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Illil! 


iii!' 


LIBRARY 

OF  THE 

University  of  California. 


Class 


CAESAR'S  CONQUEST  OF  GAUL 


^'J- 


'  a'aijuf&  OiyutaU.ttJt  .t 


CAESAE'S 
CONQUEST  OF  OAUL 

AN  HISTOEICAL  NAERATR^E 


(BEIXG  PAET  I.  OF  THE  LAEGEE  WOEK  OX 
THE  SAME  SUBJECT) 


BY 

T.    RICE   HOLMES 

AUTHOR   OF    '  A   HISTORY   OF   THE    IKDIAX   MUTIN~i"  ' 


Hontion 
MACMILLAX    AXD    CO.,    Ldhted 

XE"^  YORK  :  THE  MACMILLAX  COMPANY 

1903 

All  rights  reserved 


First  Edition  November  1899. 

Second  Edition  {omitting  Part  II.)  October  1903. 

Tlie  First  Edition  is  still  in  print. 


a  3/^  6, 


PREFACE 

In  November,  1899,  Messrs.  Macmillan  published  for  me  a 
large  volume,  called  Caesar's  Conquest  of  Gaul,  the  first  part 
of  which  contained  an  historical  narrative  of  the  conquest, 
while  the  second  consisted  of  articles,  systematically  grouped 
in  seven  sections,  on  all  questions  of  Gallic  and  Gallo-Eoman 
history  relating  to  the  narrative.  Professor  Tyrrell,  Mr. 
George  Macmillan,  and  various  critics,  notably  Mr.  Haverfield 
in  the  English  Historical  Review  and  Mr.  Peskett  in  the 
Classical  Rcvievj,  have  suggested  that  the  first  part,  reissued 
as  a  separate  volume,  would  interest  many  readers  who  had 
not  leisure  or  inclination  to  study  the  second.  I  have  been 
guided  by  their  advice ;  and  although  I  doubt  whether  many 
people  in  this  country  would  expect  to  find  any  narrative  of 
the  conquest  of  Gaul  entertaining,  I  hope  that  every  one  who 
endures  to  the  end  of  the  first  chapter  of  this  little  book  will 
find  it  worth  while  to  read  on.  I  have  made  a  few  slight 
alterations  and  added  a  few  sentences  and  footnotes ;  and,  in 
revising  the  narrative,  I  have  taken  note  of  the  observations 
of  eminent  scholars  in  this  country,  in  Prance  and  Germany, 
and  in  the  United  States  of  America,  for  whose  informing 
criticisms  I  am  not  less  grateful  than  for  the  favourable 
opinions  which  they  have  so  generously  expressed.  Two  pre- 
liminary notes  contained  in  the  first  part  of  the  larger  edition 
have  been  omitted.    On  the  other  hand,  most  of  the  references 

V 


vi  PEEFACE 

to  the  second  part  which  were  made  in  footnotes  to  the 
original  narrative  have  been  retained  in  this  edition  for  the 
benefit  of  any  readers  who  may  care  to  learn  more  of  the 
subject ;  and  I  hope  that  some  few  may  not  rest  content  with 
reading  the  narrative,  but  may  feel  moved  to  consult  Part  II. 
of  the  original  edition,  which  is  still  in  print. 

September  6,  1903. 


PREFACE 

TO  THE  LARGER  EDITION 

As  this  book  has  far  outgrown  my  original  conception,  I  will 
explain  how  it  came  to  assume  its  existing  form.  Eleven  years 
ago  it  occurred  to  me  that  an  English  narrative  of  Caesar's 
conquest  of  Gaul  might  help  to  relieve  the  weariness  of  the 
schoolboys  whose  lot  it  is  to  flounder,  in  ceaseless  conflict  with 
the  Ablative  Absolute,  through  the  pages  of  the  Commentaries  ; 
might  help  them  to  realise  that  those  pages  were  not  written 
for  the  purpose  of  inflicting  mental  torture,  but  were  the  story 
of  events  which  did  really  happen,  and  many  of  which  rival  in 
interest  the  exploits  of  Cortes  or  of  Clive.  I  hoped  too  that 
a  few  "  general  readers  "  might,  if  they  could  overcome  their 
aversion  to  the  title  of  the  book,  find  something  to  interest 
them  in  its  contents.  In  my  ignorance  I  promised  myself  a 
comparatively  easy  task.  Certain  chapters  of  history,  which  I 
had  written  before,  had  cost  me  prolonged  research  and  anxious 
toil.  For  the  history  of  the  Gallic  war,  on  the  other  hand, 
I  imagined  that  virtually  the  sole  original  authority  was  the 
Memoirs  of  the  conqueror.  Virtually  the  sole  original  authority, 
but  so  great  a  one  that  it  would  be  impossible,  I  thought,  for  a 
man  who  honestly  worked  upon  it  to  produce  a  really  bad  book. 
So  I  said  to  myself.  Let  me  once  master  the  Commentaries,  and 
it  will  go  hard  with  me  if  I  cannot,  with  the  aid  of  Napoleon's 
Histoire  de  Jules  C^sar,  and  sundry  other  books  which  I  must 
of  course  consult,  evolve  from  such  material  a  readable  narra- 
tive. I  shall  be  spared  the  labour  of  searching  through  Blue 
Books,  forgotten  memoirs  and  dusty  bundles  of  MSS.     It  is 

vii 


viii         PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION 

needless  to  say  that  I  soon  found  out  my  mistake.  The  list 
of  the  "  sundry  other  books "  was  continually  lengthening. 
Though  for  the  narrative  as  a  whole,  Caesar  is  virtually  the 
sole  original  authority — for  Plutarch  and  Suetonius,  Dion 
Cassius,  Florus  and  Orosius  do  not  count  for  much — yet,  in 
order  to  understand  his  military  system  and  to  supplement  the 
information  which  he  gives  on  certain  points,  we  are  obliged 
to  have  recourse  to  many  other  writers,  ancient  and  mediffival, 
historians,  geographers,  chroniclers,  compilers  of  itineraries. 
He  has  left  many  questions  obscure, — questions  of  geography, 
of  ethnology,  of  sociology,  of  religion,  of  politics,  and  of  mili- 
tary science.  To  throw  light  upon  these  questions,  and  to 
explain  the  difficulties  in  his  language,  has  engaged  the  labour 
of  a  host  of  scholars, — geographers,  antiquaries,  anthropologists, 
ethnologists,  archseologists,  military  specialists,  philologists, 
learned  editors  ;  and  the  works  which  they  have  produced,  the 
greater  part  of  which  are  scattered  in  the  learned  periodicals 
of  foreign  countries,  would  fill  a  large  library.  If  the  bulk  of 
these  works  are  mainly  controversial  or  exegetical,  if  they  are 
largely  devoted  to  the  discussion  and  elucidation  of  ancient 
texts,  yet  on  this  point  or  on  that  many  of  them  are  virtually 
original  authorities.  They  contain  scraps  of  genuine  informa- 
tion, which  enable  one  to  fill  up  gaps  in  the  memoirs  of  the 
conqueror.  Excavators  have  discovered  disputed  sites.  Coins, 
inscriptions,  rusty  weapons,  and  even  skulls  have  added  items 
to  our  store  of  knowledge.  Soldier-scholars,  trained  to  observe 
the  geographical  features  of  a  country,  have  travelled,  Com- 
mentaries in  hand,  through  the  length  and  breadth  of  France 
and  Belgium  and  Alsace  and  Switzerland ;  and,  if  prejudiced 
zeal  or  local  patriotism  have  often  misled  them,  their  united 
labours  have  not  been  in  vain. 

Nor  was  this  all.  It  was  not  enough  for  my  purpose  merely 
to  write  a  narrative  of  the  conquest.  I  was  obhged  of  course 
also  to  write  an  introduction,  in  order  to  render  my  narrative 
of  the  conquest  intelligible  ;  and  gradually  it  became  evident 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAKGER  EDITION  ix 

that,  if  I  wished  to  avoid  defrauding  and  insulting  the  pur- 
chasers whom  I  hoped  to  attract,  even  this  brief  chapter  could 
uot  be  written  without  recourse  to  the  most  recondite  materials. 
Since  the  publication  of  the  standard  histories  of  Thierry, 
Mommsen,  Merivale  and  others,  new  light  had  been  thrown 
upon  the  ethnological  and  other  questions  which  I  had  set 
myself  to  handle.  Some  opinion  I  must  hazard  regarding  the 
degree  of  political  development  which  the  Gauls  had  reached  ; 
and,  if  it  were  to  be  worth  printing,  I  must  form  it  at  first 
hand.  I  had  no  intention  of  writing  a  history  of  the  Gauls  : 
my  subject  was  only  their  conquest  by  Julius  Caesar ;  but  I 
was  bound  to  take  as  much  pains  to  understand  their  history 
as  if  I  had  been  ambitious  of  writing  it.  As  I  plunged  deeper 
and  deeper  into  the  slough,  I  saw  that  many  of  the  problems 
were  insoluble  ;  but  this  did  not  absolve  me  from  the  duty  of 
grappling  with  them.  Even  if  a  historical  or  geographical 
problem  cannot  be  solved  with  mathematical  certainty,  prob- 
ability may  be  attainable ;  and  if  one  solution  is  as  good  or 
as  bad  as  another,  the  reader  has  a  right  to  ask  the  reason 
why.  It  is  something  even  to  fix  precisely  the  extent  of 
one's  ignorance.  Either  I  must  leave  the  subject  alone,  or  I 
must  master  it.  If  the  study  of  Caesar  is  arduous,  it  is  fas- 
cinating. Year  after  year  I  read  on  and  on,  quite  as  much  for 
the  delight  of  learning  as  with  the  ambition  of  instructing. 
And  I  determined  to  do  my  best  to  produce  something  which 
should  not  only  be  useful  to  teachers  and  interesting  to  general 
readers,  but  should  also  be  worthy  of  the  notice  of  scholars  and 
of  students  of  the  art  of  war. 

To  praise  the  Commentaries  of  Caesar,  laudafos  toties  a 
Iciudafis,  would  be  almost  impertinent.  But  I  may  be  allowed 
to  say  why  I  hope  that  a  better  fate  may  yet  be  in  store  for 
them  than  to  serve  as  a  mere  whetstone  for  gerund-grinders. 
At  present,  I  believe  that  the  book  is  rarely  used  in  education, 
at  least  in  this  country,  except  by  young  boys,  and  never  read 
through  by  them.      But,  even  if  only  one  or  two  of  the  seven 


X  PREFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION 

Commentaries  can  be  read,  they  can  at  all  events  be  read  not 
merely  as  a  lesson  in  construing  but  also  as  history.  Something, 
I  gladly  acknowledge,  has  already  been  done  to  promote  this 
object.  Much, however,  still  remains  to  be  done.  Unfortunately, 
the  editions  of  the  Commentaries  which  have  been  published 
in  this  country  are  defective,  especially  in  the  department  of 
geography.  Most  of  the  editors  are  far  too  prone  to  submit 
to  the  authority  of  Napoleon.  Those  of  them  who  have  worked 
in  the  most  intelligent  spirit,  sometimes,  for  want  of  drudgery, 
lead  their  readers  farthest  astray.  I  know  of  one  who,  inspired 
by  the  hope  of  firing  the  imagination  of  youthful  scholars, 
embellished  his  edition  with  pictures  with  which  cmly  one 
fault  could  be  found, — that  the  greater  number  represented 
places  where  Caesar  had  never  been.  If  a  little  knowledge  is 
a  dangerous  thing,  a  little  research  is  labour  thrown  away.  The 
fact  is  that,  if  a  man  professes  to  explain  the  geography  of  the 
Gallic  war,  he  must  do  one  of  two  things.  Either  he  must  go 
into  the  subject  as  an  independent  inquirer,  pursuing  his  re- 
searches whithersoever  they  may  lead  him — and  to  do  this 
requires  an  amount  of  labour  so  enormous  that  it  would  not 
pay  the  editor  of  a  school-book  to  undertake  it — or  he  must 
take  Napoleon,  or  some  such  writer,  as  his  guide ;  in  which 
case  he  will  assuredly  be  led  into  a  great  many  mistakes.^ 

Nor  is  there  any  reason,  apart  from  the  consideration  of 
what  subjects  are  most  remunerative,  why  Caesar  should  only 
be  used  as  an  elementary  text-book.  The  reform  which  I 
hope  to  see  one  day  accomplished  is  that  he  should  be  read 
by  more  advanced  students  as  well.  Boys  in  the  highest 
class  of  a  public  school  could  easily  read  the  whole  work 
through,  side  by  side  with  other  authors,  in  the  course  of  a 
couple  of  years.  By  doing  so,  their  knowledge  of  Latin  would 
gain  at  least  as  much  as  their  knowledge  of  history, 

^  I  may  be  allowed  to  refer  to  an  article  which  I  contributed  to  the  West- 
minster Review  of  August  1892,  pp.  176-7.  The  really  valuable  part  of  the 
Emperor's  book  is  that  which  is  based  upon  the  results  of  Colonel  Stotfel's 
excavations. 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION  xi 

I  do  not  know  whether  educationists  will  consider  this 
ideal  desirable.  But  is  it  even  attainable  ?  Not  certainly 
at  present.  It  does  not  "  pay  "  to  teach  Caesar  to  the  more 
advanced  scholars  of  public  schools.  If  there  is  ever  to  be  a 
reform,  it  must  begin  with  the  universities.  And  there  is 
another  class  of  students  for  whom  the  Commentaries  would 
be  peculiarly  appropriate, — the  candidates  for  the  Eoyal 
Military  Academy  and  for  the  Eoyal  Military  College. 

But  this  book  is  not  addressed  only,  not  even  primarily, 
to  teachers  ;  and  for  pupils,  in  its  present  form,  it  is  of  course 
too  costly  and  too  large.  The  narrative  is  addressed  both  to 
scholars  and  to  those  general  readers,  civil  and  military,  who 
are  interested  in  history.  The  second  part  is  addressed  in  the 
first  instance  to  scholars ;  and  if  it  wins  their  approval,  I 
hope  that  the  labour  spent  upon  it  will  not  repel  other  readers 
who  are  wiUing  to  be  interested  in  the  subject.  Of  all  that 
has  been  done  in  France,  Germany,  Italy  and  Belgium  to 
solve  the  problems  of  Gallic  history  nothing  is  known  in  this 
country,  except  to  a  few  students.  And  yet  to  those  who  care 
for  history  the  study  would  be  full  of  entertainment.  The 
story  of  the  conquest  of  Gaul,  if  that  of  any  war  of  antiquity, 
is  still  worth  reading ;  for  not  only  were  the  operations  in- 
trinsically interesting,  but  their  results  are  of  permanent 
importance.  Mr.  Freeman  was  right  when  he  called  the 
conquest  "  one  of  the  most  important  events  in  the  history  of 
the  world."  ^  The  war  with  Hannibal,  and  it  alone,  rivals  the 
Gallic  war  in  interest.  And  the  Gallic  war  has  this  great 
advantage  over  the  war  with  Hannibal,  that  we  know  far 
more  about  it.  Viewed  simply  as  military  history,  intelligible 
without  being  technical,  the  Commentaries  are  by  far  the  most 
valuable  work  of  antiquity:  they  are  among  the  most  valuable 
of  any  age.^     Let  any  soldier  who  possesses  a  fair  knowledge 

^  General  Sketch  of  European  History,  1874,  p.  77. 

-  I  am  not  sure  that  the  Civil  War  is  not  even  more  interesting  than  the 
Gallic  War;  for  in  his  later  work  Caesar  describes  the  campaigns  which  he  con- 


xii  PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION 

of  Latin  read  Livy's  description  of  the  battle  of  Cannae  :  let 
him  then  read  Caesar's  description  of  the  battle  with  the 
Nervii,  and  he  will  have  made  up  his  mind.  He  will  appreciate 
the  difference  between  military  histoiy  as  written  by  a  mere 
literary  artist  and  military  history  as  written  by  a  literary 
artist  who  was  also  a  general. 

I  said  that  I  would  not  take  upon  myself  to  praise  the 
CommentciTies:  but  when  one  has  derived  great  and  wholesome 
pleasure  from  a  book,  it  is  hard  to  refrain  from  expressing 
one's  gratitude  and  admiration.  Xot  to  repeat  encomiums 
that  are  familiar  to  all  who  take  any  interest  in  the  classics, 
I  will  only  speak  my  own  thoughts  ;  for  I  would  fain  persuade 
all  who  have  not  wholly  forgotten  their  Latin — all  who  love 
good  literature ;  all  who  can  appreciate  an  informing  story 
well  and  truly  told — to  get  a  copy  of  Caesar,  and  read  him 
through  from  end  to  end.  I  sometimes  wish  that  the  book 
had  never  been  used,  in  the  way  it  has  been  used,  as  a  school- 
book  at  all.  For  the  reminiscences  of  the  Fourth  Form  are  at 
once  so  \'ivid  and  so  dreary,  that  even  classical  scholars,  many 
of  them,  pass  through  life  without  reading  this  great  classic. 
In  boyhood  they  plodded  through  the  pages,  chapter  by 
chapter,  forgetting  one  chapter  before  they  began  the  next, 
reading  one  book  and  missing  the  others,  and  of  the  whole 
story  or  even  of  single  episodes  forming  no  idea.  Some 
critics  say  that  the  narrative  is  dull,  cold  and  colourless.  I 
do  not  believe  that  any  one  would  maintain  these  charges  if 
he  read  the  book  rapidly  through  ;  and  otherwise  no  story  can 
be  fairly  judged.  Macaulay  himself  might  be  dull,  if  he  were 
read  by  a  foreigner  at  the  rate  of  a  single  paragraph  a  day. 
Caesar  certainly  did  not  pour  out  his  spirit  with  the  fervid 
passion  of  a  Napier.  But  if  a  man's  heart  beats  faster  when 
he  reads  how  Badajoz  was  stormed  and  how  "  six  thousand 
unconquerable  British  soldiers "  fought  their   way  up  "  the 

ducted  against  civilised  enemies,  one  of  whom  was,  as  a  strategist  and  tactician, 
perhaps  his  equal.    (See  H.  A.  Bruce'sZj/e  of  General  Sir  William  Xapier,  ii.  341. 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION        xiii 

fatal  hill  "  of  Albuera,  lie  will  not  be  unmoved  by  Caesar's 
account  of  the  battle  with  the  Xervii  or  of  the  last  struggle  of 
Yercingetorix.  If  his  eyes  become  dim  when  they  light  on 
iSTapier's  epitaph  on  Colonel  Eidge — "  And  no  man  died  that 
night  with  more  glory ;  yet  many  died,  and  there  was  much 
glory  " — he  will  hardly  keep  down  a  tear  when  he  reads  how 
Sextius  Baculus  arose  and  saved  the  camp  at  Aduatuca, 
"  facing  fearful  odds,"  till  he  was  borne  back  fainting  to  his 
sick-bed.  No,  Caesar  is  not  dull,  except  to  minds  enervated 
by  sensational  reading.  There  is  no  tinsel  in  his  narrative  : 
but  it  is  not  void  of  colour.  His  style  is  severe  :  but  it  is  not 
frigid.  Like  Thucydides  and  the  historian  of  the  Acts  of  the 
Apostles,  he  has  no  sentimentality,  but  no  lack  of  sentiment. 
His  passion  never  breaks  from  his  control :  but  it  communicates 
itself  to  us.  Intent  simply  on  telling  his  tale,  he  rises  without 
an  effort,  whenever  the  subject  inspires,  to  genuine  eloquence. 
It  is  true  that  that  swift  narrative  often  baffles  curiosity,  even 
when  curiosity  is  legitimate :  but  it  is  idle  to  wish  a  good 
book  other  than  it  is.  Enough  that  this  book  is  worthy  of  its 
theme  and  of  its  author.  We  know  on  the  highest  authority 
that  even  in  our  age  the  soldier  who  means  to  study  his  pro- 
fession cannot  afford  to  neglect  the  Commentaries}  And  if  a 
time  should  ever  come  when  for  purely  professional  purposes 
they  shall  have  lost  their  value,  they  will  still  be  worth  reading 
for  themselves.'     They  were  written,  with  a  purpose  no  doubt 

^  "The  statement,"  says  General  Maurice  {War,  1891,  p.  12),  "  of  the 
most  brilliant  and  successful  general  of  the  British  army  of  to-day  appears  to 
be  indisputable  that  a  perusal  of  the  words  of  even  Caesar  himself  will  suggest 
to  any  thoughtful  soldier  who  knows  something  also  of  modern  war,  reflec- 
tions that  he  may  afterwards  recall  with  advantage  as  applicable  to  modern 
campaigns."  (See  Lord  Wolseley's  The  Soldier  s  Pocket-Book,  5th  ed.,  p.  286.) 
Tlie  great  Napoleon,  himself  a  diligent  student  of  the  Commentaries,  recom- 
mended all  aspiring  officers  to  read  them.    {JUmoires,  notes  et  melanges,  ii.  155.) 

-  "La  imrtie  divine  de  I'art,"  writes  Colonel  Stoflfel  {Hist,  de  Jicles  Cesar, 
Guerre  civile,  i.  v.),  "est  restee  la  meme  et  elle  ne  changera  jamais  .  .  .  I'etude 
des  campagnes  de  Cesar  est  fertile  en  renseignements.  On  y  trouvera  I'applica- 
tion  presque  constante  des  vrais  principes  :  tenir  ses  forces  reunies,  n'etre 
vulnerable  nuUe  part,  marcher  avec  rapidite  sur  les  points  importants,  s'en 
rapporter  aux  moyens  moraux,  a  la  reputation  de  ses  armes,  a  la  crainte  qu'on 


xiv         PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION 

but  still  in  the  main  honestly,  by  the  greatest  man  of  the 
world  who  has  ever  lived ;  and  men  of  the  world  who  are 
also  lovers  of  literature  will  best  appreciate  and  most  enjoy 
them.  Whoever  cares  for  a  great  book  in  a  small  compass, 
and  will  give  it  the  attention  that  it  demands ;  whoever  can 
appreciate  literary  qualities  that  have  fallen  out  of  fashion 
but  will  have  their  turn  again — masculine  strength,  simplicity, 
directness,  reserve,  relevancy;  and,  above  all,  the  natural 
dignity  that  belongs  to  "  the  foremost  man  of  all  this  world  " 
writing  the  history  that  he  had  himself  made — whoever  cares 
for  these  things  should  read  Caesar's  Commentaries,  and  he 
will  have  his  reward.^ 

Let  me  try  to  explain  the  scope  of  my  own  book.  It  does 
not  narrate  the  events  of  the  conquest  in  precisely  the  same 
detail,  from  first  to  last,  in  which  Caesar  narrated  them ;  for 
such  a  narrative,  even  if  it  were  skilfully  composed,  would 
inevitably  weary  a  modern  reader ;  and  where  it  wearied,  it 
would  also  fail  to  instruct.  Caesar  doubtless  knew,  though  it 
was  not  his  way  to  say  so,  that  his  book  would  be  a  KTrj^ia  e? 
aei :  but  he  wrote,  first  of  all,  for  his  own  generation ;  and, 
regarded  as  material  for  history,  some  of  his  matter,  if  only  a 
little,  has  lost  its  interest.  Nothing,  for  instance,  would  be 
gained  by  narrating  in  full  detail  the  campaign  of  Crassus  in 
Aquitania.  The  general  reader  would  be  bored  by  what  he 
could  not  but  regard  as  an  anticlimax  to  the  more  dramatic 
struggle  of  Caesar  with  the  Veneti;  and  the  student  of  Eoman 
warfare  would  learn  nothing  that  he  might  not  learn  as  well 
or  better  from  a  study  of  the  operations  which  Caesar  con- 
inspire  et  aussi  aux  moyens  politiques  pour  maintenir  dans  la  fidelite  ses  allies, 
dans  I'obeissance  les  jieuples  conquis  ;  se  donner  toutes  les  chances  possibles 
pour  s'assurer  la  victoire  sur  le  champ  de  bataille  ;  pour  cela  faire,  y  r(.nmir 
toutes  ses  troupes.  On  y  remarquera  la  promptitude  dans  I'execution,  I'liabilete 
a  profiter  de  la  victoire.  Eniin  on  reconnaitra  chez  Cesar  .  .  .  un  chef  .  .  . 
en  qui  ni  la  bonne  ni  la  mauvaise  fortune  .   .   .  ne  troublent  I'equilibre." 

^  But  he  will  not  appreciate  the  forbearance  of  Caesar's  character  unless 
he  goes  on  to  read  the  Commentaries  on  the  Civil  War.  See,  for  instance, 
i.  71-85,  and  Long's  Decline  of  the  Roman  Repuhlic,  v.  63-4,  66,  71-4. 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION    xv 

ducted  in  person.  On  the  other  hand,  of  such  events  as  the 
siege  of  Avaricum,  the  blockade  of  Alesia,  the  campaign  of 
that  great  marshal,  Labienus,  against  the  Parisii,  indeed  of 
almost  every  operation  of  the  war,  I  have  tried  to  give  a  full 
and  clear  account,  which  might  at  once  satisfy  professional 
and  interest  general  readers.  Moreover,  knowledge  derived 
from  personal  exploration  of  the  country,  from  the  results  of 
excavation,  from  Cicero's  letters  and  other  ancient  authorities, 
from  the  researches  of  anthropologists,  and  from  various 
monuments,  has  made  it  possible,  as  the  reader  of  the  Second 
Part  will  discover,  to  fill  up  certain  gaps  in  Caesar's  narrative. 
The  two  expeditions  to  Britain  I  have,  of  course,  not  described 
at  all,  but  only  made  such  a  passing  allusion  to  them  as  was 
necessary  to  a  right  understanding  of  my  subject, — the  conquest 
of  Gaul.  I  do  not  profess  to  have  followed  the  whole  of 
Caesar's  track,  because  the  thing  is  impossible :  only  sections 
of  the  track  can  be  traced  with  certainty,  and  we  often  have 
to  be  content  with  the  knowledge  of  the  general  direction  of 
his  march.  But  I  have  travelled  long  distances  in  order  to 
explore  the  known  sites  at  which  important  events  occurred. 
I  hold  that  discussions  on  questions  of  evidence  ought  to  be 
rigidly  excluded  from  narrative ;  and  my  narrative  therefore 
takes  for  granted  the  conclusions  at  which  I  have  arrived  in 
the  Second  Part  of  the  book.  Let  me  take  the  opportunity  of 
expressing  my  gratitude  to  Colonel  Stoffel,  the  principal  col- 
laborator of  the  late  Emperor  Napoleon,  who  has  sent  me  a 
most  interesting  account,  which  will  be  found  on  pp.  xxviii.-xxx., 
of  the  method  by  which  he  discovered  Caesar's  camps  and 
entrenchments  near  Mont  Auxois  (Alesia)  and  at  other  places  ; 
and  also  to  Major-General  J.  F.  Maurice  and  Major-General 
Sir  Coleridge  Grove,  who  allowed  me  to  consult  them  on 
certain  military  questions,  which  are  discussed  in  Part  II., 
and  whose  opinions,  I  was  glad  to  find,  generally  confirmed 
my  own  conclusions. 

One  word  re^ardinE^  the  Second  Part  of  this  volume.     I 


xvi         PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION 

dare  say  the  impatient  reader,  who  measures  its  length  against 
that  of  the  narrative,  will  be  inclined  to  reverse  Prince  Hal's 
dictum,  and  cry,  "  Oh,  monstrous  !  but  one  half-pennyworth  of 
sack  to  this  intolerable  deal  of  bread. "  But  the  remedy  is  in 
his  own  hands.  It  is  not  for  me  to  warrant  the  quality  of 
my  sack  :  but  whoever  has  no  appetite  for  the  bread  can  leave 
it  untouched.  It  happened  once  at  a  dinner  party  that  the 
lady  whom  I  had  taken  in  asked  me  whether  I  had  read  an 
account  of  a  certain  battle  by  a  famous  historian.  I  replied 
that  I  had  not,  but  that,  if  the  critics  were  to  be  believed,  it 
was  most  likely  full  of  mistakes.  "  What  does  that  matter," 
rejoined  my  neighbour,  "  so  long  as  he  makes  a  good  battle  of 
it  ? "  It  was  a  delicious  little  speech ;  and  I  verily  believe 
that,  if  it  had  been  addressed  to  the  late  Mr.  Freeman,  he 
would  not  have  had  the  heart  to  scold  the  lady.  For  my  part, 
I  have  always  been  grateful  to  her  for  her  frank  avowal.  She 
made  it  so  clear  to  me  that  the  majority  of  readers  who  take 
up  a  history  care  nothing  whether  it  is  accurate  or  not,  pro- 
vided it  is  interesting.  Still,  while  I  should  like  to  think  I 
had  succeeded  in  "  making  a  good  battle  of  it,"  I  do  like  to 
make  sure  that  this  or  that  statement  is  true  before  committing 
it  to  paper ;  and  so,  for  my  own  satisfaction  and  for  the  satis- 
faction of  scholars  and  the  few  general  readers  who  are  not 
satisfied  with  results,  but  want  to  know  the  evidence  on  which 
they  are  based,  I  have  written  my  Appendix.  Those  who 
are  at  all  familiar  with  the  difficulties  of  the  subject  will  not 
think  that  it  has  run  to  an  undue  length.-^  For  a  writer  who 
deals  with  ancient  history  is  at  one  great  disadvantage  as 
compared  with  a  writer  wdiose  period  falls  within  more  recent 
times.  He  is  obliged  to  spend  years  of  labour  in  finding  out 
the  truth  on 'matters  of  geography,  military  science  and  the 
like,  which  his  fellow -labourer  finds  ready  to  his  hand. 

My  object  in  writing  the  Second  Part  has  been  to  determine 

1  Long  indeed  remarks  [Decline  of  the  Roman  Reimblic,  iv.  4)  that  an 
adequate  commentary  on  Caesar's  memoirs  "  would  fill  several  volumes  "  ;  but 
this  was  the  estimate  of  a  man  who  had  not  attempted  the  task. 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION        xvii 

what  can  and  what  cannot  be  proved  in  regard  to  those  points 
which  are  still  in  dispute,  and  to  furnish  readers  with  the 
materials  for  forming  their  own  opinion.  My  method  has  been 
not  only  to  state  my  own  reasons  for  the  opinions  which  I 
have  formed,  but  also  to  present,  in  the  briefest  possible  com- 
pass, the  reasons  for  the  views  from  which  I  dissent.  It  is 
true  that  a  point  can  hardly  be  called  disputed  when  a  decision, 
all  but  unanimously  accepted,  is  cavilled  at  by  a  few  crotcheteers. 
Astronomers  do  not  waste  their  time  in  defending  the  conclu- 
sions of  Copernicus  and  Kepler  against  the  assaults  of  "  Paral- 
lax '* ;  and  I  once  thought  that  it  would  not  be  worth  while  to 
answer  the  objections  of  the  antiquaries  who,  even  after  the 
appearance  of  the  famous  article  by  the  Due  d'Auraale  in  the 
Revue  des  Deux  Moncles,  of  the  Dictionnaire  archeologique  de  la 
Gaide,  of  M.  A.  de  Barthelemy's  admirable  article  in  the  Revue 
des  Questions  Historiqites,  and  of  Ernest  Desjardins's  candid 
recantation,  persisted  in  identifying  Alesia  with  Alaise.  But, 
for  reasons  which  I  have  given  in  the  Appendix,  I  decided  that 
it  would  be  expedient  to  treat  M.  Quicherat  and  his  school, 
and  even  M.  Maissiat,  with  more  respect  than  "  Parallax." 

So  far  as  I  am  aware,  this  is  the  only  English  narrative 
which  deals  specially  with  Caesar's  conquest  of  Gaul.  Narra- 
tives more  or  less  detailed  are  to  be  found  in  Mr.  Eroude's 
Caesar,  in  Mr.  Warde  Fowler's  Julius  Caesar,  in  Colonel  Dodge's 
Caesar,  in  Dean  Merivale's  History  of  the  Romans  render  the 
Empire,  in  Long's  Decline  of  the  Roman  Rejmblic,  and  in  the 
English  translations  of  Mommsen's  Romische  Geschichte,  the 
late  Emperor  Napoleon's  Histoire  de  Jules  C6sar,  and  Duruy's 
Histoire  des  Romains.  None  of  these  writers,  however,  makes 
any  systematic  and  comprehensive  attempt  to  discuss  doubtful 
points ;  and  even  the  von  Gijlers,  father  and  son,  in  Ccisars 
Gallischer  Krieg,  which  has  not  been  translated,  have  not  re- 
garded this  task  as  falling  within  their  scope.  Indeed  there 
has  not  hitherto  appeared  in  any  language  a  book  which 
attempts  to  collect,  to  co-ordinate  and  to  estimate  the  results 


xviii       PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAKGEE  EDITION 

of  the  innumerable  researches  which  have  aimed  at  throwing 
light  upon  the  problems  of  Gallic  history,  and  most  of  which  are 
practically  inaccessible.  Mommsen,  strictly  subordinating  his 
narrative  to  his  great  historical  scheme,  goes  into  details  hardly 
at  all.  Mr.  Eroude  writes,  not  as  a  military  historian  but  as 
the  biographer  of  Caesar ;  and  his  brilliant  sketch,  which  has 
been  as  enthusiastically,  if  not  as  widely,  admired  as  his  larger 
works,  necessarily  omits  much  that  would  interest  not  only 
military  but  even  general  readers.  On  geographical  questions 
he  almost  invariably  follows  Napoleon ;  and  his  book  would 
certainly  have  been  not  less  trustworthy  than  it  is  if  he  had 
never  looked  at  any  other  commentary.  The  scheme  of  his 
work  and  the  rules  of  art  compel  him  to  dismiss  battles,  such 
as  that  with  the  Helvetii  or  Ariovistus,  in  a  single  sentence ; 
even  when  he  is  describing  such  important  operations  as  the 
siege  of  Avaricum  or  the  attack  on  Gergovia,  he  leaves  very 
much  to  the  imagination  of  his  readers ;  and  throughout  his 
narrative  he  draws  freely  upon  his  own.^  Indeed,  as  he 
apparently  wrote  the  entire  work  in  less  than  a  year,-  it  is 
safe  to  say  that  he  did  not  waste  much  time  in  investigation. 
Colonel  Dodge's  account,  which,  like  Mr,  Fowler's  brief  sketch, 
did  not  appear  until  the  rough  draft  of  my  own  narrative  had 
been  completed,  is  sufficiently  full :  but  he  too,  like  Mr.  Froude, 
is  a  faithful  follower  of  Napoleon ;  and  Napoleon,  as  I  shall 
show,  makes  many  serious  mistakes.  The  colonel  claims  credit 
for  having  studied  the  works  of  "  the  best  recognised  modern 
critics,"  and  for  having  visited  "  the  theatre  of  Caesar's  cam- 
paign and  his  many  battle-fields."  But  if  a  man  wants  to  find 
out  what  can  and  what  cannot  be  known  about  the  Gallic 
war,  he  must  not  shrink  from  the  labour  of  checking  the 

'  See  my  article  in  the  JJ'est minster  Review  of  August  1892,  pp.  174-89. 

-  Ill  a  letter,  dated  May  3,  1878,  to  Mr.  John  Skelton,  Froude  says,  "I 
am  reading  up  Caesar  and  his  times,  with  a  view  to  writing  a  book  about  him. " 
In  a  letter  dated  February  6,  1879,  he  says,  "  '  Caesar'  is  in  the  press."  The 
book  was  published  some  time  before  July  of  the  same  year.  {Blackwood' s 
Magazine,  December  1894,  pp.  772,  774.) 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEK  EDITION         xix 

opinions  of  "  the  best  recognised  modern  critics  "  by  the  works 
of  unrecognised  scholars  who  have  wrought  diligently  in  the 
same  field ;  and,  if  I  may  be  pardoned  the  Hibernicism,  it  is 
of  no  use  to  visit  battle-fields,  unless  it  is  certain  that  battles 
were  fought  upon  them.      Merivale  wrote  before  the  modern 
era  of  continental  research  had  begun  :  he  worked  upon  a 
scale  which  forbade  him  to  describe  military  operations  in 
detail ;  and  I  am  obliged  to  say  that  whoever  compares  his 
pages  with  the  Commentaries  will  find  that  some  of  his  most 
impressive  passages  are  purely  fictitious.^      Long's  narrative, 
which  forms  the  bulk  of  his  fourth  volume,  is  very  full, — too 
full  perhaps  in  parts :  but  Long  had  a  hearty  contempt  for 
the  general  reader.      Moreover,  his  knowledge  of  GalKc  geo- 
graphy, although  thoroughly  sound,  was  very  far  from  com- 
plete.    Every  student  of  Caesar  is,  indeed,  under  the  deepest 
obligations  to  him  ;  for  no  man  ever  brought  a  stronger  judo-e- 
ment  to  the  study  of  the  problems  which  Caesar  left  us  to 
solve.      He  knew  his  ancient  texts  by  heart :  he  was  perfectly 
familiar  with  the  works  of  such  modern  authorities  as  d'Anville, 
Walckenaer,  Eiistow  and  von  Goler  :  but  of  the  enormous  mass 
of  articles  which  are  scattered  among  the  transactions  of  the 
numerous  French  archaeological  societies  and  other  periodical 
publications,  as  well  as  of  the  numberless  monographs  and 
pamphlets  which  have  been  published  independently,  and  of 
the  mediaeval  chronicles  which  bear  upon  the  subject,  he  knew 
very  little.      No  doubt  ninety-nine  hundredths  of  the  printed 
matter  contained  in  these  works  are  valueless :  but  amid  the 
dross  of  verbiage  and  declamation  with  which  too  many  of 
them  abound  there  lie  embedded  grains  of  solid  information. 
Moreover,   since   Long  wrote,   light  has    been  thrown   upon 
various  matters,  which,  in  his  time,  were  obscure. 

It  is  to  be  wished  rather  than  hoped  that  the  appalling 
mass  of  printed  matter  which,  for  four  centuries,  has  been 
accumulating  round  the  Cominentaries,  may  not  be  swelled  in 

1  See  pp.  128,  n.  1,  133,  n.  3,  infra. 


XX  PKEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION 

the  future  by  mere  verbiage.  If  only  tlie  editors  of  German 
periodicals  would  restrain  the  ardour  of  the  emend  ators  who 
inundate  them  with  futile  conjectures,  they  would  be  setting 
a  good  example.  The  Tabula  Coniedurarum  which  Meusel 
prints  at  the  end  of  his  great  Lexicon  Caesariamtm  fills  thirty- 
six  pages  super  royal  octavo,  closely  printed  in  double  columns  ; 
and  of  all  these  conjectures  those  which  really  deserve  the 
name  of  emendations  would  not  fill  a  single  page  ;  while  those 
which  have  been  unanimously  adopted  might  be  counted  upon 
the  fingers  of  one  hand.  In  the  Greek  state  of  Locri  there 
was  a  rule  that  whoever  proposed  a  new  law  should  do  so  with 
a  rope  round  his  neck,  and,  if  his  proposal  were  rejected,  should 
be  strangled  on  the  spot.  It  would  be  a  good  thing  if  editors 
would  combine  to  deal  with  emendators  in  a  like  spirit.  Death 
would  perhaps  be  an  excessive  penalty  even  for  a  bad  con- 
jecture :  but  whoever  proposed  an  emendation  which  failed 
within  a  certain  period  to  win  general  acceptance  might  be 
forbidden  ever  to  contribute  to  a  learned  periodical  again.^ 
We  have  not  yet  got,  nor  will  conjectural  emendation  give  us, 
a  final  critical  edition  of  the  Commentaries :  but  for  the 
purposes  of  history,  in  the  most  comprehensive  sense  of  the 
word,  the  text  is  good  enough.  Very  few  of  the  passages  in 
which  it  is  uncertain  offer  a  stumbling-block  to  the  historian ; 
and  those  mainly  in  points  of  minute  detail.  Many  of  the 
geographical  and  other  problems  are  now  solved ;  and  I  hope 
that  I  have  succeeded  in  contributing  something  to  the  result. 
Others,  as  I  have  tried  to  show,  are  at  present  insoluble,  and 
must  remain  so  imless  and  until  fresh  discoveries  throw  light 
upon  them.  But  excavation,  carried  out  regardless  of  cost  and 
intelligently  directed,  has  already  been  so  active  in  France 
that  I  doubt  whether,  for  the  period  of  Caesar's  campaigns,  it 
has  many  surprises  in  store  for  us.      It  is  perhaps  conceivable 

^  If  these  remarks  had  not  been  misunderstood,  I  should  have  thought  it 
unnecessary  to  say  that  they  were  directed  not  against  the  use  but  against  the 
abuse  of  conjecture.     [26.8.0o.] 


PEEFACE  TO  THE  LAEGEE  EDITION         xxi 

that  the  future  may  reveal  some  lost  memoirs  which  may 
supplement  Caesar's  own  narrative.  But  even  if  our  positive 
knowledge  is  not  destined  to  be  increased,  we  know  enough 
already  for  essential  purposes ;  and  the  most  that  further 
research  or  happy  chance  can  bring  to  light  is  very  little  in 
comparison  with  what  has  been  already  discovered.  And 
when  the  catalogue  of  "  programmes  "  and  dissertations  is  com- 
plete, when  modern  research  and  modern  literary  skill  shall 
have  combined  to  produce  the  final  history  of  the  Gallic  war, 
the  unpretending  little  book  which  Caesar  wrote  two  thousand 
years  ago  in  the  scanty  leisure  of  a  busy  life  will  outlive 
them  all. 


11  DouRO  Place,  Kensington,  W. 
July  23,  1899. 


THE  BUSTS  OF  JULIUS  CAESAR 

Whoever  wishes  to  know  all  that  can  he  known  about  the  busts  of 
Caesar  should  read  Bernoulli's  learned  and  beautifully  illustrated 
Edmische  Ikonografhie.  That  work  will  tell  him  what  busts  are 
generally  regarded  as  authentic  :  but  what  we  really  want  to  know  is 
which  of  the  authentic  busts  offers  the  most  faithful  likeness  ;  and 
this  is  what  neither  Bernoulli  nor  any  one  else  can  certainly  tell.  It 
comes  to  this,  that  every  one  must  study  for  himself  Caesar's  history, 
form  his  own  idea  of  his  character,  and  then  use  his  own  judgement  ; 
and  if  a  man  distrusts  his  own  judgement  and  finds  a  learned  treatise 
tiresome,  perhaps  he  might  do  worse  than  take  Mr.  Baring  Gould  for 
his  guide.  It  is  true  that  the  author  of  Tlie  Tragedy  of  the  Caesars 
sometimes  lets  his  imagination  run  awaj"  with  him.  He  has,  I  think, 
idealised  the  character  of  Caesar,  and  read  his  ideal  in,  or  rather  into 
his  favourite  busts.  But  it  is  impossible  for  him  to  take  pen  in  hand 
without  being  interesting ;  and,  accurate  or  not,  a  man  of  his  calibre 
cannot  fail  to  throw  light  upon  any  subject  with  which  he  deals. 

A  portrait  which  has  done  duty  in  many  works  on  Caesar  is  taken 
from  the  colossal  bust  of  Naples.  This  seems  to  me,  not  indeed,  as 
Mr.  Baring  Gould  ^  thinks,  characterless,  but,  at  any  rate,  no  true 
presentment  of  the  character  of  Caesar.  The  face  is  powerful,  but 
heavy  if  not  brutal.- 

Mr.  Warde  Fowler,^  suggests  that  the  real  Caesar  may  be  represented 
by  the  green  basalt  bust  of  Berlin.  The  breadth  of  skull  which 
characterises  the  marble  bust  in  the  British  Museum,  and,  in  varying 
degrees,  all  the  others,  is  absent  from  this  :  but  Mr.  Baring  Gould  ^ 
suggests  that  the  block  of  basalt  which  the  sculptor  used  may  have 
been  too  narrow.  Surely  this  is  pushing  conjecture  too  far.  M. 
Salomon  Reinach,^  on  the  other  hand,  points  out  that  the  iy^Q  of  the 
basalt  bust  is  not  to  be  found  on  any  of  the  coins  of  Caesar,^  and  that 
it  is  similar  to  the  type  represented  in  the  bust  of  an  Alexandrine 
Greek  in  the  Imperial  Museum  of  Vienna.      Mr.  J.  C.  Ropes,''  indeed, 

^   Tiie  Tragedy  of  the  Caesars,  i.  3,  116. 

-  The  illustrations  of  this  bust  iu  Mongez's  Iconorjrajjhic  roimdne  (tome  ii.)  are 
idealised.     Compare  them  with  Taf.  xiii.  iu  Bernoulli's  book. 

^  Classical  Review,  vii.,  1893,  p.  108. 

■*  The  Tragedy  of  the  Caesars,  i.  106. 

^  Gazette  des  Beaux- Arts,  3*^  per.,  t.  vii.,  1892,  pp.  474-6. 

^  See  the  beautiful  illustrations  of  the  coins  in  H.  Cohen's  Description  ghierale 
des  vioniiaies  de  la  republique  rornaine,  1857. 

7  ScHbner's  Mag.,  1.,  1887,  pp.  132,  135. 

xxii 


I 


THE  BUSTS  OF  JULIUS  CAESAE  xxiii 

speaks  of  "  a  mark  by  which  one  can  generally  recognise  the  authentic 
busts  of  Caesar,  namely  a  scar  or  furrow  on  the  left  side  of  the  face  "  ; 
and  he  adds  that  this  mark  is  to  be  found  on  the  bust  in  the  British 
Museum,  and  also  on  the  basalt  bust.  There  is  certainly  a  furrow  on 
the  left  side  of  the  bust  in  the  British  Museum  :  but  there  is  a  corre- 
sponding, though  shorter,  furrow  on  the  right  side  ;  and  I  used  to 
think  that  both  of  them  simply  represented  lines  such  as  are  to  be 
seen  on  the  faces  of  many  men  who  have  passed  middle  life.  I  have, 
however,  since  noticed  that  some  of  the  coins  ^  show  a  furrow  on  the 
right  cheek  AN-ith  great  distinctness.  But,  whatever  may  be  the  worth 
of  the  furrows  as  evidence,  Bernoulli,  as  well  as  M.  Reinach,  questions 
the  authenticity  of  the  basalt  bust ;  and  only  an  enthusiast  could  detect 
any  similarity  between  it  and  any  of  the  other  busts  the  authenticity  of 
which  is  admitted. 

M.  Geffroy,-  the  director  of  the  Ecole  fran§aise  de  Rome,  remarks 
that  Signer  Barracco  possesses  a  bust  of  Caesar,  the  genuineness  of 
which  is  proved  by  its  bearing  on  the  crown  of  the  head  the  star 
mentioned  by  Suetonius.  Undoubtedly  this  bust  was  intended  to 
represent  Caesar :  but  what  proof  is  there  that  the  artist  ever  saw 
Caesar,  or  even  worked  with  an  authentic  portrait  before  him  ?  If 
any  one  thinks  this  question  vexatious,  I  beg  him  to  suspend  his  judge- 
ment until  he  has  finished  reading  this  note.  Suetonius  ^  says  that,  on 
the  occasion  of  the  first  games  which  Augustus  held  in  honour  of 
Julius,  a  comet  appeared  ;  that  the  comet  was  regarded  as  a  sign  that 
Caesar's  soul  had  been  received  into  heaven  ;  and  that,  in  consequence, 
the  image  of  a  star  was  placed  upon  the  head  of  his  bust.  Now  M. 
Geffroy  cannot  prove  that  the  bust  in  Signor  Barracco's  possession  is 
the  very  bust  of  which  Suetonius  speaks,  or  even  a  replica  of  it  ;  for  it 
is  probable  that  a  posthumous  bust  or  busts  were  produced  with  a  star 
upon  the  head  ;  and  if  Signor  Barracco's  bust  was  posthumous,  as  he 
himself  believes  that  it  was,-  it  must  either  have  been  a  coj^y  of  an 
original  or  simply  a  work  of  memory  or  of  imagination.  It  was  found 
in  the  delta  of  the  Nile  ;  and  two  photographs  of  it  are  reproduced  in 
a  volume  entitled  La  collection  Barracco,  by  G.  Barracco  and  W.  Helbig. 
The  face  is  covered  ■nath  a  beard  of  about  a  fortnight's  growth.^  The 
shape  of  the  head  is  strikingly  different  from  that  of  the  bust  in 
the  British  Museum,  and  its  relative  breadth  is  much  less  ;  though  in 
both  the  forehead,  as  distinguished  from  the  head  itself,  is  remarkably 
narrow.      In  expression  the  two  busts  have  hardly  any  resemblance. 

Mr.    Baring   Gould    has   a   very   high   opinion  of   the  bust  in   the 

^  See  Bernoulli,  Xos.  53  and  62,  and  Mommsen,  Hist,  de  la  monnaie  rom.,  t.  iv. 
PI.  xxxii.  No.  5. 

-  Rev.  arch.,  3^  ser.,  t.  xx.,  1892,  p.  256. 

"  Divus  lulius,  c.  88.     Cf.  ArchaeotogiscJie  Zeiticng,  xix.,  1867,  pp.  110-13. 

*  "  Nous  pouvons  concliire  que  la  statue  dont  provient  notre  tete  fut  executee 
apres  la  consecration  de  Cesar."  La  collection  Barracco,  by  G.  Barracco  and  W. 
Helbig,  1893-4,  p.  51. 

"  The  authors  of  La  collection  Barracco  conjecture  that  Caesar  had  let  his  beard 
grow  as  a  sign  of  mourning  for  Pompey,  just  as,  according  to  Suetonius  (Divus 
Iidiiis,  c.  67),  he  did  while  he  was  avenging  the  massacre  at  Aduatuca. 


xxiv  THE  BUSTS   OF  JULIUS  CAESAE 

British  Museum  :  so  has  Bernoulli ;  i  and,  given  the  authenticity  of  the 
bust,  which  is  generally  admitted,"-^  I  do  not  think  that  any  one  could 
doubt  that  it  was  the  work  of  a  sculptor  who,  as  Mr.  Baring  Gould  says, 
"  knew  Caesar  and  loved  him,"  or  at  least  understood  and  admired  him. 
But  Mr.  Baring  Gould  tells  us  that  Mr.  Conrad  Dressier,  the  sculptor, 
who  shares  his  admiration  for  the  bust,  has  pronounced  that  Caesar 
could  not  have  sat  to  the  artist,  because  the  extraordinary  breadth  of  the 
skull  above  the  ears  is  anatomically  impossible.*^  When  I  read  this  it 
struck  me  as  most  unlikely  that  a  sculptor  who  is  assumed  to  have 
known  Caesar  well  would  have  cared  to  model  his  bust  from  memory, 
or  that  his  memory  wovild  have  been  so  defective  ;  and  it  seemed  quite 
incredible  that  a  sculptor  who  was  capable  of  producing  such  a  work  of 
art  should  have  lacked  an  elementary  knowledge  of  anatomy.  I  asked 
Mr.  Hope  Pinker,  whose  bust  of  Sir  Henry  Acland  is  a  speaking 
likeness,  for  his  opinion.  It  confirmed  my  own.  Have  Mr.  Baring 
Gould  and  Mr.  Dressier  forgotten  the  bust  of  the  youthful  Augustus 
which  stands  in  the  British  Museum,  within  a  few  feet  of  the  bust  of 
Caesar  ?  Let  them  look  at  it  again,  and  I  think  they  will  admit  that 
its  breadth  above  the  ears  is  just  as  remarkable  as  that  of  its  neighbour.* 
Mr.  Baring  Gould  considers  a  bust  in  the  Louvre,  of  which  he  gives 
an  illustration,  as  good  in  its  way  as  the  bust  in  our  national  collection  : 
but  it  seems  to  him  to  rejjresent  the  militant  rather  than  the  reflective 
side  of  Caesar's  character.^  To  my  mind  the  bust  in  the  British  Museum 
represents,  as  a  bust  should  do,  not  one  side  of  the  man's  character,  but 
the  whole.  The  bust  in  the  Louvre  has  features  of  the  Caesarian  type  ; 
but  the  expression  is  quite  different.  Mr.  Dressier  has  remarked  that, 
in  default  of  direct  evidence,  there  is  no  better  test  of  the  fidelity  of  a 
portrait  than  the  impression  which  it  leaves  upon  the  mind  of  an 
intelligent  observer.^  The  test  is  obviously  imperfect  :  but  it  is  worth 
pages  of  discussion.  Nor  would  I  hesitate  to  apply  that  test,  according 
to  the  measure  of  my  intelligence,  if  only  it  were  certain  that  the  bust 
in  the  British  Museum  is  really  an  authentic  bust  of  Julius  Caesar. 
But  even  this  certainty  is  wanting.  There  is  not  in  existence  a  single 
bust  of  which  it  can  be  said,  with  absolute  certainty,  both  that  the 
sculptor  intended  it  to  be  a  portrait  of  Caesar,  and  also  that  either 
Caesar  sat  for  the  likeness  or  the  sculptor  had  personal  knowledge  or 

^  "  Among  those  busts,"  says  Bernoulli  (p.  171),  "  which  recommend  themselves 
by  their  resemblance  to  the  coins  this  is  the  one  which  most  suggests  Caesar." 

-  Mr.  Cecil  Smith,  of  the  British  Museum,  tells  me  that  Herr  Furtwiingler,  the 
well-known  writer  on  classical  sculpture,  regards  the  bust  as  a  forgery.  I  have  not 
been  able  to  discover  any  reference  to  it  in  those  works  of  Herr  Furtwiingler,  which 
are  catalogued  in  the  Museum.  If  the  sculptor  was  a  forger,  he  was  also  a  genius  ; 
but  no:'forger  would  have  thought  of  portraying  that  narrow  forehead  in  combination 
with  a  broad  head.  [M.  Salomon  Reiuach,  in  a  review  of  the  larger  edition  of  this 
book,  asserts  that  the  bust  is  "  modern."] 

^  The  Tragedy  of  the  Caesars,  i.  114-15. 

^  Only  the  other  day  I  saw  a  child,  whose  head,  extraordinarily  broad,  projected 
above  the  ears  as  much  as  that  depicted  by  the  bust  in  the  Museum.  [16.11.97.] 
The  bust  is  not  more  brachycephalic  than  the  heads  of  many  living  Auvergnats. 
and  inhabitants  of  the  department  of  Jura. 

5  The  Tragedy  of  the  Caesars,  i.  115.  «  lb.,  pp.  9-10. 


THE  BUSTS  OF  JULIUS  CAESAE  xxv 

an  authentic  likeness  to  guide  him.  Some  years  ago  I  asked  an 
eminent  authority  on  Greek  and  Roman  sculptures  whether  there  was 
any  doubt  of  the  authenticity  of  the  marble  bust.  "  Oh  !  no,"  he 
answered ;  "  no  doubt  whatever."  But  he  could  not  give  me  any  proof. 
The  bust  was  once  believed  to  represent  Cicero.  If  physiognomy  is 
any  index  to  character,  it  is  certain  that  that  calm  face  bore  no 
resemblance  to  his  :  but  the  conjecture,  absurd  as  it  Avas,  would  never 
have  been  made  if  there  had  been  direct  evidence  that  the  bust  was 
intended  for  Caesar.  Evidence,  however,  there  is  none  for  the  authen- 
ticity of  this  or  of  any  one  of  the  so-called  busts  of  Caesar,  except  such 
evidence  as  is  to  be  got  from  the  study  of  the  texts  and  of  the  coins. 
The  evidence  of  the  texts  is  veiy  scanty  ;  and  most  of  the  coins  differ 
widely  among  themselves.^  The  contemporary  coins  which  bore  Caesar's 
effigy  were  the  work  of  five  different  agents, — L.  Aemilius  Buca,  L. 
Flaminius  Chilo,  M.  Mettius,  P.  Sepullius  Macer,  and  C.  Cossutius 
Maridianus.  None  of  them  were  struck  before  44  B.C.,  the  year  of 
Caesar's  death.  Others,  known  as  the  Voconian  group,  were  executed 
a  few  years  later.-  In  the  Description  of  the  collection  of  Ancient 
Marbles  in  the  British  Museum  ^  it  is  affirmed  that  there  is  an  agreement 
among  the  Aemilian  and  Voconian  coins  "  which  is  perfectly  satisfactory," 
and  that  with  all  of  them  the  bust  in  the  Museum  "  exhibits  a  striking 
similarity."  Well,  the  reader  should  look  through  Cohen's  Description 
ge'nerale  des  monnaies  de  la  rqmblique  romaine,  and  judge  for  himself. 
The  Aemilian  coins  are  numbered  15,  16,  17,  and  18  on  Plate  ii.  ;  the 
Voconian  1  and  2  on  Plate  xlii.  No.  2  certainly  resembles  15, 
but  differs  widely  from  1  ;  17  and  18  are  about  as  much  like  the 
others  as  Gladstone  was  like  Beaconsfield  ;  and,  in  expression,  none  of 
the  six  resembles  any  of  the  busts.  All  that  can  be  said  is  that,  in 
profile,  there  is  a  general  resemblance  between  No.  15,  No.  2,  Nos.  2 
and  3  on  Plate  xvi.,  3  on  Plate  xviii.  and  4  on  Plate  xxxvii.  ;  that  the 
type  of  face  depicted  on  these  six  coins  is  not  unlike  that  of  the  bust  in 
the  British  Museum  ;  and  that  the  lean  muscular  neck  shown  in  the 
former  resembles  that  of  the  latter.  When  one  looks  at  different 
portraits  of  any  well-known  modern  face,  one  can  always  tell  at  a  glance 
whom  they  were  intended  to  represent.  Similarly,  the  portraits  of 
Queen  Elizabeth,  for  instance,  are  all  unmistakable.  And,  to  go  back 
to  ancient  times,  it  does  not  need  an  expert  to  tell  that  the  busts  of 
Augustus  were  all  intended  to  portray  the  same  face.  But  the  busts 
of  Caesar  differ  from  each  other  so  much  in  expression,  and  some  of 
them  even  in  feature,  that,  although  there  is  a  certain  vague  "  Caesarian  " 
type  common  to  all,  an  untrained  eye,  if  the  inscriptions  were  removed, 
•  would  probably  take  them  for  portraits  of  different  men.  The  con- 
clusion appears  to  be  either  that  most  of  the  sculptors  were   unable 

^  The  face  on  a  coin  in  the  British  Museum,  an  illustration  of  which  is  given  in 
Mr.  Warde  Fowler's  Caesar,  is  that  of  an  imbecile  buffoon. 

-  E.  Babelon,  Descr.  hist,  et  chron.  des  monnaies  de  la  ripuhlique  rom.,  1886, 
t.  i.,  p.  497,  t.  ii.,  p.  560  ;  Mommsen,  Hist,  de  la  moimaie  roni.,  t.  ii.,  1870, 
p.  545,  n.  1. 

=*  Part  xi.,  1861,  pp.  39-40. 


xxvi  THE  BUSTS  OF  JULIUS  CAESAE 

to  catch  a  likeness,  or  that  most  of  them  worked  from  memory  or 
imagination,  or,  finally,  that  some  of  the  busts  were  not  meant  to 
represent  Caesar  at  all.  But  this  much  is  certain  : — if  the  original  of 
the  bust  in  the  British  Museum  was  not  Caesar,  he  was  a  very  great 
man,  perhaps  the  noblest  Roman  of  them  all  ;  and  who  1  The  experts 
cannot  help  us  to  arrive  at  a  definite  conclusion  ;  and  for  my  part  I  am 
content  to  accept  as  the  likeness  of  Caesar  the  noble  bust  which  has 
approved  itself  to  Mr.  Froude,  to  Bernoulli,  to  Mr.  Baring  Gould,  and 
to  other  well-qualified  judges.^ 

This  bust  represents,  I  venture  to  say,  the  strongest  personality 
that  has  ever  lived,  the  strongest  which  poet  or  historian,  painter  or 
sculptor  has  ever  portrayed.  In  the  profile  it  is  impossible  to  detect  a 
flaw  :  if  there  is  one  in  the  full  face,  it  is  the  narrowness  of  the  forehead 
as  compared  with  the  breadth  of  the  skull.  The  face  appears  that  of  a 
man  in  late  middle  age.  He  has  lived  every  day  of  his  life,  and  he  is 
beginning  to  weary  of  the  strain  :  but  every  faculty  retains  its  fullest 
vigour.  The  harmony  of  the  nature  is  as  impressive  as  its  strength. 
No  one  characteristic  dominates  the  rest.  Not  less  remarkable  than  the 
power  of  the  countenance  are  its  delicacy  and  fastidious  refinement. 
The  man  looks  perfectly  unscrupulous  ;  or,  if  the  phrase  be  apt  to 
mislead,  he  looks  as  if  no  scruple  could  make  him  falter  in  pursuit  of 
his  aim  :  but  his  conduct  is  governed  by  principle.  Passion,  without 
which,  it  has  been  truly  said,  there  can  be  no  genius,  inspires  his  resolve 
and  stimulates  its  execution  :  but  passion,  in  the  narrow  sense,  is  never 
suffered  to  warp  his  action.  He  is  kindly  and  tolerant :  but,  to  avoid 
greater  ills,  he  would  shed  blood  without  remorse.  "The  mild  but 
inexorable  yoke  of  Caesar," — so  jMr.  Strachan-Davidson  ^  describes  the 
ascendency  to  which  Cicero  reluctantly  submitted  ;  and  mild  inex- 
orability is  apparent  in  the  expression  of  this  man.  He  can  be  a 
charming  companion  to  men  ;  and,  though  he  is  no  longer  young,  he 
knows  how  to  win  the  love  of  women.  He  sees  facts  as  they  are, 
accepts  and  makes  the  best  of  them.  Knowledge  of  men  has  made  him 
cynical  :  but  the  cynicism  is  dashed  by  humour.  Look  at  the  profile 
from  the  left,  and  you  will  note  an  expression  of  restrained  amusement, 
as  of  one  who  is  good-naturedly  observant  of  the  weaknesses  of  his 
fellows.       If  his  outlook  passes   beyond  mundane  things   and   strains 

1  lu  the  DescriiJtion  of  the  collection  of  Ancient  Marbles  in  the  British  Museum 
(Part  xi.,  pp.  39-40)  it  is  asserted  that  "  the  general  character  of  the  features  of 
Caesar  are  as  well  known  and  as  clearly  marked  as  those  of  any  personage  of 
Roman  times,"  and  that  "the  features  of  the  marble  bust  agree  with  them."  If 
this  statement  requires  some  qualification,  it  may,  I  think,  be  affirmed  that  the 
marble  bust  agrees  as  well  as  any  other  with  the  coins,  and  that,  as  Bernoulli  says, 
it  is  the  one  which  "  most  suggests  Caesar."  It  is  interesting  to  compare  it  with 
Visconti's  illustrations  (in  Mongez's  Icoiwgraphie  romaine,  t.  ii.)  of  the  Neapolitan, 
Capitoline  and  St-Cloud  busts.  These  three,  though  they  differ  in  expression, 
represent,  I  feel  sure,  the  same  man.  The  lines  of  the  forehead  in  them  and  in 
the  British  Museum  bust  are  alike  ;  and  there  is  a  certain  resemblance  in  the  profile 
and  the  shape  of  the  head,  though  the  jaw  in  the  St-Cloud  bust  is  squarer,  and  the 
chin  more  prominent  than  in  the  other  three.  The  ear  of  the  former  is  very  like 
that  of  the  British  Museum  bust,  and,  like  it,  lies  very  close  to  the  head. 

-  Cicero,  1894,  p.  208. 


THE  BUSTS  OF  JULIUS  CAESAE  xxvii 

after  the  unknown,  he  does  not  let  us  into  the  secret  of  his  thoughts. 
But  if  the  ordinary  observer  is  unable  to  discern  that  look  of  faith,  that 
"  far-off  look  "  which  Mr.  Baring  Gould  ^  loves  to  fancy  that  he  can  read 
in  the  expression,  he  cannot  fail  to  recognise  the  stamp  not  only  of  will 
and  of  intellect,  but  also  of  nobility.  The  bust  represents  a  man  of  the 
world,  in  the  fullest  meaning  of  the  term.  It  alone  represents  a  man 
such  as  Caesar  has  revealed  himself  in  his  writings,  and  as  his  con- 
temporaries have  revealed  him  in  theirs  ;  and  that  is  why  I  have  chosen 
it  to  illustrate  this  book. 

[Mr.  Frank  J.  Scott,  of  Toledo,  U.S.A.,  has  recently  published  a 
book,  called  The  Portraitures  of  Julius  Caesar,  which  contains  illustrations 
of  all  or  nearly  all  the  busts,  coins,  and  gems  that  have  been  regarded 
as  meant  to  portray  Caesar's  features.  That  many  of  them  were  so 
meant  is  certain  ;  but  which  of  them  was  the  best  likeness,  and  whether 
any  one  of  them  was  executed  from  life,  are  problems  that  remain 
unsolved.] 

^  The  Tragedy  of  the  Caesars,  i.  114-15. 


CONTENTS 


Pkeface  .... 
Preface  to  the  Larger  Edition 
The  Busts  of  Julius  Caesar  , 
List  of  Illustrations  . 


Vll 

xxii 
xxxvi 


CHAPTER    I 

Gallic  invasion  of  Italy  :  battle  of  the  AUia  and  its  results 

Gallic  tribes  assist  the  enemies  of  Rome  . 

The  Romans  fight  their  way  to  the  Po     . 

And  conquer  Cisalpine  Gaul  .... 

Formation  of  the  Roman  Province  in  Transalpine  Gaul  . 
Gaul  and  its  inhabitants  ..... 

Ethnology  of  Gaul  ..... 

Civilisation  of  the  Gauls  ..... 

Their  political  and  social  organisation 

The  Druids  ...... 

Invasions  of  the  Cimbri  and  Teutoni 

Invasion  of  Ariovistus       ..... 

Revolt  of  the  AUobroges  ..... 

Threatened  invasion  of  the  Helvetii 

Consulship  of  Caesar         ..... 

How  he  attempted  to  provide  against  the  Helvetian  danger 

He  is  appointed  Governor  of  Gaul 

His  army  ....... 

His  intentions        ...... 


1 
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 

10 
12 
16 
18 
19 
20 
20 
21 
22 
22 
23 
25 


CHAPTER    II 

campaigns  against  the  relvetii  and  ariovistus 


Caesar  hears  that  the  Helvetii  are  about  to  march  through  the  Province       26 
He  hastens  to  Geneva  and  destroys  the  bridge    .  .  .  .26 

Helvetian  envoys  ask  his  leave  to  use  the  road  through  the  Province    .         26 


XXX 


CONTENTS 


He  promises  to  reply  in  a  fortnight,  and  meanwhile  fortifies  the  left  bank 
of  the  Rhone ...... 

He  prevents  the  Helvetii  from  crossing  . 

The  Sequani  allow  them  to  march  through  the  Pas  de  TEoluse 

Caesar  goes  back  to  Cisalpine  Gaul,  returns  with  reinforcements,  and 
encamps  above  the  confluence  of  the  Rhone  and  the  Saone 

The  Aedui  solicit  his  aid  against  the  Helvetii 

He  defeats  and  disperses  the  rearguard  of  the  Helvetii  . 

His  passage  of  the  Saono  ..... 

The  Helvetii  attempt  to  negotiate,  but  reject  Caesar's  terms 

They  march  northward,  followed  by  Caesar 

Caesar  pressed  for  supplies,  owing  to  the  intrigues  of  Dumnorix 

His  abortive  attempt  to  surprise  the  Helvetii 

He  marches  for  Bibracte  (Mont  Beuvray)  to  get  supplies 

Defeat  of  the  Helvetii  near  Bibracte 

Caesar's  treatment  of  the  fugitives 

Settlement  of  the  Boii       ..... 

Envoys  from  Celtican  Gaul  congratulate  Caesar,  and  solicit  his  aid 
against  Ariovistus      ..... 

failure  of  his  attempts  to  negotiate  with  Ariovistus 

He  marches  against  Ariovistus  and  seizes  Vesontio  (Besancon) 

Panic  in  the  Roman  army  .... 

How  Caesar  restored  confidence    .... 

He  resumes  his  march  against  Ariovistus 

His  conference  with  Ariovistus     .... 

Mission  of  Troucillus  and  Mettius 

Ariovistus  cuts  Caesar's  line  of  communication    . 

How  Caesar  regained  command  of  it        . 

The  Germans  from  superstition  delay  to  fight  a  pitched  battle 

Caesar  attacks  them  ..... 

They  are  defeated  and  expelled  from  Gaul 

Caesar  quarters  his  legions  at  Vesontio    . 

Significance  of  this  step    ..... 


CHAPTER   III 


THE    FIRST    CAMPAIGN    AQAIN.ST    THE    BELGAE 

Results  of  the  first  camj^aign        .... 

The  Belgae  conspire  against  Caesar 

Caesar  returns  to  Gaiil  and  marches  against  them 

The  Remi  submit  and  help  Caesar 

He  sends  Divitiacus  to  ravage  the  lands  of  the  Bellovaci 

Marches  to  encounter  the  advancing  host,  crosses  the  Aisne,  and  encamps 

near  Berry-au-Bac 
The  Belgae  attack  Bibrax  (Vieux-Laon)  . 
Caesar  sends  his  auxiliaries  to  the  rescue 
The  Belgae  encamp  opposite  Caesar 
Caesar  makes  his  position  impregnable    . 
The  Belgae  attempt  to  cut  his  communications,  but  are  defeated 


CONTENTS 

They  disperse        ....... 

Caesar's  cavalry  pursue  them        ..... 

He  marches  westward  and  receives  the  submission  of  the  Suessiones 

Bellovaci  and  Ambiani  ..... 

The  Nervii  resolve  to  resist  ..... 

Caesar  marches  against  them         ..... 
He  learns  that  they  and  their  allies  are  encamped  on  the  right  bank  of 

the  Sambre     ....... 

His  pioneers  mark  out  a  camp  on  the  heights  of  Keuf-Mesuil    . 
Battle  of  Neuf-Mesnil       ...... 

Caesar  treats  the  survivors  with  clemency 

He  besieges  the  stronghold  of  the  Aduatuci 

They  surrender     ....... 

But  afterwards  make  a  treacherous  attack 

Their  punishment  ...... 

Galba's  campaign  in  the  Yalais    ..... 

Submission  of  the  tribes  of  Brittany  and  Normandy 
Rejoicings  at  Rome  ...... 


XXXI 

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53 
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53 
54 
57 
57 
58 
58 
59 
59 
61 
61 


CHAPTER    IV 

CAMPAIGNS    AGAINST    THE    MARITIME    TRIBES    AXD    THE    AQUITAXI 


Delusive  prospects  of  peace 

Rebellion  of  the  Veneti,  Curiosolites  aud  Esuvii 

Caesar  prepares  for  a  naval  war    . 

The  conference  at  Luca     . 

Caesar  retm-ns  to  Gaul      ... 

Preparations  of  the  Yeneti 

The  Roman  fleet  weather-bound  in  the  Loire 

Caesar's  fruitless  campaign  against  the  Yeneti 

Sea-fight  between  the  Yeneti  and  Brutus 

Punishment  of  the  Yeneti 

Campaign  of  Sabinus  against  the  northern  allies  of  the  Yeneti 

Brilliant  campaign  of  Crassus  in  Aquitania 

Fruitless  expedition  of  Caesar  against  the  Morini 


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64 
64 
65 
65 
65 
66 
66 
67 
68 


CHAPTER    V 

THE    MASSACRE    OF    THE    USIPETES    AND    TENCTERI 

The  Usipetes  and  Tencteri  invade  Gaul  . 

Caesar  fears  that  some  of  the  Gallic  tribes  may  join  them 

He  returns  to  Gaul  and  summons  a  Gallic  council 

He  marches  against  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri    . 

And  negotiates  with  their  envoys 

Their  cavalry,  in  violation  of  a  truce,  attack  his 

He  resolves  to  attack  them  at  once 

Arrests  their  chiefs,  who  had  come  ostensibly  to  apologise 

And  virtuallv  annihilates  the  host 


70 
71 
71 
71 
71 


73 
73 


XXXll 


CONTENTS 


His  conduct  condemned  in  the  Senate     .... 
He  bridges  the  Rhine,  punishes  the  Sugambri,  and  returns  to  Gaul 


PAGE 

74 
74 


CHAPTER   VI 

THE    DISASTER    AT    ADUATUCA    AXD    ITS    RESULTS 

Caesar's  invasions  of  Britain         ..... 

Intrigues  of  Dumnorix      ...... 

His  fate      ........ 

The  Gallic  nobles  in  a  dangerous  mood    .... 

Distribution  of  the  legions  for  the  winter  of  54-53  B.C.  . 
Divide  et  impera   ....... 

Assassination  of  King  Tasgetius,  Caesar's  nominee,  by  the  Carnutes 

Intrigues  of  Indutiomarus  against  Caesar 

The  Eburones,  under  Ambiorix,  make  a  futile  attack  on  the  camp  of 

Sabinus  and  Cotta      ...... 

Ambiorix  advises  Sabinus  to  withdraw  his  force  to  one  of  the  nearer  cam 
The  advice  discussed  in  a  council  of  war 

In  spite  of  the  protests  of  Cotta,  Sabinus  decides  to  abandon  the  camp 
The  Romans  march  out    ...... 

They  are  surrounded  by  the  Eburones     .... 

And  virtually  annihilated  ..... 

Ambiorix  persuades  the  Aduatuci  and  Nervii  to  join  him  in  attacking 

Q.  Cicero        ....... 

Siege  of  Cicero's  camp       ...... 

A  messenger  from  Cicero  carries  a  despatch  to  Caesar     . 
Caesar  marches  to  relieve  Cicero  ..... 

The  Gauls  abandon  the  siege,  and  march  to  encounter  him 
Defeat  of  the  Gauls  ...... 

Caesar  joins  Cicero  ...... 

Immediate  effects  of  his  victory  ..... 

Manj^  of  the  nobles  continue  to  intrigue  .... 

Schemes  of  Indutiomarus ...... 

He  is  outwitted  by  Labienus,  defeated  and  slain 

Caesar  raises  two  new  legions,  and  borrows  a  third  from  Pompey 

Continued  troubles  in  north-eastern  Gaul 

Caesar  punishes  the  Nervii  ..... 

Forces  tlie  Senones  and  Carnutes  to  submit 

And  prepares  to  punish  Ambiorix  .... 

As  a  preliminary  step,  he  crushes  the  Menapii    . 

Labienus  disperses  the  Treveri     ..... 

Caesar  again  crosses  the  Rhine,  and  threatens  the  allies  of  Ambiorix 

Returning  unsuccessful  to  Gaul,  he  marches  against  Ambiorix . 

The  Eburones  keep  up  a  guerilla  warfare 

Caesar  invites  the  neighbouring  tribes  to  harry  them 

The  Sugambri  surprise  Cicero 

Caesar  ravages  the  country  of  the  Eburones 

Ambiorix  eludes  pursuit  .... 

The  legions  distributed  for  the  winter     . 
Execution  of  Acco  .... 


CONTENTS 


XXXIU 


CHAPTER   VII 


THE    REBELLION    OP    VERCINGETORIX 

News  of  the  murder  of  Clodius  reaches  Gaul 

Gallic  chiefs  encouraged  to  consiiire  against  Caesar 

The  Carnutes  massacre  Roman  citizens  at  Cenabum  (Orleans)    . 

The  news  reaches  the  Arverni      ..... 

Gergovia    ........ 

Vercingetorix,  notwithstanding  the  opposition  of  the  Arverniau  goveri 

ment,  rouses  popular  enthusiasm  for  rebellion 
Most  of  the  tribes  between  the  Seine  and  the  Garonne  join  him,  an 

elect  him  Commander-in-Chief 
How  he  raised  an  army     . 
The  dissentient  tribes 
The  Bituriges  join  Vercingetorix . 
Caesar  returns  with  recruits  to  the  Province 
How  shall  he  rejoin  his  legions  ?  . 
He  rescues  the  Province  from  a  threatened  invasion 
Crosses  the  Cevennes,  invades  Auvergne,  and  forces  Vercingetorix  to 

come  to  its  relief       ...... 

Then  seizes  the  opportunity  to  rejoin  his  legions 
Vercingetorix  besieges  Gorgobina  .... 

Caesar  marches  from  Agedincum  (Sens)  to  relieve  Gorgobina     . 

Captures  Vellaunodunum  (Montargis  ?)    . 

Captures  and  punishes  Cenabum  .... 

Crosses  the  Loire  and  captures  Noviodunum 
And  marches  to  besiege  Avaricum  (Bourges) 
Vercingetorix  persuades  the  Bituriges  and  other  tribes  to  burn  thei 

towns  and  granaries  ...... 

The  Bituriges,  contrary  to  his  advice,  resolve  to  defend  Avaricum 
Siege  of  Avaricum  ...... 

Storming  of  Avaricum       ...... 

Indiscriminate  massacre    ...... 

Vercingetorix  consoles  his  troops ..... 

He  raises  fresh  levies         ...... 

Caesar,  at  the  request  of  the  Aedui,  decides  between  rival  claimants  for 

the  office  of  Vergobret 
He  sends  Labienus  to  suppress  rebellion  in  the  basin  of  the  Seine,  and 

marches  himself  to  attack  Gergovia  . 
He  establishes  a  magazine  at  Noviodunum  (Nevers) 
Crosses  the  Allier  by  a  stratagem 
And  encamps  before  Gergovia 
First  operations  at  Gergovia 
Defection  of  the  Aeduan  Vergobret 
An  Aeduan  contingent,  marching  to  join  Caesar,  persuaded  by  its  leader 

to  declare  for  Vercingetorix  . 
Caesar  makes  a  forced  march,  overawes  the  contingent,  and  returns  just 

in  time  to  rescue  his  camp    . 
Outra'^es  of  the  Aedui  against  Roman  citizens 


PAGE 

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102 

103 

103 
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104 
104 
104 
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105 

105 
106 
106 
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108 
109 
109 
114 
115 
115 
116 

116 

117 
117 
118 
119 
119 
120 

120 

121 
122 


XXXIV 


CONTENTS 


Anxiety  of  Caesar  ..... 

He  attempts  to  take  Gergovia  by  a  coup -de-main 

The  attack  repulsed  with  heavy  loss 

Caesar  marches  to  rejoin  Labienus 

His  critical  position  ..... 

Eporedorix  and  Viridomariis  seize  Noviodunum,   and  try  to  prevent 

Caesar  from  crossing  the  Loire 
He  saves  himself  by  a  series  of  extraordinary  marches    . 
Labienus's  campaign  against  the  Parisii . 
He  extricates  himself  from  a  perilous  position  by  victory 
And  marches  to  rejoin  Caesar        .... 
The  rebellion  stimulated  by  the  adhesion  of  the  Aedui  . 
They  claim  the  direction  of  the  war 

Vercingetorix  re-elected  Commander-in-Chief  by  a  general  council 
His  plan  of  campaign 
He  hounds  on  the  neighbours  of  the  Provincial  tribes  to  attack  them 
Caesar  enlists  German  cavalry      .... 
He  marches  to  succour  the  Province 
Vercingetorix  attacks  Caesar's  cavalry     . 
And  retreats  beaten  to  Alesia  (Mont  Auxois) 
Caesar  invests  Alesia         ..... 
The  Gallic  cavalry  make  a  sortie,  but  are  beaten 
Vercingetorix  sends  them  out  to  fetch  succour    . 
Caesar  constructs  lines  of  contravallation  and  circumvallation 
Organisation  of  an  army  of  relief 
Famine  in  Alesia  . 
Critognatus  proposes  cannibalism 
The  fate  of  the  Mandubii . 
Arrival  of  the  army  of  relief 
The  final  struggle 
The  self-sacrifice  of  Vercingetorix 
Surrender  of  the  garrison 
Vercingetorix  and  his  place  in  history 
Caesar  distributes  his  legions  for  the  winter 


CHAPTER    VIII 


THE    END    OF   THE    STRUGGLE 


Effects  of  Caesar's  victory  at  Alesia  .... 

Various  tribes  prepare  to  renew  the  struggle 
Caesar  disperses  the  Bituriges  and  Carnutes 
Campaign  against  the  Bellovaci   ..... 

Caninius  and  Fabius  compel  Dumnacus  to  raise  the  siege  of  Lemonum 
(Poitiers)         ....... 

Drappes  and  Lucterius  take  refuge  in  Uxellodunum  (Puy  d'Issolu) 
Blockade  of  Uxellodunum  ..... 

Execution  of  Gutuatrus    ...... 

Caesar  marches  for  Uxellodunum  .... 

He  cuts  off  the  garrison  from  their  supply  of  water 


CONTENTS 


XXXV 


PACK 

Surrender  of  the  garrison .  .  .  .  .  .157 

Their  punishment  .......       157 

Caesar  follows  up  coercion  by  conciliation  ....       158 


CHAPTER    IX 

Conclusion  ••......  160 

Appendix  ........  165 

Index       .........  173 


LIST  OF  ILLUSTKATIONS 


Caesar  (from  the  bust  in  the  British  Museum)  . 

Frontispiece 

Gaul  in  the  time  of  Caesar 

.  to  face  page    1 

Defeat  of  the  Helvetii    .... 

33 

Operations  on  the  Aisne 

49 

Battle  of  Neuf-Mesnil     .... 

53 

Gergovia.             ..... 

117 

Labienus's  campaign  against  Camulogenus 

129 

Alesia      ....... 

133 

Uxellodunum      ...... 

153 

[An  article  on  "The  Map  of  Gaul"  will  be  found  by  any  reader  who  may 
care  to  consult  it  on  pages  329-332  of  the  larger  edition  of  this  book. 

When  pages  following  172  are  referred  to  in  the  footnotes  without  the 
mention  of  any  book — for  example,  "  See  p.  606  "  or  "  See  note  on  Gokgobina, 
pp.  426-32" — the  reference  is  to  the  larger  edition.] 


9  ID' 


Stm/inU  «My*  -*''">^  ^^-^ 


Luu'lna    Mftcniilln,u  &  Co,! 


CAESAK'S   CONQUEST  OF  GAUL 


CHAPTEE    I 

INTKODUCTION 

Three  centuries  before  the  birth  of  Caesar,  while  patrician  Gallic 
was  still  struggling  with  plebeian,  while  both  were  still  con-  oo^aTy : 
tending   with   rival   peoples  for   supremacy,  the    Gauls  first  ^J-'^ttie  of 
encountered  their  destined  conquerors.      For  a  generation  or  and  its 
more,^   the    Celtic  wanderers,    whose   kinsmen   had    already  results. 
overflowed  Gaul,  crossed  the  Pyrenees  and  passed  into  Britain 
and  into  Ireland,  had  been  pouring,  in  a  resistless  stream, 
down  the  passes  of  the  Alps.     They  spread  over  Lombardy. 
They  drove  the  Etruscans  from  their  strongholds  in  the  north. 
They  crossed  the  Po,  and  pushed  further  and  further  south- 
ward into  Etruria  itself.     At  length  they  overthrew  a  Eoman  388  b.c. 
army  in   the   battle  of  the   Allia,  and    marched  unopposed 
through    the    Colline    Gate.      The    story    of    the    sack    and 
burning    of    the    city  was   noised    throughout    the  civilised 
world ;  yet  the  disaster  itself  hardly  affected  the  history  of 
Eome.    It  probably  tended  to  rivet  the  bonds  of  union  between 
her  and  the  other  cities  of  Latium,  and  to  strengthen  her 
claim  to  supremacy  in  Italy.     From  time  to  time  during  the 
next    century   the    Gauls    returned    to   plunder :    but   their 
incursions    were    repelled ;    and    the    champion    of    Italian 
civilisation  was  Eome. 

But  the  Eoman  dread  of  the  Gauls  long  remained  ;  and  Gallic 


tribes  assist 
the  enemii 

her.     In  the  last  Samnite  war,  one  of  the  most  crucial  events  of  Rome. 


more  than  once  Eome's  enemies  enlisted  their  services  against  ^j^g  enemies 


^  Regarding  the  date  of  the  Gallic  invasion  of  Italy,  and  the  place  from 
which  the  invaders  came,  see  pp.  548-50  of  the  larger  edition  of  this  book. 

1  B 


CAES^iPi'S   CONQUEST  OF  GAUL 


CHAPTER    I 

INTRODUCTION 

Three  centuries  before  the  birth  of  Caesar,  while  patrician  Gallic 
was  still  struggling  with  plebeian,  while  both  were  still  con-  ^Ytaiy : 
tending   with   rival   peoples  for   supremacy,  the    Gauls  first  ^^t^^i^  of 
encountered  their  destined  conquerors.      For  a  generation  or  aud  its 
more,^   the    Celtic  wanderers,    whose   kinsmen   had    already  results. 
overflowed  Gaul,  crossed  the  Pyrenees  and  passed  into  Britain 
and  into  Ireland,  had  been  pouring,  in  a  resistless  stream, 
down  the  passes  of  the  Alps.      They  spread  over  Lombardy. 
They  drove  the  Etruscans  from  their  strongholds  in  the  north. 
They  crossed  the  Po,  and  pushed  further  and  further  south- 
ward into  Etruria  itself.     At  length  they  overthrew  a  Pioman  383  b.c. 
army  in   the   battle  of  the   Allia,  aud    marched  unopposed 
through    the    CoUine    Gate.      The    story    of    the    sack    and 
burning    of    the    city  was   noised    throughout    the  civilised 
world ;  yet  the  disaster  itself  hardly  affected  the  history  of 
Eome.    It  probably  tended  to  rivet  the  bonds  of  union  between 
her  and  the  other  cities  of  Latium,  and  to  strengthen  her 
claim  to  supremacy  in  Italy.     From  time  to  time  during  the 
next    century   the    Gauls    returned    to   plunder  :    but    their 
incursions    were    repelled ;     and    the    champion    of    Italian 
civilisation  was  Eome. 

But  the  Pioman  dread  of  the  Gauls  long;  remained  ;  and  Gallic 


t:ibes  assist 
the  enemi 

her.     In  tlie  last  Samnite  war,  one  of  the  most  crucial  events  of  Rome. 


more  than  once  Pome's  enemies  enlisted  their  services  against  ^^xe  enemies 


^  Kegarding  the  date  of  the  Gallic  invasion  of  Italy,  and  the  place  from 
which  the  invaders  came,  see  pp.  548-50  of  the  larger  edition  of  this  book. 

