-ID
= C0
= 00
I CD
= cn
t 0
in
1 (O
= c^
CO
Digitized by tlie Internet Arcliive
in 2008 witli funding from
IVIicrosoft Corporation
littp://www.arcli ive.org/details/caesarscivilwarwOOcaesuoft
^^CAESAR'S
CIVIL WAR
WITH POMPEIUS
TRANSLATED WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES
BY THE
REV. F. P. LONG, M.A.
SOMETIME EXHIBITIONER OF WORCESTER COLLEGE
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1906
D4
3
HENRY FROWDE, M.A.
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD
LONDON, EDINBURGH
NEW YORK AND TORONTO
PRINTED IN ENGLAND,
EDITOR'S NOTE
The Text followed in this translation has been, apart from
one place in the second book (c. Ii), where I have retained
a passage on intrinsic grounds which has not perhaps strong
MS. authority, and another in Book III (c, 48), where I have
hazarded a conjecture in a corrupted passage, the Clarendon
Press edition of Du Pontet, from which also I have adapted
the Index.
In preparing the rough maps and plans which accompany
the Text, my obligations to previous editors, especially to
Stoffel, are obvious.
I take this opportunity to express my thanks to Mr. H. J.
Cunningham, Fellow of Worcester College, for his kindness
:n reading the whole of the version, and for many valued
suggestions : also to the Provost of Oriel who read the
proofs while passing through the Press.
F P. L.
Poi, presso al tempo che tutto il ciel voile
ridur lo mondo a suo modo sereno,
Cesare, per voler di Roma, il tolle :
e quel che fe' da Varo infino al Reno,
Isara vide ed Era e vide Senna,
ed ogni valla onde Rodano & pieno.
Quel che fe' poi ch* egli usci di Ravenna,
e saltd Rubicon, fu di tal volo
che nol seguiteria lingua n^ penna.
In ver la Spagna rivolse lo stuolo;
poi ver Durazzo, e Farsalia percosse
si ch' al Nil caldo si senti del duolo.
Antandro e Simoenta, onde si mosse,
rivide, e la dov' Ettore si cuba,
e mal per Tolommeo poi si riscosse :
da indi scese folgorando a Juba,
poscia si volse nel vostro occidente,
dove sentia la Pompeiana tuba.
Dante, Paradiso vi. 55-72.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
EDITOR'S NOTE iii
INTRODUCTION vii
BOOK I
Italy and Spain
CHAP.
I. The Outbreak of War (1-28) ... I
II. The Safeguarding of the West (29-55) . 26
III. The First Naval Engagement (56-58) . -47
IV. The Reward of a Great Strategist (59-87) . 50
BOOK II
Marseilles and North Africa
I. An Historic Siege (1-16) . . . -73
II. The Clearing of Southern Spain (17-22) . 87
III. The Set-back in Africa (23-44) • ♦ '94
BOOK III
Dyrrachium and Pharsalia
I. The Passage of the Adriatic (1-19) . .116
II. A Backwater of the Revolution (20-22) . 135
III. The Lines of Dyrrachium (23-57) • -138
IV. The Forcing of the Blockade (58-87) . . 170
V. Pharsalus and After (88-112) . . .199
Index of Proper Names ..... 223
LIST OF MAPS
Central and S. Italy .
Plan of Brindisi
N. E. Spain .
Campaign of Lerida .
Lerida and the Ebro .
Plan of Marseilles
Coast between Marseilles
Campaign in N. Africa
The Greek Peninsula .
Bay of Durazzo .
Pharsalia
. ^
n? face
P-
I
.
55
23
55
33
.
55
35
.
55
55
.
55
73
^ND Toulon
55
76
.
55
95
.
55
121
55
55
157
199
INTRODUCTION
Most historical parallels are deceptive, but none the less § i
many may be instructive. Among the latter is that fre-
quently drawn by an English reader between the Roman and
the British Empires. Many problems of government have
doubtless been common to the two. The administration of
backward races, the reform of decayed monarchies, the adjust-
ment of local autonomy and national character with eflFective
imperial control, the relations of the circumference with the
centre, and the due subordination of great governors to the
home government that appoints them ; these and many
more than these have alike presented themselves to the Roman
and to the British politician, and have compelled from both
their several efforts at solution. In both cases an empire has
been built up by a great military and commercial people,
endowed by Nature vnih. a rare genius for the government
both of themselves and of others, and in each case the value
and the endurance of that empire is determined by the moral
qualities that underlie its rule. Beyond such general princi-
ples, the parallel perhaps ceases to be fruitful. The world-
dominion of the Roman was achieved by the steady expansion
of a virile people, living under the freest of democratic insti-
tutions, who first extended the hegemony of their city-state
on the Tiber over their kinsmen in the Campagna and Latium,
then over the whole Italian peninsula, and then, in wave
after wave of conquest, over the entire basin and hinterland
of the Mediterranean.
viii Introduction
Throughout the various stages of this expansion there had
ever been present in imagination the striking dictum of the
great Athenian historian, that Democracy and Empire are
incompatibles. The truth of this dictum he had recognized
in the premature downfall of his own imperial city, and it was
now being tried afresh in the marvellous growth of the more
western people. Yet we must remember that during the
really critical period of the rise of Rome it was not democracy
but rather an oligarchy that had guided the nation. During
the life and death struggle with Hannibal and the other great
wars both before and after, it was the Roman Senate, filled
by representatives of all the great families in the state, trained
from earliest youth in the conduct of affairs, and holding their
seats for life, that shaped the foreign policy and directed the
armies of the Republic. It is true that the annual magis-
trates were elected by the people, and that this people held
other sovereign rights, such as that of declaration of war and
conclusion of peace, not to mention its prerogatives in civil
matters ; but for all practical purposes the constitution at
this time was an aristocracy, and sovereignty lay in that august
body which won from awe-struck foreigners the famous title
of ' an assembly of kings ', The difficulty was that this pre-
eminence of the Senate rested as much on unchallenged
custom as on any ultimate and original law of the constitution.
No one could say with certainty what this constitution was.
Polybius, the Greek historian of the second century B.C.,
whose admiration for Roman institutions is only equalled by
his sagacity in analysing them, is at much pains to point out
its highly ' mixed ' character, and the subtilty with which
the various elements were held in solution, and checks imposed
tor preserving its equilibrium. Mommsen speaks of it in its
Introduction ix
earliest days as ' a constitutional monarchy inverted ' ; and,
substituting the collective senatorial ' kings ' for the single
' king ', this description applies equally to its later stages.
Whilst the Roman people was the sole fount of honour and
source of pardon, functions that with us attach to the Crown
as its special prerogatives, the real power lay in the assembly
of nobles, which was virtually independent of the commons.
But however excellent in its results this rule of the Senate
during its best days may have been, at times of storm and
stress when its strong patriotism and sound political sense
shine out the more brightly the darker grows the political
outlook for the nation, it was not to be expected that this
monopoly of power would remain unchallenged when such
times had disappeared. Nor, we may add, was it to be ex-
pected that a body which was practically a close corporation
of privileged families, with difficulty recruited from below,
should for ever retain its native qualities and vitality, when
the vital occasions for their exercise had passed, and the dis-
integrating forces of prosperity and growing wealth, and the
social changes which these bring, began to make themselves felt.
By the year 133 B.C., Rome was the undisputed mistress of
the Mediterranean. Carthage had been finally destroyed in
146 B.C., and Greece as a political force had ceased to exist in
the same year, by the destruction of the commercial city of
Corinth. The Spanish peninsula had been conquered after
a protracted struggle, and Macedon become a Roman pro-
vince ; whilst the country then known as ' Asia ' (i. e. the
western end of Asia Minor), had been bequeathed to Rome
by its last native ruler. It is significant that in this year
occurred the first of those many attempts at reform which
mark the close of Roman republican government, and which
X Introducttcn
continued intermittently until the Republic was finally super-
seded by the absolute monarchy of Caius Julius Caesar in
49 B.C. This reform movement need not detain us here.
It is enough to remember that it was in many respects
a genuine effort to redress social and political inequalities,
and to break down the walls of privilege. The middle and
lower classes had done their share in the hard fighting and
self-sacrifice necessary for the acquisition of empire, and now
that it was won they naturally claimed a share in the spoils.
' New men,' i.e. men outside the charmed circle of senatorial
nobility, and sprung from the people itself, begin to appear
on the political stage, and to demand admission to the high
oflices of State and to the lucrative emoluments which these
carried both at home and abroad. If wars were bungled by
senatorial incapacity and provincials plundered by senatorial
oppression, the people did not intend to look idly on, whilst
these defaulters were secure against all punishment, by the
constitutional arrangement which restricted the ranks of jury-
men to the same social class as that of the distinguished
culprits. Moreover the very basis of the franchise needed
widening. Rome, the mistress of the world, was still a city-
state, of the ordinary type characteristic of ancient civilization,
and the Italian people, who had shed their blood in the foreign
wars, were absolutely outside the pale of her citizenship.
This anomaly was only remedied after a bitter struggle lasting
from 91-88 B.C. ; but the remedy, so far as practical politics
were concerned, proved to be wellnigh valueless. Repre-
sentative institutions being unknown to ancient political
philosophy, the vote of an Italian could only be effective if
recorded in Rome: consequently, the franchise was rarely ex-
ercised, and the best part of the nation was still deprived of any
Introduction xi
real voice In the shaping of the national destinies. It is not
difficult to foresee the inevitable results of such a system.
Instead of a strong national middle class as the guarantee of
social order and imperial unity and the source of all legislation,
the Italians only tended to become indifferent to the fortunes
of the empire, except from purely selfish reasons, and legisla-
tion came to be controlled more and more by one or two
dominant figures in Rome for the time being, who turned it
to their ovm aggrandisement by debauching, through every
conceivable form of bribery, the worthless proletariat of the
city. The only way in which the Senate could have controlled
its own members, if these were disposed to defy constituted
authority through reliance on the military arm, would have
been if it had really contained in itself the best and ablest men
of the country, and if it had rested for its position on a truly
national and representative basis. Failing that, it was clear
that absolute power must sooner or later gravitate into the
hands best fitted to its exercise.
Caius Julius Caesar was born probably in the year 102 B.C.,
his great rival Cnaeus Pompeius being four years his senior.
Their boyhood was passed amid the fierce civil war between
Rome and her Italian allies, followed by another similar strug-
gle between the popular party under Marius and the senatorial
under Sulla. It was in 83 B.C., when Sulla returned from his
campaign against Mithridates, King of Pontus, that the young
Pompeius, then only twenty- three years of age, raised an army
in central Italy and helped the chief of the oligarchy to crush
the democratical government, for which share in the victory
he was formally saluted ' Imperator ' by the conqueror.
Pompeius thus won his spurs as a commander in the field many
years before his rival, and this remarkable reputation as a
xii Introduction
soldier of consummate genius and as easily the first general
of his day, he never again lost, until at the close of his life he
found himself face to face with the somewhat younger con-
queror of Gaul. Honours followed thick upon him. In
8 1 B.C. Sulla entrusted him with the recovery from the
Marians of Northern Africa, and from Africa he was sent by
the triumphant Senate into Spain, to stamp out there the
remnant of democratic resistance then being gallantly main-
tained under the genius of Sertorius. Meanwhile Sulla was
dead, and Pompeius, returning to Italy in 71 B.C., was just in
time to gather further laurels by robbing Marcus Crassus of
the certain honour of finishing the troublesome Slave War.
The next year, 70 b.c, these two men were consuls together,
although Pompeius had held none of the lower magistracies,
nor indeed ever did hold them, and though he was seven years
short of the recognized age for that office, being then only 36.
Very different had been the lot of Caesar. His sympathies
and his ties were all with the other party. Not only was he
closely related to Marius, who had married his father's sister
Julia, but in 84 B.C. he had himself married a daughter (Cor-
nelia) of Cinna the great democratical leader, four times consul
during Sulla's absence in the East ; and when Sulla on his
return ordered him, for political reasons, to divorce his bride,
he had boldly refused, although Pompeius had obeyed the
Dictator in a similar demand. But though at the intercession
of powerful friends his life was spared, he deemed it advisable
to withdraw to Asia Minor, where war against Mithridates
was again threatening to break out. Here he saw service, and
at the siege of Mytilene won the equivalent of our own
Victoria Cross for conspicuous gallantry in the field. Return-
ing after the death of Sulla in 78 b.c, he refused to join all
Introduction
2111
premature attempts to undo the work of the great reactionist,
preferring to bide his time as a politician, and meanwhile to
seek a reputation at the Bar. Comparative failure as a speaker
soon led him to leave Rome once more, and to study at Rhodes
under the famous teacher of rhetoric, Molon. On his way
out occurred the well-known story of his capture by pirates,
who at this time swarmed in the Mediterranean. During
this visit also he acted on a critical occasion with all that
promptitude and willingness to take responsibility which so
distinguished him in later life. Mithridates was recommenc-
ing war, and it was touch and go with the Roman province
of ' Asia ', which threatened to revolt. The young Caesar,
then 27, instantly raised a body of troops, and by the vigour
and rapidity of his movements saved the province for Rome.
Home again at the close of 74 B.C., he seems to have remained
quietly in the capital, though actively supporting his party
in their campaign against the Sullan legislation, until we come
to the return of Pompeius from Spain and his first consulship
with Crassus in 70 b.c.
The next ten years were spent by him in passing through
the usual cursus honorum of every Roman public man — the
quaestorship (68 B.C.), aedileship (65 B.C.), and praetorship
(62 B.C.), and they were marked on the whole by a steady
gain of democracy upon senatorial prerogative, as reconsti-
tuted under the Sullan regime. As quaestor, or governor's
paymaster, Caesar's province had been Farther or Western
Spain ; and at the close of his praetorship he had himself
governed the same country as propraetor, thereby doubly
identifying himself with Western peoples, whilst his rival was
for the future to stand rather as the champion of the East.
For in Sy b.c. there had been enacted the first of those great
xiv Introduction
military commissions, which more than anything else brought
about the downfall of the Republic, by habituating men's
minds to the sight and the necessity of supreme power in the
hands of an individual. And, strange to say, they were all
effected by popular legislation, at the instance of leading
tribunes of the people, whose chief function in these latter
days was to subserve the interests of the rival heads of the two
great parties in the State. The Gabinian Law of this year
gave Pompeius as his 'province' the entire Mediterranean,
with administrative powers equal to those of the actual pro-
vincial governors anywhere within fifty miles of the coast,
and the absolute control of the military and financial resources
of the empire, for the purpose of ending the intolerable state
of things brought about by the insolence of the pirates. It
was followed next year (66 B.C.) by a similar measure, trans-
ferring to him the command against Mithridates, a work
which kept him in the East for the next five years. Mean-
while in 63 B.C. had occurred the Catilinarian conspiracy, the
desperate outbreak of the extreme revolutionary party led by
a desperate and broken man. How far Caesar was implicated
— he was then praetor elect — must remain a question of
opinion, but we may notice that in the historic debate on the
punishment of the ringleaders, when he pleaded for modera-
tion in the masterly speech of a great statesman, he was openly
menaced by the naked swords of his opponents, and that when
most of those sitting next him sheered off at the threatened
danger, Curio was one of the small band who drew round
their leader prepared to offer resistance — that same Curio
who fills such a pathetic place in Caesar's own pages in the
second book of these Commentaries. We may also observe
that it was by Cato, of whom we are also to hear much, that
Introduction
XV
the good impression made by Caesar's speech was undone, and
the judicial murder of the Catilinarians forced upon the Senate.
We can now pass to the summer of the year 60 b.c. Pom-
peius had landed at Brindisi some eighteen months before,
and to the great relief of aU parties had dismissed his army
of veterans at a moment when empire lay in the hollow of
his hand. Caesar arrived home from Spain outside the gates
of Rome on the eve of the consular elections, for which three
weeks' personal canvassing inside the city was required by law.
He must, therefore, either renounce his triumph for his
Spanish operations (since military command in Rome ceased
when its holder crossed the city boundary), or else obtain
a dispensation, a course certainly not without precedent.
Again it was Cato who persuaded the Senate to reject his
demand ; whereupon Caesar gave up his triumph and was
duly elected consvd for 59 B.C., his colleague being Marcus
Bibulus, who figures largely in the Civil War, an uncom-
promising upholder of Senatorial prerogative. Into the acts
of his first consulship we need not enter here. Suffice it
to say that Caesar formed an alliance with Pompeius, the
master of many legions, and with Crassus, no less the master
of money bags, and that between them the three men carried
through all the legislation they deemed desirable, including
the ratification of Pompeius's settlement of the East, and the
various problems raised by his great extension of the empire
in that quarter. This political alliance was sometime this
year further cemented by a marriage between Pompeius and
Caesar's only daughter, Julia, who, as long as her short life
was spared, continued to act as a strong bond of union and
potent influence for good between the two statesmen. At
the close of his term of office Caesar went oflE to his new
xvi Introduction
Governorship. This was the northern part of Italy, known
then as Cisalpine Gaul, and Illyricum, now represented by
Bosnia and the Adriatic provinces of Austria-Hungary, These
had been granted him for five years by another of those Tri-
bunician laws already mentioned, and the Senate had after-
wards added the Transalpine province (the old Provence)
where danger was threatening from the movements of power-
ful Gallic tribes. What his work was there is known to all
readers of his own Commentaries. We may, however,
notice the marked difference between the positions at this
time of the two leading men at Rome. While Pompeius was
virtually at the close of his military career, that of Caesar
was only now commencing. It was not exactly a case of the
rising and the setting sun, for Pompeius continued for the
next nine years to be easily the first man in Italy as also in
the eyes of the Roman world in general ; but from the time
of his return home in 6l B.C., until he unsheathed his sword
against his rival in 49 B.C., he was never again at the head of
an army in the field, whereas, with trifling interruptions
Caesar was campaigning aU the while.
We need not follow either the fortunes of Caesar in Gaul
or those of Pompeius in the capital for the next few years.
A few decisive dates must however be noted. Early in 56 B.C.
the two leaders met in conference at the city of Lucca on the
Cisalpine frontier (for no Roman governor might leave his
province), where it was arranged that Pompeius and Crassus
should share the consulship for the next year, to be followed
by an important grant of provinces and armies, at the same
time that Caesar's own command was extended for five years
more. The triumvirs naturally had their way, and at the
close of the year 55 B.C., Crassus went ofi to his death at the
Introduction xvif
hands of the Parthians In the great Roman disaster of Carrhae,
whilst Pompeius stayed at home as proconsul and preferred to
govern his Spanish provinces by two of his trusty lieutenants-
general. So things continued till 52 B.C., when the constant
rioting and utter lawlessness prevailing in Rome caused Pom-
peius to be nominated sole consul by the Senate, and given
supreme power to meet the crisis. Martial law was pro-
claimed, and the capital overawed by the presence of the
legions which Pompeius was now commissioned to raise. It
is from this year onward that the rift between him and Caesar
begins to widen. Crassus was dead, and Julia, the well-
beloved wife and daughter, was dead also, and thus had
disappeared together the two strongest influences for peace.
Caesar was in the throes of a terrible uprising of the Gauls
which threatened to wreck all his work, and for the time was
powerless to intervene in city politics. No wonder then that
ancient historians represent Pompeius at this period as vir-
tually monarch. But though Caesar perforce acquiesced in
this aggrandizement, yet his adherents managed to obtain
some sort of counterpoise in their master's interest. It is at
this point we reach what is technically known as the question
between Caesar and the Senate, and as it is inextricably bound
up with the outbreak of the Civil War, it is highly important
to hold it clearly before our minds.
According to the usual explanation of this question,
Caesar's command expired on March I, 49 B.C., and he
desired election that summer for the consulship of 48 B.C.
During his long absence from the capital the animosity of
his opponents had only intensified, and with Cato at their
head they were now eagerly waiting their chance to impeach
him for numerous acts in his province, as soon as ever he
LONG \j
xviii Introduction
appeared in Rome for the elections. He would then be
merely a private citizen, and as such amenable to prosecu-
tion. At his request therefore, and presumably with the
approval of Pompeius, a law was passed this year (52 b.c.)
by the whole coUege of ten tribunes, granting him dispensa-
tion from a personal canvass, a course that had been refused
him in 60 b.c. Doubtless this was a privilege, but it was one
well within constitutional usage, and it issued from the fount
of all honour, viz. the People. So far so good : Caesar's
position seemed secured, and no interval would elapse between
his old command as proconsul and his new status as consul.
As an actual magistrate of the Republic he would be inviolate,
and Cato and his clique would have to wait at least another
year for their revenge. We have said his governorship expired
on March i, 49 b.c, but he would not naturally be succeeded
in his provinces until January, 48 b.c. Since Sulla's time
governors had proceeded to their provincial commands imme-
diately after their year of office in Rome, and as Caesar would
still be in legal possession on January i, 49 b.c, his provinces
would not form part of those taken by the magistrates of
50 B.C. but of 49 B.C., and Caesar would be left undisturbed
until succeeded in January, 48 b.c But this did not suit his
enemies, and in this year (52 b.c) of Pompeius's sole consul-
ship a law was passed entirely altering the method of provincial
appointments, and ordaining that five years should elapse
between a magistracy at home and a governorship abroad.
Nominally it was aimed at the gross malpractices in Roman
elections, since it was thought that people would not gamble
so heavily for power, if they had to wait five years before
recouping themselves from the unlucky provincials ; but in
reality it was directed against Caesar, and, from the point of
Introduction
XIZ
view of its authors, was a most masterly stroke. For it enabled
the Senate to produce a candidate for the Gallic succession
immediately Caesar's command expired, i.e. on March I,
49 B.C., and Caesar would then be left a mere private citizen
at the full mercy of his antagonists. Moreover, one of its
clauses expressly enacted that all candidates must canvass in
person ; and when the inconsistency of this with the earlier
law of the ten tribunes was pointed out to Pompeius, the
latter met the objection by adding a rider, after the measure
had already been passed and lodged in the archives, that
Caesar's position would not be effected thereby. The legal
value of this was of course absolutely nil. How far Pompeius
acted in good faith it is impossible now to say : he was no
politician, and he may well have been capable of such a simple
blunder. But at all events the prejudicial effect on Caesar's
own position is beyond dispute. The next year, 51 B.C., an
attempt was made by one of the consuls to raise the question
of his succession, but Pompeius effected a postponement until
March i, 50 B.C., and when that day arrived it was once more
shelved. It was now rapidly becoming clear to both parties
that, without considerable concessions from one side or the
other, civil war was inevitable. That Caesar did not want war
admits of no doubt, but unless some compromise could be
arranged which would equalize the position of the two pro-
tagonists at Rome when Caesar laid down his command, war
was the only solution. We may speak of Caesar, if we will,
as the arch-rebel, and perhaps technically he was unjustified
in disputing the orders of the Senate, supposing, that is, that
the Senate was still the governing body at Rome. But most
people vsdll agree that this was not the case, and that the
Senate had long ago committed political suicide. Indeed, it
b2
XX Introduction
is just this refusal on the part of the senatorial party to face
accomplished facts and to readjust their attitude to the new
factors in the empire's administration, that at once justifies
Caesar and puts his opponents outside the pale of our own
sympathies. Apart altogether from personal grounds, it was
impossible, nay, ridiculous to ignore the claims of a public
man in the position of Caesar after his ten years in Gaul, or
to deny his right to be considered in the settlement of the
immediate political future. For the Senate was no longer
the Senate of the days of Hannibal ; and before they could
claim to dictate to Caesar they should first learn to control
Pompeius, instead of stultifying their own remonstrances by
abdicating their rightful position and thereby tacitly admit-
ting their need of a protector. It is natural to see in Caesar
the invader of his country and the violator of its constitution,
and if it were a question merely between the Senate and
himself, this view might possibly be maintained. But it is
a travesty of facts to regard the Senate at this time as the
palladium of Roman liberty entrenched behind the sacred
bulwarks of the constitution, and Caesar as the ruthless
destroyer of those liberties. The position of Pompeius must
always invalidate all such contentions, and the appeal to
constitutionalism becomes a mere legal quibble in face of the
incontestible fact that the constitution had long broken down,
and for several years past been in a state of suspended anima-
tion. Either, then, the Senate must justify its claim to rule
by ordering the simultaneous surrender of their provinces and
armies from both its great proconsuls, or these two must fight
out between them the question of mastership over the Senate.
Caesar's proposals accordingly were directed along the lines
of the first of these two alternatives. It is not easy to discover
Introduction xxi
the true order of development between the month of March,
50 B.C., and the outbreak of hostilities in January, 49 B.C.
There were various proposals and counter-proposals, as always
before a great war, and these were doubtless repeated on more
than one well-marked occasion : consequently we find our
authorities diflfering considerably in detail as to the actual
march of events. But the main outlines are clear, and we are
left in no real doubt as to the nature of the concessions made
by either party. We know that sometime in this year (50 B.C.),
at a full meeting of the Senate, three distinct resolutions were
put to the vote. First, that Pompeius should be relieved of
his present military command — rejected almost unanimously :
secondly, that Caesar be so relieved — as unanimously carried :
thirdly, at the instance of Caesar's supporters, that both
should simultaneously resign — carried unanimously, or, accord-
ing to one report, by 370 votes to 22. If the mind of the
Senate can be deduced from these decisions, it is surely that
they would gladly be free of both encumbrances, but that
being between the devil and the deep sea, they hated Caesar
better than they loved Pompeius. Later on in the year we
also know that, after careful inquiries made by his repre-
sentatives, Caesar put forward the following propositions.
He would give up the Transalpine province and the vast bulk
of his veteran army, if allowed to retain either the Cisalpine
(Northern Italy) with two legions, or it and lUyricum with
one : these he would also surrender if, and when elected
consul according to the privilege previously granted him.
These concessions Pompeius is said to have accepted, but the
consuls to have rejected. The chief champion of Caesar
among the magistrates had hitherto been the tribune Caius
Scribonius Curio, already mentioned in connexion with the
xxii Introduction
Catilinarian conspiracy, whose services Caesar is said to have
bought this year by paying off his very considerable debts.
His pow^ers expired on December lo, when the new tribunes
would enter upon office. Amongst these the two definitely
professed Caesarians were Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony)
and Quintus Cassius. Caesar had meanwhile come south to
Ravenna, and was there joined by Curio at the close of his
tribunate, who brought with him a full account of the situa-
tion, and urged, as some ancient historians tell us, an instant
appeal to the sword. Caesar, however, made one last attempt
at peace and sent back Curio with what practically constituted
his ultimatum. This, as far as one can judge, still left open
his earlier proposals ; but, while suggesting that both Pom-
peius and himself should lay down their commands, clearly
stated his intention of not doing so alone. Curio is said to
have travelled the 150 English miles in three days, and to have
reached Rome with his dispatch on the first day of the New
Year, just as the new consuls were entering the Senate House.
Here we may fittingly leave the story, and for the sequel
turn to Caesar's own written account in the pages that follow.
§ 2 It will help our study of this great war, which so changed
the face of history, if we first review the military forces at
the disposal of either combatant. On Caesar's side this fortu-
nately presents no difficulty. In 53 B.C. we know that he
had eleven veteran legions in Gaul, viz. ten of his own,
numbered respectively from the sixth to the fifteenth, and
one, the first, lent him by Pompeius. In 50 b.c. the Senate
had ordered the two commanders to surrender one legion
each for a threatened Parthian War. Caesar sent the fifteenth
and Pompeius selected the one then serving with his rival
The whole thing was notoriously a trick against Caesar, but
Introduction xxiii
the result was to reduce his establishment to nine veteran
legions. The winter quarters of these we know from the
last book of the Gallic War to have been as follows : — four
in Belgium under Trebonius, four in the neighbourhood of
Macon under Fabius, and one, the thirteenth, in the Cisalpine
under Caesar himself. The late Colonel Stoffel, to whose
work on Caesar's campaigns every reader, especially every
military reader, should be referred, has calculated from notices
of these legions occurring in the Civil War, that orders for
concentration must have been sent to Fabius and Trebonius
not later than December 20, i.e. three weeks before the actual
outbreak of hostilities. In all probability Fabius dispatched
half of his division, i.e. two legions, to reinforce Caesar in
Northern Italy, and then with the other half moved south to
the neighbourhood of Narbonne, whilst Trebonius also came
south to replace Fabius, with orders to transfer one of his
four legions to the now weakened command of his colleague.
If these movements on the northern side of the Alps are
a little problematical, it is at least certain, on the testimony
of all ancient authorities, that Caesar began the war with
only a single legion, however much he might know that others
were hurrying to reinforce him. It becomes therefore a point
of considerable historical and military value to determine the
actual strength of his opponent. Unfortunately this is by
no means easy. From various notices in Roman historians
we might conjecture that at the beginning of 49 B.C. there
was a really powerful military force on foot in Italy. We
know that in 52 b.c. Pompeius had been commissioned to raise
troops for the restoration of public order, and that these did
actually garrison Rome and perhaps other parts of the country.
But we neither know their numbers nor how long they
xxiv Introduction
remained embodied. From the language not only of Caesar
but of other writers it seems likely that Pompeius was not the
only commander in Italy at this time at the head of at least
a nominal field force, and Suetonius says that one reason for
Caesar's proposal for an all-round disbandment was that he
knew if things came to a pinch he could recall his own veterans
to the colours quicker than Pompeius could collect his raw
troops. On the other hand, these notices may not indicate
more than the levies which the Senate, under Pompeius and
Domitius, had begun to raise ever since the autumn of the
last year (50 B.C.). There is indeed one well-known expres-
sion of Pompeius that points to the existence of a considerable
military force at this time. He told the Senate that he had
ten legions ready to take the field. Those who like Colonel
Stoffel scout the notion of Caesar's invading Italy with a single
legion against any real strong opposition, explain this by the
seven legions, mostly veteran, which we know Pompeius to
have had in Spain, -plus the two surrendered by Caesar for the
Parthian War, -plus some 4,000 men said to have been hastily
raised by Domitius. Those on the contrary, like Mommsen,
who believe in this splendid piece of audacity, take the ten
legions to have been all Italian, viz. the two transferred by
Caesar, plus eight lately raised by conscription. At any rate,
in coming to an opinion we must remember that, on Caesar's
own testimony, Pompeius took five legions with him when he
evacuated Italy, and that he had lost 130 battalions in Italy
and Spain. Allowing for the seven Spanish legions, this leaves
us six for Italy, which, when added to the five, more than
make up the required ten. No doubt these figures prove the
existence of numerous bodies of troops in Italy for the early
part of 49 B.C. ; and that the levies organized throughout the
Introduction
XXV
country resulted in such a force cannot be denied. But how
far they can be said to have constituted an army is a very
different matter, and we shall probably not be wrong, especi-
ally in face of the repeated outcry about want of preparations
raised by Cicero and others, if we decide with Stoffel that
Caesar, who knew his business, did not run much risk in seizing
Northern and Central Italy with only the Thirteenth legion,
at a time when the forces of his opponent had barely passed
out of the hands of the recruiting sergeants. As far as Pom-
peius is concerned, then, the distribution of troops for the
opening of 49 B.C. will be firstly, seven legions in the Spanish
Peninsula, too far away to affect the fate of Italy, even if, as
Appian says, they were intended as a striking force, prepared
to go anywhere at a moment's notice. What this force might
have effected, had the fleet been ready, is an interesting specu-
lation ; but it took another twelve months before the naval
forces were fully organized, and by that time the Spanish
army had ceased to exist. Secondly, there are the two sur-
rendered Caesarian regiments, both of very doubtful loyalty,
now wintering in Apulia ; and lastly, a mass of heterogeneous
recruits, in all stages of mobilization, but capable of forming,
when fully drilled and equipped, another eight or nine com-
plete legions. Thus we shall conclude that Pompeius's ex-
aggeration lay not in the numbers, but in the quality of the
troops he claimed to possess. Numbers however apart, there
was no comparison between the rival forces. Caesar's army
was perhaps the finest military instrument that history
records, and the parallel between it and Cromwell's Iron-
sides has become proverbial. Officers and men alike were
veterans, with a magnificent record of conquest behind
them, and all were inspired by a peculiar devotion to their
xxvi Introduction
leader. Of Caesar's marshals not one deserted him when
the crisis came, excepting Labienus, whose disappointed
ambition drove him to join the opposite camp ; and the
contest was, generally speaking, one of recruits against
veterans, between a perfect unity of command on the one
side and divided counsels and vacillation on the other.
Finally a word of explanation is needed on the Roman
military organization, and the system of rendering its details in
English adopted for this version. The Roman legion has here
been translated ' regiment ', and it consisted of ten cohorts or
' battalions '. Each battalion contained three maniples or
* companies ', and each maniple two centuries or half-com-
panies. The latter term I have not employed, but have
spoken of the century as itself the ' company ', because of its
nearer numerical approximation, as will appear below. Each
century was commanded by a centurion, of whom therefore
there were six in a battalion, and these, where the Latin
name is not retained, I have called ' company officers'. There
was no separate commanding officer of the ' battalion ', but
the regiment or legion had attached to it six military tribunes,
here termed ' regimental officers '. These were generally
young men of good family, appointed partly by the com-
mander-in-chief, partly by popular election, who held this
post at about the age of thirty as the preliminary step in the
ordinary career of office. They, with the centurions (who
represent the N.C.O.'s), were responsible for all the routine
work of the regiment, but in actual battle their powers varied
at different periods and under different generals. In Caesar's
army, though their position still preserves much of its earlier
importance, we find them frequently replaced in action by
a special staff officer, who then commands the whole legion.
Introduction xtvii
This is not so much a feature of the Civil War as of the
Gallic, and was doubtless determined solely by circum-
stances. As to the numerical strength of a legion, perhaps
it is best to regard it as essentially an unfixed quantity. In
early days the normal figure had been 4,200. On occasion
this was raised to 5,000, and later 6,000 was not unknown.
Perhaps 5,000, the number often substituted by Greek writers
as an equivalent, may be fairly taken as a practical basis of
calculation. This gives 500 for the ' battalion ', and about
80 for the century or 'company'. But it is of the utmost
importance to remember that this number is purely con-
ventional, and that the effective strength of any unit at any
given time would vary, as it does to-day, with the various
circumstances of the campaign. To take an example. At
the battle of Pharsalus, while Pompeius's battalions averaged
410 men, Caesar's were only 275, and later on we find two
entire legions mustering but 3,200 men between them.
While, therefore, we may advantageously think of 5,000 and
500 in mentally translating regiments and battalions into
round numbers, we must bear in mind that, unless actual
figures are given, the process is distinctly hazardous. Lastly,
as to the cavalry. Each legion had generally attached to it
a body of 300 mounted men, who counted as part of the regi-
ment. But the mass of Roman cavalry was always composed of
foreign auxiliaries, like our own Indian horse, and was drawn
principally at this time from Gauls, Spaniards, and Germans.
To praise the Commentaries of Caesar at this time of day § 3
is to be guilty almost of a banality. Their beauty, their
strength, their stately simplicity of language, wedded to an
unerring precision of thought, their pure Latinity and scorn
of meretricious ornament, at once proclaim the man of action
xxvlii Introduction
and the finished scholar in a unison such as the world has
probably never seen elsewhere. No English version can ever
reproduce this combination of great qualities, and any trans-
lator is sadly conscious of how the author would have con-
demned his work for one fault if he did not reject it for
another. But even in a translation we may gain much. We
may familiarize ourselves with the working of a powerful
mind, and we may follow the steps of a campaign which
certainly changed the fortunes of what was then the civilized
world. The study of Caesar has always attracted great sol-
diers, and the names of eminent English commanders who
have had his campaigns by heart will readily suggest them-
selves : while even the civilian can see that, apart from
changes in armament, they still teach the main outstanding
factors that bring success in war. For the peculiar value of
Caesar's writings lies in the fact that he wrote for a public
of which the great majority were themselves soldiers, accus-
tomed to command men, and that he therefore explains in
a soldier's language the military principles on which he acted.
The Civil War is a more readable book than the Gallic;
its theme is more attractive, it has more artistic unity,
and is not so kaleidoscopic ; in short, it is a better story. It
deals with Caesar's own political and social equals, men of
his own race whom he had known intimately for a lifetime ;
consequently the characterization is proportionately enhanced.
And lastly, in its speeches which, like all ancient historians,
he has put into the mouth of his characters, we can recover
something of that dignified, courteous, but none the less fiery
eloquence, which made him inferior as a speaker not even to
Cicero, and which rendered his diction, in the words of the
greatest of Roman critics, even ' imperial ' in its grandeur.
\Cis-Alpine!i
\. Gaul
BOOK I
ITALY AND SPAIN
CHAPTER I i ^
The Outbreak of War
When Caesar's dispatch reached the consuls, it was only Jan. 1,49*
the urgent representations of the tribunes that gained it
a hearing by the House ; the further request for a definite
motion on its terms was refused,,, and the House passed, at
the instance of the Government, to the general debate upon
public affairs. Lucius Lentulus pledged his support to the
Senate and Republic, provided members were ready to
express themselves with boldness and determination ; but any
coquetting with Caesar or bidding for his favour, such as
they had shown in previous years, would find him consulting
his own interests without the slightest heed to their decrees.
' He, as well as they', he added significantly, 'had his line of
retreat open to him in the favour and friendship of Caesar.'
Scipio* spoke in similar terms. Pompeius was resolved to
stand by the Republic if supported by the Senate ; but let
them hesitate or shrink from decided measures, and any
subsequent appeal to his aid, should they afterwards desire
it, would only be made in vain. This speech of Scipio's was 2
taken by the House as representing the actual language of
* Approximate only, owing to the state of the calendar, which was some
five weeks ahead of the season. Any month and day given must be
corrected accordingly. Thus Jan. 1, 49 becomes abcut Nov. 24, 50.
' Father-in-law of Pompeius since 52.
LONC B
2 Proceedings in the Senate
Jan. 49 Pompeius ; for, although they were met within the city walls,
Pompeius was at the time in the neighbourhood of Rome.^
O^her and more conciliatory measures, it should be noticed,
had been previously counselled by various members present.
Marcus Marcellus, for example, in addressing the House had
urged that it was premature to discuss the main issue till
levies had been completed throughout Italy, and armies put
into commission ; under whose protection they could then
venture to formulate their wishes with liberty and security.
Again, Marcus Calidius had a proposal that Pompeius should
leave Italy and go off to his provinces '^, thereby removing all
pretext for war ; since what Caesar feared was that the reten-
tion near the capital of the two legions lately extorted from
him by the Senate should look like a deliberate menace from
Pompeius to himself. This proposal of Calidius was repeated,
with slight verbal changes, by Marcus Caelius Rufus.
They were one and all made the object of a savage attack
by the presiding consul Lentulus, and effectually silenced by
his scathing satire : in fact, he even went so far as to refuse to
put the motion of Calidius ; whereupon Marcellus, alarmed
at the growing storm of obloquy, withdrew that standing in
his name. The result was that this language of the consul,
backed up by the terrorizing effect of the presence of the
army, together with the open threats of Pompeius's friends,
succeeded in forcing the House, against the convictions of the
majority, to adopt the motion of Scipio, whereby Caesar was
to disband h"s army before a fixed date or be held guilty of
open treason. This resolution being vetoed by two of the
' As holding full military command Pompeius could not, without
forfeiting it, enter the ancient city boundary.
^ The two Spains, then governed by his deputies. See Introd.
Proceedings in the Senate 3
tribunes, Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius, the legality Jan. 49
of such veto was immediately challenged ^ Extreme
opinions were expressed, and the applause that greeted
each speaker from the ranks of Caesar's opponents was in
direct proportion to the bitter and vindictive spirit each
displayed.
It was evening before the Senate broke up, and Pompeiu5 3
at once summoned to a conference outside the city all who
possessed a seat in the House, praising their recent action and
stiffening them to face the future, while rebuking and stimu-
lating the faint-hearted. From all parts of the country large
numbers of those who had belonged to the old Pompeian
armies were called out for active service, induced by hopes
of plunder and high military rank ; many also of those who
were attached to the two legions lately transferred by Caesar
now received orders to be in attendance ; with the result
that the city, the ascent to the Capitol, and the Comitium
were soon crowded with regimental officers, centurions, and
reservists. An overflowing meeting of the House was shortly
afterwards held, packed with the friends of both consuls, and
the supporters, not merely of Pompeius, but of all who nursed
old grievances against Caesar ; and these, by their chreatening
language and imposing numbers, intimidated the weak-kneed,
strengthened the waverers, and made a free decision for most
of those present impossible. An offer was made by Lucius
Piso, one of the censors *, and Lucius Roscius, one of the
* Apparently on the ground that the proceedings involved the appoint-
ment to consular provinces, which was exempt from the veto.
* A quinquennial office, lately fallen into abeyance. The two censors,
when appointed, held the census, revised the senatorial register, and
supervised Public Works.
B 2
Proceedings in the Senate
Jan. 49 praetors,^ to carry a report of these proceedings to Caesar,
six days only being asked for the purpose : similarly others
urged that a commission be sent to lay before him the mind
of the House.
4 To all alike objection was raised, and all alike were thwarted
by speeches from the consul, from Scipio, and from Cato.
Cato's opposition was due to long-standing dislike of Caesar,
increased by resentment at an electoral defeat. The action of
the consul Lentulus was dictated by the colossal proportions
of his debts, which he looked forward to settling by the com-
mand of an army and provinces, and by the princely profits
to be made out of foreign king-making : indeed, he boasted
in private that he would be a second SuUa, into whose hands
the supreme government would one day fall. As for Scipio,
his motives were similar ambitions for a province and armies,
the command of which he thought he, as a relative, would
share with Pompeius : to this must be added his fears of pro-
secution, and also the ostentatious flattery of which he was at
this time the subject, not merely from himself, but from all
his most powerful contemporaries in the political and legal
worlds. Finally, in the case of Pompeius, the influence
of Caesar's opponents along with his inability to tolerate
a rival on equal terms, had induced him completely to with-
draw his old friendship and to resume intimate relations with
their common antagonists, whose enmity, in the majority of
cases, he had himself fastened upon Caesar in the old days of
their family alliance.'^ In addition to this, the public stigma
1 Eight annual magistrates representing the Roman Bench, who could
however command troops.
' In 59 after Caesar's consulship Pompeius had married his daughter Julia
who died in childbirth in 54.
Proceedings in the Senate f
attaching to the affair of the two legions, which, instead of Jan. 49
marching for Asia Minor and Syria, had been diverted by him
to secure his own sovereignty, drove him to work for a settle-
ment by the sword.
It was such considerations that now caused everything to 5
be hurried through in disorder. The delay asked for by
Caesar's friends, in order to acquaint him with these develop-
ments, was steadily refused ; the two tribunes of the people
were allowed no opportunity either of protesting again? t their
personal peril, or even of maintaining, in the form of the veto,
that fundamental right of their office which had been left
them by Lucius Sulla. The seventh day of the New Year
saw them compelled to take measures for their personal safety,
such as, in the case of the notorious revolutionaries of the
past, had generally been adopted as their hazardous refuge
only after eight months spent in multifarious political acti-
vity. Such indecent haste, in fact, was now displayed, that
without more ado recourse was had to the very last weapon
of Senatorial government, — the well-known ' final decree ', —
which no amount of effrontery in popular legislators had
ever before brought to a division in the House, unless indeed
Rome were all but burning, and the very existence of the
country despaired of, — the decree directing consuls, praetors,
tribunes, and all proconsuls near the capital to take measures
for the safety of the State. This order was embodied in a
decree of the House dated January 7 : and thus within the
first five days on which the Senate could legally be convened
since Lentulus entered upon office (not reckoning the two
days set down for comitial business), a decision was arrived
at of extreme severity and malignity both on the question of
Caesar's military command, and on the fate of two distin-
6 Proceedings in the Senate
Jan. 49 guished tribunes of the people. The latter at once left Rome
and fled to Caesar, who wa then at Ravenna, awaiting an
answer to his very moderate demands, and still hoping that
men's general sense of fairness would render a peaceful solu-
tion possible.
6 The next few days the Senate met outside the city boun-
dary. The conduct of Pompeius tallied with the forecast
given of it by Scipio. After commending the courage and
firmness that the Senators had just displayed, he proceeded
to lay before them an account of the military forces at his
disposal, which were not less, he declared, than ten fully mo-
bilized Roman legions. To this was added the statement
that he had trustworthy intelligence that Caesar's troops
looked coldly on his schemes, and could neither be induced
to support his cause, nor to follow his leadership. Motions
were then put before the House dealing with other requisite
measures. It was proposed that enlisting should be
organized throughout Italy; that Faustus Sulla should
be dispatched without delay to Morocco {Mauretania) ;
and lastly, that Pompeius should be supplied with money
from the Treasury. The question was also raised of
making an alliance of friendship with King Juba,' but
the consul Marcellus refused for the present to entertain
this idea ; whilst the proposal concerning Faustus was
vetoed by Philippus, one of the tribunes. The rest were
duly embodied in regular decrees. It was further deter-
mined to give commands of provinces to men not then in
office, two of these to be consular and the rest praetorian.
Of the former Syria fell to Scipio, Gaul to Lucius Domitius.
By a clandestine arrangement Philippus and Cotta were
^ Oi Niimidia (Algeria). See Bk. II, ch. 3.
Caesar^s Appeal to his Troops 7
passed over, neither of their lots being thrown in. To the Jan. 49
remaining provinces ex-praetors were sent out ; and these,
without waiting for the legal confirmation of their command
by the people, after offering the customary state-prayers,
immediately left the capital in full military attire. The con-
suls, acting against all precedent, took their departure from
the city, whilst inside and on the Capitol lictors were seen in
attendance on men no longer in office, a sight unexampled
in the history of the commonwealth. Over the whole of
Italy troops were being enlisted, arms commandeered, money
levied on the country towns and even plundered from the
temples ; in short, every distinction between the claims of
the State and of religion was obliterated.
Caesar no sooner had intelligence of these proceedings 7
than he appealed to his troops. After recounting in detail the
wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his political opponents,
he charged Pompeius with having allowed his mind to be
misled, and his judgement to be warped by the pernicious
influence these exerted upon him, owing to the petty jealousy
he felt at his rival's reputation ; and that, despite the fact
that that rival had himself always actively supported the power
and prestige of Pompeius. A further grievance was the
establishment of an unwarrantable precedent in the consti-
tution, when military force was invoked to annul and to over-
ride the tribunes' power of veto — that same veto which in
past years had only been restored by a similar appeal to force.
Even Sulla, who stripped the tribunician office of all its func-
tions, yet left it the free exercise of the veto ; Pompeius, who
was regarded as the restorer of their lost privileges, had
actually succeeded in robbing them of what they had always
enjoyed. Again, on every occasion when the well-known
8 Caesar*s appeal to his Troops
Jan. 49 decree had been passed for the magistrates ' to see to it that
the country take no harm ' — the statutory formula for sum-
moning the Roman people to arms — it had been at a time
either of the promulgation of some obnoxious legislation, of
some violence offered by a tribune, or of some popular
disturbance ; and then only after the temples and city heights
had already been seized. How such revolutionary attempts
in past history had been avenged by the downfall of Saturninus
and the Gracchi, he next reminded them. Yet of these
circumstances not one had at this time arisen or been even
thought of : no law had been promulgated, no popular legis-
lation proposed, no disturbance taken place. He called upon
them now to protect from political adversaries the honour
and good name of their commander, under whose leadership
for nine long years they had fought with such brilliant success
the battles of their country, during which time they had
gained such numberless victories, and subjugated the whole
of Gaul and Germany.^
The men of the Thirteenth legion, the only one present,
answered with a cheer (Caesar had summoned this regiment
to him when the general levy in Italy began ; the concentra-
tion of the others was not yet completed), ' they were ready
to protect the rights of their commander and of the people's
tribunes '
8 Assured of the temper of his troops, Caesar began his ad-
vance with this legion as far as Rimini {Ariminum) "^^ where he
^ i.e. W. of the Rhine.
' Thereby crossing the Rubicon, the small stream that then separated
Italy from the Cisalpine Province. ' We can still go back ', are the words
attributed to him by later writers, ' but once cross this little bridge, and
then the sword must settle everything.' Suet. 31.
The T^ubicon crossed 9
met the two tribunes who had lately fled to his protection : Jan. 40
his remaining legions he ordered out of their winter quarters
with instructions to follow close in his rear. At Rimini he
was waited on by young Lucius Caesar, a son of one of his own
generals. This young man, after first stating the primary
object of his mission, went on to explain that he had a private
message from Pompeius to Caesar on the subject of their
personal relations. This was to the effect that ' Pompeius
desired to clear himself in Caesar's eyes, so that the latter
should not take as an insult to himself what had solely been
dictated by public exigencies ; that he had always regarded
the claims of public interests as prior to those of private friend-
ship, and that Caesar similarly should now show his true
greatness by sacrificing ambition and passion to the general
good, and not allow resentment against opponents to go so
far as to involve his country in the punishment he hoped to
inflict upon them'. There was more in the same strain
along vnth excuses for the conduct of Pompeius ; and a very
similar appeal, in similar language, was made to Caesar by the
praetor Roscius, who stated that he had it from Pompeius.
