by the
GOVERNMENT PRESS and SURVEY OF EGYPT.
I9iy.
General Sir Edmund Henry Hynman Allenby, q.c.b,, gc.mg.,
Commander in Chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force
FROM June i917.
A IIKIEF [fliCdlUI (II'
THE ADVANCE OF THE
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITJONAKY FORCE
UNDER TPIE COMMAND OF
GENERAL SIR EDMUND H. H. ALLENBY, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
JULY 1917 TO OCTOBER 1918.
Compiled from Official Sources and Published by
CAIRO.
Produced by the
GOVERNMENT PRESS and SURVEY OF EGYPT.
1919.
ERRATA.
Page 47. — In brief record of service of Yeomaiiry Mounted Division, col. 1, para. 3, and following, for "Oct. 8, 9, 11,
12, 13," read "Nov. 8, 9, 11, 12, 13."
Facing Plate 3, line 8, for " 160th Brigade " read " 158th Brigade ".
Facing Plate 8, line 22, for " took over from the right on the 74th Division," read " came into line on the right of the
74th Division."
Facing Plate 19, last line, for " Vlllth Army," read " Vllth Army."
Facing Plate 20, third line from bottom, for " 32rd " read " 23rd ".
GLOSSARY.
Descriptive terms which occur with place names, and the abbreviations used : —
Abu = Father, Khak = Inn.
AiN = Spring. Khureet (abbreviation Kh.) = Ruin.
Beit = House. Makhadet = Ford.
BiEKET = Pool. Nahe = River.
Bm = Well. ^^^^ ^ ^ p^ j^^j_
Deis = Monastery. tt i ^
Ed, el, er, es, bz = TU^- definite article " the ". ^^^ = ^^'''^' """P"' ^°P-
Jebbl = Mountain. Sheikh (abbreviation Sh.) = Chief, elder, saint.
JlSE = Bridge. Tel = Mound (especially one covering ruins).
Kefb = Village. Wapi = A watercourse (normally dry).
Govt. Press {1726-1'J18-1G,OUO e.\.
PKEIACE.
This Record of the roceafc activities of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force to the East of the Suez
Canal has been prepared in order that members of that Force may be able to take home with thorn an
acceptable account of the great advance in which they played a part. Advantage has been taken
of many ofScial documents wiilch are available and of the experience of officers still at General
Headquarters in charge of the Departments with the work of which they were familiar during the
operations. Thus it has been possible to compile the Record while the events which it details are fresh
in the memory.
Thanks are due to the following officers for their kindness in supplying accounts of the work of
their respective departments, or information concerning the same : —
Major Gen. 11. I?. H. Wriqht, C.B., C.M.G., R.E. (Royal Engineers).
Brig.-Gcn. P. A. Baindridqe, C.B., C.M.G., R.A.O.C. (Ordnance Services).
Brig.-Gon. E. R. C. Buti-er, C.B., C.M.G., R.A.V.C. (Veterinary Services).
Brig.-Gen. Jkllicoe, D.S.O., R.A.S.C., and Lieut.-Col. H. J. Hioas, A.M. (Egyplian I.uboiir Corps).
Brig.-Gen. Sir G. B. MAOAnLEy, K.C.M.G., C.B., and Lieut.-Col. W. Waqnell (Railways).
Col. P. Waerbn, C.M.G., R.E. and Lieut.-Col. F. H. Kbmpb, M.O. (Postal Services).
Lieut.-Col. D. MoLeod, D.S.O., M.C. (Palestine Lines of Communication).
Lieut.-Col. H. C. B. VVemyss, D.S.O., M.C, R.E. (Signals).
Lieut.-Col. G. E. Badcock, Tt.S.O., R.A.S.C, and Lieut.-Col. J. II. Morris, D.S.O., R.A.S.C. (R.A.S.C. PereoDnel
and Mechanical Transport).
^ Major A. W. Dobbin, R.A. (Anti-Aircraft Section).
^ Major W. J. Maulb, D.S.O. (Survey).
Major G. F. Bird, M.C, R.A.M.C (Medical Services).
Major R. C Haddon (Camel and Donkey Transport).
<Zy^ Major R. M. Di.x, R.A.S.C. (Navy and Army Canteen Board).
Capt. J. Mc G. Glen. M.C, R.A.F. (Royal Air Force).
^ Thanks are also due to the following officers for their collaboration and advice in the preparation
'^, of the text which accompanies the Maps and of the various chronological summaries : —
£ Major-Gen. Sir V. B. Fane, K.C.I.E., CB.
C>7 Major-Gen. Sir L. J. BoLS, K.CB., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Major-Gen. Sir J. S. M. Shea, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.
'^ Major-Gen. Sir E. W. C Chaytor, K.C.M.G., C.B., A.D.C
. Brig.-Gen. Hamblin, French Detachment.
4; Brig.-Gen. S. M. Edwardes, CB., C.M.G., D.S.O.
V Brig.-Gen. C. F. Wat.son, C.B., C.M.G.
cjr Brig.-Gen. G. de L. Ryrie, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
C5\7 Brig.-Gen. L. C Wilson, C.M.G.
Lieut.-Col. Cav. G. Pesenti, Italian Detachment.
Lieut.-Col. W. E. Da vies, C.M.G.
^ Lieut.-Col. R. H. Osborne, D.S.O., M.C.
Lieut.-Col. H. E. Macfaklane, D.S.O., M.C.
Lieut.-Col. A. H. C. Kearsey, D.S.O.
Lieut.-Col. G. K. M. Mason, D.S.O.
"'' Lieut.-Col. A. O'B. ffrench-Blake.
I Major D. H. Aoworth, M.C.
r* Major G. H. Bell, M.C
~ Capt. R. H. Andrew, M.C.
tl Capt. F. L. Seymodr-Jones, M.C.
Capt. A. W. Manning, M.C.
Capt. A. Kinross, R.A.S.C.
Capt. G. 1. C. Marchant, R.A.
Capt. J. Armstrong.
Capt. S. E. L. Baddeley.
Capt. E. G. HOLI.EBONE.
Lieut. N. East.
Lieut. R. E. Heathcock.
PREFACE.
Great assistance in the work of editing and of preparing the Kecord for the press has been given
by Capt. L. M. Gotch and Lieut. W. R. Kay. The former compiled the maps which form so
important and interesting a feature of the Record, and acted in conjunction with " The Palestine
News " and the Egyptian Government departments concerned in producing the Record.
The Director-General of the Survey of Egypt, Mr. E. M. DowsoN, C.B.E., and the Acting Controller
of Printing for the Government of Egypt, Mr. \V. H. Crosthwaite, O.B.E., imdertook the reproduction
of the maps and the printing; and the following officials of the Survey of Egypt were actively concerned
in the production of the maps : —
3Ir. J. H. W. ROWNTEEE.
Mr. H. C. Allen, Superintendent of the Printing Office.
Mr. G. Douglas, M.B.E., Superintendent of the Photo Process Office.
Mr. W. LoOAN, Superintendent of the Geographical Drawing Office.
Mr. G. AlTKEN, of the Geographical Drawing Office.
Mr. G. B. Newton, Technical Assistant to the Controller of Printing, acting as Official in charge
of the MiUtary Printing Section at the Government Press, was responsible for the printing of the
letterpress, and gave much valuable advice.
Lieut. P. S. Taylor, Deputy Director of " The Palestine News" was responsible for the work in
connection with the distribution of the Record.
Without the generous assistance and advice of these officers and officials, this Record of the Advance
of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force under General Allenby could have been neither compiled nor
pubhsbed ; and it is hoped that it will fill the gap so far as the history of the campaign in Palestine and
Syria is concerned until the appearance of the Official History of the War.
H. PIRIE-GORDON, Lieut.-Colonel,
Military Editor.
TJie Palestine News,
G.H.Q., E.E.F.
February, 1919.
CONTENTS.
PoRTRAtT OF Gknerai. Sir E. II. II. ALLENBY, G.C.B., G.C.M.G.
FnONTISPtECl!.
Pack.
iii
Pbbface
Qbnebal ALLENHY'S Despatches ; —
(i) Dkcembbb 16, 1917
(ii) Skpteubbr 18, 1918
(iii) OcTOBEU 31, 1918
Order of linltU oj the. Kijijplian Expedilionary Forcc^with winch are included the namen of General Officers and a brie/ record of
service oj the major jormaiions : —
General Headquarters
Gkneral Headquarter-s Troops
Eastern Force
Desert C'oh;mn
*Desert Mounted Corps
♦XXtu Army Corps
*XXIsT Army Corps
♦Chaytor's Force
♦French Detachment
♦Italian Detachment
*4th Cavalry Division
•5th Cavalry Division
♦Australian Mounted Division ...
♦Australian and New Zealand Mounted Divlsion
♦3rd (Lahore) Division
♦7th (Indian) Divi.sion
*10th Division
♦52nd Division
♦53rd Division
♦54th Division
♦GOtii Division
*74th Division
♦75th Division
Bbioades (Non-Divisional) : —
♦Imperial Camel Corps Brigade..
♦20th Indian Infantry Brigade..
*49th Indian Iktantry Brigade..
Palestine Lines op Communications..
Lines of Communication Units
Force in Egypt
Alexandria District
Delta and Western Force
Medical Services
Brief Records of the work of variants hranrhes of the Army : ■
The Anti- Aircraft Sections
The Royal Engineers : —
(1) Water Supply
(2) Signal Service
(3) Survey Company
(4) Military Rah.ways
(5) Army Postal Services
Royal Army Service Corps : —
(1) Establishment and Supplies
(2) Mechanical Transport
(3) Camel and Donkey Transport
Ordnance Work in the Palestine and Syrian Campaigns
The Work op the Medical Services
Royal Army Veterinary Corps
Labour IN the Egyptian Expeditionary Force
Navy and Army Canteen Board
Brief Record of the Work op the Royal Air Force ...
1
13
25
37
38
39
39
39
41
42
44
45
46
46
49
51
64
56
57
59
61
63
65
66
68
70
72
73
73
73
75
77
78
79
79
82
83
86
88
90
93
94
95.
98
100
106
107
III
112
An asterisk denotes where a brief Record of Service is included.
CONTENTS— conimwei.
Descriptive Text facing Plate.
Explanatory Note to the Maps illustrating operations
Lines of Communications, Oct., 1917
Lines of Communications, Oct., 1917, continued...
Operations from Oct. 28-Nov. 13, 1917
Operations from Nov. 1 4-1)60. 8, 1917 ...
Operations on Dec. 9 and 10, 1917
Operations from Dec. 11-31, 1917
Operations from Dec. 11-31, 1917
Operations from Feb. 18-21, 1918
Operations from March 21-April 2, 1918
Operations from April 29-May 1, 1918
The Water Supply of Jerusalem and the XXth Corps
Area.
The September Advance
Operations from Sept. 18-20, 1918
Operations from Sept. 18-20, 1918, continued
Operations on Sept. 21-22, 1918
Operations from Sept. 23-27, 1918
Sherifian co-operation in September
Operations from Sept. 28-30
Operations on Oct. 1 and story of the Arab Movement
Story of the Arab Movement, continued
From the Fall of Damascus to the Armistice
Lines of Communications, 1918
The Military Administration of the Territory released
from the Turks.
A Summary of the Terms of the Turkish Armistice (as
published) which came into force on Oct. 31, 1918.
Title of Plate. Plate.
Reference to Conventional Signs 1
Lines of Communications, Oct., 1917 2
Advance through Palestine 3-14
Advance into Judsea 15-26
Occupation of Jerusalem 27
Advance into Mount Ephraim and Sharon 28-30
Area occupied as the result of operations from Oct. 31
28-Dec. 31, 1917.
Development of Water Supply prior to operations Liset 31
Nov. 1-Dec. 31.
Capture of Jericho 32 & 33
Amman Raid 34-36
Es Salt Raid 37 & 38
Area occupied as the result of operations from Dec. 31, 39
1917-Sept. 18, 1918.
Development of Water Supply XXth Corps front ... Inset 39
British dispositions as shown by enemy Intelligence 40
Service.
Advance into Samaria 41-43
Area occupied as the result of operations from Sept. 44
18-20, 1918.
Egyptian Labour Corps Oct. 28, 1917-Sept. 17, 1918... Inset 44
Advance through Samaria and into Hnlilee 45 & 46
Advance through Gilead and Galilee 47 & 48
Area occupied as the result of operations from Sept. 49
21-27.
Locations of Anti-Aircraft Section, Sept., 1918 Inset 49
Capture of Damascus 60
Capture of Damascus 51
Area occupied as the result of operations from Sept. 62
28-Oct. 1.
Egyptian Labour Corps Sept. 18 onwards Inset 52
Advance through Northern Syria 53
Lines of Communications, Oct., 1918 64
Military Administration of the Territory occupied by 55
the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
Turkish Empire Oct. 31, 1918, showing conditions of 56
Armistice and disposition of Turkish troops.
TIII^ ADVyVNCE OF THE
EGYPTIAN KXrEDlTJONAUY lORCE.
The following Despatches, sent by General Sir Edmund H. H. Allenby,G.C.B.,G.C.M.G.,
to the Secretary of State for War, are republished from The London Gazette.
General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
December 10, 1017.
My Lord —
I have the honour to submit a report on the operations of the Force serving in Eg)q5t and Palestine
since June 28, 1917, the date on which I assumed command.
1. When I took over the command of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force at the end of June, 1917,
I had received instructions to repoit on the conditions in which offensive operations against the Turkish
Army on the Palestine front might be undertaken in the autunm or winter of 1917.
After visitmg the front and consulting with the Commander of the Eastern Force,* I submitted
my appreciation and proposals in a telegram dispatched in the second week of July.
2. The main features of the situation on the Palestine front were then as follows : —
The Turkish Army in Southern Palestine held a strong position extendhig from the sea at Gaza,
roughly along the main Gaza-Beersheba Road to Beersheba. Gaza had been made into a strong modern
fortress, heavily entrenched and wired, offering every faciHty for protracted defence. The remainder
of the enemy's line consisted of a series of strong localities, viz. : the Sihan group of works, the Atawineh
group, the Baha group, the Abu Hareira-Arab el Teeaha trench system, and, finally, the works cover-
ing Beersheba. These groups of works were generally from 1,.500 to 2,000 yards apart, except that the
distance from the Hareira group to Beersheba was about four and a half miles.
The enemy's force was on a wide front, the distance from Gaza to Beersheba being about thirty
miles ; but his lateral communications were good, and any threatened point of the line could be very
quickly reinforced. (See Platk 3.)
My force was extended on a front of twenty-two miles, from the sea, opposite Gaza, to Gamli.
Owing to lack of water I was unable, without preparations which would require some considerable
time, to approach within striking distance of the enemy, except in the small sector near the sea coast
opposite Gaza.
3. My proposals received the approval of the War Cabinet, and preparations were undertaken to
enable the plan I had formed to be put into execution.
I had decided to strike the main blow against the left flank of the main Turkish position, Hareira
and Sheria. The capture of Beersheba was a necessary preliminary to this operation, in order to secure
the water supplies at that place and to give room for the deployment of the attacking force on the high
ground to the north and north-west of Beersheba, from which direction I intended to attack the Hareira-
Sheria line.
This front of attack was chosen for the following reasons. The enemy's work? in this sector were
Jess formidable than elsewhere, and they were easier of approach than other parts of the enemy's
defences. When Beersheba was in our hands we should have an open flank against w-hich to operate,
and I could make full use of our superiority in mounted troop? ; and a success here offered prospects of
pursuing our advantage and forcing the enemy to abandon the rest of his fortified positions, which no
other line of attack would afford.
It was important, in order to keep the enemy in doubt up to the last moment as to the real point
of attack, that an attack should also be made on the enemy's right at Gaza in conjunction with the
main operations. One of my Commanders was therefore ordered to prepare a scheme for operations
against Gaza on as large a scale a? the force at his disposal would permit. I also asked the Senior Naval
Officer, Egvpt, Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., to afford me naval co-operation by bombarding
the Gaza defences and the enemy's railway stations and depots north of Gaza. Rear-Admiral Jackson
afforded me cordial assistance, and during the period of preparation Naval Officerf worked in the closest
co-operation with my staff at General Headquarters and the staff of the G. O.C. troops operating in that region.
* Major General (temporary Lieut.-General) Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S 0.
2 THE ADVANCE OF THE Oct. 27-31, 1917.
4. The difficulties to be overcome iii the operations agamst Beersheba and the Sheria-Hareira line
were considerable, and careful preparation? and training were neces.sarj-. The chief difficulties were
those of water and transport, and arrangement? had to be made to ensure that the troops could be ke] t
supplied with water while operating at considerable distances from their original water base for a pericd
which might amoimt to a week or more ; for, though it was known that an ample supply of water exiftcd
at Beersheba, it was uncertain how quickly it could be developed or to what extent the enemy would
have damaged the wells before we succeeded in occupying the town. Except at Beersheba, no large
supply of water would be found till Sheria and Hareira had been captured.
The transport problem was no less difficult ; there were no good roads south of the line Gaza-
Beersheba, and no reliance could therefore be placed on the use of motor transport. Owing to the steep
banks of many of the wadis which intersected the area of operations, the routes ])assable by wheeled
transport were limited, and the going was heavy and difficult in many places. Practically the whole
of the transport available in the force, including 30,000 pack camels, had to be aUotted to one portion
of the eastern force to enable it to be kept supplied with food, water, and ammunition at a distance of
fifteen to twenty-one miles in advance of railhead. Arrangements were also made for railhead to be
pushed forward a? rapidly as possible towards Karm, and for a line to be laid from Gamli towards
Beersheba for the transport of anmiunition.
A railway line was also laid from Deir el Belah to the Wadi Ghuzze, close behind the sector held
by another portion of the eastern force.
Considerable strain was thrown on the military railway from Kantara to the front during the
period of preparation. In addition to the normal requirements of the force, a number of siege and heavy
batteries, besides other artillery and units, had to be moved to the front, and large depots of supplies,
ammunition and other stores accumulated at the various railheads. Preparations had also to
be made and the necessary material accuniulated to push forward the lines from Deir el Belah and
Shellal.
5. During the period from July to Oct. the enemy's force on the Palestine front had been
increased. It was evident, from the arrival of these reinforcements and the construction of railway
extensions from El Tine, on the Ramleh-Beersheba railway, to Deir Sineid and Beit Hanmi, north of
Gaza, and from Deir Sineid to Huj, and from reports of the transport of large supplies of ammunition
and other stores to the Palestine front, that the enemy was determined to make every effort to main-
tain his position on the Gaza-Beersheba line. He had considerably strengthened his defences on this
line, and the strong localities mentioned in paragraph 2 had, by the end of Oct., been joined up to
form a practically continuous line from the sea to a point south of Sheria, except for a gap between
AH Muntar and the Sihan Group. The defensive works rovmd Beersheba remained a detached system,
but had been improved and extended.
6. The date of the attack on Beersheba, which was to connuence the operations, was fixed
as Oct. 31. Work had been begun on the railway from Shellal towards Karm, and on the line from
Gamli to El Buggar. The development of water at Esani, Khalasa, and Asluj proceeded satisfactorily.
These last two places were to be the starting point for the mounted force detailed to make a wide flanking
movement and attack Beersheba from the east and north-east.
On the morning of Oct. 27 the Turks made a strong reconnaissance towards Karm from the
direction of Kauwukah, two regiments of cavalry and two or three thousand infantry, with guns, being
employed. They attacked a line of outposts near El Girheir, held by some Yeomanry, covering railway
construction. One small post was rushed and cut up, but not before inflicting heavy loss on the enemy :
another post, though surrounded, held out all day, and also caused the enemy heavy lo.'s. The gallant
resistance made by the Yeomanry enabled the 5.3rd (Welsh) Division to come up in time, and on their
advance the Turks withdrew.
The bombardment of the Gaza defences commenced on Oct. 27, and on Oct. 30 warships of the
Royal Navy assisted by a French battleship, began co-operating in this bombardment.
Capture of Beersheba, Oct. 31.
7. On the evening of Oct. 30 the jiortion of the eastern force, which was to make the attack on
Beersheba, was concentrated in positions of readiness for the night march to its ])ositions of deployment.
8. The night march to the positions of deployment was successfully carried out, all units reaching
their appointed positions up to time.
The plan was to attack the hostile works between the Khalasa road and the Wadi Saba with two
divisions, masking the works north of the Wadi Saba with the Imperial Camel Corps and some infantry,
while a portion of the HSrd (Welsh) Division further north covered the left of the corps. The right of
the attack was covered by a cavalry regiment. Further east, mounted troops took up a line oj)posite
the southern defences of Beersheba.
Nov. 1, 1917. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 3
As a preliminary to tlic luiiiii attacl-, in order to enable field guns to Ik; hroiiglit within effective
range for wire-cntting, the eueiny's advaiieed works at 1,070 were to be taken. This was successfully
aocoiuplislicd at 8.'1.^) a.m., after a sliort preliminary bombardment, by London troops, with small loss,
ninety prisoners ))eing taken. Tin; cutting of the wire on the main line then proceeded satisfactorily,
though pauses had to be made to allow the dust to clear ; and the final assault was ordered for
12.15 p.m. It was successful all along the front attacked, and by about 1 p.m. the whole of the works
between the Khalasa road and t])e Wadi Saba were in our hands.
Some delay occurred in ascertaining whether the enemy still occupied the works north of the road ;
it was decided, as they wer(! still held by small parties, to attack them from the south. After a pre-
liminary bombardment the works were occupied with little oppo.sition by about 7.30 p.m.
The casualties were light, considering the strength of the works attacked ; a large proportion occurred
during the advance towards the positions previous to the assault, the hostile guns being very accurate
and very difficult to locate.
Meanwhile, the mounted troops, after a night march, for part of the force of twenty-five and for the
remainder of thirty-five miles, arrived early in the morning of the ,31st about Khasim Zanna, in the
hills some five miles east of Boersheba. From the hills the advance into Beensheba from the east and
north-east lies over an open and almost flat ])lain, commanded by the rising ground north of the town
and flanked by an under feature in the Wadi Saba called Tel el Saba.
A force was sent north to secure Bir es Sakaty, on the Hebron road, and protect the right flank;
this force met with some opposition, and was engaged with hostile cavalry at Bir es Sakaty and to the
north during the day. Tel el Saba was found strongly held by the enemy, and was not captured till
late in the afternoon.
Meanwhile, attempts to advance in small parties across the plain towards the town made slow
progress. In the evening, however, a mounted attack by .Au.stralian Light Horse, who rode straight
at the town from the east, proved completely successful. They galloped over two deep trenches held
by the enemy just outside the town, and entered the tomi at about 7 p.m., capturing numerous prisoners.
The Turks at Beersheba were undoubtedly taken completely by surprise, a surprise froni which the
dash of London troops and Yeomanry, finely supported by their artillery, never gave them time to
recover. The charge of the Australian Light Horse completed their defeat.
A very strong position was thus taken with slight loss, and the Turkish detachment at Beersheba
almost completely put out of action. About 2,000 prisoners and thirteen giuis were taken, and some
500 Turkish corpses were buried on the battlefield. This success laid open the left flank of the main
Turkish position for a decisive blow. {See Plate 5.)
The Attack on Gaza.
9. The actual date of the attack at Gaza had been left open till the result of the attack at Beersheba
was known, as it was intended that the former attack, which was designed to draw hostile reserves
towards the Gaza sector, should take place twenty-four to forty-eight hours previous to the attack on
the Sheria position. After the complete success of the Beersheba operations, and as the early reports
indicated that an ample supply of water would be available at that place, it was hoped that it would
be po-ssible to attack Sheria by Nov. 3 or i. The attack on Gaza was accordingly ordered to take
place on the morning of Nov. 2. Later reports showed that the water situatioji was less favourable
than had been hoped, but it was decided not to postpone the attack.
The objectives of this attack were the hostile works from Umbrella Hill (2,000 yards south-west of
the town) to Sheikh Hasan, on the sea (aliout 2,500 yards north-west of the town). The front of the
attack was about 6,000 yards, and Sheikh Hasan, the furthest objective, was over 3,000 yards from our
front line. The ground over which the attack took place consisted of sand dmies, rising in places up to
150 feet in height. This sand is very doeji and heavy going. The enemy's defences consisted of several
lines of strongly built trenches and redoubts.
As Umbrella Hill flanked the advance against the Turkish works further west, it was decided to
capture it by a preliminary operation, to take jDlace four hours previous to the main attack. It was
accordingly attacked, and captured at 11 p.m. on Nov. 1 by a portion of the 52nd (Lowland)
Division. This attack drew a heavy bombardment on Umbrella Hill itself and our front lines, which
lasted for two hoius, but ceased in tune to allow the maui attack, which was tuned for 3 a.m., to form
up without interference.
It had been decided to make the attack before daylight owing to the distance to be covered between
our front trenches and the enemy's position.
The attack was successful in reaching all objectives, except for a section of trench on the left and
some of the final objectives m the centre. Four hundred and fifty prisoners were taken and many
Turks killed. The enemy also suffered heavily from the preliminary bombardment, and subsequent
reports from prisoners stated that one of the divisions holding the Gaza sector was withdrawn after
a THE ADVANCE OF THE Nov. 3-6, 1917.
losing thirty-three per cent of its effectives, one of the divisions in general reserve being drawn into
the Gaza sector to replace it. The attack thus succeeded in i;.s primary object, which was to prevent
any units being drawn from the Gaza defences to meet the threat to the Turlcish left flank, and to draw
into Gaza as large a proportion as possible of the available Turkish reserves. Further, the capture of
Sheikh'Hasan and the south-western defences constituted a very distinct threat to the whole of the Gaza
position, which could be developed on any sign of a withdrawal on the part of the enemy. (<See Plate 7.)
Our losses, though considerable, were not in any way disproportionate to the results obtained.
Advance from Beersheba.
10. Meanwhile on our right flank the water and transport difficulties were found to be greater than
anticipated, and the preparations for the second phase of the attack were somewhat delayed in con-
sequence.
On the early morning of Nov. 1 the 53rd (Welsh) Division, with the Imperial Camel Corps
on its right, had moved o\it into the hills north of Beersheba, with the object of securing the flank of
the attack on Sheria. Mounted troops were also sent north along the Hebron Road to secure Dhaheriyeh
if possible, as it was hoped that a good supply of water would be found in this area, and that a motor
road which the Turks were reported to have constructed from Dhaheriyeh to Sheria could be secured
for our use.
The 53rd (Welsh) Division, after a long march, took up a position from Towal Abu Jerwal (six
miles north of Beersheba) to Muweileh (four miles north-east of Abu Irgeig). Irish troops occupied Abu
Irgeig the same day.
On Nov. 3 we advanced north on Ain Kohleh and Tel KhuweiLfeh, near which place the mounted
troops had engaged considerable enemy forces on the previous day. This advance was strongly opposed,
but was pushed on through difficult hill country to within a short distance of Ain Kohleh and Khuweilfeh.
At these places the enemy was found holding a strong position with considerable and increasing forces.
He was obviously determined not only to bar any further progress in this direction, but, if possible, to
drive our flankguard back on Beersheba. During the 4th and 5th ho made several determined attacks
on the mounted troops. These attacks were repulsed.
By the evening of Nov, 5 the 19th Turkish Division, the remains of the 27th and certain luiits
of the 16th Division had been identified in the fighting roimd Tel el Khuweilfeh, and it was also fairly
clear that the greater part of the hostile cavalry, supported apparently by some infantry (" depot "
troops) from Hebron, were engaged between Khuweilfeh and the Hebron Road.
Enemy's Counter-Stroke Defeated.
The action of the enemy in thus employing the whole of his available reserves in an unmediate
counter-stroke so far to the east was apparently a bold effort to induce me to make essential alterations
in my offensive plan, thereby gaining time and disorganizing my arrangements. The country north of
Beersheba was e.Kceediugly rough and hilly, and very little water was to be found there. Had the enemy
succeeded in drawing considerable forces against him in that area the result might easily have been an
indecisive fight (for the terrain was very suitable to his methods of defence) and my own main striking
force would probably have been made too weak effectively to break the enemy's centre in the neigh-
bourhood of Sheria Hareira. This might have resulted in our gaining Beersheba, but failmg to do more —
in which case Beersheba would only have been an incubus of a most inconvenient kind. However,
the enemy's action was not allowed to make any essential modification to the original plan, which it
had been decided to carry out at dawn oir Nov. 6.
By the evening of Nov. 5, all preparations had been made to attack the Kauwukah and Rushdi
systems and to make every effort to reach Sheria before nightfall.
The mounted troops were to be prepared in the event of a success by the main force to collect, as
they were somewhat widely scattered owing to water difficulties, and push iiorth in pursuit of the enemy.
Tel el Khuweilfeh was to be attacked at dawn on the 6th, and the troops were to endeavour to reach
the line Tel el Khuweilfeh-Rijm el Dhib.
Assault on Kauwukah and Rushdi.
11. At dawn on the 6th the attacking force had taken up positions of readiness to the S.E. of the
Kauwukah system of trenches. The attack was to be commenced by an assault on the group of works
forming the extreme left of the enemy's defensive system, followed by an advance due west up the railway,
capturing the line of detached works which lay east of the railway. During this attack London and
Nov. 7-8, 1917. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE fl
Irish troops wore to advance towards tlie Kauwukah system, brinr^ing ff)rward tlicir guns to witliin wire-
cutting range. They were to assault the soutli-eastcrn face of tiie Kauwukah system as soon as tlic
bomhardtuent had proved cITective, and tlience take the remainder of the system in enfilade.
The attack progressed ra])idly, the Yeomanry storming the works on the enemy's extreme left with
great dash ; and soon after noon tlie London and f risli troops commenced their attack. It was completely
successful in capturing all its objectives, and the whole of the Rushdi system in addition. Sheria
Station was also captured bef(jre dark. The Yeomanry reached the line of the Wadi Sheria to Wadi
Union ; and the troops on the left were close to Hareira Redoubts, which was still occupied by the enemy.
This attack was a fine performance, the troops advancing eight or nine miles during the day and capturing
a series of vorv sti'oug works covering a front of about seven miles, the greater part of which had Itcen
held and strengthened by the enemy for over six nu)nths. Some GOO j)risoners were taken and some
guns and nuichine guns captured. Our casualties were comparatively slight. The greatest opposition
was encountered by the Yeomanry in the early morning, the works covering the left of the enemy's
line being strong and stubbondy defended.
During the afternoon, as soon as it was seen that the attack had succeeded, mounted troops were
ordered to take up the pursuit and to occupy lluj and Jemmamah.
The 53rd (Welsh) IJivision had agam had very severe fighting on tlie Gth. Their attack at dawn
on Tel el Khuweilfeh was successful, and, though they were driven off a hill by a counter-attack, they
retook it and captured another hill, which much improved their position. The Turkish losses in this
area were very heavy indeed, and the stu])l)orn figliting of the 53rd (Welsh) Division, Imperial Camel
Corps, and part of the mounted troops during Nov. 2 to 6 drew in and exhausted the Turkish
reserves and paved the way for the success of the attack on Sheria. The 53rd (Welsh) Division took
several hundred prisoners and some guns during this fighting. (See Plate 8.)
The Fall of Gaza, Nov. 7.
12. The bombardntent of Gaza had meanwhile continued, and another attack was ordered to take
place on the night of the 6th-7th.
The objectives were, on the right. Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill (to be attacked at 11.30 p.m.
on the 6th), and on the left the bne Belah Trench-Turtle Hill (to be attacked at dawn on the 7th).
During the Gth a certain amount of movement on the roads north of Gaza was observed by our air-
men and fired on by our heavy artillery, but nothing indicating a general retirement from Gaza.
The Pttack on Outpost Hill and Middlesex Hill met with httle opposition, and as soon, after they
had been taken, as patrols could be pushed forward, the enemy was found to be gone. East Anghan
troops on the left also found at dawn that the enemy had retired during the night, and early in the morn-
ing the main force occupied the northern and eastern defences of Gaza. Rearguards were still occupying
Beit Hanun and the Atawineh and Tank systems, from whence Turkish artillery continued to fire on
Gaza and Ali Muntar till dusk.
As soon as it was seen that the Turks had evacuated Gaza a part of the force pushed along the coast
to the mouth of the Wadi Hesi, so as to turn the Wadi Hesi line and prevent the enemy making any
stand there. Cavalry had already pushed on round the north of Gaza, and became engaged with an
enemy rearguard at Beit Hamm, which maintained its position till nightfall. The force advancing along
the coast reached the Wadi Hesi by evening, and succeeded in establishmg itself on the north bank in
the face of considerable opposition, a Turkish rearguard making several determined counter-attacks.
On our extreme right the situation remained practically michanged dming the 7th ; the enemy
made no further attempt to counter-attack, but maintained his positions opposite our right flank guard.
In the centre the Hareira Tepe Redoubt was captured at dawn ; sonae prisoners and guns were taken.
The London troops, after a severe engagement at Tel el Sheria, which they captured by a bayonet charge
at 4 a.m., on the 7th, subsequently repulsmg several counter-attacks, pushed forward their line about
a mile to the the north of Tel el Sheria ; the mounted troops on the right moved towards Jemmamah and
Huj, but met with considerable opposition from hostile rearguards. [See Plate 9.)
Charge of the Yeomanry at Huj, Nov. 8.
13. During the 8th the advance was contmued, and interest was chiefly centred in an attempt to
cut off, if possible, the Turkish rearguard which had held the Tank and Atawineh systems. The enemy
had, however, retreated durmg the night 7tli-8th, and though considerable captures of prisoners, guns,
ammunition, and other stores were made diu-ing the day, chiefly in the vicmity of Huj, no large formed
body of the enemy was cut off. The Turkish rearguards fought stubbornly and offered considerable
opposition. Near Huj a fine charge by some squadrons of the Worcester and Warwick Yeomanry
captured twelve guns, and broke the resistance of a hostile rearguard. It soon became obvious from the
Q THE ADVANCE OF THE Nov. 8-13, 1917.
reports of the Royal Flj'iug Corps, wlio tlirougliout the 7th and 8th attacked the retreating columns
with bombs and machine-gun fire, and from other evidence, that the enemy was retirmg in considerable
disorganization, and could offer no very serious resistance if pressed with determination. {See Plate 10.)
Instructions were accordingly issued on thi morning of the 9th to the mounted troops, directing them
on the line EI Tine-Beit Duras, with orders to press the enemy relentlessly. They were to be supported
by a portion of the force, which was ordered to push forward to Julis and Mejdej.
The enemy opposite our right flank guard had commenced to retreat towards Hebron on the morning
of the 8th. He was pm-sued for a short distance by the Yeomanry, and some prisoners and camels were
captured, but the Yeomanry were then recalled to rejoin the main body of the mounted troops for the
more important task of the pursuit of the enemy's main body.
By the 9th, therefore, operations had reached the stage of a direct pursuit by as many troop? as
could "be .supplied so far in front of railhead. The problem, in fact, became one of supply rather than
manoeuvre. The question of water and forage was a very difficult one. Even where water was fomid
in sufficient quantities, it was usually in wells and not on the surface, and consequentlv if the machinery
for workmg the wells was damaged, or a sufficient supply of troughs was not available, the process of
watering a large quantity of anunal.s was slow and difficult.
Increased Turkish Resistance.
14. On the evening of Nov. 9 there were indications that the enemy was organizing a counter-
attack towards Arak el Menshiye by all available units of the force which had retired towards Hebron,
with the object of taking pressure off the main force, which was retiring along the coastal plain. It was
ob\dous that the Hebron force, which was beheved to be short of transport and ammunition, to have lost
heavily and to be in a generally disorganized state, could make no effective diversion, and that this
threat could practically be disregarded. Other information showed the seriousness of the enemy's
losses and the disorganization of his forces. {See Pl.\te 11.)
Orders were accordingly issued to press the pursuit and to reach the Junction Station as early as
possible, thus cutting off the Jerusalem Army, while the Imperial Camel Corps was ordered to move to the
neighbourhood of Tel el Nejile, where it would be on the flank of any counter-stroke from the hills.
Operations on the 1 0th and 11th showed a stiffening of the enemy's resistance on the general line of
the Wadi Sukereir, with centre about El Kustineh; the Hebron group, after an ineffective demonstration in
the direction of Arak el Menshiye on the 10th retired north-east and prolonged the enemy's line towards
Beit Jibrin. Roval Flying Corps reports indicated the total hostile forces opposed to us on this line at
about 1.5,000 ; and this increased resistance, coiiplcd with the capture of prisoners from abnost every unit
of the Turkish force, tended to show that we were no longer opposed to rearguards, but that all the
remainder of the Turkish Army which could be induced to fight was making a last effort to arrest our
pur.suit south of the important Junction Station.
In these circimistances our progress on the 10th and llth wa= slow ; the troops suffered considerably
from thirst (a hot, exhausting wind blew during these two days), and our supjily difficulties were great ;
but by the evening of the llth favourable positions had been reached for a combined attack.
(See Plates 12 & 13).
The 12th was spent in preparations for the attack, which was ordered to be begun early on the
morning of the 13th, on the enemy's position covering Junction Station. Onr forces were now operating at a
distance of some thirty-five miles in advance of their raiDiead, and the bringing up and distribution of
supplies and animimition formed a difficult problem. The routes north of the Wadi Hesi were found to
be hard and good goii'g, though there were some difficult wadi crossings, but the main road through Gaza
and as far as Beit Hanun was sandy and difficult. The supply of water in the area of operations, though
good and plentiful in most of the villages, lies mainly in wells 100 feet or more below the surface, and
in these circumstances a ra))id supply and distribution was almost impossible. Great credit is due to all
concerned that these difficulties were overcome and that it was found pos.siblo not oidy to sui^ply the
troops already in the lino, but to bring up two heavy batteries to support the attack.
15. The situation on the morning of IMov. 1 3 was that the enemy had strung out his force (amount-
ing probalily to no more than 20,000 rifles in all) on a front of twenty miles, from El Kubeibeh on the
north to about Beit Jibrin to the .south. The right lialf of his line ran roughly ])arallcl to and only about
five miles in front of the Ilamleh-Junction Station railway, his main fine of supply from the north, and his
right flank was already almost turned. This position had been dictated to him by the rapidity of our
movement along the coast, and the determination with which his learguards on this flank had been pressed.
The advanced guard of the 52nd (i.owland) Division had forced its way almost to Burkah on the
llth, on which day also .some mounted troops pushed across the Nahr Sukereir at ,lisr Esdud, where they
held a bridge-head. During the 12th the Yeomanry pushed north up the left bank of the Nahr Sukereir,
and eventually seized Tel el Murrch on the right bank near the mouth.
Nov. 14.J0, 1917. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 7
The lio.stile commandeer may have hoped to exorcise some moral e(T(;et on our plans by the presence
of the southern ))ortiou of his forces on the (lank of our advance : if so, he was mistaken. The .Australian
mounted troops, (extended over a wide front, not only secured this flank hut jjressed forward on the I2th
towards Balin, Berkusie, and Tel es S;iti. Tiieir advanced troo])S were counter-attacked and driven
back a short distance, but the enemy made no effort to press further forward. Arrangements were then
made to attack on the 13th.
The country over which tlie attack took place is open and rollin'^. dot ted uilli small villages sur-
rounded by mud walls with planlations of trees outside the walls. Thee most prominent feature is the
liii'e of heights ou wliicli ane the villages of K itrah and Kl Mughar, standing out above the low fiat ground
which separates them from the rising ground to the west, on which stands the village? of Beshshit, about
2,000 yards distant. This Katrah-Kl Mughar line forms a very strong position, and it was here that
the enemy made his most determined resistance against the turning movement directed agaiast his
right flank. The capture of this position by the .')'2nd (Lowland) Division, assisted by a most dashing
charge of mounted troops who galloped acro.ss the jilain under heavy fire and turned the enemy's position
from the north, was a fine feat of arms. Some 1,100 prisoners, three guns, and many machine guns
were taken here. After this the enemy resistance weakened, and by the evening his forces were retiring
east and north. (See Plate 14.)
Capture of Junction Station, Nov. 14.
The infantry, who were sent forward about dusk to occupy .Junction Station, met with some re.sis-
tance and halted for the night, not much more than a mile we.st of the station. Early ne.xt morning
(Nov. 14) they occupied the station.
The enemy's army had now been broken into two separate parts, which retired north and east
respectively, and were reported to consist" of small scattered groups rather than formed bodies
of any size.
In fifteen days our force had advanced .sixty miles on its right and about forty on its left. It had
driven a Turkish Army of nine infantry divisions and one cavalry division out of a position in which
it had been entrenched for six months, and had pursued it, giving battle whenever it attempted to stand,
and inflictmg on it losses amounting probably to nearly two-thirds of the enemy's original effectives.
Over 9,000 prisoners, about eighty guns, more than 100 machine guns, and very large quantities of
ammunition and other stores had been captured. {See Flate 15.)
16. After the capture of Junction Station on the morning of the lith, our troops secured a position
covering the station, while the Australian mounted troops reached Kezaze that same evening.
The mounted troops pressed on towards Ranileh and Ludd. On the right Naaneh was attacked
and captured in the morning, while on the left the New Zealand Mounted Rifles liad a smart engagement
at Ayun Kara (Rishon le Zion, sLx miles south of Jaffa). Here the Turks made a determined counter-
attack and got to within fifteen yards of our line. A bayonet attack drove them back with heavy loss.
Flankmg the advance along the railway to Ramleh and covering the main road from Ramleh to
Jerusalem, a ridge stands up prominently out of the low foot hills surrounding it. This is the site of the
ancient Gezer, near which the village of Abu Shusheh now stands. A hostile rearguard had established
itself on this feature. It was captured on the mornijig of the 15th in a brilliant attack by mounted troops,
who galloped up the ridge from the south. A gun and 360 prisoners were taken in this affair.
By the evening of the 15th the mounted troops had occupied Ramleh and Ludd, and had pushed
patrols to within a short distance of Jaffa. At Ludd 300 prisoners were taken, and five destroyed
aeroplanes and a quantity of abandoned war material were found at Ramleh and Ludd.
Occupation of Jaffa, Nov. 16.
Jaffa was occupied without opposition on the evening of the IGth.
17. The situation was now as follows : —
The enemy's army, cut in two by our capture of Jimction Station, had retired partly east into the
mountains towards Jerusalem and partly north along the plain. The nearest hne on which these two
portions could re-unite was the line Tul Keram-Nablus. Reports from the Royal Flying Corps
indicated that it was the probable intention of the enemy to evacuate Jerusalem and withdraw to
reorganize on this line. (See Plate 16.)
On our side the mounted troops had been marching and fighting continuously since Oct. 31,
and had advanced a distance of seventy-five miles, measured in a straight hne from Asluj to Jaffa. The
troops, after their heavy fighting at Gaza, had advanced in nine days a distance of about forty miles,
with two severe engagements and co'^tinual advanced guard fighting. The 52nd (Lowland) Division had
covered sixty-nine miles in this period.
8 THE ADVANCE OF THE Nov. 17-24, 1917-
The railway was being pushed forward as rapidly as possible, and every opportunity was taken of
landing stores at points along the coast. The landing of stores was dependent on a continuance of favour-
able weather, and might at any moment be stopped for several aays together.
A pause was therefore necessary to await the progress of railway construction, but before our
position in the plain could be considered secure it was essential to obtain hold of the one good road
which traverses the Judssan range from north to south, from Nablus to Jerusalem.
The Advance into Judsea.
18. The west side of the Judaean range consists of a series of spurs running east and west, and
separated from one another by narrow valleys. These spurs are steep, bare and stony for the most
part, and in places precipitous. Between the foot of the spur of the main range and the coastal plain
is the low range known as the Shephelah.
On our intended hue of advance only one good road, the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road, traversed the
hills from east to west. For nearly four miles, between Bab el Wad (two and a half miles east of Latron)
and Saris, this road passes through a narrow defile, and it had been damaged by the Turks in several
places. The other roads were mere tracks on the side of the hill or up the stony beds of wadis, and were
unpracticable for wheeled transport without hnprovement. Throughout these hills the water supply
was scanty without development.
On Nov. 17 the Yeomanry had commenced to move from Ramleh through the hills direct on
Bireh by Annabeh, Berfilya and Beit wc el Tahta (Lower Bethhoron). By the evening of Nov. 18
one portion of the Yeomanry had reached the last-named place, while another portion had occupied
Shilta. The route had been found impossible for wheels beyond Annabeh. {See Plate 17.)
On the 1 9th the Infantry commenced its advance. One portion was to advance up the main road
as far as Kuryet el Enab, with its right flank protected by Australian mounted troops. From that
place, in order to avoid any fighting in the close vicinity of the Holy City, it was to strike north towards
Bireh by a track leading through Biddu. The remamder of the infantry was to advance through Berfilya
to Beit Likia and Beit Dukka, and thence support the movement of the other portion.
After capturmg Latron and Amnas on the morning of the 19th, the remainder of the day was spent
in clearing the defile up to Saris, which was defended by hostile rearguards. {See Plate 18.)
On the 20th Kmyet el Enab was captured with the bayonet ui the face of organized opposition, while
Beit Dukka was also captured. On the same day the Yeomanry got to withm four miles of the Nablus-
Jerusalem road, but were stopped by strong opposition about Beitmiia.
On the 21 st a body of infantry moved north-east by a track from Kuryet el Enab through Biddu
and Kulundia towards Bireh. The track was found impassable for wheels, and was imder hostile shell fire.
Progress was slow, but by evening the ridge on which stands Neby Samwil was secured. A further body
of troops was left at Kuryet el Enab to cover the flank and demonstrate along the main Jerusalem road.
It drove hostile parties from Kustul, two and a half miles east of Kuryet el Enab, and secured this ridge.
Bv the afternoon of the 21st advanced parties of Yeomanry were within two miles of the road, and an
attack was being dehvered on Beitunia by other mounted troops. {See Plate 19.)
Turkish Countep-Attacl<s.
19. The positions reached on the evening of the 21st practically marked the limit of progress in this
first attempt to gain the Nablus-Jerusalem road. The Yeomanry were heavily coimter-attacked and
fell back, after bitter fighting, on Beit ur el Foka (Upper Bethhoron). Durhig the 22nd the enemy made
two cormter-attacks on the Neby Samwil ridge, which were repulsed. Determined and gallant attacks
were made on the 23rd and on the 24th on the strong positions to the west of the road held by the enemy,
who had brought up reiiiiorcements and nimierous machine guns, and could support his mfantry by
artillery fire from guns placed in positions along the main road. Our artillery, from lack of roads, could
not be brought up to give adctjuate support to our infantry. Both attacks failed, and it was evident
that a period of preparation and organization would be necessary before an attack could be dehvered
in sufficient strength to drive the enemy from his positions west of the road. {See Plate 20.)
Orders were accordingly issued to consolidate the positions gained and prepare for relief.
Though these troops had failed to reach their final objectives, they had achieved invaluable results.
The narrow passes from the plain to the plateau of the Judtcan range have seldom been forced, and
have been fatal to many invading armies. Had the attempt not been made at once, or had it been
pressed with less determination, the enemy would have had time to reorganize his defences in the passes
lower down, and the conquest of the plateau would then have been slow, costly, and precarious. As it
was, positions had been won from which the final attack could be prepared and delivered with good pro-
spects of success,
Nov. 25-Dec. 9, 1917. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 9
20. By Dec. 4 ull r(>licfH wen; coiiijilctf, and fi line was held from Kustul by the Neby Saiinvil
ridge, Beit Izza, and Beit Dukka, to Beit ur el Talita. (See Plates 22, 23, & 24).
Fighting on the Auja.
Dining tliis period attacks by the enemy along the whole line led to severe local fighting. On
Nov. 25 our advanced posts north of the river Auja were driven back across the river. From the
27th to the 30th the enemy delivered a series of attacks directed especially against the high ground north
and north-east of Jaffa, the left flank of our position in the hi'ls from Beit ur el Foka to El Burj, and
the Neby Saniwil ridge. An attack on the night of the 29th succeeded in penetrating our outjtost line
north-east of Jaffa, but next morning the whole hostile detachment, numbering 150, was surrounded and
captured by Australian Light Horse. On the 30th a similar fate befell a battalion which attacked near
El Burj ; a counter-attack by Australian Light Horse took 200 prisoners and practically destroyed the
attacking battalion. There was particularly heavy fighting between El Burj and Beit ur el Foka, but the
Yeomanry and Scottish troops successfully resisted all attacks and inflicted severe losses on the enemy.
At Beit ur el Foka one company took 300 prisoners. [See Plate 21).
Enemy Failure at Neby Samwil.
All efforts by the enemy to drive us off the Neby Samwil ridge were completely repulsed. These
attacks cost the Turks very dearly. We took 750 prisoners between Nov. 27 and 30, and the enemy's
losses in killed and wounded were undoubtedly heavy. His attacks in no way affected our positions
nor unpeded the progress of our preparations.
Converging Movement on Jerusalem.
21. Favoured by a continuance of fine weather, preparations for a fresli advance against the Turkish
positions west and south of Jerusalem proceeded rapidly. Existing roads and tracks were improved
and new ones constructed to enable heavy and field artillery to be placed in position and ammunition
and supplies brought up. The water supply was also developed.
The date for the attack was fixed as Dec. 8. Welsh troops, with a Cavalry regiment attached,
had advanced from their positions north of Beersheba up the Hebron-Jerusalem road on the 4th. No
opposition was met, and by the evening of the 6th the head of this column was ten miles north of Hebron.
The Infantry were directed to reach the Bethlehem-Beit Jala area by the 7th, and the fine Surbahir-Sherafat
(about three miles south of Jerusalem) by dawn on the 8th, and no troops were to enter Jerusalem diu'ing
this operation. (See Plate 25.)
It was recognized that the troops on the extreme right might be delayed on the 7th and fail to reach
the positions assigned to them by dawn on the 8th. Arrangements were therefore made to protect the
right flank west of Jerusalem, m case such delay occurred.
22. On the 7th the weather broke, and for three days rain was almost continuous. The hills were
covered with mist at frequent intervals, rendering observation from the air and visual signaUing unpossible.
A more serious effect of the rain was to jeopardise the supply arrangements by renderirg the roads almost
impassable — quite impassable. Indeed, for mechanical transport and camels in many places. (See Plate 26.)
The troops moved into positions of assembly by night, and, assaulting at dawn on the Sch, soon carried
their first objectives. They then pressed steadily forward. The mere physical difficulty of climbing the
steep and rocky hillsides and crossing the deep valleys would have sufficed to render progress slow, and
the opposition encountered was considerable. Artillery support was soon difficult, owing to the length
of the advance and the difficulty of moving guns forward. But by about noon London troops had already
advanced over two miles, and were swinging north-east to gain the Nablus-Jerusalem road ; while the
Yeomanry had captured the Beit Iksa spur, and were preparing for a further advance.
Surrender of Jerusalem, Dec. 9.
As the right column had been delayed and was still some distance south of Jerusalem, it was necessary
for the London troops to throw back their right and form a defensive flank facing east towards Jerusalem,
from the western outskirts of which considerable rifle and artillery fire was being experienced. This
delayed the advance, and early in the afternoon it was decided to consohdate the fine gained and resume
the advance next day, when the right colmnn would be in a position to e.xert its pressure. By night-
fall our line ran from Neby Samwil to the east of Beit Iksa, through Lifta to a pouat about one and a half
miles west of Jerusalem, whence it was thrown back facing east. All the enemy's prepared defences
west and north-west of Jerusalem had been captured, and our troops were within a short distance of the
Nablus-Jerusalem road.
lO THE ADVANCE OF THR Dec. 9-11, 1917.
The London troops and Yeomanry had displayed great endurance in difficult conditions. The
London troops especially, after a night march in heavy rain to reach their positions of deployment,
had made an advance of three to four miles in difficult hills in the face of stubborn opposition.
During the day about 300 prisoners were taken and many Turks killed. Our own casualties were
light.
23. Next morning the advance was resumed. The Turks had withdrawn during the night, and the
London troops and Yeomanry, driving back rearguards, occupied a lin-? across the Nablus-Jerusalem
road four miles north of Jerusalem, while Welsh troops occupied a position east of Jerusalem across the
Jericho road. These operations isolated Jerusalem, and at about noon the enemy sent out a parletnentaire
and surrendered the city. (See Plate 27.)
Official Entry.
At noon on the 11th I made my official entry into Jerusalem.
24. In the operations from Oct. 31 to Dec. 9 over 12,000 prisoners were taken. The total captures
of material have not yet been fully comited, owing to the large area covered by these operations ; but
they are known to include about 100 guns of various calibres, many machine guns, more than
20,000,000 rounds of rifle ammunition, and 250,000 rounds of gun ammunition. More than twenty
aeroplanes were destroyed by our airmen or burnt by the enemy to avoid capture.
25. My thanks are due to the cordial assistance which I received from his Excellency the High
Commissioner, General Sir Francis Wingate, 6.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., D.8.O., who has always given
me the greatest assistance.
26. During the whole period Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., has given me most loyal
support, and has co-operated with me in a manner which has materially contributed to our success.
27. Brigadier-General Sir G. Macauley, K.C.M.G., C.B., Director of Railway Transport, has given
invaluable help in the organisation of my railways.
28. All ranks and services in the Force under my command have acquitted themselves in a manner
beyond praise. Fatigue, thirst, heat, and cold have been endured uncomplainingly. The co-operation
of all arms has been admirable, and has enabled success in battle to be consummated by irresistible
and victorious pursuit.
Leaders and staffs have all done well, and in particular I bring to your Lordship's notice the names
of the following officers ; —
Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-Genera] ) Sir Philip C!hetwode, Bart., K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O.
My plan of operations was based on his appreciation of the situation and on the scheme which he
put forward to me on my arrival in Egypt last summer. To his strategical foresight and tactical skill
the success of the campaign is largely due.
Major-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) E. S. Bulfin, C.B., C.V.O.
Has shown great ability as an organizer and leader in high command. To his determination
in attack, and his dash and drive in purfsuit, is due the swift advance to Jerusalem.
Mijor-General (temporary Lieutenant-General) Sir Henry Chauvel, K.C.M.G., C.R.
Has commanded my mounted troops with invariable success in attack and pursuit. His co-operatioD
with other arms has always been ready and loyal, and has contributed greatly to the victory won.
Major-General L. J. Bols, C.B., D.S.O., Chief of the General Staff, has done briUiant work. He is
a general staff officer of the first rank.
Major-General J. Adye, C.B., Deputy Adjutant-General, has rendered invaluable service.
Major-General Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., Deputy Quartermaster-General, has
had a difficult task which he has carried out with complete success.
Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) G. P. Dawnay, D.S.O., M.V.O., Reserve
of Officers, Brigadier-General, General Staff, has proved himself a strategist and tactician of unusual
merit. His work has been of the highest value.
I have the honour to be.
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
E. II. 11. Allenby,
General,
Commanding-in-Chiof,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
Dec. 20-21, 19J7. K(;YPTIAN EXPEDlTlONAliY FORCE 11
General Hftiul')uart<'r8,
Egyptian Kxptiditionar}' Force,
Sepletnber IS, WIS.
My Lord,
I have the honour to sulnnit a llcport on tlie operations undertaken .since Dec. II, 1917, by the
Force serving in Egypt and Palestine.
1. The ojM'ratioiis dcsiTihcd in tiiy De,si)atcli of Dec. 10, 1917, had resulted in the enemy's army
being broken into two se])arate parts. One part had retinal northwards, and had come to a halt on
the hills overlooking the ])lain which lies to the north of .Jaffa and Kamleh. This force consisted of
five divisions, four of which had been badly shaken in the recent retreat. Opposite it the XXIst Corps
held a line, which starting at the mouth of the Nahr el Auja, three miles north of Jaffa, crossed the
Tiu-kish railway from Ludd to Jiljulieh at a point five miles north of I^udd, and thence ran in a south-
easterly direction to Midieh. (<SVe Plate 28.)
The other jiart of the enemy's arniy had retired in an easterly direction towards .Jerusalem. Here
the remains of six divisions had been concentrated. The XXth Corps, after it had compelled the enemy
to evacuate Jerusalem, held a line across the roads leading from Jerusalem to Jericho and Nablus, four
miles east and north of the city, and thence westwards through the hills past Beit ur el Foka to SufTa.
The two wings of the Turkish Army were s -parated by a roadless tract of country, the chief features
of which consist of a series of spiu-s running west. The spurs are bare and rocky, the valleys between
them are deep. No operations on a large scale are possible in this country until the tracks have been
improved sufficiently to admit of the passage of guns and of wheeled transport. The only lateral com-
mimication possible to the Turks lay some thirty miles to the north of the line Tul Keram-Nablas.
2. In order to provide more effectively for the security of Jerusalem and Jaffa, it was essential
that the line should be advanced. I therefore ordered the XXth Corps to advance to the line Beitin-
Nalin. This involved an advance on a twelve-mile front to a depth of six miles immediatelv north of
Jerusalem. The XXIst Corps on the left I ordered to advance to the line Kibbieh-Rantieh-Mulebbis-
Sheikh el Ballutah-El Jelil. When this advance had been carried out the distance between the enemy
and Jaffa would be increased to eight miles.
3. Before either of these advances could take place a considerable amount of labour was necessary
on the construction of roads and the improvement of communications. Supplies and ammunition had
to be brought up, a task which was rendered more difficult by the weather. Heavy rains interfered with
the progress of railway construction, and in .some places washed away the existing line, while the roads
became deep in mud, rendering the use of mechanical transport and camels impossible, and that of horse
transport slow and difficult.
4. The operation on the left was the first to be carried out. The chief obstacle lay in the cros.sing
of the Nahr el Auja. This river is only fordable in places, and all approaches to it are overlooked from
Sheikh Muannis and Khurbet Hadrah. At these places two spurs ruiming from north to south terminate
abruptly in steep slopes some 500 yards from the river.
Before the XXIst Corps could reach its final objectives, it was necessarv that the guns should move
forward with the infantry. Consequently Sheikh Muannis, Khurbet Hadrah, 'and the high ground over-
looking the river had to be captured as a preliminary to the general advance in order that bridges might
be built.
The Passage of the Nahr El Auja, Dec. 20 21.
The chief difficulty lay in concealing the collection and preparation of rafts and bridging material.
All preparations were completed, however, without attracting the enemy's attention, and on the night
of Dec. 20-21 the .'32nd Division crossed the river in three columns. The enemv was taken com-
pletely by surprise. The left column, fording the river near its mouth, at this point four feet deep,
captured Tell er Rekkeit, 4,000 yards north of the river's mouth ; the centre and right columns, crossing
on rafts, rushed Sheikh Muannis and Khurbet Hadrah at the point of the bayonet. By dawn a line
from Khurbet Hadrah to Tell er Rekkeit had been consolidated, and the enemy deprived of all observa-
tion from the north over the valley of the Nahr el Auja.
The successful crossing of the Nahr el Auja reflects great credit on the 52nd (Lowland) Division.
It involved considerable preparation, the details of which were thought out with care and precision.
The sodden state of the ground, and, on the night of the crossing, the swollen state of the river, added to
the difficulties, yet by dawn the whole of the infantry had crossed. The fact that the enemv were taken
by surprise, and that all resistance was overcome with the bayonet without a shot being fired, bears
testimony to the discipline of this division. Eleven officers, including two battalion commanders, and
305 other ranks, and ten machine guns were captured in this operation.
12 THE ADVANCE OF THE Dec. 21-27, 1917.
Dec. 21 was spent in building bridges. Considerable hostile shell fire was e.^perienced during
the day, chiefly from the right flank. From Mulebbis the enemy could observe the valley of the Auja.
Despite this the bridges were completed, and by dusk the whole of the Divisional Artillery of the 52nd
Division had crossed to the right bank, ready to support the advance to the final objectives.
• On the morning of Dec. 22, the 54th Division on the right drove the enemy from the orchards
which surromid Mulebbis, and captured the villages of Rantieh and Fejja. On the left the 52nd Division
reached all their objectives and consohdated the line Tel el Mukhmar-Arsuf, the latter place, although
two miles beyond the allotted objective, being occupied to deny direct observation on Jaffa harbour to
the enemy.
During the day the Royal Flying Corps attacked the enemy with bombs and machine-gun fire as
he withdrew, inflicting nunierous casualties.
Throughout these operations the XXIst Corps received most effective support from the Royal Navy.
This operation, by increasing the distance between the enemy and Jaffa from three to eight miles,
rendered Jaffa and its harbour secure, and gained elbow-room for the troops covering Ludd and Ramleh
and the main Jaffa-Jerusalem road. {See Plate 29.)
Enemy Attempt to Recover Jerusalem, Dec. 26-27.
5. In the meantime, on XXth Corps front, only minor operations had taken place, resulting in the
capture of various points of local tactical unportance.
The preparations for the advance to the Beitin-Nalin line were hindered by the weather, heavy rain
falling during the week before Christmas. As they were nearing completion, various movements and
concentrations of troops on the part of the enemy indicated that he intended to attack, with the object
of recovering Jerusalem.
This proved to be the case. On the night of Dec. 26-27, the enemy attacked with great determina-
tion astride the Jerusalem -Nablus road. A counter-attack against the right of his attack was carried
out immediately by two divisions. As the result of three days' fighting, not only did the enemy's attempt
to recapture Jerusalem fail, but by the end of the third day he foimd himself seven miles further from
Jerusalem than when his attack started.
The enemy's attack was launched at 11.30 p.m. on Dec. 26, the advanced posts of the 60th
Division, east of the Jerusalem road, being driven in. By 1.30 a.m. on Dec. 27 the 60th Division was
engaged along its whole front.
Between 1.30 a.m. and 8 a.m. the outposts of the 60th Division on the ridge north of Beit Hanninah
repelled four determined attacks, but the heaviest fighting took place to the east of the Jerusalem-
Nablus road. Repeated attacks were made against Tel el Ful ; a conispicuous hill from which Jerusalem
and the intervening ground can be overlooked. The attacks were made by picked bodies of troops, and
were pressed with great determination. At only one point did the enemy succeed in reaching the main
line of defence. He was driven out at once by the local reserves. In all these attacks he lost
heavily.
In the meantime the enemy had delivered attacks against various points held by the 53rd Division
east of Jerusalem. On the extreme right at Kh. Deir Ibn Obeid, a company of Middlesex troops was
surrounded by 700 Turks, supported by mountain artillery. Although without artillery support, it
offered a most gallant resistance, holding out till rehef came on the morning of the 28th. None of the
other attacks on this division's front were any more successful.
On the 60th Division front north of Jerusalem, a lull in the fighting occurred after 8 a.m. This
lasted till 12.55 p.m., when the enemy launched an attack of unexpected strength against the whole
front. In places this attack reached our main line of defence, but these small successes were short-
lived, for in each case local counter-attacks, carried out unmediately, were successful in restoring the line.
This proved to be the final effort.
At noon the counter-attack by the 74th and 10th Divisions, which had been laimched at 6.30 a.m.
agamst the right of the enemy's attack, had made itself felt.
The 74th Division, climbing the western slopes of the Zeitun Ridge, advanced along it in an easterly
direction. On their left a brigade of the 10th Division advanced along the neighbouring ridge, the left
of the 10th Division advancing in a northerly direction to form a defensive flank.
These divisions met with a determined and stubborn resistance. The ground over which the advance
took place was sufficiently rough and broken to render the advance slow and difficult, quite apart from
any action of the enemy. In addition, the boulders on the hills rendered it ideal ground in which to
fight a delaying action, providing positions for machine guns, which are dillicult to locate.
Nevertheless, when night fell the 74th Division had reached the east end of the Zeitun Ridge, oppo-
site Beitunia. On their left the 10th Division overlooked Ain Arik, and further to the left were in
possession of Deir Ibzia.
Dec. 28-29, 1917 EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 13
The counter-attack of these two divisions had thus not only resulted in an advance of 4,000 yards
on a six-mile front, but, by attracting the enemy's reserves, had prevented the enemy from repeating
his attacks on the GOth Division, and, depriving him of the initiative, had forced him to abandon his
attempt to capture Jerusalem.
Advance into Mount Ephraim.
Seeing that the Turkish attack was spent I ordered the XXth Corps to make a general advance
northwards on Dec. 28.
The enemy, after the failure of his attack on Dec. 27, was still holding liis original position in front
of the 60th Division. This position was of considerable strength, and included Khurbet Adaseh, a high
ridge overlooking the approaches from Beit Ilaninah, while further west it included the villages of Bir
Nebala and El Jib, tiie scene of heavy fighting at the end of November.
El Jib and Bir Nebala were captured by 1 p.m. Khurbet Adaseh was then attacked and captured
by 5.30 p.m.
At G.30 p.m. the advance was resumed and by 9.15 p.m. the GOth Division had reached the line Er
Ram-llafat. Considerable resistance was met with at Er Ram. The right of this advance was protected
by the 53rd Division, which extended its left northwards, capturing the villages of Anata and Kh. Almit.
On the left the 74th Division, advancing from the east end of the Zeitnn Ridge, captured Beitimia,
which was defended with obstinacy, and seized the high ridge east and north of it. Further to the left,
the right of the lOth Division, descending into the valley of the Ain Arik, climbed the opposite slopes
and captured Kefr 8hiyan hill, one mile east of Ain Arik, and the ridge between this hill and Kh. Rubin.
Considerable opposition was encountered, and great difficulty was experienced in locating the enemy's
machine guns.
The GOth Division continued its advance on Dec. 29. At the start no opposition was met with,
the enemy having withdrawn to Bireh and the Et Tahuneh ridge just north of the vOlage, leaving a
garrison at Shab Salah, a precipitous hill 1,000 yards south of Bireh, overlooking the Jerusalem-Nablus
road. As soon as the leading troops came within range of Bireh they were met with heavy rifle and
machine-gun fire. Some delay was caused owing to the difficulty experienced in bringing the guns forward.
By 4.15 p.m. the left of the attack reached the Birfeh-Ram Allah road, and then stormed the Tahuneh
ridge, the last position from which the enemy could observe the approaches to Bireh.
Simultaneously with this attack the right of the GOth Division had stormed Shab Saleh in face of
heavy machine-gun fire, subsequently capturing the ridge east of Bireh.
At 9 p.m. the advance was continued to the line Beitin-El Balua-Kh. El Burj. Little opposition
was encomitered. On this day the 53rd Division extended its line northwards to protect the right of
the 60th Division, occupying Hizmeh Jeba and the high ground north of it overlooking the Wadi el
Medineh, with little opposition.
On the left the 74th Division occupied Ram Allah, and the 10th Division advanced without oppo-
sition to the line Khurbet Rubin-Ras Kerker-Deir el Kuddis.
The final line occupied by the XXth Corps thus ran from Deir Ibn Obeid, south-east of Jerusalem,
northwards past Hizmeh and Jeba to Beitin, and thence westwards through EI Burj, Ras Kerker, to
Deir el Kuddis.
During these days the Royal Air Force not only gained valuable and timely information, but re-
peatedly attacked the enemy's troops and transport with bombs and machine-gun fire from low altitudes,
inflicting considerable losses.
o
Results of the Four Days' Fighting.
The Turkish attempt to recapture Jerusalem had thus ended in crushing defeat. He had employed
fresh troops who had not participated in the recent retreat of his army from Beersheba and Gaza and had
escaped its demoralizing effects. The determination and gallantry with which his attack was carried
out only served to increase his losses. The attack had commenced on the night Dec. 26-27. By the
evening of Dec. 30, the XXth Corps had advanced on a front of twelve miles to a depth varying from
six miles on the right to three miles on the left. This advance liad to overcome not only a determined
and obstinate resistance, but great natural difficulties as well, which had to be overcome before gims
could be brought up to support the infantry.
■J- Seven hundred and fifty prisoners, twenty-four machine guns, and three automatic rifles were
captured during these operations, and over 1,000 Turkish dead were buried by us. Our own casualties
were considerably less than this number.
As a result of this advance and of that of the XXIst Corps, my force was in a far better position
to cover Jerusalem and the towns of Ramleh and Jaffa, and the road, which, running from^Jaffa to
Jerusalem, formed the chief artery of lateral communication behind my fine. (-See Plate 30.)
14 THE ADVANCE OF THE Feb. 19, 1918.
Importance of the Jordan Bridges.
6. Any further advance northwards on my part was out of the question for the time being. Besides
the construction of roads and the improvement of communications in the forward areas, stores of
suppHes and ammmiition had to be accumulated. Until the railway had reached a point considerably
nearer my front, this was of necessity a difficult task, and one rendered still more difficult by frequent
spells of wet weather. Moreover, before a further advance could be made, it was necessary to drive
the enemy across the River Jordan to render my right flank secure. {See Plate 31.) The possession
of the crossings over the Jordan offered other advantages. These were : —
(a) The enemy would be prevented from raiding the tract of country to the west of the Dead Sea.
(b) Control of the Dead Sea would be obtained.
(c) A point of departure would be gained for operations eastwards, with a view to interrupting
the enemy's line of communication to the Hedjaz, in conjunction with the Arab forces based on Akaba.
7. Before the country around Jericho could be used as a base for operations against Amman, a
further advance northwards was necessary to gain sufficient space to the north to render any interrup-
tion from that direction impossible.
I had intended to carry out this advance to the north simultaneously with the advance eastwards
to the River Jordan. It, however, became apparent that, if this was to be carried into effect the opera-
tions against Jericho would have to be postponed for a considerable time to enable preparations for
the advance northwards to be completed. I, therefore, decided to carry out the advance to the Jordan
as a separate enterprise, the limits of the advance being the Jordan on the east and the Wadi el Auja on
the north. This wadi joins the Jordan eight miles north of the point where the Jordan enters the
Dead Sea.
For this operation the Austrahan and New Zealand Mounted Division, less the Mounted Brigade
and the Divisional Artillery, was attached to the XXth Corps.
The 60th Division had taken over the line east of Jerusalem some time previously. Opposed to it
were some 5,000 rifles, while to the north another 2,000 rifles were in a position from which to act against
the left flank of the 60th Division as it advanced.
The chief obstacle to the advance lay in the difficulties of the ground rather than any opposition
the enemy might offer.
The descent from the vicinity of Jerusalem to the valley of the Jordan is very steep. The beds of
the main wadis run from west to east. Their banks are often precipitous, rendering any crossing from
one bank to the other impossible. Numerous tributaries join the main wadis from all directions, break-
ing up the ridges into a tmnbled mass of hills.
The descent to the Jordan Valley from the line then held by the 60th Division is not, however,
continuous. It is interrupted by a series of ridges which afforded the enemy strong defensive positions.
Opposite the right of the 60th Division's line El Muntar formed a conspicuous landmark overlooking
all the country in the vicinity : opposite the centre the high ground about Ras Umm Deisis and Arak
Ibrahim afforded the enemy a strong position, while further north, on the left bank of the wadi es
Suweinit, Ras el Tawil formed a dominating feature. After a further fall the ground rose again at Talaat
ed Dumm. This rise continued in a south-easterly direction to Jebel Ekteif, thence eastwards to Neby
Musa, descending from there to the Jordan Valley, five miles south of Jericho.
To the west of Jericho at Jebel Kurimtul the ground falls sharply in steep cliffs to the Jordan Valley.
The general plan consisted of a direct advance by the 60th Division to the cliffs overlooking Jericho.
The Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was to co-operate on the right flank with a view to
entering the Jordan Valley near Neby Musa, thus cutting off the enemy's retreat from Jericho.
The Descent into the Jordan Valley.
The first step of the operation was carried out on Feb. 1 9. By 9 a.m. the GOtli Division had captured
El Muntar, Arak Ibrahim and Ras et Tawil, the Tj.'ird Division extending its right to include Rummon,
thence along the right bank of the Wadi el A.sa, in toucli with the left of the 60th Division. The greatest
opposition was encountered on the left at Ilummon by the 53rd Division, and in the vicinity of Ras et
Tawil by the 60th Division.
The capture of El Muntar enabled the mounted troops to concentrate behind it, preparatory to
operating against the enemy's left on the 20th.
On the left the 53rd Division was now in a position to command the Et Taiyibeh-Jericho road,
along which any troops intended to act against the left of the (iOth Division would move.
During the day further ground was secured by the 60th Division in face of considerable opposition,
to cover the deployment for the attack on Feb. 20. (See Plate 32.)
Feb. 20-22, 1918. KCJYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 16
DiiriMjj the nii;ht of Feb. 19-20 the (iOth Division moved into po.sition.s of deployment in the Wad!
es Sidr. The covering; troojis of the centre brigade were attacked durinji the nipht, but the enemy was
repulsed after a sharp strufigb. On the morning of the 20th th(! centre brij^ade'captured Taiat ed Dumm
at 7.15 a.m., the enemy resistinj; with stubl)ornness. After a j)ause to enable guns to be brought for-
ward, a further advance of 2,000 yards was made.
The right brigade, advancing on .lebcl Ei<teif-, met with great opposition. Moreover, the ground
over which the attack had to take place proved the most rugged and ditticult yet met with in thi.s
country. Only one approach existed by which the assaulting waves could climb Jebei Ekteif, but by
midday it had been stormed.
The left brigade, on the north of the Wadi Farah, advanced foui- niilos, over diflicult country, the
enemy fighting a rearguard action from ridge to ridge.
Thu.s by the evening the (JOth Division had reached a line running north from Jebel Ekteif, four
miles west of the clifTs overlooking Jericho.
In the meantime the mounted troops on the riglit had encountered considerable oppo.sition, and had
been much ham])ered by the ditficuities of the ground.
Two miles so\ith of N(>by Musa the enemy held the high ground at Jebel el Kalimum and Tubk el
Kaneiterah. Compelled to move in single file over tracks which were exposed to machine-gun fire from
the enemy's position, and which had been registered accurately by the enemy'.s guns at Nebv Musa, the
progress of the mounted troops was necessarily slow. By 2 p.m., however, the enemy was driven from
his position at Jebel el Kalimum and Tubk el Kaneiterah. The further advance of the New Zealand
Brigade on Neby Musa was hampered by the giound, and was finally checked at the Wadi Mukelik, the
only possible crossing over which was subjected to a heavy fire from Neby Mu.sa. On the right of the
New Zealanders an Australian Mounted brigade discovered a crossing over the Wadi Kumran, and
entering the Jordan plain reached the Wadi Jufet Zeben by dusk.
The chief feature of the enemy's resistance was the volume of machine-gun fire.
By 6 a.m. the New Zealanders and a battalion of the 60th Division reached Neby Musa, meeting
with no opposition.
Occupation of Jericho, Feb. 21.
The Australian Mounted Brigade, advancing along the plain, entered Jericho at 8.20 a.m., the
enemy having withdrawn during the night.
The 60th Division advanced to the line Rujjji es ,Shema-Liyeh~Kh. Kakun-Jebel Karuntul, over-
looking Jericho.
Meanwhile, patrols from the Au.stralian Mounted Brigade reconnoitred as far as the AVadi el Aujah
to the north and the El Ghoraniyeh bridge. The enemy was found to be holding the high ground north
of the Aujah, and a bridgehead coverhig the El Ghoraniyeh bridge with guns on the left bank,
(.^ee Plate .33.)
As a direct attack on the bridgehead would have involved heavy losses, without compensating
advantages, it was not attempted. On the 22nd the 60th Division withdrew to the line Jebel Ekteif-
Talat ed Dumm-Ra.s et Tawil, leaving outposts on the cliffs overlooking Jericho. The Mounted Divi-
sion, leaving one regiment to patrol the Jordan Valley, returning to Bethlehem.
During these operations four officers, 140 other ranks, and six machine guns were captured from
the enemy.
On no previous occasions had such difficulties of gromid been encountered. As an instance of
this, a Field Artillery battery took thirty-six hours to reach Neby Mu.sa, the distance covered, as the
crow flies, being only eight miles.
The Royal Air Force rendered valuable service, but mist and low-lying clouds interrupted their
work to a great extent.
Improving the Position.
8. This operation, by driving the enemy across the Jordan, had rendered niv right flank secure,
but the base thus obtained was not sufficiently broad to permit of operations being carried out east of
the Jordan again.st the Hedjaz Railway.
Before any such operation could be undertaken it was essential in the first place to cross the Wadi
Aujah and secure the high ground on the north bank covering the approaches to the Jordan Valley bv
the Beisan-Jericho road, and, secondly, by advancing sufl^ciently far northwards on either side of the
Jerusalem Nablus road, to deny to the enemy the use of all tracks and roads leading to the lower Jordan
Valley. This accomplished, any troops he might determine to trjnsfer from the west to the east bank
of the Jordan would have to make a considerable detour to the north.
16 THE ADVANCE OF THE March 8-10, 1918.
I therefore ordered the XXth Corps to secure Kh. el Beijnidat and Abu Telhil, in the Jordan Valley,
north of the Wadi el Aujah, and further to the west the line Kefr Malik-Kh. Abu Felah, the high ground
South of Sinjil, and the ridge north of the Wadi el Jib running through Kh. Ahuta-Jiljilia-Abwein-
Arura, thence to Deir es Sudan and Nebi Saleh.
The watershed from which the wadis run, in the one direction to the River Jordan, in the other
through the hills to the plain north of Ludd and thence to the sea, rims parallel to and some two miles
east of the Jerusalem-Nablus road. The fall to the Jordan Valley is short and sharp, with the result
that the beds of the wadis are deep and their sides ahnost precipitous. The cormtry is so intricate that
it cannot be crossed by large bodies of troops. Consequently, there was no danger in leaving a gap
between the right of the XXth Corps at Kefr Malik and the detachment in the Jordan Valley at Abu
Tellul.
To conform to the advance of the XXth Corps, I ordered the XXIst Corps to advance its right to
include the ridge north of the Wadi Ballut, the village of Mejdel Yaba, a conspicuous landmark on a foot-
hill overlooking the plain north of Ludd, Ras el Ain, an old Crusader stronghold on the railway from
Ludd to Tul Keram, and El Mirr.
As a result of this advance the XXIst Corps would be placed in a better position for a further
advance, should it decide to attack the defensive system constructed by the enemy from Jiljulieh
westwards through Tabsor to the sea.
The two Corps were thus advancing on a front, from Kefr Malik to El Mirr, of twenty-six miles,
to a maximum depth of seven miles.
The ground over which the advance was to take place is rugged and difficult. A succession of high
and rocky ridges, separated by deep valleys, afforded the enemy a series of positions of great natural
strength. The slopes of the ridges are in many places precipitous. Ledges of rock confine the descent
to definite places, on which the enemy could concentrate his fire. In places the slopes are terraced,
and men had to pull or hoist each other up.
It was necessary to reconnoitre each successive position held by the enemy, and the subsequent
movement of troops into positions of assembly was of necessity a slow process.
Under these conditions no rapid advance could be looked for.
As soon as supplies and anmiunition had been collected and preparations were complete, both
Corps made a preliminary advance to enable a closer recomiaissance of the enemy's main positions to
be made, and to allow of the construction of roads for the movement of gims and supphes.
By March 8 the XXth Corps hcd reached the line En Nejmeh-Et Taiyibeh-Aln Sinia, on the
Jerusalem-Nablus road. Hill 2,665 overlooking Bir ez Zeit-Beit Ello, the 53rd Division being on the
right, the 7-lth Division in the centre astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road, and the 10th Division on the left.
On the right of the XXIst Corps the 75th Division had captured Abud and the ridge between the
Wadis Barbara and Abud.
In neither case was any serious opposition encountered.
When the subsequent advance began the opposition stiffened considerably on the front of both
Corps.
On March 9 and 10 the XXth Corps had to drive the enemy from ridge after ridge before the
final objectives were reached.
During the night of March 8-9, the brigades of the XXth Corps moved forward to their posi-
tions of assembly. On the extreme right, in the Jordan Valley, the brigade of the 60th Division entrusted
with the task of capturing Kh. el Beiyudat and Abu Tellul experienced some difficulty in crossing the
Wadi el Aujah in the dark, and subsequently met with determined resistance. By 3 p.m., however,
Kh. el Beiyudat and Abu Tellul had been captured. The occupation of a position astride the Beisan-
Jericho road completed this operation. Further west the 53rd, 74th and 10th Divisions had advanced
by the evening to a depth varying between 3,000 and 7,000 yards, and had reached a line rumimg east
and west through Tell Asur, thence along the ridges overlooking the AVadis En Nimr and El Jib. The
53rd Division on the right had met with considerable opposition and great natural difficulties, especially
on the extreme right and at Tell Asur, a conspicuous landmark among a mass of high hills. The impor-
tance attached to Tell Asur by the enemy was shown by the number of determined efforts he made to
recapture it, all of which were repulsed.
On March 10 both the enemy's resistance and the difficulties of the gro\md increased, but during
the day and the early hours of the night of March 10-11, an advance of 3,000 yards was made on a
front of twelve miles. The line reached ran from Kefr Malik, along the ridge overlooking the Wadi el
Kola and the Burj el Kisaneh ridge, past Kh. el Sahlat, Kh. Aliuta, Jiljilia, Abwein, and Arura to its
former position at Deir es Sudan and Neby Saleh.
The enemy contested the ridges north of the AVadis en Nirm and Kl Jib with great obstinacy, while
on the extreme left near Neby Saleh he counter-attacked the hit of the 10th Division on several occa-
sions. The descent of the slopes leading down to the AVadis en Niiur and El Jib and the ascent on the
far side presented great difficulties. The downward slopes were exceptionally steep, ahnost precipitous
March 11-] 2, ]918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE IT
in places. It was impossible for companies and platoons to move on a wide front. The slopes were
swept by machine-gun and rifle fire and the bottom of the wadi.s l)y enfilade fire. The ascent on
the far side was steeply terraced. Men had alternately to hoist and pull each other up, under fire,
and linaljy to expel the enemy from the summits in hand-to-hand i'v^hfinfr.
On March 11 the operation of the XXth Corps was completed by the occupation of Kh. Abu
Felah and the heights overlooking Sinjil and the comparatively low-lying country to the north-east.
The result of this operation was the capture of a line with great natural faeihties for defence, and of eleven
officers, 1(30 otlier ranks, eleven machine guns and considerable amounts of ammunition and other booty.
The second phase of the operation by the XXIst Corps, the preliminary phase having taken place
on March 7, was carried out on March 12.
At first the opposition encountered was not serious, but from the time the 75th Division reached
the ridge overlooking the Wadi Ballut it stiffened, the enemy contesting the ridge on the far side of the
wadi stubbornly, and when driven off making several counter-attacks to regain it. At Benat Burrv, a
razor-edged ridge north of Kh. Balatah, the top of the ridge is honeycombed with caves and entrances
on both sides. Considerable difficulty was experienced in overcoming the enemy's resistance here.
Eventually, however, a platoon of Gurkhas worked round to the rear of the ridge. A Lewis gun was
brought to bear on the exits. The garrison of the caves, numbering five officers and fifty other ranks,
then surrendered.
On the left of the 75th Division the 54th Division cajitured the villages of El Mezeireh, Kh. Dikerin
and Mejdel Yaba in the foothills, and Ras el Ain and P:i Mirr in the plain. Seven officers, 105 other
ranks, and two niachine guns were taken by these two divisions.
Sherifian Operations in Moab during January.
9. The Jordan Valley had now been sufficiently cleared of the enemy to enable operations to be
carried ont against the Turkish line of communication to the Hedjaz, in conjunction with the .\rab
forces under Sherif Feisal, which were operating in the country to the south-east of the Dead Sea and
were under my control.
Sherif Feisal's forces were based on Akaba. In Jan. 1918, he had captured the high groimd about
Uheida, within seven miles of Maan, his main objective. At the same time a force under Sherif Abdul
Magin had occupied the whole of the Hish Forest up to and including Shobek, twenty miles north by
west of Maan, destroying thirty-five kilometres of the enemy's light railway which left the main line
at Kalaat Aneiza and was used to transport wood as fuel for locomotives. After the capture of Shobek
a force under Sherif Nazir raided Jauf ed Derwish, a station on the main line thirty miles north of Maan.
This they held for three days, burning the station buildings and destroying two locomotives and some
rolling stock. In this successful raid the Turkish losses amoimted to over 100 killed, over 200 prisoners,
a moimtain gun and two machine guns. Further north a separate force of Arab tribesmen mider Sherif
Nazir captured Tafile, fifteen miles south-east of the south end of the Dead Sea, on Jan. 16. The garri-
son, which consisted of 100 Turks and the officials of the place, surrendered after a short resistance.
Ten days later a Turkish force, consisting of three battalions, with two mountain guns and twenty-seven
machine guns, advanced from Kerak to recapture Tafile. An engagement took place on Jan. 26, in
which the enemy suffered a crushing defeat. His losses amounted to over 4.50 in killed and 2.30 in pri-
soners. In addition, the whole of his artillery and machine guns fell into the hands of the Arabs. In
March the Turks concentrated a considerable force, includmg a battahon of German infantrv, and,
advancing from Kutrani and Jauf ed Derwish, re-occupied Tafile, the Arab tribesmen, in face of superior
numbers, withdrawing to positions north of Shobek.
The situation to the east of the Jordan thus presented a favourable opportunity for a raid on the
enemy's communications with the Hedjaz.
Importance of Amman.
Its immediate effect would be to compel the enemy to recall the force which had recently occupied
Tafile. It might, in addition, compel the enemy to call on the garrison of Maan for support. If this
should prove to be the case, Sherif Feisal would be afforded his opportunity to attack Maan with some
prospects of success. The extent of this opportunity would depend on the amount of damage done to
the Hedjaz Railway. Near Amman, the railway crosses a viaduct and passes through a tmmel. If these
could be destroyed it would be some weeks before traffic could be resumed. I determined therefore to
carry out a raid on Anmian, with the object of destro\-ing the \'iaduct and tmmel and, if this should be
found impossible, to damage the railway as much as possible. Even if traffic was only interrupted for a
short time, the mere threat of a repetition of this raid would compel the enemy to maintain a considerable
18 THE ADVANCE OF THE March 21-22, 1918.
force to cover Amman. The troops available to operate against the Arabs would be reduced, and
possibly the enemy might transfer a portion of his reserves from the west to the east of the Jordan,
thereby weakening his power to make or meet any attack on the main front.
Animan is thirty miles east by north of Jericho as the crow flies. The nature of the intervening
coxmtry varies to a marked degree. From the banks of the Jordan to the clay ridges, a mile east of the
river, the groimd is flat, and after rain becomes marshy. Beyond the ridges the coimtry is covered with
scrub and intersected by nimaerous wadis. For the first five miles the total rise is only 500 feet. In
the next twelve miles the groimd rises some 3,500 feet till the edge of the plateau of Moab is reached.
The hills are riigged and steep. The main wadis descend from the plateau to the Jordan in deep valleys.
