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REV. F. P. LONG, M.A. 













The Text followed in this translation has been, apart from 
one place in the second book (c. Ii), where I have retained 
a passage on intrinsic grounds which has not perhaps strong 
MS. authority, and another in Book III (c, 48), where I have 
hazarded a conjecture in a corrupted passage, the Clarendon 
Press edition of Du Pontet, from which also I have adapted 
the Index. 

In preparing the rough maps and plans which accompany 
the Text, my obligations to previous editors, especially to 
Stoffel, are obvious. 

I take this opportunity to express my thanks to Mr. H. J. 
Cunningham, Fellow of Worcester College, for his kindness 
:n reading the whole of the version, and for many valued 
suggestions : also to the Provost of Oriel who read the 
proofs while passing through the Press. 

F P. L. 

Poi, presso al tempo che tutto il ciel voile 
ridur lo mondo a suo modo sereno, 
Cesare, per voler di Roma, il tolle : 

e quel che fe' da Varo infino al Reno, 
Isara vide ed Era e vide Senna, 
ed ogni valla onde Rodano & pieno. 

Quel che fe' poi ch* egli usci di Ravenna, 
e saltd Rubicon, fu di tal volo 
che nol seguiteria lingua n^ penna. 

In ver la Spagna rivolse lo stuolo; 
poi ver Durazzo, e Farsalia percosse 
si ch' al Nil caldo si senti del duolo. 

Antandro e Simoenta, onde si mosse, 
rivide, e la dov' Ettore si cuba, 
e mal per Tolommeo poi si riscosse : 

da indi scese folgorando a Juba, 
poscia si volse nel vostro occidente, 
dove sentia la Pompeiana tuba. 

Dante, Paradiso vi. 55-72. 




Italy and Spain 


I. The Outbreak of War (1-28) ... I 

II. The Safeguarding of the West (29-55) . 26 

III. The First Naval Engagement (56-58) . -47 

IV. The Reward of a Great Strategist (59-87) . 50 


Marseilles and North Africa 

I. An Historic Siege (1-16) . . . -73 

II. The Clearing of Southern Spain (17-22) . 87 

III. The Set-back in Africa (23-44) • ♦ '94 


Dyrrachium and Pharsalia 

I. The Passage of the Adriatic (1-19) . .116 

II. A Backwater of the Revolution (20-22) . 135 

III. The Lines of Dyrrachium (23-57) • -138 

IV. The Forcing of the Blockade (58-87) . . 170 
V. Pharsalus and After (88-112) . . .199 

Index of Proper Names ..... 223 


Central and S. Italy . 
Plan of Brindisi 
N. E. Spain . 
Campaign of Lerida . 
Lerida and the Ebro . 
Plan of Marseilles 
Coast between Marseilles 
Campaign in N. Africa 
The Greek Peninsula . 
Bay of Durazzo . 

. ^ 

n? face 

















^ND Toulon 












Most historical parallels are deceptive, but none the less § i 
many may be instructive. Among the latter is that fre- 
quently drawn by an English reader between the Roman and 
the British Empires. Many problems of government have 
doubtless been common to the two. The administration of 
backward races, the reform of decayed monarchies, the adjust- 
ment of local autonomy and national character with eflFective 
imperial control, the relations of the circumference with the 
centre, and the due subordination of great governors to the 
home government that appoints them ; these and many 
more than these have alike presented themselves to the Roman 
and to the British politician, and have compelled from both 
their several efforts at solution. In both cases an empire has 
been built up by a great military and commercial people, 
endowed by Nature vnih. a rare genius for the government 
both of themselves and of others, and in each case the value 
and the endurance of that empire is determined by the moral 
qualities that underlie its rule. Beyond such general princi- 
ples, the parallel perhaps ceases to be fruitful. The world- 
dominion of the Roman was achieved by the steady expansion 
of a virile people, living under the freest of democratic insti- 
tutions, who first extended the hegemony of their city-state 
on the Tiber over their kinsmen in the Campagna and Latium, 
then over the whole Italian peninsula, and then, in wave 
after wave of conquest, over the entire basin and hinterland 
of the Mediterranean. 

viii Introduction 

Throughout the various stages of this expansion there had 
ever been present in imagination the striking dictum of the 
great Athenian historian, that Democracy and Empire are 
incompatibles. The truth of this dictum he had recognized 
in the premature downfall of his own imperial city, and it was 
now being tried afresh in the marvellous growth of the more 
western people. Yet we must remember that during the 
really critical period of the rise of Rome it was not democracy 
but rather an oligarchy that had guided the nation. During 
the life and death struggle with Hannibal and the other great 
wars both before and after, it was the Roman Senate, filled 
by representatives of all the great families in the state, trained 
from earliest youth in the conduct of affairs, and holding their 
seats for life, that shaped the foreign policy and directed the 
armies of the Republic. It is true that the annual magis- 
trates were elected by the people, and that this people held 
other sovereign rights, such as that of declaration of war and 
conclusion of peace, not to mention its prerogatives in civil 
matters ; but for all practical purposes the constitution at 
this time was an aristocracy, and sovereignty lay in that august 
body which won from awe-struck foreigners the famous title 
of ' an assembly of kings ', The difficulty was that this pre- 
eminence of the Senate rested as much on unchallenged 
custom as on any ultimate and original law of the constitution. 
No one could say with certainty what this constitution was. 
Polybius, the Greek historian of the second century B.C., 
whose admiration for Roman institutions is only equalled by 
his sagacity in analysing them, is at much pains to point out 
its highly ' mixed ' character, and the subtilty with which 
the various elements were held in solution, and checks imposed 
tor preserving its equilibrium. Mommsen speaks of it in its 

Introduction ix 

earliest days as ' a constitutional monarchy inverted ' ; and, 
substituting the collective senatorial ' kings ' for the single 
' king ', this description applies equally to its later stages. 
Whilst the Roman people was the sole fount of honour and 
source of pardon, functions that with us attach to the Crown 
as its special prerogatives, the real power lay in the assembly 
of nobles, which was virtually independent of the commons. 
But however excellent in its results this rule of the Senate 
during its best days may have been, at times of storm and 
stress when its strong patriotism and sound political sense 
shine out the more brightly the darker grows the political 
outlook for the nation, it was not to be expected that this 
monopoly of power would remain unchallenged when such 
times had disappeared. Nor, we may add, was it to be ex- 
pected that a body which was practically a close corporation 
of privileged families, with difficulty recruited from below, 
should for ever retain its native qualities and vitality, when 
the vital occasions for their exercise had passed, and the dis- 
integrating forces of prosperity and growing wealth, and the 
social changes which these bring, began to make themselves felt. 
By the year 133 B.C., Rome was the undisputed mistress of 
the Mediterranean. Carthage had been finally destroyed in 
146 B.C., and Greece as a political force had ceased to exist in 
the same year, by the destruction of the commercial city of 
Corinth. The Spanish peninsula had been conquered after 
a protracted struggle, and Macedon become a Roman pro- 
vince ; whilst the country then known as ' Asia ' (i. e. the 
western end of Asia Minor), had been bequeathed to Rome 
by its last native ruler. It is significant that in this year 
occurred the first of those many attempts at reform which 
mark the close of Roman republican government, and which 

X Introducttcn 

continued intermittently until the Republic was finally super- 
seded by the absolute monarchy of Caius Julius Caesar in 
49 B.C. This reform movement need not detain us here. 
It is enough to remember that it was in many respects 
a genuine effort to redress social and political inequalities, 
and to break down the walls of privilege. The middle and 
lower classes had done their share in the hard fighting and 
self-sacrifice necessary for the acquisition of empire, and now 
that it was won they naturally claimed a share in the spoils. 
' New men,' i.e. men outside the charmed circle of senatorial 
nobility, and sprung from the people itself, begin to appear 
on the political stage, and to demand admission to the high 
oflices of State and to the lucrative emoluments which these 
carried both at home and abroad. If wars were bungled by 
senatorial incapacity and provincials plundered by senatorial 
oppression, the people did not intend to look idly on, whilst 
these defaulters were secure against all punishment, by the 
constitutional arrangement which restricted the ranks of jury- 
men to the same social class as that of the distinguished 
culprits. Moreover the very basis of the franchise needed 
widening. Rome, the mistress of the world, was still a city- 
state, of the ordinary type characteristic of ancient civilization, 
and the Italian people, who had shed their blood in the foreign 
wars, were absolutely outside the pale of her citizenship. 
This anomaly was only remedied after a bitter struggle lasting 
from 91-88 B.C. ; but the remedy, so far as practical politics 
were concerned, proved to be wellnigh valueless. Repre- 
sentative institutions being unknown to ancient political 
philosophy, the vote of an Italian could only be effective if 
recorded in Rome: consequently, the franchise was rarely ex- 
ercised, and the best part of the nation was still deprived of any 

Introduction xi 

real voice In the shaping of the national destinies. It is not 
difficult to foresee the inevitable results of such a system. 
Instead of a strong national middle class as the guarantee of 
social order and imperial unity and the source of all legislation, 
the Italians only tended to become indifferent to the fortunes 
of the empire, except from purely selfish reasons, and legisla- 
tion came to be controlled more and more by one or two 
dominant figures in Rome for the time being, who turned it 
to their ovm aggrandisement by debauching, through every 
conceivable form of bribery, the worthless proletariat of the 
city. The only way in which the Senate could have controlled 
its own members, if these were disposed to defy constituted 
authority through reliance on the military arm, would have 
been if it had really contained in itself the best and ablest men 
of the country, and if it had rested for its position on a truly 
national and representative basis. Failing that, it was clear 
that absolute power must sooner or later gravitate into the 
hands best fitted to its exercise. 

Caius Julius Caesar was born probably in the year 102 B.C., 
his great rival Cnaeus Pompeius being four years his senior. 
Their boyhood was passed amid the fierce civil war between 
Rome and her Italian allies, followed by another similar strug- 
gle between the popular party under Marius and the senatorial 
under Sulla. It was in 83 B.C., when Sulla returned from his 
campaign against Mithridates, King of Pontus, that the young 
Pompeius, then only twenty- three years of age, raised an army 
in central Italy and helped the chief of the oligarchy to crush 
the democratical government, for which share in the victory 
he was formally saluted ' Imperator ' by the conqueror. 
Pompeius thus won his spurs as a commander in the field many 
years before his rival, and this remarkable reputation as a 

xii Introduction 

soldier of consummate genius and as easily the first general 
of his day, he never again lost, until at the close of his life he 
found himself face to face with the somewhat younger con- 
queror of Gaul. Honours followed thick upon him. In 
8 1 B.C. Sulla entrusted him with the recovery from the 
Marians of Northern Africa, and from Africa he was sent by 
the triumphant Senate into Spain, to stamp out there the 
remnant of democratic resistance then being gallantly main- 
tained under the genius of Sertorius. Meanwhile Sulla was 
dead, and Pompeius, returning to Italy in 71 B.C., was just in 
time to gather further laurels by robbing Marcus Crassus of 
the certain honour of finishing the troublesome Slave War. 
The next year, 70 b.c, these two men were consuls together, 
although Pompeius had held none of the lower magistracies, 
nor indeed ever did hold them, and though he was seven years 
short of the recognized age for that office, being then only 36. 
Very different had been the lot of Caesar. His sympathies 
and his ties were all with the other party. Not only was he 
closely related to Marius, who had married his father's sister 
Julia, but in 84 B.C. he had himself married a daughter (Cor- 
nelia) of Cinna the great democratical leader, four times consul 
during Sulla's absence in the East ; and when Sulla on his 
return ordered him, for political reasons, to divorce his bride, 
he had boldly refused, although Pompeius had obeyed the 
Dictator in a similar demand. But though at the intercession 
of powerful friends his life was spared, he deemed it advisable 
to withdraw to Asia Minor, where war against Mithridates 
was again threatening to break out. Here he saw service, and 
at the siege of Mytilene won the equivalent of our own 
Victoria Cross for conspicuous gallantry in the field. Return- 
ing after the death of Sulla in 78 b.c, he refused to join all 



premature attempts to undo the work of the great reactionist, 
preferring to bide his time as a politician, and meanwhile to 
seek a reputation at the Bar. Comparative failure as a speaker 
soon led him to leave Rome once more, and to study at Rhodes 
under the famous teacher of rhetoric, Molon. On his way 
out occurred the well-known story of his capture by pirates, 
who at this time swarmed in the Mediterranean. During 
this visit also he acted on a critical occasion with all that 
promptitude and willingness to take responsibility which so 
distinguished him in later life. Mithridates was recommenc- 
ing war, and it was touch and go with the Roman province 
of ' Asia ', which threatened to revolt. The young Caesar, 
then 27, instantly raised a body of troops, and by the vigour 
and rapidity of his movements saved the province for Rome. 
Home again at the close of 74 B.C., he seems to have remained 
quietly in the capital, though actively supporting his party 
in their campaign against the Sullan legislation, until we come 
to the return of Pompeius from Spain and his first consulship 
with Crassus in 70 b.c. 

The next ten years were spent by him in passing through 
the usual cursus honorum of every Roman public man — the 
quaestorship (68 B.C.), aedileship (65 B.C.), and praetorship 
(62 B.C.), and they were marked on the whole by a steady 
gain of democracy upon senatorial prerogative, as reconsti- 
tuted under the Sullan regime. As quaestor, or governor's 
paymaster, Caesar's province had been Farther or Western 
Spain ; and at the close of his praetorship he had himself 
governed the same country as propraetor, thereby doubly 
identifying himself with Western peoples, whilst his rival was 
for the future to stand rather as the champion of the East. 
For in Sy b.c. there had been enacted the first of those great 

xiv Introduction 

military commissions, which more than anything else brought 
about the downfall of the Republic, by habituating men's 
minds to the sight and the necessity of supreme power in the 
hands of an individual. And, strange to say, they were all 
effected by popular legislation, at the instance of leading 
tribunes of the people, whose chief function in these latter 
days was to subserve the interests of the rival heads of the two 
great parties in the State. The Gabinian Law of this year 
gave Pompeius as his 'province' the entire Mediterranean, 
with administrative powers equal to those of the actual pro- 
vincial governors anywhere within fifty miles of the coast, 
and the absolute control of the military and financial resources 
of the empire, for the purpose of ending the intolerable state 
of things brought about by the insolence of the pirates. It 
was followed next year (66 B.C.) by a similar measure, trans- 
ferring to him the command against Mithridates, a work 
which kept him in the East for the next five years. Mean- 
while in 63 B.C. had occurred the Catilinarian conspiracy, the 
desperate outbreak of the extreme revolutionary party led by 
a desperate and broken man. How far Caesar was implicated 
— he was then praetor elect — must remain a question of 
opinion, but we may notice that in the historic debate on the 
punishment of the ringleaders, when he pleaded for modera- 
tion in the masterly speech of a great statesman, he was openly 
menaced by the naked swords of his opponents, and that when 
most of those sitting next him sheered off at the threatened 
danger, Curio was one of the small band who drew round 
their leader prepared to offer resistance — that same Curio 
who fills such a pathetic place in Caesar's own pages in the 
second book of these Commentaries. We may also observe 
that it was by Cato, of whom we are also to hear much, that 



the good impression made by Caesar's speech was undone, and 
the judicial murder of the Catilinarians forced upon the Senate. 
We can now pass to the summer of the year 60 b.c. Pom- 
peius had landed at Brindisi some eighteen months before, 
and to the great relief of aU parties had dismissed his army 
of veterans at a moment when empire lay in the hollow of 
his hand. Caesar arrived home from Spain outside the gates 
of Rome on the eve of the consular elections, for which three 
weeks' personal canvassing inside the city was required by law. 
He must, therefore, either renounce his triumph for his 
Spanish operations (since military command in Rome ceased 
when its holder crossed the city boundary), or else obtain 
a dispensation, a course certainly not without precedent. 
Again it was Cato who persuaded the Senate to reject his 
demand ; whereupon Caesar gave up his triumph and was 
duly elected consvd for 59 B.C., his colleague being Marcus 
Bibulus, who figures largely in the Civil War, an uncom- 
promising upholder of Senatorial prerogative. Into the acts 
of his first consulship we need not enter here. Suffice it 
to say that Caesar formed an alliance with Pompeius, the 
master of many legions, and with Crassus, no less the master 
of money bags, and that between them the three men carried 
through all the legislation they deemed desirable, including 
the ratification of Pompeius's settlement of the East, and the 
various problems raised by his great extension of the empire 
in that quarter. This political alliance was sometime this 
year further cemented by a marriage between Pompeius and 
Caesar's only daughter, Julia, who, as long as her short life 
was spared, continued to act as a strong bond of union and 
potent influence for good between the two statesmen. At 
the close of his term of office Caesar went oflE to his new 

xvi Introduction 

Governorship. This was the northern part of Italy, known 
then as Cisalpine Gaul, and Illyricum, now represented by 
Bosnia and the Adriatic provinces of Austria-Hungary, These 
had been granted him for five years by another of those Tri- 
bunician laws already mentioned, and the Senate had after- 
wards added the Transalpine province (the old Provence) 
where danger was threatening from the movements of power- 
ful Gallic tribes. What his work was there is known to all 
readers of his own Commentaries. We may, however, 
notice the marked difference between the positions at this 
time of the two leading men at Rome. While Pompeius was 
virtually at the close of his military career, that of Caesar 
was only now commencing. It was not exactly a case of the 
rising and the setting sun, for Pompeius continued for the 
next nine years to be easily the first man in Italy as also in 
the eyes of the Roman world in general ; but from the time 
of his return home in 6l B.C., until he unsheathed his sword 
against his rival in 49 B.C., he was never again at the head of 
an army in the field, whereas, with trifling interruptions 
Caesar was campaigning aU the while. 

We need not follow either the fortunes of Caesar in Gaul 
or those of Pompeius in the capital for the next few years. 
A few decisive dates must however be noted. Early in 56 B.C. 
the two leaders met in conference at the city of Lucca on the 
Cisalpine frontier (for no Roman governor might leave his 
province), where it was arranged that Pompeius and Crassus 
should share the consulship for the next year, to be followed 
by an important grant of provinces and armies, at the same 
time that Caesar's own command was extended for five years 
more. The triumvirs naturally had their way, and at the 
close of the year 55 B.C., Crassus went ofi to his death at the 

Introduction xvif 

hands of the Parthians In the great Roman disaster of Carrhae, 
whilst Pompeius stayed at home as proconsul and preferred to 
govern his Spanish provinces by two of his trusty lieutenants- 
general. So things continued till 52 B.C., when the constant 
rioting and utter lawlessness prevailing in Rome caused Pom- 
peius to be nominated sole consul by the Senate, and given 
supreme power to meet the crisis. Martial law was pro- 
claimed, and the capital overawed by the presence of the 
legions which Pompeius was now commissioned to raise. It 
is from this year onward that the rift between him and Caesar 
begins to widen. Crassus was dead, and Julia, the well- 
beloved wife and daughter, was dead also, and thus had 
disappeared together the two strongest influences for peace. 
Caesar was in the throes of a terrible uprising of the Gauls 
which threatened to wreck all his work, and for the time was 
powerless to intervene in city politics. No wonder then that 
ancient historians represent Pompeius at this period as vir- 
tually monarch. But though Caesar perforce acquiesced in 
this aggrandizement, yet his adherents managed to obtain 
some sort of counterpoise in their master's interest. It is at 
this point we reach what is technically known as the question 
between Caesar and the Senate, and as it is inextricably bound 
up with the outbreak of the Civil War, it is highly important 
to hold it clearly before our minds. 

According to the usual explanation of this question, 
Caesar's command expired on March I, 49 B.C., and he 
desired election that summer for the consulship of 48 B.C. 
During his long absence from the capital the animosity of 
his opponents had only intensified, and with Cato at their 
head they were now eagerly waiting their chance to impeach 
him for numerous acts in his province, as soon as ever he 

LONG \j 

xviii Introduction 

appeared in Rome for the elections. He would then be 
merely a private citizen, and as such amenable to prosecu- 
tion. At his request therefore, and presumably with the 
approval of Pompeius, a law was passed this year (52 b.c.) 
by the whole coUege of ten tribunes, granting him dispensa- 
tion from a personal canvass, a course that had been refused 
him in 60 b.c. Doubtless this was a privilege, but it was one 
well within constitutional usage, and it issued from the fount 
of all honour, viz. the People. So far so good : Caesar's 
position seemed secured, and no interval would elapse between 
his old command as proconsul and his new status as consul. 
As an actual magistrate of the Republic he would be inviolate, 
and Cato and his clique would have to wait at least another 
year for their revenge. We have said his governorship expired 
on March i, 49 b.c, but he would not naturally be succeeded 
in his provinces until January, 48 b.c. Since Sulla's time 
governors had proceeded to their provincial commands imme- 
diately after their year of office in Rome, and as Caesar would 
still be in legal possession on January i, 49 b.c, his provinces 
would not form part of those taken by the magistrates of 
50 B.C. but of 49 B.C., and Caesar would be left undisturbed 
until succeeded in January, 48 b.c But this did not suit his 
enemies, and in this year (52 b.c) of Pompeius's sole consul- 
ship a law was passed entirely altering the method of provincial 
appointments, and ordaining that five years should elapse 
between a magistracy at home and a governorship abroad. 
Nominally it was aimed at the gross malpractices in Roman 
elections, since it was thought that people would not gamble 
so heavily for power, if they had to wait five years before 
recouping themselves from the unlucky provincials ; but in 
reality it was directed against Caesar, and, from the point of 



view of its authors, was a most masterly stroke. For it enabled 
the Senate to produce a candidate for the Gallic succession 
immediately Caesar's command expired, i.e. on March I, 
49 B.C., and Caesar would then be left a mere private citizen 
at the full mercy of his antagonists. Moreover, one of its 
clauses expressly enacted that all candidates must canvass in 
person ; and when the inconsistency of this with the earlier 
law of the ten tribunes was pointed out to Pompeius, the 
latter met the objection by adding a rider, after the measure 
had already been passed and lodged in the archives, that 
Caesar's position would not be effected thereby. The legal 
value of this was of course absolutely nil. How far Pompeius 
acted in good faith it is impossible now to say : he was no 
politician, and he may well have been capable of such a simple 
blunder. But at all events the prejudicial effect on Caesar's 
own position is beyond dispute. The next year, 51 B.C., an 
attempt was made by one of the consuls to raise the question 
of his succession, but Pompeius effected a postponement until 
March i, 50 B.C., and when that day arrived it was once more 
shelved. It was now rapidly becoming clear to both parties 
that, without considerable concessions from one side or the 
other, civil war was inevitable. That Caesar did not want war 
admits of no doubt, but unless some compromise could be 
arranged which would equalize the position of the two pro- 
tagonists at Rome when Caesar laid down his command, war 
was the only solution. We may speak of Caesar, if we will, 
as the arch-rebel, and perhaps technically he was unjustified 
in disputing the orders of the Senate, supposing, that is, that 
the Senate was still the governing body at Rome. But most 
people vsdll agree that this was not the case, and that the 
Senate had long ago committed political suicide. Indeed, it 


XX Introduction 

is just this refusal on the part of the senatorial party to face 
accomplished facts and to readjust their attitude to the new 
factors in the empire's administration, that at once justifies 
Caesar and puts his opponents outside the pale of our own 
sympathies. Apart altogether from personal grounds, it was 
impossible, nay, ridiculous to ignore the claims of a public 
man in the position of Caesar after his ten years in Gaul, or 
to deny his right to be considered in the settlement of the 
immediate political future. For the Senate was no longer 
the Senate of the days of Hannibal ; and before they could 
claim to dictate to Caesar they should first learn to control 
Pompeius, instead of stultifying their own remonstrances by 
abdicating their rightful position and thereby tacitly admit- 
ting their need of a protector. It is natural to see in Caesar 
the invader of his country and the violator of its constitution, 
and if it were a question merely between the Senate and 
himself, this view might possibly be maintained. But it is 
a travesty of facts to regard the Senate at this time as the 
palladium of Roman liberty entrenched behind the sacred 
bulwarks of the constitution, and Caesar as the ruthless 
destroyer of those liberties. The position of Pompeius must 
always invalidate all such contentions, and the appeal to 
constitutionalism becomes a mere legal quibble in face of the 
incontestible fact that the constitution had long broken down, 
and for several years past been in a state of suspended anima- 
tion. Either, then, the Senate must justify its claim to rule 
by ordering the simultaneous surrender of their provinces and 
armies from both its great proconsuls, or these two must fight 
out between them the question of mastership over the Senate. 
Caesar's proposals accordingly were directed along the lines 
of the first of these two alternatives. It is not easy to discover 

Introduction xxi 

the true order of development between the month of March, 
50 B.C., and the outbreak of hostilities in January, 49 B.C. 
There were various proposals and counter-proposals, as always 
before a great war, and these were doubtless repeated on more 
than one well-marked occasion : consequently we find our 
authorities diflfering considerably in detail as to the actual 
march of events. But the main outlines are clear, and we are 
left in no real doubt as to the nature of the concessions made 
by either party. We know that sometime in this year (50 B.C.), 
at a full meeting of the Senate, three distinct resolutions were 
put to the vote. First, that Pompeius should be relieved of 
his present military command — rejected almost unanimously : 
secondly, that Caesar be so relieved — as unanimously carried : 
thirdly, at the instance of Caesar's supporters, that both 
should simultaneously resign — carried unanimously, or, accord- 
ing to one report, by 370 votes to 22. If the mind of the 
Senate can be deduced from these decisions, it is surely that 
they would gladly be free of both encumbrances, but that 
being between the devil and the deep sea, they hated Caesar 
better than they loved Pompeius. Later on in the year we 
also know that, after careful inquiries made by his repre- 
sentatives, Caesar put forward the following propositions. 
He would give up the Transalpine province and the vast bulk 
of his veteran army, if allowed to retain either the Cisalpine 
(Northern Italy) with two legions, or it and lUyricum with 
one : these he would also surrender if, and when elected 
consul according to the privilege previously granted him. 
These concessions Pompeius is said to have accepted, but the 
consuls to have rejected. The chief champion of Caesar 
among the magistrates had hitherto been the tribune Caius 
Scribonius Curio, already mentioned in connexion with the 

xxii Introduction 

Catilinarian conspiracy, whose services Caesar is said to have 
bought this year by paying off his very considerable debts. 
His pow^ers expired on December lo, when the new tribunes 
would enter upon office. Amongst these the two definitely 
professed Caesarians were Marcus Antonius (Mark Antony) 
and Quintus Cassius. Caesar had meanwhile come south to 
Ravenna, and was there joined by Curio at the close of his 
tribunate, who brought with him a full account of the situa- 
tion, and urged, as some ancient historians tell us, an instant 
appeal to the sword. Caesar, however, made one last attempt 
at peace and sent back Curio with what practically constituted 
his ultimatum. This, as far as one can judge, still left open 
his earlier proposals ; but, while suggesting that both Pom- 
peius and himself should lay down their commands, clearly 
stated his intention of not doing so alone. Curio is said to 
have travelled the 150 English miles in three days, and to have 
reached Rome with his dispatch on the first day of the New 
Year, just as the new consuls were entering the Senate House. 
Here we may fittingly leave the story, and for the sequel 
turn to Caesar's own written account in the pages that follow. 
§ 2 It will help our study of this great war, which so changed 
the face of history, if we first review the military forces at 
the disposal of either combatant. On Caesar's side this fortu- 
nately presents no difficulty. In 53 B.C. we know that he 
had eleven veteran legions in Gaul, viz. ten of his own, 
numbered respectively from the sixth to the fifteenth, and 
one, the first, lent him by Pompeius. In 50 b.c. the Senate 
had ordered the two commanders to surrender one legion 
each for a threatened Parthian War. Caesar sent the fifteenth 
and Pompeius selected the one then serving with his rival 
The whole thing was notoriously a trick against Caesar, but 

Introduction xxiii 

the result was to reduce his establishment to nine veteran 
legions. The winter quarters of these we know from the 
last book of the Gallic War to have been as follows : — four 
in Belgium under Trebonius, four in the neighbourhood of 
Macon under Fabius, and one, the thirteenth, in the Cisalpine 
under Caesar himself. The late Colonel Stoffel, to whose 
work on Caesar's campaigns every reader, especially every 
military reader, should be referred, has calculated from notices 
of these legions occurring in the Civil War, that orders for 
concentration must have been sent to Fabius and Trebonius 
not later than December 20, i.e. three weeks before the actual 
outbreak of hostilities. In all probability Fabius dispatched 
half of his division, i.e. two legions, to reinforce Caesar in 
Northern Italy, and then with the other half moved south to 
the neighbourhood of Narbonne, whilst Trebonius also came 
south to replace Fabius, with orders to transfer one of his 
four legions to the now weakened command of his colleague. 
If these movements on the northern side of the Alps are 
a little problematical, it is at least certain, on the testimony 
of all ancient authorities, that Caesar began the war with 
only a single legion, however much he might know that others 
were hurrying to reinforce him. It becomes therefore a point 
of considerable historical and military value to determine the 
actual strength of his opponent. Unfortunately this is by 
no means easy. From various notices in Roman historians 
we might conjecture that at the beginning of 49 B.C. there 
was a really powerful military force on foot in Italy. We 
know that in 52 b.c. Pompeius had been commissioned to raise 
troops for the restoration of public order, and that these did 
actually garrison Rome and perhaps other parts of the country. 
But we neither know their numbers nor how long they 

xxiv Introduction 

remained embodied. From the language not only of Caesar 
but of other writers it seems likely that Pompeius was not the 
only commander in Italy at this time at the head of at least 
a nominal field force, and Suetonius says that one reason for 
Caesar's proposal for an all-round disbandment was that he 
knew if things came to a pinch he could recall his own veterans 
to the colours quicker than Pompeius could collect his raw 
troops. On the other hand, these notices may not indicate 
more than the levies which the Senate, under Pompeius and 
Domitius, had begun to raise ever since the autumn of the 
last year (50 B.C.). There is indeed one well-known expres- 
sion of Pompeius that points to the existence of a considerable 
military force at this time. He told the Senate that he had 
ten legions ready to take the field. Those who like Colonel 
Stoffel scout the notion of Caesar's invading Italy with a single 
legion against any real strong opposition, explain this by the 
seven legions, mostly veteran, which we know Pompeius to 
have had in Spain, -plus the two surrendered by Caesar for the 
Parthian War, -plus some 4,000 men said to have been hastily 
raised by Domitius. Those on the contrary, like Mommsen, 
who believe in this splendid piece of audacity, take the ten 
legions to have been all Italian, viz. the two transferred by 
Caesar, plus eight lately raised by conscription. At any rate, 
in coming to an opinion we must remember that, on Caesar's 
own testimony, Pompeius took five legions with him when he 
evacuated Italy, and that he had lost 130 battalions in Italy 
and Spain. Allowing for the seven Spanish legions, this leaves 
us six for Italy, which, when added to the five, more than 
make up the required ten. No doubt these figures prove the 
existence of numerous bodies of troops in Italy for the early 
part of 49 B.C. ; and that the levies organized throughout the 



country resulted in such a force cannot be denied. But how 
far they can be said to have constituted an army is a very 
different matter, and we shall probably not be wrong, especi- 
ally in face of the repeated outcry about want of preparations 
raised by Cicero and others, if we decide with Stoffel that 
Caesar, who knew his business, did not run much risk in seizing 
Northern and Central Italy with only the Thirteenth legion, 
at a time when the forces of his opponent had barely passed 
out of the hands of the recruiting sergeants. As far as Pom- 
peius is concerned, then, the distribution of troops for the 
opening of 49 B.C. will be firstly, seven legions in the Spanish 
Peninsula, too far away to affect the fate of Italy, even if, as 
Appian says, they were intended as a striking force, prepared 
to go anywhere at a moment's notice. What this force might 
have effected, had the fleet been ready, is an interesting specu- 
lation ; but it took another twelve months before the naval 
forces were fully organized, and by that time the Spanish 
army had ceased to exist. Secondly, there are the two sur- 
rendered Caesarian regiments, both of very doubtful loyalty, 
now wintering in Apulia ; and lastly, a mass of heterogeneous 
recruits, in all stages of mobilization, but capable of forming, 
when fully drilled and equipped, another eight or nine com- 
plete legions. Thus we shall conclude that Pompeius's ex- 
aggeration lay not in the numbers, but in the quality of the 
troops he claimed to possess. Numbers however apart, there 
was no comparison between the rival forces. Caesar's army 
was perhaps the finest military instrument that history 
records, and the parallel between it and Cromwell's Iron- 
sides has become proverbial. Officers and men alike were 
veterans, with a magnificent record of conquest behind 
them, and all were inspired by a peculiar devotion to their 

xxvi Introduction 

leader. Of Caesar's marshals not one deserted him when 
the crisis came, excepting Labienus, whose disappointed 
ambition drove him to join the opposite camp ; and the 
contest was, generally speaking, one of recruits against 
veterans, between a perfect unity of command on the one 
side and divided counsels and vacillation on the other. 

Finally a word of explanation is needed on the Roman 
military organization, and the system of rendering its details in 
English adopted for this version. The Roman legion has here 
been translated ' regiment ', and it consisted of ten cohorts or 
' battalions '. Each battalion contained three maniples or 
* companies ', and each maniple two centuries or half-com- 
panies. The latter term I have not employed, but have 
spoken of the century as itself the ' company ', because of its 
nearer numerical approximation, as will appear below. Each 
century was commanded by a centurion, of whom therefore 
there were six in a battalion, and these, where the Latin 
name is not retained, I have called ' company officers'. There 
was no separate commanding officer of the ' battalion ', but 
the regiment or legion had attached to it six military tribunes, 
here termed ' regimental officers '. These were generally 
young men of good family, appointed partly by the com- 
mander-in-chief, partly by popular election, who held this 
post at about the age of thirty as the preliminary step in the 
ordinary career of office. They, with the centurions (who 
represent the N.C.O.'s), were responsible for all the routine 
work of the regiment, but in actual battle their powers varied 
at different periods and under different generals. In Caesar's 
army, though their position still preserves much of its earlier 
importance, we find them frequently replaced in action by 
a special staff officer, who then commands the whole legion. 

Introduction xtvii 

This is not so much a feature of the Civil War as of the 
Gallic, and was doubtless determined solely by circum- 
stances. As to the numerical strength of a legion, perhaps 
it is best to regard it as essentially an unfixed quantity. In 
early days the normal figure had been 4,200. On occasion 
this was raised to 5,000, and later 6,000 was not unknown. 
Perhaps 5,000, the number often substituted by Greek writers 
as an equivalent, may be fairly taken as a practical basis of 
calculation. This gives 500 for the ' battalion ', and about 
80 for the century or 'company'. But it is of the utmost 
importance to remember that this number is purely con- 
ventional, and that the effective strength of any unit at any 
given time would vary, as it does to-day, with the various 
circumstances of the campaign. To take an example. At 
the battle of Pharsalus, while Pompeius's battalions averaged 
410 men, Caesar's were only 275, and later on we find two 
entire legions mustering but 3,200 men between them. 
While, therefore, we may advantageously think of 5,000 and 
500 in mentally translating regiments and battalions into 
round numbers, we must bear in mind that, unless actual 
figures are given, the process is distinctly hazardous. Lastly, 
as to the cavalry. Each legion had generally attached to it 
a body of 300 mounted men, who counted as part of the regi- 
ment. But the mass of Roman cavalry was always composed of 
foreign auxiliaries, like our own Indian horse, and was drawn 
principally at this time from Gauls, Spaniards, and Germans. 

To praise the Commentaries of Caesar at this time of day § 3 
is to be guilty almost of a banality. Their beauty, their 
strength, their stately simplicity of language, wedded to an 
unerring precision of thought, their pure Latinity and scorn 
of meretricious ornament, at once proclaim the man of action 

xxvlii Introduction 

and the finished scholar in a unison such as the world has 
probably never seen elsewhere. No English version can ever 
reproduce this combination of great qualities, and any trans- 
lator is sadly conscious of how the author would have con- 
demned his work for one fault if he did not reject it for 
another. But even in a translation we may gain much. We 
may familiarize ourselves with the working of a powerful 
mind, and we may follow the steps of a campaign which 
certainly changed the fortunes of what was then the civilized 
world. The study of Caesar has always attracted great sol- 
diers, and the names of eminent English commanders who 
have had his campaigns by heart will readily suggest them- 
selves : while even the civilian can see that, apart from 
changes in armament, they still teach the main outstanding 
factors that bring success in war. For the peculiar value of 
Caesar's writings lies in the fact that he wrote for a public 
of which the great majority were themselves soldiers, accus- 
tomed to command men, and that he therefore explains in 
a soldier's language the military principles on which he acted. 
The Civil War is a more readable book than the Gallic; 
its theme is more attractive, it has more artistic unity, 
and is not so kaleidoscopic ; in short, it is a better story. It 
deals with Caesar's own political and social equals, men of 
his own race whom he had known intimately for a lifetime ; 
consequently the characterization is proportionately enhanced. 
And lastly, in its speeches which, like all ancient historians, 
he has put into the mouth of his characters, we can recover 
something of that dignified, courteous, but none the less fiery 
eloquence, which made him inferior as a speaker not even to 
Cicero, and which rendered his diction, in the words of the 
greatest of Roman critics, even ' imperial ' in its grandeur. 

\. Gaul 



The Outbreak of War 

When Caesar's dispatch reached the consuls, it was only Jan. 1,49* 
the urgent representations of the tribunes that gained it 
a hearing by the House ; the further request for a definite 
motion on its terms was refused,,, and the House passed, at 
the instance of the Government, to the general debate upon 
public affairs. Lucius Lentulus pledged his support to the 
Senate and Republic, provided members were ready to 
express themselves with boldness and determination ; but any 
coquetting with Caesar or bidding for his favour, such as 
they had shown in previous years, would find him consulting 
his own interests without the slightest heed to their decrees. 
' He, as well as they', he added significantly, 'had his line of 
retreat open to him in the favour and friendship of Caesar.' 
Scipio* spoke in similar terms. Pompeius was resolved to 
stand by the Republic if supported by the Senate ; but let 
them hesitate or shrink from decided measures, and any 
subsequent appeal to his aid, should they afterwards desire 
it, would only be made in vain. This speech of Scipio's was 2 
taken by the House as representing the actual language of 

* Approximate only, owing to the state of the calendar, which was some 
five weeks ahead of the season. Any month and day given must be 
corrected accordingly. Thus Jan. 1, 49 becomes abcut Nov. 24, 50. 

' Father-in-law of Pompeius since 52. 


2 Proceedings in the Senate 

Jan. 49 Pompeius ; for, although they were met within the city walls, 
Pompeius was at the time in the neighbourhood of Rome.^ 
O^her and more conciliatory measures, it should be noticed, 
had been previously counselled by various members present. 
Marcus Marcellus, for example, in addressing the House had 
urged that it was premature to discuss the main issue till 
levies had been completed throughout Italy, and armies put 
into commission ; under whose protection they could then 
venture to formulate their wishes with liberty and security. 
Again, Marcus Calidius had a proposal that Pompeius should 
leave Italy and go off to his provinces '^, thereby removing all 
pretext for war ; since what Caesar feared was that the reten- 
tion near the capital of the two legions lately extorted from 
him by the Senate should look like a deliberate menace from 
Pompeius to himself. This proposal of Calidius was repeated, 
with slight verbal changes, by Marcus Caelius Rufus. 

They were one and all made the object of a savage attack 
by the presiding consul Lentulus, and effectually silenced by 
his scathing satire : in fact, he even went so far as to refuse to 
put the motion of Calidius ; whereupon Marcellus, alarmed 
at the growing storm of obloquy, withdrew that standing in 
his name. The result was that this language of the consul, 
backed up by the terrorizing effect of the presence of the 
army, together with the open threats of Pompeius's friends, 
succeeded in forcing the House, against the convictions of the 
majority, to adopt the motion of Scipio, whereby Caesar was 
to disband h"s army before a fixed date or be held guilty of 
open treason. This resolution being vetoed by two of the 

' As holding full military command Pompeius could not, without 
forfeiting it, enter the ancient city boundary. 

^ The two Spains, then governed by his deputies. See Introd. 

Proceedings in the Senate 3 

tribunes, Marcus Antonius and Quintus Cassius, the legality Jan. 49 
of such veto was immediately challenged ^ Extreme 
opinions were expressed, and the applause that greeted 
each speaker from the ranks of Caesar's opponents was in 
direct proportion to the bitter and vindictive spirit each 

It was evening before the Senate broke up, and Pompeiu5 3 
at once summoned to a conference outside the city all who 
possessed a seat in the House, praising their recent action and 
stiffening them to face the future, while rebuking and stimu- 
lating the faint-hearted. From all parts of the country large 
numbers of those who had belonged to the old Pompeian 
armies were called out for active service, induced by hopes 
of plunder and high military rank ; many also of those who 
were attached to the two legions lately transferred by Caesar 
now received orders to be in attendance ; with the result 
that the city, the ascent to the Capitol, and the Comitium 
were soon crowded with regimental officers, centurions, and 
reservists. An overflowing meeting of the House was shortly 
afterwards held, packed with the friends of both consuls, and 
the supporters, not merely of Pompeius, but of all who nursed 
old grievances against Caesar ; and these, by their chreatening 
language and imposing numbers, intimidated the weak-kneed, 
strengthened the waverers, and made a free decision for most 
of those present impossible. An offer was made by Lucius 
Piso, one of the censors *, and Lucius Roscius, one of the 

* Apparently on the ground that the proceedings involved the appoint- 
ment to consular provinces, which was exempt from the veto. 

* A quinquennial office, lately fallen into abeyance. The two censors, 
when appointed, held the census, revised the senatorial register, and 
supervised Public Works. 

B 2 

Proceedings in the Senate 

Jan. 49 praetors,^ to carry a report of these proceedings to Caesar, 
six days only being asked for the purpose : similarly others 
urged that a commission be sent to lay before him the mind 
of the House. 
4 To all alike objection was raised, and all alike were thwarted 
by speeches from the consul, from Scipio, and from Cato. 
Cato's opposition was due to long-standing dislike of Caesar, 
increased by resentment at an electoral defeat. The action of 
the consul Lentulus was dictated by the colossal proportions 
of his debts, which he looked forward to settling by the com- 
mand of an army and provinces, and by the princely profits 
to be made out of foreign king-making : indeed, he boasted 
in private that he would be a second SuUa, into whose hands 
the supreme government would one day fall. As for Scipio, 
his motives were similar ambitions for a province and armies, 
the command of which he thought he, as a relative, would 
share with Pompeius : to this must be added his fears of pro- 
secution, and also the ostentatious flattery of which he was at 
this time the subject, not merely from himself, but from all 
his most powerful contemporaries in the political and legal 
worlds. Finally, in the case of Pompeius, the influence 
of Caesar's opponents along with his inability to tolerate 
a rival on equal terms, had induced him completely to with- 
draw his old friendship and to resume intimate relations with 
their common antagonists, whose enmity, in the majority of 
cases, he had himself fastened upon Caesar in the old days of 
their family alliance.'^ In addition to this, the public stigma 

1 Eight annual magistrates representing the Roman Bench, who could 
however command troops. 

' In 59 after Caesar's consulship Pompeius had married his daughter Julia 
who died in childbirth in 54. 

Proceedings in the Senate f 

attaching to the affair of the two legions, which, instead of Jan. 49 
marching for Asia Minor and Syria, had been diverted by him 
to secure his own sovereignty, drove him to work for a settle- 
ment by the sword. 

It was such considerations that now caused everything to 5 
be hurried through in disorder. The delay asked for by 
Caesar's friends, in order to acquaint him with these develop- 
ments, was steadily refused ; the two tribunes of the people 
were allowed no opportunity either of protesting again? t their 
personal peril, or even of maintaining, in the form of the veto, 
that fundamental right of their office which had been left 
them by Lucius Sulla. The seventh day of the New Year 
saw them compelled to take measures for their personal safety, 
such as, in the case of the notorious revolutionaries of the 
past, had generally been adopted as their hazardous refuge 
only after eight months spent in multifarious political acti- 
vity. Such indecent haste, in fact, was now displayed, that 
without more ado recourse was had to the very last weapon 
of Senatorial government, — the well-known ' final decree ', — 
which no amount of effrontery in popular legislators had 
ever before brought to a division in the House, unless indeed 
Rome were all but burning, and the very existence of the 
country despaired of, — the decree directing consuls, praetors, 
tribunes, and all proconsuls near the capital to take measures 
for the safety of the State. This order was embodied in a 
decree of the House dated January 7 : and thus within the 
first five days on which the Senate could legally be convened 
since Lentulus entered upon office (not reckoning the two 
days set down for comitial business), a decision was arrived 
at of extreme severity and malignity both on the question of 
Caesar's military command, and on the fate of two distin- 

6 Proceedings in the Senate 

Jan. 49 guished tribunes of the people. The latter at once left Rome 
and fled to Caesar, who wa then at Ravenna, awaiting an 
answer to his very moderate demands, and still hoping that 
men's general sense of fairness would render a peaceful solu- 
tion possible. 
6 The next few days the Senate met outside the city boun- 
dary. The conduct of Pompeius tallied with the forecast 
given of it by Scipio. After commending the courage and 
firmness that the Senators had just displayed, he proceeded 
to lay before them an account of the military forces at his 
disposal, which were not less, he declared, than ten fully mo- 
bilized Roman legions. To this was added the statement 
that he had trustworthy intelligence that Caesar's troops 
looked coldly on his schemes, and could neither be induced 
to support his cause, nor to follow his leadership. Motions 
were then put before the House dealing with other requisite 
measures. It was proposed that enlisting should be 
organized throughout Italy; that Faustus Sulla should 
be dispatched without delay to Morocco {Mauretania) ; 
and lastly, that Pompeius should be supplied with money 
from the Treasury. The question was also raised of 
making an alliance of friendship with King Juba,' but 
the consul Marcellus refused for the present to entertain 
this idea ; whilst the proposal concerning Faustus was 
vetoed by Philippus, one of the tribunes. The rest were 
duly embodied in regular decrees. It was further deter- 
mined to give commands of provinces to men not then in 
office, two of these to be consular and the rest praetorian. 
Of the former Syria fell to Scipio, Gaul to Lucius Domitius. 
By a clandestine arrangement Philippus and Cotta were 
^ Oi Niimidia (Algeria). See Bk. II, ch. 3. 

Caesar^s Appeal to his Troops 7 

passed over, neither of their lots being thrown in. To the Jan. 49 
remaining provinces ex-praetors were sent out ; and these, 
without waiting for the legal confirmation of their command 
by the people, after offering the customary state-prayers, 
immediately left the capital in full military attire. The con- 
suls, acting against all precedent, took their departure from 
the city, whilst inside and on the Capitol lictors were seen in 
attendance on men no longer in office, a sight unexampled 
in the history of the commonwealth. Over the whole of 
Italy troops were being enlisted, arms commandeered, money 
levied on the country towns and even plundered from the 
temples ; in short, every distinction between the claims of 
the State and of religion was obliterated. 

Caesar no sooner had intelligence of these proceedings 7 
than he appealed to his troops. After recounting in detail the 
wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his political opponents, 
he charged Pompeius with having allowed his mind to be 
misled, and his judgement to be warped by the pernicious 
influence these exerted upon him, owing to the petty jealousy 
he felt at his rival's reputation ; and that, despite the fact 
that that rival had himself always actively supported the power 
and prestige of Pompeius. A further grievance was the 
establishment of an unwarrantable precedent in the consti- 
tution, when military force was invoked to annul and to over- 
ride the tribunes' power of veto — that same veto which in 
past years had only been restored by a similar appeal to force. 
Even Sulla, who stripped the tribunician office of all its func- 
tions, yet left it the free exercise of the veto ; Pompeius, who 
was regarded as the restorer of their lost privileges, had 
actually succeeded in robbing them of what they had always 
enjoyed. Again, on every occasion when the well-known 

8 Caesar*s appeal to his Troops 

Jan. 49 decree had been passed for the magistrates ' to see to it that 
the country take no harm ' — the statutory formula for sum- 
moning the Roman people to arms — it had been at a time 
either of the promulgation of some obnoxious legislation, of 
some violence offered by a tribune, or of some popular 
disturbance ; and then only after the temples and city heights 
had already been seized. How such revolutionary attempts 
in past history had been avenged by the downfall of Saturninus 
and the Gracchi, he next reminded them. Yet of these 
circumstances not one had at this time arisen or been even 
thought of : no law had been promulgated, no popular legis- 
lation proposed, no disturbance taken place. He called upon 
them now to protect from political adversaries the honour 
and good name of their commander, under whose leadership 
for nine long years they had fought with such brilliant success 
the battles of their country, during which time they had 
gained such numberless victories, and subjugated the whole 
of Gaul and Germany.^ 

The men of the Thirteenth legion, the only one present, 
answered with a cheer (Caesar had summoned this regiment 
to him when the general levy in Italy began ; the concentra- 
tion of the others was not yet completed), ' they were ready 
to protect the rights of their commander and of the people's 
tribunes ' 
8 Assured of the temper of his troops, Caesar began his ad- 
vance with this legion as far as Rimini {Ariminum) "^^ where he 

^ i.e. W. of the Rhine. 

' Thereby crossing the Rubicon, the small stream that then separated 
Italy from the Cisalpine Province. ' We can still go back ', are the words 
attributed to him by later writers, ' but once cross this little bridge, and 
then the sword must settle everything.' Suet. 31. 

The T^ubicon crossed 9 

met the two tribunes who had lately fled to his protection : Jan. 40 
his remaining legions he ordered out of their winter quarters 
with instructions to follow close in his rear. At Rimini he 
was waited on by young Lucius Caesar, a son of one of his own 
generals. This young man, after first stating the primary 
object of his mission, went on to explain that he had a private 
message from Pompeius to Caesar on the subject of their 
personal relations. This was to the effect that ' Pompeius 
desired to clear himself in Caesar's eyes, so that the latter 
should not take as an insult to himself what had solely been 
dictated by public exigencies ; that he had always regarded 
the claims of public interests as prior to those of private friend- 
ship, and that Caesar similarly should now show his true 
greatness by sacrificing ambition and passion to the general 
good, and not allow resentment against opponents to go so 
far as to involve his country in the punishment he hoped to 
inflict upon them'. There was more in the same strain 
along vnth excuses for the conduct of Pompeius ; and a very 
similar appeal, in similar language, was made to Caesar by the 
praetor Roscius, who stated that he had it from Pompeius. 