Now, although this episode had apparently but little bearing 9
on the removal of his own grievances, yet, finding appro-
priate agents at hand for conveying his vwshes to Pompeius,
Caesar begged each of them that, as they had brought him
Pompeius's terms, so they would not object to taking back
his ovra demands to Pompeius. It was surely worth while
to go to a little trouble, if by this means a great quarrel
could be settled and the whole of Italy thus freed from appre-
hension. * Let them then understand that with him honour
had always been first, — dearer than life itself. This honour
had been wounded when the privilege granted him by the
I o Final Negotiations
J. in. 49 people of Rome had been floutingly snatched from him by
opponents, and when, after being robbed of six months' com-
mand, he found himself, as he now did, dragged back to the
capital, in spite of the fact that a resolution allowing his
candidature at the approaching elections to be accepted in
his absence had been expressly passed by the sovereign peo-
ple.' Though, however, he had borne without complaint,
for the sake of public peace, this curtailment of his rights, yet
his own modest suggestion for a general disarmament, which
he made in a dispatch to the Senate, had been bluntly re-
fused : levies were even now proceeding throughout Italy ;
whilst the two legions which had been detached from his
command on the pretext of a Parthian war, were still de-
tained at home : in short, the whole country was in arms.
What did all this point to except his own destruction ? Still,
he was ready to stoop to every humiliation and to endure
every injustice, if thereby he could save the commonwealth.
Accordingly, these were his terms : Pompeius to take his
departure to his own provinces, and both to disband their
armies simultaneously with a general disarmament in Italy.
That would allay the apprehension of the country, and enable
elections and the whole machinery of government to be car-
ried on by both Senate and people without coercion. Lastly,
in order to facilitate the settlement by giving it fixed terms
and the sanction of their sworn oath, he proposed that either
Pompeius should advance to meet him, or else allow a visit
from himself ; for he felt confident that by talking matters
10 over all differences could be adjusted.' With this message
Roscius and Lucius Caesar came to Capua, where they found
the consuls and Pompeius, to whom they delivered Caesar's
* See Introd.
The Senate s J^eply
It
stipulations. After due deliberation an answer was returned Ja11.-Fcb.49
by the same messengers, who thereupon brought back the
written demands the other side had to make, of which the
following represents the summary : ' Caesar must recross the
Rubicon, evacuate Rimini, and disband his army ; after that,
Pompeius would go to his Spanish provinces. Meanwhile,
until a pledge had been given that Caesar would keep his word,
the consuls and Pompeius would continue to raise troops.'
It was obviously a one-sided bargain to require Caesar to 11
evacuate Rimini and retire upon his province, whilst his
opponent kept both provinces and legions alike to which he
had no claim : to propose that Caesar's army should be dis-
banded, while yet proceeding with his own levy : or again,
to undertake to go to his province, without, however, fixing
a date for his departure. The consequence of this last pro-
vision would have been that, supposing at the close of Caesar's
consulship Pompeius had not yet left Rome, he could
not justly be held guilty of any breach of faith by this
refusal to quit the capital. Finally, his omission to arrange
an interview or to promise any visit could but reduce the
chances of peace to a minimum. Accordingly Caesar dis-
patched Marcus Antonius with a force of five battalions to
seize Arrezo {Arretium), whilst he himself remained with
two more at Rimini, where the raising of fresh troops was
forthwith commenced. At the same time, with the three
remaining battalions of his single legion he occupied the coast
towns of Pesaro (Pisaurum), Fano (Fanum), and Ancona.
During these same few days intelligence reached mm 12
that the praetor Thermus, with a force of five battalions
was at Gubbio (Iguvium), engaged in fortifying the town, the
inhabitants of which were all strongly disposed towards him-
12 Caesar's T{apid Advance
Jan.-Feb.49 self. Under the command therefore of Curio the three
battalions stationed at Pesaro and Rimini were at once ordered
to the place. On hearing of their approach Thermus, who
felt no confidence in the temper of the town, hastily withdrew
his garrison ; but his men deserted on the march to return to
their homes, and Curio was then left to receive an enthusiastic
reception into Gubbio.
The report of these proceedings determined Caesar to trust
the adhesion of the country boroughs, and, by withdrawing
the battalions of the Thirteenth legion then garrisoning them,
to march upon Osimo (Auximum). Tliis town was then
held by Attius, who, after throwing a few battalions into it
as a garrison, was now engaged in raising troops throughout
the whole of Piceno {Picenum) with the help of a number of
senators who were traversing the country for that purpose.
1 3 On the news of Caesar's advance, however, the town coun-
cillors of Osimo waited in a body upon Attius Varus, and
informed him that, vsdthout constituting themselves judges
in the present quarrel, neither they nor the rest of the town
were prepared to see a general like Caius Caesar, whose public
services had been so signal, refused admission within their
walls ; and that he would therefore do well to consult his
future interests. This language led Varus to make a precipi-
tate withdrawal of the garrison he had established in the
town; but, overtaken by a small knot of infantry from Caesar's
advanced companies and compelled to give battle, he found
himself deserted by his troops, who either dispersed to their
homes or went over to Caesar. Amongst them was Lucius
Pupius, the senior centurion of his legion, who had formerly
held that post in the army of Pompeius, and who was now
brought by his men as a prisoner to Caesar. The latter.
Caesar* s J{apid Advance 1 3
after congratulating Attius's troops upon their decision, dis- Feb. 49
missed Pupius, and, in thanking the townspeople of Osimo,
told them he would not forget their conduct.
Meanwhile, in Rome, such a panic arose from the accounts 14
of these operations, that the consul Lentulus, who had gone
to open the treasury for the purpose of disbursing the money-
voted by the Senate to Pompeius, fled incontinently from the
city, leaving the more sacred of the two treasuries * wide open,
owing to a false alarm that Caesar was momentarily expected,
and his cavalry already at the gates. He was at once followed
by his colleague Marcellus, and by the majority of the other
magistrates. Pompeius had left the capital the day before,
and was now on his way to the two legions taken from Caesar,
which he had distributed in winter quarters in Apulia. All
levying of troops was at once suspended in the vicinity of the
city ; no place was thought safe north of Capua. Here, with
their confidence at last recovered, they rallied, and began to
organize a levy among the farmers lately settled as colonists in
that district by the Julian law ; ^ and the consul Lentulus even
went so far as to take the band of gladiators maintained there
by Caesar, and bring them out into the market-place, where,
after inciting their hopes by the prospect of earning their
liberty, he gave them horses and placed them under his orders.
A subsequent hint, however, from his friends that this pro-
ceeding was universally condemned, compelled him to dis-
tribute them for custody amongst his acquaintances in the
Capuan district.
Meanwhile Caesar, advancing from Osimo {Auximum), 15
' Containing a special war reserve, originally designed to meet a Gallic
invasion.
* One of Caesar's laws, 59.
14 Flight of the Government
Feb. 49 overran the whole of the Marches of Piceno (Picenum). He
was received with open arms by all the country towns, who
readily supplied his army with all it needed. Even Cingolo
(Ctngulum), a town founded by Labienus ^, and built at his
personal charges, sent a deputation to inform him what
great pleasure it would give them to receive his commands ;
and on his ordering troops, sent them at once. By this time
also the Twelfth legion overtook him ; and with these two he
now advanced against Ascoli Piceno (J senium Picenum).
That town was held by a force of ten battalions under
Lentulus Spinther ; but, on the news of Caesar's approach,
Spinther evacuated the place, and endeavoured to take his
battalions with him. Deserted, however, by the larger
number, he continued his march with a mere handful, until
he fell in with VibuUius Rufus, who had lately come with
a special commission from Pompeius to strengthen the hands
of his party in the Picenian lowlands. VibuUius, on hearing
from Spinther the state of operations in that quarter, took
over the latter's troops, and dismissed their commander. He
then proceeded to concentrate as many units as he could
from the Pompeian levy in the surrounding districts, amongst
which there joined him six battalions under Lucilius Hirrus,
whom he met flying from Camerino (Camerinum) with what
had formerly been the garrison of that city ; and in this way
he siicceeded in making up as many as thirteen battalions.
These he then led by forced marches to Domitius Ahenobar-
bus atPentima (Corfiniumy, to whom he announced the near
approach of Caesar with two legions. Domitius himself,
' The distinguished general who had deserted Caesar. See Introd.
' Pentima on the upper Pescara is only approximately the site of the
ancient Corfinium.
The j4dvance continued i j*
it should be added, had also collected a force of about twenty Feb. 49
battalions from Albe (Alba), drawn from the country of the
Marsi, Peligni, and neighbouring districts V
Continuing his advance, Caesar, after securing Fermo 16
(Firmum), and giving orders, upon the expulsion of Lentulus,
to search out the troops who had deserted that general, and
to organize a levy, had halted one day at Ascoli (Asculum) to
obtain supplies, and had then started for Pentima. Arrived
here, he found five battalions, thrown forward by Domitius
for that purpose, engaged in cutting the bridge that spans
the river '^ at a distance of some three miles from the city.
With this force Caesar's advanced patrols now came into
contact, vdth the result that Domitius's men were driven
from the bridge and retired upon the town. Caesar quickly
had his legions across, and, halting near the city, pitched his
camp close up to the walls.
On intelligence of his arrival, Domitius selected some of 17
those conversant with the country, and induced them, by
the offer of a large reward, to go with a letter to Pompeius
in Apulia, conveying a strongly-worded appeal for succour.
In it he declared his belief that with two armies, aided by
the natural difficulties of the country, it would be an easy
task to surround Caesar, and to sever his communications ;
failing this, the lives of himself and more than thirty battalions
of men, as well as those of numerous senators and Roman
knights would be endangered. In the interval he encouraged
his own party, placed artillery on the walls, allotted each
officer his special duties in the defence, and, in a public
harangue to his troops, promised each man a farm of twenty-
* The Abruzzi.
' The Aterno or Pesca'a.
1 6 Italy declares for Caesar
Feb. 49 five acres out of his own landed property, with corresponding
increase in the case of centurions and reservists.
1 8 About this time Caesar received information that the
people of Salmone (Sulmo), a town seven miles from Pentima,
were anxious to side openly with him, but were prevented by
Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius the Pelignian, who
were holding it with a force of seven battalions. Accordingly
Marcus Antonius was dispatched to the place virith five bat-
talions of the Thirteenth legion ; with the result that the
townspeople no sooner recognized the gleam of our standards
than, throwing open their gates, they streamed out, soldiers
and citizens alike, to welcome Antony. Lucretius and Attius
meanwhile tried to escape by leaping from the walls ; but
Attius was caught and brought back to Antonius, whereupon
he requested to be sent to Caesar. Thus, on the same day
as he had come, Antony was able to return with the surren-
dered battalions, taking Attius along with him. The troops
Caesar incorporated with his own army ; Attius he dismissed
without penalty.
Three days had now passed before Pentima, spent by Caesar
in strongly fortifying a camp, in collecting provisions from
the neighbouring towns, and in awaiting the arrival of his
remaining forces. Indeed, during these days he was joined,
not only by the Eighth legion, but also by twenty-two
battalions from the new levies in northern Italy, and some
three hundred cavalry from the King of Noricum ' : reinforce-
ments which enabled him to form a second camp on another
side of the town, which he put under the charge of Curio.
On the following days he commenced the circumvallation of
the city with fortified lines of entrenchment ; and the work
' Roughly Styria and Carinthia.
The Entanglement of Corfimum 1 7
on this was all but finished just as the messengers sent to Feb. 49
Pompeius got safely back.
As soon as Domitius had read the letter which they brought, 1 9
he determined to suppress the truth, and openly announced
in a council of war that Pompeius was about to make a rapid
march to their relief, exhorting his staff not to despair, but
to make every preparation for the defence of the town. To
a few intimate friends he divulged the real answer, and began
to lay plans for escape. When it was seen, however, that his
looks did not accord with his words, and that his whole
manner betrayed more haste and nervousness than had been
usual with him on previous days ; and further that, contrary
to his ordinary habit, he now held long and secret conversa-
tions with his friends for discussing their mutual plans, while
he shrank from attending the councils of war and from the
society of his brother-officers, the truth could no longer be
hidden or disguised. This was that Pompeius had written
back, flatly declining to court certain disaster ; and intimating
that, as Domitius had locked himself up in Pentima in oppo-
iition to his own plans and wishes, he must now take any
opportunity that offered for rejoining him with all his forces.
It was, of course, to prevent this very step, that Caesar was
drawing his blockading lines around the city.
When the scheme of Domitius became generally known jo
amongst the troops in Pentima, they privately summoned an
unauthorized gathering among themselves at dusk; and using
as their mouthpiece one of their officers, together with the
centurions and most influential of their own rank, expressed
their decision as follows. ' They found themselves blockaded
by Caesar, whose siege-works and fortifications were all
but finished. Their own general Domitius, trust and confi-
LONO C
1 8 Corfinium surrenders
Feb. 49 dence in whom had alone induced them to stay and hold the
city, had thrown them all over and was now meditating
flight : under these circumstances it was their duty to consult
their own safety.' From this resolution the Marsi in the place
at first strongly dissented, and seized upon what was con-
sidered the most strongly fortified quarter of the town. So
bitter, indeed, grew the quarrel, that an attempt was made
to come to blows and to fight it out with weapons ; but
shortly afterwards the envoys who were dispatched by each
party to the other enabled the Marsi to learn what they did
not know before, viz. the contemplated flight of Domitius.
When this was once known, the two forces joined hands, and
fetching their general into the open, surrounded him with
a guard. They then sent representatives of their own body
to Caesar, with a message that they were prepared to open
the gates, to obey his orders, and to deliver Domitius alive
into his hands.
21 On receipt of these overtures, Caesar at once felt the
extreme importance of taking possession of the town at the
earliest possible opportunity, and of transferring the bat-
talions in it to his own camp. There was always the chance
of the garrison changing their minds, either through bribery,
or the recovery of their spirits, or by false reports ; grave
events in war being often determined by the slightest of
accidents. On the other hand, there was also the fear that
the entry of his troops at night might lead to excess and the
looting of the town. Under these circumstances, therefore,
he gave the envoys a cordial welcome, and then sent them
back to their city ; whilst to his own men he issued orders
closely to watch the gates and walls. He further stationed
troops on the incompleted siege works, not, as on previous
Corfinium surrenders \y
days, at fixed intervals, but in one continuous line of sentries Feb. 49
and pickets, so that the men could touch hands with each
other and thus cover the entire chain of works. Officers
were sent round on tours of inspection, strictly charged, not
only to guard against salLcs by bodies of the enemy, but also
to look out for any secret ebcape of individuals. That night
not a man slept in camp, however careless or indifferent he
might otherwise be ; but engrossed as all were in the now
rapidly approaching crisis, they continued to debate in their
own minds the various aspects of the issue, as they wondered
what would happen to the Pentimians, to Domitius, to Len-
tulus, and the rest, and what fate was in store for each group.
About six o'clock in the morning Lentulus Spinther hailed 22
our sentries and guards from the city wall, with the request
that, if possible, he might be allowed an audience with Caesar.
Leave being granted, he was sent out from the town under an
armed escort of Domitius's troops, who took good care not to
leave him until they had brought him safely into the presence
of Caesar.
He began with an impassioned appeal for his own life,
imploring Caesar to spare him, and reminding him of their
longstanding friendship, and of Caesar's many kindnesses to
himself — ^which indeed were considerable ; including, as they
did, his election to the pontifical college ^, his appointment to
the province of Spain at the end of his praetorship, and sup-
port in his canvass for the consulship. Caesar interrupted his
speech by telling him he had not left his province as a brigand,
but to defend himself against the insults of his opponents, and
to restore to their legal position tribunes of the people who
had been driven from their country for daring to uphold his
' One of the great religious corporations.
C 2
2 0 Caesar^ s Justification
Feb. 49 rights : in a word, to reassert the freedom both of himself
and of the Roman people, at present ground down by the
despotism of a clique. Reassured by such language, Lentulus
asked leave to return to the town, intimating that his own
successful petition would be a comfort and encouragement to
others as well, some of whom were so panic-stricken as to be
obliged to contemplate laying violent hands on their own per-
sons. His request was granted, and he then withdrew.
23 At daybreak Caesar gave orders for all senators and their
21 Feb. ' sons, as well as all officers and Roman knights, to be brought
before him. Of the senatorial order there appeared five
representatives, viz. Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus
Spinther, Lucius Caecilius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus
(Domitius's paymaster), and Lucius Rubrius : the others
included a son of Domitius, together with many other young
lads, and a considerable number of knights and borough coun-
cillors, who had been ordered out for the campaign from the
local towns by Domitius. Arrived in his presence, Caesar
first placed them out of reach of the abuse and gibes of his own
men, and then addressed them in a few curt phrases, seeing
that they had not had the grace, on their side, to acknowledge
his own extraordinary leniency towards themselves : after that
he released them all without condition. A sum of about
j^50,ooo, which Domitius had taken with him into Pentima
and there deposited in the city chest, was presently brought
out by the four city magistrates. It was at once returned to
Domitius by Caesar, who was determined men should not
say he had shown more self-restraint in dealing with their
lives than with their property ; although it was well known
that this particular specie was in fact government money, re-
^ According to Cicero.
and Alagnafiimity
21
ceived from Pompeius for the payment of the troops. Having Feb. 49
settled these preliminaries, he gave orders for Domitius's men
to take the oath of military allegiance to himself ; and then on
the same day, striking camp, completed a full day's march,
after a stay at Pentima of altogether one week. An advance
through the districts of Ortona, Lanciano, Termoli, and
Larino (the Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates) brought him
into Apulia.
To return to Pompeius. On intelligence of the operations 24
round Pentima, he had left Lucera (Luceria), and, marching
through Canosa (Canusium), came down to Brindisi (Brundi-
sium). The various contingents raised by the recent levy
were ordered to concentrate upon this seaport from the dif-
ferent parts of the country ; whilst, in addition, slaves and
herdsmen were armed and mounted, till they made up a force
of about three hundred horse. Lucius Manlius, one of the
praetors, followed his leader in all haste with six battalions
from Albe {Alba) ; whilst another praetor, Rutilius Lupus,
brought three more from Terracina. Both these bodies came
in sight of the distant cavalry of Caesar, commanded by Vibius
Curius, and each, leaving the praetor to himself, went over to
that officer. The same thing happened on the remaining stages
of the march, some units falling in with Caesar's main column,
others with his cavalry. In addition to this, the colonel
commandant of engineers in the army of Pompeius, Numerius
Magius of Cremona, was captured on the march, and con-
ducted into the presence of Caesar. The latter at once sent
him back to his own commander with the following message.
' Hitherto he had been refused the opportunity of an inter-
view ; but he was now coming to Brindisi {Brundisium), and
it was of the most vital public interest that he should have
2 2 The Advance continued
Feb. 49 a conference with Pompeius; for it was impossible tomake the
same progress by exchanging proposals through the medium
of others, as by a personal discussion on all the points at issue.'
25 Soon after sending this message, he himself reached Brindisi
at the head of six legions : three of these consisted of veterans,
while the rest were composed of the recent levies, and had only
been brought up to their full strength during the recent
march. This represented all his force, since the surrendered
army of Domitius had been sent straight away from Pentima
(Corfiniurn) into Sicily. On arrival, he found that the two
consuls had crossed to Durazzo (Dyrrachium) with the bulk of
the Pompeian army, but that Pompeius himself was still at
Brindisi with twenty battalions. It was impossible to dis-
cover whether the latter remained there for want of transports
or whether his intention was to retain a hold on Brindisi,
and to use this corner of Italy, with the opposite Greek coast,
as a base for keeping command of the Adriatic ; a course
which would allow him to conduct hostilities simultaneously
from either side. Fearing, however, that his opponent would
not think it advisable to abandon Italy, Caesar determined to
block the entrance to Brindisi harbour and render it im-
practicable for shipping. The method employed for this
was as follows. Selecting the narrowest part of the harbour
entrance, he built out from either shore, where the water was
shallow, a sort of rough breakwater, carrying a broad level top.
To this structure, as soon as the deeper water rendered further
progress impossible, owing to the rubble no longer holding
together, a couple of rafts were attached, each thirty feet
square, one at either end, and made fast by four anchors from
the four corners, so that no action of the waves could shift
them. As soon as the first pair were completed and placed in
Plan of Brindisi. (Brundisium.)
AA. Inner Harbour. B. Outer Harbour
C. Islands of S? Andrea . (Ancient Barra,.)
D. Town • EE. Caesar'.* Moles.
To face p. 23.
operations at Brin.iisi 23
position, others of similar dimensions were fastened in con- March ^i)
tinuation, and over all a smooth surface of earth was laid,
designed to give a free road to his men when charging to repel
the enemy. Round the front and flanks of each raft were
erected protection-hurdles and mantlets ; whilst every fourth
raft carried a two-storied tower to aid in beating off the
assaults of the enemy's ships, or his attempts to set fire to the
work.
To meet this device, Pompeius had recourse to a number of 2^>
large merchantmen, which he had commandeered in Brindisi
harbour. These vessels were specially fitted out by the erec-
tion on their decks of three-storied towers, armed with
numerous pieces of artillery and every species of missile
weapon. They were then driven against Caesar's works, with
the object of breaking through the line of rafts and injuring
the barricade ; and daily engagements between the two
parties, though not indeed at close quarters, were carried on
by means of slings, arrows, and other similar weapons.
These operations, though necessarily demanding Caesar's
most careful attention, did not, however, as yet cause him to
despair altogether of peace. It was true that the failure of
Magius to return, after being expressly sent with communica-
tions to Pompeius, caused him considerable misgiving ; it was
also true that his continued efforts in this direction gravely
compromised his plans for taking military initiative : but not-
withstanding all this, he felt himself bound to leave no stone
unturned in the pursuit of his main object. He therefore dis-
patched one of his staff, Caninius Rebilus, a personal friend
and relative of Scribonius Libo, with a commission to see that
officer, and to beg him to exert his influence for peace. Above
all, he requested a personal conference with Pompeius, and
24 Further Futile 'Negotiations
March 49 again stated his firm conviction that if this could only be
brought about, a peaceful solution, honourable to both par-
ties, would be arrived at. Should this result be attained, most
of the credit and reputation attaching to it w^ould belong to
Libo, whose active intervention would then have prevented
a civil war. Libo went straight from this conversation with
Caninius to Pompeius ; only, however, to return with the
message that, in the absence of the two consuls, no steps
towards a settlement could be taken. With this last answer
to efforts continually repeated, and repeated in vain, Caesar
came to the reluctant conclusion that the time for such mea-
sures had now gone by, and that henceforward the war must
be prosecuted with vigour.
37 The sea-mole he was building was about half finished, after
nine days' work spent upon it, when the transports which had
conveyed the van of the Pompeian army across to Durazzo
{Dyrrachium) returned from the consuls, and safely entered
Brindisi. Thereupon, whether it was that he became nervous
at Caesar's blockading piers, or that his plan of campaign had
all along been to let Italy go — at all events, with the arrival
of these ships, Pompeius commenced preparations for eva-
cuation. In order, however, to break the force of an attack
from Caesar's troops, should the latter storm the town at
the moment of withdrawal, he caused the city gates to be
blocked up, barricaded the streets and thoroughfares of the
town ; whilst across the main arteries trenches were carried,
bristling on the far side with sharp stakes and horizontally set
piles, which were then carefully covered with light hurdles
strewn with earth. All external approaches to the harbour,
including two regular roads, were fenced off by driving into
the ground enormous baulks carrying sharply-pointed heads ;
Pompeius evacuates Italy 25-
and with these dispositions completed, orders were given for March 49
the legionaries to embark in silence ; whilst on the walls and
city towers was posted a thin line of light-armed troops,
drawn from the reservists, archers, and slingers. These last
were, at a prearranged signal, immediately the legionaries
were all on board, to fall back upon a conveniently sheltered
spot, where transports suitable for either sailing or rowing
lay ready to receive them.
Now, the people of Brindisi, instigated by what they had 28
suffered from the Pompeian soldiery, as well as by their
contemptuous treatment at the hands of Pompeius himself,
heartily espoused the cause of Caesar. As soon as the news,
therefore, leaked out of this decision to sail, under cover
of the confusion caused by the busy preparations of the
troops, signals were made on all sides from houses in the
town. Informed in this way of what was going forward,
Caesar ordered his men to prepare scaling-ladders and to
put on their arms, determined to lose no chance of striking
an effective blow. At nightfall, however, Pompeius sailed.
The guards left behind on the wall retired at the appointed
signal, and rushed down to the ships by paths well known
to themselves. Caesar's troops flung their ladders into
position, and swarmed up the walls ; but, warned by the
townspeople against the sunken ditches and fenced dykes,
they were forced to check their rush, and were then guided
round to the harbour by a more circuitous route. Here,
finding two of the transports with troops on board which
had run upon the mole, they hauled them off by row-boats
and launches, and then safely secured them as prisoners.
26 Caesar's Dilemma
CHAPTER II
The Safeguarding of the West
29 With the escape of Pompeius an accomplished fact, the
March 49 plan that most commended itself to Caesar for settling the
business between them was to collect transports, and cross
over after his opponent before the latter could strengthen
his position by raising large bodies of oversea auxiliaries.
The delay, however, and length of time involved in this
course was a serious consideration ; for Pompeius, by requi-
sitioning every ship on that part of the coast, had made
immediate pursuit of himself impossible. The only alterna-
tive was to wait for vessels to come from the somewhat
distant regions of Northern Italy and Piceno (Picenum),
or from the Sicilian Straits ; but this, owing to the, un-
favourable season of the year, appeared both a slow and
precarious scheme. And, further, whilst he was waiting,
the two Spanish provinces (one of which was devoted to
the interests of Pompeius by reason of the great services he
had rendered it), together with the veteran army stationed
in them, would be steadily strengthened ; auxiliary forces and
• cavalry would continue to be raised ; and the allegiance of
Gaul and Italy would be undermined, while he was out of the
way; noneof whichproceedingshe was at all disposed to allow.
30 For the present, therefore, he gave up the idea of pur-
suing Pompeius, and determined to transfer the war to
Spain.' For this purpose orders were at once given to
the governing magistrates of all municipal seaports to com-
' Caesar summed up the military situation by remarking that ' he went
to an army without a general, and should return to a general without an
army'. Suet. 35.
Sicily
secured 27
mandeer the required vessels, and have them brought round March 40
to Brindisi (^Brundisium). With equal promptitude one
of his staff, Valerius, was sent with a single legion to secure
Sardinia ; and Curio, with two legions and the powers
of a governor, was similarly dispatched to Sicily, with orders
to take his army over into Africa, immediately that island
had been reduced. Sardinia was at the time held by Marcus
Cotta, Sicily by Marcus Cato ; whilst Tubero had been
allotted Africa and was then due to take over the governor-
skip. In Sardinia the people of Cagliari (Carales), as soon
as they heard that Valerius was to be sent them, even before
the expeditionary force had left Italy, of their own initiative
expelled Cotta from the town ; whereupon the Pompeian
officer, frightened by the knowledge that the feeling of the
province was unanimous, hastily quitted Sardinia for Africa.
In Sicily Cato was busy repairing old men-of-war, and
levying new ones from the various local communities ;
work into which he was throwing himself with extraordinary
vigour. Special service officers had been sent to raise troops
throughout Basilicata and Calabria {Lucania and Bruttium)
from among those who held the Roman franchise ; whilst in
Sicily each township was required to furnish its fixed quota
of horse and foot. These dispositions were all but completed
when news reached the island of the approach of the rival
governor Curio. Upon this report Cato summoned a general
assembly, and in it openly denounced Pompeius for having
deserted and betrayed his representative, and for having
embarked on a war for which there had been no sort of
necessity, without even the semblance of preparation ; and
that, in spite of the assurances publicly given in the Senate,
in response to inquiries from himself and the rest, that
2 8 uind Sardinia
March' 49 everything was fully prepared for hostilities. With this last
public protest he took a hurried farewell of his province.
31 Thus it was that when Valerius and Curio arrived with
their armed forces in Sardinia and Sicily respectively, they
each found a province bereft of its constituted authorities.
Tubero, on the other hand, on reaching Africa, found that
province in the hands of Attius Varus, who was there engaged
in exercising full military command. This general, after
losing his battalions at Osimo {Auximtim) under the cir-
cumstances already described, had completed his flight
by taking the first ship for Africa ; and, the country being
at the time without a governor, had appointed himself
to the command. Here he organized a levy and succeeded
in raising two entire legions ; his knowledge of the locality
and its inhabitants, and his familiarity with the province,
opening a way for such considerable designs ; he having
a few years previously governed this province at the close
of his praetorship. Thus, when Tubero arrived with his
ships off Utica \ he found himself refused admission to
either the harbour or town ; not even his son, who was sick
on board, was allowed to be landed, and he was obliged
to weigh anchor and set sail from the neighbourhood.
32 This was the point events had reached when Caesar, being
desirous of resting his men from their recent hard work before
commencing further active operations, made a distribution
of his present forces among the neighbouring Italian towns "^^
1 April ^ and then set out himself for the capital. Here having
summoned the Senate, he made the House a statement
of the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his political
* In Tunis, not far from Bizerta. See Map, p. 95.
^ Biindisi, Taranto, and Otranto (Cicero and Appian). ^ Cicero.
Caesar at l{ome 29
adversaries. He reminded members that it was no unconsti- April 49
tutional position he had sought ; he had waited the legal
time for re-election to the consulship, and had shown
himself content with what was within the reach of every
citizen alike. A proposal, allowing him to stand in his
absence, had been submitted to the people hy all the ten
tribunes, and there carried in the teeth of the violent opposi-
tion of his opponents, particularly that of Cato, who had
characteristically employed his favourite trick of talking
out time each day the assembly had met. This measure,
he reminded them, had been adopted in Pompeius's own
consulship ' ; why then, if the latter disapproved of it, did
he allow it to be passed, or why, if he approved, had he
prevented his (Caesar's) availing himself of the concession
thus granted? He then asked the House to notice his
own extraordinary forbearance in voluntarily proposing the
disbandment of both armies, involving, as it would have
done, a deliberate sacrifice of prestige and of his own
legitimate position. He also exposed the bitter party-spirit
betrayed by his antagonists, who did not hesitate to ask
from another what they declined to do themselves ; but
sooner than yield up their command over standing armies
preferred to plunge the whole world into war. The ille-
gality of depriving him of the two legions was, moreover,
openly denounced, along with the violent, high-handed
action of curtailing the powers of the tribunate ; nor did
he omit to mention his own proposals for peace, and his
repeated but thwarted attempts at an interview. ' Under
these circumstances he urged and invited them to take
up, and to retain the reins of government in conjunction
' 52 B.C. Introd.
30 ]^Ieets the Senate
April 49 with himself. Did, however, they shrink from co-operation
with him, through fear of the consequences to themselves,
he would not inflict himself upon them, but would carry
on the administration alone. Meanwhile, he considered
representatives should at once be sent to Pompeius with
a view to a settlement ; for he felt no apprehension himself,
like that lately uttered in the Senate by Pompeius, viz. that
the opening of overtures by one party implied the recogni-
tion of the justice of the other party's claims, and a corre-
sponding want of confidence in its own. That was but
a weak and childish view of things. His own desire was
to triumph by justice and equity, even as he had already
sought to anticipate his opponent in action.'
33 The idea of opening negotiations with Pompeius com-
mended itself to the House ; the difficulty was to find
those willing to go. The chief reason for this general
refusal to serv^e on such a commission was personal fear ; since
Pompeius, on evacuating the capital, had openly declared
in the Senate that he would regard all who stayed behind
in Rome in the same category as those actually within
Caesar's camp. The result of this threat was that three
whole days were now wasted in wrangling and excuses.
Moreover, the party opposed to Caesar put up Lucius
Metellus to frustrate this proposal, and at the same time
to block all other business which Caesar had designed.
Perceiving his object, therefore, and reflecting that he had
already spent several wasted days, when he was determined
not to lose more time, Caesar left his proposed measures
unfinished, and, taking his departure from the city, travelled
through to Further Gaul ^
* Modern France.
Leaves fur Marseilles 3 i
Arrived here, he learnt that Pompeius had recently 34
dispatched into Spain Vibullius Rufus, whom he had himself ^pr'! 49
only a few days previously captured and released at Pentima
(Corfinium) : that Domitius had similarly gone oflE to seize
Marseilles (Nlassilia) with seven fast ships of the mercantile
marine that could either sail or row, which he had collected
from private owners off the island of Giglio {Igilium) and
in the harbour of Cosa, and there manned with his own
slaves, freedmen, and small tenantry : and lastly, that
some young nobles of Marseilles, who had lately been in
Rome, had been sent on home as envoys from Pompeius,
with a strong appeal, given on the eve of his departure
from the capital, that they would not allow the recent
services rendered to their city by Caesar to obliterate the
memory of his own past benefits. It was the receipt of
this message that had induced the Massiliots to shut their
gates against Caesar. They had further requisitioned the
services of the Albici, a foreign tribe living in the hill country
north-east of Marseilles, to which city they had long been
subject : corn had been got in from the surrounding neigh-
bourhood and from all their fortified stations, for storage in
the city ; arsenals had been established for the manufacture
of war material ; and finally the walls and gates and fleet
were now being put into repair.
Caesar requested the presence from Marseilles of the stand- 35
ing committee of fifteen chief councillors of the city ; and on
their arrival, pleaded with them not to allow their town
to incur the responsibility of commencing hostilities, but
to follow the unanimous decision of Italy rather than give
ear to the wishes of a single individual. Other considerations
which he thought calculated to bring them to their senses
3 2 Attitude of the Town
April 49 were also added ; and the delegates departed to report his
words, only, however, to return with the following resolution
of their governing council. ' The Roman world ', they under-
stood, ' was divided between two factions ; but which of these
had the better right was beyond their province and their
power to decide. The leaders of these two parties (Pompeius
and Caius Caesar) were both alike patrons of their city,
which owed to one of them the annexation of the territories
of the Arecomican Volcae and the Helvii ^, and to the other
an increase of their revenues by the incorporation of the
Sallyae ', whose conquest he had effected. With such an
equality in favours received, the proper return to make was
a like impartiality in their own attitude ; to give assistance
to neither against the other, and to allow to neither access
to their city or harbours.'
36 These negotiations were still actively proceeding, when
Domitius arrived with his squadron off Marseilles, to be
at once admitted by the inhabitants, placed in command
of the city, and given supreme direction of the war. Acting
upon his instructions, the fleet was sent out to scour the seas
in every quarter ; and every merchantman they could lay
their hands upon was brought back into harbour, where
any that were found to be unsound in their rivets, timber,
or rigging were broken up and used for the equipment and
repair of the others. All the corn discoverable was com-
mandeered for the public service, and any other provisions
or supplies were held in reserve against a possible siege of
the town.
Such unwarrantable acts determined Caesar to order up
three legions to Marseilles, Upon their arrival, siege towers
' Neighbourhood of Nismes and Ardeche. * East of Aries.
Saragossa
C aesaraugus ta
English Miles
o lO 2o 30 -to 50
Ancient Main Roads
Heights in Feet
The Position in Spaifi 3 3
and shelters were at once pushed forward against the walls May 4')
with a view to the assault of the town, and at the same
time instructions were given for a fleet of twelve warships
to commence building at Aries (Arelate). These last were '
put together and fitted out within a month of the day the
timber for them was felled ; and upon their safe transference
to Marseilles, Decimus Brutus was appointed as their admiral
by Caesar, who thereupon took his departure from Mar-
seilles, leaving his general Caius Trebonius to superintend
the operations on the landward side.
During this period of preparation another general, Caius 37
Fabius, had been dispatched into Spain at the head of three
legions, lately distributed in winter quarters at Narbonne
and its neighbourhood, vnth orders to seize without delay
the passes of the Pyrenees, then in the hands of Lucius
Afranius, who held them for Pompeius. This force was
immediately to be followed by the remaining legions, then
wintering further away. In obedience to his orders, Fabius,
acting with great promptitude, dislodged the garrison from
the pass before him, and then marched rapidly upon the
army of Afranius.
In Spain the arrival of Lucius Vibullius Rufus on a mission, 3^
as we have seen, from Pompeius, had resulted in a conference
of the three Pompeian representatives, viz. Afranius,
Petreius, and Varro ; who held respectively Eastern Spain
with three legions. Western Spain, or the territory between
the Sierra di Morena and the Guadiana (Castolo range and
the Anas) with two more, and the country north of the
Guadiana (Anas), including Estremadura and Portugal
(the Vettones and Lusitania) likewise with two. At this
conference they arranged their own shares in the pending
34 The T^ival Forces
May 49 operations. Petreius was to inarch with his whole force
from Portugal (Lusitanid), through Estremadura (the
Vettones), in order to join Afranius ; whilst to Varro was
allotted the defence of the whole of the western part of
the Peninsula with the legions attached to his command.
Having settled these preliminaries, they proceeded to raise
cavalry and auxiliary troops; Petreius superintending the
levy throughout Portugal {Lusitanid), and Afranius that
in Guadalajara and Avenca, Oviedo and Santander {Celti-
beria and the Cantabri), and among all the barbarian tribes
of the north-western seaboard. Directly these were ready
Petreius lost no time in passing through Estremadura to
Afranius ; and the two agreed to co-operate in the conduct
of the war, and to make their head quarters at Lerida (Ilerdd)
on account of the great strategical importance of that place.
39 As stated above, Afranius had three legions and Petreius
a) -June ^^^ . ^^ addition to these there had now been raised in
the Eastern province an infantry force armed with the
oblong shield of regulars, and in the Western a similar force
carrying the light round Spanish shield, the two bodies
amounting in all to some eighty battalions ; whilst each
of the two provinces had also contributed some 5,000 mounted
men. As against these, Caesar's present field army consisted
of six Roman legions. Of auxiliary infantry he possessed
none ; though he still retained with him the 3,000 native
cavalry which had served through all his late campaigns ;
and this force had lately been doubled by the addition of
an equal number from Gaul, which he had himself
personally raised by inviting individually to his standard
the flower of the nobility and manhood in each of the
Gallic communes. Finally, this body had been furtjier
Campaign
of LERIDA49BC
English Miles
1 1 . — 1_
_^\
1/2 1
Heights in Feet
^\
Ca
Caesar's Upper Bridge
^^
Spanish Campaign opens 3 f
strengthened by incorporating in it drafts from the splendid May-June
fighting races of Aquitaine, and from the hill tribes on the ^'^
frontier of Provence. As for the probable course of the cam-
paign, there had lately reached him a report to the effect
that Pompeius, with his legions, was marching on Spain
by way of Morocco (Mauretania), and was now rapidly
approaching. It was at this time also that he borrowed
money from his officers and centurions for distribution
among the troops, a device by which two distinct objects
were gained ; on the one hand, the loyalty of his centurions
was assured by the stakes he now held from them ; on the
other hand, such lavish liberality secured the interested
devotion of the common soldiers.
Meanwhile Fabius was endeavouring to win the adhesion 40
of the neighbouring Spanish communes by addressing
letters to their leaders, and by disseminating proclamations
among the country folk. On the Segre (Sicoris) two bridges
had been constructed, some four miles apart, over which
foraging parties were now regularly proceeding, as every-
thing on the westward side had been eaten up during the
previous days. The same course of action was being
pursued by the Pompeian generals, and for the same reason,
thus giving rise to numerous cavalry skirmishes between
the two forces. Two legions were accordingly sent over
as a daily escort to the Fabian foragers ; and on one
occasion these had but just crossed by the lower bridge,
and were being followed by the baggage and all the cavalry,
when suddenly the heavy wind that was blowing, aided
by the swollen state of the river, caused the bridge to snap,
thereby leaving a section of the cavalry cut off on the farther
side. Petreius and Afranius quickly realizing the situation
D 2
3<^ Caesar at Lerida
June 49 from the hurdles and bridge-flooring that came swirling
down the stream, the latter commander at once took
over four legions and all his cavalry by the permanent
bridge connecting the opposite bank with the town of
Lerida (Ilerdd) and his own camp, and then rapidly advanced
against the two legions of Fabius. Their approach was
reported to Lucius Plancus, the commanding officer for
the day of the Fabian guard ; and he immediately per-
ceived the necessity of taking up a position on some high
ground, where he drew up his men on a double front, in
order to ensure himself from being surrounded by the
enemy's horse. In this formation he received the attack,
and, though vastly outnumbered, succeeded in beating
off the fierce assaults of the legions and mounted troops.
The engagement between the opposing cavalry had not
long been in progress, when both sides caught sight in the
distance of the advancing standards of two more legions.
These proved to be reinforcements for ourselves, dispatched
across the upper bridge by Fabius owing to his suspicion
of what in fact had occurred, viz. that the enemy's generals
would avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered
them by fortune for crushing our intercepted detachment.
Their arrival put an end to the action, and thereupon both
sides withdrew into camp.
4' Two days after this event Caesar arrived at head quarters,
accompanied by 900 cavalry which he had previously detained
as a bodyguard. The bridge vnrecked by the storm he
found almost repaired, and at once gave orders for its com-
pletion during the night. He next informed himself of the
nature of the surrounding country, and on the morrow,
leaving a garrison of six battalions for the camp and bridge,
Caesar at Lerida 37
together with all his baggage, drew up his entire force June 49
in three parallel columns, and marched straight upon Lerida,
halting beneath the camp of Afranius. There he remained
some time in battle formation, in order to give Afranius
an opportunity for coming down to engage him upon level
ground. Afranius answered the challenge by moving
out in force, but half-way down the hill halted under the
protection of his fortified lines ; whereupon Caesar, seeing
it was Afranius who declined the combat, determined to
entrench a camp about 400 yards from the lowest spurs
of the fortress rock. To prevent his troops being thrown
into confusion, whilst engaged upon its construction, by
any sudden onset from the enemy which might force them
to break off the work, he gave orders to omit the building
of a rampart, which was bound to be seen at a distance by
projecting above the level, and directed his men merely
to dig a trench thirty feet wide along his front and parallel
with the enemy. His first two lines then continued to
stand to arms in their original formation, whilst behind
them the work was secretly executed by the third \ and by
this device the whole business was finished off before Afranius
discovered that a camp was being fortified under his very
eyes. At the close of the day Caesar withdrew his legions
inside this trench, and that night his men slept under arms.
On the morrow the whole army was kept within the 42
same trench ; and, since the earth necessary for a raised
rampart would have to be fetched further afield, the same
plan was, for the present, adopted in the work, a single
legion being told off to the fortification of each of the
three remaining sides of the camp, with orders to dig trenches
of equal dimensions with the first. The three other legions
38 Attempt on the Puig Bordel
June 49 were at the same time stationed in light embattled order
fronting the enemy and ready for action. In this situation
Afranius and Petreius, hoping to create a diversion and to
hinder the construction of our earthworks, advanced their
entire force down to the lowest spurs of the hill, thus menacing
a general attack. They were not successful, however, in
inducing Caesar to suspend the work, the latter having full
confidence in the ability of the three legions to defend it,
especially when aided by the protection of the trench ;
and so, after remaining in position for a short time, without
ever advancing further than the base of the hill, they with-
drew their troops back into camp.
The third day of his arrival before Lerida (Ilerda) saw
Caesar's camp fortified with an earthen rampart ; and
on its completion, orders were at once given for the remain-
ing battalions left behind at the earlier camp, together with
all the baggage, to join the new head quarters.
43 Now between the town of Lerida and the hill which
lies nearest it, on the heights of which Petreius and Afranius
lay encamped, there stretched an open plain some 300
yards wide ; and about half-way across this plain rose a gentle
knoll ^, the occupation and fortification of which would,
Caesar was convinced, enable him to cut the enemy's
communications with the town and bridge, and the immense
quantity of stores they had there accumulated. In the
hope of accomplishing this coup, he advanced three legions
from camp ; then, having drawn up his main line in a suit-
able position, he pointed to the hill and ordered the first
ranks of one of the legions to dash forward and seize it.
The movement was no sooner discovered by the enemy
' Now the Puig Bordel.
J{epulse of the Caesarians 39
than the battalions of Afranius on picket duty before their June 49
own camp were sent by a shorter route to occupy the same
ground. A fight ensued, and Afranius's men, coming up
first to the hill, repulsed our detachment and compelled
it, on the approach of further reinforcements, to turn and
fall back upon the main body of the legions.
The type of fighting affected by the enemy's troops 4+
was to open with an impetuous charge, and boldly seize
upon some good position. Little or no endeavour was made
to preserve strict formation, fighting, as they did, in open
and scattered order ; whilst, if hard pressed, no scruples
of military honour deterred them from falling back or
evacuating their post. Residence with Lusitanians and
other foreign tribes had familiarized them with this kind
of warfare ; for experience shows that troops generally
conform in great measure to the customs of the country
in which they have long been stationed. These tactics
now occasioned much confusion amongst our men, who
were quite unaccustomed to such a mode of attack. The
isolated rushes of the enemy produced the belief that their
unprotected flank ' was being turned ; whilst, on the other
hand, it was a military tradition with themselves not to
break their ranks, or to leave the standards, or surrender
a position once occupied, except from the gravest causes.
The result was that when the advanced ranks were driven
in, the legion posted on that wing failed to stand its ground,
and fell back upon the nearest hill.
The whole incident had been so unexpected and so 45
exceptional, that practically the whole Caesarian line was
swaying with unsteadiness. Rallying his men, Caesar led
* i. e. the right ; the shield protecting the left.
40 Fierce Fight outside Lerida
June 49 up the Ninth legion in support of his beaten detachment,
which was now being hotly and triumphantly pursued by
the enemy. His advance at once checked them, and com-
pelled them in turn to take flight towards the town, where
they halted just under the wall. But the men of the Ninth,
carried away by the excitement of battle, in their eagerness
to repair the loss sustained by their comrades, followed
recklessly upon the protracted flight of the enemy, until
they found themselves on ground that put them at con-
• siderable disadvantage, viz. at the foot of the hill on which
stands the town of Lerida (Ilerdd). On endeavouring to
extricate themselves from this predicament, they were once
more hard pressed by the enemy, who now held the advan-
tage of position. The place was a precipitous one, with
a perpendicular wall of rock on either side, and only of about
sufficient width to accommodate three battalions in battle
order ; consequently no reinforcements could be sent up
from either flank, nor could the cavalry afford them any
relief in their distress. From the town the path descended
with a gently falling slope some 0bo paces long, and it was
down this slope that our men had now to retire, through
their inconsidered zeal in pressing the pursuit so far ; and
here a most unequal fight had to be maintained. For not
only was the path inconveniently narrow, but the enemy
had halted immediately under the shoulders of the rock,
and could therefore make every discharge tell with effect
upon our troops. In spite of this, the latter fought on with
unflinching courage, patiently enduring the many wounds
inflicted upon them. The Pompeians were presently re-
inforced, and additional battalions were constantly dispatched
from their camp and pushed up through the town, thereby
Fierce Fight outside Lerida 41
allowing fresh troops to replace those who were exhausted. June 49
This movement Caesar was also obliged to adopt, and to
send up fresh battalions into the same cul-de-sac, in order
to withdraw his wearied men.
After five uninterrupted hours of this kind of combat, the 46
Caesarian troops, finding themselves sorely pressed by
superior numbers, and having now exhausted their supply
of spears, drew swords and charged uphill into the serried
masses of the enemy, where, hurling some over the rocks,
they compelled the others to turn and run. /'Forcing them
up against the city wall, they even drove a section through
panic into the town, until by this vigorous action they had
procured for themselves an unmolested retreat\ During
this interval the cavalry also, after being obliged to halt on
the rocky ground lower down, had managed on both flanks
by splendid efforts to work its way up the hill-side, where by
riding up and down between the two hostile lines, it ensured
a more undisturbed and safer retirement for the legionaries.
The battle was thus one of varying fortunes. Our losses
at the first collision were about 70 killed, including Quintus
Fulginius, a centurion of the third company ^ in the first
battalion of the Fourteenth legion, who had reached that
position from the lower grades through conspicuous gal-
lantry in the field j whilst the wounded numbered over
600. On the side of the Afranians Titus Caecilius, the
first centurion of his legion, together with four other centu-
rions, were killed, as well as over 200 rank and file.
The general opinion entertained about the day's events 47
showed that each party claimed to have left the field as
victors. The Afranians appealed to the fact that, though
* i.e. maniple. Introd.
