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THE 

CAMBRIDGE 
MODERN HISTORY 



•^^^ 



THE 



gAMBRIDGE 
MODERN HISTORY 



PLANNED BY 
THE LATE LORD ACTON LL.D. 

REGIUS PROFESSOR OF MODERN HISTORY 



EDITED BY 

A. W. WARD LiTT.D. 

G. W. PROTHERO Lrrr.D. 

STANLEY LEATHES M.A. 



VOLUME X :'.'::- ■••'•. >: 

THE RESTORATION"': ;Vr; :\'/- 



NctD gorft 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 

1907 

/I// rights reserved 



COFTRIOHT, 1907, 

bt the hacuillan coMPAinr. 

Set up and dec iroiyp ed. PnUubed M97, 1907. 



I I 54?a 



HortuaB 9n%§ 

J. 8. CoabUiB & Co. — Berwick & Smttti Co. 

Honrood, IUn« ir.S.A. 



PREFACE 



A S we advance towards modern times, our task must needs become 
■*-^ more difficult. Tlie niasB of material frum wUiuh history has to 
ba coostruoted grows couHtautly greater ; and the sourceij liave uot yet 
been collated aud coordinated ho thoroughly as iu earlier periods^. The 
political struggles of the early uiueteentli century still awake living 
passiomi aud touch burning controversies of to-day. The scene la 
nearer to our ejes; proportion and perspective are in consequence 
more diflBoult to preserve. On the otiier hiiad, for this period, the 
authentic records are for the most )>art uow accessible, though as yet 
imperfectly worked; for periods still later they will be closed to us, 
except in so far as a more liberal system, may lead to the removal of 
unnecessary restrictions. 

The unity of action aud interests wluch characterises the history of 
Europe in the Napoleonic [jeriod still survives for some years after 
the Emperor's fall. For seven years the attempt was made to govern 
Euro[wau relations, and the affairs of individual States, by common 
action concerted in European conclave. The epoch during which this 
unifying effort was maintained is surveyed in a separate clmpter of tins 
volume; for once, it is actually possible to treat the history of Europe 
as a single whole ; and international relations group themselves as the 
affairs of an inchoate Confederation. Hut national aspirations soon 
shattered this ideal, the individualist policy of Great Britain largely 
contributing to the rupture. Thus in the later part of the period 
international relations must be studied in connexion with particiilar 
questions : more especially, \vith that of South America, with the 
Eastern Question, and with the problems presented by the various 
revolutions and by the unstable political equilibrium of the countries 
of southern £uro{>e. The grouping of the Powers varies as each new 
question arises. Meanwhile the evolution of the modern State pro- 
ceeds and can be studied best in the United Kingdom, where the niOHt 
momentous problems were successfully and peacefully solved, and also, 
at different stages, iu France and Gerninny. In Ku8.sin alone among 
the Great Powers reaction seems more evident than progress; and the 

T 



vi Preface 

dreams of Alexander are found to have produced no tangible effect. 
This volume closes on the threshold of other and greater changes, 
whose effect on the European polity is not yet exhausted. 

We have been fortunate in securing the cooperation of distinguished 
foreign scholars for chapters which deal with the affairs of France, 
Italy, Spain, Russia, and Poland. Economic changes and economic 
thought have received due attention ; and place has been found for the 
great literary movements in England, France, and Germany. In some 
cases a retrospect has enabled us to do justice to developments which 
it was difficult to consider in conjunction with the tumultuous politics 
of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic eras. 

Russian and Polish orthography have presented a difficult problem. 
The compromise between a phonetic and the native spelling which we 
have adopted is not and cannot be in all respects satisfactory ; but the 
correct native spelling of Polish names would involve the use of an 
alphabet unknown to most of our readers ; and a purely phonetic 
spelling would be too great a deviation from customary us^^. In one 
case we have deliberately retained the familiar German transliteration. 
General Dlebitsch might not have been recognised as Dybicz. 

Our cordial thanks are due to all those who have cooperated with 
us in this portion also of our enterprise for the great pains which 
they have taken in contributing to its progress. 

A. W. W. 
G. W. P. 
S. L. 
Cahsbidob, 
Apra, 1007. 



TABLE OF CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

THE CONGRESSES, 1816-22 

By W. Alison Phillips, M.A.,fonneily Senioi Scholar of St John's 

College, Oxford 

PAOX 

I^poleon and the federaUon of Europe 1 

Wie Congress of Vienna. Idea of a central constitution for Europe . 2 — 

Birth of the Concert of Europe 3~ 

Revulsion from the ideas of the French Revolution 4 

The romantic and the religious reaction . > 5 

The teaching of de Haistre 6 

The Grand Alliance of the Four Powers 7-- 

Predominance of Alexander I of Russia 8 

Triumph of the Coalition 9 

The Holy Alliance • 10— 

Relations of Europe and France as defined in the Treaties of Novembn, 181S 11- 

Castlereagh and the "European System" 12 

.. Reaction. The problem of France 13 

Evacuation of France 44 

JPhe Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle 15- 

Proposal for a general Alliance. Views of Alexander and Hettemich . . ld-~ 

Attitude of Great Britain 17 

The resulting compromise JL§_. 

Scope of the Conference. . Slave-trade and piracy 19 

Weakness of the Concert. Alarmist rumours 20 

Mistrust of Russia. Vacillation of Alexander 21 

Treaty of Frankfort. The Carlsbad Decrees 22- 

Change in Alexander's attitude 23 

Rebellion in Spain and at Naples 24 

Movements for and against a further Conference 25 

Meltemich accepts the Conference 26 

*Great Britain and the Conference of Troppau 27 — 

The Protocol of Troppau. Castlereagh's protest 28- 

<rhe Conference of lAibach 29— 

Division in Europe 30 

The Eastern Question. French policy in Spain 31 

Meeting of Mettemich and Castlereagh at Hanover 32 

' ingress of Verona. Questions at issue ....... 33-^ 

Attitude of Great Britain at Verona 34 

The Spanish Question 35 

Great Britain abandons the Concert 36- 

The policy of Canning. Non-intervention 37- 

Til 



Vlll 



Contents 



Frnm VKroaa tn the B^volatioaof 4al7 
ItMrfdnition of the iiouth Ameiiea£ Bepttblics. 
ailiauce 



S 



BreakiduvTL of the 



CHAPTER n 

THE DOCTRIXAIBES 

By XjAI>y Blkskkbhassext 

!7af>f>l«ftn Mid thA ^AaSnen^Aum 40 

The IdfMttffwJt and the lint Restontion 41 

Th*r l'>>iwtitiiti*'>nal Momtfchina. Roy«-CoUard tt 

(■;ii»wvt. Rr*nald. De Majatre . . -tt 

TAmennaM. R«ligir>UH intolerance. Louis XYIII at Gbait . ... 44 

The VitritiA Rfstoration and the Ubenla 4S 

f/ppr^qnor partus. The White Terror. The "Ci^nt&rr intrawabU' . . 46 

{Ce^iff7iAtir>n 'tt TaJIeyrand. The Miniatr7 of Riefaeliea 47 

The f.^hamher and jtfl punitive measures 48 

FJeety>r»l proymtA 40 

r^man/ta of the LltrM and nt the Pbwas 50 

Kteef.k(n f4 a new Chamber 51 

A new f:ief:t/>ral Taw. The name of "Doctrinaires" fiS 

Their lea/ler.4 and their principles 51 

1)iv*rs(ntrj9 amr,nii the T>>ctriiuure9. Alliance of Cltras and Liberals . 54 

fcef'->rmf( in the army 55 

The Orne^rrdat. The end of the fordgn occupation 50 

rail o1 Kieheliei] 57 

The Miniittry of fMeazeii and the Chambers 58 

f^l'>ert.y f^ tlte 1*r*tm. Propoflala for an anuiesty 50 

Itiviiptatitm r>1 K/iyer-Ollard. Election of 1819 00 

fjfffleiiltien fit Ijerazen and de Serre 01 

Ker/ynKtnietb'fn of the Miniiitry 03 

Murder r4 th*^ f^iilc- of Herry. Fall of Decazes OS 

Ki^heiieri'fi fteerynd Minlittry 01 

New i^U-f^fTni jfft,i)fttMin. Attitude of dc Serre ...... 05 

Tler^ftteit in the <,7tamtier 60 

Kleet/zral m-.h/^tif. amended and pSMied 07 

R/fyalliit reaetjon 68 

V'tTtitcfi f^nrrifflirntioiM 09 

flef«at frf HIchelieu. VilRle Prime Minister 7G 



CHAPTER III 

FIEACTIOX AXIJ REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 

By l^Mir.K WoynrnWiW, Professor in the University of Paris 



Miirnjfiftry of the prrirefllnfc periofi 

Till- MuyiiWui. nrid renK)"<iN nnetlon. Chat^Taubriand'n schemes 
Morlr-raMon mid n (t^ryallftt fiovemment. The Church 
I'rojffitfl of irit4'rv<r[it.]on ubrood 
l'oH(;y r,r VIIIMf .... 
Hiipprifwlon of roriHpIrncy 
I'ri'HH LrtW. New i'lci!tir»nH 



71 
72 
73 
74 

75 
76 
77 



Contents ix 



luSra 



PAOB 

The priest-party and education. Successes ^^^H&e 78 

Chateaubriand and the warlike policy . ^HPT 79 

Intervention in Spain. Chateaubriand disnuSra 80 

Peers created. The Chamber of Deputies dissolved. Septennial Act . . 81 

Royalist majority. PrppoBcd conversion of the French Debt '„ . . 82 

Compensation for the Emigria ' , .83 

The Religious Orders. Opposition of the Peers 84 

Accession of Charles X. Fresh projects 85 

Law for compensation to Emigres 86 

Laws relating to Religious Orders and Sacrilege 87 

Consecration of Charles X, New Succession Law proposed ... 88 

Return of the Jesuita. New Press Law proposed 89 

Apparent success of ViU^le. Repressive policy 90 

Coalition of Royalists with Liberals. Dissolutioa .' . . .91 

Ministry of Martignac . . . '. 92 

His policy 93 

The Royalists condemn Martignac's moderation . . . . . .94 

The Liberals equally dissatisfied. Local self-govenunait .... 95 

The Coalition defeats Martignac . . " 96 

The Polignac Ministry. Liberal revolt . 97 

The Algerian enterprise 98 

Address of the Liberal deputies. New electioD 99 

The three Ordinances. Insurrection of July 100- 

Poets and playwrights 101 

Historical novels and histories 102 

Vitality in literature and art ' . . 103 



CHAPTER IV 

ITALY 

By Carlo SEGitfc, Professor in the University of Rome 

Effects of the Revolution in Italy 104 

Austrian [>olicy in Italy 105 

Austrian rule in Lombardy and Venetia 106 

Government of Parma, Modena, and Tuscany 107 

Piedmont. Return of Victor Emanuel 108 

The Papal States. Naples 109 

Ferdinand IV and Naples . 110 

The Secret Societies. The Carboneria Ill 

Revolt at Naples. A Constitution granted 112 

Ferdinand at Laibach. War breaks out 113 

Neapolitan Revolution crushed. Rising in Piedmont 114 

Carlo Alberto 115 

Abdication of Victor Emanuel 116 

Failure of the rebellion in Piedmont. Conspiracies in Lombardy and else- 
where 117 

Condemnation of Confalonicri 118 

Rppressive measures in Italy. The Revolution of July .... 119 

Risings in Central Italy 120 

Need of combination. Mazzini 121 

"Young Italy" and its methods 122 

Rising in Calabria. Carlo Alberto 123 

Literature in Italy 124 



^^^ PAGE 

The Literature of revolt. Havin^^Hcrehet 126 

Leopardi. Silvio PeWioo'a Mie Pr^ivrii 127 

TuflCATiy. The Antologia. Hoeuuni 128 

Sck-Jitiflc oongrc«ai». Mtulc 129 

UuKicimiH aad tibrettute 130 



CHAPTER V 
THE PAPACY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 



By Lady BtBHiiEBHASBiirrT 

Early life of Consalvf 131 

Electiim of Piue VII. Hia rflaUoae with Cuoaalvi 132 

Consdvi's first Administration (1800-6). His exile 133 

Kn^toratinn of the Papal gnvemmcnt 134 

Consalvi and Mettemicli. His opposition to Pacca 13S 

OuDBOlvi's scbi?me of udmmiHtration 130 

Finance. ConimtTce. Industry 137 

Law. Justice. Brigandage 138 

Opprisiticiii to Conftah-i. 'ITie Concordats 139 

PnipoHals for repral f>f the b'renrh {.V>n{rordBt 140 

(•rcat Britain. Ireland. Russia 141 

Spain. Sarijiiiiji miii Pit'dmnut, TuBcany 142 

Napltti. Fruncru 143 

Settlement, with l-Vance. Austria and the Pope ...... 144 

llmierstanding with Consalvi. Atlempt to establish a Oennan national 

Church 14fi 

Bavarian Ccjncurdat. Gxtfnaive roncccelona to the hierarchy . . . 146 

Uifheiiltics with Buvariu. Prussia 147 

Hanover. The States of the Upper Rhine 148 

The Netherhuidfl. Swiijeerland 14S 

Consalvi and Xbt: rpvniutinnary movetnenta 150 

Deulha of Pjufi VII and Cuiifialvi . 151 

Reuetion uuder Leu XII. Kc]ire«Hivc policy 152 

Ecclesiastical reform. Foreign policy ISS 

PiusVIlI. Gregory XVI 154 

Rising in the Papal Rtateti. Demands of the Powers ..... 155 

Aufitrian and I'rftich intprvi*ntinn (1S32-S) ISA 

The Protect of Rimini. Origin of the Ultramoutanc movemeDt , . . 157 

Ftbroniu^:. The Punctutions of Ems 158 

Reaction again.st GaJlicanism and Febronianiam 159 

Ocrtnun Rj:)maDtieisin. Haller. Bonald . 160 

JoKRpb de Maistre's Du Pape 161 

LaLUfuuaie. Hiy breach with tho hierarchy aod thu Crown . . • 162 

The writcre of LMwrnir 163 

The Papacy condi'iitntt Lainennais ........ 164 

The Liberal CathoUci and UltramoQtaQism 165 

The Italian Romantics, (iioberti 168 

Ce^iare Balbo. Mtuwiiuo d'Azvglio 167 

Roemini. Election of Piu« IX 168 




PA 01 

The Treaty of Bucharest, 1812 ,169 

Tlip Eastern Qutstiau. Tho ChriiiliBn Bubjecta of tlw Porte . . .170 

IX*ctmc lit thf Olt4imuii Power 171 

Rise of Pajihas 1o indrpendenro 172 

Movt^Tnfnta townrdH racial indopenflrnce 173 

Thn Hpllimtc mnvpinput: its liUrary side 174 

Turkey, Rtu^tia, anJ thi- Ojnjtm'fi uf Vitnna 17€ 

Heiairia Pi^ijike. Ali uf Jatiiim. TIr' luiiUui I^and^ . . . . < 176 

Great BrituJii on^l AU. Qiientioa of Parga. Ali di'poMxI .... 177 

Death of Ali. Inva.«k)n of Vpsiliuili 178 

Defeat of ypftilanti 170 

Rining iu the Mnrea. Pvrinds of the war . 180 

CauHee of the Gn-ek succettB. Their supcriurfty at ma . . . .181 

Sympatiiy of Europe. Byroo 182 

ExMrutton of Uref;orins. Attitude of Russia 183 

AlHiudf* of (ithiT Howeiu Conning 18< 

HuHdnn n^'ievannv. MaoMcre of Rcio. Dramali in the Horoa . . ISA 

^Great Britain n-i-ogniBes Uio GreekK am belligLTunta ..... 186 

Fraiieis luid .'ih-xaaiJer at C»?rnovit2 187 

Pru[Mi^» for a Cunftrrencw 188 

Conffrence of St Petersburg. Great Britain RtaodH aloof .... 189 

Ibrahim in the Mi)rea. CanDinR appmnohes KuBsia ISO 

The Proloool of fit PetersburK ISI 

Revolt of the Jaiiiissarii-s. Treaty of Akkerinaii 102 

I&actton uf tbt: Puwera 193 

anfennoe of Lonrlon. Thi:- Portf; rejects mediation 1!>4 

of London. Dentli of C'Anniog I9JS 

— Battle of Nttvarhid 196 

Effi-ela of the news of Navarinn 197 

The Porti- repiidiutt^-s the Trealy of Akkeruian ...... 198 

Wellington's p<^H<-y. Ru.-(MU prx'pitres for war 199 

r-RuasIan armies invade the iinikan Penin.-tula. Caporti-^triaft President of the 

Greek revolutionary State. Confereriec in IiOQd'm .... 200 

I'IFtvnch intcrvt-nliun, fbrahitu withdrun'e. ML'tlumidi iuturposoa .* . 301 

IProKTcaH towardu settlement. Tre^ity of .Adrianuplc ..... 203 

iQuttUon of the boundaries of Greece ........ 203 

iBouttdoriM fixed. Prince Otto of Bavaria King of Greece .... 204 



xu 



Contents 



^^^^ PAQIS 

Peraonul ch&ncter of Fcrdinan|^^^ 207 

Alwolutist reaction in ^>au). "i^BthariUa 208 

Oaray's financijU reforms 209 

Liberal conspirarios and iiifrurrcction.1 210 

Spaiu and the Foreign Powers 211 

British «nd Ktisi<ian influence at Madrid 212 

GalitziD. Mora. Americau revolutionary agcota 213 

Progress of the revolutionary movement 214 

The PrccmaBons in Spain 215 

Rc^■oIt of the troops. Inaction of the Govcmmcait 216 

Th^- ppvolution nccomptUhcd 217 

The Patriotic Sndeties, The National Militia ...... 218 

TheCortfs: anti-clerical policy 219 

Diviitiun anionj; the Liberala. Riego 220 

Comanrrox and Anillrroe 221 

"The King's pig-tail." Tht- Powers 222 

The Cortes of 1821. Murder of Vinuc** 223 

Riego. tJrowing disorder 224 

The Congress of Verona 225 

Great Britain. The other Great Powers 226 

Frcnoh intervention. The King and the Cortes 227 

OonstlluTioniU government, eiidwl . 22S 

The inteUecUial movement. AbaoJutist reaction 229 

Persecutifin of the IJhrrals 230 

Corliflt party. Fourth innrriage of Ferdinand 231 

Don OirUw luid Maria CrisUnu. Succuseiiun Law 232 

IXtith of Ferdinand. Accession of l»at>c] 233 

Hegeni*y nf CrisUrm. tiufulniple Alliance 234 

Mnrtinpz dc IjO. Knsa. 0.rlUt War 2SS 

Aati-moniuitLe movement. Mc-udizabal in power ..... 238 

Mendii::ibiirs ixiiiey and fall 237 

Owlixt W;ir. Progresaive Govemtnent. Conetitutioa of 1837 . . . 238 

Moderati:- (iovrrnment. I>eeline of (^rJiRm 230 

Knd nf tlip Carli.-^t War 240 

KevoluLion of 18-10. Abdii-ution of Cristiuu 341 

Rule of Esparteru. Brigadier Prim ■ . 242 

Rule of NarvaeK and the Moderabee 243 



CHAPTER VIII 



THK SPANHSH DOMINIONS IN AMERICA 

By F. A. KiRKPATRicK, M.A., formerly Scholar of Trinity College 

CoDBoUdation of S[)siii3h nile up to 1000 244 

Organisation niui iulmini.4lratiQn of thu Spaiusli ludiesa .... 245 

Munieipal inslitntinn-s 246 

Corporations. Royal authority 247 

LeginJaliun. The two Vd'eroyaUics of New Spain and Peru . . . 2 18 

Governments and prnvinrrs ......... 2411 

lAvyts and adniinifitratiou. PutnHf 250 

EuropL-uiiH mid CVeuk-s. Laxity uud corruption . ..... 251 

Conflict of authoritiitf. 'I'lie Churrli 252 

The KeJigious Ordem. The Inquisition ....... 253 

Ounmerce. The fleets 254 



Contents 



Xlll 



PAOB 

The great fairs. . The Manila galleon. Trade witi China .... 255 

Hie Caaa de Contrataeidn. Array and militia T 25S 

InuaigraUon. Contrabaad . . 357 

Taxation. Coinafie. MiniuR r^frulations and revenue .... 258 

Foreignera in the minea. Net revenue . 269 

Havcry and the slttvc-trjidc ... 260 

The Indian population. .Mortality. Eptdeffiies 261 

Govenuiient of the InrJiana 262 

Forced Uibour. Hutuanc laws ....«>... 263 

Rejiiilation of labour. The mita of Potoaf 264 

Decrease of Indian populatJcm. Abtues 265 

Orievancea s.ail in.'mrTPrtlnn» . 266 

Tupac .\inBnt. Reform uf Kovernruent 267 

Eneomiendas. InrreuHo of meittizoa. Indiana to New Spain . . . 268 

The frontiers. The roJs^ons 260 

Jesuit govemnipnt in Guairn. . 270 

The expuisiun of the JejiuiUt 271 

Effect of foreign ware. Biiecanwre 272 

Bn|;JUh contraband. War of 1730. Dourbon rcforniB .... 273 

Reforms of the eightwiith eentur>' 374 

Increase of trade. Dincuntent of the Creoles 276 

Effects of the .American and French Rovoluliona 270 

Extent and eharaoteristica of Spanish rule 277 

Qrievaaces of the whites. Foreign testitnony 278 

The medieval spirit 27B 



CHAPTER IX 
THE ESTABLISHMENT OP INDEPENDENCE IN SPANISH AMERICA 



By F. A. KiKKPATBlCK, M.A. 

Miranda in Europe. Projects of Pitt . • 380 

British uperntions in South .\merk'a (1806-7) 281 

Vlciw!tudc« in the hiatory of Spain {1808-23) 282 

Spani.'ih Amorica, Ferdinand VII, nud Joseph 283 

Revohitionary movements in South AmcriCft 284 

The rpvolulion in RuenoH Airea 285 

The example of Buenos Airctf followed 286 

TTie Arjrntine Provinres. C^ile 287 

Peru. The northern rountriea. Cararas 288 

Royftliet successes. BoHvar. Boves 289 

%>anteh expedition under Morillu 2S0 

The riouble advanee of Son Murttn and Boltvar 291 

Vicforie^i of San Harttn and tVtchranc 203 

San Martin in Peru. Ri.w of Knllvar . 393 

Bhtt>;ti mereeuariea. Republic of CoMmbia 294 

Bolivar taken up the ta^k uf Shu Mtirtlo in Peru. Battle of .4yacucho 29fi 

Pfni, Bolivia, and Colombia. Deulli of B<il(var 296 

Eiitimate of BoKvar and hie work 207 

Unitarifiin and Federalism 208 

Indian n-ei^tauce to the Ri>\'olutinn 200 

The nfpon of the River Plate. Artij^ SOU 

The Argentine Provinces and Chile 301 



xiv Contents 

PAOB 

Political ideas in SpaiUBh AmeHca ,. . . 302 

Revolt in Mexico. Hidalgo and Morelos ....... 303 

Mexican Revolution. Iturbide 304 

Provinces of Central America. Attitude of the Spanish Regency and C!ortee 305 

The Spanish Absolutists and Constitutionalists 306 

British policy and action 307 

The European Powers. Congress of Verona 308 

Canning and the United States. The Monroe message. Recognition of 

South American independence 309 



CHAPTER X 

BRAZIL AND PORTUGAL 

By the Rev. George Edmundson, M.A., formerly Fellow and 
Tutor of Braseaose College, Oxford 

The Portuguese Court takes refuge at Rio de Janeiro (1807) . . 310 

Portuguese rule in Brazil. Government of Dom John .... 311 

Brazil made a kingdom. Revolution in Portugal (1820) .... 312 

Effect in Brazil. John VI returns to Lisbon 313 

Dom Pedro Regent in Brazil 314 

Pedro persuaded to stay in Brazil. The Andradas 315 

Brazil declared an independent Empire 316 

Absolutist movement in Portugal. Dom Miguel 317 

Dom Pedro carries out a coup d'itat in Brazil 318 

New Constitution in Brazil. Peace with Portugal 319 

Death of John VI. Pedro grants a Charter and abdicates .... 320 

British intervention. Dom Miguel and Dona Maria da Gloria . . 321 

Miguel assumes the title of King , 322 

Reign of Terror. Maria in Brazil 323 

Preparations and operations at Terceira 324 

Policy of France and England. Pedro II Emperor of Brazil . . . ?25 

Pedro I in Europe. Preparations for war 326 

Dom Pedro in the Azores 327 

His expedition lands in Portugal 328 

The Liberator army besieged in Oporto ?29 

Siege of Oporto 330 

The defence entrusted to Solignac and Saldanha 331 

Sartorius replaced by Napier 332 

Napier destroys the Miguelist fleet 333 

Terceira defeats the Miguelists before Lisbon 334 

Dom Pedro in possession of Lisbon 335 

His successes. Quadruple Alliance 336 

Miguel leaves Portugal. Death of Pedro 337 

Reign of Maria II. Parties in Portugal 338 

Revolutions of 1842 and 1846. British intervention. Tranquillity restored 339 



Contents 



XV 



CHAPTER XI 

THE GEKMANIC FEDERATION 

(181&-40) 

By A. F. PoLLABD, M.A., Professor of Constitutional 
History in University College, London 

PACK 

Fftillire of the NtttfoiUkl niov«mont ia Germany (181^-40) .... 340 

Conftuioa of parties in Germany. Territorial parUcuIarism . . 341 

Prussian and Austrian policy 342 

Minor States. The Germanic Confederation 343 

OozMtiluUon of tlio Federal St4tt« 344 

Weakness of the Diet 345 

First aeesion of the Diet. The Elector of He«Be 346 

The Grand Duke of Saxe-Weinjar. The Prms 347 

Scheme for a federal army. PruKuan particuIariKin 348 

LiheraUsm in Prussia Sift 

Cooecrratavc Opposition In Prxiaaia. The Estates in Oermaay . . . 350 
Question of representative government in PruaHi&. Need of a practical 

RtaUsman in Prussia 351 

Reaction a^nst Lib<.Talism in Prussia S-'iZ 

Administrative reform In Prussia. The Rhine provincea .... 353 

FinaDcial reforms. Internal free trade 354 

Education. Austrian pDlicy ......... 8iS 

Conaervatism necessary to Auatria. Meltcmieb'a domestic policy . 356 

Finance. Education- The Press 3S7 

Frtreiim policy of Mettcmich 368 

Montgplna. The Buvurian Constitution 359 

Fr^erick of WQrttt*mberg. Wanffunheim 360 

Hcaction in WUrttemberg under William. KtuattoQ of Baden . . 361 

Cbiuititution of Baden. Na.<ttU)U 302 

Other German States. Agitation in the Universitlea. The Burtehttuehaft 

movement 363 

Thr Wartburj^ festival. Reaction. Alexander of Russia . ^ . . 364 

The murder of Kotzcbuc 365 

C-nnffrenrc nt Tcplitz 366 

The Carljihad Decrees. Conference at Vienna 367 

^H^c Vienna ri-^olut ions 368 

^^^artt<'ml>L-rg and the minor Slates 369 

^^Bucceas of Mott^rnlch . 370 

SiKns of Liberal revival. The Magyar Diet. Ludwrig I of Ba>-aria . 371 

BefilnninKs of the ZoUverein 372 

Rival Customii' Union faits ,' , 373, 

PTlic Rc%-itluiinn8 of 1830. Brunswick. Saxony. Hanover. PruMfa . 374 

h>>vMluli"iiary miivcmcnl on the Rhine ....... 375 
Tlte Hclgisn <)UR)tioo. Understanding of the Eastern Powers. Treaty of 

Beriin (1833) 376 

ction in the Diet (1832). Frankfort plot 377 

ive mpasurc*. Death of FfAncis H. The Zolherein completed . 378 

inovrr separated from Great Britain. The CoiwHtution annulled 379 

|fx<-*d Marriages in Pru!U)ian territory- 380 

nt of Pruasian Archbishops 381 

Itempt at Protestaut union. Death of Frederick WiUiaoi fit . 382 



xvi Contents 

CHAPTER XII 

LITERATUBG IN GEKUANY 

By J. G. R0BBET8OK, M.A., B.Sc^ Ph.D., Professor of German 
Language and Literature in the University of London 

Development of German literature. Foreign influences .... 383 

Gottsched and the Swiss critics 384 

Lessing, Klopstock, and Wietand 385 

Herder and German nationalism . . . . . . . . 386 

Sturm und Drang. The Gottingen Dichterbund. WerOter . . . .387 

Heinse. Barrenness of the movement 388 

Goethe's early years in Weimar 389 

Goethe in Italy. SchiUer 390 

Schiller and Goethe 391 

The mutual influence of Goethe and Schiller 392 

German classicism. Hermann und Dorothea 393 

Schiller's masterpieces. Writings of the German claasical age . . . 394 

Classicism and Romanticism 305 

Meaning of the word "Romantic" 306 

Aims of Romanticism 397 

The Romantic School. Tieck. Wackenroder 398 

Novalis. The brothers Schlegel 399 

Romantic criticism 400 

The Heidelberg Romanticists 401 

Comparison of the two phases of Romanticism 402 

Heinrich von Kleist. The patriotic lyric 403 

Developments from the Romantic movement. Eichendorff , . . 404 

Decay of Romanticism. The Swabian poets 405 

Uhland. Literature in Austria 406 

Griilparzer. The Romanticists and Goethe 407 

Goethe's attitude towards Romanticism 408 

Goethe's later years and later works 409 

Hegel. Schopenhauer 410 

The Revolution of July and Young Germany 411 

Heine. Journalism 412 



CHAPTER XIII 

RUSSIA 

By S. AsKBNAZY, Ph.D., Professor in the University of Lemberg 

Territorial acquisitions of Alexander I 413 

Russian revenue and currency 414 

The Russian army and system of recruiting 415 

The military colonies 416 

The navy. The Council of State 417 

Codiflcation. Bentham and the Tsar. The Senate 418 

The Committee of Ministers 410 

The Ministries. Provincial government 420 

Corruption. Vodka revenues 421 



Cmiienis 



xvu 



that 

FHbodb. HcIiKion 422 

The clergy, "wliiu-," and "black." The Sjnod. Seraphim. PlioUua . 423 

Rf!ff>rni.s in the Onhodux Church. The Concordat 424 

RiATtioo. Forced convereion 425 

Tbo pi-a&ants. Sfrfdoni 426 

Arakchfieff. Prubletu of einancipaliun 427 

Alexander's projects of refonii. Tliu bur;;h(-'r oIbhi 428 

The Dobility of Ruaiiia. Attiludi; of the iiubk-s tu tlio Government . . 420 

And to the community. Education 430 

The UnivcrsiUes. Literature 4X1 

Secret feocietie*. .Mexaudt-r'e carlii-r attitude to them .... 482 

The grand duchy of Kinluud. S>'Ktcm of govprannuit .... 4S3 

Profiperily of Finland. It» Constiltition 434 

Reaction agaiu!>t Fumi.-<h autonomy 435 

Finnish army. The Imperial Uouhc 430 

Renunciation of Com^tantini?. Liberal projccte of Alexander . . . 437 

Project of a Rusfiian Couatitutiun. Reaction 438 

IVath of Alexjirider 439 

Nicholas and Conslanline 440 

The abortive riuog of Decembt-r 441 

RMng in the South. Treatment of the conspirators 442 

Sentence and ponaltieit. Nicholas and njform 443 

Fordgo policy of Nicholag 444 



CHAPTER XIV 
POLAND AND THE I»OLISH REVOLUTION 



Diet 



Relations between 



By S. AsKENAZY, Ph.D. 

