Full text of "Buddhism & science"

See other formats

_^^H HB-2L-T

■

■V- 1 1

UMlttslfi)

y?_ig;_3 H- H-

Cthntnt af

(Titling

BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE

.s-

MACM1LLAN AND CO., Limited

LONDON • BOMBAY • CALCUTTA
MELBOURNE

THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

NEW YORK • BOSTON • CHICAGO
DALLAS • SAN FRANCISCO

THE MACMILLAN CO. OF CANADA, Ltd.
TORONTO

BUDDHISM & SCIENCE

PAUL DAHLKE

TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

THE BHIKKHU SlLACARA

MACMILLAN AND CO., LIMITED
ST. MARTIN'S STREET, LONDON

1913

l?/Z

CONTENTS

Introduction vn

i. What is a World-Theory and is it necessary? . i

2. Faith and a World-Theory 8

3. Science and a World-Theory . . . 13

4. An Introduction to the Thought-World of the

Buddha Gotama 23

5. The Doctrine of the Buddha . . . -35

6. Buddhism as a Working Hypothesis . . .81

7. Buddhism and the Problem of Physics . .110

8. Buddhism and the Problem of Physiology . .126

9. Buddhism and the Problem of Biology . .14°

10. Buddhism and the Cosmological Problem . 194

11. Buddhism and the Problem of Thought . . 206
Conclusion 254

INTRODUCTION

The Purpose of the Book

Three kinds of books there are. First, those that
give nothing and from which we demand nothing.
These constitute the greater portion of the book-
world; empty entertainment for the idle. Secondly,
those books that give the unfamiliar and are un-
familiar to us — that is, demand only our memory.
These are manuals of instruction presenting facts.
And thirdly, those books that give themselves
and demand ourselves. These are the books that
are mental nutriment in the real sense of the
words, and impart to the entire process of mental
development a stimulus which, like the stimulus
imparted to a growing tree, never again can be
lost. The present book makes claim to belong
to the last category. As something experienced
by myself, it is meant to become such an experience
to others.

The mental poverty of our time finds its most
accurate expression in the prevalent lack of indi-
vidual experience. We are not impressed where we
ought to be impressed, because we allow ourselves
to be impressed where in truth there is nothing
impressive. We mistake our true interests. The

vii

viii BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE

interesting is something in which we have an
interest, in which we have a share. But there has
been such a derangement of positions that in
presence of our true interests we stand stupid spec-
tators, whilst for the interesting in the banal sense,
we are ready to go through fire and flood. To the
average man of to-day it is far more interesting to
read hair-splitting investigations into the question as
to whether Christianity is a branch of Buddhism or
Buddhism of Christianity, than to think out and live
that which both have taught and continue to teach.

All this is inherent in the conditions under which
we live at the present time.

Thought is ever confronted by life as by a
question — a question that of necessity becomes
actual in me, the thinker. For as a candle illumin-
ates a certain portion of space and thereby first calls
forth question-raising objects, so does thought itself
illuminate these stellar spaces and thereby first calls
forth question-raising objects. The / is the natural
point of departure of every view of the world, being
the objective as well as the subjective point of
departure. Now that philosophy, in the endeavour
to construct a world-conception out of pure thought
alone, has come to ruin on her own nothingness,
natural science has constituted itself the emissary of
the world-conception idea, and in contra-distinction
to philosophy has sought to realize it over the head
of the /, so to speak — an attempt which, despite all
its grandeur, is forever doomed to failure, seeing
that, as the last to include the / itself in this world-
theory, the problem is insoluble. Hence the fact
that we no longer possess a philosophy such as the
ancients and the schoolmen possessed ; and do not

INTRODUCTION ix

yet possess a natural science that can give us any
genuine aid.

Every thinker, every seeker — and every thinker
is a seeker — is to-day in a state of mental inter-
regnum. And it is the hope of this book that, as
masses of atmosphere in labile equilibrium frequently
at the slightest impulse break into whirling motion,
so also the minds of our time that are in this state of
labile equilibrium may prove themselves still more
susceptible to stimuli, and respond, if not exactly
with a mental typhoon, at least with a gentle zephyr.

Three kinds of men there are. First, the indif-
ferent, comparable to the inert bodies of chemistry.
To them applies the saying of Confucius, " Rotten
wood cannot be turned." Secondly, the believers,
comparable to those chemical bodies whose affinities
are satisfied. In so far as their faith is genuine, to
these applies already during their lifetime, the
parable of beggar Lazarus in Abraham's bosom.
And thirdly there is the thinking class, destitute of
faith, corresponding to chemical bodies in the nascent
state. To them applies that word of the Buddha,
" Painful is all life."

Our book has value only for this third, last
kind. The indifferent, however highly educated he
may be, will never give himself the trouble to think
it out ; and with the believer it will only provoke
contradiction.

A thinker destitute of faith I call him who at the
idea of endlessness, which none who thinks at all
can escape, reacts with that psychic uneasiness
which may be compared with the purely intellectual
uneasiness one experiences in presence of the

x BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE

irrational in mathematics, both, as a matter of fact,
being also analogues.

The circle of readers of this book is thus circum-
scribed in advance. But the few for whom it is
written, they are the few that count.

Three questions there are that before all else
occupy every thinking man, and always have occu-
pied him. The question, " What am I ? " The
question, "How must I comport myself?" The
question, " To what end am I here ? ,: This
" what," this "how," this "to what end," — these are
the subjects of contention in all mental life. It is not
every one who, like Emperor Augustus of old, can
withdraw from this scene of things with a plaudite
amici. There are minds to whom life is more
than a play, and all that is transient more than a
symbol.

It is the negative task of this book to show that
neither faith nor science supply such an answer to
these questions as can satisfy the thinking man. It
is the positive task of this book to show that a
solution of these three questions is furnished in the
Buddha-thought, but in a form so strange at first
sight, that until now it has achieved no practical
importance. Trained one-sidedly to inductive
attempts at concepts, we know not how to trans-
late into modern prose these enigmatic formulas
of thought. We know not what to make of a
Nirvana — the epitome of all blessedness and yet
no heaven. We know not what to make of a
Karma that from beginninglessness binds existence
to existence and yet is no soul. And so the truest
of all teachings, uncomprehended by philosophy,

INTRODUCTION xi

unheeded by natural science, is lost to us and to
the needs of our time.

The question arises, How comes it that Buddh-
ism has always remained essentially alien to us, a
sort of mental curiosity ?

To this I give the answer, brief and blunt, It is
not understood. That is only too painfully evident
from the literature published about it. Here I do
not at all refer to those commonplace compilations
that simply swarm with misconceptions. It is just
the best books on the subject which reveal how far
removed it is beyond our powers of apprehension.

I am prepared to have reproach brought against
me ; first, that in many places I have become
polemical, and secondly, that I have not sufficiently
studied that tone of affected diffidence such as has
become the fashion in our books, just in so far as
they deal with the theme of a world-conception.

As to the first point, I can bear witness that
nowhere have I indulged in polemics for polemics'
sake. It is with the Buddha-thought as with many a
colossal edifice, whereof the greatness only becomes
apparent by comparison with ordinary erections.
As in the case of the pyramids of Gizeh, the endless
background of the desert offers no fitting standard
of measurement for their greatness, so the Buddha-
thought, when projected upon beginninglessness
alone, offers nothing by which its greatness can be
measured. One must place by its side other mental
structures if one is ever to be able to reveal it in all
its stupendous proportions. It is easy to under-
stand that in this case simple comparison must
already amount to polemics.

As to the second point, my opinion is this : Either

xii BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE

one has something useful to contribute, in which
case one does not need to practise this affected
diffidence, or else one has nothing useful to contri-
bute, in which case one does not need to write at
all. I dare speak thus because I bring nothing of
my own, but only speak in the place of a Greater.
" We do not know, but there is no sound reason for
doubting that so-and-so," and all such phrases, how-
soever couched, by means of which an endlessly
considerable probability is intended to be smuggled
into the ranks of truth, are quite uncalled for in a
teaching like that of the Buddha. Whoso knows,
" Thus it is," simply says, " Thus it is."

I x

WHAT IS A WORLD-THEORY AND
IS IT NECESSARY?

There is present a something given, an actuality,
which we designate by the collective name of
" world." The untutored person and the thinker
alike make use of the same expression. This latter
is indifferent, acquiring a definite meaning only
with reference to a particular explanation — that is,
with reference to a view of the world.

The impulse to explain actuality, the need of
a world -theory, a world -conception, is deeply
embedded in every living being endowed with
consciousness.

The moment any being has so far developed as
to begin to think, it finds itself involved in a huge
system within which it seeks to know its way,
striving the while to understand it in its various
details.

This system comes before it in a twofold aspect :
on the one hand, as " something that is," i.e. things ;
and on the other hand, as " something that happens,"
i.e. the play of events among things. A " being "
without a " happening " attached, is as little to be
found as a "happening" without a "being." In
other words : processes only exist.

I B

2 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE i

Here two questions immediately arise. First,
What is the world? And second, How does the
play of events come about ?

Both sides of the world-picture, and therewith
both questions, blend into one question — the
question as to adequate causes. As well the fact
that " something is here," as the fact that " some-
thing happens," requires adequate causes. The
adequate cause is the thotcght-necessity given with all
mental life. The entire universe in all its parts
and processes, is to the thinking man a species of
marionette show. He sees the puppets dance but
he does not see the strings, neither does he see
that which pulls the strings. The incentive to a
view of the world is the craving, so to speak, to
get a peep behind the scenes, to spy out Nature's
secrets, and therewith seize upon the meaning and
significance of life itself. This latter is the real
object of every world-theory.

Now it is quite true, that if I do not perceive
the meaning and significance of life I am but little
better than the donkey that drags the full sacks to
the mill and the empty ones back without knowing
why, in the one case as in the other. I owe it to
my dignity as a man to seek out the meaning and
significance of life. But this is not all.

That I am here is a given fact. Were I not
here, had I never been here, not for that would
any breach have yawned in the structure of the
world. But now that I am here, all turns upon
how I conduct myself during this my existence. Not
the fact that I am here, but how I employ this
existence is the all-important thing.

This question as to the " how " can only be

i WHAT IS A WORLD-THEORY? 3

answered in any natural way through the "what."
I must know what I am, and what are the things
and beings outside me ; I must learn my relations
to the external world, I must apprehend the meaning
and significance of life before I can possess a
genuine canon and standard for my behaviour, for
my morality. For all morality, whether it find
expression in doing or in leaving undone, issues in
acts of selflessness. This, however, requires that
motives be brought forward, otherwise such an act
is either a perverted form of self-seeking like all
asceticism, or it is mere training, bearing, indeed,
the outward semblance of morality, in reality,
however, having nothing at all to do with it. It is
only in virtue of cognition that any act acquires
moral value. One can speak of real morality there
only where it is a function of cognition. Hence
there can be no morality without comprehension,
without a world-conception.

This is the first reason why a world-theory is
necessary.

But it behoves a being worthy the name of man
also to know whether this life is merely a blind
adventure, or whether it has aim and goal. The
thinking man demands to know what he may expect
after this life. He insists upon looking beyond
this life. He claims an answer to the question,
"Whence? Whither?"

This demand to look out beyond life, this
questioning, as to the aim and goal of life, is called
religion. As with the query, " How must I conduct
myself?" which permits of being answered in natural
fashion then only when I know what I am, so is it
with the question, " Whence am I, and whither

4 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE i

am I bound ? " Only when I know what I am, can
this question also find a natural reply. A genuine
religion, like a genuine morality, has its roots in
cognition. Both alike must be functions of cogni-
tion.

Such are the two reasons why for every thinking
being a world-theory is not only a matter of giving
honourable satisfaction to his dignity as a man, but
also why it is a positive necessity. In their absence
genuine morality and genuine religion alike are
impossible.

Now every backward glance into time, i.e.
universal history, as well as every look round us in
space, i.e. ethnology, reveals the fact that there
never has been, and also that there is not, a people
destitute of every trace, every touch of morality
and religion. The only question is, Is this natural
capacity of mankind for morality and religion a
veritable function of cognition ?

The essence of all cognition is the individual.
Every act of cognition is always something in-
dividual, personal, pertaining to me alone. Were
all men to cognize alike, the content of this cogni-
tion would still be the individual possession of each
and every single person. Cognition separates.

Opposite to it stands another function of human
nature — emotion. Emotion unites. If things cog-
nizable are the affair of the individual, things
emotional have to do with the mass. Every natural
capacity of mankind for morality and religion
consists altogether of what pertains to the emotions.
Here all morality is founded upon an instinctive
feeling of correlation which finds expression in the
well-known saying : —

i WHAT IS A WORLD-THEORY? 5

What you would not men did to you,
See that you do not them unto!

or in the maxim, "So conduct thyself towards
others as thou wouldst wish that they should
conduct themselves towards thee ! "

The unifying quality of emotion is made manifest
in every form of compassion, which latter frequently
rises to the pitch of an actual vegetative suffering
with the afflicted person. Such facts, open to every
one's observation, awaken in all the instinctive
feeling of an inner connection of beings, and yield
a natural morality that is purely a function of
emotion.

It may be asked, " Could such a morality of
emotion suffice humanity ? "

It would suffice a humanity whose development
had only reached so far as the capacity for emotion.
So soon, however, as a being passes from the stage
of the emotional and enters upon the stage of the
cognitive, the morality of emotion no longer suffices,
as little so as the reasons one is accustomed to give
to children suffice the grown man.

The emotional holds sway as long as an individual
is not yet fully conscious of himself, not yet come
to pure reflection. So soon as he is fully conscious,
there arises also the need to understand ourselves
as well as our morality and religion. Then only
may I say that I have morality and religion when
I have understood them, when both have become
functions of my cognition. So long as this is not
the case, so long are religion and morality things of
emotion, and these are subject to every conceivable
variation. Hence the endless diversity of moralities
as well as of religions in the stage of the emotional.

6 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE i

Here both — to use the language of current speech
— are mere matters of taste, lacking in all inner
foundation. Hence also comes all that is unin-
telligible in the manners and customs connected
with morality and religion among foreign peoples
of ancient and of modern times. This is not the
place to go into details. Every historical record,
every account of civilization, furnishes abundant
examples.

Whether upon our globe a state of affairs has
ever prevailed in which morality and religion have
been exclusively things of emotion, it is impossible
to say. The fact remains that at the point where,
in our glance backward over the history of the
world, man first emerges, the purity of emotional
morality and religion is no longer intact. Historical
man, as first presented to us in the states of Egypt
and Babylonia, already exhibits a morality and re-
ligion which are no longer pure functions of emotion,
but have now become functions of reflection.

This necessity for reflection is given with the
essential being of all that is real.

As already said, all that is, on the one hand,
presents itself as "something that is," i.e. a being;
and, on the other hand, as "something that happens,"
i.e. a becoming ; that is, as a process. Wherever
something happens, an adequate cause must be
present. And the world by its simple existence,
by reason of its very nature as a process, is the
standing incitement to comprehension, to reflection,
inasmuch as the mind hankers after an adequate
cause for all that occurs. " The apparent changes
in organic being all about me," says Goethe in his
Morphologic ; " took a strong hold of my mind.

i WHAT IS A WORLD-THEORY? 7

Imagination and nature seemed to strive with one
another which of the two should stride forward with
the bolder and firmer step."

The search after adequate causes is everywhere
given as a necessity of thought wherever mental
life is found. An adequate cause is required for
"that which is," just as much as for "that which
happens " ; it is that which both presume. To possess
a world-theory and therewith a world-conception means
to comprehend adequate causes.

According to the attitude assumed by mental life
toward the question of adequate causes, does it
separate off in two main directions : the direction of
faith and the direction of science.

FAITH AND A WORLD-THEORY

There is present a something given — the world.

It presents itself as an endlessly vast sum of
processes. Where there is a process there is
happening. Where something happens, there
adequate causes are demanded.

Every attempt to comprehend adequate causes
leads backwards in endless series, since each cause
comprehended is something which itself in turn
demands an adequate cause, and so on backwards
without ever a conclusion.

Faith is that particular form of mental life which
from this fact draws the inference that for the
human mind a real comprehension is impossible,
since behind the physical there stands a something
transcendent, a force, with reference to which all
life - phenomena become that which their name
expresses : phenomena of a " life " which faith for
the most part designates by the word u god"

This force stationed behind the physical, to
which faith traces back all that happens, must be
an "adequate cause in itself," hence something
contrary to sense in the fullest meaning of the
words. For all that is, without exception, requires
an adequate cause. An "adequate cause in itself"

ii FAITH AND A WORLD-THEORY 9

would thus be that something which by its simple
existence would give the lie to this thought-
necessity, inasmuch as itself would be that which
would have no adequate cause. When the thought-
necessity of an adequate cause is thus satisfied with
an " adequate cause in itself," this just means : it is
satisfied in a fashion contrary to sense.

The essence of all that is contrary to sense
consists in this, that when followed out in thought,
it deprives itself of the possibility of existence. A
mistake in an arithmetical sum is the most familiar
form of what is contrary to sense. It is something
that in correct thinking is by itself deprived of all
possibility of existence ; it is something that makes
its appearance only that it may appear no more.

In like case stands faith. Does it essay to think
that in which it believes, then must that present
itself to it in one or other relation or form — that is,
conceptually. A transcendent, however, that pre-
sents itself conceptually is transcendent no longer,
but, on the contrary, the one completely conceptu-
alized thing there is in the world, inasmuch as its
whole existence just consists of the concept of it.
Accordingly, when faith ventures to think, it deprives
itself of the possibility of existence ; when it does
not think, it has no existence as faith, and therefore
no existence at all.

When, as in these days frequently happens, people
complain of the ever-increasing decay of faith, the
reason mostly given is, that faith does not contain a
sufficiency of what is of value to the understanding.
The believer must know what, how, and why he
believes, and not have his faith based simply upon
feeling. But this is somewhat the same as if one

io BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE n

should reproach darkness with not containing a
sufficiency of light among its ingredients. Is
light present, then there can be no darkness ; is
understanding present, then there can be no faith.
Credo ut intelligam is the most vain of all wishes.

Pantheism in its noblest form, that of the Indian
Vedanta, endeavours to avoid this dilemma by con-
ceiving of its divine in purely negative terms. But
the famous " neti, neti " — "not this, not this" — of
the Upanishads, is a definition too, and so a limitation.

Through this its essential characteristic, of itself
in being thought out, depriving itself of the possi-
bility of existence, faith takes its place — as third in
the trio — along with illusion and error.

Illusion is what I call a mistaken view ; error,
what I call a mistaken experience. When I mistake
a rope for a snake, a train of ants for a crack in the
ground, these are illusions. When I hold infusoria
to have their origin in the infusion of hay, or look
upon the evening and the morning star as two
different orbs, these are errors.

Upon this, its community of nature with illusion
and error, is based another essential characteristic
of faith — namely, the impossibility, when once it has
vanished, of its ever again coming to life. Once
the rope on my path which I formerly mistook for
a snake has been recognized by me for a rope, never
again can I voluntarily return to my illusion. I can,
indeed, by force of imagination, represent it to
myself as a snake, but this representation no longer
"works"; it no longer excites fear. And in just
the same way I can quite successfully recall the
conditions under which certain optical and acoustic
delusions made their appearance, but they are

ii FAITH AND A WORLD-THEORY n

illusions that are dead. The like holds good of
error and, for a third, of faith.

People who call for a resuscitation of vanished
faith, and by some means or other hope to see it
effected, know not what it is that they hope and
call for. They are calling for the restoration of a
vanished ignorance — an utter inconceivability.

Now there exists one great distinction between
faith, on the one hand, and illusion and error on the
other ; in this respect, namely, that the two latter
have the physical, the material for their object, hence
can be checked and set right by this — that is, by
reality. Faith, however, that has for its object the
non-physical, the non-material, which is just what-
ever the believer chooses to conceive it to be,
cannot be checked and set right by reality. On
the contrary, the believer interprets the entire
world in accordance with his concept, devours, so
to speak, the world's entire content of reality, and
sets up a view of the world that is unread, seeing
that he interprets the physical from the transcen-
dental standpoint — that is, abnormally ; and there-
fore he is never in the position to be set right by
reality, since he never can knock up against con-
tradictions. One must know that one does not
know before one can let oneself be taught.

In perfect accordance with this essential feature
of faith (so far as the theory of knowledge is con-
cerned) is its morality and religion : both are contrary
to sense.

The essence of all morality is to be found in
selflessness. Every act of selflessness requires a
motive. To possess a motive one must exercise
cognition, comprehension.

12 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE n

As a matter of fact the essential nature of every
faith-morality is selfish, despite all its acts of re-
nunciation. Here one practises renunciation like a
man who stints himself of a certain amount of money
and invests it in a lottery. As he parts with his
money that he may win back more in its place, so
here the believer gives up money, goods, life — yea,
honour and truth, everything, if so be he may draw
the first prize above.

The essence of all religion consists in the search
for the aim and goal of life. This search faith
satisfies by referring life as a whole to a something
transcendent. But the existence of the transcendent
is nothing else but the concept of it. To refer life
as a whole to a transcendent thus means nothing
but to refer itself to itself, which — so to speak — is
the analytical expression for ignorance.

Further development of these ideas is not essential
to our task. Here we have only to bear well in
mind that, as the world-theory from the standpoint
of faith is one contrary to sense, so also is its
morality and its religion. All three are functions
of a nescience, and therefore void of actuality.

Ill

SCIENCE AND A WORLD-THEORY

There is present a something given — the zuorld.

With reference to this something given, science
takes up a position that in its own way is every
whit as arbitrary as again in its way is that of
religion ; with this difference, however, that whereas
the latter, so to speak, turns the clock of mental life
backward, science would fain turn it forward.

The play of world-events with equal justice may
be held to declare that we comprehend adequate
causes as to declare that we do not comprehend them,
inasmuch as all we may have comprehended as the
adequate cause of any life-phenomenon, itself on its
part demands an adequate cause, and so on back-
wards ad infinitum. In short, Every adequate
cause is of a secondary nature. From this science
argues as follows : —

It is a fact that we comprehend adequate causes, in
certain respects, up to a certain degree, consequently
perfect comprehension is possible, everything de-
pending simply on patience and correct methods.

With this claim of the comprehensibility in
principle of life -phenomena, science takes upon
itself the proud task, of itself working out a world-
theory from the foundation upwards

i4 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE in

Comprehensibility in principle of life-phenomenon
is that standpoint with reference to actuality which
is given for every science without exception. On
any other hypothesis science as science has no
justification whatever for its existence. Science, if
it is to be what its name implies, is that which
furnishes knowledge. Knowledge can only be
furnished where things can be completely demon-
strated, made tangible to sense. That, however,
is only possible if nothing lies hidden in things
that is not perceptible by sense. Hence science, if
she does not wish to gainsay her own right to exist,
must proceed upon the arbitrary hypothesis that
there is nothing in the play of world- events that is
not perceptible to the senses. And if really there is
something of the sort there, then for her it is
merely the not yet demonstrable, which later on,
with patience, with improvements in methods, will
also be achieved. This is the position which
science takes up with reference to the play of
world-events, the foundation on which her whole
superstructure is erected. Science is possible there
only where there is the sensible, the demonstrable,
where there is something so constituted that
I can class it with others of its kind. And all
science — to put it briefly — is just the endeavour to
make tangible to sense the entire play of world-
events.

In support of this standpoint in principle of
science, I citethe following passage fromW.Ostwald's
Schule der Chemie : —

Pupil. These are only properties. What I mean,
however, is that which lies at the root of all properties.
Teacher. This then ought to remain behind when you

in SCIENCE AND A WORLD-THEORY 15

have thought away all properties from the matter. Well,
think away all its properties from a piece of sugar —
colour, shape, hardness, weight, taste, and so forth — what
then remains over ? Nothing ! For it is only through
its properties that I can recognize that there is something
there. . . . You must get rid of the notion that apart
from the properties of a thing there is anything at all to
be found beneath them that is higher or more real than
the properties.

From this rejection of all that is not perceptible
to sense, it follows that science may not recognize
as adequate causes for " that which is " even as for
" that which happens " — in short, for all the
phenomena of life — anything else but other pheno-
mena of life. If for faith the thought-necessity, an
adequate cause, becomes an " adequate cause in
itself," a pure absolute, for science it becomes a pure
relative. Anything is an adequate cause purely in
its relation to another phenomenon of life, and with
reference to itself another phenomenon of life again
is the adequate cause. In brief, the adequate
cause is here just as much an " effect " as a

" cause.

With this rejection in principle of all that is
not perceptible to sense, science rejects all actual
energies. For an actual energy can never be any-
thing perceptible to sense, the latter ever and always
necessitating the question as to its adequate cause.

In the universe as constructed for itself by
science, the actuating impulse is simply the various
differences that obtain in situation and tension,
which are equally as countless in number as the
countless processes with which they are given.
The play of world-events in its entirety becomes a

16 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE in

stupendous process of compensation, and all values
become simply values of relation. Here nothing
has sense and meaning by itself, but only as it first
receives them from others.

The purely scientific standpoint can only be the
materialistic one, along with which of necessity is
given the mechanical mode of apprehending the
play of world-events.

In the mechanical apprehension of things, the
play of world-events becomes a "falling." Every
fall demonstrates the absence of actual forces by
the fact that in its downward course it can be
computed in advance.

The aim and object of all science is computation
in advance. The ability to do this finds its due
expression in scientific law.

The proof that upon this path one had arrived
at a world-theory, would thus be an absolutely and
universally valid law.

Such a law science does not possess. Every
law, without exception, is an abstraction from ex-
perience, and may be swept away again by fresh
experiences.

Now it is true modern physics lays claim to
one universal law — the law of the conservation of

energy.

We shall have to return to this law later on.
Here in passing be it only said —

First, That the law of the conservation of energy
has by no means been arrived at upon the legitimate
path of science — that is, upon the path of induction
— but has been found intuitively. Secondly, The
law of the conservation of energy is nothing but a
"reading" of the facts, on one hand, by way of

in SCIENCE AND A WORLD-THEORY 17

definite compromise ; on the other, valid only for a
limited domain of nature.

The compromise is as follows : —

Were the law of the conservation of energy really
a law abstracted from experiences and absolutely
valid, it would be proven by the complete passing
over, without any remainder, of one phenomenon
of life into another ; as, for instance, by the trans-
formation of a process of heat into a process of
motion ; and physics would have a right to draw
the conclusion of an analogy between this and
other processes. The play of world-events as pure
relation-values, its potential comprehensibility, would
be proven by a single transformation without residue,
of heat into motion and motion back into heat —
that is, by a single completely reversible process.

But the idea of reversible processes has practical
and theoretical possibility only in an absolutely
closed system. Such a thing, however, is not to
be had in the world of actuality. All things here,
without exception, stand in relation to one another,
and these mutual relations do not admit of total
suspension even for a single moment of time.
Thus at no time can one get anything but approxi-
mately closed systems ; therefore at no time can
one attain to anything but approximately correct
results. Every attempt to demonstrate practically
a completely reversible process works with minimum
losses, which the physicist, to be sure, lays to the
charge of the procedure adopted, but which the
thinker is equally justified in interpreting as a loss
of energy. No matter what the exactitude with
which the experiment is carried out, no matter how
small in value the loss, it is always there ; there

18 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE in

is no such thing as a completely reversible process !
One can only derive a law of the conservation of
energy from the facts, if for thought the same is
already given. From experiments alone, inductively,
it would be as impossible to arrive at a law of the
conservation of energy as it would be to arrive at
the concept of the circle solely from the concept of
the polygon. The circle must be given beforehand
as ultimate concept (Grcnzbcgrijf) ; and in exactly
the same way the law of the conservation of energy
must be given beforehand as ultimate concept
(Grcnzbegrijff), if the experiments are to lead up to
it. Thus it was with Robert Mayer's great intuition:
it was a thing given. And this intuition was taken
up by science and worked out, because here was
given it a means of proving with scientific appliances
the impossibility of a perpehium mobile. Perpetual
motion, however, is the violation of the law of
adequate cause, transferred to the domain of the
physical.

That is one side of the matter. The other is that
the law of the conservation of energy conformable
with its nature, can only possess validity in the
domain of processes reversible and not dependent
upon time, for in a non-reversible process there
would lie no possibility whatever of its proof.

Here this is quite enough to signalize the nature
of the law of the conservation of energy. In the
conception of the play of world-events as yielded
by this law, the physicist turns his eyes entirely
away from the real, active energies of the play of
world-events. He confines himself entirely to what
is exhibited to sense, the motions ; he takes them
for the forces themselves, but is entitled to do so

in SCIENCE AND A WORLD-THEORY 19

only so long as he keeps clear before him the fact
that it is only a reading that is in question, and
derives therefrom what alone can be derived — work
done. Work done, however, is not energy itself
but the reaction from energies. And that which
the physicist calls the " world-picture of energetics "
is, in point of fact, void of all energies. The entire
world-picture of energetics is no actual thing but,
in the strictest sense, a thing re-actual, — if such a
word may be coined — which as such has no title
whatever to be used as a world-theory. Should,
nevertheless, this occur, then those consequences
follow about which we shall speak later.

So long as science abides by actuality she can
say nothing else but that every attempt to trace
back completely one phenomenon of life to another
— that is, to represent the play of world-events in
the form of pure relation-values — slips into an
endless series ; and what is most of all worthy of
remark, each member of this endless series is itself
in turn the point of departure for a new endless
series, so that in the last analysis the fact of this
limitless comprehensibility of the phenomena of life
remains as the one real problem of science. And
every science that is in earnest, and does not
merely seek to avail itself of technique, at the very
outset must ask itself the question, This limitless
onward movement which every point of departure
yields, start where we may, has it or has it not a
conclusion ?

To be able to judge of that one must possess
some firm standing-ground from which to look out
and see whether this unceasing progression really
is progress. On this journey upon the high seas

20 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE m

of knowledge one must have a landmark by which
to steer. Such a possibility, however, is excluded,
and excluded by science itself. For, as already
said, science as such has standing only where the
hypothesis of potential comprehensibility, of the
absence of all that is not perceptible to sense holds
good ; in other words, where the play of world-
events admits of being resolved without remainder
into relation-values. Such a landmark, however,
could only be something which itself did not admit
of being resolved into pure relation-values, but was
a constant in itself, an unconditioned constant.
Were science, however, to admit the existence of
such a " something," she would be cutting the
ground from under her own feet. The whole value
of science, as such, resides in its pure relativity, in
the liability of its values ; even as the value of faith
resides in the fixity of its one value.

From all this it follows that in science itself
absolutely nothing can be found that might serve
it to prove whether or not there is genuine progress
toward knowledge — that is, whether all these end-
less series, which every experiment and every piece
of thought opens up, do or do not proceed toward
a final conclusion. At this stao-e one view of the
matter has precisely as much justification as the
other; an ignorabimus just as much and just as
little value as the most flamboyant optimism. We
cannot know. It is, so to speak, entirely a matter
of taste as to the sense in which one chooses to
interpret these endless series.

In full consonance with this is the value which
science possesses in relation to morality and religion.

Whoso will give mankind morality and religion,

in SCIENCE AND A WORLD-THEORY 21

must give it something in which it can find support.
Both morality and religion at bottom are nothing
but a support in the wide waste of infinitudes.
Every thinking man craves for such a support. If
it is lacking, then for the real thinker a condition
supervenes that is all as unbearable as that physical
one, when for the moment a person has lost all
possibility of learning the lie of his surroundings,
as, for instance, when he wakes up confused out of
a deep sleep and does not know how to find his
way anywhere. Here as there it is the pure
anguish of thought that comes over us in such a
condition, an anguish that will not let us rest until
we have again constructed the mental support,
again established continuity in thought with the
whole.

If faith fabricates this support in a manner
contrary to sense, and consequently projects in
consonance with her nature a morality and religion
that are contrary to sense, science as a whole on its
part is nothing but the attempt to fabricate for
itself a support in law. Scientific law, how-
ever, yields a support solely with reference to a
theory of knowledge. Hence never under any
circumstances can science project moral and re-
ligious values. It would be a contradiction of her
own nature. Could she do so, she would no longer
be science — i.e. the form of mental life which must
comprehend the entire play of world-events in the
form of relation-values. Where there exists nothing
but relation-values, there can exist no support in
itself, and therefore no morality or religion. Science
is a-moral and a-religious ; and the layman as well
as the scientist himself ought ever to keep this

22 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE in

clearly before his mind. The efforts made in our
day to carve out, so to speak, the results of
science to suit religious ends as modern monism
seeks to do, only go to show how necessary is
such an admonition. From the continuity of life,
expounded in the materialistic sense as a cell, men
seek to deduce the idea that we ourselves live on in
the generations to come, somewhat as the manure
lives on in the plant it has manured. But these are
such playthings of thought as only are possible
where one is operating with what is wholly divorced
from actuality, that is, with the empty concept of
" life."

To seek to derive moral and religious values
from science is, as the Indian saying has it, "to
milk the bull by the horns."

Now both faith and science alike have the same
starting-point — the thing given, the world. The
question then arises, " How can it be possible that
with reference to this given thing, each should take
up such a directly opposite position ? How comes
it that the one apprehends the adequate cause of
the play of world-events as a pure absolute, while
the other apprehends it as a pure relative ? "

At this point we come face to face with the
Buddha-thought and its significance for mental life.

AN INTRODUCTION TO THE THOUGHT-
WORLD OF THE BUDDHA GOTAMA

As aid towards a better understanding of that
personality of the greatest significance for the
mental life of mankind, there follow here some
remarks upon him and the age in which he
lived.

Buddhism is the teaching of the Buddha, or as
one may equally well say — of the Buddhas. For
" Buddha " is no private name, but the title of one
endowed with certain mental capacities. The word,
therefore, ought always to be accompanied by the
article. It signifies, The Awakened.

According to the teaching the number of the
Buddhas is endless. He whom we know by this
name, for the time being the last of this beginning-
less series, is the Buddha Gotama. His family
name was Siddhattha. He came of the ancient
race of the Sakyas, well known for their pride, and
as such belonged to the warrior caste. He is,
therefore, often alluded to under the name of
" Sakyaputta," scion of the Sakyas, or as " Samana
Gotama," ascetic Gotama.

He was born in Kapilavatthu, the capital city of
a small state in Northern India, on the borders of

24 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE iv

present-day Nepal. His grave was discovered in
the year 1898 near Piprava, in the jungle-covered
foothills of the Himalayas called the Terai.

The years of his birth and of his death cannot
be exactly determined. Meanwhile one does not
go far wrong if one places the period of his activity
in the neighbourhood of the year 500 before the
Christian era. This would make him the elder
contemporary of Heraklitus of Ephesus and some-
what younger than Lao Tse in China.

He died at the advanced age of eighty years
(if one does not choose to regard the recurring
statements in the texts as to age, on the part
of the most different personalities, as merely an
indication of old age in general), after almost
fifty years of active life spent in travelling about,
preaching.

The precepts, discourses, and explanations — all
that which makes up the Buddhist canon — are
gathered together into what is called the Tipitaka,
or Three Baskets. The language of the canon
is Pali. Whether this was the Buddha's own
mother tongue or only related to it, is a question
upon which there exist differences of opinion
between native and European scholars.

The mental atmosphere in which the Buddha
arose may be briefly characterized as follows : A
feeling of life as suffering, fermenting throughout
the entire Indian people; a firm belief in the
transmigration of the soul and the endless pro-
longation of this suffering conditioned thereby ; the
conviction that asceticism purifies, after the effected
purification from old guilt, heaps up merit, assures
re-birth in heaven, and finally procures deliverance

iv THE BUDDHA GOTAMA 25

from Samsara, this terrible, ceaseless wandering
from existence to existence. Once more, the
fundamental theme in this Indian symphony of
destiny, recurring in unending variations, was this,
Life is Suffering, or to say the least of it, a some-
what doubtful blessing. But this statement of life
as suffering was not in ancient India the hollow
phrase that it is with us to-day ; neither was it that
cold play of thought found in many philosophical
systems. It was a grim reality which men sought
to escape with an energy of self-immolation, a
determination, a recklessness, an ardour of which
we lukewarm creatures of to-day can form no
conception.

India in the days of the Buddha was full of
companies of monks and schools of ascetics, all of
them wrestlers with the riddle of life. But one
only wrestles with life when one feels it as suffer-
ing.

The sons of noble families left their homes to
search for truth either out there in the frightful
solitudes of the Indian forest, or in the cloister of
the monk. As in later days men went forth in
search of El Dorado, so in those days did men go
forth upon the search for truth. But what gives to
the search for truth in ancient India a character
entirely its own is this, that all search here is turned
towards the / itself; that the fight for truth did not
as in ancient Greece exhaust itself in elegant
rhetorical disputations and exercises in dialectic, but
in full unmitigated rigour was lived out in one's
own /, without a single thought as to whether the
outward form would support the heat of the friction
within or not.

26 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE iv

Amid this swarm of searchers for truth the young
Siddhattha also made his appearance. " Black-
haired, in the bloom of manhood," in spite of weep-
ing and wailing parents, in spite of a loved and
loving wife, in spite of a dear young son, he left his
father's halls where he had led a life of rarest pomp
and pleasure to enter shaven of head and garbed in
yellow, upon the inclement life-path of the penitent.
It was the force of thought that drove him forth.
He gazed face to face on the transiency of all that
lives, and troubled, tormented by this irresistible,
unseizable flood of appearances, he turned his
mental eye inwards, resolved to find there in the
depths of his own / that hold and stay which the
outer world everywhere denied to him, the weary.
Truthfulness toward oneself, seriousness of search
regardless of consequences, an unfailing sense of
reality, that was the foundation upon which that
most banal of all phrases, adapted as is no other to
coquetting with itself — the phrase, "All is transient,"
— became for him that unique teaching of which he
himself could say with ample right, " It is the
teaching which is founded upon itself."

In one of the Buddhist monk's chants there
occurs the phrase, " One single thing — he thinks it
out ! " This, in few words, is what the Buddha did.
He thought out to an end, one thought — the thought
of transiency. I will not call his teaching the
grandest or the deepest of all teachings. Grand, like-
wise, is Heraklitus's teaching of the All-becoming;
deep, likewise, is the Vedanta teaching of the All-
one in Brahman ; but the teaching of the Buddha is
more than this — it is actual. Through this it
obtains that really compelling character such as is

iv THE BUDDHA GOTAMA 27

possessed by actuality alone. For there is only one
thing that is compelling — truth ; and there is only
one thing that is true — actuality.

Through this its truthfulness, his teaching has
conquered half a world ; not by fire and sword but
even as truth conquers, by demonstration, by teach-
ing. And so it now stands, old by two thousand
years, before the portals of western culture, and
claims entrance not into the cloudy domain of a
vague mysticism or a crude pantheism, but into the
realm of clear, clean thinking, as fulfilment of that
which never can be attained by the means at the
disposal of science. Comprehension, a world-
conception, this goal of all mental life, made
impossible by science in its false apprehension of
the task — this the Buddha resolves in the limitation
that reveals the genius.

Whoso, if only from afar, has scented the import
of the Buddha and his teaching, must feel that here
he has to do with something wholly unique. One
can place on one side not only all the religions of the
world but also all the philosophical and scientific
systems, and upon the other Buddhism will take its
place alone. Yet not as their antithesis. Buddhism
is the teaching of actuality, and actuality has no
antitheses, because itself the union of antitheses.
The Buddha laid hold of actuality there where alone
it can be laid hold of — in one's own I. Here he
found the secret law, the sacred riddle that the
chorus outside there mockingly sings us, like to
some oracle of Delphi at one and the same time
revealing and concealing.

All religions founded upon revelation are of a
decidedly revolutionary nature. Buddhism is a

28 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE iv

pure evolution, a process of mental development
in which thought, so to speak, passes a culminating
point and works on with reversed signs. This
reversal of all life-values has set in with a new point
of view, from which the struggle for no more existence,
so unintelligible for us, follows as a logical necessity.
Henceforth truth is no more the servitor of life, but
life of truth. As a candle manifests itself through
itself, by consuming itself in burning, so does the /
manifest itself through itself in expending itself in
thinking. In this teaching he is not great who
loves most, but he who thinks most.

The full scope of this can only be understood
later ; for the moment it may serve the reader
as preparation for what is to follow. Let him know
then, at the very outset, that here he enters the
realm of a man who seeks not life but truth — a man
for whom life has no value in itself but only as an
instrument of truth. Him I call a sorry seeker for
truth who in his investigation of the riddle of life,
sets life itself as sacrosanct in a place of security,
making that which is to be measured into the
measure itself.

To unite in passion, to contrive clever arrange-
ments that insure the success of the business of
propagation and the rearing of the young generation,
these the animals also can do ; their arrangements for
living together in herds are by far more ingenious
than those of men ; but the capacity to doubt, to
question, to seek — of these even the most highly
developed animals possess only faint suggestions.
' -tyCTo doubt is the duty of man, and the Buddha is
the representative type of humanity, because the
doubter. We common men, we do indeed doubt of

St • ***

iv THE BUDDHA GOTAMA 29

this and of that, and pique ourselves in no small
measure upon our powers of judgment ; but we
none of us get any further than the symptoms. He
alone seized at one grasp the entire, ever-changing
host of doubts and questions by the root, with the
daring of genius demanding to know the right to
exist of life itself. This the reader ought well to
bear in mind, otherwise for him the Buddha-thought
must always retain something strange and forbidding,
even as for the honest townsman we all know, a man
who dares go up to High Authority Itself — whether
established in heaven or on earth — and ask for its
identification papers, ever remains in some sort a
fear-inspiring figure.

