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CESAR'S ARMY:
A STUDY OF THE
MILITARY ART OF THE ROMANS IN THE LAST
DAYS OF THE REPUBLIC.
BY
HARRY PRATT JUDSON.
BOSTON:
GINN & COMPANY, PUBLISHERS.
1903.
Entered, according to Act of Congress, in the year 1888, by
HARRY PRATT JUDSON,
in the Office of the Librarian of Congress, at Washington.
u
no3
Typography by J. S. Cushing & Co., Boston.
Presswork by Ginn & Company.
PREFACE.
This little book is an attempt to reconstruct Caesar's Army so
as to give a clear idea of its composition and evolutions. It is
hoped that students of Caesar's writings and students of military
science alike may find interest in such a study.
The Commentaries of Csesar are the story of his wars. They
are military history. It is true that they were intended largely
for civilian readers at Rome. Still, they imply throughout a
certain amount of military knowledge that all Roman citizens
were supposed to have. The modern student can hardly be
said to read understandingly, unless the text conveys to his
mind the same idea that it conveyed to the intelligent Roman
reader to whom Caesar addressed it. Hence it seems clear that
we should at least seek to gain those notions of the military
art with which the Roman reader was familiar, and in the light
of which Caesar described his campaigns.
Many of these facts are entirely lost. Many others we can
reach at best only approximately. Our inferences, based some-
times on meagre data, may often be erroneous. And yet is it
not better to have even such an inadequate idea than no idea
at all?
It is needless to say that in these pages the work of modern
scholars has been laid heavily under contribution. Especially
the exhaustive and ingenious treatise of Riistow has been followed
in many particulars. It has been the aim of the author to reach
the truth, and to present it as clearly as he could, giving credit
IV PREFACE.
where the investigations of others have been of use, and never
hesitating to set forth different conclusions where the circum-
stances seem to warrant.
War is barbarism. But the story of man has no epoch in
which war has not existed. The history of war is the history of
the development of the human mind. The military science of
each age is almost the exact reflex of the civilization of that age.
And no study of the achievements of man can be complete unless
we understand the method of the hostile collision of nations.
The history of military science is yet to be written. Thus far,
only some fragments exist. This work is intended as an essay
at grouping and illustrating some such fragments.
The University of Minnesota,
Minneapolis, February, 1888.
CONTENTS.
I.
PAGE
THE ORGANIZATION i
1. The Infantry of the Legion 2
2. The Standards 13
3. The Music 15
4. The Baggage Train 16
5. The Auxiliary Infantry 18
6. The Cavalry ... 19
7. The Artillery 20
8. The Staff and Staff Troops 26
II
THE LEGIONARY
1. Enlistment
2. Clothing
3. Armor .
4. Arms .
5. Baggage
6. Work .
7. Pay . .
8. Discipline
30
30
32
32
33
36
36
37
38
III.
TACTICS OF THE LEGION 40
A. Order of Battle 41
1. The Cohort 41
2. The Legion 43
B. Order of March 46
1. The Cohort 47
2. The Legion 49
VI CONTENTS.
IV.
PAGE
TACTICS OF THE CAVALRY 53
V.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY 55
A. The Battle 55
1. Offensive 55
2. Defensive 57
3. Manner of Attack 59
B. The March 62
1. The Advance 64
2. The Retreat 67
3. The Flank March 68
4. Crossing Streams 70
C. The Camp 70
I. The Summer Camp 71
1. The Site 71
2. The Fortification 72
(a) The Ground Plan 72
(b) The Elevation 73
1. The Ditch 73
2. The Wall 76
3. The Interior 7S
4. Arrangement of the Cohorts ... 81
5. Arrangement of Cavalry 82
6. Time needed for Fortifying ... 82
7. Camp Duties 84
II. The Winter Camp 86
D. The Siege 87
1. Blockade 87
2. Assault 89
3. Regular Siege 90
(a) Construction of the Agger 93
(J>) Siege Apparatus 96
VI.
THE SHIPS AND SEA-FIGHTS , . , . . 102
CONTENTS.
Vll
VII.
PAGE
THE ENEMY 104
A. Defence of Fortified Towns 104
B. The Gallic Array and Arms 106
^fc C. The British Chariots 108
MAPS AND PLANS ILLUSTRATING THE GALLIC WAR . 109
INDEX TO LATIN MILITARY TERMS 125
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
Caesar Frontispiece
Fig. I. Aquila 13
2. Signum 13
3. Vexilluni 13
4. Aquilifer 14
5. Buccina 15
6. Tuba 15
7. Cornu 15
8. Infantry soldiers 18
9. Cavalryman 19
10. Catapiilta 21
11. Ballista ^ 22
12.. Scorpio 24
Legionary 30
Fig. 13. Scutum 2^2^
" 14. Gladius 33
" 15. Pilufn 34
" 16. Pilum 34
" 17. Maniple 42
" 18. Cohort in Line of Battle 41
" 19. Legion in Triple Line 44
" 20. Cohort in Column of Maniples 41
" 21. Cohort in Column of Centuries 41
" 22. Cohort in Column of Centuries 41
" 23. Legion marching in Lines 44
" 24. Legion marching by Wings 44
" 25. Legion marching in Square 50
" 26. Bridge over the Rhine 69
" 27. The Summer Camp 72
" 28. Wall and Ditch 74
" 29. Fossa Punica 75
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS. X
PAGE
Fig. 30. Fossa directis lateribus 75
" 31. Fortifying the Camp 83
« 32. Oppugnatio 88
" 33. Horizontal Section of Agger 90
" 34. Vertical Section of Agger and Hostile Wall .... 92
" 35. General View of Siege Operations 94
** 36. Musctdus 97
" 37. Musculus 97
« 38. Vinea 98
" 39. Pluteus 98
" 40. Pluteus 99
" 41. Pluteus 99
" 42. Caesar's Circumvallation at Alesia 100
" 43. Lilium loi
" 44. Section of Galley 102
" 45. Horizontal Section of Gallic Wall 104
" 46. Vertical Section of Gallic Wall 105
" 47. The British Attack with Chariots io8
Plan I. Fortifications on the Rhone in
" II. Battle with Helvetians 112
" HI. Battle with Ariovistus 113
" IV. Battle on the Aisne 114
" V. Battle on the Sambre 115
" VI. Siege of Aduatuca 116
" VII. Campaign against the Veneti 117
" VIII. Siege of Avaricum 1 18
" IX. Siege of Gergovia 1 19
" X. March of Labienus against Lutetia 120
" XI. Defeat of Vercingetorix 121
« XII. Siege of Alesia 122
" XIII. Campaign against the Bellovaci 123
" XIV. Siege of Uxellodunum 124
Campaign Maps : —
I. Gaul in the time of Csesar.
II. Campaign of B.C. 58.
III. Campaign of B.C. 57.
IV. Campaigns of B.C. 55 and 54.
V. Britain in Campaigns of B.C. 55 and 54.
VI. Campaign of B.C. 52.
ABBREVIATIONS.
A. = Caesar de Bella Africano*
App. = Appian.
B. G. = Caesar de Bella Gallico.
C. = Caesar de Bella Civili.
Dio. = Dion Cassius.
G. = Goler, Caesars Gallischer Krieg, Tubingen, 1880.
Gen. = Albericus Gentilis, De Armis Romanis.
Gro. = Grotefend, Zur Romischen Legions geschichte.
H. = Caesar de Bella Hispanico.
Jal = Jal, La Flotte de Cesar.
Jung = Jung, Leben und Sitten der Romer in der Kaiserzeit.
K. = Krohl, De Legionibus Reipublicae Romanae.
Lange = Lange, Mutationum Historia.
L. = Lindenschmidt, Die Alterthiimer unser heidnischer Vorzeit.
M. = Marquardt-Mommsen, Handbuch der Rom. Alterthumer, Bd. 5, i8l
N. = Nissen, Das Templum.
N. = Histoire de Jules Cesar, par Napoleon IIL
Notes = Notes to Allen and Greenough's New Caesar.
P. = Polybius.
Plut. Caes. = Plutarch's Caesar.
Plut. Pomp. = Plutarch's Pompey.
R. = Riistow, Heerwesen und Kriegfiihrung Casars.
R. K. = Riistow and Kochly, Geschichte des Griechischen Kriegwesens.
Ro. = Robertson, History of Charles V.
Sch. A. = Schambach, Die Artillerie bei Casar.
Sch. R. = Schambach, Die Reiterei bei Casar.
Schef. = Scheffer, De Militia Navali Veterum, 1654.
Suet. = Suetonius.
T. G. = Tacitus, De Germania.
U. = Upton's United States Army Infantry Tactics, 1883.
V. — Vegetius.
CESAR'S ARMY.
I. THE ORGANIZATION.
1. THE INFANTRY OF THE LEGION.
§ I. The chief strength of the Roman army was the
yjonary infantry. The cavalry was merely auxiliary to this
field operations and was comparatively weak in number,
le engines (corresponding to our artillery) were used in
ge operations, but very little in the field. The heavy
'antry furnished by the allies {auxilia), though generally
^anized and trained after the Roman model, were rather
sd to make a show of force than for much important
. , , B.G.III,2S.
rvice m battle.
The European armies of the middle ages were composed almost „ t § tt
oily of cavalry; the individual horseman being encased in heavy p. So, 81.
nor and equipped with sword, spear and battle-axe. In modern
nies the infantry is again the main arm of the service. Unlike the
man legions, however, our infantry is greatly strengthened by a
iverful field artillery. No army of mere cavalry can be very effective
less in partial and temporary operations.
§ 2. The tactical unit of the Roman infantry was the
jion {legio). Caesar had under his command at different
aes a varying number of legions.
A tactical unit may be defined as a body of troops under a single
nniand, by a combination of several of which a higher unit is formed.
us in the army of the United States, the tactical unit of the army u. §§ 365,
he corps ; each corps should contain three divisions; each division, 551,718,748.
ee brigades; each brigade, four regiments (or battalions); each
2 CiESAR S ARMY.
regiment, ten companies. The company is the lowest unit of organiza-
tion in the United States army.
The organization of European armies is in the main similar to that
of our own country; the main difference being in the size and sub-
division of the regiment.
Each tactical unit has a commanding officer, who receives orders
from the commander of the next higher unit. Thus, the captain of a
company reports for orders to the colonel of his regiment; the colonel,
to his brigade commander (usually a brigadier-general), etc., etc. Each
commanding officer regulates the formation and movements of his com-
mand by a combination of the proximate units of which it is composed;
his orders being given to the commanders of those units.
§ 3. The Roman legions were designated by numbers,
probably given according to priority in formation. The
corps of a modem army are distinguished in like manner.
Caesar had under his command in Gaul, at different times, the legions
numbered I, III, VII, VIII, IX, X, XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV.
g Q J 2 When he came to Geneva, in the spring of the year 58 B.C., he
found only one legion stationed in the farther province. This was the
E.G. I, 4o'3. jQj.j^ (Legio X), afterwards so distinguished for fidelity and courage.
As soon as the Helvetians set out through the territory of the Sequani,
Caesar hastened to Hither Gaul, enrolled two new legions (XI and
XII),* and called from their winter quarters the three (VII, VIII, and
IX) that were stationed in that province. It was these six legions,
together with auxiliaries (both horse and foot), that composed the army
with which the Helvetians were conquered and Ariovistus was driven
across the Rhine.
In the campaigns of the years 57, 56 and 55 Caesar had eight legions;
the six used in the previous year, 58, and two of new levies (Legiones
XIII and XIV).
E.G. V, 243. In the year 54, probably in the spring, Caesar enlisted a new legion,
G. 169. (XV), The 14th was divided. Five of its ten cohorts were scattered,
* We learn the numbers from B. G. II, 23. XI and XII are the highest
of those numbers, and hence doubtless belonged to the two new legions.
In tlie after narrative Caesar in no case mentions a legion with a number
higher than XII without having previously referred to a legion or legion.s
newly raised. So we have little difficulty in tracing the numbers of his
legions. The numbers are specifically given by Hirtius in his commentary
(commonly called Bk. VIII).
E.G. I, io3.
E.G. II, 2I
THE ORGANIZATION. 3
the men being used to fill up the depleted ranks of the other legions.
Thus Caesar had in that year eight and a half legions under arms. Of
these, fifteen cohorts (all of Legion XV and five cohorts of Legion
XIV) were destroyed with Sabinus.
At the opening of the campaign of 53 B.C., Pompey loaned Ceesar B.G.
two legions (I and III). One new one was raised, which received the ^^' ^» 32^-
same number (XIV) as the one Caesar had divided, and of which five ^- J^S,
^ ^ note 3.
cohorts were lost with Sabinus. These ten legions were used in the
operations of the year 52.
In the commentary written by Hirtius Pansa (de Bello Gallico, Bk. ^'^"^l^^'
VIII) the legions are repeatedly mentioned by number; although, 11,24,54.
unfortunately, with considerable confusion where the Mss. agree, and ^-G- VIII,
2, 24, 54.
moreover with considerable variation in the Mss. If we should follow „ ^ „jjj
the text of Pansa, we should find the 12th legion in three dififerent places 2, 24.
at the same time: then, too, he mentions a 6th legion, which we no- B.G.VIII,4.
where else find in Caesar's army. However, by using some care we can g. pp. 333
trace the different legions from place to place pretty accurately. It is 334. 336, 338,
clear enough that in his last campaign in Gaul, Caesar had eleven legions, ^'*°' ^g^' ^^'
although Pansa makes no mention of the levy of the additional legion. 373, 374.
Very possibly it was numbered XV, as Goler conjectures, to take the
place of that Legio XV that had been destroyed with Sabinus in 54 B.C.
For a careful study of the history of Caesar's legions, see the disser-
tation of J. G. Krohl, De Legionibus Reipublicae Romanae.
§ 4. The officers in command of a legion were originally
the military tribunes {tribuni milituni), six in number. These
were appointed partly by the Cojnitia at Rome, partly by the
consul, or, frequently, by the proconsul himself; but always
from the knights or nobles. The old requirement of mili-
tary experience had become obsolete in Caesar's time, so e.g. i, 39.
that the tribunes were mostly selected mainly from political
considerations. It can readily be seen that this did not add
to their efficiency. The six assigned to each legion were
divided into three pairs, and each pair took the command
for two months. During this period the two alternated on
duty day by day. This custom seems an odd survival of the
peculiar Roman jealousy of a single command, as in the case
of the consuls. Their duties were, a general superintendence
of the legion, the nomination and assignment to duty of the
4 C/ESAR S ARMY.
centurions, and to preside at courts-martial. They were
E.G. Ill, f. often detached to obtain suppHes, such tribunes being very
probably from the four not on duty with the legion. They
E.G. 1, 41. formed the natural channel for petitions or other communi-
E.G. IV, cation from the soldiers to the general. They were also
^^ ' ' ^ ' summoned to councils of war by the commander of the
army. The tribunes, like the staff of a modern infantry
regiment, were mounted.
This constant change in command and variety of duties,
together with the merely political source from which most
of the tribunes came, made them hardly reliable to lead
soldiers in batde, and Caesar accordingly soon devised a
B.G. better plan. Without displacing the tribunes, he stationed
v.^ii, 25S°' ^ legatus (§ 30) with each legion — in the first place merely
47-. also as a witness for the general of the way in which each officer
notes, p. 64;
M. v. 457. and soldier performed his duty, afterwards as the actual
commander of the legion in battle. This important reform
of Caesar remained under the empire ; the legate so assigned
being distinguished as legatus legion is (§ 29).
R. 12. Rustow considers the duties of the tribunes to have been mainly ad-
ministrative and judicial; i.e., as having to do with an oversight of the
rations and equipments of the troops, and with the cognizance of
■v,52; VII ' niilitary offences. This is true as far as it goes. Still, we meet repeated
47, 52, 62. instances in which the tribunes undoubtedly commanded in actual
B.G. VI, 39. battle. Their command of detachments composed of one or more co-
horts, is not infrequent. The many duties of the tribunes are divided
among a number of officers in a modern army. The qua I'ter master
(whether of brigade, regiment, or company) sees to arms, equipments,
and clothing. The commissary provides food. Courts-martial are
composed of details from the various officers. Thus the whole admin-
istration of the army is systematized and made more effective.
§ 5. The normal or full strength of a legion in Caesar's
time we have no adequate means of learning. This is to be
regretted, as a knowledge of the fact in question would help us
to comprehend the Roman tactics. However, the effective
THE ORGANIZATION. 5
Strength in the field we can estimate with tolerable accu-
racy. From the experience of modern armies we know that
the number of effectives ready for duty in the field always
falls considerably below the number on the rolls ; and again,
that even the number on the rolls rarely approximates very
closely to the full strength of any organization as prescribed
by the tactics. And we may be very sure that in like manner
the effective strength of any legion must have varied con-
stantly with the exigencies of the campaign — always, how-
ever, or nearly always, being less than that of a full legion
just recruited.
In his account of the battle of Pharsalia, C?esar speaks
especially of the great depletion some of his legions had suf-
fered. In that battle his legions had an average strength of c m, 88,
2750 men. Those of Pompey averaged a Httle over 4000.
Riistow estimates the average effective force of the legions r. p. 3.
throughout Caesar's campaigns at from 3000 to 3600 men.
Goler puts the normal strength at about 4800, besides 300 g. p. 213.
antesignani (§ 36). These estimates cannot be far from the
truth.
Caesar in one place speaks of a detachment of two legions of infantry b.G. V, 4a.
and a few cavalry as hardly 7000 strong. That would make about 3500
to the legion.
In the return from Britain in B.C. 55, two transports came to land b.G. IV, 36,
below the main port, and the soldiers debarked and marched overland. 37-
From these two ships 300 soldiers landed. Assuming the two trans-
ports to have been of about the same size, that would average 150 men to
a ship. Now Caesar had 80 transports and an unknown number of ^-^-IV'
galleys. He lost 12 vessels in the storm. It seems likely that those 12 ^ ' ^^ '
were transports, as they lay at anchor, and hence would be more exposed
to the storm than the galleys, which were hauled up on the beach.
Then at that rate the 68 transports remaining carried 10,200 men. b.G. notes,
Allowing for staff officers and servants, the two legions must have P* ^35«
averaged somewhat less than 5000 men. At the outbreak of the civil
war, Caesar had with him at Ariminium only the XIII Legion (C. I, 7).
But Plutarch {C<£s. 32) says that Caesar had at that time 5000 men.
t
6 C^SAR S ARMY.
So we may fairly assume that that number was in round numbers the
strength of a legion when its ranks were full.
Geiiius, § 6. The legion was divided into ten cohorts {cohortes) ;
^^'4' 6. each cohort into three maniples {nianipuli) \ each maniple
into two centuries {centuriae^ ordines).
The tactical unit of the legion was the cohort ; of the
cohort, the maniple.
C. I, 64; The half of the maniple Caesar usually calls or do. The term centuria
111,91. occurs only twice in the Commentaries; and it is at least doubtful in
each case whether reference is made to the divisions of the maniple at
all. We should notice that the word ordo is also used in other senses
than the above. It often means a rank, or line, of soldiers; often a
relation of rank among officers, as primorum ordinum centuriones ;
sometimes it refers to the officers themselves; and frequently it denotes
a mere position in the array.
The maniple, as the tactical unit of the cohort, consisted from day
to day of the same men, so far as these were present. Each time the
maniple was formed, it was divided, presumably according to the height
of the soldiers, into two equal parts. These were the ordines. Thus it
will be seen that these did not necessanily c(pnsist from day to day of
the same men ; as, of course, if any should be absent, the division would
not be made at the same point in the line on successive days. The prdo
corresponded exactly to the platoon of an American company. The
maniple corresponded to our company.
§ 7. With Goler's estimate of 4800 men to the legion,
each cohort would contain 480 men; and each maniple, 160
men. Riistow's computations are based on an average
strength in the field of 3600 in the legion. That would
give 360 to the cohort, and 120 to the maniple.
§ 8. Each maniple was under the command of two cen-
turions {^centuriones) , one (the senior in rank) in charge of
the first ordo ; the other (the junior), in charge of the second
Varro; ordo. Each centurion probably had a subcenturion {optio)
Fcstus; to assist him. The optio was chosen from the ranks by the
PauiusDiac. ccnturion. The centurion, Hke the line officers of our
THE ORGANIZATION. /
ifantry, was on foot. As a badge of his office, he carried a
lort staff {vitis), or baton; this was in token of his power
)f inflicting punishment.
g. Of the six centurions in a cohort, the senior centu- m. v,
ion of the first maniple was called pilus prior; the junior, 368-374«
ilus posterior. The senior of the second maniple was prifi-
teps prior, and the junior \\Z!s> princeps posterior. The senior
>f the third maniple was hastatus prior, and the junior, has-
itus posterior.
Thus the terms pilus, princeps, hastatus referred to the first, second,
and third maniple respectively. This is plainly a survival of the old
organization, in which the soldiers of the first line were called pilani
■ (pitt), those of the second pri napes, and those of the third hastati (or
triarii). Such distinction was entirely lost as applied to the soldiers,
in the new organization of the legion by cohorts. The only traces of
I we find in the three maniples whose union formed a cohort, and in
e titles of the centurions of those maniples.
We readily learn the ordo the centurion commanded by the epithet
•ior for the first and postei'ior for the second.