Now, although this episode had apparently but little bearing 9 
on the removal of his own grievances, yet, finding appro- 
priate agents at hand for conveying his vwshes to Pompeius, 
Caesar begged each of them that, as they had brought him 
Pompeius's terms, so they would not object to taking back 
his ovra demands to Pompeius. It was surely worth while 
to go to a little trouble, if by this means a great quarrel 
could be settled and the whole of Italy thus freed from appre- 
hension. * Let them then understand that with him honour 
had always been first, — dearer than life itself. This honour 
had been wounded when the privilege granted him by the 

I o Final Negotiations 

J. in. 49 people of Rome had been floutingly snatched from him by 
opponents, and when, after being robbed of six months' com- 
mand, he found himself, as he now did, dragged back to the 
capital, in spite of the fact that a resolution allowing his 
candidature at the approaching elections to be accepted in 
his absence had been expressly passed by the sovereign peo- 
ple.' Though, however, he had borne without complaint, 
for the sake of public peace, this curtailment of his rights, yet 
his own modest suggestion for a general disarmament, which 
he made in a dispatch to the Senate, had been bluntly re- 
fused : levies were even now proceeding throughout Italy ; 
whilst the two legions which had been detached from his 
command on the pretext of a Parthian war, were still de- 
tained at home : in short, the whole country was in arms. 
What did all this point to except his own destruction ? Still, 
he was ready to stoop to every humiliation and to endure 
every injustice, if thereby he could save the commonwealth. 
Accordingly, these were his terms : Pompeius to take his 
departure to his own provinces, and both to disband their 
armies simultaneously with a general disarmament in Italy. 
That would allay the apprehension of the country, and enable 
elections and the whole machinery of government to be car- 
ried on by both Senate and people without coercion. Lastly, 
in order to facilitate the settlement by giving it fixed terms 
and the sanction of their sworn oath, he proposed that either 
Pompeius should advance to meet him, or else allow a visit 
from himself ; for he felt confident that by talking matters 
10 over all differences could be adjusted.' With this message 
Roscius and Lucius Caesar came to Capua, where they found 
the consuls and Pompeius, to whom they delivered Caesar's 
* See Introd. 

The Senate s J^eply 


stipulations. After due deliberation an answer was returned Ja11.-Fcb.49 
by the same messengers, who thereupon brought back the 
written demands the other side had to make, of which the 
following represents the summary : ' Caesar must recross the 
Rubicon, evacuate Rimini, and disband his army ; after that, 
Pompeius would go to his Spanish provinces. Meanwhile, 
until a pledge had been given that Caesar would keep his word, 
the consuls and Pompeius would continue to raise troops.' 

It was obviously a one-sided bargain to require Caesar to 11 
evacuate Rimini and retire upon his province, whilst his 
opponent kept both provinces and legions alike to which he 
had no claim : to propose that Caesar's army should be dis- 
banded, while yet proceeding with his own levy : or again, 
to undertake to go to his province, without, however, fixing 
a date for his departure. The consequence of this last pro- 
vision would have been that, supposing at the close of Caesar's 
consulship Pompeius had not yet left Rome, he could 
not justly be held guilty of any breach of faith by this 
refusal to quit the capital. Finally, his omission to arrange 
an interview or to promise any visit could but reduce the 
chances of peace to a minimum. Accordingly Caesar dis- 
patched Marcus Antonius with a force of five battalions to 
seize Arrezo {Arretium), whilst he himself remained with 
two more at Rimini, where the raising of fresh troops was 
forthwith commenced. At the same time, with the three 
remaining battalions of his single legion he occupied the coast 
towns of Pesaro (Pisaurum), Fano (Fanum), and Ancona. 

During these same few days intelligence reached mm 12 
that the praetor Thermus, with a force of five battalions 
was at Gubbio (Iguvium), engaged in fortifying the town, the 
inhabitants of which were all strongly disposed towards him- 

12 Caesar's T{apid Advance 

Jan.-Feb.49 self. Under the command therefore of Curio the three 
battalions stationed at Pesaro and Rimini were at once ordered 
to the place. On hearing of their approach Thermus, who 
felt no confidence in the temper of the town, hastily withdrew 
his garrison ; but his men deserted on the march to return to 
their homes, and Curio was then left to receive an enthusiastic 
reception into Gubbio. 

The report of these proceedings determined Caesar to trust 
the adhesion of the country boroughs, and, by withdrawing 
the battalions of the Thirteenth legion then garrisoning them, 
to march upon Osimo (Auximum). Tliis town was then 
held by Attius, who, after throwing a few battalions into it 
as a garrison, was now engaged in raising troops throughout 
the whole of Piceno {Picenum) with the help of a number of 
senators who were traversing the country for that purpose. 
1 3 On the news of Caesar's advance, however, the town coun- 
cillors of Osimo waited in a body upon Attius Varus, and 
informed him that, vsdthout constituting themselves judges 
in the present quarrel, neither they nor the rest of the town 
were prepared to see a general like Caius Caesar, whose public 
services had been so signal, refused admission within their 
walls ; and that he would therefore do well to consult his 
future interests. This language led Varus to make a precipi- 
tate withdrawal of the garrison he had established in the 
town; but, overtaken by a small knot of infantry from Caesar's 
advanced companies and compelled to give battle, he found 
himself deserted by his troops, who either dispersed to their 
homes or went over to Caesar. Amongst them was Lucius 
Pupius, the senior centurion of his legion, who had formerly 
held that post in the army of Pompeius, and who was now 
brought by his men as a prisoner to Caesar. The latter. 

Caesar* s J{apid Advance 1 3 

after congratulating Attius's troops upon their decision, dis- Feb. 49 
missed Pupius, and, in thanking the townspeople of Osimo, 
told them he would not forget their conduct. 

Meanwhile, in Rome, such a panic arose from the accounts 14 
of these operations, that the consul Lentulus, who had gone 
to open the treasury for the purpose of disbursing the money- 
voted by the Senate to Pompeius, fled incontinently from the 
city, leaving the more sacred of the two treasuries * wide open, 
owing to a false alarm that Caesar was momentarily expected, 
and his cavalry already at the gates. He was at once followed 
by his colleague Marcellus, and by the majority of the other 
magistrates. Pompeius had left the capital the day before, 
and was now on his way to the two legions taken from Caesar, 
which he had distributed in winter quarters in Apulia. All 
levying of troops was at once suspended in the vicinity of the 
city ; no place was thought safe north of Capua. Here, with 
their confidence at last recovered, they rallied, and began to 
organize a levy among the farmers lately settled as colonists in 
that district by the Julian law ; ^ and the consul Lentulus even 
went so far as to take the band of gladiators maintained there 
by Caesar, and bring them out into the market-place, where, 
after inciting their hopes by the prospect of earning their 
liberty, he gave them horses and placed them under his orders. 
A subsequent hint, however, from his friends that this pro- 
ceeding was universally condemned, compelled him to dis- 
tribute them for custody amongst his acquaintances in the 
Capuan district. 

Meanwhile Caesar, advancing from Osimo {Auximum), 15 

' Containing a special war reserve, originally designed to meet a Gallic 

* One of Caesar's laws, 59. 

14 Flight of the Government 

Feb. 49 overran the whole of the Marches of Piceno (Picenum). He 
was received with open arms by all the country towns, who 
readily supplied his army with all it needed. Even Cingolo 
(Ctngulum), a town founded by Labienus ^, and built at his 
personal charges, sent a deputation to inform him what 
great pleasure it would give them to receive his commands ; 
and on his ordering troops, sent them at once. By this time 
also the Twelfth legion overtook him ; and with these two he 
now advanced against Ascoli Piceno (J senium Picenum). 
That town was held by a force of ten battalions under 
Lentulus Spinther ; but, on the news of Caesar's approach, 
Spinther evacuated the place, and endeavoured to take his 
battalions with him. Deserted, however, by the larger 
number, he continued his march with a mere handful, until 
he fell in with VibuUius Rufus, who had lately come with 
a special commission from Pompeius to strengthen the hands 
of his party in the Picenian lowlands. VibuUius, on hearing 
from Spinther the state of operations in that quarter, took 
over the latter's troops, and dismissed their commander. He 
then proceeded to concentrate as many units as he could 
from the Pompeian levy in the surrounding districts, amongst 
which there joined him six battalions under Lucilius Hirrus, 
whom he met flying from Camerino (Camerinum) with what 
had formerly been the garrison of that city ; and in this way 
he siicceeded in making up as many as thirteen battalions. 
These he then led by forced marches to Domitius Ahenobar- 
bus atPentima (Corfiniumy, to whom he announced the near 
approach of Caesar with two legions. Domitius himself, 

' The distinguished general who had deserted Caesar. See Introd. 
' Pentima on the upper Pescara is only approximately the site of the 
ancient Corfinium. 

The j4dvance continued i j* 

it should be added, had also collected a force of about twenty Feb. 49 
battalions from Albe (Alba), drawn from the country of the 
Marsi, Peligni, and neighbouring districts V 

Continuing his advance, Caesar, after securing Fermo 16 
(Firmum), and giving orders, upon the expulsion of Lentulus, 
to search out the troops who had deserted that general, and 
to organize a levy, had halted one day at Ascoli (Asculum) to 
obtain supplies, and had then started for Pentima. Arrived 
here, he found five battalions, thrown forward by Domitius 
for that purpose, engaged in cutting the bridge that spans 
the river '^ at a distance of some three miles from the city. 
With this force Caesar's advanced patrols now came into 
contact, vdth the result that Domitius's men were driven 
from the bridge and retired upon the town. Caesar quickly 
had his legions across, and, halting near the city, pitched his 
camp close up to the walls. 

On intelligence of his arrival, Domitius selected some of 17 
those conversant with the country, and induced them, by 
the offer of a large reward, to go with a letter to Pompeius 
in Apulia, conveying a strongly-worded appeal for succour. 
In it he declared his belief that with two armies, aided by 
the natural difficulties of the country, it would be an easy 
task to surround Caesar, and to sever his communications ; 
failing this, the lives of himself and more than thirty battalions 
of men, as well as those of numerous senators and Roman 
knights would be endangered. In the interval he encouraged 
his own party, placed artillery on the walls, allotted each 
officer his special duties in the defence, and, in a public 
harangue to his troops, promised each man a farm of twenty- 

* The Abruzzi. 

' The Aterno or Pesca'a. 

1 6 Italy declares for Caesar 

Feb. 49 five acres out of his own landed property, with corresponding 
increase in the case of centurions and reservists. 
1 8 About this time Caesar received information that the 
people of Salmone (Sulmo), a town seven miles from Pentima, 
were anxious to side openly with him, but were prevented by 
Quintus Lucretius, a senator, and Attius the Pelignian, who 
were holding it with a force of seven battalions. Accordingly 
Marcus Antonius was dispatched to the place virith five bat- 
talions of the Thirteenth legion ; with the result that the 
townspeople no sooner recognized the gleam of our standards 
than, throwing open their gates, they streamed out, soldiers 
and citizens alike, to welcome Antony. Lucretius and Attius 
meanwhile tried to escape by leaping from the walls ; but 
Attius was caught and brought back to Antonius, whereupon 
he requested to be sent to Caesar. Thus, on the same day 
as he had come, Antony was able to return with the surren- 
dered battalions, taking Attius along with him. The troops 
Caesar incorporated with his own army ; Attius he dismissed 
without penalty. 

Three days had now passed before Pentima, spent by Caesar 
in strongly fortifying a camp, in collecting provisions from 
the neighbouring towns, and in awaiting the arrival of his 
remaining forces. Indeed, during these days he was joined, 
not only by the Eighth legion, but also by twenty-two 
battalions from the new levies in northern Italy, and some 
three hundred cavalry from the King of Noricum ' : reinforce- 
ments which enabled him to form a second camp on another 
side of the town, which he put under the charge of Curio. 
On the following days he commenced the circumvallation of 
the city with fortified lines of entrenchment ; and the work 
' Roughly Styria and Carinthia. 

The Entanglement of Corfimum 1 7 

on this was all but finished just as the messengers sent to Feb. 49 
Pompeius got safely back. 

As soon as Domitius had read the letter which they brought, 1 9 
he determined to suppress the truth, and openly announced 
in a council of war that Pompeius was about to make a rapid 
march to their relief, exhorting his staff not to despair, but 
to make every preparation for the defence of the town. To 
a few intimate friends he divulged the real answer, and began 
to lay plans for escape. When it was seen, however, that his 
looks did not accord with his words, and that his whole 
manner betrayed more haste and nervousness than had been 
usual with him on previous days ; and further that, contrary 
to his ordinary habit, he now held long and secret conversa- 
tions with his friends for discussing their mutual plans, while 
he shrank from attending the councils of war and from the 
society of his brother-officers, the truth could no longer be 
hidden or disguised. This was that Pompeius had written 
back, flatly declining to court certain disaster ; and intimating 
that, as Domitius had locked himself up in Pentima in oppo- 
iition to his own plans and wishes, he must now take any 
opportunity that offered for rejoining him with all his forces. 
It was, of course, to prevent this very step, that Caesar was 
drawing his blockading lines around the city. 

When the scheme of Domitius became generally known jo 
amongst the troops in Pentima, they privately summoned an 
unauthorized gathering among themselves at dusk; and using 
as their mouthpiece one of their officers, together with the 
centurions and most influential of their own rank, expressed 
their decision as follows. ' They found themselves blockaded 
by Caesar, whose siege-works and fortifications were all 
but finished. Their own general Domitius, trust and confi- 


1 8 Corfinium surrenders 

Feb. 49 dence in whom had alone induced them to stay and hold the 
city, had thrown them all over and was now meditating 
flight : under these circumstances it was their duty to consult 
their own safety.' From this resolution the Marsi in the place 
at first strongly dissented, and seized upon what was con- 
sidered the most strongly fortified quarter of the town. So 
bitter, indeed, grew the quarrel, that an attempt was made 
to come to blows and to fight it out with weapons ; but 
shortly afterwards the envoys who were dispatched by each 
party to the other enabled the Marsi to learn what they did 
not know before, viz. the contemplated flight of Domitius. 
When this was once known, the two forces joined hands, and 
fetching their general into the open, surrounded him with 
a guard. They then sent representatives of their own body 
to Caesar, with a message that they were prepared to open 
the gates, to obey his orders, and to deliver Domitius alive 
into his hands. 
21 On receipt of these overtures, Caesar at once felt the 
extreme importance of taking possession of the town at the 
earliest possible opportunity, and of transferring the bat- 
talions in it to his own camp. There was always the chance 
of the garrison changing their minds, either through bribery, 
or the recovery of their spirits, or by false reports ; grave 
events in war being often determined by the slightest of 
accidents. On the other hand, there was also the fear that 
the entry of his troops at night might lead to excess and the 
looting of the town. Under these circumstances, therefore, 
he gave the envoys a cordial welcome, and then sent them 
back to their city ; whilst to his own men he issued orders 
closely to watch the gates and walls. He further stationed 
troops on the incompleted siege works, not, as on previous 

Corfinium surrenders \y 

days, at fixed intervals, but in one continuous line of sentries Feb. 49 
and pickets, so that the men could touch hands with each 
other and thus cover the entire chain of works. Officers 
were sent round on tours of inspection, strictly charged, not 
only to guard against salLcs by bodies of the enemy, but also 
to look out for any secret ebcape of individuals. That night 
not a man slept in camp, however careless or indifferent he 
might otherwise be ; but engrossed as all were in the now 
rapidly approaching crisis, they continued to debate in their 
own minds the various aspects of the issue, as they wondered 
what would happen to the Pentimians, to Domitius, to Len- 
tulus, and the rest, and what fate was in store for each group. 

About six o'clock in the morning Lentulus Spinther hailed 22 
our sentries and guards from the city wall, with the request 
that, if possible, he might be allowed an audience with Caesar. 
Leave being granted, he was sent out from the town under an 
armed escort of Domitius's troops, who took good care not to 
leave him until they had brought him safely into the presence 
of Caesar. 

He began with an impassioned appeal for his own life, 
imploring Caesar to spare him, and reminding him of their 
longstanding friendship, and of Caesar's many kindnesses to 
himself — ^which indeed were considerable ; including, as they 
did, his election to the pontifical college ^, his appointment to 
the province of Spain at the end of his praetorship, and sup- 
port in his canvass for the consulship. Caesar interrupted his 
speech by telling him he had not left his province as a brigand, 
but to defend himself against the insults of his opponents, and 
to restore to their legal position tribunes of the people who 
had been driven from their country for daring to uphold his 

' One of the great religious corporations. 
C 2 

2 Caesar^ s Justification 

Feb. 49 rights : in a word, to reassert the freedom both of himself 
and of the Roman people, at present ground down by the 
despotism of a clique. Reassured by such language, Lentulus 
asked leave to return to the town, intimating that his own 
successful petition would be a comfort and encouragement to 
others as well, some of whom were so panic-stricken as to be 
obliged to contemplate laying violent hands on their own per- 
sons. His request was granted, and he then withdrew. 
23 At daybreak Caesar gave orders for all senators and their 
21 Feb. ' sons, as well as all officers and Roman knights, to be brought 
before him. Of the senatorial order there appeared five 
representatives, viz. Lucius Domitius, Publius Lentulus 
Spinther, Lucius Caecilius Rufus, Sextus Quintilius Varus 
(Domitius's paymaster), and Lucius Rubrius : the others 
included a son of Domitius, together with many other young 
lads, and a considerable number of knights and borough coun- 
cillors, who had been ordered out for the campaign from the 
local towns by Domitius. Arrived in his presence, Caesar 
first placed them out of reach of the abuse and gibes of his own 
men, and then addressed them in a few curt phrases, seeing 
that they had not had the grace, on their side, to acknowledge 
his own extraordinary leniency towards themselves : after that 
he released them all without condition. A sum of about 
j^50,ooo, which Domitius had taken with him into Pentima 
and there deposited in the city chest, was presently brought 
out by the four city magistrates. It was at once returned to 
Domitius by Caesar, who was determined men should not 
say he had shown more self-restraint in dealing with their 
lives than with their property ; although it was well known 
that this particular specie was in fact government money, re- 
^ According to Cicero. 

and Alagnafiimity 


ceived from Pompeius for the payment of the troops. Having Feb. 49 
settled these preliminaries, he gave orders for Domitius's men 
to take the oath of military allegiance to himself ; and then on 
the same day, striking camp, completed a full day's march, 
after a stay at Pentima of altogether one week. An advance 
through the districts of Ortona, Lanciano, Termoli, and 
Larino (the Marrucini, Frentani, and Larinates) brought him 
into Apulia. 

To return to Pompeius. On intelligence of the operations 24 
round Pentima, he had left Lucera (Luceria), and, marching 
through Canosa (Canusium), came down to Brindisi (Brundi- 
sium). The various contingents raised by the recent levy 
were ordered to concentrate upon this seaport from the dif- 
ferent parts of the country ; whilst, in addition, slaves and 
herdsmen were armed and mounted, till they made up a force 
of about three hundred horse. Lucius Manlius, one of the 
praetors, followed his leader in all haste with six battalions 
from Albe {Alba) ; whilst another praetor, Rutilius Lupus, 
brought three more from Terracina. Both these bodies came 
in sight of the distant cavalry of Caesar, commanded by Vibius 
Curius, and each, leaving the praetor to himself, went over to 
that officer. The same thing happened on the remaining stages 
of the march, some units falling in with Caesar's main column, 
others with his cavalry. In addition to this, the colonel 
commandant of engineers in the army of Pompeius, Numerius 
Magius of Cremona, was captured on the march, and con- 
ducted into the presence of Caesar. The latter at once sent 
him back to his own commander with the following message. 
' Hitherto he had been refused the opportunity of an inter- 
view ; but he was now coming to Brindisi {Brundisium), and 
it was of the most vital public interest that he should have 

2 2 The Advance continued 

Feb. 49 a conference with Pompeius; for it was impossible tomake the 
same progress by exchanging proposals through the medium 
of others, as by a personal discussion on all the points at issue.' 
25 Soon after sending this message, he himself reached Brindisi 
at the head of six legions : three of these consisted of veterans, 
while the rest were composed of the recent levies, and had only 
been brought up to their full strength during the recent 
march. This represented all his force, since the surrendered 
army of Domitius had been sent straight away from Pentima 
(Corfiniurn) into Sicily. On arrival, he found that the two 
consuls had crossed to Durazzo (Dyrrachium) with the bulk of 
the Pompeian army, but that Pompeius himself was still at 
Brindisi with twenty battalions. It was impossible to dis- 
cover whether the latter remained there for want of transports 
or whether his intention was to retain a hold on Brindisi, 
and to use this corner of Italy, with the opposite Greek coast, 
as a base for keeping command of the Adriatic ; a course 
which would allow him to conduct hostilities simultaneously 
from either side. Fearing, however, that his opponent would 
not think it advisable to abandon Italy, Caesar determined to 
block the entrance to Brindisi harbour and render it im- 
practicable for shipping. The method employed for this 
was as follows. Selecting the narrowest part of the harbour 
entrance, he built out from either shore, where the water was 
shallow, a sort of rough breakwater, carrying a broad level top. 
To this structure, as soon as the deeper water rendered further 
progress impossible, owing to the rubble no longer holding 
together, a couple of rafts were attached, each thirty feet 
square, one at either end, and made fast by four anchors from 
the four corners, so that no action of the waves could shift 
them. As soon as the first pair were completed and placed in 

Plan of Brindisi. (Brundisium.) 

AA. Inner Harbour. B. Outer Harbour 

C. Islands of S? Andrea . (Ancient Barra,.) 

D. Town • EE. Caesar'.* Moles. 

To face p. 23. 

operations at Brin.iisi 23 

position, others of similar dimensions were fastened in con- March ^i) 
tinuation, and over all a smooth surface of earth was laid, 
designed to give a free road to his men when charging to repel 
the enemy. Round the front and flanks of each raft were 
erected protection-hurdles and mantlets ; whilst every fourth 
raft carried a two-storied tower to aid in beating off the 
assaults of the enemy's ships, or his attempts to set fire to the 

To meet this device, Pompeius had recourse to a number of 2^> 
large merchantmen, which he had commandeered in Brindisi 
harbour. These vessels were specially fitted out by the erec- 
tion on their decks of three-storied towers, armed with 
numerous pieces of artillery and every species of missile 
weapon. They were then driven against Caesar's works, with 
the object of breaking through the line of rafts and injuring 
the barricade ; and daily engagements between the two 
parties, though not indeed at close quarters, were carried on 
by means of slings, arrows, and other similar weapons. 

These operations, though necessarily demanding Caesar's 
most careful attention, did not, however, as yet cause him to 
despair altogether of peace. It was true that the failure of 
Magius to return, after being expressly sent with communica- 
tions to Pompeius, caused him considerable misgiving ; it was 
also true that his continued efforts in this direction gravely 
compromised his plans for taking military initiative : but not- 
withstanding all this, he felt himself bound to leave no stone 
unturned in the pursuit of his main object. He therefore dis- 
patched one of his staff, Caninius Rebilus, a personal friend 
and relative of Scribonius Libo, with a commission to see that 
officer, and to beg him to exert his influence for peace. Above 
all, he requested a personal conference with Pompeius, and 

24 Further Futile 'Negotiations 

March 49 again stated his firm conviction that if this could only be 
brought about, a peaceful solution, honourable to both par- 
ties, would be arrived at. Should this result be attained, most 
of the credit and reputation attaching to it w^ould belong to 
Libo, whose active intervention would then have prevented 
a civil war. Libo went straight from this conversation with 
Caninius to Pompeius ; only, however, to return with the 
message that, in the absence of the two consuls, no steps 
towards a settlement could be taken. With this last answer 
to efforts continually repeated, and repeated in vain, Caesar 
came to the reluctant conclusion that the time for such mea- 
sures had now gone by, and that henceforward the war must 
be prosecuted with vigour. 
37 The sea-mole he was building was about half finished, after 
nine days' work spent upon it, when the transports which had 
conveyed the van of the Pompeian army across to Durazzo 
{Dyrrachium) returned from the consuls, and safely entered 
Brindisi. Thereupon, whether it was that he became nervous 
at Caesar's blockading piers, or that his plan of campaign had 
all along been to let Italy go — at all events, with the arrival 
of these ships, Pompeius commenced preparations for eva- 
cuation. In order, however, to break the force of an attack 
from Caesar's troops, should the latter storm the town at 
the moment of withdrawal, he caused the city gates to be 
blocked up, barricaded the streets and thoroughfares of the 
town ; whilst across the main arteries trenches were carried, 
bristling on the far side with sharp stakes and horizontally set 
piles, which were then carefully covered with light hurdles 
strewn with earth. All external approaches to the harbour, 
including two regular roads, were fenced off by driving into 
the ground enormous baulks carrying sharply-pointed heads ; 

Pompeius evacuates Italy 25- 

and with these dispositions completed, orders were given for March 49 
the legionaries to embark in silence ; whilst on the walls and 
city towers was posted a thin line of light-armed troops, 
drawn from the reservists, archers, and slingers. These last 
were, at a prearranged signal, immediately the legionaries 
were all on board, to fall back upon a conveniently sheltered 
spot, where transports suitable for either sailing or rowing 
lay ready to receive them. 

Now, the people of Brindisi, instigated by what they had 28 
suffered from the Pompeian soldiery, as well as by their 
contemptuous treatment at the hands of Pompeius himself, 
heartily espoused the cause of Caesar. As soon as the news, 
therefore, leaked out of this decision to sail, under cover 
of the confusion caused by the busy preparations of the 
troops, signals were made on all sides from houses in the 
town. Informed in this way of what was going forward, 
Caesar ordered his men to prepare scaling-ladders and to 
put on their arms, determined to lose no chance of striking 
an effective blow. At nightfall, however, Pompeius sailed. 
The guards left behind on the wall retired at the appointed 
signal, and rushed down to the ships by paths well known 
to themselves. Caesar's troops flung their ladders into 
position, and swarmed up the walls ; but, warned by the 
townspeople against the sunken ditches and fenced dykes, 
they were forced to check their rush, and were then guided 
round to the harbour by a more circuitous route. Here, 
finding two of the transports with troops on board which 
had run upon the mole, they hauled them off by row-boats 
and launches, and then safely secured them as prisoners. 

26 Caesar's Dilemma 


The Safeguarding of the West 

29 With the escape of Pompeius an accomplished fact, the 
March 49 plan that most commended itself to Caesar for settling the 
business between them was to collect transports, and cross 
over after his opponent before the latter could strengthen 
his position by raising large bodies of oversea auxiliaries. 
The delay, however, and length of time involved in this 
course was a serious consideration ; for Pompeius, by requi- 
sitioning every ship on that part of the coast, had made 
immediate pursuit of himself impossible. The only alterna- 
tive was to wait for vessels to come from the somewhat 
distant regions of Northern Italy and Piceno (Picenum), 
or from the Sicilian Straits ; but this, owing to the, un- 
favourable season of the year, appeared both a slow and 
precarious scheme. And, further, whilst he was waiting, 
the two Spanish provinces (one of which was devoted to 
the interests of Pompeius by reason of the great services he 
had rendered it), together with the veteran army stationed 
in them, would be steadily strengthened ; auxiliary forces and 
• cavalry would continue to be raised ; and the allegiance of 
Gaul and Italy would be undermined, while he was out of the 
way; noneof whichproceedingshe was at all disposed to allow. 
30 For the present, therefore, he gave up the idea of pur- 
suing Pompeius, and determined to transfer the war to 
Spain.' For this purpose orders were at once given to 
the governing magistrates of all municipal seaports to com- 

' Caesar summed up the military situation by remarking that ' he went 
to an army without a general, and should return to a general without an 
army'. Suet. 35. 


secured 27 

mandeer the required vessels, and have them brought round March 40 
to Brindisi (^Brundisium). With equal promptitude one 
of his staff, Valerius, was sent with a single legion to secure 
Sardinia ; and Curio, with two legions and the powers 
of a governor, was similarly dispatched to Sicily, with orders 
to take his army over into Africa, immediately that island 
had been reduced. Sardinia was at the time held by Marcus 
Cotta, Sicily by Marcus Cato ; whilst Tubero had been 
allotted Africa and was then due to take over the governor- 
skip. In Sardinia the people of Cagliari (Carales), as soon 
as they heard that Valerius was to be sent them, even before 
the expeditionary force had left Italy, of their own initiative 
expelled Cotta from the town ; whereupon the Pompeian 
officer, frightened by the knowledge that the feeling of the 
province was unanimous, hastily quitted Sardinia for Africa. 
In Sicily Cato was busy repairing old men-of-war, and 
levying new ones from the various local communities ; 
work into which he was throwing himself with extraordinary 
vigour. Special service officers had been sent to raise troops 
throughout Basilicata and Calabria {Lucania and Bruttium) 
from among those who held the Roman franchise ; whilst in 
Sicily each township was required to furnish its fixed quota 
of horse and foot. These dispositions were all but completed 
when news reached the island of the approach of the rival 
governor Curio. Upon this report Cato summoned a general 
assembly, and in it openly denounced Pompeius for having 
deserted and betrayed his representative, and for having 
embarked on a war for which there had been no sort of 
necessity, without even the semblance of preparation ; and 
that, in spite of the assurances publicly given in the Senate, 
in response to inquiries from himself and the rest, that 

2 8 uind Sardinia 

March' 49 everything was fully prepared for hostilities. With this last 
public protest he took a hurried farewell of his province. 

31 Thus it was that when Valerius and Curio arrived with 
their armed forces in Sardinia and Sicily respectively, they 
each found a province bereft of its constituted authorities. 
Tubero, on the other hand, on reaching Africa, found that 
province in the hands of Attius Varus, who was there engaged 
in exercising full military command. This general, after 
losing his battalions at Osimo {Auximtim) under the cir- 
cumstances already described, had completed his flight 
by taking the first ship for Africa ; and, the country being 
at the time without a governor, had appointed himself 
to the command. Here he organized a levy and succeeded 
in raising two entire legions ; his knowledge of the locality 
and its inhabitants, and his familiarity with the province, 
opening a way for such considerable designs ; he having 
a few years previously governed this province at the close 
of his praetorship. Thus, when Tubero arrived with his 
ships off Utica \ he found himself refused admission to 
either the harbour or town ; not even his son, who was sick 
on board, was allowed to be landed, and he was obliged 
to weigh anchor and set sail from the neighbourhood. 

32 This was the point events had reached when Caesar, being 
desirous of resting his men from their recent hard work before 
commencing further active operations, made a distribution 
of his present forces among the neighbouring Italian towns "^^ 

1 April ^ and then set out himself for the capital. Here having 
summoned the Senate, he made the House a statement 
of the wrongs he had suffered at the hands of his political 

* In Tunis, not far from Bizerta. See Map, p. 95. 

^ Biindisi, Taranto, and Otranto (Cicero and Appian). ^ Cicero. 

Caesar at l{ome 29 

adversaries. He reminded members that it was no unconsti- April 49 
tutional position he had sought ; he had waited the legal 
time for re-election to the consulship, and had shown 
himself content with what was within the reach of every 
citizen alike. A proposal, allowing him to stand in his 
absence, had been submitted to the people hy all the ten 
tribunes, and there carried in the teeth of the violent opposi- 
tion of his opponents, particularly that of Cato, who had 
characteristically employed his favourite trick of talking 
out time each day the assembly had met. This measure, 
he reminded them, had been adopted in Pompeius's own 
consulship ' ; why then, if the latter disapproved of it, did 
he allow it to be passed, or why, if he approved, had he 
prevented his (Caesar's) availing himself of the concession 
thus granted? He then asked the House to notice his 
own extraordinary forbearance in voluntarily proposing the 
disbandment of both armies, involving, as it would have 
done, a deliberate sacrifice of prestige and of his own 
legitimate position. He also exposed the bitter party-spirit 
betrayed by his antagonists, who did not hesitate to ask 
from another what they declined to do themselves ; but 
sooner than yield up their command over standing armies 
preferred to plunge the whole world into war. The ille- 
gality of depriving him of the two legions was, moreover, 
openly denounced, along with the violent, high-handed 
action of curtailing the powers of the tribunate ; nor did 
he omit to mention his own proposals for peace, and his 
repeated but thwarted attempts at an interview. ' Under 
these circumstances he urged and invited them to take 
up, and to retain the reins of government in conjunction 
' 52 B.C. Introd. 

30 ]^Ieets the Senate 

April 49 with himself. Did, however, they shrink from co-operation 
with him, through fear of the consequences to themselves, 
he would not inflict himself upon them, but would carry 
on the administration alone. Meanwhile, he considered 
representatives should at once be sent to Pompeius with 
a view to a settlement ; for he felt no apprehension himself, 
like that lately uttered in the Senate by Pompeius, viz. that 
the opening of overtures by one party implied the recogni- 
tion of the justice of the other party's claims, and a corre- 
sponding want of confidence in its own. That was but 
a weak and childish view of things. His own desire was 
to triumph by justice and equity, even as he had already 
sought to anticipate his opponent in action.' 
33 The idea of opening negotiations with Pompeius com- 
mended itself to the House ; the difficulty was to find 
those willing to go. The chief reason for this general 
refusal to serv^e on such a commission was personal fear ; since 
Pompeius, on evacuating the capital, had openly declared 
in the Senate that he would regard all who stayed behind 
in Rome in the same category as those actually within 
Caesar's camp. The result of this threat was that three 
whole days were now wasted in wrangling and excuses. 
Moreover, the party opposed to Caesar put up Lucius 
Metellus to frustrate this proposal, and at the same time 
to block all other business which Caesar had designed. 
Perceiving his object, therefore, and reflecting that he had 
already spent several wasted days, when he was determined 
not to lose more time, Caesar left his proposed measures 
unfinished, and, taking his departure from the city, travelled 
through to Further Gaul ^ 

* Modern France. 

Leaves fur Marseilles 3 i 

Arrived here, he learnt that Pompeius had recently 34 
dispatched into Spain Vibullius Rufus, whom he had himself ^pr'! 49 
only a few days previously captured and released at Pentima 
(Corfinium) : that Domitius had similarly gone oflE to seize 
Marseilles (Nlassilia) with seven fast ships of the mercantile 
marine that could either sail or row, which he had collected 
from private owners off the island of Giglio {Igilium) and 
in the harbour of Cosa, and there manned with his own 
slaves, freedmen, and small tenantry : and lastly, that 
some young nobles of Marseilles, who had lately been in 
Rome, had been sent on home as envoys from Pompeius, 
with a strong appeal, given on the eve of his departure 
from the capital, that they would not allow the recent 
services rendered to their city by Caesar to obliterate the 
memory of his own past benefits. It was the receipt of 
this message that had induced the Massiliots to shut their 
gates against Caesar. They had further requisitioned the 
services of the Albici, a foreign tribe living in the hill country 
north-east of Marseilles, to which city they had long been 
subject : corn had been got in from the surrounding neigh- 
bourhood and from all their fortified stations, for storage in 
the city ; arsenals had been established for the manufacture 
of war material ; and finally the walls and gates and fleet 
were now being put into repair. 

Caesar requested the presence from Marseilles of the stand- 35 
ing committee of fifteen chief councillors of the city ; and on 
their arrival, pleaded with them not to allow their town 
to incur the responsibility of commencing hostilities, but 
to follow the unanimous decision of Italy rather than give 
ear to the wishes of a single individual. Other considerations 
which he thought calculated to bring them to their senses 

3 2 Attitude of the Town 

April 49 were also added ; and the delegates departed to report his 
words, only, however, to return with the following resolution 
of their governing council. ' The Roman world ', they under- 
stood, ' was divided between two factions ; but which of these 
had the better right was beyond their province and their 
power to decide. The leaders of these two parties (Pompeius 
and Caius Caesar) were both alike patrons of their city, 
which owed to one of them the annexation of the territories 
of the Arecomican Volcae and the Helvii ^, and to the other 
an increase of their revenues by the incorporation of the 
Sallyae ', whose conquest he had effected. With such an 
equality in favours received, the proper return to make was 
a like impartiality in their own attitude ; to give assistance 
to neither against the other, and to allow to neither access 
to their city or harbours.' 
36 These negotiations were still actively proceeding, when 
Domitius arrived with his squadron off Marseilles, to be 
at once admitted by the inhabitants, placed in command 
of the city, and given supreme direction of the war. Acting 
upon his instructions, the fleet was sent out to scour the seas 
in every quarter ; and every merchantman they could lay 
their hands upon was brought back into harbour, where 
any that were found to be unsound in their rivets, timber, 
or rigging were broken up and used for the equipment and 
repair of the others. All the corn discoverable was com- 
mandeered for the public service, and any other provisions 
or supplies were held in reserve against a possible siege of 
the town. 

Such unwarrantable acts determined Caesar to order up 
three legions to Marseilles, Upon their arrival, siege towers 
' Neighbourhood of Nismes and Ardeche. * East of Aries. 

C aesaraugus ta 

English Miles 

o lO 2o 30 -to 50 
Ancient Main Roads 

Heights in Feet 

The Position in Spaifi 3 3 

and shelters were at once pushed forward against the walls May 4') 
with a view to the assault of the town, and at the same 
time instructions were given for a fleet of twelve warships 
to commence building at Aries (Arelate). These last were ' 
put together and fitted out within a month of the day the 
timber for them was felled ; and upon their safe transference 
to Marseilles, Decimus Brutus was appointed as their admiral 
by Caesar, who thereupon took his departure from Mar- 
seilles, leaving his general Caius Trebonius to superintend 
the operations on the landward side. 

During this period of preparation another general, Caius 37 
Fabius, had been dispatched into Spain at the head of three 
legions, lately distributed in winter quarters at Narbonne 
and its neighbourhood, vnth orders to seize without delay 
the passes of the Pyrenees, then in the hands of Lucius 
Afranius, who held them for Pompeius. This force was 
immediately to be followed by the remaining legions, then 
wintering further away. In obedience to his orders, Fabius, 
acting with great promptitude, dislodged the garrison from 
the pass before him, and then marched rapidly upon the 
army of Afranius. 

In Spain the arrival of Lucius Vibullius Rufus on a mission, 3^ 
as we have seen, from Pompeius, had resulted in a conference 
of the three Pompeian representatives, viz. Afranius, 
Petreius, and Varro ; who held respectively Eastern Spain 
with three legions. Western Spain, or the territory between 
the Sierra di Morena and the Guadiana (Castolo range and 
the Anas) with two more, and the country north of the 
Guadiana (Anas), including Estremadura and Portugal 
(the Vettones and Lusitania) likewise with two. At this 
conference they arranged their own shares in the pending 

34 The T^ival Forces 

May 49 operations. Petreius was to inarch with his whole force 
from Portugal (Lusitanid), through Estremadura (the 
Vettones), in order to join Afranius ; whilst to Varro was 
allotted the defence of the whole of the western part of 
the Peninsula with the legions attached to his command. 
Having settled these preliminaries, they proceeded to raise 
cavalry and auxiliary troops; Petreius superintending the 
levy throughout Portugal {Lusitanid), and Afranius that 
in Guadalajara and Avenca, Oviedo and Santander {Celti- 
beria and the Cantabri), and among all the barbarian tribes 
of the north-western seaboard. Directly these were ready 
Petreius lost no time in passing through Estremadura to 
Afranius ; and the two agreed to co-operate in the conduct 
of the war, and to make their head quarters at Lerida (Ilerdd) 
on account of the great strategical importance of that place. 
39 As stated above, Afranius had three legions and Petreius 

a) -June ^^^ . ^^ addition to these there had now been raised in 
the Eastern province an infantry force armed with the 
oblong shield of regulars, and in the Western a similar force 
carrying the light round Spanish shield, the two bodies 
amounting in all to some eighty battalions ; whilst each 
of the two provinces had also contributed some 5,000 mounted 
men. As against these, Caesar's present field army consisted 
of six Roman legions. Of auxiliary infantry he possessed 
none ; though he still retained with him the 3,000 native 
cavalry which had served through all his late campaigns ; 
and this force had lately been doubled by the addition of 
an equal number from Gaul, which he had himself 
personally raised by inviting individually to his standard 
the flower of the nobility and manhood in each of the 
Gallic communes. Finally, this body had been furtjier 



English Miles 

1 1 . — 1_ 


1/2 1 

Heights in Feet 



Caesar's Upper Bridge 


Spanish Campaign opens 3 f 

strengthened by incorporating in it drafts from the splendid May-June 
fighting races of Aquitaine, and from the hill tribes on the ^'^ 
frontier of Provence. As for the probable course of the cam- 
paign, there had lately reached him a report to the effect 
that Pompeius, with his legions, was marching on Spain 
by way of Morocco (Mauretania), and was now rapidly 
approaching. It was at this time also that he borrowed 
money from his officers and centurions for distribution 
among the troops, a device by which two distinct objects 
were gained ; on the one hand, the loyalty of his centurions 
was assured by the stakes he now held from them ; on the 
other hand, such lavish liberality secured the interested 
devotion of the common soldiers. 

Meanwhile Fabius was endeavouring to win the adhesion 40 
of the neighbouring Spanish communes by addressing 
letters to their leaders, and by disseminating proclamations 
among the country folk. On the Segre (Sicoris) two bridges 
had been constructed, some four miles apart, over which 
foraging parties were now regularly proceeding, as every- 
thing on the westward side had been eaten up during the 
previous days. The same course of action was being 
pursued by the Pompeian generals, and for the same reason, 
thus giving rise to numerous cavalry skirmishes between 
the two forces. Two legions were accordingly sent over 
as a daily escort to the Fabian foragers ; and on one 
occasion these had but just crossed by the lower bridge, 
and were being followed by the baggage and all the cavalry, 
when suddenly the heavy wind that was blowing, aided 
by the swollen state of the river, caused the bridge to snap, 
thereby leaving a section of the cavalry cut off on the farther 
side. Petreius and Afranius quickly realizing the situation 
D 2 

3<^ Caesar at Lerida 

June 49 from the hurdles and bridge-flooring that came swirling 
down the stream, the latter commander at once took 
over four legions and all his cavalry by the permanent 
bridge connecting the opposite bank with the town of 
Lerida (Ilerdd) and his own camp, and then rapidly advanced 
against the two legions of Fabius. Their approach was 
reported to Lucius Plancus, the commanding officer for 
the day of the Fabian guard ; and he immediately per- 
ceived the necessity of taking up a position on some high 
ground, where he drew up his men on a double front, in 
order to ensure himself from being surrounded by the 
enemy's horse. In this formation he received the attack, 
and, though vastly outnumbered, succeeded in beating 
off the fierce assaults of the legions and mounted troops. 
The engagement between the opposing cavalry had not 
long been in progress, when both sides caught sight in the 
distance of the advancing standards of two more legions. 
These proved to be reinforcements for ourselves, dispatched 
across the upper bridge by Fabius owing to his suspicion 
of what in fact had occurred, viz. that the enemy's generals 
would avail themselves of the opportunity thus offered 
them by fortune for crushing our intercepted detachment. 
Their arrival put an end to the action, and thereupon both 
sides withdrew into camp. 
4' Two days after this event Caesar arrived at head quarters, 
accompanied by 900 cavalry which he had previously detained 
as a bodyguard. The bridge vnrecked by the storm he 
found almost repaired, and at once gave orders for its com- 
pletion during the night. He next informed himself of the 
nature of the surrounding country, and on the morrow, 
leaving a garrison of six battalions for the camp and bridge, 

Caesar at Lerida 37 

together with all his baggage, drew up his entire force June 49 
in three parallel columns, and marched straight upon Lerida, 
halting beneath the camp of Afranius. There he remained 
some time in battle formation, in order to give Afranius 
an opportunity for coming down to engage him upon level 
ground. Afranius answered the challenge by moving 
out in force, but half-way down the hill halted under the 
protection of his fortified lines ; whereupon Caesar, seeing 
it was Afranius who declined the combat, determined to 
entrench a camp about 400 yards from the lowest spurs 
of the fortress rock. To prevent his troops being thrown 
into confusion, whilst engaged upon its construction, by 
any sudden onset from the enemy which might force them 
to break off the work, he gave orders to omit the building 
of a rampart, which was bound to be seen at a distance by 
projecting above the level, and directed his men merely 
to dig a trench thirty feet wide along his front and parallel 
with the enemy. His first two lines then continued to 
stand to arms in their original formation, whilst behind 
them the work was secretly executed by the third \ and by 
this device the whole business was finished off before Afranius 
discovered that a camp was being fortified under his very 
eyes. At the close of the day Caesar withdrew his legions 
inside this trench, and that night his men slept under arms. 

On the morrow the whole army was kept within the 42 
same trench ; and, since the earth necessary for a raised 
rampart would have to be fetched further afield, the same 
plan was, for the present, adopted in the work, a single 
legion being told off to the fortification of each of the 
three remaining sides of the camp, with orders to dig trenches 
of equal dimensions with the first. The three other legions 

38 Attempt on the Puig Bordel 

June 49 were at the same time stationed in light embattled order 
fronting the enemy and ready for action. In this situation 
Afranius and Petreius, hoping to create a diversion and to 
hinder the construction of our earthworks, advanced their 
entire force down to the lowest spurs of the hill, thus menacing 
a general attack. They were not successful, however, in 
inducing Caesar to suspend the work, the latter having full 
confidence in the ability of the three legions to defend it, 
especially when aided by the protection of the trench ; 
and so, after remaining in position for a short time, without 
ever advancing further than the base of the hill, they with- 
drew their troops back into camp. 

The third day of his arrival before Lerida (Ilerda) saw 
Caesar's camp fortified with an earthen rampart ; and 
on its completion, orders were at once given for the remain- 
ing battalions left behind at the earlier camp, together with 
all the baggage, to join the new head quarters. 
43 Now between the town of Lerida and the hill which 
lies nearest it, on the heights of which Petreius and Afranius 
lay encamped, there stretched an open plain some 300 
yards wide ; and about half-way across this plain rose a gentle 
knoll ^, the occupation and fortification of which would, 
Caesar was convinced, enable him to cut the enemy's 
communications with the town and bridge, and the immense 
quantity of stores they had there accumulated. In the 
hope of accomplishing this coup, he advanced three legions 
from camp ; then, having drawn up his main line in a suit- 
able position, he pointed to the hill and ordered the first 
ranks of one of the legions to dash forward and seize it. 
The movement was no sooner discovered by the enemy 
' Now the Puig Bordel. 

J{epulse of the Caesarians 39 

than the battalions of Afranius on picket duty before their June 49 
own camp were sent by a shorter route to occupy the same 
ground. A fight ensued, and Afranius's men, coming up 
first to the hill, repulsed our detachment and compelled 
it, on the approach of further reinforcements, to turn and 
fall back upon the main body of the legions. 

The type of fighting affected by the enemy's troops 4+ 
was to open with an impetuous charge, and boldly seize 
upon some good position. Little or no endeavour was made 
to preserve strict formation, fighting, as they did, in open 
and scattered order ; whilst, if hard pressed, no scruples 
of military honour deterred them from falling back or 
evacuating their post. Residence with Lusitanians and 
other foreign tribes had familiarized them with this kind 
of warfare ; for experience shows that troops generally 
conform in great measure to the customs of the country 
in which they have long been stationed. These tactics 
now occasioned much confusion amongst our men, who 
were quite unaccustomed to such a mode of attack. The 
isolated rushes of the enemy produced the belief that their 
unprotected flank ' was being turned ; whilst, on the other 
hand, it was a military tradition with themselves not to 
break their ranks, or to leave the standards, or surrender 
a position once occupied, except from the gravest causes. 
The result was that when the advanced ranks were driven 
in, the legion posted on that wing failed to stand its ground, 
and fell back upon the nearest hill. 

The whole incident had been so unexpected and so 45 
exceptional, that practically the whole Caesarian line was 
swaying with unsteadiness. Rallying his men, Caesar led 
* i. e. the right ; the shield protecting the left. 

40 Fierce Fight outside Lerida 

June 49 up the Ninth legion in support of his beaten detachment, 
which was now being hotly and triumphantly pursued by 
the enemy. His advance at once checked them, and com- 
pelled them in turn to take flight towards the town, where 
they halted just under the wall. But the men of the Ninth, 
carried away by the excitement of battle, in their eagerness 
to repair the loss sustained by their comrades, followed 
recklessly upon the protracted flight of the enemy, until 
they found themselves on ground that put them at con- 
• siderable disadvantage, viz. at the foot of the hill on which 
stands the town of Lerida (Ilerdd). On endeavouring to 
extricate themselves from this predicament, they were once 
more hard pressed by the enemy, who now held the advan- 
tage of position. The place was a precipitous one, with 
a perpendicular wall of rock on either side, and only of about 
sufficient width to accommodate three battalions in battle 
order ; consequently no reinforcements could be sent up 
from either flank, nor could the cavalry afford them any 
relief in their distress. From the town the path descended 
with a gently falling slope some 0bo paces long, and it was 
down this slope that our men had now to retire, through 
their inconsidered zeal in pressing the pursuit so far ; and 
here a most unequal fight had to be maintained. For not 
only was the path inconveniently narrow, but the enemy 
had halted immediately under the shoulders of the rock, 
and could therefore make every discharge tell with effect 
upon our troops. In spite of this, the latter fought on with 
unflinching courage, patiently enduring the many wounds 
inflicted upon them. The Pompeians were presently re- 
inforced, and additional battalions were constantly dispatched 
from their camp and pushed up through the town, thereby 

Fierce Fight outside Lerida 41 

allowing fresh troops to replace those who were exhausted. June 49 
This movement Caesar was also obliged to adopt, and to 
send up fresh battalions into the same cul-de-sac, in order 
to withdraw his wearied men. 

After five uninterrupted hours of this kind of combat, the 46 
Caesarian troops, finding themselves sorely pressed by 
superior numbers, and having now exhausted their supply 
of spears, drew swords and charged uphill into the serried 
masses of the enemy, where, hurling some over the rocks, 
they compelled the others to turn and run. /'Forcing them 
up against the city wall, they even drove a section through 
panic into the town, until by this vigorous action they had 
procured for themselves an unmolested retreat\ During 
this interval the cavalry also, after being obliged to halt on 
the rocky ground lower down, had managed on both flanks 
by splendid efforts to work its way up the hill-side, where by 
riding up and down between the two hostile lines, it ensured 
a more undisturbed and safer retirement for the legionaries. 

The battle was thus one of varying fortunes. Our losses 
at the first collision were about 70 killed, including Quintus 
Fulginius, a centurion of the third company ^ in the first 
battalion of the Fourteenth legion, who had reached that 
position from the lower grades through conspicuous gal- 
lantry in the field j whilst the wounded numbered over 
600. On the side of the Afranians Titus Caecilius, the 
first centurion of his legion, together with four other centu- 
rions, were killed, as well as over 200 rank and file. 

The general opinion entertained about the day's events 47 
showed that each party claimed to have left the field as 
victors. The Afranians appealed to the fact that, though 
* i.e. maniple. Introd. 