I now pass on to a point more external, but one,
none the less, that has its own importance in an
introduction to the thought-world of the Buddha.

Buddhism is not only the oldest of the three
world-religions, but also the only one of the three
that is of Aryan origin.

The significance of this fact lies for me not in
the racial question, but in the matter of language.
The tongue in which the Buddha preached, taught,
and thought, whether it was the Pali itself or some
dialect related to it, belongs to the Indo-Germanic
stem. The root-words, the grammatical construc-
tions, are akin to those found in European languages.
Without any more said, we see how deep is the tie
that binds us to the Buddha. Mental life can mix
and blend with mental life only through the medium
of language. If no congruity exists between one
language and another, neither can there be any
congruity of thought. We know what enormous
difficulties block the way of any European scholar

30 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE iv

who would force an entrance into the thought-world
of the Chinese. So much so, that even at this late
day it is still possible to argue the point as to
whether the Chinese have any conception of deity
at all. To this day it remains open to every trans-
lator to interpret Lao Tse, for example, either as a
"god- inspired man" — to quote a good Christian
translator — or as a free-lance in the fields of
thought.

Something similar, if in somewhat less positive
terms, may be advanced concerning the Semitic
stem. Who can say whether the Indo-German has
ever rightly understood Semitism as the deserts of
Judea and Arabia have hatched it out. The
absurdities and confusions of thought in which
Indo-German peoples find themselves entangled the
moment they make the attempt to understand and
think it out leave it fairly open to doubt. It may
be, that pure Semitism, that is to say, that flat
contradiction to sound sense, a personal god, can
only be perfectly digested with the help of the
Semitic root language. The thinking of the Indo-
Germanic peoples, or rather of the Indo-Germanic
root language, has set itself against this bald crudity
from the very beginning. At the idea of predesti-
nation, over which the Semite Paul balances his way
with considerable natural agility, the half- Aryan
Augustine only comes to grief. For the brutality
with which the latter champions this dogma is
nothing else but the expression of the brutality
with which he forcibly squeezed his own mind
beneath its yoke. For us the Aryan speaking and
thinking, a religion that in its natural logical conse-
quences conducts to such an anomaly as predestina-

iv THE BUDDHA GOTAMA 31

tion, is either at bottom a moral monstrosity, and
so incapable of becoming religion, or else it is a
thing misunderstood.

On the other hand, I should refer the intellectual
derailment which the Buddha-thought has under-
gone in Tibet, China, and Japan, in no small
measure to the lack of congruity that exists be-
tween the Indo- German and the Mongolian
languages. The tongue of the Mongol is simply
incapable of rendering exactly the content of the
Pali syllables.

Buddhism is the teaching of actuality, and its
language also — the Pali — as regards content of
actuality, takes a leading place among languages.

As upon one hand one may look upon the
phenomena of life as processes, actualities, things
alive, and upon the other as things rounded off in
themselves, rigid, strictly defined, realities, according
as, following mental disposition, here the one there
the other mode of comprehension predominates, so
in one language does the thrust of the actual pre-
dominate, and in the other the thrust of the real,
the objective. In the one the dynamic predominates,
in the other the static.

A language of an eminently static character is
the Latin ; whence the impossibility of finding
another equally good to take its place in a well-
ordered corpus juris, with which latter capacity for
definition counts above everything. What juris-
prudence requires is the complete, the bounded
(objectively as well as conceptually) realities. It
lops away everything actual, which at all times and
places is a processive motion, a species of status
nascens, until comprehended it can be grasped, pretty

32 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE iv

much as out of the actual surface of the earth in a
state of constant transformation the land-surveyor
cuts out a piece, settles it as something real and
seizable, so that as such its owner at will can
exchange it, till the time when the millenium hand
on the horologe of the world indicates an advance
and renders necessary a new settlement, a new
definition. This method is quite sufficient where
it is only a question of arriving at definite ends. It
corresponds to that which in another place was
styled the re-actual comprehension of things, and
the Latin word res, considered etymologically,
points directly to this "re-actual" feature.

In complete opposition to Latin the Pali is a
language of an eminently actual character. The
seeming offences against logic, that with more or
less good nature have been laid to the charge of
the Buddha by western scholars, have their rise
in this content of actuality that distinguishes the
language on one hand and its thinking on the other.
In actuality there is nothing defined or definable
to be found — nothing but a relentless processive
movement. Every definition is a compromise with
actuality, and is always to be held, as such, by every
genuine thinker.

It is owing to this content of actuality in
Buddhism and its language that so many expres-
sions are found in it for which a fitting translation
is scarcely or not at all to be found. In language,
also, a gradual stiffening process is taking place
amongst us which renders us ever more capable in
definition, and ever more incapable in the compre-
hension of actuality. Here quite evidently we are
caught in a vicious circle. We are proud of this

iv THE BUDDHA GOTAMA 33

our ability in defining, and imagine we have com-
prehended the thing itself when we have succeeded
in decorating it with a definition. In such cases,
however, all we have really done is to fling bridges
of thought, as it were, high up over things, which
permit us to hop from one conceptual " place " to
another without once wetting even our toes in
actuality. On the Rhine near Bonn there stands
hewn in stone these words : " Caesar primus flumini
pontem imposuit." There are not a few minds
associated with the lecture -room and laboratory
who take themselves for Caesars when they
" impose " new definitions upon things, upon actu-
ality. The riddles of life in this wise are neatly
and perfectly resolved in definitions ; which, after
all, is nothing very much to wonder at with riddles
of life that for the most part only exist in the form
of definitions.

All things in the world are so constituted that
with them concept and object are separable : the
concept admits of being " manipulated " apart from
the object. And all mental life in a certain sense
just amounts to the attempt to get concept and
object to coincide — an attempt that eternally fails,
because eternally losing itself in unending series.
One thing only in all the world is so constituted
that in regard to it no separation of concept and
object is found — I myself! For that which I con-
ceive myself as, that even I myself am ; and every
attempt to form a concept is just a form of myself.
Here the concept of myself is experience, actuality
itself. I myself am the unique, to me accessible,
pure actuality of the world. Buddhism is the teach-
ing of achtality. It starts out with the only pure

34 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE iv

actuality of the world, and from this point proceeds
to suck the entire play of world-events without
exception into the whirlpool of its thinking. And
with this we find ourselves in the presence of the
Buddha-thought itself.

V
THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA

I begin with the question that concludes the third
essay : " How can it be possible for faith and science
to possess opposed conceptions when both actually
start out from one and the same given thing, the
world ? "

All that exists presents itself on one hand as
" something that is," and on the other as " some-
thing that happens " — that is to say, as something
found in a state of perpetual change, as processes.

Where something happens, there adequate causes
must be present. These adequate causes must be
forces.

All processes — i.e. the entire play of world-events
— fall into two great classes : those that are main-
tained, dead processes, and those that maintain
themselves, living processes ; the latter presenting
themselves, on the one hand, as processes of com-
bustion, as flame, and on the other as processes of
alimentation, as living beings.

All dead processes can be interpreted or read as
falls. Their type is the falling stone. A stone
does not fall because of an indwelling force that
causes its falling ; it only falls because it has
previously been raised, because between it and

16 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE

the surface of the earth there exists a difference of
tension. Its fall thus signifies that force must have
been present, in the sense that it must previously
have been active ; for otherwise the difference in
position of stone and surface of the earth could
never have come about. When physics interprets
the fall of the stone in differing fashion — namely, by
having it caused by the attractive force of the
earth's surface in action during the fall — this is purely
a working hypothesis, advanced solely in the interest
of a uniform physical world-theory.

To much the same effect as the falling stone,
every physical happening without exception is to be
interpreted or read, whether it concern mechanical,
chemical, thermal, electrical, magnetic, or any other
such-like phenomena. All alike are to be taken as
falls from places of higher to places of lower tension.
The import of each and all is only that forces,
actuating impulsions, must once have been present.
In each case we really have to do not with actions
but with reactions.

The proof that no actual forces are here at work
is to be found in the fact that the process ceases so
soon as the differences of tension are adjusted.

This world of reactions is the given province of
all science.

Science, because Jbent upon furnishing demon-
stration, has a title to existence only where there is
nothing that is not perceptible to sense. Where
there are actual living processes, there actual forces
must be present. A force, however, can never be
perceptible to sense ; for everything perceptible to
sense necessitates the question as to its adequate
cause — that is, as to the force in virtue of which it

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 37

exists. Where there are dead, re-actual processes,
there forces are not in action themselves, and
hence force is not a real but only a conceptual
necessity, a mere logical presumption. Hence also
in the interpretation of this re-actual world, it is
always possible to slur over, to eliminate the
question as to actual forces, and to replace these
latter by the various differences of tension, of
potentiality, and thus remain wholly within the
domain of the sensible.

Such a position is quite permissible to a science
that devotes itself exclusively to technique, i.e. aims
at nothing more than tomeasure and calculate in
advanr.ea_jor ir is onlyjca.nr.fnn1 pror.eedwffSL thaT
admit of being measured and calculated, in advance.
When such and such a planet will occupy such and
such a position in the heavens, this admits of being
calculated beforehand with the most perfect accuracy.
But whether this next moment I shall twirl my
thumb to the right or to the left, that no science,
no academy in the world can compute in advance.

The position which science takes up towards the
world — a_rejection in principle of all that is not
perceptible to sense — of necessity involves restric-
tlon tothe re - actual world, and therewith the
mechanical conception of the play of world-events.

Yet once more. This conception is perfectly
legitimate so long as it confines itself to the re-
actual world. But it becomes an anomaly the
moment it seeks to pass beyond this re-actual world
— the moment a man tries to read the actual world,
the living processes, according to the same scheme
— that of a falling. For here it is actual forces that
are at work ; here the question as to actual forces

38 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

declines to be eliminated or exempted by acts of
intellectual violence that by their repugnancy to
common sense bring about their own downfall.
Later on we shall have to revert to these attempts
to interpret physically living beings, the entire man
as a falling, a mere process of adjustment, and to
explain consciousness in purely mechanical fashion.
Though one should be able to " read " the animal
organism after physical formulas in never so far-
reaching a manner, though one should be able to
co-ordinate the whole process of alimentation, the
housekeeping of life, in never so perfect a fashion
with the law of the conservation of energy, nothing
has been gained withal that might settle the question
as to what exactly that is which keeps this mechanism
going : such a question is never once touched on at
all ; nay, by this method of procedure it is deliber-
ately pushed on one side, as much and as long as
ever is possible, until straightforward, natural think-
ing rises in revolt against such behaviour as a learned
pastime and demands actuality.

Hence : —

That particular form of mental life which rejects
in principle what is not perceptible to sense, thereby
of necessity is confined to the re-actual world. If
it seeks to encroach upon actual processes, it must
arbitrarily leave out of consideration that in them
which is essential, the forces at work in them, —
whereby it falls into absurdities that speedily
take their revenge by raising problems that are
insoluble.

This form of mental life is universally called
"science" whereby, it must be admitted, the more
or less active counter-currents — those of the teleo-

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 39

logical conception of things — are passed over
unnoticed. Science, properly speaking, is always

???ffffriah\fif, anTI itS rnnrppTmrTnTl-hp play~nf world-"*

eventg^-a4ways—^tf4€tly mecAanicgl. For it the
adequate cause of each occurrence is simply another
occurrence. Adequate causes remain perceptible
to sense.

Opposite to it stands faith.

Faith is that particular form of mental life which
recognizes an " imperceptible to sense in itself,"
i.e. de/ieves^j^ndso^do'mg, assumes a universal
"adequate cause in itself" for the entire play
of woHcT"eventsT From this it follows that the
living processes -are ^h^truc^jps^^meer^^f att

~fartrn hi lEerri alone are actual forces, i.e.

that which is imperceptible to sense, actively at'
work.

As soon as faith seeks to make use of its intuition,
i.e. seeks to supply a world-view, it finds itself in
the same predicament as science. Just as this
latter, as world-theory, is obliged to read the actual
processes according to the scheme of the re-actual, so
faith as world-theory is obliged to read the re-actual
processes according to the scheme of the actual ; in
other words, it must represent the world, even to
the extent that it represents itself as purely a falling,
as guided by a divine force. Here not a hair can
drop from my head, not a jjtQJielikll.io tJi&^ground,
witTi61Itr~a~ThVine decree having taken an active part
therein as adequate cause, an idea which, thought
out, leads to the absurdity of the doctrine of pre-
destination, with which doctrine faith robs herself
of the possibility of her own existence. For, where
there is predestination, there is no free will ; where

40 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

there is no free will there is no soul ; and where
there is no soul there is no God.

That which, in being thought out, deprives itself
of the possibility of existence is contrary to sense,
and as such, a nescience, like illusion and error.

Between and raised ahoy e. both these opposed

positions stands the Buddha.

This is his teacBing : —

All that is, all processes whatsoever, whether
they be re-actual or whether they be actual, all is
Sankhara. This is the epistemological key-word of
Buddhism. Its meaning is, All is of a compounded,
of a conditioned nature. The Rnddha ronr^rswith
modern science in so far as it rejects an uncom-
pounded, an unconditioned, a unity in itself, a soul-
substance, or whatever else one chooses to style it.
"As alreacty" shown, for science one event is entirely
condjdpjietLby^jQther events; she makes the adequate
^ause_ of one_phr€4K)menon of lite simply other
phenomena of life, and thereby frankly remains
always in the realm of the sensible, the demon-
strable — thereby limits herself, however, to the
re-actual side of the world. Among the actual,
self-sustaining processes, this position has no foot-
hold whatever ; for in these actual forces must be
present, and as such never by any means can be
perceptible to sense, thus also can never be the
subject of science.

One can only speak of an actual view of the
world where the actual world is concerned. I com-
prehend it when I discern the adequate causes of
the actual processes, that is, the forces actively at
work in them.

Now the word Sankhara signifies not only " the

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 41

compounded," "the conditioned," but also "the
compounding," " the conditioning," somewhat the
same as the German word Wirkung may equally
well be held to signify the result effected by the
cause as the actual effecting of that result itself.
In the former case it signifies that forces have been
present ; it has reference to the re-actual world.
In the latter case it means that forces are present ;
it refers to the actual world. Like the word
Wirkung, the word Sankhara embraces both these
aspects.

With reference to the self-sustaining, actual
processes, the teaching of the Buddha proceeds : —

All living beings exist by reason of forces.
Accordingly^-the— Buddha here agrees with faith^
inasmuch as he recognizes the presence in living
beings of what is imperceptible to sense ; for a force
can never be perceptible to sense.

But whilst faith makes every living being exist
in virtue of a universal force, and thereby assumes
an "adequate cause in itself" — as a transcendent,
an absolute, a god — which means " believing," thus
landing itself in the predicament of having to inter-
pret the re-actual side of the world also by this
" force " ; the Buddha on his part teaches : —

Every living being is here in virtue of individual

force peculiar to him alone. This force hereby in

quite a literal sense becomes an in-force, an en-ergy.

The Buddha teaches the existence of actual energies,

in contradistinction to faith's universal force. -

This in-force peculiar to every living being, and
thereby unique, is called by the Buddha the Kamma
(Sanskrit, Karma) of such a living being.
"Kamma means nothing but " the working."

42 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

Kamma is that in virtue of which a living being
manifests activity after its own unique fashion — in
its own unique way reacts upon the external world ;
it is that which makes a living being to be an
individuality, a personality.

Every living being is a thing unique, and as such
incapable of being compared, incapable of being
repeated, as re-actual processes are not, since in them
no actual forces are active. Though I see, hear,
smell, taste, touch, and think the same thing, it is
yet my own, a something unique that I see, hear,
smell, taste, touch, and think.

I am a thing unique, a personality in virtue of
my in-force, of my Kamma.

The distinction between an in -force and a
universal force is this : —

The latter is a something existing of itself, a
something existing of its own authority, i.e. a crea-
tion of faith ; whilst an in-force has being solely in
dependence upon its material, only with the help of
the material worked up by it. As " heat," " light,"
" electricity," and so forth, are words of no meaning
in the absence of a material in which to manifest
themselves, so in-force Kamma, is a word of no
meaning in the absence of its material.

This material of Kamma is by the Buddha called
the Khandhas.

They are five in number, these namely : —

Corporeality, Sensation, Perception, Discrimina-
tions, and Consciousness.

The word Khandha may be variously translated
as group, aggregation, coagulation, formation.

The Khandhas do not represent parts, pieces of
the /-process, but phases, forms of development,

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 43

something like the shape, colour and odour in a
flower. An actual process, a proceeding of the
nature of combustion or alimentation, never can
have any parts. It is only in connection with dead
products like a table, a chair, and so forth, that one
can speak of such; as also where one intentionally
conceives of things after this fashion with a definite
end in view. From the purely anatomical stand-
point, the eye, the brain, the lungs, the liver, and
so forth in a corpse, are parts of the body. Truly
speaking, in the living person they are forms of
development, since all have come forth from one
common root. One must keep firm hold of this if
one makes claim to think in terms of actuality.

" Material" in contradistinction to matter, is
that which is specially worked up by an energy.
" Matter in itself" is all as hollow a figment of
thought, projecting like a blind end out of actuality,
as is "force in itself." Both are products of faith :
the one pertaining to science, the other to religions.
Actuality has no "substance" no "matter" but only
material, i.e. matter worked up by energies ; it has
no " force," but only energies, i.e. forces apparelled,
substantialized, so to speak. Actuality always and
everywhere is only the unity of opposites — a pro-
cess.

To allow one's thought to occupy itself with a
"force by itself," or a "substance by itself," means
to work with half actualities possessing as much
content of actuality as one side of a sheet of paper
imagined by itself. I assert that to think thus is an
intellectual breach of discipline.

Now the manner in which I represent myself
corporeally, receive sensations, acquire perceptions,

44 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

exercise discriminations, become conscious of things,
is one peculiar to me and to me alone, a thing
unique. This means : —

In every motion, corporeal as mental, physical as
psychical, I am the form of Kamma itself.

This fact, that every living being is wholly and
entirely the embodiment of his Kamma, is expressed

by the Buddha in the word " anatta," noL-seiL All

befngs are "anatta," but this does not in any way
mean, as science would fain make out, that they are
all of a purely re-actual nature. It only means that
they do not conceal within them a " force in itself,"
a "constant in itself," but are out and out processes
of combustion, of alimentation, such as cannot conceal
any " constant in itself," since at every moment of
their existence they represent a fresh biological
value, and hence hold nothing that could possibly
justify the notion of an /-identity, a genuine self.

" The body, O monks, is 'anatta.' If the body
were the self (atta), then this corporeal frame could
not go to decay, and in this corporeal frame, this
wish of mine would find fulfilment : ' Let my cor-
poreal part be thus ! Let not my corporeal part be
so ! ' But, O monks, because the corporeal is
anatta, therefore does the corporeal go to decay,
and the wish, ' Let my corporeal part be thus !
Let not my corporeal part be so ! ' does not find
fulfilment."1

Following the like scheme, the remaining four
Khandhas are then dealt with ; and so, step by step,
the idea of an /-identity is banished.

The Buddha conceives of the entire actual world,
i.e. the world of self-sustaining processes as an

1 Mahavagga, i. 6, and many other passages.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 45

infinitely large number of combustion processes.
Every being burns in virtue of a purely individual
in-force, Kamma.

This his world - conception is given by the
Buddha in that famous "Fire Sermon" which,
shortly after the inauguration of his career of
activity as a teacher, he delivered to his followers
on a hill in the neighbourhood of Gaya. It is the
" Sermon on the Mount " of Buddhism.

" All things, O monks, is a burning. And why,
O monks, is all a burning ? The eye, O monks, is
a burning. Visual consciousness [that is, the con-
scious representation that results in virtue of visual
impressions] is a burning. Visual contact [i.e. the
act of the encountering of eye and objects] is a
burning. That which arises in virtue of visual con-
tact, be it a pleasant, be it an unpleasant sensation,
be it a neither pleasant nor unpleasant sensation, is
a burning."1

Following the like scheme, the ear and the
audible, the nose and the olfactory, the tongue and
the gustatory, the body and the tangible, thought
and concepts are then dealt with.

The place of the Buddha between and above the
opposites, faith and science, may be briefly formu-
lated as follows : —

Faith says, " Everything stands" — namely, in
the place in which it has been set by that "force
in itself," God. Science says, " Everything falls"
which means that she neglects- actual forces in
general. The Buddha says, " Everything burns"
meaning that every process exists in virtue of a
single in-force, peculiar to itself.

1 Mahavagga, i. 21.

46 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

And now as a consequence there follows this
question : —

"If through and through, without residue, I am a
form of Kamma, where is to be found the position
from which I can comprehend myself as such ? " For
every position, without exception, of sheer necessity
must itself again be a form of Kamma.

Kamma, the in-force, is that which gives to the
process concerned, to the living being, foothold,
coherence, continuity.

As such it presents itself to me the individual
immediately as consciousness. In consciousness I
comprehend myself as a something existing in
virtue of an in-force, inasmuch as consciousness on
one hand is that which gives continuity to the I-
process ; on the other hand, however, at every
moment presents a fresh biological, Kammic value,
even as cannot be otherwise in any combustion
process.

Be it well noted, however, Consciousness is not
the Kamma. That would give us Kamma as an
identity. But Kamma in the course of its self-
acting development becomes consciousness. Con-
sciousness is the ultimate value (Grenzwert), in
which at every moment of its existence the form of
the energy and the energy itself merge and mingle,
and consequently that which gives to the /-process
not only conceptual, but also actual continuity.

Faith adopts as adequate cause a transcendent
force, an imperceptible to sense in itself. Science
rejects all that is imperceptible to sense and adopts
as the adequate cause of one occurrence other
occurrences. The Buddha teaches that the actual
processes have being in virtue of an in-force, i.e. an

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 47

imperceptible to sense ; but this imperceptible to
sense is so, not " in itself" as a transcendent in
itself, but in the course of its automatic develop-
ment, for the individual becomes perceptible to sense
as consciousness.

It is in this sense that we are to understand the
matter when the Buddha, having specified con-
sciousness as one of the five Khandhas, thus making
it a form of Kamma, upon another occasion says,
11 It is Cetana [thinking) that I call Kamma." In a
Burmese school I once listened to the following
questions and answers : Teacher^ " What is
Kamma?" Pupil, "Cetana." Teacher, "What
is Cetana?" Pupil, "Kamma."

In this sense is to be understood the frequently
recurring formula : " In dependence upon individu-
ality {iiama-rupa) arises consciousness {vinnand) ; in
dependence upon consciousness arises individuality."
For in-force, in contradistinction to a transcendent
universal force, is something that only exists in
dependence upon its material.

The understanding of this point will be rendered
much easier by a comparison with a flame.

In a flame each moment of its existence repre-
sents a specific degree of heat which, as such, is the
power to set up a succeeding moment of ignition.
This power is actualized wherever and for as long
as inflammable matter, fuel, is present. The inflam-
mable matter, so to say, is the liberating provocation
that causes this power, this potential energy which
the flame every moment represents in virtue of its
heat to enter into life, and shows it the way into
living energy.

But with this conversion into living energy, i,e.

48 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

with the fact that a new ignition moment is called
into life, a new degree of heat, a new value in
potential energy also is produced, which, as the
succeeding ignition moment, anew passes over into
living energy, thus forming a repetition of the whole
proceeding. It is a process which may be briefly
designated as a self-charging. The self-discharg-
ing, the act of the passage of potential into living
energy, is simultaneously the charging anew with
potential energy. Precisely in this consists the
nature of the self-active. The self-active is that
which possesses the faculty, the power to sustain
itself; and this self-sustaining, when analyzed,
exhibits itself in the form of self-charging. If
potential energy has passed over into living energy,
there is here no need of an accession of foreign
energy to fashion a new store of potential energy.
This new store is implied in the discharge itself.
Energy, actual energy, is not something that must
receive an impetus from without in order to come
into activity, it is activity, action itself, and proves
itself such by itself; and all that is necessary is to
comprehend, to comprise it in this its characteristic
quality.

That this perfectly natural conception to us has
become so unnatural, must be laid to the charge of
our habits of thought, trained one-sidedly as we
have been, along the lines of mechanical views.
Where something happens, we look for some impulse
from without ; but we ought never to forget that
science does not give the actual world at all, but
only a re-actual world ; in which world, to be sure,
impulses must be given if anything is to happen at
all. The mechanical world -theory is simply a

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 49

" reading " of the play of world-events in order to
give computation and determination in advance ;
never under any circumstances does it furnish an
insight into actuality itself. Actuality is action
out of itself; it is the self- active. And all the
insoluble problems in which science loses her way
when she seeks to carry the mechanical com-
prehension of the play of world -events from the
reversible processes where it is possible and
legitimate, over to the non-reversible processes, all
in the last analysis amount to this, that one is
trying to demonstrate something — i.e. the biological
process — from external preconditions, which along
such lines can never be demonstrated, not because
in itself incapable of demonstration, but because
it is demonstrating itself through itself.

This the genuine thinker must absolutely hold
to. Actuality is action itself, not something that
first must be acted upon. Everything re-actual is
thinkable only as the sequel of a push requires
a push for its explanation. Everything that is
actual burns.

After this, what takes place in the /-process
becomes comprehensible.

Here the passing over from potential to living
energy has its counterpart in the volitional move-
ments. At every moment of its existence the /-pro-
cess represents a specific value in potential energy
which there where the external world enters with its
"liberating" provocations, ever and again passes over
into living energy as volitional movement. Every
discharge in the form of a volitional movement is a
charging afresh with potential energy. It is a self-
sustaining proceeding in the fullest sense of the

50 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

words. The volitional movements are the ever
repeated new foothold which the / fashions for
itself, the ever repeated "sustenance" wherewith
it provides itself afresh.

The all-important point about this conception is
that one should clearly see that Kamma does not,
like a cord of some sort of solid material, thread
itself through the /-process, as would be bound to
be the case with an /-force, whether dubbed soul,
or life-force, or whatever else ; but that in every
volitional movement it ever and again springs up
anew out of a material to which it itself, in the first
place, ever and again lends the power to this
end. The material has to be Kammatized so as
to be able to give Kamma the opportunity to spring
up anew. As in the friction of one piece of wood
with another, heat springs up, and ever and again
springs up with each repetition of the friction, so in
the friction of the /-process with the external world,
with things, ever and again new volitional move-
ments spring up. " Somewhat, O monk, as when
two pieces of wood are laid one upon the other,
are rubbed one against the other, heat arises, fire
springs up ; and when these two pieces of wood are
parted, are separated, the heat that has arisen,
disappears, ceases ; even so, O monk, by reason of
a contact of a pleasurable nature, a pleasurable
sensation springs up." 1

This the reply, the reaction peculiar to itself of
the /-process to the external world, a reply, a reaction
that takes the form of volitional movements, this
is Kamma, the action of this /-process. That which
as regards all the rest of the world is imperceptible

1 Majjkima Nikaya, Sutta 140.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 51

to sense, here in the self-acting, the spontaneous
development of the individual, becomes perceptible
to sense. Nothing else whatever is concealed within
the /-process : itself has disclosed itself. As in a
flame there is nothing hidden and concealed, its
activity constituting its entire being, so in the I-
process there is nothing hidden and concealed. Its
activity constitutes its entire being, and this activity
in full entirety is disclosed in consciousness to the
individual himself, and to him only. And nothing
more is needed than to comprehend actuality simply
as that which it is.

This insight into the /as a pure combustion
process places the whole problem of existence upon
an entirely new foundation.

In a combustion process every moment of its
existence is a setting-up-of-life just as much as an
entering-into-life. The /-process in all its activities,
whether of the corporeal or of the mental variety,
is a constant growing up of life itself, an arising, a
perpetual refashioning, setting up anew, inasmuch
as the energy perpetually works up, assimilates
fresh material. Here is no / that experiences ; no
/ that thinks, speaks, does. I do not have all this as
my functions, but this doing, speaking, thinking —
this itself I am. In all this I ever and again am
being built anew, just as in the assimilating of the
nourishment of which I partake, I ever and again
am built anew, — it is all the one same process of
combustion, differing only in the surrounding
circumstances and antecedent conditions.

"What, O monks, is the arising of the world?
By reason of the eye and of forms there arises
visual consciousness. The conjunction of the three

52 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

constitutes contact. In dependence upon contact
arises sensation. In dependence upon sensation
arises the thirst for life. In dependence upon the
thirst for life arises clinging. In dependence upon
clinging arises becoming. In dependence upon
becoming arises birth (as the birth of a fresh
biological impulsion). In dependence upon birth
arises old age and death."

This passage recurs with great frequency in the
Scriptures. Following the same scheme there are
next dealt with — hearing and sounds, smell and
odours, taste and flavours, the body and contacts,
thinking and concepts.

In every one of its activities, at every moment
' of its existence, the /-process is not something that
possesses arising as a function, but it is the arising
itself, as the flame is the arising itself. And it is
the arising itself because it burns, because it exists
in virtue of an individual energy. It is the thirst
for life, the impulsion towards life, which upholds
life, causes it ever and again to spring up anew,
and is life itself \ in exactly the same way that the
heat of a flame upholds the flame and is the flame
itself. We do not have the impulse to life — that
calls for a conscious impulse — but we are the life-
impulse itself.

A lay adherent upon one occasion inquires of
the nun Dhammadinna : —

" Personality, personality, they say, O venerable
One. But what does the Exalted One say is the
personality? "

To which the nun replies : —

"The five forms of clinging {iipadanakkhandha)
is the personality, the Exalted One has said ; these

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 53

namely : the form of clinging that refers to body,
the form of clinging that refers to sensation, the
form of clinging that refers to perception, the form
of clinging that refers to discriminations, the form of
clinging that refers to consciousness. . . ."

" The arising of personality, the arising of person-
ality, they say, O venerable One. But what, O
venerable One, does the Exalted One say is the
arising of personality ? "

" This thirst for life (tanka) that leads to re-birth,
bound up with lust and craving, now here, now
there, revelling in delight — namely, the impulse
towards sensuality, the impulse towards existence,
the impulse towards present well-being (without
regard to any possible future). This, friend, so the
Exalted One has said, is the arising of personality." l

The distinction between faith and science on the
one hand and the Buddha on the other, may be
formulated thus : —

According to faith, living beings all possess as
adequate cause for their existence a transcendent
force, usually called " soul." According to science,
living beings as well as all re-actual processes, have
their adequate cause entirely in what is perceptible
to sense ; which means that science derives living
beings simply and solely from their begetters —
mother and father — thus entangling herself in her
insoluble problem of heredity. The Buddha on his
part teaches that every being is adequate catise to
itself. As a flame maintains itself by its own heat,
so every /-process maintains itself by its volitional
movements.

Now it is an incontestable biological fact that

1 Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 44.

54 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

man, and along with him a considerable proportion
of the animal world, originate in the union of a
maternal ovum-cell with a paternal sperm-cell. How
can the teaching of the Buddha that beings are
their own adequate causes be brought into line
with this fact ?

It is just here that the Buddha breaks with
vulgar thinking in a manner that at first sight seems
out of all reason.

He teaches that that which mother and father
furnish in the act of union is only, so to speak, the
material of the new living being, only represents
the possibility of a new individuality ; that this
material is developed into an individuality only
through the advent of an individual energy. " By
the conjunction of three things, O monks, does the
formation of a germ of life come about. If mother
and father come together, but it is not the mother's
proper period, and the exciting impulse does not
present itself, a germ of life is not planted. I f mother
and father come together and it is the mother's
proper period, but the exciting impulse does not
present itself, a germ of life is not planted. If,
however, O monks, mother and father come together
and it is the mother's proper period, and the ex-
citing impulse presents itself, then a germ of life is
there planted." x

As the igniting spark catches, breaks in, and,
taking the kindling wood and the oxygen of the
atmosphere which, but for its advent, would have
lain beside one another for long enough without
any reaction, fuses them together into the individu-
ality, " flame," so does the individual energy joining

1 Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 38.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 55

up with the material of procreation, fuse ovum- and
sperm-cell together into the new personality.

This " in-breaking " energy that joins up with
the raw material of procreation, — this is the Kamma
of some other existence which has been unable any
longer to maintain its form against the pressure of
the external world, an occurrence which we usually
denominate " death." The Kamma of the dis-
integrating existence — so the Buddha teaches — at
the moment of death passes over into a new abode,
plants itself, breaks in here in new inflammable
material, kindles a new /-process, fashions a new I-
sayer. And as the igniting spark becomes the flame
by developing itself, growing, unfolding along with
the material of which it has taken hold, so does
Kamma become the new form of existence by
developing itself, growing, unfolding along with the
material of which it has taken hold. In other
words, / am the form of my Kamma. I am my
Kamma corporealised.

This Kamma series it is which constitutes the
actual genealogical tree of a living being. As the
genealogical tree of a fire does not lead in the
direction of the forest or the coal-mine whence its
material was derived, but back to the flame from out
of which the kindling spark took hold, so the genea-
logical tree of living beings does not run back in
the direction of progenitors but in the direction of
the Kamma, the direction of a disintegrating exist-
ence. " Heirs of deeds," therefore, the Buddha
calls living beings, not heirs of mother and father ;
and, " springing from the womb of Kamma (kam-
mayoni)" The Kamma, in virtue of which I now
say " /," derives from a previous existence ; the "/-

56 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

sayer" of this previous existence, on his part again,
derives from a previous existence, and so on further
and further back in a series that never has had a
beginning. At every moment of my existence I am
the final member of a beginningless series of " I-
sayers." The Kamma at this moment active in me
— it has never not existed, never not been active.
This is what means a self-sustaining process. Such
a process can never have had a beginning ; for then
it would be no self-sustaining thing, it would have
been created, either by a god, or by external
circumstances and antecedent conditions. It would
be no actual process but a product. As soon as
clear cognition brings me the insight that I am a
pure process of combustion, i.e. sustain myself, along
with that insight is given as a logical necessity
beginninglessness.

Individual beginninglessness is the key-word, the
guiding clue to the Buddha-thought. In it is ex-
hausted the teaching of Kamma. The /-process
has its in-force, its Kamma from out a previous
existence. Otherwise expressed : The /-process is
not the result of an impact, has not been set going,
but burns on from beginninglessness down to this
present moment, itself ever and again perpetuating
itself. Whenever an existence disintegrates, the
Kamma in virtue of which it has been burning
takes hold anew in a new location and there sets
alight a new /-process that unfolds itself into a new
personality. The Buddha teaches re-births.

The self-perpetuation of the individual energies,
the Kammas, in the formation of ever new in-
dividualities, is by the Buddha called " Samsara."

This word is most frequently translated, " the

THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 57

circling round of re-births," — a rendering that may
easily lead to a false conception. Where the entire
universe is nothing but a huge summation of single
combustion processes, there no circling round can
be ; there each moment of existence always and
everywhere is something that never before has been
and never again will be. With the translation
" circling round of re-births," one only works with
physics and its reversible processes ; one is in
danger of apprehending life mechanically. As a
matter of fact, " Samsara " means nothing but the
" together-wandering," the ascent and descent of
the beings in the universe, that ever and again,
now here now there, come into manifestation anew,
according as their Kamma here or there takes hold.

" Without beginning, without end is this Samsara.
A beginning of beings encompassed by nescience
who, fettered by the thirst for life, pass on to ever
new births, verily is not to be perceived."

The thinking man naturally asks, " Is there any
proof of such a teaching ? or must it simply be
believed? " In the latter case it were as worthless
to the genuine thinker as is every religion of faith.
Whether I call that on which I believe, force or
energy, god or Kamma, makes no essential differ-
ence.

But to this question there are two answers — an
answer of a real, and an answer of an abstract nature.

The answer of real nature is supplied by the
Buddha when he affirms of himself that simul-
taneously with the attainment of his Buddha-
knowledge, he acquired the faculty of remembering
his previous forms of existence back into eras of
time the most stupendously remote. He teaches,

58 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

however, that every one who, like himself, has
wrestled his way to the same knowledge, obtains
this same capacity of calling to remembrance his
previous states of existence.

Now the Buddha-knowledge is no supernatural
illumination, but consists simply of a clear insight
into the nature of my own existence — or rather, in
the removal of a false conception as to myself, the
conception of the "/" as an identity. To attain to
this insight, all that is needed is reflection and
instruction. This seemingly supernatural character
of the faculty of remembering previous existences is
thus " supernatural " only in the sense that the
telephone or the Rontgen ray or wireless telegraphy
is supernatural to untutored savages. We are
merely lacking in the prerequisite conditions as
respects cognition, and in the intellectual technique.

This much safely may be said, that the biological

possibility of memory of the distant past can only
be brought to bear upon the several existences in
so far as these themselves have run their course in
touch with the power of memory, in touch with
consciousness. To try to make this faculty extend
over the embryonal periods also, would be absurd,
since here the organic possibilities of such memory
— the sense-organs, namely — are not developed,
and so there is nothing there for one to remember.
Hence, when he speaks of his previous existences
the Buddha says, not, " I remember having left
such and such a womb," but, " I remember having
been of such a name, such a family, such a rank,
such a calling ; having experienced such and such
weal and woe, and such a departure from life."
Here what is meant by the constantly recurring

THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 59

phrase " evam ayupariyanto " — " thus was the term,
the end of my life " — is not physical death, but the
ending of that section of the individuality which
runs its course self-illuminated, under the designa-
tion of consciousness. This end may indeed
synchronize with the physical end, death, but it may
also precede it by a longer or shorter period of time.

In corresponding terms the Buddha goes on
to say, " Departing thence, elsewhere I appeared
anew. There now I was, bore such a name," and
so on. The memories of the past adhere only to
those phases of existence that are illumined by
consciousness.

It may be asked, " By what means is it possible
to acquire such a faculty of remembering the distant
past ? "

I reply, " I do not know." I can only suggest
an analogy. One must extinguish one's own light
in order to see the light that shines through the
chink in a neighbouring room. In somewhat the
same fashion, a man must have extinguished his
own light — the notion of an /-identity — and won to
the Buddha- knowledge, in order to see himself
emerge recurrently as a something luminous in
consciousness further and yet further away in the
"dark backward and abysm of time," — one lucent
phase, ever and again revealing itself, anterior to
the other, until the last faint glimmer is lost in the
dim dusk teeming with life, of the beginningless
infinitudes.

The Buddha himself instances a definite limit
to the capacity to recall to memory past existences,
up to which limit he himself attained. Here we
have the best possible proof that we have to do, not

60 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

with a supernatural enlightenment, a species of
omniscience, but simply with an intellectual technique
which as being purely intellectual, presupposes a
certain grade of cognition. If we may put any
confidence in the texts, there were in the days of
the Buddha, and in those days of which the " Chants
of the monks and nuns " tell us, quite a large
number of persons who had acquired this faculty.
If some one here interjects, " Such a thing is
impossible ! " he resembles a man at the foot of a
hill to whom another standing on the top has
described what he sees from that point of vantage,
and who retorts, "It is quite impossible that you
should see all this. I have eyes in my head as
well as you. I look upon the same world as you
do and I perceive nothing whatever of all this.
Consequently your imagination must be playing
tricks with you."

So much for the real answer. The abstract
answer presents itself in the light of an intellectual
necessity.

Kamma is that which gives continuity to the
/-process. As such it presents itself to me the
individual immediately as consciousness. Conscious-
ness, rightly comprehended, tells me that the
/-process gives to itself its own coherence ; which
means that it is self-acting ; which in turn means
that it is beginningless. I experience the self-per-
petuation, the burning of the /-process in conscious-
ness. But just as Kamma conducts from one
moment of existence to the next, so does it conduct
from one existence to the next.

Should one wish to render this procedure in
comprehensible language, one can come at it no

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 61

otherwise than simply by saying, " Consciousness
passes over from existence to existence." " Kamma"
in itself conveys no more meaning than, for ex-
ample, the word /, which indicates anybody and
everybody without distinction, and only acquires
actual significance with reference to myself. In
exactly the same way " Kamma," the force in virtue
of which every single living creature has being,
acquires actual significance only as my own conscious-
ness. Kamma as such has being only as conscious-
ness.

It is in this sense that those passages are to be
understood, so obscure to our scholars, in which
the Buddha speaks of vinfiana (consciousness) as
that which plants itself in the new womb. Address-
ing his disciple Ananda, he says, " If, Ananda,
consciousness did not pass into the womb, would
it then be possible for the (new) individuality to
differentiate itself? " 1

Among the Theras of Ceylon the established
expression for the Kamma that passes over from
one existence to the next is patisandhivihnana, a
word which means " the again-linking-up conscious-
ness," the consciousness that ever and again
supplies the bond between existence and existence.

That there is here no thought of consciousness
as "something in itself," as soul, as an identity,
is made abundantly clear in the following passage : —

A monk named Sati, as the outcome of his own
cogitations, arrives at the conclusion that " conscious-
ness " is something that in the progress of re-births

1 "Differentiate itself" is meant to equate samucchissatha, a word for
which it is difficult to find an adequate equivalent. It signifies the self-
integration of the new being simultaneously with its severance from the
maternal organism.

62 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

passes over as anaiiiiay, as " not-other "—that is,
as an identity, as a spiritual substance. He is repri-
manded by the Buddha in these words : " Have
not I in many and diverse ways expounded
consciousness as something arising always in depend-
ence upon somewhat ? Without adequate cause
there is no coming to be of consciousness." 2

To much the same effect runs a passage in the
Visuddki Magga : —

" But it is to be understood that this latter
consciousness (that of the new existence is meant)
did not come to the present existence from the
previous one, and also that it is only to causes
contained in the old existence that its present
appearance is due." 2

Only when one understands that Viiinana
(consciousness) is Kamma itself, does a " conscious-
ness " that passes over from existence to existence
become divested of its seeming senselessness.