Trefttment of Poland at the Congress of Vienna . 
The new kingdom of Poland .... 

The Constitution of Poland. Its Liberal character 
Tlie Grand Duke Constantine. Novosiltsoff 
Rdigion. Education. AdnunistratJon 

Ffauuce. The fifBt Diet 

Reaction and (uiminlatrative reprcseloD. The second 
The Polinh (Imrrh. Secrot societiea . 
The "True Poles." The Patriotic Society 
Omdeinnation nf Liikasin^ki and hi^ companions. 

Russian and Polisb socictira 
Ldbecki's finauciul admin bt ration. The third Diet. The Land Bank 
Death of .Vlcxflnder. Nicholas .... 
Attack on the Patriotic Hociety. Trial and sentences 
NieholBB conciliuic!! the Poles. Fourth Diet 
Utfanaofan ad miiii.«l ration . 
The Republic of Cracow 
Galicia. The Galiclnn Diet 
AuMrian policy in Calicia 
PmMrian policy in Pf>.ten 

Preparatiuus fur the Polish Revolution. Vynocki 
Effect of the FW>nch and Belgian Kc^'olutiona 
Kiaing in Wnraaw and throuj;hout Poland 
Conata n ttne retires. Chlopicki Dict^itor 



xviii Contents 



PAOR 

Military position of Riusia 468 

Preparations of Nicholas. Diebitsch enters Poland 469 

Battle of Grochov. Military operations 470 

The peasants. Polish inaction 471 

Battle of Ostrolenka 472 

End of the war. Attitude of the Powers towards Poland .... 473 

The autonomy of Poland at an end 474 

CHAPTER XV 

THE ORLEANS MONARCHY 

By l^MILE BOUBGBOIS 

The Revolution of July ... 475 

Progress of the revolt. Action of the Deputies 476 

The Duke of Orleans and the Deputies ... ... 477 

Revision of the Constitution 478 

Louis-Philippe's character and position 479 

Revolt of the Belgians. Policy of Louis-Philippe 480 

The foreign Powers. The compact of Carlsbad 481 

French understanding with England. Talleyrand 482 

Belgium. Poland. Italy 483 

French policy of neutrality 484 

Ministry of Casimir P^rier. Defects of the Republican party . . . 485 

Policy of repression. The legitimists 486 

Liberal legislation. The army reorganised 487 

Policy of peace. Risings repressed 488 

Louis-Philippe and Guizot 489 

Ministry of Soult. Antwerp expedition. Education law .... 490 

Republican movements. Rising at Lyons 491 

Measures against the Republicans . 492 

Economic progress. The Third Party 493 

Impulse to action abroad. Understanding with Mettemich . , . 494 

The King, Broglie, and Thiers 495 

Thiers and Louis-Philippe 496 

Guizot returns to power. Guizot and Mol6 497 

Mold's Ministry 498 

Schemes of social reform. Lamennais 499 

Transformation of the Legitimist party 500 

Amnesty to Republicans and Catholics 501 

^Prosperity of France 502 

Conquest and colonisation of Algiers ........ 503 

Colonial policy before and under Mol4 . 504 

Completion of the conquest of Algeria. Belgium ..... 505 

The Belgian settlement. Italy. Greece 506 

Character of Mold's Ministry 507 

Coalition against Mol£ 508 

The national honour. Dissolution of the Chamber 509 

Fall of Mol6. Difficulties of Louis-Philippe 510 

Interregnum. Rising in Paris. Marshal Soult's Ministry . , . .511 

Mehemet Ali. France, England, and Russia 512 

The Ministry of Thiers. Convention of the Straits . . , , . 513 

Historians and critics . 514 

Poets, dramatists, and novelists 515 

Disillusionment 516 



Contents xix 

CHAPTER XVI 

THE LOW COUNTRIES 
By the Rev. George Edhundson, M.A. 

PAGB 

Independeqce of the Netherlands 517 

William of Nassau. The Fundamental Law 518 

The United Netherlands. The Eight Articles 519 

The attitude of the Powers 520 

The Hundred Days. Difficulties attending the UnioD 521 

Race. Religion. Material interests 522 

Fundamental Law for the United Netherlands 523 

Limits and prosperity of the new kingdom 524 

Representation and administration. Dutch preponderance .... 525 

Attitude of the Catholic clergy , 526 

Abortive Concordat. The language question ...... 527 

The debt. New taxes 528 

Belgian opposition. The Press 529 

Alliance of Belgian Catholics and Liberals. Grievances .... 530 

Progress of agitation ........... 531 

Campaign through the Press. Libri-Bagnano 532 

The French Revolution of July ......... 533 

Riot in Brussels. Inaction of the Government 534 

The Prince of Orange in Brussels 535 

The Revolution supreme in Brussels 536 

The Revolution spreads throughout Belgium 537 

The National Congress of Belgium. The Great Powers .... 538 

The London Protocols of January, 1831 539 

The Eighteen Articles. King Leopold 540 

Dutch invasion under the Prince of Orange 541 

Intervention of the French. The 24 Articles 542 

William refuses to recognise Belgian independence 543 

Final settlement of outstanding questions 544 



CHAPTER XVII 

MEHEMET ALI 
By W. Alison Philups, M.A. 

The Eastern Question 545 

Change in Russian policy. Reserve of Nicholas 546 

Rise of Mehemet Ali 547 

Mehemet All's nile in Egypt 548 

Ibrahim's invasion of Syria .......... 549 

Successes of Ibrahim 550 

Mahmud appeals to Great Britain. Ibrahim at Konieh .... 551 

Russian chips in the Bosphonis ......... 552 

Convention of Kiutayeh .......... 553 

The Porte, Russia, and the western Powers 554 

The Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi 555 

Rivalry of Great Britain and Russia in Central Asia 556 

The Convention of Mfinchengrfttz 557 



XX Contents 



PAGE 

Better relations between Great Britain and Ruasia ..... 558 

Revolt in Syria repressed 559 

Mahmud eager to renew the war. Revolt in Albania .... 560 

Commercial treaty with Great Britain. Outbreak of war .... 561 

Battle of Nezib. Death of Mahmud 562 

Joint action of the Powers 563 

Rufiaia approaches Great Britain 564 

France and Mehemet Ali 665 

Negotiations between Great Britain and France .....'. 566 

Policy of Thiers 567 

Isolation and indignation of France 568 

The Convention of London. Napier at Beirout 569 

Resignation of Thiers. Louis-Philippe's policy 570 

Collapse of Mehemet Ali 571 

The Convention of the Straits 572 



CHAPTER XVIII 

GREAT BRITAIN 

(1815-32) 

By H. W. V. Temperlet, M.A., of Fellow Peterhouse 

Stages in the first period after the Great War 573 

The Ministry of Lord Liverpool. The Opposition 574 

The first peace budget. Industrial depression 575 

The Luddite and other riots. The Radical sections 576 

Cobbctt, Hunt, and Thistlewood. Spa Fields riot 577 

Repressive legislation. The Blanketeers 578 

Alleged general conspiracy 579 

The Radical movement. The Press prosecutions 580 

The " Manchester Massacre." The Six Acts 581 

Thistlewood's plot. Riot at Glasgow. Death of George III . . . 582 

George IV's Divorce Bill. Death of Castlereagh S83 

Canning succeeds Castlereagh. His policy 584 

Legal and social reforms. Combination Laws 585 

Navigation Acts. Restrictions on Colonial trade removed .... 586 

Colonial policy. Currency. The gold standard 587 

Huskisson's policy. The Sinking Fund. Customs Duties .... 588 

The crisis of 1825 689 

The Com Law of 1815. Changes to 1826 590 

Canning Prime Minister. Resignations ....... 591 

New Corn Law defeated. Death of Canning. His attitude towards Parlia- 
mentary Reform . 592 

Ministry of Wellington. Test Acts and Catholic Relief . . . .693 

Death of George IV. Ministry of Earl Grey. Bentham's influence . 594 

Origin of Bentham's political views. Helv6tius. Priestley. . . . 595 

The greatest happiness of the greatest number 696 

Bentham's defects, fallacies, and inconsistencies. James Mill . . . 597 

Bentham and Parliamentary Reform. His disciples 598 

Francis Place. Early Reform motion.s 599 

Attitude of the Whig and the Tory parties. Coleridge. Canning . . 600 

Minor proposals for Reform. Macaulay 601 

The Whigs and Reform 602 



I>AOB 

The Whjfs in povcr. Committee for Befonn 003 

Bottea and noaunation boroughs 604 

Bribery and un<lue influence. Dcmocrattc boroughs (305 

The counties. Scotlacd 006 

Ireland. The Irish fntnohise restricted (1829) 607 

Work of the ItAfonn Committee G08 

Lord Durham's share in the work. Lord John liuascll .... 009 

The Hcrorm Bill fiitroduccd 610 

DwBOlutiou of Parliatnont. Popular foeUng BlI 

The GovemmeQt plan f^ujiia ground 6L2 

The Irfird.-* rpject the Second Keform BUI. TWrd Reform BUI . . . 613 

Thr Cjiliinet and the Peers 614 

Vr'elliDKiuii fails to form a &Lini5try. Lord Grey recftllod ... . . 616 

The Kt-fonn Bill |m»M_-d 616 

Results of the Ucfomi Bill 617 

The aetUement rpRurded an permanent 618 

Estimate of prugnss in thi> period 619 



CHAPTER XIX 

CATHOLIC EMANCIPATION 

By H. W. C. Davis, M.A., Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, OxfoM 

The provisions of the Pciial Laws 630 

Practical efTcctjt of CathoUc dtitubEIities 621 

Education. Public functions. The profeouons 622 

The Penal Lawn in England and Ireland compared 623 

Phaacs of the Relief tiinvcrmjit 624 

TiiL- firet EnRUab movwncnt. The Acta of 1778 and 1791 .... 625 

The t'ijailpitjf Club. The Irish movement . 626 

The Dublin A.<eoriattrin . Lord Krnmaro 027 

John Kcogh. The Bork-Iane Parliament. Wolfe Tone .... 628 

Ktxif^ and the United Irishmen. Dennis Scully 020 

Daoirl O-Conuell 6»0 

Repnd and Emnneiptttion. Petitioutt to Parliament 031 

RaoilCaiusatinn in Ireland 632 

Qaestioo of the Iriidi Vet47. Vetnists and No-Security men . . . 033 

Orattan's Bill. The Buihopfi and the Veto «»4 

Papal derision. O'Ctmnell's B(»ard pnirliurat'd ttSfl 

PtUBket'^ BiU. O'Comiell'K attitude. PlhI iii Irchmd .... 036 

OrarRi- IV' in Ireland. Comniittc-es of enquiry 037 

Erunomic distrepp. I{<'ligious feuds. Secret 8odetlee 038 

The famine of 1H22 and Utt reflultfl 039 

A new AaBodtttion. The CatJiolic Rent 040 

Pro^-durc of the .Aitsooiatiun 641 

Goulburu'a Act. The .\i<i<ueiatioo diKMiived 042 

71- I ■■'.1* reject Burdett's Bill. A new .\s8oeiation formed . . . 643 

id ehrdiim. Thfi Waterford eieotion 644 

ri'q MiiUBtry. Attitude of Peel 045 

derlioo 040 

' .1.;. a eli-cti-d. l.awle.HS in Monaghan 047 

l)vm<'i;.-lraliiius in Ti[)perar>' 048 

f^arntiuni! for Catholic candidatures 649 

Reeall of Angleeey. Attitude of the King 650 



Ml 



xxii Contents 

PAGB 

The Ministry accept Emancipation. Provisions of the Bill . . .651 

The King's resistance overcome 652 

Peel's surrender. The BUI carried 653 

The remaining disabilities 654 



CHAPTER XX 

GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND 

(1832-41) 

By G. P. GoocH, M.A., M.P., Trinity College 

The elections of 1832. Conservative party 655 

The first Reformed Parliament. Radical and Irish groups .... 656 

Irish policy of Ministers. The Irish Church 657 

Movement for abolition of slavery 658 

Emancipation of the slaves. Child labour ....... 659 

The first Factory Act. Finance 660 

The Report on the Poor Law 661 

Reform of the Poor Law. Irish tithe. Resignations 662 

The Ministry reconstructed. Resignation of Lord Grey .... 663 

Lord Melbourne's Ministry. His character 664 

Difficulties of the Government. Lord Brougham's tour .... 665 

Melbourne's Ministry dismissed 666 

Peel forms a Tory Ministry. His programme 667 

Melbourne returns to office . 668 

Lord John Russell. CConneU and the Whigs. The King's attitude . . 669 

Municipal reform in Scotland and England 670 

Conflict with the Lords. Orange Lodges ....... 671 

The Duke of Cumberland. Irish municipalities. Tithe Commutation in 

England 672 

Marriage Act. Stamp Acts. Ecclesiastical Commission .... 673 

Death of William IV. Accession of Queen Victoria 674 

Melbourne and the Queen. Collapse of the Radical party .... 675 

Their programme. Irish Poor Law and tithe 676 

Irish administration. Thomas Dnimmond. Jamaica 677 

Peel and the Bedchamber question. Melbourne returns .... 678 

Education. Penny post 679 

Stockdale v. Hansard. Irish Municipal Bill. Election committees. De- 
feat of the Whigs 680 

Peel's Ministry. Marriage of the Queen. Chartism 681 

Owcnism and the Trade Unions. Agitation against the new Poor Law . 682 

The Six Points of the Charter. The National Convention .... 683 

Reasons for the failure of Chartism 684 



CHAPTER XXI 

CANADA 

By E. A. Benians, M.A., Fellow of St. John's College 

The Peace of Paris, 1763. The problems arising from it ... . 685 

The Quebec Act (1774) and its effects 686 

Results of the American Revolution 687 



Contents xxiii 

FAazi 
The United Empire Loyalists. Acts of 17S4 and 1791 . . . .688 

English and French in the Colony. Lack of unity 689 

Immigration. Distribution of land 690 

Population. Defects of the government of Canada 691 

Situation in Upper and Lower Canada. Risings 692 

Mission of Lord Durham. The Act for the Government of Canada . 693 

Geographical conditions. Communications 694 

Education. Political problems 695 



CHAPTER XXII 

THE REVOLXrriON IN ENGLISH POETRY AND FICTION 

By W. J. COUBTHOPE, C.B., D.Litt., LL.D., New College, Oxford, 
First Civil Service Commissioner 

Literature after the Revolution of 1688 696 

The classical age of English poetry 697 

Revival of me^eval and democratic ideas . 698 

Influence of the French Revolution. Previous state of literature in England 699 

Erasmus Darwin. Campbell. Crabbe 700 

Scottish poetry. Ramsay. Fergusson 701 

Robert Bums 702 

The Lake School 703 

Wordsworth. Coleridge 704 

Principles of Wordsworth and Coleridge 705 

Coleridge's criticism of Wordsworth 706 

The achievement of Wordsworth 707 

The imaginative poems of Coleridge 708 

Southey's poetry. Landor 709 

Romantic revival. German influences 710 

Byron 711 

Shelley 712 

Revolutionary character of Shelley's poetry 713 

The diction of Byron and Shelley 714 

Thomas Moore 715 

The poetry of Scott 716 

The novel and the romance 717 

The novel in the eighteenth century 718 

The Waverley Novels 719 

Keats. Leigh Hunt 720 

Keats' idealism. His lyrics 721 

Survey of the Romantic movement 722 

Multiplicity of artistic aims 723 

Effect upon Continental literature 724 

Continental influence of Byron 725 

Influence of Scott. The French Romantic novel 726 



xxiv Contents 

CHAPTER XXIII 

ECONOMIC CHANGE 

By J. H. Clafham, M.A., King's College, Professor of Ekioaomics 
in the Universitj of Leeds 

PAOB 

Cumulative effect of various economic changes 727 

Industrial development in the eighteenth century 728 

Means of communication. Customs barriers 729 

Common field agriculture 730 

Progress and conservatism in agriculture 731 

Small and large industriea 732 

Mechanical inventions 733 

Iron industry. Machine manufacture 734 

Cotton spinning and weaving. The woollen industry 735 

Growth of the factory system in England 736 

Survival of domestic industries 737 

Roads. Canals. Harijours. Steam transport 738 

Railways. Agriculture 739 

Enclosure Acts. Large farming 740 

Steady agricultural progress in England 741 

London and international finance 742 

Foreign wars. Joint-stock enterprise. Banking. 743 

English enterprise abroad 744 

Transport improvements on the Continent 745 

Railways and banking on the Continent 746 

Slow rate of progress 747 

Investment of capital and land tenure on the Continent .... 748 

Open fields and common land 749 

Improvements in continental agriculture. Stock-breeding .... 750 

Sugar-beet. Potato spirit. The guilds 751 

Government influence. Tariffs 752 

Mechanical industry on the Continent 753 

Wool, linen, and silk 754 

Continental scientific industry 755 

Coal-mining. The iron industry 756 

Engineering. Social movements 757 

Primitive conditions in Germany 758 

Oceanic trade. The English markets 759 

The wheat-trade. Eastern trade 760 

The West Indies. American trade 761 

Emigration 762 

CHAPTER XXIV 

THE BRITISH ECONOMISTS 

By J. S. Nicholson, D.Sc, Trinity College, Professor of Political 
Economy in the University of Edinburgh 

Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations 763 

His criticisms of governmental action 764 

The Mercantile System. Colonial and commercial policy .... 766 

Positive teaching of Adam Smith 766 



Contents xxv 

PAGE 

His historical method 767 

Land. Labour, Wages. Profits 768 

The economic functions of the State 769 

Precursors of Adam Smith 770 

Originality and influence of Adam Smith 771 

David Ricardo 772 

Influence of Ricardo on Peel 773 

Ricardo's contribution to economic theory. The Manchester School . 774 

Blalthus on Population 775 

Influence of the dogmatic economists 776 

Economic dogma and Free Trade 777 

Individualism. Socialism. Godwin . * \ • • * * "^"^^ 

Robert Owen \ 779 

Charies HaU. William Thompson . .1 780 

John Gray. Thomas Hodgskin . ... . y 781 

Historical economists. Eden .^ 782 

Arthur Young. Macpberson. Riclurd Jones. Tooke .... 783 

Porter. Senior 784 



/ - 



(.' 



-h 



LIST OF BIBLIOGRAPHIES 

OBAFB. PAOCS 

General Bibliography .... 7S5 — 6 

I. The Congresses, 1815-22 .... 787—90 

n. The Doctrinaires 791—3 

III. Reaction and Revolution in France . . 794 — 5 

IV. Jtaly 796—9 

V. The Papacy . . . , 800— « 

VI. Greece and the Balkan Peninsula (1812-31) 803—7 

VII. Spain, 1815-45 808—11 

VIII. The Spanish Dominions in America . . 812 — 7 
IX. The Emancipation of the Spanish Dominions 

in America 818 — 21 

X. Brazil and Portugal 822 — 5 

XI. The Germanic Confederation, 1815-40 . 826—32 

Xn. Literature in Germany .... 833 — 8 

XIII, XIV. Russia 839-^2 

Poland 842—3 

XV. The New Orleans Monarchy (1830-40) . 844—7 

XVI. The Low Countries 848—51 

XVII. Mehemet Ali 852—5 

XVIII. Great Britain (1815-32) .... 856—9 

XIX. Catholic Emancipation .... 860 — 6 

XX. Great Britain and Ireland, 1832-41 . . 867—70 

XXI. Canada 871—8 

XXII. The Revolution in English Poetryand Fiction 879—82 

XXIII. Economic Change 883—9 

XXIV. The British Economists .... 89(KH2 



Chronological Table of Leading Events 
Index 



893—8 
899 



xxvU 



CORRIGENDA 

pp. 3, middle, 15, 1. 6 from foot. For Novossilzoff nod NovoBiltaoff. 

p. 21, 1. 8. For Tatischeff read Taticheff. 

p. 114, 1. 10 from foot. For SUvano Costa di Beaur^ard read Sylvain Costa de 

Beaur^ard. 
p. 139, 1. 13. For Castiglione read Caatiglioni. 
p. 175, middle. For Ismailia read Ismail, 
p. 202, 1. 4 from foot. For Anapi read Anapa. 

p. 255, 1. 31. Read to the port of Acapulco on the west coaat of New Spain, laden, 
p. 309, 1. 14. For over read in. 
pp. 355, 357, 358, 378. For Francis II read Francis I. 



TO&X. 



CHAPTER I 
THE CONGRESSES, 1816-22 

N APOLEOlf, in his exile at St 1 TelenfL, ex|jlaUied t« the worW, through 
Ms secretary Kas Cases, the great ideal toward wliich all hia efforts had 
been directed. He had aimed, lie said, at coacontrating the great 
European peoples, divided hitherto by a multiplicity of artificial 
Ikoundaries, into homojjeneous nations, out of which be would liave 
formed a confederation bound together "-by unity of codes, principles, 
opinious, feelings, and interests." At the head of thia leag^ue, under the 
aegis of his Empire, he had dreamed of establishing a central assembly, 
modelled on the American Congress ur the Amphictyonic assembly of 
{Ji-eece, to watch over the commou weal of "the great European family." 
The dream had been dissipated by hi^ ruin; but he prophesietl that it 
would yet be realised, sooner or later, "by the force of circumstancscs." 
" The impulse has been given, and 1 do not think that, after ray fall and 
the disappearance of my system, thero will be any other great equilibrium 
possible in Europe than the concentration and confederation of the great 
l^oples. The first sovereign who, in the midst of the first great struggle, 
»liall embrace in good faith the cauHO of the peojiles, will find liimt>elf at 
the head of all Europe, and will be able to accomplish whatever he 
vishes." 

Whether, but for the chastening offeot of his downfall. Napoleon 
would es'er have proclaimed this ideal, or whether, had he done so, circum- 
stAUces, which he acknowledged to have been even his roaster, would have 
enabled him to realise it, is a speculation, more fascinating than profitable. 
The significant thing is that 8o keen an observer of the temper of the 
timeB sliould have given it to the world, on the morrow of the Congress 
of Vienna, as the apology for his career. 

The treaties which were the outcome of the Congress were, in fact, 
& bitter disappointment to those who had looked for an authoritative 
recognition of those new-horn forces of nationality to which, in the 
stieHS of the War of Liberation, the mouarcha had appealed. They were 
scarcely less of a disappointment to those who had hoped from this 
Qniquc constituent assembly of sovereign princes an iuternational eou- 
slitution which would liave obviated for ever the need of the barbarous 

o. H. n. X. 1 1 



-^ -^' 



appeal to aniis- " Men bad promised themselves," wrote Friedrich von 
GenLz, immediately after he had witnessed the signing of the Final Act, 
"an all-embracing reform of the political system of Europe, guarantees 
for peace ; in one word, tlie return of the Golden Age. The Congress 
has resulted in nothing but restorations, which had already been effected 
by arms ; agreements between the Great Powers, of little value for the 
future balance and jtreservatlon of the peace of Europe; quite arbitrary 
alterations in the pos.ses»»ion8 of the loss important States; but in no act 
of a higher nature, no great measure for public order or for the univci-sal 
good, which might compensate humanity for its long sufferings, or 
reassure it as to the future. . . . The Protocol of the Congress bears the 
stamp rather of a temporary agreement than of work destined to last 
for centuries. Hut, to bo just. The Treaty, such as it is, has tho 
undeniable merit of having prepared the world for a more complete 
political structure. If ever the Powers should meet again to establish a 
political system by which wars of conquest would be rendered impossible 
and the rights of all guaranteed, the Congress of Vienna, as a prepara- 
tory assembly, will not have been without use. A number of vexatious 
details have been settled, and the ground has been made ready for 
building up u better social structure." It is with the attempt to com- 
plete the work left unfinished at Vienna, and to build up this "bettor 
social structure," that the history of Europe from 1815 to 1822 is 
mainly concerned. 

The idea of a central constitution for Europe, though new life had 
been given to it by the common sufferings of the revolutionary epoch, 
was of course no new one. The Holy lloman Empire, so long as it 
carried on even a shsidowy existence, had reniaiiied as the venerable 
symbol of this idea ; and, at the close of the Congress of Vienna, Cardinal 
Consalvi, in the name of the Holy See, had entered a solemn protest 
against the failure of the Christian Powers to maintain the "centre of 
political unity." Hut the Empire had been too long closely a-ssociated 
with the interests of the German nation and the House of Halwburg to 
be treated, even by theorists, as the key-atone of an international con- 
federation; and in all the "-projects of perpetual peace'" which had been 
published to tho world during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, 
the Empire had been either ignored or assigned, at htst, but a sub- 
ordinate place. Of these schemes the Projct de Traiti pour rendre la 
paix perpStwlle, published in 1713 by the Abb^ de Saint-Pierre, deserves 
more particular notice as having formed the basis of all suljsequent platis 
of the same kind. It aimed at making the Treaty of Utrecht the basis 
of an international system resembling that estAblished afterwards among 
the Gennan States by the Act nf Confederation fmmed by the Congress 
of Vienna. A European League or "Christian Kejmblic " was to I)e 
established, of which the membens were to renounce the right of making 
war against one another and to submit their disputes to the arbitratiooi 




u 



of a central asaembly of the Allies, whose decuioD was to be enforced, 
if necoHsarVt by a common armament. Tins idea was taken up and 
elaborated, Erom time to time, by tliinkurs of the most divergent Bchools. 