42 ^flections on the Day 

June 49 considered by common consent to be inferior troops to those 
of the enemy, they had nevertheless stood up to their attack 
for a considerable length of time ; not to mention that in 
the early part of the day they had secured their position 
at the knoll which had been the original cause of the engage- 
ment, and at this first encounter had actually compelled 
their enemy to turn and fly. On the other hand, our men 
could show that, with both ground and numbers against 
them, they had notwithstanding maintained a steady resis- 
tance of five long hours, at the end of which they had stormed 
the hill, and at the point of the sword dislodged the enemy 
from his vantage-ground, putting him to flight and even 
driving him into the town. 

As a consequence of this engagement, the hill, for the 
possession of which the battle had been waged, was now 
strongly fortified by the Pompeians, and a garrison established 
on it. 
48 Two days after these events there suddenly occurred 
a further misfortune. A storm of exceptional severity arose ; 
indeed, the floods that ensued were admittedly unprece- 
dented for those regions. On this occasion the rain also 
washed down the snow from all the hills, causing the river 
to overflow, and smashing on one and the same day both 
the bridges erected by Caius Fabius. This last circumstance 
caused the gravest inconvenience to Caesar's army ; for 
his camp being built, as already explained, between the 
two rivers Segre and Cinca (Sicoris and Cinga), a space only 
thirty miles wide, now that neither of these two was passable, 
the whole of his forces were inevitably penned in between 
their narrow barriers. Outside too, not only were the 
native states which had joined him unable to bring up pro- 

Storm and Flood 43 

visions for the army, but bodies of his own troops, who had June 49 
been away on distant foraging parties, saw themselves cut 
off by the swollen rivers and powerless to return ; whilst 
immense convoys now coming from Italy and Gaul found 
it impossible to get through to camp. Further to aggravate 
matters, it was an especially awkward period of the year : 
the supplies in the magazines of the winter camps had now 
run oiit, and the new year's corn was not quite ripe. In 
addition to this, the native Spanish communes had already 
been drained dry ; for Afranius had, before Caesar's arrival, 
collected into Lerida nearly all the corn in their hands, any 
that remained having been subsequently consumed by Caesar 
himself ; whilst the cattle belonging to the neighbouring 
communities, which at such a time of scarcity might have 
proved a useful substitute, had all been removed to a dis- 
tance by their owners on account of the war. The result 
was that the parties who were away foraging for corn and 
provender were now harassed by light-armed Lusitanians, 
and by the light Spanish infantry from the Eastern province. 
These men not only knew every inch of the ground, but 
found no difficulty in swimming any river, since they never 
go on active service without taking their air-bladders along 
with them^ On the other hand the Afranian army had 49 
abundant 'supplies of every kind. Steps had early been 
taken to amass large stocks of corn, and this was still being 
largely increased from every quarter of the province : 
similarly of forage there were unlimited supplies. Lastly 
the bridge at Lerida afforded ample facilities for collecting 
all such stores, and gave them a wholly untapped source of 
supply in the country east of the Segre {Sicoris), from which 
of course Caesar was completely excluded. 

44 Breakdown 

50 These floods lasted several days. Caesar made attempts 
i"ne 49 ^Q repair the bridges, but the volume of water would not 

allow of it, and, moreover, the pickets of the enemy that 
lined the opposite bank rendered their completion impossible. 
It was indeed an easy task for these latter to prevent the work 
of construction, since, besides the state of the river itself 
and the quantity of water we had to deal with, they were in 
a position to concentrate all their spears upon a single narrow 
point from the whole line of bank ; and it was a difficult 
matter for our people to carry on the engineering works in 
the midst of a boiling stream, and at the same time to avoid 
the weapons hurled at them. 

51 Meanwhile Afranius received intelligence that the large 
convoys on their way to Caesar had halted at the river. Those 
who had thus arrived were in the first place a body of archers 
from the tribe of the Ruteni (Rodez), with a force of cavalry 
from the old province of Gaul, accompanied by numbers of 
waggons and a huge baggage-train, in the true Gallic fashion ; 
besides these a heterogeneous collection of some 6,000 persons, 
including the sons and servants of their masters. These 
unwieldy numbers exhibited no sort of internal arrange- 
ment, and possessed no recognized authority ; but everybody 
followed his own private caprice, and the whole party was 
travelling without the slightest misgiving, and in full enjoy- 
ment of the freedom which previous journeys in the past had 
made habitual with them. Many of them were young men 
of distinguished families, sons of senators, and already mem- 
bers of the equestrian order ; there were also delegates from 
various communities, and even some officers of Caesar ; all 
of whom now found themselves alike hemmed in by the 

of Caesar's Commissariat 47 

To smash them, therefore, while in this predicament, July 49 
Afranius undertook a night march with all his mounted 
forces and three of his legions ; his cavalry being sent on 
ahead to deliver a surprise attack. But though surprised, 
the Gallic horse were quickly in their places, vigorously giving 
battle to the enemy. As long as the affair could be one be- 
tween similar arms, their small force v/as quite a match for 
the large numbers of the Afranians ; but the approaching 
standards of the legions caused them to beat a retreat to the 
nearest hills, after losing a few of their number. It was this 
part of the engagement that proved an invaluable diversion 
for securing the safety of the rest of the party, who used the 
respite thus gained to make for the higher ground. The 
day's losses amounted to some 200 of the archers and a few 
of the horse, together with a slight number of camp followers 
and some of the baggage. 

All these causes, however, resulted in a serious rise in the 5^ 
price of corn, which is generally inflated, not merely by 
present scarcity, but also by apprehensions for the future. 
It had now touched 150 shillings a bushel, and the want of 
farinaceous food had already lowered the physique of the 
troops, whose distress was increasing daily. Indeed, the 
last few days had produced such a complete revolution in 
the general position, and such a striking change of fortune, 
that, whilst our own men were suffering from the want of 
common necessaries, the enemy, with their unlimited supplies 
of every kind, were already being regarded as the winning 
side. Caesar accordingly turned for help to those townships 
which had already declared in his favour, and as their stocks 
of corn were so low, requisitioned cattle instead ; the sutlers 
of the army were got rid of by being sent away to the more 

^6 The Army^s Peril 

July 49 distant communities ; and at the same time he personally 
took steps to alleviate the present distress by every device in 
his power. 

53 Exaggerated and glowing accounts of the present military 
situation were now sent home to their supporters in Rome 
by Afranius, Petreius, and their party ; and being further 
magnified by popular rumour, produced the impression 
that the war was virtually over. On the arrival of these 
letters and messages in Rome, large crowds flocked to the 
house of Afranius with the most profusive congratulations. 
Numbers prepared to cross over from Italy to Pompeius ; 
some from a desire to be regarded as the harbingers of such 
good news, others to avoid the appearance of having first 
waited to learn the issue of the war, or again of seeming to 
be quite the last to come in, 

54 In this critical position, with all the roads blocked by 
Afranius's cavalry and infantry, and the bridges impossible 
to repair, Caesar directed his troops to build a number of 
boats, of a type which had become familiar to him in recent 
years from the method followed in Britain. The keels and 
main framework of these consisted of light timber, whilst 
the hull was constructed of plaited osiers lined outside with 
hides. When finished, these coracles were laid upon linked 
waggons, and carried upstream by a night march twenty-one 
miles from camp. Troops were then conveyed in them across 
the river, and at once proceeded to seize a hill which sloped 
down to the edge of the bank ; and before the enemy had 
wind of the affair this hill was rapidly fortified. A whole 
legion was subsequently ferried over to the same point, and 
a fresh bridge commenced from either bank and finished off 
in two days. By this means Caesar succeeded in recovering 

Caesar's Ingenuity 47 

his convoys and foraging parties in safety, and thereby at once July 49 
relieved the strain upon his commissariat. 

The same day that the bridge was completed, a large force 55 
of cavalry was thrown across the stream. Delivering a sur- 
prise attack upon the enemy's foragers, who were scattered 
about the country without the slightest apprehension, they 
headed off a considerable number of animals and men ; and, 
on the approach of several battalions of Spanish light infantry 
sent to their relief, skilfully divided their forces, one division 
taking charge of the spoil, whilst the other remained to meet 
and repulse the advancing enemy. One of these battalions 
rashly broke its line, and charged ahead of the others ; where- 
upon it became severed from its supports, was surrounded, 
and cut to pieces. The whole body of cavalry then returned 
to camp by the same bridge, bringing with them a large 
quantity of booty, and without having lost a single man.y 


The First Naval Engagement 

During these operations at Lerida the inhabitants of 56 
Marseilles (Massilia), acting upon the advice of Lucius 
Domitius, fitted out a squadron of seventeen warships, eleven 
of which were decked boats. These were further increased 
by the addition of several smaller craft, in the hope of 
frightening our fleet by mere numbers. On board these 
ships was placed a strong force of archers, together with 
large drafts of the already mentioned Albici, whose courage 
was then incited by means of bribes and promises. , A certain 
number of vessels Domitius claimed to be allowed as his 

48 The 'Rival Fleets 

July 49 own ; and these he manned with the tenant farmers and 
herdsmen whom he had brought with him from Italy. The 
fleet, being thus fully equipped, sailed out with all confidence 
to meet our squadron, which under the command of Decimus 
Brutus was then lying at its base off an island that faces 

57 Brutus was far the weaker in number of ships; but, on 
the other hand, Caesar had appointed to this fleet, as its 
fighting crews, the elite of all his army, especially picked 
for their personal courage from each of his several legions, 
comprising front-rank soldiers and centurions, who had all 
begged to be allowed to undertake this particular duty. 
These crews had now prepared grappling-irons and boat- 
hooks, and provided themselves with an unlimited supply of 
heavy legionary and similar javelins, as well as the other 
lighter kinds of spears. As soon, therefore, as they had intelli- 
gence of the enemy's advance, they rowed their ships out of 
harbour, and gave battle to the Massiliots. The fight was 
conducted with the fiercest valour on either side. The 
Albici yielded little or nothing in bravery to our own men, 
being a race of hardy mountaineers, habituated to war ; 
moreover they had only just parted from the Marseilles people, 
and still carried the promises these had made them fresh in 
their memory. Similarly, the herdsmen of Domitius men- 
tioned above, with the hope of liberty as their incentive, were 
burning to prove their mettle beneath the eyes of their master. 

58 The Massiliots themselves, relying on the speed of their 
ships and the skill of their steersmen, continued for some 
time to elude our attempts at attack by suddenly shifting 
their helm whenever our vessels bore down upon them. As 

' See Map, p. 76. 

Victory of Caesarian Admiral 49 

long as they had sufficient sea room, they remained strung July 49 
out in a single long line, directing all their efforts to surround- 
ing us, or trying to concentrate two or more ships against 
one of our own ; or again, wherever they had a chance, they 
would endeavour to dash past our sides and to rip off 
the blades from our banks of oars. But when closer quarters 
became inevitable, and the skilful manoeuvres of their helms- 
men no longer availed them, it was to the fighting power of 
their mountaineers that their hopes were next directed. On 
the other hand, our people had to make shift with ill-trained 
oarsmen and less expert captains at the helm, men who had 
been suddenly transferred out of merchantmen, and who 
hardly knew even the names of the fittings of a man-of-war. 
They were also handicapped by the slow pace and great 
weight of their ships, which, having been hurriedly built 
from green wood, had not yet attained the same adaptability 
for rapid movement as those confronting them. Under 
these conditions as long as they were allowed a hand-to-hand 
fight, they had no hesitation in running their single ships 
in between two of the enemy ; when, by letting go the 
grappling-irons, they would make both these fast to their 
own, one on either beam, and each crew then fighting in two 
divisions would board the two vessels alongside. By these 
tactics they inflicted heavy losses upon the Albici and herds- 
men, and succeeded in sinking a part of the squadron, 
capturing others with their crews, and driving back the 
remainder into port. 

As a result of the day's engagement the Massilians lost 
altogether nine of their vessels, this number including those 
which were captured. 

f o Ejfect of the Victory 

The Reward of a Great Strategist 

59 News of this battle duly reached Caesar at Lerida, and, 
J" y 49 taken in conjunction with the completion of the bridge, 

caused a speedy reaction in the fortunes of the campaign. 
For the Pompeians, through wholesome dread of the quality 
of our cavalry, now showed far less freedom and confidence 
in moving about the country. Some days they would come 
out only a short distance from camp, so as to have a quick 
means of retreat (a plan which confined their foraging to^ 
somewhat narrow limits) ; at other times they would make 
a long detour, and so avoid the pickets waiting for them ; 
sometimes a slight brush with the enemy, or even the 
sudden appearance of our cavalry on the sky-line, would 
make them drop their loads upon the spot and scurry back 
to camp. Latterly they had taken to doing their foraging 
at intervals of several days, and even by night ; this last 
surely an unprecedented course for a commander to adopt. 

60 Meanwhile the people of Huesca and Loarre (Calagurris), 
(the latter being politically incorporated with the former 
town), sent representatives to Caesar to put themselves at his 
disposal. They were followed at once by those of Tarra- 
gona (Tarraco), the lacetanians and Ausetanians on the 
Mediterranean litoral, and a few days later by the lUur- 
gavonensians from the southern bank of the Ebro. From all 
alike he requested help in the shape of corn. This they at 
once provided, and hunting up every pack-animal in the 
district, sent it forthwith into camp. The battalion of 
the Illurgavonensians serving vdth the enemy, on hearing 

The Turn of the Tide f i 

of this decision of its tribe, actually deserted to Caesar, July 49 
bringing over its standards from the post where they were 
quartered. Far-reaching indeed, and most rapid, was the 
revolution now effected. With the bridge completed, with 
five powerful tribes secured as friendly, with the commissariat 
once more working smoothly, and the rumours as to the 
alleged advance of Pompeius through Morocco (Mauretania) 
with a relieving force of legionaries finally disposed of, many 
of the more distant cantons now began to break their con- 
nexion with Afranius, and to declare on the side of Caesar. 

All these circumstances produced the greatest consterna- 61 
tlon in the ranks of his opponents, and Caesar determined 
to profit by it. With the object of putting an end to the 
necessity of always sending his cavalry by a long detour across 
his new bridge, he selected a suitable spot up-stream, and pro- 
ceeded to dig a number of canals thirty feet wide, which, by 
drawing off part of the waters of the Segre (Sicoris) would 
create a ford over that river. These were on the point of 
completion, when Afranius and Petreius became seized with 
the utmost concern lest they should find themselves abso- 
lutely cut off from either corn or forage, on account of the 
overwhelming force of Caesar's cavalry. They therefore 
decided to anticipate this contingency by evacuating that part 
of the country, and transferring the seat of war to central 
Spain (Celtiberia). What further contributed to the adoption 
of this plan was the fact that, of the different Spanish states 
which had taken opposite sides in the late war with Sertorius,* 
the vanquished party had nothing but dread for the name and 
rule of Pompeius, even though an absentee governor : those, 
on the other hand, who had remained loyal now felt the 
^ Introd. 
E 2 

5*2 Vompeians evacuate Lerida 

July 49 warmest affection towards the man who had so greatly 
advanced their own interests ; whilst as to Caesar, his name 
did not carry the same familiarity in the ears of foreigners 
as did that of his rival. Moreover, in these quarters they 
were expecting further large bodies of cavalry and native 
auxiliary infantry ; and, once on their own ground, their 
idea was to prolong the campaign until winter had set 
in. In execution of this scheme, orders were given to collect 
boats all along the Ebro (Hiberus), and to bring them to Octo- 
gesa, a town on that river,. twenty miles south of their present 
camp. A bridge of boats was then ordered to be built at 
that place, whilst two legions were moved across the Segre 
and a camp fortified on its farther bank as a tete-de-pont 
with an earth rampart twelve feet high. 

62 Intelligence of these movements duly reached Caesar by 
means of his spies. The work of draining the river was 
accordingly pushed on without intermission day and night 
alike, the men straining every nerve. It had now advanced 
far enough for the cavalry to cross ; and these did not hesitate 
to swim their horses over, although it was an operation 
fraught with the utmost difficulty, and indeed was but barely 
possible. But the infantry were still up to their shoulders, 
nearly neck deep, and were hindered from crossing, not 
merely by the depth of the water, but also by the rapidity of 
the current. Yet notwithstanding these difficulties, there was 
no appreciable interval between the news of the approaching 
completion of the bridge over the Ebro and the discovery of 
a ford at the Segre. 

63 This last event made the enemy consider it advisable to 
hasten their departure. Leaving a guard of two auxiliary 
battalions at Lerida, they crossed the Segre in full force, and 

A Baring 'Manoeuvre 5-3 

proceeded to camp in conjunction with the two legions that July 49 
had crossed a few days earlier. The only course now left 
to Caesar was to employ his horse to harry and distress the 
retreat of his opponents. To use his own bridge for trans- 
porting his infantry involved a long detour, which would 
inevitably allow the enemy to reach the Ebro by a very much 
shorter route. The cavalry were therefore dispatched across 
the river, and, after crossing by the ford, suddenly appeared 
in the dark on the rearguard of the Pompeians (they had 
marched shortly after midnight), and, deploying in great 
force, endeavoured to check and disorganize the retreat. 

At dawn it could be seen, from some high ground near 64 
Caesar's camp, that our men were delivering a furious attack 
on the skirts of the enemy, and that the whole of their rear- 
guard was occasionally held up and separated from the main 
body ; whilst every now and then the Pompeians would take 
the offensive, and our people would be repulsed by a combined 
charge of all their regiments ; only, however, to resume the 
assault as soon as our opponents turned their backs. Inside 
the camp the troops collected into knots, indignant at seeing 
the enemy thus slip from their grasp and the war unnecessarily 
prolonged. Approaching the centurions and officers, they 
implored these to tell Caesar not to think of sparing them 
either trouble or danger, but to assure him that they were 
quite ready and able, and fully prepared to venture on the 
passage of the stream where the cavalry had already crossed. 
Moved by their ardent representations, Caesar decided that 
the attempt should be made, in spite of the apprehensions 
he felt at exposing his army to such a body of water. Orders 
were given to weed out from every company any whose cour- 
age or strength seemed likely to prove unequal to the ordeal. 

^4 Caesar*s Pursuit 

July 49 These were left behind with a single legion to hold the 
camp, and the remaining force then marched out of their 
old quarters in light battle equipment. Arrived at the 
river, numbers of transport animals were strung across 
the stream, both above and below the ford, and when every 
precaution had thus been taken the passage of the army was 
successfully accomplished. Of the troops who took part 
in this enterprise a few were carried down by the force of the 
stream ; but all were caught and rescued by the improvised 
cavalry, whilst of casualties there was not one. 

With the army safely landed, the whole force fell into 
position and commenced to advance in three lines ; and so 
great was the enthusiasm of the troops, that, although they 
had an additional six miles to do between camp and the ford, 
and were further greatly delayed at the river, they yet suc- 
ceeded in overtaking before three o'clock in the afternoon 
those who had marched about one on the previous morning. 
65 As soon as their approach was descried on the horizon by 
Afranius and Petreius, the former general, astounded at the 
amazing sight, at once halted on some rising ground and 
drew up for battle. Caesar, however, not wishing to send 
his men exhausted into action, halted in the plains to 
rest his army ; but on the enemy once more attempting to 
advance, he renewed his harassing pursuit. They had there- 
fore no option but to pitch camp sooner than otherwise 
had been their design. For the truth was they were now 
approaching a range of hills, and five miles further on they 
would come to difficult and narrow roads. These hills 
it was their great object to penetrate, since their possession 
would not only deliver them from Caesar's cavalry, but also 
enable them, by holding the passes in his face, to bar the 

English Miles 

Caesar's Pursuit Ci, Pt, First Position (c.c.65-G7) 

Cz, P2, Position after Caesar's turning movement (c.c. 70, 71) 
Ca, Po, Position after the Retreat on Lerida (c.c. Sl-St^) 

Taken from the latest Government survey map : the rondg there- 
fore are modern. The route of the two armies here adopted is that 
of StofFel, who places Octogem at Mequinenza. Others place it near 
Ribarroja or at Flix ; and Goler takes a route through Alcano and 
Llardecans. Mt. Maneu is the most prominent landmark in the 
district, and can be seen from Lerida. 

To /ace f> 55. 

Caesars 'Pursuit jy 

further progress of his army, and meanwhile to effect the July 49 
passage of the Ebro (Hiberus) without danger or fear of 
molestation to themselves. The plan was one which they 
were bound to attempt and to carry out at all hazards • 
nevertheless, the fatigue consequent upon a whole day's battle 
and the heavy exertions of the march induced them to post- 
pone it until the morrow. Caesar also then camped on the 
nearest high ground. 

About midnight information reached him through some 66 
prisoners who had strayed too far from camp after water and 
had been caught by our cavalry, that the Pompeian generals 
were silently withdrawing from their intrenchments ; where- 
upon the bugle was at once ordered to be sounded, and the 
command for striking camp to be proclaimed in the usual 
military fashion. The enemy, hearing the sound, and dread- 
ing lest they should be forced to fight at night when under 
the weight of their heavy marching kit, or again that they 
might be hemmed in amongst the narrow defiles by Caesar's 
horse, at once arrested their movement, and kept their forces 
in camp. The next morning Petreius made a secret expedi- 
tion with a small party of mounted men to examine the lie 
of the land, and a similar party left Caesar's camp, under the 
command of Lucius Decidius Saxa, also to reconnoitre the 
country. Both parties reported in the same terms, viz. that 
for the first five miles the road ran through a plain, which 
was then succeeded by rugged mountain tracts ; and that 
the side which got first to the passes could easily check the 
other's further advance. 

A council of war having been summoned, a discussion was 67 
opened by Petreius and Afranius and the question raised as 
to the best time for making a start. The general opinion 

y5 The Pomp elans outmanceuvred 

July 49 favoured a night march, holding it quite possible to reach 
the passes without being detected. Others pointed to the 
orders for marching, which they had heard the previous 
night in Caesar's camp, as a proof that a surreptitious depar- 
ture was out of the question. Evidently Caesar's cavalry 
surrounded them at night, holding all the roads and neigh- 
bourhood, and night engagements were to be avoided, 
because in civil war, when a panic took place, troops generally 
obeyed the instincts of fear rather than those of discipline. 
Daylight, on the contrary, possessed a power in itself of 
bringing before the eyes of all men a keen fear of disgrace, 
which was greatly aided too by the presence of their officers 
and centurions ; and it was these incentives that usually 
restrained troops and kept them to their duty. Hence on 
all grounds the attempt to break through should be made 
by day ; for even though they might encounter some slight 
casualties, yet the desired position could quite well be captured 
without endangering the safety of the main army. 

This last view prevailed in the council, and it was deter- 
mined to make a start at daybreak on the following morning. 
68 Meanwhile Caesar had carefully explored the locality, and 
with the first streak of dawn led his whole force out of camp. 
Their march took them by a long detour over roads that were 
little better than tracks, as all the main routes leading to 
the Ebro {Hiherus) and Octogesa were necessarily blocked by 
. the enemy, whose camp lay across their path. Caesar's army 
had therefore to traverse a series of deep and difficult valleys, 
where the road was often rendered impracticable by precipi- 
tous rocks ; so much so that the men's arms and accoutrements 
had to be passed along from hand to hand, and much of the 
march was only accomplished by the troops shouldering one 

The J{ace to the Ebro 77 

another up after thus freeing themselves of their armour. July 49 
Yet no one was heard to complain of the severity of the toil, 
well knowing, as they did, that all their toils alike would end, 
could they once succeed in barring the enemy from the Ebro, 
and in cutting his supplies. 

The Afranian troops, in their joy, at first ran out from 69 
camp to see the sight, flinging after their retreating enemy 
many a parting taunt to those who now found themselves 
without enough to eat, and therefore obliged to go back to 
Lerida. And, indeed, there was some justification for their 
gibes ; for the route led clean away from our objective, and 
thus made us seem to be marching in exactly the opposite 
direction. Their generals also began congratulating them- 
selves on their own decision to remain in camp, and not 
too without much apparent reason : they could see that 
our pursuit had been undertaken without camp-animals or 
baggage, and naturally felt convinced that we could no 
longer hold out against the scarcity of food. When, however, 
they perceived that our column was gradually bending round 
to the eastward, and observed that its head was already abreast 
of the position occupied by their own camp, the most lethar- 
gic and indolent amongst them were found demanding instant 
departure and a race to overtake us. The call sounded to 
arms; and, leaving behind a few garrison battalions, the entire 
force turned out of camp and headed straight for the Ebro. 

It was a contest in speed, and speed only, viz. which 7° 
of the two parties could first seize the pass and mountain 
range. Caesar's army was retarded by the difficulties of the 
roads ; Afranius's force was continually checked by the pur- 
suing Caesarian cavalry. On the other hand, this last action 
of the Afranians had brought the situation to this inevitable 

^8 A Great Opportunity 

July 49 conclusion— that should they be the first to reach the moun- 
tains ahead of them, although they might escape their own 
peril, they must none the less lose the baggage of their 
entire army, as well as their battalions left in camp ; for these 
were now absolutely cut off by the intervention of Caesar's 
army from even the slightest possibility of relief. Caesar 
covered the distance first, and finding a sort of plateau as he 
emerged from the lofty rocks, drew up his line of battle on 
it in face of the enemy. Afranius, seeing his rearguard hard 
pressed by the Caesarian horse, and the enemy on his front, 
selected some high ground and there halted. From thence 
he dispatched a force of four Spanish light infantry battalions 
towards what was the dominating hill in all the surrounding 
country, with orders to advance at full speed and occupy it ; 
his design being to follow in force himself, and, changing 
his first plan, to make for Octogesa by another route over the 
hills. The hght infantry were hastening by a flank approach 
towards their objective, when they were discovered by 
Caesar's cavalry and at once attacked. The Spaniards were 
never for a moment equal to withstanding the fierce onset 
of our horse, but were quickly surrounded, and all cut to 
pieces in sight of both armies. 
71 It was an opportunity such as rarely falls to the lot of 
a commander. Caesar was well aware that, after so terrible 
a disaster enacted before their very eyes, the enemy's army 
would be too shaken to offer much resistance, especially as 
they were completely dominated by his cavalry, who would 
be able to act with effect on the level and open ground where 
the conflict must be decided. To seize this opportunity was 
now the universal petition addressed to him. Generals, 
centurions, regimental officers— all alike came running up 

and Caesar's IJse of it S9 

with the request that he would not hesitate to give battle. July 49 
They pointed out that the men's ardour was strung to the 
highest pitch, whilst the Afranians, on the other hand, had 
given many proofs of a state of panic : first of all in failing 
to go to the relief of their own troops, then in declining to 
leave their hill ; as well as in the fact that they could scarcely 
succeed even in keeping oflE the attacks of the cavalry, but 
were crowding together, with their standards mingled in 
confusion, not keeping to their own colours, or observing 
their proper ranks. They added, that if the enemy's advantage 
in position made him hesitate, an opportunity for a fight 
somewhere or other would doubtless soon arise, since Afranius 
would have to come down from the place, as he could not 
stay there without water. 

On his side, Caesar had conceived a hope of being able 72 
to attain his purpose without a battle, and without bloodshed 
to his own troops, now that he had succeeded in cutting his 
opponents' supplies. Why, he asked himself, should he lose 
any of his men, even in a successful engagement, and why 
expose to the chance of wounds troops who had served him 
so magnificently ? What right again had he to tempt Fortune, 
especially considering that a commander's duty is to effect 
his conquests by strategy no less than by the sword ? Com- 
passion also swayed him for his fellow countrymen, whose 
slaughter he could not but foresee ; and he preferred to gain 
his ends with these men safe and sound. However, this 
plan did not commend itself to the majority ; the troops 
were even heard declaring amongst themselves that, if 
such a golden opportunity for victory was to be thrown away, 
they would not fight even when Caesar wanted them. 
Nevertheless, he stood to his decision, and accordingly 

6o Overtures by the Men 

J"'y 49 drew oi? a little from Kls present ground with the object of 
relieving the tension on his frightened opponents ; whereupon 
Petreius and Afranius, profiting by the occasion, retreated 
to their old camp. Caesar then proceeded to post pickets 
and guards along the hills ; after which, with every road 
to the Ebro (Hiberus) securely barred, he fortified a camp 
as close up to that of his enemy as was practicable. 

73 On the morrow the commanders of the Pompeians, dis- 
tracted at seeing all hope now gone of securing supplies 
or of reaching the Ebro, held a consultation on their future 
plans. There were only two roads open to them — one to 
Lerida, if they chose to return there, another if they made 
for Tarragona (Tarraco). In the midst of the discussion, 
a report was brought in that our cavalry were attack- 
ing their watering party. The report being confirmed, 
a guard was immediately posted in the shape of a series of 
pickets drawn from the cavalry and native infantry, and 
supported by battalions of the legions ; and this step was 
then followed by orders to run up a rampart between camp 
and the watering-place, so that the watering might proceed 
behind the earthwork without fear of molestation or need 
of any further guard. The supervision of this breastwork 
Petreius and Afranius decided to share between themselves, 
and in order to see it executed went out some considerable 
distance from their fortified lines. 

74 Their departure afforded their men an uninterrupted 
opportunity for a talk with those in the opposite camp, and, 
flocking out, they proceeded to hunt up and hail any acquain- 
tance or fellow townsman each happened there to possess. 
The first thing was a general expression of thanks to all our 
men for having spared them the day before when in their 

Fraternisation of the Two Camps 6i 

state of panic : their lives, they declared, they owed to this July 49 
act of clemency. Next, they wanted to know what trust 
could be reposed in the others' commander ; whether 
they would do right to put themselves in his power ; 
following up this by a regret that they had not done so at 
first, instead of taking arms against their friends and blood 
relations. Encouraged by these conversations with our men, 
they next put forward a petition to the Caesarian general to 
spare the lives of Petreius and Afranius, being anxious to 
avoid the appearance of having committed the crime of 
betraying their own officers. Reassured on this point, they 
then declared they would come over at once, and proceeded 
to authorize their leading centurions to go as peace delegates 
to Caesar. While these were thus engaged, many of the 
Pompeians invited their Caesarian friends and took them 
back to their own camp, whilst others of themselves were 
taken off to ours ; in a word, the unification of the two camps 
appeared complete. Numbers of regimental officers also 
and centurions came and tendered their allegiance to Caesar. 
The same course was taken by the Spanish chieftains whom 
the enemy had summoned to the campaign, and now held 
as hostages in their own camp. These men applied to their 
acquaintances and any with whom their families visited, to 
ensure for them each a favourable introduction to Caesar. 
The young son of Afranius was likewise engaged in negotiat- 
ing with Caesar, through the help of the general Sulpicius, 
for his own and his father's life. On all sides were heard 
rejoicing and congratulation ; since it looked as if the one 
party had escaped a dire peril, and the other gained a wonderful 
achievement without so much as a scratch. Everybody 
admitted the greatness of the reward which Caesar's un- 

62 Interrupted by Petreius 

July 49 deviating clemency had brought him, and his recent decision 
was now universally applauded. 

75 The report of these novel proceedings brought Afranius 
back from the earthwork then in course of construction, and 
he arrived in camp fully prepared, as was believed, to acqui- 
esce without demur in whatever turn events might have 
taken. Petreius, on the contrary, never lost his presence 
of mind. Arming his retinue of private servants, and also 
taking with him the light Spanish infantry battalion that 
acted as the commander-in-chief's bodyguard, together with 
a small squadron of specially privileged native cavalry which 
were always about his person, he suddenly galloped up to the 
rampart, stepped the intercourse between the two armies, 
and drove our men out of his camp, putting any whom he 
caught to the sword. The rest drew together, and, appalled 
by the sudden peril, wrapped their left hands in their cloaks, 
and drawing their swords protected themselves as best they 
could against the horsemen and Spaniards. The nearness 
of their own camp lent them confidence ; and, as they ap- 
proached it, the pickets on guard outside advanced to their 

75 Having effected so much of his purpose, Petreius next made 
the round of the companies, appealing to the troops with 
tears in his eyes, and beseeching them not to betray him to 
the tender mercies of his foes, and not to betray their own 
absent commander Pompeius. A general move was at once 
made towards head quarters. There he demanded that 
every man in camp should solemnly swear not to desert or 
betray the army or its chiefs, and not to enter upon any secret 
course of action on his own authority. This oath he first of 
all took himself, and then administered to Afranius. They 

Pomp elans turn back to Lertda 63 

were followed by the regimental officers and centurions ; July 49 
after which each company was brought forward and the men 
swore to observe the same. An order was then published 
that any one harbouring a Caesarian should produce him 
forthwith, and on their production all were publicly executed 
in the space outside the head quarters tent. Most of them, 
however, were secretly hidden by their hosts, and sent over 
the rampart during the night. But the result of this intimi- 
dation on the part of the leaders, and the infliction of this 
atrocious punishment upon our innocent men, taken in con- 
junction with the solemn obligation of the new oath, was 
to destroy all hopes of an immediate surrender, and, by 
changing the temper of the troops, to bring the situation 
once more back to the old arbitrament of war. 

Meanwhile Caesar gave orders that such of his opponents' 77 
troops as had come across during the late period of negotia- 
tions should be collected together with every mark of respect, 
and sent back to their own camp. A certain proportion, 
however, of the group of officers and centurions preferred 
to stay with him, and were subsequently treated with con- 
spicuous favour, the centurions being reappointed to their 
former companies, and all the officers who were Roman 
knights being gazetted according to their previous rank. 

To revert now to the fortunes of the Afranians. Their 7^ 
foraging was exposed to constant attack, their watering 
conducted under the greatest difficulties. The legionaries 
amongst them possessed some small amount of supplies, having 
received orders to take rations for twenty-two days on quit- 
ting Lerida ; but the Spanish infantry and native auxiliaries 
had none. Moreover, these last had but slender chances of 
obtaining any, and even if they did, were physically unequal 

($4 ^ ^arguard Action 

July 49 to carrying heavy loads ; consequently they deserted daily 
in large numbers to Caesar. It was beyond doubt a most 
critical position. Of the two plans open to them, the more 
advisable seemed to be a return to Lerida, where a small 
quantity of provisions had been left behind ; for once there, 
they were confident of seeing their way through their subse- 
quent difficulties. Tarragona was too far off, and over that 
distance of ground they were well aware that more than one 
accident might wreck their course. Having therefore settled 
on the former alternative, they marched out of their present 
entrenchments. Caesar at once detached his mounted men 
to harass and check their rearguard, whilst following in person 
with the legions ; and without a moment's delay his cavalry 
became engaged with the tail of the Pompeian army. 
79 The fighting that ensued proceeded along the following 
general lines. The rear of the retreating column was brought 
up by a number of infantry battalions, free of all superfluous 
baggage, and these, whenever the army's march lay through 
a plain, would be halted, several strong, to act as a covering 
force. Where a mountain range had to be scaled, the danger 
to this force was easily repelled simply by the nature of the 
ground, as the vanguard could use their higher position to 
protect their comrades toiling up the slope ; but when 
a valley or other kind of descent lay before them, not only 
could the advanced party render no help to that which was 
checking the pursuit, but the Caesarian cavalry also, from 
their vantage-ground, rained down spears upon their backs, 
thereby gravely imperilling the safety of the force. The 
only way to meet this danger was, when they approached such 
places, to order the legions to halt, and by a determined 
charge scatter the enemy's horse ; then, when these had been 

Brilliant Caesarian Cavalry 6f 

dislodged, the entire force would suddenly fling themselves July 49 
down the hillside at the double, and, getting across the valley 
in this way, form up once more on the opposite heights. As 
for their own cavalry, so far were they from getting any help 
from it, though numerically a strong force, that, owing to 
its panic-stricken state consequent on the preceding engage- 
ments, it had itself to receive protection by being kept in the 
centre of the column ; and the invariable result of letting 
any trooper quit the line was to be instantly snapped up 
by the Caesarian horse. 

Now when fighting of this nature is in progress, the march 80 
of an army is necessarily slow and tentative, involving frequent 
halts for the relief of its own units. And such was the case 
now. After proceeding four miles, the attacks of our cavalry 
became so galling, that the enemy were driven to seize a lofty 
hill; here they commenced fortifying one side of a camp where 
it ^aced their pursuers, though without unloading their bag- 
gage train. Subsequently, on seeing that Caesar's camp was 
fully laid out, with its tents pitched, and that his cavalry were 
absent with scattered foraging parties, they suddenly, about 
eleven o'clock on the same day, made a dash to escape ; and, 
filled with a new hope of respite through the absence of the 
enemy's horse, started once more on the march. Aware of 
the new movement, Caesar first of all refreshed his troops, and 
then set out in pursuit ; leaving behind one or two bat- 
talions to guard his baggage, and giving instructions that 
at four o'clock in the afternoon the foraging parties should 
follow and the cavalry be recalled. The latter force lost 
no time taking up their daily part in the march. Sharp 
fighting ensued along the rearguard, all but resulting in the 
enemy's rout, and involving several casualties amongst 

66 The Sufferings of the 1^ treat 

July 49 their rank and file and to some extent among their cen- 

Meanwhile Caesar was coming up, and his column, in full 
force, was now hard on their heels. 
8i In this predicament, unable either to search for a suitable 
camping ground or to proceed further with their march, 
there remained no alternative but to halt, and to make 
a camp on a site both destitute of water and naturally un- 
suited to their purpose. Notwithstanding this, Caesar, acting 
on the reasons indicated above, refrained from all attack, and 
• merely contented himself with not allowing any tents to be 
pitched after this day, in order that every man in his force 
might be the readier to take up the pursuit, no matter whether 
the enemy broke away by day or by night. The latter, on 
discovering the impracticable nature of their present site, 
employed all the hours of darkness in extending their lines, 
thus turning camp into camp ; and this work was continued 
at daybreak on the following morning and occupied them 
throughout the ensuing day. Unfortunately, the further 
they carried their works and advanced their lines, the further 
they got from water ; and they thus found themselves 
remedying their present evil only by incurring new ones. 
The first night after this no watering whatever was attempted ; 
on the morrow a guard was left behind in camp, while the 
rest of the force moved out towards the watering-place, 
though still not a single forager ventured to make his appear- 
ance. Caesar much preferred letting punishment of this 
kind do its work amongst them, and so force them to a sur- 
render, to having to decide matters by a pitched battle. 
Yet, though this was so, it did not prevent him from attempt- 
ing the circumvallation of his opponents by means of rampart 

The Suffemigs of the l^treat 67 

and ditch ; his object being to counteract as far as possible Ju!j' 49 
the surprise sorties which he foresaw they would be driven 
to adopt. It was with this design in view that on their side 
an order was now given to slaughter all baggage animals ; 
a decision that under any circumstances would have been 
necessary, on account of their absolute dearth of fodder. 

A period of two days was spent in arranging these works 8a 
and the plans connected with them, and the third day found 
considerable progress made with much of the entrenchments. 
But about three o'clock in the afternoon of this day the 
enemy's signal for action suddenly sounded, and his legions, 
advancing from camp, drew up in line with the express object 
of preventing the completion of our fortifications. Caesar at 
once recalled his own regiments from his earthworks, ordered 
his cavalry to concentrate in force, and marshalled his line 
of battle. Thus much indeed was imperative on him ; for 
to expose himself to the imputation of having shirked a con- 
test, in face of the reasonable expectation of his troops and 
his general reputation with the world, would beyond all 
doubt have struck a serious blow at his prestige. On the 
other hand, he was still influenced by the reasons already indi- 
cated for not desiring a battle with his opponents, and even 
more so in the present instance, inasmuch as the narrow limits 
of the ground rendered it hardly possible to inflict a crush- 
ing defeat upon them, even if actually routed. For the space 
between the two camps did not exceed two miles ; two-thirds 
of this was occupied by the rival armies, and the remainder 
just gave room enough to the troops for delivering their 
charge; consequently, in case of a general action, the 
defeated side would find an easy escape in its flight through 
the close proximity of its own camp. It was these con- 

F 2 

68 Caesar succeeds in 

July 49 siderations which had now determined him, whilst yet 
resisting any unprovoked attack, not himself to take the 
83 The Afranians were in two lines, consisting of five Roman 
legions ; whilst a third position in the rear was held by their 
native reserves. Caesar's army was in three lines ; but his 
five legions were distributed with four battalions from each 
in the front line, then three more apiece as a first reserve, 
followed again by the same number once more, each battalion 
being always in support of part of its own legion. His archers 
and slingers were withdrawn inside the ranks of his centre, 
whilst his two flanks were screened by cavalry. With their 
lines thus arranged, each party seemed to have attained its 
desired object : Caesar, to refuse battle unless forced upon 
it ; the enemy, to hinder the construction of the other's 
earthworks. The situation, however, was only becoming 
prolonged ; and the troops, after being kept in position till 
sunset, then parted from each other to their respective 

The next day Caesar prepared to finish his incompleted 
works, whilst the Pompeians proceeded to try a ford over the 
Segre, in the hope of crossing that river. To frustrate this, 
Caesar threw his light-armed Germans with a cavalry section 
across the stream, along the banks of which he then posted 
a strong line of pickets. 
84 Blockaded thus at every outlet, with what camp animals 
"g- 49 they still possessed now without fodder for four whole days, 
and destitute alike of water, fuel, and provisions, the Pompeian 

2 Aug.i leaders at length petitioned to negotiate, and if possible, in 
some place at a distance from the troops. This last stipu- 
* According to an ancient almanac. 

avoiding unnecessary 'Bloodshed ($9 

lation was refused by Caesar, who, however, agreed, if they Aug. 49 
so cared, to meet them in the open ; whereupon the son of 
Afranius came over as a hostage, and the interview took place 
at a spot selected by Caesar. Here, in the ears of both 
armies, Afranius spoke as follows. * No blame attached, he 
hoped, either to himself, his colleague, or their army, for 
their natural desire to act loyally by Cneius Pompeius, their 
own commander. The claims of duty, however, had now 
been fully satisfied, and as to punishment, their complete 
destitution might well be regarded as adequate. They were 
now caged in virtually like wild beasts, debarred from water, 
and debarred from movement ; and such a position was not 
physically more intolerable than it was galling to their pride. 
They accordingly confessed themselves beaten : at the same 
time they desired, if not too late, to make a strong appeal for 
mercy, in the hope that Caesar would not consider himself 
bound to exact from them the utmost penalty of war.' 

The whole speech, it should be added, was delivered with 
the greatest possible deference and respect. 

In answer, Caesar reminded him that no man had ever had 85 , 
less justification than he to adopt a tone either of complaining 
of his lot, or of claiming commiseration for it. * Every one 
else had acted as became them : for himself, when he 
refused to force a conflict, though conditions were favour- 
able and time and place to his own advantage ; for his 
army, when they did not allow the outrage perpetrated 
on them by the murder of their comrades to deter them 
from preserving and guarding the lives of those in their 
power; finally, for Afranius's own men, by their taking 
the initiative in making overtures for peace, when they had 
even held it their dutv to demand a safe-conduct for all their 

79 Capitulation of Pcmpeians 

Aug. 49 officers. Every one, in short, had being animated hy a 
spirit of conciliation ; they, the leaders, had alone set their 
face against peace ; they alone had disregarded the sanctity 
due to a time of pourparlers and of truce, and had foully 
butchered unsuspecting men, when duped by what they 
believed to be negotiations. They had met the fate that 
usually befell people of overweening obstinacy and pride ; 
and now found themselves driven back upon, and even pas- 
sionately desiring, a course which they lately regarded with 
contempt. However, he had no wish to use their present 
humiliation or to take advantage of the present opportunity 
in order to swell his own resources ; but what he did insist 
upon was that those armies, which for so many years they 
had been nursing against himself, should now be disbanded 
He said'' against himself ", for no other explanation was possi- 
ble of the dispatch of six legions to Spain, and the embodiment 
afterwards of a seventh raised in the Peninsula ; or again 
of the mobilization of so many powerful fleets, and of the 
appointment of eminent soldiers to their command. Not 
one of these steps had been necessary for the establishment 
of peace in the Spanish governments, or the normal military 
requirements of the province ; whose long unbroken rest 
made all reinforcements superfluous. No, it was against 
himself that all these preparations had been for so long 
directed ; it was to cripple him that an unprecedented type 
of command was to be created, which permitted a man to 
control the administration of the capital from his residence 
outside the gates of Rome, and at the same time to retain 
year after year the absentee governorship of two provinces 
stocked with fighting races : it was solely to checkmate him- 
self that a violent change was now to be wrought in the 

Imposition of Terms 7 1 

constitution of the magistracies, whereby governors were Aug. 49 
sent out to provinces no longer, as before, at the expiration 
of their consulship or praetorship, but upon the interested 
selection of a clique. Again, when he was to be opposed, 
no one was allowed to plead the excuse of age ; but veterans, 
well tried in past campaigns, must be called out to take over 
the command of the armies that were to crush him : and 
finally, in his case only, an exception was made to the courtesy 
always extended to all commanders alike, which allowed 
them, after success in the field, to return home with honour, 
or at least not in disgrace, and there to disband their army. 
Yet all these insults he had endured with patience, and would 
continue to endure ; nor was his object now to deprive them 
of their army in order to retain it with his own, though doubt- 
less that were an easy matter ; it was merely to disarm them 
of any weapon they could afterwards turn against himself. 
That being so, he must, as already indicated, call upon them 
to evacuate the provinces, and to break up their army. Pro- 
vided that were done, nobody should suffer at his hands : 
that, however, was the one indispensable condition of peace. 

Amongst the Afranian troops the notion that men, who 86 
justly expected some sort of punishment, should actually 
be presented with their discharge, was one affording high 
satisfaction and delight — as indeed could be gathered from 
the way they now gave expression to their feelings. For, 
on a question arising as to the time and place of carrying out 
this discharge, the whole army, from the position which they 
had taken up on the ramparts, began, with shouts and gesticu- 
lations, to declare that it must take place at once, and that, 
were it postponed, there would be no security of its afterwards 
being effected, no matter what pledge to the contrary might 

72 Pomp elan Army dishanded 

Aug. 49 now be given. After a short discussion between the parties, 
it was finally arranged that aU the men possessing house or 
property in Spain should receive their discharge on the spot, 
and the rest on arrival at the Var ^ ; Caesar meanwhile giving 
a guarantee that no one should be molested, or compelled to 
take the military oath of allegiance to himself against his 
own personal inclinations. 
87 He also took upon himself to find them in provisions from 
now onwards, during their march to the Var ; and further 
added that, in the case of those who had lost property during 
the campaign, any of this now in the hands of his own troops 
should be restored to the losers, he himself compensating his 
men for everything, after fair valuation made. 

Whatever subsequent disputes arose amongst the Pompeian 
soldiery were voluntarily brought to him for adjudication ; 
and, upon a mutiny all but breaking out amongst the sur- 
rendered legions, owing to their clamouring for pay from 
Afranius and Petreius which the latter declared to be not 
yet due, a demand was made that Caesar should try the case ; 
and his decision was at once accepted by both parties. 

During the next two days about a third of the army re- 
ceived its discharge ; after which Caesar gave orders for two 
of his own legions to start as an advanced guard, whilst the 
others followed close behind, thus ensuring that the two camps 
were not far apart. The whole operation was entrusted to 
one of his staff, Quintus Fufius Calenus ; and, in accordance 
with the instructions issued to that officer, the army marched 
from Spain to the Var, and there the rest of the Pompeians 
were disbanded. 

^ Then the boundary between Italy and Gaul. 

Plan of 


Scale (Miles) 

l/a '/2 3/4 

Old Coast Line 

To face p. 7.VI 

\_Adapled from Sloffel. 



An Historic Siege 

During this campaign in the Spanish provinces, Caius i 
Trebonius, the general left in charge of the assault on .g 
MarBcilles (^Massilia), had commenced operations by driving 
siege embankments against the wall of that city, surmounted 
by protection-sheds and wooden towers. One of these 
embankments was advanced on the side of the town close 
to the harbour and dockyards : the other by the gate where 
the road from Gaul and Spain enters the city, not far from the 
sea into which the river Rhone debouches. For Marseilles, 
it must be remembered, is washed by the sea on three sides 
of the town, the fourth alone offering a land approach ; and 
even in this last section that part which faces the citadel is 
strongly protected by the natural conformation of the ground 
and by a deep ravine running under the wall, making an 
assault at this point a long and laborious process. 

Trebonius, in order to carry out these works, now com- 
mandeered from the whole of Provence innumerable draft 
animals and day labourers, at the same time giving orders to 
accumulate large stores of osier wood and building-timber : 
then with these preparations completed, he proceeded to 
construct a siege mound eighty feet in height. 

74 ^ Formidable Tas^ 

' So great, however, was the original supply in the city of 
°* every species of war material, and so unlimited the number of 
siege guns, that none of the ordinary protection-sheds, con- 
structed out of close-knit osier work, were found proof against 
the impact of their shot. Huge wooden harpoons, twelve feet 
long, and sheathed with a metal point, would be discharged 
with aU the added impetus given by gigantic engines of war, 
and, tearing through four successive layers of hurdles, would 
bury themselves in the earth. The only remedy was to build 
a series of movable galleries, roofed with twelve-inch baulks 
firmly clamped together, under cover of which the workmen 
then found it possible to pass along the material from hand 
to hand. Ahead of the advancing mound, for the purpose of 
levelling all obstacles, moved a military tortoise, with a front 
of sixty feet, likewise built of stout timbers, and wrapped round 
with every kind of substance capable of withstanding the 
showers of fire and stones. Yet, in spite of these precautions, 
the vast scale of the works attempted, along with the great 
height of the enemy's wall and turrets, and the number of 
guns mounted on them, combined to render the progress 
of the operations everywhere a tedious one. Constant sallies, 
moreover, from the town were undertaken by the Albici, 
on which occasions fire would be freely flung upon the mound 
and towers : although indeed these attacks were always easily 
repulsed by our troops, who would even take the offensive 
and drive back the sortie parties into the town, with the 
infliction upon them of very considerable losses. 
3 While the siege of the city was thus progressing, a move- 
ment towards its relief had been instituted by Pompeius, who 
had detached a squadron of sixteen warships, a few of them 
armed with copper-cased bows and ram, under the command 

Attempted Relief by Sea jj 

of Lucius Nasidius, to sail to the assistance of Domitius and May-Aug. 
the Massilians. This officer made his way up the Sicilian "^'-^ 
Straits without the knowledge or suspicion of the acting 
governor Curio ; and, putting in with his flotilla at Messina 
{Messana), took advantage of the flight of the leading citizens 
and local senators which followed on the sudden panic pro- 
duced by his appearance, to launch one of their ships from 
the dockyards, and to incorporate it with the rest of his fleet. 
He then continued his voyage towards Marseilles, after secretly 
sending in advance a small dispatch vessel to apprise Domitius 
and the MassiHans of his coming, and earnestly beg them once 
more to give battle to Brutus's squadron, now that they were 
reinforced by his own ships. 