When, for example, I say, " The American
heat-wave has passed over to Europe," this does
not mean that an absolutely definite something
called "heat-wave" has set out on a journey. It
only means that certain pulses of energy which
manifest themselves to sense under the form of
a wave of heat are making their presence known in
a new locality. In just the same way, when I say,
" Consciousness passes over from one existence
to another," this does not mean that an absolutely
definite something called "consciousness" goes
forth upon its travels, but that the pulse of energy
of the /-process which, wherever it is present at all

1 Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 38.
2 Buddhism in Translations, by H. C. Warren, p. 239.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 63

as stcck manifests itself as consciousness, makes its
presence known in a new location. Should any-
one insist upon conceiving of the heat-wave as a
something travelling, he would rightly become the
butt of ridicule. In similar wise, the scholars of the
west with their profound researches into this
" consciousness " that passes over from existence to
existence, make fair marks for jest and laughter.
Here, of course, they are only working further
along in the tracks of physiology and biology, both
of which so long as they seek for a "seat" of
consciousness, labour under a like tragi-comic mis-
conception.

No good purpose is to be served by instancing
here in detail all the crass misconceptions of which
our western scholars are guilty in the interpretation
of this point. That would only be to burden this
book on its way with quite unnecessary ballast.
Wherever the reader meets with such misconcep-
tions, he can correct them for himself on the lines
of the foregoing explanations. In passing, however,
it may be mentioned that he will meet with such
misconceptions ih pretty nearly every book about
Buddhism.

And now we stand confronted by the question : —

"After what fashion is one to picture to oneself
the passing over of Kamma from one existence to
another ? "

To us in the West who have been reared in the
mechanistic views of science and admit of the
inductive method alone in argument, this seems the
point most obscure among all the obscurities we
find in the Buddha - thought. In the Buddha's
days, however, this point seems to have been so

64 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

completely free from anything savouring of the
problematical that the Buddha himself would seem
never to have found it necessary to express himself
categorically upon it.

If to-day one asks the Theras in Ceylon or
Burma how one ought to think of this passing over,
one receives the unfailing reply, "It is not the
case that ' something ' passes over."

Here one must fall back upon the works of the
commentators for fuller information.

In the Milinda Paflha (the Questions of King
Milinda), a work that in Ceylon is held in the
highest esteem, there occurs the following passage : —

(The King says) : " Bhante (Reverend Sir)
Nagasena, does the connection (with the next
existence) take place without anything passing
over?" (The Monk Nagasena replies): "Yes,
great King, the connection takes place without
anything passing over." " Give me an example of
connection taking place without anything passing
over!" "Suppose a man to light one lamp at
another, does one light here pass over to the
other?" "No, bhante." "In just the same way

the connection takes place without anything passing

>> i
over.

Hereupon the question arises : —

" This previous existence of which I am the
immediate continuation — am I this itself or am I
another ? "

A further passage in the same book, the Milinda

Paiiha, runs : —

"He who is born — is he the same or is he
another?" "Neither the same, neither another."

i Pali Text, P.T.S. edition, p. 71.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 65

"Give me an illustration!" "Suppose a man to
light a lamp : would it burn the whole night
through?" "Yes, it would burn the whole night
through." " Now, is the flame of the first watch
the same with the flame of the middle watch ? "
" No, indeed ! " " Or is the flame of the middle
watch the same with the flame of the last watch ? "
" No, indeed ! " " Then is the lamp of the first
watch one, the lamp of the middle watch another,
and the lamp of the last watch yet another ? " " No,
indeed! In dependence upon one and the same
(lamp) the light burns all the night through."
"Even so does the continuity of men and things
come about. One arises, another passes away.
On the instant, as it were, without before or after,
the linking up is effected. Thus it is not oneself,
nor yet is it another, that passes on (and con-
stitutes) each last present phase of conscious-
ness."

With this we arrive at the crucial point. The
passing over ensues on the instant, im7nediately, not
in space and time.

Buddhism, if it is to satisfy the thinker, here will
have to come to an understanding with modern
physics. In a succeeding essay this will be
attempted. For the present, as preliminary, we
hold fast only to the fact.

The /-process as being the form of an in-force,
at every moment of its existence represents a
certain value in potential energy, a certain unique
state of tension, an individual tendency. This
tendency it is which at the breaking up of the old
form immediately establishes itself in the new
location.

66 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

But where? Is this new location always ready-
waiting to take up the new Kamma?

A universe that consists of nothing but a huge
summation of combustion processes, finds itself, so
to speak, in a perpetual status nascens. Here
every fresh moment represents a new, unique,
biological, Kammic value, which as such never
before has been and never again will be.

Now all actual happenings come to pass in
virtue of peculiar attunements — in the language of
chemistry, specific affinities. A body, a process,
acts upon another because in virtue of its peculiar
attunement it can and must act on that other. But
where the entire universe is a something existing
in a perpetual status nascens, there is, strictly
speaking, no such thing as a being attuned, but only
an each-after-other self -attuning, taking place anew
with each new moment. The entire actual happen-
ings of a world from this point of view become
something that does not have laws, but is law itself-,
a thought as sublime as it is terrible. The signi-
ficance of Buddhism for a morality is completely
dominated by it.

Hence, where the actual play of world-events
alone is in question, the same is indicated by the
word " Dhamma" (law or norm). All beings, even
as they are Sankhara, are also Dhamma.1 Kamma,

1 These two words are not, as most western scholars aver, altogether
synonymous, for "Dhamma" embraces everything — actual as well as re-
actual processes. When, on the other hand, it is desired particularly to
specify the re-actual processes, the word "Sankhara" serves the purpose.
The stereotyped formula : " All Sankharas are transient ; all Sankharas are
painful ; all Dhammas are non-self," is not based upon any caprice nor yet
upon metrical considerations (as Oldenburg asserts in his Buddha, 1897
edition, p. 291), for the prose versions render the three phrases in exactly
the same form, as may be seen by a reference to the Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta
35. On the contrary, the formula is founded upon a clearly understood

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 67

the individual in-force, at the break up of the
form, will "take hold" anew there where in the
beginningless each -after- other self-attunement of
the play of world-events, it can take hold — indeed,
must take hold. This "taking hold" anew is not
something that has law, that runs its appointed
course according to definite laws, but it is law
itself.

Now Kamma, as individual in-force, is a some-
thing unique. It is itself and nothing else besides,
as it manifests itself in me the individual ; for my
consciousness tells me that I am a something
unique, that I am myself and nothing else besides.

As a something unique, it must also be uniquely
attuned to its new location. There will be one
single location which, out of the endless host of
world-events, will correspond to the Kamma of the
disintegrating existence, will answer to it. We all
eat out of the one dish — every one eater for himself.

This unique attuneme7it, however, implies im-
mediate passing over as a logical necessity. If
Kamma passed over in space and time, this passing
over would be a new self-attunement at innumer-
able points. Immediate passing over and unique
attunement are two different expressions for one
and the same event.

We shall have to dwell upon this idea at greater
length in another place. Here I conclude with the

distinction between Sankhara and Dhamma. The native scholars express
this distinction by saying that the Dhammas take in, embrace, the element of
Nibbana. Which means nothing more than that they refer to actual pro-
cesses, to living beings. Western scholars would do well to sit at the feet of
the native scholars somewhat more than they at present incline to do. Many
a misconception might thereby be removed, or prevented from ever arising,
indeed. An admonition such as this is needed in every nook and corner of
our literature upon Buddhism.

68 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

caution that the Kamma-teaching of the Buddha
is not to be confounded with the teaching of the
transmigration of the soul found in pantheistic
systems. The two have nothing, absolutely
nothing, in common with one another except the
words "Samsara" and "re-births." Language is
no more than a servant. It serves one master just
as well as another. To seek to deduce community
of essence from similarities in terminology is a
piece of idle trifling of which many an expositor
of Buddhism is most unwarrantably guilty. It is
no very difficult matter to " support " the words
of the Buddha with quite a host of sayings culled
from the works of mystics and pantheists — and
scientists also, if one so chooses. But in good sooth,
to him who understands, all this only makes need-
less ballast, and to him who does not understand,
needless perplexity.

A transmigration of the soul requires something
persistent, something eternal, a unity in itself.
"As the worm from leaf to leaf" — runs the illustra-
tion in the Upanishads — "so goes the soul (the
Atman, the true Self) from existence to existence."

For the Buddha there is no such " something in
itself." For the real, genuine thinker life is a thing
that at every moment wholly and completely arises
anew. Life is this arising itself, just as a flame is
the arising itself. Any kind of persisting something
here is not to be found. Every moment of existence
is a new, biological, Kammic value, whereof the
prerequisite condition, the adequate cause, resides
solely in the previous moment, while itself is pre-
requisite condition, adequate cause to the moment
succeeding. No continuity is present, as a Being,

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 69

as a true /, a something identical with itself, but
with each new moment the continuity is formed anew ;
every moment is the last link in a beginningless
series ; every now the final result of an individual
combustion process that, hither descended from past
beginninglessness, continues to burn on through
future endlessness ; the Kamma whereof, as oft as
one form falls to pieces, without break seizes hold
of a new raw-material. It is no persisting some-
thing in itself that passes over ; it is the individual
tendency, the predispositions, the character, the
consciousness, or whatever else one has a mind to
call the value in potential energy represented by
the /-process at its disintegration, that passes over,
by immediately taking effect, striking in, imparting
the new impulse to the material to which it is
uniquely attuned — the material that appeals to it
alone of all that is present, and to which it alone of
all that is present, answers.

Yet once more : —

Kamma is no cord binding the existences
together — as little so as the lightning of the
firmament is a cord. The notion of a persisting
"self" or "soul" is repeatedly and emphatically
repudiated.

"Further, one may entertain the notion: 'This
identical self of mine, I maintain, is veritably to be
found now here, now there, reaping the fruits of its
good and of its evil deeds ; and this my self is a
thing permanent, constant, eternal, not subject to
change, and so abides for ever.' But this, monks,
is a walking in mere opinion, a resorting to mere
notions, a barren waste of views, an empty display
of views ; this is merely to writhe, caught in the

70 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

toils of views " ; runs a passage in the second Sutta
of the Majjhima Nikaya. While we find Buddha-
ghosa's great commentary, the Visuddhi Magga,
saying : "There is no entity, no living principle, no
elements of being, transmigrated Irom the last
existence into the present one."

• • • • • •

I sum up in brief what has gone before.

The Buddha teaches : —

All actual processes are combustion processes.

They burn in virtue of purely individual in-forces
(Kammas).

As such they are self-sustaining processes.

As such they are beginningless.

They have sustained themselves from beginning-
lessness down to the present by volitional activities.

With the Kamma-teaching the significance of
Buddhism for a world-conception is given in all its
amplitude.

To possess a world-conception means to compre-
hend the play of world-events.

To comprehend means to comprehend adequate
causes.

Adequate causes must be forces.

Forces of necessity must be something imper-
ceptible to sense.

As such they must lie beyond the reach of all
comprehension.

An exception to this is constituted by one single
process — the /, the individual himself; inasmuch as
the in-force, in virtue of which I have my being,
becomes perceptible to sense in consciousness.

This given, the whole problem here focuses
itself, as it were automatically, into one point, forth

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 71

from which every genuine view of the world must
necessarily proceed — ones own I.

Whilst faith conceives of the / from a transcen-
dental standpoint, i.e. believes ; whilst science
strains itself to conceive of the / from the stand-
point of the material world, i.e. inductively; the
Buddha conceives of it from the standpoint of itself,
i.e. intuitively.

Along with my comprehension of myself is com-
prehended the entire residue of the world. If I
myself have being in virtue of a purely individual
in-force, then all remaining actual processes also
have being in virtue of purely individual in-forces,
and I comprehend them all — i.e. the world — as
thereby beyond being comprehended ; not as being
incomprehensible in themselves — that were a self-
evident contradiction — but as so fashioned that each
of them can only comprehend itself.

Here it may be objected : —

A world-conception that teaches me to compre-
hend the world as being incomprehensible — is it
not just as much of the nature of a paradox as the
world-conception of faith ?

To this the answer is : —

The demand for a view of the world is not to be
taken literally as such. If a freezing man says, " I
much need a coat," it is not the coat in itself of
which he has need, but the warmth that the coat
will procure him. In the selfsame way, when an
uninstructed person says, " I much need a view of
the world," what he would fain comprehend is not
the world in itself, but that which furnishes internal
support, coherence, to the play of world-events. In
reality, every world-conception means nothing else

72 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

but a comprehension of the something that persists
throughout the play of world-events, that remains
constant through all vicissitude, — hence, a satisfac-
tion of the idea of conservation.

This idea of conservation religious faith endea-
vours to satisfy with its " force in itself," God.
Scientific faith endeavours to satisfy it with " matter,"
_vgtrich lsTust asmuch a thing of faith as is " force."
Actuality knows neither iorce by itself nor matter
by itself; it only knows the unity of both: processes.
One is just " believing " when one operates abstractly
with either of these two opposites ; and to operate
with them other than abstractly is quite impossible.

Out of itself does science provide satisfaction for
the idea of conservation in the cosmogony of
energetics ; this it does, however, by furnishing not
actual energies but only the reactions of energies.

An actual conservation, and therewith an actual
world-view is furnished by the Buddha alone when
he points out that every living being is a some-
thing self-sustaining ; in other words, that there
is no such thing as an " /," considered as identical
with itself, as a unity in itself.

The same, to be sure, is said by every school of
criticism. Hume and modern psychology say so
with unequivocal clearness, but none of them go
beyond negation. They confine themselves to
Socratic knowledge. Alone the Buddha says, (4 I
not only am aware that I am no true /, as a unity in
itself, but I also know what it is that I am. A-nd-fehat
this has really been comprehended by me, — this I
prove in my own person. For, from the moment that
I comprehended myself as a process sustaining itself
from beginninglessness down to the present hour

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 73

~by its own volitional activities, all volitional activities
have wholly ceased in me. A new up-welling of
in-force, any further self-charging of the /-process,
has no more place in me. I know ; this is my last
existence. When it breaks up, there is no more
Kamma there to take fresh hold in any new location,
be it in heavenly, be it in earthly worlds. The
beginningless process of combustion is expiring, is
coming to an end of itself, like the flame that is fed
by no more oil.-^

This thought which finds expression in the four
propositions concerning suffering and the Nibbana
teaching, sums up the significance of Buddhism for
morality and religion, and its amplification, therefore,
belongs to the successor to this volume. Here it is
only interesting to us from the epistemological point
of view, i.e. in so far as it makes ignorance as to one-
self the antecedent condition of all life. For —

I sustain my own existence through the perpetu-
ally renewed up-welling of volitional activities. It
is possible for these to spring up again and again
only so long as an object for my willing is present,
i.e. so long as the delusion of identity is not put an
end to. The moment any being arrives at the in-
sight that there are in truth no identities — that there
are nothing but flickering, flaring processes of
combustion, which are one thing when I crave for
them, another when I stretch forth my hand to
seize them, and yet again another when I have
seized them and hold them fast, he stops short,
begins to reflect ; and in reflection the blind impulse
to live is sapped and weakened. The knowledge is
borne in upon him : " It is not worth the seizing."

So long as I take a glittering object in the grass

74 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

for a diamond, I will clutch at it, scuffle for it —
mayhap enter on a life-and-death struggle to obtain
it. But the moment I perceive, " It is a dewdrop
in which a sunbeam is reflected," I trouble myself no
more about it. I know " A shake, a gust of wind
— and all is over ! "

So is it with the genuine thinker in face of the
world and its values, whether they be called wife or
child, money or possessions, fame or honour, family
or home. One clear, piercing, scrutinizing glance
is more than they will bear. To the penetrating
mind, the wretchedness of transiency is everywhere
manifest — he turns away — it is not worth while !

To Sakka, the king of the gods, the Buddha
imparts the following instruction : —

" Then, chief of the gods, a monk hears : ' All
that is, when clung to, falls short.' And when,
chief of the gods, a monk has heard : ' All that is,
when clung to, falls short,' he closely observes each
and every thing. In the close observation of each
and every thing he sees into each and every thing.
And seeing into each and every thing, whatsoever
sensation he experiences, whether pleasurable or
unpleasurable, or neither pleasurable nor unpleasur-
able, in all these sensations he abides in the insight
that they are transient, so that he cares naught for
them, ceases from them, renounces them. And
abiding as respects these sensations in such insight,
he clings to nothing whatsoever in all the world.
Clinging to nothing in the world, he is free from fear.
Free from fear he attains to his own extinction of
delusion." x

This insight that ignorance as to one's own self

1 Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 37.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 75

is the antecedent condition of all existence, is
formulated by the Buddha in the so-called " Causal
Chain."1

It is not the intention of this book to furnish a
fully rounded statement of Buddhism, and so I am
at liberty here to confine myself to what is necessary
for our immediate purpose. To attempt to deal in
detail with all the many mistakes that have here
been made by western expositors would require a
whole book to itself.

The Causal Chain consists of twelve links, on
which account it is also alluded to under the name
of the "Twelve Nidanas."

The twelve links of the chain are : 1. Ignorance
(Avijja) ; 2. Predispositions, Tendencies (Sankhara) ;
3. Consciousness (Vinnana) ; 4. Individuality (Nama-
rupa) ; 5. The seat of sense ; 6. Contact ; 7. Sensation ;
8. Thirst of life (Tanha) ; 9. Clinging (Upadana) ;
10. Becoming (Bhava) ; 11. Birth (Jati)j; 12. A
Complex consisting of the essential ingredients of
all existence — namely, old age, death, misery,
lamentation, sorrow, grief, and despair.

This " Chain " is translated by the great majority
of occidental expositors of Buddhism thus : " Out
of Ignorance arise the Predispositions. Out of the
Predispositions arises Consciousness," and so forth.

Such a translation is at one and the same time
incorrect as regards the wording and misleading as
regards the meaning. For here the separate links
of the chain are placed with regard to each other
in the relationship of cause and effect, in the purely
physical sense in which the two represent a follow-

1 In Pali, paticcasamiippada, which may be rendered as " The together-
arising in dependence upon."

76 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

ing after one another. But in order to have a pure
following after one another of cause and effect,
there are needed artificial preconditions such as
physics puts for herself when she works with
"bodies," — that is, with fixed magnitudes complete
in themselves. Actuality, however, knows nothing
of any such things. Actuality knows only processes
which at every moment of their existence represent
a new biological value.

Only where " bodies " in this purely physical
sense are presumed to exist, can one speak of a
following after one another of cause and effect ; —
a mode of representing matters that is ridiculed
by men of insight among physicists themselves.
E. Mach, for example, makes fun of it in the
humorous phrase : " Upon a dose of cause there
follows a dose of effect " ; whereby, to be sure, him-
self, and with him the whole of modern positivism
whose mouthpiece he is,1 falls into the opposite
extreme, inasmuch as he seeks to substitute for
the conception of causality of scholasticism — the
following after one another of cause and effect —
dependence outside of time, as represented by the
concept of mathematical function.

In sooth, one position is as far removed from
actuality as the other. Every causal relation
existing in actuality runs its course on the lines —
to take an example — of seed and tree, where the
causal relation is neither a pure, unmixed following
after one another, nor yet a lying alongside one
another outside of time, but a combination of
following after and lying alongside one another.

This combination of succession and juxtaposition

1 Cf. Essay XI.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 77

is implied, moreover, in the Pali word, paccaya, used
to express the connecting together of the separate
links. Verbally correct and true to the meaning,
the Causal Chain would be translated as follows : —
" Ignorance must be present in order that
Tendencies may come to pass. Tendencies must
be present in order that Virmana may come to
pass ; — which latter here signifies Consciousness as
passing-over Kamma ; for this passing-over Kamma
does not admit being spoken of otherwise than
in the form of consciousness. This passing-over
Kamma must be present in order that the fashioning
of a new Individuality may come to pass. This
latter must be present in order that a referring
back of all the Six Kinds of Sense -Impressions
to myself may come to pass. This must be present
in order that Contact, an approaching on my part
to things whether physical or mental, may come to
pass. Contact must be present in order that Sensa-
tion, this in order that Craving, this in order that
Clinging, this in order that the perpetually repeated,
new upspringing of the /-process may come about
which here is disintegrated in the stage of Passing-
over (Bhava) and the final result (Jati),1 the Coming-

1 The texts give the true meaning of Jati with sufficient frequency, as, for
instance, in the ninth Sutta of the Majjhima Nikaya, as follows : —

" Khandhimarj patubhavo, ayatananan patilabho, ayan vuccat' avuso jati."
Which means : " The coming into manifestation of the Khandhas (that is, the
arising anew of corporeality, sensations, perceptions, discriminations, and
cognition-acts, such as at every moment are exhibited in every individual
combustion process, every alimentation process), the ever repeated seizing of
the Ayatanas (that is, of the objects of sense, or of that, supported by which
— in the objective as in the subjective sense — the senses are able to come
into activity), — this, friend, is called birth."

I embrace the opportunity of calling attention to the equally misleading
rendering of Nama-riipa by "name and form." The native pandits laugh
at such a rendering. Here Nama is "that which bends" (nameti), i.e. that
which conglobates the material (rupa) into that specific form through which
even it becomes an individual. It is not merely name, but the totality

78 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

into -manifestation of a new Kammic impulsion
within this my personality ; whereupon the last
link follows as a natural consequence.

The Causal Chain is the best touchstone by
which to test whether a person is really capable
of following the Buddha-thought or not. If he is
incapable of doing so, he comes by a sad fall at
the " violation " of the law of contradictories which
follows ixovsxjati being taken as Birth in the grossly
vulgar acceptation of the word ; and cannot make
out how an individual who has long since been
active as such, should only subsequently be "born."

The other absurdity which necessarily arises
when one interprets the links in the vulgar sense
as a following after one another of cause and effect,
is this : that in this case Ignorance is installed
as a sort of blind end, and so the way is opened
for the introduction of all sorts of cosmological
speculations to which our men of learning are only
the more inclined that they generally come from
Sanskrit to Pali, or, what in substance amounts to
the same thing, from the Upanishads to the Suttas.

In the Vedanta, ''Ignorance" is a given thing
in itself, an incomprehensible ; it is the point on
which, for the genuine thinker, the whole system
comes to grief. In Buddhism Ignorance is not
anything that is given in itself. Its presence in
everything that lives has no other basis than that

precisely of what most is worth naming. As a matter of fact, the pandits
of Ceylon explain it as the evolutional form of Vifinana.

In harmony with this, in the above cited Sammaditthi Sutta, Sariputta
gives the following explanation : " Sensation, perception, volition, thought-
contact, cogitation, this is called nama" And in the Milinda Panha it is
said : " What is gross, that is rupa ; what is of fine, mind-like constitution,
that is nama.'''' In the Abhidhamma exegesis, the so-called Nama-series is
directly identified with Vifinana.

v THE DOCTRINE OF THE BUDDHA 79

all that lives, by the mere fact of its existence
shows that it must have been compounded with
Ignorance, since otherwise the /-process concerned
would have been bound to have collapsed, just in
the same way that everything that has being, by
its very existence shows that up to now it must
have been fertile, capable of propagation, since
otherwise it could not be here. As little as on
that account "fertility" is a given in itself, just as
little is Ignorance a given in itself.

When the Buddha in the formula of causality
places " Ignorance " at the head of his world-system,
makes it the antecedent condition of all individual
existence, he does nothing but formulate abstractly
what in the Kamma-teaching he gives actually —
the beginninglessness of the /-process. To the
question, " What is the adequate cause of living
beings? How is it ever possible for the / to come
about?" he gives in the Kamma-teaching, the
answer, "through willing," and in the Causal Chain
the answer, "through ignorance as to one's self."
Both answers bear the one import, — this, namely,
that anterior to the present / ever and again stands
the /, running backward in a series that knows
no beginning, and never has known a beginning.
Whether I say, "A being is here in virtue of his
volitional activities, of his Kamma," or, " He is
here in virtue of his Ignorance," there exists no
other distinction between these two expressions
than between the two phrases : "light is present,"
and, "shadow is present." Shadow in itself means
nothing save only that light is present. Shadow
is light itself, but in empty abstract form. In the
selfsame way Ignorance of itself means nothing save

80 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE v

only that will is present. Ignorance is will itself,
but in empty abstract form.

In the intuition of the beginninglessness of the
individual, both series — the actual as the Kamma-
teaching, and the abstract as the teaching con-
cerning ignorance — merge into one.

Buddhism is the teaching of actuality. The
actual is only what I myself experience — I, the I-
process.

The Buddha teaches me to comprehend myself,
and only as a function of this self-comprehension
does there follow a comprehension of the external
world.

A view of the world based solely upon a com-
prehension of one's self perforce lies beyond reach
of any inductive procedure ; the question, therefore,
arises : —

By what means and method is such a doctrine
to be brought within reach of others ?

BUDDHISM AS A WORKING
HYPOTHESIS

Each with its own world -conception, faith and
science alike, are representatives of a knowledge.

Faith stands for a "knowledge in itself," — the
knowledge, in fact, of a something divine. Sciejtce^
seeks to work_Ji£j^Jway-4o--a^knjawLedg^e p[aced^ jn
'Maw^; a_labour, Jto__be sure, with which she-
remains for ever "on the way." The Buddha, on
the contrary, obtains his world-conception, not by
the creation of any new knowledge buLjyybringing
to an endji begimm^essj^nora^

Now we moderns are accustomed to look upon
science as the mediator betwixt us and truth, — as
the high-priest of truth, so to speak, from whose
hands we receive the sacred host. With the
position which every science takes up towards
nature — a rejection in principle of everything not
perceptible to sense, implying thereby the potential
comprehensibility of the phenomena of life — its
methods also are definitely determined ; they are
"the methods of induction and deduction. Both
amount to comprehending an occurrence by round-
about ways through other occurrences ; or, what is
the same thing, to finding the adequate cause of

81 g

82 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

one phenomenon of life in other phenomena of
life.

Now there is one unique thing in the world
with reference to which this possibility is absent —
something that I never can approach by round-
about paths ; it is my own consciousness. For,
this I myself am ; and where I am, thither it is
impossible for me to go, though I seek so to do by
the cunningest and craftiest of psycho-physiological
by-ways.

The whole Buddha - thought has its roots in
discernment as to the essential nature of conscious-
ness. This discernment, however, is itself a form
of consciousness, thus, cannot be come at by any
kind of path, by any kind of method ; it cannot be
mediate.

Here the scientist will say, " If a discernment
be not mediate — that is, derived from experience —
then it must be immediate. But that means it is
an illumination, a matter of faith. And thus the
whole of Buddhism, with its teaching of Kamrna,
differs only in name not in nature from religions
founded upon revelations."

Such a conclusion, however, would be false.
There offers a third alternative.

Science conceals within herself a domain in
regard to which it is with her much as it is with us
all in regard to the sexual commerce of daily life.
We are proud of our children but we are shame-
faced over the act that has brought them into the
world. Even so is it with science in respect of
those of her children that have not originated as
homunculi in the reagent tube, but have really
been begotten — her intuitions. One is proud of

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 83

them, but one never rests until one has methodized
them, put the inductive smock-frock on them, and
brought them into tune with the tone of conversation
of science.

Galileo's law of falling bodies, the Newtonian
law, Robert Mayer's law of the conservation of
energy, are all intuitions. But many another flash
of insight to which science has denied the status
of legitimate child, contemning them instead for
bastards, are like intuitions — such as the phrenology
of Gall, Hahnemann's idea of similia similibus
curantur, which has blossomed into the methods
of treatment so fraught with blessing to humanity,
of homoeopathy, and many others.

All these intuitions have this in common that
they have not been abstracted from a duly defined
number of experiments. They are each an ^^r-
j^£r^££_JjlJthe-domaia^oX_cjognition thaftias come"
to pass by reason of a unique, impulse. They are
each a process of mental growth, mental develop-
ment that has been evoked by an impulse of a
special character. As all vegetable growth
demands an impulsion, a provocation, so also does
that mental growth which science names " intuition."
One does not arrive at an intuition by the paths of
induction-deduction; one grows into it. Were the
power of comprehending things so fashioned that
it could lay hold of, work up, and assimilate a
definite impulsion, as result there would blossom
forth such a sequence as could never be reached by
the path of experiment. A single impulsion, the
lighter coloured blood of the venous circulation in
the tropics, gave Robert Mayer his intuition. A
single impulsion, a remark in Cullen's Materia

84 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

Medico, about China and its characteristic of giving
rise to intermittent fever, supplied Hahnemann with
his intuition. A single impulse — so it is said — a
falling apple, furnished Newton with his intuition ;
and so on through many examples.

Such an intuition is the Buddha-thought also.
The sight of an aged man, a sick person, a corpse
— so says the legend — gave rise in the Buddha to
that impulsion which, worked up by him, and
proceeding to bud and bloom, drove him forth
from the home of his fathers, forced him into
asceticism, eventuating finally the ripe fruit of the
Buddha-teaching.

The Buddha-teaching is a pure intuition, is the
intuition, and proves itself such in that any attempt
to treat of it after the methods of science, to master
it inductively, is impossible.

Though I lay the Buddha-teaching before the
ablest scientific man that ever lived, it must always
remain for him an entirely insipid thing if his
intellectual faculty is not in such a condition as to
vibrate in harmony with it, react to the "provoca-
tion " offered, work it up, assimilate it.

As little as it can be proven that a given food
is nourishing for me — it can only be offered, and
I myself must eat, whereupon the food of itself
proves its own nutritive quality or its worthlessness
— just as little can the truth of the Buddha-thought
be proven: it can only be offered, and I myself must
try it, whereupon the thought is either worked up
as nourishing stimulus or rejected as entirely worth-
less. Here holds good the old saying: " Sapere
aude! "

The Buddha-thought is powerless in respect of

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 85

a mind to which it is not assimilable, as also is that
mind in respect of the Buddha-thought.

In respect of the teaching it is with such minds
as it is with many desert regions of the torrid zone
in regard to rain : their overheated soil prevents
the rain-clouds that pass over them year after year
from discharging their burden. They receive no
rain, not because they are soaking with water, but
because they are too parched and dry. They come
under the law of the circulus vitiosus. Because
they are rainless no vegetation can come ; and
because they are without vegetation no rain can
come. Here there is nothing to be done but wait
patiently until some time in the course of the
beginningless, incalculable play of world-events a
seed sprouts, a drop of water falls, and so a happier
circle sets in which, with the increasing vegetation,
increases the capacity for drawing down rain, and
with the increasing rain-fall increases the capacity
for bringing forth vegetation. In the selfsame
way, in the case of those minds that are overheated
with theories, there is nothing to be done but wait
patiently, point out and point out again and again,
until one day in the course of the beginningless,
incalculable play of world-events some first grain
of the teaching sprouts, some first drop of genuine
insight falls.

Strictly speaking, no intuition, whether appertain-
ing to the Buddha or to science, can be proven.
All so-called proofs are surreptitious proofs, as is
most clearly to be seen in the case of the scientific
proof of the law of the conservation of energy.
The value of an intuition admits of being measured
only by its usefulness as a working hypothesis.

86 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

And so with respect to the Buddha-thought, the
only thing to be done is to ask: " Of what use, of
what service is it as a working hypothesis ? "

If here it is of any service, a man will place
confidence in it. If a man places confidence in it,
he will reflect upon it. If he reflects upon it, he
allows his thoughts to dwell upon it. If he allows
his thoughts to dwell upon it, the more readily
will the possibility occur of the mind leaping to the
truth of the teaching and recognizing, " It is so ! '

All mental life is based upon the thought-
necessity of adequate cause. To it faith and
science alike are subject. But no science is able to
furnish any explanation as to what it is that this
necessity is founded on.

The Buddha furnishes this explanation by
showing that consciousness — as Ka??zma — is this
adequate cause itself. Hence the necessity that
wheresoever life runs its course under the configura-
tion of consciousness, this question as to adequate
causes is given along with it. So long as one fails
to grasp the fact that consciousness is force, i.e.
adequate cause, one seeks in phenomena that which
one is oneself, that which is accessible nowhere else
save only in oneself.

This it is which makes possible that scepticism
— as found in Hume, for example — which denies
that there is any actual causality at all. For the
adequate causes of happenings can never be proved,
since as forces they can never be perceptible to
sense. From this there follows the possibility of
unravelling a process to any exten! one chooses
without once coming upon anything to justify the
conception of causality. One must first have

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 87

understood that my consciousness, the conscious-
ness of the investigator, is this causality itself, if
one is to understand wherein lies the necessity of
seeing a causal relation everywhere — without seeing
it!

To arrive at the conception of causality by way
of experience is quite impossible. This has been
shown by Hume in masterly fashion. But his
escape from the difficulty by declaring this con-
ception to be a product of habit is all as mistaken
as the other device of declaring it to be a some-
thing given a priori to all experience. There is a
third alternative, lying between and above these
two opposites.

As from the polygon one could never arrive
at the conception of the circle, though one carried
the duplication of the angles never so far — one
would still be left with the concept of the polygon,
— so from the simple data, from the following upon
one another of two occurrences, one can never
arrive at the conception of causality though one
should multiply one's observations even to in-
finitude. One can only comprehend the circle
from the polygon, when the former is given as
ultimate concept (Grenzbegriff). In the selfsame
way one can only comprehend the causal relation
from the succession of events, when the former
is given as ultimate value (Grenzwert). This,
however, does not mean that it is a something
given a priori ; it only means that consciousness
itself is this ultimate value. Towards this it is
that all unwittingly one is striving when one sees
in events the causal relation and yet is unable to
furnish any explanation of it.

88 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

Such is the riddle of the logical necessity of the
law of adequate cause as solved by the Buddha.

Again : All mental life splits itself up into
these two divisions — faith and science.

Faith says, " There must be present a something
imperceptible to sense." Science says, "We are
unable to find anything imperceptible to sense
and therefore reject in principle any such con-
ception."

At this point the Master interposes and points
out that they are both of them right, because they
are both of them wrong, since neither of them
knows how to interpret " consciousness," i.e. oneself.
Consciousness, as Kamma, is the something im-
perceptible to sense, is the in-force, but it becomes
perceptible to sense for me, the individual, in the
course of its beginningless, self-acting development.
Such is the interpretation supplied by the Buddha
as to how it is possible for mental life to manifest
itself in the two contradictories, faith and science.

Again : Science makes shipwreck on the bound-
lessness, so to speak, of her results. Make a
beginning where she will, everywhere there opens
before her a new, unending series of facts, each
one of which in turn is the starting-point of another
unending series. And in science herself no point
of departure is to be found, proceeding from which
she might be able to account for this fact. She is
unable to say whether these series, converging,
move on towards a conclusion, or the reverse.

Here again the Buddha-thought proves its value
as a working hypothesis.

The entire world of actuality consists of an
endless number of self-sustaining processes.

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 89

The in-forces in virtue of which these processes
subsist are imperceptible to sense, save where they
become sense-perceptible to the individual himself
as consciousness.

This amounts to saying that I can comprehend
nothing but myself — that I can do nothing in
regard to the external world but react to it after a
fashion altogether inexhaustible — that, however,
despite the endless diversity of the symptoms
necessarily bound up with the same, a genuine
comprehension ever remains equally near and
equally far.

Whence, then, the fact of scientific law ? For
that science is in possession of genuine laws is
proven by her faculty of calculating in advance. If,
however, I can calculate in advance, this must mean
that I not only react but also really comprehend.

It is precisely upon scientific law that a peculiar
flood of light is thrown by the interpretation of
the play of world-events yielded by the Buddha-
thought.

Where the universe is nothing but an endless
number of combustion processes, there the whole
play of world-events is just the passage from one
process to the next, the self- adaptation of process
to process.

The play of world-events is law itself.

This, however, for the observing mind, also
implies the possibility of apprehending the play
of world-events as something that has law. As the
flame has light and heat because it is light and heat
— these themselves, so the play of world-events has
laws because it is law itself. The laws of science
are simply the outcome of an act of self-adaptation,

9o BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

self-accommodation to actuality. To use an illus-
tration : Science in its relations to nature resembles
an old body-servant who has studied his master's
ways long enough to be able to prophesy with
tolerable accuracy what his master will do then and
then under this or other circumstances — provided
only that he does not do something else !

Such is the position of science towards the in-
exhaustible play of world-events. The longer she
observes, with all the more probability of being
correct, she can tell beforehand what her master,
Nature, will do at this or the other moment under
such and such conditions — always supposing that
he does not go away and do something else quite
different !

All laws, even those that would appear to be
most surely established, in every case hold good
only up to the "now"; they may at any time be
overthrown by the succeeding " now." Even the
forecasts of astronomy — that pride of science — hold
good always only under the proviso that the entire
system within which the forecast applies, up till
then has not suffered a collision ; vulgarly put, that
up till then the world has not come to an end. In
fine, the forecasts of astronomy only hold good if
something else does not happen, to say nothing at
all of predictions in the field of biology, therapeutics,
and so forth.

And so science hobbles along at the tail of the
play of world-events, ever and again conforming
herself to it anew, as she tinkers and patches up her
" laws." And when she would fain have us believe
that in the end man may soar to the position of lord
of this world-process, she only resembles the fool in

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 91

the Indian saying, who shakes his stick at the
setting sun and then assumes great airs as if its
going down was all his doing.

If one has comprehended the Buddha, one com-
prehends that the human mind can do naught save
react in a manner that is altogether inexhaustible.
As through and through a process of combustion, in
every motion whether physical or psychical, I am
this reaction itself. I am positively nothing else
but just this reaction. The whole universe is
nothing but an eternal self-adaptation of process to
process.

Science in all its forms, without exception, is
nothing but a methodical description of occurrences.
All its "explanations," without exception, are only
so many skilful forms of description.

When in hours of despair she now and then
admits this herself, as Kirchhoff, for instance, has
done in his well-known saying, this only means that
she is making a virtue of necessity. And when E.
Mach also, in his Analyse der Empfindungen, says :
"One might imagine that the concern of physics is
the atoms, forces, laws, that to a certain extent
constitute the kernel of the sensible facts. Nothing
of the kind ! All practical and intellectual require-
ments are met so soon as our thoughts are able
completely to counterfeit the sensible facts," he
assumes with regard to nature the purely disin-
terested attitude of description, and in effect says
the same as Kirchhoff.

It may be said : —

" Provided only'that it were sufficiently abundant,
might it not be possible through description also at
last to attain to a genuine knowledge ? "

92 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

To this the answer is : —

By description, even though carried on to all
eternity, I attain nothing but the cognizing again
and again of a certain occurrence as such, even
under altered conditions, and in a state of disguise.
But this act of recognition has nothing whatever to
do with a genuine knowledge. I may meet a man
year after year on the street, recognize him in every
imaginable costume, be able to describe him with
the fullest detail, all without knowing the man
himself. And, to adapt this similitude to the
Buddha-thought : Even if some day this man of
himself should make himself known and say to me,
"My name is so-and-so; I am such-and-such a
person," this would still mean nothing but an
extension of the process of description. Really
to know and comprehend means to know the
energies at work in things. These, however, can
be got at only in one single case : there where the
individual comprehends them, i.e. in himself, in
consciousness. Every other kind of intercourse
betwixt me and the external world is all of it,
positively all, nothing but a reaction. I can de-
scribe but I cannot explain, though I set myself to
it never so scientifically. Though the intercourse
betwixt myself and another be never so intimate
the two /-worlds are for ever divided, the one from
the other. Self-luminous and illuminating only one-
self, each goes his own way through the beginning-
less infinitudes — a terrible thought when grasped
in all its fullness. But it is verily so : actuality is
terrible, and whoso fails to recognize it as such does
not know it.

Here it may be interposed : —

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 93

"If each single person can do naught save react
to the external world after his own individual
fashion, how is it ever possible to arrive at uni-
formity in impressions, ideas, concepts ? '

The answer is : —

By means of language such a thing becomes
possible. Again and again language misleads us
into thinking that solid bridges of thought stretch
from / to /. But when I say, " That is green,"
" That is a tree," and so forth, and another person
says the same, in strict truth we both agree only as
regards the form of words. Each reacts in his own
individual fashion, perceives his own "green," his
own "tree." The Buddha instructs us that this
individual perception and sensation also are merely
forms of the individual combustion- or alimentation-
process. These, too, are nourishment, a tasting,
just like that of the tongue. We all eat out of the
one disk — every one eater for himself.

" Whence, then, springs the uniformity found in
our terms of speech ? "

The answer is : —

Sounds are simply token-values. When I say,
"That is green," the statement conveys no definite
positive content of knowledge ; in making it I only
say, "That is not red, yellow, blue, and so forth."
And if I say, " That is red," by such a statement I
only say, " That is not green, yellow, blue, and so
forth." Thus, just as in an algebraical equation,
one sign repeatedly serves as the fellow-determinant
of another, and none possesses any positive content
of its own. Each merely announces that I react,
i.e. that I burn. I do not recognize a cherry tree
in itself, but only to the extent that it is not a plum

94 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

or an apple or a pear tree, and so forth. And I
recognize a plum tree just in so far as it is not a
cherry or an apple or a pear tree, and so forth. It
is a General Reciprocity Company, each member
of which gives the other credit without a single
member in the whole company possessing a penny
of solid capital ; in fine, a fraudulent concern which
the honest, upright thinker must keep a sharp eye
on if he would not be swindled.

" But whence comes language at all then ? "

To this question the reply is : Thence whence
I myself am come, whence thou thyself art come —
out of beginninglessness.

