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^^CAESAR'S 

CIVIL  WAR 

WITH   POMPEIUS 


TRANSLATED  WITH  INTRODUCTION  AND  NOTES 

BY   THE 

REV.  F.  P.  LONG,  M.A. 

SOMETIME   EXHIBITIONER   OF  WORCESTER  COLLEGE 


OXFORD 

AT   THE   CLARENDON   PRESS 

1906 


D4 


3 


HENRY  FROWDE,  M.A. 

PUBLISHER  TO  THE  UNIVERSITY  OF  OXFORD 

LONDON,  EDINBURGH 

NEW  YORK  AND  TORONTO 


PRINTED  IN  ENGLAND, 


EDITOR'S  NOTE 

The  Text  followed  in  this  translation  has  been,  apart  from 
one  place  in  the  second  book  (c.  Ii),  where  I  have  retained 
a  passage  on  intrinsic  grounds  which  has  not  perhaps  strong 
MS.  authority,  and  another  in  Book  III  (c,  48),  where  I  have 
hazarded  a  conjecture  in  a  corrupted  passage,  the  Clarendon 
Press  edition  of  Du  Pontet,  from  which  also  I  have  adapted 
the  Index. 

In  preparing  the  rough  maps  and  plans  which  accompany 
the  Text,  my  obligations  to  previous  editors,  especially  to 
Stoffel,  are  obvious. 

I  take  this  opportunity  to  express  my  thanks  to  Mr.  H.  J. 
Cunningham,  Fellow  of  Worcester  College,  for  his  kindness 
:n  reading  the  whole  of  the  version,  and  for  many  valued 
suggestions :  also  to  the  Provost  of  Oriel  who  read  the 
proofs  while  passing  through  the  Press. 

F  P.  L. 


Poi,  presso  al  tempo  che  tutto  il  ciel  voile 
ridur  lo  mondo  a  suo  modo  sereno, 
Cesare,  per  voler  di  Roma,  il  tolle : 

e  quel  che  fe'  da  Varo  infino  al  Reno, 
Isara  vide  ed  Era  e  vide  Senna, 
ed  ogni  valla  onde  Rodano  &  pieno. 

Quel  che  fe'  poi  ch*  egli  usci  di  Ravenna, 
e  saltd  Rubicon,  fu  di  tal  volo 
che  nol  seguiteria  lingua  n^  penna. 

In  ver  la  Spagna  rivolse  lo  stuolo; 
poi  ver  Durazzo,  e  Farsalia  percosse 
si  ch'  al  Nil  caldo  si  senti  del  duolo. 

Antandro  e  Simoenta,  onde  si  mosse, 
rivide,  e  la  dov'  Ettore  si  cuba, 
e  mal  per  Tolommeo  poi  si  riscosse : 

da  indi  scese  folgorando  a  Juba, 
poscia  si  volse  nel  vostro  occidente, 
dove  sentia  la  Pompeiana  tuba. 


Dante,  Paradiso  vi.  55-72. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 
EDITOR'S  NOTE iii 

INTRODUCTION vii 


BOOK  I 
Italy  and  Spain 

CHAP. 

I.  The  Outbreak  of  War  (1-28)         ...       I 

II.  The  Safeguarding  of  the  West  (29-55)  .    26 

III.  The  First  Naval  Engagement  (56-58)   .         -47 

IV.  The  Reward  of  a  Great  Strategist  (59-87) .    50 

BOOK  II 

Marseilles  and  North  Africa 

I.    An  Historic  Siege  (1-16)        .         .         .         -73 

II.    The  Clearing  of  Southern  Spain  (17-22)       .    87 

III.    The  Set-back  in  Africa  (23-44)     •         ♦         '94 

BOOK  III 

Dyrrachium  and  Pharsalia 

I.  The  Passage  of  the  Adriatic  (1-19)       .  .116 

II.  A  Backwater  of  the  Revolution  (20-22)  .  135 

III.  The  Lines  of  Dyrrachium  (23-57)  •  -138 

IV.  The  Forcing  of  the  Blockade  (58-87)  .  .  170 
V.  Pharsalus  and  After  (88-112)         .         .  .199 

Index  of  Proper  Names  .....  223 


LIST  OF  MAPS 


Central  and  S.  Italy  . 
Plan  of  Brindisi 
N.  E.  Spain  . 
Campaign  of  Lerida     . 
Lerida  and  the  Ebro  . 
Plan  of  Marseilles 
Coast  between  Marseilles 
Campaign  in  N.  Africa 
The  Greek  Peninsula  . 
Bay  of  Durazzo    . 
Pharsalia 


.    ^ 

n?  face 

P- 

I 

. 

55 

23 

55 

33 

. 

55 

35 

. 

55 

55 

. 

55 

73 

^ND  Toulon 

55 

76 

. 

55 

95 

. 

55 

121 

55 
55 

157 
199 

INTRODUCTION 

Most  historical  parallels  are  deceptive,  but  none  the  less  §  i 
many  may  be  instructive.  Among  the  latter  is  that  fre- 
quently drawn  by  an  English  reader  between  the  Roman  and 
the  British  Empires.  Many  problems  of  government  have 
doubtless  been  common  to  the  two.  The  administration  of 
backward  races,  the  reform  of  decayed  monarchies,  the  adjust- 
ment of  local  autonomy  and  national  character  with  eflFective 
imperial  control,  the  relations  of  the  circumference  with  the 
centre,  and  the  due  subordination  of  great  governors  to  the 
home  government  that  appoints  them ;  these  and  many 
more  than  these  have  alike  presented  themselves  to  the  Roman 
and  to  the  British  politician,  and  have  compelled  from  both 
their  several  efforts  at  solution.  In  both  cases  an  empire  has 
been  built  up  by  a  great  military  and  commercial  people, 
endowed  by  Nature  vnih.  a  rare  genius  for  the  government 
both  of  themselves  and  of  others,  and  in  each  case  the  value 
and  the  endurance  of  that  empire  is  determined  by  the  moral 
qualities  that  underlie  its  rule.  Beyond  such  general  princi- 
ples, the  parallel  perhaps  ceases  to  be  fruitful.  The  world- 
dominion  of  the  Roman  was  achieved  by  the  steady  expansion 
of  a  virile  people,  living  under  the  freest  of  democratic  insti- 
tutions, who  first  extended  the  hegemony  of  their  city-state 
on  the  Tiber  over  their  kinsmen  in  the  Campagna  and  Latium, 
then  over  the  whole  Italian  peninsula,  and  then,  in  wave 
after  wave  of  conquest,  over  the  entire  basin  and  hinterland 
of  the  Mediterranean. 


viii  Introduction 

Throughout  the  various  stages  of  this  expansion  there  had 
ever  been  present  in  imagination  the  striking  dictum  of  the 
great  Athenian  historian,  that  Democracy  and  Empire  are 
incompatibles.  The  truth  of  this  dictum  he  had  recognized 
in  the  premature  downfall  of  his  own  imperial  city,  and  it  was 
now  being  tried  afresh  in  the  marvellous  growth  of  the  more 
western  people.  Yet  we  must  remember  that  during  the 
really  critical  period  of  the  rise  of  Rome  it  was  not  democracy 
but  rather  an  oligarchy  that  had  guided  the  nation.  During 
the  life  and  death  struggle  with  Hannibal  and  the  other  great 
wars  both  before  and  after,  it  was  the  Roman  Senate,  filled 
by  representatives  of  all  the  great  families  in  the  state,  trained 
from  earliest  youth  in  the  conduct  of  affairs,  and  holding  their 
seats  for  life,  that  shaped  the  foreign  policy  and  directed  the 
armies  of  the  Republic.  It  is  true  that  the  annual  magis- 
trates were  elected  by  the  people,  and  that  this  people  held 
other  sovereign  rights,  such  as  that  of  declaration  of  war  and 
conclusion  of  peace,  not  to  mention  its  prerogatives  in  civil 
matters ;  but  for  all  practical  purposes  the  constitution  at 
this  time  was  an  aristocracy,  and  sovereignty  lay  in  that  august 
body  which  won  from  awe-struck  foreigners  the  famous  title 
of  '  an  assembly  of  kings  ',  The  difficulty  was  that  this  pre- 
eminence of  the  Senate  rested  as  much  on  unchallenged 
custom  as  on  any  ultimate  and  original  law  of  the  constitution. 
No  one  could  say  with  certainty  what  this  constitution  was. 
Polybius,  the  Greek  historian  of  the  second  century  B.C., 
whose  admiration  for  Roman  institutions  is  only  equalled  by 
his  sagacity  in  analysing  them,  is  at  much  pains  to  point  out 
its  highly  '  mixed '  character,  and  the  subtilty  with  which 
the  various  elements  were  held  in  solution,  and  checks  imposed 
tor  preserving  its  equilibrium.     Mommsen  speaks  of  it  in  its 


Introduction  ix 

earliest  days  as  '  a  constitutional  monarchy  inverted  ' ;  and, 
substituting  the  collective  senatorial  '  kings '  for  the  single 
'  king ',  this  description  applies  equally  to  its  later  stages. 
Whilst  the  Roman  people  was  the  sole  fount  of  honour  and 
source  of  pardon,  functions  that  with  us  attach  to  the  Crown 
as  its  special  prerogatives,  the  real  power  lay  in  the  assembly 
of  nobles,  which  was  virtually  independent  of  the  commons. 
But  however  excellent  in  its  results  this  rule  of  the  Senate 
during  its  best  days  may  have  been,  at  times  of  storm  and 
stress  when  its  strong  patriotism  and  sound  political  sense 
shine  out  the  more  brightly  the  darker  grows  the  political 
outlook  for  the  nation,  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  this 
monopoly  of  power  would  remain  unchallenged  when  such 
times  had  disappeared.  Nor,  we  may  add,  was  it  to  be  ex- 
pected that  a  body  which  was  practically  a  close  corporation 
of  privileged  families,  with  difficulty  recruited  from  below, 
should  for  ever  retain  its  native  qualities  and  vitality,  when 
the  vital  occasions  for  their  exercise  had  passed,  and  the  dis- 
integrating forces  of  prosperity  and  growing  wealth,  and  the 
social  changes  which  these  bring,  began  to  make  themselves  felt. 
By  the  year  133  B.C.,  Rome  was  the  undisputed  mistress  of 
the  Mediterranean.  Carthage  had  been  finally  destroyed  in 
146  B.C.,  and  Greece  as  a  political  force  had  ceased  to  exist  in 
the  same  year,  by  the  destruction  of  the  commercial  city  of 
Corinth.  The  Spanish  peninsula  had  been  conquered  after 
a  protracted  struggle,  and  Macedon  become  a  Roman  pro- 
vince ;  whilst  the  country  then  known  as  '  Asia '  (i.  e.  the 
western  end  of  Asia  Minor),  had  been  bequeathed  to  Rome 
by  its  last  native  ruler.  It  is  significant  that  in  this  year 
occurred  the  first  of  those  many  attempts  at  reform  which 
mark  the  close  of  Roman  republican  government,  and  which 


X  Introducttcn 

continued  intermittently  until  the  Republic  was  finally  super- 
seded by  the  absolute  monarchy  of  Caius  Julius  Caesar  in 
49  B.C.  This  reform  movement  need  not  detain  us  here. 
It  is  enough  to  remember  that  it  was  in  many  respects 
a  genuine  effort  to  redress  social  and  political  inequalities, 
and  to  break  down  the  walls  of  privilege.  The  middle  and 
lower  classes  had  done  their  share  in  the  hard  fighting  and 
self-sacrifice  necessary  for  the  acquisition  of  empire,  and  now 
that  it  was  won  they  naturally  claimed  a  share  in  the  spoils. 
'  New  men,'  i.e.  men  outside  the  charmed  circle  of  senatorial 
nobility,  and  sprung  from  the  people  itself,  begin  to  appear 
on  the  political  stage,  and  to  demand  admission  to  the  high 
oflices  of  State  and  to  the  lucrative  emoluments  which  these 
carried  both  at  home  and  abroad.  If  wars  were  bungled  by 
senatorial  incapacity  and  provincials  plundered  by  senatorial 
oppression,  the  people  did  not  intend  to  look  idly  on,  whilst 
these  defaulters  were  secure  against  all  punishment,  by  the 
constitutional  arrangement  which  restricted  the  ranks  of  jury- 
men to  the  same  social  class  as  that  of  the  distinguished 
culprits.  Moreover  the  very  basis  of  the  franchise  needed 
widening.  Rome,  the  mistress  of  the  world,  was  still  a  city- 
state,  of  the  ordinary  type  characteristic  of  ancient  civilization, 
and  the  Italian  people,  who  had  shed  their  blood  in  the  foreign 
wars,  were  absolutely  outside  the  pale  of  her  citizenship. 
This  anomaly  was  only  remedied  after  a  bitter  struggle  lasting 
from  91-88  B.C. ;  but  the  remedy,  so  far  as  practical  politics 
were  concerned,  proved  to  be  wellnigh  valueless.  Repre- 
sentative institutions  being  unknown  to  ancient  political 
philosophy,  the  vote  of  an  Italian  could  only  be  effective  if 
recorded  in  Rome:  consequently,  the  franchise  was  rarely  ex- 
ercised, and  the  best  part  of  the  nation  was  still  deprived  of  any 


Introduction  xi 

real  voice  In  the  shaping  of  the  national  destinies.  It  is  not 
difficult  to  foresee  the  inevitable  results  of  such  a  system. 
Instead  of  a  strong  national  middle  class  as  the  guarantee  of 
social  order  and  imperial  unity  and  the  source  of  all  legislation, 
the  Italians  only  tended  to  become  indifferent  to  the  fortunes 
of  the  empire,  except  from  purely  selfish  reasons,  and  legisla- 
tion came  to  be  controlled  more  and  more  by  one  or  two 
dominant  figures  in  Rome  for  the  time  being,  who  turned  it 
to  their  ovm  aggrandisement  by  debauching,  through  every 
conceivable  form  of  bribery,  the  worthless  proletariat  of  the 
city.  The  only  way  in  which  the  Senate  could  have  controlled 
its  own  members,  if  these  were  disposed  to  defy  constituted 
authority  through  reliance  on  the  military  arm,  would  have 
been  if  it  had  really  contained  in  itself  the  best  and  ablest  men 
of  the  country,  and  if  it  had  rested  for  its  position  on  a  truly 
national  and  representative  basis.  Failing  that,  it  was  clear 
that  absolute  power  must  sooner  or  later  gravitate  into  the 
hands  best  fitted  to  its  exercise. 

Caius  Julius  Caesar  was  born  probably  in  the  year  102  B.C., 
his  great  rival  Cnaeus  Pompeius  being  four  years  his  senior. 
Their  boyhood  was  passed  amid  the  fierce  civil  war  between 
Rome  and  her  Italian  allies,  followed  by  another  similar  strug- 
gle between  the  popular  party  under  Marius  and  the  senatorial 
under  Sulla.  It  was  in  83  B.C.,  when  Sulla  returned  from  his 
campaign  against  Mithridates,  King  of  Pontus,  that  the  young 
Pompeius,  then  only  twenty- three  years  of  age,  raised  an  army 
in  central  Italy  and  helped  the  chief  of  the  oligarchy  to  crush 
the  democratical  government,  for  which  share  in  the  victory 
he  was  formally  saluted  '  Imperator '  by  the  conqueror. 
Pompeius  thus  won  his  spurs  as  a  commander  in  the  field  many 
years  before  his  rival,  and  this  remarkable  reputation  as  a 


xii  Introduction 

soldier  of  consummate  genius  and  as  easily  the  first  general 
of  his  day,  he  never  again  lost,  until  at  the  close  of  his  life  he 
found  himself  face  to  face  with  the  somewhat  younger  con- 
queror of  Gaul.  Honours  followed  thick  upon  him.  In 
8 1  B.C.  Sulla  entrusted  him  with  the  recovery  from  the 
Marians  of  Northern  Africa,  and  from  Africa  he  was  sent  by 
the  triumphant  Senate  into  Spain,  to  stamp  out  there  the 
remnant  of  democratic  resistance  then  being  gallantly  main- 
tained under  the  genius  of  Sertorius.  Meanwhile  Sulla  was 
dead,  and  Pompeius,  returning  to  Italy  in  71  B.C.,  was  just  in 
time  to  gather  further  laurels  by  robbing  Marcus  Crassus  of 
the  certain  honour  of  finishing  the  troublesome  Slave  War. 
The  next  year,  70  b.c,  these  two  men  were  consuls  together, 
although  Pompeius  had  held  none  of  the  lower  magistracies, 
nor  indeed  ever  did  hold  them,  and  though  he  was  seven  years 
short  of  the  recognized  age  for  that  office,  being  then  only  36. 
Very  different  had  been  the  lot  of  Caesar.  His  sympathies 
and  his  ties  were  all  with  the  other  party.  Not  only  was  he 
closely  related  to  Marius,  who  had  married  his  father's  sister 
Julia,  but  in  84  B.C.  he  had  himself  married  a  daughter  (Cor- 
nelia) of  Cinna  the  great  democratical  leader,  four  times  consul 
during  Sulla's  absence  in  the  East ;  and  when  Sulla  on  his 
return  ordered  him,  for  political  reasons,  to  divorce  his  bride, 
he  had  boldly  refused,  although  Pompeius  had  obeyed  the 
Dictator  in  a  similar  demand.  But  though  at  the  intercession 
of  powerful  friends  his  life  was  spared,  he  deemed  it  advisable 
to  withdraw  to  Asia  Minor,  where  war  against  Mithridates 
was  again  threatening  to  break  out.  Here  he  saw  service,  and 
at  the  siege  of  Mytilene  won  the  equivalent  of  our  own 
Victoria  Cross  for  conspicuous  gallantry  in  the  field.  Return- 
ing after  the  death  of  Sulla  in  78  b.c,  he  refused  to  join  all 


Introduction 


2111 


premature  attempts  to  undo  the  work  of  the  great  reactionist, 
preferring  to  bide  his  time  as  a  politician,  and  meanwhile  to 
seek  a  reputation  at  the  Bar.  Comparative  failure  as  a  speaker 
soon  led  him  to  leave  Rome  once  more,  and  to  study  at  Rhodes 
under  the  famous  teacher  of  rhetoric,  Molon.  On  his  way 
out  occurred  the  well-known  story  of  his  capture  by  pirates, 
who  at  this  time  swarmed  in  the  Mediterranean.  During 
this  visit  also  he  acted  on  a  critical  occasion  with  all  that 
promptitude  and  willingness  to  take  responsibility  which  so 
distinguished  him  in  later  life.  Mithridates  was  recommenc- 
ing war,  and  it  was  touch  and  go  with  the  Roman  province 
of  '  Asia ',  which  threatened  to  revolt.  The  young  Caesar, 
then  27,  instantly  raised  a  body  of  troops,  and  by  the  vigour 
and  rapidity  of  his  movements  saved  the  province  for  Rome. 
Home  again  at  the  close  of  74  B.C.,  he  seems  to  have  remained 
quietly  in  the  capital,  though  actively  supporting  his  party 
in  their  campaign  against  the  Sullan  legislation,  until  we  come 
to  the  return  of  Pompeius  from  Spain  and  his  first  consulship 
with  Crassus  in  70  b.c. 

The  next  ten  years  were  spent  by  him  in  passing  through 
the  usual  cursus  honorum  of  every  Roman  public  man — the 
quaestorship  (68  B.C.),  aedileship  (65  B.C.),  and  praetorship 
(62  B.C.),  and  they  were  marked  on  the  whole  by  a  steady 
gain  of  democracy  upon  senatorial  prerogative,  as  reconsti- 
tuted under  the  Sullan  regime.  As  quaestor,  or  governor's 
paymaster,  Caesar's  province  had  been  Farther  or  Western 
Spain ;  and  at  the  close  of  his  praetorship  he  had  himself 
governed  the  same  country  as  propraetor,  thereby  doubly 
identifying  himself  with  Western  peoples,  whilst  his  rival  was 
for  the  future  to  stand  rather  as  the  champion  of  the  East. 
For  in  Sy  b.c.  there  had  been  enacted  the  first  of  those  great 


xiv  Introduction 

military  commissions,  which  more  than  anything  else  brought 
about  the  downfall  of  the  Republic,  by  habituating  men's 
minds  to  the  sight  and  the  necessity  of  supreme  power  in  the 
hands  of  an  individual.  And,  strange  to  say,  they  were  all 
effected  by  popular  legislation,  at  the  instance  of  leading 
tribunes  of  the  people,  whose  chief  function  in  these  latter 
days  was  to  subserve  the  interests  of  the  rival  heads  of  the  two 
great  parties  in  the  State.  The  Gabinian  Law  of  this  year 
gave  Pompeius  as  his  'province'  the  entire  Mediterranean, 
with  administrative  powers  equal  to  those  of  the  actual  pro- 
vincial governors  anywhere  within  fifty  miles  of  the  coast, 
and  the  absolute  control  of  the  military  and  financial  resources 
of  the  empire,  for  the  purpose  of  ending  the  intolerable  state 
of  things  brought  about  by  the  insolence  of  the  pirates.  It 
was  followed  next  year  (66  B.C.)  by  a  similar  measure,  trans- 
ferring to  him  the  command  against  Mithridates,  a  work 
which  kept  him  in  the  East  for  the  next  five  years.  Mean- 
while in  63  B.C.  had  occurred  the  Catilinarian  conspiracy,  the 
desperate  outbreak  of  the  extreme  revolutionary  party  led  by 
a  desperate  and  broken  man.  How  far  Caesar  was  implicated 
— he  was  then  praetor  elect — must  remain  a  question  of 
opinion,  but  we  may  notice  that  in  the  historic  debate  on  the 
punishment  of  the  ringleaders,  when  he  pleaded  for  modera- 
tion in  the  masterly  speech  of  a  great  statesman,  he  was  openly 
menaced  by  the  naked  swords  of  his  opponents,  and  that  when 
most  of  those  sitting  next  him  sheered  off  at  the  threatened 
danger,  Curio  was  one  of  the  small  band  who  drew  round 
their  leader  prepared  to  offer  resistance — that  same  Curio 
who  fills  such  a  pathetic  place  in  Caesar's  own  pages  in  the 
second  book  of  these  Commentaries.  We  may  also  observe 
that  it  was  by  Cato,  of  whom  we  are  also  to  hear  much,  that 


Introduction 


XV 


the  good  impression  made  by  Caesar's  speech  was  undone,  and 
the  judicial  murder  of  the  Catilinarians  forced  upon  the  Senate. 
We  can  now  pass  to  the  summer  of  the  year  60  b.c.  Pom- 
peius  had  landed  at  Brindisi  some  eighteen  months  before, 
and  to  the  great  relief  of  aU  parties  had  dismissed  his  army 
of  veterans  at  a  moment  when  empire  lay  in  the  hollow  of 
his  hand.  Caesar  arrived  home  from  Spain  outside  the  gates 
of  Rome  on  the  eve  of  the  consular  elections,  for  which  three 
weeks'  personal  canvassing  inside  the  city  was  required  by  law. 
He  must,  therefore,  either  renounce  his  triumph  for  his 
Spanish  operations  (since  military  command  in  Rome  ceased 
when  its  holder  crossed  the  city  boundary),  or  else  obtain 
a  dispensation,  a  course  certainly  not  without  precedent. 
Again  it  was  Cato  who  persuaded  the  Senate  to  reject  his 
demand ;  whereupon  Caesar  gave  up  his  triumph  and  was 
duly  elected  consvd  for  59  B.C.,  his  colleague  being  Marcus 
Bibulus,  who  figures  largely  in  the  Civil  War,  an  uncom- 
promising upholder  of  Senatorial  prerogative.  Into  the  acts 
of  his  first  consulship  we  need  not  enter  here.  Suffice  it 
to  say  that  Caesar  formed  an  alliance  with  Pompeius,  the 
master  of  many  legions,  and  with  Crassus,  no  less  the  master 
of  money  bags,  and  that  between  them  the  three  men  carried 
through  all  the  legislation  they  deemed  desirable,  including 
the  ratification  of  Pompeius's  settlement  of  the  East,  and  the 
various  problems  raised  by  his  great  extension  of  the  empire 
in  that  quarter.  This  political  alliance  was  sometime  this 
year  further  cemented  by  a  marriage  between  Pompeius  and 
Caesar's  only  daughter,  Julia,  who,  as  long  as  her  short  life 
was  spared,  continued  to  act  as  a  strong  bond  of  union  and 
potent  influence  for  good  between  the  two  statesmen.  At 
the  close  of  his  term  of  office  Caesar  went  oflE  to  his  new 


xvi  Introduction 

Governorship.  This  was  the  northern  part  of  Italy,  known 
then  as  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and  Illyricum,  now  represented  by 
Bosnia  and  the  Adriatic  provinces  of  Austria-Hungary,  These 
had  been  granted  him  for  five  years  by  another  of  those  Tri- 
bunician  laws  already  mentioned,  and  the  Senate  had  after- 
wards added  the  Transalpine  province  (the  old  Provence) 
where  danger  was  threatening  from  the  movements  of  power- 
ful Gallic  tribes.  What  his  work  was  there  is  known  to  all 
readers  of  his  own  Commentaries.  We  may,  however, 
notice  the  marked  difference  between  the  positions  at  this 
time  of  the  two  leading  men  at  Rome.  While  Pompeius  was 
virtually  at  the  close  of  his  military  career,  that  of  Caesar 
was  only  now  commencing.  It  was  not  exactly  a  case  of  the 
rising  and  the  setting  sun,  for  Pompeius  continued  for  the 
next  nine  years  to  be  easily  the  first  man  in  Italy  as  also  in 
the  eyes  of  the  Roman  world  in  general ;  but  from  the  time 
of  his  return  home  in  6l  B.C.,  until  he  unsheathed  his  sword 
against  his  rival  in  49  B.C.,  he  was  never  again  at  the  head  of 
an  army  in  the  field,  whereas,  with  trifling  interruptions 
Caesar  was  campaigning  aU  the  while. 

We  need  not  follow  either  the  fortunes  of  Caesar  in  Gaul 
or  those  of  Pompeius  in  the  capital  for  the  next  few  years. 
A  few  decisive  dates  must  however  be  noted.  Early  in  56  B.C. 
the  two  leaders  met  in  conference  at  the  city  of  Lucca  on  the 
Cisalpine  frontier  (for  no  Roman  governor  might  leave  his 
province),  where  it  was  arranged  that  Pompeius  and  Crassus 
should  share  the  consulship  for  the  next  year,  to  be  followed 
by  an  important  grant  of  provinces  and  armies,  at  the  same 
time  that  Caesar's  own  command  was  extended  for  five  years 
more.  The  triumvirs  naturally  had  their  way,  and  at  the 
close  of  the  year  55  B.C.,  Crassus  went  ofi  to  his  death  at  the 


Introduction  xvif 

hands  of  the  Parthians  In  the  great  Roman  disaster  of  Carrhae, 
whilst  Pompeius  stayed  at  home  as  proconsul  and  preferred  to 
govern  his  Spanish  provinces  by  two  of  his  trusty  lieutenants- 
general.  So  things  continued  till  52  B.C.,  when  the  constant 
rioting  and  utter  lawlessness  prevailing  in  Rome  caused  Pom- 
peius to  be  nominated  sole  consul  by  the  Senate,  and  given 
supreme  power  to  meet  the  crisis.  Martial  law  was  pro- 
claimed, and  the  capital  overawed  by  the  presence  of  the 
legions  which  Pompeius  was  now  commissioned  to  raise.  It 
is  from  this  year  onward  that  the  rift  between  him  and  Caesar 
begins  to  widen.  Crassus  was  dead,  and  Julia,  the  well- 
beloved  wife  and  daughter,  was  dead  also,  and  thus  had 
disappeared  together  the  two  strongest  influences  for  peace. 
Caesar  was  in  the  throes  of  a  terrible  uprising  of  the  Gauls 
which  threatened  to  wreck  all  his  work,  and  for  the  time  was 
powerless  to  intervene  in  city  politics.  No  wonder  then  that 
ancient  historians  represent  Pompeius  at  this  period  as  vir- 
tually monarch.  But  though  Caesar  perforce  acquiesced  in 
this  aggrandizement,  yet  his  adherents  managed  to  obtain 
some  sort  of  counterpoise  in  their  master's  interest.  It  is  at 
this  point  we  reach  what  is  technically  known  as  the  question 
between  Caesar  and  the  Senate,  and  as  it  is  inextricably  bound 
up  with  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  it  is  highly  important 
to  hold  it  clearly  before  our  minds. 

According  to  the  usual  explanation  of  this  question, 
Caesar's  command  expired  on  March  I,  49  B.C.,  and  he 
desired  election  that  summer  for  the  consulship  of  48  B.C. 
During  his  long  absence  from  the  capital  the  animosity  of 
his  opponents  had  only  intensified,  and  with  Cato  at  their 
head  they  were  now  eagerly  waiting  their  chance  to  impeach 
him  for  numerous  acts  in  his  province,  as  soon  as  ever  he 

LONG  \j 


xviii  Introduction 

appeared  in  Rome  for  the  elections.  He  would  then  be 
merely  a  private  citizen,  and  as  such  amenable  to  prosecu- 
tion. At  his  request  therefore,  and  presumably  with  the 
approval  of  Pompeius,  a  law  was  passed  this  year  (52  b.c.) 
by  the  whole  coUege  of  ten  tribunes,  granting  him  dispensa- 
tion from  a  personal  canvass,  a  course  that  had  been  refused 
him  in  60  b.c.  Doubtless  this  was  a  privilege,  but  it  was  one 
well  within  constitutional  usage,  and  it  issued  from  the  fount 
of  all  honour,  viz.  the  People.  So  far  so  good :  Caesar's 
position  seemed  secured,  and  no  interval  would  elapse  between 
his  old  command  as  proconsul  and  his  new  status  as  consul. 
As  an  actual  magistrate  of  the  Republic  he  would  be  inviolate, 
and  Cato  and  his  clique  would  have  to  wait  at  least  another 
year  for  their  revenge.  We  have  said  his  governorship  expired 
on  March  i,  49  b.c,  but  he  would  not  naturally  be  succeeded 
in  his  provinces  until  January,  48  b.c.  Since  Sulla's  time 
governors  had  proceeded  to  their  provincial  commands  imme- 
diately after  their  year  of  office  in  Rome,  and  as  Caesar  would 
still  be  in  legal  possession  on  January  i,  49  b.c,  his  provinces 
would  not  form  part  of  those  taken  by  the  magistrates  of 
50  B.C.  but  of  49  B.C.,  and  Caesar  would  be  left  undisturbed 
until  succeeded  in  January,  48  b.c  But  this  did  not  suit  his 
enemies,  and  in  this  year  (52  b.c)  of  Pompeius's  sole  consul- 
ship a  law  was  passed  entirely  altering  the  method  of  provincial 
appointments,  and  ordaining  that  five  years  should  elapse 
between  a  magistracy  at  home  and  a  governorship  abroad. 
Nominally  it  was  aimed  at  the  gross  malpractices  in  Roman 
elections,  since  it  was  thought  that  people  would  not  gamble 
so  heavily  for  power,  if  they  had  to  wait  five  years  before 
recouping  themselves  from  the  unlucky  provincials ;  but  in 
reality  it  was  directed  against  Caesar,  and,  from  the  point  of 


Introduction 


XIZ 


view  of  its  authors,  was  a  most  masterly  stroke.  For  it  enabled 
the  Senate  to  produce  a  candidate  for  the  Gallic  succession 
immediately  Caesar's  command  expired,  i.e.  on  March  I, 
49  B.C.,  and  Caesar  would  then  be  left  a  mere  private  citizen 
at  the  full  mercy  of  his  antagonists.  Moreover,  one  of  its 
clauses  expressly  enacted  that  all  candidates  must  canvass  in 
person ;  and  when  the  inconsistency  of  this  with  the  earlier 
law  of  the  ten  tribunes  was  pointed  out  to  Pompeius,  the 
latter  met  the  objection  by  adding  a  rider,  after  the  measure 
had  already  been  passed  and  lodged  in  the  archives,  that 
Caesar's  position  would  not  be  effected  thereby.  The  legal 
value  of  this  was  of  course  absolutely  nil.  How  far  Pompeius 
acted  in  good  faith  it  is  impossible  now  to  say :  he  was  no 
politician,  and  he  may  well  have  been  capable  of  such  a  simple 
blunder.  But  at  all  events  the  prejudicial  effect  on  Caesar's 
own  position  is  beyond  dispute.  The  next  year,  51  B.C.,  an 
attempt  was  made  by  one  of  the  consuls  to  raise  the  question 
of  his  succession,  but  Pompeius  effected  a  postponement  until 
March  i,  50  B.C.,  and  when  that  day  arrived  it  was  once  more 
shelved.  It  was  now  rapidly  becoming  clear  to  both  parties 
that,  without  considerable  concessions  from  one  side  or  the 
other,  civil  war  was  inevitable.  That  Caesar  did  not  want  war 
admits  of  no  doubt,  but  unless  some  compromise  could  be 
arranged  which  would  equalize  the  position  of  the  two  pro- 
tagonists at  Rome  when  Caesar  laid  down  his  command,  war 
was  the  only  solution.  We  may  speak  of  Caesar,  if  we  will, 
as  the  arch-rebel,  and  perhaps  technically  he  was  unjustified 
in  disputing  the  orders  of  the  Senate,  supposing,  that  is,  that 
the  Senate  was  still  the  governing  body  at  Rome.  But  most 
people  vsdll  agree  that  this  was  not  the  case,  and  that  the 
Senate  had  long  ago  committed  political  suicide.     Indeed,  it 

b2 


XX  Introduction 

is  just  this  refusal  on  the  part  of  the  senatorial  party  to  face 
accomplished  facts  and  to  readjust  their  attitude  to  the  new 
factors  in  the  empire's  administration,  that  at  once  justifies 
Caesar  and  puts  his  opponents  outside  the  pale  of  our  own 
sympathies.  Apart  altogether  from  personal  grounds,  it  was 
impossible,  nay,  ridiculous  to  ignore  the  claims  of  a  public 
man  in  the  position  of  Caesar  after  his  ten  years  in  Gaul,  or 
to  deny  his  right  to  be  considered  in  the  settlement  of  the 
immediate  political  future.  For  the  Senate  was  no  longer 
the  Senate  of  the  days  of  Hannibal ;  and  before  they  could 
claim  to  dictate  to  Caesar  they  should  first  learn  to  control 
Pompeius,  instead  of  stultifying  their  own  remonstrances  by 
abdicating  their  rightful  position  and  thereby  tacitly  admit- 
ting their  need  of  a  protector.  It  is  natural  to  see  in  Caesar 
the  invader  of  his  country  and  the  violator  of  its  constitution, 
and  if  it  were  a  question  merely  between  the  Senate  and 
himself,  this  view  might  possibly  be  maintained.  But  it  is 
a  travesty  of  facts  to  regard  the  Senate  at  this  time  as  the 
palladium  of  Roman  liberty  entrenched  behind  the  sacred 
bulwarks  of  the  constitution,  and  Caesar  as  the  ruthless 
destroyer  of  those  liberties.  The  position  of  Pompeius  must 
always  invalidate  all  such  contentions,  and  the  appeal  to 
constitutionalism  becomes  a  mere  legal  quibble  in  face  of  the 
incontestible  fact  that  the  constitution  had  long  broken  down, 
and  for  several  years  past  been  in  a  state  of  suspended  anima- 
tion. Either,  then,  the  Senate  must  justify  its  claim  to  rule 
by  ordering  the  simultaneous  surrender  of  their  provinces  and 
armies  from  both  its  great  proconsuls,  or  these  two  must  fight 
out  between  them  the  question  of  mastership  over  the  Senate. 
Caesar's  proposals  accordingly  were  directed  along  the  lines 
of  the  first  of  these  two  alternatives.     It  is  not  easy  to  discover 


Introduction  xxi 

the  true  order  of  development  between  the  month  of  March, 
50  B.C.,  and  the  outbreak  of  hostilities  in  January,  49  B.C. 
There  were  various  proposals  and  counter-proposals,  as  always 
before  a  great  war,  and  these  were  doubtless  repeated  on  more 
than  one  well-marked  occasion  :  consequently  we  find  our 
authorities  diflfering  considerably  in  detail  as  to  the  actual 
march  of  events.  But  the  main  outlines  are  clear,  and  we  are 
left  in  no  real  doubt  as  to  the  nature  of  the  concessions  made 
by  either  party.  We  know  that  sometime  in  this  year  (50  B.C.), 
at  a  full  meeting  of  the  Senate,  three  distinct  resolutions  were 
put  to  the  vote.  First,  that  Pompeius  should  be  relieved  of 
his  present  military  command — rejected  almost  unanimously  : 
secondly,  that  Caesar  be  so  relieved — as  unanimously  carried : 
thirdly,  at  the  instance  of  Caesar's  supporters,  that  both 
should  simultaneously  resign — carried  unanimously,  or,  accord- 
ing to  one  report,  by  370  votes  to  22.  If  the  mind  of  the 
Senate  can  be  deduced  from  these  decisions,  it  is  surely  that 
they  would  gladly  be  free  of  both  encumbrances,  but  that 
being  between  the  devil  and  the  deep  sea,  they  hated  Caesar 
better  than  they  loved  Pompeius.  Later  on  in  the  year  we 
also  know  that,  after  careful  inquiries  made  by  his  repre- 
sentatives, Caesar  put  forward  the  following  propositions. 
He  would  give  up  the  Transalpine  province  and  the  vast  bulk 
of  his  veteran  army,  if  allowed  to  retain  either  the  Cisalpine 
(Northern  Italy)  with  two  legions,  or  it  and  lUyricum  with 
one  :  these  he  would  also  surrender  if,  and  when  elected 
consul  according  to  the  privilege  previously  granted  him. 
These  concessions  Pompeius  is  said  to  have  accepted,  but  the 
consuls  to  have  rejected.  The  chief  champion  of  Caesar 
among  the  magistrates  had  hitherto  been  the  tribune  Caius 
Scribonius  Curio,  already  mentioned  in  connexion  with  the 


xxii  Introduction 

Catilinarian  conspiracy,  whose  services  Caesar  is  said  to  have 
bought  this  year  by  paying  off  his  very  considerable  debts. 
His  pow^ers  expired  on  December  lo,  when  the  new  tribunes 
would  enter  upon  office.  Amongst  these  the  two  definitely 
professed  Caesarians  were  Marcus  Antonius  (Mark  Antony) 
and  Quintus  Cassius.  Caesar  had  meanwhile  come  south  to 
Ravenna,  and  was  there  joined  by  Curio  at  the  close  of  his 
tribunate,  who  brought  with  him  a  full  account  of  the  situa- 
tion, and  urged,  as  some  ancient  historians  tell  us,  an  instant 
appeal  to  the  sword.  Caesar,  however,  made  one  last  attempt 
at  peace  and  sent  back  Curio  with  what  practically  constituted 
his  ultimatum.  This,  as  far  as  one  can  judge,  still  left  open 
his  earlier  proposals ;  but,  while  suggesting  that  both  Pom- 
peius  and  himself  should  lay  down  their  commands,  clearly 
stated  his  intention  of  not  doing  so  alone.  Curio  is  said  to 
have  travelled  the  150  English  miles  in  three  days,  and  to  have 
reached  Rome  with  his  dispatch  on  the  first  day  of  the  New 
Year,  just  as  the  new  consuls  were  entering  the  Senate  House. 
Here  we  may  fittingly  leave  the  story,  and  for  the  sequel 
turn  to  Caesar's  own  written  account  in  the  pages  that  follow. 
§  2  It  will  help  our  study  of  this  great  war,  which  so  changed 
the  face  of  history,  if  we  first  review  the  military  forces  at 
the  disposal  of  either  combatant.  On  Caesar's  side  this  fortu- 
nately presents  no  difficulty.  In  53  B.C.  we  know  that  he 
had  eleven  veteran  legions  in  Gaul,  viz.  ten  of  his  own, 
numbered  respectively  from  the  sixth  to  the  fifteenth,  and 
one,  the  first,  lent  him  by  Pompeius.  In  50  b.c.  the  Senate 
had  ordered  the  two  commanders  to  surrender  one  legion 
each  for  a  threatened  Parthian  War.  Caesar  sent  the  fifteenth 
and  Pompeius  selected  the  one  then  serving  with  his  rival 
The  whole  thing  was  notoriously  a  trick  against  Caesar,  but 


Introduction  xxiii 

the  result  was  to  reduce  his  establishment  to  nine  veteran 
legions.  The  winter  quarters  of  these  we  know  from  the 
last  book  of  the  Gallic  War  to  have  been  as  follows  : — four 
in  Belgium  under  Trebonius,  four  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
Macon  under  Fabius,  and  one,  the  thirteenth,  in  the  Cisalpine 
under  Caesar  himself.  The  late  Colonel  Stoffel,  to  whose 
work  on  Caesar's  campaigns  every  reader,  especially  every 
military  reader,  should  be  referred,  has  calculated  from  notices 
of  these  legions  occurring  in  the  Civil  War,  that  orders  for 
concentration  must  have  been  sent  to  Fabius  and  Trebonius 
not  later  than  December  20,  i.e.  three  weeks  before  the  actual 
outbreak  of  hostilities.  In  all  probability  Fabius  dispatched 
half  of  his  division,  i.e.  two  legions,  to  reinforce  Caesar  in 
Northern  Italy,  and  then  with  the  other  half  moved  south  to 
the  neighbourhood  of  Narbonne,  whilst  Trebonius  also  came 
south  to  replace  Fabius,  with  orders  to  transfer  one  of  his 
four  legions  to  the  now  weakened  command  of  his  colleague. 
If  these  movements  on  the  northern  side  of  the  Alps  are 
a  little  problematical,  it  is  at  least  certain,  on  the  testimony 
of  all  ancient  authorities,  that  Caesar  began  the  war  with 
only  a  single  legion,  however  much  he  might  know  that  others 
were  hurrying  to  reinforce  him.  It  becomes  therefore  a  point 
of  considerable  historical  and  military  value  to  determine  the 
actual  strength  of  his  opponent.  Unfortunately  this  is  by 
no  means  easy.  From  various  notices  in  Roman  historians 
we  might  conjecture  that  at  the  beginning  of  49  B.C.  there 
was  a  really  powerful  military  force  on  foot  in  Italy.  We 
know  that  in  52  b.c.  Pompeius  had  been  commissioned  to  raise 
troops  for  the  restoration  of  public  order,  and  that  these  did 
actually  garrison  Rome  and  perhaps  other  parts  of  the  country. 
But  we  neither  know  their  numbers   nor    how  long  they 


xxiv  Introduction 

remained  embodied.  From  the  language  not  only  of  Caesar 
but  of  other  writers  it  seems  likely  that  Pompeius  was  not  the 
only  commander  in  Italy  at  this  time  at  the  head  of  at  least 
a  nominal  field  force,  and  Suetonius  says  that  one  reason  for 
Caesar's  proposal  for  an  all-round  disbandment  was  that  he 
knew  if  things  came  to  a  pinch  he  could  recall  his  own  veterans 
to  the  colours  quicker  than  Pompeius  could  collect  his  raw 
troops.  On  the  other  hand,  these  notices  may  not  indicate 
more  than  the  levies  which  the  Senate,  under  Pompeius  and 
Domitius,  had  begun  to  raise  ever  since  the  autumn  of  the 
last  year  (50  B.C.).  There  is  indeed  one  well-known  expres- 
sion of  Pompeius  that  points  to  the  existence  of  a  considerable 
military  force  at  this  time.  He  told  the  Senate  that  he  had 
ten  legions  ready  to  take  the  field.  Those  who  like  Colonel 
Stoffel  scout  the  notion  of  Caesar's  invading  Italy  with  a  single 
legion  against  any  real  strong  opposition,  explain  this  by  the 
seven  legions,  mostly  veteran,  which  we  know  Pompeius  to 
have  had  in  Spain,  -plus  the  two  surrendered  by  Caesar  for  the 
Parthian  War,  -plus  some  4,000  men  said  to  have  been  hastily 
raised  by  Domitius.  Those  on  the  contrary,  like  Mommsen, 
who  believe  in  this  splendid  piece  of  audacity,  take  the  ten 
legions  to  have  been  all  Italian,  viz.  the  two  transferred  by 
Caesar,  plus  eight  lately  raised  by  conscription.  At  any  rate, 
in  coming  to  an  opinion  we  must  remember  that,  on  Caesar's 
own  testimony,  Pompeius  took  five  legions  with  him  when  he 
evacuated  Italy,  and  that  he  had  lost  130  battalions  in  Italy 
and  Spain.  Allowing  for  the  seven  Spanish  legions,  this  leaves 
us  six  for  Italy,  which,  when  added  to  the  five,  more  than 
make  up  the  required  ten.  No  doubt  these  figures  prove  the 
existence  of  numerous  bodies  of  troops  in  Italy  for  the  early 
part  of  49  B.C. ;  and  that  the  levies  organized  throughout  the 


Introduction 


XXV 


country  resulted  in  such  a  force  cannot  be  denied.  But  how 
far  they  can  be  said  to  have  constituted  an  army  is  a  very 
different  matter,  and  we  shall  probably  not  be  wrong,  especi- 
ally in  face  of  the  repeated  outcry  about  want  of  preparations 
raised  by  Cicero  and  others,  if  we  decide  with  Stoffel  that 
Caesar,  who  knew  his  business,  did  not  run  much  risk  in  seizing 
Northern  and  Central  Italy  with  only  the  Thirteenth  legion, 
at  a  time  when  the  forces  of  his  opponent  had  barely  passed 
out  of  the  hands  of  the  recruiting  sergeants.  As  far  as  Pom- 
peius  is  concerned,  then,  the  distribution  of  troops  for  the 
opening  of  49  B.C.  will  be  firstly,  seven  legions  in  the  Spanish 
Peninsula,  too  far  away  to  affect  the  fate  of  Italy,  even  if,  as 
Appian  says,  they  were  intended  as  a  striking  force,  prepared 
to  go  anywhere  at  a  moment's  notice.  What  this  force  might 
have  effected,  had  the  fleet  been  ready,  is  an  interesting  specu- 
lation ;  but  it  took  another  twelve  months  before  the  naval 
forces  were  fully  organized,  and  by  that  time  the  Spanish 
army  had  ceased  to  exist.  Secondly,  there  are  the  two  sur- 
rendered Caesarian  regiments,  both  of  very  doubtful  loyalty, 
now  wintering  in  Apulia  ;  and  lastly,  a  mass  of  heterogeneous 
recruits,  in  all  stages  of  mobilization,  but  capable  of  forming, 
when  fully  drilled  and  equipped,  another  eight  or  nine  com- 
plete legions.  Thus  we  shall  conclude  that  Pompeius's  ex- 
aggeration lay  not  in  the  numbers,  but  in  the  quality  of  the 
troops  he  claimed  to  possess.  Numbers  however  apart,  there 
was  no  comparison  between  the  rival  forces.  Caesar's  army 
was  perhaps  the  finest  military  instrument  that  history 
records,  and  the  parallel  between  it  and  Cromwell's  Iron- 
sides has  become  proverbial.  Officers  and  men  alike  were 
veterans,  with  a  magnificent  record  of  conquest  behind 
them,  and  all  were  inspired  by  a  peculiar  devotion  to  their 


xxvi  Introduction 

leader.  Of  Caesar's  marshals  not  one  deserted  him  when 
the  crisis  came,  excepting  Labienus,  whose  disappointed 
ambition  drove  him  to  join  the  opposite  camp ;  and  the 
contest  was,  generally  speaking,  one  of  recruits  against 
veterans,  between  a  perfect  unity  of  command  on  the  one 
side  and  divided  counsels  and  vacillation  on  the  other. 

Finally  a  word  of  explanation  is  needed  on  the  Roman 
military  organization,  and  the  system  of  rendering  its  details  in 
English  adopted  for  this  version.  The  Roman  legion  has  here 
been  translated  '  regiment ',  and  it  consisted  of  ten  cohorts  or 
'  battalions '.  Each  battalion  contained  three  maniples  or 
*  companies ',  and  each  maniple  two  centuries  or  half-com- 
panies. The  latter  term  I  have  not  employed,  but  have 
spoken  of  the  century  as  itself  the  '  company ',  because  of  its 
nearer  numerical  approximation,  as  will  appear  below.  Each 
century  was  commanded  by  a  centurion,  of  whom  therefore 
there  were  six  in  a  battalion,  and  these,  where  the  Latin 
name  is  not  retained,  I  have  called  '  company  officers'.  There 
was  no  separate  commanding  officer  of  the  '  battalion ',  but 
the  regiment  or  legion  had  attached  to  it  six  military  tribunes, 
here  termed  '  regimental  officers '.  These  were  generally 
young  men  of  good  family,  appointed  partly  by  the  com- 
mander-in-chief, partly  by  popular  election,  who  held  this 
post  at  about  the  age  of  thirty  as  the  preliminary  step  in  the 
ordinary  career  of  office.  They,  with  the  centurions  (who 
represent  the  N.C.O.'s),  were  responsible  for  all  the  routine 
work  of  the  regiment,  but  in  actual  battle  their  powers  varied 
at  different  periods  and  under  different  generals.  In  Caesar's 
army,  though  their  position  still  preserves  much  of  its  earlier 
importance,  we  find  them  frequently  replaced  in  action  by 
a  special  staff  officer,  who  then  commands  the  whole  legion. 


Introduction  xtvii 

This  is  not  so  much  a  feature  of  the  Civil  War  as  of  the 
Gallic,  and  was  doubtless  determined  solely  by  circum- 
stances. As  to  the  numerical  strength  of  a  legion,  perhaps 
it  is  best  to  regard  it  as  essentially  an  unfixed  quantity.  In 
early  days  the  normal  figure  had  been  4,200.  On  occasion 
this  was  raised  to  5,000,  and  later  6,000  was  not  unknown. 
Perhaps  5,000,  the  number  often  substituted  by  Greek  writers 
as  an  equivalent,  may  be  fairly  taken  as  a  practical  basis  of 
calculation.  This  gives  500  for  the  '  battalion ',  and  about 
80  for  the  century  or  'company'.  But  it  is  of  the  utmost 
importance  to  remember  that  this  number  is  purely  con- 
ventional, and  that  the  effective  strength  of  any  unit  at  any 
given  time  would  vary,  as  it  does  to-day,  with  the  various 
circumstances  of  the  campaign.  To  take  an  example.  At 
the  battle  of  Pharsalus,  while  Pompeius's  battalions  averaged 
410  men,  Caesar's  were  only  275,  and  later  on  we  find  two 
entire  legions  mustering  but  3,200  men  between  them. 
While,  therefore,  we  may  advantageously  think  of  5,000  and 
500  in  mentally  translating  regiments  and  battalions  into 
round  numbers,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that,  unless  actual 
figures  are  given,  the  process  is  distinctly  hazardous.  Lastly, 
as  to  the  cavalry.  Each  legion  had  generally  attached  to  it 
a  body  of  300  mounted  men,  who  counted  as  part  of  the  regi- 
ment. But  the  mass  of  Roman  cavalry  was  always  composed  of 
foreign  auxiliaries,  like  our  own  Indian  horse,  and  was  drawn 
principally  at  this  time  from  Gauls,  Spaniards,  and  Germans. 

To  praise  the  Commentaries  of  Caesar  at  this  time  of  day  §  3 
is  to  be  guilty  almost  of  a  banality.     Their  beauty,  their 
strength,  their  stately  simplicity  of  language,  wedded  to  an 
unerring  precision  of  thought,  their  pure  Latinity  and  scorn 
of  meretricious  ornament,  at  once  proclaim  the  man  of  action 


xxvlii  Introduction 

and  the  finished  scholar  in  a  unison  such  as  the  world  has 
probably  never  seen  elsewhere.  No  English  version  can  ever 
reproduce  this  combination  of  great  qualities,  and  any  trans- 
lator is  sadly  conscious  of  how  the  author  would  have  con- 
demned his  work  for  one  fault  if  he  did  not  reject  it  for 
another.  But  even  in  a  translation  we  may  gain  much.  We 
may  familiarize  ourselves  with  the  working  of  a  powerful 
mind,  and  we  may  follow  the  steps  of  a  campaign  which 
certainly  changed  the  fortunes  of  what  was  then  the  civilized 
world.  The  study  of  Caesar  has  always  attracted  great  sol- 
diers, and  the  names  of  eminent  English  commanders  who 
have  had  his  campaigns  by  heart  will  readily  suggest  them- 
selves :  while  even  the  civilian  can  see  that,  apart  from 
changes  in  armament,  they  still  teach  the  main  outstanding 
factors  that  bring  success  in  war.  For  the  peculiar  value  of 
Caesar's  writings  lies  in  the  fact  that  he  wrote  for  a  public 
of  which  the  great  majority  were  themselves  soldiers,  accus- 
tomed to  command  men,  and  that  he  therefore  explains  in 
a  soldier's  language  the  military  principles  on  which  he  acted. 
The  Civil  War  is  a  more  readable  book  than  the  Gallic; 
its  theme  is  more  attractive,  it  has  more  artistic  unity, 
and  is  not  so  kaleidoscopic  ;  in  short,  it  is  a  better  story.  It 
deals  with  Caesar's  own  political  and  social  equals,  men  of 
his  own  race  whom  he  had  known  intimately  for  a  lifetime  ; 
consequently  the  characterization  is  proportionately  enhanced. 
And  lastly,  in  its  speeches  which,  like  all  ancient  historians, 
he  has  put  into  the  mouth  of  his  characters,  we  can  recover 
something  of  that  dignified,  courteous,  but  none  the  less  fiery 
eloquence,  which  made  him  inferior  as  a  speaker  not  even  to 
Cicero,  and  which  rendered  his  diction,  in  the  words  of  the 
greatest  of  Roman  critics,  even  '  imperial '  in  its  grandeur. 


\Cis-Alpine!i 
\.  Gaul 


BOOK   I 
ITALY  AND    SPAIN 

CHAPTER  I  i       ^ 

The  Outbreak  of  War 

When  Caesar's  dispatch  reached  the  consuls,  it  was  only  Jan.  1,49* 
the  urgent  representations  of  the  tribunes  that  gained  it 
a  hearing  by  the  House  ;  the  further  request  for  a  definite 
motion  on  its  terms  was  refused,,,  and  the  House  passed,  at 
the  instance  of  the  Government,  to  the  general  debate  upon 
public  affairs.  Lucius  Lentulus  pledged  his  support  to  the 
Senate  and  Republic,  provided  members  were  ready  to 
express  themselves  with  boldness  and  determination ;  but  any 
coquetting  with  Caesar  or  bidding  for  his  favour,  such  as 
they  had  shown  in  previous  years,  would  find  him  consulting 
his  own  interests  without  the  slightest  heed  to  their  decrees. 
'  He,  as  well  as  they',  he  added  significantly,  'had  his  line  of 
retreat  open  to  him  in  the  favour  and  friendship  of  Caesar.' 
Scipio*  spoke  in  similar  terms.  Pompeius  was  resolved  to 
stand  by  the  Republic  if  supported  by  the  Senate  ;  but  let 
them  hesitate  or  shrink  from  decided  measures,  and  any 
subsequent  appeal  to  his  aid,  should  they  afterwards  desire 
it,  would  only  be  made  in  vain.  This  speech  of  Scipio's  was  2 
taken  by  the  House  as  representing  the  actual  language  of 

*  Approximate  only,  owing  to  the  state  of  the  calendar,  which  was  some 
five  weeks  ahead  of  the  season.  Any  month  and  day  given  must  be 
corrected  accordingly.      Thus  Jan.  1,  49  becomes  abcut  Nov.  24,  50. 

'  Father-in-law  of  Pompeius  since  52. 

LONC  B 


2  Proceedings  in  the  Senate 

Jan.  49  Pompeius  ;  for,  although  they  were  met  within  the  city  walls, 
Pompeius  was  at  the  time  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Rome.^ 
O^her  and  more  conciliatory  measures,  it  should  be  noticed, 
had  been  previously  counselled  by  various  members  present. 
Marcus  Marcellus,  for  example,  in  addressing  the  House  had 
urged  that  it  was  premature  to  discuss  the  main  issue  till 
levies  had  been  completed  throughout  Italy,  and  armies  put 
into  commission  ;  under  whose  protection  they  could  then 
venture  to  formulate  their  wishes  with  liberty  and  security. 
Again,  Marcus  Calidius  had  a  proposal  that  Pompeius  should 
leave  Italy  and  go  off  to  his  provinces  '^,  thereby  removing  all 
pretext  for  war  ;  since  what  Caesar  feared  was  that  the  reten- 
tion near  the  capital  of  the  two  legions  lately  extorted  from 
him  by  the  Senate  should  look  like  a  deliberate  menace  from 
Pompeius  to  himself.  This  proposal  of  Calidius  was  repeated, 
with  slight  verbal  changes,  by  Marcus  Caelius  Rufus. 

They  were  one  and  all  made  the  object  of  a  savage  attack 
by  the  presiding  consul  Lentulus,  and  effectually  silenced  by 
his  scathing  satire  :  in  fact,  he  even  went  so  far  as  to  refuse  to 
put  the  motion  of  Calidius ;  whereupon  Marcellus,  alarmed 
at  the  growing  storm  of  obloquy,  withdrew  that  standing  in 
his  name.  The  result  was  that  this  language  of  the  consul, 
backed  up  by  the  terrorizing  effect  of  the  presence  of  the 
army,  together  with  the  open  threats  of  Pompeius's  friends, 
succeeded  in  forcing  the  House,  against  the  convictions  of  the 
majority,  to  adopt  the  motion  of  Scipio,  whereby  Caesar  was 
to  disband  h"s  army  before  a  fixed  date  or  be  held  guilty  of 
open  treason.     This  resolution  being  vetoed  by  two  of  the 

'  As  holding  full  military  command  Pompeius  could  not,  without 
forfeiting  it,  enter  the  ancient  city  boundary. 

^  The  two  Spains,  then  governed  by  his  deputies.     See  Introd. 


Proceedings  in  the  Senate  3 

tribunes,  Marcus  Antonius  and  Quintus  Cassius,  the  legality  Jan.  49 
of  such  veto  was  immediately  challenged  ^  Extreme 
opinions  were  expressed,  and  the  applause  that  greeted 
each  speaker  from  the  ranks  of  Caesar's  opponents  was  in 
direct  proportion  to  the  bitter  and  vindictive  spirit  each 
displayed. 

It  was  evening  before  the  Senate  broke  up,  and  Pompeiu5  3 
at  once  summoned  to  a  conference  outside  the  city  all  who 
possessed  a  seat  in  the  House,  praising  their  recent  action  and 
stiffening  them  to  face  the  future,  while  rebuking  and  stimu- 
lating the  faint-hearted.  From  all  parts  of  the  country  large 
numbers  of  those  who  had  belonged  to  the  old  Pompeian 
armies  were  called  out  for  active  service,  induced  by  hopes 
of  plunder  and  high  military  rank ;  many  also  of  those  who 
were  attached  to  the  two  legions  lately  transferred  by  Caesar 
now  received  orders  to  be  in  attendance  ;  with  the  result 
that  the  city,  the  ascent  to  the  Capitol,  and  the  Comitium 
were  soon  crowded  with  regimental  officers,  centurions,  and 
reservists.  An  overflowing  meeting  of  the  House  was  shortly 
afterwards  held,  packed  with  the  friends  of  both  consuls,  and 
the  supporters,  not  merely  of  Pompeius,  but  of  all  who  nursed 
old  grievances  against  Caesar  ;  and  these,  by  their  chreatening 
language  and  imposing  numbers,  intimidated  the  weak-kneed, 
strengthened  the  waverers,  and  made  a  free  decision  for  most 
of  those  present  impossible.  An  offer  was  made  by  Lucius 
Piso,  one  of  the  censors  *,  and  Lucius  Roscius,  one  of  the 

*  Apparently  on  the  ground  that  the  proceedings  involved  the  appoint- 
ment to  consular  provinces,  which  was  exempt  from  the  veto. 

*  A  quinquennial  office,  lately  fallen  into  abeyance.  The  two  censors, 
when  appointed,  held  the  census,  revised  the  senatorial  register,  and 
supervised  Public  Works. 

B  2 


Proceedings  in   the  Senate 


Jan.  49  praetors,^  to  carry  a  report  of  these  proceedings  to  Caesar, 
six  days  only  being  asked  for  the  purpose  :  similarly  others 
urged  that  a  commission  be  sent  to  lay  before  him  the  mind 
of  the  House. 
4  To  all  alike  objection  was  raised,  and  all  alike  were  thwarted 
by  speeches  from  the  consul,  from  Scipio,  and  from  Cato. 
Cato's  opposition  was  due  to  long-standing  dislike  of  Caesar, 
increased  by  resentment  at  an  electoral  defeat.  The  action  of 
the  consul  Lentulus  was  dictated  by  the  colossal  proportions 
of  his  debts,  which  he  looked  forward  to  settling  by  the  com- 
mand of  an  army  and  provinces,  and  by  the  princely  profits 
to  be  made  out  of  foreign  king-making  :  indeed,  he  boasted 
in  private  that  he  would  be  a  second  SuUa,  into  whose  hands 
the  supreme  government  would  one  day  fall.  As  for  Scipio, 
his  motives  were  similar  ambitions  for  a  province  and  armies, 
the  command  of  which  he  thought  he,  as  a  relative,  would 
share  with  Pompeius :  to  this  must  be  added  his  fears  of  pro- 
secution, and  also  the  ostentatious  flattery  of  which  he  was  at 
this  time  the  subject,  not  merely  from  himself,  but  from  all 
his  most  powerful  contemporaries  in  the  political  and  legal 
worlds.  Finally,  in  the  case  of  Pompeius,  the  influence 
of  Caesar's  opponents  along  with  his  inability  to  tolerate 
a  rival  on  equal  terms,  had  induced  him  completely  to  with- 
draw his  old  friendship  and  to  resume  intimate  relations  with 
their  common  antagonists,  whose  enmity,  in  the  majority  of 
cases,  he  had  himself  fastened  upon  Caesar  in  the  old  days  of 
their  family  alliance.'^      In  addition  to  this,  the  public  stigma 

1  Eight  annual  magistrates  representing  the  Roman  Bench,  who  could 
however  command  troops. 

'  In  59  after  Caesar's  consulship  Pompeius  had  married  his  daughter  Julia 
who  died  in  childbirth  in  54. 


Proceedings  in  the  Senate  f 

attaching  to  the  affair  of  the  two  legions,  which,  instead  of  Jan.  49 
marching  for  Asia  Minor  and  Syria,  had  been  diverted  by  him 
to  secure  his  own  sovereignty,  drove  him  to  work  for  a  settle- 
ment by  the  sword. 

It  was  such  considerations  that  now  caused  everything  to  5 
be  hurried  through  in  disorder.  The  delay  asked  for  by 
Caesar's  friends,  in  order  to  acquaint  him  with  these  develop- 
ments, was  steadily  refused  ;  the  two  tribunes  of  the  people 
were  allowed  no  opportunity  either  of  protesting  again? t  their 
personal  peril,  or  even  of  maintaining,  in  the  form  of  the  veto, 
that  fundamental  right  of  their  office  which  had  been  left 
them  by  Lucius  Sulla.  The  seventh  day  of  the  New  Year 
saw  them  compelled  to  take  measures  for  their  personal  safety, 
such  as,  in  the  case  of  the  notorious  revolutionaries  of  the 
past,  had  generally  been  adopted  as  their  hazardous  refuge 
only  after  eight  months  spent  in  multifarious  political  acti- 
vity. Such  indecent  haste,  in  fact,  was  now  displayed,  that 
without  more  ado  recourse  was  had  to  the  very  last  weapon 
of  Senatorial  government, — the  well-known  '  final  decree  ', — 
which  no  amount  of  effrontery  in  popular  legislators  had 
ever  before  brought  to  a  division  in  the  House,  unless  indeed 
Rome  were  all  but  burning,  and  the  very  existence  of  the 
country  despaired  of, — the  decree  directing  consuls,  praetors, 
tribunes,  and  all  proconsuls  near  the  capital  to  take  measures 
for  the  safety  of  the  State.  This  order  was  embodied  in  a 
decree  of  the  House  dated  January  7 :  and  thus  within  the 
first  five  days  on  which  the  Senate  could  legally  be  convened 
since  Lentulus  entered  upon  office  (not  reckoning  the  two 
days  set  down  for  comitial  business),  a  decision  was  arrived 
at  of  extreme  severity  and  malignity  both  on  the  question  of 
Caesar's  military  command,  and  on  the  fate  of  two  distin- 


6  Proceedings  in  the  Senate 

Jan.  49  guished  tribunes  of  the  people.  The  latter  at  once  left  Rome 
and  fled  to  Caesar,  who  wa  then  at  Ravenna,  awaiting  an 
answer  to  his  very  moderate  demands,  and  still  hoping  that 
men's  general  sense  of  fairness  would  render  a  peaceful  solu- 
tion possible. 
6  The  next  few  days  the  Senate  met  outside  the  city  boun- 
dary. The  conduct  of  Pompeius  tallied  with  the  forecast 
given  of  it  by  Scipio.  After  commending  the  courage  and 
firmness  that  the  Senators  had  just  displayed,  he  proceeded 
to  lay  before  them  an  account  of  the  military  forces  at  his 
disposal,  which  were  not  less,  he  declared,  than  ten  fully  mo- 
bilized Roman  legions.  To  this  was  added  the  statement 
that  he  had  trustworthy  intelligence  that  Caesar's  troops 
looked  coldly  on  his  schemes,  and  could  neither  be  induced 
to  support  his  cause,  nor  to  follow  his  leadership.  Motions 
were  then  put  before  the  House  dealing  with  other  requisite 
measures.  It  was  proposed  that  enlisting  should  be 
organized  throughout  Italy;  that  Faustus  Sulla  should 
be  dispatched  without  delay  to  Morocco  {Mauretania) ; 
and  lastly,  that  Pompeius  should  be  supplied  with  money 
from  the  Treasury.  The  question  was  also  raised  of 
making  an  alliance  of  friendship  with  King  Juba,'  but 
the  consul  Marcellus  refused  for  the  present  to  entertain 
this  idea  ;  whilst  the  proposal  concerning  Faustus  was 
vetoed  by  Philippus,  one  of  the  tribunes.  The  rest  were 
duly  embodied  in  regular  decrees.  It  was  further  deter- 
mined to  give  commands  of  provinces  to  men  not  then  in 
office,  two  of  these  to  be  consular  and  the  rest  praetorian. 
Of  the  former  Syria  fell  to  Scipio,  Gaul  to  Lucius  Domitius. 
By  a  clandestine  arrangement  Philippus  and  Cotta  were 
^  Oi  Niimidia  (Algeria).     See  Bk.  II,  ch.  3. 


Caesar^s  Appeal  to  his  Troops  7 

passed  over,  neither  of  their  lots  being  thrown  in.  To  the  Jan.  49 
remaining  provinces  ex-praetors  were  sent  out ;  and  these, 
without  waiting  for  the  legal  confirmation  of  their  command 
by  the  people,  after  offering  the  customary  state-prayers, 
immediately  left  the  capital  in  full  military  attire.  The  con- 
suls, acting  against  all  precedent,  took  their  departure  from 
the  city,  whilst  inside  and  on  the  Capitol  lictors  were  seen  in 
attendance  on  men  no  longer  in  office,  a  sight  unexampled 
in  the  history  of  the  commonwealth.  Over  the  whole  of 
Italy  troops  were  being  enlisted,  arms  commandeered,  money 
levied  on  the  country  towns  and  even  plundered  from  the 
temples ;  in  short,  every  distinction  between  the  claims  of 
the  State  and  of  religion  was  obliterated. 

Caesar  no  sooner  had  intelligence  of  these  proceedings  7 
than  he  appealed  to  his  troops.  After  recounting  in  detail  the 
wrongs  he  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  his  political  opponents, 
he  charged  Pompeius  with  having  allowed  his  mind  to  be 
misled,  and  his  judgement  to  be  warped  by  the  pernicious 
influence  these  exerted  upon  him,  owing  to  the  petty  jealousy 
he  felt  at  his  rival's  reputation  ;  and  that,  despite  the  fact 
that  that  rival  had  himself  always  actively  supported  the  power 
and  prestige  of  Pompeius.  A  further  grievance  was  the 
establishment  of  an  unwarrantable  precedent  in  the  consti- 
tution, when  military  force  was  invoked  to  annul  and  to  over- 
ride the  tribunes'  power  of  veto — that  same  veto  which  in 
past  years  had  only  been  restored  by  a  similar  appeal  to  force. 
Even  Sulla,  who  stripped  the  tribunician  office  of  all  its  func- 
tions, yet  left  it  the  free  exercise  of  the  veto  ;  Pompeius,  who 
was  regarded  as  the  restorer  of  their  lost  privileges,  had 
actually  succeeded  in  robbing  them  of  what  they  had  always 
enjoyed.     Again,  on  every  occasion  when  the  well-known 


8  Caesar*s  appeal  to  his  Troops 

Jan.  49  decree  had  been  passed  for  the  magistrates  '  to  see  to  it  that 
the  country  take  no  harm  ' — the  statutory  formula  for  sum- 
moning the  Roman  people  to  arms — it  had  been  at  a  time 
either  of  the  promulgation  of  some  obnoxious  legislation,  of 
some  violence  offered  by  a  tribune,  or  of  some  popular 
disturbance ;  and  then  only  after  the  temples  and  city  heights 
had  already  been  seized.  How  such  revolutionary  attempts 
in  past  history  had  been  avenged  by  the  downfall  of  Saturninus 
and  the  Gracchi,  he  next  reminded  them.  Yet  of  these 
circumstances  not  one  had  at  this  time  arisen  or  been  even 
thought  of :  no  law  had  been  promulgated,  no  popular  legis- 
lation proposed,  no  disturbance  taken  place.  He  called  upon 
them  now  to  protect  from  political  adversaries  the  honour 
and  good  name  of  their  commander,  under  whose  leadership 
for  nine  long  years  they  had  fought  with  such  brilliant  success 
the  battles  of  their  country,  during  which  time  they  had 
gained  such  numberless  victories,  and  subjugated  the  whole 
of  Gaul  and  Germany.^ 

The  men  of  the  Thirteenth  legion,  the  only  one  present, 
answered  with  a  cheer  (Caesar  had  summoned  this  regiment 
to  him  when  the  general  levy  in  Italy  began  ;  the  concentra- 
tion of  the  others  was  not  yet  completed),  '  they  were  ready 
to  protect  the  rights  of  their  commander  and  of  the  people's 
tribunes ' 
8  Assured  of  the  temper  of  his  troops,  Caesar  began  his  ad- 
vance with  this  legion  as  far  as  Rimini  {Ariminum)  "^^  where  he 

^  i.e.  W.  of  the  Rhine. 

'  Thereby  crossing  the  Rubicon,  the  small  stream  that  then  separated 
Italy  from  the  Cisalpine  Province.  '  We  can  still  go  back  ',  are  the  words 
attributed  to  him  by  later  writers,  '  but  once  cross  this  little  bridge,  and 
then  the  sword  must  settle  everything.'     Suet.  31. 