As a matter of fact, after their earlier reverse, the Massilians 4 
had drawn out of dockyard a number of old vessels equal to 
what they had lost, and had then proceeded with surprising 
energy to repair and fit these out. Their large reserves of 
oarsmen and skippers had also enabled them to supplement 
the fleet by several open fishing-boats, which had been pre- 
viously decked for the purpose of protecting the rowers from 
all exposure to spears ; and the whole of these additional 
vessels were now given full complements both of archers and 
big guns. The squadron being by these methods at length 
fully equipped, the crews were incited by pathetic appeals 
from all the old men, matrons, and maidens of the city, not 
to fail their country in this her hour of need ; after which 
they embarked with all the confidence and courage that had 
marked their first engagement. For it is a common weak- 
ness of human nature to be both unduly elated and alarmed in 
the face of the unseen and the unknown ; and this law was 
now illustrated by the immoderate hopes and enthusiasm 

"jd Second Naval Engagement 

May-Aug. which the arrival of Lucius Nasidius had kindled in the 
^^ Massilian republic. 

Having secured a favourable wind, they put out from 
harbour, and effected a junction with Nasidius off Tarente 
(Tauroenta), a fortified settlement of Marseilles. Here they 
cleared their ships for action, heartened one another to face 
a second encounter, and arranged their respective duties in 
the approaching battle ; it being agreed that the Massilians 
should form the right, and Nasidius the left division. 
5 Meanwhile Brutus also bore down upon the same point, 
with a fleet considerably increased in numbers. His original 
twelve ships, built by Caesar's orders at Aries, had now been 
reinforced by the six lately captured from the Massilians, 
which during the intervening days he had repaired and made 
thoroughly efficient in every particular. After briefly en- 
couraging his crews, therefore, to treat with contempt a beaten 
foe whose full strength they had already once vanquished, he 
moved out against them full of cheerful courage. From the 
camp of Trebonius and from all the higher ground in the 
vicinity ^ our investing forces easily overlooked the city, where 
they could see all the fighting population that had remained 
behind in the town, as well as all the older inhabitants, accom- 
panied by wives and children and the city guard, either stand- 
ing on the battlements with uplifted hands, or flocking to the 
temples of the eternal gods, before whose images they then 
prostrated themselves, praying heaven to grant them victory. 
Not a soul was there who did not realize that on the issue 
of this day hung the decision of all their future destiny. For 
those who had gone on board included young men from their 
best-known families, together with their most distinguished 
^ e.g. Notre Dame de la Garde. See Plan. 

Section of Coast 

Entjlish Miles 

To face p. 76. 


and Defeat of Pompeians 77 

citizens in every period of life, all of whom had received May-Aug 
a personal summons and earnest appeal for service. In case '^^ 
of disaster, therefore, they saw clearly that nothing would be 
left them afterwards even to try ; while victory, on the other 
hand, whether gained by their own forces or by their foreign 
supports, would leave them confident in the ultimate success 
of their beloved city. 

As soon as the action commenced, it became clear that the 6 
Massilians did not want for courage; but, remembering the 
commands lately laid upon them by their friends, they fought 
under the evident conviction that this was to be their last 
chance, and that those who ventured their lives in battle were 
only anticipating by a little the fate in store for the rest of 
their countrymen, all of whom must undergo the similar 
penalty of war upon the capture of their city. Accordingly, 
as our squadron slowly opened out, their commanders utilized 
the finer speed of their own ships for much skilful manoeuvring ; 
and, wherever we got an opportunity of throwing our grap- 
pling-irons and making fast one of their vessels, they would 
row up from every quarter to the help of their struggling 
consorts. Even here, at close quarters, they were formidable 
opponents, fighting, as they did, side by side with the Albici, 
and yielded little in courage to our own crews ; whilst at the 
same time their smaller craft poured in a hail of spears at longer 
range, inflicting constant wounds without warning upon our 
hampered men. Two of their three-deckers ' having sighted 
Brutus's flagship — easily recognizable by his pennant — had 
already set themselves in motion to ram her from opposite 

* Only an analogy. The question whether an ancient trireme had three 
superimposed banks of oars, or one bank, with three men to each oar, or 
even some other formation, is still sub judice. 

7 8 Description of Siege-rvorks 

May-Aug. quarters, when the admiral, seeing his danger, put his vessel 
"^9 rapidly under way, and thus eluded them by the barest 

second. Advancing at high speed the two big ships crashed 
into one another with such terrific violence that both were 
badly crippled by the impact, whilst one had all her forepart 
carried away and became quite unmanageable. Seeing what 
had happened, the vessels of Brutus's fleet which were nearest 
to the spot dashed upon them in their difficulties, and quickly 
sent both to the bottom. 

7 As to the squadron under Nasidius, it proved of no service 
whatever, and after a very brief interval withdrew out of action. 
These lacked the incentive of the sight of fatherland and the 
commands of dear ones to compel them to the utmost risk of 
life ; consequently, from this division not a single ship was 
lost. The losses to the Massilian fleet, on the other hand, 
were five sunk, four captured, and one which fled with the 
ships of Nasidius, who all made for the coast of Eastern Spain. 
Of the surviving vessels one was sent on ahead to Marseilles 
to carry the news of the day's disaster ; and whilst it was still 
approaching the city, the whole population streamed out to 
learn the issue of the fight ; and on the truth becoming 
known, such a wail of lamentation ensued, that one might 
have thought the town had at that very moment been carried 
by assault. 

Nevertheless, in spite of this defeat, the Massilians pro- 
ceeded to complete their preparations for the defence of their 
city with the same dogged determination as before. 

8 To resume the narrative of the landward operations. It 
was noticed by the legionaries in charge of the right, or north- 
eastern, part of the siege-works, as a consequence of the 
repeated sorties of the enemy, that it would afford no little 

Description of Siege-works 7^ 

protection in that quarter, if, instead of a mere block-house May-Aug. 

to serve as a rallying-point, they were to build a full-sized 

brick tower, close under the city wall, where previously they 

had constructed only a small and low shelter against these same 

sudden attacks. It was to this shelter that they were in the 

habit of retiring; it was from this, moreover, that they fought 

as an advanced outpost, on the enemy pushing home any 

attack with unusual vigour; and it was out from this that they 

used to charge both to repulse and pursue him. Its dimensions 

were fully thirty feet square, but, on the other hand, its walls 

had been built five feet thick ; and now, after its construction, 

in accordance with the law that experience is the universal 

guide in life, their applied intelligence led them to discover 

that the raising of this block-house to the height of a regular 

siege tower might prove of very considerable service. This 

transformation was effected as follows. 

When the building had been raised high enough to carry 9 
a floor, the latter was carefully fitted into the outside walls 
in such a way that the heads of the beams, though extended 
into the brickwork, were nevertheless completely enclosed by 
the masonry, and thus prevented any protrusion outside on 
which fire flung by the defenders could lodge. Round this 
first floor were next piled pillars of small flat tiles, as high 
as the protection of the military screen and sheds they were 
using allowed of ; and then, on the top of this temporary 
work, two large beams were laid, parallel with, and not far 
from the outer edge of, the two side walls — beams fromwhich 
it was intended to hang the flooring that was to form the 
ultimate roof of the tower. Above these, and crossing them 
at right angles, joists were next laid down, and massed together 
by planking. These joists were made a little longer than the 

8 o Description of Siege-works 

May-Aug. walls, and protruded beyond them, so that from their extremi- 
ties could be suspended coverlets which should act as an 
impenetrable defence against all shots launched at the men 
whilst engaged upon that section of the wall which intervened 
between this roofing and the part already completed. The 
top of this floor was further paved with crude brick and mor- 
tar, to guard against any attempts of the enemy to damage 
it by fire ; and, finally, a number of soaked cushions were 
thrown on, to prevent either the woodwork being broken 
by the discharges of artillery, or the brickwork smashed by 
the heavy shot from the mortars. Three large mats were 
next manufactured out of anchor hawsers, in length equal to 
the tower walls, and four feet deep ; and these were then 
lashed to the protruding joists on the three sides exposed to 
the enemy, thereby forming a continuous curtain round the 
tower. These mats were made of this material, because expe- 
rience elsewhere had proved it to be the only one capable of 
resisting the passage both of hand-spears and ordnance shot, 
no matter of what weight and size. 

As soon as the already finished portion of the tower was 
thus covered and fortified against every sort of discharge from 
the enemy, the screens hitherto used were wheeled off to 
other parts of the siege-works, and the men in the tower 
began to let the roof hang free and then to raise it 
with levers working from the first-floor beams ; hoisting 
it as high as the suspension of the curtains allowed 
of. That done, they proceeded, completely hidden and 
protected by these coverings, to build up the four walls 
with brickwork ; and, on the completion of this particular 
section, the overhanging hood was prised up anew, and a fresh 
space cleared for construction. When it was judged time for 

Description of Siege-works 8 i 

the insertion of the second floor, the beams were again fitted May-Aug. 
into and concealed by the outside layers of bricks ; after which ^^ 
the new flooring was used, in its turn, as a leverage for once 
more hoisting the top roof-work and its hanging mats. In 
this way they effected the construction of altogether six 
stories, in perfect safety and without a wound or danger of 
any kind ; leaving as they built, wherever occasion seemed 
to demand, a number of loopholes through which afterwards 
to direct artillery fire. 

As soon as they felt confident that their position in the lo 
new tower enabled them to cover with its fire all the surround- 
ing siege-buildings, they set to work to construct a sapping 
shelter, sixty feet in length, and made from timbers two feet 
square, with the intention of running it from the brick tower 
down to the enemy's wall and the particular bastion facing 
them. This shelter was of the following formation. 

Two beams of equal length were first laid out upon the 
ground, four feet apart, into each of which was let a row of 
uprights five feet high. These were then coupled across by 
a series of strong braces, forming a slight angle in the centre, 
on the top of which other beams were to be laid as a roof. 
Along these braces two-foot beams were accordingly fitted, 
and fastened by nails and metal clamps. The next step was 
to let in aU along the edges of this roof, or, in other words, 
along the extremities of the beams which formed it, a raised 
ledge of wood, about three inches broad and high, for the 
purpose of holding the brickwork that was to follow. The 
frame having thus received an appropriate slant to its roof, 
and being neatly finished off, as soon as the roof beams were 
made fast upon the braces, the shed was cased above with 
crude brick and mortar, as a protection against fire thrown 

82 Description of Siege-ivorks 

May-Aug. from the battlements. These bricks were then given several 
"* coatings of stucco to prevent their being washed to pieces by 

water played upon them through pipes by the garrison: 
whilst, finally, the stucco itself was laid over with soaked 
cushions, to guard in turn against damage from either fire or 
heavy stones. The whole of this piece of work was kept hidden 
behind protection-sheds, and executed outside the tower itself : 
and, upon its completion, the legionaries, with a sudden move- 
ment totally unlooked for by the enemy, swept it out on rollers 
and, using a type of winch employed for beaching ships, rushed 
it down to the opposing bastion and fastened it to the masonry, 
1 1 At the consternation wrought by this new peril the garrison 
fetched out crowbars, and, prising up the biggest stones that 
could be stirred, rolled them headlong down upon the sapping- 
shed. But its stout timbers held against the crash, and all 
that fell upon it slid off down the sloping roof. Seeing this, 
the enemy changed their tactics, and, filling barrels with pine 
shavings and pitch, set them alight and dropped them from 
the wall upon the shed below. These, as they struck the roof, 
also rolled to the ground, and were there fended off from the 
sides of the structure by means of long poles and pitchforks. 
Meanwhile, beneath the shelter, the troops were tearing out 
with crowbars the lowest stones of the enemy's tower holding 
the foundations together ; during which operation the shed 
was guarded by the garrison of the brick tower, who poured in 
so hot a fire of hand-spears and artillery shot, that they drove 
the enemy from his wall and bastions, and thereby made it a 
harder task for him to withstand the progress of our sappers. 
Several stones had already been removed from the underground 
part of the bastion, when suddenly all that portion collapsed 
and fell, whilst the remainder looked like tottering to its fall. 


The City sues for Terms 8 3 

At this, the enemy, unnerved by the sudden ruin of the 12 
tower, and overwhelmed by a reverse so unexpected, cowed 
also by the evident wrath of heaven, and dreading the plunder 
of their city,rushed out in a body through the gatewayinto the 
open, armed only withthewhite flag,^ and with hands upraised 
towards the generals and the army, in token of surrender. 
Such an unexpected movement caused a complete suspension 
of military operations ; and the soldiers ceased fighting, and 
eagerly turned to pick up what news they could. The enemy, 
on reaching the presence of the generals and the main army, 
threw themselves on their knees and begged to be allowed 
to await the arrival of Caesar. ' They could see ', so they 
declared, 'that their city was now taken, that the Roman 
siege-works were completed, and their own bastion under- 
mined : they accordingly gave up the defence. If, when 
Caesar arrived, they were to refuse compliance with his 
terms, he would only have to give the word, and nothing 
could possibly prevent the instant sacking of their town. Even 
as things were, they observed that, if the rest of the bastion 
went, it would be beyond the power of the Roman officers 
to restrain their men from bursting into the city in hopes of 
plunder, and levelling it with the ground.' 

All this, with much more to the same effect, was pleaded 
in tones of striking pathos and with a copious use of tears, as 
indeed was only to be expected from such past-masters of 
forensic eloquence. 

Touched by this appeal, the Roman generals withdrew their 1 3 
forces from the siege ramparts, and abandoned the blockade, 
merely leaving a few sentinels upon the works. Humanity 
induced them to grant the enemy a sort of truce, while waiting 

* ' With suppliant fillets.' 
G 2 

84 -^ Truce granted 

May-Aiig. the return of Caesar, and no further shot was fired either from 
"^"^ the wall or from our own lines ; but everybody, assuming the 

contest at an end, relaxed their precautions and vigilance. 
A further reason for the armistice was that Caesar had 
written strict injunctions to Trebonius not to allow the city 
to be taken by storm, lest the troops, who were unusually 
irritated at the town's revolt and its contemptuous defiance 
of their power, as well as by their own protracted exertions, 
should put the whole adult population to the sword, which 
indeed they threatened to do. Even now they were hardly 
to be restrained from breaking into the town, and were highly 
exasperated because they fancied that Trebonius had baulked 
them of their prey. 
14 The enemy, however, were only faithlessly seeking a favour- 
able opportunity for an act of most consummate treachery ; 
and, after a few days' interval, when our men had to some 
extent grown slack and careless, they suddenly, about midday, 
whilst some of the guards were absent from their posts, and 
some weary after their long labours, actually asleep on the 
works, with all their accoutrements laid aside and in their 
covers,^ burst out from the gates, and, aided by a strong 
wind, set fire to the siege buildings. The wind blew this fire 
in all directions, with the result that embankment and screens, 
tortoise, and wooden tower, together with the artillery upon 
it, simultaneously caught ablaze, and were all completely 
gutted before even the cause of the outbreak could be dis- 

Shaken by the sudden catastrophe, the troops who were on 
the spot seized what arms they could, and, others rushing up 

^ A Roman soldier's shield was kept, when not in use, in a leather 

and treacherously hrok^i 8f 

from the camp, a general attack was made upon the cnemv. May-Ang. 
The latter indeed was quickly routed, but our men were pre- ^^ 
vented from pressing home the pursuit through the showers 
of arrows and artillery-shot launched upon them from the 
ramparts. The Massilians, on the other hand, fell back under 
the shelter of their walls, and there at their leisure proceeded 
to burn down both sapping-shed and brick tower. Thus dis- 
appeared in a few moments, through the enemy's treachery 
and the force of the gale, the accumulated work of many 
months. The same artifice was again attempted the next 
day, when, with the wind blowing as before, they charged out 
with even greater confidence to give battle at the second 
wooden tower and mound, dashing quantities of fire upon 
them. But, whereas on the first occasion our troops had com- 
pletely relaxed their earlier vigilance of the siege ;. this time, 
warned by yesterday's mishap, they were found completely 
prepared for defence, vidth the consequence that the enemy 
was driven back into the town after heavy slaughter and the 
total failure of his plan. 

Trebonius at once set himself to the task of taking in hand ^5 
and rebuilding his ruined works, inspired by the greatly inten- 
sified enthusiasm of his troops. For on seeing the fiasco in 
which all their labours and preparations had now resulted, 
a wave of fury swept them at the thought of how their im- 
mense efforts would only look ridiculous in face of the fact 
that they were now totally destitute of even a source for 
obtaining further siege material, since every tree throughout 
t he length and breadth of the Massilian territories had already 
been cut down and carted to the army. Accordingly they 
determined to substitute an unprecedented type of siege 
mound. This took the form of two parallel brick walls six 

^6 New Siege-worJ^ built 

M?.y-Aug. feet each in width, roofed above, and of nearly equal height 
to the former embankment of timber. Wherever the space 
between the two, or the weakness of the material used seemed 
to require it, stout tie-rods were inserted as couplers, and big 
beams laid across to give additional strength ; whilst every 
part of the roofing was covered with hurdle work, which, 
again, was coated with mortar. The men working below 
thus found themselves protected overhead by a roof, on each 
side by a wall, and in front by the shelter of a military 
screen, and could therefore safely bring up everything 
they wanted for the work. The enterprise was consequently 
carried through with expedition, and the lost fruits of their 
long labours were quickly regained by the ingenuity and devo- 
tion of the troops. Finally, gateways for future sorties were 
left at appropriate intervals in the wall. 
16 The enemy thus saw the extensive buildings, whose recon- 
struction he had fondly hoped to be impossible, no matter 
what time were spent upon them, rebuilt with the labour and 
output of a few days, and rebuilt, moreover, in such a way 
as to leave no opening for any treacherous sally, or any 
possibility whatever either of injuring our troops by the 
discharge of spears or of damaging the works by fire. Simul- 
taneously it came home to them that this first experiment 
might very well be so extended as to enclose the whole of the 
landward side of their city within a bastioned wall, which 
must then force them to abandon their position on their 
own fortifications, now that our troops had nearly effected a 
junction between their brick walls and those of the city, 
and were already throwing handspears. It was also clear that 
their big artillery, from which they had hoped so much, was 
rapidly becoming useless through the shortened range ; and, 

Final Surrender 8 7 

each party having now equal opportunities of fighting from May-Aug. 
towets and battlements, they were quite conscious of their ^^ 
own inability to match our men in personal courage. It was 
these considerations which induced them to fall back once 
more upon the previous terms of capitulation. 

The Clearing of Southern Spain 

Meanwhile in Further or Western Spain, Marcus Varro 17 
had at first, upon news of the initial operations in Italy, given "^^'"^ ^^^ 
up the cause of Pompeius as lost, and continued to speak in 
the most flattering terms of Caesar. ' Whilst his own in- 
terests ', he declared, 'were already engaged on the side of 
Pompeius, in virtue of the deputy-command he held from 
that leader, which bound him to the obligation of loyalty, his 
position was complicated by an equally strong friendship for 
Caesar. However, he knew what was the duty of a commander 
holding a commission of trust under a superior officer, and he 
knew too the forces at his own disposal, as well as the universal 
bias of his province towards Caesar.' ^ 

Such was the tone of all his conversation, reflected in his 
conduct by a general inactivity. Subsequently there came 
the information of Caesar's detention before Marseilles, of the 
junction of Petreius's forces with the army of Afranius,of the 
successful concentration of large bodies of auxiliaries, and the 
confident expectation of others equally strong, and, last but 
not least, of the unanimous feeling of the Eastern province for 
Pompeius. And when this was finally followed by the news of 
the critical state of Caesar's supplies before Lerida, communi- 

"■ who had been Governor's Paymaster and Governor of it. See Inirod. 

88 Coercion of the Province 

Summer 49 cated by Afranius in exaggerated and bombastic terms, he no 
longer hesitated to change his own attitude with the change 
of fortune. 
1 8 Enlisting was organized throughout the province, till his two 
legions had been raised to their full complement and further 
strengthened by the addition of some thirty native battalions : 
he collected large supplies of corn, to be forwarded to the 
Massilians as well as to Afranius and Petreius ; ordered the 
city of Cadiz (Gades) to build ten warships, whilst superin- 
tending the building of several more at Seville (Hisfalis), and 
removed to Cadiz all money and valuables from the great 
temple of Hercules. From the province a force of six 
battalions was sent south to garrison Cadiz ; Caius Gal- 
lonius, a Roman knight, and a friend of Domitius, who 
happened to be there on a business errand from the latter 
connected with a legacy, was installed as commandant of that 
town ; and all arms, whether the property of the government 
or individuals, were ordered to be conveyed to the residence 
of the new governor. 

These overt acts he followed up by delivering violent 
speeches against Caesar, and several times openly announced 
from his official platform that that commander had fought 
various unsuccessful actions, and that large bodies of his troops 
had gone over to Afranius ; information of which he declared 
he had satisfied himself from most trustworthy messengers 
and indisputable sources. 

Having by these methods terrorized the Roman citizens in 
his province, he coerced them into promising him for the 
public services j^i 50,000 coin of the realm, and 20,000 pounds 
weight of bar silver, together with about 4,000 quarters of 
wheat : while, further to mark his bitterness, the townships 

Caesar's J{apid Move on Cordova 89 

suspected of sympathy with Caesar were saddled with the Summer 49 
heaviest burdens, garrisons also being set up in their midst. 
Finally he allowed prosecutions to be brought against private 
individuals, by which any who had been guilty of treasonable 
language against the present regime had their goods con- 
fiscated to the state, and the entire province had to take an 
oath of allegiance to Pompeius and himself. 

On learning the issue of the operations in Eastern Spain, he 
prepared for war, though the conduct of the war was to be 
a strange one, and consisted of retiring with his two legions 
upon Crdiz, and there locking up his fleet along with all his 
provisions ; a course of action forced upon him by the dis- 
covery that his province was now solid for Caesar. There, on 
the island which forms that city, with sufficient ships and 
supplies of food, he regarded it an easy matter to effect the 
procrastination of the war. 

Caesar, however, had determined, in spite of much urgent 
business which at this moment summoned him back to Italy, 
not to leave any area of war behind him in the Spanish pro- 
vinces ; for he was perfectly well aware of the signal benefits 
conferred by Pompeius upon the Eastern province, and of his 
immense following in that region. 

He therefore dispatched the tribune Quintus Cassius ' with 19 
a force of two legions to march upon Southern Spain, whilst 
he himself travelled ahead by rapid marches, and escorted 
by a bodyguard of 600 horse. He also sent on before him a 
proclamation, fixing a date on which he desired the attend- 
ance at Cordova (Corduba) of the magistrates and leading 
citizens of all the communities in this part of the Peninsula. 

* One of those who vetoed the Senate's declaration of war. Cf. Bk. I, 
ch. I. 

90 Grorving Discontent of the Province 

Summer 49 The terms of this proclamation were disseminated throughout 
the province ; and, on the day appointed, there was not a 
single township which had not sent some members of its 
governing council to Cordova, and not a single Roman 
citizen of any standing who was not there to meet him. 

During this time also the Roman settlement in Cordova 
took upon themselves to shut the city gates against Varro ; 
guards and sentinels were posted upon the walls and turrets, 
and two of the so-called ' colonial corps ' having chanced to 
arrive there, they were kept under orders for the defence of 
the town. Simultaneously, the inhabitants of Carmona, by 
far the strongest township of the whole province, of their own 
initiative expelled the three battalions established in their 
citadel as a garrison by Varro, and then shut their gates 
against him. 
20 All this only increased Varro's haste to get to Cadiz with 
his two legions as quickly as possible, lest he should find 
either the road or the passage across to the island barred in his 
face ; so widespread and so decided did he now realize the 
feeling of the province to be in favour of Caesar. He had not 
gone far when dispatches met him from Cadiz informing him 
that the news of Caesar's manifesto had at once been followed 
by a conspiracy between the leaders of the town and the offi- 
cers of the troops there in garrison, to eject Gallonius and hold 
the city and island for Caesar : that after the hatching of this 
plot an ultimatum had been addressed to Gallonius advising 
his voluntary departure from Cadiz, whilst he could safely do 
so (for otherwise the conspirators would take their own 
measures), and that upon this threat Gallonius had evacuated 
the town. 

On hearing of this last development, one of the two legions, 

and Su7 render to Caesar 91 

termed the home-born regiment ', pulled up from the ground Summer 4(y 
its standards in Varro's camp, with their commander actually- 
standing by and looking on, and then and there marched 
back to Seville ; where, without committing any breach of 
discipline, it proceeded to bivouac in the market-place and 
public colonnades of the city. This conduct won such warm 
approbation from the Roman citizens in that administrative 
area, that they each took some of the troops off to their own 
homes, and there entertained them with the keenest pleasure. 

Proceedings like these caused Varro considerable misgiving. 
Changing his route, he started off with the hope of getting 
to Santiponce (Italica), only, however, to receive intelligence 
from his supporters that the gates were already closed 
against him. He was now cut off from every possible line of 
march, and, accordingly, sent in word to Caesar that he was 
prepared to surrender his remaining legion to whomever 
Caesar should direct him. The latter dispatched Sextus 
Caesar to his late opponent, bearing instructions for the legion 
to be surrendered to him. After the surrender, Varro came 
to meet Caesar at Cordova, where he gave a faithful return of 
all his government accounts, paying over whatever ready money 
he had in hand, and specifying all stores and ships anywhere 
under his immediate command. 

Subsequently Caesar delivered a public address in a Durbar 21 
at Cordova, in which he expressed his gratitude to all the various 
classes of his audience in their order. First of all to the Roman 
citizens, for their active steps in securing the allegiance of the 
provincial capital ; next to the Spaniards for their expulsion 
of the enemy's garrisons ; then to the peopl&of Cadiz, for 

' i. e. from Roman citizens born and bred in the province, like some 

92 'Temporary Settlements of Spain 

successfully foiling the plots of his opponents and asserting 
their own independence of action ; lastly to the officers and 
centurions, lately in garrison in that city, for having lent 
their military support to the execution of the policy of the 
civilians. After this, he released the Roman citizens from 
their undertaking to supply Varro with moneys for the public 
service ; and at the same time restored their confiscated 
property to all who were proved to have been so fined for 
excessive freedom of speech. 

Having then distinguished certain of his adherents by the 
grant of privileges both public and private in character, he 
filled the rest with bright hopes for their political future, and, 
after a stay of two days in Cordova, set out for Cadiz, where 
all treasure and valuables taken from the sanctuary of Hercules 
and afterwardslodged in a private dwelling-house were ordered 
to be restored to that temple. This done, he appointed 
Quintus Cassius as governor of the province with a military 
force of four legions; he then went on board the vessels lately 
built by Marcus Varro and, at his injunctions, by the town 
of Cadiz, and set sail for Tarragona {Tarraco), and, after 
a few days' voyage, cast anchor off that city. Here he found 
representatives of pretty well the whole Eastern province 
awaiting his arrival. Following the same policy as at Cordova, 
he selected certain communities to be the recipients of both 
public and personal distinctions, and afterwards left by the 
overland route for Narbonne, travelling thence on to Mar- 
seilles, where he learned that in accordance with a law passed 
by the people he had been nominated Dictator by Marcus 
Lepidus the praetor. 
! The Massilians he found reduced to the utmost straits. 
Their supplies were at starvation point, they had been twice 

Fate of Marseilles 9 3 

beaten at sea, their numerous sallies had uniformly been Summer 49 
repulsed, and now, to crown all, they were in the throes of 
a virulent plague. This last calamity was due to their long 
immurement and change of diet, the only food now obtainable 
being stale millet and mouldy barley, stores of which grain had 
been long accumulated in public granaries as a provision 
against such contingencies. One of their bastion-towers was, 
moreover, down, and much of their wall undermined ; whilst 
all hope had now disappeared of succour from the Spanish 
provinces and armies, the news of whose capture by Caesar 
had lately reached them. They therefore determined to sur- 
render without further attempt at treachery. A few days, 
however, before the actual capitulation, Lucius Domitius, on 
discovering the intention of the town, had proceeded to fit out 
three ships ; and, after allotting two of these to his suite, had 
himself embarked on the third ; when, favoured by dirty 
weather, he made a dash to escape. He was sighted by the 
vessels, which, by the orders of Brutus, lay daily off the har- 
bour to enforce the blockade, and these at once weighed 
anchor and gave chase. One of the three, viz. that of Domi- 
tius, alone kept on her course, and continued her efforts to 
escape, until, aided by the heavy weather, she was lost to sight 
by her pursuers : the other two, frightened at seeing our war- 
ships closing in upon them, put back into port. 

TheMassilians,in obedience to Caesar's orders, now brought 
out through the town gates all the arms and siege-guns they 
possessed, and then made over to Brutus all the ships remain- 
ing either in harbour or dockyards : simultaneously surrender 
was made of all funds in the public Treasury. These pre- 
liminaries disposed of, Caesar agreed to spare their autonomy, 
though more out of consideration, it must be confessed, for 

'94- Curio in Jfrica 

Slimmer 49 the city's great name and distinguished history in the past, 
than for any services they had rendered to himself. 
Leaving, therefore, a garrison of two legions in the place, he 
sent on the remainder into Italy, and then started on his way 
to Rome. 


The Set-back in Africa 

23 It was during the events recorded in the previous chapter 
Aug.-Sept. that the expedition of Caius Curio to North Africa was begun 
^^ and ended. Exhibiting from the outset a fatal contempt for 

the military strength of his opponent, Publius Attius Varus, he 
crossed over from Sicily, accompanied by only two of the four 
legions originally given him by Caesar, and by but five hundred 
cavalry ; and, after a passage of some sixty hours, landed, on 
the morning of the third day, at a place called Anquillaria. 
This spot is distant twenty-two miles from Klibia (Clufea), 
and in summer-time offers a fairly convenient anchorage, 
lying, as it does, between two bold headlands. Klibia itself 
was occupied by the younger Lucius Caesar, who was cruising 
off the port in readiness for Curio's arrival with a squadron of 
ten warships, old vessels that had been hauled up into the 
dockyards of Utica at the close of the war with the pirates, 
and fitted out again for the present campaign by the orders of 
Attius. Their admiral had accordingly taken alarm at the 
imposing numbers of our flotilla, and, flying from the open sea, 
had run his flagship, a three-decker ^, upon the nearest point of 
the coast-line, where he left it stranded, and set out overland 
to the town of Susa (Hadrumetuni), then held by a single 
•legion under Caius Considius Longus. The rest of the squad- 
' A decked trireme. See note, p. 77- 

7 o face p. 05. 

Brilliant Opening of the Campaim 9 5- 

ron, upon the flight of their leader, likewise made for Susa. Aug.-Sept. 
Meanwhile Curio's twelve warships, which he had brought '♦9 
over from Sicily to escort his transports, started under the 
command of his paymaster Marcius Rufus and gave chase 
to Caesar ; but, on seeing the latter's vessel abandoned on 
the beach, they towed her off, and then returned to Curio. 

Thr latter, after completing his disembarkation, directed 24 
Marcius to take the ships round to Utica, and, following their 
departure, set his army in motion for the same objective, 
a two days' march bringing him to the banks of the Medjerda 
(Bagradas). There leaving Caius Caninius Rebilus in charge 
of the legions, he rode forward with the cavalry to reconnoitre 
the old camp of Scipio ^, a site which he believed to be admira- 
bly adapted for the permanent quarters of his army. It 
consists of a tongue of precipitous rock, jutting out into the 
sea, steep and rugged on two sides, but with a slightly less 
abrupt descent on that looking towards Utica, from which, 
by the direct route, it is little over a mile distant. This route, 
however, passes through springs, where there is a considerable 
inlet of the sea, converting all the surrounding district into 
a marsh, and any one wishing to avoid this can only reach the 
town by a detour of fully six miles. 

Having reconnoitred the position, Curio also succeeded in 25 
obtaining a view of his opponent's camp. It lay hard by the 
wall of the town, which it actually touched at what is known 
as the Military Gate. It thus had the advantage of great 
natural strength ; for, in addition to the city of Utica itself 
forming one of its four sides, a second rested on the theatre, 
which faces the town outside, and on the immensely strong 

^ Used by the great Scipio Africanus at the close of the second Punic 
War, 204. 

9 5 Brilliant Opening of the Campaign 

Aug.-Sept, substructures of this building ; and lastly, the approach to 
"^^ it was both narrow and difficult of access. 

Whilst investigating the camp, he noticed that all round the 
neighbourhood the roads were thronged with the inhabitants 
Carrying and driving loads of property from the country 
towards the city, hoping to convey it thither for safety in their 
panic at the sudden outbreak of war in their midst. Curio at 
once launched his cavalry upon this prospective plunder and 
booty ; but had hardly given the word when a body of 600 
Numidian horse and 400 foot emerged from the town, having 
been dispatched by Varus to act as an escort to the coveted 
prize. These troops had arrived at Utica a few days before 
as reinforcements from King Juba, whose action had been 
prompted, not merely by the old friendship between his father 
andPompeius,but also by a feeling of intense animosity against 
Curio, who, in his tribunate of the year before, had laid a bill 
before the people, the ratification of which would have meant 
the annexation of Juba's kingdom. The opposing cavalry met 
in the shock of battle, but the opening charge was enough for 
the Numidians, who quite failed to stand their ground, and, 
with the loss of some 120 killed, fell back upon their camp 
outside the city wall. Meanwhile the warships had arrived off 
the town, and Curio at once ordered his admiral to notify the 
numerous fleet of merchantmen who lay off Utica some 200 
strong, that any captain who did not immediately bring his 
vessel round to the Cornelian camp would be regarded as an 
enemy. On receipt of this notice, the entire fleet, without 
a moment's hesitation, weighed anchor, and, leaving Utica, 
moved across to the place indicated, thereby enriching the 
army with abundant supplies of every description. 
26 With this successful opening to the campaign, Curio 

A Second Victory 97 

returned to his camp on the Medjerda, and, as he rode in, was Aug.-Sept. 
received by the thunderous applause of every man in his army ^^ 
acclaiming him as their own victorious Commander.^ The 
next day he moved with his force upon Utica, pitching his 
camp close by the city. The entrenchments of this were not 
yet completed, when his mounted pickets brought in word 
that large auyiliary bodies of horse and foot, dispatched by 
Juba, were approaching the town. Even as they spoke a heavy 
cloud of dust could be descried, and in another moment the 
head of the advancing column was in sight. Astounded at 
a sight so wholly unexpected, Curio threw forward his cavalry 
to hold back and check their advance, while he quickly recalled 
his infantry from the work of fortification, and arranged his 
line of battle. The cavalry dashed into action, and, before 
the legionaries could be deployed or assume their proper places 
in the ranks, it had swept back the king's forces in one confused 
melee ; caught, as they were, in the same state of disorder and 
over-confidence as had characterized their march. A con- 
siderable portion of their infantry were cut to pieces ; but 
nearly all the cavalry made good their escape by a headlong 
flight across the sands into the town. 

During the night which followed this engagement tv^ro of 27 
Curio's centurions, Marsians ^ by birth, left his camp to desert 
to Attius Varus, taking voth them twenty-two men of their 
two companies. Perhaps it was their honest conviction that 
they reported to him, or perhaps it was only to declare them- 
selves his courtiers as well as his soldiers — seeing that the wish 

' A regular custom under the Republic after an adequate victory. 
Under the Empire the emperor alone held the title. For other instancej 
see Bk. Ill, chs. 3 and 4 (31, 71). 

' From the Abiuzzi. 

9 8 Symptoms of Disloyalty 

Aug.-Sept. is often father to the thought, and that our own opinions we 
would fain believe to be those of our neighbours — at all events 
they asserted disaffection to be rife in the army of Curio, and 
that the situation urgently demanded a meeting with his army 
which might give it an opportunity to negotiate. Their 
opinion weighed so much with Varus that early on the next 
morning he advanced his legions from camp : Curio immedi- 
ately responded by a similar movement ; and each commander 
then drew up his forces for battle, with merely a slight hollow 
separating the two hostile lines, 
28 Now there was serving in the army of Varus, the Sextus 
Quintilius Varus who, as recorded above, had been one of 
those taken at Pentima (Corfiniuw). This officer, after being 
released by Caesar, had crossed to Africa ; whilst Curio 
also, it will be remembered, had made up his expeditionary 
force out of the legions previously acquired by Caesar at the 
capture of Pentima. So closely, indeed, had their old organi- 
zation been adhered to, that, with the exception of a few 
changes amongst the centurions, the personnel of the com- 
panies and battalions had undergone no change whatever. 
This fact now afforded Quintilius a pretext for addressing 
overtures to our men ; and he accordingly proceeded to ride 
down the lines of Curio, appealing to the troops not to put 
lightly aside the recollection of their earlier oath of allegiance, 
sworn in the presence of Domitius and of himself as that 
general's paymaster, and not to bear arms against old comrades 
who had shared with them all the privations of a siege, nor 
to give their services to a party who only stigmatized them 
as traitors. He then wound up by hinting at the rewards 
which they might confidently expect from his own generosity 
in the event of their joining himself and Attius. 

in Curious Army 99 

At the conclusion of the speech no indication whatever of Aug.-Sepf. 
their feeling was made on the part of Curio's army, whereupon ^^ 
both sides withdrew their forces to camp. 

As soon as Curio's troops were back in their entrenchments 29 
a strange misgiving seized upon all ranks, and quickly gathered 
head as the various expressions of opinion made themselves 
heard. Exaggerated notions were conjured up by each man's 
private imagination, so that to the fears communicated by his 
comrades each also added something of his own. In this way 
an idea, which in reality emanated from a single individual, 
first spread its way amongst a few, and was then transmitted 
from man to man, until finally it appeared to rest upon the 
authority of quite a number. For, the reader must remember, 
it was a time of civil war, and one had to do with a class of men 
who possessed complete freedom of action, and could follow 
whatever course they chose. These legions again were peculiar 
in the fact that they had but recently been serving with those 
who were now ranged against them. Moreover, the very 
frequency of Caesar's leniency in dealing with surrendered 
foes had led them to under-estimate his generosity. Some 
of the men, accordingly, now pressed for more decided action ; 
others, inclined to temporize, could obtain but a cold hearing ; 
and, finally, in some cases a fictitious air of defiance was 
assumed by those who wished to seem the bolder spirits.^ 

Such symptoms led Curio to summon a council of war to 30 
discuss the situation. On assembling, some of the officers 
were for going on at all hazards, and for actually storming the 
camp of Varus ; holding that, where troops were contemplat- 
ing measures of this nature, the most fatal thing of all was 
inaction ; and, come what might, it was better to try the 
•" Much of this chapter is slightly conjectural, owing to faulty text. 

100 A Council of War 

Aug.-Sept. fortune of battle with sword in hand than to be deserted and 
^^^ betrayed by their own men, and afterwards have to undergo 

the extreme penalty of war. Others were of opinion they 
should fall back in the early hours of the morning upon the 
old camp of Scipio, so that the men might recover their 
senses after being kept a few days longer from all contact 
with the enemy; pointing out also that, in the case of disaster, 
the large number of ships lying there would give them a safer 
and easier retreat back to Sicily than that afforded by their 
present position. 
31 Neither plan commended itself to Curio, who considered 
one scheme to err as much by defect of courage as the other 
did by excess, when half of those present looked favourably 
upon what was nothing less than the most cowardly flight, 
and the other half were for giving battle even with the advan- 
tage of position directly against them. For what sort of 
confidence was it that led any one to believe in the possibility 
of storming a camp, defended, not merely by artificial, but 
also by immense natural fortifications ? And how were they 
the better off if, after a crushing defeat, they were compelled 
to fall back from the assault ? Surely it was a well-established 
axiom that while success in the field ensured for commanders 
the devotion of their troops, disaster no less earned their 
hatred. Then, as to the proposal to change their own quar- 
ters, he could see in it nothing but an ignominious flight, 
prompted by unmitigated despair, and inevitably to be fol- 
lowed by the disaffection of the army. Their plain interests 
demanded that no handle should be given, either to the men 
who were loyal, to suspect that their allegiance was doubted, 
or to the mutineers, to discover the dread which they in- 
spired ; for any signs of wavering on their own part not only 

Curious Self-possession i o i 

strengthened the insubordination of the disaffected, but also Aug.-Sept. 
weakened the obedience of the well disposed. Granted, there- ^^ 
fore, that they were really satisfied of the substantial truth 
of the reports concerning the army's disloyalty — which he, for 
his part, felt confident were either pure fabrications or at any 
rate less serious than was generally supposed — how much more 
dignified a course was it to ignore such rumours and to keep 
them secret, rather than allow their own conduct to be taken 
as their confirmation? Every man when engaged in battle 
endeavoured to conceal his own wounds : ought they not 
similarly to cover up the weak places in an army, which might 
otherwise tend to raise their adversaries' hopes ? If he were 
told that these dangers were discounted by the proposal to 
march at midnight, all he could say was that such a proposal, 
in his opinion, put a direct premium upon any leanings 
towards misconduct. Movements of this character were 
only restrained by one of two incentives, either feelings of 
honour or fear of punishment, and both these checks were 
least operative at night. To sum up therefore. He was 
neither such a fire-eater as to urge a hopeless attack upon 
fortified entrenchments, nor such a poltroon as to throw up 
the expedition in despair. On the contrary, he was of the 
opinion that every other alternative should first be tried, 
and he already felt confident that he should carry the great 
majority of the council with him in this decision. 

Having dismissed his council, Curio summoned a general 32 
meeting of the troops. On their assembly, he recalled to their 
recollection the enthusiastic devotion they had tendered 
Caesar at Pentima, and reminded them how their friendly 
initiative at that time had put a large part of Italy at his feet. 

' One after the other ', he continued, ' all the country towns 

I02 A Frank Appeal to the Troops 

followed your guidance and repeated your action ; and well 
might Caesar then regard your decision with feelings of pro- 
foundest gratitude, and the Pompeians with those of dismay. 
For mark the consequences. In the camp of the enemy that 
first verdict of yours told so heavily, that, without any defeat 
in a pitched battle, Pompeius ordered the evacuation of Italy ; 
whilst Caesar, to show his trust in you, at once committed to 
your safeguarding one of his dearest friends in the person of 
myself, along with the government of Sicily and North Africa ; 
countries whose resources are indispensable to him if he is to 
retain the capital and Italy .-^ But, I am reminded, there are 
some who would now urge you to leave us. It may well be so. 
For what could afford them keener pleasure than to out- 
manoeuvre us and at the same time to involve you in a piece 
of low villany ; or what grosser insult to yourselves can their 
impotent rage suggest, than that you should betray the party 
which attributes its success solely to your attitude, and walk 
into the arms of those who hold you responsible for all their 
disasters? You surely have heard of Caesar's triumphant 
career in Spain, and how two armies, with their two com- 
manders, have gone down before him, and two provinces been 
brought under his control ; and that all this has been accom- 
plished within forty days of his first sighting his opponents. 
Is it conceivable that a side which could make no stand with 
all its forces intact can now do so when its cause is lost ; and 
can you, who declared for Caesar when victory still hung in 
the balance, now think of siding with the vanquished, after 
the issue of the war is decided, and when you ought to be 
reaping the reward of your services? But perhaps you feel 
uneasy at what they allege to have been your desertion and 
^ Not only strategically, but also as the granaries of Italy. 

a?id Dissipation of Doubts 103 

betrayal of their cause, and at their reference to your earlier Aug. -Sept. 
oath of allegiance. Well, I ask you, was it you who deserted ^^ 
Lucius Domitius, or was it he who abandoned you ? Is it not 
the fact that he threw you over when you were fully prepared 
to go on to the bitter end, and that he tried to save his own 
skin without a single word to yourselves? And is it not 
equally true that after being betrayed by him you received 
back your lives as the free gift of Caesar? So much then for 
the alleged desertion ; and as to the oath, what authority had 
he to hold you to it, when the insignia of his office ' had been 
surrendered, his military command laid down, and he himself 
had passed under the higher authority of his captor, becoming 
a mere prisoner of war and a magistrate no longer? It is 
indeed a queer notion of a soldier's obligation they are left 
to appeal to, if they think it incumbent upon you to disregard 
the oath by which you are at present bound, in order to recon- 
sider that which expiredbythe capitulation of the general who 
dictated it, and by the forfeiture of his legal standing which 
that capitulation involved. 

' Possibly, however, I am to conclude that, though you 
approve of Caesar, you find fault with me. I am not now 
going to talk about my own claims upon your gratitude, which 
still fall short of what either I could wish or yourselves expect ; 
but let me remind you it is always at the end of a war that 
soldiers look for the reward of their efforts, and what that end 
is going to be not even you can doubt. Yet why should I not 
mention the great care we have shown for your safety, as well 
as the success that has so far attended our expedition ? Do you 
regret that I brought the whole army over in perfect safety 
without the loss of a single transport? That on my arrival 
^ ' The axes of his lictors.' 

1 04 A '■ Soldier of Caesar ' 

Aug.-Sept. I scattered the enemy's fleet at the first encounter? That in 
two successive days I won two cavalry engagements? That 
I secured for us out of the harbour and bay occupied by the 
enemy 200 laden merchantmen, and forced him into a position 
where no provisions could reach him either overland or by 
sea ? However, if you will, fling away good fortune such as this, 
and leaders with this record, and go and identify yourselves 
with the disgraceful fiasco of Pentima, the ignominious flight 
from Italy, and the surrender of the Spanish provinces — all of 
them a sure forecast of the verdict on this African war. For 
myself, I was always content to be called a soldier of Caesar, 
and it was you who acclaimed me by the title of Commander. 
If you regret it, I return you your gift ; but do you at the same 
time give me back my former name, unless you wish the honour 
you then bestowed upon me to be taken as a deliberate insult 
to myself.' 
33 Such a speech aroused the deepest feelings of the soldiery ; 
and even during its delivery constant interruptionswere heard, 
showing that the suspicion of disloyalty stirred them to an 
almost intolerable indignation. On his leaving the assembly 
they swarmed around him, and with one voice bade him dis- 
miss his doubts, and not hesitate at any moment to give battle 
to the enemy, and so put their loyalty and resolution to the 
test. This demonstration of the men's feeling completely 
altered both the temper and mental attitude of the whole 
army, and Curio resolved accordingly, with the approval of 
his staff, to risk a decisive action upon the first opportunity 
that offered. On the morrow, therefore, he moved out from 
his lines and drew up for battle on the position occupied by 
his troops during each of the preceding days. Equally little 
did Attius Varus pause to consider before advancing his own 

Battle outside %)tica lof 

force, determined as he was to profit by any occasion that Aug.-Sept« 
might present itself either of tampering with his opponent's ^^ 
army or of engaging it on equal terms. 

As already indicated, the two embattled lines were separated 34 
by a ravine, of no great size, but presenting a steep and 
difficult ascent. Each commander, therefore, manoeuvring 
for the better position delayed his attack in the hope that his 
adversary would attempt the passage of this donga. After 
some interval, a movement was observed on the left wing of 
Attius, where, it was noticed, the full strength of his cavalry, 
together with a large contingent of Numidian light infantry 
interspersed through its ranks, was descending the banks of 
the ravine. To meet this attack Curio dispatched his cavalry 
and two battalions of Marrucinians ^ ; but the enemy's 
squadrons refused to face the charge, and, stretching 
their horses to the gallop, hastened back to their main 
body ; whereupon the light infantry who had accompanied 
the forward movement were, through this desertion by 
the cavalry, in course of being surrounded and cut to pieces 
by our troops. On this point were now concentrated 
the eyes of the whole Pompeian line, as they watched the 
flight and slaughter of their comrades ; and it was at this 
critical moment that Rebilus, one of Caesar's generals, whose 
wide military experience had led Curio to bring him over from 
Sicily with the expedition, turned to his commander, and 
pointing to the confusion among the enemy, asked why he 
hesitated to seize the opportunity thus offered. With a single 
word to his troops to remember their promises of the previous 
day. Curio put himself at their head, and ordered them to 
follow. On reaching the ravine they were met by such 
^ On the Adriatic, south of the Pescara. See Bk. I, ch. i (23;. 

io6 Victory of Curio 

\ii!r.-Fept. formidable obstacles at its ascent, that the leading files, when 
"^'^ not shouldered up behind by their comrades, only clambered 

out with the greatest exertions. But the legionaries of Atius 
had no stomach for a fight, as the sight of the recent flight and 
massacre of their auxiliaries had left them paralysed with 
terror, and their imagination already represented them as sur- 
rounded by our cavalry. The result was, that before a single 
javelin could be thrown, or our men get to closer quarters, 
the whole of the enemy's line turned and broke, retreating in 
confusion upon their camp. 
.^5 In the pursuit which followed a soldier named Fabius, 
a Pelignian ^ by race, and a centurion in one of the inferior 
companies of his legion, worked his way to the head of the 
flying enemy, continually shouting the name of Varus, and 
searching for him everywhere, thus giving the impression that 
he was one of his own men and had something of importance 
to communicate. That general, on hearing himself so often 
addressed, looked at the man and stopped to ask him who he 
was and what he wanted. In a moment the other had raised 
his sword and slashed at the officer's unguarded shoulder, and 
was within an ace of killing him, had not Varus brought 
his shield up to parry the blow and so escaped with his life. 
Fabius was thereupon immediately surrounded and cut down 
by the bystanders. 

When the flying rout approached the camp, the gates 
quickly became blocked and the road jammed with the 
crowded rabble, and the losses here incurred without the 
infliction of any wound were even heavier than during either 
the action or the pursuit. At one time it looked as if the 
enemy would actually be driven from his entrenched camp ; 
^ Neighbours to the Marruciiiians on the upper Pescara. 

Preparations for a Siege 107 

and, indeed, some of the fugitives only halted upon reaching Aug.-Sept 
the shelter of the town. The natural advantage of its position, ^^ 
however, and the strength of its fortifications, effectually 
barred all approach: and it was further rendered impracticable 
by the want of the proper tools and appliances, since our 
men had left camp equipped only for a pitched battle and 
not for an assault upon fortified entrenchments. Curio, 
therefore, withdrew his army back to hij own lines, with 
the single loss of Fabius, in contrast with the 600 killed 
and 1,000 wounded on the side of his opponent. After his 
retirement, all the enemy's wounded, and many more whose 
fears had since developed imaginary wounds, left the camp 
and made their way into the town. The discovery of this 
fraud, and the knowledge that his army was demoralized with 
panic, made active measures on the part of Varus imperative. 
Giving orders, therefore, for a single bugler and a certain 
number of tents to be left behind to disarm suspicion, he 
struck camp in silence ^ during the early hours of morning, 
and moved into the city with all his army. 