The plateau itself is imdulating, the lower portions of it marshy after rain. The hills which rise from it
are rocky and covered with scrub. They are isolated features, and only form continuous ridges immed-
iately west of Amman, which lies m a cultivated plain, extending some two miles west and foiu miles
north-west of the town. This plain, which is the site of many ruins, is intersected by numerous deep
wadis difficult to cross — especially the Wadi Amman, which runs from south to north, leaving the town
of Amman on its right.
The Turks had constructed a metalled road from Ghoraniyeh bridge to Es Salt and Amman.
Following the Wadi Nimrin, it enters the hills at Shunet Nimrin and winds round the slojjes of the valley
of the Wadi Shaib, supported by embankments, in places twenty feet high. At Es Salt, a town of some
15,000 inhabitants, eighteen miles from Ghoraniyeh by road, it is joined by tracks leading from the
fords over the Jordan at Umm es Shert and Jisr ed Damieh, and from Jerash to the north. On leaving
Es Salt the road rims in a northerly direction for two miles, and then turns east, reaching the edge of the
plateau five miles further on. This is the only xoad, and is in bad repair. Various tracks follow the
wadis to the plateau, but are unfit for wheeled transport. One leaves the main road at Shunet Nimrin,
and follows the Wadis Jeria and Sir, passing the village of Ain es Sir. Another leads from Ghoraniyeh
and Makhadet Hajlah up the Wadi el Kefrein to Naaur, where it joins the main route from Madeba to
Amman.
The Amman Raid, March 21-April 2.
11. The force detailed to carry out the raid consisted of the 60th (London) Division, the Australian
and New Zealand Mounted Division, the Imperial Camel Brigade, a Momitain Artillery Brigade, the
Light Armoured Car Brigade, and a heavy battery. This force was placed under the command of the
General Officer Commanding 60th Division. The 60th Division was to force the crossings over the
Jordan and advance astride the metalled road to Es Salt, which it was to hold, its left flank being
protected by a mounted brigade. The moimted troops and the Camel Brigade, following the 60th
Division across the Jordan, were to move direct on Amman by the tracks passing through Ain es Sir
and Naaur. On reaching Amman the railway was to be destroyed and the viaduct and tunnel demolished.
This having been accomphshed, the mounted troops were to withdraw on the COth Division, the whole
force then withdrawing to bridgeheads at the Jordan.
The operations, which started during the night of March 21-22, were hampered considerably
by rain, which fell during the days preceding the raid and on March 27 and the three following days.
The Jordan is unfordable at this tune of the year. The current is at all times rapid, and is liable to
sudden floods which render the banks boggy and difficult of approach for transport. On March 28 it
rose nine feet. The rain which fell during the operations rendered the tracks in the hills slippery and
the movement of horses, and especially of camels, slow and difficult. The delay thus caused enabled
the enemy to bring up reinforcements. Before Amman could be attacked in strength some 4,000 Turks
supported by fifteen guns were in position near Amman, covering the viaduct and tunnel, while another
2,000 were moving on Es Salt from the north. To have driven the enemy from his position, without
adequate artillery support, would have entailed very heavy losses. Owing to the marshy nature of the
country it was only possible to bring up mountain artillery, and I therefore ordered a withdrawal, which
was carried out without serious interruption. Although it had not been possible to effect any permanent
demolitions, five miles of railway line, including several large culverts, and the points and crossings at
Alanda station, were destroyed to the south of Ajnman, while to the north of the town a two-arch bridge
was blown up.
Considerable losses were inflicted on the enemy, and in addition fifty-three officers and over 900
Other ranks were taken prisoner, including several Germans.
The raid also enabled a considerable number of Armenians to escape and find a refuge west of the
Jordan.
Mapch 22-29, 1918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 19
The Passage of the Jordan, March 22 April 2.
12. The crossing of the Jordan took place during the night of March 21-22. {See Plate 34.)
The crossing was to have Leon effected by a l)riga(lc of tlie 00th Division at Ohorariiyeii and Makh-
adet Ilajlali. This brigade was tlieii to cover the construction of bridges, the OOtli Division crossing
at the former, the mounted troops at the latter piaco. The attempt to cross at Ghoraniyeh failed owing
to the strength of the current, which prevented all attempts to cross both by swmimin" and bv means
of rafts and pontoons.
At Ilajlah, however, the swimmers succeeded in reaching the opposite bank at 1.20 a.m., and by
7.45 a.m. the leading battalion was across. Till dawn this crossing was unperceived by the enemy,
but subsequenlly the troops had to be ferried across, and a bridge constructinl under fire. The brid"e
was completed by 8.30 a.m. Further troops crossed, but it was found impossible to enlarge the brid'Te-
head till dark, owing to the enemy's fire. and the thickness of the scrub.
A further attempt to cross at Ghoraniyeh during the night of the 22nd-23rd was again frustrated
by the current and the enemy's fire. Early in the morning, however, a New Zealand regiment crossed
at Hajlah, and, gallo|iing northwards, drove back the enemy and formi>d a bridgehead at Ghoraniveh.
The cm-rent having diminished, three bridges were constructed durnig the day, and by 10 a.m. the whole
of the infantry of the 60th Division and the greater part of the mounted troops were east of the Jordan,
but owing to the swollen state of the river much valuable time had been lost.
Shunet Nimrin and Es Salt.
On March 24 the 60th Division attacked the enemy and drove him frotn his position at El Hand
and Shunet Nimrin, covering the entrance to the pass leading to Es Salt. Three guns were captured
by a battalion of the London Regiment, the teams being shot down by the fire of the Lewis guns.
Following on the heels of the retreating enemy, the 60th Division advanced four miles along the road
to Es Salt, which was occupied the following evening without opposition.
In the meantime the mounted troops, followed by the Camel Brigade, made their way along the
tracks towards Ain es Sir and Naaur. Early in the day all wheeled transport had to be sent back. Even
so, the tracks had been rendered so slippery by rain, which fell continuously on the 25th, that progre.ss
was slow. In many places horses had to move in single file, and had to be pulled or pushed up the slip-
pery slopes.
Naaur was reached late in the evening of March 25.
The rain continued to fall on March 26. At 5 a.m. the New Zealand and Australian Brigades
met at Ain es Sir. The Australians moved on to Suweileh, north of the Es Salt-Amman road, capturing
170 Turks there. Both men and horses were, however, too exhausted by their exertions to admit of
more than demolition parties being sent on to the railway.
On March 27 the advance was resumed. The gromid favoured the enemy, the rocks and scrub
on the hills affording excellent cover to his riflemen. The wadis could only be crossed at a few places,
and then only in single file.
Destruction of Railway near Amman.
By evening the New Zealauders had reached the railway south of Amman, their demolition parties
working southwards. In the centre the Camel Brigade advanced direct on Amman, but were claecked
some 1,500 yards west of Amman village. On the left the Australians were unable to reach the railway
north of Amman, being heavily counter-attacked ; but during the night a demolition party succeeded
in blowing up a small bridge seven miles north of Amman.
On March 28 a brigade of the 60th Division arrived from Es Salt accompanied by mountain artillery.
The road was too soft to admit of field guns being brought. In fact, twenty-two Tiukish motor-lorries
and other vehicles found along the road were so embedded in the mud that they had to be destroyed.
On its arrival tliis brigade attacked along the Es Salt-Amman road, the Austrahans attacking on its
left, the Camel Brigade on its right, while the New Zealanders attacked Hill 3,039 just south of Amman.
Enemy Counter-Attacks.
Little progress was made. The enemy made several counter-attacks, especially against the
Australians, who were forced back a short distance.
On March 29 Turkish reinforcements arrived, and the counter-attacks were renewed, but without
success. (See Pl.ate 35.)
During the afternoon two more battahons of the 60th Division and a battery of Royal Horse- Artil-
lery arrived after a long, and arduous march.
20 THE ADVANCE OF THE March SO-April 13, 1918.
The attack on Amman was renewed at 2 a.m. on March 30. The New Zealanders captured a
portion of Hill 3,039, but were unable to drive the enem}' from tde northern and eastern ends. Parties
of New Zealanders entered the village, but were fired on from the houses. Elsewhere the attack met
with only sHght success. It was apparent that without greater artillery support further attacks could
only succeed at the cost of heavy losses. Moreover, Turkish troops from Jisr ed Dan\ieh and from the
north had begim to make their presence felt at Es Salt. Orders were therefore issued for a withdrawal
to take place during the night. This was carried out without interruption, after all the wounded had
been evacuated.
By the evening of April 2 the whole force had recrossed the Jordan, with the exception of the
troops left to hold the bridgehead on the east bank. {See Plate 36.)
Results of the Raid.
Although no permanent damage had been done to the Hedjaz Railway, the raid had succeeded in
drawing northwards and retaining not only the Turkish troops which had been operating against the
Arabs, but in addition a portion of the garrison of Maan and the stations further south.
Before the raid was carried out the enemy's strength in the Amman-Es Salt-Shimet Nimrin area
was approximately 4,000. By the middle of April it had increased to over 8,000.
13. Taking advantage of this opportimity, Sherif Feisal commenced operations against Maan.
The railway was first cut both north and south of Maan at Ghadir el Haj and Jerdun. At these places
270 Tiu-ks and three machine giuis were captured. On April 13, Senna, a Turkish post 4,000 3'ards
south-west of Maan Station, was captured, and on April 17 the station was entered and 100 prisoners
made, but the attack was imable to make any impression on the strong Turkish position 400 yards
north of the station. This position was of considerable strength, and was provided with concrete
machine-gun emplacements. The Arabs then withdrew to a strong position at Senna to await the
arrival of further ammunition for their artillery.
In the meantime another column attacked the line between Batn el Ghul and Kalaat et Mudawara,
seventy kilometres south of Maan, and destroyed 100 kilometres of line so effectively that at least a
month's uninterrupted work will be required to repair it, and then only if large gangs of labourers are
available. The damage to the railway north of Maan was not so thorough, but was sufficient to prevent
through traffic for several days.
Enemy Attack on Ghoraniyeh Bridgehead.
14. After the troops employed in the last raid had been withdrawn to the west bank of the Jordan,
the enemy reoccupied the Shunet Nimrin position, which he held with some 5,000 rifles.
On April 11 he made simultaneous attacks on the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead and on EI Musallabeh,
which covers the Beisan-Jericho road west of the Jordan. Both attacks were pressed with considerable
determination, but brought him no success, and during the night April 11-12 he withdrew to his posi-
tions at Shunet Nimrin, which he commenced to strengthen. His losses in these attacks were heavy.
He left three officers and 113 other ranks in our hands as prisoners, while some 500 dead were buried
by us or seen to be buried by the enemy.
I determined to seize the first opportunity to cut off and destroy the enemy's force at Shunet Nimrin,
and, if successful, to hold Es Salt till the Arabs could advance and relieve my troops. This would have
denied the enemy the use of the harvest. I had intended to carry out this operation about the middle
of May, when the reorganization of the 1st Moimted Division had been completed. In the meantime,
however, a deputation from the Beni Sakhr tribe arrived stating that the tribe was concentrated near
Madeba, ready to co-operate with any advance I might make, provided it took place before May 4, after
which date their supplies would be finished and the tribe would have to disperse.
The troops available to carry out this raid were the Desert Mounted Corps, less the 1st Mounted
Division, the fiOth Division, less one brigade, and the Imperial Service Cavalry and Infantry lirigadcs.
The 60th Division was to attack the enemy's position at Shunet Nimrin, whilst the Mounted Troops,
moving northwards from Ghoraniyeh, were to turn east along the tracks leading from Umm es Shert
and Jisr ed Damieh, and protect the left flank.
In the former raid tlie only route found fit for wheeled transport between Amman and Shunet
Nimrin had been the metalled road passing through Es Salt. The arrival of the mounted troops at Es
Salt would thus sever the main line of communication of the force at Shunet Bimrin, who would be
dependent for their supplies on the track further south through Ain es Sir. This track was exposed to
attack by the Beni Sakhr tribe.
. There appeared every chance therefore of the Turkish force at Shunet Nimrin being compelled to
retreat imder very difficult ppnditions, and ft fair chance of its being captured.
April 30 May i, 1918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 21
The Es Salt Raid, April 30 May 4.
The operations were oonunenced early on tlie iiioniiiii.' of April 30, and proeeoded according to plan.
The GOth Division captured tlie advanced works of tlie Shuiict Ninuin position, but were unable
to make further progress in face of the stubborn resistance offered by the enemy. (See Pl.\te 37.)
The mounted troops, moving northwards, rode round the right of the Shunet Niinrin position, and
by 6 p.m. had captured Es Salt, leaving an Australian Brigade to watch the left fiank.
This brigade took up a position facing north-west astride the Jisr ed Daiuieh-Es Salt track, with
patrols watching the Wadi ez Zerka, and with a detachment on the high ground on the east bank of the
Jordan, two miles north of Umiu es Shert.
At 7.30 a.m. on May 1 this brigade was attacked by the 3rd Turki.sh Cavalry Division, and a part
of the 24th Division, which had crossed from the west bank of the Jordan during the night at Jisr ed
Daniieh. The; eiK^my succeeded in penetrating between the left of the brigade and the detacliinent on
the bank of the Jordan. The brigade was driven back through the foothills to the Wadi el Abyad.
Dm-ing its retirement through the liills nine guns and part of its transport had to be abandoned, being
unable to traverse the intricate ground.
The Umm es Shert-Es Salt track was thus the only line of supply or retreat left to the mounted
troops in Es Salt, till the main road and the Wadi Arseniyet track could be opened by the capture of the
Shunet Ninirin {)osition and El Hand. (See Plate 38.)
Arrangements were made for a combined attack to take place on this position on May 2. The
60th Division was to attack from the west and the momited troops at Es Salt from the north-east.
On May 2 the mounted troops in Es Salt were attacked by two Turkish battalions which had
arrived fr(jm Amman acccmipanied by heavy guns, as well as by cavalry from the north, and troops
from Jisr ed Damieh. These attacks were driven of!, but the force intended to attack Shunet Nimrin
from the north-east had to be weakened and was checked at El Howeij, five miles south of Es Salt. The
60th Division was also unable to make any substantial progress, in spite of determined efforts.
Inactivity of the Beni Sakhr.
As the assistance of the Beni Sakhr tribe had not materialized, the Ain es Sir track was still open
to the garrison of Shimet Nunrin. Further Turkish reinforcements were known to be on their way.
It was evident that the Shunet Nimrin position could not be captured without losses, which I was not
in a position to afford. In these circmnstances I ordered the mounted troops to withdraw from Es
Salt. Their retirement was accomplished successfully. The enemy, who followed up closely, was held
off without difficulty. By the evening of May 4 all the troops had recrossed the Jordan, bridgeheads
being left to cover the bridges at Ghoraniyeh and the crossing at El Auja.
Although the destruction of the Turkish force at Shunet Nimrin had not been effected, the enemy's
losses were considerable, the prisoners brought in amoxmting to fifty officers and 892 other ranks ; twenty-
nine machine guns and several motor cars and lorries were destroyed by the mounted troops before they
left Es Salt.
The raid lias undoubtedly rendered the enemy apprehensive of further operations east of the
Jordan, and has compelled him to maintain considerable forces in the Amman -Shxmet Nimrin area,
reducing the forces available to meet the Arab menace.
^o
Despatch of Troops to France.
15. The despatch of troops to France, and the reorganization of the force, has prevented further
operations, of any size, being imdertaken, and has rendered the adoption of a policy of active defence
necessary. During the first week in April the 52nd Division embarked for France, its place being
taken by the 7th (Meerut) Division which had arrived from Mesopotamia.
The departure of the 52nd Division was followed by that of the 74th Division, which left Palestine
during the second week in April. The 3rd (Lahore) Division was sent from Mesopotamia to replace
the 74th Division, but it was not till the middle of June that the last units disembarked. In addition
to the 52nd and 74th Divisions, nine Yeomanry regiments, five and a half siege batteries, ten British
battahons, and five machine gun companies were withdrawn from the line, preparatory to embarkation
for France, (a)
By the end of April the Yeomanry regiments had been replaced by Indian Cavalry regiments,
which had arrived from France, and the British battahons by Indian battalions despatched from India.
These Indian battalions had not, however, seen service durmg the present war ; and, naturaDy, had not
the experience of the battahons they replaced.
(a) See footnote on following page.
22 THE ADVANCE OF THE Juke 8-Aug. 12, 1918.
Thus in April the strength of the force had been reduced by one division, five and a half siege bat-
teries and five machine-gun companies ; while one mounted division was in process of being reorganized,
and was not available for operations.
In May a further fourteen battalions of British mfantry were withdrawn and despatched to France, (a)
Only two Indian battalions were available to replace them. Thus at the end of May the force had been
further reduced by twelve battaUons, while the loss of the 74th Division had not yet been fully made
good. On the other hand, the reorganization of the moimted division had been completed.
In June the places of the British battalions which had been despatched to France were filled by
Indian battalions. Six of the Indian battahons had, however, been formed by withdrawing a company
from twenty -four of the Indian battalions aheady m the Force. As few reinforcements were available
for the battalions thus depleted, the Force had been completed in name only.
During July and the first week in Augiist a further ten British battalions were replaced by ten
Indian battahons, the personnel of the British battahons being used as reinforcements, (b)
16. Duriag these months of reorganization various muior operations and a number of raids have
been carried out.
Advance in the Coastal Sector.
Between April 9 and 11, the right of the hne held by the XXIst Corps was advanced on a front of
twelve miles, to a maximmn dejjth of three miles ; the villages of Kefr Ain, Berukin, El Kefr and Rafat
being captured. Considerable resistance was met with, the Tm'kish troops being stiffened by a German
battahon. The enemy made several attempts to recapture Berukin and Rafat. His counter-attacks
were broken up by the infantry, ably supported by the artillery, but, in some cases, only after sharp hand-
to-hand fighting. The enemy's losses were considerable, over 300 of his dead being counted.
On Oune 8 an advance was made on the coast, at the extreme left of my Ime, with the object of
depriving the enemy of observation. The enemy's positions were captured by two battalions — the
Black Watch and the Guides. Two counter-attacks were made. In the first the enemy succeeded in
reoccupying a portion of the position, but he was expelled. The second counter-attack broke down
before it reached our new position. The enemy's losses were considerable, and four ofiicers and 101
other ranks were captiu'ed. The capture of these positions not only prevented the enemy from over-
lookmg a considerable length of our defences and the ground in rear, but secured observation of the
approaches to the enemy's positions, with the result that his movements, by day, have been considerably
restricted.
Successful Indian Raids.
The Indian troops have carried out a number of minor raids with success. On July 13 a party of
the Guides surprised the enemy in his trenches in the middle of the day, bringing back fifteen prisoners
and a machine gun. On July 27 a Pathan company of the 53rd Sikhs F.F. intiicted heavy casualties
on the enemy, and brought m thirty-three prisoners and two machine guns.
A raid on a larger scale, carried out on Aug. 12 by the Leinster Regiment, 54th Sikhs, and 1st
Battahon, 101st Grenadiers, was crowned with complete success. The objective was the enemy's defences
on the El Burj-Ghurabeh ridge, north-west of Smjil. This ridge is some 5,000 yards in length, and lies
2,000 yards in front of our line. It was held by 800 rifles and thirty-sis machine guns. The defences
consisted of strongly-built sangars, protected by thick wire entanglements. The approaches to it are
rocky and broken, involving a chmb of 900 feet. The position was attacked from both flanks. The
enemy was surprised. His losses were heavy, and the raiders brought back 239 prisoners, including
a battalion commander and sixteen officers and thirteen machine guns. Great dash was shown by ail
the troops taking part in it.
In the Jordan Valley the momited troops have carried out successful raids, and have ambu.shed a
number of hostile patrols. The Indian cavalry have used the lance with good effect on several occasions.
(a) TKANSFEKUEn.
i'eu/iiaiiri/. — l/lft Warwirks, South Notts Hus.Jiirs, l/lst Bucks., 1/lst Berks., 1/lst Lines., 1/lst City of LdiiiIoii, 1/2iu1 and
1/Hiii Oi>iiii(y <if Jjiiiidcjii. l.lsl Kast Hidings.
Scige JJtil/rnm.—'MUt, 2J2nd, 32otli, ;S22tii, laiird, and 4-45tli.
lujuiitnj liatliiiwun.—tjMx K. West .■'urrejs, l/.'itli Devons, 2/4th Somerset L. I., I/itli and l/7tli Cliesliire.', 5th and filh
K. Inniskillint' Kusiliejs, l/4th K. !Snsse.\, 2/lth HarM|i.s|iiies, 2nd Liiyal North Lanes , otii K. Insli t'lisiliers, 5tli Uojnianglit
liangeis, (jtli Leinsters, litli K. Jlunster Fusiliers, tiUi and 7tli U. i)ul)lin I'nsiliers, 2,11, 2, l;i, 2/lti, 2/2U, 2/23ril, and
2/24111 Lcinilons, I/lst Herefords.
Machine Gun Cumjianie/i.—iiun. r2i, 202, 2(54, 271, and 272.
(J) Disbanded.
Infinitiij Jltitniliu)iK.—2/tth Devons, l,51li and l/iltli K. Welsli Fusiliers (amalgamated as 5/Gtli U. Welsh Fusiliers), 2/.")th
iluijipshiie.-, 24tli Dorsets, 1/Uh and 1/itli Welsh (ainalganiated a.s 4/6tli Welsh), 2/4tli K. West Kents, 2/iUth
Middlese.\, 0th 14. Irish Kitles, 2^18lli aud 2/21st Louduns.
July U, 1918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 23
17. This activity on our ])art has not been imitated by tho enemy, except in one instance. Tlien
the bnmt of the fi-jhtiiif!; fell on German troops. Early in July movements of troops, and increased
artillery and aerf)])lane activity, foreshadowed an attack on our defences in the Jordan Valley.
On th(! rii,dit bank of tlie .loidan our defences form a marked salient. The eastern side of the salient
faces the ford at Umni csh Shcrt. 'I'iic ape.x; is at El Musallabeh, wliile the western face runs acro.ss the
north-west slopes of Abu Teilul.
Abu Teilul.
Early on the morning of July 14 the enemy was seen to be concentrating in the deep wadis north-
west of iVbu Teilul. At 3.30 a.m. the attack began. The enemy penetrated between the advanced posts
and seized Abu Teilul, thus cutting off the posts further north at El Musallabeh. At 4.30 a.m. the Ist
Australian flight Hor.se Brigade counter-attacked. By 5 a.m. Abu Teilul had been regained. The enemy,
driven against our advanced posts, which, with one exception, had held their ground, suffered heavily.
Two hundred and seventy-six Germans, including twelve officers, and sixty-two Turks were captui-ed, in
addition to six machine gims and forty-two automatic rifles. One hundred wounded and many dead
were left on the ground. Great credit is due to the Au.strahans for th(i quickness of their counter-
attack and for the determination displayed by the garrisons of the advanced posts in holding out,
although sxirrounded.
El Henu Ford.
While this fightmg was in progress a Turkish force of considerable strength was observed to be con-
centrating to the east of the Jordan, opposite El Henu Ford, which is midway between the El Ghoraniyeh
bridgehead and the Dead Sea. A cavalry brigade moved out to counter-attack. Taking advantage of
the ground, the cavalry arrived within charging distance before they were observed. In the charge that
ensued some ninety Turks were speared ; and ninety-one, including six officers, in addition to four machine
guns, were captured. It was only by reaching ground impassable for cavalry that the remainder of the
Turks effected their escape. The Jodhpur Lancers played a distinguished part in this charge.
The enemy's attack on both banks of the Jordan thus failed ignominiously. His losses, especially
those of the German troops, were heavy, and it is probable that the German units which took part will
need a long rest before being ready for active operations again. Our casualties were comparatively light.
18. Since April no events of any importance have taken place in the Hedjaz. The Turks have been
unable to restore through railway communication between Maan and the north. South of Maan a
detachment of the Imperial Camel Corps attacked and captured the station at Kalaat el Mudawara,
destroymg the water tower and pumps. Thirty-five Turks were killed, six officers and 146 other ranks,
two guns and three machine gmis were captured.
As a result of this operation, no water supply now exists on the railway for a distance of 150 kilo-
metres south of Maan. Medina has thus been definitely cut off from the north.
Summary of the Operations.
19. The operations, which took place durmg the first half of the period covered by this despatch,
rendered secure the fruits of the fighting, which, commencing with the capture of Beersheba, cuhninated
in the occupation of Jerusalem.
On Dec. 12 the enemy still remained within four miles of Jerusalem. He is now twenty-two miles
from the Holy City. {See Plate 39.) To the east he has been driven across the Jordan, and his
communications to the Hedjaz raided. His losses between Dec. 12, 1917, and May 31, 1918, were
considerable, the number of prisoners amountuig to 331 officers and 6,088 other ranks. His one attempt
on a large scale to assume the offensive and retake Jerusalem failed, and was turned into a defeat,
accompanied by a considerable loss of territory.
In driving back the enemy my troops suffered considerable hardships. The rugged country in which
the majority of the fightuig took place not only favoured the defence, but demanded great physical
exertion on the part of the attackers. In the early months of the year their task was often rendered
more difficult by the cold and heavy rains which added greatly to their discomfort. They responded
to every call made on them, and proved their superiority over the enemy on every occasion. The second
half of the period under review has been .spent in reorganization and ui trainmg. • Although operations
have been limited to raids, sLxty-nine officers and 1,614 other ranks have been taken from the enemy
since June 1.
24 THE ADVANCE OF THE
20. Throughout the whole period, the work of the Eoyal Air Force has been of great value. Fifty-
three hostile aeroplanes have been destroyed, in addition to twenty-three which have been driven down
out of control. The enemy's troops, camps, and railways, have been bombed with good results, while
very important photographic work has been carried out. Co-operation with the other arms has been
excellent.
21. During the early months of the year, whilst the rainy season was still in progress, and before
railhead had reached the troops, the supply situation presented great difficulties. The wadis came down
hi spate, overflowing their banks and flooding the surrounding country. Not only was railway construc-
tion hindered, but the coimtry became almost impassable for motor, and extremely difficult for horse
transport. Nevertheless, all difficulties were overcome.
The Assistance of Egypt.
22. I am indebted to His Excellency General Sir Francis Wingate, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.,
D.S.O., High Commissioner for Eg3^pt, for the cordial assistance he has given me at all times.
Egypt has provided transport personnel, drivers for the Camel Transport Corps, and men for the
Egj'ptian Labour Corps in large numbers, in addition to several units of the Egyptian Army. These
have all done work which, though im ostentatious, has been of great value. Durmg the operations
in the hills of Judaea, and of Moab, the troops often depended for their supplies on the Camel Transport
Corps. The drivers displayed steadiness under fire and devotion to duty in the face of cold and rain,
which they had never experienced previously. The Egyptian Labour Corps shared these hardships.
The construction and maintenance of roads was a task of considerable importance and difficulty during
the rainy season, and threw a great strain on the Egyptian Labour Corps. Its successful accomplishment
reflects credit on the Corps. The Egyptian authorities have complied at once with all requests that I
have made, and my thanks are due to them for their loyal support.
23. The Army Postal Service has carried out its work efficiently. During the early months of the
year, when my troops were far in advance of railhead, the deUvery and collection of mails was a matter
of considerable difficulty, which was invariably overcome.
24. Throughout the period I have received every help from Rear-Admiral T. Jackson, C.B., M.V.O.
I have the honour to be,
Your Lordship's most obedient servant,
E. H. H. Allenby,
General,
Commanding-in-Chief,
Eg^-ptian Expeditionary Force.
>J
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 25
General Headquarters,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force,
Oclok-r 31, I'JIH.
My Lord,
I have the honour to forward a despatch describing the operations wliich, commencing on Sept. 19,
resulted in the destruction of the enemy's army, the liberation of Palestine and Syria, and the occupa-
tion of Damascus and Aleppo.
1. The latter months of the period covered by my despatch of Sept. 18, 1018, had been spent in
the reorganization of my force. The last Indian battalions to arrive had been incorporated in divisions
early in August. Some of these battalions had only been formed a few months, and I should have liked
to have given them further opportunities to accustom themselves to the conditions prevaihng on this
front, before calluig on them to play a part in arduous operations on a large scale. The rains, however,
usually commence at the end of October, rendering the plains of Sharon and Esdraelon impassable for
transjiort, except along the few existmg roads. Consequently, operations could not be postponed
beyond the middle of September.
Strength of the Enemy.
2. At the beginning of September I estimated the strength of the IVth, Vllth, and Vlllth Turkish
Armies to be 23,000 rifles, 3,000 sabres, and 340 gmis. The IVth Army— 0,000 rifles, 2,000 sabres, and
seventy-four guns — faced my forces in the Jordan Valley. The Vllth Army held a front of some twenty
miles astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road with 7,000 rifles and 111 guns, while the Vlllth Army front
extended from Furkhah to the sea, and was held by 10,000 rifles and 157 guns.
In addition, the garrison of Maan and the posts on the Hejaz Railway north of it, consisted of some
6,000 rifles and thirty guns.
The enemy's general reserve, only 3,000 rifles in strength, with thirty guns, was distributed between
Tiberias, Nazareth, and Haifa.
Thus, his total strength amoimted to some 4,000 sabres, 32,000 rifles, and 400 guns — representing
a ration strength, south of the line Rayak-Beirut, of 104,000.
3. I had at my disposal two cavalry divisions, two mounted divisions, seven infantry divisions,
and Indian infantry brigade, four miallotted battalions, and the French detachment (the equivalent of
an infantry brigade with other arms attached) ; a total, in the fighting line, of some 12,000 sabres, 57,000
rifles, and 540 guus.
I had thus a considerable superiority in numbers over the enemy, especially in mounted troops.
4. I was anxious to gain touch with the Arab Forces east of the Dead Sea, but the experience,
gained in the raids which I had undertaken against Amman and Es Salt in March and May, had proved
that the communications of a force in the hills of Moab were hable to interruption, as long as the enemy
was able to transfer troops from the west to the east bank of the Jordan. This he was in a position to
do, as he controlled the crossing at Jisr ed Damieh.
The defeat of the Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies, west of the Jordan, would enable me to control
this crossing. Moreover, the destruction of these armies, which ajjpeared to be within the bounds of
possibility, would leave the IVth Ai-my isolated, if it continued to occupy the country south and west
of Amman. I determined, therefore, to strike my blow west of the Jordan.
5. With the exception of a sniall and scattered reserve, the whole of the Turkish Force west of
the Jordan was enclosed in a rectangle forty-five miles in length and only twelve miles in depth. The
northern edge of this rectangle was a line from Jisr ed Damieh on the Jordan, through Nablus and Tul
Keram, to the sea. All the enemy's communications to Damascus ran northwards from the eastern
half of this fine ; converging on El Afule and Beisan, some twenty-five miles to the north. Thence,
with the exception of the roads leading from El Afule along the western shore of the Sea of Galilee, his
communications ran eastwards up the valley of the Yarmuk to Deraa, the junction of the Palestine and
Hejaz railways. (See Plate 41.)
Thus, El Afule, Beisan, and Deraa were the vital points on his communications. If they could be
seized, the enemy's retreat would be cut off. Deraa was beyond my reach, but not beyond that of
mobile detachments of the Arab Army. It was not to be expected that these detachments could hold
this railway junction, but it was within their power to dislocate all traffic.
El Afule, in the Plain of Esdraelon, and Beisan, in the Valley of Jezreel, were withm reach of my
cavalry, provided the infantry could break through the enemy's defensive sj'stems, and create a gap
for the cavalry to pass through. It was essential that this gap should be made at the conuuencement
of operations, so that the cavalry might reach their destinations, forty-five and sixty miles distant, before
the enemy could make his escape. Moreover, whichever route the cavalry followed, the hills of Samaria,
26 THE ADVANCE OF THE
or tbeir extension towards Mount Carmel, had to be crossed before the Plain of Esdraelon, and the Valley
of Jezreel, could be reached ; and it was most important that the enemy should not be given time to
man the passes.
6. For this reason I decided to make my main attack in the coastal plain, rather than through the
hills north of 'Jerusalem. In the hills the groimd afforded the enemy positions of great natural strength,
and taxed the physical energy of the attackers to the utmost. The operations in March, astride the
Jerusalem -Nab lus road, had proved that an advance of five miles in one day, in face of determined
opposition, was the most that could be expected. A far more rapid and decisive advance than this was
necessary. In addition, the route along the coast would enable the cavahy to pass through the hills
of Samaria, into the Plain of Esdraelon, at their narrowest point ; thus ensuring greater speed and less
likelihood of being checked. The supply of a large force of troops in the plain also presented fewer
difficulties.
The Sharon Front.
7. The Coastal Plain at Jiljuheh, the ancient Gilgal, is some ten miles in width. The railway
from Jiljuheh to Tul Keram skirts the foothills, running through a shght depression on the eastern edge
of the plain. To the west of this depression th-e Turks had constructed two defensive systems. The first,
14,000 yards in length and 3,000 in depth, ran along a sandy ridge in a north-westerly direction from
Bir Adas to the sea. It consisted of a series of works connected by continuous fire trenches. The second,
or Et Tireh system, 3,000 yards in rear, ran from the village of that name to the mouth of the Nahr
Falik. On the enemy's extreme right the ground, except for a narrow strip along the coast, is marshy
and could only be crossed in few places. The defence of the second system did not, therefore, require
a large force.
The railway itself was protected by nmnerous works, and by the fortified villages of Jiljuheh and
KaLkiheh. The ground between our front line at Has el Ain and these villages was open, and was over-
looked from the enemy's works on the foothills round Kefr Kasim.
8. By reducing the strength of the troops in the Jordan Valley to a minimum, and by withdrawing
my reserves from the hills north of Jerusalem, I was able to concentrate five divisions and the French
detachment, with a total of 383 gmis, for the attack on these defences. Thus, on the front of attack,
I was able to concentrate some 35,000 rifles against 8,000, and 383 guns against 130. In addition, two
cavalry and one Austrahan mounted divisions were available for this front. [See Plate 41.)
The Plan of Campaign.
9. I entrusted the attack on the enemy's defences in the coastal plain to Lieut.-General Sir Edward
Bulfin, K.C.B., C'.V.O., commandmg the XXIst Corps. In addition to the 3rd (Lahore), 7th (Meerut),
54th, and 75th Divisions, which already fornaed part of the XXIst Corps, I placed at his disposal the 60th
Division, the French Detachment, the 5th Austrahan Light Horse Brigade, two brigades of mountain
artillery, and eighteen batteries of heavy and siege artillery.
1 ordered him to break through the enemy's defences between the railway and the sea, to open
a way for the cavalry, and at the same tune, to seize the foothills south-east of Jiljuheh. The XXIst
Corps was then to swing to the right, on the line Hableh-Tul Keram, and then advance in a north-easterly
direction through the hills, converging on Samaria and Attara, so as to drive the enemy up the Messudie-
Jenin road into the arms of the cavalry at El Afule.
I ordered Lieut.-General Sir Harry Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., commanding the Desert Mounted
Corps, less the Australian and New Zealand Moimted Division, to advance along the coast, directly the
infantry had broken through, and had secured the crossmg? over the Nahr Fahk. On reaching the line
Jelameh-Hudeira, he was to turn north-east, cross the hills of Samaria, and enter the Plain of Esdraelon
at El Lejjun and Abu Shusheh. Riding along the plain, the Desert Mounted Corps was to seize El Al'ule,
sending a detachment to Nazareth, the site of the Yildciim General Headquarters. Sufficient troops
were to be left at El Afule to intercept the Tui-kish retreat there. The remainder of the Corps was to ride
down the Valley of Jezreel and seize Beisan.
I ordered Lieut.-General Sir Phihp Chetvvode, Bart., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., commanding the
XXth Corps, to advance his fine east of the Bireh-Nablus road, on the night preceding the main attack,
80 as to place the 53rd Division on his right flank, which was somewhat drawn back, in a more favourable
position to advance and block the exits to the lower valley of the Jordan.
I ordered him to be jnepared to carry out a further advance with both the 53rd and 10th Divisions,
on the evening of the day on which the attack in the coastal plain took place, or later as circumstances
demanded.
Sept. 18-19, 1918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 27
10. The main difficulties lay in concealing the witlidrawal of two cavalry divisions from the Jordan
Valley, and in concentrating secretly, a large force in the coastal plain.
To prevent the decrease in strength in the Jordan Valley being discover<;d by the enemy, I ordered
Major-General .Sir Edward C'haytor, K.C.iVI.G., C.li., A.D.C., to carry out with the Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division, the 20th Indian (Imperial Service) Infantry Brigade, the 38th and ;i9th Batta-
lions Royal Jiusiliers, and the 1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment, a series of demon-
strations with the object of inducing the enemy to believe that an attack east of the Jordan was intended,
either in the direction of Madeba or Amman. The enemy was thought to be anticipating an attack in
these directions, and every pcjssible step was taken to strengthen his suspicions.
At this tune a mobile column of the Arab Army, accompanied by Briti.sh armoured cars and a French
mountain battery, was assembling at Kasr el Azrak, fifty miles east of Annnan. The real objective
of this colunui was the railway nortli, south, and west of Deraa. There was always the possibility,
however, that this concentration might be observed. Should this occur, it was hoped that the demon-
strations by Chaytor's force would strengthen the enemy's belief that a concerted attack on Amman was
intended.
Preparation for the Attack.
The concentration in the coastal jjlain was carried out by night, and every precaution was taken to
prevent any increased movement becoming apparent to the Turks. Full use of the many groves round
Ramleh, Ludd, and Jafla, was made to conceal troops during the day. The chief factor in the secrecy
mamtamed nmst be attributed, however, to the supremacy in the air which had been obtained by the
Royal Air Force. The process of wearing down the enemy's aircraft had been going on all through the
simmier. Durhig one week in Jmie lUO hostile aeroplanes had crossed our luies. Dming the last week
in August this nmnber had decreased to eighteen. In the next few days a number were shot down, with
the result that only four ventured to cross our lines during the period of concentration.
»
11. That the enemy expected an offensive on my part about this date is probable. That he remained
in ignorance of my intention to attack in the coastal plain with overwhelming numbers is certain.
On the morning of Sept. 19, when the attack in the coastal jjlaiu was launched, his dispositions
were normal.
Arab Action.
12. ^Vhilst the concentration in the coastal plain was nearing completion, the enemy's railway
communications at Deraa were attacked by the Royal Air Force, and by the mobile column of the Axab
Army, which, after concentrating at Kasr el Azrak, iifty miles east of Amman, had moved into the Hauran.
The railway line and station buildings at Deraa were damaged by the Royal Air Force on Sept. 16
and 17. On Sept. 16th the Arab colmim, which had been joined by the Shalaan Sections of the Rualla,
Anazeh, and by a nimiber of Druses, attacked the Hejaz Railway, fifteen miles south of Deraa, destroying
a bridge and a section of the railway. On the following day the line was attacked both north and west
of Deraa, extensive demoUtions being carried out. As the result of these demolitions, all through traffic
to Palestine ceased, and a considerable quantity of transport, which had been intended for the Hejaz,
was diverted to bridge the break in the railway. {ISee Plates 41-44.)
The Eastern Front.
13. The concentration in the coastal plain had been completed by the morning of Sept. 18.
During the night of Sept. 18-19, the XXth Corps swmig forward its right on the east of the Bueh-A'ablus
road. The 53rd Division descended mto the basin at the head of the Wadi Samieh, captured Kh. Jibeit,
El Mugheir, and the ridge on the far side of the basin, and all its objectives, with the exception of one hill,
Kh. Abu Alalul. Considerable opposition was encountered ; and hand-to-hand fighting took place, in
which over 400 prisoners were taken.
In the early hours of Sept. 19 El Afule and the headquarters of the Turkish ^T^Ith and Vlllth
Armies at Nablus and Tul Keram were bombed by the Royal Air Force, with a view to disorganizing their
signal commmiications.
At 0430 the artillery in the coastal plaui opened an intense bombardment lasting fifteen minutes,
under cover of which the infantry left their positions of deployment. Two torpedo boat destroyers
assisted, brmgmg tire on the coastal road to the north. {6ee Plate 42.)
14. The operations which followed fall into five phases.
28 THE ADVANCE OF THE
The first phase was of short duration. In thirty-six hours, between 0430 on Sept. 19 and 1700 on
Sept. 20, the greater part of the Vlllth Turkish Army had been overwhehned, and the troops of the
Vllth Army were in full retreat, through the hills of Samaria, whose exits were already in the hands of
my cavalry. {See Plates 43-44.)
In the second phase the fruits of this success were reaped. The infantry, pressing relentlessly on
the heels of the retreating enemy, drove him into the arms of my cavalry, with the result that practically
the whole of the Vllth and Vlllth T>irkish Armies were captured, with their guns and transport.
This phase also witnessed the capture of Haifa and Acre, and the occupation of Tiberias, and of the
country to the south and west of the Sea of Galilee.
As the result of the rout of the Vllth and Vlllth Armies, the IVth Turkish Army, east of the Jordan,
retreated, and Maan was evacuated. {See Plates 45-46.)
The third phase commenced with the pursuit of this army by Chaytor's force, and closed with the
capture of Amman, and the intercep!;ion of the retreat of the garrison of Maan, which surrendered.
(See Pl.\te 47.)
The fourth phase witnessed the advance by the Desert Mounted Corps to Damascus, the capture
of the remnants of the IVth Turkish Army, and the advance by the XXIst Corps along the coast from
Haifa to Beirut. (<S'ee Plates 48-52.)
In the fifth phase my troops reached Homs and Tripoli without opposition. My cavalry then
advanced on Alej^po, and occupied that city on Oct. 26. {See Plate 53.)
The Main Attack.
15. The attack in the coastal plain on the morning of Sept. 19 was attended with complete success.
On the right, in the foothills, the French Tirailleurs and the Armenians of the Legion d'Orient advanced
with great dash, and, in spite of the difficulties of the groimd, and the strength of the enemy's defences,
had captured the Kh. Deir el Kussis ridge at an early hour. On their left the 54th Division stormed
Kefr Kasm village, and wood, and the foothills overlooking the railway from Ras el Ain to JiljuUeh.
North of Kefr Kasim the advance was checked for a time at Sivri Tepe, but the enemy's resistance was
quickly overcome, and the remaining hills south of the Wadi Kanah captured.
The Battle of Sharon.
In the coastal plain the 3rd (Lahore) Division attacked the enemy's first sj'stem between Bir Adas
and the Hadrah road. On its left the 75th Division attacked the Tabsor defences, the 7th (Meerut)
Division the works west of Tabsor, while the 60th Division attacked along the coast. The enemy replied
energetically to our bombardment, but in most cases his barrage fell behind the attacking mfantry.
The enemy was overwhelmed. After overrunning the first system the three divisions on the left pressed
on, without pausing, to the Et Tireh position. On the left the 60th Division reached the Nahr Fahk,
and moved on Tul Keram, leavmg the route along the coast clear for the Desert Mounted Corps. The
7th (Meerut) Division, after passing through the second system, swung to the right, and headed for
Et Taiyibeh, leaving Et Tireh, where the 75th Division was still fighting, on its right.
By 1100 the 75th Division had captured Et Tireh, a strongly fortified village standing on a sandy ridge,
where the enemy offered a determined resistance. On the right the 3rd (Lahore) Division turned to the
east, and attacked Jiljulieh, Railway Redoubt, Kefr Saba, and Kalkilieh, all of which were defended
with stubbornness by the enemy. His resistance was, however, broken, and the 3rd (Lahore) Division
pressed on eastwards into the foothills near Hableh, joining hands with the 54th Division, north of the
Wadi Kanah.
Disorganized bodies of the enemy were now streammg across the plain towards Tul Keram, pursued
by the 60th Division and the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade. This brigade, which had been attached
to the XXIst Corps, consisted of two Australian Light Horse Regunents, with a composite regiment of
Chasseurs d'Afrique and Spahis attached. Great confusion reigned at Tul Keram. Bodies of troops,
guns, motor lorries, and transport of every description were endeavouring to cscajjc along the road
leading to Messudie and Nablus. This road, which follows the railway up a narrow valley, was already
crowded with troops and transport. The confusion was added to by the persistent attacks of the Royal
Air Force, and Austrahan Flying Corps, from which there was no escape. Great havoc was caused,
and, in several places, the road was blocked by overturned lorries and vehicles. Later in the evening
an Australian regiment, having made a detour, succeeded in reaching a hill four miles east of Tul
Keram, overlooking the road. As a result, a large amoimt of transport, and many guns, fell into
our hands.
Sept. 20, 1918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 29
In the meantime the 7th (Mcerut) Division and 3rd (Lahore) Divi.sion had entered the hills, and, in
conjunction with the 51 th Division, had pressed eastwards. By dusk the line Bidieh-Kh. Kcfr Thilth-
Jiyus-Fclanueh-Tiiiyibeh had been reached. The 75th Division remained in the vicinity of Et Tireh
in Corps reserve. {See Plate 42.)
The Battle of Mount Ephraim.
IG. As soon as the success of the initial attack by the XXIst Corps, on the morning of Sept. 19,
had become apparent, I ordered the XXth Corps to advance that night on Nablus, and the high ground
north-east of that town, in order to close the roads leading to the lower valley of the .Jordan, and to drive
the enemy from tlie triangle formed by the Kh. Fusail -Nablus road, our original front line, and the El
Funduk-Nablus track, by which the 3rd (Lahore) Division was advancing.
The two divisions of the XXth Corps had been concentrated beforehand, in readiness to carry out
this ojjeration ; the 53rd Division to the east of the Bireh-Nablus road, the 10th Division on the extreme
left of the Corps area, in the vicinity of Berukin and Kefr Ain. The enemy had long anticipated an
attack astride the Bireh-Nablus road, and had constructed defences of great strength on successive
ridges. For this reason the 10th Division was ordered to attack in a north-easterly direction astride
the Furkhah-Seliit and Berukin-Kcfr Haris ridges, thus avoiding a direct attack. Even .so, the task
of the XXth Corps was a difficult one. The enemy in this portion of the field was not disorganized,
and was able to oppose a stout resistance to the advance. The country is broken and rugged, demanding
great physical exertion on the part of the troops, and preventing the artillery keeping pace with the
mfantry.
Nevertheless, good progress was made on the night of Sept. 19, and during the following day. The
53rd Division captured Kh. abu Malul, and advanced their line in the centre. On their right Khan
Jibeit was heavily counter-attacked on the morning of Sept. 20. The Turks succeeded in regaining
the hill, but were driven off again after a sharp fight. This incident, and the necessity of making a road,
to enable the guns to be brought forward, caused delay.
The 10th Division advanced in two cohmins, and, by midday on Sept. 20, the right colunin, after
a hard fight at Furkhah, had reached Selfit, and was approaching Iskaka, which was strongly held by
the enemy. The left coliunn reached Kefr Haris, which was only captured after heavy fighting. The
10th Division had already driven the enemy back seven miles. The artillery, however, had been rmable
to keep up with the infantry, and little progress was made during the afternoon.
On the left of the 10th Division the XXIst Corps had continued its advance in three columns. On
the right, the 3rd Division advanced up the Wadi Azzun. In the centre, the Meerut Division moved
on Kefr Sur and Beit Lid. The 60th Division and the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade advanced
along the Tul Keram-Nablus road on Messudie Station. By evening the line Baka-Beit Lid-Messudie
Station-Attara had been reached.
The 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions encountered a determined and well-organized resistance,
which stiffened as the Meerut Division approached Beit Lid. The enemy showed no signs of demoral-
ization, and the country was very rugged and difficult.
Considerable confusion existed, however, behind the enemy's rearguards. All day. his transport
had been w-ithdrawing. The Messudie-Jenin road was crowded. Its defiles had been bombed contin-
uously by the Royal Air Force, as had long columns of troops and transport moving on Nablus in order
to reach the Beisan road. It is probable that the enemy did not yet realize that my cavalry was already
in Afule and Beisan, and had blocked his main lines of retreat. (See Plate 43.)
The Advance of the Cavalry.
17. Early on the morning of Sept. 19, before the infantry had advanced to the attack, the 4th and
5th Cavalry Divisions moved out of the groves roimd Sarona, and formed up in rear of the 7th (Meerut)
and 60th Divisions. The Australian Mounted Division, less the 5th Light Horse Brigade, was on its
way from Ludd.
Thanks to the rapidity with which the infantry broke through both Turkish systems of defence,
the cavalry obtained a good start. By noon the leading troops of the Desert Jloimted Corps had reached
Jelameh, Tel ed Dhnrr, and Hudeira, eighteen miles north of the original front hne. After a brief rest,
the advance was continued. The 5th Cavalry Division moved north to Ez Zerghaniyeh. It then turned
north-east and, riding through the hills of Samaria past Jarak, descended into the Plain of Esdraelon
at Abu Shusheh. The 13th Cavalry Brigade was then directed on Nazareth, the 14th on El Afule.
The 4th Cavalry Division turned north-east at Kh. es Sumrah, and followed the valley of the Wadi
Arab into the hills. The valley gradually narrows_as the pass at Musmus is reached.
30 THE ADVANCE OF THE Sept. 20-22, 1918.
The enemy had sent a battaUon from El Afule to hold this pass, but only its advanced guard arrived
in time. Overcoming its resistance the cavalry encomitered the remainder of the battalion at El Lejjun.
The 2nd Lancers charged, killed forty-six with the lance, and captured the remainder, some 470 in
number.
The 4th Cavalry Di\'ision then marched to El Aiule, which it reached at 0800, half an hour after
its capture by the 14th Cavahy Brigade.
The Nazareth Raid— Sept. 20.
In the meantime the 13th Cavalry Brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, riding across the Plain of
Esdraelon, had reached Nazareth, the site of the Yilderim General Headquarters, at 0530. Fighting
took place in the streets, some 2,000 prisoners being captured. Jjiman von Sanders had already made
good his escape, but his papers and some of his staff were taken. This brigade then marched to El Afule,
arrivmg there as the 4th Cavalry Division rode down the Plain of Jezreel to Beisan, which it reached at
1630, having covered some eighty miles in thirty-four hours. The 4th Cavalry Division detached a
regiment to seize the railway bridge over the Jordan at Jisr Mejamie.
The AustraHan Moimted Division, which had followed the 4th Cavalry Division into the Plain of
Esdraelon, was directed on Jenin, where the road from Messudie to El Afule leaves the hills. Jenin was
reached at 1730, and was captured after a sharp fight, a large number of prisoners being taken.
Thus, within thirty-sLx hours of the commencement of the battle, all the main outlets of escape
remaining to the Turkish Vllth and Vlllth Armies had been closed. They could only avoid capture
by using the tracks which run south-east from the vicinity of Nablus to the crossings over the Jordan at
Jisr ed Damieh. These were being rapidly denied to them. (*S'ee Plate 43.)
The first phase of the operations was over.
Destruction of the Turkish Vllth and Vlllth Armies.
18. The enemy's resistance had been broken on Sept. 20. On Sept. 21 the Turkish rearguards
were driven in early in the morning. All organized resistance ceased. The 5th Austrahan Light Horse
Brigade, with the French cavalry leading, entered Nablus from the west ; the 10th Division from
the south.
By the evening, the XXth Corps had reached the line Neby Belan, on the high ground north-east
of Nablus, and Momit Ebal ; the XXIst Corps the line Samaria, Attara, Belah.
Since the early hours of the morning great confusion had reigned m the Turkish rear. Camps and
hospitals were being hurriedly evacuated ; some were in flames. The roads leading north-east, and east,
from Nablus to Beisan, and the Jordan Valley, were congested with transport and troops. Small parties
of troops were movmg east along the numerous wadis. The disorganization which already existed was
increased by the repeated attacks of the Koyal Air Force ; in particular, on the closely packed column
of transport moving north from Balata to Kh. Ferweh, where a road branches off, along the Wadi Farah,
to Jisr ed Damieh. Some of the transport continued along the road to Beisan, where it fell into the
hands of the 4th Cavalry Division. The greater part made for the Jordan along the Wadi Farah. Nine
miles from Kh. Ferweh, at Ain Shibleh, a road branches oS to the north to Beisan. A mile beyond this
point the Wadi Farah passes through a gorge. The head of the column was heavily bombed at this
pomt. The drivers left their vehicles in panic, wagons were overturned, and in a short time the road
was completely blocked. Still attacked by the Koyal Air Force, the remainder of the column turned
off at Ain Shibleh, and headed for Beisan. (See Plate 45.)
The Vllth Turkish Army was by this time thoroughly disorganized, and was scattered in the area
between the Kh. Ferweh Beisan road, and the Jordan. These parties had now to be collected.
At 0130 on Sept. 22 the New Zealand Momited Rifles Brigade, and the British West Indies
battalions of Chaji^or's Force, seized the bridge at Jisr ed Damieh. All hope of escape for the enemy
in that direction had vanished.
In the early hours of the morning, parties of Turks, of strengths varying from fifty to 300, began to
approach Beisan, preceded by white flags.
At 0800 a column, with transport and guns, ten miles long, was reported by the Royal Air Force
to be moving north along the Ain Shibleh-Beisan road, its head being nine miles south of Beisan. The
4th Cavalry Division was ordered to send detachments towards it, and also to patrol the road, which
follows the Jordan on its east bank, to secure any parties which might escape across the Jordan.
At the same time the Worcester Yeomanry of the XXth Corps, supported by infantry, was ordered
to advance northwards from Ain Shibleh, and the infantry of the 10th Division along the Tubas-Beisan
road, to collect stragglers, and to drive any formed bodies into the hands of the 4th Cavalry Division^
Sept. 23-24, 1918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 31
The Royal Air Force had proceeded to attack (lie Tuikinh colmim, whiili hroke up and abandoned
its guns and tiansjjort. The task of cleariiii,' tlie eiKiiny between thi; Kh. Ferweh-lieisan road and the
Jordan was continued during Sept. 23. On this day the XXth Corps Cavalry met with occasional
opposition, and its advance was hampered considerably by the large nunibers of Turks who surrendered.
Great quantities of transport and numerous guns were found abandoned by the roadsides. On one
stretch of road, under five miles in length, eighty-seven guns, fifty-five motor lorries, and 812 vehicles
were found.
Numerous bodies of Turks surrendered to the 4th Cavalry Division. One column attempted to
escape across the Jordan at Makhadet abu Naj, five miles south-east of Beisan, but was intercepted by
the 11th Cavalry Brigade. Part of the column had already crossed to the east bank. It was charged
by the SCth (Jaco])'s) Horse, and broken up, few escaping. On the west bank the remainder of the
column was charged by the 29th Lancers and Middlesex Yeomanry, who killed many and captured the
remainder, together with twenty-five mac'hine guns.
On Sept. 24 the 11th Cavalry Brigade attacked and dispersed another column in the Wadi el
Maleh. The last remnants of the Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies had been collected. As armies
they had ceased to exist, and but few had escaped.
19. Whilst the 4t]i Cavalry and the Australian Mounted Divisions were collecting the remnants
of the Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies, I ordered the Desert Moimted Corps to occupy Acre and Haifa.
The roads leading to Haifa from Tul Keram are only country tracks, which, in the event of rain, might
become impassable for motor lorries at any time. Any force, advancing northwards from Haifa along
the coast, would have to depend on supplies landed at that port. It was necessary, therefore, to occupv
the town without delay, in order that the harbour could be swept for mines, and tlie landing of stores
taken in hand. The 13th Cavalry Brigade of the 5th Cavalry Division, which had entered Nazareth
on Sept. 20, and had then marched to El Afule, returned to Nazareth the following day.
Part of the garrison of Haifa, which was attempting to reach Tiberias, was intercepted by this
brigade on the morning of Sept. 22. At 0130 this column approached the outposts of the 13th Cavalry
Brigade. It was attacked in the moonhght by the 18th Lancers, who killed a large number of Turks
and captured over 300.
That afternoon Haifa was recoimoitred by a battery of arnaoured cars. It was held by the enemy.
The road w-as barricaded, and the armoured cars were shelled from the slopes of Mount Carmel.
On Sept. 23 the 5th Cavalry Division, less the 13th Cavalry Brigade, marched from El Afule to
capture the town. The 13th Cavahy Brigade marched direct from Nazareth on Acre.
Capture of Acre and Haifa, Sept. 23.
The road from EI Afule to Haifa skirts the north-eastern edge of the Mount Carmel range. Some
two miles before Haifa is reached, the road is confined between a spur of Moimt Carmel on the left, and
the marshy banks of the River Kishon and its tributaries on the right, ^\^len the 5th Cavalry Divasion
reached this point on Sept. 23 it was shelled from the slopes of Mount Carmel, and foxmd the road and
the river crossings defended by numerous machine guns.
Whilst the Mysore Lancers were clearmg the rocky slopes of Mount Carmel, the Jodhpur Lancers
charged through the defile, and, riding over the enemy's machine guns, galloped into the town, where
a number of Turks were speared in the streets. Colonel Thakur Dalpat Singh, M.C., fell, gallantly
leading this charge.
In this operation 1,350 prisoners and seventeen gims were taken.
At Acre, the 13th Cavalry Brigade met with little opposition. The small garrison, consisting of
150 men and two guns, attempted to escape to the north, but was overtaken and captured.
Operations East of the Jordan.
20. Interest now turned to the fate of the IVth Turkish Army east of the Jordan. Up till Sept. 22
this army showed no signs of moving from its position on the east bank. (See Plate 45.) On the
west bank, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the 1st and 2nd Battahons British West
Indies Regiment had advanced northwards on Sept. 21, west of the Jericho-Beisan road, and had
reached Khurbet Fusail, four miles in advance of our defences at El Musalabeh. The enemv, however,
still held the bridgeheads on the west bank, covering the crossings at Umm es Shert, Red Hill, Mafid
Jozeleh, and Jisr ed Damieh. Early in the morning of Sept. 22, the 38th Battahon Royal Fusiliers
captured the bridgehead at Umm es Shert. The New Zealand Mounted Rifles placed themselves
astride the road which follows the Wadi Farah from Nablus to Jisr ed Damieh, thus closing the last
loophole of escape to the Turkish forces west of the Jordan. The crossing at Jisr ed Damieh was
captured a few hours later. The bridge was intact. 514 prisoners were taken.
32 THE ADVANCE OF THE Sept. 25-30, 1918.
Capture of Amman, Sept. 25.
Thus the west bank of the Jordan had been cleared. As a result of the defeat of the Vllth and
Vlllth Armies, the position of the IVth Army east of the Jordan was no longer tenable, and, by the
morninff of Sept. 23, this army was in full retreat on Es Salt and Amman, pursued by the Australian
and New Zealand Mounted Division, and bombed by the Royal Air Force. At 1630 the New Zealanders
captured Es Salt, taking 380 prisoners and three guns. The pursuit was continued on a broad front, in
face of stout opposition from the enemy's rearguards. On Sept. 25 Amman was attacked and captured.
The enemy retreated northwards along the Hejaz Railway, and the Pilgrim Route, m a disorganized
state, harassed by the Royal Air Force and the Arabs. He was pursued by the Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Di\'ision, and left over 5,000 prisoners and twenty-eight gims in their hands.
I ordered Chaytor's Force to remain at Amman to intercept the troops of the Ilnd Turkish Army
Corps, who were retreatmg from the Hejaz. Maan had been evacuated on Sept. 23, and had been
occupied by the Arab Army, which then advanced to Jerdim, harassing the rear of the retreating garrison.
[See Plate 47.)
Surrender of the Turkish Ilnd Corps.
On Sept. 28, these troops came into contact with the patrols of Chaytor's Force atLeban Station,
ten miles south of Amman. The Turkish Commander, seeing that escape was impossible, surrendered
on the following day with 5,000 men.
21. In addition to bringing about the retreat of the IVth Turkish Army, the total defeat of the
Vllth and Vlllth Armies had removed any serious obstacle to an advance on Damascus. On Sept. 25
I ordered the Desert Moimted Corps to carry out this operation, occupy the city, and intercept the
retreat of the renmants of the IVth Turkish Army.
22. The Desert Momited Corps was to advance on Damascus in two colunins ; one column by the
south end of the Sea of Galilee, via Irbid and Deraa, the other romid the north end of the Sea, via, El
Kmieitra.
On Sept. 24, Semakh at the south end of the Sea of Galilee, was captured by the 4th Australian Light
Horse Brigade, after fierce hand-to-hand fighting, in which 350 Turks and Germans and a gun were
captured. Tiberias was occupied on the following afternoon.
Thus, on Sept. 26, the Australian Mounted Division was concentrating round Tiberias, and the
5th Cavalry Division was marching from Haifa and Acre to Nazareth. The 4th CavaLry Division was
concentrated roimd Beisan. {See Plate 47.)
The Advance on Damascus.
23. The 4th Cavalry Division started on its 1 20-mile march that afternoon. The Australian and
5th Cavalry Divisions started the following day, the distance they had to traverse being thirty niiles
less. Both colmnns met with opposition. The Australian Mounted Division experienced considerable
difficulty in crossing the Jordan on Sept. 27. {See Plate 48.) The bridge at Jisr Benat Yakub had
been damaged, and Turkish rearguards commanded the crossings. After some delay, the 5th Australian
Brigade succeeded in crossing the river a mile south of the bridge ; and, working romid the enemy's flank,
forced him to retire. Opposition was again met with on the eastern side of the Jordan plateau, at El
Kuneitra, and the column was continually fired on by the Circassians who dwell on the plateau. Passing
throuo-h El Kimeitra, the column entered first a plateau covered by boulders and then imdulating
pasture land, intersected by the numerous streams which rise in Moimt Hermon. Fighting took place at
Sasa, but the enemy's rearguards were driven back, and, by 1000 on Sept. 30, Katana, twelve miles
south-west of Damascus, had been reached by the Australian Momited Division, which was here
checked for a time.
At this hour the 14th Cavalry Brigade, on the right of the Australian Mounted Division, was
approaching Sahnaya on the old French railway. Further south the 4th Cavalry Division, with the
Arab Army on its right, was approaching Kiswe. {See Plate 50.)
Destruction of the Turkish IVth Army.
The route followed by the 4th Cavalry Division across the Jordan ])lateau had proved difficult,
and consid(Tablo opposition had been encountered at Irbid, and again at Er Renite, wiicre, after driving
the enemy northwards towards Mezerib, the Cavalry gained touch with the Aral) Army.
After its raids on the enemy's railways round Deraa between Sept. 16 and 18, the Arab Army had
moved into the Hauran. It issued thence to attack the IVth Turkish Army, as the latter passed Mafrak
Oct. 1-8, 1918. EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 33
in its retreat northwards, forcing the Turks to abandon guns and transport. Moving rapidly northwards
the Arabs then caj)tiii('(l tlic, stations of Ezra and Ghazalc, between Damascus and Deraa. On Sept. 27
tliey eiitrenrlied themselves at Sheikh Saad, seventeen miles north of Deraa, across the Turkish line of
retreat. Sharp fighting took place all day, in which heavy casualties were infli(t(Ml on the rc'treating
Turks and CJcrmans, and in which numerous prisoners were taken. After breaking up the retreating
columns of the IVth Army, the Arabs captured Deraa, and, on Sept. 28, joined hands with the 4th
Cavalry Division near Er Remte.
The cavalry then advanced northwards through Mezerib, and along the old French railway, with
the Arabs on its right flank, collecting stragglers, and pressing on the heels of the remnants of the
IVth Turkish Army.
In this way a column of Turks some 1,-500 strong was driven at noon on Sept. 30 into the arms
of the 14th Cavalry Brigade at Sahnaya. {See Plate .50.)
Fall of Damascus.
Shortly after midday on Sept. 30, the Australian Mounted Division overcame the enemy's resistance
at Katana. By the evening it had closed tlie exits from Damascus to the north and north-west, while
the 5th Cavalry Division had reached the southern outskirts of the town. {See Plate 51.)
At 0600 on Oct. 1, the Desert Mounted Corps and the Arab Army entered Damascas amidst scenes
of great enthusiasm. After the German and Turkish troops in the town had been collected, and guards
had been posted, our troops were withdrawn. In the meantime, the 3rd Australian Light Hor.se Brigade
had proceeded northwards in pursuit of bodies of the enemy, which had succeeded in leaving the town
on the previous day, or had avoided it, and the cordon round it, by making a detour to the east. On
Oct. 2 a column was overtaken at Kubbeth i Asafir, seventeen miles north-east of Damascus. This
colunm was dispersed, 1,500 prisoners and three guns being taken.
Plight of the Enemy.
24. The advance to Damascus, following on the operation in the Plain of Esdraelon and the Valley
of Jezreel, had thrown a considerable strain on the Desert Mounted Corps. Great results were, however,
achieved.
On Sept. 26, when the advance began, some 45,000 Turks and Germans were still m Damascus or
were retreating on it. It is true that all units were in a state of disorganization but, given time, the
enemy could have formed a force capable of delaying my advance.
The destruction of the renmants of the IVth Army and the capture of an additional 20,000 prisoners,
prevented any possibility of this. The remnants of the Turkish Armies in Palestine and Syria, numbering
some 17,000 men, of whom only 4,000 were effective rifles, fled northwards a mass of individuals, with-
out organization, without transport, and without any of the accessories required to enable it to act even
on the defensive.
25. I determined to exploit this success, and to advance to the line Rayak-Beirut. The occupation
of Beirut would give me a port, with a road and a railway, leading inland to Rayak and Damascus. An
alternative and shorter line of supply would thus be obtained.
The Desert Moxmted Corps, leaving the Australian Mounted Division at Damascus, moved on Rayak
and Zahle on Oct. 5. No opposition was encoimtered, and both places were occupied on the
followmg day.
At Rayak, the junction of the broad gauge railway from the north and the metre gauge lines to
Beirut and to Damascus and the Hejaz, were found on the aerodrome the remains of thirty aeroplanes
which had been biu-nt by the enemy before he retired. Large quantities of stores and rolling stock were
captured, most of the latter in a damaged condition.
The March of the 7th Division.
In the meantime the 7th (Mereut) Division had marched from Haifa to Beirut. Leaving Haifa on
Oct. 3, it marched along the coast. Crossing the Ladder of Tyre, it was received by the populace of
T3're and Sidon with enthusiasm. On Oct. 8 it reached Beirut, where it was warmly welcomed, the
uihabitants handing over 660 Turks, including sixty officers, who had surrendered to them. Ships of
the French Navy had already entered the harbour. (-See Plate 53.)
34 THE ADVANCE OF THE Oct. 9-31, 1918.
Occupation of Horns, Tripolis, and Hama.
26. On Oct. 9 I ordered the Desert Mounted Corps to continne its advance and occupy Horns,
leaving one d^vision at Damascus. At the same time I ordered the XXIst Corps to continue its march
along the coast to Tripoli. Annoured cars occupied Baalbek on Oct. 9, taking over 500 Turks who
had surrendered to the uihabitants. The 5th Cavalry Division, which led the advance, reached Baalbek
on Oct. 11, and, crossing the watershed between the Nahr Litani on the south and the Orontes on the
north, followed up the valley of the latter river, past Lebwe, and reached Horns on Oct. 15, having
marched over eighty miles since leaving Eayak.
The station buildings at Homs had been burnt by the enemy before he evacuated the town on
Oct. 12.
On the coast, Tripoli was occupied by the XXIst Corps Cavalry Regiment and Armoured Cars on
Oct. 13. No opposition was encomitered. The Corps Cavalry Regiment was followed by a brigade
of the 7th (Meerut) Division. The occupation of Tripoli provided a shorter route by which the cavalry
at Homs could be supphed.
27. Having secured Homs and Tripoli, I determined to seize Aleppo, with the least possible delay.
The 5th Cavalry Division and the Armoured Car Batteries were alone'available. The Australian Mounted
Division at Damascus was over 100 miles distant from Homs, and could not be brought up in time. The
4th Cavalry Division at Baalbek was much reduced in strength by sickness, and needed a rest to
reorganize. Time was of importance, and I judged that the 5th Cavalry Division would be strong
enough for the purpose. The information available indicated the presence of some 20,000 Turks and
Germans at Aleppo. Of these, only some 8,000 were combatants, and they were demoralized. More-
over, reports from all sources showed that considerable nimibers of the enemy were leaving the town
daily by rail for the north.
The Armoured Cars had reached Hama without opposition on Oct. 20. On the following day the
5th Cavalry Division commenced its advance. On Oct. 22 the Armoured Cars reached Khan Sebil,
half-way between Homs and Aleppo, as the enemy's rearguard left the village in lorries. A German
armoured car, a lorry, and some prisoners were captured. The enemy was not encountered again till
Oct. 24, when a body of cavahy was dispersed at Khan Tuman, ten miles south of Aleppo. Five miles
further on, the armoured cars were checked by strong Turkish rearguards, and had to remain in observa-
tion till the cavalry came up. [See Plate 53.)
On the afternoon of Oct. 25 the Armoured Cars were joined by the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry
Brigade. That evening a detachment of the Arab Army reached the eastern outskirts of Aleppo, and
dm-ing the night forced their way in, inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.
Early on the morning of Oct. 26 the Armoured Cars and the 15th Cavalry Brigade, moving
rovmd the west side of the town, followed the enemy along the Aleppo-Katma road, and gained touch
with him south-east of Haritan. The Turkish rearguard consisted of some 2,500 infantry, 150 cavalry,
and eight guns. The Mysore Lancers and two squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers attacked the enemy's
left, covered by the fire of the Armoured Cars, the Machine Gun Squadron, and two dL-rmoimted
squadrons of the Jodhpur Lancers. The Mysore and Jodhpur Lancers charged most gallantly. A
number of Turks were speared, and many threw down their arms, only to pick them up again when the
cavalry had passed through, and their weakness had become apparent. The squadrons were not strong
enough to complete the victory, and were withdrawn till a larger force could be assembled.
That night the Turkish rearguard withdrew to a position near Deir el Jemel, twenty miles north-
west of Aleppo.
The 5th Cavalry Div-ision remained in observation, astride the roads leading from Aleppo to
KilUs and Katma, and occupied Muslimie Jimction.
It was too weak to continue the advance to Alexandretta till the arrival of the Australian Mounted
Division, which had already left Damascus to join it.
The Armistice.
Before the latter could arrive, the Armistice between the Allies and Turkey had been concluded,
and came into force at noon on Oct. 31 . (/Sec Plate 5(5.)
The 5th Cavalry Division captured fifty prisoners and eighteen guns in Alo])po. The Turks had
carried out demolitions on the railway at Aleppo and Muslimie Junction before retiring, but had left
eight engines and over 100 trucks, which, though damaged, were not beyond repair.
Aleppo is over 300 miles from our former front line. The 5th Cavalry Division covered 500 miles
between Sept. 19 and Oct. 2(), and captured over 11,000 prisoners and fifty-two guns, During this
period the 5th Cavahy Division lost only twenty-one per cent of its horses.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 35
28. Between Sept. 19 and Oct. 26 75,000 prisoners have been captured. Of the.se, over 200 oflScers
and 3, .500 other ranks are Germans or Austrians.
In addition, .'J()0 guns liavc fallen into our hands, and the transport and equipment of three Turkish
armies. It is not yet possible to give accurate figures, owing to the rapidity and the extent of the
advance. In the first three phases of the operations, material and equipment were hastily abandoned
by the enemy in a mountainous area, extending over 2,. 500 square mili-s, while in the remaining pha.ses
a further advance of over ."500 miles had been made. The captures, however, include over 800 machine
guns, 210 motor lorries, forty-four motor cars, some 3,500 animals, eighty-nine railway engines, and
468 carriages and trucks. Of these many are unserviceable, but none have been included that are
beyond repair.
29. The plan of operations and the arrangements for the concentration were carefully prepared
and well executed by Commanders and stalls. During the subsequent days of fighting, full advantace
was taken of every opjiortunity offered.
Appreciation of Services.
The gallantry and determination of all ranks and of all arms has been most marked. Many units
had already made their reputation in this, and other, theatres of the war. Some had yet to gain their
first experience of modern warfare. British, French, and Indian troops, and those of the Dominions
and Colonies, have all alike done magnificently.
The infantry, in a few hours, broke through the defences, which the enemy had spent months in
strengthening, thus enabling the cavalry to accomplish its mission. The subsequent advance through
the hills, over most difficult country, and in face of determined and organized resistance by the enemy's
rearguards, tried the infantry severely. Nothing, however, stopped its progress, and the relentless
pressure maintained on the enemy's rearguards allowed him no time to carry out an organized retreat,
and drove him, in disorganized bodies, into the arms of the cavalry.
The Desert Mounted Corps took some 46,000 prisoners during the operations. The complete
destruction of the Vllth and Vlllth Turkish Armies depended mainly on the rapidity with which
their communications were reached, and on quick decision in dealing with the enemy's columns as they
attempted to escape. The vigorous liandling of the cavalry by its leaders, and the rapidity of its move-
ments, overcame all attempts to delay its progress. The enemy's columns, after they had outdistanced
the pursuing infantry, were given no time to reorganize and fight their way through.
In these brilhant achievements, the regiment of French cavalry took its full share, whilst east of
the Jordan the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, by its untiring pursuit, threw the IVth
Turkish Army into a state of disorganization, intercepted the garrison of Maan, and compelled it to
surrender. Chaytor's Force took 10,000 prisoners in the Valley of the Jordan and the Hills of Moab.
The cavahy and infantry received every help from the Royal Artillery and the Royal Engineers,
whilst the hifantry, in its attack along the coast, was given valuable assistance by the Destroyers
"Druid " and "Forester," which Rear- Admiral T. .Jackson, C.B., M.V.O., had detailed to assist me.
Of the fighting troops, all have taken their share, and have carried out what was required of them.
I would bring to notice the good fighting qualities shown by the newer units. These include the
Armenian troops of the Legion d'Orient, the Tirailleurs Algeriens, the 1st BattaUon Cape Corps, the
38th and 39th (Jewish) BattaKons of the Royal Fusiliers, the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the British West
Indies Regiment, and all the recently formed battahons of Indian infantry.
The Royal Air Force.
Brilhant work has been done by the Palestine Brigade, Royal Air Force, and the Austrahan Flying
Corps, not only during the actual operations, but in the preceding months. The process of wearing
down the enemy's strength in the air had been continuous throughout the summer. Our ascendancy
in the air became so marked towards the end of August that onl}' a few of the enemy's aeroplanes were
able to fly, with the result that my troops were immime from air attacks during the operations, and
the whole strength of the Air Forces could be concentrated on the enemy in his retreat.
Besides taking an active part in the fighting, the Air Forces provided me with full and accurate
information as to the enemy's movements.
36 THE ADVANCE OF THE
The Arab Army.
Tbe Arab Army has rendered valuable assistance, both in cutting the enemy's commimications,
before, and djiring, the operations, and in co-operating with my cavahy during the advance on Damascus.
By throwing itself across the enemy's line of retreat, north of Deraa, it prevented the escape of portions
of the IVth Turkish Army, and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy.
The fighting troops have been loyally assisted by the administrative services and departments, who
have carried a heavy burden on their shoulders, both in front of, and behind, railhead. The accumula-
tion of ammimition and stores before operations commenced threw a great strain on the railway. The
delivery of these stores to the troops during operations proved a difficult task. Supply columns have
had long distances to cover, over bad roads, but all difficulties have been overcome.
My thanks are due to the Eoyal Navy for its assistance in arranging and securing the landing
of supphes at the various harbours along my fine of advance, and to the French Navy for valuable
information gained in the reconnaissance of the northern ports.
The Italian Detachment carried out to my entire satisfaction the task allotted to it, and
throughout the operations gave valuable and loyal assistance.
From the first day of operations the Egyptian Labour Corps has followed the troops as they advanced,
working hard and successfully to improve the roads. On Sept. 19 companies were working on the roads
in front of our original line, while our gtms were still firing.
The Camel Transport Corps has rendered valuable services, which have greatly aided in the
victorious campaign.
The Signal Service, strained to its utmost, has mamtained uninterrupted commimication with
imits of the Army as far east as Amman and as far north as Aleppo.
The rapid advance has rendered difficult the task of evacuating the sick and wounded. The
difficulty was increased by the large number of prisoners who, after marching for days, with little
food or water, surrendered in a state of extreme weakness, unable to march another day. The care and
evacuation of these men has heavily taxed the Medical Services, who have worked untiringly.
I have the honour to be,
Yoiu- Lordship's most obedient servant,
E. H. H. Allenby,
General,
Commanding-in-Chief,
Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 37
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
General Headquarters.
Commander-in-Chief.— Gen. Sir E. H. H. ALLENBY, G.C.B., G.C.M.G., p..s.c.
Chief of Ihe General Staff. — Major-Gen. Sir A. Lynden-Bell, K.C.M.G., C.B., p.s.c. (relinquislied,
Sept., 1917).
Major-Gen. Sir L. J. Bols, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c.
Brigadier- General, General Staff. — Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. P. Dawnay, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
M.V.O. (R. of 0.) (relinquished, Jan., 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. B. Robertson, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Cameron Highlanders, p.s.c. (relinquished, April, 1918).
Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. H. Bartholomew, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
R.A., p.s.c.
Brigadier- General, General Staff {!). — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) B. T. Buckley, C.M.G., Northumber-
land Fusiliers, p.s.c.
Deputy Adjutant- General. — Major-Gen. Sir John Adye, K.C.M.G., C.B. (relinquished, March, 1918).
Major-Gen. W. G. B. Western, C.B., p.s.c.
Deputy Quartermaster- General. — Major-Gen. Sir Walter Campbell, K.C.B.. K.C.M.G., D.S.O., p.s.c.
Assistant to Deputy Quartermaster-General. — Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. F. 0. Gascoigne,
C.M.G., D.S.O. (li. of 0.) (relinquished, Jan., 1918).
Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. Evans, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Wiltshire Regt., A.D.C.
Major- General, Royal Artillery. —Ma.ioi-Gen. Sir S. C. U. Smith, K.C.M.G., C.B.
Engineer-in-Chief.—Co\. (temp. Major-Gen.) H. B. H. Wright, C.B., C.M.G., late R.E.
Chief Political Officer.— UajoT (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. F. Clayton, C.B., C.M.G. (R. of 0.)
Chief Administrator, Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. —
Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. F. Clayton, C.B., C.M.G. (R. of 0.) (relinquished,
April, 1918).
Major-Gen. Sir A. W. Money, K.C.B., C.S.I., p.s.c. (O.E.T.A. South).
Colonel P. de Piepape, C.B. (O.E.T.A. North).
Au RizA Pasha el Rikabi (O.E.T.A. East).
Director of Army Signals. — Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) M. G. E. Bowm.-vn-Manifold, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., R.E., p.s.c.
Director of Works.-^ol (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. M. Paul, C.B., late R.E.
Director of Supplies and Transport.— '&t. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. F. Davies, C.B., C.M.G., R.A.S.C.
Director of Railway Traffic— Tem^. Brig.-Gen. Sir G. Macauley, K.C.M.G., C.B., (R. of 0.) (Bt. Major,r.p.).
Director of Ordnance Services. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) P. A. Bainbridge, C.R., C.M.G., R.A.O.C.
R.A.O., Base Depot, Alexandria.— Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. W. M. Jackson, C.B., C.M.G., R.A.O.C.
Director of Renwunts. — Temp. Brig.-Gen. C. L. Bates, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O.
Director of Veterinary Services. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. R. C. Butler, C.B., C.M.G.
Director of Medical Services. — Col. (temp. Surgeon-Gen.) Sir J. Maker, K.C.M.G., C.B., r.p. (relin-
quished, Oct., 1917).
Col. A. E. 0. Keble, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., A.M.S. (relinquished, Feb.,
1918).
Major-Gen. W. T. Swan, C.B., A.M.S. (relinquished, Sept., 1918).
Col. (temp. Major-Gen.) R. H. Luce, C.B., C.M.G., M.B., F.R.C.S., T.F.
Reserve.
Director of Libaur.—Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. C. Jellicoe, D.S.O., R.A.S.C.
Principal Chaplain. — ^Rev. A. V. C. Hordern, C.M.G. (relinquished, June, 1918).
Rev. E. R. Day, C.M.G.
38 THE ADVANCE OF THE
Director of Inland Water Transport. — Major (temp. Col.) W. H. Coysh, D.S.O., E.E. (relinquished,
July, 1918).
Temp. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. N. Bicket, R.E.
Brigadier-General Training, E.E.F.—Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. B. Robertson, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., Cameron Highlander.s, p.s.c.
3rd Echelon.
Deputy Adjutant-General— i/Lajov (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. P. Scudamore, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., r.p.
Royal Flying Corps, Middle East Brigade.
Commander.— Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. G. H. Salmond, D.S.O., R.A., p..s.c. (relinquished,
Oct., 1917).
Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. S. Brancker, R.A., attd. R.F.C., p.s.c. (relinquished on re-
organization).
Middle East, Royal Air Force.
Commander.— Rt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Major-Gen.) W. G. H. Salmond, D.S.O., E.A., p.s.c.
Commanding, Palestine Brigade,' R.A.F. —Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. E. Borton, C.M.G.,
D.S.O., A.F.C., Royal Highlanders.
Commanding, Training Brigade, R.A.F.—Bt. Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) P. L. W. Herbert, Notts. &
Derby Regt.
GENERAL HEADQUARTERS TROOPS.
Palestine Brigade, R.A.F.
" X " Aircraft Park.
" X " Fhght.
5th Wing (Corps Wing) : — •
Nos. 14, 113, 142 Squadrons, R.A.F.
40th Wing (Arniv Wing) :—
Nos. Ill, 144, 145 Squadrons, R.A.F.
No. 1 Squadron, A.F.C. (late 67th Squadron, A.F.C.).
No. 21 Balloon Company.
Nos. 49, 50, 57 Balloon Sections.
Mounted Troops.
South Nottinghamshire Hussars (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/6/18).
Artillery.
390th and 391st Siege Batteries, R.G.A. (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 18/1/18).
Machine Gun Corps.
Nos. 11 and 12 Light Armom-ed Car Batteries (L.A.C. Brigade).
Engineers.
MiHtary Printing Section (Government Press, Cairo), R.E.
No. 7 Field Survey Company, R.E. : — •
Topographical Section.
Lithographic and Letterpress Section.
Meteorological Section (Stations at G.H.Q. and JeriBalem).
1st Bridging Company, Canadian Railway Troops.
Signal Service.
G.H.Q. Signal Company.
Nos. N 14, N 15, N 23, 42, 61 Airline Sections.
NA, NB, NN, UU, Cable Sections.
No. 6 Wagon W/T, and No. 6 Pack W/T Sections.
Pigeon Section.
Infantry.
.38th and 39th Bns. Roval Fusiliers.
l/23rd and 2/23rd Sikh' Pioneers.
Ist and 2nd Bns. British West Lidics Regt.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 39
Royal Army Service Corps.
(a) Mecbaiiical Transport : —
No. 347 M.T. Company (Supply Column).
No. (514 M.T. Company (Heavy Repair Worksliop and Stores Branch).
No. 89.'3 M.T. C'omj)any (Caterpillar Tractor Sii])ply C<jhnnn).
No. 9r)0 M.T. Coi}ipaMy (Ford Su|)ply Company).
Nos. 905, 90G, 907, 1009, 1010, 1011, 10;J8, 1039, 1010, M.T. (Auxiliary Petrol) Coys.
No. lOOG, M.T. Company.
Nos. 4, G, 9, 10, 11, IG (Efrypt), Mobile Repair Units.
Advanced M.T. Sub-Depot, Ludd.
(b) Horse Transport : —
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, Donkey Transport Companies.
(c) Camel Transport Corps : —
"A," "B," "D," "E," "F," "G," "K," " L," "M," "P," " T," Companies.
Miscellaneous.
Corps of Guides and Interpreters.
Lent lo British Mission in Hejaz.
No. 1 L.A.C. Battery.
2 — 10-pr. B.L. guns on Motor Lorries.
1 Platoon, 1st Garr. Bn. Royal Irish Regt.
Detachments : —
No. 2 Camel Depot.
Egyptian Labour Corps.
Egyptian Camel Corps.
R.A.S.C.
R.A.O.C.
EASTERN FORCE.
(Ceased to exist Aug. 12, 1917.)
Commander. — ^Major-Gen. (temp. Lieut.-Gen.) Sir Philip W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Brigadier- General, General Staff. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. P. Dawnay, D.S.O., M.V.O.
(R. of 0.).
Brigadier- General, Royal Artillery. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. H. Short, C.B.
Chief Engineer. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. L. Waller, R.E.
Deputy Adjutant ani Quirterm:isler- General. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. F. 0. Gascoigne,
C.M.G., D.S.O. (R. of 0.).
DESERT COLUMN.
(Became Desert Mounted Corps, Aug. 12, 1917.)
Commander. — ^Major-Gen. H. G. Chauvel, C.B., C.M.G.
Brigadier- General, Royal Artillery. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. D'A. King, C.B., D.S.O., r.p. (R. of 0.).
Chief Engineer.— Majoi (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. E. M. Russell, D.S.O., R.E.
DESERT MOUNTED CORPS.
Commander.~Ma.ioi-Gen. (temp. Lieut. Gen.) Sir H. G. Chauvel, K.C.B., K.C.M.G.
Brigadier General, General Staff.— Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. G. H. Howard-Vyse, C.M.G.,
D.S.O.. Royal Horse Guards, f.s.c. (relinquished, July. 1918).
Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. A. C. GoD^\^N, D.S.O., 23rd Cavalry,
LA., p.s.c.
Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster-General— Mnjov (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. F. Trew, C.M.G., D.S.O..
Royal Marines, p.s.c.
General Officer Commanding, Royal Artillery. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. D'A. King, C.B., C.M.G.,
D.S.O., r.p. (R. of 0.).
40 THE ADVANCE OF THE
HEADQUARTERS.
Mounted Troops.
1/lst Worcester Yeomanry (attached from XXth Corps).
Arlillery. •
10th (Indian) Mountain Artillery Brigade, R.G.A.
29th, 32nd, 39th (Indian) Momitain Batteries.
Machine Gun Corps.
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, Light Car Patrols.
No. 2 Light Armoured Car Battery.
Signal Service.
" W " Corps Signal Company.
"BS," "KK," "AO," Cable Sections, and " DJ " (Indian) Cable Section.
103rd (Indian) AirUne Section.
D.C. Cable Section.
Desert Mounted Corps Wireless Troop (formed from No. 9 Wagon W/T Section and Lon-
don Pack W/T Section).
Australian Airline Section (disbanded, 23/8/18).
Australian Imperial Force Cable Section (disbanded, 23/8/18).
Australian Mounted Divisional Signal Company (disbanded, 23/8/18).
Engineers.
No. 4 Austrahan Field Troop.
Desert Mounted Corps Pontoon Park (8 Pontoons).
Infantry.
20th Indian Infantry Brigade.
2/155th Pioneers.
Royal Army Service Corps.
Nos. 3 and 5, (Egypt), Mobile Repau- Units.
Corps Troops Supply Column (Supply details only).
Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
No. 38 Ordnance Mobile Workshop (light)
Corps Troops Supply Column (Ordnance details only).
Miscellaneous.
No. 1032 Area Employment Company.
Brief Record of Service.
Organized on Aug. 12, 1917, the Corps has taken a prominent part in the several advances through
Palestine and Syria.
The envelopment of the Turkish left flank resulted in the capture of Beersheba by the Australian
Mounted Division on Oct. 31, 1917. During the advance through Philistia, the Corps, operating in front
of the infantry, captured many important points, such as Deir Sineid and Huj (Nov. 8), Akir and Abu
Shusheh (Nov. 1.5). When the infantry attack swung eastward through the Judsoan Hills, Australian
and New Zealand troops continued to push northward against ever-stiffening resistance, capturing
Ramleh on Nov. 15, and occupying Jaffa and Sarona on Nov. IC and 17 respectively. The Yeomanry
Mounted Division, covering the left flank of the XXIst Corps, advanced up the Valley of Ajalon to
Bethhoron. The capture of Neby Musa and Jericho was effected in co-operation with the XXth Corps
on Feb. 21, 1918, and two important raids (Amman, March 21 to April 2, and Es Salt, April 29 to May 4),
provided heavy fighting, in wiiich infantry of the London Division co-operated. Subsequently, the
Desert Mounted Corps was engaged at the Ghoraniych bridgehead and at other points in the Jordan
Valley.
H-ard marching and occasional stiff fighting were experienced in September, resulting in the capture
of Jenin (Sept. 20), Nazareth (Sept. 21, after having been succe.s.sfuliy raided on Sept. 20), Haifa
(Sept. 23), Semakh a?Kl Tibcr.as (Sept 2")), and Damascus (Oct. 1), the last-named in conjunction
with the Sherifian forces. Jlayak was occu])ied on Oct. .5, and, after a brief halt, the rapid advance
was continued, Horns, Hama, and Aleppo being reached on Oct. 15, 22, and 26, respectively.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
41
Abasan (three miles cast of Khan Yunus)
Esani (twenty miles south-south-east
of (ia/.a)
Ashij (tiftoon miles south of Beersheba)
Beershelia
Tel esh Sheria
Khurbet Muntaret (near Muntaret el
Kanei(era)
Hill 331 (near Julis)
Yebna
Khurbet Dciran (near EI Kubeibe) ...
Talat cd Dunim
Locations of Corps Hbadquaeters
from Aug. 12, 1917 Jerioho
Tulat ed Dumm
Oct. 28, 1017
Oct. 30, 1917
Nov. I, HII7
Nov. 7, 11JI7
.. from
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
Nov.
April
8, I!I17
10. 1!I17
14, 1!»I7
Hi, 1917
25, 1918
Jerislieh (near Sarona)
Kl L(;jjun (six miles west of El Afulc)...
Tiiierias
Honh I'ina (near Safed)
El Kuneitra
Kaukab ...
Damascus
Beirut
Tripolis ...
Horns
April
.May
Sejlt.
Sept.
Sept.
Sept.
Sept.
Sept.
Oct.
Oct.
Oct.
Nov.
30, 1918
0, 1918
10, 1918
20, 1918
27, 1918
28, 1918
29, 1918
30, 1918
1, 1918
30, 1918
31, 1918
1, 1918
XXth CORPS.
Commander.— Ma']OT-Gen. (temp. liieut.-Gen.) Sir Philip W. Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O.
Brigadier- General, General Staff. — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Biig.-Gen.) W. H. Bartholomew, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
K.A., p.s.c. (reliiKjui.shed, April, 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. P. Wavell, C.M.G., M.C., Royal
Highlanders, p.s.c.
Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster- General. — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. Evans, C.M.G., D.S.O.,
Wiltshire Regt. "A.D.C. (relinquished, Jan., 1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. W. Pearless, C.M.G.,
D.S.O. , .S(juth AVales Borderers, p.s.c.
General Office Commanding, Royal Artillery. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. H. Short, C.B., C.M.G.
General Officer Commanding, Corps Heavy Artillery. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) P. de S. Bueney,
C.B. (R. of 0.)
Chief Engine.er.—Bt. Lieut. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. L. Waller, C.M.G., R.E.
HEADQUARTERS.
Mounted Troops.
1/lst Worcester Yeomanry.
Artillery.
9tli Mountain Artillery Brigade, R.G.A. : 10th, 12th, 16th Mountain Batteries.
Hong-Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, R.G.A.
61st Brigade, R.G.A. ; 379th, 420th, 443rd Siege Batteries (ceased to belong to E.E.F.,
21/5/18.)
9Gth Brigade, R.G.A. ; 91st Heavy Battery ; 300th, 378th, 383rd, 440th, 445th Siege
Batteries. (44.5th Siege Battery ceased to belong to E.E.F., 4/4/18.)
97th Brigade, R.G.A. ; 195th Heavy Battery ; 134th, 201st, 334th, 421st, 422nd Siege
Batteries. (201st Siege Battery ceased to belong to E.E.F., 7/5/18.)
103rd Brigade, R.G.A. ; 10th Heavy Battery ; 205th, 387th, 392nd Siege Batteries.
Nos. 1, 2, 3 (Medium), Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
Machine Gun Corps.
Half Machine Gun Company, Cape Corps.
Engineers.
No. 13 Pontoon Park, R.E.
220th Army Troops Company, R.E.
" V " Section (Sound Ranging) 7th Field Survey Company, R.E.
Signal Troops.
" V " Corps Signal Company, R.E.
N 24 Airline Section, R.E.
"AG," "BQ," "BR," Cable Sections. R.E.
No. 1 Signal Section, Corps Heavy Artillery, R.E,
42
THE ADVANCE OF THE
Royal Army Service Corps.
(a) Mechanical Transport : —
Nos. 811, 963, 964, 966, 980, 983, 990, 1007, 1008, 1030, 1072 M.T. Companies
(attached Heavy ArtiUery).
Nos. 12 and 13 (Egypt), Mobile Eepair Units.
(h) Horse Transport : — ■
Corps Troops Train.
(c) Camel Transport : —
" N," " U," " V," Companies.
Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
Nos. 52, 58, 60, Ordnance Mobile Workshops (light).
Corps Troops Supply Column (Ordnance details only).
Miscellaneous.
No. 1000 Area Employment Company.
Brief Record of Service.
The Corps was formed on Aug. 2, 1917, and took over the Une on the right of the XXIst Corps. In
the advance into Phihstia, the Turkish defences west and south-west of Beersheba were carried on
Oct. 31, and during the following ^week the enemy was swept from strong positions in the battles of
Khuweilfeh, Sheria, and Hareira. At the beginning of December, the XXth Corps reheved the XXIst
in the Judsean Hills, captured Jerusalem on Dec. 9, and, in the last days of the year, pushed northward
astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road against powerful resistance. Jericho was captured on Feb. 21, 1918,
(in co-operation with Desert Mounted Corps), and a northerly advance, entailing stifi fighting over
difficult ground, was made in March.
A portion of the Corps co-oj^erated with cavalry of the Desert Mounted Corps in the Amman raid
(March-April) and the Es Salt raid (April-May).
The commencement of the final operations of the camjjaign wae a vigorous attack, covered by a
feint on the night of Sept. 18-19, and during the following week the XXth Corps drove the Turks
northward and westward across the irugged hills of Mount Ephraim, into the areas where enemy
resistance had been dislocated and disorganized by the rapid movements of the XXIst and Desert
Mounted Corps.
Locations of Cobps Hbadquartees.
Deir el Belah (beach)
Wadi Selka (south-east of
Belah)
El Fukhari
*E1 Buggar
*Becrsheba
*Gaza (Red House)
Deir el
from Aug. 2, 1917
Aug.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov.
Nov.
18, 1917
3, 1917
30, 1917
2, 1917
18, 1917
*Juiiction Station
*Latron ...
Jerusalem
Ram Allah
*Hi'warah
Nablua ...
Haifa
from
Nov. 23, 1917
Nov. 28, 1917
Jan. 3, 1918
Sept. 19, 1918
Sept. 22, 1918
24, 1918
29, 1918
Sept.
Oct.
* Advanced Headquarters.
XXIst CORPS.
Comminder. — Major-Gen. (temp. Lieut.-Gcn.) Sir Edward S. Bulfin, K.C.B., C.V.O.
Brigadier- General, General Staff. — Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. T. Humphreys, D.S.O., Lancashire
Fusiliers, f.s.c. (reUnquished, Feb., 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gcn.) H. F. Salt, D.S.O., R.A., f.s.c.
Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster- General.^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) St. G. B. Armstrong, R.M.L.I.,
p.s.c.
General Officer Commanding, Royal Artilhry. — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) II. A. D. Simpson Baikie,
C.B., C.M.G., R.A., f.s.c.
General Officer Commanding, Corps Heavy Artillery. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) 0. C. Williamson-Oswald,
C.B., C.M.G., R.G.A.
Cluef Engineer.— Majov (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. P. T. Hawksley, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.E.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FOIICE 43
HEADQUARTERS.
Mounted Troops.
Composite Yeomanry Regiment (" Aj" Squadron, Duke of Lancaster's Own Yfomanry,
and "A" and "B" Squadrons, 1/lst Herts. Yeomanry).
Odth Divisional Cyclist Company.
Artillery.
8th Mountain Artillery Brii^ado, R.G.A. : 11th, l.'Jth, 17th Mountain Batteries.
95th Brigade, R.G.A. ; 181st Heavy Battery ; 304th, 314th, 32()th, 322nd, 394th Siege
Batteries, (:520th and 322nd Siege Batteries ceased to belong to E.E.F., 4/4/18.)
lOOth Brigade, liXi.A. ; IHth Heavy Battery ; 43rd, 292nd, 423rd Siege Batteries. ' (292nd
and 423rd Siege Batteries ceased to belong to E.E.F., 7/5/18.)
102nd Brigade, R.G.A. ; 189th, 202nd Heavy Batteries ; 209th, 380th, 424th Siege Bat-
teries. (421th Siege Battery ceased to belong to E.E.F., 3/1/18.)
Nos. 55, 121, 123 Aiiti-Aircraft Sections, R.A.
Nos. 4, 5, 6 (Medium), Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
Engineers. *■
14th A.T. Company, R.E.
" N " and " NN " Sections (Sound Ranging) 7th Field Survey Company, R.E.
28th Observation Group, 7th Field Survey Company, R.E.
Signal Service.
" U " Corps Signal Company, R.E.
N 21 Airline Section, R.E.
" DH " (Indian), " HH " and " GY " Cable Sections, R.E.
No. 12 Pack W/T Section, R.E.
No. 2 Signal Section Corps Heavy Artillery, R.E.
Infantry.
2nd Battalion Loyal North Lancashire Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 7/5/18).
2/107th Pioneers.
Royal Army Service Corps.
(a) Mechanical Transport :^
Nos. 810, 904, 951, 952, 955, 965, 967, 982, 984, 988, 989, 1031, 1032, 1073 M.T.
Companies (attached Heavy Artillery). (Nos. 810, 1031, 1032 Companies ceased
to belong to E.E.F., 21/5/18.)
Nos. 1 and 2 (Egypt), Mobile Repair Units.
(b) Horse Transport : —
Corps Troops Train.
(c) Camel Transport : —
" C," " H," and " R " Companies.
Royal Army Ordnance Corps.
Nos. 37 and 59 Ordnance Mobile Workshops (light).
Corps Troops Supply Column (Ordnance details only).
Miscellaneous.
No. 1031 Area Employment Company.
Brief Record of Service.
The Corps was organized on Aug. 12, 1917, and took over the Coastal and Sheikh Abbas sectors,
which it held until the general advance started. Gaza was captured on Nov. 7, and the rapid advance
through Philistia into the Judajan hills (in co-operation with the Desert Mounted Corps), carried the
troop.< of the XXIst Corps to within five miles of Jerusalem by Nov. 21. During this advance the
nature of the fighting changed from trench warfare to open warfare, and then to hill fighting. In
December, on relief by the XXth Corps, the XXIst relieved the Desert Mounted Corps on the new line
from Midieh to the sea. The crossing of the Auja, in Dec, 1917, and the difficult hill fighting around
the Wadi Ballut, in March and April, 1918, advanced the line to an average depth of six miles.
44
THE ADVANCE OF THE
On Sept. 19, the right of the strong Turkish defensive system was broken in the battle of Sharon,
Kefr Kasim, Jiljulieh.^Tireh, and Tul Keram were captured, end the flank rolled up to allow the
mounted troops to carry out the envelopment required of them.
After a brief halt at Haifa, the advance northward was continued on Oct. 1, and as the result of
hard marchiilg, Beirut and Tripolis were occupied on Oct. 8 and 18 respectively.
Locations of Corps Headquarters.
Deir cl Belali from
♦Raspberry Hill (2J miles east of Deir
elBelaii)
*Deir Sineid ,.
♦Jewish Colony (near Beit Duras) ... „
*E1 Kukab
Bir Salcni (Geiman Orphanage, near
Ramleh) ,,
Aug. 12, 1917
Nov.
1,
1917
Nov.
11,
1917
Nov.
14,
1917
Nov,
If,
1917
Jaffa
Jerisheh (near Sarona)
♦Sabieh
*Tul Keram
Haifa
Beirut
from
Jan.
April
Sept.
Sept.
Sept.
Oct.
Nov. 28, 1917
♦ Advanced Headquarters.
4, 1918
1, 1918
19, 1918
21, 1918
28, 1918
8, 1918
CHAYTOR'S FORCE.
(During Operations, Sept. 19 to Oct. 31, 1918).
Commander. ^Col (temp. Major-Gen.) Sir E. W. C. Ch.a.ytor, K.C.M.G., C.B., f.s.c, A.D.C.
(And Staff of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division.)
HEADQUARTERS.
Mounted Troops.
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division (less one Squadron).
Arfillery.
A/263 Battery, E.F.A.
No. 195 Heavy Battery, R.G.A.
29th and 32nd (Indian), Mountain Batteries, R.G.A.
No. 6 (Medium) Trench Mortar Battery, R.A.
Nos. 96, 102, 103 Anti-Aircraft Sections, R.A.
Engineers.
Infantry.
Detachment No. 35 A.T. Company, R.E.
38th and 39th Battalions Royal FusiUers.
20th Indian Brigade.
1st and 2nd Battalions British West Indies Regiment.
Sept. 18.-
„ 19.
Brief Record of Se
-The Force, constituted as above, held the eastern end of the B
West op Jordan.
The 2nd British West Indies Regiment captured
ridge south of Balir Ridge, and on the following
day
„ 20. — captured Bakr and Chalk Ridges, while Ist British
West Indies Regiment captured Grant Hill and
Baghalat, and the Auckland Mounted Rifles
seized Kh. Fusail and Tel Sh. edh Dhiab.
„ 22. — The 38th Battalion Royal Fusiliers advanced to
Mankattat el Mallaha and, with the assistance
of two companies of the 39th Battalion, cap-
tured the ford at Umm esh Shert.
Further north, the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles Brigade captured Fl Makhruk and Abd
el Kadir, taking 500 prisoners, including a
Divisional Commander, and blocking the im-
portant road vid the bridge at Jisr ed Daniieh,
between Nablus, west of Jordan, and Ks Salt
on the east. The bridge itself was captured by
the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and
Ist British West Indies Regiment. Isl Light
Hor.se Brigade and 2nd British West Indies
Regiment were engaged near Matid Jozeleh.
,, 23. — All enemy opposition ceased on west bunk of
Jordan.
rvice.
ritish line, including the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead.
East of Jord.an.
Sept. 22.— The 2nd Light Horse Brigade captured Tel er
Rame, a Turkish strong post seven miles south-
east of the Ghoraniyeh bridge.
„ .23. — The 1st Light Horse, with 2nd Briti.sh West Indies
■ Regiment, captured Malid Jozeleh, and the 2nd
Light Horse took Kabr Mujahid, while the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles, having croseed the
Jordan, pushed rapidly eastward and seized
Es Salt.
,, 24. — Ain es Sir and Ain Hemar occupied by 2nd Light
Horse.
„ 25. — The Auckland Mounted Rifles succeeded in cutting
the Hcjaz Railway near Kalaat ez Zerka, and
1st and 2nd Light Horse Brigades captured
Amman, the Canterbury Mounted Rifles taking
a prominent part in this latter engngcmcnt.
„ 26. — The 1st Light Horse captured Kalaat cz Zerka,
and 2nd Light Horse cut the railway north of
Ziza Station.
„ 27. — 1st Light Horse engaged a body of the enemy
north of Wadi cl Hammam, taking 300 prisoners
and two machine g\ms.
,, 29. — The Maan garrison, consisting of 4,000 officers and
men, with twelve guns and thirty-five machine
guns, surrendered to the 2ud Light Horse
Brigade near El Kastal.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 45
FRENCH DETACHMENT.
(DL'taclicment Fran^ais dc Palestine et Syrie.)
Commander. — Col. F. de I'ikpape, (!.B.
HF.ADQUARTERS.
Infantry.
Rogiiueiit of Tiraillonis, consisting of 7th Battalion 1st Tirailleurs and 9th Battalion 2nd
Tirailleurs, Algerians, with section of 2 guns.
Regiment I-egion d'Orient, consisting of 1st and 2nd Battalions Armenians, and 23rd
Company .Syiians, with .section of 2 guns.
5th Garrison Battalion of 115th Territorial Regiment.
3rd Battalion Legion d'Orient.
Cavalry.
Two Squadrons, 1st Regiment of Spahis.
Two Squadrons, 4th Regi)nent Chasseiu's d'Afrique.
One Machine Gun Troop (dismounted).
Artillery Group.
1st liattery.
14th Battery of 5th African Field Artillery Group.
30th Battery of 2nd Mountain Artillery Regiment.
30th Mixed Munition Section.
Engineers.
19/6 Comjjany 2nd Engineer Regiment (three sections Sappers and Miners).
Signals.
Signal Section of 8th Engineer Regiment (4th Section of above Engineer Company).
Artillery and Engineer Services.
Subsidiary Depots of the main Artillery and Engineer Base Depot at Port Said.
Medical Service.
Nos. 2/P and 3/P Mountain Ambulances.
Stretcher-Bearer Group.
No. 2 Field Hospital and CCS.
Advanced Depot of Medical Stores and Material.
Supply Section of Detachment.
M.T. Section.
Transport of Material.
Military Police.
Three moimted, and one disraoimted " Brigades."
Brief Record of Service.
1918. Cavalev. 1918. Infantry.
Sept. 18.— At Jaffa. Sept. 18.— Tlie infantry of the detachment held the ridge
19.— Advanced in co-operation with 5th Australian north of the Wadi Ballut, with a front of nearly
Light Horse, crossed the Tul Keram-Haifa road, 6,000 yards, between Rafat and Kh. Umm el
capturing an enemy battery and seizing a con- Ikba ; with 10th Division on its right, and
voy of guns, supplies, and a detachment of the 54th Division on its left.
Turkish Field Treasury.
„ 20.— Co-operated with 5th Australian Light Horse in » 19.— 0430.— The attack started, and in spite of vigorous
the successful raid to cut the Tul Keram-Jenin resistance. Three Bushes Hill
T^ '^!''' "?"\t 1^1 • r /■ 1 i • , -1 0515. — was stormed, and this initial success was
., 21.-Entered Nablus m face of determined resistance followed by the capture of
and captured 700 prisoners, two guns, and nine
machine guns. 0545. — Scurry Hill. In this brief action, 212
„ 27. — Carried out a demonstration against enemy hold- prisoners (including sixteen officers) and
ing the Jordan crossing near the village of nine machine guns were taken.
Mishmar Hayarden, and forded the river 700 nnnn r, ■ y -wr • i i i . .
1 iu 1 T Ti * V 1 I, 0700. — Dcir el Kussis reached, but as the position
yards south of Jisr Benat Yakub. j j ., • ^
of^ T 1 J ■ • Ui. *; 1 i- i o 1 was exposed and the situation uncertain.
„ 2!). — Involved in severe night nghtine at Sasa, where ,i,- , , ■ , ,, •
. , 1 u- this advanced point was not held,
two guns and several machme guns were cap- '
tured. 1415. — Two Cairns Hill captured and the enemy
„ 30. — Moved, dismounted, along the hills of Kalabet el driven into the Wadi Ayun.
Mezza, brushing aside all opposition, and o'>-.^i -n. ■ \ j^ i_- i i_ j i ■ .
■ 1 1 J .1 TvT TIT c T^ r> \, 1 2JoO. — Deir el Kussis, which had been reoccupied,
blocked the gorije N.W. of Er Rabue, and oo- . . . . i-j ^ j "^
, J ■,, E,. T ■ ut TT Tj • 1 • again captured and consolidated,
operated with 5th Light Horse Brigade in s f
capture of 4,000 prisoners. 0500. — Arara and Zawieh captured.
Oct. 19. — Left Damascus for Beirut. Oct. 8. — Haifa reached and on
Oct. 20, — the Detachment entered Beirut.
46 THE ADVANCE OF THE
ITALIAN DETACHMENT.
(Distaccamento Italiano di Palestina.)
Commander. -^Lieut.-Co\. Cav. Francesco D'Agostino, Corps of Bersaglieri (relinquished, Sept. 9, 1918).
Lieut. -Col. Cav. Gustavo Pesenti, Corps of Alpini.
Headquarters.
Royal Carabinieri Company.
Bersaglieri Company.
Cacciatori Company.
Mounted Carabinieri Platoon.
Port Said Base and Composite Platoon.
Special Platoon.
Ex-Prisoners-of-War Company.
Brief Record of Service.
The Italian Palestine Detachment was formed on July 1, 1917.
On Nov. 8 and following days, it formed part of the mobile column known as the Composite Force,
and took part in the cajDture of the Atawineh Redoubt Trench System and the advance north of Gaza.
The Detachment was present at the fall of Jerusalem, and furnished a Guard of Honour at the
official entry of General AUenby on Dec. 11 ; since when important guard duties have been continuously
performed at Jerusalem, Junction Station, Jaffa, and other centres.
4th CAVALRY DIVISION.
(Late 1st Mounted Division, late Yeomanry Mounted Division.)
Commander. — ^Major-Gen. Sir G. de S. Barrow. K.C.M.G., C.B., p..s.c.
1 0th Cavalry Brigade (late 6th Mounted Brigade, late l/2nd South Midland Mounted Brigade) : —
Commander. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) T. M. S. Pitt, 2nd County of London Yeomanry (relinquished,
July, 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. A. C. Godwin, D.S.O., 2.3rd Cavalry, LA. (relin-
quished, Aug., 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Bris.-Gen.) R. G. H. Howard- Vyse, C.M.G., D.S.O., Royal Horse
Guards, p..s.c. (relinquished, Sept., 1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. G. K. Green, D.S.O., 36th Jacob's Horse, LA.
1/lst Dorset Yeomanry, 2nd Lancers, 38th Central Lidia Horse.
1/lst Bucks Yeomanry and 1/lst Berks. Yeomanry (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/6/18).
10th Cavalry Brigade Signal Troop, R.E.
17th Machine Gun Squadron.
llth Cavalry Brigade (late 8th Mounted Brigade, late 1/lst London Mounted Brigade) : —
Commander. —Col (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. H. M. Taylor, D.S.O., (relinquished, Sept., 1917).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. S. Rome, D.S.O., llth Hussars (relinquished, June,
1918).
Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. L. Gregory, C.B., 19th Lancers, ihs.c.
1/lst County of London Yeomanry, 29th Lancers, 36th Jacob's Horse.
1/lst City of London Yeomanry, and l/3rd County of London Yeomanry (ceased to belong
to E.E.F., 2/7/18).
llth Cavalry Brigade Signal Troop, R.E.
21st Machine Gun Squadron.
I2fh Cavalry Brigade (late 22nd Mounted Brigade, late 1/lst North Midland Mounted Brigade) : —
Comnvmder. — (Jol. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) F. A. B. Fryer (relinquished, Dec. 1917).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Geu.) P. D. Fitzgerald, D.S.O., llth Hu.ssars, p.s.c. (re-
linquished, April, 1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. T. WiOAN, C.M.G., D.S.O., Berks. Yeomanry,
EGYPTIAN EXrEDlTIONARY FORCE
47
1/lst Staffordshire Yeomanry, 6th Cavalry, 19th Lancers.
1/lst Lincohisliire Yeomanry and 1/lst East Riding Yeomanry (ceased to belong to E.E.F.,
2/7/18).
12th Cavalry Brigade Signal Troop, R.E.
18th Machine Gun Squadron.
Corps Cavalry Regiment. l/2nd Coimty of London Yeomanry (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 28/5/18).
Divisional Troops.
20th Brigade, K.H.A. (1/lst Berks., Hamps., and Leicester Batteries, and Brigade Ammuni-
tion Column.
4th Field Sqnadron (late No. 6), R.E.
4th Cavalry Division Signal Squadron, R.E.
4th Cavalry Di\nsional Train (Nos. 999, 1000, 1001, 1002 Companies, R.A.S.C).
10th, 11th, 12th Cavahry Brigade Mobile Veterinary Sections.
Brief Record of Service.
The Yeomanry Regiments of which the Yeomanry Division was composed left England in 191.j,
and served as detached brigades and regiments on the Egyptian, Gallipoli and Salonika fronts : and
with Desert Column took part in the advance from the Suez Canal, culminating in the battles of Gaza
in March and April, 1917.
On the reorganization in Aug., 1917, it joined the Desert Mounted Corps as the Yeomanry
Division. Six regiments were withdrawn in April, 1918, for service as machine-gunners on the
Western Front, the vacancies being filled by Indian Cavalry Regiments. The division was renamed
" 4th Cavalry Division " in July, 1918, and Gth, 8th, and 22nd Momited Brigades became 10th, 11th,
and 12th Cavalry Brigades, respectively.
Yeomanry Mounted Division.
1917.
Oct. 26."
27.—:
■ 9
to U
, 12.-
13.— i
The Division was detached as Army Reserve, and
concentrated about Hi.'seia and Shellal, but 8th
Mounted Brigade was lent to Australian Mounted
Divi.sion and held an outpost line from near El
Buggar north-westward to Point 280 near Kh.
Umni Rijl, a length of twelve miles. The right
of this line was held by 1st County of London
(Middlesex) Yeomanry, with 3rd County of
London Yeomanry on the left, and City of
London Yeomanry in reserve at Kami.
Middlesex Yeomanry were heavily attacked at
041.5 by a force of all arms estimated at 3,000-
4.000. The garrison at Point 630, although al-
most surrounded by 051. 5, defended the posi-
tion throughout the day against repeated
assaults, until relieved by infantry of 158th
Brigade at IGOO. 3rd Australian Light Horse
Brigade were ordered up from Shellal to support
the squadron holding the knoll Point 720, but,
before they could arrive the post was subjected
to concentrated shell- fire and overwhelmed by
a combined mounted and dismounted attack.
The reserve regiment frustrated an attempt to
break through between Points 721) and 030, and
at dusk when the enemy withdrew, former
position was reoccupied.
•The division moving north-eastward, as a part of
"Barrow's Detachment," encountered stiff re-
sistance at Kh. Mujeidilat. City of London and
Middlesex Yeomanry attacked but were imable
to dislodge the enemy and order.s were received
to break off the action and march to Tel esh
Sheria.
The division moved via Huj, Zeita, and Kl Mejdel,
and
relieved Australian and New Zealand (Anzac)
Division along the Wadi .Sukereir between o2nd
Division and the sea.
6th and 8th Mounted Brigades occupied Beshshit
and Yebnah respectively in conjunction with
the infantry attack on Katrah and El Mughar.
Patrols found Kubeibeb and Zernukah strongly
1917
Oct.
13.
held and the infantry advance was checked near
El Mughar. Sth Mounted Brigade moved on
Zemukah and Kubeibeh ; 22nd Brigade was held
in readiness to attack Akir as soon as El Muharg
was taken ; while Gth Brigade were ordered to
attack the ridge running north-east from El
Mughar. At 1500 Royal Bucks Hussar.s and
Dorset Yeomanry charged the El Mughar ridge
from the Wadi .Jamus riding 4,500 yard.s across
an open plain devoid of cover, and subjected
throughout to galling shell, machine-gun, and
rifle fire. The whole hostile position was cap-
tured and consolidated by 1530 and 1,096 pri-
soners, two field guns, and fourteen machine
guns taken. (Later in the evening the village
was cleared and two squadrons Berkshire Y'eo-
maniy captured a further 400 prisoners.)
22nd Mounted Brigade attacked Akir at
1.530, but were held up until nightfall. This
brigade rounded up seventy-two prisoners and a
machine gun retiring from the El Mughar Ridge.
Middlesex Yeomanry (Sth Mounted Brigade)
occupied Zernukah and Kubeibeh at dawn.
Imperial Camel Brigade, attached, remained
about Zemukah and Kubeibeh to watch the
north, while the division moved east on Kh.
Selmeh, Naaneh, and Bir Ghazlun. 22nd
Brigade took Naaneh at 1430 with sixty prison-
ers and one gun, and demolished one mile of
railway to the south.
Nov. 15. — The Sidun-Abu Shusheh Ridge, attacked at
0700 from south-west and north-west by 6th and
22nd Mounted Brigades, with one battalion
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade attached, was
strongly held. I.«icestershire and Berkshire
Batteries, R.H.A., assisted by 75th Divisional
Artillery, covered the advance, but the position
was only taken at 0900 after a stubborn re-
sistance, when a mounted charge by Dorset
Yeomanry routed the enemy with the loss of
360 prisoners and one gun. Over 400 Turks
were killed in this engagement.
„ 14.
48
THE ADVANCE OF THE
1917.
Nov. 18 Brigades pushed forward into the Judiean Hills,
to along rock-strewn wadis, and by tracks which
„ 19 existed only in name. Little enemy opposition
was encountered but difficulties of terrain ren-
■dered rapid movement impossible.
„ 20. — Strong organized resistance was encountered
around Beitunia.
„ 21. — 6th Mounted Brigade renewed its attack on
BeituDJa, supported by Lincoln Yeomanry (22nd
Brigade), but were opposed by fresh troops
brought from Aleppo, numerous and well-
trained, who counter- att.aeked and forced a
withdrawal. Meanwhile. East Riding Yeomanry
(22nd Brigade) were held up at Raraallah. and
the division was ordered to fall back on Beit Ur
el Foka and Beit Ur et Tahta.
,, 25. — Leicester Battery, R.H.A., by superhuman efforts
man-handled their guns up to Foka, and
„ 26, — Berkshire Battery arrived at Tahta.
„ 27. — -An enemy force 400 strong, supported by a howit-
zer battery, attacked Sh. Abu ez Zeitoun, one
mile east of Foka. The garrison (Oth Mounted
Brigade) held out throughout the day although
outnumbered seven to one. At the same time,
200 Turks attacked the left of 8th Jlonnted
Brigade near Beit Dukka, and 2,000 hostile in-
fantry were known to be concentrating at Bei-
tunia. 7th Mounted Brigade (Corps Reserve)
were sent up from Zernukah in support, made a
forced march, and
„ 28. — arrived at Tahta at 0,500. A strong attack was
launched against 22nd Brigade at 0630, but
Sherwood Rangers and South Notts. Hussars
(7th Brigade) reinforced and the attack was
held. ISoth Brigade (52nd Division), ordered
up to cover the left flank of the defence, arrived
at 0900. Meanwhile the post at Zeitoun, after
a most stubborn resistance, was overwhelmed
at 0800, and the brigade was forced to fall
back to the ridge between Foka and Tahta.
The attack on 7th Mounted Brigade was re-
newed after dark, but, with assistance from
l/7th Scottish Rifles (52nd Division), the attack
was beaten off.
,, 29 Australian Mounted Division came up on the left ;
52nd and 74th Divisions relieved the Yeomanry,
to who, after ten days arduous fighting over diffi-
,, 30 cult ground, went into bivouac for rest and
refitting at El Mughar.
Nov. 30 (The division was inspected by the Com-
mander-in-Chief in December : January was
spent in refitting and training : and February
in salvage work on the old trench lines south of
Gaza. In March the division moved up to the
Wadi Sukerier, but, on April 2, returned to
1018. Belah for reorganization.)
April 24. — 6th Mounted Brigade, with Middlesex Yeomanry
and Mysore Imperial Lancers, were ordered to
march to Jordan Valley to take part in the
Es Salt raid, and reached the point of concen-
tration on April 29.
May 2. — The brigade crossed the Jordan in support of
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Troo])s,
who were holding a defensive flank northward
to cover the withdrawal from Es Salt. The
brigade was not engaged and re-crossed the
river during the night May 3-4.
(During the following week the remainder of
the division reached the valley ; the Indian
regiments, to replace the units withdrawn,
arrived ; and the reorganization was complete.
May Constant patrolling and consolidation of defences
to were carried on in the heat and dust of the
July Jordan Valley. The enemy was completely
dominated ; seventy prisoners were captured,
and over 100 Turks killed or wounded in patrol
encounters.
4th Cavalrv^ Division.
1918.
July 19. — The division went into camp at Ras Deiran to
rest and recoup.
Aug. 8. — Division returned to the Jordan Valley, and once
more took over patrol duties. 29th Lancers
and 36th Jacob's Horse (11th Cavalry Brigade)
were engaged in successful patrol encounters.
Climatic conditions improved and training could
be carried on.
Sept. 18. — Concentrated in the orange groves near Selmeh.
„ 19. — Divisional artillery supported the infantry attack,
and pioneer parties advanced in rear of 7th
Division to cut gaps in the wire and flag the
routes for the cav.alry through the captured
defences.
11th Cavalry Brigade passed through the wire
at 0858, and moved rapidly northward to the
Kakon-Liktera switch line, where the advanced
guard came under fire. The position was
galloped by Jacob's Horse and 250 prisoners
taken. By 1800 10th Brigade was moving on
Kerkur, I2th Brigade was at Jelameh, head-
quarters and 11th Brigade at Tel ed Dhrur.
2nd Lancers (10th Brigade) advanced up the
Kerkur- Lcjjun defile, and at 2145 No. 11 Light
Armoured Car Battery was attached to the
Lancers to reconnoitre the Musmus Pass, which
was found clear.
,, 20. — Lejjun was occupied at 0330 and two hours later
2nd Lancers and the armoured cars moved on
El Afule. On debouching from the Pass the
Turks were encountered in strength astride the
road. One squadron and the cars held the
enemy in front while the remainder of the
regiment charged their left flank, killing or
wounding forty-six and capturing 470. 12th
Brigade occupied El Afule at 0800, and cap-
tured ten locomotives, fifty trucks, and three
aeroplanes, while the armoured cars captured
twelve lorries driven by Germans endeavouring
to escape by Beisan. By 0900 all railway lines
radiating from El Afule had been cut, and the
division moved on Beisan at 1300, leaving one
regiment to hold all roads to the north. 10th
Brigade reached Beisan at 1630 (having cap-
tured 800 prisoners en rovte), and galloped over
all opposition, taking 100 prisoners and three
15cm. howitzers which were manned to cover
the roads to south and east. The division
concentrated at Beisan at 1800, and 19th
Lancers (12th Brigade) were sent by a difficult
mountainous road to hold the Jordan crossing
at
„ 21. — Jisrel Mujamia, where they arrived at 0800. South
of Beisan 38th Central India Horse (lOth
Brigade) captured li>8 prisoners as the result
of a moonlight charge. All roads in the neigh-
bourhood were picquetted and 3,(U10 were made
prisoner or gave themselves \ip to our patrols
during the night.
,, 22. — Jacob's Horse crossed the Jordan at Jisr Esh Sh.
Hussein to patrol the east bank and to round
up fugitives. No. 11 Light Armoured Car
Battery left to join Desert Mounted Corps
Headquarters.
„ 23. — Central India Horse relieved 19th Lancers at
Jisr el Mujamia. At 0600 1 1th Brigade moved
south along both banks of the Jordan to cut off
the retreat of Seventh Turkish Army. Patrols
of 29th Lancers were fired on at OH.'U), from the
tlirection of Alakt Abu Naj, by a force covering
the ford. Middlesex Yeomanry moved around
the enemy's left Hank while two squadrons
29th Lancers charged a mound forming the
centre of the hostile position and captured
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
49
1918.
Sept. 23. — 800 prLsoners and fifteen machine gunn. Two
charges by Jacob's Horse on the left bank were
held, and the liampshiro Battery was ordered
up. The battery came into action in the open,
but was iniMKHliatcIy subjected to a heavy and
accurate fire from two concealed enemy battcrie.'i.
The situation was cleared by a squadron of
Middlesex Yeomanry, who forded the river at
.Makt. Fatahallah and charged the guns, putting
them out of action. The enemy thereupon
withdrew, abandoning large quantities of stores
and sullering heavy ca.sualtics from machine-
gun (ire.
,, 24. — The march southward continued. Middlesex
Yeomanry encountered a hostile advanced
guard, estimated at 1,200 with numerous
machine guns, in the VVadi Malch. Haiupshire
gunners came into action and the Turks were
driven back to the Jordan in hopeless rout,
exposing the main body to immediate attack.
On the west bank 4,000 prisoners (including
Rushdi Bey, commanding 10th Division),
twenty-nine machine guns and 8,000 rifles
were taken, and the few Turks who got away
across the river were driven into barren and
waterless country. A further 1,000 prisoners
were rounded up by Dorset Yeomanry at Ain
el Beida.
,, 25. — Division concentrated atBcisan with 10th Brigade
at Jisr el Muj:iiuia, in preparation for operations
east of Jordan.
,, 26. — 1 0th Brigade engaged enemy holding a line through
Zebda-lrbid Bcjtras. One squadron2ndLancers
covered deployment, while remainder of the
regiment fought its way round the north liank.
Central India Horse captured Zcbda, and by
nightfall Irbid was closely invested on north,
west, and south.
l?th Brigade moved to Esh Shuni, and
Divisional Headquarters and 11th Brigade to
Jisr el Mujamia.
1918.
Sept. 27. — Irbid was evacuated during the night, and 10th
Brigade followed up the retreat and forced an
action at Er Remte. Dorset Yeomanry at-
tacked from west and south-west at lO:!.";, while
remainder of brigade worked round under cover
to cut the line of retreat east lo Deraa. The
enemy counter-attacked Dorset Yeomanry, but
the advanced squadron was withdrawn, mounted,
and launched upon the counter-attacking force.
Twenty- five of the enemy were killed in the
charge and the rest Hed in disorder to the village.
A charge by Central India Horse near Tujele
was equall}' successful, and by ll.'id the Turks
were in full retreat leaving 187 prisoners and
over twenty machine guns and automatic rifles
in our hands.
During the night patrols gained touch with
Sherilian troops operating against Deraa.
., 28. — The Division moved on Deraa which was found
to have been occupied by the .Sherifian Army.
lOth Brigade remained about Deraa and the
rest of the division moved to Mezerib.
,, 29. — Division marched north along the Haj road with
Sherilian Army on the right.
,, 30. — 1 1th Brigade, acting as advanced guard, reached
Khiyara at 1700, where it was shelled from
the Jebel el Mania and an enemy column
was seen retiring on Kiswe. The village was
cleared by a mounted charge, one regiment was
sent in pursuit, while the brigade pushed forward
on Khan Denun. Some of the enemy escaped
up the sleep slopes of Jebcl el Mania and the
rest retired in disorganized rout on Kiswe.
Oct. I. — The Division camped in the neighbourhoon of
Daraya, having covered 140 miles over difficult
country in six days.
,, 6 The march was continued vid Khan Mcizelun,
to Zebdani, and .Shtora, to Baalbek, whence 12th
,, 15 Brigade pushed on to Lebwe.
(Total prisoners taken from Sept. 19 to Oct. 15
were approximately 20,000.)
5th CAVALRY DIVISION.
(Late 2nd Mounted Division.)
Commander. — ^Major-Gen. H. J. M. MacAndrew, C.B., D.S.O.
13th Cavalry Brigade (late 5tli Mounted Brigade).
Oomminder. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (teinp. Brig.-Gen.) P. D. Fitzgerald, D.S.O. , 11th Hu.'^sars (relinqiUBhed,
Dec, 1917).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) P. J. V. Kelly, C.M.G., D.S.O., 3rd Hussars (relin-
quished, Oct., 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. A. Weir, D.S.O., 3rd Dragoon Guards.
1/lst Gloucester Yeomanry, 9th Hodsou's Horse, 18th Lancers.
13th Cavalry Brigade Signal Troop, R.E.
19th Machine Gun Squadron.
14th Cavalry Brig : (late 7th Mounted Brigade).
Commcmder. — Lieat.-Cu . (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. T. Wigan, C.M.G., D.S.O., Berks. Yeomanry (re-
linquished, Dec, 1917).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. V. CljVrke, D.S.O., City of London Yeomanry.
1/lst Sherwood Rangers, 20th Deccan Horse, 31th Poona Horse.
14th Cavab-y Brigade Signal Troop, R.E.
20th Machine Gun Squadron.
50
THE ADVANCE OF THE
ISth (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade (late I.S. Cavaby Brigade).
Commander. — Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. E. Harbord, D.S.O., SOtli Lancers, I.A.
Jodhpore I.S. Lancers, Itysore I.S. Lancers, 1st Hyderabad I.S. Lancers.
ISth Kathiawar I.S. Signal Troop.
Imperial Service Machine Gun Squadron.
Divisional Troops.
Essex Battery, R.H.A., and Brigade Ammunition Column (less 2 Sections).
5th Field Squadron (late No. 7), R.E.
5th Cavalry Division Signal Squadron, R.E.
5th Cavahy Divisional Train (Nos. 1103, 1014, 1104, 1105 Companies, R.A.S.C;
13th, 14th, and 15th (I.S.), Cavaky Brigade Mobile Veterinary Sections.
Brief Record of Service.
5th Cavalry Division, after serving with the British Expeditionary Force in France, landed in Egypt
in March, 1918. The Di\asion was brought up to strength by the inclusion of Yeomanry and Imperial
Service Cavalry, who had been serving with the Egj^ptian Expeditionary Force, and joined Desert
Mounted Corps on July 2.
1918.
Sept. 18. — Division was concentrated in the orange groves
north-west of Sarona, in preparation for the
attack.
,, 19. — At 0430 divisional artillery was inaction to support
the advance of 60th Division.
13th Brigade crossed Nahr el Falik and ad-
vanced to the line Tel ed Dhrur-Liktera-the Sea.
A column of the enemy was engaged at 1100,
and 250 prisoners and four guns captured. At
181.5 the brigade left Liktera with Divisional
Headquarters for Jarak.
14th Brigade crossed Nahr Iskanderuneh at
1100 and pushed on towards Jarak : while
15th Brigade, with artillery and transport column
reached Liktera at 1500.
20.— 13th and 14th Brigades reached Jarak at 0100,
having left a squadron of 0th Hodson's Horse
(13th Brigade) to guard the left flank of troops
advancmg through the Wadi Arab. The column
reached El Mezrah and Nazareth at dawn, after
cutting the El Afule-Haifa railway, having
marched fifty miles in twenty-two hours. The
enemy were attacked north of Naz.areth by 13th
Brigade, who withdrew to El Afule with 1,200
prisoners. El Afule was attacked from north
by 14th Brigade and captured in conjunction
with 4th Cavalry Division.
„ 21. — Nazareth was reoccupied by 13th Brigade after a
sharp engagement, and reconnoitring patrols
were sent out to Kefr Kenna and Sepphoris.
14th Brigade marched to Jenin at 0400, to
co-operate with Australian Mounted Division.
This Brigade returned to El Afule at 1530, and
with 15th Brig.ade, who had arrived at 0100,
picquelted the line El Afule-Shutta Station.
„ 22. — Nazareth was attacked at 0530 by a force of 700
Turks from Haifa. After a sharp fight 18th
Lancers (13th Brigade) charged the ecicmy
capturing 311 prisoners and four machine giins.
„ 23. — 13th Brigade with No. 11 Light Armoured Car
Battery and No. 1 Light Car Patrol, left Nazareth
at 0500 and, at 1300, captured Acre after a short
engagement, taking 259 prisoners and two guns.
14th and 15th Brigades turned over their line
to 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade and
marched on Haifa vid Jebata and Jeida at
0500. 15th Brigade were engaged by Turkish
artillery covering Haifa, at 1015; 14th Brigade,
with Divisional Headquarters, occupied tho
Ki.fhoii railway bridge and " n.iroshelh of (he
1918
Sept.
23. — Gentiles " at midday ; and at 1400 Jodhpore and
Mysore Lancers, supported by " B " Battery,
H.A.C., attacked Haifa in face of strong
resistance.
The town was captured at 1500, after street
fighting, and 1,351 prisoners, seventeen guns,
and eleven machine guns fell into our hands.
,, 25. — 13th Brigade returned to Kefr Kenna, leavmg a
squadron of Gloucestershire Yeomanry in Acre.
„ 26. — Division was relieved by 2nd Leicesters (7th
Division), and, less 1/lst Sherwood Rangers, left
Haifa at 0500 for Kefr Kenna, where it concen-
trated at 0700.
„ 27. — Left Kefr Kenna (0300) and arrived at Tiberias
at 0700. After a halt pushed on to a point
north of the road between Alishmar Hayarden
and Mahanayim,
„ 28. — Crossed the Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub and
reached El Kuneifra at 2030.
„ 29. — Left El Kuneitra at 1800, in rear of Australian
Mounted Division.
„ 30.— Entered Sasa at 0830.
1200. — 13th Brigade seized Jebel el Aswad astride
Kiswe-Damascus road, engaged the enemy and,
having cut their line of retreat, advanced to
Kaukab.
1700. — This Brigade captured Iviswe taking '576
prisoners and four guns, and rejoined Division at
Kaukab on arrival of 4th Cavalry Division from
Deraa.
Night dispositions. — Divisional Headquarters and
13th Brigade at Kaukab; 14th Brigade astride
Kiswe-Damascus road, and 15th Brigade about
Khan esh Shiha.
Oct. I. — 0600. — Division concentrated and moved into
positions cast of Damascus, with 13th Brigade on
Barada, and Division in touch with Australian
Mounted Division on the north.
(During period Sept. 19 to Oct. 1, captures totalled
9,934 prisoners, twenty-seven guns, and twenty
machine guns, excluding guns abandoned by the
enemy.)
„ 4. — Division (less 1/lst Sherwood Bangers and let
Hyderabad Lancers), concentrated atElJudcide
wiVh No. 12 L.A.C. Batterv and No. 7 L.C. Patrol.
„ 5. — Marched vid Katana to Khan Mrizclun (sixteen
miles) and occupied
„ 0. — Rayak at 1400.— Hth Brigade captured Zahlo
(twenty-ono miles) at 1500, with 177 prisoners
and two guns.
., 7. — Armoured car reconnaissance to Beirut.
EGYrTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
61
101!
Oct.
10. — Annnurod par rpconnaissaiifo to Baalbek.
II. — !:!lli UriL'adi' occupied Baalbek.
12. — Remaiiuler of Divi-sion arrived at Baalbek and
divided into two eolunins. Coliinm "A,"
Divisional Headquarters with 1 5t li ISrij^ade and
Arinourod Car» ; Column " B," llitli and 14th
Brigades.
Columns marched as follows ; —
"A" "B"
13. — Tx-bwo (twenty niile=).
14. — El Kaa {sixteen miles). Lebwe.
15. — Kussior (thirteen miles). El Kaa.
Arnuuired Car.? entered Iloms.
If). — Horns (eighteen mile.i). Kusseir.
17. — The divi.sion concentrated north-west of Horns at
niiddiiy.
19._l,'-,ii, Bri^rade, with No. 5 Field Squadron, R.E.,
advanced to repair the Orontea Bridge at Kr
Kastan (eleven miles).
20. — Divisional Headquarters, with Nos. 2, II and 12,
L.A.C. Batteries, and Nos. 1 (Australian), 2,
and 7 L.C. Patrols joined loth Brigade at Er
Raslan, forming Column "A." Remainder of
Division formed Column " B."
21. — Column "A" advanced through Hama to Zor
Defai (twenty miles).
22. — Armoured Cars arrived at Ma'arit en Na'aman at
12:50 and two hours later engaged enemy cars
near Khan es Sebil. A running fi.ght for fifteen
miles ensued, resulting in the capture of tweve
prisoners and two cars. A point four miles
north of Seraikiu was the end of the day'.s run.
Column "A" reached KhanShaikhun (twenty-
one miles).
1918.
Oct. 2.1. — The Cars ong.aged enemy cavalry near Khan
Tuman, and at 1000 reached Ali'p|>o and
summoned the city to surrender. This was
refused.
Column " A " reached Mu'arit en Na'araan
(sixteen miles), and Column "B" marched to
Khan .Shaikhun.
„ 24. — Armoured Cars reoecupied Khan Tuman at 0700,
reconnoitred towards Aleppo and Turmanin,
and withdrew to Ziihe.
Column "A" reached Seraikin (eighteen and a
half miles), and Column " B " reached Ma'arit
en Na'araan.
,, 25. — The Armoured Cars eng.-igcd bodies of the enemy
near Aleppo and Turmanin during the morning.
Column " A " arrived at Turmanin and 15th
Brigade relieved the Cars while Column "B"
reached Seraikin.
„ 2G. — 0700. — 1 5th Brigade engaged astride Aleppo-
Alexandretta road. Mysore Lancers and two
sfjuadrons .Jodhpore Lancers charged the enemy.
1000. — Divisional Headquarters with Armoured
Cars entered Aleppo (which had surrendered to
Sheritian troops) followed at 2030 by 14th
Brigade which had pushed on rapidly from
Khan Tuman.
„ 28. — 13th Brigade holding Aleppo-Alexandretta road,
and 1 4th Brigade at .Musliraiyeh Junction,
having relieved Shcrifian troops.
(During operation-^ Oct. 2 to Oct. 2S. 821 pri.soners,
eighleea guns, and much railway and other
material were captured.)
AUSTRALIAN IVIOUIMTED DIVISION.
Comminder. — Col. (temp. Major-Gen.) H. W. Hodgson, C.V.O., C.B.
3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
Commander.— Col (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. R. Royston, C.M.G., D.S.O. (relinquished, Oct., 1917).
LiiHit.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) L. C. Wilson, C.M.G., .5th Australian Light Horse Regt.
8th, 9th and 10th Regiments, Australian Light Horse.
3rd Australian Light Horse Signal Troop.
3rd Australian Machine Gun Squadron.
4th Australian Light Horse Brigade.
Comminder. — Lieut. -Col. (temp. Rrig.-Gen.) J. B. Meredith, D.S.O., 1st Aastralian Li^ht Horse Begt.
(relinquished, Sept., 1917).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig -Gen.) W. Grant, D.S.O., 11th Australian Light Horse Regt.
4th, 11th and 12th Regiments, Au^trahan Light Horse.
4th Australian Light Horse Signal Troop.
4th Australian Machine Gun Squadron.
Sth Australian Light Horse Brigade (late Imperial Camel Corps Brigade).
Cotnmander.— Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. M. M. Onslow, D.S.O., V.D., 7th Australian Light Horse
Regt.
14th, 15th and IGth Regiments, Australian Light Horse.
1/lst Warwickshire Yeomanry (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/6/18).
5th .Australian Liirht Horse Signal Troop.
2nd New Zealand Machine Gim Squadron.
Divisional Trooos.
19th Brigade, R.H.A. (" A " and " B " Batteries H.A.C., 1/lst Notts. Battery, and Brigade
Ammunition Column).
2nd Field Squadron, Australian Engineers.
2nd Signal Squadron, Australian Engineers.
Australian Mounted Divisional Train (Nos. 35, 36, 37, 38 Companies, Australian A.S.C.).
5th, 8th and 9th Australian Mobile Veterinary Sections,
52
THE ADVANCE OF THE
Brief Record of Service.
In July, 1917, the Australian Mounted Division consisted of 3rd and 4tli Australian Light Horse,
and 5th Mounted, Brigades. The last named became 13th Cavalry Brigade and left the division
Aug. 22, 1918, the vacancy being filled by 5th Australian Light Horse (formerly Imperial Camel
Corps), Brigade.
Iitl7.
Sept. 18. — The division relieved Yeomanry Division with an
outpost line through Bir el Esani-Kh. Khasif-
Abu Shawish.
., 24
to
Oct. 24
97
Continual reconnaissances and patrols.
-Middlesex Yeomanry (1st County of London) of
8th Mounted Brigade (attached) heavily attacked
near El Buggar at dawn by a force estimated
at 3,000-4,000. In spite of heavy casualties
the attack was temporarily successful and
9th and 10th Regiments (3rd Australian Light
Horse Brigade) were sent forward in support.
They were ordered not to counter-attack however,
and the position was re-taken by infantry of
53rd Division after nightfall.
,, 29. — Concentrated at Khalasa for the attack on
Beersheba.
„ 31. — 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade strongly en-
gaged in supporting Australian and New Zealand
Mounted (.-^nzac) Division in attack on Tel el
Saba. 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade
galloped over strong Turkisli positions, demora-
lized the enemy, and captured Beersheba at
1800 with 1,148 prisoners. 5th and 7th Mounted
Brigades came up in support and junction was
effected with Auzac Division on the outpost line.
Nov. 2. — 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade rejoined
Division, and 5th Mounted Brigade was attached
to Anzacs. 8th Regiment (3rd Australian Light
Horse Brigade) in action at Khuweilfeh.
„ 4-5. — 7th Mounted Brigade attached. Outpost line,
Wadi Hanafish-Hiseia, taken over from Yeo-
manry Division.
,, 7. — Advanced through Irgeig. Stiff fighting at Sheria,
where llth Regiment (4th Australian Light
Horse Brigade) pushed the enemy back and
beat off a counter-attack, thus assisting the
concentration of 60th Division.
„ 8. — Sharp fighting and troop actions by all regiments
of 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade resulted
in the capture of several guns. 12th Regiment
(4th Australian Light Horse Brigade) effected
junction with Imperial Service Cavalry (XXIst
Corps) at Beit Hanun as the result of hard
riding. One mile west of Huj ten troops of
Warwick and Worcester Yeomanry (5th Mounted
Brigade) charged a strong position, the garrison
of which was delaying the advance of 60th
Division. The charge was completely successful
and eleven guns and four machine guns were
taken.
„ 9. — Marched vid Tel el Hesi to Arak el Menshiye where
a counter-attack by an enemy column was
repulsed.
„ 11. — 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment occupied
Summeil. Contact was established with 75th
Division.
„ 12. — 9th Australian Light Horse Regiment occupied
Borkusic. The outpost line through Zeita-
Borkusie was slightly withdrawn in consequence
of a heavy attack against 5th Mounted Brigade
and 9th Australian Light Horso Regiment.
The 8th and 10th Regiments supported, the
attack was held, and the original positions
re-occupied during the night.
„ 13. — 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade advanced,
protecting right flank of 75th Division, and
occupied Tel et Turmus after sharp fighting.
In carrying out this operation the brigade was
corapellod to move across the enemy's front.
1917.
Nov. 14. — 1th Regiment (4th Australian Light Horse Brigade)
captured Et Tine with large quantities of
ammunition and stores. 7th Mounted Brigade
co-operated with 75th Division in the capture
of Junction Station.
., 18. — Operating around Amwas and Latron. In to\ich
with Yeomanry Division on the left (north).
(5th Mounted Brigade and 10th Australian
Light Horse Regiment, attached to XXIst Corps,
carried out valuable patrols over most difficult
country. Later, on withdrawal of XXIst Corps,
these units passed under orders of XXth Corps
and were employed to form link between 53rd
and 60th Divisions during the final advance
to Jerusalem).
., 28. — tth Australian Light Horse Brigade took over
part of line (and came under Yeomanry
Division) at Beit ur et Tahta.
,, 29. — 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade relieved the
155th Brigade (52nd Division) at El Burj.
,, 30. — tth Australian Light Horse Brigade and 7th
Mounted Brigade rejoined division, which now
held the line. El Burj-Beit Sira.
(During the month the division captured
1,804 prisoners, thirty- five guns, and eight
machine guns.)
Dec. 1. — A strong enemy attack was checked only when
within thirty yards of the line held by 8th
Australian Light Horse Regiment. A party of
Gloucester Yeomanry (5th Mounted Brigade),
and two companies l/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers
(52nd Division) were sent up in support and the
attacking force was surrounded and captured.
112 unwounded and sixty wounded prisoners
were taken, and over 100 dead were buried.
(This attack was made by the 190th Assault
Battalion, and a prisoner captured subsequently
stated that the whole battalion had been killed
or captured).
,,26 28. — The line was advanced 1,500 yards with very
little opposition. On Dec. 27 patrols assisted
the advance of 29th Infantry Brigade by demon-
strations against right flank of enemy's positions
1918. on Namah Ridge.
Jan. 1. — Relieved by 10th Division and moved back to
Deir el Belah, leaving 4th Australian Light
Horse Brigade in the line until Jan. 6 to fill
the gap between XXth and XXIst Corps.
Jan. to I Spent in refitting, extensive training, and salvage
March I work on the old trench systems south of tUaza.
„ 14. — Division inspected by H.R.H. Duke of Connaught.
K.G.
Apl.1-26. — Moved vid Selmeh and Talaated Dumm to Jericho,
which was the point of concentration for the
projected raid on Es Salt.
„ 30. — 5th Mounted Brigade, on the Umm esh Shert-
Es Salt track, readied its first objective with
little opposition. 4th Australian Light Horse
Brigade, in position astride the Jisr ed Damich-
Es Salt track, sent forward llth Regiment,
who found the ctyiiiy holding llic Jisr od Damich
Bridgehead in great strength and could not
advance, but 1st Regiment (attached) captured
Red Hill at 1225. 3rd Australian Light Horse
Brigade moving ea.stward was held up by fire
from enemy works covering Es Salt, lint these
were stormed by 9th ond 10th Reginitnts dis-
mounted, while 8th Regiment galloped along
the road and forced its way into Es Salt at 1800
in face of stubborn resistance. One troop
pursued the enemy for two miles nlong the
Amman road, riding down and capturing several
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
63
1918.
April 30
May 1.-
2-3 —
May )
and /
June \
„ 11 (
to /
July 13 1
.. U.~
20..
Aug.
23.-
to
Sept.
27
17
18.-
»»
19.
20.
.. 23-
„ 24.
„ 25.
parties. 300 pri.'ioners, twenty-nine machine
guns, and large quantities of material were taken.
ICnemy attacked 4th Australian Light Horse
Brigade, who inflicted heavy oasualties, but were
forced to withdraw by overwhelming numbers.
lOlh Australian Light Horse Regiment was
attacked four times during the night, but suc-
ceeded in beating oil the enemy with heavy losse.n.
An attack was launched at dawn against 8th
Regiment supported by one squadron of fith
Regiment. This attack al.'<o was repulsied and
319 of the enemy were cut off and captured.
■The division was withdrawn west of the river and
took over the left sector of the Jordan Valley
defences.
Continual consolidating and active patrolling
carried on. Close contact with enemy was main-
tained throughout, but the weather was very hot
and trying and a good deal of sickness ensued.
During this period all brigades were withdrawn
for a time to the Bethlehem-Solomon's Pools
area.
4th Australian Light Horse Brigade assisted
Anzac Division to repulse an attack in the
Musallabeh Salient.
-Australian Mounted Division took over the left
sector of Jordan Valley defences from Anzac
Division. There was no especial activity, but
troops suffered considerably with malaria.
-Relieved by Anzac Division and moved to the
Ludd-Ramleh area.
Continuous training was carried out, and the
division was armed with swords.
-5th Australian Light Horse Brigade was placed
under command of 00th Division; the remainder
of the division was concentrated south of Selmeh.
-Moved (less 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade)
to Nahr Iskanderuneh
-and Lejjun. 3rd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade
(less 8th Regiment) pushed on to Jenin, where
lOth Regiment swept in from the north,
demoralizing the enemy and capturing 4,000.
A Giermau force put up a tight after dark but
were caught bymaolune-gun tire and surrendered.
(Total captures in the neighbourhood of Jenin
included 8,000 prisoners, five m.achine guns and
much booty; and twenty-four aeroplanes, burned
by the enemy, were found in the aerodrome.)
-Divisional Headquarters and 4th Australian Light
Horse Brigade arrived at El Afule at 0945. A
squadron of 9th Regiment reconnoitred to near
Beisan and took eighty prisoners.
—4th Australian Light Horse Brigade marched via
Beisan to Jisr Mejamie, and pushed on to
-Semakh, reaching the outskirts of that place
at 0425. The enemy were found to be in force
but the Brigade Commander decided to attack
at once, without waiting for reinforcements.
The 11th Regiment attacked from the east
supported from the south by the fire of the
machine-gun squadron, while one squadron
of 12th Regiment worked round and attacked
from the west. Several charges were pressed
home and the defenders driven back into the
town. Desperate hand-to-hand fighting cul-
minated at the railway buildings which were
fiercely defended for an hour, but by 0600
Semakh was captured with 389 prisoners (of
whom 1 50 were Germans). The enemy casualties
also included .seventy killed and fifty wounded.
Strong patrols sent up the Yarmuk Valley
by the 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment
meanwhile had found the enemy occupying
strong positions. Tiberias was captured after
a sharp tight by sqiadrons of 3rd and 4th
Brigades, who had attacked the town from the
west and south simultaneously. Two cars of
28.-
29.
30.
1918.
Sept. 25 llth Light Armoured Car Battery co-operated
in this engagement.
(.Meanwhile 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade
with cavalry of the French Palestine Detachment
(Regiment Mixto de Marehe dc Cavalcrie) at-
tached, were engaged near Tul Keram where
3,000 prisoners were taken (Sept. 19), and the Tul
Keram-Jenin railway was cut near Ajjeh
(Sept. 20). On Sept. 21 Nablus was captured
1345 and junction effected with XXth Corps
at lialata an hour later. The brigade moved
to Zerin to rejoin the division (Sept. 24), and
on arrival there sent forward 15th Regiment
in support of 4th Brigade at Semakh.]
Sept. 27. — The march on Damascus commenced. The bridge
over the Jordan at Jisr Benat Yakub had been
blown up, and enemy held high ground east of
the river with many machine guns. A crossing
was effected both north and south of the bridge,
however, and seventy prisoners and four guns
captured.
El Kuneitra reached before nightfall.
4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (less two
regiments) remained at El Kuneitra; rest of
division moved off with 3rd Australian Light
Horse Brigade leading at 1500. Enemy opposi-
tion was encountered near Sasa, and the country
was verj- difTicult for mounted work, but
the brigade forced its way through, capturing
twenty- five prisoners, two guns, and seven
machine guns. 4th and 12th Regiments (form-
ing Bourehicr's Force) continued the pursuit,
taking 350 prisoners, one gun, eight machine
guns, and 400 rifles, and at 111.5 attacked the
Kaukab line, which was held by 2,500 rifles and
numerous machine guns. After a preliminary
bombardment, 4th Light Horse Regiment
made a frontal charge on the position while 12lh
Regiment attacked the enemy's left flank. This
eo-operation was entirely successful, and seventy-
two prisoners and twelve machine-guns were
taken on the spot. The greater proportion of
the defenders were ridden down and captured
later, in the direction of Daraya. Meanwhile,-
5th and 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigades
moved rapidly towards north-west of Damascus
until held up at El Mezze Heights by heavy
shell and machine-gun fire, but the 19th Brigade,
R.H.A., silenced most of the opposition. The
French Cavalry moving dismounted along the
hills of Kalabet el Mezze, blocked the gorge
north-west of Er Rabue and captured 4,000
prisoners, in conjunction with 14th Regiment.
3rd Brigade, delayed at Salahiye by heavy
opposition, defeated an enemy column and
Oct. 1. — pushed on towards Damascus, captured en route
a loaded train with 483 prisoners, eight guns,
and thirty machine guns, and passed through
the city at 0600. This brigade fought contin-
uously throughout the day, and seized enemy
positions at Maraba, Duma, and Kusseir.
„ 2. — 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade pursued a
force escaping north-east, and after riding hard
for six miles, charged the column before the
guns could be unlimbered, or machine guns
brought into action. 1,500 prisoners, including
a Divisional Commander, three guns, and twenty-
six machine guns, were captured within an hour
of being sighted.
(Total capture.s, in the advance on, and occu-
pation of Damascus, were over 25,000 prisoners,
thirty-nine guns, 254 machine guns, and nine-
teen automatic rifles.)
,, 4. — Division concentrated in and around Damascus.
,, 19. — French Cavalry left to rejoin the French Palestine
Detachment at Beirut.
„ 27. — Left Damascus for Horns and concentrated there
on November 1.
54 THE ADVANCE OF THE
AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND MOUNTED DIVISION.
Commander. —Col (temp. Major-Gen.) Sir E. W. C. Chaytoe, a.C.M.G., C.B., f.s.c, A.D.C.
Isf Australian Light Horse Brigade.
Com7na7ider:—Co\. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. F. Cox, C.R., C.M.G., D.S.O.
1st, 2nd and 3rd Regiments, Australian Light Horse.
1st Australian Light Horse Signal Troop.
1st Australian Machine Gun Squadron.
2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade.
Comminder. —Co\. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. de L. Ryrie, C.B., C.M.G.
5th, 6th and 7th Regiments, Australian Light Horse.
2nd Australian Li'rht Horse Signal Troop.
2nd Austrahan Machine Gun Squadron.
New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade.
Comwanfie?-.— Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. Meldrum, C.M.G., D.S.O., Welhngton Mounted Rifles.
Auckland, Canterbury, and Wellington Moimted Rifles Regiments.
No. 1 New Zealand Mounted Rifles Signal Troop.
1st New Zealand Machine Gun Squadron.
Divisional Troops.
18th Brigade, R.H.A. (Inverness, Ayr, and Somerset Batteries, and Brigade Ammunition
Column.)
Australian and New Zealand Field Squadron.
1st Signal Squadron, Austrahan Engineers.
Austrahan and New Zealand Mounted Divisional Train (Nos. 32, 33 and 34 Companies,
Australian A.S.C., and No. 4 Company, New Zealand A.S.C.).
6th and 7th, Australian, and No. 2 New Zealand Mobile Veterinary Sections.
Brief Record of Service.
The Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, widely known as the " Anzac Mounted
Division," was formed in March 1916 of Austrahan and New Zealand Brigades that had served in
Gallipoli and landed in Eg}T5t, December 23-31, 1915.
The Division took part ui the advance from the Suez Canal, and the first and second battles of Gaza
in March and April, 1917, as part of the Desert Column. It joined Desert Moimted Corps on formation
of the latter in August 1917, and throughout subsequent operations retained its Order of Battle
unchanged.
1917. 1917.
Oct. 30. — Concentrated at Asluj, fifteen miles south of Nov. 2 \ During tliis period there was continuous fighting
Beersheba. to > in difficult country. 2nd Light Horse Brigade
„ 31. — 2nd Australian Brigade struck from east and „ 5 ) sujiported by Ayrshire Battery, moved on Dha-
took its first objectives, Bir el Hamraam heriyeh. astride the Hebron road, in constant
and Bir Salim Abu Irgeig, by 0800, without touch with Turkish 3rd Cavalry Division,
encountering serious opposition. Resistance 1st Light Horse and New Zealand Brigades,
stiffened considerably but Tel es Sakaty was with 7th Mounted and Impenal Camel Corps
captured at 1,'jOO, and the Brigade was astride Brigades and 8th Light Horse Regiment at-
the Beersheba-Hebron road by 1350. Tel es taclied, were severely engaged in the neigh-
Saba was strongly held against attacks by bourhood of Ras en Nagb and Tc! Khuweilfeh.
1st Light Horse Brigade and New Zealand 7th .Mounted Brigad(' captured the former, with
Mounted Rifles Brigade, assisted by units of eleven prisoners and two guns.
Australian Mounted Division. This position „ 6 ) New Zealand Brigade experienced severe fighting
wascarrie.dat 1.500, and, by 1800. the Division, to ) in the capture and subsequent defence of Tel
with 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade at- ,, 7 \ Khuweilfeh, in eo-operati<ui with 53rd Division,
tached, held an outpost line through Bir el „ 7.— 1st Light Horse Brigade captured the station east
Hammam-Bir es Sakaty-juat north of Beer- of l\h. Unim .Anieidal (on the .)eru^alem-
sheba. Beersheba line), and took 300 prisoners and
Nov. 1. — 170 prisoners and four machine guns were cap- much material. Anzac unit" were also engaged
tured as the result of an advance of five miles in llieneiglibuurlMod of Tel .Vbu Dilakli. Knemy
to the Bir el Makruneh-Towal Abu .lerwal line. rearguards fought stubbornly, making full use of
Ist Light Hor.se and New Zealand Brigades macliine guns, and progress was slow
were involved in severe fighting in advancing „ 8. — -Lack of water compclKd vigorous action to se-
en Tel Khuweilfeh and Ain Kohleh. euro supplies, and the Division (less New Zealand
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
55
1917.
Nov. 8
„ 10,
„ 11.
.. 12
14,
,. 15.-
,. 16.
.. 17.
„ 19.—:
„ 24.—
„ 25.
Deo. 1
to
„ 5
21
to (
23
1918.
Feb. 18.-
Brigado, but with 7th Mounted Brigade at-
tached), fought its way into the VVadi Jemma-
raeh and took 300 p.-i,soncr.'i and two gunn. 7th
Mounted Brigade wa.s counter-attacked nriir
Tel Hudeiwe, but repulsed the enemy wilh
heavy los.ses.
An advance of ten miles enabled the Divi.sion to
occupy a lino from Arak ol Mon.shiyo through Es
SuaUr esh Shcrkiye to Beit Duras, in elose
touch with main Turkish rearguard.
■Ksdud was captured, and
. — 1st Light Horse Brigade and Inverness Battery
was engaged with enemy rearguards at the .Tisr
Esdud bridgehead. Ist Light Horse Regiment
was prominent in this figliting, in which the
enemy made full use of machine guns, supported
by heavy art,illery at long range.
, — 1st Light Horse Brigade captured Tel el Murre,
and supported 52nd Division in the attack on,
and capture of, Burkah. Now Zealand Brigade
(detaidied since Nov. 7), rejoined the Division,
and the Imperial Camel Brigade temporarily
took the place of 2nd Light Horse Brigade.
— New Zealand Brigade were heavily engaged at
Ayun Kara (Richon le Zion). The enemy
counter-attacked in force, and were only re-
pulsed by the Auckland and Wellington Regi-
ments at the point of the bayonet.
Ramleh and Ludd were taken by 1st Australian
Light Horse Brigade, who captured 360
prisoners.
•New Zealand Mounted Rifles occupied Jaffa with-
out opposition ; and
patrols from this brigade passed through Sarona
and reached Nahr el Auja, but failed to bring
the retreating enemy to action.
Patrols to Rantieh located enemy redoubts at
Nebi Tari and trenches at ICli. Hadrah on
north bank of Nahr el Auja.
•New Zealand Brigade crossed the Auja and cap-
tured the advanced line through ICh. Hadrah
and Sh. Muannis.
-The enemy fiercely counter-attacked Kh. Hadrah
at 0300 and at 0800 forced a withdrawal to the
old line south of the Auja. Sh. Muannis was
also abandoned to an overwhelming force dur-
ing the morning.
The line Yehudieh-Jerisheh-south bank of
the Auja to the sea, held by Anzac Divison
(less 1st Light Horse Brigade, but with Imperial
Camel and 161st Infantry Brigades attached),
was consolidated in expectation of a general
hostile attack. The Turks were content, how-
ever, to hold their positions, and the attack did
not materialize.
Bald Hill, an important po.sition one mile south-
west of Miilebbis, was successfully raided by
2nd Light Horse and Camel Brig.ades. Sharp
fighting and considerable hostile shelling was ex-
perienced, particularly by 6th Light Horse Regt.
(The division captured 3,5.53 prisoners, twenty-
one guns, and twenty-one machine guns during
the period Oct. 31 to Dec. 7.)
1st Light Horse Brigade supported 54th Division
in the advance to Mulobbis, and Auckland and
Wellington Regiments supported 52nd Division
in the crossing of the Auja.
The period for necessary rest and refitting was
cut short by the concentration for operations in
the Jordan Valley.
-Wellington Mounted Rifles were at Deir Ibn Obeid,
while Divisional Headquarters with 1st Light
•Horse Brigade and remainder of New Zealand
Brigade were concentrated about Jerusalem and
Bethlehem.
1918.
Feb. 19. — Anzac units moved eastward through desolate
country to El Muntar, six miles from the Dead
Sea.
.. 20. — Tubk el Kaneitera and Jebel el Kahmun were
strongly held, and accurate shell and machine-
gun lire from the direction of Neby Musa delayed
the advance. The first two positions were cap-
tured shortly after noon, however, by a dis-
mounted attack along narrow mountain tracks
through precipil,ou8 country.
., 20 1st Light Hor>ie Brigade pushed on through
the gorge of the Wadi Ktimran to the plain on
north-west shore of the Dead Sea, and took up
a line along the Wadi Jofet Zeben at 1800. New
Zealand Brigade, in co-operation with 2/14th
London and 10th Mountain Battery, occupied
Neby Musa.
,, 21. — 1st Light Horse Brigade reached Jericho at 0820,
and immediately sent out patrols to El Ghor-
aniyoh (where the Turks were found holding a
bridgehead on the west bank of the Jordan),
and to the Wadi Aujah.
One squadron New Zealand Mounted Rifles
oocui)ied Rujm el Bahr, a Turkish Base on the
northern shore of the Dead Sea.
Moh. 7 ) 1st Light Horse Brigade and Inverness Battery
to \ were engaged in the Wadi Samieh, on the risht
„ 15 ) flank of 53rd Division.
„ 23. — Auckland Mounted Rifles crossed the Jordan at
Hajlah at 0400, to clear the east bank of the
river. Several enemy detachments were gal-
loped down, and the high ground covering Ghor-
aniyeh .secured by noon, with the capture of
sixty-eight prisoners and four machine guns.
Meanwhile one regiment of 1st Light Horse
Brigade also crossed the river at Hajlah, and was
engaged in clearing the country to south and
south-east.
,, 24. — 1st Light Horse Brigade, about one mile north of
El Mandesi ford, covered the left flank of 60th
Division, while the remainder of the mounted
troops moved east and north-east from Hajlah.
Infantry turned enemy's right flank, and, with
a squadron of Wellington Jlounted Rifles in
advance, pursued them up the Es Salt road.
2nd Light Horse Brigade reached Rujm el Oshir
during the afternoon, but advance was seriously
delayed by the state of the track, which was im-
passable for wheels and almost so for mounted
men. New Zealand Brigade advanced by the
Wadi Jofet cl Ghazlaniye towards Es Sir.
,, 25. — Naaur was reached by 2nd Light Horse Brigade at
1030, and New Zealand troops occupied Es Sir,
but progress was very slow on account of the
mud. Es Salt, evacuated by the enemy, wa.s
occupied by 3rd Light Horse Regiment at 1800.
,, 26. — 2nd Light Horse Brigade pushed out patrols north
of the Es Salt-Amman road and captured 170
prisoners. It was necessary to rest the greater
proportion of the horses, but a raiding party
reached the Hojaz Railway, seven miles suuth
of Amman, and blew up a section of the line
during the night.
,, 27. — Division left for Amman at 0900. New Zealand
Brigade reached Ain Amman at 1030, and 2nd
Light Horse Brigade, on their left, were three
miles from Amman Station. New Zealand Bri-
gade cut the railway south of Amman at 1500,
but 2nd Brigade were held up and only reached
the line during the night, when a demolition
party succeeded in blowing up a two-arch
bridge.
„ 28. — 1st Light Horse Brigade engaged an enemy column
moving along the Jisr ed Damieh track towards
Es Salt. Heavy fighting followed a general
attack on Amman, and a determined enemy,
56
THE ADVANCE OF THE
1918. 1918-
Mch. 28 well supplied with machine guns, held up our April 11
advance in the afternoon and
29. — throughout the following day.
^, 30. — A sudden attack was launched against the whole
hostile position at 0200, and at 0430 New Zea-
land troops captured part of Hill .3039 (a
dominating feature south-east of the village),
and took six machine guns, but it was found
impossible to clear the hill. New Zealand
patrols entered the village and some house-to- ,, 30
house fighting ensued. Hill 3039 was heavily
counter-attacked at 1100, and, though the
attack was broken up, the defence was subjected May 4
to continual shelling throughout the day.
Meanwhile strong hostile reinforcements had
arrived in the vicinity of Kefr Huda, and were July 14.-
threatening Es Salt from north-west. During
the fighting that ensued 3rd Light Horse Regi-
ment captured three machine guns and killed or
captured seventeen Turks in a skirmish.
Orders were received for a general retirement,
and
„ 31. — 2nd Light Horse Brigade covered the withdrawal
of 181st Infantry Brigade through Es Sir.
(460 prisoners were taken by the Division
during the Amman raid, March 23-31.) Sept. 19
ApiU 3. — 1st Light Horse Brigade and 5th Regiment {2nd to
Brigade) took over the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead ,, 29
from 2/1 7th and 2/ 19th London.
„ 11. — Enemy attacked the Ghoraniyeh bridgehead in
strength at 044-5 and throughout the day. The
attacks were launched along the Wadi Nimrin,
and were all repulsed with very heavy losses.
3rd Light Horse Regiment attempted to envelope
a hostile force from north and south but found
the enemy echeloned in depth and, coming under
heavy shell and machine-gun fire, withdrew.
2nd Light Horse Brigade (less 5th Regiment)
supported Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, who
were heavily attacked by German troop.s at
Musallabeh.
During the raid on Es Salt, 1st and 2nd Light
Horse Brigades, attached to .\ustralian Mounted
Division, were involved in heavy fighting around
Es Salt, while New Zealand Brigade, with other
mounted imits fought several severe actions on
the line Red Hill (east of Jordan) to the foothills.
-A determined attack on the Musallabeh salient,
Abu Teliul-The Bluff, was repulsed by 1st
Light Horse Brigade and 5th Reg'ment, sup-
ported by New Zealand Brigade. Wellington
Mounted Rifles were prominent in this action.
2nd Light Horse Brigade (less 5th Regiment)
also beat off an attack in the Wadi Mellahah.
38! Germans and 185 Turks were captured,
and 180 enemy dead count^'d, as the result of
the day's fighting.
Anzao Division, as part of " Chaytor's Force "
iq.v.), was engaged in the Jordan Valley : seized
Shunet Nimrm, Es Salt, and Amman ; cut the
Hejaz Railway ; and, in co-operaliou with other
units under General Chaytor's Command, cap-
tured 10,000 prisoners, fifty-five guns, 160
machine guns, and 800 tons of ammunition.
3rd (LAHORE) DIVISION.
Commander. — ^Major-Gen. A. R. Hoskins, C.M.6., D.S.O., f.s.c.
Commanding, Royal Artilkry.—Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. R. Peck, C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.
71h Infantry Brigade.
Commmder. — Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) S. R. Davidson, C.M.G., 47th Sikhs, l.k.
1st Battalion Connaught Rangers, 27th and 91st Pimjabis, 2/7th Giu'kha Rifles.
7th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
8th Infantry Brigade.
Commander.— Col (temp. Brig.-Gen.) S. M. Edwardes, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., I.A.
1st BattaUon Manchester Regiment, 47th Sikhs, 59th Scinde Rifles (F.F.), 2/124th Balu-
chistan Infantry.
8th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
9tii Infantry Brigade.
Comtnander. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. C. Luard, C.M.G.
2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment, 93rd Infantry, 105th Mahratta Light Infantry, 1/lst
Gurkha Rifles.
9th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Troops.
4th Brigade, R.F.A. (7th, 14th and B/G9th Batterioa).
8th Brigade, R.F.A. (372nd, 373rd and 428th Batteries).
53rd Brigade, R.F.A. (66th, 374th and 430th Batteries).
3rd Divisional Ammunition Column.
20th and 21st Companies, 3rd Sappers and Miners.
65th Field Comjjany, R.E.
3rd Divisional Signal Company, R.E.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
57
3rd Divisional Machine Gun Battalion (No3. 131, 132, 133 Companies).
l/34th Sikh Pioneers.
3rd Divisional Train (S. & T.).
No. 3 Mobile Veterinary Section.
Brief Record of Service.
The 3rd (Lahore) Division served on the Western Front in 1911 -15 ; in Mesopotamia 1916-17 ; and
landed in Ejiypt in April, 1918. In June, 1918, the division joined XXIst Corps, and reheved 54th Division
in the front line, from Kh. Uimn cI Ikba to near Tel el Mukiiniar, a length of nearly eight miles.
1918.
Aug. 19.
105tli MahraUa Light Infniiliy (!tth Brigade),
supiiorted by an artillery V)arrage, raided iiii
encmv post on the west slope of Hrown Hill,
and killed or captured the whole garrison. The
])oHt was stormed at 022,'> in face of gallant
resistance, partiunlarly on the part of machine-
gnnners, wlio stuck to their guns to the last.
The raiders returned to the British line.? by a
circuitous route to avoid the heavy hostile
barrage of H.K. put doxni in front of Brown Hill.
Sept. 19. — The Division attacked on a front of J, 800 yards,
with 04th Division ou the right and VOth Divi-
sion on the left. 7th Brigade attacked Bir
Adas and Fir Hill ; 0th Brigade attacked the
strong trench system on Browii Hill ; while
8th Brigade moved towards Jiljulich in reserve.
In the right attack 2/7th Gurkhas captured
trenches north-west of Bir Adas, and 27th Pun-
jabis were equally successful on the west of Fir
Hill, while 1st Connaught Rangers carried the
main Fir Hill defences agamst consideiivble
resistance ; and by 0700 the brigade was ad-
vancing through Kefr Saba. On the left 2nd
Dorsets and l/Ist Gurkhas seized Brown Hill
and Hill 283 respectively, and by 0630, having
pierced the enemy defences to a depth of two
miles, the brigade was swinging eastward to-
wards the foothills.
8th Brigade was ordered to attack Jiljulieh
and Railway Redoubt. Both positions were
stubbornly defen<lcd, but 2/124th Baluchis
stormed the Redoubt at 1030, and, at 1100,
1st Jlanchesters swept the enemy from the
village. The whole of the enemy front line
positions were captured by 1200, and the Divi-
sion advanced eastward on a north and south
line througli Hableh. 9th Brigade on the left
was strongly engaged (particularly 105th Mah-
rattas) in the advance to and capture of Jij'us,
and, after being held up for a time, 1/lst Gurkhas
advanced in co-operation with right flank of 7th
Division.
By nightfall the Division held a line about
two miles west of Kh. Kefr Thilth and Azzun
on the right, with its left resting on Jiyus.
1918.
Sept. 20.
Brigades moved at 0500, and made steady progress
in spite of vigorous resistance by enemy rear-
guards and howitzer fire from the direction of
Kefr Thilth and Azzun. The greatest opposi-
tion was experienced along the line of the Wadi
Azzun, and 47th Sikhs and 59lh .Scinde Rifles
were heavily engaged on the high ground north
and south respectively. Azzun and Kefr Thilth
were taken by 1100, and a company of 2/7th
Gurkhas was left to clear the former of snipers.
A large quantity of war material was abandoned
by the enemy along the Azzun road, and at
Kl Furiduk Connaught Rangers captured six
Held guns, five mountain guns, two machine
guns, 150 w'agfms, and 2.50 animals.
The Division halted for the night on the line
El Funduk-Kuryet Jit-Kefr Kadduni.
21. — The advance was continued in a north-easterly
direction, the only ojiposition experienced being
from the direction of Nabhis on the 9lh Brigade
front. Kus.sein was reached about 0730, but
93rd Burma Infantry had a hard fight for Hill
2533, a prominent feature two miles west of
Nablus (or Shechem). This important posi-
tion was captured at 1115 after a stiff climb
under fire, and, as it afforded direct observation
on Nablus, 3rd Divisional Artillery were able
to shell enemy guns in action and transport
columns, and assist 5th Australian Light Horse
Brigade to capture this hub in the Turkish
communications.
By 1915 all the Divisional objectives had been
taken, and a line was occupied facing east
astride the Tul Kerani-Nablus road through
Beit Udhen-Zawata-Jenne.''inia-Nusfjebil, join-
ing up with 7th (IndL-tn) Division near Samaria.
(During the period .Sept. 19-21, 1 ,366 prisoners
and seventy guns were captured and recorded ;
but the actual numbers taken probably much
exceeded these figures.)
24. — 7th Brigade marched to Jenin, where it was at-
tached to Desert Mounted Corps, and garrisoned
Jenin, El Afule, Nazareth, and Beisan for a week.
29. — Divisional Headquarters, with 8th and 9th Bri-
gades concentrated at Hableh ; and 7th Brigade
at Semakh.
7th (INDIAN) DIVISION.
CojiwrnntZer.— Major-Gen. Sir V. B. Fane, K.C.I.E., C.B.
Commanding, Royal Artillery.— lAsvit.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. C. JIassy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.
19th Infanlry Brigade.
Commander.— iji(i\\i.-Go\. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. J. M. Wood, D.S.O., 97th Infantry, I. A. (relinquished,
April, 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) G. A. Weir, D.S.O., 3rd Dragoon Guards (relinquished,
Oct., 1918).
Bt. CoL (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. S. Leslie, D.S.O., 31st Punjabis, LA., f.s.c.
1st Battalion Seaforth Highlanders, 28th and 92nd Punjabis, 125th Napier's Eifles.
19th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
58
THE ADVANCE OF THE
2Ist Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Biig.-Gen.) A. G. Kemball, 31st Punjabis.
2nd Battalion Black Watch, 1st Guides Infantry, 20th Punjabis, l/8th Gurkha Rifles.
. 21st Light Trench Mortar Battery.
2Sth Infantry Brigade (F.F.).
Commander.— RL Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. H. Davibs, C.M.G., D.S.O., LA.
2nd BattaHon Leicester Regiment, 51st Sikhs (F.F.), 53rd Sikhs (F.F)., 56th Punjabi
Rifles (F.F.).
28th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Troops.
261st Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," "B " and " C " Batteries).
262nd Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," "B " and 438th Batteries).
264th Brigade, R.F.A. (422nd, 423rd and " C " Batteries).
7th Divisional Ammimition Column.
3rd and 4th Companies, 1st (King George's Own) Sappers and Miners.
522nd (London) Field Company, R.E.
7th Divisional Signal Company, R,E.
121st Pioneers.
7th Divisional Machine Gun Battalion (Nos. 134, 135, 13G Companies).
272nd Machine G\m Company (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 6/6/18).
7th Divisional Train (S. & T.).
No. 2 Mobile Veterinary Section.
Brief Record of Service.
The 7th (Indian) Division served in France (1914-15), in Mesopotamia (1916-17), landed in Egypt
in January, 1918, joined XXIst Corps and relieved 54th Division in the Coastal Sector of the front Une,
(from near Tel el Mukhmar to Axsuf), in March.