The  T^ubicon  crossed  9 

met  the  two  tribunes  who  had  lately  fled  to  his  protection  :  Jan.  40 
his  remaining  legions  he  ordered  out  of  their  winter  quarters 
with  instructions  to  follow  close  in  his  rear.  At  Rimini  he 
was  waited  on  by  young  Lucius  Caesar,  a  son  of  one  of  his  own 
generals.  This  young  man,  after  first  stating  the  primary 
object  of  his  mission,  went  on  to  explain  that  he  had  a  private 
message  from  Pompeius  to  Caesar  on  the  subject  of  their 
personal  relations.  This  was  to  the  effect  that  '  Pompeius 
desired  to  clear  himself  in  Caesar's  eyes,  so  that  the  latter 
should  not  take  as  an  insult  to  himself  what  had  solely  been 
dictated  by  public  exigencies ;  that  he  had  always  regarded 
the  claims  of  public  interests  as  prior  to  those  of  private  friend- 
ship, and  that  Caesar  similarly  should  now  show  his  true 
greatness  by  sacrificing  ambition  and  passion  to  the  general 
good,  and  not  allow  resentment  against  opponents  to  go  so 
far  as  to  involve  his  country  in  the  punishment  he  hoped  to 
inflict  upon  them'.  There  was  more  in  the  same  strain 
along  vnth  excuses  for  the  conduct  of  Pompeius  ;  and  a  very 
similar  appeal,  in  similar  language,  was  made  to  Caesar  by  the 
praetor  Roscius,  who  stated  that  he  had  it  from  Pompeius. 

Now,  although  this  episode  had  apparently  but  little  bearing  9 
on  the  removal  of  his  own  grievances,  yet,  finding  appro- 
priate agents  at  hand  for  conveying  his  vwshes  to  Pompeius, 
Caesar  begged  each  of  them  that,  as  they  had  brought  him 
Pompeius's  terms,  so  they  would  not  object  to  taking  back 
his  ovra  demands  to  Pompeius.  It  was  surely  worth  while 
to  go  to  a  little  trouble,  if  by  this  means  a  great  quarrel 
could  be  settled  and  the  whole  of  Italy  thus  freed  from  appre- 
hension. *  Let  them  then  understand  that  with  him  honour 
had  always  been  first, — dearer  than  life  itself.  This  honour 
had  been  wounded  when  the  privilege  granted  him  by  the 


I  o  Final  Negotiations 

J. in.  49  people  of  Rome  had  been  floutingly  snatched  from  him  by 
opponents,  and  when,  after  being  robbed  of  six  months'  com- 
mand, he  found  himself,  as  he  now  did,  dragged  back  to  the 
capital,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  a  resolution  allowing  his 
candidature  at  the  approaching  elections  to  be  accepted  in 
his  absence  had  been  expressly  passed  by  the  sovereign  peo- 
ple.' Though,  however,  he  had  borne  without  complaint, 
for  the  sake  of  public  peace,  this  curtailment  of  his  rights,  yet 
his  own  modest  suggestion  for  a  general  disarmament,  which 
he  made  in  a  dispatch  to  the  Senate,  had  been  bluntly  re- 
fused :  levies  were  even  now  proceeding  throughout  Italy  ; 
whilst  the  two  legions  which  had  been  detached  from  his 
command  on  the  pretext  of  a  Parthian  war,  were  still  de- 
tained at  home  :  in  short,  the  whole  country  was  in  arms. 
What  did  all  this  point  to  except  his  own  destruction  ?  Still, 
he  was  ready  to  stoop  to  every  humiliation  and  to  endure 
every  injustice,  if  thereby  he  could  save  the  commonwealth. 
Accordingly,  these  were  his  terms :  Pompeius  to  take  his 
departure  to  his  own  provinces,  and  both  to  disband  their 
armies  simultaneously  with  a  general  disarmament  in  Italy. 
That  would  allay  the  apprehension  of  the  country,  and  enable 
elections  and  the  whole  machinery  of  government  to  be  car- 
ried on  by  both  Senate  and  people  without  coercion.  Lastly, 
in  order  to  facilitate  the  settlement  by  giving  it  fixed  terms 
and  the  sanction  of  their  sworn  oath,  he  proposed  that  either 
Pompeius  should  advance  to  meet  him,  or  else  allow  a  visit 
from  himself ;  for  he  felt  confident  that  by  talking  matters 
10  over  all  differences  could  be  adjusted.'  With  this  message 
Roscius  and  Lucius  Caesar  came  to  Capua,  where  they  found 
the  consuls  and  Pompeius,  to  whom  they  delivered  Caesar's 
*  See  Introd. 


The  Senate  s  J^eply 


It 


stipulations.  After  due  deliberation  an  answer  was  returned  Ja11.-Fcb.49 
by  the  same  messengers,  who  thereupon  brought  back  the 
written  demands  the  other  side  had  to  make,  of  which  the 
following  represents  the  summary  :  '  Caesar  must  recross  the 
Rubicon,  evacuate  Rimini,  and  disband  his  army  ;  after  that, 
Pompeius  would  go  to  his  Spanish  provinces.  Meanwhile, 
until  a  pledge  had  been  given  that  Caesar  would  keep  his  word, 
the  consuls  and  Pompeius  would  continue  to  raise  troops.' 

It  was  obviously  a  one-sided  bargain  to  require  Caesar  to  11 
evacuate  Rimini  and  retire  upon  his  province,  whilst  his 
opponent  kept  both  provinces  and  legions  alike  to  which  he 
had  no  claim  :  to  propose  that  Caesar's  army  should  be  dis- 
banded, while  yet  proceeding  with  his  own  levy  :  or  again, 
to  undertake  to  go  to  his  province,  without,  however,  fixing 
a  date  for  his  departure.  The  consequence  of  this  last  pro- 
vision would  have  been  that,  supposing  at  the  close  of  Caesar's 
consulship  Pompeius  had  not  yet  left  Rome,  he  could 
not  justly  be  held  guilty  of  any  breach  of  faith  by  this 
refusal  to  quit  the  capital.  Finally,  his  omission  to  arrange 
an  interview  or  to  promise  any  visit  could  but  reduce  the 
chances  of  peace  to  a  minimum.  Accordingly  Caesar  dis- 
patched Marcus  Antonius  with  a  force  of  five  battalions  to 
seize  Arrezo  {Arretium),  whilst  he  himself  remained  with 
two  more  at  Rimini,  where  the  raising  of  fresh  troops  was 
forthwith  commenced.  At  the  same  time,  with  the  three 
remaining  battalions  of  his  single  legion  he  occupied  the  coast 
towns  of  Pesaro  (Pisaurum),  Fano  (Fanum),  and  Ancona. 

During   these  same   few  days  intelligence   reached   mm  12 
that  the  praetor  Thermus,  with  a  force  of  five  battalions 
was  at  Gubbio  (Iguvium),  engaged  in  fortifying  the  town,  the 
inhabitants  of  which  were  all  strongly  disposed  towards  him- 


12  Caesar's  T{apid  Advance 

Jan.-Feb.49  self.  Under  the  command  therefore  of  Curio  the  three 
battalions  stationed  at  Pesaro  and  Rimini  were  at  once  ordered 
to  the  place.  On  hearing  of  their  approach  Thermus,  who 
felt  no  confidence  in  the  temper  of  the  town,  hastily  withdrew 
his  garrison  ;  but  his  men  deserted  on  the  march  to  return  to 
their  homes,  and  Curio  was  then  left  to  receive  an  enthusiastic 
reception  into  Gubbio. 

The  report  of  these  proceedings  determined  Caesar  to  trust 
the  adhesion  of  the  country  boroughs,  and,  by  withdrawing 
the  battalions  of  the  Thirteenth  legion  then  garrisoning  them, 
to  march  upon  Osimo  (Auximum).  Tliis  town  was  then 
held  by  Attius,  who,  after  throwing  a  few  battalions  into  it 
as  a  garrison,  was  now  engaged  in  raising  troops  throughout 
the  whole  of  Piceno  {Picenum)  with  the  help  of  a  number  of 
senators  who  were  traversing  the  country  for  that  purpose. 
1 3  On  the  news  of  Caesar's  advance,  however,  the  town  coun- 
cillors of  Osimo  waited  in  a  body  upon  Attius  Varus,  and 
informed  him  that,  vsdthout  constituting  themselves  judges 
in  the  present  quarrel,  neither  they  nor  the  rest  of  the  town 
were  prepared  to  see  a  general  like  Caius  Caesar,  whose  public 
services  had  been  so  signal,  refused  admission  within  their 
walls ;  and  that  he  would  therefore  do  well  to  consult  his 
future  interests.  This  language  led  Varus  to  make  a  precipi- 
tate withdrawal  of  the  garrison  he  had  established  in  the 
town;  but,  overtaken  by  a  small  knot  of  infantry  from  Caesar's 
advanced  companies  and  compelled  to  give  battle,  he  found 
himself  deserted  by  his  troops,  who  either  dispersed  to  their 
homes  or  went  over  to  Caesar.  Amongst  them  was  Lucius 
Pupius,  the  senior  centurion  of  his  legion,  who  had  formerly 
held  that  post  in  the  army  of  Pompeius,  and  who  was  now 
brought  by  his  men  as  a  prisoner  to  Caesar.     The  latter. 


Caesar* s  J{apid  Advance  1 3 

after  congratulating  Attius's  troops  upon  their  decision,  dis-  Feb.  49 
missed  Pupius,  and,  in  thanking  the  townspeople  of  Osimo, 
told  them  he  would  not  forget  their  conduct. 

Meanwhile,  in  Rome,  such  a  panic  arose  from  the  accounts  14 
of  these  operations,  that  the  consul  Lentulus,  who  had  gone 
to  open  the  treasury  for  the  purpose  of  disbursing  the  money- 
voted  by  the  Senate  to  Pompeius,  fled  incontinently  from  the 
city,  leaving  the  more  sacred  of  the  two  treasuries  *  wide  open, 
owing  to  a  false  alarm  that  Caesar  was  momentarily  expected, 
and  his  cavalry  already  at  the  gates.  He  was  at  once  followed 
by  his  colleague  Marcellus,  and  by  the  majority  of  the  other 
magistrates.  Pompeius  had  left  the  capital  the  day  before, 
and  was  now  on  his  way  to  the  two  legions  taken  from  Caesar, 
which  he  had  distributed  in  winter  quarters  in  Apulia.  All 
levying  of  troops  was  at  once  suspended  in  the  vicinity  of  the 
city ;  no  place  was  thought  safe  north  of  Capua.  Here,  with 
their  confidence  at  last  recovered,  they  rallied,  and  began  to 
organize  a  levy  among  the  farmers  lately  settled  as  colonists  in 
that  district  by  the  Julian  law ;  ^  and  the  consul  Lentulus  even 
went  so  far  as  to  take  the  band  of  gladiators  maintained  there 
by  Caesar,  and  bring  them  out  into  the  market-place,  where, 
after  inciting  their  hopes  by  the  prospect  of  earning  their 
liberty,  he  gave  them  horses  and  placed  them  under  his  orders. 
A  subsequent  hint,  however,  from  his  friends  that  this  pro- 
ceeding was  universally  condemned,  compelled  him  to  dis- 
tribute them  for  custody  amongst  his  acquaintances  in  the 
Capuan  district. 

Meanwhile  Caesar,   advancing   from   Osimo   {Auximum),  15 

'  Containing  a  special  war  reserve,  originally  designed  to  meet  a  Gallic 
invasion. 

*  One  of  Caesar's  laws,  59. 


14  Flight  of  the  Government 

Feb.  49  overran  the  whole  of  the  Marches  of  Piceno  (Picenum).  He 
was  received  with  open  arms  by  all  the  country  towns,  who 
readily  supplied  his  army  with  all  it  needed.  Even  Cingolo 
(Ctngulum),  a  town  founded  by  Labienus  ^,  and  built  at  his 
personal  charges,  sent  a  deputation  to  inform  him  what 
great  pleasure  it  would  give  them  to  receive  his  commands ; 
and  on  his  ordering  troops,  sent  them  at  once.  By  this  time 
also  the  Twelfth  legion  overtook  him ;  and  with  these  two  he 
now  advanced  against  Ascoli  Piceno  (J senium  Picenum). 
That  town  was  held  by  a  force  of  ten  battalions  under 
Lentulus  Spinther ;  but,  on  the  news  of  Caesar's  approach, 
Spinther  evacuated  the  place,  and  endeavoured  to  take  his 
battalions  with  him.  Deserted,  however,  by  the  larger 
number,  he  continued  his  march  with  a  mere  handful,  until 
he  fell  in  with  VibuUius  Rufus,  who  had  lately  come  with 
a  special  commission  from  Pompeius  to  strengthen  the  hands 
of  his  party  in  the  Picenian  lowlands.  VibuUius,  on  hearing 
from  Spinther  the  state  of  operations  in  that  quarter,  took 
over  the  latter's  troops,  and  dismissed  their  commander.  He 
then  proceeded  to  concentrate  as  many  units  as  he  could 
from  the  Pompeian  levy  in  the  surrounding  districts,  amongst 
which  there  joined  him  six  battalions  under  Lucilius  Hirrus, 
whom  he  met  flying  from  Camerino  (Camerinum)  with  what 
had  formerly  been  the  garrison  of  that  city ;  and  in  this  way 
he  siicceeded  in  making  up  as  many  as  thirteen  battalions. 
These  he  then  led  by  forced  marches  to  Domitius  Ahenobar- 
bus  atPentima  (Corfiniumy,  to  whom  he  announced  the  near 
approach  of  Caesar  with  two  legions.     Domitius  himself, 

'  The  distinguished  general  who  had  deserted  Caesar.     See  Introd. 
'  Pentima  on  the  upper  Pescara  is  only  approximately  the  site  of  the 
ancient  Corfinium. 


The  j4dvance  continued  i  j* 

it  should  be  added,  had  also  collected  a  force  of  about  twenty  Feb.  49 
battalions  from  Albe  (Alba),  drawn  from  the  country  of  the 
Marsi,  Peligni,  and  neighbouring  districts  V 

Continuing  his  advance,  Caesar,  after  securing  Fermo  16 
(Firmum),  and  giving  orders,  upon  the  expulsion  of  Lentulus, 
to  search  out  the  troops  who  had  deserted  that  general,  and 
to  organize  a  levy,  had  halted  one  day  at  Ascoli  (Asculum)  to 
obtain  supplies,  and  had  then  started  for  Pentima.  Arrived 
here,  he  found  five  battalions,  thrown  forward  by  Domitius 
for  that  purpose,  engaged  in  cutting  the  bridge  that  spans 
the  river  '^  at  a  distance  of  some  three  miles  from  the  city. 
With  this  force  Caesar's  advanced  patrols  now  came  into 
contact,  vdth  the  result  that  Domitius's  men  were  driven 
from  the  bridge  and  retired  upon  the  town.  Caesar  quickly 
had  his  legions  across,  and,  halting  near  the  city,  pitched  his 
camp  close  up  to  the  walls. 

On  intelligence  of  his  arrival,  Domitius  selected  some  of  17 
those  conversant  with  the  country,  and  induced  them,  by 
the  offer  of  a  large  reward,  to  go  with  a  letter  to  Pompeius 
in  Apulia,  conveying  a  strongly-worded  appeal  for  succour. 
In  it  he  declared  his  belief  that  with  two  armies,  aided  by 
the  natural  difficulties  of  the  country,  it  would  be  an  easy 
task  to  surround  Caesar,  and  to  sever  his  communications ; 
failing  this,  the  lives  of  himself  and  more  than  thirty  battalions 
of  men,  as  well  as  those  of  numerous  senators  and  Roman 
knights  would  be  endangered.  In  the  interval  he  encouraged 
his  own  party,  placed  artillery  on  the  walls,  allotted  each 
officer  his  special  duties  in  the  defence,  and,  in  a  public 
harangue  to  his  troops,  promised  each  man  a  farm  of  twenty- 

*  The  Abruzzi. 

'  The  Aterno  or  Pesca'a. 


1 6  Italy  declares  for  Caesar 

Feb.  49  five  acres  out  of  his  own  landed  property,  with  corresponding 
increase  in  the  case  of  centurions  and  reservists. 
1 8  About  this  time  Caesar  received  information  that  the 
people  of  Salmone  (Sulmo),  a  town  seven  miles  from  Pentima, 
were  anxious  to  side  openly  with  him,  but  were  prevented  by 
Quintus  Lucretius,  a  senator,  and  Attius  the  Pelignian,  who 
were  holding  it  with  a  force  of  seven  battalions.  Accordingly 
Marcus  Antonius  was  dispatched  to  the  place  virith  five  bat- 
talions of  the  Thirteenth  legion  ;  with  the  result  that  the 
townspeople  no  sooner  recognized  the  gleam  of  our  standards 
than,  throwing  open  their  gates,  they  streamed  out,  soldiers 
and  citizens  alike,  to  welcome  Antony.  Lucretius  and  Attius 
meanwhile  tried  to  escape  by  leaping  from  the  walls ;  but 
Attius  was  caught  and  brought  back  to  Antonius,  whereupon 
he  requested  to  be  sent  to  Caesar.  Thus,  on  the  same  day 
as  he  had  come,  Antony  was  able  to  return  with  the  surren- 
dered battalions,  taking  Attius  along  with  him.  The  troops 
Caesar  incorporated  with  his  own  army  ;  Attius  he  dismissed 
without  penalty. 

Three  days  had  now  passed  before  Pentima,  spent  by  Caesar 
in  strongly  fortifying  a  camp,  in  collecting  provisions  from 
the  neighbouring  towns,  and  in  awaiting  the  arrival  of  his 
remaining  forces.  Indeed,  during  these  days  he  was  joined, 
not  only  by  the  Eighth  legion,  but  also  by  twenty-two 
battalions  from  the  new  levies  in  northern  Italy,  and  some 
three  hundred  cavalry  from  the  King  of  Noricum ' :  reinforce- 
ments which  enabled  him  to  form  a  second  camp  on  another 
side  of  the  town,  which  he  put  under  the  charge  of  Curio. 
On  the  following  days  he  commenced  the  circumvallation  of 
the  city  with  fortified  lines  of  entrenchment ;  and  the  work 
'  Roughly  Styria  and  Carinthia. 


The  Entanglement  of  Corfimum        1 7 

on  this  was  all  but  finished  just  as  the  messengers  sent  to  Feb.  49 
Pompeius  got  safely  back. 

As  soon  as  Domitius  had  read  the  letter  which  they  brought,  1 9 
he  determined  to  suppress  the  truth,  and  openly  announced 
in  a  council  of  war  that  Pompeius  was  about  to  make  a  rapid 
march  to  their  relief,  exhorting  his  staff  not  to  despair,  but 
to  make  every  preparation  for  the  defence  of  the  town.  To 
a  few  intimate  friends  he  divulged  the  real  answer,  and  began 
to  lay  plans  for  escape.  When  it  was  seen,  however,  that  his 
looks  did  not  accord  with  his  words,  and  that  his  whole 
manner  betrayed  more  haste  and  nervousness  than  had  been 
usual  with  him  on  previous  days  ;  and  further  that,  contrary 
to  his  ordinary  habit,  he  now  held  long  and  secret  conversa- 
tions with  his  friends  for  discussing  their  mutual  plans,  while 
he  shrank  from  attending  the  councils  of  war  and  from  the 
society  of  his  brother-officers,  the  truth  could  no  longer  be 
hidden  or  disguised.  This  was  that  Pompeius  had  written 
back,  flatly  declining  to  court  certain  disaster ;  and  intimating 
that,  as  Domitius  had  locked  himself  up  in  Pentima  in  oppo- 
iition  to  his  own  plans  and  wishes,  he  must  now  take  any 
opportunity  that  offered  for  rejoining  him  with  all  his  forces. 
It  was,  of  course,  to  prevent  this  very  step,  that  Caesar  was 
drawing  his  blockading  lines  around  the  city. 

When  the  scheme  of  Domitius  became  generally  known  jo 
amongst  the  troops  in  Pentima,  they  privately  summoned  an 
unauthorized  gathering  among  themselves  at  dusk;  and  using 
as  their  mouthpiece  one  of  their  officers,  together  with  the 
centurions  and  most  influential  of  their  own  rank,  expressed 
their  decision  as  follows.  '  They  found  themselves  blockaded 
by  Caesar,  whose  siege-works  and  fortifications  were  all 
but  finished.     Their  own  general  Domitius,  trust  and  confi- 

LONO  C 


1  8  Corfinium  surrenders 

Feb.  49  dence  in  whom  had  alone  induced  them  to  stay  and  hold  the 
city,  had  thrown  them  all  over  and  was  now  meditating 
flight  :  under  these  circumstances  it  was  their  duty  to  consult 
their  own  safety.'  From  this  resolution  the  Marsi  in  the  place 
at  first  strongly  dissented,  and  seized  upon  what  was  con- 
sidered the  most  strongly  fortified  quarter  of  the  town.  So 
bitter,  indeed,  grew  the  quarrel,  that  an  attempt  was  made 
to  come  to  blows  and  to  fight  it  out  with  weapons ;  but 
shortly  afterwards  the  envoys  who  were  dispatched  by  each 
party  to  the  other  enabled  the  Marsi  to  learn  what  they  did 
not  know  before,  viz.  the  contemplated  flight  of  Domitius. 
When  this  was  once  known,  the  two  forces  joined  hands,  and 
fetching  their  general  into  the  open,  surrounded  him  with 
a  guard.  They  then  sent  representatives  of  their  own  body 
to  Caesar,  with  a  message  that  they  were  prepared  to  open 
the  gates,  to  obey  his  orders,  and  to  deliver  Domitius  alive 
into  his  hands. 
21  On  receipt  of  these  overtures,  Caesar  at  once  felt  the 
extreme  importance  of  taking  possession  of  the  town  at  the 
earliest  possible  opportunity,  and  of  transferring  the  bat- 
talions in  it  to  his  own  camp.  There  was  always  the  chance 
of  the  garrison  changing  their  minds,  either  through  bribery, 
or  the  recovery  of  their  spirits,  or  by  false  reports  ;  grave 
events  in  war  being  often  determined  by  the  slightest  of 
accidents.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was  also  the  fear  that 
the  entry  of  his  troops  at  night  might  lead  to  excess  and  the 
looting  of  the  town.  Under  these  circumstances,  therefore, 
he  gave  the  envoys  a  cordial  welcome,  and  then  sent  them 
back  to  their  city  ;  whilst  to  his  own  men  he  issued  orders 
closely  to  watch  the  gates  and  walls.  He  further  stationed 
troops  on  the  incompleted  siege  works,  not,  as  on  previous 


Corfinium  surrenders  \y 

days,  at  fixed  intervals,  but  in  one  continuous  line  of  sentries  Feb.  49 
and  pickets,  so  that  the  men  could  touch  hands  with  each 
other  and  thus  cover  the  entire  chain  of  works.  Officers 
were  sent  round  on  tours  of  inspection,  strictly  charged,  not 
only  to  guard  against  salLcs  by  bodies  of  the  enemy,  but  also 
to  look  out  for  any  secret  ebcape  of  individuals.  That  night 
not  a  man  slept  in  camp,  however  careless  or  indifferent  he 
might  otherwise  be ;  but  engrossed  as  all  were  in  the  now 
rapidly  approaching  crisis,  they  continued  to  debate  in  their 
own  minds  the  various  aspects  of  the  issue,  as  they  wondered 
what  would  happen  to  the  Pentimians,  to  Domitius,  to  Len- 
tulus,  and  the  rest,  and  what  fate  was  in  store  for  each  group. 

About  six  o'clock  in  the  morning  Lentulus  Spinther  hailed  22 
our  sentries  and  guards  from  the  city  wall,  with  the  request 
that,  if  possible,  he  might  be  allowed  an  audience  with  Caesar. 
Leave  being  granted,  he  was  sent  out  from  the  town  under  an 
armed  escort  of  Domitius's  troops,  who  took  good  care  not  to 
leave  him  until  they  had  brought  him  safely  into  the  presence 
of  Caesar. 

He  began  with  an  impassioned  appeal  for  his  own  life, 
imploring  Caesar  to  spare  him,  and  reminding  him  of  their 
longstanding  friendship,  and  of  Caesar's  many  kindnesses  to 
himself — ^which  indeed  were  considerable  ;  including,  as  they 
did,  his  election  to  the  pontifical  college  ^,  his  appointment  to 
the  province  of  Spain  at  the  end  of  his  praetorship,  and  sup- 
port in  his  canvass  for  the  consulship.  Caesar  interrupted  his 
speech  by  telling  him  he  had  not  left  his  province  as  a  brigand, 
but  to  defend  himself  against  the  insults  of  his  opponents,  and 
to  restore  to  their  legal  position  tribunes  of  the  people  who 
had  been  driven  from  their  country  for  daring  to  uphold  his 

'   One  of  the  great  religious  corporations. 
C  2 


2  0  Caesar^ s  Justification 

Feb.  49  rights  :  in  a  word,  to  reassert  the  freedom  both  of  himself 
and  of  the  Roman  people,  at  present  ground  down  by  the 
despotism  of  a  clique.  Reassured  by  such  language,  Lentulus 
asked  leave  to  return  to  the  town,  intimating  that  his  own 
successful  petition  would  be  a  comfort  and  encouragement  to 
others  as  well,  some  of  whom  were  so  panic-stricken  as  to  be 
obliged  to  contemplate  laying  violent  hands  on  their  own  per- 
sons. His  request  was  granted,  and  he  then  withdrew. 
23  At  daybreak  Caesar  gave  orders  for  all  senators  and  their 
21  Feb. '  sons,  as  well  as  all  officers  and  Roman  knights,  to  be  brought 
before  him.  Of  the  senatorial  order  there  appeared  five 
representatives,  viz.  Lucius  Domitius,  Publius  Lentulus 
Spinther,  Lucius  Caecilius  Rufus,  Sextus  Quintilius  Varus 
(Domitius's  paymaster),  and  Lucius  Rubrius  :  the  others 
included  a  son  of  Domitius,  together  with  many  other  young 
lads,  and  a  considerable  number  of  knights  and  borough  coun- 
cillors, who  had  been  ordered  out  for  the  campaign  from  the 
local  towns  by  Domitius.  Arrived  in  his  presence,  Caesar 
first  placed  them  out  of  reach  of  the  abuse  and  gibes  of  his  own 
men,  and  then  addressed  them  in  a  few  curt  phrases,  seeing 
that  they  had  not  had  the  grace,  on  their  side,  to  acknowledge 
his  own  extraordinary  leniency  towards  themselves :  after  that 
he  released  them  all  without  condition.  A  sum  of  about 
j^50,ooo,  which  Domitius  had  taken  with  him  into  Pentima 
and  there  deposited  in  the  city  chest,  was  presently  brought 
out  by  the  four  city  magistrates.  It  was  at  once  returned  to 
Domitius  by  Caesar,  who  was  determined  men  should  not 
say  he  had  shown  more  self-restraint  in  dealing  with  their 
lives  than  with  their  property  ;  although  it  was  well  known 
that  this  particular  specie  was  in  fact  government  money,  re- 
^  According  to  Cicero. 


and  Alagnafiimity 


21 


ceived  from  Pompeius  for  the  payment  of  the  troops.  Having  Feb.  49 
settled  these  preliminaries,  he  gave  orders  for  Domitius's  men 
to  take  the  oath  of  military  allegiance  to  himself ;  and  then  on 
the  same  day,  striking  camp,  completed  a  full  day's  march, 
after  a  stay  at  Pentima  of  altogether  one  week.  An  advance 
through  the  districts  of  Ortona,  Lanciano,  Termoli,  and 
Larino  (the  Marrucini,  Frentani,  and  Larinates)  brought  him 
into  Apulia. 

To  return  to  Pompeius.  On  intelligence  of  the  operations  24 
round  Pentima,  he  had  left  Lucera  (Luceria),  and,  marching 
through  Canosa  (Canusium),  came  down  to  Brindisi  (Brundi- 
sium).  The  various  contingents  raised  by  the  recent  levy 
were  ordered  to  concentrate  upon  this  seaport  from  the  dif- 
ferent parts  of  the  country ;  whilst,  in  addition,  slaves  and 
herdsmen  were  armed  and  mounted,  till  they  made  up  a  force 
of  about  three  hundred  horse.  Lucius  Manlius,  one  of  the 
praetors,  followed  his  leader  in  all  haste  with  six  battalions 
from  Albe  {Alba)  ;  whilst  another  praetor,  Rutilius  Lupus, 
brought  three  more  from  Terracina.  Both  these  bodies  came 
in  sight  of  the  distant  cavalry  of  Caesar,  commanded  by  Vibius 
Curius,  and  each,  leaving  the  praetor  to  himself,  went  over  to 
that  officer.  The  same  thing  happened  on  the  remaining  stages 
of  the  march,  some  units  falling  in  with  Caesar's  main  column, 
others  with  his  cavalry.  In  addition  to  this,  the  colonel 
commandant  of  engineers  in  the  army  of  Pompeius,  Numerius 
Magius  of  Cremona,  was  captured  on  the  march,  and  con- 
ducted into  the  presence  of  Caesar.  The  latter  at  once  sent 
him  back  to  his  own  commander  with  the  following  message. 
'  Hitherto  he  had  been  refused  the  opportunity  of  an  inter- 
view ;  but  he  was  now  coming  to  Brindisi  {Brundisium),  and 
it  was  of  the  most  vital  public  interest  that  he  should  have 


2  2  The  Advance  continued 

Feb.  49  a  conference  with  Pompeius;  for  it  was  impossible  tomake  the 
same  progress  by  exchanging  proposals  through  the  medium 
of  others,  as  by  a  personal  discussion  on  all  the  points  at  issue.' 
25  Soon  after  sending  this  message,  he  himself  reached  Brindisi 
at  the  head  of  six  legions  :  three  of  these  consisted  of  veterans, 
while  the  rest  were  composed  of  the  recent  levies,  and  had  only 
been  brought  up  to  their  full  strength  during  the  recent 
march.  This  represented  all  his  force,  since  the  surrendered 
army  of  Domitius  had  been  sent  straight  away  from  Pentima 
(Corfiniurn)  into  Sicily.  On  arrival,  he  found  that  the  two 
consuls  had  crossed  to  Durazzo  (Dyrrachium)  with  the  bulk  of 
the  Pompeian  army,  but  that  Pompeius  himself  was  still  at 
Brindisi  with  twenty  battalions.  It  was  impossible  to  dis- 
cover whether  the  latter  remained  there  for  want  of  transports 
or  whether  his  intention  was  to  retain  a  hold  on  Brindisi, 
and  to  use  this  corner  of  Italy,  with  the  opposite  Greek  coast, 
as  a  base  for  keeping  command  of  the  Adriatic  ;  a  course 
which  would  allow  him  to  conduct  hostilities  simultaneously 
from  either  side.  Fearing,  however,  that  his  opponent  would 
not  think  it  advisable  to  abandon  Italy,  Caesar  determined  to 
block  the  entrance  to  Brindisi  harbour  and  render  it  im- 
practicable for  shipping.  The  method  employed  for  this 
was  as  follows.  Selecting  the  narrowest  part  of  the  harbour 
entrance,  he  built  out  from  either  shore,  where  the  water  was 
shallow,  a  sort  of  rough  breakwater,  carrying  a  broad  level  top. 
To  this  structure,  as  soon  as  the  deeper  water  rendered  further 
progress  impossible,  owing  to  the  rubble  no  longer  holding 
together,  a  couple  of  rafts  were  attached,  each  thirty  feet 
square,  one  at  either  end,  and  made  fast  by  four  anchors  from 
the  four  corners,  so  that  no  action  of  the  waves  could  shift 
them.     As  soon  as  the  first  pair  were  completed  and  placed  in 


Plan  of  Brindisi.  (Brundisium.) 


AA.   Inner    Harbour.  B.  Outer  Harbour 

C.  Islands  of  S?  Andrea  .  (Ancient  Barra,.) 

D.  Town  •  EE.  Caesar'.*  Moles. 


To  face  p.  23. 


operations  at  Brin.iisi  23 

position,  others  of  similar  dimensions  were  fastened  in  con-  March  ^i) 
tinuation,  and  over  all  a  smooth  surface  of  earth  was  laid, 
designed  to  give  a  free  road  to  his  men  when  charging  to  repel 
the  enemy.  Round  the  front  and  flanks  of  each  raft  were 
erected  protection-hurdles  and  mantlets  ;  whilst  every  fourth 
raft  carried  a  two-storied  tower  to  aid  in  beating  off  the 
assaults  of  the  enemy's  ships,  or  his  attempts  to  set  fire  to  the 
work. 

To  meet  this  device,  Pompeius  had  recourse  to  a  number  of  2^> 
large  merchantmen,  which  he  had  commandeered  in  Brindisi 
harbour.  These  vessels  were  specially  fitted  out  by  the  erec- 
tion on  their  decks  of  three-storied  towers,  armed  with 
numerous  pieces  of  artillery  and  every  species  of  missile 
weapon.  They  were  then  driven  against  Caesar's  works,  with 
the  object  of  breaking  through  the  line  of  rafts  and  injuring 
the  barricade ;  and  daily  engagements  between  the  two 
parties,  though  not  indeed  at  close  quarters,  were  carried  on 
by  means  of  slings,  arrows,  and  other  similar  weapons. 

These  operations,  though  necessarily  demanding  Caesar's 
most  careful  attention,  did  not,  however,  as  yet  cause  him  to 
despair  altogether  of  peace.  It  was  true  that  the  failure  of 
Magius  to  return,  after  being  expressly  sent  with  communica- 
tions to  Pompeius,  caused  him  considerable  misgiving  ;  it  was 
also  true  that  his  continued  efforts  in  this  direction  gravely 
compromised  his  plans  for  taking  military  initiative :  but  not- 
withstanding all  this,  he  felt  himself  bound  to  leave  no  stone 
unturned  in  the  pursuit  of  his  main  object.  He  therefore  dis- 
patched one  of  his  staff,  Caninius  Rebilus,  a  personal  friend 
and  relative  of  Scribonius  Libo,  with  a  commission  to  see  that 
officer,  and  to  beg  him  to  exert  his  influence  for  peace.  Above 
all,  he  requested  a  personal  conference  with  Pompeius,  and 


24  Further  Futile   'Negotiations 

March  49  again  stated  his  firm  conviction  that  if  this  could  only  be 
brought  about,  a  peaceful  solution,  honourable  to  both  par- 
ties, would  be  arrived  at.  Should  this  result  be  attained,  most 
of  the  credit  and  reputation  attaching  to  it  w^ould  belong  to 
Libo,  whose  active  intervention  would  then  have  prevented 
a  civil  war.  Libo  went  straight  from  this  conversation  with 
Caninius  to  Pompeius ;  only,  however,  to  return  with  the 
message  that,  in  the  absence  of  the  two  consuls,  no  steps 
towards  a  settlement  could  be  taken.  With  this  last  answer 
to  efforts  continually  repeated,  and  repeated  in  vain,  Caesar 
came  to  the  reluctant  conclusion  that  the  time  for  such  mea- 
sures had  now  gone  by,  and  that  henceforward  the  war  must 
be  prosecuted  with  vigour. 
37  The  sea-mole  he  was  building  was  about  half  finished,  after 
nine  days'  work  spent  upon  it,  when  the  transports  which  had 
conveyed  the  van  of  the  Pompeian  army  across  to  Durazzo 
{Dyrrachium)  returned  from  the  consuls,  and  safely  entered 
Brindisi.  Thereupon,  whether  it  was  that  he  became  nervous 
at  Caesar's  blockading  piers,  or  that  his  plan  of  campaign  had 
all  along  been  to  let  Italy  go — at  all  events,  with  the  arrival 
of  these  ships,  Pompeius  commenced  preparations  for  eva- 
cuation. In  order,  however,  to  break  the  force  of  an  attack 
from  Caesar's  troops,  should  the  latter  storm  the  town  at 
the  moment  of  withdrawal,  he  caused  the  city  gates  to  be 
blocked  up,  barricaded  the  streets  and  thoroughfares  of  the 
town  ;  whilst  across  the  main  arteries  trenches  were  carried, 
bristling  on  the  far  side  with  sharp  stakes  and  horizontally  set 
piles,  which  were  then  carefully  covered  with  light  hurdles 
strewn  with  earth.  All  external  approaches  to  the  harbour, 
including  two  regular  roads,  were  fenced  off  by  driving  into 
the  ground  enormous  baulks  carrying  sharply-pointed  heads  ; 


Pompeius  evacuates  Italy  25- 

and  with  these  dispositions  completed,  orders  were  given  for  March  49 
the  legionaries  to  embark  in  silence  ;  whilst  on  the  walls  and 
city  towers  was  posted  a  thin  line  of  light-armed  troops, 
drawn  from  the  reservists,  archers,  and  slingers.  These  last 
were,  at  a  prearranged  signal,  immediately  the  legionaries 
were  all  on  board,  to  fall  back  upon  a  conveniently  sheltered 
spot,  where  transports  suitable  for  either  sailing  or  rowing 
lay  ready  to  receive  them. 

Now,  the  people  of  Brindisi,  instigated  by  what  they  had  28 
suffered  from  the  Pompeian  soldiery,  as  well  as  by  their 
contemptuous  treatment  at  the  hands  of  Pompeius  himself, 
heartily  espoused  the  cause  of  Caesar.  As  soon  as  the  news, 
therefore,  leaked  out  of  this  decision  to  sail,  under  cover 
of  the  confusion  caused  by  the  busy  preparations  of  the 
troops,  signals  were  made  on  all  sides  from  houses  in  the 
town.  Informed  in  this  way  of  what  was  going  forward, 
Caesar  ordered  his  men  to  prepare  scaling-ladders  and  to 
put  on  their  arms,  determined  to  lose  no  chance  of  striking 
an  effective  blow.  At  nightfall,  however,  Pompeius  sailed. 
The  guards  left  behind  on  the  wall  retired  at  the  appointed 
signal,  and  rushed  down  to  the  ships  by  paths  well  known 
to  themselves.  Caesar's  troops  flung  their  ladders  into 
position,  and  swarmed  up  the  walls  ;  but,  warned  by  the 
townspeople  against  the  sunken  ditches  and  fenced  dykes, 
they  were  forced  to  check  their  rush,  and  were  then  guided 
round  to  the  harbour  by  a  more  circuitous  route.  Here, 
finding  two  of  the  transports  with  troops  on  board  which 
had  run  upon  the  mole,  they  hauled  them  off  by  row-boats 
and  launches,  and  then  safely  secured  them  as  prisoners. 


26  Caesar's  Dilemma 

CHAPTER   II 

The  Safeguarding  of  the  West 

29  With  the  escape  of  Pompeius  an  accomplished  fact,  the 
March  49  plan  that  most  commended  itself  to  Caesar  for  settling  the 
business  between  them  was  to  collect  transports,  and  cross 
over  after  his  opponent  before  the  latter  could  strengthen 
his  position  by  raising  large  bodies  of  oversea  auxiliaries. 
The  delay,  however,  and  length  of  time  involved  in  this 
course  was  a  serious  consideration  ;  for  Pompeius,  by  requi- 
sitioning every  ship  on  that  part  of  the  coast,  had  made 
immediate  pursuit  of  himself  impossible.  The  only  alterna- 
tive was  to  wait  for  vessels  to  come  from  the  somewhat 
distant  regions  of  Northern  Italy  and  Piceno  (Picenum), 
or  from  the  Sicilian  Straits  ;  but  this,  owing  to  the,  un- 
favourable season  of  the  year,  appeared  both  a  slow  and 
precarious  scheme.  And,  further,  whilst  he  was  waiting, 
the  two  Spanish  provinces  (one  of  which  was  devoted  to 
the  interests  of  Pompeius  by  reason  of  the  great  services  he 
had  rendered  it),  together  with  the  veteran  army  stationed 
in  them,  would  be  steadily  strengthened  ;  auxiliary  forces  and 
•  cavalry  would  continue  to  be  raised ;  and  the  allegiance  of 
Gaul  and  Italy  would  be  undermined,  while  he  was  out  of  the 
way;  noneof  whichproceedingshe  was  at  all  disposed  to  allow. 
30  For  the  present,  therefore,  he  gave  up  the  idea  of  pur- 
suing Pompeius,  and  determined  to  transfer  the  war  to 
Spain.'  For  this  purpose  orders  were  at  once  given  to 
the  governing  magistrates  of  all  municipal  seaports  to  com- 

'  Caesar  summed  up  the  military  situation  by  remarking  that  '  he  went 
to  an  army  without  a  general,  and  should  return  to  a  general  without  an 
army'.     Suet.  35. 


Sicily 


secured  27 


mandeer  the  required  vessels,  and  have  them  brought  round  March  40 
to  Brindisi  (^Brundisium).  With  equal  promptitude  one 
of  his  staff,  Valerius,  was  sent  with  a  single  legion  to  secure 
Sardinia  ;  and  Curio,  with  two  legions  and  the  powers 
of  a  governor,  was  similarly  dispatched  to  Sicily,  with  orders 
to  take  his  army  over  into  Africa,  immediately  that  island 
had  been  reduced.  Sardinia  was  at  the  time  held  by  Marcus 
Cotta,  Sicily  by  Marcus  Cato  ;  whilst  Tubero  had  been 
allotted  Africa  and  was  then  due  to  take  over  the  governor- 
skip.  In  Sardinia  the  people  of  Cagliari  (Carales),  as  soon 
as  they  heard  that  Valerius  was  to  be  sent  them,  even  before 
the  expeditionary  force  had  left  Italy,  of  their  own  initiative 
expelled  Cotta  from  the  town  ;  whereupon  the  Pompeian 
officer,  frightened  by  the  knowledge  that  the  feeling  of  the 
province  was  unanimous,  hastily  quitted  Sardinia  for  Africa. 
In  Sicily  Cato  was  busy  repairing  old  men-of-war,  and 
levying  new  ones  from  the  various  local  communities  ; 
work  into  which  he  was  throwing  himself  with  extraordinary 
vigour.  Special  service  officers  had  been  sent  to  raise  troops 
throughout  Basilicata  and  Calabria  {Lucania  and  Bruttium) 
from  among  those  who  held  the  Roman  franchise ;  whilst  in 
Sicily  each  township  was  required  to  furnish  its  fixed  quota 
of  horse  and  foot.  These  dispositions  were  all  but  completed 
when  news  reached  the  island  of  the  approach  of  the  rival 
governor  Curio.  Upon  this  report  Cato  summoned  a  general 
assembly,  and  in  it  openly  denounced  Pompeius  for  having 
deserted  and  betrayed  his  representative,  and  for  having 
embarked  on  a  war  for  which  there  had  been  no  sort  of 
necessity,  without  even  the  semblance  of  preparation  ;  and 
that,  in  spite  of  the  assurances  publicly  given  in  the  Senate, 
in  response  to  inquiries  from  himself  and  the  rest,  that 


2  8  uind  Sardinia 

March' 49  everything  was  fully  prepared  for  hostilities.     With  this  last 
public  protest  he  took  a  hurried  farewell  of  his  province. 

31  Thus  it  was  that  when  Valerius  and  Curio  arrived  with 
their  armed  forces  in  Sardinia  and  Sicily  respectively,  they 
each  found  a  province  bereft  of  its  constituted  authorities. 
Tubero,  on  the  other  hand,  on  reaching  Africa,  found  that 
province  in  the  hands  of  Attius  Varus,  who  was  there  engaged 
in  exercising  full  military  command.  This  general,  after 
losing  his  battalions  at  Osimo  {Auximtim)  under  the  cir- 
cumstances already  described,  had  completed  his  flight 
by  taking  the  first  ship  for  Africa  ;  and,  the  country  being 
at  the  time  without  a  governor,  had  appointed  himself 
to  the  command.  Here  he  organized  a  levy  and  succeeded 
in  raising  two  entire  legions  ;  his  knowledge  of  the  locality 
and  its  inhabitants,  and  his  familiarity  with  the  province, 
opening  a  way  for  such  considerable  designs ;  he  having 
a  few  years  previously  governed  this  province  at  the  close 
of  his  praetorship.  Thus,  when  Tubero  arrived  with  his 
ships  off  Utica  \  he  found  himself  refused  admission  to 
either  the  harbour  or  town ;  not  even  his  son,  who  was  sick 
on  board,  was  allowed  to  be  landed,  and  he  was  obliged 
to  weigh  anchor  and  set  sail  from  the  neighbourhood. 

32  This  was  the  point  events  had  reached  when  Caesar,  being 
desirous  of  resting  his  men  from  their  recent  hard  work  before 
commencing  further  active  operations,  made  a  distribution 
of  his  present  forces  among  the  neighbouring  Italian  towns  "^^ 

1  April  ^  and  then  set  out  himself  for  the  capital.  Here  having 
summoned  the  Senate,  he  made  the  House  a  statement 
of  the  wrongs  he  had  suffered  at  the  hands  of  his  political 

*  In  Tunis,  not  far  from  Bizerta.     See  Map,  p.  95. 

^  Biindisi,  Taranto,  and  Otranto  (Cicero  and  Appian).  ^  Cicero. 


Caesar  at  l{ome  29 

adversaries.  He  reminded  members  that  it  was  no  unconsti-  April  49 
tutional  position  he  had  sought ;  he  had  waited  the  legal 
time  for  re-election  to  the  consulship,  and  had  shown 
himself  content  with  what  was  within  the  reach  of  every 
citizen  alike.  A  proposal,  allowing  him  to  stand  in  his 
absence,  had  been  submitted  to  the  people  hy  all  the  ten 
tribunes,  and  there  carried  in  the  teeth  of  the  violent  opposi- 
tion of  his  opponents,  particularly  that  of  Cato,  who  had 
characteristically  employed  his  favourite  trick  of  talking 
out  time  each  day  the  assembly  had  met.  This  measure, 
he  reminded  them,  had  been  adopted  in  Pompeius's  own 
consulship '  ;  why  then,  if  the  latter  disapproved  of  it,  did 
he  allow  it  to  be  passed,  or  why,  if  he  approved,  had  he 
prevented  his  (Caesar's)  availing  himself  of  the  concession 
thus  granted?  He  then  asked  the  House  to  notice  his 
own  extraordinary  forbearance  in  voluntarily  proposing  the 
disbandment  of  both  armies,  involving,  as  it  would  have 
done,  a  deliberate  sacrifice  of  prestige  and  of  his  own 
legitimate  position.  He  also  exposed  the  bitter  party-spirit 
betrayed  by  his  antagonists,  who  did  not  hesitate  to  ask 
from  another  what  they  declined  to  do  themselves ;  but 
sooner  than  yield  up  their  command  over  standing  armies 
preferred  to  plunge  the  whole  world  into  war.  The  ille- 
gality of  depriving  him  of  the  two  legions  was,  moreover, 
openly  denounced,  along  with  the  violent,  high-handed 
action  of  curtailing  the  powers  of  the  tribunate  ;  nor  did 
he  omit  to  mention  his  own  proposals  for  peace,  and  his 
repeated  but  thwarted  attempts  at  an  interview.  '  Under 
these  circumstances  he  urged  and  invited  them  to  take 
up,  and  to  retain  the  reins  of  government  in  conjunction 
'  52  B.C.     Introd. 


30  ]^Ieets  the  Senate 

April  49  with  himself.  Did,  however,  they  shrink  from  co-operation 
with  him,  through  fear  of  the  consequences  to  themselves, 
he  would  not  inflict  himself  upon  them,  but  would  carry 
on  the  administration  alone.  Meanwhile,  he  considered 
representatives  should  at  once  be  sent  to  Pompeius  with 
a  view  to  a  settlement  ;  for  he  felt  no  apprehension  himself, 
like  that  lately  uttered  in  the  Senate  by  Pompeius,  viz.  that 
the  opening  of  overtures  by  one  party  implied  the  recogni- 
tion of  the  justice  of  the  other  party's  claims,  and  a  corre- 
sponding want  of  confidence  in  its  own.  That  was  but 
a  weak  and  childish  view  of  things.  His  own  desire  was 
to  triumph  by  justice  and  equity,  even  as  he  had  already 
sought  to  anticipate  his  opponent  in  action.' 
33  The  idea  of  opening  negotiations  with  Pompeius  com- 
mended itself  to  the  House  ;  the  difficulty  was  to  find 
those  willing  to  go.  The  chief  reason  for  this  general 
refusal  to  serv^e  on  such  a  commission  was  personal  fear ;  since 
Pompeius,  on  evacuating  the  capital,  had  openly  declared 
in  the  Senate  that  he  would  regard  all  who  stayed  behind 
in  Rome  in  the  same  category  as  those  actually  within 
Caesar's  camp.  The  result  of  this  threat  was  that  three 
whole  days  were  now  wasted  in  wrangling  and  excuses. 
Moreover,  the  party  opposed  to  Caesar  put  up  Lucius 
Metellus  to  frustrate  this  proposal,  and  at  the  same  time 
to  block  all  other  business  which  Caesar  had  designed. 
Perceiving  his  object,  therefore,  and  reflecting  that  he  had 
already  spent  several  wasted  days,  when  he  was  determined 
not  to  lose  more  time,  Caesar  left  his  proposed  measures 
unfinished,  and,  taking  his  departure  from  the  city,  travelled 
through  to  Further  Gaul  ^ 

*  Modern  France. 


Leaves  fur  Marseilles  3  i 

Arrived  here,  he  learnt  that  Pompeius  had  recently  34 
dispatched  into  Spain  Vibullius  Rufus,  whom  he  had  himself  ^pr'!  49 
only  a  few  days  previously  captured  and  released  at  Pentima 
(Corfinium)  :  that  Domitius  had  similarly  gone  oflE  to  seize 
Marseilles  (Nlassilia)  with  seven  fast  ships  of  the  mercantile 
marine  that  could  either  sail  or  row,  which  he  had  collected 
from  private  owners  off  the  island  of  Giglio  {Igilium)  and 
in  the  harbour  of  Cosa,  and  there  manned  with  his  own 
slaves,  freedmen,  and  small  tenantry :  and  lastly,  that 
some  young  nobles  of  Marseilles,  who  had  lately  been  in 
Rome,  had  been  sent  on  home  as  envoys  from  Pompeius, 
with  a  strong  appeal,  given  on  the  eve  of  his  departure 
from  the  capital,  that  they  would  not  allow  the  recent 
services  rendered  to  their  city  by  Caesar  to  obliterate  the 
memory  of  his  own  past  benefits.  It  was  the  receipt  of 
this  message  that  had  induced  the  Massiliots  to  shut  their 
gates  against  Caesar.  They  had  further  requisitioned  the 
services  of  the  Albici,  a  foreign  tribe  living  in  the  hill  country 
north-east  of  Marseilles,  to  which  city  they  had  long  been 
subject  :  corn  had  been  got  in  from  the  surrounding  neigh- 
bourhood and  from  all  their  fortified  stations,  for  storage  in 
the  city  ;  arsenals  had  been  established  for  the  manufacture 
of  war  material ;  and  finally  the  walls  and  gates  and  fleet 
were  now  being  put  into  repair. 

Caesar  requested  the  presence  from  Marseilles  of  the  stand-  35 
ing  committee  of  fifteen  chief  councillors  of  the  city  ;  and  on 
their  arrival,  pleaded  with  them  not  to  allow  their  town 
to  incur  the  responsibility  of  commencing  hostilities,  but 
to  follow  the  unanimous  decision  of  Italy  rather  than  give 
ear  to  the  wishes  of  a  single  individual.  Other  considerations 
which  he  thought  calculated  to  bring  them  to  their  senses 


3  2  Attitude  of  the  Town 

April  49  were  also  added  ;  and  the  delegates  departed  to  report  his 
words,  only,  however,  to  return  with  the  following  resolution 
of  their  governing  council.  '  The  Roman  world  ',  they  under- 
stood, '  was  divided  between  two  factions ;  but  which  of  these 
had  the  better  right  was  beyond  their  province  and  their 
power  to  decide.  The  leaders  of  these  two  parties  (Pompeius 
and  Caius  Caesar)  were  both  alike  patrons  of  their  city, 
which  owed  to  one  of  them  the  annexation  of  the  territories 
of  the  Arecomican  Volcae  and  the  Helvii  ^,  and  to  the  other 
an  increase  of  their  revenues  by  the  incorporation  of  the 
Sallyae  ',  whose  conquest  he  had  effected.  With  such  an 
equality  in  favours  received,  the  proper  return  to  make  was 
a  like  impartiality  in  their  own  attitude  ;  to  give  assistance 
to  neither  against  the  other,  and  to  allow  to  neither  access 
to  their  city  or  harbours.' 
36  These  negotiations  were  still  actively  proceeding,  when 
Domitius  arrived  with  his  squadron  off  Marseilles,  to  be 
at  once  admitted  by  the  inhabitants,  placed  in  command 
of  the  city,  and  given  supreme  direction  of  the  war.  Acting 
upon  his  instructions,  the  fleet  was  sent  out  to  scour  the  seas 
in  every  quarter  ;  and  every  merchantman  they  could  lay 
their  hands  upon  was  brought  back  into  harbour,  where 
any  that  were  found  to  be  unsound  in  their  rivets,  timber, 
or  rigging  were  broken  up  and  used  for  the  equipment  and 
repair  of  the  others.  All  the  corn  discoverable  was  com- 
mandeered for  the  public  service,  and  any  other  provisions 
or  supplies  were  held  in  reserve  against  a  possible  siege  of 
the  town. 

Such  unwarrantable  acts  determined  Caesar  to  order  up 
three  legions  to  Marseilles,     Upon  their  arrival,  siege  towers 
'  Neighbourhood  of  Nismes  and  Ardeche.  *  East  of  Aries. 


Saragossa 
C  aesaraugus  ta 

English      Miles 


o        lO       2o       30       -to      50 
Ancient  Main  Roads 

Heights  in  Feet 


The  Position   in   Spaifi  3  3 

and  shelters  were  at  once  pushed  forward  against  the  walls  May  4') 
with  a  view  to  the  assault  of  the  town,  and  at  the  same 
time  instructions  were  given  for  a  fleet  of  twelve  warships 
to  commence  building  at  Aries  (Arelate).  These  last  were  ' 
put  together  and  fitted  out  within  a  month  of  the  day  the 
timber  for  them  was  felled  ;  and  upon  their  safe  transference 
to  Marseilles,  Decimus  Brutus  was  appointed  as  their  admiral 
by  Caesar,  who  thereupon  took  his  departure  from  Mar- 
seilles, leaving  his  general  Caius  Trebonius  to  superintend 
the  operations  on  the  landward  side. 

During  this  period  of  preparation  another  general,  Caius  37 
Fabius,  had  been  dispatched  into  Spain  at  the  head  of  three 
legions,  lately  distributed  in  winter  quarters  at  Narbonne 
and  its  neighbourhood,  vnth  orders  to  seize  without  delay 
the  passes  of  the  Pyrenees,  then  in  the  hands  of  Lucius 
Afranius,  who  held  them  for  Pompeius.  This  force  was 
immediately  to  be  followed  by  the  remaining  legions,  then 
wintering  further  away.  In  obedience  to  his  orders,  Fabius, 
acting  with  great  promptitude,  dislodged  the  garrison  from 
the  pass  before  him,  and  then  marched  rapidly  upon  the 
army  of  Afranius. 

In  Spain  the  arrival  of  Lucius  Vibullius  Rufus  on  a  mission,  3^ 
as  we  have  seen,  from  Pompeius,  had  resulted  in  a  conference 
of  the  three  Pompeian  representatives,  viz.  Afranius, 
Petreius,  and  Varro ;  who  held  respectively  Eastern  Spain 
with  three  legions.  Western  Spain,  or  the  territory  between 
the  Sierra  di  Morena  and  the  Guadiana  (Castolo  range  and 
the  Anas)  with  two  more,  and  the  country  north  of  the 
Guadiana  (Anas),  including  Estremadura  and  Portugal 
(the  Vettones  and  Lusitania)  likewise  with  two.  At  this 
conference  they  arranged  their  own  shares  in  the  pending 


34  The  T^ival  Forces 

May  49  operations.  Petreius  was  to  inarch  with  his  whole  force 
from  Portugal  (Lusitanid),  through  Estremadura  (the 
Vettones),  in  order  to  join  Afranius ;  whilst  to  Varro  was 
allotted  the  defence  of  the  whole  of  the  western  part  of 
the  Peninsula  with  the  legions  attached  to  his  command. 
Having  settled  these  preliminaries,  they  proceeded  to  raise 
cavalry  and  auxiliary  troops;  Petreius  superintending  the 
levy  throughout  Portugal  {Lusitanid),  and  Afranius  that 
in  Guadalajara  and  Avenca,  Oviedo  and  Santander  {Celti- 
beria  and  the  Cantabri),  and  among  all  the  barbarian  tribes 
of  the  north-western  seaboard.  Directly  these  were  ready 
Petreius  lost  no  time  in  passing  through  Estremadura  to 
Afranius  ;  and  the  two  agreed  to  co-operate  in  the  conduct 
of  the  war,  and  to  make  their  head  quarters  at  Lerida  (Ilerdd) 
on  account  of  the  great  strategical  importance  of  that  place. 
39      As  stated  above,  Afranius  had  three  legions  and  Petreius 

a) -June  ^^^  .  ^^  addition  to  these  there  had  now  been  raised  in 
the  Eastern  province  an  infantry  force  armed  with  the 
oblong  shield  of  regulars,  and  in  the  Western  a  similar  force 
carrying  the  light  round  Spanish  shield,  the  two  bodies 
amounting  in  all  to  some  eighty  battalions ;  whilst  each 
of  the  two  provinces  had  also  contributed  some  5,000  mounted 
men.  As  against  these,  Caesar's  present  field  army  consisted 
of  six  Roman  legions.  Of  auxiliary  infantry  he  possessed 
none ;  though  he  still  retained  with  him  the  3,000  native 
cavalry  which  had  served  through  all  his  late  campaigns  ; 
and  this  force  had  lately  been  doubled  by  the  addition  of 
an  equal  number  from  Gaul,  which  he  had  himself 
personally  raised  by  inviting  individually  to  his  standard 
the  flower  of  the  nobility  and  manhood  in  each  of  the 
Gallic   communes.     Finally,   this   body   had   been   furtjier 


Campaign 

of   LERIDA49BC 


English  Miles 

1             1   .     — 1_ 

_^\ 

1/2                     1 

Heights  in  Feet 

^\ 

Ca 

Caesar's  Upper  Bridge 


^^ 


Spanish  Campaign  opens  3  f 

strengthened  by  incorporating  in  it  drafts  from  the  splendid  May-June 
fighting  races  of  Aquitaine,  and  from  the  hill  tribes  on  the  ^'^ 
frontier  of  Provence.  As  for  the  probable  course  of  the  cam- 
paign, there  had  lately  reached  him  a  report  to  the  effect 
that  Pompeius,  with  his  legions,  was  marching  on  Spain 
by  way  of  Morocco  (Mauretania),  and  was  now  rapidly 
approaching.  It  was  at  this  time  also  that  he  borrowed 
money  from  his  officers  and  centurions  for  distribution 
among  the  troops,  a  device  by  which  two  distinct  objects 
were  gained  ;  on  the  one  hand,  the  loyalty  of  his  centurions 
was  assured  by  the  stakes  he  now  held  from  them  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  such  lavish  liberality  secured  the  interested 
devotion  of  the  common  soldiers. 

Meanwhile  Fabius  was  endeavouring  to  win  the  adhesion  40 
of  the  neighbouring  Spanish  communes  by  addressing 
letters  to  their  leaders,  and  by  disseminating  proclamations 
among  the  country  folk.  On  the  Segre  (Sicoris)  two  bridges 
had  been  constructed,  some  four  miles  apart,  over  which 
foraging  parties  were  now  regularly  proceeding,  as  every- 
thing on  the  westward  side  had  been  eaten  up  during  the 
previous  days.  The  same  course  of  action  was  being 
pursued  by  the  Pompeian  generals,  and  for  the  same  reason, 
thus  giving  rise  to  numerous  cavalry  skirmishes  between 
the  two  forces.  Two  legions  were  accordingly  sent  over 
as  a  daily  escort  to  the  Fabian  foragers ;  and  on  one 
occasion  these  had  but  just  crossed  by  the  lower  bridge, 
and  were  being  followed  by  the  baggage  and  all  the  cavalry, 
when  suddenly  the  heavy  wind  that  was  blowing,  aided 
by  the  swollen  state  of  the  river,  caused  the  bridge  to  snap, 
thereby  leaving  a  section  of  the  cavalry  cut  off  on  the  farther 
side.  Petreius  and  Afranius  quickly  realizing  the  situation 
D  2 


3<^  Caesar  at  Lerida 

June  49  from  the  hurdles  and  bridge-flooring  that  came  swirling 
down  the  stream,  the  latter  commander  at  once  took 
over  four  legions  and  all  his  cavalry  by  the  permanent 
bridge  connecting  the  opposite  bank  with  the  town  of 
Lerida  (Ilerdd)  and  his  own  camp,  and  then  rapidly  advanced 
against  the  two  legions  of  Fabius.  Their  approach  was 
reported  to  Lucius  Plancus,  the  commanding  officer  for 
the  day  of  the  Fabian  guard  ;  and  he  immediately  per- 
ceived the  necessity  of  taking  up  a  position  on  some  high 
ground,  where  he  drew  up  his  men  on  a  double  front,  in 
order  to  ensure  himself  from  being  surrounded  by  the 
enemy's  horse.  In  this  formation  he  received  the  attack, 
and,  though  vastly  outnumbered,  succeeded  in  beating 
off  the  fierce  assaults  of  the  legions  and  mounted  troops. 
The  engagement  between  the  opposing  cavalry  had  not 
long  been  in  progress,  when  both  sides  caught  sight  in  the 
distance  of  the  advancing  standards  of  two  more  legions. 
These  proved  to  be  reinforcements  for  ourselves,  dispatched 
across  the  upper  bridge  by  Fabius  owing  to  his  suspicion 
of  what  in  fact  had  occurred,  viz.  that  the  enemy's  generals 
would  avail  themselves  of  the  opportunity  thus  offered 
them  by  fortune  for  crushing  our  intercepted  detachment. 
Their  arrival  put  an  end  to  the  action,  and  thereupon  both 
sides  withdrew  into  camp. 
4'  Two  days  after  this  event  Caesar  arrived  at  head  quarters, 
accompanied  by  900  cavalry  which  he  had  previously  detained 
as  a  bodyguard.  The  bridge  vnrecked  by  the  storm  he 
found  almost  repaired,  and  at  once  gave  orders  for  its  com- 
pletion during  the  night.  He  next  informed  himself  of  the 
nature  of  the  surrounding  country,  and  on  the  morrow, 
leaving  a  garrison  of  six  battalions  for  the  camp  and  bridge, 


Caesar  at  Lerida  37 

together  with  all  his  baggage,  drew  up  his  entire  force  June  49 
in  three  parallel  columns,  and  marched  straight  upon  Lerida, 
halting  beneath  the  camp  of  Afranius.  There  he  remained 
some  time  in  battle  formation,  in  order  to  give  Afranius 
an  opportunity  for  coming  down  to  engage  him  upon  level 
ground.  Afranius  answered  the  challenge  by  moving 
out  in  force,  but  half-way  down  the  hill  halted  under  the 
protection  of  his  fortified  lines ;  whereupon  Caesar,  seeing 
it  was  Afranius  who  declined  the  combat,  determined  to 
entrench  a  camp  about  400  yards  from  the  lowest  spurs 
of  the  fortress  rock.  To  prevent  his  troops  being  thrown 
into  confusion,  whilst  engaged  upon  its  construction,  by 
any  sudden  onset  from  the  enemy  which  might  force  them 
to  break  off  the  work,  he  gave  orders  to  omit  the  building 
of  a  rampart,  which  was  bound  to  be  seen  at  a  distance  by 
projecting  above  the  level,  and  directed  his  men  merely 
to  dig  a  trench  thirty  feet  wide  along  his  front  and  parallel 
with  the  enemy.  His  first  two  lines  then  continued  to 
stand  to  arms  in  their  original  formation,  whilst  behind 
them  the  work  was  secretly  executed  by  the  third  \  and  by 
this  device  the  whole  business  was  finished  off  before  Afranius 
discovered  that  a  camp  was  being  fortified  under  his  very 
eyes.  At  the  close  of  the  day  Caesar  withdrew  his  legions 
inside  this  trench,  and  that  night  his  men  slept  under  arms. 

On  the  morrow  the  whole  army  was  kept  within  the  42 
same  trench  ;  and,  since  the  earth  necessary  for  a  raised 
rampart  would  have  to  be  fetched  further  afield,  the  same 
plan  was,  for  the  present,  adopted  in  the  work,  a  single 
legion  being  told  off  to  the  fortification  of  each  of  the 
three  remaining  sides  of  the  camp,  with  orders  to  dig  trenches 
of  equal  dimensions  with  the  first.     The  three  other  legions 


38  Attempt  on   the  Puig  Bordel 

June  49  were  at  the  same  time  stationed  in  light  embattled  order 
fronting  the  enemy  and  ready  for  action.  In  this  situation 
Afranius  and  Petreius,  hoping  to  create  a  diversion  and  to 
hinder  the  construction  of  our  earthworks,  advanced  their 
entire  force  down  to  the  lowest  spurs  of  the  hill,  thus  menacing 
a  general  attack.  They  were  not  successful,  however,  in 
inducing  Caesar  to  suspend  the  work,  the  latter  having  full 
confidence  in  the  ability  of  the  three  legions  to  defend  it, 
especially  when  aided  by  the  protection  of  the  trench  ; 
and  so,  after  remaining  in  position  for  a  short  time,  without 
ever  advancing  further  than  the  base  of  the  hill,  they  with- 
drew their  troops  back  into  camp. 

The  third  day  of  his  arrival  before  Lerida  (Ilerda)  saw 
Caesar's  camp  fortified  with  an  earthen  rampart ;  and 
on  its  completion,  orders  were  at  once  given  for  the  remain- 
ing battalions  left  behind  at  the  earlier  camp,  together  with 
all  the  baggage,  to  join  the  new  head  quarters. 
43  Now  between  the  town  of  Lerida  and  the  hill  which 
lies  nearest  it,  on  the  heights  of  which  Petreius  and  Afranius 
lay  encamped,  there  stretched  an  open  plain  some  300 
yards  wide ;  and  about  half-way  across  this  plain  rose  a  gentle 
knoll  ^,  the  occupation  and  fortification  of  which  would, 
Caesar  was  convinced,  enable  him  to  cut  the  enemy's 
communications  with  the  town  and  bridge,  and  the  immense 
quantity  of  stores  they  had  there  accumulated.  In  the 
hope  of  accomplishing  this  coup,  he  advanced  three  legions 
from  camp  ;  then,  having  drawn  up  his  main  line  in  a  suit- 
able position,  he  pointed  to  the  hill  and  ordered  the  first 
ranks  of  one  of  the  legions  to  dash  forward  and  seize  it. 
The  movement  was  no  sooner  discovered  by  the  enemy 
'  Now  the  Puig  Bordel. 


J{epulse  of  the  Caesarians  39 

than  the  battalions  of  Afranius  on  picket  duty  before  their  June  49 
own  camp  were  sent  by  a  shorter  route  to  occupy  the  same 
ground.  A  fight  ensued,  and  Afranius's  men,  coming  up 
first  to  the  hill,  repulsed  our  detachment  and  compelled 
it,  on  the  approach  of  further  reinforcements,  to  turn  and 
fall  back  upon  the  main  body  of  the  legions. 

The  type  of  fighting  affected  by  the  enemy's  troops  4+ 
was  to  open  with  an  impetuous  charge,  and  boldly  seize 
upon  some  good  position.  Little  or  no  endeavour  was  made 
to  preserve  strict  formation,  fighting,  as  they  did,  in  open 
and  scattered  order ;  whilst,  if  hard  pressed,  no  scruples 
of  military  honour  deterred  them  from  falling  back  or 
evacuating  their  post.  Residence  with  Lusitanians  and 
other  foreign  tribes  had  familiarized  them  with  this  kind 
of  warfare ;  for  experience  shows  that  troops  generally 
conform  in  great  measure  to  the  customs  of  the  country 
in  which  they  have  long  been  stationed.  These  tactics 
now  occasioned  much  confusion  amongst  our  men,  who 
were  quite  unaccustomed  to  such  a  mode  of  attack.  The 
isolated  rushes  of  the  enemy  produced  the  belief  that  their 
unprotected  flank '  was  being  turned ;  whilst,  on  the  other 
hand,  it  was  a  military  tradition  with  themselves  not  to 
break  their  ranks,  or  to  leave  the  standards,  or  surrender 
a  position  once  occupied,  except  from  the  gravest  causes. 
The  result  was  that  when  the  advanced  ranks  were  driven 
in,  the  legion  posted  on  that  wing  failed  to  stand  its  ground, 
and  fell  back  upon  the  nearest  hill. 

The   whole   incident    had    been   so    unexpected    and   so  45 
exceptional,  that  practically  the  whole  Caesarian  line  was 
swaying  with  unsteadiness.     Rallying  his  men,  Caesar  led 
*  i.  e.  the  right ;  the  shield  protecting  the  left. 


40  Fierce  Fight  outside  Lerida 

June  49  up  the  Ninth  legion  in  support  of  his  beaten  detachment, 
which  was  now  being  hotly  and  triumphantly  pursued  by 
the  enemy.  His  advance  at  once  checked  them,  and  com- 
pelled them  in  turn  to  take  flight  towards  the  town,  where 
they  halted  just  under  the  wall.  But  the  men  of  the  Ninth, 
carried  away  by  the  excitement  of  battle,  in  their  eagerness 
to  repair  the  loss  sustained  by  their  comrades,  followed 
recklessly  upon  the  protracted  flight  of  the  enemy,  until 
they  found  themselves  on  ground  that  put  them  at  con- 
•  siderable  disadvantage,  viz.  at  the  foot  of  the  hill  on  which 
stands  the  town  of  Lerida  (Ilerdd).  On  endeavouring  to 
extricate  themselves  from  this  predicament,  they  were  once 
more  hard  pressed  by  the  enemy,  who  now  held  the  advan- 
tage of  position.  The  place  was  a  precipitous  one,  with 
a  perpendicular  wall  of  rock  on  either  side,  and  only  of  about 
sufficient  width  to  accommodate  three  battalions  in  battle 
order ;  consequently  no  reinforcements  could  be  sent  up 
from  either  flank,  nor  could  the  cavalry  afford  them  any 
relief  in  their  distress.  From  the  town  the  path  descended 
with  a  gently  falling  slope  some  0bo  paces  long,  and  it  was 
down  this  slope  that  our  men  had  now  to  retire,  through 
their  inconsidered  zeal  in  pressing  the  pursuit  so  far  ;  and 
here  a  most  unequal  fight  had  to  be  maintained.  For  not 
only  was  the  path  inconveniently  narrow,  but  the  enemy 
had  halted  immediately  under  the  shoulders  of  the  rock, 
and  could  therefore  make  every  discharge  tell  with  effect 
upon  our  troops.  In  spite  of  this,  the  latter  fought  on  with 
unflinching  courage,  patiently  enduring  the  many  wounds 
inflicted  upon  them.  The  Pompeians  were  presently  re- 
inforced, and  additional  battalions  were  constantly  dispatched 
from  their  camp  and  pushed  up  through  the  town,  thereby 


Fierce  Fight  outside  Lerida  41 

allowing  fresh  troops  to  replace  those  who  were  exhausted.  June  49 
This  movement  Caesar  was  also  obliged  to  adopt,  and  to 
send  up  fresh  battalions  into  the  same  cul-de-sac,  in  order 
to  withdraw  his  wearied  men. 