The miracle of language is as little to be
explained as the miracle of the /-process. There
is present a given beginningless something — the
world. And this thing given represents not only
a mere possibility, as science would have us believe
— whereby she lands herself in the predicament of
being obliged to explain how all our faculties could
have come to be — but it represents a power in
itself, in which the power of speech is just as much
implied, as a beginningless faculty, as the power
to see, to hear, to think, and so forth.

I turn back to our main subject.

All the seeming explanations furnished by
science are nothing else but more or less ingenious
and special forms of description founded solely
upon skilful adaptation. They assume the
semblance of explanations from the fact that an
impression of continuity is produced by an ever
more closely packed accumulation of momentary
forms. Such continuity, however, resembles the
continuity of a circumference made up of a number

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 95

of the smallest possible single parts : the greater
the appearance of continuity, all the greater in
reality, the discontinuity. The impulsion which
furnishes the actual connection between events —
the energies at work in occurrences, the real laws
of formation — are thus never touched on at all,
nay, they are deliberately ignored.

These eternally repeated attempts at adaptation
on the part of science may very well be likened to
the voyage of a vessel up stream through locks.
When one has come to a stand-still in a lock — that
is, when one has completed one act of adaptation —
one waits until sufficient water — that is, sufficient
new material in the shape of facts — has accumulated
to enable one to reach a new lock — that is, a new
act of adaptation.

This process of adaptation displays itself in its
most characteristic shape when it assumes that
epochal form known as " inversion of point of
view."

An example of such an epochal form of adaptation
to new factual material is to be found in the
inversion that took place in the astronomical idea
of the world when Copernicus displaced Ptolemy.
A similar inversion, but in the epistemological
domain, was effected by Kant, in terms of which
the conformity to law observed in phenomena was
lifted out of the occurrences and placed in the
mind observing them. Another such inversion,
but in the realm of biology, is the transition from
the old teleological view which said, " The eye
leads to seeing," to the modern mechanistic view
which says, " The eye results from seeing."

It is one of the most striking proofs of how little

96 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

science is acquainted with her own nature that she
extols these inversions as the greatest of her
achievements. Far from that, they are nothing
but the clearest possible expression of the fact that
the human mind can do nothing but limp along in
the wake of events ; and as it does so, the incon-
gruity, the lack of consonance, ofttimes becomes
so very pronounced that nothing short of a complete
revolution — some such inversion to wit — is needed
every little while to relieve the situation ?

Even the most successful of these inversions
ever remains but an effort at adjustment. The
Copernican inversion also is nothing but a useful
" reading " of the facts of the astronomical world.
When a sufficiency of new factual material has
accumulated, then just as men perforce were swept
away out of the Ptolemaic system, so in turn will
they be swept away perforce out of the Copernican.

That whereby science finds herself constrained
to make ever fresh adjustments, is experiment.
With reference to this latter she resembles the
neophyte in magic of Goethe's poem, with his
broom. One is in danger of drowning in the
superabundance of material, and knows not the
magic word wherewith to bring the irresistible
inflow of results to a stand-still.

Were the fresh facts which science is continually
bringing forward real stages on the way to
knowledge, then in the hour of death we could not
help but feel like the expiring caravan animal in
the desert, as with dying eyes it gazes after the
caravan that wends its way there before it towards
the longed-for goal now to itself for ever lost.
Death to the thinker would be a most terrible

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 97

occurrence, the hugest of all catastrophes. But
science does not wend its way towards any goal at
all. That question which science from her own
resources can never answer, as to whether her
endless series, converging, tend towards any goal,
finds answer thus in the Buddha-thought : We
can do naught save react, inexhaustibly react to
the external world, and so doing we alike remain
eternally near and eternally far from knowledge.

Science occupies herself with problems in varia-
tion and permutation. How were it possible for us to
know so terribly much if we actually knew anything ?
Exact science has to do only with relations. She
does not wish to know anything at all about things
themselves. Any such knowledge would be as
inconvenient to her as would be to an advocate
a too far-reaching confession on the part of his
clients. It is only this utter absence of misgiving
as to things themselves which really makes possible
scientific methods of procedure.

It is men of science themselves who are respon-
sible— partly intentionally and partly unintentionally
— for the mistaken, exaggerated ideas as to the
nature and value of science current among the laity.
One does not quite like to let people peep into pots.
One much prefers to appear before an astounded
public with results imposing by reason of their
completeness. With a certain kind of diffidence —
intelligible enough, by the way, to him who can see
behind the scenes — which, however, with no little
skill is so managed that along with the simple key-
note quite half a dozen overtones vibrate in unison,
— hopes, allusions to the future — one tenders one's
gift to the world, but does not at all care about

98 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

acquainting that world with the fact that at bottom
this gift is the simple product of a scientific
game of blind-man's buff, and " shut-your-eyes-and-
hit-the-pot ! " If it does not suit one way perhaps it
will the other. Every theory is the outcome of
trying, of testing. It was thus that Galileo himself
adjusted his intuition with respect to the law of
falling bodies. Thus did Kepler all his life "play"
against nature and finally — once for all — win the
game ; and so to all eternity will this playing
against, and these efforts at adjustment, go on. So
to all eternity will descriptions in the form of ex-
planations be brought forward — descriptions which,
strictly speaking, will convey no more than Reuter's
bon mot about destitution to the effect that it is the
result of " poverty."

I can describe with increasing exactitude the fall
of a body and formulate the laws that govern the
same. But all these descriptive details only assume
the character of an explanation through men in each
case interpolating as adequate cause the attractive
force of the earth. This latter, however, is purely
the creature of thought, a working hypothesis pure
and simple, advanced with the sole object of making
possible the comprehension of all single instances of
falling. From the purely epistemological point of
view, I am equally entitled to say that the force
of attraction results from the falling ; for it is only
from this, from a definite number of single instances
of the same, that the theory of the " attractive force
of the earth " is obtained.

With her working hypotheses science acts like a
man who, in order to relieve himself of troublesome
daily disbursements, pays out one lump sum of

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 99

money for the settlement of all these petty claims.
So science, in the place of countless daily, hourly — ■
yea, in the amplest sense of the words — continuous
incomprehensibilities of life, pays out one single,
great incomprehensibility in the shape of central
forces, atoms, ethers, out of which all the trifling
requirements of the day — the running expenses, so
to say — can now be met. The knowledge which
science supplies us is the most pregnant possible
expression for our ignorance. Were a genuine
comprehension in question, one would make a
speculation of it like a man who should buy up all
the tickets in a lottery in order to make sure of the
first prize.

From the position which science takes up
towards the play of world-events — that of potential
comprehensibility — she is obliged to combat every-
thing that would militate against this potential
comprehensibility. Hence the embittered fight
over the axioms of mathematics. Science, if she
would -xemain scienjcp, may Holgrate only what
springs from experience. But what springs from
ex^rfernr^'^analsjn be swept a way_ a gR in by ex-
>er ien ce7~"~Ssthe god Kronos devours his own
offspring' so, in reverse wise, does each young
experience devour its genitor. But it is just this
mobility, this, the complete relativity o_f her results;"
which lends to science her security. Were she
anywhere to strike against solid ground, against-
anythingTrotr springing from experience, it would
be with her as with a deep-sea vessel gone ashore :
she would be dashed to pieces by the crashing waves
of actuality.^ Of course there is no danger of any
such thing happening so long as science keeps to

too BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

her own domain, the re-actual world. As biology,
however, where she must encounter life itself, face
the fact consciousness, she is such a stranded ship as
long since must have gone to wreck under the
assaults of actuality did not physics time and again
come to her aid and support.

This is the interpretation of the fact " science " in
the Buddha-thought : We can do nothing but in-
exhaustibly react to a world which in its every
motion is law itself, and therefore offers the
possibility of a reading in accordance with law, but
in regard to its own essential nature for ever and
ever remains utterly beyond our reach.

Whence then the possibility of the human mind
ever and again adjusting itself anew to this inex-
haustible play of world-events ?

Because thinking itself is energy, therefore it
does not have the faculty, the power of adjustment,
but is this power itself. Thinking in every form,
even in the most vulgar, is a self-adjustment, and
the scientific form is distinguished from the lay form
only in this, that it is directed, set in play towards
definite ends ; hence, whatever is troublesome is here
dropped with more skill, and on the doing of this, in
the last resort, all scientific adjustment is founded.
Rightly does E. Mach say, in his Erhaltung der
Arbeit : " Science has almost made greater progress
through that which she has known how to ignore
than by that which she has taken into account."

Here for a first occasion I would bring that
reproach against science which in what follows in
treating of her problems will be frequently repeated :
She deprives us of the sense of actuality ; or, rather,
places it in a false object, the re-actual, whereby

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 101

she does just as much harm to honest thinking as
faith does by placing it in a non-actual, in the
transcendental.

There is only one actuality in the world — that
which I experience as such. To deprive us of this
pure actuality, to direct our attention towards a
world that can be " read " in the form of work done
— this I call a turning of genuine thinkers into
tradesmen whose one and only concern is the
establishing of advantageous relations with the
external world.

Gradually to win back the lost sense of actuality,
gradually again to arouse the feeling that there is a
given something present which as such cannot be
proven, not because unprovable in itself but because
proving itself by itself — a given something re-
presenting no mere possibility but a power — this
will be the first task of a time which itself feels in
every nerve and fibre that there's something rotten.
It is this blind running against all the facts of life,
this courage of pure folly ever and again excited
and supported by an overheated scientific imagina-
tion lacking in all self-control — it is this that we
must leave behind would we make good our claim
to be mentally adult.

— ' That science can furnish no real explanations
she herself admits with her calculation of prob-
abilities on the one hand and her philosophy
of probabilities on the other. Both require com-
promises with actuality, the ignoring of minimum
values, the equating of an endlessly great probability
with truth itself: in fine, an intellectual act of
violence. Whoever has his need of a world-theory
satisfied by Herbert Spencer's deductions, I should

io2 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

imagine he might also find it relieved by those of
Thomas Aquinas. And if any one maintains with
particular pride that his world-theory is based on
strictly scientific axioms, he perpetrates an in-
voluntary joke, inasmuch as he thereby says that
his world-theory is based upon an exact calculation
of probabilities ; for, when all is said and done, the
only exact thing about science is her calculation of
probability — that is, the freedom she takes to herself
to be inexact.

" What of mathematics ? " it may be asked.

But the higher mathematics which, in the con-
sideration of the world from the physical point of
view, comes into question before everything else,
is just the calculation of probabilities itself. And
it is with no actualities that geometry and algebra
deal, but with ultimate values — -that is, values that
are neither actual nor non-actual, but are given
with actuality, as for example, the horizon and the
ideal plane betwixt the air of the atmosphere and
the surface of a sheet of water are neither actual
nor non- actual, but merely things given with
actuality.

This is a point of the highest epistemological
importance which, so far as my knowledge goes,
has nowhere been taken into consideration ; to go
into it more fully, however, would here be out of
place. The Euclidean instruments — point, line,
superficies — are simply, ultimate values of like
kind ; hence, neither actual nor non-actual. To
operate with such ultimate values where the
problem of life, actuality, is concerned, and in such
operations to set out from mathematical truths, as
does the Kantian philosophy for instance — this

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 103

just means that one has failed to understand
actuality.

Mathematics is only possible where there are
identities. These, however, are to be found only
in the realm of ultimate values. Actuality has no
identities. Where there are nothing but combustion
processes, there each moment of existence is a
thing unique that never before has been and never
again will be.

Whoso has comprehended the play of world-
events after the manner of the Buddha._to_su.ch an
one it becomes ever more clear that science, with
her pretensions to furnish us at some^uJ;ure_date
with a genuine world-conception, resembles that
penniless wag who affixed "~a~Trofice~6iitside his door
bearing the inscription : " To-morrow I will pay
my debts." Science, to the question as to when
she finally means to pay what she owes to
humanity, a genuine world-conception, has always
but this one answer, " To-morrow ! "

Science might easily obtain a clear idea of her
own nature if only she would venture to think out
to a conclusion her own trains of thought.

The nature of every scientific world-conception
consists in comprehending the play of world-
events in its entirety, without residue, as relation
values. Herewith she remains stuck fast in what
may be called conclusionless comprehension. The
Buddha explains this fact in the manner already
shown ; science confronts this fact all uncomprehend-
ing_ofjts_im£ort, and therefore with some show of
justification can argue in this strain : —

" We are .undoubtedly making progress in com-
prehension, as is shown by our increasing capacity

io4 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

for determination in advance. Hence we are
justified in presuming the final link in our train of
thought — the entire play of world - events as a
summation of pure relation values — and in building
up for ourselves already the world - conception
which we are sure to reach in practice some time
in the future."

This is the world - conception which modern
physics calls her cosmogony of energetics — that is,
that ideal world which is wholly subject to the law
of the conservation of energy, and thus is conceived
of as consisting entirely of reversible processes not
dependent upon time.

Of course, the more discerning among modern
physicists now clearly perceive that the law of the
conservation of energy merely represents from the
limited standpoint of physics a reading of the play
of world-events. I f one forgets that, if one attempts
to make it cover actual processes, tries to work it
up into a world-theory, then not only does the
real nature of the law of the conservation of energy
come to light, but also the real nature of the whole
of science. For —

The law of the conservation of energy has sense
and meaning only in a closed system. In this fact
alone its purely hypothetical nature already stands
revealed ; for never under any conditions what-
soever can actuality have a closed system. Thus
at the very outset one has to make a compromise
with actuality, a proceeding that is justified only
where it is a question of achieving some practical
result.

If now one makes the law of the conservation of
energy into a universal law and on this erects a

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 105

world-theory, one is bound to posit the universe
itself as a closed system ; otherwise, to speak of a
universe in which the sum of all existent energies
remains constant were altogether meaningless.

With this, however, science puts herself in such
a position that, so soon as she ventures to think
things out to a conclusion, she robs herself of the
possibility of her own existence, as the following
considerations will make evident.

A universe such as this, consisting entirely of
relation values without residue, would be one huge
process of compensation, an endlessly diversified
fall from positions of higher to positions of lower
tension. It is just this mode of representation which
makes it possible for the physicist to calculate,
to determine in advance. He cannot set about
this his work at all until first after such a fashion
he has given a new interpretation to the play
of world-events. He must also, in similar wise,
mechanise the invisible matter of the molecules,
before he can master, so far as calculation goes,
what takes place internally. In thought, one must
loosen the existing connection between the molecules
in order to be able to establish the internal falls.
It is here as it is in a minuet : one takes a step
backward in order to be able to take a step forward !

But this is what the physicist dares to do. All
he is concerned about is to calculate, measure,
determine in advance. As a general rule he not
only says, " Apres nous le deluge" but also " Avant
nous le de'luge." He rejoices in his power of being
able to interpret and make use of the re-actual play
of world-events to suit his own ends, and for the
rest does not care a straw whence this power comes

106 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

or whither in the future it may go. He does not
think : lie only zvorks.

Now, so long as he preserves as physicist an
attitude of strict impartiality towards this universe,
the attitude of simple spectator, he may reach by
calculation, by technique, whatever so is reachable.
He stands before his universe as before an open
piece of clock-work in which with increasing
accuracy he observes the style and manner of its
running and formulates the laws of the same. If,
however, he allows himself to be led away into
working at a world-view, into putting the question
" Where will this clock-work run to? " he cuts the
ground from under his own feet.

For in such a universe there remains as
actuating impulsion nothing but the distinctions
given with the separate processes. It is just like
a pendulum ever hastening on towards a condition
of rest.

Now, since under the assumption in question —
a universe as a closed system — an influx of force
from without is excluded, what we have here is a
process of mutual borrowing, so to speak, and
cosmic bankruptcy is only a question of time.

This logical necessity is taken account of by
science in her entropy concept — the concept of the
whole universe as a process hastening towards
equilibrium, though that consummation be distant
by millions of years.

Therewith, however — presuming that she is
honest — science stands confronted by the following
question : —

Every difference of tension demands a something
that has established this difference. Where there

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 107

is a swinging pendulum it must originally have
received a push. If, however, the entire universe
is one single mass of differences in tension, the
impelling force can only lie outside the universe.
In other words : this force could only have been the
finger of a god. He it was, the Father-god, who
put all his capital of force into this universe, upon
which capital everything now feeds and will con-
tinue to feed until at length all is consumed, and
the great world-death comes which " He " alone
again can bid depart in communicating a fresh
impulsion of motion — if He should happen to feel
so disposed.

Of course science does not say, " Energy dis-
appears." Instead she says, " Energy only becomes
inert ; as such, however, remains conserved." This,
however, is about as sensible as if one should
say, " Heat does not disappear, it only becomes
cold ; as such, however, it remains conserved "
— an absurdity rightly denounced by thinking
minds among physicists, such as E. Mach, for
example.

And the conclusion of the whole matter ?

The colossal achievements of science upon which
is erected her cosmogony of energetics, have served
no other purpose but to look after those interests of
faith which faith itself dare not look after if it
wishes to retain its vitality. In her audacious
attempt to make light of the " imperceptible in
itself," the god-idea, as a mere rudiment of atavism,
science has made a pitiable shipwreck. By such
an attempt she only shows that she herself is an
apostate from the god-idea ; and to be honourable,
nothing is left her but to return as contrite vassal

108 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vi

to the ancient and sovereign race of those that are
"of Jehovah."

Should she, however, attempt to interpret the
play of world-events not as a fall, but try instead
to interpolate forces, then of necessity she must
resort to the hypothesis of central forces ; and, as
above she plays into the hands of the extra-cosmic
deity of monotheism, so here she plays into the
hands of the intra-cosmic deity of pantheism ; for
this central force, if really .believed in and not a
mere working hypothesis, would be nothing else
but the world-spirit of pantheism translated into
physical terms.

These two, faith and science, at their deepest
roots, share in one common nature, since both in
truth represent that grandest form of symbiosis
in which is made manifest the instinct of self-
preservation on the part of the universe — the
universe considered as the totality of all living
beings. When faith thinks things out it falls back
into the lap of science. When science thinks
things out it falls back into the lap of faith. And
both by their simple existence demonstrate the
truth of the Buddha-teaching that all mental life
perforce operates under the encumbrance of
ignorance. For let science, or rather the scientist
in person, place himself, if only temporarily and
for a specific purpose, at the artificial standpoint
of the mechanistic world-view, and so soon as he
really begins to think he jgives the lie to his own
scientific view, inasmuch as he everywhere works
with the concept of identity. Nay, he is never
even in a position to maintain a clear distinction
between the two points of view. This is proven

vi A WORKING HYPOTHESIS 109

by the problems of science, which, without exception,
are of a purely dialectical nature, inasmuch as they
all presuppose the erroneous concept of things
as identities.

Our task here is to throw the light of the
Buddha - thought upon these problems, and to
this task we now proceed to address ourselves.

VII.

BUDDHISM AND THE PROBLEM OF

PHYSICS

Were one to lay the Kamma teaching of the
Buddha before a physicist, in all likelihood he
would dismiss it with this objection : —

" Immediate passing over that cannot be put
to the proof in space and time is telekinesis.
Telekinesis is a fact only for faith. Accordingly,
Buddhism too, like every other religion, is a
religion of faith."

The scientifically-educated man would probably
concur in this train of thought. Hence, if Bud-
dhism is to have any prospect whatever of playing
a part in our intellectual life, it must offer a reply
to such a line of argument.

That reply would run somewhat as follows : —

Actuality, when, where, and howsoever it makes
itself manifest, really means nothing more than this
— action is present. For actuality is action, doing,
the power to do itself. It tells us, however, nothing
at all as to how this action is bound to take place.
Whence comes it then that science has the presump-
tion to dictate to actuality a definite kind of action
— would have it, so to speak, run along fixed
rails ?

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS in

The one-sided requirement of science that all
action must be mediate, demonstrable in space and
time, follows perforce from the position she takes
up towards nature.

Science is only possible where there is the
perceptible to sense — where there is what can be
compared.

Comparison is only possible where things are
so arranged that the actual energies can be
neglected. For every energy is something unique,
strictly individual, not comparable, as my con-
sciousness immediately proves to me.

This leaving out of account of the actual energies
is only possible in the world of reactions. Here
it is possible, and therefore also legitimate, to
regard any kind of process as a something constant
and complete, as a product, and correspondingly
to treat it as such. Every physicist knows that
the grocer's pound weight, as well as the grain of
his own scales, rigorously tested, to-morrow are
no longer the same as they were to-day. Never-
theless we make a compromise with actuality and
act as though they were the same. It suffices for
all practical purposes, and so is permissible. Here
one is not at all aiming at a world -theory ; one
only seeks to measure and weigh, and satisfy
certain needs.

This compromise with actuality — the looking
upon things as finished, completed — is forced upon
us by the idea of identity, with which all mental
life, without exception, operates. And the physicist
accommodates himself to this idea with his concept
of " body."

Body, in the physical acceptation of the word,

ii2 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vn

is nowhere to be found in actuality ; none the less
the physicist is justified in making use of this
idea so long as, in the pursuit of his aims, he
can do so with advantage — that is, so long as it
is a question of measuring and determining in
advance.

The re-actual point of view of science involves
as logical correlate the merging in one, of " motion "
as manifesting itself to sense, and "energy." Aught
else corresponding to energy besides motion itself
is not to be found in the re-actual world of the
physicist. Here motion is energy itself.

Under these two preliminary conditions — the
regarding of things as " bodies," and their motions
as energies themselves — the play of world-events
displays itself in its entirety to perception by the
senses ; and every effect is something mediate,
possible of being followed up in space and time.

But the movements that are perceptible to sense
are just as little the energies themselves as " bodies,"
in the physical acceptation of the word, are actuality.

The sensible motion is not the energy; it is only
the evidence that energies are present.

When two electro-magnets, placed in a certain
position with reference to each other, go through
circular movements, this does not mean that these
circular movements are the energies themselves ;
it only means that energies are there present, and
of themselves prove themselves such by producing
effects.

When a geyser discharges water every hour, it
does not mean that this kind of action is energy
itself; it means nothing more than that energies are
there present, and as such are at work.

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS 113

The earth's course round the sun does not re-
present energy itself; it means nothing more than
that energies are there present, and as such are at
work.

Motion is not energy itself, but the by-product
yielded by two systems of energies acting on each
other. This by-product will manifest itself, according
to circumstances and antecedent conditions, at one
time as circular, at another time as elliptical, at
another as rhythmical motion, and so forth.

In its essential nature this by-product — the move-
ment perceptible to sense — corresponds wholly and
completely to a shadow. As a shadow means
nothing save that light is present — it is nothing but
the by-product of two systems of energies, one
giving, the other receiving, light — so " movement "
means nothing save that energy is there present.
It is nothing but the by-product of two systems of
energies.

It is absolutely essential that the genuine thinker
should make this idea as to the intrinsic nature of
all motion his own. As little as it is possible ever
to draw from shadows any conclusion as to light
itself — saving the one conclusion that it must be
present — just as little is it possible ever to draw
from movements any conclusion as to the energies
themselves, saving only that they must be present.
The energies themselves withal remain wholly in-
accessible. As to whether these are transmitted
mediately or immediately, the fact " movement "
supplies no information whatever.

Here the physicist will say, "That the movements
are transmitted mediately is proved to me by ex-
periment, since I can intercept an energy on its

ii4 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vn

way at as many intermediate stations as I choose ;
hence, as mediate, can track its path."

But this is a grossly erroneous conclusion.

To be sure, if I have a magnet here and a needle
there, I can intercept the magnetic energy at as
many intermediate stations as I choose, and so
construct for myself a " path " for the energy. But
such a "path" is nothing but a dead line artificially
made up of momentary reactions whose continuity
is nothing actual and vital, but founded solely upon
the minuteness and multiplicity of the moments of
section.

Again the physicist may object : —

" We can measure exactly the speed with which
the energies propagate themselves, as, for example,
the time required for light to reach us from the
moons of Jupiter."

But this also is an erroneous conclusion.

Of course, the fact itself is beyond dispute. But
the time here mentioned does not represent the
transmission-speed of the energies themselves ; it
only informs us as to how much delay these have
encountered on their way ; whether the halting-
places have been very numerous and the stay at
each a long one. This time which the physicist
measures does not give the speed of transmission
of the energies, but only the time of their non-
transmission.

In accord with this is the incorrectness of
ordinary physical terminology. The physicist calls
light, heat, and so forth, energies themselves. But
light is not energy itself, but only a designation for
energies that lie for ever beyond our reach.

But once more I would call attention to the fact

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS 115

that this entire manner of conceiving of things as
" bodies," and of movements as energies themselves,
is quite legitimate on the part of the physicist so
long as he remains a physicist. It only becomes
illegitimate when, reaching out beyond the field of
reactions, it seeks to get itself recognized as a
world-theory — that is, when it would have actual
processes "read" in accordance with the like
scheme. For now there follows the claim one
makes upon nature that all her action shall manifest
itself mediately, as possible of being followed up in
time and space.

The illegitimate feature about this conception
arises from the fact that it poses itself with an
insoluble problem — the problem of telekinesis.

If one regards things as "bodies" in the
physical sense, and if upon this conception one
insists on erecting a world-theory, then one has to
solve the question : How can it ever be possible
for action to take place between separate bodies ? —
a question which involves the idea that every effect
produced by contact, even the very slightest, always
presents itself to thought as a form of telekinesis.
In other words : Everywhere effects are being pro-
duced, and yet one is unable to explain how they
can ever be brought about.

The insolubility of this problem is attributable
not to things but to thinking ; that is to say, it is a
problem of a purely dialectical nature.

In starting out from the conception " body " as a
thing complete in itself, identical with itself, one
cuts oneself off from the possibility of ever being
able to explain how one thing can act upon
another. In thought one has torn things out of

u6 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vn

their natural connection, and holds them fast
conceptually in this artificial isolation. Once I
make a thing a " body," no power in the world can
move it so as to bring it into contact with some
other thing ; as little so as any power in the world
can impart movement to a reflected image, taken
by itself. Just as such movement can only be
brought about through movement of the object
reflected, only from this can proceed, so contact
between things can only take place, proceeding
forth from the beholder, when he lets drop his false
notions and comprehends actuality unmodified as
that which it is — namely, perpetual coming together
into contact itself. Actuality is verily nothing but
the passing over from thing to thing — that is to
say, process. Actuality is not, as science would
fain have us believe, mere possibility — if so, it would
always be necessary first to have explained how
these possibilities could ever arrive at realization —
but actuality is a potency, and so, at every moment
of existence, self-realization itself.

If only actuality is rightly conceived of, the
question as to how action betwixt thing and thing
can take place simply loses all meaning. Actuality
is seen to be nothing but this action itself. Where
one is, thither one cannot go ; and what one is,
that none can become.

When physics, and with it science as a whole,
puts forward the claim that all action must be
capable of being tracked mediately in space and
time, it excludes itself from this requirement.
For, without exception, every case of action in its
own domain is to be read as a special instance
of telekinesis. But be it well noted, the concepts,

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS 117

action by contact and telekinesis, are not something
existent in themselves ; they are merely intel-
lectually-conceived functions of the purely artificial
concept " body." Where this concept is absent,
there is neither action by contact nor yet tele-
kinesis ; there the whole universe, as a totality of
combustion-processes, is action itself, but tells us
nothing whatever as to how action can come
about, or as to whether this action is mediate or
immediate.

How action proceeds can never be comprehended
from the observation of reactions, though one should
track these with never so much perseverance and
accuracy ; that can only be ascertained where one is
acquainted with the energies themselves.

In all the world there is but one single energy
that is open to approach — my own in-force which
becomes perceptible to me in consciousness. Thus
the question as to how action itself proceeds can
never be answered on the lines of induction : it can
only be experienced.

When one asks the Theras of Ceylon for an
illustration of how Kamma passes over from one
existence to the new location, the example of
teacher and pupil is that most frequently given.
As instruction, stimulation, pass over from teacher
to pupil, with effects that last throughout the latter's
entire lifetime, even so does Kamma pass over.

And just here we come upon something that lies
too close at hand for the ordinary person to give
much heed to it. Nothing is more strange to us
than actuality — that is, than we ourselves !

As a matter of fact, life in its entirety, as it
runs its course among human beings, is such an

n8 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vn

instance of immediate effectuation. All actuality is
immediate : it is only re-actuality that is mediate.
Wherever I actually am alive, I stand in the midst
of such immediate effectuations as mock at all
scientific calculations.

When two pairs of eyes encounter one another
and that springs up which we call love or hate, as
the case may be, this is an instance of immediate
passing over between two systems of energies. All
forms of mental excitement, all our numberless
sympathies and antipathies ; the mutual under-
standing between man and man, between man and
animal ; the unspoken self-revelation, self-discovery
between man and wife ; the communion between
mother and child ; — all these are immediate effectua-
tions. Each possibility of one giving an order to
another, of one obeying another ; all possibility of
life in communities, animal or human ; every
possibility of education, has its roots in such
immediate effectuations. But the very attempt to
enumerate them tends to beget the fallacious idea
that they are the exceptions. It is not so ! All
beings communicate with one another immediately.
In immediate effectuations we live, move, and have
our being. But through the re-actual apprehension
of things inculcated by science our sense of actuality
has become so dwarfed and stunted that we no
longer dare to take actuality as itself; nay, we do
not even know how to do so, but are disposed to
recognize it as such only when we can have it
handed us by some system of grains, feet, and
seconds.

All unspoiled, natural thinking and feeling
proceeds by way of immediate effectuation. The

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS 119

never wholly-eradicable idea of magic, as it still
survives to-day — one last little remnant of it — in the
form of " Sympatkiekuren" is nothing else but the
instinctive idea of the necessity for such effectuation.
How the nobleman of Capernaum would have
laughed if Professor X. had said to him, " When
you say to your servant, ' Do this ! ' and he does it,
that seems to you quite a natural thing. But in
strict truth this fact simply bristles with insuperable
difficulties from the point of view of exact scientific
explanation." It is the high privilege of our age
to listen with becoming awe to such-like profound
absurdities just because the sense of actuality is lost
to us, because through the insistence and authority
wherewith science has been able to make her re-
actual views prevail, we have finally come to the
point of believing in all seriousness that in the
actual, in things like eating and drinking, a pro-
ceeding indispensable to their proper performance
is carefully to count one, two, three !

Science dubs all immediate effectuations " mysti-
cal," and refuses to rest until she has extirpated all
such-like ideas. But the mystical is not that which
science understands by the term ; for to her the
mystical is nothing but the non-scientific. It is
actuality itself that is mystical. Apart from actuality
there is nothing mystical whatever ; for it is only
the actual, no matter where one lays hold of it, that
rolls back into the twilight of beginninglessness.
Beginninglessness is what is mystical, and my
consciousness the mystical itself. A miracle is
nothing mystical. For, if it happens, then it is
law ; and if it does not happen — why, then it
simply is not !

120 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vn

This immediate action of man upon man — this it
is that reveals to me how energies operate. When
a glance from my eye produces a "stir" in another
human being, this energical impulse is not obliged
to pass through all the media lying between, but
operates immediately. To be sure, an attempt is
made to read mechanically this fact also — to interpret
it in the form of psychic vibrations, subtlest etheric
waves ; and science and theosophic, spiritistic, and
all sorts of mysticism here go hand in hand. But
there is not the least necessity that it should be a
glance, a sound, or anything else of a positive
nature which moves another. A silence, a failure
to look may ofttimes be that which produces the
most striking psychic convulsions. To interpret
this, however, as a case of transmigrating vibrations,
were scarcely possible even for the boldest of
hypothesis-makers.

It is even so ! That which is most natural is
most strange to us. Here too, as with " conscious-
ness," it is a case of sapere aude ! We simply
must learn again to dare to take actuality for that
which it is — for that which acts there where it can
and must act.

When love springs up between two beings, this
means that unique attunement prevails. This,
however, signifies that energy passes over im-
mediately. It has no need first to wrestle with
air and ether molecules : it exists there only where it
acts, and it acts there only where it is uniquely
attuned.

This is the way in which actual energies operate.
This way cannot be proven inductively : it can
only be experienced intuitively. And it is this

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS 121

experience which supplies us with our parallel,
our point of support, in comprehending how Kamma
works. And only because we have lapsed out of
this actual life into the re-actual life of science,
has the Kamma-teaching become strange and
unnatural to us.

The value of an intuition to him who has not
himself experienced it, is only measurable by the
extent to which it is of service as a working
hypothesis.

Of what service is the Buddha-thought here ?

In the first place, it makes it possible to "read"
both kinds of motion, the inorganic as well as the
organic, the falling as well as the proceeding, from
one common point of view.

Where the whole actual play of world-events
is a summation of self-sustaining processes,
existence is action itself; and the simple existence
of an energical, of a Kammic system, purports that
it makes itself felt with regard to other systems
of energies — sustains itself in opposition to them.
Actuality is devouring : man in his very nature
an eater.

Where there are a number of energical systems,
they act against one another. Where there is
action, the corresponding reactions are present in
the shape of motions perceptible to sense.

These latter, here also, signify nothing save
that energies are present, and as such are at
work according to circumstances and antecedent
conditions.

When two men, in wrestling with each other,
fall into a whirling movement, this by no means
implies that there resides in these men an energy

122 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vn

of this particular variety ; it means nothing more
than that energies are present, even as the circular
movement of two electro-magnets intimates nothing
more than that energies are present. Here also
motion is only a by-product, the equivalent of the
shadow in the case of light — nothing in and of
itself. When the flower unfolds itself to the sun,
when the creeper draws itself up towards the light,
when the caterpillar crawls along the leaf, when
the wild geese cleave the air like a wedge, when
the dog snaps at the tit-bit, when I lift my arm,
lie down, get up, do this or the other thing — in
each case it is the same. All this only intimates
that energies are present, and in the course of
their action against other systems of energies
yield by-products. In this mode of apprehending
the fact " motion " as the shadow of energy the
entire play of world-events, organic as well as
inorganic nature, the dead as the living, the
re-actual as the actual, admits of one uniform
reading.

Secondly : —

In her fight against "telekinesis," it is with
science as with one who in public discourses
eloquently on enlightenment, but whose own house
is haunted by a ghost.

This hobgoblin of exact science is gravitation ;
and it bids fair to scatter all exactitude to the
winds, since the physicist, too, is unable to represent
it to himself otherwise than as acting independent
of time.

In the Buddha-thought this independence of
time permits of being " read " without the least
difficulty, since here it is nothing but the by-product

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS 123

which two systems of energies acting upon one
another yield with every alteration of energy-value
on one side or the other. When I shift the light
with reference to the object illumined, the move-
ment of the shadow takes place as a by-product
independent of time. In the selfsame way, what
we call gravitation is nothing but the by-product
independent of time which informs us that a change
is taking place in the energical relation of two
world-systems.

Thirdly : —

The Buddha-thought furnishes a reading of the
concept of time and space.

Time and space as something existent in them-
selves are only possible where one is working with
"bodies" in the physical sense, where one is
operating with identities. Such bodies have need
of a space existent in itself in order to perform
movements ; and, as a matter of fact, physics so
completely objectifies the conception of space that
it does not hesitate to make the attempt to
determine the curvature-measurement of space.
Such bodies, further, require time as something
objective in order to traverse this space. An
objective time and an objective space represent, so
to speak, the ordinate and abscissa of the artificial
system "body" as conceived of by the physicist.
If one does not work with such " bodies," but, as a
philosopher, with things regarded as mere " appear-
ances " — like Kant, for instance — then time and
space, from being things purely objective, must
become just as much things purely subjective —
forms of perception given a priori ; the one view
as erring as the other !

i24 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vn

"Avoiding both extremes, the Buddha points to
the truth in the mean." This continually-recurrent
phrase applies, as everywhere, so also here in the
strife of opposites. Actuality has no opposites. It
is the union of opposites itself. And wherever
contention reigns of or about opposites, it only
shows that both parties alike have become entangled
in pseudo-problems of a purely dialectical nature.
This the seeker for truth may depend on, as a rule
that has no exceptions : Where there are opposites,
there is nescience ! Whence it follows that there is
no solution from the side of things, but only from
the side of thinking, in the rectification of our mental
assumptions.

So also is it here.

Where the actual play of world-events is compre-
hended as a summation of individual combustion-
processes, time and space are things neither purely
objective nor purely subjective, but belonging
equally to both — a Becoming, like everything else.
They arise, spring up, in the effectuation of the
/- process with respect to the external world
wheresoever the preliminary conditions are such
that they can and must unfold themselves ; in
just the same way that consciousness arises in the
effectuation of the /-process with respect to the
external world wheresoever the preliminary con-
ditions are so regulated that it can and must un-
fold itself.

So much for the Kamma-teaching, and its bearing
upon the claims of modern physics.

Immediate passing over does not contradict
actuality, but only the artificial premises of science.
All that is actual is immediate. For this reason a

vii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSICS 125

passing over of the actual in time and space is an
absurdity, since time and space are, first and fore-
most, functions of the actual, forms of experience,
hence never can be made to serve as measure of this
experience.

VIII

BUDDHISM AND THE PROBLEM OF
PHYSIOLOGY

In the position it assumes towards actuality
science resembles a man who has reduced all
language to mere grammar and now finds himself
hard put to it to explain how purely grammatical
signs and formulae could ever have given rise to
actual speech. As grammar presupposes actual
speech — is secondary, derived from it — so the
mechanical, re-actual view presupposes actuality —
is secondary, derived from it — and it is against all
common-sense to seek now to turn the tables with
an endeavour to prove the possibility of the living
language " actuality," assess its title to existence,
by the "grammar" of the scientific conception of
things. From this position, the fact that anything
ever happens at all, remains an eternally unfathom-
able mystery.

The first claim upon the genuine thinker is that he
should understand clearly that a something given is
present, whose simple existence represents also the
power to exist ; whose activity has no need of being
proven, since proving itself by itself. The en-
deavours of science from its re-actual position, to
govern and administer actuality itself also, betray a

126

viii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOLOGY 127

limitedness and crudity of thought at which later
generations will stand amazed. So long as science
fails tolunderstand and respect her natural limitations,
so long as she keeps trying to interpret the actual
mechanically, so long is she as serious a danger to
the world as faith.

In the treatment of the problem of physiology
that follows I can be brief, because all the details
here relate to a technical domain to which the
majority of my readers are unlikely to bring either
interest or ability to understand.

Just as physics — in the widest sense of the word
— may be briefly designated as the teaching that
informs us of the relations existing between
"bodies," so physiology may be succinctly termed
the teaching that instructs us as to the relations ex-
istent between living beings and the external world.

Where living beings are comprehended as pro-
cesses of combustion pure and simple, every relation-
ship betwixt them and their environment becomes
a form of alimentation. The intellectual as the
vegetative, the psychic as the physical life, are here
comprised under the one common, all - inclusive
concept of alimentation. Whether I appropriate,
assimilate something to myself through the organs
of sense and thought or through the tongue and
the digestive apparatus, both proceedings are the
same — forms of alimentation.

Accordingly we find the Buddha calling living
beings " aharatthitika," i.e. "existing through
alimentation," and placing this expression — as
synonymous — alongside " sankharatthitika," i.e.
"existing through Sankhara," compounded, con-
ditioned.

128 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vm

Here in their every movement the entire
existence of living beings becomes a laying hold of
the external world— -a gross laying hold with hands
and teeth as well as that subtle ??iental laying hold
which we generally denominate "comprehension."
As the whole existence of a flame is a laying hold
of the external world, as it subsists solely by
reason of this prehensile activity, even so is it with
the /-process.

Buddhist psychology distinguishes between four
varieties of aliment. First, there is aliment in the
common, vulgar sense of the word, be it in gross
growth-promoting form as solid or liquid food, be
it in fine growth -promoting form as respiration.
Second, contact, as the mutual encounter of the
senses and their corresponding objects. Third,
mental apprehension ; and fourth, consciousness ;
these two latter being the working up, the assimilat-
ing of what issues from contact.

From the commanding height of the position
which Buddhist thinking takes up towards the
process of life, it cannot possibly encounter that
"problem" with which scientific physiology finds
itself forced to wrestle.

Briefly stated, that problem runs as follows : —

" How can it ever be possible for a living being
to appropriate something to itself, assimilate some-
thing, take up something into itself, whether this
'something' be of the gross growth-promoting
variety — nourishment in the vulgar sense of the
word — or of the intellectual sort, as sense im-
pressions and the content of consciousness ? "

There was a time in the history of natural
science, more particularly in the history of the

vin THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOLOGY 129

healing art — and that time is hardly past yet ; we
still stand within its fringes — when to work at all
with the concept of a " vital energy " was regarded
as synonymous with being unscientific, indeed, was
esteemed mere blind faith. At every opportunity,
seasonable and unseasonable, it was declared that
"to-day" we had no longer any need of a "vital
energy," that the mechanical view explained all
that very much better ; yet, in actual truth, one
only showed how wanting one was in the sense of
actuality when one could accept as satisfactory a
"reading" of life which presented it under the
figure of endosmotic and diosmotic processes, and
such like.

Here, however, is abundantly proved true that
saying of Horace that nature is something which
man cannot drag out even with a pitchfork ; and
it was with a pitchfork of the biggest sort that the
mechanists took the field against actual life. To-
day the antithesis of the mechanical view — the
teleological — has found its way back into medical
thought, and begins again to move about naturally
and without restraint in the domain of therapeutics.

Beyond all else, it was the progress made in
physiological chemistry, the peculiar, seemingly
inexplicable facts here observed, which perforce
impelled towards this inversion of positions.