1918.
May 28-29. — Advanced the line one and a half milop on a
seven mile front. 2nd Leicesters and 53rd
Sikhs (28th Brig.ade) were prominent in this
fighting, and took over 100 prisoners.
June 8-10. — 21st Brigade took the " Sisters " after heavy
fighting, in which 2nd Black Watch and 1st
Guides Infantry bore the brunt. As the re-
sult of this engagement 250 prisoners were
taken, and the energy lost a valuable obser-
vation post.
July 13. — A post in the enemy's front sy.stem was raided
in daylight by Gurkhas of the 1st Guides, who
captured fifteen prisoners and three machine
guns.
„ 27. — A company of 53rd Sikhs raided a portion of
the enemy trenches and captured thirty-three
prisoners and several machine guns.
(Much of the work in preparation for active
operations had to be undertaken by the
division, during August and the early part of
September, for the divisions that could only
be brought into the area immediately before
the attack.)
„ 19. — Attack on the Tabsor system carried out by
two columns. On the right, 92nd and 28th
Punjabis were supported by Ist Seaforths
and 125th Rifles (19th Brigade); on the left,
2nd Black Watch, supported by l/8th Gurkhas
(21st Brigade). Front line objectives were
quickly taken by the attacking troops, and
the supporting battalions passed through and
seized the support and reserve lines. During
the further advance to the Felamieh-Taiyibeh
line, the 2()th Punjabis captured the village of
Fflamich, supported on the left by 2nd Black
1918.
Sept.
19 Watch ; while the 92nd Punjabis captured
El Mejdel and took a number of prisoners and
two machine guns. Further north 56th Rifles
and S.Srd Sikhs (28th Brigade) stormed the
village of Taibiyeh in face of considerable re-
sistance.
20. — 19th Brigade met with most determined re-
sistance during the advance on Beit Lid (1st
Seaforths and 125th Rifles). The village was
finally rushed by the Seaforths. 28th
Brigade pushed on from El Burj, and seized
21. — Messudieh railway station at 0300. 63rd
Sikhs were sent roxmd to attack Samaria Hill
from the west and occupy the to\vn, while
51st Sikhs attacked the hill from south. Both
hill and town were captured by 0500 after a
sharp fight, in which 200 prisoners and four
machine guns were taken.
21. — The division had fought and marched for
forty-eight hours, and had covered thirty-
four miles over difficult and rocky country,
but all objectives had been reached, with the
capture of over 2,000 prisoners and twenty
guns.
23. — 19th Brigade marched toAnebta, 21st Brigade
to Sluiweikeh.
24. — 2 1st Brigade moved to Hudeira, 2Sth Brigade
to north of Kakon. 2nd Leicesters loft for
Haifa in motor lorries, and arrived there on
the following morning.
26. — Division marched in three brigade groups vid
Zimmarin and Alhlit, nnil on
29. — concentrated at Haifa.
Orders were received to continue the march
to Beirut along llie coast road. A section of
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 69
1918. 1918.
Sept. 29 this road, upwards of hiilf a milo in length, Sept. 29 'I'he (irst day's march waa around the Bay
kuown an the " Ladder of Tyre," consisted of of Acre, and, from the high ground near Haifa,
a narrow rocky track on the side of the clitf the head of the column could be seen moving
with ft deep drop to the sea, and at one point on to tlic new camping area, as tlie rear of the
bceamo a Hight of steps roughly hewn out of column left the old area, more than ten miles
the rock. The Sappers and Jlmers and 121st apart.
Pioneers, assisted by infantry, by working The division camped as follows :—
continuously for 24 days, made the road lit for -, , ..,»,-, i ■. r, ,, /, . n /-. >.
, ■' ■ , ■' , ,,,, , Column A. Column ii. Column C.
armoured cars, motors, and (id-pounder guns
The division marched in three columns, as
Oct. 3 — Ras Nakura. Acre. Haifa.
follows • " ^- — lye. Rat Nakura. Acre.
CoK "A."— XXIst Corps Cavalry and an .. 5.— Ain -I Burak. Ras el Ain. Ra- Nakura.
Infantry Detachment. •• 6.— Sidon. Nahr el Kasmiye. Ras el Ain.
" B."— 28lh Brigade, Kth Mountain .. 7.— Kd Damur. El Khidr. N. el Kasmiye.
Artillery Brigade, one and a .. 8.— Beirut. Ed Ilamur. Sidon.
half companies Sappers and •■ 9.— Beirut. Beirut. Ed Damur.
Miners, 121st Pioneers, one .. 10.— Beirut. Beirut. Beirut.
Machine (Jun Company, one (Column " 0 "' marched 96 milea in eight
Field Ambulance. days.)
" C." — Divisional Headquarters, 19th „ 14. — 19th Brigade left Beirut for Tripolis (fifty-four
and 21st Brigades, Com- miles) and
posite Brigade, R.F.A., 15th _^ 18.— reached the latter to>vn five days later.
Heavy Battery, R.G.A., oi r> ■ i r lu i- • • "t, i ,t. j
XT Vnn r>- 1 1 V. .. 21. — Remainder of the division marched northward
No. 522 Field Company, , t t ■ i- i ^ j .u
„ ,. ^ ^. r. en ro«l« for J ripolis, and concentrated there on
R.E., two sections Sappers '
and Miners, Machine Gun •• 28.— having marched about 270 miles in forty days.
Battalion (less 1 Company), „ 31. — Divisional Headquarters at EI Mina, 19th
Di\isional Ammunition Col- Brigade at Khan Abdi (twelve miles north-
umn, and two field Ambu- east of Tripolis), 2l8t Brigade at Ras el Lados,
lances. and 28th Brigade near Nahr Berid.
10th DIVISION.
Commander. — ^Major-Gen. J. R. Longley, C.B., C.M.G.
Commanding, Royal Artillery. — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. B. Emery, C.B., C.M.G., R.A.
291h Infantry Brigade,
Commander.— Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. S. Vandeleur, C.B., C.M.G., Seaforth Highlanders
(relinquished, June, 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. L. Smith, V.C, M.C, Duke of Cornwall's Light
Infantry.
1st Battalion Leinster Regiment, 1/The 101st Grenadiers, l/54th Sikhs (F.F.), 2/151st
Indian Infantry.
5th Battalion Connaught Rangers, and 6th Battalion Leinster Regiment (ceased to belong
to E.E.F., 28/.5/18).
6th Battalion Royal Irish Rifles (disbanded, 20/5/18).
29th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
30th Infantry Brigade,
Commander. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) F. A. Greer, C.M.G. , D.S.O., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
1st Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, 38th Dogras, 46th Pimjabis, 1st Kashmir I.S. Infantry.
6th Battalion Royal DubUn Fusiliers (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 2/7/18), 6th Battalion
Royal Mimster Fusihers, and 7th Battalion Royal Dublin Fusiliers (ceased to belong
to E.E.F., 28/5/18).
30th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
31st Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. M. Morris, C.B., C.M.G., Royal Lancaster Regt.
2nd Battalion Royal Irish Fusihers, 2/42nd Deoli Regunent, 74th Punjabis, 2/The 101st
Grenadiers.
5th and 6th Battalions Royal Inniskilliag Fusiliers (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/6/18
and 28/5/18 re,spectively), and 5th Battalion Royal Irish Fusihers (ceased to belong to
E.E.F., 20/5/18).
31st Light Trench Mortar Battery.
60
THE ADVANCE OF THE
Divisional Troops.
67tli Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and " C " Batteries).
68th Brigade, R.F.A. ("A," "B" and "C" Batteries).
263rd Brigade R.F.A. (75th, 424th and " C " Batteries).
10th Divisional Ammunition Column.
18th Company, 3rd Sappers and Aliners.
66th and 85th Field Companies, R.E.
10th Div-isional Signal Compan}', R.E.
10th Divisional Machme Gun Battahon (Nos. 29, 30, 31 Companies).
10th Divisional Train (Nos. 475, 476, 477, 478 Companies, R.A.S.C).
25th Mobile Veterinary Section.
Brief Record of Service.
The 10th (Irish) Division, composed originally of Irish Battalions of the New Army (•' First
Hundred Thousand "), saw service in Gallipoh and Salonika and landed in Egypt in September, 1917.
It then consisted of three Regular Battalions (one in each brigade), and nine New Army Battalions.
The Division joined XXth Corps during the concentration for the attack on Beersheba. Between
May and July, 1918, the New Ariuy Battalions were withdrawn for service in France, and their
places filled by Indian units, with the necessary alteration in title.
1917.
Oct. 30.^Concentrated in the Shellal-Tel el Fara area.
Nov. 1. — -Gth Royal laniakilling Fusiliers (31st Brigade)
captured Abu Irgeig.
„ 6. — -After concentrating on a line north of Irgeig the
division participated in the attack on the
Kauwukah and Rushdi trench systems, on the
left of 53rd Division who were attacking Tel
Khuweilfeh. In this fighting, in which 2nd and
5th Royal Irish Fusiliers (31st Brigade) were
prominent, all objectives were gained during
the afternoon.
,, 7. — Harejra Tepe Redoubt was stormed by 2nd Royal
Irish Fusiliers in face of stubborn resistance
and heavy machine-gun fire.
,, 10 ) Division concentrated at Karm ; moved to Deir
to > el Belah a week later; marched northward via,
„ 30 ) Beit Duras to Junction Station ; and then east-
ward into the Judaean Hills via Latron.
Dec. 2 ( Relieved 52nd Division and 229th and 231st
to 5 I Brigades of 74th Division.
„ 11. — Occupied the line Beit Dukka-Beit Ur Et Tahta-
Suffa.
,, 27. — Ist Leinsters (29th Brigade) captured Deir Ibzia,
while the whole line covering Jerusalem on the
north and east was furiously engaged in repuls-
ing the general Turkish attack.
„ 28. — Abu el Ainein and Kh. Rubin Ridge were cap-
tured by 1st Roval Irish Regiment and 6th
Royal Munster Fusiliers (30th Brigade), while
5th and 6th Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers (31st
Brigade) seized Kefr Shiyan.
,, 29. — Et Tireh Ridge occupied and the line advanced
to Batn Harasheh-Ras Kerker-Deir el Kuddis.
1918.
Mar. 9. — After a winter spent in holding the positions
gained, operations commenced on a front of
15,000 yards, with 3l3t and 30th Brigades
forming the right column of attack, and 29th
Brigade the left column.
Right AHack.^A rapid attack by 2nd Royal
Irish Fusiliers forced the enemy to abandon
strong positions on Sh. Kalrawuny, near Bir
ez Zeit and enabled 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers
to capture Ras et Tarfu and Attara by 0920.
In the evening the latter unit forced the crossing
of the VVadi Jib and seized the lower slopes of
the hill forming the main defence of Jiljilia.
Farther to the left 6lh Royal Munster Fusiliers
and 1st Royal Irish Regiment pushed back
the enemy and captured Ajul.
1918.
Mar. 9 Lejt attach. — 5th Connaught Rangers occupied
Neby Saleh at 0730, and 1st Lemsters also
pushed forward ; but progress was slow owing
to exceptional difficulties of terrain.
,, 10. — Right attack. — 5th Royal Irish Fusiliers, supported
by two companies 5th Roj'al Inniskilling
Fusiliers, captured the strong defences south
of Jiljilia, and drove the enemy in disorder
through the village on to the slopes beyond.
A small party, commanded by a German officer,
held out to the last, when they were overwhelmed
by a bayonet charge. 5th Royal Inniskilling
Fusiliers captured Kh. Aliuta against opposition ;
while 1st Royal Irish Regiment and 6th Royal
Dublin Fusiliers captured the ridge west of
Jiljilia in face of strong resistance.
,, 10. Left attack. — Extraordinary difficulties were
encountered in the attack on Arura and Holy-
wood Hill, owing to precipitous nature of the
Wadi Jib, which had to be crossed although
swept by heavy oblique fire from numerous
machine guns. In spite of this, however, 6th
Royal Irish Rifles captured the lower slopes of
Holywood Hill and Sh. Redwan by 0730. Dur-
ing the night 5th Connaught Rangers repulsed
a counter-attack, and the enemy withdrew hie
line north of the Wadi Gharib,
Mar. 19. — Kefr Tur occupied by 5th Connaught Rangers.
(During the March operations thirty miles of
new roads had to be constructed during the
actual fighting, to enable supplies to reach the
advancing troops )
April 9. — Kefr Ain and Kefr Ain Hill were captured to cover
the right (lank of attack by 75th Division.
Aug.l2~13.— 1st Leinsters, l/54th Sikhs, and 1/lOlst Grena-
diers (29th Brigade) successfully raided tha
El Burj-Ghurabeh Ridge, and annihilated the
Turkish 33rd Regiment, while troops of 60th
Division carried out a demonstration on the
right. In this operation the enemy was sur-
prised, and, though he put up considerable
resistance, suffered about 450 casualties.
Sept. 18. — Division held the line Arura to Rafat (exclusive),
with 53rd Division on the right and French
Palestine Detachment on the left.
19.— Ist Leinsters and 2/15Ist Infantry (29th Brigade)
captured Furkhah Ridge and Topee Hill respec-
tively, while 74th Punjabis (31st Brigade) took
Kh. Er Ras, Kh. Mutwy, and Mogg Ridge.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 61
1918. 1018.
Sept.20.— 2/!r)Ist Infantry and 1/IOIst CrcnndiorR (:."Jth Sept. 20 (lank was turned, withdrew rapidly from his
Brigade) ri'achcd tlio lino Kunr cs Sananieh- positions.
SelHt where they wre held up. but, supported d,,,,^^ t,,^ „i ,,t ^f Sept. 20-2 1, 30th Brigade,
by /54th Silchs captured all positions ,n face ,„,„i„^, f^on, Kh. FA Mutwy through Huwarah,
of doterni,ncd resistance and by 1530 were ooc.pied Neby Belan Heights, north of Nablus,
established on high ground south-west of Iskaka having covered twenty-one miles of very rough
,n reafbness for further advance. ■ -^ ,,; . j
2/4L'nd DeoliB and 2/lOlst Grenadiers (3!st „, „, „ , . , ,, ,
Brigade) advanced to the lino Ras Aish-Kefr " 21.— 3l8t Brigade occupied Lslamiyeh, and completed
llaris, Sh. Othman falling to an attack by the , "'° ""P^''"' °^ N'^'''""-
Grenadiers en route. 2/42nd Deolis made six •> 22 i The area Kh. Fcrweh-Tubas-Ain Shiblch was
desperate but unsuccessful attem[)ts to storm ^° ( cleared of the enemy, and the fighting was over
Kas Aish, and the 2/lOlst Grenadiers wero " 24 1 so far as 10th Division was concerned,
equally unfortunate in their attacks on the (Between Sept. 19 and 24 0,000 prisoners,
Kefr Haris defences. 2nd Royal Irish Fusiliers 130 guns, and masses of transport and material
(31st Brigade) finally rushed the village of right were taken on the divisional front ; these figures
Haris and the enemy, realizing that his Kefr including the captures by Corps Cavalry.)
52nd (LOWLAND) DIVISION (T.)-
(Ceased to belong to E.E.F. 21/4/18).
Commander.— Rt. Col. (temp. Major-Gen.) W. E. B. Smith, C.B., C.M.G. (relinquished, Sept., 1917)
Major-Gen. J. Hill, C.E., D.S.O., I.A., A.D.C.
Commanding, Royal Artillery. — laeut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. C. Ma.ssy, C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., R.A.
ISSth Infantry Brigade.
C?ommaw<^er.— Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. B. Pollok McCall, C.M.G., D.S.O. (R. of 0.) (relin-
quished, April, 1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) P. S. Allan, D.S.O.. Gordon Highlanders.
l/4th and l/5th Battalions Royal Scots Fusiliers, l/4th and l/5th Battalions King's Own
Scottish Borderers.
155th Machme Gun Company, and 155th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
I561h Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. H. Leggett, D.S.O. (R. of 0.).
l/4th and l/7th Battalions Royal Scots, l/7th and l/8th Battalions Scottish Rifles.
156th Machine Gim Company, and 15Gth Light Trench Mortar Battery.
157th Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. D. Hajiilton Moore, C.M.G., D.S.O., Royal Warwickshire
Regt., f.s.c.
l/5th, l/6th and l/7th Battalions Highland Light Infantry, and l/5th Battalion Argyll
and Sutherland Highlanders.
157th Machine Gim Company, and 157th Light Trench Mortar Batterv.
Divisional Troops.
52nd Divisional Cyclist Company.
9th Brigade, R.F.A. (19th, 20th, 28th and D/69th Batteries).
56th Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B," " C " and 527th Batteries).
52nd Divisional Ammimition Column.
133rd and 134th (Medium), Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
410th, 412th, 413th (Lowland) Field Companies, R.E.
52nd Divisional Signal Company, R.E.
Pioneer Battalion, 5th Royal Irish Regiment.
211th Machine Gim Company.
52nd Divisional Employment Company.
52nd Divisional Train (Nos. 217, 218, 219 and 220 Companies, R.A.S.C).
1/lst Lowland Mobile Veterinary Section.
62
THE ADVANCE OF THE
Brief Record of Service.
52nd Division, composed entirely of Lowland Territorial Battalions, served through the Gallipoli
campaign, and took part in the advance across the desert from the Suez Canal. It fought in the battle
of Eomani, and the first and second battles of Gaza, in March and April, 1917.
The annihilation of Sea Post, a strong Turkish redoubt west of Gaza, in June, by l/5th King's Own
Scottish Borderers, inaugurated the series of successful raids that did so much to harass the enemy during
the four months prior to the winter campaign.
As a Division of XXIst Corps it played an important part in the final overthrow of the Turks at
Gaza and the subsequent advance ; but ceased to belong to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force on
embarking for France in April, 1918.
1917.
Oct. 31. — The Division held the left sector of the line from
the Gaza-Ca ro road and along Samson's Ridge
to the Sea.
Nov. l-2.-At 2300, after a heavy bombardment lasting
six days, 156th Brigade (temporarily attached
to 54th Division) stormed Umbrella Hill, a
strong redoubt and the key of the Gaza defences.
The posit'on was ^tubbor^lly defended, but after
a stiff fight in which l/7th Scottish Rifles were
prom'uent, it wa'* captured and consolidated.
„ 5. — I'he whole of the defensive system at Gaza was
in British hands, and 155th and 157th Brigades
advanced along the beach and seized the high
ground north of the Wadi Hesi.
„ 8. — The advance was continued in co-operation with
Imperial Service Cavalry, and after a trying
march over soft sand, the high ground north-
west of Deir Sineid was taken. The Turks
launched a determined counter-attack from
the direction of Ascalon to retake this position
and four times drove the Lowlanders off the
hill, but at the fifth attempt it was held and
consolidated.
„ 9. — The Division captured the line Deir Sineid-Beit
Jerjah-Ascalon with little opposition.
„ 10. — Advanced to the Esdud-Mejdel-Herbiah line.
The ridge north of Beit Duras was stormed
by 157th Brigade after a march of fourteen miles
over heavy sand.
„ 12. — Enemy resistance stiffened considerably and a
determined stand was made on a line through
Brown Hill and Burkah. Several assaults were
launched and heavy fighting ensued in which
150th Brigade was heavily engaged. Eventually
the whole hostile position was taken late in the
afternoon, two battalions of 75th Division
co-operating on the right in the last assault.
„ 13. — The enemy continued to fight stubbornly and
155th Brigade met severe opposition in the
attack on the Katrah-El Mughar line. The
attack had to cross over 4,000 yards of open
ground swept by heavy shell and machine-gun
fire. Yeomanry co-operation on the left flank,
and an infantry charge on the right captured the
positions late in the afternoon. King's Own
Scottish Borderers dashed up the hill and
captured the Mughar defences, while Royal
Scots Fusiliers worked their way into Katrah
by a. series of Hank attacks supported by bombers,
and rushed the village.
The capture.-) at Katrah included a Turkish
infantry battalion, a company of machine-
gunners with twenty-six guns, two field guns,
and a large store of ammunition.
„ IS. — Division moved up to Ludd and Ramleh, where
,, 19. — it turned to the east towards the .Tudaean Hills,
and occupied Kubab and Annahch without
opposition. The advance was continued with
75th Division on the right and Yeomanry
Mounted Division on the left. The tracks were
so bad that only throe sections of guns accom-
panied the infantry and thoy had to bo doublo-
horsed.
„ 20. — Beit Dukka was captured by 157th Brigade.
1917.
Nov. 22. — 155th Brigadecaptured Beit Izza, and ISGthBrigade
relieved 233rd and 234th Brigades (75th
Division) at Neby Samwil, where captured
positions were extended during the night, in
spite of considerable enemy resistance.
,, 24. — The Division attacked with the intention of getting
astride the Jerusalem-Nablus road. The first
step was to capture El Jib and Bir Nebala,
but these commanding positions were strongly
held, and the formation of the ground made it
impossible to attack from the flanks. 155th
Brigade attacked El Jib but could make no
headway and the action was broken off.
,, 26. — 60th Division relieved 52nd, and the latter were
ordered to march to Ludd, but the Turks com-
menced a series of severe attacks that threatened
to cut our communications along the Ramleh-
Jerusalem road, and the Lowlanders were
hurried back into the line.
,, 28. — 155th Brigade took over on the left of the Yeomanry
Division, and 15Gth Brigade went up in support.
l/7th Scottish Rifles (156th Brigade) assisted
8th Mounted Brigade to repulse a strong attack.
„ 29-30.-157th Brigade relieved 22nd and 7th Mounted
Brigades during the night, and the whole Division
was engaged in stemming hostile attacks.
Dec. 1. — l/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers supported 8th Aus-
tralian Light Horse Regiment which was attacked
in the early morning by a Turkish Assault Bat-
talion. A determined attack was made on the
Tahta defences held by 157th Brigade and it was
compelled to give ground but recaptured the
original line after fierce hand-to-hand fighting.
,, 7. — 52nd Division, relieved by 10th, marched to
Ramleh, and
„ 12. — concentrated on the left in the coastal sector,
between Neby Tari and the sea, covering Sel-
meh and Sarona.
,, 201 The final advance by the Division in Palestine
to > was the crossing of the Auja. The river was
,, 21 5 swift and swollen by recent rain, and the fords
were few and difficult to find. The ground
north of the river was entirely unreconnoitred,
and the enemy held a strong entrenched line
along the high ground overlooking the wide
belt of open country through which the river
flowed. Light canvas rafts were constructed
and concealed in orange groves. These were
carried to the river after dark and lashed in
position to form a bridge, over which infnntry
and guns crossed. souml being deadened by use of
matting. Meanwhile, some infantry crossed in
coracles; others found a jiossible ford, I inked arms
and waded over breast deep. Post after post was
rushed in silence at the point of the bayonet
without a shot being fired. Kh. Hadrah, Sh.
Jliiannis, and Tel er Hckkeit were captured by
155th, 156th, and 157th Brigades respectively,
and by dawn all objectives were taken with
316 prisoners and ten machine guns.
,, 22. — The lino was further advanced to a depth of one
and a half miles by the capture of Tel cl Mukh-
mar and Arsuf; and the Division held this line
wth two brgades, and one 'n reserve at Sarona,
until relieved by 7tli (Indian) Division in March.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 63
53rd DIVISION.
Commander. — Major (temp. Major-Gen.) S. F. Mott, C.B., r.f., p.s.c.
Commanding, Roijal Arlillcrij. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gcn.) 11. E. A. Le Mottke, R.A. (relinquished,
Oct., 1917).
Lieut. -Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. AV. Hope, D.S.O., R.F.A. (relinqui.shed,
Nov., 1917).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. W. Walker, D.S.O., T.D., R.F.A.
(T.F.).
l5Sth Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. S. Rome. C.M.G., D.S.O., lilh llussans (relinquished,
Sept., 1917).
Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. A. Vernon, D.S.O., King's Royal Rifle Corps (relinquished,
Sept., 1918).
Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. IL Wildblood, D.S.O., 1st Leinster Regt.
5/Cth Battalion Royal Wel.sh Fusiliers (l/5th and 1/Gth Battalions amalgamated 3/8/18),
3/1 53rd Rifles "(late Infantry) 3/1 54th Indian Infantry, 4/1 1th Gurkha Rifles.
1/lst Battalion Herefordshire Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/6/18).
158th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
IS9th Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. H. du B. Travers, C.B. (reHnquished, Oct., 1917).
Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) N. E. Money, C.M.G., D.S.O., Shropshire Yeomanry.
4/5th Battalion AVelsh Regiment (l/4th and 1 /5th Battalions amalgamated 3/8/18), 3/152nd,
l/153rd and 2/153rd Punjabis (late Infantry).
l/4th and l/7th Battalions Cheshire Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/6/18).
159tli Light Trench Mortar Battery.
160th Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) V. L. N. Pearson, D.S.O., Middle.sex Regt. (relinqui.«hed,
Oct., 1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) F. H. Borthwick, D.R.O., 5th Bn. Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
l/7th Battalion Royal Welsh Fusihers, l/17th Infantry, l/21st Pmijabis, 1st Battalion
Cape Corps.
2/4th Battahon Royal West Kent Regiment (disbanded, 13/9/18), 2/lOth BattaHon Mid-
dlesex Regiment (disbanded, 20/8/18), 2/4th Battahon Queen's Roj'al West Surrey
Regiment and l/4th Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F.,
19/6/18).
160th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Troops.
53rd Divisional Cyclist Company.
265th Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and " C " Batteries).
266th Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and " C " Batteries).
267th Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and 439th Batteries).
53rd Divisional Ammunition Column.
436th and 437th (Welsh), Field Companies, R.E.
72nd Compan}', 3rd Sappers and Miners.
53rd Divisional Signal Company, R.E.
53rd Divisional Machuie Gun Battalion (Nos. 158, 159, 160 Companies).
1 /155th Pioneers.
53rd Divisional Tram (Nos. 246, 247, 248 and 249 Companies, R.A.S.C).
53rd Mobile Veterinary Section.
64
THE ADVANCE OF THE
Brief Record of Service.
The 53rcl Division was composed originally of Territoilal battalions, and landed in Egypt from
Gallipoli as a Territorial Division. It took part in the advance from the Suez Canal, the first and
second battles of Gaza, and eventually joined the XXth Corps, on its formation in Aug., 1917. Certain
BattahoQS were withdrawn and others were amalgamated or disbanded between June and Aug., 1918,
their places being taken by Indian Units and a Battalion of the Cape CorjJS.
1917.
Oct. 31
the neighbourhood of
Division concentrated
El Buggar, and,
Nov. 1. — after the fall of Beersheba, occupied the line
north of the town, from Towal Abu Jerwal to
Kh. el Muweileh.
,, 3. — Orders were received to attack the heights of
Tel Khuweilfeh, and three days and nights of
almost continuous fighting ensued. 159th
Brigade were heavily engaged, particularly l/4th
and l/5th Welsh, and l/7th Cheshires ; the
first-named carrying a rocky hill at the point
of the bayonet.
„ 4. — 160th Brigade, in an exposed position, suffered
considerably from lack of water.
,, 5. — 265th Brigade, R.F.A., were shelled incessantly
throughout the day, but held their ground.
,, 6. — 158th Brigade, with l/4th Sussex attached, stormed
the Khuweilfeh Heights in the early morning,
in conjunction with the main Corps operation,
■ and reached all objectives by dawn. A Com-
pany of 1/lst Herefords rushed nine field guns
in a ravine, complete with personnel and
teams, but had to abandon them later.
Five counter-attacks were launched during
the ensuing twenty-four hours, and twice the
enemy regained the summit for short periods,
but were driven off with heavy losses by l/7th
Royal Welsh Fusiliers, supported by accurate
artillery fire.
,, 8. — Division concentrated at Khuweilfeh.
Deo. 4. — March towards Jerusalem commenced ; Hebron
occupied on Dec. 5, and Bethlehem during the
night of Dec. 8-9.
„ 9. — The division was now in touch with 60th Division,
attacking Jerusalem from the west, and the
advance was continued at an early hour. Mar
Elias was occupied by l/5th Welsh (159th
Brigade) at 0800, and this Battalion was under
the walls of the Holy City at 0845, and in action
near the cemetery on the Jericho road at 0900.
Later in the day l/4th and l/5th Welsh cap-
tured the Mount of Olives, their advance being
assisted by 1 '4th Cheshires on the right and
troops of 60th Division on the left.
,, U. — Fighting continued, and a line from Abu Dis to
El Aziriyeh, astride the Jerusalem-Jericho
road was occupied.
., 13. — 159th Brigade captured Ras el Kharrubeh.
17._l/4th Sussex and 2/4th Royal West Kents (160th
Brigade) seized the ridge east of Abu Dis and
took 126 prisoners and two machine guns.
„ 21. — Ras ez Zamby and White Hill were captured by
2/4th Queens and 2/lOth Middlesex (160th
Brigade) after heavy fighting, and these posi-
tions were held against a strong counter-
attack.
,, 27. — The Turks made a series of de.sperate attacks on
the line covering Jerusalem, with the evident
intention of retaking the city, but all attacks
were ropuKsed with heavy losses. Dcir Ibn
Obeid, held by 2/lOth Middlesex, was subjected
to particularly fierce assaults, but, though sur-
rounded, the position was resolutely defended
for several hours and eventually relieved by
l/4th Sussex.
„ 28. — Anata was taken by 158th Brigade, and the line
further advanced by the capture of Ras Arkub
es Suffa (l/7th Royal Wel.'^h Fusiliers) and
Khamlit (l/lst Hereforde).
1917.
,, 29. — 159th Brigade captured Hizmeh and Jeba.
Feb. 13. — Early in the year 63rd Division relieved 60th
Division astride t,he Jerusalem-Nablus road
(Et Tell-Sh. Abdallah-Arnutieh-Kh. Wady es
Serah), 60th Division taking over the line east
of Jerusalem in preparation for forthcoming
operations towards Jericho.
1918.
Feb. 14 — The right of the line was advanced to Deir Diwan
and Kh. Alia to protect the left flank of the
attack by fiOlh Division.
,, 19. — 2/lOth Middlesex captured Rummon, and on the
following day,
,, 20. — the line Rummon-Garden Hill-Sh. Abdallah was
occupied.
Mch. 7.— Nejmeh was captured by l/7th Cheshures at 0500
after a rapid advance.
., 8-9. — A night advance over difficult ground resulted
in the capture of Munatir Ridge by l/4th
Cheshires ; and l/4th VV'clsh stormed Dar
Jerir and Drage's Hill in face of strong oppo-
sition. Tell Asur was captured by l/5th Royal
Welsh Fusiliers at the point of the bayonet, and
successfully held against three determined
counter-attacks ; while 1/lst Herefords carried
Chipp Hill after heavy fighting.
., 10. — 158th and 159th Brigades captured important
ridges in rapid succession and Kefr Malik was
occupied at 1400.
1 1. — 1.59th Brigade reached the south bank of the Wady
Kola by 0900.
,, 11-12. — A night advance by the Division secured the
line Nejmeh-Rock Park-Kh. Abu Fclah-
Mezrah el Sherkiyeh. In an attempt to ad-
Vance beyond this line a company of 2/lOth
Middlesex were heavily counter-attacked on
the slopes of Kh. Amurich, and this attack was
not pushed home.
J 53rd Division remained in the same sector of
i the line throughout the summer.
18. — The general attack that wa.s to smash the Turkish
Armies in Palestine commenced at 2200, when
l/17th Infantry (160th Brigade) moved north
in the direction of Square Hill, followed by the
rest of the brigade. Further to the left 159th
Brigade captured Round Hill (overlooking
Kh. Abu Felahl at 2230.
19. — t/5th Welsh (159th Brigade) captured Kew Hill
and Pt. 2401 by O045, and 160th Brigade took
Valley View at 0215. Strong enemy positions
at Sh. el Azeir, El Mugheir, Boulder Boil, and
Pt. 2362, attacked from the rear by I/7th Royal
Welsh Fusiliers, were in our hands by 0300, and
the Cape Corps seized Square Hill at 0450.
159th Brigade captured Hindhead (4/5lh Welsh),
and were heavily engaged near Kh. Abu Malul,
where 3/ 152nd Infantry, after three unsuccess-
ful assaults, stormed the defences at dusk.
20. — Kh. Jiboit and Gallows Hill wore stormed by the
Cape Corps, but a fierce counter-attack b_v over-
whelming numbers, covered by heavy shelling,
forccil them to withdraw. l/17lh Infantry re-
captured Kh. Jiboit at 1230, and took 150
prisoners.
2/l53rd Infantry (I.59th Brigade) captured
Ras et Tawil, but 15Sth Brigade were held up
Mch.
to
Sept.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 66
1918. 1918.
Sept. 20 for a time by stubbuiu oppuuition south of Si'pt. 21 liy nightfall the diviuioti had reached Beit
Kh. Birki't el Kusr. At midnight the division Dejan and Beit Furik, having dislodged the
continued (ho advance. enemy from positions of great natural strength
„ 21. — 5/Oth Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 4/1 1th Gurkhas and driven the remnant fifteen miles across
(l.'iSlh lirigado) seized Kh. Birket el Kusr and most dillioult country on to the cavalry patrola
Pt. 29(10 respectively, l.'iilth Brigade ad- of Desert .Mounted Corps.
vanood rapidly capturing Kusrah (4/5th WeUh) „ 20. — Division conoeatrated in the Siujil-Tell Aaur
and Akrabeh, at 0400 and 1000 reapootively. area.
54th (EAST ANGLIAN) DIVISION (T.).
Commander. — Major-Gen. S. W. Hare, C.B.
Commanding, Royal Arlillenj. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) D. B. Stewart, D.S.O., R.A.
161st Infantry Brigade,
Commander. — ^Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. Marriott Dodington, Oxford. & Bucks. Light Infantry,
f.s.c. (relinquished, Feb., 1918).
Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. B. II. Orpen Palmer, D.S.O., Royal Irish Fusiliers.
l/4th, l/5th, l/6th and l/7th Battalions Essex Regt.
161st Light Trench Mortar Battery.
1 62nd Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. Mudge, C.M.G., Queen's Royal West Surrey Regt.
l/5th Battalion Bedfordshire Regunent, 1/lth Battahon Northamptonshire Regiment,
1/lOth and 1/llth Bitta lions London Regiment.
162nd Light Trench Mortar Battery.
163rd Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — Lient.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) T. Ward, C.M.G., T.F. Reserve (relinqui?hed, April, 1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. J. McNeill, D.S.O., Lovat's Scouts Yeomanry.
l/4th and l/Gth Battalions Norfolk Regiment, l/5th Battalion Sufiolk Regiment, l/Sth
Battalion Hampshire Regiment.
163rd Light Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Troops.
270th Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and " C " Batteries).
271st Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and 440th Batteries).
272nd Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and " C " Batteries).
54th Divisional Ammimition Column.
484th and 486th (East Anglian), and 495th (Kent), Field Companies, R.E.
54th Divisional Signal Company, R.E.
54th Di\'isional Machine Gun Battalion (Nos. 161, 162, 163 Companies).
54th Divisional Tram (Nos. 921, 922, 923 and 924 Companies, R.A.S.C).
1/lst East Anglian Mobile Veterinary Section.
Brief Record of Service.
54th Division, composed entirely of Territorial Battalions, fought through the GaHipoh campaign ;
landed in Egypt in December, 1915 ; and marched across the desert from the Suez Canal.
It took part in the first and second battles of Gaza in March and April, 1917 ; held the left of the
line in front of Gaza in Jime and July ; and eventually was included in XXIst Corps on its formation
in August.
Throughout the Palestine campaign 54th Division fought unchanged in its order of battle.
66
THE ADVANCE OF THE
1917.
July 14-15.
„ 20-21.—
„ 27-28,
Nov. 2.
19.—'
27.—'
*f
28.
..
30.
Dec.
2
"
11.
»•
15
Dec.
22.-
The Turkish redoubt known as Beach Post was
successfully raided by one company l/8th
Hampshires (ItiSrd Brigade), with one company
2/5th Hampshires (232nd Brigade), attached.
l/5th Bedfords {162Dd Brigade) successfully
' raided Umbrella Hill, an important redoubt
south of Gaza, and
— followed this up by a second raid.
— The Division attacked Gaza with the 156th
Brigade of the 52nd Division attached. In
the enemj' frontline system the 156th Brigade
captured Umbrella Hill ; l/5th Suffolks and
l/8th Hampshires, assisted by l/4th and
l/5th Norfolks, stormed El Arish Redoubt ;
l/6th and l/5th Essex captured Beach and
Sea Posts and Eafa Redoubt at the point of
the bayonet. Zowaiid and Cricket Redoubts
also fell to the Essex (161st) Brigade ; whilst
the l/5th Bedfords and 1/1 1th Londons pushed
on and seized Sheikh Hassan and Gun Hill
respectively, strong points in the Turks' second
line of defence. All positions wereeon.solidated
and held in spite of determined counter-attacks.
— The 162nd Brigade occupied Belah Trench-Turtle
Hill. Patrols through Gaza found it evacuated
and a defensive line from Sh. Redwan to the
sea was occupied and linked up with the line
held by 75th Division on the right.
The Division reached Ludd and proceeded to
take over a portion of the new line covering
Jaffa.
The Turks heavily attacked on the line Beit
Nabala-Deir Tureif-Wilhelma, but were re-
pulsed by the 162nd Brigade, particularly stout
defence being put up by the l/4th Northamp-
tons (162nd Brigade) at Wilhelma.
— l/5th Essex raided the Turkish trenches on the
south bank of the Auja.
— l/5th Bedfords repulsed a Turkish attack on
Zeifizfiyeh Hill.
— I/6th Essex repeated the raid on Turkish trenches.
— l/4th Norfolks (163rd Brigade) and " C " Battery
272nd Field Artillery Brigade repulsed a second
determined Turkish attack on Zeifizfiyeh Hill.
— The 163rd Brigade captured Kb. cl Bornat and
Et Tireh on the fringe of the Judasan Hills.
—The 161st and 162nd Brigades advanced the line
to the River Auja, north of Mulebbis, the
1917.
Deo, 22
1918.
1/llth Londons storming Bald Hill, which was
strongly held, in the course of this engagement.
March 12. — The 162nd and 163rd Brigades advanced the line
further to a depth of four miles, capturing
Mezeirah (l/5th Bedfords and 1/llth London.s)
Kh. Dikerin (l/4th Northamptons), Mejdel
Yaba (1/lOth Londons), and Ras el Ain (l/4th
Norfolks).
Sept. 18. — 1 61st Brigade at Mejdel Yaba ; 162nd Brigade at
Mezeirah-Kuleh ; and 163rd Brigade, Kuleh-
Rantieh.
19. — 0420. — Division advanced on a front of 3,000
yards, and by 0700 had captured
Crown Hill (l/8th Hampshires), Kefr
Kasim and Jevis Tepe (l/4th and
l/5th Esse.x), strong resistance being
experienced bj' the 101st Brigade at
Kasim Wood.
1105. — Oghlu Tepe was stormed by the 1/1 0th
Londons and l/4th Northamptons.
During this action the 1/lOth Londons
rushed and captured two 5'9-inch
howitzers on high ground overlooking
the Wadi Kanah.
1115. — Sivri Tepe was captured by l/5th Essex,
after stubborn resistance.
1515. — Kh. Sirisia was taken by I /4th Norfolks,
supported by l/5th Norfolks.
The Division had to advance over
broken and difficult country, but all
objectives were taken by nightfall,
with 600 prisoners and eleven guns.
A feature of the day's fighting was the
use made of captured enemy machine
guns. l/8th Hampshires, in particular,
used caj)tured guns with satisfactory
results.
,, 20. — The 163rd Brigade occupied north and south line
through Bidieh by 0300.
„ 24. — The Division concentrated in the Hableh area ;
,, 28. — started the march to Haifa, and on
Oct. 4. — concentrated at Haifa.
,, 23. — The advance northward to Beirut was continued
and on
„ 31. — the Division marched through Beirut at the hour
that hostilities with Turkey ceased.
60th DIVISION.
Commander. — ^Major-Gen. E. S. Bulfin, C.B., C.V.O. (relinquished, Aug., 1917).
Major-Gen. Sir J. S. M. Shea, K.C.M.G., C.B., D.S.O., LA., -p.s.c.
Commanditig, Royal Artillery.— Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. A. D. Simpson-Baikie, C.B., R.A. (re-
linquished, Aug., 1917).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. M. Drake, E.F.A. (relinquished, Oct.,
1917).
Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. A. Robinson, C.B., C.M.G., R.A.
179th Infanlry Brigade.
Commander. — Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) Fitz J. M. Edwards, C.M.G., D.S.O., LA., A.D.C. (relinquished,
Feb., 1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. T. Humphreys, D.S.O., Lanca.shirc Fusiliers, p.s.c.
2/13th Battalion London Regiment, 2/19th Punjabis, 2/127th Baluch Light Lifantry.
3/l.'jlst Punj.'ilji Rifles (late Infantry),
2/Hth, 2/15th, 2/1 Gth Battalions London Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/G/18.)
179th Light Trench JVlortar Battery,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 67
180th Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — ^Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) F. M. Carleton, D.S.O. (R. of 0.), j).s.c. (relinquished Aua
1917).
Bt. Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) J. H[ll, D.S.O. , I.A., A.D.C. (relinquished, Sept., 1917).
Bt. Lieut.-Cnl. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. F. Watson, C.M.G., D.S.O., Queen's Koyal West
Surrey Regt.
2/19th Battahon London Regiment, l/50th Kumaon Rifles.
2/17th and 2/20th Battalions London Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 19/G/18
and 2/7/18, respectively), 2/lsth J3attaIion London Regiment (disbanded, 10/7/18).
180th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
I8lst Infantry Brigade.
Commander. ^Rt. Lieut. -Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. C. da Costa, C.M.G., D.S.O., East Lancashire Regt.
2/22nd Battahon London Regiment, l/30th Baluchis, 2/97th Deccan Infantry, 2/152nd
Punjabis (late Infantry).
2/21st Battahon London Regiment (disbanded, 11/6/18), 2/23rd and 2/24th Battahons
London Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 2/7/18).
181st Light Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Troops.
301st Brigade, R.F.A. ("A," "B" and "C" Batterie.s).
302nd Brigade, R.F.A. ("A," "B " and 41.3th Batteries).
303rd Brigade, R.F.A. (" A," " B " and " C " Batteries).
GOth Divisional Ammunition Column.
No. 1 Company, 1st (King George's Own) Sappers and Miners.
519th and 521st (London) Field Companies, R.E.
GOth Divisional Signal Company, R.E.
GOth Divisional Machme Gun Battalion (Nos. 179, 180, 181 Companies).
GOth Divisional Train (Nos. 517, 518, 519 and 520 Companies, R.A.S.C).
2/2nd London Mobile Veterinary Section.
Brief Record of Service.
GOth (London) Division, composed entirely of Loudon Territorial Battalions, served in France
from Jime to December, 1916, was transferred to Salonika, and eventually landed in Egypt in June,
1917. It reached the front in July, and joined XXth Corps in August.
The Division was reorganized in July, 1918, when seven Battalions were withdrawn for service in
France and two were disbanded. The vacancies were filled by Indian imits, and the Territorial title
was dropped.
1917. 1917.
Oct. 30. — Concentrated about the Wadi Mirtaba, six miles Deo. 5. — 23l3t Brigade (74th Division) took over the Xebi
south-west of Beersheba. Samwil-Beit Izza sector, and 60th Divison
„ 31. — 179th and 181st Brigades attacked the Beersheba concentrated about Kustul for the attack on
defences from south-west, on right of 74th .Jerusalem.
Division. 2/14th and 2/15th London broke ,, 8. — 179th Brigade, with mountain batteries, crossed
through by 1230, and twenty minutes later all the Wadi Surar during the night and seized the
objectives were taken. . 2/1 3th London were high ground south of Ain K.arim at 0330. The
shelled and machine-gunned from direction of right of the line thus secured, the main attack
Beersheba, so the battalion advanced about a began at dawn (051.5) in heavj- rain, and bv 0700
mile and captured two 77mm. guns. the defences on the formidable ridge overhanging
Nov. 6. — Attacked Kauwukah and Rushdi systems at the Wadi Surar were captured. Strong resis-
1230, with 74th on right and 10th on left. tance was experienced at the " Heart and
179th and 180th Brigades broke through, after Liver" redoubts, and the works at Deir Yesin;
two hours sharp fighting, and occupied Sheria and the left of the attack was held up until 15o0
Station. when a bayonet charge dislodged the enemy.
„ 7. — Tel Esh Sheria still held out but the enemy was The steep slopes to Lifta were swept by hostile
dislodged after a sharp tight. machine-gun tire but 180th Brigade pushed on
,, 18. — Division concentrated at Gaza, and marched and occupied the village at dusk.
northward on the following day. „ 9. — The Turks evacuated Jerusalem during the night,
„ 24 ) Relieved 232nd Brigade (75th Division) and 52nd and the city surrendered to General Shea at
to > Division, in the J\idiean Hills, on the line 0830.
,, 27 ] Soba-Kustul-Nebi Samwil-Bcit Izza. Enemy rearguards were engaged and positions
Dec. 1. — Three determined hostile attacks on Xebi Samwil were occupied at Tel el Ful and Shafat, four
were beaten off, with a loss to the enemy of miles north of Jerusalem on the Nablus road.
500 killed, ,, 11. — Division occupied the line Tel el Ful-Beit Ha.nnina.
68
1917.
Dec. 23.
27
THE ADVANCE OF THE
2a
29.
1918.
Feb. 13,
„ 14.
., 19.
20.
21
„ 22
Mar. 9
.. 14
» 22
.. 23
,. 24
— 2/24th l/ondon advanced 800 yards on the left,
and 2/18th London stormed Ki. Adaseh, but
the main attack was postponed and this advanced
position was abandoned.
, — The Turks attacked along the whole line covering
• Jerusalem at 0130, and bitter fighting continued
throughout the day. A particularly violent
attack at dawn enabled them to gam a footing
in a portion of our line, but 2/15th London
counter-attacked and, in spite of heavy shelling,
recaptured the lost ground. Thirteen costly
attacks had been delivered by dusk with the net
gain to the enemy of the advanced posts on
Kh. Ras et Tawil and the quarry north of Tel
el Ful, abandoned in the early morning to over-
whelming numbers.
. — 181st Brigade occupied El Jib and Bir Nebala,
and 18Uth Brigade took Kh. Adaseh at 1725.
2/20th London captured Er Ram, and the line
Er Ram-Rafat was occupied at 1915.
, — Tel en Nasbeh and the hill north of Kefr Akab
were taken by 2/19th and 2/20th London,
respectively, and these battalions stormed Shab
Salah at 1520. On the right 2/17th and 2/18th
seized the ridge immediately north-west of
Burkah, and on the left the Tahuneh ridge was
carried by 2/22nd and 2/23rd. Beitin and
Balua were taken during the night by 180th
and 181st Brigades respectively, and the line
carried on to near Kh. el Bnrj where junction
was effected with 74th Division.
— The Division held the line Deir Ibn Obeid-Ras es
Sulfa-Hizmeh, taken over from 53rd Division.
— 181st Brigade occupied Mukhmas and Tel es Suwan.
— 179th Brigade captured El Muntar ; 180th Brigade
stormed Arak Ibrahim after severe fighting ;
and 181st Brigade seized Splash Hill and Ras
et Tawil.
— Jebel Ekteif and Talaat ed Dumm were captured
by lyyth and 180th Brigades, respectively,
while 181st Brigade advanced four miles along
the north of the Wadi Farah. Neby Musa was
occupied by 2/14th London, in co-operation
with .New Zealand Mounted Brigade.
— The Division occupied the lino Rujm esh Sheraa-
liyeh-Kh. Kakun-.Jebel Kuruntul, and, the
object of ihe advance achieved,
— withdrew to the line Jebel Ekteif-Talaat ed Dumm
-Ras et Tawil, with 144 prisoners and six machine
guns.
— 181st Brigade advanced rapidly over rough country
and El Wadbeh and Kh. el Beiyudat were occu-
pied by 2/24th and 2/22nd London, respec-
tively. With 2/2l3t astride Wadi Aujah at
0930, 2/24th, supported by Light Armoured
Car Batteries, captured Abu Tellul at 1630.
— -The advance was continued and El Musallabeb
captured in spite of opposition.
— The first crossing of the Jordan, swollen and
unfordable, was effected by swimmers of 2/iyth
London at Hajlah at 0100, and as the result
of their efforts 2/19th and 2/18th Battalions
were able to cross on rafts and a light pontoon
bridge by 1200.
— Swimmers reached tlio eastern bank at Ghoraniyeh
at 1320 ; rafting and bridge construction com-
menced, and
— The whole force detailed for the Amman raid
had crossed the river by 050(1.
1918.
Mar. 24 179th Brigade captured EI Hand, and ISlet
Brigade took Shunet Nimrin. 2/22nd London
captured three guns in their attack on Tel el
Musta.
,, 25. — -The advance was delayed by weather conditions
but 179th Brigade occupied Es Salt at 2000
„ 28. — The first attack on Amman commenced at 1300.
2/23rd and 2/21st Battalions were held up
1,000 yards north-west of Amman by intense
machine-gun and rifle fire, and 2/17th and 2/18th
were ordered up from Es Sir in support.
„ 30. — After thirty-six hours almost continuous fighting
a night attack was launched at 0200. 2/22nd
London captured 135 prisoners and four
machine guns, but were held up 500 yards from
their objective (the " Citadel ") at 0845. 2/18th
on their right were also held up by a heavy
frontal fire. 2/21st on the extreme left, though
repeatedly counter-attacked, invariably held the
advantage in the hand-to-hand fighting that
ensued. 2/18th London again tried to storm
the " Citadel " at 1500, but were checked by
heavy fire from right flank, and shortly after
orders were received to withdraw.
Meanwhile the Battalions left to hold Es Salt
defeated an enemy attack from the direction
of Kefr Huda.
The Division started to withdraw during the
night, and
April 3. — the rear units re-crossed the Jordan.
„ 30. — The troops detailed for the Es Salt raid crossed to
east of Jordan. 180th Brigade attacked Shunet
Nimrin and captured some advanced positions,
but the enemy were strongly posted and no
further progress was possible. HOth Brigade
attacked El Hand but met with no better
success.
May 3-4. — The force withdrew west of Jordan after heavy
fighting, covered by 181st Brigade, who formed
an extended bridgehead.
Sept. 17. — 180th Brigade relieved 28th Brigade 7th (Indian
Division) in the coastal sector, and the Division
concentrated north and north-east of Arsuf.
„ 19.— 180th Brigade attacked on a front of 1,.500 yards
at 0440, with 1/OOth Kumaon Rifles (supported
by 2/97th Infantry of 181st Brigade) on the
right and 2nd Guides Infantry on the left
The objective of this attack was the strong
trench system on the extreme right of the
Turkish line, consisting of three lines of pre-
pared positions. These were all carried by
0540, and by 0650 2/1 9th London had forced
the Nahr el Falik and established a bridge-
head to cover the advance of the cavalry.
181st Brigade pushed forward and 2/22nd
London, 130th Baluchis and 2/152ud Punjabis
reached a north and south line through Umm
Sur at 1400. This Brigade advanced sixteen
and a half miles in twelve and a half hours,
and 2/22nd London and 2/1 52nd Punjabis
captured Tulkeram and Irtah, respectively,
with 835 prisoners. The Punjabis captured
seven 77mm. guns in this last engagement,
knocking out the teams with Lewis gun-fire.
„ 20.— The Division advanced at 0500 and 3/1 51st Punjabi
Rifles (179th Brigade) captured Anebta and the
Bir Asur tunnel.
„ 21. — The line .Jebel Bir Asur-Belah-Shuweikeh was
occupied,
„ 25. — and the Division concentrated at Rantieh in Army
Reserve, loss 181st Brigade, which remained
at Kakon for escort duly.
74th (YEOMANRY) DIVISION.
(Ceased to belong to E.E.F. 7/5/18.)
Commander. — Bt. Col. (temp. Major-Gen.) E. S. Girdwood, C.B., Scotti.sh Rifles.
Coynmanding, Royal Artillery. — ^Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) L. J. Hext, C.M.G., R.A.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 69
229th Infantry Brigade.
Commander.— Co\. (tomp. Brig.-Gen.) Tl. Hoark, D.S.O., late 4th Hussars.
inth (Royal 1st Devon and Royal North Devon Yeomanry) Battalion Devonshire Regiment.
12th (West Somerset Yeomanry) Battalion Somerset Light Infantry.
14th (Fife and Forfar Yeomanry) Battalion Black Watch.
12th (Ayr and Lanark Yeomanry) Battalion Royal Scots Fusiliers.
4th Machine Gun Company.
229th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
230th Infantry Brigade.
Commander.— Lient.-Co]. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. J. McNeill, D.S.O., Lovat'e Scouts Yeomanry (re-
linquished, Dec, i917).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. B. H. Orpen-Palmer, D.S.O., Royal Irish Fusiliers
(relinquiished, Feb., 1918).
Major (tenip. Brig.-Gen.) W. J. Bowker, C.M.G., D.S.O., Somerset Light Infantry.
10th (Royal East Kent and West Kent Yeomanry) Battalion East Kent Regiment.
16th (Sussex Yeomanry) Battalion Royal Sussex Regiment.
1.5th (Suffolk Yeomanry) Battalion Suffolk Regiment.
12th (NorfoUc Yeomanry) Battahon Norfolk Regiment.
209th Machine Gun Company.
230th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
231st Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — ^Major (temp. Brig.-Gen.) W. J. Bowker, C.M.G., D.S.O., Somerset Light Infantry (re-
linquished, Sept., 1917).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. E. Heathcote, C.M.G., D.S.O., Yorkshire Light
Infantry.
10th (Shropshire and Cheshire Yeomanry) Battalion King's Shropshire Light Infantry.
24th (Denbighshire Yeomanry) Battalion Royal Welsh Fusiliers.
25th (Montgomeryshire and Welsh Horse Yeomanry) Battalion Royal Welsh Fusihers.
24th (Pembroke and Glamorgan Yeomanry) Battahon Welsh Regiment.
210th Machine Gim Company.
231st Light Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Troops.
117th Brigade, R.F.A. ("A," "B," 366th and "D" Batteries).
44th Brigade, R.F.A. (340th, 382nd, 425th and " D " Batteries).
74th Divisional Ammunition Column.
X 74 and Y 74 (Medium), Trench Mortar Batteries, R.A.
No. 5 (Royal Monmouth), No. 5 (Royal Anglesey), 439th (Cheshire) Field Companies, R.E.
74th Divisional Signal Company, R.E.
Pioneer Battahon l/12th Loyal North Lancashire Regiment.
261st Machine -Gun Company.
74th Divisional Employment Company.
74th Divisional Train (Nos. 447, 448, 449 and 450 Companies, R.A.S.C).
59th Mobile Veterinary Section.
Brief Record of Service.
74th (Yeomanry) Division was formed in .January, 1917, of eighteen disraoimted Yeomanry regiments,
including twelve that had served in Gallipoli. The newly-formed Infantry battalions were brought up
to strength with drafts, and reached the front in time for the second battle of Gaza in April.
As an Infantry Division it joined XXtli Corps on its formation in August, and, during August and
September, Brigades were employed alternately in holding portions of the line and constructing new
defences in the left sector.
70
THE ADVANCE OF THE
After taking part in the attack on Beersheba,
fialitin" dui-ing the winter months, the Division emb
to the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
the capture of Jerusalem, and the subsequent hill-
arked for France in May, 1918, and ceased to belong
1917.
Oct. 30. — Concentrated south-west of the Wadi Saba.
„ 31. — 291st and 230th Brigades attacked Beersheba at
0830 on the left of 60th Division, 10th East
Kents (Buffs) and 12th Norfolks leading the
attack. Their objectives were the main
Turkish trench-line immediately south of the
Wadi Saba. Stubborn resistance was met with
but all objectives were taken by 1330. Later
in the day 230th Brigade crossed the Wadi
Saba and rolled up all hostile defences as far
north as the Beersheba-Tel el Fara road, while
a brigade of 53rd Division threatened them from
the west.
Nov. 6. — 230th and 229th Brigades attacked the system of
trenches and redoubts covering Sheria at dawn,
with yeomanry on the right and 60th Division
on the left. Stubborn resistance was encoun-
tered, but all positions east of the railway were
stormed by 1515, and the Division moved to the
high ground north of Sheria. Several guns and
machine guns were captured and a way cleared
for the advance of the cavalry.
„ 17. — Division marched to north of Deir el Belah, and
„ 23. — vid Gaza towards Mejdel and Latron.
„ 28. — A composite Artillery Brigade was sent forward
from Latron in support of the Yeomanry
Mounted Division, who were heavily attacked on
the Beit Ur el Foka-Beit Ur ct Tahta-Suffa line.
„ 29.— 231st Brigade relieved 8th and 6th Mounted
Brigades,
,, 30. — and, throughout the day, was heavily engaged
repulsing strong Turkish attacks between Et
Tireh and Beit Ur el Foka.
Dec. 3. — 16th Devons (229th Brigade) recaptured Beit Ur
el Foka, which had been abandoned to the
enemy on Nov. 28. Seventeen prisoners and
three machine guns were taken in this engage-
ment and several very determined counter-
attacks were repulsed with heavy losses to the
Turks who left fifty dead in the village alone.
The village was again abandoned in the after-
noon as it was dominated by high ground and
was continually swept by hostile machine-gun
fire.
„ 5. — The Division took over the Neby Samwil-Beit
Izza Sector from 60th Division, and
„ 7. — extended the line southward to Sh. Abd el Aziz,
one mile south-east of Beit Surik.
„ 8. — A general attack along the XXth Corps front was
launched just before dawn. 230th Brigade
captured Beit Iksa by 1100, but further advance
to the Kb. el Burj Ridge was held up by hea%'y
shelling and enfilade machine-gun fu'e from the
right Sank.
191'
Dec.
19
Mar.
9. — 229th Brigade completed the capture of the Neby
Samwil Ridge before dawn, and the right of
the line, swinging north towards Beit Hannina
linked up with GOth Division astride the Jerusa-
lem-Nablus road. Enemy resistance weakened
considerably and the line was advanced to four
miles north of Jerusalem.
11. — The Division moved to the left to conform with
Corps redistribution, and took over the Neby
Samwil-Beit Izza-Beit Dukka line.
26.— 24th Welsh Regiment (231st Brigade) stormed
Hill 1910, one mile north of Beit Dukka, and
beat off a heavy counter-attack.
27.— 24th Royal Welsh FusUiers (231st Brigade) cap-
tured Kb. Ed Dreihemeh at 1015, and beat off a
counter-attack after withdrawing slightly. 229th
Brigade was heavily engaged on the Zeitun
Ridge, where the last objective was rushed after
dark.
28.— 24th Royal Welsh Fusiliers and 24th Welsh Regi-
ment took Hill 2,450 and Kh. El Jufeir respec-
tively, and 229th Brigade captured Beitunia at
1550 against strong resistance.
29. — The enemy made determined efforts to hold
Ram Allah, but it was taken, after a stiff fight,
by 230th, supported by 229th Brigade.
30. — A night attack by 230th Brigade resulted in the
capture of the Kh. Et Tireh-Kh. El Burj line.
The captured positions were consolidated, the
Division having advanced over five miles in
three days, through rugged and difficult country,
and against continual and stubborn opposition.
18.
S. — The Division advanced astride the Jerusalem-
Nablus road, with 53rd and 10th Divisions on
right and left respectively. Ain Sinia was
captured by 230th Brigade after a stiff fight.
9. — 231st Brigade rushed hostile defences at Selwad by
0525, Ijut two assaults on Yebrud by 230th
Brigade were unsuccessful.
10. — The precipitous ridge of Burj el Lisaneh was
stormed at 0300 and successfully defended
against three counter-attacks, while 230th
Brigade reversed the verdict of the previous
day by capturing Yebrud and Burj Bardawile
after heavy fighting. This Brigade again
advanced to a depth of nearly two miles against
considerable resistance.
11.— 231st Brigade captured Sh. Selim, while 230th
Brigade occupied the ridge overlooking Sinjil.
This was the (inal operation of the 74th
(Yeomanry) Division in Palestine, and after a
few weeks .spent in holding the captured line
the Division was withdrawn for service in France.
75th DIVISION.
CowmajK^er.— Major-Gen. P. C. Palin, C.B., C.M.G., I.A.
Commanding, Royal Artillery. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. A. Boyce, D.S.O., R.A.
232nd Infantry Brigade.
Commander. — Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. J. Huddleston, C.M.G. D.S.O., M.C., Dorset Regiment.
l/4th Battalion Wiltshire Regiment, 72nd Punjabis, 2/3rd Gurkha Rifles, 3rd Kashmir
I.S. Infantry.
2/5th Battalion Hampshire Regiment (di.sbandcd, 17/8/18), 2/4th Battalion Somerset Light
Infantry, and l/5th Battahon Devonshire Regiment (ceased to belong to E.E.F.,
28/.5/18).
232nd Light Trench Mortar Battery.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
71
233rd Infantry Brigade.
Comimnder.—Bt Licut.-(3ol. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) Hon. E. M. Colston, C.M.G., D.S.O., M.V.O., Grenadier
Guards.
l/5th Battalion Somerset Lij^lit Infantry, 29th Punjabis, 2/154th Indian Infantry,
:3/3rd Giu-kha Rides.
2/4th Battalion Dorset Regiment (disbanded 17/8/18), 2/4th Battalion Hampshire Regi-
ment (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 28/5/18).
233rd Light Trench Mortar Battery.
234th Infantry Brigade.
Comtmnder.^Col (temp. Brig.-Gen.) F. J. Anley, C.B., C.M.G. (relinquished, Nov., 1917).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. A. 11. Maclean, D.S.O., Argyll & Sutherland High-
landers (relimiuished, Oct., 1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. P. H. Keii,y, C.M.G., D.S.O., 125th Napier's Rifles, I.A.
l/4th Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 58th Vaughan's Rifles (F.F.), 123rd Outram's
Rifles, l/152nd Punjabis (late Infantry).
2/4th Battalion Devonshire Regiment (disbanded, 17/8/18).
234th Light Trench Mortar Battery.
Divisional Troops.
37th Brigade, R.F.A. (389th, 390th and 405th Batteries.)
172nd Brigade, R.F.A. (391st, 392nd and 406th Batteries).
Lst South African Field Artillery Brigade, (" A," " B " and " C " Batteries).
75th Divisional Ammunition Column.
496th (Kent) Field Company, R.E.
Nos. 10 and 16 Companies, 2nd (Queen Victoria's Own) Sappers and Miners.
75th Divisional Signal Company, R.E.
75th Divisional Machine Gun Battahon (Nos. 229, 230, 231 Companies).
2/32nd Sikh Pioneers.
75th Divisional Train (Nos. 925, 926, 927 and 928 Companies, R.A.S.C).
60th Mobile Veterinarv Section.
Brief Record of Service.
The 75th Division, made up of imits (Territorial and
included in XXIst Corps on its formation, and on
Indian) recently arrived from India, was
1917.
Oct. 31. — was comentrated in the Mansura area.
Nov. 6-7. — During the night the 233rd Brigade captured Out-
post and Jliddlesex Hills in the trench system
south of Gaza, and on the morning of Nov. 7
captured Green Hill, and occupied Australia
and Fryer's Hills. The 232nd Brigade had
captured The Labyrinth and Ali Muntar, and
occupied The Quariyand Delilah's Neck by 1330.
,, 8. — Tank and Atawineh Redoubt.s were occupied by
234th Brigade and Composite Force.
„ 9. — The advance northward was commenced with
232nd Brigade leading, and this
„ 10. — Brigade occupied Suafir el Gharbiyeh by 1900.
12.— 2/5th Hampshires and 2/3rd Gurkhas {of 232nd
Brigade) co-operated with 52ud Division in
attack on, and capture of, Burkah and Brown Hill.
,, 13. — The 233rd Brigade captured El Me.smiye and, with
232nd Brigade advancing tlirough Yasur, pushed
back Turkish rearguards covering Junction
Station, taking 292 prisoners and seven machine
guns.
,. 14.— 123rd Rifles, supported by 58th Rifles (234th
Brigad';). captured Junction Station.
„ 19. — 232nd Brigade captured Amwas and Latron by
noon, and, with 58th Rifles attached, pushed
on thi'ough difficult hill country in face of con-
siderable opposition to within one mile of Saris.
„ 20. — While 2/ 3rd Gurkhas and l/oth Devons advanced
eastward along the steep hills north of the road,
1917.
Nov. 20
21.-
the 2/5th Hampshires and 58th Rifles enveloped
Saris, which was stormed by the 2/4th Somer-
sets at 1415. Subsequently, 3/3rd Gurkhas
overcame fresh resistance from the enemy : and
at 1700 the 2/3rd Gurkhas of 232nd Brigade,
with l/5th Somerset Light Infantry and l/4th
Wiltshires (233rd Brigade), assaulted and carried
the final defences of Kuryet el Enab.
232nd Brigade captured Kustul (1130), and 234th
Brigade, after occupying Soba, El Kubeibe, and
Biddu, sent forward 1 '4th D C.L.I, and 123rd
Rifles to attack Neby Samwil. The 2/4th
Hampshires and 3/3rd Gurkhas (233rd Brigade)
co-operated in the last-named engagement, and.
this strong position was stormed late in the day.
— N'by Samwil heavily counter-attacked. Severe
righting around El Jib by l/5th Somersets and
l/4th Wiltshires of 233r"d Brigade, with l/5th
Devons and 2/3rd Gurkhas of 232nd Brigade
attached.
Attack on El Jib by the same units, in face of
heavy shell and machine-gun fire.
23-25.— 233rd and 234th Brigades relieved by 52nd Divi-
sion, and 232nd Brigade by 179th Brigade of
60th Division. Intermittent fighting continued
during this relief.
Attack en Sh. el Gharbawy repulsed by 2/4th
Hampshires supported by one company 3/3id
Gurkhas (attached 54th Division).
23.
30;
72 THE ADVANCE OF THE
1917. 1918.
Deo. II. — -Occupied line Midieh-Zebdah-Kh. Hamid-Budrus- April 10. — Severe fighting around Berukin, Arara, and Rafat,
Sh. Obeid Rahil (232nd Brigade). in which units of 232nd and 233rd Brigades
,, 15. — Captured Kibbieh {2/3rd Gurlihas) ; Dathrah were heavily engaged against German and
(2/5th Hampshires) ; Kh. Ibanueh (.iSth Rifles). Turliish troops.
Kh. el Bornat occupied by 2/4th Somersets. _^ U.— 123rd Rifles of 234th Brigade were involved in
„ 22.— Kh.'el Beida and Kh. el Bireh occupied by 232nd severe fighting on Tlu-ee Bushes Hill.
Brigade, with 58th Rifles attached. __ ,^ ^ , , ,,,i,,^i, r>r. ij
,q.(, ^ ,, 27. — .Attempted raid on l/4th D. C.L.I, at Rafatrepulsed.
It o <>/>> J /> 1 u i.in.1 A x> ■ A \ , J T> • »u Determined night attacks on 2/4lh Dorsets (Tin
Mar 8. — 2/3rd Gurkha.s (232nd Brigade) captured Deir Abu ^
Meshal, Abud and Abud Ridge. »• 3U) Hat HiU)and 58th Rifles (Rafatj, and an attemp-
,,11-12.— 2/kh Somersets (232nd Brigade) occupied Rentis. *Iay 1 ) ted raid on 2/5lh Hampshires (Toogood Hill)
12.— Fighting in Wadi Ballut ; 232nd Brigade occupied were beaten off.
Rijal Sufah, and captured Mughair Ahmeh (2,'4th .July 13. — Attack by German assault troops on 3/3rd Gurkhas
Somersets) ; Benat Burry (2/3rd Gurkhas) ; Deir at. Rafat, after an intense bombardment, was
Kulah (2/5th Hamp.shires) ; Kh. el Emir (l/5th broken up and heavy casualtie.s inflicted on the
Devons) : 2/3rd Gurkhas captured sixty enemy enemy.
who had fortiticd a cave and weie holding up , qi ) After having been continuously in the line since
the attack with machine guns. 234th Brigade °' ( April, the division was relieved by the French
(cooperating with 54th Division on their left), „ t I'i ( Palestine Detachment and 10th Division, and
occupied the Kh. Bara'aish-Kefr Insha ndge, ' P " ' ' ' moved to Beit Nabala and thence to Mulebbis.
crossed the Wadi Ballut and seized the Ballut „ 19. — 0700. — l/4th Wiltshires of 232nd Brigade captured
ridge, the 1/tth D.C.L.I. capturing Ballut vil- Miskeh.
lage at 1430. 0800.— 58th and 123rd Rifles (234th Brigade) cap-
April 9. — El Kefr, Sh. Nafukh-Toogood Hill, Berukin, and tured enemy defensive system west of
Tin Hat Hill were stormed by 2/3rd Gurkhas, Kt Tireh.
2/5th Ham])shires, l/5th Devons, and 2/4th 1100.— 232nd Brigade, assisted by I /1 52nd Pun-
Somersets respectively, in face of considerable jabis of 234th Brigade, cairied Et Tireh
opposition. The l/5th Somersets, and 2/4th after stubborn resistance.
Dorsets suhsequently reinforced by 123rd "A" Squadron, XXIst Corps Cavalry, and No. 2
Rifles, carried Ratat village and Three Bushes L.A.C. Battery, under orders of G.O.C., 75th
Hill respectively, while l/4th D.C.L.I. cap- Division, pressed on and attacked Turkish col-
tured Rafat Ridge. Later in the day, 2/4th umns retreating on Tul Keram.
Dorsets and 123rd Rifles were heavily counter- At midnight the division came into Corps Reserve,
attacked on Three Bushes HiU. concentrated about Et Tireh and Miskeh.
BRIGADES (Non-Divisional).
IMPEEIAL CAMEL CORPS BRIGADE.
Commander. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. L. Smith, V.C, M.C, D.C.L.I. (relinquished, June,
1918).
Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) C. S. Rome, D.S.O., 11th Hussars.
1st (Auzac) Battalion. Four Austrahan Companies.
2nd Battalion. Four British Companies.
3rd (Anzac) Battalion. Four Australian Companies.
4th (Anzac) Battalion). Two Australian and two New Zealand Companies.
Two Detached Companies (British).
No. 26 Macliine Gun Squadron (late Scottish Horse).
Hong Kong and Singapore Mountain Battery, R.G.A.
Brigade Ammunition Column.
Field Troop, R.E.
Signal Section, R.E.
Detachment, R.A.S.C.
Aastralian Camel Field Ambulance.
Brief Record of Service.
The Imperial Camel Corp.s Brigade, constituted as above, took part in the attack on Beersheba ;
the subsequent advance into Philistia ; the Amman Raid ; and co-operated in the Es Salt Raid. It
w.as reorganized as a cavalry force at the end of June, 1918, Headquarters and six companies (later
reduced to four), being retained, and joined the Australian Mounted Division as the 5th Australian
Light Horse Brigade on Aug. 22, 1918.
1917. 1917.
Oct. 31. — Engaged near the Wadi Saba, west of Beersheba. Nov. 12. — Occupied Yebnah in conjunction with Yeomanry
Not. 1. — In action at Towal Abu Jerwal in co-operation
Mounted Division.
"™"ru'Ti!„"A..llVr J" '.i"ivT "''V''i "iVi '"*"']' •• '5. — Cooperated with Yeomanry Division in the
with the Austranan and Now Zealand Mounted .' , . . / ,, ., ^ , ,_
Division attack on, and cai]ture of, the Abu Shusheh
Ridge.
-Engaged in repulsing a determined counter-attack „ 27 i
near Tol Khuwoilfeh. to [ Engaged in operations around Jaffa.
Deo. 6 I
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. 73
1918. 191H.
Moh. 27. — The brigade, having crossed the Jordan at Hajlah, Ajiril 9 i The enemy launched a series of strong attacks
moved directly on Amman, over difficult coun- to • (led by a Ccrman storm battalion), after a
try rendered almost impassable by bad weather. „ 11 I heavy artillery bombardment, against the posts
„ 28.— The enemy, holding Amman in strength, checked '" "'« Musallabeh salient, held by Ist (Anzac)
the advance, but demolition parties were able Battali(,n, but they were repulsed after hard
to destroy a section of the line near Libben. figl'li"!?. with considerable los.ses to the enemy.
„„ ,. ., , ,, .,..,. 1. 1 May 1 I Cooperated in the Ks Salt Raid by carrying out
„ 29. — Heavily engaged on the right of the attack on / i , ' , ,. ., • u i r.i i i
" .1 to / demonstrations on the west bank of the Jordan.
Amman and, ., ]
„ 30.— captured two trenches, but were held up by en- July | Headquarters and two companies carried out
filade fire. to .■ operations in northern Hejaz including capture
,, 31. — The withdrawal having been ordered the brigade Aug. ) of Mudawara otation with 133 prisoners. This
reached Es Sir at 0715, and eventually withdrew force returned to Beersheba on Sept. 6 baviiig
to the west bank of the Jordan. covered 930 miles.
20th INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Commander.— Co\. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) H. D. Watson, C.M.G., CLE., M.V.O., I.A. (rolinq\ii.shed, Jan.,
1918).
Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. R. B. Murray, 90th Ptinjabis, I.A.
110th Mahratta Light Infantry.
Alwar I.S. Infantry.
GwaUor I.S. Infantry.
Patiala I.S. Infantry.
Signal Section (British), R.E.
20th Indian Infantry Brigade Train.
Brief Record of Service.
The 20th (Indian) Infantry Brigade arrived in Egypt from India in Nov., 1914 ; was engaged in
repelhng the Turkish attacks on the Ei Fcrdan Sector of the Suez Canal in 1915 ; and took part in the
advance into Palestine in 1917.
The Brigade operated in the Gaza-Mendur sector during Oct. and Nov., 1917 ; held the Ghoraniyeh
Bridgehead from April to Sept., 1918 ; and, finally, took part in the advance on Amman in September
as part of Chaytor's Force {q.v.).
49th INDIAN INFANTRY BRIGADE.
Commander. — ^Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. R. B. Murray, 90th Punjabis, I.A.
1/The 101st Grenadiers.
2/The lOl&t Grenadiers.
Signal Service (British), R.E.
Brief Record of Service.
The lOlst Grenadiers landed in Egypt from East Africa on Sept. 4, 1916, and joined 29th (Indian)
Infantry Brigade on Canal Defences. The battalion was formed into two battalions on Feb. 3, 1917,
and the Brigade became 49th (Indian) Infantry Brigade (two battalions only), on April 15.
The brigade was in support to 54th Division on Samson's Ridge (April 1917), and, later, took over
the Canal, and Rafa, defences.
In Jan. 1918, the brigade was disbanded and the battalions composing it joined 20th (Indian)
Infantry Brigade, and, on May 1, 29th Infantry Brigade of 10th Division {q.v.).
PALESTINE LINES OF COMMUNICATION.
HEADQUARTERS.
Commander. — ^Bt. Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) E. N. Broadbent, C.M.G., D.S.O., King's Own Scottish
Borderers.
Canal Zone.
Commander. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) A. H. 0. Lloyd, C.B., C.M.G., M.V.O., Shropshire Yeomanry.
Austrahan and New Zealand Training Centre (Moascar).
74 THE ADVANCE OF THE
Mounted Troops.
" C " Squadron Royal Glasgow Yeomanry (less one troop).
Camel Coastal Patrol.
Nos. 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 Companies, Imperial Camel Corps.
• Nos. 1, 3, 6 Companies, Bikanir Camel Corps.
Arab Scouts (taken over by F.D.A.).
1st Squadron Cavalry, Egyptian Army (employed under O.E.T.A.).
No. 1 Company Egyptian Camel Corps (employed under O.E.T.A.).
Indian Cavalry Base Depot.
Artillery.
Anti- Aircraft Group, R.A.
Nos. 30, 38, 85, 96, 102, 103, 119, 120, 122, 124, 125, 126, 151, 152 Anti-Aircraft Sections. R.A.
No. 204 (Calcutta) Battery, R.G.A.
Armoured Trains.
Nos. 1 and 3.
Machine Gun Corps.
221st, 262nd, 264tli Machine Gun Companies (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 7/5/18).
Engineers.
35th A.T. Company, R.E.
357th, 359th, 360th Companies, R.E. (Water Units),
555th (Lancashire), 569th, 570th, 571st (Devon), A.T. Companies, R.E.
Nos. 1 and 2 Egyptian Sapper Companies.
Infantry.
1st Garrison Battalion Royal Warwickshire Regiment, 1st Garrison Battalion Devonshire
Regiment, 1st GarrisonBattaUon Essex Regiment, 1st Garrison Battahon Northampton-
shire Regiment, 2nd Garrison Battahon Cheshire Regiment, 19th Garrison Battahon
Rifle Brigade.
2nd Battalion West India Regiment, 2/18th Infantry, 2nd (Reserve) Half Battalion Cape
Corps, 1st, 2nd, 3rd Egyptian Infantry BattaHons, Egyptian Detachment Palestine
Gendarnierie (2 Companies employed under O.E.T.A.).
Nos. 1, 2, General, and Indian Infantry, Base Depots.
Royal Army Veterinary Corps.
Nos. 16 (Acts as Base Depot) and 31 Veterinary Hospitals.
Advanced Depots of Veterinary Stores, Ludd and Jerusalem.
No. 3 Base Depot, Veterinary Stores.
Nos. 2, 3, 4 Camel Hospitals.
Nos. 1 and 2 Field Veterinary Detachments, and No. 23 (Indian) Field Veterinary Section.
Royal Army Service Corps.
(a) Mechanical Transport : —
No. 7 (Egypt) Mobile Repair Unit.
493rd M.f. Company (Supply Column).
1080th M.T. Company (No. 3 Motor Ambulance Transport Company).
Advanced M.T. Sub-Depot, Kantara.
(b) Horse Transport : —
No. 900 Company A.S.C. (23rd Auxiliary H.T. Company).
(c) Supply Companies : —
Nos. 18 and 27 Field Bakeries.
Nos. 18, 19, 20, 21, 36, 37 L. of C. Supply Companies.
No. 17 Field Butchery (ceased to exist 21/3/18).
(d) Camel Transport Corps : —
" 0," " Q " and " S " Companies.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. 75
Area Employment Groups.
No. 3 Group : —
Nos. 809, 810, 811, 812, 813 Companies.
No. 4 Group : —
No. 808, 814 and 815 Companies.
Postal Units.
British : —
Advanced Base Army Post Offices, RZ 8 and 8Z 9.
Army Post Offices— SZ 2, SZ 7, SZ M, SZ 17, SZ 18, SZ 23, SZ 27, SZ .32, SZ 34, SZ 38,
SZ 43, KZ 47, SZ 48, SZ 49, SZ .57, SZ 58, SZ .59.
Travelling Post Offices (Railway Trains) DAL, KAL, LAD, LAK, LAP, PAL, RAB,
BAR, JAP PAJ.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION UNITS.
(Controlled by General Headquarters.)
COMMAND DEPOT.
Mounted Troops.
Headquarters and Administrative Centre Imperial Camel Corps (Abbassia).
Engineers.
389th Advanced Park Company, R.E.
46th Base Park Company, R.E.
5 Railway Transportation Sections, R.E.
Railway Operating Division.— Nos. 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 94, 95, 99, 100, 101, 102,
103, 104 and 105 Sections, R.E.
98th Light Railway Train Crew Company, R.E.
115th, 116th, 265th, 266th Railway Companies, R.E.
272nd Railway Construction Company, R.E.
Light Railway Survey Section, R.E.
299th (Indian) Railway Construction Company.
Signal Service.
L. of C. Signal Companies, R.E. " M," Sinai, South Palestine, North Palestine.
Airline Sections, R.E. Nos. 12, 62, 68, 69 and 105 (Indian).
Northern W/T Section, R.E.
No. 6 Light Railway Signal Section, R.E.
Egyptian Construction Section.
Base Signal Depot, R.E.
Schools of Instruction.
Imperial School of Instruction (Zeitoun).
Senior Officers School (Heliopolis).
Officer Cadet Battalion, Egypt.
Branch School (El Arish).
School of Cookery (IsmaiUa).
Central Gas School (Rafa).
M.T. Drivers Training School (Lorries).
Royal Array Service Corps.
(a) Horse Transport : —
137th Company (2nd Base Horse Tran.sport Depot), Kantara.
973rd Company (Advanced Horse Transport Depot), Ludd.
Indian Transport Depot, Richon-le-Zion.
(h) Camel Transport Corps : —
No. 1 Camel Depot, Kantara, No. 2 Camel Depot, Ramleh.
76 THE ADVANCE OF THE
(c) Harbour Transport : —
R.A.S.C. Motor Boat Company.
(d) Supply Companies : —
Nos. 22, 34, 35 (L. of C.) Supply Companies.
19tli Field Bakery (less detachment).
« Labour.
(a) Inspectorate of Recruiting (Cairo) : —
Recruiting Camps (Sohag, Assiut, Cairo).
(6) Military Labour Bureaux (Alexandria, Port Said, Cairo, Ismailia, Jaffa, Jerusalem, Haifa) .
(c) Egyptian Labour Corps : —
Headquarters and Advanced Depot. Ludd.
Base Depot, Kantara.
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36,
37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80,
81, 82. 83, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 100, 101,
102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118,
119, 120 Companies.
Remounts.
No. 1 Remount Depot (40th and 47th Squadrons).
No. 2 Remount Depot (44th Squadron).
No. 3 Remoimt Depot (46th Squadron).
No. 4 Remount Depot (AustraUan Remoimt Unit).
Nos. 1 and 2, Camel Remoimt Depots.
Nos. 1 and 2, Field Remount Sections.
No. 1 Camel Field Remount Section.
No. 1 Syce Remount Corps.
Royal Army Veterinary Corps.
Veterinary Hospitals Nos. 20, 21 and 26.
Convalescent Horse Depot.
Advanced Base Depot of Veterinary Stores.
No. 1 Camel Hospital.
Indian Veterinary Hospital.
Ordnance.
Nos. 9, 11, 24, 25, 26, 27, 31, 123, Detachment 136, 138 and 139 Companies R.A.O.C.
and Detachment No. 140 Boot Repairing Companv.
Nos. 16, 32, 38, 39, 44, 56, 113, and 141 Companies, R'.A.O.C. and Headquarters No. 140
Boot Repairing Company, R.A.O.C. (employed with R.A.O. Base Depot).
Nos. 22, 23, 24 (Medium), and No. 39 (Light) R.A.O. Mobile Workshops.
Nos. 1 and 2, Ammunition Depots, L. of C, R.A.O.C.
Nos. 1, 2 and 3, Advanced Ammimition Railheads, R.A.O.C.
Postal Units.
British :—
Base Army Post Offices K., T., Z.
Advanced Base Army Post Office SZ 10.
Army Post Offices— SZ 4, SZ 5, ,SZ 6, SZ 11, SZ 12, SZ 15, SZ 16, SZ 20, SZ 22, SZ 24,
SZ 25, SZ 26, SZ 50, SZ 55, SZ 56.
Travelling Post Offices (Railway Trains)— CAT, TAG.
Australian : —
Base Army Post Office SZ 3.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. 77
New Zealand : —
Base Army Post Office SZ 1.
Indian : —
Base Army Post Office " E."
Miscellaneous.
H.Q. Army Printing and Stationery Services (E^ypt and Salonika).
Commission of Graves Registration and Enquiries.
Central Claims Bureau.
FORCE IN EGYPT.
HEADQUARTERS.
Commander.— Gol (temp. Major-Gen.) H. D. Watson, C.B., C.M.G., C.I.E., M.V.O., I.A.
Solium Section.
Commander. — Lieut.-Col. (temp. Brig.-Gen.) R. M. Yorke, C.M.G., D.S.O., Gloucestershire Regiment.
Mounted Troops.
Royal Glasgow Yeomanry (One Troop " C " Squadron).
Imperial Camel Corps (No. 6 Company).
Bikanir Camel Corps (No. 7 Company).
Infantry.
1st Garrison Battalion Notts, and Derby Regiment, 1st Garrison Battalion Liverpool
Regiment, 1st Garrison Battalion Royal Irish Regiment, 2nd Garrison Battalion
Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 20th Garrison Battahon Rifle Brigade, 21st Garrison Battahon
Rifle Brigade (to India, 28/9/18), 40th (PaUstinian) Battahon Royal FusiUers, 3rd
Egyptian Infantry Battahon, one Company.
Machine Gun Corps.
Machine Gun Corps, Base Depot.
Machine Gun Section, Egyptian Army.
Armoured Cars.
Light Armoured Car Brigade (less 3 Batteries) : —
Headquarters.
No. 3 Light Armoured Car Battery.
Nos. 5, 6, 7, 9 Light Car Patrols (Ford Cars).
Heavy Armoured Car.
Armoured Trains.
No. 2 Armoured Train.
Royal Army Service Corps.
(a) Mechanical Transport : —
H.Q. and Solium Detachment, 790 Company (Western Force M.T. Supply Column).
No. 1079 M.T. Company (No. 2 Motor Ambulance Transport Company).
Nos. 14 and 15 (Egypt) Mobile Repair Unit-s.
Advanced M.T. Sub-Depot, Cairo.
Trainuig School for M.T. drivers (Lorry), Hehuich.
THE ADVANCE OF THE
{b) Horse Transport : —
313 H.T. Company (6th Axixiliary Horse Company;.
Matruh Detachment, 671 Company (Auxiliary Horse Transport Company),
(c) Supply Companies : —
23rd L. of C. Supply Company.
2/3rd " D " Supply Company.
Detachment No. 19 Field Bakery.
No. 26 Field Bakery.
(d) Camel Transport Corps : —
Detachment from No. 1 Camel Depot.
Area Employment Group. (No. 2.)
Nos. 80i, 805, 806 and 807 Companies.
Miscellaneous.
Command Depot (Abbassia).
Egyptian Army Transport Corps (Tel-el-Kebir).
ALEXANDRIA DISTRICT.
HEADQUARTERS.
Commander.— Qo\. (temp. Brig.-aen.) R. C. Boyle, C.B., C.M.G.
Mounted Troops.
Bikanir Camel Corps, Nos. 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 Companies.
Coast Defence Artillery.
103rd (Local) Company, R.G.A.
Royal Malta Artillery Detachment.
Royal Engineers.
13th Base Park Company, R.E.
Infantry.
1st Garrison BattaHon Royal Scots (2 Companies), 5th (Reserve) Battalion British West
India Regiment, l/70th Burma Rifles.
Royal Army Service Corps.
(a) Mechanical Transport : —
No. 8 (Egypt) Mobile Repair Unit.
No. 303 M.T. Company (Divisional Ammunition Park).