After  five  uninterrupted  hours  of  this  kind  of  combat,  the  46 
Caesarian  troops,  finding  themselves  sorely  pressed  by 
superior  numbers,  and  having  now  exhausted  their  supply 
of  spears,  drew  swords  and  charged  uphill  into  the  serried 
masses  of  the  enemy,  where,  hurling  some  over  the  rocks, 
they  compelled  the  others  to  turn  and  run.  /'Forcing  them 
up  against  the  city  wall,  they  even  drove  a  section  through 
panic  into  the  town,  until  by  this  vigorous  action  they  had 
procured  for  themselves  an  unmolested  retreat\  During 
this  interval  the  cavalry  also,  after  being  obliged  to  halt  on 
the  rocky  ground  lower  down,  had  managed  on  both  flanks 
by  splendid  efforts  to  work  its  way  up  the  hill-side,  where  by 
riding  up  and  down  between  the  two  hostile  lines,  it  ensured 
a  more  undisturbed  and  safer  retirement  for  the  legionaries. 

The  battle  was  thus  one  of  varying  fortunes.  Our  losses 
at  the  first  collision  were  about  70  killed,  including  Quintus 
Fulginius,  a  centurion  of  the  third  company  ^  in  the  first 
battalion  of  the  Fourteenth  legion,  who  had  reached  that 
position  from  the  lower  grades  through  conspicuous  gal- 
lantry in  the  field  j  whilst  the  wounded  numbered  over 
600.  On  the  side  of  the  Afranians  Titus  Caecilius,  the 
first  centurion  of  his  legion,  together  with  four  other  centu- 
rions, were  killed,  as  well  as  over  200  rank  and  file. 

The  general  opinion  entertained  about  the  day's  events  47 
showed  that  each  party  claimed  to  have  left  the  field  as 
victors.     The  Afranians  appealed  to  the  fact  that,  though 
*  i.e.  maniple.     Introd. 


42  ^flections  on   the  Day 

June  49  considered  by  common  consent  to  be  inferior  troops  to  those 
of  the  enemy,  they  had  nevertheless  stood  up  to  their  attack 
for  a  considerable  length  of  time ;  not  to  mention  that  in 
the  early  part  of  the  day  they  had  secured  their  position 
at  the  knoll  which  had  been  the  original  cause  of  the  engage- 
ment, and  at  this  first  encounter  had  actually  compelled 
their  enemy  to  turn  and  fly.  On  the  other  hand,  our  men 
could  show  that,  with  both  ground  and  numbers  against 
them,  they  had  notwithstanding  maintained  a  steady  resis- 
tance of  five  long  hours,  at  the  end  of  which  they  had  stormed 
the  hill,  and  at  the  point  of  the  sword  dislodged  the  enemy 
from  his  vantage-ground,  putting  him  to  flight  and  even 
driving  him  into  the  town. 

As  a  consequence  of  this  engagement,  the  hill,  for  the 
possession  of  which  the  battle  had  been  waged,  was  now 
strongly  fortified  by  the  Pompeians,  and  a  garrison  established 
on  it. 
48  Two  days  after  these  events  there  suddenly  occurred 
a  further  misfortune.  A  storm  of  exceptional  severity  arose  ; 
indeed,  the  floods  that  ensued  were  admittedly  unprece- 
dented for  those  regions.  On  this  occasion  the  rain  also 
washed  down  the  snow  from  all  the  hills,  causing  the  river 
to  overflow,  and  smashing  on  one  and  the  same  day  both 
the  bridges  erected  by  Caius  Fabius.  This  last  circumstance 
caused  the  gravest  inconvenience  to  Caesar's  army ;  for 
his  camp  being  built,  as  already  explained,  between  the 
two  rivers  Segre  and  Cinca  (Sicoris  and  Cinga),  a  space  only 
thirty  miles  wide,  now  that  neither  of  these  two  was  passable, 
the  whole  of  his  forces  were  inevitably  penned  in  between 
their  narrow  barriers.  Outside  too,  not  only  were  the 
native  states  which  had  joined  him  unable  to  bring  up  pro- 


Storm  and  Flood  43 

visions  for  the  army,  but  bodies  of  his  own  troops,  who  had  June  49 
been  away  on  distant  foraging  parties,  saw  themselves  cut 
off  by  the  swollen  rivers  and  powerless  to  return  ;  whilst 
immense  convoys  now  coming  from  Italy  and  Gaul  found 
it  impossible  to  get  through  to  camp.  Further  to  aggravate 
matters,  it  was  an  especially  awkward  period  of  the  year  : 
the  supplies  in  the  magazines  of  the  winter  camps  had  now 
run  oiit,  and  the  new  year's  corn  was  not  quite  ripe.  In 
addition  to  this,  the  native  Spanish  communes  had  already 
been  drained  dry  ;  for  Afranius  had,  before  Caesar's  arrival, 
collected  into  Lerida  nearly  all  the  corn  in  their  hands,  any 
that  remained  having  been  subsequently  consumed  by  Caesar 
himself ;  whilst  the  cattle  belonging  to  the  neighbouring 
communities,  which  at  such  a  time  of  scarcity  might  have 
proved  a  useful  substitute,  had  all  been  removed  to  a  dis- 
tance by  their  owners  on  account  of  the  war.  The  result 
was  that  the  parties  who  were  away  foraging  for  corn  and 
provender  were  now  harassed  by  light-armed  Lusitanians, 
and  by  the  light  Spanish  infantry  from  the  Eastern  province. 
These  men  not  only  knew  every  inch  of  the  ground,  but 
found  no  difficulty  in  swimming  any  river,  since  they  never 
go  on  active  service  without  taking  their  air-bladders  along 
with  them^  On  the  other  hand  the  Afranian  army  had  49 
abundant  'supplies  of  every  kind.  Steps  had  early  been 
taken  to  amass  large  stocks  of  corn,  and  this  was  still  being 
largely  increased  from  every  quarter  of  the  province : 
similarly  of  forage  there  were  unlimited  supplies.  Lastly 
the  bridge  at  Lerida  afforded  ample  facilities  for  collecting 
all  such  stores,  and  gave  them  a  wholly  untapped  source  of 
supply  in  the  country  east  of  the  Segre  {Sicoris),  from  which 
of  course  Caesar  was  completely  excluded. 


44  Breakdown 

50  These  floods  lasted  several  days.     Caesar  made  attempts 
i"ne  49  ^Q  repair  the  bridges,  but  the  volume  of  water  would  not 

allow  of  it,  and,  moreover,  the  pickets  of  the  enemy  that 
lined  the  opposite  bank  rendered  their  completion  impossible. 
It  was  indeed  an  easy  task  for  these  latter  to  prevent  the  work 
of  construction,  since,  besides  the  state  of  the  river  itself 
and  the  quantity  of  water  we  had  to  deal  with,  they  were  in 
a  position  to  concentrate  all  their  spears  upon  a  single  narrow 
point  from  the  whole  line  of  bank ;  and  it  was  a  difficult 
matter  for  our  people  to  carry  on  the  engineering  works  in 
the  midst  of  a  boiling  stream,  and  at  the  same  time  to  avoid 
the  weapons  hurled  at  them. 

51  Meanwhile  Afranius  received  intelligence  that  the  large 
convoys  on  their  way  to  Caesar  had  halted  at  the  river.  Those 
who  had  thus  arrived  were  in  the  first  place  a  body  of  archers 
from  the  tribe  of  the  Ruteni  (Rodez),  with  a  force  of  cavalry 
from  the  old  province  of  Gaul,  accompanied  by  numbers  of 
waggons  and  a  huge  baggage-train,  in  the  true  Gallic  fashion  ; 
besides  these  a  heterogeneous  collection  of  some  6,000  persons, 
including  the  sons  and  servants  of  their  masters.  These 
unwieldy  numbers  exhibited  no  sort  of  internal  arrange- 
ment, and  possessed  no  recognized  authority ;  but  everybody 
followed  his  own  private  caprice,  and  the  whole  party  was 
travelling  without  the  slightest  misgiving,  and  in  full  enjoy- 
ment of  the  freedom  which  previous  journeys  in  the  past  had 
made  habitual  with  them.  Many  of  them  were  young  men 
of  distinguished  families,  sons  of  senators,  and  already  mem- 
bers of  the  equestrian  order  ;  there  were  also  delegates  from 
various  communities,  and  even  some  officers  of  Caesar  ;  all 
of  whom  now  found  themselves  alike  hemmed  in  by  the 
rivers 


of  Caesar's  Commissariat  47 

To  smash  them,  therefore,  while  in  this  predicament,  July  49 
Afranius  undertook  a  night  march  with  all  his  mounted 
forces  and  three  of  his  legions  ;  his  cavalry  being  sent  on 
ahead  to  deliver  a  surprise  attack.  But  though  surprised, 
the  Gallic  horse  were  quickly  in  their  places,  vigorously  giving 
battle  to  the  enemy.  As  long  as  the  affair  could  be  one  be- 
tween similar  arms,  their  small  force  v/as  quite  a  match  for 
the  large  numbers  of  the  Afranians  ;  but  the  approaching 
standards  of  the  legions  caused  them  to  beat  a  retreat  to  the 
nearest  hills,  after  losing  a  few  of  their  number.  It  was  this 
part  of  the  engagement  that  proved  an  invaluable  diversion 
for  securing  the  safety  of  the  rest  of  the  party,  who  used  the 
respite  thus  gained  to  make  for  the  higher  ground.  The 
day's  losses  amounted  to  some  200  of  the  archers  and  a  few 
of  the  horse,  together  with  a  slight  number  of  camp  followers 
and  some  of  the  baggage. 

All  these  causes,  however,  resulted  in  a  serious  rise  in  the  5^ 
price  of  corn,  which  is  generally  inflated,  not  merely  by 
present  scarcity,  but  also  by  apprehensions  for  the  future. 
It  had  now  touched  150  shillings  a  bushel,  and  the  want  of 
farinaceous  food  had  already  lowered  the  physique  of  the 
troops,  whose  distress  was  increasing  daily.  Indeed,  the 
last  few  days  had  produced  such  a  complete  revolution  in 
the  general  position,  and  such  a  striking  change  of  fortune, 
that,  whilst  our  own  men  were  suffering  from  the  want  of 
common  necessaries,  the  enemy,  with  their  unlimited  supplies 
of  every  kind,  were  already  being  regarded  as  the  winning 
side.  Caesar  accordingly  turned  for  help  to  those  townships 
which  had  already  declared  in  his  favour,  and  as  their  stocks 
of  corn  were  so  low,  requisitioned  cattle  instead  ;  the  sutlers 
of  the  army  were  got  rid  of  by  being  sent  away  to  the  more 


^6  The  Army^s  Peril 

July  49  distant  communities  ;  and  at  the  same  time  he  personally 
took  steps  to  alleviate  the  present  distress  by  every  device  in 
his  power. 

53  Exaggerated  and  glowing  accounts  of  the  present  military 
situation  were  now  sent  home  to  their  supporters  in  Rome 
by  Afranius,  Petreius,  and  their  party ;  and  being  further 
magnified  by  popular  rumour,  produced  the  impression 
that  the  war  was  virtually  over.  On  the  arrival  of  these 
letters  and  messages  in  Rome,  large  crowds  flocked  to  the 
house  of  Afranius  with  the  most  profusive  congratulations. 
Numbers  prepared  to  cross  over  from  Italy  to  Pompeius  ; 
some  from  a  desire  to  be  regarded  as  the  harbingers  of  such 
good  news,  others  to  avoid  the  appearance  of  having  first 
waited  to  learn  the  issue  of  the  war,  or  again  of  seeming  to 
be  quite  the  last  to  come  in, 

54  In  this  critical  position,  with  all  the  roads  blocked  by 
Afranius's  cavalry  and  infantry,  and  the  bridges  impossible 
to  repair,  Caesar  directed  his  troops  to  build  a  number  of 
boats,  of  a  type  which  had  become  familiar  to  him  in  recent 
years  from  the  method  followed  in  Britain.  The  keels  and 
main  framework  of  these  consisted  of  light  timber,  whilst 
the  hull  was  constructed  of  plaited  osiers  lined  outside  with 
hides.  When  finished,  these  coracles  were  laid  upon  linked 
waggons,  and  carried  upstream  by  a  night  march  twenty-one 
miles  from  camp.  Troops  were  then  conveyed  in  them  across 
the  river,  and  at  once  proceeded  to  seize  a  hill  which  sloped 
down  to  the  edge  of  the  bank ;  and  before  the  enemy  had 
wind  of  the  affair  this  hill  was  rapidly  fortified.  A  whole 
legion  was  subsequently  ferried  over  to  the  same  point,  and 
a  fresh  bridge  commenced  from  either  bank  and  finished  off 
in  two  days.     By  this  means  Caesar  succeeded  in  recovering 


Caesar's  Ingenuity  47 

his  convoys  and  foraging  parties  in  safety,  and  thereby  at  once  July  49 
relieved  the  strain  upon  his  commissariat. 

The  same  day  that  the  bridge  was  completed,  a  large  force  55 
of  cavalry  was  thrown  across  the  stream.  Delivering  a  sur- 
prise attack  upon  the  enemy's  foragers,  who  were  scattered 
about  the  country  without  the  slightest  apprehension,  they 
headed  off  a  considerable  number  of  animals  and  men ;  and, 
on  the  approach  of  several  battalions  of  Spanish  light  infantry 
sent  to  their  relief,  skilfully  divided  their  forces,  one  division 
taking  charge  of  the  spoil,  whilst  the  other  remained  to  meet 
and  repulse  the  advancing  enemy.  One  of  these  battalions 
rashly  broke  its  line,  and  charged  ahead  of  the  others  ;  where- 
upon it  became  severed  from  its  supports,  was  surrounded, 
and  cut  to  pieces.  The  whole  body  of  cavalry  then  returned 
to  camp  by  the  same  bridge,  bringing  with  them  a  large 
quantity  of  booty,  and  without  having  lost  a  single  man.y 

CHAPTER  III 

The  First  Naval  Engagement 

During  these  operations  at  Lerida  the  inhabitants  of  56 
Marseilles  (Massilia),  acting  upon  the  advice  of  Lucius 
Domitius,  fitted  out  a  squadron  of  seventeen  warships,  eleven 
of  which  were  decked  boats.  These  were  further  increased 
by  the  addition  of  several  smaller  craft,  in  the  hope  of 
frightening  our  fleet  by  mere  numbers.  On  board  these 
ships  was  placed  a  strong  force  of  archers,  together  with 
large  drafts  of  the  already  mentioned  Albici,  whose  courage 
was  then  incited  by  means  of  bribes  and  promises.  ,  A  certain 
number  of  vessels  Domitius  claimed  to  be  allowed  as  his 


48  The    'Rival  Fleets 

July  49  own ;  and  these  he  manned  with  the  tenant  farmers  and 
herdsmen  whom  he  had  brought  with  him  from  Italy.  The 
fleet,  being  thus  fully  equipped,  sailed  out  with  all  confidence 
to  meet  our  squadron,  which  under  the  command  of  Decimus 
Brutus  was  then  lying  at  its  base  off  an  island  that  faces 
Marseilles.^ 

57  Brutus  was  far  the  weaker  in  number  of  ships;  but,  on 
the  other  hand,  Caesar  had  appointed  to  this  fleet,  as  its 
fighting  crews,  the  elite  of  all  his  army,  especially  picked 
for  their  personal  courage  from  each  of  his  several  legions, 
comprising  front-rank  soldiers  and  centurions,  who  had  all 
begged  to  be  allowed  to  undertake  this  particular  duty. 
These  crews  had  now  prepared  grappling-irons  and  boat- 
hooks,  and  provided  themselves  with  an  unlimited  supply  of 
heavy  legionary  and  similar  javelins,  as  well  as  the  other 
lighter  kinds  of  spears.  As  soon,  therefore,  as  they  had  intelli- 
gence of  the  enemy's  advance,  they  rowed  their  ships  out  of 
harbour,  and  gave  battle  to  the  Massiliots.  The  fight  was 
conducted  with  the  fiercest  valour  on  either  side.  The 
Albici  yielded  little  or  nothing  in  bravery  to  our  own  men, 
being  a  race  of  hardy  mountaineers,  habituated  to  war  ; 
moreover  they  had  only  just  parted  from  the  Marseilles  people, 
and  still  carried  the  promises  these  had  made  them  fresh  in 
their  memory.  Similarly,  the  herdsmen  of  Domitius  men- 
tioned above,  with  the  hope  of  liberty  as  their  incentive,  were 
burning  to  prove  their  mettle  beneath  the  eyes  of  their  master. 

58  The  Massiliots  themselves,  relying  on  the  speed  of  their 
ships  and  the  skill  of  their  steersmen,  continued  for  some 
time  to  elude  our  attempts  at  attack  by  suddenly  shifting 
their  helm  whenever  our  vessels  bore  down  upon  them.     As 

'  See  Map,  p.  76. 


Victory  of  Caesarian  Admiral        49 

long  as  they  had  sufficient  sea  room,  they  remained  strung  July  49 
out  in  a  single  long  line,  directing  all  their  efforts  to  surround- 
ing us,  or  trying  to  concentrate  two  or  more  ships  against 
one  of  our  own  ;  or  again,  wherever  they  had  a  chance,  they 
would  endeavour  to  dash  past  our  sides  and  to  rip  off 
the  blades  from  our  banks  of  oars.  But  when  closer  quarters 
became  inevitable,  and  the  skilful  manoeuvres  of  their  helms- 
men no  longer  availed  them,  it  was  to  the  fighting  power  of 
their  mountaineers  that  their  hopes  were  next  directed.  On 
the  other  hand,  our  people  had  to  make  shift  with  ill-trained 
oarsmen  and  less  expert  captains  at  the  helm,  men  who  had 
been  suddenly  transferred  out  of  merchantmen,  and  who 
hardly  knew  even  the  names  of  the  fittings  of  a  man-of-war. 
They  were  also  handicapped  by  the  slow  pace  and  great 
weight  of  their  ships,  which,  having  been  hurriedly  built 
from  green  wood,  had  not  yet  attained  the  same  adaptability 
for  rapid  movement  as  those  confronting  them.  Under 
these  conditions  as  long  as  they  were  allowed  a  hand-to-hand 
fight,  they  had  no  hesitation  in  running  their  single  ships 
in  between  two  of  the  enemy  ;  when,  by  letting  go  the 
grappling-irons,  they  would  make  both  these  fast  to  their 
own,  one  on  either  beam,  and  each  crew  then  fighting  in  two 
divisions  would  board  the  two  vessels  alongside.  By  these 
tactics  they  inflicted  heavy  losses  upon  the  Albici  and  herds- 
men, and  succeeded  in  sinking  a  part  of  the  squadron, 
capturing  others  with  their  crews,  and  driving  back  the 
remainder  into  port. 

As  a  result  of  the  day's  engagement  the  Massilians  lost 
altogether  nine  of  their  vessels,  this  number  including  those 
which  were  captured. 


f  o  Ejfect  of  the  Victory 

CHAPTER  IV 
The  Reward  of  a  Great  Strategist 

59  News  of  this  battle  duly  reached  Caesar  at  Lerida,  and, 
J"  y  49  taken  in  conjunction  with  the  completion  of  the  bridge, 

caused  a  speedy  reaction  in  the  fortunes  of  the  campaign. 
For  the  Pompeians,  through  wholesome  dread  of  the  quality 
of  our  cavalry,  now  showed  far  less  freedom  and  confidence 
in  moving  about  the  country.  Some  days  they  would  come 
out  only  a  short  distance  from  camp,  so  as  to  have  a  quick 
means  of  retreat  (a  plan  which  confined  their  foraging  to^ 
somewhat  narrow  limits)  ;  at  other  times  they  would  make 
a  long  detour,  and  so  avoid  the  pickets  waiting  for  them  ; 
sometimes  a  slight  brush  with  the  enemy,  or  even  the 
sudden  appearance  of  our  cavalry  on  the  sky-line,  would 
make  them  drop  their  loads  upon  the  spot  and  scurry  back 
to  camp.  Latterly  they  had  taken  to  doing  their  foraging 
at  intervals  of  several  days,  and  even  by  night ;  this  last 
surely  an  unprecedented  course  for  a  commander  to  adopt. 

60  Meanwhile  the  people  of  Huesca  and  Loarre  (Calagurris), 
(the  latter  being  politically  incorporated  with  the  former 
town),  sent  representatives  to  Caesar  to  put  themselves  at  his 
disposal.  They  were  followed  at  once  by  those  of  Tarra- 
gona (Tarraco),  the  lacetanians  and  Ausetanians  on  the 
Mediterranean  litoral,  and  a  few  days  later  by  the  lUur- 
gavonensians  from  the  southern  bank  of  the  Ebro.  From  all 
alike  he  requested  help  in  the  shape  of  corn.  This  they  at 
once  provided,  and  hunting  up  every  pack-animal  in  the 
district,  sent  it  forthwith  into  camp.  The  battalion  of 
the  Illurgavonensians  serving  vdth  the  enemy,  on  hearing 


The  Turn  of  the  Tide  f  i 

of  this  decision  of  its  tribe,  actually  deserted  to  Caesar,  July  49 
bringing  over  its  standards  from  the  post  where  they  were 
quartered.  Far-reaching  indeed,  and  most  rapid,  was  the 
revolution  now  effected.  With  the  bridge  completed,  with 
five  powerful  tribes  secured  as  friendly,  with  the  commissariat 
once  more  working  smoothly,  and  the  rumours  as  to  the 
alleged  advance  of  Pompeius  through  Morocco  (Mauretania) 
with  a  relieving  force  of  legionaries  finally  disposed  of,  many 
of  the  more  distant  cantons  now  began  to  break  their  con- 
nexion with  Afranius,  and  to  declare  on  the  side  of  Caesar. 

All  these  circumstances  produced  the  greatest  consterna-  61 
tlon  in  the  ranks  of  his  opponents,  and  Caesar  determined 
to  profit  by  it.  With  the  object  of  putting  an  end  to  the 
necessity  of  always  sending  his  cavalry  by  a  long  detour  across 
his  new  bridge,  he  selected  a  suitable  spot  up-stream,  and  pro- 
ceeded to  dig  a  number  of  canals  thirty  feet  wide,  which,  by 
drawing  off  part  of  the  waters  of  the  Segre  (Sicoris)  would 
create  a  ford  over  that  river.  These  were  on  the  point  of 
completion,  when  Afranius  and  Petreius  became  seized  with 
the  utmost  concern  lest  they  should  find  themselves  abso- 
lutely cut  off  from  either  corn  or  forage,  on  account  of  the 
overwhelming  force  of  Caesar's  cavalry.  They  therefore 
decided  to  anticipate  this  contingency  by  evacuating  that  part 
of  the  country,  and  transferring  the  seat  of  war  to  central 
Spain  (Celtiberia).  What  further  contributed  to  the  adoption 
of  this  plan  was  the  fact  that,  of  the  different  Spanish  states 
which  had  taken  opposite  sides  in  the  late  war  with  Sertorius,* 
the  vanquished  party  had  nothing  but  dread  for  the  name  and 
rule  of  Pompeius,  even  though  an  absentee  governor  :  those, 
on  the  other  hand,  who  had  remained  loyal  now  felt  the 
^  Introd. 
E  2 


5*2  Vompeians  evacuate  Lerida 

July  49  warmest  affection  towards  the  man  who  had  so  greatly 
advanced  their  own  interests  ;  whilst  as  to  Caesar,  his  name 
did  not  carry  the  same  familiarity  in  the  ears  of  foreigners 
as  did  that  of  his  rival.  Moreover,  in  these  quarters  they 
were  expecting  further  large  bodies  of  cavalry  and  native 
auxiliary  infantry ;  and,  once  on  their  own  ground,  their 
idea  was  to  prolong  the  campaign  until  winter  had  set 
in.  In  execution  of  this  scheme,  orders  were  given  to  collect 
boats  all  along  the  Ebro  (Hiberus),  and  to  bring  them  to  Octo- 
gesa,  a  town  on  that  river,. twenty  miles  south  of  their  present 
camp.  A  bridge  of  boats  was  then  ordered  to  be  built  at 
that  place,  whilst  two  legions  were  moved  across  the  Segre 
and  a  camp  fortified  on  its  farther  bank  as  a  tete-de-pont 
with  an  earth  rampart  twelve  feet  high. 

62  Intelligence  of  these  movements  duly  reached  Caesar  by 
means  of  his  spies.  The  work  of  draining  the  river  was 
accordingly  pushed  on  without  intermission  day  and  night 
alike,  the  men  straining  every  nerve.  It  had  now  advanced 
far  enough  for  the  cavalry  to  cross  ;  and  these  did  not  hesitate 
to  swim  their  horses  over,  although  it  was  an  operation 
fraught  with  the  utmost  difficulty,  and  indeed  was  but  barely 
possible.  But  the  infantry  were  still  up  to  their  shoulders, 
nearly  neck  deep,  and  were  hindered  from  crossing,  not 
merely  by  the  depth  of  the  water,  but  also  by  the  rapidity  of 
the  current.  Yet  notwithstanding  these  difficulties,  there  was 
no  appreciable  interval  between  the  news  of  the  approaching 
completion  of  the  bridge  over  the  Ebro  and  the  discovery  of 
a  ford  at  the  Segre. 

63  This  last  event  made  the  enemy  consider  it  advisable  to 
hasten  their  departure.  Leaving  a  guard  of  two  auxiliary 
battalions  at  Lerida,  they  crossed  the  Segre  in  full  force,  and 


A  Baring  'Manoeuvre  5-3 

proceeded  to  camp  in  conjunction  with  the  two  legions  that  July  49 
had  crossed  a  few  days  earlier.  The  only  course  now  left 
to  Caesar  was  to  employ  his  horse  to  harry  and  distress  the 
retreat  of  his  opponents.  To  use  his  own  bridge  for  trans- 
porting his  infantry  involved  a  long  detour,  which  would 
inevitably  allow  the  enemy  to  reach  the  Ebro  by  a  very  much 
shorter  route.  The  cavalry  were  therefore  dispatched  across 
the  river,  and,  after  crossing  by  the  ford,  suddenly  appeared 
in  the  dark  on  the  rearguard  of  the  Pompeians  (they  had 
marched  shortly  after  midnight),  and,  deploying  in  great 
force,  endeavoured  to  check  and  disorganize  the  retreat. 

At  dawn  it  could  be  seen,  from  some  high  ground  near  64 
Caesar's  camp,  that  our  men  were  delivering  a  furious  attack 
on  the  skirts  of  the  enemy,  and  that  the  whole  of  their  rear- 
guard was  occasionally  held  up  and  separated  from  the  main 
body  ;  whilst  every  now  and  then  the  Pompeians  would  take 
the  offensive,  and  our  people  would  be  repulsed  by  a  combined 
charge  of  all  their  regiments  ;  only,  however,  to  resume  the 
assault  as  soon  as  our  opponents  turned  their  backs.  Inside 
the  camp  the  troops  collected  into  knots,  indignant  at  seeing 
the  enemy  thus  slip  from  their  grasp  and  the  war  unnecessarily 
prolonged.  Approaching  the  centurions  and  officers,  they 
implored  these  to  tell  Caesar  not  to  think  of  sparing  them 
either  trouble  or  danger,  but  to  assure  him  that  they  were 
quite  ready  and  able,  and  fully  prepared  to  venture  on  the 
passage  of  the  stream  where  the  cavalry  had  already  crossed. 
Moved  by  their  ardent  representations,  Caesar  decided  that 
the  attempt  should  be  made,  in  spite  of  the  apprehensions 
he  felt  at  exposing  his  army  to  such  a  body  of  water.  Orders 
were  given  to  weed  out  from  every  company  any  whose  cour- 
age or  strength  seemed  likely  to  prove  unequal  to  the  ordeal. 


^4  Caesar*s  Pursuit 

July  49  These  were  left  behind  with  a  single  legion  to  hold  the 
camp,  and  the  remaining  force  then  marched  out  of  their 
old  quarters  in  light  battle  equipment.  Arrived  at  the 
river,  numbers  of  transport  animals  were  strung  across 
the  stream,  both  above  and  below  the  ford,  and  when  every 
precaution  had  thus  been  taken  the  passage  of  the  army  was 
successfully  accomplished.  Of  the  troops  who  took  part 
in  this  enterprise  a  few  were  carried  down  by  the  force  of  the 
stream  ;  but  all  were  caught  and  rescued  by  the  improvised 
cavalry,  whilst  of  casualties  there  was  not  one. 

With  the  army  safely  landed,  the  whole  force  fell  into 
position  and  commenced  to  advance  in  three  lines ;  and  so 
great  was  the  enthusiasm  of  the  troops,  that,  although  they 
had  an  additional  six  miles  to  do  between  camp  and  the  ford, 
and  were  further  greatly  delayed  at  the  river,  they  yet  suc- 
ceeded in  overtaking  before  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon 
those  who  had  marched  about  one  on  the  previous  morning. 
65  As  soon  as  their  approach  was  descried  on  the  horizon  by 
Afranius  and  Petreius,  the  former  general,  astounded  at  the 
amazing  sight,  at  once  halted  on  some  rising  ground  and 
drew  up  for  battle.  Caesar,  however,  not  wishing  to  send 
his  men  exhausted  into  action,  halted  in  the  plains  to 
rest  his  army ;  but  on  the  enemy  once  more  attempting  to 
advance,  he  renewed  his  harassing  pursuit.  They  had  there- 
fore no  option  but  to  pitch  camp  sooner  than  otherwise 
had  been  their  design.  For  the  truth  was  they  were  now 
approaching  a  range  of  hills,  and  five  miles  further  on  they 
would  come  to  difficult  and  narrow  roads.  These  hills 
it  was  their  great  object  to  penetrate,  since  their  possession 
would  not  only  deliver  them  from  Caesar's  cavalry,  but  also 
enable  them,  by  holding  the  passes  in  his  face,  to  bar  the 


English    Miles 


Caesar's  Pursuit Ci,  Pt,  First  Position   (c.c.65-G7) 

Cz,  P2,  Position  after  Caesar's  turning  movement (c.c. 70, 71) 
Ca,  Po,  Position  after  the  Retreat  on  Lerida  (c.c.  Sl-St^) 


Taken  from  the  latest  Government  survey  map  :  the  rondg  there- 
fore are  modern.  The  route  of  the  two  armies  here  adopted  is  that 
of  StofFel,  who  places  Octogem  at  Mequinenza.  Others  place  it  near 
Ribarroja  or  at  Flix  ;  and  Goler  takes  a  route  through  Alcano  and 
Llardecans.  Mt.  Maneu  is  the  most  prominent  landmark  in  the 
district,  and  can  be  seen  from  Lerida. 


To /ace  f>   55. 


Caesars   'Pursuit  jy 

further  progress  of  his  army,  and  meanwhile  to  effect  the  July  49 
passage  of  the  Ebro  (Hiberus)  without  danger  or  fear  of 
molestation  to  themselves.  The  plan  was  one  which  they 
were  bound  to  attempt  and  to  carry  out  at  all  hazards  • 
nevertheless,  the  fatigue  consequent  upon  a  whole  day's  battle 
and  the  heavy  exertions  of  the  march  induced  them  to  post- 
pone it  until  the  morrow.  Caesar  also  then  camped  on  the 
nearest  high  ground. 

About  midnight  information  reached  him  through  some  66 
prisoners  who  had  strayed  too  far  from  camp  after  water  and 
had  been  caught  by  our  cavalry,  that  the  Pompeian  generals 
were  silently  withdrawing  from  their  intrenchments ;  where- 
upon the  bugle  was  at  once  ordered  to  be  sounded,  and  the 
command  for  striking  camp  to  be  proclaimed  in  the  usual 
military  fashion.  The  enemy,  hearing  the  sound,  and  dread- 
ing lest  they  should  be  forced  to  fight  at  night  when  under 
the  weight  of  their  heavy  marching  kit,  or  again  that  they 
might  be  hemmed  in  amongst  the  narrow  defiles  by  Caesar's 
horse,  at  once  arrested  their  movement,  and  kept  their  forces 
in  camp.  The  next  morning  Petreius  made  a  secret  expedi- 
tion with  a  small  party  of  mounted  men  to  examine  the  lie 
of  the  land,  and  a  similar  party  left  Caesar's  camp,  under  the 
command  of  Lucius  Decidius  Saxa,  also  to  reconnoitre  the 
country.  Both  parties  reported  in  the  same  terms,  viz.  that 
for  the  first  five  miles  the  road  ran  through  a  plain,  which 
was  then  succeeded  by  rugged  mountain  tracts ;  and  that 
the  side  which  got  first  to  the  passes  could  easily  check  the 
other's  further  advance. 

A  council  of  war  having  been  summoned,  a  discussion  was  67 
opened  by  Petreius  and  Afranius  and  the  question  raised  as 
to  the  best  time  for  making  a  start.    The  general  opinion 


y5         The  Pomp  elans  outmanceuvred 

July  49  favoured  a  night  march,  holding  it  quite  possible  to  reach 
the  passes  without  being  detected.  Others  pointed  to  the 
orders  for  marching,  which  they  had  heard  the  previous 
night  in  Caesar's  camp,  as  a  proof  that  a  surreptitious  depar- 
ture was  out  of  the  question.  Evidently  Caesar's  cavalry 
surrounded  them  at  night,  holding  all  the  roads  and  neigh- 
bourhood, and  night  engagements  were  to  be  avoided, 
because  in  civil  war,  when  a  panic  took  place,  troops  generally 
obeyed  the  instincts  of  fear  rather  than  those  of  discipline. 
Daylight,  on  the  contrary,  possessed  a  power  in  itself  of 
bringing  before  the  eyes  of  all  men  a  keen  fear  of  disgrace, 
which  was  greatly  aided  too  by  the  presence  of  their  officers 
and  centurions  ;  and  it  was  these  incentives  that  usually 
restrained  troops  and  kept  them  to  their  duty.  Hence  on 
all  grounds  the  attempt  to  break  through  should  be  made 
by  day  ;  for  even  though  they  might  encounter  some  slight 
casualties,  yet  the  desired  position  could  quite  well  be  captured 
without  endangering  the  safety  of  the  main  army. 

This  last  view  prevailed  in  the  council,  and  it  was  deter- 
mined to  make  a  start  at  daybreak  on  the  following  morning. 
68  Meanwhile  Caesar  had  carefully  explored  the  locality,  and 
with  the  first  streak  of  dawn  led  his  whole  force  out  of  camp. 
Their  march  took  them  by  a  long  detour  over  roads  that  were 
little  better  than  tracks,  as  all  the  main  routes  leading  to 
the  Ebro  {Hiherus)  and  Octogesa  were  necessarily  blocked  by 
.  the  enemy,  whose  camp  lay  across  their  path.  Caesar's  army 
had  therefore  to  traverse  a  series  of  deep  and  difficult  valleys, 
where  the  road  was  often  rendered  impracticable  by  precipi- 
tous rocks ;  so  much  so  that  the  men's  arms  and  accoutrements 
had  to  be  passed  along  from  hand  to  hand,  and  much  of  the 
march  was  only  accomplished  by  the  troops  shouldering  one 


The  J{ace  to  the  Ebro  77 

another  up  after  thus  freeing  themselves  of  their  armour.  July  49 
Yet  no  one  was  heard  to  complain  of  the  severity  of  the  toil, 
well  knowing,  as  they  did,  that  all  their  toils  alike  would  end, 
could  they  once  succeed  in  barring  the  enemy  from  the  Ebro, 
and  in  cutting  his  supplies. 

The  Afranian  troops,  in  their  joy,  at  first  ran  out  from  69 
camp  to  see  the  sight,  flinging  after  their  retreating  enemy 
many  a  parting  taunt  to  those  who  now  found  themselves 
without  enough  to  eat,  and  therefore  obliged  to  go  back  to 
Lerida.  And,  indeed,  there  was  some  justification  for  their 
gibes ;  for  the  route  led  clean  away  from  our  objective,  and 
thus  made  us  seem  to  be  marching  in  exactly  the  opposite 
direction.  Their  generals  also  began  congratulating  them- 
selves on  their  own  decision  to  remain  in  camp,  and  not 
too  without  much  apparent  reason  :  they  could  see  that 
our  pursuit  had  been  undertaken  without  camp-animals  or 
baggage,  and  naturally  felt  convinced  that  we  could  no 
longer  hold  out  against  the  scarcity  of  food.  When,  however, 
they  perceived  that  our  column  was  gradually  bending  round 
to  the  eastward,  and  observed  that  its  head  was  already  abreast 
of  the  position  occupied  by  their  own  camp,  the  most  lethar- 
gic and  indolent  amongst  them  were  found  demanding  instant 
departure  and  a  race  to  overtake  us.  The  call  sounded  to 
arms;  and,  leaving  behind  a  few  garrison  battalions,  the  entire 
force  turned  out  of  camp  and  headed  straight  for  the  Ebro. 

It  was  a  contest  in  speed,  and  speed  only,  viz.  which  7° 
of  the  two  parties  could  first  seize  the  pass  and  mountain 
range.  Caesar's  army  was  retarded  by  the  difficulties  of  the 
roads ;  Afranius's  force  was  continually  checked  by  the  pur- 
suing Caesarian  cavalry.  On  the  other  hand,  this  last  action 
of  the  Afranians  had  brought  the  situation  to  this  inevitable 


^8  A  Great  Opportunity 

July  49  conclusion— that  should  they  be  the  first  to  reach  the  moun- 
tains ahead  of  them,  although  they  might  escape  their  own 
peril,  they  must  none  the  less  lose  the   baggage  of  their 
entire  army,  as  well  as  their  battalions  left  in  camp  ;  for  these 
were  now  absolutely  cut  off  by  the  intervention  of  Caesar's 
army  from  even  the  slightest  possibility  of  relief.     Caesar 
covered  the  distance  first,  and  finding  a  sort  of  plateau  as  he 
emerged  from  the  lofty  rocks,  drew  up  his  line  of  battle  on 
it  in  face  of  the  enemy.     Afranius,  seeing  his  rearguard  hard 
pressed  by  the  Caesarian  horse,  and  the  enemy  on  his  front, 
selected  some  high  ground  and  there  halted.     From  thence 
he  dispatched  a  force  of  four  Spanish  light  infantry  battalions 
towards  what  was  the  dominating  hill  in  all  the  surrounding 
country,  with  orders  to  advance  at  full  speed  and  occupy  it  ; 
his  design  being  to  follow  in  force  himself,  and,  changing 
his  first  plan,  to  make  for  Octogesa  by  another  route  over  the 
hills.    The  hght  infantry  were  hastening  by  a  flank  approach 
towards   their   objective,   when   they  were    discovered  by 
Caesar's  cavalry  and  at  once  attacked.    The  Spaniards  were 
never  for  a  moment  equal  to  withstanding  the  fierce  onset 
of  our  horse,  but  were  quickly  surrounded,  and  all  cut  to 
pieces  in  sight  of  both  armies. 
71      It  was  an  opportunity  such  as  rarely  falls  to  the  lot  of 
a  commander.     Caesar  was  well  aware  that,  after  so  terrible 
a  disaster  enacted  before  their  very  eyes,  the  enemy's  army 
would  be  too  shaken  to  offer  much  resistance,  especially  as 
they  were  completely  dominated  by  his  cavalry,  who  would 
be  able  to  act  with  effect  on  the  level  and  open  ground  where 
the  conflict  must  be  decided.     To  seize  this  opportunity  was 
now  the   universal   petition   addressed   to   him.     Generals, 
centurions,  regimental  officers— all  alike  came  running  up 


and  Caesar's  IJse  of  it  S9 

with  the  request  that  he  would  not  hesitate  to  give  battle.  July  49 
They  pointed  out  that  the  men's  ardour  was  strung  to  the 
highest  pitch,  whilst  the  Afranians,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
given  many  proofs  of  a  state  of  panic  :  first  of  all  in  failing 
to  go  to  the  relief  of  their  own  troops,  then  in  declining  to 
leave  their  hill ;  as  well  as  in  the  fact  that  they  could  scarcely 
succeed  even  in  keeping  oflE  the  attacks  of  the  cavalry,  but 
were  crowding  together,  with  their  standards  mingled  in 
confusion,  not  keeping  to  their  own  colours,  or  observing 
their  proper  ranks.  They  added,  that  if  the  enemy's  advantage 
in  position  made  him  hesitate,  an  opportunity  for  a  fight 
somewhere  or  other  would  doubtless  soon  arise,  since  Afranius 
would  have  to  come  down  from  the  place,  as  he  could  not 
stay  there  without  water. 

On  his  side,  Caesar  had  conceived  a  hope  of  being  able  72 
to  attain  his  purpose  without  a  battle,  and  without  bloodshed 
to  his  own  troops,  now  that  he  had  succeeded  in  cutting  his 
opponents'  supplies.  Why,  he  asked  himself,  should  he  lose 
any  of  his  men,  even  in  a  successful  engagement,  and  why 
expose  to  the  chance  of  wounds  troops  who  had  served  him 
so  magnificently  ?  What  right  again  had  he  to  tempt  Fortune, 
especially  considering  that  a  commander's  duty  is  to  effect 
his  conquests  by  strategy  no  less  than  by  the  sword  ?  Com- 
passion also  swayed  him  for  his  fellow  countrymen,  whose 
slaughter  he  could  not  but  foresee  ;  and  he  preferred  to  gain 
his  ends  with  these  men  safe  and  sound.  However,  this 
plan  did  not  commend  itself  to  the  majority  ;  the  troops 
were  even  heard  declaring  amongst  themselves  that,  if 
such  a  golden  opportunity  for  victory  was  to  be  thrown  away, 
they  would  not  fight  even  when  Caesar  wanted  them. 
Nevertheless,  he  stood  to    his  decision,  and    accordingly 


6o  Overtures  by  the  Men 

J"'y  49  drew  oi?  a  little  from  Kls  present  ground  with  the  object  of 
relieving  the  tension  on  his  frightened  opponents ;  whereupon 
Petreius  and  Afranius,  profiting  by  the  occasion,  retreated 
to  their  old  camp.  Caesar  then  proceeded  to  post  pickets 
and  guards  along  the  hills ;  after  which,  with  every  road 
to  the  Ebro  (Hiberus)  securely  barred,  he  fortified  a  camp 
as  close  up  to  that  of  his  enemy  as  was  practicable. 

73  On  the  morrow  the  commanders  of  the  Pompeians,  dis- 
tracted at  seeing  all  hope  now  gone  of  securing  supplies 
or  of  reaching  the  Ebro,  held  a  consultation  on  their  future 
plans.  There  were  only  two  roads  open  to  them — one  to 
Lerida,  if  they  chose  to  return  there,  another  if  they  made 
for  Tarragona  (Tarraco).  In  the  midst  of  the  discussion, 
a  report  was  brought  in  that  our  cavalry  were  attack- 
ing their  watering  party.  The  report  being  confirmed, 
a  guard  was  immediately  posted  in  the  shape  of  a  series  of 
pickets  drawn  from  the  cavalry  and  native  infantry,  and 
supported  by  battalions  of  the  legions ;  and  this  step  was 
then  followed  by  orders  to  run  up  a  rampart  between  camp 
and  the  watering-place,  so  that  the  watering  might  proceed 
behind  the  earthwork  without  fear  of  molestation  or  need 
of  any  further  guard.  The  supervision  of  this  breastwork 
Petreius  and  Afranius  decided  to  share  between  themselves, 
and  in  order  to  see  it  executed  went  out  some  considerable 
distance  from  their  fortified  lines. 

74  Their  departure  afforded  their  men  an  uninterrupted 
opportunity  for  a  talk  with  those  in  the  opposite  camp,  and, 
flocking  out,  they  proceeded  to  hunt  up  and  hail  any  acquain- 
tance or  fellow  townsman  each  happened  there  to  possess. 
The  first  thing  was  a  general  expression  of  thanks  to  all  our 
men  for  having  spared  them  the  day  before  when  in  their 


Fraternisation  of  the  Two  Camps     6i 

state  of  panic  :  their  lives,  they  declared,  they  owed  to  this  July  49 
act  of  clemency.  Next,  they  wanted  to  know  what  trust 
could  be  reposed  in  the  others'  commander ;  whether 
they  would  do  right  to  put  themselves  in  his  power ; 
following  up  this  by  a  regret  that  they  had  not  done  so  at 
first,  instead  of  taking  arms  against  their  friends  and  blood 
relations.  Encouraged  by  these  conversations  with  our  men, 
they  next  put  forward  a  petition  to  the  Caesarian  general  to 
spare  the  lives  of  Petreius  and  Afranius,  being  anxious  to 
avoid  the  appearance  of  having  committed  the  crime  of 
betraying  their  own  officers.  Reassured  on  this  point,  they 
then  declared  they  would  come  over  at  once,  and  proceeded 
to  authorize  their  leading  centurions  to  go  as  peace  delegates 
to  Caesar.  While  these  were  thus  engaged,  many  of  the 
Pompeians  invited  their  Caesarian  friends  and  took  them 
back  to  their  own  camp,  whilst  others  of  themselves  were 
taken  off  to  ours ;  in  a  word,  the  unification  of  the  two  camps 
appeared  complete.  Numbers  of  regimental  officers  also 
and  centurions  came  and  tendered  their  allegiance  to  Caesar. 
The  same  course  was  taken  by  the  Spanish  chieftains  whom 
the  enemy  had  summoned  to  the  campaign,  and  now  held 
as  hostages  in  their  own  camp.  These  men  applied  to  their 
acquaintances  and  any  with  whom  their  families  visited,  to 
ensure  for  them  each  a  favourable  introduction  to  Caesar. 
The  young  son  of  Afranius  was  likewise  engaged  in  negotiat- 
ing with  Caesar,  through  the  help  of  the  general  Sulpicius, 
for  his  own  and  his  father's  life.  On  all  sides  were  heard 
rejoicing  and  congratulation  ;  since  it  looked  as  if  the  one 
party  had  escaped  a  dire  peril,  and  the  other  gained  a  wonderful 
achievement  without  so  much  as  a  scratch.  Everybody 
admitted  the  greatness  of  the  reward  which  Caesar's  un- 


62  Interrupted  by  Petreius 

July  49  deviating  clemency  had  brought  him,  and  his  recent  decision 
was  now  universally  applauded. 

75  The  report  of  these  novel  proceedings  brought  Afranius 
back  from  the  earthwork  then  in  course  of  construction,  and 
he  arrived  in  camp  fully  prepared,  as  was  believed,  to  acqui- 
esce without  demur  in  whatever  turn  events  might  have 
taken.  Petreius,  on  the  contrary,  never  lost  his  presence 
of  mind.  Arming  his  retinue  of  private  servants,  and  also 
taking  with  him  the  light  Spanish  infantry  battalion  that 
acted  as  the  commander-in-chief's  bodyguard,  together  with 
a  small  squadron  of  specially  privileged  native  cavalry  which 
were  always  about  his  person,  he  suddenly  galloped  up  to  the 
rampart,  stepped  the  intercourse  between  the  two  armies, 
and  drove  our  men  out  of  his  camp,  putting  any  whom  he 
caught  to  the  sword.  The  rest  drew  together,  and,  appalled 
by  the  sudden  peril,  wrapped  their  left  hands  in  their  cloaks, 
and  drawing  their  swords  protected  themselves  as  best  they 
could  against  the  horsemen  and  Spaniards.  The  nearness 
of  their  own  camp  lent  them  confidence ;  and,  as  they  ap- 
proached it,  the  pickets  on  guard  outside  advanced  to  their 
relief. 

75  Having  effected  so  much  of  his  purpose,  Petreius  next  made 
the  round  of  the  companies,  appealing  to  the  troops  with 
tears  in  his  eyes,  and  beseeching  them  not  to  betray  him  to 
the  tender  mercies  of  his  foes,  and  not  to  betray  their  own 
absent  commander  Pompeius.  A  general  move  was  at  once 
made  towards  head  quarters.  There  he  demanded  that 
every  man  in  camp  should  solemnly  swear  not  to  desert  or 
betray  the  army  or  its  chiefs,  and  not  to  enter  upon  any  secret 
course  of  action  on  his  own  authority.  This  oath  he  first  of 
all  took  himself,  and  then  administered  to  Afranius.     They 


Pomp  elans  turn  back  to  Lertda        63 

were  followed  by  the  regimental  officers  and  centurions ;  July  49 
after  which  each  company  was  brought  forward  and  the  men 
swore  to  observe  the  same.  An  order  was  then  published 
that  any  one  harbouring  a  Caesarian  should  produce  him 
forthwith,  and  on  their  production  all  were  publicly  executed 
in  the  space  outside  the  head  quarters  tent.  Most  of  them, 
however,  were  secretly  hidden  by  their  hosts,  and  sent  over 
the  rampart  during  the  night.  But  the  result  of  this  intimi- 
dation on  the  part  of  the  leaders,  and  the  infliction  of  this 
atrocious  punishment  upon  our  innocent  men,  taken  in  con- 
junction with  the  solemn  obligation  of  the  new  oath,  was 
to  destroy  all  hopes  of  an  immediate  surrender,  and,  by 
changing  the  temper  of  the  troops,  to  bring  the  situation 
once  more  back  to  the  old  arbitrament  of  war. 

Meanwhile  Caesar  gave  orders  that  such  of  his  opponents'  77 
troops  as  had  come  across  during  the  late  period  of  negotia- 
tions should  be  collected  together  with  every  mark  of  respect, 
and  sent  back  to  their  own  camp.  A  certain  proportion, 
however,  of  the  group  of  officers  and  centurions  preferred 
to  stay  with  him,  and  were  subsequently  treated  with  con- 
spicuous favour,  the  centurions  being  reappointed  to  their 
former  companies,  and  all  the  officers  who  were  Roman 
knights  being  gazetted  according  to  their  previous  rank. 

To  revert  now  to  the  fortunes  of  the  Afranians.  Their  7^ 
foraging  was  exposed  to  constant  attack,  their  watering 
conducted  under  the  greatest  difficulties.  The  legionaries 
amongst  them  possessed  some  small  amount  of  supplies,  having 
received  orders  to  take  rations  for  twenty-two  days  on  quit- 
ting Lerida  ;  but  the  Spanish  infantry  and  native  auxiliaries 
had  none.  Moreover,  these  last  had  but  slender  chances  of 
obtaining  any,  and  even  if  they  did,  were  physically  unequal 


($4  ^  ^arguard  Action 

July  49  to  carrying  heavy  loads ;  consequently  they  deserted  daily 
in  large  numbers  to  Caesar.  It  was  beyond  doubt  a  most 
critical  position.  Of  the  two  plans  open  to  them,  the  more 
advisable  seemed  to  be  a  return  to  Lerida,  where  a  small 
quantity  of  provisions  had  been  left  behind  ;  for  once  there, 
they  were  confident  of  seeing  their  way  through  their  subse- 
quent difficulties.  Tarragona  was  too  far  off,  and  over  that 
distance  of  ground  they  were  well  aware  that  more  than  one 
accident  might  wreck  their  course.  Having  therefore  settled 
on  the  former  alternative,  they  marched  out  of  their  present 
entrenchments.  Caesar  at  once  detached  his  mounted  men 
to  harass  and  check  their  rearguard,  whilst  following  in  person 
with  the  legions ;  and  without  a  moment's  delay  his  cavalry 
became  engaged  with  the  tail  of  the  Pompeian  army. 
79  The  fighting  that  ensued  proceeded  along  the  following 
general  lines.  The  rear  of  the  retreating  column  was  brought 
up  by  a  number  of  infantry  battalions,  free  of  all  superfluous 
baggage,  and  these,  whenever  the  army's  march  lay  through 
a  plain,  would  be  halted,  several  strong,  to  act  as  a  covering 
force.  Where  a  mountain  range  had  to  be  scaled,  the  danger 
to  this  force  was  easily  repelled  simply  by  the  nature  of  the 
ground,  as  the  vanguard  could  use  their  higher  position  to 
protect  their  comrades  toiling  up  the  slope ;  but  when 
a  valley  or  other  kind  of  descent  lay  before  them,  not  only 
could  the  advanced  party  render  no  help  to  that  which  was 
checking  the  pursuit,  but  the  Caesarian  cavalry  also,  from 
their  vantage-ground,  rained  down  spears  upon  their  backs, 
thereby  gravely  imperilling  the  safety  of  the  force.  The 
only  way  to  meet  this  danger  was,  when  they  approached  such 
places,  to  order  the  legions  to  halt,  and  by  a  determined 
charge  scatter  the  enemy's  horse  ;  then,  when  these  had  been 


Brilliant  Caesarian  Cavalry  6f 

dislodged,  the  entire  force  would  suddenly  fling  themselves  July  49 
down  the  hillside  at  the  double,  and,  getting  across  the  valley 
in  this  way,  form  up  once  more  on  the  opposite  heights.  As 
for  their  own  cavalry,  so  far  were  they  from  getting  any  help 
from  it,  though  numerically  a  strong  force,  that,  owing  to 
its  panic-stricken  state  consequent  on  the  preceding  engage- 
ments, it  had  itself  to  receive  protection  by  being  kept  in  the 
centre  of  the  column  ;  and  the  invariable  result  of  letting 
any  trooper  quit  the  line  was  to  be  instantly  snapped  up 
by  the  Caesarian  horse. 

Now  when  fighting  of  this  nature  is  in  progress,  the  march  80 
of  an  army  is  necessarily  slow  and  tentative,  involving  frequent 
halts  for  the  relief  of  its  own  units.  And  such  was  the  case 
now.  After  proceeding  four  miles,  the  attacks  of  our  cavalry 
became  so  galling,  that  the  enemy  were  driven  to  seize  a  lofty 
hill;  here  they  commenced  fortifying  one  side  of  a  camp  where 
it  ^aced  their  pursuers,  though  without  unloading  their  bag- 
gage train.  Subsequently,  on  seeing  that  Caesar's  camp  was 
fully  laid  out,  with  its  tents  pitched,  and  that  his  cavalry  were 
absent  with  scattered  foraging  parties,  they  suddenly,  about 
eleven  o'clock  on  the  same  day,  made  a  dash  to  escape  ;  and, 
filled  with  a  new  hope  of  respite  through  the  absence  of  the 
enemy's  horse,  started  once  more  on  the  march.  Aware  of 
the  new  movement,  Caesar  first  of  all  refreshed  his  troops,  and 
then  set  out  in  pursuit  ;  leaving  behind  one  or  two  bat- 
talions to  guard  his  baggage,  and  giving  instructions  that 
at  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  the  foraging  parties  should 
follow  and  the  cavalry  be  recalled.  The  latter  force  lost 
no  time  taking  up  their  daily  part  in  the  march.  Sharp 
fighting  ensued  along  the  rearguard,  all  but  resulting  in  the 
enemy's   rout,  and    involving   several    casualties    amongst 


66        The  Sufferings  of  the  1^ treat 

July  49  their  rank  and  file  and  to  some  extent  among  their    cen- 
turions. 

Meanwhile  Caesar  was  coming  up,  and  his  column,  in  full 
force,  was  now  hard  on  their  heels. 
8i  In  this  predicament,  unable  either  to  search  for  a  suitable 
camping  ground  or  to  proceed  further  with  their  march, 
there  remained  no  alternative  but  to  halt,  and  to  make 
a  camp  on  a  site  both  destitute  of  water  and  naturally  un- 
suited  to  their  purpose.  Notwithstanding  this,  Caesar,  acting 
on  the  reasons  indicated  above,  refrained  from  all  attack,  and 
•  merely  contented  himself  with  not  allowing  any  tents  to  be 
pitched  after  this  day,  in  order  that  every  man  in  his  force 
might  be  the  readier  to  take  up  the  pursuit,  no  matter  whether 
the  enemy  broke  away  by  day  or  by  night.  The  latter,  on 
discovering  the  impracticable  nature  of  their  present  site, 
employed  all  the  hours  of  darkness  in  extending  their  lines, 
thus  turning  camp  into  camp  ;  and  this  work  was  continued 
at  daybreak  on  the  following  morning  and  occupied  them 
throughout  the  ensuing  day.  Unfortunately,  the  further 
they  carried  their  works  and  advanced  their  lines,  the  further 
they  got  from  water ;  and  they  thus  found  themselves 
remedying  their  present  evil  only  by  incurring  new  ones. 
The  first  night  after  this  no  watering  whatever  was  attempted ; 
on  the  morrow  a  guard  was  left  behind  in  camp,  while  the 
rest  of  the  force  moved  out  towards  the  watering-place, 
though  still  not  a  single  forager  ventured  to  make  his  appear- 
ance. Caesar  much  preferred  letting  punishment  of  this 
kind  do  its  work  amongst  them,  and  so  force  them  to  a  sur- 
render, to  having  to  decide  matters  by  a  pitched  battle. 
Yet,  though  this  was  so,  it  did  not  prevent  him  from  attempt- 
ing the  circumvallation  of  his  opponents  by  means  of  rampart 


The  Suffemigs  of  the  l^treat        67 

and  ditch  ;  his  object  being  to  counteract  as  far  as  possible  Ju!j'  49 
the  surprise  sorties  which  he  foresaw  they  would  be  driven 
to  adopt.  It  was  with  this  design  in  view  that  on  their  side 
an  order  was  now  given  to  slaughter  all  baggage  animals  ; 
a  decision  that  under  any  circumstances  would  have  been 
necessary,  on  account  of  their  absolute  dearth  of  fodder. 

A  period  of  two  days  was  spent  in  arranging  these  works  8a 
and  the  plans  connected  with  them,  and  the  third  day  found 
considerable  progress  made  with  much  of  the  entrenchments. 
But  about  three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon  of  this  day  the 
enemy's  signal  for  action  suddenly  sounded,  and  his  legions, 
advancing  from  camp,  drew  up  in  line  with  the  express  object 
of  preventing  the  completion  of  our  fortifications.  Caesar  at 
once  recalled  his  own  regiments  from  his  earthworks,  ordered 
his  cavalry  to  concentrate  in  force,  and  marshalled  his  line 
of  battle.     Thus  much  indeed  was  imperative  on  him  ;  for 
to  expose  himself  to  the  imputation  of  having  shirked  a  con- 
test, in  face  of  the  reasonable  expectation  of  his  troops  and 
his  general  reputation  with  the  world,  would  beyond  all 
doubt  have  struck  a  serious  blow  at  his  prestige.     On  the 
other  hand,  he  was  still  influenced  by  the  reasons  already  indi- 
cated for  not  desiring  a  battle  with  his  opponents,  and  even 
more  so  in  the  present  instance,  inasmuch  as  the  narrow  limits 
of  the  ground  rendered  it  hardly  possible  to  inflict  a  crush- 
ing defeat  upon  them,  even  if  actually  routed.    For  the  space 
between  the  two  camps  did  not  exceed  two  miles ;  two-thirds 
of  this  was  occupied  by  the  rival  armies,  and  the  remainder 
just  gave  room  enough  to  the  troops  for  delivering  their 
charge;    consequently,   in    case   of    a    general    action,  the 
defeated  side  would  find  an  easy  escape  in  its  flight  through 
the  close  proximity  of  its  own  camp.     It  was  these  con- 

F  2 


68  Caesar  succeeds  in 

July  49  siderations  which  had  now  determined  him,  whilst  yet 
resisting  any  unprovoked  attack,  not  himself  to  take  the 
offensive. 
83  The  Afranians  were  in  two  lines,  consisting  of  five  Roman 
legions  ;  whilst  a  third  position  in  the  rear  was  held  by  their 
native  reserves.  Caesar's  army  was  in  three  lines ;  but  his 
five  legions  were  distributed  with  four  battalions  from  each 
in  the  front  line,  then  three  more  apiece  as  a  first  reserve, 
followed  again  by  the  same  number  once  more,  each  battalion 
being  always  in  support  of  part  of  its  own  legion.  His  archers 
and  slingers  were  withdrawn  inside  the  ranks  of  his  centre, 
whilst  his  two  flanks  were  screened  by  cavalry.  With  their 
lines  thus  arranged,  each  party  seemed  to  have  attained  its 
desired  object :  Caesar,  to  refuse  battle  unless  forced  upon 
it ;  the  enemy,  to  hinder  the  construction  of  the  other's 
earthworks.  The  situation,  however,  was  only  becoming 
prolonged  ;  and  the  troops,  after  being  kept  in  position  till 
sunset,  then  parted  from  each  other  to  their  respective 
quarters. 

The  next  day  Caesar  prepared  to  finish  his  incompleted 
works,  whilst  the  Pompeians  proceeded  to  try  a  ford  over  the 
Segre,  in  the  hope  of  crossing  that  river.  To  frustrate  this, 
Caesar  threw  his  light-armed  Germans  with  a  cavalry  section 
across  the  stream,  along  the  banks  of  which  he  then  posted 
a  strong  line  of  pickets. 
84  Blockaded  thus  at  every  outlet,  with  what  camp  animals 
"g-  49  they  still  possessed  now  without  fodder  for  four  whole  days, 
and  destitute  alike  of  water,  fuel,  and  provisions,  the  Pompeian 

2  Aug.i  leaders  at  length  petitioned  to  negotiate,  and  if  possible,  in 
some  place  at  a  distance  from  the  troops.    This  last  stipu- 
*  According  to  an  ancient  almanac. 


avoiding  unnecessary   'Bloodshed         ($9 

lation  was  refused  by  Caesar,  who,  however,  agreed,  if  they  Aug.  49 
so  cared,  to  meet  them  in  the  open  ;  whereupon  the  son  of 
Afranius  came  over  as  a  hostage,  and  the  interview  took  place 
at  a  spot  selected  by  Caesar.  Here,  in  the  ears  of  both 
armies,  Afranius  spoke  as  follows.  *  No  blame  attached,  he 
hoped,  either  to  himself,  his  colleague,  or  their  army,  for 
their  natural  desire  to  act  loyally  by  Cneius  Pompeius,  their 
own  commander.  The  claims  of  duty,  however,  had  now 
been  fully  satisfied,  and  as  to  punishment,  their  complete 
destitution  might  well  be  regarded  as  adequate.  They  were 
now  caged  in  virtually  like  wild  beasts,  debarred  from  water, 
and  debarred  from  movement ;  and  such  a  position  was  not 
physically  more  intolerable  than  it  was  galling  to  their  pride. 
They  accordingly  confessed  themselves  beaten  :  at  the  same 
time  they  desired,  if  not  too  late,  to  make  a  strong  appeal  for 
mercy,  in  the  hope  that  Caesar  would  not  consider  himself 
bound  to  exact  from  them  the  utmost  penalty  of  war.' 

The  whole  speech,  it  should  be  added,  was  delivered  with 
the  greatest  possible  deference  and  respect. 

In  answer,  Caesar  reminded  him  that  no  man  had  ever  had  85  , 
less  justification  than  he  to  adopt  a  tone  either  of  complaining 
of  his  lot,  or  of  claiming  commiseration  for  it.  *  Every  one 
else  had  acted  as  became  them :  for  himself,  when  he 
refused  to  force  a  conflict,  though  conditions  were  favour- 
able and  time  and  place  to  his  own  advantage ;  for  his 
army,  when  they  did  not  allow  the  outrage  perpetrated 
on  them  by  the  murder  of  their  comrades  to  deter  them 
from  preserving  and  guarding  the  lives  of  those  in  their 
power;  finally,  for  Afranius's  own  men,  by  their  taking 
the  initiative  in  making  overtures  for  peace,  when  they  had 
even  held  it  their  dutv  to  demand  a  safe-conduct  for  all  their 


79  Capitulation  of  Pcmpeians 

Aug.  49  officers.  Every  one,  in  short,  had  being  animated  hy  a 
spirit  of  conciliation  ;  they,  the  leaders,  had  alone  set  their 
face  against  peace ;  they  alone  had  disregarded  the  sanctity 
due  to  a  time  of  pourparlers  and  of  truce,  and  had  foully 
butchered  unsuspecting  men,  when  duped  by  what  they 
believed  to  be  negotiations.  They  had  met  the  fate  that 
usually  befell  people  of  overweening  obstinacy  and  pride  ; 
and  now  found  themselves  driven  back  upon,  and  even  pas- 
sionately desiring,  a  course  which  they  lately  regarded  with 
contempt.  However,  he  had  no  wish  to  use  their  present 
humiliation  or  to  take  advantage  of  the  present  opportunity 
in  order  to  swell  his  own  resources ;  but  what  he  did  insist 
upon  was  that  those  armies,  which  for  so  many  years  they 
had  been  nursing  against  himself,  should  now  be  disbanded 
He  said''  against  himself  ",  for  no  other  explanation  was  possi- 
ble of  the  dispatch  of  six  legions  to  Spain,  and  the  embodiment 
afterwards  of  a  seventh  raised  in  the  Peninsula  ;  or  again 
of  the  mobilization  of  so  many  powerful  fleets,  and  of  the 
appointment  of  eminent  soldiers  to  their  command.  Not 
one  of  these  steps  had  been  necessary  for  the  establishment 
of  peace  in  the  Spanish  governments,  or  the  normal  military 
requirements  of  the  province ;  whose  long  unbroken  rest 
made  all  reinforcements  superfluous.  No,  it  was  against 
himself  that  all  these  preparations  had  been  for  so  long 
directed  ;  it  was  to  cripple  him  that  an  unprecedented  type 
of  command  was  to  be  created,  which  permitted  a  man  to 
control  the  administration  of  the  capital  from  his  residence 
outside  the  gates  of  Rome,  and  at  the  same  time  to  retain 
year  after  year  the  absentee  governorship  of  two  provinces 
stocked  with  fighting  races  :  it  was  solely  to  checkmate  him- 
self that  a  violent  change  was  now  to  be  wrought  in  the 


Imposition   of  Terms  7 1 

constitution  of  the  magistracies,  whereby  governors  were  Aug.  49 
sent  out  to  provinces  no  longer,  as  before,  at  the  expiration 
of  their  consulship  or  praetorship,  but  upon  the  interested 
selection  of  a  clique.  Again,  when  he  was  to  be  opposed, 
no  one  was  allowed  to  plead  the  excuse  of  age  ;  but  veterans, 
well  tried  in  past  campaigns,  must  be  called  out  to  take  over 
the  command  of  the  armies  that  were  to  crush  him  :  and 
finally,  in  his  case  only,  an  exception  was  made  to  the  courtesy 
always  extended  to  all  commanders  alike,  which  allowed 
them,  after  success  in  the  field,  to  return  home  with  honour, 
or  at  least  not  in  disgrace,  and  there  to  disband  their  army. 
Yet  all  these  insults  he  had  endured  with  patience,  and  would 
continue  to  endure  ;  nor  was  his  object  now  to  deprive  them 
of  their  army  in  order  to  retain  it  with  his  own,  though  doubt- 
less that  were  an  easy  matter  ;  it  was  merely  to  disarm  them 
of  any  weapon  they  could  afterwards  turn  against  himself. 
That  being  so,  he  must,  as  already  indicated,  call  upon  them 
to  evacuate  the  provinces,  and  to  break  up  their  army.  Pro- 
vided that  were  done,  nobody  should  suffer  at  his  hands  : 
that,  however,  was  the  one  indispensable  condition  of  peace. 

Amongst  the  Afranian  troops  the  notion  that  men,  who  86 
justly  expected  some  sort  of  punishment,  should  actually 
be  presented  with  their  discharge,  was  one  affording  high 
satisfaction  and  delight — as  indeed  could  be  gathered  from 
the  way  they  now  gave  expression  to  their  feelings.  For, 
on  a  question  arising  as  to  the  time  and  place  of  carrying  out 
this  discharge,  the  whole  army,  from  the  position  which  they 
had  taken  up  on  the  ramparts,  began,  with  shouts  and  gesticu- 
lations, to  declare  that  it  must  take  place  at  once,  and  that, 
were  it  postponed,  there  would  be  no  security  of  its  afterwards 
being  effected,  no  matter  what  pledge  to  the  contrary  might 


72  Pomp  elan  Army  dishanded 

Aug.  49  now  be  given.  After  a  short  discussion  between  the  parties, 
it  was  finally  arranged  that  aU  the  men  possessing  house  or 
property  in  Spain  should  receive  their  discharge  on  the  spot, 
and  the  rest  on  arrival  at  the  Var  ^ ;  Caesar  meanwhile  giving 
a  guarantee  that  no  one  should  be  molested,  or  compelled  to 
take  the  military  oath  of  allegiance  to  himself  against  his 
own  personal  inclinations. 
87  He  also  took  upon  himself  to  find  them  in  provisions  from 
now  onwards,  during  their  march  to  the  Var  ;  and  further 
added  that,  in  the  case  of  those  who  had  lost  property  during 
the  campaign,  any  of  this  now  in  the  hands  of  his  own  troops 
should  be  restored  to  the  losers,  he  himself  compensating  his 
men  for  everything,  after  fair  valuation  made. 

Whatever  subsequent  disputes  arose  amongst  the  Pompeian 
soldiery  were  voluntarily  brought  to  him  for  adjudication  ; 
and,  upon  a  mutiny  all  but  breaking  out  amongst  the  sur- 
rendered legions,  owing  to  their  clamouring  for  pay  from 
Afranius  and  Petreius  which  the  latter  declared  to  be  not 
yet  due,  a  demand  was  made  that  Caesar  should  try  the  case  ; 
and  his  decision  was  at  once  accepted  by  both  parties. 

During  the  next  two  days  about  a  third  of  the  army  re- 
ceived its  discharge  ;  after  which  Caesar  gave  orders  for  two 
of  his  own  legions  to  start  as  an  advanced  guard,  whilst  the 
others  followed  close  behind,  thus  ensuring  that  the  two  camps 
were  not  far  apart.  The  whole  operation  was  entrusted  to 
one  of  his  staff,  Quintus  Fufius  Calenus ;  and,  in  accordance 
with  the  instructions  issued  to  that  officer,  the  army  marched 
from  Spain  to  the  Var,  and  there  the  rest  of  the  Pompeians 
were  disbanded. 

^  Then  the  boundary  between  Italy  and  Gaul. 


Plan  of 

2^\\MARSEILLES 

Scale  (Miles) 

l/a  '/2  3/4 

Old  Coast  Line 


To  face  p.  7.VI 


\_Adapled from  Sloffel. 


BOOK   II 

MARSEILLES  AND  NORTH 
AFRICA 

CHAPTER  I 
An  Historic  Siege 

During  this  campaign  in  the  Spanish  provinces,  Caius  i 
Trebonius,  the  general  left  in  charge  of  the  assault  on  .g 
MarBcilles  (^Massilia),  had  commenced  operations  by  driving 
siege  embankments  against  the  wall  of  that  city,  surmounted 
by  protection-sheds  and  wooden  towers.  One  of  these 
embankments  was  advanced  on  the  side  of  the  town  close 
to  the  harbour  and  dockyards  :  the  other  by  the  gate  where 
the  road  from  Gaul  and  Spain  enters  the  city,  not  far  from  the 
sea  into  which  the  river  Rhone  debouches.  For  Marseilles, 
it  must  be  remembered,  is  washed  by  the  sea  on  three  sides 
of  the  town,  the  fourth  alone  offering  a  land  approach ;  and 
even  in  this  last  section  that  part  which  faces  the  citadel  is 
strongly  protected  by  the  natural  conformation  of  the  ground 
and  by  a  deep  ravine  running  under  the  wall,  making  an 
assault  at  this  point  a  long  and  laborious  process. 

Trebonius,  in  order  to  carry  out  these  works,  now  com- 
mandeered from  the  whole  of  Provence  innumerable  draft 
animals  and  day  labourers,  at  the  same  time  giving  orders  to 
accumulate  large  stores  of  osier  wood  and  building-timber  : 
then  with  these  preparations  completed,  he  proceeded  to 
construct  a  siege  mound  eighty  feet  in  height. 