Here in the domain of physiological chemistry
there come to light processes, reactions, which make
a mock of all the rules and laws got from re-agent
tubes. Here in the living organism it is found that
the "strongest" acid — sulphuric acid — is crowded
out of its combinations by the " weakest " — carbonic
acid ; which means nothing else but that the

mo BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vm

■3

concept of "strength" as it has been taken over
from inorganic nature does not apply here at all.
By reason of such experiences it has been found
necessary to introduce a new concept, that of
"avidity"; in other words, here as everywhere,
one hobbles along at the heels of the facts of
actuality, being obliged ever and again to adapt
oneself to them anew as best one may.

Here in the living organism, albumen, fats, and
carbohydrates are worked up at temperatures at
which they undergo no change under the action of
the oxygen of the atmosphere. The most marvellous
thing of all, however, is the action of the glands,
which, in taking up the material to be elaborated,
display a power of choice that, so far as our ideas
go, defies all explanation. Not the least regard
is here paid to chemical and physical laws as
abstracted by science from inorganic nature.
Complete arbitrariness prevails. The epithelium
of the stomach, for example, possesses the power of
always despatching the hydric chloride set free
from sodium chloride in one direction — namely,
into the excretory ducts of the rennet glands, and
of always sending the sodium carbonate formed in
another direction, back into the lymph and blood
circulation.

Examples such as this might be multiplied to
almost any extent, did we here aim at completeness.

The key-word to it all, as revealed to us by the
latest researches in physiological chemistry, is —
arbitrariness !

Of course, as everywhere so also here, only give
her time enough and science will come round to
adjustments in thought, and with that to the

viii THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOLOGY 131

formulation of all such facts into laws. In respect
of such facts, however, it must clearly be understood
that the purely mechanical view is no longer able
to hold the field ; that the teleological view has
broken through the artificial embankments of the
mechanical view and again poured forth over the
level lands of scientific thinking.

That which has hitherto given such weight to
the mechanical view in physiology is the possibility,
up to a certain degree, of reading the physiological
facts mechanically. One can " read " the eye so
far as its external apparatus is concerned, according
to the laws of catoptrics and dioptrics ; but the
bearing of this upon the faculty of seeing or upon
an explanation of that faculty is simply nothing.
This is not the fitting place to deal with the revolt-
ing outrage upon sound thinking of which the
scientific theory of vision is guilty in its interpreta-
tion of the reversed retinal image : that demands a
chapter to itself.

One may " read " the heart and the vascular
system as a pumping contrivance, and the osseous
system and its joints as an arrangement of levers.
One may reckon in heat-units the nutrition-values
taken in and given off, and equilibrate them with
tolerable success, as can also be done with a
calorimeter; that is to say, one can "read" the
living organism in accordance with the formula of
the law of the conservation of energy. But nothing
thereby is gained that is of the slightest assistance
towards a comprehension of the actual energies at
work in all these functions, except in so far as to
the genuine thinker all this makes more vital and
pressing the question as to what precisely that

132 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vm

wonderful something is which pulls the strings.
And if one school of science would like to make us
believe that on the basis of an ever-increasing
facility in " reading " the organism mechanically
the question as to actuating energies may in the
end be completely disposed of, as referring to
quantities so minute as to be negligible, it need not
be taken seriously ; it only resembles a man who
would account for the revolution of a wheel solely
from the shape and texture of the wood.

That which along with the results of physiological
chemistry helped towards the overthrow of the
mechanical view, was the new tendency in thera-
peutics— serum therapeutics, to wit — which, put
briefly, amounts to a working out of specific
affinities between the living organism and certain
organic substances.

As the physiological chemist was forced to note
that he had fallen out of the realm of crude but
easily-handled quantities into the realm of un-
accountable qualities — that is, out of re-actuality
into actuality — so was it with the experimenter in
these specific remedies. One was obliged to take
note that in this field the grossly quantitative
according to mass and weight no longer went for
anything. Ehrlich calls the antitoxins " magic
bullets " which hit their mark immediately. Here it
is no longer a question of the mere more or less by
which one has hitherto been accustomed to gauge
effects, but of an attunement more or less fine and
delicate. In short, one has forced one's way into
the domain of actual energies and seeks gropingly
after one or another method of accommodation. For
the quantitative position may not be abandoned

vin THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOLOGY 133

entirely if one would remain scientific. One must
be able to measure. Actual energies, however, do
not admit of being measured by dead material.
They are only to be measured through themselves,
i.e. through their working.

Already more than a hundred years ago,
Hahnemann, the founder of the homoeopathic
method of treating disease, consciously and com-
pletely abandoned the crude quantitative position
in the field of medical science. He had freed
himself entirely from the quantitative conception of
curative effect. He called his remedies "potencies,"
and this potency was determined not according to
mass but according to the fineness, the delicacy of
the mutual accord between the organism and the
remedy. This mutual accord, however, grows
subtler, more acute, with progressive dematerializa-
tion, with the freeing of the active energies resident
in the remedies from the burden of their ballast of
material. Hence the apparently paradoxical idea
that the curative effect augmented with the diminu-
tion of the dose — an idea which has given the
doctors of the orthodox schools such abundant
occasion for misunderstanding and barbed raillery.
The effectiveness is not increased with the lessening
of the dose, but with the subtilization of the unique
accords concerned. Hahnemann had the courage
to bring his thinking into line with the actual
energies and their manner of working — a courage
which modern serum therapeutics does not possess,
and quite likely never will possess, so that we may
look to see the wave of actuality which here has
burst upon therapeutic life again crushed under by
re-actual tendencies.

134 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vm

Wherever opposites are found, there mere
dialectical problems form the subject of contention.
The contradictions between the mechanical and
the teleological views with respect to the living
organism are also of a purely dialectical nature.
Both take up the position that the organism is an
identity, and accordingly a something so constituted
that it can take nutriment into itself. Both alike,
teleology as mechanism, looking upon the cell as
life itself, make it their endeavour to master the
miracle of that life ; the former, as a result of its
efforts, coming to the conclusion that a vital force,
an incomprehensible something in itself, must some-
where lie concealed in this wonderful machinery ;
whilst the latter pushes on unswervingly towards
the goal it has set before itself — that of becoming,
by ever closer and closer description, master at
length of the great riddle.

As everywhere, so also here, the Buddha stands
between and above these two opposites, inasmuch
as he teaches : —

A living being so constituted that it must and
can take up something into itself, simply does not
exist. Such a living being is only to be found
where one is dealing with the concept of identities.
But identities are nowhere to be found within the
domain of actuality. Here are only processes of
combustion. If one sets out with the concept of
identities, one creates for oneself a problem whose
insolubility proceeds as much from its purely
dialectical nature as the problem of telekinesis in
physics. If one abides by the actual, if one holds
strictly to the insight that living beings are
individual processes of combustion, then there exist

vin THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOLOGY 135

nothing but energies which for a certain period of
time put a body of material specifically belonging
to themselves in a specific condition of tension, for
a time maintain it so, and then after a time again
abandon it. Here the cell is not life itself, but
simply the most primitive structural expression of
the fact that certain materials find themselves in a
certain state of tension, in the same way that the
ridges and furrows in a Chladni's sound-figure are
a structural expression of the fact that a certain
material — some sand on a glass plate — finds itself
in a certain state of tension.

This whole body of phenomena is by physiology
termed the " circulation of matter." But there is
here no "/" as an identity that takes up matter
into itself, melts it down, and — so to speak — gives
it forth again as new coinage. Nowhere in the
universe are there any unstamped values, nowhere
is there any raw material of substance, but always
and everywhere only a recoining : a continuous
change in the individual conditions of tension which
as little warrants the idea of "resorption" — taken
literally — as the flame, or the wind that for a certain
space of time whirls up and holds a certain particle
of sand in a certain form. An appropriation, a
taking up into oneself, can only take place where
there is a proprietor able to take something into
his house. But actuality does not permit of any
such comfortable ideas. Here are nothing but
energies that continuously lay hold, pull to them-
selves, and maintain what has thus been pulled,
under the influence of their individual tendency,
until such time as other energies make their
presence felt in superior force, whereupon the

136 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vm

tension is dissolved here, only to assert itself anew
elsewhere.

Whatever may be manifest as form in the living
being, from the gross forms of the limbs down to
the cell, to its protoplasm, to its nucleus, to the
ever-new marvels of the structure of its body — it is
all alike one material, maintained by one individual
energy in an individual state of tension.

I do not have the marvel of alimentation as my
function, but I am all this itself; and beyond this,
nothing ! That, however, I am this individual,
unique being — of this the antecedent conditions lie
buried deep in beginninglessness.

Kamma is an individual energy : as such it is a
thing unique : as unique it seizes hold of Kammic,
i.e. unique material, whereof the uniqueness is
proven in the fact that Kamma evolves therefrom
a unique being, an individual. If all this marvel
of alimentation, this marvel of sight, hearing, and
so forth, were obliged to come about as a some-
thing entirely new only through external pre-
conditions, never could it come about at all. I
learn to see, hear, taste, and so forth, as the flame
learns to burn, the flower to blow. All this, down
even to the minutest detail, lies ready, prepared
beforehand, in the material ; and it needs but the
stimulator — which, just because it is a question of
a unique material, must also be a thing unique
— in order to have all these properties brought
into play, have them set in full activity.

The material lineage of the living being is per-
force as beginningless as the Kamma lineage ; but
whilst the beginninglessness of the latter manifests
itself only immediately in consciousness, the be-

vin THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOLOGY 137

ginninglessness of the former admits of being com-
prehended only mediately as a logical deduction.

" Suppose, O monks, that a man were to cut
down all the grass and leaves in this Jambudlpa
[India], and, gathering them together, take one
handful after another and say (at each handful),
' This is my mother ; this is my mother's mother,'
there would never be any end to the mother's
mother of such a man ; but all the grass and leaves
in Jambudlpa well might run out, well might
come to an end." *

Both lineages, the material as the Kammic, are
a beginningless, reciprocal, each-to-other self-attune-
ment, in a universe that in its every motion is law
itself.

To this we shall have to return in the succeeding
essay, in treating of the problem of heredity.

The man of science will say, " It is no very
difficult matter to explain everything if one simply
refers everything back to beginninglessness, and
assigns as reason for the fact that everything is as
it is, that in accordance with the natural conditions
of growth it has been obliged to come about thus
and not otherwise."

To this it may be said in reply that the Buddha-
" reading" of the play of world-events is productive
of but little for science, being that reading which
is actuality itself — which takes and leaves actuality
as that which it is, thereby shutting off the very
possibility of all those learned and profound re-
searches which accrue to science in such abundant
measure through its endeavours to have actuality
become actuality only under its own hands, so to

1 Samyntta Nikaya, ii. 15, 3.

138 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE vm

speak ; in somewhat the same way that I, the living
being, exist to a magistrate, not as myself, but only
in virtue of certain identification papers.

Besides, the Buddha - thought is an intuition.
And the value of an intuition is made manifest
solely in its use as a working hypothesis.

As a working hypothesis, then, of what service
is the Buddha-thought in the domain of physiology?

The answer is : —

It alone explains the possibility alike of disease
and of cure.

Neither for science — that is, in the purely
mechanical manner of regarding the living being
— nor for faith — that is, where living beings are
represented as endowed with soul — is disease — and
therewith cure — a conceivability. As well to a
thing divine as to a purely mechanical fall, disease
were an unattainable capability. Man only can
fall ill — the man whom the Buddha points out to us,
the man who through and through is a combustion, an
alimentation-process, with whom at every moment
of his existence energy and material stand in mutual
functional dependence each upon the other. Corre-
spondingly, it is only in a process thus constituted
that the fact of cure is capable of explanation.

By the term cure I understand the fact that a
single incitation develops a reaction which no longer
stands in any kind of working relationship to the
original impulse, but goes on developing itself as
a self-acting increase. Such a proceeding is possible
neither with a purely mechanical process of com-
pensation nor yet with a "force in itself." It is only
possible there where an energy and its material
stand in a relation of mutual functional dependence.

vin THE PROBLEM OF PHYSIOLOGY 139

The fact also that diseases permit of being
affected by the power of the mind, by thought, is
possible of explanation only where an individual
energy and its material stand in a relationship of
mutual dependence.

All the numberless instances of the influence of
the mind over the body, of the body over the mind ;
all our " moods " of good and ill-humour ; further,
the acquisition of habits and the physical necessity
of sleep, are explicable only in the Buddha-thought.

It may be interposed : —

" We have not the least need of the Buddha in
order to see that. We have long since recognized
the mutual dependence of mind and body as a
necessity."

Very good ! But if you have really recognized
that, you must also draw the conclusions unavoidably
consequent upon the same, and these consist in the
intellectual necessity of individual beginninglessness.
If you have not understood that, then you have
understood neither the Buddha, nor actuality, nor
yourselves. You have not understood the truth ;
you only meet it, as two cross-roads meet one
another and then pass on in opposite directions.
Individual beginninglessness is the key-word, the
guiding clue to the Buddha-thought.

And with this we come to that most important
of all problems, the problem of heredity.

BUDDHISM AND THE PROBLEM OF

BIOLOGY

To the question, " Whence have I sprung ? " faith
answers, " From God," while science answers,
" From your parents." Faith calls men the children
of their Father in heaven ; science calls them the
children of their begetter.

Meanwhile this discrepancy means no more than
that the answer of science, couched in such a form,
despite its apparent accuracy yields men no satis-
faction. For that I am descended from my parents,
on this no rational being can cast a doubt ; and if the
believer says that beings have sprung from God, he
can only mean this in some particular respect.

Upon what foundation rests the necessity for
this peculiar interpretation of facts patent to all
eyes — the facts concerned with procreation ?

All things in the world may be divided up into
two great classes — things that admit of being
generalized, and things that do not admit of being
generalized. Of these, the former alone lie within
reach of science, for science comes into play only
where comparison and repetition are possible,
comparison being a generalization in regard to
what is presented simultaneously, and repetition a

140

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 141

generalization in respect of what is presented in
succession. Living beings do not admit of being
either compared or repeated, hence cannot become
a subject of science.

In one particular regard, it is true, living beings
may be conceived of as open to comparison and
repetition ; but this, as pointed out, has to do only
with that in the individual which precisely in a
certain specific elaboration can be rendered capable
of comparison and repetition — namely, that in me
which is re-actual, not the actual, not that which
says, "/am."1 As this latter I can neither be
compared nor repeated. As a being endowed with
consciousness, I am a something unique, a unity —
more correctly, a non-duality ; and here is to be
found the reason why the answer given by science
never satisfies and never can satisfy. Heredity
requires the single-branched tracing back of one
being to another. I bestow no theory of heredity
upon a flame when, on the one hand, I trace it
back to the kindling wood, and on the other to the
oxygen of the atmosphere. The answer of science,
however, would have me, the unity, arise out of
two other unities, father and mother, each of whom
in their turn would spring from two other unities,
and so on in geometrical progression ; thus, in
place of a single-branched tracing back, one infinite
in its ramifications. Hence the answer of science
is lacking in that which it is bound to supply if it is

1 When a modern writer, like T. Loeb in his Dynamik der Lebenser-
scheinungen, declares living beings to be machines "which consist essentially
of colloidal matter possessing the property of automatic alimentation and
reproduction," the statement has about as much value as if one should think
to explain the arc-light as something that consists essentially of a stick of
carbon possessing the property of automatically lighting itself every evening
and burning throughout the night.

142 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

to satisfy the thinker. As a something unique I
am a something singly determined. If, however,
I were nothing but the product of the union of an
ovum-cell and a sperm-cell, there would positively
be nothing present to make it necessary that pre-
cisely I should spring from this ovum-cell and this
sperm-cell. I could just as well have sprung from
the cell material out of which, as a matter of fact,
my brother has come forth ; while he, on his part,
could just as well have come from the cell material
from which in the actual event I have come. The
uniquely determined goes by the board. But that
that which "/" now am, might just as well have
been some other I, — such an idea is a self-evident
absurdity. It is not the cell matter alone that
does make up the "/." The cell matter is only so
much working material of a particular kind, and a
something uniquely determining this material must
appear on the scene, otherwise there would offer no
possibility whatever of the fact, "I" To think to
explain me by the cell matter alone were somewhat
the same as thinking to explain the flame by the
kindling wood and the oxygen of the atmosphere,
exclusively.

Of such an Hebraic conception of the matter —
to speak like Humboldt — no physicist would ever
be guilty ; but the biologist is. The manner in
which he deals with the problem of heredity is
Hebraic in the fullest sense of the word, and so
fashioned that it cannot help but tumble to the
ground simply of its own weight. Assuming
beforehand the identity of " life " and " cell,"
endeavour is made to solve the riddle of life by
means of description alone, the way leading from

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 143

the material of generation to the new living being
plotted out with ever increasing exactitude until
finally an apparently uninterrupted succession stands
before us ; where, to be sure, it is conveniently
forgotten that its seeming continuity is solely due to
the fineness, the delicacy, of the isolated momentary
images. As little as I can fabricate actual, living
movement out of a series of stereoscopic pictures,
though making never so slight the duration of each
separate picture, just as little is the process of
generation to be comprehended by mere descrip-
tion, even though it bring before us a simply
endless number of phases of development. Still,
I can lull myself with the delusion that by this
method I am drawing ever nearer to my goal, and
that salvation lies simply in the fineness of the
lenses, the delicacy and ingenuity of the modes of
colouring, and in patience. But far other powers
than these are required for the solving of the riddle
of life. For upon this line of inquiry one remains
ever and always concerned with reactions. Let the
discoveries thus made, the new demonstrations of
the entire process supplied, be never so novel,
never so interesting, withal they remain reactions,
and tell us nothing save that energies must be
present ; never a word do they say bearing on these
latter themselves.

This is not the place to go more closely into
the details which physiology and embryology have
brought to the light of day in the course of their
increasingly accurate demonstration of the germina-
tion process. It must suffice to point out that all
these results without exception have to do with
reactions, and say nothing — absolutely nothing —

144 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

about the essential nature of what takes place — a
fact which sufficiently indicates the extent of their
value. The question as to how it is possible that a
man, a living being, can be developed out of a cell,
is one that is never even broached upon this line
of inquiry. The question as to actual energies is
here set aside unintentionally, as in the mechanical
world - theory of the physicist it is excluded
deliberately.

The reading which the Buddha-thought supplies
on this question already, in what has gone before,1
has been sufficiently worked out, and so need only
be briefly summarized here. It runs as follows : —

The whole insoluble problem of heredity only
arises, as with the problem of the effecting of contact
and the problem of nutrition, through working with
fixed quantities, with identities. As in physics one
asks, "How can two bodies come into contact?"
thus putting a question the answering of which is
already estopped with the simple putting of the
question, since in the physical sense there are no
such things as " bodies " ; and as in physiology one
does the like when one asks, " How can the living
being assimilate nutriment into itself? " where there
is not anything at all present of such sort that it
can assimilate something to itself \ so in the matter
of procreation the question is asked, " How is it
possible that out of two biological identities a new
identity can arise ? " But it is not an identity at all
that rises new in procreation ; that truly would
mean carrying out the arithmetical sum one plus one
equals one into actual practice. Nothing happens
save that material of a peculiar character, for a

1 Cf. Essay V., " The Teaching of Kamma."

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 145

longer or shorter period, is subjected to a new state
of strain of a peculiar character — has a fresh tendency
imparted to it. And this new tendency, this
impulsion it is, which, as Kamma coming from a
previous existence, now takes hold. It takes hold
where it does take hold, just because it must take
hold there ; because this location answers to it, the
individual, the unique, as the only one in the
universe ; and all it does here is merely to stimulate,
to develop that which already lies prefigured in the
material, extending even to what is most singular,
most individual. Were the material nothing indi-
vidual, certainly no individual energy could take
hold of it. But just because there is an individual
material, therefore does it call for individual energy.
Because the energy is individual, therefore does it
call for individual material, and nowhere else can
it take hold save just there where it does.

The question as to how it is possible that I can
see, hear, smell, taste, feel, think, take nourishment,
and so forth, here rolls back into beginningless-
ness, into a double question — that concerning the
succession of Kamma, representing endlessness in
time ; and that concerning the material, representing
the corresponding endlessness in space. I learn to
see, hear, think, and so forth, as the flame learns
to burn. Had I to learn this in the vulgar sense
of the word, never in life could I compass it. As pure
process of alimentation I have not all these powers;
I am this potency itself. I do not have functions ; I
am functioning itself, as a genuine, self-acting pro-
cess which burns in virtue of a genuine energy that
never can be demonstrated, that only demonstrates
itself in consciousness.

146 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

When science teaches that I am descended wholly
and entirely from my parents, it teaches that the
/-process is not kindled at all, but propels itself
hither from parents, grandparents, and so forth —
does not burn, but rolls — so making necessary the
question as to the first beginning of this motion ; for
everything set in motion, urged onward — in short,
every reaction — must have a first moment of
beginning.

In contradistinction to science, faith teaches that
the parents provide the material, while God sets all
alight by endowing me with an immortal soul — an
idea, indeed, demanding faith.

The Bziddha teaches : The parents provide the
material, the groundwork, and the /-energy of some
disintegrating /-process corresponding uniquely to
these potentialities, sets all alight. Here I take rise
in my parents as the fountain takes its rise in the hill.
That the fountain does so, is beyond all cavil, is
patent to any eye ; yet it is but as an alien guest.

Thus of the three, the Buddha is the only one
to abide by actuality, the only one with whom the
entire miracle of propagation takes its place among
mundane events, conforming likewise to the laws of
mundane occurrences. For faith, the miracle of
propagation lies outside the jurisdiction of these
latter ; for science, it is true it remains within
their jurisdiction, but only as a barren possibility.

It is here where the true thinker must clutch
and claw his way in, that I would confront him, as
the highwayman the traveller, with a " Sta viator ! '
For the simple fact that I am here, a single moment
of the " /," yields the entire cosmogony of the
Buddha. Every /-moment is possible, is thinkable,

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 147

only as the point of intersection of the lines of
Kamma and of the material, hence as the form of a
world that has not law but itself is law. I am here,
means, I am here as self-conscious. I am here as
self-conscious, means, I am determined as one and
single. I am determined as one and single, means,
The twofold material of generation must be made
one through some energy. That, however, means,
I am without beginning.

Of what service is this idea as a working
hypothesis ?

The answer is : It alone makes possible a reading
of the fact, " consciousness " — that is to say, a read-
ing of myself which, as already shown, can never be
of an inductive, but only of an intuitive nature.
That which in the mode of apprehending it peculiar
to science, invests the problem of heredity with a
specific gravity such that of itself it must necessarily
tumble to the ground, is the fact that in this
apprehension of the problem consciousness falls to
be included as part of that which is to furnish the
demonstration.

From the standpoint physiology adopts, con-
sciousness must reside in the groundwork, in the
cell material ; so that now it is a question of carrying
the demonstration right on into this groundwork.

As their trump card against the materialistic and
mechanistic wing of science, the idealistic and teleo-
logical wing play this : " Consciousness, thought,
psychic faculty, or whatever else one chooses to name
it, does not admit of being explained under the image
of a motion, thus cannot be explained mechanically."
And materialism yields the point with a grinding of
the teeth behind which is concealed a sort of inward

148 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

satisfaction that would say something to this effect :
" It is quite true what you say there. We can
account for everything, only not for this last little
remainder, consciousness. The extent of our
knowledge is best shown by this our helplessness ;
but the day will yet come when this holy Ilion
also, this stronghold of nature and her secrets —
consciousness — shall fall before our giant strokes."

With the adoption of such an attitude, science
finds herself in the difficult position of having
to account for consciousness from its antecedent
conditions. These antecedent conditions may be
followed up along two lines of inquiry ; on the one
hand, along the line of anatomical, physiological
conditions, sense organs and brain ; and on the
other hand, along the line of functional conditions,
of the perceptions in their varying degrees and
qualities — two tasks which physiology and psycho-
logy share between them.

To the former task it is that we are indebted for
the existence of one of the most splendid depart-
ments— perhaps, indeed, the most splendid depart-
ment— of the physiological sciences : the physiology
of the sense-organs. One may say that this line of
research reveals most impressively of all the splendid
poverty of science — a dazzling altogether astounding
wealth of the most interesting details, which, how-
ever, instead of converging to draw nearer to the
sought-for goal, lose themselves in the boundless.

That which the physiology of the sense-organs
aims at is to make functioning — with what one
might call suggestive violence — follow as a logical
necessity from the anatomical and physiological
details. The delicate intricacies of the retina, of

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 149

the cortical organ, of the papillae of smell and taste,
have been laid bare with such a completeness that
it seems to need but one more breath, the last and
lightest of all, to wake in this wondrous instrument
the melody of life. But it is just this last lightest
breath that remains lacking, and is not to be secured
by any mere dexterity in method however highly
developed. Set to where one will, whether at the
first turning over of the ovum, whether upon the
heights of the evolution of sense, everywhere the
miracle stands before us complete. It is entirely
owing to the vast numbers and continuous relays of
workers in the realm of science that the conviction
that upon this path, a description becoming ever
more minute and exact, there is nothing real to be
achieved has not already gained much more ground
than is the case. As oft as pen and scalpel fall
from a trembling hand, into the breach leaps youthful
vigour, and begins the battle anew with fresh
courage.

The like holds good of the latest branch of
psychology, the working out of prerequisite con-
ditions of function. On all hands a similar scene
meets the eye. Each new result, each fresh-won
eminence avails nothing but to open out in yet more
impressive fashion the vista of endless, towering
mountains beyond. Here it would almost seem as
if men intentionally slurred over the patent fact
that the explanation of consciousness, of the power
to think, already in every case presupposes this
itself, and that every sensation, if at all present as
such, already possesses also a certain content of
consciousness. It is the chase after the horizon, —
the attempt by a vigorous and decided advance to

150 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

see over on the other side of one's own limit of
vision, — perpetual progression without progress !

The best illustration of this is furnished by what
I might call the naive disunion prevailing within
psychology's own camp. The various movements
are not infrequently to be found fighting against
one another, like different divisions of the same
army in the darkness of night. One party says :
" In the analysis of the sensations lies all our salva-
tion. Out of them only can we have consciousness
arise synthetically, and, all said and done, up to our
time science has achieved nothing just because she
has neglected this natural prerequisite to all possi-
bilities of knowledge." Thewhich,it maybe remarked
in passing, is somewhat cold comfort after more than
two thousand years of labour ! Then suddenly a
counter-movement interjects : " The sensations are
what one may not seek to analyse." ! Well, that is
what I should call plagiarizing the words of the bon
dien in the Garden of Eden : "Of the tree of know-
ledge thou shalt not eat." If I may not lay finger
upon the fount of my existence, what boots to me the
never so broad but turbid stream of the lower levels ?

If one compares with this utter lack of success
the indubitable honesty of the effort, the entire
phenomenon " science " assumes something of an
air of sublime absurdity, of melancholy enthusiasm,
such as ever and again recalls to one's mind the
immortal hero of Cervantes' romance — vigorous,
single-hearted effort from a mistaken standpoint,
directed towards a mistaken end.

As a matter of fact, however, in these latter days
the impossibility of the old path with reference to

1 E. Mach, Erkenntnis and Irrtum.

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 151

the problem of consciousness seems to be perceived.
But the new path upon which in their need men
have entered is an utterly paradoxical one ; it is
the modern theory of the cell endowed with con-
sciousness in the shape of the faculty of memory.
Seeing no possibility whatever of explaining con-
sciousness into the cell material without more ado
they have recourse to the device of making the cell
set out on its campaign, so to speak, with the faculty
of memory in its knapsack.1 In this manner they
rid themselves once for all of the mischief-maker,
" consciousness " ; and with astounding simplicity
change ground to a position whence they can fight
out the battle about a world-theory after the fashion
of army manoeuvres, all according to programme

1 Thus, Hering writes in Das Gedachtniss ah Fitnktion der belebten
Matcrie: "The central sections of the nervous system must retain some
memory of that which they formerly have done. ... In like manner the
motor system must possess memory, albeit unknown to us it is true." Further
on he says : "The reappearance in the daughter organism of the character-
istics of the mother organism is a reproduction on the matter side, of such a
process as the former already once before has shared in, if only as germ in the
ovary, which process it remembers, inasmuch as to like stimuli it reacts
exactly as that organism of which it once formed a part " ; from which the
fact of the hereditary transmission of characteristic qualities would work out
as a specimen merely of the "memory of unconscious matter." Hering
adds : " Thus every organic being of the present day stands before us ulti-
mately as a product of the unconscious memory of organized matter."

All such ideas are nothing but ingenious paraphrases of actuality ; and in
the last analysis amount to nothing but an audacious juggle with the word
memory. And when it is further said: "If memory be attributed to the
species the same as to the individual, instinct immediately becomes compre-
hensible " ; and in conclusion : " The conscious memory of man is extinguished
at death, but the unconscious memory of nature is indestructible," I can only
call this dealing in poetry, not science, a possibility only to be arrived at by
the ^-actualizing of actuality. In reality memory exists solely where some-
thing is remembered, just as a flame exists there only where it is burning. Of
this kind of memory, however, but one example is to be found in all the
world — I myself ! It is just this lack of the sense of actuality — as displayed
in physics — which to such a large extent constitutes the greatness of science,
while it also no less constitutes its weakness, as in biology. E. Mach in his
Erkenntnis una1 Irrtam, p. 49, expresses himself to the self-same effect :
" Heredity, instinct, may then be depicted as memory stretching out beyond
the individual," a sentence that possesses about as much content of actuality
as the " songs unsung " of a dead poet.

152 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

upon any lines that may be desired. " Give me a
chaos and out of it I will make you a world," says
Kant in his Prolegomena. " Give me a cell and out
of it I will make you a Goethe or a Newton," says
the modern biologist. The necessary arrangements
are all made, the " stern wrestle with the problems
of life " can begin in the shape of fantasies drawn
from the Ratskeller of the Alma Mater. If one
hews out the building stones to one's own fancy,
one may indeed erect systems — a mechanics, a
thermo-dynamics, but never a genuine world-con-
ception.

The possibility of ideas such as these is to be
found in what I might call the mechanizing of
biological values. Thinking is represented, along
with heat, as a molecular vibration ; the psychic act,
under the figure of an impress, of an " Engramm," 1
thus of work accomplished ; and therewith we get
the possibility of that rolling back of the /-process
from the individual to his begetters, and from these
in turn to their begetters, and so on backwards ad
infinitum — in short, the possibility of remaining
upon the lines of the purely material, which partakes
of the nature of a reaction precisely as much as
the lines upon which the physicist works in the
cosmogony peculiar to energetics. Just as there,
from the outset, the real energies are left out of
consideration and only their reactions dealt with,
looked upon as work done ; so in the treatment
of the problem of heredity by science the whole
process of life is looked upon simply as work
done, in biological guise, a mode of apprehend-
ing it to which scientific thought itself, as re-

1 Cf. R. Semon, Die Mneme.

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 153

presented by the teleological school, is entirely
opposed.1

With the mechanistic representation of things is
necessarily involved the question as to the seat of
consciousness. Modern physiology vaunts itself
not a little upon having got beyond the follies of
the centuries that are past, when this seat was
sought for in all sorts of hidden nooks. But sooth
to say, its own position nowise differs ; the change
is only in the means of defence employed. Now,
as formerly, endeavour is made to localize conscious-
ness in certain regions ; there is a search for the
"seat" of consciousness. Whether as a pure
hypothesis I transfer this seat to the pineal gland,
or whether, from the results of experiments upon
animals, I seek by a process of exclusion, as it were,
to find it in the cerebral cortex — all this makes no
essential difference. The mistake, the Hebraism,
lies in seeking for a " seat " of consciousness at all.
To such an idea only a few exceptionally clear minds
oppose a front of resistance. As an example, I cite
in a footnote a passage from E. Mach's Analyse der
Empfindungen?

1 "They (the materialists) teach that in the central nervous system also
all is only the oscillation of atoms, only reflex motion, only mechanics. In
one part of the brain only, there in the grey substance of a portion of the
cerebral cortex, something takes place which as yet we are unable to explain.
But it is only a question of time. Sooner or later it will certainly be demon-
strated that this also is nothing but mechanics, nothing more than a complicated
species of reflex action" (Bunge, Physiologie, i. p. 164).

2 "The practice of treating the unanalysed /-complex as an indivisible
unity frequently finds scientific expression in singular fashion. First of all,
the nervous system is set apart from the body as being the seat of sensation.
In the nervous system, again, the brain is picked out as likeliest to be such a
seat. And, finally, in order to save the supposed psychic unity, search is
made in the brain for a point as the seat of the soul. Views so crude as these,
however, are but ill adapted to indicate beforehand even in roughest outline the
path of future investigation as to the connection between the physical and the
psychical." Comparison should also be made with the introductory remarks
to the chapter on "Der Sitz des Bewusstseins " in Bunge's Physiologie.

154 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

Singular reflections are provoked when one
contrasts with these extravagant profundities the
conception of things presented by the Indian
thinker six hundred years before the Christian era
began. In the Buddha-thought there is no some-
thing called "consciousness," as equally there is no
something called "life." There is only an experi-
ence of the unfolding of consciousness — a constant
becoming conscious. I do not have consciousness as
I might have a half-crown in my pocket, but I am
consciousness objectified, as I am will objectified.
As long as I think in terms of actuality, there is
just but one consciousness in the world — I myself.
As long as I think in terms of actuality, conscious-
ness means just this and no more — to experience
myself. But this is possible only as an intuition,
and a specific impulsion, instruction, is needed in
order to arrive at this intuition. Consciousness,
just like all the remainder of the /-process, is a
form of the individual process of nutrition ; the only
difference is this, that it is the last, the highest
phase, as the fruit is the last, the highest phase
of the vegetative process. To speak of a "seat"
of consciousness has about as much meaning as to
speak of a "seat" of bodily heat. All this falls
under the one inclusive concept, " nutrition." What
modern physicist would ever be so childish as in
some hot body to search for the " seat " of heat ?
But physiologist and biologist stagger along ex-
hausted under the load of their learnedness on
the subject of the " seat " of consciousness. There
is just as much reason, and no more, for holding
the brain -cells of the cerebral cortex to be the
seat of consciousness as there is for regarding the

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 155

electric cells in its central telegraph office as the
seat of the intelligence of a great city.

The teaching of Buddhist physiology is as
follows : —

Where the eye and forms encounter one another,
and the antecedent conditions are such that each
acts upon the other, there arises visual conscious-
ness. Where the ear and sounds encounter one
another, there arises aural consciousness. Where
nose and odours encounter one another, there
arises olfactory consciousness. Where tongue and
flavours encounter one another, there arises gus-
tatory consciousness. Where bodies and objects
come in contact with one another, there arises tactile
consciousness. Where thinking and things (known
abstractly) encounter one another, there arises
thought-consciousness.

"If the inward eye is undamaged, and external'
objects do not come within the range of vision, and
(as a consequence) no corresponding interaction
takes place, then a corresponding moment of con-
sciousness does not result. If the inward eye is
undamaged, and external objects come within the
range of vision, and (nevertheless) no correspond-
ing interaction takes place, then also a corresponding
moment of consciousness does not result. If, how-
ever, the inward eye is undamaged, and external
objects come within the range of vision, and the
corresponding interaction takes place, then there
results the corresponding moment of conscious-
ness.

Thus my entire individuality, the totality of indi-
vidual experience is a becoming conscious at every

1 Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 28.

156 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

moment of existence. Consciousness is a Sankhara,
like all else, distinguished therefrom only in this,
that in it Kamma itself becomes perceptible to sense.

Were teleology and mechanistics to come before
the Buddha and say, " Decide thou ! Which of us
two is right ? Is the eye born of seeing, or is seeing
born of the eye? Is the brain born of thinking,
or is thinking born of the brain ? " the Buddha
would reply with a smile : —

" My young friends, you are both right because
you are both wrong. Your question is not correctly
put. There are no such things as ' eye ' and ' brain '
in the sense in which you use the words. There is
only an /-process, that unfolds itself by way of
certain differentiations which in themselves run
their course at a pace sufficiently slow to justify
such separate verbal designations as the ' eye,' the
'brain,' and so forth. Your question, 'Is the eye
born of seeing, or is seeing born of the eye ? Is
the brain born of thinking, or is thinking born of the
brain ? ' would have sense and meaning only if the
eye and the brain were in themselves organs all
finished and complete, to which in that case a specific
function also would have to correspond. All this,
however, is nothing but a phase, nothing but the form
of development assumed by a single process. It is
not the eye that sees : you see. The eye is neither
born of seeing, nor yet is seeing born of the eye ;
the eye is simply the form tinder which seeing exists.
You do not see with the eye but in virtue of the
fact of eye-evolution, the same as you think in
virtue of the fact of brain - evolution, which is
only another way of saying that you are the
form assumed by individual energies."

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 157

Here the physiologist breaks in : " That con-
sciousness has its seat in certain regions of the
cerebral cortex may be proven by experiments on
animals." But this is a conclusion as grossly mis-
taken as that of the physicist when he imagines he
can follow up energy throughout all its ramifications.1
What can be got at by experimental methods is
merely negative phenomena, and these furnish no
warrant for coming to conclusions as to the seat
of consciousness. If I cut through the wire con-
nected with an electric light at any point at all in
the circuit, the negative phenomenon " darkness "
assuredly supervenes ; but to say on that account,
" The point of section must be the seat of the electric
energy ; here is ocular demonstration," would be
sheer foolishness. Yet the physiologist is guilty of
just such foolishness, and at its behest does not
stick at the perpetration of all those cruelties
such as are scarcely to be avoided in experiments
upon animals. If only the time would come
when true ideas about life would take possession
of science, the laboratories of physiologists would
no longer be those places where every day sacri-
fice is made to error as in the temples of blood-
stained idols.

All these researches on the subject of the seat of
consciousness are only possible where one is work-
ing with empty concepts. If one thinks in terms
of actuality consciousness is just that with regard
to which a reading, a working hypothesis of an
inductive nature, is utterly impossible ; for here
the reading is precisely the form assumed by the
consciousness, by that which is to do the reading,

1 Cf. Essay VII.

158 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

by the problem itself, and thus itself again requires
a reading, and so on ad infinitum.

But there is another point involved in this
problem of "consciousness" which, so far as I
know, has never been taken account of, and yet is
of the utmost significance.

As the Darwinian idea does not embrace in its
purview the case of hybrid formations — it does not
react upon it at all — so the scientific mode of
envisaging things does not take in the case of the
physiological negative phenomena of consciousness,
does not at all react upon it. With the apparatus of
science there is no possibility whatever of getting
at such facts as "faith," "illusion," "error," "for-
getting." Science requires something sensible and
objective, something so constituted that I can rank
it along with other things. In no respect, however,
are any of these negative phenomena objective
things. Here no possible point of entry offers for
science with its instrument, induction.

I may indeed read consciousness under the figure
of associative occurrences, but only in the form of
recollection. Applied to the corresponding dis-
sociative event, forgetting, this explanation is as
impossible as that a molecular mixture which has
once come to equilibrium within itself should again
spontaneously return to dissolution, to dissociation.
As the natural adjustment of differences of mole-
cular tension may be explained or read as a fall, so
in its associative activities consciousness may be
explained or read as a fall, but never so in its
dissociative activities. This, however, involves the
utter worthlessness of the former explanation ; for
every mixture, every association, presupposes separa-

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 159

tion, dissociation, and, called upon to indicate the
essence of consciousness, what I should point to is
not so much the associative as the dissociative,
not so much recollection, conjunction, as forgetting,
disjunction. Once the stone is raised from the
earth's surface its return fall forthwith ensues. But
it is the separation from the earth's surface for which
effective causes must be found. In like manner,
it is dissociation, forgetting, that really demands
elucidation ; association, recollection can as easily
be read mechanistically as the fall of a stone once it
has been raised. Dissociation is the physiological
miracle, in presence of which science stands alto-
gether helpless.

The like holds good of faith, illusion, error. The
purely mechanistic conception of things, the view
which regards the /-process simply as an instance
of the phenomenon of the compensation of tensile
differences, can never be accommodated to the possi-
bility of such things as faith, illusion, and error.
But a similar impossibility also exists for the teleo-
logical apprehension of the world. How should a
" force " ever acquire the faculty of deceiving itself
or of falling into error ? To a compensation-
phenomenon pure and simple, as to God, illusion and
error are wholly unattainable potentialities ; they
belong to mankind alone, to the man whom the
Buddha points out to us.

If I am nothing but an unceasing reaction to the
outer world, if I constantly adapt myself to things
and things adapt themselves to me, not as a mere
adjustment but in virtue of specific energies, only
then are faith, illusion, error, and all other negative
phenomena equally possible with all positive phe-

160 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

nomena. Beginningless process furnishes the
possibility of both.

Such things as actual illusion, actual error, science
may nowise recognize, for in so doing she would be
recognizing something for which there is absolutely
no room in her cosmogony. One would thereby
introduce functions for which one could furnish no
organized basis. Only in the cosmogony of the
Buddha, only in the concept of individual beginning-
lessness does each find its necessary place. Here
they are the necessary preconditions of all existence.
Science is powerless to defend herself against them
otherwise than by an attempt to "explain away"
such occurrences out of the order of world-events.
Upon this point E. Mach, in his Analyse der Empfin-
dungen, expresses himself as follows : " The phrase,
' illusion of the senses,' shows that man has not yet
rightly come to a consciousness, or at least has
not yet found it necessary to express such con-
sciousness in fitting terminology, that the senses
indicate neither false nor true. The only ' true '
of which one can speak in connection with the sense
organs is that under different conditions they yield
different sensations and perceptions. Since these
conditions are so extremely manifold in their variety
... it may very well seem ... as if the organ
acts dissimilarly under similar conditions. Results
out of the usual order are what men are accustomed
to call illusions." This is to make illusion merely
truth in an infinitesimal form, to " read " it as a
special form of truth, and so be rid of it.