No. 500 M.T. Company (Base M.T. Depot).
No. 644 M.T. Company (Heavy Repair Workshop and Stores Branch).
No. 1078 M.T. Company (No. 1 Motor Ambulance Transport Company).
(6) Horse Transport : —
No. 671 Company (9th Auxihary Horse Transport Company).
No. 930 Company (24th Auxiliary Horse Transport Company).
(c) Camel Transport : —
Detachment No. 1 Camel Depot.
{d) Supply Companies : —
Nos. 24 and 25 L. of C. Supply Companies.
H.Q. and l/3rd " D " Supply Company.
Area Employment Group. (No. 1.)
Nos. 800, 810, 802 and 803 Companies.
Miscellaneous.
Command Depot (Sidi Bishr).
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. 79
DELTA AND WESTERN FORCE.
(Ceased to exist, April 8, 1918.)
Commander.— Col. (temp. Bng.-Gen.) II. G. Casson, O.B., C.M.G.
25th Motor Macliinc Gun Battery (disbanded, 18/1/18).
ARMY MEDICAL SERVICES.
DIVISIONAL FIELD AMBULANCES.
4th Cavalry Division.
10th Cavalry Brigade Combined Field Ambulance (formerly Cth Mounted Brigade Field
Ambulance, forn^erly ]/2nd South Midland Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance).
11th Cavalry Brigade Combined Field .\mbulance (formerly 8th Mounted Brigade Field
Ambulance, formerly 1/Lst London Mounted Brigade Field Ambul.ince).
12th Cavalry Brigade Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 22nd Mounted Brigade Field
Ambulance, formerly 1/lst North Midland Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance).
Sth Cavalry Division.
13th Cavalry Brigade Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 5th Mounted Brigade Field
Ambulance, formerly 1/lst South Midland Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance).
14th Cavalry Brigade Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 7th Mounted Brigade Field
Ambulance, formerly 1/lst Notts and Derby Mounted Brigade Field Ambulance).
15th Cavalry Brigade Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 124th Indian (Cavalry Field
Ambulance).
Australian Mounted Division.
3rd, 4th, and 5th (formerly Australian Camel Brigade Field Ambulance) Light Horse
Field Ambulances.
Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division.
l.st and 2nd Light Horse, and New Zealand Mounted Brigade Field Ambulances.
3rd (Lahore) Division.
110th, 111th, and 112th Indian Combined Field Ambulances.
7th (Indian) Division.
128th, 129th, and 130th Indian Combined Field Ambulances.
lOth Division.
154th Indian Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 32nd Field .Ambulance).
165th Indian Combined Field Ambulance (30th Field Ambulance disbanded).
166th Indian Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 31st Field Ambulance).
52nd Division.
1/lst, l/2nd, and l/3rd Lowland Field Ambulances (ceased to belong to E.E.F., 21/4/18).
53rd Division.
1/lst Welsh Field Aubulance.
113th, 170th (formerly l/2nd Welsh), and 171st (formerly l/3rd Welsh), Indian Combined
Field Ambidances.
54th Division.
2/lst, l/2nd, and l/3rd East Anghan Field Ambulances.
60lh Division.
121st Indian Combined Field Ambulance (2/4th London Field Ambulance disbanded).
160th Indian Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 2/5th London Field Ambulance).
179th Indian Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 2/6th London Field Ambulance).
80 THE ADVANCE OF THE
74th Division.
229th, 230th, and 231st Field Ambulaucea (ctased to belong to E.E.F., 7/5/18).
7Sth Division.
123rd Indian Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 147th Field Ambulance).
127th Indian Combined Field Ambulance (145th Field Ambulance disbanded).
163rd Indian Combined Field Ambulance (formerly 146th Field Ambulance).
20th Indian Infantry Brigade.
157th (formerly 110th) Indian Field Ambulance.
Palestine Lines of Communication.
Scottish Horse Field Ambulance.
CASUALTY CLEARING STATIONS AND CLEARING HOSPITALS.
Palestine Lines of Communication.
26th, 35th, 66th, 74th, 76th Casualty Clearing Stations (35th Casualty Clearing Station.
ceased to belong to E.E.F., April, 1918).
24th Indian Clearing Hospital.
31st Indian Clearing Hospital (formerly 31st Combined Clearing Hospital),
loth Combined Clearing Hospital.
32nd Combined Clearing Hospital (formerly 75th Casualty Clearing Station).
33rd Combined Clearing Hospital (formerly 77th Casualty Clearing Station).
34th Combined Clearing Hospital (formerly 65th Casualty Clearing Station).
STATIONARY HOSPITALS, etc.
Palestine Lines of Communication.
24th, 26th, 36th, 43rd, 44th, 45th, 47th, and 48th Stationary Hospitals (43rd Stationary
Hospital disbanded, 4.5th Stationary Hospital ceased to belong to E.E.F., April, 1918).
No. 2 (Australian) and 137th (Indian) Stationary Hospitals.
Medical Store Depots.
Levant Medical Store Depot (Alexandria).
No. 5 Base Depot Medical Store (Alexandria).
Base Depot Medical Stores (.4bbassia).
No. 8 Base Depot Medical Stores.
Nos. 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8 Advanced Depots Medical Stores.
Laboratories.
Military Bacteriological Laboratory (formerly Central Bacteriological Laboratory).
Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 Field Laboratories.
32nd, 37th, and 38th Mobile Laboratories.
Anzac Field Laboratory (Desert Mounted Corps).
Sanitary Sections.
5th Cavalry Division (formerly 5th Indian Cavalry) Sanitary Section.
18th, 19th, 24th, 29th, 30th, 31st (formerly 4th Indian Cavalry), 52nd, 53rd, 54th, 60th,
80th, 85th, 87th, 88th. 89th, 90th, 91st, 92nd, 93rd, 94th, "95th, 107th, 108th, 113th,
114th, 115th, 116th, 121st, 122nd, 123rd, and 124th Sanitary Sections, (.52nd and
87th Sections ceased to belong to E.E.F. on 21/4/18 and 7/5/18 respectively).
7th and 8th Australian Sanitary Sections.
11th and 12th Indian Sanitary Sections.
Hospital Trains.
(Former numbers shown in brackets).
Nos. 40, 44 (1), 45 (2), 46 (3), 47 (5), 48 (43), 50 (45), 51 (46) -56 (47).
Nos. 49 (44) and .57 (11) (Eg}T)tian).
Hospital Barge.
" Niagara."
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE. 81
HOSPITALS AND CONVALESCIiNT DEPOTS.
Palestine Lines of Communication.
G'Jtii and 78th General Hospitals.
No. 14 Australian General llospital.
Nos. 5, 30, 32, 39, 41, 44, 00 (formerly " Indian Base Hospital "), 54th, and Mhow,
Indian General Hospitals.
Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Prisoners-of-War Hospitals.
Nos. 1 (formerly No. C), 2, 3, and 4 Egyptian Stationary Hospitals.
Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, G, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 Egyptian Detention Hospitals.
Force in Egypt.
27th, 31st, and 71st General Hospitals.
Nos. 31 and 45 (formerly 70th General) Indian General Hospitals.
Citadel and Nasrieh Hospitals.
Infectious Hospital, Choubra, and Orthopicdic Hospital, Helwan.
Nos. 1, 2, 6, 7, 8, and 9 Prisoners-of-War Hospitals.
No. 13 Egyptian Detention (formerly No. 1 Egyptian Stationary) Hospital.
Alexandria District.
15th, 17th, 19th, 21st, and 87th General Hospitals (15th General Hospital ceased to
belong to E.E.F. April, 1918).
Ras el Tin Military Hospital.
No. 10 Prisoners-of-War Hospital.
Nos. 2 and 14 (formerly No. 5 Egyptian Stationary) Egyptian Detention Hospitals.
Convalescent Depots.
Abbassia, Boulac, Montazah, Mustapha.
Aotea New Zealand Convalescent Home.
Indian Convalescent Depot.
Reception Station, Mustapha.
82 THE ADVANCE OF THE
THE AIMTI-AIRCRAFT GECTIONS.
In July, 1917, there were in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force only seven Anti- Aircraft Sections,
of which 'two had only lately arrived. Owing to the small number of sections available, it was im-
possible to do more at that time than protect points of vital importance, such as railheads, dumps, and
aerodromes.
With the arrival in October and November of eight new sections, equipped with more modern
guns (two additional sections were formed later for the protection of important bases) and the formation
of Anti-Aircraft Group Headquarters to co-ordinate the work of the sections, it became possible for a
more comprehensive scheme of defence to be formulated. During the operations of Nov. and Dec,
1917, Anti-Aircraft Sections followed up the advance as closely as transport facihties and the state of
the roads would permit.
When the hue had been stabilized, a front line barrage was established — except on a few miles of
front where the country, on account of its mountainous and broken character, became unsuitable for
anti-aircraft positions — with the object of preventing hostile aircraft from crossing our hue without
being observed and engaged. Secondary, but most important considerations in establishing this barrage,
were the protection of our front line trenches and the prevention of co-operation between enemy artillery
and their aircraft. {See inset Plate 52.)
In the earher months of the present year, there was a considerable amount of hostile air activity,
and most of the sections were kept pretty fully occupied. For example, in April one section was in
action seventy-six times and fired an average of just under 100 rounds per day.
A more elaborate scheme of co-operation with the Koyal Air Force was gradually evolved, and
with a view to giving immediate warning of the approach of enemy machines, wireless telegraphy
stations were placed at the positions of several of the more advanced sections. A system of directional
shots was arranged to point out the position of hostile machines to oxu: air patrols, ground arrow
signals were put out, and the course of every aeroplane, from the time it appeared till it finally went
out of sight behind its own lines, was charted and reported.
The result of this, together with the increasing number and improved types of our own machines, was
that enemy planes crossed our hues at an ever-increasing height until very few flew lower than from 14,000
to 18,000 feet. There was also a gradual decrease in the number of hostile 'planes seen, and from
Sept. 6 to 17 inclusive, only two machines crossed our hues, and these were at too great a height to get
information of any value, as their reports, which have since been captured, show.
The last machine to be engaged was one which flew over the Jordan Valley on Sept. 21. The
section which engaged it were immediately shelled out of their position by artillery fire — an interesting
sideHght on the absence of knowledge on the part of the enemy forces in that area as to the true posi-
tion of affairs on that date. (See Plate 45.)
Owing to the entire absence of enemy machines during the September (1918) advance, the Anti-
Aircraft Sections took no active part in the operations. Sections were, however, pushed forward
rapidly in case they should be required. By Oct. 31 three of them had made the long journey to Beirut
by road. One of these was on its way north from there when the Armistice came into effect and it was
recalled.
Protection has also been afforded throughout the whole campaign to the more important points
on the lines of communication.
That anti-aircraft did something towards fulfilHng its functions on this front is testified to by the
constantly recurring entries in the captured diaries of the enemy Flying Corps Headquarters and
squadrons, which shew that machines were continually being damaged and reconnaissances prevented
by anti-aircraft fire. The following are typical extracts : —
"20/3/18. Machines hit at Ramleh at height of 4,700 metres."
" 13-19/4/18. Anti-aircraft defence still very strong and makes things difficult for our working machines in the near
reconnaissances. "
"20/5/18. VVadi Auja. 1240. Reconnaissance here was impossible in spito of much turning, in consequence of a
storm and extraordinarily lively anti-aircraft fire. Shooting extraordinarily violent."
" 2/0/ 1 8-8/6/ 18. Enemy anti-aircraft fire was lively and as good as ever."
" 19/7/18. Machine of 300 Squadron was seriously damaged in the elevator* by anti-aircraft hits. Glided down to
500 metres and broke up on the ground."
" 22/8/18. Machine of 301 Squadron considerably damaged by anti-aircraft lire."
"27/8/18. Very strong anti-aircraft firo over Ramleh, whereby there were several hits in the machine and petrol
tank shot through."
• TIm- "cU-vator" here referred to is part of the lifting gear in the wings of the niadiini'.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 83
THE ROYAL ENGINEERS.
1.— Water Supply.
The army, which crossed the Sinai Desert into Palestine and then deploying on a broad front,
enveloped the Turkish position extending from Beersheba to Gaza, demanded much of its engineers.
During its deliberate advance it was followed by a broad gnage railway and a piped supply of filtered
water from Kantara, on the Suez Canal, into the field of battle near Beersheba, a distance of 147 miles.
It would be an exaggeration to say that there is no water in the Sinai Peninsula, which separates
Egypt from Palestine, but the supplies are so scanty and bad that the desert has always been a very
formidable obstacle to the passage of troops.
The only practicable route across the desert runs along its northern edge where scanty supplies of
water are fomid in small wells on the caravan route, or by digging new wells in the .sand dunes, but,
nearly all water in these wells is brackish and unpalatable and as a supply it is quite inadequate for a
large force, followed by an army of labourers constructing a railwav. It was therefore necessary to
provide the army with water from a source outside Sinai.
The water supply system, as originally planned, was only intended to supply 500,000 gallons a day
for a force of one mounted and two infantry divisions detailed to recapture the Egyptian town of El Arish,
which was in the hands of the Turks, but, as it was extended beyond there and proved to be an important
factor in subsequent operations it must be briefly described.
On the west bank of the Suez Canal, at its northern end, runs the Port Said branch of the Sweet
water Canal which carries the water of the Nile to that town. In the autumn of 1910, plant to filter
600,000 gallons of water per day was installed on this sweet water canal at Kantara, and the purified
water was pumped through syphons imder the Suez Canal into masonry reservoirs on the east bank.
From Kantara East a water supply main of twelve inch, ten inch, and eight inch steel screw-jointed
pipes was laid into El Arish, in four sections each about twenty-four miles long. Duplicate engines and
pumps drove the water from the reservoir at Kantara to a reservoir at the end of the first section and
thence it was again pumped forward through the next section of pipe and so forward, section by section,
until it reached El Arish.
To explain the work done on water supply it is necessary to describe briefly the system adopted
for the distribution of water by rail and camel convoys and the cleare.st way to do this is to start from the
beginning.
Before the pipe-line from Kantara was laid and supplying water, the army had started on the march
forward covering the railway construction parties and water had to be carried forward in trains of
water trucks.
These water trains were filled at a special siding, where twenty or more trucks could be dealt with
simultaneously, and on arrival at railhead were emptied into a long row of canvas reservoirs laid beside
the rails. Here small camel tanks, called fantasses, were filled up and these were carried forward by
camel convoys for distribution to the troops beyond railhead.
When the first section of pipe-line was completed a new water siding was provided and the railway
was relieved of carrying water for the first stage and so on until water was finally pumped to railhead.
Once El Arish had been reached the army passed into a country where, within certain limits, the troops
could be supplied with water from local resources. The railway engineers, however, rejected local water
as unfit for use in its locomotives on account of its salinity and hardness : the railway, therefore, became
the principal consumer of the piped supply : it was, however, also used by the troops to a considerable
extent to supplement local supplies and in the final operations was a very valuable asset.
The army continued its advance from El Arish to Khan Yimis on a narrow front, along the caravan
route, near the coast where the only water which can be found in the district is from wells in the sand
dune area and in the villages of El Burj, Sheikh Zowaid, Rafa, and Khan Yunis. At Khan Yunis two
good wells about 100 feet deep and at Beni Sela, an adjoining village on a higher site, a well 210 feet deep
were found.
These three wells, when provided with pumps and engines, eventually supplied 130,000 gallons a day.
From Khan Yunis forward it became possible to extend on to a wider front, as water can be got in
some parts of the bed of the Wadi Ghuzze and in its tributary valleys, from springs or in pools or by sinking
shallow wells, while further to the right lay Beersheba, whose wells have been famous since the days
Abraham watered his flocks there.
On the left front lay the village of Deir el Belah, with several good wells twenty to thirty feet deep,
the Wadi Ghuzze, and, further forward, the town of Gaza with abundant suppUes of water from
deep wells.
The Turks abandoned to us Deir el Belah and Shellal, where the best supplies of water in the Wadi
Ghuzze are found, but held on to Gaza and Beersheba.
84 THE ADVANCE OF THE
For a time the army advanced no further but utilised the next few months in preparations and
during this period much useful work was done in the development of local supplies and in laying pipe-lines
forward and to the right flank to enable troops to be concentrated where required.
The railway was extended to Rafa and thence to Ganili and Shellal on the right and to Deir el Relah
on the left. The water from Kantara followed the railway to Rafa, in six-inch and twin four-inch pipes,
and to Shellal. supplying the requirements of General Headquarters and El Fukhari on the way. A
pipe-line was also laid from the wells at Khan Yunis, via Abasan el Kebir and Abu Sitta, to Abu Bakra,
and this was cross-connected from Abu Sitta to Abu Khatli so that water could be distributed either from
Rafa or Khan Yunis to any point. {See Plate 2.)
At Shellal springs, yielding about 14,000 gallons per hour, of somewhat saline water, had been cleaned
out, covered in, and the water was led through pipes to a water distributing area. A natural rock basin
had been improved by a masonry dam and provided storage for some 500,000 gallons of water. A pipe-
line had been laid forward from Shellal to Imara and three sets of twenty- five horsepower engines and
centrifugal pumps were installed for local distribution and to pump water forward if required. The
capacity of each of the.se pumping sets was 1,800 gallons per hour against a 200 feet head and the pumps
were arranged so that any two sets could work " in series " to pump against a 400 feet head, keeping one
set spare in reserve.
At Abu Bakra several miles of piping were held ready to extend the pipe-line beyond the Wadi Ghuzze
if required.
At Mendur and at Dorset House deep bore wells had been sunk and provided with pumping engines.
The Deir el Belah wells were connected up and, from these, water was pumped into the trenches
south of Gaza, while further to the left there was another smaller piped supply from the Red House
wells. Along the Wadi Ghuzze and in the sand dunes near the coast where\ er water could be got and
was required wells had been dug.
Between March and Oct., 1917, the force in this area gradually grew to three mounted divisions,
a brigade of the Imperial Camel Corps, seven infantry divisions, and a composite brigade of Allied and
Indian Imperial Service troops. General Headquarters moved into the area in Aug., 1917, and
preparations were made for an enveloping attack on the Turkish position at Beersheba, combined with
a frontal attack on Gaza.
On Plate 31 {see Inset) an attempt has been made to indicate the arrangement of the water
supply up to and during the operations which commenced on Oct. 22.
The supply of water which could be brought into the area by rail and delivered at Shellal or Gamli
was some 100,000 gallons.
The El Arish-Rafa pipe-line, after meeting railway requirements at Rasum, could supply some
156,000 gallons per day to Rafa, whence 60,000 gallons per day could be dehvered through Fukhari
and Sheikh Nuran to Shellal or Abu Sitta.
The Khan Yunis well and pumping station could supply some 100,000 gallons per day to Abu Sitta
and thence by the cross line to Sheikh Nuran and Shellal, or direct to Abu Bakra.
These transferable supplies from the rear, amounting to 260,000 gallons were controlled by General
Headquarters during the course of the operations and deliveries at the various watering points were
regulated according to the daily movements of the troops.
The development of water supplies east of Esani was allotted to the Desert Moimted Corps, but
could not be commenced until the date fixed for the first movement of troops into the area (Oct. 22).
Preparations had to be made at once to collect suitable engines, pumps and plant to restore and
develop water supphes in an area which had not yet been occupied.
The development of water suppHes in the Sheikh Nuran-Gamli-Shellal-Heseia area, and east,
including the improvement and restoration of the water supplies in Beersheba, when captured, was
allotted to the XXth Corps, but no work east of the Wadi Ghuzze was to be taken in hand until Oct. 22.
The arrangements for the distribution of water in the Gamli-Shellal-Hi.seia area, from which three
mounted and four infantry divisions, accompanied by large convoys of camels for carrying water, were
to .start for the attack on the Turkish position, was of first importance.
There is a considerable amount of water in springs and in pools in the bed of the Wadi Ghuzze
within the limits indicated, but to make it available for rapid distribution involved a great deal of
preparatory organization and work.
At intervals along the valley a tot!il of over .3,000 running feet of ma.sonry and wood troughs
were ])rovided for watering horses and camels.
In addition to tlie main road crossings, for use by transport, and roads for use of the troops moving
out from tfie concentration area, special frac-ks across the wadi had boon arranged for animals going to
and returning from water and others again for camel convoys carrying fauatis to and from tiic fantasse
filling areaq. All these roads were placarded with notice boards showing what formations had to use
them, and where they led to.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 85
At Shcllal, a faiitas.sc filling area, in which 2,000 fanatis (;oul(l Ijc filled and loadc.'d on camels every
hour, was organized, and the pipiiiL' for the line to be laid forward, canvas tanks, watering troughs, and
everything which was likely to be recjuired for water distribution forward, was also collected here.
At both Uaiuli and iliseia pumping engines were erected to fill high level storage tanks, supplying
water by gravity to fantasse filhng areas, capable of filling 250 fanatis per hour.
The engines, pumps, and plant for work in Beersheba had to be collected, loaded on tractor trains
and held ready to push forward without delay when the town had been captured.
The maintenance and enlargement of the water supply in the area Mendur to Sheikh Ajlin, on the
sea, and back to Deir el lielah, was allotted to the XXlst Corps.
Until Oct. 22 no troops or animals watered east of the Wadi Ghuzze. After this date troops began
to move eastward to take up their position for the attack on Beersheba.
The following is a brief summary of the work done between Oct. 22 and Nov. 1 : —
Desert Mounted Corps.
Abu Qhnlyun was occupied at dawn on Oct. 22 and work in by (lie enemy. Tlicsc parties, relieved every two hours,
on water development started at once. An old well was worked continuously until finally the wells had been cleaned
cleaned out but failed to produce a satisfactory sujiply. Work out to a depth of forty-two and thirty -six feet respectively,
on a second well was started but was abantloucd. Mean- Pumps and engines with a capacity of 4,500 gallons jjer
while, an officer of the Australian Engineers " divined " hour were installed and water sufficient for a division of
water in the wadi bed not far away. Two wclla, sunk at mounted troops was stored.
the places indicated by him, reached an abundant supply Asluj was occupied on the night of Oct. 25-20 and work
of water at 13ft. depth. started at once on the restoration of wells which the enemy
Malaga was occupied the same day and here trenches had thoroughly destroyed. After a great deal of heavy work
dug in the wadi bed provided a good supply. including the installation of machinery, Asluj on the
Kltalansa was occupied by the Camel Brigade on the night 30th was in a position to water a mounted division, Corps
of the 22nd/23rd and working parties started at dawn of the Headquarters, and a considerable concentration of friendly
23rd to restore two wells which had been effectively blown Arabs.
XXth Corps.
Esani. — Was occupied by one mounted brigade and one started on the 23rd. On this day, five kilometres of pipe were
infantry brigade on the night of Oct. 22-23. A party of laid out and screwed up in ten sections. On the 24th, these
1,000 men of the Egyptian Labour Corps accompanied this ten sections were connected through the pijie, was tested and
force for work under the Royal Engineers, and work began washed out and storage tanks and distribution arrangements
on the morning of the 23rd. Two portable power-driven were completed at Karm. During the night of the 24th-
pumping sets, with a combined capacity of 8,000 gallons per 25th the water was bemg pumped from Shellal through
hour, canvas storage tanks with a capacity of 150,000 gallons, Imara to Karm and was available on the morning of the
and water distribution gear were installed. Two hundred 25th, for the use of the troops. Later, additional storage and
wood horse troughs filled by lift and force pumps were also a second water distribution area were provided at Karm for
provided in the wadi bed. Work was completed within three water brought by the rail from £1 Arish, and when the railway
days, when a yield of 100,000 gallons per day had been extension had tieen completed, 80,000 gallons per day were
attained. delivered for some days.
Imara — On Oct. 25, storage capacity for 80,000 gallons Kha^if. — At Khasif, the cisterns were cleaned out and filled
was erected at Imara, and the water was pumped forward to with 60,000 gallons of water, carried there by two camel
Imara, from Shellal. convoys of 1,000 camels each on Oct. 29 and 30. This pro-
Karm. — Work on the pipeline from Imara to Karm was vided an additional advanced reserve of water.
The water problem at Beersheba, after its capture, was not confined to the immediate provision of
water sufficient for the minimum daily needs of the cavalry corps and two infantry divisions, in itself a
large order, but it was necessary, with as little delay as possible, to make such preparations as would
allow the second phase of the operations to begin. This could only happen when it was possible for
the force to march out with a day's rations of water in hand for troops, and every animal to drink its
fill before starting.
The water question ahead of Beersheba was, at best, a doubtful one, and it was essential that when the
advance from Beersheba began, the force employed should be in a position to face a long waterless period.
The Ttirks only destroyed a few of the wells before leaving, though all the principal wells had been
prepared for demolition. This neglect, while most fortunate for us, was not creditable to the Turkish
engineers, for, however sudden the attack, it was only the work of a moment to light the fuses which
were ready in position.
Of the seventeen wells in Beersheba, only two were thoroughly demolished, and two partly damaged.
In three wells the pumps were in a workable condition though the engines had been put out of action.
In three other wells, saqqias* were found in at least a workable condition, and though two of these saqqias
were discarded as unprofitable and replaced by pmups and engines, the third was put in good working
order in a few hours and was able to cope with the full yield of the well. In addition, the Turks had
left intact two reservoirs containing some 90,000 gallons, a very useful legacy.
It was at once clear that the sotirce of water in Beersheba was a large one and hkely to provide
nearly the whole needs of that part of the force which was temporarily based on the town — a force
requiring in all about 400,000 gallons per day.
* A Saqqia is a wliecl fitted with buckets for raiding water. It is worked as a rule by an animal pacing round in a circle on
the principle of an old fashioned mill.
86 THE ADVANCE OF THE
It was not to be expected that this volume of water would be available at once, but liorses can
subsist without water for forty-eight hours, and men can do with less than a gallon per day if the
weather is at all favourable as one might hope it would be in the beginning of November.
However, the three or four days after the capture of Beersheba were among the hottest of the year —
a strong khamsin wind blew without intermission, and the whole of the district was enveloped in fine dust.
Of the plant carried by the tractor train, five engines and three pumps were erected and parts of the
sixth engine were used to replace similar parts in a duplicate engine left by the Turks. The three pmnps
left by the Turks were put in good working order. Four pumping sets brought in from Asluj were erected,
one saqqia was put in order and u.sed continually, and from two wells water was raised by bucket and rope.
Several of the wells were concealed in houses and gardens ; two were not found until the third day
and one on the fourth day. On the third day, in the afternoon, the water situation was most acute.
Every available gallon of water stored during the previous night having been consmned.
The output was just equal to the demand and it was expected that watering animals for the day
would be finished by midnight.
At 1600 a mounted brigade of some 2,000 men and horses with forty-eight hours thirst, arrived
unexpectedly.
A new well, with saqqia, had fortunately been found about noon on this day, the saqqia was being
repaired and troughs were being erected, but there was no means of knowing what the yield of the well
would be. This well was at work by 1700 and proved a goo.d one, yielding about 1,500 gallons per hour,
just enough to provide water by midnight for the mounted brigade.
During the first two days, some water had been found in shallow pools and in pits dug in the wadi
bed to the west of the town. This supply, however, was nothing more than surface water left from a
storm which had occurred about a week before, and it was soon exhausted.
By the morning of the fourth day, the water development had reached its maximum, the total
output was about 390,000 gallons per day. After this there was no further great anxiety.
As an extreme measure, an attempt was made to cut down the ration of water to horses by imposing
a time limit for each batch of horses as it came to the troughs. Such rationing might be effective
where the control of the watering area was very perfect and where animals had not been without water
for an undue time. In the exceptional circumstances at Beersheba, the famished horses got out of
control and rushed the troughs as soon as they got near them and then wliile some drank greedily, it
was a difficult matter to get others to drink. There is no difficulty in limiting the ration of water for
camels, as the camel habitually d.ink in two " bouts " with an interval of about ten minutes.
The provision of a stout guard rail to every line of troughing was well worth the extra time and
labour, as it prevented animals from breaking down the troughing in their eagerness to drink,
(/See text facing Plate 39 for continuation of above.)
2. — Signal Service.
A branch of the Royal Engineers that merits a separate chapter is the Signal Service. The nature
of the operations, the rapid and wide movements, and the great distances traversed, which have been
special features of our operations in Palestine, made the problems of intercommunication peculiarly difficult.
The sharp changes from soft sandy deserts to rolhng pasture land passable by wheels, and then to moun-
tain tracks where lines could be laid only by hand, and material conveyed by pack animals, called for
much elasticity in transport, and ingenuity in methods of building telegraph lines. The necessity for
long distance speech from the front to the base required the provision of telephone trunk hnes as long
as from London to Aberdeen. The volume of traffic to be dealt with has involved the use of
delicate apparatus for high-speed automatic telegraphy, under very trying conditions of dust and
damp ; and its successful employment is entirely due to skilful handling by the telegraphists, and to
the watchful tending of the instrument mechanics.
An expeditionary force operating in such varying circumstances necessarily has to undergo many
changes in organization, and each alteration in the organization of a force involves corresponding
changes in the means of communication. Not only does this apply to actual lines and offices, but to the
organization of signal personnel. On the formation of the XXth and XXIst Corps, new companies and
sections to meet the demands of these headquarters were necessary, and to a great extent were improvised
locally. This improvisation has certain advantages, e.g. the officers and men are accustomed to local
conditions but, on the other hand, the older units have to suffer from the withdrawal of officers and men.
Besides these major changes in organization, there are always others going on, due chiefly to an ever-
extending line of communication, but also to additional means of signalling such as pigeons or "trench"
wireless and to the re-grouping of units and formations. Tliis all means, that, while the Signal Service is
functioning as a whole, the parts are constantly being altered and improved, and the smooth working of the
machine must go on owing to elasticity of the organization and the adaptability of individual members.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 87
The system of intcrcommumcation built up to July, 1917, consisted of : (1) the tactical cable and
airhaes between East Force Headquarters and the battle front, wliich included special artillery, Royal
Flying Corps and other circuits ; (2) the main backbone of semi-permanent lines connecting East Force
Head(]uarters (near Deir el Bolah) with the Kantara base (about 140 miles away); (3) the permanent
lines witliin Ef^ypt connecting Kantara to Cairo, Alexandria, Port Said, Suez, and to our cables to Europe,
India, and Australia.
During September and October of 1917, with the prospect of an advance, signal units were very
busy — in addition many had only recently been formed, and still had to continue training. Behind the
battle area, the increase in administrative services and the doubling of the railway line entailed an ex-
pansion of the Lines of Communication Signals. Not only were the local telephone systems continually
growing, but m(!aas of maintaining telephonic conununication with Egypt as the force advanced required
the previous building of heavier trunk wires. To economise men, as the lines lengthened, the old Turkish
desert telegraph lines had to be replaced by new lines along the railway, where maintenance is easier.
Forward units with the assistance of infantry and artillery were engaged on elaborate buried telephone
systems in the shelled areas. Alternative routes were so developed that any battery, for example, could
always ring up any observation post or artillery commander, even if some of the main lines were cut.
Preparations for the attack on Beersheba and the maintenance of communication with the cavalry on
their long march of envelopment also involved much careful preliminary work and training. Material
for airlines and cables was laid out and concealed ready for rai)id laying when the flag fell. Three cables
accompanied the cavalry and these were patrolled constantly by hor.seinen left at test points every five
or six miles. Although tlie lines were cut one or more of the three were always in working order and
communication was preserved throughout the enveloping attack.
When " Z " day arrived and Beersheba was captured, rapidly erected permanent wires were sub-
stituted for the long cable lines which had been laid round by way of Asluj. A network of cables spread
out from Beersheba to the north and north-west as the flank attacks on the main Turkish positions
progressed. When mounted troops advanced, wireless communication came into use to keep touch
with the rear. When Gaza fell, lines were rapidly extended up the main road and along the railway.
Gaza, Beit Hanun, Deir Sineid, Mejdel, each in turn became railhead where local telephonic systems
were rapidly installed. Among the troops advancing, divisional and corps signal units were ever at
work coping with the constant forward jumps of their headquarters. For two months this process
continued in difficult country and during severe cHmatic changes. Then, as warfare became less mobile,
more elaborate fornis of forward commimications grew, involving alternative means of all sorts. In
rear the railway and its telegraphs advanced, and as Ludd became railhead there grew up the usual
telephone system. Jerusalem, Ramleh, and Jaffa were all linked up, and became important centres ;
while Jericho served as the focus of intercommunication for the operations across the Jordan.
During the summer of 1918, while big changes in the constitution of the force were in progress some
signal units had largely to help units of other arms who were short of trained signallers in maintaining
their telephonic systems. Assistance was also given in the training on a large scale of regimental signallers
in Corps Signal Schools. A very large increase in the number of signallers was effected in Indian Army
units. The more prosaic side, such as the improvement, and in some instances multiphcation of Unes
in rear, and the transmission of masses of telegrams, numerous telephone calls, and messages by despatch
rider went on continuously through 1918.
Early in September, preparations had to be made for the final battle of the war with the Turk. The
wonderful secrecy of all the preUminary arrangements necessitated Umitations to the amount of work
that could be done in certain directions. On the other hand, considerable scope to ingenuity was given
by opportunities for misleading the enemy. For instance, the leaving of signal stations in their old places,
the continuation of work as usual and the building out of dummy fines, and special telephone exchanges
built only for purposes of deception, helped to mask our intentions.
Finally, when the cavalry had moved across to the left flank and all was ready, the " break through "
was effected. As is well known, the advance of the cavalry averaged some sixty miles during the first
twenty-four hours. As soon as the cavalry divisions got to their positions across the fine of retreat
of the Turks at Aiule and Beisan, telegraphic communication was estabfished between these points and
General Headquarters near Ramleh by rapid building and repairs to Turkish fines. Thus, the move-
ments of cavalry working northwards from Ghoraniyeh and southwards from Beisan — closing the ring —
could be co-ordinated. It must not be forgotten that other forms of telegraphy — visual and wireless — and
motor cyclist despatch riders were also playing their important part.
To resume, after the major portion of the Turkish army had been surrounded the freer movements of
the cavalry made still greater calls on their signal units. One day's march from Aiule led to the capture
of Haifa, and, though this was an advance of about thirty miles over new territory the capture was re-
ported from just outside the town by telephone to the Desert Corps Headquarters at Megiddo (Lejjim)
the same afternoon.
88 THE ADVANCE OF THE
During the subsequent advances to Damascus and Aleppo, telegraphic communication to advanced
troops was usually obtained as soon as these halted. The method employed was to mount parties of
linemen in motor cars with the necessary material and implements, and so effect rapid repairs to existing
wires. Subsequently, the patched-up lines have to be thoroughly overhauled, and for many weeks
after the army is at rest the cable and airline sections of the Signal Service are kept hard at work
re-building and adding to the telegraph system in the occupied territory.
For those who appreciate figures, it may be of interest to picture the " traffic " dealt with at various
places : —
Average number of words telegraphed daily at (a) Divisional Headquarters 12,000
„ „ „ ,, „ ,, (6) Corps Headquarters ... 2.3,000
„ „ „ „ „ ,, (c) General Headquarters . . . 90,000
„ J, „ ,, „ „ (d) Kantara 60,000
3. — Survey Company,
The work of the 7th Field Survey Company, Royal Engineers, may be summarized under the
headings : Field survey, compilation and reproduction of maps and photographs and letterpress printing,
sound ranging sections and observation group, meteorological section.
A series of contoured maps on the scale of 1 : 40,000 of the coastal belt of Northern Sinai up to Rafa
had been issued before July, 1917. Work on this scale was continued up to the Gaza-Beersheba line,
and a series on the scale of 1 : 10,000 was started, showing the enemy trenches, barbed wire, and gun
positions in greater detail. The work of the field parties consisted chiefly of triangulation, detailed
survey with plane tables showing contours, intersecting points in and beyond the enemy's lines, and
fixing battery positions and datum points for the artillery. Survey parties also accompaiued all recon-
naissances in force towards the more easterly trench systems and Beersheba, and did such survey work
as time permitted on these occasions, fixing points ahead which were of great use to the artillery and
in the compilation of the maps from aeroplane photographs. Officers in charge of sections in the field
also kept in close touch with divisions and brigades and supphed them with advanced tracings of new
or special areas surveyed.
The Royal Air Force and Austrahan Flying Corps took aeroplane photographs regularly over the
enemy trench fines and coimtry beyond. Copies were supphed to the Field Survey Company, and from
these many maps were compiled wholly ; intersected points or good detail on the existing maps forming
the basis. An ofiicer was appointed under G.S.I, to study all photographs and indicate all enemy defence
works and details of military importance which were then plotted by the Survey Company on the maps.
Enemy battery positions and other important targets were plotted at once, and co-ordinates supphed
to this officer for communication to the artillery.
The compilation of maps from survey and photographs, and fair drawing ready for reproduction
were done at headquarters, and in June, 1917, a power-driven hthographic printing machine was installed
at Rafa for printing maps with a minimum loss of time. In this way up to about the middle of Aug.,
1917, all the country from the sea near Gaza to south of Beersheba was mapped in more or less detail,
including all enemy trenches, and published in nine sheets on the 1 : 40,000 scale, and seventeen sheets
on the 1 : 10,000 scale, in all thirty-seven editions.
Owing to the large number of 1 : 10,000 scale sheets required to cover the whole line of trench
systems the scale of 1 : 20,000 was adopted and eighteen sheets were prepared, and twenty-eight
editions printed, nineteen of them by the Survey Company, Printing Section, and nine by the Survey
of Egypt, Cairo. Of the area covered by these sheets, 282 square miles were surveyed, and 403 square
miles were compiled from aeroplane photographs. Over 3,000 photographs of the Gaza area and its
communications were dealt with.
When the Turks evacuated their Gaza-Beersheba positions and retreated to the Jaffa-Jerusalem
line, the survey parties continued the triangulation through the intervening country in two belts, one
through the coastal plain and thence to Jerusalem, the other along the Beersheba-Hebrou-Jcrusalem
road in the hills. Points were thus established for the continuation of detailed ground survey along the
new fines of defence, and for laying out new bases for soimd ranging sections without delay. At the
same time a limited amount of contoured detailed survey of immediate importance was done.
The rate of advance of our troops during periods of open warfare was too great to allow detailed
survey of all the country traversed at the time, but as soon as the enemy held a defensive line again,
detailed survey was resumed by the field sections and continued with the gradual British advances,
comprising a belt across the front from the sea to the River Jordan averaging fifteen miles in depth.
This survey was carried practically up to the enemy's lines and a large number of points such as
prominent hills, trees, and buildings in and beyond the enemy line were fixed by intersection. A check
base fine measured near Jaffa, and connected with the triangulation, showed that a satisfactory standard
of accuracy was being maintained.
EGYPTIAN EXI'EDITTONARY FORCE 8&
The scale of 1 : 20,000 was continued for a time, but in consideration of the extent of the country
to be mapped and the steep mountainous character of the greater part of it, the scale of 1 : 40,000 was
adopted again for the general map, while shortly before the British attack in September, five sheets were
printed on the more open scale of 1 : 20,000, covering those areas where the enemy trench and communi-
cation systams were most complicated and extensive — that is, upon the coastal plain and the foothills.
The operations maps of the 1 : 40,000 scale series were printed in four colours ; the wadis, roads, rail-
ways, villages, wells, and such topographical features, the lettering and also the numbered reference
grid, were in black, contours in brown, trees in green, and enemy trenches, gun emplacements, barbed
wire, and such works in red over black. Different classes of roads were also indicated in red. Contours
were surveyed at twenty metres (about sixty-six feet) vertical interval in the hilly country and at ten
metres on the plain, with spot heights on the hills. A small number of sheets were also overprinted
with a special grid sub-division and enemy battery numbers in blue, for the use of the artillery in
counter-battery work.
The Royal Air Force photographed the whole of the enemy trench line, and country in the rear of
it to a distance of roughly twenty-five miles, and in addition the main roads and railways leading into
this area from the north. From Jan. 1, 1918, to the cessation of hostiUties, 15,G90 photographs were
dealt with, and the topographical information published in map form.
The Photographic Section of the lloyal Air Force has shown the greatest willingness to co-operate
with, and meet the somewhat exacting requirements of, the Survey Company in the matter of aeroplane
photographs, with the result that these photographs have been used in the compilation of topographical
detail maps in this force to a relatively greater extent, perhaps, than on any other front.
After the survey in the neighbourhood of the line had been completed, a number of topographers
were available for surveying the country passed over in the rapid advance from Gaza. The area between
the sea and three miles east of the Jerusalem-Beersheba road, and back to the area surveyed before the
Gaza-Beersheba hne, has now been completed for the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration. This
area covers 1,473 square miles. After the British advance in September field sections continued the
triangulation northwards, one party along the Nablus road, another along the plain and foothills to near
Messudieh railway junction, whence a single belt was continued beyond Nazareth to Damascus, thus
connecting Damascus with the Survey in Egypt.
Astronomical observations have been made at Baalbek, Hama, and Aleppo, determining the
latitudes and longtitudes of these places.
A small party proceeded to the Hedjaz and determined by star observations the geographical
positions of several places, including Maan and Shahm on the railway. The wireless time signals of
Paris and Berlin were received.
In addition to the regular sheets of the principal series of maps a considerable number of other mis-
cellaneous maps were produced and new information from aeroplane photographs added to sheets of the
one inch to one mile series. Maps showing the disposition of enemy forces to accompany " Intelligence
Summaries" were printed periodically. During active operations these maps showing the situation up
to 1,800 or 2,200 were printed at night for despatch to units in the field before the commencement of
following day's operations. These maps were issued for some sixty days.
Sun printing and photography were also used for reproducing maps and plans when small numbers
only were required.
Twenty-six telephoto panoramas were taken from a number of positions commanding good views
over the enemy's groimd, and enlarged copies supphed to the corps and divisions concerned.
Two Topographical Sections were formed in Aug., 1918, to work in closer touch with the headquarters
of the XXth and XXIst Corjjs, and to compile and print small maps of the enemy's defence Une as
required, showing information from the latest air photographs and Intelligence reports, more frequently
than the regular full sheets of the Survey Company could be issued. The maps of the Survey Company
were used as a basis, and new work was added or enlargements of limited areas were made to show smaller
details. Maps measuring fourteen and a half inches by nine inches were reproduced in five colours if
necessary, on duplicators, and in this way several hundred copies could be produced within twenty-four
hours of the taking of the photographs. The short time required to get out a map with a suitable amount
of detail, made this a very useful supplementary method, especially in the case of raids. In the
short period of seven weeks, during which the topographical sections were in action, thirty-two of these
sketch maps in all were produced, and over 8,800 copies distributed.
The Letterpress Section of the Company.
Periodical " Intelligence Simamaries," Topographical Handbooks, and other reports were printed
at Ramleh.
90 THE ADVANCE OF THE
Sound Eanging Sections.
Two Sound Ranging Sections were added to the establishment of the Field Survey Company in Aug.,
1917. Their work was to locate enemy guns and bursts of shells by sound, and also to conduct shoots
on certain, of the more active gun positions located. It should be noted that the sound ranging here
spoken of is carried out by an apphcation of advanced electrical science, and should not be confused with
what are known as " sound bearings " — a rough and ready method, where direction is judged by hearing.
On the Gaza-Beersheba line two bases were surveyed and occupied, one by each section, between the
coast and Mendur. In this way the whole of the enemy's front line from the sea to Atawineh was covered
— approximately ten miles. In this position 629 gun locations were made and twenty-four shoots
conducted.
With open warfare these sections came out of action, but with the commencement of trench warfare
bases were once more established and occupied. The sections moved with the advance of our line
until the Arsuf-Sinjil line was reached, where three bases were occupied by one section on the hills
and two bases by the other section on the plain. In Aug., 1918, a third sound ranging section was
formed locally to occupy a sixth base on the foothills. In this way the whole of the enemy line,
approximately thirty-six and a half miles in length to a depth of five miles, was covered.
Sound ranging sections are able to locate guns by day or night with considerable accuracy, except
in 'strong adverse winds, and at the same time to give the calibre of the guns located. In conjunction
with aeroplane photographs sound ranging succeeded in locating practically all the enemy gun positions,
and shoots on the majority of the locations were so eSective that the enemy was forced to vacate occupied
pits or their guns were silenced at will by our artillery.
From Sept., 1917, to Sept., 1918, over 3,000 gun locations were made, and over seventy shoots by
our artillery were conducted.
Observation Group.
This group came into action in the foothill area in Aug., 1918. Its work consisted in locating enemy
guns by flash spotting and reporting enemy activity behind the line, for example, concentration of troops,
movements along roads, etc., The group required four accurately fixed observation posts, for which
the necessary survey was done by the field sections of the company. During the short time the group
was in action, however, enemy artillery activity on its front was shght, and very little opportunity was
given for locating guns in this way.
Meteorological Section.
Regular meteorological observations have been made by this section of the company. Readings
of maximum and minimum temperatures, hxmiidity, barometric pressure, evaporation, wind, and rain-
fall were recorded four times a day. A daily weather report was issued comprising the observations
at General Headquarters and at Jerusalem, and also a weekly smnmary of the observations at these
two places. The necessary observations were telegraphed every morning to the Physical Service, Cairo,
where they were combined with data from other places and used in making the forecast for the Palestine
front. This forecast was issued daily except during the settled smnmer season. Recently a daily report
has been issued giving weather and road conditions at a number of places throughout Syria.
Measurements of the direction and velocity of upper air currents were made by the observation
of the flight of small pilot balloons. From these observations corrections were computed for the use
of the artillery and communicated usually once daily. During artillery activity balloon flights were
observed at intervals of four hours during the day and night. These upper air reports were also issued
to the Royal Ar Force, and to the Sound Ranging Sections. Special balloons flights were observed,
when required by the Royal Ar Force, before long distance aeroplane flights.
The second meteorological station was established at Jerusalem in April, 1918, and later pilot balloon
work was conducted there and the results sent to the artillery on that part of the front.
The Meteorological Section also undertook the checking and calibration of instruments, such aa
aneroid barometers, compasses, thermometers, etc., for other units as required.
4.— Military Railways.
Previous to the operations against the Gaza position in 1917, the mala lino had been laid to
kilometre 226-2 and was operated as far as Belah Station.
From Rafa (kilometre 200), a branch line had been laid in the direction of Beersheba as far aa
kilometre 28 from Rafa, and was operated as far as Shellal Junction from which point a short line of
about seven kilometres in length ran southwards to Gamli.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 91
During tho same period the double tracking of the main line from Kantara East to Rafa had advanced
as far as kilometre 137 "5, tiiat is to say, to Maadan Station. This length of double line enabled
considerable economies to bo effected in tijne, engines, trucks, and operating staff.
In order to economise transport immediately in front of Belah, for the purpose of increasing' the
amount available in the Becrshoba area, a two-foot six-inch gauge light railway was run from Belah
Station to various points but little west of the Wadi Ghuzze. Before operations commenced this line
had attamcd a length of nineteen kilometres and was eventually extended another four kilometres. A
large part of this line was in direct view from the Turkish position, but no material damage resulted.
This lino enabled large reserves of supplies and anununition to be placed before-hand well up towards
the front line and proved to bo of considerable value.
In connection with the Gaza operations the following programme was arranged. The Beersheba
branch was to be extended to Karm Station at kilometre 36'8. This necessitated track being laid at a
rate approaching two miles per day. At the same time it was arranged to extend tho main line in front
of Gaza, across the Wadi Ghuzze, and then construct a dummy station on the west side of the wadi.
In spite of heavy rains both parts of the programme were carried out successfully ; Karm Station being
opened for traffic one day ahead of the scheduled date, viz. Oct. 28. During the operations the Beersheba
line was extended to about kilometre 39.
In view of the successful development of the attack, work was stopped on the Beersheba line,
and the construction of the main line towards Gaza was recommenced on Nov. 10.
Up to this date the hght railways were constructed and operated by the Railway Operating Division
of the standard gauge. Owing to the rapid advance after the capture of Gaza and the necessity
for operating the captured Turkish railways (at this time isolated from the standard gauge system),
a Light Railway Organization was formed which moved up to Deir Sineid to take over and operate the
three-foot six-inch lines taken from the Tm-ks. The useful part of this line extended from Beit Hanun
to Jerusalem (eighty-nine kilometres), with a branch from Jmiction Station (Wadi Surar Junction) to
Ludd (nineteen kilometres). At first the line was only available for use as far as Artuf on the Jerusalem
line on account of the destruction of bridges. On the branch towards Ludd the bridge over the
Wadi Surar had been destroyed, but a temporary deviation was soon constructed which made this line
available for traffic.
On the line between Artuf and Jerusalem four steel bridges had been destroyed, viz. : two of thirty
metres span, one of ten metres span, and one of sixteen metres span. The work of reconstruction was
immediately commenced.
Further advances by our troops and the possibility of imloading stores at Jaffa rendered the con-
struction of railway communications with that port necessary. The light railway staff was therefore
transferred to Jaffa about the middle of December and construction commenced on lines north of Jaffa
and towards Ludd to coimect with the existing three-foot six-inch line. To enable this to be done the
three-foot six-inch lines were taken over by the Railway Operating Division.
The reconstruction of the bridges on the Jerusalem line was much hammered by the narrowness
and rocky nature of the gorge which prevented much material being taken forward to any bridge until
those in rear were completed.
The four bridges were finally completed and the whole of the line to Jerusalem opened to traffic on
Jan. 27, 1918.
During this period the narrow gauge suffered severely from rains. The line from Deir Sineid to
Tineh was constructed on new earthworks with inadequate drainage. Nimierous washouts occurred,
and the line was closed on this account on several occasions for periods varying from three to ten days.
Meanwhile, the standard gauge was progressing northwards through Gaza, and Deir Sineid Station,
with ample facilities for transhipment to the three-foot six-inch line, was opened for traffic on Nov. 28,
1917. The opening of this station enabled additional rolling stock for the narrow gauge to be brought
up with consequent increase of capacity.
North of Deir Sineid the standard gauge line runs through long stretches of brown cotton soil which
caused endless trouble during tho winter. The heavy rains caused subsidences of the new earthwork
and washouts were frequent. The unfavourable nature of the soil not only caused trouble on the rail-
way but greatly hampered the camel transport during wet weather. Indeed movement of any sort of
transport was at tunes impossible. Considerable relief was afforded when the railway reached the sandy
hills which stretched from south of Jaffa towards Wadi Surar Junction. To effect this a temporary
supply railhead was opened at Deiran (kilometre 293) on Jan. 8, 1918. Besides taking supplies for troops
to the north, this station was used for supplies to the Jerusalem region, as Ramleh (about seven miles
distant) was connected to Jerusalem by a fairly good metalled road and by the older portion of the three-
foot six-inch line, which was made available for through traffic by the completion of the bridges on
Jan. 27, 1918. Ludd Station, with extensive railway facilities, and unloading sidings for all departments,
was opened for traffic on Feb. 4, 1918. Ample transhipment facihties to the three-foot six-inch line
were soon available for all services, which reduced the handling of goods destined for Jerusalem to a
minimum.
ft2
THE ADVANCE OP THE
Construction of the line north of Ludd was continued as far as kilometre 315, just beyond Rantieh
Station, which was as far as the military situation then permitted.
It soon became evident that traffic demands to Jerusalem could not be met by the narrow gauge
line. The first stage of relief was the laying of the standard gauge from Ludd to Artuf and the construc-
tion of transhipment sidmgs at the latter place. This portion of the line was laid with three rails, so as
to allow the narrow gauge trains to rim at night while construction work was not in progress. This
work was commenced on Feb. 27, 1918, and finished on March 31. It was then possible to concentrate
all the narrow gauge rolling stock on the Artuf -Jerusalem section, thus increasing the capacit)' of the line.
Shortly after this, it was decided to push the standard gauge on to Jerusalem and, as the amount of
rockwork necessary to permit the passage of the larger rolling stock was not excessive, the work was put
in hand on April 22. Except for eight hours per day, while construction work was in progress, the
narrow gauge line was open for traffic, and was worked to its maximmn capacity. The daily programme
of work consisted of taking up a length of narrow gauge, levelling and removing the ballast, laying the
standard gauge, laying the narrow gauge rails inside the new ones and finally joining up the narrow
gauge to permit traffic to continue. This is probably the best laid and most permanent section of the
whole system. During the alteration of this section the average daily tonnage taken into Jerusalem by
rail exceeded 740 tons, and as a maximimi reached 1,051 tons on May 24. Jerusalem was reached on
June 9, and the station opened for standard-gauge traffic on June 15.
The construction of the standard gauge line to Beersheba had been going on intermittently during
the spring and was finished on May 3, 1918.
In accordance with the demands of the military situation the standard gauge was laid on tlie old
Turkish formation between Irgeig, on the Beersheba line, and Wadi Surar Jimction, thus giving an
alternative line north of Rafa to Ludd, Wadi Surar, and Jerusalem. This was carried out between May
14 and July 8.
The construction of the double line, which was temporarily stopped near Maadan, was recommenced
by a small construction party on Nov. 1, 1917, and was completed through to Rafa on April 17, 1918.
Following up the successful operations of Sept., 1918, railway construction was again commenced
on the 20th. On Sept. 28 the standard gauge alignment swung on to the old Turkish formation north
of Ras el Ain, thus enabling construction to be carried out at an increased rate (two kilometres per day).
Tul Keram Station was reached on Oct. 15, enabling direct transhipment to take place between the
standard gauge and the narrow gauge rimning towards Haifa and Damascus. Continuing northwards
from Tul Keram, by way of Tanturah and the western end of Mount Carmel, the line reached Haifa,
and was opened for traffic early in Jan., 1919.
From Dec, 1917, light railways were constructed and operated for the suj^ply of our more advanced
lines : —
From Jaffa to Ludd.
,, Sarona to Jelil.
„ Sheikh Muannis to Carrick Hill.
a total of some 115 kilometres, exclusive of sidings.
From Ludd to Ras el Ain.
„ Kafr Jiunis to Lubban.
„ Jerusalem to Bireh.
The following figures are of interest in connection with the standard gauge lines :-
Total length of track laid kilos. 1,000 Number of locomotives
Number of turnouts laid
Number of stations
(includes Haifa Station).
748
80
Number of wagons
Number of passenger vehicles
Number of hospital coaches
160
2.573
50
98
The Units which have taken part in the construction and operation of military railways of all
gauges are : —
Railway Operating Division, R.E. (eighteen sections,
about 5,500 all ranks).
90th Light Railway Operating Company, R.E.
98lh Light Railway Train Crew Company, R.E.
115lh Railway Construction Company, R.E.
llOth Railway Construction Company, R.E.
265lh Railway Construction Company, R.E.
2GCth Railway Construction Company, R.E.
272nd Light RaiKvay Construction Company, R.K.
1st Bridging Company, Canadian Railway Troops.
299th (Indian) Railway Construction Com]iany.
l/23rd Sikh Pioneers.
2/23rd Sikh Pioneers.
2/32ud Sikh Pioneers.
12l8t Sikh Pioneers.
Egyptian Army Reserve (about 2,800).
Egyptian Labour Corps (eventually al)out 2<),000).
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
98
5. — The Army Postal Service.
Tlie Army Postal Service of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was formed of British, Australian,
New Zealand, and Indian sections, and served an area stretching from Mersina to Assiut, and from
Sollmn to Amman, through 140 army post offices. The personnel of all sections totals : British,
twenty-five officers, 5C4 men ; Australian, one officer, fifty-seven men ; New Zealand, twelve men ; Indian,
eighteen British officers, twenty-nine other ranks, and 257 Indian officers and other ranks. The average
number of bags received weekly for the troops from overseas reached : —
IjCtters. Parcels. Total.
British bags 2,.'')00 ... 2,350 ... 4,850
Australian 632 ... 1,339 ... 1,971
New Zealand „ 1.30 ... 270 ... 400
Indian „ 20 ... 20 ... 40
The maximum number of bags received in one calendar week at one port totalled 24,810 bags.
Every bag, from its despatch to this force to its receipt at railhead, has to be handled and re-handled not
less than twenty- five times.
The average number of letters sent weekly to the home countries was : British, 500,000 ; Australian,
42,000; New Zealand, 8,400; Indian, 15,000. The totals for the period are: British, 36,000,000;
Australian, 3,000,000; New Zealand, 000,000; Indian, 950,000. Letters received from home are re-
ceived in sealed bags and amount for the period to many millions, exceeding these figures. 173,7.50
letters circulate weekly within the forces, and 47,000 letters are posted weekly by the Egyptian Expedi-
tionary Force for Egypt. The combined Army Returned Letter Offices dealt with 4,548,000 items.
Registered letters dealt with by the combined services during the period total 600,000 received and
297,000 despatched.
Postal Orders and Money Orders have been issued to a value of £476,000 and paid to a value of
£165,000 by the British post offices, while the Indian post offices have issued Money Orders to a value
of £256,250. War Savings Certificates recently issued total £4,180.
In addition to normal Army post office work, Egyptian civil mails have been embarked and
disembarked, and mails in transit from India, China, and the East, to England and the Continent, have
been handled over land and re-embarked.
Civil Mails in Occupied Enemy Territory.
In the Occupied Enemy Territory, postal services for civilians have been carried on at fifteen post
offices. Postal Orders have been issued and paid to a value of £12,000 in each case, and Money Orders
to a value of £2,250 and £3,900 respectively.
Special stamps were issued on Feb. 10, 1918, for use in this area. At first only one piastre and five
milliemes overprinted on one piastre were available ; but other values were added from tune to time,
and the complete set now consists of the issues described hereunder : —
Current Stamps.
All these are gummed and perforated,
numbers : —
They were printed in England and have no control
Denomination.
Date of Issue.
Colour.
1 millieme
. July 16, 1918
brown.
2 milliemes
. July 16. 1918
green.
3
. Dec. 17, 1918
pale chocolate.
4
. July 16, 1918
scailet.
5
. Sept. 25, 1918
orange.
I piastre
. Nov. 9, 1918
dark indigo.
2 pi'tstres
. July 16, 1918
olive.
5 „
. Julv 16, 1918
purple.
9 ..
. Dec. 17, 1918
bistre.
10 „
. Dec. 17, 1918
blue.
20 „
. Doe. 27, 1918
grey.
Obsolete Stamps
Denomination.
Date of Issue.
Colour.
Description.
Control
Number
Where
Number.
Issued.
Printed
5 milliemes (a) ...
Feb. 16, 1918 ...
blue
... roulotted and
ungnninu-d
... B18A ...
6,(RK1
•• Eg.Tpt
„ (b) ...
March 5, 1918 ...
blue
... rouletted
... C18B ...
55,560
•• Egypt
„ (c) ...
May 13, 1918 ...
blue
... rouletted
.. DI8C ...
54.120
.. Egypt
I piastre (a) ...
Feb. 10, 1918 ...
dark indigo
... rouletted and
unguTumcd
.. A 18
21.000
- Egypt
„ (6) ...
March 5, 1918 ...
blue
... rouletted
... C 18
338,000
.. Egypt
94
THE ADVANCE OF THE
ROYAL ARMY SERVICE CORPS.
1. — Establishment and Supplies.
NIBIBER OF R.A.S.C. OFFICERS IN THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
The Roya! Army Service Corps in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force is divided into four main
branches, viz. : mechanical transport, horse transport, supply, and camel transport, and the number of
officers employed with these branches is as under : —
Mechanical transport, 273 ; horse transport, 174: ; supply, 256 ; camel transport, 234.
In addition there are the following : —
Supply and transport Directorate, 23 ; StaS of G.H.Q., corps, divisions, etc., 19 ; attached to
Infantry, 76 ; attached to R.A.F., 12 ; duty with O.E.T.A., 17 ; duty with Egyptian Army, 2 ;
miscellaneous (non-R.A.S.C. duties), 8. In all, 1,094.
This total of 1,094 officers comprises the following : —
Regulars, 39 ; Indian S. & T. Corps, 33 ; Territorials, 110 ; Austrahans, 49 (serving with C.T.C.) ;
Anglo- Egyptians, 51 ; New Army, 783 ; Regular Quartermasters, 29.
CIVIL PROFESSIONS.
Of the 168 recorded professions followed by New Army officers in civil life, the chief are as under ;
Accountants (includes 1 1 Chartered)
Assurance and Insurance
Auctioneers and Valuers
Agents and Travellers
Bankers, Bank Managers, etc
Brewers and Distillers
Brokers
Civil Servants
aerks
Clergymen
Commercial Directors and Secretaries
Contractors and Builders
Egyptian Ministry Officiak
Carritd forward
50
16
5
59
19
U
16
35
73
3
22
13
20
342
Brought forward
Engineers
Farmers, Graziers, Cattle and Sheep Men
Journalists and Lecturers
Manufacturers ,
Merchants
Planters ,
Schoolmasters and Educational OiEcials
Solicitors
Students
Surveyors
Theatrical Managers and Actors
Total
342
154
76
11
16
61
16
32
30
21
10
6
763
STRENGTH OF OTHER RANKS IN THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
BRITISH.
INIIIAXS.
EGYl^TIANS.
H.T.
Driver
Class.
M.T.
Driver
Class.
o
<
S
P3
a
3
ti
Pi
m
0
egyptian
Camel
Drivers.
►a
<
H
O
H
GRAND
TllTAL.
(1) Horse Transport
(2") Supply
■1705
2]s
r.c,
(;.-,.-,8
GS.5
12: IS
r.u
i:i54
17."i2
20
4
43S
5390
4273
7S56
23S
00
2725
3677
47119
977
19123
38G8
8476
977
19423
3868
16591
4273
(3) Mechanical Transpoit
(4) Camel Transport
(.i) Donkey Transport ...
8833
19661
3928
Total
4979
f;5.58
198:1
734
1354
177«
433
17817
2725
3677
.5776
23291
32744
532SG
SUPPLIES— EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
(1) Approximate Ration Strength Sept. 19, 1918 : —
British
Indians
Egyptians ...
Total
22fi,n00
111,800
128,950
467,050
Horses ...
Muloa ...
Camels
Donkeys
Total
74,800
39,100
35,000
1 1 ,000
159.900
The daily cost of feeding the above Ration Strength amounts to £43,385.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE
96
(2) Sources of origin of principal supplies : —
Article.
Meat Frozen
or
Meat preserved
Flour
Atta, or
Biscuit
Bacon
Cheese
Jam
Tea ...
Milk ...
Sugar
Salt ...
Rice ...
Dried fruit
Fuel wood
Sheep and goats
Origin.
Australia, South Africa, |
Argentine (
America, Australia
Australia, India, Canada
India
England and Egypt
England, Australia
Australia
Australia, Egypt
Ceylon
England, America
Egypt
Egypt
Rangoon
Cyprus, Egypt, India, Basra
Egypt and Cyprus
Sudan and Cyprus
req
Daily
uirements.
70 tons
62 ,.
90 „
230 „
250 „
24 „
20 „
24 „
(> ,.
17 „
25 „
7 „
31 „
8 „
250 „
300 head
Article.
Potatoes
Lontilsand beans
Onions
Matches
Barley
Maize
Gram
Millet
Tibben
Blioosa
Huy
Dries
Sucrepaille
Green forage ...
Petrol
Kerosene
Origin.
Egypt and Cyprus
Egypt
Egypt
Japan
Egypt and India
Egypt
India
Sudan
Egypt
India
India
Egypt
Egypt
Egypt
SumatrOf Red Sea wells
(refined at Suez)
Daily
requirements.
25 tons
.. 16 „
25
..100,800 boxes
I grain
[ 800 tons
HaystulTs
900 tons
Avtn. 8,000 galls.
Tspt. 15,000 „
5,000 „
(3) Supplies produced and Establishments managed by R.A.S.C., or under R.A.S.C. supervision: —
Compressed forage
Compressed tibben
Compressed dries
Biscuit
Margarine . . .
Rum
Pickles
Jam
Cured fish ...
loe
Flour mills ...
In cotton presses at Alexandria.
In cotton presses at Alexandria,
Zugazig, Mansura, Barrage, and
Assiut.
Cairo, Alexandria.
Cairo.
Alexandria.
Cairo.
Alexandria.
Port Said, Kautara.
Port Said, Jaffa, Jerusalem.
Cairo and Zagazig.
Grain crushers
Dairy farm
Bakeries
Cold storage premises
Kantara, Port Said, and Cairo.
VVilhelma, Palestine — milk, butter,
eggs.
Alexandria, Cairo, Port Said, Bir
Salem, Ludd, Jerusalem, Haifa,
Beirut, Tripoli, Rayak.
Three at Port Said. One W.D.
property with capacity for 4,500
tons ; two requisitioned premises,
each with capacity of about 600
tons.
(4) Average daily tonnage of supplies despatcJied by rail via Egypt, Port Said, and Kantara to Palestine : —
June, 1,615 tons ; July, 2,026 tons ; Aug., 2,317 tons ; Sept., 1,732 tons ; Oct., 806 tons ;
2.— Mechanical Transport.
The great value of mechanical transport in this force may be said to bave commenced in connection
with the operations resulting in the capture of Beersheba and Gaza, and the advance through Southern
Palestine to the Jafia-Ramleh-Jerusalem line in the months of Nov. and Dec, 1917.
Prior to this date mechanical transport was almost entirely localized in station transport in Egypt,
with the exception of a certain number of Ught ambulances and Ford vans and Light Car Patrols, used in
the Western Desert and in the advance across the desert to Sinai, it being impossible at this stage of
the proceedings to use heavier types of vehicles, except caterpillar tractors of which there were then
only some half dozen, and these were engaged in pipe laying.
Once the desert was crossed, it was possible to use heavy transport in the Palestine operations.
The roads in most cases were bad — httle more than tracks — ^but nevertheless, with care, it was possible
to make use of lorry transport. The immediate result of this change was that units, hitherto only
equipped with horse and camel transport, had their War Establishments amended to pro\'ide for the
use of mechanical transport, resulting in a greatly increased mobihty on the part of the whole force in
Palestine, and enabUng operations to be carried out at a much greater distance in advance of railhead.
To give some idea of the great increase in mechanical transport in this force subsequent to July,
1917, it is only necessary to point out that between that date and Nov. 30, 1918, the mechanical
transport of the whole force had more than doubled, and if that portion which has been employed in
the Palestine operations were taken alone, it would be safe to say that, whereas, in the summer of 1917
we had only a few hundred mechanical transport vehicles in Palestine, we have now thousands.
96 THE ADVANCE OF THE
Just before the Armistice the following mechanical transport vehicles were employed in this force,
these figures being exclusive of Royal Air Force vehicles and those of AlUed contingents, which if included
would considerably augment the numbers shewn : —
Motor cycles
Touring cars
Motor ambulances
Lorries, includiug gun, workshop, store lorries, etc.
Vans
Caterpillar tractors
Caterpillar trucks and other trailers
Motor boats
1523
617
586
1579
670
281
612
37
Total 5905
There are in the force between sixty and seventy distinct Army Service Corps Mechanical Transport
Units, in addition to which must be added mechanical transport which is attached to almost every
other branch of the service, e.g. Corps, Divisional and Brigade Headquarters, Heavy Artillery, Light
Car Patrols, Armoured Batteries, Signal Companies, Sanitary Sections, Postal Service, Bridging Com-
panies, Ordnance Workshops, Army Troops Companies, R.E., Railway Construction and Operating
Companies, Hospitals, and Casualty Clearing Stations, etc.
Mechanical transport may be divided into various branches, of which the following are a few : —
Workshops. — Those at the Base being for heavy work, while others, which are mobile, follow the troops from place
to place and are employed for carrying out repairs in the field.
Stores. — This branch deals with the demand for spare parts from the United Kingdom, with the local purchase of parts
which can be obtained in Egypt, and with the distribution of spares to all units employing mechanical transport.
Convoy IForA;.— Embracing supply convoys, transport of ammunition for heavy artillery. Ordnance, and Royal
Engineer material and troops. Convoys have largely been made up of lorries, but caterpillar tractors have also been
used where the nature of the ground precludes the use of lorries and Ford van convoys also have been run.
Motor Boats. — There is attached to this force what I believe is a unique unit in the Army Service Corps work, viz. :
Motor Boat Company, A.S.C. This unit consists of thirty-seven motor boats of different sizes, the bulk of which are
employed on the Suez Canal and ports, but with detachments at Cairo, Alexandria, Dead Sea, and the Palestinian ports.
Subsequent to the operations in the autumn of 1917, it was decided to send motor boats to the Dead Sea. The only
means of transport from railhead, then at Ludd, was by hauling the boats on specially constructed drags from Ludd to
the Dead Sea, a work of no small magnitude when one realizes the excessive gradients to be negotiated, the hair-pin bends
and, in many cases, the narrowness of the roads at such bends but still four boats were safely taken to the I)cad Sea.
After the recent advance it was decided to send two boats to Lake Tiberias, the larger of the two boats selected being
forty feet in length, standing sixteen feet from the ground, and weighing twenty-one tons with its drag. The journey
from the Dead Sea was commenced on Sept. 29 via Jerusalem, Nablus, Jenin, Nazareth, Tiberias being reached on
Oct. 12. Shortly after the boats had been launched, the rapidity of the advance made their retention on the Lake of
Tiberias unnecessary. Orders were therefore given for them to be withdrawn and taken by caterpillar tractor to Haifa.
The diflSculties of the transport of these boats were very great. They were accompanied by a guard of British West
Indians and by Egyptian Labour Corps personnel. In many cases the sides of the roads had to be built up to permit the
passage of the boats. In other cases culverts had to be strengthened en route. Wadis with from three to four feet of
water had to be crossed. In other places abandoned German lorries had to be pushed over the side of the road. In
some sections SifScuIties of travelling were so great that only three miles were accomplished in the twenty-four hours.
Fighting Units. — ^These are principally comprised of Armoured Car Batteries and Light Car Patrols.
These units perform important functions in scouting and reconnaissance work, particularly in the case
of an advance such as those which took place in 1917 and recently. They were also employed in out-
lying work on the Western Desert along the TripoUtan frontier. Practically the whole of the Heavy
and Siege Artillery of this force is moved by caterpillar tractors. During the operations which resulted
in the capture of Jerusalem the strain on this branch of the service was extremely heavy. Owing to it
being the winter season, the country was largely composed of one vast bog through which the tractors
had to haul the guns ; and they had also to get the ammunition up to the dumps once the guns were
in position. Notwithstanding the difficulties the caterpillar tractors had to contend with the heavy
guns, throughout the operations, were kept up with the advance.
Tyre Presses. — These form an important adjunct to the mechanical transport in this country. The
standard life of a lorry tyre is based at 10,000 miles. Needless to say owing to the difficulties imder
which lorries have to work in Palestine (in many cases over roads, which are roads in name only), the
heavy gradients, etc., the life rarely, if ever, exceeds 2,000 miles, and in some instances, such as the
run from Samakh to Damascus, the life of a lorry tyre does not exceed 700 miles. Tyres are taken off
and new ones put on by means of hydraulic presses, which work at a pressure up to eighty tons. In order
to cope with the difficulties of retyring lorries diu-ing the recent advance, two tyre presses were built on
to German lorries (captured in the Beersheba operations of 1917), and followed the lorry companies
througliout the advance, thereby reducing the time the lorries were kept o(T the road to a minimum.
Man Power. — ^During 1918 it has been with the greatest dilficulty that personnel has been found
for the ever-growing needs of transport. Early in the year the question of substitution of the "A"
class personnel by men of lower category was considered by the War Ollico. In view of the climatic
conditions, the length of the journeys to be performed, the dust, etc., it was considered by this force
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 97
that it was of the utmost importance that as many of the personnel in Palestine should be " A " class,
and that substitution was inadvisable. This was finally agreed to by the War Office, and it is safe
to say that the heavy and continuous work which has devolved on the mechanical transport in Palestine
during the summer and autumn of 1918 has fully upheld the action taken some twelve months ago.
Even in spite of the fact that as many " A " class persoimel as possible were employed, the number of
men in hospital has increased from about four per cent in June, 1918, to ten per cent at the present
time. In order to assist the supply of drivers. War Office was informed early in 1918, that as far as
possible, this force would be self-contained as regards drivers and artificers. In consequence of this
in Jan. 1918, a School of Instruction for lorry drivers was formed at Cairo for training Egyptians.
Recruits were given ten weeks training in the school and then drafted into lorry companies employed
in Egypt and the Canal Zone, the British personnel theieby released being sent to Palestine to take over
additional lorries, etc., which were being received from the United Kingdom, and also to replace casual-
ties. Further Egyptians were trained at the garages in Cairo, Alexandria, and Kantara as drivers for
light cars and motor ambulances in Egypt. Egyptian artificers have been also taken on in the work-
shops in Egypt and trained and given instruction in mechanical transport shops. At the present time
there are upwards of 800 Egyptian drivers and about 200 Egyptian artificers employed in this force
in the mechanical transport. In order to further assist matters, in the autunm of this year a certain
number of Jewish women were taken on at the Advanced Base M.T. Sub-Depot, Palestine, to release
men and were employed in the stores department, vulcanizing shops, and on clerical work. Another
source from which drivers were provided was by obtaining " B " class personnel from the infantry and
other branches of the service for instruction in mechanical transport ; in fact every possible source from
which drivers could be obtained was tapped.
Repairs. — At times great difficulty has been experienced in keeping mechanical transport on the
road owing to the lack of spare parts. This arose from various causes. Some of the principal makes
of vehicles employed in this force, e.g. Peerless lorries. Ford cars, van and ambulances, Holt caterpillar
tractors, are American, and the spares for these vehicles had to be brought first from America to
England and then sent on to this force. Also the supply was curtailed owing to the demands from
other theatres of war. Again in many instances transports with consignments of spare parts were sunk
owing to enemy action, causing delay often of months before the spares could be replaced. Various
expedients had to be resorted to, the chief being the manufacture of parts in the Army Service Corps
workshops, local purchase of parts made by engineering firms in Egypt, adapting parts for other uses
than those for which they were originally intended ; and temporarily disassembhng vehicles and
employing the parts removed to keep other vehicles on the road.
During all the operations east of Gaza, the mainstay of the army for suppHes has been the mechanical
transport, until the broad gauge railway had been built or the narrow gauge Turkish hues repaired.
In the case of the operations in 1917, the troops were fed over sixty miles ahead of railhead by means
of mechanical transport. Ever since the occupation of Jericho all troops in the Jordan Valley and on
the east of the Jordan at Es Salt and Amman have been fed by means of mechanical transport.
In the recent operations resulting in the capture of Damascus, Aleppo, and Alexandretta, the whole
of the supplies and ammunition were taken from railhead by the mechanical transport, until such time
as Syrian ports at Haifa, Beirut, Tripolis, and Alexandretta were opened. To give instances how the
troops were maintained, it is only necessary to point out that troops were fed at Tiberias by lorries
working from Has el Ain, a distance of some eighty miles, and that until the Turkish railways could be
put in order they were fed at Damascus from lorries based at Samakh, the return journey occuppng
three to four days. Again in the advance on Aleppo, the troops were fed and ammunition conveyed
by lorries based at Beirut and Tripolis. In fact, without the extensive employment of mechanical
transport, it is difficult to see how the services of maintenance could have been carried out in the opera-
tions which resulted in the capture of Jerusalem in 1917, Damascus and Aleppo in 1918.
The whole work of the mechanical transport officers and men of all ranks has been consistently
maintained at a very high standard. In order to maintain vehicles on the road and to meet the demands
made on them during the last eighteen months, the strain on the workshop and store personnel has been
exceptionally heavy. To maintain the troops at the front the drivers of lorries, cars, and caterpillar
tractors had continuously to work long hours under trying conditions of heat and dust or wet, according
to the season of the year. Every branch of the service however, rose to each emergency as it came along,
and it is impossible to appreciate too highly the work done by this branch of the service during the past
eighteen months.
98 THE ADVANCE OF THE
3.— Camel and Donkey Transport.
In July, 1917, the Camel Transport Corps consisted of sixteen companies and two depots, the total
strength of bmrden camels being 32,712. Eleven of these companies (2,000 camels per company) were heavy
burden camels and were attached to East Force. Five light burden companies (2,000 camels per company)
were employed on hnes of communication with detachments on the western front at Matruh, Solium,
and Baharia.
During the following months of August and September, the companies of the Corps were allocated
to the army formations as follows : —
Camels. Duty.
XXth Army Corps 8,000 ... 1st line transport
XXIst Army Corps 8,000 ... 1st line transport
Desert Mounted Corps 8,000 ... Convoy.
General Headquarters 4,000 ... Convoy.
The remaining camels of the corps were employed on lines of communication and the western front.
In October a further re-distribution of camels was made to the formations. The XXth Corps had
20,000 camels allotted, 8,000 being attached to divisions for first line work and the remaining 12,000
were employed on convoy duty.
The XXIst Corps had 6,000 camels allotted to divisions for first line work and Desert Mounted
Corps received G,000 for convoy duty.
The total strength of burden camels including those working on lines of communication and those
on the we.stern front was 35.000. Transport work during the preceding months had been comparatively
light and the camels were remarkably fit when operations commenced.
Durins the actual period of operations, i.e. from October to December all companies were very
hard worked. The troops were operating in areas in advance of the railheads and long convoys were
necessary to maintain them in water, rations, and ammunition.
In the Beersheba area large convoys marched out daily from the railhead, but as the tracks were
suitable for camels and the weather remained mild and open, camel wastage was very low.
In early December severe weather set in. Heavy rain storms made the going difficult and the
piercing cold had a telling effect both on animals and personnel. In the XXth Corps area the condi-
tions were particularly bad. The troops were then operating in the hills. To keep in touch, long camel
convoys had to wind their way over the stony hill sides where there were no definite tracks, the roads up
the valleys being reserved for other forms of transport. Camel camps were frequently pitched on the
wind-swept hills, often at an altitude of 3,000 feet. The biting night winds and the showers of ice-cold
rain militated severelv against the camels and their drivers, both of which were entirely new to such
climatic conditions.
In the central area the conditions were equallv difficult. Desert Mounted Corps convoys were work-
ing from the railhead at Deir Seneid, Esdud, and Sukercir to Ramleh. Tue intervening country consisted
of tilled land across which there were no permanent roads. The heavy rains soon reduced the whole
area to one vast spongy quagmire, crossed here and there by broad wadies, which were difficult to negotiate.
In places camels sank up to the girth in the mud and many had to be abandoned. This was probablj-
the first occasion on which camel transport had been called upon to work under such adverse conditions.
The XXIst Corps camels operating in the sandy area along the coast worked under much easier
conditions.
The camels in the XXth and XXIst Corps areas were very short of forage during the period Dec,
liJl7, to Feb., 1918 ; five pounds of grain being the maximum ration for long periods and during this
period full rations of grain and tibbin were exceptional.
Towards the end of January conditions as to forage for animals, and clothing and equipment for
personnel were much improved.
The following table gives a list of casualties (from all causes) sustained in animals and personnel
during the 1917 operations : —
British ...
Egyptians
Camels ...
Horses . , .
lied.
Died of
Wounded.
Missing.
Died of
Captured.
Total,
Wounds.
1
8
6
... 1.58
E.xposure.
7
... 5.39
38
.. 125
209
1
574
27
... 310
29
... 2090
3
... 3033
I
—
—
J
4
—
Q
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 99
During the months of Feb. and March, 1918, camel transport was reorganized on a basis of 1,200
camels per company. The rea-sons for this change were : —
(a) A reduction in size of command for despite standard of efficiency maintained, competent
authorities were convinced that a 2,000 camel unit was too big for continuous efficient control.
(6) As only 1,200 camels were required for the first line transport of infantry divisions, that
number constituted a complete unit.
(c) Uniformity of organization and consequent interchangeability of first line transport and
convoy companies.
The strength of the Corps at latter part of March, 1918, was 29,000 camels. Distribution was as
follows : — '
XXth Army Corpa 13,200 camels
XXlst Army Corps 6,000
Dosort Mounted Corps 1,200 „
Lines of Comnumication 2,400 „
The remaining camels were at kilo. 298 in reserve and employed on convoys at Ramleh. Camels
with the XXth Corps were doing heavy convoys from railhead and depots to various points. The tracks
and weather conditions were still very bad.
During the Amman operations (from March 23) in practically every instance the ground over which
the camels worked was of the worst possible nature, being extremely hilly and stony. The Anzac
convoys marched by routes which were simply goat tracks in the sides of the hills — only wide enough in
many places for one .string of camels to pass at a time. {See Plate 3-5.)
At Ain Sir village three broad rough terraces had to be crossed. The country was everywhere
difficult, time was limited and officers in charge of convoys had to exercise the greatest care in negotiating
the hills. The stony nature of the ground injured the camels' feet and the heavy rains rendered the
narrow tracks down the inclines very difficult. Nos. 1 and 2 convoys, 1,100 camels, based on Shunet
Nimrin worked to Ain Sir, a distance of sixteen miles. No. 3 convoy working from Ain Sir forward,
had to traverse extremely bad and difficult ground, which was in many places marshy. The camels
were often long hours under their loads owing to existing situation and fluctuation of battle, and coupled
with this fact they had to work at night. This same convoy had a most trying time during the with-
drawal marching from 1600 on March 31 until 1400 on April 1 when they reached Shunet Nimrin. The
most difficult part of the journey had to be done in complete darkness with heavy rain falling and the
ground thick with mud and exceedingly slippery. The convoy was greatly hara.sised and broken by
other units of the retiring column on the single track. In all convoys fifty per cent of the camels were
overloaded owing to nature of supplies and size of bales and sacks. The good work performed was
fully recognized and appreciated by the XXth Corps and the divisions concerned. Two. thousand camels
were used in the two convoys out of which number, 100 were killed in action and ninety-two had to
be destroyed on account of injuries received on the march.
In the latter part of April, 1918, the strength of the Corps was 27,800 camels.
XXth Army Corps had 3,600 with divisions.
XXIst Army Corps had 2,400 with divisions.
Desert Mounted Corps and General Headquarters had the remaining camels on convoy excepting
3,800 on Palestine Lines of Communication and in depots.
In May, strenuous work was done by camels in the second Amman operations. "Weather con-
ditions had improved and tracks were better.
The months of June, .July, and August were comparatively quiet, the camels working on ordinary
duties of first fine with divisions and convoys from railhead to Wadi Surar and Latron. Rations and
water were good, and camels recovered condition.
Camels have also been supplied for work in the Hejaz. In March, 1918, 700 light burden camels
fidly equipped were sent from " Q " Company to Akaba to operate with the Egyptian army in the
Hejaz. These camels were under the command of, and worked by. Camel Transport personnel.
In April, 1918, a further detachment of 2,000 camels was despatched from No. 2 depot at kilo. 298
to Beersheba, where they were handed over to the representative of the Hejaz forces.
At the commencement of the operations in Sept., 1918, the strength of the Corps in camels was 25,700.
They were allotted to formations as follows : —
Formation. No. of Camels.
XXth Corps, 1st Line with divisions 3,600
Convoy
XXIst Corps, 1st Line with divisions
Convoy
Desert Mounted Corps, Convoys
Palestine Lines of Communioation, W.F.F. and Dep6t8
1,400
3,600
9,600
2,600
4,900
100 THE ADVANCE OF THE
Foiir of the convoy companies working with the XXIst Corps were used for carrying water and the
remaining four carried rations.
Compared with the 1917 operations the work of the camels was exceedingly light.
The distances covered were very small ; the weather conditions were excellent, the country in which
the majority of the companies were working was fairly open. Consequently casualties were very few.
The following table shews the total casualties sustained in animals and personnel : —
Killed. Wounded. Missing. Died of Total.
Exhaustion
and exposure.
Egyptians 7 ... 19 ... 38 ... — ... 64
Camels 25 ... 6 ... 15 ... 37 ... 82
In the later stages of operations when the troops moved up country north of Haifa, seven of the
XXIst Corps camel companies were employed on convoy duties until Beirut and Tripolis were reached.
Donkeys. — ^During Sept. and Oct., 1917, the formation of donkey transport companies was in
progress, the estabhshment being 2,000 donkeys to a company. In November of 1917 the first of the
donkey transport companies. No. 1 D.T.C. moved from Rafa to the front and this company was
employed during the whole of the winter under the most arduous conditions.
No. 2 D.T.C. moved up early in 1918 followed by Nos. 3 and 4. These companies comprised 2,000
donkeys in each and during the summer of 1918 were largely employed in road making and were dis-
tributed over the whole forward area from Jericho to Jaf?a. The donkeys, allowing for the casualties
in No. 1 Company caused by abnormal conditions of worli in the winter of 1917, and lack of proper
rations at times have been kept in remarkably good condition.
The following table shews the casualties sustained by the donkeys during the operations : —
led.
Wounded.
Died of
Wounds.
Died of
Exposure.
TOTA
5
5
2
233
245
9
12
—
2
23
1917
1918
Total ... 14 ... 17 ... 2 ... 235 ... 268
It will th\is be seen that the camel transport drivers whose sky blue galabiehs added a very welcome
touch of colour to the drabness of our khaki and of the country side, together with their trusty " oonts ",
besides increasing our knowledge of natural history, took a very considerable share in operations, and
were not wanting in pluck when occasion required. The camel, by the way, proved to be impervious
to shell-fire and the drivers stood their ground repeatedly under difficult circumstances, showing them-
selves well-endowed with the fatalistic courage of the East. The same may be said of the Donkey Corps,
and, in addition, these plucky little beasts made fast friends of all who had to deal with them.
ORDNANCE WORK IN THE PALESTINE AND SYRIA CAMPAIGNS.
A Brief Review.
The work of the Army Ordnance Department, with its scale of supply to a fighting force, ranging
from big guns to bootlaces, has been arduous and interesting during the Palestine and Syria campaigns.
Many problems have been encountered, in addition to routine duties, since warfare in the desert,
combined with an advance into enemy country at a pace unequalled in any other theatre of war, has
pre.sented many special difficulties. Seemingly small things tell ; and it is not too much to say, for
instance, that had not many thousands of fanalis, or water-tanks, of different sizes, been provided for
the Expeditionary Force, its advance across the Sinai desert from the Canal and onwards into Palestine
would not have been possil)le.
If departmental responsibilities may be roughly defined, it should be understood that while other
authorities feed the soldier and his animals and consider both in sickness, the Royal Army Ordnance
Corps provides a fighting force witli its guns, rifles, and ammunition, the clothes it wears, the tentage
that shelters it, the vehicles for its transport, the oil and grease for tlio maintenance of its implements,
its sanitary and cooking utensils, its office furniture, its soap and dubbin, its pails, spades and shovels,
its tools, timber, metals, repair material of all kinds, signalling im])lements and telephones, its harness
and saddlery, its entrenching tools and dial sights — in fact, the full equipment of a fighting force which
enables it to fight. And, whatever the special conditions of campaign, the speed of advance, the nature
of country or weather, these stores must be adcfjuately su])plied, and guns, vehicles, tents, rifles, harness,
and so forth, must be kept in repair. To achieve this was the first principle of Ordnance policy in the
Palestine and Syria campaigns.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 101
The position of Ordnance servicos by the late summer of 1917 may be briefly defined. The summer
montlis iiiid been busy with exjjansioii in men, arms, guns, transport, ammunition, aeroplanes, hospitals.