The cohort to which a centurion belonged was indicated
by its number in the legion ; e.g., the lowest centurion in a
gion was decimus hastatus posterior; tertius hastatus prior
Quid refer to the centurion in command of the first ordo of
the third maniple of the third cohort ; and the senior cen-
Iurion of the whole legion was primus pilus prior, or simply
\rimipilus.
■ § 10. The senior centurion of a maniple must have com- m. v,
^nded the maniple. Each cohort was under the command 37i-7a«
of its pilus prior ; and the primipilus, at least in time of
battle, practically directed the legion.
||^f Such an arrangement would hardly be feasible in a modern army.
Only the solidity and uniformity of the Roman array made it possible
for them.
8 Caesar's army.
1^ p^j § II. The position and duties of a centurion corresponded
very nearly with those of non-commissioned officers in a
modern army. They were chosen from the ranks, as are our
sergeants and corporals, and were very rarely promoted to
the grade of tribune. However, their responsibilities (not
their rank) were in some respects (§ lo) like those of our
commissioned officers. The centurions were usually nomi-
nated by the tribunes. They received their appointment,
however, from the -commanding general.
§ 12. The relative rank of the cer.turions in a cohort is
not difficult to learn, and there is little doubt that it was as
explained in the sections just preceding. The order of their
rank throughout the legion, however, — or, in other words,
the rank of the centurions of any one cohort relatively to
those of any other, — is quite a different matter. We have
no clear and positive information on the subject, and the
various theories formed are based on isolated references, and
on inferences from the general spirit of the Roman organiza-
tion and from the probable course that human nature, as we
know it, would take under conditions like those in which the
Romans were.
The main facts with which any theory must accord, are
the following : —
1 . The centurions were plainly divided into classes accord-
ing to rank. There is constant reference to those of the first
class {primorum ordinutn). Caesar in one place speaks of a
C. Ill, 53. centurion who for especial gallantry was promoted from the
eighth class {ab octavis ordtnibi/s) to the position oi ptimipi-
lus, senior centurion of the first cohort (§9).
2. We may infer from this last reference {ab octavis
ordinibus) that there were at least eight classes. Of course
there may have been more.
3. From an expression of Tacitus (Hist. HI, 22 : occisi
sex primorum ordinum centuriones) we infer that at that
E.G. I, 4i2
THE ORGANIZATION. 9
time there were at least six centurions of the first class. As
the time to which he refers was that of the emperor Galba,
not much more than a century after Juhus Caesar, it seems
Hkely that no material change had been made meanwhile.
4. A passage in Vegetius (II, 21) gives us some idea of
the order of promotion. We quote : —
Nam quasi in o?'bem que?ndam per diversas scholas f?iilites
pr'cwioventta', ita ut ex prima cohorte ad gradum quempiam
promotus vadat ad decimatn cohorte^n ; et rursus ab ea, cres-
centibus stipendiis, cum majore gradu per alias recurrit ad
primam.
5. The centurions of the first class {prifnorum ordinum) b.g. v, 282;
held so high rank that they were regularly invited to the ^^' 7^'
council of war, in company with the tribuni militu77i and
'egati.
On these and a few minor facts, ingenious military antiquarians have
constructed very elaborate and very diverse theories. The most promi-
nent of these theories, with a few considerations both for and against
em, are as follows : —
RUstow conjectures that the centurions of each cohort form one r „„ s-n
s. There would then be ten classes in the legion, with six in each
The regular order of promotion would be, through all the six
grades of the tenth cohort, then from the sixth through to the first
place in the ninth cohort; and in like manner until every grade
had been passed to that of pruiiipilus. According to this view, the
centuriones primorwn ordinum were those of the first cohort, six in
number.
It will be seen that this scheme accords with 2 and 3 above. The
sage in Vegetius (4 above), Riistow gives this interpretation: As
cancies occurred in the ranks of any cohort, they were filled by de-
iling men from the next lower cohort. Thus recruits would always
fall to the tenth cohort, and the first would contain the very flower of
e legion. Hence, under ordinary circumstances, when it became
cessary to appoint a centurion, selection would be made from the
privates of the first cohort (presumably from its first maniple), and he
would be assigned as a centurion {hastatus posterior) of the tenth co-
Irt (decimus). Then he would pass successively through the grades
^nent
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^^^lass
grac
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had
cent
num
'^^ailii
fall
lO CAESAR S ARMY,
became first centurion of the first cohort. Thus the circle {orbeni) of
service would be complete.*
G. pp. Goler devises a different scheme. In the first place, to the 60 cen-
222-28. turions of the legion he adds 60 subcenturions {optiones), making a
total of 120. The subcenturions he calls simply centurions, just as in
our army a lieutenant-colonel is commonly called merely " colonel," or
a brigadier-general is usually addressed as " general." Then he makes
12 classes of rank, each class comprising 10 centuriones ; i.e., one from
each cohort. The first class {centuriones primorum ordinuni) would
include the \o pill prior es, or, in other words, the commanders of the
10 cohorts. The second class would be the 10 pili posteriores ; and so
on through the 6 classes of real centurions, the sixth being the lo has-
tati posteriores. The seventh class he considers to have been the 10
subcenturions of the pili prior es ; and in like o der to the twelfth class,
the 10 subcenturions of the hastati posteriores.
It will at once appear that this theory also accords with the essential
points, 3 and 4, above. Goler would explain Vegetius in this way : —
When a private soldier was promoted, he became subcenturion to the
decitnus hastatus posterior. As he rose in rank, he passed from cohort
to cohort, but always as subcenturion to the hastatus posterior, until he
reached that position in the first cohort. His next step in promotion
would lead him from the twelfth to the eleventh class, and he would
return to the tenth cohort as subcenturion of the decijnus hastatus prior.
Thus again and again he would complete the circle {orbeni), going
through the cohorts 6 times in the 6 classes of subcenturions, and 6
times in the 6 classes of centurions, until at last he would reach the rank
oi primipilus. Here his promotion usually ended.
Riistow argues that the cohorts, as well as the centurions, were care-
fully distinguished in rank; that it is well known that the earlier Roman
custom of beginning the battle with less experienced troops, and reserv-
ing the veterans for an emergency, had by the time of Caesar been quite
reversed; so that the first line of the legion (the first four cohorts)
must have included the choice soldiers; and hence that the centurions
would in all probability have been graded in like manner.
M. p. 371. Marquardt objects to the scheme of Riistow, that thereby promotion
would make the commander of a cohort merely a subordinate in the
next higher cohort, an arrangement quite impossible to the military
mind. Moreover, as Goler says, the most experienced and skilled offi-
* This is an amplification of the interpretation of Vegetius by Riistow ;
but merely carries out the suggestions of the latter.
I
THE ORGANIZATION. II
cers would be grouped in the first cohort, and the least experienced
and skilled would be gathered in the tenth — an arrangement obviously
unpractical.
Riistow remarks, however, and the remark is not without weight,
that there was not, after all, a very great difference between the different
cohorts of a legion in point of soldiership; nor again a very wide dis-
tinction in the same regard between the centurions and the privates.
The Roman organization was marked by a peculiar solidarity, very
much unlike our own; and while, of course, the officers had great
influence on the fortunes of the battle, yet that influence must have B.G. II, 202.
been very considerably less than in a modern army.
But the strongest point in favor of some such plan as that of Goler
is the fact that the primi ordines are sometimes mentioned in such a
way as to imply that they held immediate relations with all the cohorts -
in the legion. Thus, after the council of war that preceded the opera-
tions against Ariovistus, the legions that had been panic-stricken ' ' *^ *
arranged with the tribunes and centurions of the first class to make their
apologies to Caesar. This would imply that the primi ordines, like the
tribunes, were immediately accessible by all the soldiers. It would be
difficult to imagine the troops of the other nine cohorts coming for such
a service to the officers of the first. Certainly it would seem more natu-
ral for the men of each cohort to go to their own commander. Passages
of similar import are quoted by Marquardt from Livy, Hyginus, Tacitus ^^" P* 37i'
(II, 89), Frontinus, and others. The scheme of Marquardt, it may
be noted, is the same as Goler's, without the subcenturions. This
would make but six classes, and cannot be reconciled with point 2
above.
The principal objection to the system proposed by Goler is the fact
that subcenturions seem not to have been in the grades of promotion,
but were more probably chosen from the ranks, each by his own cen-
turion (§ 8). If we take away these, we are at once reduced to the six
classes of Marquardt, and meet the same difficulty.
One striking difference between the Roman organization
and that of modern armies is in the matter of the number
of officers. The Romans had far fewer than we. In neither
cohort nor maniple do we find any trace of officers corre-
sponding to the commissioned officers in one of our compa-
nies, or even to our relatively numerous corporals. The
centurions seemed to have all the functions that we should
12 CiESARS ARMY.
assign to sergeants. They must, besides that, have exer-
cised at least a portion of the duties of general supervision
and command that belong to a captain and lieutenants of
our infantry. Each prior centurion must have had some
s\ich general authority over his maniple ; and each pilus
prior, besides the direction of his maniple, must have had
some charge of the cohort. For the command of the legion,
as we -have seen, the Roman methods provided.
The objection of Marquardt to Rlistow's scheme of rank
applies with equal force both to Marquardt's own plan and to
Goler's, as well as to Rtistow's. According to the scheme of
either of the two former, a centurion who had commanded
maniples, e.g., primus hastatus prior, on promotion would
become second in command of a maniple, e.g., decimus prin-
ceps posterior. This would be quite as little according to
modern military ideas as to promote the commander of a
cohort to a subordinate place in another cohort. Then to
make the two theories named quite consistent, we should
make the first three classes contain the priores, in the order
oi pili, pri7icipes, and hastati ; and the second three classes
should comprise the posteriores, in the same order.
This, however, would provide for but six classes, and we
see that there must have been not less than eight (2, above).
If we adopt the view of Goler, and add six classes of sub-
centurions to the six of centurions, we at once run counter
to a strong probability that subcenturions {optiofies) were
not in the regular line of promotion, but were chosen each
by his own centurion. At least, this seems to have been ihe
Livy; fact both bcforc and after the time of Caesar; and hence
Felu°s- ^^^y likely was not different at that time. A fair verdict on
Pauius each of the ingenious theories thus far propounded would
perhaps be, " not proven."
THE ORGANIZATION.
13
2. THE STANDARDS.
Fig. 1.
§ 13. Each legion had as its standard an eagle {aquila, c. in, 64.
Fig. I ) , usually of bronze or silver, on a wooden staff. This
was entrusted to the care of the
first cohort, and usually to its
senior centurion {primipilus) .
Hence this officer was sometimes
called aquilifer; though the same
term was applied to the men he
selected to carry the standard
(Fig. 4)-
Each cohort, also, had a stand- b.g. ii, 25.
ard of its own {signum^ Fig. 2).
The bearer of this was called
signifer. Sometimes the legion
for brevity was called aquila, and h. 30.
in like manner the cohort was denoted by signum. The signum h. 18.
was usually an animal — a sheep, for instance — on a staff.
Of course it would differ for different cohorts, so that the men
in the confusion of battle might know their proper place. b.g.iv,26i.
The cavalry and light
troops (§§17, 18) car-
ried a vexiilum (Fig. 3).
This was a little banner,
white or red, attached to
II a short horizontal piece
I of wood or metal sur-
II mounting the staff.
Fig. 3. There was another ^^^' ^'
banner called vexiilum, the standard of the general. This b.g. ii, 2o».
was white, with an inscription in red letters giving the name c. iii, 89.
of the general, his army, etc. It was placed near the gen- Dio Cassius,
eral's tent in the camp, and when displayed was the sign for ^^^' ^°'
march or battle.
14
CyESAR S ARMY.
Fig. 4. jLquUifer.
G.pp.
239-40
In the period when the maniple was the tactical unit of the legion^
each maniple had its signum. Goler thinks this to have been the case
even in Caesar's army. But a consideration of the account of the battle
B.G. II, 252, with the Nervii would lead to a different conclusion. Caesar relates
that of the fourth cohort all the centurions had fallen, the standard ,
bearer had been slain and the standard lost. This certainly seems to
imply that the cohort had only one standard and one standard-bearer,
g Q yj Again, in speaking of the flight of the servants on one occasion when
40', also a foraging party was suddenly attacked, Caesar says se in signa manipu-
notes, p. 163. losque coniciunt. We interpret, the servants thre^u themselves among
P- 439-
THE ORGANIZATION.
15
the cohorts and maniples. That is, they rushed for safety into the
intervals between the cohorts {in signa'), and also even into the smaller
intervals between the maniples {in nianipulos) . Here signa seems to
refer to the cohorts.
3. THE MUSIC.
§ 14. The musical instruments used in the Roman army-
were the bugle {buccina, Fig. 5), the trumpet {tuba, Fig. 6),
the cavalry trumpet {lituus, Fig. 7), and the horn {cor?m).
This last was made of the horn of a buffalo, and provided
with a silver mouthpiece. The others were probably of
brass.
Fig. .5.
Fig. 6.
Fig. 7.
Caesar mentions as musicians onXy buccinatores and //^/^/- b.g. ii,2o»;
cines. The former seem to have used the cornu as well as J^\.^''''
^. ii> 35'
the buccina.
The Romans knew very well a fact familiar to modern
tactics, that, to carry a command amid the tumult of battle
or down a long line of march, the penetrating notes of a
brazen horn are much more effective than the sound of the
human voice. And accordingly the signals for the various
evolutions of march and battle were given by horn and
trumpet, first by the horn, at command of the general, then
taken up by the trumpets. The bugle seems to have sounded
the divisions of the day — reveille, noon, and night-fall.
i6 Caesar's army.
We know that there were more trumpets than horns.
Quite hkely each maniple had its trumpeter, and each cohort
its buccinator.
4. THE BAGGAGE TRAIN.
Q J gj § 15. The heavy baggage of the legion {impedimenta'^
E.G. v,i2. -was carried by pack-animals {Jumenta, jumetita sarcinarid)\
either horses or mules. Wagons or carts, while occasionally
used by the army, were generally found only with the sutlers
A. 75. {mercatores) who followed the legions. The personal bag-
gage {sarcinae) was carried by the soldiers (§§ 45-48).
R. pp. 16-19. § 16. Riistow has made elaborate calculations of the quan-
tity of baggage a legion must have had. We follow his
estimates in the main, making such adaptations as may be
warranted by deviation from his figures for the size of the
legion.
We may reckon the load of one pack-animal at 200 lbs.
The first thing would be the tents {tentoria, tabernacula).
These as described by Hyginus were on a square base, 10
feet on a side, with a wedge roof. Ten men could use such
Hy. 1. a tent. Hyginus estimates 8 men in a tent. Yet he allows
one to every 10 men, as one-fifth of each contubernium
should always be on guard duty; and hence of the 10
belonging to any one tent, only 8 would ever occupy it at
the same time. It seems safe to consider that the contiibcr-
nium, a group of soldiers messing together in a tent, was 10
in number also in Caesar's army. Then, each centurion had
one tent. So a maniple would need 14 tents for the centu-
rions and a strength of 120 men. Allowing two for the ser-
• vants, the entire number would be 16. That would make
48 for a cohort, and 480 for a legion. To this number
must be added those needed by the six tribunes and their
servants, or perhaps 12 more. If tents are allowed also for
subcenturions, perhaps we should estimate 60 or 30 more;,
I
THE ORGANIZATION. 1 7
according as two siibcenturions or one should be allowed to
one tent.
The tents were of leather {pelles) . The weight of one, b.g. hi,
including two upright poles, one ridge-pole, and a supply ^9'-
of pegs, must have been at least 40 lbs. One horse, then,
could carry five such tents. It seems more likely, however,
that we should estimate one pack-animal to each tent ; i.e.,
one to each centurion and one to each coniiibernium. In
this way would be carried provisions for a week, with hand-
mills (§ 47), blankets, etc.
For pitching camp there must have been needed a full
supply of stakes, tools, etc. As these were for general use,
they could not have been divided among the pack-animals
of the cohorts. So we may add one animal to each cohort
for this service. Thus the cohorts would have at least 49
beasts. To each beast should be allowed one servant {calo), b.g. 11, 242;
who could attend to a centurion or contubernmm, and on
the march would lead the animal conveying the baggage
under his charge.
The higher officers had, besides at least two riding-horses b.g. vii,
each, a still greater number of pack-animals. We shall not
be far astray if we assign to each tribune three pack-animals
and five servants. Thus the number of the pack-horses or
mules in the baggage train of a legion reaches at least 520.
If we consider the normal strength of one of Caesar's g. p. 213.
legions to have 4800 men, the maniple would have had 160.
This excess of 40 men over the estimate above would have
required four tents and other appurtenances, and four pack-
animals to carry them. That would add 120 animals and
the same number of servants to the baggage train, giving a
total of 640 beasts of burden. However, even if this is the
nearly correct number for a normal legion, we must remem-
ber that a legion very rarely had its normal force. Riistow's
estimate of 520 animals cannot be far out of the way as the
baggage train of one of Caesar's legions in the field.
i8
C^SAR S ARMY.
B.G. II, f
lo'.
5. THE AUXILIARY INFANTRY.
§ 17. The auxiliaries {auxiliares) were raised from sub-
ject or allied states by enlistment, by conscription, and by
treaty. Of course in no case were they Roman citizens.
Among the auxiUaries obtained by voluntary enlistment
were the light-armed troops {milites levis armaturae. Fig. 8),
a b C d e
Fig. 8.
a. Slinger. — b. Light-armed soldier. — c. Legionary on the march. —
d. Legionary ready for battle. — e. Light-armed soldier.
used for skirmishing or rapid movements for which the heavily
loaded legionaries were hardly adapted (§ 46). Then there
were the slingers {funditores, Fig. 8), casters of stones and
leaden balls, those from the Balearic Islands being especially
skilful ; and the archers {sagitfarii^ , often from Crete or
Numidia.
Of the organization of the auxiliaries conscripted or sup-
plied by the allies, little is known definitely. We may infer
that it would depend much upon the nation ; but in case of
long service the Roman general doubtless gave some atten-
THE ORGANIZATION.
19
tion to their improvement. They were for the most part
used to make a show of strength, thus impressing the enemy
with fear, or to aid in constructing fortifications, or similar b.g. 1,51;
work. Caesar never placed much dependence on them for ' '^'
actual battle. As they were usually posted on the wings of
the army, they were often called alarii.
The light-armed auxiliaries (Fig. 8) wore a short jerkin,
or jacket, of leather, without the corselet ; and they carried
a light, round shield {parma) instead of the heavy scutum.
The archers had neither corselet, helmet, nor shield, as
their bow and quiver would prevent their carrying them.
Their arms were protected by very thick sleeves.
6. THE CAVALRY.
§ 18. Originally in the Roman army a body of cavalry,
about 300 strong, of Roman citizens, was attached to each
Fig. 9.
ion. This custom had been discontinued by Caesar's
time, although afterwards it was revived under the empire.
Caesar's cavalry consisted entirely of auxiliary troops, raised
in like manner and from the same sources as the auxiliary
infantry ; and these were massed in a single body. During
the Gallic war the cavalry attached to the Roman army v,' 5.*
20 C^SAR S ARMY.
averaged about 4000 in number. When the legions were
in winter quarters, the cavalry contingents were scattered to
B.G. V, 463; theii- homes. There were, however, a few enhsted men in
26^; VII, ' this arm of the service who remained constantly under
55' • the standards. They were Gauls, Germans, and Spaniards.
(Fig. 9-)
The organization of the auxiliary cavalry contingents was
after the manner of their nation ; modified more or less,
doubtless, by Roman customs. Contingents of from 200 to
B.G. IV, ^QQ j^gj^ were commanded by praefecti eqi/itum. A larger
B.G. 1, 528. body was always under a Roman commander.
Of course the enlisted cavalry was organized entirely in
the Roman way. A tactical unit was the ala, or regiment, 300
to 400 strong, commanded by 2. praefectus equitum. The ala
B.a'vi, 8*. was divided into turmae, squadrons, of perhaps 33 men each,
A. 29. including the commander, the decurio. The turina was
G. p. 229. '^
divided into three decuriae of 1 1 men each.
7. THE ARTILLERY.
§ 19. For battles in the open field the Romans of Cae-
sar's day seldom used anything corresponding to modern
artillery. In defending and attacking fortified places, how-
ever, engines of various kinds were employed for hurling
R. pp. 16-19. missiles, and, in case of attacking, for battering down walls.
As such engines could not easily be improvised, and must
always be at hand in a campaign involving siege operations,
it seems quite likely that a siege train would usually be car-
ried with the army. That would involve a body of men
who should see to its transportation and who should under-
stand setting it up, using, and repairing it. Possibly a de-
tachment of the /^M" (§ 36) was entrusted with this work.
§ 20. Of the exact construction of the Jloman artillery
of this period we have no precise accounts. We can oi]]y
THE ORGANIZATION.
21
infer what it was from the names applied, from its use, and
from what we jinow of Greek mihtary engines and of those
in general use at a later time.
§ 21. The missile weapon Caesar almost universally calls
tormentum. This word (from torquere, to twist) plainly
refers to the source of power, viz., the elasticity of torsion.