42 ^flections on the Day
June 49 considered by common consent to be inferior troops to those
of the enemy, they had nevertheless stood up to their attack
for a considerable length of time ; not to mention that in
the early part of the day they had secured their position
at the knoll which had been the original cause of the engage-
ment, and at this first encounter had actually compelled
their enemy to turn and fly. On the other hand, our men
could show that, with both ground and numbers against
them, they had notwithstanding maintained a steady resis-
tance of five long hours, at the end of which they had stormed
the hill, and at the point of the sword dislodged the enemy
from his vantage-ground, putting him to flight and even
driving him into the town.
As a consequence of this engagement, the hill, for the
possession of which the battle had been waged, was now
strongly fortified by the Pompeians, and a garrison established
on it.
48 Two days after these events there suddenly occurred
a further misfortune. A storm of exceptional severity arose ;
indeed, the floods that ensued were admittedly unprece-
dented for those regions. On this occasion the rain also
washed down the snow from all the hills, causing the river
to overflow, and smashing on one and the same day both
the bridges erected by Caius Fabius. This last circumstance
caused the gravest inconvenience to Caesar's army ; for
his camp being built, as already explained, between the
two rivers Segre and Cinca (Sicoris and Cinga), a space only
thirty miles wide, now that neither of these two was passable,
the whole of his forces were inevitably penned in between
their narrow barriers. Outside too, not only were the
native states which had joined him unable to bring up pro-
Storm and Flood 43
visions for the army, but bodies of his own troops, who had June 49
been away on distant foraging parties, saw themselves cut
off by the swollen rivers and powerless to return ; whilst
immense convoys now coming from Italy and Gaul found
it impossible to get through to camp. Further to aggravate
matters, it was an especially awkward period of the year :
the supplies in the magazines of the winter camps had now
run oiit, and the new year's corn was not quite ripe. In
addition to this, the native Spanish communes had already
been drained dry ; for Afranius had, before Caesar's arrival,
collected into Lerida nearly all the corn in their hands, any
that remained having been subsequently consumed by Caesar
himself ; whilst the cattle belonging to the neighbouring
communities, which at such a time of scarcity might have
proved a useful substitute, had all been removed to a dis-
tance by their owners on account of the war. The result
was that the parties who were away foraging for corn and
provender were now harassed by light-armed Lusitanians,
and by the light Spanish infantry from the Eastern province.
These men not only knew every inch of the ground, but
found no difficulty in swimming any river, since they never
go on active service without taking their air-bladders along
with them^ On the other hand the Afranian army had 49
abundant 'supplies of every kind. Steps had early been
taken to amass large stocks of corn, and this was still being
largely increased from every quarter of the province :
similarly of forage there were unlimited supplies. Lastly
the bridge at Lerida afforded ample facilities for collecting
all such stores, and gave them a wholly untapped source of
supply in the country east of the Segre {Sicoris), from which
of course Caesar was completely excluded.
44 Breakdown
50 These floods lasted several days. Caesar made attempts
i"ne 49 ^Q repair the bridges, but the volume of water would not
allow of it, and, moreover, the pickets of the enemy that
lined the opposite bank rendered their completion impossible.
It was indeed an easy task for these latter to prevent the work
of construction, since, besides the state of the river itself
and the quantity of water we had to deal with, they were in
a position to concentrate all their spears upon a single narrow
point from the whole line of bank ; and it was a difficult
matter for our people to carry on the engineering works in
the midst of a boiling stream, and at the same time to avoid
the weapons hurled at them.
51 Meanwhile Afranius received intelligence that the large
convoys on their way to Caesar had halted at the river. Those
who had thus arrived were in the first place a body of archers
from the tribe of the Ruteni (Rodez), with a force of cavalry
from the old province of Gaul, accompanied by numbers of
waggons and a huge baggage-train, in the true Gallic fashion ;
besides these a heterogeneous collection of some 6,000 persons,
including the sons and servants of their masters. These
unwieldy numbers exhibited no sort of internal arrange-
ment, and possessed no recognized authority ; but everybody
followed his own private caprice, and the whole party was
travelling without the slightest misgiving, and in full enjoy-
ment of the freedom which previous journeys in the past had
made habitual with them. Many of them were young men
of distinguished families, sons of senators, and already mem-
bers of the equestrian order ; there were also delegates from
various communities, and even some officers of Caesar ; all
of whom now found themselves alike hemmed in by the
rivers
of Caesar's Commissariat 47
To smash them, therefore, while in this predicament, July 49
Afranius undertook a night march with all his mounted
forces and three of his legions ; his cavalry being sent on
ahead to deliver a surprise attack. But though surprised,
the Gallic horse were quickly in their places, vigorously giving
battle to the enemy. As long as the affair could be one be-
tween similar arms, their small force v/as quite a match for
the large numbers of the Afranians ; but the approaching
standards of the legions caused them to beat a retreat to the
nearest hills, after losing a few of their number. It was this
part of the engagement that proved an invaluable diversion
for securing the safety of the rest of the party, who used the
respite thus gained to make for the higher ground. The
day's losses amounted to some 200 of the archers and a few
of the horse, together with a slight number of camp followers
and some of the baggage.
All these causes, however, resulted in a serious rise in the 5^
price of corn, which is generally inflated, not merely by
present scarcity, but also by apprehensions for the future.
It had now touched 150 shillings a bushel, and the want of
farinaceous food had already lowered the physique of the
troops, whose distress was increasing daily. Indeed, the
last few days had produced such a complete revolution in
the general position, and such a striking change of fortune,
that, whilst our own men were suffering from the want of
common necessaries, the enemy, with their unlimited supplies
of every kind, were already being regarded as the winning
side. Caesar accordingly turned for help to those townships
which had already declared in his favour, and as their stocks
of corn were so low, requisitioned cattle instead ; the sutlers
of the army were got rid of by being sent away to the more
^6 The Army^s Peril
July 49 distant communities ; and at the same time he personally
took steps to alleviate the present distress by every device in
his power.
53 Exaggerated and glowing accounts of the present military
situation were now sent home to their supporters in Rome
by Afranius, Petreius, and their party ; and being further
magnified by popular rumour, produced the impression
that the war was virtually over. On the arrival of these
letters and messages in Rome, large crowds flocked to the
house of Afranius with the most profusive congratulations.
Numbers prepared to cross over from Italy to Pompeius ;
some from a desire to be regarded as the harbingers of such
good news, others to avoid the appearance of having first
waited to learn the issue of the war, or again of seeming to
be quite the last to come in,
54 In this critical position, with all the roads blocked by
Afranius's cavalry and infantry, and the bridges impossible
to repair, Caesar directed his troops to build a number of
boats, of a type which had become familiar to him in recent
years from the method followed in Britain. The keels and
main framework of these consisted of light timber, whilst
the hull was constructed of plaited osiers lined outside with
hides. When finished, these coracles were laid upon linked
waggons, and carried upstream by a night march twenty-one
miles from camp. Troops were then conveyed in them across
the river, and at once proceeded to seize a hill which sloped
down to the edge of the bank ; and before the enemy had
wind of the affair this hill was rapidly fortified. A whole
legion was subsequently ferried over to the same point, and
a fresh bridge commenced from either bank and finished off
in two days. By this means Caesar succeeded in recovering
Caesar's Ingenuity 47
his convoys and foraging parties in safety, and thereby at once July 49
relieved the strain upon his commissariat.
The same day that the bridge was completed, a large force 55
of cavalry was thrown across the stream. Delivering a sur-
prise attack upon the enemy's foragers, who were scattered
about the country without the slightest apprehension, they
headed off a considerable number of animals and men ; and,
on the approach of several battalions of Spanish light infantry
sent to their relief, skilfully divided their forces, one division
taking charge of the spoil, whilst the other remained to meet
and repulse the advancing enemy. One of these battalions
rashly broke its line, and charged ahead of the others ; where-
upon it became severed from its supports, was surrounded,
and cut to pieces. The whole body of cavalry then returned
to camp by the same bridge, bringing with them a large
quantity of booty, and without having lost a single man.y
CHAPTER III
The First Naval Engagement
During these operations at Lerida the inhabitants of 56
Marseilles (Massilia), acting upon the advice of Lucius
Domitius, fitted out a squadron of seventeen warships, eleven
of which were decked boats. These were further increased
by the addition of several smaller craft, in the hope of
frightening our fleet by mere numbers. On board these
ships was placed a strong force of archers, together with
large drafts of the already mentioned Albici, whose courage
was then incited by means of bribes and promises. , A certain
number of vessels Domitius claimed to be allowed as his
48 The 'Rival Fleets
July 49 own ; and these he manned with the tenant farmers and
herdsmen whom he had brought with him from Italy. The
fleet, being thus fully equipped, sailed out with all confidence
to meet our squadron, which under the command of Decimus
Brutus was then lying at its base off an island that faces
Marseilles.^
57 Brutus was far the weaker in number of ships; but, on
the other hand, Caesar had appointed to this fleet, as its
fighting crews, the elite of all his army, especially picked
for their personal courage from each of his several legions,
comprising front-rank soldiers and centurions, who had all
begged to be allowed to undertake this particular duty.
These crews had now prepared grappling-irons and boat-
hooks, and provided themselves with an unlimited supply of
heavy legionary and similar javelins, as well as the other
lighter kinds of spears. As soon, therefore, as they had intelli-
gence of the enemy's advance, they rowed their ships out of
harbour, and gave battle to the Massiliots. The fight was
conducted with the fiercest valour on either side. The
Albici yielded little or nothing in bravery to our own men,
being a race of hardy mountaineers, habituated to war ;
moreover they had only just parted from the Marseilles people,
and still carried the promises these had made them fresh in
their memory. Similarly, the herdsmen of Domitius men-
tioned above, with the hope of liberty as their incentive, were
burning to prove their mettle beneath the eyes of their master.
58 The Massiliots themselves, relying on the speed of their
ships and the skill of their steersmen, continued for some
time to elude our attempts at attack by suddenly shifting
their helm whenever our vessels bore down upon them. As
' See Map, p. 76.
Victory of Caesarian Admiral 49
long as they had sufficient sea room, they remained strung July 49
out in a single long line, directing all their efforts to surround-
ing us, or trying to concentrate two or more ships against
one of our own ; or again, wherever they had a chance, they
would endeavour to dash past our sides and to rip off
the blades from our banks of oars. But when closer quarters
became inevitable, and the skilful manoeuvres of their helms-
men no longer availed them, it was to the fighting power of
their mountaineers that their hopes were next directed. On
the other hand, our people had to make shift with ill-trained
oarsmen and less expert captains at the helm, men who had
been suddenly transferred out of merchantmen, and who
hardly knew even the names of the fittings of a man-of-war.
They were also handicapped by the slow pace and great
weight of their ships, which, having been hurriedly built
from green wood, had not yet attained the same adaptability
for rapid movement as those confronting them. Under
these conditions as long as they were allowed a hand-to-hand
fight, they had no hesitation in running their single ships
in between two of the enemy ; when, by letting go the
grappling-irons, they would make both these fast to their
own, one on either beam, and each crew then fighting in two
divisions would board the two vessels alongside. By these
tactics they inflicted heavy losses upon the Albici and herds-
men, and succeeded in sinking a part of the squadron,
capturing others with their crews, and driving back the
remainder into port.
As a result of the day's engagement the Massilians lost
altogether nine of their vessels, this number including those
which were captured.
f o Ejfect of the Victory
CHAPTER IV
The Reward of a Great Strategist
59 News of this battle duly reached Caesar at Lerida, and,
J" y 49 taken in conjunction with the completion of the bridge,
caused a speedy reaction in the fortunes of the campaign.
For the Pompeians, through wholesome dread of the quality
of our cavalry, now showed far less freedom and confidence
in moving about the country. Some days they would come
out only a short distance from camp, so as to have a quick
means of retreat (a plan which confined their foraging to^
somewhat narrow limits) ; at other times they would make
a long detour, and so avoid the pickets waiting for them ;
sometimes a slight brush with the enemy, or even the
sudden appearance of our cavalry on the sky-line, would
make them drop their loads upon the spot and scurry back
to camp. Latterly they had taken to doing their foraging
at intervals of several days, and even by night ; this last
surely an unprecedented course for a commander to adopt.
60 Meanwhile the people of Huesca and Loarre (Calagurris),
(the latter being politically incorporated with the former
town), sent representatives to Caesar to put themselves at his
disposal. They were followed at once by those of Tarra-
gona (Tarraco), the lacetanians and Ausetanians on the
Mediterranean litoral, and a few days later by the lUur-
gavonensians from the southern bank of the Ebro. From all
alike he requested help in the shape of corn. This they at
once provided, and hunting up every pack-animal in the
district, sent it forthwith into camp. The battalion of
the Illurgavonensians serving vdth the enemy, on hearing
The Turn of the Tide f i
of this decision of its tribe, actually deserted to Caesar, July 49
bringing over its standards from the post where they were
quartered. Far-reaching indeed, and most rapid, was the
revolution now effected. With the bridge completed, with
five powerful tribes secured as friendly, with the commissariat
once more working smoothly, and the rumours as to the
alleged advance of Pompeius through Morocco (Mauretania)
with a relieving force of legionaries finally disposed of, many
of the more distant cantons now began to break their con-
nexion with Afranius, and to declare on the side of Caesar.
All these circumstances produced the greatest consterna- 61
tlon in the ranks of his opponents, and Caesar determined
to profit by it. With the object of putting an end to the
necessity of always sending his cavalry by a long detour across
his new bridge, he selected a suitable spot up-stream, and pro-
ceeded to dig a number of canals thirty feet wide, which, by
drawing off part of the waters of the Segre (Sicoris) would
create a ford over that river. These were on the point of
completion, when Afranius and Petreius became seized with
the utmost concern lest they should find themselves abso-
lutely cut off from either corn or forage, on account of the
overwhelming force of Caesar's cavalry. They therefore
decided to anticipate this contingency by evacuating that part
of the country, and transferring the seat of war to central
Spain (Celtiberia). What further contributed to the adoption
of this plan was the fact that, of the different Spanish states
which had taken opposite sides in the late war with Sertorius,*
the vanquished party had nothing but dread for the name and
rule of Pompeius, even though an absentee governor : those,
on the other hand, who had remained loyal now felt the
^ Introd.
E 2
5*2 Vompeians evacuate Lerida
July 49 warmest affection towards the man who had so greatly
advanced their own interests ; whilst as to Caesar, his name
did not carry the same familiarity in the ears of foreigners
as did that of his rival. Moreover, in these quarters they
were expecting further large bodies of cavalry and native
auxiliary infantry ; and, once on their own ground, their
idea was to prolong the campaign until winter had set
in. In execution of this scheme, orders were given to collect
boats all along the Ebro (Hiberus), and to bring them to Octo-
gesa, a town on that river,. twenty miles south of their present
camp. A bridge of boats was then ordered to be built at
that place, whilst two legions were moved across the Segre
and a camp fortified on its farther bank as a tete-de-pont
with an earth rampart twelve feet high.
62 Intelligence of these movements duly reached Caesar by
means of his spies. The work of draining the river was
accordingly pushed on without intermission day and night
alike, the men straining every nerve. It had now advanced
far enough for the cavalry to cross ; and these did not hesitate
to swim their horses over, although it was an operation
fraught with the utmost difficulty, and indeed was but barely
possible. But the infantry were still up to their shoulders,
nearly neck deep, and were hindered from crossing, not
merely by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of
the current. Yet notwithstanding these difficulties, there was
no appreciable interval between the news of the approaching
completion of the bridge over the Ebro and the discovery of
a ford at the Segre.
63 This last event made the enemy consider it advisable to
hasten their departure. Leaving a guard of two auxiliary
battalions at Lerida, they crossed the Segre in full force, and
A Baring 'Manoeuvre 5-3
proceeded to camp in conjunction with the two legions that July 49
had crossed a few days earlier. The only course now left
to Caesar was to employ his horse to harry and distress the
retreat of his opponents. To use his own bridge for trans-
porting his infantry involved a long detour, which would
inevitably allow the enemy to reach the Ebro by a very much
shorter route. The cavalry were therefore dispatched across
the river, and, after crossing by the ford, suddenly appeared
in the dark on the rearguard of the Pompeians (they had
marched shortly after midnight), and, deploying in great
force, endeavoured to check and disorganize the retreat.
At dawn it could be seen, from some high ground near 64
Caesar's camp, that our men were delivering a furious attack
on the skirts of the enemy, and that the whole of their rear-
guard was occasionally held up and separated from the main
body ; whilst every now and then the Pompeians would take
the offensive, and our people would be repulsed by a combined
charge of all their regiments ; only, however, to resume the
assault as soon as our opponents turned their backs. Inside
the camp the troops collected into knots, indignant at seeing
the enemy thus slip from their grasp and the war unnecessarily
prolonged. Approaching the centurions and officers, they
implored these to tell Caesar not to think of sparing them
either trouble or danger, but to assure him that they were
quite ready and able, and fully prepared to venture on the
passage of the stream where the cavalry had already crossed.
Moved by their ardent representations, Caesar decided that
the attempt should be made, in spite of the apprehensions
he felt at exposing his army to such a body of water. Orders
were given to weed out from every company any whose cour-
age or strength seemed likely to prove unequal to the ordeal.
^4 Caesar*s Pursuit
July 49 These were left behind with a single legion to hold the
camp, and the remaining force then marched out of their
old quarters in light battle equipment. Arrived at the
river, numbers of transport animals were strung across
the stream, both above and below the ford, and when every
precaution had thus been taken the passage of the army was
successfully accomplished. Of the troops who took part
in this enterprise a few were carried down by the force of the
stream ; but all were caught and rescued by the improvised
cavalry, whilst of casualties there was not one.
With the army safely landed, the whole force fell into
position and commenced to advance in three lines ; and so
great was the enthusiasm of the troops, that, although they
had an additional six miles to do between camp and the ford,
and were further greatly delayed at the river, they yet suc-
ceeded in overtaking before three o'clock in the afternoon
those who had marched about one on the previous morning.
65 As soon as their approach was descried on the horizon by
Afranius and Petreius, the former general, astounded at the
amazing sight, at once halted on some rising ground and
drew up for battle. Caesar, however, not wishing to send
his men exhausted into action, halted in the plains to
rest his army ; but on the enemy once more attempting to
advance, he renewed his harassing pursuit. They had there-
fore no option but to pitch camp sooner than otherwise
had been their design. For the truth was they were now
approaching a range of hills, and five miles further on they
would come to difficult and narrow roads. These hills
it was their great object to penetrate, since their possession
would not only deliver them from Caesar's cavalry, but also
enable them, by holding the passes in his face, to bar the
English Miles
Caesar's Pursuit Ci, Pt, First Position (c.c.65-G7)
Cz, P2, Position after Caesar's turning movement (c.c. 70, 71)
Ca, Po, Position after the Retreat on Lerida (c.c. Sl-St^)
Taken from the latest Government survey map : the rondg there-
fore are modern. The route of the two armies here adopted is that
of StofFel, who places Octogem at Mequinenza. Others place it near
Ribarroja or at Flix ; and Goler takes a route through Alcano and
Llardecans. Mt. Maneu is the most prominent landmark in the
district, and can be seen from Lerida.
To /ace f> 55.
Caesars 'Pursuit jy
further progress of his army, and meanwhile to effect the July 49
passage of the Ebro (Hiberus) without danger or fear of
molestation to themselves. The plan was one which they
were bound to attempt and to carry out at all hazards •
nevertheless, the fatigue consequent upon a whole day's battle
and the heavy exertions of the march induced them to post-
pone it until the morrow. Caesar also then camped on the
nearest high ground.
About midnight information reached him through some 66
prisoners who had strayed too far from camp after water and
had been caught by our cavalry, that the Pompeian generals
were silently withdrawing from their intrenchments ; where-
upon the bugle was at once ordered to be sounded, and the
command for striking camp to be proclaimed in the usual
military fashion. The enemy, hearing the sound, and dread-
ing lest they should be forced to fight at night when under
the weight of their heavy marching kit, or again that they
might be hemmed in amongst the narrow defiles by Caesar's
horse, at once arrested their movement, and kept their forces
in camp. The next morning Petreius made a secret expedi-
tion with a small party of mounted men to examine the lie
of the land, and a similar party left Caesar's camp, under the
command of Lucius Decidius Saxa, also to reconnoitre the
country. Both parties reported in the same terms, viz. that
for the first five miles the road ran through a plain, which
was then succeeded by rugged mountain tracts ; and that
the side which got first to the passes could easily check the
other's further advance.
A council of war having been summoned, a discussion was 67
opened by Petreius and Afranius and the question raised as
to the best time for making a start. The general opinion
y5 The Pomp elans outmanceuvred
July 49 favoured a night march, holding it quite possible to reach
the passes without being detected. Others pointed to the
orders for marching, which they had heard the previous
night in Caesar's camp, as a proof that a surreptitious depar-
ture was out of the question. Evidently Caesar's cavalry
surrounded them at night, holding all the roads and neigh-
bourhood, and night engagements were to be avoided,
because in civil war, when a panic took place, troops generally
obeyed the instincts of fear rather than those of discipline.
Daylight, on the contrary, possessed a power in itself of
bringing before the eyes of all men a keen fear of disgrace,
which was greatly aided too by the presence of their officers
and centurions ; and it was these incentives that usually
restrained troops and kept them to their duty. Hence on
all grounds the attempt to break through should be made
by day ; for even though they might encounter some slight
casualties, yet the desired position could quite well be captured
without endangering the safety of the main army.
This last view prevailed in the council, and it was deter-
mined to make a start at daybreak on the following morning.
68 Meanwhile Caesar had carefully explored the locality, and
with the first streak of dawn led his whole force out of camp.
Their march took them by a long detour over roads that were
little better than tracks, as all the main routes leading to
the Ebro {Hiherus) and Octogesa were necessarily blocked by
. the enemy, whose camp lay across their path. Caesar's army
had therefore to traverse a series of deep and difficult valleys,
where the road was often rendered impracticable by precipi-
tous rocks ; so much so that the men's arms and accoutrements
had to be passed along from hand to hand, and much of the
march was only accomplished by the troops shouldering one
The J{ace to the Ebro 77
another up after thus freeing themselves of their armour. July 49
Yet no one was heard to complain of the severity of the toil,
well knowing, as they did, that all their toils alike would end,
could they once succeed in barring the enemy from the Ebro,
and in cutting his supplies.
The Afranian troops, in their joy, at first ran out from 69
camp to see the sight, flinging after their retreating enemy
many a parting taunt to those who now found themselves
without enough to eat, and therefore obliged to go back to
Lerida. And, indeed, there was some justification for their
gibes ; for the route led clean away from our objective, and
thus made us seem to be marching in exactly the opposite
direction. Their generals also began congratulating them-
selves on their own decision to remain in camp, and not
too without much apparent reason : they could see that
our pursuit had been undertaken without camp-animals or
baggage, and naturally felt convinced that we could no
longer hold out against the scarcity of food. When, however,
they perceived that our column was gradually bending round
to the eastward, and observed that its head was already abreast
of the position occupied by their own camp, the most lethar-
gic and indolent amongst them were found demanding instant
departure and a race to overtake us. The call sounded to
arms; and, leaving behind a few garrison battalions, the entire
force turned out of camp and headed straight for the Ebro.
It was a contest in speed, and speed only, viz. which 7°
of the two parties could first seize the pass and mountain
range. Caesar's army was retarded by the difficulties of the
roads ; Afranius's force was continually checked by the pur-
suing Caesarian cavalry. On the other hand, this last action
of the Afranians had brought the situation to this inevitable
^8 A Great Opportunity
July 49 conclusion— that should they be the first to reach the moun-
tains ahead of them, although they might escape their own
peril, they must none the less lose the baggage of their
entire army, as well as their battalions left in camp ; for these
were now absolutely cut off by the intervention of Caesar's
army from even the slightest possibility of relief. Caesar
covered the distance first, and finding a sort of plateau as he
emerged from the lofty rocks, drew up his line of battle on
it in face of the enemy. Afranius, seeing his rearguard hard
pressed by the Caesarian horse, and the enemy on his front,
selected some high ground and there halted. From thence
he dispatched a force of four Spanish light infantry battalions
towards what was the dominating hill in all the surrounding
country, with orders to advance at full speed and occupy it ;
his design being to follow in force himself, and, changing
his first plan, to make for Octogesa by another route over the
hills. The hght infantry were hastening by a flank approach
towards their objective, when they were discovered by
Caesar's cavalry and at once attacked. The Spaniards were
never for a moment equal to withstanding the fierce onset
of our horse, but were quickly surrounded, and all cut to
pieces in sight of both armies.
71 It was an opportunity such as rarely falls to the lot of
a commander. Caesar was well aware that, after so terrible
a disaster enacted before their very eyes, the enemy's army
would be too shaken to offer much resistance, especially as
they were completely dominated by his cavalry, who would
be able to act with effect on the level and open ground where
the conflict must be decided. To seize this opportunity was
now the universal petition addressed to him. Generals,
centurions, regimental officers— all alike came running up
and Caesar's IJse of it S9
with the request that he would not hesitate to give battle. July 49
They pointed out that the men's ardour was strung to the
highest pitch, whilst the Afranians, on the other hand, had
given many proofs of a state of panic : first of all in failing
to go to the relief of their own troops, then in declining to
leave their hill ; as well as in the fact that they could scarcely
succeed even in keeping oflE the attacks of the cavalry, but
were crowding together, with their standards mingled in
confusion, not keeping to their own colours, or observing
their proper ranks. They added, that if the enemy's advantage
in position made him hesitate, an opportunity for a fight
somewhere or other would doubtless soon arise, since Afranius
would have to come down from the place, as he could not
stay there without water.
On his side, Caesar had conceived a hope of being able 72
to attain his purpose without a battle, and without bloodshed
to his own troops, now that he had succeeded in cutting his
opponents' supplies. Why, he asked himself, should he lose
any of his men, even in a successful engagement, and why
expose to the chance of wounds troops who had served him
so magnificently ? What right again had he to tempt Fortune,
especially considering that a commander's duty is to effect
his conquests by strategy no less than by the sword ? Com-
passion also swayed him for his fellow countrymen, whose
slaughter he could not but foresee ; and he preferred to gain
his ends with these men safe and sound. However, this
plan did not commend itself to the majority ; the troops
were even heard declaring amongst themselves that, if
such a golden opportunity for victory was to be thrown away,
they would not fight even when Caesar wanted them.
Nevertheless, he stood to his decision, and accordingly
6o Overtures by the Men
J"'y 49 drew oi? a little from Kls present ground with the object of
relieving the tension on his frightened opponents ; whereupon
Petreius and Afranius, profiting by the occasion, retreated
to their old camp. Caesar then proceeded to post pickets
and guards along the hills ; after which, with every road
to the Ebro (Hiberus) securely barred, he fortified a camp
as close up to that of his enemy as was practicable.
73 On the morrow the commanders of the Pompeians, dis-
tracted at seeing all hope now gone of securing supplies
or of reaching the Ebro, held a consultation on their future
plans. There were only two roads open to them — one to
Lerida, if they chose to return there, another if they made
for Tarragona (Tarraco). In the midst of the discussion,
a report was brought in that our cavalry were attack-
ing their watering party. The report being confirmed,
a guard was immediately posted in the shape of a series of
pickets drawn from the cavalry and native infantry, and
supported by battalions of the legions ; and this step was
then followed by orders to run up a rampart between camp
and the watering-place, so that the watering might proceed
behind the earthwork without fear of molestation or need
of any further guard. The supervision of this breastwork
Petreius and Afranius decided to share between themselves,
and in order to see it executed went out some considerable
distance from their fortified lines.
74 Their departure afforded their men an uninterrupted
opportunity for a talk with those in the opposite camp, and,
flocking out, they proceeded to hunt up and hail any acquain-
tance or fellow townsman each happened there to possess.
The first thing was a general expression of thanks to all our
men for having spared them the day before when in their
Fraternisation of the Two Camps 6i
state of panic : their lives, they declared, they owed to this July 49
act of clemency. Next, they wanted to know what trust
could be reposed in the others' commander ; whether
they would do right to put themselves in his power ;
following up this by a regret that they had not done so at
first, instead of taking arms against their friends and blood
relations. Encouraged by these conversations with our men,
they next put forward a petition to the Caesarian general to
spare the lives of Petreius and Afranius, being anxious to
avoid the appearance of having committed the crime of
betraying their own officers. Reassured on this point, they
then declared they would come over at once, and proceeded
to authorize their leading centurions to go as peace delegates
to Caesar. While these were thus engaged, many of the
Pompeians invited their Caesarian friends and took them
back to their own camp, whilst others of themselves were
taken off to ours ; in a word, the unification of the two camps
appeared complete. Numbers of regimental officers also
and centurions came and tendered their allegiance to Caesar.
The same course was taken by the Spanish chieftains whom
the enemy had summoned to the campaign, and now held
as hostages in their own camp. These men applied to their
acquaintances and any with whom their families visited, to
ensure for them each a favourable introduction to Caesar.
The young son of Afranius was likewise engaged in negotiat-
ing with Caesar, through the help of the general Sulpicius,
for his own and his father's life. On all sides were heard
rejoicing and congratulation ; since it looked as if the one
party had escaped a dire peril, and the other gained a wonderful
achievement without so much as a scratch. Everybody
admitted the greatness of the reward which Caesar's un-
62 Interrupted by Petreius
July 49 deviating clemency had brought him, and his recent decision
was now universally applauded.
75 The report of these novel proceedings brought Afranius
back from the earthwork then in course of construction, and
he arrived in camp fully prepared, as was believed, to acqui-
esce without demur in whatever turn events might have
taken. Petreius, on the contrary, never lost his presence
of mind. Arming his retinue of private servants, and also
taking with him the light Spanish infantry battalion that
acted as the commander-in-chief's bodyguard, together with
a small squadron of specially privileged native cavalry which
were always about his person, he suddenly galloped up to the
rampart, stepped the intercourse between the two armies,
and drove our men out of his camp, putting any whom he
caught to the sword. The rest drew together, and, appalled
by the sudden peril, wrapped their left hands in their cloaks,
and drawing their swords protected themselves as best they
could against the horsemen and Spaniards. The nearness
of their own camp lent them confidence ; and, as they ap-
proached it, the pickets on guard outside advanced to their
relief.
75 Having effected so much of his purpose, Petreius next made
the round of the companies, appealing to the troops with
tears in his eyes, and beseeching them not to betray him to
the tender mercies of his foes, and not to betray their own
absent commander Pompeius. A general move was at once
made towards head quarters. There he demanded that
every man in camp should solemnly swear not to desert or
betray the army or its chiefs, and not to enter upon any secret
course of action on his own authority. This oath he first of
all took himself, and then administered to Afranius. They
Pomp elans turn back to Lertda 63
were followed by the regimental officers and centurions ; July 49
after which each company was brought forward and the men
swore to observe the same. An order was then published
that any one harbouring a Caesarian should produce him
forthwith, and on their production all were publicly executed
in the space outside the head quarters tent. Most of them,
however, were secretly hidden by their hosts, and sent over
the rampart during the night. But the result of this intimi-
dation on the part of the leaders, and the infliction of this
atrocious punishment upon our innocent men, taken in con-
junction with the solemn obligation of the new oath, was
to destroy all hopes of an immediate surrender, and, by
changing the temper of the troops, to bring the situation
once more back to the old arbitrament of war.
Meanwhile Caesar gave orders that such of his opponents' 77
troops as had come across during the late period of negotia-
tions should be collected together with every mark of respect,
and sent back to their own camp. A certain proportion,
however, of the group of officers and centurions preferred
to stay with him, and were subsequently treated with con-
spicuous favour, the centurions being reappointed to their
former companies, and all the officers who were Roman
knights being gazetted according to their previous rank.
To revert now to the fortunes of the Afranians. Their 7^
foraging was exposed to constant attack, their watering
conducted under the greatest difficulties. The legionaries
amongst them possessed some small amount of supplies, having
received orders to take rations for twenty-two days on quit-
ting Lerida ; but the Spanish infantry and native auxiliaries
had none. Moreover, these last had but slender chances of
obtaining any, and even if they did, were physically unequal
($4 ^ ^arguard Action
July 49 to carrying heavy loads ; consequently they deserted daily
in large numbers to Caesar. It was beyond doubt a most
critical position. Of the two plans open to them, the more
advisable seemed to be a return to Lerida, where a small
quantity of provisions had been left behind ; for once there,
they were confident of seeing their way through their subse-
quent difficulties. Tarragona was too far off, and over that
distance of ground they were well aware that more than one
accident might wreck their course. Having therefore settled
on the former alternative, they marched out of their present
entrenchments. Caesar at once detached his mounted men
to harass and check their rearguard, whilst following in person
with the legions ; and without a moment's delay his cavalry
became engaged with the tail of the Pompeian army.
79 The fighting that ensued proceeded along the following
general lines. The rear of the retreating column was brought
up by a number of infantry battalions, free of all superfluous
baggage, and these, whenever the army's march lay through
a plain, would be halted, several strong, to act as a covering
force. Where a mountain range had to be scaled, the danger
to this force was easily repelled simply by the nature of the
ground, as the vanguard could use their higher position to
protect their comrades toiling up the slope ; but when
a valley or other kind of descent lay before them, not only
could the advanced party render no help to that which was
checking the pursuit, but the Caesarian cavalry also, from
their vantage-ground, rained down spears upon their backs,
thereby gravely imperilling the safety of the force. The
only way to meet this danger was, when they approached such
places, to order the legions to halt, and by a determined
charge scatter the enemy's horse ; then, when these had been
Brilliant Caesarian Cavalry 6f
dislodged, the entire force would suddenly fling themselves July 49
down the hillside at the double, and, getting across the valley
in this way, form up once more on the opposite heights. As
for their own cavalry, so far were they from getting any help
from it, though numerically a strong force, that, owing to
its panic-stricken state consequent on the preceding engage-
ments, it had itself to receive protection by being kept in the
centre of the column ; and the invariable result of letting
any trooper quit the line was to be instantly snapped up
by the Caesarian horse.
Now when fighting of this nature is in progress, the march 80
of an army is necessarily slow and tentative, involving frequent
halts for the relief of its own units. And such was the case
now. After proceeding four miles, the attacks of our cavalry
became so galling, that the enemy were driven to seize a lofty
hill; here they commenced fortifying one side of a camp where
it ^aced their pursuers, though without unloading their bag-
gage train. Subsequently, on seeing that Caesar's camp was
fully laid out, with its tents pitched, and that his cavalry were
absent with scattered foraging parties, they suddenly, about
eleven o'clock on the same day, made a dash to escape ; and,
filled with a new hope of respite through the absence of the
enemy's horse, started once more on the march. Aware of
the new movement, Caesar first of all refreshed his troops, and
then set out in pursuit ; leaving behind one or two bat-
talions to guard his baggage, and giving instructions that
at four o'clock in the afternoon the foraging parties should
follow and the cavalry be recalled. The latter force lost
no time taking up their daily part in the march. Sharp
fighting ensued along the rearguard, all but resulting in the
enemy's rout, and involving several casualties amongst
66 The Sufferings of the 1^ treat
July 49 their rank and file and to some extent among their cen-
turions.
Meanwhile Caesar was coming up, and his column, in full
force, was now hard on their heels.
8i In this predicament, unable either to search for a suitable
camping ground or to proceed further with their march,
there remained no alternative but to halt, and to make
a camp on a site both destitute of water and naturally un-
suited to their purpose. Notwithstanding this, Caesar, acting
on the reasons indicated above, refrained from all attack, and
• merely contented himself with not allowing any tents to be
pitched after this day, in order that every man in his force
might be the readier to take up the pursuit, no matter whether
the enemy broke away by day or by night. The latter, on
discovering the impracticable nature of their present site,
employed all the hours of darkness in extending their lines,
thus turning camp into camp ; and this work was continued
at daybreak on the following morning and occupied them
throughout the ensuing day. Unfortunately, the further
they carried their works and advanced their lines, the further
they got from water ; and they thus found themselves
remedying their present evil only by incurring new ones.
The first night after this no watering whatever was attempted ;
on the morrow a guard was left behind in camp, while the
rest of the force moved out towards the watering-place,
though still not a single forager ventured to make his appear-
ance. Caesar much preferred letting punishment of this
kind do its work amongst them, and so force them to a sur-
render, to having to decide matters by a pitched battle.
Yet, though this was so, it did not prevent him from attempt-
ing the circumvallation of his opponents by means of rampart
The Suffemigs of the l^treat 67
and ditch ; his object being to counteract as far as possible Ju!j' 49
the surprise sorties which he foresaw they would be driven
to adopt. It was with this design in view that on their side
an order was now given to slaughter all baggage animals ;
a decision that under any circumstances would have been
necessary, on account of their absolute dearth of fodder.
A period of two days was spent in arranging these works 8a
and the plans connected with them, and the third day found
considerable progress made with much of the entrenchments.
But about three o'clock in the afternoon of this day the
enemy's signal for action suddenly sounded, and his legions,
advancing from camp, drew up in line with the express object
of preventing the completion of our fortifications. Caesar at
once recalled his own regiments from his earthworks, ordered
his cavalry to concentrate in force, and marshalled his line
of battle. Thus much indeed was imperative on him ; for
to expose himself to the imputation of having shirked a con-
test, in face of the reasonable expectation of his troops and
his general reputation with the world, would beyond all
doubt have struck a serious blow at his prestige. On the
other hand, he was still influenced by the reasons already indi-
cated for not desiring a battle with his opponents, and even
more so in the present instance, inasmuch as the narrow limits
of the ground rendered it hardly possible to inflict a crush-
ing defeat upon them, even if actually routed. For the space
between the two camps did not exceed two miles ; two-thirds
of this was occupied by the rival armies, and the remainder
just gave room enough to the troops for delivering their
charge; consequently, in case of a general action, the
defeated side would find an easy escape in its flight through
the close proximity of its own camp. It was these con-
F 2
68 Caesar succeeds in
July 49 siderations which had now determined him, whilst yet
resisting any unprovoked attack, not himself to take the
offensive.
83 The Afranians were in two lines, consisting of five Roman
legions ; whilst a third position in the rear was held by their
native reserves. Caesar's army was in three lines ; but his
five legions were distributed with four battalions from each
in the front line, then three more apiece as a first reserve,
followed again by the same number once more, each battalion
being always in support of part of its own legion. His archers
and slingers were withdrawn inside the ranks of his centre,
whilst his two flanks were screened by cavalry. With their
lines thus arranged, each party seemed to have attained its
desired object : Caesar, to refuse battle unless forced upon
it ; the enemy, to hinder the construction of the other's
earthworks. The situation, however, was only becoming
prolonged ; and the troops, after being kept in position till
sunset, then parted from each other to their respective
quarters.
The next day Caesar prepared to finish his incompleted
works, whilst the Pompeians proceeded to try a ford over the
Segre, in the hope of crossing that river. To frustrate this,
Caesar threw his light-armed Germans with a cavalry section
across the stream, along the banks of which he then posted
a strong line of pickets.
84 Blockaded thus at every outlet, with what camp animals
"g- 49 they still possessed now without fodder for four whole days,
and destitute alike of water, fuel, and provisions, the Pompeian
2 Aug.i leaders at length petitioned to negotiate, and if possible, in
some place at a distance from the troops. This last stipu-
* According to an ancient almanac.
avoiding unnecessary 'Bloodshed ($9
lation was refused by Caesar, who, however, agreed, if they Aug. 49
so cared, to meet them in the open ; whereupon the son of
Afranius came over as a hostage, and the interview took place
at a spot selected by Caesar. Here, in the ears of both
armies, Afranius spoke as follows. * No blame attached, he
hoped, either to himself, his colleague, or their army, for
their natural desire to act loyally by Cneius Pompeius, their
own commander. The claims of duty, however, had now
been fully satisfied, and as to punishment, their complete
destitution might well be regarded as adequate. They were
now caged in virtually like wild beasts, debarred from water,
and debarred from movement ; and such a position was not
physically more intolerable than it was galling to their pride.
They accordingly confessed themselves beaten : at the same
time they desired, if not too late, to make a strong appeal for
mercy, in the hope that Caesar would not consider himself
bound to exact from them the utmost penalty of war.'
The whole speech, it should be added, was delivered with
the greatest possible deference and respect.
In answer, Caesar reminded him that no man had ever had 85 ,
less justification than he to adopt a tone either of complaining
of his lot, or of claiming commiseration for it. * Every one
else had acted as became them : for himself, when he
refused to force a conflict, though conditions were favour-
able and time and place to his own advantage ; for his
army, when they did not allow the outrage perpetrated
on them by the murder of their comrades to deter them
from preserving and guarding the lives of those in their
power; finally, for Afranius's own men, by their taking
the initiative in making overtures for peace, when they had
even held it their dutv to demand a safe-conduct for all their
79 Capitulation of Pcmpeians
Aug. 49 officers. Every one, in short, had being animated hy a
spirit of conciliation ; they, the leaders, had alone set their
face against peace ; they alone had disregarded the sanctity
due to a time of pourparlers and of truce, and had foully
butchered unsuspecting men, when duped by what they
believed to be negotiations. They had met the fate that
usually befell people of overweening obstinacy and pride ;
and now found themselves driven back upon, and even pas-
sionately desiring, a course which they lately regarded with
contempt. However, he had no wish to use their present
humiliation or to take advantage of the present opportunity
in order to swell his own resources ; but what he did insist
upon was that those armies, which for so many years they
had been nursing against himself, should now be disbanded
He said'' against himself ", for no other explanation was possi-
ble of the dispatch of six legions to Spain, and the embodiment
afterwards of a seventh raised in the Peninsula ; or again
of the mobilization of so many powerful fleets, and of the
appointment of eminent soldiers to their command. Not
one of these steps had been necessary for the establishment
of peace in the Spanish governments, or the normal military
requirements of the province ; whose long unbroken rest
made all reinforcements superfluous. No, it was against
himself that all these preparations had been for so long
directed ; it was to cripple him that an unprecedented type
of command was to be created, which permitted a man to
control the administration of the capital from his residence
outside the gates of Rome, and at the same time to retain
year after year the absentee governorship of two provinces
stocked with fighting races : it was solely to checkmate him-
self that a violent change was now to be wrought in the
Imposition of Terms 7 1
constitution of the magistracies, whereby governors were Aug. 49
sent out to provinces no longer, as before, at the expiration
of their consulship or praetorship, but upon the interested
selection of a clique. Again, when he was to be opposed,
no one was allowed to plead the excuse of age ; but veterans,
well tried in past campaigns, must be called out to take over
the command of the armies that were to crush him : and
finally, in his case only, an exception was made to the courtesy
always extended to all commanders alike, which allowed
them, after success in the field, to return home with honour,
or at least not in disgrace, and there to disband their army.
Yet all these insults he had endured with patience, and would
continue to endure ; nor was his object now to deprive them
of their army in order to retain it with his own, though doubt-
less that were an easy matter ; it was merely to disarm them
of any weapon they could afterwards turn against himself.
That being so, he must, as already indicated, call upon them
to evacuate the provinces, and to break up their army. Pro-
vided that were done, nobody should suffer at his hands :
that, however, was the one indispensable condition of peace.
Amongst the Afranian troops the notion that men, who 86
justly expected some sort of punishment, should actually
be presented with their discharge, was one affording high
satisfaction and delight — as indeed could be gathered from
the way they now gave expression to their feelings. For,
on a question arising as to the time and place of carrying out
this discharge, the whole army, from the position which they
had taken up on the ramparts, began, with shouts and gesticu-
lations, to declare that it must take place at once, and that,
were it postponed, there would be no security of its afterwards
being effected, no matter what pledge to the contrary might
72 Pomp elan Army dishanded
Aug. 49 now be given. After a short discussion between the parties,
it was finally arranged that aU the men possessing house or
property in Spain should receive their discharge on the spot,
and the rest on arrival at the Var ^ ; Caesar meanwhile giving
a guarantee that no one should be molested, or compelled to
take the military oath of allegiance to himself against his
own personal inclinations.
87 He also took upon himself to find them in provisions from
now onwards, during their march to the Var ; and further
added that, in the case of those who had lost property during
the campaign, any of this now in the hands of his own troops
should be restored to the losers, he himself compensating his
men for everything, after fair valuation made.
Whatever subsequent disputes arose amongst the Pompeian
soldiery were voluntarily brought to him for adjudication ;
and, upon a mutiny all but breaking out amongst the sur-
rendered legions, owing to their clamouring for pay from
Afranius and Petreius which the latter declared to be not
yet due, a demand was made that Caesar should try the case ;
and his decision was at once accepted by both parties.
During the next two days about a third of the army re-
ceived its discharge ; after which Caesar gave orders for two
of his own legions to start as an advanced guard, whilst the
others followed close behind, thus ensuring that the two camps
were not far apart. The whole operation was entrusted to
one of his staff, Quintus Fufius Calenus ; and, in accordance
with the instructions issued to that officer, the army marched
from Spain to the Var, and there the rest of the Pompeians
were disbanded.
^ Then the boundary between Italy and Gaul.
Plan of
2^\\MARSEILLES
Scale (Miles)
l/a '/2 3/4
Old Coast Line
To face p. 7.VI
\_Adapled from Sloffel.
BOOK II
MARSEILLES AND NORTH
AFRICA
CHAPTER I
An Historic Siege
During this campaign in the Spanish provinces, Caius i
Trebonius, the general left in charge of the assault on .g
MarBcilles (^Massilia), had commenced operations by driving
siege embankments against the wall of that city, surmounted
by protection-sheds and wooden towers. One of these
embankments was advanced on the side of the town close
to the harbour and dockyards : the other by the gate where
the road from Gaul and Spain enters the city, not far from the
sea into which the river Rhone debouches. For Marseilles,
it must be remembered, is washed by the sea on three sides
of the town, the fourth alone offering a land approach ; and
even in this last section that part which faces the citadel is
strongly protected by the natural conformation of the ground
and by a deep ravine running under the wall, making an
assault at this point a long and laborious process.
Trebonius, in order to carry out these works, now com-
mandeered from the whole of Provence innumerable draft
animals and day labourers, at the same time giving orders to
accumulate large stores of osier wood and building-timber :
then with these preparations completed, he proceeded to
construct a siege mound eighty feet in height.
74 ^ Formidable Tas^
' So great, however, was the original supply in the city of
°* every species of war material, and so unlimited the number of
siege guns, that none of the ordinary protection-sheds, con-
structed out of close-knit osier work, were found proof against
the impact of their shot. Huge wooden harpoons, twelve feet
long, and sheathed with a metal point, would be discharged
with aU the added impetus given by gigantic engines of war,
and, tearing through four successive layers of hurdles, would
bury themselves in the earth. The only remedy was to build
a series of movable galleries, roofed with twelve-inch baulks
firmly clamped together, under cover of which the workmen
then found it possible to pass along the material from hand
to hand. Ahead of the advancing mound, for the purpose of
levelling all obstacles, moved a military tortoise, with a front
of sixty feet, likewise built of stout timbers, and wrapped round
with every kind of substance capable of withstanding the
showers of fire and stones. Yet, in spite of these precautions,
the vast scale of the works attempted, along with the great
height of the enemy's wall and turrets, and the number of
guns mounted on them, combined to render the progress
of the operations everywhere a tedious one. Constant sallies,
moreover, from the town were undertaken by the Albici,
on which occasions fire would be freely flung upon the mound
and towers : although indeed these attacks were always easily
repulsed by our troops, who would even take the offensive
and drive back the sortie parties into the town, with the
infliction upon them of very considerable losses.
3 While the siege of the city was thus progressing, a move-
ment towards its relief had been instituted by Pompeius, who
had detached a squadron of sixteen warships, a few of them
armed with copper-cased bows and ram, under the command
Attempted Relief by Sea jj
of Lucius Nasidius, to sail to the assistance of Domitius and May-Aug.
the Massilians. This officer made his way up the Sicilian "^'-^
Straits without the knowledge or suspicion of the acting
governor Curio ; and, putting in with his flotilla at Messina
{Messana), took advantage of the flight of the leading citizens
and local senators which followed on the sudden panic pro-
duced by his appearance, to launch one of their ships from
the dockyards, and to incorporate it with the rest of his fleet.
He then continued his voyage towards Marseilles, after secretly
sending in advance a small dispatch vessel to apprise Domitius
and the MassiHans of his coming, and earnestly beg them once
more to give battle to Brutus's squadron, now that they were
reinforced by his own ships.