The cliannel of Ordnance supplies was sin)ple and as e.\peditir)us as tlie D(>sert Railway could make it.
Alexandria was, as always, the Base. A Depot at Cairo, working hand in hand with the Base, looked
after the troops in Egypt, the Western Frontier, the stores for the Hejaz operations, the rapidly increasing
training cainj)s, cadet schools, hospitals, and flying grounds, which Kgypt with its wide areas, its good
railways and its healthy climate was so admirably ada[)ted to (jntertain. On the Canal itself were useful
Ordnance posts at Port Said, Suez, and Aloascar (Isinailia), while the main w(jrk of Ordnance supply
for the fighting force was done by the Field Depot at Kautara, on the east bank of the Canal and at the
terminus of the Desert Railway.
The development of the Ordnance Depot at Kantara has been characteristic of the general activity
of the Egyptian ]*]xpeditionary Force; and of its Ordnance Services. A bare patch of sand in the
autumn of IDIG, this area has now become a highly organized Ordnance Depot covering in all many
acres, with a working personnel little short of 3,0U0, extensive offices, areas for the different " groups "
of stores, for salvage and transit, large workshops, armouries, and magazines, sidings from the broad
gauge railway and an internal narrow gauge system. It has wharves on the Canal itself, at which in one
month alone fifteen ocean-going steamships and Jiincteen Inland Water Transport craft were discharged.
In the autumn of 1918 no fewer than 976 Royal Array Ordnance Corps troops were at work,
while over 700 men of the Egyptian Laboux Corps and over 700 prisoners-of-war were daily
euiployed on unskilled work, and no fewer than 558 Egyptian Labour Corps, civilian, and prisoners-of-
war tradesmen, tentmenders, carpenters, saddlers, tinsmiths, wheelers, blacksmiths, were kept bu.sy in
the big workshops. Here, too, in one autumn month, over 19,000 indents for Ordnance stores for units
were dealt with and over 19,000 tons of ammunition handled.
During 1017, up the line, and in preparation for operations, advanced posts had been establi.shed at
El Arish, Rafa, Deir el Belah, and later at Karm. {See Plate 2.) These were steadily fed by Kantara,
and in order to make for greater efficiency, the El Arish Depot wa.'' closed down and pushed forward
on Oct. 27, 1917, to make contact with the Light Railway that led from Deir el Belah directly to our
troops in the po.sitions before Gaza. Thus, at Deii' el Belah and Karm, emergency depots were quickly
established, holding for urgent issue to troops during the earlier stages of the operations such stores as
clothing and boots, picketing gear, horse-shoes and nails, mess-tins, nose-bags, dubbin, soap, oil and
grease for rifles and guns, ground sheets and blankets. On Oct. 27 the operations against Gaza began.
It may be well to record that the wide scope and variety of Ordnance supply had now to embrace
the daily needs of a force of some 250,000 British and over 18,000 Indian troops, together wdth 100,000
Egyptians, and some 150,000 horses, mules and camels, and that, from the Ordnance standpoint, the
position was comphcated by the fact that the force was very heterogeneous, so that special stores of
many kinds, over and above stores peculiar to Egyptian and desert conditions, had to be provided
for French and Itahan contingents, Indians, units of the Egyptian Army, British West Indian regiments,
natives of the Egyptian Labour Corps, and Camel Transport personnel.
When, after the successful onslaught on the Gaza-Beersheba positions, the force was advancing
rapidly into Palestine, new problems at once presented themselves. Of these the chief were transport
and the weather. The troops had left the railway behind and practically ever)' available channel of
motor or pack transport was required for food, while ammunition was hastened forward by coa.stal
steamer. Great difficulty was experienced in getting important stores up to the troops, for the
Turkish railway was constantly breaking down under stress of weather, and roads became
impassable. Nevertheless a Railhead Ordnance Post was estabhshed as early as Dec. 6 at
Junction Station, and a depot was formed temporarily at Deir Sineid, to be pushed forward to
Ludd and greatly expanded directly the broad gauge railway giving direct commimication with
Kantara was available. Railhead Ordnance posts kept pace with the broad gauge railway as it
advanced, and on Feb. 6 the Ordnance post at Junction Station was moved up to Jerusalem itself.
Throughout these very difficult weeks of the quick dash of the fighting force up to the Jaffa-Jerusalem
line the heavy wear and tear on Ordnance stores of many kinds gave a great deal of hard work to depots
and workshops. The line of commmiications, it must be remembered, began in the hot, dry sand of
Sinai and extended through the moist lowlands of Gaza and Deir Sineid to the arid and barren highlands
of Judaea. It is not easy to conceive more exacting contrasts of chmate and natural conditions than those
of Kantara and Jerusalem. It is easy to reaUze the strain upon troops passing through such varied condi-
tions in so short a time in the wet season. The wear and tear of material in a swift campaign over such
varied areas — especially, for instance, of wheels, harness, clothing, and boots — is necessarily very great.
Jaffa had fallen on Nov. 16, 1917. Jerusalem had surrendered on Dec. 9. The later operations,
while establishing our positions north of both places, and securing the lateral communications from
east to west and working into, and across, the Jordan valley, so as to get into touch with the Sherifian
troops and protect our extended right flank, did not involve any great advance, but enabled the railway
to get up to the troops and the Ordnance to reorganize its system of supply. So far as general stores
102 THE ADVANCE OF THE
were concerned, the Advanced Base Depot at Kantara, the depot at Ludd, and the Railhead post at
Jerusalem constituted a quick and accurate channel. A similar policy had been adopted for two most
essential Ordnance duties, the supply of ammunition and the never-ending task of salvage and repair.
The principle adopted in every branch of Ordnance work has been that supply must keep pace with
the troojis, whatever the difficulties of transport and local conditions. During the summer of 1917
ammunition was steadily concentrated near the scene of operations. Magazines at El Arish and Rafa
covered each some 26,000 square feet. Large stocks were massed at these places, at Belah and at Karm.
During operations approximately 250 tons of ammunition were sent daily up the line. During the
summer of 1918 advanced magazines were estabhshed at Ludd, Jerusalem, and Sarona, to meet the
requirements of the campaign which was to come and the minor but important operations which
estabhshed our prehminary jDositions and safeguarded our earher gains.
Immediate work of repair to guns, vehicles, etc., is done by Light Travelling Workshops, while
heavier jobs are sent back to medium shops or down to depots, or the Base, where larger plant has
been established and greater facihties exist. The Mobile Workshops advance on the heels of troops
and are thus immediately ready for any task that offers. A line of these shops had, by the end of
Dec. 1917, reached Jaffa, Ramleh, Junction >Station, Latron, and Jerusalem. They were subsequently
pushed further forward still and then concentrated into two groups centring upon Jerusalem and
Jafia, thus meeting the requirements of each flank.
These travelling workshops had by no means an easy time during the stormy winter months in
Palestine. They had been thrown almost entirely on their own resources in motor lorries and cars as
it was quite impracticable, on the one hand, to get spare parts, and so forth, up to the shops near the
line by any other means ; or, on the other hand, to send gims, etc., needing heavy repair, to shops farther
back. It is not to be wondered at that on arrival at captured cities such as Jerusalem and Jaffa the
Ordnance workshops made the most of everythmg that could be requisitioned in the way of plant and
premises. At Jerusalem, Turkish armourer's, blacksmith's, and instrument shops were promptly absorbed
and plant was taken over in various parts of the city, including a spacious and well-equipped shop in
a Franciscan Monastery. Shops were estabhshed for bootmakers since boots had suffered severely in
the change from use in summer on the hot desert sand to winter conditions among the wet and rocky
moimtains of Judaea. To help in these new Ordnance workshops, on whose capacity very heavy demands
were at once made, native tradesmen of several trades were brought in.
A great deal of work was thus at once undertaken in repairs to guns, vehicles, etc. The busy activity
and elastic scope of the Jerusalem Ordnance workshops was reproduced at Jaffa. It is interesting to
record that at Jaffa a foundry was established and captured Turkish gim cartridge cases were used for
casting pipe boxes of wagon wheels .... a development which illustrates the extreme technical isolation
of the whole front of the force in the earlier part of the year. In advance of these workshops at Jerusa-
lem and Ludd mobile shops were suitably posted. Behind them were well-equipped shops at Ludd and
the large, still steadily expanding shops at Kantara.
The thoroughness of this workshop organization, as it got mto its stride for the summer, enabled
it to cope effectively with the serious situation which arose owing to the effect on vehicles in summer
of the great heat and dryness of the Jordan Valley. A vehicle repair shop was established in Jericho
and did good work ixnder very trying conditions. In the ten weeks prior to the autumn operations the
mobile shops forward of Kantara repaired no fewer than 2,500 vehicles and, including Kantara, over
14,000 wheels.
The reconstruction of the fighting force which took place in the summer of 1918, involving the
despatch to France of many British troops and their replacement in Egypt and Palestine by Indian
imits from India, Mesopotamia, and France, gave more work to the Ordnance authorities than is per-
haps fully realized. Arrangements had to be made for troops leaving the country to hand in large
quantities of stores and vehicles, and the units arriving had to be equipped according to the Egyptian
scale, while suitable provision had to be made for them to be regularly supplied with the stores peculiar
to their race or rehgion. All this, on a considerable scale, meant careful organization ; a marked extra
strain was thrown upon the Ordnance organizations at Ludd and Kantara ; and to meet the needs of
Indian imits a busy temporary depot was opened at Tel el Kcbir.
The time now approached for the beginning of a second autunm campaign. Ordnance preparations
of all kinds — the estabhshment of ammunition supplies, the repair of guns and vehicles, the expansion
of hospitals, and the supply of tentage for reinforcement camps — were accelerated. For various rea.sons
it had been decided to close down the Ordnance Depot at Ludd and the channel of supply now ran direct
from Kantara to railheads. Both depot and railway proved adequate to the emergency. The develop-
ment of .sea-going traffic direct to Kantara from England, Taranto, Alexandria, and India, must be noted
as having an important bearing on the supply and handling of stores during and after the Syria opera-
tions. Nor nmst the bridging of the Suez Canal itself be ignored, establishing direct railway com-
munication with Egypt, for the first through train from Jerusalem to Cairo left on July 15.
EGYPTIAN^EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 103
The autumn operations presented problems very similar to those of the preceding campaign. Again
troops went " into the blue " and means of sujjply to them, over difficult couiitiy, became sparse and
uncertain. Hut this time the weatlu'r held and the very lapiditv of the advance into Syria enabled a
imw system of supply to be quickly brought into operation. This was supply by sea from Kantara
direct to such ports as Haifa, Beirut, Tiipolis, and Alexandretta, as they successively came within the
area occupied by the Egyptian Ex])editionary Force. Thus the curious, but thoroughly economical
phenomenon was now witnessed of important Ordnance stores which had been collected in Palestine
being sent all the way down tiie line again to Kantara for shipment to Syrian ports. Ordnance per-
sonnel was promptly sent up to these ports and new channels of supply were thus established ; while
such divisions as were later on returned down the line to Egvpt found the old system ready to meet
their needs. Meanwhile a similar policy had been followed with the Mobile Workshops which had been
promptly moved up in accordance with their accepted principle of working as near as jiracticable to the
troops. (See Plate 54.)
Ne.xt, the Ordnance system again confronted two of the great problems which successful operations
in war always involve. These are salvage and the accommodation of prisoners-of-war. Salvage in the.se
operations was immense in quantity and much of the material was very difficult to get at and bring to
the collecting depots at railhead. So salvage ]josts were at once established at important centres, such
as Jelil, Kalkilieh, Ras el Ain, Tul Keram, Ham Allah, Afule, and Damascus, and the di.sposal of salved
stores, thousands of tons in bulk, will come under the final control of Kantara and Alexandria. Exten-
sive areas have been prepared for the reception not only of captured and salved stores from the last
operations but also of an immense amount of Ordnance stores, including especially, camp equipment
from hospitals and standing camps in Egypt. In Palestine itself large quantities of vehicles have been
sold through the O.E.T.A. to the local population at reasonable prices. The salvage of guns necessarily
depends on the capacity of the broad gauge railway, and it is only fair to record that, at every point
and throughout their system, the railway authorities have always endeavoured to meet Ordnance re-
quirements as fully and fairly as possible.
A further task was that of providing accommodation for the thousands of pri.soners-of-war who
now thronged into Egypt and had to be provided with camps and hospitals, the latter, especially, calling
for urgent attention as the percentage of sickness was very high ; and that not only amongst the
prisoners-of-war, but also amongst our own British and Indian troops and Egyptians. It should be
noted that the ration strength of the fighting force had steadily increased from the figures above-quoted
for 1917, until, at the time of the Armistice it amounted to : British and Indians, 341,000 ; Egyptians,
13.3,000; animals, 160,000; and in addition some 90,000 prisoners-of-war. Ordnance work consequently
at this stage was greatly extended, the strain falling chiefly upon Cairo, Kantara, and the Base.
Tentage, camp equipment, and clothing had to be provided — for example, at Belbeis for 30,000
prisoners-of-war, at Tel el Kebir for 19,000, and at Salhia for 10,000 — whilst five large hospitals had
to be formed and six hospitals largely expanded, as the condition of the prisoners on arrival was
generally deplorable.
We have now traced the nrain current of Ordnance Services during the two campaigns and the
intervening summer of 1918. The full scope of Ordnance work can, indeed, only be outlined — the im--
raense developments at Kantara ; the gun-repair work done at Jaffa and Jerusalem ; shipping, amnmni-
tion and railhead work up and down the line ; the establishment of laundries, boot and clothing-repair
shops ; experimental work on pack-saddlery, covers for machine guns in the de.sert, ped-rails and caco-
lets ; the steady provision of desert stores, involving a trustworthy and ab.solutely indispensable water
supply ; the fine work on dial sights and range-finders ; the exacting work on vehicles which had
suffered so severely under the rough Palestine conditions — all these and a hmidred other daily tasks
have been duly and painstakingly performed. There have been difficult questions of per.sonnel, of
local labour, of health, and above all of the extremely heavy strain thrown upon Ordnance organization
at a period of such great pressure in a hot summer by the substitution for their trained personnel of
utterly inexperienced men generally less capable and always of inferior physique. It is hoped, however,
that in general, whatever the conditions, the daily job has been done and the very wide Ordnance
requirements of the troops fully and fairly met.
104 THE ADVANCE OF THE
THE WORK OF THE MEDICAL SERVICES.
The arrival of General Sir Edmund Allenby in July, 1917, was followed almost immediately by a
reorganization of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force. This necessitated considerable changes in the
medical service. The front hue had been for some months on the southern bomidary of Palestine, and
our field ambulances were already provided with motor ambulances, sand-carts and camel cacolets. A
motor ambulance convoy arrived in time for the Gaza operations, and from then until now has done
excellent service. The expansion of the force necessitated the addition of five new casualty clearing
stations and one Indian clearing hospital — previously there had been but two all told. Five new stationary
hospitals were provided, making eight in all, and four 1,040 bedded general hospitals were added to the
seven already in the country. With these new medical imits to hand, the extensive preparations for the
Gaza-Beersheba operations were commenced. Three casualty clearing stations, with a total accom-
modation for 3,000 patients were allotted to serve the right flank and these were placed at Imara ; the
two at Belah dealt with the evacuations from the Gaza sector.
Imara was in full, though distant, view of the Turkish positions and orders forbade the pitching
of any tents until after dusk of the evening preceding the attack. Many readers will remember the
appearance next morning of the erstwhile bare plain with its whole town of tents. To these advanced
hospitals extra surgeons were sent up from the Base so that there should be no delay in surgical treatment,
and hospital trains were able to evacuate the wounded direct to El Arish and Kantara.
The casualties during these early operations, though not as heavy as had been prepared for, were
quite enough to keep the medical department busy in all its branches. From Oct. 28_to Nov. 11, 1917,
Desert Mounted and XXth Corps had 245 officers and 4,674 other ranks wounded, and XXIst Corps
126 officers and 2,947 other ranks. During the same period an equal number of sick was dealt with.
The pursuit taken up by the Desert Moimted and XXIst Corps, which did not cease until Jaffa
had been taken and Jerusalem was in sight, taxed the medical services to their utmost. All medical
transport which could be spared from XXth Corps was temporarily transferred to the other two Corps
to enable them to get their sick and wounded away. As it was impossible to move forward a casualty
clearing station for some time, two field ambulances were also lent them to string out their long Hne of
evacuation, and to provide resting and feeding places for the patients coming dowTi. The weather
during this period of the fighting was very bad and greatly increased the difficulties of the medical
service. The work of the front hne units, especially the field ambulances of the 52nd, 74th, and Yeomanry
Divisions in the Judsean Hills, was at this time very arduous.
The pause which occmred before the attack on Jerusalem enabled three casualty clearing stations
to be brought up ; one to Gaza, another to Deir Seneid, and the third to Junction Station, to which
point the Tm-kish railway was by this time fitfully rimning. On the capture of Jerusalem it was necessary
to hold up the sick and wounded there in order to save them the long journey in the bad weather which
still persisted. A casualty clearing station was soon opened in Jerusalem, to be followed later by two
others. Meanwhile, a fomth had been opened at Jafi'a, and on the arrival of the railway at Ludd, this
latter place became the centre for evacuation from the whole front.
The strain was not confined to the front hne and lines of communication, and mention must be
made of the good work done by the hospitals at the Base, which, although depleted of many of their
staS in order to fill gaps in the front hne, were called upon to work for a time at very hi'gh pressure.
The raid on Es Salt and Amman was from the medical point of view exceptionally arduous. The
closely-pressed retirement from Amman, over ground so deep in mud as to be almost impassable for
camels and wheeled transport, made the evacuation of the wounded a task of considerable magnitude.
In April came the reorganization of the force owing to the demands for man-power from France.
The substitution of Indian for British regiments necessitated a complete remodelling of the Divisional
field ambulances, which became combined units capable of dealing with both British and Indian troops.
Casualty clearing stations were similarly converted into combined clearing hospitals. Five new Indian
general hospitals were opened, two British being at the same time closed. These alterations entailed
drastic changes in the personnel. India were able to supply but a very hmited number of medical officers,
and many of the units, on arrival, consi.sted simply of equipment and very partially-trained Indian
personnel. The few weeks remaining before operations began were devoted to " intensive training ",
and it is greatly to the credit of all concerned that, when put to the test, these hastily-formed units
fulfilled their functions with credit to themselves and their service.
In the final operations, the casualties from wounds were fortunately not heavy and well within the
numbers anticipated. The speed of the pursuit and the consequent rapid lengthening of the line of
evacuation accentuated the transport difficulties. With the capture of Haifa the pressm:e was relieved
by the opening of a casualty clearing station there which was able to despatch cases by hospital ship
direct to Alexandria. Later on, this hospital ship service was extended to the otlier Syrian ports, where
casualty clearing stations have been opened. Damascus also was supplied with a casualty clearing station
the moment transport became available. The total number of womided in these operations has been
239 officers and 4,854 other ranks.
EGYPTIAN EXI'EDITKJNARY FORCE 105
No sooner liad we reached a breathing space in dealing with our own wounded tlian we were
overvvhcliiied with sick and wounded jirisoners-of-war. The captured Turks were in a deplrnablc con-
dition of health, owini^ to prolonged .shortage of food, to malaria, and finally to a serious epidemic of
influenza. Of the 1UU,000 cajjtured, more than 2U,000 pa.ssed into medical charge. For their accom-
modation three large 2,000 bedded hospitals were rapidly prepared in Egypt and the permanent pri.soners-
of-war hospitals were also gieatly expanded. Several of tlie Egyptian Hospitals — a service which ha.s
done splendid work tliroughout the campaign — were also devoted to their treatment, and for a short
time the I5ritisli Ueneral Hos])ital at Giza was set free for the accommodation of the more serious cases.
The Hood of pri.soners had subsided, and now a new trouble had to be faced. Our own sick rate
began to show an alarming increase, the daily average of hcspital admissions rising from GOO to 1,000
and even to 1,400 per day. This was mainly due to malaria contracted in the newly-occupied districts
and to influenza. 8u])erhuman efl'orts were made in (Jairo and Alexandria to open new ho.spitals and
expand existing ones. By these means it was found just jwssible to keep pace with tlie increasing sickness.
From a medical point of view, the most important problem of this campaign- — as of all previous
campaigns in this country — has been that of malaria. During 1917 this disease was easily controlled
by dealing with the localized mosquito-breeding areas in the Wadi Ghuzzee. In 1918 it was a very
different story. Palestine is notoriously malarious, and, during the summer months some localities
such as the Jordan Valley, the coastal plain, and the Vale of Esdraelon have the reputation of being
barely habitable. Practically all the peremiial streams produce marshes which are infested with
mosquitoes, including many anopheline varieties. Even the hill country is by no means free, and every
well, cistern, and streamlet is a potential breeding place for these pests.
Directly oiu: front hne was definitely established in the early spring, the campaign against mos-
quitoes began in earnest. Each division was made responsible for its own areas. Their sanitary sections
soon got to work, and with the aid of the Royal Engineers and Egyptian labour, marshes were drained,
streams canalised, and wells and cisterns oiled. Each regiment was further expected to provide a malaria
squad to deal with the vicinity of its own camp. By mid-summer, the result of this combined offensive
became apparent, and the mosquito had been driven even from areas which in early summer had been
its most formidable strongholds. The slightest relaxation of effort was immediately followed by a
counter-offensive on the part of the anophehnes, who missed no chance of re-establishing their position
in any unguarded water area. Even the Jordan Valle)' was so satisfactorily dealt with that troops were
enabled to Uve through the worst season of the year in this poisonous locahty without any alarming
amount of sickness. In order to assist in the early detection of malaria cases, small " diagnosis stations "
were scattered along the front line in easily accessible positions. Each corLsisted of one medical officer
and two trained orderlies with microscopes and a diagnosis was made on the spot. No less than 40,000
blood slides were examined in these units and have been the means of saving hundreds of hves.
With the advent of active operations and the passage of the troops into an untreated area, it was
inevitable that the incidence of malaria should rise for a time. Within a fortnight of the opening day
the number of malaria admissions began to increase, most of the cases being of the malignant type. The
average sick rate, which had been 28.5 per cent for the four weeks preceding operations, increased to
5"51 per cent for the period of the third to sixth week of operations. This was a proof, if any were needed
of the efficacy of our previous anti-malarial measivres. There is little doubt that had not the problem
been energetically grappled with from the first, and had malaria been allowed to exact its toll throughout
the summer months, the efficiency of the troops would have been very seriously taxed. What efTect
such a state of afl'airs might have had upon the campaign gives opportunity for interesting speculation.
Typhus, enteric, relapsing fever, and cholera have been kept in check by inoculation, cleanfiness
and sanitation. It may well be said that the incinerator and disinfector have helped to win this war.
A small outbreak of cholera among the civil population at Tiberias was soon got mider control with only
a single case of infection among the troops. The only other epidemic of any serious aspect has been
that of pellagra among the Turkish prisoners. This obscure disease has been responsible for many deaths
among them and is at present the subject of an exhaustive enquiry by a special medical commission.
No case has occurred among British troops and only one German prisoner has been foimd suffering from it.
Ophthalmia, which in Napoleon's Egyptian and Palestine expeditions proved so formidable a bug-
bear, has, thanks to the cleanly habits of the British soldier, been practically absent from our ranks.
In the case of the Turks, however, both before and after capture, its ravages have been severe.
With the arrival of the armistice, further problems await the medical service. Sick repatriated
prisoners have to be looked after, and, in this '" half-way hou.se," from India, no doubt many sick will
find a hospital lodging on their way to and fro.
W^ithin the hmits of a short article it is posisible to enumerate but a few of the multifarious activities
of a medical .service called upon to safeguard the health and tend the sick and wounded of a force larger
than the peace-time British Army. Altogether the force may be congratulated on the state of its health
during the campaign, and the short period following the opening of operations which pro\'ided so much
sickness may perhaps be considered part of the inevitable price to be paid for one of the most complete
victories in the history of British arms.
106 THE ADVANCE OF THE
ROYAL ARMY VETERINARY CORPS.
At the begiiining of the period now under review, the veterinary service of the force found itself
already organized and equipped on a basis which provided for the efficient performance of its duties
at the moment, and at the same time permitted of considerable expansion, if necessary, without
dislocating 'existing arrangements.
To its formation, AustraUa, New Zealand, India, Egypt, and the Mediterranean Expeditionary
Force, had contributed varied miits, and to these had been added two veterinary hospitals originally
intended for another theatre of war ; but the organization and equipment of the various components
differed, and even the British imits were not uniform in either particular.
It had been at once evident that satisfactory service could hardly be rendered imder such conditions
and a complete reorganization had been carried out ; a reorganization which was rendered comparatively
easy by the enthusiasm and co-operation of all concerned. The adherence of the Australian and New
Zealand authorities to the idea of a imiversal organization was especially fortunate, and in consequence
all Colonial divisions which were transferred to France, landed in that country with a veterinary organi-
zation similar to the other formations of the British Expeditionary Force.
^Vhile speaking of Australian and New Zealand imits it may here be remarked that the high profes-
sional standard of veterinary officers of the forces of these Dominions, their devotion to duty and loyalty
to the Directorate, has been a marked and pleasing feature in the veterinary history of the Egyptian
Expeditionary Force.
Veterinary hospitals were established at centres where rail connection and the possibility of obtain-
ing green fodder combined to make transit easy and the forage supply suitable for sick animals. In
these line of communication establishments Egyptians were employed as much as possible in order to
economise British personnel. Field veterinary units with divisions were brought to a miiform estab-
lishment and equipped similarly to those in France, the possibility of their being required overseas having
been realized.
So far as horses, mules, and donkeys were concerned it was also necessary to estabhsh a trustworthy
system of malleiu inoculation throughout the army in order to detect cases of glanders and endeavour to
prevent extension of the disease when mtroduced. This equine scourge may easily become one of the
great sources of loss among the animals of armies in the field, and consequently every animal in the
force was tested. Subsequentl)' every entry to a veterinary hospital or issue to a remount deijot was
retested, and, although many isolated cases and local outbreaks occurred, the disease has always been
kept under control, and the losses have been very slight. More cases indeed were detected among
captured Turkish animals than occurred among the entire army duriag the campaign.
The raising of Camel Corps on a large scale naturally called for a special organization on the part
of the veterinary service. However successful previous camel campaigns may have been from the
military point of view, they have generally resulted in the rapid extinction of the animals, and the main-
tenance of numbers has only been possible by renewing them in lolo.
In one of the Central Asian campaigns of the Russian Army for instance, a force mider General
Skobeleff, with a transport of 12,000 camels, returned after some months with one camel only ; and
in our own Afghan campaign of 1879-80 we lost 70,000 transport animals of which a high proportion
were camels, the necessary nmnbers of which could hardly have been mamtaiued for a longer period.
The animal mortality of a camel corps, therefore, might be confidently anticipated at a very high figure,
and the large numbers it was proposed to employ called for special effort to keep losses at the minunum
possible.
In its endeavours to assist in the creation and maintenance of this branch of the army the veterinary
service was again fortunate : its recommendations received due consideration and the spirit in which
the camel veterinary duties were undertaken both by officers and other ranks was worthy of every
commendation. Camel hospitals were established for the reception of serious casualties, and a consider-
able veterinary personnel was specially tramed to deal with cases which could be retained with their
units. This included a comprehensive scheme for the treatment of camel mange, a disease which, if
allowed to run its course unchecked, will destroy a camel corps on service in from three to six months.
Since practically every adult camel in Egypt has the disease, and as all suitable Egyptian camels were
employed, it is easy to understand that extensive preparations were necessary in order to combat its
ravages successfully. The losses in camels have proved to be about thirty per cent per annum. This
is, of course, a high percentage, but when it is considered that an average of some 40,000 camels has
been maintained in the field for between two and three years it represents a great advance on previous
similar campaigns. Many factors which do not come altogether within the piu'view of this article were
naturally concerned in the successful accomplishment of the work of the camel corps with this force, but
the efficient manner in which the veterinary duties were carried out undoubtedly contributed to the result.
The operations which began in Oct., 1917 (Beersheba -Gaza -Jerusalem) were of the most strenuous
nature for all animals of the army. The weather conditions varied from a heat wave to frost, and from
a drought to torrential rain. During the heat many horses were without water for forty to eighty hour's,
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 107
while military requirements combincfl with floods and mud prevented the refj;ular supply of full quanti-
ties of forage. The resulting casualties were perforce heavy, and only the unremitting attention of all
formations and all ranks concerned jnevented more serious loss. During this period the work of the
Mobile Veterinary Sections and Field Veterinary Detachments calls for special notice, and through
their agency very many animals which would otherwise have perished were saved and subsequently
restored to the service.
The continuous work demanded from all animals of I he army during the summer and autumn of
1918 was such as to keep veterinary hospitals full ; and although they were organized and prepared to
deal with a further increase had it beeia necessary as a result of the operations, viz. the advance from
Haifa to Aleppo, this was not requisite. Though considerable casualties were sustained during this
advance they were the unavoidable outcome of war, out of all proportion small, when compared with
the results achieved, .and the general healtli of animals remains good up to the period of writing.
In such a brief review it is impossible to give statistics of the contagious diseases encountered and
dealt with, but glanders, anthrax, mange, piroplasmosis (tick fever), and epizootic lymphangitis, may be
mentioned as affecting horses and mules, while trypanosomiasis (surra, debab), and mange, have been
the most frequent among canaels.
The last-mentioned conditions combined with insufficient food supply are said to have been the
cause of the breakdown of the Turkish camel transport in 191G-17, their losses of the.se animals during
that period in the Jordan Valley, being estimated by their own officers at 40,000. Whatever may have
been the real numbers, the skeletons everywhere in evidence on our arrival in the area mentioned, warrant
its being placed at a very high figure.
During the period under review (July, 1917-Oct., 1918), over 03,000 horses, mules or donkeys, and
31,000 camels were received into veterinary hospitals, while the number of less serious casualties attended
to in the field greatly exceeded these figures.
The percentage of animals returned from hospitals to the Remount Department as fit for re-issue
to the service has been eighty per cent in the case of horses, and seventy per cent m the case of camels.
The total losses during the entire campaign calculated on the average strength of the animals of
the army have not exceeded sixteen per cent of horses, mules and donkeys, and thirty per cent of camels,
per annum.
LABOUR IN THE EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE.
General Remarks.
Under the above heading was included all the imskilled Egyptian personnel and a large proportion
of the skilled and semi-skilled per.sonnel which Egypt was called on to furnish to\tards the needs of the
Egyptian Expeditionary Force. It fell to the Directorate of Labour to arrange for its provision and
distribution.
The numbers involved eventually reached a total of 135,000 men, engaged on six months' contracts
giving an annual turn-over of some 270,000 men, apart from replacement of casualties. The figures
before the attack on Gaza in 1917 and the figures reached during 1918 were as under in the various
corps : —
1917 1918
Egyptian Labour Corps 48,472 ... *100,002 labourers
Camel Transport Corps 20,000 ... 23,452 drivers
Donkey Transport Corps — ... 1,992 „
Horse Transport (A.S.C.) 3,200 ... 4,349
Remount Service 1,200 ... 1,433 syces
Veterinary Service 1,100 ... 3,496
Imperial Camel Corps 280 ... 247 drivers
Totals 74,252 ... 134,971
Recruiting.
The modest needs of the Mediterranean Expeditionary Force in 1915-16 in imskilled Egyptian
personnel had been adequately met by collecting the men required in the large cities and sending a few
recruiting agents to Ujjper Egypt at intervals. Towards the end of 1916, however, demands for
Egyptian personnel, especially for Camel Transport Corps, became insistent and it was found necessary
to set up a small recruiting staflf in Upper Egypt to provide for Camel Transport Corps, leaving the
hitherto untapped Delta as a field for Egyptian Labour Corps recruiting. Early in 1917, between calls
' Incluiies G,100 sliilled or semi-.-^lsilled Egyptians.
108
THE ADVANCE OF THE
for Egyptian labour for service in France, Mesopotamia, and Salonika, and the rapidly growing needs
of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, it became obvious that provision for recruiting on an extensive
scale should be made. An Inspectorate of Eecruiting (Directorate of Labour) was therefore established
consisting of twenty-six officers whose activities extended throughout Egypt from Alexandria to Assouan.
A strict system of medical inspection and examination was enforced and an advance of L.E. 3 made to
all recruits accepted to enable them to provide for their dependents.
The appointment of Inspector of Recruiting was filled by a senior Inspector of the Ministry of the
Interior, whose services were placed at the disposal of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force by the
E<Typtiau Government ; this arrangement subsequently proved to be of very great assistance and was
attended with most successful results.
Recruiting camps for the reception of Egyptians were opened at Sohag, Assiut, and Roda Island,
Cairo, whence special trains, conveying 2,000 recruits at a time were run to the respective Base Depots
on the Suez Canal (Kantara) where the men were disinfected, clothed, equipped, and organized into
companies or detachments. The Inspectorate of Recruiting also made provision for some 6,000 skilled
or semi-skilled personnel constantly required in the Egyptian Labour Corps.
Organization of Labour.
Apart from the recruitment of Egyptian personnel generally, the allotment of labour to employers
was dealt with by authorized demands being put forward locally by services and departments to Assistant
Directors or Deputy Assistant Directors of Labour.
The following table shows the chain of responsibility : —
A.D.L. (Egypt)
I
D.AB.Vs.
D. of L.
(at G.H.Q.)
I
A.D.L. (Palestine and Syria)
I
D A.D.L's.
Labour Aieas
E.L.C.
I
Companies
E.L.C.
Mil. Labour
Bureaux.
I
Casual
local labaur.
Labour Areas
E.L.C.
I
Comnanies
E.L.C.
Mil. Labour
Bureaux.
i
Casual
local labour.
(The Inspector of Recruiting and Inspector, Egyptian Labour Corps, were in direct communication
with Director of Labour, G.H.Q.)
The system outlined above, whilst ensuring decentralized control, did away to a great extent with
the practice of and necessity for employers holding reserves of labour at their own disposal ; it enabled
a " pool " of labour to be established at various centres of activity and especially at the base ports of Alex-
andria, Port Said, Suez, and Kantara, and subsequently at JaSa, Haifa, Beirut, Tripoli, and Alexandretta.
Very great savings, financially and otherwise, were effected thereby.
Egyptian Labour Corps.
The strength of the corps was as under :
In Jan.,
1916
In Aug ,
1916
In Aug.,
1917
In Aug.,
1918
In Nov.
1918
Officers.
Men.
39
2.973
88
24,838
292
55,592
418
85,547
504
100,002*
In 1916, 10,463 Egyptian Labour Corps were sent to France ; 8,280 to Mesopotamia ; 600 to
Salonika ; whilst in Oot"^, 1918, 7,000 labourers were held ready for despatch to Salonika before Turkey
had capitulated.
Among many difficulties experienced, but successfully overcome, in deaUng with the above extra-
ordinarily rapid expansion, was the question of finding suitable officers. Egypt had been thoroughly
tapped by the spring of 1916 in order to furnish Arabic-speaking officers for the various local corps and
for Intelligence duti'es. The original and experienced officers of the Egyptian Labour Corps who had
done exceTlent service in Mudros, Egypt, and elsewhere were required for senior appointments in the
corps, tfnd they represented only a fraction of the increased numbers now necessary. Consequently, if
•lucluilos 6,106 skilled or seuii-skilled K.L.C.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 109
Egyptian labour was to be prop<uly ort^anizwl it became essential to draw suitable officers with a know-
ledge of discipline from some otiicr source. The problem was solved by offering temporary commissionfi
to selected candidates from the ranks of British units, and ensuring them facilities for the acquisition
of Arabic with extra duty pay on becoming proficient. Only those candidates who showed an aptitude
in the handling of Egyptians, after a thorough practical test extending over se'-eral weeks, were accepted,
and it is of interest to state that out of over 800 candidates dealt with 401 have been commissioned.
Although Egypt could make no further provision in officers, it could still produce large numbers
of local subjects of European descent, who by their knowledge of the fellahin and their proficiency in
languages proved to be most valuable material for foremen. Advantage was taken of this fact to engage
and train large numbers as serjeant-foremen and corporal-foremen. Meanwhile, practical experience
in working Egyptian Labour Corps in the field had led to the evolution of the organization best suited
to its many and varied activities.
The smallest unit in the corps is the gang. It consists of fifty men, viz. a reis and forty-nine
labourers. The reis, usually, is personally known to all the men in his gang, and frequently all come
from the same village or markaz. Thus in a company of GOO labourers there are twelve gangs, and in
a double company of 1,200 labourers, twenty-four gangs. To such companies skilled personnel were
frequently attached. The proportion of officers handling labour is one officer to each section of 200 men.
The organization of the Egyptian Labour Corps was as follows on Sept. 19, 1918 : —
Headquarters (Inspector, E.L.C.) Ludd
Base Depot, E.L.C Kantara
Advanced Depot, E.L.C Ludd
Double companies 24
Single companies 75
" Labour areas " for purposes of administration, and consisting of the requisite number of com-
panies, were formed as circumstances demanded.
It is not possible in a short survey to enter into particulars as regards the detailed employment of
100,000 men ; therefore it must suffice to enumerate the main classes of work on which these consider-
able numbers were engaged : —
(a) Railway construction and maintenance (broad and narrow gauge), and bridge building.
(b) Roadmaking and metalling ; constructing and laying " wire roads " ; clearing tracks.
(c) Laying pipe-hnes.
{d) Construction of buildings and reservoirs ; carpentry and general Royal Engineer work.
(e) (Quarrying stone.
(/) Well-boring.
(g) Formation of supply depots and general Army Service Corps labour.
{h) Stretcher bearing and conservancy ; drainage of malarial areas.
(t) Ammunition depots and general Ordnance labour.
(j) Loading and discharging ships ; stevedoring, including working winches and derricks.
(k) Boatmen — manning surf boats landing stores along the coasts of Palestine and Syria.
{I) Labour for Royal Air Force, for "Signals," and for salvage.
To all members of the force the Egyptian Labour Corps were well-known in small detachments ;
it was given to few to observe them at work where large numbers were employed ; but those who have
seen many thousands of Egyptian Labour Corps labourers on task work, either driving a cutting with
pick and fasse through Palestine clay, or in their thousands carrying baskets of earth to pile up some
railway embankment, will long remember such examples of intensive labour. No less striking was it
to watch the line of laden boats leaving the storeships off the coast and making their way through the
surf to the beach, there to be hauled high up by teams of cheerful Egyptians working to whistle signal
under their own officers.
Nor must their equally important work at the base ports of .'Vlexandria, Port Said, Suez, and Kantara
be forgotten. Trained stevedore gangs under Egyptian Labour Corps officers were always in readiness
to board incoming ocean-going steamers, work their discharging gear, and empty the holds as rapidly
as had hitherto been done by skilled contractor's personnel ; or, conversely, to load outgoing vessels
with supplies, ammunition, and stores required for operations on the Syrian coast or in Salonika.
It stands to the lasting credit of the officers of the Egyptian Laboirr Corps, that certain companies,
under selected Egyptian Labour Corps officers, reached such a high standard in connection with work
on roads, railways, pipe-line, and other services, that they were able to make satisfactory progress
without constant expert supervision.
110 THE ADVANCE OF THE
Among the skilled trades represented by over 6,000 Egyptians in the Egyptian Labour Corps, the
following are examples : —
Basket-menders ; blacksmiths ; carpenters ; fitter,-- ; hammermen ; masons ; plasterers ; quarry-
men ; saddlers ; stevedores ; stokers ; tentmenders ; tinsmiths ; well-borers ; wheelwrights ; winchmen.
The accompanying maps (inset on Plates 44 and 52) show in a general way the distribution of the
Egyptian Labour Corps throughout Palestine and Syria in connection with the advance of the force,
but it should be borne in mind that equally large numbers were employed in Egypt particularly in the
Suez Canal Zone and at Alexandria.
Military Labour Bureaux.
In order to eflect economy and utihze all local sources of casual labour, Military Laboiur Bureaux
had been successfully established at Alexandria and Port Said in 1916.
Concurrently with the advance from Gaza-Beersheba in 1917, immediate steps were taken by the
Directorate of Labour to collect and organize the labour resources of the newly occupied territory in
conformity to the military requirements.
The first Military Labour Bureau in Palestine was opened at Jaffa shortly after the town was
occupied. Labour requirements to clear the streets, repair roads, and prepare the quay for the arrival
of shipping were immediate and any labour that could be utilized at once was of especial value.
Certain notables, sheikhs, and muktars were called together, the situation explained and notices
issued calling for volunteers.
The chief difficulty at the onset was the natural tendency of the population to hold aloof until they
understood the new regime and government, and this was augmented by the necessity of their becoming
accustomed to receive wages in a new currency. In fact, at every Labour Bureau opened, the initial
work was largely concerned in creating confidence in the local inhabitants with totally new conditions
and in every case such confidence was uniformly and quickly established.
Payment initially was made in coin to each separate labourer at the finish of each day's work. As
soon as confidence was assured and the number of employees consequently increased, a weekly system
of payment— partly in paper and partly in coin^was instituted. Each labourer had a numbered green
armlet and a pay-slip which was marked up and checked at least twice a day.
It soon became necessary to open a Bureau at Jerusalem, and very shortly some 10,000 local labourers
were engaged on work extending from Hebron to Jerusalem and Jerusalem to Jaffa, controlled and
organized by two bureaux.
These large numbers had absorbed most of the available able-bodied men and both women and
boys were then allowed to volunteer for certain classes of work on which they could be suitably
employed.
Where food was scarce millet was issued in part payment to individual labourers, at their option.
The Mihtary Labour Bureaux ensured that regular work was provided in Palestine for thousands
of people who in many cases would otherwise have been destitute.
The currency question was thus very materially helped, both by the circulation of large sums in the
new coinage as wages and because every case of trafficking or depreciating the official paper cmrency
was immediately taken up by the Labour Bureaux officers whenever one of the employees reported that
he could not obtain full value for his wages when paid in notes.
In addition to the labourers, some 1,.500 skilled men were registered and engaged on casual employ-
ment by these bureaux, boatmen from Jaffa and stone dressers from Jerusalem being particiilarly
successful and freely volunteering for work in any locality required.
Similar steps were taken for opening labour bureaux currently with the advance of 1918. Within
seven days of the commencement of operations, labour Bureaux were opened at Tul Keram, at Haifa,
and shortly afterwards at Beirut.
All Bureaux were organized on the same lines as proved successful at Jaffa and Jerusalem, and the
rates of pay of casual labour were standardized throughout Palestine and Syria.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 111
THE NAVY AND ARMY CANTEEN BOARD.
Under the title of tbe Army Canteen Committee, an organization was o.stal>lisiied by the War Office
in April, 1910, to control the operations of Army Canteens managed by Contractors. In Dec, 1916,
the actual conduct of canteens was vested in this Conmiittee. Its functions were .subsequently enlarged
to include the operation of Naval Canteens ashore and on board His Majesty's Ships, and the name was
changed to the Navy and Army Canteen Board.
in June, 1917, a Commission under Major-General Sir G. C. Kitson, appointed by the Quartermaster-
General , arrived in Egypt and at once proceeded to take over the canteens previously managed by civilian
contractors west of the Suez Canal and in the Sudan.
In Sept., 1917, the Board took over the conrrol of the forty-one canteens on the Canal and to the
east of it, formerly provided by the Expeditionary Force Canteens (a temporary organization).
Then came the advance of Oct., 1917, and it was during this difficult period that the lioard's activities,
30 far as the advanced sections were concerned, commenced. At that time the canteen organization was
not provided with its own transport, and was insufficient iy stafTcd, but, nevertheless, by the time the troops
had .settled down north of the JafTa-Jerusalem line canteen facilities were available at .TafFa, Ludd, Bir
Salem, Latron, and Jerusalem. During the spring of 1918 these facilities were extended by the provision
of canteens at Sheikh Muannis, Sarona,Bir cz Ziet, Mulebbis, Wilhelma, Hot Corner, in the Wady Ballut..
Khurbetha ibn Harith, Ain Sinia, Ramallah, Jericho, and on the Auja.
The summer of 1918 was a time of preparation, during which upwards of sixty motor vehicles arrived,
and at the moment of the advance in September arrangements were complete by which it was hoped
that the advancing infantry would never be out of touch with an Army Canteen. In pursuance of this
object army canteens were opened at Tul Keram on Sept. 25, Nablus on Sept. 28, Haifa on Oct. 2, Beirut
on Oct. 19, Tripolis on Oct. 23, Aleppo on Nov. 6, and at Damascus. The previously existing canteens
at Ras el Ain, Jiljulieh, and Messudieh supplied the wants of those divisions that were withdrawn. One
division was accompanied during its advance to Tiberias by a mobile canteen comprising five lorries.
It is of interest to study a few points in connection with the administration of the Navy and Army
Canteen Board in the area of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force.
The unit forms a section of the Royal Army Service Corps and has an establishment of twenty-seven
officers and 372 other ranks, with 135 personnel attached. It employs upwards of 800 European and
Egyptian civilians.
It is charged with the supply and conduct of all Army canteens, now ninety-eight in number. In
addition it operates four mmeral water factories, the Jerusalem Hotel, the Summer Camp Hotel at
Alexandria, and the Winter Camp Hotel, Cairo.
It has, or has had, bakeries at Cairo, Alexandria, Jerusalem, Jaffa, and Beirut, and it maintains
refreshment tents or rooms for officers and men at railhead and intermediate stations on the Palestine
Military Railway.
In Egypt, where Egyptian personnel is available, each Canteen consists, as at home, of a coffee bar,
a grocery bar, and a beer bar, and in addition, in some cases, of a recreation room and a wholesale
grocery bar. Owing to the shortage of personnel it was not found possible in the advanced sections to
provide more than wholesale and retail grocery bars with, where possible, refreshment rooms for
officers and men. During the summer of 1918, however, a number of kiosks containing soda fountains
where such articles as cigarettes, sweets, and cakes, were available, were provided as near to the hne
as possible. Among such kiosks were those opened at Sheikh Muannis, Hot Corner, Bir ez Zeit, and
Ain Sinia.
In the Egyptian Expeditionary Force the canteen sales amount to a yearly total of upwards of four
and a half million sterling, and the approximate value of the canteen stores in Egypt is one million
pounds. Regimental and other funds are largely maintained by means of a rebate or discount of eight
per cent on all cash sales to soldiers, and the Christmas issue of half a pound of plum pudding per man,
in addition to many other amenities, was provided by the Army Council out of an additional two per
cent which is paid by the Board to it.
112 THE ADVANCE OF THE
THE ROYAL AIR FORCE.
In July, 1917, tlie Eoyal Air Force on this front consisted only of two squadrons, of which one was
Australian. The Austrahan Squadron was chiefly employed in long distance reconnaissance, bomb-
dropping and photography ; while the other carried out the tactical work and artillery co-operation.
The machines with which these squadrons were eqiiipped were of an old type and much inferior to those
used by the enemy. As a result, httle could be achieved towards acquiring the superiority in the air.
Shortly before the attack on the Gaza-Beersheba front, a second artillery squadron arrived, thus
enabling the nucleus of a fighting squadron to be formed. The machines of the latter included one
flight of Bristol fighters, which were held in reserve until a few days prior to the attack. One memorable
morning four Bristols left the ground in response to a hostile aircraft alarm ; they met and engaged an
enemy formation, and, for the first time on this front, shot down an enemy machine in our lines. The
German pilot who was captured stated that he had been taken completely by surprise, never having
doubted that his own machine was superior to anything that we had.
From that day onward the tables were turned in our favour, and during the next few weeks other
German machines shared the fate of the first. In all ninety-three enemy machines were brought down,
fifty-nine of them behind the enemy's lines, eleven in our own lines, and twenty-eight out of control.
Our long distance reconnaissance machines, which on previous occasions had been attacked on sight by
the enemy, were now carefully avoided by him.
On Sept. 29, 1917, the Commander of the Sinai Front informed the Yilderim Group Command that,
" The mastery of the air has unfortimately for some weeks completely passed over to the British." He
adds that, " Our aviators estimate the number of British aircraft at from thirty to forty." Though
the enemy considered our Bristol fighter as far superior to their own machine, and were fond of attributing
their want of success to the " machine," the following remark indicates that there were also other
factors : —
" The shooting down of a second fighting plane, which again was fighting alone, points to tlie necessity of an experienced
O.C, Aircraft." (Von'Papen, 16/10/17.)
During the Gaza operations, formations of slow aeroplanes escorted by one or two Bristols, bombed
and fired upon the retreating enemy without interfernece on the part of the German Flying Corps.
Late in November the Bristol fighters were reinforced by S.E.5 scouts, a faster machine than any on
this front ; and this type, with the Bristol fighters, gained for us the complete superiority in the air, which
we held until the end.
By the time our troops had taken up the Jerusalem-Jaffa line, the position of the Royal Air Force
as regards machines and personnel rendered possible a continuous policy of offensive action against enemy
aircraft, which were in all cases, \vithout exception, attacked whenever met and in whatever numbers.
The following extracts from captured enemy docmnents show the cumulative effect of this policy on the
moral of the German Air Forces : —
•25/8/18-31/8/18.
" In consequence of lively hostile flying activity, no reconnaissances could be carried out."
" 1/9/18-7/9/18.
" No flights over enemy country."
"8/9/I8-14/9/I8.
"No flights over enemy country."
This was confinned in the weekly reports from enemy Air Force Headquarters, as follows : —
"25/8/18-31/8/18.
" The loss of two more machines of 301st Abteilung compelled the suspension of all reconnaissance in front of
Vlllth Army.
" An attempt will be made to continue flights on the remainder of the front occasionally."
Thus it will be seen that the enemy was imable to obtain an}' information from aerial reconnaissance
at a period when this was of vital importance.
This is even more remarkable when it is realized that at the commencement of the advance in Sept.,
1918, the enemy Air Force was in considerable strength and equijiped witii up-to-date types of machiaes,
which, if properly handled, were greatly superior in performance to our artillery machines.
On the night of Sept. 18-19, a Handley-Page, carrying over half-a-ton of bombs flew over enemy
country and attacked Afuleh Station and Aerodroine. This machine, which had previously flown all
the way from England, started the offensive as far as the Royal Air Force is concerned.
At dawn the next morning, that is, " Z " day, a perfect orgy of bombing took place. A special
.squadron, detailed solely for bombing, bad arrived a few weeks before operations commenced. This
squadron attacked all telephone and telegraph exchanges far behind the line; while the Corps squadrons
bombed the smaller exchanges just behind the trenches, with the result that enemy communication by
telephone or telegraph was completely deranged.
EGYPTIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE 113
To ensure that the enemy should not be aware of the massing of our cavalry just before the attack
and their subsequent movements after the infantry liad }irf)kcn through, it was necessary to prevent
enemy machines from leaving the ground. With this objeciive, two scouts at a time patrolled over
Jcnin aerodrome. Each machine carried four bombs, which were dropped on any sign of activity on the
aerodrome. Each pair was relieved while still patrolling over the aerodrome and on relief came down
and fired machine guns into the hangars, with the result that enemy aircraft were prevented from taking
any part in the battle.
During the infantry attack, three artillery machines continually patrolled the front of the XXIst
Corps and, co-operating with the artillery, located and engaged thirty-two active batteries.
On Sc])t. 20 and 21, every available machine was used for bombing the retreating enemy. Of
these, the column retreating on the Nablus-Kh. Ferweh road on the 21st su.stained the greatest losses.
Early on the morning of the 21st a column of enemy troops and transport was reported by a strategical
reconnaissance machine moving along the Nablus-Wadi Farah road, just south of Kh. Ferweh. It was
of the utmost ini])ortance that this movement should be stopped, as, although the cavalry had blocked
the enemy retreat by way of Beisan, the road to the bridge over the Jordan, at Jisr ed Damich could not
possibly be closed by our troops for some hours ; nor could the crossings over the Jordan between that
place and Beisan be guarded in time. All available machines were at once mobilized for this attack,
and departures wore so timed that two machines should arrive over the objective every three minutes,
and that an additional formation of si.x machines should come into action every half hour. These attacks
were mamtained from 0800 till noon, by which tune our troops were in touch with the column. The road
was completely blocked and was strewn with a mass of debris of wrecked wagons, guns and motor lorries,
totalling in all eighty-seven gims, fifty-five motor lorries, four motor cars, and 932 wagons.
Very few flights took place in the air during operations, for the simple reason that practically no
enemy machines were met with ; but, just prior to the capture of Aleppo, an interesting combat occurred.
Two Bristol fighters belonging to the Austrahan Flying Corps met an enemy aeroplane and after a running
fight drove him down, forcing him to land behind his own lines. The occupants left the stricken machine,
seeing which, the Bristol landed beside it and, while our observer held up the two German airmen, the
pilot set fire to the hostile machine. Owing to the soft nature of the groimd, he was prevented from
bringing back the two Germans as prisoners, who were released and left where they were.
A comparison of the strength of the Royal Air Force in Palestine in July, 1917, and Sept., 1918, is
interesting. On the former date it consisted of one Wing, with two Squadrons, and a Balloon Company ;
whilst in Sept., 1918, it consisted of a Brigade, with two Wings, seven Squadrons, and a Balloon Company.
EXPLANATORY NOTE
TO THE
mAPS ILLUSTRATING OPERATIONS.
The movemeuts of troops during any fixed period are frequently so complex that it is not possible
to illustrate such moves in detail on maps of a scale which is, of necessity, small in order to include the
wide area of coimtry over which the troops were disposed.
Consequently, the following maps, with a few exceptions, show the dispositions of our forces and those
of the enemy as they were known at General Headquarters at certain fixed times, and are based on the
situation maps which were issued nightly during the major operations. Considerable information has
been added, such as the location of heavy artillery and aerodromes, and alterations made where later
information proved the original maps to be incorrect.
In order to avoid overcrowding the maps, the words " division " and " brigade " have been omitted
except where brigades have been acting separately from their divisions ; and in all cases the positions
are approximate only. Thus, in the case of the heavy artillery, it has frequently been impossible to show
each battery, or even the Royal Garrison Artillery brigade, in the actual position occupied, and the
conventional sign has been placed close to the headquarters of the formation with or under which it
was operating.
Regiments and battalions are only shown when acting apart from their higher command, and then
only when space permits.
It should be realised that the Turkish regiment {i.e. three battalions) is a similar formation to
our brigade, and is the enemy's principal fighting formation. This fact, and the number of odd units
on the front, especially east of the Jordan, tends to make the Turkish troops appear on the maps in
an imdue preponderance.
Throughout, the activities of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force are shown in red, and those of the
enemy in green.
For details of the moves of any particular unit reference should be made to the " Brief Record
of Service " of the formation concerned.
Owing to the abnormal weather conditions in Cairo during the period in which the maps were
printed, the unequal expansion and contraction of the paper caused unusual difficulty in obtaining
correct colour registration, and the paper shortage in Egypt and the limited time in which delivery was
required, made reprinting impossible.
LINES OF COMMUNICATION, 1917.
British.
In June, 1917, the " Palestine Lines of Comnmnication " comprised the bases Port Said and
Kantara, and a single line of railway track from Kantara to Deir el Belah, the railhead station which
had been opened in April, 1917. {See Plate 2.)
Great stress was thrown upon all departments by the erection of efficient railway, ordnance, and
engineer workshops, the construction of wharves along the Canal bank, the laying out of thirty miles
of metalled roads, the development of the temiinus of the military railw ay, and the transfer of all the more
'J'v face. I'liUi: I.
REFERENCE
TO CONVENTIONAL SIGNS
RaiJivays
Mcuinj JixtcLtis
Other Roads
Good TrcLcJc^
TeLegrapTv LiTtes
^ejwish/ ColonLes
Heights in/ faet above/ Sea^ LeveZ,
„ „ beZojr „
BRITISH
( lyivtsvoTu
Infanirj I
L Jiriqaxte/
CavaJzy
Arah Army ._
Army H'.Q.
Corps Jf. Q
Arab Arrrtv H.Q.
Divi^iorLoJ.' B . Q. , ,
PalroU, Caxr. <fc Inr.
Heavy or Stege/ ArtiZLery
Armoiij'ecL Car
Motor Trart^port CoLumTis
AERIAL
Aerodrome and
Ac^van ced Lajirb/icf Gj^onntl
Areas bombed
7 I
16l|
sk
^
hH
i-
I I I I I I I I I I
5020
.-1254
TURKISH
Durisix>Tiy.
Infantry
\ Reginvent
Germarv Infantry
Cavalry.
Army H. Q
Corps S. Q
DivijrLorLaL H. Q _•
He<i\-v ArtULery
Disorganised/ retreaJxn/j CoLumns
Motor Transport CoLumns. . .
Horse Tr-ansport Coliimjis.
LijLes of Retreat/
AERIAL
Aerodrome.
Arptis bombed.
rORMATIONS AJIE SHOWN^ THUS:
M
m
ConjCjentrated/
in/Lin^e
in Column of Route
Front Line/ 18-9-18
PLATE I
53|
A
Wa-
*
-f^
)Bff>rodt,ced by C/te Survey or£^^.D«cJ9IS.(04S3)
important base depots from Egypt to Kantara ; all performed against time, in order that the army in
front might derive full benefit from these works when active operations should be opened.
In the most difficult and most important work of all, that is to say, in transforming Kantara into
a port at which many ocean-gouig steamers can discharge, th'^ Suez Canal (Company gave its fullest
and most effective support. Essential as these works were for the army in the field, the Canal was not
constructed with a view to such developments, and the harbour works might well have been regarded
by the Company as of doubtful value. Nevertheless, the Company entered sympathetically into the
programme, and, not content with giving its formal consent to the proposed works, technical advice
and assistance were freely placed at the disposal of the army.
While the work was going forward at the main base of the lines of communication during^the summer
of 1917, developments were also taking place further east. El Arish was made mto a hospital centre
in order to ease the transference of sick and wounded from railhead to the base hospitals ; advanced
depots of supplies, stores, and ammimition were established at Eafa, Khan Yimis, and at Deir el Belah ;
while the work of doubling the railway traek across Sinai was pushed forward rapidly, the double track
to El Arish being opened for trafhc by mid-November. Two months previously the lines of communica-
tion had been extended to include the new railhead at Shellal on the Rafa-Shellal branch.
The operations which began in October resulted m the extension of the hues of commimication,
first to Beersheba to the east and to Mejdel to the north. This was quickly followed by the inclusion
of Ranileh (Dec. 24), Jaffa (Jan. 30) and Jerusalem (Feb. 4). In the meantime the defence and admini-
stration of the lines of communication were placed imder one commander.
During this period and vmtil the arrival of railhead m the neighbourhood of Ramleh, there were
many periods of anxiety and difficulty owing to the weather conditions.
The movement of supplies, reinforcements, and remounts was seriously interrupted both by rail
and road, as owmg to the heavy floods dm-ing November and December, the railway track was repeatedly
breached in the low-lying coastal plaui, and this made the movement of all forms of transport impossible
for days together. No metalled road existed across this plaiii between the Wadi Ghuzze and Julis, a
distance of over twenty miles, and parties of reinforcements marching from the ever-advancing railhead
to the front line found themselves isolated in a waste of mud and water, unable to move forward or
back, and suffered considerable hardships before arriving in the front Ime. It was due t(j the persistent
efforts of the railway construction parties and of engineers, who did what could be done with the " roads,"
such as they were, that the lines of commxmication were kept open under the difficult conditions which
prevailed.
Turkish.
The Turkish lines of commmiication, which extended from Bozanti to Beersheba (see Plate 2), were
under the Syrian Western Ai'abia Command, and the G.O.C. (AJimed Jemal Pasha) did not work har-
moniously with the Yildirim Army group as he was jealous becau.se his command had been taken over
by a foreigner.
The task of keeping up supplies, even luider the best of conditions, was not an easy one, for at this
time the Amanus and Taurus tmanels were incomplete, and all supplies from west of Bozanti had to be
imloaded, and either re-loaded into narrow-gauge trucks, which were drawn by engines driven by com-
pressed air, or transported by motor lorry or pack animals to the east end of the tunnels. The same
procedure was adopted over the Amanus range, thus entailing four separate transhipments of all supplies.
A further transhipment took place at Rayak owing to the change from the normal guage line to the
metre gauge of the Hejaz and Palestine railways. (See Plate 2.)
Thus the only means of communication for the Turkish force in Palestine with their main base
at Ifaidar Pasha (Constantinojjle Station in A.sia), was by a single line of rail about h275 miles in length,
which had in addition to carry all ordnance stores for the force in Mesopotamia, as far as Bluslimie, and
for the Hejaz, as far as Deraa. (See Platk 2.)
The rolling stock was neither good nor nvunerous, and the wood fuel wliich was used in place of coal
did not tend to accelerate the service. An instance occurred of a train being stopped between stations
so that the wood fuel could be chopped into pieces small enough to feed the fire. Niunerous short lines
were constructed for the purpose of bringing the requi.'-:ite wood from the timbered areas. In order to
release rolling stock, reinforcements frequently inarched from Rayak to the front line, a distance
of about 2.% miles.
In addition to the above difficulties, the inefficiency of Turkish officials and their amenity to bribery,
made the supply and equipment of the Yildirim armies no easy problem.
'J'u face riate 2.
PLATE 2
,".p'-ntiij<:ed by the Survty of Egypt Deti l3lli(04S3)
October 28.
The concentration for the attack on Beersheba had been proceeding for a week past, and troops
were f;radually moving to their concentration areas. On Oct. 27 the Hne of observation (the Rashid
Bek-EI Buggar-Pohit 720-Pomt G30 ridge), was held by the 8th Mounted Brigade, and at dawn the
enemy launched a determined attack on Points 630 and 720, and eventually succeeded in occupying
the crests of both hills, despite the very gallant and determined resistance of the 1st County of London
(Middlesex) Yeomanry. The garrison on Point 720 were, save for three men, all killed or wounded,
and thart on Point 630 held on in a support trench close behind the crest, in spite of heavy casualties
and though ahuost surrounded. It was eventually relieved by 160th Brigade, and the whole line re-
occupied m the evening, on the enemy withdrawing.
Much work on the ever-pressmg question of water suj)ply was necessary, wells being developed
and water stored at Esani, Asluj, Khalasa for the cavalry, and at Abu Ghalyun and Maalaga for the
infantry.
On Oct. 28, the outpost line was held by the 53rd Division, plus the 229th Brigade (74:th Division),
covering the construction of the railway to Kami. The remamder of the XXth Corps was concentrating
aboutsrTel el Fara, while Desert Momited Corps was moving to its concentration area about Khalasa
and Asluj.
It is not uninteresting to review the enemy situation at this period : —
The German Staff in Sinai had, so far back as August, decided that the British would make another
effort to break through on that front, and with such forces that, mdess the Turks were heavily remforced,
the result could only be in favour of the British. That the weaknesses of their position were its extent
and the exposed left flank at Beersheba, was fully realized by the Command in the field, and during
August and September repeated requests were made to the Higher Command for a shortening of the line
by withdrawing from Beersheba, or generous reinforcements so that Beersheba could be held a Voutrance.
The soundness of these demands was fully realized by the German advisers of the Turks, but there
existed a policy which was a veritable millstone to those who wished to conduct the operations in accor-
dance with clear strategic ^'I'iut'iples. This policy was directed towards the recovery of Baghdad.
Baghdad, a former capital of the Khalifs, and therefore important to the pan-Islamic party, was ever
before the Yomig Turk, soldier, and politician, and the plan had received the backing of Berlin. A
composite German force had been formed and one of the first of German soldiers. Marshal Erich von
Falkenhayn, lent for the carrying through of this undertakmg. If Baghdad was to be retaken, every
man and gun must be sent to Irak and every man sent to Sinai decreased the chance of success. But
to this was the mianswerable argujnent of those who asked that reinforcements should be sent to Sinai :
" If the Sinai front is broken, Palestine and Syria will fall into the enemy's hands, and not only w^ll
Baghdad not be retaken, but the armies in Irak will be caught like a rat in a trap, with the British across
their lines of commimication at Aleppo." It was not until mid-October that this argmnent prevailed
and then it was too late. Troops being diverted from Mesopotamia were still on the lines of communication
and the aircraft were still being mqjacked and put together on their aerodromes, when the Briti.sh troops
attacked and captured Beersheba on Oct. 31, 1917.
The German Command had, however, estimated the date of the British attack with fair accuracy,
which they considered would take place, owing to weather conditions, early in November. But they
were totally incorrect in their estimate of its direction.
Various circumstances made them believe that it would consist of a third and final assault on Gaza,
combined with a landing to the north, which would turn their right flank and enable the British to occupy
the fertile coastal plam. To meet this i^rimarily, all defensive work was concentrated for many weeks
on the Gaza sector, and their main reserves — the 7th and 19th Infantry Divisions — were concentrated
behind Gaza.
\'on Fallienha3'n proposed, by a concentration of forces, to deliver an attack on the British right
flank, and so drive back General Allenby out of Palestine into the waterless and difficult comitry east
of the Wadi el Arish. In addition to its strategical effect, this would have had the political result of
clearing that portion of the Turkish Empire from the invader.
This attack was originally timed for the latter half of October, to precede and forestall the British
attack. Owuig, however, to indecision, general procrastination, jioor tran.sport facilities, and, above
all, to the jealou.sy and ()p])0siti(m of Ahmed Jenial Pasha, G.O.C. of the Fourth Army and Govei-nor
of Syria, it had to be postponed, and was eventually timed for early December.
By Oct. 28 the organization of the Turkish forces under the Yildirim Army Group into the seventh
and eighth armies was nearing completion. The head(|uarters of (Jeneral Kress von Kressenstein (G.O.C,
Eighth .Army) had moved back from lluj lo Jluleikat so that the former, now coimected to the main
railway by a light line, mijiht be used as a reserve area, and Fevzi Paslia (G.O.C., Seventh Army) was
about to move forward his hcad([uarters from Hebron to near Beersheba, finally to take over the troops
allotted to his command. Marshal von Falkenhayn was at Aleppo en route for Jerusalem.
The front had been sti-engthened by three fresh divisions -the 19th (Sedad Bey). 21th (Wiliner Bey,
a German), and 26th (Fakhr-ed-Din Hey), and the 20lh Division was moving towards the front on the
lines of connnunication, south of .Mcppo.
J'li face J'liitc .I.
ADVANCE niHOlJGII IMIII.ISl lA
I' LATE 3
'MK I) I T E R Tt\ANEA N
Prmted by the Survey afE^ypt. Dec 1918(0*53)
Miles 10
10
20 Miles
Situationat.6 p^rn-on 28"10."!7aslinowTiat G.H.O.E.E.F.
OcTOBKR 28th — continued.
The Gaza sector was a network of trenches, wire entanglements, and strongl}' fortified posts, con-
veniently sited for mutual support and cross fire, which extended to the south-east until the defences
of Beersheba were reached. The German Staff appears to ha'va been very well satisfied as to the security
of the line against frontal attack and any second-lme system of defence had been almost totally neglected.
A wide turning movement on the east was considered impossible owing to the broken nature of the
comitry'and lack of water. Although the possibility of a landing on the coast north of Gaza had alwavs
been considered, the following telegram, despatched on Oct. 24 to the Yildirim Army Group Headquarters
by Major von Papen (of esj)ionage notoriety in the U.S.A.), Liaison officer between the armies and the
group, is indicative of the accepted views on this point : —
" Reconnaissance undertaken to-day along the coastal sector shows that .sufficient positions for local defence are
in existence near Askalon and Wadi Hesy. Disembarkation, which might be tactically possible, could not, from the
nature of the country, take place north of \Vadi Hesy. Employment of naval guns and a few machine guns seems desirable
for local defence."
October 29.
On Oct. 29 the process of concentration continued. The Desert Mounted Corps continued its move
towards Khalasa and Asluj. In the XX th Corps area, the 5.3rd Division continued to cover the front
and left flank of the concentration, and the enemy made no fruther attempt to interfere with or to recon-
noitre the movement. The 60th Division moved up from Tel el Fara to Bir el Esani, the advanced brigade
moving to a point south of Maalaga. Or.e brigade of the 74th Division moved forward to link up the
GOth and 53rd Divisions, while the 10th Division commenced to move from Rafa to Tel el Fara.
The enemy were still unaware of the real British intentions : —
" An outflanking attack on Beersheba, with about one infantry and one cavalry division is indicated, but ihe main
attack, as before, must be expected on the Gaza front."
So ran the enemy ajjpreciation, based on reports of our tactical deployment for the offensive as
received from their air service.
The standing camps left in the whole area around Deir el Belah, and inhabited by only a few details,
also misled the enemy, who, about this period, estimated that there were "six infantry Divisions in the
Gaza sector, deeply echeloned."
To fare Piute 4.
I
\DVANCE THROUGH PIIII.ISl^IA
PLATE 4
32
MK 1) I 1' I'l R RAN^J^AN
2Gunbodts
Printer^ by the Survey of Egypt: Dec I9l8(0'tb3)
Miles 10
20 Miles
■A
Situationat.B p.rn.on 29.-JQ-17as knownat G.H.Q. E.E.F.
October 30-31.
On the nipht of Oct. 30-31, the XXtli Corps moved forward to positions of deployment, and by dawn
was in position ready for the attack. At the same time, the Desert Monnted Corps (less the Yeomanry
Mounted Division) moved from its concentration area about Khalasa and Ashij to positions about Khashim
Zanna ready to attack Beersheba from the east, in co-operation with the XXth Corps. The moves to
the final positions were aided by the bright moon, which rose shortly after sunset.
Tlie jilan of attack was for the 60th and 74th Divisions to seize the enemy works between the Khalasa
road and the Wadi Salm, while the defences north of the wadi were masked by the Imperial Camel Corps
Brigade and two battalions of the 53rd Division. The Anzac Momited Division, Australian Mounted
Division, and 7th Mounted Brigade were to attack the defences of the town from the north-east, east,
and south-east.
At 0555 on the morning of Oct. 3] , the artillery of the GOth and 74th Divisions commenced to bombard
the enemy's positions on a front of some 4,500 yards. Some 100 field gmis and howitzers took part in
the bombardment, while twenty heavy gims were engaged mainly in counter-battery work. At 0830, the
181st Infantry Brigade advanced to the assault of Point 1070, an advanced enemy work which was cap-
tured within ten minutes. The gims now moved forward in order to cut the wire of the enemy's main
line of defence, and at 1215 the main assault was launched, the attacking troops from right to left being
the 179th, 181st, 231st, and 230th Brigades. By 1330, all objectives had been gained and soon after
an outpost line was estabhshcd.
The enemy was, however, .still holding out in his positions north of the Wadi Saba. While a brigade
of the 53rd Division threatened these from the west, the 230th Brigade, 74th Division, attacked them from
the south at 1900 and found no difficulty in occupying the works, as the enemy had evacuated them during
the preliminary bombardment.
Meanwhile, the Anzac Mounted Division reached Bir el Hammam and Bir Salim abu Irgeig, their
first objective, with only slight opposition, by about 0800. Resistance now stiffened considerably,
but Tel es Sakaty was captured by 1300 by the 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade and by 1350 this
brigade was astride the Hebron road. The strongly held position of Tel es Saba was captured by the
New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, assisted by the 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigade by 1500.
By 1800 the Anzac Mounted Division, plus the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade (Australian Mounted
Division) attached, reached the line Bir el Hammam-Bir es Sakaty-Point 1020-Point 970.
The Australian Mounted Division reached Iswaiwin by 1100 and at 1600 the 4th Australian Light
Horse Brigade moved forward to attack Beersheba. The brigade galloped over successive lines of trenches
in the face of .severe machme-gun and rifle fire, and succeeded in occupying the town by about 1800.
The 7th Mounted Brigade assisted in turning the defences on Ras Ghannam and reached Beersheba
about 1830.
The enemy troops holding Beersheba consisted of the 27th Division, an Arab formation of poor
moral, but stiffened by battalions from the 16th and 24th Divisions.
The defence of Beersheba had been entrusted to the Ilird Corps, and of its tactical handling by its
commander, Ismet Bey, the following criticism by a German staff officer is of interest : —
"The battle control of the Illrd Corps appearr.l ili-ploralilo : even bofoiv the loinmcnconicnt of the decisive infantry
attack, all reserves had been thrown in."
Tu fucv I'hite 5,
ADVANCE THROUGH PIIIIJSl^IA
PLATE 5
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Printed by the Survey of Egypt. Dec. 1918(0-453)
BeitOha^yiio TellltJeil
e'so
Miles 10
10
20 Miles
Situation at..6p..m-on.31.-10-T.l7.as known at G.H.Q.E.E.F.
November 1.
After the capture of Beersheba, preparations were at once commenced for the attack on the Kauwukah
and Rushdi trench systems covering Tel esh 8heria and Abu Hareira. Accordingly, on the morning
of Nov. 1, the 53rd Division, with the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade on its right, moved to Towal abu
Jerwal in order to protect the flank of the corps during the coming attack.
The question of water supply for moimted imits raised great difficulties, as the surface water remaining
after the thunderstorm of Oct. 2.^ had di-ied up, and the supply from the Beersheba wells was not equal
to the demand. Accordingly, on Nov. 1 the Australian Mounted Division was withdrawn into reserve,
and the Anzac Mounted Division advanced, and, after a certain amount of opposition, occupied the line
Bir el Marruneh-Towal abu Jerwal, captming 179 prisoners and four machme gmis.
To assLst in completmg the rout of the Turkish troops retiring from Beersheba, a small mobile force
on camels, consisting of Lewis guimers, machine gunners, and a few Sudanese Arab scouts, under Lieut.-
Col. S. F. Newcombe, R.E., D.S.O., left Asluj on Oct. 30. It had a number of machine guns and Lewis
guns, a large quantity of small arms ammiuiition, and carried three days' rations. Moving rajjidlv,
it established its headquarters at Yutta, and on Oct. 31 occupied some high gromid west of and com-
manding the road between Dhaheriyeh and Hebron. It was hoped that the Turks retiring by night
from Beersheba would encomiter this force, which, taking them by surprise, would by its large fire power
])ut them to rout, and cause a general debacle on the Tm-kish left wing. However, as the Anzac Momited
Division had cut the road further south, the Turkish forces from Beersheba retired north to Tel esh
8heria. The force, nevertheless, succeeded hi intercepting and capturing the motor transport with supplies
which was endeavouring to reach Beersheba from Jerusalem.
The Turks were surjirised by the appearance of this force, and having no idea of its numbers, despatched
the 12th Depot Regiment from Hebron, and the 143rd Regiment from Tel esh Sheria — six battalions
in all — to dislodge it. It held out resolutely, but, after sustaining heavy casualties and having exhausted
all its ammunition, was obliged to sm'render on Nov. 2 or 3.
To face I'liitc (/'.
ADVANCE THROUGH PIIIUSTIA
PLATE 6
Printed by the Survey of Egypt .Dec /9/8f0463)
Miles 10
10
20 M 1 1 e s
Situational e.p.m.on. 1-1 l-.n-.asknownatG.H.Q.E.E.F
November 2.
The role which had been allotted to the XXLst Corps in the operations of Oct.-Nov., 1917,
was to pin down as many enemy troops as possible in the coastal sector, and to endeavour to atrract
his reserves to this neighbourhood. In order to accomplish this, it was decided, while holding the line
in sufficient strength, to repulse any attack made by the enemy to relieve the pressure of the Beersheba
operations, to attack the works in front of Gaza and, eventually, if possible, to capture the town.
To carry out this plan, it was first of all essential to smash the elaborate S3'stem of defences which
the enemy had spent the past six months in constructing. Accordingly, on Oct. 27 the bombardment
commenced, increasing day by day, and carried out by two 60-pomider batteries, five and a half 6-inch
howitzer batteries, one 8-inch howitzer battery and the divisional artillery of the 52nd, 54th, and 75th
Divisions. On the 29th the Navy jomed in with H.M.S. "Grafton," and II.M.M. 15,29,31, and 32.
The river gunboats "Ladybird," and "Amphis," and the destroyers "Staimch" and "Comet" also
co-operated. The bombardment was highly successful, as prisoners and captm-ed documents testify.
Owing to the great width of " No man's land," averagmg 1,000 yards, it was necessary to carry out
the attack by night. Accordingly, on the night of Nov. 1-2 at 2300, the 156th Brigade assaulted and
caiDtured Umbrella Hill. At 0300 on Nov. 2 the enemy's front-line trenches were treated to an mteuse
bombardment, and the 161st and 162nd Brigades attacked, captxiring the whole of the front Hne system
at once. The 163rd Brigade were not so successful in their assault on the support trenches at 0345,
meeting with stiff resistance. The 162nd Brigade carried on the attack and by 0630 had reached Sheikh
Hassan. Six tanks participated in the later parts of the attack, rendering material assistance.
During the afternoon of Nov. 2, the enemy laimched three comiter-attacks, two on Sheikh Hassan,
the first of which was broken uj) by naval and heavy artillery fire with severe loss to the enemy, and
one from the direction of Crested Rock. All were successfully repulsed.
Some 650 ]jrisoners were taken and over 1,000 Turkish dead were bm'ied in the positions. The
enemy also lost three gims, one Hotchkiss, twenty-nine machine gims, seven trench mortars, and a large
cjuantity of rifles, amnaunition, and stores.
Meanwhile, on the right flank the XXth Corps moved its headquarters to Beersheba. The left
of the 53rd Division's line was taken over by the 229th Brigade, while the remainder of the 74th Division
moved to the neighbourhood of Point 910. The 10th Division occupied Abu Irgeig without opposition,
and was in touch with the 74th Division on the right.
The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade and 7th Mounted Brigade advanced towards Dhaheriyeh
and the Khuwcilfeh area respectively. Stiff opposition was met ui very difficult coimtry, but by nightfall
the line J5ir en Nettar-Deir el Hawa-Ras en Nagb -Point 1580, had been reached, linkmg up with the
Imperial Camel Corps Brigade about one mile NNE. of Towal Abu Jerwal. The position of Ras en Nagb,
to which the enemy attached great importance was captured by the 7th Moimted Brigade, which took
eleven j)risoncrs and two guns.
I'n fiit'C l^hlle 7.
ADVANCE THROUGH PHHJSl^IA
PLATE. 7.
Printed by the Survey of Eyypt Dec 1918(0453)
Miles 10
20 Miles
Situation at .6.|)-.rn..on .?. ~ llr.].7..as known at G.H.O. E.E.F.
November 3 to 6.
On Nov. 3 the 53rd Division attacked the Khuweilfeh lines but was only able to occupy part of the
position in view of the stout resistance made by the enemy who had diverted a considerable proportion
of his reserves to this sector of the front. He was by this tmie probably under the impression that a
wide outflanking movement was to be undertaken rather than a break-through. This attack continued
day and night against superior forces and the division was at last able to capture Tel el Khuweilfeh on
Nov. 6. Once the enemy succeeded in regaining the position with a great coimter-attack but was again
dislodged wnth the loss of many hmidred prisoners and some gmis. There is no doubt that the obstmate
fighting of the 53rd Division, which came temporarily luider the G.O.C., Desert Mounted Corps from
XXth Corps did much to confirm the enemy in his erroneous estunate of our intentions, and by attracting
his reserves to the Khuweilfeh area to contribute to the subsequent success of the lOth, 60th. and 74th
Divisions at Kauwukah, although such action naturally increased the difficulty of its own attack.
Meanwhile the lack of water in the operations area occupied by our right and right centre made it
necessary for the Australian Momited Division, which had passed into reserve on Nov. 1, to return to
Karm for water. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade which was manoeuvring against the Turkish
3rd Cavalry Division and his ]2th Depot Regiment in front of Dhaheriyeh, was able to draw sufficient
water locally. From this point, the extreme right of our Ime, there was a good deal of cavalry fighting
during these days in which the 5th Mounted, the New Zealand Momited Rifle, and Imperial Camel Brigades,
j-epulsed determined enemy counter-attacks, inflicting satisfactory losses in the process. The 5th Moimted
Brigade was withdrawn to the Tel el Saba area after the first day, when the 2nd Australian Light Horse
Brigade came south-west from Dhaheriyeh, and on Nov. 6 the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade
also came out of the line. Meanwhile the Yeomanry Division came light romid the back of the front
from near Shellal on Nov. 3 and during the night of the 5th took over from the right on the 74th Division
two miles south of Ain Kohleh in order to free the infantry for movement into its position for deploying
for the Kauwukah operations. The horses were then sent back to Beersheba.
In order to facilitate the operations of Nov. 6 a detachment for the defence of the right flank of the
army was formed undar Major-General G. de 8. Barrow, C.B., consisting of the Imperial Camel Corps
Brigade, the 53rd Division, the Yeomanry Momated Division, the New Zealand Mounted Rifle Brigade, and
part of the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade. At the same time the 60th Division was temporarily
attached to the Desert Mounted Corps which was rejoined by the Australian Momited Division on its
return from Karm to Bir Imleih.
On Nov. 6 at dawn the three infantry divisions, 10th, 60th, and 74th, with the Yeomanry on the extreme
right, attacked the series of Kauwukah positions held in strength by the Turkish Vllth Ai-my under
Fevzi Pasha. The 74th Division met with obstinate resistance on its extreme right, but was able to
capture all its objectives by 1315. Wire cutting was sufficiently far advanced for the attack on the
main Kauwukah svstem to be launched at 1230, and two hours later the fiOth and lOtli Divisions had
broken tlucnigh. The 60tli Division then advanced to Shcria and occu])ied the station hut was much
delayed in its furtlier advance by the explosion of a Turkish ammunition depot at the station w Jiich caused
a large fire which unduly exposed its movements. In consequence of this the division was luiable to
cross the Wadi Slieria that night. After the break-through at Kauwukah a Biigade of the 10th
Division took over the cajjtm-ed works while the remauider of the division passed into Corps reserve near
Samarra J5ridge and the 74th Divisi'ju faced north-east.
To face Plate A'.
ADVANCE THROUGH PHH.ISTIA
PLATE 8
30
32°
faron^^-NebTTari <«>£fV ^iS^irSi
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Printed by the Survey of Egypt: Dec l9tB(0-t53)
^OeZ-^/ Wjlian
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Miles 10
10
20 Miles
Situationat..6.p..'J!.on6.:.J.L-.l7..as known at G.H.Q.E.E.F.
November 7.
On Nov. 7 the main interest .shifts to the coastal sector, where the intense bombardment carried out
bv the Navy and the XXIst Corps on the 5th and 6th, had produced so strong a feehng of unease among
the Turks that a considerable part of their forces were carefully withdi'awn. To such an extent had this
retirement been carried out, that British attacks during the night of Nov. 6-7 on Outpost Hill and
Middlesex Hill, met with only half-hearted opposition, and the occupation of AH Muntar itself was effected
by the 75th Di/ision at 0740 without much trouble. A little before this, at 0700, the 54th Division was
able to establish a line from Sheikh Redwan to the sea, and two squadrons had passed up the beach at
06.30, to push patrols up to the Wadi Hesi. The Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade advanced towards
Beit Hanun, after passing right through the ruins of Gaza at 0900. Two brigades of the 5'2nd Division,
withdrawn from the trenches, moved off at 1000 and, after advancing under cover of the cliffs along the
beach, seized the high ground on the right bank of the Wadi Hesi, in the face of considerable resistance
on the part of the 53rd Turkish Division (Mehmet Salah-ed-Din Bey). The 52nd Division by this move
passed behind the 54th and formed the extreme left of the British line.
Gaza itself was found to be in a deplorable condition. Its civilian population had been evacuated
and the greater part of the wood-work of the houses, floors, roofs, doors, and fittings, w-indow sashes
and shutters, removed to be used either for the revetting of Tiu'kish trenches in the sandy soil, or for
firewood. Many trees had been cut down and immense damage effected by the explosions of the Tm'kish
ammunition stored in prominent buildings and detonated by British gun fire. The place was, in conse-
quence, entirely ruinous and destitute of any economic value to the victor. On the other hand, General
Allenby was not called upon to make arrangements for the feeding of a large civilian population.
Away on the right, the 10th Division captured the Hareira Tepe redoubt, in face of considerable
machine-gun fire, thereby making it possible for a junction to be effected with the extreme right of the
XXIst Corps near the Wadi Baha. The intention had been for the Desert Mounted Corps to pass imme-
diately through the gap in the Turkish line made by the three Infantry Divisions at Kauwukah, but the
Turks were not yet too disorganized to oft'er sturdy resistance in places, and the COth Division had some
difficulty in dislodging them from Tell esh Sheria at 0600 as a necessary preliminary to an advance of
two miles beyond the Wadi Sheria. This cleared the way finally for the cavalry. Passing through
the gap, the 1st Au.stralian Light Horse Brigade captured the station east of Kh. Um Ameidat, four
and a half miles north of Tell esh Sheria, with 300 prisoners and much material. The Australian and
New Zealand Momited Division was then engaged with enemy rear-guards and was only able to advance
to the positions shown — a distance of two and a half miles — ^by nightfall. The Australian Mounted
Division filled the gap between the advanced cavalry and the 60th Division to the north of the Wadi
Sheria. The lack of water in this area was severely felt.
7ii fa,;- I'liitc U.
i
1
ADVANCE THROUGH PIIILISl^IA
PLATE 9
Printed by the Survey of Egypt . Dec 1918(0453)
Miles 10 s
10
Situationat 6 p.ra. on.7.-.lI.-.17.-asknownat G.H.Q.E.E.F.
20 M i I e s
November 8.
The desperate resistance made by the enemy and the lack of water had delayed the Desert Mounted
Corps dm-ing the few hoiurs required by the Turks to unthdraw the greater part of their 26th and 54th
Divisions, commanded respectively by Fakhr-ed-Din Bey and Nasuhi Bey, through the gap which still
remained between the XXLst Corps at Beit Hamm and the newly-won positions to the west. The Desert
Mounted Corps, however, was in bad country and the " break through " after the Battle of iSheria was
vastly handicapped by natural as well as human obstacles in comparison with the " break through "
after the Battle of Sharon ten months later. During this day, Nov. 8, the Australian and New Zealand
Mounted Division fought its way to water at the Wadi Jemmameh, capturing 300 prisoners and two
guns. The 7th Mounted Brigade heartily repulsed a Tiu'kish counter-attack near Tell Hudeiwe, while
the Austrahan Mounted Division came up on the left and occupied a hne from Umni Rujimi to the
north side of Huj, which, with its large accumulations of ammunition was occupied by the 60th Division
after an advance of ten miles, during which the enemy had been defeated in three successive rearguard
actions. In one of these at 1-500 ten troops of 1/lst Worcester and 1/lst Warwick Yeomanry of the
5th Mounted Brigade (Au.stralian Momited Division) charged a detachment of Turks holding a position
one mile west of Huj, with complete success in spite of the stout resistance of the enemy who served his
guns until the last moment. Further west the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade got into touch with
the XXIst Corps at Beit Hanun.