But the value of the Buddha- thought in this
domain does not end here. Over and above, it
explains to begin with, the every-day fact of experi-

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 161

ence, that not every pairing evolves a new embryo.
This fact is alike incapable of explanation whether
from the standpoint of faith or from that of science.

Faith, which sees a divine soul breathed into the
material of generation, permits of no standpoint at
all, since for it everything takes place according
to God's good pleasure. From the standpoint of
science, however, with every conjunction of ovum
and sperm-cell, conception also must be granted,
since here both are already the form of the new life,
already contain in themselves all the ingredients of
this new life. It is only the Buddha-thought that
explains why, meanwhile, despite the union of ovum
and sperm, conception does not take place : it has
not " struck in." At the moment when both were
open to the inflow of the energy, the latter was not
ready. In the ceaseless, unbroken attunement, each
to the other, of the happenings of a world, the
proper moment was let slip.1

The Buddha-thought further explains the else
inexplicable fact of the simultaneous resemblance and
lack of resemblance between parents and children.
The view of the matter taken by faith supplies no
argument in favour of any kind of resemblance what-
ever between the two. The soul is inbreathed by
God whithersoever it pleaseth him. In the view of
science, on the contrary, there is found no argument
for any failure in resemblance betwixt progenitors
and offspring. Ever and always the characteristics
of the latter can only be a combination of the char-
acteristics of both the parents. In the Buddha-
thought alone are similarity and dissimilarity alike
accounted for. I may have inherited my father's

1 Cf. Essay V., the citation from the Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 38.

i62 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

nose, his manner of blowing it indeed, since all lay
foreshadowed in the material, and was obliged so to
evolve itself: but the evolver is a stranger, hence
one common starting-point yields an independent
evolving series. Here conception means no more
than that two paths, two lines, that of the material
and that of energy, intersect one another. We
are as at some cross-road, where two highways
meet, only to lead further and further away from
each other the further we pursue them.

The third item that finds an explanation in the
Buddha- thought is the fact of innate aptitudes.
Where the act of learning is envisaged from a purely
empirical point of view these are a standing, incom-
prehensible miracle. Opposed to this, the defective-
ness of the nativistic theory resides in the fact that
according to it every being must make his appear-
ance fitted out all complete with fixed, inborn
abilities. Midway removed from both extremes
stands the Buddha. With equal ease he explains
the possibility of gradual development and that of
appearance all ready and complete, inasmuch as with
him all depends upon the tempo at which the energy
closing with the material enters upon its unfolding
process. Is the tempo so fast that the organic
recipients are already developed upon leaving the
womb, then the innate abilities are there present ;
the organs can set to forthwith, the external world
acts immediately as liberating lure, and the nativists
have the last word. Is the tempo slow, then there
set in processes that admit of being empirically
interpreted or read as a gradual attainment of
faculty by experience.

Apart, however, from the biological facts, the

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 163

Buddha-thought also explains those lofty specula-
tions that have haunted the minds of men from the
earliest times, such as " previous existence," Plato's
idea of learning as " reminiscence," and so forth.
" Many a time it has seemed to me as if I must
have been in existence once already," says such a
clear, keen mind as Lichtenberg. Indeed here, if
one likes, even the Kantian " a priori of all experi-
ence," this pure ens of scholasticism, acquires sense
and meaning. That which with Kant stands out
from reality as a blind end, destitute of any real
foothold, like the spirit moving upon the face of the
waters, here balls itself together into the / myself.
My Kamma is the " a priori" ; in a sense, such as
Kant never suspected, it is true. All these minds
lack guidance, lack light. In dim fashion they feel,
but they do not see. During my latest sojourn at
Anuradhapura, in the course of a conversation with
the abbot of Ruanwelli, he said to me, " Every
one who is without the Teaching is like the blind
elephant in the jungle : he feels at every twig " —
to find out if it is eatable. Here we have an apt
illustration of inquiring ignorance.

With this solution of the problem of procreation
as furnished by the Buddha are involved a few
necessary questions which might have been dis-
posed of in our fifth essay, but may more fitly be
dealt with here.

The first is this : —

"If, as said above, the uniquely appropriate energy
is not always ready for the material, if contact can
be missed, must then a quota of material always
stand ready for the Kamma that is set free at every
death ? "

1 64 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

To which the answer is : " That a faggot should
miss the kindling spark ; this may very well happen,
but that the kindling spark should find nothing upon
which to act, such is never the case." Its very
being is just its taking hold, the actuity itself. The
/-energy takes hold there precisely where it can
take hold.

But will it always take hold just there where
legitimately it ought to take hold ? Will it take
hold rightly ?

To put such a question is the same as if one
should ask : " Will the sun indicate mid-day correctly
and unfailingly every day ? Or : Will the ocean
maintain itself unceasingly at sea-level ? " Where
the entire universe has not but is law there, " to
take hold " is as much as to say " to take hold
legitimately": "to take hold legitimately" is as
much as to say "to take hold rightly." All such
questions were justified only if we had to do with a
reciprocal being attuned ; but all things are found
to be a series of ever new self-attunings, each after
other — no working into one another like cog and
groove, no pre-established harmony, no psycho-
physical parallelism. The whole universe is a thing
that finds itself in a state of perpetual nascency. If
a jest may be ventured in face of the monster, one
might say that the whole world is constantly in a
state of bringing forth, yet never is there born a
" something " that stands ideally fast, so as to be
fitted to serve as a standard for true and untrue.

The fact that a chemical compound decomposes,
that its constituent elements are set free, always
implies that from another direction forces more
powerful are coming into play. Decomposition is

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 165

nothing but the form of a new combination. In
similar wise Kamma does not become free just for
the sake of becoming free, just in order to be free.
Not in any arbitrary fashion does it leap out of its
old location ; it does so only because its material
falls away from under it. That it can take fresh
hold and always can take hold, of this the guarantee
is the simple fact that there is a world at all, for the
latter is just the series of self-attunings each after
other, itself. Were the world obliged to come to
this self-attuning first, never by any means could
there be a world. What we find present is precisely
something given — actuality, and this stands for no
mere set of possibilities ; it represents a power — its
own power to exist ; and the expression of this
power to exist is just this eternal ability to take
fresh hold.

To change the simile : For every falling stone
there is always ready the spot on which it can fall.
For along with the fact "falling stone" are also
given all the pre-requisite conditions in which such
questions as, " Where can it fall ? Will it find its
spot?" are already met and answered. Its fall is
nothing motiveless ; it does not fall blindly, by pure
accident. Neither is its fall any previously deter-
mined affair ; it does not fall towards any given
goal. Its fall is an attuning of itself, an accom-
modating of itself to its goal. In the act of falling
it finds its goal. In the same way this my whole
existence is simply my finding my way, my accom-
modating of myself to the new goal. Kamma does
not go to its new place as a spontaneous force, nor
does it fall, as a mere reaction, but it advances
itself as a flame advances itself. In the beginning-

1 66 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

less happenings of a world, living at every moment
accommodates itself to living. It is like a uni-
versal round dance, this Samsara. Kamma has
seized his partner, and with her whirls through the
infinitudes until she collapses with fatigue, is worn
out, or, become clumsy and heavy, slips from him
because she no longer suits him. She no longer
suits him, however, because there is another whom
she suits better. Thus does the material pass
from hand to hand, because one lender snatches it
away from the other.

Indeed 'twas only borrowed — the lenders are so many !

And thus is disposed of that other question :
" Once set alight, could not an /-process burn for
ever ? "

Science, because it never can be actual science,
makes an effort at least not to be of the laity, and
endeavours to make good this its distinctive char-
acteristic by the striking, one might almost say
the sensational, manner in which it formulates its
problems. Thus it tries to signalize the command-
ing nature of its standpoint with respect to the
problems of life by telling the dumbfounded layman
of a death that is purely a phenomenon of adapta-
tion— yea more, of a death that is nothing but a bad
habit. Upon this point, Weismann in his Datcer
des Lcbens says : " From a purely physiological
standpoint there is no perceivable reason why it
should not be possible for the fission of the cells
to proceed ad infinitum, i.e. for the organism to
function eternally. To me the necessity for death
is intelligible only from the standpoint of utility. . . .
An individual that lived for ever would always

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 167

become infirm and useless to the species. Death is
merely a utilitarian arrangement; it is no necessity,
grounded in the essential nature of life." This is
about as sensible as if one said, relying upon the
facts of kitchen routine, " The going out of the
fire is merely a utilitarian arrangement : it is no
necessity grounded in the essential nature of fire."
To speak of death as a phenomenon of adaptation
is to juggle with death as with some empty concept.
In truth it is not as some think, death that accom-
modates itself to life, but simply thinking to the
facts. The crass absurdity only becomes evident
when out of this mere " reading " of the facts one
seeks to evolve a truth of practical application, as
MetchnikofT does in his " daring " surmises. I
assert that science ought to be ashamed of herself
for filling the nursery room of mankind with such
fabulous tales of the future, when already the air is
thick enough with the fables of the past. The old
Salernitanian school of medicine used to ask : " Cur
moritur homo, cut crescit salvia in hortis?" In
much the same way the new — nay, the very newest
— school of medicine demands : " Why does man
die, for whom in the laboratory grows the Maya
Yoghurt ? " thereby showing that in the depths
below the surface she grows on the same stock as
the so much contemned " blind faith."

Like a grown man among children stands the
Buddha towards such fictions. With him death
is nothing but living in a new environment.
The distaff keeps ceaselessly turning ; it is only
that a new clump of wool has been placed on it.
The discernment that life is of the nature of a
process involves of necessity the discernment that

168 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

life can persist only so long as the active affinities
concerned are not overmastered by other affinities.
Here again, to be sure, I can interpret death as
a phenomenon of accommodation, but equally as
well can I so interpret life, for here I am just the
beginningless self - accommodating, self- attuning
itself. However varied the length of time during
which the attuning may last, however it may be
prolonged by the use of specific contrivances, to
speak of a potential immortality is to do away with
the process-like nature of life, to make the never-
resting actuality stiffen into a childish counterfeit.
With the fact that I am born, the fact of dying is
guaranteed me. For beings can only be born if
previously they have died ; they must buy themselves
their birth with their own death. Were we not
born, then, to be sure, we need not die either. But
to be born and yet not to see in death a necessity
grounded in the very nature of life, this demands
place alongside that passage in the book of Joshua:
" Sun, stand thou still upon Gibeon ; and thou,
Moon, in the valley of Ajalon." What a different
ring has this word of the Master : " That that which
has life should not meet with death — such a thing is
not ! ' And yet it is so ! We demand life-values
at any cost ; and, are the udders milked dry, then
must death itself make good the lack !

If science and the Buddha-thought be placed
alongside one another for mutual and unbiassed
comparison, perforce the superiority of the latter
must be acknowledged, since by it is neatly resolved
in one single conception that which science with
two distinct concepts makes an inextricable tangle
of. From the point of view of science, dying is

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 169

every whit as much of a miracle as being born,
since in birth a new identity appears on the scene
all entire, and in death all as entire vanishes ; in
the same way that to a child's idea a thunder-
storm as such, i.e. taken purely as a symptom, is
something that arises all entire, and all entire passes
away again. The simple fact is : despite all the
technical skill with which she handles the problem
of heredity, and notwithstanding all the suggestions
made to the understanding to recognize as un-
interrupted the passage from life to life, science has
her abode in the realm of the miraculous. The
technique of her descriptions, to which she gives
the misleading title, "doctrine of evolution," leave
the actual problem of evolution entirely untouched.
In face of the miracles of birth and death, science
strongly resembles a boy making his first observa-
tions in natural history. Finding in his glass-case
the caterpillar dead and the butterfly born, he will
say, " Two miracles ! The old has died and some-
thing new has made its appearance." Instead of
both facts merging into one another in a true con-
ception of what has taken place, to his mistaken
notion they fall apart from one another, and become
problems defying solution. Even so is it with
science. Through her failure to recognize that the
facts of birth here and death there are forms of one
and the same experience instead of a single compre-
hension of both under the one aspect, two miracles
are found by her to be present. The noose of life
has become a knot, and every attempt to undo it
by continued pulling only makes worse the tangle.
On this point the physicist has already left the
stage of childhood behind. To-day he no longer

i7o BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

says, "Two miracles! Heat is gone and motion is
present." He has found the clue, albeit, it is true,
only in form of reaction. The biologist, however,
still remains incapable of replacing two miracles
with a true and genuine conception. He is still
unaware that it is with dying that being born must
be purchased. Hence he treats birth as a fact by
itself, and death as a fact by itself, and so remains
confronting both problems internally insoluble.

So much for that point. A further question
that suggests itself is : " Could not a Kamma be
simultaneously attuned in two or more places ? "

To this the answer would be: "Theoretically,
so long as one confronts the problem from the
mechanistic standpoint, that is, from the standpoint
that deals only with reactions, it is attuned in
places innumerable." In exactly the same way a
drop of water, as it trickles downward, theoretically
can have innumerable points as its resting-place ;
practically, however, it will have one single resting-
place, and this latter will prove itself the resting-
place and the one single resting-place among count-
less possibilities simply and solely by the fact that
the drop comes to a halt just at this spot. Actuality
is simple as singly determined. It only becomes
complex in the mechanistic mode of apprehending
it ; that is, where reactions alone are dealt with.

Again, it may be asked : "Could not two Kammas
attune themselves to one and the same body of
material ? "

But this question has just as much meaning as if
one asked, " Could not two men appropriate to
themselves, assimilate, and be nourished by, the
same loaf of bread ? '! So long as one treats of

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 171

" bread " in purely theoretical fashion, eats concepts,
well and good ! But if one eats in actuality, the
absurdity becomes obvious.

Again : " Might it not happen for once that the
ovum should conduct the lightning without the
assistance of the sperm-cell ? "

So far as mankind is concerned, the only reply
is that here both factors are required. It simply
is so ! Why are certain reactions brought about
only when certain catalytic agents or ferments are
introduced ? How weighty the above objection has
always been to the mind of mankind is shown by
the important role which " immaculate conception "
has played from the earliest times. That in itself
it is not impossible the animal kingdom sufficiently
attests. With man, however, the conditions are so
disposed that both, ovum- and sperm-cell, are
required in order to conduct the Kamma and cause
it to take hold.

If one asks : " But could not this also happen
outside a maternal womb?' I reply: "I do not
know." It certainly does not happen with man. It
happens with cold-blooded creatures, with dogs, and
so forth. In the botanical gardens at Peradeniya,
Ceylon, in the climate the most perfect in the
world for vegetation, there are several trees — the
Bertholetia excelsa of Brazil, for example — which,
despite the similarity of the climate to that of their
native haunts, as yet have resisted all attempts to
propagate them. It simply is so! Actuality lays
down its own laws because it is itself law. Science
can do nothing but hobble along as best she may
in the wake of all these facts, and endeavour to
accommodate herself to them. But what bears

172 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

witness in favour of the Buddha-thought is precisely
the impossibility of getting fecundation to take
place outside a womb, or of bringing it about by
introducing sperm into the uterus by artificial means,
of which latter proceeding a single, not altogether
unequivocal instance is reported by an American
gynaecologist. What is needed is the living energy
which for a limited period vibrates in the material
like the energy in the plucked string of a lute. It
is just this vibrating energy in it which first makes
the material to be material, i.e. the thing that is
capable of a unique attunement.

And here we come to the most important question
of all :—

" Is a human Kamma always obliged to take fresh
hold precisely of human /-material ? Would it not
be possible for once, that human Kamma should be
attuned to animal material or reverse wise, animal
Kamma to human material ? ' To this the answer
is : Kamma can take hold only where there is
material that itself is the form of a Kamma. How
far down in the kingdom of living creatures this
material extends cannot be said any more than in
the case of a flame can be indicated exactly how far
the circle of its radiance extends, the precise limit
stated at which it gives place to darkness. And
just as, despite this, the flame has a definite circle
of radiance, so Kamma has a definite sphere of
operation, albeit no science — such as zoology or
anthropology and so forth — is in a position to
establish this thesis. Kamma takes hold where it
can take hold — that is to say, where in the material
of procreation there vibrate energies to which
it is uniquely attuned ; and in the scale of living

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 173

creatures it reaches just as far as it is able to
reach.

In the Jatakas, the birth-stories of the Buddha,
we see him in Samsara ranging this whole scale
through from the lowest stages of the animal
kingdom right up to the worlds of the gods, ever
and again planting foot there where the Kamma was
attuned at the moment of collapse.

It is a fact of experience that between living
beings there exist peculiar consonances. To a
stone or a tree no tie of compassion binds us.
Compassion only begins at the animal world, and
its limits are individual, and vary according to bring-
ing up. With many compassion is entirely confined
to human beings ; more especially is this the case
with those brought up in the shadow of monotheistic
beliefs. In pantheism, on the contrary, as it has pre-
vailed in India from the earliest days, the boundary
line of compassion runs right down into the lowest
animal kingdom. Meanwhile, among us, too, those
incapable of feeling compassion for a dog, a horse, a
cow, a cage-bird, are very few.

In the last analysis the capacity for compassion
consists in the peculiar attunement, consonance
existing between one /-energy and other /-energies.
Where, as in the case of the stone, there are no
/-energies, there can likewise be no compassion.

In the Buddha-thought the classification of the
phenomena of life adopted is one peculiar to itself
alone. The usual crude divisions into stone, plant,
animal, and man, or into inorganic and organic,
count for nothing here. All these are based upon
the assumption that things are fixed quantities,
identities ; hence they prescribe artificial precondi-

174 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

tions, and consequently have no value in themselves
but only with reference to some such determined
end as increased facility of comprehension. In the
Buddha-thought all life-phenomena divide them-
selves into these two classes — those that have power
to act upon me, stimulate or excite me, set me in
sympathetic vibration and correspondingly be set in
sympathetic vibration by me, and those with which
this is not more or not yet the case.

We are bound to admit — and all physiological
phenomena bear witness to it — that the ovum- and
sperm-cell are those forms of development of the
/-process in which the /-energy of the individuals
concerned reveals itself in its purest and most
intimate, because most intrinsic form. If they are
torn apart from the whole in the act of generation,
yet are they able to furnish the new /-material,
because they keep the /-energy vibrating sufficiently
long in themselves to be able to answer to the
Kamma peculiarly attuned to them.

Such an apprehension of things would seem like
a slap in the face for biology and the whole history
of evolution, and here the task of the Buddha-
thought is to come to an understanding with the
theory of descent if it is to prove satisfactory to the
man of education.

To begin with, one must be quite clear on this
point — that the whole theory of descent is nothing
but a form of reading the biological facts, a theory
in the strictest sense of the word. As a con-
sequence it has value only with reference to certain
ends. First, in order to group together under one
main heading the enormous miscellany of facts —
thus, for didactic ends. And secondly, read from

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 175

below upwards instead of from above downwards,
that is, apprehended as a theory of evolution instead
of as a theory of descent, it suggests a life-value of
such inspiring power as in this respect might also
be set alongside the ideas of God and of the state —
the idea of a development of mankind that progresses
ever further and further. This idea, of course, is
much older than Darwin, but it was only in his
teaching that for the first time it assumed requisite
reality.

The evolution theory is far removed from
Darwin's original teaching upon natural selection
and the survival of the fittest. It has only been
read into it by this age of ours ever hungering after
life-values. Man must have something to which to
cling in the dread wastes of endlessness ; he must
have something that points beyond this life — some-
thing to which he can relate this life as a whole.
To an age whose belief in God more and more
dwindles away, the evolution theory is an invaluable
substitute. Even if it yields no real nourishment,
yet does it point in emblem beyond this life of the
individual, and soothes like the sight of a beautiful
picture. That in reality one can only speak of
evolution where one has at hand a standard one can
apply to it, to the progress made — in other words,
where one can measure it ; this men forget and
willingly forget, for this single consideration perforce
flings the whole idea of progressive evolution into
the category of illusions. We must have an absolute
point of departure if we are to speak of evolution in
itself. This we no more possess than we possess
an absolute space to which we can relate its motion.
Where an absolute point of departure is lacking,

176 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

the idea of evolution is as meaningless as the idea
of absolute motion. The evolutional is " interpreted
into " the facts by main force. To declare man to
be more evolved than the monads, savours of a
limited despotism. The directly opposite view
were every whit as possible. Since the monads
achieve life with an infinitely much simpler apparatus
than man, they therefore stand higher in evolution ;
for " it is in limitation that the master is revealed."
A great many animals can do very much more than
man with his organ of thought, the main purpose of
which, when all is said and done, would appear to
consist in putting obstacles between him and actual
life, and subjecting him to the tyranny of concepts.
In point of fact, however, the miracle of the cells is
everywhere the same, in the monads as in the brain-
cells, and one position is all as futile as the other.

In the fact that science as represented by biology
is particularly qualified to adopt the development-
idea in the form of the theory of evolution, and to
make use of it, she shows her deep-lying and
essential fellowship with faith. For where in this
sense there is development, there is beginning ;
where there is beginning, there is an absolute ; and
where there is an absolute, there is faith. To
honest, genuine thinking, every thing, every moment
of beginning, whether of a real or of a conceptual
nature, leads back to a beginninglessness. In the
simple existence of life, that is, of anything that is
alive, its beginninglessness is already implied. With
this the evolution idea is deprived of all possibility.
Here development signifies nothing but the unfold-
ing of the characteristics involved in the material
laid hold of. Actual development proceeds just as

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 177

much from seed to blossom as from blossom to seed.
A moment of evolution is as little to be found in the
happenings of the world as in a burning flame. To
hold one world-period as more developed than
another is a childish position. Every moment
demonstrates, simply by its existence, that it is the
form of adaptation which just at that moment is the
only possible and therefore necessary one. The
world of the cosmic nebula — as being the blossom
of earlier worlds, the seed of later ones — is as
developed as the world of the ichthyosaurus, as the
world of the homo sapiens. All are forms of the
series of self-attunings, each after other. To call
the world of the now more developed than the world
of the Coal Age were somewhat the same as to call
the descent of a stone after it has been falling for
five seconds more developed than when it has been
falling for one second. The downward velocity
after one second is the adaptation just as much as is
the downward velocity after five seconds. It only
shows the childishness of the biological apprehen-
sion of things that it should still continue to find
satisfaction in such trivialities, based wholly as these
are upon concepts of its own fabrication.

But as already said, in the original teaching of
Darwin nothing is to be found of such conceptions.
He was a good Christian who had not the remotest
idea of setting up a primordial cell as competitor
against the bon dieu, or of aping him with such like
theories. And when he happens to meet him on
his way, he humbly pulls off his hat like Hodge in
presence of " squire."

The essence of Darwinism is contained in the
theory of selection. Against this theory reproach

178 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

has been brought that it embraces in its scope
only the transformations, not the arising of living
creatures. Rarely has theory encountered reproach
more childish and mistaken. That is found fault
with, which precisely constitutes the very greatness
of the thought.

Darwin's thesis is as follows : —

" Given the existence of organic matter, given
its tendencies to transmit its characteristics. Given,
finally, the life conditions of the organic matter —
these things in their totality are the causes of the
present and past conditions of organic nature."

The greatness of this statement lies in its truly
scientific exactitude, in its purely mechanistic appre-
hension of things. Just as the physicist, when he
speaks of force and mass, intentionally eliminates
everything of the actual — he simply cannot work
until first all that is actual is eliminated, and pure
relation-values established — so Darwin eliminates
everything actual and sets to work with pure
relation -values. Otherwise put: His teaching is
nothing but a new system of measurement for
actuality ; and his greatness consists in this, that
he was the first to take biology and apply to it
the methods of the physicist. He it was who first
approached the biological facts from the standpoint
of differences of tension, differences of potentiality.
His doctrine of the survival of the fittest is simply
a kind of biological measure of force. What would
one say of a man who made it a matter of reproach
in connection with a yard-stick that it did not also
at the same time indicate the nature and origin
of the object measured by it ? Only when it is
independent of all such questions can anything serve

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 179

as a standard of measurement. Where would the
physicist find himself were he to say, " I will not
concern myself with forces until I really know what
force is?' He does not wish to know what force
is. Were one to tell him he would stop his ears.
He wants to make use of force, to be able to
measure it ; nothing more. In the same way
Darwin does not in the least want to know and
tell what living beings are. Should one say,
"They are from God," another, "They are from
the devil," he, Darwin, happens to be of the former
opinion ; but that has nothing to do with the
problem before him. As the physicist lays hold
of the pendulum in its swing and says, "If now
I let it go, such and such phenomena must occur,"
so Darwin — figuratively speaking of course — lays
hold of the biological pendulum and says, "If now I
let it go, this and this must happen." The physicist
so arranges his preliminary conditions that he can
measure what occurs, and so also does- Darwin.
As the physical resultant is measured in the form of
work, so Darwin measures the biological resultant
in the form of the law of the survival of the fittest.
Previous to him, biology stood much on the same
level as the Ptolemaic universe which is based solely
upon observation. Observation indeed permits of
measurements of mass but not of measurements of
force. At one bound Darwin leaps to an appre-
hension and treatment of biology strictly after the
fashion of energetics, and thereby makes good his
claim to rank with Robert Mayer and his successors.
Comprehension, science, can only be carried on
where there is flux, where there is change. It is
the glory of the Darwinian theory that it sufficiently

180 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

fluidized for thought, the world of living beings,
broke up the rigid conception of species, the belief
in single acts of creation, as to render them access-
ible to a physical mode of apprehension ; the which
always amounts to a mechanistic mode, to a falling,
even where it calls itself the mode of energetics.
His theory of natural selection is, in the strictest
sense of the words, a liquidation of the inventory
of antiquated ideas. But be it well noted : like
the greatness of every mechanistic view, the great-
ness of the Darwinian thought resides in its purely
re-active quality, in the fact that it only furnishes
biological relation-values.

I incline to look upon the reception and inter-
pretation which the Darwinian teaching has received
at the hands of science as one of the hugest jokes
world - history — taken in the biological, not the
historical sense — has ever indulged in at the
expense of the human mind. It is more than a
joke ; it is a stroke of wit ! In all seriousness
men wrangle as to whether Darwin's doctrine is
true or false ; which is the same as if they disputed,
for example, about the truth or falsity of the decimal
system. Men find that the longer the theory of
natural selection is tested, the more frequently does
it fail them ; which is the same as if a man bent
upon measuring everything regardless of distinctions
with a yard-stick, should find, the longer he proceeds,
an ever increasing number of things that do not
admit of being measured by such a scale. In fine,
men so comport themselves, that oftentimes one
could almost wish to live sufficiently long to hear
the helpless laughter of posterity. And, with it all,
what erudition !

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 181

It is unfailingly interesting and instructive to
observe the difference between biology and physics.
In the latter is found a sort of well-bred savoir
vivre, a clear perception of the relativity of all
knowledge- values — Pontius Pilate's query trans-
lated with all the refinements of mechanistics into
physicist phraseology. In the former, in modern
monism, is heard the droning, "A mighty strong-
hold is our God," sung in unison by shepherd and
sheep ; wherein, to be sure, by the word " God " one
does not mean that jealous God who visits the sins
of the fathers upon the children, but that abstract
creature of air, "the law of evolution" which in
retrospective wise, seeks to avenge the follies of
the children upon the fathers.

Yet once more be it said, The doctrine of the
evolution of life out of one primordial form to
forms that mount by degrees ever higher and
higher, is of purely symbolical significance, as indeed
every law is of purely symbolical significance, inas-
much as it furnishes nothing save the possibility of
grouping together in one definite connection a large,
nay, a limitless number of phenomena.

Of course men point to the fact that modern
biology is able to bring about actual and genuine
modifications in living creatures. Nothing is further
from my intention than to call in question the facts
connected with breeding. Daily life sufficiently
proves them, and the laboratory demonstrates them
under a variety of elegant and surprising forms.
But what does one breed ? One breeds peculiar
conditions under which some life-process or other
runs its course — never by any means the process
itself — in the selfsame way that the physicist

i82 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

" breeds " the sunbeam as a spectrum, as a polarised
ray, as interference, and so forth. Never yet has
breeding brought about the transmutation of one
life-form into another higher in the scale of being.

Now comes the moment when the evolution
theorist plays out his last and highest trump.
" Very good ! " he says. " Let it be that in con-
sequence of our hitherto still defective technique
we have not yet succeeded in transmuting one
species into a higher, nevertheless, in the facts
that have been grouped together under the name
of the fundamental biogenetic law and in rudi-
mentary formations, Nature shows us that she
herself has actually come this way."

Of a surety the Buddha knew of no funda-
mental biogenetic law, probably also had no idea of
so-called rudimentary formations ; but I simply can-
not imagine anything that more conclusively proves
the truth of his thought than these same facts.
For, to him who has learned of the Buddha, these
facts do not say that which the modern biologist
imputes to them ; they testify to the existence of
actual associations between living beings right down
into what we call the lowest stages. They bring
immediately before our eyes the competency ot
human Kamma to find foothold outside the human
kingdom also. As a traveller bears about with
him this and the other trace of the dirt of the
roads along which he has journeyed, so does the
embryo in the various stages of its development
exhibit the traces of Samsara, demonstrate its power
to take hold in the heights and in the deeps, exactly
according as its Kamma is attuned, and demonstrate
also that it has taken hold in the heights and deeps,

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 183

exactly according as its Kamma was attuned. The
embryonal forms show — to use the language of
physics — the tremendous amplitude of vibration of
the /-process. They show that zve all eat out of the
one dish.

I am quite prepared to find interpretations such
as these evoke nothing but merriment among
orthodox men of science. But I address myself as
little to the slaves of science as to the slaves outside
it. I address myself to men who think with sufficient
independence and possess sufficient sense of actuality
to allow facts to have unbiassed weight with them.
The following is also worthy of consideration : —
The fundamental biogenetic law, as interpreted
by Haeckel is a complete contradiction of the very
nature of the theory of Natural Selection. Like
every purely scientific mode of envisaging things,
the latter comes in on an unaccented beat, so to
speak. It starts out with a given difference of
potentiality, with respect to which one does nothing
but observe the symptoms furnished by the process of
compensation ; refraining, however, from every inter-
pretation of how these differences could ever have
arisen. In the interpretation of the evolutionist, on
the other hand, the facts upon which the fundamental
biogenetic law is based of necessity point in the
direction of a first beginning ; they converge upon
the idea of the " setting in of life." Hence they
constrain to a scientific form of faith, which necessi-
tates acrimonious warfare against the church-form of
the same, if one cannot agree that the primordial
cell, existing all complete, and the " In the beginning
God created the heaven and the earth," may be
regarded simply as different attempts at the defini-

1 84 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

tion of one and the same occurrence. It is the feud
betwixt dog and wolf. In the dusk they might pass
for mates, were it not that each is busy trying to
take a bite out of the other's throat. But, like
all atheists from the most ancient times, modern
monism, too, forgets that to challenge the bon dieu
to single combat is, as politicians would say, to
" recognize him in principle," and that at bottom this
duel can be nothing but a modus vivendi for both
parties.

Darwin's original position entirely obviates such
a strait as this. It is, as all science should be,
strictly a-moral. With disconcerting — or if one
likes, refreshing — coolness, the biological pieces are
set up on the cosmic chess-board, and a game begun.
The first move of the opening is already made, and
now move after move follows of simple necessity.
Where, for example, Darwin speaks of the cuckoo's
instinct, he makes no attempt to account for the
same by itself. He rather begins, " Now let us
suppose that the ancient progenitor of our European
cuckoo had the habits of the American cuckoo, and
that she occasionally laid an egg in another bird's
nest . . ." and so on;1 which simply means: the
game is already in full swing, and. so one move
follows from the other.

Darwin might be called the grand master of the
art of biological chess. Nothing was further from
his mind — originally at least — than turning the
game to earnest ; from the fact that a biological
game is in progress, to seek to deduce an answer to
the question as to how such a thing could ever have
come about. That would only mean spoiling the

1 Origin of Species, p. 212. John Murray, London, 1S84.

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 185

whole game. And as a matter of fact, by none has
it been more completely spoiled for him than by his
own followers. To them it is that Bunge's words are
directed : " The Darwinians teach that everything
is cleared up, that only the riddle of heredity yet
remains to be solved. But it is precisely this riddle
of heredity which makes up the riddle the Darwinians
imagine they have explained. What, then, is in-
herited ? In the case of man there is inherited the
capacity to evolve a man out of a cell. For as long
as one remains unable to .solve this riddle — the
riddle of ontogeny — one remains still less able to
solve the riddle of phylogeny." x

Darwin himself so chose his position that at all
times he could look his God in the face. The
unalleviated insipidity of his position is precisely the
proof of the exact scientific form in which he — the
first to do so — laid hold of the biological problem.
But in this mode of laying hold of it, the fundamental
biogenetic law with its various perspectives has no
place whatever.

But neither do the rudimentary formations admit
of being read by the Darwinian formula. They
must have arisen through persistent disuse. In the
mechanistic world-view, however, an arising through
disuse is a sheer contradiction. Every disuse
implies the presence of an arbitrary impulsion. In
the strictly mechanistic apprehension of things, the
whole universe in each of its impulsions is to be
apprehended as the relapse of some other impulsion,
that is, as process of compensation ; and every
deficiency of activity in this never-resting process
of compensation, practically as well as theoretically,

1 Physiologie, i.'p. 402.

186 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

would be a miracle. As in the mechanical cosmo-
gony of the physicist, so also in the Darwinian
cosmogony, the single active impulsion in the whole
mechanism remains the diversity given with the
various forms of life ; and as above the physical, so
also here the biological event becomes simply the
compensation of these countless single diversities.
Hence every theory of disuse is synonymous with'the
introduction of a foreign, non-mechanical impulsion.

The Darwinian formula lays hold of the pheno-
mena of life only in a certain medial tract. Some-
what as a scale of temperature-measurement lays
hold of the phenomena of heat only in a certain
medial tract, and above and below that tract is of no
service, so the theory of natural selection is of no
service as regards the fundamental biogenetic law
on the one hand, and the rudimentary formations on
the other.

The third and weightiest consideration, however,
is this, that the fact of the formation of hybrids lies
neither above nor below the scale, but altogether
outside of it ; following our metaphor, to apply the
Darwinian idea to them would mean to seek some-
how to apply the heat-scale to electric or magnetic
phenomena. So soon as the evolution theory
attempts to bring the fact of the formation of hybrids
within its sphere of operation, it annihilates the
possibility of its own existence. Natural selection
is only possible in self-copulation. A self-copulation
to the point of sterility is a contradiction in itself;
hence Darwin himself is here obliged to have
recourse to unknown impulsions. " The general
sterility of crossed species may safely be looked at,
not as a special acquirement or endowment, but as

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 187

incidental on changes of an unknown nature in their
sexual elements."1 Again, "The extinction of
species has been involved in the most gratuitous
mystery. . . . We need not wonder at extinction ;
if we must marvel, let it be at our own presumption
in imagining for a moment that we understand the
many complex contingencies on which the existence
of each species depends."2 This, however, means
nothing but putting the question, " Who says we
have a right to inquire into everything ? " And that,
again, means nothing but to be a good Christian.

That, of course, is not the slightest disparage-
ment to the teaching, so long as one takes it for
what it really is — a standard of measurement for
the facts, a formula by means of which one may
more easily express them. It would be passing
sentence of death upon it, as also upon the law of
the conservation of energy, if, apprehending it in
childish wise, one interpreted it as a genuine world-
conception, as a law that should not merely supply a
reading of the facts, but account for these facts
themselves.

When modern biology inclines to set aside the
Darwinian teaching in favour of the more novel
theories of mutation, it is acting like that country-
man who bought himself a pair of spectacles,
expecting them not only to make print clear to his
eyes but also teach him how to read, and who then
made complaint that the glasses did not do their
duty. The theory of natural selection, as well as
every other theory, may be likened to reading-
glasses. It reveals the facts in such a way as to

1 Origin o Species, p. 259. John Murray, London, 1884.
2 Ibid. p. 297.

188 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

lighten the labour for weakly eyes, but it does not
teach one to understand the facts themselves. And
as with glasses, so with theories; one has to change
them, on an average, every five years.

But let us return to our subject proper.

Here also the Buddha supplies a single concept
in the place of two miracles. That to which science
gives the name of rudimentary organs are here not
the results of continuous disuse — once more I ask,
how in a purely mechanical apprehension of things
disuse can ever set in at all — but, precisely the
same as the facts of the fundamental biogenetic law,
they are witnesses to a beginningless journey up
and down throughout the entire domain of living
creatures. In the place of the double miracle —
a threatened absolute beginning in the facts of
the fundamental biogenetic law, and a threatened
absolute end in the fact of rudimentary organs — one
single concept ! And the formation of hybrids is
here robbed of all its danger. Beings are neither
heirs of their progenitors nor bequeathers to their
posterity ; they are heirs of themselves.

In such a mode of apprehending life, that which
we basely and vulgarly call co-ition acquires a
meaning of its own. Again there is that delicate
irony that comes only of commanding height of
position. The intercourse of the sexes is only the
attempt at co-ition, at coming together. In plain
truth, both man and woman are nothing but the
surrogates of nature, which makes use of them in
order to render possible the real co-ition, the conflux
of Kamma and its material. Hence, species and
sub-species count for nothing. Such a "something"
as species is nowhere to be found in actuality. It

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 189

is nothing but a way of apprehending the phenomena
of life.

It may be rejoined, " But as a matter of fact
beings are so constituted as to admit of their being
grouped together into species. This is so in the
scientific apprehension of things, where the new
being is exclusively derived from the material of
the parents, in accordance with nature. But in
the Buddhistic apprehension of things, there is no
reason whatever why two living beings, so far
as form is concerned, should be like one another
at all."

To this, reply may be made, Two living beings
exactly alike as to form are not to be found.
Groupings, of no matter what kind, are always
matters of accommodation ; which means that they
are only made possible by the neglecting of trifling
divergencies. The fool in King Lear, inform-
ing us why the Pleiades has seven stars, says,
" Because there are not eight of them." There are
not eight of them, however, not because an eighth
is not there, but just because we leave out the
remainder, do not count them in. So also is it
with species. Of course, I am never in any doubt
as to what it is that I name man, dog, cow, and so
forth, for these concepts have first been settled by
myself. But as that which I comprehend with my
horizon changes content at every step I take, so
also do the concepts man, dog, and so forth.
Everything is comprehended in an uninterrupted
self- accommodation, self-attunement, each after
other, that only runs its course with sufficient
sluggishness, provisionally to render possible and
justify the groupings of natural science in order to

190 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

better understanding. To ask why precisely there
are the forms that there are, is to ask why in
general there is anything given at all. It simply
is so ! The question would have some meaning
were stationary forms here present from eternity
and to eternity. But all these forms are nothing
but a perpetual forming itself into itself from
beginninglessness down to the present moment.
To say that there is a world, a reality at all, is to
say that there must be resemblances. Otherwise
a self-attunement of energy and material were
utterly impossible. The resemblances, and there-
with in the second place the possibility of classific
syntheses are real and conceptual preliminary con-
dition of all actuality — yea, actuality itself.

Another objection which every thinking man
must make is one that out of prudence is raised by
the theory of descent itself. It is this : " How can
the theory of a gradual unbroken ascent in the
evolutional series be reconciled with the simultaneous
existence of the lowest alongside of the highest
forms ? " Here the theory of descent is unable even
to make an attempt at a satisfactory explanation.
Darwin himself on this point says, " Such objec-
tions as the above would be fatal to my view, if it
included advance in organization as a necessary
contingent." ! This declaration throws a flood of
clearest light upon Darwin's whole attitude towards
the theory of evolution, and at the same time upon
the arbitrariness with which he has been interpreted
by his followers.

Now let us consider the other side. The
Buddha-thought, regarded from the physiological

1 Origin of Species, p. 308.

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 191

position, is based upon the insight that every living
being is a singly determined existence. The
question is, Are there facts in nature which would
contradict this one and single determination ?

I confine myself to the most promising instance,
that of the amoeba multiplying themselves by fission.
This fact, interpreted according to science, would
mean that here energy divides itself, exists along-
side itself, since Weissman says that at the moment
of partition neither of the two cells, if " endowed
with self-consciousness," could say which was
mother and which daughter. " I have no doubt
that each half would look upon the other as the
daughter, and itself as the original individual," he
says in his Daner des Lebejzs.

Were there any real necessity to compel such
an interpretation, then the single determination of
energies would be riddled through and through.
But there is no compelling necessity, nay, nor
even possibility, of interpreting what happens after
such a fashion. One is equally entitled to say
that in the sundered sections a new energy lays
hold. That this daughter-section continues its
movements without a break is no proof of the
orthodox conception of what takes place. The
human sperm-cell, after its expulsion from the old
organism, also for a longer time retains its own
particular movements. It works itself towards the
ovum against the vibratory movements of the
epithelium ; thus, so to speak, against the stream.

Incidentally it may be remarked that this fact
alone, interpreted according to physiology, would
give rise to a difficulty that must render insoluble
the entire problem of fecundation. For this move-

192 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE ix

ment of the sperm -cell renders necessary the
question, " When precisely does the actual moment
of fecundation occur? Is it at the first signs of
conception ? or at the moment when the sperm-cell
penetrates the sheath of the ovum ? or at the
moment of their first mutual contact ? or has not
fecundation already virtually set in with this
endeavour of the sperm-cell to get to the ovum-
cell ? " One might then inquire, after the fashion of
jurists : " At what moment precisely is the deed
born ? Is it when I carry it out ? or when I get
ready to carry it out ? or when I form the resolve
to carry it out ? " Such are the difficulties that arise
when one seizes the problem of procreation in a
purely materialistic way. And one is bound to
seize it in a purely materialistic way if one would
seize it scientifically.