Yet, bnt for the Kevolution, all their projects might have remained 
mere speculations of theorists. It wtia the common peril of the revolu- 
tionary propaganda, however underrated and misunderstood, that first 
revealed to statesmen a political Europe, i-ecognising common rights and 
common duties. The Concert of Europe was born in the circular letter 
of Tount Kaunitz, dated July 17, 1701, in which, in the name of the 
Emperor Leopold, he impressed upon the Imperial ambassadors the duty 
of all the Powers to make common cause for the purpose of preserving 
"public peace, the tranquillity of States, the inviolability of possessions, 
and the faith of treaties," and pointed out^ as Voltaire had done in his 
Steele de Louis XIV.thAt the nationsof Europe — united by ties of religion, 
institutjons, and culture — fonned but "-'asingle family." Thirteen years 
later, when the moral had l)een enforced by the bitter results of the 
continuance of the traditional dissensions, the Eraperar Alexander T 
of Russia took up the theme. In a dispatch dated September 11, 1804, 
and addressed to Novossilzoff, the Russian special envoy in England, he 
suggested for the consideration of Pitt a plan resembling in general outline 
tliatof the Abbe de Saint-l'ierre. In the event of the triumph of the 
Coalition over Napoleon, the outcome of the war was to be, not merely , / 
"the liberation of France," but the universal triumph of ^^the rigbtA 
of humanity.'' To this end it would be necessary, " after having attached 
the nations to their fiovernments by making those incapable of acting 
save in the greatest interests of their subjects, to fix the relations of the 
States among each other on more precise niles, such as it is to their 
interest to respect." A general treaty was to form the basis of the 
relations of the States forming "the European Confederation." " Why 
could one not submit to it," the Emperor asked, " the positive rights of 
nations, assure the privilege of ueutraliQ', insert the obligation of never 
beginning war until all the resources which the mediation of a third , 
party could offer have been exhausted, until the grievances have by this 
means been brought to light, and an effort to remove them has been 
made? On principles such as these one could proceed to a general 
pacification, and give birth to a league of which the stlpulatious would 
form, so to speak, a new code of the law of nations, while those who 
tbould try to infringe it would risk bringing upon themselves the forces 
of the new union." 

This proposal had, of course, been stillborn. Ten years were to 
pus before the liberation of France prepared the vr&y for new ex- 
{KrimenLs in the confederation of humanity; and meanwhile the Tsar 
himself, dazzled bj' the genius of Napoleon, had bartered away at Tiiait 
his ideals of a united Europe for the vision of a world in which there 
should be room only for the EmperorB of the East and the West. Ilia 



Chateaubriand. De Maisire. Bentham 



I 



breach with Napoleon, the horrors of the Moscow campaign, and tha ■ 
comradeship of the wars of Libemtlon had reawakened the old ideal. And, 
to all appearance, the times were sing'ulai'ly propitious for its realisation. 
The close of the revolutionary era had left Europe exhausted and dis- 
Ulusioiied. "Tho doctrine of extreme equality," which had issued in 
the despotism of one masterful wlU, might still — to quote Talleyrand — 
"have as apostles and partisans a few dreamers, building theories for 
an imagiuarj" world"; the surface of society, here and there, might 
be agitated by the nationalist storm called up during the War of 
Liberation ; but, En general, princes and peoples alike aspired only to 
some moderate system which should be a guarantee of [>eace and of 
orderly progress. The question which occupied the minds of theorists, 
as of men of affairs, was in what this system should consist. Howovor 
opinion might differ as to the social changes wrought by the Revolution, 
there waa little diffei-ence as to tlie principles on which they had been 
based. To Chateau briaml and de Maistre, the apostles of the new Ultra- 
montanisra, they were '* satanic," as false and as fatal as those which had 
inspired the original revolt against authority and laid upon the world 
the curse of God. To Jeremy Bentham, the prophet of the new 
Liberalism, tlie '* Declaration of the Rights of Man " was mei-cly a 
"hodgepodge of confusion and absurdity," and its outcome, in so far as 
this had been disastrous, but the result of false premisses and defective 
logic. 

These strangely contrasted appreciations may be taken as generally- 
typical of the two schools of political thought which came into pro- 
minence at this period and were destined to play go conspicuous a part 
in the controversies of the nineteenth century. One aim was common 
to both; for alike they sought in a quaking world for some £rm foothold 
of authority. Tho one found this in religion, and in the divine right 
of the established order ; the other in inductive science, and the duty of 
men to build up, on the secure basis of observed facts, a social system 
which should conduce to " the greatest happiness of the greatest number." 

For the moment it seemed as though the new " Utilitarianism" 
would vanquish the spirit of reaction in tho councils of the world. 
Bentham, who bad lectured mankind for half-a-century in vain, in his 
old age suddenly found himsolf a power. T^iberalising monarchs in 
£uroj>e and the young republics of the New World sought his advice. 
His works, in the French versions of Dunionl, circulated by thousands, 
and his principles left their impress on a dozen experimental con- ■ 
Btitutions. Yet the cold syllogisms of the recluse who proclaimed a 
gospel of enlightened selfishness did not appeal to a generation accus- 
tomed to be swayed by violent and conflicting emotions. The scientific 
spirit, which in a subsequent age was to work so great a miracle of _ 
transformation in the material and intellectual world, was as yet in its I 
faint beginnings. Stronger by far as yet was that romantio spirit which 




L- 



represented the revolt of the human iraaginiLtinn against the iooiioclasm 
of the Revolution^ and which sought its inspiration in the idetilised 
past. 

Romanticism was the outcome rather of emotion than of thought. 
It appealed, indeed, to history, but to history so ill understood as to be 
itself romance. It sought to materialise in art, in literature, in religion, 
its ideal vision of a world long dead. It inspired the Gothic revival ku 
architecture, the " Christian '* school in painting, the Komantic school in 
literature, and in religion the Cathulic revival. In politics its iiiflueneo, 
less clearly defined, since it was the outcome of confused and nebulous 
ideals, was from the first charged with fateful contradictions. ' It 
conjured ap the beautiful mirage of the Middle Ages, which trans- 
figured the selfish crj* for the retention or revival of feudal and ecclesi- 
astical privilege ; it breathed new life into the doctrine of the divine 
right of kings; but it also, in its reaction from the colourless cosmo* 
politanism of the Revolution, gave an imaginative stimulus to the 
new-born passion of natiormlity which was to prove, during the century, 
the revolutionary force most fat-al to the established order of the world. 
The nationalist agitation indeed, though alarming to the authorities, 
was practically condned as yet to Germany, and in Germany to a section 
of the literary and professional classes. The world at large was content 
to accept the principle \inderlying the Treaties of Vienna, to the fmmera 
of which sovereignty was still territorial, the nation no more than the 
aggregate of souls owing allegiance to a single government. The 
doctrine of " I^egitimacy," which the cynical statecraft of Talleyrand 
bad devised as the best lever to raise the Bourbons once more to the -, 
throne, identiGed the rights of sovereignty and of private property byiy 
basing both on prescription. This doctrine was consecrated by the 
principle, loudly pr<x;laimed by the apostles of the religious revival, of 
the eternal union between **the altar and the throne." 

The religious reaction, which is one of the most remarkable 
phenomena of the period immediately following the Revolution, and 
one of the most momentous In its results, was mainly the outcome of a 
nattiral revulsion. To the devout imagination it was natural to sec in 
the woes that had fallen upon Europe the divinely decreed consequences 
of the unbridled reign of reason. The fashionable philosophy of the 
eighteenth centun,* had brought dogmatic ('hiistianity into disrepute, 
and the old antagonisms, which had once suflieed to deluge Ii^urope in 
blood, had all but vanished. But the sceptical spirit which, io both 
Catholic and Protestant pulpits, had tended to sul)stitut6 ethical philo- 
•ophy for dogmatic religion, rested on too slight a foundation to resist 
the force of deeply stirred reHgions emotion. Scientific criticism and the 
study of comparative religions which, later in the century, were to prove 
more serious foes to Christian orthodoxy, were as yet unknown ; and it 
wu easy for Chateaubriand, in his Q£nU du ChrxMtianieme published in 



6 



TJte teaching of de Maistre 



1801 on the eve of tho Coneordat, to turn the laugh against the age 
when *' the documents of bumaii wisdom wero arraDged in alphabetical 
order in the Encyolopidie^ that Habel of the sciences and reason," and 
to show thai the worship of Jehovah wab at least as renpectable as that 
of Jove, and that the Virgin had occupied as great a pLace as Venus iii_ 
the history of art. J| 

More important than tho eloquent, but shallow, volumes of 
\^ Chateaubriand, was the ct-lebrated work of Count Jasepli de Maistre, 
J}u Pape, which is dated 1817, though not published until 1819. Ft wa^d 
written during a critical time in the history of the C'hurch. The Papacy, 
after weathering the storms of the Information, had seemed on the verge 
of succumbing to the solvent fovces of the new cnlightonmont. The 
frontier line between Catholicism and the world out*}ide, sharply defined 
at Trent, had become blurred and indistinct ; and the belief was widely 
expressed tJiat on the deatli of Pius VII the Holy See would share the 
fate of the Holy Empire. In Fnuice, though Napoleon's Concordat had 
made an end of the constitutional Chuivh, (xallicanism was still a militantH 
force. In Germany, iu spite of the abolition of the ecclesiastical States, 
the ideals of " Kebronius " were still in the ascendant, aiming at a great 
national German (church, which should absorb at least the Lutherans, 
and owe at best but a shadowy allegiance to Rome ; and the Prince 
Primate, Karl von Dalberg, had sent to the Congress of Vienna, to repre- 
sent the interesla uf the German Church, Bishop von Wesseuberg, wh< 
as Vicar-General of Constance, had, on his own authority, reformed thtt] 
services in his diocese in an avowed effort to meet the Protestants halfway^ 
The Catholic princes of the Confederation were willing to follow any 
system which would moat readily make the Church the instrument of 
their secular ambitions. The reply of Pope Pius VII to those move- 
ments was the issue on August 7, 1814, soon after his return to Rome, 
of the bull Sollicitmlo omnium ecdegiaruni, reconstituting the Order of 
Jesus. The I>u Pape oi do Maistre revealed the full significance of this 
act, an act which proclaimed the iiTeooncilable attitude to be taken up 
by the Papacy toward the Liberal movements of the century, which was 
defined in Pius IX'a Syllahug of 1864, and culminated in 1870 in the 
dogma of papal infanil>ility. With a sincere and forcible style, with 
much display of erudition, and with admirable logic, the author of The 
Pope proffered once more for the acceptance of the world the medieval 
iduals of Gregory VH and Innocent III. The Revolution, he argued, 
was but the logical outcome of the principles of the Reformation. The 
rejection by half Christendom of the God-appointed central authority 
had loosened the ties of all authority; and the true cure for the present 
ills was tlie recognition of the Pope as in all causes, bolli temporal and 
spirituttl, the sujireme and inspired head of all Christian nations. Iu 
place of a committee of the Powers, de Maistre would have established 
the Holy See as the central court of appeal, and this, not only in 



re- 




1815] 



Tke Quadruple Alliance 



international questions, but in nil serious disputes between sovereigns 
and subjects. The book created a deep impression. To Gentz, no 
ehallnw critic of men and things, it displayed "a pollticjil insight 
such as no Montesquieu ever had, with the eloquence of Burke, and an 
inspiration bordering at times on the loftiest poetry " ; it was at once 
accepted as the text-book of the Ultramontane party. 

On the morrow of the Revolution the cross eurrents of thoiight 
produced by it had not, of course, as yet united into any streams of 
public opinion rtapable of shaping the destinies of the world; nor, had 
thei-fi been such a defined force of opinion, could it have influenr«d 
directly the course of affaire. Europe had been liberated ; but the sword 
was yet supreme, tbougli it had been put into oommtAKlon, and, for the 
one oian of genius wbo had wielded it, had been substituted a committee 
of comparative mediocrities. *• What is Europe? *' Alexander of Russia 
had exclaimed, after Tilsit, to the ambassador of France, " what is 
£arope, if it is not you and I?" /wVfter Waterloo Europe consisted, in 
tfFecU of the four Great Towers constituting the Grand Alliance. Of 
these Powers three, Uiissia, Austria, and Prussia, were autocracies ; the 
fourth. Great Britain^ was represented by statesmen wbo, though 
hampered by their responsibility to Parliament, wei-e less so than if 
Parliament had been truly representative of popular opinion. | Under 
these conditions the character and the point of view of the fBWmen in 
whose hands power was concentrated were for the moment of moi-e 
importance than the great movements of tliought which only became 
politically effective at a later period, and of which the tendencies were 
stilt either unsuspected or misunderstood. 

Of all the members of the Alliance by far the most conspicuous, and, 
for the Ume, the most important, was the Kra[>eror Alexander I of 
Russia. It is true that Great Britain, her long struggle with Napoleon 
crowned bj' the victory of Waterloo, still dominated the councils of 
Europe ; but thet transparent honesty of Lord CiLstlereagh's diplomacy 
kt Vienua''aud sifterwards had tended to discount the effects of her 
power. All the world knew that she wanted peace, the establishment of 
"a jast equilibrium" in Europe, the abolition of the slave-trade; and 
that for these ends she was willing to make enormous sacrifices, and, 
whether on the Continent or in the colonies, to identify British with 
Eoropean interests. Austria too, though disinterestedness could hardly 
be predicated of hor policy, was prepared for the momeot to subordinate 
her peculiar ambitions. Exhaustedand all but bankrupt, the Habsburg 
tnonarchy needed peace and time to recuperate ; and to this end. during 
Ibe negotiations leading up to the Treaty of Chaumont, Mellernich 
hid. as his faithful henchman Gentc bitterly complained, substituted 
"Europe" for *' Austria" in his policy, had broken the dynastic ties 
which had bound the Habsburg monarchy to France, and risked the 



u 



8 



Alexander J of Russia 



d 
fa I 



*^' revival of the Franco- Russian alliance which during the next few y* 
was to be the nightmare of the chanceries. As for Prussia, she wae^ 
Btill less than Austria in a position to take any leading part in the 
councils of the Alliance. Ilersoldiera might exact from France barbarous 
vengeance for barbarous wrongs ; King Frederick William III, picms and 
narrow-minded, was bound to the Tsar by ties of gratitude an well as oi 
personal affection, and, aj)art from all these considerations, was to bol 
occupied for ycara to come in the task of trying to absorb into the tifa' 
of the Prussian monarchy the heterogeneous populations assigned to it 
by the Treaty of Vienna. Thus Alexander found himself in the poiiitioa _ 
of which he had long dreamed — the central figure of the ConfedcratioaH 
of Europe, and arbiter of the world, by the grace of God, and the 
sanction of the luibrokeu might of Russia, thrust forward now, ia 
consequence of the acquisition of Poland, into the heart of Europe. , ^k 

Under these conditions the menace of Russia to the liberties of 
Europe seemed to men of affaii's nearly as alarming as had been that 
of France. Apprehension was increased by the enigmatic chai-acter of 
the Kmperor. Behind the handsome mask of his face, with the smiling 
lips and the eyes that never smiled, was hidden a nature moulded and 
transformed by the most conlmdictory influences. His childhood had 
been spent at the voluptuous Court of tlse Empress Catharine, his 
adolescence under the sombre tutelage of his father PauU who had 
inspired him with his own love of military detail, his theoretical love of 
mankind, and his contempt for men. The Jacobin Frederic Cesar 
de La Harpe had been his tutor, and from him he had imbibed the 
doctrines of Rousseau ; while liis military governor, Marshal SoItikofE, 
had drilled him in the traditions of Kusslan autocracy. Lastly, to all 
this had !focn added, after he had nionntcd the throne nver the body o£S 
hia murdered father, a mystic melancholy liable at any moment to issued 
in extravagance of thought or action. With him the moment had come 
during the Iiorron* of the campaign of 1812. At the bunding of Moscow, 
he declared afterwards to Bishop Eyierl, his own soul had been illumi- 
nated. During the campaign that followed he had sought to calm the 
unrest of his conscience by corresponding with the leaders of the 
evangelical revival on the Continent, and had searched for omens and 
snpeniatnral guidance in texts and passages of Scripture. Finally, in 
the autumn of 1813 he had met at Hasel tlie Baroness von Kriidener, 
a lady who had turned from a life of pleasure to the congenial task of 
converting princes, and who had the singular good fortune to make a 
spiritual conquest of the most powerful of them all. From this time a 
mystic pietism became the avowed motive of his public as of his private 
action. Madame von Kriidener and her colleague, the evangelist Em- 
paytaz, were during the allied occupation of Paris the confidants of the 
Tsar's most secret thoughts, and the Imperial prayer- meetings the oracle 
on whose revelations hung the fate of the world. 



[ 




1814-5 



Triumph of the Coalition 



9 



With tbe memory of Tilsit still fresh in their minds, it ia not 
sarprisifig that men of the world like Mettemich believed the UtiRsian 
autocrat to be disguising ** under the language of evaugelieal abnegation '' 
vast and jjeriUnis schemes of ambition. The suspicion was increased by 
other and seemingly inconsistent tendencies of the Emperor, which yet 
seemed all to point to a like disquieting concluaion. Alexander had 
declared open war on the Revolution ; but La Harpe was again at hia 
elbow, and ttie catchwords of the gospel of humanity were still on liis 
lips. The very proclamations, in which he had denounced Napoleon ns 
the genius of evil, had denounced him in the name of "■* liberty " and 
'* enlightenment." A monstrous intrigue was suspected between the 
autocrat of nil the Russian and the Jacobinism of all Europe, its aim 
the aubetitution of an all-powerful Russia for an att-powerful France. 
At the Congress of Vienna Alexander's conduct had accentuated and 
given point to the distrust of an Imperial conscience which had suffered 
him to keep his hold on Poland in violation of his treaty obligations ; 
and, though the Hundred Days had intervened since the secret alliiince 
of January S, 1815, between Austria, Great Hritain, and France, the 
distrust of which it was the symbol rcsmained. 

The links that bound the Powers together, of which the first had 
been riveted at Teplitz, had been slow in forging; and more than once 
they had threatened to give way under the sledge-hammer blows of 
NajK>leon's maaterly defensive campaign. It was not until the break- 
down of the conferences at Ch&tillon had proved the impossibility of 
coming to terms with the French Emporov, that the tactful dijilomacy 
o£ Castlcrcagh succeeded in welding them together at Chaumont. in the 
trea^ which gave to the Grand Alliance the form it was to retain until 
6nally shattered by tlie revolutions of 1848. The Treaty of Paris of 
May 30, 1814, and that of Vienna of March 25, 1815, were essentially 
but renewals of that of Chaumont. \A^\ were directed primarily to the 
preservation of Eurojie from any further peril of French aggression.^ 
*I*he triumph of the Cualitiou had proved tlie quality of the Concert of 
Europe; but, its object achieved, there w;is danger that it would i-esolve 
itself into its elements. When the Abbe ile SaintrPierre communicated 
his project to Fleury, the Cardinal told Hai that he had forgotten one 
eiaenlial article, namely, to send missiohaties to touch the hearU of 
princes and convert them to his views. In 1815 the omission seemed 
10 be supplied; for the councils of Europe .were presided over by au 
Imperial evangelist whose mission, loudly proclaimed, was to substitute . 
in all public relations the principles of the gospel of Christ for the evil 
traditions of Machiavellian statecraft. On September 2H, 1815, the 
Emperor Alexander announced to tlie world, at a great re\*iew held on 
the plain of Vertus, the scheme of the Holy Alliance, already signed by 
bimsclf and his brother sovereigns of Austria and Prussia. Henceforth 
f/Hnces were to regard each otlier as brothers and their peoples as their 



children ; and all their acta were to be founded on the sacred principles 
of the Gospel of our Lord and Saviour Jesua ('hi-ist. 

The Holy Alliance, by one of the atrange iroiiios of history, came to 
be regarded as the symbol of all that waa oppreasive and reactionary. 
Yet there was nothing iu its provisions, nor in thu intentions of its 
creator, to warrant the sinister meanings read into it by a suspicious 
world. To Alexander himself it wiis calculated "to give a lofty tiatis- 
faction to Divine Providence " as an attempt to lift jxilttics on to a 
higher plane; and so little was it a hypocritical conspiracy against 
liberty, that in one of hi* " Jacobin " moods he urged on his reluctant 
brother autocrats that Liberal constitutions were the logical outcome of its 
doctrines. The manifesto was, in fact, of immediate practical importance 
only in so far as it tended to complicate the diplomatic relations of the 
Allies during the yeare that followed — owing to the Russian claim, 
persistently repeated, that it committed the Powers to Alexander's 
idea! nf a '"universal union,*' which they in fact repudintod. Of all 
the princes who signed the Holy Alliance probably only Alexander 
himself did so with conviction. To Mottenuch it was " a loud sounding 
nothing," to Caatlereagh "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense." 
The British Government, divided between fear of offending the Allies 
and exposing itself to the shafts of the Opposition, found a loophole ttf 
escape in the constitutional objection to the Prince Regent signing any 
document without the counter-signature of a Minister. The powerful 
endorsement of the ruler of Great Biitain was thus lacking to this new 
family conipat^t of llie European sovereigus; and the Allies had to be 
content with a personal letter from the Regent, expressing his hejirty 
approval of tlieir sublime principles. With this, and two other notable 
exceptions, the document was signed by all the sovereigns, great and 
small, of Europe. The other exceptions were the Pope and the Sultan. 
Pius VII, busy with his preparations for a new crusade against Liberalism, 
would be no party to a compact devised by a heretic and a Liberal. 
The Sultan, for reasons sufficiently obvious-, was never invited to sign; 
but, in view of the fact that t^ie integrity of the Ottoman Empire had 
found no place in the guarantes of the Vienna treaties, the omission of 
his name was held to he omffious of Alexander's intention to exclude 
Turkey from tho sphere of the Concert, in order to retain its destinies in 
his own hands. 

At the date of the promulgation of the Holy Alliance the fate of 
France had not yet been definitely settled; and, in the councils of the 
Allies, while all were agreed that she must for ever he rendered incapable 
of again oversetting the balance of Europe, opinion was sharply divided 
as to the means for attaining this end. But counsels of moderation 
prevailed ; and in the settlement with France the principle wiis re- 
affirmed which had guided the policy of ihe Allies before the Hundred 
Days. France, deltned by her " legitimate " frontiers, was to he. 




received back on equal terras into the comity of nations ao soon as her 
internal stability should have been consolidated under hvtr legitimate 
monarch and the constitutional system granted by him. The problem 
was how this "-consolidation " was to be ensured. It was more difficult 
after than before the Hundred Days to dissociate the spirit of France 
from that of Napoleon ; and deep-rooted distrust of the French people 
underlay all the counsels aud cnm))LuatLon8 of the Powers for years to 
come. The first of the two treaties signed at I'aris on November 20, 
1815, settled the frontiers and the financial obligations of France, and 
fixed the conditions for the occupation of French territory by the 
Allied anny. Moreover, for the purpose of watching over the restored 
monarchy, a committee of the Ministers of the Allied Powers was to 
be established at Paris, receiving daily reports from the King's Cabinet 
on the Rondition of the countrj-, and fi-ee on any question of internal a« 
well as of external policy to tender advice which would be backed by the 
irresistible sanction of the army of occupation. The second treaty, 
from which France was escluded, is known as the Treaty of Alliance 
of November 20, 1H15, and was avowedly a renewal of the Treaty of 
Chanmont and of the Vienna Treaty of March 2^, 1815; both of 
which had been directed' specificsilly against France. By Article 6 of 
this Treaty it was agreed that "in order to cotisolidalo the iniimaUi tie 
which unites the four sovereigns for the happiness of the world, the High 
Contracting Powers have agreed to renew at fixed intervals, either under 
their own auspices, or by their respective niitnsters, meetings consecrated 
to great common objects and to the examinatiun of such measures aa 
at each one of these epochs shall be judged most salutary for the peace 
and prosperity of the nations and for the maintenance of the peace of 
Europe." 

This article, which formed the basis of all the subsequent attempts 
I to establish a *^ Confederation of Europe," was the outcome of negotia- 
tions which have a permanent interest, as revealing not only the essential 
differences of principle l>et*een the J'owers, which rendered the great 
international experiment almrttve, but alao the fundamental problems 
involved in the attempt to realise an international ideal, which will 
remain insoluble so long as the nationalist spirit, tlto most characteristto 
development of the nineteenth century, survives. The original draft 
of the Treaty had been drawn up under the direction of the Emperor 
Alexander, and embodied his vie\v8. Its preamble staled baldly that 
"the object of the Powers" was *'to establish royalty in France on a 
constitutional foundation and to preserve the happy union of the Powers 
for tills result of common interest"; and the remaining articles proclaimed 
in every line the right of united Europe to watch over and regulate the 
internal affairs of France, ('astloi'eagli at once saw the peril to national 
independence involved in tliis. He shared to the full the geneml belief 

he reality of the danger of a renewed outburst of revolutionary 



12 CasUereagh and the "European System'' [1815-23 



France and the view that " notliing could keep her down but tlie 
strong hand of European power" ; but he objected to '*too strong and 
undisguised an intorferonee of the Allied sovereigns in the internal con- 
cerns of France," to their posing as " umpires in the constitutional 
struggles'" of the country, and in short to any attitude not dictated 
by " the immediate security of their own dominions." In the counter- 
project which he submitted, and which was accepted aa the basis of the 
Treatvi he "endeavoured to keep the iuternal affairs of Franue jn the 
background, and to make the colour of the contingent interference (of 
the Alliance) as Kuropean as possible." The determining attitude of 
Great Britain towards the " Bublime conception " of the Imijerial 
visionary was thus from the first defined. The Concert of Europe had 
achieved great things, and might do ao yet ^ain, should a common 
peril once more call for common action. But the nature of such 
common peril, and the character of the common action, must be 
determined, not on any general principle which would lead to a minute 
regulation by the Great Powers of the affairs of the nations, but as each 
ease arose on its own merits. C'astlereagh himself, indeed, did not as 
yet realise the full Itnportof his attitude, lie looked upon the Alliance 
as a conveaieul arrangement which, by bringing the sovereigns and their 
Cabinets into touch, enabled business to be transacted far more rapidly, 
and with much less risk of friction, than through the ordinary diplomatic 
channels, it was not till IHIH, at Aix-la-Chapelle, that he Iwgan to 
suspect the incompatibility of the " Kun^penn System" with the liberties 
dear to Englishmen. At Troppau and Laibach the suspicion was con- 
firmed; but it was only in 1822, on the eve of the Congress of Verona, 
that the long process of his ilisiUusionment culminated in the deter- 
mination to make that open breach with the S3rstem of which, by his 
untimely death, the credit fell to George Canning. 