1  B 


2  INTEODUCTION  chap. 

295  B.C.  of  Eoman  history,  Samnites,  Etruscans  and  Gauls  made  a 
desperate  effort  to  crush  the  rising  power ;  and  after  this 
attempt  had  been  frustrated,  the  Etruscans  once  again  rose 
in  revolt,  and  their  Gallic  mercenaries  destroyed  a  Eoman 
army  under  the    walls    of  Arretium.      It  was  not  until  the 

283  B.C.  Senones  had  in  their  turn  been  defeated  and  expelled  from 
Italy,  and  the  Boii,  who  hastened  to  avenge  them,  had  been 

282  B.C.  crushed  near  the  Lake  of  Vadimo,  that  the  republic  was 
finally  released  from  the  fear  of  Gallic  invasion. 

The  Years  passed  away.     Eome  became  mistress  of  the  penin- 

fight^thdr   ^^^^'^   ^^^  determined  to  vindicate  her  natural  right  to   the 

way  to       rich  plain  on  her  own  side  of  the  Alpine  barrier.      The  Gauls 

'      offered  a  strenuous  resistance,  and  even  assumed  the  offensive. 

Eeinforced  by  a  swarm  of  free-lances  from  the  valley  of  the 

upper  Ehone,  they  boldly  crossed  the  Apennines  and  plundered 

Etruria.      The  Eomans  were  taken  by  surprise  :  but  in  the 

225  B.C.  great  battle  of  Telamon  they  checked  the  invasion ;  and 
within  two  years  they  fought  their  way  to  the  right  bank  of 
the  Po,  The  Insubres  on  the  northern  side  still  held  out : 
but  before  the  outbreak  of  the  second  Punic  war  Mediolanum, 

222  B.C.  or  Milan,  their  chief  stronghold,  was  captured ;  and  the 
fortresses  of  Placentia  and  Cremona  were  founded. 

and  con-  ^xit  the  work  of  conquest  was  only  half  completed  when 

alpine  Gaul  Hannibal  descended  into  the  plain,  and  the  exasperated  Gauls 

218  B.C.  rallied  round  him.  When  Eome  emerged,  victorious,  from 
her  great  struggle,  they  knew  what  was  in  store  for  them, 
and  made  a  last  desperate  effort  to  win  back  their  liberty. 

200  B.C.  Placentia  was  sacked,  and  Cremona  was  invested.  The 
Eoman  army  whicli   marched    to  its  relief  gained  a  victory, 

199  B.C.  but  was  in  its  turn  almost  annihilated  by  the  Insubres.  The 
Gauls,  however,  could  never  long  act  together  :  their  country- 
men beyond  the  Alps  gave  them  no  help  :  the  league  of  the 
northern  tribes  was  rent  by  discord  and  treachery ;  and  the 

196  B.C.  Insubres  and  Cenomani  were  compelled  to  accept  a  peace, 
which  allowed  them  indeed  to  retain  their  constitution,  but 
forbade  them  to  acquire  the  Eoman  citizenship.  South  of 
the  Po  the  Boii  strove  frantically  to  hold  their  own :  but  in 
a   series  of  battles  their  fighting   men  were  well  nigh   ex- 

191  B.C.      terminated:   the  Eomans  insisted  upon   the  cession  of  half 


I  INTEODUCTION  3 

their  territory ;  and  on  both  sides  of  the  river  the  survivors 
were  gradually  lost  among  Italian  settlers. 

Eastward  and  southward  and  westward  the  empire  of  the  Formation 
Eomans  spread.      They  conquered  Greece.      They  conquered  ^q„)^^,j 
Carthage.      They  conquered  Spain.      But  between  the  central  Province  in 
and  the  western  peninsula  they  had  no  means  of  communica-  ^j^g  Qa„i_ 
tion  by  land  save  what  was  afforded  by  the  Greek  colony  of 
Massilia.      It  was  an  entreaty  from  the  Massiliots  for  protec-  [Mar- 
tion  that  gave  occasion  to  the  wars  which  resulted  in  the  ^®' 
formation   of  the  Province   of  Transalpine    Gaul ;    and   the 
natural   willingness    of   the    Senate    to    support    their    most 
faithful  allies  was  doubtless  stimulated  by  the  desire  to  secure 
possession  of  the  indispensable  strip  of  coast  between   the 
Alps  and  the  Pyrenees,  partly  also  perhaps  by  the  idea  of 
creating  a  Greater  Italy  for  the  growing  Italian  population. 
In  155  B.C.  the  Eomans  stepped  forward  as  the  champions 
of  Massilia  against  the  Ligurian  tribes  between  the  Maritime 
Alps  and  the  Ehone.      The  highlanders  who  inhabited   the 
forest-clad  mountains  above  the  Eiviera  were  crushed  in  a 
single   campaign ;     after   an   interval   of    thirty   years    their 
western  neighbours,  the  Salyes,  were  forced  to  submit ;  and  125  b.c 
their  seaboard,  like  that  of  the  other  tribes,  was  given  to  the 
Massiliots.      But  the  Eomans  had  come  to  stay.      The  Aedui, 
who  dwelt  in  the  Nivernais  and  western  Burgundy,  calculated 
that  the  support  of  the  Eepublic  would  lielp  them  to  secure 
ascendency  over  their  rivals ;  and  by  a  treaty,  fraught  with  1-3  b.c. 
unforeseen  issues,  they  were  recognised  as  Friends  and  Allies 
of  the  Eoman  people.      The  Allobroges,  on  the  other  hand, 
whose  home  was  between  the  Lake  of  Geneva,  the  Ehone  and 
the  Isere,  refused  to  surrender  the  king  of  the  Salyes,  who 
had  claimed  their  protection ;  and  the  king  of  the  Arverni, 
with  all  the  hosts  of  his  dependent  tribes,  marched  to  support 
them.     Just  twenty  years  before  the  birth  of  Caesar  a  great  121  b.c. 
battle  was  fought  at  the  coutiuence  of  the  Ehone  and  the 
Isere.     The  Gauls  were  beaten ;    and  the  bridges  over  the 
Ehone  broke  down  beneath  the  multitude  of  the  fugitives. 

This  victory  was,  in  the  strictest  sense,  decisive.  The 
Eomans  were  now  masters  of  the  lower  Ehone ;  and  if  they 
were  ever  to  penetrate  into  Further  Gaul,  their  base  could 


INTRODUCTION 


[Nar- 
boune.] 


be  advanced  some  hundreds  of  miles.  The  Arverni,  whose 
hegemony  had  extended  to  the  Rhine  and  the  Mediterranean, 
had  received  a  blow  from  which  they  never  recovered. 

The  Province  which  was  now  formed  stretched  from  the 
Maritime  Alps  to  the  Rhone.  Succeeding  consuls  rapidly 
extended  the  frontier  until  it  ran  along  the  Cevennes  and 
the  river  Tarn  down  into  the  centre  of  the  Pyrenees.  The 
tribes  were  obliged  to  pay  tribute  ;  and  their  subjection  was 
assured  by  the  construction  of  roads  and  fortresses.  The 
heavy  exactions  of  the  conquerors  provoked  frequent  insur- 
rections ;  but  year  by  year  the  Provincials  became  steadily 
Romanised.  Roman  nobles  acquired  estates  in  the  Province, 
and  sent  their  stewards  to  manage  them.  Roman  merchants 
built  warehouses  and  counting-houses  in  the  towns ;  and  the 
language  and  civilisation  of  Rome  began  to  take  root.^  Narbo 
with  its  spacious  harbour  was  not  only  a  powerful  military 
station,  but  in  commerce  the  rival  of  Massilia.  Meanwhile 
events  were  paving  the  way  for  the  conquest  of  the  great 
country  that  stretched  beyond  the  Rhone  and  the  Cevennes 
to  the  Rhine  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean. 

The  aspect  of  this  region  was,  of  course,  very  different 
tauts  ^^^  ^'  fi'ooi  tl^^t  of  the  beautiful  France  with  which  we  are  familiar. 
The  land  of  gay  cities,  of  picturesque  old  towns  dominated 
by  awful  cathedrals,  of  corn-fields  and  vineyards  and  sunny 
hamlets  and  smiling  chateaux,  was  tlien  covered  in  many 
places  by  dreary  swamps  and  darkened  by  huge  forests. 
Gaul  extended  far  beyond  the  limits  of  modern  France,  in- 
cluding a  large  part  of  Switzerland,  Alsace  and  Lorraine, 
Belgium  and  southern  Holland.  The  people  were  divided 
(_^-  into  three  groups,  differing  in  race,  language,  manners  and 
institutions.  Between  the  Garonne  and  the  Pyrenees  were  the 
Aquitani,  of  whom  certain  tribes  were  akin  to  the  Iberians 
of  Spain.  North-east  of  the  Seine  and  the  Marne,  in  the 
plains  of  Picardy,  Artois  and  Champagne,  on  the  mist-laden 
flats  of  the  Scheldt  and  the  lower  Rhine  and  in  the  vast 
forest  of  the  Ardennes,  dwelt  the  Belgae,  who  may  have 
partially  mixed  and  were  continually  at  war  with  their 
German  neighbours.      The  lowlands   of  Switzerland,  Alsace 

^  Cicero,  Pro.  Fonteio,  11. 


Gaul  and 


1  INTKODUCTION  5 

and  Franche  Corate,  the  great  plains  and  the  uplands  of 
central  France,  and  the  Atlantic  seaboard,  were  occupied  by 
the  Celtae. 

Modern  science,  however,  has  established  a  more  detailed  Ethnology- 
classification.  Neither  in  Aquitania  nor  in  Celtica  nor  in 
the  land  of  the  Belgae  were  the  people  homogeneous.  To 
what  era  is  to  be  assigned  the  first  appearance  of  man  in 
Gaul,  is  still  a  disputed  question.  Some  ethnologists  affirm 
that  even  in  the  tertiary  epoch,  more  than  a  million  years 
ago,  the  country  round  Aurillac  was  inhabited  by  men,  if 
men  they  can  be  called,  who  wrought  for  themselves  flint 
implements  which  remain  as  their  sole  memorial.^  Even 
after  the  close  of  that  period  our  own  country  was  still  part 
of  the  continent,  and  the  great  ice-age  had  not  yet  begun. 
Thenceforward  uncertainty  disappears.  In  the  quaternary 
epoch  came  the  palaeolithic  races,  whose  existence  is  attested 
not  only  by  their  weapons  but  by  their  own  remains.  These 
men  maintained  themselves  in  Gaul  during  the  second  inter- 
glacial  epoch,  and  sheltered  in  caves  throughout  the  countless 
centuries  in  which  the  glaciers  were  spreading  and  receding 
and  spreading  again  over  the  uplands  of  central  Europe.^ 
Earliest  of  all  were  the  Neanderthal,  or,  as  they  are  some- 
times called,  the  Canstadt  race,  with  their  low  brutish  fore- 
heads and  huge  beetling  brows,  whose  skeletons  have  been 
found  in  the  basin  of  the  Meuse  and  between  the  valley  of 
the  Ehine  and  Auvergne.  Towards  the  close  of  this  epoch 
appeared  the  dawn  of  pictorial  art.  From  tlie  caves  of  La 
Madelaine  and  Les  Eyzies  in  the  basin  of  the  Dordogne  have 
been  recovered  tusks  of  mammoths  and  horns  of  reindeer, 
engraved  with  likenesses  of  horses,  of  fish  and  of  men.^  The 
palaeolithic  races  were  all  dolichocephalic :  their  heads,  that 
is  to  say,  were  long  in  proportion  to  their  breadth  ;  and  the 

^  See  A.  Bertrand,  La  Gaule  avant  les  Gaulois,  2nd  ed.,  1891,  pp.  31-52  ; 
A.  H.  Keane,  Ethnology,  2nd  ed.,  1896,  pp.  91-2  ;  and,  for  a  full  discussion  of 
the  whole  subject  of  this  and  the  next  three  paragraphs,  my  essay  on  "The 
Ethnology  of  Gaul  "  (pp.  245-322). 

"  See  J.  Geikie,  The  Great  Ice  Age,  3rd  ed.,  1894,  pp.  577-84,  608,  612, 
684-5,  687,  689-90.     But  see  also  p.  823  of  the  larger  edition  of  this  book. 

^  See  the  illustrations  in  Bertrand's  La  Gaule  avant  les  Gaulois,  pp.  84 
87-91,  93-5,  102. 


6  INTEODUCTION  chap. 

same  characteristic  is  found  in  the  skulls  of  the  tall  Cro- 
Magnon  race,  and  of  the  slender  stunted  people  of  I'Homme 
Mort,  who,  though  they  may  have  been  descended  from  the 
older  inhabitants,  belonged  to  the  neolithic  age.  Both  of 
these  peoples,  who  are  called  after  the  caverns  in  which  the 
first  specimens  were  found,  appear  to  have  been  diffused  over 
the  length  and  breadth  of  Gaul.  But  as  the  new  epoch 
advanced,  new  races  began  to  appear ;  and  the  invaders 
who  came  from  the  east,  and  gradually  subdued  the  feebler 
aborigines,  were  characterised  by  brachycephaly,  or  great 
breadth  of  skull.  Among  the  neolithic  tribes  were  some 
whose  chiefs  erected  dolmens,  or  vast  structures  of  stone,  to 
cover  the  sepulchres  of  their  dead.  It  is  believed  by  some 
ethnologists  that  the  dolmen-builders  belonged  to  the  so- 
called  Mediterranean  race,  which  originated  in  Africa,  of 
which  the  peoples  of  Cro-Magnon  and  I'Homme  Mort  were 
branches,  and  which  penetrated  into  the  British  Isles  ^ ;  while 
others  hold  that  the  great  majority  of  them  came  from  the 
north  and  east,  and  were  identical  with  the  Ligurians,  who,  in 
historical  times  were  apparently  confined  within  the  limits 
of  the  modern  Provence.  The  dolmens  are  not  all  of  one 
pattern:  some  of  them  contained  implements  of  bronze  as  well 
as  of  flint ;  and  the  skeletons  which  have  been  found  in  them 
belong  to  more  than  one  race.  The  era  in  which  they  were 
constructed  was  marked  by  considerable  commercial  activity  ; 
for  some  of  them  have  yielded  ornaments  of  jade  and 
turquoise,  which  must  have  been  imported  into  Gaul.  The 
huge  stone  monuments  which  Caesar  doubtless  saw  when  his 
legions  entered  Brittany  were  only  one  of  many  groups  which 
extended  along  the  coast  from  the  Pyrenees  to  the  Channel, 
and  were  scattered  over  central  Gaul :  but  not  a  single 
dolmen  has  been  found  on  Gallic  soil  east  of  the  great  barrier 
formed  by  the  Jura  and  the  Vosges.^  The  neolithic  races 
were  of  manifold  types  :  but  it  has  been  suggested  that  the 

^  The  Tamaliu,  with  whom  the  dolmen-builders  have  also  been  identified, 
and  whose  features  were  portra3-ed  in  Egyptian  wall-paintings  more  than  3000 
years  ago,  were  themselves,  it  should  seem,  a  branch  of  the  "Mediterranean 
race." 

^  Bertrand  has  published  a  map  showing  the  distribution  of  the  Gallic 
dolmens.     See  La  Gaule  avant  Us  Gaulois,  1891,  p.  128. 


I  INTKODUCTION  7 

latest  were  the  sturdy,  dark,  round-headed  people  whose 
descendants  still  form  the  mass  of  the  population  not  only  of 
France,  but  also  of  southern  Germany.  Probably  this  type, 
which  some  ethnologists  call  the  "  Auvergnat "  and  others 
the  "  Ligurian,"  summed  up  the  characteristics  of  divers 
intermingled  groups. 

The  earliest  inhabitants  of  Gaul  about  whom  history  has 
anything  to  tell  were  the  Iberians,  who  dwelt  between  the 
Ehone  and  the  Pyrenees.  The  "  Iberian  question  "  is  one  of 
the  problems  which  amuse  and  baffle  ethnologists ;  for  there 
can  be  little  doubt  that  in  the  land  which  belonged  to  the 
Iberians  of  history,  in  Spain  as  well  as  in  southern  Gaul, 
there  prevailed  two  forms  of  speech, — Basque  and  the  un- 
couth, undeciphered  language  in  which  were  engraven  the 
so-called  Iberian  inscriptions.  But  the  researches  of  anthro- 
pologists would  seem  to  show  that,  if  the  Iberians  were  not 
one  race,  the  bulk  of  them  were  small  and  dark,  and  were 
akin  to  the  neolithic  people  of  I'Homme  Mort,  On  their 
east  dwelt  the  Ligurians,  small  and  dark  like  them,  and,  as 
some  believe,  an  offshoot  from  the  same  Mediterranean  stock, 
though  others  insist  that  they  were  the  purest  representatives 
of  the  round-headed  "  Auvergnat "  type.  According  to  the 
ancient  geographers,  the  land  which  belonged  to  them  in  Gaul 
was  the  mountainous  tract  between  the  Ehone,  the  Durance 
and  the  Cottian  and  Maritime  Alps ;  but  Ligurians  were 
mingled  with  Iberians  on  the  west  of  the  Ehone ;  and  it  is 
certain  that  in  Caesar's  time  Liguria,  as  well  as  the  land  of 
the  Iberians,  was  also  peopled  by  the  descendants  of  Celtic 
invaders.  It  was  perhaps  in  the  eighth  century  before 
the  Christian  era  that  the  tall  fair  Celts  began  to  cross 
the  Ehine  ^ :  but  it  is  unlikely  that  even  these  invaders 
were  homogeneous ;  and  those  to  whom  belonged  the 
characteristics  which  the  ancient  writers  associated  with  the 
GalHc  or  Celtic  type  may  have  been  accompanied  by  the 
descendants  of  aliens  who  had  joined  them  during  their  long 
sojourn  in  Germany.  Successive  swarms  spread  over  the 
land,  partly  subduing  and  mingling  with  the  descendants  of 
the  pakeolithic  peoples  and  of  their  neolithic  conquerors,  partly 

1    See  p.  823. 


8  INTRODUCTTOX  chap. 

perhaps  driving  them  into  the  mountainons  tracts.  Physic- 
ally, they  resembled  the  tall  fair  Germans  whom  Caesar  and 
Tacitus  describe :  but  they  differed  from  them  in  character 
and  customs  as  well  as  in  speech.  And  although  the  tumuli, 
in  which  remains  of  their  dead  have  been  discovered,  contain 
implements  of  iron,^  there  are  writers  who  maintain  that  the 
earliest  hordes  had  begun  to  arrive  in  neolithic  times.  The 
Belgic  Celts  were  the  latest  comers ;  and  among  the  Belgae 
of  Caesar's  time  the  aboriginal  elements  were  comparatively 
small.  If  Caesar  was  rightly  informed,  the  languages  of  the 
Belgae  and  the  Celtae  were  distinct.  Both,  it  is  needless  to 
say,  were  Celtic,  and  the  difference  may  not  have  been  gi-eat ; 
for  if  a  Goidelic  dialect  was  spoken  anywhere  in  Gaul,  the 
vestiges  of  Gallic  that  remain  belong  to  the  Brytlionic 
branch  of  the  Celtic  tongue.-  In  Aquitania  the  natives 
remained  comparatively  pure,  and  formed  a  separate  group, 
which,  in  Caesar's  time,  stood  politically  apart  from  the 
Celtae  as  well  as  from  the  Belgae.  They  are  generally 
spoken  of  as  an  Iberian  people  :  but  the  name  is  misleading. 
The  conquering  Celts,  as  the  evidence  of  nomenclature  shows, 
had  advanced,  though  probably  in  small  numbers,  beyond 
the  Garonne ;  and  evidence  supplied  by  recent  measurements 
of  the  heads  of  living  inhabitants  appears  to  show  that  in 
certain  parts  of  Aquitania  the  "  Auvergnat "  element  was 
considerable.  But  it  is  certain  that  the  Celtic  language  was 
not  generally  spoken  in  Aquitania ;  and  the  Iberian  type 
was  sufficiently  conspicuous  to  give  some  colour  to  the 
popular  theory. 
.  Thus  when  Caesar  entered  Gaul,  the  groups  whom  he 
called  Belgae,  Celtae  and  Aquitani  were  each  a  medley  of 
different  races.  The  Belgae  were  the  purest  and  the  least 
civilised  of  the  three  ;  and  both  in  Belgic  and  in  Celticau 
Gaul  the  Celtic  conquerors  had  imposed  their  language  upon 
the  conquered  peoples.  Even  in  a  political  sense,  the 
Belgae  and  the  Celtae  were  not  separated  by  a  hard  and  fast 

^  A  map  showing  the  distribution  of  the  tumuli  both  in  Belgic  and  in 
Celtican  Gaul  will  be  found  in  M.  Bevtrand's  Arch^ologie  ccUiquc  et  gauloise, 
2nd  ed.,  1889,  p.  264.    See  my  essay  on  "  The  Ethnology  of  Gaul,"  pp.  284-5. 

2  See  App.  A. 


1  IXTRODUCTION  9 

line ;  for  the  Celtican  tribe  of  the  Carniites  was  among  the 
clients  of  the  Belgic  Eemi,  while  on  the  other  hand  the 
Celtican  Aedui  claimed  supremacy  over  the  Belgic  Bellovaci. 
But  if  not  scientifically  complete,  the  grouping  adopted  by 
Caesar  was  sufficient  for  the  purpose  of  his  narrative.  Just 
as  a  modern  conqueror,  without  troubling  himself  about 
recondite  questions  of  ethnology,  might  say  that  the  people  of 
Great  Britain  were  composed  of  Englishmen,  Scotchmen  and 
"Welsh,  so  Caesar,  knowing  and  caring  nothing  about  ethnical 
subdivisions,  divided  the  people  of  Gaul  into  Belgae,  Celtae 
and  Aquitani. 

But  who  would  be  content  with  the  mere  knowledge  of 
the  physical  characteristics  of  the  races,  more  or  less  inter- 
mingled, of  which  a  people  was  composed  ?  Measurements 
of  skulls,  tables  of  stature,  diagrams  illustrating  tints  of  hair 
or  of  complexion, — these  things  have  their  uses ;  but  they 
leave  our  curiosity  unsatisfied.  Even  the  arrows  and  the 
harpoons  that  have  been  found  in  the  caves  of  Perigord  and 
the  Dordogne,  the  pottery,  the  tools  and  the  ornaments  that 
have  been  taken  from  the  dolmens  to  enrich  the  museums  of 
France,  have  only  enabled  the  most  diligent  of  antiquaries  to 
piece  together  an  outline  of  the  culture  of  paheolithic  and 
neolithic  men.  They  hunted  and  fished  ;  they  domesticated 
animals  ;  they  learned  to  sow  and  reap  and  grind  their  corn  ; 
they  tried  to  propitiate  the  spirits  with  which  their  imagina- 
tion peopled  the  lakes  and  springs.^  All  this  we  know :  but 
when  the  races  have  amalgamated  into  the  three  groups  of 
Belgae,  Celtae  and  Aquitani,  and  the  epoch  of  Eoman 
conquest  is  approaching,  we  desire  to  know  more.  What 
manner  of  men  were  the  inhabitants  of  Gaul  ?  If  this 
question  can  be  answered,  the  answer  can  only  come  from  a 
mind  subtle  and  powerful  no  less  than  well-informed.  Every 
man  has  his  own  character.  Yet,  with  all  the  idiosyncrasies 
which  distinguish  them  one  from  another,  Yorkshiremen 
have  a  common  type  of  character  which  differentiates  them 
from  the  men  of  Kent :  Englishmen  have  a  common  type 
which     differentiates     tliem     from     Scotsmen  ;     and     finally 

1  See  A.  Bertrand,  La  religion  des  Gaulois,  1897,  pp.  191-3,  268-9,  and 
J.  Rhys,  Celtic  Heathendom,  1888,  pp.  105-6. 


10  INTEODUCTION  chap. 

Englishmen  and  Scotsmen  have  something  in  common,  which, 
in  the  eyes  of  foreign  observers,  differentiates  the  people  of 
Great  Britain,  morally  and  intellectually,  from  the  other 
nations  of  the  earth.  For  in  our  own,  as  in  other  lands, 
long  association,  intermarriage,  the  prolonged  influence  of 
common  conditions  of  life  have  given  to  originally  distinct 
groups,  without  destroying  the  individuality  of  any,  a  com- 
mon recognisable,  if  indefinable,  mental,  and  even  physical, 
type.  To  some,  though  for  obvious  reasons  a  less  degree, 
the  same  causes  must  have  operated  in  Gaul.  Setting  aside 
the  Aquitani,  of  whom  Caesar  had  little  to  tell,  and  perhaps 
also  the  Belgae,  the  medley  of  peoples  whom  he  called 
"  Galli "  had  probably  so  far  coalesced  that  they  had  acquired 
certain  common  traits  of  character.  Perhaps  when  he 
described  the  features  of  the  Gallic  temperament  which  had 
most  impressed  him  in  the  course  of  the  war,  he  took  little 
note  of  the  lowest  class,  the  cultivators  and  the  shepherds, 
who  had  little  to  do  with  political  life :  but  we  can  hardly 
suppose  that  his  remarks  applied  only  to  the  ruling  class  or 
to  the  purer  Celts.^  To  attempt  the  portrayal  of  national 
character  is  often  as  misleading  as  it  is  tempting :  but  guided 
by  Caesar's  observations,  we  cannot  go  far  astray  even  if  we 
do  not  go  very  far.  The  Gauls  were  an  interesting  people, 
1  enthusiastic,  impulsive,  quick-witted,  versatile,  vainglorious 
\J  and  ostentatious,  childishly  inquisitive,  rash,  sanguine  and 
I  inconstant,  arrogant  in  victory  and  despondent  in  defeat,  sub- 
missive as  women  to  their  priests,  impatient  of  law  and  disci- 
pline, yet  capable  of  loyalty  to  a  strong  and  sympathetic  ruler. 
Civilisation^  The  Gallic  peoples  had  all  risen  far  above  the  condition 
Gauls.  of  savages ;  and  the  Celticans  of  the  interior,  many  of  whom 
had  already  fallen  under  Eoman  influence,  had  attained  a 
certain  degree  of  civilisation  and  even  of  luxury.  Their 
trousers,  from  which  the  Province  took  its  name  of  Gallia 
Braccata,  and  their  many-coloured  tartan  shirts  and  cloaks 
excited  the  astonishment  of  their  conquerors.  The  chiefs 
wore  rings  and  bracelets  and  necklaces  of  gold  ;  and  when 

1  See  especially  B.  O.,  ii.  1,  §  3  ;  iii.  19,  §  6  ;  iv.  5,  §§  2-3,  13,  §  3  ;  vii.  20-21  ; 
and  compare  Strabo,  Geogr.,  iv.  4,  §§  2-6.  I  am  not  sure  whether  Caesar's 
remarks  apply  to  the  Belgae. 


I  '  INTEODUCTION  11 

those  tall  lair-haired  warriors  rode  forth  to  battle  with  their 
helmets  wrought  in  the  shape  of  some  fierce  beast's  head  and 
surmounted  by  nodding  plumes,  their  chain  armour,  their 
long  bucklers  and  their  clanking  swords,  they  made  a  splendid 
show.  Walled  towns  or  large  villages,  the  strongholds  of 
the  various  tribes,  were  conspicuous  on  numerous  hills.  The 
plains  were  dotted  by  scores  of  open  hamlets.  The  houses, 
built  of  timber  and  wicker-work,  were  large  and  well- 
thatched.^  The  fields  in  summer  were  yellow  with  corn. 
Eoads  ran  from  town  to  town.  Eude  bridges  spanned  the 
rivers ;  and  barges,  laden  with  merchandise,  floated  along 
them.  Ships,  clumsy  indeed  but  larger  than  any  that  were 
seen  on  the  Mediterranean,  braved  the  storms  of  the  Bay  of 
Biscay  and  carried  cargoes  between  the  ports  of  Brittany  and 
the  coast  of  Britain.  Tolls  were  exacted  on  the  goods  which 
were  transported  on  the  great  water-ways  ;  and  it  was  from 
the  farming  of  these  dues  that  the  nobles  derived  a  large 
part  of  their  wealth.  Every  tribe  had  its  coinage ;  and  the 
knowledge  of  writing,  in  Greek  and  in  Eoman  characters, 
was  not  confined  to  the  priests.  The  Aeduans  were  familiar 
with  the  plating  of  copper  and  of  tin.  The  miners  of 
Aquitaine,  of  Auvergne  and  of  the  Berri  were  celebrated  for 
their  skill.  Indeed  in  all  that  belonged  to  outward  prosperity 
the  peoples  of  Gaul  had  made  great  strides  since  their  kins- 
men first  came  in  contact  with  Eome." 

But  the  growth  of  material  prosperity  had  not  been 
matched  by  true  national  progress.  The  Aquitani,  indeed, 
the  maritime  tribes  and  the  Belgae  were  untouched  by 
foreign  influences :  but  the  Celticans  of  the  interior  had  been 

^  Recent  excavations,  however,  have  shown  that  the  houses  in  the  great 
manufacturing  town  of  Bibracte,  on  Mont  Beuvray,  the  capital  of  the  Aedui, 
were  rectangular,  built  of  stone  compacted  with  clay,  and  partially  subterranean. 
See  an  interesting  article  by  M.  Joseph  Dechelette  in  Gongr^s  international 
d'anthr.  et  d'arch,  pr^hist.,  1900,  pp.  418-27. 

2  Livy,  vii.  10,  xxxviii.  17  ;  Virgil,  Aen.,  viii.  660,  662  ;  Propertius,  iv.  10 
43  ;  Tacitus,  Hist.,  ii.  20  ;  Strabo,  Geogr.  iv.  4,  §  3  ;  Diodorus  Siculus,  v.  2S 
30  ;  Caesar,  B.  G.,  i.  18,  §§  3:4,  ii.  5,  §  6,  vii.  34,  §  3,  etc. ;  Did.  arch,  de  la  Gaule, 
i.  450  and  illustrations  2)assim  ;  J.  G.  Bulliot  and  H.  de  Fontenay,  Vart  de 
I'emaillerie  chez  les  ^diiens,  1875  ;  Desjardins,  Geogr.  dc  la  Gaule  rom.,  ii.  566- 
70  ;  Journal  des  Savants,  1880,  pp.  45,  52-3,  76-8  ;  Revue  des  Deux  Mondes, 
1881,  p.  733  ;  Rev.  arch.,  nouv.  ser.,  t.  xvi.,  1867,  pp.  69-72. 


12  INTRODUCTION  chap. 

enfeebled  by  contact  with  Roman  civilisation.  Much  non- 
sense has  been  written  about  the  enervating  effect  of  luxury. 
Its  effect,  however,  when  it  is  suddenly  introduced  among  a 
half-civilised  people,  is  quite  different  from  its  effect  when  it 
is  a  natural  growth.  The  Gauls  had  lost  the  strength  of 
■^^oarbarism,  and  had  not  gained  the  strength  of  civilisation. 
They  had  once,  as  Caesar  remarked,  been  more  than  a  match 
for  the  Germans :  but  enervated  by  imported  luxury,  and 
cowed  by  a  succession  of  defeats,  they  no  longer  pretended 
to  be  able  to  cope  with  them. 
Their  poll-  Their  constitution  was  based  upon  the  tribe,  if  that  word 
sodaf or-  ^^^J  ^®  applied  to  the  political  unit  which  Caesar  called  a 
gauisation.  civitcis.  The  tribe  was  generally  an  aggregate,  more  or  less 
compact,  of  communities  to  which  he  gave  the  name  of  ^5«^i, 
the  members  of  which  had  originally  been  related  by  blood 
or  by  near  neighbourhood ;  but  it  would  seem  that  some  of 
the  smaller  tribes  consisted  each  of  one  pagus  only.  Each 
pagus  appears  to  have  enjoyed  a  certain  measure  of  inde- 
pendence, and  to  have  contributed  its  separate  contingent  to 
the  tribal  host/  Each  tribe  had  its  council  of  elders,  and 
'^— -iiad  once  had  its  king :  but  in  certain  tribes  the  king  was 
now  superseded  by  an  annually  elected  magistrate  ;  while  in 
others  perhaps  the  council  kept  the  government  to  itself 
A  rule  which  prevailed  among  the  Aedui  illustrates  the 
jealousy  which  was  felt  of  monarchical  power.  In  that  state 
the  chief  magistrate,  who  was  known  as  the  Vergobret,  was 
forbidden  to  stir  beyond  the  frontiers  of  the  country,  from 
which  it  may  be  inferred  that  it  was  not  lawful  for  him  to 
command  the  host.  The  executive  was  generally  weak. 
Some  of  the  smaller  communities  of  which  a  tribe  was 
composed  occasionally  acted  on  their  own  account,  in  opposi- 
tion to  the  rest  or  to  the  policy  of  the  tribal  authorities.^ 
Like  the  Anglo-Saxon  thanes  and  the  Norman  barons,  the 

^  Sir  Henry  Maine  {Earhj  Hist,  of  Institutions,  1875,  ]).  30)  speaks  of 
"Caesar's  failure  to  note  the  natural  divisions  of  the  Celtic  tribesmen,  the 
families  and  septs  or  sub-tribes."  See,  however,  F.  de  Coulanges,  Hist,  des 
inst. pol.  de  Vancienjie  France, — la  Gaulerom.,  1891,  pp.  8-9,  and  pp.  519-21 
of  the  larger  edition  of  this  book.  As  M.  Caraille  Jullian  has  shown  in  a  most 
interesting  and  suggestive  article  {Revue  des  etudes  ancicnnes,  iii.,  1901,  pp. 
77-97),  i\\& pagi  were  themselves  "natural  divisions." 

2  B.  G.,  iv.  22,  §  1,  5. 


I  INTRODUCTION  13 

nobles  surrounded  themselves  with  retainers, — loyal  followers 
or  enslaved  debtors;^  and  none  but  those  who  became  their 
dependents  could  be  sure  of  protection.  On  the  other  hand, 
none  but  those  who  were  strong  enough  to  protect  could 
be  sure  of  obedience.  The  oligarchies  were  no  more  secure 
than  the  monarchs  whom  they  had  supplanted.  These  men 
or  their  descendants  sullenly  plotted  for  the  restoration  of 
their  dynasties,  and,  reckless  of  the  common  weal,  they  were 
in  the  mood  to  grasp  the  hand  even  of  a  foreign  conqueror, 
and  reign  as  his  nominees.  Here  and  there  some  wealthy 
noble,  like  Pisistratus  in  Athens,  armed  his  retainers,  hired 
a  band  of  mercenaries,  won  the  support  of  the  populace  by 
eloquence  and  largess,  and,  overthrowing  the  feeble  oligarchy, 
usurped  supreme  power.  The  populace  were  perhaps  be- 
ginning to  have  some  glimmering  of  their  own  latent 
strength :  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  anywhere  they  had 
any  dejfinite  political  rights.  The  Druids  and  the  nobles  or, 
as  Caesar  called  them,  the  knights,  enjoyed  a  monopoly  of 
power  and  consideration  : "  the  bulk  of  the  poorer  freemen, 
ground  down  by  taxation  and  strangled  with  debt,  had  no 
choice  but  to  become  serfs. 

And  if  in  individual  tribes  there  was  anarchy,  want  of 
unity  was  the  bane  of  them  all.  It  was  not  only  that 
Belgian  and  Aquitanian  and  Celtican  were  naturally  distinct. 
This  distinction  might  have  been  as  readily  overcome  as  that 
between  English  and  Scotch  and  Welsh.  But  the  evil  was 
more  deeply  seated.  It  is  of  course  true  that  disunion  is  the 
normal  condition  of  half-civilised  peoples.  The  Old  English 
tribes  showed  no  genius  for  combination :  it  was  the  strong 
hand  of  an  Egbert,  an  Edgar,  an  Athelstan,  that  laid  the 
foundations  of  the  English  kingdom.      Nor  was  the  kingdom 

1  B.  G.,  i.  18,  §§  4-5  ;  ii.  1,  §  4  ;  vi.  11,  §  4,  13,  §§  1-2,  15  ;  vii.  40,  §  7.  Cf. 
F.  de  Coulanges,  Hist,  des  inst.  j^ol.  de  Vancienne  France, — la  Gaule  rom., 
pp.  37-8. 

-  Sir  Henry  Maine  [Early  Hist,  of  Institutions,  p.  29)  holds  that  the 
Equites,  or  Chiefs,  though  to  some  extent  they  were  a  class  apart,  did  not 
stand  in  such  close  relation  to  one  another  as  they  stood  to  the  various  septs  or 
groups  over  which  they  presided.  He  bases  his  criticism  of  Caesar's  account 
of  the  Gallic  institutions,  which,  he  thinks,  "is  accurate  as  far  as  it  goes,"  but 
"errs  in  omission  of  detail,"  upon  "the  evidence  concerning  a  Celtic  com- 
munity which  the  Brehon  tracts  supply." 


14  INTEODUCTION  chap. 

united,  except  in  the  loosest  sense,  even  on  the  eve  of  the 
Norman  Conquest.  If  Harold  was  formally  king  over  all 
England,  his  subjects  felt  themselves  Yorkshiremen  or  men 
of  Kent  rather  than  Englishmen.  Moreover,  the  circum- 
stances of  the  Gauls  were  peculiarly  unfortunate.  Their 
patriotism,  if  it  was  latent,  was  real :  they  were  proud  of 
what  their  fathers  had  achieved  in  war;  and  the  sense  of 
nationality  was  stirring  in  their  hearts.  If  they  had  been 
unmolested  or  had  been  exposed  to  attack  only  from  a  single 
enemy,  it  seems  probable  that  a  Vercingetorix  would  have 
welded  them  into  an  united  nation.  But  menaced  as  they 
were  by  the  Germans  on  the  one  hand  and  by  the  Eomans 
on  the  other,  their  tendency  to  disunion  was  increased.  This 
much  we  may  safely  conclude, — that  the  Gauls  were  not  J 
well  fitted  for  developing  from  their  own  resources  a  coherent 
polity.  If  the  Englishman  was  provincial  and  unpatriotic, 
the  Gaul  was  factious  and  impracticable.  Much  glib  general- 
isation has  been  hazarded  regarding  the  hypothetical  defects 
of  the  Celtic  character :  but  only  a  very  rash  or  a  very  dis- 
cerning historian  would  undertake  to  say  how  far  the  evil 
was  due  to  circumstances,  how  far  to  an  inherited  strain. 
Organism  and  environment  are  for  ever  acting  and  reacting 
upon  one  another.  While,  however,  it  is  foolish  to  pass 
sweeping  judgements  upon  a  people,  of  whom,  except  during 
the  few  years  that  preceded  the  loss  of  their  independence, 
we  have  only  the  scantiest  knowledge,  it  would  be  a  great 
mistake  to  leap  to  the  conclusion  that,  in  political  capacity, 
one  race  is  as  good  as  another.  What  aptitude  for  self- 
government  or  for  stable  government  of  any  kind  the 
descendants  of  the  Gauls  ^  have  exhibited  during  the  past 
century,  is  known  to  all  the  world.  No  one  would  deny 
that  the  Greeks  were  endowed  with  a  genius  for  art  and 
literature  which  their  environment  doubtless  helped  to 
develop ;  and  it  may  be  that  the  Celts  were  but  poorly  en- 
dowed with  political  talent,  and  that  circumstances  had  helped 

^  To  avoid  possible  misconception,  I  ought  perhaps  to  say  that  I  use  the 
word  "Gauls"  in  the  wider  sense  in  ■which  Caesar  used  it, — meaning  the 
inhabitants  of  Gaul,  without  distinction  of  race,  who  formed  the  great  majority 
of  the  ancestors  of  the  French  people. 


I  INTEODUCTION  15 

to  stunt  its  growth.  The  important  fact  is,  explain  it  as  we 
may,  that  the  tribal  rulers  of  Gaul  had  not  achieved  even 
that  initial  step  towards  unity  which  the  kings  of  Wessex, 
Mercia  and  Northumberland  achieved  when  they  swallowed 
up  the  petty  kingdoms  of  the  heptarchic  period.  Or  perhaps 
it  would  be  more  true  to  say  that,  when  the  Eomans  first 
established  themselves  on  the  west  of  the  Alps,  the  Arvernian 
king  had  achieved  that  step ;  but  that  first  his  defeat  on 
the  banks  of  the  Ehone,  and  afterwards  the  revolution  which 
subverted  the  royal  power,  had  broken  his  supremacy  and 
dealt  a.  fatal  blow  to  the  political  development  of  Gaul. 
There,  as  in  Latium,  the  downfall  of  the  monarch  inevitably 
weakened  the  power  of  the  tribe;  and  the  oligarchies,  if 
they  had  the  power,  were  not  granted  the  time  to  work  out 
their  owm  salvation.  Individual  tribes,  such  as  the  Aedui 
and  the  Sequaui,  did  indeed  achieve  some  sort  of  supremacy 
over  their  weaker  neighbours.  There  were  leagues  of  the 
Belgae,  the  Aquitani  and  the  maritime  tribes.  But  supre- 
macy had  not  hardened  into  sovereignty ;  ^  and  the  leagues 
were  loose,  occasional  and  uncertain.  If  some  powerful 
baron,  stimulated  by  ambition  or  impressed  by  the  evils  of 
disunion,  succeeded  in  clutching  the  power  of  a  Bretwalda, 
he  was  forthwith  suspected  by  his  brother  nobles  of  a  design 
to  revive  the  detested  monarchy,  and  was  lucky  if  he  escaped 
the  stake.  The  country  swarmed  with  outlawed  criminals, 
w'ho  had  fled  from  justice,  and  exiled  adventurers,  who  had 
failed  to  execute  cou]js  d'dtat.  Nobles  and  their  clients  lived 
sword  in  hand ;  and  hardly  a  year  passed  without  some  petty 
war.  Every  tribe,  every  hamlet,  nay  every  household  w^as 
riven  by  faction.  One  was  for  the  Eomans  and  another  for 
the  Germans :  one  for  the  Aedui  and  another  for  the  ^ 
Sequani :  one  for  a  Divitiacus  and  another  for  a  Dumnorix ; 
one  for  the  constitutional  oligarchy  and  another  for  the 
lawless  adventurer.  All,  in  short,  were  for  a  party ;  and 
none  was  for  the  state.^ 

^  Certain  "client  "  tribes  appear  to  have  paid  tribute  and  rendered  military 
service.     But  hegemony  was  not  firmlj'^  grasped,  and  client  tribes  transferred 
their  allegiance  from  one  overlord  to  another.     See  pp.  528-9. 
^  See  various  Notes  in  Part  II.,  Section  IV. 


16  INTEODUCTION  chap. 

"  'AiTwXofieB'  aV,"  said  Theniistocles,  "  el  firj  uTrcoXofxeOa" -.^ 
like  the  Euglish,  whom  the  Normans  chastened,  the  Gauls 
needed  the  discipline  of  foreign  conquest. 
The  Yet  in  Gaul,  as  in  England  before  the  Norman  Conquest,, 

there  was  one  influence  which  tended  to  make  every  man 
feel  that  he  and  his  fellows  belonged  to  one  nation, — com- 
munity of  religion.  Local  superstitions  doubtless  flourished 
side  by  side  with  the  official  cult ;  but  Druidism,  which 
recognised  and  regulated  them  all,  was  the  religious  force 
which  affected  the  destiny  of  the  people.  The  question  of 
the  origin  and  affinities  of  Druidism  has  given  rise  to  super- 
abundant speculation,  which  has  led  to  no  certain  result. 
Caesar  was  informed  that  the  system  was  believed  to  have 
been  imported  from  Britain.  At  all  events,  there  is  no 
evidence  that  it  was  known  to  the  Celts  of  Cisalpine  Gaul ; 
nor  is  it  certain  that  in  Transalpine  Gaul  it  existed  outside 
the  limits  of  the  region  which  was  inhabited  by  the  "  Celtae." 
Scholars,"  whose  opinion  carries  weight,  accept  Caesar's 
statement,  and  hold  that  the  Druids  had  entered  Gaul  at  a 
comparatively  recent  date,  and  had  established  their  priestly 
supremacy  without  extirpating  the  superstitions  of  the  older 
races.  From  the  study  of  the  remains  of  certain  typical 
Gallic  fortresses  they  have  inferred  that  the  Druids  created  a 
school  of  architecture,  and  from  the  laconic  statement  of  a 
Greek  writer  ^  that  they  were  the  great  civilisers  of  GauL 
Other  scholars  of  equal  eminence  ^  maintain  that  the  Celtic 
conquerors,  holding  a  creed  which  had  much  in  common  %vith 
that  of  the  Eomans,  found  Druidism  existing  in  Gaul,  and 
that  Druidism  was  strong  enough  to  secure  terms,  and 
finally  to  make  itself  supreme.  But  all  that  we  know  for 
certain  about  the  Gallic  branch  of  this  strange  hierarchy  we 
learn  from  the  brief  notices  of  Caesar  and  other  ancient 
writers ;  and  Caesar  has  told  us  all  that  was  essential  for 
the  subject  of  his  narrative.      The  Druids  formed  a  corpora- 

1  "  We  should  have  beeu  undone  if  we  had  not  been  undone."     Plutarch, 
Themistodcs,  29. 

2  JE.g.  M.  Alexandre  Bertrand. 

^  Timagenes,  quoted  by  Ammianus  Marcellinus,  xv.  9,  §§  4,  8. 
••  U.g.   Professor  Rhys,    Celtic  Britain,   2nd  ed.,    1SS4,    pjj.    67-9  ;  Celtic 
Heathendom,  1888,  pp.  105-G,  etc. 


I  INTEODUCTIOX  17 

tion,  admission  to  whicli  was  eagerly  sought :  they  jealously 
guarded  the  secrecy  of  their  lore ;  and  full  membership  was 
only  obtainable  after  a  long  novitiate.  They  were  ruled  by 
a  pope,  who  held  office  for  life  ;  and  sometimes  the  succession 
to  this  dignity  was  disputed  by  force  of  arms.  They  were 
exempt  from  taxation  and  from  service  in  war.  They  had, 
as  the  priests  of  a  rude  society  always  have,  a  monopoly  of 
learning.  The  ignorance  and  superstition  of  the  populace, 
their  own  orf^anisation  and  submission  to  one  head  gave 
them  a  tremendous  power.  The  education  of  the  aristocracy 
was  in  their  hands.  The  doctrine  which  they  most  strenu- 
ously inculcated  was  that  of  the  transmigration  of  souls. 
"  This  doctrine,"  said  Caesar,  "  they  regard  as  the  most 
potent  incentive  to  valour,  because  it  inspires  a  contempt 
for  death."  ^  They  claimed  the  right  of  deciding  questions 
of  peace  and  war.  Among  the  Aedui,  if  not  among  other 
peoples,  at  all  events  in  certain  circumstances,  they  exercised 
the  right  of  appointing  the  chief  magistrate.  They  laid 
hands  on  criminals,  and,  in  their  default,  even  on  the 
innocent,  imprisoned  them  in  monstrous  idols  of  wicker-work, 
and  burned  them  alive  as  a  sacrifice  to  the  gods.  They 
practically  monopolised  both  the  civil  and  the  criminal 
jurisdiction ;  and  if  this  jurisdiction  was  irregular,  if  they 
had  no  legal  power  of  enforcing  their  judgements,  they  were 
none  the  less  obeyed.  Every  year  they  met  to  dispense 
justice  in  the  great  plain  above  which  now  soar  the  spires  of 
Chartres  cathedral.  Those  who  disobeyed  their  decrees  were 
excommunicated ;  and  excommunication  meant  exclusion 
from  the  civil  community  as  well  as  from  communion  in 
religious  rites.^  One  religious  custom,  of  which  Caesar  him- 
self witnessed    examples,   suggests   an    interesting   question. 

1  B.  G.,  Ti.  14,  §5. 

-  See  pp.  532-6.  The  latest  theories  about  Druidism  are  to  be  found  in 
La  religion  dcs  Gaulois  (1S97),  by  M.  Alexandre  Bertraud,  who  devoted  liis 
life  to  the  study  of  the  prehistoric  antiquities  and  the  early  history  of  his 
own  country.  The  conjectures  in  which  his  book  abounds  are  supported  by 
arguments  drawn  from  a  wide  knowledge  of  coins,  megalithic  and  other 
monuments,  as  well  as  from  a  study  of  classical  and  Irish  texts  :  they  are 
sometimes  convincing,  and  always  interesting  and  ingenious.  The  book  was 
ably  reviewed  by  M.  Salomon  Reinach  in  the  Revue  archeologique,  xxxii., 
1898,  pp.  451-2. 

C 


V 


18  INTKODUCTION  chap. 

When  the  warriors  of  a  Gallic  tribe  had  made  a  successful 
raid,  they  used  to  sacrifice  to  Toutates,  whom  Caesar  recog- 
nised as  the  counterpart  of  Mars,^  a  portion  of  the  cattle 
which  they  had  captured ;  the  rest  of  their  booty  they 
erected  in  piles  on  consecrated  ground.  It  rarely  happened 
that  any  one  dared  to  keep  back  part  of  the  spoil ;  and  the 
wretch  who  defrauded  the  god  was  punished,  like  Achan,^  by 
a  terrible  death.  Along  with  Druidism  there  prevailed,  at 
least  among  the  Celtic  conquerors,  the  worship  of  divinities 
which  appeared  to  Caesar  to  resemble  tliose  of  Greece  and 
Eome ;  and  it  seems  probable  that  the  Druids  had  sanctioned, 
in  order  to  control  the  polytheism  which  was  not  part  of 
their  original  creed.^ 

But   though  religion   might   perhaps   foster   the   idea,   it 

Invasions    could  not  Supply  the  instant  need  of  political  union.      Over 

Cimbri  and  ^^®  ^^^^  wooded  plains  of  Germany  fierce  hordes  were  roam- 

Teutoni.      ing,  looking  with  hungry  eyes  towards  the  rich  prize  that 

lay  beyond  the  Khine.     Moreover,  the  danger  of  Gaul  was 

[  the  danger  of  Italy.      The  invader  who  had  been  attracted" 

by  "  the  pleasant  land  of  France "  would  soon  look  south- 

jj  ^'^  ward  over  the  corn-fields,  the  vineyards  and  the  olive-gardens 

J   <?"  of  Lombardy.      When  Caesar  was  entering  public  life,  men 

yN,  -^  who  were  not  yet  old  could  remember  the  terror  which  had 

'  /     '  been  inspired  by  the  Cimbri  and  Teutoni, — those  fair-haired 

giants  who   had   come    down,  like   an   avalanche,  from   the 

unknown  lands  that  bordered  on  the  northern   sea.       They 

descended  into  the  valley  of  the  Danube.     They  overthrew  a 

113  B.C.      Roman  consul  in  Carinthia ;  crossed  the  Ehine  and  threaded 

the  passes  of  the  Jura ;  and  overran  the  whole  of  Celtican 

109  B.C.      Gaul.      Four   years   after   their   first  victory,  they  defeated 

•*  See  Corpus  I^iscriptionum  Latinarum,  vol.  vii.  No.  84. 

^  Rhys,  Celtic  Heathendom,  pp.  49-50. 

3  B.  G.,  vi.  13,  §  4,  16,  §  3,  17,  §§  3-5.  M.  Bertraiid  insists  {La  religion  des 
Gaulois,  p.  340)  that  the  worship  of  the  three  chief  Gallic  deities,  Toutates, 
Taranis  and  Esus  (see  Lucan,  Pharsalia,  i.  444-6),  "  ne  penetra  pas  dans  les 
contrees  on  les  druides  doniinaient,"  that  is  to  say,  the  land  of  the  Celtae  :  but 
on  page  354  he  modities  this  assertion  ;  and  his  own  work  furnishes  proof  that 
monuments  of  the  worship  in  question  have  been  discovered  in  numerous 
districts  of  the  land  of  the  Celtae,  namely  in  the  departments  of  Allier, 
Charente-Inferieure,  Cote-d'Or,  Doubs,  Indre,  Maine-et-Loire,  Puy-de-D6me, 
Saone-et-Loire,  Seine  and  Vosges. 


I  INTEODUCTION  19 

another  consul  in  the  Province.  Then  they  vanished  :  but 
four  years  later  they  reappeared ;  and  two  more  armies  were 
destroyed  on  the  banks  of  the  Ehone.  The  panic-stricken  105  b.c. 
Italians  dreaded  another  Allia :  but,  while  Italy  lay  at  their 
mercy,  the  Cimbri  turned  aside ;  and  when,  after  three  years' 
wandering  in  Spain  and  Gaul,  they  rejoined  the  Teutoni,  and 
the  two  swarms  headed  for  the  south,  Marius  was  waiting  for 
them  on  the  Ehone,  and  his  brother  consul  in  Cisalpine  Gaul. 
Once  more  the  host  divided ;  and  while  the  Teutoni  encountered 
Marius  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Aix,  the  Cimbri  threaded  the 
Brenner  Pass,  and  descended  the  valley  of  the  Adige.  The 
ghastly  appellation  of  the  Putrid  Plain  commemorated  the  lO^  b.c. 
slaughter  of  the  Teutoni :  the  Cimbri  were  annihilated  at 
Vercellae,  near  the  confluence  of  the  Sesia  and  the  Po.-^  loi  b.c. 

But  if  this  danger  had  been  averted,  the  movements  of 
the  other  German  peoples  might  well  cause  anxiety.  Press- 
ing resolutely  onward,  they  fought  their  way  through  the 
outlying  Celtic  territory,  up  to  the  right  bank  of  the 
Upper  Eliine.  Some  years  before  the  conspiracy  of  71  b.c. 
Catiline "  an  opportunity  was  afforded  them  of  making  good 
their  footing  in  the  heart  of  Gaul.  A  bitter  enmity  had  for 
many  years  existed  between  the  rival  tribes  of  the  Aedui 
and  the  Sequani.  The  Aedui  were  the  stronger;  and  they 
enjoyed  the  countenance  of  Eome.  The  Sequani  hired  the  invasion  of 
aid  of  a  German  chieftain,  Ariovistus,  who  crossed  the  Ehine  ^"ovistus. 
with  fifteen  thousand  men.  They  were  enchanted  with  the 
country,  its  abundance  and  its  comparative  civilisation  ;  and 
fresh  swarms  were  attracted  by  the  good  news.  After  a 
long  struggle  ■,lie  Aedui  were  decisively  beaten,  and  had  to 
pay  tribute  and  give  hostages  to  their  rivals.  Their  chief 
magistrate,  the  famous  Druid,  Divitiacus,  went  to  Eome  and 
implored  the  Senate  for  help.  He  was  treated  with  marked 
distinction,  made  the  acquaintance  of  Caesar,  and  discussed 
religion  and  philosophy  with  Cicero :  ^  but  the  Senate  did 
not  see  their  way  to  interfere  on  his  behalf.  All  that  6i  b.c 
they  did  was  to  pass  a  vague  decree  that  whoever  might 
at  any  time  be  Governor  of  Gaul  should,  as  far  as  might 
be  consistent  with  his  duty  to  the  republic,  make  it  his 
1  See  pp.  551-6.  ^  g^e  pp.  557.8.  »  cicero,  De  Div.,  i.  41,  §  90. 


20  INTEODUCTION  chap. 

business   to  protect   the  Aedui  and  the  other  allies  of  the 

Roman   people.       Meanwhile   the   Sequani   had    found   that 

their  ally  was  their  master.      He  was  not  going  to  return  to 

the  wilds  of  Germany  when  he  could  get  a  fertile  territory 

for  the  asking.      He  compelled  the  Sequani  to  cede  to  him 

the  northern  portion  of  Alsace.     At  length  they  and  their 

Gallic  allies,  including,  as  it  should  seem,  even  the  Aedui, 

mustered   all   their   forces   and   made  a   desperate   effort   to 

60B.C.       throw  off  the  yoke:   but  they  sustained  a  crushing  defeat; 

and   their  conqueror  was  evidently  determined  to  found  a 

German  kingdom  in  Gaul. 

Revolt  of  Meanwhile    the   Allobroges,   who   had   never  yet    fairly 

broges.        accepted    their    dependent    condition,    had    risen    in    revolt. 

61  B.C.       They    were    still    embittered    by    defeat    when    the  Roman 

60  B.C.       agents  in  the  Province  were  alarmed  by  the  appearance  of 

bands  of  marauders  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhone.     They 

had  been  sent  by  the  Helvetii,  a  warlike  Celtic  people,  who 

Threatened  dwclt  in   that  part  of  Switzerland  which  lies   between  the 

"rtii^°^      Rhine,  the  Jura,  the  lake  of  Geneva  and  the  Upper  Rhone. 

Helvetii.     The  Romans  had  already  felt  the  weight  of  their  arms.     A 

generation  before,   the  Tigurini,  one  of  the  four  Helvetian 

tribes,  had  thrown  in  their  lot  with  the  Cimbri.     They  had 

107  B.C.      spread  desolation  along  the  valley  of  the  Rhone,  defeated  a 

consular  army,  and   compelled   the  survivors   to  pass  under 

the  yoke.     JSTow,  in  their  turn,  they   were  hard  pressed   by 

the    Germans ;    and    they    had    formed    the    resolution    of 

abandoning  their   country  and  seeking  a  new  home  in  the 

fertile  land  of  their  kinsmen. 

The  author  of  the  movement  was  Orgetorix,  the  head  of 
the  Helvetian  baronage.  His  story  throws  a  vivid  light 
upon  the  condition  of  the  Gallic  tribes.  He  persuaded  his 
brother  nobles  that  they  would  be  able  to  win  the  mastery 
over  Gaul.  He  undertook  a  diplomatic  mission  to  the 
leading  Transalpine  states.  Two  chiefs  were  ready  to  listen 
to  him,  Casticus,  whose  father  had  been  the  last  King  of  the 
Sequani,  and  Dumnorix,  brother  of  Divitiacus,  who  was  at 
that  time  the  most  powerful  chieftain  of  the  Aedui.  If 
Divitiacus  saw  the  salvation  of  his  country  in  dependence 
upon    Rome,    his    brother     regarded     the     connexion    with 


I  INTEODUCTION  21 

abhorrence.  He  was  able,  ambitious  and  rich ;  and  the 
common  people  adored  him.  Orgetorix  urged  him  and 
Casticus  to  seize  the  royal  power  in  their  respective  states, 
as  he  intended  to  do  in  his,  and  promised  them  armed 
support.  The  three  entered  into  a  formal  compact  for  the 
conquest  and  partition  of  Gaul.  But  the  Helvetii  had  still 
to  be  reckoned  with.  They  heard  that  their  envoy  had 
broken  his  trust,  and  immediately  recalled  him  to  answer 
for  his  conduct.  He  knew  that,  if  he  were  found  guilty,  he 
would  be  burned  alive ;  and  accordingly,  when  he  appeared 
before  his  judges,  he  was  followed  by  his  retainers  and  slaves, 
numbering  over  ten  tliousand  men.  The  magistrates,  de- 
termined to  bring  him  to  justice,  called  the  militia  to  arms  : 
but  in  the  meantime  the  adventurer  died,  perhaps  by  his 
own  hand. 

But  the  idea  which  he  had  conceived  did  not  die.  The 
Helvetii  had  no  intention  of  abandoning  their  enterprise ; 
nor  Dumnorix  of  abandoning  his.  He  had  married  a 
daughter  of  Orgetorix ;  and  he  was  quite  ready  to  help 
them,  if  they  would  make  it  worth  his  while.  They  resolved 
to  spend  two  years  in  preparing  for  their  emigration  ;  bought 
up  waggons  and  draught  cattle ;  and  laid  in  large  supplies 
of  corn.  Their  purpose  threatened  Eome  with  a  twofold 
danger.  Once  they  had  gone,  the  lands  which  they  left\ 
vacant  would  be  overrun  by  the  Germans,  who  would  then  ^  • 
be  in  dangerous  proximity  to  Italy ;  and  there  was  no  telling 
what  mischief  they  might  do  in  Gaul.  Above  the  din  of 
party  strife  at  Eome  the  note  of  warning  was  heard.  ]\Ien 
talked  anxiously  of  the  prospects  of  war ;  and  the  Senate 
sent  commissioners  to  dissuade  the  Gallic  peoples  from  joining 
the  invaders.^  Diplomacy,  however,  was  pow^erless  to  shake 
the  purpose  of  a  brave  and  desperate  nation.  Perhaps  the 
Senate  failed  to  realise  the  gravity  of  the  crisis.  Perhaps 
they  shrank  from  putting  the  sword  into  the  hands  of  the 
man  who  might  ultimately  turn  it  against  themselves. 

But  the  hesitation  of  an  effete  Senate  was  soon  to  give  Cousuiship 
way  to  the  energy  of  a  leader  of  men.      One  of  the  consuls 
for  the  year  59  was  Julius  Caesar.     About  the  time  of  the 

1  Cicero,  Ep.  ad  Alt.,  i.  19,  §  2. 


22  INTEODUCTION  chap. 

election  Ariovistus  made  overtures  for  au  alliance  with  Eome  ; 
and  doubtless  with  the  object  of  securing  his  neutrality  in 
view  of  the  threatened  Helvetian  invasion,  the  Senate  con- 
ferred upon  him  the  title  of  Friend  of  the  Eoman  People. 
They  had  already  half  promised  to  protect  their  Gallic  allies. 
They  now  practically  guaranteed  to  the  conqueror  of  those 
How  he      allies  the  security  of  his  conquest.     And  in  this  latter  policy 
to  provide   Cacsar,  if  we   may  believe   his  own  word,  fully  concurred, 
against  the  He   must  have  seen  the  impending  troubles.     But  he  was 
danger.       ^'^^  J^^  free  to  encountcr  them ;  and  he  doubtless  approved 
of  any  expedient  for   keeping   the  barbarian  chief  inactive 
until  he  could  go  forth  in  person  to  encounter  him.      That 
He  is  time  was  at  hand,      in  the  year  of  his  consulship  Caesar  was 

Gkiverno^r  J^^de  Govcmor  of  Illyricum,  or  Dalmatia,  and  of  Gaul,  that 
of  Gaul,  is  to  say  of  Gallia  Cisalpina,  or  Piedmont  and  the  Plain  of 
Lombardy,  and  of  Gallia  Braccata,  or,  as  it  was  usually 
called,  the  Province.-  If  Suetonius  ^  was  rightly  informed,  his 
commission  gave  him  the  right  to  include  Gallia  Comata — 
"the  land  of  the  long-haired  Gauls" — that  is  to  say  the 
whole  of  independent  Gaul  north  of  the  Province,  within 
his  sphere  of  action.^  '"'He  had  already  gained  distinction  in 
Spain  both  as  a  general  and  as  an  administrator :  but  hitherto 
he  had  had  no  chance  of  showing  the  full  measure  of  his 
powers.  He  was  at  this  time  forty-three  years  old.^  In  person 
he  was  tall  and  slight,  but  well-knit;  and,  if  he  was  as 
licentious  as  the  mass  of  his  contemporaries,  his  constitution, 
fortified  by  abstemious  habits,  was  capable  of  sustaining 
prodigious  efforts.  His  broad  dome-like  skull;  his  calm  and 
penetrating  eyes ;  his  aquiline  nose  ;  his  massive  yet  finely 
moulded  jaw,  expressed,  like  no  other  human  countenance,  a 
rich  and  harmonious  nature, — intellect,  passion,  will  moving 
in  accord.  And,  if  his  vices  were  common,  his  generosity, 
his  forbearance,  his  equanimity,  his  magnanimity  were  his 
own.  He  believed,  with  an  unwavering  faith,  that  above 
himself  there  was  a  power,  without  whose  aid  the  strongest 
judgement,  the  most  diligent  calculation  might  fail.  That 
power  was  Fortune ;  and  Caesar  was  assured  that  Fortune 

1  Divus  Julius,  22.  -  See  pp.  195,  823. 

3  See  pp.  560-61. 


I  INTRODUCTION  23 

was  ever  on  his  side.^  But  it  would  be  impertinent  to  this 
narrative  to  attempt  to  analyse  the  character — to  which  our 
greatest  poet  has  done  less  than  justice — of  the  greatest  man 
of  action  who  has  ever  lived.  Whatever  quality  was  lacking, 
the  want  in  no  wise  affected  his  fitness  for  the  task  which 
he  had  now  to  perform. 

Tiis  appointment  carried  with  it  the  command  of  an  army  His  army, 
consisting  of  four  legions,  perhaps  about  twenty  thousand 
men.^  One  of  them  was  quartered  in  Transalpine  Gaul :  the 
other  three  were  at  Aquileia,  near  the  site  of  the  modern 
Trieste.  He  could  also  command  the  services  of  slingers  from 
the  Balearic  isles,  of  archers  from  Numidia  and  Crete,  and  of 
cavalry  from  Spain.^  Various  military  reforms  had  been 
introduced  by  Marius ;  and  the  legions  of  Caesar  were,  in 
many  respects,  different  from  those  which  had  fought  against 
Hannibal.  They  were  no  longer  a  militia,  but  an  army  of 
professional  soldiers;  / 1  Each  legion  consisted  of  ten  cohorts ; 
and  the  cohort,  formed  of  three  maniples  or  six  centuries, 
had  replaced  the  maniple  as  the  tactical  unit  of  the  legion. 
From  the  earliest  times  the  legion  had  been  commanded  by 
an  officer  called  a  military  tribune.  Six  were  assigned  to 
each  legion ;  and  each  one  of  the  number  held  command  in/ 
turn.  But  they  now  often  owed  their  appointments  to 
interest  rather  than  to  merit;  and  no  tribune  in  Caesar's 
army  was  ever  placed  at  the  head  of  a  legion.  They  still 
had  administrative  duties  to  perform,  and  exercised  subordinate 
commands.  But  the  principal  officers  were  the  legati,  who 
might  loosely  be  called  generals  of  division.  Their  powers 
were  not  strictly  defined,  but  varied  according  to  circum- 
stances and  to  the  confidence  which  they  deserved.  A  legatus 
might  be  entrusted  with  the  command  of  a  legion  or  of  an 
army  corps ;  he  might  even,  in  the  absence  of  his  chief,  be 
entrusted  with  the  command  of  the  entire  army.  But  he 
was  not  yet,  as  such,  the  permanent  commander  of  a  legion. 
The  of&cers  upon  whom  the  efficiency  of  the  troops  mainly 

1  Cicero,  Ei^.  ad  Att.,  x.  8b  ;  Caesar,  B.  G.,  v.  58,  §  6  ;  vi.  30,  §  4,  35,  §  2, 
42,  §§  1-2  ;  vii.  89,  §  2  ;  £.  C,  iii.  10,  §  6,  68,  §  1,  95,  §  1  etc.     See  App.  B. 

2  See  pp.  561,  563-7. 

^  The  succeeding  narrative  will  show  that  Caesar  raised  the  bulk  of  his 
cavalry  during  the  Gallic  war  year  by  yenr  in  Gaul  itself. 


24  INTRODUCTION  chap. 

depended  were  the  centurions.  They  were  chosen  from  the 
ranks  ;  and  their  position  has  been  roughly  compared  with 
that  of  our  own  non-commissioned  officers.  But  their  duties 
were,  in  some  respects,  at  least  as  responsible  as  those  of  a 
captain :  the  centurions  of  the  first  cohort  were  regularly 
summoned  to  councils  of  war ;  and  the  chief  centurion  of  a 
legion  was  actually  in  a  position  to  offer  respectful  suggestions 
to  the  legate  himself.^  Every  legion  included  in  its  ranks 
a  number  of  skilled  artisans,  called  fcibri,  who  have  been 
likened  to  the  engineers  in  a  modern  army:  but  they  were  not 
permanently  enrolled  in  a  separate  corps.^  They  fought  in 
the  ranks  like  other  soldiers ;  but  when  their  special  services 
were  required,  they  were  directed  by  staff- officers  called 
praefedi  fdbruin.  It  was  their  duty  to  execute  repairs  of 
every  kind,  to  superintend  the  construction  of  permanent 
camps,  and  to  plan  fortifications  and  bridges ;  and  it  should 
seem  that  they  also  had  charge  of  the  artillery,^ — the  hallistae 
and  catapults,  which  hurled  heavy  stones  and  shot  arrows 
against  the  defences  and  the  defenders  of  a  besieged  town. 

The  legionary  wore  a  sleeveless  woollen  shirt,  a  leathern 
tunic  protected  across  breast  and  back  by  bands  of  metal, 
strips  of  cloth  wound  round  the  thighs  and  legs,  hob-nailed 
shoes,  and,  in  cold  or  wet  weather,  a  kind  of  blanket  or 
military  cloak.  His  defensive  armour  consisted  of  helmet, 
shield  and  greaves :  his  weapons  were  a  short,  two-edged, 
cut-and-thrust  sword  and  a  javelin,  the  blade  of  which,  behind 
the  hardened  point,  was  made  of  soft  iron,  so  that,  when  it 
struck  home,  it  might  bend  and  not  be  available  for  return. 
These,  however,  formed  only  a  part  of  the  load  which  he 
carried  on  the  march.  Over  his  left  shoulder  he  bore  a  pole, 
to  which  was  fastened  in  a  bundle  his  ration  of  grain,*  his 
cooking  vessel,  saw,  basket,  hatchet  and  spade.  For  it  was 
necessary  that  he  should  be  a  woodman  and  navvy  as  well  as 
a  soldier.  No  Eoman  army  ever  halted  for  the  night  without 
constructing  a  camp  fortified  with  trench,  rampart  and  palisade. 

1  See  B.  G.,  iii.  5,  §  2.  ^  See  p.  583. 

^  See  Long's  Decline  of  the  Eoman  Eepuhlic,  ii.  19. 

*  Sometimes  a  sixteen  days'  ration  was  served  out ;  but  the  amount  certainly 
varied  according  to  circumstances.     See  pp.  587-8. 


I  INTRODUCTION  ^25 

The  column  was  of  course  accompanied  by  a  host  of  non- 
combatants.  Each  legion  required  at  least  five  or  six  hundred 
horses  and  mules  to  carry  its  baggage ;  ^  and  the  drivers, 
with  the  slaves  who  waited  on  the  officers,  formed  a  numerous 
body.  Among  the  camp-followers  were  also  dealers  who 
supplied  the  wants  of  the  army,  and  were  ready  to  buy  booty 
of  every  kind.^ 

What  line  of  policy  Caesar  intended  to  follow,  he  has  not  His 
told  us.     While  he  was  going  forth  to  govern  a  distant  land, "' 
the  government  of  his  own  was  lapsing  into  anarchy.--     He 
must  have  seen  that  the  Germans  would  soon  overrun  Gaul 
unless  the  Romans  prevented  them ;  and  that  the  presence 
of  the  Germans  would  revive  the  peril  from  which  Marius 
had  delivered  Rome. '?  We  may  feel  sure  that  he  had  deter- 
mined to  teach  them,  by  a  rough  lesson  if  necessary,  that 
^Xthey  must  advance  no  further  into  Gaul,  nor  venture  to  cross 
the  boundaries  of  the  Province  or  of  Italy.      It  can  hardlyx 
be  doubted  that  he  dreamed  of  adding  a  new  province  to  the 
empire,  which  should  round  off  its  frontier  and  add  to  its 
wealth.      But  whether  he  had  definitely  resolved  to  attempt  j     n^^,"; 
a  conquest  of  such  magnitude,  or  merely  intended  to  follow, 
as  they  appeared,  the  indications  of  Fortune,  it  would  be  idle 
to  conjecture.      Ambitious  though  he  was,  he  only  courted, 
he  never  tempted  her.      The  greatest  statesman  is,  in  a  sense, 
an  opportunist.      When  Caesar  should  find  himself  in  Gaul, 
he  would  know  best  how  to  shape  his  ends. 

1  Caesar  nowhere  mentions  that  he  used  waggons  or  carts  during  the  Gallic 
war,  though  it  seems  certain  that  he  must  have  usad  some,  to  carry  artillery 
and  material  for  mantlets  and  the  like.  See  Bell.  Afr.,  9  ;  B.  C,  iii.  42,  §  3  ; 
and  Daremberg  and  Saglio,  Did.  des  antiquites  grccques  et  rom.,  i.  929. 

2  W.  Smith,  Did.  of  Gk.  and  Roman  Ant.,  i.  346,  811-12,  851  ;  ii.  588-9, 
614  ;  Polybius,  vi.  23  ;  F.  Frohlich,  Das  Kriegsivcsen  Casars,  1891,  pp.  56-7, 
62-4,  66-7,  75  ;  Stoffel,  Rist.  de  Jules  C^sar,— Guerre  civile,  1887,  ii.  339,  n.  2; 
Daremberg  and  Saglio,  Diet,  des  ant.  grccques  et  rom.,  ii.  957,  1447,  1605-6; 
W.  Riistow,  Hcerwesen  und  Kriegfiihrung  Cdsars,  1857,  pp.  16-19  ;  Frontinus, 
Strat.  iv.  1,  §  7  ;  Josephus,  De  hello  ludaico,  iii.  5,  §  5  ;  Ammianus  Marcellinus, 
xvii.  9,  §  2  ;  Caesar,  B.  C,  i.  78,  §  1  ;  Cicero,  Tusc.  ii.  16,  §  37.  See  also 
various  notes  in  Section  VI.  of  the  larger  edition  of  this  book.  There  is  no 
evidence  that  there  was  any  medical  staff  in  Caesar's  army  or  under  the 
Republic  at  all,  though  it  may  perhaps  be  inferred  from  a  passage  in  Suetonius 

"  {Divus  Augustus,  11)  that  wealthy  officers  were  attended  by  their  private 
surgeons. 


CHAPTEE    II 

"pCAMPAIGNS    AGAINST    THE    HELVETII    AND    AKIOVISTUS 

58  B.C.       About  the  middle  of  March  a  startling  announcement  reached 

Caesar        Caesar.      The  Helvetii  had  actually  begun  to  move ;  and  their 

theHeivetii  ^^rdes  would  sooH  be  streaming  over  the  Roman  Province. 

are  about    Three  neighbouring  tribes,  the  Eaurici,  the  Tulingi,  and  the 

through  the  ^atobrigi,  and  also  the  Boii,  who  had  long  ago  migrated  into 

Province.     Germany,  had  been  induced  to  join  them ;  they  had  laid  in 

sufficient  flour  to  last  for  three  months ;  and,  to  stimulate 

their    resolution   and    enterprise,   they   had   deliberately  cut 

themselves  off  from  all  prospect  of  return  by  burning  their 

homes.      On  the  24th  ^  of  that  very  month  the  whole  vast 

multitude,  numbering,  according   to   their  own  muster-rolls, 

three  hundred  and  sixty -eight   thousand,^  was   to  assemble 

opposite  Geneva,  ready  to  cross  the  Ehone. 

He  hastens         Caesar    instantly    left    Eome,    and,    hurrying    northward 

and  d^^^'^    ninety  miles  a  day,^  crossed  the  Alps,  took  command  of  the 

stroys  the    Provincial  legion,  ordered  a  fresh  .  levy,  and  reached  Geneva 

"  °'^'        at  the  end  of  a  week.     He  immediately  destroyed  the  bridge 

Helvetian    by  whicli  the  Helvetii  intended   to   cross  the  river.     They 

his^ieavr^  Sent  ambassadors  to  say  that  they  only  wanted  to  use  the 

to  use        road   through   the   Province,  and   would   promise   to   do   no 

throuc^hthe  i^iischief.     Would  Caesar  give  them  permission  ?     Caesar  had 

Province,     of  course  no  intention  of  granting  their  request :  but,  as  he 

M'anted  to  gain  time  for  his  levies  to  assemble,  he  told  the 

^  March  28  of  the  unrefornied  calendar. 
2  See  pp.  222-5. 

^  Plutarch,  Caesar,  17.     See  also  ^.  G^.,  i.  7,  §  1  ;  Suetonius,  Divxis  Julius, 
57,  and  the  map  of  Gaul. 

26 


CHAP.  II  HELYETII  AND  ARIOVISTUS  27 

ambassadors  that  he  would  think  over  what  they  had  said,  58  b.c. 
and  give  them  an  answer  on  the  9th  of  the  following  month.^ 
He  made  good  use  of  the  interval.  The  legion  was  with  him; 
and  the  Provincial  levies  arrived  in  time  to  join  in  executing 
the  design  which  he  had  formed.  The  road  by  which  the 
Helvetii  desired  to  march  led  through  Savoy ;  and  the  river 
was  at  certain  points  fordable.  It  should  seem  that  they  had 
not  yet  had  time  to  assemble  in  force.  Along  the  southern 
bank  of  the  Rhone,  between  the  lake  and  the  Pas  de  I'ficluse 
— a   distance  of  about   seventeen   miles — Caesar   threw  up  He  pro- 

niisGs  to 

lines  of  earthworks  in  the  few  places  where  the  banks  were  reply  in  a 
not  so  steep  as  to  form  a  natural  fortification.^     The  soldiers  foitnight, 

1     •  1     1  •     1       1  1  -tTTi  ^^^  mean- 

were   posted   m   redoubts    behmd    the   works.       When    the  while  forti- 

ambassadors  returned,  Caesar  plainly  told  them  that  he  would  Ses  the  left 

-■^  •'  .  nank  of  the 

not  allow  the  Helvetii  to  pass  through  the  Province.      Un-  RhOue. 
deterred  by  this  rebuff,  the  emigrants  made  several  attempts 
to  force  the  passage  of  the  river.      Some   of  them  waded ;  He  pre- 
others  made  bridges  of  boats,  and  tried  to  storm  the  ramparts:  1^°,*^!^^ 
but  the  soldiers  pelted  them  with  missiles   and   sent   them  from  cross- 
staggering  back.  ^°^" 

Only  one   route   now  remained, — the   road   that  winded 
along  the  right  bank  of  the  Rhone,  beneath  the  rocky  steeps 

^  F.  Eyssenhardt  {Neue  Jalirhucher  fur  Philologie  unci  Paedagogik,  Ixxxv., 
1862,  p.  760)  accepts  Dion  Cassius's  statement  {Hist.  Bom.,  xxsviii.  31)  that 
Caesar  held  out  to  the  Helvetian  envoys  the  hope  that  he  -would  allow  them  to 
pass  through  the  Province.  Otherwise,  he  insists,  it  is  impossible  to  explain 
why  the  Helvetii  waited  for  the  day  which  Caesar  had  appointed.  Caesar 
neither  says  nor  implies  that  he  did  not  hold  out  such  a  hope  to  the  envoys. 
On  his  own  showing,  indeed,  he  intended  to  deceive  them.  I  suspect,  however, 
that  this  is  one  of  Dion's  embellishments,  because  I  believe  that  Caesar  would 
have  kept  the  fact  to  himself  instead  of  blurting  it  out  to  any  of  the  "excellent 
authorities  "  whom  Dion  is  assumed  to  have  followed  (see  pp.  178-81).  But 
Dion  may  have  hit  upon  the  truth.  Caesar  would  certainly  have  held  out  such 
a  hope  to  the  Helvetii,  if  it  had  been  worth  his  while  to  do  so.  "  As  a  nation," 
writes  Lord  Wolseley,  "  we  are  bred  up  to  feel  it  a  disgrace  even  to  succeed  by 
falsehood  .  .  .  we  will  keep  hammering  along  with  the  conviction  that  '  honesty 
is  the  best  policy '  and  that  truth  always  wins  in  the  long  run.  These  pretty 
little  sentences  do  well  for  a  child's  copy-book,  but  the  man  who  acts  upon 
them  in  war  had  better  sheathe  his  sword  for  ever."  Soldier's  Pocket-hook, 
5th  ed.,  1886,  p.  169.  Again,  the  general  "can,  by  spreading  false  news 
among  the  gentlemen  of  the  press,  use  them  as  a  medium  by  which  to  deceive 
an  enemy."     Tb.,  4th  ed.,  p.  337. 

2  See  pp.  184-5,  608. 


28  CAIUPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  of  the  Jura,  through  the  Pas  de  I'^cluse.  The  emigrants 
Seq^aui  might,  it  would  seem,  have  made  their  way  into  Gaul  by  the 
allow  them  route  that  leads  to  Pontarlier  or  one  of  the  other  passes  in 
through  the  Jura :  but  either  because  they  shrank  from  encountering 
the  Pas  de  Ariovistus  or  for  some  other  reason,  of  which  Caesar  took  no 

1  Ecluse.  •       1       mi  1 

account,  these  routes  were  out  oi  the  question.  ine  road 
that  led  through  the  Pas  de  I'Ecluse  was  so  narrow  that 
there  was  barely  room  for  a  single  waggon  to  move  along  it 
at  a  time :  beyond  the  pass,  it  led  into  the  territory  of  the 
Sequani ;  and  if  they  offered  the  slightest  opposition,  it 
would  be  hopeless  to  attempt  to  get  through.  They  refused 
at  first  to  grant  a  safe-conduct :  but  Dumnorix,  at  the  request 
of  the  Helvetii,  willingly  acted  as  mediator.  He  had  estab- 
lished his  influence  with  the  Sequani  by  wholesale  bribery ; 
and,  after  a  little  negotiation,  he  succeeded  in  procuring  for 
his  friends  the  favour  which  they  sought.  The  Helvetian 
leaders  undertook  to  restrain  their  people  from  plundering ; 
and  hostages  were  exchanged  for  the  fulfilment  of  the  com- 
pact. The  ultimate  object  of  the  emigrants  was  to  settle  in 
western  Gaul,  in  the  fertile  basin  of  the  Charente.  Thence 
they  would  be  able  to  make  raids  upon  the  open  corn-growing 
districts  of  the  Province  ;  and  their  mere  presence  would  be 
a  standing  menace  to  Eoman  interests  in  Gaul.  But  first 
they  would  have  to  make  their  way  along  the  valley  of  the 
Eh6ne,  across  the  plain  of  Amberieu,  and  over  the  plateau 
of  Dombes  to  the  Saone.  Caesar  calculated  that  while  their 
Caesar  goes  huge  unwieldy  column  was  crawling  along  the  muddy  tracks, 
Cisalpine  ^^^  would  havc  time  to  raise  a  new  army,  strong  enough  to 
Gaul,  re-  gopc  witli  them.  Leaving  his  ablest  lieutenant,  Labienus,  to 
reiuforce-  guard  the  liues  on  the  Rhone,  he  hastened  back  to  Cisalpine 
ments  and  Qaul ;  raised  two  new  legions  on  his  own  responsibility;  with- 

encamps  „,..  , 

above  the  drcw  the  Other  three  from  their  winter-quarters  ;  and  marched 
^nh^'^"°^  back  by  the  road  leading  along  the  valley  of  the  Dora  Riparia 
Rhone  and  and  over  Mont  Genevre.  The  mountain  tribes,  who  doubt- 
Saone.  j^gg  hoped  to  plunder  his  baggage-train,  attempted  to  stop 
[The  Graio-  ^^g  advance  :  but  agjain  and  again  he  dashed  them  aside  until, 

cell  Ceu-  . 

trones,  and  descending  into  the  valley  of  the  Durance,  he  pushed  on 
Catunges.]  through  the  highlands  of  Dauphine,  past  Brian^on,  Embrun 

1  See  p.  607. 


II  HELVETII  AND  AEIOYISTUS  29 

and  Gap/  crossed  the  Isere  and  the  Ehone,  and  encamped  on  08  b.c. 
the  heights  of  Sathonay,  near  the  point  where  the  rushing  About_  ^ 
current  is  swelled  by  the  tranquil  stream  of  the  Saone. 

He  was  only  just  in  time.      The  bulk  of  the  Helvetii  had  The  Aedui 
crossed  the  Saone,  and  descended,  like  a  swarm  of  locusts,  ^^^^^^^ 
upon  the  cornfields  and  homesteads  of  the  Aedui.      Envoys  against  the 
came  to  beg  Caesar  to  remember  the  loyalty  of  their  country-    ^^*^  "' 
men,  and  help  them  to  get  rid  of  the  invaders.     Labienus 
with  his  legion  had  already  joined  him.      The  rearguard  of 
the  Helvetii,  numbering  about  a  fourth  of  the  entire  host, 
were  gathered  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  river,  in  the  valley 
of  the  Formans,  eleven  miles  to  the  north.^      Caesar  left  his 
camp  soon  after  midnight,  marched  quietly  up  the  valley  of 
the   Saone   over   ground    which   masked    his   approach,   and  He  defeats 
launched   his   legions   upon    the    unsuspecting  multitude,  as  persesthe 
they  were  crowding  into    their   boats.      Those  who  escaped  rearguard 
the  slaughter  vanished  in  the  surrounding  forests.      They  and  Helvetii. 
their  slain  kinsfolk  belonged  to  the  tribe  called  the  Tigurini,^ 
by  which,  fifty  years  before,  a  Eoman  army,  under  the  consul 
Lucius   Cassius,  had    been   defeated   and   compelled    to   pass 
under  the  yoke. 

Within  twenty-four  hours  Caesar  had  thrown  a  bridge  of  His  passage 
boats  ^  over  the  river,  and  transported  his  entire  army  to  the  ^^^^^ 
right  bank.      The  Helvetii,  who  had  taken  three  weeks  over 
the  passage,  were  greatly  alarmed,  and  sent  an  embassy  to  The 
meet  him.      The  principal  envoy  was  an  aged  chief  named  ^jempt  to 
Divico,  who,  in  his  youth,  had  commanded  the  army  which  negotiate, 
defeated  Cassius.      He  said  that  his  countrymen  were  willing  caesrr'r 
to  settle  wherever  Caesar  pleased,  if  he  would  only  leave  them  terms, 
unmolested.      But  if  he  was  bent  upon  war,  they  were  ready  ; 
and  he  would  do  well  to  remember  that  they  had  already 
defeated  a  Eoman  army.      Caesar  replied  that  he  remembered 
the  treacherous  exploit  of  which  they  boasted,  and  remembered 

1  Between  Brian^on  (Brigantio)  and  the  Rhone  the  itinerary  is  not  abso- 
lutely certain  ;  but  Caesar  must  have  gone  either  by  the  route  indicated  in 
the  text  or  by  the  valley  of  the  Romanche  and  Grenoble.  See  Carte  dc 
France  (1 :  200,000),  Sheet  60,  and  p.  609. 

^  See  Napoleon,  Hist,  dc  Jules  Cisar,  ii.  57,  n.  2. 