On the following day Curio commenced the siege and block- 36 
ade of Utica. The composition of this town was peculiar. 
Long years of quiet ease had made its crowded populace 
unfamiliar with war: old services rendered by Caesar had made 
the body of burgesses his friends : the Roman settlement in 
the city was distinctly heterogeneous in character : finally, 
over all alike was the terror inspired by the result of preceding 
battles. It was no wonder, then, that open suggestions for 
capitulation already made themselves heard in all quarters, and 
a petition was laid before Varus demanding the sacrifice of his 
own amour propre to the threatened ruin of the whole com- 

1 i. e. without the loudly-repeated word of command that was usual. 

io8 The Africa?! Thunder-cloud 

Uig.-Sept. munity. In the midst of these negotiations couriers arrived 
■^'^ from King Juba, charged with the announcement that that 

monarch was close at hand at the head of a strong relieving 
force, and begging the inhabitants to take every step for the 
retention and defence of the town. This intelligence restored 
37 the hopes of the panic-stricken city ; but Curio for some 
time refused to give it any credence, so confident was 
he of his own security. In this attitude he was still 
further strengthened by the fact that authentic news of 
Caesar's victories in Spain was now beginning to reach Africa ; 
and all these circumstances combined to embolden him to the 
supposition that the king would take no overt measures against 
him. The subsequent Intelligence, however, from indis- 
putable sources that the Numidian host was now less than 
twenty-five miles from Utlca, determined him to abandon 
his siege-works, and to fall back upon the old camp of Sclplo. 
Here he proceeded to collect supplies of grain, to superin- 
tend the fortification of his lines, and to lay in stocks of fuel ; 
urgent orders being meanwhile sent across to Sicily for the 
dispatch of his two remaining legions and the rest of the 
cavalry. The camp Itself was admirably adapted for the delay 
of operations. Not only was the natural strength of its posi- 
tion stiU further increased by intrenchments, but it rested on 
the proximity of the sea, and could also reckon on an abundance 
of fresh water and cooking-salt, large quantities of which had 
already been conveyed into it from the salt-pans of the neigh- 
bourhood. There was no fear, either, of their fuel giving out, 
timber being everywhere plentiful, nor of their corn, as the 
fields around were laden vdth it. Thus with the approval 
of his staff. Curio prepared to await reinforcements, and to 
prolong the course of the campaign. 

A Fatal Change of Plan 109 

Scarcely had these dispositions been made and these plans 38 
agreed upon, when word was brought in by a party of deserters ^"8-"'^'^^ • 
from the townspeople that Juba had been summoned back by 
the outbreak of a frontier war and a quarrel with the city of 
Leptis ; that this had caused his own detention at home, 
whilst his lieutenant Saburra had been dispatched at the head 
of a merely nominal force, and was now advancing upon Utica. 
An over hasty acceptance of these statements led to a fatal 
modification of Curio's original scheme, and he now determined 
to bring matters to the issue of a pitched battle. Among the 
causes which specially predisposed him to the adoption of this 
decision was, first of all, the impulsiveness of youth, combined 
with a high degree of native courage ; to which must be added 
the stimulus of previous success, and an absolute confidence 
of coming victory. Fired by these incentives, he sent off the 
whole of his cavalry at nightfall, with instructions to attack the 
enemy's camp on the Medjerda ; and there, no doubt, as his 
previous intelligence indicated, Saburra was in command. 
What he did not knowwas that the Numidian king was follow- 
ing in the rear of his lieutenant, and lay that night encamped 
only six miles behind him. The cavalry completed their 
march while it was still dark, and fell upon the enemy before 
these had any knowledge or suspicion of their presence. With 
what seems to be a tradition among foreign nations, the African 
force lay scattered about their camping-ground without any 
properly made lines ; consequently, when our troopers dashed 
in upon the broken groups of heavily sleeping men, numbers 
were slaughtered on the spot, and a considerable body took 
refuge in panic-stricken flight. Their object thus attained, 
the squadrons set out on their return journey to Curio, taking 
their prisoners along with them. 

no A Fatal Change of Plan 

39 Meanwhile Curio with the infantry had marched about an 
Aug.-Sept. j^QUj. before dawn, taking with him the whole of his effective 
force, except five battalions which were left behind to garrison 
the camp. After going six miles he met his returning cavalry, 
who reported to him their recent action. A question to the 
prisoners elicited the answer that Saburra had been in com- 
mand of the camp on the Medjerda (Bagradas) : the rest of 
the facts he omitted to investigate, in his eagerness to get to 
the end of his march. Looking round at his leading files, 
' You see, men,' he exclaimed, ' how the prisoners' tale tallies 
with that of the deserters. The king is not here, and only 
a weak force has been sent, who were not even a match for 
a few squadrons of horse. On then, on then to the spoil, 
on to fame and glory, so that at last we may begin to think 
how we can best reward you, and how best acknowledge your 
services '. 

Now it was no mean performance that the cavalry had 
accomplished, particularly if their insignificant numbers were 
compared with the host of the Numidians ; but, even as 
people always love to sound their own praises, the men, not 
content with this, began vaunting their achievements. More- 
over, the eye fell upon a quantity of booty that the column 
had in train, and amongst the captures could be seen a number 
of men and horses, so that every moment lost seemed an un- 
necessary postponement of victory. The great expectations of 
Curio, therefore, were amply seconded by the excitement of 
his men. The cavalry were ordered to turn once more, and 
the pace of the march was quickened, in order that the enemy 
might be attacked at the height of the panic produced by 
their recent flight. But the task was beyond them ; horse 
and rider were both spent by the hard work of a whole night's 

and Stupendous Blunder 


march, and one after the other they dropped out of the Aug.-Sept. 
column. Even this warning failed to check the ardour of ^^ 

In the meantime Juba had been informed by Saburra of 4° 
the night engagement, and at once pushed up to his support 
a force of 2,000 Spanish and Gallic horse, which constituted his 
permanent bodyguard, together with the most trustworthy 
portion of his infantry. These were followed more leisurely 
by the king himself with the remainder of his army, including 
sixty elephants. Having taken these precautions, Saburra, 
suspecting that the advance of the Roman cavalry meant 
the near approach of the Roman general also, drew up 
his contingents of horse and foot with orders, upon the 
advance of the enemy, to simulate panic r.nd gradually 
give ground and fall back, promising at the right moment to 
give them the signal for battle together with their necessary 
instructions for action. The situation, therefore, which pre- 
sented itself to Curio upon his arrival on the scene only tended 
to confirm his already extravagant hopes ; and, under the 
belief that the Numidians were in genuine flight, he left the 
shelter of the surrounding heights and began a descent into 
the plain. 

The hills had been left behind some considerable distance 41 
when the utter exhaustion, of the army, produced by the 
severity of a march of fully sixteen miles, at length compelled 
a halt. Then at last Saburra gave his signal, settled his line 
of battle and, riding down the ranks, proceeded to harangue 
his tribesmen. Only his horse, however, were placed in the 
fighting line ; all his unmounted troops being stationed some 
little distance apart, to produce merely a moral effect by their 
imposing numbers. Nor was Curio less anxious for battle, 


J{oman Army trapped 

Aug.-Sept. but with words of cheer to his soldiers urged upon them to 
'^^^ trust only to their own right arms. The infantry of the 

legions, in spite of their exhaustion, were eager for the fray, 
and fought with all their accustomed valour, as also did the 
handful of toil-spent cavalry ; though these last now counted 
but 200 sabres, the rest having all fallen out on the march. 
Nevertheless, weakened as they were, they forced back the 
enemy's line at whatever point they charged, but they had 
not the strength either to follow up the retreating horsemen, 
or to spur their own jaded horses to a quicker pace. The 
enemy, on the other hand, presently commenced a move- 
ment to envelope our whole line, one division of horsemen 
starting from each flank and working forwards to meet the 
other, thereby endeavouring to ride our men down from the 
rear. To prevent this, a few battalions would every now and 
again make a sally from the main body, but the rapid move- 
ment of the Numidians always enabled them to elude the 
charge ; and as our men once more fell back upon their 
supports, they would wheel and attempt to surround them, 
and cut off their retreat from the rest of the line. Thus 
there was no way of safety for the Roman force either in 
standing their ground and preserving their formation, or 
by taking their chance in a desperate charge. Moreover, the 
enemy's numbers were continually increasing by reinforce- 
ments forwarded by the king, whilst the strength of our 
own men was steadily failing through fatigue. An intensifi- 
cation of their sufferings was the impossibility of attending 
to the wounded, who could neither leave the fighting line, 
nor be carried to a place of safety, since the whole of our 
position was effectually commanded by the enemy's en- 
circling squadrons. Resigning, therefore, all hope of escape, 

by the Light Horsemen of the Desert 113 

they began to give way to those bitter outcries against death Aug.- Sept. 
which man generally utters in his last hour, or else they ^^ 
turned to their comrades and begged them to look to their 
aged parents at home, if Fate should enable any of them to 
survive the disasters of that day. On all sides was panic and 

Seeing the state of universal terror pervading his troops, 42 
and that they were deaf alike to exhortation and entreaty, 
Curio, as a last hope in a piteous situation, ordered all ranks 
to take to the nearest hills, and the whole army to advance 
in line upon them. But even this outlet was forestalled by 
Saburra, who detached a body of horsemen to seize it in 
advance. This last disappointment gave the crowning touch 
to their despair. Some broke and fled, but were caught and 
cut in pieces by the pursuing cavalry ; others simply went 
down as they stood. An appeal was made to Curio by his 
cavalry brigadier, Cneius Domitius, who closed round him 
with a few of his troopers, begging him seek safety in flight and 
make a dash for the camp, and promising not to leave his side. 
But Curio answered unhesitatingly that, having lost the army 
which Caesar had entrusted to his charge, he would never go 
back to look him in the face, and with that answer he died . 
fighting. Only a very small proportion of the Roman cavalry 
escaped from the battle ; but those who, as recorded above, 
had dropped behind in the rear for the purpose of resting their 
horses, on observing from their distant position that the whole 
army was a rout, made good their return to the camp. The 
infantry were all cut down to a man. 

In the camp Curio's paymaster, Marcius Rufus, had been 43 
left in command ; and, on receiving news of the disaster, that 
officer at once used all his efforts with the garrison to face their 


114 Cur'to chooses Death 

Aug.-Sept. critical situation with calmness. Their only answer was a 
"^^ clamorous demand to be taken back to Sicily on board the 

ships. To this he consented, and gave orders to the ship- 
masters to have all boats down at the beach directly it was 
dark. So unrestrained, however, was the universal panic, that 
the wildest rumours went afloat. Some said that Juba's forces 
were outside the gates; others declared that Varus was march- 
ing upon them with his two legions, and that they already 
distinguished the dust of his approach — both statements being 
equally devoid of truth ; whilst others, again, anticipated that 
the enemy's fleet would swoop down upon them without 
delay. In this state of abject terror every man looked to 
himself. The crews of the fleet of warships made all haste to 
depart, and the example of their flight had such a bad effect 
upon the merchant skippers, that only a few small dinghies 
responded to the call of duty and the previously issued instruc- 
tions. Even then so fierce was the struggle along the crowded 
beach as to who should get first on board out of all the dense 
multitude, that some of the boats were swamped by sheer 
weight of numbers, while the rest hesitated to come in nearer, 
through fear of encountering a similar fate. 
44 The end of the matter was that a few soldiers and a certain 
number of civilian residents, whose popularity or powers of 
appeal were exceptional, or who contrived to swim out to the 
shipSjWere received on board and taken safely across to Sicily: 
the rest of the force sent its centurions that night to Varus to 
act as plenipotentiaries, and surrendered themselves into that 
officer's hands. The next day Juba arrived, and outside the 
town his eye falling upon the men of the surrendered bat- 
talions, he boastfully claimed them as his own booty, and 
immediately ordered off to execution the large majority, 

A Haughfy Barbarian 1 1 7 

though a few were reserved to be sent away for captivity into Aug. Fept. 
his own dominions ; Varus all the while protesting against ^^ 
this violation of his sworn promise, yet not venturing to 
oppose it. 

The African king subsequently entered the town on horse- 
back with a large number of Roman senators in his train, 
amongst whom could be seen Servius Sulpicius and Licinius 
Damasippus. There he made what arrangements pleased 
him, giving orders to a small number of adherents as to his 
wishes with regard to Utica ; and then, after a few days more, 
returned to his own kingdom, taking along with him the 
whole of his military forces. 

I a 




The Passage of the Adriatic 

The elections which were held in the autumn under the 
presidency of Caesar, by virtue of his dictatorial powers, 
resulted in the return of himself and Publius Servilius as the 
consuls for the ensuing year ; that being the year in which the 
law of the constitution again allowed Caesar to hold the con- 
sulship.^ The electoral business disposed of, his attention 
was next demanded by the insecurity of public credit through- 
out the country, which was already producing a disinclination 
to the discharge of legitimate liabilities. He accordingly 
appointed a board of arbitrators with powers to make a valua- 
tion of all property, both real and personal, on the basis of its 
money value before the outbreak of the war ; and, upon their 
estimate, the property was then to be transferred to creditors 
as legal tender. This measure he considered most nearly 
designed to effect the twofold purpose of at once removing 
and modifying those fears of a general repudiation of debts 

^ By a law of 342, confirmed by Sulla in 81, ten years must elapse 
between two tenures of the same magistracy. Caesar had been consul 59. 
Like many others this law was often broken towards the close of the 
Republic. Pompeius had been consul in 70, 55, and 52. It was in this 
last year that the trials mentioned below occurred. 

Concentration at Brmdisi 117 

which foreign wars and civil disturbances tend to create, as End of 4(> 
well as of maintaining intact the social position of debtors. 

With a similar policy, he also provided for a series of public 
resolutions to be laid before the assembled populace by the 
praetors and people's tribunes, restoring to their full civic 
rights certain of those who had been convicted under the 
Pompeian law relating to bribery. These men had been 
tried during the recent years when Pompeius had garrisoned 
Rome with strong detachments from his legions ; and under 
that intimidation each trial had been finished off in a 
single day, with a different body of jurymen to hear the 
evidence from that which gave the verdict. These exiles had 
tendered Caesar their support at the opening of the present 
war, in the event of his caring to avail himself of their military 
services ; and this spontaneous offer on their part he now 
regarded as equivalent to his having actually profited by it. 
The particular method adopted in their restoration arose out 
of deference to constituted usage, which demanded that their 
return should be effected by a formal and judicial expression 
of the popular vdll, rather than look like a private act of 
clemency of his own. By taking this course he avoided not 
only the charge of want of gratitude in repaying past services 
to himself, but also any suspicion of arrogance in usurping the 
people's constitutional right of granting privilege. 

These measures, along with the Latin Festival ^ and the ^ 
transaction of all outstanding comitial business, took up alto- 
gether eleven days ; after that, Caesar laid down his dictator- 

^ The oldest religious celebration of the united Latin race, held annually 
on the Alban Mount, under the presidency of Rome. Its date was fixed 
as early in each civil year as possible, since it was regarded as a sacred 
confirmation of the powers of the new consuls. 

1 1 8 The Various Forces of the East 

End of 49 ship, and, taking his departure from the capital,' travelled 
through to Brindisi. Orders had already been issued for 
the concentration there of twelve legions of infantry and 
all his cavalry ; though on arrival he found the transports 
assembled w^ere barely sufficient to carry over 15,000 
legionaries with 500 mounted troops. (It was this want of 
troopships it should be noted that constituted for Caesar the 
sole obstacle to a rapid termination of the war.) Moreover, the 
forces actually available had to embark at something far below 
their normal strength. The long series of Gallic wars had 
made large gaps in their ranks ; their numbers had further 
been greatly reduced by the protracted overland march from 
Spain ; whilst the pestilential moisture of an autumn spent in 
Apulia and round the neighbourhood of Brindisi, following 
after the exceptionally healthy regions of Gaul and Spain, had 
produced an outbreak of sickness through the whole army. 
3 Very different were the circumstances of Pompeius. Hav- 
ing secured a full year's period for the mobilization of his 
forces, a period undisturbed by war and unhampered by the 
presence of an enemy, he had used the respite in collecting an 
enormous fleet ^ from Asia Minor and the Cyclades, from 
Corfu (Corcyrd), Athens, Pontus, Bithynia, Syria, Cilicia, 
Phoenicia, and Egypt, and had further taken steps to construct 
another of equal magnitude in aU the maritime ports. He 
had likewise levied enormous sums of ready money upon the 
provinces of Asia Minor and Syria, upon the various eastern 

' Followed, adds Appian, by the crowds, who begged him to come to 
terms with Pompeius. 

* 600, according to Appian, of which loo had fighting crews of 
Romans. According to Cicero, Pompeius's original plan, when driven from 
Italy, was to take to his ' wooden walls ' like the Greeks at Salamis. 

rally round Vcmpeius 1 1 9 

kings, potentates, and petty sovereigns, and upon the self- 49 
governing states of Greece ; and not content with this, he 
had obliged the large commercial houses, which farmed the 
public revenues in the provinces under his military control, to 
pay over to him another equally enormous contribution. 

As to his land forces, nine legions of Roman citizens had in 4 
all been got together. These included, first of all, the five 
brought over from Italy ; in addition, a sixth drawn from 
Cilicia, which, owing to its formation out of two others, he 
called the Twin Regiment ; another raised in Crete and 
Macedonia among the veterans settled in these provinces 
after their discharge by former commanders ; and lastly two 
that had arrived from Asia Minor, where they had been lately 
embodied by order of the consul Lentulus. Besides this infan- 
try of the line, large contingents had been called for from 
Thessaly, Boeotia, the Peloponnese, and Epirus, to be distri- 
buted among the legions by way of supplementary drafts, 
a treatment likevdse extended to the surrendered troops of 
Caius Antonius * ; whilst finally, to complete his regular 
forces, he was expecting two more legions from Syria, which 
were now advancing under their commander Scipio ^. His 
irregular corps included 3,000 archers, drawn from Crete, 
Sparta, Pontus, Syria, and all other states that could furnish 
them ; as well as two battalions of slingers, each 600 strong. 
His cavalry mustered 7,000 sabres, and was composed of the 
following contingents. From Galatia Deiotarus had brought 
600 Gallic horsemen, and Ariobarzanes 500 from Cappadocia; 
and a like number was contributed from Thrace byCotys,who 

^ Brother of Marcus, had lost a Caesarian force during the past year at 
V eglia in the Adriatic. See below (10) and ch. 4 (68). 
' Appointed Governor by the Senate, Bk. I, ch. 1 (6). 

I20 Forces of the East rally round Pompeius 

Jan. 48 had also sent his son Sadala. From Macedonia came 200 
troopers under Rhascypolis, a brilliant soldier ; while a force 
of 500 Gauls and Germans had been shipped from Alexandria 
with the Egyptian fleet by the younger Pompeius, forming 
a detachment of the Gabinian troops lately left behind in that 
city by Aulus Gabinius as a protecting garrison to King 
Ptolemy \ Another 800 had been enrolled from Pompeius's 
own slaves and herdsmen ; 300 had been provided from Gallo- 
graecia by Tarcondarius Castor and Domnilaus — the former 
coming in person with his force, the latter sending his son ; 
and 200 more had been dispatched from Syria by Antiochus of 
Commagene — handsomely rewarded for it by Pompeius — the 
majority of whom consisted of mounted archers. To these 
contingents were added bodies of Dardanians and Bessians, 
partly mercenaries, partly enrolled by military order or through 
personal influence, in conjunction with similar bodies of Mace- 
donians, Thessalians, and various other tribes and townships, 
bringing up the grand total to the figure already mentioned. 
5 Immense stores of provisions had been accumulated from 
Thessaly, Asia Minor, Egypt, Crete, Greece, and other dis- 
tricts : and Pompeius had now determined to winter at Du- 
razzo (Z))»rr«f^zMOT), Apollonia,and the other maritime towns, 
with the object of preventing the passage of the Adriatic 
by Caesar ; for which purpose also the fleet had been strung 
out along the whole of the lUyrian coast-line. This fleet 
was in several detachments. The Egyptian squadron was 
commanded by the younger Pompeius, that of Asia Minor by 
Decimus Laelius and Caius Triarius, that of Syria by Caius 
Cassius, the Rhodian by Caius Marcellus, who had Caius 
' Gabinius, when Governor of Syria in 55, had restored Ptolemy Auletes 
with a Roman force. See below, ch. 5 (i lo). 

D A R D A N I A 

r. 10 30 4-0 00 
Main Roads 

winter Crossing of the Adriatic 


Coponius as a colleague, and the Liburnian and Greek by Jan. 4S 
Scribonius Libo and Marcus Octavius. The naval service as 
a whole, however, was under the supervision of Marcus 
Bibulus, who directed all the operations, and the supreme 
command rested with that officer. 

To returnnowto Caesar. On arrival at Brindisi he addressed 6 
his assembled troops. Reminding them that they were at 
last near the end of their hardships and dangers, he asked them 
to be ready to leave behind in Italy their servants and baggage, 
and to embark alone without these encumbrances, so as to 
allow of a greater number of soldiers being taken on board ; 
meanwhile to look forward to victory and his own generosity 
for supplying them with all their needs. His men answered 
with a cheer that he could order what he thought best, and 
that they would gladly obey whatever those orders might be. 
He accordingly set sail on the fourth of January,^ with a fleet 
conveying, as already mentioned, seven legions of infantry. 
The following day he made the land hard by the Ceraunian 
mountains, and, finding an anchorage of calm water clear of 
the rocks and other dangerous spots, and carefully avoiding all 
harbours because these were suspected of being held by the 
enemy, disembarked his troops at a point called Palaeste, 
without the loss of a single transport. 

At the time there was lying at Oricum ^ a detached squadron 7 
of eighteen ships of the Asiatic fleet under the command of 
Lucretius Vespillo and Minucius Rufus, acting under instruc- 

^ Thus repeating his surprise of Jan. 49. The Pompeians, we read, 
never dreamed of his crossing in mid-winter, but expected him to wait for 
the New Year ceremonies at Rome, corresponding to our opening of 

* Now Paleo-Kastro at the south end of the bay of Avlona. 

I 22 

Caesar eludes the Hostile Fleets 

Jan. 48 tions from their admiral, Decimus Laelius ; whilst further to 
the south lay Marcus Bibulus with 1 10 sail at Corfu (Corcyrd). 
Of these two forces, however, the first-named had not the 
requisite self-confidence to leave the shelter of port, though 
Caesar's naval escort to his transports numbered no more than 
twelve ships of war, of which only four were decked ; and 
Bibulus was caught with his vessels unprepared for action 
and his crews scattered on shore. As a consequence he came 
up too late, since Caesar was already sighted off the mainland 
before even the faintest rumour of his crossing had time to 
reach the neighbourhood. 
8 With the disembarkation completed, the transports were 
sent back that night to Brindisi to bring over the rest of the 
legions with the cavalry. This duty had been entrusted to 
Fufius Calenus, a general officer, in order to ensure prompti- 
tude in the work of transporting the legions. The ships 
unfortunately got o£F somewhat late, and, missing the advan- 
tage of the night breeze, encountered a serious disaster on 
their return journey. For Bibulus, informed at Corfu of 
Caesar's arrival, and hoping to succeed in falling in with at 
least a section of the laden troopships, fell in with the return- 
ing empties instead. Thirty of these or thereabouts he 
managed to secure, and, venting upon them the rage which 
his carelessness and consequent keen disappointm.ent had ex- 
cited, he burnt the entire lot, leaving the crews and masters 
to perish in the flames ; his idea being that their comrades 
would be frightened from returning by the enormity of the 
punishment inflicted. This exploit accomplished, he pro- 
ceeded to distribute his fleets in effective occupation of every 
roadstead and section of coast from the island of Sasino 
{Sajonae) in the south to Veglia (Curicta) in the north, his 

Vompeiaiis fail to secure Salonae 123 

ships patrolling far and wide. Scouting squadrons were J->"- 
placed with greater care than hitherto, and, though it was 
the depth of winter, he yet persisted in keeping the sea with 
his blockading flotilla, resolved to shirk neither difficulty nor 
duty, even with no hope of relief in his arduous task, if only 
he could come to grips with Caesar.^ 

FoUowang the withdrawal of the Liburnian fleet from Illy- 9 
rian waters, the admiral, Marcus Octavius, with the division 
under his command, put in at Salonae'^. There he stirred up 
Dalmatians and other native tribes, and succeeded in alienating 
the island of Lissa from its adherence to Caesar ; but on 
attempting the same project with the Roman settlement at 
Salonae, he found that neither promises nor threats of reprisals 
could shake their allegiance, and therefore determined to 
carry the town by assault. Now this town has strong natural 
fortifications both from its general geographical position and 
from its commanding site on the crest of a hiU. Notwith- 
standing, the Roman burghers at once took the further step of 
strengthening the defences by a series of wooden towers along 
the walls ; and, on finding that their slender numbers offered 
but a weak resistance to the attack, and that they were seriously 
incapacitated by repeated wounds, they had recourse to the 
desperate expedient of liberating all their able-bodied slaves, 
and even cut the hair from off all their women-folk in order 
to manufacture ropes necessary to the working of artillery.* 
When the news of their determination reached Octavius, he 

* Apparently a lacuna here in MSS. which contained the disaster to 
Antonius and Dolabella at Veglia late in the preceding year. 

" Close by the future Spalato. 

^ In ancient ordnance the driving force was obtained by suddenly 
relaxing the tension of strongly-twisted ropes. For these ropes women's 
hair formed the very best material (Vitruvius x. i6. 2). 

124 Caesar renexvs Peace Overtures 

Jan. 48 surrounded the city with five separate camps, and went on to 
press the garrison simultaneously by blockade and a series of 
concerted assaults. On their side the defenders were ready 
to continue the defence at any and every cost, but they 
suffered most severely from shortness of supplies. Agents 
were therefore dispatched to Caesar to petition his help in this 
. one particular ; every other kind of distress they continued to 
support unaided as best they could. 

After the lapse of a considerable interval of time, it was 
noticed by the garrison that the long protraction of the 
siege had induced a certain carelessness among the troops of 
Octavius. They accordingly seized an opportunity whilst 
the besiegers were absent from their stations for the midday 
siesta ; and, after posting women and children along the city 
wall so that no detail of the daily routine should be missed by 
the enemy, they formed a sortie-party from themselves and 
their recently liberated slaves, and dashed out upon the nearest 
of the Octavian camps. This they quickly stormed; and, 
following it up without a break by successive attacks on the 
second, third, fourth, and remaining camps in turn, they 
drove the Pompeians with great slaughter out of the whole 
series, and forced the remainder under Octavius to take shelter 
on board the fleet. This affair ended the siege ; for, the 
winter now approaching, Octavius, after the heavy losses 
incurred, relinquished all hope of a successful assault on the 
town, and sailed away to rejoin Pompeius at Durazzo. 
10 It has already been recorded how Lucius Vibullius Rufus, 
a sectional commander of Pompeius, had twice fallen into the 
hands of Caesar, and twice been released by him, viz. once at 
Pentima and a second time in Spain. The obligations thus 
conferred had induced Caesar to consider him an appropriate 

Caesar renews Peace Overtures 1 2 f 

agent for sending to Pompeius with fresh proposals of peace, Jan. 
especially as he was understood to possess distinct influence 
with his chief. The general purport of these instructions was 
as follows. 

' Common prudence dictated that each party should now 
set a limit to its present attitude of uncompromising oppo- 
sition, and, by agreeing to a cessation of hostilities, tempt 
Fortune no longer. They had both experienced defeats on 
a sufficiently serious scale to serve as a wholesome lesson for 
dreading further disasters. Whilst his opponent had been 
driven from Italy, and had lost Sicily, Sardinia, both Spanish 
provinces, and no less than 130 battalions of Roman troops, 
either in Italy itself or in Spain ; he, on the other hand, had 
to mourn the death of Curio, the destruction of the army of 
Africa, and the surrender of Antonius and the force under him 
at Veglia. Should they not then cease to inflict these blows 
on themselves and their country, particularly when their 
own reverses had now abundantly shown them what a 
powerful factor is Fortune in war? The present moment 
offered a unique opportunity of treating for peace, at a time 
when each side still felt complete confidence in ite'own 
ultimate success, and whilst honours as yet seemed easy. If, 
however, Fortune, were now to give either belligerent even a 
trivial advantage, all terms would alike be rejected by what 
would then regard itself as the winning side, and equal stakes 
would no longer content the claimant who believed all to be 
in his grasp. The actual conditions of peace, whose settle- 
ments had hitherto been impossible, should be looked for at 
Rome, at the hands of the Senate and sovereign people : mean- 
while it ought to be a sufficient guarantee to both their 
country and themselves, if each were at once to take an oath 

I 26 The Nature of his Proposals 

Jan. 48 before his assembled troops to disband his army within three 
days after that event. By breaking up their organized forces 
and the auxiliary bodies on which they now relied, they would 
have no course left them but to abide by the decision of the 
Senate and people.' 

Such were the proposals now forwarded by Caesar, and, in 
order to facilitate their acceptance by Pompeius, he made the 
further concession that he was ready to disband the whole of 
his field army and all garrisons in the towns.^ 
1 1 Now VibuUius had landed at Corfu ; but, thinking it of at 
least equal importance that Pompeius should be informed of 
Caesar's sudden arrival on the coast, so as to take his counter- 
measures before the subject of the peace proposals was broached , 
he immediately posted off to meet him ; and, travelling night 
and day, vrith relays of fresh cattle at every town to ensure 
greater speed, brought the intelligence that Caesar had landed. 
Pompeius was at this time in Candavia^, on his way to his 
army's winter quarters ' in Apollonia and Durazzo; but 
Vibullius's news was so alarming that he at once began to 
quicken his march towards Apollonia, with the object of 
preventing his rival's occupation of the coast towns. Caesar, 
however, had only waited till his troops were all disembarked 
before marching upon Oricum. On his appearance before 
that town, the Pompeian governor of the place, Lucius Tor- 
quatus, endeavoured to make a show of resistance by means of 

' The genuineness of this last sentence, though found in all MSS., is 
doubted by most editors. 

' The hill country near the modern Lake Ochrida. Through it passed 
the great military trunk road connecting Durazzo with Saloniki (Via 
Egnatia), the East with the West. 

' The Pompeian head quarters during 49 had been Saloniki {Thessa- 
loniea), where the exiled senate continued to meet. 

The Coast Towns declare for him 127 

his garrison of Parthini, and orders were given to close the Jan. ^8 
gates. But his Greek troops, when commanded to man the 
walls and take up arms, flatly refused to act in opposition to a 
duly elected representative of the Roman Government ; and 
when their refusal was accompanied by an independent 
attempt on the part of the townspeople to admit Caesar, 
Torquatus gave up the situation as hopeless, and, directing 
the gates to be opened, surrendered himself and the town to 
Caesar, by whom he was treated with all the honours of war. 

Halting merely to take over the surrendered town, Caesar 1 2 
at once started for ApoUonia. Upon the news of his advance 
reaching the governor, Lucius Staberius, that officer proceeded 
to move a supply of water into the citadel of the town and to 
throw up fortifications for its defence ; at the same time 
demanding hostages from the townsfolk for their good 
behaviour. But not only did these decline to give any such 
guarantees, but they openly declared they would never shut 
their gates in a consul's face, or set up their own private 
judgement against the unanimous verdict of Italy and the 
Roman world. Staberius, therefore, recognizing the firm 
attitude of the citizens, had no choice left him but a secret 
flight from the town ; whereupon the inhabitants dispatched 
an embassy to Caesar and threw open their city to his 
approach. Their example was followed by the people of Bullis 
and Amantia and other neighbouring townships, and by prac- 
tically the whole of Epirus, envoys arriving from all quarters 
to assure him of their readiness to submit to his orders. 

Meanwhile the result of these opening operations at Oricum 13 
and ApoUonia made Pompeius extremely anxious for the safety 
of his base at Durazzo (Dyrrachium), and he was now marching 
night and day upon that city. Simultaneously the rumour 

128 Narrow Escape of Pompeius 

Jan. 48 spread that Caesar was close on his heels; a report that created 
such violent panic in Pompeius's army after his frantic haste 
in turning night into day and in marching his men without 
a halt, that virtually aU the troops hailing from Epirus and 
its immediate neighbourhood deserted their ranks, many of 
them actually flinging away their arms, and the whole march 
degenerating into something like a rout. This disgraceful 
panic was not even stayed with their safe arrival before 
Durazzo ; and accordingly, when the usual order had been 
given to mark out the camp boundaries, Labienus, in order 
to check the demoralization, stepped forward and solemnly 
swore that he would never desert Pompeius, but would share 
with him any and every lot that fortune might decree. This 
same oath was taken by all the other generals present, followed 
by the regimental officers and centurions ; after which the 
whole of the rank and file swore to observe the same. As for 
Caesar, on finding his march upon Durazzo anticipated, he 
gave up the chase, and pitched his camp near the river Ergent 
[Afsus), within the territories of Apollonia — a position which 
enabled him to protect by a ring of fortified outposts the 
townships which had recently served him so loyally. Here he 
determined to await the arrival of the rest of his legions from 
Italy, and to go under canvas ^ for winter. The same resolu- 
.tion was also taken by Pompeius, who now entrenched himself 
on the opposite or northern bank of the Ergent, and proceeded 
to concentrate within his new lines the whole of his regular and 
auxiliary forces. 
14 Meanwhile Calenus, in execution of his orders received 
from Caesar, had embarked the legions and cavalry at Brindisi 
as far as his supply of transports allowed, and, setting sail, had 

Lit. 'skins', of wliich Roman tents were made. 

and for Caesuras 1{cinforccments 129 

got some little distance from port, when he was met by jm. 43 
a dispatch-boat from Caesar with intelligence that the whole 
of the opposite harbours and shores were effectually held by 
the enemy's fleets. Upon this information, he at once put 
back towards harbour, and signalled the recall to his remaining 
convoy. A single ship, however, kept on her course, and 
refused to acknowledge the admiral's signal, since she had no 
troops on board, but was sailing under private orders. She 
was carried down the lUyrian coast to Oricum, and there 
captured by Bibulus ; who, exacting the full penalty alike 
from slaves and free, and even beardless boys, massacred every 
living soul on board. 

On so short a space of time, and on so mere a chance, hung 
the safety of the whole army. 

It will have been noticed from the above that Bibulus with 1 5 
his fleet was now at Oricum, where a singular military position 
had developed itself. On his side, his blockading squadrons 
effectually deprived Caesar of all control both of the sea 
and its harbours ; whilst his own force was no less completely 
debarred from every inch of ground along the same territories : 
for, the whole of the foreshore being safely held by Caesar's 
pickets and patrols, the Pompeians had no means either of 
watering xheir ships and supplying them with fuel, or of 
mooring them to the beach. So impossible, indeed, grew 
the situation, and so hard pressed were they for the barest 
necessaries of life, that they were forced to employ cargo- 
boats to bring up from Corfu, not merely the ordinary require- 
ments for victualling a fleet, but even their very firewood and 
drinking-water. To aggravate their sufferings, there came 
a period of contrary winds, during which they were actually 
driven to collect the night dew off the skins which served 

130 UnauthoriT^ed Negotiations 

Ftb. 48 as awnings to their ships. Yet these sufferings were borne 
with cheerful resignation, nor was there any thought of 
withdrawing their watch upon the harbours or of leaving the 
coast uncovered. 

It was during the critical state of their supplies as just 
described, and after Libo had rejoined Bibulus at Oricum 
with the division under his command, that these two officers 
addressed a petition in common from the decks of their flag- 
ships to Manius Acilius and Statins Murcus, the Caesarian 
military authorities in that region — the former in charge of 
the town fortifications, the latter of the shore-defences — to 
the effect that, if their request could be complied with, they 
desired an audience with Caesar on a matter of most vital 

A few remarks were added by way of confirmation of their 
statement, and to give the impression that the subject of 
a settlement was to be brought forward ; and meanwhile, 
until the interview could be arranged, they requested an 
armistice, which was accordingly granted them by the Caesarian 
officers. For not only did the message conveyed appear to 
them of considerable moment, but they well knew how sin- 
cerely anxious Caesar was for an opening of this nature, whilst 
what weighed with them further was the belief that the 
overtures lately initiated by Vibullius had apparently met 
with some measure of success. 
16 At the particular time Caesar happened to be absent from 
Oricum, having lately left with a single legion to receive the 
surrender of the more distant townships, and also to improve 
his commissariat department, which was supplying him but 
indifferently. He was now at Butrinto {Buthrotum), a coast 
town just opposite to Corfu ; but, upon receiving dispatches 

By the Pompeian Admirals 131 

from Acilius and Murcus informing him of the demands put Feb. 4? 
forward by Libo and Bibulus, he left the legion behind and 
at once returned to Oricum. There, on his arrival, he invited 
the two Pompeian chiefs to a conference. Only Libo 
made his appearance, excusing the absence of Bibulus, 
which, doubtless, was prompted by his excessively hot temper, 
and by the fact that, in addition to political differences, he 
had long nursed a private quarrel with Caesar, originating in 
the years of their common aedileship and praetorship.^ ' For 
this reason,' said Libo, * his colleague had now avoided meet- 
ing his opponent, in order that his own temper might not 
prove an obstacle to the success of proceedings which promised 
so well for the future.' 

With this introduction, he proceeded to assure Caesar that 
the most earnest desire of Pompeius was, and had always been, 
for a peaceful settlement and cessation from hostilities ; but 
that they could not give practical effect to their commander's 
wishes, because the whole conduct of the campaign and of all 
other questions alike had been made over to him absolutely by 
a decree of their council of war. If, however, Caesar would 
acquaint them with the nature of his demands, they would 
forward these to Pompeius, who would then conduct the rest 
of the negotiations directly with him, receiving the while 
every support from themselves. In the interval, until an 
answer could be returned from Pompeius, they asked for the 
armistice to hold good, and no hostile measure to be taken 
by either belligerent. This included all that was pertinent 
in his proposals, though certain remarks were added about his 
own cause and about the armed forces under his command ; 

^ 65 and 62. The aediles had chiefly police duties, the care of markets, 
aqueducts, distribution of corn, arrangement of the great public games, &c. 
K 2 - 

132 J^ejected by Caesar 

17 remarks which Caesar both ignored at the time, as not neces- 
'^ sitating an answer, and which to-day we see no sufficient 
reason for putting upon record. 

His own definite demands were then formulated as follows : 
' He must either be allowed to send representatives to Pom- 
peius without let or hindrance, and with a safe-conduct 
guaranteed by Libo and his colleagues, or else the latter coulJ 
themselves take his officers on board and be responsible for 
conveying them to Pompeius. As for the question of armistice, 
they must look to the strategical position of the two comba- 
tants, which was so pecuUarly balanced that, whilst they with 
their fleet blocked his ships and reinforcements, he, on the 
other hand, cut them off from their watering and from all 
communication with the shore. If they wanted this privation 
relaxed, they must relax their watch on the sea : if, on the 
contrary, that was maintained, he would retain his hold on 
the land. However, there was no reason why peace negotia- 
tions should not equally well be conducted under the status 
quo, nor did the one state of things constitute any obstacle to 
the other.' In answer to this, Libo replied that he could 
neither undertake to receive Caesar's delegates on board, nor 
could he guarantee their safe-conduct ; he could only refer 
the whole matter for decision to Pompeius. The one point 
that he steadily urged was the truce, and for that he contended 
with extraordinary passion. Caesar, therefore, realizing that 
the whole proceedings had simply been instituted with the 
sole object of escaping their present dangerous situation and 
shortness of supplies, and that Libo was in a position to offer 
no genuine prospect or proposal for peace, broke oflf the dis- 
cussion, and returned to the task of perfecting his plans for 
the war. 

Failure of Caesar^ s own Overtures 133 

As for Libo's colleague Bibulus, his long exclusion from the >8 
shore was presently complicated by serious sickness, the result 
of exposure to cold and constant work ; and, suitable treat- 
ment being impossible, whilst he steadily refused to quit the 
post of duty, his constitution proved unequal to withstanding 
the disease. Upon his death, the supreme naval command 
was not again vested in any single authority ; but the various 
divisional fleets acted independently of each other, according 
to the caprice of their respective admirals. 

With respect to Vibullius and his mission, as soon as the 
tumult excited by Caesar's sudden arrival had abated, and the 
first opportunity occurred after his own return to the coast, he 
had secured an interview with Pompeius. To this interview 
there were also admitted Libo, Lucius Lucceius, and Theo- 
phanes, the three confidential advisers with whom Pompeius 
habitually conferred on high matters of state ; and Vibullius 
then proceeded to unfold the instructions received from Caesar. 
He had barely commenced speaking when Pompeius cut him 
short with an order to say no more. ' What value ', he 
exclaimed, ' will life or country possess for me, when I shall 
be thought to retain them merely on the sufferance of Caesar ? 
an opinion that nothing will get rid of, if people come to 
regard me as fetched back to Italy, after having freely de- 
parted from it.' 

This incident came to Caesar's knowledge at the close of 
the war, from those who were present at the speech ; yet, in 
spite of this latest failure, he still continued his efforts to open 
up through other channels verbal negotiations for peace. 

The method next tried was as follows. 

The two opposing camps were separated solely by the river 19 
Ergent {Apsus), and, as a consequence, frequent communica- 

134 Failure of Caesar's own Overtures 

Feb, 48 tions passed to and fro between the rival troops ; the speakers 
mutually agreeing that no hostile shot should be fired across 
the stream during these meetings. Caesar accordingly com- 
missioned Publius Vatinius, a staff officer, to go down to the 
very edge of the river bank, with powers to discuss the basis 
of a settlement, and to ask repeatedly in tones plainly audible 
whether citizens were not permitted to send a pair of peace 
envoys to fellow citizens — a concession hitherto allowed even 
to runaway slaves among the Pyrenean passes, and to defeated 
pirates ^ — above all when their sole object was the prevention 
of an armed struggle between Romans and Romans. In 
execution of this charge Vatinius spoke at considerable length, 
and with the earnestness of appeal rightly demanded where 
the vital interests both of himself and of the civilized world 
were at stake, and his words were listened to in silence by the 
soldiers of either army. An answer was returned from the 
side of the Pompeians that Aulus Varro pledged himself to 
appear at a conference on the following day, and, further, to 
take measures for ensuring our envoys both a safe-conduct 
and absolute freedom of speech. A time was accordingly 
fixed for this meeting ; and on the morrow, at the appointed 
hour, large numbers assembled from both sides, in eager 
anticipation of the event, and with every man's thoughts 
seemingly intent on peace. Out of this throng there then 
stepped Titus Labienus, who in quiet conversational tones 
began a speech on the subject of peace, and to enter on a debate 
with Vatinius. In the midst of their discussion, they were 
suddenly interrupted by a shower of spears flung from every 
quarter ; and, although Vatinius managed to escape by the 
intervention of his soldiers' shields, several others were 
^ Alluding to two of Pompeius's earlier wars. See lutrod. 

The j^ct of a T^negade 1 3 f 

wounded, including Cornelius Balbus, Marcus Plotius, and Feb. 48 
Lucius Tiburtius, as well as some centurions and privates. 
Thereupon Labienus exclaimed, * It is nonsense, you see, to 
talk of a settlement : until we have Caesar's head, there can 
be no peace between us '. 


A Backwater of the REvoLtrrioK 

Contemporary with these events abroad there had been ao 
certain serious trouble in the capital at home, where Marcus J*"-*F«"-4' 
Caelius Rufus, one of the praetors for the year, had taken on 
himself to champion the cause of the debtor classes. After 
entering upon his official duties, he had established his magis- 
terial dais alongside the judicial chair of his colleague the 
city praetor, Caius Trebonius, and there proceeded to promise 
his official support to any who chose to appeal on the valuation 
of their property and the enforced payments of liabilities that 
were now being carried out by the verdict of individual 
arbitrators, in accordance with the measure adopted by Caesar 
during his late stay in Rome. So essentially fair, however, 
was this measure in itself, and so wise a toleration did Tre- 
bonius exhibit in executing its terms, from conviction that 
the times called for a considerate and temperate dispensation 
of justice, that no parties were forthcoming to initiate the 
process of appeal. The truth is that, whilst very ordinary 
courage is required to plead poverty and declaim against one's 
own personal troubles or those of the times, and to lay before 
the court the hardships attending an enforced sale ; to keep 
entire possession of property, admittedly due to another. 

1 3 <^ Idiots in J^me 

Ia11.-Feb.48 argues the very height of assurance, not to say effrontery. 
Consequently no one could be found to put forward so extra- 
vagant a demand ; and Caelius was left to prove himself more 
intractable than even the parties for whom he was professedly 
acting. For, once started on his career, he had now to avoid 
the fiasco of having undertaken a discreditable piece of busi- 
ness with nothing to show for it : he therefore brought 
forward a measure by which all debts were to be discharged 
without accumulation of interest that day six years. 
2 1 This proposal naturally met with opposition from the con- 
sul Servilius and the rest of the Government ; and Caelius, 
baulked of his expectations, determined to make a bid for the 
support of the populace. Withdrawing his earlier law, he 
now substituted two others in its place; in the first of which 
he made a present of a year's rent to every tenant of an 
inhabited house, and in the second announced a general 
cancelling of debts : and further he instigated the mob to 
a brutal attack against Caius Trebonius, who was hustled off 
his magisterial platform, whilst several others were wounded. 
These proceedings were reported by Servilius to the Senate, 
and the Chamber resolved that Caelius had deserved suspen- 
sion from public functions. Acting on this decree, the consul 
then forbade him the House, and when he subsequently 
endeavoured to address the assembled people outside, ordered 
his forcible removal from the rostra ^. This last open dis- 
grace stung him to resentment ; and, giving out in public 
that he was leaving Rome to go off to Caesar, he secretly 
sent agents to Milo, then under sentence of exile upon the 
charge of murdering Clodius, and invited him into Italy. 
Milo he considered a useful tool for his purpose, because the 
^ An elevated platform for speakers. Cf. the French Tribune. 

Death of the T{mgleaders 137 

lavish public games formerly exhibited by him in the city Ja11.-Feb.4S 
had still left him with a remnant of his old gladiatorial gang. 
A junction was effected between the two, and Milo was then 
sent on in advance to raise the herdsmen in the regions round 
Thurii. Caelius himself came down to Casilinum ; only, 
however, to hear that all his regimental colours ^ and stacks 
of arms had been seized at Capua, and that the band of hired 
bravoes, which was to contrive the treacherous surrender of 
Naples (Neapolis), had been discovered in that city. The 
plot now stood revealed, and Capua in consequence shut its 
gates against him ; even personal danger was to be feared, 
since the district had taken up arms and was now inclined to 
treat him as a common outlaw. He therefore broke off his 
present design, and retired from his advance in these regions. 

In the meantime Milo was distributing a pro^amation 22 
among the Italian municipalities, to the effect that he was 
acting under the express orders of Pompeius, received in the 
form of instructions from Vibullius ; and on the strength 
of this artifice was endeavouring to win the support of any 
whom he had reason to suspect of being in money difficulties. 
These last failing to respond, he proceeded to break open 
some private slave compounds, and then to lay siege to the 
town of Cosa, situated in the territories of Thurii. A legion 
was at once dispatched to its relief by Quintus Pedius, one 
of the praetors, and Milo was subsequently killed by a stone 
that struck him from the city wall. As for Caelius, maintain- 
ing his assertion that he was on his way to Caesar, he got as 
far as Thurii. There he tried to tamper with certain of the 
city authorities ; but on offering a bribe to the Caesarian 
cavalry, composed of Gallic and Spanish horse, who had been 
^ ' Military standards.' 

138 Death of the J^ngleaders 

Jan.-Feb.48 sent down to garrison the place, he met with his death at 
their hands. In this way what threatened to develop into 
a serious movement, and, owing to the pre-occupation of the 
Government with the crisis abroad, was giving rise to serious 
anxiety in Italy, came to an easy and a speedy termination. 

The Lines of Dyrrachium 
23 To resume the narrative of the campaign. It was about this 
time that a naval demonstration against Italy was organized 
under Libo, who, with the fleet of fifty ships of the line under 
his immediate command, set sail from Oricum and crossed 
to Brindisi, where he seized as his base the island commanding 
the entrance to that harbour.^ This plan he adopted because 
he considered it sounder strategy to concentrate his attention 
upon a single point where our forces must inevitably pass out 
to sea, than to maintain a blockade of all the adjacent shores 
and harbours. His sudden arrival on the coast enabled him 
to pick up a few stray merchantmen : these he all promptly 
burned, excepting one with a cargo of corn which was brought 
back by its captors as a prize. Altogether he created no 
little panic amongst our people ; and this was further in- 
creased by a successful night attack, in which a landing-party 
of legionaries and archers dislodged one of our mounted 
pickets. His strong position, indeed, gained him such marked 
advantages, that, in a dispatch to Pompeius, he assured his 
commanding officer that, if he liked, he might give orders 
for the rest of the fleet to go into dock and refit, since his 
own squadron would effectually block up the reinforcements 

destined for Caesar. 

* See Plan, p. 23. 

A Device of Mark Antony 139 

Fortunately at this moment Antonius was at Brindisi. ^4 
x». . . ,. . 1- 11-1 1- r I • Feb-March 

Placing implicit reliance on the high quality ot his troops, .g 

this officer selected some sixty ships' cutters from his larger 
transports, which he then proceeded to cover with a super- 
structure of fascines and mantlets. On board of these 
a picked body of legionaries was next embarked, and the 
boats were then stationed in detachments at various points 
along the shore. This done, orders were given for two three- 
deckers \ lately built under his supervision at Brindisi, to row 
out to the mouth of the harbour under the pretence of exer- 
cising the crews. Noticing the boldness with which they 
came on, Libo conceived the hope of cutting off their retreat, 
and detached five of his four-deckers ' against them. These 
had approached to within a short distance of our vessels, when 
our crews, veterans though supposed to be, were suddenly 
seen to go about and to be running for the shelter of port ; 
on which the Pompeians, with more enthusiasm than caution, 
at once commenced to pursue Suddenly, on the given 
signal, out shot from every quarter the Antonian launches, 
racing up to the enemy. Singling out one of the four- 
deckers, they captured her at the first burst with all her 
navigating ° and fighting crews, whilst her consorts sought 
safety in a disgraceful flight. 

This disaster was soon afterwards followed by another. 
Antonius having stationed a chain of mounted patrols along 
the foreshore, the enemy found himself deprived of all access 
to water ; so that Libo, feeling his position to be as untenable 
as it was undignified, was forced to evacuate Brindisi, and to 
relinquish the blockade of our reinforcements waiting there. 