74  ^  Formidable  Tas^ 

'  So  great,  however,  was  the  original  supply  in  the  city  of 
°*  every  species  of  war  material,  and  so  unlimited  the  number  of 
siege  guns,  that  none  of  the  ordinary  protection-sheds,  con- 
structed out  of  close-knit  osier  work,  were  found  proof  against 
the  impact  of  their  shot.  Huge  wooden  harpoons,  twelve  feet 
long,  and  sheathed  with  a  metal  point,  would  be  discharged 
with  aU  the  added  impetus  given  by  gigantic  engines  of  war, 
and,  tearing  through  four  successive  layers  of  hurdles,  would 
bury  themselves  in  the  earth.  The  only  remedy  was  to  build 
a  series  of  movable  galleries,  roofed  with  twelve-inch  baulks 
firmly  clamped  together,  under  cover  of  which  the  workmen 
then  found  it  possible  to  pass  along  the  material  from  hand 
to  hand.  Ahead  of  the  advancing  mound,  for  the  purpose  of 
levelling  all  obstacles,  moved  a  military  tortoise,  with  a  front 
of  sixty  feet,  likewise  built  of  stout  timbers,  and  wrapped  round 
with  every  kind  of  substance  capable  of  withstanding  the 
showers  of  fire  and  stones.  Yet,  in  spite  of  these  precautions, 
the  vast  scale  of  the  works  attempted,  along  with  the  great 
height  of  the  enemy's  wall  and  turrets,  and  the  number  of 
guns  mounted  on  them,  combined  to  render  the  progress 
of  the  operations  everywhere  a  tedious  one.  Constant  sallies, 
moreover,  from  the  town  were  undertaken  by  the  Albici, 
on  which  occasions  fire  would  be  freely  flung  upon  the  mound 
and  towers  :  although  indeed  these  attacks  were  always  easily 
repulsed  by  our  troops,  who  would  even  take  the  offensive 
and  drive  back  the  sortie  parties  into  the  town,  with  the 
infliction  upon  them  of  very  considerable  losses. 
3  While  the  siege  of  the  city  was  thus  progressing,  a  move- 
ment towards  its  relief  had  been  instituted  by  Pompeius,  who 
had  detached  a  squadron  of  sixteen  warships,  a  few  of  them 
armed  with  copper-cased  bows  and  ram,  under  the  command 


Attempted  Relief  by  Sea  jj 

of  Lucius  Nasidius,  to  sail  to  the  assistance  of  Domitius  and  May-Aug. 
the  Massilians.  This  officer  made  his  way  up  the  Sicilian  "^'-^ 
Straits  without  the  knowledge  or  suspicion  of  the  acting 
governor  Curio  ;  and,  putting  in  with  his  flotilla  at  Messina 
{Messana),  took  advantage  of  the  flight  of  the  leading  citizens 
and  local  senators  which  followed  on  the  sudden  panic  pro- 
duced by  his  appearance,  to  launch  one  of  their  ships  from 
the  dockyards,  and  to  incorporate  it  with  the  rest  of  his  fleet. 
He  then  continued  his  voyage  towards  Marseilles,  after  secretly 
sending  in  advance  a  small  dispatch  vessel  to  apprise  Domitius 
and  the  MassiHans  of  his  coming,  and  earnestly  beg  them  once 
more  to  give  battle  to  Brutus's  squadron,  now  that  they  were 
reinforced  by  his  own  ships. 

As  a  matter  of  fact,  after  their  earlier  reverse,  the  Massilians  4 
had  drawn  out  of  dockyard  a  number  of  old  vessels  equal  to 
what  they  had  lost,  and  had  then  proceeded  with  surprising 
energy  to  repair  and  fit  these  out.  Their  large  reserves  of 
oarsmen  and  skippers  had  also  enabled  them  to  supplement 
the  fleet  by  several  open  fishing-boats,  which  had  been  pre- 
viously decked  for  the  purpose  of  protecting  the  rowers  from 
all  exposure  to  spears ;  and  the  whole  of  these  additional 
vessels  were  now  given  full  complements  both  of  archers  and 
big  guns.  The  squadron  being  by  these  methods  at  length 
fully  equipped,  the  crews  were  incited  by  pathetic  appeals 
from  all  the  old  men,  matrons,  and  maidens  of  the  city,  not 
to  fail  their  country  in  this  her  hour  of  need  ;  after  which 
they  embarked  with  all  the  confidence  and  courage  that  had 
marked  their  first  engagement.  For  it  is  a  common  weak- 
ness of  human  nature  to  be  both  unduly  elated  and  alarmed  in 
the  face  of  the  unseen  and  the  unknown  ;  and  this  law  was 
now  illustrated   by  the  immoderate  hopes  and  enthusiasm 


"jd  Second  Naval  Engagement 

May-Aug.    which  the  arrival  of  Lucius  Nasidius  had  kindled  in  the 
^^  Massilian  republic. 

Having  secured  a  favourable  wind,  they  put  out  from 
harbour,  and  effected  a  junction  with  Nasidius  off  Tarente 
(Tauroenta),  a  fortified  settlement  of  Marseilles.  Here  they 
cleared  their  ships  for  action,  heartened  one  another  to  face 
a  second  encounter,  and  arranged  their  respective  duties  in 
the  approaching  battle ;  it  being  agreed  that  the  Massilians 
should  form  the  right,  and  Nasidius  the  left  division. 
5  Meanwhile  Brutus  also  bore  down  upon  the  same  point, 
with  a  fleet  considerably  increased  in  numbers.  His  original 
twelve  ships,  built  by  Caesar's  orders  at  Aries,  had  now  been 
reinforced  by  the  six  lately  captured  from  the  Massilians, 
which  during  the  intervening  days  he  had  repaired  and  made 
thoroughly  efficient  in  every  particular.  After  briefly  en- 
couraging his  crews, therefore,  to  treat  with  contempt  a  beaten 
foe  whose  full  strength  they  had  already  once  vanquished,  he 
moved  out  against  them  full  of  cheerful  courage.  From  the 
camp  of  Trebonius  and  from  all  the  higher  ground  in  the 
vicinity  ^  our  investing  forces  easily  overlooked  the  city,  where 
they  could  see  all  the  fighting  population  that  had  remained 
behind  in  the  town,  as  well  as  all  the  older  inhabitants,  accom- 
panied by  wives  and  children  and  the  city  guard,  either  stand- 
ing on  the  battlements  with  uplifted  hands,  or  flocking  to  the 
temples  of  the  eternal  gods,  before  whose  images  they  then 
prostrated  themselves,  praying  heaven  to  grant  them  victory. 
Not  a  soul  was  there  who  did  not  realize  that  on  the  issue 
of  this  day  hung  the  decision  of  all  their  future  destiny.  For 
those  who  had  gone  on  board  included  young  men  from  their 
best-known  families,  together  with  their  most  distinguished 
^  e.g.  Notre  Dame  de  la  Garde.     See  Plan. 


Section  of  Coast 


Entjlish  Miles 


To  face  p.  76. 


May- 
49 


and  Defeat  of  Pompeians  77 

citizens  in  every  period  of  life,  all  of  whom  had  received  May-Aug 
a  personal  summons  and  earnest  appeal  for  service.  In  case  '^^ 
of  disaster,  therefore,  they  saw  clearly  that  nothing  would  be 
left  them  afterwards  even  to  try  ;  while  victory,  on  the  other 
hand,  whether  gained  by  their  own  forces  or  by  their  foreign 
supports,  would  leave  them  confident  in  the  ultimate  success 
of  their  beloved  city. 

As  soon  as  the  action  commenced,  it  became  clear  that  the  6 
Massilians  did  not  want  for  courage;  but,  remembering  the 
commands  lately  laid  upon  them  by  their  friends,  they  fought 
under  the  evident  conviction  that  this  was  to  be  their  last 
chance,  and  that  those  who  ventured  their  lives  in  battle  were 
only  anticipating  by  a  little  the  fate  in  store  for  the  rest  of 
their  countrymen,  all  of  whom  must  undergo  the  similar 
penalty  of  war  upon  the  capture  of  their  city.  Accordingly, 
as  our  squadron  slowly  opened  out,  their  commanders  utilized 
the  finer  speed  of  their  own  ships  for  much  skilful  manoeuvring ; 
and,  wherever  we  got  an  opportunity  of  throwing  our  grap- 
pling-irons and  making  fast  one  of  their  vessels,  they  would 
row  up  from  every  quarter  to  the  help  of  their  struggling 
consorts.     Even  here,  at  close  quarters,  they  were  formidable 
opponents,  fighting,  as  they  did,  side  by  side  with  the  Albici, 
and  yielded  little  in  courage  to  our  own  crews  ;  whilst  at  the 
same  time  their  smaller  craft  poured  in  a  hail  of  spears  at  longer 
range,  inflicting  constant  wounds  without  warning  upon  our 
hampered  men.     Two  of  their  three-deckers  '  having  sighted 
Brutus's  flagship — easily  recognizable  by  his  pennant — had 
already  set  themselves  in  motion  to  ram  her  from  opposite 

*  Only  an  analogy.  The  question  whether  an  ancient  trireme  had  three 
superimposed  banks  of  oars,  or  one  bank,  with  three  men  to  each  oar,  or 
even  some  other  formation,  is  still  sub  judice. 


7  8  Description  of  Siege-rvorks 

May-Aug.    quarters,  when  the  admiral,  seeing  his  danger,  put  his  vessel 
"^9  rapidly  under  way,  and  thus   eluded   them  by  the   barest 

second.  Advancing  at  high  speed  the  two  big  ships  crashed 
into  one  another  with  such  terrific  violence  that  both  were 
badly  crippled  by  the  impact,  whilst  one  had  all  her  forepart 
carried  away  and  became  quite  unmanageable.  Seeing  what 
had  happened,  the  vessels  of  Brutus's  fleet  which  were  nearest 
to  the  spot  dashed  upon  them  in  their  difficulties,  and  quickly 
sent  both  to  the  bottom. 

7  As  to  the  squadron  under  Nasidius,  it  proved  of  no  service 
whatever,  and  after  a  very  brief  interval  withdrew  out  of  action. 
These  lacked  the  incentive  of  the  sight  of  fatherland  and  the 
commands  of  dear  ones  to  compel  them  to  the  utmost  risk  of 
life  ;  consequently,  from  this  division  not  a  single  ship  was 
lost.  The  losses  to  the  Massilian  fleet,  on  the  other  hand, 
were  five  sunk,  four  captured,  and  one  which  fled  with  the 
ships  of  Nasidius,  who  all  made  for  the  coast  of  Eastern  Spain. 
Of  the  surviving  vessels  one  was  sent  on  ahead  to  Marseilles 
to  carry  the  news  of  the  day's  disaster  ;  and  whilst  it  was  still 
approaching  the  city,  the  whole  population  streamed  out  to 
learn  the  issue  of  the  fight ;  and  on  the  truth  becoming 
known,  such  a  wail  of  lamentation  ensued,  that  one  might 
have  thought  the  town  had  at  that  very  moment  been  carried 
by  assault. 

Nevertheless,  in  spite  of  this  defeat,  the  Massilians  pro- 
ceeded to  complete  their  preparations  for  the  defence  of  their 
city  with  the  same  dogged  determination  as  before. 

8  To  resume  the  narrative  of  the  landward  operations.  It 
was  noticed  by  the  legionaries  in  charge  of  the  right,  or  north- 
eastern, part  of  the  siege-works,  as  a  consequence  of  the 
repeated  sorties  of  the  enemy,  that  it  would  afford  no  little 


Description  of  Siege-works  7^ 

protection  in  that  quarter,  if,  instead  of  a  mere  block-house  May-Aug. 

to  serve  as  a  rallying-point,  they  were  to  build  a  full-sized 

brick  tower,  close  under  the  city  wall,  where  previously  they 

had  constructed  only  a  small  and  low  shelter  against  these  same 

sudden  attacks.     It  was  to  this  shelter  that  they  were  in  the 

habit  of  retiring;  it  was  from  this,  moreover,  that  they  fought 

as  an  advanced  outpost,  on  the  enemy  pushing  home  any 

attack  with  unusual  vigour;  and  it  was  out  from  this  that  they 

used  to  charge  both  to  repulse  and  pursue  him.  Its  dimensions 

were  fully  thirty  feet  square,  but,  on  the  other  hand,  its  walls 

had  been  built  five  feet  thick  ;  and  now,  after  its  construction, 

in  accordance  with  the  law  that  experience  is  the  universal 

guide  in  life,  their  applied  intelligence  led  them  to  discover 

that  the  raising  of  this  block-house  to  the  height  of  a  regular 

siege  tower  might  prove  of  very  considerable  service.     This 

transformation  was  effected  as  follows. 

When  the  building  had  been  raised  high  enough  to  carry  9 
a  floor,  the  latter  was  carefully  fitted  into  the  outside  walls 
in  such  a  way  that  the  heads  of  the  beams,  though  extended 
into  the  brickwork,  were  nevertheless  completely  enclosed  by 
the  masonry,  and  thus  prevented  any  protrusion  outside  on 
which  fire  flung  by  the  defenders  could  lodge.  Round  this 
first  floor  were  next  piled  pillars  of  small  flat  tiles,  as  high 
as  the  protection  of  the  military  screen  and  sheds  they  were 
using  allowed  of  ;  and  then,  on  the  top  of  this  temporary 
work,  two  large  beams  were  laid,  parallel  with,  and  not  far 
from  the  outer  edge  of,  the  two  side  walls — beams  fromwhich 
it  was  intended  to  hang  the  flooring  that  was  to  form  the 
ultimate  roof  of  the  tower.  Above  these,  and  crossing  them 
at  right  angles,  joists  were  next  laid  down,  and  massed  together 
by  planking.     These  joists  were  made  a  little  longer  than  the 


8  o  Description  of  Siege-works 

May-Aug.  walls,  and  protruded  beyond  them,  so  that  from  their  extremi- 
ties could  be  suspended  coverlets  which  should  act  as  an 
impenetrable  defence  against  all  shots  launched  at  the  men 
whilst  engaged  upon  that  section  of  the  wall  which  intervened 
between  this  roofing  and  the  part  already  completed.  The 
top  of  this  floor  was  further  paved  with  crude  brick  and  mor- 
tar, to  guard  against  any  attempts  of  the  enemy  to  damage 
it  by  fire  ;  and,  finally,  a  number  of  soaked  cushions  were 
thrown  on,  to  prevent  either  the  woodwork  being  broken 
by  the  discharges  of  artillery,  or  the  brickwork  smashed  by 
the  heavy  shot  from  the  mortars.  Three  large  mats  were 
next  manufactured  out  of  anchor  hawsers,  in  length  equal  to 
the  tower  walls,  and  four  feet  deep  ;  and  these  were  then 
lashed  to  the  protruding  joists  on  the  three  sides  exposed  to 
the  enemy,  thereby  forming  a  continuous  curtain  round  the 
tower.  These  mats  were  made  of  this  material,  because  expe- 
rience elsewhere  had  proved  it  to  be  the  only  one  capable  of 
resisting  the  passage  both  of  hand-spears  and  ordnance  shot, 
no  matter  of  what  weight  and  size. 

As  soon  as  the  already  finished  portion  of  the  tower  was 
thus  covered  and  fortified  against  every  sort  of  discharge  from 
the  enemy,  the  screens  hitherto  used  were  wheeled  off  to 
other  parts  of  the  siege-works,  and  the  men  in  the  tower 
began  to  let  the  roof  hang  free  and  then  to  raise  it 
with  levers  working  from  the  first-floor  beams ;  hoisting 
it  as  high  as  the  suspension  of  the  curtains  allowed 
of.  That  done,  they  proceeded,  completely  hidden  and 
protected  by  these  coverings,  to  build  up  the  four  walls 
with  brickwork ;  and,  on  the  completion  of  this  particular 
section,  the  overhanging  hood  was  prised  up  anew,  and  a  fresh 
space  cleared  for  construction.     When  it  was  judged  time  for 


Description  of  Siege-works  8  i 

the  insertion  of  the  second  floor,  the  beams  were  again  fitted  May-Aug. 
into  and  concealed  by  the  outside  layers  of  bricks  ;  after  which  ^^ 
the  new  flooring  was  used,  in  its  turn,  as  a  leverage  for  once 
more  hoisting  the  top  roof-work  and  its  hanging  mats.  In 
this  way  they  effected  the  construction  of  altogether  six 
stories,  in  perfect  safety  and  without  a  wound  or  danger  of 
any  kind ;  leaving  as  they  built,  wherever  occasion  seemed 
to  demand,  a  number  of  loopholes  through  which  afterwards 
to  direct  artillery  fire. 

As  soon  as  they  felt  confident  that  their  position  in  the  lo 
new  tower  enabled  them  to  cover  with  its  fire  all  the  surround- 
ing siege-buildings,  they  set  to  work  to  construct  a  sapping 
shelter,  sixty  feet  in  length,  and  made  from  timbers  two  feet 
square,  with  the  intention  of  running  it  from  the  brick  tower 
down  to  the  enemy's  wall  and  the  particular  bastion  facing 
them.    This  shelter  was  of  the  following  formation. 

Two  beams  of  equal  length  were  first  laid  out  upon  the 
ground,  four  feet  apart,  into  each  of  which  was  let  a  row  of 
uprights  five  feet  high.  These  were  then  coupled  across  by 
a  series  of  strong  braces,  forming  a  slight  angle  in  the  centre, 
on  the  top  of  which  other  beams  were  to  be  laid  as  a  roof. 
Along  these  braces  two-foot  beams  were  accordingly  fitted, 
and  fastened  by  nails  and  metal  clamps.  The  next  step  was 
to  let  in  aU  along  the  edges  of  this  roof,  or,  in  other  words, 
along  the  extremities  of  the  beams  which  formed  it,  a  raised 
ledge  of  wood,  about  three  inches  broad  and  high,  for  the 
purpose  of  holding  the  brickwork  that  was  to  follow.  The 
frame  having  thus  received  an  appropriate  slant  to  its  roof, 
and  being  neatly  finished  off,  as  soon  as  the  roof  beams  were 
made  fast  upon  the  braces,  the  shed  was  cased  above  with 
crude  brick  and  mortar,  as  a  protection  against  fire  thrown 


82  Description  of  Siege-ivorks 

May-Aug.    from  the  battlements.    These  bricks  were  then  given  several 
"*  coatings  of  stucco  to  prevent  their  being  washed  to  pieces  by 

water  played  upon  them  through  pipes  by  the  garrison: 
whilst,  finally,  the  stucco  itself  was  laid  over  with  soaked 
cushions,  to  guard  in  turn  against  damage  from  either  fire  or 
heavy  stones.  The  whole  of  this  piece  of  work  was  kept  hidden 
behind  protection-sheds,  and  executed  outside  the  tower  itself : 
and,  upon  its  completion,  the  legionaries,  with  a  sudden  move- 
ment totally  unlooked  for  by  the  enemy,  swept  it  out  on  rollers 
and,  using  a  type  of  winch  employed  for  beaching  ships,  rushed 
it  down  to  the  opposing  bastion  and  fastened  it  to  the  masonry, 
1 1  At  the  consternation  wrought  by  this  new  peril  the  garrison 
fetched  out  crowbars,  and,  prising  up  the  biggest  stones  that 
could  be  stirred,  rolled  them  headlong  down  upon  the  sapping- 
shed.  But  its  stout  timbers  held  against  the  crash,  and  all 
that  fell  upon  it  slid  off  down  the  sloping  roof.  Seeing  this, 
the  enemy  changed  their  tactics,  and,  filling  barrels  with  pine 
shavings  and  pitch,  set  them  alight  and  dropped  them  from 
the  wall  upon  the  shed  below.  These,  as  they  struck  the  roof, 
also  rolled  to  the  ground,  and  were  there  fended  off  from  the 
sides  of  the  structure  by  means  of  long  poles  and  pitchforks. 
Meanwhile,  beneath  the  shelter,  the  troops  were  tearing  out 
with  crowbars  the  lowest  stones  of  the  enemy's  tower  holding 
the  foundations  together  ;  during  which  operation  the  shed 
was  guarded  by  the  garrison  of  the  brick  tower,  who  poured  in 
so  hot  a  fire  of  hand-spears  and  artillery  shot,  that  they  drove 
the  enemy  from  his  wall  and  bastions,  and  thereby  made  it  a 
harder  task  for  him  to  withstand  the  progress  of  our  sappers. 
Several  stones  had  already  been  removed  from  the  underground 
part  of  the  bastion,  when  suddenly  all  that  portion  collapsed 
and  fell,  whilst  the  remainder  looked  like  tottering  to  its  fall. 


49 


The  City  sues  for  Terms  8  3 

At  this,  the  enemy,  unnerved  by  the  sudden  ruin  of  the  12 
tower,  and  overwhelmed  by  a  reverse  so  unexpected,  cowed 
also  by  the  evident  wrath  of  heaven,  and  dreading  the  plunder 
of  their  city,rushed  out  in  a  body  through  the  gatewayinto  the 
open,  armed  only  withthewhite  flag,^  and  with  hands  upraised 
towards  the  generals  and  the  army,  in  token  of  surrender. 
Such  an  unexpected  movement  caused  a  complete  suspension 
of  military  operations ;  and  the  soldiers  ceased  fighting,  and 
eagerly  turned  to  pick  up  what  news  they  could.  The  enemy, 
on  reaching  the  presence  of  the  generals  and  the  main  army, 
threw  themselves  on  their  knees  and  begged  to  be  allowed 
to  await  the  arrival  of  Caesar.  '  They  could  see ',  so  they 
declared,  'that  their  city  was  now  taken,  that  the  Roman 
siege-works  were  completed,  and  their  own  bastion  under- 
mined :  they  accordingly  gave  up  the  defence.  If,  when 
Caesar  arrived,  they  were  to  refuse  compliance  with  his 
terms,  he  would  only  have  to  give  the  word,  and  nothing 
could  possibly  prevent  the  instant  sacking  of  their  town.  Even 
as  things  were,  they  observed  that,  if  the  rest  of  the  bastion 
went,  it  would  be  beyond  the  power  of  the  Roman  officers 
to  restrain  their  men  from  bursting  into  the  city  in  hopes  of 
plunder,  and  levelling  it  with  the  ground.' 

All  this,  with  much  more  to  the  same  effect,  was  pleaded 
in  tones  of  striking  pathos  and  with  a  copious  use  of  tears,  as 
indeed  was  only  to  be  expected  from  such  past-masters  of 
forensic  eloquence. 

Touched  by  this  appeal,  the  Roman  generals  withdrew  their  1 3 
forces  from  the  siege  ramparts,  and  abandoned  the  blockade, 
merely  leaving  a  few  sentinels  upon  the  works.     Humanity 
induced  them  to  grant  the  enemy  a  sort  of  truce,  while  waiting 

*   '  With  suppliant  fillets.' 
G  2 


84  -^  Truce  granted 


May-Aiig.    the  return  of  Caesar,  and  no  further  shot  was  fired  either  from 
"^"^  the  wall  or  from  our  own  lines ;  but  everybody,  assuming  the 

contest  at  an  end,  relaxed  their  precautions  and  vigilance. 
A  further  reason  for  the  armistice  was  that  Caesar  had 
written  strict  injunctions  to  Trebonius  not  to  allow  the  city 
to  be  taken  by  storm,  lest  the  troops,  who  were  unusually 
irritated  at  the  town's  revolt  and  its  contemptuous  defiance 
of  their  power,  as  well  as  by  their  own  protracted  exertions, 
should  put  the  whole  adult  population  to  the  sword,  which 
indeed  they  threatened  to  do.  Even  now  they  were  hardly 
to  be  restrained  from  breaking  into  the  town,  and  were  highly 
exasperated  because  they  fancied  that  Trebonius  had  baulked 
them  of  their  prey. 
14  The  enemy,  however,  were  only  faithlessly  seeking  a  favour- 
able opportunity  for  an  act  of  most  consummate  treachery  ; 
and,  after  a  few  days'  interval,  when  our  men  had  to  some 
extent  grown  slack  and  careless,  they  suddenly,  about  midday, 
whilst  some  of  the  guards  were  absent  from  their  posts,  and 
some  weary  after  their  long  labours,  actually  asleep  on  the 
works,  with  all  their  accoutrements  laid  aside  and  in  their 
covers,^  burst  out  from  the  gates,  and,  aided  by  a  strong 
wind,  set  fire  to  the  siege  buildings.  The  wind  blew  this  fire 
in  all  directions,  with  the  result  that  embankment  and  screens, 
tortoise,  and  wooden  tower,  together  with  the  artillery  upon 
it,  simultaneously  caught  ablaze,  and  were  all  completely 
gutted  before  even  the  cause  of  the  outbreak  could  be  dis- 
covered. 

Shaken  by  the  sudden  catastrophe,  the  troops  who  were  on 
the  spot  seized  what  arms  they  could,  and,  others  rushing  up 

^  A  Roman  soldier's  shield  was  kept,  when  not  in  use,  in  a  leather 
casino;. 


and  treacherously  hrok^i  8f 

from  the  camp,  a  general  attack  was  made  upon  the  cnemv.  May-Ang. 
The  latter  indeed  was  quickly  routed,  but  our  men  were  pre-  ^^ 
vented  from  pressing  home  the  pursuit  through  the  showers 
of  arrows  and  artillery-shot  launched  upon  them  from  the 
ramparts.  The  Massilians,  on  the  other  hand,  fell  back  under 
the  shelter  of  their  walls,  and  there  at  their  leisure  proceeded 
to  burn  down  both  sapping-shed  and  brick  tower.  Thus  dis- 
appeared in  a  few  moments,  through  the  enemy's  treachery 
and  the  force  of  the  gale,  the  accumulated  work  of  many 
months.  The  same  artifice  was  again  attempted  the  next 
day,  when,  with  the  wind  blowing  as  before,  they  charged  out 
with  even  greater  confidence  to  give  battle  at  the  second 
wooden  tower  and  mound,  dashing  quantities  of  fire  upon 
them.  But,  whereas  on  the  first  occasion  our  troops  had  com- 
pletely relaxed  their  earlier  vigilance  of  the  siege  ;.  this  time, 
warned  by  yesterday's  mishap,  they  were  found  completely 
prepared  for  defence,  vidth  the  consequence  that  the  enemy 
was  driven  back  into  the  town  after  heavy  slaughter  and  the 
total  failure  of  his  plan. 

Trebonius  at  once  set  himself  to  the  task  of  taking  in  hand  ^5 
and  rebuilding  his  ruined  works,  inspired  by  the  greatly  inten- 
sified enthusiasm  of  his  troops.  For  on  seeing  the  fiasco  in 
which  all  their  labours  and  preparations  had  now  resulted, 
a  wave  of  fury  swept  them  at  the  thought  of  how  their  im- 
mense efforts  would  only  look  ridiculous  in  face  of  the  fact 
that  they  were  now  totally  destitute  of  even  a  source  for 
obtaining  further  siege  material,  since  every  tree  throughout 
t  he  length  and  breadth  of  the  Massilian  territories  had  already 
been  cut  down  and  carted  to  the  army.  Accordingly  they 
determined  to  substitute  an  unprecedented  type  of  siege 
mound.     This  took  the  form  of  two  parallel  brick  walls  six 


^6  New  Siege-worJ^   built 

M?.y-Aug.  feet  each  in  width,  roofed  above,  and  of  nearly  equal  height 
to  the  former  embankment  of  timber.  Wherever  the  space 
between  the  two,  or  the  weakness  of  the  material  used  seemed 
to  require  it,  stout  tie-rods  were  inserted  as  couplers,  and  big 
beams  laid  across  to  give  additional  strength ;  whilst  every 
part  of  the  roofing  was  covered  with  hurdle  work,  which, 
again,  was  coated  with  mortar.  The  men  working  below 
thus  found  themselves  protected  overhead  by  a  roof,  on  each 
side  by  a  wall,  and  in  front  by  the  shelter  of  a  military 
screen,  and  could  therefore  safely  bring  up  everything 
they  wanted  for  the  work.  The  enterprise  was  consequently 
carried  through  with  expedition,  and  the  lost  fruits  of  their 
long  labours  were  quickly  regained  by  the  ingenuity  and  devo- 
tion of  the  troops.  Finally,  gateways  for  future  sorties  were 
left  at  appropriate  intervals  in  the  wall. 
16  The  enemy  thus  saw  the  extensive  buildings,  whose  recon- 
struction he  had  fondly  hoped  to  be  impossible,  no  matter 
what  time  were  spent  upon  them,  rebuilt  with  the  labour  and 
output  of  a  few  days,  and  rebuilt,  moreover,  in  such  a  way 
as  to  leave  no  opening  for  any  treacherous  sally,  or  any 
possibility  whatever  either  of  injuring  our  troops  by  the 
discharge  of  spears  or  of  damaging  the  works  by  fire.  Simul- 
taneously it  came  home  to  them  that  this  first  experiment 
might  very  well  be  so  extended  as  to  enclose  the  whole  of  the 
landward  side  of  their  city  within  a  bastioned  wall,  which 
must  then  force  them  to  abandon  their  position  on  their 
own  fortifications,  now  that  our  troops  had  nearly  effected  a 
junction  between  their  brick  walls  and  those  of  the  city, 
and  were  already  throwing  handspears.  It  was  also  clear  that 
their  big  artillery,  from  which  they  had  hoped  so  much,  was 
rapidly  becoming  useless  through  the  shortened  range  ;  and, 


Final  Surrender  8  7 

each  party  having  now  equal  opportunities  of  fighting  from  May-Aug. 
towets  and  battlements,  they  were  quite  conscious  of  their      ^^ 
own  inability  to  match  our  men  in  personal  courage.     It  was 
these  considerations  which  induced  them  to  fall  back  once 
more  upon  the  previous  terms  of  capitulation. 

CHAPTER  II 
The  Clearing  of  Southern  Spain 

Meanwhile  in  Further  or  Western  Spain,  Marcus  Varro  17 
had  at  first,  upon  news  of  the  initial  operations  in  Italy,  given  "^^'"^  ^^^ 
up  the  cause  of  Pompeius  as  lost,  and  continued  to  speak  in 
the  most  flattering  terms  of  Caesar.  '  Whilst  his  own  in- 
terests',  he  declared,  'were  already  engaged  on  the  side  of 
Pompeius,  in  virtue  of  the  deputy-command  he  held  from 
that  leader,  which  bound  him  to  the  obligation  of  loyalty,  his 
position  was  complicated  by  an  equally  strong  friendship  for 
Caesar.  However,  he  knew  what  was  the  duty  of  a  commander 
holding  a  commission  of  trust  under  a  superior  officer,  and  he 
knew  too  the  forces  at  his  own  disposal,  as  well  as  the  universal 
bias  of  his  province  towards  Caesar.'  ^ 

Such  was  the  tone  of  all  his  conversation,  reflected  in  his 
conduct  by  a  general  inactivity.  Subsequently  there  came 
the  information  of  Caesar's  detention  before  Marseilles,  of  the 
junction  of  Petreius's  forces  with  the  army  of  Afranius,of  the 
successful  concentration  of  large  bodies  of  auxiliaries,  and  the 
confident  expectation  of  others  equally  strong,  and,  last  but 
not  least,  of  the  unanimous  feeling  of  the  Eastern  province  for 
Pompeius.  And  when  this  was  finally  followed  by  the  news  of 
the  critical  state  of  Caesar's  supplies  before  Lerida,  communi- 

"■  who  had  been  Governor's  Paymaster  and  Governor  of  it.  See  Inirod. 


88  Coercion  of  the  Province 

Summer  49  cated  by  Afranius  in  exaggerated  and  bombastic  terms,  he  no 
longer  hesitated  to  change  his  own  attitude  with  the  change 
of  fortune. 
1 8  Enlisting  was  organized  throughout  the  province, till  his  two 
legions  had  been  raised  to  their  full  complement  and  further 
strengthened  by  the  addition  of  some  thirty  native  battalions  : 
he  collected  large  supplies  of  corn,  to  be  forwarded  to  the 
Massilians  as  well  as  to  Afranius  and  Petreius ;  ordered  the 
city  of  Cadiz  (Gades)  to  build  ten  warships,  whilst  superin- 
tending the  building  of  several  more  at  Seville  (Hisfalis),  and 
removed  to  Cadiz  all  money  and  valuables  from  the  great 
temple  of  Hercules.  From  the  province  a  force  of  six 
battalions  was  sent  south  to  garrison  Cadiz  ;  Caius  Gal- 
lonius,  a  Roman  knight,  and  a  friend  of  Domitius,  who 
happened  to  be  there  on  a  business  errand  from  the  latter 
connected  with  a  legacy,  was  installed  as  commandant  of  that 
town ;  and  all  arms,  whether  the  property  of  the  government 
or  individuals,  were  ordered  to  be  conveyed  to  the  residence 
of  the  new  governor. 

These  overt  acts  he  followed  up  by  delivering  violent 
speeches  against  Caesar,  and  several  times  openly  announced 
from  his  official  platform  that  that  commander  had  fought 
various  unsuccessful  actions,  and  that  large  bodies  of  his  troops 
had  gone  over  to  Afranius  ;  information  of  which  he  declared 
he  had  satisfied  himself  from  most  trustworthy  messengers 
and  indisputable  sources. 

Having  by  these  methods  terrorized  the  Roman  citizens  in 
his  province,  he  coerced  them  into  promising  him  for  the 
public  services  j^i 50,000  coin  of  the  realm,  and  20,000  pounds 
weight  of  bar  silver,  together  with  about  4,000  quarters  of 
wheat  :  while,  further  to  mark  his  bitterness,  the  townships 


Caesar's  J{apid  Move  on  Cordova      89 

suspected  of  sympathy  with  Caesar  were  saddled  with  the  Summer  49 
heaviest  burdens,  garrisons  also  being  set  up  in  their  midst. 
Finally  he  allowed  prosecutions  to  be  brought  against  private 
individuals,  by  which  any  who  had  been  guilty  of  treasonable 
language  against  the  present  regime  had  their  goods  con- 
fiscated to  the  state,  and  the  entire  province  had  to  take  an 
oath  of  allegiance  to  Pompeius  and  himself. 

On  learning  the  issue  of  the  operations  in  Eastern  Spain,  he 
prepared  for  war,  though  the  conduct  of  the  war  was  to  be 
a  strange  one,  and  consisted  of  retiring  with  his  two  legions 
upon  Crdiz,  and  there  locking  up  his  fleet  along  with  all  his 
provisions ;  a  course  of  action  forced  upon  him  by  the  dis- 
covery that  his  province  was  now  solid  for  Caesar.  There,  on 
the  island  which  forms  that  city,  with  sufficient  ships  and 
supplies  of  food,  he  regarded  it  an  easy  matter  to  effect  the 
procrastination  of  the  war. 

Caesar,  however,  had  determined,  in  spite  of  much  urgent 
business  which  at  this  moment  summoned  him  back  to  Italy, 
not  to  leave  any  area  of  war  behind  him  in  the  Spanish  pro- 
vinces ;  for  he  was  perfectly  well  aware  of  the  signal  benefits 
conferred  by  Pompeius  upon  the  Eastern  province,  and  of  his 
immense  following  in  that  region. 

He  therefore  dispatched  the  tribune  Quintus  Cassius  '  with  19 
a  force  of  two  legions  to  march  upon  Southern  Spain,  whilst 
he  himself  travelled  ahead  by  rapid  marches,  and  escorted 
by  a  bodyguard  of  600  horse.  He  also  sent  on  before  him  a 
proclamation,  fixing  a  date  on  which  he  desired  the  attend- 
ance at  Cordova  (Corduba)  of  the  magistrates  and  leading 
citizens  of  all  the  communities  in  this  part  of  the  Peninsula. 

*  One  of  those  who  vetoed  the  Senate's  declaration  of  war.  Cf.  Bk.  I, 
ch.  I. 


90    Grorving  Discontent  of  the  Province 

Summer  49  The  terms  of  this  proclamation  were  disseminated  throughout 
the  province  ;  and,  on  the  day  appointed,  there  was  not  a 
single  township  which  had  not  sent  some  members  of  its 
governing  council  to  Cordova,  and  not  a  single  Roman 
citizen  of  any  standing  who  was  not  there  to  meet  him. 

During  this  time  also  the  Roman  settlement  in  Cordova 
took  upon  themselves  to  shut  the  city  gates  against  Varro  ; 
guards  and  sentinels  were  posted  upon  the  walls  and  turrets, 
and  two  of  the  so-called  '  colonial  corps '  having  chanced  to 
arrive  there,  they  were  kept  under  orders  for  the  defence  of 
the  town.  Simultaneously,  the  inhabitants  of  Carmona,  by 
far  the  strongest  township  of  the  whole  province,  of  their  own 
initiative  expelled  the  three  battalions  established  in  their 
citadel  as  a  garrison  by  Varro,  and  then  shut  their  gates 
against  him. 
20  All  this  only  increased  Varro's  haste  to  get  to  Cadiz  with 
his  two  legions  as  quickly  as  possible,  lest  he  should  find 
either  the  road  or  the  passage  across  to  the  island  barred  in  his 
face  ;  so  widespread  and  so  decided  did  he  now  realize  the 
feeling  of  the  province  to  be  in  favour  of  Caesar.  He  had  not 
gone  far  when  dispatches  met  him  from  Cadiz  informing  him 
that  the  news  of  Caesar's  manifesto  had  at  once  been  followed 
by  a  conspiracy  between  the  leaders  of  the  town  and  the  offi- 
cers of  the  troops  there  in  garrison,  to  eject  Gallonius  and  hold 
the  city  and  island  for  Caesar  :  that  after  the  hatching  of  this 
plot  an  ultimatum  had  been  addressed  to  Gallonius  advising 
his  voluntary  departure  from  Cadiz,  whilst  he  could  safely  do 
so  (for  otherwise  the  conspirators  would  take  their  own 
measures),  and  that  upon  this  threat  Gallonius  had  evacuated 
the  town. 

On  hearing  of  this  last  development,  one  of  the  two  legions, 


and  Su7 render  to  Caesar  91 

termed  the  home-born  regiment ',  pulled  up  from  the  ground  Summer  4(y 
its  standards  in  Varro's  camp,  with  their  commander  actually- 
standing  by  and  looking  on,  and  then  and  there  marched 
back  to  Seville ;  where,  without  committing  any  breach  of 
discipline,  it  proceeded  to  bivouac  in  the  market-place  and 
public  colonnades  of  the  city.  This  conduct  won  such  warm 
approbation  from  the  Roman  citizens  in  that  administrative 
area,  that  they  each  took  some  of  the  troops  off  to  their  own 
homes,  and  there  entertained  them  with  the  keenest  pleasure. 

Proceedings  like  these  caused  Varro  considerable  misgiving. 
Changing  his  route,  he  started  off  with  the  hope  of  getting 
to  Santiponce  (Italica),  only,  however,  to  receive  intelligence 
from  his  supporters  that  the  gates  were  already  closed 
against  him.  He  was  now  cut  off  from  every  possible  line  of 
march,  and,  accordingly,  sent  in  word  to  Caesar  that  he  was 
prepared  to  surrender  his  remaining  legion  to  whomever 
Caesar  should  direct  him.  The  latter  dispatched  Sextus 
Caesar  to  his  late  opponent,  bearing  instructions  for  the  legion 
to  be  surrendered  to  him.  After  the  surrender,  Varro  came 
to  meet  Caesar  at  Cordova,  where  he  gave  a  faithful  return  of 
all  his  government  accounts,  paying  over  whatever  ready  money 
he  had  in  hand,  and  specifying  all  stores  and  ships  anywhere 
under  his  immediate  command. 

Subsequently  Caesar  delivered  a  public  address  in  a  Durbar  21 
at  Cordova,  in  which  he  expressed  his  gratitude  to  all  the  various 
classes  of  his  audience  in  their  order.  First  of  all  to  the  Roman 
citizens,  for  their  active  steps  in  securing  the  allegiance  of  the 
provincial  capital ;  next  to  the  Spaniards  for  their  expulsion 
of  the  enemy's  garrisons ;  then  to  the  peopl&of  Cadiz,  for 

'  i.  e.  from  Roman  citizens  born  and  bred  in  the  province,  like  some 
An?lo-Indians. 


92       'Temporary  Settlements  of  Spain 

successfully  foiling  the  plots  of  his  opponents  and  asserting 
their  own  independence  of  action  ;  lastly  to  the  officers  and 
centurions,  lately  in  garrison  in  that  city,  for  having  lent 
their  military  support  to  the  execution  of  the  policy  of  the 
civilians.  After  this,  he  released  the  Roman  citizens  from 
their  undertaking  to  supply  Varro  with  moneys  for  the  public 
service  ;  and  at  the  same  time  restored  their  confiscated 
property  to  all  who  were  proved  to  have  been  so  fined  for 
excessive  freedom  of  speech. 

Having  then  distinguished  certain  of  his  adherents  by  the 
grant  of  privileges  both  public  and  private  in  character,  he 
filled  the  rest  with  bright  hopes  for  their  political  future,  and, 
after  a  stay  of  two  days  in  Cordova,  set  out  for  Cadiz,  where 
all  treasure  and  valuables  taken  from  the  sanctuary  of  Hercules 
and  afterwardslodged  in  a  private  dwelling-house  were  ordered 
to  be  restored  to  that  temple.  This  done,  he  appointed 
Quintus  Cassius  as  governor  of  the  province  with  a  military 
force  of  four  legions;  he  then  went  on  board  the  vessels  lately 
built  by  Marcus  Varro  and,  at  his  injunctions,  by  the  town 
of  Cadiz,  and  set  sail  for  Tarragona  {Tarraco),  and,  after 
a  few  days'  voyage,  cast  anchor  off  that  city.  Here  he  found 
representatives  of  pretty  well  the  whole  Eastern  province 
awaiting  his  arrival.  Following  the  same  policy  as  at  Cordova, 
he  selected  certain  communities  to  be  the  recipients  of  both 
public  and  personal  distinctions,  and  afterwards  left  by  the 
overland  route  for  Narbonne,  travelling  thence  on  to  Mar- 
seilles, where  he  learned  that  in  accordance  with  a  law  passed 
by  the  people  he  had  been  nominated  Dictator  by  Marcus 
Lepidus  the  praetor. 
!  The  Massilians  he  found  reduced  to  the  utmost  straits. 
Their  supplies  were  at  starvation  point,  they  had  been  twice 


Fate  of  Marseilles  9  3 

beaten  at  sea,  their  numerous  sallies  had  uniformly  been  Summer  49 
repulsed,  and  now,  to  crown  all,  they  were  in  the  throes  of 
a  virulent  plague.  This  last  calamity  was  due  to  their  long 
immurement  and  change  of  diet,  the  only  food  now  obtainable 
being  stale  millet  and  mouldy  barley,  stores  of  which  grain  had 
been  long  accumulated  in  public  granaries  as  a  provision 
against  such  contingencies.  One  of  their  bastion-towers  was, 
moreover,  down,  and  much  of  their  wall  undermined  ;  whilst 
all  hope  had  now  disappeared  of  succour  from  the  Spanish 
provinces  and  armies,  the  news  of  whose  capture  by  Caesar 
had  lately  reached  them.  They  therefore  determined  to  sur- 
render without  further  attempt  at  treachery.  A  few  days, 
however,  before  the  actual  capitulation,  Lucius  Domitius,  on 
discovering  the  intention  of  the  town,  had  proceeded  to  fit  out 
three  ships ;  and,  after  allotting  two  of  these  to  his  suite,  had 
himself  embarked  on  the  third ;  when,  favoured  by  dirty 
weather,  he  made  a  dash  to  escape.  He  was  sighted  by  the 
vessels,  which,  by  the  orders  of  Brutus,  lay  daily  off  the  har- 
bour to  enforce  the  blockade,  and  these  at  once  weighed 
anchor  and  gave  chase.  One  of  the  three,  viz.  that  of  Domi- 
tius, alone  kept  on  her  course,  and  continued  her  efforts  to 
escape,  until,  aided  by  the  heavy  weather,  she  was  lost  to  sight 
by  her  pursuers  :  the  other  two,  frightened  at  seeing  our  war- 
ships closing  in  upon  them,  put  back  into  port. 

TheMassilians,in  obedience  to  Caesar's  orders,  now  brought 
out  through  the  town  gates  all  the  arms  and  siege-guns  they 
possessed,  and  then  made  over  to  Brutus  all  the  ships  remain- 
ing either  in  harbour  or  dockyards  :  simultaneously  surrender 
was  made  of  all  funds  in  the  public  Treasury.  These  pre- 
liminaries disposed  of,  Caesar  agreed  to  spare  their  autonomy, 
though  more  out  of  consideration,  it  must  be  confessed,  for 


'94-  Curio  in  Jfrica 

Slimmer  49  the  city's  great  name  and  distinguished  history  in  the  past, 
than  for  any  services  they  had  rendered  to  himself. 
Leaving,  therefore,  a  garrison  of  two  legions  in  the  place,  he 
sent  on  the  remainder  into  Italy,  and  then  started  on  his  way 
to  Rome. 

CHAPTER    III 

The  Set-back  in  Africa 

23      It  was  during  the  events  recorded  in  the  previous  chapter 
Aug.-Sept.   that  the  expedition  of  Caius  Curio  to  North  Africa  was  begun 
^^  and  ended.     Exhibiting  from  the  outset  a  fatal  contempt  for 

the  military  strength  of  his  opponent, Publius  Attius  Varus,  he 
crossed  over  from  Sicily,  accompanied  by  only  two  of  the  four 
legions  originally  given  him  by  Caesar,  and  by  but  five  hundred 
cavalry  ;  and,  after  a  passage  of  some  sixty  hours,  landed,  on 
the  morning  of  the  third  day,  at  a  place  called  Anquillaria. 
This  spot  is  distant  twenty-two  miles  from  Klibia  (Clufea), 
and  in  summer-time  offers  a  fairly  convenient  anchorage, 
lying,  as  it  does,  between  two  bold  headlands.  Klibia  itself 
was  occupied  by  the  younger  Lucius  Caesar,  who  was  cruising 
off  the  port  in  readiness  for  Curio's  arrival  with  a  squadron  of 
ten  warships,  old  vessels  that  had  been  hauled  up  into  the 
dockyards  of  Utica  at  the  close  of  the  war  with  the  pirates, 
and  fitted  out  again  for  the  present  campaign  by  the  orders  of 
Attius.  Their  admiral  had  accordingly  taken  alarm  at  the 
imposing  numbers  of  our  flotilla,  and,  flying  from  the  open  sea, 
had  run  his  flagship,  a  three-decker  ^,  upon  the  nearest  point  of 
the  coast-line,  where  he  left  it  stranded,  and  set  out  overland 
to  the  town  of  Susa  (Hadrumetuni),  then  held  by  a  single 
•legion  under  Caius  Considius  Longus.  The  rest  of  the  squad- 
'  A  decked  trireme.     See  note,  p.  77- 


7 o  face  p.  05. 


Brilliant  Opening  of  the  Campaim     9  5- 

ron,  upon  the  flight  of  their  leader,  likewise  made  for  Susa.  Aug.-Sept. 
Meanwhile  Curio's  twelve  warships,  which  he  had  brought      '♦9 
over  from  Sicily  to  escort  his  transports,  started  under  the 
command  of  his  paymaster  Marcius  Rufus  and  gave  chase 
to  Caesar  ;  but,  on  seeing  the  latter's  vessel  abandoned  on 
the  beach,  they  towed  her  off,  and  then  returned  to  Curio. 

Thr  latter,  after  completing  his  disembarkation,  directed  24 
Marcius  to  take  the  ships  round  to  Utica,  and,  following  their 
departure,  set  his  army  in  motion  for  the  same  objective, 
a  two  days'  march  bringing  him  to  the  banks  of  the  Medjerda 
(Bagradas).  There  leaving  Caius  Caninius  Rebilus  in  charge 
of  the  legions,  he  rode  forward  with  the  cavalry  to  reconnoitre 
the  old  camp  of  Scipio  ^,  a  site  which  he  believed  to  be  admira- 
bly adapted  for  the  permanent  quarters  of  his  army.  It 
consists  of  a  tongue  of  precipitous  rock,  jutting  out  into  the 
sea,  steep  and  rugged  on  two  sides,  but  with  a  slightly  less 
abrupt  descent  on  that  looking  towards  Utica,  from  which, 
by  the  direct  route,  it  is  little  over  a  mile  distant.  This  route, 
however,  passes  through  springs,  where  there  is  a  considerable 
inlet  of  the  sea,  converting  all  the  surrounding  district  into 
a  marsh,  and  any  one  wishing  to  avoid  this  can  only  reach  the 
town  by  a  detour  of  fully  six  miles. 

Having  reconnoitred  the  position,  Curio  also  succeeded  in  25 
obtaining  a  view  of  his  opponent's  camp.  It  lay  hard  by  the 
wall  of  the  town,  which  it  actually  touched  at  what  is  known 
as  the  Military  Gate.  It  thus  had  the  advantage  of  great 
natural  strength  ;  for,  in  addition  to  the  city  of  Utica  itself 
forming  one  of  its  four  sides,  a  second  rested  on  the  theatre, 
which  faces  the  town  outside,  and  on  the  immensely  strong 

^  Used  by  the  great  Scipio  Africanus  at  the  close  of  the  second  Punic 
War,  204. 


9  5     Brilliant  Opening  of  the  Campaign 

Aug.-Sept,  substructures  of  this  building ;  and  lastly,  the  approach  to 
"^^  it  was  both  narrow  and  difficult  of  access. 

Whilst  investigating  the  camp,  he  noticed  that  all  round  the 
neighbourhood  the  roads  were  thronged  with  the  inhabitants 
Carrying  and  driving  loads  of  property  from  the  country 
towards  the  city,  hoping  to  convey  it  thither  for  safety  in  their 
panic  at  the  sudden  outbreak  of  war  in  their  midst.  Curio  at 
once  launched  his  cavalry  upon  this  prospective  plunder  and 
booty ;  but  had  hardly  given  the  word  when  a  body  of  600 
Numidian  horse  and  400  foot  emerged  from  the  town,  having 
been  dispatched  by  Varus  to  act  as  an  escort  to  the  coveted 
prize.  These  troops  had  arrived  at  Utica  a  few  days  before 
as  reinforcements  from  King  Juba,  whose  action  had  been 
prompted,  not  merely  by  the  old  friendship  between  his  father 
andPompeius,but  also  by  a  feeling  of  intense  animosity  against 
Curio,  who,  in  his  tribunate  of  the  year  before,  had  laid  a  bill 
before  the  people,  the  ratification  of  which  would  have  meant 
the  annexation  of  Juba's  kingdom.  The  opposing  cavalry  met 
in  the  shock  of  battle,  but  the  opening  charge  was  enough  for 
the  Numidians,  who  quite  failed  to  stand  their  ground,  and, 
with  the  loss  of  some  120  killed,  fell  back  upon  their  camp 
outside  the  city  wall.  Meanwhile  the  warships  had  arrived  off 
the  town,  and  Curio  at  once  ordered  his  admiral  to  notify  the 
numerous  fleet  of  merchantmen  who  lay  off  Utica  some  200 
strong,  that  any  captain  who  did  not  immediately  bring  his 
vessel  round  to  the  Cornelian  camp  would  be  regarded  as  an 
enemy.  On  receipt  of  this  notice,  the  entire  fleet,  without 
a  moment's  hesitation,  weighed  anchor,  and,  leaving  Utica, 
moved  across  to  the  place  indicated,  thereby  enriching  the 
army  with  abundant  supplies  of  every  description. 
26      With  this   successful   opening   to  the    campaign,   Curio 


A  Second  Victory  97 

returned  to  his  camp  on  the  Medjerda,  and,  as  he  rode  in,  was  Aug.-Sept. 
received  by  the  thunderous  applause  of  every  man  in  his  army  ^^ 
acclaiming  him  as  their  own  victorious  Commander.^  The 
next  day  he  moved  with  his  force  upon  Utica,  pitching  his 
camp  close  by  the  city.  The  entrenchments  of  this  were  not 
yet  completed,  when  his  mounted  pickets  brought  in  word 
that  large  auyiliary  bodies  of  horse  and  foot,  dispatched  by 
Juba,  were  approaching  the  town.  Even  as  they  spoke  a  heavy 
cloud  of  dust  could  be  descried,  and  in  another  moment  the 
head  of  the  advancing  column  was  in  sight.  Astounded  at 
a  sight  so  wholly  unexpected,  Curio  threw  forward  his  cavalry 
to  hold  back  and  check  their  advance,  while  he  quickly  recalled 
his  infantry  from  the  work  of  fortification,  and  arranged  his 
line  of  battle.  The  cavalry  dashed  into  action,  and,  before 
the  legionaries  could  be  deployed  or  assume  their  proper  places 
in  the  ranks,  it  had  swept  back  the  king's  forces  in  one  confused 
melee  ;  caught,  as  they  were,  in  the  same  state  of  disorder  and 
over-confidence  as  had  characterized  their  march.  A  con- 
siderable portion  of  their  infantry  were  cut  to  pieces  ;  but 
nearly  all  the  cavalry  made  good  their  escape  by  a  headlong 
flight  across  the  sands  into  the  town. 

During  the  night  which  followed  this  engagement  tv^ro  of  27 
Curio's  centurions,  Marsians  ^  by  birth,  left  his  camp  to  desert 
to  Attius  Varus,  taking  voth  them  twenty-two  men  of  their 
two  companies.  Perhaps  it  was  their  honest  conviction  that 
they  reported  to  him,  or  perhaps  it  was  only  to  declare  them- 
selves his  courtiers  as  well  as  his  soldiers — seeing  that  the  wish 

'  A  regular  custom  under  the  Republic  after  an  adequate  victory. 
Under  the  Empire  the  emperor  alone  held  the  title.  For  other  instancej 
see  Bk.  Ill,  chs.  3  and  4  (31,  71). 

'  From  the  Abiuzzi. 


9  8  Symptoms  of  Disloyalty 

Aug.-Sept.  is  often  father  to  the  thought,  and  that  our  own  opinions  we 
would  fain  believe  to  be  those  of  our  neighbours — at  all  events 
they  asserted  disaffection  to  be  rife  in  the  army  of  Curio,  and 
that  the  situation  urgently  demanded  a  meeting  with  his  army 
which  might  give  it  an  opportunity  to  negotiate.  Their 
opinion  weighed  so  much  with  Varus  that  early  on  the  next 
morning  he  advanced  his  legions  from  camp  :  Curio  immedi- 
ately responded  by  a  similar  movement ;  and  each  commander 
then  drew  up  his  forces  for  battle,  with  merely  a  slight  hollow 
separating  the  two  hostile  lines, 
28  Now  there  was  serving  in  the  army  of  Varus,  the  Sextus 
Quintilius  Varus  who,  as  recorded  above,  had  been  one  of 
those  taken  at  Pentima  (Corfiniuw).  This  officer,  after  being 
released  by  Caesar,  had  crossed  to  Africa  ;  whilst  Curio 
also,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  made  up  his  expeditionary 
force  out  of  the  legions  previously  acquired  by  Caesar  at  the 
capture  of  Pentima.  So  closely,  indeed,  had  their  old  organi- 
zation been  adhered  to,  that,  with  the  exception  of  a  few 
changes  amongst  the  centurions,  the  personnel  of  the  com- 
panies and  battalions  had  undergone  no  change  whatever. 
This  fact  now  afforded  Quintilius  a  pretext  for  addressing 
overtures  to  our  men  ;  and  he  accordingly  proceeded  to  ride 
down  the  lines  of  Curio,  appealing  to  the  troops  not  to  put 
lightly  aside  the  recollection  of  their  earlier  oath  of  allegiance, 
sworn  in  the  presence  of  Domitius  and  of  himself  as  that 
general's  paymaster,  and  not  to  bear  arms  against  old  comrades 
who  had  shared  with  them  all  the  privations  of  a  siege,  nor 
to  give  their  services  to  a  party  who  only  stigmatized  them 
as  traitors.  He  then  wound  up  by  hinting  at  the  rewards 
which  they  might  confidently  expect  from  his  own  generosity 
in  the  event  of  their  joining  himself  and  Attius. 


in  Curious  Army  99 

At  the  conclusion  of  the  speech  no  indication  whatever  of  Aug.-Sepf. 
their  feeling  was  made  on  the  part  of  Curio's  army,  whereupon      ^^ 
both  sides  withdrew  their  forces  to  camp. 

As  soon  as  Curio's  troops  were  back  in  their  entrenchments  29 
a  strange  misgiving  seized  upon  all  ranks,  and  quickly  gathered 
head  as  the  various  expressions  of  opinion  made  themselves 
heard.  Exaggerated  notions  were  conjured  up  by  each  man's 
private  imagination,  so  that  to  the  fears  communicated  by  his 
comrades  each  also  added  something  of  his  own.  In  this  way 
an  idea,  which  in  reality  emanated  from  a  single  individual, 
first  spread  its  way  amongst  a  few,  and  was  then  transmitted 
from  man  to  man,  until  finally  it  appeared  to  rest  upon  the 
authority  of  quite  a  number.  For,  the  reader  must  remember, 
it  was  a  time  of  civil  war,  and  one  had  to  do  with  a  class  of  men 
who  possessed  complete  freedom  of  action,  and  could  follow 
whatever  course  they  chose.  These  legions  again  were  peculiar 
in  the  fact  that  they  had  but  recently  been  serving  with  those 
who  were  now  ranged  against  them.  Moreover,  the  very 
frequency  of  Caesar's  leniency  in  dealing  with  surrendered 
foes  had  led  them  to  under-estimate  his  generosity.  Some 
of  the  men,  accordingly,  now  pressed  for  more  decided  action  ; 
others,  inclined  to  temporize,  could  obtain  but  a  cold  hearing ; 
and,  finally,  in  some  cases  a  fictitious  air  of  defiance  was 
assumed  by  those  who  wished  to  seem  the  bolder  spirits.^ 

Such  symptoms  led  Curio  to  summon  a  council  of  war  to  30 
discuss  the  situation.  On  assembling,  some  of  the  officers 
were  for  going  on  at  all  hazards,  and  for  actually  storming  the 
camp  of  Varus  ;  holding  that,  where  troops  were  contemplat- 
ing measures  of  this  nature,  the  most  fatal  thing  of  all  was 
inaction ;  and,  come  what  might,  it  was  better  to  try  the 
•"  Much  of  this  chapter  is  slightly  conjectural,  owing  to  faulty  text. 


100  A  Council  of  War 

Aug.-Sept.    fortune  of  battle  with  sword  in  hand  than  to  be  deserted  and 
^^^  betrayed  by  their  own  men,  and  afterwards  have  to  undergo 

the  extreme  penalty  of  war.     Others  were  of  opinion  they 
should  fall  back  in  the  early  hours  of  the  morning  upon  the 
old  camp  of  Scipio,  so  that  the  men  might  recover  their 
senses  after  being  kept  a  few  days  longer  from  all  contact 
with  the  enemy;  pointing  out  also  that, in  the  case  of  disaster, 
the  large  number  of  ships  lying  there  would  give  them  a  safer 
and  easier  retreat  back  to  Sicily  than  that  afforded  by  their 
present  position. 
31       Neither  plan  commended  itself  to  Curio,  who  considered 
one  scheme  to  err  as  much  by  defect  of  courage  as  the  other 
did  by  excess,  when  half  of  those  present  looked  favourably 
upon  what  was  nothing  less  than  the  most  cowardly  flight, 
and  the  other  half  were  for  giving  battle  even  with  the  advan- 
tage of  position  directly  against  them.     For  what  sort  of 
confidence  was  it  that  led  any  one  to  believe  in  the  possibility 
of  storming  a  camp,  defended,  not  merely  by  artificial,  but 
also  by  immense  natural  fortifications  ?    And  how  were  they 
the  better  off  if,  after  a  crushing  defeat,  they  were  compelled 
to  fall  back  from  the  assault  ?    Surely  it  was  a  well-established 
axiom  that  while  success  in  the  field  ensured  for  commanders 
the  devotion  of  their  troops,  disaster  no  less  earned  their 
hatred.     Then,  as  to  the  proposal  to  change  their  own  quar- 
ters, he  could  see  in  it  nothing  but  an  ignominious  flight, 
prompted  by  unmitigated  despair,  and  inevitably  to  be  fol- 
lowed by  the  disaffection  of  the  army.     Their  plain  interests 
demanded  that  no  handle  should  be  given,  either  to  the  men 
who  were  loyal,  to  suspect  that  their  allegiance  was  doubted, 
or  to  the  mutineers,  to  discover  the  dread  which  they  in- 
spired ;  for  any  signs  of  wavering  on  their  own  part  not  only 


Curious  Self-possession  i  o  i 

strengthened  the  insubordination  of  the  disaffected,  but  also  Aug.-Sept. 
weakened  the  obedience  of  the  well  disposed.  Granted,  there-  ^^ 
fore,  that  they  were  really  satisfied  of  the  substantial  truth 
of  the  reports  concerning  the  army's  disloyalty — which  he,  for 
his  part,  felt  confident  were  either  pure  fabrications  or  at  any 
rate  less  serious  than  was  generally  supposed — how  much  more 
dignified  a  course  was  it  to  ignore  such  rumours  and  to  keep 
them  secret,  rather  than  allow  their  own  conduct  to  be  taken 
as  their  confirmation?  Every  man  when  engaged  in  battle 
endeavoured  to  conceal  his  own  wounds  :  ought  they  not 
similarly  to  cover  up  the  weak  places  in  an  army,  which  might 
otherwise  tend  to  raise  their  adversaries'  hopes  ?  If  he  were 
told  that  these  dangers  were  discounted  by  the  proposal  to 
march  at  midnight,  all  he  could  say  was  that  such  a  proposal, 
in  his  opinion,  put  a  direct  premium  upon  any  leanings 
towards  misconduct.  Movements  of  this  character  were 
only  restrained  by  one  of  two  incentives,  either  feelings  of 
honour  or  fear  of  punishment,  and  both  these  checks  were 
least  operative  at  night.  To  sum  up  therefore.  He  was 
neither  such  a  fire-eater  as  to  urge  a  hopeless  attack  upon 
fortified  entrenchments,  nor  such  a  poltroon  as  to  throw  up 
the  expedition  in  despair.  On  the  contrary,  he  was  of  the 
opinion  that  every  other  alternative  should  first  be  tried, 
and  he  already  felt  confident  that  he  should  carry  the  great 
majority  of  the  council  with  him  in  this  decision. 

Having  dismissed  his  council,  Curio  summoned  a  general  32 
meeting  of  the  troops.    On  their  assembly,  he  recalled  to  their 
recollection  the  enthusiastic   devotion   they  had   tendered 
Caesar  at  Pentima,  and  reminded  them  how  their  friendly 
initiative  at  that  time  had  put  a  large  part  of  Italy  at  his  feet. 

'  One  after  the  other ',  he  continued, '  all  the  country  towns 


I02     A  Frank  Appeal  to  the  Troops 

followed  your  guidance  and  repeated  your  action  ;  and  well 
might  Caesar  then  regard  your  decision  with  feelings  of  pro- 
foundest  gratitude,  and  the  Pompeians  with  those  of  dismay. 
For  mark  the  consequences.  In  the  camp  of  the  enemy  that 
first  verdict  of  yours  told  so  heavily,  that,  without  any  defeat 
in  a  pitched  battle,  Pompeius  ordered  the  evacuation  of  Italy ; 
whilst  Caesar,  to  show  his  trust  in  you,  at  once  committed  to 
your  safeguarding  one  of  his  dearest  friends  in  the  person  of 
myself,  along  with  the  government  of  Sicily  and  North  Africa  ; 
countries  whose  resources  are  indispensable  to  him  if  he  is  to 
retain  the  capital  and  Italy .-^  But,  I  am  reminded,  there  are 
some  who  would  now  urge  you  to  leave  us.  It  may  well  be  so. 
For  what  could  afford  them  keener  pleasure  than  to  out- 
manoeuvre us  and  at  the  same  time  to  involve  you  in  a  piece 
of  low  villany  ;  or  what  grosser  insult  to  yourselves  can  their 
impotent  rage  suggest,  than  that  you  should  betray  the  party 
which  attributes  its  success  solely  to  your  attitude,  and  walk 
into  the  arms  of  those  who  hold  you  responsible  for  all  their 
disasters?  You  surely  have  heard  of  Caesar's  triumphant 
career  in  Spain,  and  how  two  armies,  with  their  two  com- 
manders, have  gone  down  before  him,  and  two  provinces  been 
brought  under  his  control ;  and  that  all  this  has  been  accom- 
plished within  forty  days  of  his  first  sighting  his  opponents. 
Is  it  conceivable  that  a  side  which  could  make  no  stand  with 
all  its  forces  intact  can  now  do  so  when  its  cause  is  lost ;  and 
can  you,  who  declared  for  Caesar  when  victory  still  hung  in 
the  balance,  now  think  of  siding  with  the  vanquished,  after 
the  issue  of  the  war  is  decided,  and  when  you  ought  to  be 
reaping  the  reward  of  your  services?  But  perhaps  you  feel 
uneasy  at  what  they  allege  to  have  been  your  desertion  and 
^  Not  only  strategically,  but  also  as  the  granaries  of  Italy. 


a?id  Dissipation  of  Doubts  103 

betrayal  of  their  cause,  and  at  their  reference  to  your  earlier  Aug. -Sept. 
oath  of  allegiance.  Well,  I  ask  you,  was  it  you  who  deserted  ^^ 
Lucius  Domitius,  or  was  it  he  who  abandoned  you  ?  Is  it  not 
the  fact  that  he  threw  you  over  when  you  were  fully  prepared 
to  go  on  to  the  bitter  end,  and  that  he  tried  to  save  his  own 
skin  without  a  single  word  to  yourselves?  And  is  it  not 
equally  true  that  after  being  betrayed  by  him  you  received 
back  your  lives  as  the  free  gift  of  Caesar?  So  much  then  for 
the  alleged  desertion  ;  and  as  to  the  oath,  what  authority  had 
he  to  hold  you  to  it,  when  the  insignia  of  his  office  '  had  been 
surrendered,  his  military  command  laid  down,  and  he  himself 
had  passed  under  the  higher  authority  of  his  captor,  becoming 
a  mere  prisoner  of  war  and  a  magistrate  no  longer?  It  is 
indeed  a  queer  notion  of  a  soldier's  obligation  they  are  left 
to  appeal  to,  if  they  think  it  incumbent  upon  you  to  disregard 
the  oath  by  which  you  are  at  present  bound,  in  order  to  recon- 
sider that  which expiredbythe  capitulation  of  the  general  who 
dictated  it,  and  by  the  forfeiture  of  his  legal  standing  which 
that  capitulation  involved. 

'  Possibly,  however,  I  am  to  conclude  that,  though  you 
approve  of  Caesar,  you  find  fault  with  me.  I  am  not  now 
going  to  talk  about  my  own  claims  upon  your  gratitude,  which 
still  fall  short  of  what  either  I  could  wish  or  yourselves  expect ; 
but  let  me  remind  you  it  is  always  at  the  end  of  a  war  that 
soldiers  look  for  the  reward  of  their  efforts,  and  what  that  end 
is  going  to  be  not  even  you  can  doubt.  Yet  why  should  I  not 
mention  the  great  care  we  have  shown  for  your  safety,  as  well 
as  the  success  that  has  so  far  attended  our  expedition  ?  Do  you 
regret  that  I  brought  the  whole  army  over  in  perfect  safety 
without  the  loss  of  a  single  transport?  That  on  my  arrival 
^  '  The  axes  of  his  lictors.' 


1 04  A  '■  Soldier  of  Caesar ' 

Aug.-Sept.  I  scattered  the  enemy's  fleet  at  the  first  encounter?  That  in 
two  successive  days  I  won  two  cavalry  engagements?  That 
I  secured  for  us  out  of  the  harbour  and  bay  occupied  by  the 
enemy  200  laden  merchantmen,  and  forced  him  into  a  position 
where  no  provisions  could  reach  him  either  overland  or  by 
sea  ?  However,  if  you  will,  fling  away  good  fortune  such  as  this, 
and  leaders  with  this  record,  and  go  and  identify  yourselves 
with  the  disgraceful  fiasco  of  Pentima,  the  ignominious  flight 
from  Italy,  and  the  surrender  of  the  Spanish  provinces — all  of 
them  a  sure  forecast  of  the  verdict  on  this  African  war.  For 
myself,  I  was  always  content  to  be  called  a  soldier  of  Caesar, 
and  it  was  you  who  acclaimed  me  by  the  title  of  Commander. 
If  you  regret  it,  I  return  you  your  gift ;  but  do  you  at  the  same 
time  give  me  back  my  former  name,  unless  you  wish  the  honour 
you  then  bestowed  upon  me  to  be  taken  as  a  deliberate  insult 
to  myself.' 
33  Such  a  speech  aroused  the  deepest  feelings  of  the  soldiery ; 
and  even  during  its  delivery  constant  interruptionswere  heard, 
showing  that  the  suspicion  of  disloyalty  stirred  them  to  an 
almost  intolerable  indignation.  On  his  leaving  the  assembly 
they  swarmed  around  him,  and  with  one  voice  bade  him  dis- 
miss his  doubts,  and  not  hesitate  at  any  moment  to  give  battle 
to  the  enemy,  and  so  put  their  loyalty  and  resolution  to  the 
test.  This  demonstration  of  the  men's  feeling  completely 
altered  both  the  temper  and  mental  attitude  of  the  whole 
army,  and  Curio  resolved  accordingly,  with  the  approval  of 
his  staff,  to  risk  a  decisive  action  upon  the  first  opportunity 
that  offered.  On  the  morrow,  therefore,  he  moved  out  from 
his  lines  and  drew  up  for  battle  on  the  position  occupied  by 
his  troops  during  each  of  the  preceding  days.  Equally  little 
did  Attius  Varus  pause  to  consider  before  advancing  his  own 


Battle  outside  %)tica  lof 

force,  determined  as  he  was  to  profit  by  any  occasion  that  Aug.-Sept« 
might  present  itself  either  of  tampering  with  his  opponent's     ^^ 
army  or  of  engaging  it  on  equal  terms. 