As a matter of fact, after their earlier reverse, the Massilians 4
had drawn out of dockyard a number of old vessels equal to
what they had lost, and had then proceeded with surprising
energy to repair and fit these out. Their large reserves of
oarsmen and skippers had also enabled them to supplement
the fleet by several open fishing-boats, which had been pre-
viously decked for the purpose of protecting the rowers from
all exposure to spears ; and the whole of these additional
vessels were now given full complements both of archers and
big guns. The squadron being by these methods at length
fully equipped, the crews were incited by pathetic appeals
from all the old men, matrons, and maidens of the city, not
to fail their country in this her hour of need ; after which
they embarked with all the confidence and courage that had
marked their first engagement. For it is a common weak-
ness of human nature to be both unduly elated and alarmed in
the face of the unseen and the unknown ; and this law was
now illustrated by the immoderate hopes and enthusiasm
"jd Second Naval Engagement
May-Aug. which the arrival of Lucius Nasidius had kindled in the
^^ Massilian republic.
Having secured a favourable wind, they put out from
harbour, and effected a junction with Nasidius off Tarente
(Tauroenta), a fortified settlement of Marseilles. Here they
cleared their ships for action, heartened one another to face
a second encounter, and arranged their respective duties in
the approaching battle ; it being agreed that the Massilians
should form the right, and Nasidius the left division.
5 Meanwhile Brutus also bore down upon the same point,
with a fleet considerably increased in numbers. His original
twelve ships, built by Caesar's orders at Aries, had now been
reinforced by the six lately captured from the Massilians,
which during the intervening days he had repaired and made
thoroughly efficient in every particular. After briefly en-
couraging his crews, therefore, to treat with contempt a beaten
foe whose full strength they had already once vanquished, he
moved out against them full of cheerful courage. From the
camp of Trebonius and from all the higher ground in the
vicinity ^ our investing forces easily overlooked the city, where
they could see all the fighting population that had remained
behind in the town, as well as all the older inhabitants, accom-
panied by wives and children and the city guard, either stand-
ing on the battlements with uplifted hands, or flocking to the
temples of the eternal gods, before whose images they then
prostrated themselves, praying heaven to grant them victory.
Not a soul was there who did not realize that on the issue
of this day hung the decision of all their future destiny. For
those who had gone on board included young men from their
best-known families, together with their most distinguished
^ e.g. Notre Dame de la Garde. See Plan.
Section of Coast
Entjlish Miles
To face p. 76.
May-
49
and Defeat of Pompeians 77
citizens in every period of life, all of whom had received May-Aug
a personal summons and earnest appeal for service. In case '^^
of disaster, therefore, they saw clearly that nothing would be
left them afterwards even to try ; while victory, on the other
hand, whether gained by their own forces or by their foreign
supports, would leave them confident in the ultimate success
of their beloved city.
As soon as the action commenced, it became clear that the 6
Massilians did not want for courage; but, remembering the
commands lately laid upon them by their friends, they fought
under the evident conviction that this was to be their last
chance, and that those who ventured their lives in battle were
only anticipating by a little the fate in store for the rest of
their countrymen, all of whom must undergo the similar
penalty of war upon the capture of their city. Accordingly,
as our squadron slowly opened out, their commanders utilized
the finer speed of their own ships for much skilful manoeuvring ;
and, wherever we got an opportunity of throwing our grap-
pling-irons and making fast one of their vessels, they would
row up from every quarter to the help of their struggling
consorts. Even here, at close quarters, they were formidable
opponents, fighting, as they did, side by side with the Albici,
and yielded little in courage to our own crews ; whilst at the
same time their smaller craft poured in a hail of spears at longer
range, inflicting constant wounds without warning upon our
hampered men. Two of their three-deckers ' having sighted
Brutus's flagship — easily recognizable by his pennant — had
already set themselves in motion to ram her from opposite
* Only an analogy. The question whether an ancient trireme had three
superimposed banks of oars, or one bank, with three men to each oar, or
even some other formation, is still sub judice.
7 8 Description of Siege-rvorks
May-Aug. quarters, when the admiral, seeing his danger, put his vessel
"^9 rapidly under way, and thus eluded them by the barest
second. Advancing at high speed the two big ships crashed
into one another with such terrific violence that both were
badly crippled by the impact, whilst one had all her forepart
carried away and became quite unmanageable. Seeing what
had happened, the vessels of Brutus's fleet which were nearest
to the spot dashed upon them in their difficulties, and quickly
sent both to the bottom.
7 As to the squadron under Nasidius, it proved of no service
whatever, and after a very brief interval withdrew out of action.
These lacked the incentive of the sight of fatherland and the
commands of dear ones to compel them to the utmost risk of
life ; consequently, from this division not a single ship was
lost. The losses to the Massilian fleet, on the other hand,
were five sunk, four captured, and one which fled with the
ships of Nasidius, who all made for the coast of Eastern Spain.
Of the surviving vessels one was sent on ahead to Marseilles
to carry the news of the day's disaster ; and whilst it was still
approaching the city, the whole population streamed out to
learn the issue of the fight ; and on the truth becoming
known, such a wail of lamentation ensued, that one might
have thought the town had at that very moment been carried
by assault.
Nevertheless, in spite of this defeat, the Massilians pro-
ceeded to complete their preparations for the defence of their
city with the same dogged determination as before.
8 To resume the narrative of the landward operations. It
was noticed by the legionaries in charge of the right, or north-
eastern, part of the siege-works, as a consequence of the
repeated sorties of the enemy, that it would afford no little
Description of Siege-works 7^
protection in that quarter, if, instead of a mere block-house May-Aug.
to serve as a rallying-point, they were to build a full-sized
brick tower, close under the city wall, where previously they
had constructed only a small and low shelter against these same
sudden attacks. It was to this shelter that they were in the
habit of retiring; it was from this, moreover, that they fought
as an advanced outpost, on the enemy pushing home any
attack with unusual vigour; and it was out from this that they
used to charge both to repulse and pursue him. Its dimensions
were fully thirty feet square, but, on the other hand, its walls
had been built five feet thick ; and now, after its construction,
in accordance with the law that experience is the universal
guide in life, their applied intelligence led them to discover
that the raising of this block-house to the height of a regular
siege tower might prove of very considerable service. This
transformation was effected as follows.
When the building had been raised high enough to carry 9
a floor, the latter was carefully fitted into the outside walls
in such a way that the heads of the beams, though extended
into the brickwork, were nevertheless completely enclosed by
the masonry, and thus prevented any protrusion outside on
which fire flung by the defenders could lodge. Round this
first floor were next piled pillars of small flat tiles, as high
as the protection of the military screen and sheds they were
using allowed of ; and then, on the top of this temporary
work, two large beams were laid, parallel with, and not far
from the outer edge of, the two side walls — beams fromwhich
it was intended to hang the flooring that was to form the
ultimate roof of the tower. Above these, and crossing them
at right angles, joists were next laid down, and massed together
by planking. These joists were made a little longer than the
8 o Description of Siege-works
May-Aug. walls, and protruded beyond them, so that from their extremi-
ties could be suspended coverlets which should act as an
impenetrable defence against all shots launched at the men
whilst engaged upon that section of the wall which intervened
between this roofing and the part already completed. The
top of this floor was further paved with crude brick and mor-
tar, to guard against any attempts of the enemy to damage
it by fire ; and, finally, a number of soaked cushions were
thrown on, to prevent either the woodwork being broken
by the discharges of artillery, or the brickwork smashed by
the heavy shot from the mortars. Three large mats were
next manufactured out of anchor hawsers, in length equal to
the tower walls, and four feet deep ; and these were then
lashed to the protruding joists on the three sides exposed to
the enemy, thereby forming a continuous curtain round the
tower. These mats were made of this material, because expe-
rience elsewhere had proved it to be the only one capable of
resisting the passage both of hand-spears and ordnance shot,
no matter of what weight and size.
As soon as the already finished portion of the tower was
thus covered and fortified against every sort of discharge from
the enemy, the screens hitherto used were wheeled off to
other parts of the siege-works, and the men in the tower
began to let the roof hang free and then to raise it
with levers working from the first-floor beams ; hoisting
it as high as the suspension of the curtains allowed
of. That done, they proceeded, completely hidden and
protected by these coverings, to build up the four walls
with brickwork ; and, on the completion of this particular
section, the overhanging hood was prised up anew, and a fresh
space cleared for construction. When it was judged time for
Description of Siege-works 8 i
the insertion of the second floor, the beams were again fitted May-Aug.
into and concealed by the outside layers of bricks ; after which ^^
the new flooring was used, in its turn, as a leverage for once
more hoisting the top roof-work and its hanging mats. In
this way they effected the construction of altogether six
stories, in perfect safety and without a wound or danger of
any kind ; leaving as they built, wherever occasion seemed
to demand, a number of loopholes through which afterwards
to direct artillery fire.
As soon as they felt confident that their position in the lo
new tower enabled them to cover with its fire all the surround-
ing siege-buildings, they set to work to construct a sapping
shelter, sixty feet in length, and made from timbers two feet
square, with the intention of running it from the brick tower
down to the enemy's wall and the particular bastion facing
them. This shelter was of the following formation.
Two beams of equal length were first laid out upon the
ground, four feet apart, into each of which was let a row of
uprights five feet high. These were then coupled across by
a series of strong braces, forming a slight angle in the centre,
on the top of which other beams were to be laid as a roof.
Along these braces two-foot beams were accordingly fitted,
and fastened by nails and metal clamps. The next step was
to let in aU along the edges of this roof, or, in other words,
along the extremities of the beams which formed it, a raised
ledge of wood, about three inches broad and high, for the
purpose of holding the brickwork that was to follow. The
frame having thus received an appropriate slant to its roof,
and being neatly finished off, as soon as the roof beams were
made fast upon the braces, the shed was cased above with
crude brick and mortar, as a protection against fire thrown
82 Description of Siege-ivorks
May-Aug. from the battlements. These bricks were then given several
"* coatings of stucco to prevent their being washed to pieces by
water played upon them through pipes by the garrison:
whilst, finally, the stucco itself was laid over with soaked
cushions, to guard in turn against damage from either fire or
heavy stones. The whole of this piece of work was kept hidden
behind protection-sheds, and executed outside the tower itself :
and, upon its completion, the legionaries, with a sudden move-
ment totally unlooked for by the enemy, swept it out on rollers
and, using a type of winch employed for beaching ships, rushed
it down to the opposing bastion and fastened it to the masonry,
1 1 At the consternation wrought by this new peril the garrison
fetched out crowbars, and, prising up the biggest stones that
could be stirred, rolled them headlong down upon the sapping-
shed. But its stout timbers held against the crash, and all
that fell upon it slid off down the sloping roof. Seeing this,
the enemy changed their tactics, and, filling barrels with pine
shavings and pitch, set them alight and dropped them from
the wall upon the shed below. These, as they struck the roof,
also rolled to the ground, and were there fended off from the
sides of the structure by means of long poles and pitchforks.
Meanwhile, beneath the shelter, the troops were tearing out
with crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy's tower holding
the foundations together ; during which operation the shed
was guarded by the garrison of the brick tower, who poured in
so hot a fire of hand-spears and artillery shot, that they drove
the enemy from his wall and bastions, and thereby made it a
harder task for him to withstand the progress of our sappers.
Several stones had already been removed from the underground
part of the bastion, when suddenly all that portion collapsed
and fell, whilst the remainder looked like tottering to its fall.
49
The City sues for Terms 8 3
At this, the enemy, unnerved by the sudden ruin of the 12
tower, and overwhelmed by a reverse so unexpected, cowed
also by the evident wrath of heaven, and dreading the plunder
of their city,rushed out in a body through the gatewayinto the
open, armed only withthewhite flag,^ and with hands upraised
towards the generals and the army, in token of surrender.
Such an unexpected movement caused a complete suspension
of military operations ; and the soldiers ceased fighting, and
eagerly turned to pick up what news they could. The enemy,
on reaching the presence of the generals and the main army,
threw themselves on their knees and begged to be allowed
to await the arrival of Caesar. ' They could see ', so they
declared, 'that their city was now taken, that the Roman
siege-works were completed, and their own bastion under-
mined : they accordingly gave up the defence. If, when
Caesar arrived, they were to refuse compliance with his
terms, he would only have to give the word, and nothing
could possibly prevent the instant sacking of their town. Even
as things were, they observed that, if the rest of the bastion
went, it would be beyond the power of the Roman officers
to restrain their men from bursting into the city in hopes of
plunder, and levelling it with the ground.'
All this, with much more to the same effect, was pleaded
in tones of striking pathos and with a copious use of tears, as
indeed was only to be expected from such past-masters of
forensic eloquence.
Touched by this appeal, the Roman generals withdrew their 1 3
forces from the siege ramparts, and abandoned the blockade,
merely leaving a few sentinels upon the works. Humanity
induced them to grant the enemy a sort of truce, while waiting
* ' With suppliant fillets.'
G 2
84 -^ Truce granted
May-Aiig. the return of Caesar, and no further shot was fired either from
"^"^ the wall or from our own lines ; but everybody, assuming the
contest at an end, relaxed their precautions and vigilance.
A further reason for the armistice was that Caesar had
written strict injunctions to Trebonius not to allow the city
to be taken by storm, lest the troops, who were unusually
irritated at the town's revolt and its contemptuous defiance
of their power, as well as by their own protracted exertions,
should put the whole adult population to the sword, which
indeed they threatened to do. Even now they were hardly
to be restrained from breaking into the town, and were highly
exasperated because they fancied that Trebonius had baulked
them of their prey.
14 The enemy, however, were only faithlessly seeking a favour-
able opportunity for an act of most consummate treachery ;
and, after a few days' interval, when our men had to some
extent grown slack and careless, they suddenly, about midday,
whilst some of the guards were absent from their posts, and
some weary after their long labours, actually asleep on the
works, with all their accoutrements laid aside and in their
covers,^ burst out from the gates, and, aided by a strong
wind, set fire to the siege buildings. The wind blew this fire
in all directions, with the result that embankment and screens,
tortoise, and wooden tower, together with the artillery upon
it, simultaneously caught ablaze, and were all completely
gutted before even the cause of the outbreak could be dis-
covered.
Shaken by the sudden catastrophe, the troops who were on
the spot seized what arms they could, and, others rushing up
^ A Roman soldier's shield was kept, when not in use, in a leather
casino;.
and treacherously hrok^i 8f
from the camp, a general attack was made upon the cnemv. May-Ang.
The latter indeed was quickly routed, but our men were pre- ^^
vented from pressing home the pursuit through the showers
of arrows and artillery-shot launched upon them from the
ramparts. The Massilians, on the other hand, fell back under
the shelter of their walls, and there at their leisure proceeded
to burn down both sapping-shed and brick tower. Thus dis-
appeared in a few moments, through the enemy's treachery
and the force of the gale, the accumulated work of many
months. The same artifice was again attempted the next
day, when, with the wind blowing as before, they charged out
with even greater confidence to give battle at the second
wooden tower and mound, dashing quantities of fire upon
them. But, whereas on the first occasion our troops had com-
pletely relaxed their earlier vigilance of the siege ;. this time,
warned by yesterday's mishap, they were found completely
prepared for defence, vidth the consequence that the enemy
was driven back into the town after heavy slaughter and the
total failure of his plan.
Trebonius at once set himself to the task of taking in hand ^5
and rebuilding his ruined works, inspired by the greatly inten-
sified enthusiasm of his troops. For on seeing the fiasco in
which all their labours and preparations had now resulted,
a wave of fury swept them at the thought of how their im-
mense efforts would only look ridiculous in face of the fact
that they were now totally destitute of even a source for
obtaining further siege material, since every tree throughout
t he length and breadth of the Massilian territories had already
been cut down and carted to the army. Accordingly they
determined to substitute an unprecedented type of siege
mound. This took the form of two parallel brick walls six
^6 New Siege-worJ^ built
M?.y-Aug. feet each in width, roofed above, and of nearly equal height
to the former embankment of timber. Wherever the space
between the two, or the weakness of the material used seemed
to require it, stout tie-rods were inserted as couplers, and big
beams laid across to give additional strength ; whilst every
part of the roofing was covered with hurdle work, which,
again, was coated with mortar. The men working below
thus found themselves protected overhead by a roof, on each
side by a wall, and in front by the shelter of a military
screen, and could therefore safely bring up everything
they wanted for the work. The enterprise was consequently
carried through with expedition, and the lost fruits of their
long labours were quickly regained by the ingenuity and devo-
tion of the troops. Finally, gateways for future sorties were
left at appropriate intervals in the wall.
16 The enemy thus saw the extensive buildings, whose recon-
struction he had fondly hoped to be impossible, no matter
what time were spent upon them, rebuilt with the labour and
output of a few days, and rebuilt, moreover, in such a way
as to leave no opening for any treacherous sally, or any
possibility whatever either of injuring our troops by the
discharge of spears or of damaging the works by fire. Simul-
taneously it came home to them that this first experiment
might very well be so extended as to enclose the whole of the
landward side of their city within a bastioned wall, which
must then force them to abandon their position on their
own fortifications, now that our troops had nearly effected a
junction between their brick walls and those of the city,
and were already throwing handspears. It was also clear that
their big artillery, from which they had hoped so much, was
rapidly becoming useless through the shortened range ; and,
Final Surrender 8 7
each party having now equal opportunities of fighting from May-Aug.
towets and battlements, they were quite conscious of their ^^
own inability to match our men in personal courage. It was
these considerations which induced them to fall back once
more upon the previous terms of capitulation.
CHAPTER II
The Clearing of Southern Spain
Meanwhile in Further or Western Spain, Marcus Varro 17
had at first, upon news of the initial operations in Italy, given "^^'"^ ^^^
up the cause of Pompeius as lost, and continued to speak in
the most flattering terms of Caesar. ' Whilst his own in-
terests', he declared, 'were already engaged on the side of
Pompeius, in virtue of the deputy-command he held from
that leader, which bound him to the obligation of loyalty, his
position was complicated by an equally strong friendship for
Caesar. However, he knew what was the duty of a commander
holding a commission of trust under a superior officer, and he
knew too the forces at his own disposal, as well as the universal
bias of his province towards Caesar.' ^
Such was the tone of all his conversation, reflected in his
conduct by a general inactivity. Subsequently there came
the information of Caesar's detention before Marseilles, of the
junction of Petreius's forces with the army of Afranius,of the
successful concentration of large bodies of auxiliaries, and the
confident expectation of others equally strong, and, last but
not least, of the unanimous feeling of the Eastern province for
Pompeius. And when this was finally followed by the news of
the critical state of Caesar's supplies before Lerida, communi-
"■ who had been Governor's Paymaster and Governor of it. See Inirod.
88 Coercion of the Province
Summer 49 cated by Afranius in exaggerated and bombastic terms, he no
longer hesitated to change his own attitude with the change
of fortune.
1 8 Enlisting was organized throughout the province, till his two
legions had been raised to their full complement and further
strengthened by the addition of some thirty native battalions :
he collected large supplies of corn, to be forwarded to the
Massilians as well as to Afranius and Petreius ; ordered the
city of Cadiz (Gades) to build ten warships, whilst superin-
tending the building of several more at Seville (Hisfalis), and
removed to Cadiz all money and valuables from the great
temple of Hercules. From the province a force of six
battalions was sent south to garrison Cadiz ; Caius Gal-
lonius, a Roman knight, and a friend of Domitius, who
happened to be there on a business errand from the latter
connected with a legacy, was installed as commandant of that
town ; and all arms, whether the property of the government
or individuals, were ordered to be conveyed to the residence
of the new governor.
These overt acts he followed up by delivering violent
speeches against Caesar, and several times openly announced
from his official platform that that commander had fought
various unsuccessful actions, and that large bodies of his troops
had gone over to Afranius ; information of which he declared
he had satisfied himself from most trustworthy messengers
and indisputable sources.
Having by these methods terrorized the Roman citizens in
his province, he coerced them into promising him for the
public services j^i 50,000 coin of the realm, and 20,000 pounds
weight of bar silver, together with about 4,000 quarters of
wheat : while, further to mark his bitterness, the townships
Caesar's J{apid Move on Cordova 89
suspected of sympathy with Caesar were saddled with the Summer 49
heaviest burdens, garrisons also being set up in their midst.
Finally he allowed prosecutions to be brought against private
individuals, by which any who had been guilty of treasonable
language against the present regime had their goods con-
fiscated to the state, and the entire province had to take an
oath of allegiance to Pompeius and himself.
On learning the issue of the operations in Eastern Spain, he
prepared for war, though the conduct of the war was to be
a strange one, and consisted of retiring with his two legions
upon Crdiz, and there locking up his fleet along with all his
provisions ; a course of action forced upon him by the dis-
covery that his province was now solid for Caesar. There, on
the island which forms that city, with sufficient ships and
supplies of food, he regarded it an easy matter to effect the
procrastination of the war.
Caesar, however, had determined, in spite of much urgent
business which at this moment summoned him back to Italy,
not to leave any area of war behind him in the Spanish pro-
vinces ; for he was perfectly well aware of the signal benefits
conferred by Pompeius upon the Eastern province, and of his
immense following in that region.
He therefore dispatched the tribune Quintus Cassius ' with 19
a force of two legions to march upon Southern Spain, whilst
he himself travelled ahead by rapid marches, and escorted
by a bodyguard of 600 horse. He also sent on before him a
proclamation, fixing a date on which he desired the attend-
ance at Cordova (Corduba) of the magistrates and leading
citizens of all the communities in this part of the Peninsula.
* One of those who vetoed the Senate's declaration of war. Cf. Bk. I,
ch. I.
90 Grorving Discontent of the Province
Summer 49 The terms of this proclamation were disseminated throughout
the province ; and, on the day appointed, there was not a
single township which had not sent some members of its
governing council to Cordova, and not a single Roman
citizen of any standing who was not there to meet him.
During this time also the Roman settlement in Cordova
took upon themselves to shut the city gates against Varro ;
guards and sentinels were posted upon the walls and turrets,
and two of the so-called ' colonial corps ' having chanced to
arrive there, they were kept under orders for the defence of
the town. Simultaneously, the inhabitants of Carmona, by
far the strongest township of the whole province, of their own
initiative expelled the three battalions established in their
citadel as a garrison by Varro, and then shut their gates
against him.
20 All this only increased Varro's haste to get to Cadiz with
his two legions as quickly as possible, lest he should find
either the road or the passage across to the island barred in his
face ; so widespread and so decided did he now realize the
feeling of the province to be in favour of Caesar. He had not
gone far when dispatches met him from Cadiz informing him
that the news of Caesar's manifesto had at once been followed
by a conspiracy between the leaders of the town and the offi-
cers of the troops there in garrison, to eject Gallonius and hold
the city and island for Caesar : that after the hatching of this
plot an ultimatum had been addressed to Gallonius advising
his voluntary departure from Cadiz, whilst he could safely do
so (for otherwise the conspirators would take their own
measures), and that upon this threat Gallonius had evacuated
the town.
On hearing of this last development, one of the two legions,
and Su7 render to Caesar 91
termed the home-born regiment ', pulled up from the ground Summer 4(y
its standards in Varro's camp, with their commander actually-
standing by and looking on, and then and there marched
back to Seville ; where, without committing any breach of
discipline, it proceeded to bivouac in the market-place and
public colonnades of the city. This conduct won such warm
approbation from the Roman citizens in that administrative
area, that they each took some of the troops off to their own
homes, and there entertained them with the keenest pleasure.
Proceedings like these caused Varro considerable misgiving.
Changing his route, he started off with the hope of getting
to Santiponce (Italica), only, however, to receive intelligence
from his supporters that the gates were already closed
against him. He was now cut off from every possible line of
march, and, accordingly, sent in word to Caesar that he was
prepared to surrender his remaining legion to whomever
Caesar should direct him. The latter dispatched Sextus
Caesar to his late opponent, bearing instructions for the legion
to be surrendered to him. After the surrender, Varro came
to meet Caesar at Cordova, where he gave a faithful return of
all his government accounts, paying over whatever ready money
he had in hand, and specifying all stores and ships anywhere
under his immediate command.
Subsequently Caesar delivered a public address in a Durbar 21
at Cordova, in which he expressed his gratitude to all the various
classes of his audience in their order. First of all to the Roman
citizens, for their active steps in securing the allegiance of the
provincial capital ; next to the Spaniards for their expulsion
of the enemy's garrisons ; then to the peopl&of Cadiz, for
' i. e. from Roman citizens born and bred in the province, like some
An?lo-Indians.
92 'Temporary Settlements of Spain
successfully foiling the plots of his opponents and asserting
their own independence of action ; lastly to the officers and
centurions, lately in garrison in that city, for having lent
their military support to the execution of the policy of the
civilians. After this, he released the Roman citizens from
their undertaking to supply Varro with moneys for the public
service ; and at the same time restored their confiscated
property to all who were proved to have been so fined for
excessive freedom of speech.
Having then distinguished certain of his adherents by the
grant of privileges both public and private in character, he
filled the rest with bright hopes for their political future, and,
after a stay of two days in Cordova, set out for Cadiz, where
all treasure and valuables taken from the sanctuary of Hercules
and afterwardslodged in a private dwelling-house were ordered
to be restored to that temple. This done, he appointed
Quintus Cassius as governor of the province with a military
force of four legions; he then went on board the vessels lately
built by Marcus Varro and, at his injunctions, by the town
of Cadiz, and set sail for Tarragona {Tarraco), and, after
a few days' voyage, cast anchor off that city. Here he found
representatives of pretty well the whole Eastern province
awaiting his arrival. Following the same policy as at Cordova,
he selected certain communities to be the recipients of both
public and personal distinctions, and afterwards left by the
overland route for Narbonne, travelling thence on to Mar-
seilles, where he learned that in accordance with a law passed
by the people he had been nominated Dictator by Marcus
Lepidus the praetor.
! The Massilians he found reduced to the utmost straits.
Their supplies were at starvation point, they had been twice
Fate of Marseilles 9 3
beaten at sea, their numerous sallies had uniformly been Summer 49
repulsed, and now, to crown all, they were in the throes of
a virulent plague. This last calamity was due to their long
immurement and change of diet, the only food now obtainable
being stale millet and mouldy barley, stores of which grain had
been long accumulated in public granaries as a provision
against such contingencies. One of their bastion-towers was,
moreover, down, and much of their wall undermined ; whilst
all hope had now disappeared of succour from the Spanish
provinces and armies, the news of whose capture by Caesar
had lately reached them. They therefore determined to sur-
render without further attempt at treachery. A few days,
however, before the actual capitulation, Lucius Domitius, on
discovering the intention of the town, had proceeded to fit out
three ships ; and, after allotting two of these to his suite, had
himself embarked on the third ; when, favoured by dirty
weather, he made a dash to escape. He was sighted by the
vessels, which, by the orders of Brutus, lay daily off the har-
bour to enforce the blockade, and these at once weighed
anchor and gave chase. One of the three, viz. that of Domi-
tius, alone kept on her course, and continued her efforts to
escape, until, aided by the heavy weather, she was lost to sight
by her pursuers : the other two, frightened at seeing our war-
ships closing in upon them, put back into port.
TheMassilians,in obedience to Caesar's orders, now brought
out through the town gates all the arms and siege-guns they
possessed, and then made over to Brutus all the ships remain-
ing either in harbour or dockyards : simultaneously surrender
was made of all funds in the public Treasury. These pre-
liminaries disposed of, Caesar agreed to spare their autonomy,
though more out of consideration, it must be confessed, for
'94- Curio in Jfrica
Slimmer 49 the city's great name and distinguished history in the past,
than for any services they had rendered to himself.
Leaving, therefore, a garrison of two legions in the place, he
sent on the remainder into Italy, and then started on his way
to Rome.
CHAPTER III
The Set-back in Africa
23 It was during the events recorded in the previous chapter
Aug.-Sept. that the expedition of Caius Curio to North Africa was begun
^^ and ended. Exhibiting from the outset a fatal contempt for
the military strength of his opponent, Publius Attius Varus, he
crossed over from Sicily, accompanied by only two of the four
legions originally given him by Caesar, and by but five hundred
cavalry ; and, after a passage of some sixty hours, landed, on
the morning of the third day, at a place called Anquillaria.
This spot is distant twenty-two miles from Klibia (Clufea),
and in summer-time offers a fairly convenient anchorage,
lying, as it does, between two bold headlands. Klibia itself
was occupied by the younger Lucius Caesar, who was cruising
off the port in readiness for Curio's arrival with a squadron of
ten warships, old vessels that had been hauled up into the
dockyards of Utica at the close of the war with the pirates,
and fitted out again for the present campaign by the orders of
Attius. Their admiral had accordingly taken alarm at the
imposing numbers of our flotilla, and, flying from the open sea,
had run his flagship, a three-decker ^, upon the nearest point of
the coast-line, where he left it stranded, and set out overland
to the town of Susa (Hadrumetuni), then held by a single
•legion under Caius Considius Longus. The rest of the squad-
' A decked trireme. See note, p. 77-
7 o face p. 05.
Brilliant Opening of the Campaim 9 5-
ron, upon the flight of their leader, likewise made for Susa. Aug.-Sept.
Meanwhile Curio's twelve warships, which he had brought '♦9
over from Sicily to escort his transports, started under the
command of his paymaster Marcius Rufus and gave chase
to Caesar ; but, on seeing the latter's vessel abandoned on
the beach, they towed her off, and then returned to Curio.
Thr latter, after completing his disembarkation, directed 24
Marcius to take the ships round to Utica, and, following their
departure, set his army in motion for the same objective,
a two days' march bringing him to the banks of the Medjerda
(Bagradas). There leaving Caius Caninius Rebilus in charge
of the legions, he rode forward with the cavalry to reconnoitre
the old camp of Scipio ^, a site which he believed to be admira-
bly adapted for the permanent quarters of his army. It
consists of a tongue of precipitous rock, jutting out into the
sea, steep and rugged on two sides, but with a slightly less
abrupt descent on that looking towards Utica, from which,
by the direct route, it is little over a mile distant. This route,
however, passes through springs, where there is a considerable
inlet of the sea, converting all the surrounding district into
a marsh, and any one wishing to avoid this can only reach the
town by a detour of fully six miles.
Having reconnoitred the position, Curio also succeeded in 25
obtaining a view of his opponent's camp. It lay hard by the
wall of the town, which it actually touched at what is known
as the Military Gate. It thus had the advantage of great
natural strength ; for, in addition to the city of Utica itself
forming one of its four sides, a second rested on the theatre,
which faces the town outside, and on the immensely strong
^ Used by the great Scipio Africanus at the close of the second Punic
War, 204.
9 5 Brilliant Opening of the Campaign
Aug.-Sept, substructures of this building ; and lastly, the approach to
"^^ it was both narrow and difficult of access.
Whilst investigating the camp, he noticed that all round the
neighbourhood the roads were thronged with the inhabitants
Carrying and driving loads of property from the country
towards the city, hoping to convey it thither for safety in their
panic at the sudden outbreak of war in their midst. Curio at
once launched his cavalry upon this prospective plunder and
booty ; but had hardly given the word when a body of 600
Numidian horse and 400 foot emerged from the town, having
been dispatched by Varus to act as an escort to the coveted
prize. These troops had arrived at Utica a few days before
as reinforcements from King Juba, whose action had been
prompted, not merely by the old friendship between his father
andPompeius,but also by a feeling of intense animosity against
Curio, who, in his tribunate of the year before, had laid a bill
before the people, the ratification of which would have meant
the annexation of Juba's kingdom. The opposing cavalry met
in the shock of battle, but the opening charge was enough for
the Numidians, who quite failed to stand their ground, and,
with the loss of some 120 killed, fell back upon their camp
outside the city wall. Meanwhile the warships had arrived off
the town, and Curio at once ordered his admiral to notify the
numerous fleet of merchantmen who lay off Utica some 200
strong, that any captain who did not immediately bring his
vessel round to the Cornelian camp would be regarded as an
enemy. On receipt of this notice, the entire fleet, without
a moment's hesitation, weighed anchor, and, leaving Utica,
moved across to the place indicated, thereby enriching the
army with abundant supplies of every description.
26 With this successful opening to the campaign, Curio
A Second Victory 97
returned to his camp on the Medjerda, and, as he rode in, was Aug.-Sept.
received by the thunderous applause of every man in his army ^^
acclaiming him as their own victorious Commander.^ The
next day he moved with his force upon Utica, pitching his
camp close by the city. The entrenchments of this were not
yet completed, when his mounted pickets brought in word
that large auyiliary bodies of horse and foot, dispatched by
Juba, were approaching the town. Even as they spoke a heavy
cloud of dust could be descried, and in another moment the
head of the advancing column was in sight. Astounded at
a sight so wholly unexpected, Curio threw forward his cavalry
to hold back and check their advance, while he quickly recalled
his infantry from the work of fortification, and arranged his
line of battle. The cavalry dashed into action, and, before
the legionaries could be deployed or assume their proper places
in the ranks, it had swept back the king's forces in one confused
melee ; caught, as they were, in the same state of disorder and
over-confidence as had characterized their march. A con-
siderable portion of their infantry were cut to pieces ; but
nearly all the cavalry made good their escape by a headlong
flight across the sands into the town.
During the night which followed this engagement tv^ro of 27
Curio's centurions, Marsians ^ by birth, left his camp to desert
to Attius Varus, taking voth them twenty-two men of their
two companies. Perhaps it was their honest conviction that
they reported to him, or perhaps it was only to declare them-
selves his courtiers as well as his soldiers — seeing that the wish
' A regular custom under the Republic after an adequate victory.
Under the Empire the emperor alone held the title. For other instancej
see Bk. Ill, chs. 3 and 4 (31, 71).
' From the Abiuzzi.
9 8 Symptoms of Disloyalty
Aug.-Sept. is often father to the thought, and that our own opinions we
would fain believe to be those of our neighbours — at all events
they asserted disaffection to be rife in the army of Curio, and
that the situation urgently demanded a meeting with his army
which might give it an opportunity to negotiate. Their
opinion weighed so much with Varus that early on the next
morning he advanced his legions from camp : Curio immedi-
ately responded by a similar movement ; and each commander
then drew up his forces for battle, with merely a slight hollow
separating the two hostile lines,
28 Now there was serving in the army of Varus, the Sextus
Quintilius Varus who, as recorded above, had been one of
those taken at Pentima (Corfiniuw). This officer, after being
released by Caesar, had crossed to Africa ; whilst Curio
also, it will be remembered, had made up his expeditionary
force out of the legions previously acquired by Caesar at the
capture of Pentima. So closely, indeed, had their old organi-
zation been adhered to, that, with the exception of a few
changes amongst the centurions, the personnel of the com-
panies and battalions had undergone no change whatever.
This fact now afforded Quintilius a pretext for addressing
overtures to our men ; and he accordingly proceeded to ride
down the lines of Curio, appealing to the troops not to put
lightly aside the recollection of their earlier oath of allegiance,
sworn in the presence of Domitius and of himself as that
general's paymaster, and not to bear arms against old comrades
who had shared with them all the privations of a siege, nor
to give their services to a party who only stigmatized them
as traitors. He then wound up by hinting at the rewards
which they might confidently expect from his own generosity
in the event of their joining himself and Attius.
in Curious Army 99
At the conclusion of the speech no indication whatever of Aug.-Sepf.
their feeling was made on the part of Curio's army, whereupon ^^
both sides withdrew their forces to camp.
As soon as Curio's troops were back in their entrenchments 29
a strange misgiving seized upon all ranks, and quickly gathered
head as the various expressions of opinion made themselves
heard. Exaggerated notions were conjured up by each man's
private imagination, so that to the fears communicated by his
comrades each also added something of his own. In this way
an idea, which in reality emanated from a single individual,
first spread its way amongst a few, and was then transmitted
from man to man, until finally it appeared to rest upon the
authority of quite a number. For, the reader must remember,
it was a time of civil war, and one had to do with a class of men
who possessed complete freedom of action, and could follow
whatever course they chose. These legions again were peculiar
in the fact that they had but recently been serving with those
who were now ranged against them. Moreover, the very
frequency of Caesar's leniency in dealing with surrendered
foes had led them to under-estimate his generosity. Some
of the men, accordingly, now pressed for more decided action ;
others, inclined to temporize, could obtain but a cold hearing ;
and, finally, in some cases a fictitious air of defiance was
assumed by those who wished to seem the bolder spirits.^
Such symptoms led Curio to summon a council of war to 30
discuss the situation. On assembling, some of the officers
were for going on at all hazards, and for actually storming the
camp of Varus ; holding that, where troops were contemplat-
ing measures of this nature, the most fatal thing of all was
inaction ; and, come what might, it was better to try the
•" Much of this chapter is slightly conjectural, owing to faulty text.
100 A Council of War
Aug.-Sept. fortune of battle with sword in hand than to be deserted and
^^^ betrayed by their own men, and afterwards have to undergo
the extreme penalty of war. Others were of opinion they
should fall back in the early hours of the morning upon the
old camp of Scipio, so that the men might recover their
senses after being kept a few days longer from all contact
with the enemy; pointing out also that, in the case of disaster,
the large number of ships lying there would give them a safer
and easier retreat back to Sicily than that afforded by their
present position.
31 Neither plan commended itself to Curio, who considered
one scheme to err as much by defect of courage as the other
did by excess, when half of those present looked favourably
upon what was nothing less than the most cowardly flight,
and the other half were for giving battle even with the advan-
tage of position directly against them. For what sort of
confidence was it that led any one to believe in the possibility
of storming a camp, defended, not merely by artificial, but
also by immense natural fortifications ? And how were they
the better off if, after a crushing defeat, they were compelled
to fall back from the assault ? Surely it was a well-established
axiom that while success in the field ensured for commanders
the devotion of their troops, disaster no less earned their
hatred. Then, as to the proposal to change their own quar-
ters, he could see in it nothing but an ignominious flight,
prompted by unmitigated despair, and inevitably to be fol-
lowed by the disaffection of the army. Their plain interests
demanded that no handle should be given, either to the men
who were loyal, to suspect that their allegiance was doubted,
or to the mutineers, to discover the dread which they in-
spired ; for any signs of wavering on their own part not only
Curious Self-possession i o i
strengthened the insubordination of the disaffected, but also Aug.-Sept.
weakened the obedience of the well disposed. Granted, there- ^^
fore, that they were really satisfied of the substantial truth
of the reports concerning the army's disloyalty — which he, for
his part, felt confident were either pure fabrications or at any
rate less serious than was generally supposed — how much more
dignified a course was it to ignore such rumours and to keep
them secret, rather than allow their own conduct to be taken
as their confirmation? Every man when engaged in battle
endeavoured to conceal his own wounds : ought they not
similarly to cover up the weak places in an army, which might
otherwise tend to raise their adversaries' hopes ? If he were
told that these dangers were discounted by the proposal to
march at midnight, all he could say was that such a proposal,
in his opinion, put a direct premium upon any leanings
towards misconduct. Movements of this character were
only restrained by one of two incentives, either feelings of
honour or fear of punishment, and both these checks were
least operative at night. To sum up therefore. He was
neither such a fire-eater as to urge a hopeless attack upon
fortified entrenchments, nor such a poltroon as to throw up
the expedition in despair. On the contrary, he was of the
opinion that every other alternative should first be tried,
and he already felt confident that he should carry the great
majority of the council with him in this decision.
Having dismissed his council, Curio summoned a general 32
meeting of the troops. On their assembly, he recalled to their
recollection the enthusiastic devotion they had tendered
Caesar at Pentima, and reminded them how their friendly
initiative at that time had put a large part of Italy at his feet.
' One after the other ', he continued, ' all the country towns
I02 A Frank Appeal to the Troops
followed your guidance and repeated your action ; and well
might Caesar then regard your decision with feelings of pro-
foundest gratitude, and the Pompeians with those of dismay.
For mark the consequences. In the camp of the enemy that
first verdict of yours told so heavily, that, without any defeat
in a pitched battle, Pompeius ordered the evacuation of Italy ;
whilst Caesar, to show his trust in you, at once committed to
your safeguarding one of his dearest friends in the person of
myself, along with the government of Sicily and North Africa ;
countries whose resources are indispensable to him if he is to
retain the capital and Italy .-^ But, I am reminded, there are
some who would now urge you to leave us. It may well be so.
For what could afford them keener pleasure than to out-
manoeuvre us and at the same time to involve you in a piece
of low villany ; or what grosser insult to yourselves can their
impotent rage suggest, than that you should betray the party
which attributes its success solely to your attitude, and walk
into the arms of those who hold you responsible for all their
disasters? You surely have heard of Caesar's triumphant
career in Spain, and how two armies, with their two com-
manders, have gone down before him, and two provinces been
brought under his control ; and that all this has been accom-
plished within forty days of his first sighting his opponents.
Is it conceivable that a side which could make no stand with
all its forces intact can now do so when its cause is lost ; and
can you, who declared for Caesar when victory still hung in
the balance, now think of siding with the vanquished, after
the issue of the war is decided, and when you ought to be
reaping the reward of your services? But perhaps you feel
uneasy at what they allege to have been your desertion and
^ Not only strategically, but also as the granaries of Italy.
a?id Dissipation of Doubts 103
betrayal of their cause, and at their reference to your earlier Aug. -Sept.
oath of allegiance. Well, I ask you, was it you who deserted ^^
Lucius Domitius, or was it he who abandoned you ? Is it not
the fact that he threw you over when you were fully prepared
to go on to the bitter end, and that he tried to save his own
skin without a single word to yourselves? And is it not
equally true that after being betrayed by him you received
back your lives as the free gift of Caesar? So much then for
the alleged desertion ; and as to the oath, what authority had
he to hold you to it, when the insignia of his office ' had been
surrendered, his military command laid down, and he himself
had passed under the higher authority of his captor, becoming
a mere prisoner of war and a magistrate no longer? It is
indeed a queer notion of a soldier's obligation they are left
to appeal to, if they think it incumbent upon you to disregard
the oath by which you are at present bound, in order to recon-
sider that which expiredbythe capitulation of the general who
dictated it, and by the forfeiture of his legal standing which
that capitulation involved.
' Possibly, however, I am to conclude that, though you
approve of Caesar, you find fault with me. I am not now
going to talk about my own claims upon your gratitude, which
still fall short of what either I could wish or yourselves expect ;
but let me remind you it is always at the end of a war that
soldiers look for the reward of their efforts, and what that end
is going to be not even you can doubt. Yet why should I not
mention the great care we have shown for your safety, as well
as the success that has so far attended our expedition ? Do you
regret that I brought the whole army over in perfect safety
without the loss of a single transport? That on my arrival
^ ' The axes of his lictors.'
1 04 A '■ Soldier of Caesar '
Aug.-Sept. I scattered the enemy's fleet at the first encounter? That in
two successive days I won two cavalry engagements? That
I secured for us out of the harbour and bay occupied by the
enemy 200 laden merchantmen, and forced him into a position
where no provisions could reach him either overland or by
sea ? However, if you will, fling away good fortune such as this,
and leaders with this record, and go and identify yourselves
with the disgraceful fiasco of Pentima, the ignominious flight
from Italy, and the surrender of the Spanish provinces — all of
them a sure forecast of the verdict on this African war. For
myself, I was always content to be called a soldier of Caesar,
and it was you who acclaimed me by the title of Commander.
If you regret it, I return you your gift ; but do you at the same
time give me back my former name, unless you wish the honour
you then bestowed upon me to be taken as a deliberate insult
to myself.'
33 Such a speech aroused the deepest feelings of the soldiery ;
and even during its delivery constant interruptionswere heard,
showing that the suspicion of disloyalty stirred them to an
almost intolerable indignation. On his leaving the assembly
they swarmed around him, and with one voice bade him dis-
miss his doubts, and not hesitate at any moment to give battle
to the enemy, and so put their loyalty and resolution to the
test. This demonstration of the men's feeling completely
altered both the temper and mental attitude of the whole
army, and Curio resolved accordingly, with the approval of
his staff, to risk a decisive action upon the first opportunity
that offered. On the morrow, therefore, he moved out from
his lines and drew up for battle on the position occupied by
his troops during each of the preceding days. Equally little
did Attius Varus pause to consider before advancing his own
Battle outside %)tica lof
force, determined as he was to profit by any occasion that Aug.-Sept«
might present itself either of tampering with his opponent's ^^
army or of engaging it on equal terms.
As already indicated, the two embattled lines were separated 34
by a ravine, of no great size, but presenting a steep and
difficult ascent. Each commander, therefore, manoeuvring
for the better position delayed his attack in the hope that his
adversary would attempt the passage of this donga. After
some interval, a movement was observed on the left wing of
Attius, where, it was noticed, the full strength of his cavalry,
together with a large contingent of Numidian light infantry
interspersed through its ranks, was descending the banks of
the ravine. To meet this attack Curio dispatched his cavalry
and two battalions of Marrucinians ^ ; but the enemy's
squadrons refused to face the charge, and, stretching
their horses to the gallop, hastened back to their main
body ; whereupon the light infantry who had accompanied
the forward movement were, through this desertion by
the cavalry, in course of being surrounded and cut to pieces
by our troops. On this point were now concentrated
the eyes of the whole Pompeian line, as they watched the
flight and slaughter of their comrades ; and it was at this
critical moment that Rebilus, one of Caesar's generals, whose
wide military experience had led Curio to bring him over from
Sicily with the expedition, turned to his commander, and
pointing to the confusion among the enemy, asked why he
hesitated to seize the opportunity thus offered. With a single
word to his troops to remember their promises of the previous
day. Curio put himself at their head, and ordered them to
follow. On reaching the ravine they were met by such
^ On the Adriatic, south of the Pescara. See Bk. I, ch. i (23;.
io6 Victory of Curio
\ii!r.-Fept. formidable obstacles at its ascent, that the leading files, when
"^'^ not shouldered up behind by their comrades, only clambered
out with the greatest exertions. But the legionaries of Atius
had no stomach for a fight, as the sight of the recent flight and
massacre of their auxiliaries had left them paralysed with
terror, and their imagination already represented them as sur-
rounded by our cavalry. The result was, that before a single
javelin could be thrown, or our men get to closer quarters,
the whole of the enemy's line turned and broke, retreating in
confusion upon their camp.
.^5 In the pursuit which followed a soldier named Fabius,
a Pelignian ^ by race, and a centurion in one of the inferior
companies of his legion, worked his way to the head of the
flying enemy, continually shouting the name of Varus, and
searching for him everywhere, thus giving the impression that
he was one of his own men and had something of importance
to communicate. That general, on hearing himself so often
addressed, looked at the man and stopped to ask him who he
was and what he wanted. In a moment the other had raised
his sword and slashed at the officer's unguarded shoulder, and
was within an ace of killing him, had not Varus brought
his shield up to parry the blow and so escaped with his life.
Fabius was thereupon immediately surrounded and cut down
by the bystanders.
When the flying rout approached the camp, the gates
quickly became blocked and the road jammed with the
crowded rabble, and the losses here incurred without the
infliction of any wound were even heavier than during either
the action or the pursuit. At one time it looked as if the
enemy would actually be driven from his entrenched camp ;
^ Neighbours to the Marruciiiians on the upper Pescara.
Preparations for a Siege 107
and, indeed, some of the fugitives only halted upon reaching Aug.-Sept
the shelter of the town. The natural advantage of its position, ^^
however, and the strength of its fortifications, effectually
barred all approach: and it was further rendered impracticable
by the want of the proper tools and appliances, since our
men had left camp equipped only for a pitched battle and
not for an assault upon fortified entrenchments. Curio,
therefore, withdrew his army back to hij own lines, with
the single loss of Fabius, in contrast with the 600 killed
and 1,000 wounded on the side of his opponent. After his
retirement, all the enemy's wounded, and many more whose
fears had since developed imaginary wounds, left the camp
and made their way into the town. The discovery of this
fraud, and the knowledge that his army was demoralized with
panic, made active measures on the part of Varus imperative.
Giving orders, therefore, for a single bugler and a certain
number of tents to be left behind to disarm suspicion, he
struck camp in silence ^ during the early hours of morning,
and moved into the city with all his army.
On the following day Curio commenced the siege and block- 36
ade of Utica. The composition of this town was peculiar.
Long years of quiet ease had made its crowded populace
unfamiliar with war: old services rendered by Caesar had made
the body of burgesses his friends : the Roman settlement in
the city was distinctly heterogeneous in character : finally,
over all alike was the terror inspired by the result of preceding
battles. It was no wonder, then, that open suggestions for
capitulation already made themselves heard in all quarters, and
a petition was laid before Varus demanding the sacrifice of his
own amour propre to the threatened ruin of the whole com-
1 i. e. without the loudly-repeated word of command that was usual.
io8 The Africa?! Thunder-cloud
Uig.-Sept. munity. In the midst of these negotiations couriers arrived
■^'^ from King Juba, charged with the announcement that that
monarch was close at hand at the head of a strong relieving
force, and begging the inhabitants to take every step for the
retention and defence of the town. This intelligence restored
37 the hopes of the panic-stricken city ; but Curio for some
time refused to give it any credence, so confident was
he of his own security. In this attitude he was still
further strengthened by the fact that authentic news of
Caesar's victories in Spain was now beginning to reach Africa ;
and all these circumstances combined to embolden him to the
supposition that the king would take no overt measures against
him. The subsequent Intelligence, however, from indis-
putable sources that the Numidian host was now less than
twenty-five miles from Utlca, determined him to abandon
his siege-works, and to fall back upon the old camp of Sclplo.