Whatever the ambitions or ideals of its individual members, the 
object of the Quadruple Alliance as a whole was the preservation of 
peace on the Isisis of existing treaty obligntions. Fmnce being, not 
unnaturally, regarded as the main focus of unrest, was the primary 
object of its watchful solicitude ; but the sixth article of the Treaty of 
November 20, 1815, covered equally the case of any danger arising in 
otlier quartern. There was, indeed, material enough for alarm, and 
this was b)' no means mainly supplied by the agitation of the revolu- 
tionary '* sects." The Powers were as averse from violent reaction ae 
from violent revolution; but, unhappily, in their desire to find a basis 
of principle for their action, they had exalted the doctrine of '^legitimacy" 
to a height which made it difficult for them to control the reactionary 
follies of the sovereigns whom tliey had restored to power. They 
were under no illusion as to their chanictcr or their probable con- 
sequence. They watched ^vith disgust and alarm the proceedings of 
Ferdinand VII in .Spain. It was a little matt^jr that he had violated 



\us oath to iDamtiiiu the Constitution of 1812; for the Constitutton 
was unworkable, and was not desired by the Spanish people. But 
Metternich cursed the wicked infatuation which re-established the 
Inquisition, and set up what Gentz described as "a system of reaction 
and persecution only to be compared with the reign o( terror in France 
under Rnljespierre." It was not to the interests of monarchy tlint a 
king should "debase himself to become no more than the leading police 
agent and gaoler of his country." Nor was it expedient that rulers by 
divine right should make themselves ridiculous as well as odious to tlieir 
subjects. It was not with the approval of the Powers that the Papal 
Government abolished stroct lighting in Rome as a revolutionary inno- 
ration ; that Victor Emanuel, restored to his capital of Turin, caused 
the botanical gardens planted by the French to be grubbed up, and 
forbade his subject? to use Napoleon's great roud over the Mont Cenis ; 
or that the Elector of Hesse appended once more to tJie fresh -powdered 
beads of his exiguous army the pigtails of the old regime. All these 
things were recognized in the councils of the Alliance as symbolic of a 
state of things pregnant with future dangers. For the present, however, 
the attention of the four Powers was absorbed by the problem of France. 
This problem was defined by Dccazes in a single sentence: "to 
royalise France and to nationalise the monarchy. " The successful 
eetablishment of the Bourbon dynasty iu the national life of France was 
the guarantee required by the Allied Powers before they would consent 
to leave the country to itself. The diflScuUIes of the process were 
obvious to all. The liourbous had been strangers to France for a 
quarter of a century, during which a generation of Frenchmen had 
grown up who liad been taught to regard them as enemies ; they had 
returned " in the baggage train '' of a hostile army ; and their authority 
was supported by foreign bayonets and controlled by foreign counsels. 
The violence of the '* Cuurt "■ party, beaded by the Count of Artois, the 
heir to the throne, accentuated this situation. The nation which, after 
so many changes, cared little what form it^^ government might assume, 
saw the social and material gains of the Revolution, which alone it 
valued, placed in jeopardy; and when, in September, 1815, Talleyrand, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Fouch6, the Minister of Police, who 
had been left in office partly as a guarantee against unreasoning reaction, 
were sacrificed to tho olamour of the "ultra-Royalist'' ('hambcrs, and 
replaced by tho Due de KicheUcu and the young police prefect Decuzes, 
the task of " nationalising the monarchy " seemed weU-uigh hopeless. 
"With his new servants," wrote Castlereagh to l^ortl Liverpool, "there 
leeraa to be but one opinion, that if the Allied troops were withdrawn, 
hi« Majesty would not be on hiy tlirono a week.'* Yet Richelieu realised 
from the first that the monarchy could never be firmly establii^ed until 
tlie foreign army had ceased to occupy French soil, and directed all bis 
efforts to this end. The essential conditioa was that a Qovernment 



should be eoUblislied so uioiierute and bo stable as to serve as a guarantee 
to the Powers for the payment of the huge annual instalment of the 
indemnity. The attitude of the European Concert to Krance waa 
determined by the measure of success which attended the efforts of the 
French Government Icj satisfy their conditions. The dissolution of the 
Chamhre introuvahh, whiuli had defied both the Crown and the Powers, 
though regarded as a " bold experiment,'* had the appro^'al of the 
Allies. The passing of the budget by the Chambers elected in November, 
1818, under the altered suffrage, was rewarded by a reduction of the anny 
of occupation by 510,000 men. Richelieu now bent all his efforts to 
obuiuing tho withdrawal of the rest. The burden of supporting tho 
Allied troops weighed heavily upon the French people ; their presence 
w:is a perpetual irrit^itinn, which latterly had grown to such a pitch 
tlmt Wellington reported that, in the event of the occupatioa being 
prolonged, he must concentrate his army between the Scheldt and the 
jVleuse, as the forces, extended in a tliin Kne across the breadth of 
Krance, were no longer safe in case of a popular uprising. But it waa 
realised that such a concentration would inevitably lead to the crisis ha 
feared, and the troops might be destroyed piecemeal before they could 
combine. Under these circumstances, the Allies agreed without difficulty 
on the principle that the occupation of France should not extend beyttud 
the third year, and that the question of evacuation should be the first 
task of the Conference of the Powers which it was arranged to hold in 
the autumn of 1818 at Aix-la-Chapelle. 

The Congress, or to be more stiictly correct, the Conference of 
Aix-la-Chape!le, of which the proceedings were to mark the highest 
point reached in the attempt of the Allied Powers to govern Europe in 
concert, met on October 1, 1818. The sovereigns of Russia, Austria, 
and Prussia were present in person ; Great Britain was represented 
by Lord Castlereagh and the Duke of Wellington, the Austrian 
Government by Prince Mctternich, the Russian by Capodistrias and 
Nesselrode, the Prussian by Prince Hardeuberg and Count liernstorff. 
The Due de Richelieu, by grace of the Allies, was allowed to be present 
on behalf of France- The question of the evacuation of France was 
immediately raised, and on this point a happy unanimity prevailed. 
The question of the guarantee for the payment of the remainder of the 
indemnity had been the last barrier to an agreement, and this had been 
removed as the result of negotiations carried on, on b<*.half nf tho Allies, 
by the Duke of Wellington with tlie great financial bouses of Hope of 
Amsterdam and Baring. This made it easy to arrive at a decision to 
which, by common consent, every counsel of expediency pointed. At the 
very first meeting of tho Conference the principle of evacuation was 
agreed to ; on October 9 the treaty was signed stipulating tliat by 
November 30 the soil of France should be free of foreign troops. On the 
question of the further consequences to follow from this decision there was 



I 
I 

I 



I 



1 




1818] 



The Conference of Aie-la-C/iapelle 



15 



a more fateful tlisagreemeat. Richelieu Diaimed that the same reasoning 
which liad lud the Powers to withdi-aw their forces from France would 
warrant their ailmitting Krance on equal terms to the (trard Alliance. 
This was, however, far from representing the mind of the .Vllies. 
The policy of evacuation had been inspired by no trust in the improved 
temper of the French people. The Eastern Powers viewed with exag- 
gerated alarm the supposed weakiieas of the Government in dealing 
with the Liberal revival in France, to which successive electiona 
had home witness. Alexander I, whose ''Jacobinism" waa already 
on the wane, declared that nine-tentha of the people of France were 
corrupted by bad principles or violent party sentiments, and that the 
rest were incapable of working a coustitutiou ; and he refused to 
hear of admitting France to an alliance which must be upheld for its 
original pur|jose — that of safeguarding Europe against the French 
revolutionary spirit. Metternich, also, objected that the admission of 
France would mean *' an amalgam of the conservative principle with 
that of innovation, of the remedy with the very evil it was intended to 
cure, of stability with movement, of security with risk." Castlereagh, 
on the other hand, though he shai-ed the pessimistic views of his 
colleagues on the future of monarchy in France, was less concerned 
with principles than with practical politics. He pointed out that, were 
France isolated, she would inevitably become the nucleus of a separate 
alliance, and the whole gain of the European Concert would be placed in 
jeonardy. At the same time lio realised the paradox involved in the 
inclusion of France in an alliance which, as Great Britain had always 
iusiflted, was directed primarily against herself. 

These debates opened up the whole broader question of the future 
form of the European Concert. On this the mind of the Emfwror 
Alexander was quite clear. His first care, on arriving at Aix, had 
been to define his own attitude towards the Alliance. In interviews 
with CasUereagh, with Wellington, and with Mettemich, he had in- 
dignantly repudiated the calumnious reports which for months past had 
circulated in the chanceries, that he was meditating a breach with the 
Allies and a separate understunding with the liourbon States. Any 
Btioh act, he reiterated, he should regard as a crime, and its perpetrator 
■s a fehm< As for hit* army, about which so much had been said, he 
Btuotained it. not for Russia, but for Europe. On the general question 
the views of the Tsar were presented in a long memorandum, druwn up 
by PoKzo di Borgo, which in effect revived and elaborated the scheme 
outlined in 1804 in the dispatch to Novossilzoff already quoted. 
The Quadruple Alliance, he argued, waa but the "centre" of the 
"miiveraal union," and, though " unalterable in principle," would, "by 
txtending its sphere according to circumstances,'* become " the alliance 
M all the Stales." "Tlio 8yst«mi of Europe" which was "the work 
of Providence, not of any Cabinet," was ** a general association having 



6 



for fouiidati&n the compact of Vienna and the Treaty of Paris, for co;i- 
tervative principle the fraternal union of the Allied Powers, for aim 
the guarantee of all recognised rights." There was no need for new 
treaties, or new oaths, whinh would but be weakened by repetition. 
The Quadruple Alliance, consecrated by tlie Treaty of November 20, 
1815, contained the principle of which the natural consequence was the 
general Alliance based on the Treaties of Vienna and of Paris. He 
proposed, therefore, that the Quadruple Alliance should be preserved as 
against France ; and that a general Alliance should be made effective 
for the purpose of guaranteeing the territorial ttfotua quo a,nd legitimate 
sovereignty. The establishment of this general AUiancre was to lie 
effected by a Dticlaration, to be issued at the close of the Congreaa and 
signed by all the signatory Powers of the Treaty o£ Vienna. The 
Governments, thus reheved from the fear of revolution, could offer to 
their subjects equal constitutions ; and the liberties of the pooplew, wisely 
regulated, would arise fi-om the state of affairs once recognised and 
publicly avowed. 

The Russian proposal was received in tlie Cabinets with very mixed 
feelings. Metteniich allowed his fear of Russia for a moment to be 
obscured by his haunting fear of revolution, and, in spite of the mild 
Liberal aspirations which in the last paragraph of the memorandum 
showed the hand of Capodistrias, hailed the Tsar's scheme as embody- 
ing the potentiality of a mighty conservative force. In a memoi-andum 
of October 7 he elaborated his meaning. The essence of the Treaty of 
Chaumont was eternal, as based on a principle of morality essentially 
unchangeable. This " anti -revolutionary principle " had been directed 
8j>ecially against France, and this special application should remain. Kut 
there existed another agreement, that of the Holy Alliance, on which 
should be based a general Declaration to which France might be a party- 
The principle of a universal guarantee was even more eagerly advocated 
by the Prussian Government, which, while agreeing to t!io evacuation o£ 
France, was in an agony of apprehension as to the results of this *' risky 
experiment" to its own exposed frontiei'S. The Hritisli (jovernment, 
on the other hand, viewed with dismay these pei-sisteut efforts to revive 
an idea against which it had alw.iys protested. Feeling in England was 
running high against participation in a system which not only threatened 
the liberties of others, but might, in the language of the orators of 
the Opposition, in time present the spectacle of (Cossacks encamped in 
Hyde Park tooverawothe Houseof Coramons. Moreover, as Castlereagh 
pointed out to the Tsar, the liritish Government had to deal " with a 
new Parliament and a new people, intensely bent on peace and economy." 
To initiate a fresh policy of " eventual exertion " would be to hiizard the 
sanction already obtained from Piirltament for their continental engage- 
ments. In the geiicral instructions for Lord Castlereagh's gxiidance« 
preserved in a Cabinet memorandum of September 4, it had been clearly 



I 




laid dowD that the treaty between the Powers must rest "upon the 
sauctioii received Ui the address of both Houses on May, 1810 *' ; that 
its provisions "hardly admitted of being reinforced"; and that any 
attemjit to renew them ** would lead to serious differences of opinion." 
As to the question of admitting Louis XVIII to the Alliance, the main 
objection to this had been removed by the evacuation of France. 

Under those circumatancea, the task of Castlereagb- was a somewhat 
delicate one. The abstractiouu and sweeping generalities of the Kusnian 
memorandum were in dii-ect conflict with hi» own common-sense opinion 
and with the instructions of his Government. Yet» in view of the 
apparent urgency of the need for maintaining tlie Alliance, it was 
necessary t(j humour the Tsar by approving his principles, while weaning 
him from their consequences. In the course of several interviews with 
Alexander, Castlereagh had convinced himself of the sincerity of the 
views, on which the Emperor dihited •' with a religious rhapsody." Ho 
realised that in order to hold the Emperor's mind'* within the principles 
tlrnt cciuld be maintained in Parhamcnt," it would be necessary to try 
" to present something that would at once keep within our line, and at 
the same time present the subject somewhat in the tone of his own 
ideas." The outcome was a memorandum, in reply to that of Russia, of 
which the opening sentences are a masterpiece of solemn irony. "The 
benign principles of tlie Alliance of the 26th of September, 1815," it ran, 
•* may be considered as constituting the European system in matter of 
political conscience. It would, however, be derogatory to this solemn 
act of the sovereigns to mix its discussion with the ordinary diplomatic 
obligatioius which bind State to State, and which are to be looked for 
alone in the treaties which have been concluded in the accustomed 
form." 

In this sentonce the whole policy of the British Oovernment, which 
attimately determined the fate of the Concert, is contained. The soul 
of the Holy Alliance might be suffered to hover over the councils of 
Europ<; ; but in thuse councils the treaties, and the treaties alone, were 
to be the determining factors. Nor were any special treaties to be held 
psrticularly sacred. Some bound the States collectively; others were 
peculiar to individual States. Those of Vienna and Paris even, which 
formed the " Great Charter " of the European territorial system, " con- 
taunett oo en^gements bovond the immediate object^s which were made 
matter of regulation in the treaties themselves "; an<l, though the Powers 
pOBBessed. the right, there was no obligation on them, collectively or 
bdJvidoaUy, to resent their breach; since the territories regulated by 
them were the subject of " no special guarantee, to the exclusion of 
others which rest for their title on earlier treaties of equal authority." 
Ai for the universal Alliance for securing the peace and happiness of 
Utf world, this was a problem of *' speculation and hope''; but it had 
icTcr liceii, and probably never would be. put into practice. The 



e. a. K. X. 



18 



Pi'otest affainsflnKrvenHon 



-[1818 



V, 



i/ 



British Government protested absolutely against the principle of inter- 
vention in tlie internal affairs of other Slale^s ; and. until some Ry^tam 
could be dtivit^ed far enforcing on all kiQg» atid nations an interual 
system of peace and justice, the consequence was inadmissible ; " for 
nothing could be more injurious to the idea of government generally 
_ than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the 
support of established power, without any consideration of the extent 
t<> which it was abused." The beneficial effect of the mediation of the 
Powers was admitted ; and this would be increased by adding France, 
which would give the Allifince more moral weight witliout miiking it 
too uumerous "for efficient concert." To the proposed periodical meetr 
ings Great Hritain would not agree, for they would symbolise to the 
world the very system which she repudiated; but she would willingly 
take part in any meetings called to deal with particular emergencies. 

In face of this uncompromising attitude, the temporary support 
which the Tsar's idealistic scheme had obtained from the other Allies 
collapsed. The co-operation of Great Britain was too valtiablo an asset 
to he hazarded for an experiment of whicli the succena wns at best 
doubtful. The I'csuU was a compromi^, embodied in two ingtrumente 
signed on November 15, 1818. Tlie first, in the form of a secret 
protocol, renewed the Quadruple Alliance for the purpose of watching 
over France and shielding her from revolutionary dangers, and was 
communicated in confidence to Richelieu. The second, a ^'^ declaration," 
to which France was invited to adhere, stated the intention of the 
live Powers to maintain the intimate union, atrengthened by the ties of 
Christian brotherhood, contracted by the sovereigns; pronounced the 
object of tbis union to be the preservation of peace on the basis of 
re.spect for treaties ; and stated, in conclusion, that no "partial reunions" 
should take place coaceruing the affairs of other States without their 
invitation, and, if desired, their presence. 

Thus ended, in a colourless compromise, the most serious effort ever 
made "to provide the transparent soul of the Holy Alliance with a 
l)ody." A last effort was indeed made, on the initiative of Prufisia, after 
the main question had bcoti settled, to establish an " intermediate 
system " for guaranteeing the territorial gtatu» quo. It was suggested 
that the Allied troops withdrawn fi-oin Fiunce should remain concen- 
trated at Brussels, under the command of Wellington, .as a sort of 
Knropean police force to watch over the established order. The plan 
had the support of Alexander and of Metternich ; but it broke upon the 
uncompromising opposition of Great Britain. Wellington himself pointed 
out the disastrous effect that any such action wouhl have upon French 
public opinion ; and the British Goveniment vigorously resented the 
reopening of the question of universal guarantee after it bad been settled 
once for all. The matter was then allowed to drop. 

But though, at Aix, the vision of the universal union had melted 




18X8] 



Slave-traae and piracy 



^icto air, the Congress raarked the highest point reached in the diotator- 
ehip of the Concert of the Powers. The efforts made to extend its 
sphere of influence beyond the Atlantic in the matter of the Spanish 
colonies were defeated by the stubborn attitude of Spain and the oppo- 
sition of Great Britain. But frc^m all Europe appeals came up to this 
High Court of the Allied sovereigns. Deinnark appealed to it; and 
Charlee XFV of Sweden (Bernadotte), in spito of his protests, was forced 
by the Concert to fulfil the stipulations of the Treaty of Kiel. The 
German sovereigns appealed, on a host of questions left undetermined 
in the hurried discussions of the close of the Vienna Congress; notably 
on that of the Uaden succession, discussed below, and disputes out- 
standing between Austria and Bavaria. The more complicated of these 
questiona, though debated at Aix. were ultimately reserved for the 
decision of a ministerial conference to be held the following year at 
Frankfort for the final adjustment of matters left open at Vienna. The 
petition of the Elector of Hesse, however, to be allowed to exchange his 
now meaningless title for that of King, was refused, on the ground that 
it was inexpedient to cheapen the royal sl^le ; and the complaint of the 
mediatised Princes was responded to by an admonition of the Allied 
Powers to their sovereigns to treat them; with greater consideration. 
Of more general importance were the discussions on the two great 

■/questions of the Slave-trade and the Barlmry pirat*i8. On neither of 
these was any decision reached. The Slave-trade had been condemned 
in principle by the Congress of Vienna ; and, as the outcome of endless 
pourparler, nearly all the European States had given at least a 
formal assent to the liritish demand for its suppression. In practice, 
however. Great Britain alone showed any activity in carrying out the 
work: and the trade continued to flourish under the protection of 
national flags. The BriUsh Government now proposed a reciprocal right 
of search, tu be carried out by war-vessels specially designated by the 
Powers for this purpose. But, in view of the overwhelming superiority 
of England at sea, this was taken as tantamount to a licence to British 
crutaere to interrupt the commerce of all nations ; and the I^owors 

'|Teject«d it. A counter-proposal of the Emperor Alexander to establish 
an inteniational boai-d of control on the west coast of Africa, with an 
iaternational fleet commissioned to suppress the trade, met with do 
bclt«r success. The same fate befell the Tsar's suggestion for theestab* 
lishmeut of an in tern utiu rial squadron in tlie Mcdit«irranoan directed 
Kgaiiust the Barbary pirates. The question was one which affected Great 
Britain less than the rest of Europe ; for the pirates had a wholesome 
respect for vessels sailing under the Union Jack. Austria, which had 
been forced to the humiliation of placing its seaborne commerce under 
the protection of the Turkish ensign; Prussia, which had witnessed 
depredations inflicted by African sea-rovers on the Hanseatic trade 
withio tlie North Sea; the Italian Stat«3, whose coasts were exposed to 



20 



Weahneas of the Concert 



{mi 



la 



thoir cleiicenta ; Russia, under whose llikg Uie armed trading vessels of tlie 

Greeks wuged with tlium ptretinial war, would have welcomed a scheme 

wliich promised to end an intolerable evil. But the sea-power of 

Uussia wiLs a dangerous, because unknown, quantity; the activities of 

the Tsar's a^'eii U in Spain and Italy bad excited suspicion of his ulliaiate 

aims ; and Great Britain refused to be a party to a plan which would 

have involved the establishment of RuHsiaa war-ships in the Medite 

laneau. The breakdown of the negotiations on these two imjwrtaa 

^^ queations revealed tlie fundamental weakness of the Ooncert, and indiii 

catea the causes of its ultimate collapse. After weeks of discussion, 

conducted in the moat friendly gpiiit. it had been found possible to 

agree on an abstract formula which served to disguise awhile from the 

world the essential divergence of views within the Cabinets; a few 

questions of minor importance had been satisfactorily settled; but, 

whenever t)ie interests of the several Powers were deeply engaged, it 

had been proved that no Government would or could subordinate the 

particular interest of its own country to the geneiul interest of Kurope. 

The events of the year that followed the close of the Conference of 

Aix-la-ChapcUe tended to increase the mutual suspicion and the tliverg- 

enceof views within the Alliance. AB'aii'S in France were developing in a 

way which led the more timorous Powers to doubt the wisdom of their 

generosity towards ber at the Congress. Alarmist reports of plots and 

revolutionary movements, supplied by agents whose jtay depended upon 

their aeal, poured in upon Metteruieh from all sidea. Decazcs, in 

Melternich's view, was by his weak concessions to Liberalism bringing 

the monarchy to the verge of destruction. More alarming still wore the 

" mditary preparations " being hurried on by Marshal Gouviou du Saint- 

Cyr, coupled as these were with the ** seditious language" ascribed to thafl 

Marshal and to the Minister of Finance, Baron Louis. In February, 1819, 

Metternich openly expressc^l his belief to the liritish .Minister at Vienna 

that a revolution was no longer to be avoided. Nor was he " disposed 

to take a more cheerful view of the state of things in Prussia.'* Kinjg.^ 

Frederick William, by postponing over-long the convocation of the pro^fl 

vincial Estates, had "played into the hands of the Jacobins"; army, 

bureaucracy, and people were honeycombed with disaffection ; and Prussia 

hatl become the centre of revolutionary infection for all Germany. The 

condition of Italy seemed even more alarming. Early in 1819 Metternich 

accompanied the Emperor Francis on \i\» first visit to his new Italian 

dominions; and willingagenUsuppliedhimin full measure with materials 

for con Jirming the bad impression he had gained from the sullen demeanour 

of the Italians Upwards their Imperial master. None knew better than 

he the secret of the evils of Austrian rule in Italy: the atrophy of the' 

local organs of government, duo U) the necessity for sending every I 

question, however minute, for settlement to Vienna. Lacking the courage 

to press for the alteration of this system, he chose to regard the discontent I 




1»19] 



Mistrust of Russia 



21 



of the Italians as the artificial work of foreign agents, and to picture the 
mass of the |}eop1e as anxious to attain unity under the shelter of the 
AoBLriau eagle. 

The cause of the extreme nervousness of the Austrian statesman at 
this time wiis not, however, so much fear of revolution, much as he 
dreaded it, aa fear of Russia. To Russia Mettemicb ascribed the crisis 
in France, since Pozzo di Borgo alone was responsible for encouraging 
the madness of the King's Oovernment. In Madrid, General Tatischeff 
continued his intrigues; thnir ohjent l>oing to embroil Great Rrltaiu 
with Spain in the matter of the Spanish colonies, and to bring in the 
Russian Emperor as the deuf ex machind. In Germany liberalising 
Princes looked to St Petersburg for inspiration and siippurU Kinally, 
in Italy the indiscretions of Kussiau travellers, and oven of Russian 
Ministers, were producing a state of things intolerable to the Austrian 
Government, Everywhere they openly proclaimed the sympathy of 
Russia with Liberal aspirations- Cai>odistriaa himself "horrified '* the 
Jfeapolitan Ministers by his language ; and, most monstrous of all, 
C&ar de La Harpo bad presided openly at Bologna over a meeting of 
Carbonari. 

Metternich made uo secret of his distrust of the Tsar's motives and 
aims ; and so early as February he had declared to Castlereagh, through 
Sir Robert Gordon, that he disapproved of disguising •' the proved con- 
viction of Russia's falsehood and intrigue": since the danger of **a 
reaction formidable to Europe " could only be averted by the Powers 
"diaplaying a full knowledge of the Emperor's character and setting his 
faults at defiance." Kusaians, he argued, are easier led on the right 
path by blows than by flattery ; and, happily, the Russian Emperor had 
■• one preserving quality " — want of courage. This bmve language was 
Dot, however, translated into action. Instead, it was decided that the 
Emperor Francis should himsL-lf write to his brother of Russia "with an 
air of the most confiding friendship," and remonstrate with him on the 
nuDOUS activities of his ser^-ants, continued in spite of Austria's protests 
tad, seemingly, in spite of the admonitory circular issued as their result 
in February by the Tsar. The murder on March 23, 1819, of the 
well-known dramaUst, KotEebuc, who was in Russian pay, was a terrible 
object-lesson in the consequences of the revolutionary heresy, and came 
opportunely to reinforce .Metternich's argument; but it served also to 
deepen the enigma of the Emi>eror Alexander's attitude. ''Tlte different 
language of the different Russian agents is the puzzle," wrote Gordon to 
Lord Castlereagh on April 22 ; " iu Germany Kotzebue is murdered, and 
Stourdza nearly so, for espousing the cause of unrestrained monarchy 
ud obscurantism ; while in Italy M. de La Harpe travels up and down 
holding a language of the purest democracy." 

The fact was that Alexander's mind was wavering between his Liberal 
IduA and his dread of the possible results of tlieir practical application. 



22 Treaty of Frankfirt — The Carhbad Decrees [1819 

Metternicli, ever prompt to reuoguise and use thu psychological mumontJU 
saw hia opportunity, and returned to Germany, determined to take full 
advantage of Karl 8and*8 crime, to quell the unrest in the German 
States* and to win over the Rtusian Emperor to that policy of '^stability " 
on which he held the security of Austria to depend. The outstanding 
territorial questions left unsettled at Vienna hud been finally adjusted by 
the general Treat)' of Frankfort, signed on behalf of the four Powers oin 
July 20, 1819. A few of the articles concerned matters outride Germany t* 
the cession of the border fortresaes of Marienbourg and Philippeville to 
the Netherlands, the limits of Savoy, the reversion of the Italian duchies. 
But the bulk of tlie Treaty was concerned with the settlement of the 
burning questions within the Confederation; between Austria aud 
Bavai-ia, and Bavaria and Baden. The limits of the German sovereign- 
ties being thus finally fixed, the time was ripe for Mcttemich to carry 
out his policy of making the Confederation the great conservative b&rrier, 
wliether against revolution or Russia. In the opnnon of many con- 
temporary statesmen this double eud was secured by lb© " Carlsbad 
Decrees," confirmed by the Diet on September 20, 1819, and the Vienna 
Final Act of May 15, 1820. The conferences of Carlabad and Vienna, 
which issued in these famous acts, were attended only by German 
Ministers, and belong essentially to the domestic Instory of Germany. 
But, as Metteraich pointed out in his presidential address at Vienna, the 
German Confederation was an integral part of the States system of 
Europe as establitibed at Vienna ; and not only its rights as a feileral 
body, but the rights of the individual sovereigns who composed it, 
depended on the guarantee of the treaties. Europe tlien had a special 
right uf interference in the aHaii-s of the Oonfodei-atiun ; aud it was 
a matter of importance for Austria that her German policy should be 
endorsed by the Powers. ^ 

But, again, there was a wide divergence of views within the concort.V 
The terms of the Carlsbad Decrees (described in a later chapter) had made 
a most sinister impression ; thoy wui'C regarded as the fii'sl step taken by 
the " Holy Alliance " towards the systematic sup]>ression throughout 
Europe of all liberty of thought and speech. Castlereagh saw the 
danger, aud protested against the Decrees as an unjustifiable interference 
with the liberty of sovei-eign and independent States; while to Count 
Lieven, the Russian ambassador in London, he pointed out that it was 
not to the interest of the Governnienta to contract an alliance against 
the peoples. Of greater moment for the fate of Mettortiich's policy was 
the altitude of the Emperor Alexander. It was not to the interest of 
Russia to see established on her flank a sti-ong and united Germany 
iinder the hegemony of Austria; and, in spite of his dread of revolution, 
Alexander's rdle of protector of the oppressed admirably suited his 
German policy. The lesser States, like Wiirttemberg, fearing to be 
ground out of existence between the upper aud the nether milbtone of 



1820] 



Change in Alexander's altitude 



23 



Austria aiid Prussia, flctl to htm, not in vain, as a refuge in time of 
trouble. He osteutatiously refused, indeed, to intervene in the internal 
affairs of Germany ; hut he ohose this moment to issue to the world 
A fresh manifesto of Ijis principk-s, in oveiy line of which the inlluence of 
that " coryphaeus of Liberalism," Capodistrias, was clearly ti-aceable. 
The document is remarkable aa illustrating the gradual change whieh 
was coming over the Tsar's mind. He still believed in liberty, but 
in liberty " limited by the principles of order." He still bnlieved in 
free institutions, though not in such as aro forced from feebleness, nor 
in contracts extorted by popular leaders from their sovereigns, nor in 
constitutions granted to tide over a crisis. England was still his model, 
English history, in his opinion, ''the cndo of every statesman " ; and he 
was at one with Great Britain in refusing to do anything to support 
a Ituigue of which the sole object was 'Hhe absurd pretensions of absolute 
power.'* 

Another political crime soon catno to Mett^mich's assistance. On 
February 13, 1S20, the young Duke of Berry, the popular heir-pre- 
RumptiTe to the throne of France, was murdered in the Paris Opera House^. 
Upon the Kmi»er.or Alox.inder the effect of this tragedy was profound. 
He compared the crime of Louvel with that of Sand, and in doing so, 
as iNIettemich exultingly remarked, "could not better have eulogised 
the Carlsbad Decrees.'* The influence of Capodistrias was shaken ; and 
the language of the Russian Cabinet turned suddenly from that of Liberal 
CKolttttion to the frightened advocacy of reactionary measures of pre- 
caution. The triumphant progress of the military revolt, which at the 
beginning of the year had broken out in Spain, accentuated the alarms 
produced by the condition of France. 