3  See  pp.  610-13.  ■•  See  p.  20,  supra. 

5  See  p.  606. 


30  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  it  with  indignation.  Besides,  even  if  he  were  inclined  to  let 
bygones  be  bygones,  he  could  not  overlook  the  outrages  of 
which  they  had  just  been  guilty.  Still  he  was  ready  to  make 
peace  with  them,  upon  certain  conditions.  They  must  compen- 
sate the  Aedui  for  the  damage  which  they  had  done,  and  give 
hostages  for  their  future  good  behaviour,  Divico  haughtily 
replied  that  the  Helvetii,  as  the  Eomans  had  the  best  of  reasons 
to  know,  were  accustomed  to  receive  hostages,  not  to  give  them. 
Next  day  the  emigrants  broke  up  their  encampment.     To 

The}'  reach  the  valley  of  the   Charente,  it  was  necessary  to  cross 

™orthward   ^^®  Loire.      The  direct  line  intersected  that  river  near  Eoanne. 

followed  But  the  rugged  country  between  the  basins  of  the  Saone  and 
y  aesar.  ^^^  Loire  was,  in  this  direction,  impassable ;  and  beyond 
Eoanne  the  mountains  of  Le  Forez  barred  the  way.  The 
only  course  was  to  move  up  the  valley  between  the  Saone 
and  the  hills  of  Beaujolais  until  a  practicable  route  could  be 
found.  Caesar  sent  on  his  cavalry  to  watch  the  enemy's 
movements.  They  were  composed  of  levies  from  the  Province 
and  from  the  Aedui ;  and  the  Aeduan  contingent  was  com- 
manded by  Dumnorix.  They  ventured  too  near  the  Helvetian 
rearguard,  and  lost  a  few  men  in  a  skirmish.  For  a  fortnight 
the  two  armies  continued  to  advance,  northward  and  then 
north-westward,  never  more  than  five  miles  apart.  The 
Helvetii  probably  turned  off  from  the  Saone  near  Macon,  and 
moved  up  the  valley  of  the  Petit  Grosne.-^  Their  vast  column 
must  have  extended  at  least  fifteen  miles  in  length."  The 
advanced  guard,  composed  of  the  Boii  and  Tulingi,^  was  fol- 
lowed by  the  train  of  waggons,  drawn  by  horses  or  oxen ; 
and  last  of  all  came  the  Helvetian  fighting  men.'*  Elated  by 
their  recent  success,  the  Helvetii  occasionally  faced  about 
and  challenged  their  pursuers  :  but  Caesar  would  not  allow 
his  men  to  be  drawn  into  a  combat.  He  was  looking  for  a 
favourable  opportunity  to  fight  a  decisive  battle :  but  for  the 
time  he  had  enough  to  do  in  trying  to  prevent  the  enemy 

1  See  pp.  613-14. 

^  See  Stoffel,  Rist.  de  Jules  Cisar, — Guerre  civile,  ii.  451,  aud  my  essay  on 
"  The  Credibility  of  Caesar's  Narrative  "  (pp.  222-4). 

3  See  pp.  621-2. 

*  Probably  some  of  the  fighting  men  marched  parallel  ^vith  thi  waggons. 
See  p.  622  and  n.  1. 


II  HELYETII  AXD  AEIOVISTUS  31 

from  plundering  his  allies.  Xor  was  this  his  only  anxiety.  58  b.c. 
He  depended  upon  the  Aedui  for  his  supplies  :  but  day  fol- 
lowed day,  and  no  supplies  came.  On  the  Saone  indeed  he  Caesar 
had  a  flotilla  of  barges  laden  with  corn:  but  the  necessity  of  g^ppf^eg  "'^ 
following  the  Helvetii  had  led  him  far  away  from  that  river.  owiBgtothe 
The  Aeduan  chiefs  in  his  camp  promised,  protested  and  Dunmorix. 
poured  fortli  excuses,  till  he  lost  all  patience  and  accused, 
them  of  deliberate  breach  of  faith.  This  challenge  elicited  a 
full  disclosure.  Liscus,  the  A^ergobret  or  chief  magistrate  of 
the  Aedui,  spoke  on  behalf  of  his  brother  chiefs.  It  appeared 
that  there  were  certain  individuals  whose  power  was  actually 
greater  than  that  of  the  Government.  They  had  exerted 
their  influence  over  the  people  to  prevent  them  from  sending 
supplies,  telling  them  that  if  the  Eomans  succeeded  in  defeat- 
ing the  Helvetii,  they  would  use  their  victory  to  enslave  the 
Aedui  as  well  as  the  other  tribes.  Liscus  concluded  by  telling 
Caesar  that  he  had  revealed  the  truth  at  the  risk  of  his  life, 
and  had  only  spoken  under  compulsion.  Caesar  had  no 
doubt  that  by  "  certain  individuals "  he  meant  Dumnorix. 
But  he  had  no  intention  of  discussing  matters,  of  state  in  the 
presence  of  men  whose  discretion  could  not  be  trusted.  He 
therefore  told  all  the  chiefs,  except  Liscus,  that  they  might 
go.  Liscus  then  spoke  out  frankly.  He  admitted  that 
Dumnorix  and  no  other  was  the  man.  He  had  amassed 
great  wealth,  and  had  spent  it  lavishly  in  buying  popular 
support.  He  had  acquired  great  influence  with  the  Bituriges 
and  other  tribes  by  arranging  marriages  between  the  women 
of  his  family  and  powerful  chieftains.  Xot  only  was  he 
politically  connected  with  the  Helvetii,  but  he  privately 
detested  Caesar,  because  Caesar  had  set  him  aside  and  restored 
his  brother  Divitiacus  to  power.  In  his  own  country  he  was 
the  leader  of  the  anti-Eoman  faction.  The  interests  of  the 
Helvetii  were  his  interests.  If  they  succeeded,  they  would 
help  him  to  mount  the  throne  :  if  they  failed,  he  would  be 
worse  off  than  before.  He  had  kept  them  regularly  supplied 
with  information ;  and  in  the  cavalry  skirmish,  a  few  days 
before,  he  had  set  the  example  of  flight. 

Caesar   hardly  knew   how  to   act.     Dumnorix  was  e\T.- 
dently  one  of   the  most   powerful   and   implacable    enemies 


32  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  whom  he  had  to  fear.  He  could  not  afford  to  overlook  such 
flagrant  hostility ;  but  he  was  afraid  of  offending  Divitiacus, 
whom  he  particularly  desired  to  conciliate.  He  summoned 
hhn  to  his  tent,  and,  addressing  him  through  the  medium 
of  Gains  Valerius  Troucillus,  a  distinguished  Provincial,  his 
principal  interpreter  and  trusted  friend,  earnestly  pressed 
him  to  consent  to  his  punishing  Dumnorix.  Divitiacus, 
with  a  burst  of  tears,  begged  him  not  to  be  too  hard  upon 
his  brother ;  or  it  would  be  said  that  it  was  he  who  had 
advised  the  infliction  of  the  punishment,  and  pubHc  opinion 
would  brand  him  as  a  monster.  Caesar  pressed  his  hand 
kindly,  and  bade  him  dismiss  his  fears.  His  regard  for  him, 
he  said,  was  so  great  that  he  was  willing  to  condone  the 
insult  which  had  been  offered  to  his  Government  and  the 
provocation  which  he  had  himself  received.  The  truth  was 
that  he  had  no  choice.  He  had  not  yet  won  the  prestige 
that  would  only  come  from  victory ;  and  with  powerful 
enemies  before  him,  and  doubtful  allies  around  him,  upon 
whose  goodwill  he  depended  for  the  means  of  subsistence, 
it  would  be  folly  to  raise  a  hornet's  nest  about  his  ears. 
He  contented  himself  therefore  with  sending  for  Dumnorix, 
and  giving  him  a  severe  rebuke  and  a  stern  warning.  This 
once,  he  said,  for  his  brother's  sake,  his  conduct  should  be 
overlooked.  At  the  same  tune  he  gave  secret  orders  that 
Dumnorix  should  be  watched,  and  his  movements  reported. 

His  Next  morning  Caesar  made  an  attempt  to  surprise  the 

attempt  to  enemy,  which  only  failed  through  the  stupidity  of  an  officer. 

surprise  tiie  They  had  encamped,  his  scouts  reported,  at  the  foot  of  a  hill 

HBlvftii. 

eight  miles  distant.  He  at  once  sent  a  party  to  reconnoitre 
the  hill,  and  ascertain  whether  it  would  be  possible  to  ascend 
it  from  the  rear.  They  reported  that  such  an  ascent  was 
easily  practicable.  In  the  middle  of  the  night  Caesar  sent 
Labienus  with  two  legions,  under  the  guidance  of  the  ex- 
ploring party,  to  climb  the  hill  and  swoop  down  upon  the 
enemy's  rear,  while  he  should  himself  attack  them  in  front. 
About  two  hours  after  the  departure  of  Labienus,  he  sent 
forward  his  cavalry,  and  followed  along  the  track  by  which 
the  enemy  had  advanced.  Publius  Considius,  ar  officer  of 
experience  and  reputation,  was  sent  on  ahead  with  scouts  to 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  IIELVETII. 


See  page^  $!S'6/3. 


REFERENCE 

Siiaimil  of  liill  oi"  Armepy 

-Eulreiiclmieut  Ibr  pi-otecUon  of  bfigj^age 

-ii  le^oBa  in-line  of  batUe 

Helvetii 

Helvetii forced  to   retreat  to  a  hilL 

Boli   &  Tuliti^i. 

Koinjm  5':*  Kne   Cacintf  Boi;    &  Tulintfi 

Helvptii  renewing   at^ck  ^ 

—  —  Rouiau  line  of  march 
i_  Helvetian.,,    „ 

ire  denote  intervals  in.  altitude   of  10  ntetrt 
Srale    1;  5t;.000 


Lonaon  Hacmina).    &  Co  Lt-l 


II  HELVETII  AND  ARIOVISTUS  33 

reconnoitre.  Shortly  before  sunrise  Caesar  was  within  a  58  b.c, 
mile  and  a  half  of  the  enemy,  who  suspected  nothing. 
Suddenly  Considius  rode  back  at  a  gallop  and  told  him  that 
all  had  gone  wrong :  not  Labienus,  but  the  enemy  occupied 
the  height ;  he  had  recognised  them  by  their  arms  and 
standards,  and  was  sure  that  he  had  made  no  mistake. 
Caesar  at  once  led  his  troops  on  to  another  hill  close  by, 
and  formed  them  in  line  of  battle.  Labienus  meanwhile 
was  wondering  why  he  did  not  come  ;  and  when  it  was  too 
late,  Caesar  learned  that  Considius  had  been  the  dupe  of  his 
own  fears. 

The  legions  moved  on  in  the  afternoon,  and  encamped  About 
about  three  miles  in  the  rear  of  the  Helvetii,  near  the  site 
of  Toulon-sur-Arroux.^  The  day  after,  as  no  corn-carts  had  He 
appeared  and  only  two  days'  rations  were  left,  Caesar  struck  gibracte 
off  to  the  right,  and  marched  for  Bibracte,  the  capital  of  to  get 
the  Aedui,  a  thriving  town  situated  on  Mont  Beuvray,  about 
sixteen  miles  to  the  north,  where  he  knew  that  he  would 
find  oranaries  stored  with  corn.  The  route  ran  along  the 
watershed  between  the  Arroux  and  one  of  its  affluents,  a 
rivulet  called  the  Auzon.  The  Helvetii  were  far  on  their 
way,  the  head  of  the  column  having  passed  Luzy  and  turned 
westward  down  the  valley  of  the  Alene,  when  some  deserters 
from  Caesar's  cavalry  brought  them  the  news.  Fancying 
that  he  was  afraid  of  them,  or  hoping  to  prevent  him  from 
reaching  Bibracte,  they  turned  likewise,  marched  back 
rapidly,  and  attacked  his  rearguard  near  Armecy,  about 
three  miles  north  of  Toulon.  Caesar  sent  his  cavalry  to 
retard  their  advance,  while  he  ordered  the  infantry  to  retrace 
their  steps  and  ascend  the  slopes  of  Armecy.  The  whole 
movement  must  have  occupied  about  two  hours.  Half-way 
up  the  hill,  the  four  veteran  legions  were  ranged  in  three 
lines  of  cohorts,  each  line  being  eight  men  deep."  The 
soldiers'  packs  were  collected  on  the  top,  under  the  protection 
of  the  auxiliaries  and  the  two  newly-raised  legions,  who 
were  ordered  to  entrench  the  position.  The  baggage-train 
may  either  have  been  parked  on  the  ridge  along  which  it 
was  moving,  or  have  continued  its  march  towards  Bibracte. 

1  See  pp.  618-19.  ^  See  p.  590. 

D 


To  fojcp  j>  33 


DEFEAT  OF  THE  HE 

.  (After  Col .  Stoffel}  -^ 


s . 
c . 
RR 
HH 
H'H' 
TT 
r  r 
hh 


REFERENCE 

.  Suminll  of  till  of  Annecy" 
.  Jhilrenchineiit  for  px-otecticn: 
.  4  legions  in.  line  of  tattle 
.  Hel\'etii 

.  Hel\'etii  forced  to  reti-eat 
.  Boii  &  Tulingi 
.  RonLaiL  5^!^  line  facing  BoJ 
.  Helvetii  renewing  atfeack 
.  Rom  an   line  of  march 
Helvetian.,, 


The  ccmtours  denote  intervals  in  altittide 

Scale    I:  56,000 
Kilometres 


London. lyiacTnillan    &  Co.Ltd 


II  HELVETII  AND  AEIOVISTUS  33 

reconnoitre.  Shortly  before  sunrise  Caesar  was  within  a  58  b.c, 
mile  and  a  half  of  the  enemy,  who  suspected  nothing. 
Suddenly  Considius  rode  back  at  a  gallop  and  told  him  that 
all  had  gone  wrong :  not  Labienus,  but  the  enemy  occupied 
the  height ;  he  had  recognised  them  by  their  arms  and 
standards,  and  was  sure  that  he  had  made  no  mistake. 
Caesar  at  once  led  his  troops  on  to  another  hill  close  by, 
and  formed  them  in  line  of  battle.  Labienus  meanwhile 
was  wondering  why  he  did  not  come ;  and  when  it  was  too 
late,  Caesar  learned  that  Considius  had  been  the  dupe  of  his 
own  fears. 

The  legions  moved  on  in  the  afternoon,  and  encamped  About 
about  three  miles  in  the  rear  of  the  Helvetii,  near  the  site 
of  Toulon-sur-Arroux.^  The  day  after,  as  no  corn-carts  had  He 
appeared  and  only  two  days'  rations  were  left,  Caesar  struck  gibracte 
off  to  the  right,  and  marched  for  Bibracte,  the  capital  of  to  get 
the  Aedui,  a  thriving  town  situated  on  Mont  Beuvray,  about 
sixteen  miles  to  the  north,  where  he  knew  that  he  would 
find  granaries  stored  with  corn.  The  route  ran  along  the 
watershed  between  the  Arroux  and  one  of  its  affluents,  a 
rivulet  called  the  Auzon.  The  Helvetii  were  far  on  their 
way,  the  head  of  the  column  having  passed  Luzy  and  turned 
westward  down  the  valley  of  the  Aleiie,  when  some  deserters 
from  Caesar's  cavalry  brought  them  the  news.  Fancying 
that  he  was  afraid  of  them,  or  hoping  to  prevent  him  from 
reaching  Bibracte,  they  turned  likewise,  marched  back 
rapidly,  and  attacked  his  rearguard  near  Armecy,  about 
three  miles  north  of  Toulon.  Caesar  sent  his  cavalry  to 
retard  their  advance,  while  he  ordered  the  infantry  to  retrace 
their  steps  and  ascend  the  slopes  of  Armecy.  The  whole 
movement  must  have  occupied  about  two  hours.  Half-way 
up  the  hill,  the  four  veteran  legions  were  ranged  in  three 
lines  of  cohorts,  each  line  being  eight  men  deep.^  The 
soldiers'  packs  were  collected  on  the  top,  under  the  protection 
of  the  auxiliaries  and  the  two  newly-raised  legions,  who 
were  ordered  to  entrench  the  position.  The  baggage-train 
may  either  have  been  parked  on  the  ridge  along  which  it 
was  moving,  or  have  continued  its  march  towards  Bibracte. 
1  See  pp.  618-19.  ^  gge  p.  590. 

D 


34  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  It  was  exposed  to  no  danger  from  the  Helvetii ;  and,  as  the 
Aedui  were,  for  the  most  part,  friendly,  a  slender  escort 
would  have  sufficed  to  protect  it.^  The  opportunity  for 
which  Caesar  had  been  waiting  had  at  last  come.  Although 
the  enemy  were  now  between  him  and  Bibracte,  the  hill  of 
Armecy  was  the  best  position  which  he  could  have  chosen. 
If  he  won,  the  road  would  of  course  be  open.  If  he  lost, — 
but  he  did  not  intend  to  lose.  It  was  his  first  pitched 
battle ;  and  he  knew  that  for  him  and  his  army  defeat  would 
be  destruction.  The  Helvetii  would  fight  desperately :  his 
legions,  except  perhaps  the  10  th,  had  not  yet  come  to  know 
him  ;  and  he  could  not  fully  trust  all  his  officers.  He  there- 
fore dismounted  and  made  his  staff  do  the  same,  so  that  the 
men  mijjrht  see  that  their  officers  shared  their  dangers.  The 
waggons  of  the  Helvetii  were  parked,  as  they  came  up,  on 
rising  ground  to  the  left  of  the  road ;  and  about  one  o'clock 
in  the  afternoon  the  whole  mighty  host,  congregated  in 
compact  masses,  flung  back  Caesar's  horsemen  and  with 
shields  closely  locked  pressed  up  the  hill  against  the 
Roman  line.  The  men  in  the  front  rank  held  their  shields 
before  their  bodies,  while  those  behind  bore  theirs  horizon- 
tally above  their  heads.^  The  legionaries  in  the  front  ranks 
stood  with  their  javelins  in  their  hands,  ready  to  throw. 
On  the  plateau  above,  recruits  and  auxiliaries  were  hard  at 
work  with  their  entrenching  tools.  When  the  enemy  were 
within  a  few  yards,  the  centurions  gave  the  word.  Down 
flew  a  shower  of  javelins ;  and  the  mass  began  to  break. 
The  blades  of  the  javelins,  composed  of  soft  iron,  had  bent 
as  the  points  penetrated  the  shields.^  Sword  in  hand,  the 
cohorts  of  the  first  line  charged :  many  of  the  Helvetii, 
finding  their  shields  nailed  together  by  the  javelins,  which, 
pull  and  wrench  as  they  might,  were  not  to  be  torn  out, 
flung  them  away,  and  parried  the  thrusts  as  best  they  could  : 
but  they  were  soon  overborne,  and  fell  back  to  a  hill  about 
a  mile  north  of  Armecy.     The  Romans  were  following  when 

1  See  p.  620. 

2  See  W.  Smith,  Did.  of  Greek  and  Roman  Ant.,   ii.   808  ;  and  Stoffel, 
Guerre  de  Cisar  et  d'Arioviste,  1890,  p.  69. 

^  See  p.  24,  siqira. 


II  HELYETII  AND  AEIOYISTUS  35 

the  Boii  and  Tulingi,  who  had  just  arrived  upon  the  field,  ^8  b.c. 
rushed  upon  their  flank  and  rear.      The  Helvetii  took  heart 
again  and  returned  to  the  attack ;  and,  while  the  first  two 
lines  of  the  Eomans  closed  with  them,  the  third  faced  about, 
and  confronted  their  fresh  assailants. 

Long  and    fiercely  the   battle  was    fought   out.      In   due  Defeat  of 
time  the  cohorts  of   the   second    line   relieved  those  of  the  y^^^  ^e^r 
first,  advancing  between    the   files  as   the   latter  withdrew ;  Bibracte. 
and  again   the   first   line   relieved,  in  its  turn,  the  second.^ 
Gradually  the  Helvetii  were  forced  further  up  the  hill ;  while 
the  Boii  and  Tulingi  retreated  to  their  baggage.      Standing 
behind  the  wall  of  waggons,  they  hurled  down  stones  and 
darts  upon  the  advancing  Eomans,  and  thrust  at  them  with 
long  pikes  when  they  attempted  to  storm  the  laager.      The 
struggle  was  prolonged  far  into  the  night.      At  length  the 
legionaries  burst  through  the  barrier.      Women  and  children 
who   could    not    escape   were    slaughtered ;    and    the    flying 
remnant  of  the  invading  host  disappeared  in  the  darkness  of 
night." 

Before  the  sun  went  down,  evil  tidings  must  have  reached 
the  non-combatants  who  were  still  wending  their  way 
towards  the  field.  It  is  certain  that  many  of  the  waggons 
never  came  into  the  laager.^  What  despair  fell  upon  the 
baffled '  emigrants ;  how  the  jaded  cattle  were  headed  round 
again  towards  the  north,  and  goaded  through  that  night ; 
how  those  who  escaped  the  slaughter  tramped  after,  and  told 
the  tale  of  the  calamity ;  the  din,  the  confusion,  the  long 
weariness  of  the  retreat, — these  things  it  is  easy  to  imagine, 
but  those  only  who  have  shared  the  rout  and  ruin  of  a 
beaten  army  can  adequately  realise. 

Caesar  was  unable   to   pursue.      His  cavalry  were  weak  ^^p^ar's 
and  untrustworthy ;  and  he  had  to  give  the  wounded  time  of  the 
to  recover,  and  to  bury  the  teeming  corpses  that  might  have  fugitives. 

^  See  Stoftel,  Guerre  de  Cdsar  et  d'Arioviste,  pp.  120-21,  and  pp.  593-4  of 
the  larger  edition  of  this  book. 

■^  If  Caesar's  estimate  (see  p.  26,  supra)  of  the  number  of  the  emigrants 
was  correct,  and  unless  a  considerable  proportion  had  dispersed  on  the  march, 
over  100,000,  as  Colonel  Stoffel  calculates,  must  have  perished  in  the  battle. 
See  pp.  222-5.  All  questions  relating  to  the  battle  are  discussed  on  pp. 
610-25.  3  See  pp.  223-4, 


36  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  engendered  a  pestilence  among  his  allies :  but  he  sent 
mounted  messengers  to  warn  the  Lingones,  through  whose 
country  the  fugitives  would  have  to  pass,  to  give  them  no 
help.  The  Lingones  occupied  the  country  round  Tonnerre 
and  Bar-sur-Aube  as  well  as  the  plateau  of  Langres.  At 
the  end  of  three  days  Caesar  started  in  pursuit.  On  the 
way  he  was  met  by  envoys,  whom  the  Helvetii,  now  reduced 
to  utter  destitution,  had  sent  to  arrange  terms  of  surrender. 
He  bade  them  tell  their  countrymen  to  halt,  and  await  his 
arrival.  "When  he  overtook  them,  he  ordered  them  to  give 
hostages,  and  to  surrender  their  arms  and  a  number  of  slaves, 
who  had  escaped  to  them.  Six  thousand  Helvetians  slipped 
away  in  the  night,  and  took  the  road  towards  the  Ehine : 
but  Caesar  sent  peremptory  orders  to  the  inhabitants  to 
hunt  them  down  and  bring  them  back ;  and  on  their  return, 

Settiemeut  they  were  all  put  to  death.  The  Boii  were  allowed,  at  the 
'  request  of  the  Aedui,  who  appreciated  their  martial  qualities, 
to  settle  in  Aeduan  territory.  It  would  seem  that  the  tract 
assigned  to  them  was  in  the  neighbourhood  of  St-Parize-le- 
Chatel,  between  the  Allier  and  the  Loire.  The  Helvetii  and 
the  other  tribes,  who  would  be  most  useful  as  a  barrier 
between  the  Germans  and  the  Province,  were  sent  back  to 
their  own  land ;  and  the  Allobroges  were  directed  to  supply 
them  with  grain. 

Envoys  The  news  of  this  brilliant  victory  produced  its  natural 

from  Cei-    effect.     The   success   of   the   Helvetii   would    have    been    a 

tican  Gaul 

congratu-    Calamity  to  all,   except   Dumnorix   and   his  followmg ;  and 
late  Caesar,  ^j^-g    calamity   Caesar    had    averted.     He    appeared    as    the 

and  solicit  •'  ,  ^^ 

his  aid  couqueror,  not  of  Gaul  but  of  the  invaders  of  Gaul.  At 
^lovlstus  ^^^®  worst,  his  rule  would  be  preferable  to  the  tyranny  of 
Ariovistus ;  and  he  would  doubtless  be  glad  to  aid  in 
expelling  his  rival.  The  patriots  in  the  tribal  councils,  if 
they  offered  any  opposition,  were  outvoted.  Chieftains  came 
from  all  parts  of  central  Gaul  to  congratulate  the  couqueror. 
They  told  him  that  they  had  certain  important  proposals  to 
lay  before  him ;  and,  with  his  express  sanction,  they  then 
and  there  convoked  a  council  to  arrange  details.  The 
meeting  took  place  some  days  later.  After  the  council  had 
broken  up,  Caesar  consented,  at  the  pressing  request  of  the 


II  HELVETII  AND  AEIOVISTUS  37 

chiefs,  to  give  them  a  private  interview.  They  earnestly  58  b.c. 
begged  him  to  keep  what  they  were  going  to  say  a  close 
secret ;  for  if  it  were  to  get  abroad,  they  would  be  made  to 
suffer  cruelly.  Divitiacus,  who  spoke  for  them,  related  how 
Ariovistus  had  established  his  footing  in  the  land  of  the 
Sequani,  defeated  the  Aedui  and  their  dependents,  and  finally 
overthrown  the  combined  forces  of  the  Aedui,  the  Sequani, 
and  their  respective  allies.-^  At  that  moment  there  were  a 
hundred  and  twenty  thousand  Germans  in  their  midst ;  and 
the  Gauls  would  soon  be  expelled  from  their  own  country. 
The  Sequani  had  already  been  forced  to  cede  a  third  part 
of  their  territory ;  and  they  would  soon  be  forced  to  give 
up  another  third ;  for  a  fresh  horde,  the  Harudes,  numbering 
four  and  twenty  thousand,  had  recently  crossed  the  Ehine. 
Ariovistus  was  a  cruel  bloodthirsty  tyrant ;  and,  if  Caesar 
would  not  help  them,  they  must  all  go  forth,  like  the 
Helvetii,  and  seek  some  new  home.^ 

Caesar  assured  the  chiefs  that  they  might  rely  upon  his  Failure 
support.  Their  interests  indeed  coincided  with  his.  He  attempts 
saw  that  it  was  absolutely  necessary  to  stop  the  flow  of  to  nego- 
German  invasion.  Like  the  Cimbri  and  Teutoni,  these  fierce  Ariovistus. 
hordes  might,  if  they  were  not  checked,  soon  overrun  the 
whole  of  Gaul,  and  thence  pour  into  Italy.  Moreover,  the 
interest  as  well  as  the  honour  of  Eorne  required  that  she 
should  protect  her  allies  ;  and  the  Aedui  were  allies  of  long 
standing,  whose  fidelity  had  been  rewarded  by  the  title  of 
"  Brethren."  And  there  was  another  reason  why  Caesar 
should  interfere.  Like  Clive,  when  he  found  himself  con- 
fronted by  Dupleix,  he  could  not  stand  still.  He  must 
either  advance  or  retreat.  If  he  shrank  from  espousing  the 
cause  of  the  Gauls,  he  would  lose  the  credit  which  his 
victory  had  won,  and  perhaps  force  them  to  make  common 
cause  with  Ariovistus  against  him.  Peaceful  methods,  how- 
ever, might  be  tried  first.  The  Eoman  army  was  compara- 
tively weak.  Ariovistus  was  master  of  a  formidable  host ; 
and  it  would  be  foolhardy  to  attack  him  without  absolute 
need.  He  had  been  treated  with  distinction  by  the  Senate ; 
and  there  was  just  a  chance  that  he  might  listen  to  reason. 
1  See  pp.  558-9.  "  See  pp.  187-9. 


38  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  He  was  then  probably  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Strasbourg. 
Caesar  sent  ambassadors  to  ask  him  to  name  some  inter- 
mediate spot  for  a  conference.  Ariovistus  told  them  to  say 
that  if  their  master  wanted  anything  from  him,  he  must 
take  the  trouble  to  come  to  him  in  person.  He  could  not 
risk  his  safety  by  moving  outside  his  own  territory  without 
his  army ;  and  to  move  and  feed  his  army  would  involve 
an  amount  of  exertion  which  he  did  not  care  to  undergo. 
Meanwhile  he  should  like  to  know  what  business  Caesar  had 
in  a  country  which  the  Germans  had  won  by  their  own  swords. 

Caesar  now  assumed  a  more  peremptory  tone.  Ariovistus 
had  rejected  his  invitation.  Very  good !  Then  these  were 
his  terms.  Not  another  man  must  set  foot  across  the  Ehine  : 
the  hostages  of  the  Aedui  must  be  restored ;  and  Ariovistus 
must  positively  cease  to  molest  that  people  or  their  allies. 
If  he  obeyed,  Caesar  would  be  his  friend.  If  not,  he  should 
know  how  to  avenge  the  wrongs  of  the  Aedui.  The  Senate 
had  decreed,  three  years  before,  that  the  Governor  of  Gaul 
for  the  time  being  should  protect  the  Aedui  and  the  other 
allies  of  the  Eepublic ;  and  he  intended  to  obey  his  in- 
structions. 

Ariovistus  haughtily  replied  that  he  was  a  conqueror ; 
and,  as  a  conqueror,  he  had  a  right  to  treat  his '  subjects  as 
he  pleased.  He  did  not  interfere  with  the  Eomans :  what 
right,  then,  had  the  Eomans  to  interfere  with  him  ?  He 
would  not  molest  the  Aedui  so  long  as  they  paid  their 
tribute :  but  most  certainly  he  would  not  give  up  the 
hostages ;  and  if  the  Aedui  did  not  pay,  much  good  would 
their  alliance  with  the  Eomans  do  them !  For  Caesar's 
threats  he  cared  nothing.  No  man  had  ever  withstood 
Ariovistus  and  escaped  destruction.  Let  Caesar  choose  his 
own  time  for  fighting.  He  would  soon  find  out  what  mettle 
there  was  in  the  unbeaten  warriors  of  Germany. 

With  this  message  came  the  alarming  news  that  a  host 
of  Suevi  had  appeared  on  the  eastern  bank  of  the  Ehine,  and 
that  the  Harudes  were  actually  harrying  the  lands  of  the 
Aedui.  Caesar,  the  most  reticent  of  writers,  has  told  us  that 
he  was  seriously  alarmed.^  The  Gauls  were  waiting  to  see 
1  B.  G.,  i.  37,  §4. 


11  HELVETII  AND  AKIOVISTUS  39 

whether  he  or  Ariovistus  was  to  be  master.  If  he  suffered  58  b.c. 
any  reverse,  they  would  probably  rise  in  his  rear;  and 
between  them  and  the  Germans  his  army  might  perish. 
Not  a  moment  was  to  be  lost  if  the  formidable  Suevi  were 
to  be  prevented  from  reinforcing  the  army  of  Ariovistus. 
With  all  possible  speed  Caesar  made  arrangements  with  the 
Aedui  and  the  Lingones  for  the  forwarding  of  supplies,  and 
immediately  put  his  army  in  motion.  Three  days  later  he 
heard  that  Ariovistus  was  marching  to  seize  Vesontio,  now  He  marches 

tiff  Tiiiist 

Besanqon,  the  chief  town  of  the  Sequani,  a  strong  place  well  Ariovistus 
stored  with  all  munitions  of  war.      Marching  night  and  day  ^^'^  seizes 

,  .        ,       ^       .      -,    ^t      ^  Vesontio. 

at  Ins  utmost  speed  to  anticipate  him,  he  reached  the  town 
before  the  enemy  had  emerged  from  Alsace. 

Vesontio,  which  now  became  Caesar's  base,  was  an  ideal 
Gallic  stronghold.  The  town  stood  on  a  sloping  peninsula, 
round  which  the  Doubs  swept  in  a  curve  that  nearly  formed 
a  circle  ;  while  the  isthmus,  little  more  than  five  hundred 
yards  wide,  rose  from  either  bank  into  a  steep  and  lofty  hill, 
girt  by  a  wall,  which  gave  it  the  strength  of  a  citadel,  and 
connected  it  with  the  town.  During  the  short  time  that 
Caesar  stayed  there  to  collect  supplies,  his  soldiers  had  plenty 
of  opportunities  for  gossiping.  The  people  of  the  place,  and 
especially  the  traders,  whose  business  had  brought  them  into 
contact  with  the  Germans,  told  marvellous  stories  of  theii' 
great  strength  and  desperate  bravery : — one  could  not  bear 
even  to  look  them  in  the  face,  so  terrible  was  the  glare  of 
their  piercing  eyes.  The  Eoman  soldiers  were  brave  :  but 
they  were  liable  to  fits  of  panic ;  and  they  were  very 
credulous.  The  idle  chatter  of  their  new  acquaintances  com-  Panic  in 
pletely  demoralised  them.  The  mischief  began  with  the  *|;^^°'"^° 
tribunes,  the  officers  of  the  auxiliary  corps,  and  others  who 
formed  the  personal  following  of  the  General.  Many  of 
them  were  soldiers  only  in  name.  Like  every  other  Eoman 
governor,  Caesar  had  been  obliged,  for  political  reasons,  to 
find  places  in  his  army  for  fashionable  idlers  and  disappointed 
professional  men,  who  had  had  no  experience  of  war,  and 
simply  wanted   to   mend    their  fortunes   by  looting.'      Now 

1  B.  G.,  i.  39,  §  2.     See  also  Cicero,  £);.  ad  Fam.,  vii.  5-6,  8,  10,  18  ;  ad 
Quint,  fratr.,  ii.  13,  §3. 


40  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  that  there  was  a  prospect  of  real  stern  figliting,  they  began 
to  tremble.  Some  invented  excuses  for  asking  leave  of 
absence.  Others  felt  bound,  for  very  shame,  to  stay :  but 
they  could  not  command  their  countenances  enough  to  look 
as  if  they  were  not  afraid.  Sometimes  indeed,  in  spite  of 
themselves,  they  gave  way  to  tears.  Gradually  even  centurions 
and  seasoned  veterans  were  infected  by  the  general  alarm. 
Some  of  them  indeed  made  an  effort  to  disguise  their  fears. 
They  told  each  other  that  it  was  not  the  enemy,  but  only 
the  forests  between  them  and  the  enemy  and  the  probable 
failure  of  supplies  that  they  dreaded.  All  over  the  camp 
men  were  making  their  wills ;  and  Caesar  was  actually  told 
that,  when  he  gave  the  order  to  march,  the  men  would  refuse 
to  obey. 
How  He  immediately  sent  for  the  tribunes  and  centurions,  and 

restored  g^-vc  them  a  severe  lecture.  What  business  had  they  to  ask 
confidence,  where  he  intended  to  march?  It  was  most  unlikely  that 
Ariovistus  would  be  mad  enough  to  fight :  but  supposing  he 
did,  what  was  there  to  be  afraid  of  ?  Had  they  lost  all 
confidence  in  themselves,  all  faith  in  their  General  ?  What 
had  these  terrible  Germans  ever  really  done  ?  The  crushing 
defeats  which  Marius  had  inflicted  upon  the  Cimbri  and 
Teutoni,  the  defeats  which  had  been  inflicted  upon  the  gladi- 
ators, trained  though  they  were  in  Eoman  discipline,  in  the 
recent  servile  war,  gave  the  real  measure  of  their  prowess. 
Even  the  Helvetii  had  often  beaten  them ;  and  the  Helvetii 
had  gone  down  before  the  legions.  To  talk  about  the  diffi- 
culty of  the  country  or  the  difficulty  of  getting  supplies  was 
downright  impertinence.  It  was  as  much  as  to  assume  that 
the  General  did  not  know  his  own  business.  Supplies  were 
coming  up  to  the  front  from  the  friendly  tribes ;  and  the 
croakers  would  soon  see  that  their  alarm  about  the  forests 
was  absurd.  As  for  the  story  that  the  army  was  going  to 
mutiny,  he  did  not  believe  it.  Armies  did  not  mutiny 
unless  generals  were  incapable  or  dishonest.  His  in- 
tegrity had  never  been  called  in  question ;  and  the  late 
campaign  proved  that  he  could  command.  Anyhow  on 
the  very  next  night  he  intended  to  march ;  and  if 
nobody  else  would    follow  him,   he   would  go  on  with  the 


II  HELYETII  AND  AEIOVISTUS  41 

1 0th  legion  alone ;   for  it,  at  all  events,  was  faithful  to  its  58  b.c. 
commander. 

This  vigorous  little  speech  had  a  marvellous  effect  upon 
the  troops.  From  despair  their  spirits  bounded  to  the  highest 
pitch  of  confidence  ;  and  they  were  only  impatient  to  measure 
swords  with  the  enemy.  The  men  of  the  10th,  flattered  by 
Caesar's  trust  in  them,  sent  him  a  message  of  thanks  through 
their  officers ;  while  the  other  legions  asked  theirs  to  tell 
him  that  they  were  sorry  for  what  had  occurred.  At  the 
hour  which  he  had  fixed  Caesar  struck  his  camp.  He  left  a  He  resumes 
detachment  to  hold  Vesontio.  Before  him  all  was  unknown :  against 
but  he  had  full  faith  in  Divitiacus ;  and  Divitiacus  under-  Ariovistus. 
took  to  be  his  guide.  To  avoid  the  broken  wooded  country 
between  Besanc^on  and  MontbeUard,  he  made  a  circuit  north- 
ward and  eastward,  of  about  fifty  miles,  and  then,  threading 
the  pass  of  Belfort,  debouched  into  the  plain  of  the  Rhine, 
and  pushed  on  rapidly  past  the  eastern  slopes  of  the  Vosges 
till  he  reached  a  point  within  twenty -two  miles  of  the 
German  encampment.  He  has  not  told  us  where  he  formed 
his  own  camp :  probably  it  was  on  the  river  Fecht,  between 
Ostheim  and  Gemar.-^  Ariovistus,  who  was  on  the  north, 
sent  messengers  to  say  that,  as  Caesar  had  come  nearer,  he 
had  no  objection  to  meeting  him.  Caesar  accepted  his 
proposal ;  and  the  conference  was  fixed  for  the  fifth  day 
following.  Ariovistus,  who  knew  that  Caesar's  cavalry  were 
w^eak,  pretended  to  be  afraid  of  treachery  from  the  legions, 
and  insisted  that  they  should  each  bring  with  them  a  cavalry 
escort  only.  Caesar  was  unwilling  to  raise  difficulties :  but, 
as  all  his  cavalry  were  Gauls,  and  he  did  not  care  to  trust 
his  safety  to  them,  he  mounted  the  10th  on  their  horses. 
The  place  of  meeting  was  a  knoll,  rising  above  the  plain, 
nearly  equidistant  from  the  Eoman  and  the  German  camp. 
Caesar  stationed  the  bulk  of  his  escort  about  three  hundred 
yards  off" :  Ariovistus  did  likewise ;  and  each  rode  up  with 
ten  horsemen  to  the  knoll.  Ariovistus  had  stipulated  that 
they  should  hold  the  conference  without  dismounting.      Caesar  His  confer- 

GDCG  Wltil 

began   by  reminding   Ariovistus   of  the  honours   which    the  Ariovistus. 
Senate  had  conferred  upon  him ;  and  afterwards  repeated  the 

1  See  pp.  636-8,  and  App.  C. 


42  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.  demands,  which  he  had  already  made  through  his  envoys,  on 
behalf  of  the  Aedui.  Ariovistus  replied  that  he  had  only 
crossed  the  Ehine  in  response  to  Gallic  appeals.  The  country 
which  he  occupied  in  Gaul  had  been  formally  ceded  to  him 
by  Gauls :  it  was  not  he  who  had  attacked  them,  but  they 
who  had  attacked  him.  He  had  overthrown  their  entire 
host  in  battle ;  and,  if  they  cared  to  repeat  the  experiment, 
he  was  ready  to  fight  them  again.  As  for  the  friendship  of 
the  Eomans,  it  was  only  fair  that  he  should  get  some  solid 
advantage  out  of  it ;  and  if  he  could  only  retain  it  by  giving 
up  the  tribute  which  he  received  from  his  subjects,  he  would 
fling  it  aside  as  readily  as  he  had  asked  for  it.  He  had 
entered  Gaul  before  the  Eomans.  Caesar  was  the  first 
Eoman  Governor  who  had  ever  passed  beyond  the  frontier 
of  the  Province.  What  did  he  mean  by  invading  his 
dominions  ?  His  part  of  the  country  belonged  to  him  just 
as  much  as  the  Province  belonged  to  Eome.  Caesar  talked 
a  great  deal  of  the  titles  which  the  Senate  had  bestowed 
upon  the  Aedui ;  but  he  knew  too  much  of  the  world  to  be 
imposed  upon  by  such  shams.  The  Aedui  had  not  helped 
the  Eomans  in  the  war  with  the  Allobroges  ;  and  the  Eomans 
had  not  stirred  a  finger  to  help  their  "  Brethren "  against 
himself.  He  had  good  grounds  for  suspecting  that  the 
friendship  which  Caesar  professed  for  him  was  another  sham, 
— a  mere  blind  under  cover  of  which  Caesar  was  plotting 
his  ruin.  He  happened  to  know  what  was  going  on  in 
Eome ;  and  there  were  prominent  men  there  who  would  be 
glad  to  hear  of  Caesar's  death.  If  Caesar  did  not  withdraw 
from  his  country,  he  would  expel  him  by  force  of  arms :  but 
if  he  would  only  go  away  and  leave  him  in  peace,  he  would 
show  his  gratitude.  Caesar  quietly  answered  that  it  was 
impossible  for  him  to  go  back  from  his  word  or  to  forsake 
the  allies  of  his  country ;  and,  he  added,  if  history  were  to 
be  appealed  to,  the  claim  of  the  Eomans  to  supremacy  in 
Gaul  was  better  founded  than  that  of  the  Germans.  He 
was  still  speaking  when  a  soldier  rode  up  and  warned  him 
that  a  number  of  Germans  were  edging  up  towards  the 
knoll  and  stoning  his  escort.  Eiding  back  to  his  men,  he 
withdrew  them  without  attempting  to  retaliate ;  for,  though 


II  HELVETII  AND  AEIOVISTUS  43 

he  was  confident   that  his   splendid  legion  could  easily   beat  58  b.c. 
the    Germans,   he    was    determined    not   to   give   them    any 
pretext  for  accusing  him  of  foul  play. 

Exasperated  by  this  outrage,  the  Eomans  became  more 
than  ever  impatient  for   battle.     Two  days   later  Ariovistus 
requested  Caesar  to  meet  him  again,  or  else  send  one  of  his 
generals.      His    motive   doubtless    was  the  hope  of   gaining 
time ;    for   he    had    a    superstitious    reason    for    wishing    to 
postpone  the  battle.      Caesar  saw  no  reason  for  further  dis- 
cussion, and  did   not  care   to  expose   his  lieutenants  to  the 
tender  mercies  of  a  treacherous  barbarian :  but  he  sent  his 
interpreter,  Troucillus,^    and  a   man   called   Mettius,    whom,  Mission  of 
as  he  believed,  Ariovistus  could  have  no  motive  for  injuring,  ^rouciiius 
They  were  instructed  to  hear  what  Ariovistus  had  to  say,  Mettius. 
and  bring  back  word.      The  moment  he  saw  them,  Ariovistus 
flew  into  a  passion.      "  Why  have  you  come  here,"  he  shouted  : 
"  to  play  the   spy  ? "   and  when  they  attempted   to  explain, 
he  cut  them  short  and  put  them  under  arrest. 

On  the  same  day  he  made  a  long  march  southward,  and  Ariovistus 
halted  about   six  miles   north  of  Caesar's  camp,  at  the  very  g^l^j^r's 
foot  of  the  Vosges.     He  had  conceived  a  daring  plan.     Next  line  of 
morning   his   column    ascended    the    lower    slopes,    marched  caUon"^^^' 
securely  along  them  past  the  Eoman  army,  and  took  up  a 
position  two  miles  south  of  Caesar's  camp.      As  he  looked  up 
at  the  huge  column  winding  leisurely  by,  Caesar  saw  that  he 
was  being  outmanoeuvred  :  to  send  the  legions  up  the  hill-side 
would  be  to  court  destruction  ;  and  he  could  only  wait,  a 
passive  spectator,  while  Ariovistus  was  cutting  his  communica- 
tions and  barring  the  road  by  which  he  expected  his  supplies.^ 

Next   day   Caesar  formed  up  his  army  immediately  in  How 
front  of  the    camp,   under   the    protection    of   his    artillery.  ^J^^^^j^^g^^ 
Ariovistus  might  attack   if  he  liked :   but  if  he   attacked,  it  command 
would   be  at  his  peril  ;    if  he  declined   the  challenge,    the  °  ' " 
legionaries    would    be    assured   that   the   Germans    were   not 

1  See  App.  D. 

^  See  pp.  636-7.  Napoleon  {Hist,  de  Jules  Cesar,  ii.  89,  n.  2)  infers  from 
Caesar's  narrative  {B.  G.,  i.  48,  §  2)  that  Ariovistus  only  succeeded  in  cutting 
Caesar's  communication  with  the  convoys  that  were  coming  up  from  the  Aedui 
and  the  Sequani,  not  with  those  which  he  expected  from  the  Leuci  and  the 
Lingones. 


44  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

58  B.C.       invincible.^     Ariovistus   remained  where  he  was.      On  each 
of  the   four  following   days   Caesar  offered   battle :  but  the 
enemy    would   not    be    provoked    into   leaving    their    camp. 
Cavalry  skirmishes  indeed  took  place  daily,  but  without  any 
decisive  result.      The  Germans  had  light-armed  active  foot- 
men, who  accompanied  the  cavalry  into  action :    they  were 
trained    to   run   by    the   horses'   sides,  holding   on   to   their 
manes  ;    and   if    the   troopers   were    forced    to  retreat,   they 
supported  them  and  protected  the  wounded.      As  the  infantry 
remained  obstinately  in  their  camp,  and  it  was  necessary  for 
Caesar  to   win   back   communication   with   his   convoys,   he 
resolved  to  take  the  initiative.      Forming  his  legions  in  three 
parallel  columns, — prepared,  at  a  moment's   notice,   to  face 
into   line  of  battle,  he  marched   back    to   a  point  about  a 
thousand    yards    south    of   Ariovistus's    position,    and    there 
marked   out  a  site  for  a  camp.      One   column   fell  to   work 
with  their  spades,  while  the  other  two  formed  in  two  lines  to 
protect    them.     Ariovistus    sent   a  detachment   to   stop   the 
work  ;  but  it  was  too  late :  the  fighting  legions  kept  their 
assailants   at  bay,   and   the  camp   was  made.      Two  legions 
were  left  to   hold  it ;  and   the   other  four  returned   to   the 
larger  camp.      Next  day  Caesar  led  his  men  into  the  open, 
but  not  far  from  his  camp,  and  again  offered  battle.      Ario- 
vistus  again  declined   the   challenge:    but,  as   soon   as   the 
legions   had   returned    to   their    entrenchments,   he   made    a 
The  Ger-     determined   attempt  to   storm   the  smaller  camp,  and  only 
sup^rsti-™  drew  off  his  forces  at  sunset.     Caesar  now  learned  from  some 
tion  delay   prisoners   that  the   enemy  had  been  warned  by  their  wise 
pitched       women,  whose  divinations  they  accepted  with  superstitious 
battle.        awe,  that  they  could  not  gain  the  victoiy  unless  they  post- 
Sept.  IS.     poned  the  battle  until  after  the  new  moon. 
Caesar  Caesar  saw  his  opportunity.      He  waited  till  the  following 

^^g^  morning  ;  and  then,  leaving  detachments  to  guard  his  two 

camps,  he  formed  his  six  legions,  as  usual,  in  three  lines,  and 
marched  against  the  enemy.  They  had  no  choice  but  to 
defend  themselves.  Their  waggons  stood  in  a  huge  semi- 
circle, closing  their  flanks  and  rear ;  and,  as  they  tramped 

^  See  Stoffel,  Hist,  de  Jules  Cesar,  —  Guerre  civile,  ii.  342-5  ;  Guerre  de  Cisar 
etd'Ariuviste,  p.  64  ;  and  Caesar,  B.  C,  iii.  55,  §  1,  84,  §  2. 


II  HELVETII  AND  AEIOVISTUS  45 

out,  their  women  stretched  out  their  hands  and  piteously  58  b.c. 
begged  them  not  to  suffer  their  wives  to  be  made  slaves. 
The  host  was  formed  in  seven  distinct  groups,  each  composed 
of  the  warriors  of  a  single  tribe.  As  the  Romans  were 
numerically  weaker  than  their  opponents,  the  auxiliaries 
were  drawn  up  in  front  of  the  smaller  camp,  to  make  a  show 
of  strength.  Each  of  the  legati  was  placed  at  the  head  of  a 
legion,  in  order  that  every  one  might  feel  that  his  courage 
in  action  would  not  be  overlooked.  Caesar  commanded  the 
right  wing  in  person,  and,  noticing  that  the  enemy's  left  was 
comparatively  weak,  directed  against  it  his  princij)al  attack, 
in  the  hope  of  overwhelming  it  speedily  and  thus  disconcert- 
ing the  rest  of  the  force.  But  before  the  Eomans  in  the 
front  ranks  could  poise  their  javelins,  the  Germans  were  upon 
them ;  and  they  had  barely  a  moment  to  draw  their  swords. 
Quickly  stiffening  into  compact  masses,  the  Germans  locked 
their  shields  to  receive  the  thrusts :  but  some  of  the  Eomans 
flung  themselves  right  on  to  the  phalanxes :  they  tore  the 
shields  from  the  grasp  of  their  foes,  and  dug  their  swords 
down  into  them ;  and,  after  a  close  struggle,  they  broke  the 
formation,  and  their  weapons  got  freer  play.  The  unwieldy 
masses,  unable  to  manoeuvre  or  to  deploy,  reeled  backward, 
dissolved,  and  fled.  But  the  Eoman  left,  overpowered  by 
numbers,  was  giving  ground.  You.ng  Publius  Crassus,  son  of 
the  celebrated  triumvir,  who  was  stationed  in  command  of 
the  cavalry,  outside  the  battle,  saw  the  crisis,  and  promptly 
sent  the  third  line  to  the  rescue.  The  victory  was  won,  and  They  are 
the  whole  beaten  multitude  fled  towards  the  Ehine.  But  ^mi ' 
the  Ehine  was  some  fifteen  miles  away ;  ^  the  111  had  first  to  expelled 
be  crossed ;  and  in  that  weary  flight  many  fell  under  the 
lances  of  the  cavalry.  Only  a  few,  among  whom  was  Ario- 
vistus,  were  lucky  enough  to  swim  the  river  or  find  boats. 
Caesar,  in  the  course  of  the  pursuit,  came  upon  his  inter- 
preter, who  was  being  dragged  along  in  chains  by  his  captors, 
and  had  only  escaped  death  by  the  accident  that,  on  drawing 
lots,  they  had  decided  to  postpone  his  execution.  There  is 
nothing  in  Caesar's  memoirs  more  full  of  human  interest 
than  the  passage  in  which,  breaking  his  habitual  reserve,  he 
1  See  pp.  638-40,  and  App.  C. 


46  HELVETII  AND  AEIOVISTUS  chap,  n 

58  B.C.  tells  us  of  the  joy  he  felt  on  seeing  this  man,  for  whom  he 
had  the  greatest  respect  and  regard,  alive  and  unhurt.  It 
gave  him,  he  tells  us,  a  pleasure  as  great  as  he  had  felt  in 
gaining  the  victory.^ 

The  victory  was  decisive.      The  Suevi,  who  were  on  the 
point  of  crossing  the  Ehine,  lost  heart  and  set  out  home- 
wards.    And  Caesar, — where  was  he  to  go  ?     What  use  w^as 
he  to  make  of  his  victory  ?      It  would  be  fatal  to  withdraw 
his  legions  into  the  Province.      That  would  be  to  invite  the 
German  to  attempt  a  new  invasion ;  to  confess  w^eakness  to 
the  Gaul.      Fortune  beckoned  him  on.      Gaul  was  disunited : 
her  foremost  state  was  on  his  side ;  and  others  felt  the  spell 
of  his   success.       To   bring  those  gifted  peoples   under   the 
civilising  sway  of  Eome,  to  open  their  broad  lands  to  Italian 
enterprise, — that  was  a  work   to   satisfy  the   most   soaring 
ambition.      For  the  present  indeed  he  must  return  to  Cis- 
alpine Gaul,  to  conduct  the  civil  duties  of  his  government 
and   watch   the   politics   of  Italy :    but   leaving   his   legions 
Caesar        under  the  command  of  Labienus,  he  quartered  them  for  the 
hiriegious  winter  in  the  stronghold  of  Vesontio.^      In  that  last  act  of 
atvesontio.  \^[q  ^q  niay  read   the   registration   of  a  great  resolve ;  and 
doubtless  he  reflected,  as  he  travelled  southward,  upon  the 
magnitude  of  the  undertaking  to  which  he  had  committed 
Signifi-       himself.     For  to  all  who  had  eyes  to  see  and  ears  to  hear  he 
this  step,     had  made  it  evident  that  his  purpose  was  nothing  less  than 
the  conquest  of  Gaul. 

^  Colonel  Stoffel  {Guerre  de  Cesar  et  d' Arioviste,  i>p.  67-72)  gives  a  detailed 
description  of  the  battle,  wliicli  is  partly  imaginary,  but  nevertheless  well 
woi-th  reading.  The  imagination  is  totally  different  from  that  of  a  rhetorical 
historian  :  it  is  the  imagination  of  a  soldier,  who  understands  what  he  is 
writing  about ;  and  the  description,  which  recommends  itself  as  substantially 
true,  helps  one  to  realise  what  a  liattle  was  like  in  the  circumstances  of  ancient 
warfare. 

2  So  Napoleon  conjectures  with  probability  {Hist,  de  Jules  Cesar,  ii.  97) :  we 
only  know  for  certain  that  the  winter-quarters  were  in  the  country  of  the 
Sequani  {B.  G.,  i.  54,  §  2).  But  Napoleon's  conjecture  is  supported  by  the 
fact  that  Caesar  had  garrisoned  Vesontio  {lb.,  38,  §  7). 


CHAPTEE  III 

THE    FIEST    CAMPAIGN    AGAINST    THE    BELGAE 

The  results  of  the  campaign  which  Caesar  had  just  concluded  ^'  b.c. 
may  be  summed  up  in  a  single  sentence :  —  he  had  secured,  Results  of 
at  least  for  a  time,  the  virtual  submission  of  central  Gaul ;  campaign, 
and  he  had  paved  the  way  for  the  conquest  by  destroying  or 
expelling  the  barbarian  hordes  who  threatened  to  anticipate 
him. 

But  the  Gauls  were  not  yet  ready  to  bow  their  necks  The  Beigae 
beneath  the  Eoman  yoke.  Caesar's  victories  were  doubtless  a^aSsT 
talked  of  in  every  village  from  the  Ehine  to  the  Atlantic  ;  Caesar. 
and  it  needed  less  than  the  Celtic  quickness  to  perceive  their 
significance.  Before  the  close  of  winter  he  heard  rumours 
that  the  warlike  Beigae  were  conspiring ;  and  these  rumours 
were  confirmed  by  a  despatch  from  Labienus.  The  tribes 
were  binding  each  other,  by  the  interchange  of  hostages,  to 
mutual  fidelity.  They  were  fearful  that  Caesar  would  first 
conquer  the  rest  of  Gaul,  and  then  conquer  them.  Moreover, 
they  were  egged  on  to  fight  by  certain  influential  chiefs  from 
Celtican  Gaul.  The  motives  of  these  counsellors  were  various. 
Some  simply  desired  to  make  their  country  free.  It  was  all 
very  well,  they  argued,  to  have  got  rid  of  the  Germans :  but 
these  new  intruders  were  not  a  w^hit  more  welcome.  If 
Caesar  had  expelled  Ariovistus,  he  was  evidently  determined 
to  take  his  place.  The  legions  had  settled  down  in  the 
country  ;  and  they  intended  to  make  the  country  support 
them.  Others,  merely  because  they  were  Gauls,  longed, 
above  all  things,  for  revolution.  Then  there  were  princely 
adventurers,  who  were  plotting  to  seize  royal  power,  and  who 
foresaw  that,  if  Gaul  became  a  Eoman  province,  they  would 

47 


48 


THE  riEST  CAMPAIGN 


57  B.C. 


Caesar 
returns  to 
Gaul,  and 
marches 
against 
them. 


The  Remi 
submit, 
and  help 
Caesar. 


be  obliged  to  submit  to  law,  and  would  no  longer  be  allowed 
to  hire  troops  for  the  gratification  of  their  ambition. 

On  his  own  responsibility  and  at  his  own  cost,  Caesar 
instantly  raised  two  new  legions  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  and  sent 
them  in  the  early  spring  to  join  Labienus.  As  soon  as  the 
herbage  was  sufficiently  forward  to  make  it  safe  to  take  the 
field,  he  crossed  the  Alps  and  rejoined  his  army  at  Vesontio. 
The  tribes  nearest  to  the  Belgae,  whom  he  charged  with  the 
duty  of  collecting  information,  reported  that  they  were  busily 
raising  and  concentrating  levies.  Having  arranged  for  sup- 
plies of  corn,  Caesar  pushed  on  and,  after  another  fortnight's 
marching,  appeared  on  the  northern  bank  of  the  Marne. 

The  Belgae  were  taken  completely  by  surprise.  Engrossed 
in  their  preparations  against  Caesar,  they  had  never  dreamed 
that  Caesar  might  anticipate  them.  One  tribe,  the  Eemi, 
who  occupied  the  country  round  Eeims,  Laon  and  Chalons, 
were  shrewd  enough  to  perceive  that  his  patronage  would 
strengthen  their  own  position.  They  were  subject  to  the  over- 
lordship  of  their  neighbours,  the  Suessiones,  and  wanted  to 
shake  off  the  yoke.^  Two  of  their  leading  men,  Iccius  and 
Andecumborius,  presented  themselves  in  Caesar's  camp,  and 
not  only  submitted  on  behalf  of  the  tribe,  but  promised  to 
render  him  every  assistance.  Nothing  could  have  been  more 
opportune.  He  saw  that  it  would  be  easy  to  establish  in 
the  heart  of  Belgium  a  power  as  devoted  to  his  interests  as 
the  Aedui  in  central  Gaul.  He  gave  the  envoys  a  gracious 
welcome,  only  stipulating  that  the  Eeman  senate  should 
present  themselves  before  him,  and  that  the  sons  of  the 
leading  men  should  be  delivered  up  as  hostages.  The 
envoys  gave  him  full  information.  The  Belgae,  they  said, 
were  full  of  confidence.  They  boasted  that  the  Cimbri  and 
Teutoni,  who  had  overrun  the  rest  of  Gaul,  had  never  been 
able  to  get  a  footing  in  their  land.  The  Eemi  had  done 
their   utmost   to   prevent   the    Suessiones   from   taking   part 

^  The  Reman  envoys  told  Caesar  [B.  G.,  ii.  3,  §  5)  that  the  Suessiones  and 
the  Remi  formed  one  political  community.  Now  Galba  was  the  king  of  the 
Suessiones  ;  and  therefore,  it  should  seem,  had  been  overlord  of  the  Remi. 
Mommsen  then  is  doubtless  right  in  affirming  that  the  Remi  "discerned  in  this 
invasion  of  the  foreigners  an  opportunity  to  shake  off  the  rule  which  their 
neighbours,  the  Suessiones,  exercised  over  them."     Hist,  of  Rome,  iv.  247. 


OPER.\TIONS  ON  THE  AISNE. 

The  mymbfrs  denote  tKe  heijjhts  in  metres  obin-c  the  If^el  of  the  sea  . 


i.l,.ii.lU..iiulLm  i,  luH.l. 


Ill  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  49 

ill  the   movement,  but   in   vain  :   indeed  their   king,  Galba,  57  b.c. 
had   been   unanimously  elected  commander-in-chief.      Every 
other  tribe  had  joined  the  league ;  and  Galba  was  prepared 
to    put   over    two    hundred    thousand   men   into    the    field. ^ 
Caesar  himself  could  hardly  muster  a  fourth  of  this  number ; 
and   his  enemies  were  the  stoutest  and  the  most  stubborn 
of  all  the  warriors  of  Gaul.      His  only  chance  of   success 
was  to  force  their   huge   host   to   divide.      With   this   aim, 
he    asked    Divitiacus    to    raise    a    levy    of    Aeduans,    and  He  sends 
ravage    the   lands   of  the    Bellovaci,  which   lay  beyond    the  to^rava°e^ 
Oise,  in  the   region   now   dominated   by  the   huge  choir  of  the  lands 
Beauvais.       The  entire   armament    was   now  in    full   march  Bellovaci. 
against   him.      They  were  moving   down  a  road  which   led 
from  La  Eere,  on  the  Oise,  past   Laon  to  Eeims."^     Caesar 
determined  to  choose  his  own  battle-field.      Marching  rapidly  Marches  to 
northward  from  Eeims,  he  crossed  the  Aisne  by  a  bridge  at  l^^^  advan- 
Berry-au-Bac,  and  encamped  on  rising  ground  between  that  cing  host, 
river  and  its  tributary,  the  Miette,  a  small  stream  flowing  Aisne,  and 
through  a  marshy  ooze.      The  camp  was,  as  usual,  quadri-  encamps 

TiGcir  ScrrV" 

lateral,  as  nearly  square  as  the  lie  of  the  ground  allowed.  au-Bac. 
The  rampart,  eight  feet  high,  was  faced  with  sods  and  revetted 
with  timber  and  fascines,  to  keep  its  slope  of  the  requisite 
steepness :  along  the  top  of  it  was  set  a  palisade  of  inter- 
lacing branches ;  ^  and  the  ditch  which  surrounded  it  was 
eighteen  feet  wide  and  ten  feet  deep.*  Caesar's  rear  was  pro- 
tected by  the  Aisne  ;  and  his  supplies  could  be  brought  up  in 
safety  by  the  Kemi.  At  the  northern  end  of  the  bridge  he 
established  a  tete-de-pont ;  and,  to  guard  its  further  ex- 
tremity, he  left  a  detachment  about  two  thousand  strong 
under  one  of  his  generals,  Titurius  Sabinus.      Towards  mid-  The  Beigae 

attack 

night  a  messenger  came  into  camp  with  the  news  that  the  Bibrax. 
Beigae  were  making  a  furious  attack  upon  Bibrax,  or  Yieux- 
Laon,  a  Eeman  stronghold  about  seven  miles  to  the  north- 
west, and  that  Iccius,  who  commanded  the  garrison,  despaired  Caesar 
of  being  able  to  hold  out  unless  he  were  promptly  reinforced,  auxiliaries 
Caesar  instantly  despatched  a  force  of  slingers,  bowmen  and  to  the 
light -armed  auxiliary  infantry  to  the   rescue.       The    Gauls 

1  See  pp.  228-9.  "  See  pp.  644-5.  ^  See  pp.  588-9 

*  Napoleon,  Hist,  cle  Jules  Cesar,  ii.  101,  note. 


rescue. 


To  tojce  pcLQe  4  <? 


operatio:n^s  i 

The  raunbers  denote  ihe  hfxghts  zn 


Loiniou.Maoiiull 


Ill  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  49 

iu  the   movement,  but   iu  vain  :   indeed  their   king,  Galba,  57  b.c. 
had   been   unanimously  elected  commander-in-chief.      Every 
other  tribe  had  joined  the  league ;  and  Galba  was  prepared 
to    put   over    two    hundred    thousand   men   into    the    field. ^ 
Caesar  himself  could  hardly  muster  a  fourth  of  this  number ; 
and   his  enemies  were  the  stoutest  and  the  most  stubborn 
of  all  the  warriors  of  Gaul.      His  only  chance  of   success 
was  to  force  their   huge   host   to   divide.       With   this   aim, 
he    asked    Divitiacus    to    raise    a    levy    of    Aeduans,    and  He  sends 
ravage    the   lands   of  the   Bellovaci,  which   lay  beyond    the  toTava^e^ 
Oise,  in  the   region   now   dominated   by  the   huge  choir  of  the  lands 
Beauvais.       The   entire   armament   was   now  iu   full  march  Bellovaci. 
against   him.      They  were  moving   down  a  road  which   led 
from  La  Fere,  on  the  Oise,  past   Laon  to  Eeims."^     Caesar 
determined  to  choose  his  own  battle-field.      Marching  rapidly  Marches  to 
northward  from  Pteims,  he  crossed  the  Aisne  by  a  bridge  at  tiiradl-an- 
Berry-au-Bac,  and  encamped  on  rising  ground  between  that  dug  host, 
river  and  its  tributary,  the  Miette,  a  small  stream  flowing  Aisne,  and 
through  a  marshy  ooze.      The  camp  was,  as  usual,  quadri-  encamps 
lateral,  as  nearly  square  as  the  lie  of  the  ground  allowed.  au-Bac. 
The  rampart,  eight  feet  high,  was  faced  with  sods  and  revetted 
with  timber  and  fascines,  to  keep  its  slope  of  the  requisite 
steepness :  along  the  top  of  it  was  set  a  palisade  of  inter- 
lacing  branches ;  ^   and  the  ditch  which  surrounded  it  was 
eighteen  feet  wide  and  ten  feet  deep.^      Caesar's  rear  was  pro- 
tected by  the  Aisne ;  and  his  supplies  could  be  brought  up  in 
safety  by  the  Eemi.      At  the  northern  end  of  the  bridge  he 
established   a   tete-de-pont ;    and,   to    guard   its   further   ex- 
tremity, he   left   a  detachment   about   two   thousand  strong 
under  one  of  his  generals,  Titurius  Sabinus.      Towards  mid-  The  Beigae 
night  a  messenger  came  into  camp  with  the  news  that  the  Bibrax. 
Beigae  were  making  a  furious  attack  upon  Bibrax,  or  Yieux- 
Laon,  a  Pieman  stronghold  about  seven  miles  to  the  north- 
west, and  that  Iccius,  who  commanded  the  garrison,  despaired  Caesar 
of  being  able  to  hold  out  unless  he  were  promptly  reinforced,  auxiliaries 
Caesar  instantly  despatched  a  force  of  slingers,  bowmen  and  to  the 
light -armed  auxiliary  infantry  to  the    rescue.       The    Gauls 

1  See  pp.  228-9.  '-  See  pp.  644-5.  ^  See  pp.  5S8-9 

*  Napoleon,  Hist,  de  Jules  Cesar,  ii.  101,  uote. 

E 


50 


THE  FIEST  CAMPAIGN 


encamp 
opposite 
Caesar. 

Caesar 
makes  his 
position 
impreg- 
nable. 


57  B.C.  knew  nothing  of  the  scientific  methods  by  which  the  Eomans 
captured  fortified  towns.  When  their  numbers  were  suffici- 
ently great,  they  used  to  drive  the  defenders  from  the 
rampart  by  showers  of  missiles,  and  then  to  demolish  a 
portion  of  the  wall.  But  Bibrax  was  defended  on  the  south 
by  impregnable  escarpments :  it  would  seem  that  Galba  had 
neglected  to  invest  this  side ;  and  when  Caesar's  light  troops 
appeared,  the  impatient  and  undisciplined  host  abandoned 
their  attempt.^  They  only  lingered  long  enough  to  ravage 
the  lands  and  fire  the   hamlets  within  reach  of  the  town. 

The  Beigae  On  the  following  night  the  sudden  blaze  of  a  line  of  watch- 
fires,  extending  eight  miles  in  length  beyond  the  further  side 
of  the  Miette,  revealed  to  Caesar  their  encampment. 

So  formidable  was  the  appearance  of  the  huge  host,  so 
great  was  their  reputation  as  fighting  men,  that  Caesar  did 
not  care  to  risk  a  battle  until  he  had  seen  enough  to  judge 
whether  he  would  have  a  reasonable  chance  of  success.  A 
few  cavalry  skirmishes  convinced  him  that  he  had  nothing 
to  fear.  The  rising  ground  on  which  the  camp  stood  ex- 
tended in  a  south-westerly  direction  nearly  to  the  confluence 
of  the  Miette  and  the  Aisne.  The  legions  were  protected 
in  front  by  the  Miette :  but  on  their  right  the  vast  numbers 
of  the  enemy  might  outflank  them.  To  prevent  this,  Caesar 
made  his  men  dig  two  trenches,  each  about  three  furlongs 
in  length,  one  southward  to  the  Aisne  from  the  south- 
eastern angle  of  the  camp,  the  other  northward  to  the  j\Iiette 
from  the  north-western;  and  at  the  extremity  of  either 
trench  he  caused  forts  to  be  constructed  and  armed  with 
hallistae  and  catapidts.  Along  the  whole  length  of  the  hill, 
on  the  left  of  the  camp,  he  drew  up  six  of  his  legions  in 
battle  array ;  while  the  other  two  remained  to  guard  the 
camp.  The  enemy's  masses  were  ranged  on  the  further  side 
of  the  Miette.  Each  of  the  two  armies  obstinately  waited 
for  the  other  to  cross.  Meanwhile  Caesar's  cavalry  were 
scattering  the  Belgic  squadrons.  At  length,  tired  of  waiting, 
he  led  his  legions  back  into  camp.  There  was  a  ford  on  the 
Aisne,  about  two  miles  below  the  tetc-de-pont,  which  he  had 
either  failed  to   notice   or  had  not  thought  it  necessary  to 

1  See  p.  229,  n.  1,  and  note  on  Bibuax,  p.  395. 


Ill  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  51 

guard.      Presently    au     orderly    came    from    Sabiuus,    who  57  b.c. 
reported  that  a  body  of  the  enemy  were  moving  down  to 
the   bank    on   his    left,    evidently   intending   to   cross    over, 
attack   his   camp,   and    destroy   the   bridge.      Even   if   they  The  Beigae 
failed,  the  corn-fields  of  the  Eemi  would  be  at  their  mercy  :  c^t^^g*  *° 
the  convoys  would  be  cut  off ;  and  then  the  legions  would  commuui- 
starve.      Taking  his  cavalry,  light-armed  Numidians,  archers  but°  re' 
and  slingers,  Caesar  hurried  down  the  hill,  crossed  the  bridge,  defeated. 
wheeled  to  the  right,  and  pushed  down  the  bank  towards 
the   ford.      There    were    the   enemy,    splashing   through    the 
water.      The  archers   and   slingers   attacked    them,   and   did 
terrible  execution.     The  survivors  clambered  over  the  fallen 
bodies,  and  staggered  on  under  showers  of  stones  and  arrows  : 
but   those    who   succeeded  in  reaching  the  bank  were  sur- 
rounded by  the  cavalry  and  cut  to  pieces.^ 

The  Beigae  were  thoroughly  disheartened.      They  had  no  They 
organised  commissariat ;  and  their  supplies  were  running  out.  ^  '^P'^'"^^" 
Galba  had  not  the  genius  to  control  a  vast  multitude  made 
up  of  hordes    without   discipline,    with  conflicting   interests, 
and  distracted  by  mutual  jealousies.      Caesar's  position  was 
impregnable ;  and  he  evidently  had  no  intention  of  quitting 
it.      His  allies  would  soon  be  swarming  over  the  frontier  of 
the  Bellovaci ;  and  the  chiefs  of  that  tribe  insisted  on  return- 
ing to  defend  their  families.      It  was  decided,  therefore,  that 
each   tribe    should   go   back   to  its    own  country,  and  that, 
whatever  district  the  Romans  might  invade,  all  should  rally 
to  its  defence.      But  this  resolution  was  merely  to  save  their 
self-respect.     In  the  night  the  whole  multitude  poured  out 
of  their  encampment  with  great  uproar  and  confusion,  each 
man   struggling   to   get  in  front  of  his  fellows.      Caesar  at 
first  suspected  that  this  movement  was  merely  a  ruse :  but 
at  daybreak  he  received  positive  information  that  the  enemy  Caesar's 
had  really  gone,  and  immediately  sent  his  cavalry,  supported  pursuT 
by   three   legions,   under   Labienus,   in   pursuit."     The    rear  ^^s"^- 
ranks,  when  they  were  overtaken,  stood  at  bay,  and  resisted 
resolutely :  but   those   in   front,   hearing    the    shouts   of  the 

^  Regarding  Caesar's  operations  on  the  Aisne,  see  pp.  645-52,  and  App.  E. 
"  Caesar  wisely  entrusted  the  command  of  the  cavalry  to  two  of  his  legati, 
one  of  whom,  Cotta,  was  a  soldier  of  the  highest  class. 


52  THE  FIEST  CAMPAIGN  chap. 

57  B.C.  combatants,  made  haste  to  escape.  The  slaughter  was 
instant ;  and  the  pursuers  raced  on.  As  long  as  daylight 
lasted,  they  hung  on  the  rearguard,  slaying,  pursuing  and 
slaying  again  ;  and  at  sunset  they  returned  to  camp.  Caesar 
left  the  disorganised  host  no  time  to  rally.  Next  morning 
He  marches  he  puslicd  OH  wcstward  down  the  valley  of  the  Aisne.  In 
westward,   ^  single  forccd  march  of  some  seven  and  twenty  miles  he 

and  re-  ^  .  ,  •' 

ceives  the  reached  Noviodunum,  near  the  modern  Soissons,  the  chief 
of^he^^^°°  stronghold  of  the  Suessiones,  and  at  once  attempted  an 
Suessiones,  assault :  ^  but  though  the  garrison  was  weak,  the  moat  was 
and"^^*^^  so  wide  and  the  wall  so  high  that  his  troops  were  repulsed. 
Ambiaui.  In  spite  of  their  fatigue,  they  proceeded  to  fortify  their  camp 
and  make  preparations  for  a  siege.  Sappers'  huts  were  con- 
structed for  protecting  the  workers :  earth  and  fascines  were 
shot  into  the  moat ;  and  wooden  towers  were  erected  to  carry 
the  artillery  which  was  to  play  upon  the  defenders  of  the 
wall.  During  the  night  the  contingent  of  the  Suessiones, 
which  had  retreated  from  the  camp  on  the  Miette,  thronged 
into  the  town  and  reinforced  the  garrison :  but  they  were  so 
confounded  by  the  formidable  appearance  of  the  siege  works 
that  they  surrendered  without  striking  a  blow.  Marching 
[Breteuii?p  on  westward,  Caesar  crossed  the  Oise.  Bratuspantium,  the 
chief  town  of  the  Bellovaci,  opened  its  gates  on  his  approach  ; 
and  when  he  drew  near  Samarobriva,  where  now  rises  the 
colossal  pile  of  the  cathedral  of  Amiens,  the  Ambiani  likewise 
tendered  their  submission,  Caesar  treated  the  three  tribes 
with  equal  clemency  and  firmness.  He  punished  no  one  : 
but  he  disarmed  the  garrisons  of  Noviodunum  and  Bratus- 
pantium, and  required  the  surrender  of  hostages  of  noble 
birth.  Divitiacus,  who  had  rejoined  him,  interceded  for  the 
Bellovaci ;  and,  as  his  policy  was  to  strengthen  the  influence 
of  the  Aedui,  he  gave  out  that  it  was  his  regard  for  those 
loyal  allies  which  led  him  to  show  mercy.  But  now  he 
learned  that  his  progress  was  about  to  be  disputed.  On  the 
north-east,  among  the  inhospitable  forests  of  the  Sambre 
and  the  marshes  of  the  Scheldt,  dwelt  a  tribe  whose  primitive 
virtues  had  not  yet  been  enfeebled  by  contact  with  civilisa- 
tion. No  traders  were  suffered  to  cross  their  frontier,  for 
1  See  pp.  473-4,  652-4.  2  See  pp.  396-8. 


To  face  po^e  53 


THE     BATTLE    OF  NEUF-MESNIL. 

77i^  mimhers  deiwte  the  heights  m  melres  ahin-e  the  level  of  the  sea 


*,    ,,.*«^ 


.#11 


^,  Noul-iMosnil 


VicUxMl'SMil 


«S^ 


MAVHKlTfiE  Vv5:?>vl 


'"'  '■!■  ,. 


Scale      1:4-0,000  Roiiuui  :Mi 


Suxiitbi-^a  Georj^Zstuh^ 


Lonaoii.MacmilJaii   ,t  <'u  ,Lt 


Ill  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  53 

fear  the    luxuries    of  which    the    rude    warriors   were   still  57  b.c. 
ignorant  might  sap  their  manhood.      Bitterly  taunting  their  The  Ner\ii 
neighbour    tribes    for    having    so   tamely   surrendered,   they  IH^I^^  ^° 
vowed  that  for  their  part  they  would  accept   no  terms  of 
peace.      This  people,  whom  of  all  his  enemies  Caesar  most 
respected,  and  of   whom  he  wrote  with  one   of  those  rare 
touches  of  enthusiasm  that  here  and  there  relieve  the  severity 
of  his  narrative,  were  the  Nervii. 

A  couple  of  marches  brought  the  legions  to  the  Nervian  Caesar 
frontier.       The  road  led  through  Hainaut,  past  the  site  of^^^j^^.^^ 
the  modern  Cambrai.      Three  days  later  Caesar  gathered  from  them. 
some  rustics,  who  had  been  taken  prisoners,  that  the  warriors 
of  the  tribe  were  encamped  only  nine  miles  off,  on  the  further 
bank  of  the  Sambre,  with  their  allies,  the  Viromandui  and  He  leams 
the  Atrebates  ;  and  that  another  tribe,  the  Aduatuci,  were  ^^^  ^^^^^ 
marching  from  the  east  to  join  them.      He  immediately  sent  allies  are 

.  .  ,       .  ,         ,  .        encamped 

on  a  party  or  centurions  and  pioneers  to  choose  a  camping  ou  the  right 
ground.      It  happened  that  some  of  his  prisoners  had  escaped  bank  of  the 
to  the  enemy  in  the  night.      They  told  them  that  each  of 
the  Eoman  legions  was  separated,  on  the  march,  from  the  one 
that  followed  it  by  a  long  baggage-train ;    and  that,  when 
the   foremost    legion,   encumbered   with   their    heavy  packs, 
reached  the  camping  ground,  it  would  be  easy  to  overwhelm 
them  and  plunder  the  baggage  before  the  others  could  come 
to  the  rescue.     The  centurions  selected  for  the  site  of  the  His 
camp  the  heights  of  Neuf-Mesnil,  which  slope  evenly  and  nlark^out  a 
gently  down  towards  the  left   bank    of  the   Sambre.      The  camp  on 
depth  of  the  river  was  not  more  than  three  feet.     From  the  ofVeuf- 
opposite  bank  an  open  meadow,  over  which  were  scattered  a  Mesnii. 
few   cavalry  piquets,  rose  into  a  hill  covered   with   woods. 
The   space   for   the    camp   was   measured   and   marked    out. 
Meanwhile  the  Eoman  army  was  toiling  up  from  behind,  its 
march  being  delayed  by  thick  hedges,  which  had  to  be  cut 
through.      The  formation  was  different  from  that  which  had 
been  described  to  the  Xervii ;  for  when  close  to  an  enemy, 
Caesar  always  changed  his  order  of  march.      In  front  came 
six  legions  in  column.       Then  followed  the  entire  baggage- 
train,  protected  by  the  two  newly  raised  legions,  which  closed 
the  rear.      The  cavalry,  who  had  gone  on  in  front,  rode  across 


AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  53 


fear  the    luxuries    of  which    the    rude    warriors   were   still  57  b.c. 
ignorant  might  sap  their  manhood.      Bitterly  taunting  their  The  Nervii 

resolv( 

resist. 


neighbour    tribes    for    having    so   tamely   surrendered,    they  ^^^^^^'^  t° 


vowed  that  for  their  part  they  would  accept  no  terms  of 
peace.  This  people,  whom  of  all  his  enemies  Caesar  most 
respected,  and  of  whom  he  wrote  with  one  of  those  rare 
touches  of  enthusiasm  that  here  and  there  relieve  the  severity 
of  his  narrative,  were  the  Nervii. 

A  couple  of  marches  brought  the  legions  to  the  Nervian  Caesar 
frontier.       The  road  led  through  Hainaut,  past  the  site  of^^^j^j,^'^ 
the  modern  Cambrai,      Three  days  later  Caesar  gathered  from  them. 
some  rustics,  who  had  been  taken  prisoners,  that  the  warriors 
of  the  tribe  were  encamped  only  nine  miles  off,  on  the  further 
bank  of  the  Sambre,  with  their  allies,  the  Viromandui  and  He  leams 
the  Atrebates  ;  and  that  another  tribe,  the  Aduatuci,  were  ^^^  t^dx 
marching  from  the  east  to  join  them.      He  immediately  sent  allies  are 

„  .  ,       .  .         ,  .        encampe<l 

on  a  party  or  centurions  and  pioneers  to  choose  a  camping  on  the  right 
ground.      It  happened  that  some  of  his  prisoners  had  escaped  ^^^^^  °*'  ^^^ 
to  the  enemy  in  the  night.      They  told  them  that  each  of 
the  Pioman  legions  was  separated,  on  the  march,  from  the  one 
that  followed  it  by  a  long  baggage-train ;    and  that,  when 
the   foremost    legion,   encumbered   with    their    heavy  packs, 
reached  the  camping  ground,  it  would  be  easy  to  overwhelm 
them  and  plunder  the  baggage  before  the  others  could  come 
to  the  rescue.     The  centurions  selected  for  the  site  of  the  His 
camp  the  heights  of  Neuf-Mesnil,  which  slope  evenly  and  n]°°k^out  a 
gently  down  towards  the  left   bank    of  the   Sambre.       The  camp  on 
depth  of  the  river  was  not  more  than  three  feet.     From  the  of  ^euf- 
opposite  bank  an  open  meadow,  over  which  were  scattered  a  Mesnii. 
few   cavalry  piquets,  rose  into  a  hill  covered   with    woods. 
The   space  for  the    camp   was   measured   and   marked    out. 
Meanwhile  the  Eoman  army  was  toiling  up  from  behind,  its 
march  being  delayed  by  thick  hedges,  which  had  to  be  cut 
through.      The  formation  was  different  from  that  which  had 
been  described  to  the  Nervii ;  for  when  close  to  an  enemy, 
Caesar  always  changed  his  order  of  march.      In  front  came 
six  legions  in  column.       Then  followed  the  entire  baggage- 
train,  protected  by  the  two  newly  raised  legions,  which  closed 
the  rear.      The  cavalry,  who  had  gone  on  in  front,  rode  across 


54  THE  FIEST  CAMPAIGN  chap. 

57  B.C.  the  shallow  stream,  and,  supported  by  archers  and  slingers, 
engaged  the  enemy's  piquets.  The  piquets  fell  back  into  the 
wood,  whither  the  cavalry  dared  not  follow  them ;  and  there 
leisurely  re-forming,  they  charged  again  and  again.  As  the 
infantry  arrived  upon  the  ground,  some  began  to  dig  the  trenches 
for  the  camp,  while  others  scattered  over  the  country  to  cut 
down  wood.  Caesar  neglected  to  take  the  precaution  of  keep- 
ing a  part  of  his  force  under  arms.'^  At  length  the  head  of 
the  baggage-train  appeared.  Ambushed  among  the  trees,  the 
Gauls  caught  sight  of  it.  Suddenly  they  flashed  forth  from 
the  wood  and  came  pouring  down  the  open  ;  their  rush  swept 
away  the  terrified  cavalry ;  now  they  were  across  the  river 
and  racing  up  the  slope ;  and  now  they  fell  upon  the  half- 
formed  line. 
Battle  of  The    confusion   was    overwhelming.       From   the  moment 

Mesnii  whcn  the  onrushing  host  was  seen  there  were  hardly  ten 
minutes  for  preparation.  The  Eomans  flung  aside  their  tools. 
Caesar  had  to  give  all  his  orders  in  a  breath.  The  red  battle- 
ensign  was  quickly  hoisted  over  his  tent.  The  blast  of  the 
trumpet  recalled  the  men  who  were  working  at  the  further 
side  of  the  camp,  while  messengers  ran  to  fetch  those  who 
had  scattered  far  afield.  They  had  not  a  moment  even  to 
cram  on  their  helmets  or  pull  the  coverings  off  their  shields. 
The  generals  were  obliged  to  act  without  waiting  for  orders ; 
and  Caesar  was  glad  that  he  had  forbidden  them  to  leave 
their  respective  legions  while  the  camp  was  being  made. 
He  could  not  direct  them  ;  for  the  hedges  which  crossed  the 
field  obstructed  his  view.  The  nature  of  the  ground  prevented 
them  from  forming  a  regular  line  of  battle :  along  the  brow 
of  the  hill  a  number  of  isolated  combats  were  beginning  at 

■^  As  he  had  done  when  constructing  his  smaller  camp  in  presence  of  the 
hostile  force  of  Ariovistus  {B.  G.,  i.  49).  The  great  Napoleon  blames  him  for 
having  allowed  himself  to  be  surprised.  "  II  est. vrai,"  he  says,  "que  sa  ca Va- 
lerie et  ses  troupes  legeres  avaient  passe  la  Sambre  ;  mais,  du  lieu  ou  il  etait,  il 
s'apercevait  qu'elles  etaient  arretees  h  150  toises  de  lui,  a  la  lisiere  de  la  foret ; 
il  devait  done  ou  tenir  uue  partie  de  ses  troupes  sous  les  amies,  ou  attendre  que 
ses  coureurs  eussent  traverse  la  foret  et  eclaire  le  pays.  II  se  justifia  en  disant 
que  les  bords  de  la  Sambre  etaient  si  escarpes  qu'il  se  croyait  en  surete  dans  la 
l^osition  oil  il  voulait  camper."  Pricis  dcs  guerres  de  Cisar,  1836,  p.  45.  It 
should  be  noted  that  "150  toises"  is  a  mistake ;  the  distance  from  the  Roman 
camp  to  the  edge  of  the  wood  was  about  7  furlongs. 


Ill  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  55 

once ;  and  all  that  could  be  done  was  to  make  each  legion  57  b.c. 
face  its  immediate  assailants.  Disciplined,  and  self-reliant 
from  the  experience  which  they  had  gained,  the  soldiers  in- 
stinctively grasped  the  situation  :  they  did  not  trouble  them- 
selves to  join  their  respective  companies,  but  one  after  another, 
as  they  hastened  up,  they  fell  into  the  ranks  by  the  standards 
nearest  them.  Hurrying  down  at  haphazard  to  cheer  them 
on,  Caesar  found  himself  close  to  the  left  of  the  line. 
There  was  the  10th, — his  favourite  legion.  "Keep  cool, 
men,"  he  cried,  "  and  remember  the  honour  of  the  legion. 
Stand  up  against  that  rush  ! "  He  had  no  time  to  say  more  ; 
for  the  enemy  were  within  a  javelin's  cast,  and,  as  he  hurried 
on,  both  sides  were  engaged. 