Here he proceeded to collect supplies of grain, to superin-
tend the fortification of his lines, and to lay in stocks of fuel ;
urgent orders being meanwhile sent across to Sicily for the
dispatch of his two remaining legions and the rest of the
cavalry. The camp Itself was admirably adapted for the delay
of operations. Not only was the natural strength of its posi-
tion stiU further increased by intrenchments, but it rested on
the proximity of the sea, and could also reckon on an abundance
of fresh water and cooking-salt, large quantities of which had
already been conveyed into it from the salt-pans of the neigh-
bourhood. There was no fear, either, of their fuel giving out,
timber being everywhere plentiful, nor of their corn, as the
fields around were laden vdth it. Thus with the approval
of his staff. Curio prepared to await reinforcements, and to
prolong the course of the campaign.
A Fatal Change of Plan 109
Scarcely had these dispositions been made and these plans 38
agreed upon, when word was brought in by a party of deserters ^"8-"'^'^^ •
from the townspeople that Juba had been summoned back by
the outbreak of a frontier war and a quarrel with the city of
Leptis ; that this had caused his own detention at home,
whilst his lieutenant Saburra had been dispatched at the head
of a merely nominal force, and was now advancing upon Utica.
An over hasty acceptance of these statements led to a fatal
modification of Curio's original scheme, and he now determined
to bring matters to the issue of a pitched battle. Among the
causes which specially predisposed him to the adoption of this
decision was, first of all, the impulsiveness of youth, combined
with a high degree of native courage ; to which must be added
the stimulus of previous success, and an absolute confidence
of coming victory. Fired by these incentives, he sent off the
whole of his cavalry at nightfall, with instructions to attack the
enemy's camp on the Medjerda ; and there, no doubt, as his
previous intelligence indicated, Saburra was in command.
What he did not knowwas that the Numidian king was follow-
ing in the rear of his lieutenant, and lay that night encamped
only six miles behind him. The cavalry completed their
march while it was still dark, and fell upon the enemy before
these had any knowledge or suspicion of their presence. With
what seems to be a tradition among foreign nations, the African
force lay scattered about their camping-ground without any
properly made lines ; consequently, when our troopers dashed
in upon the broken groups of heavily sleeping men, numbers
were slaughtered on the spot, and a considerable body took
refuge in panic-stricken flight. Their object thus attained,
the squadrons set out on their return journey to Curio, taking
their prisoners along with them.
no A Fatal Change of Plan
39 Meanwhile Curio with the infantry had marched about an
Aug.-Sept. j^QUj. before dawn, taking with him the whole of his effective
force, except five battalions which were left behind to garrison
the camp. After going six miles he met his returning cavalry,
who reported to him their recent action. A question to the
prisoners elicited the answer that Saburra had been in com-
mand of the camp on the Medjerda (Bagradas) : the rest of
the facts he omitted to investigate, in his eagerness to get to
the end of his march. Looking round at his leading files,
' You see, men,' he exclaimed, ' how the prisoners' tale tallies
with that of the deserters. The king is not here, and only
a weak force has been sent, who were not even a match for
a few squadrons of horse. On then, on then to the spoil,
on to fame and glory, so that at last we may begin to think
how we can best reward you, and how best acknowledge your
services '.
Now it was no mean performance that the cavalry had
accomplished, particularly if their insignificant numbers were
compared with the host of the Numidians ; but, even as
people always love to sound their own praises, the men, not
content with this, began vaunting their achievements. More-
over, the eye fell upon a quantity of booty that the column
had in train, and amongst the captures could be seen a number
of men and horses, so that every moment lost seemed an un-
necessary postponement of victory. The great expectations of
Curio, therefore, were amply seconded by the excitement of
his men. The cavalry were ordered to turn once more, and
the pace of the march was quickened, in order that the enemy
might be attacked at the height of the panic produced by
their recent flight. But the task was beyond them ; horse
and rider were both spent by the hard work of a whole night's
and Stupendous Blunder
III
march, and one after the other they dropped out of the Aug.-Sept.
column. Even this warning failed to check the ardour of ^^
Curio.
In the meantime Juba had been informed by Saburra of 4°
the night engagement, and at once pushed up to his support
a force of 2,000 Spanish and Gallic horse, which constituted his
permanent bodyguard, together with the most trustworthy
portion of his infantry. These were followed more leisurely
by the king himself with the remainder of his army, including
sixty elephants. Having taken these precautions, Saburra,
suspecting that the advance of the Roman cavalry meant
the near approach of the Roman general also, drew up
his contingents of horse and foot with orders, upon the
advance of the enemy, to simulate panic r.nd gradually
give ground and fall back, promising at the right moment to
give them the signal for battle together with their necessary
instructions for action. The situation, therefore, which pre-
sented itself to Curio upon his arrival on the scene only tended
to confirm his already extravagant hopes ; and, under the
belief that the Numidians were in genuine flight, he left the
shelter of the surrounding heights and began a descent into
the plain.
The hills had been left behind some considerable distance 41
when the utter exhaustion, of the army, produced by the
severity of a march of fully sixteen miles, at length compelled
a halt. Then at last Saburra gave his signal, settled his line
of battle and, riding down the ranks, proceeded to harangue
his tribesmen. Only his horse, however, were placed in the
fighting line ; all his unmounted troops being stationed some
little distance apart, to produce merely a moral effect by their
imposing numbers. Nor was Curio less anxious for battle,
112
J{oman Army trapped
Aug.-Sept. but with words of cheer to his soldiers urged upon them to
'^^^ trust only to their own right arms. The infantry of the
legions, in spite of their exhaustion, were eager for the fray,
and fought with all their accustomed valour, as also did the
handful of toil-spent cavalry ; though these last now counted
but 200 sabres, the rest having all fallen out on the march.
Nevertheless, weakened as they were, they forced back the
enemy's line at whatever point they charged, but they had
not the strength either to follow up the retreating horsemen,
or to spur their own jaded horses to a quicker pace. The
enemy, on the other hand, presently commenced a move-
ment to envelope our whole line, one division of horsemen
starting from each flank and working forwards to meet the
other, thereby endeavouring to ride our men down from the
rear. To prevent this, a few battalions would every now and
again make a sally from the main body, but the rapid move-
ment of the Numidians always enabled them to elude the
charge ; and as our men once more fell back upon their
supports, they would wheel and attempt to surround them,
and cut off their retreat from the rest of the line. Thus
there was no way of safety for the Roman force either in
standing their ground and preserving their formation, or
by taking their chance in a desperate charge. Moreover, the
enemy's numbers were continually increasing by reinforce-
ments forwarded by the king, whilst the strength of our
own men was steadily failing through fatigue. An intensifi-
cation of their sufferings was the impossibility of attending
to the wounded, who could neither leave the fighting line,
nor be carried to a place of safety, since the whole of our
position was effectually commanded by the enemy's en-
circling squadrons. Resigning, therefore, all hope of escape,
by the Light Horsemen of the Desert 113
they began to give way to those bitter outcries against death Aug.- Sept.
which man generally utters in his last hour, or else they ^^
turned to their comrades and begged them to look to their
aged parents at home, if Fate should enable any of them to
survive the disasters of that day. On all sides was panic and
despair.
Seeing the state of universal terror pervading his troops, 42
and that they were deaf alike to exhortation and entreaty,
Curio, as a last hope in a piteous situation, ordered all ranks
to take to the nearest hills, and the whole army to advance
in line upon them. But even this outlet was forestalled by
Saburra, who detached a body of horsemen to seize it in
advance. This last disappointment gave the crowning touch
to their despair. Some broke and fled, but were caught and
cut in pieces by the pursuing cavalry ; others simply went
down as they stood. An appeal was made to Curio by his
cavalry brigadier, Cneius Domitius, who closed round him
with a few of his troopers, begging him seek safety in flight and
make a dash for the camp, and promising not to leave his side.
But Curio answered unhesitatingly that, having lost the army
which Caesar had entrusted to his charge, he would never go
back to look him in the face, and with that answer he died .
fighting. Only a very small proportion of the Roman cavalry
escaped from the battle ; but those who, as recorded above,
had dropped behind in the rear for the purpose of resting their
horses, on observing from their distant position that the whole
army was a rout, made good their return to the camp. The
infantry were all cut down to a man.
In the camp Curio's paymaster, Marcius Rufus, had been 43
left in command ; and, on receiving news of the disaster, that
officer at once used all his efforts with the garrison to face their
LOMG I
114 Cur'to chooses Death
Aug.-Sept. critical situation with calmness. Their only answer was a
"^^ clamorous demand to be taken back to Sicily on board the
ships. To this he consented, and gave orders to the ship-
masters to have all boats down at the beach directly it was
dark. So unrestrained, however, was the universal panic, that
the wildest rumours went afloat. Some said that Juba's forces
were outside the gates; others declared that Varus was march-
ing upon them with his two legions, and that they already
distinguished the dust of his approach — both statements being
equally devoid of truth ; whilst others, again, anticipated that
the enemy's fleet would swoop down upon them without
delay. In this state of abject terror every man looked to
himself. The crews of the fleet of warships made all haste to
depart, and the example of their flight had such a bad effect
upon the merchant skippers, that only a few small dinghies
responded to the call of duty and the previously issued instruc-
tions. Even then so fierce was the struggle along the crowded
beach as to who should get first on board out of all the dense
multitude, that some of the boats were swamped by sheer
weight of numbers, while the rest hesitated to come in nearer,
through fear of encountering a similar fate.
44 The end of the matter was that a few soldiers and a certain
number of civilian residents, whose popularity or powers of
appeal were exceptional, or who contrived to swim out to the
shipSjWere received on board and taken safely across to Sicily:
the rest of the force sent its centurions that night to Varus to
act as plenipotentiaries, and surrendered themselves into that
officer's hands. The next day Juba arrived, and outside the
town his eye falling upon the men of the surrendered bat-
talions, he boastfully claimed them as his own booty, and
immediately ordered off to execution the large majority,
A Haughfy Barbarian 1 1 7
though a few were reserved to be sent away for captivity into Aug. Fept.
his own dominions ; Varus all the while protesting against ^^
this violation of his sworn promise, yet not venturing to
oppose it.
The African king subsequently entered the town on horse-
back with a large number of Roman senators in his train,
amongst whom could be seen Servius Sulpicius and Licinius
Damasippus. There he made what arrangements pleased
him, giving orders to a small number of adherents as to his
wishes with regard to Utica ; and then, after a few days more,
returned to his own kingdom, taking along with him the
whole of his military forces.
I a
BOOK III
DYRRACHIUM AND
PHARSALIA
CHAPTER I
The Passage of the Adriatic
The elections which were held in the autumn under the
presidency of Caesar, by virtue of his dictatorial powers,
resulted in the return of himself and Publius Servilius as the
consuls for the ensuing year ; that being the year in which the
law of the constitution again allowed Caesar to hold the con-
sulship.^ The electoral business disposed of, his attention
was next demanded by the insecurity of public credit through-
out the country, which was already producing a disinclination
to the discharge of legitimate liabilities. He accordingly
appointed a board of arbitrators with powers to make a valua-
tion of all property, both real and personal, on the basis of its
money value before the outbreak of the war ; and, upon their
estimate, the property was then to be transferred to creditors
as legal tender. This measure he considered most nearly
designed to effect the twofold purpose of at once removing
and modifying those fears of a general repudiation of debts
^ By a law of 342, confirmed by Sulla in 81, ten years must elapse
between two tenures of the same magistracy. Caesar had been consul 59.
Like many others this law was often broken towards the close of the
Republic. Pompeius had been consul in 70, 55, and 52. It was in this
last year that the trials mentioned below occurred.
Concentration at Brmdisi 117
which foreign wars and civil disturbances tend to create, as End of 4(>
well as of maintaining intact the social position of debtors.
With a similar policy, he also provided for a series of public
resolutions to be laid before the assembled populace by the
praetors and people's tribunes, restoring to their full civic
rights certain of those who had been convicted under the
Pompeian law relating to bribery. These men had been
tried during the recent years when Pompeius had garrisoned
Rome with strong detachments from his legions ; and under
that intimidation each trial had been finished off in a
single day, with a different body of jurymen to hear the
evidence from that which gave the verdict. These exiles had
tendered Caesar their support at the opening of the present
war, in the event of his caring to avail himself of their military
services ; and this spontaneous offer on their part he now
regarded as equivalent to his having actually profited by it.
The particular method adopted in their restoration arose out
of deference to constituted usage, which demanded that their
return should be effected by a formal and judicial expression
of the popular vdll, rather than look like a private act of
clemency of his own. By taking this course he avoided not
only the charge of want of gratitude in repaying past services
to himself, but also any suspicion of arrogance in usurping the
people's constitutional right of granting privilege.
These measures, along with the Latin Festival ^ and the ^
transaction of all outstanding comitial business, took up alto-
gether eleven days ; after that, Caesar laid down his dictator-
^ The oldest religious celebration of the united Latin race, held annually
on the Alban Mount, under the presidency of Rome. Its date was fixed
as early in each civil year as possible, since it was regarded as a sacred
confirmation of the powers of the new consuls.
1 1 8 The Various Forces of the East
End of 49 ship, and, taking his departure from the capital,' travelled
through to Brindisi. Orders had already been issued for
the concentration there of twelve legions of infantry and
all his cavalry ; though on arrival he found the transports
assembled w^ere barely sufficient to carry over 15,000
legionaries with 500 mounted troops. (It was this want of
troopships it should be noted that constituted for Caesar the
sole obstacle to a rapid termination of the war.) Moreover, the
forces actually available had to embark at something far below
their normal strength. The long series of Gallic wars had
made large gaps in their ranks ; their numbers had further
been greatly reduced by the protracted overland march from
Spain ; whilst the pestilential moisture of an autumn spent in
Apulia and round the neighbourhood of Brindisi, following
after the exceptionally healthy regions of Gaul and Spain, had
produced an outbreak of sickness through the whole army.
3 Very different were the circumstances of Pompeius. Hav-
ing secured a full year's period for the mobilization of his
forces, a period undisturbed by war and unhampered by the
presence of an enemy, he had used the respite in collecting an
enormous fleet ^ from Asia Minor and the Cyclades, from
Corfu (Corcyrd), Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia,
Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had further taken steps to construct
another of equal magnitude in aU the maritime ports. He
had likewise levied enormous sums of ready money upon the
provinces of Asia Minor and Syria, upon the various eastern
' Followed, adds Appian, by the crowds, who begged him to come to
terms with Pompeius.
* 600, according to Appian, of which loo had fighting crews of
Romans. According to Cicero, Pompeius's original plan, when driven from
Italy, was to take to his ' wooden walls ' like the Greeks at Salamis.
rally round Vcmpeius 1 1 9
kings, potentates, and petty sovereigns, and upon the self- 49
governing states of Greece ; and not content with this, he
had obliged the large commercial houses, which farmed the
public revenues in the provinces under his military control, to
pay over to him another equally enormous contribution.
As to his land forces, nine legions of Roman citizens had in 4
all been got together. These included, first of all, the five
brought over from Italy ; in addition, a sixth drawn from
Cilicia, which, owing to its formation out of two others, he
called the Twin Regiment ; another raised in Crete and
Macedonia among the veterans settled in these provinces
after their discharge by former commanders ; and lastly two
that had arrived from Asia Minor, where they had been lately
embodied by order of the consul Lentulus. Besides this infan-
try of the line, large contingents had been called for from
Thessaly, Boeotia, the Peloponnese, and Epirus, to be distri-
buted among the legions by way of supplementary drafts,
a treatment likevdse extended to the surrendered troops of
Caius Antonius * ; whilst finally, to complete his regular
forces, he was expecting two more legions from Syria, which
were now advancing under their commander Scipio ^. His
irregular corps included 3,000 archers, drawn from Crete,
Sparta, Pontus, Syria, and all other states that could furnish
them ; as well as two battalions of slingers, each 600 strong.
His cavalry mustered 7,000 sabres, and was composed of the
following contingents. From Galatia Deiotarus had brought
600 Gallic horsemen, and Ariobarzanes 500 from Cappadocia;
and a like number was contributed from Thrace byCotys,who
^ Brother of Marcus, had lost a Caesarian force during the past year at
V eglia in the Adriatic. See below (10) and ch. 4 (68).
' Appointed Governor by the Senate, Bk. I, ch. 1 (6).
I20 Forces of the East rally round Pompeius
Jan. 48 had also sent his son Sadala. From Macedonia came 200
troopers under Rhascypolis, a brilliant soldier ; while a force
of 500 Gauls and Germans had been shipped from Alexandria
with the Egyptian fleet by the younger Pompeius, forming
a detachment of the Gabinian troops lately left behind in that
city by Aulus Gabinius as a protecting garrison to King
Ptolemy \ Another 800 had been enrolled from Pompeius's
own slaves and herdsmen ; 300 had been provided from Gallo-
graecia by Tarcondarius Castor and Domnilaus — the former
coming in person with his force, the latter sending his son ;
and 200 more had been dispatched from Syria by Antiochus of
Commagene — handsomely rewarded for it by Pompeius — the
majority of whom consisted of mounted archers. To these
contingents were added bodies of Dardanians and Bessians,
partly mercenaries, partly enrolled by military order or through
personal influence, in conjunction with similar bodies of Mace-
donians, Thessalians, and various other tribes and townships,
bringing up the grand total to the figure already mentioned.
5 Immense stores of provisions had been accumulated from
Thessaly, Asia Minor, Egypt, Crete, Greece, and other dis-
tricts : and Pompeius had now determined to winter at Du-
razzo (Z))»rr«f^zMOT), Apollonia,and the other maritime towns,
with the object of preventing the passage of the Adriatic
by Caesar ; for which purpose also the fleet had been strung
out along the whole of the lUyrian coast-line. This fleet
was in several detachments. The Egyptian squadron was
commanded by the younger Pompeius, that of Asia Minor by
Decimus Laelius and Caius Triarius, that of Syria by Caius
Cassius, the Rhodian by Caius Marcellus, who had Caius
' Gabinius, when Governor of Syria in 55, had restored Ptolemy Auletes
with a Roman force. See below, ch. 5 (i lo).
D A R D A N I A
r. 10 30 4-0 00
Main Roads
winter Crossing of the Adriatic
121
Coponius as a colleague, and the Liburnian and Greek by Jan. 4S
Scribonius Libo and Marcus Octavius. The naval service as
a whole, however, was under the supervision of Marcus
Bibulus, who directed all the operations, and the supreme
command rested with that officer.
To returnnowto Caesar. On arrival at Brindisi he addressed 6
his assembled troops. Reminding them that they were at
last near the end of their hardships and dangers, he asked them
to be ready to leave behind in Italy their servants and baggage,
and to embark alone without these encumbrances, so as to
allow of a greater number of soldiers being taken on board ;
meanwhile to look forward to victory and his own generosity
for supplying them with all their needs. His men answered
with a cheer that he could order what he thought best, and
that they would gladly obey whatever those orders might be.
He accordingly set sail on the fourth of January,^ with a fleet
conveying, as already mentioned, seven legions of infantry.
The following day he made the land hard by the Ceraunian
mountains, and, finding an anchorage of calm water clear of
the rocks and other dangerous spots, and carefully avoiding all
harbours because these were suspected of being held by the
enemy, disembarked his troops at a point called Palaeste,
without the loss of a single transport.
At the time there was lying at Oricum ^ a detached squadron 7
of eighteen ships of the Asiatic fleet under the command of
Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus, acting under instruc-
^ Thus repeating his surprise of Jan. 49. The Pompeians, we read,
never dreamed of his crossing in mid-winter, but expected him to wait for
the New Year ceremonies at Rome, corresponding to our opening of
Parliament.
* Now Paleo-Kastro at the south end of the bay of Avlona.
I 22
Caesar eludes the Hostile Fleets
Jan. 48 tions from their admiral, Decimus Laelius ; whilst further to
the south lay Marcus Bibulus with 1 10 sail at Corfu (Corcyrd).
Of these two forces, however, the first-named had not the
requisite self-confidence to leave the shelter of port, though
Caesar's naval escort to his transports numbered no more than
twelve ships of war, of which only four were decked ; and
Bibulus was caught with his vessels unprepared for action
and his crews scattered on shore. As a consequence he came
up too late, since Caesar was already sighted off the mainland
before even the faintest rumour of his crossing had time to
reach the neighbourhood.
8 With the disembarkation completed, the transports were
sent back that night to Brindisi to bring over the rest of the
legions with the cavalry. This duty had been entrusted to
Fufius Calenus, a general officer, in order to ensure prompti-
tude in the work of transporting the legions. The ships
unfortunately got o£F somewhat late, and, missing the advan-
tage of the night breeze, encountered a serious disaster on
their return journey. For Bibulus, informed at Corfu of
Caesar's arrival, and hoping to succeed in falling in with at
least a section of the laden troopships, fell in with the return-
ing empties instead. Thirty of these or thereabouts he
managed to secure, and, venting upon them the rage which
his carelessness and consequent keen disappointm.ent had ex-
cited, he burnt the entire lot, leaving the crews and masters
to perish in the flames ; his idea being that their comrades
would be frightened from returning by the enormity of the
punishment inflicted. This exploit accomplished, he pro-
ceeded to distribute his fleets in effective occupation of every
roadstead and section of coast from the island of Sasino
{Sajonae) in the south to Veglia (Curicta) in the north, his
Vompeiaiis fail to secure Salonae 123
ships patrolling far and wide. Scouting squadrons were J->"-
placed with greater care than hitherto, and, though it was
the depth of winter, he yet persisted in keeping the sea with
his blockading flotilla, resolved to shirk neither difficulty nor
duty, even with no hope of relief in his arduous task, if only
he could come to grips with Caesar.^
FoUowang the withdrawal of the Liburnian fleet from Illy- 9
rian waters, the admiral, Marcus Octavius, with the division
under his command, put in at Salonae'^. There he stirred up
Dalmatians and other native tribes, and succeeded in alienating
the island of Lissa from its adherence to Caesar ; but on
attempting the same project with the Roman settlement at
Salonae, he found that neither promises nor threats of reprisals
could shake their allegiance, and therefore determined to
carry the town by assault. Now this town has strong natural
fortifications both from its general geographical position and
from its commanding site on the crest of a hiU. Notwith-
standing, the Roman burghers at once took the further step of
strengthening the defences by a series of wooden towers along
the walls ; and, on finding that their slender numbers offered
but a weak resistance to the attack, and that they were seriously
incapacitated by repeated wounds, they had recourse to the
desperate expedient of liberating all their able-bodied slaves,
and even cut the hair from off all their women-folk in order
to manufacture ropes necessary to the working of artillery.*
When the news of their determination reached Octavius, he
* Apparently a lacuna here in MSS. which contained the disaster to
Antonius and Dolabella at Veglia late in the preceding year.
" Close by the future Spalato.
^ In ancient ordnance the driving force was obtained by suddenly
relaxing the tension of strongly-twisted ropes. For these ropes women's
hair formed the very best material (Vitruvius x. i6. 2).
124 Caesar renexvs Peace Overtures
Jan. 48 surrounded the city with five separate camps, and went on to
press the garrison simultaneously by blockade and a series of
concerted assaults. On their side the defenders were ready
to continue the defence at any and every cost, but they
suffered most severely from shortness of supplies. Agents
were therefore dispatched to Caesar to petition his help in this
. one particular ; every other kind of distress they continued to
support unaided as best they could.
After the lapse of a considerable interval of time, it was
noticed by the garrison that the long protraction of the
siege had induced a certain carelessness among the troops of
Octavius. They accordingly seized an opportunity whilst
the besiegers were absent from their stations for the midday
siesta ; and, after posting women and children along the city
wall so that no detail of the daily routine should be missed by
the enemy, they formed a sortie-party from themselves and
their recently liberated slaves, and dashed out upon the nearest
of the Octavian camps. This they quickly stormed; and,
following it up without a break by successive attacks on the
second, third, fourth, and remaining camps in turn, they
drove the Pompeians with great slaughter out of the whole
series, and forced the remainder under Octavius to take shelter
on board the fleet. This affair ended the siege ; for, the
winter now approaching, Octavius, after the heavy losses
incurred, relinquished all hope of a successful assault on the
town, and sailed away to rejoin Pompeius at Durazzo.
10 It has already been recorded how Lucius Vibullius Rufus,
a sectional commander of Pompeius, had twice fallen into the
hands of Caesar, and twice been released by him, viz. once at
Pentima and a second time in Spain. The obligations thus
conferred had induced Caesar to consider him an appropriate
Caesar renews Peace Overtures 1 2 f
agent for sending to Pompeius with fresh proposals of peace, Jan.
especially as he was understood to possess distinct influence
with his chief. The general purport of these instructions was
as follows.
' Common prudence dictated that each party should now
set a limit to its present attitude of uncompromising oppo-
sition, and, by agreeing to a cessation of hostilities, tempt
Fortune no longer. They had both experienced defeats on
a sufficiently serious scale to serve as a wholesome lesson for
dreading further disasters. Whilst his opponent had been
driven from Italy, and had lost Sicily, Sardinia, both Spanish
provinces, and no less than 130 battalions of Roman troops,
either in Italy itself or in Spain ; he, on the other hand, had
to mourn the death of Curio, the destruction of the army of
Africa, and the surrender of Antonius and the force under him
at Veglia. Should they not then cease to inflict these blows
on themselves and their country, particularly when their
own reverses had now abundantly shown them what a
powerful factor is Fortune in war? The present moment
offered a unique opportunity of treating for peace, at a time
when each side still felt complete confidence in ite'own
ultimate success, and whilst honours as yet seemed easy. If,
however, Fortune, were now to give either belligerent even a
trivial advantage, all terms would alike be rejected by what
would then regard itself as the winning side, and equal stakes
would no longer content the claimant who believed all to be
in his grasp. The actual conditions of peace, whose settle-
ments had hitherto been impossible, should be looked for at
Rome, at the hands of the Senate and sovereign people : mean-
while it ought to be a sufficient guarantee to both their
country and themselves, if each were at once to take an oath
I 26 The Nature of his Proposals
Jan. 48 before his assembled troops to disband his army within three
days after that event. By breaking up their organized forces
and the auxiliary bodies on which they now relied, they would
have no course left them but to abide by the decision of the
Senate and people.'
Such were the proposals now forwarded by Caesar, and, in
order to facilitate their acceptance by Pompeius, he made the
further concession that he was ready to disband the whole of
his field army and all garrisons in the towns.^
1 1 Now VibuUius had landed at Corfu ; but, thinking it of at
least equal importance that Pompeius should be informed of
Caesar's sudden arrival on the coast, so as to take his counter-
measures before the subject of the peace proposals was broached ,
he immediately posted off to meet him ; and, travelling night
and day, vrith relays of fresh cattle at every town to ensure
greater speed, brought the intelligence that Caesar had landed.
Pompeius was at this time in Candavia^, on his way to his
army's winter quarters ' in Apollonia and Durazzo; but
Vibullius's news was so alarming that he at once began to
quicken his march towards Apollonia, with the object of
preventing his rival's occupation of the coast towns. Caesar,
however, had only waited till his troops were all disembarked
before marching upon Oricum. On his appearance before
that town, the Pompeian governor of the place, Lucius Tor-
quatus, endeavoured to make a show of resistance by means of
' The genuineness of this last sentence, though found in all MSS., is
doubted by most editors.
' The hill country near the modern Lake Ochrida. Through it passed
the great military trunk road connecting Durazzo with Saloniki (Via
Egnatia), the East with the West.
' The Pompeian head quarters during 49 had been Saloniki {Thessa-
loniea), where the exiled senate continued to meet.
The Coast Towns declare for him 127
his garrison of Parthini, and orders were given to close the Jan. ^8
gates. But his Greek troops, when commanded to man the
walls and take up arms, flatly refused to act in opposition to a
duly elected representative of the Roman Government ; and
when their refusal was accompanied by an independent
attempt on the part of the townspeople to admit Caesar,
Torquatus gave up the situation as hopeless, and, directing
the gates to be opened, surrendered himself and the town to
Caesar, by whom he was treated with all the honours of war.
Halting merely to take over the surrendered town, Caesar 1 2
at once started for ApoUonia. Upon the news of his advance
reaching the governor, Lucius Staberius, that officer proceeded
to move a supply of water into the citadel of the town and to
throw up fortifications for its defence ; at the same time
demanding hostages from the townsfolk for their good
behaviour. But not only did these decline to give any such
guarantees, but they openly declared they would never shut
their gates in a consul's face, or set up their own private
judgement against the unanimous verdict of Italy and the
Roman world. Staberius, therefore, recognizing the firm
attitude of the citizens, had no choice left him but a secret
flight from the town ; whereupon the inhabitants dispatched
an embassy to Caesar and threw open their city to his
approach. Their example was followed by the people of Bullis
and Amantia and other neighbouring townships, and by prac-
tically the whole of Epirus, envoys arriving from all quarters
to assure him of their readiness to submit to his orders.
Meanwhile the result of these opening operations at Oricum 13
and ApoUonia made Pompeius extremely anxious for the safety
of his base at Durazzo (Dyrrachium), and he was now marching
night and day upon that city. Simultaneously the rumour
128 Narrow Escape of Pompeius
Jan. 48 spread that Caesar was close on his heels; a report that created
such violent panic in Pompeius's army after his frantic haste
in turning night into day and in marching his men without
a halt, that virtually aU the troops hailing from Epirus and
its immediate neighbourhood deserted their ranks, many of
them actually flinging away their arms, and the whole march
degenerating into something like a rout. This disgraceful
panic was not even stayed with their safe arrival before
Durazzo ; and accordingly, when the usual order had been
given to mark out the camp boundaries, Labienus, in order
to check the demoralization, stepped forward and solemnly
swore that he would never desert Pompeius, but would share
with him any and every lot that fortune might decree. This
same oath was taken by all the other generals present, followed
by the regimental officers and centurions ; after which the
whole of the rank and file swore to observe the same. As for
Caesar, on finding his march upon Durazzo anticipated, he
gave up the chase, and pitched his camp near the river Ergent
[Afsus), within the territories of Apollonia — a position which
enabled him to protect by a ring of fortified outposts the
townships which had recently served him so loyally. Here he
determined to await the arrival of the rest of his legions from
Italy, and to go under canvas ^ for winter. The same resolu-
.tion was also taken by Pompeius, who now entrenched himself
on the opposite or northern bank of the Ergent, and proceeded
to concentrate within his new lines the whole of his regular and
auxiliary forces.
14 Meanwhile Calenus, in execution of his orders received
from Caesar, had embarked the legions and cavalry at Brindisi
as far as his supply of transports allowed, and, setting sail, had
Lit. 'skins', of wliich Roman tents were made.
and for Caesuras 1{cinforccments 129
got some little distance from port, when he was met by jm. 43
a dispatch-boat from Caesar with intelligence that the whole
of the opposite harbours and shores were effectually held by
the enemy's fleets. Upon this information, he at once put
back towards harbour, and signalled the recall to his remaining
convoy. A single ship, however, kept on her course, and
refused to acknowledge the admiral's signal, since she had no
troops on board, but was sailing under private orders. She
was carried down the lUyrian coast to Oricum, and there
captured by Bibulus ; who, exacting the full penalty alike
from slaves and free, and even beardless boys, massacred every
living soul on board.
On so short a space of time, and on so mere a chance, hung
the safety of the whole army.
It will have been noticed from the above that Bibulus with 1 5
his fleet was now at Oricum, where a singular military position
had developed itself. On his side, his blockading squadrons
effectually deprived Caesar of all control both of the sea
and its harbours ; whilst his own force was no less completely
debarred from every inch of ground along the same territories :
for, the whole of the foreshore being safely held by Caesar's
pickets and patrols, the Pompeians had no means either of
watering xheir ships and supplying them with fuel, or of
mooring them to the beach. So impossible, indeed, grew
the situation, and so hard pressed were they for the barest
necessaries of life, that they were forced to employ cargo-
boats to bring up from Corfu, not merely the ordinary require-
ments for victualling a fleet, but even their very firewood and
drinking-water. To aggravate their sufferings, there came
a period of contrary winds, during which they were actually
driven to collect the night dew off the skins which served
130 UnauthoriT^ed Negotiations
Ftb. 48 as awnings to their ships. Yet these sufferings were borne
with cheerful resignation, nor was there any thought of
withdrawing their watch upon the harbours or of leaving the
coast uncovered.
It was during the critical state of their supplies as just
described, and after Libo had rejoined Bibulus at Oricum
with the division under his command, that these two officers
addressed a petition in common from the decks of their flag-
ships to Manius Acilius and Statins Murcus, the Caesarian
military authorities in that region — the former in charge of
the town fortifications, the latter of the shore-defences — to
the effect that, if their request could be complied with, they
desired an audience with Caesar on a matter of most vital
import.
A few remarks were added by way of confirmation of their
statement, and to give the impression that the subject of
a settlement was to be brought forward ; and meanwhile,
until the interview could be arranged, they requested an
armistice, which was accordingly granted them by the Caesarian
officers. For not only did the message conveyed appear to
them of considerable moment, but they well knew how sin-
cerely anxious Caesar was for an opening of this nature, whilst
what weighed with them further was the belief that the
overtures lately initiated by Vibullius had apparently met
with some measure of success.
16 At the particular time Caesar happened to be absent from
Oricum, having lately left with a single legion to receive the
surrender of the more distant townships, and also to improve
his commissariat department, which was supplying him but
indifferently. He was now at Butrinto {Buthrotum), a coast
town just opposite to Corfu ; but, upon receiving dispatches
By the Pompeian Admirals 131
from Acilius and Murcus informing him of the demands put Feb. 4?
forward by Libo and Bibulus, he left the legion behind and
at once returned to Oricum. There, on his arrival, he invited
the two Pompeian chiefs to a conference. Only Libo
made his appearance, excusing the absence of Bibulus,
which, doubtless, was prompted by his excessively hot temper,
and by the fact that, in addition to political differences, he
had long nursed a private quarrel with Caesar, originating in
the years of their common aedileship and praetorship.^ ' For
this reason,' said Libo, * his colleague had now avoided meet-
ing his opponent, in order that his own temper might not
prove an obstacle to the success of proceedings which promised
so well for the future.'
With this introduction, he proceeded to assure Caesar that
the most earnest desire of Pompeius was, and had always been,
for a peaceful settlement and cessation from hostilities ; but
that they could not give practical effect to their commander's
wishes, because the whole conduct of the campaign and of all
other questions alike had been made over to him absolutely by
a decree of their council of war. If, however, Caesar would
acquaint them with the nature of his demands, they would
forward these to Pompeius, who would then conduct the rest
of the negotiations directly with him, receiving the while
every support from themselves. In the interval, until an
answer could be returned from Pompeius, they asked for the
armistice to hold good, and no hostile measure to be taken
by either belligerent. This included all that was pertinent
in his proposals, though certain remarks were added about his
own cause and about the armed forces under his command ;
^ 65 and 62. The aediles had chiefly police duties, the care of markets,
aqueducts, distribution of corn, arrangement of the great public games, &c.
K 2 -
132 J^ejected by Caesar
17 remarks which Caesar both ignored at the time, as not neces-
'^ sitating an answer, and which to-day we see no sufficient
reason for putting upon record.
His own definite demands were then formulated as follows :
' He must either be allowed to send representatives to Pom-
peius without let or hindrance, and with a safe-conduct
guaranteed by Libo and his colleagues, or else the latter coulJ
themselves take his officers on board and be responsible for
conveying them to Pompeius. As for the question of armistice,
they must look to the strategical position of the two comba-
tants, which was so pecuUarly balanced that, whilst they with
their fleet blocked his ships and reinforcements, he, on the
other hand, cut them off from their watering and from all
communication with the shore. If they wanted this privation
relaxed, they must relax their watch on the sea : if, on the
contrary, that was maintained, he would retain his hold on
the land. However, there was no reason why peace negotia-
tions should not equally well be conducted under the status
quo, nor did the one state of things constitute any obstacle to
the other.' In answer to this, Libo replied that he could
neither undertake to receive Caesar's delegates on board, nor
could he guarantee their safe-conduct ; he could only refer
the whole matter for decision to Pompeius. The one point
that he steadily urged was the truce, and for that he contended
with extraordinary passion. Caesar, therefore, realizing that
the whole proceedings had simply been instituted with the
sole object of escaping their present dangerous situation and
shortness of supplies, and that Libo was in a position to offer
no genuine prospect or proposal for peace, broke oflf the dis-
cussion, and returned to the task of perfecting his plans for
the war.
Failure of Caesar^ s own Overtures 133
As for Libo's colleague Bibulus, his long exclusion from the >8
shore was presently complicated by serious sickness, the result
of exposure to cold and constant work ; and, suitable treat-
ment being impossible, whilst he steadily refused to quit the
post of duty, his constitution proved unequal to withstanding
the disease. Upon his death, the supreme naval command
was not again vested in any single authority ; but the various
divisional fleets acted independently of each other, according
to the caprice of their respective admirals.
With respect to Vibullius and his mission, as soon as the
tumult excited by Caesar's sudden arrival had abated, and the
first opportunity occurred after his own return to the coast, he
had secured an interview with Pompeius. To this interview
there were also admitted Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theo-
phanes, the three confidential advisers with whom Pompeius
habitually conferred on high matters of state ; and Vibullius
then proceeded to unfold the instructions received from Caesar.
He had barely commenced speaking when Pompeius cut him
short with an order to say no more. ' What value ', he
exclaimed, ' will life or country possess for me, when I shall
be thought to retain them merely on the sufferance of Caesar ?
an opinion that nothing will get rid of, if people come to
regard me as fetched back to Italy, after having freely de-
parted from it.'
This incident came to Caesar's knowledge at the close of
the war, from those who were present at the speech ; yet, in
spite of this latest failure, he still continued his efforts to open
up through other channels verbal negotiations for peace.
The method next tried was as follows.
The two opposing camps were separated solely by the river 19
Ergent {Apsus), and, as a consequence, frequent communica-
134 Failure of Caesar's own Overtures
Feb, 48 tions passed to and fro between the rival troops ; the speakers
mutually agreeing that no hostile shot should be fired across
the stream during these meetings. Caesar accordingly com-
missioned Publius Vatinius, a staff officer, to go down to the
very edge of the river bank, with powers to discuss the basis
of a settlement, and to ask repeatedly in tones plainly audible
whether citizens were not permitted to send a pair of peace
envoys to fellow citizens — a concession hitherto allowed even
to runaway slaves among the Pyrenean passes, and to defeated
pirates ^ — above all when their sole object was the prevention
of an armed struggle between Romans and Romans. In
execution of this charge Vatinius spoke at considerable length,
and with the earnestness of appeal rightly demanded where
the vital interests both of himself and of the civilized world
were at stake, and his words were listened to in silence by the
soldiers of either army. An answer was returned from the
side of the Pompeians that Aulus Varro pledged himself to
appear at a conference on the following day, and, further, to
take measures for ensuring our envoys both a safe-conduct
and absolute freedom of speech. A time was accordingly
fixed for this meeting ; and on the morrow, at the appointed
hour, large numbers assembled from both sides, in eager
anticipation of the event, and with every man's thoughts
seemingly intent on peace. Out of this throng there then
stepped Titus Labienus, who in quiet conversational tones
began a speech on the subject of peace, and to enter on a debate
with Vatinius. In the midst of their discussion, they were
suddenly interrupted by a shower of spears flung from every
quarter ; and, although Vatinius managed to escape by the
intervention of his soldiers' shields, several others were
^ Alluding to two of Pompeius's earlier wars. See lutrod.
The j^ct of a T^negade 1 3 f
wounded, including Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Feb. 48
Lucius Tiburtius, as well as some centurions and privates.
Thereupon Labienus exclaimed, * It is nonsense, you see, to
talk of a settlement : until we have Caesar's head, there can
be no peace between us '.
CHAPTER II
A Backwater of the REvoLtrrioK
Contemporary with these events abroad there had been ao
certain serious trouble in the capital at home, where Marcus J*"-*F«"-4'
Caelius Rufus, one of the praetors for the year, had taken on
himself to champion the cause of the debtor classes. After
entering upon his official duties, he had established his magis-
terial dais alongside the judicial chair of his colleague the
city praetor, Caius Trebonius, and there proceeded to promise
his official support to any who chose to appeal on the valuation
of their property and the enforced payments of liabilities that
were now being carried out by the verdict of individual
arbitrators, in accordance with the measure adopted by Caesar
during his late stay in Rome. So essentially fair, however,
was this measure in itself, and so wise a toleration did Tre-
bonius exhibit in executing its terms, from conviction that
the times called for a considerate and temperate dispensation
of justice, that no parties were forthcoming to initiate the
process of appeal. The truth is that, whilst very ordinary
courage is required to plead poverty and declaim against one's
own personal troubles or those of the times, and to lay before
the court the hardships attending an enforced sale ; to keep
entire possession of property, admittedly due to another.
1 3 <^ Idiots in J^me
Ia11.-Feb.48 argues the very height of assurance, not to say effrontery.
Consequently no one could be found to put forward so extra-
vagant a demand ; and Caelius was left to prove himself more
intractable than even the parties for whom he was professedly
acting. For, once started on his career, he had now to avoid
the fiasco of having undertaken a discreditable piece of busi-
ness with nothing to show for it : he therefore brought
forward a measure by which all debts were to be discharged
without accumulation of interest that day six years.
2 1 This proposal naturally met with opposition from the con-
sul Servilius and the rest of the Government ; and Caelius,
baulked of his expectations, determined to make a bid for the
support of the populace. Withdrawing his earlier law, he
now substituted two others in its place; in the first of which
he made a present of a year's rent to every tenant of an
inhabited house, and in the second announced a general
cancelling of debts : and further he instigated the mob to
a brutal attack against Caius Trebonius, who was hustled off
his magisterial platform, whilst several others were wounded.
These proceedings were reported by Servilius to the Senate,
and the Chamber resolved that Caelius had deserved suspen-
sion from public functions. Acting on this decree, the consul
then forbade him the House, and when he subsequently
endeavoured to address the assembled people outside, ordered
his forcible removal from the rostra ^. This last open dis-
grace stung him to resentment ; and, giving out in public
that he was leaving Rome to go off to Caesar, he secretly
sent agents to Milo, then under sentence of exile upon the
charge of murdering Clodius, and invited him into Italy.
Milo he considered a useful tool for his purpose, because the
^ An elevated platform for speakers. Cf. the French Tribune.
Death of the T{mgleaders 137
lavish public games formerly exhibited by him in the city Ja11.-Feb.4S
had still left him with a remnant of his old gladiatorial gang.
A junction was effected between the two, and Milo was then
sent on in advance to raise the herdsmen in the regions round
Thurii. Caelius himself came down to Casilinum ; only,
however, to hear that all his regimental colours ^ and stacks
of arms had been seized at Capua, and that the band of hired
bravoes, which was to contrive the treacherous surrender of
Naples (Neapolis), had been discovered in that city. The
plot now stood revealed, and Capua in consequence shut its
gates against him ; even personal danger was to be feared,
since the district had taken up arms and was now inclined to
treat him as a common outlaw. He therefore broke off his
present design, and retired from his advance in these regions.
In the meantime Milo was distributing a pro^amation 22
among the Italian municipalities, to the effect that he was
acting under the express orders of Pompeius, received in the
form of instructions from Vibullius ; and on the strength
of this artifice was endeavouring to win the support of any
whom he had reason to suspect of being in money difficulties.
These last failing to respond, he proceeded to break open
some private slave compounds, and then to lay siege to the
town of Cosa, situated in the territories of Thurii. A legion
was at once dispatched to its relief by Quintus Pedius, one
of the praetors, and Milo was subsequently killed by a stone
that struck him from the city wall. As for Caelius, maintain-
ing his assertion that he was on his way to Caesar, he got as
far as Thurii. There he tried to tamper with certain of the
city authorities ; but on offering a bribe to the Caesarian
cavalry, composed of Gallic and Spanish horse, who had been
^ ' Military standards.'
138 Death of the J^ngleaders
Jan.-Feb.48 sent down to garrison the place, he met with his death at
their hands. In this way what threatened to develop into
a serious movement, and, owing to the pre-occupation of the
Government with the crisis abroad, was giving rise to serious
anxiety in Italy, came to an easy and a speedy termination.
CHAPTER III
The Lines of Dyrrachium
23 To resume the narrative of the campaign. It was about this
time that a naval demonstration against Italy was organized
under Libo, who, with the fleet of fifty ships of the line under
his immediate command, set sail from Oricum and crossed
to Brindisi, where he seized as his base the island commanding
the entrance to that harbour.^ This plan he adopted because
he considered it sounder strategy to concentrate his attention
upon a single point where our forces must inevitably pass out
to sea, than to maintain a blockade of all the adjacent shores
and harbours. His sudden arrival on the coast enabled him
to pick up a few stray merchantmen : these he all promptly
burned, excepting one with a cargo of corn which was brought
back by its captors as a prize. Altogether he created no
little panic amongst our people ; and this was further in-
creased by a successful night attack, in which a landing-party
of legionaries and archers dislodged one of our mounted
pickets. His strong position, indeed, gained him such marked
advantages, that, in a dispatch to Pompeius, he assured his
commanding officer that, if he liked, he might give orders
for the rest of the fleet to go into dock and refit, since his
own squadron would effectually block up the reinforcements
destined for Caesar.
* See Plan, p. 23.
A Device of Mark Antony 139
Fortunately at this moment Antonius was at Brindisi. ^4
x». . . ,. . 1- 11-1 1- r I • Feb-March
Placing implicit reliance on the high quality ot his troops, .g
this officer selected some sixty ships' cutters from his larger
transports, which he then proceeded to cover with a super-
structure of fascines and mantlets. On board of these
a picked body of legionaries was next embarked, and the
boats were then stationed in detachments at various points
along the shore. This done, orders were given for two three-
deckers \ lately built under his supervision at Brindisi, to row
out to the mouth of the harbour under the pretence of exer-
cising the crews. Noticing the boldness with which they
came on, Libo conceived the hope of cutting off their retreat,
and detached five of his four-deckers ' against them. These
had approached to within a short distance of our vessels, when
our crews, veterans though supposed to be, were suddenly
seen to go about and to be running for the shelter of port ;
on which the Pompeians, with more enthusiasm than caution,
at once commenced to pursue Suddenly, on the given
signal, out shot from every quarter the Antonian launches,
racing up to the enemy. Singling out one of the four-
deckers, they captured her at the first burst with all her
navigating ° and fighting crews, whilst her consorts sought
safety in a disgraceful flight.
This disaster was soon afterwards followed by another.
Antonius having stationed a chain of mounted patrols along
the foreshore, the enemy found himself deprived of all access
to water ; so that Libo, feeling his position to be as untenable
as it was undignified, was forced to evacuate Brindisi, and to
relinquish the blockade of our reinforcements waiting there.
Many months had now elapsed, and winter was well 25
' Triremes. "^ Qiiadriremes. ' i.e. oarsmen.
140 j^fter Long Delay
Mar.-Ap.48 past its climax, whilst yet there was no sign of the transports
with the legions crossing from Brindisi to Caesar. Moreover,
it appeared to Caesar that several opportunities for making
the passage had been neglected, since the wind had certainly
blown from the quarter which, in his judgement, was essential
for putting to sea. What made the delay more serious was
that, the further the season advanced, the greater grew the
energy displayed by the enemy's naval commanders in their
watch upon the coast, and the higher rose their hopes of
successfully preventing our crossing. Frequent dispatches
also came down from Pompeius, conveying severe reprimands
on their failure to stop Caesar in his first voyage, and urgent
exhortations to see that the rest of his armament was not
similarly allowed to cross the straits ; and they were now
daily reckoning on the change of season when lighter winds
would increase the difficulties of transporting an army. All
these considerations induced Caesar to dispatch a somewhat
peremptory order to his agents at Brindisi,^ bidding them
at the first fair wind not to lose a chance of sailing, if once
they could shape such a course as to hit the opposite coast
within the boundaries of Apollonia and there run their vessels
ashore. These regions, it should be explained, were the
freest from the blockading squadrons, owing to the enemy's
nervousness about venturing far from his ports.
26 His officers responded with intrepid courage. Whilst
Marcus Antonius and Fufius Calenus jointly directed the
embarkation, the men themselves eagerly seconded their
^ Ancient authorities record the story that Caesar in desperation at the
delay, tried to cross the Adriatic in a small boat, but was driven back by
the boisterous weather. He rallied the frightened sailors by the now
proverbial words, 'You carry Caesar and his fortunes'.