§ 22. There seems no reasonable doubt that the Greek
and Roman artillery of the same age had about the same
construction ; and, further, that there had been no material
change in that construction at Caesar's time for some two or
more centuries. Then we shall be quite near the truth if
we examine the Greek artillery of a somewhat earUer day
than Caesar's.
M. 5x8.
M. 533.
Fig. 10. Catapult,
§ 23. The heavy missile weapons were of two kinds : r.k. pp. 378
lose for hurling their missile in a direction horizontal, or ^^^^'
learly so, and those that threw a heavy mass at a consider-
able angle. The former shot large arrows, and were called
Ltapults {catapultae). The latter kind usually cast heavy
Itones, but were sometimes provided with blocks of wood.
They were called ballistae.
22
CiESAR S ARMY.
§ 24. Catapult and ballista alike had three essential parts :
the standard, a track for the missile, and the arrangement
that provided motive force.
The standard (/, Figs. 10, 11) was made strong and heavy,
so that the machine might rest firmly on the ground and be
unshaken by use.
The track for the missile {ab, Figs. 10, 11) was a stout
framework in which fitted
a slide (r^) which slipped
smoothly up or down the
track. The missile was
placed in a groove on the
upper side of the slide.
By a system of levers the
track of the catapult could
be aimed to direct the
missile at a greater or less
vertical angle. By a simi- >
lar arrangement a varia-
tion in the horizontal aim
could be made.
The apparatus for pro-
viding force consisted in
the first place of a framework of three compartments, formed
by two horizontal bars or sets of bars {k, i) and four up-
rights. Through the middle compartment extended the
missile track {cd^. The other two compartments were
fitted alike. A block {h, g) bored with a vertical hole was
placed over a similar hole in the upper part (/) of the frame-
work. Strands of hair were passed from below, through
the holes in the frame and block, over an iron cross-
pin, and back down through the holes again. The other
end of these strands was passed in like manner around a
corresponding cross-pin on the under side of the framework.
The strands were then stretched to their utmost tension
"e^
Fig. 11. Sallista.
f
THE ORGANIZATION. 23
(the cross-pins meanwhile being twisted in opposite direc-
tions) and the blocks on upper and under side screwed fast.
There was thus formed a strongly twisted rope or cluster of
ropes. A rigid bar of wood or metal was then inserted
through each cluster. These bars rested in beds cut in the
two outer uprights. The inner end of each bar rested
against the front of the corresponding inner upright. The
outer ends of the bars were then connected to each other
by a strong cord (a bowstring) .
It will at once be seen that when the bowstring is drawn
back, the bars are drawn from the beds ; and that when the
bowstring is let go, the torsion of the ropes at once throws
the bars violently back against the beds again, thus tautening
the bowstring and propelling the missile along the track.
In using the tormentum the slide was pushed forward
until its hinder end was at the bowstring. This was then
slipped under a trigger-Kke arrangement near the end of the
slide, where it was held fast. Through a ring in the rear of
the slide was tied a rope, which then passed around a wind-
lass. By means of this windlass the slide was drawn back,
pulling the bowstring with it. The missile was then laid in
the groove of the slide, and, the trigger being raised, the
bowstring was released, and drove the missile towards its
destination.
'§25. The weight of a heavy catapult has been estimated, r.k. pp. 38$
according to size, at from 84 lbs. to 600 lbs.
At least two men would be required to manage the small-
est. Of course each increase in the size of the weapon
would demand more men.
From a statement of Philo, we can estimate the cost of a Phiio, p. 62.
rather small catapult of his day, allowing for change in the
purchasing power of money, at about $200.
The distance to which a missile could be cast was not
more than 1200 ft.
24
CiESAR S ARMY.
A. 31- ^- The Scorpio (Fig. 12) was a small catapult capable of
being managed by one man. It consisted of a firm fi-ame-
work, on which was fastened a bow of steel. This was bent
by a windlass, and shot its arrow (18 in. long) to a distance
of some 300 to 400 ft.
Fig. 13. Scorpio.
§ 26. The weight of the ballkta was considerably greater
than that of the catapult. At least six men would be
required to manage the smallest.
The cost of course would depend on size. A ballista
throwing a weight of 10 minae (9 lbs.) perhaps cost ^1600
in Philo's time.
The range of the ballista was about the same as that of
the catapult.
§ 27. The weight of the ancient artillery was considerably
greater in proportion than that of modern times. A mortar
throwing a bomb of 120-130 lbs. weighs about 40 lbs. A
ballista which threw a stone of 135 lbs. weighed about 200
lbs. ; /.<f., five times as much as the mortar.
This circumstance would of itself account for the fact that
the Greeks and Romans made much less use of field artillery
than do modern armies. Then, too, the clumsy construction
of catapult and ballista macJe them much more difficult to
transport than a modern field oattery.
THE ORGANIZATION. • 2$
Another objection to their employment in the field was
the long time required to make them ready.
§ 28. The main use of artillery, then, was to defend a for- Sch. 5.
tified town or camp. In almost every fortified town of the
Greeks or Romans, they were kept in considerable numbers ;
and when needed for siege operations were obtained from
such towns. The walls of a camp were often defended by
what we might call light artillery, catapults of small caliber b.g. ii, 8.
and scorpions.
In attacking fortifications the ballista was used to break
down the battlements, the catapult to sweep the wall of
defenders and thus protect the column of assault or the
workmen busied with the agger or the battering-rams.
t Ships of war were often provided with artillery, some- b.g.iii.ia
mes placed on towers. These were used, not merely against
a hostile fl.eet, but often against an enemy on the land.
There seems no doubt that artillery was conveyed with ^•^•^^^^''
'aesar's army in the field. Riistow's statement to the con- a. 31,77;
Al. o.
trary is certainly erroneous. Quite likely a certain amount R.p.26.
was assigned to each legion ; though of this we have no cer-
tain evidence. Whenever the army took a position of defence, ^•^- ^^^^'
the artillery, posted behind the legionaries, played a promi-
nent part.* The walls of the camp were often lined with vii,4i,'8r.
catdpultae and ballistae.
In the time of Vegetius (probably at the close of the fourth century c. 51, 5S.
A.D.) each legion was provided with 55 carroballistae and 10 onagri.
The carroballista was a small catapult, and the onager a light ballista.
The onager (wild ass) was so called from the story that that animal in
fleeing from its enemies cast stones against them with its hind heels.
In the Austrian army, to-day, 1 1 2 pieces of artillery are attached to an
army corps of about 50,0(X) men. Other nations employ about the
same ratio.
i* From this same passage (B. G. VIII, 14) we must infer that Caesar
)k artillery from the camp and used it in the field.
26 CiESAR's ARMY.
a THE STAFF AND STAFF TROOPS.
§ 29. The general staff of an army consisted of the
commanding general, the legates, the quaestors, the as-
sistants, the guards, and the engineers {fabri).
§ 30. The legates {legafi) were men of senatorial rank,
who were assigned to the proconsul in greater or less
numbers by the senate. In military service they were the i
• lieutenants of the commanding general, and were by him '
often placed at the head of detachments of one or more
legions, with varying powers. But all their powers were
derived from the general. Caesar made a great improve-
ment in organization by placing a legate regularly in com-
B.G. 1, 52. mand of each legion. Such legate was afterwards known,.
M. p. 457- under the empire, as legates legionis, by way of distinction
from a legate with greater powers.
§ 31. The quaestor, assigned by lot to superintend the
finances of a province, also had charge of the supplies of
the army. In the execution of this duty he saw to the food,
pay, clothing, arms, equipments, and shelter of the troops.
To do all this, he must have had under him a numerous
body of men. He filled the place both of adjutant-general
and of quartermaster-general in a modern army.
§ 32. There always followed the general a number of
young men as his attendants {contubernales, cotnites prae-
torii), who were volunteers, and who aimed to learn the art
of war. They composed the nobler part of the cohors
praetoria, or attendants of the general.
Many of them could be used as aids in the administra-
tive department of the army, or on the field of battle. When
they were very numerous, they were formed into detach-
ments, or sometimes joined the body-guard, and could thus
directly take part in battle.
THE ORGANIZATION. 2/
§ 33. The inferior part of the cohors praetoria was com-
posed of apparitores, lictors, scribes, and servants. There
were also included the speculatores, or spies.
The specula fores were men selected for obtaining news m. p. 547.
and carrying despatches. They preceded a marching column, " ' ' "*
and also accompanied the flanks, at a considerable distance,
so that no surprise or ambuscade might be met. There
were usually ten to each legion. Of course the commanding
general had an indefinite number at his disposal.
§ 34. B/ the body-guard we must understand, not choice
legions, especially honored by the commander, as was the
Tenth by Caesar, but troops which constandy stood in a
near relation to ^he general. In Caesar's army these were, b.g. vii,
in the first place, mercenary troops, possibly small bodies '^*
of German cavalry, which he used as a personal escort;
and, in the second place, the evocati.
^Ȥ 35. The evocati were those who had completed their
term of service and still remained with the army ; or even c. iii, 91.
having returned to their homes, had resumed their place in
the ranks at the solicitation of their old commander. Such
men, centurions and privates, must have been of priceless
value to a general who aimed at sovereignty, as did Caesar.
They must have exerted much more influence on the mass
of the army than could higher officers. They were on the
same plane in every way as the common men, and so would
more easily lead them to their own way of thinking.
The ezwcati in Caesar's army were formed into a regular
organization, divided into centuries. They enjoyed special
privileges. Although footmen, they had not only pack-
animals, but riding-horses as well, and used them on the
march. They could thus also be employed by the general
as orderlies, to carry commands, or as scouts. In battle the 65.
evocati were formed near the general, for the protection of
28 CiESAR'S ARMY.
his person. In their ranks were those of the voluntarii who
were not otherwise employed, and who could have no better
school in which to learn the art of war. These veterans,
composing the flower of the whole army, were ready to
give examples of courage to all.
§ 36. The engineers {Jabri), at whose head '•ms the
praefectus fabrum, or chief of engineers, must have belonged
to the staff. They were employed in building bridges,
constructing winter quarters, and very likely ir. repairing
weapons. We must notice that the main Ror lan weapon,
the pilum, was useless after it was hurled ; but when the
victory was gained, the pita could be collected from the
field, and no great skill or apparatus was needed to make
them effective again.
G.v, II. It must be noted that /^(^r/ were often called from the
ranks of the legions. Very likely men expert for the duty
immediately at hand were thus detailed, and, when the
duty was completed, returned to their places in the ranks.
Sch. 9. Schambach thinks that the artillery was managed by details
from the infantry, as was done in the main in modern armies
so late even as the middle of the eighteenth century. In
that case it is clear that the men detailed must have been
of sufficient intelligence and mechanical skill not merely to
use the tormenta, but also to see to their repair.
§ 37. There is some doubt as to the composition of the
antesignani. Goler thinks that the term applies merely to
the four cohorts that formed the first Hne.
It is Riistow's opinion that they were a detachment
separate from the cohorts. Each maniple possibly had
one contuberntum, or ten men, of antesignani, chosen for
their experience and efficiency. When needed they could
move out from their cohorts in front of the legion, and act
as light troops, or skirmishers. They would be more valu-
il
THE ORGANIZATION.
29
able and steady for such service than the auxiUaries, and
could form a valuable support for cavalry. On the march
they were always without heav)^ baggage {expedifi) . This
service furnished abundant advantages for training sub-
alterns ; and Caesar himself regarded the body as a school c. i, 57.
for centurions.
II. THE LEGIONARY.
§ 38. The main strength of a Roman army was in the
legionary infantry. Of these, naturally, then, we have the
most satisfactory accounts. About the auxiliary troops, cav-
alry and infantry, we have already spoken (§§ 17, 18). Of
the legionary, we must now speak more in detail.
1. ENLISTMENT.
§ 39. In the earlier days of the republic the army was a
compulsory levy of all the able-bodied male citizens of suita-
ble age. None but Roman citizens were admitted to the
legion. All Roman citizens must serve. At the close of the
campaign the troops were disbanded, and returned to their
homes and their usual avocations. Thus the army was a
body of citizen soldiers, or militia.
But with the great increase in the number of citizens,
especially after the social war, only a part were needed for
military duty ; and at the same time a plenty were found
who were willing to enter the service, led by hope of gain
and glory. So the armies became less and less a levy of
citizen soldiery, and more and more a body of mercenary
volunteers. From this fact certain results speedily appeared.
As the Roman army grew to be a disciplined organization of
professional soldiers, it became all the more effective ; and
the men were the more readily attached to their chosen
leader. Meanwhile the peaceful citizens who remained at
home, to a great degree lost that military spirit and knowl-
edge which had always before characterized the Roman
people. Thus the way was paved rapidly and surely for the
coming of a military despotism.
I
THE LEGIONARY. 31
§ 40. The enlistment of barbarians in the legions of
Caesar, however, was altogether exceptional. We do read
of one legion, the Alauda, which was wholly composed of
barbarians. Yet it is undoubtedly substantially true that
Caesar's legionaries were enrolled from Roman citizens, and
spoke the Latin tongue.
§ 41 . The second condition of enlistment in the legions
was that of age. This we know in the early centuries of
Rome was from 17 to 46. In all probability these were the
limits in the time of Caesar. In the army of the United
States, in the time of war, the age of the recruit must be
between i8 and 45.
§ 42. In the third place, those only would be enlisted
who had sound bodily health, and were of suitable size.
What the limit of height was in the Roman army we do not
know. In our infantry no one is received whose height is
less than 5 ft. 4 in., or more than 5 ft. 10 in. From the fact
that the legionary fought with sword and spear, instead of
with the breech-loading rifle of modern wars, we may infer
that he must have been more muscular and agile than is now
necessary ; but we cannot infer that he was of unusual size.
On the contrary, there is little doubt that the soldiers who
conquered the world for Caesar were as a rule rather under-
sized. The historians always emphasized the bigness of the t.g. i, 4-
Germans; and Caesar expressly mentions the small stature fj^ ^'q' ^^'
of his troops. ^ The Romans had learned the lesson of civil-
ization, that victories in war are gained, not by huge bones and
big bodies, but by the trained skill of scientific organization
and tactics. Any one of the German giants might perhaps
have been more than a match for any individual of his puny
Italian enemies ; but the barbarian mob of Ariovistus was
shattered when hurled against the spears of the legions.
32 CiESAR'S ARMY.
2. CLOTHING.
§ 43. All the soldiers of the legion were clothed, armed,
and equipped alike (Legionary p. 30, and Fig. 8). Next the
skin was worn a sleeveless woollen shirt {iiinica). Over
this was a leathern coat strengthened by bands of metal
across the breast and back and over the shoulders {loricd).
The troops in Trajan's column are represented with tight-
fitting trowsers {braccae) extending below the knee. It
seems likely, however, that these did not come into use
among the Romans until after Caesar's time. Strips of cloth
were quite probably worn wound around the thighs {femi-
nalia) and around the shins {cruralia). The feet were pro-
tected by sandals {caicet), or by strong shoes not unlike
those worn at the present time. Then, in cold or wet
weather, the person was covered by the military cloak
(^sagu7n), a sort of woollen blanket. , Of course this was
laid aside in battle.
3. ARMOR.
§ 44. The defensive armor consisted of helmet, greaves,
and shield.
a. The helmet of the legionary (The Legionary, p. 30)
was either of iron {cassis) , or of leather or cork strengthened
with brass {galea) . That of the officer was distinguished by
a plume of red or black feathers {crista) .
b. The greaves {ocreae) were of bronze. They were used
to protect the leg below the knee, and were held in place
sometimes by straps, sometimes by their o\\m stiffness. Usu-
ally but one was worn, on the rigWt leg, as this was the one
advanced in the fight. "^
c. The shield {scutiwi, Fig. 13) was of wood, covered
with leather or with iron plates. In the centre was a boss
THE LEGIONARY.
33
{umbo), which was merely a knob designed to strengthen and
bind all together. The shield was about
4 ft. long and 2 ft. wide. Often it was
curved so as partially to encircle the body.
On the outside was painted the badge of
the cohort — a wreath or a winged thunder-
bolt, for instance. On the inside was the
name of the soldier, with the number of
the cohort and century, or maniple ; per-
haps also the number of the legion. For
protection from dust, rain, and the like,
during the march the shield was kept in a
leathern case.
Fig. 13.
ARMS.
i% 45. The offensive weapons were the sword and spear.
a. The sword {gladius Hispanicus, Fig. 14) had a blade
4^ about 2 ft. long, and several inches wide. It was
^^ two-edged and pointed, being thus adapted either
for cutting or thrusting. The latter, however, was
its customary use. What fearful wounds could be
inflicted with this weapon we may see from Livy,
30, 34.
It hung seldom from a body belt, generally from
a shoulder belt {balteus) . This passed over the
left shoulder. Thus the sword was on the right
side, this being more convenient, since the shield
Fig. 14. was carried in the left hand. As the higher offi-
cers had no shields, they wore their swords on the left side,
and a dagger {pugio) at the right.
b. The spear {pilum, Fig. 15) was the characteristic
weapon of the legionary. We have no exact account of
it as it was in the time of Caesar. From the way in which
he mentions its use, however, we may infer that it did not
34
C^SAR S ARMY.
materially differ from the pilum of days not very remot(
from his, and of which we can form some tolerably
definite idea.
p. VI, 23.
E.G.
The pilum of the time of Polybius had usually a
square wooden shaft, 4^ ft. long and 2] in. thick. On
one side was a groove extending half the length
of the shaft, to receive the iron. This latter was also
4t ft. long. One half, square in shape, was fitted into
the groove, and held in place by two iron nails. The
other half, of pyramidal form, projected from the wood
and was sharpened at the end. At the base of the
shaft there was undoubtedly an iron shoe, so that in
camp or bivouac the pilum might be thrust into the
ground. The length of the entire weapon appears
then to have been 6| ft., and the weight can hardly
have been less than 1 1 pounds. RUstow considers
this (Fig. 15) to have been essentially the pilum of
Ctesar.
The researches of Dr. Lindenschmidt leave little
doubt as to the pilum used during the empire (Fig 16).
The iron was longer than the shaft, with a distinct
head, which produced the effect of barbs. The entire
weapon was probably somewhat lighter than that of
Polybius. It was much like a modern harpoon.
Polybius says that, besides the heavy javelin, the
soldier carried also another lighter one. Csesar makes
no mention of a second pilum, and all the circum-
stances of its use lead us to think that his legionary
Fig. 16. undoubtedly had but one. This, says RUstow, was
probably the heavy one. It seems quite as likely
that when the light spear (designed, of course, to be used
first, as it could be cast to a greater distance) was discarded,
the heavy one was somewhat reduced in weight, so as to
increase its range. This reduction could not have been so
great, however, as materially to impair its efficiency.
In the time of Marius, the upper of the two nails which held
the iron in place was of wood. When the missile struck, this pin wouldl
be apt to break, and the momentum of the shaft would cause the iroi
to bend, thus making it useless to the enemy. Caesar makes no men-
tion of the wooden pin, but he often speaks of the bending of the iroai
rig.i&..
THE LEGIONARY. 35
We can hardly infer, as does Rustovv, that the wooden pin was not
Used in the pila of Caesar. On the contrary, so many other contri-
\ ances of the sagacious Marius were retained, and so few years had
elapsed from his day when the Gallic wars began, that it seems
altogether probable that the pilum of Caesar was quite the same as that
of Marius. At any rate, had Caesar contrived, or even authorized, any
material change in this most important weapon, we can hardly doubt
that a writer so scrupulous as he in assigning to the conqueror of Gaul
his full meed of praise would have been very careful to narrate this
instance also of his hero's ingenuity.
The bending of the iron clearly implies that it was comparatively
slender and soft. So we may conclude that it was hardened only at
the end. Now this bending, accomplished in the pilum of Marius by
the breaking of the wooden pin, would have resulted in that described
by Lindenschmidt, from the extreme slenderness of the iron as com-
pared with the shaft; and this slenderness would have been made pos-
sible by the head, which was of sufficient size and hardness not to be
affected itself by the impact.
The point of bending in the piliim of Marius was undoubtedly in
the part of the iron which lay in the wood; that of the \3Xex pilum was
as undoubtedly above the shaft.
The history of the pilum, as we get glimpses of it from time to time,
certainly shows a slow evolution. In the light of this fact, it seems
probable that in the time of Marius and Caesar it held an intermediate
position between the heavy and somewhat clumsy spear described by
Polybius and the more elegant javelin of the later empire. The shaft
was probably round. The iron was in all likelihood fitted in a groove,
and not in a socket. Where it entered the wood, the head of the shaft
was probably protected. The iron was slender, easily bent, hence
hardened only at the end and provided with a head. The weight need
not have been more than two or three pounds less than that estimated
by Riistow.
Lindenschmidt objects to this estimate (11 lbs.) that it was too
great for comfort in carrying, and for hurling to any distance. The
first objection is trivial, that being just about the weight of the modern
rnusket. And the trained muscles of the Roman veteran could have
found little difficulty in hurling an eleven-pound spear with force to a
distance of many feet.
I
36 Cesar's army.
5. BAGGAGE.
§ 46. Besides his arms and armor, the legionary was ac-
customed to carry various entrenching tools, such as saws,
spades, axes, and baskets ; articles for obtaining and cook-
ing food, as sickles, cords, and cooking vessels ; spare cloth-
ing and material for repairing any of the clothes or equip-
ments.