Hurling  their  javelins,  the  10th  and,  on  their  left,  the 
9th  fell,  sword  in  hand,  upon  the  Atrebates,  who,  panting 
from  their  headlong  rush,  soon  gave  way.  Hunted  down  the 
slope,  they  plunged  into  the  stream,  but  the  Eomaus  dashed 
after,  sword  in  hand ;  and  when  the  survivors  clambered  up 
the  further  bank  and  tried  to  rally,  fell  upon  them  again 
and  chased  them  up  the  hill.  At  the  same  time  the  11th 
and  8th  drove  the  Yiromandui  from  the  front  of  the  camp 
right  down  to  the  water's  edge.  But  the  very  success  of 
these  four  legions  was  disastrous  to  their  comrades — the 
12th  and  7th — on  the  right.  The  left  and  front  of  the 
camp  were  exposed  ;  and  the  Nervii,  compacted  in  one  mighty 
column,  swarmed  up  the  heights,  and  while  some  outflanked 
the  two  legions  on  their  right,  the  rest  pressed  on  for  the 
defenceless  camp.  The  beaten  cavalry  came  full  upon  them 
and  again  took  to  flight:  the  officers'  servants,  who  had  gone 
out  to  plunder,  looked  back,  and  ran  for  their  lives :  the 
baggage-drivers,  who  were  coming  up,  scattered  in  all  direc- 
tions, shrieking  with  terror ;  and  a  body  of  horse  from  the 
Treveri,  who  formed  part  of  the  auxiliary  force,  rode  off 
homewards  to  announce  Caesar's  defeat. 

Caesar  saw  it  all  as  he  made  his  way  from  the  left  to  the 
right  wing.  The  men  of  the  12th  were  huddled  together  so 
closely  that  they  could  hardly  use  their  swords ;  and  nearly 
every  officer  was  either  killed  or  wounded.  Sextius  Baculus, 
the  chief  centurion  of  the  legion,  was  so  weakened  by  loss  of 


56  THE  FIEST  CAMPAIGN  chap. 

57  B.C.  blood  that  lie  could  no  longer  stand.  From  the  rear  ranks 
men  were  slinking  away  to  escape  the  showers  of  missiles. 
There  were  no  reserves ;  and  the  numbers  of  the  enemy  were 
inexhaustible.  Fresh  swarms  kept  pressing  up  the  hill,  and 
closing  in  on  either  flank.  Seizing  a  shield  from  a  man 
in  the  rearmost  rank,  Caesar  pushed  his  way  through  to  the 
front :  he  called  to  his  centurions  by  name :  he  told  the  men 
to  open  up  their  ranks — so  they  would  be  able  to  use  their 
swords  better — and  charge.  At  the  sound  of  his  voice  their 
spirits  rose ;  and  each  man  of  them  hoped  that  the  General 
would  see  how  bravely  he  could  light.  But  the  7th  also,  on 
their  right,  were  hard  pressed.  Caesar  told  the  tribunes  to 
bring  the  two  legions  gradually  closer  together,  and  form 
them  up  so  as  to  face  the  enemy  on  every  side.^  And  now, 
as  the  men  were  relieved  from  the  dread  of  being  attacked  in 
the  rear,  they  fought  with  renewed  confidence.  The  two 
legions  which  guarded  the  baggage  had  heard  of  the  fight, 
and  were  marching  up  at  their  utmost  speed.  Suddenly 
above  the  ridge  of  Neuf  -  Mesnil  they  appeared ;  and 
presently  the  10th,  despatched  by  Labienus,  recrossed  the 
river,  hurried  up  the  hill  side,  and  threw  themselves  upon 
the  enemy's  rear.  The  effect  of  their  appearance  was  electrical. 
Even  the  wounded  leaned  on  their  shields,  and  plied  their 
swords :  the  scattered  camp-followers  plucked  up  courage  and 
turned  upon  the  enemy ;  while  the  cavalry  did  all  they  could 
to  atone  for  their  flight.  The  Xervii  in  their  turn  were 
hemmed  in.  But  in  their  last  agony  they  made  good  their 
proud  boast.  Man  by  man,  beneath  the  javelin  and  the 
thrust  of  the  short  sword,  their  front  ranks  fell.  Higher 
rose  the  heap  of  prostrate  bodies  ;  and  leaping  on  to  them, 
the  sur^dvors  snatched  up  the  fallen  javelins  and  flung  them 
back,  till  they  too  fell ;  and  all  was  still." 

So  ended  this  wild  fight, — a  soldiers'  battle,  and  withal 
the  battle  of  a  great  man.  Within  an  hour  it  was  over, 
fought  and  wellnigh  lost  and  won.^ 

1  See  p.  824. 

-  See  pp.  654-60.  Caesar's  narrative  {B.  G.,  ii.  27,  §§  3-5,  28,  §§  1-2) 
implies  that  a  few  of  the  Nervian  contingent  escaped  :  but  whether  they  ran 
away  from  the  fighting  line  or  had  not  come  into  action  at  all,  he  does  not  say. 

3  See  p.  660. 


Ill  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  57 

The  power  of  the  Belgae  was  broken.      What  remained  to  57  b.c. 
be  done  was   only  matter  of   detail.      The  old  men  of  the 
Nervian  tribe,  with  the  women  and  children,  had  gathered 
before  the  battle  in  the  midst  of  the  marshes  formed  by  the 
estuary  of  the    Scheldt.      Within  a  few  days  a   deputation 
came  from  them  to  ask  an  audience  of  the  conqueror.      They 
were  shrewd  enough  to  exaggerate  their  losses.^      Their  army, 
they    said,  was    all    but    annihilated.       Only   five    hundred 
fighting  men  remained  out  of  sixty  thousand ;    and  of  six 
hundred  senators  no  more  than  three.      Wishing  to  establish  Caesar 
a  reputation  for  clemency,  Caesar  permitted  the  survivors  to  glj^wvorT 
retain  their  lands  and  even  their  fortified  villages,  and  warned  with  ciem- 
the  neighbouring  tribes  to  refrain  from  molesting  them.      He  ^"°^" 
then  marched  eastward  against  the  Aduatuci.      This  people 
were  different  in  origin  from  the  rest  of  the  Belgae.      Fifty 
years  before,  the  Cimbri  and  Teutoni,  marching  for  the  south, 
had  left  some  of  their  number,  under  the  protection  of  six 
thousand  warriors,  in  Belgic  Gaul,  to  herd    the   cattle  and 
guard   the   booty   which    they   could   not   take    with    them. 
After  the  destruction  of  their  kindred,  these  men  and  their 
descendants   had   continued    to  maintain  themselves  against 
the  enemies  who  surrounded  them :    they  had  achieved,  by 
prolonged  fighting,  a  commanding  position ;    and  they  now 
occupied  the  broad  plain  of  Hesbaye  on  the  northern  bank  of 
the  Meuse.^      On  hearing  of  the  defeat  of  their  allies,  they 
had  returned  home  and  concentrated  in  one  town  of  great 
strength,   situated   on    Mont   Falhize,    opposite    the    modern 
fortress   of  Huy.      The  Meuse,  winding  in   the  shape  of  a 
horse-shoe,  flowed  through  the  meadows  beneath  the  southern 
slopes  of  the  hill ;   and  the  town,  perched  above  its  rocky 
heights,  seemed  inaccessible,  save  by  one   gentle  ascent  on 
the  north-east,  where  a  high  wall  frowned  down  upon  the 
besiegers.      Heavy   stones   and   pointed   beams   were   ranged 
upon  the  wall ;  and  in  front  of  it  was  a  deep  moat.      At  first  He  besieges 
tlie  garrison  made  a  succession  of  sorties:  but  Caesar  threw  }^oj|('Jj";^g 
up  a  rampart  from  one  reach  of  the  river,  round  the  north  Aduatuci. 
of  the  hill,  to  the  other ;  and,  as  was  usual  in  regular  sieges, 

1  See  pp.  169-70  of  the  larger  edition. 
-  In  57  B.C.  they  may  also  have  possessed  lands  on  the  right  bank.  See  pp.  349-52. 


58  THE  FIRST  CAMPAIGN  chap. 

57  B.C.  a  terrace,  composed  of  a  core  of  earth  and  timber,  supported 
by  walls  of  logs  piled  cross-wise,  was  built  up  at  right  angles 
to  the  wall.^  On  this  terrace  was  erected  one  of  the  wooden 
towers  from  the  stories  of  which  archers,  slingers  and 
artillery  used  to  shower  missiles  among  the  defenders  of  a 
besieged  town.  It  was  intended  that,  as  soon  as  the  terrace 
approached  the  wall,  a  battering-ram  should  be  employed  to 
effect  a  breach.  The  garrison,  confident  in  the  strength  of 
their  fortress,  watched  these  "operations  with  ignorant  con- 
tempt. They  despised  the  Eomans  for  their  small  stature, 
and  asked  them  if  they  imagined  that  such  pygmies  as  they 
could  get  a  huge  tower  like  that  on  to  the  wall.  But  the 
laugh  was  soon  turned  against  them.  When  they  saw  the 
tower  actually  moving  on  its  rollers  and  steadily  nearing 
the  wall,  they  fancied  there  must  be  some  supernatural  power 
at  work,  and  in  great  alarm  sent  out  envoys  to  beg  for  terms. 
They  would  surrender,  the  envoys  said  ;  only  they  entreated 
to  be  allowed  to  keep  their  arms,  without  which  they  could 
not  defend  themselves  against  their  neighbours.  Caesar 
They  insisted    on   unconditional   surrender.      He  would   take  care 

that  their  neighbours  did  not  molest  them.  The  chiefs  could 
only  submit ;  and  swords,  spears  and  shields  were  pitched 
down  into  the  moat  until  the  heap  almost  reached  the  top  of 
the  wall.  Towards  sunset  all  the  Eoman  soldiers  who  had 
gone  into  the  town  were  withdrawn,  for  fear  they  might 
commit  any  excesses.  The  garrison  had  kept  about  a  third 
of  their  weapons  in  reserve,  and  had  improvised  rude  shields. 
They  calculated  that  the  Eomans  would  be  off  their  guard, 
and  laid  their  plans  accordingly.  The  contravallation  was 
But  after-  traced  along  rising  ground.  In  the  middle  of  the  night  the 
a  treacher-  Aduatuci  pourcd  out  of  the  gates,  and  advanced  to  attack  it 
ous  attack,  where  the  ascent  was  easiest.  But  Caesar  had  provided 
against  the  chance  of  treachery.  Piles  of  wood,  all  ready 
laid,  were  set  ablaze ;  and,  guided  by  their  light,  the  troops 
came  streaming  from  the  nearest  redoubts.  The  Gauls  fought 
with  the  courage  of  despair :  but  missiles  rained  down  upon 
them  from  the  rampart  and  from  the  towers  which  had  been 

^  The  difficult  questions  relating  to  the  construction  of  the  siege-terrace 
[agger)  are  discussed  on  pp.  594-601.     See  also  pp.  109-10,  113. 


Ill  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  59 

erected  upon  it ;  and  they  were  driven  back  with  heavy  loss  57  b.c. 
into  the  town.  Next  day  the  gates  were  burst  open,  and 
the  Eomans  rushed  in.  Caesar  was  neither  vindictive  nor 
cruel :  but  to  those  who  defied  him,  and  especially  to  those 
who  broke  faith,  he  was  absolutely  ruthless.  Fifty -three  Their  pun- 
thousand  of  the  Aduatuci — all  who  were  found  within  the 
town — were  sold  as  slaves.^ 

The  campaign  was  over.  The  prestige  which  it  had  won 
for  Caesar  was  so  great  that  more  than  one  German  tribe 
sent  envoys  across  the  Ehine  to  offer  submission.  One 
partial  failure  alone  marred  the  general  success.  Amid  the 
clash  of  arms,  Caesar  did  not  forget  the  commercial  advan- 
tages which  his  conquest  might  secure  for  Eome.  On  his  Gaiba's 
way  back  to  Italy,"  he  sent  one  of  his  generals,  Servius  Galba,  in^he^^^^ 
to  open  up  the  road  leading  from  the  Valais  over  the  Great  Vakis. 
St.  Bernard  into  Italy,  which  traders  had  only  been  able  to 
use  hitherto  at  great  risk  and  by  the  payment  of  heavy  tolls. 
The  tribes  with  which  he  had  to  deal  were  the  Nantuates, 
who  occupied  the  Chablais  and  the  southern  bank  of  the 
Ehone  as  far  as  St.  Maurice ;  the  Veragri,  whose  chief  town, 
Octodurus,  stood  upon  the  site  of  Martigny,  near  the  con- 
fluence of  the  Ehone  and  the  Dranse ;  ^  and  the  Seduni, 
whose  name  is  preserved  in  the  modern  Sitten.  Gaiba's  force 
consisted  only  of  the  12th  legion,  which  had  suffered  so  severely 
in  the  battle  with  the  Nervii,  and  a  body  of  cavalry.  Skirt- 
ing the  northern  shore  of  the  Lake  of  Geneva,  the  little 
column  entered  the  broad  valley  of  the  upper  Ehone,  walled 
in  on  right  and  left  by  wooded  mountains.  Having  inflicted 
several  defeats  upon  the  mountaineers,  stormed  several  of 
their  strongholds,  and  compelled  the  chiefs  to  surrender  their 
sons  as  hostages,  he  posted  two  cohorts  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  St.  Maurice,  and  took  up  his  own  quarters  in  Octodurus. 
The  left  bank  of  the  Dranse,  which  then  flowed  in  a  different 
channel,  down  the  middle  of  the  valley,  was  on  his  right ; 
and  his  camp  was  between  Martigny-la-Ville  and  the  more 
southerly  Martigny  Bourg.  Besides  the  two  cohorts  which 
he  had  detached,  he  was  obliged  to  send  out  a  number  of 

^  See  p.  25,  supi-a,  and  note  on  ADUATUCORni  oppidum,  pp.  353-S. 
-  Schneider's  Caesar,  i.  210,  note.  ^  See  jjp.  661-2. 


60  THE  FIEST  CAMPAIGN  chap. 

57  B.C.  small  parties  for  supplies.  The  camp  was  dominated  on 
either  side  by  the  heights  which  border  the  valley  of  the 
Dranse ;  and  the  force  which  remained  was  insufficient  for 
its  protection.  The  mountaineers  resented  the  deprivation 
of  their  children ;  and,  as  Caesar  half  naively  remarked,  they 
believed  that  the  Eomans,  not  content  with  occupying  the 
roads,  intended  to  annex  their  country.  One  morning  Galba 
was  informed  that  the  heights  were  covered  by  armed  men. 
They  were  evidently  determined  to  cut  his  communications, 
and  bar  his  exit  from  the  valley.  The  fortifications  were 
still  unfinished,  and  the  supply  of  corn  was  inadequate ;  for, 
as  the  mountaineers  had  submitted  and  given  hostages,  Galba 
had  never  dreamed  that  he  might  have  to  fight.  A  council 
of  war  was  called.  Some  of  the  officers  urged  Galba  to 
abandon  the  baggage  and  fight  his  way  out :  but  he  resolved, 
with  the  concurrence  of  the  majority,  to  defend  the  camp. 
The  troops  had  only  just  time  to  man  the  rampart  before 
the  enemy  rushed  down  to  the  attack.  They  hurled  stones 
and  darts  from  every  side.  The  Romans  offered  a  vigorous 
resistance ;  and  not  a  missile  which  they  threw  from  their 
commanding  position  missed  its  mark.  But  the  enemy's 
numbers  enabled  them  to  bring  down  fresh  men  as  often  as 
they  were  wanted  ;  while  the  Eomans  had  to  fight  on  without 
relief  For  six  hours  they  fought  at  bay  till  their  stock  of 
missiles  was  nearly  spent,  and  the  enemy  were  beginning  to 
fill  up  the  trench  and  to  break  down  the  rampart.  Just  in 
time,  Sextius  Baculus,  who  had  fought  so  gallantly  on  the 
Sambre,  and  a  tribune  named  Volusenus  ran  to  the  chief, 
and  convinced  him  that  their  only  chance  of  averting  destruc- 
tion was  to  cut  their  way  out.  The  men  were  told  to  stand 
quietly  on  the  defensive  for  a  few  minutes,  and  rest  them- 
selves. Suddenly,  at  a  given  signal,  four  compact  little 
columns  dashed  out  from  all  four  gates,  and  cut  their  way 
through  the  loose  ranks  of  the  astounded  mountaineers. 
There  was  no  time  to  rally.  Discipline  prevailed  over 
numbers ;  and  the  mountaineers  were  driven  with  heavy  loss 
out  of  the  plain,  and  chased  over  the  hills.  But  Octodurus 
was  plainly  untenable ;  and  it  appeared  impossible  to  obtain 
supplies.     Next  day  therefore  Galba  burned  all  the  houses 


ni  AGAINST  THE  BELGAE  61 

in   the   village,  and  returned    to   spend   the  winter   in   the  57  b.c. 
country  of  the  Allobroges. 

The  other  legions  had  already  been  distributed  in  their 
winter -quarters.      One,    under   Publius    Crassus,   the   young 
general  whose  promptitude  had  contributed  so  much  to  the 
defeat  of  Ariovistus,  had  been  sent,  after  the  battle  with  the 
Nervii,  to  receive  the  submission  of  the  maritime  tribes  of  Submission 
Normandy  and   Brittany/      This  legion  and  the   remaining  ^f  Brittauy 
six  were  cantoned  alono;  the  valley  of  the  Loire,  from  Angers  ^^'^'^  ^'^'^• 
to    Orleans,    so   as   to    cut   on    all   communication    between 
northern  and  southern  Gaul. 

In  Italy  the  news  of  Caesar's  victories  was  received  with  Rejoicings 
an  outburst  of  enthusiasm.-  Men  felt  that  he  had  avenged 
the  disaster  of  the  Allia ;  and  even  the  Senate  gave  expres- 
sion to  the  popular  feeling.  After  his  despatches  had  been 
read,  it  was  decided  to  hold  a  thanksgiving  service  of  fifteen 
days, — an  honour  which  no  Eoman  citizen  had  ever  received 
before. 

1  The  Veneti,  Unelli,  Osismi,  Curiosolites,  Esuvii,  Aulerci  and  Redones. 
2  Plutarch,  Caesar,  23. 


CHAPTER    IV 

CAMPAIGNS    AGAINST    THE    MAKITIME    TRIBES    AND    THE 
AQUITANI 


56  B.C.       The  barbarian  invaders  of  Gaul  had  been  destroyed  or  driven 
Delusive     back  :  the  Belgae  had  been  chastised ;  and  many  of  the  other 
of^peaTe.^     States  had  proffered  their  submission.      The  Aedui  and  the 
Eemi  were  still  friendly ;  and  the  countenance  of  Caesar  had 
greatly  increased  their  consequence,  and  therefore  the  influ- 
ence which   they  were   able    to  exert  on  his  behalf.       The 
Gallic   peoples   had  little    consciousness    of  national   unity : 
they  were  familiar  with  the  idea  of  Eoman  dominion ;  and, 
while  Caesar   did   not  interfere  with  their  domestic  affairs, 
they  were  not  prepared  to  make  any  serious  effort  to  throw 
off  a  supremacy  which  as  yet  seemed  little  more  than  nominal. 
So  confident  was  Caesar  in  the  prospect  of  tranquillity  that 
he  set  out  on  a  political  tour  to  Illyricum, — the  most  distant 
quarter  of  his  province.      But  Gaul  was  still  a  long  way  from 
[The  being  subdued.      The  legion  under  Publius  Crassus  had  been 

the  Andes.]  quartered  in  the  northern  part  of  Anjou.  The  most  con- 
siderable of  the  neighbouring  tribes  were  the  Veneti,  who 
dwelt  in  the  storm-beaten  tract  of  western  Brittany  which 
comprises  the  department  of  Morbihan  and  the  southern  part 
of  the  department  of  Finistere.  Like  the  modern  Bretons, 
they  were  the  stoutest  and  the  most  skilful  seamen  in  Gaul : 
they  had  a  numerous  fleet  of  vessels,  clumsy  indeed,  but  of 
extraordinary  size  and  strength ;  and  their  prosperity  de- 
pended upon  the  carrying  trade  with  Britain,  of  which  they 
possessed  the  monopoly.  They,  however,  as  well  as  tlie  more 
distant  tribes  of  Brittany  and  Normandy,  professed  to  submit ; 
and  Crassus  sent  a  number  of  officers  to  arrange  with  them 

62 


CHAP.  IV  THE  MAEITIME  TEIBES  63 

for  a  supply  of  corn.      But  the  chiefs  of  the  Veneti  were  56  b.c. 
beginning  to  repent  of  their  tame  submission.      Besides  their  Rebellion 
natural  impatience  of  foreign  ascendency,  they  had,  we  are  vg^eti 
told,  a  business-like  motive  for  resistance.      They  had  heard,  Curioso- 
it  would  seem,  that  Caesar  was  contemplating  an  invasion  of  Esiivil? 
Britain ;  and  they  were  naturally  determined  to  prevent  him 
from  interfering  with  their  trade.^      Hoping  to  induce  Crassus 
to   restore    their    hostages,    they   detained   as   prisoners    the 
officers  who  had  come  to  them.      With  the  rash  precipitancy 
of  Gauls,  the  tribes  of  Cotes -du-Xord  and    Orne  followed 
their  example :  soon  the  whole  north-western  seaboard  was 
sworn  to  resist  the  encroachments  of  Eome ;  and  an  embassy 
was    sent    to    Crassus,    to    demand    the    restoration    of    the 
hostages. 

Messengers  were  soon  posting  with  despatches  for  Caesar,  Caesar  pre- 
who  was  still  in  Illyricum.  He  had  studied  the  character  ^^J.^i  wa/ 
of  the  Gauls  to  some  purpose ;  and  he  knew  that,  if  they 
soon  lost  heart,  their  blood  was  up  on  the  slightest  stimulus. 
Like  other  peoples,  they  preferred  independence  to  subjection  ; 
and,  above  all  things,  their  restless  spirit  craved  variety.  If 
he  were  to  overlook  the  conduct  of  the  Veneti,  the  other 
tribes  of  Gaul  would  fancy  that  they  might  defy  him  with 
impunity.  The  Belgae  indeed  were  only  half  subdued ;  and 
they  were  said  to  have  solicited  the  support  of  the  Germans. 
Accordingly  Caesar  sent  instructions  to  his  oflicers  to  have  a 
fleet  built  in  the  ports  at  the  mouth  of  the  Loire,  to  raise 
oarsmen  from  the  Province,  and  to  collect  as  many  pilots  and 
seamen  as  they  could. 

Throughout  his  proconsulate  Caesar  was  in  a  position  The  confer- 
different  from  that  of  a  modern  viceroy,  who,  if  his  work  is  ^'^^^'^^ 
almost  beyond  his  strength,  may  securely  concentrate  upon 
it  all  the  power  of  his  mind.  He  was  ever  obliged  to  look 
back  towards  Eome,  to  look  forward  to  the  uncertain  but 
stormy  future,  when  he  would  have  to  struggle  for  political 
supremacy  ;  and  whenever  an  enemy  attempted  to  weaken  his 
position,  he  was  obliged  to  parry  the  blow.  Cicero  manifested 
an  inclination  to  oppose  him ;  and  he  had  reason  to  fear  that 
I'ompey  would  join  Cicero.      His  term  of  office  would  expire 

1  Strabo,  Geogr.,  iv.  4,  §  1. 


64  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

56  B.C.  in  about  two  years,  on  the  1st  of  March,  54  B.C.  If  he  were 
recalled  then,  his  work  in  Gaul  would  be  left  unfinished ;  and 
he  would  go  back,  too  soon, — to  chaos  or  civil  war.  From 
Illyricum  he  had  returned  to  Eavenna,  where  his  associate, 
Crassus,  met  him.  Hearing  of  Cicero's  measures,  he  moved 
southward,  about  the  middle  of  April,  to  Luca,  and  invited 
Pompey  to  come  thither  as  his  guest.  At  this  little  town 
the  fortunes  of  the  world  were  decided.  Caesar  offered  terms 
of  such  startling  liberality  that  an  agreement  was  come  to  at 
once.  It  was  arranged  that  his  term  of  office  should  be  pro- 
longed for  another  five  years,  and  that  Pompey  and  Crassus 
should  exert  their  influence  with  the  Senate  to  secure  to  him 
the  right  of  increasing  his  legions  to  ten,  and  of  charging  the 
state-chest  with  the  pay  of  those  which  he  had  raised  on  his 
own  responsibility.^ 
Caesar  From  Luca  he  hastened  to  join  his  army,  and  took  up  his 

to'^Gaiil  quarters  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Nantes.  His  first  step 
was  to  distribute  the  legions  more  widely.  Labienus  was 
[The  terri-  scnt  to  the  couutry  round  Treves,  to  keep  an  eye  upon  the 
tory  of  the  ggigg^g  ^^^(^^  ^q  prevent  the  Germans  from  crossing  the  IJhine. 
[The  Lexo-  Sabinus  was  directed  to  disperse  the  allies  of  the  Veneti  in 
vii,  Uneih   Calvados,  the  Cotentin  and  Cotes  -  du  -  Nord ;   while  Crassus 

and  Curio-  .        .  -r     •  ti     i        i 

soiites.]  marched  for  Aquitania.  It  is  most  unlikely  that  the  Aqui- 
tanians  would  have  taken  up  arms  on  behalf  of  their  alien 
neighbours ;  but  Caesar  may  not  have  been  aware  of  the 
want  of  sympathy  between  the  two  peoples ;  and,  with  or 
without  provocation,  he  would  of  course  have  compelled  the 
former  as  well  as  the  latter  to  acknowledge  the  supremacy  of 

Prepara-     Rome.     The  Veneti  and  their  allies,  who  saw  that  they  had 

tions  of  the  .  •         i        i  i  n  • 

Veueti.  irretrievably  committed  themselves,  were  equally  active. 
They  provisioned  their  fortresses,  assembled  their  ships  in 
the  Venetian  ports,  and  even  sent  across  the  Channel  to  ask 
for  help.  They  knew  the  strength  of  their  country,  and  had 
little  doubt  of  success.  The  coast  of  Morbihan  was  pierced 
by  long  estuaries  and  broken  by  numerous  inlets,  which 
would    greatly   hinder    the    progress   of   an   invading   army. 

'  Cicero,  Ad  Fam.,  i.  7,  §  10,  9,  §§  9-10  ;  Ad  Quintum  fratrem,  ii.  6,  §  2  ; 
Suetonius,  Divus  lulius,  24;  Appian,  B.  C,  ii.  17;  Plutarch,  Crassus,  14, 
Caesar,  21,  Povipeiiis,  51.  See  also  Strachan- Davidson's  Cicero,  1894,  pp. 
260-70. 


IV        MARITIME  TRIBES  AND  THE  AQUITANI     65 

Little  corn  was  grown  in  those  parts  ;  and  the  granaries  had  56  b.c. 
been  emptied  to  supply  the  forts.  Want  of  food  therefore 
must  soon  force  the  Romans  to  beat  a  retreat ;  and,  if  the 
worst  came  to  the  worst,  those  born  sailors  knew  that  they 
could  take  to  the  stout  ships  which  had  weathered  so  many 
storms  ;  while  the  frail  Roman  vessels  would  be  sure  to  run 
aground  among  the  shoals,  or  to  founder  in  the  tempestuous 
seas  that  buffeted  the  rock-bound  shore. 

The  Roman  fleet,  which  included   ships  impressed  from  The  Roman 
the   maritime   tribes  ^   between   the  Loire  and  the  G-aronne,  weather- 
was  soon  assembled,  under  Decimus  Brutus,  in  the  estuary  of ''ouii<i,iii 
the  Loire :  but  the  weather  was  too  stormy  for  it  to  put  to 
sea.      Meanwhile  Caesar  crossed  the  river  Vilaine  and  entered 
the  Morbihan,  hoping,  by  the  time  the  gales  moderated,  to 
get  possession  of  the  enemy's  strongholds.      This,  however,  as  Caesar's 
he  soon  found,  was  a  work  of  extreme  difhculty.      The  forts  campaign 
were  situated  at  the  ends  of  spits  or  promontories,  connected  against  the 

.  .  .  Veneti. 

with  the  mainland  by  shoals,  which,  at  high  tide,  were  com- 
pletely submerged.  Caesar  constructed  dykes  across  the 
shoals,  along  which  the  troops  marched  to  attack  the  town. 
Before  they  could  deliver  the  assault,  however,  the  garrison 
took  to  their  ships,  and  sailed  away  to  the  nearest  fort.  The 
greater  part  of  the  summer  was  frittered  away  in  these 
tedious  sieges ;  and  Caesar  was  obliged  to  confess  that  all  his 
labour  had  been  expended  in  vain.  Accordingly  he  resolved 
to  wait  for  his  fleet,  and  encamped  on  the  heights  of  St. 
Gildas,  south  of  Quiberon  Bay.  Hard  by,  in  the  river 
Auray,  which  discharges  itself  into  the  bay,  the  whole 
Venetian  armada  was  assembled."^ 

At  length   the  wind   moderated ;   and    one    morning   the  Sea-fight 
long-looked-for  fleet  was  descried  in  the  offing.      Forthwith,  tiLTeneti 
gliding   out   from    the   mouth   of    the    Auray,   appeared   the  audBmtus. 
hostile  squadron,  numbering  two  hundred   and  twenty  sail. 
They  stood  out  of  the  water  like  floating  castles.      The  great 
sails  were  made,  not  of  canvas  but  of  leather,  to  withstand 
the  force  of  the  Atlantic  gales.      Clustering  on  the  cliffs,  the 
legionaries  had  a  good  view  of  the  two  fleets  as  they  ap- 
proached one  another.      Brutus  and  his  officers  were  at  their 

^  The  Pictones  and  Santones.  2  gee  pp.  663-74. 

F 


66 


CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE 


56  B.C.  wits'  ends  to  know  what  to  do.  The  rams  of  the  light 
galleys  would  fail  to  make  any  impression  on  those  huge 
hulls.  The  deck -turrets  were  run  up:  but  even  then  the 
Eomans  were  overtopped  by  the  lofty  poops,  and  could  not 
throw  their  javelins  with  effect.  But  the  Eoman  engineers 
had  prepared  an  ingenious  contrivance.  Two  or  more  galleys 
rowed  up  close  to  one  of  the  enemies'  ships.  Then,  with 
sharp  hooks  fixed  to  the  ends  of  long  poles,  the  Eomans 
caught  hold  of  the  halyards,  and  pulled  them  taut :  the 
rowers  plied  their  oars  with  might  and  main ;  and  the  sudden 
strain  snapped  the  ropes.  Down  fell  the  yards :  the  troops 
clambered  on  to  the  helpless  hulk ;  and  the  struggle  was 
soon  ended  by  the  short  sword.  When  several  ships  had 
been  thus  captured,  the  rest  prepared  to  escape.  But  they 
had  hardly  been  put  before  the  wind  when  there  was  a  dead 
calm ;  and,  as  they  had  no  oars,  they  could  not  stir.  The 
swift  little  galleys  ran  in  and  out  among  them,  and  captured 
them  one  after  another.  When  the  evening  breeze  sprang 
up,  a  few  slipped  away  in  the  dusk,  and  ran  for  the  shore : 
but  all  the  rest  were  taken.^ 

Punish-  This  battle  decided  the  war.      All  the  chiefs  and  all  the 

Veneti  ^  ^  warriors  of  western  Brittany  had  taken  part  in  it.  They 
had  no  reserves.  They  had  staked  everything  upon  a  single 
throw,  and  had  lost.  Deprived  of  their  ships,  the  survivors 
had  no  means  of  defending  their  forts.  There  was  nothing 
for  them  therefore  but  unconditional  surrender.  They  had 
made  a  very  gallant  fight  for  freedom ;  and  Caesar  respected 
a  brave  enemy :  but  he  always  took  the  straightest  path  to 
gain  his  end.  He  determined  to  teach  the  whole  Gallic 
people,  by  a  terrible  lesson,  that  it  was  dangerous  to  rebel. 
As  the  Venetian  senate  were  responsible  for  the  outrage 
which  had  led  to  the  war,  every  man  of  them  was  put  to 
death ;  and  all  the  rest  of  the  tribe,  or  all  that  could  be 
caught,  were  sold  into  slavery. 

Campaign         About  the  Same   time   despatches  arrived  from  Sabinus. 

ot  Sabiuus  jj^g   allies   of   the   Veneti,    commanded    by   a   chief  named 

against  the       ...  . 

northern     Viridovix,  had  mustered  in  the  peninsula  of  the  Cotentin. 
Veneti  ^  ^  ^^^  tribes  of  Calvados  and  Eure,  in  their  feverish  eagerness 

1  See  pp.  205-6. 


IV       MAKITIME  TEIBES  AND  THE  AQUITANI      67 

for  war,  had  massacred  their  senators,  simply  because  they  5(5  b.c. 
couDselled  peace.  Bandits  and  desperadoes  from  every  part 
of  Gaul  flocked  to  join  the  host.  Sabinus  encamped  on  a 
hill;  and,  having  a  wholesome  respect  for  their  numbers,  he 
could  not  be  provoked  to  come  out  and  fight.  The  enemy 
put  him  down  as  a  coward,  and  his  own  men  grumbled  at 
his  inaction.  But  he  was  simply  biding  his  time.  He 
bribed  a  Gaul  belonging  to  his  auxiliary  corps  to  go  over  to 
the  enemy,  in  the  guise  of  a  deserter,  and  tell  them  that 
Caesar  was  in  great  straits,  and  that  he  himself  was  on  the 
point  of  going  to  his  assistance.  The  man  had  a  ready  wit 
and  a  glib  tongue,  and  played  his  part  well.  The  Gauls 
eagerly  swallowed  the  tale,  and  clamoured  to  be  led  to  the 
attack.  Their  commissariat  had,  as  usual,  been  neglected ; 
and  they  were  impatient  to  finish  the  campaign  at  a  blow. 
Viridovix  and  his  brother  chiefs  were  obliged  to  let  them 

O 

have  their  way.  Their  plan  was  to  fall  upon  the  Romans 
before  they  had  time  to  man  the  ramparts.  The  ascent 
from  the  plain  to  the  camp  was  about  a  mile.  The  Gauls 
ran  up  the  slope  at  the  top  of  their  speed,  each  man  carrying 
an  armful  of  brushwood  to  fill  up  the  trench.  But  Sabinus 
was  ready  for  them.  Sallying  from  the  right  and  the  left 
gate,-^  the  disciplined  cohorts  fell  upon  the  flanks  of  the 
panting  multitude,  and  sent  them  flying.  The  cavalry 
allowed  few  to  escape.  No  second  blow  was  needed.  The 
league  fell  to  pieces  at  once.  As  inconstant  as  they  had 
been  impetuous,  the  tribes  abandoned  the  struggle,  and  laid 
down  tlieir  arms. 

Meanwhile    Crassus    was    carrying    all    before    him    in  Brilliant 
Aquitania.      Unlike   Galba,   he    took   the   greatest   pains    to  of  ^rasfus 
ensure   the   regular  delivery  of  supplies.      Caesar  had  only  in  Aqui- 
been  able  to  spare  him  twelve  cohorts,  or  about  five  thousand  '^"''^" 
men :    but   he   had   a   powerful   body  of   cavalry  and   some 
auxiliaries ;  and  he  summoned  a  number  of  brave  provincials  [Toulouse, 
from  Tolosa,  Carcaso  and  Narbo  to  join  him.      He  defeated  and^N."""'^ 
the  Sotiates  near  the  source  of  the  Ciron,  and  captured  their  bonne.] 
stronghold,  the  site  of  which  is  now  occupied  by  the  town 
of  Sos.      Thence  he  penetrated  into  the  basin  of  the  Adour. 
^  See  Long's  Caesar,  p.  176,  note. 


68  CAMPAIGNS  AGAINST  THE  chap. 

56  B.C.  The  Aquitanians,  in  great  alarm,  obtained  reinforcements 
from  their  kinsmen,  the  Iberians  of  the  Pyrenees.  The 
leaders  who  were  chosen  had  learned  the  art  of  war  under 
the  famous  Sertorius,  and  their  operations  showed  some 
degree  of  skill.  They  carefully  selected  a  position  for  their 
encampment,  and  fortified  it  in  the  orthodox  fashion.  They 
sent  out  detachments  to  block  the  roads.  Eelying  on  their 
numbers,  which  were  daily  augmented,  they  hoped  to  gain  a 
bloodless  victory  by  cutting  off  the  invader's  supplies,  and 
harassiufT  his  rear  as  soon  as  he  should  be  obliged  to  retreat. 
But  Crassus  had  no  intention  of  retreating.  He  could  not 
spare  a  man  to  secure  his  supplies,  but  he  knew  that  sheer 
audacity  will  often  work  wonders.  His  men  were  in  great 
heart,  emboldened  by  the  enemy's  inaction,  and  confident  in 
their  young  leader.  Having  offered  battle  in  vain,  he  boldly 
assaulted  the  enemy's  camp.  They  resisted  stoutly,  and 
threw  their  javelins  from  the  high  rampart  with  great  effect : 
but  they  had  neglected  to  secure  the  rear  gate;  and  some 
fresh  cohorts  managed  to  get  round  by  a  circuitous  way, 
break  down  the  feeble  defences,  and  steal  in  unobserved 
while  the  battle  was  raging  at  the  opposite  end.  The 
imprisoned  Aquitanians  and  Spaniards  rushed  pell-mell  out 
of  the  entrenchment,  and  made  a  desperate  effort  to  escape  : 
but  the  country  was  one  vast  open  plain ;  and  they  were 
ridden  down  and  slaughtered  in  thousands.  Forthwith  all 
except  the  remoter  tribes  tendered  their  submission,  and 
voluntarily  sent  hostages. 
Fruitless  The    conquest    of    the    maritime    peoples   was    all    but 

campaign  complete.  The  Morini  and  the  Menapii,  two  Belgic  tribes 
against  the  who  had  formed  an  alliance  with  the  Veneti,  alone  refused 
°'^'"^'  to  submit.  Their  country,  which  extended  from  the  neigh- 
bourhood of  Staples  to  the  lower  Ehine,  comprised  the 
northern  parts  of  the  Pas  de  Calais  and  of  Nord,  Planders, 
Zeeland  and  North  Brabant.  Caesar  had  over  four  hundred 
miles  to  march,  and  the  summer  was  nearly  at  an  end :  but 
he  felt  confident  that  he  would  be  able  to  subdue  the  re- 
calcitrant tribes  in  one  brief  campaign.  He  traversed 
Brittany  and  Normandy,  joining  Sabinus  on  the  way ; 
crossed  the  Seine  and  the  Somme ;  and  then  pushed  north- 


IV       MAEITIME  TEIBES  AND  THE  AQUITANI     69 

ward   through   Artois.       Taught   by   the   sad   experience    of56B.c. 

their  impetuous  countrymen  to  avoid  a  pitched  battle,  the 

Morini  sought  refuge,  on   the   approach  of  the   legions,    in 

their  vast  forests.       'V\Tiile  the    legionaries    were   fortifying 

their  camp,  the  enemy,  who  had  not  yet  been  seen,  suddenly 

dashed  out  of  the  woods  and  attacked  them ;  and  although  ,3^^^/it.o^w?  1 

they  were  beaten  off  with  heavy  loss,  a  few  Romans,  who 

chased  them  too  far,  were  cut  off  and  killed.      This  mishap 

made  the  legionaries  more  careful.      They  spent  some  days 

in  cutting  down  the  trees,  piling  them  up  on  both  flanks, 

as  they  advanced,  to  guard  against  surprise.      The  enemy's 

cattle  and  part  of  their  baggage  fell  into  their  hands.      But 

now  the  wind  blew  and  the  rain  fell  with  such  violence  that 

the   work  of  felling   the   trees   had   to   be    suspended :    the 

troops   could    no   longer   live  safely   in    tents ;    and   it  was 

necessary  to  abandon  the  campaign.      The  cultivated  lands 

of  the  Morini  were  harried  and  their  hamlets  burned ;  and 

the  legions    returned    to    winter    in    the    newly    conquered 

districts  between  the  Seine  and  the  Loire. 


CHAPTEE    V 

THE    MASSACRE    OF    THE    USIPETES    AND    TENCTERI 

55  B.C.       GrAUL  was  now,  to  all  appearance,  conquered.     Throughout 
The  Usi-     tjjese    three    years    the    central    tribes,    influenced     by    the 

petes  and  "^  ♦' 

Tencteri  example  of  the  Aedui,  distracted  by  intestine  rivalries,  awed 
Gauf'  by  the  genius  of  the  Eoman  Governor,  had  remained  simply 
passive.  But  it  was  not  enough  merely  to  conquer :  the 
conquest  had  also  to  be  secured  against  foreign  invasion.  A 
fresh  incursion  of  hungry  Germans  was  imminent.  The 
defeat  of  Ariovistus  had  struck  terror  into  the  Teutonic 
races  :  but  it  had  not  stilled  the  inward  throes  by  which  they 
had  so  long  been  convulsed.  The  Suevi  had  swept  before 
them  the  lesser  tribes  of  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri :  a  land 
to  dwell  in  and  food  to  eat  the  fugitives  must  needs  obtain ; 
and  now,  after  three  years'  wandering,  a  vast  horde  of 
emigrants  appeared  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Emmerich,  on 
the  right  bank  of  the  lower  Ehine.^  The  Menapii  occupied 
lands  on  both  banks  of  the  river.  Those  who  dwelt  on  the 
right  bank,  terrified  by  the  appearance  of  the  huge  host, 
hurriedly  abandoned  their  huts,  crossed  to  the  western  side, 
and,  joining  their  kinsmen,  prepared  to  dispute  the  passage. 
Baffled  in  their  attempts  to  cross,  the  Germans  made  a 
feigned  retreat,  which  lasted  three  days :  then  marched 
rapidly  back ;  surprised  and  massacred  the  Menapii,  who  had 
returned ;  seized  their  boats  and  crossed  over  ;  and  for  the 
rest  of  the  winter  lived  at  free  quarters  in  the  Menapian 
territory  on  the  west  of  the  Ehine. 

The  news  reached  Caesar  in  Cisalpine  Gaul,  while  he  was 
discharging  the  civil  duties  of  his  government.      He  knew  the 

1  See  pp.  678-9. 
70 


CHAP,  y  MASSACEE  OF  THE  USIPETES  71 

character  of  the  Gauls, — the  frivolity  and  craving  for  excite-  55  b.c. 
ment  that  impelled  them  to  rush  blindly  into  new  connexions  Caesar 
without  counting  the  cost.      There  was  indeed  no  reason  why  ^^^^  ^^\^^ 
they  should  trouble  themselves  to  repel  one  invader  for  the  Gallic 
benefit  of  another.      But  the  chances  were  that  some  of  the  jqIq  Item. 
tribes    might    be    impelled    by    jealousy   of   their   rivals   or 
hostihty  to  the  Eomans  to  welcome  the  new-comers.     Deter- 
mined to  prevent  such  a  coalition  or  crush  it  in  the  making, 
Caesar  returned  to  Gaul  earher  than  usual,  and  proceeded  to  He  returns 
join  the  legions,  which  had  concentrated  at  some  point  near  ^^^  l'^^^_ 
the  lower  Seine,  probably  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Evreux.  mons  a 
His  apprehensions  were  justified.      Certain  tribes  had  entered  council. 
into  negotiations  with  the  Germans  ;  and  they  had  by  this 
time  moved  as  far  southward  as  the  territories  of  the  Eburones 
and    the   Condrusi.      The  former   included    portions    of   the 
provinces   of  Limbourg  and  Liege  :    the  Condrusi  inhabited 
the  district  of  Condroz,  between  the  Meuse  and  the  Ourthe. 
Caesar  summoned  the  Gallic  chiefs,  including  those  who  had 
committed  themselves,  to  a  council ;  and,  pretending  to  be 
ignorant  of  the  negotiations,  told  them  that  he  was  going  to 
make  war  upon  the  common  enemy,  and  called  upon  them 
to  furnish  their  regular  contingents  of  cavalry.      When  the 
contingents    arrived,   he   made   a   selection  from  the    whole 
number,  and,  having  provided  for  the  delivery  of  his  supplies, 
marched  towards  the  distant  country  in  which  he  heard  that  He  marches 
the  Germans  were  encamped.      It  is  impossible  to  say  where  '^^l^^^  -^^ 
he  crossed  the  Meuse,  or  what  route  he  followed  afterwards :  and 
but  the  general  trend  of  his  march  was  towards  the  neigh-    ^^^^^^^  > 
bourhood  of  Coblenz.     Apparently  the  Germans  were  in  no 
aggressive  mood.     Tired  of  their  enforced  wanderings,  they 
only  wanted  to  settle  down  peaceably  in  some  fertile  part  of 
Gaul.      When  Caesar  was  still  some  days'  march  from  their  and  nego- 
encampment,  their  envoys  met  him.        The  Germans,  they  J^^^  ^^ 
said,  had  no  desire  to  fight :  but,  if  Caesar  attacked  them,  Qnvoys. 
they  would  not  flinch.     All  they  asked  was  that  he  should 
assign  them  lands,  or  at  all  events  leave  them  to  enjoy  those 
which  their  swords  had  won.    They  acknowledged  no  superiors 
but  the   Suevi ;  and  against  the  Suevi  the  gods  themselves 
could  not  contend.     Caesar  replied  that  he  could  make  no 


72  THE  MASSACEE  OF  THE  chap. 

65  B.C.  terms  with  them  while  they  remained  in  Gaul.  People  who 
could  not  defend  their  own  country  had  no  right  to  en- 
croach upon  others :  besides,  there  were  no  lands  to  spare  in 
Gaul  sufficiently  extensive  to  support  so  vast  a  multitude. 
They  were  welcome,  however,  if  they  cared  to  recross  the 
Ehine,  to  settle  in  the  country  of  the  Ubii,  who  had  just  put 
themselves  under  the  protection  of  Kome.  The  territory  of 
this  people — the  only  German  tribe  which  had  definitely 
submitted  to  Caesar — extended  from  the  neighbourhood  of 
Coblenz  to  the  neighbourhood  of  Bonn.  The  envoys  said 
that  they  would  refer  Caesar's  proposal  to  their  principals,  and 
return  with  an  answer  in  three  days.  Till  then  they  hoped 
that  he  would  advance  no  further.  This  request  he  rejected ; 
for  he  felt  sure  that  it  was  simply  a  pretext  to  gain  time  for 
the  German  cavalry,  who  had  crossed  the  Meuse  in  quest  of 
corn  and  plunder,  to  return. 

Marching  on  steadily,  he  was  only  eleven  miles  from  the 
German  headquarters  when  the  envoys  returned.  Again 
they  begged  him  to  halt ;  and  again  he  refused.  They  then 
asked  for  three  days'  grace,  to  arrange  terms  with  the  Ubii. 
What  they  really  wanted,  as  Caesar  saw,  was  to  gain  more 
time.  He  meant  to  do  the  same.  He  promised,  however, 
not  to  advance  that  day  beyond  a  river,  four  miles  distant, 
where  he  intended  to  water  ;  and  told  them  to  come  back  again 
on  the  morrow,  that  he  might  decide  on  their  request,  and  to 
bring  with  them  as  many  of  their  leaders  as  could  come. 
What  he  desired  was  to  get  those  leaders  into  his  power,  so 
that  their  formidable  host  might  be  helpless  in  his  hands.-^ 
Perhaps  he  knew  that  his  offer  to  settle  the  Germans  in  the 
country  of  the  Ubii  was  impracticable  :  perhaps  indeed  he 
had  only  made  that  offer  in  order  to  gain  time,  and  to  put 
the  Germans  off  their  guard  :  certainly  he  believed  that  they 
were  trying  to  outwit  him,  and  he  was  determined  to  outwit 
them, — determined,  by  hook  or  by  crook,  to  secure  the 
essential  object  of  ridding  himself  and  Gaul  of  these  danger- 
ous immigrants,  and  to  secure  it  at  the  least  possible  cost  to 
his  own  army.  Meanwhile,  at  the  urgent  entreaty  of  the 
envoys,  he  sent  orders  to  his  Gallic  cavalry,  who  had  gone 

1  See  p.  191. 


V  USIPETES  AND  TENCTEEI  73 

on  in  advance,  to  refrain  from   ];)rovoking  a  combat.      The  55  b.c. 
envoys  took  their  leave.      The  cavalry,  five  thousand  strong, 
were  riding  quietly  along,  on  the  faith  of  the  truce,  when, 
without  a  moment's  warning,  a  band  of  horsemen  swept  down,  Their 
and  scattered  them  right  and  left.     As  they  tried  to  rally,  the  vioiat?on'of 
enemy  leaped  to  the  ground,  and  stabbed  their  horses  in  the  » truce, 
belly.     An  Aquitanian  noble,  named  Piso,  did  his  best  to  save 
the  credit  of  the  Gallic  cavalry,  hazarding  his  life  to  rescue 
his   brother,   and   when   he   was   unhorsed,   fighting   against 
desperate  odds  till  he  fell.     His  brother,  who  had  escaped, 
would  not  survive  him,  and  galloped  back  into  the  press  to 
die.      But  their  example  was  wasted.      The  Gauls  were  six  to 
one :  but  they  were  thoroughly  unnerved ;  and,  while  many 
lay  dead,  the  rest  galloped  away,  and  never  drew  rein  till 
they  came  within  sight  of  the  Roman  column. 

Caesar  made  up  his  mind.      Those  Germans  were  treacher-  He  resolves 
ous  savages;  and  he  saw  no  reason  why  he  should  make  any  *°^  J|**^^ ' 
terms  with   them.      Besides,  this   paltry   triumph   they  had  once : 
stolen  would  make  them  heroes  to  the  feather-pated  Gauls. 
To  hold  his  hand  until  they  were  reinforced  would  be  sheer 
madness.      Next   morning   the    German    chiefs    came  to   his 
camp, — to  apologise,  as  they  said,  for  the  unauthorised  attack 
by  their  cavalry.      Caesar  was  delighted.     He  determined  to 
end  the  business  by  a  single  blow,  bloodlessly, — for  his  own 
men.       He    refused  to    hear   what    the   chiefs    had   to    say.  arrests 
Believing,  or  professing  to  believe,  that  they  only  wanted  to  Vho'^had  "' 
cajole    him    into    granting    an   extension    of   the    truce,   he  come,  os- 
ordered  them  to  be  put  under  arrest,  and  then  marched  on  expTain  ■  ° 
rapidly  against  the  Germans.     They  were  taking  their  ease 
among  their  waggons,  with  their  wives  and  children,  when 
the  legions  appeared.      Confounded   by  the  sight,  not  know-  and  virtu- 
ing  what  had  become  of  their  leaders,  they  lost  all  presence  fjjiltes  tiae 
of  mind,  and  crying   aloud  in  their  terror,  ran  hither  and  host. 
thither  about  the  camp.      The  infuriated  Eomans  burst  in. 
The   few   Germans  who   were  quick   enough    to   seize   their 
weapons,  clustered  behind  the  waggons  and  tried  to  resist : 
but,   distracted   by   piercing    shrieks,    they   turned   and   saw 
their  wives  and  children  flying  before  the  Eoman  cavalry ; 
and  flinging  aside  their  arms,  they  rushed  pell-mell  to  over- 


74  THE  MASSACRE  OF  THE  chap. 

55  B.C.        take    them.       Many    were    slain    in    the    pursuit.       Others 

scattered   over   the   country   and   escaped.       At   length   the 

panting  remnant  reached  the  confluence  of  the  Moselle  and 

the  Ehine.^     Worn  out  and  desperate,  they  plunged  in ;  and 

the  swift  current  swept  them  away. 

His  con-  The  conduct  of  Caesar  was  fiercely  condemned  by  Cato 

demned  in  ^^^^  Others  in  the  Eoman  Senate.     The  refusal  to  listen  to 

the  Senate,  the    explanation    of    the    German    chiefs ;    their    detention, 

contrary,  as  it  appeared,  to  the  law  of  nations ;  and  then  the 

virtual   extermination    of   an    entire    people, — these    things 

perhaps  shocked  sensitive  consciences,  and  certainly  gave  a 

handle  to  political  opponents.      Cato  actually  proposed  that 

the  perfidious  Governor  should  be  given  up  to  the  Germans." 

Caesar   pursued   his  course  unmoved.     The  sacrifice  of  life 

was  appalling :  but  it  was  made  once  for  all.      Thoroughly 

cowed,   the    Germans    thenceforward   ceased   to    disturb   the 

tranquillity  of  Gaul. 

He  bridges  But  Cacsar  determined  to  make  assurance  doubly  sure. 

puncher'  ^^  ^^^^  Germans  thought  so  little  of  crossing  the  Ehine,  he 

the  would  cross  it  too,  and  teach  them  that  invaders  might  in 

and  returns  their  tum  be  liable  to  invasion.      Besides,  it  was  necessary 

to  Gaul,      to  chastise  the    Sugambri,  the   northern   neighbours   of   the 

Ubii,  in   whose   country  the   cavalry   of    the   Usipetes    and 

Tencteri  had  just  found  a  ready  welcome.      When  he  sent 

to  demand  their  surrender,  the  Sugambrian  chiefs  asked  with 

what  face  he,  who   complained   so  loudly  of  the  Germans' 

crossing  the  Ehine,  could  claim  the  right  to  dictate  to  the 

Germans  in  their  own  country.      The   Ubii,   on   the    other 

hand,  besought   him   to   come   and    help   them    against   the 

Suevi :  his  prestige,  they  said,  was  so  great  that  the  mere 

appearance  of  his  army  would  be  enough  to  secure  them  from 

attack ;    and  they  would  gladly  undertake  to  find  boats  to 

cross  the  stream.      But  Caesar  did  not  think  it  safe  to  trust 

to  boats ;   and  he  intended  to  make  the  passage  in  a  way 

that  would  produce  a  greater  moral  effect.      Broad,  deep  and 

swift  as  the  river  was,  he  would  throw  a  bridge  across  it,  to 

teach  the  Germans  what  Eoman  science  could  effect.     He 

1  See  pp.  680-91. 
■^  Plutarch,  Caesar,  22  ;  Suetonius,  Divus  lulius,  24. 


V  USIPETES  AND  TENCTEEI  75 

selected  for  the  spot  a  site  between  Coblenz  and  Andernach,  55  b.c. 
which  was  opposite  the  territory  of  the  Ubii.^  The  Eomau 
engineers  were  accustomed  to  bridge  rivers  :  but  this  was  an 
undertaking  of  unprecedented  difficulty.  But  Caesar  had 
inspired  every  man  with  faith  in  his  star ;  and  all  ranks 
worked  with  extraordinary  energy.  Within  ten  days  from 
the  time  when  the  first  tree  was  felled,  the  great  river  was 
spanned  by  a  firm  bridge  of  piles,  buttressed  to  withstand 
the  force  of  the  flood ;  -  and  the  legions  were  encamped  on 
the  German  bank.  Leaving  a  strong  guard  at  either  end, 
Caesar  marched  northward  against  the  Sugambri,  Their 
country  extended  eastward  of  Crefeld,  Dusseldorf  and  Cologne. 
Envoys  from  various  tribes  met  Caesar  on  the  way,  and 
solicited  his  friendship.  He  answered  them  courteously, 
and  directed  them  to  bring  hostages  to  his  camp.  The 
Sugambri,  on  the  advice  of  the  Usipetes  and  Tencteri,  had 
taken  refuge  in  the  outlying  forests ;  and,  after  burning 
their  villages  and  cutting  their  corn,  Caesar  returned  to  the 
country  of  the  Ubii.  The  Suevi  had  sent  their  wives  and 
children  into  the  secure  recesses  of  the  vast  forest  of  central 
Germany,  and  were  banded  together  somewhere  in  the  heart 
of  their  country,  ready  for  battle.  But  Caesar  had  neither 
the  force  nor  the  inclination  to  undertake  the  conquest  of 
Germany.  Having  accomplished  every  object  for  which  he 
had  entered  the  country — punished  his  enemies,  reassured 
his  friends,  and  made  the  name  of  Eome  respected — he 
crossed  the  Ehine  and  destroyed  his  bridge. 

1  See  pp.  694-7.  The  accuracy  of  the  statement  in  the  text  has  been  con- 
firmed by  the  recent  discovery  of  a  Roman  camp  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine 
near  Neuwied,  the  identity  of  which  witli  the  camp  constructed  by  Caesar 
after  his  second  passage  of  the  Rhine  in  53  B.C.  (p.  95,  infra)  seems  morally 
certain.     See  Bonner  Jahrhucher,  Heft  104,  1899,  pp.  1-55. 

2  See  pp.  697-709. 


CHAPTEK    VI 


THE    DISASTER    AT    ADUATUCA    AND    ITS    RESULTS 


55-54  B.C. 

Caesar's 
invasions 
of  Britain. 


Intrigues 
of  Dum- 
norix. 


Caesar's  attention  was  now  diverted  for  a  time  from  the 
affairs  of  Gaul.  During  the  few  weeks  of  summer  that  fol- 
lowed his  passage  of  the  Ehine  and  the  latter  part  of  the 
ensuing  season  he  made  his  two  famous  expeditions  to  Britain. 
He  went  to  Illyricum  in  the  intervening  winter,  and  did  not 
return  to  Gaul  until  the  close  of  the  following  May.  Quintus 
Cicero,  a  younger  brother  of  the  orator,  joined  him  on  the 
road,  and  took  up  the  post  of  a  legatus.  Caesar  often  found 
time  to  write  to  the  elder  Cicero,  and  even  to  read  his  verses. 
The  correspondence  shows  us  what  manner  of  men  Caesar 
had  to  entertain  in  his  army  when  friends  or  political  asso- 
ciates asked  favours  of  him.  Cicero  begged  him  to  give  a 
place  of  some  sort  to  a  lawyer  named  Trebatius ;  and  Caesar, 
who  knew  how  to  render  such  appointments  innocuous,  good- 
naturedly  consented  in  a  letter,  the  kindliness  and  the  humour 
of  which  are  reflected  in  one  which  Cicero  wrote  to  Trebatius 
himself^ 

Caesar's  avowed  objects  in  invading  Britain  were  to  inform 
himself  about  the  island  and  its  inhabitants,  and  to  punish 
the  southern  tribes,  who  had  helped  their  kinsmen  in  Gaul 
to  resist  him.  On  each  occasion  he  left  behind  a  force 
sufficient  to  keep  open  his  communications  and  to  overawe 
intending  rebels  ;  and  on  the  second  expedition  he  took  with 
him  all  the  chiefs  whom  he  had  the  slightest  reason  to  sus- 
pect. The  one  of  all  others  whom  he  had  been  most  careful 
to  summon  was  the  notorious  Dumnorix,  who  was  as  popular 
with  the  masses  and  as  determined  an  enemy  of  IJome  as 

1  Cicero,  E-p.  ad  Fam.,  vii.  5-6,  8,  10,  18  ;  ad  Quint,  fratr.,  ii.  13  (15  a). 


CHAP.  VI        THE  DISASTEE  AT  ADUATUCA  77 

when  he  had  been  detected  in  his  intrigues  with  the  Helvetii.  54  b.c. 
Quite  recently  he  had  caused  great  alarm  and  indignation  to 
the  Aeduan  council  by  giving  out  that  Caesar  intended  to 
make  him  king.^  Nothing  could  have  provoked  Caesar  more  ; 
for  the  success  of  his  policy  depended  largely  upon  his  keeping 
the  Aeduan  government  in  good  humour.  Dumnorix  was 
most  reluctant  to  leave  the  country.  He  doubtless  saw  that 
he  might  never  again  have  such  an  opportunity  as  Caesar's 
absence  afforded  of  furthering  his  schemes  ;  and  he  begged 
for  leave  to  stay  behind.  He  was  terrified,  he  said,  at  the 
prospect  of  crossing  the  sea :  besides,  he  had  religious  duties, 
which  he  could  not  fulfil  unless  he  remained  iu  Gaul."  Caesar 
was  of  course  deaf  to  his  entreaties  and  his  pretended  scruples. 
Dumnorix  then  tried  to  induce  his  brother  chiefs  to  join  him 
in  refusing  to  go.  He  assured  them  that  Caesar  was  only 
taking  them  to  Britain  that  he  might  put  them  all  to  death. 
Caesar  kept  himself  informed  of  his  intrigues,  and  did  his 
best  to  prevent  him  from  rushing  on  his  doom.  All  this 
time  the  fleet  was  weatlier-bound  iu  the  Portus  Itius — the 
harbour  of  Boulogne — which,  in  those  days,  was  a  spacious 
estuary,  sheltered  by  the  far-reaching  promontory  of  Alpreck.^ 
At  length  the  wind  shifted ;  and  Dumnorix  took  advantage 
of  the  confusion  that  attended  the  embarkation  to  ride  off 
with  the  Aeduan  cavalry.  Instantly  stopping  the  embarka- 
tion, Caesar  sent  a  strong  body  of  horse  in  pursuit  with 
orders  to  kill  him  at  once  if  he  attempted  to  resist.  He  His  fate. 
fought  desperately  for  life  and  liberty :  but  the  troopers 
failed  to  support  him  ;  and  he  fell,  passionately  asserting 
with  his  dying  breath  the  independence  of  his  tribe. 

The  death  of  this  resolute  adventurer  was  a  temporary  The  Gallic 
relief  to  the   Eoman    Governor :  but  it  probably   helped   to  ^ajjigrTs^ 
kindle   into    a   flame   the   discontent   which   had   long    been  niood. 
smouldering   in   the    breasts    of  the    Gauls.      Doubtless   the 
Aedui  were  glad  enough  to  be  rid  of  the  Helvetii :  doubtless 

1  Various  writers  have  suggested  that  Caesar  really  had  made  the  offer  to 
Dumnorix,  in  order  to  purchase  his  support.  It  seems  to  me  more  likely 
that,  as  Schneider  conjectures  {Caesar,  ii.  26),  Dumnorix  had  made  the 
statement  in  question  in  order  to  exasperate  the  Aedui  against  Caesar. 

2  See  Schneider's  Caesar,  ii.  27. 
^  See  App.  F. 


78  THE  DISASTEE  AT  ADUATUCA  chap. 

54  B.C.  Others  besides  the  Aedui  rejoiced  at  the  overthrow  of  Ario- 
vistus.  But  it  was  not  to  be  expected  that  they  should  feel 
any  gratitude  to  Caesar.  Individuals  like  Divitiacus,  tribes 
like  the  Eemi,  had  of  course  gained  something  by  his  friend- 
ship. But  Gaul,  as  a  whole,  had  so  far  gained  nothing. 
Kot  only  were  the  constant  presence  of  the  legions  and  the 
endless  requisitions  of  corn  an  intolerable  burden,  but  to  the 
high-spirited  Celtic  knights  the  fact  of  subjection  was  more 
galling  still.  They  had  indeed  partly  themselves  to  blame. 
Weakness  of  purpose,  mutual  jealousy,  petty  ambition  had 
been  their  bane.  Tliey  had  not  realised,  or  had  not  valued 
their  national  unity  enough  to  make  a  united  effort  for  its 
preservation.  The  Nervii  indeed  had  fought  like  heroes : 
but  the  bulk  of  the  Belgae  had  been  too  selfish,  too  faint- 
hearted, too  distrustful  of  each  other,  above  all,  too  feebly 
organised  to  support  them.  The  Veneti  had  made  a  gallant 
resistance :  but  the  enthusiasm  of  their  allies  had  vanished 
at  the  first  reverse.  The  states  of  the  interior  had  acquiesced 
in  the  domination  of  Caesar,  without  a  blow,  nay  even  with- 
out a  protest.  It  would,  of  course,  be  unjust  to  ignore  the 
difficulties  with  which  they  had  to  contend.  If  Caesar  was 
justified  in  the  severity  with  which  he  criticised  the  infirmi- 
ties of  their  national  character,  it  would  have  been  unreason- 
able to  expect  from  a  medley  of  tribes,  which  had  hardly  had 
time  to  outgrow  their  political  infancy,  the  harmonious  action 
which  could  only  have  been  the  fruit  of  ages  of  discipline. 
They  were  heavily  weighted  by  the  selfishness  or  the  astute- 
ness, call  it  which  one  will,  of  the  Aedui  and  the  Eemi. 
Above  all,  no  leader  had  appeared  whose  personality  was 
sufficiently  commanding  to  rally  the  patriots  of  every  state 
round  his  standard.  But,  whatever  the  cause  may  have  been, 
the  chiefs  were  now  in  a  dangerous  mood ;  and  the  people 
were   ready  to  back  them.     Caesar   was  perfectly  aware  of 

Distribu-     their   temper.      The   harvest  in  Gaul    this  season  was   verv 

tion  of  the  itiii-  i-  ^      " 

legions  for  scauty ;  and   he   was   obliged  thereiore  on    his   return   from 

^f*fi4-^^^^  Britain,  in  order  to  ensure  an  adequate  supply  of  grain,  to 

distribute  his  legions  for  the  winter  over  a  wide  extent  of 

territory.      As  the   Belgic  states   appeared   to   be   the  most 

restless,  their  country  was  selected  for  the  occupation.      One 


VI  AND  ITS  RESULTS  79 

legion,  under  Gains  Fabius,  was  quartered  among  the  Morini,  54  b.c. 
who  had  recently  submitted  to  Labienus :  another,  under 
Quintus  Cicero,  among  the  Nervii,  in  the  neighbourhood  of 
iSTamur :  a  third,  under  Labienus,  on  the  Ourthe,  or  perhaps 
the  ]\Ieuse,  near  the  western  frontier  of  the  Treveri.  Three, 
under  Trebonius,  Crassus  and  Plancus  respectively,  were 
stationed  close  together  at  Saraarobriva  and  in  the  plain  [Amiens.] 
round  Beauvais.  One,  consisting  entirely  of  recruits,^  with 
five  veteran  cohorts,  was  sent  to  Aduatuca,  in  the  country  of 
the  Eburones.  The  site  of  this  famous  camp  has  never  been 
identified  :  but  it  was  certainly  east  of  the  Meuse,  and  not 
far  from  Aix-la-Chapelle.^  The  garrison  was  commanded  by 
Sabinus  and  Aurunculeius  Cotta,  the  former  of  whom,  as 
the  senior  officer,  had  the  superior  authority.^  One  legion 
only,  under  Koscius,  was  sent  outside  Belgic  territory  to  the 
country  of  the  Esuvii,  in  Orne.  Caesar  fixed  his  headquarters 
at  Samarobriva.  In  view  of  the  prevailing  discontent,  he 
determined  not  to  leave  Gaul  for  the  winter  until  the  various 
camps  were  fortified. 

About  this  time  an  incident  occurred  which  Caesar  may  Divide  et 
have  regarded  as  a  sign  of  a  coming  storm.      His  motto  was  ^"'^^^'""" 
Divide  ct  impera.      The  Aedui  and  the  Eemi  had  both  been 
faithful  to  him  ;  and  with  the  object  of  strengthening  their 
influence  and  thereby  diminishing  the  chances  of  revolt,  he 
had   always   treated   them    with    distinction.      Moreover,   he 
had  elevated  chiefs  who  had  done  him  service  to  the  thrones 
of  their  ancestors  in  states  where  monarchy  had  been  over- 
thrown by  oligarchy ;  his  object  doubtless  being  not  only  to 
put  a  premium  upon  loyalty,  but  also  to  use  the  loyal  as 
instruments    for   keeping   the   anti- Roman    party   in   check.  Assassma- 
One  of  his  nominees,  Tasgetius,  had,  for  three  years,  been  xiL*^* 
king   of  the  Carnutes,  a  tribe  which  dwelt  in  the  country  Tasgetius, 
round   Orleans  and  Chartres.      How  he  used  his  power,  we  nomhiee 
are  not  told  :  but  soon  after  Caesar's  return  from  Britain  he  ^y  the 
was  assassinated.      Caesar   instantly   sent   Plancus  with   his 
legion,  to  arrest  all  who  were  concerned  in  the  deed,  and  to 
terrorise  intending  rebels. 

1  See  p.  717,  u.  2.  -  See  jip.  335-47. 

3  See  p.  709. 


80  THE  DISASTER  AT  ADUATUCA  chap. 

54  B.C.  All  this  time  one  chief  in  particular,  whose  pride  Caesar 

Intrigues  had  humbled,  was  busily  intriguing  against  him.  In  the 
marus  "  Spring  of  every  year  he  convened  a  diet  of  the  Gallic  chieftains, 
against  partly,  it  should  seem,  to  test  their  temper,  partly  to  fix  the 
strength  of  the  cavalry  contingents  which  their  respective 
tribes  were  to  provide.  Since  the  battle  with  the  Nervii, 
the  Treveri,  whose  cavalry  had  witnessed  the  desperate 
struggle  of  his  legions,  had  refused  to  send  their  representa- 
tives ;  and  it  was  said  that  they  were  intriguing  with  the 
Germans.  Just  before  the  second  expedition  to  Britain, 
Caesar  entered  their  country  at  the  head  of  a  strong  force 
with  the  view  of  re-establishing  his  authority.  Two  chiefs, 
Cingetorix  and  Indutiomarus,  were  struggling  for  supremacy. 
Cingetorix  at  once  presented  himself  before  Caesar,  promised 
fidelity  to  Eome,  and  gave  full  information  of  what  was  going 
on  in  the  country.  Indutiomarus  collected  levies,  and  pre- 
pared to  fight.  Many  of  the  leading  men,  however,,  influenced 
by  Cingetorix  and  appreciating  the  power  of  the  legions, 
came  into  Caesar's  camp  and  made  terms  for  themselves. 
Indutiomarus  soon  found  that  he  had  miscalculated  his 
strength,  and  hastened  to  excuse  himself.  Caesar,  who  had 
no  time  to  spare,  contented  hhnself  with  taking  hostages  for 
his  good  behaviour.  At  the  same  time  he  of  course  did 
everything  to  strengthen  the  influence  of  his  supporter ;  and 
Indutiomarus  smarted  under  the  feehng  that  his  credit  with 
his  countrymen  was  gone.  It  is  probable  that  during  Caesar's 
absence  he  was  concocting  schemes  of  revenge.  The  isolation 
of  the  various  camps  gave  him  his  opportunity.  A  few  days 
after  the  legions  had  taken  up  their  quarters  he  instigated 
Ambiorix  and  Catuvolcus,  each  of  whom  ruled  one  half  of 
the  country  of  the  Eburones,  to  attack  the  camp  of  Sabinus 
and  Cotta.  Caesar  was  about  two  hundred  miles  away :  the 
nearest  camp,  that  of  Cicero,  at  least  forty-five  miles :  at 
Aduatuca  there  were  barely  six  thousand  legionaries,  all  told, 
and  two -thirds  of  them  were  recruits.  Success  seemed 
certain.  Ambiorix  and  Catuvolcus,  who  had  only  just  taken 
their  quota  of  corn  to  the  generals,  mustered  their  tribesmen 
in  great  force,  surprised  and  overpowered  %  fatigue  party, 
who  were  engaged  in  felling  wood  outside  the  camp,  and  then 


VI  AND  ITS  EESULTS  81 

made  a  sudden  onslaught   upon    the  camp  itself.      But   the54B.c. 
camp  was  strongly  fortified,  and  stood  upon  rising  ground  of  The 
great  natural   strength.      The   troops    promptly  manned   the  uu^er"^^' 
rampart :   a   squadron   of  Spanish    horse   made   a  successful  Aminorix, 
sally ;   and   the    assailants  fell  back  in  discomfiture.      Their  f^tiie 
leaders  shouted  out  that  they  would  like  some  one  to  come  attack  on 

iiiT  -11  the  camp 

and  talk  over  matters,  so  that  all  disputes  might   be  peace-  of  Sabiuus 
ably   settled.      Two   deputies    accordingly  were   sent   out   to  ^■^^^  ^'^*^^- 
hear  what  they  had  to  say.      Three  years  before,  Caesar  had 
relieved  Ambiorix  from  the  burden  of  paying  tribute  to  the 
Aduatuci,  and  had  restored  to  him  his  son  and  nephew,  whom 
they  had  detained  as  hostages.      Ambiorix  began  by  speaking  Ambiorix 
of  Caesar's  kindness,  and  said  that  he  was  most  anxious  to  sabinus  to 
prove  his  gratitude.      He  protested  that  he  had  not  attacked  'ivithdiaw 
the  camp  of  his  own  free  will,  but  simply  because  he  could  the  nearer 
not  resist  the  pressure  put  upon  him  by  his  tribesmen.      ISTor  camps. 
would  they  have  stirred  if  they  had  not  been  forced  to  join 
in  the  national  movement.      His  very  weakness  proved  that 
he  was  speaking  the  truth.      He  was  not  such  a  fool  as  to 
imagine  that  his  feeble  levies  could  stand  against  the  Eomans. 
But   tlie   leading  powers   of  Gaul  were   banded  together  to 
recover  their  independence  ;  and  on  that  very  day  all  the 
Eoman  camps  were  to  be  simultaneously  attacked.      He  most 
earnestly  entreated  Sabinus  to   be  on  his  guard.     A  host  of 
Germans  had  crossed  the  Ehine,  and  would  be  upon  him  in  a 
couple  of  days.      If  the  two  generals  would  take  his  advice, 
they  would  abandon  their  camp  at  once,  and  make  the  best 
of  their  way  to  the  quarters  of  Cicero  or  of  Labienus.     He 
would  pledge   his   word  that   they   should  not  be  molested 
on    the    way.       He    would    not    merely    be    making    some 
return   for    Caesar's   kindness :    it    was    to    the    interest    of 
his   people   to   be  relieved   from    the  burden    of    supplying 
the  camp. 

The  deputies  returned  to  camp,  and  reported  what  they  The  advice 
had  heard.      Sabinus  and  Cotta  were  inclined  to  think  that,  fj|!J'^J,^f^^.ji 
whether  Ambiorix  were  sincere  or  not  in  his  professions  of  of  war. 
friendship,  his  warning  was  not  to  be  despised.      One  thing 
was  certain : — a«  single  petty  tribe  like  the  Eburoues  would 
never  have  dared  to  pit  itself  against  the  power  of  Eome 

G 


82  THE  DISASTEK  AT  ADUATUCA  chap. 

54  B.C.  unless  it  had  been  strongly  supported.  The  tribunes  and 
centurions  of  the  first  rank  -^  were  summoned  to  attend  a 
council  of  war.  It  took  place  in  the  middle  of  the  camp, 
in  full  view  of  the  soldiers.  Cotta  spoke  first.  He  argued 
that,  without  Caesar's  express  command,  they  had  no  right 
to  leave  the  camp.  Behind  its  defences  they  could  defy  any 
force  that  could  be  brought  against  them.  Had  they  not 
already  beaten  off  the  enemy,  and  inflicted  heavy  loss  upon 
them  into  the  bargain  ?  They  were  not  pressed  for  supplies  ; 
and  doubtless  they  would  soon  be  relieved.  Anyhow, 
nothing  could  be  more  unsoldierlike,  more  puerile,  than  to 
take  a  step  fraught  with  the  gravest  issues,  by  the  advice  of 
an  enemy. 

Most  of  the  officers  warmly  supported  this  view.  But 
Sabinus  was  only  irritated  by  their  unanimity.  Speaking 
loudly  and  passionately,  he  insisted  that  it  was  not  a  question 
of  being  guided  by  the  advice  of  an  enemy,  but  by  hard  facts. 
Caesar  had  doubtless  gone  back  to  Italy,  or  the  Eburones 
would  never  have  attacked  them  :  so  they  need  not  expect 
help  from  him.  The  Ehine  was  close  by.  Both  Germans 
and  Gauls  had  many  an  old  score  to  wipe  out ;  and  they 
were  naturally  burning  for  revenge.  The  course  which  he 
recommended  was  safe  either  way.  If  the  %vhole  thing 
turned  out  to  be  a  false  alarm,  then  they  risked  nothing  by 
going  to  the  nearest  camp.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  Gauls  and 
Germans  were  really  leagued  against  them,  their  one  chance 
of  safety  was  to  retreat  at  once.  To  follow  Cotta's  advice 
would  involve,  at  the  best,  the  miseries  of  famine  and 
blockade. 

The  dispute  waxed  warm.  In  spite  of  all  that  Sabinus 
could  say,  Cotta  and  the  centurions  remained  inflexible. 
Sabinus  rapidly  lost  all  patience.  Eaising  his  voice  so  that 
the  men  might  hear,  "  Have  your  own  way,"  he  shouted, 
"  have  your  own  way  !  Death  has  no  terrors  for  me  !  These 
men  wiU  judge  between  us,  and,  if  anything  happens,  they'll 
call  you  to  account  for  it.  If  you  would  only  let  tliem,  they 
could  reach  the  nearest  camp  the  day  after  to-morrow,  and 
join   hands  with    their  comrades."     The   generals  stood   up. 

1  See  pp.  571-83. 


VI  AND  ITS  RESULTS  83 

Their  friends  crowded  round  them,  took  them  by  the  hand,  54  b.c. 
and  entreated  them  not  to  quarrel.      Go  or  stay,  all  would  be 
well  if  only  they  could  agree.      The  strife  of  words  was  pro- 
longed till  midnight.     At  length,  overborne  by  the  authority  in  spite  of 
of  his    senior,  Cotta  gave   up   his   point.       All   ranks   were  of^coTto  ^^^ 
warned  that  they  would  have  to  quit  the  camp  at  dawn.      The  Sabinus 
soldiers  spent  the  small  hours  in  looking  over  their  belong-  ^^baiidon  '^ 
ings  to  see  w^hat  they  could  carry  away,  and  told  each  other  tte  camp. 
that,  after  all,  Sabinus  was  in  the  right.      "  They  thought," 
wrote  Caesar,  "  of  every  argument   to   persuade  themselves 
that  they   could   not  remain   without   danger,   and  that  the 
danger  would  be  increased  by  their  fatigue  and  their  long 
spells  of  night  duty."  -^      The  drivers  had  enough  to  do  in 
loading  their  cattle.      Everybody  was  too  agitated  to  think 
of  sleep. 

Meanwhile  Ambiorix  and  his  followers,  hearing  the  hum 
of  voices  in  the  camp,  concluded  that  the  Romans  had  deter- 
mined to  follow  their  advice.  Whether  Sabinus  intended  to 
make  for  the  camp  of  Labienus  or  for  that  of  Cicero,  the  first 
stage  of  his  route  would  be  the  same.^  Ambiorix  prepared 
to  execute  his  plan. 

Just  as  day  was  breaking,  the  Romans  marched  out  of  The 
camp,  in  an  extended  column  encumbered  by  a  heavy  baggage-  n^^^if ^^ 
train.      It  seemed  as  if  Sabinus  had  implicit  confidence  in  the 
good  faith  of  Ambiorix ;   for  he  could  not  have  adopted  a 
more  dangerous  formation.      He  had  decided  to  make  for  the 
camp  of  Cicero.^     After  marching  about  two  miles,  the  head 
of  the  column  plunged  into  a  defile  shut  in  between  wooded 
hills.      Company  after  company  tramped  after.      The  last  was  They  are 
just  entering  the  valley  when,  rushing  from  the  woods,  the  ^""^unded 
Gauls  threw  themselves  upon  the  vanguard  :    the  rear  was  Eburones ; 
hustled  forward :  before,  behind,  to  right,  to  left,  everywhere 
the   enemy's   masses  were   pouring  down.      Sabinus  hurried 
about  from  place  to  place,  and  feebly  attempted  to  make  his 
dispositions.     Cool  and  collected,  Cotta  did  his  best  to  rally  the 
men ;  and,  as  the  length  of  the  column  made  it  unmanage- 
able, he  agreed  with  his  colleague  to  abandon  the  basa'ase, 

1  B.  G.,  V.  31,  §  5,     See  p.  710. 
2  See  p.  347.  ^  See  pp.  336-7. 


84  THE  DISASTEE  AT  ADUATUCA  chap- 

54  B.C.  and  form  in  a  hollow  square.^  It  was  perhaps  the  only 
course  to  adopt :  yet  the  result  was  that  the  Eomans  lost 
heart,  and  the  enemy  were  emboldened ;  for  both  knew  that 
such  an  expedient  could  only  have  been  resorted  to  by  leaders 
who  despaired.  Eough  soldiers  were  actually  weeping :  con- 
fusion was  worse  confounded ;  and  many  contrived  to  slip 
away,  and  ran  to  save  their  valuables  in  the  baggage-train 
while  there  was  yet  time.  The  Gauls  on  the  other  hand 
showed  extraordinary  steadiness ;  for  their  leaders  told  them 
they  had  only  to  win  the  battle,  and  they  should  have 
plunder  to  their  hearts'  content.  Still  the  square  remained 
unbroken.  Now  and  again  a  cohort  dashed  out ;  and  beneath 
their  short  swords  many  of  the  Gauls  sank  down.  Ambiorix 
ordered  his  men  to  fall  back  some  paces,  and  hurl  their 
missiles  from  a  safe  distance.  He  reminded  them  that  they 
were  in  good  training,  and  with  their  light  equipment  could 
easily  keep  out  of  harm's  way.  If  the  Eomans  charged  them, 
they  were  to  retreat :  when  the  Eomans  attempted  to  return 
to  the  square,  they  were  to  pursue.  Maddened  by  the  volleys 
they  were  powerless  to  return — for  they  had  no  slingers  and 
no  archers — one  cohort  and  then  another  charged.  Back 
darted  the  nimble  Gauls.  The  right  flank  of  the  Eomans 
was  exposed,  and  missiles  rained  in  on  their  unshielded  bodies. 
The  moment  the  baffled  cohort  retired,  the  enemy  swarmed 
all  round  it ;  and  then  followed  a  swift  butchery.  The  rest 
stood  shoulder  to  shoulder  in  the  square :  but  now  their 
courage  was  of  no  avail :  the  enemy  would  not  come  to  close 
quarters ;  and  stones  and  arrows  made  havoc  in  the  dense 
ranks.  Yet,  facing  such  fearful  odds,  after  seven  hours' 
fighting,  they  still  held  out ;  and,  as  Caesar  put  it,  throughout 
that  trying  time  they  did  nothing  unworthy  of  themselves. 
Quintus  Lucanius,  a  centurion  whom  Caesar  singled  out  for 
special  mention,  was  killed  in  attempting  to  rescue  his 
own  son.  Cotta  himself  was  struck  in  the  face  as  he  was 
cheering  on  the  men.  The  sun  was  sinking.  The  battle 
could  only  end  in  one  way ;  and  Sabinus,  catching  sight  of 
Ambiorix  as  he  was  moving  about  in  the  enemy's  ranks,  sent 
his  interpreter  to  ask  for  quarter.      Ambiorix   replied    that 

^  The  term  "  square"  is  used  loosely.     See  note  on  Orhis,  pp.  712-13. 


VI  AND  ITS  EESULTS  85 

Sabinus  might  come  and  speak  to  him  if  he  liked :  he  would  54  b.c. 
answer  for  his  personal  safety ;  and  he  hoped  his  men  might 
be  prevailed  upon  to  be  merciful.  Sabinus  asked  Cotta  to 
go  with  him :  but  Cotta,  true  to  Eoman  traditions,  said  that 
nothing  would  induce  him  to  treat  with  an  armed  enemy. 
Accordingly  Sabinus  and  a  few  tribunes  and  centurions  went 
out  alone.  They  were  told  to  lay  down  their  arms.  A 
parley  followed ;  and  Ambiorix  purposely  spun  out  what  he 
had  to  say.  While  he  was  speaking,  a  number  of  Gauls 
crept  stealthily  behind  Sabinus ;  and  in  a  moment  he  fell 
dead.  Then  with  a  yell  of  triumph  the  Gauls  rushed  into 
the  exhausted  legion ;  and  Cotta  and  the  bulk  of  his  men 
were  destroyed.  The  rest  fled  for  the  camp.  The  standard- 
bearer,  finding  himself  hotly  pursued,  flung  his  eagle  inside 
the  rampart,  and  died  fighting  like  a  Eoraan  soldier.  His  and  virtu- 
surviving  comrades  defended  themselves  till  nightfall.  Then,  i^ted."'^^ "" 
seeing  that  hope  was  gone,  they  fell  upon  each  others'  swords. 

A  handful  of  men,  more  fortunate  than  their  comrades, 
had  managed  to  escape  into  the  woods.  They  made  their  way 
to  the  camp  of  Labienus,  and  told  him  the  whole  story. 

Ambiorix  instantly  followed  up  his  victory.      Bidding  his  Ambiorix 
infantry  follow,  he  rode   off  westward  with   the   horsemen.  ttrN^rvii 
All  that  night  and  the  day  after  he  sped  over  the  plateau  of  to  join 
Herve  and  the  plain  of  Hesbaye :  just  pausing  to  enlist  the  attacidno- 
Aduatuci  in  the  cause,  he  pressed  on,  and  next  day  crossed  Q-  Cicero. 
the  frontier  of  the  Nervii.      This  people  had  not  forgotten 
how  their  brethren  had  been  slaughtered,  three  years  before, 
on    the   banks   of  the    Sambre.       Ambiorix   told   the   chiefs 
exultingly  of  his  victory.      Here  was  such  a  chance  as  they 
might  never  have  again.      Cicero's  camp  was  close  by.      Why 
should  they  not  do  as  he  had  done, — swoop  down  upon  the 
solitary  legion,  win   back  their  independence  for  good,  and 
take  a  glorious  revenge  upon  their  persecutors.      The  chiefs 
caught  at  the  suggestion.      The  small  tribes  that  owned  their 
sway  flocked  to  join  them :  the  Eburones,  flushed  with  victory, 
were  there  to  help ;  and  the  united  host  set  out  with  eager 
confidence  for  the  Eoman  camp.     Their  horsemen,  hurrying 
on  ahead,  cut  oS"  a  party  of  soldiers  who  were  felling  wood. 
Not   the  faintest   rumour   of  the  late  disaster  had  reached 


86  THE  DISASTEE  AT  ADUATUCA  chap. 

54  B.C.  Cicero ;  and  the  Gallic  hordes  burst  upon  him  like  a  bolt 
Siege  of  from  the  sky.  Their  first  onslaught  was  so  violent  that  even 
camp.  the  disciplined  courage  of  the  Romans  barely  averted  de- 
struction. Messengers  were  instantly  despatched  to  carry  the 
news  to  Caesar ;  and  Cicero  promised  to  reward  them  well  if 
they  should  succeed  in  delivering  his  letters.  Working  all 
night  with  incessant  energy,  the  legionaries  erected  a  large 
number  of  wooden  towers  on  the  rampart.  The  Gauls,  who 
meanwhile  had  been  strongly  reinforced,  returned  in  the 
morning  to  the  attack.  They  succeeded  in  filling  up  the 
trench :  but  the  garrison  still  managed  to  keep  them  at  bay. 
Day  after  day  the  siege  continued ;  and  night  after  night 
and  all  night  long  the  Eomans  toiled  to  make  ready  for  the 
morrow's  struggle.  The  towers,  of  which  only  the  framework 
had  been  finished,  were  furnished  with  stories  and  battlements  : 
sharp  stakes  were  made  for  hurling  at  the  besiegers,  and  huge 
pikes  for  stopping  their  rush  if  they  should  attempt  an 
assault.  Even  the  sick  and  the  wounded  had  to  lend  a  hand. 
Cicero  himself  was  in  poor  health :  but  he  worked  night  and 
day ;  and  it  was  not  until  the  men  gathered  round  him 
and  insisted  on  his  sparing  himself,  that  he  would  take  a 
little  rest.  Meanwhile  the  Nervian  leaders,  who  had  expected 
an  easy  triumph,  were  becoming  impatient.  They  asked 
Cicero  to  grant  them  an  interview.  Some  of  them  knew  him 
personally ;  and  they  doubtless  hoped  that  he  would  prove 
compliant.  They  assailed  him  with  the  same  arguments 
that  Ambiorix  had  found  so  successful  with  Sabinus.  They 
tried  to  frighten  him  by  describing  the  massacre  at  Aduatuca, 
and  assured  him  that  it  was  idle  to  hope  for  relief.  But 
they  would  not  be  hard  upon  him.  All  they  wanted  was  to 
stop  the  inveterate  custom  of  quartering  the  legions  for  the 
winter  in  Gaul.  If  he  and  his  army  would  only  go,  they 
might  go  in  peace  whithersoever  they  pleased.  Cicero  calmly 
replied  that  Eomans  never  accepted  terms  from  an  armed 
enemy.  They  must  first  lay  down  their  arms  :  then  he  would 
intercede  for  them  with  Caesar.  Caesar  was  always  just,  and 
would  doubtless  grant  their  petition. 