Alexander was in a mood for vigorous measures. He suggested that 
& Conference should be summoned at Paris to discuss the general 
ntaation. He declared JiimsL-lf ready to send an army tn the name 
ofEorope to crush the revolution in Spain. He even proposed that 
the committee of Ministers of the Allied Powers should bo re-established 
at Paris to watch over the affairs of France. To the latter suggestion 
both Caatlereagh and Metlernich were vigorously opposed. Not only 
vould it bo a breach of the engagement taken with France at Alx; 
but it would excite the very ferments it was intended to Allay. As 
to the Conference, Castlereagh reiterated the objection of the British 
Gorernment to a meeting summoned with no well-defined object. The 
Alliance had been effective becauso its aims had been clear to all the 
world : let it beware of acting "on a very questionable principle of 
precaationary diplomacy, of covering itself with the myster}- of a 
ConfeFence, and above all of hazarding its great moral ascendancy by 
canying its nouncila into all the labyrintlis and quicksands of the 
iotanial politics of France." Mettemich was equally opposed to a 
Coofereoce, but for different reasons. Austria was but little touched 



L^ 



24 



Rebellion in Naples 



[K 



sea. 



by the troubles bcj-ond the Pyrenees; but European interrention, in 
the actual mood of the Tsar, would have meant the traversing of 
lier (loiuiiiions by a great Russian army ^ a far more iinniediate peril. 
Yet to refuse the Conference was for Lim not so easy a matter as for 
Castlereagh. He endeavoured to cover his defection from the sublime 
principles of the Allititiue iu a cluud of high-suuuding' phrases. 
The moral basis of the ^Vlliance was unalterable and eternal. Thii 
being so, it was still effective for the cure of the ilia of Euroj 
which were " moral." liut the troubles of Spain were *' material 
and for the Alliance to intervene would be but to augment tbera. 
Moreover, the meeting woaild have to ha one of the Jive, not of tlie 
four Powers; and would the Hritisb C'abinet, and could the FrenchJ 
Cabinet, combine with the three Courts which were more free in their'" 
actions and more independent in their choice of forms? After all, the 
four Powers, independently (non r^untt), could do all that was needful^ 
by a firm attitude and a common language. ' " 

The dispatches to the Austrian ambassadors in which Mettemich 
developed these ■\iews at enormous length were penned in June. In 
July, 1820, a military revolt broke out in Naples, and King Ferdinand 
was forced to accept the Spanish Constitution of 1812. An event which 
80 immediately tlireat*ined the stability of the Austrian system in 
Italy produced a significant change in Metternich's language. In one 
way the nearer crisis was not wholly unwelcome to him ; for it gave him 
the opportunity of diverting attention from a question little interesting 
and very delicate, to one in which, if he played his part skilfully, Austria 
and not Uussia would have the deciding voice. The affairs of S[)ain 
could awnit the settlement of those of Naples, since " General Quiroga 
would be beaten in the person of General Pepe." The right of Austria 
to interfere in the Neapolitan revolution was based on a clearer title 
than that of any, or all, of the Powers to intervene in the affairs of 
Spain. By the terms of the secret article of tlie Treaty of June lii, 1815, 
between Austria and Naples, the Neapolitan Government was bound not_ 
to introduce any constitutiunal changes other than those allowed in th^^ 
Austrian dominions in Italy; andeven the British Government admitted 
the principle that Austria had a right, under this treaty, to intervene 
if she had good reason to suppose that the events in Naples were a 
danger to herself. France and Prussia were equally amenable ; but the 
attitude of Russia was a more doubtful quantity. The Neapolitan 
Liberals had proclaimed that they had ''the moral support" of thaH 
Emperor Alexander; and, though Mettemich aiTectetl not to doubt the™ 
personal goodwill of the Tsar, the conduct of his agents had, from the 
Austrian point of view, done only too much to justify the claim. It 
became then all important for liira to destroy, ouce for all, the belief of 
the Italian Liberals that they should reckon on the powerful patronage 
of Russia. His main fear was as to the ulterior object which lay 



4 

I 

J 



behind this nnnatural coquetting of KusHta with the revolutionary 
spirit. 

In a letter, dated August 8, he explained his views to Prince Rsterlmzy, 
for communication to the British Government. For years past, he said, 
the policy of the *• pitiable creatures" who composed the Russian 
Cabinet had been directed against what they were pleased to term 
"the influence of Austria," thus confusing "the conservative principle" 
with "diplomatic iutrigue." The Emperor Alexander, it is true, had 
changed his opinions : and perha{)s the outbreak uf a series of military 
revolts would lead him to abandon his policy of ''abstract analysis" 
&nd Bulwtitute acta for words. An ostentations agreement between the 
sovereigns of Austria and Russia would, at the moment, best have served 
Mettemich's ends. Alexander chanced to be at Warsaw ; and it was 
proposed that the two Emperors shr>uld meet. But Alexander showed 
little disposiUon to bo a party to a separate understanding. He refused 
to forget the troubles of Spain in those of Italy; and the violent 
symptoms of revolutionary unreet in Europe awoke in him with re- 
doubled ardour the dream of a European Union of Guarantee which had 
been dissipated at Aix. As for the Quadruple and <juintuple Alliances, 
Capodistrias, In conversation with Ilaron Lebzeltem, denied theircontinncd 
existence, since they had been superseded b}* the Declaration of Aix, 
and declared that Russia would recognise nothing hut "a general 
association." Nothing, in short, wonld satisfy the Tsar but a Confprf-nce 
after the toodel of that of 1818. On behalf of France, the Due de 
Richelieu wrote urging the same course, on the ground that the troubles 
in Spain and Italy wore precisely the contingencies contemplated in the 
agreements made at Aix. The unexpressed motive of the French 
Goveniment was the desire to see France ranged once more in effective 
Cuucert with the other great Powers. 

Metternich, on the other hand, still made strenuous efforts to avoid 
a Conference at which he feared the dangerous Spunish Question would 
inevitably be raised, and attempted to devise a plan which should unite 
all the five Powers in support of his Italian policy without the necea- 
siiy for their meeting in council. In a formal "Proposition," dated 
August 28. and addressed to the Courts, he outlined the policy which 
Anstria proposed to pursue. In the matter of Naples, as all the Powers 
had admitted, Austria had a peculiar right to take action by reason 
both of her geographical position and of her treaty with the Neapolitan 
Government. She proposed therefore to concentrate in Itiily a force 
Bofiicient to quell " the factious," to invite the Allies to unite themselves 
"momlly " with her, and at the same time to make " frank overtures" 
lo the Courts of Italy and Germany on the state of affairs and on 
the general attitude of Austria towards them. As for the Conference 
n^gested by France and Russia, to Austria as to Prussia and Great 
Bhtain, this seemed *^ not entirely exempt from objections." A formal 



m 



Conference, such as that of Aix, would but waste precious time, and its 
moral effect would be imperilled by the fact that Great Britain "had 
not a free hand." Austria, therefore, suggested common action on more 
simple lines. Let the Allied Courts refuse to recoj^riise the revolutionary 
Government of Naples, declare all its acts void, and support through 
their Ministers the measures for its ooercioa which Austria might adopt. 
The reply of Castleraagli to tliese propositions, dated September 16, 
was unequivocal. Grout Hrilain would be no party to the suggested 
Concert, which amounted to a hostile league against Naples, and would 
make England a principal In the resulting war; whereas she would 
neither interfere forcibly in the internal concerns of Naples herself, nor 
encourage others to do so. She was prepared to stand aside and let 
Austria act, if Austria believed her safety to be menaced. The 
Conference of Ministers at Vienna would be useful, to receive the report 
of Austria and to see that nothing was done "incompatible with tho 
present system of Europe." 

This idea of tho Conference as a sort of committee of coniml, to 
guard against any possible violation by Austria of the territorial 
treaties, was hardly likely to appeal to Metternich; and, in view of 
the attitude of the British Government, he conceived that the best 
course open to him would be to fall buck upon the solemn Congress of 
the Allies suggested by Franco and Russia. After all, if England could 
be pcreuaded to send a representative, all might be well. On the 
immediate question at issue, Uaatlereagh had expressed his desire to 
leave the Austrian Government, so far as possible, unembarrassed in its 
decision, and was prepared to consider the question of a Confercnco so 
soon as Austria had clearly defined what she wanted. With the 
Neapolitan Liberals neither he, nor the British representatives in Italy, 
were the least in sympathy. In their view, the revolution in Naples was 
but a " wanton and unprovoked " imitation of that in Spain, for which 
there was no excuse in the conduct of the Government, and which 
was therefore iiifiuitely more dangerous, as "cidculated to destroy all 
confidence between Governments and their armed forces." Thus Met- 
ternich believed that» were the Conference once assembled, the Powers, 
in spite of their secret differences, would present to the world a united 
front, and show that in her Italian policy Austria had at least their 
"moral support." 

Unfortunately for the prospective harmony of the Conference, the 
memorandum in which Metternich formulated his views as to tho 
attitude it should adopt contained statements of principle utterly at 
Tariance with those on which Uritish policy was based, and scarcely less 
distasteful to France. The interests of Austria in the affair of Naples, 
he argued, were identical with those of Europe at large ; for all tho 
Powers were equally concerned in the preservation of the treaties, and 
therefore equally threatened by revolutionary movements, and equally 



I 



I 



d 



iDterested in concerting measures for their suppression. The business 
of the Coaference which it was proposed to hold at Troppau would, 
therefore, be to define by a general proposition the principles on which 
the Allies would intervene in Naples, and to proceed at once to thoir 
application. He proceeded to explain his own idea of what these prin- 
ciples should be. Uevolution, he arg^ued, might be either legitimate^ 
when initiated from above, or illegitimate, when exacted from below. 
In the former case the intervention of foreign Powers could not be 
allowed. In the latter, the signatory Powers should contract never to 
recognise chaiiges so effected, and should undertake to abolish such as 
had taken place in their own States. The reply of Castlereagh to tliis 
remarkable pronouncement was quite unei^ui vocal and, inuidentally, fur- 
nishes the key to British pohcy from Troppau to Verona. The British 
Government, he said, was prepared to fulfil all treaty obligations; but, 
if it wert' desired " to extend the Alliance so as to include all objects 
present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character 
to such an extent and carry us so far, that we should see in it an addi- 
tional motive for adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the Alliance 
jnove away from us, without our having quitted it." ^ 

This plain statement of the British point of view was mado on the 
re of the Conference, which met at Troppau on October 20,1820; and 
the constitution of this august assembly emphasised the division within 
the Concert of which it was the first conspicuous expression. The Em- 
perora Alexander and Francis were present in person; King Frederick 
William of Prussia was represented by the Crown Prince. The Cabinets 
of the Eastern Powers were represented by the Ministers respousible for 
their general policy: Austria by Metternich, Russia by Capodistriaa, 
Prussia by Hardenberg. Great Britain, on the other hand, consistently 
with her determination to take no share in the active Concert of the 
Powers, sent no minister plenipotentiary, but was re]>resented by Lord 
Stewart:, the ambassador at Vienna. France too, though her policy was 
less clearly defmed, bad given no plenary powers to her representatives. 
The inferior status of the Ministers of the two constitutional Powers, 
therefore, tended from the first to exclude them from the inner councils 
of the sovereigns, whose intimacy the friendly and simple intercourse 
in the ((niet little Silesian town was so well calculated to cement. 
Uectemich, in fact, whose leaning towards England had been due 
aaioly to his fear of the designs of Russia, soon discovered that it was 
no longer necessary for him to depend upon a Power so "-hampered 
in its forms," that it could offer nothing but " positive dangers, or but 
flight active assistance." For the Emperor Alexander hod arrived at 
Troppau a changed man, and Capodistrias seemed to have shared his 
eoaversion. To commit the Russian Emperor publicly to the Austrian 
"conservative system" became now Metternich *s supreme aim ; and he 
nicceeded beyond his hopes. In a confidential talk over a cup of tea 



he received the Taars confession and vows of amendment. " To-day,** 
said the i-epentant autocrat, " I deplore all that I said and did betnreen 
the years 1815 and 1818. 1 regret tlie time lust; we must study to re-; 
trieve it. You have eorrectly judged the condition of things. Tell mo 
what you want and what yon want of me, and 1 will do it." 

Under these circumstances Metternich thought himself in a position^ 
to ignore the views of (ireat Hrilain and France. In a series of confer- 
ences to which the representatives of the two Western Powers were not ^ 
admitted, on the excuse that they were empowered to " report," not tofl 
*' decide," was drawn up the famous preliminary protocol signed on 
November I'J by the three Powei-s. " States which Iiave uudergoue a 
change of government due to revolution," it ran, " the results of which 
threaten other States, ipno facto cease to be niembere of the liuropean 
Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guai^ 
aiitees for legal order and stability. If, owing to such alterations, 
immediate danger threatens other States, the Powers bind themselves, 
by peaceful means, or If need be by arms, to bring back the guilty State 
into the bosom of the Great Alliance." 

The moral effect of the Troppau Protocol was, none the less, likely 
to be greatly weakened by the conspicuous disapproval of two of the five 
great Powers: and Mett«rnicb still }ioped to remedy this defect. IIo 
pointed out that the Protocol only asserted a principle to which any 
constitutional State might assent, since it applied exclusively to internal 
affairs having an external effect, and did but guarantee legitimate power, 
as the Alliance gnaranteed territorial possession, against force. Ue 
hoped for the " mural support "' even of those Powere who could not sign, 
since his object was but to prove to the world '' that the Emperor of 
Russia is not in favour of revolutions, and to bind him to the protections 
of StaU«." To these advances France, anxiona to remain on good terms 
with the Allies, replied by giving a general adhesion to the Protocol, 
but with several reservations which she placed on record. Castlereagh, 
on the other hand, was obdurate. In the long dispatch of December 16, ^ 
in which he instructed Lord Stewart to refuse his assent to the Protocol, H 
he presented a masterly criticism of its provisions. lie denied the claim 
that these grew logically out of Article 5 of the Treaty of November 
20, 1815, which applied only to France, and bound the contracting ■ 
. Powere to no more than to deliberate together with a view to guarding 
I against a common danger ; certainly not to an immediate armed inter- 
vention whenever and wherever revolution might show itself. He 
pointed out that the Protocol would defeat its own ends by seeming to h 
separate the sovereigns from their peoples and to base the security of ^ 
thrones upon foTtsign aid. Moreovei-. if, as he supposed, its provisions 
were to be made reciprocal, ** would the great Powers of Europe be 
prepared to admit the principle thai their territories were to be' 
thrown open to each other's approach upon cases of assumed uece^It 



expediency, of wliich, not the party receiving aid, but tbe party ad- 
'ministering it, waa to be tbe judge?'* The Britinh (jcivemmont at least 
protested agiiinst any attempt to consider sucli a principle a», under any 
conceivable circumstances , applicable to tbo British dominions ; and it 
followed that it protested equally against any syaiematic application of 
it to tbe internal concerns of other States. Great Britain, in short, 
)uld be no party to a system wiiich seemed "to lead to tlie creation 

a species of general government in Europe, with a superintend- 
ing Directory, destructive of all correct notions of internal sovereign 
authority/' and conld not '* charge itiielf, as a member of the Alliance, 
with the moi-al responaihility of administering a general Eurojwaan 
police of this description." 

Meanwhile the (Conference at Troppau had adjourned without coming 
to any decision on the It^ilian Question beyond that of continuing the 
conferences at Laibncb in January, and inviting the King of Naples 
to attend them. With this plan the Hiitish (rovemnient was in ^ree- 
ment ; and Castlereagh duly noted that the invitation to tbe King, '*as 
iplying negotiation," had tended to calm the ferment in Naples. 
England, while willing to send a Bqiiadron to watch over the safety of 
le Neapolitan royal family, and ** arrest disorder,*' would maintain a 
trict neutrality. From Vienna, meanwhile, Stewart reported that 

itlereagh's dispatch had created consternation in diplomatic circles, 
and that the reactionary Powers were showing signs of repenting their 
precipitancy in the matter of the Trnppau Protocol. This altitude 
was, in fact, disingenuous, and was dictnted by tbe fear that 'Great 
Britain might at the last moment refuse to send a representative to 
Laibacb. and thus advertise the disunion of the Allies to all the world. 
It succeeded; but tbe outcome wa3 hardly less un satis factoiy to the 
reactionary Powers than if it had failed. 

From tbe point of view of Europe at large the most important out- 
come of the (Conference of Laibach was the further widening of the rift 
within tbo Alliance, which at Veiona waa to develop into a permanent 
uid open breach. The Biitish Government was as little anxious as any 
other member of the Alliance to take any overt measure the result of 
_whicb would lie to weaken the (concert which it boUevod tx> Im) essential 

the safety of Europe- But the attitude of the other Powers left it 
lo choice. To Mettemich and those who thought with him it seemed 
all important that the armeil intervention of Austria should be bucked 
by the apparent moral support of all tbe allied Powers ; and to secure 
this every effort was made to force or to eutmp tbe representative of 
Great Britain into agreeing to a formula which, in the eyes of the world, 
would have committed England to the principles of the other Allies. 

in tile midst of angry discussions, in the coui-se of which it was even 
saggeat«d that be should not be admitted to the conferences. Lord Stewart 
stood firm ; and, when Capodistriaa begau to read to the assembled 



Italian plenipotentiaries what waa in effect a recapittiiatioD of the 
principles of the Troppau Protocol, be intermpted with the remark that, 
if the Rossian Minister thought it wise to proceed now to **a new 
development of their former seatimentft," he would hare to ** insert 
upon the Uce of the proceedings " the exactly opposite views of the 
British (Joremment. The attempt to revive the Troppau Protocol, 
ioAtedt which Alexander now declared to be essential to the safety of 
Europe, necessitated a formal protest ; and. to the dismay of the 
reactionary C^atHnets, Stewart insisted on adding a declaration to 
the Journals, making it clear that Great Britain was not at one with tlie 
Allied sovereigns in this matter. The bitterness created by this attitude, 
wrote Tx)rd Stewart, was very evident; and the tH«acb within the 
Alliance was scarcely less so. To the Declaration issned at the close 
of the Conference Great Britain had little objection to make; bat in 
their circular dispatches and instructions to their Ministers the three 
Powers had used a laiigui^e which, as " a development o( the Protocol," 
they knew could not but be highly displeasing to both France and 
Great Britain. In the Russian circular, Count Nesselrode declared that 
in assuming their attitude towards the troubles in Naples the Powers 
were acting in ** the cause of Europe, of law. and of the treaties " ; 
which implied that Great Britain, by holding aloof, had betrayed Europe 
and been false to her treat>' obligations. Moreover, the Tsar's idea of 
a Univeraal Union, so often repudiated, reapjtearcd undisguised and 
unashamed. " As an intimate union," he wrote. '* has been e^tabLiahed 
by solemn acts between all the European Powers, the Emperor offers to 
the Allies the aid of his arms, in case new overturns shouUI threaten 
new dangers." It was iu this spirit that 100,000 Russians liad reoeiYed 
the order to march when the news came of the revolt in Piedmont. " In 
short," wrote Stewart from Vienna on March 20, ** there can be little 
doubt from the complexion of these instruments that a Triple Under- 
standing has been created which binds the parties to carry forward their 
own views in spite of any difference of opinion which may exist between 
them and the two great constitutional Governments." It is clear that, 
but for the acute developments during the next few montlis of two 
questions which once more profoundly modified the relations of the 
Powers, the avowed split in the Alliance, which, after 18S0, was to place 
the two Western Powers in more or less general opposition to the three 
autocratic monarchies, might have been anticipated by several years. 

Of these questions by far the most immediately critical was that which, 
about this time, tirat became known as the Elastera Question. It emerged, 
with dramatic suddenness, during the Conference of Laibach, with 
the news, which reached the Emperor Alexander on March 19, of 
Ypeilauti's invasion of Moldavia, followed a month later by that of the 
national uprising of the Greeks in the Morea, It« developments, diplo- 
matic and other will be dealt with elsewhere. Here it will suffice tosav 



[831] 



The EasUm Question. — Sjxiin 



31 



that it teuded to draw closer together the two Powers, Austria and 
Great Britain, mo6t inteiesU^d in the preservation of the lutegrity of the 
Ottoman Empire ; and thnt, for tlie moment, It braced up the loosening 
bonds of the Urand Alliance, an the mo6t obvious instrument for pre- 
veiiting tlie isolated action of Russia. The second question, destined 
to have momentous consequences, was raised by the attitude of the 
uUra-Royalist Government of France toward the continued unrest in 
Spain ; the immediate consequence of which was to draw the two con- 
stitQtional Powers apart, bring France for a while into line with the 
policy of the autocratic Powers, and lead nltimately to the proclamation 
of England's breach with the Continent of Europe. 

The unrest in Spain had never ceased to grow since the revolution ' 
in 1820; and in France, where the ultra- Royalists were now in power 
under the able leadership of Villele, a clamour arose for intervention, to 
suppress a revolutionary licence which threatened to infect France her- 
Klf, and to avenge the insults offered to a monarch of the House of 
Bourbon. In August, 1S21, an epidemic of yellow fever in Spain gave> 
the French Government an excuse for establishing on the border a coi-ps 
of observation, on pretext of forming a sanitary cordon, and this was 
^kadually increased, till it cambered a hundred thousand men ; nor was 
^ withdrawn when the peril of physical infection was past. The hotter- 
heftds of the Government^ in fact^ were not averse fi'om the attempt to 
tdd lustre to the restored monarchy by a successful revival of the old 
policy of the Bourbon monarchy towards Spain. But Villele himself 
saw the necessity for caution. For Great Britain the Treaty of Utrecht 
was by no means a dead letter ; and the British Government, after pour- 
jg out the blood and treasure of the nation in driving Napoleon out of 
Be Peninsula, was not prepared to allow its peaceful occupation by hia 
Beoflssor. It held, moreover, a powerful weapon in reserve. The in- 
^^wndence of the Spanish Colonies in America was already established 
^ facto \ and though Dritish IMinisters did not yet think the time ripe, 
they were prepared to recognise them as existing de Jure rather than 
ran the risk of any attempt of a European alliance to reconquer them, 
or of any of them passing under the flag of France. In face of this 
attitude of Great Britain, therefore, France shrank from isolated action, 
aod before attempting to interfere in Spain decided to obtain, if pos- 
sible, the sanction of the European Concert. 

Before the dinisolutioii of the Congress at Laibach, in the spring of 
U it had Iwen decided that it should moct again at Verona in the 
imn of the following 3'ear. Metternich still had hopes of winning 
Great Britain U\ his views. From his standpoint the condition of 
inrope was becoming every year more alarming ; and the Torj* Govem- 
ment, ho well knew, had little sympathy with popular agitations, or with 
the attitude of the I^iberals in the south-German Chambers, which in 
Bftden had produced a legislative deadlock, and in Bavaria had driven 



30 



Diinsion in Europe 



[182] 



Italian plenipotentiaries what waa in effect a recapitulalion of the 
principles of the Troppau Protocol, he interrupted with the remark that, 
if the Russian Minister thought it wise to proceed now to "a new 
development of their former sentimenta," he would have to ** insert 
upon the face of tlio procoedingB " the exactly op^iosite views of the 
British Govenunent. The attempt to revive the Troppau Protocol, 
indeed, which Alexander now declared to be essential to the safety of 
ICurope, necessitated a fnrnml protest ; and, to the dismay of the 
reactionary Cabinets* Stewart insisted on adding a declaration to 
the Journals, making it clear tlutt Great IJritain was not at one with the 
Allied sovereigns in this matter. The bitterness created by this attitude, 
wrote Lord Stewart, was verj- evident; and the breach within the 
Alliance was scarcely less so. To the Declaration i^isued at the oIom ^ 
of the Conference Great Britain had little objection to make; bat iafl 
their circular dispatches and instructions to their Ministers the three 
E'owershad used a language whieh, as *'a development of the Protocol," 
they knew could not but be highly displeasing to both Franco and 
Great Britain. In the Russian circular. Count Nesselrodo declared that 
in assuming their attitude Lowards the troubles in Naples the Pnweni 
were acting in "the cause of P^^urope, of Law, and of the treaties": 
which implied that Great Britain^ by holding aloof, had betmjed Europe 
and been false to her treaty obligations. Moreover, the Tsar's idea of 
a Univenal Union, so often repudiated, reappeared undisguised and 
unashamed. " As an intimate union," he wrote, "has been established 
by solemn acts between all the European Powers, the Emperor offers tO' 
the Allies the aid of his arms^ in case new overturns should threaten 
new dangers." It was in this spirit that 100,000 Russians had received 
the order to march when the news came of the revolt in Piedmont. •* Is 
short," wrote Stewart from Vienna on March 20, " there can be littU 
doubt from the com[>luxion of these instruments that a Triple Under- 
standing has been created which binds the parties to cairy forward their 
own views in spite of any difference of opinion which may exist between 
them and the two great constitutional Governments." It is clear thatt 
but for the acute developments during the next few months of two 
questions which once more profoundly modified tlie relations of tho 
Powers, the avowed split in the Alliance, which, after 1 8S0, was to p 
the two Western Powers in more or less general opposition to the thri 
autocratic monarchies, might have been anticipated by several years. 

Of these questions byfar the moat immediatelycritical was thatwhicb, 
about this time, firet became known as the Eastern Question. It emer, 
with dramatic suddenness, during the Conference of Laibach, wi 
the news, which reached the Emperor Alexander on March 19, o: 
Ypsilanti's invasion of Moldavia, followed a month later by that of the 
national uprising of the Greeks in the Moroa. Its dovulopmentB, diplo- 
matic and other wilt be dealt witli elsewhere. Here it will suffice toj 



I 



I 



1821] 



The Eastern Question. • — Spain 



81 



that it tended to draw closer together the two Powers, Anstiia and 
Great Britnin, most interested in llie preservation of the integrity of the I 
OttoTDHik Empire ; and that, for the moment, it braced up the loosening ' 

K bonds of the (jrand Alliance, as the most obvious instrument for pre- 
senting Uie isolated action of Russia. The second question, deetined 
bo have momentous consequences, was raised by the attitude of the 
kltTft-Royalist Government of France toward the continued unrest in 
Spain ; the immediate consequence of which was to draw the two con- 
stLtutional I'owers apart, bring France for a while into line with the 
policy of the autocratic Powers, and lead ultimately to the proclamation 
of EngUnd'a breach with the Continent of Europe. 

The unreat in Spain had never ceased to grow since the revolution ' 
in 1H20; and in France, where tlie ultra-Royalists were now in power 
under the able leadership of ViUele, a clamour arose for intervention, to 

IBUpprees a revolutionary licence which threatened to infect Franco her- 
lelf, and to avenge the insults offered to a monarch of the House of 
Bourbon. Jn August, 1821, an epidemic of yellow fever in Spain gave ^ 
jiie French Government an excuse for establishing on the border a coi-ps 
Bf otMervntion, on pretext of forming a sanitary cordon, and this was 
gradually increased, till it numbered a hundred thousand men ; nor was 
it withdra\vn when the i>eril of physical infection was past- Tlie hotter- 
heads of the Government, in fact, were not averse from the attempt to 
add lustre to the restored monarchy by a succetsbful revival of the old 
policy of the Hourbon monarchy towards Spain. But Villelo himself 
ttw the necessity for caution. For Great Britain the Treaty of Utrecht 
was by no means a dead letter ; and the British Government, after pour- 
ing out the blood and treasure of the nation in driving Napoleon out of 
tlK Peninsula, was not prepared to allow its peaceful occupation by his 
saoranor. It held, moreover, a powerful weapon in reserve. The in- 
dependence of the Spanish Colonies in America was alread}' established 
ifc/orfo; and though British Ministers did not yet tliink the time ripe, 
ibey were prepared to recognise them as existing de Jure rather than 
ran the risk of any attempt of a European alliance to reconquer them, 
or of any of them passing under the flag of France. In face of this 
attitude of Great Britain, therefore, France shrank from isolated action, 
and before attempting to interfere in Spain decided to obtain, if poa- 
<iUe. the sanction of tlie European Concert. 