Many months had now elapsed, and winter was well 25 
' Triremes. "^ Qiiadriremes. ' i.e. oarsmen. 

140 j^fter Long Delay 

Mar.-Ap.48 past its climax, whilst yet there was no sign of the transports 
with the legions crossing from Brindisi to Caesar. Moreover, 
it appeared to Caesar that several opportunities for making 
the passage had been neglected, since the wind had certainly 
blown from the quarter which, in his judgement, was essential 
for putting to sea. What made the delay more serious was 
that, the further the season advanced, the greater grew the 
energy displayed by the enemy's naval commanders in their 
watch upon the coast, and the higher rose their hopes of 
successfully preventing our crossing. Frequent dispatches 
also came down from Pompeius, conveying severe reprimands 
on their failure to stop Caesar in his first voyage, and urgent 
exhortations to see that the rest of his armament was not 
similarly allowed to cross the straits ; and they were now 
daily reckoning on the change of season when lighter winds 
would increase the difficulties of transporting an army. All 
these considerations induced Caesar to dispatch a somewhat 
peremptory order to his agents at Brindisi,^ bidding them 
at the first fair wind not to lose a chance of sailing, if once 
they could shape such a course as to hit the opposite coast 
within the boundaries of Apollonia and there run their vessels 
ashore. These regions, it should be explained, were the 
freest from the blockading squadrons, owing to the enemy's 
nervousness about venturing far from his ports. 
26 His officers responded with intrepid courage. Whilst 
Marcus Antonius and Fufius Calenus jointly directed the 
embarkation, the men themselves eagerly seconded their 

^ Ancient authorities record the story that Caesar in desperation at the 
delay, tried to cross the Adriatic in a small boat, but was driven back by 
the boisterous weather. He rallied the frightened sailors by the now 
proverbial words, 'You carry Caesar and his fortunes'. 

Caesar* s ^inforcements sail 141 

efforts in their readiness to brave all risks for ensuring the Mar.-Ap.4'> 
safety of Caesar ; and having secured a southerly wind they 
weighed anchor, and the next day were swept up the coast 
past ApoUonia and Durazzo. As soon as they were sighted 
from the mainland, Caius Coponius, the admiral commanding 
the Rhodian fleet at Durazzo, at once rowed his ships out of 
harbour, and, the breeze slackening, got close up with our 
transports ; but at that moment the southerly gale once more 
freshened, and by so doing saved our vessels from certain 
capture. This, however, was not enough to turn Coponius 
from his purpose ; and, trusting the unflagging efforts of his 
crews to be more than a match for the pace of the gale, 
he kept up the chase even after his opponents had been blown 
past Durazzo by the great force of the wind. On the other 
hand, our ships, though fully profiting by their stroke of good 
luck, still dreaded an attack from the armed fleet, if once the 
wind should moderate. Gaining the harbour therefore called 
Nymphaeum, three miles beyond Alessio (Z,uj'M/),they steered 
their ships into it ; and though it is sheltered from a south- 
westerly gale and exposed to a southerly, they yet felt they 
had less to fear from the hurricane than from the enemy's 
pursuing squadron. They were, however, no sooner inside, 
than the wind, which for two days had blown steadily from 
the south, with a good fortune wellnigh incredible, veered 
to the south-west. 

Sudden indeed was the turning of the tables now wit- 27 
nessed. Those who a moment before had feared for their 
very lives were now within the shelter of an absolutely safe 
harbour : those on the other hand, who had just threatened 
our vessels with destruction, had now to look to their own. 
So completely were the conditions reversed, that, whilst to 

142 Veterans versus Conscripts 

Mar.-Ap.48 our men the fresh gale proved a direct preservation, it caught 
the Rhodian men-of-wrar with such violence that every one 
of their decked ships, sixteen in all, were driven ashore and 
went to pieces on the rocks. Of the large numbers forming 
their navigating and fighting crews, part were dashed upon 
the cliflFs and killed, others were rescued by our troops ; these 
last being all spared by Caesar and given a free passage home, 
28 Two of our transports unfortunately were a little late 
in completing their voyage, and accordingly were overtaken 
by night. Not knowing at what point the rest of the convoy 
had made the coast, they lay off at anchor opposite Alessio 
[Lissus). Thereupon the Pompeian commandant of the place, 
Otacilius Crassus, put out with a large number of ships' boats 
and other small craft, and commenced preparations for 
boarding ; in the meanwhile discussing terms of surrender 
and guaranteeing fair treatment to the prisoners. (One of the 
ships, it should be mentioned, had on board 220 recruits from 
a newly-raised legion, the other a trifle under 200 from a corps 
of veterans.) 

Then occurred a signal illustration of the self-defence that 
lies in undaunted courage. The recruits, frightened by the 
swarm of boats, and prostrated with sea-sickness and the effects 
of their voyage, accepted the sworn word of the enemy not 
to injure them, and surrendered to Otacilius. They were 
at once marched off to the governor ; and there, in his pre- 
sence, in defiance of his solemn oath, were brutally massacred 
to a man. On the other hand, the veteran contingent, 
though equally shaken by their cramped position in the ship's 
hold, which had been rendered still worse by the storm, 
braced themselves to maintain unsullied the lofty reputation 
of their corps j and by haggling over terms, and pretending 

The Landing safely effected 143 

to be always on the point of surrender, succeeded in wearing Mar.-Ap.48 
away the first part of the night. They then compelled their 
captain to run his ship ashore, and, finding there a defensible 
position, passed the rest of the night upon it. At dawn a body 
of cavalry, some 400 strong, forming the regular patrol of 
that section of the coast, was dispatched against them by 
Otacilius, to be shortly afterwards followed by a force of 
heavy-armed infantry from the town garrison ; but against 
both alike they made good their defence, and after inflicting 
several casualties upon the enemy, without any loss whatever 
to themselves, successfully effected a retirement upon their 
head quarters. 

Immediately after this the Roman settlement in Alessio 29 
(Lissus), which at this time was responsible for the government 
of the city, Caesar having on a previous occasion attached it 
to their jurisdiction, and at the same time provided for its 
fortification, sent out a warm welcome to Antony, putting 
everything they possessed at the disposal of his army. There- 
upon Otacilius, becoming apprehensive for his own position, 
hastily withdrew his garrison from the town, and rejoined 

Meanwhile Antonius, after completing the disembarkation 
of his reinforcements, amounting in all to three veteran and 
one conscript legion with 900 mounted troops, sent back the 
majority of his transports to Italy, with orders to convey 
across the remaining infantry and cavalry ; leaving, however, 
at Alessio a batch of large sailing punts — a species of GaUic 
craft — in order that, should Pompeius again throw his army 
across into Italy under the behef that it was now denuded of 
troops (a plan with which rumour commonly credited him), 
Caesar should at least retain some means of pursuit. He then 

144 Junctio7i with Main Army 

April 48 sent off express messengers to his commander-in-chief, inform- 
ing him both of the place of his landing and of the strength 
of the forces accompanying him. 
30 Now it so happened that information on these two points 
reached Caesar and Pompeius almost simultaneously. They 
had both witnessed the transports driving with the storm past 
ApoUonia and Durazzo, and had themselves at once started 
overland on their track ; in ignorance, however, for the first 
few days, of the particular point at which the ships had made 
the coast. The receipt of this further intelligence caused 
the adoption by the rival commanders of two mutually 
exclusive plans ; Caesar aiming at a junction with Antonius 
at the earliest possible moment, Pompeius endeavouring to 
intercept the new arrivals on their march southward, with a 
chance perhaps also of surprising them by ambush. Accord- , 
ingly each broke up his permanent quarters along the Ergent 
{Apsus) within twenty- four hours of the other, but whereas 
Pompeius secretly set his army in motion during the night, 
Caesar marched out in the light of open day. The latter had 
the longer route before him, as a considerable detour was 
involved by the necessity of first marching up-stream before 
a crossing could be effected ; in the meantime Pompeius could 
get c ff with a clear road without any river to ford, and push 
on to meet Antony by a series of forced marches. With 
the intelligence that his opponent was now close at hand, he 
selected a suitable site for encamping, and there settled down 
to await his arrival ; keeping all arms strictly within his 
lines, and as a further precaution allowing no fires to be 
lighted. These movements were promptly reported to 
Antonius by the local Greek population ; so that Antony, 
after dispatching runners to advise Caesar of the same, 

Threatened Intervention from the East 145" 

remained that day quietly in camp ; and on the next Caesar April 48 
marched in with his men. The news of their junction made 
Pompeius anxious lest he should find himself surrounded by 
the two allied armies ; he therefore fell back from the neigh- 
bourhood and marched in force to Asparagium, a town 
belonging to Durazzo, where on some strong ground a new 
camp was fortified. 

Whilst the war had thus been in progress some considerable 31 
time, Scipio had all along been busy in the East. After first 
suflFering several defeats in the region of Mount Amanus, on 
the strength of which he had acclaimed himself Commander/ 
he had followed up these exploits by levying large con- 
tributions of money upon the townships and petty sovereigns 
of his province of Syria. The arrears of taxes, owdng for the 
last two years, had been squeezed out of the contractors^, who 
had been compelled to make a further advance on mortgage 
of the estimates for the ensuing year ; at the same time a 
cavalry conscription had been ordered over the entire province. 
As soon as this force was ready he turned his back upon his 
immediate enemy, the Parthians — an enemy who had in the 
last few years caused the death of Marcus Crassus, the well- 
known commander, and had since kept Marcus Bibulus shut 
up within siege lines — and withdrew from Syria its garrisonof 
legions and mounted troops. Such a step produced the gravest 
anxiety and apprehensions of a Parthian war throughout the 
province, apprehensions which were soon echoed by not infre- 
quent murmurs among the troops, who made it known that 
if their march was to be directed against a national enemy they 
would cheerfully follow, but that against a fellow citizen and 
the first magistrate of the state they would never draw a sword. 
' Cr. Bk. II, ch. 3 (26). > ' Publicans.' 


i/\.6 Civil War and the Provinces 

vVutumn 49 At these symptoms of possible trouble, Scipio hit upon the 
device of quartering his soldiers upon Bergama {Pergamum) 
and the other rich cities of Asia Minor ; and here he not 
only indulged them with the most extravagant largesses, but, 
further to whet their appetite for the campaign, handed 
them over the townships to plunder. 
3a While the troops were thus engaged, the unhappy provin- 
cials had everywhere to find the money required to meet the 
grinding exactions of the authorities. Many novel heads of 
taxation were devised at the bidding of official cupidity. 
A poll-tax was levied on every head of the population, whether 
slave or free ; taxes on house pillars, taxes on doors, a money 
composition for the army's corn supply, for troops, accoutre- 
ments, ships' crews, ordnance, and transport ; in short, they 
had only to find a sufficiently plausible title, and it was at 
once pronounced an adequate instrument for the raising of 
fresh funds. Commandants possessed of full military powers 
were quartered, not merely in the large cities, but one might 
almost say in every individual hamlet and hill fortress of the 
province ; and those who distinguished themselves in the 
work of plunder by any remarkable cruelty or rapacity were 
rewarded by a reputation for exceptional ability and patriot- 
ism, Asia Minor was completely overrun with the holders 
of military authority and their dreaded attendants ^ ; it was 
crammed with officials and tax-gatherers. These men, in addi- 
tion to the legal sum demanded, were not above doing a bit 
of business on their own account ; the excuse constantly urged 
was that, as they had been driven from home and country, 
they were now in need of the comxmon necessaries of life ; and 
by this plea they endeavoured to cloak under a specious title 
' ' Lictors.' 

^ Diana of the Ephe nans'* 147 

of respectability their most disreputable proceedings. A fur- Autumn 49 
ther calamity for the provincials was the exorbitant rise in 
interest, a not unusual phenomenon in time of war, where 
a whole community is called upon to furnish ready money ; 
and, in the hardships thus entailed, any postponement by 
the creditors of the day of settlement was magniiied into 
a free gift to the unfortunate debtors. In this way the capital 
debt of the province more than doubled itself during these 
two years. Yet it is not to be supposed that the Roman 
citizens settled in the province were therefore allowed to go 
exempt. Fixed sums were apportioned for each administra- 
tive area, for each individual township ; and the authors of 
these forced contributions invariably represented them as 
loans negotiated on the authority of the Senate's decree. 
Finally, the farmers of the imperial revenues were compelled, 
as they had previously been in Syria, to advance the proceeds 
of the tribute for the ensuing year. 

In addition to all these sources of income, Scipio did not 33 
scruple to order the removal from the great temple of Diana 
at Ephesus of the treasures accumulated there from immemo- 
rial antiquity. On the day appointed for this sacrilege an 
entrance into the sacred building had already been effected 
by himself and a party of the senatorial order, who had been 
expressly summoned to witness the act, when dispatches from 
Pompeius were put into his hand, bearing the information 
that Caesar had crossed the water vdth a part of his legions, 
and containing urgent instructions to hasten the advance of 
his army towards a junction with his chief, to which ever}' 
other interest was to be subordinated. On receipt of this 
intelligence he at once dismissed the invited senators and 
commenced preparations for his march into Macedonia, upon 

148 Collateral ^lavements of Caesar 

Jan. -Feb. 48 which he Started a few days later ; his recall thus proving the 
salvation of the Ephesian treasures. 

34 We must now retrace the interrupted narrative of Caesar's 
own movements. The successful junction with the army of 
Antony enabled him, he thought, to withdraw the single 
legion at Oricum, previously stationed there for the defence 
of that part of the coast, and so, by extending the area of his 
operations, to test the feeling of the neighbouring provinces. 
Envoys had already reached him from Thessaly and LIvadia 
{Aetolia), charged with the duty of conveying the assurance 
that the towns of these regions only required the presence of 
a garrison in order to put themselves completely at his 
disposal. Three distinct expeditions were accordingly now 
taken in hand. In the first place, Lucius Cassius Longinus was 
sent into Thessaly at the head of a single legion of conscripts 
(the Twenty-seventh) and 200 mounted men : secondly, Caius 
Calvisius Sabinus was commissioned to invade LIvadia with 
five battalions of Infantry and a troop of horse ; both these 
officers receiving most earnest Instructions to organize in 
those immediately outlying districts a regular supply of 
corn for the main army : whilst lastly, Cnaeus Domitlus 
Calvinus had orders to march Into Macedonia with two 
legions — the Eleventh and Twelfth — and a cavalry force of 
600 sabres. The principal reason for this third enterprise was 
the presence In camp of the chieftain Menedemus, the most 
powerful ruler in what Is known as ' Independent ' Mace- 
donia, who had been dispatched to Caesar as special envoy 
from his subjects, and who was now promising the enthu- 
siastic and unanimous devotion of his followers. 

35 Of these three expeditions that under Calvisius, from the 
first day of its arrival In LIvadia [Aetolia), received the 

Collateral 'Movements of Caesar 149 

warmest support from all parties : the enemy's garrisons in April 48 
Kurtaga ^ and Lepanto {Calydon and Naupactus) were driven 
out, and complete possession gained of the country. Cassius 
also with his one legion successfully penetrated into Thessaly ; 
but the existence here of two rival political factions produced 
considerable variety in the character of the reception accorded 
him by the several states. The leader of one of these factions 
was Hegesaretos, a chief of long-established power, devoted 
to the interests of Pompeius : opposed to him was Petraeus, 
a scion of one of their noblest families, who, together with 
his party, now brought to the cause of Caesar the strenuous 
support of their combined resources. Simultaneous with both 36 
these was the arrival in Macedonia of the third force under 
Domitius. Here ambassadors from the provincial centres 
were already gathering in considerable numbers to meet 
the Caesarian representative, when the movement was sud- 
denly checked by the announcement of Scipio's near approach, 
heralded as it was on all sides by extravagant opinions con- 
cerning the powers of the new commander : it being common 
experience in all novelty for reputation to precede per- 
formance. The new-comer, making no halt anywhere in 
Macedonia, pushed on vigorously in the direction of Domitius, 
until he was now no more than twenty miles apart. He then 
suddenly turned south into Thessaly against Cassius Longinus, 
executing this flank movement with such startling rapidity 
that the news of his approach actually coincided with that 
of his arrival. Moreover, to make his march the quicker, he 
left behind at the river Vistritza {Haliacmon) (the boundary 
between Macedonia and Thessaly), a force of eight battalions 
under Marcus Favonius, as a guard to the baggage-trains of 
* Not far from Missolonghi. 

ly o Disconcerting Advance of Scipio 

April 48 his legions, with orders to construct a fort upon that 

Whilst thus engaged himself, it happened that the cavalry 
force of King Cotys, which was habitually hovering on the 
outskirts of Thessaly, swooped down upon the camp of 
Cassius : whereupon that commander, thoroughly alarmed 
by the news of Scipio's arrival on the scene, and mistaking the 
cavalry he saw for that of the Pompeian general, set his troops 
in motion for the western part of the mountain range that 
girdles the whole of Thessaly, and thence began a retirement 
in the direction of Arta (Ambracia). Scipio on his side was 
vigorously pressing the pursuit, when he was shortly overtaken 
by a dispatch from Favonius announcing the presence of 
Domitius with his two legions, and informing his commanding 
officer that unless reinforced he could not defend the fortified 
post where he had been stationed. The receipt of this dis- 
patch caused Scipio to make a complete change both in his plans 
and in the direction of his march. Breaking off the pursuit of 
Cassius, he now hastened to the relief of Favonius ; and by 
marching night and day without a halt, he succeeded in 
rejoining his lieutenant under such remarkably fortunate 
circumstances, that the rising dust of Domitius's army was 
already observed just as the leading vedettes of Scipio first 
came into sight. Thus Cassius was saved by the energetic 
conduct of Domitius, and Favonius by the rapidity of Scipio. 
37 The last-named commander now rested two days inside his 
permanent fortifications on the river Vistritza, which separated 
him from Domitius on the northern bank : on the third day 
at dawn his army crossed by a ford and proceeded to erect 
a camp ; on the fourth his line of battle was drawn up along 
the front of the new entrenchments. Once more Domitius 

Held in check by Domitius i j i 

was prompt to meet the challenge, and resolved to advance Ap.-May4!i 
his legions and then and there to accept the issue of a pitched 
battle. Between the two rival camps, however, there inter- 
vened an open plain some six miles broad : this the Caesarians 
had first to cross, and then marshalled their line beneath the 
higher ground of Scipio, who still persisted in his determina- 
tion not to come down from his entrenchments. The result 
was that in spite of the difficulties of restraining the eager 
Domitian infantry, no actual encounter as yet ensued ; the 
chief obstacle being a small stream running under Scipio's 
camp, whose awkward banks presented considerable difficulties 
to our advance. Yet Scipio had seen enough of the high 
mettle of our troops and their eagerness to engage, to induce 
the suspicion that on the morrow he would either be forced 
to fight against his will, or else suffer a serious blow in reputa- 
tion, if he still kept behind the shelter of his breastworks, 
especially after the high expectations formed of his interven- 
tion in the campaign. His first presumptuous advance thus 
ended somewhat ingloriously, and under cover of night, 
without even venturing to sound the usual signal for striking 
camp, he silently transferred his army across the river, and 
once more returned to his original quarters, where on some 
natural heights close by the stream a fresh camp was con- 
structed. A few days of inaction then followed, at the close 
of which a surprise attack by ambush was planned against our 
forces by the Pompeian leader, who placed a body of cavalry 
at a spot where on previous days we had generally gone out 
for forage. Accordingly, on the next morning, when Quintus 
Varus, the cavalry commander in Domitius's army, paid his 
daily visit to the place, his troopers were suddenly set upon by 
the concealed horsemen. A stout resistance was nevertheless 

ij-2 Some l^iinor Actions 

.-May48 offered to the attack, and, quickly rallying on their respective 
troops, the united Caesarian cavalry delivered a counter- 
attack upon their assailants. Some eighty saddles were 
emptied, and, after completing the rout of the remainder, 
the foraging party rode back to camp, having sustained in all 
but tw^o casualties. 
38 These initial operations raised some expectation in Domitius 
that Scipio might perhaps be enticed to a genera] engagement. 
Pretending, therefore, that shortness of supplies nov? com- 
pelled him to change his ground, he ordered the regular 
military signal to be sounded for striking camp, preparatory to 
marching a distance of three miles. There he found a site 
conveniently hidden from viev*^, and on it proceeded to dispose 
the whole of his effective army, including the mounted troops. 
Scipio was equally ready to follow, and for this purpose 
advanced a reconnoitring force of cavalry to ascertain the 
precise route taken by his opponent. This force proceeding 
to its appointed task, its leading squadrons had already ridden 
into the ambush awaiting it, when the champing of our 
horses by rousing their suspicions caused them to commence 
retiring upon their supports : similarly the succeeding files, 
on noticing the hasty retreat of their comrades, drew them- 
selves to the halt. The trap was now disclosed, and the 
Caesarians, perceiving the uselessness of waiting the arrival 
of the remaining squadrons, closed in on the two successfully 
caught, capturing along with them the cavalry leader 
Marcus Opimius. The rest of the two troops were either 
cut to pieces in the melee or captured and brought prisoners 
to Domitius. 
39 Meanwhile, as already related, Caesar had recalled all the 
detachments lately holding the southern coast-line, excepting 

Activity of Pomp elan Fleet ifj 

three battalions left behind at Oricum to garrison that city. April 
These troops he now further entrusted with the task of 
guarding his small fleet of warships originally brought over 
with the expedition from Italy. The officer selected for 
this twofold duty was Manius Acilius, who at once proceeded 
to move the vessels round into the inner harbour behind the 
town, and there to moor them against the shore. He next 
blocked the mouth of the harbour vdth a sunken merchant- 
man, to which was attached a second and similar craft, and 
upon their decks erected a wooden military tower, forming 
a barrier immediately in the line of the fairway. This tower 
was given a full complement of legionaries, and the troops 
were then made responsible for its safe defence against any 
surprise by sea. Information of these dispositions duly 40 
reached the younger Cnaeus Pompeius, the admiral com- 
manding the Egyptian squadron. He at once sailed for 
Oricum, and after first removing the sunken merchantman, 
by hauling on her with a series of tow-ropes, he proceeded to 
attack the second, oa^afwai^wiH^MMWlifts, by means of the 
concentrated fire of a number of his own vessels. These 
had been specially fitted vwth siege-towers, raised upon deck 
to a level that gave them the upper hand of their opponents : 
hence, by constantly bringing up fresh reserves to the relief 
of his exhausted crews, and endeavouring to divide the 
strength of the defence by pressing the attack against the 
city walls at all other points practicable, as well by escalade on 
land as by bombardment from the fleet at sea, the Pompeian 
admiral at length broke down the stubborn resistance of the 
Caesarian garrison. Compelled at last by sheer exhaustion 
and the torrent of spears to which they were exposed to quit 
their posts, they all succeeded in escaping by the boats, leaving 

15-4 Activity of Pompeian Fleet 

p.-May48 the guard-ship to be afterwards captured as a prize by the 
enemy. At the moment of this success the Pompeians also 
established a footing in the rear of the defence, on the natural 
breakwater that in course of time had converted the town 
of Oricum into a peninsula. This advantage they utilized to 
mount upon rollers four of their two-deckers ^, which they 
then drove forward by means of levers over the narrow neck 
of land across into the inner harbour. The Caesarian war- 
ships, which lay without crews tied up to the shore, were 
thus exposed to two converging attacks ; and the enemy 
soon succeeded in hauling off four and in burning the re- 
mainder. With this successful issue to his raid, the younger 
Pompeius transferred Decimus Laelius from the Asiatic fleet, 
leaving him to continue the operations against the town ; 
and under his supervision a strict blockade was maintained 
against all attempts to provision it from the two neighbour- 
ing cities of Byllis and Amantia. 

Pompeius himself went north to Alessio, where he attacked 
and burned inside the harbour of that city every one of the 
thirty transports lately left there by Mark Antony. On 
endeavouring, however, to storm Alessio itself, he was met 
by such a stout resistance from the Roman citizens settled 
in the district, and by the regular troops whom Caesar had 
previously sent down as a garrison, that after three days spent 
in fruitless attempts at assault, in the course of which he 
suffered some slight casualties, he was obliged to- vdthdraw 
his squadron with his object unattained. 
4' Meanwhile Caesar also had continued his operations. With 
the definite intelligence that Pompeius was now established 
at Asparagium, he set his united army in motion for the same 
^ ' Biremes.* 

The Pompeian Position turned iss 

objective, merely breaking his march to storm the chief town Ap.-May4S 

of the Parthini, then in the hands of a Pompeian garrison. 

The third day brought him face to face with Pompeius ; 

upon which he ordered his camp to be made in close proximity 

to his opponent, and on the morrow, advancing in full strength 

after completing his dispositions for battle, challenged his 

rival to a decisive combat. But it was soon evident that 

Pompeius was not to be enticed from his fortified lines, and 

Caesar had again to fall back upon camp, clearly recognizing 

that some alternative plan of action must now be tried. 

The next day, therefore, vdth the whole of his effective forces 

he commenced a wide turning movement to the eastwards, 

along a difficult and narrow road, with the object of marching 

directly upon Durazzo. Such a diversion, it was hoped, would 

either force Pompeius northwards upon that city, or, failing 

that, sever his communications with it ; the latter alternative 

being no less desirable than the other was probable, since 

Durazzo was by far the most important food-depot and the 

principal place of arms in the hands of the enemy. Nor 

were his expectations disappointed. At first Pompeius failed 

to read the mind of his rival ; for, on seeing the Caesarian 

army march out of their entrenchments by a route leading 

in an opposite direction to the northern emporium, he 

naturally concluded that want of supplies was responsible 

for this enforced departure. Later in the day he heard the 

real truth from his scouts ; and the next morning, breaking 

up his encampment, he started in pursuit, in the hope that 

the shorter route would allow him to head off his opponent in 

time. Caesar, however, who had foreseen this contingency, 

now called upon his troops for a supreme effort. The march 

was barely interrupted throughout the night, and early the 

1^6 Position of Pompeius at Petra 

p.-May48 next morning his army arrived before Durazzo just as the 
vanguard of the Pompeians debouched into sight. Caesar 
then camped on his new position. 
42 Pompeius's land communications vwth Durazzo {Dyrra- 
chium) were thus severed ; and finding his original design no 
longer practicable, he fell back upon the next best alternative 
open to him, and on the heights known as Petra, a site within 
fairly easy reach of ships, which can lie there under the lee of 
the wind when this is in certain quarters, fresh permanent 
fortifications were now erected. The command was also given 
for a portion of his naval force to concentrate at the new 
station ; whilst provisions and supplies were ordered up from 
Asia Minor and other countries under his military control. 

Such measures as these threatened to involve, in Caesar's 
judgement, an indefinite prolongation of the war. Besides, 
he already regarded as hopeless the supplies waiting for him 
across the water in Italy ; so complete a blockade was main- 
tained along the entire coast by the Pompeians, and so pro- 
tracted was the delay of his own war-fleets built by his orders 
during the late Vianter in Sicily, Gaul, and Italy. The 
necessity of feeding his army thus forced him to turn to 
Epirus, to which country he accordingly dispatched Quintus 
Tillius and Lucius Canuleius, the latter a staff-officer, on a 
special commission for that purpose ; while to deal with the 
difficulty arising from the excessive distance of these regions, 
a series of large granaries was established at fixed points, and 
a regular service of corn-transport allotted to each of the neigh- 
bouring communities. Similar orders were given to collect 
from Alessio, and from the district of the Parthini and all the 
hill villages, all the corn to be found there. This proved 
a mere handful, and that for two reasons : the natural quality 

Ci Caesar's Camp during Blockade. Pi Pompcy's Camp during Blockade. 

C2 .. " after .. Pi .. •• after 

M Camp of Marcellinn.H. P G Postern Gate of Subsidiary Camp. 

Caesar* s Heroic I^Ieasures ly/ 

of the soil is unfavourable, the country being a wild mountain- Spring 48 
ous tract relying mostly on imported grain ; and, moreover, 
Pompeius had anticipated this movement of his opponent, 
and, treating the Parthini during the last few days as legitimate 
booty, had ordered all cereals to be collected and brought into 
iJs lines at Petra under an escort of cavalry, with powers to 
pillage and overturn the houses of the inhabitants. 

Seeing the unpromising outlook of affairs, Caesar evolved 43 
a plan of operations based upon the actual conditions of the 
ground. The position held by Pompeius was encircled by 
numerous lofty and rugged hills. These he first of all secured 
with outpost detachments, which at once proceeded to fortify 
on each a strong redoubt ; and then, upon their completion, 
a continuous chain of earthworks was extended along the lines 
of least natural resistance, thus linking up fort with fort, and 
the circumvallation of Pompeius was begun. A triple result 
was anticipated from the new movement. Weighing well the 
shortness of his own supplies and Pompeius's overwhelming 
superiority in cavalry, Caesar confidently expected that not 
only would convoys of food-stuffs and other material require- 
ments for his army now be freer to approach from all quarters 
with less danger of attack, but the Pompeian cavalry would 
also be cut off from provender and so rendered useless as 
a military force ; and finally, he argued, a severe blow would 
thus be dealt to his opponent's prestige, a matter on which he 
notoriously placed most reliance in his intercourse with foreign 
states, when the news ran round the civilized world that the 
great commander was blockaded by Caesar and dare not face 
a pitched battle. And, indeed, Pompeius now found himself 44 
in a serious dilemma. He was unwilling to draw off from 
the sea and the neighbourhood of Durazzo, since that town 

iy8 Counter Pleasures of Pompeius 

Spring 48 had been converted into an emporium for all his war material, 
including arms, accoutrements, and ordnance ; whilst there 
was also the further objection that he depended entirely on 
sea-borne supplies for the feeding of his army. On the other 
hand, he was equally powerless to prevent the completion of 
Caesar's blockading lines, except by consenting to a general 
engagement ; and that he had determined was not at the 
present juncture advisable. His sole remaining alternative 
was one which, considered as a military measure, amounted 
wellnigh to a counsel of despair. It consisted in occupying 
all the hills that he could seize, so that by enclosing in a ring 
of fortified posts the widest possible sweep of country, he 
might keep the Caesarian forces at such extreme distance as 
he could thus command. Nor did the event belie his expecta- 
tions. Twenty-four outposts were soon completed, sufficient 
to encircle an arc some fifteen miles in extent : within this 
space his army's foraging then proceeded, and, as the area 
also contained within itself many hand-sown crops, the trans- 
port animals could for the present at any rate continue to 

Meanwhile the two armies were busily entrenching one 
against the other. As fast as the Caesarians pushed their 
fortifications in an unbroken line from each redoubt on to 
the next, in order to prevent the Pompeians from breaking 
through at any point and so taking them in the rear ; the 
enemy on the inner circle were also extending a parallel chain 
of works, likevdse intended to prevent the possibility of their 
own line being pierced and themselves surrounded from 
behind. But in this contest of the spade it was soon clear 
the Pompeians were winning ; the greater number of their 
sappers, and the shorter arc required on the inner side, rendered 

Daily Skirmishing i s 9 

such a result inevitable. Moreover, whenever it became Spring 48 
necessary for Caesar to occupy new positions in the progress 
of his works, Pompeius, without advancing in force to dispute 
them by a regular pitched battle, which he was resolved as 
yet to avoid, would nevertheless select his own ground, and 
constantly dispatch against us bodies of archers and slingers 
(an arm in which he was exceptionally strong), and by this 
device inflicted severe wounds upon our men. Indeed so 
great had grown the dread inspired by the enemy's arrows, 
that very nearly all the Caesarians had made themselves 
shirts or other coverings, of felt, or quilted padding, or hides, 
as a protection against these missiles. 

In establishing themselves at the various outposts desperate 45 
struggles ensued on either side. While Caesar strove to hem 
in Pompeius within the narrowest boundaries possible, it was 
Pompeius's main object to occupy as many hills in as wide a 
circuit as he could control. Constant minor actions were thus 
fought solely from this reason, notably one in which the Ninth 
Caesarian legion was engaged. This corps had just seized 
a certain height and commenced fortifying it, when the 
Pompeians took possession of a second hill in close proximity 
to and directly confronting the other. Between the two 
there intervened at one point a fairly level causeway of com- 
munication. Accordingly Pompeius, after first throwing out 
flanking bodies of archers and slingers, pushed forward a strong 
force of light infantry, and then, bringing up his siege-guns, 
settled down to hamper the construction of our entrench- 
ments. It was thus no light task for our soldiers at the same 
time to defend their position and also continue the work of 
fortification. Seeing his men, therefore, continually exposed 
to wounds from all sides, Caesar ordered their retreat, and 

i6o A Critical 'Retirement 

Spring 48 the evacuation of the post. The retreat led down an incline, 
and the enemy, emboldened all the more to press home the 
attack, determined to render our withdrawal a difficult matter, 
convinced as they were that panic was responsible for the 
abandonment of the position. It was during this incident 
that Pompeius is credited with having addressed the boastful 
remark to his suite, that he was prepared to forfeit aU claim 
to be considered a general of experience, if the Caesarian 
legions should succeed in extricating themselves from the 
consequences of their own ill-considered advance. 
46 Meanwhile the dangers threatening the retreat caused 
Caesar considerable disquiet. The order was given to move 
up to the front a number of military hurdles, to be placed in 
position along the ridge of the hill in line of the attack : under 
cover of these the troops were then commanded to dig 
a moderately wide ditch on the near or inner side, and to 
render the whole ground as impracticable and difficult as 
possible. In addition, Caesar personally posted bodies of 
slingers at various strategic points, to lend further assistance 
to the retreat ; then, with his precautions completed, he gave 
the order for the legion to be retired. This was at once the 
signal to the enemy for a still more determined and exultant 
advance ; and, driving our men before them, they thrust 
aside the defences formed by the interposing hurdles, prepara- 
tory to crossing the trenches. Seeing what was happening, 
and fearing the movement might be interpreted as not so 
much a retreat as a rout, leading to a still graver disaster to 
his arms, Caesar first sent his men a word of encouragement 
through Antonius, the officer commanding this legion, and 
then, from the troops' present position some half-way down 
the hill, ordered his trumpeter to sound the advance for a com- 

Inflections on the Situation \6\ 

bined charge upon the enemy. With a sudden unanimous Spring 48 
impulse, the men of the Ninth discharged their volley of 
heavy javelins ; then breasting the hill at the double, from 
their low^er ground they drove the Pompeians back in head- 
long flight, and compelled them to turn and run. Their flight, 
however, proved no easy matter, and they were greatly ham- 
pered by the opposing hurdles and long poles that blocked the 
way, and no less by the complex lines of intersecting ditches. 
As to our own troops, they considered their object fully 
attained if they coidd withdraw without serious damage. 
Having, therefore, inflicted severe losses upon the enemy, at 
a cost to themselves of only five casualties, they completed 
their retirement in perfect safety, and subsequently occupying 
another series of hills, a little outside the previous line, finished 
off the work of circumvallation. 

Strange, indeed, and altogether unparalleled in military 47 
history was the character of the present operations. The 
great number of the redoubts, the wide extent of country 
covered, the long undulating lines of entrenchment, in 
a word, the whole nature of the blockade, all doubtless 
contributed to such a result, but they were not the only 
causes. Other generals have before now endeavoured to 
blockade an opponent ; but it has always been as the sequel 
to an attack upon a broken and stricken enemy, either suffering 
under some defeat in battle, or demoralized by some other 
piece of misfortune. As a further contrast, the side which 
has thus invested the other could invariably count a superiority 
both in infantry and mounted troops, and their object has 
usually been the interruption of the enemy's supplies. Yet 
here was Caesar endeavouring with an army numerically 
iaferior to encircle an opponent whose strength was as yet 


J 62 Indomitable Spirit of the Caesarian s 

spring 48 unimpaired either by material or moral disaster, and who 
possessed in addition an abundance of all military stores. 
Every day ships were arriving from every quarter of the 
Empire, expressly chartered to carry supplies ; and the wind 
could not blow from any point of the compass without some 
of their number having a fair run for their voyage. In 
marked opposition to aU this, Caesar had already eaten up 
every vestige of corn that the length and breadth of the 
country could provide, and was now in most desperate straits. 
Yet his men set themselves to endure their privations with 
exemplary fortitude. They were cheered by the recollection 
of their similar hardships a year ago in Spain, when their 
long-suffering efforts were rewarded by the successful termina- 
tion of a great war : they remembered likewise the slender 
nature of their rations before Alesia, rations which were still 
further reduced at Avaricum ^, and yet from both these 
critical positions they had emerged victorious over the most 
powerful combinations of tribes. They were not the men 
therefore to reject either the barley or the pulse which was now 
served out to them ; while as to animal food, of which there 
was plenty in Epirus, they regarded it as a positive luxury. 
48 A lucky discovery was also made by those who had lately been 
responsible for the vegetable supplies ^ of the army, who 
now found a species of wild root called Chara. This, when 
mixed with milk, did much to alleviate the distress : it was 
made up like bread, and there was no lack of its supply. 
Indeed, in some of the informal conversations which passed 
between the private soldiers of the hostile camps, in which 

' Two critical positions in the Gallic wars, 52. 

"^ I conjecture 'ab oleribus' for the unintelligible 'a Valeribus ' of the 
MSS. Cf. Plin. iV.ZT. 19. 21. 

Sufferings of both Armies 163 

the Pompeians taunted our men with their starved condition, Early 
the latter's usual answer was to toss these loaves across at 
their opponents as the best way of dashing their rising 
hopes, ^ 

But now the corn crops were beginning to ripen, and mere 49 ; 
hope was enough to sustain the empty stomachs of the troops 
with its assurance of rapidly approaching plenty. Alike on 
picket duty and in the quiet talk amongst comrades, constant 
expressions of the dominant temper of the men were heard, 
that they would sooner live on the bark of trees than allow 
Pompeius to slip from their grasp. Much satisfaction was 
also caused by the reports brought in by deserters, who de- 
clared that though the troop-horses were still kept alive all 
other transport animals had perished. They added that the 
army itself enjoyed but indifferent health. Not only were 
they cooped up in the narrowest of quarters, exposed to the 
foul stench of hundreds of putrifying bodies, but they were 
quite unfit for the continual fatigue duty now required 
of them, and, worst of all, they suffered acutely from scarcity 
of water. This last hardship was due to the direct action of 
Caesar himself, who had either diverted or else dammed with 
solid obstructions every river or rivulet whose course led down 
to the sea. For the district being a mountainous one, and 
the valleys converging so narrowly as to form as it were 
natural conduits, it was easy to block such channels by cross- 
rows of piles let into the ground, which, when strengthened 
by artificial mounds, effectually held up the water. In 
consequence, the Pompeians were compelled of sheer necessity 

* Pompeius, on seeing these loaves, is said to have ordered their instant 
removal through fear of their effect on his own men. ' We have to do 
with wild beasts ' was his shuddering comment. Suet. 68. 
M 2 

1(^4 Responsibility in a Subordinate 

^arly to search along the lower ground where it was swampy, and 

ummer 4 ^^ ^j^ wells there, thus adding one more task to their daily 
round of labours. And yet, even when found, such sources 
of water had the marked disadvantage of being a considerable 
distance from some of the outposts, and, further, they qmckly 
dried up under the sultry heat of summer. On the other 
hand, Caesar's army enjoyed not only perfect health but 
a water supply that was practically unlimited ; whilst, with 
the sole exception of wheat, there were stores in abundance 
of every description ; and even in this particular, the soldiers 
of Pompeius had the mortification of daily seeing a better 
time coming for their adversaries, and their hopes rising under 
the prospect of the ripening corn. 
6° So unexampled a type of warfare naturally called forth 
equally curious stratagems on either side. For example, the 
Pompeians, having noticed from the camp-fires that our 
regiments lay out at night on their entrenchments, would 
steal out silently to the attack, and, after discharging a volley 
of arrows into our crowded lines, would swiftly rejoin their 
main body. To remedy this annoyance, our people learnt 
by experience to light their fires in one place (and to pass the 
night in another).^ 

51 Meanwhile intelligence of the critical position of the bat- 
talion reached Publius Sulla, the officer left in command of 
the camp by Caesar when marching out to the attack. He 
at once went to the rescue with a force of two legions, his 
arrival causing the easy repulse of the Pompeians. Without 

^ Conjectural. A considerable gap here in the MSS. probably contained 
Caesar's unsuccessful attempt on Durazzo and Pompeius's counter-attack on 
Caesar's lines, the narrative of which is now continued. 

Responsibility in a Subordinate i6^ 

waiting to face the Caesarian infantry or to stand their charge, Early 
the main body turned their backs and abandoned their "'"'"^^ 4 

position as soon as ever the leading companies were driven in. 
In the midst of the pursuit, and to stay our further advance, 
Sulla ordered the recall. Yet there is a strong consensus 
of opinion that, had he only allowed the pursuit to be pressed 
home with greater vigour, that day might have seen the 
termination of the war. 

Such criticism on that officer's judgement can scarcely 
be maintained. The functions of a subordinate are not 
those of a commander-in-chief. The actions of the one 
should in all points be regulated by his instructions : the 
other is free to embrace in the scope of his plans the entire 
military situation. In this particular instance, SuUa had 
been deputed by Caesar to hold the camp in his own absence. 
Having, therefore, effected the relief of his companions-in- 
arms, he was content to rest upon that achievement : he was 
not prepared to take the further responsibility of fighting 
a general engagement with the enemy (which after all, he 
felt, might easily involve some disaster), lest his conduct 
should be interpreted as trenching on the province of his 
commander. His appearance on the scene of action, however, 
brought considerable difficulties to the retreating Pompeians. 
Their original advance had been upwards from a lower level, 
and they had subsequently occupied the crest of the hill. By 
withdrawing, therefore, down the slope, they were menaced 
with a pursuit that had all the advantages of position on its 
side ; moreover, only a brief interval of dayhght remained 
before sundown, since the hope of reaching a definite decision 
had made them carry the affair well on towards night. The 
force of circumstances thus impelled Pompeius, by a plan 

1 66 Heavy Fitting 

Early improvised at the moment, to seize a neighbouring height 

ummer 4 j^^^ ^^^ ^£ range of artillery fire from our redoubt ; where 

after establishing himself and throwing up entrenchments, 

he proceeded to concentrate the whole of his effective forces. 

52 At the same time fighting also took place in two other parts 
of the field, since Pompeius had supported his main attack 
by subsidiary movements against a number of our redoubts, 
with the object of dividing the defence and so preventing 
the dispatch of reinforcements from the neighbouring out- 
posts. Thus at one point Volcatius Tullus successfully with- 
stood the assault of an entire legion of Pompeians, and, taking 
the offensive, actually drove it from its ground ; at another, 
the German auxiliaries sallied out from our lines, and after 
accounting for a considerable number of the enemy, safely 

53 effected their retirement back to their supports. On this 
day, therefore, six distinct engagements were fought, viz. 
three outside Durazzo and three up at the trenches. Upon 
our investigating the total casualties for the day, it was found 
that of the Pompeians no fewer than 2,000 had fallen — mostly 
reservists and centurions — included in the number being 
Valerius Flaccus, son of Lucius Flaccus, sometime governor 
of the Province of Asia Minor. Of regimental and company 
colours six altogether were brought in. On our side the killed 
amounted to no more than twenty in all six battles, though, 
on the other hand, of the men inside the redoubt not one 
escaped unwounded, and of the company officers ^ belonging 
to this one battalion four out of the six had lost their eyes. 
When the garrison wanted to adduce evidence of the desperate 
nature of their struggle, they collected the arrows which 
had been shot into the fort and counted out before Caesar 

' Centurions. 

The Position 7w altered 167 

some 30,000 ; and, on the shield of the centurion Scaeva Early 
being brought up for inspection, it was found pierced with 
a hundred-and-twenty separate holes. As some reward for 
this man's gallant services both to himself and the country he 
so well represented, Caesar first presented him with a purse of 
;^r,500, and then publicly announced his promotion from the 
eighth to the first battalion of the legion, and to the senior 
company in that ; it being common testimony that the suc- 
cessful defence of the redoubt had been largely owing to his 
splendid exertions. The whole battalion subsequently re- 
ceived double pay and rations, and was also richly rewarded 
by Caesar with gifts of new uniform and various decorations 
for distinguished conduct in the field. 

Meanwhile Pompeius had employed the night in naaking 54 
large additions to his defences ; on the following days these 
were strengthened by a series of military towers, and when 
the works had been carried to a height of fifteen feet, this 
face of the camp was screened by a number of portable 
shelters ; five days after that another moderately cloudy 
night again lent him its friendly assistance. Orders were 
at once given to barricade all the camp gates, which were 
then left as a check to pursuit ; and in the early hours of 
the morning the Pompeian forces silently evacuated the 
hill and fell back upon their old entrenchments. Upon 
the next and upon each succeeding day Caesar marched out 55 
with his army to form up for action where the ground was 
level, in hopes that he might find Pompeius ready to give 
decisive battle. In executing this movement he so disposed 
his legions that they were virtually commanded by the 
Pompeian camp, his front line being so close to the enemy's 
rampart that it only just cleared the range of hand-missiles 

id8 Movement against the Peloponnese 

Summer 48 and artillery. To disregard so direct a challenge was ob- 
viously impossible if Pompeius was to retain his military 
reputation and prestige. The Pompeian army was therefore 
drawn up outside its entrenchments, but in such a formation 
that its rearmost line actually abutted on the breastworks, 
while the whole of the force thus embattled could be effec- 
tually covered by the fire from its own ramparts. 

56 The success gained by Cassius Longinus and Calvisius 
Sabinus in securing the adhesion of Livadia (Jetolia), and 
the country round the Gulf of Arta (Acarnania and Amfhilo- 
chia), by the steps already indicated,' nowled Caesar to believe 
that the time was ripe for a similar movement with regard to 
Greece proper (Jchaea), which would carry the range of his 
arms over a somewhat wider area. Quintus Fufius Calenus 
was accordingly sent into that country, and Sabinus and 
Cassius, with the forces under them, were subordinated to 
his command. Rutilius Lupus was at this time acting as 
governor of Greece, in virtue of his appointment by Pom- 
peius ; and he, on receiving intelligence of the advance of 
the three Caesarian generals, at once took measures for the 
fortification of the Isthmus, so as to form some barrier be- 
tween Fufius and the Peloponnese. Calenus meanwhile took 
over the submission voluntarily tendered by the local authori- 
ties, of Delphi, Thebes, and Orchomenus ; other cities were 
taken by storm, and for the remainder, active steps were 
inaugurated for winning them over to the Caesarian interest 
through special missions dispatched for that purpose. These 
and similar duties served to engross the attention of Fufius. 

57 Whilst the above events were passing in Greece {Achaea) 

^ The Caesarian officers were able to raise a body of Aetolian and 
Acarnanian auxiliaries who fought at Pharsalus. App. 2. 70. 

Last Efforts for Peace 1 6<^ 

and the neighbourhood of Durazzo, as soon as the news of Summer 48 
Scipio's arrival in Macedonia was fully confirmed, Caesar, 
loath to abandon his traditional policy, directed Aulus Clodius 
to proceed on an embassy to the camp of the new commander. 
Clodius had the advantage of being a common friend to both 
parties, as he had originally been introduced by Scipio to the 
notice of Caesar, who had since made it a special point to 
treat him as one of his own intimates. Caesar now entrusted 
him with a letter addressed to Scipio, supplementing it by 
verbal instructions of which the foUovvdng formed a summary. 
' In spite of all his efforts in the direction of peace, nothing 
tangible had yet been effected, chiefly owing, as he was dis- 
posed to think, to the supineness of those whom he had chosen 
as his intermediaries, who shrank from the task of conveying 
his terms to Pompeius at a time when they would be un- 
acceptable. Scipio, on the other hand, possessed an authority 
with his chief that not only enabled him to speak his mind 
freely on all subjects, but to a large extent gave him also the 
right of criticism and of rectifying the blunders of his col- 
league ; moreover, he held an independent command in the 
field, and was thus able to back his authority by a military force 
that could compel obedience. If he were now to take this 
step, he would win from the world the unanimous tribute 
of being the one man who had given rest to a distracted 
Italy and peace to the provinces, and in so doing saved the 
Empire from disruption.' 

These instructions Clodius duly carried to Scipio, and for 
the first few days apparently met with a favourable hearing ; 
later on he was not admitted to further conference, the 
reason being, as we afterwards discovered on conclusion of 
the war, that Scipio had been roundly taken to task for his 

1 70 Last Efforts for Peace 

Summer 48 weakness by Favonius. The negotiations thus proved abor- 
tive, and Clodius had no alternative but to return to Caesar. 


The Forcing of the Blockade 

' It w^as essential to Caesar's plan that the Pompeian cavalry 
should be closely confined in Durazzo, and not allowed any 
opportunity of procuring forage. Accordingly he proceeded 
to draw across the two approaches to the town which, as 
already stated ', were not wide, strong lines of entrenched 
works supported by redoubts. This new movement quickly 
convinced Pompeius that no serious diversion could be 
expected from his horse ; and after a few days it was put on 
board ship and brought back within his permanent lines. 

The want of fodder continued to make itself acutely felt : 
so hard pressed indeed were they, that the horses had to be 
fed on leaves torn from the trees, varied by a mash made 
from the succulent roots of reeds ; for as for the young corn 
which they had found already sown within their lines, 
that had all long been eaten up. Thus they were obliged 
to import fodder from Corfu and Arta {Acarnania), a course 
involving a long sea-voyage, and even then the supply was so 
scanty that it had to be eked out with barley in order to keep 
the animals alive. At last there came a time when every 
locality had alike been stripped of barley, fodder, and all 
other vegetation whatever, and when even the foliage from 
the trees began to run out ; and when this point of destitution 

* Probably in the lost section. 

Dorvnfall of two brilliant Cavalry Leaders 171 

was reached, Pompeius, with his cavalry mounts reduced to Summer 48 
skeletons and rendered totally unfit for active service, at 
length decided that some attempt must be made towards 
forcing the blockade. 

Now there were serving with Caesar on the roll of the 59 
cavalry two brother Allobroges, Roucillus and Egus, sons of 
Adbucillus, for many years the paramount chief of his tribe, 
two men whose services to Caesar all through the Gallic wars 
had been marked no less by gallantry than efficiency. In 
return for this loyal support Caesar had appointed them to 
the highest magistracies in their own country, had contrived 
their election to the tribal Senate without passing through 
the usual grades, had given them not only lands captured 
from the enemy during the war but also large sums of ready 
money, and in a word, had raised them from poverty to 
affluence. Their personal courage had not only won them a 
warm place in Caesar's own regard,but with the army in general 
they were also great favourites. Unfortunately they allowed 
their friendship with Caesar to foster a pride that was as foolish 
as it is characteristic of subject races, and from despising their 
Gallic companions-in-arms, they came to cheating them of their 
pay, and even went so far as to appropriate the whole share 
of the plunder that should have fallen to their men. Exas- 
perated by such injustice, the troopers in a body waited upon 
Caesar, and loudly complained of their leaders' fraud ; adding 
to their other charges the further accusation that false returns 
were habitually made of the cavalry's strength, in order that 
the brothers might pocket the extra pay. 