Disappointed  though  they  were,  the  Gauls  were  not  dis- 
heartened.    They  determined  to  invest  the  camp  in  a  scien- 


VI  AND   ITS  EESULTS  87 

tific  manner.  From  the  experience  of  past  campaigns  they  54  b.c. 
had  got  a  rongh  idea  of  the  nature  of  Eomau  siege  works  ; 
and  now,  with  the  quickness  of  their  race,  they  proceeded  to 
imitate  them.  Some  prisoners  who  had  fallen  into  their 
hands,  gave  them  hints.  Having  no  proper  tools,  they  were 
obliged  to  cut  the  turf  with  their  swords,  and  use  their 
hands  and  even  theu-  cloaks  in  piling  the  sods :  but  the 
workers  swarmed  in  such  prodigious  numbers  that  in  three 
hours  they  had  thrown  up  a  rampart  ten  feet  high  ^  and 
nearly  three  miles  in  extent.^  They  then  proceeded,  under 
the  guidance  of  the  prisoners,  to  erect  towers,  and  to  make 
sappers'  huts,  ladders  and  poles  fitted  with  hooks  for  tearing 
down  the  rampart  of  the  camp.  The  huts,  which  were 
intended  to  protect  the  men  who  had  to  fill  up  the  trench 
and  demolish  the  rampart,  were  partially  closed  in  front,  and 
had  sloping  roofs,  built  of  strong  timbers,  so  as  to  resist  the 
crash  of  any  stones  which  might  be  pitched  on  to  them,  and 
probably  covered  with  clay  and  raw  hides,  as  a  protection 
against  fire.^  On  the  seventh  day  of  the  siege  there  was 
a  great  gale.  The  besiegers  took  advantage  of  it  to  fling 
blazing  darts  and  white-hot  balls  of  clay,"*  which  lighted  on 
the  straw  thatch  of  the  men's  huts  ;  and  the  wind-swept 
flames  flew  all  over  the  enclosure.  With  a  yell  of  exultation, 
the  enemy  wheeled  forward  their  towers  and  huts,  and 
planted  their  ladders :  in  another  moment  they  were  swarm- 
ing up :  but  all  along  the  rampart,  their  dark  figures  outlined 
against  the  fiery  background,  the  Eomans  were  standing, 
ready  to  hu.rl  them  down :  harassed  by  showers  of  missiles, 
half  scorched  by  the  fierce  heat,  regardless  of  the  havoc  that 
the  flames  were  making  in  their  property,  every  man  of  them 
stood  firm ;  and  hardly  one  so  much  as  looked  behind. 
Their  losses  were  heavier  than  on  any  previous  day.  The 
Gauls  too  went  down  in  scores  ;  for  those  in  front  could  not 
retreat  because  of  the  masses  that  pressed  upon  them  from 
behind.  In  one  spot  a  tower  was  wheeled  right  up  to  the 
rampart.     The  centurions  of  the  3rd  cohort  coolly  withdrew 

1  Including  the  palisade  ?  ^  See  pp.  713-14. 

3  See  Caesar,  B.  C,  ii.  10,  and  pp.  602-4. 

■•  See  pp.  714-15. 


88 


THE  DISASTEK  AT  ADUATUCA 


54  B.C. 


A  messen- 
ger from 
Cicero 
carries  a 
despatch 
to  Caesar. 


Caesar 
marclies  to 
relieve 
Cicero. 


their  men,  and  with  voice  and  gesture  dared  the  Gauls  to 
come  on :  but  none  dared  stir  a  step :  a  shower  of  stones 
sent  them  flying ;  and  the  deserted  tower  was  set  on  fire. 
Everywhere  the  result  was  the  same.  The  assailants  were 
the  bravest  of  the  Gauls :  of  death  they  had  no  fear :  but 
they  had  not  the  heart  to  hurl  themselves  upon  that  living 
wall  ;  and,  leaving  their  slain  in  heaps,  they  sullenly 
withdrew. 

Still  the  siege  went  on  ;  and  to  the  w^earied  and  weakened 
legion  its  trials  daily  increased.  Letters  for  Caesar  were 
sent  out  in  more  and  more  rapid  succession.  Some  of  the 
messengers  were  caught  in  sight  of  the  garrison,  and  tortured 
to  death.  There  was,  however,  in  the  camp  a  Nervian  named 
Vertico,  who,  just  before  the  siege,  had  thrown  himself  upon 
the  protection  of  Cicero,  and  had  been  steadfastly  true  to 
him.  By  lavish  promises  he  induced  one  of  his  slaves  to 
face  the  dangers  which  to  the  Eoman  messengers  had  proved 
fatal.  The  letter  which  he  had  to  carry  was  inserted  in  the 
shaft  of  a  javelin.  He  passed  his  countrymen  unnoticed, 
made  his  way  safely  to  Samarobriva,  and  delivered  his  des- 
patch. Xone  of  the  other  messengers  had  arrived  ;  and  so 
close  was  the  sympathy  between  the  peasants  and  the  insur- 
gents that  Caesar  had  not  heard  a  rumour  of  the  siege. 

It  was  about  four  o'clock  in  the  afternoon.  Within  a 
few  minutes  messengers  were  spurring  to  the  camps  in  the 
surrounding  country.  Crassus  was  ordered  to  come  in  to 
Samarobriva  at  once,  and  take  the  General's  place.  It  was 
most  important  to  leave  Samarobriva  in  safe  keeping ;  for 
there  were  collected  the  hostages  of  the  various  states,  the 
winter's  supply  of  corn,  the  heavy  baggage  of  the  whole 
army,^  and  the  General's  papers  and  accounts.  Fabius  was 
to  join  Caesar  on  the  road.  A  letter  went  to  Labienus, 
expressing  the  hope  that  he  would  be  able  to  march  direct 
to  the  rehef  of  the  besieged  camp :  but  this  able  officer  was 
trusted   to  use  his   own   discretion.       Plancus    and   Eoscius 

^  Impedimenta  exercitus  {B.  G.,  v.  47,  §2).  Perhaps  the  word  "material" 
would  be  more  accurate  than  "heavy  baggage  "  ;  for  the  troops  at  Aduatuca, 
and  doubtless  also  the  legions  in  the  other  camjis,  had  their  heavy  baggage  with 
them.  It  is  impossible  to  say  with  certainty  what  the  impedimenta,  to  which 
Caesar  alludes,  was  ;  but  it  may  have  included  siege  material. 


Ti  AND  ITS  RESULTS  89 

were  too  far  off  to  be  able  to  help.  About  nine  o'clock  next  54  b.c. 
morning,  hearing  that  Crassus  was  close  at  hand,  Caesar  set 
out  with  Trebonius's  legion  and  about  four  hundred  cavalry. 
No  baggage-train  accompanied  the  column  :  the  men  carried 
all  that  they  required  upon  their  backs.  The  first  march 
was  more  than  eighteen  miles.  Fabius  joined  his  chief  on 
the  way :  but  Labienus  did  not  appear.  An  express  came 
from  him  instead,  from  \vhich  Caesar  learned,  for  the  first 
time,  the  fate  of  Sabinus  and  Cotta.  It  is  said  that,  in  his 
first  burst  of  grief  and  wrath,  he  swore  that  he  would  not 
shave  his  beard  or  cut  his  hair  until  he  had  avenged  their 
deaths.^  Labienus  went  on  to  say  that  he  was  himself  hard 
pressed  by  the  Treveri,  and  thought  it  foolhardy  to  leave  his 
camp.  Caesar  approved  his  decision,  though  it  left  him  with 
barely  seven  thousand  men.  EverytluDg  now  depended  upon 
speed.  Passing  through  the  Nervian  territory,  Caesar  learned 
from  some  peasants  who  fell  into  his  hands  that  Cicero's 
situation  was  all  but  desperate :  immediately  he  wrote  a 
letter  in  Greek  characters,  assuring  him  of  speedy  relief,  and 
offered  one  of  his  Gallic  horsemen  a  large  reward  to  deliver 
it.  He  told  liim,  in  case  he  should  not  be  able  to  get  into 
the  camp,  to  tie  the  letter  to  a  javelin  and  throw  it  inside. 
Fearing  that  the  Eomans  might  take  him  for  an  enemy,  the 
man  did  as  Caesar  had  directed :  but  the  javelin  stuck  in 
one  of  the  towers,  and  remained  unnoticed  for  two  days.  A 
soldier  then  found  it  and  took  it  to  Cicero,  who  read  the 
letter  to  his  exhausted  troops.  As  they  gazed  over  the 
rampart,  they  saw  clouds  of  smoke  floating  far  away  over  the 
west  horizon,  and  knew  that  Caesar  was  approaching  and 
taking  vengeance  as  he  came. 

That  night  Caesar  received  a  despatch  from  Cicero,  warn-  The  Gauls 
ing  him  that  the  Gauls  had  raised  the  siege,  and  gone  oft'  to  ^^^^^^°° 

o  Q   >  a  the  siege, 

intercept   him.       Notwithstanding    their   heavy   losses,   they  and  march 
numbered,  it  was  said,  some  sixty  thousand  men.^      Caesar  ^o^f^^er 
made  known  the  contents  of  the  despatch  to  the  troops,  and  him. 
encouraged    them    to  nerve   themselves  for  the  approaching 
struggle.     A  short  march  in  the  early  morning  brought  the 
legions  to  a  river,  on  the  opposite  bank  of  which  the  enemy 
^  Suetonius,  Divus  Julius,  67.  '-^  See  p.  208. 


90 


THE  DISASTER  AT  ADUATUCA 


54  B.C. 


Defeat  of 
the  Gauls 


Caesar 

joins 

Cicero. 


were  encamped.  Caesar  had  no  intention  of  fighting  a  battle 
against  such  heavy  odds  on  unfavonrable  ground.  Cicero 
was  in  no  danger ;  and  he  was  therefore  not  pressed  for  time. 
He  sent  out  scouts  to  look  for  a  convenient  place  to  cross 
the  river.  Meanwhile  he  marked  out  his  cauip  on  a  slope, 
and  constructed  it  on  the  smallest  possible  scale  in  the  hope 
of  seducing  the  enemy  to  attack  him.  But  the  enemy  were 
expecting  reinforcements,  and  remained  where  they  were. 
At  dawn  their  horsemen  ventured  across  the  river,  and  at- 
tacked Caesar's  cavalry,  who  promptly  retreated  in  obedience 
to  orders.  Sitting  on  their  horses,  the  Gauls  could  see  inside 
the  camp.  An  attempt  was  apparently  being  made  to 
increase  the  height  of  the  rampart,  and  to  block  the  gateways. 
There  was  every  appearance  of  panic.  Caesar  had  told  his 
men  what  to  do ;  and  they  were  hurrying  about  the  camp 
with  a  pretence  of  nervous  trepidation.  The  enemy  hesitated 
no  longer  ;  and  in  a  short  time  they  were  all  across  the 
stream.  They  had  to  attack  up  hill :  but  that  mattered 
nothing  against  such  craven  adversaries.  Not  even  a  sentry 
was  standing  on  the  rampart.  Criers  were  sent  round  the 
camp  to  say  that  if  any  man  cared  to  come  out  and  join  the 
Gauls,  he  would  be  welcome, — till  ten  o'clock.  The  gates 
looked  too  strong  to  be  forced,  though  there  was  really  only 
a  mock  barricade  of  sods,  which  could  be  knocked  over  in  a 
moment.  The  Gauls  walked  right  up  to  the  ditch,  and 
began  coolly  filling  it  up,  and  actually  tearing  down  the 
rampart  with  their  hands, — when  from  right  and  left  and 
front  the  cohorts  charged :  there  was  a  thunder  of  hoofs ; 
and  reeling  backward  in  amazement  before  a  rush  of  cavalry, 
they  flung  away  their  arms  and  fled. 

About  three  o'clock  that  afternoon  the  legions  reached 
Cicero's  camp.  With  keen  interest  Caesar  asked  for  details 
of  the  siege,  and  gazed  witli  admiring  wonder  at  the  enemy's 
deserted  works.  When  the  legion  was  paraded,  he  found 
that  not  one  man  in  ten  was  unwounded.  Turning  to  Cicero, 
he  heartily  thanked  him  for  the  magnificent  stand  which  he 
had  made,  and  then,  calling  out,  one  by  one,  the  officers 
whom  he  mentioned  as  having  shown  especial  bravery,  he 
addressed    to    them    a   few   words   of   praise.      From   some 


Yi  AXD   ITS  EESULTS  91 

prisoners,  who  had  served  under  Ambiorix,  he  gleaned  details  54  b.c. 
of  the  massacre  at  Aduatuca.  Next  day  he  again  assembled 
the  men,  and  described  to  them  what  had  befallen  their 
comrades.  They  must  not,  he  said,  be  downhearted ;  for 
Providence  and  their  own  good  swords  had  enabled  them  to 
repair  the  disaster. 

Meanwliile  the  news  of  the  relief  had  spread  like  wildfire,  immediate 
Before   midnicfht   it   M'as    known   in    the    neighbourhood    off.^'^^.^° 

c  o  his  victory. 

Labienus's  camp,  more  than  fifty  miles  away.  A  number  of 
loyal  Eemaus  hurried  to  congratulate  the  general ;  and  a 
shout  of  joy  at  the  gates  of  his  camp  told  him  what  had 
occurred.  Indutiomarus,  who  was  on  the  point  of  attacking 
him,  beat  a  hasty  retreat.  A  large  force  from  the  maritime 
tribes  of  Brittany  and  Xormandy  was  advancing  against  the 
camp  of  Eoscius,  when  an  express  came  to  warn  them  of 
Caesar's  victory,  and  they  precipitately  fled. 

But  even  Caesar  could  not  undo  the  effect  of  the  aunihila-  Many  of 
tion  of  a  Eoman  legion.      The  Gauls  lacked   perseverance  :  the  uobies 

o  -t^  contmue  to 

they  wanted  a  great  leader :  but  they  had  broken  the  spell  intrigue. 
of  Eoman  success.  Except  among  the  Aedui  and  the  Remi, 
there  was  hardly  a  chieftain  in  Gaul  who  did  not  dream  of 
similar  victories.  Xocturnal  meetings  were  held  in  secluded 
places  ;  and  embassies  passed  from  tribe  to  tribe.  As  Caesar 
frankly  remarked,  it  was  all  perfectly  natural :  the  Gauls  had 
once  been  the  most  dreaded  warriors  in  the  world,  and  to  be 
forced  to  submit  to  Eomans  was  most  galling  to  their  self- 
esteem.  The  state  of  affairs  was  so  alarming  that  Caesar 
determined  to  break  through  his  usual  practice  and  spend 
the  winter  in  Gaul.  He  ordered  Fabius  to  return  to  his 
camp  in  the  country  of  the  Morini.  His  own  quarters  were 
at  Samarobriva ;  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  that  town  he 
cantoned  in  three  separate  camps  the  legion  of  Cicero,  that 
of  Crassus,  and  the  one  with  which  he  had  gone  to  the  relief 
of  Cicero.  He  sent  for  all  the  chiefs  who  were  in  any  way 
compromised,  and  when  he  had  thoroughly  frightened  them 
by  letting  them  know  that  he  was  aware  of  their  intrigues, 
he  tried  to  convince  them  that  it  was  their  interest  to  keep 
the  peace.  The  bulk  of  the  tribes  were  thus  deterred  from 
actually  rebelling.     The  Senones,  however,  a  powerful  people 


92  THE  DISASTER  AT  ADUATUCA  chap. 

54  B.C.  occupying  the  country  round  Sens  and  Montargis,  had  the 
temerity  to  banish  a  king  whom  Caesar  had  set  over  them ; 
and  when  he  ordered  their  council  to  come  to  Samarobriva 
and  answer  for  this  outrage,  they  flatly  refused  to  obey.  But 
Schemes  of  of  all  the  malcontents  the  most  daring  and  the  most  danger- 
raarus.  ^^^  was  Indutiomarus.  Eebuffed  by  the  German  chiefs,  who 
answered  his  appeals  for  aid  by  reminding  him  of  the  fate  of 
Ariovistus  and  the  Tencteri,  he  offered  rewards  to  all  the 
outlaws  and  exiles  in  Gaul  who  would  join  his  standard. 
His  prestige  rapidly  increased ;  and  all  the  patriots  began  to 
look  to  him  for  guidance.  He  summoned  the  warriors  of  his 
own  tribe  to  muster  in  arms  at  a  stated  place  ;  and,  in  accord- 
ance with  Gallic  custom,  the  unhappy  wretch  who  arrived 
last  was  tortured  to  death  in  sight  of  his  comrades.  In- 
dutiomarus began  by  declaring  Cingetorix  a  public  enemy, 
and  confiscating  his  possessions.  He  then  addressed  the 
assembly.  His  plan  was  to  make  a  raid  into  the  country  of 
the  Remi,  and  punish  them  for  their  desertion  of  the  national 
cause :  then  to  join  the  Carnutes  and  the  Seuones,  and  raise 
a  revolt  in  the  heart  of  Gaul.  First  of  all,  however,  he 
determined  to  make  one  more  attempt  against  Labienus. 
But  the  Roman  general  was  too  strongly  posted  to  fear  any 
attack;  and  he  determined  to  make  an  end  of  Indutiomarus 
and  his  schemes.  He  called  upon  the  neighbouring  tribes  to 
furnish  him  with  cavalry,  which  were  to  arrive  on  a  fixed 
date  ;  and,  like  Caesar,  he  did  his  best  to  lure  on  the  enemy 
by  a  pretence  of  fear.  Their  horsemen  rode  up  to  the  camp, 
hurled  missiles  over  the  rampart,  shouted  every  insulting 
epithet  at  the  Romans,  and  challenged  them  to  come  out  if 
they  dared.  Labienus  would  not  allow  his  men  to  reply. 
The  cavalry  which  he  had  summoned  arrived  punctually ; 
and  in  the  night  they  were  secretly  admitted  into  the  camp. 
Caesar  afterwards  noted  with  admiration  the  extraordinary 
precautions  which  Labienus  had  taken  to  prevent  a  single 
man  from  going  outside,  lest  the  enemy  should  hear  that  he 
He  is  out-  had  been  reinforced.  Next  day,  as  usual,  Indutiomarus  and 
Labienus^  ^i^  ^^u  Spent  their  time  in  swaggering  round  the  rampart 
defeated  and  abusing  the  Romans.  In  the  evening,  when  they  were 
scattered  and  off  their  guard,  two  of  the  gates  were  opened  : 


VI  AND  ITS  EESULTS  93 

the  cavalry  charged  ;  and  the  astounded  Gauls  fled.  Labienus  53  b.c. 
gave  orders  that  every  one  should  pursue  ludutiomarus,  and 
him  alone ;  and  he  promised  a  large  reward  to  the  man  who 
should  kill  him.  He  was  caught  in  the  act  of  fording  a 
river;  and  his  head  was  cut  off.  Forthwith  the  assembled 
bands  of  the  Xervii  and  Eburones  dispersed  ;  and  for  a  time 
Gaul  was  comparatively  still. 

Only  for  a  time,  however.      Caesar  had  reason  to  believe 
that  the  chiefs  were  hatching  a  more  formidable  conspiracy ; 
and    he    saw   that   the   best   way   to    counteract   it    was    to 
convince  them  that,  whatever  successes  they  might  gain,  the 
fighting  strength  of  Italy  was  inexhaustible.      He  accordingly  Caesar 
raised  two  new  legions,  and  asked  Pompey,  with  whom  his  [^vo^^ew 
relations  were  still  amicable,  to  lend  him  a  third.      Eome,  legions, and 
whither  he  must  soon  return,  was  convulsed  by  the  throes  of  third  from 
anarchy,  and  the  civil  war  that  was  coming  cast  its  shadow  Pompey. 
before  :  but  it  was  necessary  that  he  should  shut  out  from  his 
mind  all  distracting  thoughts,  and  perfect  his  work  in  Gaul. 

Peace  did  not  last  out  the  winter.      The  Treveri,  in  spite 
of  the  death  of  Indutiomarus,  succeeded  in  persuading,  by  Continued 
promises  of  gold,  some  of  the  more  distant  tribes  of  Germany  ^^th-^^  ^" 
to  join  them.      The  Xervii,  the  Aduatuci,  the  Menapii  and  eastern 
the    Eburones    were   all    in    arms :    the    Senones    and    the 
Caruutes  were  still  defiant.     But  Caesar,  as  usual,  was  the 
first  to  strike.      While  it  was  still  winter,  he  left  Samaro- 
briva    with    four    legions ;    made    a   sudden    raid    into    the  Caesar 
country  of  the  Nervii ;  took  numbers  of  prisoners  before  the  f^e^^xervii  • 
bewildered  tribesmen  could  either  muster  their  forces  or  flee  ; 
drove  away  their  herds,  ravaged  their  lands  and  compelled 
the  cowed  chiefs  to  submit.      When  he  convened  his  annual 
council   at    Samarobriva    in   the    early    spring,   every    tribe 
except  the  Senones,  the  Carnutes  and  the  Treveri,  sent  its 
representatives.-^     A  rapid  march  southward  so  disconcerted  fp^ces  the 
the  Senones  that  they  surrendered  at  once,  and  begged  the  and  Car- 
Aedui  to  intercede  for  them.      The  Carnutes,  without  wait-  i^^tes  to 
ing  to  be  attacked,  induced  their  overlords,  the  Ptemi,  to  do 
them  a  like  service ;   and,  as  time  pressed,  Caesar  accepted, 
without  inquiry,  the  excuses  of  both  peoples,  took  hostages 
^  See  pp.  3S4-5. 


94  THE  DISASTER  AT  ADUATUCA  chap. 

53  B.C.  for  their  good  behaviour,  and  turned  northward  to  deal  with 
the  Treveri  and  the  Eburones.  He  liad  not  forgotten  the 
and  pre-  shame  and  the  suffering  which  Ambiorix  had  brought  upon 
punish °  ^is  soldiers ;  and  he  was  determined  to  inflict  upon  him  a 
Ambiorix.   most  signal  and  awful  retribution. 

As  a  pre-  The   first   step   was    to    deprive   him   of    his   allies,   the 

iimmary  jvfejjapii,  the  Treveri  and  the  Germans.  Caesar  had  ascer- 
crushes  the  taiucd  that  he  did  not  intend  to  fight ;  and  the  object  was 
enapu.  ^^  ^^^,  against  him  every  way  of  escape.  The  Menapii, 
alone  of  all  the  Gallic  tribes,  had  never  formally  submitted 
to  Eome.  During  Caesar's  first  expedition  to  Britain, 
Sabinus  and  Cotta  had  mercilessly  ravaged  their  lands :  but 
it  was  impossible  to  follow  them  into  their  fastnesses. 
Caesar  took  his  measures  with  extreme  deliberation.  He 
sent  all  the  heavy  baggage  to  Labienus,  and  at  the  same 
time  reinforced  him  with  a  couple  of  legions.  He  then 
marched  in  overwhelming  force  against  the  Menapii.  AVith- 
out  attempting  to  resist,  they  again  took  refuge  in  their 
forests  and  marshes :  but  this  time  they  were  not  to  escape. 
Caesar  bridged  the  rivers,  constructed  causeways  over  the 
marshes,  and  threw  three  separate  columns  into  their 
country  ;  and  when  their  flocks  and  herds  were  driven  away, 
their  villages  ablaze,  and  prisoners  taken  by  scores,  they 
were  constrained  to  surrender.  Caesar  left  a  body  of  horse 
to  watch  them  under  Commius,  the  king  of  the  Atrebates, 
who  had  done  good  service  in  Britain ;  and  warning  them, 
as  they  valued  the  lives  of  their  hostages,  to  give  no  refuge 
to  Ambiorix  or  his  lieutenants,  he  pushed  southward  to  deal 
with  the  Treveri.  Before  he  could  arrive,  however,  Labienus 
Labienus  marched  out  to  meet  them,  enticed  them  by  a  feigned  flight 
disperses     across  a  rivcr,  and  then,  suddenlv  wheeling  round,  sent  them 

the  Treveri.  '  .  . 

flying  into  the  woods.  Their  German  allies,  who  had  not 
had  time  to  join  them,  returned  home ;  and  within  a  few  days 
the  whole  tribe  submitted.  Their  leaders  fled  the  country ; 
and    Caesar's    adherent,    Cingetorix,    was     appointed    chief 

Caesar        magistrate. 

again  About  this  time  Caesar  ioined  Labienus ;   and  with  the 

crosses  tlie  ,      ,       '' 

Rhine,  and  twofold   objcct   of  punishiug   the    Germans   and   preventing 
th^Tm°^  f  ^iiibiorix  from  seeking  an  asylum  in  their  country,  he  again 

Ambiorix. 


VI  AND  ITS  RESULTS  95 

threw  a  bridge  across  the  Ehiue,  a  little  above  the  site  of  53  b.c. 
the  former  one.  He  left  a  force  to  hold  the  Gallic  end  of 
the  bridge  and  keep  the  Treveri  in  awe.  A  few  days  later 
he  was  informed  by  the  Ubii  that  the  Suevi,  who  had  been 
active  in  sendincj  reinforcements  against  Labienus,  were 
massing  their  warriors  and  warning  their  dependent  tribes 
to  send  in  their  contingents.  He  immediately  entrenched 
himself  in  a  strong  position,  and  ordered  the  Ubii  to 
remove  their  stores  from  the  open  country  into  their 
strongholds,  to  drive  in  their  cattle  from  the  pastures, 
and  to  send  out  scouts  to  watch  the  enemy's  movements. 
His  hope  was  that  finding  themselves  short  of  supplies,  they 
might  be  enticed  to  venture  a  battle  at  a  disadvantage :  but 
the  scouts,  after  a  few  days'  absence,  reported  that  the  entire 
host  had  fallen  back  to  the  outskirts  of  a  huge  forest  near 
the  mountains  of  Thuringia.  To  follow  them  thither  through 
a  wild  country,  where  little  or  no  corn  was  to  be  had,  would 
simply  be  to  court  destruction.  There  was  nothing  for  it 
but  to  return.  But,  in  order  to  keep  the  Germans  in 
constant  fear  of  a  fresh  invasion,  he  only  destroyed  that  part 
of  the  bridge  which  touched  their  bank  of  the  Rhine ; 
built  a  wooden  tower  of  four  stories  on  its  extremity ;  and  [About 
detailed  twelve  cohorts  ^  to  hold  the  other  end. 

And    now,    having   made    every    preparation    that    fore-  Retuniing 
thought  could  suggest,  Caesar  bent  all  his  energies  to  destroy  fu/toGaui 
Ambiorix.      The  road  ran  westward  through  the  vast  forest  lie  marches 
of  the  Ardennes.      An  officer  named  Minucius  Basilus  was  Ambiorix. 
sent  on  ahead  with  the  cavalry.      He  was  on  no  account  to 
allow  any  fires  to   be   lighted  in    his   camp,   lest  Ambiorix 
should  be  warned  of  his    approach.      Caesar   followed    with 
the  infantry  till  he  reached  the  deserted  camp  which,  a  few 
months    before,    had    witnessed    the    self -slaughter    of    the 
remnant   of  Cotta's   legion.      The  entrenchments    were    still 
intact.      There   he    left  his  heavy   baggage   and  one  of   the 

^  Caesar  makes  no  further  mention  of  these  cohorts,  which  were  probably 
detachments  from  various  legions  ;  and  I  suppose  that  they  were  withdrawn 
from  the  Rhine  before  the  army  went  into  winter-quarters.  Their  services 
would  certainly  have  been  required  in  the  seventh  campaign.  Guischard  {Mim. 
exit,  et  hist.,  t.  iii.,  1774,  p.  32)  conjectures  that  they  were  supernumeraries  : 
but  this  is  a  mere  guess. 


96 


THE  DISASTEE  AT  ADUATUCA 


53  B.C. 


The 

Eburones 
keep  up  a 
guerilla 
warfare. 


newly  raised  legions  to  guard  it,  under  the  command  of 
Cicero.  He  promised  to  return  at  the  end  of  a  week,  and 
charged  his  lieutenant  on  no  account  to  allow  a  single  man 
to  venture  out  of  camp  until  then.  The  army  was  divided 
into  three  corps,  each  consisting  of  three  legions  or,  not 
counting  auxiliaries,  about  ten  thousand  men.  Labienus 
was  sent  to  the  northern  part  of  the  country  of  the 
Eburones,  in  the  direction  of  the  islands  which  bar  the 
mouth  of  the  Scheldt ;  and  Trebonius  to  the  south-western, 
in  the  direction  of  Huy.  They  were  to  harry  the  enemy's 
country,  to  ascertain  his  designs,  and  to  return,  if  possible  at 
the  end  of  a  week,  to  concert  measures  with  Caesar  for  a 
final  campaign.  Caesar  himself  marched  towards  the  lower 
Scheldt,  in  the  hope  of  catching  Ambiorix,  who  was  said  to 
have  retreated  to  the  extremity  of  the  Ardennes. 

Meanwhile  that  unhappy  chief  was  being  driven,  like  a 
hunted  animal,  from  lair  to  lair.  Basilus  and  his  cavaby, 
guided  by  some  peasants  whom  they  had  caught  in  the  fields, 
rode  through  a  wood  till  they  came  to  a  cottage,  in  a  small 
clearing,  where  he  was  said  to  be  hiding :  but  his  retainers 
gallantly  flung  themselves  upon  the  Eomans,  while  their 
chief  threw  himself  on  horseback  and  disappeared  among 
the  trees.  Catuvolcus,  the  aged  prince  who  had  shared  his 
counsels,  was  too  infirm  to  bear  the  hardships  of  a  hunted 
fugitive,  and  committed  suicide.  The  Eburones  were  less 
civilised  than  their  neighbours,  and  had  no  walled  towns  to 
retreat  to.  Ambiorix  sent  word  over  the  country-side  that 
every  one  must  shift  for  himself.  Many  fled  the  country 
altogether :  others  dived  into  the  recesses  of  the  forest : 
others  lurked  in  the  marshes  or  the  islets  in  the  estuary  of 
the  Scheldt.  Caesar  found  that  there  was  no  regular  force  to 
oppose  him :  but  every  glen,  every  bog,  every  clump  of  trees 
held  its  nest  of  armed  skulkers.  Massed  in  their  cohorts  and 
companies,  the  legionaries  were  powerless  against  such  foes : 
the  only  way  to  get  at  them  was  to  send  out  small  flying 
parties  in  every  direction.  But  in  those  narrow  woodland 
tracks  it  was  not  easy  for  even  the  smallest  party  to  keep 
together.  The  enemy  knew  every  inch  of  the  ground  :  they 
were  wary ;  and  they  were  desperate  :  and  a  few  legionaries 


VI  AXD   ITS  EESULTS  97 

who   strayed  in  search  of  phmder  were  cut  off  and  killed.  53  b.c. 
Always  careful  of  his  men's  lives,  Caesar  was  especially  careful 
now,  when  their  thirst  for  revenge  tempted  them  to  be  rash. 
In  order  to  spare  them  as  much  as  possible,  he  invited  the  Caessr 
surrounding  tribes  to  come  and  destroy  the  Eburones,  and  n'^^jahbonr- 
enrich  themselves  with  booty.      He  intended,  as  he  tells  us,  ing  tribes 

to  iitirrv 

"  that  Gauls  should  risk  their  lives  in  the  forests,  and  not  ^-^^^^ 
his  legionaries,  and  at  the  same  time  to  surround  the 
Eburones  with  a  mighty  host,  and,  in  requital  for  their 
signal  villainy,  to  destroy  them,  root,  branch  and  name."  ^ 
Multitudes  of  eager  plunderers  were  attracted  by  the  pros- 
pect ;  and  Caesar's  old  enemies,  the  Sugambri,  actually 
crossed  the  Ehine  with  two  thousand  horse  and  their  attend- 
ant light-armed  footmen,'  in  the  hope  of  sharing  in  the  spoil. 
The  wretched  Eburones  were  captured  by  scores,  and  their 
cattle  driven  off.  But  the  Sugambri  were  soon  tempted  by  a 
richer  prize.  One  of  their  captives  told  them  that  Caesar 
was  far  away,  and  they  need  not  be  afraid  of  him.  Why 
should  they  not  pounce  upon  Cicero's  camp,  and  carry  off  all 
the  stores  and  the  loot  which  it  contained  ? 

It  happened  that  on  this  very  day  Caesar  was  expected 
in  the  camp.  But  Cicero  had  heard  nothing  of  or  from  him, 
and  was  besjinning  to  fear  that  he  would  not  be  able  to  keep 
his  promise.  Hitherto  he  had  carefully  obeyed  his  in- 
structions, and  had  not  allowed  a  man  to  stir  outside  the 
rampart.  But  fresh  rations  were  due  :  there  were  corn-fields 
within  three  miles  of  the  camp  :  it  was  absurd  to  suppose 
that  the  persecuted  Eburones  would  venture  an  attack  so 
near ;  and  besides  it  stung  him  to  hear  that  the  men  were 
sneering  at  his  caution.  Accordingly  he  allowed  half  the 
legion,  with  a  few  convalescent  veterans,  who  were  under  a 
separate  command,  two  hundred  cavalry  and  a  number  of 
slaves,  to  go  out  and  cut  corn.  They  were  hardly  out  of  "^le 
sight,  when  a  host  of  horsemen  broke  from  an  outlying  wood,  surVi^e 
swept  down  upon  the  camp,  and  tried  to  burst  in  through  the  Cicero. 
rear  gate.  The  dealers  who  accompanied  the  army  were 
massacred   in    their    tents    outside    the    rampart ;     and    the 

1  B.  G.,  vi.  34,  §  s. 
2  See  p.  44,  and  B.  G.,  i.  48,  §§  5-7. 


98  THE  DISASTER  AT  ADUATUCA  chap. 

53  B.C.  cohort  on  duty  barely  sustained  the  first  shock.  The  enemy 
spread  round  the  camp,  looking  for  an  entrance ;  and  it  was 
all  that  the  guards  could  do  to  prevent  them  from  breaking 
through  the  gates.  The  commanding  nature  of  the  site  and 
the  strength  of  the  fortifications  forbade  any  attempt  to  enter 
elsewhere.  Within,  all  was  confusion  and  panic ;  and  the 
superstitious  recruits  remembered  with  horror  that,  on  the 
very  spot  where  they  stood,  the  soldiers  of  Cotta  and  Sabinus 
had  perished.  Even  Cicero  lost  his  presence  of  mind.  But 
it  happened  that  there  was  in  the  camp  an  invalided  centurion, 
whose  deeds  of  daring  Caesar  was  never  tired  of  extolling, — 
Sextius  Baculus.  Ill  and  weak,  he  had  not  tasted  food  for 
five  days.  As  he  lay  in  his  tent,  he  heard  the  uproar,  and 
walked  out  to  see  what  was  the  matter.  Without  a  moment's 
hesitation,  he  snatched  sword  and  shield  from  the  men  close 
by,  and  planted  himself  in  the  nearest  gateway.  The  cen- 
turions on  guard  rallied  round  him  ;  and  alone  they  kept  the 
enemy  at  bay.  Severely  wounded,  Sextius  fell  down  in  a 
faint,  and  was  with  difficulty  rescued :  but  his  splendid 
courage  shamed  the  trembling  recruits  into  action ;  and  the 
camp  was  saved. 

Meanwhile  the  foragers  were  on  their  way  back.  They 
heard  the  uproar.  The  cavalry  rode  on,  and  saw  the  enemy. 
The  rest  followed.  The  recruits  had  never  seen  a  sword  drawn 
in  anger :  there  was  no  cover  near ;  and  they  were  simply 
confounded  by  the  apparition.  They  looked  passively  to 
their  officers  for  orders :  but  the  bravest  of  their  officers  were 
for  the  moment  unnerved.  The  Germans,  descryiug  infantry 
and  cavalry  in  the  distance,  took  them  for  Caesar's  legions 
and  abandoned  their  attempt  on  the  camp :  but  presently, 
seeing  how  few  they  had  to  deal  with,  rode  off  to  attack 
them.  The  slaves,  who  had  rushed  up  a  knoll  for  refuge, 
were  speedily  dislodged,  and,  flying  pell-mell  into  the  maniples, 
increased  their  alarm.  A  hurried  consultation  was  held. 
The  recruits,  in  spite  of  all  warnings,  ended  by  clustering 
together  on  a  ridge,  where  they  fancied  they  might  be  safe. 
The  handful  of  veterans  who  had  accompanied  the  detach- 
ment kept  their  presence  of  mind,  and  saved  themselves  and 
those  who  had  the  sense  to  follow  them  by  charging  boldly 


VI  AND  ITS  EESULTS  99 

through  the  enemy's  loose  array.  The  recruits  stood  watching  53  b.c. 
them  in  helpless  hesitation.  They  could  not  make  up  their 
minds  to  stay  where  they  were  ;  and  they  knew  that  they 
could  not  follow  the  example  of  the  veterans.  At  length 
they  tried  to  reach  the  camp  anyhow ;  and  many  of  them 
were  surrounded  and  slain.  Those  who  escaped  owed  their 
lives  to  their  centurions,  who  threw  themselves  upon  the 
enemy,  for  a  moment  forced  them  back,  and  died,  fighting  to 
the  last  man.-^  The  Germans  rode  away  with  the  booty 
which  they  had  left  in  the  woods.  Caesar's  advanced  guard 
reached  the  camp  that  night,  and  found  the  young  soldiers 
almost  beside  themselves  with  panic.  They  were  positive 
that  the  General  himself  and  his  army  must  have  perished ; 
and  nothing  could  quiet  them  till  they  actually  saw  him 
arrive.  But  nobody  knew  better  than  he  how  much  fortune 
has  to  do  with  war  ;  and  he  contented  himself  with  telling 
Cicero  that  he  ought  to  have  followed  his  instructions  to  the 
letter,  and  not  have  run  the  smallest  risk. 

One   more    effort  was  made    to    catch  Ambiorix.      Fresh  Caes.ir 
plunderers  from  the  surrounding  tribes  were  hounded  on  by  couiTtry  of 
Caesar  to  hunt  down  his  people  and  harry  his  land.      Every  t^e  Ebu- 
hamlet,  every  building  was  burned  down  ;  everything  worth 
plundering  was  carried  off;  and  every  ear  of  corn  that  was 
not  sodden  by  the  rain  was  devoured ;  for  it  was  Caesar's 
deliberate  intention  that  every  man,  woman  and  child  who 
escaped  the  sword  should    perish    of  hunger.      The  soldiers 
knew  that  he  had  set  his  heart  upon  getting  Ambiorix  into 
his  hands ;  and  they  made  incredible  exertions  to  win  his 
favour.      Cavalry   in    small   parties    scoured   the    country  in 
pursuit   of  the   king.      From    time    to    time    they   captured 
peasants,   who    declared   that   he    was   hardly   out   of  sight. 
But,   in   spite   of  the   desperate   efforts    of    his    exasperated  Ambiorix 
pursuers,  he  was  never  caught.      With  four   retainers,  who  p^"j,'^.^j®^._ 
would  have  suftered    anything   rather   than   betray  him,  he 
was  lost  in  the  dark  recesses  of  the  Ardennes. 

The  legions  were  distributed  for  the  winter, — two  on  the  tHl-  legious 
western   frontier   of    the   Treveri,  two  among  the  Lingones,  f^^  H^^^  ^'^ 

winter. 
^  Caesar  does  not  tell  us  what  became  of  the  cavalry  ;  but  we  may  infer  from 
-S.  (?.,  vi.  44,  §  1,  where  he  estimates  his  loss  at  two  cohorts,  that  they  escaped. 


100  THE  DISASTER  AT  ADUATUCA        chap,  vi 

and  the  remaining  six  at  Agedincum,  now  Sens,  the  chief 
town  of  the  Senones.  One  other  task  Caesar  had  to  perform 
before  he  started  for  Italy.  He  summoned  a  Gallic  council 
to  meet  at  Durocortorum,  the  modern  Eeims.  An  inquiry 
was  held  regarding  the  rebellion,  which  at  the  time  he  had 
necessarily  condoned,  of  the  Carnutes  and  the  Senones. 
Acco,  a  Senonian  chieftain,  was  convicted  of  having  originated 
Execution  the  movement ;  and,  in  accordance  with  Eoman  custom,  he 
was  flogged  to  death.^ 

^  B.  G.,  vi.  44,  §  2,  viii.  38,  §  5  ;  Suetonius,  Nero,  49. 


of  Acco, 


CHAPTEE    VII 

THE    REBELLION    OF    VERCINGETOEIX 

A  STILLNESS  that  was  not  peace  lay  upon  Gaul.      Only  half52B.c. 
subdued,  the  Celts  were  smarting  under  the  shock  of  Caesar's  News  of 
scourge :     their    proud    necks    writhed    beneath    his    yoke,  of  ciodhir 
Early  in  the  new  year  a  gleam  of  hope  shone  out.      A  rumour  reaches 
ran  through  Gaul  that  Eome  was  a  prey  to  sedition.      The 
notorious    Clodius    had    been    murdered    by    Milo    and    his 
bravoes.      Furious  riots  followed.     Temples  were  in  flames, 
and  streets  ran  with  blood.      The  story  was  of  course  em- 
bellished  by   the   eager  imagination    of   the    Gauls.      They 
persuaded  themselves  that  Caesar  would  be  detained  in  Italy, 
and  that  his  legions  would   be   at   their   mercy.      Meetings  Gallic 
were  held  in  the  recesses  of  forests  and  other  secluded  places.  ^^^'-'^^      , 

^  encouraged 

The  death  of  Acco  was  keenly  discussed.  The  formality  of  to  conspire 
his  execution  seemed  a  sign  that  Caesar  intended  to  make  ^^^^^^ 
Gaul  into  a  Eoman  province.  Chieftains  told  each  other 
that  their  own  turn  might  come  next.  They  must  make  a 
supreme  effort  to  save  their  unhappy  country.  At  one  of 
these  gatherings  a  definite  plan  was  formed.  The  great 
object  was  to  prevent  Caesar  from  rejoining  his  legions. 
The  conspirators  persuaded  themselves  that  there  would  be 
no  difficulty  in  doing  this ;  for  the  generals  who  commanded 
the  legions  would  not  venture  to  leave  their  quarters  in 
Caesar's  absence,  and  Caesar  could  not  make  his  way  to  the 
legions  for  want  of  a  sufficient  escort.  The  question  was 
put: — who  would  take  his  life  in  his  hand,  and  strike  the 
first  blow  for  fatherland  and  freedom  ?  He  might  count 
upon  receiving  a  liberal  reward.  The  chiefs  of  the  Carnutes 
instantly  responded   to  the  appeal.     All  they  asked  was  a 

101 


102      THE- ?oEEELI,ION  OF  VEECmGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  solemn  assurance  that  their  brother  chiefs  would  not  leave 
them  in  the  lurch.  Loud  applause  followed.  Making  a  sheaf 
of  their  standards — a  Gallic  ceremony  of  the  gravest  import 
— the  assembled  chiefs  swore  to  be  true  to  their  countrymen  ; 
and  a  date  was  fixed  for  the  insurrection  to  begin. 
The  Cenabum,  one  of  the  chief  towns  of  the  Carnutes,. stood 

nfa^acre     upon  the  sitc  HOW  occupied  by  Orleans.^     It  was  thus  fitted 
Roman       to  be  the  depot  for  the  grain  that  came  from  the  plain  of 
Ceuabum    La  Beauce,  and  down   the   Loire  from   the  fertile   Limagne 
d'Auvergne.       Some    Eoman   merchants   were   settled   there, 
and   one   of  Caesar's   commissariat  officers.      When  the  ap- 
pointed day  came  round,  a  band  of  the  Carnutes,  led  by  two 
desperadoes,  Gutuatrus  and  Conconnetodumnus,  rushed  into 
the  town,  massacred  the  Eomans,  and  plundered  their  stores. 
The  tidings  sped  swiftly  through  the  length  and  breadth  of 
Gaul ;    for  whenever  an  important  event  occurred,  the  by- 
standers made  it  known  by  loud  shouts,  and  those  who  heard 
them    passed    on    the    cry   over    the    country   side.     When 
The  news    Cenabum  was  attacked,  it  was  just  sunrise.     By  eight  o'clock 
that  night  the  news,  flying  from  man  to  man,  had  reached 
the    country    of    the    Arverni — the    modern    Auvergne  —  a 
hundred  and  forty  miles  to  the  south." 
Gergovia.  Gergovia,  the  chief  town  of  this  people,  w^as  situated  on 

a  mountain,  some  two  thousand  four  hundred  feet  above  the 
sea,  about  eight  miles  south-east  of  the  Puy  de  Dome.  It 
was  equally  fitted  for  a  place  of  refuge  and  for  a  capital. 
Streamlets  watered  the  meadows  which  compassed  it  round : 
forage  was  abundant ;  and  the  town  commanded  a  view 
ranging  over  a  vast  tract.  Four  miles  to  the  north  appeared 
the  gently  sloping  eminence  above  which  now  soar  the  sombre 
lava  spires  of  Clermont  cathedral :  the  vast  plain  of  the 
Limagne,  watered  by  the  AUier  and  backed  by  the  distant 
range  of  the  Forez,  extended  on  the  north-east :  above 
wooded  hills  and  valleys  on  the  west,  its  summit  crowned  by 
the  holiest  sanctuary  of  Gallic  worship,^  towered  the  huge 
blunt  cupola  of  the  Puy  de  Dome ;  and  all  around,  as  far  as 

1  See  pp.  402-15. 

^  See  pp.  721-2,  and  Eevue  Mstorique,  Ixxv.,  1901,  p.  401. 

^  See  an  interesting  article  in  the  Eevue  Mstorique,  xxxvi.,  1888,  pp.  1-28. 


reaches  the 
Arverni. 


vii         THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  VERCINGETOEIX      103 

the  eye  could  reach,  rose  the  cones  of  the  volcanic  land  where  52  b.c.    • 
the  Arvernian  mountaineers  had  made  their  home. 

At    that   time  there   was  living   in    the  town   a   young  Vercinge- 
noble  named  Vercingetorix.       Caesar  hyl  already  discerned  his  w^thstaud" 
ability  and  attempted  to  purchase  his  support.      His  father,  ing  the 
Celtillus,  had  been  the  most  powerful  chief  in  Gaul :  but  he  of  t^e 
had  tried  to  restore  the  detested  monarchy,  and  had  paid  Arvernian 
for  his  ambition  with  his  life.     A  Celt  of  the  Celts,  brave,  ment, 
impulsive,  chivalrous  to  a  fault,  Vercingetorix  possessed  also,  ™uses 

•^  .  ,  popular 

in  a  fuller  measure  than  any  of  the  patriots  who  arose  before  enthusiasm 
him,  the  gift  of  personal  magnetism.      He  called  his  retainers  [j'J  ^^^^^' 
together,  and  told  them  his  plans.      Their  passions  were  easily 
inflamed.      The  government,  however,  had  always  adhered  to 
Caesar.      The  leading  men  regarded  the  movement  as  quixotic, 
and  ordered  the  young  chief  to  leave  the  town.      But  Ver- 
cingetorix persevered.      He  took  into  his  pay  all  the  outcasts 
and  desperadoes  in  the  district.      He  went  from  village  to 
village,   and   harangued   the   people ;   and   all    who    listened 
caught  the  fire  of  his  enthusiasm.      At  the  head  of  his  levies 
he  returned  to  Gergovia,  and  banished  the  chiefs  who  had 
lately  banished  him.      His  adherents  saluted   him   as   king.  Jiost  of  the 
He  sent  out  his  envoys  in  all  directions  :  soon  nearly  every  ^^^^^  ^^'^ 
tribe  in  western  Gaul  from  the  Seine  to  the  Garonne  joined  Seine  and 

.   .        the  Gar- 

the  movement ;    and   the    impressionable    Celts,    recognising  Q^^g  join 
Vercingetorix  as  the  man  of  destiny  who  was  to  save  their  him,  and 
country,  unanimously  bestowed  upon  him  the  chief  command,  com- 
He  levied  from  each  state  a  definite  quota  of  troops  and  of  niander-in- 
hostages,  and  ordered  each  to  manufacture  a  definite  quantity  „     , 
of  weapons  by  a  fixed  day.      He  knew  that  the  tribal  militia-  raised  an 
men  would  be  of  little  use  except  for  guerilla  warfare,  and  ^™^^' 
therefore  devoted  all  his  efforts  to  strengthening  his  cavalry. 
Waverers  and  laggards  he  soon  brought  to  their  senses  by 
ruthless    severity.      Torture    or    the    stake    punished    grave 
breaches  of  discipline  ;  while  minor  offenders  were  sent  home, 
with  their  ears  lopped  off  or  an  eye  gouged  out,  to  serve  as  a 
warning  to  their  neighbours.      These  methods  were  effective. 
An  army  was  speedily  raised ;  and  the  bulk  of  the  Celtican 
patriots   were   united,   for    the    first   time,   under    one   great 
leader. 


104      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOKIX     chap. 


52  B.C. 
The  dis- 
sentient 
tribes. 


TheiBitu- 
riges  join 
Vercinge- 
torix. 


Caesar  re- 
turns with 
recruits 
to  the 
Province. 


How  shall 
he  rejoin 
his  legions 


It  must  not,  however,  be  supposed  that  even  now  the 
movement  was  general.  The  Aedui,  jealous  of  their  old 
rivals,  the  Arverni,  and  not  prepared  to  break  with  Caesar, 
still  kept  aloof:  the  tribes  who  looked  up  to  them  remained 
passive.  The  Aquitanians  naturally  took  no  heed  of  what 
was  going  on  among  the  aliens  beyond  the  Garonne.  The 
Belgae  had  been  terribly  punished  for  their  late  rebellion ; 
and  either  for  this  reason  or  because  they  were  jealous  of 
their  Celtican  neighbours,  they  left  them  alone.  It  remained 
to  be  seen  whether  Vercingetorix  would  be  able,  by  the  spell 
of  his  personality,  or  by  the  victories  which  he  might  gain, 
to  rouse  the  whole  people  into  united  action. 

His  first  step  was  to  send  a  chief,  named  Lucterius,  the 
most  daring  of  his  lieutenants,  to  deal  with  the  Euteni,  who 
dwelt  in  the  district,  bordering  on  the  Eoman  Province, 
which  is  now  called  Aveyron.  He  himself  marched  north- 
ward, with  the  remainder  of  the  force,  into  the  great  i^lain  of 
the  Berri,  which  belonged  to  the  Bituriges.  This  people  at 
once  sent  envoys  to  the  Aedui,  whose  supremacy  they  recog- 
nised, to  ask  for  help.  The  Aedui,  acting  on  the  advice  of 
Caesar's  generals,  sent  a  force  of  infantry  and  cavalry  to  their 
assistance.  The  force  marched  to  the  banks  of  the  Loire, 
which  separated  the  two  peoples,  halted  there  for  a  few  days, 
and  then  returned.  They  excused  themselves  to  the  Eoman 
generals,  on  the  plea  that  they  had  had  reason  to  fear  that, 
if  they  crossed  the  river,  the  Bituriges  would  combine  with 
the  Arverni  to  surround  them.  Caesar  could  never  find  out 
whether  their  plea  was  true  or  false.  Directly  after  they 
had  turned  their  backs  the  Bituriges  threw  in  their  lot  with 
Vercingetorix. 

By  the  time  that  the  news  of  the  rebellion  reached  Italy, 
Eome,  in  the  strong  hands  of  Pompey,  was  quieting  down  ; 
and  Caesar  was  able  to  start  for  Gaul  without  delay.  He 
took  with  him  a  number  of  recruits,  whom  he  had  raised  in 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  to  repair  the  losses  of  the  late  campaigns. 
His  first  difficulty,  on  arriving  in  the  Province,  was  to  rejoin 
1  his  army.  The  legions  were  quartered  at  Agedincum,  on  the 
plateau  of  Langres,  and  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Treves,  two 
hundred  miles  and  more  to  the  north.      If  he  were  to  send 


VII         THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  VEECINGETOEIX      105 

for  them,  they  would  be  compelled  to  fight  a  battle  as  they  52  b.c. 
marched  southwards  ;  and  he  was  unwilling  to  trust  the  issue 
to  his  lieutenants.      On  the  other  hand,  it  would  be  foolhardy 
for  him,  with  only  a  slender  escort,  to  attempt  to  make  his 
way  to  them.     Even  the  Aedui  were  believed  to  be  uutrust-  [Tiie 
worthy ;     while    Lucterius    had    just    won    over    the    tribes  j^itiobriges 
between  the  Garonne,  the  Dordogne  and  the  Cevennes,  and,  and 
having  raised  fresh  levies,  was  threatening  to  cross  the  Tarn 
and  descend  upon  the  opulent  city  of  Xarbo,      Caesar  saw  [Nar- 
that    before    all    things    it  was   necessary    to    safeguard   the 
Province.      Hastening  to  Narbo,  he  assured  the  anxious  pro-  He 
vincials  that  there  was  no  cause  for  alarm,  and  posted  detach-  pr^o^i^'ce^*^ 
ments,  drawn  from  the  troops  who  garrisoned   the  Province,  from  a 
in  the   surrounding  country  and  also  in   the  districts  round  invasion :' 
Toulouse,  AIM  and  Nimes.    Having  thus  checkmated  Lucterius, 
he  went  to  join  his  new  levies,  which  had  been  ordered  to 
concentrate  in  the  country  of  the  Helvii,  a  Provincial  tribe 
who  dwelt  in  the  Vivarais,  on  the  eastern  side  of  the  Cevennes. 
He  now  saw  his  way  to  reach  the  army.      Beyond  the  Cevennes 
lay  the  country  of  A^ercingetorix, — undefended,  for  Yercinge- 
torix   was   in   the   Berri,  a  hundred   miles   away.      But   the 
mountain  track  was  buried  beneath  snow ;    and  no  one  had 
ever  before   attempted   the  journey   under   such    conditions. 
Nevertheless  Caesar  advanced.      Moving  up  the  valley  of  the 
Ardeche,  he  made  for  the  w^atershed  between  the  sources  of 
the  Allier  and  the   Loire.^      By  prodigious  efforts  the   men  crosses  the 
shovelled  aside  the  snow ;     and  the  Arverni,  who  had  never  j^f^^^^^s*^^' 
dreamed  that  any  one  would  venture  to  cross  their  mountain  Auvergne, 
barrier,  were  astounded  to  see  the  Ptomans  descending  into  y°  j-cin^crT-^ 
the   plains.      Caesar's   horsemen   swept  over  the   country  in  torix  to 
small  parties,  carrying  fire  and  sword.      The  news  soon  spread ;  ^^i^^^ . 
and  Vercingetorix,  reluctantly  yielding  to  the  entreaties  of  his 
tribesmen,  hurried  to  the  rescue.      This  was  just  what  Caesar 
had  anticipated.      Now  that  the  rebel  army  was  out  of  the 
way,  he  might,  with  comparative  safety,  travel  northward  to 
join  his  legions ;  and  so  confident  was  he  in  the  soundness 
of  his  forecast  that,  before  he  learned  that  Vercingetorix  had 

^  See  Arcficrological  Journal,  xviii.,  1S61,  p.  369,  and  Napoleon,  Hist,  de 
Jules  C'^sar,  ii.  244. 


106      THE  EEBELLION  OF  YEECINGETOKIX     chap. 

52  B.C.       commenced  his  march,  he  acted  as  though  he  had  done  so. 
He  left  Deciraiis  Brutus,  who  had  commanded  in  the  sea  fight 
with  the  Veueti,  to  occupy  the  enemy's  attention ;  and  for 
fear  his  design  might  get  abroad,  he  announced  that  he  was 
only  going  to  procure  reinforcements,  and  would  be  back  in 
then  seizes  three  days.      Then,  recrossing  the  Cevennes,  he  hastened  to 
tuuity^to '   Vienna  on  the  Ehone  ;  picked  up  there  a  body  of  cavalry, 
rejoin  his     which   he  had   sent  on   from   the  Province  to  wait  for  him ; 
°      '       pushed  on  up  the  valley  of  the  Saone  as  swiftly  as  horses 
could  carry  him,  hoping   to  elude  the  Aedui,  in  case  they 
were   hostile  ;  rejoined    the  legions   which  he  had  left  near 
[Early  in     Langres  ;  and,  before  Vercingetorix  knew  where  he  was,  concen- 
trated the  whole  army  in  the  neighbourhood  of  Agediucum.^ 
Vercinge-  Verciugetorix,    however,    quickly    recovered    from    this 

besieges      Surprise.      In  the  south  of  Nievre,  near  the  confluence  of  the 
Gorgobina  Allicr  and   the  Loire,"  there  was  a  town  called  Gorgobina, 

rSt  Parize- 

le-Chatei  ?]  belonging  to  the  Boii,  whom,  it  will  be  remembered,  Caesar 
had  placed  in  dependence  upon  the  Aedui.  To  strike  at 
Caesar's  allies  would  be  equivalent  to  striking  at  Caesar 
himself.  Vercingetorix  accordingly  prepared  to  besiege  the 
stronghold.  Again  Caesar  was  in  a  dilemma.  If  he  left 
Gorgobina  to  its  fate,  the  tribes  that  still  remained  loyal 
would  conclude  that  he  could  not  be  relied  upon  to  protect 
his  friends,  and  would  therefore  probably  join  the  rebels. 
If,  on  the  other  hand,  he  undertook  a  campaign  so  early  in 
the  year,  the  army  would  be  in  danger  of  starving ;  for, 
owing  to  the  severity  of  the  weather,  it  was  very  difficult  to 
transport  supplies.  But  anything  was  better  than  to  lose 
the  confidence  of  his  allies.  He  must  trust  to  the  Aedui  to 
Caesar  Supply  him  with  corn.  Leaving  two  legions  at  Agedincum 
marches      ^0  guard  his  heavy  baggage,^  and  sending  messengers  to  tell 

from  ^  J  eo   o   '  o  o 

Agediucuui 

(Sens)  to  1  Qaesar  does  not  tell  us  what  became  of  Brutus  after  he  had  fulfilled  his 

Q        I  •        mission.     Probably  he  retreated  to  the  Province.     He  took  part  in  the  opera- 
tions at  Alesia, — the  closing  scene  of  the  campaign. 
2  See  note  on  Gorgobina,  pp.  426-32. 

^  The  recruits,  who  had  been  temporarily  left  behind  with  Brutus  in  the 
country  of  the  Arverni,  were  ordered  to  march  to  Agedincum,  though  Caesar 
does  not  say  so,  doubtless  to  learn  their  drill  ;  for  Labienus  left  them  there 
when  he  started  on  his  campaign  against  the  Parisii  and  the  Senones.  See 
p.  129,  andi?,  G.,  vii.  57,  §  1. 


VII         THE  EEBELLION  OF  VERCINGETOEIX      107 

the  Boii  that  he  was  coming  and  encourage  them  to  hold^^B.c. 
out,  he  marched  for  Cxorgobina.  Instead,  however,  of  taking 
the  direct  route  southward,  he  intended  to  go  round  by  way 
of  Cenabum ;  for,  although  time  was  precious,  it  was  of 
paramount  importance  to  punish,  first  of  all,  the  people  who 
had  been  the  first  to  rebel,  and  who,  by  the  massacre  of 
Eoman  citizens,  had  outraged  the  majesty  of  Rome.-'  More- 
over, by  ravaging  the  lands  of  the  Carnutes  and  Bituriges,  he 
might  count  on  forcing  Vercingetorix  to  relax  his  hold  on 
Gorgobina.  His  cavalry  were  comparatively  weak,  for  some 
of  the  tribes  which  in  former  years  had  furnished  contingents 
were  now  in  revolt :  but  he  had  reinforced  his  Gallic  and 
Spanish  horsemen  by  four  hundred  Germans,  whose  value 
he  had  doubtless  recognised  in  the  campaign  against  the 
Usipetes  and  Tencteri.  At  the  close  of  the  second  day's 
march  he  laid  siege  to  Vellaunodunum,  a  stronghold  of  the 
Senones,  probably  on  the  site  of  the  modern  Montargis,  in 
order  to  avoid  leaving  an  enemy  in  his  rear,  and  to  facilitate 
the  transport  of  his  supplies.  In  three  days  the  place  captures 
surrendered,  and,  leaving  Trebonius  to  disarm  the  inhabitants  duimm : ' 
and  take  hostages  for  their  good  behaviour,  he  pushed  on 
for  Cenabum.  The  road  crossed  the  great  forest  of  Orleans  ; 
and  Caesar  accomplished  the  distance  in  two  long  marches. 
It  was  evening  when  he  arrived, — too  late  to  begin  the 
siege  :  but  the  troops  at  once  began  to  make  the  necessary 
preparations.  The  Loire  was  spanned  by  a  bridge,  the 
northern  end  of  which  could  only  be  reached  from  within 
the  town.  The  Carnutes,  who  had  expected  that  Vellauno- 
dunum would  hold  out  longer,  were  not  prepared  for  resist- 
ance, and  tried  to  escape  in  the  night  over  the  bridge :  but 
Caesar,  foreseeing  their  attempt,  had  kept  two  legions  under 
arms  :  the  gates  were  instantly  fired,  and  the  town  seized ; 
and,  as  the  thronging  masses  were  struggling  forward  through  captures 
the   narrow  streets,  the  legions  fell   upon  them,  and  almost  !^"^\-  i,, 

'  o  c  '  jiuuisnes 

all  were  taken  prisoners.      The  booty  was  given  up  to   the  Cenabum ; 
soldiers :  the  town  was  set  ablaze ;  and  the  army  passed  over 

^  This  seems  a  sufficient  explanation  of  Caesar's  having  made  a  detour  (see 
my  note  on  Cenabum,  pp.  406-7).  But  it  is  also  ijossible  that,  if  there  were 
any  bridges  over  the  Loire  above  Cenabum,  Vercingetorix  had  destroyed  them. 


108      THE  EEBELLION  OE  YEECINGETOEIX     chap. 


52  B.C. 

crosses  the 

Loire,  and 

cajitures 

Novio- 

(iurmm 

[Villate, 

near 

Neuvy-sur- 

Baran- 

geon  ?]  ; 

and 

marches  to 

besiege 

Avaricura. 


Vercinge- 
torix  per- 
suades the 
Bituriges 
and  other 
trihes  to 
burn  their 
towns  and 
arauaries. 


the  bridge,  and  pushed  on  to  relieve  Gorgobina,  Noviodunum, 
%vhich  lay  on  their  line  of  march,  promptly  surrendered. 
The  cavalry  of  Vercingetorix,  who  had  hurriedly  raised  the 
siege  of  Gorgobina,  appeared  in  time  to  risk  a  battle  for  its 
recovery  :  but  they  scattered  before  the  charge  of  the  German 
squadron  ;  and  Caesar  marched  southward  for  Avaricum,  the 
capital  of  the  Bituriges,  now  occupied  by  the  famous  cathedral 
city  of  Bourges. 

So  far  Vercingetorix  had  met  with  a  succession  of  disasters. 
But  his  spirit  was  indomitable,  and  he  knew  how  to  learn 
from  experience.  He  saw  that  the  war  must  be  conducted 
on  a  totally  different  principle.  Nothing  was  to  be  gained 
by  defending  towns  which  could  offer  no  resistance ;  and  it 
was  hopeless  to  encounter  the  Eomans  in  the  open  field. 
But  he  had  thousands  of  light  horse  who  could  scour  the 
country  and  cut  off  their  supplies.  The  grass  was  not  yet 
grown,  nor  the  corn  ripe  ;  and  Caesar  could  only  replenish  his 
stores  by  sending  out  detached  parties  to  rifle  the  granaries. 
Vercingetorix  called  his  officers  together,  and  told  them  his 
plans.  They  must  hunt  down  the  Eoman  foragers  wherever 
they  could  find  them,  and  attack  the  baggage-train.  They 
must  make  up  their  minds  to  sacrifice  their  own  interests 
for  the  national  weal.  Every  hamlet,  every  barn  where  the 
enemy  could  find  provender  must  be  burned  to  the  ground. 
Even  the  towns  must  be  destroyed,  save  those  which  were 
impregnable,  lest  they  should  tempt  men  who  ought  to  be  in 
the  field  to  go  to  them  for  shelter,  and  lest  the  Eomans 
should  plunder  their  stores.  This  might  sound  very  hard : 
but  it  would  be  far  harder  for  them  to  be  slain  while  their 
wives  and  children  were  sold  into  slavery ;  and,  if  they  were 
beaten,  this  would  inevitably  be  their  doom.  This  uncom- 
promising speech  was  greeted  with  unanimous  applause. 
For  such  a  leader  men  would  consent  to  any  sacrifice. 
Within  a  single  day  more  than  twenty  villages  in  the  Berri 
were  burned  down.  All  round  the  great  plain,  wherever 
the  Eomans  looked,  the  sky  was  aglow.  The  wretched  in- 
habitants told  each  other  that  they  were  going  to  win,  and 
would  soon  recover  what  they  had  lost.  But  Vercingetorix 
could  only  govern  by  character  and   tact.      He  had  not  the 


VII         THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  VEECIXGETOEIX      109 

powers  belouging  to  the  general  of  an  established  common-  52  b.c. 
wealth.      He  might  venture  to  be  severe :  but  he  could  not  rjo-es^con. 
afford    to    lose    his   popularity.       The   question   was   raised,  trary  to 
whether  Avaricum  should  be  defended,  or  destroyed  like  the  resolve  To' 
lesser   towns.       The    Bituriges    were    not   restrained    by    the  (defend 
sense   of    discipline.       Their   spokesmen    eloquently   pleaded 
their  cause.      Their  capital  was  the  finest  town  almost  in  the 
whole  of  Gaul.      Besides,  its  position  was  so  strong  that  they 
could  easily  defend  it.      Yercingetorix  strongly  opposed  their 
appeal :  but  they  pleaded  so  pathetically,  and  their  brother 
chiefs  showed  such  sympathy  with  them,  that  he  was  obliged 
to  give  way.      Following  Caesar   by  easy  stages,  he  finally 
halted   about    fourteen   miles   from   Avaricum,   on   a   strong 
position,    from    which     he     could     communicate    with     the 
garrison  and  harass  the  besiegers. 

Avaricum  was  surrounded,  on  every  side  except  the  Siege  of 
south,  by  marshes  intersected  by  sluggish  streams.  On  the  -^^''^™^™- 
south  it  was  approached  by  a  natural  causeway,  which,  about 
a  hundred  yards  from  the  wall,  suddenly  shelved  down  so  as 
to  form  a  kind  of  huge  moat.^  Behind  this  neck  of  land 
Caesar  pitched  his  camp.  As  the  marshes  rendered  it  im- 
possible to  invest  the  town,  he  proceeded  to  construct  a 
terrace,  by  which  picked  troops  were  ultimately  to  advance 
to  the  assault.  The  flanking  parts  were  to  serve  as  viaducts, 
to  carry  the  towers  in  which  artillery  were  placed ;  and  it 
is  probable  that  the  platform  intended  for  the  columns  of 
assault  occupied  only  the  front  portion  of  the  intervening 
space.  First  of  all,  in  order  to  provide  a  secure  foundation, 
the  ground  was  cleared  of  obstructions  and  levelled  as  far  as 
possible  by  men  working  under  stout  huts.^  The  sides  of 
each  viaduct  were  constructed  of  parallel  tiers  of  logs,  the 
interstices  between  which  were  probably  packed  with  earth 
and  rubble.  The  workmen  brought  up  the  material  through 
Knes  of  sheds,  which,  being  contiguous  to  one  another  and 
open  at  both  ends,  formed  covered  galleries ;  and  they  were 
further  protected  in  front  by  a  fence  of  high  wooden  shields 

^  See  Napoleon,  Hist,  de  Jiihs  Cesar,  ii.  255,  and  Planche  20. 
'^  See  Stoifel,  Hist,  de  Jules  Cesar, — Guerre  civile,  ii.  357,  and  Caesar,  B.  C, 
ii.  2,  §  4. 


110      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  moving  on  rollers.  Between  the  walls  of  timber,  which 
served  as  lateral  supports,  they  built  up  the  core  of  the 
viaduct,  which  was  composed  of  earth,  stones  and  timber. 
The  artillerymen  who  manned  the  tower  kept  their  catapults 
playing  upon  the  defenders  of  the  wall.  As  the  structure 
rose  daily  higher,  the  elevation  of  the  tower  was  correspond- 
ingly augmented.^  When  the  viaduct  was  completed,  the 
tower  could  be  moved  backwards  or  forwards  along  the 
surface ;  while  the  sheds  were  ranged  on  either  side,  and 
served  as  a  means  of  safe  communication.  The  central 
mound  was  probably  raised  higher  than  the  other  two,^ 
in  order  to  facilitate  the  assault ;  and  sheds  were  placed 
upon  it  also,  to  screen  the  assailants  from  observation  and 
attack. 

Meanwhile  the  new  policy  of  Vercingetorix  was  begin- 
ning to  make  itself  felt.  His  scouts  kept  him  informed  of 
Caesar's  movements,  and  conveyed  his  instructions  to  the 
garrison.  Whenever  the  Eomans  went  out  to  forage  or  pro- 
cure corn,  his  horsemen  kept  them  in  sight,  and  handled  them 
severely  if  they  ever  ventured  to  disperse.  Caesar  did  all 
that  ingenuity  could  suggest  to  baffle  him,  sending  the  men 
out  at  odd  times  and  in  varying  directions :  but  the  enemy 
seemed  ubiquitous.  Supplies  were  running  short,  and  Caesar 
called  upon  the  Aedui  and  the  Boii  for  corn ;  but  the  Aedui 
were  half-hearted ;  and  the  Boii,  though  they  did  their  best, 
had  little  to  give.  For  several  days  the  soldiers  had  no 
bread,  and  were  obliged  to  kill  the  cattle,  driven  in  from  dis- 
tant villages,  in  order  to  subsist  at  all.  Yet,  as  Caesar 
proudly  related,  not  one  of  them  uttered  a  word  that  was 
unworthy  of  their  own  victorious  record  or  of  the  majesty  of 
the  Eoman  people.  Caesar  went  among  them  as  they  worked, 
and  did  all  he  could  to  keep  up  their  spirits.  He  would 
abandon  the  siege,  he  -told  them,  if  they  found  the  pangs 
of  hunger  too  hard  to  bear.  But  they  would  not  hear  of 
such  a  thing.      They  proudly  reminded  him  that  they  had 

1  See  p.  600. 

^  Forming  what  is  technically  called  a  "cavalier."  See  ray  note  on  "  The 
Aqgcr,"  pp.  597-600,  and  Rev.  dcs  itudcs  anciennes,  ii.,  1900,  pp.  331,  n.  2, 
337,  n.  2. 


vii         THE  EEBELLION  OF  VERCINGETOKIX      111 

fought  under  his  commaucl   for   six  years  with  untarnished  52  b.c. 
honour ;   and  they  would  cheerfully  endure  any  hardship  if 
only  they  could  avenge  the  massacre  at  Cenabum. 

Vercingetorix,  when  his  provender  was  consumed,  moved 
some  miles  nearer  the  town.  It  was  reported  that  he  had 
left  his  infantry  in  their  new  encampment,  and  gone  with  his 
cavalry  to  lie  in  wait  for  the  Eoman  foragers  in  the  place 
where  he  expected  that  they  would  be  found  on  the  following 
day.  Caesar  saw  his  opportunity,  and  marched  at  midnight 
to  attack  the  encampment.  But  the  enemy  were  well  served 
by  their  scouts.  They  removed  their  waggons  and  baggage 
out  of  harm's  way  into  the  recesses  of  a  wood  ;  and  in  the 
early  morning  Caesar  found  them  securely  posted  on  a  hill 
surrounded  by  a  belt  of  morass,  not  more  than  fifty  feet  wide. 
They  had  broken  down  the  causeways  which  spanned  the 
morass,  and  posted  piquets  opposite  the  places  where  it  was 
fordable.  The  legionaries  clamoured  for  the  signal  to  advance : 
but  Caesar  told  them  that  victory  could  only  be  purchased  by 
the  slaughter  of  many  gallant  men,  and  that  their  lives  were 
more  precious  to  him  than  his  own  reputation. 

Vercingetorix,  on  returning  to  the  encampment,  was 
accused  of  treachery.  His  officers  told  hun  to  his  face  that 
he  would  never  have  left  them  without  a  leader,  exposed  to 
that  well-timed  attack,  if  he  had  not  intended  to  betray  them. 
He  ought  never  to  have  moved  from  his  original  position. 
It  was  plain  enough  that  he  wanted  to  reign  as  Caesar's 
creature,  not  by  the  choice  of  his  countrymen.  Vercingetorix 
was  at  no  loss  for  an  answer.  He  had  moved,  he  reminded 
them,  at  their  own  request,  simply  in  order  to  get  forage. 
They  had  not  been  in  the  slightest  danger ;  for  the  position 
in  which  he  had  left  them  was  impregnable.  He  had  pur- 
posely refrained  from  delegating  his  command  to  any  one,  for 
fear  they  should  worry  his  substitute  into  risking  a  battle ; 
for  he  knew  that  they  had  not  resolution  enough  to  adhere 
to  a  system  of  warfare  which  required  patient  toil.  They 
ought  to  be  thankful  that  the  Eomans  had  tried  to  attack 
them,  because  they  could  now  see  for  themselves  what  cowards 
the  Romans  were.  He  had  no  need  to  beg  Caesar  for  a 
kingdom  which  he  could  win  for  himself  by  the  sword ;  and 


112      THE  EEBELLION  OF  YEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

they  might  take  back  their  gift  if  they  imagined  that  they 
were  doing  him  a  favour,  and  not  indebted  to  him  for  their 
safety.  "  And  now,"  he  said,  "  that  you  may  satisfy  your- 
selves that  I'm  speaking  the  truth,  listen  to  what  the 
Piomans  themselves  say."  Some  camp-followers,  whom  he  had 
captured  a  few  days  before,  stepped  forward.  They  had  been 
carefully  drilled  in  the  part  they  were  to  play.  Questioned 
by  Vercingetorix,  they  stated  that  they  were  Eoman  soldiers, 
and  had  secretly  left  the  camp  in  the  hope  of  finding  some- 
thing to  eat ;  that  their  comrades,  one  and  all,  were  half- 
starved,  and  too  weak  to  get  through  their  work ;  and  that 
Caesar  had  made  up  his  mind,  unless  within  three  days  he 
had  achieved  some  tangible  results,  to  abandon  the  siege. 
"You  see,"  said  Vercingetorix,  "I — I  whom  you  call  a  traitor 
— have  brought  this  mighty  army,  without  the  loss  of  a  drop 
of  your  blood,  to  the  verge  of  starvation.  Xo  course  is  open 
to  them  but  an  ignominious  retreat ;  and  I  have  arranged 
that  not  a  single  tribe  shall  give  them  refuge."  Clashiug 
their  weapons,  as  their  custom  was,  the  tribesmen  swore  that 
Vercingetorix  was  the  greatest  of  generals  and  that  they 
would  trust  him  through  thick  and  thin.  They  realised  how 
much  was  staked  upon  the  safety  of  Avaricum ;  and  ten 
thousand  picked  men  were  sent  into  the  town.  But  jealousy 
had  much  to  do  with  this  decision.  If  the  Bituriges  suc- 
ceeded in  holding  the  fortress  unaided,  the  glory  of  the 
triumph  would  be  theirs. 

In  devising  expedients  to  battle  the  operations  of  the 
besiegers,  the  Gauls  showed  astonishing  ingenuity.  The  wall, 
compacted  with  transverse  balks  and  longitudinal  beams  of 
timber,  was  too  tough,  so  to  speak,  to  be  breached  by  the 
battering  ram ;  and,  being  also  largely  composed  of  stone  and 
rubble,  it  was  proof  against  fire.^  The  Eoman  engineers 
used  powerful  hooks,  riveted  to  stout  poles,  to  loosen  and 
drag  down  the  stones.  These  hooks  the  garrison  seized  with 
nooses ;  and  then,  by  means  of  windlasses,  pulled  them  up 
over  the  wall.  They  made  daily  sorties,  fired  the  woodwork 
of  the  terrace,  and  harassed  the  workers  by  frequent  attacks. 
They  erected  towers  along  the  wall,  in  imitation  of  those  of 
1  See  pp.  729-31. 


VII         THE  REBELLION  OF  VERCINGETORIX      113 

the  besiegers,  and  filled  them  with  archers  and  slingers.  52  b.c. 
They  drove  galleries  under  the  terrace,  and  dragged  away  the 
timber  of  which  it  was  composed ;  and,  assailing  the  Roman 
sappers  with  sharp  stakes,  heavy  stones  and  boiling  pitch, 
they  stopped  the  galleries  by  which  they  were  approaching 
to  undermine  the  wall.^ 

The  siege  had  lasted  twenty-five  days ;  and,  in  spite  of 
numbing  cold  and  drenching  rains  and  harassing  opposition, 
the  indefatigable  Romans  had  built  up  the  terrace,  three 
hundred  and  thirty  feet  wide  and  eighty  feet  high,-  till  it 
almost  reached  the  wall.  To  complete  the  final  section  of 
the  work  was  always  a  difficult  and  troublesome  operation. 
It  was  no  longer  possible  to  rear  a  compact  and  uniform 
structure,  as  the  enemy,  standing  right  above  on  the  wall, 
could  pitch  heavy  stones  and  other  missiles  on  to  the  work- 
men. Huts  of  extraordinary  strength,  the  sloping  roofs  of 
which  were  protected  against  fire  by  bricks,  clay  and  raw 
hides,  were  therefore  placed  near  the  edge  of  the  terrace  ;  and, 
screened  by  them,  the  men  shot  earth,  timber  and  fascines 
into  the  vacant  space  until  the  mass  reached  the  necessary 
height.^  About  midnight,  when  the  men  were  putting  the 
finishing  touches  to  the  work,  a  cloud  of  smoke  was  seen 
rising  above  it.  Some  miners  had  burrowed  underneath,  and 
set  the  woodwork  on  fire.  A  yell  of  exultation  rang  from 
the  town.  Flaming  brands  shot  down  from  the  wall  and 
illumined  the  figures  standing  above  :  pitch  and  logs  were 
fiung  on  to  the  fire ;  and  the  enemy's  masses  came  streaming 
through  the  gates.  If  the  Romans  were  confused,  it  was 
only  for  a  moment.  Caesar  himself  was  on  the  spot ;  for 
he  had  been  personally  superintending  the  workmen.  Two 
legions  were  always  kept  under  arms  in  front  of  the  camp, 
ready  for  emergencies ;  and  while  some  cohorts  threw  them- 
selves upon  the  enemy,  others  drew  back  the  towers  out  of 
reach  of  the  flames  or  dragged  asunder  the  woodw^ork  of  the 
terrace  to  save  the  hinder  part  of  it  from  catching  fire  ; 
others  again  ran  to  extinguish  the  flames.     The  small  hours 

1  See  pp.  595-7.  ^  See  pp.  731-2. 

^  See  pp.  600  and  602-4,  and  Stoffel,  Hist,  de  Jules  Cesar, — Gnerre  civile, 
ii.  359. 

I 


114      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  dragged  by  ;  and  iu  the  grey  dawn  the  battle  was  still  raging. 
The  mantlets  that  screened  the  workmen  who  moved  the 
towers  had  been  burned ;  and  it  was  therefore  hazardous  to 
wheel  the  towers  to  the  front.''  More  than  once  it  seemed 
that  the  Gauls  were  winning ;  and  Caesar  himself  was  moved 
to  admiration  by  their  stubborn  valour.  He  saw  a  man 
taking  lumps  of  fat  and  pitch  from  his  comrades,  and  flinging 
them  into  the  flames.  A  missile  struck  him ;  and  he  fell 
dead.  Another  man  stepped  across  his  prostrate  body,  and 
took  his  place.  He  too  was  struck  :  but  in  a  moment  a  third 
was  doing  his  work,  and  presently  a  fourth ;  and,  though 
others  had  to  die,  the  post  was  never  deserted  until  the 
Eomans  finally  extinguished  the  flames,  and  the  Gauls,  beaten 
at  every  point,  were  forced  back  into  the  town. 

Vercingetorix  knew  that  it  was  useless  now  to  prolong  the 
defence.  He  therefore  sent  word  to  the  garrison  to  slip  out 
in  the  dark  and  come  to  his  camp.  They  were  confident  that 
the  marshes  would  prevent  the  Eomans  from  getting  at  them. 
Night  came  on ;  and  the  men,  gathered  in  the  streets  and 
open  places,  were  just  starting.  Suddenly  there  was  a  rush  of 
women  :  weeping,  they  flung  themselves  at  their  husbands'  feet, 
and  besought  them  not  to  abandon  them  and  the  children  who 
belonged  to  father  and  mother  alike  to  the  vengeance  of  the 
Eomans.  Deaf  to  their  entreaties,  the  men  pressed  on.  Frantic 
with  terror,  the  women  screamed  and  gesticulated,  to  put  the 
besiegers  on  their  guard  ;  and  the  men  were  obliged  to  give  way. 

stormingof  Next  day  Caesar  completed  the  repair  of  the  terrace,  and 
moved  forward  one  of  the  towers.  Eain  fell  in  torrents  ;  and 
noticing  that  the  sentries  on  the  wall  were  posted  carelessly, 
he  determined  to  deliver  the  assault.  The  workmen  were 
told  to  loiter,  in  order  to  put  the  garrison  off  their  guard. 
The  troops  were  concealed  within  and  in  the  rear  of  the  sheds 
which  stood  upon  the  terrace.^  Caesar  harangued  them,  and 
promised  rewards  to  those  who  should  be  the  first  to  mount 
the  wall.  The  artillerymen  in  the  tower  made  play  with 
their  engines,  to  give   their  comrades   every  chance.^     The 

1  See  p.  605.  ^  gge  pp.  732.3. 

'  See  B.  G.,  vii.  27,  §  1  ;  Stoffel,  Hist,  dc  Jules  Cisar, — Guerre  civile,  ii. 
361  ;  and  Guischard,  Mem.  mil.  stcr  les  Grccs  et  les  Eoviains,  ii.  7. 


VII         THE  KEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOKIX      115 

signal  was  given.  Instantly  the  columns,  darting  forth  from  52  b.c. 
their  cover,  streamed  over  the  front  of  the  terrace  and 
swarmed  up  the  ladders  ;  and,  panic-stricken  and  confounded, 
the  defenders  were  overborne  and  driven  down  on  to  the  space 
below.  Quickly  rallying,  they  formed  up  in  compact  wedge- 
shaped  masses,  resolute  to  fight  it  out  if  they  should  be 
attacked.  But  the  Komans  were  too  wary  to  attack  them. 
They  lined  the  wall  all  round ;  and  not  a  man  of  them  would 
come  down.  Throwing  away  their  weapons,  the  Gauls  ran 
for  their  lives  through  the  town  to  its  furthest  extremity ; 
and  there  many,  jostling  one  another  in  the  narrow  gateways, 
were  slaughtered,  while  others,  who  shouldered  their  way  out, 
were  cut  down  by  the  cavalry.  Plunder  was  forgotten.  Ex- 
asperated by  the  long  weariness  of  the  siege,  burning  to  avenge  ludis- 
the  massacre  at  Ceuabum,  the  Eomans  slew  the  aged,  they  slew  cnmmate 

'  o      '         ./  massacre. 

women  and  infants,  and  spared  none.  Some  forty  thousand 
human  beings — all  but  eight  hundred  who  made  their  way 
to  the  camp  of  Vercingetorix — perished  on  that  day. 

It  was  late  at  night  M'hen  the  fugitives  approached  the 
camp.  Vercingetorix  had  a  turbulent  host  to  control.  They 
were  not  a  regular  army,  but  an  aggregate  of  tribal  levies, 
each  commanded  by  their  tribal  chiefs.  He  had  reason  to 
fear  that  the  pitiable  plight  of  the  fugitives  might  excite 
their  emotions,  and  lead  to  disturbance  and  subversion  of 
discipline.  He  therefore  sent  out  his  trusted  friends  and  the 
leading  men  of  the  several  tribes  to  which  the  fugitives 
belonged,  who  waited  for  them  on  the  road,  and  conducted 
them  in  separate  groups  to  their  several  quarters  in  the 
camp. 

Next  day  Vercingetorix  called  the  remnant  of  his  people  Verdnge- 
together,  and  made  them  a  speech.      The  Eomans,  he  said,  *°[g'^  ^?°" 
had  not  beaten  them  in  fair  fight.      They  had  merely  stolen  troops. 
an  advantage  over  them  by  superior  science.     As  they  all 
knew,  he  had  never  approved  of  defending  Avaricum.      But 
he  would  soon  repair  the  loss.      He  would  gain  over  all  the 
dissentient  tribes  to  the  cause ;  and  against  an  united  Gaul 
the  whole  world  could  not  stand  in  arms.      Meanwhile  he  had 
a  right  to  expect  that  in  future  they  should  adopt  the  Eoman 
custom  of  regularly  fortifying  their  camps. 