A single fact which contradicts the unique
determination of a living being is not to be found,
and never can be found. For this, it would be
necessary that energy itself should be accessible,
seizable by sense ; and that is a contradiction in
itself. One energy only is accessible — my conscious-
ness. And this is the uniquely determined.

So much for the attitude of the Buddha-thought
to the biological problem. To procure acceptance
for such views, a broad high-way would first need
to be driven through the jungle of scientific opinions.
Science divides consciousness and life, making the
former merely an accident of the latter, and seeking
and seeing it only in the line of matter. The
processes of fission in unicellular organisms call up
visions of an " eternal life." Thereupon men halt
and say with full conviction — and justification also,

ix THE PROBLEM OF BIOLOGY 193

" The continuity of consciousness is apparently
interrupted ; the continuity of life is never inter-
rupted " j1 or else, " It is no cell-complex that dies,
but a concept "; 2 in saying which, so far as the
form of the words goes, they entirely agree with
the Buddha, and yet in meaning stand so
desperately far from him that every hope of an
understanding between them is out of the question.
This inward divergence reveals itself here and
there in the sequelce : All the facts connected with
the doctrine of generation and the history of
evolution, which in the scientific mode of envisaging
them become insoluble problems, with the Buddha
are all resolved in one thought — that of individual
beginninglessness represented by the line of
Kamma, and so become the evangel of a new
world-conception.

1 Bunge's Physiologic. 2 Weissman's Leben und Tod.

BUDDHISM AND THE COSMOLOGICAL

PROBLEM

This problem treats of the question as to the
arising of the world in general and life in particular
— thus, has its foundation in the methodical play
against one another of two absurdities ; as indeed
follows from the possibility of reversing the
positions. If the materialist asks, " How has
life come into the world ? " the idealist equally
inquires, " How has the world entered into life,
i.e. into me, into my consciousness ? " From the
outset, it is obvious that here both are provided
with unlimited scope for the performance of mental
feats worthy to rank on equal terms with the derring-
do of a " raging Roland." And as the Duke of
Florence asked of the worthy Ariosto, " Messer
Ludovico, where ever did you learn all those
tricks?" so here, in similar wise, one might ask,
" Master of the lecture-room, master of the crucible
and the retort, where ever did you learn all those
tricks ? "

For biologist and physicist the train of reasoning
here runs as follows : —

"Life is present! Proof: I, the thinker!"
The first rule of play in the cosmic game, according

194

x THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 195

to scientific principles, is : " God " does not count —
just as in a vaulting contest the stick does not
count. This granted, the whole problem embodies
itself in these two possibilities : —

(a) Has life arisen through spontaneous genera-
tion ? (6) Has it descended hither from beginning-
lessness ?

The question of spontaneous generation has
undergone manifold vicissitudes. Aristotle made
use of spontaneous generation with perfect in-
genuousness, not to say unstinted lavishness.
The more, however, continued experiment taught
that where one had hitherto imagined one beheld
the arising of new life, serious mistakes had been
made — that germs of life had found their way into
the medium, all the more did men turn away from
the idea of a generatio spontanea. The experiments
of Pasteur seemed to give the decisive blow.
Wherever life is present, life is presupposed.

To-day men give their opinion on the subject
of the possibility of spontaneous generation with
that cautious reserve which has been learnt from
the calculation of probabilities.

A modern physiologist expresses himself as
follows : —

" The question as to whether out of dead
substance a living cell can be produced, whether
so-called spontaneous generation is a possibility,
does not in the present condition of our knowledge
permit of being answered in a decided negative.
We are bound to admit the possibility, even though
all experiments yield a negative result."1

The necessity which, despite all negative results,

1 G. v. Bunge, Physiologie, i. p. 361.

iq6 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE x

compels one to cling to the possibility of spontaneous
generation, is the truly heroic violence with which
biology identifies " life " and " cell."

The entire sum of biological wisdom comes to
a point in the saying, Omnis celhila e cellula
- — against which as little objection is to be urged as
against the statement of the fact that every living
being arises from another living being.

At this point, however, geology steps in and
plays the spoil-sport by producing indubitable
proofs of the one-time molten condition of our
globe, thereby setting an insurmountable limit to
" life " in the biological acceptation of the word.

This fact served as spur to all sorts of attempts
at imparting a more scientific character to the
belief in spontaneous generation.

In these endeavours the main support received
came from organic chemistry.

The first achievement on the road to the
chemical " synthesis " of life was Wohler's demon-
stration of artificial urea. But this event has
been so far outstripped that to-day one only looks
back at it in order to bring visibly before the eye
the progress that has been made in a comparatively
short space of time. To-day one is already
beginning to talk of the possibility of producing
living albumen.

The following passage from Huxley's On our
knowledge of the causes of the phenomena of organic
nature may serve as a sample of the "scientific
circumspection " with which one sets to work upon
this most difficult of tasks also.

After laying it down that there are two possible
proofs of the origin of life : first, the historical one

x THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 197

as found in geology ; and second, that derived from
experiment — of which the former is unsatisfactory
and the latter not carried out, the writer proceeds : —
"To enable us to say that we know anything
about the experimental origination of organization
and life, the investigator ought to be able to take
inorganic matters, such as carbonic acid, ammonia,
water, and salines, in any sort of inorganic combina-
tion, and be able to build them up into protein
matter, and then that protein matter ought to begin
to live in an organic form. That nobody has
done as yet, and I suspect it will be a long while
before anybody does do it. But the thing is by no
means so impossible as it looks ; for the researches
of modern chemistry have shown us — I won't say
the road towards it, but, if I may so say, they have
shown the finger-post pointing to the road that
may lead to it."

O agnus del ! lend me but a little of thy lamb's
patience, that so I may be able to smile at this
tangle of profound absurdities, this docta ignorantia.
And this they call weighing a difficult problem
with " scientific circumspection " ! It is not difficult,
God wot, to be circumspect when it is the purely
imaginary that is in question. For the famous
Monsieur " Life " of whose organization and struc-
ture mention is made above has precisely as much
actuality as that Mr. Table d'Hote for whom the
farmer from the country inquired. Such a being
is the most effective of subjects for science, for
it admits of being solved without remainder in
learnedness. Quousque tandem prof es sores !

No physicist would be so irrational as to say,
" I see the wind — in the swaying bough of a tree

Lr . • r: ..- ?" ■: :-t ~ : :.^ . - : .: : . :

irbtri - r-: — - -~i r..~ *r7: : 7hr

:;;;-: r.-.-v : f-- - l ..,;: ? :; >;_v.
?-: :. ? :::;.;.':• - - -. : : . : ■• ~r ': - : ? . -:
_-»:::- c>i - - ' ~?- :~" - r — ::;... Y..ir.
• - ■ '• ~ ' ; "^ - " " '- ^ '•- -': f^

.: r .,- - ; - ~ :-.-.:- : : - -

; ; r ~ : r _ _ : : = -.-";" --..-.-:-.:;_. ..- f
-r-irvr~-~- :.:LJ ; ~~ : - ~ : ~ L>J_f~ ; -. r LL:

; . . ■ ■ - — ^: r r: . . = -. - ; . - - -. .- -

: t ~ : lllj" :: r : _- : ; . . - - • _ : lie

r>_b_Jl. r ": ~ ,'"-• 'T ; " . " _ - . '-^-^

rrrr :~ - z~ .: -"-Z - - ~ - - - - r: r: - ;::ez-

l= — =nd : :l? ; ; _ ~:r

7 : •:- lt_l — lt:±t irz ' : is ■?:

- r. zh~r. :.-"::: 7 : -. « : r. : : ' -

:;: if iLif ::, i: ^ r-?.=r.r$.= :r. :r.t :7~ : izt
: - _.-: r.;.: — _:l: . : '.. : i i~t zt2.~'tz i . l :• _-.::;-;-
: r rirci-— r - — >" — ->- ~'- - - - — — .~; :.- . :
-■ - rrL s7-t :_:l= so-t-J ;

; — : Li , ;,. :: , -:_r : :t = ::■-=.- z-r-ilv i:
.- : :.::■: , " t - . - : "

- - -:~. : ---:.: . - : - : . .
: :.z -: '. >'. - -- " ' " .^ ' : " Lit ~ : _:t~ ?iLit

x THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 199

This theory presents a good example of how
similarity of sound may conceal complete difference
in sense.

Like the Buddha, this theory, too, teaches the
beginninglessness of organized life. But whilst
with the Buddha there is an actual new arising as
flames arise new, by an energy encountering the
material, "striking in," here there is only an inept
pushing back of the facts perceptible to sense ; in
which latter procedure meteorites are made to serve
as a sort of cosmic jam-jar, the precious stuff " life,"
in a conserved condition, so to speak, being passed
over therein from one world to another.

A variation of this problem is the question as to
whether " life " has arisen on the earth in one single
place, or in several places simultaneously.

In the Buddha-thought all such questions are
reduced to impotence.

The Buddha teaches : —

There are countless worlds ; and as here on our
world things may be destroyed by fire or water, or
otherwise, so also with the worlds in space.

But as the disintegration of anything here on the
Earth only means its reintegration anew in some
other place, so also is it with the worlds. Nothing
is destroyed, nothing perishes : it is only that a
change takes place in the centres of tension —
nothing more. An Earth, a Sun, a Jupiter, a Sirius,
and so forth, as identities, as corporealities complete
in themselves — these as little exist as there exist
identities as personalities. Even as here, so also in
the infinitudes of space, there are condensations
having their foundation in definite energical tensions
which, for the sake of easier comprehension and

200 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE x

because the process runs its course at a rate of
speed sufficiently low, we designate by the names
of Earth, Sun, Jupiter Sirius, and so forth. Like
every /-process that presents itself to my senses,
they possess significance only as symptoms ; they
are nothing but forms in which certain definite
energies make themselves manifest.

In the Buddha's system there are no such things
as worlds in themselves. A world is nothing but
the summation of the single processes of which it
is made up, just as a banquet is nothing but the
summation of the guests and the ingredients of the
feast. As birds flock together because there is
something present that attracts them in large
numbers ; as crows gather round a mango-stone ;
as a saline solution from the centre of shock out-
wards proceeds to crystallize ; so does this unitary
experience, whether it manifest itself in organic or
non-organic shape, conglobate into cosmic groups,
burst into systems of worlds. Here one must hold
to it firm and fast that " non-organic " is not the
converse of " organic," but is simply the not organic,
and an indication that energies are here concerned
upon which we ourselves even by analogy can say
nothing.1 For the rest, however, all is the same —
all is the self-interweaving of energy and material —
all is Sankhara. Whether the processes are of
such a nature as in the course of their development
to permit of flowering forth into consciousness or
whether they are not — this makes no essential
difference. When the Buddha says : " The arising
of the world will I teach you," and then proceeds
with his sequence of thought : " Where the eye

1 Cf. Essay IX.

x THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 201

and forms are, there arises visual consciousness ; the
conjunction of the three results is contact ; contact
yields feeling," and so on ; or when he says :
" The world is where the six senses are " — this is
not meant in the philosophical idealistic sense.
There is no arising of the world other than that
experienced at every moment as a self-interweaving
of energy and material in me, in every being, in
every process in the world. The summation of this
individual experience — that is the world. Other world
there is not. This moment that now says "/" —
this is the arising of the world, and never and no-
where in all the universe does it take place other-
wise. As eater, as self-nourisher, I am world-maker
in the strictest sense of the word. In this actual
world nothing new arises. Centres of tension,
tendencies, shift about hither and thither, heave
up and down like mist- wreaths over the dark depths
of unfathomable abysses — a beginningless coming
together, a beginningless falling asunder, in which
nothing persists save the never-sated thirst, the
ever-sleepless lust for food. It is the terrible game
" law " that here is played. Worlds, the arena ;
fates, the players ; and the prize — nothing !

In connection with such a beginningless integra-
tion and disintegration, to speak of a condition of
greater or lesser development is the notion of a
child. As little as the clenched list is more
developed than the five fingers outspread, just as
little is a world in space peopled with thinking,
living beings more developed than one spread
out in masses of nebula ; all things are only phases
in a beginningless proceeding here presenting
itself to me symptomatically, but of which I obtain

202 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE x

a direct comprehension in consciousness. To ask
whether suns and Milky Ways are without beginning
is meaningless ; for they are positively nothing else
but the expression of the hither and thither
movement of energies ; but that which I now
experience in consciousness, that is — rightly con-
sidered— beginninglessness itself; and the self-
integration and self- disintegration of worlds is
nothing but the functional concomitant phenomenon
of the beginninglessness of the /.

If now such a Lokadhatu (world-system) goes
to decay, this, conformable to its nature, is nothing
but a summation of single dyings. The Kamma
of the single things takes fresh hold in the universe
there where it can take hold — and therefore must
take hold. Actual energies take hold immediately,
independent of space and time. There is no need
to trace their course from meteorites and cosmic
nebulae, from one heavenly body to another, some-
what as one might trace a letter from its place of
postage to its destination ; but even as our thoughts
are immediate, independent of time and space, as
our loves are able to " lay hold " in the remotest
ends of the earth, so do the Kammas lay hold
immediately, independent of time and space, in
the most distant abysses of infinitude, even to
where no light-year any more can measure — lay
hold there, whither, in virtue of their propensities,
their tendencies, they reach out.

From the commanding position of such a
conception it follows that Buddhist cosmogony
does not fit in with our crude astronomical ideas.
As it is not always the case that " birds of a feather
flock together " — there are solitary denizens of air,

x THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 203

noble creatures that wing their way through the
ether alone — so Buddhist cosmogony makes mention
of solitary beings who segregate themselves at the
initial beginnings of a new world.

When, after the break-up of a system of worlds,
here and there worlds again begin to form, to sprout ;
when again here and there energies take hold even
because they can take hold, then these beings appear
as pure creatures of light, self-luminous, wheeling
through boundless space, through boundless epochs
of time, compact all of light, compact all of bliss, yet
even as we, belonging to the world, differing only
in the circumstances and antecedent conditions of
their "taking hold."

One reads of this in the colossal thought-
symphony of the Brahmajala Sutta of the Digha
Nikaya. It is thus that a spirit speaks who has
burst through the barriers of self-imposed con-
ceptions and unimpeded launches out into the
infinitudes where thought finds never a bound save
that itself enjoins, nor any halt save that it sets
itself.

In conclusion I recapitulate: —

Like all the other problems of science, this too
is of a dialectical nature. One is operating with
one identity "world" and another identity "life,"
and afterwards strives in vain to bring the two
into comprehensible association. In the simple
entertaining of such ideas one has cut oneself off
from every possibility of a solution. There is no
identity "world," no identity "life." There are
nothing but self-sustaining, i.e. beginningless pro-
cesses which here and there group themselves into
systems of worlds. If one has comprehended the

204 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE x

whole world as Sankhara, there is no cosmological
problem. World and life are there as the begin-
ningless unity of " processioning."

As a working hypothesis, what service is here
rendered by the Buddha-thought ?

The Buddha-thought explains how it comes to
seem as if life had a first beginning upon a world.
For as a matter of fact there is such a first begin-
ning, and it permits of being proven historically and
geologically. All this is beyond possibility of
dispute : it is only the interpretation that is mis-
taken. This first beginning is such, much in the
same way that the spring welling from the rock is
the first beginning of the river. It is the first
beginning only where one objectifies the river as
an identity. If science seeks to explain the first
beginning of life by spontaneous generation, she
resembles a man who should derive the spring from
the rock itself. If she seeks to derive the first
beginning of life from other worlds, she then is
like a man who would fain derive the spring as
such, as an abstract objectified something, from
one or another of various localities. Only in the
Buddha-thought is the first beginning of life con-
ceived of in a genuinely cosmogonical manner,
as form of the play of world-events. It is no
migration of duly shaped and formed " spring "-
elements, which out of atmospherical vapour and
the waters of the sea fashion a spring, but a self-
displacement of centres of energy. In the self-same
way it is no migration of life-elements hither out
of other worlds, but a self-displacement of centres
of energy, which makes it that life " sprouts" anew
upon a world. Here, to speak about a first begin-

x THE COSMOLOGICAL PROBLEM 205

ning as such, and consequently of a condition of
greater or lesser development, has about as much
meaning as if one should speak of a condition of
greater or lesser development in the case of the
waters of the ocean, the vapour of the atmosphere,
the fountain on the hill. What is true with
reference to science's problem of heredity is even
more true of her cosmological problem : it is wholly
Hebraic.

BUDDHISM AND THE PROBLEM OF

THOUGHT

The fact that a world exists simultaneously involves
its existence as such, i.e. as our idea.

All speculations and theories about the world
are thus of a secondary nature. Their existence
were a sheer impossibility if the world, apart from
its being in existence at all, were not also existent
as such, as idea, conceptually.

In the foreword to his Kritik der reinen Erfah-
rungt R. Avenarius says : —

" This work makes the attempt to comprehend
all theoretical relations whatsoever ... as conse-
quences of one single, simple postulate."

This " single, simple postulate for all theoretical
relations " is the possibility of such a thing, i.e. the
fact that conscious ideas, concepts, exist. The con-
cept is the problem of all thought ; and to seek to
master the world epistemologically before one has
mastered the concept, is sheer waste of time.

Now, in the matter of concept thought is in this
awkward plight, that the former offers nothing
objective that can be made to serve as a point of
departure in any possible attempt at comprehen-
sion.

206

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 207

This simple consideration alone implies that
every attempt to come at the fact "concept" in-
ductively, i.e. with the implements of science, is
hopeless, indeed absurd. And each fresh attempt
in that direction only supplies another proof of the
truth of the Buddha's teaching that all mental life
perforce is bound up with ignorance as to itself.

In what follows I shall endeavour very briefly to
sketch the various mistaken paths that here have
been traversed.

As everywhere, so also with regard to the fact
"concept," the two antitheses faith and science
stand ranged over against each other. As every-
where, so also here, the fact " concept " presents no
problem to faith. Just because I am endowed with
a soul, a " force in itself," I possess the power, the
ability to form concepts. As everywhere, so also
here, the paradoxical character of faith makes itself
palpably manifest : the fact of the formation of con-
cepts is by it accepted as proof that an inconceivable
in itself must be present.

Opposed to it stands science, which seeks to
explain and is bound to explain how such an
occurrence as the formation of concepts has ever
been able to come about. Her task falls into two
main divisions. On the one hand, there is the
demonstrating of the subjective, antecedent con-
ditions of the concept ; this is done in the physiology
of the different organs of sense. On the other
hand, there is the demonstrating of the objective,
antecedent conditions of the concept — objects, the
external world.

Of this task the subjective part, and the entire
fruitlessness of the same, have already been dealt

208 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

with in another place. The objective division
comprehends philosophy in the broadest sense of
the word. For every theory and speculation as to
the world may without exception be traced back
to this one question : " How must the world
be fashioned to render possible the fact that
consciousness-contents, conscious ideals, concepts,
exist — in fine, that the world exists as such}" In
this question is comprehended all philosophy, as
the tree is comprehended in the root.

All the theories as to the constitution of the
world that have ever been advanced or that will
ever be advanced, branch into these two funda-
mental views : —

First : the view that at the foundation of things
there exists a constant in itself, an unconditioned
constant, an identical with itself, or whatever else
one has a mind to name it.

Second : the view that there exists no such
unconditioned constant at the foundation of things,
but that all that exists is merely a relation-value,
and that the one single constant in the universe is
the constant of relations formulated abstractly in
scientific law.

Now, to the impartial observer the world presents
itself in a twofold aspect : on one hand as " some-
thing that is," and on the other as "something that
happens." In the former of these two fundamental
views, things would be something that has happen-
ing, something that has this happening proceed
forth from it. In the latter view, things would be
the happening itself, would resolve themselves
completely into happening.

As already set forth at length in what has gone

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 209

before, this latter conception is that given for
science as the mechanical world-theory. Science,
if she would justify her title to the name, dare not
accord recognition to anything concealed behind
things, anything imperceptible to sense. If this be
granted, " that which is " then becomes purely a
form of " that which happens," and the universe in
its entirety one huge mass of relation-values. For
a thing is perceptible to sense and therewith
apprehensible only in so far as it enters into
relations with other things, which includes, with
my senses.

Any third view is impossible, for, from the strictly
epistemological standpoint, opposites, between them,
always comprehend the whole. From the stand-
point of strict epistemology, with any kind of
thing as a concept — with the concept "tree" for
example — all the rest of the world is given as
"not-tree " — so completely given with it that the
interpolation of any third concept is an utter
impossibility.

It may be asked, "In what do these two opposed
fundamental views find their justification ? "

All things exist for us only in so far as they are
perceptible to us. They exist as appearances, as
the sum of their properties. If now the thinking
mind would have anything made wholly manifest,
wholly perceptible to sense — would seek to have
something made wholly and entirely appearance,
there always remains a residue that refuses to
be made manifest, refuses to be made perceptible
to sense. Speaking generally, one may say :
Applied thought seems to conduct to a something
lying at the foundation of things, to a constant in

210 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

itself, of which all properties, all in things that is
perceptible to sense, are only so many different
expressions. The idea that all that exists does so
in virtue of a constant in itself, presents itself as a
necessity of thought, which science must oppose by
every means if she would retain her title to the
name of science.

Since this constant in itself is of necessity an
imperceptible to sense, it imposes no restrictions
upon apprehension. One is perfectly at liberty to
conceive of it in quite contrary forms — as matter or
substance, equally as well as under the form of
force. If one holds by the former mode of con-
ceiving it, then, whatever the guise its elaboration
in thought may assume, one belongs to the school
of materialism. If, on the contrary, one holds by
the latter mode of apprehension, one then belongs,
quite independent of the form its detailed elabora-
tion in thought may assume, to the idealistic school.
For the correct appraisement of our whole mental
life, however, it is important clearly to understand
that the opposition is only an apparent one. Both
alike have one common root in the idea of an un-
conditioned constant lying at the foundation of
things, which, summed up, may be designated as
the substans (das Stibstans) of all appearances. The
substance, accordingly, results purely as the material
form of this substans, while the force represents its
immaterial form : the one being as well — and as ill
— authenticated as the other, since one knows
nothing of either, nor ever can know anything.

If now one follows up the various transformations
that have taken place in this domain within historical
times, one finds that, as is also the case in the domain

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 211

of natural science, they occur following the law of
the inversion of positions. Does the one school,
whether it be the materialistic or the idealistic, force
its way into such a preponderating position as to
become intolerable to sound common-sense, it is
forced to give place to its opponent, which then for
a season takes the lead, only, after a longer or
shorter period, to undergo a like fate. It is like a
game of see-saw. All the acuteness, all the pro-
fundity, all the mental florescence which the one
school has manifested in the course of centuries of
labour perhaps, in this period of decline are brought
to destruction, and only by ardent collectors can be
rescued and preserved as a palaeontological form of
mental life. At bottom, the whole of philosophy
up to each new " now " is nothing but a more or
less tastefully-arranged palaeontological collection of
thought-values.

Above and alongside this play of inversions
betwixt idealism and materialism — which I might
call the inversion of the lower order — there takes
place another inversion of a higher order.

In certain intervals the human understanding
begins to offer serious resistance to both the world-
views that base themselves on the concept of
substans in its two possible forms — that of substance
and that of force — by hastening over to one that is
the contrary of both, a world-conception from which
substans is wholly absent, a world consisting entirely
of a mass of relation-values. This latter form of
world-conception alone has the right to the designa-
tion of "scientific." For there can be no science,
properly so-called, where the subject dealt with is
any shape or form of an imperceptible to sense.

212 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

Now, the first inversion of the higher order with
which we in our Western circles of culture are
acquainted has, to be sure, a slight enough
scientific cast. It is the inversion that set in with
Protagoras the Sophist. With his thesis, " Man
is the measure of all things — of those that are,
that they are ; of those that are not, that they
are not " — he places himself in an attitude of
opposition to both world-conceptions founded on
the concept of substans ; for in both these concep-
tions things, as existing in virtue of an uncondi-
tioned constant, must also be the measure of man.

The appearance of Protagoras was a naturally-
resulting protest against the absurdities to which
materialism and idealism had mutually driven each
other. The former found its culminating point in
Democritus of Abdera, who left nothing in the
world but matter in the shape of atoms. The
latter reached its corresponding culmination in
Plato, who left nothing in the world but the im-
material substans, ideas, to whom thereby matter
became the non-existent.

The whole procedure of Protagoras conveys the
impression that his inversion was of a purely
dialectical nature. For the style and manner in
which he formulates his new point of view leaves to
humanity for all its mental life nothing but mere
opinion. His dictum as to man being the measure
of all things takes no account of a natural order of
things. To this perhaps may be attributed the fact
that his philosophy, however arresting it may have
been in his own day and time, set forth personally
by this gifted mind, has yet proved itself to be but
little permanent.

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 213

After the see-saw between idealism and material-
ism had proceeded for some two thousand years
more, the new inversion of the higher order set in
with a mighty whirlwind, the most powerful, the
most systematically-delivered attack upon the notion
of substans that Western philosophy had ever ex-
perienced— the philosophy of Hume.

Hume's philosophy, briefly stated, consists in
the investigation of what exhibits itself to sense-
perception considered as based on a possible content
of substans — in unravelling it to the last thread and
pointing out to his contemporaries with irrefutable
clearness and acuteness, " See there, you people !
a constant in itself is nowhere to be found ! '!

Hume is frequently alluded to as a sceptic. I
consider, on the contrary, that his philosophy is the
purest criticism precisely where in philosophy
criticism may be practised at all — namely, upon the
concept of substans, whether in material or im-
material form.

Every criticism of substans culminates naturally
in criticism of the notion of an /. For Hume, the
/, the self, became a bundle, a collection of separate
mental representations "that follow one another with
inconceivable rapidity and are in a state of perpetual
flow, continual motion."

But a criticism of the notion of substans is in-
complete without a criticism of the concept of cause ;
for the intuition that all that exists must have an
adequate cause is likewise a necessity of thought.
Now, where there is a constant in itself, a substans
in things, causality is an actual following after one
another of cause and effect, this " constant in itself"
being also "cause in itself" of that which happens,

2i4 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

the latter therefore, as " effect in itself," representing
a simple following upon that cause in itself, in such
sort that between the two there exists a necessary —
I might almost say — a rigid dependence ; where-
upon the question, " How is a relation between the
two possible ? " becomes a problem that defies
solution.

Hence it follows that one is bound to hold the
problem of causality as a correlate of substans. If
the latter falls, the former falls along with it.

As the notion of a constant in itself becomes in
the criticism of Hume a simple product of imagina-
tion, so for him does the concept of causality become
the simple outcome of use and wont. Because in
our representation of things we frequently observe
two things to follow one upon the other, we assume
that a necessary dependence exists between the two.
Hume solves both these problems by declaring
them, without a moment's hesitation, to have no
existence at all.

After Hume, the see-saw game of the lower
order went on for a time. Upon the intellectual
materialism of the eighteenth century — especially as
it prevailed in France, where it was represented by
such men as La Mettrie and Von Holbach — there
followed the idealism of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel.
After this had exploded of its own gaseousness, the
scientific materialism of the nineteenth century set
in, and up to our day has continued to hold the
upper hand, though now it seems to be swinging
back in a new idealistic movement.

Alongside of this a new inversion of the higher
order has managed to prepare itself, making its
appearance in two distinct forms, of which one is

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 215

the direct successor of the criticism of Hume, while
the other derives from physics.

The former is modern positivism, as developed
in particular by Ernst Mach and R. Avenarius.
The latter is the so-called world-theory of ener-
getics, as represented more especially by Ostwald
the physicist.

Both schools partake of a purely scientific
character in so far as they aim at furnishing world-
theories from which a substans is ruled out —
seek to frame a world consisting solely of relation-
values, a world in which the one thing constant is
the constancy of the relations.

A third school, modern monism, as represented
especially by Haeckel, is not scientific at all.

As already said, it is of the essence of every
scientific view that it should apprehend the entire
play of world-events purely as relation-values. Such
a world-conception is bound always to set out from
the midst of the play of events, with things already
in full swing. Modern monism, with its teaching of
primordial life in the form of a primordial cell or
some other primordial form, is science only in out-
ward appearance ; at the core it is unmitigated
superstition, and ought to be regarded as such by
every thinking man, for it betrays itself such by
its uncritical abuse of ecclesiastical dogma.

After this historical review, given with the
utmost possible brevity, we have to inquire : —

What is the reason then for this insufficiency of
the substans-views, whether it refer to a material or
to an ideal substans in things? Why are materialism
and idealism alike devoid of any kind of demonstra-
tive ability ?

216 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

The answer to this is : —

Because both alike are hampered by a contra-
diction within themselves. This contradiction be-
comes manifest in the fact that such a world as
would be yielded by the concept of substans would
be so constituted that in it the fact "concept," i.e.
the fact that a world exists as idea, would be bound
to remain an eternally insoluble problem.

This necessarily results from the following con-
siderations : —

If there is any substans lying at the foundation
of things, it must be a " constant in itself" ; as such,
however, it must be something possessing no
possibility whatever of entering into relations with
other things, in any kind of way. If it cannot do
this, neither can it become perceptible to sense.
If it does not become perceptible to sense, it
cannot become a content of consciousness.

Here it may be said : " But it is not substa?is
itself, but its expressions, i.e. things, in so far as
they are properties, functions, that enter into
relations, whether with other things or with the
organs of sense of living beings." But from this
we could never get anything else but a summation
of disconnected sense-impressions. The thread, so
to speak, needed to string the sense-impressions
together into a complete, coherent, mental repre-
sentation would be missing. Everything, so far as
it exists for me as a concept, would have to be
the expression precisely of a substans lying at its
foundation. But to possess a conscious mental
representation of this as an unconditioned constant
is a contradiction in itself. Hence the fact that
there are concepts, i.e. that a world as such exists,

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 217

i.e. that there is a world at all, is a direct contra-
diction of the idea of a substans in virtue of which
things are supposed to have existence. With the
admission of this idea, every possibility of under-
standing how such a thing as a content of conscious-
ness ever could come to be, is wholly excluded.

In point of fact, all life, within the boundaries of
materialism and idealism, exhausts itself in fruitless
attempts to furnish more or less ingenious explana-
tions to account for the connection between the
physical and the psychical. Hence the perpetual
game of see-saw between both, and the utter in-
adequacy of either to the genuine thinker, however
much ability may be displayed within the limits of
the position chosen. All becomes valueless, because
the outcome of a presupposition that is a standing
contradiction of itself.

And now, how stands it here with the view of the
world from which substans is absent ?

As already said : Where the idea of substans is
torn out of the play of world -events, nothing
remains but a world of pure relation-values wherein
the one thing constant is the constancy of the
relations.

Now, every relation is precisely the inconstant,
the unstable, in itself. The heat that springs up
with the friction of two objects may — nay, must be
looked upon as a relation-value springing up anew
with each new moment. Every moment may be
represented as consisting of an infinite number of
fractions of a moment ; in short, it is the unstable
in itself.

If now one apprehends the whole play of world-
events as relation-values, thereby not only do the

218 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

phenomena resulting from the play of things upon
one another, but also the things themselves, become
simple relation-values, and so also examples of the
unstable in itself.

Into anything by nature an unstable, connection
can only enter through me, the beholder, intro-
ducing it in my comprehension of the same. Here
the binding thread is lacking in things themselves ;
with the idea " pure relation-values " one has pulled
it out oneself, as is proven by modern positivism
itself, even if unwittingly, when it seeks to replace
the old succession of cause and effect by the timeless
function-concept of mathematics — a thing possible
only where the actual cohesion is absent.1

With this, however, one stands in a position of
contradiction to oneself, i.e. to actuality. For if the
whole play of world-events, without any exception,
is only a relation-value, then I myself am a relation-
value also. But if that were so, " memory " would
be impossible. In "memory" I experience the
cohesion of myself, and through myself prove to
myself that I am not a mere relation-value. As
such — as Hering rightly remarks in his lecture Das
Geddcktnis — our consciousness would consist of just
as many splinters as one could count moments ;
which is simply an analytical mode of expression
for the fact that there would be no consciousness
at all. This in turn would mean that there could
be no world as such, as our mental representation.
And this in its turn would mean that there could be
no world at all. For it is absurd to speak of a world
where there is no consciousness in which it is
represented as such. Without consciousness, how-

1 Cf. Essay V., remarks on the causal sequence.

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 219

ever it might run its course, experience would
know nothing of itself.

The conception of a world-theory devoid of sub-
stans thus also terminates in a contradiction in
itself, even as those world -theories which operate
with the conception of a substans.

As a matter of fact, every scientific view of the
world demonstrates its inadequacy in respect of this
first question in that it answers it in a manner
against all common-sense without itself observing
that this is so.

According to the view of science, concepts have
their origin in experience and come to be through
the discarding, the letting drop, of the unessential.
But in order that a concept may come into existence
after such a fashion, it is necessary that it exist
beforehand as a thing given, in the same way that
a statue can only come forth from out the block of
marble through the discarding of the unessential,
when it is already given ideally in the mind of the
artist.1

As already remarked, all attempts to frame a view
of the world upon purely scientific lines, to compre-
hend the play of world-events as simple relation-
values, present themselves in a twofold form.
Making physics its point of departure and from
thence working its way forward, one view endeavours
to prove the law of the conservation of energy
valid also for non-reversible processes ; this is the
world - theory of energetics. The other view

1 It is to this effect that E. Mach expresses himself on the subject of the
concept in various passages in his works — for example, in the Wcirmelefa-e
and Erkenntnis unci Irrttim. Ostwald defines the concept "as a rule in
accordance with which we take note of definite characteristics of the
phenomenon " {Naturphilosophie).

220 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

follows the results of criticism ; this is modern
positivism.

The entire value of the world-theory of energetics
is distinguished by the following consideration : —

Its axis, its thorough bass — so to speak — is the
law of the conservation of energy ; once this gives
way, no energical world-theory is possible.

As, however, has been explained in another
place, nowhere in actuality do conditions obtain
corresponding to this law. Its existence merely as
a possibility demands an artificial premiss — a corn-
completely closed system ; but this exists only as
an ideal ultimate concept (Grenzbegriff) — nowhere
in actuality.

If it is desired to make use of the law of the
conservation of energy with a view to erecting a
world-theory thereupon, one must set up the entire
universe hypothetically as a closed system in itself.
The logical consequences that necessarily follow
from this supposition are detailed at the close of
Essay VI.

The purely ideal nature of the point of view
occupied by science in this whole picture of the
world is at once evident from the simple fact that,
in order to maintain the constancy of the sum of
energy in the universe, she here finds herself in the
predicament of still having to "handle" as energy
heat that no longer permits of being transformed
into mechanical work — that is, heat that exists only
as an empty concept.

At this stage I wish once more to insist that this
entire world-theory does not at all operate with actual
energies, but only with the expression of actual
energies, with their reaction as presented in work

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 221

done. It assumes work and energy to be synony-
mous ; which is about the same as if one assumed
shadow and light to be synonymous. As shadow
attests nothing save that light is present, but attests
this of necessity, so work attests nothing save that
energy is present. Ostwald in his Naturphilosophie,
after expressly assuming work and energy to be
alike, proceeds thus : —

" With the exception of energy, all 'the other
concepts whose importance comes second to that of
the law of the conservation of energy, find their
application only within a limited field of natural
phenomena. Energy alone finds itself again, with-
out exception, in all natural phenomena ; that is
to say, all natural phenomena permit of being
ranged under the concept of energy." Further on
he says: ''All that we know of the external world
we can represent in the form of propositions con-
cerning actually-existing energies; hence the concept
of energy proves itself in every way the most
universal that science has yet framed. It compre-
hends not only the problem of substance, but also
that of causality."

Taken literally, word for word, all this is quite
correct, and yet as a whole is founded in a total
misunderstanding of actuality. That all natural
phenomena should admit of being ranged under the
concept of energy, i.e. of work done, is due solely
to the fact that everywhere actual energies are in
activity ; of these energies, however, we know
nothing, absolutely nothing ; and their universal
presence is proven solely by the universal presence
of work. And that work is only the reaction of
actual energies is made evident by the fact that the

222 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

one single actual energy we can get at — conscious-
ness— is the one single value in the universe which
never under any circumstances admits of being
" read " as work.

When further on in the same volume it is
said : —

" As regards the inverse endeavour to compre-
hend energies apart from matter, for long one dared
not attempt such a thing, albeit it was soon
perceived that as a matter of fact all we ever learn
about the world consists solely of a knowledge of
its energical relations. . . . We will, therefore,
venture the attempt to build up a view of the world
from which the concept of matter will be absent, a
view composed exclusively of energical materials
{i.e. of the fact work)" this has about as much
meaning as if some one should say, " I will
endeavour, out of shadows and their innumerable
modifications alone, to furnish a complete theory
of light." Here we have to do simply with
the occurrence designated in another place as
the " inversion of positions." From an extreme
materialistic position one leaps at a bound into an
equally extreme energical position — each position
as purely dialectical as the other. If only one held
by actuality, one would of oneself repudiate as a
profitless mental diversion the very attempt to erect
a world-theory upon such premisses. On such one
may build up physical systems, achieve technical
successes, measure, compute in advance — in fine,
carry on scientific studies ; but one thing one can
never do — out of them build up a view of the world.
For a view of the world in which consciousness
excludes itself from that which is to be compre-

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 223

hended, has precisely as much value as a numerator
without a denominator.

The law of the conservation of energy is purely
a reading of the physical facts, i.e. of the play of
world-events in so far as it manifests itself in the
form of reversible processes — thus, as re-actual;
and as such is also recognized by physicists of
intelligence.1

At this point, however, the biologist enters and
plays the part of the countryman at the theatre by
taking the picture for the reality itself. He argues
with that logical acuteness such as is only possible
where no actuality stands in its way: " If the law
of the conservation of energy is really a universal
law, the life of the brain must be just as much
subject to it as the reversible processes that are
not dependent on time." Thus, Hering says in
his lecture on " Memory " already alluded to :
" (The facts of mind, consciousness, and so forth)
cannot make the human body to be anything else
but that which it is — a complex of matter subject
to laws not to be turned aside by anything, — laws
followed by the material of the stone, by the
substance of the plant."

With this, however, the biologist is put in a
difficult position. He is all unaware that the
reversible processes are "subject" to the law of
the conservation of energy, i.e. may be read by it,
only because it is possible here to be satisfied with
reactions, only because here one does not need to
know anything about the energies themselves,

1 For a correct appreciation of the law of the conservation of energy and
the value of scientific laws and data in general, one should read among others
Poincare's two works : The Value of Science, and Science and Hypothesis.

224 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

because here there is no "/"-sayer who might
raise objections to such a mode of apprehending
things. The greatness, the exactitude of physics
consist precisely in this, that she confines herself
strictly to the realm of reactions. In the life of
the brain, so far as directly manifested — -as con-
sciousness— there are no reactions. The fact
" consciousness " in others is not accessible to me ;
and as for myself, here action and reaction always
merge into one another, though I go to work with
never so elaborate psycho-physiological precautions.

Hence the necessity of ever and again laying
out fresh frontier domains, such as bio-chemistry,
bio-kinetics, and so forth and so on, so as to be
able to say with Lady Macbeth, " We are yet
young in deeds ! " Thus, patience ! Let us but
once get these new courses drawn up and then —
how the results will come flowing in !

But the only new thing about these courses is
the name ! In truth, here as everywhere, we have
to do with the old, original problem " life " — at once
our hope and our despair. And to all these new
courses, by means of which men hope to master
the old problem, applies that answer of Pompey's
favourite cook when his master marvelled at the
host of different dishes, " All one meat : only the
sauces are different." For it is even the same
here, " All one thing : only the names are
different."

After all our vain attempts to subject conscious-
ness also to law, this remains as our final wisdom,
that the mutual dependence between the mental
and the material is a thing subject to law ; that
is, we assume as axiom to begin with, that which

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 225

we are going to prove, whereby we produce nothing
but a paraphrase of the Buddha- thought, nothing
but a lifeless formula of the actuality itself — that
the /-process is subordinate to no laws, can have
no laws because it is law itself. And the worth
of the Baconian maxim that truth may more easily
come forth from error than from confusion, is here
put to a severe test, for here are combined both
error and confusion.

I now proceed to a brief account of the other
school — that of modern positivism.

What makes this system so interesting for us
is the originality of its point of departure. Despite
the fact that for the most part it has been
developed by a physicist, it starts with the idea,
unheard-of previous to perhaps twenty-five years
ago, that the next step in the progress of science
is to be looked for not from physics and its
methods, i.e. the non- personal, but from the
personal, from the study of sense-perceptions.1

Since positivism, like every scientific world-
theory, must apprehend the play of world-events
purely as a sum of relation-values, one of its tasks
is to come to an understanding with the concept
of substance. As the direct successor of the
criticism of Hume, its position with respect to the
concept of substance remains the same as with
Hume: the existence of such a concept is ascribed
to the faculty of imagination. Because one can
remove any single constituent part of a thing
without the image thereof ceasing to represent the
total whole and to be recognized again as such,
it is assumed that all may be taken away and that

1 Cf. Foreword to E. Mach's Analyse der Sinnesempfindungen.

226 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

something will still remain behind. "Thus arises
the monstrous idea of a thing in itself, different
from its appearance and unknowable. The thing,
the body, the matter, and so on, is nothing else
but the complex of colours, sounds, and so forth,
nothing more than the so-called characteristics."1

And now it is a question of formulating a new
view with respect to a world thus stripped of the
concept of substance.