As  already  indicated,  the  two  embattled  lines  were  separated  34 
by  a  ravine,  of  no  great  size,  but  presenting  a  steep  and 
difficult  ascent.  Each  commander,  therefore,  manoeuvring 
for  the  better  position  delayed  his  attack  in  the  hope  that  his 
adversary  would  attempt  the  passage  of  this  donga.  After 
some  interval,  a  movement  was  observed  on  the  left  wing  of 
Attius,  where,  it  was  noticed,  the  full  strength  of  his  cavalry, 
together  with  a  large  contingent  of  Numidian  light  infantry 
interspersed  through  its  ranks,  was  descending  the  banks  of 
the  ravine.  To  meet  this  attack  Curio  dispatched  his  cavalry 
and  two  battalions  of  Marrucinians  ^  ;  but  the  enemy's 
squadrons  refused  to  face  the  charge,  and,  stretching 
their  horses  to  the  gallop,  hastened  back  to  their  main 
body  ;  whereupon  the  light  infantry  who  had  accompanied 
the  forward  movement  were,  through  this  desertion  by 
the  cavalry,  in  course  of  being  surrounded  and  cut  to  pieces 
by  our  troops.  On  this  point  were  now  concentrated 
the  eyes  of  the  whole  Pompeian  line,  as  they  watched  the 
flight  and  slaughter  of  their  comrades  ;  and  it  was  at  this 
critical  moment  that  Rebilus,  one  of  Caesar's  generals,  whose 
wide  military  experience  had  led  Curio  to  bring  him  over  from 
Sicily  with  the  expedition,  turned  to  his  commander,  and 
pointing  to  the  confusion  among  the  enemy,  asked  why  he 
hesitated  to  seize  the  opportunity  thus  offered.  With  a  single 
word  to  his  troops  to  remember  their  promises  of  the  previous 
day.  Curio  put  himself  at  their  head,  and  ordered  them  to 
follow.  On  reaching  the  ravine  they  were  met  by  such 
^  On  the  Adriatic,  south  of  the  Pescara.     See  Bk.  I,  ch.  i  (23;. 


io6  Victory  of  Curio 

\ii!r.-Fept.    formidable  obstacles  at  its  ascent,  that  the  leading  files,  when 
"^'^  not  shouldered  up  behind  by  their  comrades,  only  clambered 

out  with  the  greatest  exertions.  But  the  legionaries  of  Atius 
had  no  stomach  for  a  fight,  as  the  sight  of  the  recent  flight  and 
massacre  of  their  auxiliaries  had  left  them  paralysed  with 
terror,  and  their  imagination  already  represented  them  as  sur- 
rounded by  our  cavalry.  The  result  was,  that  before  a  single 
javelin  could  be  thrown,  or  our  men  get  to  closer  quarters, 
the  whole  of  the  enemy's  line  turned  and  broke,  retreating  in 
confusion  upon  their  camp. 
.^5  In  the  pursuit  which  followed  a  soldier  named  Fabius, 
a  Pelignian  ^  by  race,  and  a  centurion  in  one  of  the  inferior 
companies  of  his  legion,  worked  his  way  to  the  head  of  the 
flying  enemy,  continually  shouting  the  name  of  Varus,  and 
searching  for  him  everywhere,  thus  giving  the  impression  that 
he  was  one  of  his  own  men  and  had  something  of  importance 
to  communicate.  That  general,  on  hearing  himself  so  often 
addressed,  looked  at  the  man  and  stopped  to  ask  him  who  he 
was  and  what  he  wanted.  In  a  moment  the  other  had  raised 
his  sword  and  slashed  at  the  officer's  unguarded  shoulder,  and 
was  within  an  ace  of  killing  him,  had  not  Varus  brought 
his  shield  up  to  parry  the  blow  and  so  escaped  with  his  life. 
Fabius  was  thereupon  immediately  surrounded  and  cut  down 
by  the  bystanders. 

When  the  flying  rout  approached  the  camp,  the  gates 
quickly  became  blocked  and  the  road  jammed  with  the 
crowded  rabble,  and  the  losses  here  incurred  without  the 
infliction  of  any  wound  were  even  heavier  than  during  either 
the  action  or  the  pursuit.  At  one  time  it  looked  as  if  the 
enemy  would  actually  be  driven  from  his  entrenched  camp  ; 
^  Neighbours  to  the  Marruciiiians  on  the  upper  Pescara. 


Preparations  for  a  Siege  107 

and,  indeed,  some  of  the  fugitives  only  halted  upon  reaching  Aug.-Sept 
the  shelter  of  the  town.  The  natural  advantage  of  its  position,  ^^ 
however,  and  the  strength  of  its  fortifications,  effectually 
barred  all  approach:  and  it  was  further  rendered  impracticable 
by  the  want  of  the  proper  tools  and  appliances,  since  our 
men  had  left  camp  equipped  only  for  a  pitched  battle  and 
not  for  an  assault  upon  fortified  entrenchments.  Curio, 
therefore,  withdrew  his  army  back  to  hij  own  lines,  with 
the  single  loss  of  Fabius,  in  contrast  with  the  600  killed 
and  1,000  wounded  on  the  side  of  his  opponent.  After  his 
retirement,  all  the  enemy's  wounded,  and  many  more  whose 
fears  had  since  developed  imaginary  wounds,  left  the  camp 
and  made  their  way  into  the  town.  The  discovery  of  this 
fraud,  and  the  knowledge  that  his  army  was  demoralized  with 
panic,  made  active  measures  on  the  part  of  Varus  imperative. 
Giving  orders,  therefore,  for  a  single  bugler  and  a  certain 
number  of  tents  to  be  left  behind  to  disarm  suspicion,  he 
struck  camp  in  silence  ^  during  the  early  hours  of  morning, 
and  moved  into  the  city  with  all  his  army. 

On  the  following  day  Curio  commenced  the  siege  and  block-  36 
ade  of  Utica.  The  composition  of  this  town  was  peculiar. 
Long  years  of  quiet  ease  had  made  its  crowded  populace 
unfamiliar  with  war:  old  services  rendered  by  Caesar  had  made 
the  body  of  burgesses  his  friends  :  the  Roman  settlement  in 
the  city  was  distinctly  heterogeneous  in  character  :  finally, 
over  all  alike  was  the  terror  inspired  by  the  result  of  preceding 
battles.  It  was  no  wonder,  then,  that  open  suggestions  for 
capitulation  already  made  themselves  heard  in  all  quarters,  and 
a  petition  was  laid  before  Varus  demanding  the  sacrifice  of  his 
own  amour  propre  to  the  threatened  ruin  of  the  whole  com- 

1  i.  e.  without  the  loudly-repeated  word  of  command  that  was  usual. 


io8         The  Africa?!  Thunder-cloud 

Uig.-Sept.   munity.     In  the  midst  of  these  negotiations  couriers  arrived 
■^'^  from  King  Juba,  charged  with  the  announcement  that  that 

monarch  was  close  at  hand  at  the  head  of  a  strong  relieving 
force,  and  begging  the  inhabitants  to  take  every  step  for  the 
retention  and  defence  of  the  town.  This  intelligence  restored 
37  the  hopes  of  the  panic-stricken  city ;   but  Curio  for  some 
time  refused   to  give   it    any   credence,  so    confident   was 
he    of  his    own    security.      In  this    attitude    he    was    still 
further  strengthened  by  the  fact   that  authentic  news   of 
Caesar's  victories  in  Spain  was  now  beginning  to  reach  Africa  ; 
and  all  these  circumstances  combined  to  embolden  him  to  the 
supposition  that  the  king  would  take  no  overt  measures  against 
him.     The   subsequent    Intelligence,  however,   from   indis- 
putable sources  that  the  Numidian  host  was  now  less  than 
twenty-five  miles  from  Utlca,  determined  him  to  abandon 
his  siege-works,  and  to  fall  back  upon  the  old  camp  of  Sclplo. 
Here  he  proceeded  to  collect  supplies  of  grain,  to  superin- 
tend the  fortification  of  his  lines,  and  to  lay  in  stocks  of  fuel  ; 
urgent  orders  being  meanwhile  sent  across  to  Sicily  for  the 
dispatch  of  his  two  remaining  legions  and  the  rest  of  the 
cavalry.     The  camp  Itself  was  admirably  adapted  for  the  delay 
of  operations.     Not  only  was  the  natural  strength  of  its  posi- 
tion stiU  further  increased  by  intrenchments,  but  it  rested  on 
the  proximity  of  the  sea,  and  could  also  reckon  on  an  abundance 
of  fresh  water  and  cooking-salt,  large  quantities  of  which  had 
already  been  conveyed  into  it  from  the  salt-pans  of  the  neigh- 
bourhood.    There  was  no  fear,  either,  of  their  fuel  giving  out, 
timber  being  everywhere  plentiful,  nor  of  their  corn,  as  the 
fields  around  were  laden  vdth  it.     Thus  with  the  approval 
of  his  staff.  Curio  prepared  to  await  reinforcements,  and  to 
prolong  the  course  of  the  campaign. 


A  Fatal  Change  of  Plan  109 

Scarcely  had  these  dispositions  been  made  and  these  plans  38 
agreed  upon,  when  word  was  brought  in  by  a  party  of  deserters  ^"8-"'^'^^  • 
from  the  townspeople  that  Juba  had  been  summoned  back  by 
the  outbreak  of  a  frontier  war  and  a  quarrel  with  the  city  of 
Leptis  ;  that  this  had  caused  his  own  detention  at  home, 
whilst  his  lieutenant  Saburra  had  been  dispatched  at  the  head 
of  a  merely  nominal  force,  and  was  now  advancing  upon  Utica. 
An  over  hasty  acceptance  of  these  statements  led  to  a  fatal 
modification  of  Curio's  original  scheme,  and  he  now  determined 
to  bring  matters  to  the  issue  of  a  pitched  battle.  Among  the 
causes  which  specially  predisposed  him  to  the  adoption  of  this 
decision  was,  first  of  all,  the  impulsiveness  of  youth,  combined 
with  a  high  degree  of  native  courage  ;  to  which  must  be  added 
the  stimulus  of  previous  success,  and  an  absolute  confidence 
of  coming  victory.  Fired  by  these  incentives,  he  sent  off  the 
whole  of  his  cavalry  at  nightfall,  with  instructions  to  attack  the 
enemy's  camp  on  the  Medjerda  ;  and  there,  no  doubt,  as  his 
previous  intelligence  indicated,  Saburra  was  in  command. 
What  he  did  not  knowwas  that  the  Numidian  king  was  follow- 
ing in  the  rear  of  his  lieutenant,  and  lay  that  night  encamped 
only  six  miles  behind  him.  The  cavalry  completed  their 
march  while  it  was  still  dark,  and  fell  upon  the  enemy  before 
these  had  any  knowledge  or  suspicion  of  their  presence.  With 
what  seems  to  be  a  tradition  among  foreign  nations,  the  African 
force  lay  scattered  about  their  camping-ground  without  any 
properly  made  lines ;  consequently,  when  our  troopers  dashed 
in  upon  the  broken  groups  of  heavily  sleeping  men,  numbers 
were  slaughtered  on  the  spot,  and  a  considerable  body  took 
refuge  in  panic-stricken  flight.  Their  object  thus  attained, 
the  squadrons  set  out  on  their  return  journey  to  Curio,  taking 
their  prisoners  along  with  them. 


no  A  Fatal  Change  of  Plan 

39  Meanwhile  Curio  with  the  infantry  had  marched  about  an 
Aug.-Sept.  j^QUj.  before  dawn,  taking  with  him  the  whole  of  his  effective 
force,  except  five  battalions  which  were  left  behind  to  garrison 
the  camp.  After  going  six  miles  he  met  his  returning  cavalry, 
who  reported  to  him  their  recent  action.  A  question  to  the 
prisoners  elicited  the  answer  that  Saburra  had  been  in  com- 
mand of  the  camp  on  the  Medjerda  (Bagradas)  :  the  rest  of 
the  facts  he  omitted  to  investigate,  in  his  eagerness  to  get  to 
the  end  of  his  march.  Looking  round  at  his  leading  files, 
'  You  see,  men,'  he  exclaimed, '  how  the  prisoners'  tale  tallies 
with  that  of  the  deserters.  The  king  is  not  here,  and  only 
a  weak  force  has  been  sent,  who  were  not  even  a  match  for 
a  few  squadrons  of  horse.  On  then,  on  then  to  the  spoil, 
on  to  fame  and  glory,  so  that  at  last  we  may  begin  to  think 
how  we  can  best  reward  you,  and  how  best  acknowledge  your 
services '. 

Now  it  was  no  mean  performance  that  the  cavalry  had 
accomplished,  particularly  if  their  insignificant  numbers  were 
compared  with  the  host  of  the  Numidians ;  but,  even  as 
people  always  love  to  sound  their  own  praises,  the  men,  not 
content  with  this,  began  vaunting  their  achievements.  More- 
over, the  eye  fell  upon  a  quantity  of  booty  that  the  column 
had  in  train,  and  amongst  the  captures  could  be  seen  a  number 
of  men  and  horses,  so  that  every  moment  lost  seemed  an  un- 
necessary postponement  of  victory.  The  great  expectations  of 
Curio,  therefore,  were  amply  seconded  by  the  excitement  of 
his  men.  The  cavalry  were  ordered  to  turn  once  more,  and 
the  pace  of  the  march  was  quickened,  in  order  that  the  enemy 
might  be  attacked  at  the  height  of  the  panic  produced  by 
their  recent  flight.  But  the  task  was  beyond  them ;  horse 
and  rider  were  both  spent  by  the  hard  work  of  a  whole  night's 


and  Stupendous  Blunder 


III 


march,  and  one  after  the   other  they  dropped  out  of  the  Aug.-Sept. 
column.     Even  this  warning  failed  to  check  the  ardour  of     ^^ 
Curio. 

In  the  meantime  Juba  had  been  informed  by  Saburra  of  4° 
the  night  engagement,  and  at  once  pushed  up  to  his  support 
a  force  of  2,000  Spanish  and  Gallic  horse,  which  constituted  his 
permanent  bodyguard,  together  with  the  most  trustworthy 
portion  of  his  infantry.  These  were  followed  more  leisurely 
by  the  king  himself  with  the  remainder  of  his  army,  including 
sixty  elephants.  Having  taken  these  precautions,  Saburra, 
suspecting  that  the  advance  of  the  Roman  cavalry  meant 
the  near  approach  of  the  Roman  general  also,  drew  up 
his  contingents  of  horse  and  foot  with  orders,  upon  the 
advance  of  the  enemy,  to  simulate  panic  r.nd  gradually 
give  ground  and  fall  back,  promising  at  the  right  moment  to 
give  them  the  signal  for  battle  together  with  their  necessary 
instructions  for  action.  The  situation,  therefore,  which  pre- 
sented itself  to  Curio  upon  his  arrival  on  the  scene  only  tended 
to  confirm  his  already  extravagant  hopes  ;  and,  under  the 
belief  that  the  Numidians  were  in  genuine  flight,  he  left  the 
shelter  of  the  surrounding  heights  and  began  a  descent  into 
the  plain. 

The  hills  had  been  left  behind  some  considerable  distance  41 
when  the  utter  exhaustion,  of  the  army,  produced  by  the 
severity  of  a  march  of  fully  sixteen  miles,  at  length  compelled 
a  halt.  Then  at  last  Saburra  gave  his  signal,  settled  his  line 
of  battle  and,  riding  down  the  ranks,  proceeded  to  harangue 
his  tribesmen.  Only  his  horse,  however,  were  placed  in  the 
fighting  line  ;  all  his  unmounted  troops  being  stationed  some 
little  distance  apart,  to  produce  merely  a  moral  effect  by  their 
imposing  numbers.     Nor  was  Curio  less  anxious  for  battle, 


112 


J{oman  Army  trapped 


Aug.-Sept.  but  with  words  of  cheer  to  his  soldiers  urged  upon  them  to 
'^^^  trust  only  to  their  own  right  arms.     The  infantry  of  the 

legions,  in  spite  of  their  exhaustion,  were  eager  for  the  fray, 
and  fought  with  all  their  accustomed  valour,  as  also  did  the 
handful  of  toil-spent  cavalry  ;  though  these  last  now  counted 
but  200  sabres,  the  rest  having  all  fallen  out  on  the  march. 
Nevertheless,  weakened  as  they  were,  they  forced  back  the 
enemy's  line  at  whatever  point  they  charged,  but  they  had 
not  the  strength  either  to  follow  up  the  retreating  horsemen, 
or  to  spur  their  own  jaded  horses  to  a  quicker  pace.  The 
enemy,  on  the  other  hand,  presently  commenced  a  move- 
ment to  envelope  our  whole  line,  one  division  of  horsemen 
starting  from  each  flank  and  working  forwards  to  meet  the 
other,  thereby  endeavouring  to  ride  our  men  down  from  the 
rear.  To  prevent  this,  a  few  battalions  would  every  now  and 
again  make  a  sally  from  the  main  body,  but  the  rapid  move- 
ment of  the  Numidians  always  enabled  them  to  elude  the 
charge  ;  and  as  our  men  once  more  fell  back  upon  their 
supports,  they  would  wheel  and  attempt  to  surround  them, 
and  cut  off  their  retreat  from  the  rest  of  the  line.  Thus 
there  was  no  way  of  safety  for  the  Roman  force  either  in 
standing  their  ground  and  preserving  their  formation,  or 
by  taking  their  chance  in  a  desperate  charge.  Moreover,  the 
enemy's  numbers  were  continually  increasing  by  reinforce- 
ments forwarded  by  the  king,  whilst  the  strength  of  our 
own  men  was  steadily  failing  through  fatigue.  An  intensifi- 
cation of  their  sufferings  was  the  impossibility  of  attending 
to  the  wounded,  who  could  neither  leave  the  fighting  line, 
nor  be  carried  to  a  place  of  safety,  since  the  whole  of  our 
position  was  effectually  commanded  by  the  enemy's  en- 
circling squadrons.     Resigning,  therefore,  all  hope  of  escape, 


by  the  Light  Horsemen  of  the  Desert    113 

they  began  to  give  way  to  those  bitter  outcries  against  death  Aug.- Sept. 
which  man  generally  utters  in  his  last  hour,  or  else  they      ^^ 
turned  to  their  comrades  and  begged  them  to  look  to  their 
aged  parents  at  home,  if  Fate  should  enable  any  of  them  to 
survive  the  disasters  of  that  day.     On  all  sides  was  panic  and 
despair. 

Seeing  the  state  of  universal  terror  pervading  his  troops,  42 
and  that  they  were  deaf  alike  to  exhortation  and  entreaty, 
Curio,  as  a  last  hope  in  a  piteous  situation,  ordered  all  ranks 
to  take  to  the  nearest  hills,  and  the  whole  army  to  advance 
in  line  upon  them.  But  even  this  outlet  was  forestalled  by 
Saburra,  who  detached  a  body  of  horsemen  to  seize  it  in 
advance.  This  last  disappointment  gave  the  crowning  touch 
to  their  despair.  Some  broke  and  fled,  but  were  caught  and 
cut  in  pieces  by  the  pursuing  cavalry ;  others  simply  went 
down  as  they  stood.  An  appeal  was  made  to  Curio  by  his 
cavalry  brigadier,  Cneius  Domitius,  who  closed  round  him 
with  a  few  of  his  troopers,  begging  him  seek  safety  in  flight  and 
make  a  dash  for  the  camp,  and  promising  not  to  leave  his  side. 
But  Curio  answered  unhesitatingly  that,  having  lost  the  army 
which  Caesar  had  entrusted  to  his  charge,  he  would  never  go 
back  to  look  him  in  the  face,  and  with  that  answer  he  died  . 
fighting.  Only  a  very  small  proportion  of  the  Roman  cavalry 
escaped  from  the  battle  ;  but  those  who,  as  recorded  above, 
had  dropped  behind  in  the  rear  for  the  purpose  of  resting  their 
horses,  on  observing  from  their  distant  position  that  the  whole 
army  was  a  rout,  made  good  their  return  to  the  camp.  The 
infantry  were  all  cut  down  to  a  man. 

In  the  camp  Curio's  paymaster,  Marcius  Rufus,  had  been  43 
left  in  command  ;  and,  on  receiving  news  of  the  disaster,  that 
officer  at  once  used  all  his  efforts  with  the  garrison  to  face  their 

LOMG  I 


114  Cur'to  chooses  Death 

Aug.-Sept.    critical  situation  with  calmness.     Their  only  answer  was  a 
"^^  clamorous  demand  to  be  taken  back  to  Sicily  on  board  the 

ships.  To  this  he  consented,  and  gave  orders  to  the  ship- 
masters to  have  all  boats  down  at  the  beach  directly  it  was 
dark.  So  unrestrained,  however,  was  the  universal  panic,  that 
the  wildest  rumours  went  afloat.  Some  said  that  Juba's  forces 
were  outside  the  gates;  others  declared  that  Varus  was  march- 
ing upon  them  with  his  two  legions,  and  that  they  already 
distinguished  the  dust  of  his  approach — both  statements  being 
equally  devoid  of  truth  ;  whilst  others,  again,  anticipated  that 
the  enemy's  fleet  would  swoop  down  upon  them  without 
delay.  In  this  state  of  abject  terror  every  man  looked  to 
himself.  The  crews  of  the  fleet  of  warships  made  all  haste  to 
depart,  and  the  example  of  their  flight  had  such  a  bad  effect 
upon  the  merchant  skippers,  that  only  a  few  small  dinghies 
responded  to  the  call  of  duty  and  the  previously  issued  instruc- 
tions. Even  then  so  fierce  was  the  struggle  along  the  crowded 
beach  as  to  who  should  get  first  on  board  out  of  all  the  dense 
multitude,  that  some  of  the  boats  were  swamped  by  sheer 
weight  of  numbers,  while  the  rest  hesitated  to  come  in  nearer, 
through  fear  of  encountering  a  similar  fate. 
44  The  end  of  the  matter  was  that  a  few  soldiers  and  a  certain 
number  of  civilian  residents,  whose  popularity  or  powers  of 
appeal  were  exceptional,  or  who  contrived  to  swim  out  to  the 
shipSjWere  received  on  board  and  taken  safely  across  to  Sicily: 
the  rest  of  the  force  sent  its  centurions  that  night  to  Varus  to 
act  as  plenipotentiaries,  and  surrendered  themselves  into  that 
officer's  hands.  The  next  day  Juba  arrived,  and  outside  the 
town  his  eye  falling  upon  the  men  of  the  surrendered  bat- 
talions, he  boastfully  claimed  them  as  his  own  booty,  and 
immediately  ordered  off  to  execution  the  large  majority, 


A  Haughfy  Barbarian  1 1  7 

though  a  few  were  reserved  to  be  sent  away  for  captivity  into  Aug.  Fept. 
his  own  dominions ;  Varus  all  the  while  protesting  against      ^^ 
this  violation  of  his  sworn  promise,  yet  not  venturing  to 
oppose  it. 

The  African  king  subsequently  entered  the  town  on  horse- 
back with  a  large  number  of  Roman  senators  in  his  train, 
amongst  whom  could  be  seen  Servius  Sulpicius  and  Licinius 
Damasippus.  There  he  made  what  arrangements  pleased 
him,  giving  orders  to  a  small  number  of  adherents  as  to  his 
wishes  with  regard  to  Utica  ;  and  then,  after  a  few  days  more, 
returned  to  his  own  kingdom,  taking  along  with  him  the 
whole  of  his  military  forces. 


I  a 


BOOK  III 

DYRRACHIUM    AND 
PHARSALIA 

CHAPTER   I 

The  Passage  of  the  Adriatic 

The  elections  which  were  held  in  the  autumn  under  the 
presidency  of  Caesar,  by  virtue  of  his  dictatorial  powers, 
resulted  in  the  return  of  himself  and  Publius  Servilius  as  the 
consuls  for  the  ensuing  year  ;  that  being  the  year  in  which  the 
law  of  the  constitution  again  allowed  Caesar  to  hold  the  con- 
sulship.^ The  electoral  business  disposed  of,  his  attention 
was  next  demanded  by  the  insecurity  of  public  credit  through- 
out the  country,  which  was  already  producing  a  disinclination 
to  the  discharge  of  legitimate  liabilities.  He  accordingly 
appointed  a  board  of  arbitrators  with  powers  to  make  a  valua- 
tion of  all  property,  both  real  and  personal,  on  the  basis  of  its 
money  value  before  the  outbreak  of  the  war  ;  and,  upon  their 
estimate,  the  property  was  then  to  be  transferred  to  creditors 
as  legal  tender.  This  measure  he  considered  most  nearly 
designed  to  effect  the  twofold  purpose  of  at  once  removing 
and  modifying  those  fears  of  a  general  repudiation  of  debts 

^  By  a  law  of  342,  confirmed  by  Sulla  in  81,  ten  years  must  elapse 
between  two  tenures  of  the  same  magistracy.  Caesar  had  been  consul  59. 
Like  many  others  this  law  was  often  broken  towards  the  close  of  the 
Republic.  Pompeius  had  been  consul  in  70,  55,  and  52.  It  was  in  this 
last  year  that  the  trials  mentioned  below  occurred. 


Concentration  at  Brmdisi  117 

which  foreign  wars  and  civil  disturbances  tend  to  create,  as  End  of  4(> 
well  as  of  maintaining  intact  the  social  position  of  debtors. 

With  a  similar  policy,  he  also  provided  for  a  series  of  public 
resolutions  to  be  laid  before  the  assembled  populace  by  the 
praetors  and  people's  tribunes,  restoring  to  their  full  civic 
rights  certain  of  those  who  had  been  convicted  under  the 
Pompeian  law  relating  to  bribery.  These  men  had  been 
tried  during  the  recent  years  when  Pompeius  had  garrisoned 
Rome  with  strong  detachments  from  his  legions ;  and  under 
that  intimidation  each  trial  had  been  finished  off  in  a 
single  day,  with  a  different  body  of  jurymen  to  hear  the 
evidence  from  that  which  gave  the  verdict.  These  exiles  had 
tendered  Caesar  their  support  at  the  opening  of  the  present 
war,  in  the  event  of  his  caring  to  avail  himself  of  their  military 
services  ;  and  this  spontaneous  offer  on  their  part  he  now 
regarded  as  equivalent  to  his  having  actually  profited  by  it. 
The  particular  method  adopted  in  their  restoration  arose  out 
of  deference  to  constituted  usage,  which  demanded  that  their 
return  should  be  effected  by  a  formal  and  judicial  expression 
of  the  popular  vdll,  rather  than  look  like  a  private  act  of 
clemency  of  his  own.  By  taking  this  course  he  avoided  not 
only  the  charge  of  want  of  gratitude  in  repaying  past  services 
to  himself,  but  also  any  suspicion  of  arrogance  in  usurping  the 
people's  constitutional  right  of  granting  privilege. 

These  measures,  along  with  the  Latin  Festival  ^  and  the  ^ 
transaction  of  all  outstanding  comitial  business,  took  up  alto- 
gether eleven  days ;  after  that,  Caesar  laid  down  his  dictator- 

^  The  oldest  religious  celebration  of  the  united  Latin  race,  held  annually 
on  the  Alban  Mount,  under  the  presidency  of  Rome.  Its  date  was  fixed 
as  early  in  each  civil  year  as  possible,  since  it  was  regarded  as  a  sacred 
confirmation  of  the  powers  of  the  new  consuls. 


1 1  8     The  Various  Forces  of  the  East 

End  of  49  ship,  and,  taking  his  departure  from  the  capital,'  travelled 
through  to  Brindisi.  Orders  had  already  been  issued  for 
the  concentration  there  of  twelve  legions  of  infantry  and 
all  his  cavalry ;  though  on  arrival  he  found  the  transports 
assembled  w^ere  barely  sufficient  to  carry  over  15,000 
legionaries  with  500  mounted  troops.  (It  was  this  want  of 
troopships  it  should  be  noted  that  constituted  for  Caesar  the 
sole  obstacle  to  a  rapid  termination  of  the  war.)  Moreover,  the 
forces  actually  available  had  to  embark  at  something  far  below 
their  normal  strength.  The  long  series  of  Gallic  wars  had 
made  large  gaps  in  their  ranks ;  their  numbers  had  further 
been  greatly  reduced  by  the  protracted  overland  march  from 
Spain  ;  whilst  the  pestilential  moisture  of  an  autumn  spent  in 
Apulia  and  round  the  neighbourhood  of  Brindisi,  following 
after  the  exceptionally  healthy  regions  of  Gaul  and  Spain,  had 
produced  an  outbreak  of  sickness  through  the  whole  army. 
3  Very  different  were  the  circumstances  of  Pompeius.  Hav- 
ing secured  a  full  year's  period  for  the  mobilization  of  his 
forces,  a  period  undisturbed  by  war  and  unhampered  by  the 
presence  of  an  enemy,  he  had  used  the  respite  in  collecting  an 
enormous  fleet  ^  from  Asia  Minor  and  the  Cyclades,  from 
Corfu  (Corcyrd),  Athens,  Pontus,  Bithynia,  Syria,  Cilicia, 
Phoenicia,  and  Egypt,  and  had  further  taken  steps  to  construct 
another  of  equal  magnitude  in  aU  the  maritime  ports.  He 
had  likewise  levied  enormous  sums  of  ready  money  upon  the 
provinces  of  Asia  Minor  and  Syria,  upon  the  various  eastern 

'  Followed,  adds  Appian,  by  the  crowds,  who  begged  him  to  come  to 
terms  with  Pompeius. 

*  600,  according  to  Appian,  of  which  loo  had  fighting  crews  of 
Romans.  According  to  Cicero,  Pompeius's  original  plan,  when  driven  from 
Italy,  was  to  take  to  his  '  wooden  walls '  like  the  Greeks  at  Salamis. 


rally  round  Vcmpeius  1 1  9 

kings,  potentates,  and  petty  sovereigns,  and  upon  the  self-  49 
governing  states  of    Greece  ;  and  not  content  with  this,  he 
had  obliged  the  large  commercial  houses,  which  farmed  the 
public  revenues  in  the  provinces  under  his  military  control,  to 
pay  over  to  him  another  equally  enormous  contribution. 

As  to  his  land  forces,  nine  legions  of  Roman  citizens  had  in  4 
all  been  got  together.  These  included,  first  of  all,  the  five 
brought  over  from  Italy  ;  in  addition,  a  sixth  drawn  from 
Cilicia,  which,  owing  to  its  formation  out  of  two  others,  he 
called  the  Twin  Regiment ;  another  raised  in  Crete  and 
Macedonia  among  the  veterans  settled  in  these  provinces 
after  their  discharge  by  former  commanders  ;  and  lastly  two 
that  had  arrived  from  Asia  Minor,  where  they  had  been  lately 
embodied  by  order  of  the  consul  Lentulus.  Besides  this  infan- 
try of  the  line,  large  contingents  had  been  called  for  from 
Thessaly,  Boeotia,  the  Peloponnese,  and  Epirus,  to  be  distri- 
buted among  the  legions  by  way  of  supplementary  drafts, 
a  treatment  likevdse  extended  to  the  surrendered  troops  of 
Caius  Antonius  *  ;  whilst  finally,  to  complete  his  regular 
forces,  he  was  expecting  two  more  legions  from  Syria,  which 
were  now  advancing  under  their  commander  Scipio  ^.  His 
irregular  corps  included  3,000  archers,  drawn  from  Crete, 
Sparta,  Pontus,  Syria,  and  all  other  states  that  could  furnish 
them  ;  as  well  as  two  battalions  of  slingers,  each  600  strong. 
His  cavalry  mustered  7,000  sabres,  and  was  composed  of  the 
following  contingents.  From  Galatia  Deiotarus  had  brought 
600  Gallic  horsemen,  and  Ariobarzanes  500  from  Cappadocia; 
and  a  like  number  was  contributed  from  Thrace  byCotys,who 

^  Brother  of  Marcus,  had  lost  a  Caesarian  force  during  the  past  year  at 
V  eglia  in  the  Adriatic.     See  below  (10)  and  ch.  4  (68). 
'   Appointed  Governor  by  the  Senate,  Bk.  I,  ch.  1  (6). 


I20  Forces  of  the  East  rally  round  Pompeius 

Jan.  48  had  also  sent  his  son  Sadala.     From  Macedonia  came  200 
troopers  under  Rhascypolis,  a  brilliant  soldier  ;  while  a  force 
of  500  Gauls  and  Germans  had  been  shipped  from  Alexandria 
with  the  Egyptian  fleet  by  the  younger  Pompeius,  forming 
a  detachment  of  the  Gabinian  troops  lately  left  behind  in  that 
city  by  Aulus  Gabinius  as  a  protecting  garrison  to  King 
Ptolemy  \    Another  800  had  been  enrolled  from  Pompeius's 
own  slaves  and  herdsmen  ;  300  had  been  provided  from  Gallo- 
graecia  by  Tarcondarius  Castor  and  Domnilaus — the  former 
coming  in  person  with  his  force,  the  latter  sending  his  son  ; 
and  200  more  had  been  dispatched  from  Syria  by  Antiochus  of 
Commagene — handsomely  rewarded  for  it  by  Pompeius — the 
majority  of  whom  consisted  of  mounted  archers.    To  these 
contingents  were  added  bodies  of  Dardanians  and  Bessians, 
partly  mercenaries,  partly  enrolled  by  military  order  or  through 
personal  influence,  in  conjunction  with  similar  bodies  of  Mace- 
donians, Thessalians,  and  various  other  tribes  and  townships, 
bringing  up  the  grand  total  to  the  figure  already  mentioned. 
5      Immense  stores  of  provisions  had  been  accumulated  from 
Thessaly,  Asia  Minor,  Egypt,  Crete,  Greece,  and  other  dis- 
tricts :  and  Pompeius  had  now  determined  to  winter  at  Du- 
razzo  (Z))»rr«f^zMOT),  Apollonia,and  the  other  maritime  towns, 
with  the  object  of  preventing  the  passage  of  the  Adriatic 
by  Caesar  ;  for  which  purpose  also  the  fleet  had  been  strung 
out  along  the  whole  of  the  lUyrian  coast-line.      This  fleet 
was  in  several  detachments.      The  Egyptian  squadron  was 
commanded  by  the  younger  Pompeius,  that  of  Asia  Minor  by 
Decimus  Laelius  and  Caius  Triarius,  that  of  Syria  by  Caius 
Cassius,  the  Rhodian  by  Caius  Marcellus,  who  had  Caius 
'  Gabinius,  when  Governor  of  Syria  in  55,  had  restored  Ptolemy  Auletes 
with  a  Roman  force.     See  below,  ch.  5  (i  lo). 


D    A    R    D    A    N    I    A 


r.  10  30      4-0      00 
Main  Roads 


winter  Crossing  of  the  Adriatic 


121 


Coponius  as  a  colleague,  and  the  Liburnian  and  Greek  by  Jan.  4S 
Scribonius  Libo  and  Marcus  Octavius.     The  naval  service  as 
a  whole,  however,  was  under  the  supervision  of  Marcus 
Bibulus,  who  directed  all  the  operations,  and  the  supreme 
command  rested  with  that  officer. 

To  returnnowto  Caesar.  On  arrival  at  Brindisi  he  addressed  6 
his  assembled  troops.  Reminding  them  that  they  were  at 
last  near  the  end  of  their  hardships  and  dangers,  he  asked  them 
to  be  ready  to  leave  behind  in  Italy  their  servants  and  baggage, 
and  to  embark  alone  without  these  encumbrances,  so  as  to 
allow  of  a  greater  number  of  soldiers  being  taken  on  board  ; 
meanwhile  to  look  forward  to  victory  and  his  own  generosity 
for  supplying  them  with  all  their  needs.  His  men  answered 
with  a  cheer  that  he  could  order  what  he  thought  best,  and 
that  they  would  gladly  obey  whatever  those  orders  might  be. 
He  accordingly  set  sail  on  the  fourth  of  January,^  with  a  fleet 
conveying,  as  already  mentioned,  seven  legions  of  infantry. 
The  following  day  he  made  the  land  hard  by  the  Ceraunian 
mountains,  and,  finding  an  anchorage  of  calm  water  clear  of 
the  rocks  and  other  dangerous  spots,  and  carefully  avoiding  all 
harbours  because  these  were  suspected  of  being  held  by  the 
enemy,  disembarked  his  troops  at  a  point  called  Palaeste, 
without  the  loss  of  a  single  transport. 

At  the  time  there  was  lying  at  Oricum  ^  a  detached  squadron  7 
of  eighteen  ships  of  the  Asiatic  fleet  under  the  command  of 
Lucretius  Vespillo  and  Minucius  Rufus,  acting  under  instruc- 

^  Thus  repeating  his  surprise  of  Jan.  49.  The  Pompeians,  we  read, 
never  dreamed  of  his  crossing  in  mid-winter,  but  expected  him  to  wait  for 
the  New  Year  ceremonies  at  Rome,  corresponding  to  our  opening  of 
Parliament. 

*  Now  Paleo-Kastro  at  the  south  end  of  the  bay  of  Avlona. 


I  22 


Caesar  eludes  the  Hostile  Fleets 


Jan.  48  tions  from  their  admiral,  Decimus  Laelius ;  whilst  further  to 
the  south  lay  Marcus  Bibulus  with  1 10  sail  at  Corfu  (Corcyrd). 
Of  these  two  forces,  however,  the  first-named  had  not  the 
requisite  self-confidence  to  leave  the  shelter  of  port,  though 
Caesar's  naval  escort  to  his  transports  numbered  no  more  than 
twelve  ships  of  war,  of  which  only  four  were  decked  ;  and 
Bibulus  was  caught  with  his  vessels  unprepared  for  action 
and  his  crews  scattered  on  shore.  As  a  consequence  he  came 
up  too  late,  since  Caesar  was  already  sighted  off  the  mainland 
before  even  the  faintest  rumour  of  his  crossing  had  time  to 
reach  the  neighbourhood. 
8  With  the  disembarkation  completed,  the  transports  were 
sent  back  that  night  to  Brindisi  to  bring  over  the  rest  of  the 
legions  with  the  cavalry.  This  duty  had  been  entrusted  to 
Fufius  Calenus,  a  general  officer,  in  order  to  ensure  prompti- 
tude in  the  work  of  transporting  the  legions.  The  ships 
unfortunately  got  o£F  somewhat  late,  and,  missing  the  advan- 
tage of  the  night  breeze,  encountered  a  serious  disaster  on 
their  return  journey.  For  Bibulus,  informed  at  Corfu  of 
Caesar's  arrival,  and  hoping  to  succeed  in  falling  in  with  at 
least  a  section  of  the  laden  troopships,  fell  in  with  the  return- 
ing empties  instead.  Thirty  of  these  or  thereabouts  he 
managed  to  secure,  and,  venting  upon  them  the  rage  which 
his  carelessness  and  consequent  keen  disappointm.ent  had  ex- 
cited, he  burnt  the  entire  lot,  leaving  the  crews  and  masters 
to  perish  in  the  flames ;  his  idea  being  that  their  comrades 
would  be  frightened  from  returning  by  the  enormity  of  the 
punishment  inflicted.  This  exploit  accomplished,  he  pro- 
ceeded to  distribute  his  fleets  in  effective  occupation  of  every 
roadstead  and  section  of  coast  from  the  island  of  Sasino 
{Sajonae)  in  the  south  to  Veglia  (Curicta)  in  the  north,  his 


Vompeiaiis  fail  to  secure  Salonae    123 

ships  patrolling  far  and  wide.  Scouting  squadrons  were  J->"- 
placed  with  greater  care  than  hitherto,  and,  though  it  was 
the  depth  of  winter,  he  yet  persisted  in  keeping  the  sea  with 
his  blockading  flotilla,  resolved  to  shirk  neither  difficulty  nor 
duty,  even  with  no  hope  of  relief  in  his  arduous  task,  if  only 
he  could  come  to  grips  with  Caesar.^ 

FoUowang  the  withdrawal  of  the  Liburnian  fleet  from  Illy-  9 
rian  waters,  the  admiral,  Marcus  Octavius,  with  the  division 
under  his  command,  put  in  at  Salonae'^.  There  he  stirred  up 
Dalmatians  and  other  native  tribes,  and  succeeded  in  alienating 
the  island  of  Lissa  from  its  adherence  to  Caesar  ;  but  on 
attempting  the  same  project  with  the  Roman  settlement  at 
Salonae,  he  found  that  neither  promises  nor  threats  of  reprisals 
could  shake  their  allegiance,  and  therefore  determined  to 
carry  the  town  by  assault.  Now  this  town  has  strong  natural 
fortifications  both  from  its  general  geographical  position  and 
from  its  commanding  site  on  the  crest  of  a  hiU.  Notwith- 
standing, the  Roman  burghers  at  once  took  the  further  step  of 
strengthening  the  defences  by  a  series  of  wooden  towers  along 
the  walls ;  and,  on  finding  that  their  slender  numbers  offered 
but  a  weak  resistance  to  the  attack,  and  that  they  were  seriously 
incapacitated  by  repeated  wounds,  they  had  recourse  to  the 
desperate  expedient  of  liberating  all  their  able-bodied  slaves, 
and  even  cut  the  hair  from  off  all  their  women-folk  in  order 
to  manufacture  ropes  necessary  to  the  working  of  artillery.* 
When  the  news  of  their  determination  reached  Octavius,  he 

*  Apparently  a  lacuna  here  in  MSS.  which  contained  the  disaster  to 
Antonius  and  Dolabella  at  Veglia  late  in  the  preceding  year. 

"  Close  by  the  future  Spalato. 

^  In  ancient  ordnance  the  driving  force  was  obtained  by  suddenly 
relaxing  the  tension  of  strongly-twisted  ropes.  For  these  ropes  women's 
hair  formed  the  very  best  material  (Vitruvius  x.  i6.  2). 


124       Caesar  renexvs  Peace  Overtures 

Jan.  48  surrounded  the  city  with  five  separate  camps,  and  went  on  to 
press  the  garrison  simultaneously  by  blockade  and  a  series  of 
concerted  assaults.  On  their  side  the  defenders  were  ready 
to  continue  the  defence  at  any  and  every  cost,  but  they 
suffered  most  severely  from  shortness  of  supplies.  Agents 
were  therefore  dispatched  to  Caesar  to  petition  his  help  in  this 
.  one  particular ;  every  other  kind  of  distress  they  continued  to 
support  unaided  as  best  they  could. 

After  the  lapse  of  a  considerable  interval  of  time,  it  was 
noticed  by  the  garrison  that  the  long  protraction  of  the 
siege  had  induced  a  certain  carelessness  among  the  troops  of 
Octavius.  They  accordingly  seized  an  opportunity  whilst 
the  besiegers  were  absent  from  their  stations  for  the  midday 
siesta ;  and,  after  posting  women  and  children  along  the  city 
wall  so  that  no  detail  of  the  daily  routine  should  be  missed  by 
the  enemy,  they  formed  a  sortie-party  from  themselves  and 
their  recently  liberated  slaves,  and  dashed  out  upon  the  nearest 
of  the  Octavian  camps.  This  they  quickly  stormed;  and, 
following  it  up  without  a  break  by  successive  attacks  on  the 
second,  third,  fourth,  and  remaining  camps  in  turn,  they 
drove  the  Pompeians  with  great  slaughter  out  of  the  whole 
series,  and  forced  the  remainder  under  Octavius  to  take  shelter 
on  board  the  fleet.  This  affair  ended  the  siege  ;  for,  the 
winter  now  approaching,  Octavius,  after  the  heavy  losses 
incurred,  relinquished  all  hope  of  a  successful  assault  on  the 
town,  and  sailed  away  to  rejoin  Pompeius  at  Durazzo. 
10  It  has  already  been  recorded  how  Lucius  Vibullius  Rufus, 
a  sectional  commander  of  Pompeius,  had  twice  fallen  into  the 
hands  of  Caesar,  and  twice  been  released  by  him,  viz.  once  at 
Pentima  and  a  second  time  in  Spain.  The  obligations  thus 
conferred  had  induced  Caesar  to  consider  him  an  appropriate 


Caesar  renews  Peace  Overtures       1 2  f 

agent  for  sending  to  Pompeius  with  fresh  proposals  of  peace,  Jan. 
especially  as  he  was  understood  to  possess  distinct  influence 
with  his  chief.     The  general  purport  of  these  instructions  was 
as  follows. 

'  Common  prudence  dictated  that  each  party  should  now 
set  a  limit  to  its  present  attitude  of  uncompromising  oppo- 
sition, and,  by  agreeing  to  a  cessation  of  hostilities,  tempt 
Fortune  no  longer.  They  had  both  experienced  defeats  on 
a  sufficiently  serious  scale  to  serve  as  a  wholesome  lesson  for 
dreading  further  disasters.  Whilst  his  opponent  had  been 
driven  from  Italy,  and  had  lost  Sicily,  Sardinia,  both  Spanish 
provinces,  and  no  less  than  130  battalions  of  Roman  troops, 
either  in  Italy  itself  or  in  Spain  ;  he,  on  the  other  hand,  had 
to  mourn  the  death  of  Curio,  the  destruction  of  the  army  of 
Africa,  and  the  surrender  of  Antonius  and  the  force  under  him 
at  Veglia.  Should  they  not  then  cease  to  inflict  these  blows 
on  themselves  and  their  country,  particularly  when  their 
own  reverses  had  now  abundantly  shown  them  what  a 
powerful  factor  is  Fortune  in  war?  The  present  moment 
offered  a  unique  opportunity  of  treating  for  peace,  at  a  time 
when  each  side  still  felt  complete  confidence  in  ite'own 
ultimate  success,  and  whilst  honours  as  yet  seemed  easy.  If, 
however,  Fortune,  were  now  to  give  either  belligerent  even  a 
trivial  advantage,  all  terms  would  alike  be  rejected  by  what 
would  then  regard  itself  as  the  winning  side,  and  equal  stakes 
would  no  longer  content  the  claimant  who  believed  all  to  be 
in  his  grasp.  The  actual  conditions  of  peace,  whose  settle- 
ments had  hitherto  been  impossible,  should  be  looked  for  at 
Rome,  at  the  hands  of  the  Senate  and  sovereign  people  :  mean- 
while it  ought  to  be  a  sufficient  guarantee  to  both  their 
country  and  themselves,  if  each  were  at  once  to  take  an  oath 


I  26        The  Nature  of  his  Proposals 

Jan.  48  before  his  assembled  troops  to  disband  his  army  within  three 
days  after  that  event.  By  breaking  up  their  organized  forces 
and  the  auxiliary  bodies  on  which  they  now  relied,  they  would 
have  no  course  left  them  but  to  abide  by  the  decision  of  the 
Senate  and  people.' 

Such  were  the  proposals  now  forwarded  by  Caesar,  and,  in 
order  to  facilitate  their  acceptance  by  Pompeius,  he  made  the 
further  concession  that  he  was  ready  to  disband  the  whole  of 
his  field  army  and  all  garrisons  in  the  towns.^ 
1 1  Now  VibuUius  had  landed  at  Corfu  ;  but,  thinking  it  of  at 
least  equal  importance  that  Pompeius  should  be  informed  of 
Caesar's  sudden  arrival  on  the  coast,  so  as  to  take  his  counter- 
measures  before  the  subject  of  the  peace  proposals  was  broached , 
he  immediately  posted  off  to  meet  him  ;  and,  travelling  night 
and  day,  vrith  relays  of  fresh  cattle  at  every  town  to  ensure 
greater  speed,  brought  the  intelligence  that  Caesar  had  landed. 
Pompeius  was  at  this  time  in  Candavia^,  on  his  way  to  his 
army's  winter  quarters  '  in  Apollonia  and  Durazzo;  but 
Vibullius's  news  was  so  alarming  that  he  at  once  began  to 
quicken  his  march  towards  Apollonia,  with  the  object  of 
preventing  his  rival's  occupation  of  the  coast  towns.  Caesar, 
however,  had  only  waited  till  his  troops  were  all  disembarked 
before  marching  upon  Oricum.  On  his  appearance  before 
that  town,  the  Pompeian  governor  of  the  place,  Lucius  Tor- 
quatus,  endeavoured  to  make  a  show  of  resistance  by  means  of 

'  The  genuineness  of  this  last  sentence,  though  found  in  all  MSS.,  is 
doubted  by  most  editors. 

'  The  hill  country  near  the  modern  Lake  Ochrida.  Through  it  passed 
the  great  military  trunk  road  connecting  Durazzo  with  Saloniki  (Via 
Egnatia),  the  East  with  the  West. 

'  The  Pompeian  head  quarters  during  49  had  been  Saloniki  {Thessa- 
loniea),  where  the  exiled  senate  continued  to  meet. 


The  Coast  Towns  declare  for  him    127 

his  garrison  of  Parthini,  and  orders  were  given  to  close  the  Jan.  ^8 
gates.  But  his  Greek  troops,  when  commanded  to  man  the 
walls  and  take  up  arms,  flatly  refused  to  act  in  opposition  to  a 
duly  elected  representative  of  the  Roman  Government ;  and 
when  their  refusal  was  accompanied  by  an  independent 
attempt  on  the  part  of  the  townspeople  to  admit  Caesar, 
Torquatus  gave  up  the  situation  as  hopeless,  and,  directing 
the  gates  to  be  opened,  surrendered  himself  and  the  town  to 
Caesar,  by  whom  he  was  treated  with  all  the  honours  of  war. 

Halting  merely  to  take  over  the  surrendered  town,  Caesar  1 2 
at  once  started  for  ApoUonia.  Upon  the  news  of  his  advance 
reaching  the  governor,  Lucius  Staberius,  that  officer  proceeded 
to  move  a  supply  of  water  into  the  citadel  of  the  town  and  to 
throw  up  fortifications  for  its  defence ;  at  the  same  time 
demanding  hostages  from  the  townsfolk  for  their  good 
behaviour.  But  not  only  did  these  decline  to  give  any  such 
guarantees,  but  they  openly  declared  they  would  never  shut 
their  gates  in  a  consul's  face,  or  set  up  their  own  private 
judgement  against  the  unanimous  verdict  of  Italy  and  the 
Roman  world.  Staberius,  therefore,  recognizing  the  firm 
attitude  of  the  citizens,  had  no  choice  left  him  but  a  secret 
flight  from  the  town  ;  whereupon  the  inhabitants  dispatched 
an  embassy  to  Caesar  and  threw  open  their  city  to  his 
approach.  Their  example  was  followed  by  the  people  of  Bullis 
and  Amantia  and  other  neighbouring  townships,  and  by  prac- 
tically the  whole  of  Epirus,  envoys  arriving  from  all  quarters 
to  assure  him  of  their  readiness  to  submit  to  his  orders. 

Meanwhile  the  result  of  these  opening  operations  at  Oricum  13 
and  ApoUonia  made  Pompeius  extremely  anxious  for  the  safety 
of  his  base  at  Durazzo  (Dyrrachium),  and  he  was  now  marching 
night  and  day  upon  that  city.     Simultaneously  the  rumour 


128        Narrow  Escape  of  Pompeius 

Jan.  48  spread  that  Caesar  was  close  on  his  heels;  a  report  that  created 
such  violent  panic  in  Pompeius's  army  after  his  frantic  haste 
in  turning  night  into  day  and  in  marching  his  men  without 
a  halt,  that  virtually  aU  the  troops  hailing  from  Epirus  and 
its  immediate  neighbourhood  deserted  their  ranks,  many  of 
them  actually  flinging  away  their  arms,  and  the  whole  march 
degenerating  into  something  like  a  rout.  This  disgraceful 
panic  was  not  even  stayed  with  their  safe  arrival  before 
Durazzo  ;  and  accordingly,  when  the  usual  order  had  been 
given  to  mark  out  the  camp  boundaries,  Labienus,  in  order 
to  check  the  demoralization,  stepped  forward  and  solemnly 
swore  that  he  would  never  desert  Pompeius,  but  would  share 
with  him  any  and  every  lot  that  fortune  might  decree.  This 
same  oath  was  taken  by  all  the  other  generals  present,  followed 
by  the  regimental  officers  and  centurions ;  after  which  the 
whole  of  the  rank  and  file  swore  to  observe  the  same.  As  for 
Caesar,  on  finding  his  march  upon  Durazzo  anticipated,  he 
gave  up  the  chase,  and  pitched  his  camp  near  the  river  Ergent 
[Afsus),  within  the  territories  of  Apollonia — a  position  which 
enabled  him  to  protect  by  a  ring  of  fortified  outposts  the 
townships  which  had  recently  served  him  so  loyally.  Here  he 
determined  to  await  the  arrival  of  the  rest  of  his  legions  from 
Italy,  and  to  go  under  canvas  ^  for  winter.  The  same  resolu- 
.tion  was  also  taken  by  Pompeius,  who  now  entrenched  himself 
on  the  opposite  or  northern  bank  of  the  Ergent,  and  proceeded 
to  concentrate  within  his  new  lines  the  whole  of  his  regular  and 
auxiliary  forces. 
14  Meanwhile  Calenus,  in  execution  of  his  orders  received 
from  Caesar,  had  embarked  the  legions  and  cavalry  at  Brindisi 
as  far  as  his  supply  of  transports  allowed,  and,  setting  sail,  had 

Lit.  'skins',  of  wliich  Roman  tents  were  made. 


and  for  Caesuras  1{cinforccments      129 

got  some  little  distance  from  port,  when  he  was  met  by  jm.  43 
a  dispatch-boat  from  Caesar  with  intelligence  that  the  whole 
of  the  opposite  harbours  and  shores  were  effectually  held  by 
the  enemy's  fleets.  Upon  this  information,  he  at  once  put 
back  towards  harbour,  and  signalled  the  recall  to  his  remaining 
convoy.  A  single  ship,  however,  kept  on  her  course,  and 
refused  to  acknowledge  the  admiral's  signal,  since  she  had  no 
troops  on  board,  but  was  sailing  under  private  orders.  She 
was  carried  down  the  lUyrian  coast  to  Oricum,  and  there 
captured  by  Bibulus  ;  who,  exacting  the  full  penalty  alike 
from  slaves  and  free,  and  even  beardless  boys,  massacred  every 
living  soul  on  board. 

On  so  short  a  space  of  time,  and  on  so  mere  a  chance,  hung 
the  safety  of  the  whole  army. 

It  will  have  been  noticed  from  the  above  that  Bibulus  with  1 5 
his  fleet  was  now  at  Oricum,  where  a  singular  military  position 
had  developed  itself.  On  his  side,  his  blockading  squadrons 
effectually  deprived  Caesar  of  all  control  both  of  the  sea 
and  its  harbours ;  whilst  his  own  force  was  no  less  completely 
debarred  from  every  inch  of  ground  along  the  same  territories : 
for,  the  whole  of  the  foreshore  being  safely  held  by  Caesar's 
pickets  and  patrols,  the  Pompeians  had  no  means  either  of 
watering  xheir  ships  and  supplying  them  with  fuel,  or  of 
mooring  them  to  the  beach.  So  impossible,  indeed,  grew 
the  situation,  and  so  hard  pressed  were  they  for  the  barest 
necessaries  of  life,  that  they  were  forced  to  employ  cargo- 
boats  to  bring  up  from  Corfu,  not  merely  the  ordinary  require- 
ments for  victualling  a  fleet,  but  even  their  very  firewood  and 
drinking-water.  To  aggravate  their  sufferings,  there  came 
a  period  of  contrary  winds,  during  which  they  were  actually 
driven  to  collect  the  night  dew  off  the  skins  which  served 


130         UnauthoriT^ed  Negotiations 

Ftb.  48  as  awnings  to  their  ships.  Yet  these  sufferings  were  borne 
with  cheerful  resignation,  nor  was  there  any  thought  of 
withdrawing  their  watch  upon  the  harbours  or  of  leaving  the 
coast  uncovered. 

It  was  during  the  critical  state  of  their  supplies  as  just 
described,  and  after  Libo  had  rejoined  Bibulus  at  Oricum 
with  the  division  under  his  command,  that  these  two  officers 
addressed  a  petition  in  common  from  the  decks  of  their  flag- 
ships to  Manius  Acilius  and  Statins  Murcus,  the  Caesarian 
military  authorities  in  that  region — the  former  in  charge  of 
the  town  fortifications,  the  latter  of  the  shore-defences — to 
the  effect  that,  if  their  request  could  be  complied  with,  they 
desired  an  audience  with  Caesar  on  a  matter  of  most  vital 
import. 

A  few  remarks  were  added  by  way  of  confirmation  of  their 
statement,  and  to  give  the  impression  that  the  subject  of 
a  settlement  was  to  be  brought  forward  ;  and  meanwhile, 
until  the  interview  could  be  arranged,  they  requested  an 
armistice,  which  was  accordingly  granted  them  by  the  Caesarian 
officers.  For  not  only  did  the  message  conveyed  appear  to 
them  of  considerable  moment,  but  they  well  knew  how  sin- 
cerely anxious  Caesar  was  for  an  opening  of  this  nature,  whilst 
what  weighed  with  them  further  was  the  belief  that  the 
overtures  lately  initiated  by  Vibullius  had  apparently  met 
with  some  measure  of  success. 
16  At  the  particular  time  Caesar  happened  to  be  absent  from 
Oricum,  having  lately  left  with  a  single  legion  to  receive  the 
surrender  of  the  more  distant  townships,  and  also  to  improve 
his  commissariat  department,  which  was  supplying  him  but 
indifferently.  He  was  now  at  Butrinto  {Buthrotum),  a  coast 
town  just  opposite  to  Corfu  ;  but,  upon  receiving  dispatches 


By  the  Pompeian  Admirals         131 

from  Acilius  and  Murcus  informing  him  of  the  demands  put  Feb.  4? 
forward  by  Libo  and  Bibulus,  he  left  the  legion  behind  and 
at  once  returned  to  Oricum.  There,  on  his  arrival,  he  invited 
the  two  Pompeian  chiefs  to  a  conference.  Only  Libo 
made  his  appearance,  excusing  the  absence  of  Bibulus, 
which,  doubtless,  was  prompted  by  his  excessively  hot  temper, 
and  by  the  fact  that,  in  addition  to  political  differences,  he 
had  long  nursed  a  private  quarrel  with  Caesar,  originating  in 
the  years  of  their  common  aedileship  and  praetorship.^  '  For 
this  reason,'  said  Libo,  *  his  colleague  had  now  avoided  meet- 
ing his  opponent,  in  order  that  his  own  temper  might  not 
prove  an  obstacle  to  the  success  of  proceedings  which  promised 
so  well  for  the  future.' 

With  this  introduction,  he  proceeded  to  assure  Caesar  that 
the  most  earnest  desire  of  Pompeius  was,  and  had  always  been, 
for  a  peaceful  settlement  and  cessation  from  hostilities  ;  but 
that  they  could  not  give  practical  effect  to  their  commander's 
wishes,  because  the  whole  conduct  of  the  campaign  and  of  all 
other  questions  alike  had  been  made  over  to  him  absolutely  by 
a  decree  of  their  council  of  war.  If,  however,  Caesar  would 
acquaint  them  with  the  nature  of  his  demands,  they  would 
forward  these  to  Pompeius,  who  would  then  conduct  the  rest 
of  the  negotiations  directly  with  him,  receiving  the  while 
every  support  from  themselves.  In  the  interval,  until  an 
answer  could  be  returned  from  Pompeius,  they  asked  for  the 
armistice  to  hold  good,  and  no  hostile  measure  to  be  taken 
by  either  belligerent.  This  included  all  that  was  pertinent 
in  his  proposals,  though  certain  remarks  were  added  about  his 
own  cause  and  about  the  armed  forces  under  his  command  ; 

^  65  and  62.    The  aediles  had  chiefly  police  duties,  the  care  of  markets, 
aqueducts,  distribution  of  corn,  arrangement  of  the  great  public  games,  &c. 
K  2  - 


132  J^ejected  by  Caesar 

17  remarks  which  Caesar  both  ignored  at  the  time,  as  not  neces- 
'^    sitating  an  answer,  and  which  to-day  we  see  no  sufficient 
reason  for  putting  upon  record. 

His  own  definite  demands  were  then  formulated  as  follows  : 
'  He  must  either  be  allowed  to  send  representatives  to  Pom- 
peius  without  let  or  hindrance,  and  with  a  safe-conduct 
guaranteed  by  Libo  and  his  colleagues,  or  else  the  latter  coulJ 
themselves  take  his  officers  on  board  and  be  responsible  for 
conveying  them  to  Pompeius.  As  for  the  question  of  armistice, 
they  must  look  to  the  strategical  position  of  the  two  comba- 
tants, which  was  so  pecuUarly  balanced  that,  whilst  they  with 
their  fleet  blocked  his  ships  and  reinforcements,  he,  on  the 
other  hand,  cut  them  off  from  their  watering  and  from  all 
communication  with  the  shore.  If  they  wanted  this  privation 
relaxed,  they  must  relax  their  watch  on  the  sea  :  if,  on  the 
contrary,  that  was  maintained,  he  would  retain  his  hold  on 
the  land.  However,  there  was  no  reason  why  peace  negotia- 
tions should  not  equally  well  be  conducted  under  the  status 
quo,  nor  did  the  one  state  of  things  constitute  any  obstacle  to 
the  other.'  In  answer  to  this,  Libo  replied  that  he  could 
neither  undertake  to  receive  Caesar's  delegates  on  board,  nor 
could  he  guarantee  their  safe-conduct ;  he  could  only  refer 
the  whole  matter  for  decision  to  Pompeius.  The  one  point 
that  he  steadily  urged  was  the  truce,  and  for  that  he  contended 
with  extraordinary  passion.  Caesar,  therefore,  realizing  that 
the  whole  proceedings  had  simply  been  instituted  with  the 
sole  object  of  escaping  their  present  dangerous  situation  and 
shortness  of  supplies,  and  that  Libo  was  in  a  position  to  offer 
no  genuine  prospect  or  proposal  for  peace,  broke  oflf  the  dis- 
cussion, and  returned  to  the  task  of  perfecting  his  plans  for 
the  war. 


Failure  of  Caesar^ s  own  Overtures  133 

As  for  Libo's  colleague  Bibulus,  his  long  exclusion  from  the  >8 
shore  was  presently  complicated  by  serious  sickness,  the  result 
of  exposure  to  cold  and  constant  work  ;  and,  suitable  treat- 
ment being  impossible,  whilst  he  steadily  refused  to  quit  the 
post  of  duty,  his  constitution  proved  unequal  to  withstanding 
the  disease.  Upon  his  death,  the  supreme  naval  command 
was  not  again  vested  in  any  single  authority  ;  but  the  various 
divisional  fleets  acted  independently  of  each  other,  according 
to  the  caprice  of  their  respective  admirals. 

With  respect  to  Vibullius  and  his  mission,  as  soon  as  the 
tumult  excited  by  Caesar's  sudden  arrival  had  abated,  and  the 
first  opportunity  occurred  after  his  own  return  to  the  coast,  he 
had  secured  an  interview  with  Pompeius.  To  this  interview 
there  were  also  admitted  Libo,  Lucius  Lucceius,  and  Theo- 
phanes,  the  three  confidential  advisers  with  whom  Pompeius 
habitually  conferred  on  high  matters  of  state  ;  and  Vibullius 
then  proceeded  to  unfold  the  instructions  received  from  Caesar. 
He  had  barely  commenced  speaking  when  Pompeius  cut  him 
short  with  an  order  to  say  no  more.  '  What  value  ',  he 
exclaimed,  '  will  life  or  country  possess  for  me,  when  I  shall 
be  thought  to  retain  them  merely  on  the  sufferance  of  Caesar  ? 
an  opinion  that  nothing  will  get  rid  of,  if  people  come  to 
regard  me  as  fetched  back  to  Italy,  after  having  freely  de- 
parted from  it.' 

This  incident  came  to  Caesar's  knowledge  at  the  close  of 
the  war,  from  those  who  were  present  at  the  speech  ;  yet,  in 
spite  of  this  latest  failure,  he  still  continued  his  efforts  to  open 
up  through  other  channels  verbal  negotiations  for  peace. 

The  method  next  tried  was  as  follows. 

The  two  opposing  camps  were  separated  solely  by  the  river  19 
Ergent  {Apsus),  and,  as  a  consequence,  frequent  communica- 


134  Failure  of  Caesar's  own  Overtures 

Feb,  48  tions  passed  to  and  fro  between  the  rival  troops ;  the  speakers 
mutually  agreeing  that  no  hostile  shot  should  be  fired  across 
the  stream  during  these  meetings.  Caesar  accordingly  com- 
missioned Publius  Vatinius,  a  staff  officer,  to  go  down  to  the 
very  edge  of  the  river  bank,  with  powers  to  discuss  the  basis 
of  a  settlement,  and  to  ask  repeatedly  in  tones  plainly  audible 
whether  citizens  were  not  permitted  to  send  a  pair  of  peace 
envoys  to  fellow  citizens — a  concession  hitherto  allowed  even 
to  runaway  slaves  among  the  Pyrenean  passes,  and  to  defeated 
pirates  ^ — above  all  when  their  sole  object  was  the  prevention 
of  an  armed  struggle  between  Romans  and  Romans.  In 
execution  of  this  charge  Vatinius  spoke  at  considerable  length, 
and  with  the  earnestness  of  appeal  rightly  demanded  where 
the  vital  interests  both  of  himself  and  of  the  civilized  world 
were  at  stake,  and  his  words  were  listened  to  in  silence  by  the 
soldiers  of  either  army.  An  answer  was  returned  from  the 
side  of  the  Pompeians  that  Aulus  Varro  pledged  himself  to 
appear  at  a  conference  on  the  following  day,  and,  further,  to 
take  measures  for  ensuring  our  envoys  both  a  safe-conduct 
and  absolute  freedom  of  speech.  A  time  was  accordingly 
fixed  for  this  meeting  ;  and  on  the  morrow,  at  the  appointed 
hour,  large  numbers  assembled  from  both  sides,  in  eager 
anticipation  of  the  event,  and  with  every  man's  thoughts 
seemingly  intent  on  peace.  Out  of  this  throng  there  then 
stepped  Titus  Labienus,  who  in  quiet  conversational  tones 
began  a  speech  on  the  subject  of  peace,  and  to  enter  on  a  debate 
with  Vatinius.  In  the  midst  of  their  discussion,  they  were 
suddenly  interrupted  by  a  shower  of  spears  flung  from  every 
quarter  ;  and,  although  Vatinius  managed  to  escape  by  the 
intervention  of  his  soldiers'  shields,  several  others  were 
^  Alluding  to  two  of  Pompeius's  earlier  wars.     See  lutrod. 


The  j^ct  of  a  T^negade  1 3  f 

wounded,  including  Cornelius  Balbus,  Marcus  Plotius,  and  Feb.  48 
Lucius  Tiburtius,  as  well  as  some  centurions  and  privates. 
Thereupon  Labienus  exclaimed,  *  It  is  nonsense,  you  see,  to 
talk  of  a  settlement :  until  we  have  Caesar's  head,  there  can 
be  no  peace  between  us  '. 


CHAPTER  II 

A  Backwater  of  the  REvoLtrrioK 

Contemporary  with  these  events  abroad  there  had  been  ao 
certain  serious  trouble  in  the  capital  at  home,  where  Marcus  J*"-*F«"-4' 
Caelius  Rufus,  one  of  the  praetors  for  the  year,  had  taken  on 
himself  to  champion  the  cause  of  the  debtor  classes.  After 
entering  upon  his  official  duties,  he  had  established  his  magis- 
terial dais  alongside  the  judicial  chair  of  his  colleague  the 
city  praetor,  Caius  Trebonius,  and  there  proceeded  to  promise 
his  official  support  to  any  who  chose  to  appeal  on  the  valuation 
of  their  property  and  the  enforced  payments  of  liabilities  that 
were  now  being  carried  out  by  the  verdict  of  individual 
arbitrators,  in  accordance  with  the  measure  adopted  by  Caesar 
during  his  late  stay  in  Rome.  So  essentially  fair,  however, 
was  this  measure  in  itself,  and  so  wise  a  toleration  did  Tre- 
bonius exhibit  in  executing  its  terms,  from  conviction  that 
the  times  called  for  a  considerate  and  temperate  dispensation 
of  justice,  that  no  parties  were  forthcoming  to  initiate  the 
process  of  appeal.  The  truth  is  that,  whilst  very  ordinary 
courage  is  required  to  plead  poverty  and  declaim  against  one's 
own  personal  troubles  or  those  of  the  times,  and  to  lay  before 
the  court  the  hardships  attending  an  enforced  sale  ;  to  keep 
entire  possession  of  property,  admittedly  due  to  another. 


1 3  <^  Idiots  in  J^me 

Ia11.-Feb.48  argues  the  very  height  of  assurance,  not  to  say  effrontery. 
Consequently  no  one  could  be  found  to  put  forward  so  extra- 
vagant a  demand  ;  and  Caelius  was  left  to  prove  himself  more 
intractable  than  even  the  parties  for  whom  he  was  professedly 
acting.  For,  once  started  on  his  career,  he  had  now  to  avoid 
the  fiasco  of  having  undertaken  a  discreditable  piece  of  busi- 
ness with  nothing  to  show  for  it :  he  therefore  brought 
forward  a  measure  by  which  all  debts  were  to  be  discharged 
without  accumulation  of  interest  that  day  six  years. 
2 1  This  proposal  naturally  met  with  opposition  from  the  con- 
sul Servilius  and  the  rest  of  the  Government  ;  and  Caelius, 
baulked  of  his  expectations,  determined  to  make  a  bid  for  the 
support  of  the  populace.  Withdrawing  his  earlier  law,  he 
now  substituted  two  others  in  its  place;  in  the  first  of  which 
he  made  a  present  of  a  year's  rent  to  every  tenant  of  an 
inhabited  house,  and  in  the  second  announced  a  general 
cancelling  of  debts :  and  further  he  instigated  the  mob  to 
a  brutal  attack  against  Caius  Trebonius,  who  was  hustled  off 
his  magisterial  platform,  whilst  several  others  were  wounded. 
These  proceedings  were  reported  by  Servilius  to  the  Senate, 
and  the  Chamber  resolved  that  Caelius  had  deserved  suspen- 
sion from  public  functions.  Acting  on  this  decree,  the  consul 
then  forbade  him  the  House,  and  when  he  subsequently 
endeavoured  to  address  the  assembled  people  outside,  ordered 
his  forcible  removal  from  the  rostra  ^.  This  last  open  dis- 
grace stung  him  to  resentment ;  and,  giving  out  in  public 
that  he  was  leaving  Rome  to  go  off  to  Caesar,  he  secretly 
sent  agents  to  Milo,  then  under  sentence  of  exile  upon  the 
charge  of  murdering  Clodius,  and  invited  him  into  Italy. 
Milo  he  considered  a  useful  tool  for  his  purpose,  because  the 
^   An  elevated  platform  for  speakers.     Cf.  the  French  Tribune. 


Death  of  the  T{mgleaders  137 

lavish  public  games  formerly  exhibited  by  him  in  the  city  Ja11.-Feb.4S 
had  still  left  him  with  a  remnant  of  his  old  gladiatorial  gang. 
A  junction  was  effected  between  the  two,  and  Milo  was  then 
sent  on  in  advance  to  raise  the  herdsmen  in  the  regions  round 
Thurii.  Caelius  himself  came  down  to  Casilinum  ;  only, 
however,  to  hear  that  all  his  regimental  colours  ^  and  stacks 
of  arms  had  been  seized  at  Capua,  and  that  the  band  of  hired 
bravoes,  which  was  to  contrive  the  treacherous  surrender  of 
Naples  (Neapolis),  had  been  discovered  in  that  city.  The 
plot  now  stood  revealed,  and  Capua  in  consequence  shut  its 
gates  against  him  ;  even  personal  danger  was  to  be  feared, 
since  the  district  had  taken  up  arms  and  was  now  inclined  to 
treat  him  as  a  common  outlaw.  He  therefore  broke  off  his 
present  design,  and  retired  from  his  advance  in  these  regions. 

In  the  meantime  Milo  was  distributing  a  pro^amation  22 
among  the  Italian  municipalities,  to  the  effect  that  he  was 
acting  under  the  express  orders  of  Pompeius,  received  in  the 
form  of  instructions  from  Vibullius ;  and  on  the  strength 
of  this  artifice  was  endeavouring  to  win  the  support  of  any 
whom  he  had  reason  to  suspect  of  being  in  money  difficulties. 
These  last  failing  to  respond,  he  proceeded  to  break  open 
some  private  slave  compounds,  and  then  to  lay  siege  to  the 
town  of  Cosa,  situated  in  the  territories  of  Thurii.  A  legion 
was  at  once  dispatched  to  its  relief  by  Quintus  Pedius,  one 
of  the  praetors,  and  Milo  was  subsequently  killed  by  a  stone 
that  struck  him  from  the  city  wall.  As  for  Caelius,  maintain- 
ing his  assertion  that  he  was  on  his  way  to  Caesar,  he  got  as 
far  as  Thurii.  There  he  tried  to  tamper  with  certain  of  the 
city  authorities  ;  but  on  offering  a  bribe  to  the  Caesarian 
cavalry,  composed  of  Gallic  and  Spanish  horse,  who  had  been 
^  '  Military  standards.' 