R. p. 14. § 4y, The ration of food for one day weighed probably
about if lbs. On short expeditions, the soldier must
carry his own provisions. As many as 17 days' rations,
amounting to 28 lbs., are known to have been provided
and carried. The ration was usually in the form of coarse
flour, or of unground grain which the soldier must crush for
himself.
§ 48. According as the food was for a longer or shorter
time, the weight carried, exclusive of arms or armor, must
have reached 30 to 45 lbs.
§ 49. For the convenient carriage of all this baggage,
Marius contrived what were known by his name as " Mar-
ius's mules" {fnuli Mariani). The baggage was packed in
bundles {sarcinae), and these fastened to the upper end of
a pole {/urea), which was forked at the top. On the march
the legionary carried this pole on his shoulder. When a
temporary halt was made without laying aside the baggage,
the lower end of the /urea was placed on the ground, and
the soldier could lean on it to rest. (Fig. 8.)
6. "WORK.
§ 50. The legionary was not allowed to rust from idle-
ness. When the day's march was done, he must lay aside
baggage and arms, and do his part in fortifying the camp.
THE LEGIONARY.
37
Some were detailed to the trench and wall, some to erect
the tents, some to prepare food for the various messes.
When a long time was spent in camp, even then each hour
brought its allotted task. There were the regular tours of
guard duty, the ordinary work of keeping the camp clean,
and of making ready the meals, and regular drills, including
gymnastic exercises, which kept each muscle at its best.
I
7. PAY.
51. Caesar fixed the pay of his legionaries at 225 M.p
denarii a year (about ;^45.oo). A day laborer in Rome at
that time earned three-fourths of a denarius a day ; or, in a
year of 300 working days, just as much as a legionary.
Thus the soldier was better off than the laborer by merely
one thing ; to wit, his shelter.
For food and equipments, so far as they were provided
by the state, a deduction from his pay was made. As pro-
vision, each man was allowed per month four measures (8.67
litres, or a little less than a peck) of wheat. The measure
may be estimated to be worth at the highest three-fourths of
a denarius. Thus the amount deducted for food cannot have
exceeded 36 denarii per year. However, in the provinces,
the food, if not given outright, was reckoned at a very low
price ; and the same must have been true of clothing and
equipments. Moreover, the soldier in active service always
expected an increase to his income from booty, and from
the gifts of his general.
§ 52. We have no certain account of the relation borne Dii
by the pay of the soldier to that of the officer. But we read, ^^^^ ""'^^^
on occasion of a present to the troops, that the centurion Piut. Caes.
received twice as much as the private, the tribune and the
cavalry prefect, four times as much. On another occasion, g. 8, 4.
we know that the centurion received ten times as much as
38 Caesar's army.
the private. The former seems hkely to have been the
ordinary relation of the pay ; especially as we must remem-
ber that the centurion stood in rank and duties about mid-
way between a sergeant and the captain of a company in a
modern army. In the army of the United States, the private
of infantry is paid $13.00 a month; the sergeant $17.00;
and a captain receives $1800 a year. All are provided with
food, clothing, and shelter. A day laborer in most of our
cities can earn about $1.50 a day; about the rate of the
private in the army, considering that the laborer has to pro-
vide for himself.
8. DISCIPLINE.
§ 53. During the civil wars, the stern disciphne of the
old Roman armies became much relaxed, and commanders
had to resort to all manner of means to hold their armies
Lange, pp. order. The transition from a citizen soldiery to a mercenary
26 seqq.
army, on the other hand, paved the way for a discipline
more unrelenting than ever.
But the best means of maintaining order then, as now, lay
y in constant employment. On the march, the daily fortifi-
^y cation of the camp left the soldier little time to think of
anything but his duty. On occasion of a longer pause than
usual, the camp was to be further fortified and arranged,
and guard duty must be performed constantly. The Roman
method of war made the personal activity of the man an
indispensable condition of success. Hence constant prac-
A. 71. 72- tice in the use of weapons was necessary; and this would I
quite fill out the time.
Then, too, zeal and courage were rewarded no more bjjj
mere crowns of leaves, but by more substantial gifts in goo(
coin. So we see that the Roman general was not confin(
for his discipline to mere brutaUty.
When generals endeavored to attach their soldiers to theij^
persons, they had to allow them far more license than mei
THE LEGIONARY. 39
discipline would warrant. Violence to the conquered, mis-
use of power towards them, robbery and plunder, were at
times allowed. What the Romans regarded as purely mili-
tary crimes, such as mutiny, desertion, cowardice, abuse of Suet. Caes.
authority in the army, were punished severely ; not infre- ^7. 69.
quently the penalty was death. c. iii, 74.
In a modern army, comparatively trivial offences, such as
drunkenness, for instance, are often punished by detention
in the guard-house, and sentence to some disagreeable labor,
as cleaning the camp, or the like. Expedients like this
must have been used in ancient armies as well.
,4f9t.
III. TACTICS OF THE LEGION.
§ 54. The tactics of a body of troops consists of their
arrangement for battle and their movements in the fight,
their order of march, their disposition in camp, and all evo-
lutions in passing from one of these forms to another. The
order of battle is chiefly important, because all the other
formations are made with reference to this : and to under-
stand the order of battle of any organized body of soldiers,
we must first of all study the arrangement of the tactical unit
of that body.
MILITARY TERMS.
§ 55* We must explain a few military terms in common use.
I. English.
A tactical unit is a body, of a number of which a larger body is com-
posed, and which, in relation to that larger body, is thought of as undi-
vided. The tactical unit of the legion was the cohort ; of the cohort,
the maniple, etc.
A body of troops is in line when the greatest extent of the body is
at right angles to the direction in which they are facing (Fig. 18); in
column, when the greatest extent of the body is in the direction in
which they are facing (Fig. 21).
Troops are said to deploy when they pass from column to line,
retaining the same facing. In Figure 20, the cohort is marching in
column. If they simply halt and face to the left, they are in line of
battle, as in Figure 18. This they have done without deploying.
Alignment is making a line of troops straight.
A soldier is said to face when, standing still, he merely turns on
his heel (to the right, or left, or entirely about).
Fascines are bundles of brush bound together. They are often
used for filling a ditch.
TACTICS OF THE LEGION.
41
Fig. 31.
Cohort (§74)
Fig. 23.
Cohort (§76).
Z
^
j
r
Fig. 18. Cohort (§62).
5^ ip ;s
Fig. 30. Cohort (§73).
I
2. Latin.
Aciem instruere, to form line of battle.
Aciem dirigere, to align the front.
Cohortes disponere, to deploy the cohorts.
Consistere, to halt.
Legiones explicare, to deploy the legions.
Torquere agmen ad dextram {sinistram),
to change the direction of the march (right or
left).
A. ORDER or BATTLE.
I. The Cohort.
§ 56. The tactical unit of the legion
of Caesar was
Xht cohort {^ 6).
The men of any
one cohort as
a rule remained
together, and all movements of the legion were made by
cohorts.
We may estimate the front of a cohort in line of battle at
20 ft.
§ 57* In all estimates of extent of the legion in battle, march, or
mp, we follow RUstow's figures, which are based on the average field
strength of the legion, 3600 men, not on its nominal, or full, strength.
In relating a fight at Ilerda, in Spain, Caesar states that his troops
re drawn up across the top of a ridge, along which the enemy were
dvancing. He then says that this ridge was just wide enough for
three cohorts in order of battle {tres instructae cohortes, C. I, 45). The
ridge is readily recognized to-day, and measures just about 360 feet
across. The circumstances of the fight were such as to leave no doubt
that the cohorts were drawn up without any intervals between them;
so that this measure gives us the actual front of the cohorts. Thus we
get the estimate of 120 ft. for the front of one cohort.
The three maniples of a cohort might have been arrayed side by
side, or one behind the other. RUstow holds to the former arrange-
ment, and Goler to the latter. The reasoning of RUstow (R. p. 36
42 CESAR S ARMY.
seqq.) seems conclusive, in the light of our present knowledge ; and we
have adopted the arrangement of the maniples side by side. In that
case the two platoons {centuriae^ ordines) of each maniple doubtless
stood one behind the other.
§ 58. Assuming the three maniples to have been arrayed
side by side, this would allow 40 ft. as the front of each
maniple. Allowing 4 ft. for the in-
b' B B H B ra E3 B B B H H ^ ter\^al between each two maniples, in
BHBEBBBEin which intervals the centurions were
BBHHB3ElHHBBEia
BBBBBBHBEBBH probably placed, and a correspond-
BBEHHBBBBBHB ing distance of 4 ft. for the centu-
BBBBBBBBBBBB^ ^^^ ^^ ^^ j.jgl^^ ^f ^^ maniple which
BBEBBBBBBBBB °
BBBBBBBBBBBB f^^med the right of the hne, there
BEBBBBBBHBBB wouM be Icft 36 ft. front in each
BBBBBBBBEBBD maniple for the privates. As each
Fig. 17. Maniple. ^^^^^^^ ^^^j^ x^Q^mxt at least 3 ft.
of space, the maniple would consist of 12 files (Fig. 17).
§ 59' In military language, 2, file is a number of men in a single
line, placed one behind another. A number of men in a single line,
placed side by side, is called a rank.
The interval of four feet between the maniples would be none too much
for the centurions. The officer woiild naturally need more room than
a private, as his attention must not only be given to the enemy, but also
to his own troops down the line to his left. So it seems likely that the
first centurion was at the right of the front rank of the first platoon
{ordo), and the second centurion at the right of the front rank of the
second platoon. Thus the latter officer could keep to their duty the
men behind the fighting line, and could see that vacancies ahead should
be promptly filled.
§ 60. The distance from breast to breast, in the_ file, was
probably at least 4 ft. Thus the file was 10 men deep
{i.e., there were 10 ranks), and the maniple would form a
square of 40 ft. on a side.
In the United States army, the breadth of a man is taken at 22 in.,
his depth at 12 in.; and there is a distance between ranks, in column
TACTICS OF THE LEGION. 43
of march, of 32 in. from back to breast, or of 44 in. from heel to heel.
In line of battle, the distance from back to breast is 22 in., from breast
to breast 34 in. (^Upton's U.S. Army Infantry Tactics, 65, 209).
§ 61. We have assumed that each man in the front rank
of the maniple occupied 3 ft. This would be sufficient
space to march without being crowded, and to throw the
pilu7n. It would not give room, however, for using the
sword. Vegetius says that each man needed 6 ft. for that
purpose. . The men in each rank were numbered, from right
to left; and at the command {''Laxa/e manipulos'') each b.g. 11, 25.
odd number stepped forward, thus gaining the desired
space.
§ 62. By our estimate, a cohort in line of battle would
form a rectangle, 120 ft. front by 40 ft. deep (Fig. 18).
TJie maniple would contain 120 men, and the cohort 360,
exclusive of officers.
2. The Legion.
§ 63. The order of battle may be offensive or defensive,
^hen arrayed for the first purpose, the legion formed either
ro lines i^acies duplex), or three lines {acies triplex).
I
^y § 64. In the actes duplex there were 5 cohorts in each
line.* When the legion was in 3 lines (Fig. 19) , 4 cohorts were
placed in the first {acies prima), and 3 in each of the others
{secufida and tertia acies). Between the cohorts in the
first line were intervals equal to about the front of the
cohort (120 ft.). Behind these intervals stood the cohorts
of the second line. The third line was still further in the
* C. I, 83. Caesaris triplex {acies /iiit) ; sed primam aciem quatemae
cohortes tenebant, has subsidiariae ternae et rursus aliae totidem suae cujusque
legionis subsequebantur ; sagittarii funditoresque media continebantur acie,
equitatus later a cingebai.
44
C^SAR S ARMY.
rear, and was used as a reserve for the support of the other
two. The most experienced and reHable soldiers of the
legion were in the four cohorts of the front line.
Fig. 24.
[7^ 0
^' i
§ 65. Both Roman and Gaul depended
greatly for success in battle on the shock of
the first charge. Hence the Romans put their
best men in front. This arrangement is
probably to be attributed to Marius.
Goler has an elaborate theory of the act es G. p.
duplex and triplex quite different from this. ^^5-
According to his view, a triple line of battle
contained three divisions — a right -wiilg
{cornu dextrum), a centre (acies media), and
a left wing {cornu sinistruni). A double line
merdy had no centre {acies media), thus
having two divisions. The centre of a triple
line was always termed media acies to dis-
^ ^ ^ ^
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Fig
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u
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-
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19.
Fig. 33.
Fig. 19. Legion in triple line of battle.
Fig. 23. Legion marching in lines (§ 82 a).
Fig. 24. Legion marching by wings (§ 82 b).
tinguish it from the middle line of the cohorts of a legion, secunda
acies. Each division had a legatus in command.
This theory is hardly borne out by the facts. One who reads B.C.
I, 49 with care will see that it would be very difficult to reconcile
Goler's view with Caesar's account. Further, in A. 13 we have a simplex
acies with both right and left wings specifically mentioned; and in B.G.
Ill, 24 a double line (^duplex acies) has a centre (niedia acies). From
these considerations it seems plain enough that Qesar used the terms right
wing, left wing, and centre quite as they are used of a modern army ;
* These diagrams of battle and march are after Riistow.
TACTICS OF THE LEGION. 45
applying them in an indefinite way to those parts of a line of battle, but
not necessarily implying distinct divisions under separate commanders.
§ 66. The distance between the lines was probably
equal to the front of a cohort (120 ft.). Thus the entire
depth of the legion in this order of battle was about 600 ft.
The front would extend 840 ft., or, if supported by another
legion, 960 ft., including the interval between the legions.
§ 67. For defensive battle the legion was arranged in one
of two ways : in one line {acies simplex)^ or in a circle
{orbis) .
§ 68. The former was most commonly used to defend
the walls of the camp (§ 153). Here a second line was
unnecessary ; and also considerable depth was needless. Five
ranks (the depth of a single ordo) would do; one or two,
according to the width of the wall, on the rampart, and the
rest in reserve at its foot. Allowing 6 ft. (instead of 3 ft.)
for each man in the front rank, and arraying the ordines side
by side, we see that a single cohort would cover 480 ft. of
the wall, or a legion 4800 ft., allowing no intervals between
le cohorts.
69. This arrangement in one line without intervals was a. 13.
50 used in the open field to meet an attempt at outflank-
ig by superior numbers, and also to resist incursions of cav-
Iry or light infantry through the intervals. In this case,
lowever, the cohorts would have their normal front and
lepth, merely closing the intervals and thus giving the
igion a front of 1 200 ft.
§ 70. The circle {orbis) was designed for use in the field
case of attack on all sides.
As the circumstances for which this arrangement was
itended must have been essentially the same then as now,
re may conclude that a cohort would form in a solid square,
smaller division in a solid circle, and a detachment of sev-
4^ Caesar's army.
eral cohorts in a hollow square. This latter might have
been made circular, to resist attack at the angles. A legion
could form the square by placing the first, second, and third
cohorts in front, the eighth, ninth, and tenth in the rear, the
fifth and sixth in the right, and the fourth and seventh on
the left. There would then be a front of 360 ft. and a
flank of 320. The inner hollow space would be 280 ft. long
and 240 ft. broad, thus making 67,200 sq. ft. This would
contain more than 1000 pack-animals.
C. 111,89. § 71' Under some circumstances we read also of a quad-
ruple line of battle. This was designed to meet a flank
attack. Some cohorts were taken from the rear line {tertia
acies) and placed in line on the right (or left) flank at right
angles with the main line of battle.
B. THE ORDER OF MARCH.
The order of march is developed from the battle array.
So we must begin with the cohort.
I. The Cohort.
§ 72. The line of march {agmen) of the cohort was one
of two, — colu77in of maniples and column of centuries.
§ 73. The column of maniples {manipulatim) was
formed from order of battle by merely facing to the right
(or left) . Thus the maniples, it will be seen, were in col-
umn (Fig. 20), and the centuries in each maniple were side
by side. If the cohort was faced to the right, the order was
pilani, principes, hastati. As the depth of the cohort in line
of battle was 40 ft., of course the column of maniples was
40 ft. wide. But this was a loose order. Allowing 3 ft. to
each man, the column could easily have been made only
TACTICS OF THE LEGION. 4/
30 ft. wide. And again, this wide column could have been
reduced to half the width by the right (or left) century-
moving straight on, and the other falling in its rear. Instead
of 12 ranks of 10 men, there would be 24 ranks of 5 men.
This would make really a column of centuries by the flank.
§ 74. The column of centuries proper {centuriatim, ordi-
natim) was formed from the order of battle merely by hav-
ing the maniple on the right (or left) wing of the cohort
march straight forward, and the others successively follow.
Thus the centuries would be arranged in column (Fig. 21) ;
and the order would be pilani, principes, hastati, or the re-
verse, according as the right or left wing moved off first.
The width of the column would be the same as the front of
a maniple, i.e.^ 40 ft., including the centurion on the flank.
§ 75. When a cohort marched directly forward, the col-
umn of centuries would naturally be adopted. In this order,
then, it is likely that Caesar marched across the Rhine. But
we know that he made his bridge 40 ft. wide. It does not
> seem at all likely that this distance was that between the
piles at the bottom of the river. As the water varied in
depth, it could hardly be measured exactly, and different
sets of piles quite hkely had different distances on the river
bottom. On the top, however, an exact distance could have
been measured, and must have been preserved. Thus in
Caesar's bridge is another support of our estimate of the front
(the maniple.
§ 76. If the march was on a regular road or street less
an 40 feet wide, the breadth of the column could easily be
reduced from 40 ft. to 20 ft. The right (or left) half of
each century would move straight on, and the other half
would fall in the rear (Fig. 22). Thus the century would
consist of 10 ranks of 6 men each, instead of 5 ranks of 12
k-A
48 Caesar's army.
§ 77. On the march, we should estimate 4 ft. from breast
to breast. Then a cohort of 360 men would reach to the
following length : —
In column of centuries 1 20 ft.
In column of centuries, with double number of ranks,
240 ft.
In column of maniples, 144 ft.
In column of maniples, with double number of ranks,
288 ft.
§ 78. The line of battle {acies) was formed from the
column of march {agf?ien) as follows : from column of
'^ '^^^r-. maniples by the commands halt ! front ! (facing to the left,
if the original march was to the right ; to the right, if the
original march was to the left) ; from column of centuries,
the leading maniple would halt, and the others successively
march alongside, aligning themselves on the right or left, as
the case might be.
§ 79. We may assume that the usual formation of the
column of centuries was with the right in front, i.e., in the
order pilani, principes, hastati. But we must observe that
to form line from this column requires a deploying to the left.
Should the enemy be near, this would expose to them the
unshielded right side {latus apertuni). So we may conjec-
ture that, for instance, in a sally from the gate of a camp
against a near enemy, the cohort would march with the left
in front and deploy towards the right.
2. The Legion.
§ 80. The legion, or a still greater number of cohorts,
marched in ' one of three orders, — in column {agmen pila-
tuni) ; in order of battle {acie ins true ta) ; in square {agmen
quadratum).
TACTICS OF THE LEGION. 49
§ 81. When the legion is in column, the cohorts march
according to their number. If the march is from the right,
the first cohort has the lead, then follows the second, and
so on. If the march is from the left, the tenth cohort leads,
followed by the ninth, etc. Each cohort is in column of
centuries.
Between each two cohorts there must have been a small
distance. Suppose this to have been 20 ft. Then the
length of the legion — the cohorts marching in column of
centuries of the usual width — would have been 1400 ft.
When the cohorts doubled their number of ranks, the length
of the legion was 2600 ft.
For the train of a legion, we estimate 520 pack-animals
as the normal strength. In a road 40 ft. wide, 8 animals
can easily find room abreast. Then the train would have
had 65 ranks. Allowing each rank 10 ft. depth, the train
would extend 650 ft. When the road is only 20 ft. wide,
the pack-animals would march 4 abreast, and would extend
1300 ft.
Then a legion with its baggage in column of march
would extend 2050 or 3900 ft.
§ 82. The march in order of battle is of two kinds, — by
lines and by wings.
a. If the legion marches by lines, there are as many
columns as there are lines in the formation. Thus in Cae-
sar's army there would usually be three columns (Fig. 23).
In the first column are cohorts 1-4; in the second, cohorts
5-7 ; and in the third, cohorts 8-10. Each cohort marches
in column of maniples. So by simply facing to the right or
left, the legion is again in order of battle.
b. A legion that marches to the front by wings forms
three columns (Fig. 24). In the first are the cohorts of
the right wing, 1,5, and 8. In the second are the cohorts
of the centre, 2, 6, and 9. In the third are the cohorts of
the left, 4, 3, 7, and 10. The columns must be as far apart
50 CiESAR S ARMY.
as the distance between their leading cohorts when in Hne
of battle. Each cohort is in column of centuries.
§ 83. The march in square (Fig. 25) was employed for
a similar purpose for which the orbis was
formed. One division of troops, in col-
umns of centuries, leads. Then follows
the baggage train, and then a second divis-
ion of troops in column of centuries.
On either wing marches a body in column
of maniples. Thus by a simple facing of
the wings to the right and left, and de
ploying of the van and rear, the square i
i^egion in Square, ready to meet the enemy.