Before the dissolution of the Congress at Laibach, in the spring of 

*21, it had been decided that it should meet again at Verona in the 

itumn of the following year. Mettemich still had hoi>es of winning 

Groat Britain Ut his views. From his standpoint the condition of 

was becoming every year more alarming ; and tlie Torj* Govern* 

nt, he well knew, had little sympathy with popular agitivtions, or with 

■* Mido of the Lilwrals in the south-German Chambers, which in 

id produced a legislative deadlock, and in Bavaria had driven 



30 



Division in Europe 



[1821 



Italian plenipotentiaries what was in effect a recapitulation of the 
principles of the Troppau Protocol, he interrupted with the remark that, 
if the Russian Minister thought it wise to proceed now to "a new 
dovelopment of their former eentimenta/' he would have to ** insert 
upon the face of the proceedinga " the exactly opposite views of the 
British Government. The attempt to revive the Troppau Protocol, 
indeed, which Alexander now declared to be essential to the safety of 
Europe, necessitated a formal protest ; and, to the dismay of the 
reactionary Cabinets, Stewart insisted on adding a declaration to 
the Journals, making it clear that Great Britain was not at one with the 
Allied sovereigns in this matter. The bitterness created by this attitude, 
wrote Ijord Stewart, was very evident ; and the breach within the 
Alliance was scarcely less so. To the Declaration issued at the close 
of the Conference Great liritain had little objection to make; but in 
their circular dispatches and instructions to their Ministers the three 
Powers had used a language which, as " a development of the Protocol," 
they knew could not but be highly displeasing to both France and 
Grciit Britain. In the Russian circular, Count Nesselrode declared that 
in aasuraing their attitude towards the traubles in Naples the Powers 
were acting in "the cause of Europe, of law, and of the treaties"; 
which implied that Great Britain, by holding aloof, had betrayed Europe 
and been false to her treaty obligations. Moreover, the Tsars idea of 
a Universal Union, so often repudiated, reappeared undisguised and 
unashamed. ''^As an intimate union," he wrote, ^Mias been established 
by solemn actfi between all the European Powers, the Emperor offers to 
the Allies the aid of his arms, in case new overturns should threaten 
new dangers." It was in this spirit that 100,000 Russians had received 
the order to march when the news came of the revolt in Piedmont. '* In 
short," wrote Stewart from Vicuna on March 20, *' there can be little 
doubt from the complexion of these instruments that a Triple Under- 
standing has been created which binds the parties to caiTy forward their 
own views in spite of any difference of opinion which may exist between 
them and the two great constitutional Governments." It is clear that, 
but for the acute developnietits during the next few months of two 
questioua which once more profoundly moditied the relations of the 
Powers, the avowed split in the Alliance, which, after 1830, was to place 
the two Western Powers in more or less general opposition to the three 
autocratic monarchies, might have been anticipatec) by several years. 

Of these questions hyfar the most immediatelycritical was thatwhich, 
about this time, first became known as the Eastern Question. It emerged, 
with dramatic suddftunoss, during the Conference of Laibach, with 
the news, which reached the Emperor Alexander on March 19, of 
Ypflilunti's invasion of Moldavia, followed a month later by that of the 
national uprising nf the Greeks in the Morea. Its developments, diplo- 
matic and other will be dealt with elsewhere. Here it will suffice tosav 



I] 



The Eastern Question. — Spain 



31 



that it tended to draw closer together the two Powers, Austria and 
Great Britain, most interested in the preservation of the integrity of the 
'Ottoman Eujpire ; and that, for the moment, it braced up the loosening 
bondfl of the Grand Alliance, as the most obvious instrument for pre- 
venting the isolated action of Russia. The second question, destined 
to have momentous consequeuceSt was raised by the attitude of the 
ultra- Hoy nlist CJovemment of France to^vard the continued unrest in 
Spain ; the immediate consequence of which was to draw the two con- 
stitutional Fowcra apart, bring France for a while into line with the 
policy of the autocratic Powers, and lead ultimately to the proclamation 
of England's breiich with the Cuutiiieut of Europe. 

tThe unrest in Spain had never ceased to grow since the revolution 
1820; and in France, where the ultra- Royal is ts were now in power 
ander the able leadership of VlUele, a clamour arose for intervention, to 
suppress a revolutionary licence whioli threatened to infect France her- 
self, and to avenge the insults offered to a monarch of the House of 
Bourbon. In August, 1821^ an epidemic of yellow fever in Spain gave - 
the French Government an excuse for establishing on the border a corps 
of obttervation, on jirctext of forming a sanitary cordon, and tbis was 
gradually increased, till it numbered a hundred thousand men ; nor was 
it withdrawn when the peril of physical infection was past. The hotter- 
heads of the Government', in fact, were not averse from the attempt to 
add lustre to the restored monarchy by a successful revival of the old 
^Ucy of the Bourbon monarchy towards Spain. But Villele himself 
|hw Uie necessity for caution. For Great Britain the Treaty of Utrecht 
was by no moans n dcitxl letter ; and the British Government, after pour- 
out the blood and treasure of the nation in di-iving Napoleon out of 
Peninsula, was not prepared to allow its peaceful occupation by his 
jor. It held, moreover, a powerful weapon in reserve. The in- 
mdence of the Spanish Colonies in America was already established 
(ie/d^o; and though British Ministers did not yet think the time ripe, 
they were prepared to recognise them as existing de jure rather than 
ran the risk of any attempt of a European alliance to reconquer them, 
or of any of them passing under the flag of France. In face of this 
attitude of Great Briuiin, therefore, France shrank from isolated action, 
and before attempting to interfere in Spain decided to obtain, if pos- 
sible, the sanction of tlie Europtaii Concert. 

Before the dissolution of the Congress at Laibach, in the spring of 
H21, it had been decided that it should meat again at Verona in the 
Imtaxnn of the following year. Metternich still had hopes of winning 
over (treat Britain to hia views. From his standpoint the condition of 
Eorope was becoming every year more alarming ; and the Tory Govern* 
oieat, he well knew, bad little sympathy with popular agitations, or with 
the attitude of the Liberals in the south-German Chambers, which in 
len had produced a legislative deadlock, and in Bavaria had driven 



the King to petition the Powers for aid againgt tlie ConBtitution he had 
himself granted. CasUereagh, indeed, wa8 iis averse as ever from com- 
mitting Great Britain to the policy of the continental Powoi-s; but in 
the Eastern Question, now every day increasing iu seriousness, lie and 
Metternich stood on common ground which suggested the expediency 
of a closer understanding between them. In October, 1821, accordingly, 
during the visit of King George IV to Hanover, the two statesmen met 
in conference. A meeting apparently of so sinister an import for the 
ioture of liberty seemed to some, at the moment, of doubtful expedi- 
ency; and Castlereagh thought it necessary to justify his action. »* Had 
the question beeu of an ordinary character," he wrote to Gordon, "and 
involving the form of government under wliich any portion of Europe 
was to subsist (as that uf Naples lately did), 1 should have felt as you 
have done about an iuterview with Prince Metteruich, that it might 
lead to more nni.se and jealousy thiin was worth encountering . . . but 
the question of Turkey is of a totally different character, and one which 
in England we regard, not as a theoretical, but as a practical considera- 
tion of the greatest mnment.*' 

Alexniider's idea of a " universal union " of guarantee proved now 
a convenient diplomatic weapon in the hands of those who desired to 
prevent his intervention in Turkey. In a confidential memorandum, 
dated Hanover, October 22, Metternich defined the Austrian policy aa 
the maiutenftnce of peace on tfie haai» of exigting treaties. He would 
press the Porte to yield on those points at issue on whicli Russia's treaty 
rights were clear ; but he refused to consider the question of wax. 
"There exists," he wrote, "an explicit engagement on the part of 
Russia that the Emperor will on no ground separate himself from the 
conservative principles of the Alliance. It is to this declaration that 
the Emperor of Austrin has attached the moral guarantee which he has 
been invited by his august ally to accord to him." On October 28, 
Castlereagh, writing to Sir Charles Bagot at St Petersburg, pursued the 
same line of argument. He refused to answer the Taar's question as to 
what Great Britain would do in the event of war and the overthrow of 
the Ottoman Power. Whatever his personal sympathy with the cause 
of the Greeks might bo, the preservation of the peace of Europe was of 
paramount importance ; and he could not reconcile it with his sense of 
duty " to embark on a scheme for new modelling the position of the 
Greek population at the hazard of all the destructive confusion and dis- 
union which such an attempt would lead to, unt only within Turkey, but 
in Europe. The nature of the Turkish power was fully understood, when 
the existing state of Europe, indttdinp that of Turkey, was placed under 
the provident caro and anxious protection of the general Alliance." 
This bold claim to extend the objects of the Alliance so aa to cover 
not only the Acts of Vienna, which all had signed, but all other ex- 
isting territorial treaties, might have left the Tsar unconvinced, bad 



I 
I 

I 



I 
I 



^^ 




Jiis personal iDcUuations coincidetl with those of his people. As it was, 
Wetternich's diplomacy, backed by Castlereagh, triumphed; tho Russian 
E)m]>eror sacrificed the prestige of [lusuia in tlio East to his druuni of 
a fuilcrated Euixfpe, and consented to aend his representative to take 
counsel with the Allies at the preliminaiy conferences at Vienna in 
September, 1822. lie himself would be present at those at Verona- 
a month later. Castlerejigh, now JMartjuis of Londonderrjs \vz3 on tho 
eve of setting out for the conferences when, on August 12, hia tragio 
death placed tho guidance of the foi-eigu policy of England in other 
bauds. 

Though the masterful personality and more brilliant imagination of 
leoi^ Canning wure sure, sooner or later, to give a new tone to tlie 
IftDgunge of the British Cabinet in foreign affairs, his acceptance of the 
office opened to him. at last, by CaHtleroagli's death, made no breach in 
the continuity of the policy of the Governraent. In view of the urgency 
of the crisis in the East, the presence of a British plenipotentiary at 
Verona was considered essential. The Duke of Wellington was now 
selected as the British representative; and his iiwtructions were those 
which I>ord Londonderry, with the ajiproval of the King and the 
ibineti had dmwn up for his own guidance. 

The main subjects to be discussed were three: the Turkish Question, 
'''Qiat of Spain and the Spanish Colonies, and the affairs of Italy. As to 
the last of these, Great Britain not having charged herself with any 
superintendence of a system in which she had merely acquiesced, the 
duty of tho British Minister would only bo to keep himself informed and 
to see thatnotliing was done "inconsistent with tho Kuropeau system and 
the treaties." As to the Greek Question, tho instructions foreshadowed 
the later action of Canning. The successes of tho Greeks and '* the 
progress made by them towards the formation of a Government, together 
with the total paralysis of the Ottoman naval power in the Levant," 
pointed to the fact that, sooner or later, Great Britain would be forced 
to recognise the belligerent rights of a de facto Government in the 
Morea. As to any proposal for joint intervention, care must be taken 
Dot to commit (treat Britain beyond the limits of good oQjces. Any 
•QgagQinent in the nature of a guarantee was altogetlier inadmissible. 

On the Spanish Question, which was destined at tho Congress to 
OTerehadow all others, the language of the instructions was quite 
unequivocal ; there was to be "a rigid abstinence from any interference 
in the internal affairs of that coiintrj'." Aa to the Spanish Colonies, 
these would be recognised by ottier States, sooner or later, should the 
iBotber-country not re-establish her authority within a given time ; 
nd it would be to the interest of Spain herself to '• tiiid the means 
oE restoring an intercourse, when she cannot eacceed in restoring 
i> domiaion." Meanwhile, the British plenipotentiary was to draw 
Ktention to the commerce between England and the revolted Colonies, 

r. ». H. X. 8 



whicli it was impossible to interrupt. Great Britain had already recog- 
nised tlie df- facto existence of the Spanish Americ!\n Republics ; there 
was no immediate necessity for rrc^O);fnising their existence (h Jure, "so 
as to create a certain impediment to the assertion of the rijjhts of the 
former occupant" ; but it was a question how long it would be possible 
to postpone such recognition as would be implied bj the appointment of 
diplora;itic agents. Great Britain would be glad to "obtain a concert" in 
this matter, but not«ueh as to hamper her independence of action. Thus 
were the principles defined of that policy which culminated, two years 
later, in the i-ecognition by Canning of the South American Republics, 

The aloofness of (tipat Britain from the other Powers was from the 
first made evident. The Duke of Wellington, as Minister Blenipo- 
t«ntiary, was instructed not to go to Verona until the affairs of Italy 
had been settled tliere. His place, meanwhile, was to be taken by Lord 
Londonderry (Lord Stewart), Caatlereagh's half-brother and successor 
in the title, who was to act in the same capacity as at Troppfui and 
Laibach. Meanwhile, in a series of dispatches to Wellington, Canning 
confirmed and elaborated the instruotions of which he was the bearer. 
In the Turkish Question, as between Greeks and Turks, Great Britain 
could be no party to any intervention in the internal affaii-s of any nation; 
as between Turks and Bussians, she would insist on the olwervance of 
the treaties. In the matter of Spain, her objection to intervention had 
been confirmed by subsequent events, notably by the ill-concealed am- 
bitions of the House of Braganaa, which hoped to profit by a French 
invasion. As to the American Colonies, England could be no party to 
any declaration affirming the rights of Spain over them, so as to fetter 
the disci"etion of the British Government. Indeed, in his opinion, 
before the meeting of Parliament^ " the course of events, the interests 
of commerce, and the state of riavlgatiou in the American seas" would 
oblige the Cabinet " to come to some uudersttinding, more or less distinct, 
with some of those self-elected GovemmentB." 

Wellington, for his part, perceived while yot at Vienna that the 
Cojji^reaces at Verona would " turn almost entirely upon the affairs of 
Spain." Now that the inflnenee of Gapodistrias had Ijeen removed by 
his dismissal, Melternich, who had become, accordiug to Wellington, 
the Russian Emperor's "principal adviser," found little diflioulty in 
impressing liis views upon the Tsar ; and the attitude of the Powers 
towards the Eastern Question had l>eeii settled, in the preliminary confer- 
ences at Vienna, in a sense agreeable to Austria. When, on October 20, 
the Conferences at Verona were opened, the first and only question raised 
was that of Spain, and, with the broader qnestinna of principle involved 
in it, it occupied practically the whole j>eriod of the Congress. 

The discussion was opened by three questions formally propounded 
by Montmorency in the name of the French Government : (1) Would 
the Allies withdraw their Ministers from Madrid iu the eveat of 



I 



I 



I 



I 
I 

1 



I 



1822] 



The Spanish Qitcstwn 



35 



I 



Prance being forced to do so? (2) In case of war, under what form 
and by what acts would the Powers give France their moral support, so 
as to give to lier action all the force of the Allumce, and inspire a 
salutary fear in the revolutionaries of all countries ? (3) What material 
aid would the Powers give, if asked by France to intervene, under 
restrictions which she would declaie and they would recognise ? The 
sitnatinn created by the French memorandum is luminously described 
by Wellington in a letter to Canning dated October 29. The funda^ 
mental difficulty lay in the false position in which France bad placed 
berself by her action in Spain fiiiioe 1820; the embarrass men t of 
the Emperor Alexander with his army, which he desired to keep 
occupied ; and the fact that the German Powers felt it necessary to 
humour him in order to prevent his attacking Turkey. The reply 
of Alexander to the French enquiries had been as prompt as discon- 
certing. Already at Vienna he had made it clear to WL'llington that 
be was in favour of European iuterveutioii, and had expressed his 
surprise on learning that Villele intended to keep the question " wholly 
French." He now jiroposed to march 150,000 Russians through Germany 
to Piedmont, where they would be in au excellent position for attacking 
Jacobinism either in Spain or in France. This was a solution which 
appealed to Metternich and Jlontmorcncy as little as to Wellington. 
The French Minister "told the Tsar in positive terms " that any move- 
ment of trooj^s would be injurious to France; «nd tho Austrian and 
British Ministers combined to persuade him of the perils which would 
attend any such demonstration. The unanimity of the other Powers, 
however, 8top[ied with their opposition to the heroic measures of the 
fiujisian Emperor, and in spite of the efforts of the Allies to refrain 
from holding any language in which Great Britain could not go along 
with them, four days of "confidential communications " were suffioient 
to reveal a fundamental divergence of view between Great Britain and 
the continental Powers. 

Wellington, who from the wealth of his personal experience pointed 
Out to the Frt-nch Minister the peculiar danger of an invasion of 
Spain, proposed that France should declare her intention of maintain- 
ing peace, and should invite the good olTices of one of the Allies 
to explain this to the Spanish Government. The proposal broke 
dawn, because Great Britain, recognised as the only possible mediator, 
was too much interested in the questions at issue to he acceptable to 
Krance. Failing this, Mettcrnich suggested that all the Powers should 
ipeak, BO as to prove to Spain that France had their support ; and 
Montmorency proposed that their common language should ho based 
tipon the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle. But Wellington had already made 
clear that Great Britain would be no i»arty to any common declara- 
'ttoo or treatj* whatsoever. Mctteniich, therefore, suggested that the 
Allies should "^hold a common language, but in separate notes, though 



36 



Great Britain abandons the Concert 



[1822-3 



I 



uniform in their principles and their objects." Tliis solution was 
adopted by the continental Powers ; and Welliiiptou, true; to his instruc- 
tions not to countenance any intervention in Spanish affaire, took no 
part in the conferences that followed. On October 30 the Powers 
handed in their formal replies to the French memorandum. RuHsia, 
Austria, and Prussia would aut as France should in respect to their 
MintfiteK in Spain, and would give to Fiuncc every countenance and 
asKistanoe she might require, " the cause for such assistance^ and the 
period, and the mode of giving- it, being reserved to bo specified In a 
treaty." Wellington, on the other hand, on behalf o£ Great Britain, 
replied that, "having no knowledge of the cause of dispute, and not 
being able to form a judgment upon a hypothetlual case, he could give 
no answer to any of the questions.'' 

Attempts were made so to adjust the form of the intervention of 
the Powers as to avoid an open breach with Great Britain. But 
the interests of Great Britain were, in fact, too immediately involved 
to make any compromiae with the principle of non -inter vention on the 
occasion possible; and when, on April 7, 1823, a French army of 
95,000 men, uitder th» Duke uf Angoulume, crossed the Itidassoii, the 
experiment of a " Confederation of Europe," ruled by a council of the 
great I'owers, was at an end. 

This outcome revealed to all the world the essential weakness of the 
foundations on which the claim of the Alliance to govern Europe rested. 
Tlio dictatorship of the Allies was, in fact, as much a usurpation as the 
Napoleonic Empire which they had overthrown ; and it could survive only 
80 long as their own interests did not come ilito violent conflicL This 
had been the argument of the Emperor Alexander in his peraistent 
efforts to base his " universal union '* on the broader foundation of the 
Holy Alliance; and his opinion had been backed by the attitude of 
the minor States. The King of Sweden had protested at Aix-la- 
Chapelle against the dictatorship of tlie great Powers ; and after 
Verona, the King of Wiirttemberg, in a circular note signed by Prince 
Wintzingerode and dated January 2, 1823, had renewed the protest 
against the attitude of the Powers which had ** inherited the influence 
arrogated by Napoleon in Europe,'' and had claimed for all sovereign 
States a voice in iaternafcional councils. The open defection of Great 
Britain shook to its foundations the international structure on which, 
according to Metleniich, the safety of Euroi>e still rested. It was not 
that the attitude of the British Government was based on any new 
principle, or that its language differed essentially from that whichjthad 
always held. It was rather that, in the mouth of Canning, the old 
phrases had become infnsed with a new spirit. Castlereagh had 
lamented the loosening of the international ties which, as he rightly 
bcliercd, had done so much to secure the stability of the new order in 
Eurojie. To Canning they were but a drag on the free initiative of 



1823] 



The policy of Canninff 



37 



■r^ 



Great Britain ; and he made no secret of his satisfaction at their breach. 
In a letter of January 8, 1823, to Sir Charles liagot at St Petersburg, he 
wrote exultantly of "the issue of Verona, which has split the one and 
indivisible Alliance into three parts as distinct as the constitutions of 
England, France, and Muscovy." The thrue autocratic Courts might 
threaten the Spanish Government, should it prove refractory, with the 
resentment of collective Europe ; but the policy of the French, as of the 
iiritisb. Cabinet was now directed, not by European, but by national 
considerations. " .So things are getting back to a wholesome state again. 
Every nation for itself, and God for us all- The time for Areopagus, 
and the like of that, is gone by." In vain Mettei'nich tried to restoi-e 
the broken harmony of the Concert. To Sir Henry Wellesley, the 
Mtish ambassador at Vienna, be complained of the tone of speeches in 
'arliament, of the licence allowed to popular agitation in favour of 
'revolutionary movementa, and declared that Great Britain was in danger 
of losing her intluence in the Alliance. In a letter to Wellesley of 
September Ifi. 1823, Canning replied in language too clear to be mis- 
understood. The policy of the British Government continued to be 
what it bad consistently been throughout. There was no intention of 
breaking with the Alliance, so far as this confined itself to carrying out 
the intentions with which it had been originally formed, and which were 
defined by treaty. "England is under no obligation to interfere, or to 
assist in interfering, in the internal concerns of independent nations. 
The speciBc eugugemeut to interfere in France is au exception so 
stadioualy particularised as to prove the rule. The rule I take to be, 
that our engagements have reference wholly to the state of territorial ^^..^ 
possession settled at the Peace ; to the state of affairs between nation 
ud nation ; not (with the single exceptinn above stated) to the afTairs of 
uy nation within itself. I thought the public declaration of my pre- 
decessor had set this question entirely at rest." As for the position of 
England in the .\lliance — "What is the influence we have Imt! in the 
Connsela of the Alliance, and which Prince Metternich exhorts us to be 
io careful not to throw away ? We protested at Laibach ; we remon- 
itrated at Verona. Our protest was treated as waste-paper ; our 
remonstrances mingled with the air. Our influence, if it is to be 
maintained abroad, must be Rocure in the sources of strength at home; 
ttd the sources of that strength arc in the sympathy between the people 
ud the Government; in the union of the public sentiment with the 
j pabUc counsels; in the reciprocal confidence and coHitperation of the 
^^^OQM of Commons and the Crown." 

^B It is not surprising that language, so well justified from the 

^^ritish point of view, but from the continental point of view so 

, "insular." should have led Metternich to speak of Canning as "the 

aalevolent meteor hurled by an angry Providence upon Europe." Even 

hftd Metternich been by temperament Inclined Ut ** trust the people," 




.dbiiiailii 



38 Frmn Verona to the Revohdion of July [1823-30 



there existed in the heterogeneous empire Eor the ^veninient of which 
ho was lospnrisihle, little possibility of any " union of the public senti- 
ment with the public counsels " ; and, whatever the limitations of bU 
outlook and the errors of his policy, he was in a better position than 
Canning to ititvlise the perils to European peace involved in the stirring 
up of the dormant forces of nationality. It is clear, indeett, that 
Canning himself at this tirao did not realLse the full import of his 
language, nor contemplate the ultimate outcome of the attitude he 
assumed. lie loudly championed the principle of nationality; but for 
him, as for Mettei'uich, the boundaries of nations were the teiTitorial 
^ divisions established at Vienna; and iJi deprecating the interference of 
the Alliance in the Ottoman Empire he could even speak of the right of 
"the Turkish nation " to manage its own affaii-s. " Our business," ho 
wrote in the letter already quoted, " is to preserve the peace of the 
worid, and therefore the independence of the several nations that 
compose it. In resisting the Revolution in all its stages we resisted the 
spirit of change, to be sure, hut we resisted also the spirit of foreign 
domination." Yet it was upon "foreign domination" that the order of 
the greater part of Europe rested; and the same \vas true of tho British 
Empire itself; while, during the century to come, the clasli of national 
ideals and ambitions was to be tht; most fruitful cause uf change aud 
of war. 

The two burning questions on which, during the interval between 
Verona and tho July Revolution, the Powers split into opposing camps — 
the Spanish Colonies and the integrity of the Ottoman Empire — were 
outside the scope of the Alliance altogether; and the attempt to bring 
them into the sphere of its influence broke down on tho opposition of 
the Powers whose interests were involved. The case of the Spanish 
Colonies was the most momentous in its results, though in a sense 
very remote from the issues wliich loomed largest in contemporary fears. 
To believers in the divine right of monarchy the estAbli-shment of a 
serie-s of Republics in the New World portended tho ruin of all order 
in Europe ; to doctiinaire Liberals, like Hentham, it meant the triumph 
of enlightenment through tho example given to tlie world nf communities 
firmly based on the purest principles of reason. The philosopher 
seriously meditated transferring himself in his old age to Mexico, to 
shai-o in the glorious work ; the Due de Richelieu had proposed, in order 
to prevent a worse thing, to set up a Hourbon prince as " King of Huenos 
Aries." After the easy triumph of the Fn;nch arms in Spain, the 
Spanish Government, supported by France, suggested that the fate of 
the Sjianish Colonies should bo submitted to a Congress of the Powers. 
The proposal broke down on the opposition of Great Hritain, determined, 
in Canning's phmsc, that if France had Spain it should be " Spain 
without tho Indies." In announcing to Parliament the recognition by 
the British Government of the South American Republics (1825), Canning 



I 



\ 



I 



int 



in 



exclaimed, " We have called a new world into existence to redress the 
Uilance of the old." To an age enlightened by very nearly a century's 
experience of the working of Liberal institutions in the semi -barbarous 
South American States both the hopes and the fears excited by their 
establish men C aeora almost grotesque ; and the event now recognised as 
moat pregnant with momentous issues for the future was the sudden 
intervention of the United States of Ainciica. The reply of the great 
public of the West to the claim of the European Powers to regulate 
the afTairs of all the world vr&s the famous message of President ISfom-oe 
to Congress, on Decerolxir 2, 1823, whiuh developed into the "Monroe 
doctrine" of "America for the Americans." 

While the attitude of the United States effectually pi-evented the 
ttempt to extend the dictatorship of the Alliance beyond the bounds of 
Europe, events in Europe itself wei« rapidly tending to complete the 
proc^jss of disruption whiuh the protests of Great Britain had begun. 
The developments of the Eastern Question had already split the Powers 
into opposing camps, before the Revolutions of 1830 made the first breach 
in the ** treaties." The independence of Greece was placed under the 
arantee, not of the general Allianoe, but of Hussia, Great Britain, 
kiid France ; and, though the independonoe of Belgium and the establisb- 
nent of the Orleans dynasty in France were " brought within the 
treaties " by the Concert of all the great Powers, the result of the 
Bevolution was in effect to split the Alliance in two. The seal was set 
OQ this division by the secret articles of the Convention of Berlin of 
October 15, 18-^8, between Russia, Austria, and Prussia, by which the 
principles of the Troppau Protocol were solemnly reaffirmed. Thence- 
iurward the "Holy Alliance" wasnotoventhescmblancoof a Universal 
Union, but fmnkly a league of tlio thrco monarchies of eastern Europe 
for the defence of autocracy against revolution. The last effective 
usertionof its principles was the intervention of the Emperor Nicholas I, 
b 1849, to crush the revolt in Hungary. The "Concert of Europe*' 
ttiU subsisted as an effective factor in international relations; but it was 
buod upon the principle consistently asserted throughout by the British 
Government : the binding obligation of treaties, and the right nf the 
Powers concerned to be called into counsel on any case arising which 
threatened their interests. It was reserved for another Emperor of 
Russia. Nichoiaa II, to revive, at the close of the nineteenth century, an 
ideiil similar to that of the original Holy .Alliance, tu the attempt to 
tttablish an international system which should enable the world to rid 
itself of the ruinous burden imposed upon it by the armed rivalry of the 
n&tionfi. 




i^ 



CHAPTER II 



THE DOCTEINAIRES 



In March, 1815, France had submitted for the second time tft tne 
rule of Napoleon, although united Kurope declared him an outlaw and 
prepared the fiual effort for hie overthrow. 

Menacing- as were the dangers of France abroad, they did not prevent 
men who considered themselvea called upon to act for their country 
from fixing their anxious attention on internal political problems. They 
claimed from the despot, who had ruled France absolutely for fourteen 
yeait), the grant of constitutional liberty. These men wore Lafayette, 
Benjamin Constant, Siamondi, and a few others. They represented the 
very doctrines which Napoleon had constantly rejected. The Ideolo(fue9y 
as he used disdainfully to call them, represented, accordiug to him, the 
chimeras of abstract polities inherited from the eighteenth century. 
He did not distinguish Wtween the disciples of Montesquieu and the 
foUowera of Rousseau, but held them alike responsible for the anarchy, 
the terror, and finally for the dissolution of Kocial order. " These twelve 
or fifteen metaphysicians," he said, " ought to be thrown into the water." 
In accordance with these sentiments, he silenced the last representatives 
of free speech in the consular assemblies. 