Meanwhile the XXIst Corps had been actively pushing forward, and the 75th Di\'ision was able
to link up with the 10th after occujjying the Beer Trenches, Tank Redoubt, and Atawineh, which had been
fomid to be lightly held by the enemy, by patrols from the Composite Force, early in the morning. In
the afternoon the Comj^osite Force reheved the 75th Division which moved on the 9th to Beit Hanun.
Here the Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade had established itself, after considerable difficulty, on the
ridge to the east whence it was able to hnk up with the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, and then
pursue the enemy to Tumrah and Deir Sineid. Between the cavalry and sea the 52nd Division continued
to advance, toiling in heavy sand, and opposed strongly by the Turks, who made a formidable counter-
attack from the direction of Ascalon. Four times did the enemy drive the Lowlanders off the high
ground north-west of Deir Sineid only to lose it once more and find oiu men arrayed a fifth time against
them on the top of the hill.
This sweeping advance on nearly the whole front appears to have contributed much to the break-
down of the Turkish moral. In places the enemy was still dangerous and made sturdy resistance but
many of his people became increasingly anxious to remove themselves from the unpleasant vicinity of
the front. This frame of mind betrayed itself in the behaviour of certain units, and aerial reports gave
warning that the enemy was becoming disorganized.
To face Plate 10.
ADVANCE THRQUGII PIIILISTIA
PLATE 10
32°
^/Vj/c/i-/ fuhi -
Furhha
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Beit Ai/tn W jp {_•
Printed by the Survey of Egypt. Dec l9l8(0'fS3)
Miles 10
Situation at ^P:";'- on ^" .'I 1"^. as known at 6.H.O. E.E.F.
20 Miles
=1
November 9.
On this day the 52iid Division continued its advance, and by noon had occupied the line Deir Sineid-
Beit Jerjah-Ascalon. At 1400 Hamame, the northern point of the Mejdel oasis among the sand dunes,
was reached, and the cavaby located the Turkish rearguard at 1830 in the Suafir group of villages about
seven miles away. During the night the 75th Division arrived at Deir Sineid and the Imperial Service
Cavalry returned to the Gaza area. Further inland the cavalry was begiiming to feel the want of water.
The Yeomanry Division, which had been engaged on the previous day in the pursuit of the enemy retreat-
ing on Hebron, had been called across to the more important front and rejoined the Desert Mounted
Corps at Huj, where it was delayed in consequence of the difficulties in watering described in para. 13 of
No. 1 Despatch. The same cause prevented the Australian Mounted Division from moving far, and
only the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division with the 7th Moimted Brigade could advance.
By night they had reached the line Arak-El Menshiye-Suafir esh Sherkiye-Beit Duras, and were close
up to the Tiu'kish main rearguard, in advance of the positions shewn on the map which are those reported
up to 1800 at General Headquarters.
To face Plate 11.
ADVANCE THROUGH PIIII.ISl^IA
PLATE II
Printed by the Survey of Egypt .'Dec. 1918(0453)
Mites 10 &
Situation at6 p m , on 9 "J !.~ 17.. as known at G.H.Q. E.E.F.
20 M 1 1 e s
=1
November 10.
A khamsin, or .iciroque, as it is often called in Palestine, began to blow on Nov. 10, lasting two days.
This hot wind was an additional trial to all troop.s, particularly to the cavlary already suffering from
water-shortage. The Austrahan and New Zealand Division, however, was able to capture Esdud, the
Ashdod of the Phihstines, and its bridgehead before being brought to a halt owing to the water diffi-
culty. Dui'ing the previous night the Austrahan Mounted Division had marched north-east from Huj
via Tell el Hesi (the Lachish of the Old Testament), and linked up on the right of the hue at Arak el
Menshiye on Nov. 10. It was joined soon afterwards by the Yeomanry Division which had left Huj
early in the morning. Thus, with the exception of the New Zealand Momited Rifle Brigade and the
Imperial Service Cavalry Brigade, the whole Desert Mounted Corps was now in position for further
pursuit across the open country of Philistia and the foothills, after having captured over 1,000 prisoners
and sixteen guns in the two days. During the day the 52nd Division moved into the Esdud-Mejdel-
Herbiah area, and the 1.57th Brigade engaged the enemy north of Beit Duras, capturing the position
and three machine guns with a bayonet charge in spite of having already marched fourteen miles over
heavy sand in a khamsin.
The 75th Division advanced into the Es Suafii-JuKs-Burberah-Beit Jerjah area, and the 10th and
60th Divisions (which latter rejoined the XXth Corps) began to fall back on Karm and the railway to
facilitate supply work. The 54th Division, at Gaza, gave up all its transport to assi.st m the forward
move, and was able to maintain itself without transport on a supply of five days' rations in depots close
at hand.
7)1 face Plate 12.
ADVANCE TIIHQUGII PIIILIS^riA
barona^-f/ebtl
Mik *ve lit Q f^^
Ffrt..l,n„
EIL
MEIHTERIl\ANEAN
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Printed by the Survey of Egypt Dec 1918(0453)
Miles 10
20 M lies
SituaUonat Sp^ID-on iP")l".17as knownat G.H.Q.E.E.F
November 11 and 12.
During these two days XXIst Corps Advanced Headquarters moved up to Deir Sineid (Nov. 11)
and two important actions were fought on the banks of the Nahr Sukereir. In one of these, the 1st
Australian Light Horse Brigade drove back the enemy, forced the passage of the stream, and captured
Tel el Murro. This was an important step towards securing control of the mouth of the river, which was
afterwards most useful as a temporary landing-place for stores. In the other the 52nd Division, vnth.
two battaUons of the 75th Division, the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade, and the 8th Mounted Brigade,
assaulted and captured Burkah, in spite of determined resistance and a strong counter-attack. On the
right of the 75th Division, the Australian Mounted Division, after hard fighting succeeded in adv^ancing
as far as Berkusie on a general line running south-eastwards to Zeita ; but under pressure of a determined
counter-attack by an enemy force, estimated at 5,000 men of the 19th and 53rd Turkish Divisions
(commanded by Sedad Bey and Mehmet Salah ed Din Bey respectively), the cavalry had to retire two
or three miles to Arak el Mensbiye and Summeil.
During the night of the r2th, the Lst Australian Light Horse Brigade was reUeved by the Yeomanry
Mounted Division, which had been brought right across from one end of the line to the other, by way of
Mejdel, and now took over the country to the north of the mouth of the Nahr el Sukerier, advancing
almost to Tell el Kharrube and Beshshit. The New Zealand Mounted Kifles had now rejoined the
division, which was also reinforced by the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade, which had rejoined the Desert,
Mounted Corps at Julis on Nov. 11. Owing to the exhaustion of their horses on account of the lack of
water, the 7th Mounted and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades had to be withdrawn into corps
reserve.
The enemv was beginning to show signs of recovery and made efforts to reconstruct his line of resis-
tance, and make a front in hopes of maintaining control of the lateral line of communications along
the railway from Ludd to Jerusalem. This is clearly shewn on the map. and the importance of a further
advance before the line could harden into a prepared front, is obvious.
To face Plate 13.
ADVANCE THROUGH PHILISTIA
PLATE 13
Printed by the Survey of Egypt^Otc 1918(0^53)
Miles 10 s
20 Miles
Id
Situational 6 p..m,on.. 11- l.lrl7..as]inown at G.H.Q.EJE.F.
November 13.
Up to the evening of Nov. 12 the advance of XXIst Corps had been northward, but on the morning
of Nov. 13 it was nece.ssary for the proper execution of the Commander-in-Chief's plans to advance
eastward. The .52nd Divi.sion on the left fiank was thrown well forward and the 75th Divi.sion wheeled
on it.5 right. To guard the northern flank of the troops advancing eastward, two battaUons and a battery
of Royal Field Artillery occupied Yebna (the Jamnia of the New Testament period, the Ibehn of the
Crusades) which had been captured at 1100 by the Yeomanry and Imperial Camel Corps. A similar
force was subsequently detailed to hold the high ground north of Mughar, and one battalion and a battery
of Royal Field Artillery held Akir after its capture early next morning. All these detachments were
furnished by the 52nd Division until the arrival of the 54th Division several days later.
The enemy position on the ridge to the north-east of El Mughar was captured by infantry
of the 52nd Division and the 6th Moimted Brigade of the Yeomamy Division. The attack had
to pass over 4,500 yards of open ground near Katrah. It was entirely successful and resulted in the
capture of 1,096 prisoners, two guns, and fourteen machine guns. Over 400 dead Turks were counted
in one field. The village of El iVIughar itself was captured in the evening by two squadrons of the 1/lst
Berkshire Yeomanry who entered the village on foot and took 400 prisoners. The 75th Division had
a good deal of trouble with the Turks along the hne from Mesmiyeh to Kh. Sallujeh. The 232nd Brigade,
advancing through Yasur, was engaged on the left, while the 233rd, advancing just to the north of
Kustine, was engaged on the right. This brigade finally stormed Mesmiyeh from the south, and the
division took 292 prisoners and seven machine guns. The 234th Brigade then came through in the
centre as far as Kh. el Mugharah on the railway, where it was strongly counter-attacked during the night
by the Turks covering Junction Station less than two miles distant. The 6th Mounted Brigade opera-
ting towards Akir captured seventy-two prisoners, one gun and two machine guns. XXIst Corps
advanced headquarters moved up to a point near Beit Duras.
'J'u face Plate 14.
ADVANCE THROUGH PHH.ISTIA
ENEMY UNITS UN LOCATED
32°
24,26,27divn
tend to show that the
Units are tiised into
136 Re9t.,3 CAV.
5. All reports
residue of these
Other uivns.
DIV.
{Cirwe-
Mejd^l Yaba"^ ^-^^
— E't
Renti.
Furhha
"SaJiKye
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p/ii/*»<i. r\H'. iXutar
V WyOi- "oS^^/Ka VW ^a/l/77/
Printed by the Surrey of Egypt. Dec 1918(0453)
Mites 10
Situation at. 6. pm.on13-lH7asknownatG.H.Q.E.E.F.
20 Miles
=1
November 14.
At 0400 on Nov. 14 the 234th Brigade of the 75th Division had seized the high ground west of
Junction Station, and at 0730 the station itself was captured with 100 prisoners, two guns, two undamaged
locomotives, and much rolling stock. Two arnioiued cars of No. 12 Light Armoured Motor Battery
co-operated very effectively in the capture of the station, inflicting some 200 casualties upon the enemy.
At 0900 the 52nd Division captured Mansura two miles further north, and the 22nd Mounted Brigade
of the Yeomanry Division drove the enemy from Akir and captured Naane, another two miles to the
north, with seventy-two prisoners and one machine gun. Further north again the Austrahan and New
Zealand Mounted Division reached the outskirts of Ramleh and the ridges north of Surafend by noon.
Here the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were vigorously comiter-attacked by the enemy who approached
to within bombing distance and had to be discomfited with a bayonet charge. The headquarters of
the Desert Mounted Corps moved up to a point near Yebna.
To face Plate lo.
ADVANCl^ INTO JUDAEA
Printed by -the Survey of Ecfypt. Dec 1918(0453)
Miles 10 5 g
I — II — II — 'I — 'I — I *■
10
=1—
20 Miles
zl
Situation at Gprnon 1.4:11:1.7.. aslmown at G.H.Q. E.E.F.
November 15 and 16.
On Nov. 15 the 75tli Division had occupied the high ground east of Junction Station and next day
advanced to the Hne Kezaze Khulde and Abu Shusheh where, on Nov. 15, the Yeomanry Division and
part of the Imperial Camel Corps had had a very satisfactory engagement. The enemy was driven
back on Amwas leaving 400 dead and 360 prisoners, in addition to another ninety captured as the
yeomamy passed near Ramleh in their advance. Ramleh itself, and Ludd, were taken by the 1st Aus-
trahan Light Horse Brigade on the same day with 360 prisoners. After this the section of the Imperial
Camel Corps engaged at Abu Shusheh moved off to rejoin the other section which was operating among
the sand dunes in the Jaffa area. The Australian Moimted Division advanced close up to Latron which
was still held by the Tiurks after their defeat at Abu Shusheh, and on the north front the New Zealand
Moimted Rifles occupied Jaffa at noon Nov. 16 without opposition, and Kefr Ana, while the rest of
the division kept in touch with the yeomanry in the Ramleh-Ludd area.
During these two days the break up of the enemy forces into two widely separated bodies begins to
be strongly marked. The Vllth Army was being shepherded up into the hill-country of Judsea along
the dead end of a narrow gauge railway to a position of immense natural strength, but hampered by the
lack of good communications with his base — all his transport being of necessity confined to the roads
from Jerusalem through Nablus to the railway at Messudiyeh some forty miles away, or through the
Jordan Valley to the railway at Amman, a difficult journey of about sixty miles. The other body,
formed by the Vlllth Army was being driven out of PhiUsda into the plain of Sharon, but it was able
to keep astride of its railway and had hopes of being able to take refuge behind the Nahr el Auja.
Meanwhile, the 54th Division had begun to move north from Gaza, and to make this move possible
it was neci^ssary for the transport borrowed from this division to be sent back. This greatly increased
the difficulty of supplying the troops at the front, as railhead, in spite of the energetic work on the rail-
way, was still a long way oS.
Up in the hills to the north of Beersheba the Turks, under the tactical pressure of the advance along
the coast, saw fit to withdraw from Dhaheriyeh to the Hebron area.
To face Plate 16.
ADVANCE INTO JVDMA
PLATE 16
Aln ef Yezi
ENEMY UNITS UNLOCATED:
26 D I V. I fiot/? these D 'vns. and
53 Div. ( 1
/» r> 1 *i •■
very
weak.
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■inted by the Sc/ri-ey of Egypt. Dec 1918(0453)
Miles 10
10
20 Miles
d
SituaUon at^Prf^.-on .l?.'ll~17aslaiownat G.H.Q E.E.F.
November 17 and 18.
The weather had been imusually hot and the dust and khamsin added greatly to the trials of the
troops and animals, who were also much distressed by the shortage of water. This was accen-
tuated by the practice of the enemy in doing his best to destroy the smn.ll and very deep wells of the area
through which he had been retreating. Owing to the loss of transport caused by the return of the 54th
Divisional Train to its own division, it became necessary to rearrange the transport, and this, together
with the desirability of resting the troops for a few hours, made a day's halt almost necessary. The
Commander-in-Chief held a conference at XXIst Corps advanced headquarters on Nov. 18, and orders
were issued in obedience to which the 52nd Division moved to Ludd during the afternoon while the
54th Division, which had now come up from Gaza, moved uj) a Brigade from Kustineh to Beshshit
and occupied Yebna. The 234th Brigade of the 75th Division covered Jimction Station, while the
rest of the division prepared to advance towards Latron.
Meanwhile the cavalry had advanced a httle across open coimtry occupying Sarona, Mulebbis, and
Wilhelma without opposition. They came in contact with the enemy at Kantieh and held the line
Nahr el Auja-Beit Nabala-El Yehudieh-Point 265-Jerisheh. On the afternoon of Nov. 18 the
Australian Mounted Division executed an outflanking movement which compelled the Turks to evacuate
Amwas and Latron during the night, and the Yeomanry Division forced its way into the hills to within
two miles of Lower Bethhoron (Beit iir et Tahta). At 1630 the 22nd Mounted Brigade reached Shilta,
but the 13-pdr. battery and all wheels had to be sent back owing to difficulties of country.
In the XXth Corps area. Advanced Corps Headquarters on Nov. 18 moved to the Red House on the
Wadi Ghuzze. On the same day the 60th Division concentrated at Gaza preparatory to a further move
forward, while the 10th and 74th Divisions moved to areas north of Deir el Belah.
To face Plate 17.
ABVANCB INTO JXTD^A
PLATE 17
V Ml,
Printed by the Survey of Egypt. Dec. 19/8(0453)
Miles 10
^3=
^Z
10
=4—
Situation at6..p,rn, oii!.8.:!!.:.l7 aslmownat G.H.Q. E£.F.
November 19.
When the fresh advance approached the hills, on Nov. 19, the 75th Division encountered consider-
able opposition east of Amwas and Latron, which had been occupied by the 232nd Brigade at noon.
The main road to Jerusalem begins to rise at this point and enters narrow defiles flanked by precipitous
and rock-strewn heights. On these the enemy had constructed a series of defences commanding all
approaches. Our artillery had few positions from which the infantry could be assisted, but the avail-
able few were utilized to the utmost and the advance of the division was pressed forward. The experience
of the Gurkhas and Indian Frontier troops in mountain warfare, was of great value during these opera-
tions. As the road had been destroyed by the Tm-ks in several places, the problem of getting the guns
up the pass was one of considerable difBculty, the more so as heavy rain had set in. This downpour,
accompanied as it was by a considerable drop in temperature, was a severe trial for troops in summer
clothing without greatcoats or blankets, who had, until a few hours before, been suffering from excessive
heat. In spite of it the troops worked splendidly and took such rest as was possible in the rain among
the rocks. Meanwhile the 52nd Division had advanced on a roughly parallel line along the Beit Likia
road, where the badness of the track only permitted three sections of artillery to be brought up, and even
these had to be double-horsed with the teams of the sections left at Ramleh.
In the Bethhoron area the 8th Mounted Brigade occupied Tahta at an early hour and then advanced
through the Wadi Simt where it met with opjjosition from, some 400 Turks on the heights. The going
here was extremely bad and later became impassable for horses. As advance in this direction was not
possible the brigade held its position until the 6th Mounted Brigade could turn the enemy's flank by way
of Beit ur el Foka. This brigade, with divisional headquarters, one battery of 13-pdrs., and the Hong-
Kong and Singapore battery, reached Tahta at 1400, but the road difficulties were very great as the
Roman road had deteriorated almost out of existence. Even greater difficulties were experienced by
the 22nd Mounted Brigade, which, with one section of the Hong-Kong and Singapore battery struggled
part of the way to Ain Arik, where but little enemy opposition was experienced.
On the plain the Australian and New Zealand Division sent patrols into Rantieh and located the
enemy in occupation of redoubts at Nebi Tari and entrenched north of Hadrah on the Nahr el Auja.
On this day the 60th Division started north from the Gaza area.
To face Plate IS.
ADVANCE INTO JUDMA
PLATE ii
Printed by the Stiri^cy of Eyypt, Dec 1918(0453)
Miles 10 5
I — I ■ — ' "^
10
20 Miles
d
Situation at6.p..rn:0ii l.9.-.I.J.r.l.7..a5laiownat G.H.Q. E.E.F.
November 20 and 21.
Oil Nov. 20 the advance was continued against a very determined resistance on the precipitou??
slopes above Saris. The village itself, standing on a steep hill, was strongly held and was not stormed
until 1415. The enemy left many dead among the rocks, and over fifty prisoners, including a battalion
commander, were taken. The remainder of the Tm'kish force, estimated at a mininmm of 2,000 rifles
with many machine guns, covered by hght guns, retired to the commanding ridge protecting Kuryet
el Enab, beinc: satisfactorily shelled by 4'5 howitzers from the road below the Makam Imam Ali during
their retreat. The captirre of such a position might well have cost the division dear had not a providen-
tial fog rolled Uf), which enveloped the Turkish lines while the attacking force was deploying. Under
cover of this at 1700 the 2/3rd Gurkhas, the l/5th Somersets and the l/4th Wilts (2:32nd and 2:53rd
Brigades) attacked with the bayonet, and listeners were able to deduce what was happening from the
different timbre of the cheering which came back through the fog. By 1800 the Turks had lost Kuryet el
Enab, and the division had seized the whole of the enemy's positions and bivouacked for the night in
pouring rain. Ne.xt day Kustal and Soba were captured after some opposition had been overcome, by
the 232nd and 23lth Brigades respectively. During the advance along the crest of the ridge towards
Biddu and Kubeibeh the Turkish small arm and artillery fire from Nebi Samwil (Mizpah of the Old
Testamznl, Montjoye of the Crusader-') caused much annoyance. A. separate attack, supported by the
guns at Kuryet el Enab, was made on this position, and by 2345 Nebi Samwil was taken by the 234th
Brigade, with the 3/3rd Gurkhas and the 2/4th Hants attached. The 75th Division had thus reached
the furthest point of King Richard's advance in Jan., 1192. Reinforcements had been sent up by the
52nd Division and every effort was being made to make a track good enough for the guns to advance
from Likia to Kubeibeh (four and a quarter miles).
Some three miles to the south, on the right of the 75th Division, the 5th Mounted Brigade of the
Aastralian Division advanced astride of the railway up the narrow valley of Sorek (Wadi es Surar).
The 52nd Division had advanced as far as Beit Anan and Beit Dukku, three and four miles further
north, while keeping a strong force at Beit Likia.
To the north of the 52nd Division the yeomanry in the Bethhoron country were being held up
ahke by the difficulties of the terrain and the tenacity of the Turks. The badness of the country along
the left of this division's line of advance was in itself a protection, and the Turks refrained from
attempting an attack from the north, but shewed great obstinacy on the ridges between Upper Beth-
horon (Beit ur el Foka) and Beituna to within half a mile of which the (ith Mounted Brigade was able
to advance before it was held up at 1100 by a force of over 3,000 Turks with four batteries of "778 and
some camel guns. In spite of the arrival of two regiments of the 8th Mounted Brigade at 1145 and one
from the 22nd at 1400, the yeomanry found that further advance was impossible, and when the Turks
were reinforced at 1600 and out-ranged our mountain guns there was nothing for it but to retreat to
Beit ur el Foka, an operation which began at 1930 and was successfully covered by the 8th Mounted
Brigade. The 22nd Mounted Brigade during the day was engaged near Ram Allah.
In the plain the GOth Division arrived in the Mejdel area and the 51th Division was hnt to the
Desert Mounted Corps for tiie defence of the Ludd-Jaffa line, in front of which cavalry patrols rode up
to Rentis, Shukba, and Shebtin. The enemy still held the high land at Deir el Kuddis in this region
as well as the northern bank of the Nahr el Auja.
By this date the moral ascendancy of the British had reached such a pitch that the following re-
marks occur in a letter written by a German staff officer on Nov. 21 : —
•• We have liad a very bad time. After having, liail to relinquish good positions which liad lieen held for so long, the
lin^alxdowii of tlie army is greater than ever I could liave imagined. But for this comijlete dissolution, we should still be able
to make a good stand at Jerusalem— now the Vllltli Army bolts from any Ciivalry patrol."
To face Plate 19.
ADVANCE INTO JUDAIA
PLATE /9
32°
30
ENEMY UNITS
XVCORPS, 19&20 DIVS.
Probnhlv N jf JERUSALEM
Am el Yezeh
Munsau^ep flf'"'"'^/iufej f"""^
UNLOCATED
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Printed by the Survey of Egypt. Dec. 1918 (04 S3)
Miles 10
Mf
Situatioii.at.®..P-.'":.oiL^'.:.'.!;.!7...as known at G.H.O.E.E.F
November 22-24.
The Turkish Vllth ^Vrmy on Nov. 22 tried to recover some of the ground which it had lost, and
launched in succession three formidable but fruitless counter-attacks on Nebi Samwil. On the other
hand, the enemy so strongly opposed our attack on El Jib that he was able to retain that position,
although he )o.3t Beit Izza to the 52nd Division. Next day the 75th Division made another attempt to
take El Jib, supported by all available guns, but the enemy was in such strength, and his artillery and
machine-gun fire so formidable, that no progress could be made. The 52nd Division reheved the 75tli
during the night and began a fresh attack on the morning of Nov. 24. Simultaneously, the northern
end of the ridge was also attacked, the Yeomanry Division made a demonstration towards Beitunia
and a brigade was pushed forward against the high land north-west of El Jib. The third assault had
no better result than its predecessors and it became apparent that cold and casualties had, for the
moment, enabled the Turks to bring the advance to a standstill within sight of Jerusalem. In conse-
quence of this the 60th Division next day relieved the 75th Division from 8oba northwards, while the
52nd Division was directed to discontinue the attack. The COth Division had arrived at Junction
Station on Nov. 22, where it was attached to the XXIst Corps and then proceeded to Latron.
The 5th Mounted Brigade, having the 10th Australian Light Horse regiment attached during these
three days, moved up to Artuf on the 23rd and sent strong patrols as far as Ain Karim and Bittir next
day. The 8th and 22nd Mounted Brigades successfully withdrew to Tahta during Nov. 22 and next
day, owing to the difficulty of getting water and supplies, many horses were sent down to Ramleh.
The Yeomanry Division on this day was attached to XXIst Corps and got into touch with the infantry
east of Dukka on occupying Et Tire.
In the lower foothills the 7th Moimted Brigade on Nov. 22 entered Eelain, Deir el Kuddis, and
Shukbah without oppo.sition, and the Turks were found to have fallen back to Abud. Next day this
brigade, on being relieved along the fine Sheikh el Gharbawy-Kh. Harmush by the 54th Division,
withdrew to Zernukah into corps reserve. The Desert Mounted Corps was now holding the line
Kb. Midieh-Kh. Harmush-Haditheh-El Yehudiyeh-Point 2G5-Birket el Jamus-Sheikh Abd en Neby,
and the redistribution of troops shewn on the map was completed by the morning of the 24th, when
the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division, supported by two companies of infantry, crossed
the Nahr el Auja and occupied a line covering Kh. Hadrah and Sheikh Muannis.
Meanwhile XXth Corps advanced headquarters had moved to Junction Station, and the
74th Division started north from Deir el Belah on 32rd, reaching Gaza on the afternoon of the next
day. Patrols from Mott's detachment on the 24th established the fact that Ed Dhaheriyeh had been
evacuated by the enemy.
To face Plate 20.
ADVANCE INTO .JUDAIA
PLATE 20
'El Mughair
TellSubi'J
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EN EM Y UNI rS U N LOCATE D : K -."
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Printed by the Survey oF Egypt Dec. 1918 (01 53)
Miles 10 5
zpMiles
SitTiation at6 p...m.x)iL2.4 :.l. j - 1 7 as known, at G.H.Q . E.E.F.
November 25.
The enemy almost at once replied to the advance across the Auja. At 0300 he attacked Kh. Hadrah
and by 0800 the position could no longer be held. The cavah-y retired across the river and two com-
panies of infantry in support suffered considerably while covering the withdrawal, as they had no
artillery to help them. During the morning the enemy, who was in some strength, also recovered Sheikh
Muannis, and the rest of our people had to retire to their original line, in course of which the cavalry
had to gallop the ford over the bar at the mouth of the Nahr el Auja. As a measure of precaution the
7th Mounted Brigade was brought five miles north to Rishon le Zion for a night, but the Turks were
content with having recovered the line of the Auja and made no attempt to do anything more.
On the mountain front the enemy shelled Biddu and Nebi Samwil and attempted to attack Beit
Izza with 300 men, but nothing came of it, and the Turks, who were quite as exhausted as the two
British divisions on that front, were otherwise quiescent, except for their activity in digging-in, an opera-
tion in which they were compulsorily assisted by drafts from the local population. In the Bethhoron
area at 1400 aljout 200 Turks with machine guns were engaged by the Leicester Battery near Foka and
the Stafford Yeomanry neai' Kh. Meita. Their advance was cliecked and an attack made at 1600 was
broken up. Yeomanry Divisional Headquarters was established at Beit Ur et Tahta.
The 74th Division, hurrying up from the south, reached the Mejdel area.
'/■» fare I'Inir 31.
ADVANCE INTO .Ji:nDA:A
PLATL ;•/
Printed by the Survey of Eyypt. Dec. 19/8 (0453)
Miles 10 5 0
I — 'I — II — i I — II — I 1-
apMiips
Situatlonat ^ P:'".-.on.2.^:.'.':'Z aslaiowiial G.H.Q.EJE.F.
November 26 and 27.
During these two days the 60th Division reheved the 75th and the 52nd Divisions on the mountain
front. The 75th withdrew down the pass to Latron and the 52nd began to move over into the Beth-
horon area. Apart from shelhng there was no enemy activity on this part of the front. In the plain,
however, on the 27th the enemy reinforced the garrison of Ferrekiyeh and the defences of the bridge
across the Auja were improved. One battahon of the enemy was reported by the AustraUan and New
Zealand Division to be advancing towards Mulebbis and another dowii the narrow gauge railway to
Eantieh. In addition to this a number of Turks were seen diggmg in between Et Tireh and Rantieh
and a detachment with machine gims advanced to Deir Tureif where the 54th Division was engaged as
well as at Yehudiyeh. In the afternoon 4,000 Turks advanced to Mulebbis from the north.
On Nov. 27 three officers and sixty men of the 6th Mounted Brigade, held the Zeitim post against
600 Turks with machine guns wlio were supported by artillery from Beitimia from 1400 until dark. The
garrison, by then reduced to two officers and twenty-six men was reinforced during the night by another
fifty men, and successfully held until dawn in spite of enemy attacks which lasted all night, and the
destruction by shell fire of the building which they had been occupying. At 1500 enemy patrols were
reported to be active to the north and in the neighbourhood of Deir Ibzia, and it became apparent that
the enemy was hoping to work round the left flank of the thinly held ten-mile British line to the gap of
five or six miles between the left flank of the yeomanry and Sliilta, the nearest post of the 54th Division.
Zeitmi Post was ordered to hold out as long as possible, and No. 2 Light Ai'moured Car Battery was
posted one mile west of Tahta on the Beit 8ira road to prevent the enemy from advancing by way of
Suffa. A staff officer had to ride down to Berfilya, seven miles away, before he could get ui touch with
commimications and thus secme reinforcements, and at 2130 on Nov. 27, the 7th Mounted Brigade, which
had come from Rishon le Zion and Zernukah, left Deiran and reached Beit Ur et Tahta before dawn.
The stubborn defence by the Turkish forces in the hills can be explained by an appreciation of the
situation wTitten by Major von Papen on Nov. 23, 1917. In this, he states that an assault group, com-
posed of the 19th, 20th, and 54th Infantry Divisions, will be formed by the end of the month at Tul
Keram. In the meantime, every effort must be made, pending the attack of the assault group, to defend
Jerusalem with the XXth Corps and the El Bire Group (Ilird Corps). He does not, however, hold out
much hope of retainmg Jerusalem, as the Turkish forces had been so shattered as to reduce the com-
parative strength to a ratio of one to six.
On Nov. 21 the same writer had already reported to Count Bernstorff on the condition of the
Turkish forces at this time : —
" We have hart a very bad time.
" The breakdown of the army, after having had to relinquish the good positions in whicli it had remained for so long,
is so complete that I could never have dreamed of .such a thing. But for this complete di.ssolution, we should still be able
to make a stand south of Jeru.salem. even to-day. But now the Vlllth Army bolts from every cavalry patrol.
" Many reasons have contributed to this sorrowful result, chiefly incapacity on the part of the troops and their leaders.
Single men fight very pluc'iily, but the good officers have fallen and the remainder have bolted ; in Jerusalem alone, we
arrested 200 officers and 5,000-(),(>00 men deserters.
" Naturally Enver presses very strongly to hold on to Jerusalem with all possible means, on aceoimt of the political
effect. From a military point of view, it is a mistake, for this shattered army can only be put together again, if entirely
removed from (contact with the enemy and fitted out with new divisions. This, however, can only take place after the
lapse of months.
" Now it is just a toss-up."
That an army which had been so hammered as to break up into a condition meriting such criticism
as the above should have been able to recover during the brief breathing space afforded to it by British
difficulties over transjiort, and olTer the stmdy lesistanco which our divisions had to overcome in the
mountains of Juda'a, is a further illustration of the inunense recu2)erative jjower of Turks in strong
defensive positions.
To fiue Plate i2.
ADVANCE INTO JUDAIA
PLATE 22
ENEMY UNIT] UNLOCATED :
Ifi DIV.
A,n el YezehV TeliSybiA!^ WjTuI Ket>
el^,^,-,
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Printed by the Survey of Egypt. Dec. 1918 104 S3)
Miles 10
5 0
— i I — I I — I I—
SitiiaUoaat 6.p,m,on.27-j I .-I7 as knowaat G.H.O.E.E.F.
zpMiles
November 28, 29, and 30.
On Nov. 28, at noon, the XXth Corps took over the line from XXIst Corps, and its headquarters
moved ;ip from Junction Station to Latron. The hne as then held by the GOth Division was from 8oba
on the south to Kiistul-Beit Surik-Nebi 8amwil-Beit Izza. Near here contact was made with tlie
Yeomanry Mounted Division which held Dukka-Beit Ur el Foka-Et Tahta, and thence to the new
sector held by the 52nd Division at Suffa and Shilta after its relief by the 60th Division.
In view of the increasing stubbornness of the enemy and the consequent need to prepare a more
deliberate method of attack, it was of prime importance to improve communications. New roads were
begim between Latron and Beit Likia to Unk up with the road made by XXIst Corps between Beit
Likia and Biddu, and another was started from Kuryet el Enab to Kubeibeh, while the existing roads
and tracks were improved into usefulness. Even so it was found that traffic became difficult after a
few hours of rain, and that during wet weather camels were of little use. Consequently the Corps trans-
port had to be supplemented by 2,000 donkeys to assist in supplying troops in the advanced positions.
At this tune the rear commimications of the troops on the " Moimtain Front " were limited to the partly
metalled road from Gaza through Mejdel and Junction Station to Latron, and the Turkish light railway,
of which the maximum daily capacity was about 100 tons of Ordnance stores.
At 0500 on Nov. 28, as soon as the 7th Momited Brigade had come uito the line on the left of the
22nd Momited Brigade at Hellabi, the Turks developed a formidable attack from Beit Ur el Foka to
Suffa with some 3,000 rifles, four batteries of 'TT's, and some camel guns. To meet this a composite
Artillery Brigade of the 74th Division was sent up from Latron to the neighbomhood of Point 1746,
and the 155th Brigade of the 52nd Division came into the line on the left of the Yeomanry Division
about noon. After considerable fighting Zeitun Post was withdrawn and Foka evacuated. A new line
was taken up along a wooded ridge half way to Tahta, and during the evening a battahon of the 156th
Brigade and the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade (Australian Momited Division) came up in support.
At 1600 the 8th Mounted Brigade fell back on Dukka and the Turkish attack on Tahta was driven
back by the 7th Mounted Brigade and the howitzeis fif the 52nd Division. At 1800 the 4th Australian
Light Horse Brigade came up in support of the 6th Momited Brigade, and half an hour later a battalion
of the 156th Brigade arrived in support of the 7th Mounted Brigade.
The enemy renewed his attacks during the night, advancing south of Suffa until compelled to retire
at 0800 by the fire of the 268th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. As he was retiring he suffered satisfactory
losses from the enfilade fire of the 7th Mounted Brigade's machine guns. By 1600 on Nov. 29, the Turks
were tired of attacking and contented themselves with artillery work and sniping. Durmg the after-
noon and night the 8th and 6th Mounted Brigades were relieved by the 231st Brigade of the 74th Division
which had now come up into the line, and the 22nd and 7th Moimted Brigades by the 157tli Brigade of
the 52nd Division. The reliefs were completed by 0500 on Nov. 30, and the four mounted brigades
moved back to Beit Sira where they were joined in the afternoon by the 4th Australian Light Horse
Brigade, on the way to Divisional Headquarters at Annabeh, where the Yeomanry Division concentrated
that evening and rejoined the Desert Mounted Corjis.
At a Corps conference held near Yalo, in the Valley of Ajalon, it was decided, on account of the
absence of roads and shortage of water in the country to the north-west, to attack the Turkish
positions covering Jerusalem from the south-west and west instead of from tln^ north-west.
Tv face Plutr 2S.
ADVANCE INTO JJJBMA
PLATE 23
Printed by the SurveyofEyypt.Dec./9l8(n't53)
Miles 10
=!f
Ml
Sltuationat 6p,m ojj^30J| J7. aslaiowiatG.H.OE.EP.
December 1 and 2.
In the luoniing at 0120 shock troops belonging to the Ifjlh Turkisli Division attacked the point of
junction between the 3rd and 4th Austrahan Light Horse Brigade near El Burj. At 0150 the 8th Aus-
trahan Light Horse Regiment were strengthened by some Gloucester Yeomanry and a company of
the l/4th Royal Scots Fusiliers (155th Brigade) who came up in support. The enemy was exposed to a
cross-fii-e from rifles and machine gmis as well as to that of the 268th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery,
and of the Hong-Kong and Singajiore Battery. At 0530 an encircling movement was made which
resulted in the capture of 112 jarisoners. The enemy also lost over 100 killed and twenty wounded, who
were picked up. At the same time a determined attack was made oil the 157th Brigade (52nd Division)
holding the Tahta defences. An important position was lost for a time, but recovered after stubborn
hand-to-hand fighting at 0430. After this the enemy withdrew a little, and abandoned further attempts
to dislodge our troojjs from this sector of the front. On the same day three determined Tirrkish attacks
were made on the Nebi Samwil positions held by the 60th Division. In these the enemy appears to have
lost more than 500 killed.
On the first of the month the 10th Division, which had started north from Belah on Nov. 27, took
over the line Wadi Zait-Tahta-Kh. Faaush, a mile to the north of Beit Sira, and the 52nd Division
reverted to XXIst Corps.
The 5th Mounted Brigade came into Divisional Reserve at El Burj on the night of Dec. 1 and, on
the 2nd, the 7th Mounted Brigade left the Australian Mounted Division and went into Corps Reserve
near Akir, where the Yeomanry Division had arrived from Amiabeh during the previous day.
To face Plate 24.
ADVANCE INTO JUDAIA
PLATE 24
32°
UN LOCATED
Am el Yezek
^snts of
from AMMAN.
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(^ BirlflMil ,.
Printed by the Survey of Egypt Dec.1918 10453)
Miles 10 S
10
20 Miles
SituatioiLat 6 p..m,oiL 2-12-17 as Imoimat G.H.O.E£.F.
December 3 and 4.
On t)ec. 3 the Royal Devon Yeomanry Regiment of the 229th Brigade (74th Division) re-
captured Beit Ur el Folia with seventeen prisoners and three machine guns, and re]>ulsed a series of
comiter-attacks. Owing, however, to the fact that the enemy still held high ground from which the
village could be dominated with machine-gun fire, the place was evacuated and our troops withdrew
to their original line, leaving fifty dead Turks in the village of Foka alone.
On the night of Dec. 3-4 the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade raided Bald Hill. Further to the left
the 2ud Austrahan Light Horse Brigade killed twenty Tm'ks and captured five j^risoners. During the
next night the New Zealand Momited Rifles Brigade reUeved the Imperial Camel Corps in the line about
Point 265. The latter withdrew to Yebna and thence to Shellal. During the same night the
10th Division reheved the 229th and 230th Brigades of the 74th Division and extended its line to
cover Beit Dukku.
Decembep 5, 6, 7, and 8.
In the i^rocess of concentration for the great attack which was to result in the fall of Jerusalem,
a process which occupied from Dec. 4 to 7, the 53rd Division, with the exception of the 158th Brigade,
and the XXth Corps Cavalry, began to move north along the Beersheba-Hebron road and reached
the Bilbeh area on Dec. 6, getting into touch with the 10th Austrahan Light Horse Regiment which
had occupied El Kudr. On Dec. 5 the enemy withdrew a httle in front of the 10th Division. This
enabled our troops to occupy Kh. Hellabi and Suft'a, and the Austrahan Momited Division also moved
forward a short distance. That night the 231st Brigade of the 74th Division relieved the 60th Division
in the Beit Izza and Nebi Samwil sector, and dming the next night the 74th Division took over the
Ime as far south as the Makani of Sheikh Abdul Aziz, one mile south-east of Beit Surik. At 0700 on
Dec. 5 patrols reported that Kefi- Rut, about one mile west from Sufi'a, had been evacuated by the
enemy. Accordingly, an hour later, the 4th Austrahan Light Horse Brigade and the 5th Mounted
Brigade moved forward, and at 1630 the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade occupied a hne about 1,000
yards north-north-east of El Burj further to the west. Thus, in the evening, the Desert Mounted Corps
held a line rimning through a point 500 yards east-north-east of Kh. ed Daty, another jiomt 1,500 yards
north of that place, Shilta, and a point 500 yards west of >Shilta. This filled the gap between the 31st
Brigade of the 10th Division on the right and the 233rd Brigade of the 75th Division on the left.
On Dec. 7 the XXIst Corps took over the line covering Ramleh, Ludd, and Jaffa. The 75th Division
had the eastern sector on the right, the 54th Division the central sector, and the 52nd Division the coastal
or western sector on the left.
On the eve of the attack the Turks were holding a line covering Bethlehem on the south and rmming
north past Ras el Balua, Aui el Hand, Kibriyan, Kulat el Ghuleh, to the west of Ain Harim and along the
formidable ridge running above the Wadi es Surar in front of Deir Yesin and Beit Iksa. It contmued
north to the east of Nebi Samwil, to the west of El Jib and thence in a westerly direction past Kh. ed
Dreihemeh, Et Tireh, Beit Ur el Foka, Kh. Ilasa. Kh. Aberjan to a point near Sulfa. As a piehnunary
to the main attack the 179th Brigade with the mountain batteries crossed the Wadi Surar during the night
and by 0330 had captured the high ground south of Ain Karim. In spite of rain the main attack began
at dawn on Dec. 8. It was supported by the Divisional Artillery, the 96th Heavy Ai'tillery Group of three
6-inch batteries — the 383rd, 387th, and 440th — one 60-pounder battery and one section of the 195th
Heavy Battery, the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery attached to the 74th Division, the 10th and IGth
Mountain Batteries attached to the GOth Division and the 91st Heavy Battery attached to the 53rd Division.
The 60th and^74th Divisions attacked at 0515 and by 0700 had captured the line of Turkish trenches
crowning the formidable hills to the east of the Wadi Surar. Considerable difficulty was experienced
before the great Heart and Liver Redoubts and the carefa'ly prepared works at Deir Yesin could be taken
by the 60th Division. The main road past Kulonieh and up the steep ascent to Lifta was exposed to Turk-
ish artillery and machine-gun hre, which greatly interfered with the advance of this division and the
movements of its guns. The country traversed was very broken and precipitous and the rain and darkness
greatly increased the difficulty of the advance. The weather and strenuous Tiu'kisb resistance had delayed
the 53rd Division and it was only at 0900 that it could get into position to attack the high ground west
and south-west of Beit Jala, consecjuently this division was unable effectively to protect the right flank
of the 60th. The necessity for securing this flank made it impossible for the 60th Division to advance
so far as its right was concerned. On the left it encountered serious opposition at 1330 which was only
overcome by a bayonet charge at IGOO. Further north the 74th Division reached Beit Iksa by 1100,
but was there held up by heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, and was unable to capture the El Burj
ridge to the north-east owing to enfilade fire from the right. The attack was suspended and at nightfall
both divisions consolida(ed the line to which they had advanced while the 10th Australian Light Horse
Regiment at Malhali and the 1/1 Worcester Veomanry (tiie (!or[)S Cavalry Regiment) mauitained
communication amid the rain and mist with the 53rd Division near Beit Jala. In the morning tiie
AVorcester Yeomanry worked right acro.ss the front of the 53rd Division and cut the enemy's luie of
retreat by getting astride of the Jericho road where it tiuiis east from the Valley of Jehosbaphat.
During the night the 53rd Division had pushed forward to the outskirts of Bethlehem from which
the enemy withdrew, and by 0830 on Dec. 9 the division had advanced to a line two and a half miles
To face Plate. 25.
ADVANCE INTO JUDA:A
PLATi. 25
3Jf>' ~
Onlocated
Z Cavalry Re<^ts.& elements of
150^" B.ect. arriving from AUMM.
ME l> I TH n n A \ I'JAiV t^^J^^ ^m^,^ ^
;}2°
51611
/Ia.Ch. >4feth \ r
Be>t,n[
f^'Kusr
r(7ep&._ .
pAnata
Printed by the Survey of Eifypt. Dec 1918 (01 S3)
Miles 10
10
.=f
20 Miles
Situation at 6 pm-ojoL 4-]27l7 asknownat G.H.O-E.E.F.
1
south of Jeiusalein. The enemy, having iio hope of holding Jerusalem now that his positions overhanging
the Wadi Surar had been forced, made no comiter-attacks during the night but retired to a line north
and north-east of the city which was surrendered at 0830 by the Mayor who apjiroached the outjiost of
the 180th Brigade. Major-Gen. Shea commanding the GOth Division, was instructed to accept the
surrender, and did so at 1300.
On the morning of Dec. 8 large nmnbers of the inhabitants of Jerusalem, with the remaining religious
chiefs, were personally warned by the police to be ready to leave at once. The extent to which the Turks
were jjrepared to clear the city is shown by the fact that out of the Armenian community of 1,400 souls
300 received this notice. Jemal Pasha, when warned that vehicles were unavailable for the trausjwrt
of the unhaij^jy exiles to Shecheiu or Jericho, telegraphed curtly that they and theirs must walk. The
fate of coimtless Armenians and many Greeks has shown that a jjopulation of all ages suddenly turned
out to walk indefinite distances imder Turkish escort is exposed to outrage and hardship which prove
fatal to most of them ; but the delay in telegraphing had saved the population, and the sun had risen
for the last time on the Ottoman donaination of Jerusalem, and the Turks' power to destroy faded
with the day.
Towards dusk the British troops were reported to have passed Lifta, and to be within sight of the city.
On this news being received, a sudden panic fell on the Turks west^and south-west of the town, and at
1700 civilians were surprised to see a Turkish transport colunm gallopmg furiously cityward along the
Jaffa road. In passuig they alarmed all miits within sight or hearing, and the wearied infantry arose and
fled, bootless and without rifles, never pausing to think or to fight. Some were flogged back by their
officers and were compelled to pick up their arms ; others staggered on through the mud, augmenting
the confusion of the retreat.
After four centmies of conquest the Turk was ridding the land of his presence m the bitterness of
defeat, and a great enthusiasm arose among the Jews. There was a rmming to and fro ; daughters called
to their fathers and brothers concealed in outhouses, cellars, and attics, from the police, who sought them
for arrest and deportation. " The Turks are running," they called ; " the day of deliverance is come ".
The nightmare was fast passing away, but the Turk still fingered. In the evening he fired his guns con-
tinuously, perhaps heartening huuself with the loud noise that comforts the soul of a barbarian, perhaps
to cover the sound of his own retreat. Whatever the intention was, the roar of the gmifire persuaded
most citizens to remain indoors, and there were few to witness the last act of Osmanli authority.
Towards midnight the Governor, Izzet Bey, went personally to the telegraph office, discharged
the staff, and himself smashed the instruments with a hammer. At 0200 on Sunday tired Turks began
to troop through the Jaffa gate from the west and south-west, and anxious watchers, jjeering out through
the windows of the Grand New Hotel to learn the meaning of the tramping, were cheered by the sullen
remark of an officer, "Gitmaya mejburuz" ("We've got to go"), and from 0200 till 0700 that morning
the Turks streamed through and out of the city, which echoed for the last time their shuffling tramp.
On this same day 2,082 years before, another race of conquerors, equally detested, were lookmg their
last on the city which they could not hold, and masmuch as the liberation of Jerusalem in 1917 will
probably ameliorate the lot of the Jews more than that of any other commmiity in Palestine, it was fitting
that the flight of the Turks should have coincided with the national festival of the Hannkah, which com-
memorates the recapture of the Temple from the heathen Seleucids by Judas Maccabajus in 165 B.C.
The Governor was the last civil official to depart. He left in a cart belonging to Mr. Vester, an
American resident, from whom he had " borrowed " an hitherto unrequisitioned cart and team. Before
the dawn he hastened down the Jericho road, leaving behind him a letter of surrender, which the Mayor
as the sun rose set forth to deliver to the British commander, accompanied by a few frightened poUce-
men holdmg two tremulous white flags. He walked towards the Lifta Hill and met the first representa-
tives of the British Army on a spot which may be marked in the futme with a white stone as the
site of a historic e])isode.
The last Turkish soldier is said to have left Jerusalem at about 0700 by the east gate of the city,
which is named after St. Stephen, but even later armed stragglers were still trickling along the road just
outside the north wall, requisitioning food and water at the point of the bayonet. This is no grcvious
crime on the pait of flefeated troops, uncertain of their next meal, but is recorded as the last kick of the
dying Ottoman authority in a city where it had been supreme for four centuries.
As the Turkish flood finally ebbed away into the shadowy depths of the Valley of Jelidshaphat the
townsfolk roused themselves from the lethargy into which hunger and the Turkish police had plunged
them and fell upon a variety of buildings, offii-ial or requisitioned for official purposes, and looted them,
even stri|)ping roofs, doors, and floors from the Oftoiiian IjUTiacks next to the Tower of David for firewood.
It must 1)(! admitted that, as the Government had furnished and maintained itself almost entirely by
uncompensated re(|uisitions, the crowd was only trying to indemnify itself. i>ut this disorder ceased
as suddenly as it had arisen on the ajjpearance of the British infantry.
To face Plate 26.
ADVANCE INTO JUDA:A
PLATE 26
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Miles 10 s
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Situatioiiat6 pm .on-7"1?~1.7 asknownat G.H.OE.E.F.
December 9 and 10.
After the surrender of Jerusalem the 74th and 60th Divisions wheeled northwards pivotting on Nebi
Saniwil. The 74th naet with no great ojiposition but the 60th Division on debouching shortly after
1030 from the suburbs to the north of the Lifta road came under heavy rifle and machine-gmi fii'e from
the ridge to the west of Sir John Grey Hill's house on the Momit of Olives, which was strongly held by
the enemy. At about 1600 the Turks were dislodged from this at the point of the bayonet, leaving
seventy dead. Meanwhile on the left of the division the 180th Brigade which was advaucmg along
the ridge to the east of the Wadi Beit Hannina, occupied Shafat and Tel el Ful on the Shechem
(Nablus) road.
By 1100 the 53rd Division was at Mar Elias with its advanced guard on the Jericho road to the
south-east of Jerusalem. The Mount of Olives was strongly defended by the Turks, and the division
was not able to drive theni off until nightfall.
The same day the Desert Mounted Corps extended its front to the east so as to include Sulfa. This
move brought the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade from El Bxuj up mto the neighbourhood of Kh. ed
Daty. During this period the enemy line ran westwards just in front of Khurbetha ibn Harith, Jurdeh,
Deir el Kuddis, and Nahn.
On Dec. 10 the 53rd Division was engaged to the east of Jerusalem in pushing the enemy back off
the ridges from which he could observe the Holy City.
Note on the Surrender of Jerusalem.
Before the arrival of the flag of truce on Dec. 9 the movement of the crowds accompanying it had
been observed and reported by patrols, but definite news of the impending surrender was first actually
communicated to British soldiers by civihans, who informed Pte. H. E. Church and Pte. R. W. J. Andrews
of the 2/20th Battalion London Regiment. These men, who had advanced into the outskirts of Jerusalem
in order to obtain water, reported what had been told to them without meeting the flag of truce. Shortly
before 0800 Sergt. Hurcomb and Sergt. Sedgewick, of the 2/19th Battalion London Regiment, met the
flag of truce and, shortly afterwards, Lieut. -Colonel H. Bailey, D.S.O., Major M. D. H. Cooke, and Major
W. Beck, R.A., came up and entered into conversation with the Mayor. Lieut.-Colonel Bailey, as senior
officer, declined to accept the surrender and reported the Mayor's wishes to Brig. -General C. F. Watson,
C.M.G.,D.S.O., Commanding 180th Brigade, who rode up a few minutes later and reassured the Mayor.
Brig.-General Watson transmitted the offer of the sm-render of Jerusalem to Major-General J. S. M. Shea,
C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C. 60th Division, who was then at Enab. Major-General Shea communicated
with Lieut.-General Sir Philip Chetwode, Bt., K.C.B., K.C.M.G., D.S.O., G.O.C. XXth Corps, and about
1100 was instructed to accept the surrender of the city. Li the meantime Brig.-General Watson (with
a small mounted escort, followed by the Mayor in his carriage) had ridden forward to reassure the people,
and was the first British soldier to arrive at the Jafi'a Gate. Guards were posted at 0930 from the 2/17th
Battalion London Regiment over the Post Office, which had been occupied in the interval by Major
Cooke, at some hospitals, and outside the Jaffa Gate. Shortly after Brig.-General Watson's arrival
a mounted patrol from the 53rd Divasion appeared. Major-General Shea, on arriving in a motor car
outside the Post Office, sent for the Mayor and Cliief of Police. The.se functionaries were informed that
Major-General Shea accepted the surrender of the city in the name of the Commander-in-Chief, and
Brig.-General Watson was directed to make the necessary arrangements for the maintenance of order.
7h fiicc Plate 27.
OCCUPATIOISr OF JERIJSAI.KM
Cji a t fr 97
Printed by the Survey of Egypt. Oec. 1918 (0453)
Miles 10 5
iMile
Situation at ^ P /"• on_ ^."'.?r. !Z.as Ijhoyvbl at G.H.Q - E.E.F.
December 11 and 12.
On Dec. 11 the Commander-in-Chief, followed by representatives of the Allies, made his formal entry
into Jerusalem. The hi.storic Jaffa Gate was opened, after years of disuse, for the purpose, and he
was thus enabled to pass into the Holy City without making use of the gap in the wall made for the
Emperor William in 1898. ^\^len the time came for the great and simple act of the solemn entry of
General AUenby into Jerusalem, and the Arab prophecy was fulfilled that when the Nile had flowed into
Palestine, the prophet (Al Nebi) from the west should drive the Turk from Jerusalem, the inhabitants
mustered courage to gather in a great crowd. They were themselves amazed, for during more than three
years an assembly of more than three persons in one ])lace was discouraged by the police by blows, fines,
imjirisonment, and even exile. Eye-witnesses of all three events state that the crowd gathered at the
Jaffa gate to greet the General was larger than that which met the Emperor William when on his fantastic
political pilgrimage, and denser than the gathering which greeted the revival of the Ottoman Constitu-
tion when it was proclaimed, ten years later, at the Damascus Gate, where there is more space. Many
we])t for joy, priests were seen to embrace one another, but there were no theatricalities such as the hollow
reconciliations which niade the trium]5h of the Young Turk in 1908 memorable, and sicken the memories
of those who know the horrors and calamities which that trimnph was doomed to bring. The CTcneral
entered the city on foot, and left it on foot, and throughout the ceremony no AlUed flag was flown, while
naturally no enemy flags were visible.
A jjroclamation amiomicing that order would be maintained in all the hallowed sites of the three
great religions, which were to be guarded and preserved for the free use of worshippers, was read in English,
French, Arabic, Hebrew, Greek, Russian, and Italian, from the terrace of the entrance to the citadel
below the Tower of David. When this was done the chief notables and ecclesiastics of the different
commimities who had remained in Jerusalem were presented to General Allenby. After this brief cere-
mony the Commander-in-Chief left the city by the Jaffa Gate.
In the neighbourhood of Jerusalem there was no fightuig on this dav apart fron\ an attack by a small
party of Turks near Tel el Ful which was repulsed by the 179th Brigade.
In the XXIst Corps area the 75th Division advanced its front to the Ime Midieh-Kh. Hamid-Budrus-
Sheikh Obeid Rahil, meeting with slight opposition m the process. An enemy counter-attack, after
preliminary bombardment of the Zeifizfiyeh Ridge, at 1000 was repulsed.
On Dec. 12 the 53rd Division improved its position by advancing several himdred yards, but there
was otherwise little activitv on either side.
The 3rd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade relieved the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade in the
8uffa-Kh. ed Daty sector of the line.
r» face Plate 28.
ADVANCE INTO MOUNT EPHHAIMAND SHARON....
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Miles 10 s
10
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IP
Situationat 6 p.m.on 12-12.-].7-.a5luiown at G.KQ.E.E.F.
December 13 to 22.
On Dec. 13 the 53rd Division further advanced its line, and the 181st Brigade of the 60th Division
captiu'ed Ras el Khaiiiibeh (near Anata) with forty-three piisoners and two machine guns. During
the fine weather wliich lasted until the afternoon of Dec. 1-i much road work was done. Pi'eparations
were being made for the further advance which was to drive the enemy back to a respectful distance
from Jerusakm, and at dawn on Dec. 17, two battalions of the 160th Brigade attacked the high ground
east of Abu Dis. The ridge was captured with a loss to the enemy of forty-six killed, 126 prisoners,
and two machine guns. The 53rd Division, which was taking over the line as far north as the Wadi Anata,
was again engaged on Dec. 21, when the l;j9th Brigade stormed Ras ez Zamby (about two and a quarter
miles west-north-west of Jerusalem) and White Hill. There was a good deal of fighting and the position
with three machuie guns was not taken until hodu. The Tmks made three counter-attacks which cost
them a fiu'ther loss of fifty killed.
The 60th Division, relieved as far as the Wadi Anata by the 53rd, took over the line east of Nebi
Samwil from the 74th Division, which in its turn extended to Beit Ur et Tahta on the west. This read-
justment was effected by Dec. 21.
On Dec. 14 the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment which had been attached to the 60th Division
drumg the operations against Jerusalem, rejoined the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade in the Desert
Mounted Corps area.
On Dec. 15 the 75th Division again advanced their line and took in Kibbiah, Kh. Ibbaneh, and Kh.
el Bornat, while the 54th Division moved up to Et Tireh. At this place and at Kh. Ibbaneh the enemy
made some resistance.
In the coastal sector preparations were being made by the XXIst Corj)s to remove the enemy ivom
his positions at the mouth of the Nahr el Auja, which menaced the town and landing place of Jaffa and
the main road thence to Randeh. The River Auja, some forty yards wide and ten feet deep between
abrupt banks, was in itself a formidable obstacle to an advance. The enemy had entrenched the high
northern bank and also held Bald Hill with a line of trenches about a mile to the south of Mulebbis
and Fejja.
Major-Geueral Hill, Conmiandmg the 52nd Division, on Dec. 14 submitted a plan for making a sur-
prise passage of the river. The requisite preparations were made — portable bridges were constructed
by the Engineers, under cover of the orange groves of Sarona, pontoons were assembled and canvas
corracles, capable of carrying twenty men apiece, were built from local materials. A considerable con-
centration of artillery was also effected and, on Dec. 18 and 19, the 52nd Division was relieved in the
trenches by the 161st Brigade of the 54th Division and the Auckland and Wellington Mounted Rifle
Regts. At the same time the 75th Division extended its front westwards so as to enable the 54th
Division to spare the 161st Brigade from near Ludd.
Three days' heavy rain followed which considerably increased the volume of water in the Auja
and did much to render its south bank difficult of access by turning the plain into a mud swamp. In
spite of this the surprise attack was successful. The covering parties crossed imperceived during the
night of Dec. 20 amid wind and rain in their corracles, and the bridges were placed in position. Owing
to the extreme lightness of their construction (they were designed to be carried nearly two miles), some
of them collapsed after a time, and the 156th Brigade had to link arms and cross breast-deep at the
ford.* The enemy's trenches covering the river were rushed in silence and cajitured. Sheikh Muannis
was carried at the point of the bayonet, Kh. Hadrah was rushed and captured, and by the dawn of Dec. 21
the 52nd Division had occupied the whole line from Hadrah to Tel el Rekkeit on the sea two miles
north of the river-mouth. The enemy had been completely taken by siu'j^rise and lost many killed in
addition to 316 prisoners and ten machine guns.
Throughout Dec. 21 preparations were made to enable the rest of the division to cross, and during
the night of Dec. 21-22, while the 52nd was establishing itself to the north of the Auja, the 54th Division
stormed and captured Bald Hill, two miles south of Mulebbis, in spite of the determined resistance of
the enemy, who lost fifty-two killed and forty-four prisoners. As a result of this the enemy retired
from Mulebbis f and Fejja at dawn and the 54th Division was able to occupy these villages without
further opposition. A little later in the day Rantieh was also occupied.
During Dec. 22 the 52nd Division advaiu'ed to the line Tel el Mukhniai- at the confluence of the
Wadi Ishkar and the Auja Sheikh el iiallutah .\rsuf, on the cliffs above the sea. This ojieration was
greatly assisted by the co-operation of a squadron composed of H.M.S." Grafton," flying the flag of
Rear-Adndral Jackson, H.M.M. 29, 31, and 32, and H.M.D. " Lapwmg " and "Lizard." The ships
shelled El Jelil and cornjicllcd parties of the enemy to retire rapidlv northwards from El Haram
and Arsuf.
As a result of this sucees.sful advance the Turks were driven back five miles and Jaffa became more
secure as a landing-place for stores.
• This spot is now marked by an antiqno eolnmn with inscription,
f Miik'bhi.s contains the important Hebrew Colony of Petaeli Tikvah.
Tii fiiee I'lalc 20.
AD\^NCE INI O MOUNT EPHRAIM AND SHARON
PL 29
Printed by the Sur,ey of Egypt , Dec. 1318 (0453)
Miles 10
10
2oMiles
Situationat 6 piTl-oj^ 22-12-17 as Imovvn at G.H.Q.E.E.F.
December 23-31.
On the assumption that the general advance into the southern portions of Mount Ephraim would
begin on the night of Dec. 24, the 180th and 181st Brigades had been instructed to advance against
Kh. Adaseh and a point north of Beit Hannina respectively at dawn on Dec. 23. The 180th Brigade
was unable to take its objective before the attack was abandoned owing to the postponement of tlie
general advance on account of weather. The new^ advance was now fi.xed for dawn on Dec. 27, but at
2330 on 26tii, the enemy launched an attack and drove in the outposts of the 60th Division at Kh. Ras
et Tawil and the quarries to the north of it ; at the same time, seven and a half miles to the west, the
24th Welsh Regiment (Pembroke and Glamorgan Yeomanry) stormed Hill 1910, close to Et Tireh, and
held it in spite of a strong counter-attack, kilhng seventy Turks and cajituring three machine guns.
At dawn on Dec. 27 the Turks naade determined attacks on WHiite Hill and Ras ez Zamby, from the
former of which our troops were dislodged. The position was recovered after dark as the enemy had been
luiable to occupy it owing to our artillery fire. A company of the 2/lOth Middlesex held Deir ibn Obeid
all day and night against vigorous attacks, although surrounded and cut ofE for several hours. At 0130
the whole line was engaged. The enemy made eight assaults before 0800, chiefly in the neighbourhood
of Tel el Ful. In one place he established himself in part of our line until ejected by the 2/l-'jth Londons
who advanced in spite of an artillery and machine-gun enfilade. Between 0230 and 0630 the 2/24th
Londons repelled four energetic attacks. After a lull in the fighting the enemy dehvered an assault with
an unexpectedly large number of men at 1255. The Turks succeeded in reaching certain sections of the
main line but a counter-attack restored our original front.
In si^ite of the enemy activity on the front of the 53rd and 60th Divisions the general advance began,
according to plan, at 0600 on the left where the 29th and 30th Brigades pushed forward in the face of
considerable opposition. The 1st Leinsters and 5th Connaiight Rangers had a good deal of fighting
west of Deir Ibzia but, when this was taken, there was not much trouble in reaching the line running
north-westerly in front of this village through Shabimy to Sheikh Abdullah, where connexion was made
with the Australian Mounted Division. This advance was supported by the 263rd Field Artillery Brigade
and the 9th and 10th Mountain Batteries. The 31st Brigade (10th Division), supported by the 68th
Field Artillery Brigade from near Tahta, advanced at 0700 to the line running from the right of the
29th and 30th Brigades through Kh. el Hafy to near Kh. Jeriut. The 229th Brigade (74th Division),
supported by the 67th (from near Foka and Likia), the 44th and 117th Field Artillery Brigades started
at 0750 and reached the west end of the Sheikh Abu ez Zeitun ridge at 0900. From now on the advance
was exposed to constant artillery and machine-gun fire, and the whole ridge was only captured after
dusk. At 1015 the 24th Royal Welsh Fusihers (231.st Brigade) captm-ed Kh. ed Dreihemeh and at 1100
assaulted Hill 2450 some 600 yards to the north-east. The result of this advance was apparent by 1400
when the enemy was observed to be moving his 1st Division westwards from Bireh, thus showing that he
found himself forced to conform to our movements and to abandon the initiative.
On Dec. 28 the 158th Brigade captured Anata, but the l/7th Royal Welsh Fusiliers w^ere held up for
a long time on Ras Arkub es Suffa, one and three-quarters of a mile to the south-east, and only gained
the position after dusk. The 1/lst Herefords also seized Kh. Almit, one mile north-east of Anata after
dark. The right flank of the 60th Division was thus covered from an attack from the Jericho road.
The 60th Division captured Kh. Adaseh at 1725 with the 179th Brigade, while the 181st was sent forward
on the left and occupied El Jib, which had caused so much trouble on Nov. 23, and Bir Nebala shortly
after noon. The 179th jnished on and seized the Er Ram-Rafat line at 1915.
Early in the morning of Dec. 28 the 74th Division completed the capture of Hill 2450. The main
advance was resumed at 1330 and by dusk the division had reached the line from the left of the 60th
Division at Rafat to the right of the 229th Brigade near Beitunia, which had been captured in face of
strong opposition at 1550. when the commander of the garrison, seventy other prisoners, and seven
machine guns were taken. Further west Kefr Skiyan was taken by the 31st Brigade at 1740, and the
29th and 30th Brigades had a lot of trouble fi'om enemy machine guns cunningly hidden among the
rocks in very broken country before they could take Abu el Ainein (seven furlongs north-east of Ain
Arik) and Kh. Rubin. At 1430 a 6-inch howitzer of the 378th Siege Battery, which had been moved to
Beit Ur el Foka during the morning, began to bombard the enemy withdrawing from Ram Allah and
persevered imtil midnight.
On Dec. 29 enemy opposition faded away on the extreme right and the 159th Brigade pressed north-
wards to cover the flank of the 60th Division. Hizmeh and Jeba were thus occu])ied without difficulty
and 271 enemy dead were buried on the 53rd Division front — the harvest of the last three days. At
0600 the 60th Divi.sion resumed its advance. The 181st Brigade was held up just short of Bireh and
Ras et Tahuneh until the 303rd Field Artillery Brigade could get into action l)y way of the main road,
as the Kuhuidia trac'k was im|)assable for guns. At 1130 the advance was resumed, and at 1615 the
2/22iid and 2/23rd Londons were in position by the Ram Allah i^ireh road to assault the Tahuneh ridge
which was captured, after a stubborn defence, at 1700. Meanwhile, on the right the 2/19th and
2/20th Londons stormed Shab Salah, a precipitous and strongly-held position. This was cajitured
by 1530, and the 2/1 7th and 2/1 8th Londons (180tli Brigade) ]msh(>d forward by 1830 and ca]>tured
the ridge half a mile north-west of Burkah. At 2100 the 180th and 181st Brigades occupied the line
To face Plate 30.
ADVANCE INTO MOUNT EPHRAIM AND SHARON
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Si Illation at 6 p. m.on. .3.1.7. 1 2." IT.as known at G.H.Q. E.E.F.
20 Miles
Beitin-Balua-Kh. el Burj without serious opposition. Rain Allah had been occupied by the 229th
and 230th Brigades at 0917 and, by 2100, the latter was holding a line between the left of the
60th Division and Et Tiieh, where the ridge had been occupied by the 10th Divisif)n without o])])osition
soon after 0800.
The Royal Flying Corps by tunely information durmg the course of the day greatly assisted the
operations of the XXth Corps and, by bombing the enemy's retreating columns, caused him heavy loss
and hindered, his withdrawal.
By the morning of Dec. 30 enemy resistance on our right flank had died down and the XXth C'orps
took up the position shewn in the adjoining map. Throughout these operations the Australian Jlounted
Division carried out strong reconnaissances and advanced its line to the north of Deir el Kuddis and
Khurbetha ibn Harith on Dec. 29. On Dec. 31 this sector as far as a point .500 yards north-west of Deir
el Kiiddis was taken over by the 29th Brigade and the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade relieved the
3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade in the Deir el Kuddis-Nalin sector.
Durmg the operations between Dec. 11 and 31, the XXtli Corps took 1,301 prisoners, of whom
750 were captured during the three days Dec. 27-29. Twenty-four machine gims were also taken.
The map opposite .shows the extent of territorv—all Philistia and almost all .Tuda'a — from which
the Turks had been driven as a result of the successive advances of the Egyptian Expeditionary
Force up to the end of 1917.
Ti' fiirr I'hite 31.
AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS
FROM OCTOBER 28^i' TO DECEMBER3r-n917
PLATE 31
Repr„dijrrd kytbt Survey „f Egypt On I9IS(0463)
February 18.
As a preluniiiary to the operations for the capture of Jericho the 53rd Division relieved the 60th
on the hne astride of the Shecheni (Nablus) road in order that the Londoners might take over the eastern
front. The 74th Division detailed the 231st Brigade for service with the 60th, and the New Zealand
Mounted Rifles and 1st Australian Light Horse Brigades were also attached. A week before the advance
the 60th Division held a line running northward from Kh. Deir ibn Obeid to Ras Arkub es 8uf[a, passmg
about three miles to the east of .Jerusalem. Thence it ran north-westerly to Hizmeh and a point three-
quarters of a mile south of Burkah. Here the 53rd Division had its extreme right. At dawn on Feb.
14 the 60th Division seized Mukhmas (Michmash) and Tel es Suwan just after the 53rd had captured
Kh. el Alia and Deir Diwan. By the night of the 18th the Wellington Momited Rifles were at Kh. Deir
ibn Obeid, and the rest of the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade and the 1st Australian Light Horse
Brigade with their Divisional Headquarters were concentrated in Jerusalem and Bethlehem.
To fuce I'late 32.
February 19-21.
On tke morning of Feb. 19 the 53id and 60th Divisions attacked the Tiu:kish positions which were
held in isome strength along a series of commanding heights. The 2/23rd Londoiis took 8pla«h Hill,
about one mile east of Tel es Suwan, with thiity-two prisoners, at 0600. Rummon was captured by the
2/lOth Middlesex at 0830, and Ras et Tawil was abandoned by the enemy to the 181st Brigade at 0900,
owing to om- artillery fire. The Turks made a stout resistance across the .\i'ak Ibrahim ridge to the south
of the Wadi Farah, where the 2/20th Londons were held up in spite of three assaults. Finally, the
position was stormed after artillery had played upon it from 1330 to 1400. While this fightmg had been
in progress to the north the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division had passed through the
wilderness of Jeshmion and concentrated near El Mmitar, little more than six miles from the Dead Sea.
By nightfall the line held by the 60th Division ran northward from this point, shewing an average advance
of three miles over very bad country during the day. Armoured cars had reconnoitred the Jericho road
beyond this line but were held up by a broken bridge three-quarters of a mile further on. The Tm'ks
still held a strong position to the south of, and astride, the Jericho road, and dming the night the 179th
Brigade moved into the Wadi Sidr to deploy for an attack on Jebel Ekteif. The 180th Brigade only
reached its positions of deployment in this wadi, at dawn, as the Turks had made three counter-attacks
against the sector of front held by the 2/18tli Londons.
On the morning of the 20th the advance of the cavahy against Jebel el Kalimun and Tubk el Kunei-
trah was necessarily slow owing to the badness of the comitry. In places progress was only possible in
single file along tracks which were under accurate artillery and machine-gmi fire from Neby Musa and the
two immediate objectives. These two hills were, however, captured by a dismomited attack delivered
by the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade shortly after noon. Meanwhile, the 180th Brigade had
successfully stormed Talaat ed Dumm, above the Good Samaritan's Inn, at 071.J, in the face of con-
siderable ojiposition, but the 179th had been seriously delayed in its attack upon Jebel Ekteif on account
of the smpassmg malignity of the terrain. On one line only was advance possible, and, after a bombard-
ment which lasted mitil 0800, the 2/15th Londons stormed the first Ime trenches. Co-operation
between the two brigades now became possible and the 2/18th Londons and a battery gave assistance
on the left Hank of the 179th Brigade against Turkish positions at Rujm el Kibliyeh, from which an
enfilading machme-gmi fire was causuig annoyance. During this advance two Turkish machine guns
were captured and turned upon the Tm-ks in the Rujm el Kibliyeh positions with excellent effect. The
summit of Jebel Ekteif was captured about noon.
The rest of the 180th and the 181st Brigades were also delayed further to the north by bad country,
enemy resistance, and the destiuction of the road which impeded the progress of the guns, but by dusk
the 181st had moved forward nearly three miles and occujiied a line from the ridge above the Wadi Farah,
astride the Wadi Rijan up to the ridge to the south of the Wadi el Makuk. After dark two battaUons
of the 231st Brigade relieved the 181st on the front north of the Ras et Tawil-Kurmitul track which runs
down the Wadi Rijan.
Fiuther to the south the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade ])assed through the gorge of the Wadi
Kmnran and reached the jilam on the north-western shores of the Dead Sea. It took up a position along
the \\'adi Jofet Zeben at 1800 and, early next morning, started north across the slimy, marl plain and
reached Jericho at 0820. At 0600 on the morning of Feb. 21 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles
Brigade with the 2/14th Londons and the lOtli Mountain Battery had occupied Neby Musa and it now
became apparent that the Turks had retii-ed during the night along their whole line. The 60th Division
thereujjon advanced to Rujm esh Shemaliyeh Kh. Kakun and Jebel Kmuntul overlooking .lericho, the
1st Australian Light Horse Brigade pushed out patrols from Jericho towards the Wadi Aujah m the
north and El Ghorauiyeh, where the enemy still held a bridgehead, on the west of the Jordan. To the
south the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade occupied Rujm el Bahr (Dead Sea Post) with a squadron
thus seizing the Turkish base upon the Dead Sea with its workshops. The acquisition of this landing-
place was afterwards of great importance in openuig communications with the Northern Operations of
the Sherifian Army when in the Kerak area.
During these operations one enemy aeroplane was brought down in front of the 53rd Division.
To face Piute S3.
■y
CM
March 21.
After the advance on the northern front at the begiiming of March, by the XXth and XXlst Corps,
which pushed the front ahnost up to the luie on which it remained until September, a raid upon the
enemy'w hnes of communications in Gilead along which he was feeding his forces engaged against the
Sherifian troops hi the Hejaz, was decided upon. A special force was formed for this raid, known from
the name of its Commander as " Shea's Group." It consisted of : —
The Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division.
The 60th (London) Division.
._ The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade.
10th Heavy Battery, Royal Garrison Artillery.
9th British Mountain Artillery Brigade.
Light Armoured Car Brigade.
Army Bridging Train.
Desert Mounted Corps Bridging Train.
On March 21, Group Headquarters, the cavalry and the camels were at Talaat ed Dmnm (except a
brigade at Neby Musa with the armoured cars), the 60th Division was in the Wadi Nueiameh (except
a battahon of the 180th Brigade in the Wadi Kelt), the Divisional Artillery was disposed to cover the
crossings at Ghoraniyeh and Hajlah, the Moimtain Gims were unmediately south of the Wadi Nueiameh,
and the Bridging Trams were partly near Jericho and partly in the Wadi Kelt.
Reconnaissances had shewn that the Jordan at this tune of year was mifordable at any available
point and that the only practicable places for throwing bridges across were Makhadet, Hajlah, and
Ghoraniyeh. It was decided that the cavalry and camels should cross by a steel pontoon bridge at
Hajlah, while a standard pontoon bridge, a heavy barrel pier bridge, and an infantry bridge were to be
built for the 60th Division at Ghoraniyeh. The 180th Brigade was instructed to force both crossings,
with artillery support, and establish bridgeheads to cover the bridge builders. Feints at Aujah,
Mandesi, Enkhola, Yehud, and Henu fords were to hold the enemy opposite these places while the
180th Brigade forced the passage in between.
At 1500 on March 21 the enemy reinforced his positions at Ghoraniyeh with 600 infantry and sent
two squadrons of cavah-y to Hajlah.
At midnight the first attempts to cross the river by swimming were made at Ghoraniyeh, but there
was so much flood water m the Jordan that the swimmers of the 2/17th Londons were imable to make
headway against the cmrent. Repeated attempts were also made to cross ur pimts or on rafts but these
were, for the same reason, rmsuccessful. Om' continued activities alarmed the enemy who opened fire and
thus further comj^licated an abeady difficult oj^eration. Meanwhile the 2/19th Londons had been more
fortimate at Hajlah. Theu' swimmers * had got across imobserved and at 0120 on March 22 the first raft,
holding twenty-seven men, was ferried across. Ten minutes later orders were given that the attempt
to cross at Ghoraniyeh was to be abandoned for the tune. Accordmgly the 180th Brigade Headquarters,
and the 2/20th Londons moved down to Hajlah leaving the 2/ 17th Londons, some machine guns, and
four guns of the 180th Trench Mortar Battery opposite Ghoraniyeh.
At 0500 the 179th Brigade Group moved into a concealed position west of Hajlah, and the 181st
Brigade moved to Tel es Sultan at dawn.
Shortly after dawn an enfilade fire from enemy machuie gims was brought to bear on om' rafts from
a commanding hill some 1,000 yards north-west of the crossing-place at Hajlah. Only eight men could
be sent over at a time and these had to be at the bottom of the raft. One load had seven men hit. Two
sections of the 180th Machine Gun Company provided covermg fire and, by 0745, the whole of the 2/19th
Londons were across the river. The 2/18th Battahon London Regiment, which had reached Hajlah at
0430, then began to cross and by 0810 the first pontoon bridge was finished. By noon the 2/18th Londons
were also across and at 1315 efforts were made to enlarge the bridgehead, but owing to enemy machine-
gim fire and the density of the jimgle on the eastern bank of the river little could be effected.
The efforts of the 181st Brigade to cross at Ghoraniyeh at midnight again failed owing to the swift-
ness of the current, and it was not until the mornmg of March 23 that rafting became possible here after
the swinmiers had got across to the other bank from which the enemy had been driven by om' concentrated
machine-gun fire.
At 0400 the Auckland Mounted Rifles began to cross at Hajlah in order to clear the enemy out of
the country on the east bank as far north as Ghoraniyeh, and later a I'cgunent of the 1st Austrahan Light
Horse I?rigade was sent to Hajlah to clear llic country to the east and south-east of the new bridge. The
Aufklantl Mounted Jiiljes gailopeil down a number ol Turkish detachments and seemed the ground
covering Ghoraniyeh by noon, cai^turing sixty-eight prisoners and four machme guns. At 0915 a landhig
party which had crossed the Dead Sea in motor boats and landed on the Turkish side of the Jordan
joined up with the 180th ]5rigade at a point about three miles north of the Dead Sea.
The second jtontoon bridge at Hajlah, 600 yards ujistream from the first, was finished at 1330, and
the light infantry bridge at Ghoianiyeh was ready by 1630 and was used by the 181st Brigade. The
barrel pier bridge and the pontoon bridge at Ghoraniyeh were finished by 2150.
* Tin: names of those who Hwam the: .Jordan on tho night o£ March 21-22 are, 2nd Lieut. G. E. Jones, ^f.C.■, Cpl. K.
Margrave, ^f..V. ; L/Cpl. W. H. Henderson; L/Cpl. F. I'opham, Mahdllc MiUtuire; L/Cpl. \V. V. Davis; L/Cnl. U. Silver:
I'te. A. C. Hardwick ; I'te. H. Ho.xton ; Pte. .]. K. I'owell ; I'te. K. N. Williams.
To face Plate 34.
March 24-29.
At 0500 on the morniiig of March 24 the dispositions of Shea's Group were as follows : the 179th
Brigade was in the Wadi Nimrin, about two miles up the gulley, the 180th was between the 179th and
the Ghoraniyeh bridges, and had guards at these and at the Hajlah bridges. The 181st Brigade was on
the right (south) flank of the 179th along the Shimet Nimrin road. The 1st Austrahan Light Horse
Brigade was covermg the left (north) flank of the 60th Division about one mile north of El Mandasi
ford, and the rest of the Australian and New Zealand Mounted Division was to the east of Hajlah. The
303rd Brigade Royal Field Artillery which had crossed at Ghoraniyeh during the night, and two Mountain
Artillery Batteries, supported the 181st Brigade in its attack on Shimet Nimrin at 0830, and one Mountain
Artillery Battery supported the 179th Brigade. By 1500 Tel el M\ista and El Hand had both been
captui'ed. During their attack on the former the 2/22nd Londons had taken three field gims. The
presence of the 179th on El Hand enabled the left of the 181st to advance in the valley, and by turning
the enemy's right flank compelled him to retire. The 181st pursued the retreating enemy as fast as
possible up the Es Salt road with a sqiiadron of Wellington Moimted Rifles in advance. The Australian
Imperial Force Airline Section followed the infantry closely and erected an airline to Shunet Nimrin
under fire. At midday Group Headquarters moved from the junction of the Jericho and Nebi Musa
roads, about one and quarter miles below Talaat ed Dimim, to the west bank of the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh.
At 1300 the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade was at Teleil Muslim and began following up the Wadi
Kefrein, reaching Rujm el Oshir, sLx miles further on, at 1520. Here its advance was delayed by the
bad state of the track, which was foimd to be impassable for wheels. All wheel transport had to be with-
drawn to Shimet Nimrin and the ammunition transferred to camels. In many cases the horses and
camels had to be dragged, pushed, and even hfted up the slippery track along which they could only
move in single file. The New Zealand Momited Rifles Brigade was movmg north-eastwards along the
Wadi Jofet el Ghazlaniye, and the head of the Imperial Gamel Corps Brigade was about two miles west
of Kabr Mujahid. By dusk the 181st Brigade had advanced about four miles up the Es Salt road beyond
Shimet Nmirin and was in touch with the enemy who was holding positions astride of the road.
March 25 was very wet, and the cavalry and camels found great difficulty in reaching Naaur,
seven miles from Rujm el Oshir, by 1030. The 181st Brigade was also much hampered by the mud
and did not reach a point within a mile of Es Salt imtil 1615. Salt itself, which had been evacuated by
the eneni}', was occupied by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Regunent at 1800 and by the 179th Brigade
at midnight. No ojjposition had been made to their advance by way of the Arseniyat track.
On March 26 the cavalry continued their march from Naaur in heavy rain, and at 0500 the 2nd
Austrahan Light Horse Brigade joined the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade at the cross-roads
one mile east of Es Sir. The 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade then pushed out north of the Amman-
Es Salt road capturmg 170 prisoners near Sweileh. At 1400 the Mounted Division foimd it necessary
to rest men and horses, but sent a raiding party which blew up the Hejaz railway, seven miles south of
Amman, during the night.
At 0500 on the morning of March 27 the 181st Brigade (less two battalions), which had handed
over the defence of Es Salt to the 179th, advanced towards Amman with three moimtain batteries.
The advance was, however, interrupted by the incidence of a local feud which happened to be m progress
between the Circassians of Sweileh and the Christian Arabs of El Fuheis. The column halted for the
night two miles east of Sweileh. The cavalry started for Amman at 0900, and the New Zealand Moimted
Rifles Brigade reached Ain Amman at 1030 with the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade within three
miles of Amman Station on the left. The Imperial Camel Corps Brigade at 1100 advanced on Amman
village but was held up by enemy fire. At 1500, after much delay in crossing the Wadi Amman the
New Zealand Moimted Rifles Brigade reached the railway south of Animan, but the 2nd Austrahan Light
Horse Brigade were imable to reach it to the north. Demolition parties were usefully employed m des-
troying the line and its culverts in the direction of Libben. During the night the 2nd Australian Light
Horse Brigade succeeded in destroying a two-arch bridge on the railway seven miles north of Amman.
At 1100 on March 28 the two battalions of the 181st Brigade which had been left ui Es Salt, started
for Amman. Dming the day the defence of Es Salt was strengthened by the 2/14th and 2/16th Londons,
who came up from El Howeij, whither they had proceeded on the 27th for supply pmposes. Thus, by
evening, the whole of the 179th Brigade, except the 2/13th Londons (still at El Howeij), the 3rd Austrahan
Ivight Horse Regiment, and two howitzer batteries, were at Es Salt. Diuing the mornuig twenty-two
Turkish lorries were destroyed by the Ai-mom-ed Car Brigade on the road between Salt and Sweileh.
At 1430 an enemy force was observed by the 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigade advancing along the
road from Jisr ed J3amieh, and two batteries of Royal Field Artillery moved out in support of the cavahy.
Meanwhile the attack on Amman had begun at 1300 when the 2/23rd Londons on the right, and the
2/21st Londons on the left, advanced parallel to the north of the Sweileh- Aiuiuan road against the
eastern bank of the Wadi Amman. They wore suj)ported by the 9th Moimtain Artillery Brigade, which also
shelled Hill 3039 to assist the adviince of the Now Zealand Mt)untod Rifles Brigade. The advance over
ab.solutely exposed ground was held up by intense enemy machine-gun and rifle fire about 1,000 yards
to the north-west of Amman. Further artillery suj)port was didicult owing to lack of observation, and
co-operation on the flanks became essential for a contmuancc of the attack, but the 2nd Australian
Light Horse Brigade on the left and the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade on the right had been unable to
move, while the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade was held up by machine-gun fire from Hill 3039,
which dominated Anunan from the south-east. Dui'ing the afternoon the 2/17th and 2/18th Londons
Tu face Plate 35.
1
1
1 ^
were ordered to proceed from Es Sir to support the 181st Brigade. On our left the 2/20th Londons and
a battery of armoured cars were sent to support the 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigade.
Owing to the heavy rains the Jordan bridges had been subjected to a very heavy strain by the rush
of flood-water. The Jordan had risen nine feet in a very few hours, and only one bridge with its causeway
had been kept open at Ghoraniyeh.
At 1730 thirteen enemy aeroplanes bombed Shunet Nimrin causing a number of casualties among
the camels..
During the morning of March 29 enemy reinforcements reached Amman Station (two miles distant
from Amman village), and the enemy tried to work round the left flank of the 181st Brigade through a
gap which existed between it and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade. There were still hopes,
however, that the enemy intended to evacuated Amman, and preparations were made for a night attack
and at 1530 a battery of Royal Horse Artillery started for Amman from Shunet Ninarin. At Salt the
enemy began to show considerable activity and tried to work roiuid the left flank of the 179th Brigade.
March 30 to April 3.