Caesar* s ^inforcements sail 141
efforts in their readiness to brave all risks for ensuring the Mar.-Ap.4'>
safety of Caesar ; and having secured a southerly wind they
weighed anchor, and the next day were swept up the coast
past ApoUonia and Durazzo. As soon as they were sighted
from the mainland, Caius Coponius, the admiral commanding
the Rhodian fleet at Durazzo, at once rowed his ships out of
harbour, and, the breeze slackening, got close up with our
transports ; but at that moment the southerly gale once more
freshened, and by so doing saved our vessels from certain
capture. This, however, was not enough to turn Coponius
from his purpose ; and, trusting the unflagging efforts of his
crews to be more than a match for the pace of the gale,
he kept up the chase even after his opponents had been blown
past Durazzo by the great force of the wind. On the other
hand, our ships, though fully profiting by their stroke of good
luck, still dreaded an attack from the armed fleet, if once the
wind should moderate. Gaining the harbour therefore called
Nymphaeum, three miles beyond Alessio (Z,uj'M/),they steered
their ships into it ; and though it is sheltered from a south-
westerly gale and exposed to a southerly, they yet felt they
had less to fear from the hurricane than from the enemy's
pursuing squadron. They were, however, no sooner inside,
than the wind, which for two days had blown steadily from
the south, with a good fortune wellnigh incredible, veered
to the south-west.
Sudden indeed was the turning of the tables now wit- 27
nessed. Those who a moment before had feared for their
very lives were now within the shelter of an absolutely safe
harbour : those on the other hand, who had just threatened
our vessels with destruction, had now to look to their own.
So completely were the conditions reversed, that, whilst to
142 Veterans versus Conscripts
Mar.-Ap.48 our men the fresh gale proved a direct preservation, it caught
the Rhodian men-of-wrar with such violence that every one
of their decked ships, sixteen in all, were driven ashore and
went to pieces on the rocks. Of the large numbers forming
their navigating and fighting crews, part were dashed upon
the cliflFs and killed, others were rescued by our troops ; these
last being all spared by Caesar and given a free passage home,
28 Two of our transports unfortunately were a little late
in completing their voyage, and accordingly were overtaken
by night. Not knowing at what point the rest of the convoy
had made the coast, they lay off at anchor opposite Alessio
[Lissus). Thereupon the Pompeian commandant of the place,
Otacilius Crassus, put out with a large number of ships' boats
and other small craft, and commenced preparations for
boarding ; in the meanwhile discussing terms of surrender
and guaranteeing fair treatment to the prisoners. (One of the
ships, it should be mentioned, had on board 220 recruits from
a newly-raised legion, the other a trifle under 200 from a corps
of veterans.)
Then occurred a signal illustration of the self-defence that
lies in undaunted courage. The recruits, frightened by the
swarm of boats, and prostrated with sea-sickness and the effects
of their voyage, accepted the sworn word of the enemy not
to injure them, and surrendered to Otacilius. They were
at once marched off to the governor ; and there, in his pre-
sence, in defiance of his solemn oath, were brutally massacred
to a man. On the other hand, the veteran contingent,
though equally shaken by their cramped position in the ship's
hold, which had been rendered still worse by the storm,
braced themselves to maintain unsullied the lofty reputation
of their corps j and by haggling over terms, and pretending
The Landing safely effected 143
to be always on the point of surrender, succeeded in wearing Mar.-Ap.48
away the first part of the night. They then compelled their
captain to run his ship ashore, and, finding there a defensible
position, passed the rest of the night upon it. At dawn a body
of cavalry, some 400 strong, forming the regular patrol of
that section of the coast, was dispatched against them by
Otacilius, to be shortly afterwards followed by a force of
heavy-armed infantry from the town garrison ; but against
both alike they made good their defence, and after inflicting
several casualties upon the enemy, without any loss whatever
to themselves, successfully effected a retirement upon their
head quarters.
Immediately after this the Roman settlement in Alessio 29
(Lissus), which at this time was responsible for the government
of the city, Caesar having on a previous occasion attached it
to their jurisdiction, and at the same time provided for its
fortification, sent out a warm welcome to Antony, putting
everything they possessed at the disposal of his army. There-
upon Otacilius, becoming apprehensive for his own position,
hastily withdrew his garrison from the town, and rejoined
Pompeius.
Meanwhile Antonius, after completing the disembarkation
of his reinforcements, amounting in all to three veteran and
one conscript legion with 900 mounted troops, sent back the
majority of his transports to Italy, with orders to convey
across the remaining infantry and cavalry ; leaving, however,
at Alessio a batch of large sailing punts — a species of GaUic
craft — in order that, should Pompeius again throw his army
across into Italy under the behef that it was now denuded of
troops (a plan with which rumour commonly credited him),
Caesar should at least retain some means of pursuit. He then
144 Junctio7i with Main Army
April 48 sent off express messengers to his commander-in-chief, inform-
ing him both of the place of his landing and of the strength
of the forces accompanying him.
30 Now it so happened that information on these two points
reached Caesar and Pompeius almost simultaneously. They
had both witnessed the transports driving with the storm past
ApoUonia and Durazzo, and had themselves at once started
overland on their track ; in ignorance, however, for the first
few days, of the particular point at which the ships had made
the coast. The receipt of this further intelligence caused
the adoption by the rival commanders of two mutually
exclusive plans ; Caesar aiming at a junction with Antonius
at the earliest possible moment, Pompeius endeavouring to
intercept the new arrivals on their march southward, with a
chance perhaps also of surprising them by ambush. Accord- ,
ingly each broke up his permanent quarters along the Ergent
{Apsus) within twenty- four hours of the other, but whereas
Pompeius secretly set his army in motion during the night,
Caesar marched out in the light of open day. The latter had
the longer route before him, as a considerable detour was
involved by the necessity of first marching up-stream before
a crossing could be effected ; in the meantime Pompeius could
get c ff with a clear road without any river to ford, and push
on to meet Antony by a series of forced marches. With
the intelligence that his opponent was now close at hand, he
selected a suitable site for encamping, and there settled down
to await his arrival ; keeping all arms strictly within his
lines, and as a further precaution allowing no fires to be
lighted. These movements were promptly reported to
Antonius by the local Greek population ; so that Antony,
after dispatching runners to advise Caesar of the same,
Threatened Intervention from the East 145"
remained that day quietly in camp ; and on the next Caesar April 48
marched in with his men. The news of their junction made
Pompeius anxious lest he should find himself surrounded by
the two allied armies ; he therefore fell back from the neigh-
bourhood and marched in force to Asparagium, a town
belonging to Durazzo, where on some strong ground a new
camp was fortified.
Whilst the war had thus been in progress some considerable 31
time, Scipio had all along been busy in the East. After first
suflFering several defeats in the region of Mount Amanus, on
the strength of which he had acclaimed himself Commander/
he had followed up these exploits by levying large con-
tributions of money upon the townships and petty sovereigns
of his province of Syria. The arrears of taxes, owdng for the
last two years, had been squeezed out of the contractors^, who
had been compelled to make a further advance on mortgage
of the estimates for the ensuing year ; at the same time a
cavalry conscription had been ordered over the entire province.
As soon as this force was ready he turned his back upon his
immediate enemy, the Parthians — an enemy who had in the
last few years caused the death of Marcus Crassus, the well-
known commander, and had since kept Marcus Bibulus shut
up within siege lines — and withdrew from Syria its garrisonof
legions and mounted troops. Such a step produced the gravest
anxiety and apprehensions of a Parthian war throughout the
province, apprehensions which were soon echoed by not infre-
quent murmurs among the troops, who made it known that
if their march was to be directed against a national enemy they
would cheerfully follow, but that against a fellow citizen and
the first magistrate of the state they would never draw a sword.
' Cr. Bk. II, ch. 3 (26). > ' Publicans.'
LONG L
i/\.6 Civil War and the Provinces
vVutumn 49 At these symptoms of possible trouble, Scipio hit upon the
device of quartering his soldiers upon Bergama {Pergamum)
and the other rich cities of Asia Minor ; and here he not
only indulged them with the most extravagant largesses, but,
further to whet their appetite for the campaign, handed
them over the townships to plunder.
3a While the troops were thus engaged, the unhappy provin-
cials had everywhere to find the money required to meet the
grinding exactions of the authorities. Many novel heads of
taxation were devised at the bidding of official cupidity.
A poll-tax was levied on every head of the population, whether
slave or free ; taxes on house pillars, taxes on doors, a money
composition for the army's corn supply, for troops, accoutre-
ments, ships' crews, ordnance, and transport ; in short, they
had only to find a sufficiently plausible title, and it was at
once pronounced an adequate instrument for the raising of
fresh funds. Commandants possessed of full military powers
were quartered, not merely in the large cities, but one might
almost say in every individual hamlet and hill fortress of the
province ; and those who distinguished themselves in the
work of plunder by any remarkable cruelty or rapacity were
rewarded by a reputation for exceptional ability and patriot-
ism, Asia Minor was completely overrun with the holders
of military authority and their dreaded attendants ^ ; it was
crammed with officials and tax-gatherers. These men, in addi-
tion to the legal sum demanded, were not above doing a bit
of business on their own account ; the excuse constantly urged
was that, as they had been driven from home and country,
they were now in need of the comxmon necessaries of life ; and
by this plea they endeavoured to cloak under a specious title
' ' Lictors.'
^ Diana of the Ephe nans'* 147
of respectability their most disreputable proceedings. A fur- Autumn 49
ther calamity for the provincials was the exorbitant rise in
interest, a not unusual phenomenon in time of war, where
a whole community is called upon to furnish ready money ;
and, in the hardships thus entailed, any postponement by
the creditors of the day of settlement was magniiied into
a free gift to the unfortunate debtors. In this way the capital
debt of the province more than doubled itself during these
two years. Yet it is not to be supposed that the Roman
citizens settled in the province were therefore allowed to go
exempt. Fixed sums were apportioned for each administra-
tive area, for each individual township ; and the authors of
these forced contributions invariably represented them as
loans negotiated on the authority of the Senate's decree.
Finally, the farmers of the imperial revenues were compelled,
as they had previously been in Syria, to advance the proceeds
of the tribute for the ensuing year.
In addition to all these sources of income, Scipio did not 33
scruple to order the removal from the great temple of Diana
at Ephesus of the treasures accumulated there from immemo-
rial antiquity. On the day appointed for this sacrilege an
entrance into the sacred building had already been effected
by himself and a party of the senatorial order, who had been
expressly summoned to witness the act, when dispatches from
Pompeius were put into his hand, bearing the information
that Caesar had crossed the water vdth a part of his legions,
and containing urgent instructions to hasten the advance of
his army towards a junction with his chief, to which ever}'
other interest was to be subordinated. On receipt of this
intelligence he at once dismissed the invited senators and
commenced preparations for his march into Macedonia, upon
148 Collateral ^lavements of Caesar
Jan. -Feb. 48 which he Started a few days later ; his recall thus proving the
salvation of the Ephesian treasures.
34 We must now retrace the interrupted narrative of Caesar's
own movements. The successful junction with the army of
Antony enabled him, he thought, to withdraw the single
legion at Oricum, previously stationed there for the defence
of that part of the coast, and so, by extending the area of his
operations, to test the feeling of the neighbouring provinces.
Envoys had already reached him from Thessaly and LIvadia
{Aetolia), charged with the duty of conveying the assurance
that the towns of these regions only required the presence of
a garrison in order to put themselves completely at his
disposal. Three distinct expeditions were accordingly now
taken in hand. In the first place, Lucius Cassius Longinus was
sent into Thessaly at the head of a single legion of conscripts
(the Twenty-seventh) and 200 mounted men : secondly, Caius
Calvisius Sabinus was commissioned to invade LIvadia with
five battalions of Infantry and a troop of horse ; both these
officers receiving most earnest Instructions to organize in
those immediately outlying districts a regular supply of
corn for the main army : whilst lastly, Cnaeus Domitlus
Calvinus had orders to march Into Macedonia with two
legions — the Eleventh and Twelfth — and a cavalry force of
600 sabres. The principal reason for this third enterprise was
the presence In camp of the chieftain Menedemus, the most
powerful ruler in what Is known as ' Independent ' Mace-
donia, who had been dispatched to Caesar as special envoy
from his subjects, and who was now promising the enthu-
siastic and unanimous devotion of his followers.
35 Of these three expeditions that under Calvisius, from the
first day of its arrival In LIvadia [Aetolia), received the
Collateral 'Movements of Caesar 149
warmest support from all parties : the enemy's garrisons in April 48
Kurtaga ^ and Lepanto {Calydon and Naupactus) were driven
out, and complete possession gained of the country. Cassius
also with his one legion successfully penetrated into Thessaly ;
but the existence here of two rival political factions produced
considerable variety in the character of the reception accorded
him by the several states. The leader of one of these factions
was Hegesaretos, a chief of long-established power, devoted
to the interests of Pompeius : opposed to him was Petraeus,
a scion of one of their noblest families, who, together with
his party, now brought to the cause of Caesar the strenuous
support of their combined resources. Simultaneous with both 36
these was the arrival in Macedonia of the third force under
Domitius. Here ambassadors from the provincial centres
were already gathering in considerable numbers to meet
the Caesarian representative, when the movement was sud-
denly checked by the announcement of Scipio's near approach,
heralded as it was on all sides by extravagant opinions con-
cerning the powers of the new commander : it being common
experience in all novelty for reputation to precede per-
formance. The new-comer, making no halt anywhere in
Macedonia, pushed on vigorously in the direction of Domitius,
until he was now no more than twenty miles apart. He then
suddenly turned south into Thessaly against Cassius Longinus,
executing this flank movement with such startling rapidity
that the news of his approach actually coincided with that
of his arrival. Moreover, to make his march the quicker, he
left behind at the river Vistritza {Haliacmon) (the boundary
between Macedonia and Thessaly), a force of eight battalions
under Marcus Favonius, as a guard to the baggage-trains of
* Not far from Missolonghi.
ly o Disconcerting Advance of Scipio
April 48 his legions, with orders to construct a fort upon that
river.
Whilst thus engaged himself, it happened that the cavalry
force of King Cotys, which was habitually hovering on the
outskirts of Thessaly, swooped down upon the camp of
Cassius : whereupon that commander, thoroughly alarmed
by the news of Scipio's arrival on the scene, and mistaking the
cavalry he saw for that of the Pompeian general, set his troops
in motion for the western part of the mountain range that
girdles the whole of Thessaly, and thence began a retirement
in the direction of Arta (Ambracia). Scipio on his side was
vigorously pressing the pursuit, when he was shortly overtaken
by a dispatch from Favonius announcing the presence of
Domitius with his two legions, and informing his commanding
officer that unless reinforced he could not defend the fortified
post where he had been stationed. The receipt of this dis-
patch caused Scipio to make a complete change both in his plans
and in the direction of his march. Breaking off the pursuit of
Cassius, he now hastened to the relief of Favonius ; and by
marching night and day without a halt, he succeeded in
rejoining his lieutenant under such remarkably fortunate
circumstances, that the rising dust of Domitius's army was
already observed just as the leading vedettes of Scipio first
came into sight. Thus Cassius was saved by the energetic
conduct of Domitius, and Favonius by the rapidity of Scipio.
37 The last-named commander now rested two days inside his
permanent fortifications on the river Vistritza, which separated
him from Domitius on the northern bank : on the third day
at dawn his army crossed by a ford and proceeded to erect
a camp ; on the fourth his line of battle was drawn up along
the front of the new entrenchments. Once more Domitius
Held in check by Domitius i j i
was prompt to meet the challenge, and resolved to advance Ap.-May4!i
his legions and then and there to accept the issue of a pitched
battle. Between the two rival camps, however, there inter-
vened an open plain some six miles broad : this the Caesarians
had first to cross, and then marshalled their line beneath the
higher ground of Scipio, who still persisted in his determina-
tion not to come down from his entrenchments. The result
was that in spite of the difficulties of restraining the eager
Domitian infantry, no actual encounter as yet ensued ; the
chief obstacle being a small stream running under Scipio's
camp, whose awkward banks presented considerable difficulties
to our advance. Yet Scipio had seen enough of the high
mettle of our troops and their eagerness to engage, to induce
the suspicion that on the morrow he would either be forced
to fight against his will, or else suffer a serious blow in reputa-
tion, if he still kept behind the shelter of his breastworks,
especially after the high expectations formed of his interven-
tion in the campaign. His first presumptuous advance thus
ended somewhat ingloriously, and under cover of night,
without even venturing to sound the usual signal for striking
camp, he silently transferred his army across the river, and
once more returned to his original quarters, where on some
natural heights close by the stream a fresh camp was con-
structed. A few days of inaction then followed, at the close
of which a surprise attack by ambush was planned against our
forces by the Pompeian leader, who placed a body of cavalry
at a spot where on previous days we had generally gone out
for forage. Accordingly, on the next morning, when Quintus
Varus, the cavalry commander in Domitius's army, paid his
daily visit to the place, his troopers were suddenly set upon by
the concealed horsemen. A stout resistance was nevertheless
ij-2 Some l^iinor Actions
.-May48 offered to the attack, and, quickly rallying on their respective
troops, the united Caesarian cavalry delivered a counter-
attack upon their assailants. Some eighty saddles were
emptied, and, after completing the rout of the remainder,
the foraging party rode back to camp, having sustained in all
but tw^o casualties.
38 These initial operations raised some expectation in Domitius
that Scipio might perhaps be enticed to a genera] engagement.
Pretending, therefore, that shortness of supplies nov? com-
pelled him to change his ground, he ordered the regular
military signal to be sounded for striking camp, preparatory to
marching a distance of three miles. There he found a site
conveniently hidden from viev*^, and on it proceeded to dispose
the whole of his effective army, including the mounted troops.
Scipio was equally ready to follow, and for this purpose
advanced a reconnoitring force of cavalry to ascertain the
precise route taken by his opponent. This force proceeding
to its appointed task, its leading squadrons had already ridden
into the ambush awaiting it, when the champing of our
horses by rousing their suspicions caused them to commence
retiring upon their supports : similarly the succeeding files,
on noticing the hasty retreat of their comrades, drew them-
selves to the halt. The trap was now disclosed, and the
Caesarians, perceiving the uselessness of waiting the arrival
of the remaining squadrons, closed in on the two successfully
caught, capturing along with them the cavalry leader
Marcus Opimius. The rest of the two troops were either
cut to pieces in the melee or captured and brought prisoners
to Domitius.
39 Meanwhile, as already related, Caesar had recalled all the
detachments lately holding the southern coast-line, excepting
Activity of Pomp elan Fleet ifj
three battalions left behind at Oricum to garrison that city. April
These troops he now further entrusted with the task of
guarding his small fleet of warships originally brought over
with the expedition from Italy. The officer selected for
this twofold duty was Manius Acilius, who at once proceeded
to move the vessels round into the inner harbour behind the
town, and there to moor them against the shore. He next
blocked the mouth of the harbour vdth a sunken merchant-
man, to which was attached a second and similar craft, and
upon their decks erected a wooden military tower, forming
a barrier immediately in the line of the fairway. This tower
was given a full complement of legionaries, and the troops
were then made responsible for its safe defence against any
surprise by sea. Information of these dispositions duly 40
reached the younger Cnaeus Pompeius, the admiral com-
manding the Egyptian squadron. He at once sailed for
Oricum, and after first removing the sunken merchantman,
by hauling on her with a series of tow-ropes, he proceeded to
attack the second, oa^afwai^wiH^MMWlifts, by means of the
concentrated fire of a number of his own vessels. These
had been specially fitted vwth siege-towers, raised upon deck
to a level that gave them the upper hand of their opponents :
hence, by constantly bringing up fresh reserves to the relief
of his exhausted crews, and endeavouring to divide the
strength of the defence by pressing the attack against the
city walls at all other points practicable, as well by escalade on
land as by bombardment from the fleet at sea, the Pompeian
admiral at length broke down the stubborn resistance of the
Caesarian garrison. Compelled at last by sheer exhaustion
and the torrent of spears to which they were exposed to quit
their posts, they all succeeded in escaping by the boats, leaving
15-4 Activity of Pompeian Fleet
p.-May48 the guard-ship to be afterwards captured as a prize by the
enemy. At the moment of this success the Pompeians also
established a footing in the rear of the defence, on the natural
breakwater that in course of time had converted the town
of Oricum into a peninsula. This advantage they utilized to
mount upon rollers four of their two-deckers ^, which they
then drove forward by means of levers over the narrow neck
of land across into the inner harbour. The Caesarian war-
ships, which lay without crews tied up to the shore, were
thus exposed to two converging attacks ; and the enemy
soon succeeded in hauling off four and in burning the re-
mainder. With this successful issue to his raid, the younger
Pompeius transferred Decimus Laelius from the Asiatic fleet,
leaving him to continue the operations against the town ;
and under his supervision a strict blockade was maintained
against all attempts to provision it from the two neighbour-
ing cities of Byllis and Amantia.
Pompeius himself went north to Alessio, where he attacked
and burned inside the harbour of that city every one of the
thirty transports lately left there by Mark Antony. On
endeavouring, however, to storm Alessio itself, he was met
by such a stout resistance from the Roman citizens settled
in the district, and by the regular troops whom Caesar had
previously sent down as a garrison, that after three days spent
in fruitless attempts at assault, in the course of which he
suffered some slight casualties, he was obliged to- vdthdraw
his squadron with his object unattained.
4' Meanwhile Caesar also had continued his operations. With
the definite intelligence that Pompeius was now established
at Asparagium, he set his united army in motion for the same
^ ' Biremes.*
The Pompeian Position turned iss
objective, merely breaking his march to storm the chief town Ap.-May4S
of the Parthini, then in the hands of a Pompeian garrison.
The third day brought him face to face with Pompeius ;
upon which he ordered his camp to be made in close proximity
to his opponent, and on the morrow, advancing in full strength
after completing his dispositions for battle, challenged his
rival to a decisive combat. But it was soon evident that
Pompeius was not to be enticed from his fortified lines, and
Caesar had again to fall back upon camp, clearly recognizing
that some alternative plan of action must now be tried.
The next day, therefore, vdth the whole of his effective forces
he commenced a wide turning movement to the eastwards,
along a difficult and narrow road, with the object of marching
directly upon Durazzo. Such a diversion, it was hoped, would
either force Pompeius northwards upon that city, or, failing
that, sever his communications with it ; the latter alternative
being no less desirable than the other was probable, since
Durazzo was by far the most important food-depot and the
principal place of arms in the hands of the enemy. Nor
were his expectations disappointed. At first Pompeius failed
to read the mind of his rival ; for, on seeing the Caesarian
army march out of their entrenchments by a route leading
in an opposite direction to the northern emporium, he
naturally concluded that want of supplies was responsible
for this enforced departure. Later in the day he heard the
real truth from his scouts ; and the next morning, breaking
up his encampment, he started in pursuit, in the hope that
the shorter route would allow him to head off his opponent in
time. Caesar, however, who had foreseen this contingency,
now called upon his troops for a supreme effort. The march
was barely interrupted throughout the night, and early the
1^6 Position of Pompeius at Petra
p.-May48 next morning his army arrived before Durazzo just as the
vanguard of the Pompeians debouched into sight. Caesar
then camped on his new position.
42 Pompeius's land communications vwth Durazzo {Dyrra-
chium) were thus severed ; and finding his original design no
longer practicable, he fell back upon the next best alternative
open to him, and on the heights known as Petra, a site within
fairly easy reach of ships, which can lie there under the lee of
the wind when this is in certain quarters, fresh permanent
fortifications were now erected. The command was also given
for a portion of his naval force to concentrate at the new
station ; whilst provisions and supplies were ordered up from
Asia Minor and other countries under his military control.
Such measures as these threatened to involve, in Caesar's
judgement, an indefinite prolongation of the war. Besides,
he already regarded as hopeless the supplies waiting for him
across the water in Italy ; so complete a blockade was main-
tained along the entire coast by the Pompeians, and so pro-
tracted was the delay of his own war-fleets built by his orders
during the late Vianter in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy. The
necessity of feeding his army thus forced him to turn to
Epirus, to which country he accordingly dispatched Quintus
Tillius and Lucius Canuleius, the latter a staff-officer, on a
special commission for that purpose ; while to deal with the
difficulty arising from the excessive distance of these regions,
a series of large granaries was established at fixed points, and
a regular service of corn-transport allotted to each of the neigh-
bouring communities. Similar orders were given to collect
from Alessio, and from the district of the Parthini and all the
hill villages, all the corn to be found there. This proved
a mere handful, and that for two reasons : the natural quality
Ci Caesar's Camp during Blockade. Pi Pompcy's Camp during Blockade.
C2 .. " after .. Pi .. •• after
M Camp of Marcellinn.H. P G Postern Gate of Subsidiary Camp.
Caesar* s Heroic I^Ieasures ly/
of the soil is unfavourable, the country being a wild mountain- Spring 48
ous tract relying mostly on imported grain ; and, moreover,
Pompeius had anticipated this movement of his opponent,
and, treating the Parthini during the last few days as legitimate
booty, had ordered all cereals to be collected and brought into
iJs lines at Petra under an escort of cavalry, with powers to
pillage and overturn the houses of the inhabitants.
Seeing the unpromising outlook of affairs, Caesar evolved 43
a plan of operations based upon the actual conditions of the
ground. The position held by Pompeius was encircled by
numerous lofty and rugged hills. These he first of all secured
with outpost detachments, which at once proceeded to fortify
on each a strong redoubt ; and then, upon their completion,
a continuous chain of earthworks was extended along the lines
of least natural resistance, thus linking up fort with fort, and
the circumvallation of Pompeius was begun. A triple result
was anticipated from the new movement. Weighing well the
shortness of his own supplies and Pompeius's overwhelming
superiority in cavalry, Caesar confidently expected that not
only would convoys of food-stuffs and other material require-
ments for his army now be freer to approach from all quarters
with less danger of attack, but the Pompeian cavalry would
also be cut off from provender and so rendered useless as
a military force ; and finally, he argued, a severe blow would
thus be dealt to his opponent's prestige, a matter on which he
notoriously placed most reliance in his intercourse with foreign
states, when the news ran round the civilized world that the
great commander was blockaded by Caesar and dare not face
a pitched battle. And, indeed, Pompeius now found himself 44
in a serious dilemma. He was unwilling to draw off from
the sea and the neighbourhood of Durazzo, since that town
iy8 Counter Pleasures of Pompeius
Spring 48 had been converted into an emporium for all his war material,
including arms, accoutrements, and ordnance ; whilst there
was also the further objection that he depended entirely on
sea-borne supplies for the feeding of his army. On the other
hand, he was equally powerless to prevent the completion of
Caesar's blockading lines, except by consenting to a general
engagement ; and that he had determined was not at the
present juncture advisable. His sole remaining alternative
was one which, considered as a military measure, amounted
wellnigh to a counsel of despair. It consisted in occupying
all the hills that he could seize, so that by enclosing in a ring
of fortified posts the widest possible sweep of country, he
might keep the Caesarian forces at such extreme distance as
he could thus command. Nor did the event belie his expecta-
tions. Twenty-four outposts were soon completed, sufficient
to encircle an arc some fifteen miles in extent : within this
space his army's foraging then proceeded, and, as the area
also contained within itself many hand-sown crops, the trans-
port animals could for the present at any rate continue to
subsist.
Meanwhile the two armies were busily entrenching one
against the other. As fast as the Caesarians pushed their
fortifications in an unbroken line from each redoubt on to
the next, in order to prevent the Pompeians from breaking
through at any point and so taking them in the rear ; the
enemy on the inner circle were also extending a parallel chain
of works, likevdse intended to prevent the possibility of their
own line being pierced and themselves surrounded from
behind. But in this contest of the spade it was soon clear
the Pompeians were winning ; the greater number of their
sappers, and the shorter arc required on the inner side, rendered
Daily Skirmishing i s 9
such a result inevitable. Moreover, whenever it became Spring 48
necessary for Caesar to occupy new positions in the progress
of his works, Pompeius, without advancing in force to dispute
them by a regular pitched battle, which he was resolved as
yet to avoid, would nevertheless select his own ground, and
constantly dispatch against us bodies of archers and slingers
(an arm in which he was exceptionally strong), and by this
device inflicted severe wounds upon our men. Indeed so
great had grown the dread inspired by the enemy's arrows,
that very nearly all the Caesarians had made themselves
shirts or other coverings, of felt, or quilted padding, or hides,
as a protection against these missiles.
In establishing themselves at the various outposts desperate 45
struggles ensued on either side. While Caesar strove to hem
in Pompeius within the narrowest boundaries possible, it was
Pompeius's main object to occupy as many hills in as wide a
circuit as he could control. Constant minor actions were thus
fought solely from this reason, notably one in which the Ninth
Caesarian legion was engaged. This corps had just seized
a certain height and commenced fortifying it, when the
Pompeians took possession of a second hill in close proximity
to and directly confronting the other. Between the two
there intervened at one point a fairly level causeway of com-
munication. Accordingly Pompeius, after first throwing out
flanking bodies of archers and slingers, pushed forward a strong
force of light infantry, and then, bringing up his siege-guns,
settled down to hamper the construction of our entrench-
ments. It was thus no light task for our soldiers at the same
time to defend their position and also continue the work of
fortification. Seeing his men, therefore, continually exposed
to wounds from all sides, Caesar ordered their retreat, and
i6o A Critical 'Retirement
Spring 48 the evacuation of the post. The retreat led down an incline,
and the enemy, emboldened all the more to press home the
attack, determined to render our withdrawal a difficult matter,
convinced as they were that panic was responsible for the
abandonment of the position. It was during this incident
that Pompeius is credited with having addressed the boastful
remark to his suite, that he was prepared to forfeit aU claim
to be considered a general of experience, if the Caesarian
legions should succeed in extricating themselves from the
consequences of their own ill-considered advance.
46 Meanwhile the dangers threatening the retreat caused
Caesar considerable disquiet. The order was given to move
up to the front a number of military hurdles, to be placed in
position along the ridge of the hill in line of the attack : under
cover of these the troops were then commanded to dig
a moderately wide ditch on the near or inner side, and to
render the whole ground as impracticable and difficult as
possible. In addition, Caesar personally posted bodies of
slingers at various strategic points, to lend further assistance
to the retreat ; then, with his precautions completed, he gave
the order for the legion to be retired. This was at once the
signal to the enemy for a still more determined and exultant
advance ; and, driving our men before them, they thrust
aside the defences formed by the interposing hurdles, prepara-
tory to crossing the trenches. Seeing what was happening,
and fearing the movement might be interpreted as not so
much a retreat as a rout, leading to a still graver disaster to
his arms, Caesar first sent his men a word of encouragement
through Antonius, the officer commanding this legion, and
then, from the troops' present position some half-way down
the hill, ordered his trumpeter to sound the advance for a com-
Inflections on the Situation \6\
bined charge upon the enemy. With a sudden unanimous Spring 48
impulse, the men of the Ninth discharged their volley of
heavy javelins ; then breasting the hill at the double, from
their low^er ground they drove the Pompeians back in head-
long flight, and compelled them to turn and run. Their flight,
however, proved no easy matter, and they were greatly ham-
pered by the opposing hurdles and long poles that blocked the
way, and no less by the complex lines of intersecting ditches.
As to our own troops, they considered their object fully
attained if they coidd withdraw without serious damage.
Having, therefore, inflicted severe losses upon the enemy, at
a cost to themselves of only five casualties, they completed
their retirement in perfect safety, and subsequently occupying
another series of hills, a little outside the previous line, finished
off the work of circumvallation.
Strange, indeed, and altogether unparalleled in military 47
history was the character of the present operations. The
great number of the redoubts, the wide extent of country
covered, the long undulating lines of entrenchment, in
a word, the whole nature of the blockade, all doubtless
contributed to such a result, but they were not the only
causes. Other generals have before now endeavoured to
blockade an opponent ; but it has always been as the sequel
to an attack upon a broken and stricken enemy, either suffering
under some defeat in battle, or demoralized by some other
piece of misfortune. As a further contrast, the side which
has thus invested the other could invariably count a superiority
both in infantry and mounted troops, and their object has
usually been the interruption of the enemy's supplies. Yet
here was Caesar endeavouring with an army numerically
iaferior to encircle an opponent whose strength was as yet
LONG M
J 62 Indomitable Spirit of the Caesarian s
spring 48 unimpaired either by material or moral disaster, and who
possessed in addition an abundance of all military stores.
Every day ships were arriving from every quarter of the
Empire, expressly chartered to carry supplies ; and the wind
could not blow from any point of the compass without some
of their number having a fair run for their voyage. In
marked opposition to aU this, Caesar had already eaten up
every vestige of corn that the length and breadth of the
country could provide, and was now in most desperate straits.
Yet his men set themselves to endure their privations with
exemplary fortitude. They were cheered by the recollection
of their similar hardships a year ago in Spain, when their
long-suffering efforts were rewarded by the successful termina-
tion of a great war : they remembered likewise the slender
nature of their rations before Alesia, rations which were still
further reduced at Avaricum ^, and yet from both these
critical positions they had emerged victorious over the most
powerful combinations of tribes. They were not the men
therefore to reject either the barley or the pulse which was now
served out to them ; while as to animal food, of which there
was plenty in Epirus, they regarded it as a positive luxury.
48 A lucky discovery was also made by those who had lately been
responsible for the vegetable supplies ^ of the army, who
now found a species of wild root called Chara. This, when
mixed with milk, did much to alleviate the distress : it was
made up like bread, and there was no lack of its supply.
Indeed, in some of the informal conversations which passed
between the private soldiers of the hostile camps, in which
' Two critical positions in the Gallic wars, 52.
"^ I conjecture 'ab oleribus' for the unintelligible 'a Valeribus ' of the
MSS. Cf. Plin. iV.ZT. 19. 21.
Sufferings of both Armies 163
the Pompeians taunted our men with their starved condition, Early
the latter's usual answer was to toss these loaves across at
their opponents as the best way of dashing their rising
hopes, ^
But now the corn crops were beginning to ripen, and mere 49 ;
hope was enough to sustain the empty stomachs of the troops
with its assurance of rapidly approaching plenty. Alike on
picket duty and in the quiet talk amongst comrades, constant
expressions of the dominant temper of the men were heard,
that they would sooner live on the bark of trees than allow
Pompeius to slip from their grasp. Much satisfaction was
also caused by the reports brought in by deserters, who de-
clared that though the troop-horses were still kept alive all
other transport animals had perished. They added that the
army itself enjoyed but indifferent health. Not only were
they cooped up in the narrowest of quarters, exposed to the
foul stench of hundreds of putrifying bodies, but they were
quite unfit for the continual fatigue duty now required
of them, and, worst of all, they suffered acutely from scarcity
of water. This last hardship was due to the direct action of
Caesar himself, who had either diverted or else dammed with
solid obstructions every river or rivulet whose course led down
to the sea. For the district being a mountainous one, and
the valleys converging so narrowly as to form as it were
natural conduits, it was easy to block such channels by cross-
rows of piles let into the ground, which, when strengthened
by artificial mounds, effectually held up the water. In
consequence, the Pompeians were compelled of sheer necessity
* Pompeius, on seeing these loaves, is said to have ordered their instant
removal through fear of their effect on his own men. ' We have to do
with wild beasts ' was his shuddering comment. Suet. 68.
M 2
1(^4 Responsibility in a Subordinate
^arly to search along the lower ground where it was swampy, and
ummer 4 ^^ ^j^ wells there, thus adding one more task to their daily
round of labours. And yet, even when found, such sources
of water had the marked disadvantage of being a considerable
distance from some of the outposts, and, further, they qmckly
dried up under the sultry heat of summer. On the other
hand, Caesar's army enjoyed not only perfect health but
a water supply that was practically unlimited ; whilst, with
the sole exception of wheat, there were stores in abundance
of every description ; and even in this particular, the soldiers
of Pompeius had the mortification of daily seeing a better
time coming for their adversaries, and their hopes rising under
the prospect of the ripening corn.
6° So unexampled a type of warfare naturally called forth
equally curious stratagems on either side. For example, the
Pompeians, having noticed from the camp-fires that our
regiments lay out at night on their entrenchments, would
steal out silently to the attack, and, after discharging a volley
of arrows into our crowded lines, would swiftly rejoin their
main body. To remedy this annoyance, our people learnt
by experience to light their fires in one place (and to pass the
night in another).^
51 Meanwhile intelligence of the critical position of the bat-
talion reached Publius Sulla, the officer left in command of
the camp by Caesar when marching out to the attack. He
at once went to the rescue with a force of two legions, his
arrival causing the easy repulse of the Pompeians. Without
^ Conjectural. A considerable gap here in the MSS. probably contained
Caesar's unsuccessful attempt on Durazzo and Pompeius's counter-attack on
Caesar's lines, the narrative of which is now continued.
Responsibility in a Subordinate i6^
waiting to face the Caesarian infantry or to stand their charge, Early
the main body turned their backs and abandoned their "'"'"^^ 4
position as soon as ever the leading companies were driven in.
In the midst of the pursuit, and to stay our further advance,
Sulla ordered the recall. Yet there is a strong consensus
of opinion that, had he only allowed the pursuit to be pressed
home with greater vigour, that day might have seen the
termination of the war.
Such criticism on that officer's judgement can scarcely
be maintained. The functions of a subordinate are not
those of a commander-in-chief. The actions of the one
should in all points be regulated by his instructions : the
other is free to embrace in the scope of his plans the entire
military situation. In this particular instance, SuUa had
been deputed by Caesar to hold the camp in his own absence.
Having, therefore, effected the relief of his companions-in-
arms, he was content to rest upon that achievement : he was
not prepared to take the further responsibility of fighting
a general engagement with the enemy (which after all, he
felt, might easily involve some disaster), lest his conduct
should be interpreted as trenching on the province of his
commander. His appearance on the scene of action, however,
brought considerable difficulties to the retreating Pompeians.
Their original advance had been upwards from a lower level,
and they had subsequently occupied the crest of the hill. By
withdrawing, therefore, down the slope, they were menaced
with a pursuit that had all the advantages of position on its
side ; moreover, only a brief interval of dayhght remained
before sundown, since the hope of reaching a definite decision
had made them carry the affair well on towards night. The
force of circumstances thus impelled Pompeius, by a plan
1 66 Heavy Fitting
Early improvised at the moment, to seize a neighbouring height
ummer 4 j^^^ ^^^ ^£ range of artillery fire from our redoubt ; where
after establishing himself and throwing up entrenchments,
he proceeded to concentrate the whole of his effective forces.
52 At the same time fighting also took place in two other parts
of the field, since Pompeius had supported his main attack
by subsidiary movements against a number of our redoubts,
with the object of dividing the defence and so preventing
the dispatch of reinforcements from the neighbouring out-
posts. Thus at one point Volcatius Tullus successfully with-
stood the assault of an entire legion of Pompeians, and, taking
the offensive, actually drove it from its ground ; at another,
the German auxiliaries sallied out from our lines, and after
accounting for a considerable number of the enemy, safely
53 effected their retirement back to their supports. On this
day, therefore, six distinct engagements were fought, viz.
three outside Durazzo and three up at the trenches. Upon
our investigating the total casualties for the day, it was found
that of the Pompeians no fewer than 2,000 had fallen — mostly
reservists and centurions — included in the number being
Valerius Flaccus, son of Lucius Flaccus, sometime governor
of the Province of Asia Minor. Of regimental and company
colours six altogether were brought in. On our side the killed
amounted to no more than twenty in all six battles, though,
on the other hand, of the men inside the redoubt not one
escaped unwounded, and of the company officers ^ belonging
to this one battalion four out of the six had lost their eyes.
When the garrison wanted to adduce evidence of the desperate
nature of their struggle, they collected the arrows which
had been shot into the fort and counted out before Caesar
' Centurions.
The Position 7w altered 167
some 30,000 ; and, on the shield of the centurion Scaeva Early
being brought up for inspection, it was found pierced with
a hundred-and-twenty separate holes. As some reward for
this man's gallant services both to himself and the country he
so well represented, Caesar first presented him with a purse of
;^r,500, and then publicly announced his promotion from the
eighth to the first battalion of the legion, and to the senior
company in that ; it being common testimony that the suc-
cessful defence of the redoubt had been largely owing to his
splendid exertions. The whole battalion subsequently re-
ceived double pay and rations, and was also richly rewarded
by Caesar with gifts of new uniform and various decorations
for distinguished conduct in the field.
Meanwhile Pompeius had employed the night in naaking 54
large additions to his defences ; on the following days these
were strengthened by a series of military towers, and when
the works had been carried to a height of fifteen feet, this
face of the camp was screened by a number of portable
shelters ; five days after that another moderately cloudy
night again lent him its friendly assistance. Orders were
at once given to barricade all the camp gates, which were
then left as a check to pursuit ; and in the early hours of
the morning the Pompeian forces silently evacuated the
hill and fell back upon their old entrenchments. Upon
the next and upon each succeeding day Caesar marched out 55
with his army to form up for action where the ground was
level, in hopes that he might find Pompeius ready to give
decisive battle. In executing this movement he so disposed
his legions that they were virtually commanded by the
Pompeian camp, his front line being so close to the enemy's
rampart that it only just cleared the range of hand-missiles
id8 Movement against the Peloponnese
Summer 48 and artillery. To disregard so direct a challenge was ob-
viously impossible if Pompeius was to retain his military
reputation and prestige. The Pompeian army was therefore
drawn up outside its entrenchments, but in such a formation
that its rearmost line actually abutted on the breastworks,
while the whole of the force thus embattled could be effec-
tually covered by the fire from its own ramparts.
56 The success gained by Cassius Longinus and Calvisius
Sabinus in securing the adhesion of Livadia (Jetolia), and
the country round the Gulf of Arta (Acarnania and Amfhilo-
chia), by the steps already indicated,' nowled Caesar to believe
that the time was ripe for a similar movement with regard to
Greece proper (Jchaea), which would carry the range of his
arms over a somewhat wider area. Quintus Fufius Calenus
was accordingly sent into that country, and Sabinus and
Cassius, with the forces under them, were subordinated to
his command. Rutilius Lupus was at this time acting as
governor of Greece, in virtue of his appointment by Pom-
peius ; and he, on receiving intelligence of the advance of
the three Caesarian generals, at once took measures for the
fortification of the Isthmus, so as to form some barrier be-
tween Fufius and the Peloponnese. Calenus meanwhile took
over the submission voluntarily tendered by the local authori-
ties, of Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus ; other cities were
taken by storm, and for the remainder, active steps were
inaugurated for winning them over to the Caesarian interest
through special missions dispatched for that purpose. These
and similar duties served to engross the attention of Fufius.
57 Whilst the above events were passing in Greece {Achaea)
^ The Caesarian officers were able to raise a body of Aetolian and
Acarnanian auxiliaries who fought at Pharsalus. App. 2. 70.
Last Efforts for Peace 1 6<^
and the neighbourhood of Durazzo, as soon as the news of Summer 48
Scipio's arrival in Macedonia was fully confirmed, Caesar,
loath to abandon his traditional policy, directed Aulus Clodius
to proceed on an embassy to the camp of the new commander.
Clodius had the advantage of being a common friend to both
parties, as he had originally been introduced by Scipio to the
notice of Caesar, who had since made it a special point to
treat him as one of his own intimates. Caesar now entrusted
him with a letter addressed to Scipio, supplementing it by
verbal instructions of which the foUovvdng formed a summary.
' In spite of all his efforts in the direction of peace, nothing
tangible had yet been effected, chiefly owing, as he was dis-
posed to think, to the supineness of those whom he had chosen
as his intermediaries, who shrank from the task of conveying
his terms to Pompeius at a time when they would be un-
acceptable. Scipio, on the other hand, possessed an authority
with his chief that not only enabled him to speak his mind
freely on all subjects, but to a large extent gave him also the
right of criticism and of rectifying the blunders of his col-
league ; moreover, he held an independent command in the
field, and was thus able to back his authority by a military force
that could compel obedience. If he were now to take this
step, he would win from the world the unanimous tribute
of being the one man who had given rest to a distracted
Italy and peace to the provinces, and in so doing saved the
Empire from disruption.'
These instructions Clodius duly carried to Scipio, and for
the first few days apparently met with a favourable hearing ;
later on he was not admitted to further conference, the
reason being, as we afterwards discovered on conclusion of
the war, that Scipio had been roundly taken to task for his
1 70 Last Efforts for Peace
Summer 48 weakness by Favonius. The negotiations thus proved abor-
tive, and Clodius had no alternative but to return to Caesar.
CHAPTER IV
The Forcing of the Blockade
' It w^as essential to Caesar's plan that the Pompeian cavalry
should be closely confined in Durazzo, and not allowed any
opportunity of procuring forage. Accordingly he proceeded
to draw across the two approaches to the town which, as
already stated ', were not wide, strong lines of entrenched
works supported by redoubts. This new movement quickly
convinced Pompeius that no serious diversion could be
expected from his horse ; and after a few days it was put on
board ship and brought back within his permanent lines.
The want of fodder continued to make itself acutely felt :
so hard pressed indeed were they, that the horses had to be
fed on leaves torn from the trees, varied by a mash made
from the succulent roots of reeds ; for as for the young corn
which they had found already sown within their lines,
that had all long been eaten up. Thus they were obliged
to import fodder from Corfu and Arta {Acarnania), a course
involving a long sea-voyage, and even then the supply was so
scanty that it had to be eked out with barley in order to keep
the animals alive. At last there came a time when every
locality had alike been stripped of barley, fodder, and all
other vegetation whatever, and when even the foliage from
the trees began to run out ; and when this point of destitution
* Probably in the lost section.
Dorvnfall of two brilliant Cavalry Leaders 171
was reached, Pompeius, with his cavalry mounts reduced to Summer 48
skeletons and rendered totally unfit for active service, at
length decided that some attempt must be made towards
forcing the blockade.
Now there were serving with Caesar on the roll of the 59
cavalry two brother Allobroges, Roucillus and Egus, sons of
Adbucillus, for many years the paramount chief of his tribe,
two men whose services to Caesar all through the Gallic wars
had been marked no less by gallantry than efficiency. In
return for this loyal support Caesar had appointed them to
the highest magistracies in their own country, had contrived
their election to the tribal Senate without passing through
the usual grades, had given them not only lands captured
from the enemy during the war but also large sums of ready
money, and in a word, had raised them from poverty to
affluence. Their personal courage had not only won them a
warm place in Caesar's own regard,but with the army in general
they were also great favourites. Unfortunately they allowed
their friendship with Caesar to foster a pride that was as foolish
as it is characteristic of subject races, and from despising their
Gallic companions-in-arms, they came to cheating them of their
pay, and even went so far as to appropriate the whole share
of the plunder that should have fallen to their men. Exas-
perated by such injustice, the troopers in a body waited upon
Caesar, and loudly complained of their leaders' fraud ; adding
to their other charges the further accusation that false returns
were habitually made of the cavalry's strength, in order that
the brothers might pocket the extra pay.
Caesar, considering present circumstances to be unfavourable 60
for the visitation of punishment, and ready to forgive much
to a gallant soldier, decided to postpone the whole inquiry :
172 Downfall of two brilliant Cavalry Leaders
Summer 48 nevertheless, he privately censured the tvs^o chieftains for
making money out of their troop, and after a reminder that
there was no limit to the power of his friendship, advised them
to gauge his future kindness to themselves on the basis of that
already experienced at his hands. In spite of this secrecy,
the affair caused a popular outburst of bitter and contemptu-
ous feeling towards the two brothers, the reality of which was
brought home to their notice, as much by their own inward
self-condemnation and accusing voice of conscience, as by
the open taunts levelled at them from outside. Deeply
resenting their humiliation, and, it may be, convinced in
their own minds that instead of being given their acquittal
they were only reserved for future punishment, they deter-
mined to sever their connexion with us and our party, and
to seek their fortunes in another camp, and make new
friendships there. Having, therefore, communicated their
design to a few intimate dependants, whom they dared trust
with so desperate a venture, they first of all endeavoured
to murder the cavalry brigadier, Caius Volusenus (a fact only
discovered afterwards at the close of the war), as some earnest
of sincerity in their treacherous desertion to Pompeius ; and
when the difficulties of this project proved insurmountable
and no opportunity presented itself of carrying it into efiect,
they proceeded to borrow all the ready money they could,
under the appearance of desiring to do satisfaction to their
fellow countrymen and restore their fraudulent gains, and
then, buying up a large batch of horses, they went over to
Pompeius, followed by those who were privy to the plot.
61 Arrived in Pompeius's camp, they were received in a manner
befitting their own exalted rank and liberal education. Pom-
peius indeed could not but take into account the fact that
Caesar^ s 'Military Secrets betrayed 17 1
a considerable retinue had accompanied their arrival, and Summer 48
that numerous remounts had been also added to his army.
The men were of acknowledged gallantry, who, until recently,
had been held in high reputation by Caesar ; and the very
unexpectedness of their present exploit was itself some justi-
fication for Pompeius's action.