138  Death  of  the  J^ngleaders 

Jan.-Feb.48  sent  down  to  garrison  the  place,  he  met  with  his  death  at 
their  hands.  In  this  way  what  threatened  to  develop  into 
a  serious  movement,  and,  owing  to  the  pre-occupation  of  the 
Government  with  the  crisis  abroad,  was  giving  rise  to  serious 
anxiety  in  Italy,  came  to  an  easy  and  a  speedy  termination. 

CHAPTER  III 
The  Lines  of  Dyrrachium 
23  To  resume  the  narrative  of  the  campaign.  It  was  about  this 
time  that  a  naval  demonstration  against  Italy  was  organized 
under  Libo,  who,  with  the  fleet  of  fifty  ships  of  the  line  under 
his  immediate  command,  set  sail  from  Oricum  and  crossed 
to  Brindisi,  where  he  seized  as  his  base  the  island  commanding 
the  entrance  to  that  harbour.^  This  plan  he  adopted  because 
he  considered  it  sounder  strategy  to  concentrate  his  attention 
upon  a  single  point  where  our  forces  must  inevitably  pass  out 
to  sea,  than  to  maintain  a  blockade  of  all  the  adjacent  shores 
and  harbours.  His  sudden  arrival  on  the  coast  enabled  him 
to  pick  up  a  few  stray  merchantmen  :  these  he  all  promptly 
burned,  excepting  one  with  a  cargo  of  corn  which  was  brought 
back  by  its  captors  as  a  prize.  Altogether  he  created  no 
little  panic  amongst  our  people  ;  and  this  was  further  in- 
creased by  a  successful  night  attack,  in  which  a  landing-party 
of  legionaries  and  archers  dislodged  one  of  our  mounted 
pickets.  His  strong  position,  indeed,  gained  him  such  marked 
advantages,  that,  in  a  dispatch  to  Pompeius,  he  assured  his 
commanding  officer  that,  if  he  liked,  he  might  give  orders 
for  the  rest  of  the  fleet  to  go  into  dock  and  refit,  since  his 
own  squadron  would  effectually  block  up  the  reinforcements 

destined  for  Caesar. 

*  See  Plan,  p.  23. 


A  Device  of  Mark  Antony         139 

Fortunately  at  this  moment  Antonius  was  at   Brindisi.  ^4 
x».     .        .       ,.   .         1-  11-1  1-  r  I  •  Feb-March 

Placing  implicit  reliance  on  the  high  quality  ot  his  troops,      .g 

this  officer  selected  some  sixty  ships'  cutters  from  his  larger 
transports,  which  he  then  proceeded  to  cover  with  a  super- 
structure of  fascines  and  mantlets.  On  board  of  these 
a  picked  body  of  legionaries  was  next  embarked,  and  the 
boats  were  then  stationed  in  detachments  at  various  points 
along  the  shore.  This  done,  orders  were  given  for  two  three- 
deckers  \  lately  built  under  his  supervision  at  Brindisi,  to  row 
out  to  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  under  the  pretence  of  exer- 
cising the  crews.  Noticing  the  boldness  with  which  they 
came  on,  Libo  conceived  the  hope  of  cutting  off  their  retreat, 
and  detached  five  of  his  four-deckers  '  against  them.  These 
had  approached  to  within  a  short  distance  of  our  vessels,  when 
our  crews,  veterans  though  supposed  to  be,  were  suddenly 
seen  to  go  about  and  to  be  running  for  the  shelter  of  port ; 
on  which  the  Pompeians,  with  more  enthusiasm  than  caution, 
at  once  commenced  to  pursue  Suddenly,  on  the  given 
signal,  out  shot  from  every  quarter  the  Antonian  launches, 
racing  up  to  the  enemy.  Singling  out  one  of  the  four- 
deckers,  they  captured  her  at  the  first  burst  with  all  her 
navigating  °  and  fighting  crews,  whilst  her  consorts  sought 
safety  in  a  disgraceful  flight. 

This  disaster  was  soon  afterwards  followed  by  another. 
Antonius  having  stationed  a  chain  of  mounted  patrols  along 
the  foreshore,  the  enemy  found  himself  deprived  of  all  access 
to  water  ;  so  that  Libo,  feeling  his  position  to  be  as  untenable 
as  it  was  undignified,  was  forced  to  evacuate  Brindisi,  and  to 
relinquish  the  blockade  of  our  reinforcements  waiting  there. 

Many   months   had   now   elapsed,   and   winter   was   well  25 
'  Triremes.  "^  Qiiadriremes.  '  i.e.  oarsmen. 


140  j^fter  Long  Delay 

Mar.-Ap.48  past  its  climax,  whilst  yet  there  was  no  sign  of  the  transports 
with  the  legions  crossing  from  Brindisi  to  Caesar.  Moreover, 
it  appeared  to  Caesar  that  several  opportunities  for  making 
the  passage  had  been  neglected,  since  the  wind  had  certainly 
blown  from  the  quarter  which,  in  his  judgement,  was  essential 
for  putting  to  sea.  What  made  the  delay  more  serious  was 
that,  the  further  the  season  advanced,  the  greater  grew  the 
energy  displayed  by  the  enemy's  naval  commanders  in  their 
watch  upon  the  coast,  and  the  higher  rose  their  hopes  of 
successfully  preventing  our  crossing.  Frequent  dispatches 
also  came  down  from  Pompeius,  conveying  severe  reprimands 
on  their  failure  to  stop  Caesar  in  his  first  voyage,  and  urgent 
exhortations  to  see  that  the  rest  of  his  armament  was  not 
similarly  allowed  to  cross  the  straits ;  and  they  were  now 
daily  reckoning  on  the  change  of  season  when  lighter  winds 
would  increase  the  difficulties  of  transporting  an  army.  All 
these  considerations  induced  Caesar  to  dispatch  a  somewhat 
peremptory  order  to  his  agents  at  Brindisi,^  bidding  them 
at  the  first  fair  wind  not  to  lose  a  chance  of  sailing,  if  once 
they  could  shape  such  a  course  as  to  hit  the  opposite  coast 
within  the  boundaries  of  Apollonia  and  there  run  their  vessels 
ashore.  These  regions,  it  should  be  explained,  were  the 
freest  from  the  blockading  squadrons,  owing  to  the  enemy's 
nervousness  about  venturing  far  from  his  ports. 
26  His  officers  responded  with  intrepid  courage.  Whilst 
Marcus  Antonius  and  Fufius  Calenus  jointly  directed  the 
embarkation,   the   men  themselves   eagerly   seconded   their 

^  Ancient  authorities  record  the  story  that  Caesar  in  desperation  at  the 
delay,  tried  to  cross  the  Adriatic  in  a  small  boat,  but  was  driven  back  by 
the  boisterous  weather.  He  rallied  the  frightened  sailors  by  the  now 
proverbial  words,  'You  carry  Caesar  and  his  fortunes'. 


Caesar* s  ^inforcements  sail        141 

efforts  in  their  readiness  to  brave  all  risks  for  ensuring  the  Mar.-Ap.4'> 
safety  of  Caesar  ;  and  having  secured  a  southerly  wind  they 
weighed  anchor,  and  the  next  day  were  swept  up  the  coast 
past  ApoUonia  and  Durazzo.  As  soon  as  they  were  sighted 
from  the  mainland,  Caius  Coponius,  the  admiral  commanding 
the  Rhodian  fleet  at  Durazzo,  at  once  rowed  his  ships  out  of 
harbour,  and,  the  breeze  slackening,  got  close  up  with  our 
transports  ;  but  at  that  moment  the  southerly  gale  once  more 
freshened,  and  by  so  doing  saved  our  vessels  from  certain 
capture.  This,  however,  was  not  enough  to  turn  Coponius 
from  his  purpose  ;  and,  trusting  the  unflagging  efforts  of  his 
crews  to  be  more  than  a  match  for  the  pace  of  the  gale, 
he  kept  up  the  chase  even  after  his  opponents  had  been  blown 
past  Durazzo  by  the  great  force  of  the  wind.  On  the  other 
hand,  our  ships,  though  fully  profiting  by  their  stroke  of  good 
luck,  still  dreaded  an  attack  from  the  armed  fleet,  if  once  the 
wind  should  moderate.  Gaining  the  harbour  therefore  called 
Nymphaeum,  three  miles  beyond  Alessio  (Z,uj'M/),they  steered 
their  ships  into  it ;  and  though  it  is  sheltered  from  a  south- 
westerly gale  and  exposed  to  a  southerly,  they  yet  felt  they 
had  less  to  fear  from  the  hurricane  than  from  the  enemy's 
pursuing  squadron.  They  were,  however,  no  sooner  inside, 
than  the  wind,  which  for  two  days  had  blown  steadily  from 
the  south,  with  a  good  fortune  wellnigh  incredible,  veered 
to  the  south-west. 

Sudden  indeed  was  the  turning  of  the  tables  now  wit-  27 
nessed.  Those  who  a  moment  before  had  feared  for  their 
very  lives  were  now  within  the  shelter  of  an  absolutely  safe 
harbour  :  those  on  the  other  hand,  who  had  just  threatened 
our  vessels  with  destruction,  had  now  to  look  to  their  own. 
So  completely  were  the  conditions  reversed,  that,  whilst  to 


142  Veterans  versus  Conscripts 

Mar.-Ap.48  our  men  the  fresh  gale  proved  a  direct  preservation,  it  caught 
the  Rhodian  men-of-wrar  with  such  violence  that  every  one 
of  their  decked  ships,  sixteen  in  all,  were  driven  ashore  and 
went  to  pieces  on  the  rocks.  Of  the  large  numbers  forming 
their  navigating  and  fighting  crews,  part  were  dashed  upon 
the  cliflFs  and  killed,  others  were  rescued  by  our  troops ;  these 
last  being  all  spared  by  Caesar  and  given  a  free  passage  home, 
28  Two  of  our  transports  unfortunately  were  a  little  late 
in  completing  their  voyage,  and  accordingly  were  overtaken 
by  night.  Not  knowing  at  what  point  the  rest  of  the  convoy 
had  made  the  coast,  they  lay  off  at  anchor  opposite  Alessio 
[Lissus).  Thereupon  the  Pompeian  commandant  of  the  place, 
Otacilius  Crassus,  put  out  with  a  large  number  of  ships'  boats 
and  other  small  craft,  and  commenced  preparations  for 
boarding ;  in  the  meanwhile  discussing  terms  of  surrender 
and  guaranteeing  fair  treatment  to  the  prisoners.  (One  of  the 
ships,  it  should  be  mentioned,  had  on  board  220  recruits  from 
a  newly-raised  legion,  the  other  a  trifle  under  200  from  a  corps 
of  veterans.) 

Then  occurred  a  signal  illustration  of  the  self-defence  that 
lies  in  undaunted  courage.  The  recruits,  frightened  by  the 
swarm  of  boats,  and  prostrated  with  sea-sickness  and  the  effects 
of  their  voyage,  accepted  the  sworn  word  of  the  enemy  not 
to  injure  them,  and  surrendered  to  Otacilius.  They  were 
at  once  marched  off  to  the  governor  ;  and  there,  in  his  pre- 
sence, in  defiance  of  his  solemn  oath,  were  brutally  massacred 
to  a  man.  On  the  other  hand,  the  veteran  contingent, 
though  equally  shaken  by  their  cramped  position  in  the  ship's 
hold,  which  had  been  rendered  still  worse  by  the  storm, 
braced  themselves  to  maintain  unsullied  the  lofty  reputation 
of  their  corps  j  and  by  haggling  over  terms,  and  pretending 


The  Landing  safely  effected        143 

to  be  always  on  the  point  of  surrender,  succeeded  in  wearing  Mar.-Ap.48 
away  the  first  part  of  the  night.  They  then  compelled  their 
captain  to  run  his  ship  ashore,  and,  finding  there  a  defensible 
position,  passed  the  rest  of  the  night  upon  it.  At  dawn  a  body 
of  cavalry,  some  400  strong,  forming  the  regular  patrol  of 
that  section  of  the  coast,  was  dispatched  against  them  by 
Otacilius,  to  be  shortly  afterwards  followed  by  a  force  of 
heavy-armed  infantry  from  the  town  garrison  ;  but  against 
both  alike  they  made  good  their  defence,  and  after  inflicting 
several  casualties  upon  the  enemy,  without  any  loss  whatever 
to  themselves,  successfully  effected  a  retirement  upon  their 
head  quarters. 

Immediately  after  this  the  Roman  settlement  in  Alessio  29 
(Lissus),  which  at  this  time  was  responsible  for  the  government 
of  the  city,  Caesar  having  on  a  previous  occasion  attached  it 
to  their  jurisdiction,  and  at  the  same  time  provided  for  its 
fortification,  sent  out  a  warm  welcome  to  Antony,  putting 
everything  they  possessed  at  the  disposal  of  his  army.  There- 
upon Otacilius,  becoming  apprehensive  for  his  own  position, 
hastily  withdrew  his  garrison  from  the  town,  and  rejoined 
Pompeius. 

Meanwhile  Antonius,  after  completing  the  disembarkation 
of  his  reinforcements,  amounting  in  all  to  three  veteran  and 
one  conscript  legion  with  900  mounted  troops,  sent  back  the 
majority  of  his  transports  to  Italy,  with  orders  to  convey 
across  the  remaining  infantry  and  cavalry  ;  leaving,  however, 
at  Alessio  a  batch  of  large  sailing  punts — a  species  of  GaUic 
craft — in  order  that,  should  Pompeius  again  throw  his  army 
across  into  Italy  under  the  behef  that  it  was  now  denuded  of 
troops  (a  plan  with  which  rumour  commonly  credited  him), 
Caesar  should  at  least  retain  some  means  of  pursuit.  He  then 


144  Junctio7i  with  Main  Army 

April  48  sent  off  express  messengers  to  his  commander-in-chief,  inform- 
ing him  both  of  the  place  of  his  landing  and  of  the  strength 
of  the  forces  accompanying  him. 
30  Now  it  so  happened  that  information  on  these  two  points 
reached  Caesar  and  Pompeius  almost  simultaneously.  They 
had  both  witnessed  the  transports  driving  with  the  storm  past 
ApoUonia  and  Durazzo,  and  had  themselves  at  once  started 
overland  on  their  track  ;  in  ignorance,  however,  for  the  first 
few  days,  of  the  particular  point  at  which  the  ships  had  made 
the  coast.  The  receipt  of  this  further  intelligence  caused 
the  adoption  by  the  rival  commanders  of  two  mutually 
exclusive  plans  ;  Caesar  aiming  at  a  junction  with  Antonius 
at  the  earliest  possible  moment,  Pompeius  endeavouring  to 
intercept  the  new  arrivals  on  their  march  southward,  with  a 
chance  perhaps  also  of  surprising  them  by  ambush.  Accord-  , 
ingly  each  broke  up  his  permanent  quarters  along  the  Ergent 
{Apsus)  within  twenty- four  hours  of  the  other,  but  whereas 
Pompeius  secretly  set  his  army  in  motion  during  the  night, 
Caesar  marched  out  in  the  light  of  open  day.  The  latter  had 
the  longer  route  before  him,  as  a  considerable  detour  was 
involved  by  the  necessity  of  first  marching  up-stream  before 
a  crossing  could  be  effected ;  in  the  meantime  Pompeius  could 
get  c  ff  with  a  clear  road  without  any  river  to  ford,  and  push 
on  to  meet  Antony  by  a  series  of  forced  marches.  With 
the  intelligence  that  his  opponent  was  now  close  at  hand,  he 
selected  a  suitable  site  for  encamping,  and  there  settled  down 
to  await  his  arrival ;  keeping  all  arms  strictly  within  his 
lines,  and  as  a  further  precaution  allowing  no  fires  to  be 
lighted.  These  movements  were  promptly  reported  to 
Antonius  by  the  local  Greek  population  ;  so  that  Antony, 
after   dispatching  runners   to   advise   Caesar  of  the  same, 


Threatened  Intervention  from  the  East  145" 

remained  that  day  quietly  in  camp  ;  and  on  the  next  Caesar  April  48 
marched  in  with  his  men.  The  news  of  their  junction  made 
Pompeius  anxious  lest  he  should  find  himself  surrounded  by 
the  two  allied  armies  ;  he  therefore  fell  back  from  the  neigh- 
bourhood and  marched  in  force  to  Asparagium,  a  town 
belonging  to  Durazzo,  where  on  some  strong  ground  a  new 
camp  was  fortified. 

Whilst  the  war  had  thus  been  in  progress  some  considerable  31 
time,  Scipio  had  all  along  been  busy  in  the  East.  After  first 
suflFering  several  defeats  in  the  region  of  Mount  Amanus,  on 
the  strength  of  which  he  had  acclaimed  himself  Commander/ 
he  had  followed  up  these  exploits  by  levying  large  con- 
tributions of  money  upon  the  townships  and  petty  sovereigns 
of  his  province  of  Syria.  The  arrears  of  taxes,  owdng  for  the 
last  two  years,  had  been  squeezed  out  of  the  contractors^,  who 
had  been  compelled  to  make  a  further  advance  on  mortgage 
of  the  estimates  for  the  ensuing  year ;  at  the  same  time  a 
cavalry  conscription  had  been  ordered  over  the  entire  province. 
As  soon  as  this  force  was  ready  he  turned  his  back  upon  his 
immediate  enemy,  the  Parthians — an  enemy  who  had  in  the 
last  few  years  caused  the  death  of  Marcus  Crassus,  the  well- 
known  commander,  and  had  since  kept  Marcus  Bibulus  shut 
up  within  siege  lines — and  withdrew  from  Syria  its  garrisonof 
legions  and  mounted  troops.  Such  a  step  produced  the  gravest 
anxiety  and  apprehensions  of  a  Parthian  war  throughout  the 
province,  apprehensions  which  were  soon  echoed  by  not  infre- 
quent murmurs  among  the  troops,  who  made  it  known  that 
if  their  march  was  to  be  directed  against  a  national  enemy  they 
would  cheerfully  follow,  but  that  against  a  fellow  citizen  and 
the  first  magistrate  of  the  state  they  would  never  draw  a  sword. 
'  Cr.  Bk.  II,  ch.  3  (26).  >  '  Publicans.' 

LONG  L 


i/\.6       Civil  War  and  the  Provinces 

vVutumn  49  At  these  symptoms  of  possible  trouble,  Scipio  hit  upon  the 
device  of  quartering  his  soldiers  upon  Bergama  {Pergamum) 
and  the  other  rich  cities  of  Asia  Minor ;  and  here  he  not 
only  indulged  them  with  the  most  extravagant  largesses,  but, 
further  to  whet  their  appetite  for  the  campaign,  handed 
them  over  the  townships  to  plunder. 
3a  While  the  troops  were  thus  engaged,  the  unhappy  provin- 
cials had  everywhere  to  find  the  money  required  to  meet  the 
grinding  exactions  of  the  authorities.  Many  novel  heads  of 
taxation  were  devised  at  the  bidding  of  official  cupidity. 
A  poll-tax  was  levied  on  every  head  of  the  population,  whether 
slave  or  free  ;  taxes  on  house  pillars,  taxes  on  doors,  a  money 
composition  for  the  army's  corn  supply,  for  troops,  accoutre- 
ments, ships'  crews,  ordnance,  and  transport ;  in  short,  they 
had  only  to  find  a  sufficiently  plausible  title,  and  it  was  at 
once  pronounced  an  adequate  instrument  for  the  raising  of 
fresh  funds.  Commandants  possessed  of  full  military  powers 
were  quartered,  not  merely  in  the  large  cities,  but  one  might 
almost  say  in  every  individual  hamlet  and  hill  fortress  of  the 
province  ;  and  those  who  distinguished  themselves  in  the 
work  of  plunder  by  any  remarkable  cruelty  or  rapacity  were 
rewarded  by  a  reputation  for  exceptional  ability  and  patriot- 
ism, Asia  Minor  was  completely  overrun  with  the  holders 
of  military  authority  and  their  dreaded  attendants  ^ ;  it  was 
crammed  with  officials  and  tax-gatherers.  These  men,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  legal  sum  demanded,  were  not  above  doing  a  bit 
of  business  on  their  own  account ;  the  excuse  constantly  urged 
was  that,  as  they  had  been  driven  from  home  and  country, 
they  were  now  in  need  of  the  comxmon  necessaries  of  life  ;  and 
by  this  plea  they  endeavoured  to  cloak  under  a  specious  title 
'   '  Lictors.' 


^  Diana  of  the  Ephe nans'*  147 

of  respectability  their  most  disreputable  proceedings.  A  fur-  Autumn  49 
ther  calamity  for  the  provincials  was  the  exorbitant  rise  in 
interest,  a  not  unusual  phenomenon  in  time  of  war,  where 
a  whole  community  is  called  upon  to  furnish  ready  money  ; 
and,  in  the  hardships  thus  entailed,  any  postponement  by 
the  creditors  of  the  day  of  settlement  was  magniiied  into 
a  free  gift  to  the  unfortunate  debtors.  In  this  way  the  capital 
debt  of  the  province  more  than  doubled  itself  during  these 
two  years.  Yet  it  is  not  to  be  supposed  that  the  Roman 
citizens  settled  in  the  province  were  therefore  allowed  to  go 
exempt.  Fixed  sums  were  apportioned  for  each  administra- 
tive area,  for  each  individual  township  ;  and  the  authors  of 
these  forced  contributions  invariably  represented  them  as 
loans  negotiated  on  the  authority  of  the  Senate's  decree. 
Finally,  the  farmers  of  the  imperial  revenues  were  compelled, 
as  they  had  previously  been  in  Syria,  to  advance  the  proceeds 
of  the  tribute  for  the  ensuing  year. 

In  addition  to  all  these  sources  of  income,  Scipio  did  not  33 
scruple  to  order  the  removal  from  the  great  temple  of  Diana 
at  Ephesus  of  the  treasures  accumulated  there  from  immemo- 
rial antiquity.  On  the  day  appointed  for  this  sacrilege  an 
entrance  into  the  sacred  building  had  already  been  effected 
by  himself  and  a  party  of  the  senatorial  order,  who  had  been 
expressly  summoned  to  witness  the  act,  when  dispatches  from 
Pompeius  were  put  into  his  hand,  bearing  the  information 
that  Caesar  had  crossed  the  water  vdth  a  part  of  his  legions, 
and  containing  urgent  instructions  to  hasten  the  advance  of 
his  army  towards  a  junction  with  his  chief,  to  which  ever}' 
other  interest  was  to  be  subordinated.  On  receipt  of  this 
intelligence  he  at  once  dismissed  the  invited  senators  and 
commenced  preparations  for  his  march  into  Macedonia,  upon 


148     Collateral  ^lavements  of  Caesar 

Jan. -Feb.  48  which  he  Started  a  few  days  later  ;  his  recall  thus  proving  the 
salvation  of  the  Ephesian  treasures. 

34  We  must  now  retrace  the  interrupted  narrative  of  Caesar's 
own  movements.  The  successful  junction  with  the  army  of 
Antony  enabled  him,  he  thought,  to  withdraw  the  single 
legion  at  Oricum,  previously  stationed  there  for  the  defence 
of  that  part  of  the  coast,  and  so,  by  extending  the  area  of  his 
operations,  to  test  the  feeling  of  the  neighbouring  provinces. 
Envoys  had  already  reached  him  from  Thessaly  and  LIvadia 
{Aetolia),  charged  with  the  duty  of  conveying  the  assurance 
that  the  towns  of  these  regions  only  required  the  presence  of 
a  garrison  in  order  to  put  themselves  completely  at  his 
disposal.  Three  distinct  expeditions  were  accordingly  now 
taken  in  hand.  In  the  first  place,  Lucius  Cassius  Longinus  was 
sent  into  Thessaly  at  the  head  of  a  single  legion  of  conscripts 
(the  Twenty-seventh)  and  200  mounted  men :  secondly,  Caius 
Calvisius  Sabinus  was  commissioned  to  invade  LIvadia  with 
five  battalions  of  Infantry  and  a  troop  of  horse ;  both  these 
officers  receiving  most  earnest  Instructions  to  organize  in 
those  immediately  outlying  districts  a  regular  supply  of 
corn  for  the  main  army :  whilst  lastly,  Cnaeus  Domitlus 
Calvinus  had  orders  to  march  Into  Macedonia  with  two 
legions — the  Eleventh  and  Twelfth — and  a  cavalry  force  of 
600  sabres.  The  principal  reason  for  this  third  enterprise  was 
the  presence  In  camp  of  the  chieftain  Menedemus,  the  most 
powerful  ruler  in  what  Is  known  as  '  Independent '  Mace- 
donia, who  had  been  dispatched  to  Caesar  as  special  envoy 
from  his  subjects,  and  who  was  now  promising  the  enthu- 
siastic and  unanimous  devotion  of  his  followers. 

35  Of  these  three  expeditions  that  under  Calvisius,  from  the 
first  day  of  its  arrival  In  LIvadia   [Aetolia),  received  the 


Collateral   'Movements  of  Caesar      149 

warmest  support  from  all  parties  :  the  enemy's  garrisons  in  April  48 
Kurtaga  ^  and  Lepanto  {Calydon  and  Naupactus)  were  driven 
out,  and  complete  possession  gained  of  the  country.  Cassius 
also  with  his  one  legion  successfully  penetrated  into  Thessaly  ; 
but  the  existence  here  of  two  rival  political  factions  produced 
considerable  variety  in  the  character  of  the  reception  accorded 
him  by  the  several  states.  The  leader  of  one  of  these  factions 
was  Hegesaretos,  a  chief  of  long-established  power,  devoted 
to  the  interests  of  Pompeius  :  opposed  to  him  was  Petraeus, 
a  scion  of  one  of  their  noblest  families,  who,  together  with 
his  party,  now  brought  to  the  cause  of  Caesar  the  strenuous 
support  of  their  combined  resources.  Simultaneous  with  both  36 
these  was  the  arrival  in  Macedonia  of  the  third  force  under 
Domitius.  Here  ambassadors  from  the  provincial  centres 
were  already  gathering  in  considerable  numbers  to  meet 
the  Caesarian  representative,  when  the  movement  was  sud- 
denly checked  by  the  announcement  of  Scipio's  near  approach, 
heralded  as  it  was  on  all  sides  by  extravagant  opinions  con- 
cerning the  powers  of  the  new  commander  :  it  being  common 
experience  in  all  novelty  for  reputation  to  precede  per- 
formance. The  new-comer,  making  no  halt  anywhere  in 
Macedonia,  pushed  on  vigorously  in  the  direction  of  Domitius, 
until  he  was  now  no  more  than  twenty  miles  apart.  He  then 
suddenly  turned  south  into  Thessaly  against  Cassius  Longinus, 
executing  this  flank  movement  with  such  startling  rapidity 
that  the  news  of  his  approach  actually  coincided  with  that 
of  his  arrival.  Moreover,  to  make  his  march  the  quicker,  he 
left  behind  at  the  river  Vistritza  {Haliacmon)  (the  boundary 
between  Macedonia  and  Thessaly),  a  force  of  eight  battalions 
under  Marcus  Favonius,  as  a  guard  to  the  baggage-trains  of 
*  Not  far  from  Missolonghi. 


ly o     Disconcerting  Advance  of  Scipio 

April  48  his    legions,   with    orders  to  construct   a   fort   upon    that 
river. 

Whilst  thus  engaged  himself,  it  happened  that  the  cavalry 
force  of  King  Cotys,  which  was  habitually  hovering  on  the 
outskirts  of  Thessaly,  swooped  down  upon  the  camp  of 
Cassius  :  whereupon  that  commander,  thoroughly  alarmed 
by  the  news  of  Scipio's  arrival  on  the  scene,  and  mistaking  the 
cavalry  he  saw  for  that  of  the  Pompeian  general,  set  his  troops 
in  motion  for  the  western  part  of  the  mountain  range  that 
girdles  the  whole  of  Thessaly,  and  thence  began  a  retirement 
in  the  direction  of  Arta  (Ambracia).  Scipio  on  his  side  was 
vigorously  pressing  the  pursuit,  when  he  was  shortly  overtaken 
by  a  dispatch  from  Favonius  announcing  the  presence  of 
Domitius  with  his  two  legions,  and  informing  his  commanding 
officer  that  unless  reinforced  he  could  not  defend  the  fortified 
post  where  he  had  been  stationed.  The  receipt  of  this  dis- 
patch caused  Scipio  to  make  a  complete  change  both  in  his  plans 
and  in  the  direction  of  his  march.  Breaking  off  the  pursuit  of 
Cassius,  he  now  hastened  to  the  relief  of  Favonius ;  and  by 
marching  night  and  day  without  a  halt,  he  succeeded  in 
rejoining  his  lieutenant  under  such  remarkably  fortunate 
circumstances,  that  the  rising  dust  of  Domitius's  army  was 
already  observed  just  as  the  leading  vedettes  of  Scipio  first 
came  into  sight.  Thus  Cassius  was  saved  by  the  energetic 
conduct  of  Domitius,  and  Favonius  by  the  rapidity  of  Scipio. 
37  The  last-named  commander  now  rested  two  days  inside  his 
permanent  fortifications  on  the  river  Vistritza,  which  separated 
him  from  Domitius  on  the  northern  bank  :  on  the  third  day 
at  dawn  his  army  crossed  by  a  ford  and  proceeded  to  erect 
a  camp  ;  on  the  fourth  his  line  of  battle  was  drawn  up  along 
the  front  of  the  new  entrenchments.     Once  more  Domitius 


Held  in  check  by  Domitius         i  j  i 

was  prompt  to  meet  the  challenge,  and  resolved  to  advance  Ap.-May4!i 
his  legions  and  then  and  there  to  accept  the  issue  of  a  pitched 
battle.  Between  the  two  rival  camps,  however,  there  inter- 
vened an  open  plain  some  six  miles  broad  :  this  the  Caesarians 
had  first  to  cross,  and  then  marshalled  their  line  beneath  the 
higher  ground  of  Scipio,  who  still  persisted  in  his  determina- 
tion not  to  come  down  from  his  entrenchments.  The  result 
was  that  in  spite  of  the  difficulties  of  restraining  the  eager 
Domitian  infantry,  no  actual  encounter  as  yet  ensued  ;  the 
chief  obstacle  being  a  small  stream  running  under  Scipio's 
camp,  whose  awkward  banks  presented  considerable  difficulties 
to  our  advance.  Yet  Scipio  had  seen  enough  of  the  high 
mettle  of  our  troops  and  their  eagerness  to  engage,  to  induce 
the  suspicion  that  on  the  morrow  he  would  either  be  forced 
to  fight  against  his  will,  or  else  suffer  a  serious  blow  in  reputa- 
tion, if  he  still  kept  behind  the  shelter  of  his  breastworks, 
especially  after  the  high  expectations  formed  of  his  interven- 
tion in  the  campaign.  His  first  presumptuous  advance  thus 
ended  somewhat  ingloriously,  and  under  cover  of  night, 
without  even  venturing  to  sound  the  usual  signal  for  striking 
camp,  he  silently  transferred  his  army  across  the  river,  and 
once  more  returned  to  his  original  quarters,  where  on  some 
natural  heights  close  by  the  stream  a  fresh  camp  was  con- 
structed. A  few  days  of  inaction  then  followed,  at  the  close 
of  which  a  surprise  attack  by  ambush  was  planned  against  our 
forces  by  the  Pompeian  leader,  who  placed  a  body  of  cavalry 
at  a  spot  where  on  previous  days  we  had  generally  gone  out 
for  forage.  Accordingly,  on  the  next  morning,  when  Quintus 
Varus,  the  cavalry  commander  in  Domitius's  army,  paid  his 
daily  visit  to  the  place,  his  troopers  were  suddenly  set  upon  by 
the  concealed  horsemen.     A  stout  resistance  was  nevertheless 


ij-2  Some  l^iinor  Actions 

.-May48  offered  to  the  attack,  and,  quickly  rallying  on  their  respective 
troops,  the  united  Caesarian  cavalry  delivered  a  counter- 
attack upon  their  assailants.  Some  eighty  saddles  were 
emptied,  and,  after  completing  the  rout  of  the  remainder, 
the  foraging  party  rode  back  to  camp,  having  sustained  in  all 
but  tw^o  casualties. 
38  These  initial  operations  raised  some  expectation  in  Domitius 
that  Scipio  might  perhaps  be  enticed  to  a  genera]  engagement. 
Pretending,  therefore,  that  shortness  of  supplies  nov?  com- 
pelled him  to  change  his  ground,  he  ordered  the  regular 
military  signal  to  be  sounded  for  striking  camp,  preparatory  to 
marching  a  distance  of  three  miles.  There  he  found  a  site 
conveniently  hidden  from  viev*^,  and  on  it  proceeded  to  dispose 
the  whole  of  his  effective  army,  including  the  mounted  troops. 
Scipio  was  equally  ready  to  follow,  and  for  this  purpose 
advanced  a  reconnoitring  force  of  cavalry  to  ascertain  the 
precise  route  taken  by  his  opponent.  This  force  proceeding 
to  its  appointed  task,  its  leading  squadrons  had  already  ridden 
into  the  ambush  awaiting  it,  when  the  champing  of  our 
horses  by  rousing  their  suspicions  caused  them  to  commence 
retiring  upon  their  supports  :  similarly  the  succeeding  files, 
on  noticing  the  hasty  retreat  of  their  comrades,  drew  them- 
selves to  the  halt.  The  trap  was  now  disclosed,  and  the 
Caesarians,  perceiving  the  uselessness  of  waiting  the  arrival 
of  the  remaining  squadrons,  closed  in  on  the  two  successfully 
caught,  capturing  along  with  them  the  cavalry  leader 
Marcus  Opimius.  The  rest  of  the  two  troops  were  either 
cut  to  pieces  in  the  melee  or  captured  and  brought  prisoners 
to  Domitius. 
39  Meanwhile,  as  already  related,  Caesar  had  recalled  all  the 
detachments  lately  holding  the  southern  coast-line,  excepting 


Activity  of  Pomp  elan  Fleet         ifj 

three  battalions  left  behind  at  Oricum  to  garrison  that  city.  April 
These  troops  he  now  further  entrusted  with  the  task  of 
guarding  his  small  fleet  of  warships  originally  brought  over 
with  the  expedition  from  Italy.  The  officer  selected  for 
this  twofold  duty  was  Manius  Acilius,  who  at  once  proceeded 
to  move  the  vessels  round  into  the  inner  harbour  behind  the 
town,  and  there  to  moor  them  against  the  shore.  He  next 
blocked  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  vdth  a  sunken  merchant- 
man, to  which  was  attached  a  second  and  similar  craft,  and 
upon  their  decks  erected  a  wooden  military  tower,  forming 
a  barrier  immediately  in  the  line  of  the  fairway.  This  tower 
was  given  a  full  complement  of  legionaries,  and  the  troops 
were  then  made  responsible  for  its  safe  defence  against  any 
surprise  by  sea.  Information  of  these  dispositions  duly  40 
reached  the  younger  Cnaeus  Pompeius,  the  admiral  com- 
manding the  Egyptian  squadron.  He  at  once  sailed  for 
Oricum,  and  after  first  removing  the  sunken  merchantman, 
by  hauling  on  her  with  a  series  of  tow-ropes,  he  proceeded  to 
attack  the  second,  oa^afwai^wiH^MMWlifts,  by  means  of  the 
concentrated  fire  of  a  number  of  his  own  vessels.  These 
had  been  specially  fitted  vwth  siege-towers,  raised  upon  deck 
to  a  level  that  gave  them  the  upper  hand  of  their  opponents  : 
hence,  by  constantly  bringing  up  fresh  reserves  to  the  relief 
of  his  exhausted  crews,  and  endeavouring  to  divide  the 
strength  of  the  defence  by  pressing  the  attack  against  the 
city  walls  at  all  other  points  practicable,  as  well  by  escalade  on 
land  as  by  bombardment  from  the  fleet  at  sea,  the  Pompeian 
admiral  at  length  broke  down  the  stubborn  resistance  of  the 
Caesarian  garrison.  Compelled  at  last  by  sheer  exhaustion 
and  the  torrent  of  spears  to  which  they  were  exposed  to  quit 
their  posts,  they  all  succeeded  in  escaping  by  the  boats,  leaving 


15-4        Activity  of  Pompeian  Fleet 

p.-May48  the  guard-ship  to  be  afterwards  captured  as  a  prize  by  the 
enemy.  At  the  moment  of  this  success  the  Pompeians  also 
established  a  footing  in  the  rear  of  the  defence,  on  the  natural 
breakwater  that  in  course  of  time  had  converted  the  town 
of  Oricum  into  a  peninsula.  This  advantage  they  utilized  to 
mount  upon  rollers  four  of  their  two-deckers  ^,  which  they 
then  drove  forward  by  means  of  levers  over  the  narrow  neck 
of  land  across  into  the  inner  harbour.  The  Caesarian  war- 
ships, which  lay  without  crews  tied  up  to  the  shore,  were 
thus  exposed  to  two  converging  attacks ;  and  the  enemy 
soon  succeeded  in  hauling  off  four  and  in  burning  the  re- 
mainder. With  this  successful  issue  to  his  raid,  the  younger 
Pompeius  transferred  Decimus  Laelius  from  the  Asiatic  fleet, 
leaving  him  to  continue  the  operations  against  the  town  ; 
and  under  his  supervision  a  strict  blockade  was  maintained 
against  all  attempts  to  provision  it  from  the  two  neighbour- 
ing cities  of  Byllis  and  Amantia. 

Pompeius  himself  went  north  to  Alessio,  where  he  attacked 
and  burned  inside  the  harbour  of  that  city  every  one  of  the 
thirty  transports  lately  left  there  by  Mark  Antony.  On 
endeavouring,  however,  to  storm  Alessio  itself,  he  was  met 
by  such  a  stout  resistance  from  the  Roman  citizens  settled 
in  the  district,  and  by  the  regular  troops  whom  Caesar  had 
previously  sent  down  as  a  garrison,  that  after  three  days  spent 
in  fruitless  attempts  at  assault,  in  the  course  of  which  he 
suffered  some  slight  casualties,  he  was  obliged  to-  vdthdraw 
his  squadron  with  his  object  unattained. 
4'  Meanwhile  Caesar  also  had  continued  his  operations.  With 
the  definite  intelligence  that  Pompeius  was  now  established 
at  Asparagium,  he  set  his  united  army  in  motion  for  the  same 
^  '  Biremes.* 


The  Pompeian  Position  turned      iss 

objective,  merely  breaking  his  march  to  storm  the  chief  town  Ap.-May4S 

of  the  Parthini,  then  in  the  hands  of  a  Pompeian  garrison. 

The  third  day  brought  him  face  to  face  with  Pompeius  ; 

upon  which  he  ordered  his  camp  to  be  made  in  close  proximity 

to  his  opponent,  and  on  the  morrow,  advancing  in  full  strength 

after  completing  his  dispositions  for  battle,  challenged  his 

rival  to  a  decisive  combat.     But  it  was  soon  evident  that 

Pompeius  was  not  to  be  enticed  from  his  fortified  lines,  and 

Caesar  had  again  to  fall  back  upon  camp,  clearly  recognizing 

that  some  alternative  plan  of  action  must  now  be  tried. 

The  next  day,  therefore,  vdth  the  whole  of  his  effective  forces 

he  commenced  a  wide  turning  movement  to  the  eastwards, 

along  a  difficult  and  narrow  road,  with  the  object  of  marching 

directly  upon  Durazzo.    Such  a  diversion,  it  was  hoped,  would 

either  force  Pompeius  northwards  upon  that  city,  or,  failing 

that,  sever  his  communications  with  it  ;  the  latter  alternative 

being  no  less  desirable  than  the  other  was  probable,  since 

Durazzo  was  by  far  the  most  important  food-depot  and  the 

principal  place  of  arms  in  the  hands  of  the  enemy.     Nor 

were  his  expectations  disappointed.     At  first  Pompeius  failed 

to  read  the  mind  of  his  rival ;  for,  on  seeing  the  Caesarian 

army  march  out  of  their  entrenchments  by  a  route  leading 

in   an  opposite  direction  to  the   northern  emporium,  he 

naturally  concluded  that  want  of  supplies  was  responsible 

for  this  enforced  departure.     Later  in  the  day  he  heard  the 

real  truth  from  his  scouts ;  and  the  next  morning,  breaking 

up  his  encampment,  he  started  in  pursuit,  in  the  hope  that 

the  shorter  route  would  allow  him  to  head  off  his  opponent  in 

time.     Caesar,  however,  who  had  foreseen  this  contingency, 

now  called  upon  his  troops  for  a  supreme  effort.     The  march 

was  barely  interrupted  throughout  the  night,  and  early  the 


1^6     Position  of  Pompeius  at  Petra 

p.-May48  next  morning  his  army  arrived  before  Durazzo  just  as  the 
vanguard  of  the  Pompeians  debouched  into  sight.  Caesar 
then  camped  on  his  new  position. 
42  Pompeius's  land  communications  vwth  Durazzo  {Dyrra- 
chium)  were  thus  severed  ;  and  finding  his  original  design  no 
longer  practicable,  he  fell  back  upon  the  next  best  alternative 
open  to  him,  and  on  the  heights  known  as  Petra,  a  site  within 
fairly  easy  reach  of  ships,  which  can  lie  there  under  the  lee  of 
the  wind  when  this  is  in  certain  quarters,  fresh  permanent 
fortifications  were  now  erected.  The  command  was  also  given 
for  a  portion  of  his  naval  force  to  concentrate  at  the  new 
station  ;  whilst  provisions  and  supplies  were  ordered  up  from 
Asia  Minor  and  other  countries  under  his  military  control. 

Such  measures  as  these  threatened  to  involve,  in  Caesar's 
judgement,  an  indefinite  prolongation  of  the  war.  Besides, 
he  already  regarded  as  hopeless  the  supplies  waiting  for  him 
across  the  water  in  Italy  ;  so  complete  a  blockade  was  main- 
tained along  the  entire  coast  by  the  Pompeians,  and  so  pro- 
tracted was  the  delay  of  his  own  war-fleets  built  by  his  orders 
during  the  late  Vianter  in  Sicily,  Gaul,  and  Italy.  The 
necessity  of  feeding  his  army  thus  forced  him  to  turn  to 
Epirus,  to  which  country  he  accordingly  dispatched  Quintus 
Tillius  and  Lucius  Canuleius,  the  latter  a  staff-officer,  on  a 
special  commission  for  that  purpose ;  while  to  deal  with  the 
difficulty  arising  from  the  excessive  distance  of  these  regions, 
a  series  of  large  granaries  was  established  at  fixed  points,  and 
a  regular  service  of  corn-transport  allotted  to  each  of  the  neigh- 
bouring communities.  Similar  orders  were  given  to  collect 
from  Alessio,  and  from  the  district  of  the  Parthini  and  all  the 
hill  villages,  all  the  corn  to  be  found  there.  This  proved 
a  mere  handful,  and  that  for  two  reasons  :  the  natural  quality 


Ci  Caesar's  Camp  during  Blockade.        Pi   Pompcy's   Camp  during  Blockade. 

C2  ..  "         after  ..  Pi  ..  ••  after 

M    Camp  of  Marcellinn.H.  P  G  Postern  Gate  of  Subsidiary  Camp. 


Caesar* s  Heroic  I^Ieasures  ly/ 

of  the  soil  is  unfavourable,  the  country  being  a  wild  mountain-  Spring  48 
ous  tract  relying  mostly  on  imported  grain  ;  and,  moreover, 
Pompeius  had  anticipated  this  movement  of  his  opponent, 
and,  treating  the  Parthini  during  the  last  few  days  as  legitimate 
booty,  had  ordered  all  cereals  to  be  collected  and  brought  into 
iJs  lines  at  Petra  under  an  escort  of  cavalry,  with  powers  to 
pillage  and  overturn  the  houses  of  the  inhabitants. 

Seeing  the  unpromising  outlook  of  affairs,  Caesar  evolved  43 
a  plan  of  operations  based  upon  the  actual  conditions  of  the 
ground.  The  position  held  by  Pompeius  was  encircled  by 
numerous  lofty  and  rugged  hills.  These  he  first  of  all  secured 
with  outpost  detachments,  which  at  once  proceeded  to  fortify 
on  each  a  strong  redoubt ;  and  then,  upon  their  completion, 
a  continuous  chain  of  earthworks  was  extended  along  the  lines 
of  least  natural  resistance,  thus  linking  up  fort  with  fort,  and 
the  circumvallation  of  Pompeius  was  begun.  A  triple  result 
was  anticipated  from  the  new  movement.  Weighing  well  the 
shortness  of  his  own  supplies  and  Pompeius's  overwhelming 
superiority  in  cavalry,  Caesar  confidently  expected  that  not 
only  would  convoys  of  food-stuffs  and  other  material  require- 
ments for  his  army  now  be  freer  to  approach  from  all  quarters 
with  less  danger  of  attack,  but  the  Pompeian  cavalry  would 
also  be  cut  off  from  provender  and  so  rendered  useless  as 
a  military  force  ;  and  finally,  he  argued,  a  severe  blow  would 
thus  be  dealt  to  his  opponent's  prestige,  a  matter  on  which  he 
notoriously  placed  most  reliance  in  his  intercourse  with  foreign 
states,  when  the  news  ran  round  the  civilized  world  that  the 
great  commander  was  blockaded  by  Caesar  and  dare  not  face 
a  pitched  battle.  And,  indeed,  Pompeius  now  found  himself  44 
in  a  serious  dilemma.  He  was  unwilling  to  draw  off  from 
the  sea  and  the  neighbourhood  of  Durazzo,  since  that  town 


iy8       Counter  Pleasures  of  Pompeius 

Spring  48  had  been  converted  into  an  emporium  for  all  his  war  material, 
including  arms,  accoutrements,  and  ordnance  ;  whilst  there 
was  also  the  further  objection  that  he  depended  entirely  on 
sea-borne  supplies  for  the  feeding  of  his  army.  On  the  other 
hand,  he  was  equally  powerless  to  prevent  the  completion  of 
Caesar's  blockading  lines,  except  by  consenting  to  a  general 
engagement ;  and  that  he  had  determined  was  not  at  the 
present  juncture  advisable.  His  sole  remaining  alternative 
was  one  which,  considered  as  a  military  measure,  amounted 
wellnigh  to  a  counsel  of  despair.  It  consisted  in  occupying 
all  the  hills  that  he  could  seize,  so  that  by  enclosing  in  a  ring 
of  fortified  posts  the  widest  possible  sweep  of  country,  he 
might  keep  the  Caesarian  forces  at  such  extreme  distance  as 
he  could  thus  command.  Nor  did  the  event  belie  his  expecta- 
tions. Twenty-four  outposts  were  soon  completed,  sufficient 
to  encircle  an  arc  some  fifteen  miles  in  extent  :  within  this 
space  his  army's  foraging  then  proceeded,  and,  as  the  area 
also  contained  within  itself  many  hand-sown  crops,  the  trans- 
port animals  could  for  the  present  at  any  rate  continue  to 
subsist. 

Meanwhile  the  two  armies  were  busily  entrenching  one 
against  the  other.  As  fast  as  the  Caesarians  pushed  their 
fortifications  in  an  unbroken  line  from  each  redoubt  on  to 
the  next,  in  order  to  prevent  the  Pompeians  from  breaking 
through  at  any  point  and  so  taking  them  in  the  rear  ;  the 
enemy  on  the  inner  circle  were  also  extending  a  parallel  chain 
of  works,  likevdse  intended  to  prevent  the  possibility  of  their 
own  line  being  pierced  and  themselves  surrounded  from 
behind.  But  in  this  contest  of  the  spade  it  was  soon  clear 
the  Pompeians  were  winning  ;  the  greater  number  of  their 
sappers,  and  the  shorter  arc  required  on  the  inner  side,  rendered 


Daily  Skirmishing  i  s  9 

such  a  result  inevitable.  Moreover,  whenever  it  became  Spring  48 
necessary  for  Caesar  to  occupy  new  positions  in  the  progress 
of  his  works,  Pompeius,  without  advancing  in  force  to  dispute 
them  by  a  regular  pitched  battle,  which  he  was  resolved  as 
yet  to  avoid,  would  nevertheless  select  his  own  ground,  and 
constantly  dispatch  against  us  bodies  of  archers  and  slingers 
(an  arm  in  which  he  was  exceptionally  strong),  and  by  this 
device  inflicted  severe  wounds  upon  our  men.  Indeed  so 
great  had  grown  the  dread  inspired  by  the  enemy's  arrows, 
that  very  nearly  all  the  Caesarians  had  made  themselves 
shirts  or  other  coverings,  of  felt,  or  quilted  padding,  or  hides, 
as  a  protection  against  these  missiles. 

In  establishing  themselves  at  the  various  outposts  desperate  45 
struggles  ensued  on  either  side.  While  Caesar  strove  to  hem 
in  Pompeius  within  the  narrowest  boundaries  possible,  it  was 
Pompeius's  main  object  to  occupy  as  many  hills  in  as  wide  a 
circuit  as  he  could  control.  Constant  minor  actions  were  thus 
fought  solely  from  this  reason,  notably  one  in  which  the  Ninth 
Caesarian  legion  was  engaged.  This  corps  had  just  seized 
a  certain  height  and  commenced  fortifying  it,  when  the 
Pompeians  took  possession  of  a  second  hill  in  close  proximity 
to  and  directly  confronting  the  other.  Between  the  two 
there  intervened  at  one  point  a  fairly  level  causeway  of  com- 
munication. Accordingly  Pompeius,  after  first  throwing  out 
flanking  bodies  of  archers  and  slingers,  pushed  forward  a  strong 
force  of  light  infantry,  and  then,  bringing  up  his  siege-guns, 
settled  down  to  hamper  the  construction  of  our  entrench- 
ments. It  was  thus  no  light  task  for  our  soldiers  at  the  same 
time  to  defend  their  position  and  also  continue  the  work  of 
fortification.  Seeing  his  men,  therefore,  continually  exposed 
to  wounds  from  all  sides,  Caesar  ordered  their  retreat,  and 


i6o  A  Critical  'Retirement 

Spring  48  the  evacuation  of  the  post.  The  retreat  led  down  an  incline, 
and  the  enemy,  emboldened  all  the  more  to  press  home  the 
attack,  determined  to  render  our  withdrawal  a  difficult  matter, 
convinced  as  they  were  that  panic  was  responsible  for  the 
abandonment  of  the  position.  It  was  during  this  incident 
that  Pompeius  is  credited  with  having  addressed  the  boastful 
remark  to  his  suite,  that  he  was  prepared  to  forfeit  aU  claim 
to  be  considered  a  general  of  experience,  if  the  Caesarian 
legions  should  succeed  in  extricating  themselves  from  the 
consequences  of  their  own  ill-considered  advance. 
46  Meanwhile  the  dangers  threatening  the  retreat  caused 
Caesar  considerable  disquiet.  The  order  was  given  to  move 
up  to  the  front  a  number  of  military  hurdles,  to  be  placed  in 
position  along  the  ridge  of  the  hill  in  line  of  the  attack  :  under 
cover  of  these  the  troops  were  then  commanded  to  dig 
a  moderately  wide  ditch  on  the  near  or  inner  side,  and  to 
render  the  whole  ground  as  impracticable  and  difficult  as 
possible.  In  addition,  Caesar  personally  posted  bodies  of 
slingers  at  various  strategic  points,  to  lend  further  assistance 
to  the  retreat ;  then,  with  his  precautions  completed,  he  gave 
the  order  for  the  legion  to  be  retired.  This  was  at  once  the 
signal  to  the  enemy  for  a  still  more  determined  and  exultant 
advance ;  and,  driving  our  men  before  them,  they  thrust 
aside  the  defences  formed  by  the  interposing  hurdles,  prepara- 
tory to  crossing  the  trenches.  Seeing  what  was  happening, 
and  fearing  the  movement  might  be  interpreted  as  not  so 
much  a  retreat  as  a  rout,  leading  to  a  still  graver  disaster  to 
his  arms,  Caesar  first  sent  his  men  a  word  of  encouragement 
through  Antonius,  the  officer  commanding  this  legion,  and 
then,  from  the  troops'  present  position  some  half-way  down 
the  hill,  ordered  his  trumpeter  to  sound  the  advance  for  a  com- 


Inflections  on  the  Situation  \6\ 

bined  charge  upon  the  enemy.  With  a  sudden  unanimous  Spring  48 
impulse,  the  men  of  the  Ninth  discharged  their  volley  of 
heavy  javelins  ;  then  breasting  the  hill  at  the  double,  from 
their  low^er  ground  they  drove  the  Pompeians  back  in  head- 
long flight,  and  compelled  them  to  turn  and  run.  Their  flight, 
however,  proved  no  easy  matter,  and  they  were  greatly  ham- 
pered by  the  opposing  hurdles  and  long  poles  that  blocked  the 
way,  and  no  less  by  the  complex  lines  of  intersecting  ditches. 
As  to  our  own  troops,  they  considered  their  object  fully 
attained  if  they  coidd  withdraw  without  serious  damage. 
Having,  therefore,  inflicted  severe  losses  upon  the  enemy,  at 
a  cost  to  themselves  of  only  five  casualties,  they  completed 
their  retirement  in  perfect  safety,  and  subsequently  occupying 
another  series  of  hills,  a  little  outside  the  previous  line,  finished 
off  the  work  of  circumvallation. 

Strange,  indeed,  and  altogether  unparalleled  in  military  47 
history  was  the  character  of  the  present  operations.  The 
great  number  of  the  redoubts,  the  wide  extent  of  country 
covered,  the  long  undulating  lines  of  entrenchment,  in 
a  word,  the  whole  nature  of  the  blockade,  all  doubtless 
contributed  to  such  a  result,  but  they  were  not  the  only 
causes.  Other  generals  have  before  now  endeavoured  to 
blockade  an  opponent ;  but  it  has  always  been  as  the  sequel 
to  an  attack  upon  a  broken  and  stricken  enemy,  either  suffering 
under  some  defeat  in  battle,  or  demoralized  by  some  other 
piece  of  misfortune.  As  a  further  contrast,  the  side  which 
has  thus  invested  the  other  could  invariably  count  a  superiority 
both  in  infantry  and  mounted  troops,  and  their  object  has 
usually  been  the  interruption  of  the  enemy's  supplies.  Yet 
here  was  Caesar  endeavouring  with  an  army  numerically 
iaferior  to  encircle  an  opponent  whose  strength  was  as  yet 

LONG  M 


J  62    Indomitable  Spirit  of  the  Caesarian s 

spring  48  unimpaired  either  by  material  or  moral  disaster,  and  who 
possessed  in  addition  an  abundance  of  all  military  stores. 
Every  day  ships  were  arriving  from  every  quarter  of  the 
Empire,  expressly  chartered  to  carry  supplies ;  and  the  wind 
could  not  blow  from  any  point  of  the  compass  without  some 
of  their  number  having  a  fair  run  for  their  voyage.  In 
marked  opposition  to  aU  this,  Caesar  had  already  eaten  up 
every  vestige  of  corn  that  the  length  and  breadth  of  the 
country  could  provide,  and  was  now  in  most  desperate  straits. 
Yet  his  men  set  themselves  to  endure  their  privations  with 
exemplary  fortitude.  They  were  cheered  by  the  recollection 
of  their  similar  hardships  a  year  ago  in  Spain,  when  their 
long-suffering  efforts  were  rewarded  by  the  successful  termina- 
tion of  a  great  war :  they  remembered  likewise  the  slender 
nature  of  their  rations  before  Alesia,  rations  which  were  still 
further  reduced  at  Avaricum  ^,  and  yet  from  both  these 
critical  positions  they  had  emerged  victorious  over  the  most 
powerful  combinations  of  tribes.  They  were  not  the  men 
therefore  to  reject  either  the  barley  or  the  pulse  which  was  now 
served  out  to  them ;  while  as  to  animal  food,  of  which  there 
was  plenty  in  Epirus,  they  regarded  it  as  a  positive  luxury. 
48  A  lucky  discovery  was  also  made  by  those  who  had  lately  been 
responsible  for  the  vegetable  supplies  ^  of  the  army,  who 
now  found  a  species  of  wild  root  called  Chara.  This,  when 
mixed  with  milk,  did  much  to  alleviate  the  distress  :  it  was 
made  up  like  bread,  and  there  was  no  lack  of  its  supply. 
Indeed,  in  some  of  the  informal  conversations  which  passed 
between  the  private  soldiers  of  the  hostile  camps,  in  which 

'  Two  critical  positions  in  the  Gallic  wars,  52. 

"^  I  conjecture  'ab  oleribus'  for  the  unintelligible  'a  Valeribus '  of  the 
MSS.     Cf.  Plin.  iV.ZT.  19.  21. 


Sufferings  of  both  Armies  163 

the  Pompeians  taunted  our  men  with  their  starved  condition,  Early 
the  latter's  usual  answer  was  to  toss  these  loaves  across  at 
their  opponents  as  the  best  way  of   dashing  their  rising 
hopes,  ^ 

But  now  the  corn  crops  were  beginning  to  ripen,  and  mere  49  ; 
hope  was  enough  to  sustain  the  empty  stomachs  of  the  troops 
with  its  assurance  of  rapidly  approaching  plenty.  Alike  on 
picket  duty  and  in  the  quiet  talk  amongst  comrades,  constant 
expressions  of  the  dominant  temper  of  the  men  were  heard, 
that  they  would  sooner  live  on  the  bark  of  trees  than  allow 
Pompeius  to  slip  from  their  grasp.  Much  satisfaction  was 
also  caused  by  the  reports  brought  in  by  deserters,  who  de- 
clared that  though  the  troop-horses  were  still  kept  alive  all 
other  transport  animals  had  perished.  They  added  that  the 
army  itself  enjoyed  but  indifferent  health.  Not  only  were 
they  cooped  up  in  the  narrowest  of  quarters,  exposed  to  the 
foul  stench  of  hundreds  of  putrifying  bodies,  but  they  were 
quite  unfit  for  the  continual  fatigue  duty  now  required 
of  them,  and,  worst  of  all,  they  suffered  acutely  from  scarcity 
of  water.  This  last  hardship  was  due  to  the  direct  action  of 
Caesar  himself,  who  had  either  diverted  or  else  dammed  with 
solid  obstructions  every  river  or  rivulet  whose  course  led  down 
to  the  sea.  For  the  district  being  a  mountainous  one,  and 
the  valleys  converging  so  narrowly  as  to  form  as  it  were 
natural  conduits,  it  was  easy  to  block  such  channels  by  cross- 
rows  of  piles  let  into  the  ground,  which,  when  strengthened 
by  artificial  mounds,  effectually  held  up  the  water.  In 
consequence,  the  Pompeians  were  compelled  of  sheer  necessity 

*  Pompeius,  on  seeing  these  loaves,  is  said  to  have  ordered  their  instant 
removal  through  fear  of  their  effect  on  his  own  men.     '  We  have  to  do 
with  wild  beasts '  was  his  shuddering  comment.     Suet.  68. 
M  2 


1(^4      Responsibility  in  a  Subordinate 

^arly  to  search  along  the  lower  ground  where  it  was  swampy,  and 

ummer  4  ^^  ^j^  wells  there,  thus  adding  one  more  task  to  their  daily 
round  of  labours.  And  yet,  even  when  found,  such  sources 
of  water  had  the  marked  disadvantage  of  being  a  considerable 
distance  from  some  of  the  outposts,  and,  further,  they  qmckly 
dried  up  under  the  sultry  heat  of  summer.  On  the  other 
hand,  Caesar's  army  enjoyed  not  only  perfect  health  but 
a  water  supply  that  was  practically  unlimited  ;  whilst,  with 
the  sole  exception  of  wheat,  there  were  stores  in  abundance 
of  every  description  ;  and  even  in  this  particular,  the  soldiers 
of  Pompeius  had  the  mortification  of  daily  seeing  a  better 
time  coming  for  their  adversaries,  and  their  hopes  rising  under 
the  prospect  of  the  ripening  corn. 
6°  So  unexampled  a  type  of  warfare  naturally  called  forth 
equally  curious  stratagems  on  either  side.  For  example,  the 
Pompeians,  having  noticed  from  the  camp-fires  that  our 
regiments  lay  out  at  night  on  their  entrenchments,  would 
steal  out  silently  to  the  attack,  and,  after  discharging  a  volley 
of  arrows  into  our  crowded  lines,  would  swiftly  rejoin  their 
main  body.  To  remedy  this  annoyance,  our  people  learnt 
by  experience  to  light  their  fires  in  one  place  (and  to  pass  the 
night  in  another).^ 

51  Meanwhile  intelligence  of  the  critical  position  of  the  bat- 
talion reached  Publius  Sulla,  the  officer  left  in  command  of 
the  camp  by  Caesar  when  marching  out  to  the  attack.  He 
at  once  went  to  the  rescue  with  a  force  of  two  legions,  his 
arrival  causing  the  easy  repulse  of  the  Pompeians.     Without 

^  Conjectural.  A  considerable  gap  here  in  the  MSS.  probably  contained 
Caesar's  unsuccessful  attempt  on  Durazzo  and  Pompeius's  counter-attack  on 
Caesar's  lines,  the  narrative  of  which  is  now  continued. 


Responsibility  in  a  Subordinate      i6^ 

waiting  to  face  the  Caesarian  infantry  or  to  stand  their  charge,  Early 
the  main  body  turned  their  backs  and  abandoned  their   "'"'"^^  4 

position  as  soon  as  ever  the  leading  companies  were  driven  in. 
In  the  midst  of  the  pursuit,  and  to  stay  our  further  advance, 
Sulla  ordered  the  recall.  Yet  there  is  a  strong  consensus 
of  opinion  that,  had  he  only  allowed  the  pursuit  to  be  pressed 
home  with  greater  vigour,  that  day  might  have  seen  the 
termination  of  the  war. 

Such  criticism  on  that  officer's  judgement  can  scarcely 
be  maintained.  The  functions  of  a  subordinate  are  not 
those  of  a  commander-in-chief.  The  actions  of  the  one 
should  in  all  points  be  regulated  by  his  instructions  :  the 
other  is  free  to  embrace  in  the  scope  of  his  plans  the  entire 
military  situation.  In  this  particular  instance,  SuUa  had 
been  deputed  by  Caesar  to  hold  the  camp  in  his  own  absence. 
Having,  therefore,  effected  the  relief  of  his  companions-in- 
arms, he  was  content  to  rest  upon  that  achievement :  he  was 
not  prepared  to  take  the  further  responsibility  of  fighting 
a  general  engagement  with  the  enemy  (which  after  all,  he 
felt,  might  easily  involve  some  disaster),  lest  his  conduct 
should  be  interpreted  as  trenching  on  the  province  of  his 
commander.  His  appearance  on  the  scene  of  action,  however, 
brought  considerable  difficulties  to  the  retreating  Pompeians. 
Their  original  advance  had  been  upwards  from  a  lower  level, 
and  they  had  subsequently  occupied  the  crest  of  the  hill.  By 
withdrawing,  therefore,  down  the  slope,  they  were  menaced 
with  a  pursuit  that  had  all  the  advantages  of  position  on  its 
side ;  moreover,  only  a  brief  interval  of  dayhght  remained 
before  sundown,  since  the  hope  of  reaching  a  definite  decision 
had  made  them  carry  the  affair  well  on  towards  night.  The 
force  of  circumstances  thus  impelled  Pompeius,  by  a  plan 


1 66  Heavy  Fitting 

Early  improvised  at  the  moment,  to  seize  a  neighbouring  height 

ummer  4     j^^^  ^^^  ^£  range  of  artillery  fire  from  our  redoubt ;  where 

after  establishing  himself  and  throwing  up  entrenchments, 

he  proceeded  to  concentrate  the  whole  of  his  effective  forces. 

52  At  the  same  time  fighting  also  took  place  in  two  other  parts 
of  the  field,  since  Pompeius  had  supported  his  main  attack 
by  subsidiary  movements  against  a  number  of  our  redoubts, 
with  the  object  of  dividing  the  defence  and  so  preventing 
the  dispatch  of  reinforcements  from  the  neighbouring  out- 
posts. Thus  at  one  point  Volcatius  Tullus  successfully  with- 
stood the  assault  of  an  entire  legion  of  Pompeians,  and,  taking 
the  offensive,  actually  drove  it  from  its  ground  ;  at  another, 
the  German  auxiliaries  sallied  out  from  our  lines,  and  after 
accounting  for  a  considerable  number  of  the  enemy,  safely 

53  effected  their  retirement  back  to  their  supports.  On  this 
day,  therefore,  six  distinct  engagements  were  fought,  viz. 
three  outside  Durazzo  and  three  up  at  the  trenches.  Upon 
our  investigating  the  total  casualties  for  the  day,  it  was  found 
that  of  the  Pompeians  no  fewer  than  2,000  had  fallen — mostly 
reservists  and  centurions — included  in  the  number  being 
Valerius  Flaccus,  son  of  Lucius  Flaccus,  sometime  governor 
of  the  Province  of  Asia  Minor.  Of  regimental  and  company 
colours  six  altogether  were  brought  in.  On  our  side  the  killed 
amounted  to  no  more  than  twenty  in  all  six  battles,  though, 
on  the  other  hand,  of  the  men  inside  the  redoubt  not  one 
escaped  unwounded,  and  of  the  company  officers  ^  belonging 
to  this  one  battalion  four  out  of  the  six  had  lost  their  eyes. 
When  the  garrison  wanted  to  adduce  evidence  of  the  desperate 
nature  of  their  struggle,  they  collected  the  arrows  which 
had  been  shot  into  the  fort  and  counted  out  before  Caesar 

'  Centurions. 


The  Position  7w altered  167 

some  30,000 ;  and,  on  the  shield  of  the  centurion  Scaeva  Early 
being  brought  up  for  inspection,  it  was  found  pierced  with 
a  hundred-and-twenty  separate  holes.  As  some  reward  for 
this  man's  gallant  services  both  to  himself  and  the  country  he 
so  well  represented,  Caesar  first  presented  him  with  a  purse  of 
;^r,500,  and  then  publicly  announced  his  promotion  from  the 
eighth  to  the  first  battalion  of  the  legion,  and  to  the  senior 
company  in  that ;  it  being  common  testimony  that  the  suc- 
cessful defence  of  the  redoubt  had  been  largely  owing  to  his 
splendid  exertions.  The  whole  battalion  subsequently  re- 
ceived double  pay  and  rations,  and  was  also  richly  rewarded 
by  Caesar  with  gifts  of  new  uniform  and  various  decorations 
for  distinguished  conduct  in  the  field. 

Meanwhile  Pompeius  had  employed  the  night  in  naaking  54 
large  additions  to  his  defences ;  on  the  following  days  these 
were  strengthened  by  a  series  of  military  towers,  and  when 
the  works  had  been  carried  to  a  height  of  fifteen  feet,  this 
face  of  the  camp  was  screened  by  a  number  of  portable 
shelters  ;  five  days  after  that  another  moderately  cloudy 
night  again  lent  him  its  friendly  assistance.  Orders  were 
at  once  given  to  barricade  all  the  camp  gates,  which  were 
then  left  as  a  check  to  pursuit ;  and  in  the  early  hours  of 
the  morning  the  Pompeian  forces  silently  evacuated  the 
hill  and  fell  back  upon  their  old  entrenchments.  Upon 
the  next  and  upon  each  succeeding  day  Caesar  marched  out  55 
with  his  army  to  form  up  for  action  where  the  ground  was 
level,  in  hopes  that  he  might  find  Pompeius  ready  to  give 
decisive  battle.  In  executing  this  movement  he  so  disposed 
his  legions  that  they  were  virtually  commanded  by  the 
Pompeian  camp,  his  front  line  being  so  close  to  the  enemy's 
rampart  that  it  only  just  cleared  the  range  of  hand-missiles 


id8   Movement  against  the  Peloponnese 

Summer  48  and  artillery.  To  disregard  so  direct  a  challenge  was  ob- 
viously impossible  if  Pompeius  was  to  retain  his  military 
reputation  and  prestige.  The  Pompeian  army  was  therefore 
drawn  up  outside  its  entrenchments,  but  in  such  a  formation 
that  its  rearmost  line  actually  abutted  on  the  breastworks, 
while  the  whole  of  the  force  thus  embattled  could  be  effec- 
tually covered  by  the  fire  from  its  own  ramparts. 

56  The  success  gained  by  Cassius  Longinus  and  Calvisius 
Sabinus  in  securing  the  adhesion  of  Livadia  (Jetolia),  and 
the  country  round  the  Gulf  of  Arta  (Acarnania  and  Amfhilo- 
chia),  by  the  steps  already  indicated,'  nowled  Caesar  to  believe 
that  the  time  was  ripe  for  a  similar  movement  with  regard  to 
Greece  proper  (Jchaea),  which  would  carry  the  range  of  his 
arms  over  a  somewhat  wider  area.  Quintus  Fufius  Calenus 
was  accordingly  sent  into  that  country,  and  Sabinus  and 
Cassius,  with  the  forces  under  them,  were  subordinated  to 
his  command.  Rutilius  Lupus  was  at  this  time  acting  as 
governor  of  Greece,  in  virtue  of  his  appointment  by  Pom- 
peius ;  and  he,  on  receiving  intelligence  of  the  advance  of 
the  three  Caesarian  generals,  at  once  took  measures  for  the 
fortification  of  the  Isthmus,  so  as  to  form  some  barrier  be- 
tween Fufius  and  the  Peloponnese.  Calenus  meanwhile  took 
over  the  submission  voluntarily  tendered  by  the  local  authori- 
ties, of  Delphi,  Thebes,  and  Orchomenus  ;  other  cities  were 
taken  by  storm,  and  for  the  remainder,  active  steps  were 
inaugurated  for  winning  them  over  to  the  Caesarian  interest 
through  special  missions  dispatched  for  that  purpose.  These 
and  similar  duties  served  to  engross  the  attention  of  Fufius. 

57  Whilst  the  above  events  were  passing  in  Greece  {Achaea) 

^  The  Caesarian   officers  were  able  to  raise  a  body  of  Aetolian  and 
Acarnanian  auxiliaries  who  fought  at  Pharsalus.     App.  2.  70. 