116      THE  KEBELLION  OF  VEECmGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  This  speech  made  an  excellent  impression.     The  multitude 

could  not  but  admire  the  cheery  courage  of  their  leader : 
they  could  not  but  admit  that  the  event  had  proved  his 
foresight.  They  respected  him  too  because  he  had  had 
the  courage  to  confront  them  in  the  hour  of  defeat,  when 
another  leader  might  not  have  dared  to  show  his  face.  So 
far  then  from  lessening,  the  disaster  only  increased  the 
estimation  in  which  he  was  held. 
He  raises  He  immediately  set  to  work  to  fulfil  his  promise.     Agents, 

^^^^^' chosen  for  their  eloquence  and  tact,  bore  lavish  bribes  and 
still  more  lavish  promises  to  the  dissentient  chiefs.  New 
weapons  and  new  clothing  were  provided  for  the  survivors  of 
the  siege.  New  levies,  including  large  numbers  of  bowmen, 
were  speedily  raised ;  and  Teutomatus,  king  of  the  Nitiobriges, 
who  occupied  the  country  round  Agen,  hastened  to  join 
Vercingetorix  with  his  own  cavalry  and  with  others  whom 
he  had  hired  from  the  Aquitanians.  Thus  the  losses  which 
had  been  incurred  at  Avaricum  were  made  good ;  while  those 
who  had  already  fought  under  Vercingetorix  had  learned  a 
salutary  lesson,  and,  in  spite  of  their  natural  laziness  and 
impatience  of  discipline,  were  in  the  humour  to  do  or  to  suffer 
whatever  he  might  command. 

The   hungry   Eomans   found   an   abundance    of    corn    in 
Avaricum ;  and  Caesar  remained  there  a  few  days  to  recruit 
their  strength.      Winter  was  just  over ;  and  he  was  about  to 
open  his  campaign  in  earnest.      The  Gauls,  in  their  new-born 
zeal,  had  entrenched  their  camp ;  and  he  was  too  prudent  to 
attack  their  strong  position  :  but  he  hoped  either  to  lure  them 
into  the  open  or  else  to  blockade  and  force  them  to  surrender. 
Caesar,  at    Suddenly  his  attention  was  distracted  by  serious  news  from 
offte^^^^^*  the  Aedui.      Two  chiefs,  Cotus  and  Convictolitavis,  were  con- 
Aedui,        tending  for  the  first  magistracy,  each  insisting  that  he  had 
tween  rival  l^^cn  legally  elected  :  their  retainers  were  up  in  arms  ;  and  a 
claimants    civil  war  was  imminent.      A  deputation  of  leading  men  begged 
office  of      Caesar  to  arbitrate.      He  saw  that  it  was  of  vital  importance 
Vergobret.  to  prevent  the  weaker  side  from  appealing  for  aid  to  Ver- 
cingetorix.    Accordingly,  though  he  was  most  reluctant  to 
delay  his  operations,  he  summoned  the  rivals  and  the  council 
to  meet  him  at  Decetia,  or  Decize,  on  the  Loire.     This  town 


GERGOVIA 


C      Col  .i«j  OmtU' 


R.un.H.n.il 


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voo^-^'^ 


r.u  ,!.  M..rmalil 


(InlhlMl 


London  Majnnillaii  <t   Co  LtJ 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOKIX      117 

was  in  Aeduan  territory,  and  nearly  sixty  miles  from  Avaricum:  52  b.c. 
but  it  was  illegal  for  the  Vergobret  to  cross  the  frontier ;  and 
Caesar  was  too  wise  to  offer  a  needless  slight  to  native  custom. 
He  was  informed  that  Cotus  had  been  nominated  by  his 
brother,  the  late  Vergobret,  in  defiance  of  an  Aeduan  law 
which  prescribed  that  no  man  should  hold  office  or  even  sit 
in  the  senate  while  any  member  of  his  family  who  had  done 
so  survived.  He  accordingly  settled  the  dispute  in  favour  of 
Convictolitavis,  who,  as  was  the  custom  when  the  outgoing 
Vergobret  failed  to  nominate  an  eligible  successor,  had  been 
appointed  by  the  Druids.^  Before  dismissing  the  council,  he 
urged  them  to  forget  their  differences,  and  told  them  that, 
if  they  wanted  to  share  in  the  spoils  of  victory,  they 
must  honestly  help  to  put  down  the  rebellion.  He  should 
require  ten  thousand  foot  to  guard  his  convoys,  and  all  their  He  sends 
cavalry.  He  then  divided  the  army  into  two  parts,  ^o  suppress 
Labienus  was  sent  northward  with  four  legions,  including  the  rebellion 

1-ii'i  the  basin 

two  that  had  been  left  at  Agedmcum,  to  restore  order  in  the  of  the 
upper  valley  of  the  Seine  ;   while  Caesar  himself,  with  the  ^^^^^y  and 
remaining   six,    marched    southward,   up    the    eastern    bank  himself  to 
of  the  AUier,  to  strike  a  blow  at  Gergovia, — the  heart  of  the  ^^^^^  . 

'  "  '  Gergovia.    • 

rebellion. 

On  the  hill  now  crowned  by  the  cathedral  of  Nevers,  He  estab- 
which  rises  above  the  Loire,  in  the  peninsula  formed  by  its  niaiiazine 
confluence  with  the  Nievre,  was  an  Aeduan  town  called  at  Novio- 
Noviodunum.  Caesar  had  marked  the  strength  of  the  (Nevers) : 
position  ;  and  here  he  established  his  chief  magazine. 

Vercingetorix  was  still  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Allier. 
As  soon  as  he  heard  of  Caesar's  advance  he  broke  down  all 
the  bridges.  The  two  armies  moved  in  full  view  of  one 
another,  with  the  river  between  them.  The  Gallic  scouts 
were  so  vigilant  that  Caesar  found  it  impossible  to  repair  any 
of  the  bridges  ;  and  he  began  to  fear  that  he  might  be  barred 
by  the  river  during  the  entire  summer.  But  Vercingetorix 
had  not  learned  the  necessity  of    watching  his   rear.     One 

^  The  question  whether  the  influence  of  the  Druids  was  generally  exerted 
on  Caesar's  side  is  discussed  on  p.  534.  See  also  M.  Camille  Jullian's  Ver- 
cingetorix,  2nd  ed.,  1901,  pp.  107-11,  and  Emjlish  Historical  Review,  April, 
1903,  p.  336. 


]h  fhc. 


i-Wvi'^nat 


.^=^^r?   ^•'' 


N 


Cham)iial 


Roman  Miles 


vii         THE  EEBELLION  OF  VERCINGETOEIX      117 

was  in  Aeduan  territory,  and  nearly  sixty  miles  from  Avaricum:  52  b.c. 
but  it  was  illegal  for  the  Vergobret  to  cross  the  frontier ;  and 
Caesar  was  too  wise  to  offer  a  needless  slight  to  native  custom. 
He  was  informed  that  Cotus  had  been  nominated  by  his 
brother,  the  late  Vergobret,  in  defiance  of  an  Aeduan  law 
which  prescribed  that  no  man  should  hold  office  or  even  sit 
in  the  senate  while  any  member  of  his  family  who  had  done 
so  survived.  He  accordingly  settled  the  dispute  in  favour  of 
Convictolitavis,  who,  as  was  the  custom  when  the  outgoing 
Vergobret  failed  to  nominate  an  eligible  successor,  had  been 
appointed  by  the  Druids.^  Before  dismissing  the  council,  he 
urged  them  to  forget  their  differences,  and  told  them  that, 
if  they  wanted  to  share  in  the  spoils  of  victory,  they 
must  honestly  help  to  put  down  the  rebellion.  He  should 
require  ten  thousand  foot  to  guard  his  convoys,  and  all  their  He  sends 
cavalry.  He  then  divided  the  army  into  two  parts.  ^^  suppress 
Labienus  was  sent  northward  with  four  legions,  including  the  rebellion 

1-1       in  tlis  basin 

two  that  had  been  left  at  Agedmcum,  to  restore  order  m  the  of  the 
upper  valley  of  the  Seine  ;  while  Caesar  himself,  with  the  ^^'^^'  ^^^^ 
remaining   six,    marched    southward,   up    the    eastern    bank  himself  to 
of  the  Allier,  to  strike  a  blow  at  Gergovia, — the  heart  of  the  ^^^^'^  . 

'  ^  Gergovia.    • 

rebellion. 

On  the  hill  now  crowned  by  the  cathedral  of  Nevers,  He  estab- 
which  rises  above  the  Loire,  in  the  peninsula  formed  by  its  mapazine 
confluence  with  the  Nievre,  was  an  Aeduan  town  called  at  Novio- 
Noviodunum.  Caesar  had  marked  the  strength  of  the  (Nevers) : 
position  ;  and  here  he  established  his  chief  magazine. 

Vercingetorix  was  still  on  the  western  bank  of  the  Allier. 
As  soon  as  he  heard  of  Caesar's  advance  he  broke  down  all 
the  bridges.  The  two  armies  moved  in  full  view  of  one 
another,  with  the  river  between  them.  The  Gallic  scouts 
were  so  vigilant  that  Caesar  found  it  impossible  to  repair  any 
of  the  bridges  ;  and  he  began  to  fear  that  he  might  be  barred 
by  the  river  during  the  entire  summer.  But  Vercingetorix 
had  not  learned  the  necessity  of    watching  his   rear.      One 

1  The  question  whether  the  influence  of  the  Druids  was  generally  exerted 
on  Caesar's  side  is  discussed  on  p.  534.  See  also  M.  Camille  Jullian's  Ver- 
ciny&orix,  2nd  ed.,  1901,  pp.  107-11,  and  English  Historical  Review,  April, 
1903,  p.  336. 


gem 


118      THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  VEECINGETORIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  evening,  Caesar  encamped  on  a  wooded  spot,  opposite  one  of 
Aiiier  by  ^  ^^^®  bridges.  K"ext  morning  he  took  forty  out  of  the  sixty 
a  strata-  cohorts  composing  his  force ;  arrayed  them  in  six  divisions, 
so  that,  seen  from  a  distance,  they  would  look  like  the  six 
legions ;  ^  and  ordered  them  to  make  a  long  march  on.  Ver- 
cingetorix  suspected  nothing.  Caesar  remained  behind  with 
the  rest  of  the  force,  waiting  for  the  hour  when,  as  he 
calculated,  the  four  legions  and  the  enemy  should  have  en- 
camped for  the  night.  Then  he  set  the  men  whom  he  had 
kept  behind,  to  work  at  the  repair  of  the  bridge.  When  it 
was  finished,  he  made  them  cross  over,  and  sent  for  the  other 
cohorts.  Yercingetorix,  finding  that  he  had  been  outwitted, 
and  unwilling  to  risk  a  battle,  hurried  on  southward  by 
prodigious  marches. 

Caesar  followed  more  leisurely ;  and  moving  across  the 
level  expanse  of  the  Limagne,  found  himself,  early  on  the 
fifth  day,  approaching  the  mountain  of  Gergovia.  Kising  on 
his  right  front,  fully  twelve  hundred  feet  above  the  plain, 
the  northern  face,  with  its  upper  terraces  broken  here  and 
there  by  sheer  precipices,  manifestly  defied  attack  ;  and,  as 
he  moved  on  past  the  long  spurs,  he  saw  that  the  eastern 
side,  steep,  rugged  and  scored  by  deep  ravines,  was  equally 
unassailable.  Presently,  observing  on  his  left  front  a  suitable 
spot  for  a  camp,  he  halted  near  the  foot  of  the  south-eastern 
slope.  His  cavalry  were  soon  engaged  in  a  skirmish ;  and 
in  the  afternoon  he  reconnoitred  the  stronghold  from  the 
south.  The  town  stood  on  an  oblong  plateau,  which  formed 
the  summit,  extending  about  seven  furlongs  from  east  to 
west,  and  six  hundred  yards  wide.  The  higher  terraces,  and 
also  the  outlying  heights  of  Eisolles,  linked  by  a  col  or  saddle 
to  the  south-western  angle  of  the  plateau,  were  bristling 
with  the  tents  of  the  Gauls ;  and  the  encampment  was  pro- 
tected by  a  wall  of  loose  stones,  which,  about  half-way  up 
the  slope,  ran  along  the  whole  southern  side.  From  the  very 
foot  of  the  mountain,  below  the  central  point  of  the  wall, 
rose  a  low  but  steep  hill,  now  called  La  Eoche  Blanche, 
which  projected  southward  at  right  angles,  and  terminated 
in   an  almost  sheer  precipice.     A  small  stream,  the  Auzon, 

1  See  pp.  733-6, 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOKIX      119 

flowed  eastward  through  the  meadows  which  extended  past  52  b.c. 
the  base  of  the  hill ;  and  two  miles  beyond  the  valley,  on 
the  left  as  one  looked  up  the  stream,  the  view  was  closed  by 
a  long  ridge,  the  Montague  de  la  Serre.  Beyond  the  heights 
of  Eisolles  was  the  high  pass  of  Opme,  which  at  one  point 
gave  access  to  them  by  a  comparatively  easy  slope,  and 
separated  them  from  the  distant  Puy  Giroux. 

The  result  of  the  reconnaissance  was  not  encouraging. 
The  ascent  to  the  stronghold  appeared  less  difficult  on  the 
south  than  on  the  other  sides :  but  even  on  the  south  the 
ascent  was  not  easy.  Moreover,  the  Gauls  held  the  whole 
space  between  the  outer  wall  and  the  town  ;  and  their  ap- 
pearance, as  Caesar  remarked,  was  truly  formidable.  Even 
if  the  Komans  could  gain  the  col  on  the  south-west,  they 
would  still  be  confronted  by  a  steep  though  short  incline. 
All  round  the  plateau  ran  a  natural  glacis,  to  climb  which, 
in  the  face  of  a  determined  enemy,  would  have  been  im- 
possible. To  assault  the  town  was  therefore  evidently  out 
of  the  question ;  and  Caesar  resolved  to  make  sure  of  his 
supplies  before  proceeding  even  to  blockade  it.  Meanwhile  he 
pitched  his  camp  on  a  low  plateau  north  of  the  Auzon,  about  and 
half  a  mile  north-west  of  the  modern  village  of  Orcet  and  before^^ 
three  thousand  yards  from  the  south-eastern  corner  of  the  Gergovia. 
town. 

For  some  days  no  event  occurred  more  important  than  rirstopera- 
a  cavalry  combat.  Vercingetorix  kept  his  troopers  busy ;  Gergovia. 
and  frequent  skirmishes  took  place  in  the  plain  between  the 
south-eastern  spurs  and  the  Roman  camp.  He  made  the 
tribal  chiefs  repair  daily  to  his  quarters  before  sunrise,  to 
furnish  their  reports  and  receive  his  instructions.  But  one 
detail  escaped  his  vigilance.  Caesar  had  detected  a  weak 
point  in  the  enemy's  position.  The  Roche  Blanche,  which 
commanded  the  only  descent  from  the  town  to  the  rich 
meadows  of  the  Auzon,  was  inadequately  garrisoned.  If  only 
he  could  get  possession  of  this  hill,  he  would  cut  off  the 
Gauls  from  the  chief  source  of  their  supplies.  The  ascent 
on  the  eastern  side  was  practicable.  In  the  dead  of  night 
Caesar  stole  out  of  camp  with  two  legions,  drove  out  the 
startled  garrison,  and  occupied  the  hill.      There  he  constructed 


120       THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 


52  B.C. 


Defection 
of  the 

Aeduan 
Vergobret. 


An  Aeduan 

contingent, 

marching 

to  join 

Caesar, 

persuaded 

by  its 

leader  to 

declare  for 

Vercinge- 

torix. 


a  small  camp,  and  counected  it  with  the  larger  one  by  a 
pair  of  parallel  trenches,  so  that  men  might  pass  unobserved 
from  camp  to  camp  under  cover  of  the  ramparts  formed  by 
the  excavated  earth.^  Even  now,  however,  he  had  cause  for 
anxiety  ;  for  his  entire  force  was  hardly  more  than  five-and- 
twenty  thousand  men, — too  few  to  invest  a  position  fully 
twelve  miles  in  extent. 

Just  at  this  time  the  alarming  news  arrived  that  the  Aedui 
were  on  the  brink  of  revolt.  They  had  not  embraced  the 
cause  of  Eome  with  the  same  unanimity,  the  same  resolution 
as  the  astute  and  far-seeing  Eemi.  Divitiaciis  had  been 
Caesar's  best  friend :  but  he  had  not  been  able  to  silence  the 
anti-Eoman  party ;  and  even  the  Caesarians  were  no  longer 
staunch.  If  they  adhered  to  Caesar,  they  would  no  doubt 
be  rewarded, — if  Caesar  gained  the  day.  But  was  it  certain 
that  he  would  ?  Vercingetorix  was  a  formidable  antagonist. 
He  might  perhaps  succeed  after  all ;  and  then  their  old  rivals, 
the  Arverni,  would  supplant  them.  If,  on  the  other  hand, 
they  threw  in  their  lot  with  him,  their  strength  would  surely 
turn  the  scale.  To  them  would  belong  tlie  glory  of  liberating 
Gaul  from  the  invader;  and  then  they  would  hold  sway,  not 
as  his  servile  nominees,  but  as  the  champions  of  a  great  and 
independent  confederation.  Caesar  had  suspected  them  from 
the  outset  of  the  revolt :  but  the  story  which  he  now  heard 
must  have  taken  him  by  surprise.  The  ringleader  was  no 
other  than  Convictolitavis,  the  Vergobret,  whose  election  he 
had  himself  secured.  Vercingetorix  had  offered  him  a  bribe ; 
and  he  promptly  responded  to  that  most  potent  spur  of  Gallic 
patriotism.  He  in  turn  talked  over  some  of  the  younger 
chiefs,  and  gave  them  part  of  the  money.  But  the  senate 
would  certainly  think  twice  before  venturing  to  turn  upon 
their  powerful  patron.  The  chiefs  took  counsel  together. 
The  infantry  contingent,  which  Caesar  had  demanded,  was 
just  starting  for  Gergovia.  A  chief  named  Litaviccus  was 
placed  in  command  of  it ;    and  his   brothers  were   sent   on 

^  Napoleon,  Hist,  de  Jules  Cisar,  ii.  271.  "Si  Ton  s'etonuait,"  says 
Napoleon,  "que  les  Romains  eussent  creuso  deux  petits  fosses  de  6  pieds  de 
largeur  chacun  et  de  4  pieds  de  profondeur,  au  lieu  d'en  faire  un  seul  de  8  de 
largeur  sur  6  de  profondeur,  ce  qui  aurait  donne  la  meme  deblai,  on  repondrait 
que  les  deux  petits  fosses  etaient  bien  plus  vite  faits  qu'un  seul  grand  fosse." 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX      121 

ahead  to  joiu  Caesar.  About  half-way  to  Gergovia,  near  the  52  b.c. 
site  of  the  modem  village  of  Serbannes/  Litaviccus  halted  the 
column,  and  delivered  an  inflammatory  harangue.  The  troops 
were  horrified  to  hear  that  all  the  Aeduan  cavalry  with 
Caesar,  and  among  them  two  chiefs  named  Eporedorix  and 
Yiridomarus,  had  been  massacred  on  a  trumped-up  charge  of 
treachery.  Some  men,  who  were  in  the  secret,  came  forward 
and  swore  that  the  story  was  true :  they  themselves,  they 
declared,  were  tlie  sole  survivors  of  the  massacre.  The 
thoughtless  Aeduans  drank  in  the  lying  tale  and  put  them- 
selves in  the  hands  of  their  leader.  It  was  settled  that  as 
soon  as  they  reached  Gergovia,  they  should  join  Vercingetorix 
and  avenge  the  slaughter  of  their  countrymen.  Some  Eoman 
citizens  were  travelling  under  the  Aeduan  escort  with  grain 
and  stores  for  Caesar.  Litaviccus  had  them  tortured  and 
killed  ;  and,  before  resuming  his  march,  he  sent  off  messengers 
to  spread  the  news  of  the  pretended  massacre  among  the 
Aedui,  and  urge  them  to  arm. 

Eumour  flew   fast.       The   intrigue   was    soon   known    at  Caesar 
Gergovia.      Eporedorix  himself  came  to  Caesar  in  the  middle  j^^Jg^j  ^ 
of  the  night,  and  told  the  whole  story.     He  entreated  him  march, 
not  to  allow  a  few  wrong-headed  men  to  drag  a  friendly  thrcoT-^ 
people  into  revolt  :  if  Litaviccus  and  the  ten  thousand  sue-  tingeut. 
ceeded  in  joining  Vercingetorix,  the  Aeduan  authorities  would  j^g^  j^  time 
have  no  choice  but  to  throw  in  their  lot  with  them.      Caesar  to  rescue 
was  intensely  anxious ;  but  he  did  not  hesitate.      He  deter- 
mined   to  go   and  intercept    the    deluded  infantry  at   once, 
though  he  knew  that  the  large  camp  would,  in  his  absence, 
be  exposed  to  a  most  serious  risk.      The  camp  on  the  Eoche 
Blanche,  in  the  hands  of  a  few  resolute  men,  would  be  virtually 
impregnable."     Before  starting,  Caesar  ordered  the  arrest  of 
Litaviccus's  brothers  :  but  they  had  already  fled.      He  took 
with  him  all  the  cavalry  and  four  legions,  leaving  two  only 
to  hold  the  camps.      The  defence  was  entrusted  to  Fabius, 
who,  two  years  before,  had  joined  in  the  relief  of   Cicero. 
Caesar  told  his  men  that  he  must  call  upon  them  to  make  a 
most  trying  effort :  but,  he  added,  the  occasion  was  urgent, 
and   they  would  not   grumble.      They  were  in  the  best  of 
1  See  pp.  748-9.  -  See  p.  740. 


122      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.        spirits  and  ready  for  anything.      They  had  marched  twenty- 
three  miles  down  the  valley  of  the  Allier  when  the  Aeduan 
column  was  descried.      Caesar  sent  on  the   cavalry  to  stop 
them,  but  warned  them  to  do  violence  to  no  man.      At  the 
same  time  he  made  Eporedorix  and  Viridomarus  show  them- 
selves.     The  Aedui  were  overawed ;  and  they  saw  that  they 
had  been  duped.      They  grounded  their  arms  and  begged  for 
mercy  :  but  Litaviccus  managed  to  escape  with  his  retainers, 
and  made  his  way  to  Gergovia.      Caesar  knew  that  his  action 
was  sure  to  be  misrepresented.      He  therefore  took  the  pre- 
caution of  sending  messengers  to  give  the  Aeduan  authorities 
a  true  account  of  what  had  passed,  and  to  impress  upon  them 
that  he  had  treated  the  mutinous  contingent  with  forbearance. 
Darkness  was  now  closing  in.      Caesar  allowed  three  hours 
for  rest;    and  then  the  Aedui  went  back  quietly  with  the 
legions.      On  the  march  a  party  of  horsemen  came  to  meet 
the  column,  and  reported  that   Vercingetorix  had   been  at- 
tacking the  large  camp  with  desperate  fury.      The  artillery 
.  had  alone  enabled  the  little  garrison  to  hold  out ;  and  Fabius 
was  busily  erecting  breastworks  upon  the  rampart,  in  view  of 
a  renewed  attack.      The  news  stimulated  the  tired  men  to  do 
their  utmost.     Pressing  on  all  through  the  small  hours,  Caesar 
reached   the  camp    before   sunrise,  having  accomplished  the 
extraordinary  march  of  forty-six  miles  in  little  more  than 
twenty-four  hours,  just  in  time  to  avert  the  destruction  of 
his  exhausted  legions. 
Outrages  of        For  the  moment  the  danger  was  over.      But  there  were 
the  Aediu    ^nxnistakable  signs  that  the  Aedui  would  soon  go  over  to  the 

against  "  t      i  i        i; 

Roman  rebels.  The  ignorant  populace  took  for  granted  the  truth  or 
citizens.  ^i^g  news  about  the  massacre  of  the  cavalry.  Some  were 
exasperated ;  others  simply  rapacious.  They  burst  open  the 
dwellings  of  Eoman  residents,  robbed  them,  murdered  them, 
sold  them  as  slaves.  Convictolitavis  worked  upon  their 
passions.  Once  they  had  committed  themselves,  he  saw,  they 
would  feel  that  Caesar  would  never  forgive  them,  and  that 
they  had  everything  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by  taking 
up  arms.  The  Aedui  took  care  of  course  to  send  apologies 
and  explanations  to  Caesar,  as  soon  as  they  heard  that  their 
contingent  was  in  his  power.     The   Government,  they  said, 


VII         THE  EEBELLION  OF  VERCINGETOEIX       123 

had  not  sanctioned  the  outrages  which  had  been  committed  :  52  b.c. 
the  property  of  Litaviccus  had  been  confiscated ;  and  full 
restitution  should  be  made.  But  they  had  tasted  the  sweets 
of  plunder  :  they  had  little  hope  of  being  forgiven ;  and  they 
secretly  commenced  preparations  for  war.  Caesar  received 
their  envoys  with  all  possible  politeness  ;  but  he  was  not  for 
a  moment  deceived.  He  doubtless  wished  to  leave  the  door 
of  repentance  open  for  his  old  allies.  There  was  perhaps  just 
a  chance  that,  if  he  affected  to  believe  that  the  authorities  Anxiety  of 
were  not  responsible  for  the  excesses  of  the  rabble,  they 
might  be  wise  enough  to  draw  back.  Meanwhile  he  would 
prepare  for  the  worst.  The  defection  of  so  powerful  a  state 
would  inevitably  give  a  fresh  stimulus  to  the  rebellion ;  and 
it  seemed  probable  that,  if  he  delayed  where  he  was  any 
longer,  he  might  find  himself  hemmed  in.  Yet,  besides  the 
humiliation  of  failure,  to  abandon  the  siege  would  of  itself 
encourage  waverers  to  turn  against  him.  How  was  he  to  get 
away  and  rejoin  Labienus  without  leaving  the  fatal  impression 
that  he  was  obliged  to  flee  ?  ^ 

While  he  was  considering  this  problem,  he  ascended  the 
Eoche  Blanche  in  order  to  inspect  the  works  of  the  camp. 
Standing  upon  the  plateau,  he  noticed  with  astonishment 
that  a  hill  forming  part  of  the  mass  of  Eisolles  was 
abandoned.  What  could  this  mean  ?  Some  deserters 
explained  the  mystery.  Vercingetorix  was  greatly  alarmed 
for  the  safety  of  the  saddle  which  connected  Eisolles  with 
Gergovia.  If  the  Eomans  captured  this  place  as  well  as  the 
hill  on  the  south  which  they  already  occupied,  it  would  be 
hardly  possible  for  foragers  to  get  out ;  and  the  garrison 
would  be  starved  into  surrender.  Every  available  man 
therefore  had  been  called  away  to  fortify  the  western  approach 
to  Eisolles,  where  alone  the  ascent  was  practicable. 

Caesar    immediately   devised   a    stratagem.      About   mid-  He 
night  he  sent  several  squadrons  of  cavalry  up  the  valley  of  to  take 

Gergovia 
1  "Cesar,"  says  M.   Jullian  {Vercingetorix,   p.    204),    "avait  decidement  i^y  a  ^ow^. 

commis  une  faute  en  reconciliant  les  deux  partis  eduens  ;  s'il  les  avait  laisses  de-main. 

se  battre,  il  aiirait  ete  certain  d'en  avoir  un  pour  allie."     Perhaps  the  event 

may  have  convinced  Caesar  that  he  had  made  a  mistake  :  but  his  aim  had 

been  to  keep  the  Aedui  wholly  on  his  side  ;  and  I  am  not  sure  that,  on  the 

information  before  him,  he  did  wrong  to  interfere. 


124      THE  REBELLION  OF  VERCINGETORIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  the  Avizon,  whence  they  struck  off  to  the  left  and  moved 
along  the  slopes  of  the  Montagne  de  la  Serre,  as  though  they 
intended  to  make  for  the  pass  of  Opme.  In  obedience  to 
orders  they  moved  with  a  show  of  excitement  and  made  a 
noise,  in  order  to  attract  attention.  At  daybreak  a  number 
of  baggage-drivers,  equipped  to  look  like  troopers,  rode  after 
them.  One  of  the  legions  followed,  and,  after  advancing  a 
short  distance,  moved  down  towards  the  Auzon,  and  con- 
cealed itself  in  a  wood.  Vercingetorix,  who,  from  his 
commanding  position,  could  discern  these  movements,  became 
thoroughly  alarmed,  and  sent  the  rest  of  his  forces  to  push 
on  the  work  of  fortification.  Now  was  Caesar's  opportunity. 
He  made  the  soldiers  move  in  small  parties,  so  that  they 
might  not  be  observed,  from  the  larger  camp  to  the  foot  of 
the  Eoche  Blanche.^  Some  cohorts  of  the  13th  legion  were 
detailed  for  the  protection  of  the  smaller  camp ;  while  the 
10th  was  to  remain  as  a  reserve  under  Caesar's  personal 
command.  When  all  was  ready,  he  explained  his  plans  to 
his  generals.  The  ground,  he  said,  being  so  unfavourable, 
he  did  not  want  to  fight  a  battle,  but  to  effect  a  surprise : 
their  one  chance  of  success  was  to  ascend  with  all  possible 
speed ;  and  he  particularly  warned  them  not  to  allow  the 
men,  in  their  eagerness  for  plunder,  to  get  out  of  hand. 
Once  in  possession  of  the  camps,  he  doubtless  hoped  that 
they  would  have  time  to  cut  off  the  Gallic  troops  from  the 
town. 

The  legions  were  formed  up  on  nearly  level  ground,  on 
the  right  of  the  Roche  Blanche.  Their  path  ascended  a 
hollow  or  gentle  depression.  From  where  they  stood  the 
actual  distance  to  the  town  was  rather  more  than  two 
thousand  yards ;  while  the  place  which  the  Gauls  were 
fortifying  was  barely  five  furlongs  from  the  nearest  gate. 
The  legionaries  advanced  rapidly  until  they  came  to  the 
outer  wall :  over  it  they  clambered,  and  took  possession  of 
three  of  the  camps.  The  few  men  who  had  been  left  in 
them  fled  up  the  hill.  The  king  of  the  Nitiobriges,  roused 
from  his  siesta,  had  but  just  time  to  spring  up  half  naked, 

^  Though  Caesar  does  not  say  so,  I  suppose  that  a  sufficient  force  was  left 
to  hold  the  large  camp  and  protect  the  baggage. 


VII         THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECmGETOEIX      125 

scramble  on  to  his  horse  and  gallop  away.  Caesar  was  with  ^2  b.c. 
the  10  th  legion  on  the  hill-side,  on  the  right  of  the  valley 
by  which  the  column  had  ascended.  Perhaps  he  had 
reason  to  believe  that  it  would  be  impossible  to  follow  up  his 
advantage :  possibly  he  intended  to  re-form  the  scattered 
legionaries,  retain  possession  of  the  camps,  and  force 
Vercingetorix  to  fight :  anyhow  he  made  his  trumpeter  sound 
the  recall.^  Separated  from  him  by  the  valley,  the  troops 
did  not  hear  the  blast  of  the  trumpet,  and,  heedless  of  the 
commands  of  their  officers,  pressed  on  still  higher  up  the 
slope,  close  to  the  southern  gate  of  the  town.  A  centurion, 
named  Lucius  Fabius,  had  reminded  his  comrades  of  the 
rewards  which  Caesar  had  offered  before  the  assault  of 
Avaricum,  and  boasted  that  no  one  should  get  into  Gergovia 
before  him.  He  was  hoisted  on  to  the  wall  by  three  of  his 
men,  and  then  hauled  them  up  in  turn.  A  cry  of  terror 
rose  from  the  town.  The  women  threw  down  money  and 
clothes  to  satisfy  the  soldiers,  and,  craning  over  with  bare 
breasts  and  outstretched  hands,  besought  them  not  to  treat 
them  as  they  had  treated  the  women  and  children  at 
Avaricum ;  while  many  in  the  distant  parts  of  the  town, 
fancying  that  the  Eomans  were  inside,  ran  for  their  lives. 
Now,  however,  the  men  who  had  been  engaged  in  fortifying 
EisoUes,  hearing  the  uproar  and  stimulated  by  a  succession 
of  messengers,  came  hurrying  back  and  formed  up  at  the 
foot  of  the  wall.  The  women  held  up  their  little  ones  in 
their  arms  and  screamed  to  their  men-folk  to  fight  for  them. 
Standing  high  above  them,  these  dense  and  ever-growing 
masses  were  too  much  for  the  tired  legionaries  ;  and  they 
had  to  fight  desperately  to  hold  their  ground.  Anxiously 
watching  the  struggle,  Caesar  sent  an  order  to  Sextius,  the 
officer  whom  he  had  left-  in  command  of  the  smaller  camp, 
to  lead  out  his  cohorts  and  form  them  up  at  the  foot  of 
Gergovia,  so  that,  in  case  the  legions  were  repulsed,  he 
might  fall  upon  the  right  flank  of  their  pursuers.  He  him- 
self moved  with  the  10  th  a  little  nearer  to  the  outer  wall. 
Meanwhile  the  panic  in  the  town  had  subsided.  The 
centurion  and  the  soldiers  who  had  got  in  first  were  killed, 

1  See  pp.  211-14. 


126      THE  KEBELLION  OF  VERCINGETOEIX 


repulsed 
with  heavy 
loss. 


52  B.C.  and  their  bodies  pitched  over  the  wall.  Another  centurion, 
Marcus  Petronius,  while  attempting  to  hew  down  one  of  the 
gates,  was  surrounded  and  severely  wounded.  The  men  of 
his  company  had  followed  him.  "  I  cannot  save  myself  and 
you  too,"  he  cried :  "  but  I  led  you  into  danger,  and  so  help 
me  Heaven,  I'll  save  you.  You  have  your  chance  :  use  it !  " 
With  these  words,  he  flung  himself  into  the  thick  of  the 
enemy,  killed  two  of  them,  and  beat  off  the  rest  from  the 
gate.  His  men  rallied  round  him.  "  It's  useless,"  he  cried  : 
"  I  am  dying :  you  cannot  help  me.  Go  while  you  can,  and 
return  to  your  legion."  Fighting  to  the  last,  Petronius  fell : 
but  he  saved  his  men. 

The  battle  was  still  raging  when  the  Ptomans  caught  sight 
of  a  column  moving  over  the  shoulder  of  the  hill  on  their 
The  attack  right  flank.  It  was  the  Aedui,  whom  Caesar  had  sent  up 
the  eastern  slope,  in  support  of  the  attack :  but  the  Eomans, 
deceived  by  their  armour,  took  them  for  enemies :  the  Gauls 
were  closing  in  upon  them  on  every  side  ;  and  now  thoroughly 
unnerved,  they  were  hurled  back,  and  fled  headlong  down  the 
valley.  Blindly  pursuing  them,  the  Gauls  were  roughly 
checked,  on  right  and  left,  by  the  cohorts  of  Sextius,  and  by 
the  10th,  who  had  moved  lower  down  the  hill.  As  soon  as 
they  reached  level  ground,  the  runaways  halted  and  faced  the 
enemy,  who  then  moved  off:  but  forty-six  centurions  and 
nearly  seven  hundred  privates  lay  dead  upon  the  hill.^ 

Next  day  Caesar  assembled  the  troops,  and  lectured  them 
severely  for  their  disobedience.  He  admired  their  spirit,  he 
told  them :  but  discipline  was  as  necessary  to  a  soldier  as 
courage ;  and  it  was  the  height  of  presumption  in  them  to 
imagine  that  they  knew  how  to  gain  a  victory  better  than 
their  general.  At  the  same  time  they  must  not  be  dis- 
heartened ;  for  they  had  only  been  beaten  because  they  had 
been  rash  enough  to  fight  on  unfavourable  ground.  To  give 
effect  to  his  words,  he  formed  them  up  in  line  of  battle  on 
the  most  advantageous  ground  which  he  could  select :  but 
Vercingetorix  naturally  refused  to  walk  into  the  trap.  On 
that  day,  ho.wever,  and  the  next,  there  were  slight  cavalry 
skirmishes,  in  which  the  Piomans  had  the  advantage.      Then, 

^  Regarding  the  operations  at  Gergovia,  see  pjj.  738-48,  and  App.  G. 


Caesar 
marches 
to  rejoin 
Labieuus, 


VII         THE  KEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOKIX      127 

feeling  that  he  had  done  enough  to  abate  the  exultation  of  52  b.c. 
the   enemy  and   restore   the  confidence  of  his    men,  Caesar 
abandoned  the  siege,  and  marched  once  more  down  the  valley 
of  the  Allier.^ 

The  situation  was  serious  indeed.  The  Gauls  had  found  His  critical 
out  that  he  was  not  invincible.  For  the  first  time  in  all  P*^^^^'"^- 
these  years  he  had  been  beaten ;  and  his  defeat  would  inevit- 
ably weaken  his  prestige  and  act  like  a  tonic  upon  the  spirits 
of  his  enemies.  Fortunately  Vercingetorix  did  not  venture 
to  pursue  him.  On  the  third  day  of  his  retreat  he  repaired 
one  of  the  bridges  over  the  Allier.  He  had  only  just  recrossed 
the  river  when  Eporedorix  and  Viridomarus  told  him  that 
Litaviccus  had  left  Gergovia  with  the  Gallic  cavalry,  and 
gone  to  recruit  for  Vercingetorix  among  the  Aedui.  Might 
they  go  too  ?  It  was  of  the  last  importance  that  they  should 
reach  home  first,  so  that  they  might  persuade  their  brother 
chiefs  to  return  to  their  allegiance  while  there  was  yet  time. 
Caesar  was  convinced  that  the  Aedui  were  lost  irretrievably, 
and  he  believed  that  the  departure  of  the  chiefs  would  pre- 
cipitate the  rupture :  still  he  thought  it  best  to  let  them  go, 
as  it  would  be  wiser  not  to  betray  any  anxiety  or  give  the 
slightest  ground  for  saying  that  he  had  treated  his  allies  as 
enemies.  When  they  took  their  leave,  he  reminded  them  of 
all  that  he  had  done  for  their  people,  and  made  a  last  earnest 
appeal  to  their  loyalty.  It  is  just  possible  that  they  may 
have  meant  what  they  said :  but  when  they  reached  Novio- 
dunum,  and  found  that  the  Vergobret  and  the  council  had 
definitely  declared  for  Vercingetorix,  they  saw  their  oppor- 
tunity. Two  or  three  days  after  their  departure,  Caesar  Eporedorix 
learned  that  they  had  seized  Noviodunum,  where  all  his  niaras^  seize 
hostages,  a  quantity  of  his  baggage,  his  stores,  treasure  and  Novio- 

dimum,au(l 

try  to  pre- 

^  "La  defaite,"  says  M.  Jullian  [Vercingetorix,  p.   216),  "qu'il  venait  de  vent  Caesar 

subir  n'etait  pas  due  seulement  a  la  faiblesse  de  ses  etfectifs  et  de  ses  positions.  1^°"^  cross- 

Elle  etait  la  conclusion  de  cet  entetement  continu  qui  I'avait  arrete  pendant  I"?    ^^ 

ijOire. 
un  mois  devant  une  ville  imprenable,  usant  les  forces  de  ses  soldats  dans 

I'illusion  avaut  de  les  briser  centre  les  murailles. "     But  what  ought  Caesar  to 

have  done  ?     I  doubt  whether  he  could  have  declined,  without  serious  loss  of 

prestige,  to  follow  Vercingetorix  to  Gergovia  ;  and  he  could  not  safely  leave 

the  stronghold  without  making  some  effort  to  take  it.     If  there  had  been  no 

Gergovia,  there  would  have  been  no  Alesia. 


128      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VERCmGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.        cavalry  remounts  were  collected,  plundered  and  burned  it  to 

the  ground,  sent  off  all  his  hostages  to  Bibracte,  thrown  into 

the  river  all  the  corn  which  they  could  not  carry  away,  and 

massacred  the  slender  garrison  and  the  Italian  traders  who 

had  settled  in  the  town.^      Cavalry  were  scouring  the  country 

to  cut  off  his  supplies,  and  infantry  threatening  to  prevent  him 

from  crossing  the  Loire.     The  water,  swollen  by  the  melting 

of  the  mountain  snows,  was  rushing  like  a  torrent.      Caesar 

saw  that  the  crisis  of  the  war  had  come.      The  Aeduan  infantry 

had  deserted  him.      The  Arverni,  elated  by  their  victory,  were 

on  his  rear  :    on  his  left  the  Bituriges,  exasperated  by  tlie 

bitter  memory  of  Avaricum :  the  perfidious  Aedui  barred  the 

road  in  front.      His  chief  magazine  was  destroyed  ;  and  his 

supplies    were   fast   running   out.      The  Province   itself  was 

insufficiently  protected.      The  object  of  the  Aedui  was  to  hem 

him  in  between  the  Allier  and  the  Loire,  and  there  starve 

him  into  surrender ;  or  if,  in  desperation,  he  should  make  a 

dash  for  the  Province,  to  cut  him  off  from  the  easier  way 

over  the  Loire,  and  drive  him  back  towards  the  Cevennes  into 

the  clutches  of  A^'ercingetorix.      Eetreat,  however,  was  not  to 

be  thought  of :  with  the  mountains  barring  the  way,  it  would 

be  very  difficult  as  well  as  disgraceful ;  and  above  all,  he 

could  not  leave  Labienus  and  his  four  legions  to  perish.'     At 

all  costs,  he  must  reach  the  Loire  before  the  Aedui  had  had 

time  to  assemble  in  strength.      They  had  not  burned  their 

granaries  in  accordance  with  Vercingetorix's  plan ;    and  he 

He  saves     might  perhaps  get  supplies  in  their  country.      Night  and  day 

a  series  of  he  marched  till  he  reached  the  river  a  few  miles  south  of 

extra-         IsTevers.^      Some  troopers  rode  to  look  for  a  ford,  and  found 

ordiriary 

marches.     One  which  was  just  practicable,  the  water  bemg  breast-high. 
The  cavalry  rode  into  the  river,  and  formed  a  line  from  bank 

■•  Merivale's  narrative  of  thisepisode  {History  of  thcEomansundertheEmpire, 
ii.  57  [cabinet  ed.])  is  remarkable.  He  says  that  Caesar  "  arrived  in  front  of 
Noviodunum  in  time  to  hear  the  hist  crash  of  the  sinking  bridge,  and  to  see 
the  devouring  flames  rise  triumphantly  behind  it."  Now  after  Caesar  heard 
that  Noviodunum  had  been  burned,  he  made  a  series  of  forced  marches  in  order 
to  reach  the  Loire.  Yet,  when  he  reached  it,  according  to  Merivale,  he  found 
the  fire  still  blazing  and  the  bridge  still  falling  !  There  is  not  a  word  in  the 
Commentaries  about  a  bridge  at  Noviodunum  ;  and  there  is  no  evidence  that 
Caesar  went  to  Noviodunum  at  all  after  its  destruction.     See  p.  755. 

2  See  pp.  750-55.  •'  See  p.  755. 


l^VniKNUS'S   CAAD'AIGN  AG^VIXST  CAMULOGEiVTTS. 


yi^  ^r^ '- 


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Loivdou:  JKaomUlan  S,  Co.Lul. 


vri        THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  YEECINGETOEIX      129 

to  bank,  to  break  the  force  of  the  current :  ^  then  the  infantry,  52  b.c. 
holding  their  weapons  above  their  heads,  waded  across  the 
stream.  Once  more  Caesar  was  saved  by  his  marvellous 
speed.  The  Aedui  were  so  confounded  by  his  unexpected 
arrival  that  they  fled  without  attempting  to  hinder  the 
passage :  the  soldiers  took  all  the  grain  and  all  the  cattle 
that  they  needed ;  and  the  army  marched  on  towards  the 
valley  of  the  Yonne  to  succour  Labienus. 

That  officer  meanwhile  was  in  great  peril.  Leaving  the  Labienus's 
heavy  baggage  at  Agedincum  in  charge  of  the  recruits  who  atainsme 
had  accompanied  Caesar  from  Italy,  he  had  marched  with  Parisii. 
his  four  legions  down  the  left  bank  of  the  Yonne  and 
of  the  Seine,  for  Lutetia,  the  capital  of  the  Parisii.  Master 
of  this  central  position,  he  would  be  able  to  overawe  those 
old  offenders,  the  Senones  and  the  Carnutes.  A  large 
force  assembled  to  oppose  him.  Their  leader  was  Camu- 
logenus,  an  Aulercan  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Evreux, 
who,  though  weighed  down  by  extreme  old  age,  was  looked 
up  to  as  a  soldier  of  extraordinary  skill.  On  the  approach 
of  the  Eomans,  he  encamped  on  the  edge  of  a  far-reaching 
morass,  about  twenty  miles  south  of  Paris,  through  which  the 
Essonne  crept  sluggishly  to  join  the  Seine.  Labienus  tried 
to  construct  a  causeway  across  the  slush :  but  finding  this 
impossible  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  he  silently  quitted  his 
camp  in  the  night ;  marched  back  as  far  as  Metiosedum,  or 
]\Ielun,  a  town  standing  on  an  island  in  the  Seine ;  seized 
some  fifty  barges  and  rapidly  lashed  them  together ;  threw  a 
detachment  across ;  chased  away  the  panic-stricken  inhabi- 
tants ;  repaired  the  bridge,  which  they  had  demolished ; 
transported  his  army  to  the  opposite  bank  ;  and  then  moved 
down  the  valley  in  the  direction  whence  he  had  come.  The 
townsmen  who  had  fled  from  Metiosedum  hurried  with  the 
news  to  Camulogenus.  He  at  once  sent  messengers  to  order 
the  destruction  of  Lutetia,  and  then  moved  northward  from 
the  marsh.  The  barges  accompanied  the  Eoman  column ; 
and  with  their  aid  Labienus  crossed  the  Marne.      Lutetia  was 

^  I  am  inclined  to  infer  from  a  passage  in  the  Civil  War  {B.  C,  i.  64,  §§  5-6) 
that  the  cavalry  may  have  been  formed  in  two  lines,  one  above  the  infantry, 
the  other  below,  to  rescue  any  soldiers  who  might  be  carried  off  their  feet. 

K 


I^4BIEXUS*S   CAIVIPAIGN  AGAIl 

To  fcLC,    pnpc    '"J<- ^^^^__^^ 


20         10 

London :  Maranillan  &  Co 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX      129 

to  bank,  to  break  the  force  of  the  current :  ^  then  the  infantry,  52  b.c. 
holding  their  weapons  above  their  lieads,  waded  across  the 
stream.  Once  more  Caesar  was  saved  by  his  marvellous 
speed.  The  Aedui  were  so  confounded  by  his  unexpected 
arrival  that  they  fled  without  attempting  to  hinder  the 
passage :  the  soldiers  took  all  the  grain  and  all  the  cattle 
that  they  needed ;  and  the  army  marched  on  towards  the 
valley  of  the  Yonne  to  succour  Labieuus. 

That  officer  meanwhile  was  in  great  peril.  Leaving  the  Labieuus's 
heavy  baggage  at  Agedincum  in  charge  of  the  recruits  who  at"|usuhe 
had  accompanied  Caesar  from  Italy,  he  had  marched  with  I'arisii. 
his  four  legions  down  the  left  bank  of  the  Yonne  and 
of  the  Seine,  for  Lutetia,  the  capital  of  the  Parisii.  Master 
of  this  central  position,  he  would  be  able  to  overawe  those 
old  offenders,  the  Senones  and  the  Carnutes.  A  large 
force  assembled  to  oppose  him.  Their  leader  was  Camu- 
logenus,  an  Aulercan  from  the  neighbourhood  of  Evreux, 
who,  though  weighed  down  by  extreme  old  age,  was  looked 
up  to  as  a  soldier  of  extraordinary  skill.  On  the  approach 
of  the  Eomans,  he  encamped  on  the  edge  of  a  far-reaching 
morass,  about  twenty  miles  south  of  Paris,  through  which  the 
Essonne  crept  sluggishly  to  join  the  Seine.  Labienus  tried 
to  construct  a  causeway  across  the  slush :  but  finding  this 
impossible  in  the  face  of  the  enemy,  he  silently  quitted  his 
camp  in  the  night ;  marched  back  as  far  as  Metiosedum,  or 
Melun,  a  town  standing  on  an  island  in  the  Seine ;  seized 
some  fifty  barges  and  rapidly  lashed  them  together ;  threw  a 
detachment  across ;  chased  away  the  panic-stricken  inhabi- 
tants ;  repaired  the  bridge,  which  they  had  demolished ; 
transported  his  army  to  the  opposite  bank ;  and  then  moved 
down  the  valley  in  the  direction  whence  he  had  come.  The 
townsmen  who  had  fled  from  Metiosedum  hurried  with  the 
news  to  Camulogenus.  He  at  once  sent  messengers  to  order 
the  destruction  of  Lutetia,  and  then  moved  northward  from 
the  marsh.  The  barges  accompanied  the  Eomau  column ; 
and  with  their  aid  Labienus  crossed  the  Marne.      Lutetia  was 

^  I  am  inclined  to  infer  from  a  passage  in  the  Civil  War  {B.  C,  i.  64,  §§  5-6) 
that  the  cavalry  may  have  been  formed  in  two  lines,  one  above  the  infantry, 
the  other  below,  to  rescue  any  soldiers  who  might  be  carried  off  their  feet. 

K 


130      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  built  upon  the  island  in  the  Seine  on  whicli  now  stands  the 
cathedral  of  Notre  Dame.  When  Labienus  arrived,  the 
bridges  had  been  broken  down  and  the  town  burned  to  the 
ground.  He  encamped  just  opposite  the  island ;  and  the 
enemy  established  themselves  over  against  his  army  on  the 
southern  bank. 

Just  at  this  time  the  news  arrived  that  Caesar  had  been 
forced  to  retreat  from  Gergovia,  and  that  the  Aedui  had 
joined  the  rebellion.  The  story  lost  nothing  in  the  telling. 
Labienus  was  dependent  on  Gallic  peasants  for  his  information ; 
and  their  statements  were  positive.  Caesar  had  tried  to 
cross  the  Loire  and  had  failed.  He  could  get  no  supplies. 
He  was  in  full  retreat  for  the  Province.  The  Bellovaci  im- 
mediately rose  in  arms.  Labienus  found  himself  threatened 
by  this  warlike  people  on  the  north-east :  on  the  south  the 
Parisii  and  their  allies  confronted  him ;  while  the  broad 
flood  of  the  Seine  separated  him  from  his  base  at  Agedincum, 
Back  to  that  town  he  must  somehow  find  his  way ;  for  he 
saw  that,  in  his  altered  circumstances,  it  would  be  folly  to 
think  of  an  offensive  campaign.  But  how  to  return  ?  That 
was  a  problem  that  would  tax  all  the  force  of  his  mind ; 
and,  as  Caesar  said,  who  so  appreciated  his  worth,  he  knew 
that  he  must  rely  upon  the  force  of  his  own  mind  alone. 
He  might  have  gone,  as  he  had  come,  by  the  right  bank 
of  the  Seine :  but  he  had  never  yet  fled  before  the  face 
of  an  enemy ;  and  to  flee  at  such  a  crisis  would  shatter  the 
enfeebled  prestige  of  the  Roman  arms.  Besides,  to  reach 
Agedincum,  he  must,  sooner  or  later,  recross  the  river ;  and, 
hurry  as  he  might,  cross  where  he  would,  the  enemy  would 
be  there  to  dispute  his  passage.  There  was  nothing  for  it 
but  to  cross  there  and  then  by  some  skilful  stratagem ;  and, 
if  he  must  fight,  to  clear  the  way  by  victory. 

In  the  evening  he  assembled  his  officers,  and  urged  them 
to  carry  out  his  instructions  to  the  letter.  The  barges  were 
lying  under  the  bank,  ready  for  use.  A  number  of  small 
boats  were  also  collected.  Labienus  placed  each  of  the  barges 
under  the  charge  of  an  officer,  and  ordered  them  to  drop  down 
the  stream  about  ten  o'clock  for  a  distance  of  four  miles,  and 
there  await  his  arrival.      He  left  half  a  legion  to  protect  the 


vir        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOKIX      131 

camp;  sent  the  other  half  with  the  baggage- train  up  the  52  b.c. 
bank  ;  and  ordered  the  boats  to  be  rowed  alongside  of  them 
with  a  loud  splashing  of  oars.  Soon  after  midnight  he  moved 
stealthily  in  the  opposite  direction  with  his  remaining  legions, 
till  he  came  to  the  spot  where  the  barges  were  waiting,  near 
the  southern  end  of  the  Bois  de  Boulogne.  A  furious  storm 
was  sweeping  over  the  valley ;  and  in  the  rush  and  roar  of 
wind  and  rain  the  enemy's  outposts  were  surprised  and  cut 
down ;  and  the  troops  were  ferried  across  the  river.  The 
stratagem,  however,  only  partially  succeeded.  About  day- 
break messengers  hurried  one  after  another  into  the  Gallic 
encampment,  and  reported  that  there  was  a  great  uproar  in 
the  Roman  camp,  soldiers  tramping  and  oars  splashing  up 
the  stream,  barges  crossing  below.  Camulogenus  was  per- 
plexed. He  fancied  that  the  Romans  were  crossing  the  river 
in  three  places,  and  would  soon  be  in  full  retreat.  Sending 
a  small  detachment  in  the  direction  of  Metiosedum,  and 
leaving  another  to  watch  the  Roman  camp,  he  marched  in 
jDcrson  against  Labienus. 

It  was  about  half  an  hour  before  sunrise.  The  Roman 
general  harangued  his  troops.  He  reminded  them  of  the 
glorious  victories  which  they  had  won  in  the  past,  and  told 
them  that  he  expected  them  to  fight  as  they  would  have 
fought  if  Caesar   had   been  there  to  command  them.      The  He  estri- 

C  tit 6 s  liiiii • 

Gallic  left  broke  before  the  first  charge :  but  the  right  fought  self  from  a 
with  extraordinary  resolution ;  and  for  a  long  time  the  issue  perilous 
was  doubtful.      The  aged  Camulogenus  was  in  the  forefront  victory ; 
of  the  battle,  cheering  on  his  men.      At  length,  however,  the 
victorious  Roman  right  fell  upon  their  rear.      Even  then  not 
a  man  would  give  way :  but  all  were  surrounded  and  slain. 
Camulogenus  shared  their  fate.      The  troops  which  had  been 
detached  to  watch  the  Roman  camp  hurried  to  the  rescue, 
and  established  themselves  on  the  hill  of  Mont  Parnasse  :  but 
they  were  speedily  dislodged.      The  runaways  from  the  left 
wing  who  failed  to  reach  the  woods  w^ere  cut  to  pieces  by  the  and 
horse.      The  road  to  Agedincum  was  again  open.      Labienus  "oTejoln 
returned  thither  to  take  up  the  heavy  baggage ;  and  thence  Caesar, 
marched  southward  to  rejoin  Caesar.-^ 
1  See  pp.  753-66. 


132      THE  KEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  Still    the   rebellion    was    rapidly   gaining   ground.     The 

liousthuu-  defection   of  the   Aedui    was   a   turning-point    in    the   war. 

lated  by      Other  tribes  were  won  over  by  their  influence  and  their  gold. 

sioVofthe  Waverers  they  terrified  by  threatening  to  put  to  death  the 

Aedui.        hostasres  whom  Caesar  had  left  at  Noviodunum.      But  discord 

and  jealousy  even  now   made  themselves  felt.      The   Aedui 

asked  Vercingetorix  to  come  to  them  and  concert  operations ; 

They  claim  and  he  readily  consented.      Forthwith  they  claimed  the  right 

tion  ofThe  ^^  directing  the  campaign :  but  their  demand  was  disputed ; 

war.  and  a  general  assembly  was  convened  at  Bibracte  to  settle 

the   question.     The    Eemi   and   the   Lingones,  who   steadily 

adhered    to    the   stronger   side,  and   the   Treveri,  who    were 

themselves   hard   pressed   by   the   Germans,  alone   failed  to 

appear.      All   the  other  tribes,  even  the  most  distant,  sent 

their   representatives    to    the   mountain    city.      It    was    the 

supreme  moment  in  the  life  of  Vercingetorix.      A  few  weeks 

before,  while  they  were  still  smarting  under  defeat,  he  had 

told  his  men  that  he  would  win  over  the  rest  of  Gaul  to  the 

cause,  and  that  against  an  united  Gaul  the  whole  world  could 

not  stand  in  arms.     And  now  his  promise  seemed  about  to 

be  fulfilled.      With  a  fraction  of  the  people  he  had  vanquished 

the  invincible  conqueror ;  and  the  whole  people  was  rallying 

Verciuge-    to  his  side.     The  question  was  put  to  the  vote ;  and,  without 

elected"      ^^^  dissentient,  the  representatives  of  the  Gallic  nation  chose 

Com-         Vercingetorix  as  their  General.      Bitterly  chagrined,  the  Aedui 

Chief  by  a  repented  the  rashness  with  which  they  had  flung  aside  the 

general       friendship  of  the  Eomans :  but  it  was  too  late  now  to  draw 

council. 

back. 
His  plan  of  Vercingetorix  determined  to  adhere  to  his  original  plan 
campaign.  ^^  campaign.  His  infantry  were  sufticient  for  a  guerilla 
warfare ;  and  he  contented  himself  with  levying  fifteen 
thousand  horse  from  his  new  allies.  Eelying  on  his  superiority 
in  this  arm,  he  intended  simply  to  cut  off  his  enemy's  supplies  ; 
and  once  more  he  appealed  to  his  countrymen  to  destroy  their 
crops  and  burn  their  granaries  that  they  might  achieve  their 
liberty.  He  forced  the  peoples  who  had  just  joined  the 
movement  to  give  hostages  for  their  fidelity.  That  he  might 
have  a  stronghold  to  retreat  to  in  case  of  necessity,  he  fortified 
and  provisioned  Alesia,  a  town  belonging  to  the  Mandubii, 


vii        THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  YERCIXGETOEIX      133 

which  covered  the  plateau  of  Mont  Auxois,  in  the  highlands  52  b.c, 

of  Cote-d'Or.      But  he  intended  also  to  cany  the  war  into 

the  enemy's  country.      The  Eoman  Province  was  a  tempting 

prize.      If  he  could  seize  it  or  could  seduce  the  Provincials 

to  join  him,  would  not  the  triumph  of  his  cause  be  assured  ? 

He   hounded    on   the   neighbours  ^    of   the    Helvii    and    the  He  hounds 

.-I 

Volcae  Arecomici  to  attack  them ;  and,  believing  that  the  °eichboiirs 
Allobroges  were  still  smarting  under  the  punishment  which  of  the  Pro- 
Piome  had  inflicted  upon  them  a  few  years  before,  he  sent  bribes  to  at- 
envoys  to  bribe  the  chiefs  and  to  hold  out  to  the  government  tack  them. 
the  prospect  of  supremacy  over  the  Province,  and  raised  a 
levy  of  ten  thousand  Aeduans  to  coerce  them  if  persuasion 
should  fail. 

It  was  a  master-stroke ;  and  Caesar  knew  that,  if  it 
succeeded,  he  would  be  in  extreme  peril.  Everything  de- 
pended upon  the  Allobroges.  They  had  been  badly  treated 
by  former  Governors ;  and  before  Caesar  entered  Gaul  they 
had  been  the  most  disaffected  subjects  of  Home.  But  Caesar 
had  rescued  them  from  the  Helvetii :  he  had  distinguished 
two  of  their  leading  men,  who  had  rendered  him  signal 
services,  by  special  marks  of  fa\'Our ;  ^  and,  doubtless  by  the 
exercise  of  his  unerring  tact,  he  had  taught  them  to  believe 
that  his  cause  was  theirs.^  The  Province  was  fairly  satisfied 
with  Eoman  rule.  The  Allobroges  guarded  the  fords  of  the 
Ehone  and  presented  an  impenetrable  front  to  the  enemy ;  ■* 
while  ten  thousand  men,  raised  in  the  Province  itself  and 
commanded  by  Lucius   Caesar,  a  kinsman  of  the  Governor, 

1  The  Gabali,  Arverni,  Ruteni  and  Cadurci. 

•-  E.  C,  iii.  59,  §  3. 

^  Mr.  "VV.  H.  Hall  [The  Romans  on  the  Pdviera  mid  the  Ehone,  1898, 
pp.  132-4)  does  "well  to  emphasise  the  importance  of  the  loyalty  of  the  Allo- 
broges, if  he  somewhat  exaggerates  the  evils  that  -would  have  resulted  from 
their  disaffection  :  but,  trusting  to  the  authority  of  a  Monsieur  J.  J.  Pitot 
{Hecherchcs  sur  les  antiquites  dawphinois'S,  1833),  he  makes  certain  statements 
as  to  the  steps  which  Caesar  had  taken  to  safeguard  the  Province,  for  which 
there  is  no  evidence. 

■*  Merivale,  setting  Caesar's  testimony  at  defiance  and  yet  appealing  to  it  in 
a  footnote,  says  that  the  Allobroges  "took  measures  to  defend  the  points  at 
which  the  upper  Rhone  could  be  crossed,  so  as  to  anticipate  any  attempt  the 
proconsul  might  'make  to  regain  the  Province  in  that  direction."— History  of  the 
RomMns  under  the  Empire,  vol.  ii.,  1850,  pp.  27-8. 


134      THE  EEBELLION   OF  VERCmGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  were  posted  at  various  points  along  the  threatened  frontier. 
The  Helvii,  however,  who  risked  a  battle,  were  defeated  with 
heavy  loss  and  driven  into  their  strongholds.  Meanwhile 
Caesar  contrived  a  plan  for  counteracting  the  enemy's 
superiority  in  cavalry.  No  reinforcements  could  be  expected 
Caesar  from  the  Province ;  for  the  roads  were  blocked.  He  therefore 
German  ^^^^  across  the  Ehine  to  the  tribes  which  he  had  reduced  to 
cavalry.  Submission,^  and  procured  from  them  numbers  of  horsemen 
with  their  attendant  light  infantry,  who  eagerly  welcomed 
the  chance  of  sharing  in  the  plunder  of  Gaal.  But  the 
German  horses,  though  hardy,  were  small  and  light ;  and 
Caesar  saw  that  his  new  allies  would  be  at  a  disadvantage 
when  they  encountered  Vercingetorix's  well-mounted  troopers 
in  the  shock  of  battle.  He  therefore  remounted  them  on  the 
horses  of  his  tribunes  and  body-guard  and  of  the  time-expired 
centurions  and  legionaries  who,  on  his  invitation,  had  volun- 
teered for  service,  and  were  accordingly  privileged  to  ride  on 
the  march. 
He  marches  Some  wccks  had  passed  since  Caesar  had  rejoined  Labienus. 
the''pro°^"  The  meeting  had  taken  place  on  the  south  of  Agedincum, 
vince.  near  the  confluence  of  the  Armangon  and  the  Yonne  ;  and,  as 
Agedincum  itself  had  been  abandoned,  the  united  army  took 
up  its  quarters  not  far  from  Troyes,  among  the  friendly 
Lingones."  It  was  the  most  convenient  breathing-place  that 
Caesar  could  have  found.  The  Remi,  steadily  loyal  to  him 
and  steadily  false  to  their  countrymen,  were  close  by  on  the 
north,  to  support  him  and  to  receive  his  support :  the  Aedui 
were  on  the  south ;  and,  while  he  was  near  enough  to  watch 
their  movements,  he  could  collect  fresh  stores  and  rest  his 
troops  in  comparative  security.  But  the  Province  was  still 
threatened ;  and  he  saw  that  he  must  march  to  its  relief. 
Probably  he  intended  also  to  reinforce  his  troops  there,  and 
then  to  return  and  make  an  end  of  the  rebellion.  Ac- 
cordingly he  moved  down  the  valley  of  the  Tille,  intending 
to  cross  the  Saone  near  St.  Jean-de-Losne,  and  take  the  road 
through  the  country  of  the  Sequani.  Vercingetorix  with  his 
infantry  and  his  fresh  hosts  of  horsemen  moved  off  from 
Alesia  to  intercept  him,  and  took  up  a  position  behind  a 
1  See  p.  215.  ^  See  pp.  766-70. 


ALE  S lA 


D  Cisiip  a*  Rfgaaui  &  Cojl 

PHIK.  UAmitm    Jjfalry  ooTnps 

PQRS  /      f  oi  Yerv^rufetarui 
I(        /t  bahb-positunof  C 

Iwaiq  ihje  final  struggle 
— -  i  TTife^uraL  tracing  of  in 


LoniLm.Mainmllan    &   PoLld 


vii        THE  KEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETORIX      135 

stream,  not  far  from  Dijon,^  about  ten  miles  south  of  the  spot  52  b.c. 
where  the  liomans  were  encamped.  He  made  up  his  mind 
to  risk  an  action,  although,  only  a  few  weeks  before,  he  had 
declared  that  he  would  not  tempt  fortune ;  so  much  harder  is  it 
to  pursue  than  to  adopt  a  wise  plan  of  campaign.  It  would 
be  rash,  however,  to  affirm  that  he  consciously  departed  from 
his  original  resolution.^  He  did  not  contemplate  a  regular 
engagement.  He  was  proud  of  his  own  cavalry ;  and  he  was 
perhaps  ignorant  that  Caesar  had  been  reinforced  by  those 
doughty  squadrons  from  beyond  the  Ehine.  The  legions 
were  of  course  too  strong  to  be  attacked :  but  they  were 
hampered  by  an  immense  baggage  -  train ;  and  they  must 
either  lose  precious  time  in  defending  it,  or  abandon  it  at 
the  cost  of  their  honour,  nay  of  their  means  of  subsistence. 
He  would  draw  up  his  infantry  in  front  of  his  encampment, 
to  encourage  his  cavalry  and  overawe  the  liomans.  If  he 
allowed  Caesar  to  reach  the  Province,  he  would  soon  come 
back  stronger  than  ever ;  and  then  all  hope  of  liberating 
Gaul  would  be  at  an  end.  Such,  we  are  told,  were  the 
arguments  by  which  he  tried  to  animate  his  officers.  With 
one  voice  they  cried,  in  an  outburst  of  enthusiasm,  that  every 
man  must  be  sworn,  by  a  solemn  oath,  to  ride  twice  through 
the  enemy's  ranks,  or  never  again  be  admitted  to  hearth  and 
home,  never  again  be  suffered  to  come  nigh  unto  father  or 
mother  or  wife  or  child.  Vercingetorix  assented ;  and  the 
oath  was  taken.  Next  morning  the  Eoman  column  was 
discerned.  Vercingetorix  ranged  his  infantry  in  front  of  his  Verciuge- 
encampment,  in  an  imposing  array;  while  the  cavalry  swept  ^.^^j.'^g^  ' 
down  upon  the  Eoman  vanguard  and  on  either  flank.  Caesar  Caesar's 
was  surprised  as  completely  as  in  the  battle  on  the  Sambre.  '^'^^^^^' 
The  lie  of  the  ground  had  prevented  him  from  discerning  the 
approach  of  the  Gauls ;  and,  marching  securely  through  a 
friendly  country,  he  had  neglected  to  send  out  scouts.  He 
made  his  dispositions,  however,  with  his  usual  calmness.  He 
sent  his  cavalry,  in  three  divisions,  to  repel  the  triple  attack ; 
and  the  legions  formed  a  hollow  square  outside  the  baggage, 

^  See  pp.  771-81.  The  exact  position  of  the  battle-field  cannot  be  ascertained. 
In  the  note  referred  to  I  liave,  I  tliink,  proved  that  it  was  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Dijon.  -  See  p.  771. 


W: 


S 


%. 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECmGETOEIX      135 

stream,  not  far  from  Dijon/  about  ten  miles  south  of  the  spot  52  b.c. 
where  the  liomans  were  encamped.  He  made  up  his  mind 
to  risk  an  action,  although,  only  a  few  weeks  before,  he  had 
declared  that  he  would  not  tempt  fortune ;  so  much  harder  is  it 
to  pursue  than  to  adopt  a  wise  plan  of  campaign.  It  would 
be  rash,  however,  to  aftirm  that  he  consciously  departed  from 
his  original  resolution.^  He  did  not  contemplate  a  regular 
engagement.  He  was  proud  of  his  own  cavalry ;  and  he  was 
perhaps  ignorant  that  Caesar  had  been  reinforced  by  those 
doughty  squadrons  from  beyond  the  Ehine.  The  legions 
were  of  course  too  strong  to  be  attacked :  but  they  were 
hampered  by  an  immense  baggage -train ;  and  they  must 
either  lose  precious  time  in  defending  it,  or  abandon  it  at 
the  cost  of  their  honour,  nay  of  their  means  of  subsistence. 
He  would  draw  up  his  infantry  in  front  of  his  encampment, 
to  encourage  his  cavalry  and  overawe  the  Eomans.  If  he 
allowed  Caesar  to  reach  the  Province,  he  would  soon  come 
back  stronger  than  ever ;  and  then  all  hope  of  liberating 
Gaul  would  be  at  an  end.  Such,  we  are  told,  were  the 
arguments  by  which  he  tried  to  animate  his  officers.  With 
one  voice  they  cried,  in  an  outburst  of  enthusiasm,  that  every 
man  must  be  sworn,  by  a  solemn  oath,  to  ride  twice  through 
the  enemy's  ranks,  or  never  again  be  admitted  to  hearth  and 
home,  never  again  be  suffered  to  come  nigh  unto  father  or 
mother  or  wife  or  child.  Vercingetorix  assented ;  and  the 
oath  was  taken.  Next  morning  the  Eoman  column  was 
discerned.  Vercingetorix  ranged  his  infantry  in  front  of  his  Vercinge- 
encampmeiit,  in  an  imposing  array  ;  while  the  cavalry  swept  tacks  ^  " 
down  upon  the  Eoman  vanguard  and  on  either  flank.  Caesar  Caesar's 
was  surprised  as  completely  as  in  the  battle  on  the  Sambre.  ^^""^^^^ 
The  lie  of  the  ground  had  prevented  him  from  discerning  the 
approach  of  the  Gauls ;  and,  marching  securely  through  a 
friendly  country,  he  had  neglected  to  send  out  scouts.  He 
made  his  dispositions,  however,  with  his  usual  calmness.  He 
sent  his  cavalry,  in  three  divisions,  to  repel  the  triple  attack ; 
and  the  legions  formed  a  hollow  square  outside  the  baggage, 

1  See  pp.  771-81.  The  exact  position  of  the  battle-field  cannot  be  ascertained. 
In  the  note  referred  to  I  have,  I  think,  proved  that  it  was  in  the  neighbourhood 
of  Dijon.  -  See  p.  771. 


136      THE  REBELLION  OF  VERCIXGETORIX     chap. 


52  B.C. 


and  re- 
treats 
beaten  to 
Alesia 
(Mont 
Auxois), 


ready  to  support  them  if  they  were  hard  pressed.^  For  a 
time  the  Gauls  had  a  slight  advantage :  but  the  legions 
prevented  them  from  following  it  up.  At  length  from  a  hill 
on  the  Eoman  right  the  German  horse  came  thundering  down 
on  their  flank  ;  and  the  battle  was  won.  The  Gauls  galloped 
for  their  lives :  the  infantry,  passive  spectators  of  the 
slaughter,  fell  back  upon  their  camps ;  and  Vercingetorix, 
ordering  his  baggage-drivers  to  follow  him,  hastened  westward 
towards  Alesia.  With  his  beaten  force  he  could  not  keep 
the  field,  lest  his  disheartened  followers  should  fall  away  and 
disperse.^  Either  he  must  submit  to  the  fate  of  Ambiorix, 
or  he  must  again  plant  himself  in  a  stronghold  and  defy  his 
enemy  to  dislodge  him.  But  Caesar  was  pressing  upon  his 
rear ;  and  at  nightfall,  when  the  pursuit  ceased,  three 
thousand  of  the  fugitives  were  slain. 

Next  day  the  Eomans  arrived  at  Alesia,  where  Vercinge- 
torix was  preparing  to  make  his  final  stand.  The  column 
descended  a  valley  closed  on  the  right  and  the  left  by  the 
hills  of  Bussy  and  Pevenel.  On  their  left  front,  connected 
with  Pevenel  by  a  broad  neck  of  land,  rose  a  hill,  much  lower 
than  Gergovia,  but  still  too  steep  to  be  taken  by  assault. 
The  Gauls  were  swarming  on  the  eastern  slope,  beneath  the 
scarped  rocks  of  the  plateau,  on  which  stood  the  town ;  and 
Vercingetorix  had  made  them  build  a  wall  and  dig  a  ditch 
to  protect  their  encampment.  Just  at  their  feet  the  legions 
saw  a  stream,  the  Oze,  winding  like  a  steely  thread  through 
the  greenery  that  fringed  the  north  of  the  hill ;  and  beyond 
its  southern  side,  parallel  to  the  Oze,  but  invisible,  flowed 
the  little  river  Ozerain.  Moving  down  past  the  hill  of  Eea, 
the  soldiers  came  to  a  miniature  plain,  which  extended,  three 
miles  in  length,  beneath  the  western  slope  of  Alesia,  and  was 


^  To  effect  this  formation,  if,  as  Napoleon  infers  from  B.  G.,  ii.  17,  §  2,  each 
legion  was  separated  on  the  march  from  the  one  that  followed  it  by  a  baggage - 
train  (see  p.  53,  supra),  would  of  course  have  required  a  considerable  time  ; 
and  M.  Masquelez  may  perhaps  be  right  in  inferring  that  the  army  was  march- 
ing "en  plusieurs  colonnes  separees  par  des  intervalles  dans  lesquels  Jules 
Cesar  fit  entrer  les  bagages."  Spectateur  militairc,  2^  ser.,  t.  xlvi.,  1864,  p.  54. 
Caesar's  statement  {Consistit  agmen ;  invpedimenta  intra  Ugiones  rccipiuntur 
\_B.  G.,  vii.  67,  §  3])  leaves  it  doubtful  whether  one  square  was  formed,  or 
more.  -  See  pp.  781-2. 


VII        THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  YEECIXGETOEIX      137 

bounded   on   its   further   side    by  a   range   of  heights :    the  52  b.c. 
river  Brenne,  -which  received  the  waters  of  the  Oze  and  the 
Ozerain,  meandered  through   it   from  south   to   north ;    and 
beyond  the  Ozerain  the   steep  declivities  of  Flavigny  com- 
pleted the  zone  of  hills. 

Caesar   harangued    his    troops   and    encouraged   them    to  Caesar 
brace   themselves   for  a  toilsome  effort.      As  it  was  evident  ^°7^^^^ 

Alesia. 

that  the  place  could  not  be  taken  except  by  a  blockade,  he 
drew  a  line  of  investment,  fully  ten  miles  in  length,  along 
which  a  ring  of  camps  was  constructed.  Those  intended  for 
the  cavalry  vs'ere  on  low  ground, — three  in  the  plain  and  one 
in  the  valley  of  the  Eabutin,  which  entered  the  Oze  from 
the  north.  The  rest  were  strongly  placed  upon  the  slopes  of 
the  outlying  hills.  Close  to  the  camps  redoubts  or  blockhouses, 
twenty -three  in  all,  were  thrown  up:  and  strong  piquets 
were  placed  in  them,  to  guard  against  any  sudden  sortie. 

Soon  after  the  commencement  of  the  works,  Yercingetorix  The  Gallic 
sent  all  his  cavalry  down  the  hill ;  and  a  desperate  combat  ^akea 
was  fought  in  the  western  plain.  Caesar's  Gallic  and  Spanish  sortie,  but 
horse  were  soon  in  trouble ;  and  he  sent  his  Germans  to 
reinforce  them.  The  legions  were  drawn  up  in  front  of  their 
camps,  to  deter  the  enemy's  foot  from  attempting  a  sortie. 
The  Gauls  were  beaten,  and  galloped  back  along  the  valleys 
of  the  Oze  and  the  Ozerain,  hotly  pursued  by  the  Germans : 
but  the  gates  of  the  camp  being  too  narrow,  many  of  the 
thronging  fugitives  were  cut  down  ;  while  others  threw 
themselves  off  their  horses  and  tried  to  scramble  over  the 
wall.  The  legions,  by  Caesar's  order,  moved  forward  a  little. 
The  Gauls  inside  the  wall  were  smitten  with  panic :  "  To 
arms,"  they  cried,  "  to  arms "  :  many  of  them  fled  helter- 
skelter  up  the  hill-side ;  and  Yercingetorix  was  obliged  to 
shut  the  gates  of  the  town,  for  fear  the  camp  should  be  left 
unprotected. 

He  saw  with  dismay  that  the  toils  were  closing  around  Vercinge- 
him.  He  had  never  expected  that  Caesar,  who  had  failed  so  them  out 
ignominiously  at  Gergovia,  would  be  strong  enough  to  ^°  ^^tch 
attempt  a  systematic  blockade.  But  there  were  now  ten 
legions  instead  of  six  ;  ^  and  wherever  he  looked,  over  the 
^  See  pji.  782-3. 


SUCCOUl'. 


138      THE  KEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  plain  or  down  in  the  valleys,  there  were  soldiers  at  woik 
with  axe  or  spade.  There  was  nothing  for  it  but  to  appeal 
to  the  whole  Gallic  people  to  extricate  him  from  the  trap  in 
which  he  was  caught.  The  ring  of  redoubts  was  not  yet 
complete :  the  Eomans  were  far  too  few  to  blockade  the 
whole  circuit  of  the  mountain ;  and  the  cavalry  might 
perhaps  steal  out  in  the  dark  without  attracting  notice. 
He  charged  them  to  go,  each  to  his  own  country,  and  bring 
back  with  them  every  man  who  could  wield  a  sword.  He 
reminded  them  of  all  that  he  had  done  for  the  good  cause, 
and  adjured  them  not  to  abandon  him  to  the  vengeance  of 
the  Eomans.  Everything  depended  on  their  using  all  speed : 
if  they  left  him  to  perish,  the  whole  garrison  would  perish 
with  him.  By  reducing  the  rations,  he  reckoned  that  he 
might  make  the  provisions  last  a  little  over  a  month. 
Silently  up  each  river  valley  sped  the  shadowy  cavalcade, 
until  it  was  lost  to  view. 
Caesar  con-  Caesar  learned  the  whole  story  from  some  deserters.  Its 
lines^o'f  ^^^^^  effect  was  to  stimulate  his  inventive  genius.  If  he 
contravai-  could  keep  the  army  of  Vercingetorix  from  breaking  out,  he 
drcumvai-  could  also  keep  the  relieving  force  from  breaking  in.  The 
lation.  most  Vulnerable  part  of  his  position  was  the  open  meadow 
on  the  western  side  of  the  mountain.  Across  this  expanse, 
from  the  Oze  to  the  Ozerain,  a  trench  was  dug,  twenty  feet 
wide  with  perpendicular  sides  to  prevent  the  enemy  from 
attacking  the  troops  while  they  were  constructing  the  proper 
works.  About  four  hundred  yards  behind  the  ends  of  this 
trench,  but  bending  outwards,  was  traced  the  line  of  con- 
travallation,  which  was  prolonged  so  as  to  surround  Alesia, 
and  ran  along  the  lower  slopes  of  the  encircling  hills  and 
across  the  valley  of  the  Eabutin.  First  of  all,  two  parallel 
trenches  were  dug,  each  fifteen  feet  wide  and  eight  feet  deep, 
the  outer  of  which  extended  only  across  the  plain,  while  the 
inner,  embracing  the  whole  circuit  of  the  hill,  was  filled,  where 
the  level  permitted,  with  water  drawn  from  the  Ozerain  and 
the  Eabutin.  Just  behind  the  outer  trench,  and  also  behind 
that  portion  of  the  other  which  encompassed  the  rest  of  the 
position,  a  rampart  was  erected,  surmounted  by  a  palisade, 
with  an  embattled  fence  of  wattle-work  in   front,  from  the 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEKCmGETOKIX       139 

bottom  of  which  projected  stout  forked  branches.      The  com-  52  b.c. 
billed    height    of    rampart    and    palisade    was    twelve    feet. 
Wooden  towers  were  erected  upon  the  western  section  of  the 
rampart  at  intervals  of  eighty  feet,  and  also  at  certain  points 
along  the  rest  of  the  contravallation. 

To  repel  the  reinforcements  for  which  Vercingetorix  had 
sent,  a  line  of  works  somewhat  similar  to  these,  forming  the 
circumvallation,  was  traced  along  the  heights  of  Flavignj, 
Pevenel  and  Bussy,  and  across  the  intervening  valleys  and 
the  plain.     The  circuit  of  this  line  was  fully  ten  miles. 

But  even  these  works  were  not  deemed  sufficient.  The 
Gauls  made  frequent  and  furious  sallies.  Comparatively  few 
of  the  Eomans  were  available  as  combatants ;  for  many  had 
to  go  in  quest  of  corn  and  timber,  while  others  were  labouring 
on  the  works.  Caesar  therefore  invented  various  subsidiary 
defences.  Ditches,  five  feet  deep,  were  dug  just  inside  the 
large  moat  that  was  filled  with  water ;  and  five  rows  of 
strong  boughs  were  fixed  in  each,  with  one  end  protruding 
above  ground,  sharpened  and  with  the  branches  projecting  so 
as  to  form  a  kind  of  abatis.  In  front  of  them  and  rising  a 
few  inches  above  the  ground,  but  purposely  concealed  by 
brushwood,  were  sharp  pointed  logs  embedded  in  small  pits. 
In  front  of  these  again,  concealed,  but  barely  concealed, 
beneath  the  turf,  were  barbed  spikes  fixed  in  pieces  of  wood. 
Fringed  by  these  formidable  defences,  Caesar  expected  that  con- 
travallation and  circumvallation  would  be  alike  impregnable. 

Nevertheless,  the  struggle  was  likely  to  be  prolonged ; 
and  it  would  certainly  tax  to  the  utmost  the  endurance  and 
the  fighting  power  of  the  men.  As  soon  as  the  relieving 
army  should  arrive,  the  Eomans  would  be  hemmed  in  between 
two  desperate  enemies.  Every  moment  for  preparation  was 
precious.  Flying  parties  scoured  the  country  for  corn  and 
provender :  but  they  could  not  collect  a  sufficient  supply ; 
and  the  rations  had  to  be  reduced.^  Every  day — even  by 
night,  when  the  moon  was  up,  or  in  the  glow  of  the  watch- 
fires — the  besieged  could  see  the  indefatigable  legionaries 
labouring  to  finish  their  works  before  the  time  for  the  great 
hazard  should  arrive. 

1  Cf.  Caes.,  B.  C,  iii.  47,  §6. 


140      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOKIX     chap. 


52  B.C. 


Organisa- 
tion of  an 
army  of 
relief. 


Meanwhile  Vercingetorix  had  abandoned  his  camp,  and 
withdrawn  the  troops  who  occupied  it  into  the  town.  He 
took  every  precaution  to  husband  his  scanty  resources.  He 
ordered  the  whole  of  the  grain  to  be  thrown  into  one  common 
stock  and  brought  to  him  for  safe  keeping ;  and  he  let  it  be 
known  that  disobedience  would  be  punished  with  death. 
Erom  time  to  time  each  man  received  his  scanty  ration. 
Meat  was  tolerably  abundant ;  for  the  Mandubii  had  driven 
large  numbers  of  cattle  into  the  stronghold. 

The  appeal  of  Vercingetorix  had  meanwhile  been  answered. 
A  council  of  chieftains  met  to  consider  the  situation.  Ver- 
cingetorix, in  his  great  need,  had  asked  for  an  universal  levy : 
but  the  cooler  judgement  of  the  council  rejected  his  demand. 
So  vast  a  multitude  would  become  unmanageable ;  and  it 
would  be  impossible  to  find  food  for  so  many  mouths.^  It 
was  resolved,  therefore,  to  call  upon  each  tribe  for  a  limited 
contingent.  The  summons  was  obeyed  with  alacrity;  and 
from  north  and  south  and  east  and  west,  from  the  Seine, 
the  Loire  and  the  Garonne,  from  the  marshes  of  the  Scheldt 
and  the  Sambre  and  the  mountains  of  the  Vosges  and  the 
Cevennes,  from  the  Channel  and  the  Atlantic  Ocean,  horse 
and  foot  came  swarming  to  save  the  hero  of  Gaul.  But  even 
in  this  supreme  moment,  in  one  instance,  tribal  jealousy 
prevailed  over  patriotism.  The  Bellovaci  peremptorily  refused 
to  send  a  single  man.  They  intended,  they  said,  to  attack 
Caesar  on  their  own  account,  and  had  no  intention  of  being 
dictated  to  by  any  one.  They  consented,  however,  as  a 
personal  favour  to  Commius,  king  of  the  Atrebates,  who  had 
great  influence  with  them,  to  despatch  a  small  contingent. 
Four  generals  were  chosen ;  for,  except  Vercingetorix  himself, 
there  was  no  one  leader  of  sufficient  eminence  to  command 
universal  confidence.  And,  as  if  this  weakening  of  authority 
were  not  enough,  the  generals  were  fettered  by  civil  commis- 
sioners, whose  instructions  they  were  to  follow  in  the  conduct 
of  the  campaign.  One  of  the  four  was  Commius,  who  had, 
in  former  years,  rendered  good  service  to  Caesar,  but  was  now 
swept  away  on  the  wave  of  patriotic  enthusiasm.  He  had 
indeed  good  reason  to  abhor  the  Eoman  name.     Just  before 


See  p.  800. 


VII         THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX       141 

the  outbreak  of  the  rebellion,  Labienus  had  discovered  that  52  b.c. 
he  was  conspiring  against  Caesar,  and  had  sent  the  tribune 
Volusenus  to  assassinate  him.  He  escaped  with  a  wound  ;  and 
now  he  saw  a  prospect  of  taking  his  revenge.  His  brother 
generals  were  Eporedorix  and  Viridomarus,  representing  the 
Aedui,  and  Vercassivellauuus,  a  cousin  of  Vercingetorix. 
The  vast  host  mustered  in  the  country  of  the  Aedui,  eight 
thousand  horsemen  and  nearly  two  hundred  and  fifty  thousand 
foot,  and  marched  for  Alesia  in  the  certain  confidence  of  victory. 