§ 84. These are conservative estimates. To compare the Roman
army with one of modern days, we quote a very comprehensive calcu-
lation from the New York Evening Post. It must be remembered that
an American brigade of four regiments corresponded very nearly with
the Roman legion.
"A company of infantry moving in column of fours, the usual march-
ing formation, takes up about 33 yards of depth. A regiment of ten
companies will require 330 yards, a company of cavalry about 100
yards, and a battalion of four companies about 450 yards. A six-gun
battery of field artillery in column of sections, and accompanied with
the usual baggage, requires about 225 yards. From these figures we
calculate the length of a column moving on a single road. An infantry
brigade of four regiments will take up, exclusive of baggage, 1350
yards. The baggage, including ammunition, will require nine six-
mule wagons to each regiment. Each wagon with its team requires
20 yards depth, and for the entire brigade the depth will be over
700 yards. Add this to 1350 yards, and we have nearly 2100 yards,
or a mile and a quarter for the depth of the column. If we allow but
three regiments to the brigade, we can reduce the depth to about i,6cx>^
yards. For the baggage belonging to different headquarters we must :
allow a depth of 200 yards.
" Now, coming to a division of infantry, we have but to multiply the ■
foregoing total by the number of brigades in the division. But when >
we take up an army corps, we have to make calculations for artillery
and cavalry, extra baggage and supply trains. Suppose we take as a:
n
TACTICS OF THE LEGION. 5 1
maximum figure an army corps composed all told of 42,000 men. It
has four divisions of infantry, eight to twelve batteries, and at least four
regiments of cavalry. Were it able to march close up, on a single road
with all its trains, including reserve supplies, it would stretch out, at
the least calculation, about eighteen miles. But it is impossible for a
column of this length to keep from stretching, or " lengthening out,"
as it is technically termed, and so the best authorities make an allow-
ance of 25 per cent, which, added to the 18 miles, makes 22 i miles, or
a distance which would take a mounted messenger moving from tlie
head of the column to the rear, if he made good speed and met with
no obstruction, at least three hours to make, or moving from the rear to
the head, nearly half a day.
" Gen. McClellan, in one of his reports, says : * If I had marched
the entire army, 100,000 men, in one column, instead of on five different
roads, the column, with its trains, would have stretched out 50 miles.'
In the Franco-Prussian war it was found that a Prussian army corps of
42,512 men, 90 guns, 13,800 horses, and 1300 vehicles took up on a
single road 27 miles, 18 miles occupied by the troops and 9 miles by
the trains.
" If roads were all broad enough and in good condition, columns
could march with a far greater front, and the depth be vastly reduced.
But in this country, at least, there are few roads where there is room
for a column of greater width than a set of fours to move and leave
sufficient space for the unimpeded progress of orderlies and staff
officers, or for vehicles which have to go in an opposite direction. It
may be asked why the column cannot be kept closed up, why it has to
lengthen out? Sometimes a wagon breaks down. It is hauled to one
side for repairs and the others pass on. But to haul it to one side con-
sumes some time, mayhap only a few moments, and a few moments
again when repaired to re-enter the column. The consequence is a
halt of everything in the rear. Neither men nor horses can be marched
steadily without a halt and rest every hour, and a halt at the head of
the column, or in resuming the march, occasions loss of time to all
regiments in rear, which cannot start at once, bujt must do so succes-
vely.
" Again, perhaps, a bridge has to be crossed, and time is lost by the
reaking of step, or, perhaps, the change of formation. Perhaps a
stream has to be forded, or some obstacle is met in the road. It
must be remembered that, in addition to the actual distance accom-
plished in marching, many other things are required of the soldier.
He has to go on guard or picket, he is sent out perhaps as a flanker on
52
CiESAR S ARMY.
the march, or arriving at camp he has to collect fuel and water ; more-
over, he carries a heavy load, his kit, gun, ammunition, and day's
rations, averaging from fifty to sixty pounds. So that perhaps, were we
able to calculate all that he has done, we should find he has expended
as much strength as would take the ordinary pedestrian over 25 to 30
miles of road."
II IV. TACTICS OF THE CAVALRY.
P § 85. The small tactical unit of the Roman cavalry, or of
tnat formed on the Roman plan, was the turma, of 32 horses
in rank and file. This was probably arranged in 4 ranks
of 8 horses. Allowing 5 ft. front room to each horse, the
turma would have a front of 40 ft., equal to that of the
maniple. Taking 10 ft. depth for each rank, the depth of
the turma would also be 40 ft., again equal to that of the
maniple. The order of march could easily be formed from
this order of battle.
§ 86. A regiment {ala) of 400 horses consisted of 12
turmae. The battle array of the cavalry would very likely
resemble that of the infantry. It would then consist of
several lines, two or three, with intervals between the
turmae. A regiment of 12 turmae in 2 lines would have
^6 in each line ; and the front, including intervals, would be
440 ft. Of course, if it should be desired to overwhelm the
enemy with the momentum of the mass of horse, the inter-
s would be closed up.
K
87. If the number of cavalry should be considerable,. a
larger tactical unit would be desirable. Three turmae^
arrayed side by side, would amount to about 100 horses,
with a front of 120 ft., equal to that of a cohort. A regi-
ment i^ald) of 400 horses would contain 4 such divisions.
y § 88. In attacks in mass, doubtless columns were formed
of entire alae, perhaps 3 turmae front and 4 turmae (/>.,
16 ranks) deep. After the success was won, the turmae in
the rear could be brought up in the front {turmatim) to
pursue the scattered foe.
54 C^SAR S ARMY.
§ 89. Of course the tactics of the cavalry would depend
largely upon their arms, as well as upon their numbers. If
provided with missiles, they would doubtless be arrayed in
turmae only, and would never form columns for attack.
§ 90. Cavalry were sometimes strengthened by infantry
mingled with them. Caesar used with good effect his ante-
signani for that purpose.
§ 91. The usual order of march of the ala of 400 men
was probably in column of turmae. If there was room for a
column 40 ft. wide, the normal order of battle would be
kept by each turma. The ala, not including the train,
would extend 480 ft. The train must have been considera-
ble, and would have added at least a half to the length of
the line. A column of 10 alae, or 4000 men, which Caesar
sometimes had, would have extended 7200 ft.
§ 92. If the road allowed the column a breadth of only
20 ft., the turma would march with a front of 4 horses and
a depth of 8. The ala would then need 960 ft., without
baggage, and with it 1440 ft.^ A column of 10 alae would
require 14,400 ft.
\
V. TACTICS OF THE ARMY.
A. THE BATTLE.
§ 93. The core of the Roman army was the legion.
Hence we see that in describing the battle array of the
legion, we have very nearly explained the mode of battle
of the army as a whole.
I. Offensive.
§ 94. It is clear that the normal order with the Romans
was the offensive. Caesar usually employed the triple line
{acies triplex). The legions that composed the line of
battle stood side by side, each in three lines.
The third line was designed as a reserve for the other two.
The Roman method was to hurl the first line against the
enemy. Should this onset not suffice, or should the first
line become exhausted, then the second line in turn took up
the attack, while the first retired between the intervals and
rested. Thus the two lines alternately assailed the foe, until
the latter should break. Meanwhile the third line was in
reserve. Should the enemy attempt a flank movement, this
line was deployed to the left or right to meet it. If no such
movement was attempted, or if auxiliaries were at hand to
meet it, the third line was held in reserve until the crisis
of the battle. Then it was hurled at the enemy in a decisive
charge.
Often, also, the third line was busied in fortification, while b.g. i, 25,
the first and second covered the work. 89194. '
§ 95. In case a reserve seemed unnecessary, or a greater
extension of front was desirable, the legions were formed in
56 CiESAR's ARMY.
C.I, 83. two lines {acies duplex). On the other hand, circumstances
might demand a double reserve, and the legions were then
93,"4-'^' ^^ ^"^^^ ^^^^^ {acies quadruplex). In this case, the third
line was held to support the attack, and the fourth to guard
the flanks. For this last service, the fourth line was not
behind the third, but was deployed on one side or the other
of it — sometimes at right angles to the main line of battle.
The fourth line was usually weaker than the other two.
Sometimes one flank of the army was in three lines, and
the other in four.
§ 96. We must notice that the Romans placed great
dependence on their first charge. And it is significant, in
this connection, that the first line was the strongest of the
three, and contained the most experienced cohorts.
§ 97. The cavalry, in an offensive battle, was used for
guarding against a flank movement, for taking the enemy in
flank, and for hurling upon the enemy when routed, thus to
complete his destruction.
B.G. Ill, For these purposes, the cavalry was commonly placed
cis'ni °^ ^^ flanks of the legions. Sometimes it was placed
88,89,93. behind the fourth line. Thus the latter could receive an
attack of the enemy's cavalry — which being repulsed, the
Roman cavalry could issue between the intervals to attack
g Q J in turn. Often the cavalry was drawn up behind the
24, 25. legions. It was then placed behind the first cohorts, as
thus they could more easily pass through the intervals for a
charge.
c. 1, 83; A. § 98. The light troops, archers, and slingers were either
13, 60, 81. placed in the intervals of the cavalry, or thrown out in ad-
vance of the legions as skirmishers, or placed on the wings
to resist flanking movements. Of course they were of no
avail for making a charge.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 57
§ 99. The front of the Hne of battle was divided into b.g. i, 52:
three parts, the right and left wings {cornu dextrum, sinis- ^^'ll{ ^ .
trum), and the centre {actes media). These were often a. 60,81.
placed under legati detailed for the purpose.
§ 100. The most experienced legions were usually placed c. in, 89;
on the wings ; on the wing which was to begin the attack, ^' ^' ^''
the best of all. This, again, was in accordance with the
Roman custom of trusting much to the impetus of the first
onset.
§ loi. When the line of battle was formed (aa'e in- b.g. 11,20
structa)y the general passed from legion to legion, addressing ^' ^^^' ^°'
each with a brief speech of encouragement {cohortatio) ,
He then proceeded to his own post (usually the wing that
was to begin the attack). When the right moment arrived,
he ordered his trumpeter to give the signal for the onset
{signutn). This signal was taken up by the trumpets of the c. 111,92;
other legions, and passed down the line. So the attack was ^' ^^'
made by the legions successively. The cavalry was held in
reserve on the flanks, ready to receive flank attacks, and in
turn to assail the enemy in the flank.
The general oversaw the battle, supplied reserves, and e.g. vii,
was present himself, or sent one of his staff", at every critical '''^'
point. If victory was won, the cavalr}^ was hurled on the
broken enemy to complete the rout ; or infantry was ad-
vanced to overcome renewed resistance. If the Romans
were beaten, the general, with a cloud of cavalry and light
troops, covered the retreat to the fortified camp.
2. Defensive.
§ 102. The fundamental ideas of the Roman defensive
were, to .nake use of ground that would cause as much
weariness to the enemy as possible, to delay their approach,
58 Cesar's army.
to weaken them meanwhile by missiles, and then, at the
right moment, to assail them at their weakest point.
§ 103. Modern armies are much better provided for
defensive battle than were the Romans. Our troops are
armed with missile weapons which are not useless as soon
as used and which are still effective for hand to hand work.
The vast improvement in the modem arms of precision is
daily making this truth more emphatic. An excellent illus-
tration of a collision between the modern power of resistance
and the ancient power of attack is afforded by the battles at
Teb and vicinity between the British troops under General
Graham and the Arabs of Osman Digma, in 1884. The
Arabs, armed with spear and shield, and inspired with fran-
tic courage, rushed in crowds upon the British squares. But
the incessant volleys of the repeating rifles poured a cease-
less deluge of balls upon them, and not many of the blacks
lived to reach the bayonets. At a few points, where the
line was for a moment broken, the lithe Arab with his spear
proved a deadly foe ; but rifle and revolver restored the
day.
§ 104. The only missile weapons of the ancients that
had any great range, capable of being used in the field, were
bow and sling. But the Romans never had many archers
and slingers. These were of no use for hand to hand fight,
and the legions were of no use for anything else.
§ 105. Hence great care was exercised in the choice of
ground. Whenever it could be done, the army was drawn
up where approach was possible only on one side ; and this
side difficult on account of a swamp, a watercourse, or some
similar natural barrier. If necessary, and time wi.s afforded
for the work, approach was further hindered by ditches,
chevaux-de-frize, pitfalls, or something of the sort.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY.
59
3. Manner of Attack.
§ 106. The :^oman infantry sought always to gain the b.g. 1,22,
advantage of a higher place {superioris loci). Their favor- 24,25; 11,8;
ite position was on the side of a gently sloping hill, so that vi.'46; v'li',
the enemy were below them. The enemy had then a dis- g"* ^' [j}^'
advantageous place {locus iniqims) . If at the foot of this 46.
hill there was a plain, and the enemy were at a greater dis- b.g. ii, 23,
tance than the cast of a javelin (10 to 20 paces ; i.e., 25 to ^7. 33: v,
50 ft.), then to the enemy was left the initiative. If, how- c.i, 45.
ever, their adversaries were at the foot of the hill or had set
out to climb it, then the Romans rushed against them.
§ 107. If the distance was considerable, say 250 paces c. 1,87.
to an enemy just setting out to the attack, or 1 20 paces to ^'^' ^"^'^
an enemy evidently intending to await the onset, then the
cohorts at first moved forward at a walk, probably at an equal B.o.viii.g.
pace {certo gradu) . Having reached the proper distance,
they set out at a run {cursus), sword in sheath, the first cm, 92.
ranks with spears raised in the right hand ready to hurl
{puis infestis). At a distance of 10 to 20 paces, the first cm, 93.
ranks hurled the spears. This volley at short range threw the b.g. i, 25;
enemy into confusion, inflicting numerous fearful wounds. ^^'^^''^*^^
The dead and wounded fell, and thus gaps appeared in the
hostile array. Here and there a pilum remained sticking in
a shield, and thus embarrassed its bearer ; or in the thick
phalanx two shields were bound together, and so two of the
enemy were rendered useless for the fight, unless they let
their shields go and exposed their unprotected bodies to the
Roman weapons.
§ 108. As the spears could be thrown only from a short b.g. 1,52.
distance, it is clear that sometimes a rapidly advancing
enemy would get near too soon, — the right moment would
have passed, — and the Romans must then drop their jave-
lins and engage with the swords. But usually the volley of
heavy spears preceded the use of the sword.
6o Cesar's army.
B.G. II, 23; § 109. As soon as the first ranks have hurled the spears,
VII 88' C
III '46. ^^^y draw their swords and rush forward to take advantage
of the confusion and gaps in the enemy's line. The odd
numbers of the first rank spring forward to gain room ; the
even numbers and the entire second rank follow as a
support.
Along the front of the cohort exists now a series of single
combats. The third, fourth, and fifth ranks press close up
to aid their comrades and to take the places of any who
fall, and meanwhile throw their spears over the heads of the
combatants among the throng of the enemy behind. The
remaining five ranks of the cohort stand fast, as a reserve.
§110. The various acts of the attack are sharply distin-
BQ VI, 45; guished in mihtary parlance. Advancing to attack was
c. II, 93. called signa iiifen-e. Then followed the run {concursus)^
then the volley of spears {etnissio pilorum) . If the enemy
B.G. 1, 25, still held out, there remained the last resort, the onset with
52: VI, 8. ^j^g swords {inipetus gladioruni) .
§111. It will be seen that each cohort, if only two ranks
hurled the spears at once, could attack five times. At
R. pp. 49, 5©; Ilerda, each of these attacks consumed at least 20 minutes.
§ 112. Another advantage sought by the Romans must
be noticed. We must remember that their favorite vantage-
ground was a hillside, down which they could rush against
their enemy. Under such circumstances more than two
ranks could hurl the pila, and also these weapons would fall
with more force.
§ 113. Of course if the volley of spears was cast too
soon, they fell harmless on the ground. It was often quite
likely, in the confusion of battle, that such a mistake would
be made. Moreover, the Romans were accustomed to throw
the weapons while on the run themselves, and against an
E.G. I, 25.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 6 1
advancing enemy. Should the latter receive the onset
standing, as did Pompey's men at Pharsalia, the volley might c. iii, 92.
easily be ineffective.
§ 114. Running to the attack gave an impetus that was
of great value. But if this run should be begun too soon,
there was danger that the men would reach the enemy out
of breath and tired, and also that the ranks would be more
or less spread apart.
§ 115. It was much in favor of this onset to be made on
a hillside down which there was a gentle slope. The
momentum thus gained would carry the men against the
enemy, whether they would or not. Also, the enemy were
more likely to become demoralized at sight of this mass
pouring down from above. Moreover, the same circum-
stance which made the attack heavier, would make it less
effective for the enemy to make a charge to meet it.
§ 116. The rush was usually made by a line at once ; or, e.g. i, 52;
the cohort on one wing would begin, and the rest of the ?'V^'^^'
line would immediately take it up. The second line fol-
lowed the first at the usual distance (about 200 ft.), and
halted as soon as the first became engaged.
§ 117. Should the legions thus attack a continuous line of
the enemy, it is clear that they would impinge on that line
only at certain places, and there was danger that the enemy
would pour into the intervals and attack the cohorts in flank,
especially on the right side, unprotected by the shields b.g. i, 25;
{latus apertum). This could be met by advancing the sec- ^^'^3= ^-^
ond line, thus losing the advantage of using this as a reserve :
or, the rear ranks of the first line could be deployed to
right and left into the inter\^als. We find in fact that the
second line was generally used as a reserve, through whose
intervals the exhausted first line could retire, and behind
which it could re-form.
i
62 Cesar's army.
§ ii8. How long one line would remain in the fight
before it was relieved we have no definite knowledge.
But we may easily conjecture that it could hardly have been
more than 15 minutes in general. Then the second line
would advance to the attack, the first would assemble behind
it, re-form, rest, and be ready in turn again to take up the
fight.
§ 119. Caesar usually fought in three lines rather than in
two. We may suppose that he brought the third line into
action only in case the blows inflicted by the other lines
successively proved insufficient to cause the enemy to break.
Thus the third line was a last reserve.
§ 120. We see that we must imagine the cohorts in battle
as in almost constant motion. The two lines are hurled
successively against the enemy, giving the latter no rest, and
wearing them out by the incessant blows of the cohorts.
§ 121. When the enemy were finally routed, the cavalry
was hurled on the fleeing mass to complete their destruc-
tion. Caesar never failed in this way to follow up a beaten
foe. Hence his victories, hke Napoleon's for the same
reason, seldom proved indecisive.
B. THE MARCH.
§ 122. Every long distance was divided into day's marches
{itinera). After each two or three days of marching, as a
rule, followed a day of rest.*
Each day's march (//<?;-) was from one camp to another ;
B.G. VII, so that " a distance of five camps " means a five days' march.
36.
§ 123. The Romans aimed to fight only near their own
camp. When they were compelled to break this rule, and
* If no such rest was taken, it was regarded as wholly exceptional.
See B.G. I, 41, Septimo die, cum iter non intermitteret, etc.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 63
fight on the march {ex itinere), they usually allowed only a b.g.iii,2i,
part of their men to engage, the rest being employed in ^X' '^- '^*
fortifying.
§ 124. Vegetius says that the recruits were practised to v. 1,9.
march in five summer hours, at the usual pace {militari
gradu), 40,000 steps (of 2\ ft.), and at quick step 48,000
steps. Five summer hours are equal to about 6-| of our
hours. Then in the first case there would be 100, and in
the second case 120, steps to the minute. Upton's Tactics,
the standard of the United States army, as now revised,
prescribes a step of 30 inches, from heel to heel, both in
common and quick time, and a cadence of 100 steps per
minute for common time and 120 steps for quick time, ex-
actly the Roman standard.
§ 125. The step {gradus) of 2^ (Roman) feet, was the dis-
tance from heel to heel, and was one-half a pace {passus) .
This latter was the full distance from the point at which the
heel leaves the ground to the point at which the same heel
next returns to the ground, and was reckoned at 5 (Roman)
feet. It must be remembered that the Roman feet probably
was about 0.9708 of an EngHsh foot.
§ 126. The Roman day's march ordinarily covered about r. p. 93.
7 hours, from sunrise (4 to 5 or 6 a.m.) until 11 or 12.
^Allowing time for rest, it seems hardly likely that they would
iverage more than 30,000 to 40,000 steps in that time.
'his would be 14.6 to 19.5 English miles.
§ 127. The average day's march for infantry in the United States
irmy is from 15 to 20 miles (§ 84). Rest is generally allowed at the U. 750.
ite of 10 minutes an hour. Taking these facts into account, we see
lat we cannot be far out of the way in our estimate of the Roman
irch; especially when we consider what an amount of work had to
performed in fortifying the camp.
Of course forced marches were often made, continuing sometimes
even all night.
64 Caesar's army.
§ 128. We must distinguish three forms of march, — the
march forward, to the rear, and to either flank.
I, The Advance.
§ 129. When the column is marching forward, we must
B g!\' ty. distinguish three parts of the army, — the van {p7imi/?n
B.G. II, 19. agmen), the main body {exercitus, onines copiae, ag77ien
B.G. 1, 15, kgionum), and the rear-guard {agmen novissimum, agmen
c.'i"3.1i. ^xtremum).
§ 130. The van may have one of three objects.
B.G. II, 19. {a) The first is to engage the rear of the enemy so as to
delay their march, and give time for the main body to
deploy and for the commander to form his plans. For this
purpose a body of cavalry was sent forward, sometimes with
the addition of light infantry.