In consideration of all this, the two chiefs were conducted
in person by Pompeius on a tour of inspection round his lines,
where every detail was pointed out to them. For till now
not a single foot soldier or cavalryman had gone over from
Caesar to his rival, though the desertions from Pompeius's
camp were of almost daily occurrence; whilst the troops
which had been raised in Epirus and Livadia (Aetolia) and
in all the regions now under the military control of Caesar
commonly went over en masse. Now, however, deserters had
arrived who knew every secret of the enemy : the unfinished
portions of his siege lines, the additional touches of strength
desired at certain places by the engineering experts, the
regular routine of duties amongst the besiegers, the distances
between point and point, the varying degrees of watchfulness
among the different pickets according to the natural tempera-
ment or zeal of the respective officers in charge — all this they
had seen and noted, and no less a gift than this they now
imparted to Pompeius.
That commander first made himself thoroughly master of 63
their detailed information, and then, having already, as men-
tioned above, formed the design of a sortie, issued orders to
his troops to make wicker coverings for their helmets, and
to provide themselves with a quantity of entrenching
soil. These preparations completed, at nightfall a strong
body of light infantry and archers was embarked on board
174 Night Attack of Pompeians
Summer 48 dinghies and galley-oared transports, and shortly after mid-
night a force of sixty battalions drawn from both the main
camp and the strongest outposts, was put under motion
for that section of the circumvallating lines which abutted
on the sea and which was furthest removed from Caesar's
own head quarters. The same rendezvous was given to
the fleet of vessels which had been loaded, as described, with
their freight of earth and light infantrymen, and at the same
time the Pompeian battleships were brought round from
Durazzo. After this each officer was carefully instructed as
to his own share in the forthcoming operations.
At this particular corner of the works Caesar had the Ninth
legion in position, under command of his paymaster Lentulus
Marcellinus ; though owing to that officer's indifferent state
of health Fulvius Postumus had been attached as his second
in command. The works at this point were of the following
63 design. First came a ditch fifteen feet wide ; this was sur-
mounted by a palisaded rampart ten feet high, facing the
enemy, and backed by an equal depth of solid earth : then
200 yards in the rear rose a second and similar rampart, though
of somewhat slighter proportions, and this time fronting
outwards or in an opposite direction to the first. The
reason for this double line was the apprehension disturbing
Caesar's mind during the last few days that his position might
here be turned by an approach from sea ; and he therefore
had to devise some means of defence in the event of his being
exposed to a simultaneous assault from north and south.
Unfortunately there had not been time to complete the
scheme : the general scale of the works undertaken had been
too vast, and the labour required for the seventeen miles cir-
cuit of entrenchments too incessant : consequently the cross-
The Caesartans surprised 17 5"
rampart which was to connect the two main lines, and had Summer 4S
its front to the sea, was not yet finished off. This fact was
well known to Pompeius through the information brought by
the two treacherous Allobroges, and now became the cause
of a considerable disaster to our arms. For soon after detach-
ments of the Ninth had taken up their bivouac for the night
in close proximity to the sea, the Pompeians were suddenly
seen advancing in the grey light of early dawn. Their
attack quickly developed itself from both sides. While the
troops who had come by boat were pouring in a hot fire of
missiles upon the outer or southern rampart, under cover
of which the ditches were rapidly filled up with the earth
brought for that purpose, the infantry of the legions were
bringing up scaling ladders and creating no small confusion
among the defenders on the inner stockade by volleys of
artillery shot and hand-spears of all descriptions ; whilst, to
crovni the disorder, swarms of archers were deploying in
support of each of the two attacking bodies. What rendered
matters worse was that our men had nothing to reply with
excepting stones from their slings, and against such blows the
enemy were largely protected by the wicker coverings pre-
viously fitted to their helmets. In the midst of this fierce
onslaught, when resistance was already a desperate matter, the
fatal discovery was made of the flaw in the fortifications already
mentioned : troops were rapidly landed from the sea in boats
at a point between the two parallel ramps where the works
were stiU unfinished, and, taking our men in the rear, drove
them from both lines and compelled them to turn and run.
As soon as information of this raid reached Marcellinus, 64
that ofiicer at once pushed up fresh battalions from camp to
the support of his hard-pressed detachment. The sight of
17 6 The Caesarians surprised
Summer 48 their comrades in full flight, however, was too much for his
reserves ; they could neither stay the stampede by their own
arrival on the scene, nor did they attempt to stand against
the onset of the enemy. As fast as the relieving columns
followed one another, each and all caught the infection of
panic from the fugitives, and thereby only added to the
general confusion and critical position of the entire force,
since the retreat threatened to become blocked though the
heavy congestion of men.
While the battle was at its height the standard-bearer of the
legion's eagle was mortally wounded ; but just as his strength
was failing the man caught sight of our passing cavalry.
' Take this ', said he, ' which for many a year I have jealously
guarded whilst living, and now that I'm dying hand back to
Caesar with the self-same devotion : see to it, I charge you,
that no negligence of yours bring about a military disgrace
which was never yet known in the army of Caesar, but carry
the standard back safe into his hands.' By this fortunate inci-
dent the regimental colours were saved from capture, after
the first battalion had lost every one of its company com-
manders except the third in order of rank.
65 Meanwhile the victorious Pompeians were marching on the
camp of Marcellinus, dealing out as they advanced heavy
slaughter through our ranks. Their approach raised no little
panic among the remaining battalions of the Ninth, until
Marcus Antonius, who held the neighbouring command in the
line of redoubts, and who had been informed of the perilous
nature of the position, was seen to be descending, with the
hills behind him, at the head of a strong relieving column of
twelve battalions. His arrival on the field of action effectu-
ally checked the advancing enemy, and at the same time lent
The Blockade forced 177
sufficient steadiness to the remaining troops to recover from Summer 48
their recent state of abject terror. Very soon afterwards
Caesar himself arrived on the scene, accompanied by a few
battalions, which he had rapidly drafted from the various
outposts, on seeing the signal of rising smoke passed on from
fort to fort, in accordance with the established custom of the
preceding days. Realizing at once the extent of the disaster
and perceiving that Pompeius had succeeded in forcing his
way outside the lines of circumvallation, in such a manner
that his foraging could be freely conducted along the seaboard
whilst he still maintained communication with his ships,
Caesar decided on a total revolution in the conduct of the
war ; and, his original plan having now miscarried, he gave
orders to entrench a camp close up to the enemy's new
position.
The work of fortification was just completed when his 66
scouts discovered a large body of men, representing perhaps
the strength of a legion, hidden behind a neighbouring wood,
on their march to what was known as the old camp. The
situation of this camp was as follows. It had originally
formed the head quarters of the Ninth legion, at the time
when that regiment was ordered to stem the advance
of the Pompeians in this quarter, preparatory to walling
them round in the manner previously described ; it rested
upon a wood on one side, and was not more than 500 yards
from the sea. Subsequently, certain reasons had produced
a modification of plan, and Caesar had withdrawn this corps
a little further inland. After a few days' interval, the camp
had been occupied by Pompeius himself ; and as he intended
to post more than one legion at this particular point, the inner
walls were left standing and the main circuit greatly increased,
178 An Attempt at 'Retrieval
Summer 48 the effect being to convert the smaller camp thus contained
by the larger into a kind of fortified citadel to the other.
A further change introduced was to run a breastwork from
the left-hand corner of the extended lines down to the river
bank, in order that the troops might water with more freedom
and without fear of molestation from the enemy. But Pom-
peius too had changed his plans, for reasons unnecessary here
to particularize, and had evacuated the position ; thus the
camp had existed for a considerable number of days, and all
its fortifications were still intact/
67 This was the site towards which our scouts now reported
the Pompeian legion to have headed, and the same move-
ment was also observed from some of our higher redoubts,
which at once confirmed the news. Now the place was
distant from Pompeius's new camp about 800 yards. Caesar
thereupon conceived the hope of successfully crushing this
isolated regiment ; and being anxious to repair the day's
disaster, ordered two of his battalions to remain on the earth-
work and keep up the appearance of entrenching, whilst with
the other thirty-three, among which were those of the bat-
tered Ninth with its heavy death-roll of officers ''' and sorely
attenuated ranks, he marched out with all the secrecy possible,
in double column formation and by a route pointing directly
away from his objective, towards the detached body of
Pompeians and this lesser camp of theirs. Nor was his judge-
ment found to be at fault. Arriving safely at his destination
before Pompeius could become aware of his departure, he
quickly turned his left wing, where he himself was posted,
against the enemy, and, in spite of the formidable nature of
the defences, drove him from the rampart. The camp gates
* See plan. * Centurions.
At first successful 179
proved to be blocked by chevaux de frise, which slightly Summer 48
delayed our advance ; and a sharp struggle ensued between
the impetuous efforts of our men to rush the obstacles and
the stubborn resistance of the garrison ; conspicuous amongst
whom was Titus Puleio, who has been previously mentioned
as responsible for the treacherous surrender of the army under
Caius Antonius, and who now fought most gallantly from
his place in the ranks. Our men, however, quickly asserted
their superiority, and having hewn away the intervening
barrier, burst first of all into the larger or outer camp, and
from thence into the inner fortress contained in it, whither
the defeated legion had retired, and where several were now
cut down while still maintaining their resistance.
But, alas, there is a power which, mighty though it be in 68
other spheres, is mightiest of all in war, working most momen-
tous changes by means of incidents most trivial — we mean
the power of Fortune : as was now to be exemplified. For
the units composing the right Caesarian wing, in their igno-
rance of the ground, followed the course of the outlying
breastwork, which ran, as already indicated, from the camp
to the river side, searching for its gate and believing it to
form the rampart to the main camp. On discovering their
mistake, however, and finding it to be connected directly vwth
the stream, they tore down the defences and passed through
vdthout opposition, being followed by the whole body of
mounted troops.
In the meanwhile, after this sufficiently serious delay, 69
news of the attack reached the ears of Pompeius. He
at once recalled five of his legions from their work on
his new entrenchments, and advanced at their head to
the relief of his beleaguered detachment ; and while his
N 2
i8o The Attempt ends in Disaster
Summer 48 cavalry bore down upon our troopers, our infantry on the
rampart of the newly-conquered camp discovered to their
amazement a line of legionaries in full battle formation. In
a moment the situation was completely altered. The isolated
legion of Pompeians, rallying under the prospect of immediate
relief, endeavoured to make a stand at the postern gate, and
even delivered a counter-attack upon our troops : Caesar's
horse, at that moment engaged in scaling the outer breast-
work through the narrow breaches, grew alarmed for the
safety of its retreat, and gave the signal for general flight ;
whereupon the right wing, which had by this time lost touch
with its left, seeing the panic pervading the mounted troops,
and anxious to save itself from being crushed on the inner
side of the earthwork, drew back again through the breaches
which they had just made in it. There the greater part
of them, afraid of being caught in the narrow gangways,
hurled themselves over into the trenches of a rampart fully
tea feet high ; the first of them were trampled to death,
but the rest passed out into safety over the dead bodies of
their comrades. Similarly on the left wing, as soon as the
Caesarians saw from their station on the rampart that the
Pompeian army was upon them, and their own second division
in headlong flight, a dread arose of finding themselves com-
pletely trapped in the narrow interval, now that they had an
enemy both inside and outside the rampart ; and they began
looking to their own safety by retracing the steps of their
previous advance. Everywhere alike was confusion and panic-
stricken flight, so utterly uncontrolled that when Caesar
snatched at the standards of some of the fugitives and ordered
the men to halt, some let go their horses and joined in the
stampede on foot, while others were so beside themselves with
The Fortune of War i 8 i
terror as to let even the standards go, and not a single man Summer 48
could be induced to stand his ground.
Disastrous as the situation was, there were still some 70
redeeming circumstances, withoutwhich thetotal annihilation
of the army must inevitably have followed. Foremost among
these was Pompeius's fear of ambush, due in all probability
to his astonishment at the turn events had taken, after he had
just seen his own men chased out of their entrenchments ;
an astonishment which now rendered him for some time
nervous about approaching the outer works : and another
advantage was that, the camp gates being narrow and firmly
held by Caesar's troops, the pursuit of the cavalry was thereby
considerably delayed. Thus it happened that the same cir-
cumstance, trivial in itself, produced two quite dissimilar
trains of consequences, each of them far-reaching in its effects.
It was the breastwork leading from camp to the river that,
at the moment when the Pompeian lines had been carried,
intervened between Caesar and a victory as good as won:
it was the same obstacle which now, by retarding the enemy's
pursuit, proved in turn the salvation of our force. ^
These two battles on this one day cost Caesar altogether 71
960 of the rank and file, besides the distinguished Roman
knights Tuticanus Gallus, son of a Roman senator, Caius
Fleginas of Piacenza {Placentia), Aulus Granius of Pozzuoli
{Puteoli), and Marcus Sacrativer of Capua, as well as thirty-
two regimental and company officers. A large proportion,
however, of these met their death either by suffocation in
the trenches, or at the narrow gaps in the earthworks, or down
' Caesar is said to have remarked that, had the enemy possessed a
general who knew how to conquer, that day would have ended the war.
Suet. 36 ; Appian, B. C. 2. 62.
1 8 2 Reflections on the Defeat
Summer 48 by the river banks, without the infliction of any sort of
wound, and merely through the terrorized flight of their own
comrades. Of military standards thirty-two in all were lost.
As a result of the day's fighting Pompeius was formally
acclaimed ' Commander ' by his troops, a name which he
retained, and subsequently allowed himself to be addressed
by, although he rarely used the title at the head of his official
dispatches, and never wore the usual laurel wreath on the
staves of his military attendants.^ In marked contrast to this
moderation was the conduct of Labienus. Having induced
his chief to order the transfer of the prisoners to his own
charge, he first had them marched on to the parade
ground, presumably for the sake of display and to strengthen
people's faith in a traitor, and then addressing them as fellow
soldiers, and asking in terms of studied insult whether veteran
troops were in the habit of running away, butchered the whole
body in cold blood before the eyes of the assembled army.
72 These successes evoked such overweening confidence in the
camp of the Pompeians, that, disdaining all further thought
for the conduct of the war, they regarded the campaign
as already won. They did not pause to consider the weakness
of our own force, or the adverse conditions and cramped
dimensions of the late battle-field, due to the enemy's previous
possession of the camp ; so that, face which way we would, we
had to meet a double menace both from within and without
the rampart. They failed to take account of the circum-
stance that our army had been cut into two halves, neither
of which could help the other ; nor did they make the further
reflection that the action had not been the result of a fair
charge in open fight, but that our self-inflicted losses from the
^ i. e. on the axes of his lictors.
Caesar addresses his Defeated Troops 183
overcrowding and want of room had been even heavier than Summer 48
those inflicted by the enemy. Finally, they forgot to allow
for the ordinary vicissitudes of war, and for the numerous
occasions on which the most trivial incidents have been the
cause of the gravest disasters — for example, an ill-grounded
suspicion, a sudden panic, or a superstitious scruple — and the
frequency with which an army in the field has come to grief
through either an inefficient general or a careless subordinate.
All this they now ignored, and acting as though they had won
solely on their merits, and no further change of fortune were
possible, they began, both by word of mouth and written
dispatch, to fill the entire world with a chorus of jubilation
over the victory this day had brought them.
Meanwhile the position of Caesar, after the overthrow of 73
his earlier designs, rendered it advisable in his judgement
to make a complete revolution in his conduct of the war.
He first withdrew at one stroke every one of the garrisons
in his chain of redoubts, and definitely abandoned the
blockade. He then called up the whole force and
pubUcly harangued the men, urging them not to take
too much to heart their recent misfortunes or be alarmed
at what had occurred, but pointing out the unreason-
ableness of setting against their long line of victories in
the past a single reverse which was after all an insignifi-
cant one. * On the contrary, they owed much thanks to
Fortune. Italy had been won by them without a scratch ;
the two Spains with their teeming population of fighting
races, led by generals of the highest skill and military expe-
rience, had been reduced to peace and order ; the home
provinces, on whose corn they depended, had been brought
under effective occupation ; while to crown the series of
184 A J\etreat Imperative
Summer 48 successes, there was the astonishing piece of good fortune
which enabled them all to cross the water in perfect safety
through the very centre of the enemy's fleets, who swarmed
alike before the harbours and along the open coastline. If
their run of luck had not proved absolutely unbroken, they
must remember that heaven helps those who help them-
selves. As far as he personally was concerned in their late
disaster, he was the last man who could be justly held respon-
sible. He had provided a fair field for the encounter ; the
enemy's camp had been captured, the enemy himself turned
out of his entrenchments, and all opposition overcome. What-
ever it was that had then stepped in to snatch victory from
his grasp — ^whether some unsteadiness of their own, some-
body's blunder, or even the fickleness of Fortune — at the very
moment when victory lay assured in their hands ; at all
events every man must now earnestly strive to atone for that
regrettable incident by his own good conduct in the future.
That would convert their defeat into a blessing, as had once
before been the case at Gergovia * ; and they who had lately
shrank from a conflict would become the first to throw down
the challenge.'
74 At the close of this speech a sentence of public disgrace was
passed upon certain of the standard-bearers, who were forth-
with relieved of their position of trust. Through the army
generally such burning indignation arose at the thought of
their late discomfiture, and so fierce a longing to retrieve the
tarnished reputation of their arms, that without waiting for
the word of command from battalion or company officers, the
men of their own accord even added to their ordinary duties
by way of punishment ; and such a burning desire to meet the
■* 52, just before the great victory of Alesia.
Pursuit by Pompeius 185-
enemj pervaded all ranks, that even higher-grade officers were Sumnier 4S
found seriously persuading themselves that they ought to hold
on to their present position and risk the chances of a general
engagement.
Against all such views, Caesar felt the danger of trusting
troops which had so recently yielded to panic, and thought
it wiser to allow them time sufficient to recover their
confidence : moreover, with the raising of the blockade,
the question of his supplies had become acute. No 75
time was therefore lost beyond what was required for
attending to the sick and wounded, and at nightfall the
baggage-trains of the army were all quietly got under motion
and dispatched on the road to ApoUonia, with strict orders to
make no halt whatever before completing their full day's march.
They were accompanied by an escort of one legion. These
preliminaries satisfactorily disposed of, at about three o'clock
in the morning two other legions were told off to remain in
camp, while the rest of the force moved out by a number of
separate gates, and were likewise dispatched on the same
journey. Last of all, after another brief interval, in order that
military tradition might be maintained and yet his own de-
parture be disclosed at the latest possible moment, Caesar gave
the word for the march to be openly sounded ; and his rearguard
turning out at once, quickly overhauled the preceding column,
and was soon out of sight of their old entrenchments.
Equally little delay in the pursuit was observed by Pompeius
when once he had divined his adversary's purpose ; but acting
on the lines that Caesar had foreseen, viz. to seize the
opportunity of catching his enemy in the general panic
which must follow, he conceived, on the disorganization of
the march, he drew out his army from camp, and at once
i8<J Outwitted by his Adversary
Summer 48 detached his cavalry to harass the retreat of the rearguard.
This, however, they failed to overtake, since Caesar, by march-
ing light, had gained a long start of his pursuers. But on
reaching the river Schkumbi (Genusus), the awkward banks of
this stream gave time for the Pompeian horsemen to come up,
and an endeavour was made to delay the rearmost divisions by
forcing an engagement. Against this attack Caesar opposed
his own cavalry, interspersing through the squadrons a body
of 400 front rank legionaries lightly equipped ; and so well
did these perform in the ensuing cavalry action, that they
totally routed the Pompeians, and after killing a large number,
rejoined the column without any loss to themselves.^
j-6 The army of Caesar had now completed a fuU day's march,
in accordance with his pre-arranged plan, and after safely
making the passage of the Schkumbi (Genusus), took up its
quarters in its old lines fronting Asparagium. The infantry
of the legions were confined strictly to camp ; the cavalry
were first sent out to give the impression of foraging, and then
ordered to return with all speed by the rearmost gate that
was out of sight of the enemy. Meanwhile Pompeius had
also completed a full day's march, and he too from similar
motives decided to occupy his old position at Asparagium.
The fortifications of this were still intact, and the troops,
being thus relieved from their ordinary duty of entrenchment,
began straying some distance from camp, partly after firewood,
' Here probably occurred the incident recorded by Polyaenus (viii. 13).
At one point of the retreat Caesar had a swamp on his left, the sea on
his right, and the enemy on his rear. The Pompeian fleet was also
' shelling ' his troops with missiles of all kinds, when he hit on the simple
device of ordering them to transfer their shields from the left to the right
side.
Nerv Plans of Campaign 187
partly in quest of fodder, whilst others were seen leaving Summe- 48
the rampart in the direction of their late camping-ground.
The explanation of this last circumstance was that the decision
to march having been taken hastily, a large proportion of the
army's baggage and soldiers' kits had been left behind ; and
it was to recover this lost property that the troops, tempted
by the nearness of the camp they had just evacuated, now
strayed off from the trenches, after first discarding their arms
and depositing them in their tents. As soon as they had thus
incapacitated themselves for pursuit, Caesar, who had fore-
seen this very result, gave the signal for departure, it being then
about midday ; and his army, moving out of camp once more
for a second march on the same day, proceeded to cover an
additional eight miles from that spot ; it being impossible
for Pompeius to do the same on account of the straying of his
troops.
The next day the same order was observed, and with the 77
first fall of night the transport was again sent on in advance,
to be followed about 3 a.m. by the main force under the
personal direction of Caesar, who thus made sure that, if
compelled to fight, he should be in a position to meet the
sudden emergency with his army free of encumbrances.
Throughout the following days the same dispositions were
repeated ; and as a result of these precautions the retreat
was conducted without hitch or accident of any kind, in spite
of having to traverse rivers of great depth and country
exceptionally difficult. For Pompeius never recovered the
time lost on the first day. Strive as he would to accelerate by
forced marches the pace of his army, in his eagerness to over-
take those ahead of him, his efforts were all in vain ; on the
fourth day he abandoned the pursuit, and recognized the
1 8 8 Both Armies move rapidly West
78 necessity of some alternative plan of action. As for Caesar,
' '™'"^'' 4 various reasons had concurred in forcing him to touch at
Apollonia, There were the wounded to be provided for,
the army to be paid, the local communities to be reassured,
garrisons to be stationed in the principal towiis. The time
allotted to these matters, however, was no more than the
urgency of his situation made necessary : all his thoughts were
riveted on Domitius, and the risk he ran of being caught by
the Pompeian advance before he himself could get up with
him ; and he was now pressing towards that officer with all the
speed which deep concern for his peril could elicit.
Considered in its general bearings, the scheme of operations
which it was his purpose to develop rested on the follow-
ing calculations. If Pompeius were making for the same
point as himself, then he would be drawing his enemy away
from the sea and from all the reserve supplies accumulated
by him at Durazzo : Pompeius could then be forced to fight
out the issue on equal terms, deprived of the support of his
food stocks and other miHtary stores. Supposing, on the
other hand, Pompeius decided to cross into Italy,^ it would
then be easy for himself to effect a junction with Domitius,
and to march his army round the head of the Adriatic to the
relief of that country. Finally, if his opponent attempted to
lay siege to Apollonia and Oricum, with the object of cutting
all Caesar's communications with the coast, he would find
himself confronted with the blockade of Scipio and the impera-
tive necessity of going to the relief of his isolated force.
^ Afranius erpecially urged Pompeius to turn the tables on Caesar by first
recovering the West and then leading it against the East, meanwhile holding
Caesar in check with the fleet. It was the isolation of Scipio's force and
his own fear of losing caste with the Orient that turned the scale the other
way, Appian, 2. 65.
Both Armies move rapidly West 189
Reasoning on these lines he forthwith dispatched couriers in Summer
advance to Cnaeus Domitius, with written instructions indi-
cating the course of action that officer was to pursue ; and
after establishing garrisons at ApoUonia, Alessio (Lissus), and
Oricum of four, one, and three battalions respectively, and
after carefully housing his wounded, he started on his march
through Epirus and the region of Athamania.^
During this same time Pompeius was hastening towards the
same goal. Conjectural interpretation of Caesar's motives
pointed to a rapid movement towards Scipio as the soundest
strategy of the moment. Should Caesar and himself take the
same line, he could then reinforce his lieutenant ; or, if he
proved unwilling to quit the seaboard and the neighbourhood
of Oricum, through continued hopes of fresh legions and
cavalry from Italy, the way would thus be open to himself to fall
uponDomitiuswiththewholeof his effective strength. Speed, 79
therefore, was now the first consideration on both sides ; each
had the twofold object of rescuing their friends and of seizing
the rare opportunity offered by the present conjunction of
events for crushing an opponent. But whereas Caesar was going
out of his way in touching at ApoUonia, Pompeius had a clear
road before him into Macedonia through the Candavian tract "^ ;
and a further complication had now arisen from an altogether
unforeseen event. Thiswas the position of Domitius, who, after
lying encamped for several days cheek by jowl with Scipio,
had been compelled by want of supplies to vacate his watch
upon that general, and to retire in the direction of Heraclia ' ;
^ Following the course of the Voyussa [Aous) and entering Thessaly by
the Metsovo Pass — still the high road to Constanlinople.
' The great military road {Via Egnatia).
' On the Via Egnatia, distant, according to the ancient Itineraries, some
seventy miles from the stage marked 'In Candavia '.
ipo Caesar unites his Forces
Summer 48 and as that town lies at the foot of the Candavian hill country,
it seemed as though Fortune herself were conspiring to throw
him across the path of Pompeius. At present this was un-
known to Caesar, although a fresh difficulty was already
threatening him. The origin of this was the device of Pom-
peius in publishing through aU the provinces and native states
exaggerated and glowing accounts of the late battle before
Durazzo, accounts that were wholly unwarranted by the
actual facts ; the result of which was to propagate a widespread
rumour that Caesar had been beaten, and was now in headlong
flight with the virtual loss of all his army. In consequence,
the roads had been rendered exceedingly hostile,, and some of
the local townships actually contemplated desertion from the
Caesarian cause; and though numerous messengers were dis-
patched by various routes from Caesar to Domitius and from
Domitius to Caesar,, they all alike found it impossible to get
through. Fortunately the cavalry scouts of Domitius were
sighted on the march by the party of Allobroges — those
friends of Roucillus and Egus whose treachery we have already
recorded : and either through the force of old associations
(they having served together in the Gallic wars), or else
through swollen vanity, these men now gave their former
comrades a full and correct account of what had really taken
place, and particularly of Caesar's departure from before
Durazzo and the simultaneous advance of Pompeius. This
information was at once reported to Domitius ; and though
he had barely four hours' start, yet, thanks to his friend the
enemy, he succeeded in escaping his danger, and at the town
of Kalambaka (Jeginium), which lies directly across the ap-
proach into Thessaly, met Caesar in full career towards him.
80 The junction of the two Caesarian armies thus safely
Effects of J^cent Events 191
eflFected, the advance was continued to Palaea Episkopi Summer 4S
(Gompht), the first town of Thessaly as you enter from
Epirus. This people had a few months earlier in the war,
and quite unsolicited, sent envoys to Caesar, putting all their
resources at his free disposal, and asking only for a garrison to
be sent down to them. Unluckily the garbled version of the
battle at Durazzo, noticed above, had had time to reach the
city, and had greatly magnified the importance of that event.
The effect was soon apparent. Androsthenes, the chief native
magistrate of Thessaly, preferring to range himself on the
side of a victorious Pompeius rather than share the mis-
fortunes of a Caesar, required the entire rural population,
slave no less than free, to withdraw inside the town, and then
closed the gates against all comers. At the same time he sent
off urgent messages for help to Scipio and Pompeius, inform-
ing them that he had full confidence in the strength of the
town defences if quickly relieved, but that he could not
endure any protracted siege. At this particular moment in the
course of events Scipio had just heard of the break-up of
the armies round Durazzo, and in consequence had marched
his legions to Larissa, while Pompeius was still some distance
from the Thessalian border. Caesar, therefore, after first
fortifying a camp, ordered the construction of scaling-ladders
and battery-sheds, and the preparation of defensive hurdles.
Then, as soon as these were ready, he appealed to his troops,
pointing out to them how much it would conduce to the
relief of their general state of want, if they could gain posses-
sion of a well-stocked and wealthy town, and by the example
they made of it strike terror into the counsels of other
communities : above all, if they did this at once, before
the reinforcements from outside had time to concentrate.
192 A Stern Example
Summer 48 The men answered by an extraordinary display of enthusiasm,
and accordingly the assault of the town was taken in hand on
the same day as their arrival before it ; and though the walls
were of great height and it was already past four in the after-
noon, yet by sundown the place had been carried and given
over as plunder to the troops.^ Without further delay the
camp was then moved from the neighbourhood of the town,
and the army continued its march to Metropolis^, outstrip-
ping the tidings and even the rumour of the captured city.
81 At first the Metropolitans were inclined to adopt the policy
of their neighbours, influenced as they were by the same idle
stories : a little later, however, on learning the fate that had
overtaken the Gomphians from the lips of the prisoners
purposely sent up to the wall by Caesar, they threw open
their city gates. They were treated with the utmost con-
sideration ; and the contrast drawn between the easy lot
of the Metropolitans and the ruinous end of Gomphi was
so significant, that not a single state in all Thessaly, with
the sole exception of Larissa, which was strongly held by
Scipio's armies, subsequently refused adhesion to Caesar or
compliance with his demands. He, meanwhile, had selected
a suitable camping-ground in the open country, where the
corn crops were now all but ripe, and resolved to await there
the approach of Pompeius, and to make this place decide once
for all the issue of the campaign.
82 As for his opponent, a few days after these operations he
crossed the Thessalian frontier, and, in the course of an
harangue delivered to his now united army, expressed his
' Ancient authorities agree that Caesar's hungry troops here got
considerably out of hand, and that much excess ensued.
^ Now represented by a village with the generic name Paleo-Kastro.
Overweenhig Confidence of 'Pompeians 193
thanks to the men of his own command for their past services Summer 48
to himself ; and then, turning to the troops under Scipio,
asked them to be willing, though the main victory was already
won, to accept a share of the spoils and rewards of the campaign.
After that, the legions were all concentrated within one camp,
and Pompeius, courteously dividing with Scipio his privileges
as commander, ordered all bugle-calls to be repeated before
that general, and a second head quarters tent to be pitched
for him.
Such an increase of numbers on the part of the Pompeians,
and the successful junction of their two powerfiJ armies did
but confirm the general belief that had long been prevalent
amongst them. So certain indeed grew their hopes of victory,
that any pause in the conduct of the operations seemed but
to delay their own return to Italy, and any movement on the
part of Pompeius, that exhibited unusual deliberateness and
caution, could always, according to his critics, have been
well finished off in a single day ; and he was loudly accused
of toying with his command, and of treating as menials men
who had filled the highest offices in the State.^ Much con-
troversy also ensued amongst the rival claimants to the
various prizes of the war, notably the great public priesthoods,
whilst the consulship was settled in advance over a number
of years. Others claimed the houses and property of those
in the Caesarian camp ; and a heated dispute arose in
open council on the case of Lucilius Hirrus, at that
moment away on a mission from Pompeius to the Parthian
court, and on his right to stand in his absence as a candi-
date at the approaching praetorian elections. Thus while his
^ i.e. as consuls and praetors. They dubbed him ' Agamemnon, king
of kings'. Appian, 2. 67.
LOHG O
194 Caesar again J{eady for Action
Summer 48 friends appealed to the plighted word of Pompelus and the
obligation incumbent upon him of fulfilling the pledge
given at his departure (unless indeed he wished Hirrus to be
thought a fool for trusting to his support), the rest stoutly
maintained that, where the danger and hardships were alike
for all, no one man should be given these exceptional privileges.
83 So too the daily bickerings that passed between Lucius
Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther, on the subject of
Caesar's priestly office,^ had lately degenerated into open
brawling of the most offensive character ; Lentulus insisting on
the claims of seniority, Domitius boasting of his wide influence
and prestige in the capital, Scipio confident in his family
connexion with Pompeius. Another incident at this time
was the public indictment of Lucius Afranius by Acutius
Rufus for what he alleged to have been the betrayal of the
army in Spain ; while Lucius Domitius, not to be behindhand,
had a separate proposal of his own to submit to the council.
This was that on the conclusion of hostilities all those of
senatorial rank who had assisted in fighting for the common
cause should be constituted a judicial body, with three votes '^
given to each member : sentence should then be passed
individually upon every one who had either stayed behind
in Rome, or, while showing themselves inside the Pompeian
lines, had taken no active part in the campaign ; one ticket
to be cast by those who favoured complete acquittal, another
where the verdict was capital punishment, and a third by
those who imposed a fine. Everybody, in short, was engrossed
either with his own political interests, or the money- rewards
he hoped to reap for party services, or with the prosecution
' Caesar had been Chief Pontiff (Pontifex Maximus) since 63.
2 ' Wax tablets.'
A Substitute for Cavalry 1 9 f
of his private quarrels. Men's minds were no longer concerned Summer 48
with the indispensable conditions of success, but rather with
the best use they could make of their victory.
In the meantime Caesar had not been idle. His supplies 84
were now adequately organized, his troops had recovered their
moral, and a sufficient interval had elapsed since the two
battles of Durazzo : and now, to show the implicit trust he
reposed in the temper of his men, he resolved to test the
extent to which Pompeius either desired or designed a general
engagement. His army accordingly moved out of camp and
drew up for action, at first on ground of his own choosing and
at some little distance from the Pompeian camp, but, later on,
advancing well away from the shelter of their own rampart
and bringing their line of battle close up to the hills
occupied by the Pompeians. As a result of these tactics the
confidence of the army in its own powers strengthened daily.
Yet Caesar did not feel justified in abandoning the practice
lately instituted with regard to the cavalry, and already
described above; but finding himself greatly outnumbered
in this arm of the service, he formed a corps of young soldiers,
lightly equipped, and drawn from legionaries of the front
rank specially selected for speed of foot. This body was
then instructed to fight with their usual equipment, inter-
spersing themselves among the troopers ; and by constant
daily practice they soon attained a marked proficiency in
this new type of warfare. The advantage gained by this
device was that 1,000 Caesarian horsemen, having once ac-
quired experience, had no hesitation, even on more or less open
ground, in standing the charge of the 7,000 who formed the
cavalry of Pompeius ; and the large numbers of the latter had
little terror for their composite enemy. Indeed it was during
o 2
1^6 Pomp ems decides en Battle
Summer 48 these few days that a successful cavalry skirmish took place in
which one of the two brother Allobroges, whose desertion
to Pompeius we have recorded above, was killed, with
85 certain others of his followers. As for the main force of
the Pompeians at this time, it was their daily habit to move
down from their camp on the hills, and at the lowest spurs
of the mountain to form up in order of battle, in constant
expectation, it would seem, that Caesar might somehow or
other place himself at a disadvantage. When, therefore, it
became evident that no artifice could entice his opponent to
an action, Caesar determined that for his part the easiest
method for the further prosecution of the war was to break
up his present encampment, and in future to keep per-
petually on the march : calculating that, by constantly chang-
ing his camping-ground and moving about from place to place,
he would find it easier to feed his troops, and at the same
time have opportunities for fighting on the road ; on the
other hand, the daily marches would exhaust the endurance
of Pompeius's army which was not so habituated to fatigue.
Everything was accordingly ready for the new departure ;
the signal to march had teen given, and the tents taken down
and stowed away, when it was suddenly observed that the
Pompeian battle-line, going beyond its daily practice, had a
minute cr two before advanced a considerable distance from
its entrenchments, thus suggesting the possibihty of engaging
it upon something like equal terms. On receipt of this
intelligence Caesar turned to his colleagues, and though his
column was by this time in the actual gateways of the camp,
' We must give up our march for the present ', he said, ' and
turn our attention to battle, as has always been our earnest
wish. We are all ready for a fight : we shall not again easily
Pom pet us decides on Battle 197
find the opportunity.' And without further delay he led Summer 48
out his forces fully equipped for action.
The same decision to fight had, as was afterwards discovered, 86
been also taken by Pompeius in deference to the urgent solici-
tations of his party. Such a resolution on his part had been
foreshadowed in the council-meetings of the last few days,
when he had assured his colleagues that they might expect to
see the rout of the Caesarian army even before the two hostile
lines were in contact with each other. Noting the looks of
surprise called forth by this statement, he had then con-
tinued, ' I am well aware that what I promise sounds almost
incredible, but to give you greater confidence for going into
action, listen to the plan I have formed for the battle. I have
induced our cavalry — and they have pledged themselves to
the task — immediately we begin to come to close quarters,
to attack the right wing of the Caesarians on its exposed
flank, and, by riding round the rear of their line, to drive
the enemy before them in all the confusion that such a
diversion will cause, before even a single spear can be thrown
by ourselves. In this way we shall finish off the war without
the slightest risk to the legions, and with scarcely a scratch
to any of us : whilst, as you will see, the manceuvre presents
no sort of difficulty owing to our immense preponderance
in cavalry.'
He ended by a solemn warning to hold themselves ready
for all future emergencies, and now that they had their chance
of fighting, as had so often occupied their thoughts, to show
the world that in point of efficiency and courage they were not
unworthy of its high opinion.
He was followed by Labienus, whose supreme contempt S7
for the forces under Caesar was only equalled by the extrava-
1 98 The Last Council Meeting
Summer 48 gant eulogy he poured upon the plan of Pompeius. ' Do not
imagine, Sir,' said he, ' that this is the army which conquered
Gaul and Germany. I was personally present at all those
battles, and am not therefore rashly making statements on
a subject I do not fully comprehend. A very small fraction
of that army now survives : a large proportion of it is dead
and gone, as indeed was inevitable where so much fighting
had to be done ; numbers were carried off by fever in Italy
last autumn, numbers again have scattered to their homes,
and numbers have been left behind in charge of continental
Europe. Surely you yourselves have heard from your corre-
spondents across the water, whose delicate health obliged
them to stay at home, how fresh battalions have been
formed at Brindisi (Brundisiuvi). What you now see before
you are corps that have been repleted from the levies in
Northern Italy during the last few years, and many of them
come from the colonies beyond the Po (Padus) ; while, even
so, the pith and kernel of the men have perished in the two
battles before Durazzo.'
At the end of this speech he bound himself by an oath not
to return to camp except as a victor and urged upon the others
to follow his example. His action won the warm approval
of Pompeius, who immediately took the same oath, and was
followed unhesitatingly by the remainder of the staff. At
the close of this scene the council broke up amid the light-
hearted confidence of all present : imagination already put
victory in their grasp ; for where the issues involved were so
great, and the speaker so trained a master of war, it was im-
possible not to suppose that he had fully weighed the import
of his words.
To fact p. ig9-
The J{ival Forces 199
CHAPTER V
Pharsalus and After
As the army of Caesar approached the lines of Pompeius the 88
following was found to be his adversary's order of battle. The Summer 4S
left wing was formed by the two legions, known respectively as
the First and Third, which had been surrendered by Caesar
on command of the Senate at the opening of the civil troubles :
here too was Pompeius himself. The centre was occupied
by Scipio with his Syrian corps, while the left was in charge
of the legion from Cilicia, supported by the Spanish battalions
which, as already recorded, Afranius had brought over to his
chief. All these troops constituted in Pompeius's judgement
the most reliable portion of his army. The remaining units
were distributed between the centre and wings, and made
up a total strength of no battalions, or in round numbers
45,000 men \ About 2,000 of these were reservists, time-
expired men who had served in Pompeius's permanent body-
guard on previous campaigns, and had now flocked to the
standard of their old commander for the present war : these
he had parcelled out along his whole line. There were
also seven other battalions distributed as garrisons to the main
camp and adjacent outposts. Lastly, as his right was firmly
protected by a stream presenting steep and difficult banks,
he had massed the whole of his cavalry and light-armed bow-
men and slingers in a single dense body outside his left wing.
On his side Caesar had followed his customary dispositions, 89
and had placed the Tenth legion on his right and the Ninth
' i.e. regulars. An enormous number of Oriental auxiliaries was also
on the ground, though the battle was decided solely by the Italian troops.
20 0 Dispositions of the Armies
Summer 48 on his left, despite the fact that the last-named regiment
had suffered so terribly in the battles before Durazzo ; ^ it
was, however, now coupled with the Eighth, thus forming
practically one legion out of two, each of whom had orders
to support the other. Eighty battalions altogether had
taken their place in the line, amounting to 22,000 troops,
while two more had been left behind to hold the camp.
Marcus Antonius had been appointed to command the
left, Publius Sulla the right, and Cnaeus Domitius the
centre : Caesar himself took his stand facing Pompeius. But
the discovery of the enemy's peculiar distributions as just
described had rendered him uneasy as to the safety of his
right wing, in case he should find it turned by the over-
whelming cavalry opposed to it. At this moment, therefore,
he rapidly drafted from his third or rearmost line a single
battalion from each of the legions represented in it ; these
he then formed into a fourth, so placed as to confront the
hostile horsemen, with minute instructions as to the part they
were to perform, and an intimation that on their personal
gallantry depended the fortunes of the day. At the same time
both the third line and the whole of the army were warned not
to charge without his special orders, but that when the proper
moment came he would give the flag-signal to engage.
90 In addressing his army with the customary exhortations to
battle, and in emphasizing the unbroken continuance of his
^ This is the legion which had the stiff fight outside Lerida (l, 45),
which was greatly endangered during the circumvallation of Durazzo
(3. 45) and severely mauled at the final sortie of Pompeius and the subse-
quent defeat of Caesar (3. 62-67), ^" ^^ autumn of 49, on returning
from Spain, it had headed a serious mutiny at Piacenza (P'acentia), of
which temporary lapse in its loyalty Caesar characteristically says nothing.
A Devoted Centurion 201
own services to his men, special stress was laid on the fact that Summer 48
he could call them personally to witness how anxiously he
had desired to bring about a settlement. He need only recall
the verbal negotiations instituted through Vatinius, the mis-
sion of Aulus Clodius to Scipio, and the strenuous appeal
made at Oricum to Libo with a view to the dispatch of peace
envoys. They might rest assured it had never been his object
to trifle with the lives of Roman soldiers, nor yet to rob his
country of either one or the other of the two great armies
which now stood face to face.
At the close of his speech, as his men were clamouring to
advance and burning with the excitement of battle, without
further delay he gave the signal by trumpet.
Now there was serving in the army of Caesar a certain 91
reservist named Crastinus, a man of magnificent courage, who
the year before had been his senior centurion of the Tenth
legion. This man, as soon as the signal sounded, exclaimed
to those near him, ' Follow me, my old comrades, and give
your general the support you have agreed to give him. This
is the last battle left us : only see this through, and he is re-
stored to his rightful position and we get back our liberty.'
Then glancing at Caesar, he added, ' I'll manage to-day,
General, that dead or alive you shall have cause to thank me.'
With these words he dashed out from the right wing at the
head of the line, and was at once followed by 120 men of the
same company, specially picked troops who were serving as
volunteers.
Between the two hostile lines there remained only just 9^
sufficient space for each army to deliver its charge. Notwith-
standing this, Pompeius had issued previous instructions to
his men to stand strictly on the defensive in meeting the
20 2 The Psychology of Battle
Summer 48 attack of the Caesarians, so as to allow their advancing line
to become disorganized. This order he was said to have
given upon the advice of Caius Triarius, under the belief that
the opening rush of the enemy's legions would have its force
dissipated by their loss of accurate formation, while his own
troops, by maintaining their proper distances, could then fall
upon the broken ranks of their opponents. He further hoped
that the impact of the falling javelins would be less if his men
were kept to their positions, than if they were allowed to run
in and meet the hail of spears ; while the double distance
the Caesarians would have to traverse might well be expected
to render them breathless with exhaustion.
In our judgement this decision of Pompeius has nothing to
recommend it. There is in all men a certain instinctive
courage and combativeness implanted in us by Nature, which
is only kindled by the excitement of battle. This instinct it
should be the object of commanding officers not to repress
but to encourage ; and there was sound reason in the ancient
practice of letting the bugles call the advance over all the
field at once, followed by a single shout from all the men :
such a custom, it was found, struck terror into the ranks of the
93 enemy no less than it stimulated their own side. In this
particular instance our troops, who at the given signal had
dashed forward with brandished spears, on finding that the
Pompeians were not advancing to meet them, instinctively
slackened speed ; and, taught by the accumulated experience
of past battles, halted some half-way across the open ground,
so as not to spend their strength before coming up with
their enemy. Here taking a short rest, and then resum-
ing their rush, they discharged their volley of heavy javelins,
and in obedience to Caesar's orders instantly drew their
The Battle cf Vhar solus 203
broadswords. Nor, to tell the truth, did the Pompeians Summer 4S
show any desire to shirk the encounter, but, parrying the
flying spears with their shields, they boldly met the shock of
the charging legions with unbroken ranks, and, after hurling
their own javelins, went to work with the sword. At the same
time their cavalry, acting upon its previous instructions, ad-
vanced from the left wing in one dense mass, whilst the mob of
archers also commenced to spread themselves over the ground.
This attack was more than our own cavalry could cope with,
and slowly giving way they recoiled before the onslaught.
Thereupon the enemy's horsemen, pushing home the assault
with still fiercer vigour, began deploying in squadrons pre-
paratory to surrounding our main battle-line on its exposed
flank. Perceiving the threatened danger, Caesar gave the
signal to his fourth line, which he had recently improvised out
of a number of disconnected battalions. Advancing at high
speed and with colours flying, this force delivered such a furious
attack upon the opposing cavalry,^ that not a single trooper
stood against them ; but, wheeling in a body, they not only
evacuated their position in the line, but galloping on in head-
long flight took cover in a range of lofty hills. Their dispersal
left the archers and slingers wholly unprotected, and being
altogether without defensive armour the whole helpless crowd
was slaughtered to a man. Following up this exploit, the same
force went on without a halt to surround the Pompeian left,
which they found still fighting and maintaining a stubborn
resistance in line, when it was thus taken unexpectedly in the
rear. It was at this critical moment in the battle that Caesar's 94
third line, which had hitherto remained quietly in position,
' Their orders were to keep their heavy javelins (j.ila) and use them
to strike at the faces of the mounted men. Plutarcli.
2 04 Tf^^ Battle of Pharsalus
Summer 48 received its orders to advance. His exhausted troops in front
Were thus replaced by fresh and vigorous reserves; and assailed
as they also w^ere from behind, the resistance of the Pompeians
at length gave way, and the whole line broke and fled. But
though the victory was won, it did not escape the attention
of Caesar that the first steps towards its consummation had
been the work of those battalions which he had posted in his
fourth line to hold in check the Pompeian horse, precisely as
he had indicated in his address to the men. It was they who,
in the first place, had effected the rout of the cavalry ; it was
they, again, who had cut to pieces the slingers and archers :
finally, it was they who, by turning the left of the Pompeian
line, had started the general flight. In the meanwhile
Pompeius, on perceiving the disaster to his mounted troops,
and the crippling panic pervading that branch of his army on
which he chiefly relied, and despairing of success from other
quarters, had withdrawn from the fighting line and galloped
rapidly back to camp. There, as he passed the pickets on
duty outside the frontal gate, he called in loud tones to the
centurions in charge, so that the men might catch his words :
' Look to the camp, and in case of accident defend it with
care. I am going the round of the other gates in order to
encourage the troops on guard.'
So saying, he made straight for head quarters : in gloomy
anticipation of the verdict of the day, yet waiting to learn
the end.
95 Meanwhile his routed followers had also been driven back
to their camp and there forced over the trenches. Caesar
strongly felt the desirability of giving no breathing space to
the terrified rabble, and urged upon his men to take Fortune
while in the mood, and to carry the camp by storm. In spite
The Pursuit 2 of
of the great heat — the affair had been protracted to midday Summer
— his troops, whom nothing now could stop, gave willing
obedience to their commander's orders. The camp was vigor-
ously defended by the force left behind for that purpose, and
still more fiercely by the Thracians and other foreign auxili-
aries : as for the fugitives from the battle, they were so de-
moralized with panic and physically so exhausted, that in most
cases their arms and standards were indiscriminately flung
away, and they were far more concerned with continuing
their flight than with staying to hold the camp. And, indeed,
it was but a momentary resistance that could be offered
against the deadly discharge of our spears even by the force
which had manned the ramparts : compelled by their wounds
to relinquish their posts, they quickly followed the lead of
their regimental and company officers, and fled precipitately
to the heights that adjoined the camp.
Inside the Pompeian lines the eye fell upon the spectacle 9<5
of arbours artificially constructed, of masses of silver plate
laid out for present use, of tents paved with cool, fresh
cut sods, and even, in the case of Lentulus and others, pro-
tected from the heat by ivy. Many other indications could
likewise be discerned of extravagant luxury and of confidence
in coming victory, rendering it an easy assumption that men
who went so far out of their way in the pursuit of superfluous
pleasures could have had no misgivings as to the issue of the
day. Yet these were the men who habitually taunted the
poverty-stricken, long-suffering army of Caesar with the
charge of being voluptuaries ; whereas in truth they had all
along been in want of the barest necessaries.