By  this  time  the  garrison  were  in  great  straits.      Their  Famine  m 

•  Al      ■ 

grain  was  all  consumed.^      Day  after  day  they  strained  their     '^^^^' 
eyes,  trying  to  catch  a  glimpse  of  the  relieving  army :  but 
there  was  never  a  sign.      At  length  the  chieftains  called  a 
council    of    war.       Some    advised    surrender :     others    were 
clamorous  for  a  grand  sortie :  but  one  proposal  equalled  in 
atrocity  the  worst  that  has  been  told  of  Jerusalem  or  Samaria. 
An   Arvernian    chieftain,   called    Critognatus,    reminded    his  Critogna- 
hearers  that  their  fathers,  when  driven  into  their  fastnesses  p^se^'^can- 
by  the   Cimbri  and   Teutoni,  had   sustained  life   by  feeding  nibaiism. 
upon  the  flesh  of  those  who  were  useless  for  warfare  ;  and 
he  urged  that,  to  give  the  garrison  strength  to  hold  out  to 
the  last  against  the  tyrants  who  made  war  only  to  enslave, 
this  glorious  precedent  should  be  followed.      Finally  it  was 
decided  that  all  who  were  too  old,  too  young,  or  too  feeble 
to  fight  should  be  expelled  from  the  town ;  that  those  who 
remained  should  try  every  expedient  before  having  recourse 
to   the   desperate   remedy  of  Critognatus ;    but   that,  if  the 
relieving  army  failed  to   arrive  in   time,  they  should   even 
follow  his  counsel  rather  than  surrender.      Accordingly  the  The  fate 
Mandubii,  to  whom  the  town  belonged,  were  compelled  to  Mandubii. 
depart,  with  their  wives  and  children.      They  presented  them- 
selves before  the  Eoman  lines.     Many  of  them  were  weeping. 
They  piteously  begged  the  soldiers  to  receive  them  as  slaves, 
— only  give  them  something  to  eat.      To  grant  their  prayer 
was  impossible ;  and  a  line  of  guards,  whom  Caesar  posted 
on  the  rampart,  forbade  any  attempt  to  escape. 

^  According  to  Napoleon  I.  {Precis  des  guerres  de  Cesar,  1836,  p.  110),  more 
than  50  days  must  have  elapsed  between  the  departure  of  Yercingetorix's 
cavalry  and  the  arrival  of  the  relieving  army. 


142      THE  REBELLION  OF   VERCINGETOEIX     chap. 


52  B.C. 
Arrival  of 
the  army 
of  relief. 


The  final 
struggle. 


But  suspense  was  nearly  at  an  end.  It  was  just  after 
the  expulsion  of  the  Mandubii  when  the  anxious  watchers 
on  the  hill  saw,  moving  over  the  plain,  a  multitude  of  cavalry. 
The  infantry  were  on  the  heights  of  Mussy-la-Fosse  behind. 
In  a  fever  of  exultation  men  ran  to  and  fro,  exchanging 
congratulations.  The  garrison  descended  the  hill,  prepared 
for  a  sortie.  Vercingetorix  had  forgotten  nothing.  His  men 
were  provided  with  fascines  for  filling  up  the  trenches,  and 
movable  huts  to  protect  their  approach.  Soon  a  fierce 
combat  of  horse  was  raging  over  the  plain.  The  legionaries 
were  posted,  ready  for  emergencies,  along  the  outer  and  the 
inner  lines.  Archers  were  scattered  among  the  Gallic  ranks ; 
and  the  arrows  fell  so  thick  and  fast  that  scores  of  wounded 
horsemen  were  seen  riding  off  the  field.  Every  man  fought 
like  a  hero ;  for  they  knew  that  from  the  heights  around 
friends  and  enemies  alike  were  anxiously  watching.  The 
numbers  of  the  Gauls  began  to  tell ;  and  their  countrymen, 
behind  and  before,  encouraged  them  by  loud  yells.  All 
through  the  afternoon  the  battle  raged  uncertain.  But 
towards  sunset  the  ever -victorious  Germans  charged  in  a 
compact  body,  and  threw  the  division  opposed  to  them  into 
disorder :  the  archers  were  exposed  and  killed :  the  rout  was 
general ;  and  the  besieged  who  had  sallied  forth  turned  in 
despair,  and  reascended  the  hill. 

But  Commius  and  his  brother  generals  were  still  hopeful. 
Next  day  their  men  were  hard  at  work,  making  fascines  and 
scaling  ladders  for  a  grand  assault  on  the  Roman  lines. 
About  midnight  they  quitted  their  camp,  and  moved  in 
silence  across  the  plain.  As  they  approached  the  works, 
they  raised  a  simultaneous  shout,  to  put  the  besieged  on  the 
alert ;  and,  as  they  flung  their  fascines  into  the  ditch,  the 
trumpet  was  heard,  calling  the  garrison  to  arms.  Stones 
flew  from  slings :  arrows  whizzed  through  the  air ;  and, 
though  the  Romans  too  plied  their  slings,  and  supports 
hurried  from  the  neighbouring  redoubts  to  the  relief  of  any 
point  that  was  too  hardly  pressed,  the  enemy  were  too  many 
for  them,  and  they  suffered  heavily :  but  when  those  ghost- 
like companies  rushed  in  to  storm  the  rampart,  they  trod 
upon  the  spikes,  or,  stumbling  into  the  holes,  impaled  them- 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX      143 

selves  on  the  pointed  logs,  while  heavy  pikes  were  hurled  ^-  ^.c. 
down  from  the  towers  into  the  seething  multitude.  Tlie 
Roman  artillery  made  great  havoc.  The  losses  on  either  side 
were  very  lieavy ;  for  they  were  fighting  in  the  dark,  and 
shields  were  of  little  use.  Towards  dawn  the  Gauls  retreated, 
fearing  an  attack  in  flank ;  and  the  besieged,  who  had  lost 
much  valuable  time  in  attempting  to  cross  the  inner  trench, 
went  back  before  they  could  strike  a  blow. 

One  more  chance  remained.  The  leaders  of  the  relieving 
army  questioned  the  rustics  about  the  lie  of  the  ground  on 
the  north  and  the  nature  of  the  Roman  defences.  Mont 
Rea,  which  bounded  the  plain  and  rose  above  the  further 
bank  of  the  Oze,  extended  so  far  to  the  north  that  Caesar 
had  not  been  able  to  enclose  it  in  his  line  of  circumvallation.^ 
On  the  southern  slope,  close  to  the  stream,  stood  one  of  the 
Roman  camps.  It  was  held  by  two  legions — perhaps  about 
eight  thousand  men — under  Reginus  and  Caniuius.  In  order 
to  avoid  observation,  it  would  be  necessary  to  approach  the 
camp  by  a  wide  detour.  The  Gauls  sent  scouts  to  recon- 
noitre. It  appeared  that  Mont  Rea  was  connected  by  a 
ridge  with  a  further  group  of  heights.  Just  after  dark  sixty 
thousand  picked  men,  under  the  command  of  Vercassivel- 
launus,  left  the  Gallic  camp,  and,  passing  right  round  the 
sweep  of  the  northern  hills,  halted  at  daybreak  for  a  rest  in 
a  hollow  north-east  of  Mont  Rea.  About  noon,  just  as  they 
were  moving  down  on  the  camp,  the  cavalry,  by  a  jDrecon- 
certed  arrangement,  streamed  over  the  plain  towards  the 
Roman  lines  :  the  rest  of  the  infantry  showed  themselves  in 
front  of  their  encampment ;  and  Vercingetorix,  observing 
these  movements  from  the  citadel,  descended  the  hill  and 
moved  towards  the  plain. 

This  time  there  was  no  delay.  The  inner  trench  was 
filled  up,  where  necessary,  with  earth  and  fascines :  stout 
sappers'  huts,  destined  to  protect  the  men  when  they  should 
approach  to  storm  the  lines,  long  poles  fitted  with  hooks  for 
tearing  down  the  rampart,  and  other  implements  which 
Vercingetorix  had  provided,  were  carried  across ;  and  the 
besieged  moved  on  to  make  their  last  effort. 

1  See  pp.  373-4. 


144      THE  EEBELLION  OF  YEECINGETORIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  A  desperate  struggle  then  began.      Wherever  there  was 

a  weak  spot  in  the  defences,  the  Gauls  threw  themselves 
upon  it ;  and  the  Eomans,  comparatively  few  in  numbers, 
and  scattered  owing  to  the  vast  extent  of  their  lines,  found 
great  difficulty  in  massing  themselves  upon  the  exposed 
points.  Moreover,  they  were  painfully  distracted  by  the 
roar  of  battle  in  their  rear ;  for  both  on  the  inner  and  the 
outer  line  men  felt,  as  they  fought,  that  they  must  perish  if 
their  comrades  behind  suffered  the  enemy  to  break  through. 
Yet,  agitated  as  they  were,  they  combated  with  a  nervous 
eager  energy ;  and  the  besieged  struggled  as  desperately  as 
they  ;  for  both  knew  that  that  day's  fight  would  decide  all : — 
the  Gauls  were  lost  unless  they  could  break  the  line  ;  the 
Eomans,  if  they  could  but  hold  that  line,  saw  their  long  toil 
at  an  end.  From  the  slope  of  Flavigny,  south  of  the  Ozerain, 
the  view  from  which  embraced  the  whole  plain,  Caesar 
directed  the  battle,  and  sent  supports  to  every  point  where 
he  saw  his  men  hard  pressed.  The  attack  on  the  circum- 
vallation  in  the  plain  was  comparatively  feeble ;  for  the 
bulk  of  the  reheving  force  was  formidable  only  in  numbers. 
Nor  were  those  numbers  wisely  directed.  The  Aedui  may 
have  been  treacherous :  the  generals  may  have  disagreed,  or 
they  may  have  been  fettered  by  the  civil  commissioners ; 
anyhow  the  Gauls  made  no  attempt  upon  the  circumvallation, 
except  on  Mont  Eea  and  in  the  plain.  The  fighting  was 
fiercest  on  Mont  Eea.  The  Gauls  were  so  numerous  that 
Vercassivellaunus  could  always  send  fresh  men  to  relieve 
their  comrades.  Coming  down  on  the  camp  from  a  higher 
level,  the  assailants  hurled  their  missiles  with  fatal  momen- 
tum :  they  shot  earth  in  heaps  over  the  pointed  logs  and  the 
spikes,  and,  locking  their  shields  over  their  heads,  passed 
unscathed  to  the  rampart ;  and  then  their  numbers  began  to 
tell.  Suddenly  a  galloper  rode  up  and  told  Caesar  that  the 
garrison  were  worn  out,  and  their  stock  of  missiles  failing.^ 
He  immediately  sent  Labienus  with  six  cohorts  to  the  rescue, 
telling  him  to  hold  on  as  long  as  he  could,  and,  when  he 
could  hold  on  no  longer,  to  sally  forth,  and  fight  it  out  in 
the  open.      Then,  riding  down  between  the  lines  on  to  the 

1  See  p.  798. 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX      145 

plain,  he  harangued  his  weary  soldiers  and  adjured  them  not  52  b.c. 
to  give  in :  just  one  short  hour,  and  the  prize  was  won.  At 
last  the  besieged  abandoned  in  despair  the  attempt  to  break 
through,  and,  wheeling  to  the  left,  crossed  the  Ozerain,  and 
flung  themselves  against  the  works  at  the  foot  of  Flavigny. 
They  drove  the  artillerymen  from  the  towers  with  volleys  of 
missiles  :  they  shot  earth  and  fascines  into  the  ditch,  and 
made  their  way  across  :  they  tore  down  the  palisading  of  the 
rampart :  six  cohorts,  then  seven  more  were  sent  down  to 
help,  and  still  they  pressed  on, — till  Caesar  himself  hurried 
to  the  spot  with  fresh  reinforcements,  and  drove  them  away. 
Everywhere,  except  at  Mont  Eea,  the  victory  was  won. 
Caesar  called  out  four  cohorts  from  the  nearest  redoubt,  told 
his  cavalry  to  follow  him,  and  sent  a  horseman  galloping  to 
the  northern  cavalry  camp  to  send  another  detachment  down 
upon  the  enemy's  rear.^  They  were  now  swarming  over  the 
rampart ;  and,  as  a  last  resource,  Labienus  summoned  every 
available  man  from  the  neighbouring  redoubts  to  his  aid. 
By  good  luck  these  reinforcements  amounted  to  eleven 
cohorts, — perhaps  four  thousand  men.  And  now,  conspicuous 
in  his  crimson  cloak,  Caesar  was  descried,  hurrying  across 
the  plain.  The  enemy  made  a  supreme  effort.  Labienus 
and  his  men  took  heart,  and  rushed  into  the  thick  of  the 
stormers.  As  Caesar  approached,  he  heard  the  shouts  of  the 
combatants :  he  saw  the  camp  abandoned  and  the  short 
swords  flashing  over  the  slopes  beyond.  Suddenly  the  cavalry 
appeared  on  the  heights  above  the  enemy's  rear :  Caesar's 
reserves  came  up  to  attack  them  in  front ;  and  they  fled  in 
bewilderment, — into  the  midst  of  the  hostile  squadrons. 
Yercassivellaunus  himself  was  captured,  and  seventy-four 
standards ;  and  of  the  sixty  thousand  chosen  men  who  had 
marched  out  of  camp  the  night  before  only  a  remnant 
returned.  The  whole  scene  was  visible  from  the  town ;  and 
in  despair  the  officers  left  in  command  sent  to  recall  their 
comrades  from  below.  The  vast  host  without  vanished  in 
the  gathering  darkness.  The  legions  were  too  tired  to  follow, 
or  all  might  have  been  destroyed :  but  at  midnight  the 
cavalry  were  sent   in  pursuit ;    and  when   day  broke,  they 

1  See  pp.  797-8. 

L 


146      THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.        were   still   hunting   the   fugitives   and  capturing  or   slaying 

them  in  scores.^ 

The  self-  All  was  lost :  SO  Yercingetorix  clearly  saw.      In  the  night 

Vercin<^e-    ^^  formed  liis  resolve.      Next  morning  he  gathered  the  tribal 

torix.         chiefs  around  him.     He  told  them  that  he  had  fought,  not 

for  himself  but  for  his  countrymen ;   and,  since  they  must 

needs  all  bow  to  fortune,  he  was  ready  to  place  himself  at 

their  disposal, — to  die,  if  they  wished  to  appease  the  Eomans 

by  his  death,  or  to  yield  himself  up  as  a  prisoner  of  war. 

They  accepted  his  offer,  and  consented  to  purchase  life  by 

sacrificing  the  leader  of  their  own  choice.      Ambassadors  were 

sent  to  learn  the  pleasure  of  the  conqueror.      He  ordered  the 

chiefs  of  the  garrison  to  be  brought  out,  and  all  the  arms  to 

be   surrendered.     The   chiefs   were   led   forth ;    and   Caesar, 

Surrender    seated  on  his  tribunal,  received  their  submission.     Yercinge- 

garrison.     torix,  mounted  on  a  gaily  caparisoned   charger,  rode  round 

the  tribunal,  and  then,  leaping  to  the  ground,  took  off  his 

armour,  laid  down  his  sword,  and  bowed  himself  at  Caesar's 

feet.^     He  was  sent  to  Eome,  and  imprisoned  in  a  dungeon. 

Six    years    later    he    was    brought    out,    to    adorn    Caesar's 

triumph ;  and  then  he  was  put  to  death.^ 

Verciuge-  Two   thousand   years   have   passed   away ;    and   still   the 

ijis  place  in  name  of  Yercingetorix  retains  its  hold  upon  the  imagination. 
Wstory.  Our  neighbours  think  of  him  as  the  Germans  think  of 
Arminius  and  the  Scots  of  Wallace ;  and  the  traveller  who 
stands  upon  the  wind-swept  plateau  of  Gergovia  and  looks 
down  upon  the  vineyards  that  cover  the  slopes  over  which 
he  drove  Caesar's  legions,  or,  speeding  on  his  way  to  the  Swiss 
mountains,  looks  out,  as  the  train  whirls  him  past  the 
station  of  Les  Laumes,  upon  the  colossal  statue  which  marks 
the  western  promontory  of  Mont  Auxois,  must  be  dull  indeed 
if  he  does  not  sympathise  with  the  nation's  veneration  for 
the  great  Gaul.  Looking  back  across  that  vast  gulf  of  time, 
we  behold  him,  as  he  appears  by  the  testimony  of  his  con- 
queror, not  only  a  chivalrous  patriot,  but  also  a  born  leader 
of  men.      In  this  character  he  is  the  equal  of  Caesar  himself. 

'  All  questions  relating  to  the  operations  at  Alesia  are  discussed  on  pp.  783-99. 
2  See  p.  799.  s  See  p.  799. 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VEECINGETOPJX      147 

The  Gauls  and  their  descendants  have  sometnnes  mistaken  52  b.c. 
a  charlatan  for  a  hero :  but  the  hero  to  whom  they  are  loyal 
while  they  are  still  smarting  under  a  defeat,  must  be  a  hero 
indeed.  When  Vercingetorix  at  Avaricum  regained  his 
ascendency  over  the  fickle  Celtic  multitude,  he  showed  a 
knowledge  of  human  nature  as  profound  as  Caesar  when  he 
quelled  the  mutiny  of  the  Tenth  Legion.  If  he  knew  how 
to  use  flattery  as  an  instrument  for  fortifying  self-respect, 
he  never  condescended  to  the  arts  of  the  demagogue :  he 
could  tell  wholesome  truths,  however  unpalatable ;  and  with 
the  most  winning  persuasiveness  he  possessed  a  capacity  for 
being  terribly  severe.  He  recognised  the  softness  of  moral 
fibre,  the  mollities  animi,  which  in  the  Gauls  coexisted  with 
personal  bravery ;  and  with  springing  energy  he  stimulated 
them  to  transmute  that  weakness  into  strength,  to  undergo 
toils  from  which  they  had  ever  shrunk,  and  to  sacrifice  their 
particular  interests  for  the  national  weal.  Who  shall 
imagine  the  intensity  with  which  he  lived? — within  that 
year  the  youth  became  a  veteran.  Those  only  who  have 
some  knowledge  of  affairs  can  appreciate  the  genius  for 
organisation,  the  unremitting  toil,  the  sleepless  vigilance 
that  were  needed  to  force  those  diverse  levies  into  the  field, 
to  arm  and  clothe  and  feed  them,  to  direct  their  operations, 
to  procure  information,  to  raise  money,  to  negotiate,  to  bribe, 
to  persuade.  It  must  moreover  be  remembered  that  his 
power  depended  upon  sheer  unaided  force  of  character :  he 
might  control  only  so  long  as  he  could  please :  his  com- 
mission was  held  at  the  pleasure,  nay  the  caprice,  of  the 
most  inconstant  of  the  races  of  men.  Yet,  alone  among  the 
Gallic  leaders,  he  united  the  discordant  elements  of  the 
greater  part  of  Celtican  Gaul ;  and,  by  his  tact  in  gaining 
over  the  dissentient  tribes,  he  drove  one  of  the  greatest 
generals  of  the  world,  whose  army  was  in  all  but  numbers 
far  superior  to  his,  to  the  point  of  withdrawing  from  the 
theatre  of  war.  But  Caesar  vanquished  him ;  and  with 
Caesar  he  may  not  be  compared.  His  generalship  was  not 
equal  to  his  mastery  of  men.  He  knew  indeed  how  to  choose 
a  position.  He  had  the  good  sense  to  learn  from  his  enemy. 
He  had  the  courage  to  confess  the  inferiority  of  his  army 


148      THE  EEBELLIOX  OF  VEECINGETOEIX     chap. 

52  B.C.  upon  the  open  battle-field,  and  the  wisdom  to  originate  a 
guerilla  warfare.  We  cannot  tell  whether  circumstances 
would  have  allowed  him  to  work  out  his  conception  with 
the  thoroughness  which  might  have  forced  his  adversary  to 
retreat  or  to  starve.  But  the  fact  remains  that  he  lost 
golden  opportimities  and  committed  irreparable  errors ;  and 
therefore,  whatever  his  capacity  may  have  been,  it  is  im- 
possible to  affirm  that  he  approved  himself  a  great  general. 

But  after  all,  if  Vercingetorix  had  been  a  weaker  man, 
his  place  in  history  would  still  be  assured.  Eor  the  heart 
of  the  reader  is  always  tender  to  the  hero  of  a  lost  cause. 
He  cares  for  Hannibal  more  than  for  Scipio,  for  Mary  more 
than  for  Elizabeth,  for  Charles  more  than  for  Cromwell. 
And  so,  while  reason  tells  him  that  it  was  well  that  Caesar 
should  conquer,  his  sympathies  are  still  with  Vercingetorix. 

Caesar  dis-         Cacsar  determined,  instead  of  going  to  Italy,  to  spend  the 
tributes  his  ^j^ter   in    the  Aeduan   capital.      The  Aedui  were   only  too 

legions  for  -"^        _  _  •' 

the  winter,  ready  to  return  to  their  allegiance.  The  Arverni,  who  had 
given  no  trouble  in  former  years,  were  quite  cowed,  and 
promised  implicit  obedience  for  the  future.  Caesar  was  too 
politic  to  bear  hardly  upon  either.  He  therefore  restored 
to  them  the  prisoners  whom  he  had  made,  though  he  de- 
manded a  large  number  of  hostages.  But  the  soldiers  had 
to  be  rewarded  for  their  protracted  labours ;  and  every  man 
received,  by  way  of  booty,  a  prisoner,  whom  he  might  sell 
as  a  slave.  Caesar  was  generous  as  well  as  politic ;  and 
doubtless  his  officers  were  not  overlooked.  For  himself, 
there  was  no  law  of  prize  to  limit  the  general's  share. 
When  he  came  to  Gaul,  he  was  poor  and  in  debt :  when  he 
quitted  Gaul,  he  was  rich  enough  to  lend  and  to  bribe.  ^ 
The  legions  were  quartered  for  the  winter  among  the  Eemi, 
the  Sequani,  the  Aedui,  the  Ambivareti,  the  Bituriges  and 
the  Euteni,  that  is  to  say,  around  Eeims,  Besancon,  Mont 
Beuvray,  Chalon  and  Macon,  Bourges  and  Eodez.-  By  this 
aiTangement  the  friendly  Eemi  would  be  protected  from  the 

^  See  Long's  Decline  of  the  Roman  Repi.iblic,  x.  475,  and  Suetonius,  Div-us 
lulius,  54. 

^  The  habitat  of  the  Ambivareti  is  uncertain.     See  p.  378. 


VII        THE  EEBELLION  OF  VERCINGETOEIX      149 

vengeance  of  the  Bellovaci :  the  submission  of  the  Aedui  52  b.c. 
was  assured :  the  legions  quartered  among  them  could  easily 
communicate,  on  the  east,  through  the  territory  of  the  friendly 
Lingones,  with  their  comrades  in  Sequania,  on  the  north-east, 
with  those  quartered  among  the  Eemi :  the  Arverni  were 
hemmed  in  on  the  north  by  the  legion  which  menaced  the 
Bituriges,  on  the  south  by  that  which  watched  the  Ruteni ; 
and  this  last  was  on  the  borders  of  the  Province,  whence  it 
could,  if  necessary,  summon  aid.  Thus  the  troops  were 
distributed  in  such  a  way  as  to  safeguard  the  loyal,  to 
overawe  the  disaffected,  to  cover  the  Province,  and  to  be 
ready  for  mutual  support. 


CHAPTEE   VIII 


THE    END    OF    THE    STEUGGLE 


52  B.C. 

Effects  of 
Caesar's 
victory  at 
Alesia. 


Varioxis 
tribes  pre- 
pare to 
renew  the 
struggle. 


Caesar  dis- 
perses the 
Bituriges 
and 
Carnutes. 


The  victory  at  Alesia  was  decisive.  Their  great  leader  gone, 
their  entire  host  shattered,  like  a  billow  surging  against  a 
rock,  by  the  little  army  which  it  had  marched  to  destroy, 
the  confederacy  was  dissolved  as  quickly  as  it  had  been 
formed. 

Nevertheless  some  of  the  more  resolute  patriots  were  pre- 
paring to  renew  the  struggle.  They  knew,  indeed,  that  all 
the  men  whom  they  could  muster  had  no  chance  of  standing 
against  Caesar  in  a  pitched  battle :  but  they  allowed  them- 
selves to  hope  that,  if  they  all  rose  simultaneously,  his  forces 
would  not  be  strong  enough  to  engage  them  all  at  once  in 
detail.  Such  is  the  account,  based  probably  upon  the  reports 
of  Caesar's  spies,  which  Aulus  Hirtius  ^  has  given  us.  But 
it  may  perhaps  be  doubted  whether  the  rebellious  tribes  had 
any  such  definite  and  concerted  plan.  It  is  probable  that 
they  were  actuated,  not  jointly  but  severally,  by  sheer  abhor- 
rence of  a  foreign  yoke,  by  sullen  despair,  by  desire  for 
plunder,  perhaps  by  the  vague  hope  that  when  Caesar  was 
gone,  his  successor  would  leave  such  obstinate  rebels  to 
themselves. 

The  Bituriges,  who  had  not  forgotten  the  slaughter  at 
Avaricum,  were  the  first  to  stir.  The  single  legion  which 
had  been  quartered  in  their  country  was  powerless  to  restrain 
them.  Caesar  was  anxious  to  give  a  long  rest  to  his  soldiers, 
who  were  tired  out  by  the  extraordinary  duration  and  severity 
of  the  late  campaign :  but  before  the  year  was  out  he  took 

^  The  last  book  of  the  Commentaries  on  the  Gallic  War  was  written,  not  by 
Caesar,  but  by  his  friend  Aulus  Hirtius. 

150 


CHAP.  VIII       THE  END  OF  THE  STRUGGLE  151 

the  field  ;  and  -while  the  chiefs  were  still  talking  over  their  51  b.c. 
plans,  another  legion  was  upon  them.  Thousands  of  peasants 
were  captured,  while  they  were  working  in  the  fields  :  others 
had  just  time  to  flee  :  but  hurry  where  they  might,  Caesar 
was  too  quick  for  them ;  and  his  swiftness  so  impressed  men's 
minds  that  the  friendly  tribes  saw  that  it  was  their  interest 
to  remain  loyal  to  a  Governor  who  was  strong  enough  both 
to  protect  and  to  punish,  while  waverers  hastened  to  sue  for 
peace.  Caesar  sent  the  legions  back  to  quarters  with  the 
promise  of  a  substantial  present  for  every  officer  and  man  ; 
while  he  himself  returned  to  his  civil  work  at  Bibracte. 
But  in  little  more  than  a  fortnight  his  rest  was  interrupted. 
"When  the  humbled  Bituriges  begged  for  his  aid  against  the 
Carnutes,  who  had  turned  upon  them,  he  put  two  fresh  legions 
in  motion ;  and,  on  the  mere  rumour  of  his  coming,  the 
Carnutes  fled  in  every  direction.  Chased  from  place  to  place 
by  cavalry  and  auxiliary  infantry,  numbed  by  the  cold  and 
drenched  by  the  rains,  they  finally  dispersed  among  the 
neighbouring  tribes  ;  and  their  pursuers  returned,  laden  with 
plunder.  The  lesson  sufficed  for  the  time  :  but  the  legions 
were  left  at  Cenabum,  to  keep  the  unruly  tribesmen  in  awe. 

Still,  there  was  another  tribe  to  be  reckoned  with,  the  Campaign 
warlike  Bellovaci,  who,  six  years  before,  had  headed  the  Belgic  Bdiovaci.^ 
league.  They  had  some  grudge  against  the  Suessiones,  whom 
Caesar  had  placed  in  dependence  upon  his  steady  allies,  the 
Eemi,  and  were  mustering  their  forces  and  those  of  the 
neighbouring  tribes  to  attack  them.  The  confederacy  com- 
prised the  Atrebates,  the  Ambiani,  the  Veliocasses,  the  Caleti 
and  the  Eburovices,  who  inhabited  the  districts  round  Arras, 
Amiens,  Eouen,  Lillebonne  and  Evreux.  The  leaders  were  a 
Bellovacan  chief  called  Correus,  and  Commius,  whose  spirit 
was  not  subdued  by  his  defeat  at  Alesia.  On  Caesar's 
approach  they  established  themselves  in  the  forest  of  Com- 
piegne,  on  Mont  St.  Marc,  a  hill  protected  by  a  marshy 
watercourse,  which  oozed  northward  into  the  river  Aisne.^ 
Caesar's  force  consisted  of  four  legions,  which,  without 
reckoning  auxiliaries,  probably  numbered  about  fifteen  thou- 
sand men.      He  was  very  anxious  to  bring  on  a  battle :  but 

1  See  pp.  803-8. 


152  THE  END  OF  THE  STEUGGLE  chap. 

51  B.C.        the  enemy  were  too  wary  to  quit  their  vantage  ground :  their 
numbers  were  great ;  and  the  hill,  rising  abruptly  above  the 
further  side  of  the  deep  valley,  was  hard  to  ascend.      Accord- 
ingly  he    encamped    on    Mont    St.    Pierre,   the   height  just 
opposite  theirs.      The  fortifications  which  he  constructed  were 
of  extraordinary   strength  ;    for   he   hoped    that   the   enemy 
would  be  emboldened  by  his  caution  to  attack  him,  and,  as 
his  foragers  were  obliged  to  go  long  distances,  it  was  necessary 
that  the  camp  should  be  defensible  by  a  comparatively  small 
force.     During  the  next  four  days  frequent  skirmishes  took 
place :  but  nothing  would  induce  the  enemy  to  come  out  and 
hazard  a  general  action.      It  was  impossible  to  storm  their 
camp  without  fearful  bloodshed ;  and,  as  a  large  force  was 
needed  to  invest  it,  Caesar  sent  for  the  three  legions  which 
he  had  left  at  Cenabum  and  in  the  country  of  the  Bituriges. 
When   the  rebel   leaders   heard  of  their   approach,  they 
remembered   the  dismal  fate  of  Alesia,  and   determined   to 
send  off  their   non-combatants  and   baggage   in   the   night. 
The  long  line  of  waggons  was  barely  in  motion  when  day 
broke,  and  the  Eomans  caught  sight  of  them.     The  enemy 
formed    up    in   front   of    their   camp    to   cover   the   retreat, 
intending  to  follow   as  soon   as  possible.       Caesar  was   too 
wary  to  attempt  to  fight  his  way  up  that  steep  ascent :  but 
he  determined   not  to   let  the   enemy  move   off  unscathed. 
On  their  left  and  separated  from  their  camp  only  by  a  narrow 
depression,  was  a  plateau  with  gently  sloping  sides.      Caesar 
rapidly  bridged  the  marsh,  led  his  troops  across,  ascended 
the  plateau,  and  just  on  its  edge  placed  engines  to  throw 
missiles  against  the  enemy's  masses.      They  dared  not  send 
off  their  troops,  for  fear  they  might  become  confused  as  they 
broke   into    detachments,    and  fall    victims    to    the    Eoman 
cavalry.       For  some  hours,  therefore,  they  remained  under 
arms.     Caesar  made  a  new  camp  on  the  plateau,  formed  up 
the  legions  in  front  of  it,  and  kept  the  troop-horses  bridled, 
ready  to  charge  at  a  moment's  notice.      Towards  nightfall,  as 
the  enemy  could  not  remain  where  they  were   any  longer 
without  food,  they  had  recourse  to  a  stratagem.      Bundles  of 
straw  and  sticks  were  laid  in  front  of  the  line  and  set  ablaze. 
In  a  moment  a  vast  wall  of  flame  hid  the  entire  multitude. 


uxi-:i.lodt™um 


London:  MacmiUan  &  Co.,L-td.. 


viii  THE  END  OF  THE  STEUGGLE  153 

and  they  instantly  fled.  Suspecting,  though  he  could  not  51  b.c. 
see  what  they  had  done,  Caesar  made  the  legions  advance 
cautiously,  and  sent  his  cavalry  up  the  hill  in  pursuit.  But 
the  cavalry  were  afraid  to  ride  through  the  fiery  barrier  ; 
and  a  few  bold  troopers  who  spurred  in,  could  hardly  see 
their  horses'  heads  for  the  smoke.  Meanwhile  the  enemy 
were  well  on  their  way  down  the  valley  of  the  Aisne  ;  and 
having  crossed  the  Oise,  of  which  it  is  a  tributary,  they 
encamped  on  Mont  Ganelon  in  the  plain  beyond. 

On  the  soutliern  bank  of  the  Aisne,  in  the  angle  formed 
by  its  confluence  with  the  Oise,  there  was  a  large  meadow, 
the  luxuriance  of  which,  Correus  expected,  would  attract  the 
Eoman  foragers.  In  the  woods  which  encompassed  this 
meadow  he  posted  a  strong  force  of  horse  and  foot.  Having 
learned  his  design  from  a  prisoner,  Caesar  sent  his  cavalry 
and  light-armed  auxiliaries  down  the  valley  of  the  Aisne,  and 
followed  himself  in  support  with  the  legions.  Discerning 
the  cavalry  as  they  approached,  the  Gauls  rode  out  from  the 
wood  and  charged :  but  the  disciplined  squadrons  sustained 
the  shock  with  admirable  coolness :  supported  by  the  auxili- 
aries, they  baffled  every  effort  to  outflank  them ;  and  they 
had  already  won  the  day  when  the  infantry  appeared.  The 
flying  Gauls,  caught  in  their  own  trap,  were  hunted  down 
and  slaughtered  in  the  woods  and  by  the  banks  of  the  Oise. 
But  Correus  would  neither  yield  nor  fly.  Standing  alone 
upon  the  field,  refusing  to  accept  quarter,  he  struck  fiercely 
at  his  opponents  and  wounded  numbers  of  them,  until, 
infuriated  by  his  obstinacy,  they  hurled  a  volley  of  javelins 
into  his  body,  and  he  fell  dead. 

This  was  the  expiring  effort  of  the  Bellovaci.  Commius 
escaped  to  wage  a  guerilla  warfare,  but  ultimately  made  his 
peace  with  the  conqueror,  stipulating  only  that,  as  a  con- 
cession to  his  fears,  he  might  never  again  look  upon  the  face 
of  a  Eoman.  Those  who  had  remained  in  camp  appealed  to 
Caesar's  clemency,  and  obtained  a  contemptuous  forgiveness. 
Their  excuse  was  that  Correus  had  stirred  up  the  populace 
to  rebel,  in  defiance  of  the  senate.  Caesar  reminded  them 
that  they  had  borne  arms  against  him  before :  it  was  easy 
to  blame  the  dead,  but  no  single  man  could  raise  a  revolt 


ToiiLce.pcLqe  153. 


VIII  THE  END  OF  THE  STEUGGLE  153 

and  tliey  instantly  fled.  Suspecting,  though  he  could  not  51  b.c. 
see  what  they  had  done,  Caesar  made  the  legions  advance 
cautiously,  and  sent  his  cavalry  up  the  hill  in  pursuit.  But 
the  cavalry  were  afraid  to  ride  through  the  fiery  barrier  ; 
and  a  few  bold  troopers  who  spurred  in,  could  hardly  see 
their  horses'  heads  for  the  smoke.  Meanwhile  the  enemy 
were  well  on  their  way  down  the  valley  of  the  Aisne  ;  and 
having  crossed  the  Oise,  of  which  it  is  a  tributary,  they 
encamped  on  Mont  Ganelon  in  the  plain  beyond. 

On  the  southern  bank  of  the  Aisne,  in  the  angle  formed 
by  its  confluence  with  the  Oise,  there  was  a  large  meadow, 
the  luxuriance  of  which,  Correus  expected,  would  attract  the 
Eoman  foragers.  In  the  woods  which  encompassed  this 
meadow  he  posted  a  strong  force  of  horse  and  foot.  Having 
learned  his  design  from  a  prisoner,  Caesar  sent  his  cavalry 
and  light-armed  auxiliaries  down  the  valley  of  the  Aisne,  and 
followed  himself  in  support  with  the  legions.  Discerning 
the  cavalry  as  they  approached,  the  Gauls  rode  out  from  the 
wood  and  charged :  but  the  disciplined  squadrons  sustained 
the  shock  with  admirable  coolness :  supported  by  the  auxili- 
aries, they  baffled  every  effort  to  outflank  them ;  and  they 
had  already  won  the  day  when  the  infantry  appeared.  The 
flying  Gauls,  caught  in  their  own  trap,  were  hunted  down 
and  slaughtered  in  the  woods  and  by  the  banks  of  the  Oise. 
But  Correus  would  neither  yield  nor  fly.  Standing  alone 
upon  the  field,  refusing  to  accept  quarter,  he  struck  fiercely 
at  his  opponents  and  wounded  numbers  of  them,  until, 
infuriated  by  his  obstinacy,  they  hurled  a  volley  of  javelins 
into  his  body,  and  he  fell  dead. 

This  was  the  expiring  effort  of  the  Bellovaci.  Commius 
escaped  to  wage  a  guerilla  warfare,  but  ultimately  made  his 
peace  with  the  conqueror,  stipulating  only  that,  as  a  con- 
cession to  his  fears,  he  might  never  again  look  upon  the  face 
of  a  Roman.  Those  who  had  remained  in  camp  appealed  to 
Caesar's  clemency,  and  obtained  a  contemptuous  forgiveness. 
Their  excuse  was  that  Correus  had  stirred  up  the  populace 
to  rebel,  in  defiance  of  the  senate.  Caesar  reminded  them 
that  they  had  borne  arms  against  him  before :  it  was  easy 
to  blame  the  dead,  but  no  single  man  could  raise  a  revolt 


154  THE  END  OF  THE  STEUGGLE  chap. 

51  B.C.       with  the  support  of  a  mere  rabble  if  the  friends  of  order 

were  determined  to  prevent  him.      From  many  parts  people 

were  actually  emigrating,  so  intense  was  their  reluctance  to 

submit  to  the  authority  of  Eome :  but  Caesar  distributed  his 

legions  in  such  a  way  as  to  bar  their  escape.      He  himself 

marched   against   the   Eburones,   whom   he    had   already   so 

ruthlessly  punished,  and  sent  out  flying  columns  everywhere 

to  ravage,  burn  and  slay.     Ambiorix  evidently  was  not  to 

be   captured :    but   Caesar  resolved  that  the  wretched  man 

should  never  dare  to  show  his  face  again  among  the  people 

upon  whom  he  had  brought  such  a  terrible  doom. 

Caninius  The   end  was   at  hand.     The  most  warlike  states  were 

compel  ^"^  subdued  or  overawed  :   only  some  tribes  in   the  west  were 

Dumnacus  still  restless.      A  rebel  chief  named  Dumnacus,  with  a  motley 

siege  of      force   from    Brittany   and    the   country   round    Orleans   and 

Lemonum.  Chartres,  was  besieging  Lemonum,  on  the  site  of  the  modern 

Poitiers,  in  which  an  adherent  of  Caesar's  had  taken  refuge. 

Two   of  Caesar's   generals,  Caninius    and  Eabius,  compelled 

him  to  raise  the  siege;  and  while  he  was  hurrying  to  escape 

across  the  Loire,  Eabius  pounced  upon  him  and  defeated  him 

with   heavy  loss.      The  fugitives,  rallied   by   an   adventurer 

Drappes      called  Drappcs   and   Lucterius,  the  chief  who   had   so   ably 

tus  take  ^^'  Supported  Vercingetorix,  went  off  to  plunder  the  Province : 

refuge  in     but,   finding  themselves   hotly  pursued   by    Caninius,  threw 

dunum".       themsclves   into    the  fortress   of  Uxellodunum,  the   modern 

Puy  d'lssolu,^  of  which,  before  the  great  rebellion,  Lucterius 

had  been  the  over-lord. 

Blockade  They  had  hardly   shut   the   gates   before   their   pursuers 

dunum  °    arrived.       The   hill   overlooked   the  left   bank  of  the   river 

Tourmente,  which,  about  two  miles  to  the  south-west,  emptied 

itself  into  the   Dordogne.       It   rose   fully  six  hundred  feet 

above  the  valley ;  and  steep  rocks  on  every  side  forbade  any 

attempt  to  ascend.      Caninius,  therefore,  proceeded  to  invest 

the   town.       On   the   west,  rising   above   the   valley  of  the 

Tourmente,  and  on  the  north-east,  linked  to  the  stronghold 

by  a   broad  neck  of  land,  there  were   hills  of  considerable 

height.      Caninius  made  two  camps  on  the  former  and  one 

on  the  latter,  and  began  to  connect  them  by  a  line  of  con- 

1  See  pp.  493-504. 


VIII  THE  END  OF  THE  STKUGGLE  155 

travallatioii.  Watching  the  progress  of  the  works,  the  51  b. 
garrison  remembered  the  story  of  Alesia :  Lucterius  had  been 
there,  and  knew  how  Vercingetorix  and  his  people  had 
suffered ;  unless  his  own  men  bestirred  themselves  at  once, 
they  too  would  be  starved  into  surrender.  It  was  agreed 
that  Lucterius  and  Drappes  should  make  an  attempt  to 
procure  supplies.  On  the  following  night,  leaving  two 
thousand  men  to  hold  the  town,  they  stole  out  with  the 
rest  of  the  force.  For  several  days  they  scoured  the  sur- 
rounding country,  collecting  corn.  During  this  time  they 
occasionally  attacked  the  Eomans  by  night  with  such  vigour 
that  Caninius  was  obliged  to  suspend  the  construction  of  his 
lines.  One  morning,  in  the  early  twilight,  the  Eoman 
sentries  heard  an  unusual  noise :  scouts  were  sent  out,  and 
returned  with  the  news  that  a  string  of  pack-horses  was 
moving  up  a  narrow  path  leading  to  the  town.  The  troops 
instantly  turned  out :  the  drivers  rushed  helter-skelter  down 
the  hill ;  and  the  escort  were  slaughtered  almost  to  a  man. 
Lucterius  with  a  few  followers  escaped.  Within  a  few  hours 
another  division  under  Drappes,  encamped  a  few  miles  off, 
was  surprised  ;  and  every  man  who  escaped  the  sword  was 
made  prisoner. 

Next  day  Caninius  was  reinforced  by  the  legions  of 
Fabius,  who  had  just  concluded  a  most  successful  expedition 
along  the  valley  of  the  Loire.  Promptly  following  up  his 
victory  over  Dumnacus,  he  had  fallen  upon  the  Carnutes, 
who,  having  suffered  severely  in  that  battle,  were  ill  pre- 
pared to  resist.  This  warlike  people,  who  had  never  been 
thoroughly  subdued,  were  now  completely  cowed  and  forced 
to  give  hostages ;  and  the  maritime  states  of  Brittany, 
which,  like  them,  had  supported  Dumnacus,  hastened  to 
follow  their  example.  Caesar,  who  had  been  making  a 
political  progress,  and  trying  to  conciliate  the  humbled  chiefs, 
was  now  at  Cenabum.  The  Carnutes  were  still  uneasy  at 
the  remembrance  of  the  provocation  which  they  had  given 
in  the  great  revolt ;  and  it  seemed  likely  that  despair  might 
drive  them  to  fresh  excesses.  Caesar  saw  that  the  only  way 
to  restore  their  confidence  was  to  make  an  example  of  the 
chief  who  had  led  them  astray,  and  frankly  forgive  the  rest. 


156 


THE  END  OF  THE  STEUGGLE 


51  B.C. 


Execution 
of  Gutua- 
trus. 


Caesar 
marches 
for  Uxello- 
dunum. 


He  cuts 
off  the 
garrison 
from  their 
supply  of 
water. 


He  therefore  demanded  that  Gutuatrus,  who  had  been  the 
author  of  the  massacre  at  Cenabum  in  the  preceding  year, 
should  be  delivered  up  to  him  for  punishment ;  and  the 
people,  eager  to  purchase  the  favour  of  the  conqueror,  hunted 
him  down  and  brought  him  a  prisoner  into  the  Eoman  camp. 
Caesar,  if  Hirtius  is  to  be  believed,  was  unwilling  to  order 
his  execution,  but  could  not  afford  to  disregard  the  clamours 
of  the  soldiery.  But  Caesar  knew  how  to  silence  any 
clamour ;  and,  if  he  had  told  the  story  himself,  he  would 
have  told  it  without  excuse.  The  wretched  man  was  flogged 
till  he  was  insensible ;  and  his  head  was  cut  off. 

Caesar  now  received  a  series  of  despatches  informing  him 
of  the  obstinate  resistance  of  Uxellodunum.  Contemptible 
as  were  the  numbers  of  the  rebels,  their  example  might 
encourage  other  states  to  renew  the  wearing  struggle.  Only 
one  more  summer  had  to  pass,  as  the  malcontents  had  doubt- 
less reckoned,  and  his  government  would  be  at  an  end.^  But 
Caesar  determined  that,  before  that  time,  they  should  be  for 
ever  subdued.  Taking  his  cavalry  with  him,  he  hurried 
southward,  followed  by  two  legions,  for  Uxellodunum. 

He  instantly  detected  the  weak  point  in  the  enemy's 
position.  His  lieutenants  had  merely  intended  a  blockade. 
But  the  garrison  were  amply  provisioned ;  ^  and  the  only 
effectual  way  of  reducing  them  was  to  cut  off  their  supply  of 
water.  Archers,  slingers  and  artillery  were  posted  on  the 
western  bank  of  the  Tourmente,  so  as  to  command  every 
approach  to  the  stream.  Thus  menaced,  the  enemy  were 
afraid  to  descend ;  and  thenceforward  they  could  get  no 
water  except  from  a  spring  on  the  western  slope  of  the  hill. 
Opposite  this  spring,  Caesar  proceeded  to  construct  a  terrace. 
From  the  heights  above,  the  enemy  hurled  down  missiles ; 
and  many  of  the  Romans  were  struck :  but  the  rest  toiled 
doggedly  on ;  and  the  terrace  was  built  up  nearer  and  nearer 
still,  A  tower  was  erected  upon  it,  of  the  extraordinary 
height  of  ten  stories,  high  enough  to  overtop  the  spring ;  and 


1  See  p.  809. 

-  It  must  be  remembered  that,  although  the  attempt  to  procure  fresh 
supplies  had  failed,  the  numbers  of  the  garrison  had  been  greatly  reduced, 
and  therefore  there  were  far  fewer  people  to  feed. 


VIII  THE  END  OF  THE  STEUGGLE  157 

the  garrison  dared  not  approach  under  the  shower  of  stones  oi  b.c. 
and  arrows  which  its  engines  rained  down.  Men  and  cattle 
alike  were  parched  by  thirst.  Torture  and  death  stared  them 
in  the  face.  But  there  was  the  spring  still  gushing  forth. 
As  a  last  resource,  the  garrison  set  fire  to  a  number  of 
barrels,  filled  with  pitch,  grease  and  shavings,  and  rolled  them 
on  to  the  terrace.  The  woodwork  and  the  sheds  were 
presently  in  a  blaze.  The  garrison  with  desperate  energy 
flung  down  missiles  to  deter  the  Eomans  from  advancing  to 
put  out  the  fire.  But  right  up  against  the  roaring  flames, 
undaunted  by  the  missiles,  unheeding  the  sight  of  their 
falling  comrades,  the  Roman  soldiers  pressed  steadily  on : 
with  a  mighty  shout  they  answered  their  enemy's  yells ;  and 
each  man,  eager  that  his  valour  should  be  observed,  fought 
as  he  had  never  fought  before.  Still  the  flames  shot  up ; 
and  precious  lives  were  sacrificed  in  vain.  In  this  extremity, 
Caesar  sent  a  number  of  cohorts  to  climb  the  hill  and  feign 
an  assault  upon  the  town.  Panic-stricken,  the  garrison 
recalled  their  comrades  from  below ;  and  the  moment  they 
had  turned  their  backs,  the  Eomans  ran  forward  and  ex- 
tinguished the  flames.  Still  the  Gauls  held  out ;  for  the 
spring  itself  was  still  untouched.  At  length,  however,  a 
party  of  sappers  crept  through  a  gallery  which  had  been 
secretly  driven  into  the  hill-side  to  the  source  of  the  spring, 
and  diverted  its  flow.      Then  at  last,  feeling  that  Heaven  was  ^"^^^^"^^^ 

'  "=>  of  the 

fighting  against  them,  the  garrison  surrendered.  garrison. 

Caesar  saw  that,  if  these  rebellions  were  to  break  forth  Their  pun- 
again  and  again,  his  work  would  never  be  at  an  end.  He  ^*^™®^*- 
determined,  therefore,  to  inflict  upon  the  garrison  a  punish- 
ment so  appalling  that  all  malcontents  should  in  future  remain 
quiet.  He  would  not  put  his  prisoners  to  death,  because,  if 
he  did,  their  fate,  though  it  might  be  talked  of  for  a  time, 
would  soon  be  forgotten.  They  were  to  remain  as  a  living 
warning  to  intending  rebels.  He  ordered  their  hands  to  be 
cut  off,  and  sent  them  forth  to  exist  as  they  best  might. 

One  notable  survivor  of  the  great  rebellion  was  still  at 
large.  Lucterius,  the  lieutenant  of  Vercingetorix,  a  man  who, 
as  Caesar  said,  was  ready  to  dare  anything,  had  wandered 
far  from  Uxellodunum.     He  knew  that  for  him  there  was  no 


158  THE  END  OF  THE  STEUGGLE       chap,  vm 

51  B.C.  forgiveness  ;  and  he  went  from  place  to  place  in  fear  of 
betrayal.  At  length  he  fell  into  the  hands  of  a  renegade 
Aeduan,  who  brought  him  in  chains  to  Caesar ;  and  what 
was  his  fate  we  can  only  guess. 

Caesar  g^^^  Caesar  knew  that  conquest  can  never  be  complete 

follows  up  •  1  1  f.    n  1      T  -T        •  X         1-       1 

coercion  by  Until  cocrcion  has  been  followed  by  concihation.  In  little 
concilia-  more  than  a  year  he  would  be  leaving  the  country ;  and  he 
must  contrive  to  leave  it  at  peace.  The  time  had  not  come, 
nor  had  he  the  authority  to  organise  a  government :  it  would 
be  enough  if  his  successors  could  enter  upon  that  task  with- 
out encountering  opposition.  He  had  no  wish  to  oppress  the 
Gauls,  or  to  hurt  their  national  pride :  on  the  contrary,  he 
desired  that  they  should  learn  to  feel  themselves  really  citizens 
of  Eome.  He  fixed  their  tribute  at  a  moderate  amount.^  He 
did  not  interfere  with  their  institutions,  though  he  doubtless 
used  his  influence  to  promote  his  own  adherents  to  power. 
He  distinguished  certain  tribes,  in  which  the  party  that 
adhered  to  Eoman  interests  appeared  sufficiently  strong,  by 
the  bestowal  of  a  comparatively  free  constitution.  He  loaded 
the  chiefs  with  presents  :  he  won  their  hearts  by  the  charm 
of  his  address ;  and  when  he  quitted  Gaul,  and  threw  down 
the  gauntlet,  on  a  wider  arena,  to  a  mightier  foe,  they  sent 
their  bravest  warriors  to  fight  under  his  fiag.^ 

1  40,000,000  sesterces  or  about  £400,000.  See  Suetonius,  Divus  luUus,  25, 
and  Mommsen's  Hist,  of  Home,  iv.  283. 

-  B.  G.,  viii.  49  ;  Cicero,  Ep.  ad  Att.,  ix.  13  ;  B.  C,  i.  39,  §  2  ;  Suetonius, 
Divus  lulius,  25  ;  F.  de  Coulanges,  Hist,  des  inst.  pol.  de  I'ancicnne  Frarice, — 
la  Gaule  rom.,  1891,  66,  n.  1,  84,  n.  1  ;  Desjardins,  Giogr.  de  la  Gaule 
rom.,  iii,  48-9. 


CHAPTEE    IX 

CONCLUSION 

V 

The  conquest  of  Gaul,  fraught  with  illimitable  issues,  was 
at  last  complete.^  Destiny  had  decided  that  Gaul  was  to 
be  either  German  or  Eoman  ;  and  Caesar  did  not  hesitate 
to  grasp  the  gift  of  destiny  for  Kome.  The  Gallic  warriors 
were  perhaps  as  brave,  man  for  man,  as  the  Eoman  legion- 
aries ;  and  their  numbers  were  far  greater.  But,  whatever 
may  have  been  their  political  capacity,  when  Caesar  came 
among  them  they  were  only  feeling  after  political  union : 
they  did  not  combine  to  expel  him  until  it  was  too  late,  and 
not  with  a  whole  heart  even  then.  With  all  their  dash  and 
nervous  enthusiasm,  they  lacked  the  tenacity  of  the  Eoman : 
rushing  vehemently  to  the  attack,  they  fell  away  at  the  first 
reverse.  j^This  weakness,  which  Caesar  so  often  notices,  may 
have  been  inherent  in  the  race :  it  may  have  been  wholly  or 
in  part  the   result  of  a  want  of  mutual  confidence : "    but 

^  This  statement  will  naturally  betaken  in  a  general  sense.  The  subjugation 
of  the  north-western  part  of  the  country  was  doubtless,  as  Mommsen  says  {Hist, 
of  Rome, — The  Provinces,  i.  79),  comparatively  superficial  :  there  was  fighting 
in  Aquitania  in  38  and  28-27  B.C.  ;  and  there  was  a  partial  insurrection  in  the 
reign  of  Tiberius.  Still,  the  thoroughness  with  which  Caesar  had  done  his 
work  was  demonstrated,  first  by  the  j^eace  which  prevailed  during  the  civil 
war,  when  Gaul  was  almost  entirely  denuded  of  troops,  and  secondly  by  the 
fact  that,  during  the  long  reign  of  Augustus,  notwithstanding  the  disturbances 
in  Germany,  Gaul  remained  submissive,  and  that,  as  Mommsen  puts  it  {lb., 
pp.  80-81),  Vercingetorix  found  no  successor.  See  also  F.  de  Coulanges,  Hist, 
des  inst.  pol.  de  Vancienne  France, — la  Gaule  ram.,  pp.  71-84,  and  Desjardins, 
G6ogr.  de  la  Gaule  rom.,  iii.  49-50. 

-  The  numerous  host  of  the  warlike  Baluchis  was  defeated  by  Sir  Charles 
Napier's  little  force  at  Miani  principally  because  it  was  a  loose  aggregate  of 
tribal  levies  which  had  not  been  trained  to  act  in  concert  (see  my  article  on 

160 


160  CONCLUSION  CHAP. 

whatever  the  cause,  the  fact  remained.  Xor,  for  the  most 
part,  were  the  heterogeneous  levies  who  opposed  Caesar  the 
equals  of  the  purer  Gauls  who  had  routed  a  Eoman  army 
on  the  banks  of  the  Allia.  The  Helvetii,  the  Parisii,  the 
Senones  and  a  few  of  the  Belgic  tribes  alone  maintained  the 
ancient  renown  of  the  Celtic  infantry.  The  Gauls  had  no 
regular  army  :  they  had  no  science  :  they  had  no  discipline  ; 
and,  until  Vercingetorix  arose,  they  had  no  great  leader. 
Their  conqueror,  on  the  other  hand,  was  master  of  a  compact, 
disciplined  and  well-equipped  army,  the  finest  in  the  world :  ^ 
he  was  free  to  pursue  a  definite  aim  in  opposition  to  the  sporadic 
efforts  of  his  enemies ;  and,  while  he  became  a  general  only 
to  achieve  higher  ends,  he  was  one  of  the  greatest  generals 
that  have  ever  lived.  His  writings  leave  so  much  to  the  intelli- 
gence of  the  expert  that  few  can  conceive  how  hard  it  was  to 
conduct  the  operations  which,  in  the  narrative,  appear  so 
easy ;  what  resolution  was  needed  to  adhere,  in  the  face 
of  unforeseen  obstacles,  to  plans  readily  formed,  to  banish 
distracting  doubts,  to  preserve  equanimity  under  the  friction 
of  accumulating  difficulties,  to  sustain  the  military  virtue 
of  the  army  in  privation  and  in  the  bitterness  of  defeat,  to 
carry  out  combinations  when  calculations  were  disturbed.^ 
How  Caesar  did  these  things  the  war-bred  soldier  can  alone 
realise ;  but  we  can  all  form  some  conception  if  we  rightly 
study  what  he  wrote.  He  knew  that  a  well-organised  com- 
missariat is  the  foundation  of  success  in  war ;  and  the  truth 
of  this  maxim  is  borne  in  at  every  turn  upon  the  reader  of 

the  battle  of  Miani  in  Macmillans  Magazine,  January,  1900)  ;  and  it  is  prob- 
able that  the  defeats  which  Vercingetorix  suffered  were  partly  due  to  the 
same  defect. 

^  It  has  been  asserted  that  the  legionaries  with  whom  Caesar  conquered  Gaul 
were  themselves  Gauls.  Xo  one  could  make  a  statement  so  misleading  who 
had  any  knowledge  of  ethnology,  or  who  had  noted  the  emphasis  with  which 
Caesar  marks  the  distinction,  in  regard  to  stature,  between  the  Gauls  and  his 
legionaries  {B.  G.,  ii.  30,  §  4).  All  the  legions  which  he  raised  during  the 
Gallic  war,  vdVa.  one  possible  exception  (see  p.  783,  n.  2),  were  levied  from  the 
mixed  population,  composed  of  Italian,  Gallic,  Ligurian,  and  doubtless  also 
Etruscan  and  aboriginal  elements,  which  inhabited  Piedmont  and  the  Plain 
of  Lombardy, 

-  "  Everything,"  says  Clausewitz  {On  JFar,  translated  by  Col.  J.  J.  Graham, 
i.,  1873,  p.  40),  "everything  is  very  simple  in  war,  but  the  simplest  thing 
is  diflBcult." 


IX  CONCLUSION  161 

his  memoirs.  While  his  enemies  were  more  than  once  obliged 
to  strike  prematurely  or  to  disperse  because  they  had  not 
secured  their  means  of  subsistence,  he  was  always  able  to  keep 
his  army  together  and  to  choose  his  own  time.  For  a  few 
days'  raid  the  legionaries  could  carry  their  food  on  their  backs  : 
but  whenever  his  operations  were  likely  to  be  protracted,  he 
stored  his  grain  in  magazines  and  provided  for  its  transport 
and  protection.  His  geographical  intuition  was  as  unerring 
as  that  of  Napoleon.  He  knew  both  how  to  govern  and  how 
to  fascinate  his  soldiers,  so  that  they  would  strain  every  nerve 
to  win  his  praise, — all  the  more  because  they  saw  that  he 
was  more  careful  of  their  lives  than  of  his  own.  Emergencies 
the  most  sudden  and  confounding,  even  when  they  resulted 
from  his  own  mistakes,  seemed  only  to  make  him  more  calm. 
He  was  not  only  master  of  all  the  science  of  his  time,  but 
he  showed  an  inexhaustible  fertility  in  inventing  expedients. 
He  concentrated  his  strength  upon  the  decisive  point :  he 
was  always  ready  to  put  everything  to  the  hazard  for  a 
great  end.  He  knew  the  rashness  of  his  enemy,  and  lured 
him  on  by  an  affectation  of  fear.  He  confounded  him 
by  the  swiftness  of  his  marches  :  he  seized  the  best  of 
the  ground  before  he  attacked ;  and  when  he  had  won 
the  victory,  he  followed  it  up  with  an  energy  that  over- 
whelmed. 

Nor  would  it  be  just  to  forget  the  support  which  the 
general  received  from  his  lieutenants.  Few  of  them  failed 
to  do  what  was  required  ;  and  one  may  fairly  rank  among  the 
great  marshals  of  the  world.  The  oenius  of  Labienus  has 
not  been  adequately  appreciated :  but  it  needs  little  insight 
to  see  that  Caesar  placed  him  in  a  class  by  himself.  Caesar 
trusted  him  to  the  full ;  and,  so  long  as  his  engagement 
lasted,  that  faithless  man  was  true.  The  most  difficult  enter- 
prises were  imposed  upon  him  ;  and  he  accomplished  them 
all.  He  fulfilled  his  instructions  to  the  letter :  he  assumed 
responsibilities  without  fear.  Beset  by  dangers  the  most 
appalling,  his  judgement  was  unerring,  his  decision  unfaltering. 
In  the  crisis  of  the  most  critical  campaign  he  avenged  his 
chief's  defeat  by  victory :  in  the  crisis  of  Alesia  he  repelled 
the   fiercest  onslaught,  and  struck    the  decisive  blow ;    and 

M 


162  CONCLUSION  chap. 

throughout   those  eight  years,  from   first   to  last,   he  never 
made  a  single  mistake. 

'^  But  Caesar's  was  the  directmg  mind.  And  Caesar  was 
much  more  than  a  great  general.  He  was  a  far-seeing  states- 
man and  withal  a  dexterous  politician.//  Many  historians 
have  affirmed  that  the  oligarchies  in  the  Gallic  states 
supported  him,  and  that  the  adventurers  who  aimed  at 
winning  royal  power  were  his  opponents.  There  is  some 
truth  in  this  view  ;  but  it  needs  qualification.  No  generalisa- 
tion can  be  safely  made  about  the  attitude  of  the  various 
parties  in  Gaul.  Caesar  shaped  his  policy  according  to 
circumstances ;  and  if  Dumnorix  and  Indutiomarus  were  his 
enemies,  he  himself,  as  we  have  seen,  set  up  kings  in  various 
republican  states.  With  cool  calculation  he  took  advantage 
of  the  fears,  the  necessities,  the  jealousies,  the  intestine 
broils,  the  spasmodic  revolutions,  the  petty  ambitions 
of  those  incoherent  multitudes.  For  it  must  never  be 
forgotten  that,  as  we  conquered  India  with  the  aid  of 
Indians,  Caesar  conquered  Gaul  with  the  aid  of  Gauls.  At 
first  indeed  he  was  welcomed  as  a  deliverer  ;  and  when  he 
had  expelled  the  Helvetii  and  the  Germans,  it  is  doubtful 
whether  he  was  generally  feared  as  a  conqueror.  It  was  only 
when  the  presence  of  his  legions  was  felt  as  a  burden,  and 
when  ambitious  chieftains  saw  reason  to  fear  that  he  would 
blast  their  schemes,  that  he  awakened  partial  opposition. 
The  Gauls  were  not  devoid  of  patriotism :  but  it  was  choked 
by  the  tares  of  jealousy  ;  and  when  Vercingetorix  was  fighting 
for  the  fatherland,  it  is  probable  that  there  were  many  who 
had  as  much  to  fear  from  his  success  as  from  his  failure. 
Those  who  courted  Caesar's  friendship  and  adhered  to  his  cause, 
were  distinguished  by  every  mark  of  favour,  and  might  reckon 
with  certainty  upon  his  support.  The  Aedui  adhered  to  him 
for  six  years,  and  when  they  changed  their  minds  they  found 
that  they  had  served  his  turn :  ^  the  Remi  saw  from  the  first 
that  he  was  going  to  win,  and,  having  made  their  choice,  they 
abided  by  it  to  the  end.     The  Aquitanians  cared  nothing  for 

^  "Ces  chefs  eduens,"  says  M.  Julliau  {Vercingitorix,  p.  236),  "qui 
n'embrassaient  uno  cause  que  pour  en  regretter  une  autre,  etaient  toujours 
traitres  a  la  trahi.sou  nieme." 


IX  CONCLUSION  163 

tlie  Gauls,  and  their  isolated  resistance  was  paralysed  in  a 
single  campaign.  The  Celticans,  with  the  exception  of  the 
maritime  tribes,  submitting,  for  the  most  part,  without  an 
effort,  looked  on,  with  folded  hauds,^  until,  at  the  eleventh 
hour,  Vercingetorix  roused  them  to  a  convulsive  resistance ; 
and  then  the  Belgae,  who  had  hitherto  borne  the  brunt  of 
the  struggle,  held  aloof  until  it  was  too  late. 

It  has  been  said  that  it  is  impossible  to  conquer  a  people 
who  are  determined  to  be  free.  Perhaps,  in  our  modern 
age ;  and  doubtless  in  every  age,  when  the  people  dwell  in  a 
country  which  nature  has  fortified,  and  when  they  are  brave, 
numerous,  and  of  one  mind.  But  Caesar  succeeded,  as 
William  the  Conqueror  succeeded,  not  merely  because  the 
people  with  wdiom  he  had  to  deal  were  disunited,  but  also 
because  he  was  prepared  to  go  any  lengths  rather  than  fail. 
The  Gauls  were  willing  to  sacrifice  myriads  of  lives,  so  they 
might  preserve  their  liberty  ?  Then  he  would  slay  a  million, 
aye  and  slay  women  and  children,  and  ravage  their  lands, 
and  burn  their  houses  over  their  heads,  and  lop  off  their 
limbs,  so  he  might  at  last  subdue  them  !  And,  though  he 
was  ruthless,  he  was  also  merciful.-  When  he  had  beaten 
down  opposition,  he  held  out  his  hand  in  friendship ;  and 
the  Gauls  took  it,  and  bore  him  no  grudge. 

And  when  he  had  gone,  what  motive  had  they  to  rebel  ? 
Many  of  the  states  retained  administrative  independence ; 
and  none  had  exchanged  independence  for  servitude.  National 
independence  they  had  never  had ;  for  they  had  never  been 
a  united  nation.  As  a  nation,  they  could  make  no  effort  to 
throw  off  the  Eoman  yoke ;  for  there  was  none  among  them 
W'ho  could  command  the  confidence  of  the  nation,  or  weld  it 
into  a  coherent  whole?  Many  of  the  smaller  peoples  had 
already  been  in  subjection  to  powerful  neighbours ;  and  it 
was  less  humiliating  to  obey  an  alien  master  than  one  of 
their  own  race.  Eome  was  distant ;  and  her  glory  wrought 
upon  the  imagination.\\Eome  was  the  resistless  power  which, 
for  centuries,  had  been  bringing,  one  after  another,  the  nations 

^  Unless  the  Treveri  are  to  be  counted  as  Celtae  (see  pp.  384-5). 
-  In  Caesare  haec  sunt :   mitis  clemensquc  natura.     So  wrote  Cicero  in 
46  B.C.  {Ep.  ad  Fam.,  vi.  6,  §  8). 


164  CONCLUSION  CHAP.  IX 

of  the  earth  within  her  empire.  Jealousies  were  hushed 
beneath  her  sway.  Her  yoke  was  easy  ;  and  her  rule  brought 
peace,  security  and  prosperity.  *  If  adventurers  in  Gaul,  as 
in  India,  regretted  the  good  old  days  when  they  could  win 
thrones  by  their  wits  and  their  swords,  the  many  gained 
more  than  they  had  lost ;  and  so  it  happened  that  the  few 
spasmodic  outbreaks  which  followed  Caesar's  departure  were 
foredoomed  to  failure,  and  that  his  conquest  was  effected  once 
for  all. 


APPENDIX 


Professor  Rhys  holds  that  the  existence  of  the  Goidelic  language  in 
Gaul  "  has  been  placed  beyond  doubt  by  the  discovery  of  fragments  of 
a  calendar  engraved  on  bronze  tablets  ...  at  a  place  called  Coligny 
in  the  department  of  the  Ain,"  that  is  to  say,  in  the  country  of  the 
Sequani  ;  and  he  adds  that  "  two  inscriptions  in  what  appears  to  be  the 
same  language  have  come  to  light  also  at  a  place  called  Rom,  in  the 
Deux  Sevres,"  which  belonged  to  the  Pictones.  He  points  out,  however, 
that  in  this  language  "  several  of  the  phonetic  changes  characteristic  of 
Goidelic  had  not  taken  place.  .  .  .  Among  other  things  it  preserves 
intact  the  Aryan  consonant  p,  which  has  since  mostly  disappeared  in 
Goidelic.^ 

M.  d'Arbois  de  Jubainville,-  on  the  other  hand,  still  maintains  that 
"  the  Goidels  formed  a  Celtic  group  which  must  be  distinguished  from 
the  Gauls  " ;  and,  referring  ^  to  the  calendar  of  Coligny,  he  refuses  to 
admit  the  existence  among  the  Sequani  of  a  Celtic  dialect  "  in  which, 
while  initial  q  was  changed  into  2^,  medial  q  remained."  Such  an 
hypothesis,  he  argues,  is  refuted  by  the  Sequanian  place-names,  Epam- 
anduodurum  and  Loposagium.  We  can  no  more  conclude,  he  insists, 
that  the  language  of  the  calendar  was  a  Celtic  dialect  than  that  Welsh 
is  a  dialect  of  English. 

M.  Seymour  de  Ricci  points  out*  that  while  some  scholars,  for 
example  Otto  Hirschfeld  and  M.  J.  Loth,  regard  the  language  of  the 
calendar  as  Celtic,  others  consider  it  Ligurian. 


B 

In  a  recent  number  of  the  Classical  Review,^  Mr.  Warde  Fowler  did 
me  the  honour  of  devoting  an  article  to  a  criticism  of  the  statement 
which  I  made  in  the  larger  edition  of  this  book  as  to  Caesar's  belief  in 

'  Report  of  .  .  .  the  British  Association  for  the  Advancement  of  Science,  1900, 
p.  895.  See  also  Mr.  E.  W.  B.  Nicholson's  The  Language  of  tJis  Continental  Picts, 
1900. 

^  Principaux  auteurs  de  V antiquity  a  consulter  sur  I' hist,  des  Celtes,  1902, 
pp.  183-4. 

2  Rev.  celt.,  xx.,  1899,  pp.  108-9.  ^  lb.,  xxi.,  1900,  p.  19. 

5  April,  1903,  pp.  153-6. 

165 


166  APPENDIX 

Fortune.  In  tlie  present  edition  I  have  allowed  the  statement  to  stand, 
merely  substituting  the  words  "  an  unwavering  faith  "  for  "  the  faith  of 
a  devotee,"  which  was  certainly  open  to  criticism ;  and  I  believe  that  it 
is  supported  by  the  evidence  to  which  I  have  referred  in  the  first  foot- 
note to  page  23.  I  cannot  help  thinking  that  Mr.  Warde  Fowler 
misunderstood  me.  I  really  was  not  so  simple  as  to  suggest  that 
Caesar  believed  in  a  personal  goddess  called  Foriuna.  What  I  meant 
to  convey  was  simply  that,  in  common  with  many  men  of  action,  he 
believed  that  fortune  may  wreck  the  most  wisely  planned  and  most 
diligently  executed  operations,  while  she  may  rescue  her  favourites  from 
the  penalties  of  their  own  mistakes  ;  and  that,  in  common  with  Sulla, 
Napoleon,  and  other  great  commanders,  he  had  a  firm  faith,  touched 
perhaps  by  mysticism,  in  his  own  star. 

C 

The  eminent  archaeologist,  M.  Salomon  Keinach,  has  censured  me 
for  not  having  taken  note,  in  the  larger  edition  of  this  book,  of  M. 
Colomb's  "  admirable  study  "  on  the  campaign  of  Caesar  against  Ario- 
vistus,  which  appeared  in  the  Revue  archeologique  for  July,  1898.  This 
number  had  unfortunately  not  reached  the  library  of  the  British 
Museum  at  the  time  when  I  sent  my  manuscript  to  the  printer ;  but  I 
have  read  the  article  since.  M.  Colomb  begins  by  insisting  that  his 
extraordinary  knowledge  of  the  whole  theatre  of  the  war  places  him  in 
a  position  to  speak  with  authority ;  and  his  conclusion  is  that  the 
defeat  of  Ariovistus  took  place  not  in  the  plain  of  Alsace  but  between 
Arcey  and  Presentevillers.  Readers  who  do  not  know  the  country  as 
intimately  as  M.  Colomb  will  find  that  Sheets  101  and  114  of  the  Carte 
de  I'Etat-Major  (3-0,^770)  ^^'^^^  enable  them  to  control  his  arguments. 

M.  Colomb  makes  Caesar  advance  from  Vesontio  (Besangon)  by  way 
of  Oiselay  to  Pennesieres,  that  is  to  say,  by  a  longer  and  more  westerly 
route  than  the  one  adopted  by  Napoleon  III.  and  Colonel  Stoffel ;  ^  but 
from  Pennesieres  to  Arcey  the  route  which  he  adopts  coincides  with 
theirs.  He  argues  that  Caesar  marched  by  way  of  Oiselay  in  order  to 
approach  the  river  Saone,  "  by  which  the  Aedui  and  the  Lingones  were 
forwarding  him  supplies."  -  But  a  glance  at  the  map  will  show  that, 
by  following  the  route  indicated  by  M.  Colomb,  Caesar  would,  in  the 
most  favourable  circumstances,  only  have  begun  to  receive  supplies  from 
the  Aedui  and  the  Lingones  one  day  earlier  than  if  he  had  gone  by 
Vovay,  Rioz,  and  Filaine, —  the  route  adopted  by  Colonel  Stoffel :  for 
the  first  few  days  his  troops  unquestionably  carried  their  food  with 
them ;  and  the  Aedui  and  the  Lingones  were  obliged  to  forward 
supplies  right  up  to  the  actual  theatre  of  war. 

According  to  Colonel  Stoffel,  Caesar  marched  on  from  Arcey  through 
the  pass  of  Belfort  into  the  plain  of  Alsace  :  according  to  M.  Colomb,^ 
his  march  terminated  at  Arcey.     M.  Colomb  defends  his  view  by  the 

1  See  pp.  629-30,  636  of  the  larger  edition  of  this  work. 
2  Rev.  arch.,  xxxiii.,  1898,  p.  36.  -^  lb.,  pp.  34-5,  40-45. 


APPENDIX  167 

following  arguments  : — (1)  Caesar,  he  insists,  could  not  venture  to 
advance  beyond  Arcey  either  north  -  eastward  in.  the  direction  of 
Hericourt,  ur  eastward  in  the  direction  of  Montbeliard,  because,  if  he 
had  taken  either  of  these  routes,  Ariovistus  would  have  seized  the 
other,  planted  himself  in  the  rear  of  the  Romans,  and  thus  severed  their 
line  of  communication.  (2)  The  distance  from  Besan^on  by  Oiselay  to 
Arcey  is  90  kilometres,  and  M.  Colomb  argues  that  Caesar  would  not 
have  marched  more  than  this  in  seven  days.  He  says  that  in  52  B.C. 
Caesar  took  four  days  to  march  from  Sens  to  Gien  by  way  of  Trigueres, 
that  is  to  say,  that  he  marched  not  mors  than  25  kilometres  a  day  at 
the  very  outside  ;  and  he  infers  that  from  Besancon  to  Arcey  he  only 
marched  14  kilometres  a  day.  He  admits  that  Caesar  marched  from 
Sens  to  Gien  very  early  in  the  year,  when  the  roads  were  in  bad  con- 
dition, whereas  he  marched  against  Ariovistus  at  the  most  favourable 
season  ;  but  he  says  that  the  road  from  Besancon  to  Ai'cey  must,  at  the 
best  of  times,  have  been  bad,  and  he  maintains  that  Caesar  had  no 
motive  for  hurrying.  (3)  He  points  out  that  in  the  Hungarian 
invasion  of  929  a.d.  and  in  Bourbaki's  campaign  of  1871  fighting  took 
place  along  the  line  Villersexel — Arcey — Montbeliard  ;  and  he  holds 
that  these  examples  prove  that  this  is  the  natural  route  for  all  invasions 
coming  from  the  east  and  for  all  attacks  coming  from  France  and 
having  the  pass  of  Belfort  as  their  objective. 

The  first  argument  depends  upon  the  unverifiable  assumption  that 
Ariovistus  waited  for  Caesar  in  the  pass  of  Belfort.  But  I  am  willing, 
for  the  sake  of  argument,  to  grant  the  assumption.  !Now  if  Ariovistus 
had  attempted,  with  his  whole  force,  to  cut  Caesar's  line  of  communica- 
tion, he  would  have  played  a  dangerous  game  ;  for,  by  doing  so,  he 
would  have  found  himself  cut  off  from  his  own  dominions  in  the  plain 
of  Alsace.  If,  in  the  case  which  M.  Colomb  supposes,  Caesar  had 
advanced  beyond  Arcey,  he  would  have  left  detachments  to  guard 
Arcey,  or  the  gorge  of  Presentevillers  on  the  road  leading  to  Montbeliard, 
or  both,  and  would  have  advanced  himself  by  way  of  Hericourt.  Now, 
supposing  that  Ariovistus  had  been  so  rash  as  to  quit  Belfort  and  advance 
by  the  Montbeliard  road  in.  order  to  seize  Arcey,  what  would  have 
happened  ?  In  the  gorge  of  Presentevillers  he  would  have  found  a  force 
ready  to  dispute  his  passage.  Meanwhile  would  Caesar  have  neglected 
his  opportunity  ?  Turning  to  tlie  right,  he  would  have  hotly  pursued 
the  German  column,  and  Ariovistus  would  have  found  himself  caught 
inextricably  in  a  trap.  If  he  had  merely  sent  a  detachment  to  operate 
against  Caesar's  communications,  he  would  evidently  have  had  no  pros- 
pect of  success.  Besides,  as  we  shall  presently  see,  M.  Colomb,  contra- 
dicting himself,  holds  that  Caesar  did  advance  a  few  kilometres  from 
Arcey  in  the  direction  of  Hericourt,  and  did  leave  Arcey  undefended  I 
The  second  argument  depends  upon  a  string  of  blunders.  Caesar,  as  I 
have  demonstrated  elsewhere,^  never  went  near  Trigueres  or  Gien  :  he 
marched  from  Sens  not  to  Gien  but  to  Orleans,  a  distance  of  at  least 
108  kilometres.     Moreover,  the  argument  that  because  Caesar  marched 

1  Caesars  Conquest  of  Gaul,  1899,  pp.  402-15,  504-9. 


168  APPENDIX 

25  (or  rather  27)  kilometres  a  day  on  a  bad  road  in  the  winter,  therefore 
he  did  not  inarch  more  than  14  kilometres  a  day  on  a  bad  road  in  the 
summer,  is  one  which  I  find  rather  difficult  to  follow.  I  maintain,  in 
opposition  to  M.  Colomb,  that  Caesar  marched  against  Ariov-istus  as  fast 
as  he  conveniently  could  :  otherwise,  why  did  he  make  a  point  of  telling 
us  that  he  marched  for  seven  consecutive  days  without  allowing  one  day 
for  rest  {septimo  die  cum  iter  non  interonitteret  etc.)  ?  ^  The  historical 
precedents  which  M.  Colomb  quotes,  might  perhaps  have  weight  if  it 
could  be  proved  that  Ariovistus  waited  for  Caesar  in  the  pass  of  Belfort : 
but  I  find  it  difficult  to  believe  that  Ariovistus  would  ever  have  com- 
mitted himself  to  an  offensive  movement  against  Caesar  westward  of 
the  pass. 

But  when  we  come  to  scrutinise  the  kernel  of  M.  Colomb's  argument, 
we  find  that  his  case  completely  breaks  down.  Caesar  says  that  his 
conference  with  Ariovistus  took  place  at  a  tumulus  terrenus,  which  may 
mean  either  a  natural  knoll  or  an  earthen  mound,  in  a  great  plain 
{magna  2jlanities).^  I  have  assumed  in  the  text  -^  that  the  great  plain  was 
the  plain  of  Alsace  ;  and  I  agree  with  Colonel  Stoffel,  who  is  not  a  bad 
topographer,  that  there  is  no  other  great  plain  in  any  part  of  Gaul  in 
which  the  conference  can  possibly  be  supposed  to  have  taken  place. 
No  !  says  M.  Colomb  :  the  great  plain  was  that  in  which  Montbeliard  is 
situated  ;  it  was  between  the  Savoureuse  and  the  Lisaine,  which  flow 
into  the  Allan,  and  it  was  bounded  on  the  south  by  the  Doubs.  Its 
extent  from  east  to  west  Avas  more  than  6  kilometres,  and  from  north 
to  south  nearly  7.*  Well,  I  will  not  quarrel  about  measurements, 
although,  if  M.  Colomb's  description  is  just,  Port  Meadow,  near  Oxford, 
might  fairly  be  called  a  great  plain.  But  is  M.  Colomb's  great  plain  a 
plain  at  all  ?  Certainly  it  looks  like  one  in  M.  Colomb's  sketch-map  : 
he  contrives  to  make  it  do  so  by  the  simple  process  of  leaving  the  area 
blank  and  shading  the  svirrounding  hills.  By  a  similar  process  I  could 
produce  a  map  in  which  the  Matterhorn  would  look  like  a  plain.  If 
the  reader  will  take  my  advice,  he  will  check  M.  Colomb's  map  by  Sheet 
114  of  the  Carte  de  VEtat-Major.  He  will  there  find  that  the  entire 
area  of  M.  Colomb's  plain  is  covered  by  hill-shading.  The  tumulus 
terrenus,  according  to  M.  Colomb,  was  the  hill  called  La  Chaux.  M. 
Colomb  observes  that,  viewed  from  the  summit  of  this  hill,  the  plain 
"  semble  etre  rigoureusement  plate."  I  can  only  reply  that  within  a 
fraction  of  the  area,  not  including  La  Chaux  itself,  I  find  the  following 
different  elevations,  expressed  in  terms  of  metres  above  the  level  of  the 
sea, — 320,  347,  349,  366,  312,  349.  Is  not  this  "great"  little  plain 
somewhat  uneven  ? 

Let  us  now  examine  M.  Colomb's  explanation  of  the  flank  march  by 
which  Ariovistus  succeeded  in  temporarily  cutting  Caesar's  line  of  com- 
munication. According  to  M.  Colomb,  the  hill  at  the  foot  of  which 
Ariovistus  halted  on  the  night  before  he  made  this  march  was  a  hill 
overlooking  Montbeliard :  Caesar's  camp  was  on  the  north-west,  between 

^  B.  G.,  i.  41,  §  5.  -  lb.  43,  §  1. 

^  See  p.  41,  snj)7-a.  *  Rev.  arch.,  xxxiii.,  1898,  p.  49. 


APPENDIX  169 

Semondans  and  Desandans,  and  on  the  road  leading  from  Arcey  to 
Hericourt  ;  and  Ariovistus  advanced  through  the  gorge  of  Presentevillers, 
passed  Ste-Marie,  and  encamped  at  Arcey.  When  the  reader  looks  at 
the  map,  he  will  want  to  know  how  Ariovistus  came  to  undertake  so 
desperately  hazardous  a  movement,  and  why  Caesar  tamely  allowed  him 
to  execute  it.  But  M.  Colomb  ^  is  ready  with  an  answer.  He  shall 
speak  for  himself : — ■"  Cesar  ouhlie  assez  volontiers  de  raconter  les  dvene- 
ments  qui  n'ont  pas  tourne  a  son  honneur.  Dion  Cassius  .  .  .  dit  en 
etfet  qu'il  y  eut  une  lutte  acharnee  dans  laquelle  la  nombreuse  cavalerie 
germaine  .  .  .  ayant  fait  eprouver  de  graades  pertes  aux  Romains,  les 
forga  a  se  renfermer  dans  leur  camp  et  a  y  demeurer  spectateurs  impuis- 
sants  de  la  marche  hardie  qui,  conduisant  Arioviste  a  Arcey  meme, 
c'est-a-dire  a  I'orifice  superieur  du  col  de  Granvillars  et  an  point  de 
croisement  de  toutes  les  routes  de  Sequanie,  coupait  Cesar  et  I'isolait." 
I  take  leave  to  say  that  Dion  Cassius  says  nothing  of  the  kind.  What 
he  says  is  that  Ariovistus,  having  been  warned  by  his  "  wise  women  " 
not  to  fight  a  jiitched  battle  before  the  new  nioon,^  contented  himself  at 
first,  although  the  Roman  infantry  challenged  him,  with  engaging  in 
cavalry  combats,  in  which  he  handled  the  Romans  severely  ;  and  that,  in 
consequence  of  this  success,  he  conceived  a  contempt  for  the  Romans, 
and  occupied  a  position  beyond  their  camp  etc.  (8ta  rovro  6  'Aptoovicrros 
.  .  .  01' Y  a—da-y  ei'^us  ry  ^vvdfiei  KaiToi  rwv  'Pcuyu,atwv  TTpoKaXov/xevijiv 
<Tcf)as  (Tvveixi'qev,  dXXa  rous  liv—kas  fx^ra  Tiov  o-vvrerayfievwv  crffaari  Tre^'wv 
jjiovov?  eKTrefiTrMV  tcr^iipws  avTOv<;  eAt'Tret.  kcIk  tovtov  KaTa(j)pov'ij(ra<; 
XojpLov  TL  VTrep  Tov  racjipevfjiaros  crcfiMV  KaraXafielv  €iri.\eip'i](T(..  Kai, 
KaTerry^e  fikv  ai'ro,  dvriKara.XafSovTiov  8k  Kal  cKeiVoji/  erepov  ^  etc.).  This 
is  obviously  an  inaccurate  paraphrase  of  Caesar's  narrative  ;  for  the 
challenges  of  the  Roman  infantry  and  the  cavalry  combats  took  place 
not  before  but  after  Ariovistus  occupied  the  position  in  question  :  ^  but 
even  if  Dion's  account  were  correct,  it  would  lend  no  support  to  M. 
Colomb's  theory,  that  Ariovistus  succeeded  in  forcing  his  way  through 
the  gorge  of  Presentevillers  and  accomplishing  his  flank  march  by  dint 
of  a  single  "  lutte  acharnee  "  in  which  he  defeated  Caesar's  cavalry.  The 
notion  that  Caesar  would  have  attempted  to  stop  his  march  with  cavalry 
alone,  while  the  legions  looked  idly  on,  is  truly  comical :  Caesar  at  all 
events  had  no  scruples  about  employing  his  infantry  before  the  new 
moon.  The  whole  episode  of  the  march,  as  conceived  by  M.  Colomb,  is 
absolutely  incredible.  If  Ariovistus  had  attempted  it,  he  must  inevitably 
have  been  driven  back  with  heavy  loss.  Nothing  would  have  been 
easier  for  Caesar  than  to  seize  the  commanding  position  at  Arcey,  which 
Ariovistus  is  assumed  to  have  occupied,  when  the  head  of  Ariovistus's 
column  began  to  debouch  from  the  gorge  of  Presentevillers,  even  if  he 
had  not  secured  it  before  :  nothing,  I  say,  would  have  been  easier, 
except  to  destroy  the  unwieldy  column  as  it  was  slowly  emerging  from 
the  gorge.  M.  Colomb  asks  us  to  believe  that  Caesar,  who,  a  few  days 
later,  utterly  defeated  Ariovistus  in  a  pitched  battle,  was  so  imbecile  as 

1  Rev.  arch.,  xxxiii.,  1898,  p.  53.  ^  cf.  B.  G.,  i.  50,  §  4-5. 

3  Hist.  Rom.,  xxxviii.,  48,  §  2.  *  B.  G.,  1.  48-50. 


170  APPENDIX 

to  allow  him  to  execute  a  movement  which  any  intelligent  centurion 
would  have  known  how  to  frustrate. 

M.  Colomb  points  triumphantly,  in  support  of  his  theory,  to  Caesar's 
statement  of  the  distance  which  separated  the  battle-field  from  the 
Rhine  :  " les  Commentaires"  he  asserts,  " disent  que  le  champ  de  bataille 
se  trouve  a  50,000  pas  du  Rhin."  ^  M.  Colomb  will  pardon  me  for  cor- 
recting him.  Milia  passuum  quinquaginta  (50,000  paces,  or  50  Roman 
miles)  does  not  occur  in  any  MS.  of  the  Commentaries  :  milia  passurim 
circiter  quinque  ("  about  five  miles  ")  occurs  in  all.  But  on  this  question 
I  must  refer  to  my  larger  edition. 