At 0200 on March 30 the night attack on Amman liegan, and at 0130 the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles Brigade captured part of Hill 3039 vnth six machine guns, but it was unable to secure the rest
of the hill. On their left the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade captured two lines of trenches with twelve
prisoners, but the 18Lst Brigade was imable to reach the Wadi Amman " north of the Citadel " in spite
of the capture of 135 prisoners and fom- machine guns by the 2/22nd Londons. The 2/18th Londons,
between the 2/22nd Londons and the Imjjerial Camel Corps Brigade to the soutli, got within half a mile
of the " Citadel," but were held up by the heavy frontal fire. Repeated counter-attacks were directed
against the 2/21st Londons on the left of the 181st Brigade. Stubborn hand-to-hand fightmg ensued
and the enemy was constantly repulsed with satisfactory losses, but no contact could be made with the
2nd Australian Ijight Horse Brigade on the extreme left. Troops of the New Zealand Moimted Rifles
Brigade entered Anunan village at 0900 but were fired upon from the houses, and the Imperial Camel
Corps Brigade was held up In' enfilade machine-gun fire from both flanks. At this time the Royal Horse
Artillery battery which had left Slumet Nimrin on the previous day, came into action. At 1100 a Turkish
comiter-attack agamst Hill 3039 was dispersed by artillery fire, but the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade
could make no further progress, while the northern (left flank) of the 181st Brigade was hard pressed
by the enemy. At 1500 after an artillery bombardment the 2/18th Londons again stormed the " Citadel "
but was checked within 400 yards of its objective by machine-gun fire from the right flank. Meanwhile
the New Zealand Momited Rifles Brigade was being heavily shelled on Hill 3039, and enemy reinforce-
ments were arriving from the north.
During the day the situation at Es Salt had become somewhat complicated owing to the arrival
of enemy reinforcements in the vicinity of Kefr Huda, on the Jebel Osha, two miles north-west of the
town. A battalion of the 180th Brigade was sent up from Nimrin to Howeij and the 2/13th Londons
were brought back to Salt from the direction of Amman. The enemy attack from the direction of
Kefr Huda was defeated at 2255, and the 3rd Australian Light Horse Regiment in a skirmish captured
three prisoners, three machine guns, and killed fourteen Turks. During the night the withdrawal from
Amman began.
At 0715 on March 31 the Imperial Camel Corps Brigade reached Es Sir, and the evacuation of the
wounded from the advanced dressing stations was completed by 1000. The 181st Brigade withdrew
from its original positions before the last attack on Anunan. by way of Sweileh and Es Sir, in order to
avoid the Amman-Fuhais road. The 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade covered this withdrawal.
The infantry reached Es Sir just before dusk and continued marching along the track, which was almost
impa.ssable for camels, in rain and darkness.
At 1055 the 301st Field Artillery Brigade and "B" 303rd Battery took up positions west of the
Jordan to cover the crossing of divisional troops and two batteries of armoured cars, after dusk.
On April 1 the retirement continued and, during the night, the 179th Brigade withdrew from
Es Salt without incident, after blowing up the whole of the captured ammunition.
By 0500 on April 2 the 2/17th and 2/19th Londons rejoined the 180th Brigade and formed a bridge-
head imtil relieved by the 1st Australian Light Horse Brigade and one regiment of the 2nd Australian
Light Horse Brigade, next day. The withdrawal of the whole fore:-, with the exce])tion of the bridge-
head troops, was completed by the evening of April 2, without interference from the enemy.
In spite of the trouble caused by flood-water in the river, and of the feet that large numbers of
civilian refugees from Es Salt, as well as 986 prisoners and 30,000 animals, had to use the bridges in addi-
tion to the troojjs, no delay of any kind was experienced in re-crossing the Jordan.
The medical arrangements of this raid were conducted under unusual difficulties, and as Jerusalem
was the nearest base to which cases could be evacuated, the following stations and relay posts were
established : —
(1) Talaat ed Dumm.
(2) Main dressing station near .Jericho with special operating unit for .serious cases,
(■')) Main dressing station Shuiu^t Nimrin.
(1) Advanced dressing station and motor ambulance relay, Es Salt.
(5) Motor ambulance relay, four miles east of Es Salt, on the .Amman roa(|.
((>) Advanced dressing station, two miles west of Amman.
During the raid, 1,88G sick and woundecl were evacuated.
o.
w
CO
CO
I
CO
I
a
0
3
1
X
April 29.
The second raid into Gilead, which did so much to persuade the enemy that the ultimate advance
against Damascus would be made by way of Es Salt and Amman — and thereby comjDelled him to keep
the whole of his IVth Army on the east of Jordan— was prinittrily intended to harass and, if possible,
cut ofi the large concentration of Turkish troops at Shunet Nimrin, and co-operate with a Sherifian
advance at Es Salt. The Desert Mounted Corps was detailed to captxire Es Salt and, thereby, cut the
the only metalled road serving the Shunet Nimrin position. The secondary line of commimication
down the Wadi es Sir ran through the territory of the Beni Sakhr tribe which had agreed to attack the
Turks in co-operation with any British advance before May 4, the date on which the tribe would have
to move to fresh grazing grounds. The 180th Brigade (60th Division) on the morning of April 30
attacked the Shimet Nimrin position and captured the advanced works, while the 179th Brigade attacked
El Haud. The enemy, however, being in great strength offered so stubborn a resistance that no further
progress was possible.
Meanwhile, the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade, having the Hong Kong and Singapore Battery
attached instead of the Notts. Battery, detached for service with the 4th Austrahan Light Horse
Brigade, started from Ghoraniyeh for Es Salt by way of the Jisr ed Damie track. The 5th Mounted
Brigade moved on the same objective by a more direct route. The 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade
was accompanied by 360 camels, artillery, and ambulance transport. The brigade was engaged about
two miles north-west of Es Salt and entered the town which was full of enemy troops and transports
at 1830. A brisk action in and around the town resulted in the seizure of the junction of the Amman
and Shunet Nimrin roads beyond the town, and the capture of numbers of prisoners. The General
Headquarters of the IVth Turkish Army only escaped capture by the narrowest margin, given as " one
minute " in a captured enemy docimient signed by the Chief of the General StafE of that army. The
9th Austrahan Light Horse Eegiment then moved out to cover the town from the north-east to the
north-west, and at 2200 a detachment of the 10th Australian Light Horse Eegiment, with four machine
guns, moved eastwards to seize the junction of the Amman-Ain es Sir roads near Ain Hemar. The
Turks, however, were astride of the Amman road, 2,000 yards west of Ain Hemar, and the detachment
was held up. Next day the 2nd Austrahan Light Horse Brigade reached Es Salt and Ain Hemar was
occupied, when the detachment rejoined its regiment.
The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade, having crossed the Jordan at Ghoraniyeh at 1900 on
April 29 moved north through tliick jungle at 0320, being fired upon by the enemy from Red Hill. At
0530 the main body reached the Jisr ed Damie and the 4tli Australian Light Horse Regiment advanced
up the Nahr ez Zerka. By 0730 the brigade held a hne running from the Nahr ez Zerka to a point 500
yards south of the Jisr ed Damie-Es Salt track, about 2,000 yards west of the liills. The 11th Australian
Light Horse Regiment failed to capture the Turkish bridgehead at the ford as the position was held in
rtrength. By evening enemy reinforcements began to arrive from the north-west, and the line was
shortened by a withdrawal eastwards into the foothills while Red Hill, some two miles to the south,
covering the line of retreat to Ghoraniyeh was held by a detachment of the 11th Australian Light Horse
Regiment with four machine guns. The 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment held the left of the line
and the 4th the right of the line, with the rest of the 11th in reserve.
May 1.
At 0800 on May 1 the Turks attacked in force, bringing their guns forward. Further Turkish rein-
forcements were observed coming up and the " B " Battery, Honourable Artillery ComjDany was with-
drawn southwards along the track running parallel with the foothills. During its withdrawal one gun
fell over a precipice and had to be abandoned. At 1000 the enemy captured Red Hill, the garrison of
which withdrew to the south. At 1030 the Turks again attacked and drove in the right flank, and by
1100 had advanced to within half a mile of the main position. The enemy advance on the left flank
was also pressed forward in spite of the reinforcement of the 12th Australian Light Horse Regiment by
the reserves. At 1130 the Turks were only 200 yards away and afforded an admirable target for our
machine guns. The batteries still in the line, the "A" Battery, Honourable Artillery Company and the
Notts, continued in action, firing point blank into the massed enemy. As there was no track fit for wheels
the eight guns had to be abandoned but the persomiel of the batteries was withdrawn with the gun-
teams, and fresh guns being issued, the batteries were again in action within forty-eight hours. At
the time, however, the brigade was hard put to effect its retreat over country which was full of gullies
and gorges so steep that in many eases animals fell down precipices and perished.
By noon the brigade had taken up a line running from a point immediately north of -Southern
Pas.4 to a point just south of Red Kill, where a stand was made against repeated enemy attacks. This
position covered the Unuii esli Short track from the Jordan to Es Salt which was now the only means
of retreat for the cavalry at Es Salt.
Meanwhile, the enemy was bringing up large reinforcements, and tiie Beni Sakhr tribe failed to take
the action which had been expected. This left the Es Sir road open to the Turks and the Shunet Nimrin
force, instead of being an isolated body of troops, formed the southern claw of a formidable pair of ])in-
cers with which the enemy threatened to cut oft' the cavalry at Es Salt. Without the co-o])eration
alike of the Beni Sakhr ami the Desert Mounted Corps it was in vain for (lie (iotii Division to continue a
71< /«(v Plate 37.
frontal attack in hopes of compelling a superior force to surrender. The Desert Mounted CorpB was
therefore ordered to withdraw from the Es Salt area, as a preliminary to a general retirement to the
Ghoraniyeh bridgehead.
After having cleared their line of advance from Jisr ed Damieh towards Es Salt, the Turks made
an attack at 2000, on May 2, against the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment covering the town.
In spite of constant repulses the 66th Regiment came on again at 2030, at 0200 on May 3, and at 0400.
On the faihire of the last attack the Turks were chased down hill with bombs, and retired nearly a mile.
The 8th Regiment, attached to the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade, was attacked on the north-past
front covering Es Salt, near Kh. el Fokan, at dawn on May 3. The Turks were vigorously counter-
attacked at 0630 and lost 319 prisoners. At the same time enemy attacks were delivered on the Kefr
Huda ridce, held by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade. A post was driven in and, before any
decision as to a reorganization could be put into effect, the withdrawal of the whole force from Es Salt
was ordered. The incidence of this enemy activity interfered with the joint attack upon Shunet Nimrin
by the cavalry and the 60th Division which took place on May 2. The Turks succeeded in holding the
cavalry at Howeij. while the 179th and 180th Brigades were unable to make any substantial progress.
The weather during these operations was excellent, a material factor in favour of the Turks, as
the Es Sir road, improved since March, was capable of carrjang considerable traffic in dry weather.
The retirement was successfully accomplished under cover of the 181st Brigade which had been
brought up to form an extended bridgehead at Ghoraniyeh. By the evening of May 4 all troops of the
raiding force had recro.ssed the .lordan, and the original bridgehead was restored. The ra'ders had taken
in all 942 prisoners and twenty-nine machine guns.
That the operations east of Jordan during April-May finally convinced the enem}- that future
British operations would be in this area, with the railway junction of Deraa as an objective, is shown
by captured enemy documents. It was fully reahzed that the capture and retention of that place by
the British would involve the retirement or surrender of any troops remaining to the south, and the
direct line to Deraa lay east of Jordan. This belief on the part of the Enemy Command led to the
dispersal of forces with a difficult obstacle — the Jordan River and Valley — between the two main
groups. These two groups consisted of the Vllth and Vlllth Armies west of the Jordan and IVth
Army east of that river.
The respective enemy commanders were incessant in their claims for reinforcements, multiplying
their difficulties, and, in the case of the IVth and Vllth Army Commands, tendering their resignation
on the grounds of neglect of their demands, and criticism of their command. The Commander of the
IVth Army philosophically commences his reply to an adverse criticism by the German Commander-
in-Chief — Liman von Sanders — with the remark, " In this fifth year of the war we are all accustomed
to misunderstanding and friction." In this short sentence is gently expressed what had been evident
to close observers of the relations between the Turkish and German Staffs and individual officers since
the operations leading to the loss of Baghdad. The German's standpoint regarding his mission is well
expressed in the following extract from a letter addressed to a German Staff Officer of the IVth Army
on May 4, 1918 :—
" It is we, as Prussian officers, who are charged with the duty of pushing forward with the greatest energy, satisfying
complaints as far as possible, but otherwise insisting with an iron-like resolution on our wishes."
and his opinion of the Turkish officer with whom he had to deal : —
" The view of the equality of right of the Turks with Europeans, originating in the abolition of the Capitulations, is,
of course, just like comparing Lascars to German soldiers, and in many ways, even for enliglitened senior Turkish officers
it assumes quite grotesque forms."
On the part of the Turkish officer, apart from his feeling of resentment at being driven to further
other aims than those which would be of advantage to his own country, there was always the — for the
time being — ^repressed feeling against the infidel. The extent of this feeling may be judged from the
following extract from a personal letter from Fevzi Pasha, G.O.C. Vllth Ai-my, to Von Falkenhayn ;—
" .\fy departure for Amman, in order to take over the new command to which I was appointed by Your E.vccllency,
as wfU as the spiritual and social circumstances of the new post, demand a succession of special measures, neglect of whioli
will entail serious consequences. . . .
" Bearing this in mind, and I regard it as very important, it is clear that the employment of officers and men in
German imiform in the iieighbourliood of the Hejaz Railway, regarded by Moslems as sacred, will favour and strengthen
British prc)pai,'anda, and will increase the already treasonable e(mvictions and fanaticism of the inhabitants.
" For this reason, I shall not be .able therefore to take with me to Amman the oliiiers and men in German uniform
who have hitJKTto l)een on my staff, and I sliall also send the (Jerman ballaUon now in the neii,'libc}iirlinii(l of Kerak
to the XXth (Turkish) Army Corps.*
" I request you either speedily rejilace the German llyiiif,' units luiil iiiolor loriy inluiiMis now in the above-named
zone with Turkish officers .and men, or else e(|iiip lliciii IbnuiKlicml with 'riirUisb iiiiiliirms."
•The Turkish XXth Corps was at that- time west of .Ionian
To fmr Pliilr .IS.
The Water Supply of Jerusalem and the XXth Corps Area.
The Engineers having completed the first part o£ their task, namely, the provision of a sufficient
supply of water to enable General Allenby's army to march on Jerusalem, next turned their attention
to roads. When the capital of Palestine had fallen, however, they were again confronted with the pro-
blem of providing water, not only for the army and its numerous appurtenances, but for the population
of the Holy City itself.
When oxir troops entered Jerusalem the sources of water supply were : —
(1) Rain-water, stored in cisterns.
(2) Aqueduct-borne water from Solomon's Pools, a quantity of 40,000 gallons per day.
(3) The Pool of Siloam, practically hquid sewage.
Our troops perforce drew heavily upon this supply during the winter, and it was necessary, in order
to avoid a dangerous shortage, to take steps that would become operative before the rainless summer
was upon the city. The scheme proposed by the Engineers and successfully carried out is rich in historic
and even romantic associations. It was based on a modification of the Herod-Pontius Pilate system.
The ancient engineers of the Roman world had carried the water of the Wadi Arrub springs in rock-cut
channels to a reservoir of 4,000,000 gallons capacity, and thence to Jerusalem by a masonry aqueduct
via the Pools of Solomon. So now the rock-cut channels leading from the springs were thoroughly
cleansed — they were blocked with an accumulation which can literally be described as " the dust of ages,"
including the remains of several individuals who may have belonged to almost any period. Next the
ancient reservoir was repaired, pumps were installed, pumping water to a newly erected reservoir of
300,000 gallons capacity at a point near the springs, whence water flowed by the force of gravity to a
reservoir constructed on a high point west of Jerusalem, so that now it was possible for water-pipes to
carry a supply to any point in the town itself. (See Plate 39.)
This water system in Jerusalem was laid down primarily for immediate military necessities, and
partly in order to recoup the civilian population for the water stored by them and consumed by the army,
but the installation will be of permanent value to the city. The work was begun on April 15, 1916,
and nine weeks later, on June 18, water was deUvered to the inhabitants. Twelve miles of pipe-hne
had been laid to ensure this result. The daily supply was 280,000 gallons, and during early summer,
when supply was plentiful, storage cisterns were filled in Jerusalem for the bigger buildings. Not since
the days of the Romans has running water been so plentiful in the Holy City. It is estimated, by the way,
that Jerusalem contains rain-water storage cisterns to the capacity of 360,000,000 gallons, or, in other
words, barely sufficient for the needs of Greater London for thirty-six hours.
The district north of Jerusalem, both immediately behind the line held by the XXth Corps, and in
the reserve area near Ramallah, was extremely sh(nt of water. Beyond the cisterns in the villages,
used by the local inhabitants but useless for military purposes, there were only a few good springs, and
these for the most part in very deep and often almost inaccessible valleys. The positions held and the
principal lines of communication, on the other hand, were, generally speaking, on the highest ground,
situated 2-3,000 feet above sea-level. To get water, therefore, it was necessary to instal pumping plant
in order to raise the product of the springs. In some cases a total lift of 1,000 feet had to be attained,
necessitating relay pumping station and reservoirs.
The principal supplies in the hills were : —
(1) Wadi Reiya and Wadi Zerka to El Lubban.
(2) From the Wadi Darah to Umm SufEa.
(3) A gravitation supply to a point north of Ain Sinia on the Nablus Road.
(4) From Durah, Jufna, and Ain Sinia to Tel Asur and Dar Jerir.
(5) From Ain Arik and Ain Jeriut to Beitunia and Bireh.
The total number of pump houses erected was fourteen, and the total height pumped from the
eleven pump houses on the above mentioned five supplies was about 3,600 feet ; average height about
330 feet per pump. The total length of pipes laid was over twenty-eight miles. The masonry storage
reservoirs erected in the area contained over 250,000 gallons, and the temporary storage exceeded
this figure.
On the Jericho road, water was pumped from the springs in Wadi el Fara to a watering area at
Talaat cd Dumm (Samaritan's Inn), a rise of (iOO feet, necessitating two sets of puni])ing machinery, one
at the bottom and one half-way up, and two additional pumping stations were installed to forward the
water for distribution.
In the coastal plain, water was obtained from wells varying from 120 feet to forty feet in depth
and over a wide area. Development, therefore, took the form of the installation of a large number of
pumps and engines on the many wells discovered and improved in tlie district. Boring sections, too,
were most successful in sinking for water.
n fme Phite 30.
AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS
FROM DECEMBER .31^^917 TO SEPTEMBER17^:^1918 plate 39
The September Advance.
The day before the September advance, the enemy Intelligence Service issued a disposition map,
which was captured in the headquarters of the Yilderim Army Group at Nazareth, and is reproduced
in facsimile on the opposite page. The information embodied in this map was cjnite in accordance with
the enemy's air service reports that " no essential changes had taken place in the distribution of the
British forces." No change is shown. The move of the 60th Division into the XXIst Corps area, and
the concentration of the cavalry on the coast, not to mention the alteration in the front of the 10th
and 53rd Divisions, are passed unnoticed. The latter was apparently considered aw being in reserve to
sector lately occupied by the Desert Mounted Corji.s. The Gth Poona Division (at the time in Mesopo-
tamia) is shown as being within ten miles of the front hue, thougii to be fair, its exact location is queried.
The position of General Headquarters is not shown, and that of the XXIst C'orjjs Headquarters is
placed eleven miles away from where it was actually to be found. The French troops up in the hne are
queried as Italians.
To face Plate 40.
September id.
On this day the preliminary concentration was complete. The divisions detailed for the main
attack, 60th, 7th, 75th, 3rd, 54th, and the French contingent, had actually taken up their positions,
the troops previously holding the coastal sector having closed up on to their own fronts of attack to
make room for them.
The cavalry were concealed in the orange and olive groves, two divisions immediately north and
east of Jafia, and one (the Austrahan Mounted Division) near Ludd ; all were within easy reach of the
positions of assembly which they were to occupy during the night 18th-19th.
On the right the 10th and 53rd Divisions had closed in their outer flanks, west and east respectively,
leaving their centre from Kefr Mahk to Jiljulia covering the main Jerusalem-Nablus road to be occupied
by " Watson's Force," a composite detachment formed from the XXth Corps cavalry regiments, two
pioneer battalions, and the XXth Corps reinforcement camp. The 53rd Division were in position to
launch their preliminary attack on El Mugheir as soon as darkness fell, and thus bring forward the
right flank of the corps preparatory to fiu'ther advance.
The way in which this preliminary concentration was carried out and concealed from the enemy,
was one of the most remarkable achievements of the whole operations. A hostile aeroplane reconnais-
sance on the 15th reported as follows : " Some regrouping of cavalry units apparently in progress behind
the enemy's left flank ; otherwise nothing unusual to report " ; and this at a time when three cavalry
divisions, five infantry divisions, and the majority of the heavy artillery of the force were concentrated
between Ramleh and the front fine i. ' the coastal sector, there being no less than 301 guns in place of the
normal number of seventy.
On the same date the enemy Into llgence Staff was advised in another aeroplane report that General
Allenby's headquarters at Bir Salem w>'s " infantry camp, two battaUons."
Prisoners from the coastal plain an:! the lower foothills of the Juda>an range say that they had been
told that the British would make a big attack about the 18th, but they had so often been given the same
warning that no attention was paid to this one. That the Chief Command were uncertain as to which
part of the front would be attacked is indicated by the fact that nowhere were troops grouped in reserve
who could make an efiective counter-attack. New units arriving on the front were dispersed, and the
move, just previous to operations, of two German battalions from the west to east of Jordan was
counter-balanced by the move of a strong Turkish regiment — the 191st — from the east to the west of
the river.
To face Plate iU'
September 19.
The attack was launched at 0445 after only a quarter of an hour's bombardment, and broke clean
through the Turkish defences on the coast with hardly a pause. On the right near Rafat the French
contingent encountered determined opposition, and probably the hardest fighting of the day took place
here and at Et Tireh, where the 75th Division only dislodged the reserves of the Turkish XXIInd Corps
(Rafet Bey) after a sharp struggle.
But to take the main attack as a whole, the hackneyed expression that '' it went entirely according
to plan " is quite inadequate ; the pace at which the infantry broke down the opposition and the cavalry
got through and away, exceeded the most sanguine hopes. By 0730 the 5th Cavalry Division were
crossing the Nahr Falik, and by midday they were across the Iskanderuneh ; and the 4th Cavalry Division,
though at first delayed by the wire and trenches which they had to cross, were little behind them. By
evening the cavalry were in the positions shewn, and the 4th and 5th Divisions had fed and watered and
were ready to continue their advance.
There is little more to be said about the infantry beyond what is shewn on the map. The 60th
Division, after marching and fighting for eighteen miles, mostly over heavy sand, carried Tul Keram
before dark. The 7tb Division had reached the foothills about Et Taiyibeh ; while the 3rd (Lahore)
Division, after taking its first objective changed direction eastwards, carried the strong works round
Kalkilieh, Jiljulieh, and Hableh, and established itself in the foothills to the east. A pijje-hne, 7,000
yards in length, was laid in eight and a quarter hours by the Royal Engineers, while operations were
in progress, from the mill-race on the Nahr el Auja, and conveyed 4,000 gallons per hour to Jiljulieh,
where storage was arranged the same day for 70,000 gallons. The 54th Division and the French had
secured all their objectives and were sufficiently advanced to support the northern flaidi of the 10th
Division, which had orders to start its advance that night.
The 75th Divi.sion having disposed of all Turkish troops round Et Tireh, remained in that area
and became Army Reserve.
On the front of the XXth Corps (53rd and 10th Divisions) there was no movement during the day ;
the 53rd Division consolidated the line of El Mugheir which it had successfully cajjtured the night before.
At 1535 telegraphic orders were sent for both these divisions to start their main advance on the night
19th-20th.
To face Plate 42.
\'^i.-J
September 20.
On this day the 54th Divisioa and French contingent ceased to be engaged, having successfully
occupied Bidieh and the high ground north of the Wadi Kadah and so secured the left flank of the 10th
Division attack ; they ■were shortly afterwards withdrawn into reserve near the railway.
The GOth Division advanced up the Tul Keram-Nablus road and though engaged all day with enemy
rearguards, had no very severe fighting. By evening they had occupied Anebta village and had secured
the railway tunnel at Bir Asur intact, and were pushing forward towards the important railway station
of Messudieh .which had already been occupied by a squadron of the XXIst Corps cavalry and the 2nd
L.A.C. Battery. The 5th Australian laght Horse Brigade, which was attached to the XXIst Corps
for the time being, was operating north of Messudieh, and cut the railway near Ajje. The L.A.C. Battery
subsequently pushed on towards Nablus.
The 7th Division pushed on all night through very difficult country, following mountain tracks
over which no wheels could move ; their greatest hardship was shortage of water, many men having
nothing but what they carried in their water-bottles for more than twenty-four hours. Though in touch
with scattered parties of the enemy all the time, they had no serious oppo.sition until reaching the com-
manding village of Beit Lid, which overlooks the Nablus road, some three miles east of Anebta. Here
the enemy had a strong rearguard posted supported by numerous machine guns, and the division was
held up for a time, the Seaforth Highlanders suffering particularly heavily. The opposition was, however,
overcome, and the division was astride the road and railway north of Messudieh by 0300 on the 21st
a magnificent exhibition of marching and fighting and worthy of the best traditions of the 7th (late
Meerut) Division which has seen as much hard fighting in difierent theatres of war as any division in the
Indian Army.
The 3rd (Lahore) Division advanced steadily all day up the Azzon-Funduk track. This advance
was slow in the face of strong enemy rearguards but good progress was made and all oj^position overcome.
Both the 7th and the 3rd Divisions had to rely for their water-supply during this day's advance on the
two specially organized Camel Transport Corps water convoys each of 2,400 camels.
The 10th Division, who launched their attack early on the night of 19~20th, experienced strong opposi-
tion both from infantry and artillery, most of the German troops being engaged in this sector. However,
the enemy was pressed back as far as Kefr Harris before nightfall. It must be remembered that the 10th
Division, also the 53rd Division, were operating in a most difficult country, which it lends itself par-
ticvdarly to the defence ; also, on this day they were attacking prepared, and often wired, positions.
On the right flank the Turks had concentrated comparatively large forces to oppose the 53rd Division,
and in the course of the morning a counter-attack drove back our most advanced troops. The position
was shortly afterwards recaptured by the 160th Infantry Brigade, the 1st Cape Corps BattaHon and the
l/17th Infantry (Indian) particularly distinguishing themselves, and the advance of the whole division
was continued.
While the infantry were breaking down the last organized resistance of the enemy, the action of the
cavalry ensured the success of the operations and the destruction or capture of the whole Turkish force
east of the Jordan. Pressing on all night in parallel columns, the 4th Cavalry Division on Megiddo
(Lejjnn) and the 5th Cavalry Division on Abu Shusheh (a few miles to the north), the Plain of Esdraelon
was reached before dawn. Here the first opposition was met with ; as the advanced guard of the 4th
Cavalry Division debouched from the defile at Lejjun, a Turkish battaUon with several machine guns
was deploying in the plain below them. They were charged without hesitation by the leading regiment,
the 2nd Lancers, and in a few minutes the division was able to continue its advance ; less prompt action
might have caused fatal delay. The 4th Cavalry Division continued its advance through Al Afule to
Beisan which was successfully reached by evening ; the 19th Lancers securing the important bridge over
the Jordan at Jisr Mejamie ten miles further north. As showing the rapidity of our advance and the
extent to which it surprised the enemy command, the following incident might be mentioned : —
Shortly after our cavalry had taken El Afule, a German aeroplane, arriving from the north, landed
on the aerodrome, the pilot being quite unconscious of the fact that the place was in the hands of the
British.
Meanwhile the 5th Cavalry Division crossed the plain, and soon after dawn the 13th Brigade rode
into Nazareth. Here some hard street- fighting occurred, but the Germans and Turks were driven
out of the town and only held out in a few houses covering the Tiberias road. They were not di.slodged
as only one brigade was available for the attack, the remainder being held ready in the plain to support
the 4th Division if necessary. Yilderim Army Group Headquarters were captured in Nazareth with
numbers of valuable documents, and the enemy commander. Marshal Liman von Sanders Pasha, himself
only just made his escape in time ; some accounts even say that he was actually in the town when the
cavalry arrived, but, if so, he cannot have stayed there long.* In the evening the whole of the 5th
Division were at and around Afule.
The Australian Mounted Division, which moved forward in close support of the Ith Division, reached
• An cyewitnes.s assiM'ts th;it at tlu; first alarm hi; ran, clad only in pyjamas and armed with an oleotric torch, from h'iti
Rlftoping <|uarterB to near Onr I<a(Iy's Well shontiiii,' for the drivi'r of his motor car iji which he made ofT. Subsecinently the
Marshal returned, dressed and snperiiitendiMl tlic removal of some of his |i:i|icrs.
Til face Plate -U.
Leiiun about midday and at once detached the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade to occupy Jenin.
This was accomplished early in the afternoon, the brigade galloping over an entrenched position and
speedily crushing all opposition. The only remaining brigade, the 4th Australian Light Horse (the 5th
Australian Light Horse Brigade being attached to the XXIst Corps) was fully employed collecting and
convepncf the prisoners which had been picked up in ever increasing numbers all day.
In a°word, a boldly conceived and ambitious cavalry scheme had been carried out to the letter,
and all hnes of retreat west of the Jordan denied to the enemy.
To face Plate 44.
AREA OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS
FBOM SEI^Tli:MOEK 18 i^'TO 2Cr-" 1D18.
PLATE i-
no eoMUi-
/
REFERENCE "'"wJ^
iri'd 171, OlXiJfUttUllt "1 .u*r™ 1 T
■ .. oUnraL oTTvrk, dunnj, period Sopi.lS'!- - ■iO<^l!)IH J ^^
;=} „ „ „ „ prmousto.S<-pf.;„J,rj-ia'i-IOIH J
NOTE: Devlopmeni of R'ilway fromOeccmbarSf- 1917
Sepi.n"'l9IB. Shown ((iu» I I t — f
D*CMUVlltt ^ 1 1 — f— H-
ME D JTEIiRAiVE^
September 21.
The 60th, 7th, and 3rd Divisions had no further fighting on this day, but concentrated and moved
into the positions shown covering Samaria, Messudieh, and Tul Keram, and the road and railway between
those places.
The 10th Division pushed forward with little opposition and occupied positions covering Nablus
from the north and east before dark. This division covered over twenty-four miles in as many hours
over the roughest country ; a very fine feat of marching.
The .53rd Division experienced considerable opposition during the morning, but this diminished
during the day and by evening two brigades had reached the vicinity of Beit Dejan and had closed the
road leading through that place to the Jordan Valley.
Chaytor's Force in the Jordan Valley had so far confined itself to vigorous patroUing to ensure
that the enemy could make no move without their knowledge. The role of this composite force was to
secure the right flank of the army and the Jordan's crossings, to keep in close touch with the enemy and
take advantage of any withdrawal on their part but to run no risk of being involved with a more powerful
foe too early in the battle. This difficult task was admirably carried out.
On the morning of the 21st, it was found that the enemy resistance was weakening on our northern
front in the valley, and the 1st Battalion British West Indians rushed forward and seized two spurs
where they were heavily shelled. Mounted patrols occupied Khirbet Fosail still further north. In
the evening orders were issued for the New Zealand Mounted Riflc'^ Brigade, and parts of the 1st and
2nd battalions British West Indians, to move forward during the night and seize the crossing over the
Jordan at Jisr ed Damieh ; while other troops kept up pressure on the rest of the Jordan front. The
actual crossing was not secured until the following evening, as it was strongly held by infantry, but the
road leading to Nablus was occupied during the night and a large number of prisoners taken, including
a Turkish divisional commander. During this day the Cavalry Corps were chiefly engaged in collecting
prisoners, who came in in such numbers that their evacuation became a very serious difficulty. The
Australian Mounted Division patrolled the country to the east, south, and west of Jenin, and the 14th
Cavalry Brigade (of the 5th Division) moved down to Jenin early in the morning to support them.
The 13th Cavalry Brigade reoccupied Nazareth and picquetted all the roads to the west, north,
and east. At 0130 on the night 21st-22nd a body of about 1,000 Turks, apparently trying to escape
towards Tiberias from Haifa or Acre, attacked the outposts of the brigade and were repulsed after a sharp
fight, in which the 18th King George's Own Lancers made a successful charge, killing sixty and
taking 100 prisoners.
The 4th Cavalry Division remained at Beisan with posts right across the Jordan Valley, and collected
a large number of prisoners, who began to straggle in along the Nablus road early in the day.
To face Plate 45.
September 22.
After the 21st there was no infantry action of importance. It must not be thought, however, that
the trials of the infantry were over ; for some time they were busily engaged in clearing the battlefield,
collecting and marching in prisoners, developing water supplies, making roads, and the innumerable
other duties which remain to be done after a swift advance.
Chaytor's Force continued to press the enemy vigorously all dav. Shortly after midnight the
38th Royal Fusiliers occupied the trenches overlooking the Umm esh Shert Ford and at 0300 in
conjunction with two companies of the 39th Royal Fusiliers captured Umm esh Shert. Shortly
afterwarde these troops advanced and successfully occupied Mankattat el Mellaha. The New
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade captured El Makhruk and Abd el Kadir with the Commander of the
53rd Turkish Division and some 500 prisoners, and by evening the important crossing at Jisr ed
Damieh had been seized by that brigade in conjunction with the 1st Battalion British West Indies
Regiment, though the enemy still held the crossing at Mafid Jozele further south against the 1st
Australian Light Horse Brigade and the 2nd Battalion British West Indians. On the east bank their
outposts were driven in, and by evening the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade was facing the main
Turkish po.sition in the foothills at Shunet Nimrin.
Early in the night it became clear that a general retirement of the Turkish Fourth Army had begun,
and orders were issued for the force to follow them vigorously, the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade
by the Jisr ed Damieh crossing supported by the British West Indians, and the 2nd Australian Light Horse
Brigade by the main Shunet Niinrin-Es Salt road with the 20th Indian Infantry Brigade in support.
The 5th Cavalry Division concentrated towards Nazareth during tlie afternoon with a view to a further
advance on Haifa and Acre, their place at Afule being taken by the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade
of the Australian Mounted Division. During the day the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade rejoined
its division.
The 4th Cavalry Division remained at Beisan sending one regiment to patrol the east bank of the
Jordan ; and numbers of prisoners continued to come in.
At 1330 the 11th and 12th Light Armoured Car Batteries were sent to reconnoitre and, if possible,
to occupy Haifa ; but they mot with strong opposition from artillery and machine guns a few miles east
of the town and had to fall back.
To face Plate 4G.
September 23.
Chaytor's Force pressed forward all day, meeting with little opposition from the enemy but being
severely handicapped by the broken nature of the country. As an example of this, the pack wireless
set of the 1st Austrahan Light Horse Brigade fell over a cliff, resulting in all touch being lost with this
brigade for several hours.
By 1630 the New Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade occupied Es Salt, and by nightfall all roads lead-
ing into the town were covered. The 4th and 5th Cavalry Divisions both had sharp fighting. Of the
5th Division, the 13th Cavalry Brigade occupied Acre at 1300 with little or no opposition, but the 15th
Cavalry Brigade on approaching Haifa were met by a battery of 77 mm. guns on the slopes of Mt. Carmel
and at least ten machine guns covering the entrance to the town. The space between the mountain
and the Kishon left little room for cavalry to manoeuvre, but the Jodhpur Lancers made a brilliant
charge riding over the machine guns and pursuing the enemy right through the town. A squadron of
the 1st Hyderabad Lancers was sent over Mt. Carmel at the same time to turn the town from the south,
and they also made a gallant charge in the face of heavy machine-gun fire. The Turks made a very
stubborn defence at Haifa, and, but for the dash of the 15th (Imperial Service) Cavalry Brigade, might
have held out for a con.siderable time.
In the Jordan Valley at 0800 the 11th Cavalry Brigade of the 4th Division intercepted a large column
of the enemy trying to cross the river at Makhadet Abu Naj ford, six miles south-east of Beisan, sup-
ported by a large number of guns and machine guns. The ford was not captured until midday after
sharp fighting during which the 29th Lancers captured twenty- five machine guns in a single charge
on the west bank of the river, while the 35th Jacob's Horse broke up the columns on the east bank.
The hard nature of the fighting is exemplified by the fact that the Hants, battery coming into
action in the open had every one of their guns hit.
Over 3,000 prisoners were captured in this action.
September 24.
Chaytor's Force pushed forward all day in touch with enemy rearguards ; the New Zealand Mounted
Rifles Brigade, supported by the 1st AustraUan Light Horse Brigade, moving on the main Es Salt-
Amman road and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade to the south of them through Aid Essir.
By evening the New Zealand Mounted Rifles were east of Suweileh and the 20th Imperial Infantry
Brigade had occupied Es Salt.
The 11th Cavalry Brigade of the 4th Division patrolled down both banks of the Jordan to within
twelve miles of Jisr ed Damieh, clearing up small parties of the enemy on the way.
The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade marched at 1100 for Semakh at the southern end of Lake
Tiberias.
Otherwise there was no movement of importance.
September 25.
Chaytor's Force captured Amman at 1510 ; the town and railway station were both held and hard
fighting was necessary before they were captured by the 1st and 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigades
and the Canterbury Mounted Rifles.
The railway was seized some miles north of Amman by the Auckland Mounted Rifles and about
600 prisoners in all captured.
Early in the morning the 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade took Semakh after some hand to hand
fighting at the station, where a considerable nimiber of Germans were killed in the defence of the
" laager " which they had constructed of engines and other rolling stock.
The 5th Cavalry Division moved to Nazareth preparatory for the advance on Damascus.
'J'o face Plate 47.
PLA TE 47
ADVANCE THI^OUGH
GILE AD A]VD GALILE E
Miles 10 s o 10 - 20 Miles
s 0
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^(ll^uli&jLlll )moving on
DERAA
Prmte<i by the.Sur*-fiy of Etjypt .Oec 1318 {04S3)
September 26 and 27.
The interest now began to shift to the crossing places of the Jordan and the country of Gilead and
Bashan. In the north, the AustraUan Mounted Division moved up from the southern end of the Sea of
Gahlee to march to Damascus by way of Tiberias and Jisr Btnat Yakub, followed by the 5th Cavalry
Division, which had come up from its capture of Acre and Haifa by way of Nazareth and Tiberias. The
two divisions were intended to capture Damascus, if possible before the Turkish IVth Army could get
there. The 4th Cavalry Division left Beisan and the Jordan Valley with the intention of falHng upon
the left flank of the Turks, which was hurrying north along the Hejaz Railway in order to avoid the
attacks of Chaytor's Force in the south. On the right flank of the retreating IVth Army, the advanced
troops of the Hejaz northern operations were already active and had done much to delay the retreat
by the destruction of railway and bridges. Away in the south, as far as Maan inclusive, where desultory
operations had for some time past been in progress between a flying column from the Ilnd Corps and the
Arabs who were watching the town from the Semna hills, the Turks were hurrying north in a vain hope
of reaching Damascus before Chaytor's Force could effectively bar their retreat. Of the presence of
Sherifian troops to the north of it, the Ilnd Corjjs was still ignorant, but it was fully aHve to the danger
which it ran from the energetic hostiUty of the country through which it was retreating and the insistent
attacks of the troops of the Hejaz southern operations which preyed upon its flanks and rear. It was an
interesting race and it is possible that the bidk of the IVth Army might have got through to Damascus
in time to organize some sort of a defence against the cavalry, had it not been delayed for several
precious hours by the destructive activities of Lieut. -Col. T. E. Lawrence, C.B., and his Arab Camel
Corps and armoured cars. The part played by the Royal Air Force was also important in causing that
delay in the Turkish retreat which enabled the Australian Mounted Division and the 5th Cavalry Division
to get so good a start in the race.
In hopes of delaying this northern force, the enemy had blown one arch of the Jisr Benat Yakub
(now generally known as " Jordan Bridge "), and had formed a laager of lorries with artillery and machine
gmis. Thus the Australians, at the end of their eighteen miles' advance from Mejdel on the Sea of
Galilee (during which the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade had reconnoitred up to Safed) found them-
selves faced with strong opposition on attempting to cross the Jordan. The 4th Australian Light Horse
Brigade, however, swam the river at El Min, a mile below the broken bridge, while the 3rd Australian
Light Horse Brigade was strongly engaged in the swampy country between Jisr Benat Yakub and Lake
Hule. The 4th Australian Light Horse Brigade imperilled the communications of the enemy and cap-
tured much transport, while the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade kept the enemy busy at the bridge.
At dusk the 3rd Australian Light Hor.se Brigade forced a passage to the north of the bridge and, pressing
on through the night, captured Deir es Saras just before dawn with prisoners and guns. This operation
delayed the AustraUan-Mounted Division for some time, so that it was overtaken by the 5th Cavalry
Division which had come thirty-two miles from Kefr Kenna to a point near Jisr Benat Yakub.
Meanwhile, the 4th Cavalry Division had crossed the Jordan at Jisr Mujamie, south of the Sea of
Galilee and was advancing upon Deraa. The 10th Cavalry Brigade got into visual connection with the
Sherifian troops on the far side of the retreating Turks at 1130 on the morning of Sept. 26, but actual
contact had still to be established. The enemy made considerable resistance west of Irbid and that
town was only occupied at nightfall. The same brigade was again engaged near Er Remte, when the
1/lst Dorset Yeomanry executed a highly successful charge, which resulted in satisfactory enemy casual-
ties as well as the capture of 200 prisoners and twenty machine guns. After this, Er Remte was taken
and advanced patrols pushed on through the night towards Deraa. This the Sherifian troops occupied
shortly before midnight, after an exciting race, in which Colonel Lawrence's fast camels beat the Sherif
Feisal's horsemen by a neck along a course from the headquarters of the Hejaz northern operations.
Troopers of the Central India Horse established contact with the Sherifian Arabs just after dawn on
Sept. 28 west of Deraa, and only desisted from arresting one of the British officers serving with the Arabs,
under the impression that he was a German serving with the Turks, on recognizing the well-known English
expletive that was drawn from him by their proposal.
With Chaytor's Force, the period covered by Sept. 2G and 27, forms a gap in the operations, owing
to the fact that the main body of the Turkish Ilnd Corps had not yet come within range to be struck
at and the rest of the Turkish Fourth Army had moved away from the Amman area into the inhospitable
Hauran (Bashan). The force was actively engaged in finding fresh enemies to conquer, and the 1st
Australian Light Horse Brigade was fortunate in finding some Turks in the Wadi el Hammam, who fought
before surrendering to the number of 105 with one gun. Other Turks were seen moving south, stragglers
probably from the main body of the Fourth Army, trying to join the advancing Ilnd Corps for
safety, in view of the hostility of the local population. The 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade located
the advancing troops of this corps near Kastal and, on the morning of Sept. 27, there was a further
engagement in the Wadi el Hatnmaiii, in whicli tlic .'5rd Australian Light Horse Regiment, with aeroplane
assistance, ca])tur(>d 300 prisoners and two iiuuliine guns. Later in the day, the Australian and New
Zealand Mounted Division was disposed between the water at Wadi el Hammam and Kalaat ez Zerka,
and the Turks moving north, while the New Zealand Mounted Rifles had a detaclunent across the Darb
el Haj and the 2nd Australian Light Horse Brigade held the water at Lcbau Station.
To face I'lute 4H.
PLATE 48
ADVANCE THROUGH
GILEAD AND GALILE E
Mllesio s 0
'=a~'-^ I— i t-i 1^1 ^=
10
20 Miles
d
Situation at)Qp.m.on27-9-l8aslaiown at GJiQ.EEF
^J ■ teRl^a^
" iv "
'^^^' 7/ cj ■*)««"'• \
Printed by tfre Survey of Cqypt, Dec /9I8(04S3)
Sherifian Co-operation in September.
On Aug. 31 a detachment of the regular forces of King Husein started north from near Akaba in
order to co-operate in the then forthcoming operations against the Turks. The direct route from Akaba
to Damascus runs by way of Maan, Amman, and Deraa, and was, at that time, still for the most part
in the occupation of the enemy. It was, therefore, necessary for a wide outflanking movement to be
undertaken. That this was successfully carried through was most creditable to the troops engaged in
the operation, as on one occasion they made a four days' march from water to water, followed imme-
diately after that by a two days' march to the next supply. Nor was this water supply of the most
inviting description. Leaches abounded and many of those who drank hastily found afterwards that
these unpleasant creatures had got into their mouths and fastened themselves in the nasal tubes.
Abu Lissa, near Maan, was reached on Sept. 2, then by way of Jafar and Bair the force reached Kasr
el Azrak and continued through Umm el Jemal and Umtaiye which was reached on the afternoon of the
15th. This was made the base for the operations in the immediate future. A raid was made upon
the railway between Deraa and Damascus. A point near Tel Arar was the place selected, and a bridge
and 1,200 rails were blown up and destroyed during the morning of the 17th. A daylight occupation
of a point only four miles from a German aerodrome invited the intervention of the enemy, and the
force was attacked and bombarded by nine aeroplanes from Deraa. The work was, however, success-
fully carried through, and part of the force proceeded during the day to the railway station at Mezerib,
which was captured in the evening of the same day. This important point on the enemy lines of com-
munication was carefully burned, two trains were destroyed, the water tanks blown up, and a quantity
of rails bent and displaced. A good day's work being thus creditably brought to a close, the Arab force
passed the night peacefully astride the enemy's only railway between his front in Palestine and Gilead
and his base. Next day the force retreated southwards on Umtaiye passing near Remte and reaching
Nasib station on the Hejaz Railway, south of Deraa, in time to blow up a large bridge and damage
a quantity of rails before bed-time. On the morning of the 19th the Arab regulars accompanied by a
numerous following from the local tribes and country-side in general, arrived at Umtaiye where they
were attacked by their previous acquaintances, the German aeroplanes, who were in search of vengeance.
The garrison of Deraa must have felt particularly vindictive, as the Arab regulars had, in the course
of forty-eight hours, completely cut their communications with Amman, the Palestine front, and
Damascus alike. Bombs were freely dropped. The tribesmen and local peasantry vanished into the
surrounding country, but the regular troops of the Arab Army barracked their camels, dismounted,
and sat immovable, each man by the side of his beast, until the storm was passed. The Germans returned
to Deraa for more bombs, whereupon the Camel Corps withdrew into a wadi and sat still among the
blocks of lava which were to be found therein. By making no movement at all they concealed their
presence from the questing planes, and the Germans returned disappointed, doubtless to report that
the entire force had been destroyed. The picture of the Hejaz Camel Corps passing itself off as black
stones recalls the story of Sherherazad in the " Arabian Nights," and, as in that story, the black stones
came to life again and busily harassed the enemy. They remained among the lava until Sept. 24, issuing
on one occasion by night to catch and kill a passing train, and on another occasion by day to blow up a
bridge and destroy a great length of rails. On Sept. 24 the Turkish 4th Army began to surge northwards
in its vain endeavour to escape disaster which had overtaken the troops to the west of Jordan.
The Arab Camel Corps being immensely outnumbered by this force, which still retained a certain
amount of organization, was unable to stop this retreat, and was obliged to content itself during two days
with vigorous minor operations for incommoding its passage. These took the shape of a succession
of raids upon selected units. A flurry of rifle fire would be followed by a charge and a swift withdrawal,
leaving twenty or thirty dead Turks on the ground, and a dozen or so prisoners in the hands of the
Arabs. In this way, two officers, 300 men, and twenty-five gmis were captured. On Sept. 26, the Camel
Corps having hurried north through the night, was able to blow up the railway and capture Ezra and
Ghazale stations. Through Sheikh Miskin the force went to Sheikh Saad on one of the roads north
from Mezerib to Damascus. Here thirty officers and 500 men were captured, many of the former being
Germans and Austrians. The state of demoralization into which the enemy had fallen is exemplified
in this force. Although provided with fifteen machine guns, as well as rifles and adequate ammunition,
no resistance was made to the attacks of tribesmen and peasants, who reduced them to Buch a con-
dition that only one pathetic figure had retained sufficient of his property to be able to wave portion?
of a white handkerchief, saying : " I am a major, we surrender." During Sept. 27, the last Turkish
formations evacuated Deraa and the Es Salt force moved north by way of Mezerib and Tafas. This
force was so imbued with tlie doctrine of frightfulness that it thought in its madness that an example of
terrorisiri might overawe the ilauran which was bubbling in open rebellion all round it. Consequently
it was decided " to make an example of " the unhappy villages of Tafas and Tiu'aa. Eighty women
and children were butchered with every revolting circumstance of atrocity, but the last hour of Turkish
rule, east of Jordan, had already struck. The Arabs, so far from being overawed and terrorised into
a dutiful submission to their former tyrants, were justly incensed by this thoroughly Turkish outrage.
The force which was responsible for it was visited by immediate and well-earned retribution, and the
units which had moved out of Deraa and Mezerib never reached Damascus. Sheikh Tallal, a fighting
man of high repute and a notable of the Hauran, was with the Arab Army. On finding what atrocities
To face Plate 40.
AP^A OCCUPIED AS THE RESULT OFOPERVTIONS
FHOM SEI»TI:MI{KIJ 21'^-'^ to 'Z7'^'1918
REFERENCE
'^Arta in oa-itftiiluiit uf TiirWt.
98B " cUarrdoTTiirkt during pvriodScftl 2l'i-\i7'b lU in
f^J " >• >i •• prtiioujt toScf>tcmJ,rr 21'-' l.'IIH
NOTE: Dnthpmeni of Rmilwy from September la*^ '
27l'';9/S .Shown (hus-i 1 1 1
Drcnuv,lt»
Mi^ D \ T i: U U AS h M ;V
PL A TE
.S E A
p K r\ J
had been committed in his village he charn;ed single-handed upon a Turkish column and furiously exacted
blood for blood until he was riddled with bullets. At dawn on the 27th, the Arab Camel Corps rode into
Deraa, so long a Turkish place of strength, and shortly afterwards at a point a little to the west of the
railway junction, made their first contact with sowars of the 38th Central India Horse.
September 28, 29, and 30.
The 5th Cavalry Division was somewhat delayed in crossing the Jordan — a lorry broke down the
temporary bridge across the arch destroyed by the enemy — and finally made use of fords. By 1800 all
fighting troops and fighting wheels were across, but further delay was caused to the latter by the dis-
tressing nature of the road leaduig up to the plateau on the east of the river. It was not until 2030
that the division reached Kuneitra, which the Austrahan Mounted Division had occupied at 1300, and
its rear wheels only arrived at 0600 on Sept. 29. Tired horses had been left in the Jordan Valley. The
Australian Moimted Division led in the advance from Kuneitra in the evenmg of Sept. 29, and the 3rd
Australian Light Horse Brigade was engaged with the Turks on the high groimd south of Sasa at 2000.
The brigade was hampered in its attack by the masses of lava deposits which made it difficult for men
to move across country in the dark. The enemy's flank was protected by an impassable morass, and
no attack could be made before 0300 on Sept. 30, when the enemy was disposed of by the 9th and 10th
Austalian Light Horse Eegiments and lost twenty-five prisoners, two guns and seven machine guns.
The advance continued without check imtil some 2,500 Turks with machine gims were foimd to be
holding Kaukab and the ridge east of it. A successful mounted attack was made by the 12th and ith
Australian Light Horse Regiments, supported by the Notts Battery of Royal Horse Artillery and " A "
Battery Honourable Artillery Company, and the ridge was taken at the gallop. Many of the Turks fled
into the woods near Daraya. Meanwhile, at 0845, an aeroplane report was received by the 5th Cavalry
Division to the effect that some 2,000 Turks were retiring on Damascus by the Deraa road. The
llrth Cavalry Brigade was ordered to intercept this force and then march on Damascus. This brigade
cut the Tinkish column iti half, capturing the bulk of the leading portion including all that was left of
the 3rd Tmkish Cavalry Division with the Divisional Commander and his staff'. The 13th and 15th
Cavalry Brigades concentrated just north of Sasa in Corps reserve. At noon, after some opposition,
the 13th Cavalry Brigade seized the Jebel el Aswad astride the Kiswe-Damascus road and cut off large
nmnbers of Turks trying to withdraw to Kiswe, who tried to break away to the left and right of the
brigade and up the Wadi Zabirani. Others, greatly disorganized, were streaming up the hills to the
north-east and along the main road to Damascus. The former were shelled by the Essex Battery and
the latter were headed off towards the 4th Cavalry Division, with the loss of about 1,000 prisoners. At
1300 the brigade advanced to Kaukab and then co-operated with the 14th and 15th Brigades (the latter
being on the right, astride of the Wadi Zabirani) against the Turks who were trying to break out from
Kiswe. At 1700 the 13th Brigade captured Kiswe with 675 prisoners and fom- gims. In the evening
the 5th Mounted Division had its headquarters at Kaukab with the 13th Mounted Brigade, the 14th was
astride the Kiswe-Damascus road north of the Jebel el Aswad with patrols at Kadem Station, and the
15th was round Khan esh Slieha, which had been occupied at 1000. Two troops of the 1/lst Royal
Gloucester Hussars Yeomanry (13th Cavalry Brigade) bad been sent forward in hopes of capturing the
enemy wireless station at Kaden^. This was however blown up on their approach at 1630. The
yeomanry charged the destruction party, killing fifteen with the sword, but had to retire in face of con-
siderable German reinforcements, and afterwards joined the Australian Mounted Division.
The 4th Moimted Division coming up from the south with the Sherifian forces on its light, entered
Deraa miopposed on Sept. 28, and next day got into touch with the retreating Turks in the Dilli area.
For two days the enemy was pressed and harassed, his columns were fired upon and broken up, and on
Sept. 30 the division got into touch with the other divisions of the Desert Mounted Corps, and reached
Zerakiye late at night. By dusk the 5th Australian Light Horse Brigade and the French Cavahy imder
Commandant Lebon, attached to the Australian Mounted Division, had worked across the Damascus-
Beirut road immediately north-west of Damascus and on the hills surrounding it. Here the enemy was
trapped — the defile was swept with rifle and machine-gun fire, trains were wrecked, and every form of
transport destroyed. In this action the Turks lost 4,000 prisoners and very many killed.
In Gilead Chaytor's Force located the southern portion of the Turkish Fourth Army at Kastal, with
tiiree trains in the station. At 1515 the Commander was summoned to surrender by 0845 next day, in
a message dropped from an aeroplane, but no reply was received. At 1145, however, on Sept. 29, the
Turks opened negotiations with the 5th Australian Light Horse Regiment, on the railway south of Leban.
The situation was difficult as large numbers of the local inhabitants, intent upon looting, were surromid-
ing the Turkish position. Any sign of a white flag was likely to ])recipitate nuitters, so the 2nd Austrahan
Light Horse Brigade advanced to Kastal and formed a cordon behind which the Turks were able to
surrender. The Turkish Commander, All Bey Wahabi, was taken by car to Divisional Headquarters.
The other prisoners to the nmuber of over 4,000 marched into Amman under the protection of the New
Zealand Mounted Rifles Brigade, while some 500 sick had to be left for a time at Kastal. The surrender
also included twelve guns and thirty-five machine guns, and brought the list of captures by Chaytor's
Force during its operations as a separate entity to over 10,000 prisoners, fifty-seven guns, and 132 machine
guns. Large quantities of railway rolling stock, ammunition, and other material were also taken.
Til face Plate 50.
CAPTURE OF DAMASCUS
PLA TE 50
Printed by the Surye/ of Egypt. Dec. 1918 (Otf^.V
Miles S 4 3 2 I o
10 Miles
-t
Sltiiatioiiatl2 a.m.on.30-9~18 asknownat G.H.QE F F
October 1.
No precise moment can be fixed for the fall of Damascus. Politically its independence from
Turkish domination was proclaimed about 1100 on 8ept. B') while Jemal Pasha, Commander of
the Fourth Army and numbers of armed Turks and Germans were still in the city. Yet, so
reduced was the moral of these troops, that they wearily trailed out of Damascus along the
north bank of the Barada and gazed apathetically at the Sherifian flags which proclaimed the jubilation
of the Damascenes at their defeat and emphasized the collapse of four centuries of empire. No formal
surrender took place as the municipal authorities welconied the troops alike oi the Desert Moimted Corps
and of the Sherifian Army as liberators and alUes, and no enemy admuiistration survived in such a form
as to be able to take upon itseK the task of arranging a capitulation. The last days of Turkish rule in
the famous city had indeed been full of hmniliation for the defeated side. People refused to sell pro-
visions to Turks, even for gold. It was impossible to obtain supplies for the hospitals, and the Germans
forcibly seized all available transport for their own especial benefit. During the morning of the 30th
the Damascenes were delighted to witness a brisk fight between Turks and Germans, provoked by the
rapacity of the latter over the distribution of vehicles. Satisfactory numbers on both sides lost their
lives in this encomiter, which was, apparently, the most formidable of many similar skirmishes between
the Turks and their Prussian patrons, evidence of which had been forthcoming in the shape of nmuerous
German corpses all along the line of retreat. In the hospitals the Turkish sanitary department entirely
collapsed during the last five days, so much so that one of the first tasks to be undertaken after the
occupation of the town, was the very necjssary burial of bodies which had been left three, four, and even
five days, on the floor where they had died. Food was obtained for the survivmg patients, and the
hospital staff was forcibly induced to resmiie its duties. The 14th Cavalry Brigade and Sherifian troops
had entered Damascus on Oct. 1, but in so large a city it is not surprising that both detachments were
ignorant of the arrival of the other, and that both thought that they were first in. In point of actual
time a detachment of the 10th Australian Light Horse Regiment mider Major Olden reached the Serail at
0630 on Oct. 1, while Colonel Lawrence and the Sherifian Camel Corps were a Httle later, but it was not
until 0830 that General Chauvel motored into Damascus to confer with the Civil Authorities. During
the early hours of the morning of Oct. 1, the 14th Cavaby Brigade mtercepted numbers of Turks who were
still trying to reach Damascus, ia ignorance of the fact that the city was no longer a refuge for them. The
rest of the 5th Cavalry Division concentrated at Deir Khabiye at 0600 and moved up the Kiswe-Daraascus
road to join the 14th Brigade. The 4th Cavalry Division which had left Zerakiye at 0300 followed. At
1030 the 14th Cavalry Brigade was sent through the town to Jobar to co-operate with the 3rd Australian
Light Horse Brigade in closing the Dimia road to those Turks who were trymg to escape that way.
Meanwhile, the AustraHan Moimted Division, which had been astride the Beirut road all night,
at 0500 pushed forward the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade through the town and blocked the Aleppo
road. On the way this brigade captured a train, with 483 prisoners, eight gims, and thirty machine
guns, and engaged an enemy column at Duma. The 10th Australian Light Horse Eegiment charged
the rear of this column, killed numbers of the enemy and cajitured 600 prisoners and thirty-seven machine
gxms. The pursuit was continued and in the evening some Germans and machine gmis were taken at
Khan Kusseir. The brigade remained at Duma for the night. At 0825 next morning the brigade
galloped for nearly six miles across country and charged an enemy cohmm with sword. The Turks
were broken and lost many dead, in addition to a captured Divisional Commander, 1,500 other prisoners,
three guns, and twenty-six machine gims. This brought the operations round Damascus to a close.
Story of the Arab Movement.
A SJierif (Arabic plural Ashraf) in the Moslem world is one who claims descent in the male line from
the Khalif Ali (656-661 a.d.) by his marriage with Fatima, daughter of the Prophet Mohammed (died 632).
There are many of these Ashraf in Arabia, Morocco and the Sudan, but among those generally accepted
as such, only the Ashraf inscribed in the Register of Mecca, which has been strictly kept for many
centuries past — if not from the days of the Prophet himself, are of absolutely uncjuestioued authenticity.
They are divided into a number of clans, living mostly in the Hejaz, and form an accepted aristocracy
with pecuhar privileges under a law of their own.
For the first four centuries after the death of the Prophet, the Ashraf were not very numerous and
had not as yet estabhshed their position as a political ^wwer. Towards the end of the tenth century,
however, one of the Ashraf of Mecca got possession of his native town and inaugurated in the Hejaz
a tradition of Slierifian temjjoral power, the holder of which was regarded as the Emir and head of the
Ashraf, or, as he has for centuries been known in Europe — " The Grand Sherif of Mecca."
In course of time a fighting Sherif of the Juheinah clan, by name Qatada, became Emir and a Prince
of his dynasty during the sixteenth century, established the undoubted predominance of the Emirate of
Mecca over the Hejaz, and secured for his own family an exclusive right to the throne. The reigning
representative of the senior line of the dynasty founded by the Emir Qatada succeeded to the throne
of Mecca as the I'^mir ilusein in 1908, and so long as it was possible to reconcile his position as a vassal
of the Sultan of Turkey with his dignity as an Arab Prince and head of the Ashraf, he remained a
loyal subject of the Ottoman Empire, but at the beginning of the war the Turkish atrocities in Syria
which came on the top of the violent attempts of the Constantinople Government forcibly to Ottomanize
all nationalities under its authority, made a revolt of the Arab nation against its oppressors inevitable.
To face Plate 51.
CAPTURE OF DAMASCUS
PLATE
Printed by the Survey of £yypt. Dec. /9/8 (0453)
Miles 5 4 3 2 1 O
Ife
10 Miles
Situation at P^I^oil 3p-9-.J.7 askaownat G.H.OE.E.F.
In May, 1910, the position of the Emir of Mecca was threatened by the arrival of a picked force of
3.000 Turkish troops in Medina. Their plan of campaiiin was to march through the Ilejaz consolidating
the waning Ottoman authority in that principality, and then to proceed to the Yemen in order to reinforce
the Turkish army operating against Aden. The foresighted poHcy of the Emir in preventing the pro-
longation of the Hejaz railway from Medina to Mecca, caused a much needed delay in the progress of the
Turks, and the Emir decided that the privileged position of the Hejaz and pos.sibly his own authority
would be m'enaced by the arrival of so large a Turkish force. He placed himself at the head of the national
cause and drew his sword in the defence of the Arab as against the Turk.
The Arab revolt began on June 5, 19] C, with the formation of a thin Bedouin cordon round Medina,
where Ali and Feisal, two sons of the Shcrif Husein, were in command. The Hejaz railway was broken
at several points between Medina and Abu Naara ; but the Arabs, inexpert in demolition, did not effect
enough before being driven off by relief parties with machine guns, to interrupt seriously the com-
munication of Medina with the north, and the besieging force, short of arms and supplies, and with no
guns worth mentioning, could do little but watch the city from afar. Jiddah, however, which was attacked
on June 9, held out barely a week. Cut o2 from Mecca by the loss of the blockhouses on the road, and
exposed to naval guns and 'planes, the Turkish garrison, in a weak position north of the town, yielded to
the instance of the civilian population and surrendered at discretion. Mecca had passed in the mean-
time into the Emir's hands, with the exception of the forts and entrenched barracks, held by small
garrisons, the bulk of the Turkish force being absent in summer cpiarters at Taif with the Governor-General.
These garrisons, who had had some inkling of what was coming, opened fire on the town, putting a shell
or two even into or near the Great Mosque, to the infinite scandal of all pious Moslems ; and they were
not reduced until artillery was brought up from Jiddah. They had all surrendered by July IG. Taif
where over 2,000 men, the bulk of the Turkish force, were entrenched, with Ghalib Pasha, the G.O.C.
and Governor-General, held out much longer — till Sept. 23 — and then capitulated from hopelessness
rathsr than from scarcity or fear of its assailants. It had been blockaded very effectively for three and
a half months by Sherif Abdullah, the Emir's second son, with a mixed force of Ateibah Bedouins and
Meccan townsfolk, but though regularly bombarded it had never been really assaulted.
Smaller places, like Lith and Yambo, surrendered as soon as they were seriously attacked, and the
greater part of the Hejaz was now clear of the Turks. So far the task of the Arabs had been com-
paratively easy. Isolated bodies of troops, divided from all possible relief by 300 miles of hostile, ill-watered
country and barred from the sea, were bound to capitulate sooner or later, however superior in fighting
quality and equipment to their foes. But the Medina garrison was in a different case. It had been rein-
forced, re-armed, re-victualled, and reassured by successful sorties during these four months, and, late
in September it was able to issue forth, driving the Arabs before it, and make Medina secure by establishing
a cordon of fortified posts, thirty to forty miles out along the Mecca roads. This done, the Turks pushed
farther still, realizing that their best defence was an offensive and at one time they threatened to occupy
both Yambo and Rabugh, the important half-way house to Mecca. But only some 14,000 strong, they
had not the forces necessary to hold such distant objectives together with the lines of communication.
Considerable Arab armies moved up frona south and south-west, and the Turks withdrew again behind
the fortified outposts of Medina at the end of the year.
It had become clear that owing to their inexperience in modern siege warfare the Arabs could not
expect to reduce Medina. The only operation likely to be fruitful would be systematic attack on the
800 miles of the single track of the Hejaz railway which connects Medina with Damascus. For such raiding
however, and for ultimate extension of the revolt to Syria, more northerly bases than Jiddah, Rabugh,
or even Yambo, were required. Therefore at the of Jan., 1917, Sherif Feisal, with the Northern
Arab Army, installed himself at Wejh, already occupied bv landing parties, and extended his hold
farther north to Dhaba and Moweilah on the Midian coast. His brother, Abdullah, had arrived at Wadi
Ais, north-west of Medina, leaving only liis eldest brother, Ah, in the former theatre of operations.
The raiding carried out during the following six months, with British and French help, lowered the
strength and spiiit of the Turkish forces in Medina, provided scope for adventure which attracted many
fresh .\rab elements, and offered a demonstration of activity which induced many more to engage them-
selves on the Shcrifian side in view of a move still farther north. But it did not cut oft' Medina. The
permanent way proved harder to wreck irretrievably, and the enemy better prepared to make inter-
ruptions good, than had been expected. The alternative scheme, that of blowing up trains, was evolved,
and under the direction of Lieut. -Colonel T. E. Lawrence, this form of military activity began to rank
almost as a national sport. Numerous instances occurred of small ])arties of Arabs under Allied leader-
ship, blowing u]) the engine of a train while in motion. Sometimes the disaster merely resulteil in the
di'lay and discomfiture of the enemy - sometimes the Arabs were able to inflict serious losses and ca]iture
valuable material as the result of one of these episodes. In any case such destruction invariably impaired
the railway track, reduced the number of engines and the amount of rolling stock available, caused delay
and laid a lu^avy burden upon the Turkish lines of comnnmication.
.Meanwhile, early in July, 1917, .\kaba had been ca])ture(l from the Turks, and Sherif Feisal nu)ved
U]). Ojjerations and propaganda could now be extended much I'.utlier northwards. Previously there
had been no raiding of the railway above Tebuk. Now it was attacked, iu)t only south of Maan liut.
north, while Arab forces threatened both Maan itself and also the forest district on the north-west, whence
the railway locomotives were drawing their fuel supply. The effect on Medina was soon evident, and
had the Turks been in a ])osition to evacuate by the railway without almost certain disaster, they would
'/;/ r^ire I'lule r,2.
AREA 0C(:UP1P]D AS THE RESULT OF OPERATIONS
FFIOM SKPTKMin<]l{ '2»'-"T0 (X'TOtnOR T^:' 11)18 plate 52
Rfpfcauiitd ty fhe S<,r^t\- jt' Egypt Dec I9ts0t4-i^)
probably have done so early in the current, year. But, for lack of sufficient rolling stock and troops
to keep the line during withdrawal, they evidently decided to hold on, as the lesser evil ; for, in any case,
they were secure for some months of being able to repel direct Arab attack, all reduced and scurvy-ridden
though their troops had become, both at headquarters and on the line of communication. There they
remained until their .surrender became necessary as the result of the Armistice which the Turks were
compelled to accept at the end of October. Lines of connnunication troops who had hoped to make
good tlieir e,«cape northwards, when disaster overtook the Turkish armies west of the Jordan were beset
by hostile tribesmen and finally surrendered to Chaytor's force at Ziza.
Having secured the adhesion or neutrality of all Arabs as far up as Maan, and made provisional
arrangements with others to northward, Felsal could now contemplate an advance into the trans-Jordan
country. He had collected, from one source or another, some thousands of partly-trained troops, beside
contingents from Bedouin tribes of higher fighting quality than the Hejazis. Also he was much better
equipped with guns, small arms, and auxiliary services than any Arab army had been heretofore. The
Turks in Maan and the Hishe Forest made attempts to dislodge him from the Petra region in Oct.
and Nov., 1917, but proved to weak to press home any advantage they gained. The cold of the
highlands in winter, and lack of transport, mihtated against strong counter-offensives by the Arabs, but
in Jan., 1918, they were able to begin an advance towards the eastern Dead Sea lands. There were,
but few Turks to oppose them, and the local inhabitants, though jealous and suspicious of a strange force
in their midst, did not obstruct. Shobak and the Hishe Forest were occupied, and towards the end of
January, the Arabs had taken and passed Tafilah, raided up to Mezra on the Dead Sea, and began to
threaten the Turks in Kerak and on the railway north of Jurf el Derwish.
To stay an advance, which, if not checked would bring all their Hejaz forces into an inextricable
situation, the Turks renewed, in February, their efforts at offensive, from Kerak and from the railway.
The first attempt by an infantry force, about 700 strong, to reach Tafilah ended in signal disaster, barely
fifty men getting back to Kerak, with the loss of all guns and material. A second attempt, made from the
railway early in March, with two comparatively strong columns, stiffened by German units, effected
its purpose with little difficulty, the Arabs retiring from Tafilah to Shobak ; but its effect was demonstrative
only, the Turks being unable to remain at Tafilah in ^^ew of the probability of an advance by the British
across the Jordan. The Arabs re-occupied Tafilah on March 18, and, on the Turks withdrawing from
Kerak a few days later, a detachment of Feisal's irregular troops entered this place also. They did not,
however, stay long. The past month of April was marked by a great increase of Arab activity, and as
a result of the capture of all the stations on the fine between Maan and Mudowara and destruction of track
and bridges for over seventy miles, Medina was finally isolated. Maan was vigorously attacked and the
Sherifian forces, although unable at the first attempt to hold the railway station which they had entered,
took up a strong position dominating both the station and the town. Further north much damage was
done to stations, tracks and bridges, and the Beni Sakhr tribe gave assurances of future co-operation,
which were, at the time, believed to be satisfactory. The history of the Es Salt raid (April and May, 1918)
showed that this confidence had been misplaced, and the operation did not result in the wholesale destruc-
tion of Turkish troops owing to the Beni Sakhr tribe remaining quiescent at the critical moment.
The strong position taken up by the Turkish Fourth Army in the Belka during the summer made
it impo.ssible for the Arab Army to attempt an offensive owing to its lack of the resources and heavy
artillery necessary for such an operation. The September advance made by General Allenby in
Palestine caused the Fourth Army to retire upon Damascus and gave the Sherif Feisal the opportunity
for which he had so long been waiting.
From the fall of Damascus to the Armistice.
The result of the September operations left the Turks depressed in moral, and so greatly reduced in
numbers as to be almost entirely deprived of power to resist the northward sweep of the cavalry, except
in the neighbourhood of Aleppo. The obstacles which still impeded the advance were chiefly those
offered by long distances, by bad roads, and by disease. The troops which had passed through the
Beisan area suffered severely from malaria after the period of incubation had elapsed, by which time they
had advanced into the Damascus area. The widely prevalent influenza also produced many casualties.
In spite of these difficulties there were some examples of rapid advance on the part both of cavalry
and infantry. The 5th Cavalry Division, which was engaged in the fighting round Damascus on the
last day of September, was fighting Turks fifteen miles north of Aleppo on the last day of October. The
7th Indian Division, at Haifa on Oct. 1, marched to Beirut in a week, and occupied Tripolis on Oct. 18,
after halting on the historic shores of St. George's Bay for five days. In the course of the advance to
Beirut, this division found time to construct a road, over which guns were taken, across the Ladder of
Tyre, a natural obstacle of imposing and picturesque magnitude. Full details of the advances of these
two divisions will be found in their respective records.
During the advance of the 5th Cavahy Division on the afternoon of Oct. '22, the Armoured Car Column
engaged a number of the enemy's armed lorries near Khan Sebil (thirty-five miles south of Aleppo).
An enemy armoured car was captured, and the lorries, which kept up fire from machine guns, were
chased for fifteen miles. One lorry was run to a standstill but some of its crew escaped in the darkness,
leaving twenty-five casualties and five prisoners. Another lorry with five prisoners was captured next
day but the Turkish Commander in Aleppo itself declined to surrender to the Armoured Car Column.
To face Plate .53.
ADVANCE THROUGH NORTHERN SYRIA
PLATE 53
^0 iO
50 «0
LINES OF COMMUNICATION, 1918.
British.
Early in the spring of 1918, railhead having been established at Ludd, and active operations on a
large scale having ceased, preparations began to be made for the next stage of the advance.
These preparations included the doubling of the railway track from El Arish to Rafa, the relaying
of the Turkish railway from Ludd to Jerusalem with a track of standard gauge {see Plate 40), the for-
mation of large hospital centres at Gaza and Deir el Belah, and the development of Jerusalem and Ludd
as advanced bases ; to these base camps, medical units and reserves of supplies and stores were trans-
ferred from the bases frona which the November advance had been made. An immense amount of labour
was expended on roads, which were rapidly put into a condition to bear the heaviest traffic ; water sujsplies
were developed ; and a widespread and thorough campaign was carried on through the summer against
malaria in — and immediately in rear of — the Corps areas.
The pressure of work on the Lines of Communication was greatly increased by the withdrawal of
the .52nd and 74th Divisions for service in France ; by the arrival of the 3rd and 7th Indian Divisions to
take their places ; and by the reorganization of the remaining British Divisions (except the 54th) on the
Indian scale.
On July 1 the Lmes of Commimication were extended to include the area west of the Suez Canal
known as the Suez Canal Zone, thus taking in the Canal ports of Suez and Ismailia ; and on the same date
the defence of Tor and Abu Zenima. together with their garrisons, came imder the Lines of Commimication.
In the latter part of August, advice was received that active operations would start in the near
future, and on a large scale, thus involving a certain amomit of preparation being made on the Lines of
Commimication ; e.g. ho.spital accommodation was increased and medical miits pushed forward close on
the rear of the fighting line ; arrangements were made for receiving prisoners -of -war in large numbers
and for their accommodation on the journey from the front line to the base ; and reinforcemnent cam])s
were established from the railhead to the front line in order that reinforcements could be hurried forward
during the advance. Owing to the necessity for secrecy, the final arrangements could not be made until
immediately before the advance started : consequently, the night of Sept. 18 was a very busy period on
the lines of communication.
The great success and rapidity of the advance involved great activity on the lines of communication,
in order to keep up as far as possible with the advancmg army. Reinforcement camps were pushed
forward, prisoners-of-war cages were taken over, and, on Sept. 26, the area of the lines of commimication
was extended northwards along the whole front from the sea to the Jordan. On Oct. 4 it was again
extended northwards to include Nablus and Tul Keram ; on Nov. 1, Haifa, Damascus, and the railway
line between these two places were taken over ; and on Nov. 16, Nazareth and Tiberias were included.
Summing up, the lmes of commimication have grown from what they were on the arrival of General
Allenby, the bases of Port Said and Kantara, with a single railway track to Deir el Belah — a distance of
220 kilometres (.see Plate 2) — to what they are now, with a railway line from Kantara to Damascus —
approximately 650 kilometre.s — and branch railheads at Beersheba and Jerusalem. {See Plate 54.)
The troops employed on the lines of commimication at its start were entirely British, but later
battalions of the Egyptian Army were substituted, who have done valuable work, including the holding
of the mner cordon on the west bank of the Suez Canal, and duties with balloon sections in the rear of
the front line. Battalions of the British West Indies Regiment and Jewish battahons of the Royal
Fusihers took over duties on the further extension of the line, but these were eventually withdrawn
and transferred to fighting formations.
It is impossible to go fully into statistics in so small a space, but the following two points may be of
interest : —
(1) The rations strength of Kantara when taken over by Palestine Lines of Communication in May,
1917, was less than 10,000, while on the day of the Armistice it reached 100,000.
(2) LTp till May, 1917, no ocean-going shij) had ever been berthed at Kantara, whereas, in Oct., 1918,
the daily average of ocean-going ships loading and discharging in the Port of Kantara was five.
These figures alone will give some idea as to the amount of organization which was required to bring
the lines of communication up to their present dimensions.
Turkish.
In the spring of 1918, Germans were substituted for the majority of the Turkish officials, and
matters improved somewhat. A " Navy " was formed on the Dead Sea, and wheat from Kerak was
transpoited up the Dead Sea by motor boats and barges. (See Plate 2.)
Th(^ weak spot of the enemy lines of communication was Deraa : and the destruction of the line to
flic north, south, and west, by the Arab Northern Army on Se])t. 17 and 18, ((imitietcly cut off their
supplies. DuriuL' the retreat in Sept., 1918, an attempt^ was made to use their l)oats on the Sea of
Tiberias, and to transport stores from the northern shore to Damascus by camels ; also the motor-lorry
colunms, which had been extensively used from Damascus southwards, were altle lo i-emove a small
])ortion of the stores from their advanced bases.
It was not until Oct. 9, 1918, that the first broad gauge train ran tliniUL'li (lie TauniK liinncl, and
the first train to run direct from Coiistuntiiiople to ,\li'ppo arrived onK- :i icw (lii\'s before the cily was
occuipied l)y our troops.
71. /„,;■ I'latf r,l.
PLATE 5«
M Y. B I T E 11 Ha N E/A IV /> ^.--^.v»^
Raii'desifroyt^i
Ha^b»jfA,
^AMAGCUS
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pVAritAH STA
LINESoFCOMl^lfATIONS '
OCTOBER 1918
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iT
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BAN STA
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REFERENCE
0 Mtun. 5uff>V l}tpe^
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I I »• " n^l* "
1 I 1 StxrrtPti '* "
- ■ - - Rflnd*
J
A .BoTnaiunt Ordnance WarhahepA
. . Liijht }•• »>
"^ Pipt Line-
^^ .Sufy>tc«A 7KlfUpor(«i frf Micrfor Ltwr-xn
■4/A .. Sea. homr. gupplus
The Military Administration of the Territory released from the Turks.
As the Egyptian Expeditionary Force advanced and more and more territory was released from
Turkish rule the Commander-in-Chief gradually became responsible for the administration of a large
area and a considerable population. The former had suffered from centuries of neglect and the passsage
of contesting armies, while the latter were impoverished and ill-nourished as the result of exhaustive
Turkish requisitions and the blockade to which the country, while under Turkish rule, had been subjected
by the Alhes. The peculiar rehgious status of Jerusalem and the presence of numerous privileged eccles-
iastical corporations also gave rise to complicated questions of a nature seldom presented to the military
administration of, occupied enemy territory. General Allenby at first entrusted the administration of
Southern Palestine to his Chief Political Officer, Brigadier-General G. F. Clayton, C.B., C.M.G., who
built up such measures of government of the civilian populations as is provided for in " The Laws and
Usages of War," laid down by the international agreements embodied in the Hague Convention. This
administration, of what was technically " Occupied Enemy Territory," was entrusted locally to Mihtary
Governors, who were able greatly to improve the condition of the country and to alleviate the sufferings
of a population which had welcomed General .yienby as a deliverer from the detested Turk. The work
of administration developed so greatly that in April Major-General Sir Arthur Wigram Money, K.C.B.,
C.S.I., was appointed Chief Admimstrator of Occupied Enemy Territory Administration, as the control
of administration could no longer be combined with that of the Political Department. Postal faciUties
for civiUans had been restored and the introduction of the stable Egyj)tian currency enabled commerce
to revive in spite of the necessary priority of mihtary claims upon the transport available. Major-General
Money constituted *an improved system for the dispensation of justice and organized the finances of a
territory which had, to all seeming, been in the last stages of economic distress in Dec, 1917. In March,
1918, taxes had again become payable, and by the summer the Military Administration was able
to provide for the payment of dues appropriated to the service of the Ottoman Pubhc Debt in
accordance with international arrangements. The policing of the country was effectively undertaken,
transport faciUties were provided for civihan travellers, education was regulated, schools were reopened,
and the administration of the property of Moslem Pious Bequests {wakfs) enabled the income to be
appropriated to the needs of Moslem beneficiaries in Palestine instead of its being sent to Constantinople
as was formerly the case. Colonel R. Storrs, C.M.G., the Military Governor of Jerusalem, was able
greatly to abate the acerbity of ecclesiastical differences in the Holy City, and it was largely due to his
personal efforts and influence that the Ceremony of the Holy Fire on the Orthodox Easter (May 5, 1918)
passed off without disorder in spite of a long tradition of riot and violence during the Turkish period.
In the new spirit of conciliation, fostered by the Military Administration, the Orthodox clergy voluntarily
removed an unsightly party-wall from the nave of the Church of the Nati\dty at Bethlehem, and the
careful handling of religious questions by the Military Administration has permitted the formation of
an atmosphere contributing to the existence of a spirit of sweet reasonableness wliich would have struck
a Turkish Mutessarif of Jerusalem as being most unusual. The deference paid on every .side to Moslem
susceptibilities, the guard of Indian Moslems round the Dome of the Rock and in front of the Mosque
el Aska, no less than the military assistance given by the Commander-in-Chief to make the Moslem
pilgrimage to Nebi Musa possible, went far to convince the Mohammedan population of the country
that the interests of their rehgion were better safeguarded by the Allies of the Sherif of Mecca than by
the Turks.
The arrival of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force was fortunately so timed as to prevent the whole-
sale deportation of Hebrew colonists and residents which had actually been ordered by the Turks, and
these careful agriculturists were able to restore to a great extent the properties in the Kaza of Jaffa
which they had been able to preserve in part from the spoliation of the enemy. Not only did the colon-
ists benefit from the market afforded by the presence of the army, but were able to co-operate in the
efforts made on behalf of the whole Hebrew community by the energetic Dr. Chaim Weiszmann and the
Zionist Commission, which culminated in the ceremonial foundation of the University of Jerusalem as
a symbol alike of their confidence in the future and of their recognition of the necessity of imparting
higher education in their own language.
As the tide of victory rolled north and east it became necessary very largely to extend the activities
of the Military Administration, and in course of time the Commander-in-Chief found it desirable to
divide occupied enemy territory into three sectors, south, north, and east. The respective areas were
administered under the control of the Commander-in-Chief by General Money from Jerusalem, by Colonel
P. de Piepape, C.B., from Beirut, and by Ali Riza Pasha el Rikabi from Damascus. The opposite map
shews the extent of these three area« and indicates the position of the kazas actually allotted to
Occupied Enemy Territory Administration North hut tem])orarily de])eiident, for the sake of adminis-
trative convenience, upon Occu])ied Enemy Territory Administration .l<]ast. Throughout the whole
of the.se extensive territories efforts are being made to enable the population to recover from the
effects of four centuries of Turkish domination and to restore the ordinary amenities of civilization
and commerce.
71/ /"«(■« J'liite 55.
PLATE 55
Printed by the Swve^ a/^£pyf' ' "'S ,0453)
A Summary of the Terms of the Turkish Armistice (as published) which
came into force on Oct. 31, 1918.
Art. 1. — Opening of the Dardanelles and Bosphoms and access to the Black Sea. The Allied occu-
pation of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus forts.
Art. 2. — The position of all minefields, torpedo tubes, and other obstructions in Turkish waters
to be indicated and assistance to be given to sweep or remove them as may be required.
-Art. 3. — All available information regarding the mines in the Black Sea is to be communicated.
Art. 4r. — All Allied prisoners and Armenians interned to be collected in Constantinople and handed
over unconditionally to the Allies.
Art. 5. — The immediate demobilization of the army except troops required for the surveillance of
the frontier and maintenance of internal order, their number and disposal to be determined later by the
Allies after consultation with the Turkish Government.
Art. 6. — The surrender of all war vessels in the Turkish waters or the waters occupied by Turkey.
These ships are to be interned at such Turkish port or ports, as may be directed, except such small vessels
as required for the police or similar purposes in Turkish territorial waters.
Art. 7. — The Allies arc to have the right to occupy any strategic points in the event of any situation
arising, which threatens the security of the Allies.
Abt. 8. — The free use by Allied ships of all ports and anchorages now in Turkish occupation, and
the denial of their use to the enemy. Similar conditions are to apply to Turkish mercantile shipping
in Turkish waters for the purposes of trade and the demobilization of the army.
Art. 9. — The use of all ship repair facihties at all Turkish ports and arsenals.
Abt. 10. — AlUed occupation of the Taurus tunnel system.
Art. 11. — Withdrawal of Turkish troops from north-western Persia. Part of Trans-Caucasia has
already been ordered to be evacuated ; the remainder to be evacuated if the Allies require after they
study the situation there.
Aet. 12. — -Wireless and cable stations to be under Allied control ; Turkish Government messages
are excepted.
Art. 13. — ^Prohibition of the destruction of any naval, militarv, or commercial material by the
Turks.
Ar'J'. 14. — Facilities are to be given for the pm'chase of coal, oil-fuel, and naval material from Turkish
sources, after the requirements of the country have been met. None of the above material is to be
exported.
Art. 15. — -AlUed control of all railways and Allied occupation of Batoum. Turkey not to object
to the Allied occupation of Baku.
Art. 16. — The surrender of the garrisons of the Hejaz, Assir, Yemen, Syria, and Mesopotamia,
and the withdrawal of troops from Cilicia, except those maintaining order as determined under clause 5.
The surrender of all ports there.
Art. 17. — The surrender of all Turkish officers in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica to the nearest Italian
garrison. Turkey guarantees to stop supplies to and communication with these officers if they do not
obey the order of suiTender.
Art. 18. — The surrender of all ports occupied in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica, including Misurata,
to the nearest Alhed garrison.
Art. 19. — All Germans and Austrians, naval, military, and civilian, to quit Tm'key within a month.
These who are in remote districts to do so as soon as possible thereafter.
Art. 20. — Compliance with the Allies' orders as regards the disposal of arms and the transport of
the demobiUzed under clause 5.
Art. 21. — An Allied representative to be attached to the Tuikish Ministry of Supplies to safeguard
Allied interests.
Art. 22.— Turkish prisoners to be kept at the disposal of the Allies. The release of Turki.sh civihan
prisoners and prisoners over military <age to be considered.
Airr. 23. — Turkey to cease all relations with the Central Powers.
Art. 24. — In case of disorder in the six Armenian vilayets the Alhes reserve the right to occupy
any of them.
'hi fare riate .5ff.
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