But to return to Pompeius. Delaying his departure until
our troops were actually in motion within his lines, he seized
20 6 The Pursuit continued
Summer 48 a horse and, tearing off all outward signs of his marshal's rank,
fled through the postern gate, where, putting spurs to his
mount, he headed in the direction of Larissa. Making no halt
at that town, but maintaining the same rapid rate of travelling,
and merely picking up a few followers from the general rout,
he continued his journey without intermission through the
night ; and, with an escort of no more than thirty troopers,
at length reached the sea. There he embarked on board a
corn-ship, repeatedly complaining, so it was said, that his
expectations had been wofully falsified, that the very men
in whom he had placed his hopes of victory had been the
first to fly, and, to judge by appearances, had virtually be-
trayed him,
97 Master of the Pompeian camp, Caesar once more appealed
to his troops not to let their natural anxiety for plunder
hinder the execution of those measures still necessary for the
full realization of their victory. Once more they yielded to
his wishes, and preparations were immediately begun for
the circumvallation of the high ground to which the enemy
had retreated. But as the hill was found to be without water,
the Pompeians, distrusting the position, had determined to
abandon it and to follow the line of heights in a general
retirement towards Larissa. Their intentions were at once
detected by Caesar. Dividing his forces, he ordered part
of his legions to remain in the captured camp of Pompeius,
another division to be sent back to his own camp, while he
himself with the remaining four set out on the task of heading
off the retreating Pompeians by taking an easier route. At
the end of six miles he was in a position to form up in line of
battle ; whereupon the enemy halted on one of the numerous
hills. The base of this hill was washed by a stream ; and in
Surrender of the Fugitives 207
order to prevent his opponents from watering during the Summer 48
night, Caesar made one last appeal to his weary troops : and,
exhausted as they were by their long day's work, with night
already upon them, they nevertheless succeeded in interposing
between the hill and the river a fully fortified breastwork.
On the completion of this work the enemy sent in a deputa-
tion to open negotiations for surrender ; at the same time a
few representatives of the senatorial order who had attached
themselves to the mission, took the opportunity to seek per-
sonal safety by escaping under cover of night.
As soon as it was day, the order was given for the whole 98
party up on the hill to descend from the high ground to the
plain below, and there to throw down their arms. This they
did without demur, and then, flinging themselves to the
earth, with weeping eyes and hands upraised, they begged
their lives of Caesar. In reassuring tones he bade them rise,
and after a brief reference to his well-knovra clemency in order
to appease their fears, granted their lives to all, and then
transferred them to the kindly attentions of his own men,
with strict injunctions that no one was to be in any way
injured or to lose any of his property. Having thus pro-
vided for the care of his prisoners, he immediately ordered
up other legions from camp, while those who had come on
with him were directed to take their turn of rest and then
to rejoin their old quarters. With these arrangements com-
pleted, he marched through to Larissa on the same day.
His own casualties from this battle did not exceed 200 rank 99
and file, though on the other hand he had to deplore the loss
of fully thirty centurions — gallant men whom he could ill
spare. Among the slain also was the Crastinus mentioned
above, killed by a sword-thrust straight in the face, as he fought
20 8 Losses on both Sides
Summer 48 with desperate courage. His conduct had amply justified
the words he uttered on going into battle. In Caesar's
judgement the palm of valour In this action belonged to
Crastinus,: and deep was his sense of gratitude for the man's
devotion to himself. Of the Pompeian army some 15,000
were estimated to have fallen,^ while the total number of
prisoners taken exceeded 24,000, a number which included
the garrisons of outposts who afterwards surrendered to Sulla,
besides large bodies also which sought shelter in the neigh-
bouring townships. Of battalion and company colours 180
were brought in to Caesar as the total list of trophies from
the battle, and 9 eagles of distinct legions. Finally it should
be mentioned that Lucius Domitius, while endeavouring to
escape from camp to the hills, was overtaken and cut down
by our cavalry, when his strength had now given out through
fatigue.
100 While the issue was thus decided on land, a hostile fleet,
this time under the command of Decimus Laelius, had again
visited Brindisi. Adopting the same plan of action that
Libo, it will be remembered, had attempted before him,
he seized as his base the island off the mouth of the harbour ;
only to be met by a similar scheme of defence on the part of
Vatinius, then acting as governor of Brindisi. Having care-
^ According to a Caesarian officer present, only 6,000 Italians were
killed. If 15,000 Romans really fell, it is a striking proof of Caesar's
trustworthiness, when the temptation to minimize the slaughter must have
been strong. Though Caesar, modestly perhaps, does not mention it,
Appian says that both before the battle and at the moment of victory
strict orders were given to spare fellow countrymen. ' They would have
it so ' ; is said by one of his own officers to have been Caesar's comment as
he surveyed the stricken field, ' after all my great services, they would have
condemned me in their courts, had I not appealed to my army.' Suet. 30.
Further sporadic Attacks of Fomp elan Fleet 209
fully screened and fitted out a number of small boats, Vatinius Summer 48
enticed the ships of Laelius to venture inside ; and one of
these, a five-decker \ having advanced too far, was captured
in the narrow entrance to the port together with two other
smaller craft. This success he followed up by stationing along
the foreshore, just as his predecessor had done before him,
a series of cavalry patrols to prevent the hostile fleet from
watering. Laelius, however, had the advantage of a better
season of the year for purposes of navigation, and bringing up
water supplies for his force by merchant boats from Corfu and
Durazzo, showed he was not to be lightly deterred from his
project : in fact, it was only after the news of the battle fought
in Thessaly, that either the ignominious loss of his vessels or
his want of necessary stores could induce him to quit his
hold upon the island and harbour.
Almost contemporary with this raid was a descent of Caius loi
Cassius upon Sicily with his divisional fleet of Syrian, Phoeni-
cian, and Cilician squadrons. Caesar's own fleet, it must be
explained, had been divided into two separate commands :
half of it was stationed at Vibo-on-Straits {Monteleone) under
the praetor Publius Sulpicius, the other half lay off Messina
(Messana), under Marcus Pomponius. Yet in spite of these
dispositions, Cassius succeeded in swooping down with his
ships upon Messina before any whisper of his coming reached
the ears of Pomponius, who was thus caught in a state of great
confusion, with no scouting vessels on the look-out and no
settled formation in his squadron. The wind was high and
favoured the design of Cassius. Filling a number of old
merchantmen with pine, pitch, tow, and other inflammable
materials, he launched them against the Pomponian fleet with
' Quinquereme. See note on Trireme, Bk. II, ch. I (6).
LONG P
21
o Further Sporadic j4 Hacks of Pomp eia?i Fleet
Summer 48 such deadly effect that the whole thirty-fiye vessels, twenty
being decked boats, were quickly burned to the water-line.
A widespread panic followed upon this exploit, and notwith-
standing the presence in Messina of a garrison legion, the
town was with difficulty retained for Caesar : indeed, had it
not been that at this very moment the first tidings came
through of his recent victory on land, conveyed by a chain of
mounted patrols, the general opinion was that it would inevi-
tably have been lost. As it was, the fortunate arrival of this
news made the defence of the city possible, and Cassius there-
upon sailed away to Vibo to turn his attentions to the squadron
under Sulpicius. Here, finding our ships to be moored close
in to shore, owing to their infection with the same general
panic, his crews prepared to repeat their former tactics.
Helped by a favourable wind, some forty odd merchantmen
were carefully fitted out as fireships, and then sent in among
the enemy's fleet ; and, the fire taking hold on either wing,
five of their number were soon completely gutted. As the
flames continued to spread with the force of the gale, the
detachment of veterans from Caesar's sick-list who had been
left by him in charge of this fleet could no longer endure the
insult : without waiting for orders, they manned some of the
vessels and, putting out to sea, attacked the fleet of Cassius,
capturing two five-deckers (one of which had the admiral on
board who only escaped by taking to a boat), and sending two
of the three-deckers to the bottom. Soon afterwards there
arrived definite intelligence of thebattle justfoughtinThessaly,
so explicit as to convince even the Pompeians, who hitherto
had affected to believe that the reports current were merely the
inventions of Caesar's officers and friends. With this authentic
information Cassius removed his squadron from those waters.
The Flight of Pompeius
21 I
Meanwhile it was clear to Caesar that every other object 102
should be subordinated to the supreme task of pursuing Pom- ^"'"™^'' 4
peius into whatever corner of the world his flight might have
taken him ; on no account must he be allowed to collect fresh
forces and so to renew the war. As fast, therefore, as his
cavalry could cover the ground, he was now daily pressing
hard on his heels, having first left orders for one of the legions
to follow by easier stages. A decree had already been pub-
lished at Amphipolis ^ in the name of Pompeius, commanding
the presence of every man of military age in the province, no
matter whether Greek or Roman, with the object of being
sworn in for active serv^ice ; but whether he had issued this
edict in order to avert suspicion and so conceal to the last
moment his plans for a more protracted flight, or whether
he contemplated the defence of Macedonia by means of fresh
levies in the event of not being immediately pursued, was
a question on which there were no satisfactory means of form-
ing an opinion. At any rate what he actually did was to lie
off the town at anchor for a single night, and to summon on
board his Greek friends, from whom he borrowed money for
his personal expenses; and then, on the news of Caesar's
approach, set sail from the place and arrived after a few days
at Mytilini (JSIytilene). Here he was delayed two days by bad
weather, after which, having been joined by some other fast
craft, he continued his voyage to Cilicia, from whence he
crossed to Cyprus. At Cyprus he was met by intelligence
that the citadel of Antioch had, as the result of a concerted
movement on the part of both native inhabitants and the
Roman citizens settled there in business, been forcibly occu-
pied with a view to his exclusion from the city ; and that an
* Oa the Stnima or Karasii, one of the chief cities of S. Macedonia.
P 2
212
The Flight of Pompeius
Summer 48 express warning had been dispatched to those refugees from
the battle who were reported as having sheltered in towns of
the immediate vicinity, that they would do well not to ap-
proach Antioch *, and that any such step on their part would
be taken at their own imminent peril. A similar incident had
happened at Rhodes to Lucius Lentulus, consul the preceding
year, Publius Lentulus an ex-consul, and to various others.
These men had arrived off the island in the course of their
flight after Pompeius, only to find themselves refused ad-
mission to either town or harbour : an intimation was
served upon them that they must quit the neighbour-
hood, and sorely against their will they had been obliged to
set sail.
Another cause that helped to determine this attitude of
the native populations was the rumour of Caesar's advance,
which by this time was circulating amongst them.
103 Knowledge of these facts induced Pompeius to abandon all
design of visiting Syria. He therefore seized the funds of the
local revenue company, supplementing these by private loans,
and at the same time took on board ship a large sum of copper
coinage for war purposes. He then armed a force of
2,000 men, partly drawn from the staff of the official
revenue officers, partly pressed from the resident mercantile
houses, and, incorporating with them such private servants of
his own friends as their masters considered fit for the enter-
prise on hand, with this force he arrived at Pelusium '^. Here,
as chance would have it, he found the Egyptian king, Ptolemy,
a mere boy in years, at present engaged at the head of a for-
midable military force in a war with his sister Cleopatra, whom
^ Capital of Syria.
* At the most eastern mouth of the Nile, twenty miles east of Port Said.
Arrives in Egypt ^'^^ is there murdered 213
a few months earlier he had expelled from the kingdom by the Summer 4S
help of his kinsmen and supporters ; the two camps of brother
and sister being only a short distance apart. To him, there-
fore, Pompeius sent a request that, in consideration of the
ties of hospitality and friendship which had existed between
himself and the boy's father, he might be allowed to enter
Alexandria and to find protection in the monarch's resources
during this his hour of adversity. Unfortunately his envoys,
after discharging the duties of their mission, entered into con-
versation, in rather too unguarded terms, with the royal
troops, pressing them to take up the cause of their leader,
and not to look askance upon his present humble circum-
stances. Of these troops the greater part were old soldiers
of Pompeius, whom Gabinius had taken over from Pompeius's
army of the East when succeeding to the governorship of
Syria, and subsequently had brought across to Alexandria ;
where, at the close of the war for which they were imported,
they had been left behind in the service of Ptolemy, the father
of the present boy.
The discovery of these advances on the part of the officers 104
by the king's advisers, who, owing to his minority, were then
administering the kingdom, determined them at once to take
action. It may be they were filled with a genuine alarm (so
at least they afterwards declared), that the tampering with
the royal army might lead to a military occupation of Alexan-
dria and Egypt by Pompeius ; or — since misfortune usually
converts friends to foes — they may have thought it safe to
show contempt for fallen greatness ; at all events they first
gave a favourable answer in public to Pompeius's envoys, bid-
ding him come to the king, and then, secretly conspiring
amongst themselves, dispatched a certain fellow named
214 Caesar in Full 'Pursuit
Summer 48 Achillas, the holder of a command in the royal household
and a desperado of singular boldness, together with Lucius
Septimius, an ofHcer of regimental rank, with directions to
murder Pompeius. These two approached their chief victim
with greetings of marked cordiality ; and, as he already pos-
sessed some slight acquaintance with Septimius, who had
served under him as a company officer ^ in the war with the
pirates, he was induced to go on board their mere cockleshell
of a boat along with a few members of his suite. There he
28 Sept. was foully murdered by Achillas and Septimius ; and with
like treachery Lucius Lentulus was arrested under the king's
orders, and was put to death in his dungeons.
105 To continue now the narrative of Caesar's movements.
On arrival in Asia Minor he found that an attempt had been
made by Titus Ampius to remove from Ephesus the treasures
in the temple of Diana. For this purpose all the Roman
senators in the province had been summoned to certify to
the amount of specie taken ; but his own rapid approach
had disturbed the proceedings, and Ampius had in the mean-
while taken to flight. Thus for the second time Caesar
was instrumental in saving the treasures of the Ephesian
goddess. Equally significant was the well-attested fact that
in the temple of Minerva at Elis ^, on the very day of his
successful battle, as was found by a careful calculation of the
dates, the statue of Victory, whose place in the temple was
in front of Minerva herself and which had hitherto faced the
statue of that deity, turned itself round to the temple doors
with its face towards the entrance. Again, at Antioch in Syria,
^ Centurion.
* In the western Peloponnese about twenty-five miles north-west of
Olynipia.
Heaven acclaims the Victor 2 1 f
twice on the same day there was heard the shout of an army Summer 48
advancing into battle, and so clear a blast of trumpets that the
whole body of citizens rushed in full armour to their places
on the walls. The same portent was repeated at Ptole-
mais ^ ; while at Bergama (Pergamum) in the inmost recesses
of the temples, where none but the priests are allowed to enter
and which the Greeks call ' sanctuaries ' ^, the noise of cymbals
was distinctly heard : and at Tralles ' in the temple of Victory,
where a bust of Caesar had been lately consecrated, a palm-
tree was pointed out as having during those days sprouted
through the masonry of the roof, between the joints of the
stonework.
It was while still in Asia Minor, after a halt of a few days, 106
that intelligence reached Caesar that Pompeius ha'd been seen
in Cyprus, leading to the obvious conjecture that Egypt was
his goal ; not merely on the ground of his own intimate con-
nexion with that kingdom, hut also because of the other
signal advantages offered by its position. He accordingly
embarked with the single legion that he had ordered to
follow from Thessaly, and a second which had been detached
from Greece (Achaia) from the command of Quintus Fufius ;
and with the addition of 800 horse and ten Rhodian men-of-
war and a few others from Asiatic ports, crossed the sea to
Alexandria. Of these two legions the present strength was
only 3,200 men : the remainder of the corps had been unable
to reach him, some disabled by wounds received in battle,
others by the exhaustion following on their long and fatiguing
march. Yet even with such weak supports he had not
hesitated to continue his advance ; and relying on the moral
^ Probably Acre in Palestine. ' a^vra, ' the unapproachable.'
' In Asia Minor on the Menderez (Maeander), nowAidin-Gazelhissar.
2 1 6 Caesar at Alexandria
Autumn 48 effect produced by the report of his recent victory he con-
cluded that all places would prove equally safe for him.
At Alexandria he heard of the death of Pompeius ; and he had
no sooner set foot on shore, than he was greeted by a shout
of challenge from the troops whom the king had left to garrison
the city, and a crowd was seen coming out to protest against
the official insignia ^ which were carried before him. Such
a display, the whole mob declared, was a slight upon the
royal dignity.
This disturbance was successfully quelled ; but subsequently,
owing to the turbulence of the populace, frequent riots
became of daily occurrence, and in every quarter of the city
J07 numbers of our troops were killed. Seeing therefore the
threatening aspect of the situation, Caesar sent orders to
Asia Minor for a further reinforcement, namely, the
legions which had quite recently been embodied from the
surrendered Pompeian infantry : it was impossible for him
now to draw back, since his own force was effectively cooped
up in Alexandria by the Etesian winds which so seriously
impede navigation from that port.
Pending their arrival, he determined to investigate the
dispute between the two sovereigns of the country. Such
a task he regarded as falling distinctly within the sphere of
Roman interests, and of his own activities as chief magistrate ^ ;
while the circumstance that it was in his first consulship that a
treaty of alliance, ratified by both Senate and popular assembly,
had been negotiated with their father Ptolemy, constituted a
special claim upon his own good offices. He therefore announced
his decision that King Ptolemaeus and his sister Cleopatra
should each disband the armies they had on foot, and fight
^ The fasces. 2 Consul.
Internal Condition of Egypt 2 1 7
out their dispute by process of law before himself rather than Autumn 48
by an appeal to arms between each other. At that time the 108
regent in charge of the kingdom during the boy's
minority was a certain eunuch named Pothinus. This fellow
now began to protest indignantly, amongst his own ad-
herents, against the notion of a king being summoned to
trial ; and having after a while won over some of the king's
advisers to the support of his scheme, he secretly sent an
order calling up the native army from Pelusium to Alexandria,
and appointing to the supreme command the Achillas whom
we have already mentioned. In a written dispatch, supple-
mented by a verbal message, he first excited the ambition
of the newly-promoted generalissimo by private promises
of his own, further enforced by those of the king, and then
proceeded to give him minute instructions as to the steps
he was to take.
Meanwhile Caesar found that in the will of the late king
Ptolemy there were set down as joint heirs the senior of his
two sons and the elder of his two daughters ; and to secure this
settlement he had added an earnest appeal to Rome, by all that
was sacred and by the treaties negotiated with us in the capital,
that these dispositions should not be disturbed. One copy
of this instrument had been brought to Rome by special
envoys of the king, to be deposited in the Treasury (though
owing to the press of public business this had not been carried
out, the document being stored for safety at the residence
of Pompeius), while a duplicate version fully signed had been
left for future reference at Alexandria. The whole matter 109
was under investigation by Caesar, whose sole desire was to
effect a settlement between the two rulers in the character
of a common friend and arbitrator, when the proceedings
2 1 8 Caesar defied by the Alexandrines
Autumn 48 were suddenly interrupted by the startling announcement
that the royal army with all its cavalry was marching on
Alexandria. In this emergency Caesar, whose forces were by
no means so numerous that he could safely rely on them if
compelled to fight outside the walls, had no alternative but
to confine himself to his own quarter inside the city, and
there to ascertain the intentions of Achillas. At the same time
his troops all received orders to remain under arms, and the
king was strongly urged to send a deputation to Achillas from
among his own most trusted advisers, to convey to him his
pleasure in the matter. Two of these were accordingly dis-
patched, viz. Dioscorides and Serapion, both of them men
who had visited Rome as plenipotentiaries under the elder
Ptolemy, in whose counsels they had exercised very consider-
able influence. These made their way to the Alexandrine, but
had no sooner entered his presence than, without either
granting them audience or even ascertaining the object of
their mission, he gave the word to have them seized and put
to death. Thereupon one of the two was savagely wounded
and carried off for dead by the intervention of his attendants ;
the other was murdered outright. This outrage determined
Caesar to keep the young king in his own custody ; for not
only was great weight attached, as he conceived, by the popu-
lace to the royal title, but the responsibility for the war
would thus be made to appear the independent action of
a band of cut-throats rather than the settled determination
of the sovereign.
110 With regard to the forces at the command of Achillas,
neither their number, composition, nor experience rendered
it safe to hold them in contempt. Fully 20,000 men were at
his disposal. Of these the backbone consisted of the old
Nature of their Army 2 1 9
Gabinian troops, men who by long residence had virtually Autumn 48
become naturalized Alexandrines, familiar with all the wild
licence characteristic of that city: the pride of race and
disciplined habits of Rome had been gradually unlearned :
they had married native women, and many of them had
children by these alliances. Their ranks were swelled by the
sweepings of all the buccaneers and highwaymen that infest
Syria, the province of Cilicia, and the neighbouring lands,while
many a convict whose death sentence compelled him to fly
his own country had foregathered in this city. Besides these
there was a contingent of our own runaway slaves, who could
always count on a safe asylum and an assured means of liveli-
hood in Alexandria, seeing they had only to give in their names
to be at once enrolled as soldiers. Should any of their number
be afterwards seized by his lawful owner, there was a perma-
nent understanding among the troops that he must at once
be rescued, and any hand laid upon one of their fellows would
be resisted by them as though their own personal safety were
threatened ; for they well knew that one and all were involved
in a similar delinquency. This was the crew whose custom
it was to demand the lives of kings' ministers, to carve up the
property of wealthy burgesses, to besiege the royal palace
with demands for increased pay, to banish and recall from
banishment at their own sweet wiUj all in obedience to what
seems an immemorial tradition for an Alexandrine army.
Finally, there was the cavalry, 2,000 strong. All these were
old campaigners : they had served in the innumerable wars
of Alexandria, they had restored Ptolemy to his throne, slain
two sons of Bibulus, and fought the native Egyptians — beyond
doubt a formidable record.
Relying on this material, with a corresponding contempt m
2 20 Caesar retains Command of the Sea
Autumn 48 for the weak numbers of his enemy, Achillas now took perma-
nent occupation of the whole of Alexandria, except the portion
commanded by Caesar and his troops. His first move was an
attempt to rush the buildings in which Caesar himself was
quartered ; but picquets were posted along the streets and
the attack was successfully met. Simultaneously, fighting took
place down by the harbour, and here by far the most desperate
struggle was occasioned. The enemy, dividing his forces, gave
battle in several thoroughfares at once, and endeavoured by
sheer weight of numbers to gain possession of the warships that
were lying there. Of these ships fifty formed the fleet that
had been recently sent to the support of Pompeius, and after the
crushing defeat in Thessaly had since returned home : they
were all either four- or five-deckers *, and constituted a thor-
oughly equipped and sea-going force. In addition, there were
the twenty-two regular guardships of Alexandria, decked boats
every one. Should, therefore, the enemy once succeed in
seizing this formidable flotilla, they would be able to wrench
from Caesar his own small squadron, and by their undis-
puted mastery of the sea cut his communications with the
outside world, including all possibility of supplies or rein-
forcements. The action was therefore contested with all the
obstinacy demanded by the crisis ; for while with one party
success meant a speedy triumph for their arms, defeat for the
other meant disaster. Victory, however, rested with Caesar,
who, recognizing his inability with so weak a force to control
so wide an area, first set fire to the whole fleet and the rest
of the ships in the naval yards, and then hastily landed troops
close up to Pharus.
112 Pharus is a lighthouse standing upon the island from which
* Quadriremes or quinqueremes.
ajid waits for ^Enforcements
221
it has taken its name, of immense height, and built on Autumn 4S
a strikingly massive scale. It is the position of this island
opposite Alexandria that forms the harbour of that city,
although at its upper part it is connected with the main town
by a sea-mole some three-quarters of a mile in length, crowned
with a narrow causeway and bridge. It is covered with houses
of the native Egyptians, forming a quarter equal in point of
size to an ordinary town ; and if any passing ships find them-
selves a trifle out of their course, either through losing their
bearings or from stress of weather, they are plundered by its
inhabitants quite after the manner of professional pirates.
Owing moreover to the narrowness of the passage, the posses-
sion of Pharus absolutely controls the entrance to the harbour ;
and it was the apprehensions excited by this circumstance that
now led Caesar, while the enemy's attention was engrossed
by the battle, to land troops, occupy the tower, and establish
a garrison. He thus secured a safe transit for his oversea
supplies and reinforcements, which were now summoned by
express orders from aU the nearest provinces of the Empire.
In other quarters of the town the day's fighting ended in
a drawn battle without the definite repulse of either party,
a result due to the restricted nature of the ground ; and both
sides having sustained slight casualties, Caesar drew a cordon
round all the positions of highest strategical value, and on
them proceeded under cover of night to construct a line of
defence-works. The quarter so enclosed contained a tiny
wing of the royal palace where apartments had been found
for Caesar upon his first arrival, and also a theatre abutting
on the palace which served as a citadel, and commanded
approaches both to the harbour and the other naval depots.
These fortifications were then extended on succeeding days
2 22 Court Intriguer
Autumn 48 until they practically formed a curtain-wall effectually pro-
tecting him from being forced to fight against his will.
In the midst of these proceedings the younger daughter
of the late king Ptolemy, in the fond hope that the throne
was now without an occupant, left her quarters in the palace
to join the camp of Achillas, where she at once began to co-
operate with him in the conduct of the war. But a quarrel
quickly broke out between them on the question of pre-
cedence, and this diversion proved greatly to the profit of the
common soldiery, as both parties staked heavily to win their
good opinion. Meanwhile, the enemy being thus employed,
Pothinus, the king's guardian and regent of the kingdom,
although professedly acting in the interests of Caesar, was
all along busily intriguing by means of secret correspondence
with Achillas, whom he exhorted not to lose courage but to
go on and persevere with their enterprise. His agents were,
however, betrayed and arrested, and he himself thereupon
put to death by the orders of Caesar.
Such were the circumstances that occasioned the subse-
quent Alexandrine war.
INDEX OF PROPER NAMES
[The reference is always to the chapters of the Latin text as given in
the margin. The Roman numerals denote the book.]
Achillas iii 104, 108-II2.
Acilius, M'. iii 15, 16, 39, 40.
Acre {Ptolemais) iii 105.
Acutius Rufus iii 83.
Adbucillus iii 59.
Adriatic i 25 ; iii 78.
Aeginium iii 79.
(Aelius, L.) Tubero i 30, 31.
(Aemilius,) M. Lepidus ii 21.
Afranius, L. i 37-43, 48-53, 60-
76, 84, 87; iii7, 18; iii 83, 88.
Africa, North i 30, 31 ; ii 23, 28,
32, 37-
the army of iii 10.
Ahenobarbus see Domitius,
Albe {Alba) i 15. 24.
Albici i 34, 56-58 ; ii 2, 6.
Alesia iii 47.
Alessio (Lissus) iii 26, 28, 29, 40,
42, 78.
Alexandria iii 4, 103-11 2,
Alexandrine war iii 122.
army iii no.
AUobroges iii 59, 63, 79, 84.
Amantia iii 12, 40,
Amanus, Mt. iii 31,
Amphipolis iii 102.
Ampius, T. iii 105.
Ancona in,
Androsthenes iii 80.
(Annius, T.) Milo iii 2 1, 22.
Anquillaria ii 23.
Antioch iii 102, 105.
Antiochus of Commagene iii 4.
Antonius :
(a) C. iii 4, 10, 67.
Antonius :
(b) M. i 2, II, 18; iii 24-30,
34. 40. 46, 65, 89.
Apollonia iii 5, 11-13, 26, 30, 75,
78, 79-
(Appuleius, L.) Saturninus i 7.
Apulia i 14, 17, 23 ; iii 2.
Aquitaine {Aqrcitajiia) i 39.
Ardeche (Helvii AndArecomici) i 35.
Ariobarzanes iii 4.
Aries (Arelate) i 36.
Arta {Acarnania, Amhracia, and
Amphilochi) iii 36, 56, 58.
Ascoli (Asculum) i 15.
Asia Minor (Asia) i 4 ; iii 3-5,
42, 53, I05-I07'
Asiatic fleet iii 5. 7, 40, 106.
Asparagium iii 30, 41, 76.
Athamania iii 78.
Athens {Athenae) iii 3.
Alius :
(a) T. Labienus i 15 ; iii 13, 19,
71,87.
(b) Q. Varus iii 37.
Attius :
(a) the Pelignian i 18.
(b) P. Varus i 12, 13, 31 ; ii
23-36, 43, 44-
(Aurelius), M. Cotta i. 30.
Ausetani i 60.
Avaricum iii 47.
Avenca (Celtiberid) i 38.
Balbus see Cornelius.
Bergama {Pergamum) iii 31, 105.
Hessians iii 4.
2 24 Index of Proper Names
Bibulus see Calpurnius.
Bithynia iii 3.
Boeotia iii 4.
Brindisi (Brundisium) i 24, 25-28,
30 ; iii 2, 6, 8, 14, 23-25, 87, 100.
Brutus see Junius.
Butrinto {Butkroivm) iii 16.
By His iii 1 2, 40.
Cadiz (Gades) ii 18, 20, 21.
Caecilius ;
(a) L. Metellus i 33.
(b) (Qi Metellus Pius) Scipio i
2, 4. 6; iii 4, 31, 33, 36-38,
67. 78-83, 88, 90.
(c) L. Rufus i 23.
(d) T. i 46.
Caelius, M. Rufus i 2; iii 20-22.
Caesar see Julius.
Cagliari {Carales) i 30.
Calabria (Bruttium) i 30.
Calagurris i 60.
Caleuus see Fufius.
Calidius, M. i 2.
Calpurnius :
(a) M. Bibulus iii 5, 7, 8, 14-18,
31 ; iii 1 10.
(b) L. Piso (Caesoninus) i 3.
Calvinus see Domitius.
Calvisius, C. Sabinus iii 34, 35, 56.
Camerino {Camarinuni) i 15.
Campania i 14.
Candavia iii II, 79-
Caninius, C. Rebilus i 26 ; ii 24, 34.
Canossa (Canusinni) i 24.
Canuleius, L. iii 43.
Capitol, the i 6.
Cappadocia iii 4.
Capua i 10, 14; iii 21, 'jl.
Carmona ii 19.
Casilinum iii 21.
Cassius :
(a) C. (Longinus) iii 5, loi.
(b) L. Longinus iii 34-36, 56.
(c) Q_. Longinus i 2 ; ii 19, 31.
Castor see Tarcondarius.
Cato see Porcius.
Cenca {Citiga) i 48.
Ceraunian Mts. iii 6.
Cilicia iii 3,4, 88, loi, 102, 1 10.
Cingolo (Cingulum) i 15.
Claudius :
(a) C. Marcellus i 6, 14 ; iii 5.
(b) M. Marcellus i 2.
Cleopatra iii 103, I07.
Clodius :
(a) A. iii 57,90.
(b) (P. Pulcher) iii 21.
Commagene see Antiochus.
Considius, C. Longus ii 23.
Coponius, C. iii 5, 26.
Cordova (Cordubn) ii 19-21.
Corfu (Corcyra) iii 3, 7, 8, 11, 15,
16, 58, 100.
Cornelian camp ii 24, 25, 30, 37.
Cornelius :
(a) (L.) Balbus iii 19.
(b) L. Lentulus (Crus) i I, 2, 4,
5, 14 ; iii 4, 96, 102, 104.
(c) (P.) Lentulus Marcellinus iii
62, 64, 65.
(d) P. Lentulus Spinther i 15, 16,
21-23; iii 83, 102.
(e) L. Sulla (Felix) i 4, 5, 7.
(f) (L.) Sulla Faustus i 6.
(g) P. Sulla iii 51, 89, 99.
Cosa i 34 ; iii 22.
Cotta see Aurelius.
Cotys iii 4, 36.
Crassus see Licinius and Otacilius.
Crastinus C. iii 91, 99.
Cremona i 24.
Crete (Crela) iii 4, 5.
Curio see Scribonius.
Curius see Vibius.
Cyclades iii 3.
Cyprus iii 102, 106.
Cyrene iii 5.
Dalmatians iii 9.
Damasippus see Lici nius.
Dardanians iii 4.
Index of Proper Names 227
Decidius, L. Saxa i 66.
Deiotarus iii 4.
Delphi iii 56.
Diana iii 33, 105.
Dioscorides iii 109.
Domitius :
(a) L. Ahenobarbus 16, 15-23,
25. 34. 36, 56-58 ; i> 3. 18, 22,
28, 32 ; iii 83, 89.
(b) Cn. ii 42.
(c) Cn. Calvinus iii 34, 36-3S,
78, 79, 89.
Domnilaus iii 4.
Durazzo (^Dyrrachium) i 25, 27 7
iii 5,9, II, 13, 26, 30, 41,42,
44. 53, 57, 58, 62, 78-80, 84,
87, 89, 100.
Ebro {Hiberus) i 60-63, 65, 68,
69. 72, 73-
Egus iii 59, 79.
Egypt {Aegyptus) iii 3, 5, 40, 104,
106, no, 112.
Elis iii 105.
Ephesus iii 35, 105.
Epirus4, 12, 13, 42,47, 61, 78,80.
Ergent (Apsi^s) iii 13, 19, 30.
Estremadura {Vettones) i 38.
Etesian winds iii 107.
Fabius :
(a) C. i 37, 40, 48.
(b) the Pelignian ii 35.
Fano (Fanum) in.
Fiiustus see Comehus.
Favonius, M. iii 36, 57.
Fermo (Firmunt) i 16.
Flaccus see Valerius.
Fleginas, C. iii 71.
Fufius, Q. Calenus i 87 ; iii 8, 14,
26, 56, 106.
Fulginius, Q^ i 46.
Fulvius Postumus iii 62.
Gabinius, A. iii 4, 103, IIO.
Gallograecia iii 4.
Gallonius, C. ii 18, 20.
Gaul (Gallia) i 6, 7, 29, 33, 39,
48, 51 ; ii 1,40; iii 2,4, 22, 42,
59, 79, 87-
Gergovia iii 73.
Germany {Germania) i 7, 83 ; iii
4, 52, 87.
Giglio {Igilium) i 34.
Gomphi iii 80, 81.
Gracchi i 7.
Greece {Achaia, Graecia) i 25 ; iii
3, 4, 5> 56,57, 106.
Greeks iii il, 30, 102, 105.
Guadalajara {Celtiberia) i 38.
Guadiana (Anas) i 38.
Gubbio (Iguviutn) i 12.
Megesaretus iii 35.
Htraclia iii 79.
Hercules, temple of, ii 18, 21.
Hirrus see Lucilius.
Huesca {Osca) 160.
lacetani i 60.
Iliurgavonenses i 60.
Illyricum iii 9, 78.
Isthmus of Corinth iii 56.
Italy (Italia) i 2, 6,^9, 25, 27,
29. 30, 35, 48, 63; » 17. 18,
22, 32; iii I, 4,6, 10, 12, 13,
18, 21, 22, 29,39, 42, 57,73,
78, 82, 87.
North (Gallia Cisalpina) i 10,
18, 29, 48 ; iii 42, 87.
Juba 16; ii 25, 26, 36-44.
Julian law i 14.
Julius :
(a) C. Caesar passim
(b) L. Caesar i 8, 10 ; ii 23.
(c) Sex. Caesar ii 20.
(Junius) D, Brutus i 36,56, 57; ii
3,5.6, 22.
Klibia (Clupea) ii 23.
Labienus see Alius.
226 Index of Proper Names
Laelius, D. iii 5, 'j, 40, lOO.
Lanciano (^Frentani) i 23.
Larino {Larinnni) i 23.
Larissa iii 80, 81, 96-98.
Latin festival iii 2.
Legion :
(a) Caesar's —
Eighth i 18 ; iii 89.
Ninth i 45; iii 45, 46, 62,
63,66, 67, 89.
Tenth iii 89, 91.
Eleventh iii 34.
Twelfth i 15 ; iii 34.
Thirteenth 17, 12, 18.
Fourteenth i 46.
Twenty-seventh iii 34.
(b) Pompeius's (see iii 4) —
First iii 88.
Third iii 88.
Cilician iii 4, 88.
Syrian iii 88.
' Vernacular ' ii 20.
Lentulus see Cornelius.
Lepanto (Naiipactus) iii 35.
Lepidus see Aemilius.
Leptis ii 38.
Libo see Scribonius.
Liburnian fleet iii 5, 9.
Licinius :
(a) M. Crassus iii 31.
(b) Damasippus iii 44.
Lissa {Issa) iii 9.
Livadia {Aetolia) iii 34, 35, 56, 61.
Longinus see Cassius.
Lucceius, L. iii 18.
Lucera {Liicerid) i 24.
Lucilius Hirrus 115; iii 82.
Lucretius :
(a)Q^ii8.
(b) Vespillo iii 7.
Lupus see Rutilius.
Lusitanians i 44, 48.
Macedonia iii 4, il, 33, 34, 36,
57, 79, 102.
Independent iii 39.
Magius, N. i 24, 26.
Manlius, L. Torquatus i 24 ; iii 11.
Marcellinus see Cornelius.
Marcellus see Claudius.
Marcius :
(a) (L.) Philippus i 6.
(b) Rufus ii 23, 24, 43.
Marrucini ii 34.
Marseilles {Massilia) i 34-36, 56-
58; ii I, 3, 7, 14, 15, 17, 18,
21, 22.
Marsi i 15, 20 ; ii 27, 29.
Medjerda (5agTa£/as) ii 24, 26,38,
39-
Menedemus iii 34.
Messina (Messana) ii 3 ; iii 1 01.
Metellus see Caecilius.
Metropolis iii 80, 81.
Milo see Anius.
Minucius :
(a) Rufus iii 7.
(b) Thermus i 12.
Missolonghi (Calydon) iii 35.
Morocco {Mauretania) i 6, 39, 60.
Munatius, L. Plancus i 40.
Murcus see Statius.
Mytilene iii 102.
Naples (Neapolis) iii 21.
Narbonne (Narho) i 37 ; ii 21.
Nasidius, L, ii 3, 4, 7.
Nismes {Volcae) i 35.
Noricum i 18.
Numidians ii 25, 38, 39, 41.
Nymphaeum iii 26.
Octavius, M. iii 5, 9.
Octogesa i 61, 68, 70.
Opimius, M.jii 38.
Orchomenus iii 56.
Oricum iii 7, 11-16, 23, 34, 39,
40, 78, 90.
Ortona {Marrucini) i 23.
Osimo (Auximwn) i 12, 13, 15,
Otacilius Crassus iii 28, 29.
Oviedo (Cantabri) i 38.
Index of Proper Names 227
Palaeste iii 6.
Parthians i 9 ; iii 31, 82.
Parthini iii 11, 41, 42.
Pcdius, Q. iii 22.
Peligni i 25 ; ii 29.
Pelusium iii 103, 108.
Pentima {Corfinium) i 15-20, 23-
25, 34; ii 28, 32; iii 10.
Pesaro (Pisaurum) i li, 12.
Petra iii 42.
Petreius, M. i 38-43, 53, 61-67,
72-76, 87 ; ii 17, 18.
Pharus iii iii, 112.
Philippus see Marcius.
Phoenicia iii 3, loi.
Piacenza (Placentia) iii "J I,
Piceno [Picenum) i 12, 15, 29.
Piso see Calpurnius.
Plancus see Munatius.
Plotius, M. iii 19.
Po (Padiis) iii 87.
Pompeius :
(a) Cn. (Magnus) the elder i i-
39. 53, 60, 61, 76, 84; ii3, 17,
18, 25, 32; iii 1-33, 41-111,
(b) Cn. the younger iii 4, 5, 40.
Pomponius, M. iii loi.
Pontus iii 3, 4.
(Porcius) M. Cat© (of Utica) i 4,
30, 32-
Portugal {Lusitania) i 38.
Postumus see Fulvius.
Pothinus iii 108, 112.
Pozzuoli (Puleoli) iii 71.
Provence (Gallia Narboiiensis) i 39,
51; ii I.
Ptolemy :
(a) (Auletes) the father iii 4, 103,
107-110, 112,
(b) (Dionysus) the son iii 103,
104, 106-109, 112.
Puleio, T. iii 67.
Pupius, L. i 13.
Pyrenees i 37; iii 19.
Quintilius, Sex. Varus i 23 ; ii 28.
Rcbilus see Caninius.
Rhascypolis iii 4.
Rhodes iii 5, 26, 27, 102, I06.
Rhone (Rhodamis) ii I.
Rimini {AriminutJi) i 8, IO-I2.
Rodez {Ruleni) i 51.
Roman citizens i 30 ; ii 18-21 ;
iii 4, 9, 10, 29, 32, 40, 102.
Roman people or government, i 7,
9, 22, 35 ; iii II, 12, 107, 108,
110.
Roman knights i 17, 23, 77 ''
ii 18 ; iii 71.
Rome, the city of, i 2, 3, 5,6, 9,
I4> 32-34, 53; ii 22, 32; iii I,
2, 10, 83, 108, 109.
Roscius, L. i 3, 8, lo.
Roucillus iii 59, 79-
Rubrius, L. i 23.
Rufus see Acutius, Coelius, Marcius,
Minucius, Sulpicius, VibuUius.
Rutilius Lupus i 24; iii 56.
Sabinus see Calvisius.
Saburra ii 38-42.
Sacrativir, M. iii 71.
Sadala iii 4.
Salonae iii 9.
Santander (Cantabri) i 38.
Santiponce (Italica) ii 20.
Sardinia i 30, 31 ; iii 10.
Sasino (Sason) iii 8,
Saturninus i "J.
Saxa see Decidius.
Scaeva iii 53.
Schkumbi (Genusiis) iii 75, 7^*
Scipio see Caecilius.
Scribonius :
(a) C. Curio i 12, 18, 30, 31 ;
ii 3, 23-43; iii 10.
(b) Liboi 26; iii 5, 15-18, 23,
24, 90, 100.
Segre (Sicoris) i 40, 48, 61-63,
83-
(Sempronii) Gracchi i 7.
Septimius, L. iii 104.
2 28 '. Index of Proper Names
Serapion iii 109.
Sertorius Q;^ i 61.
Servilius, P. iii I, 21.
Seville {Hispalis.) ii 18, 20.
Sicily {Sicilia) i 25, 30, 31 ; ii 23,
30, 32, 34. 37. 43, 44 ; '» io>
42, 101.
straits of i 29 ; ii 3 ; iii loi.
Sierra Moreiia (Saltus Castulo-
iiensis) i 38.
Spain {Hispania) i 30, 34, 37-39,
61, 74, 85-87; ii I, 32,37; iii
2, 10, 47, 83.
Spain, Eastern i 22, 29, 38, 39,48,
49; ii 7, 17, 18, 21.
Western i 38, 39 ; ii 17-21.
Spains, the two i 2, 9-1 1, 29, 39,
85; ii 18, 32; iii 3, 10, 73.
Spaniards ii 2I, 40; iii 22, 88.
Sparta {Lacedaemoti) iii 4.
Spinther see Cornelius.
Staberius, L. iii 12.
Statins Murcus iii 15, 16.
Sulla see Cornelius.
Sulmona i 18.
Sulpicius :
(a) Ser. ii 44.
(b) P. Rufus i 74; iii loi.
Susa (Hadnimetum) ii 23.
Syria i 4, 6; iii 3, 4, 31,32, lOl,
103, 105, no.
Syrian fleet iii 5.
legions iii 4, 88.
Tarcondarius Castor iii 4.
Tarragona {Tarraco) i 60, 73, 78 ;
ii 21.
Taurois ii 4.
Terracina i 24.
Terentius :
(a) A. Varro iii 19.
Terentius :
(b) M. Varro i 38 ; ii 17, 19-21.
Termoli (Frentani) i 23.
Theb.'S iii 56.
Theophanes iii 18.
Thernius see Minucius.
Thessaly (Thessalia) iii 4, 5, 34-
36, 79-82, 100, loi, 106, III.
Thrace iii 4, 95.
Thurii iii 21, 22.
Tiburtius, L. iii 19.
Tillius, Q.. iii 42.
Torquatus see Manlius.
Tralles iii 105.
Trebonius C. i 36; ii i, 5, 13, 15 ;
iii 21, 22.
Triarius see Valerius.
Tubero see Aelius.
Tullus see Volcatius.
Tuticanus Gallus iii 71.
Utica i 31 ; ii 23-26, 36-38, 44.
Valerius :
(a) L. Flaccus iii 53.
(b) (P.) Flaccus iii 53.
(c) (Q^ Orca) i 30, 31.
(d) C. Triarius iii 5, 92.
Varro see Terentius.
Varus see Atius, Attius, Qnintilius.
Var {Varus) i 86, 87.
Vatinius, P. iii 19, 90, lOO.
Veglia (Curicta) iii 8, 10.
Vespillo see Lucretius.
Vibius Curius i 24.
Vibo iii loi.
VibuUius, L. Rufus i 15, 34, 38 ;
iii 10, II, 15, 18, 22.
Vistritsa {Haliacmon) iii 36, 37.
Volcatius Tulliis iii 52.
Volusenus, C. fii 60.
Oxford: Printed at the Clarendon Press by Horace Hart, M.A.
I Oxford Translation Series
3 All volumes sold separately. Price 5s. net each.
i '^ Greek "^
H ESIO D. The Poems and Fragments. By A.W. Mair.
g PLATO. The Four Soa'afic Dialogues. By Benjamin g
g JowETT, with Preface by Edward Cairo. Q
Q 8
Y> PLATO. The Republic. By Benjamin Jowett. Two H
^ vols. 8s. 6d. net. In one volume on India paper, los. 6d. g
^ net. b
s s
3 DEMOSTHENES. Public Orations. By A. W. g
g Pickard-Cambridge. Two vols. 8s. 6d. net. g
$ ARISTOTLE. Politics. By Benjamin Jowett, with g
'k Introduction by H. \V. C. Davis. b
g PLUTARCH. Selected Essays. By T. G. Tucker, g
g Selected Essaj^s from The Moralia, by A. O. Prickard. g
g Two vols. 8s. 6d. net. o
g EPiCTETUS. The Discourses and Manual, with S
g Fragments of his Writings. By P. E. Matheson. Two vols. S
S 8s. 6d. net. g
§ MARCUS AURELIUS. 7//^ Meditations. By John |
H Jackson, with Introduction by Charles Bigg. g
g LUCIAN. By H. W. and F. G. Fowler. Four vols, g
g i6s. net. . g
S PHILOSTRATUS. InHonour of ApolloniusofTyana. S
^ By J. S. Phillimore. Two vols. 8s. 6d. net. <i
g LONGINUS. On the Sublime. By A. O. Prickard. g
MARK THE DEACON. The Life of Porphyry of ^
Gaza. By G. F. Hill. ^
s
g 5 Latin \
I CAESAR. The Gallic War. By F. P. Long. |
S CAESAR. 7/;^ Qz;// War. By F. P. Long. g
8 LUCRETIUS. On the Nature of Things. By Cyril §
^ Bailey. b
f> g
S 5 hatin (contd.)
s
§ VIRGIL. ByJoHN Jackson. On India paper, 7s. 6d.ne»,
(?
STATIUS. The Silvae. By D. A. Slater.
^ TACITUS. 77zg Histories. By W. Hamilton Fyfe.
9, Two vols. 8s. 6d. net.
i ST. BERNARD. 0« Consideration. By George
^ Lewis.
I 5 ^itscellaneous
J
S HORACE. By E. C. Wickham. g
S PROPERTIUS. By J. S. Phillimore. 8
S TACITUS. The Dialogus, Agricola and Germaitia. By §
S W. Hamilton Fyfe. §
I APULEIUS. The Apologia and Florida. By H. E. |
Q Butler. q
S APULEIUS. The Metamorphoses. By H. E. Butler. S
^ Two vols. 8s. 6d. net. a
s ^
S SI DON I us. 7/;^ Letters. By O. M. Dalton. Two ^
§ vols. 8s. 6d. net. 'i
^ THE PARALLEL PSALTER. The Prayer Book ^
^ version of the Psalms and a new version on opposite pages. ^
^ By S. R. Driver. C
S BEOWULF. ByJoHNEARLE. - \
g ALFRED. Version of the Consolations of Boethius. <:
g By W. J. Sedgefield. f,
H DANTE. The Convivio. By W. W. Jackson. \
^ DANTE. The Divina Commedia. By H. F. Tozer. \
S MACHIAVELLI. The Prince. By N. II. Thomson. ^
g <
p HEINE. The Book 0/ Songs. By John Todhunter. ^
On India paper, 7s. 6d. net. . <.
Ahv. i()24
g f:
DG
266
C4
cop. 3
Caesar, C . Julius
Caesar's civil war with
Fompeius
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO
LIBRARY