D 

Dr.  Heinrich  Meusel,  to  whom  I  am  indebted  for  an  elaborate  and 
most  valuable  review  of  Caesar's  Conquest  of  Gaul,  tells  me  that  I  am 
mistaken  in  identifying  Procillus,  whom  Caesar  sent  to  confer  with 
Ariovistus,  with  Troucillus,  the  interpreter  through  whom  he  com- 
municated with  Divitiacus.  I  was  certainly  wrong  in  calling  the 
interpreter  Procillus,  in  doing  which  I  adopted  the  emendation  of 
Manutius  ;  for  in  the  passage "  in  which  he  is  mentioned  the  MS. 
readings  are  Troucillum,  Troacilhim,  and  Traucillum,  and  the  accuracy 
of  Troucillum  is  confirmed  by  inscriptions.^  The  question,  however, 
remains  whether  the  man  who  was  sent  to  Ariovistus  was  not  Troucillus. 
In  the  two  passages'*  in  which  he  is  mentioned  he  is  designated  as 
Procillus  in  all  the  MSS.,  except  Vind.  I.,  which  calls  him  Troicillus. 
Herr  Dittenberger  ^  says  that  he  was  not  Troucillus,  arguing  that  the 
way  in  which  Caesar  first  describes  him  ^  shows  that  he  had  not  been 
mentioned  before  ;  and  also  that  Caesar  calls  him  a  young  man 
{adulescens),  whereas  he  evidently  implies  that  Troucillus  was  well 
advanced  in  years."  The  reader  will  draw  his  own  inferences 
from  Caesar's  language  :  I  will  only  observe  that  the  mere  fact  that 
Troucillus  was  called  a  princeps  does  not  prove  that  he  was  old. 
Assuming  that  the  interpreter  and  the  adulescens  were  two  different 
men,  it  is  a  remarkable  coincidence  that  both  were  named  Gains 
Valerius ;  that  both  belonged  to  the  Provincia ;  that  Caesar  had  the 
utmost  confidence  in  both  ;  and  that  he  described  each  of  them  as 
familiarem  suum.  In  these  circumstances  I  am  inclined,  though 
doubtfully,  to  conclude  that  Troucillus  and  Procillus  were  one  and  the 
same. 

1  Rev.  arch.,  xxxiii.,  1898,  p.  44.     See  also  p.  61.  -  B.  G.,  i.  10,  §  3. 

'*  Corpus  Inscr.  Lat.,  iii.  5037  ;  v.  7269,  7287. 

*  B.  G.,  1.  47,  §  4  ;  53,  §  5. 

^  C.  lulii  Caesar  is  comvi.  de  b.  G.,  15th  ed.,  1890,  p.  394. 

^  Commodissimura  visum  est  C.  Valerium  Procillum,  C.  Valeri  Caburi  filiuni, 
suinma  virtute  et  humanitate  adulesceutem,  cuius  pater  a  C.  Valerio  Flacco  civitate 
donatus  erat,  et  propter  fideiu  et  propter  linguae  Gallicae  scientiam  ...  ad  eum 
mittere  etc.     B.  G.,  i.  47,  §  4. 

'^  Diviciacum  ad  se  vocari  iubet  et  .  .  .  per  C.  Valerium  Troucillum,  priucipem 
Galliae  provinciae,  familiarem  suum,  cui  summam  omnium  rerum  Mem  habebat, 
cum  eo  conloquitur.     76.,  19,  §  3. 


APPEXDIX  171 


E 


The  view  which  I  have  adopted  in  the  narrative,  that  Caesar 
encamped  in  57  B.C.  nearly  opposite  Berry-au-Bac,  on  an  eminence 
between  the  Aisne  and  the  Miette,  has  recently  been  opposed  by  Herr 
Konrad  Lehmann/  who  frequently  refers  to  my  pages.  Besides 
repeating  arguments  which  I  have  already  examined,  he  urges  (1)  that 
it  is  improbable  that  in  Caesar's  time  a  road  could  have  crossed  the 
marsh  formed  by  the  Miette  ;  (2)  that,  assuming  the  accuracy  of  the 
late  Emperor  Xapoleon's  Plan,-  this  marsh  was  so  extensive  that  Caesar 
would  not  have  described  it  as  "  of  no  great  size  "  {non  magna)  ;  and  (3) 
that  if  the  marsh  which  he  described  had  been  traversed  by  a  stream, 
he  would  have  mentioned  it.  To  this  last  objection  I  can  only  reply 
that  Caesar  did  not  mention  the  Essonne, — the  stream  that  undoubtedly 
traversed  the  marsh  which  Labienus  attempted  to  cross  in  52  B.c.2 
Herr  Lehmann's  other  arguments  do  not  appear  to  me  to  be  cogent. 
In  the  note  on  "  Caesar's  operations  on  the  Aisne  "  which  is  to  be  found 
in  the  larger  edition  of  this  book  I  have  shown  that  the  objections  to 
every  site  that  has  been  proposed,  except  that  which  General  von  Goler 
and  Colonel  Stoffel  pointed  out,  are  overwhelming  ;  and  the  conditions 
which  Herr  Lehmann  lays  down  as  required  by  Caesar's  narrative  are 
not  fulfilled  at  any  point  in  the  valley  of  the  Aisne  where  it  is  possible 
to  suppose  that  Caesar  crossed. 


In  the  larger  edition  of  this  book  1  argued  that  the  Portus  Itius 
was  to  be  identified  with  the  former  harbour  of  Wissant.  The  note  in 
which  my  arguments  were  embodied  was  unavoidably  written  while 
the  book  was  being  printed,  and  when  I  was  becoming  somewhat  weary 
after  more  than  ten  years'  incessant  labour.  Soon  after  the  book 
appeared  I  suspected  that  I  had  made  a  mistake  ;  and  I  have  since 
written  with  fuller  knowledge  a  dissertation,  which  will,  I  hope,  be 
published  in  a  work  to  be  entitled  Aiicient  Britain  and  the  Invasions  of 
Julius  Caesar. 


G 

According  to  M.  Camille  JuUian,'*  who  agrees  with  General  von 
Goler,-^  the  abandoned  hill  {collis  nudatus)  which  Caesar  saw  from  the 
camp  on  the  Roche  Blanche  was  simply  Gergovia  itself,  or  rather  that 
part  of  it  which  extended  between  the  town  on  the  plateau  and  the 
wall  of  loose  stones,  not,  as  I  have  stated  in  the  text,  '•  a  hill  forming 

^  Neue  Jahrbilcher  filr  das  Jdassisclie  Altertum  etc.,  1901,  pp.  506-9. 

^  Hist,  de  Jules  Cesar,  Atlas,  PL  8.  »  B.  G..  vii.  57,  §  4  ;  58,  §  1. 

■•   Vercingetorb:,  2nd  ed.,  1902,  p.  373. 

■5  Oallischcr  Krieg,  2iid  ed.,  1880,  pp.  277-9,  281. 


172  APPENDIX 

part  of  the  mass  of  RisoUes."  I  am  unable  to  agree  with  M.  Jullian, 
tirst,  because  Caesar  would  have  seen  that  the  southern  slope  of  Gergovia 
was  abandoned  before  he  ascended  the  Roche  Blanche,  and,  secondly, 
because  he  says  ^  that  one  of  the  results  of  the  stratagem  which  he 
devised  after  he  saw  that  the  hill  was  abandoned  was  that  "all  the 
[Gallic]  troops "  were  withdrawn  from  their  former  positions  by 
Vercingetorix  to  assist  in  the  work  of  fortifying  [the  approach  to 
Risolles  and  the  Col  des  Goules],  which  seems  to  show  that  the 
southern  slope  of  Gergovia  had  not  been  abandoned  before. 

M.  Jullian  2  holds  that  the  first  position  of  the  10th  legion  during 
the  unsuccessful  attack  on  Gergovia  was  at  the  northern  extremity  of 
the  Roche  Blanche,  and  that  the  valley  {satis  magna  vallis)  which 
separated  the  legion  from  the  column  of  assault  was  the  valley  "  oil  il 
se  trouvait  lui-meme,"  that  is  to  say,  the  valley  between  the  Roche 
Blanche  and  the  hill  of  Gergovia.  He  adds  that  "presque  tous  les 
ecrivains  placent  a  ce  moment  la  X®  legion  .  .  .  sur  le  flanc  de  la 
montagne  gergovienne,  et  pas  loin  du  village  "  ;  and  he  refers  to  page 
744  of  my  Caesar's  Conquest  of  Gaul.  I  venture  to  adhere  provisionally 
to  the  opinion  which  I  there  expressed,  for  the  following  reason. 
Caesar  says  ^  that  when  he  saw  that  the  assaulting  column  was  in 
difficulties,  he  ordered  Titus  Sextius,  whom  he  had  left  in  command  of 
the  camp  on  the  Roche  Blanche,  to  take  up  a  position  with  some 
cohorts  of  the  13th  legion  at  the  foot  of  Gergovia,  and  that  he 
himself  advanced  a  little  from  the  position  which  he  had  taken  up  {ad 
T.  Sextium  legatum,  quern  minoribus  castris  praesidio  reliquerat,  misit,  ut 
cohortes  ex  castris  celeriter  educeret  et  sub  infimo  colle  ab  dextro  latere 
hostium  constitueret.  .  .  .  Ipse  paidum  ex  eo  loco  cum  legione  progressus, 
uhi  constiterat,  eventum  pugnae  expectabat).  According  to  !M.  Jullian, 
Sextius  was  to  take  the  place  which  Caesar  had  vacated.  It  appears  to 
me,  on  the  other  hand,  that  the  words  sub  infimo  colle  are  contrasted 
with  eo  loco  uhi  constiterat. 

1  B.  G.,  vii.  44,  §  6. 

2  Vercingetorix,  pp.  214,  373-4,  and  374,  n.  3. 

=*  B.  G.,  vii.  49. 


INDEX 


Acco,  100-101 

Adige,  19 

Adour,  67 

Aduatuca,  Sabinus  and  Cotta  quartered 
at  (54  B.C.),  79  ;  camp  attacked  by 
Ambiori.x,  80  ;  Sabinus's  force  virtually 
annihilated  near,  83-5  ;  Q.  Cicero  left 
in  command  at  (53  B.C.),  95-6  ;  attacked 
by  Sugambri,  97-9 

Aduatuci,  53  ;  their  stronghold  captured 
by  Caesar,  57-9  ;  persuaded  by  Am- 
biorix  to  join  in  attacking  Q.  Cicero, 
85  ;  defeated  by  Caesar,  89-90  ;  re- 
main in  arms,  93 

Aedui,  their  alliance  with  Rome,  3  ;  Ver- 
gobret  of,  forbidden  to  cross  frontier, 
12 ;  hegemony  of,  15  ;  rivalry  with 
Sequani,  defeated  by  Ariovistus,  19  ; 
beg  Caesar  for  aid  against  Helvetii, 
29  ;  their  cavalry  with  Caesar  beaten 
by  Helvetii,  30  ;  fail  to  supply  Caesar 
with  corn,  31  ;  ask  that  Boii  may  be 
allowed  to  settle  in  their  country,  36  ; 
Caesar  negotiates  on  then-  behalf  with 
Ariovistus,  38,  42  ;  supply  Caesar 
with  corn  during  campaign  against 
Ariovistus,  39  ;  contingent  of,  under 
Divitiacus,  ravage  lands  of  Bellovaci, 
49  ;  Caesar  treats  with  distinction,  52, 
77,  79  ;  friendly  to  Caesar,  62,  70, 
78-9,  91,  161  ;  intercede  for  Senones, 
93  ;  keep  aloof  at  first  from  rebellion 
of  Vercingetorix,  send  troops  to  assist 
Bituriges,  104  ;  Caesar  demands  sup- 
plies from,  106,  110  ;  ask  Caesar  to 
settle  dispute  between  Cotus  ami  Con- 
victolitavis,  116  ;  Caesar  demands  cou- 
tingent  from,  117  ;  signs  of  their 
impending  defection,  120-23  ;  Caesar 
intercepts  mutinous  contingent,  121-2  ; 
contingent  joins  in  attack  on  Gergovia, 
126  ;  Aedui  definitely  join  rebellion 
of  Vercingetorix,  127  ;  contingent 
deserts  Caesar,  128  ;  Caesar  crosses 
Loire  in  spite  of,  128-9  ;  Aedui  claim 
direction  of  rebellion,  but  are  snubbed, 
132  ;   levy  of,  sent  by  Vercingetorix 

1 


against  AUobroges,  133  ;  army  raised 
for  relief  of  Alesia  musters  in  their 
country,  141  ;  probably  treacherous  to 
Vercingetorix,  144  ;  return  to  allegi- 
ance to  Caesar,  148  ;  two  legions  winter 
in  their  country  (52-51  B.C.),  148  ;  a 
renegade  Aeduan  betrays  Lucterius, 
158 

Agedincum,  six  legions  quartered  at  (53- 
52  B.C.),  100,  104  ;  Caesar  concentrates 
legions  near  (52  B.C.),  106  ;  Caesar 
garrisons,  when  marching  to  relieve 
Gorgobiua,  106 ;  Labienus  marches 
from,  against  Senones  and  Parisii,  129  ; 
returns  to,  and  thence  marches  to  rejoin 
Caesar,  131 

Agger,  built  in  siege  of  chief  stronghold 
of  Aduatuci,  57-8  ;  in  siege  of  Avari- 
cum,  109-10,  113  ;  in  siege  of  Uxello- 
dunum,  156-7 

Aisne,  Caesar's  operations  on  (57  B.C.), 
49-51,  App.  E  ;  in  51  B.C.,  151,  153 

Aix,  19 

Aix-la-Chapelle,  79 

Albi,  105 

Alene,  33 

Alesia,  fortified  and  provisioned  by  Ver- 
cingetorix, 132 ;  Vercingetorix  marches 
from,  to  intercept  Caesar,  134  ;  Ver- 
cingetorix retreats  to,  136  ;  Vercinge- 
torix blockaded  in,  by  Caesar,  136-41 ; 
final  struggle  at,  142-5 

Allia,  battle  of  the,  1 

Allier,  102  ;  bridges  over,  destroyed  by 
Vercingetorix,  117  ;  Caesar  crosses, 
lis  ;  he  marches  down  valley  of,  to 
intercept  Aedui,  122  ;  recrosses,  127  ; 
Aedui  try  to  hem  him  in  between,  and 
Loire,  128 

AUobroges,  aid  Salyes  against  Romans, 
3  ;  rebel,  20  ;  directed  by  Caesar  to 
feed  remnant  of  Helvetii,  36  ;  repel 
emissaries  of  Vercingetorix,  133 

Alps,  1-3  ;  crossed  by  Caesar,  26,  28 

Alsace,  4,  20,  39,  App.  C 

Ambiani,  submit  to  Caesar,  52 

Ambibareti.     See  Ambivareti 

73 


174 


INDEX 


Ambivareti,  148 

Amiens,  52.     See,  Samarobriva 

Andecumborius,  48 

Andernach,  75 

Andes,  62 

Angers,  61 

Anjou,  62 

Anti-Roman  party  iu  Gaul,  15,  31,  36, 

79,  120 
Apennines,  2 
Aquileia,  23 

Aquitani,  4-5,  8-9  ;  campaign  of  Crassus 
against,  67-8  ;  hired  cavalry  of,  assist 
Vercingetorix,    116 ;    ethnology,    4-5, 
8-9.     .See  also  162 
Archers,   in  Caesar's  army,  23,  49,  51  ; 
at  Aduatuca,  84  ;   employed  by  Ver- 
cingetorix, 113,  116,  142  ;  at  Uxello- 
dunnm,  156 
ArdC'che,  105 
Ardennes,  95-6,  99 

Ariovistus,  invades  Gaul  on  invitation  of 
Sequani,  defeats  Aedui,  annexes  a 
third  of  Sequanian  territory,  defeats 
Aedui  and  Sequani  and  their  respective 
allies,  19-20  ;  receives  a  title  from  the 
Senate,  22  ;  Celtae  beg  Caesar's  aid 
against,  36-7  ;  Caesar's  attempts  to 
negotiate  with,  37  -  8  ;  Caesar's  cam- 
paign against,  39-45,  and  App.  C 
Armancjon,  134 
Armecy,  33 

Armour,  of  Caesar's  legionaries,  24 
Army,  Caesar's,  23-5,  160 
Arretium,  2 

Artillery,  Caesar's,  24,  43  ;  in  siege  of 
Aduatucan  stronghold,  58  ;  in  siege  of 
Avaricum,  110,  114;  used  by  Fabius 
against  Vercingetorix,  122  ;  in  opera- 
tions at  Alesia,  143 
Artois,  69 

Arverui,  help   Salyes   against  Rome,  3  ; 
their  power  broken,  4  ;  their  hegemony 
in  Gaul,  14  ;  leading  men  among,  expel 
Vercingetorix  from  Gergovia,  expelled 
in  turn  by  him,  103  ;  Caesar  ravages 
their  country,  105  ;  submit  after  fall 
of   Alesia,   148.     .S'ec   Gergovia,   Ver- 
cingetorix 
Atrebates,  defeated  by  Caesar  at  Neuf- 
Mesnil,  53-5  ;  join  Belgic  confederacy 
against   Caesar   (51    B.C.),   151.      See 
Commius 
Aulus  Hirtius,  150 
Auray,  65 

Aurunculeius.     See  Cotta 
"Auvergnat"  type,  7 
Auxiliaries,  in    Caesar's   army,    23 ;   in 
battle  with   Helvetii,   33-4  ;  in  battle 
with  Ariovistus,   45  ;   relieve  Bibrax, 


49  ;  iu   operations  on  Aisne,   51  ;  i 
battle  with  Nervii,  54-5.     See  Aedui, 
Archers,  Cavalry,  Germans,  Numidians. 
Slingers,  Spanish 

Auzon,  118-19,  124 

Auzon  (or  Aizou),  33 

Avaricum,  Caesar  marches  for,  108  ; 
Bituriges  resolve  to  defend,  against 
advice  of  Vercingetorix,  109  ;  siege 
and  capture  of,  109-15  ;  losses  at, 
repaired  by  Vercingetorix,  116  ;  occu- 
pied by  Romans,  116 

Baculus.     See  Sextius 

Baggage,  25 ;  disposal  of  Caesar's,  in 
battle  with  Helvetii,  33-4  ;  before 
battle  with  Nervii,  53  ;  in  cavalry 
combat  before  blockade  of  Alesia,  135 

Baggage-drivers,  25,  55,  124 

Balearic  isles,  23 

Basilus.     See  Minucius 

Basques,  7 

Beaujolais,  30 

Beauvais,  49,  79 

Belfort,  41,  App.  C 

Belgae,  value  of  Caesar's  grouping  of, 
4-5,8-9;  ethnology  of,  8:  Caesar's 
first  campaign  against,  47-59  ;  char- 
acter of  their  resistauce,  78,  161  ; 
legions  quartered  in  their  country  (54- 
53  B.C.),  79  ;  hold  aloof  at  first  from  re- 
bellion of  Vercingetorix,  104  ;  Caesar's 
final  campaign  against,  151-4.  See 
also  Aduatuci,  Bellovaci,  Eburones, 
Morini,  Menapii,  Nervii,  Remi,  etc. 

Bellovaci,  Caesar  sends  Aeduan  contin- 
gent to  harry  their  country  (57  B.C.), 
49,  51  ;  surrender  Bratuspantium,  52 ; 
two  legions  quartered  among  (54  B.C.), 
79  ;  threaten  Labienus  (52  B.C.),  129  ; 
send  a  small  contiugeut  to  join  in  relief 
of  Vercingetorix,  140  ;  Caesar's  cam- 
paign against  (51  B.C.),  151-4 

Berri,  104-5,  108.     See  Bituriges 

Berry-au-Bac,  49,  App.  E 
Besancon.     See  Vesoutio 
Beuvray,  Mont.     See  Bibracte 
Bibracte,   11,  u.  1  ;  Caesar  marches   to- 
wards, Helvetii  try  to  cut  him  off  from, 
33  ;    Helvetii   defeated    near,    33  -  6  ; 
Caesar's  hostages  sent  to,  by  Eporedorix 
and   Viridomarus,    128 ;    general    as- 
sembly  at,    elect    Vercingetorix    com- 
mander-in-chief,  132  ;  Caesar  winters 
at  (52-51  B.C.),  148-9 ;  Caesar  marches 
from,  against  Bituriges,  and  returns, 
150-51 
Bibrax,  attacked  by  Belgae,  relieved  by 

Caesar,  49-50 
Bituriges,  join  rebellion  of  Vercingetorix, 


INDEX 


175 


104  ;  Verciugetorix  orders  destruction 
of  villages  in  their  country,  108  ;  they 
persuade  him  to  spare  Avaricuni,  109 ; 
their  rebellion  in  51  B.C.  crushed,  150- 
51.     See  Avaricum,  Noviodunum 

Boii  (of  Cisalpine  Gaul),  2 

Boii,  join  Helvetian  emigration,  26  ;  in 
battle  near  Bibracte,  35  ;  survivors 
allowed  by  Caesar  to  settle  in  Aeduan 
territory,  36  ;  their  stronghold,  Gor- 
gobina,  besieged  by  Vercingetorix,  106  ; 
Caesar  marches  to  relieve,  106-8  ;  send 
supplies  to  Caesar  during  siege  of 
Avaricum,  110 

Bonn,  72 

Boulogne,  77,  App.  F 

Bratuspantium,  52 

Breune,  136 

Brenner  Pass,  19 

Breteuil,  52.     See  Bratuspantium 

Brian9on,  28,  29,  n.  1 

Bridges,  of  Gauls,  11  ;  bridge  at  Geneva 
destroyed  by  Caesar,  26  ;  Caesar  bridges 
Saone,  29  ;  he  crosses  bridge  over 
Aisne  at  Berry-au-Bac,  49,  51  ;  builds 
a  bridge  over  Rhine,  75 ;  builds  a 
second  bridge,  95  ;  bridges  rivers  in 
country  of  Menapii,  94  ;  bridge  over 
Loire  at  Cenabum.  107  ;  bridges  over 
Allier  destroyed  by  Vercingetorix,  117  ; 
Caesar  repairs  one  of  them,  118  ;  he 
crosses  Allier  by,  127  ;  Labienus  re- 
pairs bridge  at  Metiosedum,  129  ; 
bridges  at  Lutetia  destroyed  by  Camu- 
logenus,  130 

Brigantio.      See  Briancon 

Britain,  trade  of  Veneti  ■with,  62-3; 
Caesar  said  to  be  contemplating  inva- 
sion of,  63  ;  his  objects  in  invading, 
76 

Brittany,  Crassus  receives  submission  of 
tribes  of,  61  ;  tribes  rebel,  62-7  ;  they 
contemplate  an  attack  on  Eoscius,  91 ; 
they  rebel  in  51  B.C.,  154-5 

Brutus.     See  Decimus 

Brythonic,  8 

Bussy.     See  Montague  de  Bussy 

Cabillonum.     See  Chalon 

Cadurci,  133,  n.  1 

Caesar,  Gains  Julius,  busts  of,  xx-xxv  ; 
his  grouping  of  Gallic  peoples,  8-9  ; 
consul,  a2ipointed  Governor  of  Gaul, 
21-2  ;  his  person  and  character,  22-3  ; 
his  army,  23-5  ;  his  intentions,  25  ; 
hastens  to  Geneva,  26  :  negotiates  with 
Helvetii  and  prevents  them  from  cross- 
ing Rhone,  26-7  ;  goes  back  to  Cisalpine 
Gaul  and  returns  with  reinforcements, 
28-9  ;  defeats  Tignrini,  29  ;   Helvetii 


attempt  to  negotiate  with,  but  reject 
his  terms,  29-30  ;  campaigns  against 
and  defeats  Helvetii,  30-36  ;  his  treat- 
ment of  fugitive  Helvetii,  36  ;  con- 
gratulated by  deputies  Ironi  Celtican 
Gaul,  who  solicit  his  aid  against  Ario- 
vistus,  36-7  ;  attempts  to  negotiate 
with  Ariovistus,  37-8  ;  seizes  Vesontio, 
39  ;  allays  panic  in  his  army  at 
Vesontio,  39-41;  campaign  against 
Ariovistus,  41-6  ;  resolves  to  conquer 
Gaul  and  returns  to  Italy,  46  ;  results 
of  his  first  campaign,  47  ;  returns  to 
Gaul  and  receives  submission  of  Remi, 
48-9  ;  campaign  of  57  B.C.  against 
Belgae,  49-59  ;  sends  Galba  into  the 
Valais,  59  ;  rejoicings  at  Rome  over 
his  victories,  61  ;  goes  on  political 
tour  to  Illyricum,  62  ;  prepares  for 
campaign  against  Veneti,  63  ;  confer- 
ence at  Luca,  63-4  ;  campaign  against 
Veneti,  64-6  ;  campaign  against  Morini, 
68-9  ;  returns  from  Cisalpine  to  Trans- 
alpine Gaul,  to  deal  with  Usipetes  and 
Tencteri,  71  ;  campaign  against  Usi- 
petes and  Tencteri,  71-4;  bridges 
Rhine,  pimishes  Sugambri  and  returns 
to  Gaul,  74-5  ;  invasions  of  Britain, 
correspondence  with  Cicero,  76  ;  has 
Dumnorix  put  to  death,  76-7  ;  quarters 
legions  for  winter  of  54-53  B.C.,  78-9  ; 
promotes  adherents  to  power,  sends 
Plancus  to  avenge  assassination  of 
Tasgetius,  79-80  ;  humbles  Indutio- 
marus,  80  ;  Ambiorix  professes  grati- 
tude towards,  81  ;  praises  bravery  of 
troops  at  Aduatuca,  84  ;  relieves  Q. 
Cicero,  88-91  ;  spends  winter  of  54-53 
B.C.  in  Gaul,  91  ;  warns  malcontents, 
91-2  ;  eulogisesgeneralship  of  Labienus, 
92  ;  borrows  a  legion  from  Pompey 
and  raises  two  others,  93  ;  punishes 
Nerv'ii  and  forces  Senones  and  Carnutes 
to  submit,  93-4  ;  crushes  Menapii,  94  ; 
crosses  Rhine  again,  but  returns  un- 
successful to  Gaul,  94-5  ;  campaign 
against  Eburones,  95-7  ;  invites  neigh- 
bouring tribes  to  harry  them,  97  ; 
gently  rebukes  Q.  Cicero  for  rashness 
at  Aduatuca,  ravages  lands  of  Eburones, 
99  ;  distributes  legions  for  winter  of 
53-52  B.C.,  100  ;  executes  Acco,  100  ; 
(iallic  chiefs  conspire  against,  101-2  ; 
returns  from  Italy  to  Gaul,  104  ; 
rescues  Province,  out-manoeuvres  Ver- 
cingetorix and  rejoins  legions,  104-6  ; 
marches  to  relieve  Gorgobina,  captures 
Vellaunoilunum,  Cenabum  and  Novio- 
dunum, 106-8  ;  besieges  and  captures 
Avaricum,  109-15  ;  secures  election  of 


176 


INDEX 


Convictolitavis  as  Vergobret,  116-17, 
123  note ;  sends  Lalnenus  against 
Parisii  and  Seuones  and  inarches  against 
Gergovia,  117;  first  operations  at  Ger- 
govia,  118-19  ;  intercepts  Aeduan  con- 
tingent, 121-2  ;  attempts  in  vain  to 
take  Gergovia  by  coujj-de-main,  123-7  ; 
marches  to  rejoin  Labienus,  127-8  ; 
Labienus  hears  rumours  that  he  has 
been  forced  to  retreat  to  Province,  130  ; 
rejoined  by  Labienus,  131  ;  enlists 
German  cavalry,  134  ;  marches  to  suc- 
cour Province,  defeats  Vercingetorix 
in  cavalry  combat  and  forces  him  to 
retreat  to  Alesia,  134-6  ;  operations 
at  Alesia,  136-45  ;  receives  surrender 
of  Vercingetorix,  146;  eli'ects  of  victory 
at  Alesia,  150  ;  disperses  Bituriges 
and  Carnutes  (51  B.C.),  150-51  ;  cam- 
paign against  Bellovaci,  151-4  ;  ravages 
lauds  of  Eburoues,  154  ;  executes 
Gutuatrus,  156  ;  captures  Uxellodunuiii 
and  punishes  garrison,  156-8  ;  concili- 
ates conquered  Gauls,  158  ;  why  he 
succeeded,  159-61 

Caleti,  151 

Calones  (drivers  and  officers'  servants), 
25,  55,  83,  97-8,  124 

Calvados,  64 

Cambrai,  53 

Camp,  Caesar's  on  the  Aisne,  49  ; 
Sabinus's  in  country  of  Unelli,  66- 
7  ;  winter  camps  of  54-53  B.C.,  79  ; 
Caesar's  at  Gergovia,  119-24  ;  at 
Alesia,  137-8 

Camulogenus,  commands  Parisii  and 
Senones  in  campaign  against  Labienus, 
129-31  ;  killed  in  action,  131 

Cauinius,  defends  camp  on  Mont  Rea, 
143  ;  forces  Dumnacus  to  raise  siege 
of  Lemonum,  drives  Drappes  and 
Lucterius  into  Uxellodunuiu,  154  ; 
blockades  Uxellodunum,  154-5 

Canstadt  race,  5 

Carcaso,  67 

Carnutes,  79  ;  rebel  against  Caesar  (53 
B.C.),  93-4  ;  Caesar  investigates  origin 
of  rebellion,  100  ;  Carnutes  strike 
first  blow  in  rebellion  of  52  B.C.,  101- 
2  ;  Caesar  captures  their  chief  town, 
Cenabum,  107  -  8  ;  attack  Bitirriges 
(51  B.C.),  punished  by  Caesar,  151 

Carthage,  3 

Cassius,  L.,  29 

Casticus,  20 

Catiliue,  19 

Cato,  74 

Caturiges,  28 

Catuvolcus,  joins  Ambiorix  in  attacking 
Aduatuca,  80  ;  commits  suicide,  '^Q 


Cavalry,  Ca^^sar's,  23  ;  in  campaign 
against  Helvetii,  30,  32-3,  35  :  against 
Ariovistus,  41,  44-5  ;  in  operations  on 
Aisne,  50-52  ;  in  battle  with  Nervii, 
54-6  ;  against  Usipetes  and  Tencteri, 
72-4  ;  at  Aduatuca,  81,  97-8  ;  in  ex- 
pedition for  relief  of  Q.  Cicero,  89-90  ; 
in  operations  against  ludutiomarus, 
92-3  ;  under  Basilus,  95-6  ;  against 
Eburones,  99  ;  ravage  country  of 
Arverni,  105  ;  in  combat  at  Novio- 
dunum,  108  ;  at  Gergovia,  118-19, 
121-3  ;  ford  Loire,  128  ;  in  battle  of 
Lutetia,  131  ;  Caesar  enlists  German, 
134  ;  in  combat  before  blockade  of 
Alesia,  135-6  ;  at  Alesia,  137-8,  142  ; 
disperse  Carnutes,  151  ;  in  campaign 
against  Bellovaci  (51  B.C.),  152-3. 
See  also  Aedui,  German,  Spanish, 
Sugambri,  Tencteri,  Treveri,  Usipetes 

Celtae,  Caesar's  grouping  of,  4-5,  8-9  ; 
culture  of,  10-11  ;  enfeebled  by  con- 
tact with  Roman  civilisation,  11  ; 
deputies  from  central  tribes  congiatu- 
late  Caesar  on  victory  over  Helvetii, 
36  ;  certain  chiefs  of,  egg  on  Belgae 
to  rebel,  47  ;  mostly  support  Vercinge- 
torix, 103-4  ;  ineftectual  nature  of 
their  resistance  to  Caesar,  162 

Celtillus,  103 

Celts,  1 ;  invade  Gaul,  7-8  ;  their  langiiage, 
8  ;  their  character,  13,  46  ;  their  re- 
ligion, 18.     See  also  Celtae,  Gauls 

Cenabum,  massacre  of  Romans  at,  102  ; 
captured  by  Caesar,  107  ;  legionaries 
resolved  to  avenge  massacre  at.  111  ; 
temporarily  garrisoned  by  two  legions 
(51  B.C.),  151-2;  Caesar  marches 
from,  against  Uxellodunum,  155-6 

Cenomani,  2 

Centurions,  24  ;  panic  among,  at  Vesontio, 
40  ;  of  the  first  rank,  82  ;  in  battle 
with  Nervii,  55-6  ;  self-sacrifice  of, 
near  Aduatuca,  99.  See  Petrouius, 
Quintus  Lucauius,  Sextius  Baculus 

Cevennes,  4  ;  crossed  by  Caesar  (52  B.C.), 
105-6 

Chablais,  59 

Chalon,  14S 

Character,  of  Gauls,  10,  13,  63,  67,  71, 
78 

Chareute,  28 

Chartres,  17 

Cicero,  Marcus  Tullius,  inclined  to  oppose 
Caesar  (56  B.C.),  63-4  ;  his  correspond- 
ence with  Caesar,  76  ;  his  opinion  of 
Caesar,  163,  n.  2 

Cicero,  Quintus,  takes  service  under 
Caesar  as  a  legatus,  76  ;  commands 
a  legion   in   country   of  Nervii,   79  ; 


INDEX 


177 


defends  his  camp  against  Ambiorix, 
85-8  ;  Gauls  abandon  siege  of  his 
camp,  89  ;  joined  by  Caesar,  90  ;  his 
legion  quartered  near  Samarobriva, 
91  ;  left  in  command  at  Aduatuca, 
95-6  ;  attacked  bv  Sugambri,  97-9 

Cimbri,  18-19,  40,  57,  141 

Cingetorix,  supports  Caesar,  80  ;  declared 
a  public  enemy  by  Indutiomarus,  9*2  ; 
appointed  chief  magistrate  of  Treveri 
on  death  of  Indutiomarus,  94 

Ciron,  67 

Clanship,  in  Gaul,  12,  n.  1,  13,  n.  2 

Clientes  (clients),  12,  15 

Clodius,  101 

Clothing,  of  Caesar's  legionaries,  24 

Coblenz,  Caesar  marches  towards,  71  ; 
Caesar  bridges  Rhine  between,  and 
Andernach,  75 

Cohort,  made  tactical  unit  of  Roman 
infantrj-,  23 

Coinage,  Gallic.  11 

Commissariat,  160 

Commius,  deputed  by  Caesar  to  watch 
Menapii,  94  ;  Labienus  tries  to  procure 
assassination  of,  appointed  a  general 
of  army  destined  for  relief  of  Vercinge- 
torix,  140-41  ;  his  operations  at  Alesia, 
142  ;  joint  leader  of  Bellovaci  and 
allied  rebels  (51  B.C.),  151  ;  obtains 
terms  after  guerilla  warfare,  153 

Conconnetodumnus,  102 

Condrusi,  Usipetes  and  Tencteri  enter 
their  country,  71 

Considius.     See  Publius 

Constitution,  of  Gallic  states,  12-15 

Convictolitavis,  his  election  as  Vergobret 
of  Aedui  confirmed  by  Caesar,  116-17  ; 
intrigues  against  Caesar,  120,  122  : 
openly  declares  for  Vercingetorix,  127 

Correus,  heads  a  rebellion  against  Caesar 
(51  B.C.),  151  ;  killed,  153 

C6tes-du-Nord,  63-4 

Cotta,  L.  Aurunculeius,  51,  n.  2  ;  placed 
in  joint  command  at  Aduatuca,  79  ; 
urges  Sabinus  to  hold  Aduatuca 
against  Ambiorix,  81-3  ;  his  splendid 
conduct  in  action,  83-5  ;  killed,  85 

Cotus,  116 

Councils,  Gallic,  12,  131,  140  ;  councils 
of  Gallic  deputies  summoned  by  Caesar, 
36,  71,  80,  93  ;  councils  of  war,  82, 
108 

Crassus  (the  triumvir),  64 

Crassus,  Publius,  strikes  decisive  blow  in 
battle  with  Ario\'istus,  45  ;  receives 
submission  of  maritime  tribes,  61  ; 
s  "anges  with  Veneti  and  other  tribes 
for  supply  of  corn,  62  ;  they  demand 
that  he  should  restore  hostages,  63  ; 


marches  for  Aquitania,  64  ;  his 
campaign  in  Aquitania.  67-8  ;  in 
command  of  a  legion  near  Samaro- 
briva, 79  ;  placed  in  charge  of  Samaro- 
briva, 88 

Cremona,  2 

Crete,  23 

Critognatus,  141 

Cro-Magnon  race,  6 

Culture,  of  prehistoric  races,  9  ;  of  Gauls, 
10-11 

Curiosolites,  63-4 

Debtors,  in  Gaul,  12-13 

Decetia,  116 

Decimus  Brutus,  commands  in  sea-fight 
against  Veneti,  65-6  ;  left  in  command 
by  Caesar  in  country  of  Arverui  (52 
B.C.),  106 

Divico,  29 

Divitiacus,  begs  Senate  for  help  against 
Ariovistus,  19  ;  restored  to  power  by 
Caesar,  31  ;  begs  Caesar  not  to  punish 
Dumnorix,  32  ;  guides  Caesar  from 
Vesoutio  to  plain  of  Alsace,  41  ;  leads 
Aeduan  le\"ies  against  Bellovaci,  49 

Dolmens,  6,  9 

Dora  Riparia,  28 

Dordogne,  5,  154 

Doubs,  39,  App.  C 

Dranse,  59-60 

Drappes.  153-4 

Druids,  16-18,  117 

Dunmacus,  154-5 

Dumnorix,  forms  compact  with  Celtillus 
and  Orgetorix,  20  ;  ready  to  help 
Helvetii,  21  ;  induces  Sequani  to  let 
Helvetii  pass  through  their  country, 
28  ;  commands  Aeduan  cavalry  with 
Caesar's  army,  30  ;  intrigues  against 
Caesar,  31-2  ;  intrigues  again  (54  B.C.), 
76-7  ;  killed,  77 

Durance,  7,  28 

Durocortorum,  100 

Ebrodunum.     See  Embrun 

Eburones,  71  ;  Sabinus  and  Cotta  encamp 
in  their  country,  79  ;  attack  Aduatuca, 
80  ;  destroy  force  of  Sabinus  and 
Cotta,  83-5  ;  besiege  Q.  Cicero's  camp, 
85-8  ;  remain  in  arms  (53  B.C.),  93  ; 
their  country  harried  by  Caesar,  95-7, 
99,  154.  See  Aduatuca,  Ambiorix, 
Catuvolcus,  Sugambri. 

Eburovices,  151 

Embrun,  28 

Emmerich,  70 

Engineers,  24,  66.     See  Fabri 

Eporedorix  reports  treachery  of  Litavic- 
cus  to  Caesar,  121 ;  seizes  No^iodunum, 


178 


INDEX 


127  ;  one  of  four  generals  in  command 

of  army  destined  for  relief  of  Alesia, 

141 
Equites,  13,  n.  2 
Essonue,  129 
Esuvii,  join  Veneti  in  resisting  Caesar, 

63  ;  Roscius's  legion  quartered  among, 

79 
Etruria,  1-2 
Evocati,  134 
Evreux,  71,  129 

Fabins,  commands  a  legion  in  winter- 
quarters  in  country  of  Morini  (54  B.C.), 
79  ;  joins  in  relief  of  Q.  Cicero,  88-9  ; 
sent  back  to  his  camp,  91  ;  left  in 
temporary  command  at  Gergovia,  121- 
2  ;  defeats  Dumnacus,  154  ;  at  Uxello- 
duuum,  155-6 

Fabins  (a  centurion).     See  Lucius 

Fabri,  24 

Fecht,  41 

Finistere,  62.     See  Osismi 

Flavigny.     See  Montague  de  Flavigny 

Forez,  30 

Formans,  29 

Fortune,  Caesar's  belief  in,  22,  and  App.  B 

Gabali,  induced  to  join  rebellion  of 
Vercingetorix,  105  ;  hounded  on  by 
Vercingetorix  to  invade  Province,  133 

Galba,  Servius,  his  campaign  in  the  Valais, 
59-61 

Galba  (king  of  the  Suessiones),  48  n., 
49  51 

Gallia  Cisalpina,  1-2,  22,  28,  46,  48,  70, 
104 

Gallia  Comata,  22 

Gap,  29 

Garonne,  boundary  (roughly  speaking) 
between  Celtae  and  Aquitani,  4  ;  tribes 
between,  and  Seine  join  Vercingetorix, 
103 

Gaul,  invaded  by  Celts,  1,  7  ;  Gauls  in 
Italy,  1-3  ;  Romans  establish  footing 
in  Transalpine  Gaul,  3-4  ;  the  country 
and  its  inhabitants,  4  -  5  ;  ethnology 
of,  5-10  ;  character,  civilisation,  political 
and  social  organisation  and  religion  of 
Gauls,  10-18  ;  invasion  of,  by  Teutoni 
and  Cimbri,  18-19  ;  by  Ariovistus,  19- 

20  ;  plan  of  Orgetorix  for  conquest  of, 
20-21  ;  Caesar  appointed  Governor  of, 

21  -  2 ;  Caesar  resolved  to  prevent 
Germans  from  conquering,  25  ;  con- 
quest of,  by  Caesar,  26-164  ;  Caesar's  re- 
marks on  character  of  Gauls,  10, 78, 159; 
monarchy  in,  12.  See  Celts.  Gallia 
Cisalpina,  Gallia  Comata,  Province 

Genabum.     See  Cenabum 


Geneva,  26 

Gergovia,  102-3  ;  Vercingetorix  banished 
from,  returns  to,  103  ;  Caesar  marches 
against,  117  ;  Vercingetorix  occupies, 
118  ;  first  operations  at,  119-20  ; 
Caesar  temporarily  quits,  to  intercept 
Aeduan  contingent,  121  -  2  ;  Caesar 
attempts  to  take,  by  coup -de- main, 
123-6  ;  he  abandons,  in  order  to  rejoin 
Labienus,  127.     See  App.  G 

German  cavalry,  44  ;  employed  by  Caesar, 
107,  134,  136-7,  142 

Germans,  threaten  Gaul,  18-19  ;  Caesar 
resolved  to  prevent,  from  conquering 
Gaul,  25  ;  Labienus  sent  to  prevent, 
from  crossing  Rhine  (56  B.C.),  64  ; 
Caesar's  invasions  of  Germany,  74-5, 
94-5  ;  Germans  said  to  be  meditating 
attack  on  Romans  (54  B.C.),  81  ;  some 
tribes  refuse,  others  promise  to  aid 
ludutiomarus,  92-3  ;  Caesar  prevents, 
from  aiding  Ambiorix,  94.  See  Ario- 
vistus, Cimbri,  Suevi,  Sugambri, 
Teutoni,  Usipetes 

Goidelic,  8,  and  Apj).  A 

Gorgobina,  besieged  by  Vercingetorix, 
106  ;  he  raises  siege,  108 

Graioceli,  28 

Great  St.  Bernard,  59 

Greece,  3 

Gutuatrus,  leads  attack  on  Cenabum,  102 ; 
executed,  156 

Hannibal,  2 

Harudes,  37 

Hegemony,  of  Arverni,  3,  15  ;  of  Aedui 
and  Sequani,  15 

Helvetii,  plan  invasion  of  Transalpine 
Gaul,  20-21  ;  prepare  to  march  through 
Roman  province,  26  ;  negotiate  with 
Caesar,  prevented  by  him  from  crossing 
Rhone,  26-7  ;  allowed  by  Sequani  to 
march  tlirough  Pas  de  Tficluse,  28-9  ; 
Aedui  solicit  Caesar's  aid  against, 
28-9  ;  Caesar's  campaign  against,  29- 
35  ;  Caesar's  treatment  of  fugitives 
after  battle  near  Bibracte,  36 

Helvii,  Caesar's  levies  concentrate  in 
country  of  (52  B.C.),  105  ;  attacked 
by  order  of  Vercingetorix  and  defeated, 
133-4 

Hesbaye,  57,  85 

Hirtius.     See  Aulus 

Homme  Mort,  6 

Human  sacrifice,  17 

Iberian  inscriptions,  7 
Iberians,  7-8 
Iccius,  48-9 
111,  45 


INDEX 


179 


Illyricum,  22,  62-4,  76 

ludutiomarus,  reluctantly  submits  to 
Caesar,  80  ;  instigates  Ambiorix  to 
attack  Aduatuca,  80  ;  his  intended 
attack  on  Labienus  prevented  by 
Caesar's  victory  over  Nervii  and 
Eburones,  91  ;  his  plan  of  campaign, 
defeated  by  Labienus  and  slain,  92-3 

Insubres,  2 

Isere,  3,  29 

Italy,  Celtic  invasion  of,  1-2  ;  threatened 
by  Cimbri  and  Teutoui,  18-19  ;  by 
Germans,  21,  25  ;  endangered  by 
presence  of  Ariovistus  in  Gaul,  37  ; 
enthusiasm  in,  at  Caesar's  Gallic 
\'ictories,  61  ;  Caesar's  custom  of 
wintering  in,  46,  70,  91,  101 

Itius,  Portus,  77,  A  pp.  F 

Javelin.     See  Pilum 
Julius  Caesar.     See  Caesar 
Jura,  20,  28 

Kings,  in  Gaul,  12.  See  Ambiorix, 
Catuvolcus,  Commius,  Galba,  Mon- 
archy, Tasgetius,  Teutomatus,  Ver- 
cingetorix 

Knights,  Gallic,  13.     See  Equites 

Labienus,  ordered  by  Caesar  to  guard 
lines  on  Rhone,  28  ;  rejoins  Caesar 
near  confluence  of  Saone  and  Rhone, 
29  ;  co-operates  with  Caesar  in  attempt 
to  surprise  Helvetii,  32-3  ;  left  in 
command  of  Roman  army  for  winter 
of  58-57  B.C.,  46  ;  informs  Caesar  of 
conspiracy  of  Belgae,  47  ;  pursues 
Belgae  down  valley  of  Aisue,  51  ;  in 
battle  with  Nervii,  56  ;  in  command 
of  a  legion  during  winter  of  54-53  B.C., 
79  ;  informed  of  disaster  at  Aduatuca, 
85  ;  unable  to  join  Caesar  in  relieving 
Q.  Cicero,  88-9  ;  informed  of  relief  of 
Cicero,  91  ;  defeats  and  slays  ludutio- 
marus, 92-3  ;  reinforced  by  Caesar, 
defeats  Treveri,  94  ;  charged  by  Caesar 
with  duty  of  suppressing  rebellion  in 
valley  of  Seine,  117  ;  Caesar  anxious 
for  his  safety,  123,  128  ;  his  campaign 
against  Camulogenus,  129-31  ;  rejoins 
Caesar,  134  ;  attempts  to  assassinate 
Commius,  141  ;  strikes  decisive  blow 
at  Alesia,  145  ;  his  great  services,  161 

La  Fere,  49 

La  IMadelaine,  5 

Langres,  36,  104 

Latium,  1 

Latobrigi,  26 

Legati,  23,  45,  54,  76  ;  services  of, 
during  conquest   of  Gaul,   160.      See 


Caninius,  Cicero,  Cotta,  Crassus, 
Decimus  Brutus,  Fabius,  Galba, 
Labienus,  Lucius  Caesar,  Plancus, 
Reginus,  Roscius,  Sextius,  Titurius 
Sabinus,  Trebonius 

Legionaries,  23  -  4  ;  panic  among,  at 
Vesontio,  39-41  ;  short  stature  of,  58  ; 
conduct  at  Avaricum,  110-11  ;  nation- 
ality, 160,  n.  1 

Legions,  Caesar's,  23-4  ;  raised  by  Caesar 
during  Gallic  war,  28,  48,  93  ;  7th, 
55-6  ;  8tli,  55  ;  9th,  55  ;  10th,  41, 
55-6,  124-6  ;  13th,  124 

Lemonum,  154 

Les  Eyzies,  5 

Les  Laumes,  146 

Leuci,  send  supplies  to  Caesar,  43,  n.  2 

Lexovii,  64 

Ligurians,  6-7 

Limagne,  102,  118 

Lingones,  Caesar  overtakes  Helvetii  in 
their  country,  36  ;  supply  Caesar  with 
corn  for  cami)aign  against  Ariovistus, 
39,  43,  n.  2  ;  two  legions  winter  among 
(53-52  B.C.),  99,104;  Caesar  rejoins  the 
legions,  106  ;  adhere  to  Caesar  during 
rebellion  of  Vercingetorix,  132  ;  Caesar 
rests  his  army  in  their  country,  134 

Liscus,  31 

Litaviccus,  tampers  with  Aeduan  con- 
tingent on  march  to  join  Caesar  at 
Gergovia,  120-22 ;  recruits  for  Ver- 
cingetorix, 127 

Lou'e,  legions  cantoned  along  valley  of 
(57  B.C.),  61  ;  Caesar  orders  ships  to 
be  built  in  estuary,  63  ;  Brutus's  fleet 
assembles  in  estuary,  65  ;  legions 
quartered  between,  and  Seine  (56  B.C.), 
69  ;  boundary  between  Aedui  and 
Bituriges,  104  ;  Caesar  crosses,  at 
Cenabum,  107-8  ;  Caesar  crosses,  in 
spite  of  Aedui,  128  ;  campaign  of 
Fabius  in  lower  valley,  155 

Luca,  64 

Lucanius.     See  Quintus 

Lucius  Caesar,  133 

Lucius  Fabius,  125 

Lucterius,  threatens  to  invade  Province, 
104-5  ;  defends  Uxelloduuum,  154-5  ; 
goes  out  to  fetch  supplies,  escapes 
slaughter,  155  ;  delivered  up  to  Caesar, 
157-8 

Lutetia,  Labienus  marches  for,  129  ; 
burned  by  order  of  Camulogenus,  130  ; 
battle  near,  131 

Luxury,  12 

Macon,  30,  148 

Mandubii,  132  ;  expelled  from  Alesia, 
their  fate,  141 


180 


INDEX 


Maniple,  23 

March,  Caesar's  forced,  during  operations 
at  Gergovia.  121-2;  to  cross  Loire, 
128.     See  App.  C 

Marcus  Petronius,  126 

Maritime  Alps,  3 

Marius,  defeats  the  Teutoni,  19  ;  his 
military  reforms,  23 

Marne,  4,  48,  129 

Marseilles,  3 

Martigny,  59.     See  Octodurus 

Massilia,  3-4 

Matisco.     Sec  Macon 

Mediolanum,  2 

"Mediterranean  race,"  6-7 

Menapii,  68  ;  their  country  invaded  by 
Usipetes  and  Teucteri,  70  ;  rebel 
after  disaster  at  Aduatuca,  93  ;  their 
lauds  harried  (55  B.C.),  94  ;  Caesar 
deters,  from  helping  Ambiorix,  94 

Metiosedum,  129,  131 

Mettius,  43 

Jleuse,  skulls  of  Neanderthal  type  found 
in  basin  of,  5  ;  winds  round  Mont 
Falhize,  57;  Caesar  crosses  (55b.c. ), 
71  ;  Aduatuca  situated  east  of,  79 

Miette,  49-50,  App.  E 

Jlilan,  2 

Milo,  101 

Miners,  of  Aquitania,  etc.,  11 

Mines,  of  Romans  and  Gauls  in  siege  of 
Avaricum,  113 

Minucius  Basilus,  sent  with  cavalry  to 
pursue  Ambiorix,  95  ;  nearly  catches 
him,  96 

Monarchy,  in  Gaul,  12,  14-15 

Mont  Auxois.     See  Alesia 

Mont  Falhize,  57 

Mont  Ganelon,  153 

Mont  Genevre,  28 

Mont  Parnasse,  131 

Mont  Pevenel,  136,  139 

Mont  Rea,  136,  143-4 

Mont  St-Marc,  151 

Mont  St-Pierre,  152 

Montague  de  Bussy,  136,  139 

Montague  de  Flavigny,  137,  139,  144-5 

Montague  de  la  Serre,  119,  124 

Montargis,  107.     See  Vellauuodunum 

Montbeliard,  41,  App.  C 

Morbihau,  62,  64 

Morini,  Caesar's  campaign  against  (56 
B.C.),  68-9  ;  Fabius's  legion  quartered 
among  (54  B.C.),  79  ;  Fabius  sent  back 
to,  after  relief  of  Cicero,  91 

Moselle,  Usipetes  and  Tencteri  defeated 
near  confluence  of,  with  Rhine,  74 

Mussy-la-Fosse,  142 

Namnetes,  59 


Naraur,  79 

Nantes,  64.     See  Namnetes 

Nantuates,  59 

Narbo,  4  ;  threatened  by  Lucterius, 
rescued  by  Caesar,  105 

Narbonne.      See  Narbo 

Neanderthal  race,  5 

Neolithic  man,  in  Gaul,  6 

Nervii,  52-3  ;  defeated  by  Caesar  (57 
B.C.),  53-6  ;  survivors  exaggerate  their 
losses,  57  ;  Caesar  treats  survivors 
with  clemency,  57  ;  Q.  Cicero  winters 
in  country  of,  79  ;  besiege  Q.  Cicero's 
camp,  85-8  ;  defeated  by  Caesar,  89- 
90 ;  remain  in  arms,  their  lands  ravaged 
by  Caesar,  93 

Neuf-Mesnil,  53,  56 

Nevers,  117.  See  Noviodunum  (Aeduo- 
rum) 

Nievre,  106 

Nimes,  105 

Nitiobriges,  induced  to  join  rebellion  of 
Vercingetorix,  105,  116 

jyobiles  (nobles),  in  Gaul,  12,  14-15 

Normandy,  Crassus  receives  submission 
of  tribes  of,  61  ;  tribes  rebel,  62-3, 
66-7  ;  they  contemplate  an  attack 
on  Roseius,  91 

Notre  Dame,  Lutetia  built  upon  its  site, 
130 

Noviodunum  (Aeduorum),  used  by 
Caesar  as  a  magazine,  117  ;  seized  by 
Eporedorix  and  Viridoniarus,  127 

Noviodunum  (Biturigum),  surrenders  to 
Caesar  (52  B.C.),  107 

Noviodunum  (Suessionum),  52 

Numidians,  23,  51 

Octodurus,  59-60 

Oise,  49,  52,  153 

Opme,  119,  124 

Orhis,  84  and  n.  1 

Greet,  119 

Orgetorix,  20-21 

Orleans,  61.     See  Cenabum 

Orne,  63,  79 

Ourthe,  71,  79 

Oze,  136-8,  143 

Ozerain,  136-8,  144-5 

Pagi,  12 

Palaeolithic  man,  in  Gaul,  5 

Parisii,   campaign    of   Labienus   against, 

129-31 
Pas  de  I'Ecluse,  27-8 
Petronius.      See  Marcus 
Pevenel,  Mont,  136,  139 
Pictones,  lend  ships  to  Caesar,  65 
Pilum,  24,  34,  45,  55 
Piso,  73 


INDEX 


181 


Placentia,  2 

Plancus,  quartered  near  Samarobriva  (5-1 
B.C.),  79  ;  sent  to  overawe  Carnutes, 
79-80 

Po,  1-2 

Pompey,  negotiates  with  Caesar  at  Luca, 
63-4  ;  lends  Caesar  a  legion,  93  ; 
restores  order  at  Rome  after  murder 
of  Clodius,  104 

Pontarlier,  28 

Praefecti  fabrum,  24 

Prehistoric  races,  of  Gaul,  4-5,  8-9 

Procillus,  App.  D 

Province,  formation  of  Roman,  in  Trans- 
alpine Gaul,  4  ;  -vdctory  of  Cimbri  and 
Teutoni  in,  18-19  ;  Caesar  appointed 
Governor  of,  24  ;  exposed  to  danger 
from  Germans,  25  ;  Helvetii  desire  to 
march  through,  26  ;  Caesar  refuses  to 
allow  Helvetii  to  enter,  27  ;  exposed 
to  danger  from  Helvetii.  28  ;  Caesar 
raises  cavalry  in,  30  ;  Ariovistus  com- 
plains that  Caesar  has  crossed  frontier 
of.  42  ;  Caesar  levies  oarsmen  from 
(56  B.C.),  63  ;  threatened  by  Lucterius, 
rescued  by  Caesar,  104  -  5  ;  Aedui 
intend  to  prevent  Caesar  from  retreat- 
ing to,  128  ;  Caesar  said  to  be  retreat- 
ing to,  130  ;  threatened  by  Vercinge- 
torix,  133-4  ;  roads  leading  to,  from 
Further  Gaul,  blocked,  134  ;  Caesar 
marches  to  succour,  134  ;  Caesar  posts 
troops  to  guard  (52-51  B.C.),  149 

Publius  Considius,  32-3 

Punic  war,  second,  2 

"Putrid  Plain,"  19 

Puy  de  Dume,  102 

Puy  Girou.v,  119 

Puy  d'Issolu,  154 

Pyrenees,  68 

Quiberon  Bay,  65 
Quintus  Lucanius,  84 

Rabutin,  137,  138 

Rations,  24 

Raurici,  26 

Ravenna,  64 

Rea.     See  Mont  Rea 

Kebilus.     See  Caninius 

Red-hot  (or  white-hot),  balls,  87 

Reginus,  defends  camp  on  Mont  Rea,  143 

Reims,  49.  100.     See  Durocortorum 

Religion  of  Gauls,  9,  16-18 

Remi,  voluntarily  submit  to  Caesar  and 
help  him,  48  -  9  ;  their  territory 
threatened  by  other  Belgic  tribes,  51  ; 
loyal  to  Caesar,  62,  120,  134 ;  he 
treats  them  with  distinction,  79  ; 
congratulate    Labienus    on    relief    of 


Cicero's  camp,  91  ;  Indutiomarus 
threatens,  92  ;  intercede  for  Carnutes, 
93  ;  two  legions  detailed  to  protect 
them  (52-51  B.C.),  148;  Suessiones 
placed  in  dependence  on,  151 

Rhine,  4-5  ;  crossed  by  Celts,  7  ;  Ger- 
mans fight  their  way  to  right  banli  of, 
18-19  ;  Ariovistus  and  beaten  host  flee 
to,  45  ;  some  Transrhenane  tribes 
otter  submission  to  Caesar  (57  B.C.), 
59  ;  Labienus  charged  to  prevent 
Germans  from  crossing,  64  ;  Usipetes 
and  Tencteri  cross,  70  ;  Usipetes  and 
Tencteri  driven  to  confluence  of,  with 
Moselle,  74  ;  Caesar  crosses  in  55  and 
53  B.C.,  74-5,  95  ;  Sugambri  cross,  97  ; 
German  cavalry  cross,  to  reinforce 
Caesar,  134.     .See  Triboci 

Rhone,  Arverni  and  allies  defeated  at 
confluence  of,  with  Isere  (121  B.C.),  3  ; 
Romans  masters  of  lower  valley,  3-4  ; 
Romans  defeated  on  banks  of,  by 
Cimbri  and  Teutoni,  19  ;  Helvetian 
marauders  on  right  bank  (60  B.C.), 
20  ;  Helvetii  prevented  by  Caesar 
from  crossing,  26-7  ;  Labienus  holds 
Caesar's  lines  on,  28  ;  Caesar  crosses, 
near  Lyons,  29  ;  AUobroges  defend 
fords  of,  against  Vercingetorix's  levies, 
133 

Risolles,  118,  123,  125 

Roamie,  30 

Roche  Blanche,  118  ;  seized  by  Caesar, 
119  ;  camp  on,  held  during  Caesar's 
absence  from  Gergovia,  121  ;  held  by 
Sextius,  125 

Rome,  captured  by  Gauls,  1  ;  Romans 
repel  Gallic  incursions  and  conquer 
Cisalpine  Gaul,  1-3  ;  establish  them- 
selves in  Transalpine  Gaul  and  form 
Province,  3-4  ;  Roman  army  defeated 
by  Tigurini,  20  ;  Roman  interests 
menaced  by  intended  Helvetian  emi- 
gration, 20-22,  28  ;  and  by  pressure 
of  Germans  upon  Gaul,  25.  37  ;  Caesar 
leaves  Rome  (58  B.C.),  26  ;  Dumnorix 
heads  anti-Roman  faction,  31  ;  Ario- 
vistus complains  of  Roman  interference 
and  bad  faith,  38,  42  ;  Roman  soldiers 
liable  to  panic,  39  ;  rejoicings  at 
Rome  over  Caesar's  victories  (57  B.C.), 
61  ;  Gauls  familiar  with  idea  of  Roman 
dominion,  62,  162  ;  Caesar  obliged  to 
think  of  Roman  politics  during  con- 
quest of  Gaul,  63,  93  ;  Roman  suprem- 
acy galling  to  Gallic  patriots,  78.  91, 
101  ;  riots  in  Rome  (52  B.C.),  101  ; 
Pomjiey  restores  order  in,  104  ;  Caesar 
desires  to  Romanise  Gauls,  158 

Roscius,  79 


182 


INDEX 


Riiteni,  induced  to  join  rebellion  of 
Vercingetorix,  104-5  ;  hounded  on  by 
Vercingetorix  to  invade  Province,  133  ; 
a  legion  quartered  in  their  countr}',  148 

Sabinus.     See  Titurius 

Saint-Gildas,  65 

Saint- Jean-de-Losne,  134 

Saint-Maurice,  59 

Saint-Parize-le-Chatel,  36,  106 

Salyes,  3 

Samarobriva,     52  ;     Trebonius's     legion 
quartered    at    (54    B.C.),    79  ;    Caesar 
fixes  his  headquarters  there  (54  B.C.), 
79  ;  Vertico  carries  a  despatch  to,  88 
Caesar  leaves  Crassus  in  charge  of,  88 
three     legions    quartered    near,    91 
Caesar    holds    Gallic   council    at    (54 
B.C.),  93 

Sambre,  52  ;  battle  on,  53-6 

Samnite  war,  third,  1-2 

Santones,  lend  ships  to  Caesar,  65 

Saone,  crossed  by  Helvetii  and  by  Caesar, 
29  ;  Caesar  marches  up  valley  of,  in 
pursuit  of  Helvetii,  30-31  ;  Caesar 
marches  up  valley  (52  B.C.),  106  ; 
Caesar  intends  to  cross,  in  order  to 
succour  Province,  134 

Sappers'  huts,  52,  87,  109,  113,  143 

Sathonay,  29 

Scheldt,  52  ;  Nerviau  non-combatants 
take  refuge  near  estuary,  57  ;  Caesar 
marches  towards  lower  valley,  Eburones 
take  refuge  in  marshes  formed  by 
estuary,  96 

Seduni,  59 

Seine,  4  ;  legions  winter  between,  and 
Loire  (56-55  B.C.),  69  ;  campaign  of 
Labienus  in  valley  of,  117,  129-31. 
See  Lexovii,  Meldi 

Senate,  Roman,  support  Massiliots  against 
Ligurians,  3  ;  will  not  definitely  assist 
Aedui  against  Ariovistus,  19  ;  try  to 
guard  by  diplomacy  against  threatened 
Helvetian  invasion,  21  ;  grant  title  to 
Ariovistus,  22  ;  order  a  thanksgiving 
service  in  honour  of  Caesar's  victories, 
61  ;  induced  to  vote  pay  for  legions 
raised  by  Caesar  on  his  own  responsi- 
bility, 64  ;  Caesar's  treatment  of  Usi- 
petes  and  Tencteri  condemned  in,  74 

Senates,  of  Gallic  tribes,  12  ;  senate  of 
the  Nervii,  57  ;  senates  of  Eburovices 
aud  Lexovii  massacred,  66-7 

Senones  (of  Cisalpine  Gaul),  ? 

Senones,  rebel  against  Caesar  (54  B.C.), 
91-2  ;  inquiry  into  their  conduct,  100  ; 
Caesar  captures  their  stroughold,  Vel- 
lauuodunum,107  ;  Labienus's  campaign 
against,  129-31 


Sequani,  15  ;  hire  aid  of  Ariovistus 
agaiust  Aedui,  subdued  in  turn  by 
Ariovistus,  19-20  ;  allow  Helvetii  to 
pass  through  their  country,  28  ;  ask 
Caesar's  aid  against  Ariovistus,  37  ; 
Caesar  occupies  their  stronghold, 
Vesontio,  39  ;  send  supplies  to  Caesar 
43,  u.  2  ;  Caesar  quarters  troops  in 
their  country  (58-57  B.C. ),  46,  u.  2  ; 
he  intends  to  march  through  their 
country,  to  succour  Province,  1.^4  ;  he 
quarters  troops  in  their  country  (52- 
51  B.C.),  148.     .Ste  App.  A 

Serbannes,  121 

Sertorius,  68 

Sextius,  his  operations  during  attack  on 
Gergovia,  125-6 

Sextius  Baculus,  in  battle  with  the 
Nervii,  55-6  ;  at  Octodurus,  60  ;  saves 
Cicero's  camp  at  Aduatuca,  98 

Slavery,  in  Gaul,  13 

Slingers,  in  Caesar's  army,  23,  49,  51, 
142  ;  at  Aduatuca,  84 

Soissons,  52.  See  Noviodunum  (Sues- 
sionum) 

Somme,  68 

Sos,  67 

Sotiates,  67 

Spain,  reinforcements  from,  join  Aqui- 
taniaus  (56  B.C.),  68 

Spanish  cavalry,  employed  by  Caesar, 
23,  81 

Strasbourg,  38 

Suessioues,  Remi  auxious  to  shake  oft 
their  yoke,  48  ;  join  Belgic  confederacy 
against  Caesar,  48-9  ;  surrender  to 
Caesar,  52  ;  threatened  by  Bellovaci, 
151 

Suevi,  threaten  to  reinforce  Ariovistus, 
38  ;  return  home,  46  ;  harry  Usipetes 
and  Tencteri,  70  ;  their  superiority 
acknowledged  by  Usipetesand  Tencteri, 
71  ;  Ubii  solicit  Caesar's  aid  against, 
74  ;  ready  to  fight  Caesar,  75  ;  send 
reinforcements  to  aid  Treveri  against 
Labienus,  95  ;  Caesar  too  wary  to 
attack,  95 

Sugambri,  refuse  to  surrender  cavalry  of 
Usipetes  and  Tencteri  to  Caesar,  74  ; 
Caesar  punishes,  75  ;  harry  land  of 
Eburones,  97  ;  attack  Cicero's  camp  at 
Aduatuca,  97-9 

Switzerland,  4,  20.  See  Helvetii,  Nantu- 
ates,  Seduni,  Veragri 

Tamahu,  6,  n.  1 

Tarn,   4  ;  Lucterius  threatens   to  cross^ 

105 
Tasgetius,  79 
Telamon,  battle  of,  2 


INDEX 


1: 


Tencteri,  cross  the  Rhine,  70  ;  Caesar's 
campaigu  against,  71-4  ;  efieet  of  his 
massacre  of,  in  deterring  Germans  from 
crossing  Rliine,  92 

Tenth  legion.     See  Legions 

Tertiary  man,  alleged  traces  of,  in  Gaul,  5 

Teutoniatus,  joins  Vercingetorix,  116  ; 
surprised  in  attack  on  Gergovia,  124 

Teutoni,  18-19,  40,  48,  57 

Thuringia,  95 

Tigurini,  defeat  a  Ronaan  army  (107  B.C.), 
20  ;  defeated  by  Caesar,  29 

Tille,  134 

Titurius  Sabinus,  holds  bridge  over  Aisne 
at  Berry-au-Bac,  49,  51  ;  sent  to  dis- 
perse northern  allies  of  Veneti,  64  ; 
defeats  them,  66-7  ;  placed  in  joint 
command  at  Aduatuca,  79  ;  attacked 
by  Ambiorix,  80  ;  overrules  his  col- 
league and  abandons  camp,  81-3  ;  con- 
duct in  subsequent  disaster,  83  -  5  ; 
killed,  85 

Tolosa,  67 

Tonnerre,  36 

Toulon-sur-Arroux,  33 

Tourmente,  154,  156 

Toutates,  18 

Towers  (movable),  in  siege  of  Aduatucan 
stronghold,  58  ;  used  by  Gauls  in  siege 
of  Q.  Cicero's  camp,  87  ;  stationary 
tower  built  on  Caesar's  second  bridge 
over  Rhine,  95  ;  movable  towers  on 
agger  at  Avaricum,  1(19-10,  113-14  ; 
towers  erected  by  Gauls  at  Avaricum, 
112  ;  Caesar's  towers  at  Alesia,  139, 
143,  145  ;  tower  at  Uxellodunum,  156 

Traders,  25,  39,  97 

Transalpine  Gaul.     See  Gaul 

Transmigration  of  souls,  17 

Trebatius,  76 

Trebonius,  quartered  at  Samarobriva  (54 
B.C.),  79  ;  Caesar  marches  with  his 
legion  to  relieve  Q.  Cicero,  89  ;  cam- 
paigns in  south-western  part  of  country 
of  Eburoues,  96  ;  disarms  Vellauno- 
dunum,  107 

Treveri,  auxiliary  cavalry  of,  desert 
Caesar  in  battle  with  Nervii,  55 ; 
Labienus  winters  near  western  frontier 
of  (54-53  B.C.),  79  ;  disafl'ection  of 
Treveri  (54  B.C.),  80  ;  Labienus  hard 
pressed  by,  89  ;  rebellion  of  (54-53 
B.C.),  91-5  ;  forced  by  attacks  of  Ger- 
mans to  hold  aloof  from  rebellion  of 
Vercingetorix,  131 

Treves,  64  ;  two  legions  quartered  near 
(53-52  B.C.),  104.     See  Treveri 

Tribes,  Gallic,  mutual  relations  of,  13-15, 
78,  162 

Tribunes,  military,  23,  39-40,  56,  60,  85 


Troucillus,  32,  43,  App.  D 

Troyes,  134 

Tulingi,  26  ;  in  battle  near  Bibracte,  35 

Tumuli,  8 

Ubii,  Caesar  invites  LTsijietes  and  Tencteri 
to  settle  in  their  country,  72  ;  beg 
Caesar  to  cross  Rhine,  74  ;  Caesar 
enters  their  country,  75  ;  give  him  in- 
formation about  movements  of  Suevi, 
95 

Unelli,  64 

Usipetes,  cross  the  Rhine,  70  ;  Caesar's 
campaign  against,  71-4 

Uxellodunum,  blockade  and  capture  of, 
154-7 

Vadimo,  Boii  defeated  near  lake  of,  2 

Veliocasses,  151 

Vellaunoduuum,  captured  by  Caesar  (52 
B.C.),  107 

Venelli.     See  Unelli 

Veneti,  their  rebellion,  62-5  ;  Caesar's 
campaign  against,  65-6 

Veragri,  59.     See  Martiguy 

Vercassivellaunus,  141  ;  attacks  Roman 
camp  on  Mont  Rea,  143-5  ;  captured, 
145 

Vercellae,  19 

Vercingetorix,  rebels  against  Caesar, 
chosen  king  and  commander-in-chief, 
raises  an  army,  103  ;  sends  Lucterius 
to  deal  with  Ruteni,  enters  country  of 
Biturige.s,  who  join  him,  104  ;  forced 
by  Caesar's  strategy  to  return  to  coun- 
try of  Arverni,  105  ;  besieges  Gorgo- 
bina,  106  ;  raises  siege  and  attempts 
to  recover  Noviodunum,  108  ;  peisuades 
Bituriges  and  other  tribes  to  burn 
towns  and  granaries,  108  ;  obliged  to 
consent  to  defence  of  Avaricum,  108-9  ; 
encamps  near  Avaricum  and  harasses 
Caesar,  109-10  ;  moves  nearer  Avari- 
cum, 111  ;  refutes  charge  of  treachery, 
111-12  ;  advises  garrison  to  evacuate 
Avaricum,  114  ;  consoles  troops  for 
loss  of  Avaricum,  115  ;  raises  fresh 
levies,  116  ;  destroys  bridges  over 
Allier,  117  ;  plants  himself  on  hill  of 
Gergovia,  118  ;  diligent  in  command, 
119  ;  bribes  Convictolitavis  to  join 
rebellion,  120  ;  fortifies  western  ap- 
proach to  Gergovia,  123  ;  defeats 
Caesar  at  Gergovia,  124-6  ;  fails  to 
harass  Caesar's  retreat  from  Gergovia, 
127  ;  joined  by  Aedui,  127  ;  resists 
their  claim  to  direct  campaign,  re- 
elected commander-in-chief  at  Bibracte, 
132  ;  his  plan  of  campaign,  fortifies 
and  provisions  Alesia,  attempts  to  gain 


184 


INDEX 


Roman  Province,  132-3  ;  attacks  Caesar 
with  his  cavalry  near  Dijon,  135-6  ; 
retreats  beaten  to  Alesia,  136  ;  failure 
of  his  first  sortie,  137  ;  sends  out 
cavalry  to  fetch  succour,  138  ;  econo- 
mises stores,  138  ;  army  organised  for 
his  relief,  140  ;  his  final  stand,  142-5  ; 
surrender,  imprisonment,  and  execu- 
tion, 146  ;  place  in  history,  146-8  ; 
other  chiefs  jealous  of  him,  162 

Vergobrets,  12.  Si'e  Convictolitavis, 
Cotus,  Dumnorix,  Liscus 

Vertico,  88 

Vesontio,  occupied  by  Caesar,  39  ;  panic 
in  Caesar's  army  at,  39-40  ;  garrisoned 
by  Caesar,  41  ;  legions  probably  quar- 
tered there  (58-57  B.C.),  46.  See  also 
48 


Vienna  (Vienue),  106 

Vieux-Laon,  49.     See  Bibrax 

Vilaine,  65 

Viridomarus,   121  ;   seizes   Noviodunum,. 

127  ;  one  of  four  generals  in  command 

of  army  destined  for  relief  of  Alesia, 

141 
Viridovix,  66-7 
Viromandui,  53,  55 
Volunteers,  134 
Volusenus,  at   Octodurus,  60  ;  attempts 

to  assassinate  Commius,  141 
Vosges,  41,  43 

Walls,  Gallic,  112 

Yonne,  129,  134 


THE   END 


Printed  hy  R.  &  R.  Clark,  Limited,  EdinhirgJi. 


In  one  Volume,  Denuj  8w,  pp.  xliv,  846,  Illustrated  with  a 
Pliotogravure  Portrait  of  Julius  Caesar  from  the  Bust  in 
the  British  Museum,  a  Map  of  Gaul,  Eight  Plans,  and  a 
few  Woodcuts.     Price  One  Guinea  net. 


CAESAR'S 
CONQUEST    OF    GAUL 


PART  1. 

CONTAINING  A  NARRATIVE  OF  THE  CONQUEST  AND  OF 
THE  EVENTS  WHICH  LED  UP  TO  IT 

PART  II. 

COMPRISING  A  SERIES  OF  ARTICLES  ON  THE  QUESTIONS  OF 
GALLIC  AND  GALLO- ROMAN  HISTORY,  ETHNOLOGICAL, 
GEOGRAPHICAL,  POLITICAL,  MILITARY,  ETC.,  RELATING  TO 
THE  NARRATIVE 

By  T.  rice   holmes 

AUTHOR   OF    '  A   HISTORY   OF   THE   INDIAN   MUTINY ' 


EXTRACTS  FROM  NOTICES  BY  THE  PRESS. 

"  It  may  be  said  at  once  that  Mr.  Holmes's  Qonqxiesl  of  Gaul  is  a 
masterpiece  of  sound  scholarship  and  historical  appreciation." — Spectator. 

"  It  is  difficult  to  discover  any  topic  of  small  or  great  importance, 
directly  or  indirectly  connected  with  the  subject,  which  has  not  received 
adequate  treatment.  .  .  .  Yet  elaborateness  has  not  been  achieved  at  its 
usual  cost  in  tediousness.  The  style  is  bright  and  even  vivacious 
throughout,  so  that  any  student  who  cares  for  Caesar's  campaigns,  or 
for  military  history  at  all,  will  be  able  to  read  with  interest  to  the  end. 
Mr.  Holmes  has  approached  his  subject  from  every  point  of  view,  and 
his  treatment  of  it  is  strong  on  most  sides,  and  really  weak  on  none. 
It  must  inspire  respect  and  admiration  for  its  learning  and  thorough- 
ness, its  acumen,  and  (if  it  be  viewed  as  a  whole)  its  historical  im- 
partiality .  .  .  the  work  is  about  as  complete  in  its  excellence  as  work 


[     2     ] 

on  such  a  scale  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  be.  It  will  figure  for 
many  years  to  come  as  the  most  prominent  and  important  discussion  of 
the  subject." — Atlienamm. 

"  The  story  of  these  campaigns  is  told  by  Mr,  Holmes  with  a  clear- 
ness and  vigour  that  surpasses  any  account  yet  written  in  English.  Mr. 
Holmes  is  a  practised  historian  ;  and  his  admirable  military  history 
will  be  read  with  interest  by  the  general  reader  and  military  student 
no  less  than  by  the  professed  scholar." — Speaker. 

"  The  historical  narrative  is  truly  admirable — terse,  lucid,  vigorous. 
It  ought  some  day  to  be  detached  from  its  environment  and  issued 
separately  as  a  companion  to  its  author's  excellent  account  of  the  Indian 
Mutiny.  Reinforced  by  a  few  additions  ...  it  would  at  once  take 
rank  as  the  standard  English  narrative  of  Caesar's  greatest  war." — Mr. 
F.  J.  Haverfield  in  English  Histoi'ical  Review. 

"  I  venture  to  suggest  that  this  [first]  part  might  with  advantage  be 
published  in  a  separate  form  ;  it  would  make  an  excellent  book  for 
schoolboys  to  read  in  connexion  with  their  study  of  the  text,  for  it 
would  help  them  more  than  any  book  that  I  know  to  realise  the  ever- 
present  interest  and  the  military  and  political  significance  of  this  great 
period  of  Roman  expansion.  In  accuracy  it  is  superior  to  Mr.  Froude's 
narrative,  and  I  think  it  is  not  inferior  to  it  in  style.  ...  I  must  again 
express  the  great  admiration  that  I  have  for  the  service  that  he  has 
rendered  to  all  students  of  Caesar.  His  grasp  of  the  whole  subject  is 
extraordinarily  comprehensive  ;  he  has  a  considerable  knowledge  of 
military  science  and  military  history  ;  he  displays  a  singular  power  of 
acute  and  penetrating  criticism  and  a  strong  faculty  of  common  sense, 
while  the  lucidity  and  vigour  of  his  style  lend  a  charm  even  to  the 
least  interesting  portions  of  his  subject." — ■  Mr.  A.  G.  Peskett  in  The 
Classical  Review. 

"  The  narrative  .  .  .  while  attractive  to  the  general  reader  from  the 
vigor  of  its  style,  will  be  found  of  interest  to  more  advanced  students 
of  the  Commentaries.  ...  Of  the  dissertations  and  notes  in  Part  II.  it  is 
not  too  much  to  say  that  they  form  the  best  commentary  on  Caesar's 
masterpiece  available  in  any  language.  .  .  .  He  has  done  for  Caesar's 
'Gallic  War'  what  Mr.  J.  G.  Frazer  lately  did  for  Pausanias." — Neio 
York  Nation. 

"  The  book  contains  such  an  abundance  of  material,  thoroughly 
worked  up,  that  one  can  only  hope  that  it  may  be  translated  into 
German  as  soon  as  possible,  and  placed  in  the  library  of  every  classical 
school,  so  that  it  may  come  into  the  hands  of  the  teachers  who  have  to 
explain  the  Bellum  Gallicnm."  ("das  Buch  enthalt  eine  solclie  Fiille 
grlindlich  verarbeiteten  Materials,  dass  man  nur  wiinschen  kann,  es 
mochte  baldigst  ins  Deutsche  iibersetzt  i;nd  an  alien  Gymnasialbiblio- 


[      3      ] 

theken  angeschafft  werden,  damit  es  in  die  Hiinde  der  Lehrer  gelauge, 
die  das  Bellum  Gallicum  zu  erkliiren  liabeii.") — Prof.  B.  Kiibler  in 
Deutsche  Litterat  urzeitung. 

"  But  these  errors  are  insignificant ;  the  work  as  a  whole  is  a  valuable 
enrichment  of  Caesarian  literature."  ("  Doch  alles  das  sind  unbedeu- 
tende  Mangel ;  das  Werk  als  Ganzes  ist  eine  wertvolle  Bereicherung 
der  Ciisarlitteratur.") — Dr.  H.  Meusel  in  Berliner  philologische  JFochen- 
schrift. 

"  The  author  has  earned  by  his  work  the  gratitude  not  only  of  all 
friends  of  Caesar  but  also  of  all  investigators  in  the  same  field." 
("  Der  Verf.  hat  sich  mit  seinem  Werke  den  Dank  nicht  nur  aller  Ciisar- 
freunde,  sondern  auch  aller  Forscher  auf  diesem  Gebiete  verdient.") — 
Dr.  R.  ]\Ienge  in  N'eue  ■philologische  Rundschau. 

"Uue  premiere  partie  contient  un  recit  fort  vivant  de  la  guerre  des 
Gaules  .  .  .  toujours  on  le  lit  avec  profit.  Son  livre  est  le  commen- 
taire  historique  le  plus  complet  de  I'ceuvre  de  Cesar  .  .  .  tons  ceux  qui 
veulent  comprendre  Cesar  feront  bien  de  I'etudier." — M.  L.  Laurand  in 
Revue  de  Philologie. 

"  Je  regrette  de  n'avoir  dit  plus  tot  tout  le  bien  que  je  pense  du 
livre  de  M.  Rice  Holmes.  V^ritablement,  c'est  une  encyclopedie  com- 
plete, exacte,  judicieuse  de  tout  ce  qui  a  pu  etre  ecrit  sur  la  guerre  des 
Gaules  ...  la  maniere  dont  M.  H.  juge  ses  devanciers  et  appuie  ses 
hypotheses  fait  reconnaitre  en  lui  un  veritable  temperament  d'historien." 
— Prof.  Camille  Jullian  in  Revue  historique. 

The  two  following  reviews  by  specialists  relate  only  to  the  essay 
on  "  The  Ethnology  of  Gaul  "  :— 

"  Cet  important  ouvrage.  ...  La  geographie  est  surtout  representee 
par  un  excellent  chapitre  :  The  Ethnology  of  Gaul "  [Also  by  a  section 
devoted  exclusively  to  geography]. —  M.  L.  Raveneau  in  Annales  de 
Geogra])hie. 

"L'auteur  a  eu  I'heureuse  idee,  en  effet,  de  consacrer  80  pages  de  son 
livre  a  une  Ethnologie  de  la  Gaule,  pour  laquelle  il  a  puise  aux  sources 
les  plus  nombreuses  et  les  plus  sures,  maniaut  la  bibliographic  anthro- 
pologique  et  archeologique  avec  la  meme  aisance  que  la  bibliographic 
historique  ou  les  textes  anciens  .  .  .  ces  divers  problemes,  traites  avec 
methode  et,  ce  qui  est  assez  rare  en  pareille  matiere,  avec  clarte.  Son 
travail  est  une  oeuvre  de  synthese  qui  se  fait  remarquer  par  un  excellent 
esprit  critique  .  .  .  nos  lecteurs  sont  prevenns  qu'ils  auront  a  la  fois 
plaisir  et  interet  a  le  lire." — M.  Boule  in  U Anthropologie. 


BY  THE  SAME  AUTHOR 

A    HISTORY    OF 
THE     INDIAN     MUTINY 

AND    OF    THE    DISTURBANCES    WHICH 
ACCOMPANIED    IT   AMONG   THE   CIVIL   POPULATION 

Fifth  Edition,  revised  throughout  and  slightly  enlarged 

WITH  FIVE  MAPS  AND  SIX  PLANS 

Extra  Crown  8vo,    12s.   6d. 


EXTRACTS  FROM  NOTICES  BY  THE  PRESS. 

Baibj  News. — "  Mr.  Holmes  has  taken  infinite  pains  to  verify  his 
information,  and  the  result  is  that  his  history  of  the  Mutiny  is  the  best 
which  has  yet  appeared." 

"  T.  P."  in  The  Weekly  Sun. — "  It  is  but  a  poor  and  an  insufiicient 
compliment  to  say  that  the  book  is  more  interesting  than  any  work  of 
fiction.  For  myself  I  have  read  it  as  breathlessly  as  if  it  were  an 
exciting  novel.  .  .  .  Impartiality,  profound  knowledge,  a  charming 
style,  unassailable  accuracy — these  are  qualities  that  are  not  often  found 
in  combination  ;  they  are  found  in  this  noteworthy  volume." 

Daily  Mail. — "  The  most  literary,  the  most  complete,  and  the  most 
accurate  history  of  the  Mutiny  available  to  the  reading  public." 

St.  James's  Gazette. — "  This  is  a  history  in  the  true  sense  of  the  word. 
.  .  .  Mr.  Holmes's  narrative  is  as  interesting  as  it  is  instructive,  and 
we  might  quote  passage  after  passage  as  specimens  of  his  quietly  eff'ec- 
tive  style.  .  .   .  Mr.  Holmes  is  splendidly  impartial." 

Athenmum. — "  He  has  thrown  new  light  on  many  debated  subjects 
.  .  .  and  he  has  shown  with  much  exactitude  the  precise  relation  of 
each  part  of  the  drama  to  the  whole.  .  .  .  We  cannot  refrain  from 
again  expressing  our  admiration  of  the  judicial  temperament  of  the 
author.  .  .  .  His  work  is  in  every  sense  of  the  word  a  history,  and 
deserves  to  be  read." 

Pioneer  Press  (Allahabad). — "  What  the  reader  of  to-day  wants  is 
exactly  what  Mr.  Holmes  has  given  us  :  the  whole  story  of  the  origin, 
the  course,  and  the  results  of  the  Mutiny  in  a  single  handy  and 
attractive  volume,  complete  in  itself,  and  eminently  readable  from  cover 
to  cover.  It  is  not  easy  to  see  how  the  present  work  could  be  improved. 
.  .  .  The  book  is  one  which  every  one  should  read,  and  which  should 
be  in  every  library,  and  particularly  in  every  soldier's  library,  in  the 
country." 


FOURTEEN  DAY  USE 

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This  book  is  due  on  the  last  date  stamped  below,  or 

on  the  date  to  which  renewed. 

Renewed  books  are  subject  to  immediate  recall. 


5Wia>'56RE 


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General  Library 

University  of  California 

Berkeley 


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