Shortly before Marengo, a few years before Necker's death, the First ^ 
Consul had an interview with him at Geneva. The former Minister of 
Louis XVI, who had witnessed the fall of the monarchy, propounded 
to Napoleon his favourite views. He insisted on the identity between 
morals and politics, and advised a republican and constitutional form of 
government. The impression he produced was one of mingled contempt 
and irritation. Necker's dautjhter, Madame do Stael, and the other 
members of Itis little group, had henceforth to suffer for the fatal mistake 
of daring to utilise, and at the same time to impose limitations on, the 
supreme power of Napoleon. During his reign the.se representatives of 
the principles of 178'J suffered exile and persecution. They were cbaU 
lenged by the powerful genius who felt himself strong enough to provide 
France, not only with the military glory and the institutions, but also 
with tiie ideas, which she required. Victory, while it lasted, stifled 



40 



i 



18W] Tke Id^)logue8 and the first Bestorati^n 41 

Apposition. But, aFler 18IS and the disasters whlcb the astute mind of. 
Talleyrand had seen so early &$ 1H05 to be inevitable, oHiciaL France 
claimed once nioro the right to criticise the rulor whom fortune bad 
abandoned. Kven then the effects oE the system which Napoleon bad 
hued on the weakness of human nature, on its Lore of power, on its 
selfish aims, and on the worship o£ success, prevailed with those who 
condemned, not his errors, but his misfortune. And the hope of 
secoring their position in the future induced the members of the 
Legislative Bodies of the Empire fintilly to submit without conditions to 
the Monarchy by the Grace of God, and to accept the Constitution as 
the free gift of the King. The Ideologues of Republican days alone 
hesitated. 

Their ablest publicist, Benjamin Constant, a Swiss by origin, repre- 
sented the individualistic theory in politics. Liberty was to him a 
personal right, even more than a social necessity. At the beginning of 
his career, under the Directory, bis sympathies were for the Republic. 
Uke Sieyes, he advocated the limitation of sovereignty by the artificial 
ODDibination of separate powers within the State, directed alike against 
despotism and popular terrorism. In 1814 he had supported a scheme 
of constitutional monarchy for France, with Bernadotte at the helm, 
ud Madame de Stjv«l had favoun^d it. 

The linal sanction by Europe of the legitimist solution induced the 
men of this group, as it had induced Lafayette, an advanced Liberal, 
Uid Camot, a Republican, to accept the monarchy of Louis XVIIl. 
Benjamin Constant now called tlie Bourbons of the elder branch "/« 
ftmUle incontesiie." The ullcgiance of these iwHticians was not, how- 
eier, based upon the legitimist creed, but on the pact concluded between 
tke dynasty and the nation by the promulgation of the Charter. This 
pKt excluded the return of the ancieii r{yime. The monarchy tlicreby 
tccepted the centralised administrative organisation created by the 
Enptre and the social organisation begotten by the Revolution and 
fcued on the principle of equality before the law. It further ii^sumed 
Ihat the hereditary right, which the nation had once more sanctioned, 
Muld alone reconcile old and now France and secure tlie peace of 
Earope. The first Restoration rested on the assumption that men of 
>U parties would be summoned round the throne, a visible testimony to 
the unity of a free and pacilicd nation. Under these conditions men 
«iu> did not believe in the Divine Rights of Kings were induced, both 
fcypnidencc and necessity, to accept the monarchy. 

Such an attitude was regarded with suspicion by the monarch and 
1M hateful to tiie ultra- Royalists. They were supported by the King's 
botbor. Monsieur, and were chiefly recruited from the ranks of the 
t^ifrtt, Tt was soon manifest that their intiuence was likely to prevail. 
In 18H this Iwcamo apparent more by the intentions which were 
nrealed thuu by the measures which were actually passed. But one of 



42 



The Constitutional MoiiarchisU 



[1814 



these measures, the re-establish men t of the Censorship of^the Preaa. first 
convinced Benjamin CoiiHtEint ihut the litistoration would not last. Wheu 
Caruotf one of the regicides, submitted n mecaoriindum to the King, lu 
which he made the Kraigration responsible for the death of Louis XVI, he 
was met by an outljuret of Koyalit^t jj;i88ion, which kIiowuiI that men of his 
political past could net expect toluratioa. One of the King's Ministers, 
Ferrand, justified a proposal for indemnities to the C'migri'x by asserting 
that they alone had kept " the atmight line," while the Royalists who , 
had remained in Franco were tainted with revolutionary ideas. Napoleon 
asserted that he owed his triumphant return from Kllm to this utterance 
of Kerrand. Napoleon was able to grant what the Kestoratiou refused. 
He had never punished men, either for having lield convictions which he 
liimself did not share or for evil deeds which belonged to the past. 
On condition that henceforth they submitted to his will, he had welconaec^ 

■V. Royalists and Republicans, Terrorists, Thermidorians, aristocrats, or- 
democrats, good and bad alike, in 1815, after liaving been carried by- 
a liberal and democratic current from Cannes to the Klysee, ho acted 
on the same principle. The days of his absolute rule were gone. Ho 
convinced jMitriots of the type of Lafayette and Carnot of the necessitjr 
of rBpelling foreign invasicin; he wnn over Itenjamin Constant, who 
di'afted the Acte Addiiionml iu a more liberal sense tlian the Charter. ^^ 
But Napoleon did not succeed in gaining the snpport of the Coi^B 

•■ stitutional Monarchiiits. The episode of the Hundred Days oaly 
confirmed them in the resolution to rescue the King from his reactionary ■ 
surroundings and to convince him of the necessity of shaping the 
monarchy of the futui'e not only according to the letter, but the spirit, 
of the Constitution. The foremost of the Royalists who recommended , 
this course, Pierre-Paul Royer-Collard, was well known to the King* 
Born iu 1763, the son of peasant proprietors, he had begun his caret 
as a lawyer in Paris and had approved of the beginnings of 
Revolution . The excesses which followed he condemned, and he foresai 
their consequences. He escaped from the TeiTor and was elected, 
1797, together with CauiiUe Jordan, the young and highly-gifted depi 
for Lyons, as member of the Council of the Five Hundred. In tl 
asaenibly both these men pleaded, with remarkable eloquence, for HI 
of woi'sliip and the impartial administration of justice. Their eSoi 
were in vain; and from that time Royer-('ollard went back to tl 
historic tradition of Fi'jince, as expressed in the monarchical systei 
He became in the true sense of the word a Legitimist, on tlie assumj 
tion that the hereditary Monarchy represented a priciciple, not 
party, and that it would be prepared to lead the new destinies 
France. \ trusted adviser of Louis XVIII, the Abbe de Mont 
quiou, secured Royer-Collaixl as the correspondent who kept the Kinj 
informed about events in I'rance. This correspondence came to 
end in 1800, after Marengo, when the Uoyaliat cause had bocoi 



1814-21] Boyer-CollarcL Bonald. De Maiatre 



43 



hopeless. In his valedictory letter to the King he congmtulated him on 
liaviug refused to sacriiioe his hereditary rights for pecuniary advantages 
and warned him oitce more against the follies and the intrigues of the 
Emigration. Uoyer-CoUard then appUud liimself to philosophy. He 
taoghtf under the ioflucuce of Thomas Ueid, a metaphysical doctrine 
directed chiefiy against the prevailing materialism, in defence of free 
will and the claims of humau reason. He was appointed a professor 
at the Sorbonne, where young men like Gnixot and ('harles de Romu^jAt 
became his pupils, and witnesses to the influence of his teaching in favour 
of liberty. It rested on religious convictions. While Guizot, a sincere 
Vrotc«tant, defended Christianity according to his creed, Uoyer-Collard 
remained faithful to the Jansenist tniditions in whicli lie had been 
educated. Their severe morality was congenial to his conscientious but 
liftugbty and unbending mind. lie owed it to his Jansenist teacherst 
he said, that he had never sought his own interest in public life. 

When the Abbii de Montcsriuiou Ijccame a Minister under the firet 

Restoratioa, be gave Guizot a post, and, rcmembcriog the services 

Horer-Collard bad rendered to his cause, eutiusted him with the 

supervision of the Press. Roth he and Guizot consented to limit its 

y so long as the Government was not firmly established. At the 

* time tbey resisted the policy of the Ultras. When Cliatcaubriand . 
paUisbed his liejhjrions poUtiqueu, vfhich, although directed against men 
like Camot, advoeated the recognition of the new order an<l a peaceful 
Uidej>tviuding Ijctweon the contending parties, Royer-Collaitl declared 
policy to bo the true foundntioa of the monarchical system. He 
iied in his endeavours to decentralise the existing organisation of publio 
instmetion, beuause his object, the creation of sevouteen universities, 
niet with the resolute opposition of the Vicomte de Bonald, an advocate 
of royal absolutism and of the supreme power of the Church in matters 
of education. Bonald was supported by the Abbe de Lamennaia, a man 
notlesH rigid than Bonahl himself and equal in mental and literary powers 
to Count Joseph de Maistre. These partisans of the extreme views in 
Chorch politics came to the front soon after the publication in Paris of 
de Maislre^s Prmtripe yen^rateitr <?e» ConKtifutiont politique* (1814). 
h contained the essence of doctrines which were luade fiinious by the 
lathor's later works. They proclaimed with conspicuous talent the 
^viiie origin of sovereignty, and the solidarity of mankind as a living 
^fbd coutiuuous organism, resting on tradition, guided by the infallible 
Wrthoiity of t'atholic faith, of which the Pope \& the interpreter. 
1)0 Maiatre, like Bonald, looked forward to a regeneration of religion, 
ttlbcb, notwithstanding the efforts of his genius to meet the needs of his 
tilBe, was but another expreitsion for the theocracy of the Middle Ages. 
^ kleM of de Maistre developed into a coherent syiitem only after 
b death, 1821, when the treatiae Du Pape, which he published first ia 
u iucomplote form, was followed by a fuller version, by the work on 




ki^ 



JJ Egli»«GaUicane-, and the Soiries de Saint- PSUr%bonrg ; the intellectual 
father of moduni UUrainuntanism never knew tho extent of bis triumplis. 

Lamennais introduced the doctrines of de Maistrc into practical 
politics. Ho was the first Catholic leader who proclaimed, in the 
days of the Em{iire, ttiat the destructive philosophy of the eighteenth 
century was doomed, and that the right of public instruction belonged 
exclusively to thoclorgy. In therankaof the rising generation, both lay 
and clerical, he won supporters whom the Imperial pohce failed to 
discourage and who organised the religious associations which, under the 
restored Monarchy, acquired the doubtful political fame attached to the 
intrigues and the secret working of the *' Congregation." Louis X VIH 
tried in vain to avoid the danger which was threatening to eoniplicato 
political by religious fanaticism. So early as 1814, priests refused 
absolution to the owners of national property. Regulations as to the 
observance of the Sabbath and Church processions, still more the out- 
break of popular hatred agiiinst I'roteatanta in the south of France, 
foretold a religious reaction, wluoh was arrested by tho catastrophe of 
Marcli, 1815, But it wiis well known in Paris that Louis XVIII, after 
his flight to Ghent, was surrounded by men who declared that his 
Liberal concessions were respouflihle for the downfall of the Monarchy. 

lloyer-CoUard and his friends had experienced the intolerance of the 
Ultras, whose religions views they rejected even more decidedly than their 
political psissions- They considered it their imperative duty to speak to 
the King; and they sent Guizot to Ghent. The object of his mission 
"waa to demand guarantees for a loyal acceptance of the Charter, the 
dismissal oE Blacas, the reactionary royal favourite, and the recall of 
Talleyrand, who had succeeded at the (Congress of Vienna in saving the 
prestige of his fallen sovereign. At Ghent Guizot had tho support of 
aurviving Constitutionalists of 1789, of lieugnot, who had drafted the 
Charter, of the staunch Koyalist Laine, of Baron Louis, the indispensable 
Minister of Finance in both Rcstoratioiia, but was unable to overcome 
the opposing influences. Chateaubriiind, who acted as Minister of the 
Interior, proved hostile to Guizot personally, but advocated the liberty 
of the Press. Monsieur and his followers remained of opinion that 
everything which was not mentioned in the Charter should remain as 
in the days of the ancien regime. The King was reserved, but gracious. 

After Waterloo the Duke of Wellington, speaking in the name of 
England as tho chief Power which effected the second Restoration, 
succeeded where the Constitutional Monarchists bad failed. Talleyrand 
was recalled. In his proclamation from Gambrai the King was induced to 
confess that the Government of 1814 had committed errors which would 
be avoided in tho future. He promised liberty of the Press, free elections, 
the aljolition of the system of confiscations adopted by Napoleon, a 
hereditary peerage, and a homogeneous Ministry. At the same time 
Wellington's distrust of the chances of the new Government prompted 



1815] 



TJie ttecond Restoration 



45 



Aini to insist oil Fouche beiug' placed at the head of the Ministry uf 
Police. The King reluctantly consented to this humiliating necessity ; 
bat he nominated as prefect of the Parts police a young official of the 
name of Decazes, whoae zeal for the Koyalist cause had deserved the 
Borereign'd approval and who henceforth i-oplaced Blacaa in his affectiou. 
The taslt which lay before French statesmen at the second Restora- 
tion vas one of extreme difficulty. The Tsar Alexander, ovring to the 
tttitude of TuUeyr^nd at the Congress of Vienna, had become hostile 
to Fiance. He excluded Talleyi-aud, who was Minister of Foreign Af- 
EiJis, from the negotiations with the Powers, which were in armed 
occapation of thixjc- fourths of the soil of Franco and had become ex- 
letiiiir in tlieir demands. At home, the events of the Hundred Days 
liid increased to rL>Ientless hali-cd and fanaticism the violence of tlie 
farlies into which the country remained divided. The HoyalisUt bc- 
BcTed in a conspiracy against the Crown which called for vengeance. 
The foremost Liberals rejected the monai'cliy of Louis XVIIT so late as 
thaendof June; and after the proclamation of Cambrai Fouche saw his 
tJiportunUy. He j>erfidiously encouraged Lafayette, Voyer d'Argenson, 
PovtMoulant, and Benjamin Constant to carry proposals to Hagcnau, 
tbe headquarters of the Allied sovereigns, who declined to receive them. 
The envoys Itad to bubmit to Loi-d Stewarts rudeness when they insisted 
« the right of France to choose her sovereign, and declared that neither 
Louis XV'III nor Napoleon II satisfled the wishes of the people. After 
their return to I'arist the Chambers, whose illusions they had fostered, 
vere closed, at Kouche's order, by a Prussian officer. The rejection of 
legitimacy by these Liberals remained unforgotten, nor was it ever 
wholly abandoned by them and by other leaders of the future Left in 
Uie Royalist assemblies. Their opposition became more and more anti- 
(Ijrnastic, and they undoubtedly compromised themselves by conspiring 
ig&inst the throne. 

On the other hand, the legitimate sovereign who ascended for the 
•ecoDd time the throne of France, returned, not as the successor nf 
Louis XIV, but aa the heir of the Revolution. "The Government of 

SKing," Rauke truly says, " had no other powers than those which 
Revolution had beatowed " ; and de Maistre did not hesitate to 
TO that the rightful descendant of so many Kings bad become the 
nccMsor of Bonaparte. The supremo military command, the right to 
didaze war, to conclude treaties, and to issue the ordinances and decrees 
lor tbe sanction of laws voted by the Chambers, were prerogatives which 
hul belonged to tlie Consular power. The Concordat remained in force; 
tti declaration of Catholicism as the State religion remained a dead 
kttcr. The OkaTU oclroyie left three political problems unsolved. The 
King had tbe power to choose his miuistcrs; but the question was 
leh undecided whether be was bound to select them from the ranks of 
like majority — whether liis government was to be merely constitutional 



46 



The Cliamln'e intronvable 



[1815 



or parliamentaiy; while it was settled that the Chambers were to meet 
every year, that the deputies were to be unpaid, and that a payment of 
300 francs in direct taxation was to be the qualification of the electors, 
the mode of election was not fixed ; finally, there was no Press law. 
These three questions predominated in the parliamentary debates of the 
second Restoration. France remained divided, not into two parties, but 
into two uationa. The partisans of the ancitn regime declared war to 
the knife on the children of the Revolution. The generation of the 
past was determined to recover what it had lost; the new generation 
affirmed its right to keep what it had won. 

Between these contending elements stood the King. It soon became 
apparent tliat he was resolved to govern. But at the beginning of his 
reign, in 1815, he had no military force. It was only after the troops 
on the Loire had been di.sUinded (July 16, 181.^) that it became possi- 
ble to form cne. In the meantime the White Terror broke out in the 
south. It was directed against Bonapartists, Revolution is U, and Pro- 
testants, and led to rapine and murder. Hundreds of men fell victims, 
among them (loncral Ramel at Toulouse, Marshal Brane at Avignon ; 
and the authorities were unable to prot^jct the terrified people or to 
punish the criminals. While the Duke of Angonlume, not without the 
help of Austrian troops, put down disturbances which had been stimu- 
lated by clerical influence, and while the Allied troops kept order to 
the south and east, the general election was held (August 22). The 
King, in 181-1, had retained the Imperial Chamber. Now, pending fi 
new electoral law, he issued the provisional Ordinance of July 13, by 
which the Imperial system was continued for the election of the new 
Chamber; but the limit of ago for electors was reduced, and the number 
of deputies increased to 402. The Prefeeta received instructions to use 
their influence at the elections in favour of raodemtion ; the King ap- 
pointed the presidents of electoral (Colleges without reference to party;_ 
the censorship introduced in 1814 for minor publications was abolisbi 
The Government remained impartial ; but the Royalist policy of retalli 
tioD triumpl)ed so completely that the terrorised Bonapartists anc 
Republicans only ohttvinod a few representatives; and the Chamber wa 
named by the King the Chamhre introuvahle^ because it surpassed thej 
most sanguine expectations of the Royalists themselves. 

Kouche, frightened at the extent of the Royalist victory, laid tw<i 
memoranda before the Council, pointing out that civil vnw would 
the outcome of reaction. They were made public with his connivanc 
and Talleyrand made use of this breach of trust to get rid of a colleague 
who now could only do harm. lie was himself determined to resi| 
but he counted on a return to ofhee, a oalculation never realised whil 
the Restoration lasted. In the darkest hour of the Monarchy he 
committed himself to the conviction that Franco was both Royalist am 
Constitutional. The first verdict of the country under the reatoi 



181.'!] 



The Ministry of Richelieu 



47 



dj-oasty put back the hand on the timepiece of history twenty-five years 
and indicated a re-actionary France. Tins made a Talleyrand Ministry 
inipojisible. Foreign complioatious offered the pretext for his retireraenL 
In response to the exacting terms of the Allies, Talleyrand declared 
proudly that Louis XVIII was the ally of the Powei-s, not tlieb- enemy: 
no right of conquest existed against the legitimate sovereign. Had not 
the Allies declared that the maintenance of the Treaty of Paris was 
the sole object of the ]*ecent war? But on September 20 his Ministry 
WHS forced to resign. 

Tlie Tsar held out hopes of better conditions should the Due 
de Kichelieu Ijcuome Prime Minister. When Richulieu hesitated, 
Alexander showed him the map drawn by Knesebeck, with the line 
depriving France of the circle of fortreases constructed by Vauban. 
Pozzo di Borgo, in agreement with the Tsar, then wrote the protest of > 
the French Governraentagainst linssia's allies; and Richelieu relnctantly 
accepted office. He had lived nut of the country for twenty -four years, 
bad rendered brilliant service to the Tsar as Governor of Odessa, and 
had steeled hia resolution in the struggle with Napoleon. He was a 
man of lofty character and admirable disinterestedness. In his youth he 
had been influenced by the physiocratic school, but of modern France 
be knew little. He .stood outjiide the circle of Monsieur, nor did ho 
share the violent prejudices of his cla.sst althougli he had fought in the 
ranks of the Kmigrallon. Not so his colleagues, the incnnipetent 
Vaoblanc, Minister of the Interior, the Duke of Feltre, and Du Bouchage, 
whose appointments were concessions to the Ultiius. Richelieu's aup- 
pcrrters were Barbt'-Marliois, Keept-r of the Seals, C'orvetto, Minister of 
Finance, and Decades, lo whom Louis XVIII gave the Ministry of Police, 

The Chamber met in October. It was chiefly composed of land- 
ovneis, officials, and middle-class Conservatives. Ite leaders were 
La Ilourdonnaye, a former chouan. and a fanatic; Bonald, whose 
doctrine of a hierarchical constitution of society rested on the assump- 
Iwn of the alliance between Church and State; the more sober-minded 
Corfxere, a lawyer, who tried, like VilUde, to harmonise the demands 
of the Ultras with the necessities of practical jwlitics. Neither the 
Kcret agent of Monsieur, Vitrolles, always employed and never trusted 
or rewarded* nor Chateaubriand, at once the most eloqtient champion 
of Royalist passions and the advocate of constitutional right, played a 
conspicuous part in the House. Vitrolles intrigued; Chateaubriand 
tafloenccd the Government and public opinion by ruling the Press 
with masterly power. The mainstay of the Ultras was Monsieur, who, 
>o the words of Richelieu, although heir to the throne, never ceased 
tobe a party chief. The Constitutional Royalists were represented by 
Ube, appointed President of the Chamber by the King, Royer- 
CdQud, Councillor of State and head of the Etlucation department, 
Siiatft-Aulaire, Camille Jordan, and Count Hercule de Serre, who soon 



48 The Chamher and Us punitive measures [1816 

oanaeto tho very front rank. He had fought under CondiV; Ruheequcntly 
he became President of the High Court of Justice at J^amburg duriug 
the Empire, and now held a similar j)ost at Colroax. Guizot, principal 
secretary in the Ministry of Jnstico, waa excluded by his age from the 
Chambtr. Pasquier. both as deputy aud Minister, Baraute, as a liigh 
official, represented the Imperial administrators, wlio accepted the 
Restonition. From the IIliusb of Peers, whose dignity had become 
hereditary in spite of thtj Royalists, twenty members were excluded 
for their action during the Hundred Days. The King replaced them 
by Napoleonic marshals and members of the revolutionary assembliea* 
as well as by Royalists. 

The loyal spcocli insisted on adherence to tho Charter; the address 
of the deputies reminded the King of the necessity to punish. The 
presentation of three exceptional measures met this demand. The first 
gave the Government full i)owers to arrest and detain, without bringing 
them before the Courts, all offenders against the King, the royal House, 
and the safety of the State. The second punished with extreme severity 
those who menaced the King or public security. The third created 
tribunals — the Court priv6tale9 — which, presided over by soldiers, could 
deal summarily with political oflFenders. Although the poweis of these 
Courts were not made retrospective, the King's prerogative of mercy ^ 
was practically alKiHshed. H 

In the debate on these measures, Roycr-CoUard and de Sorro came 
to the front. They recognised the necessity of exceptional laws, but 
urged milder punishments aud more exact definitions of offences. They 
opposed a law, passed by the Chamber and rejected by the Peers, for 
the temporary susi>ension of the security of judicial tenure, by the 
abolition of which the Ultrns calculated that phvues would be filled by 
their adherents. From that moment, Royer-Collard, Pasquier, and their 
friends took counsel together on the tactics to be adopted against tlie 
party stigmatised by RicheHeu as the White Jacobins. 

On November 20 Richelieu signed the second Peace of Paris "with "' 
a sorrow amounting to despair." He had to submit to the surveillance 
of Franco by the Powers, to be carried out by their ambassadors. While 
the responsibility for the settlement with Europe rested on Richelieu, • 
he was compelled to introduce tho amnesty law. In his proclamation 
from Cambrai tho King had excluded from amnesty the tmitors of the 
Hundred Days only. The ordinance of July 24 sent nineteen persons 
before Courts-martial, which began their work with the death-sentence. 
on Labedoyere. The fate of thirty-eight others was to be decided by the 
Chamber. Richelieu, supported by Royer-Collard, Pasquier, and de 
Serre, now proposed that thesti thirty-eight pei'soiis should be banished, ' 
but that all those not mentioned on Fouche's lists should be pardoned. 
The Ultras asserted the right of the Chamber in legislative matters to 
override the King's prerogative of mercy. The execution of Marshal 




[815-6] 



Electoral projects 



49 



^Hfey, the escape of Lavalette, for which Decazes and Barh6-Marbois were 
^neld responsible, increased the thirat for vengeance. The language of 
La Bonrdonnave recalled 1793. lie, Chateaubriand, Villele,andCoibiere, 
called for " categoriea *' which, contrary to the will of the King, threat- 
ened 1200 persons with exile and confiscation. 

klu the course of tbiii debate Richelieu spoke memorable words: 
I do not understand your passions, your I'elentlesd hatreds. I pass 
'ery day by the house which belonged Ui my ancestors. I see their 
property in other hands and I behold in museums the tretisures which 
belonged to them. It is a sad sight ; but it does not rouse In me feelings 
^either of despair or revenge. Vou appear to mc sometimes to be out of 
^Bour minds, aU of you who have remained in France." Neither he, nor 
^noyer-CoUard and de Serre, who spoke in a similar sense and in favour 
of the royal prerogative, of mercy, succeeded in jireventing the exclusion 
of the regicides from the amnesty. The Cabinet was divided. Three 
Ministers acted with Hlonsieur. 'Hie instructions of Decazes to interpret 
the laws of exception in a merciful sense were evaded. In the army, the 
* saTj, and tlio administration, the opponents of Iloyali.sm were dismissed. 
On December 18, 1815, Vaublanc introduced an impoKsiblc electoml 
Utr. Its object was to place the whole electoral machinery in the hands 
of the Kxecutive. It was not unfairly described as a proposal under 
which Ministers and Prefects chose the clecttjre, and the eleetore the 
"deputies. The provision of the Charter under which a fifth part of the 
Chamber had to be elected annually was retained ; but the limit of age 
for candidates was reduced from 40 to 25 years. These last two proposals 
caused the Ultras to reject the measure. It was then that VillSle, deputy 
of Toulouse, ventured on a daring counter-proposal. Ilo framed the 
only project of an electoral law which, during the Restoration, aimed at 
extending the right of suffrage to the people. This project advocated the 
reduction of the qualiilcation for the franchise from 300 to 50 francs 
ia direct taxation, thereby increasing the constituency from 100,000 to 
2 millions, while Insisting on a payment of 1000 francs in taxation hs a 
qoaUfication for the deputies, and maintaining the system of indirect 
elttolion. Villele appealed to the royal ordinance of 1815, which suirgosted 
ni'xUfications of the Charter; ho proposed that general elections should 
be quinqnennlal and that deputies should be 40 years of age. By this 
proposal the Ultras intended to increase parliamentary power at the 
expense of the Cruwu and in opposition to a Government which they 
' eonaidered hostile to their interests. They olaimed a Ministry chosen 
bom the ranks of their majority, and to uphold this majority thoy 
oqmitad upon the combined votes of the landed gentry and nobility and 
«fon Uieir influence with the rural population. Their real aim was to 
veakea the power of the Liberal midtllo classes and to secure the donii- 
utioD of their party. The Constitutional Royalists supported the 
remtnenU During the Ministry of Talleyrand, Royer-Collard, being 





50 



Demands of the Ultras 



[1816 



coiisuUed^ had 1*60 ommen (led direct elections and a qualification of 
300 franca paid in direct taxation. Now he declared in a memorable 
epeoch that in France tho King ruled iind not the Parliament, and that 
the co-uperation of the Cluimbor was only required for legislation and 
BLipplids. On the day when tiie Chamber could make or unmake 
MiiiistGi-s, a Itepublio would be established. The Chamber in his view 
was a part of the King's Goverument. De Serro characterised Villele'a 
project a8 an attack on the royal iuitiatiTe, and iusiiited on the necessity 
of maintaining unimpaired the power of the Crown in a nation without 
an aristocracy and with shifting majorities. Democracy, he said, had 
ruined the country and was unwelcome to France. 

Both Villele's and Vnublane's proposiils were lost in the Peers ; and 
Corvetto then introduced the budget. To meet the enormous deficit, he 
proposed the bale of forests which had formerly been for tlie most part 
ecclesiastical iiad communal property and which now belonged to the 
State. The Right rejected the proposal and the claims of creditors of 
tho Hundred Dnys, although the King Imd allowed them. They suggested 
payment by exchequer bonds of 100 francs, quoted at 60, which amounted 
to a declaration of partial bankruptcy. 

The Government having recommended an increased payment to the 
clergy, the Right demanded for the Church a fixed revenue of 42 millions, 
the charge of the civil registera, and restitution uf its confiscated 
property. De Serre characterised these proposala as monstrous and 
unconstitutional, and dissociated the clergy from claims which could not 
be raided without questioning the rights of property in every European 
State. Royer-Colhird reminded the House tliat the King was pledged. 
Tho majority would not lie convinced. Corvotto had to withdraw his 
proposal and to defer definite arrangements with regard to the debt 
The session wasclosed in April, 1816. Shortly afterwar* Is Vaublanc was 
replaced by Lainc. This wsia a concussion tu the minority, whoso leaders 
Richelieu henceforth consulted, and to the Powers, in whose name 
Wellington besought Louis XVI 11 to support the Ministry. The Allies 
feared that peace, the dynasty, and the solvency of France were at stake. 
The Tsar, Neftselrode, and Hardenberg advocated the dissolution of the 
Chamber. Richelieu felt this interference so humiliating that he declared 
he would rather be overthrown by Frenchmen than saved by foreigners. 