Last  Efforts  for  Peace  1 6<^ 

and  the  neighbourhood  of  Durazzo,  as  soon  as  the  news  of  Summer  48 
Scipio's  arrival  in  Macedonia  was  fully  confirmed,  Caesar, 
loath  to  abandon  his  traditional  policy,  directed  Aulus  Clodius 
to  proceed  on  an  embassy  to  the  camp  of  the  new  commander. 
Clodius  had  the  advantage  of  being  a  common  friend  to  both 
parties,  as  he  had  originally  been  introduced  by  Scipio  to  the 
notice  of  Caesar,  who  had  since  made  it  a  special  point  to 
treat  him  as  one  of  his  own  intimates.  Caesar  now  entrusted 
him  with  a  letter  addressed  to  Scipio,  supplementing  it  by 
verbal  instructions  of  which  the  foUovvdng  formed  a  summary. 
'  In  spite  of  all  his  efforts  in  the  direction  of  peace,  nothing 
tangible  had  yet  been  effected,  chiefly  owing,  as  he  was  dis- 
posed to  think,  to  the  supineness  of  those  whom  he  had  chosen 
as  his  intermediaries,  who  shrank  from  the  task  of  conveying 
his  terms  to  Pompeius  at  a  time  when  they  would  be  un- 
acceptable. Scipio,  on  the  other  hand,  possessed  an  authority 
with  his  chief  that  not  only  enabled  him  to  speak  his  mind 
freely  on  all  subjects,  but  to  a  large  extent  gave  him  also  the 
right  of  criticism  and  of  rectifying  the  blunders  of  his  col- 
league ;  moreover,  he  held  an  independent  command  in  the 
field,  and  was  thus  able  to  back  his  authority  by  a  military  force 
that  could  compel  obedience.  If  he  were  now  to  take  this 
step,  he  would  win  from  the  world  the  unanimous  tribute 
of  being  the  one  man  who  had  given  rest  to  a  distracted 
Italy  and  peace  to  the  provinces,  and  in  so  doing  saved  the 
Empire  from  disruption.' 

These  instructions  Clodius  duly  carried  to  Scipio,  and  for 
the  first  few  days  apparently  met  with  a  favourable  hearing ; 
later  on  he  was  not  admitted  to  further  conference,  the 
reason  being,  as  we  afterwards  discovered  on  conclusion  of 
the  war,  that  Scipio  had  been  roundly  taken  to  task  for  his 


1 70  Last  Efforts  for  Peace 

Summer  48  weakness  by  Favonius.     The  negotiations  thus  proved  abor- 
tive, and  Clodius  had  no  alternative  but  to  return  to  Caesar. 


CHAPTER  IV 

The  Forcing  of  the  Blockade 

'  It  w^as  essential  to  Caesar's  plan  that  the  Pompeian  cavalry 
should  be  closely  confined  in  Durazzo,  and  not  allowed  any 
opportunity  of  procuring  forage.  Accordingly  he  proceeded 
to  draw  across  the  two  approaches  to  the  town  which,  as 
already  stated ',  were  not  wide,  strong  lines  of  entrenched 
works  supported  by  redoubts.  This  new  movement  quickly 
convinced  Pompeius  that  no  serious  diversion  could  be 
expected  from  his  horse ;  and  after  a  few  days  it  was  put  on 
board  ship  and  brought  back  within  his  permanent  lines. 

The  want  of  fodder  continued  to  make  itself  acutely  felt : 
so  hard  pressed  indeed  were  they,  that  the  horses  had  to  be 
fed  on  leaves  torn  from  the  trees,  varied  by  a  mash  made 
from  the  succulent  roots  of  reeds ;  for  as  for  the  young  corn 
which  they  had  found  already  sown  within  their  lines, 
that  had  all  long  been  eaten  up.  Thus  they  were  obliged 
to  import  fodder  from  Corfu  and  Arta  {Acarnania),  a  course 
involving  a  long  sea-voyage,  and  even  then  the  supply  was  so 
scanty  that  it  had  to  be  eked  out  with  barley  in  order  to  keep 
the  animals  alive.  At  last  there  came  a  time  when  every 
locality  had  alike  been  stripped  of  barley,  fodder,  and  all 
other  vegetation  whatever,  and  when  even  the  foliage  from 
the  trees  began  to  run  out ;  and  when  this  point  of  destitution 

*  Probably  in  the  lost  section. 


Dorvnfall  of  two  brilliant  Cavalry  Leaders   171 

was  reached,  Pompeius,  with  his  cavalry  mounts  reduced  to  Summer  48 
skeletons  and  rendered  totally  unfit  for  active  service,  at 
length  decided  that  some  attempt  must  be  made  towards 
forcing  the  blockade. 

Now  there  were  serving  with  Caesar  on  the  roll  of  the  59 
cavalry  two  brother  Allobroges,  Roucillus  and  Egus,  sons  of 
Adbucillus,  for  many  years  the  paramount  chief  of  his  tribe, 
two  men  whose  services  to  Caesar  all  through  the  Gallic  wars 
had  been  marked  no  less  by  gallantry  than  efficiency.  In 
return  for  this  loyal  support  Caesar  had  appointed  them  to 
the  highest  magistracies  in  their  own  country,  had  contrived 
their  election  to  the  tribal  Senate  without  passing  through 
the  usual  grades,  had  given  them  not  only  lands  captured 
from  the  enemy  during  the  war  but  also  large  sums  of  ready 
money,  and  in  a  word,  had  raised  them  from  poverty  to 
affluence.  Their  personal  courage  had  not  only  won  them  a 
warm  place  in  Caesar's  own  regard,but  with  the  army  in  general 
they  were  also  great  favourites.  Unfortunately  they  allowed 
their  friendship  with  Caesar  to  foster  a  pride  that  was  as  foolish 
as  it  is  characteristic  of  subject  races,  and  from  despising  their 
Gallic  companions-in-arms,  they  came  to  cheating  them  of  their 
pay,  and  even  went  so  far  as  to  appropriate  the  whole  share 
of  the  plunder  that  should  have  fallen  to  their  men.  Exas- 
perated by  such  injustice,  the  troopers  in  a  body  waited  upon 
Caesar,  and  loudly  complained  of  their  leaders'  fraud  ;  adding 
to  their  other  charges  the  further  accusation  that  false  returns 
were  habitually  made  of  the  cavalry's  strength,  in  order  that 
the  brothers  might  pocket  the  extra  pay. 

Caesar,  considering  present  circumstances  to  be  unfavourable  60 
for  the  visitation  of  punishment,  and  ready  to  forgive  much 
to  a  gallant  soldier,  decided  to  postpone  the  whole  inquiry : 


172   Downfall  of  two  brilliant  Cavalry  Leaders 

Summer  48  nevertheless,  he  privately  censured  the  tvs^o  chieftains  for 
making  money  out  of  their  troop,  and  after  a  reminder  that 
there  was  no  limit  to  the  power  of  his  friendship,  advised  them 
to  gauge  his  future  kindness  to  themselves  on  the  basis  of  that 
already  experienced  at  his  hands.  In  spite  of  this  secrecy, 
the  affair  caused  a  popular  outburst  of  bitter  and  contemptu- 
ous feeling  towards  the  two  brothers,  the  reality  of  which  was 
brought  home  to  their  notice,  as  much  by  their  own  inward 
self-condemnation  and  accusing  voice  of  conscience,  as  by 
the  open  taunts  levelled  at  them  from  outside.  Deeply 
resenting  their  humiliation,  and,  it  may  be,  convinced  in 
their  own  minds  that  instead  of  being  given  their  acquittal 
they  were  only  reserved  for  future  punishment,  they  deter- 
mined to  sever  their  connexion  with  us  and  our  party,  and 
to  seek  their  fortunes  in  another  camp,  and  make  new 
friendships  there.  Having,  therefore,  communicated  their 
design  to  a  few  intimate  dependants,  whom  they  dared  trust 
with  so  desperate  a  venture,  they  first  of  all  endeavoured 
to  murder  the  cavalry  brigadier,  Caius  Volusenus  (a  fact  only 
discovered  afterwards  at  the  close  of  the  war),  as  some  earnest 
of  sincerity  in  their  treacherous  desertion  to  Pompeius ;  and 
when  the  difficulties  of  this  project  proved  insurmountable 
and  no  opportunity  presented  itself  of  carrying  it  into  efiect, 
they  proceeded  to  borrow  all  the  ready  money  they  could, 
under  the  appearance  of  desiring  to  do  satisfaction  to  their 
fellow  countrymen  and  restore  their  fraudulent  gains,  and 
then,  buying  up  a  large  batch  of  horses,  they  went  over  to 
Pompeius,  followed  by  those  who  were  privy  to  the  plot. 
61  Arrived  in  Pompeius's  camp,  they  were  received  in  a  manner 
befitting  their  own  exalted  rank  and  liberal  education.  Pom- 
peius indeed  could  not  but  take  into  account  the  fact  that 


Caesar^ s  'Military  Secrets  betrayed    17 1 

a  considerable  retinue  had  accompanied  their  arrival,  and  Summer  48 
that  numerous  remounts  had  been  also  added  to  his  army. 
The  men  were  of  acknowledged  gallantry,  who,  until  recently, 
had  been  held  in  high  reputation  by  Caesar ;  and  the  very 
unexpectedness  of  their  present  exploit  was  itself  some  justi- 
fication for  Pompeius's  action. 

In  consideration  of  all  this,  the  two  chiefs  were  conducted 
in  person  by  Pompeius  on  a  tour  of  inspection  round  his  lines, 
where  every  detail  was  pointed  out  to  them.  For  till  now 
not  a  single  foot  soldier  or  cavalryman  had  gone  over  from 
Caesar  to  his  rival,  though  the  desertions  from  Pompeius's 
camp  were  of  almost  daily  occurrence;  whilst  the  troops 
which  had  been  raised  in  Epirus  and  Livadia  (Aetolia)  and 
in  all  the  regions  now  under  the  military  control  of  Caesar 
commonly  went  over  en  masse.  Now,  however,  deserters  had 
arrived  who  knew  every  secret  of  the  enemy  :  the  unfinished 
portions  of  his  siege  lines,  the  additional  touches  of  strength 
desired  at  certain  places  by  the  engineering  experts,  the 
regular  routine  of  duties  amongst  the  besiegers,  the  distances 
between  point  and  point,  the  varying  degrees  of  watchfulness 
among  the  different  pickets  according  to  the  natural  tempera- 
ment or  zeal  of  the  respective  officers  in  charge — all  this  they 
had  seen  and  noted,  and  no  less  a  gift  than  this  they  now 
imparted  to  Pompeius. 

That  commander  first  made  himself  thoroughly  master  of  63 
their  detailed  information,  and  then,  having  already,  as  men- 
tioned above,  formed  the  design  of  a  sortie,  issued  orders  to 
his  troops  to  make  wicker  coverings  for  their  helmets,  and 
to  provide  themselves  with  a  quantity  of  entrenching 
soil.  These  preparations  completed,  at  nightfall  a  strong 
body  of  light  infantry  and  archers  was  embarked  on  board 


174        Night  Attack  of  Pompeians 

Summer  48  dinghies  and  galley-oared  transports,  and  shortly  after  mid- 
night a  force  of  sixty  battalions  drawn  from  both  the  main 
camp  and  the  strongest  outposts,  was  put  under  motion 
for  that  section  of  the  circumvallating  lines  which  abutted 
on  the  sea  and  which  was  furthest  removed  from  Caesar's 
own  head  quarters.  The  same  rendezvous  was  given  to 
the  fleet  of  vessels  which  had  been  loaded,  as  described,  with 
their  freight  of  earth  and  light  infantrymen,  and  at  the  same 
time  the  Pompeian  battleships  were  brought  round  from 
Durazzo.  After  this  each  officer  was  carefully  instructed  as 
to  his  own  share  in  the  forthcoming  operations. 

At  this  particular  corner  of  the  works  Caesar  had  the  Ninth 
legion  in  position,  under  command  of  his  paymaster  Lentulus 
Marcellinus ;  though  owing  to  that  officer's  indifferent  state 
of  health  Fulvius  Postumus  had  been  attached  as  his  second 
in  command.  The  works  at  this  point  were  of  the  following 
63  design.  First  came  a  ditch  fifteen  feet  wide  ;  this  was  sur- 
mounted by  a  palisaded  rampart  ten  feet  high,  facing  the 
enemy,  and  backed  by  an  equal  depth  of  solid  earth  :  then 
200  yards  in  the  rear  rose  a  second  and  similar  rampart,  though 
of  somewhat  slighter  proportions,  and  this  time  fronting 
outwards  or  in  an  opposite  direction  to  the  first.  The 
reason  for  this  double  line  was  the  apprehension  disturbing 
Caesar's  mind  during  the  last  few  days  that  his  position  might 
here  be  turned  by  an  approach  from  sea  ;  and  he  therefore 
had  to  devise  some  means  of  defence  in  the  event  of  his  being 
exposed  to  a  simultaneous  assault  from  north  and  south. 
Unfortunately  there  had  not  been  time  to  complete  the 
scheme  :  the  general  scale  of  the  works  undertaken  had  been 
too  vast,  and  the  labour  required  for  the  seventeen  miles  cir- 
cuit of  entrenchments  too  incessant :  consequently  the  cross- 


The  Caesartans  surprised  17  5" 

rampart  which  was  to  connect  the  two  main  lines,  and  had  Summer  4S 
its  front  to  the  sea,  was  not  yet  finished  off.  This  fact  was 
well  known  to  Pompeius  through  the  information  brought  by 
the  two  treacherous  Allobroges,  and  now  became  the  cause 
of  a  considerable  disaster  to  our  arms.  For  soon  after  detach- 
ments of  the  Ninth  had  taken  up  their  bivouac  for  the  night 
in  close  proximity  to  the  sea,  the  Pompeians  were  suddenly 
seen  advancing  in  the  grey  light  of  early  dawn.  Their 
attack  quickly  developed  itself  from  both  sides.  While  the 
troops  who  had  come  by  boat  were  pouring  in  a  hot  fire  of 
missiles  upon  the  outer  or  southern  rampart,  under  cover 
of  which  the  ditches  were  rapidly  filled  up  with  the  earth 
brought  for  that  purpose,  the  infantry  of  the  legions  were 
bringing  up  scaling  ladders  and  creating  no  small  confusion 
among  the  defenders  on  the  inner  stockade  by  volleys  of 
artillery  shot  and  hand-spears  of  all  descriptions  ;  whilst,  to 
crovni  the  disorder,  swarms  of  archers  were  deploying  in 
support  of  each  of  the  two  attacking  bodies.  What  rendered 
matters  worse  was  that  our  men  had  nothing  to  reply  with 
excepting  stones  from  their  slings,  and  against  such  blows  the 
enemy  were  largely  protected  by  the  wicker  coverings  pre- 
viously fitted  to  their  helmets.  In  the  midst  of  this  fierce 
onslaught,  when  resistance  was  already  a  desperate  matter,  the 
fatal  discovery  was  made  of  the  flaw  in  the  fortifications  already 
mentioned  :  troops  were  rapidly  landed  from  the  sea  in  boats 
at  a  point  between  the  two  parallel  ramps  where  the  works 
were  stiU  unfinished,  and,  taking  our  men  in  the  rear,  drove 
them  from  both  lines  and  compelled  them  to  turn  and  run. 

As  soon  as  information  of  this  raid  reached  Marcellinus,  64 
that  ofiicer  at  once  pushed  up  fresh  battalions  from  camp  to 
the  support  of  his  hard-pressed  detachment.    The  sight  of 


17  6  The  Caesarians  surprised 

Summer  48  their  comrades  in  full  flight,  however,  was  too  much  for  his 
reserves ;  they  could  neither  stay  the  stampede  by  their  own 
arrival  on  the  scene,  nor  did  they  attempt  to  stand  against 
the  onset  of  the  enemy.  As  fast  as  the  relieving  columns 
followed  one  another,  each  and  all  caught  the  infection  of 
panic  from  the  fugitives,  and  thereby  only  added  to  the 
general  confusion  and  critical  position  of  the  entire  force, 
since  the  retreat  threatened  to  become  blocked  though  the 
heavy  congestion  of  men. 

While  the  battle  was  at  its  height  the  standard-bearer  of  the 
legion's  eagle  was  mortally  wounded  ;  but  just  as  his  strength 
was  failing  the  man  caught  sight  of  our  passing  cavalry. 
'  Take  this ',  said  he,  '  which  for  many  a  year  I  have  jealously 
guarded  whilst  living,  and  now  that  I'm  dying  hand  back  to 
Caesar  with  the  self-same  devotion :  see  to  it,  I  charge  you, 
that  no  negligence  of  yours  bring  about  a  military  disgrace 
which  was  never  yet  known  in  the  army  of  Caesar,  but  carry 
the  standard  back  safe  into  his  hands.'  By  this  fortunate  inci- 
dent the  regimental  colours  were  saved  from  capture,  after 
the  first  battalion  had  lost  every  one  of  its  company  com- 
manders except  the  third  in  order  of  rank. 
65  Meanwhile  the  victorious  Pompeians  were  marching  on  the 
camp  of  Marcellinus,  dealing  out  as  they  advanced  heavy 
slaughter  through  our  ranks.  Their  approach  raised  no  little 
panic  among  the  remaining  battalions  of  the  Ninth,  until 
Marcus  Antonius,  who  held  the  neighbouring  command  in  the 
line  of  redoubts,  and  who  had  been  informed  of  the  perilous 
nature  of  the  position,  was  seen  to  be  descending,  with  the 
hills  behind  him,  at  the  head  of  a  strong  relieving  column  of 
twelve  battalions.  His  arrival  on  the  field  of  action  effectu- 
ally checked  the  advancing  enemy,  and  at  the  same  time  lent 


The  Blockade  forced  177 

sufficient  steadiness  to  the  remaining  troops  to  recover  from  Summer  48 
their  recent  state  of  abject  terror.  Very  soon  afterwards 
Caesar  himself  arrived  on  the  scene,  accompanied  by  a  few 
battalions,  which  he  had  rapidly  drafted  from  the  various 
outposts,  on  seeing  the  signal  of  rising  smoke  passed  on  from 
fort  to  fort,  in  accordance  with  the  established  custom  of  the 
preceding  days.  Realizing  at  once  the  extent  of  the  disaster 
and  perceiving  that  Pompeius  had  succeeded  in  forcing  his 
way  outside  the  lines  of  circumvallation,  in  such  a  manner 
that  his  foraging  could  be  freely  conducted  along  the  seaboard 
whilst  he  still  maintained  communication  with  his  ships, 
Caesar  decided  on  a  total  revolution  in  the  conduct  of  the 
war  ;  and,  his  original  plan  having  now  miscarried,  he  gave 
orders  to  entrench  a  camp  close  up  to  the  enemy's  new 
position. 

The  work  of  fortification  was  just  completed  when  his  66 
scouts  discovered  a  large  body  of  men,  representing  perhaps 
the  strength  of  a  legion,  hidden  behind  a  neighbouring  wood, 
on  their  march  to  what  was  known  as  the  old  camp.  The 
situation  of  this  camp  was  as  follows.  It  had  originally 
formed  the  head  quarters  of  the  Ninth  legion,  at  the  time 
when  that  regiment  was  ordered  to  stem  the  advance 
of  the  Pompeians  in  this  quarter,  preparatory  to  walling 
them  round  in  the  manner  previously  described ;  it  rested 
upon  a  wood  on  one  side,  and  was  not  more  than  500  yards 
from  the  sea.  Subsequently,  certain  reasons  had  produced 
a  modification  of  plan,  and  Caesar  had  withdrawn  this  corps 
a  little  further  inland.  After  a  few  days'  interval,  the  camp 
had  been  occupied  by  Pompeius  himself  ;  and  as  he  intended 
to  post  more  than  one  legion  at  this  particular  point,  the  inner 
walls  were  left  standing  and  the  main  circuit  greatly  increased, 


178  An  Attempt  at  'Retrieval 

Summer  48  the  effect  being  to  convert  the  smaller  camp  thus  contained 
by  the  larger  into  a  kind  of  fortified  citadel  to  the  other. 
A  further  change  introduced  was  to  run  a  breastwork  from 
the  left-hand  corner  of  the  extended  lines  down  to  the  river 
bank,  in  order  that  the  troops  might  water  with  more  freedom 
and  without  fear  of  molestation  from  the  enemy.  But  Pom- 
peius  too  had  changed  his  plans,  for  reasons  unnecessary  here 
to  particularize,  and  had  evacuated  the  position ;  thus  the 
camp  had  existed  for  a  considerable  number  of  days,  and  all 
its  fortifications  were  still  intact/ 
67  This  was  the  site  towards  which  our  scouts  now  reported 
the  Pompeian  legion  to  have  headed,  and  the  same  move- 
ment was  also  observed  from  some  of  our  higher  redoubts, 
which  at  once  confirmed  the  news.  Now  the  place  was 
distant  from  Pompeius's  new  camp  about  800  yards.  Caesar 
thereupon  conceived  the  hope  of  successfully  crushing  this 
isolated  regiment ;  and  being  anxious  to  repair  the  day's 
disaster,  ordered  two  of  his  battalions  to  remain  on  the  earth- 
work and  keep  up  the  appearance  of  entrenching,  whilst  with 
the  other  thirty-three,  among  which  were  those  of  the  bat- 
tered Ninth  with  its  heavy  death-roll  of  officers '''  and  sorely 
attenuated  ranks,  he  marched  out  with  all  the  secrecy  possible, 
in  double  column  formation  and  by  a  route  pointing  directly 
away  from  his  objective,  towards  the  detached  body  of 
Pompeians  and  this  lesser  camp  of  theirs.  Nor  was  his  judge- 
ment found  to  be  at  fault.  Arriving  safely  at  his  destination 
before  Pompeius  could  become  aware  of  his  departure,  he 
quickly  turned  his  left  wing,  where  he  himself  was  posted, 
against  the  enemy,  and,  in  spite  of  the  formidable  nature  of 
the  defences,  drove  him  from  the  rampart.  The  camp  gates 
*  See  plan.  *  Centurions. 


At  first  successful  179 

proved  to  be  blocked  by  chevaux  de  frise,  which  slightly  Summer  48 

delayed  our  advance ;  and  a  sharp  struggle  ensued  between 

the  impetuous  efforts  of  our  men  to  rush  the  obstacles  and 

the  stubborn  resistance  of  the  garrison  ;  conspicuous  amongst 

whom  was  Titus  Puleio,  who  has  been  previously  mentioned 

as  responsible  for  the  treacherous  surrender  of  the  army  under 

Caius  Antonius,  and  who  now  fought  most  gallantly  from 

his  place  in  the  ranks.     Our  men,  however,  quickly  asserted 

their  superiority,  and  having  hewn  away  the  intervening 

barrier,  burst  first  of  all  into  the  larger  or  outer  camp,  and 

from  thence  into  the  inner  fortress  contained  in  it,  whither 

the  defeated  legion  had  retired,  and  where  several  were  now 

cut  down  while  still  maintaining  their  resistance. 

But,  alas,  there  is  a  power  which,  mighty  though  it  be  in  68 
other  spheres,  is  mightiest  of  all  in  war,  working  most  momen- 
tous changes  by  means  of  incidents  most  trivial — we  mean 
the  power  of  Fortune :  as  was  now  to  be  exemplified.  For 
the  units  composing  the  right  Caesarian  wing,  in  their  igno- 
rance of  the  ground,  followed  the  course  of  the  outlying 
breastwork,  which  ran,  as  already  indicated,  from  the  camp 
to  the  river  side,  searching  for  its  gate  and  believing  it  to 
form  the  rampart  to  the  main  camp.  On  discovering  their 
mistake,  however,  and  finding  it  to  be  connected  directly  vwth 
the  stream,  they  tore  down  the  defences  and  passed  through 
vdthout  opposition,  being  followed  by  the  whole  body  of 
mounted  troops. 

In  the  meanwhile,  after  this  sufficiently  serious  delay,  69 
news  of  the  attack  reached  the  ears  of  Pompeius.  He 
at  once  recalled  five  of  his  legions  from  their  work  on 
his  new  entrenchments,  and  advanced  at  their  head  to 
the  relief  of  his  beleaguered  detachment ;  and  while  his 
N  2 


i8o      The  Attempt  ends  in  Disaster 

Summer  48  cavalry  bore  down  upon  our  troopers,  our  infantry  on  the 
rampart  of  the  newly-conquered  camp  discovered  to  their 
amazement  a  line  of  legionaries  in  full  battle  formation.     In 
a  moment  the  situation  was  completely  altered.    The  isolated 
legion  of  Pompeians,  rallying  under  the  prospect  of  immediate 
relief,  endeavoured  to  make  a  stand  at  the  postern  gate,  and 
even  delivered  a  counter-attack  upon  our  troops :  Caesar's 
horse,  at  that  moment  engaged  in  scaling  the  outer  breast- 
work through  the  narrow  breaches,  grew  alarmed  for  the 
safety  of  its  retreat,  and  gave  the  signal  for  general  flight ; 
whereupon  the  right  wing,  which  had  by  this  time  lost  touch 
with  its  left,  seeing  the  panic  pervading  the  mounted  troops, 
and  anxious  to  save  itself  from  being  crushed  on  the  inner 
side  of  the  earthwork,  drew  back  again  through  the  breaches 
which  they  had  just  made  in  it.    There  the  greater  part 
of  them,  afraid  of  being  caught  in  the  narrow  gangways, 
hurled  themselves  over  into  the  trenches  of  a  rampart  fully 
tea   feet  high ;  the  first  of  them  were  trampled  to  death, 
but  the  rest  passed  out  into  safety  over  the  dead  bodies  of 
their  comrades.     Similarly  on  the  left  wing,  as  soon  as  the 
Caesarians  saw  from  their  station  on  the  rampart  that  the 
Pompeian  army  was  upon  them,  and  their  own  second  division 
in  headlong  flight,  a  dread  arose  of  finding  themselves  com- 
pletely trapped  in  the  narrow  interval,  now  that  they  had  an 
enemy  both  inside  and  outside  the  rampart ;  and  they  began 
looking  to  their  own  safety  by  retracing  the  steps  of  their 
previous  advance.    Everywhere  alike  was  confusion  and  panic- 
stricken  flight,  so  utterly  uncontrolled  that  when  Caesar 
snatched  at  the  standards  of  some  of  the  fugitives  and  ordered 
the  men  to  halt,  some  let  go  their  horses  and  joined  in  the 
stampede  on  foot,  while  others  were  so  beside  themselves  with 


The  Fortune  of  War  i  8  i 

terror  as  to  let  even  the  standards  go,  and  not  a  single  man  Summer  48 
could  be  induced  to  stand  his  ground. 

Disastrous  as  the  situation  was,  there  were  still  some  70 
redeeming  circumstances, withoutwhich  thetotal  annihilation 
of  the  army  must  inevitably  have  followed.  Foremost  among 
these  was  Pompeius's  fear  of  ambush,  due  in  all  probability 
to  his  astonishment  at  the  turn  events  had  taken,  after  he  had 
just  seen  his  own  men  chased  out  of  their  entrenchments ; 
an  astonishment  which  now  rendered  him  for  some  time 
nervous  about  approaching  the  outer  works :  and  another 
advantage  was  that,  the  camp  gates  being  narrow  and  firmly 
held  by  Caesar's  troops,  the  pursuit  of  the  cavalry  was  thereby 
considerably  delayed.  Thus  it  happened  that  the  same  cir- 
cumstance, trivial  in  itself,  produced  two  quite  dissimilar 
trains  of  consequences,  each  of  them  far-reaching  in  its  effects. 
It  was  the  breastwork  leading  from  camp  to  the  river  that, 
at  the  moment  when  the  Pompeian  lines  had  been  carried, 
intervened  between  Caesar  and  a  victory  as  good  as  won: 
it  was  the  same  obstacle  which  now,  by  retarding  the  enemy's 
pursuit,  proved  in  turn  the  salvation  of  our  force. ^ 

These  two  battles  on  this  one  day  cost  Caesar  altogether  71 
960  of  the  rank  and  file,  besides  the  distinguished  Roman 
knights  Tuticanus  Gallus,  son  of  a  Roman  senator,  Caius 
Fleginas  of  Piacenza  {Placentia),  Aulus  Granius  of  Pozzuoli 
{Puteoli),  and  Marcus  Sacrativer  of  Capua,  as  well  as  thirty- 
two  regimental  and  company  officers.  A  large  proportion, 
however,  of  these  met  their  death  either  by  suffocation  in 
the  trenches,  or  at  the  narrow  gaps  in  the  earthworks,  or  down 

'  Caesar  is  said  to  have  remarked  that,  had  the  enemy  possessed  a 
general  who  knew  how  to  conquer,  that  day  would  have  ended  the  war. 
Suet.  36  ;  Appian,  B.  C.  2.  62. 


1 8  2  Reflections  on   the  Defeat 

Summer  48  by  the  river  banks,  without  the  infliction  of  any  sort  of 
wound,  and  merely  through  the  terrorized  flight  of  their  own 
comrades.  Of  military  standards  thirty-two  in  all  were  lost. 
As  a  result  of  the  day's  fighting  Pompeius  was  formally 
acclaimed  '  Commander '  by  his  troops,  a  name  which  he 
retained,  and  subsequently  allowed  himself  to  be  addressed 
by,  although  he  rarely  used  the  title  at  the  head  of  his  official 
dispatches,  and  never  wore  the  usual  laurel  wreath  on  the 
staves  of  his  military  attendants.^  In  marked  contrast  to  this 
moderation  was  the  conduct  of  Labienus.  Having  induced 
his  chief  to  order  the  transfer  of  the  prisoners  to  his  own 
charge,  he  first  had  them  marched  on  to  the  parade 
ground,  presumably  for  the  sake  of  display  and  to  strengthen 
people's  faith  in  a  traitor,  and  then  addressing  them  as  fellow 
soldiers,  and  asking  in  terms  of  studied  insult  whether  veteran 
troops  were  in  the  habit  of  running  away,  butchered  the  whole 
body  in  cold  blood  before  the  eyes  of  the  assembled  army. 
72  These  successes  evoked  such  overweening  confidence  in  the 
camp  of  the  Pompeians,  that,  disdaining  all  further  thought 
for  the  conduct  of  the  war,  they  regarded  the  campaign 
as  already  won.  They  did  not  pause  to  consider  the  weakness 
of  our  own  force,  or  the  adverse  conditions  and  cramped 
dimensions  of  the  late  battle-field,  due  to  the  enemy's  previous 
possession  of  the  camp ;  so  that,  face  which  way  we  would,  we 
had  to  meet  a  double  menace  both  from  within  and  without 
the  rampart.  They  failed  to  take  account  of  the  circum- 
stance that  our  army  had  been  cut  into  two  halves,  neither 
of  which  could  help  the  other  ;  nor  did  they  make  the  further 
reflection  that  the  action  had  not  been  the  result  of  a  fair 
charge  in  open  fight,  but  that  our  self-inflicted  losses  from  the 
^  i.  e.  on  the  axes  of  his  lictors. 


Caesar  addresses  his  Defeated  Troops    183 

overcrowding  and  want  of  room  had  been  even  heavier  than  Summer  48 
those  inflicted  by  the  enemy.  Finally,  they  forgot  to  allow 
for  the  ordinary  vicissitudes  of  war,  and  for  the  numerous 
occasions  on  which  the  most  trivial  incidents  have  been  the 
cause  of  the  gravest  disasters — for  example,  an  ill-grounded 
suspicion,  a  sudden  panic,  or  a  superstitious  scruple — and  the 
frequency  with  which  an  army  in  the  field  has  come  to  grief 
through  either  an  inefficient  general  or  a  careless  subordinate. 
All  this  they  now  ignored,  and  acting  as  though  they  had  won 
solely  on  their  merits,  and  no  further  change  of  fortune  were 
possible,  they  began,  both  by  word  of  mouth  and  written 
dispatch,  to  fill  the  entire  world  with  a  chorus  of  jubilation 
over  the  victory  this  day  had  brought  them. 

Meanwhile  the  position  of  Caesar,  after  the  overthrow  of  73 
his  earlier  designs,  rendered  it  advisable  in  his  judgement 
to  make  a  complete  revolution  in  his  conduct  of  the  war. 
He  first  withdrew  at  one  stroke  every  one  of  the  garrisons 
in  his  chain  of  redoubts,  and  definitely  abandoned  the 
blockade.  He  then  called  up  the  whole  force  and 
pubUcly  harangued  the  men,  urging  them  not  to  take 
too  much  to  heart  their  recent  misfortunes  or  be  alarmed 
at  what  had  occurred,  but  pointing  out  the  unreason- 
ableness of  setting  against  their  long  line  of  victories  in 
the  past  a  single  reverse  which  was  after  all  an  insignifi- 
cant one.  *  On  the  contrary,  they  owed  much  thanks  to 
Fortune.  Italy  had  been  won  by  them  without  a  scratch  ; 
the  two  Spains  with  their  teeming  population  of  fighting 
races,  led  by  generals  of  the  highest  skill  and  military  expe- 
rience, had  been  reduced  to  peace  and  order ;  the  home 
provinces,  on  whose  corn  they  depended,  had  been  brought 
under  effective  occupation  ;  while  to  crown  the  series  of 


184  A  J\etreat  Imperative 

Summer  48  successes,  there  was  the  astonishing  piece  of  good  fortune 
which  enabled  them  all  to  cross  the  water  in  perfect  safety 
through  the  very  centre  of  the  enemy's  fleets,  who  swarmed 
alike  before  the  harbours  and  along  the  open  coastline.  If 
their  run  of  luck  had  not  proved  absolutely  unbroken,  they 
must  remember  that  heaven  helps  those  who  help  them- 
selves. As  far  as  he  personally  was  concerned  in  their  late 
disaster,  he  was  the  last  man  who  could  be  justly  held  respon- 
sible. He  had  provided  a  fair  field  for  the  encounter  ;  the 
enemy's  camp  had  been  captured,  the  enemy  himself  turned 
out  of  his  entrenchments,  and  all  opposition  overcome.  What- 
ever it  was  that  had  then  stepped  in  to  snatch  victory  from 
his  grasp — ^whether  some  unsteadiness  of  their  own,  some- 
body's blunder,  or  even  the  fickleness  of  Fortune — at  the  very 
moment  when  victory  lay  assured  in  their  hands  ;  at  all 
events  every  man  must  now  earnestly  strive  to  atone  for  that 
regrettable  incident  by  his  own  good  conduct  in  the  future. 
That  would  convert  their  defeat  into  a  blessing,  as  had  once 
before  been  the  case  at  Gergovia  * ;  and  they  who  had  lately 
shrank  from  a  conflict  would  become  the  first  to  throw  down 
the  challenge.' 
74  At  the  close  of  this  speech  a  sentence  of  public  disgrace  was 
passed  upon  certain  of  the  standard-bearers,  who  were  forth- 
with relieved  of  their  position  of  trust.  Through  the  army 
generally  such  burning  indignation  arose  at  the  thought  of 
their  late  discomfiture,  and  so  fierce  a  longing  to  retrieve  the 
tarnished  reputation  of  their  arms,  that  without  waiting  for 
the  word  of  command  from  battalion  or  company  officers,  the 
men  of  their  own  accord  even  added  to  their  ordinary  duties 
by  way  of  punishment ;  and  such  a  burning  desire  to  meet  the 
■*  52,  just  before  the  great  victory  of  Alesia. 


Pursuit  by  Pompeius  185- 

enemj  pervaded  all  ranks,  that  even  higher-grade  officers  were  Sumnier  4S 
found  seriously  persuading  themselves  that  they  ought  to  hold 
on  to  their  present  position  and  risk  the  chances  of  a  general 
engagement. 

Against  all  such  views,  Caesar  felt  the  danger  of  trusting 
troops  which  had  so  recently  yielded  to  panic,  and  thought 
it  wiser  to  allow  them  time  sufficient  to  recover  their 
confidence :  moreover,  with  the  raising  of  the  blockade, 
the  question  of  his  supplies  had  become  acute.  No  75 
time  was  therefore  lost  beyond  what  was  required  for 
attending  to  the  sick  and  wounded,  and  at  nightfall  the 
baggage-trains  of  the  army  were  all  quietly  got  under  motion 
and  dispatched  on  the  road  to  ApoUonia,  with  strict  orders  to 
make  no  halt  whatever  before  completing  their  full  day's  march. 
They  were  accompanied  by  an  escort  of  one  legion.  These 
preliminaries  satisfactorily  disposed  of,  at  about  three  o'clock 
in  the  morning  two  other  legions  were  told  off  to  remain  in 
camp,  while  the  rest  of  the  force  moved  out  by  a  number  of 
separate  gates,  and  were  likewise  dispatched  on  the  same 
journey.  Last  of  all,  after  another  brief  interval,  in  order  that 
military  tradition  might  be  maintained  and  yet  his  own  de- 
parture be  disclosed  at  the  latest  possible  moment,  Caesar  gave 
the  word  for  the  march  to  be  openly  sounded ;  and  his  rearguard 
turning  out  at  once,  quickly  overhauled  the  preceding  column, 
and  was  soon  out  of  sight  of  their  old  entrenchments. 

Equally  little  delay  in  the  pursuit  was  observed  by  Pompeius 
when  once  he  had  divined  his  adversary's  purpose  ;  but  acting 
on  the  lines  that  Caesar  had  foreseen,  viz.  to  seize  the 
opportunity  of  catching  his  enemy  in  the  general  panic 
which  must  follow,  he  conceived,  on  the  disorganization  of 
the  march,  he  drew  out  his  army  from  camp,  and  at  once 


i8<J         Outwitted  by  his  Adversary 

Summer  48  detached  his  cavalry  to  harass  the  retreat  of  the  rearguard. 
This,  however,  they  failed  to  overtake,  since  Caesar,  by  march- 
ing light,  had  gained  a  long  start  of  his  pursuers.  But  on 
reaching  the  river  Schkumbi  (Genusus),  the  awkward  banks  of 
this  stream  gave  time  for  the  Pompeian  horsemen  to  come  up, 
and  an  endeavour  was  made  to  delay  the  rearmost  divisions  by 
forcing  an  engagement.  Against  this  attack  Caesar  opposed 
his  own  cavalry,  interspersing  through  the  squadrons  a  body 
of  400  front  rank  legionaries  lightly  equipped  ;  and  so  well 
did  these  perform  in  the  ensuing  cavalry  action,  that  they 
totally  routed  the  Pompeians,  and  after  killing  a  large  number, 
rejoined  the  column  without  any  loss  to  themselves.^ 
j-6  The  army  of  Caesar  had  now  completed  a  fuU  day's  march, 
in  accordance  with  his  pre-arranged  plan,  and  after  safely 
making  the  passage  of  the  Schkumbi  (Genusus),  took  up  its 
quarters  in  its  old  lines  fronting  Asparagium.  The  infantry 
of  the  legions  were  confined  strictly  to  camp  ;  the  cavalry 
were  first  sent  out  to  give  the  impression  of  foraging,  and  then 
ordered  to  return  with  all  speed  by  the  rearmost  gate  that 
was  out  of  sight  of  the  enemy.  Meanwhile  Pompeius  had 
also  completed  a  full  day's  march,  and  he  too  from  similar 
motives  decided  to  occupy  his  old  position  at  Asparagium. 
The  fortifications  of  this  were  still  intact,  and  the  troops, 
being  thus  relieved  from  their  ordinary  duty  of  entrenchment, 
began  straying  some  distance  from  camp,  partly  after  firewood, 

'  Here  probably  occurred  the  incident  recorded  by  Polyaenus  (viii.  13). 
At  one  point  of  the  retreat  Caesar  had  a  swamp  on  his  left,  the  sea  on 
his  right,  and  the  enemy  on  his  rear.  The  Pompeian  fleet  was  also 
'  shelling '  his  troops  with  missiles  of  all  kinds,  when  he  hit  on  the  simple 
device  of  ordering  them  to  transfer  their  shields  from  the  left  to  the  right 
side. 


Nerv  Plans  of  Campaign  187 

partly  in  quest  of  fodder,  whilst  others  were  seen  leaving  Summe-  48 
the  rampart  in  the  direction  of  their  late  camping-ground. 
The  explanation  of  this  last  circumstance  was  that  the  decision 
to  march  having  been  taken  hastily,  a  large  proportion  of  the 
army's  baggage  and  soldiers'  kits  had  been  left  behind  ;  and 
it  was  to  recover  this  lost  property  that  the  troops,  tempted 
by  the  nearness  of  the  camp  they  had  just  evacuated,  now 
strayed  off  from  the  trenches,  after  first  discarding  their  arms 
and  depositing  them  in  their  tents.  As  soon  as  they  had  thus 
incapacitated  themselves  for  pursuit,  Caesar,  who  had  fore- 
seen this  very  result,  gave  the  signal  for  departure,  it  being  then 
about  midday  ;  and  his  army,  moving  out  of  camp  once  more 
for  a  second  march  on  the  same  day,  proceeded  to  cover  an 
additional  eight  miles  from  that  spot ;  it  being  impossible 
for  Pompeius  to  do  the  same  on  account  of  the  straying  of  his 
troops. 

The  next  day  the  same  order  was  observed,  and  with  the  77 
first  fall  of  night  the  transport  was  again  sent  on  in  advance, 
to  be  followed  about  3  a.m.  by  the  main  force  under  the 
personal  direction  of  Caesar,  who  thus  made  sure  that,  if 
compelled  to  fight,  he  should  be  in  a  position  to  meet  the 
sudden  emergency  with  his  army  free  of  encumbrances. 
Throughout  the  following  days  the  same  dispositions  were 
repeated  ;  and  as  a  result  of  these  precautions  the  retreat 
was  conducted  without  hitch  or  accident  of  any  kind,  in  spite 
of  having  to  traverse  rivers  of  great  depth  and  country 
exceptionally  difficult.  For  Pompeius  never  recovered  the 
time  lost  on  the  first  day.  Strive  as  he  would  to  accelerate  by 
forced  marches  the  pace  of  his  army,  in  his  eagerness  to  over- 
take those  ahead  of  him,  his  efforts  were  all  in  vain  ;  on  the 
fourth  day  he  abandoned  the  pursuit,  and  recognized  the 


1 8  8     Both  Armies  move  rapidly  West 

78  necessity  of  some  alternative  plan  of  action.  As  for  Caesar, 
'  '™'"^''  4  various  reasons  had  concurred  in  forcing  him  to  touch  at 
Apollonia,  There  were  the  wounded  to  be  provided  for, 
the  army  to  be  paid,  the  local  communities  to  be  reassured, 
garrisons  to  be  stationed  in  the  principal  towiis.  The  time 
allotted  to  these  matters,  however,  was  no  more  than  the 
urgency  of  his  situation  made  necessary :  all  his  thoughts  were 
riveted  on  Domitius,  and  the  risk  he  ran  of  being  caught  by 
the  Pompeian  advance  before  he  himself  could  get  up  with 
him  ;  and  he  was  now  pressing  towards  that  officer  with  all  the 
speed  which  deep  concern  for  his  peril  could  elicit. 

Considered  in  its  general  bearings,  the  scheme  of  operations 
which  it  was  his  purpose  to  develop  rested  on  the  follow- 
ing calculations.  If  Pompeius  were  making  for  the  same 
point  as  himself,  then  he  would  be  drawing  his  enemy  away 
from  the  sea  and  from  all  the  reserve  supplies  accumulated 
by  him  at  Durazzo  :  Pompeius  could  then  be  forced  to  fight 
out  the  issue  on  equal  terms,  deprived  of  the  support  of  his 
food  stocks  and  other  miHtary  stores.  Supposing,  on  the 
other  hand,  Pompeius  decided  to  cross  into  Italy,^  it  would 
then  be  easy  for  himself  to  effect  a  junction  with  Domitius, 
and  to  march  his  army  round  the  head  of  the  Adriatic  to  the 
relief  of  that  country.  Finally,  if  his  opponent  attempted  to 
lay  siege  to  Apollonia  and  Oricum,  with  the  object  of  cutting 
all  Caesar's  communications  with  the  coast,  he  would  find 
himself  confronted  with  the  blockade  of  Scipio  and  the  impera- 
tive necessity  of  going  to  the  relief   of  his  isolated  force. 

^  Afranius  erpecially  urged  Pompeius  to  turn  the  tables  on  Caesar  by  first 
recovering  the  West  and  then  leading  it  against  the  East,  meanwhile  holding 
Caesar  in  check  with  the  fleet.  It  was  the  isolation  of  Scipio's  force  and 
his  own  fear  of  losing  caste  with  the  Orient  that  turned  the  scale  the  other 
way,     Appian,  2.  65. 


Both  Armies  move  rapidly  West     189 

Reasoning  on  these  lines  he  forthwith  dispatched  couriers  in  Summer 
advance  to  Cnaeus  Domitius,  with  written  instructions  indi- 
cating the  course  of  action  that  officer  was  to  pursue ;  and 
after  establishing  garrisons  at  ApoUonia,  Alessio  (Lissus),  and 
Oricum  of  four,  one,  and  three  battalions  respectively,  and 
after  carefully  housing  his  wounded,  he  started  on  his  march 
through  Epirus  and  the  region  of  Athamania.^ 

During  this  same  time  Pompeius  was  hastening  towards  the 
same  goal.  Conjectural  interpretation  of  Caesar's  motives 
pointed  to  a  rapid  movement  towards  Scipio  as  the  soundest 
strategy  of  the  moment.  Should  Caesar  and  himself  take  the 
same  line,  he  could  then  reinforce  his  lieutenant ;  or,  if  he 
proved  unwilling  to  quit  the  seaboard  and  the  neighbourhood 
of  Oricum,  through  continued  hopes  of  fresh  legions  and 
cavalry  from  Italy,  the  way  would  thus  be  open  to  himself  to  fall 
uponDomitiuswiththewholeof  his  effective  strength.  Speed,  79 
therefore,  was  now  the  first  consideration  on  both  sides  ;  each 
had  the  twofold  object  of  rescuing  their  friends  and  of  seizing 
the  rare  opportunity  offered  by  the  present  conjunction  of 
events  for  crushing  an  opponent.  But  whereas  Caesar  was  going 
out  of  his  way  in  touching  at  ApoUonia,  Pompeius  had  a  clear 
road  before  him  into  Macedonia  through  the  Candavian  tract  "^ ; 
and  a  further  complication  had  now  arisen  from  an  altogether 
unforeseen  event.  Thiswas  the  position  of  Domitius,  who,  after 
lying  encamped  for  several  days  cheek  by  jowl  with  Scipio, 
had  been  compelled  by  want  of  supplies  to  vacate  his  watch 
upon  that  general,  and  to  retire  in  the  direction  of  Heraclia  ' ; 

^  Following  the  course  of  the  Voyussa  [Aous)  and  entering  Thessaly  by 
the  Metsovo  Pass — still  the  high  road  to  Constanlinople. 

'  The  great  military  road  {Via  Egnatia). 

'  On  the  Via  Egnatia,  distant,  according  to  the  ancient  Itineraries,  some 
seventy  miles  from  the  stage  marked  'In  Candavia '. 


ipo  Caesar  unites  his  Forces 

Summer  48  and  as  that  town  lies  at  the  foot  of  the  Candavian  hill  country, 
it  seemed  as  though  Fortune  herself  were  conspiring  to  throw 
him  across  the  path  of  Pompeius.  At  present  this  was  un- 
known to  Caesar,  although  a  fresh  difficulty  was  already 
threatening  him.  The  origin  of  this  was  the  device  of  Pom- 
peius in  publishing  through  aU  the  provinces  and  native  states 
exaggerated  and  glowing  accounts  of  the  late  battle  before 
Durazzo,  accounts  that  were  wholly  unwarranted  by  the 
actual  facts ;  the  result  of  which  was  to  propagate  a  widespread 
rumour  that  Caesar  had  been  beaten,  and  was  now  in  headlong 
flight  with  the  virtual  loss  of  all  his  army.  In  consequence, 
the  roads  had  been  rendered  exceedingly  hostile,,  and  some  of 
the  local  townships  actually  contemplated  desertion  from  the 
Caesarian  cause;  and  though  numerous  messengers  were  dis- 
patched by  various  routes  from  Caesar  to  Domitius  and  from 
Domitius  to  Caesar,,  they  all  alike  found  it  impossible  to  get 
through.  Fortunately  the  cavalry  scouts  of  Domitius  were 
sighted  on  the  march  by  the  party  of  Allobroges — those 
friends  of  Roucillus  and  Egus  whose  treachery  we  have  already 
recorded  :  and  either  through  the  force  of  old  associations 
(they  having  served  together  in  the  Gallic  wars),  or  else 
through  swollen  vanity,  these  men  now  gave  their  former 
comrades  a  full  and  correct  account  of  what  had  really  taken 
place,  and  particularly  of  Caesar's  departure  from  before 
Durazzo  and  the  simultaneous  advance  of  Pompeius.  This 
information  was  at  once  reported  to  Domitius ;  and  though 
he  had  barely  four  hours'  start,  yet,  thanks  to  his  friend  the 
enemy,  he  succeeded  in  escaping  his  danger,  and  at  the  town 
of  Kalambaka  (Jeginium),  which  lies  directly  across  the  ap- 
proach into  Thessaly,  met  Caesar  in  full  career  towards  him. 
80      The  junction  of  the  two  Caesarian  armies  thus  safely 


Effects  of  J^cent  Events  191 

eflFected,  the  advance  was  continued  to  Palaea  Episkopi  Summer  4S 
(Gompht),  the  first  town  of  Thessaly  as  you  enter  from 
Epirus.  This  people  had  a  few  months  earlier  in  the  war, 
and  quite  unsolicited,  sent  envoys  to  Caesar,  putting  all  their 
resources  at  his  free  disposal,  and  asking  only  for  a  garrison  to 
be  sent  down  to  them.  Unluckily  the  garbled  version  of  the 
battle  at  Durazzo,  noticed  above,  had  had  time  to  reach  the 
city,  and  had  greatly  magnified  the  importance  of  that  event. 
The  effect  was  soon  apparent.  Androsthenes,  the  chief  native 
magistrate  of  Thessaly,  preferring  to  range  himself  on  the 
side  of  a  victorious  Pompeius  rather  than  share  the  mis- 
fortunes of  a  Caesar,  required  the  entire  rural  population, 
slave  no  less  than  free,  to  withdraw  inside  the  town,  and  then 
closed  the  gates  against  all  comers.  At  the  same  time  he  sent 
off  urgent  messages  for  help  to  Scipio  and  Pompeius,  inform- 
ing them  that  he  had  full  confidence  in  the  strength  of  the 
town  defences  if  quickly  relieved,  but  that  he  could  not 
endure  any  protracted  siege.  At  this  particular  moment  in  the 
course  of  events  Scipio  had  just  heard  of  the  break-up  of 
the  armies  round  Durazzo,  and  in  consequence  had  marched 
his  legions  to  Larissa,  while  Pompeius  was  still  some  distance 
from  the  Thessalian  border.  Caesar,  therefore,  after  first 
fortifying  a  camp,  ordered  the  construction  of  scaling-ladders 
and  battery-sheds,  and  the  preparation  of  defensive  hurdles. 
Then,  as  soon  as  these  were  ready,  he  appealed  to  his  troops, 
pointing  out  to  them  how  much  it  would  conduce  to  the 
relief  of  their  general  state  of  want,  if  they  could  gain  posses- 
sion of  a  well-stocked  and  wealthy  town,  and  by  the  example 
they  made  of  it  strike  terror  into  the  counsels  of  other 
communities :  above  all,  if  they  did  this  at  once,  before 
the  reinforcements  from  outside  had  time  to  concentrate. 


192  A  Stern  Example 

Summer  48  The  men  answered  by  an  extraordinary  display  of  enthusiasm, 
and  accordingly  the  assault  of  the  town  was  taken  in  hand  on 
the  same  day  as  their  arrival  before  it ;  and  though  the  walls 
were  of  great  height  and  it  was  already  past  four  in  the  after- 
noon, yet  by  sundown  the  place  had  been  carried  and  given 
over  as  plunder  to  the  troops.^  Without  further  delay  the 
camp  was  then  moved  from  the  neighbourhood  of  the  town, 
and  the  army  continued  its  march  to  Metropolis^,  outstrip- 
ping the  tidings  and  even  the  rumour  of  the  captured  city. 

81  At  first  the  Metropolitans  were  inclined  to  adopt  the  policy 
of  their  neighbours,  influenced  as  they  were  by  the  same  idle 
stories :  a  little  later,  however,  on  learning  the  fate  that  had 
overtaken  the  Gomphians  from  the  lips  of  the  prisoners 
purposely  sent  up  to  the  wall  by  Caesar,  they  threw  open 
their  city  gates.  They  were  treated  with  the  utmost  con- 
sideration ;  and  the  contrast  drawn  between  the  easy  lot 
of  the  Metropolitans  and  the  ruinous  end  of  Gomphi  was 
so  significant,  that  not  a  single  state  in  all  Thessaly,  with 
the  sole  exception  of  Larissa,  which  was  strongly  held  by 
Scipio's  armies,  subsequently  refused  adhesion  to  Caesar  or 
compliance  with  his  demands.  He,  meanwhile,  had  selected 
a  suitable  camping-ground  in  the  open  country,  where  the 
corn  crops  were  now  all  but  ripe,  and  resolved  to  await  there 
the  approach  of  Pompeius,  and  to  make  this  place  decide  once 
for  all  the  issue  of  the  campaign. 

82  As  for  his  opponent,  a  few  days  after  these  operations  he 
crossed  the  Thessalian  frontier,  and,  in  the  course  of  an 
harangue  delivered  to  his  now  united  army,  expressed  his 

'  Ancient    authorities    agree    that    Caesar's   hungry    troops    here    got 
considerably  out  of  hand,  and  that  much  excess  ensued. 

^  Now  represented  by  a  village  with  the  generic  name  Paleo-Kastro. 


Overweenhig  Confidence  of  'Pompeians    193 

thanks  to  the  men  of  his  own  command  for  their  past  services  Summer  48 

to  himself ;  and  then,  turning  to  the  troops  under  Scipio, 

asked  them  to  be  willing,  though  the  main  victory  was  already 

won,  to  accept  a  share  of  the  spoils  and  rewards  of  the  campaign. 

After  that,  the  legions  were  all  concentrated  within  one  camp, 

and  Pompeius,  courteously  dividing  with  Scipio  his  privileges 

as  commander,  ordered  all  bugle-calls  to  be  repeated  before 

that  general,  and  a  second  head  quarters  tent  to  be  pitched 

for  him. 

Such  an  increase  of  numbers  on  the  part  of  the  Pompeians, 
and  the  successful  junction  of  their  two  powerfiJ  armies  did 
but  confirm  the  general  belief  that  had  long  been  prevalent 
amongst  them.  So  certain  indeed  grew  their  hopes  of  victory, 
that  any  pause  in  the  conduct  of  the  operations  seemed  but 
to  delay  their  own  return  to  Italy,  and  any  movement  on  the 
part  of  Pompeius,  that  exhibited  unusual  deliberateness  and 
caution,  could  always,  according  to  his  critics,  have  been 
well  finished  off  in  a  single  day ;  and  he  was  loudly  accused 
of  toying  with  his  command,  and  of  treating  as  menials  men 
who  had  filled  the  highest  offices  in  the  State.^  Much  con- 
troversy also  ensued  amongst  the  rival  claimants  to  the 
various  prizes  of  the  war,  notably  the  great  public  priesthoods, 
whilst  the  consulship  was  settled  in  advance  over  a  number 
of  years.  Others  claimed  the  houses  and  property  of  those 
in  the  Caesarian  camp ;  and  a  heated  dispute  arose  in 
open  council  on  the  case  of  Lucilius  Hirrus,  at  that 
moment  away  on  a  mission  from  Pompeius  to  the  Parthian 
court,  and  on  his  right  to  stand  in  his  absence  as  a  candi- 
date at  the  approaching  praetorian  elections.    Thus  while  his 

^  i.e.  as  consuls  and  praetors.  They  dubbed  him  '  Agamemnon,  king 
of  kings'.     Appian,  2.  67. 

LOHG  O 


194       Caesar  again  J{eady  for  Action 

Summer  48  friends  appealed  to  the  plighted  word  of  Pompelus  and  the 
obligation  incumbent  upon  him  of  fulfilling  the  pledge 
given  at  his  departure  (unless  indeed  he  wished  Hirrus  to  be 
thought  a  fool  for  trusting  to  his  support),  the  rest  stoutly 
maintained  that,  where  the  danger  and  hardships  were  alike 
for  all,  no  one  man  should  be  given  these  exceptional  privileges. 
83  So  too  the  daily  bickerings  that  passed  between  Lucius 
Domitius,  Scipio,  and  Lentulus  Spinther,  on  the  subject  of 
Caesar's  priestly  office,^  had  lately  degenerated  into  open 
brawling  of  the  most  offensive  character ;  Lentulus  insisting  on 
the  claims  of  seniority,  Domitius  boasting  of  his  wide  influence 
and  prestige  in  the  capital,  Scipio  confident  in  his  family 
connexion  with  Pompeius.  Another  incident  at  this  time 
was  the  public  indictment  of  Lucius  Afranius  by  Acutius 
Rufus  for  what  he  alleged  to  have  been  the  betrayal  of  the 
army  in  Spain  ;  while  Lucius  Domitius,  not  to  be  behindhand, 
had  a  separate  proposal  of  his  own  to  submit  to  the  council. 
This  was  that  on  the  conclusion  of  hostilities  all  those  of 
senatorial  rank  who  had  assisted  in  fighting  for  the  common 
cause  should  be  constituted  a  judicial  body,  with  three  votes  '^ 
given  to  each  member :  sentence  should  then  be  passed 
individually  upon  every  one  who  had  either  stayed  behind 
in  Rome,  or,  while  showing  themselves  inside  the  Pompeian 
lines,  had  taken  no  active  part  in  the  campaign  ;  one  ticket 
to  be  cast  by  those  who  favoured  complete  acquittal,  another 
where  the  verdict  was  capital  punishment,  and  a  third  by 
those  who  imposed  a  fine.  Everybody,  in  short,  was  engrossed 
either  with  his  own  political  interests,  or  the  money- rewards 
he  hoped  to  reap  for  party  services,  or  with  the  prosecution 

'  Caesar  had  been  Chief  Pontiff  (Pontifex  Maximus)  since  63. 
2  '  Wax  tablets.' 


A  Substitute  for  Cavalry  1 9  f 

of  his  private  quarrels.  Men's  minds  were  no  longer  concerned  Summer  48 
with  the  indispensable  conditions  of  success,  but  rather  with 
the  best  use  they  could  make  of  their  victory. 

In  the  meantime  Caesar  had  not  been  idle.  His  supplies  84 
were  now  adequately  organized,  his  troops  had  recovered  their 
moral,  and  a  sufficient  interval  had  elapsed  since  the  two 
battles  of  Durazzo :  and  now,  to  show  the  implicit  trust  he 
reposed  in  the  temper  of  his  men,  he  resolved  to  test  the 
extent  to  which  Pompeius  either  desired  or  designed  a  general 
engagement.  His  army  accordingly  moved  out  of  camp  and 
drew  up  for  action,  at  first  on  ground  of  his  own  choosing  and 
at  some  little  distance  from  the  Pompeian  camp,  but,  later  on, 
advancing  well  away  from  the  shelter  of  their  own  rampart 
and  bringing  their  line  of  battle  close  up  to  the  hills 
occupied  by  the  Pompeians.  As  a  result  of  these  tactics  the 
confidence  of  the  army  in  its  own  powers  strengthened  daily. 

Yet  Caesar  did  not  feel  justified  in  abandoning  the  practice 
lately  instituted  with  regard  to  the  cavalry,  and  already 
described  above;  but  finding  himself  greatly  outnumbered 
in  this  arm  of  the  service,  he  formed  a  corps  of  young  soldiers, 
lightly  equipped,  and  drawn  from  legionaries  of  the  front 
rank  specially  selected  for  speed  of  foot.  This  body  was 
then  instructed  to  fight  with  their  usual  equipment,  inter- 
spersing themselves  among  the  troopers ;  and  by  constant 
daily  practice  they  soon  attained  a  marked  proficiency  in 
this  new  type  of  warfare.  The  advantage  gained  by  this 
device  was  that  1,000  Caesarian  horsemen,  having  once  ac- 
quired experience,  had  no  hesitation,  even  on  more  or  less  open 
ground,  in  standing  the  charge  of  the  7,000  who  formed  the 
cavalry  of  Pompeius ;  and  the  large  numbers  of  the  latter  had 
little  terror  for  their  composite  enemy.  Indeed  it  was  during 
o  2 


1^6         Pomp  ems  decides  en  Battle 

Summer  48  these  few  days  that  a  successful  cavalry  skirmish  took  place  in 
which  one  of  the  two  brother  Allobroges,  whose  desertion 
to   Pompeius   we   have    recorded    above,   was   killed,  with 
85  certain  others  of  his  followers.     As  for  the  main  force  of 
the  Pompeians  at  this  time,  it  was  their  daily  habit  to  move 
down  from  their  camp  on  the  hills,  and  at  the  lowest  spurs 
of  the  mountain  to  form  up  in  order  of  battle,  in  constant 
expectation,  it  would  seem,  that  Caesar  might  somehow  or 
other  place  himself  at  a  disadvantage.     When,  therefore,  it 
became  evident  that  no  artifice  could  entice  his  opponent  to 
an  action,  Caesar  determined  that  for  his  part  the  easiest 
method  for  the  further  prosecution  of  the  war  was  to  break 
up  his  present  encampment,  and  in  future  to  keep  per- 
petually on  the  march  :  calculating  that,  by  constantly  chang- 
ing his  camping-ground  and  moving  about  from  place  to  place, 
he  would  find  it  easier  to  feed  his  troops,  and  at  the  same 
time  have  opportunities  for  fighting  on  the  road  ;  on  the 
other  hand,  the  daily  marches  would  exhaust  the  endurance 
of  Pompeius's  army  which  was  not  so  habituated  to  fatigue. 
Everything  was  accordingly  ready  for  the  new  departure  ; 
the  signal  to  march  had  teen  given,  and  the  tents  taken  down 
and  stowed  away,  when  it  was  suddenly  observed  that  the 
Pompeian  battle-line,  going  beyond  its  daily  practice,  had  a 
minute  cr  two  before  advanced  a  considerable  distance  from 
its  entrenchments,  thus  suggesting  the  possibihty  of  engaging 
it   upon  something  like  equal  terms.     On  receipt  of  this 
intelligence  Caesar  turned  to  his  colleagues,  and  though  his 
column  was  by  this  time  in  the  actual  gateways  of  the  camp, 
'  We  must  give  up  our  march  for  the  present ',  he  said,  '  and 
turn  our  attention  to  battle,  as  has  always  been  our  earnest 
wish.    We  are  all  ready  for  a  fight :  we  shall  not  again  easily 


Pom  pet  us  decides  on  Battle         197 

find  the  opportunity.'     And  without  further  delay  he  led  Summer  48 
out  his  forces  fully  equipped  for  action. 

The  same  decision  to  fight  had,  as  was  afterwards  discovered,  86 
been  also  taken  by  Pompeius  in  deference  to  the  urgent  solici- 
tations of  his  party.  Such  a  resolution  on  his  part  had  been 
foreshadowed  in  the  council-meetings  of  the  last  few  days, 
when  he  had  assured  his  colleagues  that  they  might  expect  to 
see  the  rout  of  the  Caesarian  army  even  before  the  two  hostile 
lines  were  in  contact  with  each  other.  Noting  the  looks  of 
surprise  called  forth  by  this  statement,  he  had  then  con- 
tinued, '  I  am  well  aware  that  what  I  promise  sounds  almost 
incredible,  but  to  give  you  greater  confidence  for  going  into 
action,  listen  to  the  plan  I  have  formed  for  the  battle.  I  have 
induced  our  cavalry — and  they  have  pledged  themselves  to 
the  task — immediately  we  begin  to  come  to  close  quarters, 
to  attack  the  right  wing  of  the  Caesarians  on  its  exposed 
flank,  and,  by  riding  round  the  rear  of  their  line,  to  drive 
the  enemy  before  them  in  all  the  confusion  that  such  a 
diversion  will  cause,  before  even  a  single  spear  can  be  thrown 
by  ourselves.  In  this  way  we  shall  finish  off  the  war  without 
the  slightest  risk  to  the  legions,  and  with  scarcely  a  scratch 
to  any  of  us :  whilst,  as  you  will  see,  the  manceuvre  presents 
no  sort  of  difficulty  owing  to  our  immense  preponderance 
in  cavalry.' 

He  ended  by  a  solemn  warning  to  hold  themselves  ready 
for  all  future  emergencies,  and  now  that  they  had  their  chance 
of  fighting,  as  had  so  often  occupied  their  thoughts,  to  show 
the  world  that  in  point  of  efficiency  and  courage  they  were  not 
unworthy  of  its  high  opinion. 

He  was  followed  by  Labienus,  whose  supreme  contempt  S7 
for  the  forces  under  Caesar  was  only  equalled  by  the  extrava- 


1 98  The  Last  Council  Meeting 

Summer  48  gant  eulogy  he  poured  upon  the  plan  of  Pompeius.  '  Do  not 
imagine,  Sir,'  said  he, '  that  this  is  the  army  which  conquered 
Gaul  and  Germany.  I  was  personally  present  at  all  those 
battles,  and  am  not  therefore  rashly  making  statements  on 
a  subject  I  do  not  fully  comprehend.  A  very  small  fraction 
of  that  army  now  survives  :  a  large  proportion  of  it  is  dead 
and  gone,  as  indeed  was  inevitable  where  so  much  fighting 
had  to  be  done  ;  numbers  were  carried  off  by  fever  in  Italy 
last  autumn,  numbers  again  have  scattered  to  their  homes, 
and  numbers  have  been  left  behind  in  charge  of  continental 
Europe.  Surely  you  yourselves  have  heard  from  your  corre- 
spondents across  the  water,  whose  delicate  health  obliged 
them  to  stay  at  home,  how  fresh  battalions  have  been 
formed  at  Brindisi  (Brundisiuvi).  What  you  now  see  before 
you  are  corps  that  have  been  repleted  from  the  levies  in 
Northern  Italy  during  the  last  few  years,  and  many  of  them 
come  from  the  colonies  beyond  the  Po  (Padus)  ;  while,  even 
so,  the  pith  and  kernel  of  the  men  have  perished  in  the  two 
battles  before  Durazzo.' 

At  the  end  of  this  speech  he  bound  himself  by  an  oath  not 
to  return  to  camp  except  as  a  victor  and  urged  upon  the  others 
to  follow  his  example.  His  action  won  the  warm  approval 
of  Pompeius,  who  immediately  took  the  same  oath,  and  was 
followed  unhesitatingly  by  the  remainder  of  the  staff.  At 
the  close  of  this  scene  the  council  broke  up  amid  the  light- 
hearted  confidence  of  all  present :  imagination  already  put 
victory  in  their  grasp ;  for  where  the  issues  involved  were  so 
great,  and  the  speaker  so  trained  a  master  of  war,  it  was  im- 
possible not  to  suppose  that  he  had  fully  weighed  the  import 
of  his  words. 


To  fact  p.  ig9- 


The  J{ival  Forces  199 


CHAPTER  V 
Pharsalus  and  After 

As  the  army  of  Caesar  approached  the  lines  of  Pompeius  the  88 
following  was  found  to  be  his  adversary's  order  of  battle.  The  Summer  4S 
left  wing  was  formed  by  the  two  legions,  known  respectively  as 
the  First  and  Third,  which  had  been  surrendered  by  Caesar 
on  command  of  the  Senate  at  the  opening  of  the  civil  troubles : 
here  too  was  Pompeius  himself.  The  centre  was  occupied 
by  Scipio  with  his  Syrian  corps,  while  the  left  was  in  charge 
of  the  legion  from  Cilicia,  supported  by  the  Spanish  battalions 
which,  as  already  recorded,  Afranius  had  brought  over  to  his 
chief.  All  these  troops  constituted  in  Pompeius's  judgement 
the  most  reliable  portion  of  his  army.  The  remaining  units 
were  distributed  between  the  centre  and  wings,  and  made 
up  a  total  strength  of  no  battalions,  or  in  round  numbers 
45,000  men  \  About  2,000  of  these  were  reservists,  time- 
expired  men  who  had  served  in  Pompeius's  permanent  body- 
guard on  previous  campaigns,  and  had  now  flocked  to  the 
standard  of  their  old  commander  for  the  present  war  :  these 
he  had  parcelled  out  along  his  whole  line.  There  were 
also  seven  other  battalions  distributed  as  garrisons  to  the  main 
camp  and  adjacent  outposts.  Lastly,  as  his  right  was  firmly 
protected  by  a  stream  presenting  steep  and  difficult  banks, 
he  had  massed  the  whole  of  his  cavalry  and  light-armed  bow- 
men and  slingers  in  a  single  dense  body  outside  his  left  wing. 

On  his  side  Caesar  had  followed  his  customary  dispositions,  89 
and  had  placed  the  Tenth  legion  on  his  right  and  the  Ninth 

'  i.e.  regulars.     An  enormous  number  of  Oriental  auxiliaries  was  also 
on  the  ground,  though  the  battle  was  decided  solely  by  the  Italian  troops. 


20  0         Dispositions  of  the  Armies 

Summer  48  on  his  left,  despite  the  fact  that  the  last-named  regiment 
had  suffered  so  terribly  in  the  battles  before  Durazzo  ;  ^  it 
was,  however,  now  coupled  with  the  Eighth,  thus  forming 
practically  one  legion  out  of  two,  each  of  whom  had  orders 
to  support  the  other.  Eighty  battalions  altogether  had 
taken  their  place  in  the  line,  amounting  to  22,000  troops, 
while  two  more  had  been  left  behind  to  hold  the  camp. 
Marcus  Antonius  had  been  appointed  to  command  the 
left,  Publius  Sulla  the  right,  and  Cnaeus  Domitius  the 
centre  :  Caesar  himself  took  his  stand  facing  Pompeius.  But 
the  discovery  of  the  enemy's  peculiar  distributions  as  just 
described  had  rendered  him  uneasy  as  to  the  safety  of  his 
right  wing,  in  case  he  should  find  it  turned  by  the  over- 
whelming cavalry  opposed  to  it.  At  this  moment,  therefore, 
he  rapidly  drafted  from  his  third  or  rearmost  line  a  single 
battalion  from  each  of  the  legions  represented  in  it ;  these 
he  then  formed  into  a  fourth,  so  placed  as  to  confront  the 
hostile  horsemen,  with  minute  instructions  as  to  the  part  they 
were  to  perform,  and  an  intimation  that  on  their  personal 
gallantry  depended  the  fortunes  of  the  day.  At  the  same  time 
both  the  third  line  and  the  whole  of  the  army  were  warned  not 
to  charge  without  his  special  orders,  but  that  when  the  proper 
moment  came  he  would  give  the  flag-signal  to  engage. 
90  In  addressing  his  army  with  the  customary  exhortations  to 
battle,  and  in  emphasizing  the  unbroken  continuance  of  his 

^  This  is  the  legion  which  had  the  stiff  fight  outside  Lerida  (l,  45), 
which  was  greatly  endangered  during  the  circumvallation  of  Durazzo 
(3.  45)  and  severely  mauled  at  the  final  sortie  of  Pompeius  and  the  subse- 
quent defeat  of  Caesar  (3.  62-67),  ^"  ^^  autumn  of  49,  on  returning 
from  Spain,  it  had  headed  a  serious  mutiny  at  Piacenza  (P'acentia),  of 
which  temporary  lapse  in  its  loyalty  Caesar  characteristically  says  nothing. 


A  Devoted  Centurion  201 

own  services  to  his  men,  special  stress  was  laid  on  the  fact  that  Summer  48 
he  could  call  them  personally  to  witness  how  anxiously  he 
had  desired  to  bring  about  a  settlement.  He  need  only  recall 
the  verbal  negotiations  instituted  through  Vatinius,  the  mis- 
sion of  Aulus  Clodius  to  Scipio,  and  the  strenuous  appeal 
made  at  Oricum  to  Libo  with  a  view  to  the  dispatch  of  peace 
envoys.  They  might  rest  assured  it  had  never  been  his  object 
to  trifle  with  the  lives  of  Roman  soldiers,  nor  yet  to  rob  his 
country  of  either  one  or  the  other  of  the  two  great  armies 
which  now  stood  face  to  face. 