B.G. 1, 15, {b) The second object is to reconnoitre the country'
{loci naturam perspicere, iter cognoscere) , and to bring news
of the enemy. To accomplish this, special detachments of
the cavalry were sent forward {explorato?-es) , who scoured
. the country far in front and on both flanks. To these
A. 12. detachments were often assigned trusty staff-officers, accom-
panied by spies {specuiatores) .
B.G. II, 17. {c) The third object was to select and make ready the
place for the camp. This duty was entrusted to a detail of
centurions from the legions, accompanied by a few men,
and usually under a tribune or some officer of the general
staff.
§ 131. At a fixed distance after the van marched the
main body, and close after it the rear-guard. This last,
during a march to the front, had only pohce duty to per-
form ; i.e., to pick up stragglers, and the like.
§ 132. The main body may march in one of three forms :
a. In column, each legion accompanied by its baggage ;
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 65
b. In column, all the baggage of the army together ; c. In
line of battle. We will consider these in their order.
§ 133. a. This form of march was only adopted in aB.G.ll, 17.
friendly country, or when there appeared no immediate
danger of an encounter with the enemy. The legions are
in single column, the cohorts in column of centuries with
single or double number of ranks, according to the width of
the road. Each legion is followed immediately by its bag-
gage, which thus divides it from the legion next following.
The last legion probably detached a few cohorts to follow
the baggage. This detachment would thus form the rear
guard of the whole army. A column of five legions in this
order, with a breadth of 40 ft., requires 10,250 ft., or 4100
steps {gradus) in length. A sixth legion would need 40
minutes to reach the head of this column so as to join in
battle. Of course if the march was with double number of
ranks, so much more t 'me would be taken.* It is clear that
if the enemy could niake a vigorous attack in force on the
head of the column, they would have a good chance to
throw it into confusion and entirely prevent it from properly
deploying.
The legions marching in this order, each followed by its
baggage, cannot be called ready for battle {expedttae) .
§ 134. d. When near the enemy, if it is not desirable to b.g. II, 19,
march in order of battle, the column is formed as in^, but ^^''^^°
the baggage of the whole army is assembled. The greater
part of the legions, usually three- fourths of the entire num-
ber, composes the head of the column. Then followed the
collected baggage. The remaining legions, usually one-
fourth of all, brought up the rear {daudunt agmen), as
guard for the baggage and rear-guard for the army. In this
* See ante, § 84.
66 Cesar's army.
B.G. II, 19; order the legions can much more rapidly be deployed, and
V, 2; VII,
40; C. I, 64.
^'^' ' may properly be called expeditae.
B.G.
I,
24;
VII,
18
A
69.
B.G.
11,
21
B.G.
II
21
A. 12.
Although the legions can readily be brought into action,
we cannot consider them as actually ready until the indi-
vidual soldiers have made their preparations. On the march,
the soldier had to carry his personal baggage {sarcinac).
Also, his heavy helmet was hanging at his breast, his shield
was in a leather case, his field badges {insigtiia), plumes,
and the like, carefully protected from the dust.
Then if a legion marching expedita is attacked in the
march {in agmine, sub sarcinis, in itinere), before being
able to meet the enemy the legionaries must first pile their
baggage {sarcinae in acervum compo?-ta?itur, sarcifiae co7i-
feruntur), draw the shields from their coverings {tegimenta
scutis detrahuutur), put on their field badges {insignia
accommodantur) , put on helmets {galeae itiduiintur, galean-
B.G.vii,i8. tur)y and get their weapons ready {arma expeaiuntur, kgia
armatiir) . Of course time was needed for all this, and time
must be won by the vanguard. An enterprising enemy,
knowing these facts, would seek to attack the Roman army
B.G. II, 17; on the march {sub sarcinis adoriri, impeditos in agmine
i^e'e^^A^ ^doriri)^ and meanwhile give as little time as possible for
making the proper preparations to resist.
§ 135. c. The advance in order of battle {acie ins true ta^
could occur only for short distances. We find it made on
two occasions for a distance of 16,000 steps, or about three
hours' time. This formation could only be employed when
in the immediate vicinity of the enemy, and when the
ground was suitable.
When marching in order of battle, the legions marched
in columns, as has been explained under the tactics of the
legion. And when in this order it is clear that the men
B.G. VIII, must all be ready for immediate battle {legiones armatae ef
2^* insMictae^). This alone would prevent a march to any
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 6/
great distance, as the baggage {sarcinae) must all be left
in camp.
2. The Retreat.
§ 136. A retreat in presence of the enemy is less con-
venient than an advance. It was usually in one of two forms :
a. The retreat in column, with baggage massed ; b. The re-
treat in square {agmine quadrato).
§ 137. a. For the retreat in column, the baggage wasc.ni, 75,
sent out of camp as soon as possible, under escort of a de- '''''
tachment of infantry, often of an entire legion. This body
would constitute the vanguard. With them marched a de-
tail of centurions and men whose business was to stake out
the new camp.
Then followed the main body, the cohorts in column of
centuries. Finally, at a suitable distance followed the rear
guard {agmen novissimuvi) .
It was the duty of these last to delay the enemy, thus
giving the army time to push on, or to deploy, if the attack
should be made in force. The rear-guard was composed of b.g. 1,24.
cavalry, with archers and slingers. When necessary, they
would be supported by troops from the legions. Sometimes
the antesignani, and again legionary cohorts ready for battle c, in, 75:
{expeditae) , or even entire legions, marched between the " ^^'
main body and the rear-guard. Often the legions did
this duty by turns {legiones invicem ad extremum agmen a. 70.
evocabat) .
§ 138. b. The retreat in square {agmen quadratunt) was b.g.vii,67.
chosen when surrounded by the enemy ; for instance, on a
march through a rebelHous country, and also when the
enemy had numerous cavalry. A single square could be
formed from all the legions, with the united baggage of the
army in the centre ; or, each legion could form a square by
itself, with its baggage within. This last would be the mode
68 Cesar's army.
when the army was originally marching in column with
divided baggage, and was compelled to make front suddenly
on all sides, without time for the baggage to assemble. But
one square of all the legions seems to have been customary.
The cavalry, supported by the archers and slingers and by
the antesignani, remained outside the square, and skir-
mished around it on all sides.
3. The March to the Flank.
§ 139. Flank marches were made only for a short dis-
tance, and always in order of battle. The legions marchec
CHI, 67; iri a column of lines, so that there would be two or three
B.G. 1, 49- parallel columns, according to the formation.
A. 67. § 140. The baggage train would either march on th(
side opposite the enemy, or between the legions, each being
followed by its own pack-animals. The latter mode might
be used when the army was divided from the enemy by
some considerable obstacle, like a river, or when the side
remote from the enemy was difficult to traverse ; for in-
stance, when the army was marching in the valley of a
stream, so that the water was on the flank towards the
B.G.^vn, enemy, and hills and woods on the other flank. In such
case as last mentioned, no guard of light troops would be
necessary between the army and the enemy. But in open
ground such a detachment would have to be made, and
would perform the same duties as the vanguard during an
advance, and the rear-guard during a retreat.
§ 141. To form line of battle from a column of march
by the flank was a simple matter, unless the baggage was
between the legions. It was done simply by facing right or-
left, as the case might be.
P. VI, 40. § 142. In every march of a large body of troops the
order of march was changed daily, and the legions daily
TACTICS OF THE ARMY.
69
PONSA C^tSARE IN RHENO FACTUS.
.^^J"-*?!
a a. tigna bina sesquipedalia. bb. trabes bipedales. cc. fibulae.
dd. directa materia, longuriis cralibusque constrata.
e e. sublicae ad inferiorem partem fluminis pro ariete oblique actae.
f f. sublicae supra pontem immissae.
g. castellum ad caput pontis positum.
Fig. 26.
70 CiESAR S ARMY.
took turns in leading, so that each in turn might come first
to the camp.
4. Crossing Streams.
§ 143. Rivers were crossed either by /<?r</^ or by (^r/^^j.
The Romans could cross deeper fords than we, as they had
no powder to keep dry. Caesar preferred fords whenever
practicable, as they required no previous preparation. Some-
B.G.vii,56. times an artificial ford was made. Often, when the current
was strong, a line of cavalry was stationed up stream from
the point of crossing, and another line down stream, and the
infantry crossed in this shelter. The upper line of cavalry
broke the force of the current, and the lower line saved any ;
men who were carried from their footing.
§ 144. When fords were not available, bridges had to be
built. These were of many kinds. The simplest were to
cross a mere ravine, and consisted of long tree trunks cov-
ered with branches and earth. The most elaborate of
which we know was the footway 40 ft. wide with which
Caesar twice spanned the Rhine. A river in Spain he
H. 5. bridged by sinking baskets filled with stones, as foundations
for his piers. Other streams were crossed by bridges of
boats. A bridge of any importance had to be protected by
strong fortifications at each end ; and, when it was desired
to retain it, these were held by suitable garrisons {pj-aesidid) .
E.G. IV, 17; Caesar's bridges on the Rhine (Fig. 26) were of this
' ^* description. They were masterpieces of military engineer-
ing, and were held securely while the army moved into
Germany.
C. THE CAMP.
§ 145. The Romans distinguished two kinds of camp :
the field, or summer camp {castra aestiva), made at the
close of each day's march, to be abandoned the next morn-
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. /I
ing; and the winter camp {castra hibenia), in which the
army spent the time between two cam.paigns.
§ 146. We have no exact account of the camp in the
time of Caesar. Our only complete information on this
subject, in fact, is of the time of the second Punic war,
given by Polybius, and in the time of Trajan, by Hyginus.
Rustow interprets by the following rule : Whatever is com- r.
mon to both may be set down at once as true of Caesar.
Where the authorities differ, Hyginus may be preferred, as
the organization of the army in the time of Polybius differed
more from that of Caesar than did Trajan's. However, Caesar
customarily used fewer auxiliaries than did Trajan.
I. The Summer Camp.
I. TJie Site.
§ 147. When possible, the camp was always placed on
the slope of a gentle hill, so that its front had before it still
a portion of the descent, and its rear lay on the summit.
Thus the legions could pour from the gates and form against
an approaching enemy in readiness to make their favorite
onset down hill (^ex loco superiore). If at the foot of the b.g. i, 24:
declivity was some obstruction, as a stream or a morass, it jjjs.^s, 24;
ras all the better. At any rate, there should be before the
imp room for the accustomed order of battle. Of course
Iter was necessary. Therefore the camp was usually
)laced on the sloping side of the valley of some stream. If
le army had to cross a river, the camp could be made on
ither side. But the conditions were usually best met by
placing it on the hither side. Much wood, too, was needed,
)r cooking, and for the various uses to which it was put in
le fortifications. But yet the camp must not be so near a
)rest as to allow the enemy to collect in numbers under its
lelter, and then make a sudden onset.
\
72
CAESAR S ARMY.
§ 148. It is evident that all these conditions could not
always be fulfilled, and often a camp must be pitched where
necessity demanded {in loco necessario) . But to place the I
camp on low ground instead of on a hill was considered
B.G. VIII, barbarous (more barbaro) ,
36.
r
_ yo^'^^' P^'-^ir,.
Porta Pri
Sinistra.
R. pp. 75
seqq.
incipalis/
tra. \
)
*s U
—
'j
—
i
/
1
^
\
2.
h
h
^
>^.
A
X
X
^
o>
X
^
^«te
.s'
^
1 i.mm. r
Jjesat.lrib.^
_
* 1
^
Vi4i' pnnapalis
XX
5**
m
\dX
-^1 a- quint an, a.
y^uac.
Anx.
V
5. fy
Aux.
Am.
'? ^r 's
) Porta Principi
Dextra.
J
Porta Decumana.
Fig. 27. The Summer Camp.
Note. — 12= First legion, second cohort, etc. This camp is planned for 5 legions,
with cavalry and auxiliaries.
2. The Fortification. — a. The Ground Plan.
§ 149. The right-angled quadrilateral was in Caesar's time
probably the only form of a Roman camp.* The quadrilat-
A. 80. * The castra lunata mentioned at Thapsus was doubtless a series of
rectangular camps, arranged in crescent form, with intervals, connected by
wall and ditch.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. -JT^
eral was also the prevailing, if not the only, form of the
small redoubts which among the Romans were known as
castella, or little camps. We find these in the circumvuUa-
tion of towns under siege, connected by lines of fortification.
The castella very likely were quadrilaterals with side equal
to the front of a cohort. They could then each be easily
garrisoned and defended by one cohort.
The corners, both of castra and castella^ were rounded, so
as to afford more room for defence.
§ 150. The gates of the camp were usually merely open-
ings, probably as wide^ as the front of a maniple (40 ft.).
They were defended hy semi-circular tambours, or by a
traverse (^tilulum) reaching to a corresponding distance.
Very likely on the inside was a corresponding traverse.
Usually the gates were not closed up. When it was neces- b.g. v, 50.
sary to defend the camp, one or more of these might be
closed, however. In small redoubts {castella), only a
narrow opening was needed, and this might easily have had
a real gate. In lines of fortifications, openings must be left
at intervals for sorties.
b. The Elevation.
§ 151. The normal Roman fortification consists of a wall b.g. v, 39.
agger, vallum), on which the defenders place themselves;
d before it a ditch {fossa) , from which comes most of
the material for the wall, and which keeps the enemy from
approaching and stops them at the distance of a good spear
cast (Fig. 28).
I. The Ditch.
§ 152. Vegetius gives in two j^ces the size of a ditch, v. 1,24;
the one which is more like those found in Caesar, he
1
^Speaks of a ditch whose width at the top was 9 or 1 2 ft.,
^'^nd whose depth in the first case was 7 ft., and in the latter
was 9 ft., vertically downward {sub line a) .
74
CiESAR S ARMY,
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 75
We notice that the width is in each case divisible by 3,
and that the depth is two-thirds of the width, plus i.
Caesar often speaks of ditches whose width is divisible by b.g. vii,
3, of 12, 15, and 18 ft., for instance ; and only once, in the c'P\
works at Alesia, of 20 ft. Further, Caesar gives always only
one dimension of the ditch. This would seem to imply that
the other dimensions stood invariably in a fixed ratio to
the one given.* He gives expressly both dimensions of his
ditches only when they are unusual. For the customary
fortification of a camp, it seems likely that the width was 9
ft., and the depth 7. Figure 28 is to be interpreted as
follows : —
ad is the escarpment or scarp. dc is the bottom.
cd is the counterscarp. ^c ox fb is the vertical depth.
§ 153. Hyginus speaks of two forms : the fossa fastigata
(Fig. 28), in which both scarp and counterscarp are sloping ;
Fig. 39. Fig. .30.
and XhQ fossa ptmica (Fig. 29), with sloping scarp and ver-
tical counterscarp. Caesar adds a third form (Fig. 30), with b.g. vii,
vertical sides {direcfis lateribus^ ; i.e., both the scarp {latus ^^'
interiiis) and the counterscarp {latus extej'ius) were vertical.
This ditch had of course the same width at bottom as at top.
§ 154. We may infer that the fossa fastigata was the
usual form, merely because generally earth would be apt to
* Goler thinks that he named but one dimension because the other was
always the same ; and that that uniform depth was most likely 9 ft., because
more than that would render it difficult to cast up the earth. But we must
remember that the Romans relied much on baskets for carrying earth,
rather than on the shovel alone.
76 CtESAr's army.
cave in either of the others. Modern engineering makes
the slope of the scarp gi-eater than that of the counterscarp,
the better to oppose the fire of artillery. But the fortifica-
tions of the ancients had little to fear from missiles ; so it
seems probable that scarp and counterscarp had the same
slope.
§ 155. Remembering that the width ad is always divisible
by 3, it at once seems likely that one-third the width is to
be reckoned for af, one-third for dq, and the remaining one-
third for qfy or its equal, be. Then the depth qc is equal to
2Xcb-\-i. The area of the vertical section of such a ditch
is 2 cb {2 cb-\-i) sq. ft. Or, representing one-third of ad hy
X, qc= {2x-\-i) ft., and the area of the vertical section abed
= 2Jt: (2ji^-|-i) sq. ft. Thus for each running foot in the
length of the ditch, there would be 2Jc(2Jt:-|-i) cu. ft. of
earth for the construction of the wall.
2. The Wall.
§ 156. We think of a wall mainly as a breastwork, behind
which soldiers are sheltered from the fire of the enemy.
But it was quite different with the Romans. They had little
need for shelter from missiles. What they aimed at mainly
was a high position, inaccessible to the enemy, from which
to hurl their spears.
§ 157. The section of such a wall we may consider
practically a rectangle, mnop (Fig. 28), of sufficient height
and width. The width mn should be enough to give room
for standing firmly, and for moving backward and forward to
hurl the javelins. Six feet would do. The height should be
as great as possible, though of course this would be limited
by the fact that the earth which formed the wall came from
the ditch. Of course if towers were placed on the wall, the
latter had to be made wider. The usual height seems to
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 7/
have been two-thirds of the upper width of the ditch.
Ceesar often speaks of a ditch 15 ft. wide and a wall of 10 b.g. 11,5.
ft., and the like.
§ 158. The outer slope mz could be made very steep, as
there was no fire of cannons to withstand. But to keep the
earth of the wall in place, there must have been a facing of
some more tenacious material. For this purpose there were
used sods, cut in digging the ditch ; also timber and brush.
This last was put up in bundles, in the form that we call
fascines.
§ 159. Vegetius says that the Romans cut sods \\ ft. v. 111,8.
long, I ft. wide, \ ft. thick, for use in fortifications. Two
such sods, packed one on the other, gave a height of i
ft. to the facing for each foot in the length of the wall ;
assuming the sods to have been placed endwise to the wall.
Every 3 ft. in the width of the ditch gave two such sods, or
a foot high of the facing. Then from a ditch 9 ft. wide
could be cut 6 sods to the running foot, or 3 ft. in height of
facing. With these sods one-half the height of the wall
could be faced, leaving the other half to be strengthened
with sod cut elsewhere, or with fascines.
§ 160. The Romans were not always content with this
facing of the outer slope. When they sought to give the
wall especial height, they made it firmer by several lines of
wicker work, or hurdles, rs, tu, parallel to the length.
§ 161. Then the rampart must be easily mounted from
the inside. For this purpose steps were made, kl. These
were of brush, or at least strengthened with brush. So it
was clear that a Roman camp needed much wood ; and also
that the section of the wall was greater than the section of
the ditch.
78 Cesar's army.
§ 162. The vertical section of a wall 6 ft. in height and
width, well faced, and provided with steps, contains about
56 sq. ft. The ditch {fossa fas tigata) , 9 ft. wide and 7 ft.
deep, has a section of 42 sq. ft. But the earth would loosen
itself about one-sixth in digging. That gives 49 sq. ft. sec-
tion for the earthwork, leaving 7 sq. ft, for brushwork. Of
this, at least 6 sq. ft. must be allotted to the steps.
§ 163. When the wall was wide enough, on its top was
placed a breastwork {lorica, loricula) of stakes {vailt), with
only a few twigs left, which were firmly bound together.
This breastwork was either of a uniform height of 4 to 5 ft.,
so that the soldiers could easily see over it and cast their
spears, or there werie pinnacles {pinnae) placed on it, 2 or
3 ft. high, between which were gaps.
§ 164. There were often erected on the wall, from point
to point, wooden towers. At such points both wall and
ditch had to be wider. Sometimes there were two ditches
at such places.
§ 165. Caesar at his camp against the Bellovaci had two
ditches with vertical sides, 15 ft. wide. If these were 11 ft.
deep, they would yield 385 cu. ft. of earth for each foot in
the length of the wall. A wall 12 ft. high could here have
a width of 24 'ft. including the outer slope and the steps.
On such a wall could be placed towers with a square base of
16 to 20 ft. on a side, yet leaving a passage round them of
8 to 4 ft. wide. As such a tower must exert a considerable
pressure on the side of the ditch, a space of at least a foot
must have been left between the ditch and the foot of the
wall.
3. The Interior.
§ 166. The camp was generally a square, or a rectangle
whose sides were as 2 to 3 (Fig. 27). Tht front was the
side towards the enemy, or towards which on the following
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 79
clay the march would be taken up.* The rearsvas of course
opposite, and the other two sides were right and left to one
facing the front.
§ 167. The depth of the camp was divided into three
nearly equal parts. Beginning at the front, they were the
praefefitura, the latera praetorii^ and the retentura. These
three divisions were made by two broad streets, parallel to
the front, the via principalis and the via quintana. The
former ends at each side of the camp with a gate, the porta
principalis dextra and the porta principalis sinistra. Very
likely in large camps there were gates at the ends of the via b.g. hi, 19;
quintana also. J; 58; vii,
§ 168. In the middle of the front wall 'is the porta prae- b.g. ii, 24;
toria ; and opposite, in the rear wall, is the porta decmnana. JJJ' ^^^ ^^
§ 169. From the po?'ta prae toria to the via principalis
extends a street, the via prae toria. Opposite this, in the
middle part of the camp, is the praetorititn, a wide space, c. in, 82,
in which were the headquarter tents, the altars, and the
tribunal. This space occupies in length all the mJddle of
the camp, but extends only 100 or 150 ft. each side of the
middle line.