All previous attempts at world -theories have
made shipwreck on the fact that it was impossible
for them in any wise to comprehend the connection
between the physical and the psychical. What is
original about the onset of positivism is this, that
it starts out with psycho-physical units as world-
elements.

" Hence perceptions and conceptions, the will,
the feelings — in brief, the entire inner and outer
world — are made up of a limited number of homo-
geneous elements now in volatile, now in rigid
combination. These elements are usually called
sensations ; since, however, this name already
implies a one-sided theory, we prefer to speak
simply of elements."2 Again: "It is not the
bodies that beget sensation but the complex of
sensations (complex of elements) that fashion the
bodies. If to the physicist, bodies appear to be
that which is permanent, real, and sensations, on
the contrary, their fleeting, transitory appearance,
he forgets that all bodies are only mental symbols
for complexes of sensation. . . . Thus the world
for us does not consist of so many problematic

1 E. Mach's Analyse der Sinnescmpfmditngen, p. 4.
2 Analyse der Empfindungen, page 15.

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 227

beings, which through action and reaction with
another equally problematic being, the /, beget the
sensations alone accessible to us. Colours, sounds,
spaces, times ... for us are the ultimate elements
whose given connection we have to investigate."1

This I call supplying a world -theory from the
entire, completed play of world-events. The only
question is, " From a mental starting-point such as
this, how stands it with the fact of all facts — II "

Well, it goes badly, very badly indeed, with the
poor fellow ! Like a lump of sugar in a big tub of
water it melts away incontinent into the all. On
this point one should read pages eight and nine of the
Analyse der Sinnesempjindungen. To cite them
here in full would take up too much space. The
train of thought there developed concludes with
the words : " Accordingly the / may be so extended
as finally to cover and embrace the whole world."

It may be asked, " How out of this cosmic 1-
solution does the yet actually existing /-deposit
come about ? " The answer is, " Through accom-
modation." The /-concept is a convention adapted
to a certain end, a procedure pertaining to the
economy of thought.

" The gathering together of the elements being
connected with pleasure and pain, into an ideal
unit of the economy of thought, the /, is of the
utmost significance to the intellect standing at the
service of the pain-shunning, pleasure-seeking will."2

What attitude shall one adopt towards a structure
of thought which is nothing but an ingenious
description, a picture of the fact "life," whose
wealth of ingenuity, however, is purchased at the

1 Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 20. 2 Ibid.

228 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

cost of a downright, deadly indifference in respect
of this same fact, i.e. in respect of actuality ?

Epistemologically the world is as free as a bird.
Any one who chooses may exercise his intellectual
faculties upon it. The above view, moreover, is
expressly put forward as a theory, a reading. But
after all there is one requirement every theory
must fulfil, and that is that it shall not contradict
itself. And that this theory does in the most
flagrant fashion.

Modern positivism may be briefly characterized
as the application of the definition of the " concept "
in general to the /-concept in particular. As the
concept in general can be represented, " read " as
a procedure appertaining to the economy of thought,
so here in a frankly unexampled dis-actualizing
of actuality, the /-concept is to be " read " as a
procedure appertaining to the economy of thought.
But here even the slightest attempt to think in
terms of actuality, forthwith conducts into the absurd.
For an /-unity must first be given in order that it
may comprehend itself as an /-unity. On the
other hand, were the '/-concept purely a procedure
in the economy of thought, what is there to prevent
the thought-economy once in a while from demand-
ing to read me as an /-duality ? a thing that has
so far never been entertained in the brains of
thinking men, but only in the cells of lunatic
asylums.

Positivism is overtaken by the same fate that
overtakes every criticism, as, for example, that of
Hume, — commonly and incorrectly called scepticism,
— it finds no substratum for the /-concept. And
the keener its search, the more critical its procedure,

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 229

the more thorough its unravelling, the more is it
strengthened in this its mental representation.

With this, pure criticism has no more that it
can do. It must even content itself with this
negative result. Positivism, however, seeks to
round out this negative result into a world-theory
and so obtain its world consisting of elements of
sensation — a world in which there is no clearly-
outlined, definitely determined / at all.

From a starting-point of this peculiar kind there
follows, on one hand, such a similarity of expression
on the part of both, as to produce an almost un-
canny effect. On the other hand, however, there
is such a difference in essence as could scarcely be
more pronounced. In brief: modern positivism is
the faithful mirror-image of the Buddha-thought,
and thereby accomplishes in the dis-actualizing of
actuality what only thought can accomplish at all.

In the Sarjyutta Nikaya a monk asks the Buddha,
"Who has contact? who has sensation?" To
whom the Buddha replies, " The question is not
admissible. I do not say, ' He has contact.' Did
I say, ' He has contact,' then the question, ' Who
has contact, Reverend Sir?' would be admissible.
Since, however, I do not say so, then of me that do
not speak thus, it is only admissible to ask, ' From
what, Reverend Sir, does contact proceed ? ' "

In close correspondence with this, one reads
in E. Mach's Analyse der Ejnpfindungen, " If a
knowledge of the continuity of the elements (sensa-
tions) leaves us unsatisfied and we ask, ' Who has
this continuity of the sensations? who experiences
sensation ? ' we are dominated by the old habit of
classifying each element (sensation) as an item

230 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

in an unanalysed complex, and thereby unwittingly
descend to the older, lower, more limited point of
view."

But whilst with positivism this mode of expres-
sion proceeds from the notion of an / that can be
" read " from the play of world-events as a unity
pertaining purely to the economy of thought, — a
coldly contemplative point of view— with the Buddha
it issues from the idea of a beginningless, burning
actuality that asserts its individual tendencies re-
gardless of the external world. Man by his nature
is an eater. To seek to dispose of him as a simple
spectator is to play with concepts. All that is
actual by its very nature is aliment.

Herewith, as regards the problem of the concept,
we stand in presence of the Buddha-thought.
Before I pass to it, however, I consider it incumbent
upon me, with respect to the criticism of positivism,
yet once more in this place to emphasise the fact
that nothing is further from my desire than to
engage in polemical discussion. As a physicist,
Ernst Mach is in my opinion one of the most
original, nay, perhaps the most original of the
thinkers of our day and time. His Meckanik and
W'drmelehre are genuine products of intellect, works
of fermentative value, and in this regard rank high
above the smooth classicism of an H. von Helmholtz.
One only marvels the more that a mind of such
calibre should be able to find pleasure in such like
mental diversions.1

1 Positivism itself calls attention to this quality of non-actuality in its
system. In the Foreword to the second volume of R. Avenarius's Kritik der
reinen Erfahiiing, J. Petzold says, " Modern psychology is . . . char-
acterized by the elimination from the psychic machinery of every spring of
activity." Here it is as with Roland's mare in Chamisso's poem : Perfect —
but dead 1

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 231

When positivism says, "There is no substratum
to the /-concept, consequently the /-concept is the
product of fancy and ' actually ' admits of being
extended to cover the whole world," it is unaware
that between and above the two extremes — the
/-concept as the expression of an unconditioned
constant, as a soul substance, and the /-concept
as the expression of a fancy — there is a third
alternative, the actuality itself, as pointed out and
taught us by the Buddha, that concepts do not exist
at all but only the conceiving, and that the /-process,
albeit no unconditioned constant, dwells therein, is
not on that account something dissolving over the
whole world, but is something conceiving itself at
every moment of its existence, even as the flame is a
thing conceiving itself at every moment of its exist-
ence. By no inductive method can the limit of a
flame be defined with regard to its environment,
and yet there is such a limit, because the flame at
every moment of its existence limits itself. Its very
existence is just this self-limitation. In the very
same way no inductive method can define the limits
of the /-process : so far the positivists are right.
But this fact by no means imports what positivism
understands by it, that the /-process can now be
dilated, spread out to any extent one chooses : it
only intimates that the / conceives itself and alone
conceives itself, and therefore cannot be conceived
inductively. When a blow swishes down, even the
most correct-thinking of positivists can tell whether
it has struck him or not. He "conceives" himself
at every moment.

Where the /-process is cognized as a pure
process of alimentation, "conceiving" perforce

232 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

receives a physo-psychical double meaning, — or
rather, that unitary meaning which comprehends
in itself both the physical and the psychical. All
existence, whether manifesting itself objectively or
subjectively, is here a " conceiving," and this unitary
" conceiving," in which is comprehended the essence
of all life, alike devours both — concept as thing
conceived.

Where there is nothing save " conceiving,"
grasping the external world, there are neither
concepts nor anything fixed and stable, anything
corresponding to these concepts ; and the purely
dialectical nature of the whole problem of the
" concept " at once stands revealed. Such a problem
can only have being while one is working with the
notion of a " conceived," which latter must always
be also a "grasped," a defined, a complete in itself
— in brief, an identity. Where there is nothing
save processes of combustion, of alimentation, each
moment of the play of world-events represents a
new, unique, biological or Kammic value, which
never before has been and never again will be. In
such a universe there are no identities. Where
there are no identities there are no things con-
ceived. Where there are no things conceived
there are no concepts ; there is found nothing save
a beginningless reaction to the outer world. And
the problem "concept" presents itself as the
negative of all other problems, so to speak, the
latter in their totality being founded upon the idea
of a something conceived, be it as a physical, be it
as a physiological, biological, cosmological identity.

This is one of the points where the genuine
thinker must make good his hold. It is like a rift

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 233

in the clouds, through which the searching eye
penetrates into a new world, passes out of a world
of error in which we all see under the form of con-
ceiving and conceived, of subject and object, into a
world wherein all oppositions blazing, melt and dis-
solve in the beginningless glow of Becoming.

There are 710 concepts as there is no conceived.
This idea one must thoroughly have thought out
if one would understand the Buddha, his teaching,
and his attitude towards certain questions.

All commonplace thinking, of scientist as of
layman, takes its stand on concepts, i.e. operates
with the notion of a conceived, with the notion of
identities.

In formal logic this fact finds its due expression
in the laws of identity and of contradictories. For
both these laws existence is only possible where
and for so long as there are things conceived, things
confined, identities ; they have simply no meaning
with reference to an actual universe, a universe
that is naught save a sum of combustion processes.
This is the intellectual measuring-rod by which to
test whether any one is thinking in terms of actuality
or not : Do or do not the laws of identity and of
contradictories hold good for his world ?

Just as Aristotle reproached Heraclitus with
violations of the law of contradictories, — for this
really limited mind knew not, never even suspected
that actuality in its entirety is nothing else but one
huge violation of the law of contradictories, — just as
the sun is a violation of an absolutely correct-
running chronometer, so do western scholars re-
peatedly reproach the Buddha with violations of
the law of contradictories ; whereby they only

234 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

prove but that they understand neither the Buddha
nor actuality.

In Oldenburg's Buddha one reads : —

" The art of definition was something which the
era of the Buddha did not possess ; that of
demonstration was only evolved as far as the first
rudiments. An especially characteristic feature of
this mode of thinking ... is a decided antipathy to
pursuing the consideration of things back to their
ultimate principles."

Misericordia ! What shall one say of the herd
when the leading bull points in such paths ! A
teaching whose greatness resides in the fact that it
shows how all definitions are only essays which owe
their existence to the faulty formulation of the
question, is reproached with its lack of definitions !
A teaching which points out that the fact "/" of
necessity implies life and the beginninglessness
of life, is reproached that it does not involve itself
in the blind alley of contraries called in the language
of logic, "principles." The Buddha's one and only
concern is to teach, to point out that there is
nothing in the world to be defined ; hence, also, no
instruments for this purpose : principles. That
herewith the whole of science goes by the board
— what matters that to the seeker for truth !
Hearken, good people ! Here goes by the board
a great deal more than science !

To see how the Buddha bore himself with
reference to this question of principles, one ought
to read the magnificent Kevaddha Sutta — Sutta
XI. of the Digha Nikaya — where a monk craves
information as to the behaviour of the primal
elements of matter. The Buddha meets the

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 235

question as the genuine thinker alone can, with the
weapon of humour. For absurdities cannot be
dealt with at all otherwise, if one would not drown
in them past hope of help. The scene in the
court of Maha Brahma, the great Brahma, is perhaps
the most gigantic that human humour has ever
conceived. Here music alone, the humour of
Beethoven's symphonies, perhaps may risk com-
parison.

To the Buddha naught exists save actualities,
eternally fermenting, seething, simmering actualities
that melt and dissolve all drosses of definitions in
their fiery glow or ever they are able to come to
birth.

"The art of demonstration was only evolved as
far as the first rudiments." I maintain that every
single word in this sentence is false or incorrect.
The art of demonstration in the philosophical
systems that surged all about the Buddha, was
developed to a height it never can reach among
us for the simple reason that our speech and our
brains have lost the necessary flexibility. One has
only to read those great Suttas that I might call the
transcendental Suttas, such as the Brahmajala Sutta
of the Dlgha Nikaya, in order to see that as well
speech as brain with us have become so stiff in
mechanical views as to be no longer capable of
following up and thinking out all these possibilities,
all these species and sub-species of idealistic and
materialistic views. But it is just for this reason
that the Buddha is called the " Master-guide."
Like the guide in the catacombs, where at every
step the unacquainted are threatened with irretriev-
able errors, calmly and surely he takes his way

2*6 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

through this wild tangle of method, through this
rigid logic of the absurd. Serene and clear he
recognizes, perceives, "It is altogether conditioned ;
it is all of the mind's own devising." Again we
have the delicate irony that comes of commanding
insight, when in another discourse he says,
" There are wise men who call day night, and
night day." How could one hit off more aptly
certain tendencies of modern science — that astound-
ing faculty it displays for interpreting actuality in
accordance with preconceived ideas ? All those
imposing definitions that for our minds and for the
human mind in all ages, have possessed such an in-
toxicating quality, are only possible where one
fabricates artificial cores around which dialectical
processes can crystallize, and crystallize out all
the more splendidly the more carefully one protects
them from the rude shocks of actuality. The
loftiness and subtlety of our conceptual constructions
is nothing but the water-mark that indicates the
height of our ignorance. There is certainly much
that is confusing for our thought, brought up as
that has been under the sway of Aristotelian logic,
to see concepts merge and blend upon whose clear
differentiation the logical possibility of the entire
system seems to rest — such concepts, for example,
as kanima and sankkara, kamma and vinnana,
kamma and tahka, and so forth. It may easily
happen that the seeker for truth may suffer ship-
wreck on such apparent contradictions. But in such
case it is with him as with one who is stranded on
the lighthouse itself — blinded by its very light !

To be able to follow the Buddha here, one must
have understood him. What Jesus said of him-

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 237

self in terms of emotion, that, but in terms of
understanding, the Buddha also can say, " Blessed
is he that is not offended in me."

So long as one continues to take the concepts
with which he is operating for positive, firmly-
established realities, so long is it quite impossible
to avoid all these violations of exact thinking. It
is said, " If Sankhara is the process, it cannot be the
energy itself, and vice versa!' One insists, like the
countryman, upon getting one's bill, and has the
feeling of intellectual superiority into the bargain.

But there is this to be considered : When, for
instance, I wish to define a combustion process, I
am at liberty to do so just as it happens to occur
to me, either as light, or as heat, or as chemical
action, and so forth. On each such occasion I
include the whole combustion process in its entirety,
and yet none will say, "If the combustion process
is at any one time light, it cannot also be heat, for
in that case light and heat would be just the same
thing. That would be a violation of the law of
contradictories," " argal " ... as the grave-digger
in Hamlet says. But such grave-digger's logic is
followed out in every particular by exact thought
when it deals with actuality. It is the pure content
of actuality in the Buddha's teaching that renders
it irreconcilable with logic. That teaching is not
illogical, but simply a-logical. The model of the
syllogism does not apply to it at all. For even
thus are things in actuality : What at one moment
one thinks to have grasped, comprehended, that,
next moment, is swept away in the never resting
flow of Becoming. Actuality does not play a game
that complies with the established rules and

238 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

regulations called logic : one game only does it
play — the grim game of necessity. And this game
may be won, not by him who with abstract fences
and walls and dykes for a brief space fashions to
himself a little world-garden of his own, but only
by him who dares to vibrate in unison with the
iron rhythm of a beginningless necessity.

It is the indispensable task of every earnest
thinker who would really follow the Buddha, ex-
perience him in himself, to make clear to himself,
and ever and again make clear, that our whole
mental life, our concept - world is based upon
artificial premisses, in which, in the strictest sense
of the words, not life must serve truth but truth
life. As the spider itself flings forth its web over the
abyss, so from out ourselves we fling forth in the
form of concepts an inextricable network of airy roots.
As the ape from bough to bough, so springs the
human mind from concept to concept, and has
itself borne aloft by the entire network, where any
single thread would rend beneath him, each
individual bough snap under him and precipitate
him into the bottomless gulfs of an endless infinitude.
All that circulates in daily life in the way of mental
values are pure concept-values, bills of exchange
upon actuality. But in the hurry and bustle of
traffic no one has time or inclination to go and get
these bills turned into actual currency. Just as
they stand they are passed along " like a basket
from hand to hand." Hence the terrible pre-
dominance of ideals, the tyranny they exercise
over our minds, and so over genuine education
and culture. Whoso has experienced in himself
the collapse of ideals, the taking up of the bills of

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 239

current concept-values at the counter of actuality, —
he well understands why the Buddha calls his
intuition an "awakening." It is the awakening
out of the dream-world of concepts.

A Buddha, in short, is a man who dares to live
this his insight that there are no concepts and
accordingly nothing conceived, but only a "con-
ceiving." Hence his attitude towards many
questions, and above all to that question as to how
one ought to picture to oneself a Buddha, or one
who after this life is re-born no more.

The scheme of the questions runs thus : 1.
Where is he re-born ? 2. Is he not re-born ? 3.
Is he re-born as well as not re-born? 4. Is he
neither re-born nor yet not re-born ?

To all these sophistical questions the stereo-
typed answer of the Buddha is, "That does not
apply " — an answer, naturally, which gives plenty
of scope for the profoundest conjectures and hypo-
theses, but which only means that the question
is wrongly put and therefore renders impossible
any answer at all. A being that with this as his
last existence, is proceeding towards extinction, that
will never again be re-born is no longer existent,
even in the form of concept ; hence the whole
question is meaningless.

Here, again, it is impossible to do anything like
justice to the whole problem with the chess-moves
of a profound play of thought : only a witticism
meets the case. All this ingenious logic that
would fain take the measure of actuality with the
laws of identity and contradictories as with some
yard-stick, which advances against truth with the
apparently irresistible demonstrating force of its

24o BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

" aut . . . aut," resembles nothing so much as
those ingenious questions with which the child
is wont to tease the grown-up person as to the
nature and dwelling-place of Santa Claus. Another
child would be able to answer these questions with
an equal ingenuity ; the grown-up person is power-
less to meet them. In the same way the scholars
of the west would be perfectly capable of meeting
and satisfying the questions of a Vacchagotta with
equal " acuteness of logic." The Buddha cannot
do it. All he can do is to try to sweep away the
accumulated rubbish of misunderstood concepts,
and on the thus cleared foundation, cause a new
clean structure of thought to arise, the essence
whereof resides in comprehending that such a thing
as the foregoing question refers to has no existence,
neither abstractly nor actually ; hence, that the
question is in itself devoid of meaning.

This is the whole secret here lying hidden. The
interpretation given by Oldenburg to the words of
the nun Khema, are based upon a complete mis-
understanding of the entire Buddha-thought, as is
everything else he says concerning the final goal
of Buddhism. But that pertains properly to the
Nibbana teaching.

Buddhism is the doctrine of actuality, and its
value as a view of the world from the standpoint of
epistemology, lies in the fact that it teaches us to
accept actuality as actuality. To this idea it is
itself a martyr, inasmuch as its own teaching here
is nothing ideally fixed and fast, but only an in-
citation to experience it in one's own self; it is
" a raft, designed for escape ; not designed for
retention." Hence, is it said in the powerful

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 241

Dhatuvibhanga Sutta — Sutta CXL., Majjhima
Nikaya — " ■ I am,' monk, is a believing. ' Such
am 1/ is a believing. ' I shall be,' is a believing.
' I shall not be,' is a believing. ' I shall have a
form,' is a believing. ' I shall be formless,' is a
believing. ' I shall have perception,' is a believing.
' I shall be devoid of perception,' is a believing.
To entertain believings is to be ill. To entertain
believings is to be infirm. To entertain believings
is to be sick. When, however, all entertaining of
believings is overcome, then is one called a right
thinker."

And now it may be objected : —

"If there are no concepts, i.e. things conceived,
at all, but only an individual conceiving, an external,
self-renewing reaction to the external world, how is
the possibility of our various experiences to be
explained ? "

To this the reply is : —

Experiences, as understood in the vulgar sense,
there are none whatever. Our perceptions are
purely token-values out of which experiences may
be derived in the same way that practical results
may be derived out of a sum of algebraical token-
values by cancelling out one against the other.
Here must be borne in mind what was treated of
in our sixth Essay. With the perception "green"
I get no positive content of knowledge, but merely
the fact " not-red, not-yellow, not-blue," and so
forth.

At this point we are confronted by the so-called
epistemological problem, to the which, therefore,
we now must devote some little attention.

242 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

The question which forms the subject-matter of
this problem is this : How is it possible from bare
perceptions, mere sense-impressions, ever to arrive
at conscious ideas, concepts, experiences ?

This problem is associated above all with the
name of Kant.

Starting with the idea that the sense-impressions
received from without, contain no element out of
which experience, i.e. an inner connection of indi-
vidual impressions, could ever be developed, he
taught that in the subject there was contained a
business capital, so to speak, which, given a priori
to all experience, upon the occasion of the activity
of the organs of sense, came to fruition. This
business capital he called the given a priori faculty
of cognition.

The practical significance of this teaching lies
not so much in itself as in the fact that in contrast
to it the position of the natural sciences is formu-
lated all the more clearly and distinctly: the passage
from bare perceptions to experience is of a purely
empirical nature.

The erroneous features in such ideas find some
support in certain misunderstood physiological and
pathological facts.

Physiology teaches that the human infant does not
"see" but only "looks," i.e. he is the percipient of
impressions from without in virtue of the existence
of sense organs, but he attaches no meaning to
these impressions. It is the same with the grown-
up person after certain lesions of the cerebral cortex,
in animals from which the brain has been artificially
removed, and so forth. From this the conclusion
is drawn that bare perceptions may be transmuted

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 243

into experiences and that the condition of experi-
ence can again sink back into a condition of bare
perception.

Such ideas are supported by the teachings of
many philosophers who make the young living
being to enter the world as a tabula rasa, so to
speak — as an empty pot which only now is to be
filled with material from this world.

All such ideas of the existence of bare perceptions,
apart from any content of experience, are based
upon a misuse of the word " perception." The
infant has no "perceptions." He "experiences"
under the circumstances and antecedent conditions
proper to himself. It is only we, the adult, who,
looking back, can speak of the existence of bare
perceptions at this stage, somewhat as, looking
back, we can record of Caesar's Commentaries :
" Written in the year so and so before Christ."
Wherever there are perceptions, a certain content
of experience also is always present, were it only
this, that with respect to any definite perception
one has no experience at all ! To separate percep-
tion from experience and then pose the question :
" How can pure perceptions pass into experience ? "
is the same as to separate shell from kernel and
then ask, " How can the kernel ever get into the
shell ? "

The truth is this : The kernel cannot get into
the shell at all ; both alike are the outcome of a
single process of growth. And in the selfsame way
experience cannot get into the perceptions at all ;
both alike are the outcome of a single process of
growth. We learn to experience as the flame
learns to burn, the flower to blow. We can do

244 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

nothing save " conceive," lay hold of the outer
world. Experiences, as imagined in vulgar thought,
there are not. Such would be "concepts," and
where there are "concepts" there must be "things
conceived." Where these are, there must be iden-
tities. Where there are identities, there can be no
processes. Where there are no processes, there
can be no actuality.

All that we call experience is, so to speak, of
the nature of a parallax. Otherwise put : All our
knowledge is only the expression of our ignorance.
I can say of anything that I know it, only as set off
against the total mass of all that I do not know.
An actual experience would require that I should
be able to prognosticate something with uncon-
ditioned exactitude.

It may further be objected : —

If there are no actual experiences, how can I
ever come to have this experience — that there are
no experiences ? For if it also is no actual ex-
perience it has no value. If, on the other hand,
it is an actual experience, how is such a thing
possible ?

The answer is : —

Through an intuitive comprehension of my own
self, whereto I receive the inciting impulse from
the Buddha-teaching.

With this, we come to the final objection : —

"If there are no concepts, what then is that
as which I conceive myself?" In plain words, we
are now confronted by that pivot and pole of all
thinking — What is self-consciousness?

On the problem of self-consciousness, a teaching
is compelled to show whether it is actual or not.

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 245

For nothing in the world has sense and meaning in
itself, but acquires such only through its relation to
me, only from out of self-consciousness.

To the question, "What is self-consciousness?"
the answer given is, " Consciousness of oneself."
That, however, is an answer which in subtlety and
ambiguity outdoes every utterance of the Pythian
oracle. For it may just as well mean, " The con-
sciousness of a self in me " — the expression of a
pure absolute — as, " The consciousness conscious
of itself" — the expression of a pure relative. Self-
consciousness is the oracle of nature. Faith inter-
prets this oracle in the former sense ; science in
the latter.

Therewith, however, both are at odds with them-
selves. For a pure absolute that becomes conscious
of itself, that enters into relation with itself, is an
absolute no longer. And a pure relative that enters
into relations with itself is equally no longer a pure
relative.

" Transcending these two opposites the Tatha-
gata points out the Truth in the Mean."

Is there any mean here betwixt these opposites?

A wandering monk asks the Buddha : —

"How is it, Gotama? Is there an /? "—an
Atta, self, as identical with itself.

The Buddha remains silent. The other con-
tinues his question : —

" How is it, Gotama? Is there not an /?"

The Buddha still maintains silence, and the other
goes his way.

If one does not understand the Buddha, it is
impossible to interpret this colloquy other than
does Oldenburg, for example, in his Buddha.

246 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

But the meaning is quite otherwise than as there
given. We here stand before that which from the
standpoint of epistemology constitutes the keystone
of the whole Buddha-thought. To understand it
fully, we must take a plunge into the heart of
modern physics.

One of the most important forward steps taken
by physics — if not technically, perhaps, yet easily
the most important epistemologically — is its insight
in the domain of interference phenomena, especially
in the examples of the same afforded by light.
A ray of light reflected back upon itself interferes
with itself, i.e. it forms in itself "stationary waves"
which present light as "non-light."

To this paradoxical mode of expression, however,
one is only compelled so long as one identifies
light with the energy itself. For the site of inter-
ference, the nodal point of the vibrations, is just as
much " energy " as is the trough of the vibration.
And so if one assumes light itself to be the energy,
one here has a light without light. In truth, how-
ever, light is nothing but an expression of the
energy in virtue of which it exists, and it is a stroke
of genius on the part of modern physics — one, to be
sure, which it has perpetrated unknown to itself —
that in interference it has lighted on the one single
possibility of making energies perceptible to sense
in that one form in which alone they are capable of
being made sense-perceptible — as a pure negative,
a pure privation in the sense-activity of me the
observer. As all languages become alike in silence,
so all energies become alike in interferences. As
silence only means that there are languages, so
interference only means that there are energies.

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 247

With the fact " interference," accordingly, science
bears witness against herself, inasmuch as thereby
she brings before our eyes the existence of actual
energies in the form of the negative itself. That
is why I have just called the phenomena of inter-
ference the most important step epistemologically
that modern physics has yet taken. For if science
would but recognize this fact for that which it
really is, she would find herself obliged to remodel
her whole scheme of thought from the foundation
upward.

The — for the beholder — purely negative char-
acter of the interference has its basis in the entry
of the energy into itself. With this we stand in
presence of the Buddha-thought.

Here the fact " self-consciousness " becomes a
pure interference phenomenon of /-energy. As
such it is a pure entering of the /-energy into itself.
As such, again, it is, on the one hand, a pure negative
for the whole external world ; on the other hand, to
the individual himself, it is a something immediately
given, where it is simply a matter for correct inter-
pretation, and that, here, in an immediately given,
perforce can only be intuitive.

In this insight into the nature of self-conscious-
ness, the /, more sharply than anywhere else,
defines itself as a something that only comprehends
itself, while at the same time comprehending the
world as being incomprehensible. In this insight
the silence of the Buddha in the face of Vacchagotta's
questions explains itself. For, as long as the
terminus technicus " interference " is not formulated,
the question is unanswerable. An interference at
once is and is not. It is the immediately given for

248 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

the individual himself — the not given at all for
others, for beholders.

The acceptance and elaboration of this thought
is facilitated by the data of physiology and psycho-
logy.

The entire course of man's development is to be
apprehended as a surging back by degrees upon
himself, a " re-flecting " in the most literal sense of
the word. Man is the " reflecting ' living being,
the word being understood as well in its physical
as in its psychical sense. The whole process of
development from infant to adult is a gradual
becoming acquainted with himself. Disgust, shame,
are as yet unknown to the infant. These are
evolved only as phenomena of "reflection," as a
wave of experience running back upon the individual
himself, and finding its conclusion in the matured
self- consciousness. This self, however, is the
stationary wave ; at every moment the same and yet
another; the — for me — immediately certain, as which
it presents itself in consciousness ; the — for others —
not present at all.

In the foregoing it has been shown that both
these varieties of attempts at world-conceptions, as
well that based upon the concept of substans as that
which takes the whole play of world-events for pure
relation-values, thereby deprive their own selves ol
the possibility of existence, since from both points of
view a world of concepts never could come to be.
The Buddha solves the problem by pointing out
that there is no such thing as a world of concepts ;
in the /-world, however, the world itself and the
world as such — the real world and the world of
ideation — merge into one in the interference " self-

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 249

consciousness." And this is the answer to the
question, " How must the world be fashioned to
render possible the fact that it is present as such ? "

The insight into the essential' nature of self-
consciousness is the intuition.

The value of an intuition is to be judged by what
it accomplishes as a working hypothesis.

What does the Buddha-thought accomplish
here?

The answer is : —

It clears up the whole relationship of mental life
towards the concept of substans.

Every consistent application of the laws of thought
seems perforce to conduct to an " unconditioned
constant " situated at the root of things, lying, how-
ever, beyond all possibility of demonstration.

In this matter three positions are conceivable : —

1. The position of faith which sees in this the
proof of an imperceptible to sense in itself — an
absolute.

2. The position of science which sees in this a
consequence of the imaginative faculty. Its ally
is philosophical scepticism — or rather, criticism,
chiefly as represented by Hume.

3. That position formulated by Kant with his
"thing in itself," which may be briefly characterized
as a position of the most resolute indifference
towards this most important of all epistemological
phenomena. When in his History of Materialism,
Lange, in agreement with Kant, says : " What
right have we to occupy ourselves with ' things
in themselves ' at all ? " this simply means, " What
right have we to think at all ? " By this stroke,

250 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

which Kant carried out by the formulation of his
"thing in itself," he has proved himself one of the
most hurtful of all noxious creatures found on the
tree of the mental life of humanity. Here he
has done as much harm as scholastic obtuseness
only can do when it steps forth in the polished,
mirror-clear armour of a complete logic. But
this is not the place to enter any further into that
matter.

Upon all these three possibilities the Buddha
sheds a simultaneous flood of light, illuminating
sceptical criticism especially, in the most exceptional
manner.

This latter proves in entirely incontestable
fashion that a substans seated at the root of things
has no existence, yet all its proving possesses not
the slightest conclusiveness. Hume, with all his
acuteness, falls completely under that paradigm
given by R. Avenarius in his Kritik der reinen
Erfahriing, where a savage contends with a
missionary as to whether or no a spirit inhabits
in all things. The (unbelieving) missionary is
made to say, " I have investigated all these things
and never anywhere have I found the spirit." To
which the savage counters, " I have investigated
them all too, and never anywhere have I failed
to find the spirit." Indeed, this example admits
of being extended thus far in that the savage must
feel himself reinforced in his notion of an immaterial
substans by the very fact that the other, despite all
his search, has found nothing. He would say,
"Just because you have found nothing, therefore
I am right ! "

Like the two opposing views of the world,

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 251

criticism also operates with a contradiction of itself.
To be consistent, the criticism of Hume, as every
criticism, ought to run somewhat as follows : —

" A substans in things is not demonstrable ;
these present themselves to me only as a bundle
of relation-values. If there is no substans in things,
how comes it that the idea of a substans finds a
place in me ? Through experience ? That, here,
were a contradiction in itself; for this idea exists
in me, the critic, only in so far as I deny its
existence. Consequently there must be something
given in me which supplies the foundation for this
idea. But I can unravel myself also, to the very
last thread and here, too, find nothing but a bundle
of relation -values. The one thing in this bundle
which I cannot embrace in my comprehension,
is this my own capacity of unravelling myself, i.e.
my consciousness. On this, consequently, I must
in fairness withhold myself from passing any
judgment."

With this, thought would have so prepared itself
— so far as such a thing is possible from its own
resources — as to be able to take up and work out
the Buddha-thought as inciting impulsion.

From this point the Buddha-teaching, put
briefly, would continue : —

All human thinking, without exception, operates
with the concept of a substans lying at the root of
things. Thou also, the critic, must conform thyself
to the rule. It is a necessity of thought. The
ground of this is, that in point of fact a szcbstans
does lurk in things; not as a "constant in itself,"
however, — such a thing, to be sure, thou canst
through thy rigid analysis exclude — but solely as

252 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE xi

that which gives the continuity of the process, its
maintenance, as an actual law of formation. This
law of formation becomes accessible to thee, the
individual, in consciousness. To see into that,
however, thou must be taught. So long as that
does not come to pass, it is a matter of taste or of
natural inclination as to whether thou wilt interpret
the facts accessible to sense as significant of
substa?is, or of the absence of substans. For in the
facts themselves there lies nothing that impels
either in the one direction or the other. The
decision lies solely with that unique something
by means of zvhich you bring all these facts before
yourself — namely, with consciousness. To bring
this itself before you, however, as a " fact," this
is as impossible as that any one should be able to
bring his back before him though he should turn
himself about never so swiftly and dexterously.
To comprehend this unique something — for this,
instruction is needed ; and following upon this
instruction, growing insight (intuition). I f, however,
thou wilt permit thyself to be instructed, then shalt
thou learn that both these thought -necessities —
that of adequate cause as that of substans — here
merge into one. The idea of "substans" here
becomes a form of the law of adequate cause.
Both necessities of thought — that of adequate cause
and that of substans — merge and blend into one in
the Kamma teaching of the Buddha.

With this the circle is closed ; the end interlocks
with the beginning. We have discharged our
self-imposed task of assigning the Buddha-thought
its place in the life of the mind.

Nothing has been said touching the problem

xi THE PROBLEM OF THOUGHT 253

of the freedom of the will, nor on the problem of
deity which involves that of immortality.

The former of these is the problem of morality ;
the latter, the problem of religion. Their due place
is in the successor to this volume.

CONCLUSION

It is clear, without further need of demonstration,
that with the Kamma teaching of the Buddha there
is given the ferment of an actual morality as of
an actual religion. A morality and a religion are
actual when they are functions of cognition.

All morality rests upon selflessness. If selfless-
ness is not to be blind asceticism or equally blind
training, it must have a motive.

This is supplied by the Kamma teaching.

For where I apprehend myself as a process
that sustains itself through itself, i.e. through its
volitions, I know that in every moment I myself
fashion the next moment, and with this present life,
the life that shall follow it. In correct insight I
become in the most literal sense the architect of
my fate.

From this, selflessness follows as an evident
necessity.

All religion consists in the need of looking
beyond this life, of relating it to another, a higher.
The Kamma teaching reveals to me that it is the
succeeding life to which this life " is related."

From this, morality and religion follow as
functions of cognition.

One perceives that such a teaching as this
perforce involves profound changes in the appraise-

254

CONCLUSION 255

ment of life-values, and along with this, changes
in the relations of the individual to his environment,
which includes changes in his social relationships.

The perfumed brutality of our civilization has
its root in false ideas of the meaning and significance
of life, from which results a false appraisement of
life-values. We take the symptoms for the things
themselves, and are drowned in their inexhaustibility
without once being able to win through to ourselves.
That we are all steering a wrong course must be
finally clear to every thinking man. But since
none knows of any remedy this is sought practically
in a combat with the symptoms — that is, one bails
the water out of the sinking craft and forgets to
stop the leak ; and theoretically it is sought in the
setting up of all sorts of artificial ideals — that is,
in emotion-values.

Neither of these makeshifts is of any avail.
Help can only come from thinking, through the
acquiring of a correct idea as to the worth of our
so-called life-values.

It is just here that the Buddha-thought comes
in as teacher, as educator, as revolutioniser of
values — in fine, as the gospel of thought, and gives
a new turn to that terrible, blind " struggle for
existence," to which as to some dread mania, we all
are subject.

Buddhism is the doctrine of actuality, the
Kamma teaching, the outcome of thinking in terms
of actuality. To render it accessible to the thinking
of the modern man, to make it possible for him to
let his glance rove free from out the mole-like
existence of aims and objects himself has turned up,
away past the overthrown barriers of a cramping

256 BUDDHISM AND SCIENCE

ignorance — for this it is necessary that the non-
actual and the re -actual forms of world -theory,
which, as faith and science respectively, everywhere
obstruct free outlook, should be swept clean away,
or at the very least confined strictly to their own
proper domain. Room must be made for actuality
and for thinking in terms of actuality.

That was the main task of this book.

But of such sort is truth that it will not suffer
that way be made for it by violent measures of
any kind. One thing only here is permissible : to
point it out, patiently and repeatedly point it out.
Its way it makes of its own self.

" Over all gifts victorious is the gift of the truth."

THE END

Printed by R. & R. Clark, Limited, Edinburgh.

BUDDHIST ESSAYS

By PAUL DAHLKE

Translated by Bhikkhu Silacara

8vo. I os. net.

Buddhist Review. — " For the effective presentation of Buddhism
to the West, it is necessary that one should unite the ripest
scholarship with an understanding deeper than mere academic
knowledge of the dead letter. Buddhism has long awaited an
European exponent who can respond to the stimulus of Buddhism
as religion, as well as possessing the ability to grasp and expound
Buddhism as philosophy ; one, in short, to whom Buddhism is a
living Faith, and not merely a curiosity of antique literature. Such
an exponent Buddhism has found in Dr. Paul Dahlke, whose
admirable work is now available to English readers through the no
less admirable translation of the Bhikkhu Silacara. . . . No simple
review can do these Essays adequate justice. They form a work
that students of Buddhism must read ; and not only they, but all who
realise that Truth does not exclusively dwell in this well or the
other, but that there may be deeper waters still, whose depths invite
them maybe, to find therein more valuable treasures than any they
have yet known."

Athenceum. — " Dr. Dahlke's explanation of Buddhism is
thoroughly well-informed. . . . The English translation is intelli-
gent and readable."

Daily News. — " To those who wish to understand the essence of
Buddhism, and who are not unwilling to do some hard thinking,
this book may be confidently recommended. The author writes
clearly, is touched with sympathy, and, perhaps, with more than
sympathy, for the religion he has studied, and in his most eloquent
passages has caught much of the spirit of the mystic symbolism of
the East."

Occult Review. — " The solicitous and sympathetic study of this
interesting book — lucid, as it evidently is in its original form,
admirably translated as it seems, with the wonderful facility of an
Oriental hand — will communicate to any reader more simply and
directly than perhaps any formal handbook, the root-matter of that
doctrine which the Buddha gave to his world of thought and action
some five centuries before the Christian Era."

LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd.

BOOKS DEALING WITH BUDDHISM
THE SOUL OF A PEOPLE

By H. Fielding Hall
Extra Crown 8vo. 7s. 6d. net.

THE INWARD LIGHT

By H. Fielding Hall
8vo. 1 os. net.

THE WHEAT AMONG THE TARES

STUDIES OF BUDDHISM IN JAPAN

By the Rev. A. Lloyd, M.A.

Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.

GREAT MORAL TEACHERS

(CONFUCIUS, GOTAMA, SOCRATES, AND EPICTETUS)

By Canon Edward Russell Bernard

Crown 8vo. 3s. 6d. net.

GREAT RELIGIOUS TEACHERS OF

THE EAST

By Alfred W. Martin
Crown 8vo. 5 s. 6d. net.

THE RELIGIONS OF EASTERN ASIA

By Horace G. Underwood
Crown 8vo. 6s. 6d. net.

THE RELIGION OF THE CHINESE

By Prof. J. J. M. Degroot
Crown 8vo. 5 s. 6d. net.

LONDON: MACMILLAN & CO., Ltd.

Date Due

FEB 7 '47

DEC

jfc* 8 '*

RPR2 0';

W 9 w

MA:, 1 4 "

7 ;Sff

J>Alr- « . '■

9Wl]

i 2003

Library Bureau Oat. no. 1137

ZWh

CLAPP

3 5002 00127 9376

Dahlke, Paul
Buddhism & science,

BL 1475 . S35 D33 1913

Dahlke, Paul, 1865-1928.

Buddhism & science

-:•**:

2ni£#

■I i&zffi

- :*> * ■ KM

■■

Internet Archive Audio

Featured

Top

Images

Featured

Top

Software

Featured

Top

Books

Featured

Top

Video

Featured

Top

Mobile Apps

Browser Extensions

Archive-It Subscription

Save Page Now

Full text of "Buddhism & science"

See other formats