At  the  close  of  his  speech,  as  his  men  were  clamouring  to 
advance  and  burning  with  the  excitement  of  battle,  without 
further  delay  he  gave  the  signal  by  trumpet. 

Now  there  was  serving  in  the  army  of  Caesar  a  certain  91 
reservist  named  Crastinus,  a  man  of  magnificent  courage,  who 
the  year  before  had  been  his  senior  centurion  of  the  Tenth 
legion.  This  man,  as  soon  as  the  signal  sounded,  exclaimed 
to  those  near  him,  '  Follow  me,  my  old  comrades,  and  give 
your  general  the  support  you  have  agreed  to  give  him.  This 
is  the  last  battle  left  us  :  only  see  this  through,  and  he  is  re- 
stored to  his  rightful  position  and  we  get  back  our  liberty.' 
Then  glancing  at  Caesar,  he  added,  '  I'll  manage  to-day, 
General,  that  dead  or  alive  you  shall  have  cause  to  thank  me.' 
With  these  words  he  dashed  out  from  the  right  wing  at  the 
head  of  the  line,  and  was  at  once  followed  by  120  men  of  the 
same  company,  specially  picked  troops  who  were  serving  as 
volunteers. 

Between  the  two  hostile  lines  there  remained  only  just  9^ 
sufficient  space  for  each  army  to  deliver  its  charge.     Notwith- 
standing this,  Pompeius  had  issued  previous  instructions  to 
his  men  to  stand  strictly  on  the  defensive  in  meeting  the 


20  2  The  Psychology  of  Battle 

Summer  48  attack  of  the  Caesarians,  so  as  to  allow  their  advancing  line 
to  become  disorganized.  This  order  he  was  said  to  have 
given  upon  the  advice  of  Caius  Triarius,  under  the  belief  that 
the  opening  rush  of  the  enemy's  legions  would  have  its  force 
dissipated  by  their  loss  of  accurate  formation,  while  his  own 
troops,  by  maintaining  their  proper  distances,  could  then  fall 
upon  the  broken  ranks  of  their  opponents.  He  further  hoped 
that  the  impact  of  the  falling  javelins  would  be  less  if  his  men 
were  kept  to  their  positions,  than  if  they  were  allowed  to  run 
in  and  meet  the  hail  of  spears  ;  while  the  double  distance 
the  Caesarians  would  have  to  traverse  might  well  be  expected 
to  render  them  breathless  with  exhaustion. 

In  our  judgement  this  decision  of  Pompeius  has  nothing  to 
recommend  it.  There  is  in  all  men  a  certain  instinctive 
courage  and  combativeness  implanted  in  us  by  Nature,  which 
is  only  kindled  by  the  excitement  of  battle.  This  instinct  it 
should  be  the  object  of  commanding  officers  not  to  repress 
but  to  encourage  ;  and  there  was  sound  reason  in  the  ancient 
practice  of  letting  the  bugles  call  the  advance  over  all  the 
field  at  once,  followed  by  a  single  shout  from  all  the  men  : 
such  a  custom,  it  was  found,  struck  terror  into  the  ranks  of  the 
93  enemy  no  less  than  it  stimulated  their  own  side.  In  this 
particular  instance  our  troops,  who  at  the  given  signal  had 
dashed  forward  with  brandished  spears,  on  finding  that  the 
Pompeians  were  not  advancing  to  meet  them,  instinctively 
slackened  speed  ;  and,  taught  by  the  accumulated  experience 
of  past  battles,  halted  some  half-way  across  the  open  ground, 
so  as  not  to  spend  their  strength  before  coming  up  with 
their  enemy.  Here  taking  a  short  rest,  and  then  resum- 
ing their  rush,  they  discharged  their  volley  of  heavy  javelins, 
and  in  obedience  to  Caesar's  orders  instantly  drew  their 


The  Battle  cf  Vhar solus  203 

broadswords.  Nor,  to  tell  the  truth,  did  the  Pompeians  Summer  4S 
show  any  desire  to  shirk  the  encounter,  but,  parrying  the 
flying  spears  with  their  shields,  they  boldly  met  the  shock  of 
the  charging  legions  with  unbroken  ranks,  and,  after  hurling 
their  own  javelins,  went  to  work  with  the  sword.  At  the  same 
time  their  cavalry,  acting  upon  its  previous  instructions,  ad- 
vanced from  the  left  wing  in  one  dense  mass,  whilst  the  mob  of 
archers  also  commenced  to  spread  themselves  over  the  ground. 
This  attack  was  more  than  our  own  cavalry  could  cope  with, 
and  slowly  giving  way  they  recoiled  before  the  onslaught. 
Thereupon  the  enemy's  horsemen,  pushing  home  the  assault 
with  still  fiercer  vigour,  began  deploying  in  squadrons  pre- 
paratory to  surrounding  our  main  battle-line  on  its  exposed 
flank.  Perceiving  the  threatened  danger,  Caesar  gave  the 
signal  to  his  fourth  line,  which  he  had  recently  improvised  out 
of  a  number  of  disconnected  battalions.  Advancing  at  high 
speed  and  with  colours  flying,  this  force  delivered  such  a  furious 
attack  upon  the  opposing  cavalry,^  that  not  a  single  trooper 
stood  against  them  ;  but,  wheeling  in  a  body,  they  not  only 
evacuated  their  position  in  the  line,  but  galloping  on  in  head- 
long flight  took  cover  in  a  range  of  lofty  hills.  Their  dispersal 
left  the  archers  and  slingers  wholly  unprotected,  and  being 
altogether  without  defensive  armour  the  whole  helpless  crowd 
was  slaughtered  to  a  man.  Following  up  this  exploit,  the  same 
force  went  on  without  a  halt  to  surround  the  Pompeian  left, 
which  they  found  still  fighting  and  maintaining  a  stubborn 
resistance  in  line,  when  it  was  thus  taken  unexpectedly  in  the 
rear.  It  was  at  this  critical  moment  in  the  battle  that  Caesar's  94 
third  line,  which  had  hitherto  remained  quietly  in  position, 

'  Their  orders  were  to  keep  their  heavy  javelins  (j.ila)  and  use  them 
to  strike  at  the  faces  of  the  mounted  men.     Plutarcli. 


2  04  Tf^^  Battle  of  Pharsalus 

Summer  48  received  its  orders  to  advance.  His  exhausted  troops  in  front 
Were  thus  replaced  by  fresh  and  vigorous  reserves;  and  assailed 
as  they  also  w^ere  from  behind,  the  resistance  of  the  Pompeians 
at  length  gave  way,  and  the  whole  line  broke  and  fled.  But 
though  the  victory  was  won,  it  did  not  escape  the  attention 
of  Caesar  that  the  first  steps  towards  its  consummation  had 
been  the  work  of  those  battalions  which  he  had  posted  in  his 
fourth  line  to  hold  in  check  the  Pompeian  horse,  precisely  as 
he  had  indicated  in  his  address  to  the  men.  It  was  they  who, 
in  the  first  place,  had  effected  the  rout  of  the  cavalry ;  it  was 
they,  again,  who  had  cut  to  pieces  the  slingers  and  archers  : 
finally,  it  was  they  who,  by  turning  the  left  of  the  Pompeian 
line,  had  started  the  general  flight.  In  the  meanwhile 
Pompeius,  on  perceiving  the  disaster  to  his  mounted  troops, 
and  the  crippling  panic  pervading  that  branch  of  his  army  on 
which  he  chiefly  relied,  and  despairing  of  success  from  other 
quarters,  had  withdrawn  from  the  fighting  line  and  galloped 
rapidly  back  to  camp.  There,  as  he  passed  the  pickets  on 
duty  outside  the  frontal  gate,  he  called  in  loud  tones  to  the 
centurions  in  charge,  so  that  the  men  might  catch  his  words  : 
'  Look  to  the  camp,  and  in  case  of  accident  defend  it  with 
care.  I  am  going  the  round  of  the  other  gates  in  order  to 
encourage  the  troops  on  guard.' 

So  saying,  he  made  straight  for  head  quarters :  in  gloomy 
anticipation  of  the  verdict  of  the  day,  yet  waiting  to  learn 
the  end. 
95  Meanwhile  his  routed  followers  had  also  been  driven  back 
to  their  camp  and  there  forced  over  the  trenches.  Caesar 
strongly  felt  the  desirability  of  giving  no  breathing  space  to 
the  terrified  rabble,  and  urged  upon  his  men  to  take  Fortune 
while  in  the  mood,  and  to  carry  the  camp  by  storm.     In  spite 


The  Pursuit  2 of 

of  the  great  heat — the  affair  had  been  protracted  to  midday  Summer 
— his  troops,  whom  nothing  now  could  stop,  gave  willing 
obedience  to  their  commander's  orders.  The  camp  was  vigor- 
ously defended  by  the  force  left  behind  for  that  purpose,  and 
still  more  fiercely  by  the  Thracians  and  other  foreign  auxili- 
aries :  as  for  the  fugitives  from  the  battle,  they  were  so  de- 
moralized with  panic  and  physically  so  exhausted,  that  in  most 
cases  their  arms  and  standards  were  indiscriminately  flung 
away,  and  they  were  far  more  concerned  with  continuing 
their  flight  than  with  staying  to  hold  the  camp.  And,  indeed, 
it  was  but  a  momentary  resistance  that  could  be  offered 
against  the  deadly  discharge  of  our  spears  even  by  the  force 
which  had  manned  the  ramparts :  compelled  by  their  wounds 
to  relinquish  their  posts,  they  quickly  followed  the  lead  of 
their  regimental  and  company  officers,  and  fled  precipitately 
to  the  heights  that  adjoined  the  camp. 

Inside  the  Pompeian  lines  the  eye  fell  upon  the  spectacle  9<5 
of  arbours  artificially  constructed,  of  masses  of  silver  plate 
laid  out  for  present  use,  of  tents  paved  with  cool,  fresh 
cut  sods,  and  even,  in  the  case  of  Lentulus  and  others,  pro- 
tected from  the  heat  by  ivy.  Many  other  indications  could 
likewise  be  discerned  of  extravagant  luxury  and  of  confidence 
in  coming  victory,  rendering  it  an  easy  assumption  that  men 
who  went  so  far  out  of  their  way  in  the  pursuit  of  superfluous 
pleasures  could  have  had  no  misgivings  as  to  the  issue  of  the 
day.  Yet  these  were  the  men  who  habitually  taunted  the 
poverty-stricken,  long-suffering  army  of  Caesar  with  the 
charge  of  being  voluptuaries  ;  whereas  in  truth  they  had  all 
along  been  in  want  of  the  barest  necessaries. 

But  to  return  to  Pompeius.     Delaying  his  departure  until 
our  troops  were  actually  in  motion  within  his  lines,  he  seized 


20 6  The  Pursuit  continued 

Summer  48  a  horse  and,  tearing  off  all  outward  signs  of  his  marshal's  rank, 
fled  through  the  postern  gate,  where,  putting  spurs  to  his 
mount,  he  headed  in  the  direction  of  Larissa.  Making  no  halt 
at  that  town,  but  maintaining  the  same  rapid  rate  of  travelling, 
and  merely  picking  up  a  few  followers  from  the  general  rout, 
he  continued  his  journey  without  intermission  through  the 
night ;  and,  with  an  escort  of  no  more  than  thirty  troopers, 
at  length  reached  the  sea.  There  he  embarked  on  board  a 
corn-ship,  repeatedly  complaining,  so  it  was  said,  that  his 
expectations  had  been  wofully  falsified,  that  the  very  men 
in  whom  he  had  placed  his  hopes  of  victory  had  been  the 
first  to  fly,  and,  to  judge  by  appearances,  had  virtually  be- 
trayed him, 
97  Master  of  the  Pompeian  camp,  Caesar  once  more  appealed 
to  his  troops  not  to  let  their  natural  anxiety  for  plunder 
hinder  the  execution  of  those  measures  still  necessary  for  the 
full  realization  of  their  victory.  Once  more  they  yielded  to 
his  wishes,  and  preparations  were  immediately  begun  for 
the  circumvallation  of  the  high  ground  to  which  the  enemy 
had  retreated.  But  as  the  hill  was  found  to  be  without  water, 
the  Pompeians,  distrusting  the  position,  had  determined  to 
abandon  it  and  to  follow  the  line  of  heights  in  a  general 
retirement  towards  Larissa.  Their  intentions  were  at  once 
detected  by  Caesar.  Dividing  his  forces,  he  ordered  part 
of  his  legions  to  remain  in  the  captured  camp  of  Pompeius, 
another  division  to  be  sent  back  to  his  own  camp,  while  he 
himself  with  the  remaining  four  set  out  on  the  task  of  heading 
off  the  retreating  Pompeians  by  taking  an  easier  route.  At 
the  end  of  six  miles  he  was  in  a  position  to  form  up  in  line  of 
battle  ;  whereupon  the  enemy  halted  on  one  of  the  numerous 
hills.     The  base  of  this  hill  was  washed  by  a  stream  ;  and  in 


Surrender  of  the  Fugitives  207 

order  to  prevent  his  opponents  from  watering  during  the  Summer  48 
night,  Caesar  made  one  last  appeal  to  his  weary  troops  :  and, 
exhausted  as  they  were  by  their  long  day's  work,  with  night 
already  upon  them,  they  nevertheless  succeeded  in  interposing 
between  the  hill  and  the  river  a  fully  fortified  breastwork. 
On  the  completion  of  this  work  the  enemy  sent  in  a  deputa- 
tion to  open  negotiations  for  surrender  ;  at  the  same  time  a 
few  representatives  of  the  senatorial  order  who  had  attached 
themselves  to  the  mission,  took  the  opportunity  to  seek  per- 
sonal safety  by  escaping  under  cover  of  night. 

As  soon  as  it  was  day,  the  order  was  given  for  the  whole  98 
party  up  on  the  hill  to  descend  from  the  high  ground  to  the 
plain  below,  and  there  to  throw  down  their  arms.  This  they 
did  without  demur,  and  then,  flinging  themselves  to  the 
earth,  with  weeping  eyes  and  hands  upraised,  they  begged 
their  lives  of  Caesar.  In  reassuring  tones  he  bade  them  rise, 
and  after  a  brief  reference  to  his  well-knovra  clemency  in  order 
to  appease  their  fears,  granted  their  lives  to  all,  and  then 
transferred  them  to  the  kindly  attentions  of  his  own  men, 
with  strict  injunctions  that  no  one  was  to  be  in  any  way 
injured  or  to  lose  any  of  his  property.  Having  thus  pro- 
vided for  the  care  of  his  prisoners,  he  immediately  ordered 
up  other  legions  from  camp,  while  those  who  had  come  on 
with  him  were  directed  to  take  their  turn  of  rest  and  then 
to  rejoin  their  old  quarters.  With  these  arrangements  com- 
pleted, he  marched  through  to  Larissa  on  the  same  day. 

His  own  casualties  from  this  battle  did  not  exceed  200  rank  99 
and  file,  though  on  the  other  hand  he  had  to  deplore  the  loss 
of  fully  thirty  centurions — gallant  men  whom  he  could  ill 
spare.     Among  the  slain  also  was  the  Crastinus  mentioned 
above,  killed  by  a  sword-thrust  straight  in  the  face,  as  he  fought 


20 8  Losses  on  both  Sides 

Summer  48  with  desperate  courage.  His  conduct  had  amply  justified 
the  words  he  uttered  on  going  into  battle.  In  Caesar's 
judgement  the  palm  of  valour  In  this  action  belonged  to 
Crastinus,:  and  deep  was  his  sense  of  gratitude  for  the  man's 
devotion  to  himself.  Of  the  Pompeian  army  some  15,000 
were  estimated  to  have  fallen,^  while  the  total  number  of 
prisoners  taken  exceeded  24,000,  a  number  which  included 
the  garrisons  of  outposts  who  afterwards  surrendered  to  Sulla, 
besides  large  bodies  also  which  sought  shelter  in  the  neigh- 
bouring townships.  Of  battalion  and  company  colours  180 
were  brought  in  to  Caesar  as  the  total  list  of  trophies  from 
the  battle,  and  9  eagles  of  distinct  legions.  Finally  it  should 
be  mentioned  that  Lucius  Domitius,  while  endeavouring  to 
escape  from  camp  to  the  hills,  was  overtaken  and  cut  down 
by  our  cavalry,  when  his  strength  had  now  given  out  through 
fatigue. 
100  While  the  issue  was  thus  decided  on  land,  a  hostile  fleet, 
this  time  under  the  command  of  Decimus  Laelius,  had  again 
visited  Brindisi.  Adopting  the  same  plan  of  action  that 
Libo,  it  will  be  remembered,  had  attempted  before  him, 
he  seized  as  his  base  the  island  off  the  mouth  of  the  harbour  ; 
only  to  be  met  by  a  similar  scheme  of  defence  on  the  part  of 
Vatinius,  then  acting  as  governor  of  Brindisi.     Having  care- 

^  According  to  a  Caesarian  officer  present,  only  6,000  Italians  were 
killed.  If  15,000  Romans  really  fell,  it  is  a  striking  proof  of  Caesar's 
trustworthiness,  when  the  temptation  to  minimize  the  slaughter  must  have 
been  strong.  Though  Caesar,  modestly  perhaps,  does  not  mention  it, 
Appian  says  that  both  before  the  battle  and  at  the  moment  of  victory 
strict  orders  were  given  to  spare  fellow  countrymen.  '  They  would  have 
it  so ' ;  is  said  by  one  of  his  own  officers  to  have  been  Caesar's  comment  as 
he  surveyed  the  stricken  field,  '  after  all  my  great  services,  they  would  have 
condemned  me  in  their  courts,  had  I  not  appealed  to  my  army.'     Suet.  30. 


Further  sporadic  Attacks  of  Fomp elan  Fleet  209 

fully  screened  and  fitted  out  a  number  of  small  boats,  Vatinius  Summer  48 

enticed  the  ships  of  Laelius  to  venture  inside ;  and  one  of 

these,  a  five-decker  \  having  advanced  too  far,  was  captured 

in  the  narrow  entrance  to  the  port  together  with  two  other 

smaller  craft.    This  success  he  followed  up  by  stationing  along 

the  foreshore,  just  as  his  predecessor  had  done  before  him, 

a  series  of  cavalry  patrols  to  prevent  the  hostile  fleet  from 

watering.      Laelius,  however,  had  the  advantage  of  a  better 

season  of  the  year  for  purposes  of  navigation,  and  bringing  up 

water  supplies  for  his  force  by  merchant  boats  from  Corfu  and 

Durazzo,  showed  he  was  not  to  be  lightly  deterred  from  his 

project :  in  fact,  it  was  only  after  the  news  of  the  battle  fought 

in  Thessaly,  that  either  the  ignominious  loss  of  his  vessels  or 

his  want  of  necessary  stores  could  induce  him  to   quit  his 

hold  upon  the  island  and  harbour. 

Almost  contemporary  with  this  raid  was  a  descent  of  Caius  loi 
Cassius  upon  Sicily  with  his  divisional  fleet  of  Syrian,  Phoeni- 
cian, and  Cilician  squadrons.  Caesar's  own  fleet,  it  must  be 
explained,  had  been  divided  into  two  separate  commands  : 
half  of  it  was  stationed  at  Vibo-on-Straits  {Monteleone)  under 
the  praetor  Publius  Sulpicius,  the  other  half  lay  off  Messina 
(Messana),  under  Marcus  Pomponius.  Yet  in  spite  of  these 
dispositions,  Cassius  succeeded  in  swooping  down  with  his 
ships  upon  Messina  before  any  whisper  of  his  coming  reached 
the  ears  of  Pomponius,  who  was  thus  caught  in  a  state  of  great 
confusion,  with  no  scouting  vessels  on  the  look-out  and  no 
settled  formation  in  his  squadron.  The  wind  was  high  and 
favoured  the  design  of  Cassius.  Filling  a  number  of  old 
merchantmen  with  pine,  pitch,  tow,  and  other  inflammable 
materials,  he  launched  them  against  the  Pomponian  fleet  with 
'  Quinquereme.     See  note  on  Trireme,  Bk.  II,  ch.  I  (6). 

LONG  P 


21 


o  Further  Sporadic  j4 Hacks  of  Pomp  eia?i  Fleet 


Summer  48  such  deadly  effect  that  the  whole  thirty-fiye  vessels,  twenty 
being  decked  boats,  were  quickly  burned  to  the  water-line. 
A  widespread  panic  followed  upon  this  exploit,  and  notwith- 
standing the  presence  in  Messina  of  a  garrison  legion,  the 
town  was  with  difficulty  retained  for  Caesar :  indeed,  had  it 
not  been  that  at  this  very  moment  the  first  tidings  came 
through  of  his  recent  victory  on  land,  conveyed  by  a  chain  of 
mounted  patrols,  the  general  opinion  was  that  it  would  inevi- 
tably have  been  lost.  As  it  was,  the  fortunate  arrival  of  this 
news  made  the  defence  of  the  city  possible,  and  Cassius  there- 
upon sailed  away  to  Vibo  to  turn  his  attentions  to  the  squadron 
under  Sulpicius.  Here,  finding  our  ships  to  be  moored  close 
in  to  shore,  owing  to  their  infection  with  the  same  general 
panic,  his  crews  prepared  to  repeat  their  former  tactics. 
Helped  by  a  favourable  wind,  some  forty  odd  merchantmen 
were  carefully  fitted  out  as  fireships,  and  then  sent  in  among 
the  enemy's  fleet ;  and,  the  fire  taking  hold  on  either  wing, 
five  of  their  number  were  soon  completely  gutted.  As  the 
flames  continued  to  spread  with  the  force  of  the  gale,  the 
detachment  of  veterans  from  Caesar's  sick-list  who  had  been 
left  by  him  in  charge  of  this  fleet  could  no  longer  endure  the 
insult :  without  waiting  for  orders,  they  manned  some  of  the 
vessels  and,  putting  out  to  sea,  attacked  the  fleet  of  Cassius, 
capturing  two  five-deckers  (one  of  which  had  the  admiral  on 
board  who  only  escaped  by  taking  to  a  boat),  and  sending  two 
of  the  three-deckers  to  the  bottom.  Soon  afterwards  there 
arrived  definite  intelligence  of  thebattle  justfoughtinThessaly, 
so  explicit  as  to  convince  even  the  Pompeians,  who  hitherto 
had  affected  to  believe  that  the  reports  current  were  merely  the 
inventions  of  Caesar's  officers  and  friends.  With  this  authentic 
information  Cassius  removed  his  squadron  from  those  waters. 


The  Flight  of  Pompeius 


21  I 


Meanwhile  it  was  clear  to  Caesar  that  every  other  object  102 
should  be  subordinated  to  the  supreme  task  of  pursuing  Pom-  ^"'"™^''  4 
peius  into  whatever  corner  of  the  world  his  flight  might  have 
taken  him  ;  on  no  account  must  he  be  allowed  to  collect  fresh 
forces  and  so  to  renew  the  war.  As  fast,  therefore,  as  his 
cavalry  could  cover  the  ground,  he  was  now  daily  pressing 
hard  on  his  heels,  having  first  left  orders  for  one  of  the  legions 
to  follow  by  easier  stages.  A  decree  had  already  been  pub- 
lished at  Amphipolis  ^  in  the  name  of  Pompeius,  commanding 
the  presence  of  every  man  of  military  age  in  the  province,  no 
matter  whether  Greek  or  Roman,  with  the  object  of  being 
sworn  in  for  active  serv^ice ;  but  whether  he  had  issued  this 
edict  in  order  to  avert  suspicion  and  so  conceal  to  the  last 
moment  his  plans  for  a  more  protracted  flight,  or  whether 
he  contemplated  the  defence  of  Macedonia  by  means  of  fresh 
levies  in  the  event  of  not  being  immediately  pursued,  was 
a  question  on  which  there  were  no  satisfactory  means  of  form- 
ing an  opinion.  At  any  rate  what  he  actually  did  was  to  lie 
off  the  town  at  anchor  for  a  single  night,  and  to  summon  on 
board  his  Greek  friends,  from  whom  he  borrowed  money  for 
his  personal  expenses;  and  then,  on  the  news  of  Caesar's 
approach,  set  sail  from  the  place  and  arrived  after  a  few  days 
at  Mytilini  (JSIytilene).  Here  he  was  delayed  two  days  by  bad 
weather,  after  which,  having  been  joined  by  some  other  fast 
craft,  he  continued  his  voyage  to  Cilicia,  from  whence  he 
crossed  to  Cyprus.  At  Cyprus  he  was  met  by  intelligence 
that  the  citadel  of  Antioch  had,  as  the  result  of  a  concerted 
movement  on  the  part  of  both  native  inhabitants  and  the 
Roman  citizens  settled  there  in  business,  been  forcibly  occu- 
pied with  a  view  to  his  exclusion  from  the  city  ;  and  that  an 

*  Oa  the  Stnima  or  Karasii,  one  of  the  chief  cities  of  S.  Macedonia. 
P  2 


212 


The  Flight  of  Pompeius 


Summer  48  express  warning  had  been  dispatched  to  those  refugees  from 
the  battle  who  were  reported  as  having  sheltered  in  towns  of 
the  immediate  vicinity,  that  they  would  do  well  not  to  ap- 
proach Antioch  *,  and  that  any  such  step  on  their  part  would 
be  taken  at  their  own  imminent  peril.  A  similar  incident  had 
happened  at  Rhodes  to  Lucius  Lentulus,  consul  the  preceding 
year,  Publius  Lentulus  an  ex-consul,  and  to  various  others. 
These  men  had  arrived  off  the  island  in  the  course  of  their 
flight  after  Pompeius,  only  to  find  themselves  refused  ad- 
mission to  either  town  or  harbour :  an  intimation  was 
served  upon  them  that  they  must  quit  the  neighbour- 
hood, and  sorely  against  their  will  they  had  been  obliged  to 
set  sail. 

Another  cause  that  helped  to  determine  this  attitude  of 
the  native  populations  was  the  rumour  of  Caesar's  advance, 
which  by  this  time  was  circulating  amongst  them. 
103  Knowledge  of  these  facts  induced  Pompeius  to  abandon  all 
design  of  visiting  Syria.  He  therefore  seized  the  funds  of  the 
local  revenue  company,  supplementing  these  by  private  loans, 
and  at  the  same  time  took  on  board  ship  a  large  sum  of  copper 
coinage  for  war  purposes.  He  then  armed  a  force  of 
2,000  men,  partly  drawn  from  the  staff  of  the  official 
revenue  officers,  partly  pressed  from  the  resident  mercantile 
houses,  and,  incorporating  with  them  such  private  servants  of 
his  own  friends  as  their  masters  considered  fit  for  the  enter- 
prise on  hand,  with  this  force  he  arrived  at  Pelusium  '^.  Here, 
as  chance  would  have  it,  he  found  the  Egyptian  king,  Ptolemy, 
a  mere  boy  in  years,  at  present  engaged  at  the  head  of  a  for- 
midable military  force  in  a  war  with  his  sister  Cleopatra,  whom 

^  Capital  of  Syria. 

*  At  the  most  eastern  mouth  of  the  Nile,  twenty  miles  east  of  Port  Said. 


Arrives  in  Egypt  ^'^^  is  there  murdered  213 

a  few  months  earlier  he  had  expelled  from  the  kingdom  by  the  Summer  4S 
help  of  his  kinsmen  and  supporters ;  the  two  camps  of  brother 
and  sister  being  only  a  short  distance  apart.  To  him,  there- 
fore, Pompeius  sent  a  request  that,  in  consideration  of  the 
ties  of  hospitality  and  friendship  which  had  existed  between 
himself  and  the  boy's  father,  he  might  be  allowed  to  enter 
Alexandria  and  to  find  protection  in  the  monarch's  resources 
during  this  his  hour  of  adversity.  Unfortunately  his  envoys, 
after  discharging  the  duties  of  their  mission,  entered  into  con- 
versation, in  rather  too  unguarded  terms,  with  the  royal 
troops,  pressing  them  to  take  up  the  cause  of  their  leader, 
and  not  to  look  askance  upon  his  present  humble  circum- 
stances. Of  these  troops  the  greater  part  were  old  soldiers 
of  Pompeius,  whom  Gabinius  had  taken  over  from  Pompeius's 
army  of  the  East  when  succeeding  to  the  governorship  of 
Syria,  and  subsequently  had  brought  across  to  Alexandria  ; 
where,  at  the  close  of  the  war  for  which  they  were  imported, 
they  had  been  left  behind  in  the  service  of  Ptolemy,  the  father 
of  the  present  boy. 

The  discovery  of  these  advances  on  the  part  of  the  officers  104 
by  the  king's  advisers,  who,  owing  to  his  minority,  were  then 
administering  the  kingdom,  determined  them  at  once  to  take 
action.  It  may  be  they  were  filled  with  a  genuine  alarm  (so 
at  least  they  afterwards  declared),  that  the  tampering  with 
the  royal  army  might  lead  to  a  military  occupation  of  Alexan- 
dria and  Egypt  by  Pompeius ;  or — since  misfortune  usually 
converts  friends  to  foes — they  may  have  thought  it  safe  to 
show  contempt  for  fallen  greatness ;  at  all  events  they  first 
gave  a  favourable  answer  in  public  to  Pompeius's  envoys,  bid- 
ding him  come  to  the  king,  and  then,  secretly  conspiring 
amongst    themselves,    dispatched    a    certain    fellow    named 


214  Caesar  in  Full  'Pursuit 

Summer  48  Achillas,  the  holder  of  a  command  in  the  royal  household 
and  a  desperado  of  singular  boldness,  together  with  Lucius 
Septimius,  an  ofHcer  of  regimental  rank,  with  directions  to 
murder  Pompeius.  These  two  approached  their  chief  victim 
with  greetings  of  marked  cordiality  ;  and,  as  he  already  pos- 
sessed some  slight  acquaintance  with  Septimius,  who  had 
served  under  him  as  a  company  officer  ^  in  the  war  with  the 
pirates,  he  was  induced  to  go  on  board  their  mere  cockleshell 
of  a  boat  along  with  a  few  members  of  his  suite.  There  he 
28  Sept.  was  foully  murdered  by  Achillas  and  Septimius ;  and  with 
like  treachery  Lucius  Lentulus  was  arrested  under  the  king's 
orders,  and  was  put  to  death  in  his  dungeons. 
105  To  continue  now  the  narrative  of  Caesar's  movements. 
On  arrival  in  Asia  Minor  he  found  that  an  attempt  had  been 
made  by  Titus  Ampius  to  remove  from  Ephesus  the  treasures 
in  the  temple  of  Diana.  For  this  purpose  all  the  Roman 
senators  in  the  province  had  been  summoned  to  certify  to 
the  amount  of  specie  taken ;  but  his  own  rapid  approach 
had  disturbed  the  proceedings,  and  Ampius  had  in  the  mean- 
while taken  to  flight.  Thus  for  the  second  time  Caesar 
was  instrumental  in  saving  the  treasures  of  the  Ephesian 
goddess.  Equally  significant  was  the  well-attested  fact  that 
in  the  temple  of  Minerva  at  Elis  ^,  on  the  very  day  of  his 
successful  battle,  as  was  found  by  a  careful  calculation  of  the 
dates,  the  statue  of  Victory,  whose  place  in  the  temple  was 
in  front  of  Minerva  herself  and  which  had  hitherto  faced  the 
statue  of  that  deity,  turned  itself  round  to  the  temple  doors 
with  its  face  towards  the  entrance.  Again,  at  Antioch  in  Syria, 

^  Centurion. 

*  In   the  western  Peloponnese   about  twenty-five  miles  north-west  of 
Olynipia. 


Heaven  acclaims  the  Victor        2 1  f 

twice  on  the  same  day  there  was  heard  the  shout  of  an  army  Summer  48 
advancing  into  battle,  and  so  clear  a  blast  of  trumpets  that  the 
whole  body  of  citizens  rushed  in  full  armour  to  their  places 
on  the  walls.  The  same  portent  was  repeated  at  Ptole- 
mais  ^ ;  while  at  Bergama  (Pergamum)  in  the  inmost  recesses 
of  the  temples,  where  none  but  the  priests  are  allowed  to  enter 
and  which  the  Greeks  call '  sanctuaries '  ^,  the  noise  of  cymbals 
was  distinctly  heard  :  and  at  Tralles '  in  the  temple  of  Victory, 
where  a  bust  of  Caesar  had  been  lately  consecrated,  a  palm- 
tree  was  pointed  out  as  having  during  those  days  sprouted 
through  the  masonry  of  the  roof,  between  the  joints  of  the 
stonework. 

It  was  while  still  in  Asia  Minor,  after  a  halt  of  a  few  days,  106 
that  intelligence  reached  Caesar  that  Pompeius  ha'd  been  seen 
in  Cyprus,  leading  to  the  obvious  conjecture  that  Egypt  was 
his  goal ;  not  merely  on  the  ground  of  his  own  intimate  con- 
nexion with  that  kingdom,  hut  also  because  of  the  other 
signal  advantages  offered  by  its  position.  He  accordingly 
embarked  with  the  single  legion  that  he  had  ordered  to 
follow  from  Thessaly,  and  a  second  which  had  been  detached 
from  Greece  (Achaia)  from  the  command  of  Quintus  Fufius ; 
and  with  the  addition  of  800  horse  and  ten  Rhodian  men-of- 
war  and  a  few  others  from  Asiatic  ports,  crossed  the  sea  to 
Alexandria.  Of  these  two  legions  the  present  strength  was 
only  3,200  men  :  the  remainder  of  the  corps  had  been  unable 
to  reach  him,  some  disabled  by  wounds  received  in  battle, 
others  by  the  exhaustion  following  on  their  long  and  fatiguing 
march.  Yet  even  with  such  weak  supports  he  had  not 
hesitated  to  continue  his  advance ;  and  relying  on  the  moral 

^  Probably  Acre  in  Palestine.  '  a^vra,  '  the  unapproachable.' 

'  In  Asia  Minor  on  the  Menderez  (Maeander),  nowAidin-Gazelhissar. 


2 1 6  Caesar  at  Alexandria 

Autumn  48  effect  produced  by  the  report  of  his  recent  victory  he  con- 
cluded that  all  places  would  prove  equally  safe  for  him. 
At  Alexandria  he  heard  of  the  death  of  Pompeius ;  and  he  had 
no  sooner  set  foot  on  shore,  than  he  was  greeted  by  a  shout 
of  challenge  from  the  troops  whom  the  king  had  left  to  garrison 
the  city,  and  a  crowd  was  seen  coming  out  to  protest  against 
the  official  insignia  ^  which  were  carried  before  him.  Such 
a  display,  the  whole  mob  declared,  was  a  slight  upon  the 
royal  dignity. 

This  disturbance  was  successfully  quelled ;  but  subsequently, 
owing  to  the  turbulence  of  the  populace,  frequent  riots 
became  of  daily  occurrence,  and  in  every  quarter  of  the  city 
J07  numbers  of  our  troops  were  killed.  Seeing  therefore  the 
threatening  aspect  of  the  situation,  Caesar  sent  orders  to 
Asia  Minor  for  a  further  reinforcement,  namely,  the 
legions  which  had  quite  recently  been  embodied  from  the 
surrendered  Pompeian  infantry :  it  was  impossible  for  him 
now  to  draw  back,  since  his  own  force  was  effectively  cooped 
up  in  Alexandria  by  the  Etesian  winds  which  so  seriously 
impede  navigation  from  that  port. 

Pending  their  arrival,  he  determined  to  investigate  the 
dispute  between  the  two  sovereigns  of  the  country.  Such 
a  task  he  regarded  as  falling  distinctly  within  the  sphere  of 
Roman  interests,  and  of  his  own  activities  as  chief  magistrate  ^ ; 
while  the  circumstance  that  it  was  in  his  first  consulship  that  a 
treaty  of  alliance,  ratified  by  both  Senate  and  popular  assembly, 
had  been  negotiated  with  their  father  Ptolemy,  constituted  a 
special  claim  upon  his  own  good  offices.  He  therefore  announced 
his  decision  that  King  Ptolemaeus  and  his  sister  Cleopatra 
should  each  disband  the  armies  they  had  on  foot,  and  fight 
^  The  fasces.  2  Consul. 


Internal  Condition  of  Egypt       2 1 7 

out  their  dispute  by  process  of  law  before  himself  rather  than  Autumn  48 
by  an  appeal  to  arms  between  each  other.  At  that  time  the  108 
regent  in  charge  of  the  kingdom  during  the  boy's 
minority  was  a  certain  eunuch  named  Pothinus.  This  fellow 
now  began  to  protest  indignantly,  amongst  his  own  ad- 
herents, against  the  notion  of  a  king  being  summoned  to 
trial ;  and  having  after  a  while  won  over  some  of  the  king's 
advisers  to  the  support  of  his  scheme,  he  secretly  sent  an 
order  calling  up  the  native  army  from  Pelusium  to  Alexandria, 
and  appointing  to  the  supreme  command  the  Achillas  whom 
we  have  already  mentioned.  In  a  written  dispatch,  supple- 
mented by  a  verbal  message,  he  first  excited  the  ambition 
of  the  newly-promoted  generalissimo  by  private  promises 
of  his  own,  further  enforced  by  those  of  the  king,  and  then 
proceeded  to  give  him  minute  instructions  as  to  the  steps 
he  was  to  take. 

Meanwhile  Caesar  found  that  in  the  will  of  the  late  king 
Ptolemy  there  were  set  down  as  joint  heirs  the  senior  of  his 
two  sons  and  the  elder  of  his  two  daughters ;  and  to  secure  this 
settlement  he  had  added  an  earnest  appeal  to  Rome,  by  all  that 
was  sacred  and  by  the  treaties  negotiated  with  us  in  the  capital, 
that  these  dispositions  should  not  be  disturbed.  One  copy 
of  this  instrument  had  been  brought  to  Rome  by  special 
envoys  of  the  king,  to  be  deposited  in  the  Treasury  (though 
owing  to  the  press  of  public  business  this  had  not  been  carried 
out,  the  document  being  stored  for  safety  at  the  residence 
of  Pompeius),  while  a  duplicate  version  fully  signed  had  been 
left  for  future  reference  at  Alexandria.  The  whole  matter  109 
was  under  investigation  by  Caesar,  whose  sole  desire  was  to 
effect  a  settlement  between  the  two  rulers  in  the  character 
of  a  common  friend  and  arbitrator,  when  the  proceedings 


2 1  8      Caesar  defied  by  the  Alexandrines 

Autumn  48  were  suddenly  interrupted  by  the  startling  announcement 
that  the  royal  army  with  all  its  cavalry  was  marching  on 
Alexandria.  In  this  emergency  Caesar,  whose  forces  were  by 
no  means  so  numerous  that  he  could  safely  rely  on  them  if 
compelled  to  fight  outside  the  walls,  had  no  alternative  but 
to  confine  himself  to  his  own  quarter  inside  the  city,  and 
there  to  ascertain  the  intentions  of  Achillas.  At  the  same  time 
his  troops  all  received  orders  to  remain  under  arms,  and  the 
king  was  strongly  urged  to  send  a  deputation  to  Achillas  from 
among  his  own  most  trusted  advisers,  to  convey  to  him  his 
pleasure  in  the  matter.  Two  of  these  were  accordingly  dis- 
patched, viz.  Dioscorides  and  Serapion,  both  of  them  men 
who  had  visited  Rome  as  plenipotentiaries  under  the  elder 
Ptolemy,  in  whose  counsels  they  had  exercised  very  consider- 
able influence.  These  made  their  way  to  the  Alexandrine,  but 
had  no  sooner  entered  his  presence  than,  without  either 
granting  them  audience  or  even  ascertaining  the  object  of 
their  mission,  he  gave  the  word  to  have  them  seized  and  put 
to  death.  Thereupon  one  of  the  two  was  savagely  wounded 
and  carried  off  for  dead  by  the  intervention  of  his  attendants  ; 
the  other  was  murdered  outright.  This  outrage  determined 
Caesar  to  keep  the  young  king  in  his  own  custody ;  for  not 
only  was  great  weight  attached,  as  he  conceived,  by  the  popu- 
lace to  the  royal  title,  but  the  responsibility  for  the  war 
would  thus  be  made  to  appear  the  independent  action  of 
a  band  of  cut-throats  rather  than  the  settled  determination 
of  the  sovereign. 
110  With  regard  to  the  forces  at  the  command  of  Achillas, 
neither  their  number,  composition,  nor  experience  rendered 
it  safe  to  hold  them  in  contempt.  Fully  20,000  men  were  at 
his  disposal.     Of  these  the  backbone  consisted  of  the  old 


Nature  of  their  Army  2 1 9 

Gabinian  troops,  men  who  by  long  residence  had  virtually  Autumn  48 
become  naturalized  Alexandrines,  familiar  with  all  the  wild 
licence  characteristic  of  that  city:  the  pride  of  race  and 
disciplined  habits  of  Rome  had  been  gradually  unlearned  : 
they  had  married  native  women,  and  many  of  them  had 
children  by  these  alliances.  Their  ranks  were  swelled  by  the 
sweepings  of  all  the  buccaneers  and  highwaymen  that  infest 
Syria,  the  province  of  Cilicia,  and  the  neighbouring  lands,while 
many  a  convict  whose  death  sentence  compelled  him  to  fly 
his  own  country  had  foregathered  in  this  city.  Besides  these 
there  was  a  contingent  of  our  own  runaway  slaves,  who  could 
always  count  on  a  safe  asylum  and  an  assured  means  of  liveli- 
hood in  Alexandria,  seeing  they  had  only  to  give  in  their  names 
to  be  at  once  enrolled  as  soldiers.  Should  any  of  their  number 
be  afterwards  seized  by  his  lawful  owner,  there  was  a  perma- 
nent understanding  among  the  troops  that  he  must  at  once 
be  rescued,  and  any  hand  laid  upon  one  of  their  fellows  would 
be  resisted  by  them  as  though  their  own  personal  safety  were 
threatened  ;  for  they  well  knew  that  one  and  all  were  involved 
in  a  similar  delinquency.  This  was  the  crew  whose  custom 
it  was  to  demand  the  lives  of  kings'  ministers,  to  carve  up  the 
property  of  wealthy  burgesses,  to  besiege  the  royal  palace 
with  demands  for  increased  pay,  to  banish  and  recall  from 
banishment  at  their  own  sweet  wiUj  all  in  obedience  to  what 
seems  an  immemorial  tradition  for  an  Alexandrine  army. 
Finally,  there  was  the  cavalry,  2,000  strong.  All  these  were 
old  campaigners :  they  had  served  in  the  innumerable  wars 
of  Alexandria,  they  had  restored  Ptolemy  to  his  throne,  slain 
two  sons  of  Bibulus,  and  fought  the  native  Egyptians — beyond 
doubt  a  formidable  record. 

Relying  on  this  material,  with  a  corresponding  contempt  m 


2  20    Caesar  retains  Command  of  the  Sea 

Autumn  48  for  the  weak  numbers  of  his  enemy,  Achillas  now  took  perma- 
nent occupation  of  the  whole  of  Alexandria,  except  the  portion 
commanded  by  Caesar  and  his  troops.  His  first  move  was  an 
attempt  to  rush  the  buildings  in  which  Caesar  himself  was 
quartered ;  but  picquets  were  posted  along  the  streets  and 
the  attack  was  successfully  met.  Simultaneously,  fighting  took 
place  down  by  the  harbour,  and  here  by  far  the  most  desperate 
struggle  was  occasioned.  The  enemy,  dividing  his  forces,  gave 
battle  in  several  thoroughfares  at  once,  and  endeavoured  by 
sheer  weight  of  numbers  to  gain  possession  of  the  warships  that 
were  lying  there.  Of  these  ships  fifty  formed  the  fleet  that 
had  been  recently  sent  to  the  support  of  Pompeius,  and  after  the 
crushing  defeat  in  Thessaly  had  since  returned  home  :  they 
were  all  either  four-  or  five-deckers  *,  and  constituted  a  thor- 
oughly equipped  and  sea-going  force.  In  addition,  there  were 
the  twenty-two  regular  guardships  of  Alexandria,  decked  boats 
every  one.  Should,  therefore,  the  enemy  once  succeed  in 
seizing  this  formidable  flotilla,  they  would  be  able  to  wrench 
from  Caesar  his  own  small  squadron,  and  by  their  undis- 
puted mastery  of  the  sea  cut  his  communications  with  the 
outside  world,  including  all  possibility  of  supplies  or  rein- 
forcements. The  action  was  therefore  contested  with  all  the 
obstinacy  demanded  by  the  crisis ;  for  while  with  one  party 
success  meant  a  speedy  triumph  for  their  arms,  defeat  for  the 
other  meant  disaster.  Victory,  however,  rested  with  Caesar, 
who,  recognizing  his  inability  with  so  weak  a  force  to  control 
so  wide  an  area,  first  set  fire  to  the  whole  fleet  and  the  rest 
of  the  ships  in  the  naval  yards,  and  then  hastily  landed  troops 
close  up  to  Pharus. 
112  Pharus  is  a  lighthouse  standing  upon  the  island  from  which 
*  Quadriremes  or  quinqueremes. 


ajid  waits  for  ^Enforcements 


221 


it  has  taken  its  name,  of  immense  height,  and  built  on  Autumn  4S 
a  strikingly  massive  scale.  It  is  the  position  of  this  island 
opposite  Alexandria  that  forms  the  harbour  of  that  city, 
although  at  its  upper  part  it  is  connected  with  the  main  town 
by  a  sea-mole  some  three-quarters  of  a  mile  in  length,  crowned 
with  a  narrow  causeway  and  bridge.  It  is  covered  with  houses 
of  the  native  Egyptians,  forming  a  quarter  equal  in  point  of 
size  to  an  ordinary  town  ;  and  if  any  passing  ships  find  them- 
selves a  trifle  out  of  their  course,  either  through  losing  their 
bearings  or  from  stress  of  weather,  they  are  plundered  by  its 
inhabitants  quite  after  the  manner  of  professional  pirates. 
Owing  moreover  to  the  narrowness  of  the  passage,  the  posses- 
sion of  Pharus  absolutely  controls  the  entrance  to  the  harbour ; 
and  it  was  the  apprehensions  excited  by  this  circumstance  that 
now  led  Caesar,  while  the  enemy's  attention  was  engrossed 
by  the  battle,  to  land  troops,  occupy  the  tower,  and  establish 
a  garrison.  He  thus  secured  a  safe  transit  for  his  oversea 
supplies  and  reinforcements,  which  were  now  summoned  by 
express  orders  from  aU  the  nearest  provinces  of  the  Empire. 

In  other  quarters  of  the  town  the  day's  fighting  ended  in 
a  drawn  battle  without  the  definite  repulse  of  either  party, 
a  result  due  to  the  restricted  nature  of  the  ground  ;  and  both 
sides  having  sustained  slight  casualties,  Caesar  drew  a  cordon 
round  all  the  positions  of  highest  strategical  value,  and  on 
them  proceeded  under  cover  of  night  to  construct  a  line  of 
defence-works.  The  quarter  so  enclosed  contained  a  tiny 
wing  of  the  royal  palace  where  apartments  had  been  found 
for  Caesar  upon  his  first  arrival,  and  also  a  theatre  abutting 
on  the  palace  which  served  as  a  citadel,  and  commanded 
approaches  both  to  the  harbour  and  the  other  naval  depots. 
These  fortifications  were  then  extended  on  succeeding  days 


2  22  Court  Intriguer 

Autumn  48  until  they  practically  formed  a  curtain-wall  effectually  pro- 
tecting him  from  being  forced  to  fight  against  his  will. 

In  the  midst  of  these  proceedings  the  younger  daughter 
of  the  late  king  Ptolemy,  in  the  fond  hope  that  the  throne 
was  now  without  an  occupant,  left  her  quarters  in  the  palace 
to  join  the  camp  of  Achillas,  where  she  at  once  began  to  co- 
operate with  him  in  the  conduct  of  the  war.  But  a  quarrel 
quickly  broke  out  between  them  on  the  question  of  pre- 
cedence, and  this  diversion  proved  greatly  to  the  profit  of  the 
common  soldiery,  as  both  parties  staked  heavily  to  win  their 
good  opinion.  Meanwhile,  the  enemy  being  thus  employed, 
Pothinus,  the  king's  guardian  and  regent  of  the  kingdom, 
although  professedly  acting  in  the  interests  of  Caesar,  was 
all  along  busily  intriguing  by  means  of  secret  correspondence 
with  Achillas,  whom  he  exhorted  not  to  lose  courage  but  to 
go  on  and  persevere  with  their  enterprise.  His  agents  were, 
however,  betrayed  and  arrested,  and  he  himself  thereupon 
put  to  death  by  the  orders  of  Caesar. 

Such  were  the  circumstances  that  occasioned  the  subse- 
quent Alexandrine  war. 


INDEX  OF  PROPER  NAMES 


[The  reference  is  always  to  the  chapters  of  the  Latin  text  as  given  in 
the  margin.     The  Roman  numerals  denote  the  book.] 


Achillas  iii  104,  108-II2. 
Acilius,  M'.  iii  15,  16,  39,  40. 
Acre  {Ptolemais)  iii  105. 
Acutius  Rufus  iii  83. 
Adbucillus  iii  59. 
Adriatic  i  25  ;    iii  78. 
Aeginium  iii  79. 
(Aelius,  L.)  Tubero  i  30,  31. 
(Aemilius,)  M.  Lepidus  ii  21. 
Afranius,  L.  i  37-43,  48-53,  60- 
76,  84,  87;  iii7,  18;  iii  83,  88. 
Africa,  North  i  30,  31 ;  ii  23,  28, 

32,  37- 

the  army  of  iii  10. 
Ahenobarbus  see  Domitius, 
Albe  {Alba)  i  15.  24. 
Albici  i  34,  56-58  ;  ii  2,  6. 
Alesia  iii  47. 
Alessio  (Lissus)  iii  26,  28,  29,  40, 

42,  78. 
Alexandria  iii  4,  103-11 2, 
Alexandrine  war  iii  122. 

army  iii  no. 
AUobroges  iii  59,  63,  79,  84. 
Amantia  iii  12,  40, 
Amanus,  Mt.  iii  31, 
Amphipolis  iii  102. 
Ampius,  T.  iii  105. 
Ancona  in, 
Androsthenes  iii  80. 
(Annius,  T.)  Milo  iii  2 1,  22. 
Anquillaria  ii  23. 
Antioch  iii  102,  105. 
Antiochus  of  Commagene  iii  4. 
Antonius : 

(a)  C.  iii  4,  10,  67. 


Antonius  : 

(b)  M.  i  2,  II,  18;  iii  24-30, 

34.  40.  46,  65,  89. 
Apollonia  iii  5,  11-13,  26,  30,  75, 

78,  79- 
(Appuleius,  L.)  Saturninus  i  7. 
Apulia  i  14,  17,  23  ;  iii  2. 
Aquitaine  {Aqrcitajiia)  i  39. 
Ardeche  (Helvii  AndArecomici)  i  35. 
Ariobarzanes  iii  4. 
Aries  (Arelate)  i  36. 
Arta  {Acarnania,  Amhracia,  and 

Amphilochi)  iii  36,  56,  58. 
Ascoli  (Asculum)  i  15. 
Asia  Minor  (Asia)   i   4 ;  iii   3-5, 

42,  53,  I05-I07' 
Asiatic  fleet  iii  5.  7,  40,  106. 
Asparagium  iii  30,  41,  76. 
Athamania  iii  78. 
Athens  {Athenae)  iii  3. 
Alius : 

(a)  T.  Labienus  i  15  ;  iii  13,  19, 
71,87. 

(b)  Q.  Varus  iii  37. 
Attius : 

(a)  the  Pelignian  i  18. 

(b)  P.  Varus  i  12,   13,    31  ;  ii 
23-36,  43,  44- 

(Aurelius),  M.  Cotta  i.  30. 
Ausetani  i  60. 
Avaricum  iii  47. 
Avenca  (Celtiberid)  i  38. 

Balbus  see  Cornelius. 

Bergama  {Pergamum)  iii  31,  105. 

Hessians  iii  4. 


2  24  Index  of  Proper  Names 


Bibulus  see  Calpurnius. 

Bithynia  iii  3. 

Boeotia  iii  4. 

Brindisi  (Brundisium)  i  24,  25-28, 

30  ;  iii  2, 6,  8,  14,  23-25,  87, 100. 
Brutus  see  Junius. 

Butrinto  {Butkroivm)  iii  16. 
By  His  iii  1 2,  40. 

Cadiz  (Gades)  ii  18,  20,  21. 
Caecilius  ; 

(a)  L.  Metellus  i  33. 

(b)  (Qi  Metellus  Pius)  Scipio  i 
2,  4.  6;  iii  4,  31,  33,  36-38, 
67.  78-83,  88,  90. 

(c)  L.  Rufus  i  23. 

(d)  T.  i  46. 

Caelius,  M.  Rufus  i  2;  iii  20-22. 
Caesar  see  Julius. 
Cagliari  {Carales)  i  30. 
Calabria  (Bruttium)  i  30. 
Calagurris  i  60. 
Caleuus  see  Fufius. 
Calidius,  M.  i  2. 
Calpurnius  : 

(a)  M.  Bibulus  iii  5,  7,  8,  14-18, 

31  ;  iii  1 10. 

(b)  L.  Piso  (Caesoninus)  i  3. 
Calvinus  see  Domitius. 
Calvisius,  C.  Sabinus  iii  34,  35,  56. 
Camerino  {Camarinuni)  i  15. 
Campania  i  14. 

Candavia  iii  II,  79- 

Caninius,  C.  Rebilus  i  26  ;  ii  24,  34. 

Canossa  (Canusinni)  i  24. 

Canuleius,  L.  iii  43. 

Capitol,  the  i  6. 

Cappadocia  iii  4. 

Capua  i  10,  14;  iii  21,  'jl. 

Carmona  ii  19. 

Casilinum  iii  21. 

Cassius  : 

(a)  C.  (Longinus)  iii  5,  loi. 

(b)  L.  Longinus  iii  34-36,  56. 

(c)  Q_.  Longinus  i  2  ;  ii  19,  31. 
Castor  see  Tarcondarius. 


Cato  see  Porcius. 

Cenca  {Citiga)  i  48. 

Ceraunian  Mts.  iii  6. 

Cilicia  iii  3,4,  88,  loi,  102,  1 10. 

Cingolo  (Cingulum)  i  15. 

Claudius : 

(a)  C.  Marcellus  i  6,  14  ;  iii  5. 

(b)  M.  Marcellus  i  2. 
Cleopatra  iii  103,  I07. 
Clodius  : 

(a)  A.  iii  57,90. 

(b)  (P.  Pulcher)  iii  21. 
Commagene  see  Antiochus. 
Considius,  C.  Longus  ii  23. 
Coponius,  C.  iii  5,  26. 
Cordova  (Cordubn)  ii  19-21. 
Corfu  (Corcyra)  iii  3,  7,  8,  11,  15, 

16,  58,  100. 
Cornelian  camp  ii  24,  25,  30,  37. 
Cornelius  : 

(a)  (L.)  Balbus  iii  19. 

(b)  L.  Lentulus  (Crus)  i   I,  2,  4, 
5,  14  ;  iii  4,  96,  102,  104. 

(c)  (P.)  Lentulus  Marcellinus  iii 
62,  64,  65. 

(d)  P.  Lentulus Spinther  i  15,  16, 
21-23;  iii  83,  102. 

(e)  L.  Sulla  (Felix)  i  4,  5,  7. 

(f)  (L.)  Sulla  Faustus  i  6. 

(g)  P.  Sulla  iii  51,  89,  99. 
Cosa  i  34 ;  iii  22. 

Cotta  see  Aurelius. 

Cotys  iii  4,  36. 

Crassus  see  Licinius  and  Otacilius. 

Crastinus  C.  iii  91,  99. 

Cremona  i  24. 

Crete  (Crela)  iii  4,  5. 

Curio  see  Scribonius. 

Curius  see  Vibius. 

Cyclades  iii  3. 

Cyprus  iii  102,  106. 

Cyrene  iii  5. 

Dalmatians  iii  9. 
Damasippus  see  Lici  nius. 
Dardanians  iii  4. 


Index  of  Proper  Names  227 


Decidius,  L.  Saxa  i  66. 
Deiotarus  iii  4. 
Delphi  iii  56. 
Diana  iii  33,  105. 
Dioscorides  iii  109. 
Domitius : 

(a)  L.  Ahenobarbus  16,  15-23, 

25.  34.  36,  56-58  ;  i>  3.  18,  22, 
28,  32  ;  iii  83,  89. 

(b)  Cn.  ii  42. 

(c)  Cn.  Calvinus  iii  34,  36-3S, 
78,  79,  89. 

Domnilaus  iii  4. 

Durazzo  (^Dyrrachium)  i  25,  27  7 
iii  5,9,  II,  13,  26,  30,  41,42, 
44.  53,  57,  58,  62,  78-80,  84, 
87,  89,  100. 

Ebro  {Hiberus)  i  60-63,  65,  68, 

69.  72,  73- 
Egus  iii  59,  79. 
Egypt  {Aegyptus)  iii  3,  5,  40,  104, 

106,  no,  112. 
Elis  iii  105. 
Ephesus  iii  35,  105. 
Epirus4,  12,  13,  42,47,  61,  78,80. 
Ergent  (Apsi^s)  iii  13,  19,  30. 
Estremadura  {Vettones)  i  38. 
Etesian  winds  iii  107. 

Fabius  : 

(a)  C.  i  37,  40,  48. 

(b)  the  Pelignian  ii  35. 
Fano  (Fanum)  in. 
Fiiustus  see  Comehus. 
Favonius,  M.  iii  36,  57. 
Fermo  (Firmunt)  i  16. 
Flaccus  see  Valerius. 
Fleginas,  C.  iii  71. 

Fufius,  Q.  Calenus  i  87  ;  iii  8,  14, 

26,  56,  106. 
Fulginius,  Q^  i  46. 
Fulvius  Postumus  iii  62. 

Gabinius,  A.  iii  4,  103,  IIO. 
Gallograecia  iii  4. 


Gallonius,  C.  ii  18,  20. 
Gaul  (Gallia)  i  6,  7,  29,  33,  39, 
48,  51  ;  ii  1,40;  iii  2,4,  22,  42, 

59,  79,  87- 
Gergovia  iii  73. 
Germany  {Germania)  i  7,  83 ;  iii 

4,  52,  87. 
Giglio  {Igilium)  i  34. 
Gomphi  iii  80,  81. 
Gracchi  i  7. 
Greece  {Achaia,  Graecia)  i  25  ;  iii 

3,  4,  5>  56,57,  106. 
Greeks  iii  il,  30,  102,  105. 
Guadalajara  {Celtiberia)  i  38. 
Guadiana  (Anas)  i  38. 
Gubbio  (Iguviutn)  i  12. 

Megesaretus  iii  35. 
Htraclia  iii  79. 

Hercules,  temple  of,  ii  18,  21. 
Hirrus  see  Lucilius. 
Huesca  {Osca)  160. 

lacetani  i  60. 

Iliurgavonenses  i  60. 

Illyricum  iii  9,  78. 

Isthmus  of  Corinth  iii  56. 

Italy  (Italia)  i  2,  6,^9,   25,  27, 

29.  30,  35,  48,  63;  »  17.  18, 
22,  32;  iii  I,  4,6,  10,  12,  13, 
18,  21,  22,  29,39,  42,  57,73, 
78,  82,  87. 
North  (Gallia  Cisalpina)  i  10, 
18,  29,  48  ;  iii  42,  87. 

Juba  16;  ii  25,  26,  36-44. 
Julian  law  i  14. 
Julius : 

(a)  C.  Caesar  passim 

(b)  L.  Caesar  i  8,  10  ;  ii  23. 

(c)  Sex.  Caesar  ii  20. 
(Junius)  D,  Brutus  i  36,56,  57;  ii 

3,5.6,  22. 

Klibia  (Clupea)  ii  23. 
Labienus  see  Alius. 


226  Index  of  Proper  Names 


Laelius,  D.  iii  5,  'j,  40,  lOO. 
Lanciano  (^Frentani)  i  23. 
Larino  {Larinnni)  i  23. 
Larissa  iii  80,  81,  96-98. 
Latin  festival  iii  2. 
Legion  : 
(a)  Caesar's — 

Eighth  i  18  ;  iii  89. 

Ninth  i  45;    iii  45,  46,  62, 
63,66,  67,  89. 

Tenth  iii  89,  91. 

Eleventh  iii  34. 

Twelfth  i  15  ;  iii  34. 

Thirteenth  17,  12,  18. 

Fourteenth  i  46. 

Twenty-seventh  iii  34. 
(b)  Pompeius's  (see  iii  4) — 

First  iii  88. 

Third  iii  88. 

Cilician  iii  4,  88. 

Syrian  iii  88. 

'  Vernacular  '  ii  20. 
Lentulus  see  Cornelius. 
Lepanto  (Naiipactus)  iii  35. 
Lepidus  see  Aemilius. 
Leptis  ii  38. 
Libo  see  Scribonius. 
Liburnian  fleet  iii  5,  9. 
Licinius  : 

(a)  M.  Crassus  iii  31. 

(b)  Damasippus  iii  44. 
Lissa  {Issa)  iii  9. 

Livadia  {Aetolia)  iii  34,  35,  56,  61. 
Longinus  see  Cassius. 
Lucceius,  L.  iii  18. 
Lucera  {Liicerid)  i  24. 
Lucilius  Hirrus  115;  iii  82. 
Lucretius  : 

(a)Q^ii8. 

(b)  Vespillo  iii  7. 
Lupus  see  Rutilius. 
Lusitanians  i  44,  48. 

Macedonia  iii  4,   il,  33,    34,   36, 
57,  79,  102. 
Independent  iii  39. 


Magius,  N.  i  24,  26. 

Manlius,  L.  Torquatus  i  24  ;  iii  11. 

Marcellinus  see  Cornelius. 

Marcellus  see  Claudius. 

Marcius  : 

(a)  (L.)  Philippus  i  6. 

(b)  Rufus  ii  23,  24,  43. 
Marrucini  ii  34. 

Marseilles  {Massilia)  i  34-36,  56- 
58;  ii  I,  3,  7,  14,  15,  17,  18, 
21,  22. 

Marsi  i  15,  20 ;  ii  27,  29. 

Medjerda  (5agTa£/as)  ii  24,  26,38, 

39- 
Menedemus  iii  34. 

Messina  (Messana)  ii  3  ;  iii  1 01. 

Metellus  see  Caecilius. 

Metropolis  iii  80,  81. 

Milo  see  Anius. 

Minucius : 

(a)  Rufus  iii  7. 

(b)  Thermus  i  12. 
Missolonghi  (Calydon)  iii  35. 
Morocco  {Mauretania)  i  6,  39,  60. 
Munatius,  L.  Plancus  i  40. 
Murcus  see  Statius. 

Mytilene  iii  102. 

Naples  (Neapolis)  iii  21. 
Narbonne  (Narho)  i  37  ;  ii  21. 
Nasidius,  L,  ii  3,  4,  7. 
Nismes  {Volcae)  i  35. 
Noricum  i  18. 

Numidians  ii  25,  38,  39,  41. 
Nymphaeum  iii  26. 

Octavius,  M.  iii  5,  9. 

Octogesa  i  61,  68,  70. 

Opimius,  M.jii  38. 

Orchomenus  iii  56. 

Oricum  iii  7,   11-16,  23,   34,   39, 

40,  78,  90. 
Ortona  {Marrucini)  i  23. 
Osimo  (Auximwn)  i   12,  13,  15, 

Otacilius  Crassus  iii  28,  29. 
Oviedo  (Cantabri)  i  38. 


Index  of  Proper  Names  227 


Palaeste  iii  6. 

Parthians  i  9  ;  iii  31,  82. 

Parthini  iii  11,  41,  42. 

Pcdius,  Q.  iii  22. 

Peligni  i  25 ;   ii  29. 

Pelusium  iii  103,  108. 

Pentima  {Corfinium)  i  15-20,  23- 

25,  34;  ii  28,  32;  iii  10. 
Pesaro  (Pisaurum)  i  li,  12. 
Petra  iii  42. 
Petreius,  M.  i  38-43,  53,   61-67, 

72-76,  87  ;  ii  17,  18. 
Pharus  iii  iii,  112. 
Philippus  see  Marcius. 
Phoenicia  iii  3,  loi. 
Piacenza  (Placentia)  iii  "J I, 
Piceno  [Picenum)  i  12,  15,  29. 
Piso  see  Calpurnius. 
Plancus  see  Munatius. 
Plotius,  M.  iii  19. 
Po  (Padiis)  iii  87. 
Pompeius  : 

(a)  Cn.  (Magnus)  the  elder  i  i- 
39.  53,  60,  61,  76,  84;  ii3,  17, 
18,  25,  32;  iii  1-33,  41-111, 

(b)  Cn.  the  younger  iii  4,  5,  40. 
Pomponius,  M.  iii  loi. 

Pontus  iii  3,  4. 

(Porcius)  M.  Cat©  (of  Utica)  i  4, 

30,  32- 
Portugal  {Lusitania)  i  38. 
Postumus  see  Fulvius. 
Pothinus  iii  108,  112. 
Pozzuoli  (Puleoli)  iii  71. 
Provence  (Gallia  Narboiiensis)  i  39, 

51;  ii  I. 
Ptolemy : 

(a)  (Auletes)  the  father  iii  4,  103, 
107-110,  112, 

(b)  (Dionysus)  the  son  iii  103, 
104,  106-109,  112. 

Puleio,  T.  iii  67. 
Pupius,  L.  i  13. 
Pyrenees  i  37;  iii  19. 

Quintilius,  Sex.  Varus  i  23  ;  ii  28. 


Rcbilus  see  Caninius. 

Rhascypolis  iii  4. 

Rhodes  iii  5,  26,  27,  102,  I06. 

Rhone  (Rhodamis)  ii  I. 

Rimini  {AriminutJi)  i  8,  IO-I2. 

Rodez  {Ruleni)  i  51. 

Roman   citizens  i  30 ;  ii   18-21  ; 

iii  4,  9,  10,  29,  32,  40,  102. 
Roman  people  or  government,  i  7, 

9,  22,  35  ;  iii  II,   12,  107,  108, 

110. 
Roman    knights   i    17,     23,    77  '' 

ii  18  ;  iii  71. 
Rome,  the  city  of,  i  2,  3,  5,6,  9, 

I4>  32-34,  53;  ii  22,  32;  iii   I, 

2,  10,  83,  108,  109. 
Roscius,  L.  i  3,  8,  lo. 
Roucillus  iii  59,  79- 
Rubrius,  L.  i  23. 
Rufus  see  Acutius,  Coelius,  Marcius, 

Minucius,  Sulpicius,  VibuUius. 
Rutilius  Lupus  i  24;  iii  56. 

Sabinus  see  Calvisius. 

Saburra  ii  38-42. 

Sacrativir,  M.  iii  71. 

Sadala  iii  4. 

Salonae  iii  9. 

Santander  (Cantabri)  i  38. 

Santiponce  (Italica)  ii  20. 

Sardinia  i  30,  31  ;  iii  10. 

Sasino  (Sason)  iii  8, 

Saturninus  i  "J. 

Saxa  see  Decidius. 

Scaeva  iii  53. 

Schkumbi  (Genusiis)  iii  75,  7^* 

Scipio  see  Caecilius. 

Scribonius : 

(a)  C.  Curio  i  12,  18,  30,  31  ; 
ii  3,  23-43;  iii  10. 

(b)  Liboi  26;  iii  5,  15-18,  23, 
24,  90,  100. 

Segre  (Sicoris)  i   40,  48,  61-63, 

83- 
(Sempronii)  Gracchi  i  7. 
Septimius,  L.  iii  104. 


2  28   '.        Index  of  Proper  Names 


Serapion  iii  109. 

Sertorius  Q;^  i  61. 

Servilius,  P.  iii  I,  21. 

Seville  {Hispalis.)  ii  18,  20. 

Sicily  {Sicilia)  i  25,  30,  31  ;  ii  23, 

30,  32,  34.  37.  43,  44  ;  '»  io> 

42,  101. 
straits  of  i  29  ;  ii  3  ;  iii  loi. 
Sierra    Moreiia    (Saltus   Castulo- 

iiensis)  i  38. 
Spain  {Hispania)  i  30,  34,  37-39, 

61,  74,  85-87;  ii  I,  32,37;  iii 

2,  10,  47,  83. 
Spain,  Eastern  i  22,  29,  38,  39,48, 

49;  ii  7,  17,  18,  21. 
Western  i  38,  39  ;  ii  17-21. 
Spains,  the  two  i  2,  9-1 1,  29,  39, 

85;  ii  18,  32;  iii  3,  10,  73. 
Spaniards  ii  2I,  40;  iii  22,  88. 
Sparta  {Lacedaemoti)  iii  4. 
Spinther  see  Cornelius. 
Staberius,  L.  iii  12. 
Statins  Murcus  iii  15,  16. 
Sulla  see  Cornelius. 
Sulmona  i  18. 
Sulpicius  : 

(a)  Ser.  ii  44. 

(b)  P.  Rufus  i  74;  iii  loi. 
Susa  (Hadnimetum)  ii  23. 

Syria  i  4,  6;  iii  3,  4,  31,32,  lOl, 

103,  105,  no. 
Syrian  fleet  iii  5. 
legions  iii  4,  88. 

Tarcondarius  Castor  iii  4. 
Tarragona  {Tarraco)  i  60,  73,  78  ; 

ii  21. 
Taurois  ii  4. 
Terracina  i  24. 
Terentius  : 

(a)  A.  Varro  iii  19. 


Terentius : 

(b)  M.  Varro  i  38  ;  ii  17,  19-21. 
Termoli  (Frentani)  i  23. 
Theb.'S  iii  56. 
Theophanes  iii  18. 
Thernius  see  Minucius. 
Thessaly  (Thessalia)  iii  4,  5,  34- 

36,  79-82,  100,  loi,  106,  III. 
Thrace  iii  4,  95. 
Thurii  iii  21,  22. 
Tiburtius,  L.  iii  19. 
Tillius,  Q..  iii  42. 
Torquatus  see  Manlius. 
Tralles  iii  105. 
Trebonius  C.  i  36;  ii  i,  5,  13,  15  ; 

iii  21,  22. 
Triarius  see  Valerius. 
Tubero  see  Aelius. 
Tullus  see  Volcatius. 
Tuticanus  Gallus  iii  71. 

Utica  i  31  ;  ii  23-26,  36-38,  44. 

Valerius : 

(a)  L.  Flaccus  iii  53. 

(b)  (P.)  Flaccus  iii  53. 

(c)  (Q^  Orca)  i  30,  31. 

(d)  C.  Triarius  iii  5,  92. 
Varro  see  Terentius. 

Varus  see  Atius,  Attius,  Qnintilius. 
Var  {Varus)  i  86,  87. 
Vatinius,  P.  iii  19,  90,  lOO. 
Veglia  (Curicta)  iii  8,  10. 
Vespillo  see  Lucretius. 
Vibius  Curius  i  24. 
Vibo  iii  loi. 
VibuUius,  L.  Rufus  i   15,   34,  38  ; 

iii  10,  II,  15,  18,  22. 
Vistritsa  {Haliacmon)  iii  36,  37. 
Volcatius  Tulliis  iii  52. 
Volusenus,  C.  fii  60. 


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