§ 170. In the retentura was a similar place, the quaes-
toriu77i. Here were the quarters of the administrative staff,
here hostages and prisoners were kept, and forage and booty
were placed. Outside of the camp, back of the porta decu-
mana, were the booths of the sutlers {mercatores) who
followed the army. b.g. vi, 37.
§ 171. In the praetentura were stationed from one-fourth
to one- fifth of the cohorts, equally divided between the two
sides. These cohorts occupied the tents facing the wall.
* But see Nissen, Das Templum, p. 23 seqq.
8o Cesar's army.
Also in the praetentura, along the via principalis, facing
this and the middle of the camp, was the place for the tents
of the legati and tribimi milititm. Again, in each half of the
praetentura, in the space enclosed by the cohorts along
the wall, by the tents of the legati and tribuni, and by the
via principalis, were encamped one-fourth of the cavalry
and one-half of the archers and slingers. Thus in the entire
praetentura were quartered one-half of the cavalry and all
the archers and slingers, ready to move from the front gate
and form the advanced guard.
§ 172. On each flank of the mid-camp, next the wall, was
a line of cohorts : on each side one-tenth of the entire num-
ber in the army, or one -fifth altogether. Next the prceto-
rium, along both its longer sides, were placed the staff,
except, of course, the legati and tribuni. Between the
cohorts that were along the wall and the staff troops, were
encamped on each side one-fourth of the cavalry, or one-
half in the whole mid-camp. Their front was towards the
via principalis, unless there were gates at the ends of the
via quintafia. In that case one-half (or one-fourth of the
B.G. V, 50, whole) would front toward each street, and they would be
5^' ready to rush out at either side.
In the rear part of the camp, on each side of the quaes-
torium and equally divided by it, lay the rest of the cohorts,
about one-half of all in the army. Their front was towards
the wall on the flanks and rear. Enclosed by these, by the
quaestorium, and by the via quintana, was the place for the
auxiliary infantry, excepting the archers and slingers.
§ 173. Entirely around the camp, within the wall, ex-
tended a broad street. This would at once prevent the
likehhood of hostile missiles reaching the tents, and would
allow room for moving troops to defend the walls. Polybius
gives the width of this as 200 ft., and Hyginus, as 60. The
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 8 1
latter seems too small for all the movements of an energetic
defence. As we know that in Caesar's time much stress was
laid on skill in defending the camp, we may conclude that
this street was quite wide, probably at least 120 ft.
4. Arrangement of the Cohorts.
§ 174. The order in camp naturally depends on the
order of march. It seems reasonable to conclude that this
was usually in column of centuries. Hyginus gives the
arrangement of a cohort of six centuries.
§ 175. The cohort encamped in a space of 120 ft. front
and 180 ft. depth. This was divided on Hues parallel to the
front into 6 portions of 1 20 ft. by 30 ft. Each of these was
for one century.
From the length of the front, 12 ft. are to be deducted
for the street dividing the cohort from the adjacent one.
That leaves 108 ft. for the tents. Each century had 8 tents :
6 for the soldiers, i for the centurion, and i for the servants.
As each tent is 10 ft. square, the length actually covered by
tents would be 80 ft. This leaves 28 ft. for the 7 intervals
between the tents, or 4 ft. for each interval. The 3 first
centuries of the 3 maniples had their front towards the wall,
and the 3 second their front from the wall. Thus the 2
centuries of one maniple would be stationed back to back.
The second of one maniple would face the first of the next,
divided from it by a street 1 2 ft. wide, parallel to the wall.
§ 176. From the 30 ft. depth of the space allotted to the
century, 6 ft. must be allowed for their half of the street;
10 ft. for the tents ; 5 ft., behind the latter, for stacking the
weapons ; and, finally, 9 ft. for the pack-animals. The c. iii, 76.
several cohorts of a legion, according to the room, could be
placed in a line, side by side, or in several lines.
82 Caesar's army.
5. Arrangement of the Cavalry hi Camp.
§ 177. In camp there would suffice for each turtna a
space of 120 ft. by 30 ft., the same as for a century of
infantry. Then one ala of cavalry would take the same
room, and be arranged in the same way, as two cohorts of
infantry. Of course in particulars the arrangement must
have been varied to adapt it to the convenience of that arm
of the service.
6. Time iieeded for Fortifying the Camp.
§ 178. Let us assume the normal measure of the ditch
to be 9 ft. wide and 7 ft. deep. Of course a part of the
men must be under arms. We may suppose that, under all
ordinary circumstances, in a body of troops of at least two
legions, the men of one cohort could be used for each 240
ft. of wall. In digging a ditch of 9 ft. wide, in 240 ft.
length not more than 60 men can conveniently work. Then
in the same space allot 30 men to the wall, and 30 men to
make the fascines and gather material, and we see that an
equal number are at work on wall and ditch, and the two
go on at an equal rate. As 1 20 men compose the normal
strength of the maniple, and as there are three maniples, it
is clear that there could be three reliefs. A relief of the
ditch-diggers would be necessary, but it would hardly be so
with the rest. Remembering that there were always some
soldiers who were exempt from such work {immunes^ benefi-
ciarii), there might be in a maniple 100 men disposable
for the work of fortifying. Then there could easily be three
details for digging the ditch, with men to spare.
§ 179. A skilful digger, who works only one hour and is
then relieved, can easily excavate from 50 to 60 cu. ft.
(Roman) in that time. But the Roman legionaries were
above all things skilful at digging. As the cross- section of
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 85
course in special cases the guard was strengthened. Be-
sides the guards at the gates, one cohort at least was detailed
for duty in the camp, and was stationed in the praetorium
and quaestorium,
§ 183. As soon as the fortification was completed, the
supper was prepared and eaten. For this purpose the staff
assembled in the praetorium, and remained until nightfall. Livy,
The general during this time could conveniently promulgate ^^^^^» s-
orders for the night and for the next day. At nightfall, also,
the musicians of the army assembled to sound the tattoo. LKy,
This was the signal for setting the night watch. The ^^^' ^'
cavalry pickets were drawn into camp, except a few single
horsemen as outlying sentries {specii/a fores). The guard b.g. ii, 11.
cohorts were probably changed at the tattoo, the new guard
going on duty now to serve 24 hours. The night sentries
(vigiles) were at once posted on the tambours {iiiula) and b.g. viii,
wall. The night, from sunset to sunrise, was divided into 4
equal watches {vigiliae) . Each cohort on guard was divided
accordingly into 4 reliefs, one of which should be on duty
during each watch. The other 3 reliefs could rest, of
course, on their arms. If the cohort contained only about
300 men, it will readily be seen that 70 men could compose
one relief. This number, for 2100 ft. of wall, would give one
sentinel for each 30 ft. The different reliefs were signalled
by the trumpeters {buccinatores) . C. li, 35.
§ 184. At daybreak the musicians sounded the reveille.
If the march was not to be resumed, the guard cohorts
drew in their night sentries and posted the less numerous
sentinels for the day. The cavalry pickets took their posts
{sfationes), and sent out their scouts {exploratores) , At
noon this cavalry guard was relieved. Livy, XL,
33;V.III,&
§ 185. During the night the rounds of the sentries were
probably made by the centurions of the guard. On occa-
86 Cesar's army.
sion, also, the tribunes on duty, and the general himself,
would inspect the guard.
§ i86. If camp should be made in the presence of a
threatening enemy, the usual vanguard would not be
B.G.I, 49; enough to cover the operation. One or two legions would
^" ^' ^''' then be deployed in line of battle to keep off the enemy,
and a third would do the work of fortifying.
§ 187. The army might leave the camp either to attack
a near enemy, or in order to continue the march.
a. In the first case, the tents were left standing, the bag-
gage remained in its place, and a guard was left in charge.
B.G.111,26; This guard might consist of a detail from each legion, or of
II, 8; c. I, entire legions. The latter would be likely to occur when
there were legions of raw recruits present. These would
naturally be left within the walls.
d. In case of continuing the march, the camp was aban-
doned. At the first signal {sigtium profectionis), the tents
c. Ill, 85. were struck ; at the second, they and the rest of the bag-
cm, 37, 75. gage were packed on the beasts {vasa condamantur) ; at
. the third, the march began. To conceal the departure
from the enemy, the signal might be omitted. Yet it was
deemed a point of military honor to sound it.
II. The Winter Camp.
§ 188. In winter quarters the Romans did not billet their
soldiers in towns, but kept them together in winter camps
{castra hibernd). When a portion of a town was needed,
for strategical or other reasons, then the inhabitants had to
E.G. Ill, I. leave, as we see in the case of Galba at Octodurus.
§ 189. The general arrangement of the winter camp must
have resembled that of the castra aestiva. There must
have been the same fortifications and streets. But doubtless
the convenience of the men was more regarded than when
TACTICS OF THE ARxMY. 89
§ 192. It is clear that the strength that must be given
to the fortifications depends upon the relative strength of
besiegers and besieged. If the besiegers are weak, their
works must be correspondingly stronger.
§ 193. The redoubts {caste/la) were held by garrisons b.g. vii,
{praesi(iia). These in the daytime merely threw out a line ^9; c, iii,
of sentries {stationes), which they were ready to support
immediately. At night strong pickets {excubitores) occu-
pied the works. In the redoubts were always ready the c. iii, 65.
means of making signal — smoke by day, and fire by night
— in case of attack. Constant watch was kept lest at any
point a sortie might be made by the enemy.
2. Assault.
§ 194. The principal article used in assaults was the
scaling-ladder. Breaching-huts {^miiscnli, § 210) were also cm, 80.
used. These were low, snail houses with sloping roofs, and
built of strong materials, to resist the showers of missiles
from the wall. These were pushed forward on rollers, and
under their shelter battering-rams (§ 213) were brought to
bear on the wall.
§ 195. As soon as the ladders were ready, the breaching-
huts (§ 210), were built fascines and fagots were prepared
for filling the ditch, and hurdles were made ready for pro-
tecting the archers and slingers.* These troops were then
pushed forward, thus protected, in order to clear the walls of
the defenders. Behind the missile troops were formed the
legionaries, usually in several columns. Thus the attention
of the enemy would be distracted, and at one of the points
of attack success might follow. At the head of each column
was a body of laborers with ladders and fascines. As soon
as the archers and slingers had cleared the wall, the facines
were cast into the ditch, the ladders were set up, and the
* Also see \ 28.
90
CiESAR S ARMY.
legionaries mounted to the attack. If a lodgment was
eifected, the assailants sought to spread out each way and
gain a gate, in order to open it to their comrades. Mean-
time the battering-ram was at work at various points, that
no resource might be wanting.
24; C. II, I,
15-
3. Regular Siege.
R. p. 142 § ig6. The principal work of a regular siege was the
ii?lo; VII, mound {agger, Figs. 2,2>^ 34, 35). This was always begun
at a distance from the wall, very
nearly out of reach of missiles-
It was then gradually extended
in the direction of the point to
be attacked, and was at the
same time gradually increased
in height until on a level with
the top of the walls, or even
higher. When this mound was
completed, the storming party moved on its top to the
attack.
r
rpTT(i:7ycrn:rtTTrrt B
Fig. 33.
Horizontal Section of Agger.
§ 197. The height of the mound was often considerable.
Before Avaricum it was 80 ft., and as much before Massilia.
The length of course depended on the power of the enemy's
missile weapons. It seems probable that those built in
assaulting the Gallic towns would not have been very long.
The least distance from the enemy at which the construction
could have been begun was from 400 to 500 ft.
§ 198. The width above must have been enough for a
storming column, very likely of the usual formation. If we
take this to be the front of a maniple, the least breadth
would have been 50 ft. The sides might be quite steep, as
we shall see further on. A fabric 80 ft. high and 50 ft. wide
on top might have been 60 ft. wide on the ground.
• TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 9I \
§ 199. To the building of the agger, it must be remem-
bered, everything else in the siege was subordinated.
By way of preparation for its construction, first of all the
ground must be levelled for the foundation. This could be
done by workmen protected by vineae (§ 211), stout mova-
ble sheds. Then the workmen, both those building the agger
and those providing the material, must be guarded from the R.k. p. 310.
missiles of the enemy. The former were protected by plutei
(§ 214), large standing shields, which could be advanced c. 11, 2.
from time to time. The others brought the material in cov-
ered galleries. These were composed of a series of vineae b.g. ii. 30;
reaching to the point of beginning the agger. Also, the IJ^' ^^ ' ^'
workmen were protected by archers, slingers, and artillery,
drawn up parallel to the hostile walls. The archers and
slingers were themselves protected hy plutei ; the artillery b.g. 11, 30;
was placed usually in moving towers. These parallels must I"'^!^^!!'
haye had covered approaches of long lines of huts. Under ^4-
shelter of these, also, were posted bodies of legionaries
{cohortes expeditae), to cover the operations and resist b.g. vii,
sorties. Farther in the rear bivouacked strong bodies of^^"
troops, outside the camp, ready to support. b.g. vii,
24.
§ 200. The strength of the various protections would of
course depend on the power of the enemy's missiles. Usu-
ally the side walls of the vineae were only of a sort of wattled
work. Before Massilia, however, all the covering devices
had to be made of logs of considerable thickness. c. ii, lo.
§ 201. Sometimes towers {turres ambulatoriae) were
placed on the agger. In such cases the top of the agger
was designed to be a smooth roadway ; and the height b.g. ii, 30,
needed only to -be enough for the tower to have sufficient ^^'
elevation. This probably was a quicker way of approach,
as it saved building a considerable part of the agger ; but it
was not so convenient for a column of attack. As a rule,
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 93
however, the tower accompanied the construction of tne
agger, at its side ; and served as a battery to clear the enemy
from the wall, and as a redoubt in the line of approaches
a. Construction of the Agger,
§ 202. While we have no detailed accounts of the mode
of building the agger, we do know the following facts : — R- p- 147
1. That it contained much woodwork : ia) because the
13 i^ VTT
agger was frequently set on fire by the enemy, and (/^) be- 22', 24.
cause Trebonius was compelled to build a stone agger, for ' .,' ^^'
the reason, as he expressly states, that there was no more
wood in the region.
2. That this woodwork was not merely wattled branches,
but was mainly logs {ardores, materia) . C. 11, i, 15.
3. That it was not solid, but had holes, larger and smaller,
which would admit a draft. This is inferred because it was G. vii, 24.
sometimes set on fire from below, the enemy having driven
a mine beneath it.
4. That it approached the wall gradually, and that the
workmen, meanwhile, were protected from missiles. Thus
it must have been erected one story at a time. b.g. vii.
From these facts and necessary inferences, we may draw ^'^'jj ^
up a scheme of construction which cannot be far from the
truth.
§ 203. Figure 34 is a vertical, longitudinal section of the
agger, ab is the city wall against which it is directed. The
entire section of the agger when completed is abcefhnda. It
is clear that only a portion of this, as cefhnd, can be con-
stmcted with regularity. The remainder, abed, is so near
the enemy that it must be filled up with a rush at the last
moment. We speak first of the part that is constructed
regularly.
§ 204. The point of beginning must be as near the enemy
as his missiles allow, — at some point in their long range.
ARMY.
Fig. 35. General View of Stege Operations.
A B C D. Hostile wall, j s. Testudines aggesittt'ae, arotecting those levelling tne
ground, k k. Agger, x x, x x' , &c. Plutez, prelecting those working on the
. agger, efg. Line of ////2^^/, manned with archers and lingers. 1 1. Turres,
also manned with archers and slingers nd provided with tormenta. r o.
Covered way of z^/;/^rt^, giving approach to archers and slingers. I q. Covered
way of vineae approaching the point of beginning the agger, f g . Position of
pltttei, covering the beginning of agger, m n. Covered gallery through the
^gger. n n n, ^<c. Ster)s and platforms of the several stories.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 95
First of all a line of breaching-huts is moved forward so as
to make a safe gallery through which to convey material.
Then at a distance of perhaps 30 ft. in advance of this point
is placed a line of large shields {plutei^ x) at right angles to
the Ime of huts, and longer than the width of the agger.
These shields must be strong enough to turn the hostile
missiles and high enough to protect the space of about 30 ft.
between them and the huts. In this space thus protected
the workmen set about the agger. The material with which
they work consists principally of logs 20 to 30 ft. long, and
from a foot to a foot and a half thick. These are piled, cob-
house fashion, in successive courses, each course crossing
the one below it at right angles. In the middle is left a
passage {mn) 10 or 12 ft. wide. This passage when
covered is to form a gallery through which is carried the
material for continuing the work. The spaces between the
logs are filled with stones, sods, and earth. When the struc-
ture has reached a height of about 7 ft., a course of logs
{op) is placed close together across the whole. This at the
same time covers the gallery and serves as a floor for the
second story.
This completes 30 ft. of the first story. The shields
(plutei) are now pushed on 30 ft. farther, and the work con-
tinued, material being brought through the line of huts and
through the covered gallery in the portion of the agger
already constructed. In Hke manner the work is pushed
on by successive stages of 30 ft. each.
§ 205. Meanwhile at the point of beginning steps are
made so as to mount easily to the second story. When the
first story has advanced perhaps 100 ft., a transverse row
oi plutei {k) is placed on its flat roof, and a second story is
begun and pushed on in like manner as the first. The be-
ginning of the second story is far enough forward of the
beginning of the first to leave a sufficient space, not merely
96 Cesar's army.
for the steps, but also for a platform {fg) leading to the
entrance (;/) of the second gallery. Meanwhile, the outer
sides are covered with green hides, as a protection against
fire.
§ 206. Thus the work goes on, story by story, until the
agger has reached the required height. Each story has its
gallery running throughout its length, its platform, or land-
ing, and steps leading to the story above.
§ 207. We come now to that part near the enemy's ^
wall, which can only be made by pouring in material helterj
skelter. When the agger has reached a height of three or]
four stories, and has been brought as near the enemy asj
is consistent with the safety of the workmen, then a great]
quantity of rubbish, wood, bundles of straw, stones, sod, and]
the like, are brought through the various galleries and castj
out through the openings (w), until the space between the
agger and the wall is quite filled up.
§ 208. The great size of the agger is enough to show that
wood was largely used in its construction. Then, too, wood
is on the average only one-third as heavy as earth. It can
therefore be gathered and transported more easily. Also,
the side walls of a wooden agger can be much steeper than
if of earth. An agger of earth, 50 ft. wide on the top and
80 ft. high, should be 210 ft. wide at the base, and therefore
130 ft. wide at the middle point of the height. One of wood
would need to have an average width of only 55 ft.
An agger of earth of the above dimensions and 600 ft.
long, would require 6,240,000 cu. ft. of earth. The mere
excavation of this mass would take 1000 workmen at least
20 days.
b. Siege Apparatus.
§ 209. The principal work of a regular siege was the
agger, by which safe approach was made to the hostile wall.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY. 9/
Subsidiary to this were various other means of protection
and offence.
§ 210. The musculus was a hut, which could be moved
on rollers, for the protection of workmen from the missiles
of the besieged. There were two forms.
Fig. 36.
a. The first form (Fig. 36) was used by workmen engaged
in levelling the ground for the agger^ or in filling up the
enemy's ditch. It was wedge-shaped, and built of strong
Fig. 37.
timbers covered by heavy planking. The forward end was
constructed of two triangles put together, so that missiles
would glance off.
98
CiESAR S ARMY.
b. The second form (Fig. 37) was used by pioneers who
attempted to dig out the foundation stones of the hostile
wall. As it came so near the enemy, it had to be very
strong, to resist the heavy stones thrown down from the bat-
Fig. 38.
tlements. Those used in the siege of Massilia were probably
20 ft. long, 5 ft. high, and 4 ft. broad, built of timbers 2 ft.
thick. Besides, the roof was covered with bricks and clay,
to guard against fire, with hides over all, to prevent the clay
being washed off by water.
Fig. 39.
§ 211. The vineae (Fig. ^^^ were huts, open at each
end, designed to form a safe passage-way to the muscuius,
or to any point where the siege wprk was going on. As they
TACTICS OF THE ARMY.
99
Fig. 40.
wert not brought so near the enemy as was the muscuius,
the vineae did not need to be so strong. By the description
of Vegetius, the vinea was 1 6
ft. long, 8 ft. high, and 7 ft.
wide, the side walls of strong
posts connected by vaulted
work, and the roof by a dou-
ble thickness of planking. It
will be seen that the vifiea
was more roomy than the
muscuius, being used merely
as a passage-way. Often the roof was covered with green
hides, to guard against fire
§ 212. The testudo (Fig. 32, b) was a hut, much like
the muscuius, from the front of which, however, projected
the battering-ram {aries). The ram
was suspended from the roof of the
hut, and was worked by a number
; of men thus protected.
§ 213. The battering-ram* («;7
Fig. 32, b) was a long, heavy log ui
wood, the offensive end of which
was strengthened by a head of metal
(iron or bronze), sometimes in the
shape of a ram's head. Suspended
at its middle point from the roof of
the hut {tesfudo), it was driven with
considerable force against the wall.
The ram has been found quite effec-
^ tive in disjointing stones, although its
force is small compared with that of a cannon shot. The
momentum of a ram 28 in. in diameter and 180 ft. long,
V. IV, IS.
Fig. 41.
* See 6 222, at end.
lOO
CiESAR S ARMY.
weighing 41,112 lbs. and
worked by 1000 men, is only
equal to a point-blank shot
from a 36-pounder.