Caesar, considering present circumstances to be unfavourable 60 
for the visitation of punishment, and ready to forgive much 
to a gallant soldier, decided to postpone the whole inquiry : 

172 Downfall of two brilliant Cavalry Leaders 

Summer 48 nevertheless, he privately censured the tvs^o chieftains for 
making money out of their troop, and after a reminder that 
there was no limit to the power of his friendship, advised them 
to gauge his future kindness to themselves on the basis of that 
already experienced at his hands. In spite of this secrecy, 
the affair caused a popular outburst of bitter and contemptu- 
ous feeling towards the two brothers, the reality of which was 
brought home to their notice, as much by their own inward 
self-condemnation and accusing voice of conscience, as by 
the open taunts levelled at them from outside. Deeply 
resenting their humiliation, and, it may be, convinced in 
their own minds that instead of being given their acquittal 
they were only reserved for future punishment, they deter- 
mined to sever their connexion with us and our party, and 
to seek their fortunes in another camp, and make new 
friendships there. Having, therefore, communicated their 
design to a few intimate dependants, whom they dared trust 
with so desperate a venture, they first of all endeavoured 
to murder the cavalry brigadier, Caius Volusenus (a fact only 
discovered afterwards at the close of the war), as some earnest 
of sincerity in their treacherous desertion to Pompeius ; and 
when the difficulties of this project proved insurmountable 
and no opportunity presented itself of carrying it into efiect, 
they proceeded to borrow all the ready money they could, 
under the appearance of desiring to do satisfaction to their 
fellow countrymen and restore their fraudulent gains, and 
then, buying up a large batch of horses, they went over to 
Pompeius, followed by those who were privy to the plot. 
61 Arrived in Pompeius's camp, they were received in a manner 
befitting their own exalted rank and liberal education. Pom- 
peius indeed could not but take into account the fact that 

Caesar^ s 'Military Secrets betrayed 17 1 

a considerable retinue had accompanied their arrival, and Summer 48 
that numerous remounts had been also added to his army. 
The men were of acknowledged gallantry, who, until recently, 
had been held in high reputation by Caesar ; and the very 
unexpectedness of their present exploit was itself some justi- 
fication for Pompeius's action. 

In consideration of all this, the two chiefs were conducted 
in person by Pompeius on a tour of inspection round his lines, 
where every detail was pointed out to them. For till now 
not a single foot soldier or cavalryman had gone over from 
Caesar to his rival, though the desertions from Pompeius's 
camp were of almost daily occurrence; whilst the troops 
which had been raised in Epirus and Livadia (Aetolia) and 
in all the regions now under the military control of Caesar 
commonly went over en masse. Now, however, deserters had 
arrived who knew every secret of the enemy : the unfinished 
portions of his siege lines, the additional touches of strength 
desired at certain places by the engineering experts, the 
regular routine of duties amongst the besiegers, the distances 
between point and point, the varying degrees of watchfulness 
among the different pickets according to the natural tempera- 
ment or zeal of the respective officers in charge — all this they 
had seen and noted, and no less a gift than this they now 
imparted to Pompeius. 

That commander first made himself thoroughly master of 63 
their detailed information, and then, having already, as men- 
tioned above, formed the design of a sortie, issued orders to 
his troops to make wicker coverings for their helmets, and 
to provide themselves with a quantity of entrenching 
soil. These preparations completed, at nightfall a strong 
body of light infantry and archers was embarked on board 

174 Night Attack of Pompeians 

Summer 48 dinghies and galley-oared transports, and shortly after mid- 
night a force of sixty battalions drawn from both the main 
camp and the strongest outposts, was put under motion 
for that section of the circumvallating lines which abutted 
on the sea and which was furthest removed from Caesar's 
own head quarters. The same rendezvous was given to 
the fleet of vessels which had been loaded, as described, with 
their freight of earth and light infantrymen, and at the same 
time the Pompeian battleships were brought round from 
Durazzo. After this each officer was carefully instructed as 
to his own share in the forthcoming operations. 

At this particular corner of the works Caesar had the Ninth 
legion in position, under command of his paymaster Lentulus 
Marcellinus ; though owing to that officer's indifferent state 
of health Fulvius Postumus had been attached as his second 
in command. The works at this point were of the following 
63 design. First came a ditch fifteen feet wide ; this was sur- 
mounted by a palisaded rampart ten feet high, facing the 
enemy, and backed by an equal depth of solid earth : then 
200 yards in the rear rose a second and similar rampart, though 
of somewhat slighter proportions, and this time fronting 
outwards or in an opposite direction to the first. The 
reason for this double line was the apprehension disturbing 
Caesar's mind during the last few days that his position might 
here be turned by an approach from sea ; and he therefore 
had to devise some means of defence in the event of his being 
exposed to a simultaneous assault from north and south. 
Unfortunately there had not been time to complete the 
scheme : the general scale of the works undertaken had been 
too vast, and the labour required for the seventeen miles cir- 
cuit of entrenchments too incessant : consequently the cross- 

The Caesartans surprised 17 5" 

rampart which was to connect the two main lines, and had Summer 4S 
its front to the sea, was not yet finished off. This fact was 
well known to Pompeius through the information brought by 
the two treacherous Allobroges, and now became the cause 
of a considerable disaster to our arms. For soon after detach- 
ments of the Ninth had taken up their bivouac for the night 
in close proximity to the sea, the Pompeians were suddenly 
seen advancing in the grey light of early dawn. Their 
attack quickly developed itself from both sides. While the 
troops who had come by boat were pouring in a hot fire of 
missiles upon the outer or southern rampart, under cover 
of which the ditches were rapidly filled up with the earth 
brought for that purpose, the infantry of the legions were 
bringing up scaling ladders and creating no small confusion 
among the defenders on the inner stockade by volleys of 
artillery shot and hand-spears of all descriptions ; whilst, to 
crovni the disorder, swarms of archers were deploying in 
support of each of the two attacking bodies. What rendered 
matters worse was that our men had nothing to reply with 
excepting stones from their slings, and against such blows the 
enemy were largely protected by the wicker coverings pre- 
viously fitted to their helmets. In the midst of this fierce 
onslaught, when resistance was already a desperate matter, the 
fatal discovery was made of the flaw in the fortifications already 
mentioned : troops were rapidly landed from the sea in boats 
at a point between the two parallel ramps where the works 
were stiU unfinished, and, taking our men in the rear, drove 
them from both lines and compelled them to turn and run. 

As soon as information of this raid reached Marcellinus, 64 
that ofiicer at once pushed up fresh battalions from camp to 
the support of his hard-pressed detachment. The sight of 

17 6 The Caesarians surprised 

Summer 48 their comrades in full flight, however, was too much for his 
reserves ; they could neither stay the stampede by their own 
arrival on the scene, nor did they attempt to stand against 
the onset of the enemy. As fast as the relieving columns 
followed one another, each and all caught the infection of 
panic from the fugitives, and thereby only added to the 
general confusion and critical position of the entire force, 
since the retreat threatened to become blocked though the 
heavy congestion of men. 

While the battle was at its height the standard-bearer of the 
legion's eagle was mortally wounded ; but just as his strength 
was failing the man caught sight of our passing cavalry. 
' Take this ', said he, ' which for many a year I have jealously 
guarded whilst living, and now that I'm dying hand back to 
Caesar with the self-same devotion : see to it, I charge you, 
that no negligence of yours bring about a military disgrace 
which was never yet known in the army of Caesar, but carry 
the standard back safe into his hands.' By this fortunate inci- 
dent the regimental colours were saved from capture, after 
the first battalion had lost every one of its company com- 
manders except the third in order of rank. 
65 Meanwhile the victorious Pompeians were marching on the 
camp of Marcellinus, dealing out as they advanced heavy 
slaughter through our ranks. Their approach raised no little 
panic among the remaining battalions of the Ninth, until 
Marcus Antonius, who held the neighbouring command in the 
line of redoubts, and who had been informed of the perilous 
nature of the position, was seen to be descending, with the 
hills behind him, at the head of a strong relieving column of 
twelve battalions. His arrival on the field of action effectu- 
ally checked the advancing enemy, and at the same time lent 

The Blockade forced 177 

sufficient steadiness to the remaining troops to recover from Summer 48 
their recent state of abject terror. Very soon afterwards 
Caesar himself arrived on the scene, accompanied by a few 
battalions, which he had rapidly drafted from the various 
outposts, on seeing the signal of rising smoke passed on from 
fort to fort, in accordance with the established custom of the 
preceding days. Realizing at once the extent of the disaster 
and perceiving that Pompeius had succeeded in forcing his 
way outside the lines of circumvallation, in such a manner 
that his foraging could be freely conducted along the seaboard 
whilst he still maintained communication with his ships, 
Caesar decided on a total revolution in the conduct of the 
war ; and, his original plan having now miscarried, he gave 
orders to entrench a camp close up to the enemy's new 

The work of fortification was just completed when his 66 
scouts discovered a large body of men, representing perhaps 
the strength of a legion, hidden behind a neighbouring wood, 
on their march to what was known as the old camp. The 
situation of this camp was as follows. It had originally 
formed the head quarters of the Ninth legion, at the time 
when that regiment was ordered to stem the advance 
of the Pompeians in this quarter, preparatory to walling 
them round in the manner previously described ; it rested 
upon a wood on one side, and was not more than 500 yards 
from the sea. Subsequently, certain reasons had produced 
a modification of plan, and Caesar had withdrawn this corps 
a little further inland. After a few days' interval, the camp 
had been occupied by Pompeius himself ; and as he intended 
to post more than one legion at this particular point, the inner 
walls were left standing and the main circuit greatly increased, 

178 An Attempt at 'Retrieval 

Summer 48 the effect being to convert the smaller camp thus contained 
by the larger into a kind of fortified citadel to the other. 
A further change introduced was to run a breastwork from 
the left-hand corner of the extended lines down to the river 
bank, in order that the troops might water with more freedom 
and without fear of molestation from the enemy. But Pom- 
peius too had changed his plans, for reasons unnecessary here 
to particularize, and had evacuated the position ; thus the 
camp had existed for a considerable number of days, and all 
its fortifications were still intact/ 
67 This was the site towards which our scouts now reported 
the Pompeian legion to have headed, and the same move- 
ment was also observed from some of our higher redoubts, 
which at once confirmed the news. Now the place was 
distant from Pompeius's new camp about 800 yards. Caesar 
thereupon conceived the hope of successfully crushing this 
isolated regiment ; and being anxious to repair the day's 
disaster, ordered two of his battalions to remain on the earth- 
work and keep up the appearance of entrenching, whilst with 
the other thirty-three, among which were those of the bat- 
tered Ninth with its heavy death-roll of officers ''' and sorely 
attenuated ranks, he marched out with all the secrecy possible, 
in double column formation and by a route pointing directly 
away from his objective, towards the detached body of 
Pompeians and this lesser camp of theirs. Nor was his judge- 
ment found to be at fault. Arriving safely at his destination 
before Pompeius could become aware of his departure, he 
quickly turned his left wing, where he himself was posted, 
against the enemy, and, in spite of the formidable nature of 
the defences, drove him from the rampart. The camp gates 
* See plan. * Centurions. 

At first successful 179 

proved to be blocked by chevaux de frise, which slightly Summer 48 

delayed our advance ; and a sharp struggle ensued between 

the impetuous efforts of our men to rush the obstacles and 

the stubborn resistance of the garrison ; conspicuous amongst 

whom was Titus Puleio, who has been previously mentioned 

as responsible for the treacherous surrender of the army under 

Caius Antonius, and who now fought most gallantly from 

his place in the ranks. Our men, however, quickly asserted 

their superiority, and having hewn away the intervening 

barrier, burst first of all into the larger or outer camp, and 

from thence into the inner fortress contained in it, whither 

the defeated legion had retired, and where several were now 

cut down while still maintaining their resistance. 

But, alas, there is a power which, mighty though it be in 68 
other spheres, is mightiest of all in war, working most momen- 
tous changes by means of incidents most trivial — we mean 
the power of Fortune : as was now to be exemplified. For 
the units composing the right Caesarian wing, in their igno- 
rance of the ground, followed the course of the outlying 
breastwork, which ran, as already indicated, from the camp 
to the river side, searching for its gate and believing it to 
form the rampart to the main camp. On discovering their 
mistake, however, and finding it to be connected directly vwth 
the stream, they tore down the defences and passed through 
vdthout opposition, being followed by the whole body of 
mounted troops. 

In the meanwhile, after this sufficiently serious delay, 69 
news of the attack reached the ears of Pompeius. He 
at once recalled five of his legions from their work on 
his new entrenchments, and advanced at their head to 
the relief of his beleaguered detachment ; and while his 
N 2 

i8o The Attempt ends in Disaster 

Summer 48 cavalry bore down upon our troopers, our infantry on the 
rampart of the newly-conquered camp discovered to their 
amazement a line of legionaries in full battle formation. In 
a moment the situation was completely altered. The isolated 
legion of Pompeians, rallying under the prospect of immediate 
relief, endeavoured to make a stand at the postern gate, and 
even delivered a counter-attack upon our troops : Caesar's 
horse, at that moment engaged in scaling the outer breast- 
work through the narrow breaches, grew alarmed for the 
safety of its retreat, and gave the signal for general flight ; 
whereupon the right wing, which had by this time lost touch 
with its left, seeing the panic pervading the mounted troops, 
and anxious to save itself from being crushed on the inner 
side of the earthwork, drew back again through the breaches 
which they had just made in it. There the greater part 
of them, afraid of being caught in the narrow gangways, 
hurled themselves over into the trenches of a rampart fully 
tea feet high ; the first of them were trampled to death, 
but the rest passed out into safety over the dead bodies of 
their comrades. Similarly on the left wing, as soon as the 
Caesarians saw from their station on the rampart that the 
Pompeian army was upon them, and their own second division 
in headlong flight, a dread arose of finding themselves com- 
pletely trapped in the narrow interval, now that they had an 
enemy both inside and outside the rampart ; and they began 
looking to their own safety by retracing the steps of their 
previous advance. Everywhere alike was confusion and panic- 
stricken flight, so utterly uncontrolled that when Caesar 
snatched at the standards of some of the fugitives and ordered 
the men to halt, some let go their horses and joined in the 
stampede on foot, while others were so beside themselves with 

The Fortune of War i 8 i 

terror as to let even the standards go, and not a single man Summer 48 
could be induced to stand his ground. 

Disastrous as the situation was, there were still some 70 
redeeming circumstances, withoutwhich thetotal annihilation 
of the army must inevitably have followed. Foremost among 
these was Pompeius's fear of ambush, due in all probability 
to his astonishment at the turn events had taken, after he had 
just seen his own men chased out of their entrenchments ; 
an astonishment which now rendered him for some time 
nervous about approaching the outer works : and another 
advantage was that, the camp gates being narrow and firmly 
held by Caesar's troops, the pursuit of the cavalry was thereby 
considerably delayed. Thus it happened that the same cir- 
cumstance, trivial in itself, produced two quite dissimilar 
trains of consequences, each of them far-reaching in its effects. 
It was the breastwork leading from camp to the river that, 
at the moment when the Pompeian lines had been carried, 
intervened between Caesar and a victory as good as won: 
it was the same obstacle which now, by retarding the enemy's 
pursuit, proved in turn the salvation of our force. ^ 

These two battles on this one day cost Caesar altogether 71 
960 of the rank and file, besides the distinguished Roman 
knights Tuticanus Gallus, son of a Roman senator, Caius 
Fleginas of Piacenza {Placentia), Aulus Granius of Pozzuoli 
{Puteoli), and Marcus Sacrativer of Capua, as well as thirty- 
two regimental and company officers. A large proportion, 
however, of these met their death either by suffocation in 
the trenches, or at the narrow gaps in the earthworks, or down 

' Caesar is said to have remarked that, had the enemy possessed a 
general who knew how to conquer, that day would have ended the war. 
Suet. 36 ; Appian, B. C. 2. 62. 

1 8 2 Reflections on the Defeat 

Summer 48 by the river banks, without the infliction of any sort of 
wound, and merely through the terrorized flight of their own 
comrades. Of military standards thirty-two in all were lost. 
As a result of the day's fighting Pompeius was formally 
acclaimed ' Commander ' by his troops, a name which he 
retained, and subsequently allowed himself to be addressed 
by, although he rarely used the title at the head of his official 
dispatches, and never wore the usual laurel wreath on the 
staves of his military attendants.^ In marked contrast to this 
moderation was the conduct of Labienus. Having induced 
his chief to order the transfer of the prisoners to his own 
charge, he first had them marched on to the parade 
ground, presumably for the sake of display and to strengthen 
people's faith in a traitor, and then addressing them as fellow 
soldiers, and asking in terms of studied insult whether veteran 
troops were in the habit of running away, butchered the whole 
body in cold blood before the eyes of the assembled army. 
72 These successes evoked such overweening confidence in the 
camp of the Pompeians, that, disdaining all further thought 
for the conduct of the war, they regarded the campaign 
as already won. They did not pause to consider the weakness 
of our own force, or the adverse conditions and cramped 
dimensions of the late battle-field, due to the enemy's previous 
possession of the camp ; so that, face which way we would, we 
had to meet a double menace both from within and without 
the rampart. They failed to take account of the circum- 
stance that our army had been cut into two halves, neither 
of which could help the other ; nor did they make the further 
reflection that the action had not been the result of a fair 
charge in open fight, but that our self-inflicted losses from the 
^ i. e. on the axes of his lictors. 

Caesar addresses his Defeated Troops 183 

overcrowding and want of room had been even heavier than Summer 48 
those inflicted by the enemy. Finally, they forgot to allow 
for the ordinary vicissitudes of war, and for the numerous 
occasions on which the most trivial incidents have been the 
cause of the gravest disasters — for example, an ill-grounded 
suspicion, a sudden panic, or a superstitious scruple — and the 
frequency with which an army in the field has come to grief 
through either an inefficient general or a careless subordinate. 
All this they now ignored, and acting as though they had won 
solely on their merits, and no further change of fortune were 
possible, they began, both by word of mouth and written 
dispatch, to fill the entire world with a chorus of jubilation 
over the victory this day had brought them. 

Meanwhile the position of Caesar, after the overthrow of 73 
his earlier designs, rendered it advisable in his judgement 
to make a complete revolution in his conduct of the war. 
He first withdrew at one stroke every one of the garrisons 
in his chain of redoubts, and definitely abandoned the 
blockade. He then called up the whole force and 
pubUcly harangued the men, urging them not to take 
too much to heart their recent misfortunes or be alarmed 
at what had occurred, but pointing out the unreason- 
ableness of setting against their long line of victories in 
the past a single reverse which was after all an insignifi- 
cant one. * On the contrary, they owed much thanks to 
Fortune. Italy had been won by them without a scratch ; 
the two Spains with their teeming population of fighting 
races, led by generals of the highest skill and military expe- 
rience, had been reduced to peace and order ; the home 
provinces, on whose corn they depended, had been brought 
under effective occupation ; while to crown the series of 

184 A J\etreat Imperative 

Summer 48 successes, there was the astonishing piece of good fortune 
which enabled them all to cross the water in perfect safety 
through the very centre of the enemy's fleets, who swarmed 
alike before the harbours and along the open coastline. If 
their run of luck had not proved absolutely unbroken, they 
must remember that heaven helps those who help them- 
selves. As far as he personally was concerned in their late 
disaster, he was the last man who could be justly held respon- 
sible. He had provided a fair field for the encounter ; the 
enemy's camp had been captured, the enemy himself turned 
out of his entrenchments, and all opposition overcome. What- 
ever it was that had then stepped in to snatch victory from 
his grasp — ^whether some unsteadiness of their own, some- 
body's blunder, or even the fickleness of Fortune — at the very 
moment when victory lay assured in their hands ; at all 
events every man must now earnestly strive to atone for that 
regrettable incident by his own good conduct in the future. 
That would convert their defeat into a blessing, as had once 
before been the case at Gergovia * ; and they who had lately 
shrank from a conflict would become the first to throw down 
the challenge.' 
74 At the close of this speech a sentence of public disgrace was 
passed upon certain of the standard-bearers, who were forth- 
with relieved of their position of trust. Through the army 
generally such burning indignation arose at the thought of 
their late discomfiture, and so fierce a longing to retrieve the 
tarnished reputation of their arms, that without waiting for 
the word of command from battalion or company officers, the 
men of their own accord even added to their ordinary duties 
by way of punishment ; and such a burning desire to meet the 
■* 52, just before the great victory of Alesia. 

Pursuit by Pompeius 185- 

enemj pervaded all ranks, that even higher-grade officers were Sumnier 4S 
found seriously persuading themselves that they ought to hold 
on to their present position and risk the chances of a general 

Against all such views, Caesar felt the danger of trusting 
troops which had so recently yielded to panic, and thought 
it wiser to allow them time sufficient to recover their 
confidence : moreover, with the raising of the blockade, 
the question of his supplies had become acute. No 75 
time was therefore lost beyond what was required for 
attending to the sick and wounded, and at nightfall the 
baggage-trains of the army were all quietly got under motion 
and dispatched on the road to ApoUonia, with strict orders to 
make no halt whatever before completing their full day's march. 
They were accompanied by an escort of one legion. These 
preliminaries satisfactorily disposed of, at about three o'clock 
in the morning two other legions were told off to remain in 
camp, while the rest of the force moved out by a number of 
separate gates, and were likewise dispatched on the same 
journey. Last of all, after another brief interval, in order that 
military tradition might be maintained and yet his own de- 
parture be disclosed at the latest possible moment, Caesar gave 
the word for the march to be openly sounded ; and his rearguard 
turning out at once, quickly overhauled the preceding column, 
and was soon out of sight of their old entrenchments. 

Equally little delay in the pursuit was observed by Pompeius 
when once he had divined his adversary's purpose ; but acting 
on the lines that Caesar had foreseen, viz. to seize the 
opportunity of catching his enemy in the general panic 
which must follow, he conceived, on the disorganization of 
the march, he drew out his army from camp, and at once 

i8<J Outwitted by his Adversary 

Summer 48 detached his cavalry to harass the retreat of the rearguard. 
This, however, they failed to overtake, since Caesar, by march- 
ing light, had gained a long start of his pursuers. But on 
reaching the river Schkumbi (Genusus), the awkward banks of 
this stream gave time for the Pompeian horsemen to come up, 
and an endeavour was made to delay the rearmost divisions by 
forcing an engagement. Against this attack Caesar opposed 
his own cavalry, interspersing through the squadrons a body 
of 400 front rank legionaries lightly equipped ; and so well 
did these perform in the ensuing cavalry action, that they 
totally routed the Pompeians, and after killing a large number, 
rejoined the column without any loss to themselves.^ 
j-6 The army of Caesar had now completed a fuU day's march, 
in accordance with his pre-arranged plan, and after safely 
making the passage of the Schkumbi (Genusus), took up its 
quarters in its old lines fronting Asparagium. The infantry 
of the legions were confined strictly to camp ; the cavalry 
were first sent out to give the impression of foraging, and then 
ordered to return with all speed by the rearmost gate that 
was out of sight of the enemy. Meanwhile Pompeius had 
also completed a full day's march, and he too from similar 
motives decided to occupy his old position at Asparagium. 
The fortifications of this were still intact, and the troops, 
being thus relieved from their ordinary duty of entrenchment, 
began straying some distance from camp, partly after firewood, 

' Here probably occurred the incident recorded by Polyaenus (viii. 13). 
At one point of the retreat Caesar had a swamp on his left, the sea on 
his right, and the enemy on his rear. The Pompeian fleet was also 
' shelling ' his troops with missiles of all kinds, when he hit on the simple 
device of ordering them to transfer their shields from the left to the right 

Nerv Plans of Campaign 187 

partly in quest of fodder, whilst others were seen leaving Summe- 48 
the rampart in the direction of their late camping-ground. 
The explanation of this last circumstance was that the decision 
to march having been taken hastily, a large proportion of the 
army's baggage and soldiers' kits had been left behind ; and 
it was to recover this lost property that the troops, tempted 
by the nearness of the camp they had just evacuated, now 
strayed off from the trenches, after first discarding their arms 
and depositing them in their tents. As soon as they had thus 
incapacitated themselves for pursuit, Caesar, who had fore- 
seen this very result, gave the signal for departure, it being then 
about midday ; and his army, moving out of camp once more 
for a second march on the same day, proceeded to cover an 
additional eight miles from that spot ; it being impossible 
for Pompeius to do the same on account of the straying of his 

The next day the same order was observed, and with the 77 
first fall of night the transport was again sent on in advance, 
to be followed about 3 a.m. by the main force under the 
personal direction of Caesar, who thus made sure that, if 
compelled to fight, he should be in a position to meet the 
sudden emergency with his army free of encumbrances. 
Throughout the following days the same dispositions were 
repeated ; and as a result of these precautions the retreat 
was conducted without hitch or accident of any kind, in spite 
of having to traverse rivers of great depth and country 
exceptionally difficult. For Pompeius never recovered the 
time lost on the first day. Strive as he would to accelerate by 
forced marches the pace of his army, in his eagerness to over- 
take those ahead of him, his efforts were all in vain ; on the 
fourth day he abandoned the pursuit, and recognized the 

1 8 8 Both Armies move rapidly West 

78 necessity of some alternative plan of action. As for Caesar, 
' '™'"^'' 4 various reasons had concurred in forcing him to touch at 
Apollonia, There were the wounded to be provided for, 
the army to be paid, the local communities to be reassured, 
garrisons to be stationed in the principal towiis. The time 
allotted to these matters, however, was no more than the 
urgency of his situation made necessary : all his thoughts were 
riveted on Domitius, and the risk he ran of being caught by 
the Pompeian advance before he himself could get up with 
him ; and he was now pressing towards that officer with all the 
speed which deep concern for his peril could elicit. 

Considered in its general bearings, the scheme of operations 
which it was his purpose to develop rested on the follow- 
ing calculations. If Pompeius were making for the same 
point as himself, then he would be drawing his enemy away 
from the sea and from all the reserve supplies accumulated 
by him at Durazzo : Pompeius could then be forced to fight 
out the issue on equal terms, deprived of the support of his 
food stocks and other miHtary stores. Supposing, on the 
other hand, Pompeius decided to cross into Italy,^ it would 
then be easy for himself to effect a junction with Domitius, 
and to march his army round the head of the Adriatic to the 
relief of that country. Finally, if his opponent attempted to 
lay siege to Apollonia and Oricum, with the object of cutting 
all Caesar's communications with the coast, he would find 
himself confronted with the blockade of Scipio and the impera- 
tive necessity of going to the relief of his isolated force. 

^ Afranius erpecially urged Pompeius to turn the tables on Caesar by first 
recovering the West and then leading it against the East, meanwhile holding 
Caesar in check with the fleet. It was the isolation of Scipio's force and 
his own fear of losing caste with the Orient that turned the scale the other 
way, Appian, 2. 65. 

Both Armies move rapidly West 189 

Reasoning on these lines he forthwith dispatched couriers in Summer 
advance to Cnaeus Domitius, with written instructions indi- 
cating the course of action that officer was to pursue ; and 
after establishing garrisons at ApoUonia, Alessio (Lissus), and 
Oricum of four, one, and three battalions respectively, and 
after carefully housing his wounded, he started on his march 
through Epirus and the region of Athamania.^ 

During this same time Pompeius was hastening towards the 
same goal. Conjectural interpretation of Caesar's motives 
pointed to a rapid movement towards Scipio as the soundest 
strategy of the moment. Should Caesar and himself take the 
same line, he could then reinforce his lieutenant ; or, if he 
proved unwilling to quit the seaboard and the neighbourhood 
of Oricum, through continued hopes of fresh legions and 
cavalry from Italy, the way would thus be open to himself to fall 
uponDomitiuswiththewholeof his effective strength. Speed, 79 
therefore, was now the first consideration on both sides ; each 
had the twofold object of rescuing their friends and of seizing 
the rare opportunity offered by the present conjunction of 
events for crushing an opponent. But whereas Caesar was going 
out of his way in touching at ApoUonia, Pompeius had a clear 
road before him into Macedonia through the Candavian tract "^ ; 
and a further complication had now arisen from an altogether 
unforeseen event. Thiswas the position of Domitius, who, after 
lying encamped for several days cheek by jowl with Scipio, 
had been compelled by want of supplies to vacate his watch 
upon that general, and to retire in the direction of Heraclia ' ; 

^ Following the course of the Voyussa [Aous) and entering Thessaly by 
the Metsovo Pass — still the high road to Constanlinople. 

' The great military road {Via Egnatia). 

' On the Via Egnatia, distant, according to the ancient Itineraries, some 
seventy miles from the stage marked 'In Candavia '. 

ipo Caesar unites his Forces 

Summer 48 and as that town lies at the foot of the Candavian hill country, 
it seemed as though Fortune herself were conspiring to throw 
him across the path of Pompeius. At present this was un- 
known to Caesar, although a fresh difficulty was already 
threatening him. The origin of this was the device of Pom- 
peius in publishing through aU the provinces and native states 
exaggerated and glowing accounts of the late battle before 
Durazzo, accounts that were wholly unwarranted by the 
actual facts ; the result of which was to propagate a widespread 
rumour that Caesar had been beaten, and was now in headlong 
flight with the virtual loss of all his army. In consequence, 
the roads had been rendered exceedingly hostile,, and some of 
the local townships actually contemplated desertion from the 
Caesarian cause; and though numerous messengers were dis- 
patched by various routes from Caesar to Domitius and from 
Domitius to Caesar,, they all alike found it impossible to get 
through. Fortunately the cavalry scouts of Domitius were 
sighted on the march by the party of Allobroges — those 
friends of Roucillus and Egus whose treachery we have already 
recorded : and either through the force of old associations 
(they having served together in the Gallic wars), or else 
through swollen vanity, these men now gave their former 
comrades a full and correct account of what had really taken 
place, and particularly of Caesar's departure from before 
Durazzo and the simultaneous advance of Pompeius. This 
information was at once reported to Domitius ; and though 
he had barely four hours' start, yet, thanks to his friend the 
enemy, he succeeded in escaping his danger, and at the town 
of Kalambaka (Jeginium), which lies directly across the ap- 
proach into Thessaly, met Caesar in full career towards him. 
80 The junction of the two Caesarian armies thus safely 

Effects of J^cent Events 191 

eflFected, the advance was continued to Palaea Episkopi Summer 4S 
(Gompht), the first town of Thessaly as you enter from 
Epirus. This people had a few months earlier in the war, 
and quite unsolicited, sent envoys to Caesar, putting all their 
resources at his free disposal, and asking only for a garrison to 
be sent down to them. Unluckily the garbled version of the 
battle at Durazzo, noticed above, had had time to reach the 
city, and had greatly magnified the importance of that event. 
The effect was soon apparent. Androsthenes, the chief native 
magistrate of Thessaly, preferring to range himself on the 
side of a victorious Pompeius rather than share the mis- 
fortunes of a Caesar, required the entire rural population, 
slave no less than free, to withdraw inside the town, and then 
closed the gates against all comers. At the same time he sent 
off urgent messages for help to Scipio and Pompeius, inform- 
ing them that he had full confidence in the strength of the 
town defences if quickly relieved, but that he could not 
endure any protracted siege. At this particular moment in the 
course of events Scipio had just heard of the break-up of 
the armies round Durazzo, and in consequence had marched 
his legions to Larissa, while Pompeius was still some distance 
from the Thessalian border. Caesar, therefore, after first 
fortifying a camp, ordered the construction of scaling-ladders 
and battery-sheds, and the preparation of defensive hurdles. 
Then, as soon as these were ready, he appealed to his troops, 
pointing out to them how much it would conduce to the 
relief of their general state of want, if they could gain posses- 
sion of a well-stocked and wealthy town, and by the example 
they made of it strike terror into the counsels of other 
communities : above all, if they did this at once, before 
the reinforcements from outside had time to concentrate. 

192 A Stern Example 

Summer 48 The men answered by an extraordinary display of enthusiasm, 
and accordingly the assault of the town was taken in hand on 
the same day as their arrival before it ; and though the walls 
were of great height and it was already past four in the after- 
noon, yet by sundown the place had been carried and given 
over as plunder to the troops.^ Without further delay the 
camp was then moved from the neighbourhood of the town, 
and the army continued its march to Metropolis^, outstrip- 
ping the tidings and even the rumour of the captured city. 

81 At first the Metropolitans were inclined to adopt the policy 
of their neighbours, influenced as they were by the same idle 
stories : a little later, however, on learning the fate that had 
overtaken the Gomphians from the lips of the prisoners 
purposely sent up to the wall by Caesar, they threw open 
their city gates. They were treated with the utmost con- 
sideration ; and the contrast drawn between the easy lot 
of the Metropolitans and the ruinous end of Gomphi was 
so significant, that not a single state in all Thessaly, with 
the sole exception of Larissa, which was strongly held by 
Scipio's armies, subsequently refused adhesion to Caesar or 
compliance with his demands. He, meanwhile, had selected 
a suitable camping-ground in the open country, where the 
corn crops were now all but ripe, and resolved to await there 
the approach of Pompeius, and to make this place decide once 
for all the issue of the campaign. 

82 As for his opponent, a few days after these operations he 
crossed the Thessalian frontier, and, in the course of an 
harangue delivered to his now united army, expressed his 

' Ancient authorities agree that Caesar's hungry troops here got 
considerably out of hand, and that much excess ensued. 

^ Now represented by a village with the generic name Paleo-Kastro. 

Overweenhig Confidence of 'Pompeians 193 

thanks to the men of his own command for their past services Summer 48 

to himself ; and then, turning to the troops under Scipio, 

asked them to be willing, though the main victory was already 

won, to accept a share of the spoils and rewards of the campaign. 

After that, the legions were all concentrated within one camp, 

and Pompeius, courteously dividing with Scipio his privileges 

as commander, ordered all bugle-calls to be repeated before 

that general, and a second head quarters tent to be pitched 

for him. 

Such an increase of numbers on the part of the Pompeians, 
and the successful junction of their two powerfiJ armies did 
but confirm the general belief that had long been prevalent 
amongst them. So certain indeed grew their hopes of victory, 
that any pause in the conduct of the operations seemed but 
to delay their own return to Italy, and any movement on the 
part of Pompeius, that exhibited unusual deliberateness and 
caution, could always, according to his critics, have been 
well finished off in a single day ; and he was loudly accused 
of toying with his command, and of treating as menials men 
who had filled the highest offices in the State.^ Much con- 
troversy also ensued amongst the rival claimants to the 
various prizes of the war, notably the great public priesthoods, 
whilst the consulship was settled in advance over a number 
of years. Others claimed the houses and property of those 
in the Caesarian camp ; and a heated dispute arose in 
open council on the case of Lucilius Hirrus, at that 
moment away on a mission from Pompeius to the Parthian 
court, and on his right to stand in his absence as a candi- 
date at the approaching praetorian elections. Thus while his 

^ i.e. as consuls and praetors. They dubbed him ' Agamemnon, king 
of kings'. Appian, 2. 67. 


194 Caesar again J{eady for Action 

Summer 48 friends appealed to the plighted word of Pompelus and the 
obligation incumbent upon him of fulfilling the pledge 
given at his departure (unless indeed he wished Hirrus to be 
thought a fool for trusting to his support), the rest stoutly 
maintained that, where the danger and hardships were alike 
for all, no one man should be given these exceptional privileges. 
83 So too the daily bickerings that passed between Lucius 
Domitius, Scipio, and Lentulus Spinther, on the subject of 
Caesar's priestly office,^ had lately degenerated into open 
brawling of the most offensive character ; Lentulus insisting on 
the claims of seniority, Domitius boasting of his wide influence 
and prestige in the capital, Scipio confident in his family 
connexion with Pompeius. Another incident at this time 
was the public indictment of Lucius Afranius by Acutius 
Rufus for what he alleged to have been the betrayal of the 
army in Spain ; while Lucius Domitius, not to be behindhand, 
had a separate proposal of his own to submit to the council. 
This was that on the conclusion of hostilities all those of 
senatorial rank who had assisted in fighting for the common 
cause should be constituted a judicial body, with three votes '^ 
given to each member : sentence should then be passed 
individually upon every one who had either stayed behind 
in Rome, or, while showing themselves inside the Pompeian 
lines, had taken no active part in the campaign ; one ticket 
to be cast by those who favoured complete acquittal, another 
where the verdict was capital punishment, and a third by 
those who imposed a fine. Everybody, in short, was engrossed 
either with his own political interests, or the money- rewards 
he hoped to reap for party services, or with the prosecution 

' Caesar had been Chief Pontiff (Pontifex Maximus) since 63. 
2 ' Wax tablets.' 

A Substitute for Cavalry 1 9 f 

of his private quarrels. Men's minds were no longer concerned Summer 48 
with the indispensable conditions of success, but rather with 
the best use they could make of their victory. 

In the meantime Caesar had not been idle. His supplies 84 
were now adequately organized, his troops had recovered their 
moral, and a sufficient interval had elapsed since the two 
battles of Durazzo : and now, to show the implicit trust he 
reposed in the temper of his men, he resolved to test the 
extent to which Pompeius either desired or designed a general 
engagement. His army accordingly moved out of camp and 
drew up for action, at first on ground of his own choosing and 
at some little distance from the Pompeian camp, but, later on, 
advancing well away from the shelter of their own rampart 
and bringing their line of battle close up to the hills 
occupied by the Pompeians. As a result of these tactics the 
confidence of the army in its own powers strengthened daily. 

Yet Caesar did not feel justified in abandoning the practice 
lately instituted with regard to the cavalry, and already 
described above; but finding himself greatly outnumbered 
in this arm of the service, he formed a corps of young soldiers, 
lightly equipped, and drawn from legionaries of the front 
rank specially selected for speed of foot. This body was 
then instructed to fight with their usual equipment, inter- 
spersing themselves among the troopers ; and by constant 
daily practice they soon attained a marked proficiency in 
this new type of warfare. The advantage gained by this 
device was that 1,000 Caesarian horsemen, having once ac- 
quired experience, had no hesitation, even on more or less open 
ground, in standing the charge of the 7,000 who formed the 
cavalry of Pompeius ; and the large numbers of the latter had 
little terror for their composite enemy. Indeed it was during 
o 2 

1^6 Pomp ems decides en Battle 

Summer 48 these few days that a successful cavalry skirmish took place in 
which one of the two brother Allobroges, whose desertion 
to Pompeius we have recorded above, was killed, with 
85 certain others of his followers. As for the main force of 
the Pompeians at this time, it was their daily habit to move 
down from their camp on the hills, and at the lowest spurs 
of the mountain to form up in order of battle, in constant 
expectation, it would seem, that Caesar might somehow or 
other place himself at a disadvantage. When, therefore, it 
became evident that no artifice could entice his opponent to 
an action, Caesar determined that for his part the easiest 
method for the further prosecution of the war was to break 
up his present encampment, and in future to keep per- 
petually on the march : calculating that, by constantly chang- 
ing his camping-ground and moving about from place to place, 
he would find it easier to feed his troops, and at the same 
time have opportunities for fighting on the road ; on the 
other hand, the daily marches would exhaust the endurance 
of Pompeius's army which was not so habituated to fatigue. 
Everything was accordingly ready for the new departure ; 
the signal to march had teen given, and the tents taken down 
and stowed away, when it was suddenly observed that the 
Pompeian battle-line, going beyond its daily practice, had a 
minute cr two before advanced a considerable distance from 
its entrenchments, thus suggesting the possibihty of engaging 
it upon something like equal terms. On receipt of this 
intelligence Caesar turned to his colleagues, and though his 
column was by this time in the actual gateways of the camp, 
' We must give up our march for the present ', he said, ' and 
turn our attention to battle, as has always been our earnest 
wish. We are all ready for a fight : we shall not again easily 

Pom pet us decides on Battle 197 

find the opportunity.' And without further delay he led Summer 48 
out his forces fully equipped for action. 

The same decision to fight had, as was afterwards discovered, 86 
been also taken by Pompeius in deference to the urgent solici- 
tations of his party. Such a resolution on his part had been 
foreshadowed in the council-meetings of the last few days, 
when he had assured his colleagues that they might expect to 
see the rout of the Caesarian army even before the two hostile 
lines were in contact with each other. Noting the looks of 
surprise called forth by this statement, he had then con- 
tinued, ' I am well aware that what I promise sounds almost 
incredible, but to give you greater confidence for going into 
action, listen to the plan I have formed for the battle. I have 
induced our cavalry — and they have pledged themselves to 
the task — immediately we begin to come to close quarters, 
to attack the right wing of the Caesarians on its exposed 
flank, and, by riding round the rear of their line, to drive 
the enemy before them in all the confusion that such a 
diversion will cause, before even a single spear can be thrown 
by ourselves. In this way we shall finish off the war without 
the slightest risk to the legions, and with scarcely a scratch 
to any of us : whilst, as you will see, the manceuvre presents 
no sort of difficulty owing to our immense preponderance 
in cavalry.' 

He ended by a solemn warning to hold themselves ready 
for all future emergencies, and now that they had their chance 
of fighting, as had so often occupied their thoughts, to show 
the world that in point of efficiency and courage they were not 
unworthy of its high opinion. 

He was followed by Labienus, whose supreme contempt S7 
for the forces under Caesar was only equalled by the extrava- 

1 98 The Last Council Meeting 

Summer 48 gant eulogy he poured upon the plan of Pompeius. ' Do not 
imagine, Sir,' said he, ' that this is the army which conquered 
Gaul and Germany. I was personally present at all those 
battles, and am not therefore rashly making statements on 
a subject I do not fully comprehend. A very small fraction 
of that army now survives : a large proportion of it is dead 
and gone, as indeed was inevitable where so much fighting 
had to be done ; numbers were carried off by fever in Italy 
last autumn, numbers again have scattered to their homes, 
and numbers have been left behind in charge of continental 
Europe. Surely you yourselves have heard from your corre- 
spondents across the water, whose delicate health obliged 
them to stay at home, how fresh battalions have been 
formed at Brindisi (Brundisiuvi). What you now see before 
you are corps that have been repleted from the levies in 
Northern Italy during the last few years, and many of them 
come from the colonies beyond the Po (Padus) ; while, even 
so, the pith and kernel of the men have perished in the two 
battles before Durazzo.' 

At the end of this speech he bound himself by an oath not 
to return to camp except as a victor and urged upon the others 
to follow his example. His action won the warm approval 
of Pompeius, who immediately took the same oath, and was 
followed unhesitatingly by the remainder of the staff. At 
the close of this scene the council broke up amid the light- 
hearted confidence of all present : imagination already put 
victory in their grasp ; for where the issues involved were so 
great, and the speaker so trained a master of war, it was im- 
possible not to suppose that he had fully weighed the import 
of his words. 

To fact p. ig9- 

The J{ival Forces 199 

Pharsalus and After 

As the army of Caesar approached the lines of Pompeius the 88 
following was found to be his adversary's order of battle. The Summer 4S 
left wing was formed by the two legions, known respectively as 
the First and Third, which had been surrendered by Caesar 
on command of the Senate at the opening of the civil troubles : 
here too was Pompeius himself. The centre was occupied 
by Scipio with his Syrian corps, while the left was in charge 
of the legion from Cilicia, supported by the Spanish battalions 
which, as already recorded, Afranius had brought over to his 
chief. All these troops constituted in Pompeius's judgement 
the most reliable portion of his army. The remaining units 
were distributed between the centre and wings, and made 
up a total strength of no battalions, or in round numbers 
45,000 men \ About 2,000 of these were reservists, time- 
expired men who had served in Pompeius's permanent body- 
guard on previous campaigns, and had now flocked to the 
standard of their old commander for the present war : these 
he had parcelled out along his whole line. There were 
also seven other battalions distributed as garrisons to the main 
camp and adjacent outposts. Lastly, as his right was firmly 
protected by a stream presenting steep and difficult banks, 
he had massed the whole of his cavalry and light-armed bow- 
men and slingers in a single dense body outside his left wing. 

On his side Caesar had followed his customary dispositions, 89 
and had placed the Tenth legion on his right and the Ninth 

' i.e. regulars. An enormous number of Oriental auxiliaries was also 
on the ground, though the battle was decided solely by the Italian troops. 

20 Dispositions of the Armies 

Summer 48 on his left, despite the fact that the last-named regiment 
had suffered so terribly in the battles before Durazzo ; ^ it 
was, however, now coupled with the Eighth, thus forming 
practically one legion out of two, each of whom had orders 
to support the other. Eighty battalions altogether had 
taken their place in the line, amounting to 22,000 troops, 
while two more had been left behind to hold the camp. 
Marcus Antonius had been appointed to command the 
left, Publius Sulla the right, and Cnaeus Domitius the 
centre : Caesar himself took his stand facing Pompeius. But 
the discovery of the enemy's peculiar distributions as just 
described had rendered him uneasy as to the safety of his 
right wing, in case he should find it turned by the over- 
whelming cavalry opposed to it. At this moment, therefore, 
he rapidly drafted from his third or rearmost line a single 
battalion from each of the legions represented in it ; these 
he then formed into a fourth, so placed as to confront the 
hostile horsemen, with minute instructions as to the part they 
were to perform, and an intimation that on their personal 
gallantry depended the fortunes of the day. At the same time 
both the third line and the whole of the army were warned not 
to charge without his special orders, but that when the proper 
moment came he would give the flag-signal to engage. 
90 In addressing his army with the customary exhortations to 
battle, and in emphasizing the unbroken continuance of his 

^ This is the legion which had the stiff fight outside Lerida (l, 45), 
which was greatly endangered during the circumvallation of Durazzo 
(3. 45) and severely mauled at the final sortie of Pompeius and the subse- 
quent defeat of Caesar (3. 62-67), ^" ^^ autumn of 49, on returning 
from Spain, it had headed a serious mutiny at Piacenza (P'acentia), of 
which temporary lapse in its loyalty Caesar characteristically says nothing. 

A Devoted Centurion 201 

own services to his men, special stress was laid on the fact that Summer 48 
he could call them personally to witness how anxiously he 
had desired to bring about a settlement. He need only recall 
the verbal negotiations instituted through Vatinius, the mis- 
sion of Aulus Clodius to Scipio, and the strenuous appeal 
made at Oricum to Libo with a view to the dispatch of peace 
envoys. They might rest assured it had never been his object 
to trifle with the lives of Roman soldiers, nor yet to rob his 
country of either one or the other of the two great armies 
which now stood face to face. 

At the close of his speech, as his men were clamouring to 
advance and burning with the excitement of battle, without 
further delay he gave the signal by trumpet. 

Now there was serving in the army of Caesar a certain 91 
reservist named Crastinus, a man of magnificent courage, who 
the year before had been his senior centurion of the Tenth 
legion. This man, as soon as the signal sounded, exclaimed 
to those near him, ' Follow me, my old comrades, and give 
your general the support you have agreed to give him. This 
is the last battle left us : only see this through, and he is re- 
stored to his rightful position and we get back our liberty.' 
Then glancing at Caesar, he added, ' I'll manage to-day, 
General, that dead or alive you shall have cause to thank me.' 
With these words he dashed out from the right wing at the 
head of the line, and was at once followed by 120 men of the 
same company, specially picked troops who were serving as 

Between the two hostile lines there remained only just 9^ 
sufficient space for each army to deliver its charge. Notwith- 
standing this, Pompeius had issued previous instructions to 
his men to stand strictly on the defensive in meeting the 

20 2 The Psychology of Battle 

Summer 48 attack of the Caesarians, so as to allow their advancing line 
to become disorganized. This order he was said to have 
given upon the advice of Caius Triarius, under the belief that 
the opening rush of the enemy's legions would have its force 
dissipated by their loss of accurate formation, while his own 
troops, by maintaining their proper distances, could then fall 
upon the broken ranks of their opponents. He further hoped 
that the impact of the falling javelins would be less if his men 
were kept to their positions, than if they were allowed to run 
in and meet the hail of spears ; while the double distance 
the Caesarians would have to traverse might well be expected 
to render them breathless with exhaustion. 

In our judgement this decision of Pompeius has nothing to 
recommend it. There is in all men a certain instinctive 
courage and combativeness implanted in us by Nature, which 
is only kindled by the excitement of battle. This instinct it 
should be the object of commanding officers not to repress 
but to encourage ; and there was sound reason in the ancient 
practice of letting the bugles call the advance over all the 
field at once, followed by a single shout from all the men : 
such a custom, it was found, struck terror into the ranks of the 
93 enemy no less than it stimulated their own side. In this 
particular instance our troops, who at the given signal had 
dashed forward with brandished spears, on finding that the 
Pompeians were not advancing to meet them, instinctively 
slackened speed ; and, taught by the accumulated experience 
of past battles, halted some half-way across the open ground, 
so as not to spend their strength before coming up with 
their enemy. Here taking a short rest, and then resum- 
ing their rush, they discharged their volley of heavy javelins, 
and in obedience to Caesar's orders instantly drew their 

The Battle cf Vhar solus 203 

broadswords. Nor, to tell the truth, did the Pompeians Summer 4S 
show any desire to shirk the encounter, but, parrying the 
flying spears with their shields, they boldly met the shock of 
the charging legions with unbroken ranks, and, after hurling 
their own javelins, went to work with the sword. At the same 
time their cavalry, acting upon its previous instructions, ad- 
vanced from the left wing in one dense mass, whilst the mob of 
archers also commenced to spread themselves over the ground. 
This attack was more than our own cavalry could cope with, 
and slowly giving way they recoiled before the onslaught. 
Thereupon the enemy's horsemen, pushing home the assault 
with still fiercer vigour, began deploying in squadrons pre- 
paratory to surrounding our main battle-line on its exposed 
flank. Perceiving the threatened danger, Caesar gave the 
signal to his fourth line, which he had recently improvised out 
of a number of disconnected battalions. Advancing at high 
speed and with colours flying, this force delivered such a furious 
attack upon the opposing cavalry,^ that not a single trooper 
stood against them ; but, wheeling in a body, they not only 
evacuated their position in the line, but galloping on in head- 
long flight took cover in a range of lofty hills. Their dispersal 
left the archers and slingers wholly unprotected, and being 
altogether without defensive armour the whole helpless crowd 
was slaughtered to a man. Following up this exploit, the same 
force went on without a halt to surround the Pompeian left, 
which they found still fighting and maintaining a stubborn 
resistance in line, when it was thus taken unexpectedly in the 
rear. It was at this critical moment in the battle that Caesar's 94 
third line, which had hitherto remained quietly in position, 

' Their orders were to keep their heavy javelins (j.ila) and use them 
to strike at the faces of the mounted men. Plutarcli. 