§ 214. The movable tower
{Jurris avibulatoria, Fig. 32,
c) Caesar used continually in
his sieges. It rested on
rollers, was several stories
high, of truncated pyramidal
shape, and constructed of
heavy timbers. The stories
were connected by stairs at
the side remote from the
enemy, and each floor was
protected by a high bulwark.
There were openings through
which the archers and sling-
ers could send their missiles.
The tower was constructed
out of range of the enemy,
and then advanced on rollers,
preceded by 7nusculi con-
taining workmen who leveled
the road. The use of the
tower was as a battery from
which the opposing wall could
be swept, thus protecting the
workmen continuing the ag-
ger. Also when near enough,
a bridge was let fall upon the
wall from one of the upper
stories, and thus soldiers
could rush to the assault.
TACTICS OF THE ARMY.
lOI
§ 215. The pluteiis (Figs. 39, 40, 41) was a movable
shield, running on three wheels, one at each end and one
in the middle. It was usually made of osier work covered
with hides.
Fig. 43. lAliutn.
VI. THE SHIPS AND SEA-FIGHTS.
E.G. Ill,
§ 216. This subject belongs properly to a discussion of
22-26,28,29; the Roman army, as the actual fighting on shipboard was
V, 10, II.
C. II, 3-7.
always done by details from the legions.
A A, etc. Lowest bank of rowers.
B B, etc. Highest bank of rowers.
C C, etc. Intervals between ribs.
D D, etc. Keel.
Fig. 44.*
Section of Galley with five Banks of Oars, showing the position of the rowers.
§ 217. The Roman ships were propelled both by sails
and oars. For the war-ships, however, the latter were the
main reliance. The rowers (slaves) in a ship of any size sat
under the deck, on benches arranged in tiers (Fig. 44) . Each
* From Scheffer, De Militia Navali Veterum, Upsala, 1654 A.D.
THE SHIPS AND SEA-FIGHTS. IO3
rower was chained to his bench during his period of duty.
The working crew of a war-ship comprised a few sailors to
manage the sails and enough slaves to work the oars in re-
liefs, each usually working four hours at a time.* The gal-
leys {naves longae) were very long and swift, having usually
three tiers of oars. The fighting crew, as above said, con-
sisted of a number of legionaries.
§ 218. The war-ship was fitted with a beak {I'o strum)
of bronze at the prow. With this it was attempted to run
down and sink a hostile ship. There was usually a detach-
ment of slingers and archers on board, and a supply of
artillery. Towers were sometimes raised on the deck, so as
to send missiles down among the enemy. This was espe-
cially the case when a low ship was attacking a higher one.
When two ships grappled, the legionaries boarded, with
shield and sword.
The galleys were of so light draft that they could be
drawn up on the beach. Of course the largest ships of the
Romans would be very small to modern eyes.
§ 219- The distinction between military and naval science is of
quite recent origin. Even so late as the seventeenth century a.d. the
sanxe men were employed on land or sea as might be most convenient.
That staunch old Puritan admiral, Blake, who made the arms of the
commonwealth as much feared on the sea as Cromwell did on land,
was originally an officer of cavalry, — thus being a veritable " horse
marine."
* For a vivid modern description of slave life in an ancient galley, see
Wallace's Ben Hur, Bk. III.
VII. THE ENEMY.
A. DEFENCE OP FORTIFIED TOWNS.
§ 220. The sieges that Caesar's armies conducted were
against two sorts of fortifications, — the walled towns of the
Gauls, as Alesia, and the more elaborate works that de-
fended haunts of Graeco- Roman civilization, like Massilia.
B.G. Iiri2. § 221. The former were comparatively simple, and fell
usually without much difficulty before the resources of
C. II, 1-15. Roman military science. The defences of Massilia, how-
ever, had been planned by the same engineering skill that
assailed them, and the town was supplied with every appli-
ance of resistance known to the military art of the day.
The siege of that city was a grapple of giants.
B.G.vii,23. § 222. Caesar gives a clear account of the construction
of a Gallic town wall. Logs are laid on the ground, two
r >
\_J^
Y^
r_j^"
1 ., jUU,
CXI
L ,<a....
Fig. 45. SorizonteU Section of Gallic Wall.
feet apart, their length at right angles to the direction of the
wall (Fig. 42). The large end of each log is turned with-
out, the small end within. These smaller ends are then
fastened together by cross-timbers some 40 feet long, and
earth is piled on them. Between the large ends are placed
THE ENEMY. IO5
great stones, and a rubble of small stones is poured into the
remaining space between the large stones and the earth at
the smaller ends of the logs. Then a second course of logs
is laid in like manner, only so that each log of this second
course was placed over the stones filling the space between
two logs of the first course. Thus the work is carried on
until the wall has reached the desired height. Such a wall
was quite effective. The stones protected it from fire, and
the timber, firmly bound together as it was, made it quite
secure from the battering-ram.
Perhaps this is why Caesar so seldom mentions the ram in detailing R. p. 146.
his sieges, RUstow says that Caesar nowhere speaks of that implement.
This statement is an error, as reference is made in two places. ^;9' ^^' ^^''
VII, 23.
On the walls, towers were often erected at various points.
Fig. 46. Vertical Section of Gallic Wall.
§ 223. In the siege of Massilia we learn the varied re-
sources of defence, only a few of which were known to the
Gauls. ,
In the first place, the rampart was lined with artillery, so
that the besiegers had to push on their works under a b.g. vii,
shower of stones and darts. Every effort was made to set "ii, 7-15.
fire to the agger and to the various huts. At Massilia this
at one time succeeded, and all the offensive works were con-
sumed. Fire-balls, made of tow soaked in pitch and kin-
dled, were hurled from the wall. Mines were run, beginning
within the wall and ending in the siege works. Through
these mines the besieged made sudden sorties, trying to get
possession of the works and set them on fire. If the ram
I06 CiESAR's ARMY.
was brought to bear on the wall, fenders were let down
from its top by ropes to protect the stonework ; and it was
sought by great hooks to catch the ram and draw it from
its fastenings. As the agger and towers increased in height,
the town wall and towers were often carried up to correspond.
If the wall was itself successfully assailed and began to crum-
ble, another wall was rapidly constructed on the inside. If
all these things failed, however, and at last a clear way was
made for assault, the town usually surrendered.
B. THE GALLIC ARRAY AND ARMS.
§ 224. The Macedonian phalanx had a front of about
500 men and a depth of 16. That of the Gauls and Ger-
mans was doubtless of similar form, but of varying numbers.
The men stood close together, forming a compact mass.
The shields of the front rank formed a vertical wall, and
those of the rest were held overhead, lapping over one
another like the shingles on a roof, only in the reverse order.
It will be seen that the phalanx depended for its ^success on
the momentum of its mass. However, only those on its
outer edges could use their weapons, while the rest were
practically imprisoned in the crowd. Here the Romans had
a great advantage ; for, from their open and pliable order of
battle, nearly every man sooner or later was in action.
Hence, although they might be greatly inferior in number,
they could bring into use more swords and spears at a given
point than could their enemies.
At the battle of the Alma (fought Sept. 20, 1854), the British
troops in line were attacked by heavy bodies of Russians in solid
squares, not unlike the old phalanx. It seemed that if the huge
mass of Russians should ever reach the thin British line (only two
or three men deep), the latter would be shivered like a pipe-stem.
But the impact never took place. Every one of the British was free
to use his rifle, while in the square only the few men on the outer
edges could do any firing. The result was that the squares were
THE ENEMY. lO/
broken, their momentum destroyed, they gradually ceased their advance
and finally retreated. (Kinglake's Invasion of the Crimea, Vol. Ill,
p. 114 seqq.)
Such a defence in line against an opposing mass can only be made
successfully by troops of considerable individual self-rehance. Such
was the case undoubtedly with the British regiments at the Alma.
Such was the case with Caesar's legionaries. And so the open order of
battle of the Romans, bringing every soldier to bear on the enemy, was
possible, and was much more economical of force than the crowded
phalanx of the Gauls.
It should be noticed, in this connection, that modern improvements
in missile weapons are causing radical changes in tactics. Breech-
loading and repeating rifles have put an end to all solid formations in
actual battle. In 1871, at St. Privat, the German army in 30 minutes
lost one-third of its strength under the fire of the Chassepot rifles,
although at distances from the French infantry ranging from half a
mile* to a mile and a quarter. In 1878 a Russian brigade attempted a
bayonet charge on a Turkish redoubt in the Skuptschina Pass. The
redoubt was manned by infantry armed with the American Remington
rifle — and the brigade was annihilated in 15 minutes.
Since these wars, it is evident that the old tactics must be revolu-
tionized. The skirmish line becomes the main reliance. More and
more will depend on the intelligence of the individual. Of late, too,
successful experiments have been made in the use of dynamite shells.
This destroys the last possibility of mass formations.
Thus the experience of the Romans is repeated in our own day.
Modern discoveries and inventions applied to military science demand
a more open order of battle, and tend steadily to replace the brute
force of a mob by scientific skill.
It is plain enough from this that Upton's Tactics is already obsolete.
Board is now sitting to devise a new system for the army of the
Inited States.
§ 225. The Gallic sword was very long, two-edged, and
sheathed in an iron scabbard that was suspended at the right
[side by an iron or bronze chain. This sword had no point,
id hence was adapted rather for cutting than thrusting,
'he spear had a blade at least 2 ft. long and 6 to 8 in. wide,
! sometimes of an undulated form. As missile weapons, light
javelins, bows, and slings were used. The helmet was of
I08 CiESAR's ARMY.
■fl
metal, adorned with the horns of animals, having a crest
representing a bird or savage beast, and surmounted by a
high and bushy plume of feathers. The shield was of plank,
at least 5 ft. long, and very narrow. The body was guarded
besides by an iron or bronze breastplate, or by a coat of
mail. This last was a Gallic invention.
C. THE BRITISH CHARIOTS.
B.G. IV, 33. § 226. In Britain, Caesar met a new kind of attack. The
squadrons of hostile cavalry were intermingled with chariots
{essedae), two-wheeled cars, each drawn by two horses and
containing six soldiers {essedarii)
I A I I A I besides the driver {auriga) . Their
'^\v\r:0 \'\C\h/'y ^^stom was to charge fiercely,
r/1^M>^ii/4/1J^ lA^M^ hoping by the rush of their horses
b1 ! \ f B) \ \^'' B ^"^ t^^ clatter of their wheels, as
i^ ^ ^ \ l^ ^ ^ h well as by the spears hurled by
Fig. 47. the essedarii, to throw their enemy
A A. Roman Legions. into confusion. Failing this, they
B B B. British Cavalry. , . . ,
aaa.Yo%xoiessedariu returned to a position among the
^^3. Post of chariots. sQuadrons of cavalry I and thcrc
ao, etc. Course of chariots. ^ •' '
the spearmen dismounted and
took their post as footmen. Meanwhile the drivers took
the chariots to the rear, and there waited.
MAPS
OF THE PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGNS
AND
PLANS
OF THE MOST IMPORTANT BATTLES AND SIEGES
OF THE GALLIC WAR.
ADAPTED FROM
NAPOLEON'S LIFE OF C^SAR.
Scale of Miles.
Plan I. Fortifications on the Rhone. B.G., Bk. I. Chap. 8.
The dotted lines indicate wall and trench; the dotted squares, redoubts. In the
lower comer at the right is a vertical section of murus ^nA fossa. From Geneva to Pas-
de-l'Ecluse (or Pas-d'Ecluse), i8^ (English) miles by the river, is only half that distance
in a straight line.
Ill
Note. — In all battle-plans,
the Romans are represented
by broken lines, their oppo-
nents by solid lines.
1 Kilometer = .62137 of a mile.
Plan II. Battle tvith the Helvetians. B.G., Bk. I. Chap. 24-26.
1. The new legions and auxiliaries. 3. The Helvetians' baggage, parked.
2. Caesar's camp. 4. The Boii and Tulingi.
The heavy lines show the first position of the two armies. The mountain to whicl
the Helvetians fled lies immediately west of the modem village of Las. Just south c
that village, the light dotted lines show the position of the Helvetians at their secon.
attack, and, facing them, the second position of the first two lines of the Romans. Th
third line has wheeled to the right, to meet the flank attack of the Boii and Tulingi.
i
1 kilometer = .62137 of a mile.
Scale of Miles.
a. First camp of Ariovistus. d. Caesar's larger camp.
b. Hill on which the conference was held. e. Caesar's smaller camp.
c. Second camp of Ariovistus. /. Roman line of battle.
g. German line of battle.
"3
1 kilometer = .6:; 137 of a mile.
3
Scale of Miles
Flan IV. Battle on the Aisne (Axonn). B.G., Bk. II. Chap. 5-10.
C. R. Castra Romana.
114
1 kilometer = .62137 of a mile.
Scale of Miles.
Plan V. Battle on the Sambre (^Sabis). E.G., Bk. II. Chap. 19-27.
c. R. Castra Romana. c. b. Castra Belgica.
"5
Scale of Miles.
Plan VI. Siege of Aduatuca. B.G., Bk. II. Chap. 29-33.
116
3 Long. East
Scale of Miles.
Plan VII. Campaign against the Veneti. E.G., Bk. III. Chap. 7-16.
The dotted line shows the course of the two fleets from the Loire and the Auray
respectively.
117
f 1 f ^ '
f
m
tSKJc
maa-
0
12 3 4
' 1 ' '
5
10
-J
15
1
Scale of Miles.
Plan VIII. Siege of Avaricum. E.G., Bk. VII. Chap. 23-28.
!• agger, pushed towards the town from the Roman camp.
2. First position of Vercingetorix.
3. Second position of Vercingetorix.
4. Section of the agger, according to RUstow.
118
fel
Bh
^
»^
^
O
CQ
Scale of Miles.
Plan IX. Siege of Gergovia. E.G., Bk. VII. Chap. 36-53.
>• Caesar's large camp. 2. The double trench connecting the camps. 3. The small camp.
4. Gallic fortifications. 5. Gallic wall. 6. Detached legion. 7. Gallic camp.
IT9
lab.Tir.c.SS.sq^
Scale of Miles.
Plan X. March of Labienus against Lutetia. B.G., Bk. VII. Chap. 59-62.
120
f r » f
t s
M-kSlomeUr.
0 12 3
1 1 „,J 1
4 5
1 1.
10
1
Scale of Miles.
Plan XI. Defeat of Vercingetorix on the Vingeanne. E.G., Bk. VII. Chap. 66-67.
121
Flan XII. Siege of Alesia. E.G., Bk. VII. Chap. 68-
122
Plan Xni. Campaign against the Bellavaci. B.G., Bk. VIII. Ch.
C. Rom = Roman camp.
b = Camp of the Bellovaci.
C = Roman army.
d = Army of the Bellovaci.
7-16.
125
Plan XIV. Siege of Uxellodunum^ B.G., Bk. VIII. Chap. 32 se^q.
ABC. Roman camps. b. Roman agger.
124
INDEX OF LATIN MILITARY TERMS.
Numbers refer to Sections.
acie instructa, 80, 82, loi, 135.
aciem dirigere, 55.
instruere, 55.
acies, 78.
acies duplex, 63, 64, 65, 95.
media, 65, 99.
prima, 64.
quadruplex, 95.
secunda, 64.
simplex, 65, 67, 68.
tertia, 64.
triplex, 63, 64, 65, 94.
agger, 151, 196, 199, 201 seq., 223.
agmen, 72, 78.
agmen extremum, 129,
legionum, 129.
novissimum, 129, 137,
pilatum, 80, 81.
quadratum, 136, 138.
ala, 18, 86, 177.
alarii, 17.
Alauda, 40.
antesignani, 37, 90, 137, 138.
apparitores, 33.
aquila, 13.
aquilifer, 13.
arbores, 202.
aries, 212, 213.
arma expediuntur, 134.
arma in contubernio deposita, 180.
auriga, 226.
auxilia, i.
auxiliares, 17.
ballista, 23, 24, 28.
balteus, 45 a.
beneficiarii, 178.
braccae, 43.
brachia, 191.
buccina, 14.
buccinator, 14, 183.
calcei, 43.
calo, 16, 180.
carroballista, 28.
cassis, 44 <7.
castella, 149, 150, 191, 193.
castra aestiva, 145.
hiberna, 188.
ponuntur (muniuntur), 180.
catapulta, 23, 24, 28.
centuria, 6.
centuriatim, 74.
centurion, 8.
cervi. Fig. 41.
cippi, 41.
circumvallatio, 191.
claudunt agmen, 134.
cohors, 6.
cohors in statione ad portam, 182.
cohors praetoria, 32, 33.
cohortatus, loi.
126
INDEX.
cohortes disponere, 55.
■concursus, no.
consistere, 55.
contubernales, 32.
contubernium, 16, 37.
cornu, 14.
cornu dextrum (sinistrum), 65, 99.
crista, 44 a.
cruralia, 43.
cursus, 107.
decuria, 18.
decurio, 18,
emissio pilorum, no.
eques, 18.
equites in statione, 181.
esseda, 226.
essedarii, 226.
evocati, 34, 35.
excubitores, 193.
exercitus, 129.
ex itinere, 123.
ex loco superiore, 147. [137, 199.
expediti (-tae, etc.), 37' ^Z3 ^, I34»
exploratores, 130 (^, 181, 184.
fabri, 19, 29, 36.
falx, Fig. 32.
feminalia, 43.
fossa, 151.
directis lateribus, 153.
fastigata, 153, 154, 162.
punica, 153.
funditores, 17.
furca, 49.
galea, 44^;,
galeae induuntur, 134.
galeantur, 134.
gladius, 45 a.
gradu certo, 107.
militari, 124.
gradus, 125, 133.
hastati, 9, 73, 74, 79.
immunes, 178.
impedimenta, 15.
impeditos in agmine adoriri, 134.
impetus gladiorum, 1 10.
in agmine, 134.
in itinere, 134.
in loco necessario, 148.
insignia, 134.
accommodantur, 134.
iter cognoscere, 130^.
jumenta, 14.
latera praetorii, 167.
latus apertum, 79, 117.
exterius, 153.
interius, 153.
laxate manipulos, 61.
legatus, 4, 30, 65, 171.
legionis, 4, 30.
legio, 2.
armatur, 134.
legiones armatae et instructae, 135.
explicare, 55.
invicem ad extremum agmen
evocabat, 137.
lictor, 33.
lilium, Fig. 42.
lituus, 14.
loci naturam perspicere, 130 f>.
locus iniquus, 106.
lorica, loricula, 43, 163.
manipulatim, 73.
manipulus, 6, 13, 58.
materia, 202.
mercator, 15, 170.
milis levis armaturae, 17.
more barbaro, 148.
muli Mariani, 49.
munitiones, 191.
musculus, 194, 210, 214.
naves longae, 217.
obsidio, 190.
ocreae, 44 b.
INDEX.
127
oranes copiae, 129,
onager, 28.
opere dimenso, 180.
oppugnatio repentina, 190.
optio, 8, 12.
orbis, 67, 70.
ordinatim, 74.
ordo, 6.
parma, 17.
pass us, 125.
pelles, 16, 189.
phalanx, 224.
pilani, 9, 73, 74, 79.
pilis infestis, 107.
pilum, 36, 45 i^, 61, 112.
pilus, 9.
pinnae, 163.
pluteus, 199, 204, 205, 215.
porta decumana, 167, 170.
praetoria, 167, 169,
principalis dextra, 167.
principalis sinistra, 167.
praefectus equitum, 18.
fabrum, 36.
praesidia, 144, 193,
praetentura, 167, 171.
praetorium, 169, 172, 182, 183.
primipilus, 9, 12, 13.
primum agmen, 129.
princeps, 9, 73, 74, 79.
pugio, 45 a.
quaestor, 31.
quaestorium, 170, 172, 182.
retentura, 167, 170.
rostrum, 218.
sagittarii, 17.
saguni, 43.
sarcina, 15,49, 134, 135.
conferuntur, 134.
in acervum comportantur, 1 34.
Scorpio, 25 a.
scutum, 17, 44 1:.
signa inferre, 1 10.
signifer, 13.
signum, 13, loi.
profectionis, 187^.
speculator, n, \Zob, 181, 183.
stationes, 184, 193.
stimulus. Fig. 41.
subcenturion, 8.
sub linea, 152.
sarcinis, 134.
sarcinis adoriri, 134.
superior locus, 106.
tabernacula constituere, 180.
tabernaculum, 16, 189.
tegimenta scutis detrahuntur, 134.
tentorium, 16.
testudo, 212, 213.
titulum, 150, 183.
tormentum, 21, 24, 36.
torquere agmen, 55.
tribuni militum, 4, 12^, 1 71.
tuba, 14.
tubicen, 14.
tunica, 43.
turma, 18, 85, 177.
turmatim, 88.
turres ambulatoriae, 201, 214.
umbo, 44 c.
valli, 163.
vallum, 157.
vasa conclamantur, 189 (5.
vexillum, 13.
via praetoria, 169.
principalis, 167, 169, 171, 172.
quintana, 167, 172.
vigiles, 183.
vigiliae, 183.
vineae, 199, 2CX), 211.
vitis, 8.
voluntarii, 35.
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Judson, Harry Pratt
Caesar »s ariny
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