2 04 Tf^^ Battle of Pharsalus 

Summer 48 received its orders to advance. His exhausted troops in front 
Were thus replaced by fresh and vigorous reserves; and assailed 
as they also w^ere from behind, the resistance of the Pompeians 
at length gave way, and the whole line broke and fled. But 
though the victory was won, it did not escape the attention 
of Caesar that the first steps towards its consummation had 
been the work of those battalions which he had posted in his 
fourth line to hold in check the Pompeian horse, precisely as 
he had indicated in his address to the men. It was they who, 
in the first place, had effected the rout of the cavalry ; it was 
they, again, who had cut to pieces the slingers and archers : 
finally, it was they who, by turning the left of the Pompeian 
line, had started the general flight. In the meanwhile 
Pompeius, on perceiving the disaster to his mounted troops, 
and the crippling panic pervading that branch of his army on 
which he chiefly relied, and despairing of success from other 
quarters, had withdrawn from the fighting line and galloped 
rapidly back to camp. There, as he passed the pickets on 
duty outside the frontal gate, he called in loud tones to the 
centurions in charge, so that the men might catch his words : 
' Look to the camp, and in case of accident defend it with 
care. I am going the round of the other gates in order to 
encourage the troops on guard.' 

So saying, he made straight for head quarters : in gloomy 
anticipation of the verdict of the day, yet waiting to learn 
the end. 
95 Meanwhile his routed followers had also been driven back 
to their camp and there forced over the trenches. Caesar 
strongly felt the desirability of giving no breathing space to 
the terrified rabble, and urged upon his men to take Fortune 
while in the mood, and to carry the camp by storm. In spite 

The Pursuit 2 of 

of the great heat — the affair had been protracted to midday Summer 
— his troops, whom nothing now could stop, gave willing 
obedience to their commander's orders. The camp was vigor- 
ously defended by the force left behind for that purpose, and 
still more fiercely by the Thracians and other foreign auxili- 
aries : as for the fugitives from the battle, they were so de- 
moralized with panic and physically so exhausted, that in most 
cases their arms and standards were indiscriminately flung 
away, and they were far more concerned with continuing 
their flight than with staying to hold the camp. And, indeed, 
it was but a momentary resistance that could be offered 
against the deadly discharge of our spears even by the force 
which had manned the ramparts : compelled by their wounds 
to relinquish their posts, they quickly followed the lead of 
their regimental and company officers, and fled precipitately 
to the heights that adjoined the camp. 

Inside the Pompeian lines the eye fell upon the spectacle 9<5 
of arbours artificially constructed, of masses of silver plate 
laid out for present use, of tents paved with cool, fresh 
cut sods, and even, in the case of Lentulus and others, pro- 
tected from the heat by ivy. Many other indications could 
likewise be discerned of extravagant luxury and of confidence 
in coming victory, rendering it an easy assumption that men 
who went so far out of their way in the pursuit of superfluous 
pleasures could have had no misgivings as to the issue of the 
day. Yet these were the men who habitually taunted the 
poverty-stricken, long-suffering army of Caesar with the 
charge of being voluptuaries ; whereas in truth they had all 
along been in want of the barest necessaries. 

But to return to Pompeius. Delaying his departure until 
our troops were actually in motion within his lines, he seized 

20 6 The Pursuit continued 

Summer 48 a horse and, tearing off all outward signs of his marshal's rank, 
fled through the postern gate, where, putting spurs to his 
mount, he headed in the direction of Larissa. Making no halt 
at that town, but maintaining the same rapid rate of travelling, 
and merely picking up a few followers from the general rout, 
he continued his journey without intermission through the 
night ; and, with an escort of no more than thirty troopers, 
at length reached the sea. There he embarked on board a 
corn-ship, repeatedly complaining, so it was said, that his 
expectations had been wofully falsified, that the very men 
in whom he had placed his hopes of victory had been the 
first to fly, and, to judge by appearances, had virtually be- 
trayed him, 
97 Master of the Pompeian camp, Caesar once more appealed 
to his troops not to let their natural anxiety for plunder 
hinder the execution of those measures still necessary for the 
full realization of their victory. Once more they yielded to 
his wishes, and preparations were immediately begun for 
the circumvallation of the high ground to which the enemy 
had retreated. But as the hill was found to be without water, 
the Pompeians, distrusting the position, had determined to 
abandon it and to follow the line of heights in a general 
retirement towards Larissa. Their intentions were at once 
detected by Caesar. Dividing his forces, he ordered part 
of his legions to remain in the captured camp of Pompeius, 
another division to be sent back to his own camp, while he 
himself with the remaining four set out on the task of heading 
off the retreating Pompeians by taking an easier route. At 
the end of six miles he was in a position to form up in line of 
battle ; whereupon the enemy halted on one of the numerous 
hills. The base of this hill was washed by a stream ; and in 

Surrender of the Fugitives 207 

order to prevent his opponents from watering during the Summer 48 
night, Caesar made one last appeal to his weary troops : and, 
exhausted as they were by their long day's work, with night 
already upon them, they nevertheless succeeded in interposing 
between the hill and the river a fully fortified breastwork. 
On the completion of this work the enemy sent in a deputa- 
tion to open negotiations for surrender ; at the same time a 
few representatives of the senatorial order who had attached 
themselves to the mission, took the opportunity to seek per- 
sonal safety by escaping under cover of night. 

As soon as it was day, the order was given for the whole 98 
party up on the hill to descend from the high ground to the 
plain below, and there to throw down their arms. This they 
did without demur, and then, flinging themselves to the 
earth, with weeping eyes and hands upraised, they begged 
their lives of Caesar. In reassuring tones he bade them rise, 
and after a brief reference to his well-knovra clemency in order 
to appease their fears, granted their lives to all, and then 
transferred them to the kindly attentions of his own men, 
with strict injunctions that no one was to be in any way 
injured or to lose any of his property. Having thus pro- 
vided for the care of his prisoners, he immediately ordered 
up other legions from camp, while those who had come on 
with him were directed to take their turn of rest and then 
to rejoin their old quarters. With these arrangements com- 
pleted, he marched through to Larissa on the same day. 

His own casualties from this battle did not exceed 200 rank 99 
and file, though on the other hand he had to deplore the loss 
of fully thirty centurions — gallant men whom he could ill 
spare. Among the slain also was the Crastinus mentioned 
above, killed by a sword-thrust straight in the face, as he fought 

20 8 Losses on both Sides 

Summer 48 with desperate courage. His conduct had amply justified 
the words he uttered on going into battle. In Caesar's 
judgement the palm of valour In this action belonged to 
Crastinus,: and deep was his sense of gratitude for the man's 
devotion to himself. Of the Pompeian army some 15,000 
were estimated to have fallen,^ while the total number of 
prisoners taken exceeded 24,000, a number which included 
the garrisons of outposts who afterwards surrendered to Sulla, 
besides large bodies also which sought shelter in the neigh- 
bouring townships. Of battalion and company colours 180 
were brought in to Caesar as the total list of trophies from 
the battle, and 9 eagles of distinct legions. Finally it should 
be mentioned that Lucius Domitius, while endeavouring to 
escape from camp to the hills, was overtaken and cut down 
by our cavalry, when his strength had now given out through 
100 While the issue was thus decided on land, a hostile fleet, 
this time under the command of Decimus Laelius, had again 
visited Brindisi. Adopting the same plan of action that 
Libo, it will be remembered, had attempted before him, 
he seized as his base the island off the mouth of the harbour ; 
only to be met by a similar scheme of defence on the part of 
Vatinius, then acting as governor of Brindisi. Having care- 

^ According to a Caesarian officer present, only 6,000 Italians were 
killed. If 15,000 Romans really fell, it is a striking proof of Caesar's 
trustworthiness, when the temptation to minimize the slaughter must have 
been strong. Though Caesar, modestly perhaps, does not mention it, 
Appian says that both before the battle and at the moment of victory 
strict orders were given to spare fellow countrymen. ' They would have 
it so ' ; is said by one of his own officers to have been Caesar's comment as 
he surveyed the stricken field, ' after all my great services, they would have 
condemned me in their courts, had I not appealed to my army.' Suet. 30. 

Further sporadic Attacks of Fomp elan Fleet 209 

fully screened and fitted out a number of small boats, Vatinius Summer 48 

enticed the ships of Laelius to venture inside ; and one of 

these, a five-decker \ having advanced too far, was captured 

in the narrow entrance to the port together with two other 

smaller craft. This success he followed up by stationing along 

the foreshore, just as his predecessor had done before him, 

a series of cavalry patrols to prevent the hostile fleet from 

watering. Laelius, however, had the advantage of a better 

season of the year for purposes of navigation, and bringing up 

water supplies for his force by merchant boats from Corfu and 

Durazzo, showed he was not to be lightly deterred from his 

project : in fact, it was only after the news of the battle fought 

in Thessaly, that either the ignominious loss of his vessels or 

his want of necessary stores could induce him to quit his 

hold upon the island and harbour. 

Almost contemporary with this raid was a descent of Caius loi 
Cassius upon Sicily with his divisional fleet of Syrian, Phoeni- 
cian, and Cilician squadrons. Caesar's own fleet, it must be 
explained, had been divided into two separate commands : 
half of it was stationed at Vibo-on-Straits {Monteleone) under 
the praetor Publius Sulpicius, the other half lay off Messina 
(Messana), under Marcus Pomponius. Yet in spite of these 
dispositions, Cassius succeeded in swooping down with his 
ships upon Messina before any whisper of his coming reached 
the ears of Pomponius, who was thus caught in a state of great 
confusion, with no scouting vessels on the look-out and no 
settled formation in his squadron. The wind was high and 
favoured the design of Cassius. Filling a number of old 
merchantmen with pine, pitch, tow, and other inflammable 
materials, he launched them against the Pomponian fleet with 
' Quinquereme. See note on Trireme, Bk. II, ch. I (6). 



o Further Sporadic j4 Hacks of Pomp eia?i Fleet 

Summer 48 such deadly effect that the whole thirty-fiye vessels, twenty 
being decked boats, were quickly burned to the water-line. 
A widespread panic followed upon this exploit, and notwith- 
standing the presence in Messina of a garrison legion, the 
town was with difficulty retained for Caesar : indeed, had it 
not been that at this very moment the first tidings came 
through of his recent victory on land, conveyed by a chain of 
mounted patrols, the general opinion was that it would inevi- 
tably have been lost. As it was, the fortunate arrival of this 
news made the defence of the city possible, and Cassius there- 
upon sailed away to Vibo to turn his attentions to the squadron 
under Sulpicius. Here, finding our ships to be moored close 
in to shore, owing to their infection with the same general 
panic, his crews prepared to repeat their former tactics. 
Helped by a favourable wind, some forty odd merchantmen 
were carefully fitted out as fireships, and then sent in among 
the enemy's fleet ; and, the fire taking hold on either wing, 
five of their number were soon completely gutted. As the 
flames continued to spread with the force of the gale, the 
detachment of veterans from Caesar's sick-list who had been 
left by him in charge of this fleet could no longer endure the 
insult : without waiting for orders, they manned some of the 
vessels and, putting out to sea, attacked the fleet of Cassius, 
capturing two five-deckers (one of which had the admiral on 
board who only escaped by taking to a boat), and sending two 
of the three-deckers to the bottom. Soon afterwards there 
arrived definite intelligence of thebattle justfoughtinThessaly, 
so explicit as to convince even the Pompeians, who hitherto 
had affected to believe that the reports current were merely the 
inventions of Caesar's officers and friends. With this authentic 
information Cassius removed his squadron from those waters. 

The Flight of Pompeius 

21 I 

Meanwhile it was clear to Caesar that every other object 102 
should be subordinated to the supreme task of pursuing Pom- ^"'"™^'' 4 
peius into whatever corner of the world his flight might have 
taken him ; on no account must he be allowed to collect fresh 
forces and so to renew the war. As fast, therefore, as his 
cavalry could cover the ground, he was now daily pressing 
hard on his heels, having first left orders for one of the legions 
to follow by easier stages. A decree had already been pub- 
lished at Amphipolis ^ in the name of Pompeius, commanding 
the presence of every man of military age in the province, no 
matter whether Greek or Roman, with the object of being 
sworn in for active serv^ice ; but whether he had issued this 
edict in order to avert suspicion and so conceal to the last 
moment his plans for a more protracted flight, or whether 
he contemplated the defence of Macedonia by means of fresh 
levies in the event of not being immediately pursued, was 
a question on which there were no satisfactory means of form- 
ing an opinion. At any rate what he actually did was to lie 
off the town at anchor for a single night, and to summon on 
board his Greek friends, from whom he borrowed money for 
his personal expenses; and then, on the news of Caesar's 
approach, set sail from the place and arrived after a few days 
at Mytilini (JSIytilene). Here he was delayed two days by bad 
weather, after which, having been joined by some other fast 
craft, he continued his voyage to Cilicia, from whence he 
crossed to Cyprus. At Cyprus he was met by intelligence 
that the citadel of Antioch had, as the result of a concerted 
movement on the part of both native inhabitants and the 
Roman citizens settled there in business, been forcibly occu- 
pied with a view to his exclusion from the city ; and that an 

* Oa the Stnima or Karasii, one of the chief cities of S. Macedonia. 
P 2 


The Flight of Pompeius 

Summer 48 express warning had been dispatched to those refugees from 
the battle who were reported as having sheltered in towns of 
the immediate vicinity, that they would do well not to ap- 
proach Antioch *, and that any such step on their part would 
be taken at their own imminent peril. A similar incident had 
happened at Rhodes to Lucius Lentulus, consul the preceding 
year, Publius Lentulus an ex-consul, and to various others. 
These men had arrived off the island in the course of their 
flight after Pompeius, only to find themselves refused ad- 
mission to either town or harbour : an intimation was 
served upon them that they must quit the neighbour- 
hood, and sorely against their will they had been obliged to 
set sail. 

Another cause that helped to determine this attitude of 
the native populations was the rumour of Caesar's advance, 
which by this time was circulating amongst them. 
103 Knowledge of these facts induced Pompeius to abandon all 
design of visiting Syria. He therefore seized the funds of the 
local revenue company, supplementing these by private loans, 
and at the same time took on board ship a large sum of copper 
coinage for war purposes. He then armed a force of 
2,000 men, partly drawn from the staff of the official 
revenue officers, partly pressed from the resident mercantile 
houses, and, incorporating with them such private servants of 
his own friends as their masters considered fit for the enter- 
prise on hand, with this force he arrived at Pelusium '^. Here, 
as chance would have it, he found the Egyptian king, Ptolemy, 
a mere boy in years, at present engaged at the head of a for- 
midable military force in a war with his sister Cleopatra, whom 

^ Capital of Syria. 

* At the most eastern mouth of the Nile, twenty miles east of Port Said. 

Arrives in Egypt ^'^^ is there murdered 213 

a few months earlier he had expelled from the kingdom by the Summer 4S 
help of his kinsmen and supporters ; the two camps of brother 
and sister being only a short distance apart. To him, there- 
fore, Pompeius sent a request that, in consideration of the 
ties of hospitality and friendship which had existed between 
himself and the boy's father, he might be allowed to enter 
Alexandria and to find protection in the monarch's resources 
during this his hour of adversity. Unfortunately his envoys, 
after discharging the duties of their mission, entered into con- 
versation, in rather too unguarded terms, with the royal 
troops, pressing them to take up the cause of their leader, 
and not to look askance upon his present humble circum- 
stances. Of these troops the greater part were old soldiers 
of Pompeius, whom Gabinius had taken over from Pompeius's 
army of the East when succeeding to the governorship of 
Syria, and subsequently had brought across to Alexandria ; 
where, at the close of the war for which they were imported, 
they had been left behind in the service of Ptolemy, the father 
of the present boy. 

The discovery of these advances on the part of the officers 104 
by the king's advisers, who, owing to his minority, were then 
administering the kingdom, determined them at once to take 
action. It may be they were filled with a genuine alarm (so 
at least they afterwards declared), that the tampering with 
the royal army might lead to a military occupation of Alexan- 
dria and Egypt by Pompeius ; or — since misfortune usually 
converts friends to foes — they may have thought it safe to 
show contempt for fallen greatness ; at all events they first 
gave a favourable answer in public to Pompeius's envoys, bid- 
ding him come to the king, and then, secretly conspiring 
amongst themselves, dispatched a certain fellow named 

214 Caesar in Full 'Pursuit 

Summer 48 Achillas, the holder of a command in the royal household 
and a desperado of singular boldness, together with Lucius 
Septimius, an ofHcer of regimental rank, with directions to 
murder Pompeius. These two approached their chief victim 
with greetings of marked cordiality ; and, as he already pos- 
sessed some slight acquaintance with Septimius, who had 
served under him as a company officer ^ in the war with the 
pirates, he was induced to go on board their mere cockleshell 
of a boat along with a few members of his suite. There he 
28 Sept. was foully murdered by Achillas and Septimius ; and with 
like treachery Lucius Lentulus was arrested under the king's 
orders, and was put to death in his dungeons. 
105 To continue now the narrative of Caesar's movements. 
On arrival in Asia Minor he found that an attempt had been 
made by Titus Ampius to remove from Ephesus the treasures 
in the temple of Diana. For this purpose all the Roman 
senators in the province had been summoned to certify to 
the amount of specie taken ; but his own rapid approach 
had disturbed the proceedings, and Ampius had in the mean- 
while taken to flight. Thus for the second time Caesar 
was instrumental in saving the treasures of the Ephesian 
goddess. Equally significant was the well-attested fact that 
in the temple of Minerva at Elis ^, on the very day of his 
successful battle, as was found by a careful calculation of the 
dates, the statue of Victory, whose place in the temple was 
in front of Minerva herself and which had hitherto faced the 
statue of that deity, turned itself round to the temple doors 
with its face towards the entrance. Again, at Antioch in Syria, 

^ Centurion. 

* In the western Peloponnese about twenty-five miles north-west of 

Heaven acclaims the Victor 2 1 f 

twice on the same day there was heard the shout of an army Summer 48 
advancing into battle, and so clear a blast of trumpets that the 
whole body of citizens rushed in full armour to their places 
on the walls. The same portent was repeated at Ptole- 
mais ^ ; while at Bergama (Pergamum) in the inmost recesses 
of the temples, where none but the priests are allowed to enter 
and which the Greeks call ' sanctuaries ' ^, the noise of cymbals 
was distinctly heard : and at Tralles ' in the temple of Victory, 
where a bust of Caesar had been lately consecrated, a palm- 
tree was pointed out as having during those days sprouted 
through the masonry of the roof, between the joints of the 

It was while still in Asia Minor, after a halt of a few days, 106 
that intelligence reached Caesar that Pompeius ha'd been seen 
in Cyprus, leading to the obvious conjecture that Egypt was 
his goal ; not merely on the ground of his own intimate con- 
nexion with that kingdom, hut also because of the other 
signal advantages offered by its position. He accordingly 
embarked with the single legion that he had ordered to 
follow from Thessaly, and a second which had been detached 
from Greece (Achaia) from the command of Quintus Fufius ; 
and with the addition of 800 horse and ten Rhodian men-of- 
war and a few others from Asiatic ports, crossed the sea to 
Alexandria. Of these two legions the present strength was 
only 3,200 men : the remainder of the corps had been unable 
to reach him, some disabled by wounds received in battle, 
others by the exhaustion following on their long and fatiguing 
march. Yet even with such weak supports he had not 
hesitated to continue his advance ; and relying on the moral 

^ Probably Acre in Palestine. ' a^vra, ' the unapproachable.' 

' In Asia Minor on the Menderez (Maeander), nowAidin-Gazelhissar. 

2 1 6 Caesar at Alexandria 

Autumn 48 effect produced by the report of his recent victory he con- 
cluded that all places would prove equally safe for him. 
At Alexandria he heard of the death of Pompeius ; and he had 
no sooner set foot on shore, than he was greeted by a shout 
of challenge from the troops whom the king had left to garrison 
the city, and a crowd was seen coming out to protest against 
the official insignia ^ which were carried before him. Such 
a display, the whole mob declared, was a slight upon the 
royal dignity. 

This disturbance was successfully quelled ; but subsequently, 
owing to the turbulence of the populace, frequent riots 
became of daily occurrence, and in every quarter of the city 
J07 numbers of our troops were killed. Seeing therefore the 
threatening aspect of the situation, Caesar sent orders to 
Asia Minor for a further reinforcement, namely, the 
legions which had quite recently been embodied from the 
surrendered Pompeian infantry : it was impossible for him 
now to draw back, since his own force was effectively cooped 
up in Alexandria by the Etesian winds which so seriously 
impede navigation from that port. 

Pending their arrival, he determined to investigate the 
dispute between the two sovereigns of the country. Such 
a task he regarded as falling distinctly within the sphere of 
Roman interests, and of his own activities as chief magistrate ^ ; 
while the circumstance that it was in his first consulship that a 
treaty of alliance, ratified by both Senate and popular assembly, 
had been negotiated with their father Ptolemy, constituted a 
special claim upon his own good offices. He therefore announced 
his decision that King Ptolemaeus and his sister Cleopatra 
should each disband the armies they had on foot, and fight 
^ The fasces. 2 Consul. 

Internal Condition of Egypt 2 1 7 

out their dispute by process of law before himself rather than Autumn 48 
by an appeal to arms between each other. At that time the 108 
regent in charge of the kingdom during the boy's 
minority was a certain eunuch named Pothinus. This fellow 
now began to protest indignantly, amongst his own ad- 
herents, against the notion of a king being summoned to 
trial ; and having after a while won over some of the king's 
advisers to the support of his scheme, he secretly sent an 
order calling up the native army from Pelusium to Alexandria, 
and appointing to the supreme command the Achillas whom 
we have already mentioned. In a written dispatch, supple- 
mented by a verbal message, he first excited the ambition 
of the newly-promoted generalissimo by private promises 
of his own, further enforced by those of the king, and then 
proceeded to give him minute instructions as to the steps 
he was to take. 

Meanwhile Caesar found that in the will of the late king 
Ptolemy there were set down as joint heirs the senior of his 
two sons and the elder of his two daughters ; and to secure this 
settlement he had added an earnest appeal to Rome, by all that 
was sacred and by the treaties negotiated with us in the capital, 
that these dispositions should not be disturbed. One copy 
of this instrument had been brought to Rome by special 
envoys of the king, to be deposited in the Treasury (though 
owing to the press of public business this had not been carried 
out, the document being stored for safety at the residence 
of Pompeius), while a duplicate version fully signed had been 
left for future reference at Alexandria. The whole matter 109 
was under investigation by Caesar, whose sole desire was to 
effect a settlement between the two rulers in the character 
of a common friend and arbitrator, when the proceedings 

2 1 8 Caesar defied by the Alexandrines 

Autumn 48 were suddenly interrupted by the startling announcement 
that the royal army with all its cavalry was marching on 
Alexandria. In this emergency Caesar, whose forces were by 
no means so numerous that he could safely rely on them if 
compelled to fight outside the walls, had no alternative but 
to confine himself to his own quarter inside the city, and 
there to ascertain the intentions of Achillas. At the same time 
his troops all received orders to remain under arms, and the 
king was strongly urged to send a deputation to Achillas from 
among his own most trusted advisers, to convey to him his 
pleasure in the matter. Two of these were accordingly dis- 
patched, viz. Dioscorides and Serapion, both of them men 
who had visited Rome as plenipotentiaries under the elder 
Ptolemy, in whose counsels they had exercised very consider- 
able influence. These made their way to the Alexandrine, but 
had no sooner entered his presence than, without either 
granting them audience or even ascertaining the object of 
their mission, he gave the word to have them seized and put 
to death. Thereupon one of the two was savagely wounded 
and carried off for dead by the intervention of his attendants ; 
the other was murdered outright. This outrage determined 
Caesar to keep the young king in his own custody ; for not 
only was great weight attached, as he conceived, by the popu- 
lace to the royal title, but the responsibility for the war 
would thus be made to appear the independent action of 
a band of cut-throats rather than the settled determination 
of the sovereign. 
110 With regard to the forces at the command of Achillas, 
neither their number, composition, nor experience rendered 
it safe to hold them in contempt. Fully 20,000 men were at 
his disposal. Of these the backbone consisted of the old 

Nature of their Army 2 1 9 

Gabinian troops, men who by long residence had virtually Autumn 48 
become naturalized Alexandrines, familiar with all the wild 
licence characteristic of that city: the pride of race and 
disciplined habits of Rome had been gradually unlearned : 
they had married native women, and many of them had 
children by these alliances. Their ranks were swelled by the 
sweepings of all the buccaneers and highwaymen that infest 
Syria, the province of Cilicia, and the neighbouring lands,while 
many a convict whose death sentence compelled him to fly 
his own country had foregathered in this city. Besides these 
there was a contingent of our own runaway slaves, who could 
always count on a safe asylum and an assured means of liveli- 
hood in Alexandria, seeing they had only to give in their names 
to be at once enrolled as soldiers. Should any of their number 
be afterwards seized by his lawful owner, there was a perma- 
nent understanding among the troops that he must at once 
be rescued, and any hand laid upon one of their fellows would 
be resisted by them as though their own personal safety were 
threatened ; for they well knew that one and all were involved 
in a similar delinquency. This was the crew whose custom 
it was to demand the lives of kings' ministers, to carve up the 
property of wealthy burgesses, to besiege the royal palace 
with demands for increased pay, to banish and recall from 
banishment at their own sweet wiUj all in obedience to what 
seems an immemorial tradition for an Alexandrine army. 
Finally, there was the cavalry, 2,000 strong. All these were 
old campaigners : they had served in the innumerable wars 
of Alexandria, they had restored Ptolemy to his throne, slain 
two sons of Bibulus, and fought the native Egyptians — beyond 
doubt a formidable record. 

Relying on this material, with a corresponding contempt m 

2 20 Caesar retains Command of the Sea 

Autumn 48 for the weak numbers of his enemy, Achillas now took perma- 
nent occupation of the whole of Alexandria, except the portion 
commanded by Caesar and his troops. His first move was an 
attempt to rush the buildings in which Caesar himself was 
quartered ; but picquets were posted along the streets and 
the attack was successfully met. Simultaneously, fighting took 
place down by the harbour, and here by far the most desperate 
struggle was occasioned. The enemy, dividing his forces, gave 
battle in several thoroughfares at once, and endeavoured by 
sheer weight of numbers to gain possession of the warships that 
were lying there. Of these ships fifty formed the fleet that 
had been recently sent to the support of Pompeius, and after the 
crushing defeat in Thessaly had since returned home : they 
were all either four- or five-deckers *, and constituted a thor- 
oughly equipped and sea-going force. In addition, there were 
the twenty-two regular guardships of Alexandria, decked boats 
every one. Should, therefore, the enemy once succeed in 
seizing this formidable flotilla, they would be able to wrench 
from Caesar his own small squadron, and by their undis- 
puted mastery of the sea cut his communications with the 
outside world, including all possibility of supplies or rein- 
forcements. The action was therefore contested with all the 
obstinacy demanded by the crisis ; for while with one party 
success meant a speedy triumph for their arms, defeat for the 
other meant disaster. Victory, however, rested with Caesar, 
who, recognizing his inability with so weak a force to control 
so wide an area, first set fire to the whole fleet and the rest 
of the ships in the naval yards, and then hastily landed troops 
close up to Pharus. 
112 Pharus is a lighthouse standing upon the island from which 
* Quadriremes or quinqueremes. 

ajid waits for ^Enforcements 


it has taken its name, of immense height, and built on Autumn 4S 
a strikingly massive scale. It is the position of this island 
opposite Alexandria that forms the harbour of that city, 
although at its upper part it is connected with the main town 
by a sea-mole some three-quarters of a mile in length, crowned 
with a narrow causeway and bridge. It is covered with houses 
of the native Egyptians, forming a quarter equal in point of 
size to an ordinary town ; and if any passing ships find them- 
selves a trifle out of their course, either through losing their 
bearings or from stress of weather, they are plundered by its 
inhabitants quite after the manner of professional pirates. 
Owing moreover to the narrowness of the passage, the posses- 
sion of Pharus absolutely controls the entrance to the harbour ; 
and it was the apprehensions excited by this circumstance that 
now led Caesar, while the enemy's attention was engrossed 
by the battle, to land troops, occupy the tower, and establish 
a garrison. He thus secured a safe transit for his oversea 
supplies and reinforcements, which were now summoned by 
express orders from aU the nearest provinces of the Empire. 

In other quarters of the town the day's fighting ended in 
a drawn battle without the definite repulse of either party, 
a result due to the restricted nature of the ground ; and both 
sides having sustained slight casualties, Caesar drew a cordon 
round all the positions of highest strategical value, and on 
them proceeded under cover of night to construct a line of 
defence-works. The quarter so enclosed contained a tiny 
wing of the royal palace where apartments had been found 
for Caesar upon his first arrival, and also a theatre abutting 
on the palace which served as a citadel, and commanded 
approaches both to the harbour and the other naval depots. 
These fortifications were then extended on succeeding days 

2 22 Court Intriguer 

Autumn 48 until they practically formed a curtain-wall effectually pro- 
tecting him from being forced to fight against his will. 

In the midst of these proceedings the younger daughter 
of the late king Ptolemy, in the fond hope that the throne 
was now without an occupant, left her quarters in the palace 
to join the camp of Achillas, where she at once began to co- 
operate with him in the conduct of the war. But a quarrel 
quickly broke out between them on the question of pre- 
cedence, and this diversion proved greatly to the profit of the 
common soldiery, as both parties staked heavily to win their 
good opinion. Meanwhile, the enemy being thus employed, 
Pothinus, the king's guardian and regent of the kingdom, 
although professedly acting in the interests of Caesar, was 
all along busily intriguing by means of secret correspondence 
with Achillas, whom he exhorted not to lose courage but to 
go on and persevere with their enterprise. His agents were, 
however, betrayed and arrested, and he himself thereupon 
put to death by the orders of Caesar. 

Such were the circumstances that occasioned the subse- 
quent Alexandrine war. 


[The reference is always to the chapters of the Latin text as given in 
the margin. The Roman numerals denote the book.] 

Achillas iii 104, 108-II2. 
Acilius, M'. iii 15, 16, 39, 40. 
Acre {Ptolemais) iii 105. 
Acutius Rufus iii 83. 
Adbucillus iii 59. 
Adriatic i 25 ; iii 78. 
Aeginium iii 79. 
(Aelius, L.) Tubero i 30, 31. 
(Aemilius,) M. Lepidus ii 21. 
Afranius, L. i 37-43, 48-53, 60- 
76, 84, 87; iii7, 18; iii 83, 88. 
Africa, North i 30, 31 ; ii 23, 28, 

32, 37- 

the army of iii 10. 
Ahenobarbus see Domitius, 
Albe {Alba) i 15. 24. 
Albici i 34, 56-58 ; ii 2, 6. 
Alesia iii 47. 
Alessio (Lissus) iii 26, 28, 29, 40, 

42, 78. 
Alexandria iii 4, 103-11 2, 
Alexandrine war iii 122. 

army iii no. 
AUobroges iii 59, 63, 79, 84. 
Amantia iii 12, 40, 
Amanus, Mt. iii 31, 
Amphipolis iii 102. 
Ampius, T. iii 105. 
Ancona in, 
Androsthenes iii 80. 
(Annius, T.) Milo iii 2 1, 22. 
Anquillaria ii 23. 
Antioch iii 102, 105. 
Antiochus of Commagene iii 4. 
Antonius : 

(a) C. iii 4, 10, 67. 

Antonius : 

(b) M. i 2, II, 18; iii 24-30, 

34. 40. 46, 65, 89. 
Apollonia iii 5, 11-13, 26, 30, 75, 

78, 79- 
(Appuleius, L.) Saturninus i 7. 
Apulia i 14, 17, 23 ; iii 2. 
Aquitaine {Aqrcitajiia) i 39. 
Ardeche (Helvii AndArecomici) i 35. 
Ariobarzanes iii 4. 
Aries (Arelate) i 36. 
Arta {Acarnania, Amhracia, and 

Amphilochi) iii 36, 56, 58. 
Ascoli (Asculum) i 15. 
Asia Minor (Asia) i 4 ; iii 3-5, 

42, 53, I05-I07' 
Asiatic fleet iii 5. 7, 40, 106. 
Asparagium iii 30, 41, 76. 
Athamania iii 78. 
Athens {Athenae) iii 3. 
Alius : 

(a) T. Labienus i 15 ; iii 13, 19, 

(b) Q. Varus iii 37. 
Attius : 

(a) the Pelignian i 18. 

(b) P. Varus i 12, 13, 31 ; ii 
23-36, 43, 44- 

(Aurelius), M. Cotta i. 30. 
Ausetani i 60. 
Avaricum iii 47. 
Avenca (Celtiberid) i 38. 

Balbus see Cornelius. 

Bergama {Pergamum) iii 31, 105. 

Hessians iii 4. 

2 24 Index of Proper Names 

Bibulus see Calpurnius. 

Bithynia iii 3. 

Boeotia iii 4. 

Brindisi (Brundisium) i 24, 25-28, 

30 ; iii 2, 6, 8, 14, 23-25, 87, 100. 
Brutus see Junius. 

Butrinto {Butkroivm) iii 16. 
By His iii 1 2, 40. 

Cadiz (Gades) ii 18, 20, 21. 
Caecilius ; 

(a) L. Metellus i 33. 

(b) (Qi Metellus Pius) Scipio i 
2, 4. 6; iii 4, 31, 33, 36-38, 
67. 78-83, 88, 90. 

(c) L. Rufus i 23. 

(d) T. i 46. 

Caelius, M. Rufus i 2; iii 20-22. 
Caesar see Julius. 
Cagliari {Carales) i 30. 
Calabria (Bruttium) i 30. 
Calagurris i 60. 
Caleuus see Fufius. 
Calidius, M. i 2. 
Calpurnius : 

(a) M. Bibulus iii 5, 7, 8, 14-18, 

31 ; iii 1 10. 

(b) L. Piso (Caesoninus) i 3. 
Calvinus see Domitius. 
Calvisius, C. Sabinus iii 34, 35, 56. 
Camerino {Camarinuni) i 15. 
Campania i 14. 

Candavia iii II, 79- 

Caninius, C. Rebilus i 26 ; ii 24, 34. 

Canossa (Canusinni) i 24. 

Canuleius, L. iii 43. 

Capitol, the i 6. 

Cappadocia iii 4. 

Capua i 10, 14; iii 21, 'jl. 

Carmona ii 19. 

Casilinum iii 21. 

Cassius : 

(a) C. (Longinus) iii 5, loi. 

(b) L. Longinus iii 34-36, 56. 

(c) Q_. Longinus i 2 ; ii 19, 31. 
Castor see Tarcondarius. 

Cato see Porcius. 

Cenca {Citiga) i 48. 

Ceraunian Mts. iii 6. 

Cilicia iii 3,4, 88, loi, 102, 1 10. 

Cingolo (Cingulum) i 15. 

Claudius : 

(a) C. Marcellus i 6, 14 ; iii 5. 

(b) M. Marcellus i 2. 
Cleopatra iii 103, I07. 
Clodius : 

(a) A. iii 57,90. 

(b) (P. Pulcher) iii 21. 
Commagene see Antiochus. 
Considius, C. Longus ii 23. 
Coponius, C. iii 5, 26. 
Cordova (Cordubn) ii 19-21. 
Corfu (Corcyra) iii 3, 7, 8, 11, 15, 

16, 58, 100. 
Cornelian camp ii 24, 25, 30, 37. 
Cornelius : 

(a) (L.) Balbus iii 19. 

(b) L. Lentulus (Crus) i I, 2, 4, 
5, 14 ; iii 4, 96, 102, 104. 

(c) (P.) Lentulus Marcellinus iii 
62, 64, 65. 

(d) P. Lentulus Spinther i 15, 16, 
21-23; iii 83, 102. 

(e) L. Sulla (Felix) i 4, 5, 7. 

(f) (L.) Sulla Faustus i 6. 

(g) P. Sulla iii 51, 89, 99. 
Cosa i 34 ; iii 22. 

Cotta see Aurelius. 

Cotys iii 4, 36. 

Crassus see Licinius and Otacilius. 

Crastinus C. iii 91, 99. 

Cremona i 24. 

Crete (Crela) iii 4, 5. 

Curio see Scribonius. 

Curius see Vibius. 

Cyclades iii 3. 

Cyprus iii 102, 106. 

Cyrene iii 5. 

Dalmatians iii 9. 
Damasippus see Lici nius. 
Dardanians iii 4. 

Index of Proper Names 227 

Decidius, L. Saxa i 66. 
Deiotarus iii 4. 
Delphi iii 56. 
Diana iii 33, 105. 
Dioscorides iii 109. 
Domitius : 

(a) L. Ahenobarbus 16, 15-23, 

25. 34. 36, 56-58 ; i> 3. 18, 22, 
28, 32 ; iii 83, 89. 

(b) Cn. ii 42. 

(c) Cn. Calvinus iii 34, 36-3S, 
78, 79, 89. 

Domnilaus iii 4. 

Durazzo (^Dyrrachium) i 25, 27 7 
iii 5,9, II, 13, 26, 30, 41,42, 
44. 53, 57, 58, 62, 78-80, 84, 
87, 89, 100. 

Ebro {Hiberus) i 60-63, 65, 68, 

69. 72, 73- 
Egus iii 59, 79. 
Egypt {Aegyptus) iii 3, 5, 40, 104, 

106, no, 112. 
Elis iii 105. 
Ephesus iii 35, 105. 
Epirus4, 12, 13, 42,47, 61, 78,80. 
Ergent (Apsi^s) iii 13, 19, 30. 
Estremadura {Vettones) i 38. 
Etesian winds iii 107. 

Fabius : 

(a) C. i 37, 40, 48. 

(b) the Pelignian ii 35. 
Fano (Fanum) in. 
Fiiustus see Comehus. 
Favonius, M. iii 36, 57. 
Fermo (Firmunt) i 16. 
Flaccus see Valerius. 
Fleginas, C. iii 71. 

Fufius, Q. Calenus i 87 ; iii 8, 14, 

26, 56, 106. 
Fulginius, Q^ i 46. 
Fulvius Postumus iii 62. 

Gabinius, A. iii 4, 103, IIO. 
Gallograecia iii 4. 

Gallonius, C. ii 18, 20. 
Gaul (Gallia) i 6, 7, 29, 33, 39, 
48, 51 ; ii 1,40; iii 2,4, 22, 42, 

59, 79, 87- 
Gergovia iii 73. 
Germany {Germania) i 7, 83 ; iii 

4, 52, 87. 
Giglio {Igilium) i 34. 
Gomphi iii 80, 81. 
Gracchi i 7. 
Greece {Achaia, Graecia) i 25 ; iii 

3, 4, 5> 56,57, 106. 
Greeks iii il, 30, 102, 105. 
Guadalajara {Celtiberia) i 38. 
Guadiana (Anas) i 38. 
Gubbio (Iguviutn) i 12. 

Megesaretus iii 35. 
Htraclia iii 79. 

Hercules, temple of, ii 18, 21. 
Hirrus see Lucilius. 
Huesca {Osca) 160. 

lacetani i 60. 

Iliurgavonenses i 60. 

Illyricum iii 9, 78. 

Isthmus of Corinth iii 56. 

Italy (Italia) i 2, 6,^9, 25, 27, 

29. 30, 35, 48, 63; » 17. 18, 
22, 32; iii I, 4,6, 10, 12, 13, 
18, 21, 22, 29,39, 42, 57,73, 
78, 82, 87. 
North (Gallia Cisalpina) i 10, 
18, 29, 48 ; iii 42, 87. 

Juba 16; ii 25, 26, 36-44. 
Julian law i 14. 
Julius : 

(a) C. Caesar passim 

(b) L. Caesar i 8, 10 ; ii 23. 

(c) Sex. Caesar ii 20. 
(Junius) D, Brutus i 36,56, 57; ii 

3,5.6, 22. 

Klibia (Clupea) ii 23. 
Labienus see Alius. 

226 Index of Proper Names 

Laelius, D. iii 5, 'j, 40, lOO. 
Lanciano (^Frentani) i 23. 
Larino {Larinnni) i 23. 
Larissa iii 80, 81, 96-98. 
Latin festival iii 2. 
Legion : 
(a) Caesar's — 

Eighth i 18 ; iii 89. 

Ninth i 45; iii 45, 46, 62, 
63,66, 67, 89. 

Tenth iii 89, 91. 

Eleventh iii 34. 

Twelfth i 15 ; iii 34. 

Thirteenth 17, 12, 18. 

Fourteenth i 46. 

Twenty-seventh iii 34. 
(b) Pompeius's (see iii 4) — 

First iii 88. 

Third iii 88. 

Cilician iii 4, 88. 

Syrian iii 88. 

' Vernacular ' ii 20. 
Lentulus see Cornelius. 
Lepanto (Naiipactus) iii 35. 
Lepidus see Aemilius. 
Leptis ii 38. 
Libo see Scribonius. 
Liburnian fleet iii 5, 9. 
Licinius : 

(a) M. Crassus iii 31. 

(b) Damasippus iii 44. 
Lissa {Issa) iii 9. 

Livadia {Aetolia) iii 34, 35, 56, 61. 
Longinus see Cassius. 
Lucceius, L. iii 18. 
Lucera {Liicerid) i 24. 
Lucilius Hirrus 115; iii 82. 
Lucretius : 


(b) Vespillo iii 7. 
Lupus see Rutilius. 
Lusitanians i 44, 48. 

Macedonia iii 4, il, 33, 34, 36, 
57, 79, 102. 
Independent iii 39. 

Magius, N. i 24, 26. 

Manlius, L. Torquatus i 24 ; iii 11. 

Marcellinus see Cornelius. 

Marcellus see Claudius. 

Marcius : 

(a) (L.) Philippus i 6. 

(b) Rufus ii 23, 24, 43. 
Marrucini ii 34. 

Marseilles {Massilia) i 34-36, 56- 
58; ii I, 3, 7, 14, 15, 17, 18, 
21, 22. 

Marsi i 15, 20 ; ii 27, 29. 

Medjerda (5agTa£/as) ii 24, 26,38, 

Menedemus iii 34. 

Messina (Messana) ii 3 ; iii 1 01. 

Metellus see Caecilius. 

Metropolis iii 80, 81. 

Milo see Anius. 

Minucius : 

(a) Rufus iii 7. 

(b) Thermus i 12. 
Missolonghi (Calydon) iii 35. 
Morocco {Mauretania) i 6, 39, 60. 
Munatius, L. Plancus i 40. 
Murcus see Statius. 

Mytilene iii 102. 

Naples (Neapolis) iii 21. 
Narbonne (Narho) i 37 ; ii 21. 
Nasidius, L, ii 3, 4, 7. 
Nismes {Volcae) i 35. 
Noricum i 18. 

Numidians ii 25, 38, 39, 41. 
Nymphaeum iii 26. 

Octavius, M. iii 5, 9. 

Octogesa i 61, 68, 70. 

Opimius, M.jii 38. 

Orchomenus iii 56. 

Oricum iii 7, 11-16, 23, 34, 39, 

40, 78, 90. 
Ortona {Marrucini) i 23. 
Osimo (Auximwn) i 12, 13, 15, 

Otacilius Crassus iii 28, 29. 
Oviedo (Cantabri) i 38. 

Index of Proper Names 227 

Palaeste iii 6. 

Parthians i 9 ; iii 31, 82. 

Parthini iii 11, 41, 42. 

Pcdius, Q. iii 22. 

Peligni i 25 ; ii 29. 

Pelusium iii 103, 108. 

Pentima {Corfinium) i 15-20, 23- 

25, 34; ii 28, 32; iii 10. 
Pesaro (Pisaurum) i li, 12. 
Petra iii 42. 
Petreius, M. i 38-43, 53, 61-67, 

72-76, 87 ; ii 17, 18. 
Pharus iii iii, 112. 
Philippus see Marcius. 
Phoenicia iii 3, loi. 
Piacenza (Placentia) iii "J I, 
Piceno [Picenum) i 12, 15, 29. 
Piso see Calpurnius. 
Plancus see Munatius. 
Plotius, M. iii 19. 
Po (Padiis) iii 87. 
Pompeius : 

(a) Cn. (Magnus) the elder i i- 
39. 53, 60, 61, 76, 84; ii3, 17, 
18, 25, 32; iii 1-33, 41-111, 

(b) Cn. the younger iii 4, 5, 40. 
Pomponius, M. iii loi. 

Pontus iii 3, 4. 

(Porcius) M. Cat© (of Utica) i 4, 

30, 32- 
Portugal {Lusitania) i 38. 
Postumus see Fulvius. 
Pothinus iii 108, 112. 
Pozzuoli (Puleoli) iii 71. 
Provence (Gallia Narboiiensis) i 39, 

51; ii I. 
Ptolemy : 

(a) (Auletes) the father iii 4, 103, 
107-110, 112, 

(b) (Dionysus) the son iii 103, 
104, 106-109, 112. 

Puleio, T. iii 67. 
Pupius, L. i 13. 
Pyrenees i 37; iii 19. 

Quintilius, Sex. Varus i 23 ; ii 28. 

Rcbilus see Caninius. 

Rhascypolis iii 4. 

Rhodes iii 5, 26, 27, 102, I06. 

Rhone (Rhodamis) ii I. 

Rimini {AriminutJi) i 8, IO-I2. 

Rodez {Ruleni) i 51. 

Roman citizens i 30 ; ii 18-21 ; 

iii 4, 9, 10, 29, 32, 40, 102. 
Roman people or government, i 7, 

9, 22, 35 ; iii II, 12, 107, 108, 

Roman knights i 17, 23, 77 '' 

ii 18 ; iii 71. 
Rome, the city of, i 2, 3, 5,6, 9, 

I4> 32-34, 53; ii 22, 32; iii I, 

2, 10, 83, 108, 109. 
Roscius, L. i 3, 8, lo. 
Roucillus iii 59, 79- 
Rubrius, L. i 23. 
Rufus see Acutius, Coelius, Marcius, 

Minucius, Sulpicius, VibuUius. 
Rutilius Lupus i 24; iii 56. 

Sabinus see Calvisius. 

Saburra ii 38-42. 

Sacrativir, M. iii 71. 

Sadala iii 4. 

Salonae iii 9. 

Santander (Cantabri) i 38. 

Santiponce (Italica) ii 20. 

Sardinia i 30, 31 ; iii 10. 

Sasino (Sason) iii 8, 

Saturninus i "J. 

Saxa see Decidius. 

Scaeva iii 53. 

Schkumbi (Genusiis) iii 75, 7^* 

Scipio see Caecilius. 

Scribonius : 

(a) C. Curio i 12, 18, 30, 31 ; 
ii 3, 23-43; iii 10. 

(b) Liboi 26; iii 5, 15-18, 23, 
24, 90, 100. 

Segre (Sicoris) i 40, 48, 61-63, 

(Sempronii) Gracchi i 7. 
Septimius, L. iii 104. 

2 28 '. Index of Proper Names 

Serapion iii 109. 

Sertorius Q;^ i 61. 

Servilius, P. iii I, 21. 

Seville {Hispalis.) ii 18, 20. 

Sicily {Sicilia) i 25, 30, 31 ; ii 23, 

30, 32, 34. 37. 43, 44 ; '» io> 

42, 101. 
straits of i 29 ; ii 3 ; iii loi. 
Sierra Moreiia (Saltus Castulo- 

iiensis) i 38. 
Spain {Hispania) i 30, 34, 37-39, 

61, 74, 85-87; ii I, 32,37; iii 

2, 10, 47, 83. 
Spain, Eastern i 22, 29, 38, 39,48, 

49; ii 7, 17, 18, 21. 
Western i 38, 39 ; ii 17-21. 
Spains, the two i 2, 9-1 1, 29, 39, 

85; ii 18, 32; iii 3, 10, 73. 
Spaniards ii 2I, 40; iii 22, 88. 
Sparta {Lacedaemoti) iii 4. 
Spinther see Cornelius. 
Staberius, L. iii 12. 
Statins Murcus iii 15, 16. 
Sulla see Cornelius. 
Sulmona i 18. 
Sulpicius : 

(a) Ser. ii 44. 

(b) P. Rufus i 74; iii loi. 
Susa (Hadnimetum) ii 23. 

Syria i 4, 6; iii 3, 4, 31,32, lOl, 

103, 105, no. 
Syrian fleet iii 5. 
legions iii 4, 88. 

Tarcondarius Castor iii 4. 
Tarragona {Tarraco) i 60, 73, 78 ; 

ii 21. 
Taurois ii 4. 
Terracina i 24. 
Terentius : 

(a) A. Varro iii 19. 

Terentius : 

(b) M. Varro i 38 ; ii 17, 19-21. 
Termoli (Frentani) i 23. 
Theb.'S iii 56. 
Theophanes iii 18. 
Thernius see Minucius. 
Thessaly (Thessalia) iii 4, 5, 34- 

36, 79-82, 100, loi, 106, III. 
Thrace iii 4, 95. 
Thurii iii 21, 22. 
Tiburtius, L. iii 19. 
Tillius, Q.. iii 42. 
Torquatus see Manlius. 
Tralles iii 105. 
Trebonius C. i 36; ii i, 5, 13, 15 ; 

iii 21, 22. 
Triarius see Valerius. 
Tubero see Aelius. 
Tullus see Volcatius. 
Tuticanus Gallus iii 71. 

Utica i 31 ; ii 23-26, 36-38, 44. 

Valerius : 

(a) L. Flaccus iii 53. 

(b) (P.) Flaccus iii 53. 

(c) (Q^ Orca) i 30, 31. 

(d) C. Triarius iii 5, 92. 
Varro see Terentius. 

Varus see Atius, Attius, Qnintilius. 
Var {Varus) i 86, 87. 
Vatinius, P. iii 19, 90, lOO. 
Veglia (Curicta) iii 8, 10. 
Vespillo see Lucretius. 
Vibius Curius i 24. 
Vibo iii loi. 
VibuUius, L. Rufus i 15, 34, 38 ; 

iii 10, II, 15, 18, 22. 
Vistritsa {Haliacmon) iii 36, 37. 
Volcatius Tulliis iii 52. 
Volusenus, C. fii 60. 

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Caesar, C . Julius 

Caesar's civil war with