Just then disturbances broke out at Lyons and Grenoble. Their 
iiiiport*ince wpj* esaggerated by General Dounadieu and the local 
aiiihorities ; and they were repressed with needless severity. While the 
Ultras planned changes in the Charter and a Ministry of their own, tho 
firm establishment of a .moderate policy was the condition in.sisted on 
by the Powers, before reducing the array of occupation. Russia called 
attention to tho infraction of tlie Charter by the votes on the budget 
and the amnesty law. Gradually, through reports from all parts of the 
country, through memoranda from Pasquier, Guizot, Deoazes, the King 




181ft-T] 



Election of a neto Chamber 



51 



vms brought to admit that " the monarchy must be nationalised, the nation 
-wyaliaed." Richelieu and Laine gave way ; and on September 5, 1816, an 
ordinuice appeared, dissolving the Chamber. It maliitainud provisionally 
the existing electoral system ; but it reduced the Chamber to 268 members. 
DecAzes, who was the real author of this coup d'^iaU had made Darante 
KDd subsequently Royer-CoUard his conlidants. Tlie latter embi-aced 
him, exclaiming that he deserved a stiitue. The majority of the nation 
rejoiced. The Ultras were taken entirely by surprise. Chateaubriand, 
on La Monarehie teion la Charter prophesied a Jacobin assembly and 
caUftd OQ the Royalist^i to support the King against his dei:eivers. 
Docazes aupprexitcd tlie pamphlet and worked on the elcctoi-s through 
flu cenaorship of the Press, recommending tho choice of Moderates, "^ no 
matter whether these accepted the Charter because of the King, or the 
King because of the Charter." (luizol vindicated for the King the right 
of dissolution, and clearly indicated tlmt be and his friends ouly awaited 
security from reaction to complete the edifice of political liberty, 

The elections for the new Chamber in October, 181G, gave the 
Ministers a majority of between forty and fifty. The independent Left 
won twt'lveseats. When I'asquier became Chancellor in January, 1817, 
ihe waa replaced as President of the Chamber by de Serro. The Govern- 
iment confided the preparation of the electoral law to Royer-Collard, 
who recurred to his plan of 1815 — a qualificition of 300 francs for 
' Toten, the qualifications for deputies to bo payment of 1000 francs in 
Uxation and 40 yeai-s of age, direct suffrage by gcrutin de lUte iu the 
chief town of each Department, royal nomination of the presidents of 
electoral bodies, and annual election of onc-iifth of the Chamber in 
Department chosen by ballot. These were essentially the provisions of 
Article XL of the Charter, which, however, had left open tlie question 
of indirect elections, and, consequently, the formation of a wider 
dectorate. Under the new system there were hartUy 100,000 electors ; 
the centre of gravity was placed iu the middle class in order to exclude 
ibe lower, " the ingtiiiment," according to llarante, '* of intrigue and 
pusioD." 

The Republican Left was as yet too small a group to defend the 
interests of democracy. This was done by the Royalisto, who again 
called for an extended franchise, and complained of the condemnation 
o( the country to political slaver)'. Their Liberalism provoked the 
•wcann of Benjamin CunstAnt, who, pardoned by the King for hia 
conduct during the Hundred Days, supported the Government, advising 
Hto relj on t!ie (issi.stnnre of all persons free from crime, and thereby to 
nriat the party which, under the pretext of liberty, aimed at the recovery 
lof privilege. 

Richelieu did not disguise his personal preference for the scheme of 

Villcle; and feline, Minister of the Interior, although responsible for the 

'scbeine, doubted whether 28,000,000 of people would be adequately 



represented by an electorate of about 100.000. He entrusted to Guizot 
tlie defence of the ministerial plan in the press. Guizot did not conceal 
that he and his friends desired the ascendaney of the middle class, which, 
according to them, represented culture and individual independence in 
civil life and right in politics. Oe Serre took another standpoint. He 
approved of the exclusion of the masses; but he desired separate rep- 
resentation of the only great interesU which survived the HevoIutioD — 
landed property and urban industry, a proposal which found no support. 
Koyer-Coliard carried the Chamber with him when he asked them to 
trust electora, whose material independence was a pledge of political 
maturity, and who represented the aristocracies of birth, fortune, talent, 
and position. " Above the midille class," he said, "is the longing for 
power; Ijelow it is ignorance, tho habit of dependence, and, therefore, 
theincapacity of exercising the functions in question." The opposition 
in the Peers gave way unilor the influence of the King; on February 5, 
1817, the meu»ure became law. Its main principles governed France 
for thirty years. 

The Kight, under pretence that the Charter would be violated, now 
refased to consent to the prolongation of exceptional laws. Royer- 
Collard, supported by his friends, defended thera and the continuance of 
temporary press restrictions on the ground of necessity, and, in a masterly 
speech, proclaimed it as the faith of constitutional France that the King 
governed, spoke, and acted through his Ministers, so loTig an tliitse obeyed 
the law. Tt was a revolutionai-y fiction which separated the King from 
his Government. At this stAge of his career, Rove r-Co Hard, in friendly 
/ relations with Decazes and Pasnuier, accepted the designation of raini»- 
' terialist. About this time his acquaintance with the I>uc de Broglie 
began. They met at the death-bod of Madame de Stacl, whose daughter 
the young Duke had married, and were not mutually attracted. But 
their opinions harmonised better than their personalities. Broglie 
had come out of tho ranks of Im|)eria] administrators wtth exti-eme 
Liberal opinions. They were raodifiod by the doctrine of Madame de 
Stael, as expressed in the CmiekUratlons, and condensed in lier famous 
saying, " that liljcrty, not despotism, was old," and by the study of 
English and American writers. Nevertheless he scrupled to support 
a Ministry which he reproached with governing under the influence of 
foreigners. 

_^It was during the session of 1 H17 that tbo appellation of " Doctrinaire*^'^ 
was applied to the little distinct group of Constitutional Royalists. The 
name %vas given to Hoyer-Collard, de Sene, Harante, Camille Jordan, 
Guizot, and, in a more limited sense, to Beugnot, Mounter, and Remusat. 
Broglie, when he ceased to act with the Liberals, completed the balf- 
dozea about whom Uemuaat jestingly said in 1818, that the thinking 
faction " collected on a sofa, constituted themselves tho majority." Till 
then the group possessed no definite doctrine in common. According 



i 



isn] 



The principles of (he Doctrinaires 



53 



to Bamnte, the struggle with tlie Ultma led to the gradual fornmlation 
of a governiug priutiple for the iulerpretatiou of the Charter. The 
party, sa^a Gntzot, vfa» formed spontaneously, without premeditation, 
to resist a pressing evil., not in tho interest of a particular system or 
set of ideas. To support the Restoration, while combating reaction, 
was at firet its whole policy. It gained in distinctness aa time went on. 
Guizot writes that the French nionai-chy and the middle class, both 
alarmed at the pretensions of the old nobility, combined for mutual 
protection. The Doctrinaires sought in the power of the Crown a 
safeguard against the ambition of tfau Chamber, and cared little for the 
I oonsequences denvod from thcorios of representation ; nay cioro, they 
rejected them in the name of monarchy. Royer-Collard, addressing his 
constituents in 1816, said: "The King is Legitimacy. legitimacy is 
order and security. These can be maintained by moderation alone, a 
virtue derived by politics from ethics." Barante insists that Royer- 
Collard was essentially an opportunist. 

The political action of the Doctrinaires was determined less by ideas 
'than by personalities. They all developed under foreign influences ; 
Koyer-Collard under that of Scotch philosophy ; de Sorro, Caraille 
Jordan. Hroglie in Germany, either in. extlc or as Imperial nf&,ials ; 
Guizot and Barante at Geneva, in an atmoBpheru of German philo- 
sophy and poetry. The Duehcsse de Broglie represented m politics 
the principles of Madame de Stael ; it was she who won over her 
hnsband, Guizot, and Barante to orthodox Christianity. The supre- 
macy of ethics in politics was the aim of the Doctriuaires. " Morals 
are the serious [mrt of politics," Remuaat wrote. " We must show the 
Vltras that their morals ai-o as corrupt as superficial, their religion mere 
formalism. Theories are convictions. If they are repressed, nothing 
remains but persoual interest, the right of the strongest." He described 
Chateaubriand's GCtiiedu CAri8^tanMffI^ as a mischievous book, because it 
did nut interpret the Gospel as the source of political morality, liberty, 
utd civilisation. 

IlfiCpditary monarchy jraa for Royer-Collard the symbol of reverence, 
(jnlzut unJerslobd Trencli socinty aa tho outcome, not of 1789, but of 
centuries. He wanted to complete the Revolution by expelling errora, 
ftnd vindicated for himself and his friends the privilege of associating 
politics with sound philosophy. Philosophy taught that neither legiti- 
mate monarchy nor popular freedom can be improvised. He admitted 
I that legitimacy begins with usurpation, liberty in anarchy. But he 
placed bis hopes for the future in adhesion to the historical past, and, in 
the words of de Serre, wished '* to bring customs and law into harmony 
with constitutional government." This line of thought, starting from 
bictorical development and placing moral considerations above parly, 
l*d always something repellent for the French mind. The Doctrinaires 
did not conciliate it by their uncompromising, authoritative tone. Thej 



51 



Divergences amotig the Doctrinaires 



[1817 



influenced apinion ; a time came when they controlled it; but they never 
Iracamo popular, nor strong enough to form a govuining party. 

Divergences of opinion tuight be perceived among them so early 
as 1817. Uarante went with Decazes. Guizot and Uroglie showed 
predilections for Hlnglish institutions, which Royer-CQllaid in reality 
never shared. Guizot was too overbearing for him ; and hid saying 
that he would not be a figure on Ouizot's cheaslward is of an early 
date. His cutting remark, when asked whether he had called Guiwt 
an austere intriguer, " 1 never said austere," belongs to a later time. 
Remusat, witli Pasquier and Mole complained that the Doctrinaires 
were not business men and had no etlicient organ in the Press. Laine 
and I*asquier objected to their intellectual haughtiness; Richelieu 
distrusted them. The Royali.its spoke of them as Jacobins, and 
called them insufferable pedants, hater they were courted by the 
Loft. 

During the summer of 1817, after the close of the session, the 
Government was embarrassed by scarcity, lawlessness, and disturbances 
in Lyons, where Genei-al Canuul imitated Donnadieu. The Court 
pr&v6talf8 pronounced 28 capital senteuces and otlmrs uf tmnsportalion 
and imprisonment. It was only when Mm-sh^il Marmout was sent that 
order was restored. 'Hie election of a lifthof the deputies in September, 
1817, left the majority unchanged. The Goveniiuent, however, with 
difficulty prevented the return of Lafayette, lieujamia Constant, and 
Manuel for Paris. Before meeting the Chamber, Richelieu reluctantly 
replaced hia colleagues Du Houchage and the Duke of Kcltre by Mole 
and Gouvion Saint-Cyr. The royal speech announced a wide amnesty 
and the abolition of the Cotir$ pr{'v6talfi. Numeious Press proseuulious 
and the consequent excitement of public opiniuu caused the Goverument 
to ask for three years' prolongation of the censorship, for the trial of 
minor Press offences by the ordinary Courts and of incitements to crime 
before a jury. 

The Ultras and Liberals now combined in an opposition which would 
have failed without the support o£ the DoctEiuaires, who demanded a 
jury for all Press offoncos. CamiUe Jordan, altlinugh a ministarialist 
and Councillor of State, accused the Government of violating the Charter 
and of flattering without satisfying extreme opinions. Royer-Collard 
declared that liberty of the Press without freedom to criticise the 
Government was untliinkable; of all arbitrary jiowers those dealing 
with the Press should be the last entrusted to the executive. Laine 
reminded him that he had not always thought so. An attempt by 
Richelieu through Vill6le and Corbidre to come to an understan<ling 
with the Right failed. Uroglie went with the Doctrinaires, except that 
be rejected the censorship entirely, although he afterwards admitted its 
necessity while foreign armies stood in France. Tiie proposed extension 
of trial by jui'y was dropped, but tlie censorship was only retained for a 




1817-8] 



Reforiiis in the arin^ 



55 



year. Pasquier aiicl Harante belil tliut the distrust between Ministera 

^ aad the Doctrinaires origin:UeJ iii this deltate. 

■k Royer*CoUarU, a& President of the Council of Education, Lad 

^to maintain the university system against the combined attacks of 

Lamcunais, the l.ibenilg, and his own chief, Laine, who, obstinat^j as 

liiiuself, tihurud Riulielicu's aversion from liiiu. The King spoke of the 

P Doctrinaires as traitors who gloiified the Uevolution at the expense of 
pic ancienrfgime^ but supported Decazes, when accused by ClmtiMubriand 
and Kievee of complicity with the Left. The censorship upon news- 
pa{i«nt was evaded by both parties ; they attacked the Government in 
leaflets. Benjamin Constant iniule the iUinerw, a nun-periodical print, 
the most powerful organ of the Left, and sought to win over the middle 
elas6 by insisting on property as the basis of political rights. 

In December, 1817. Go uvion Saint-Cyr produced a phm for the 

I teorganiaation of the army on~a footing of 2I0,U0U. Louis XVIII had 

tbolisfaod the hated conscription ; but voluntary enlistment proved 

I I insnffioicnt to maintain an e^octive force. The Ministry retained the 

Itoluntary system, but iutroduc<Ml also recruiting by ballot and seven 

I 1 feats' service. In compensaliuu for i\m unpopular measure promotion 

by seniority up to the rank of colonel was made the rule for two-thirds 

of the oflicers, and the promotion of non-com miaaioued ofiicera was 

Use permitted. The King gave his oonsent to this limitation of 

prerogative. The formation of a i-esorve of veterans recalled to the 

colours for a number of years the disbanded, men of the Imjierinl army. 

I This system, based on equality, created, according to Camille Jordan, 

an army of soldiura and citizens. It i-econcilod tJio vetemns of the 

Empire and limited the possibility of giving commissions to imigr^t and 

aoblea. On these grounds it was an abomination to the Right, who, as 

in the Press del>ate, appealed to the Charter in support of prerogative. 

^EpioDsieur besought the King to dismiss the Ministiy ; Chateaubriand 

^tnd Villclle protested against the democratic measure, which prepared an 

instmment for despotism. The Government leaned on the Left and on 

:ie Doctrinaires. Guizot cumposeil the speech which won for Gouvion 

iul-Cyr the greatest triumph of the session. Itoyer-CoUard, like Lis 

lends, defended tlie measure, but sup[)orted by de Serre, Beugnot and 

'amille Jordan, he demanded an annual vutij for t)iu army, as I'arliament 

no right to bind it*j successors. '* It woubl be useless for the ChaniWr 

foXT he said, *• if without and apart from it an army exists which could 

ip from its hands and be as uncontrollable as the Civil List." This 

froposal was rejected. Although the Government was victorious, 

Decazes alone in the Cabinet entirely agreed with Gouvion 8aint-Crr. 

Kicheliea, who had long wished to retire, and Laine, regretted the 

keach with the Right in proportion as their antipathy to the 

Doctrinaires increased. 

The £ale of the third Governmeut proposal was sealed before debate. 



Since 1814, as shown in a Inter chapter, negotiations bad gone on 
between France and Rome for the abrogation o£ tlie Concordat of 1801. 
Not one of the negotiators thought the assent of the Chamber necessary 
for the proposed agreement. The oniiseion Iiad to b*i i-emedied; and a 
bill was drafted by Fasquier, in consultation with Royer-CoUard and 
CamiUe Jordiin, and with the a.ssistance of Portalis, which guarded the 
jurisdiction of the State, reartlrmed Uie le^'ality of the sale of Church 
property, and reserved for the (ioverunient control over the publication 
of papal Imlls, briefs^ and decrees. When it became clear that the 
ministenal scheme would he rejected by both Liberals and Doctrinaires, 
the Government put aside indefinitely the report of the commission; 
and after fruifchss negotiations with the Curia the Concordat of 1801 
remained in foioe. 

Itefort; the end of the session of 1818, by the intervention of the 
Tsar througli Pozzo di Borgo and with the final conseut of Wellington, 
it became possible to regulate the responsibilities of France towards her 
foreign L-reditors and the Powers. The claims of the foreign credilnrs 
were considerably reduced and met by an issue of rentes 9ur f^tat; 
while a further issue of rtntea was authorised to cover the war indemnity. 
An annual budget Imcamo possible now that speeial budgets were 
gradually abolished. The debt was consolidated, the State creditors 
were secured, and the ground was thus prepared for that honourable 
and economical methrxl nf adnnnistration which is the chief glory of the 
Restoration Government, 

J But in 1818,58 before, nothing but surrender would conciliate the 
tntras- Villi^le was of opinion tliut a RepubUc was at hand if a Uoyaliat 
policy were not adopted by the King. Monsieur tried to force upon hira 
a Government of the extreme Right, by representing to the Powers, in a 
secret note drawn by Vitrolles, that such a course could alone save tlie 
dynasty and the country. Louis XVIII, incensed at a Uoyalist military 
conspiracy, replied by striking the name of Vitrolles from the roll of 
Privy Councillors and by depriving Monsieur of the command of the 
National Guard (September, 1818). 

At the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle Richelieu, through his personal 

finfluence, finally liberated France from the army of occupiition. There 
the news reached hira that the annual partial ©lections had nearly 
doubled the numbere of the I^eft (October, 1818). It increased to 
45 deputies. Lafayette and Manuel were returned, the latter for Vendee. 
Richelieu gave his diplomatic colleagues tranquillising assurances, on 
which he did not himself rely, and promised to withhold his intended 
resignation, but returned to Paris with the conviction that the electoral 
law must be modified or even sacrificed and the Right conciliated. 

'*'We have defeated the Right wing," he wrote; "let us now fall on the 
Left, which Is much inoi-e dangerous, seeing that it has its reserves 
behind it." Decazes, who was held responsible for the results of the 



election, admitted that the \nvr required tnodificatioiis. but remained of 
'Opinion that the Government must lean upon the Centre. This group, 
however, having split just then into a right and a left Centre, was no 
longer able to secure a compact majority. During the election ('amillo 
Jordan had Issued a proclainatioti which was considered as tho mimifesto 
of the Doctrinaires- It rejrcted any undersuinding with the Itoyalists, 
and was interpreted as a declaration of war against the CaliJnet. 

The Chambers met in the middle of December. The last speech 
from the throne had deprecated excessive zeal and declared the King's 
8yst4;in lo mean peace and union between tho two luitions into which 
France was unhappily divided. Now Louis XVIII spoke of principles 
which, under the guise of freedom, led through anarchy to despotism — - 
words whicli were considered by Royer-CoUard and Camille Jordan as 
an affront to new France. In Iha Peers the Uoyaliat majority filled 
the committees with their nominees ; in the Chamber of Deputies the 
Doctrinaires did the same, although de Serre, whose new rules for the 
Chamber were rejected, was replaced as President by Ravez, a friend 
of Laine. In opposition to Deca/.cs. Richelieu and Laine advised an 
I klUADce with the Right, and proposed that all elections should be 
niai>ended for five years. Richelieu then approached Villeie and. 
, Corlriere, suggesting the retirement of Gouviou Saint-Cyr and Decazes 
lad the reform of the electoral law. When nothing came of this advance 
ud all hope was over of a Ministry representing the Right Centre and 
tiie Right, Richelieu resigned (December 21, 1818). He advised the 
King to send for Decazes, who, only at the express desire of Louis XVIII, 
GODsented to accept the Homo Office in a Ministry without Richelieu. 
On his recommendation, General Dessoles. a man in the Kings con- 
fidence, became President of tho Council ; de Serre was made Minister 
of Justice, Baron Louis of Finance; Portal, aa excellent administrator, 
of Marine ; GouWon Saint-Cyr remained at the War Office. The 
Hiniitry of Police was suppressed by Decazes as inconsistent with free 
goremment, and the Prefecture of police was restored. 

TIkj Cabinet was homogencousand sincerely Liberal; the Doctrinaires 
pn)int»ed de Serre their support. The programme of the King still held 
the field: *- Let us hold out our hands to the Right and to the Left ; and 
let OS say. those not agAinst us are with us." De Sorro wrote that the 
nfety of the Crown and the country lay in the development of free 
inalitutions. Liberally interpreted. He hoped to sever the RoyaGsl 
Opposition from the Ultras, and at the same time to wiai over men like 
Bioglie. The tatter still consideretl the electoral law the masterpiece 
ol the Doctrinaires, and tho abandonment of it as synonymous with 
ttpitulation to reaction. At a later time he thought otherwiae and ac- 
biovledged that it was a capital fault to sacrifice the Hichelieu Ministry 
fo» that enactment. Rit-helieu's fenre, he said, were not groundless ; the 
•hctot *! law of 1817, right in principle, was revolutionary in its working 



1 




and could not be maintained. This was proved in 1819, when the 

Ministry formed to defend it had to give it up. Kichelieu was 
overthrown at the moment when lils foreign policy triumphed ; and the 
Right Centre was driven tdowly but inevitably into the arms of the Kight. 

The Doctrinaires now joined the i^eft Centre in diifence of the 
Ministry. The Left, although favourable in principle to a C!ab:net in 
which four Ministers were more julvaneed Liberals than Ducay-es, becamo _ 
exacting in their claims ; while the exasperated Ultras were so churlish m 
in the debate on a grant to Richelieu, that, though a comparatively 
poor man, he handed the money over to the hospitals of Bordeaux. 

On February 20, 1819, Barthelemy, the former Director, proposed 
*Hhat the IVerw should humbly request the King to sanction a measure 
tending to modify the organisation of electoral bodies." This proposal 
obtained a large majority. In the Lower Chamber Laffitte moved an 
address to the Crown In favour of the exiKti]ig law. De Serre replied 
that the address was useless, because the Ministry were resolved to propose 
no change. The hostilityof the Peers was shown bytlieir refusal, without 
debate, to sanction a harmless proposal, accepted by the deputies, for 
altering the commencement of the financial year from January to July. 
A dissolution was considered ; but it was decided to create sixty Peers 
(March 8, 1819), among them Mounicr and Barante- About thir^ 
of the new Peers were former dignitaries of the Empire. Thus, as on 
September 5, 1816, a coup oTMat of the King stopped the reaction. 
Monsieur talked about the beginning of the end and the doom of bis 
House. 

When the proposal of Barthelemy came to be discussed in the 
Lower Chamber, Royer-Collard declared that any attack on the system 
of direct election threatened the middle elassoa, which embodied modorn 
interests and upheld the existing order. Tlio passionate eloquence of 
de Serre excited the enthusiasm of the Left. Ha replied to a charge 
of VillMo as to ministerial pressure on the magistracy by a denunciation 
of the White Terror and the intimidation of the juries by the fanatics of 
the South. Barthelemy's proposal was rejected by a large majority ; and, 
on March 22, 1819, de Serre introduced the three great measures which ^ 
established the liberty of the Press. ■ 

These laws were claimed by Broglio as the work of the Doctrinaires 
and the realisation of their principles and promises. He drew them 
with the help of Guizot and agreed as to their bases with Royer-CoUard ■ 
and Barante. All offences of the Press were to be dealt with under the 
ordinary law. The first measure defined crimes and offences and cfjisai- 
fied them under four heads: offences against the person of the King; 
incitemeut to crime; offences against public morality; lilwl. The 
second measure fixed the tribunabi ; all offences, with the exception oE 
libel, were to be tried before a jury. The tliiixl measure related specially 
to newspapers. Preliminary authorisation and censorship were done 



1819] 



Liberty of (he Press 



59 



away with. This was an enormous step in the direction of liberty. 
Bat the Left were not satiK&ci], while the Uight, although committtiil iu 
the previou;^ session to liberty of the iVess, now ilenouiiced these meiuures 
as a breach of the Constitution. Kutthe (ioverniuent hnrl at ita command 
tho gi-eatest oratorical talents of modern France. Wlieu the chiases 
relatijig' to public moi-alily were alternately criticised by tlie Right as 
atheistical and by Henjamin Constant as amounting to Htiite protection 
of religion, Koyer-Collard ajid de Serre triumphantly vindicated liberty 
of conscience and morality as the shield of relig-ion. ** What is man," 
said de Serre, " that feeble and passionate being, that he should offer to 
the AlmightT)* the help of his arm? Does ho pretend to usurp His 
strengtli or to offer the aid of his own weakness? . . . The vanity of this 
presamption has often been shown. The centuries that are gone teach 
in bloody characters its terrible results." 

The tone he took raised the level of the whole debate, wliieh remains 
one of the most remarkable in parliumeutary history. In reply to Luine 
who had joined the Right Centre, de Serre made use of the phrase, never 
for^ttcD by his enemies, that, iu the French assemblies, the majorities 
were sound. "Wliat,cven in the Convention? "exclaimed La Bouidonnaye. 
"Yes," retorted de Sene, "even in the Convention. That majority 
debated with daggers at their throats." The Bills were carried by largo 
mmjorities in full Chambers. On May 1, 1819, the Press.became free. ', 
Chateaubriand made the DC-hats the organ of the Royalist middle class. _; 
The Doctriniiiixjs were represented by the Cowrrter, to which Villemain, 
Remnsat, and Salvandy contributed. Hut their appeal to impai-tial 
JBStico left them Isolated. 

The Irftft organised petitions in favour of amnesty for the exiles of 
1815. Ue Serre looked on this agitation as a revnlntionary cabal, to 
iom from the King the pardon of all exiles, iucludiug the members of 
the Bonaparte family and the regicides. He reminded the Chamber 
rf the history of the breach between the Revolution and the monarchy, 
of the treachery of the Hundred Da^'s, of the covenant of the mouairhy 
with liberty, of tho magnanimity of the King, of the vote of the 
Chamber of 1815, which demanded the punishment of treason : and he 
coDoluded with the famous sentence that, except in special cases and by 
the clemency of the King, ''the regicides could never be pardoned." 
The united applause of the Right and the ('entres, with which this 
reauu-kable speech was received, convinced the Left that they had nothing 
In hope from de Serre, who stood by the monarchy as tirmly as he upheld 
liis Liberal convictions. Uoyer-CoUard replieil as distinctly to lienjamin 
Conatant that the attempt to wring an amnesty from tho King would 
l* considered an outrage in the case of a private individual. How much 
■ore so when the outr^e was directed both against natural feelings and 
tbe royal majesty, which was identical with the dignity of the nation I 
t^Maxea held similar language, and tho petitions were rejected. 



60 



Resignation of Rf/yer-ColUird 



[1819 



The military law served as a pretext for renewed attacKS on tbe 
Ministry by VJllele, Chateaubriand, and La Bourdoaoaye on the Kight, 
by Manuel ami Benjamin Constant on the Left. The session closed with 
every presage of future conflict. The belligerent attitude assumed by 
the clergy in the Royalist cauee, and the aggressive demonstratioiis agtuust 
all who did not adopt their opinions, were met by the LiberaU with 
equal violeneo. In the early summer of 1819 disturbances occurred 
among the students in Paris^ in favour of a ccnsuryd professor, which 
led to the closing of the law school. Koyer-Collard declared that he 
would put do^vn with the utmost vigour any attempt to introduec political 
stnfo into the schools. But. when Decazc^ agreed to an arrangement 
under which the Chiistian Brothers could obtain, for members of their 
confraternity, examined by tlieiuselves, diplomas from the University, 
enabling them to teach, Koyer-Collard retired from the direction of the 
Education Department., as he considered that an encroachment had been 
made on the privileges of the University. Hie resignation seemed to 
indicate the separation of the Doctrinaires from the disunited Cabinet 
The LiheraUoongratulflted Royor-CoUard ; the Royalists ironically asked 
how the Ministry was to get on without the support of the half-dozen 
men to whom they owed so many victories? 

With the cry, " Rather support a Jacobin than a ministeriaUst," 
the Right went in 1819 to the annual partial election. With their 
assistance. Gregoire, formerly "constitutional" liisbopof lllois,waselectcd 
for the Isere. He had been the very first man to propose, in 1792, the 
abolition of royalty and the prosecution of Louia XVl. Though 
personally respectable, ho was a wrong-headed and fanatical partisan, 
who Imd compared Marie-Antoinette to Jezebel and Kings to monsters, 
whose deaths in all cases should be an occasion for rejoicing. .Besides 
Gregoire, 28 members of the Left were returned, among them General 
Foy, while only five Ultras secured seats. Louis XVIII wrote to 
Decazes, to whom lie wvw becoming daily more attached: " It ia % 
consolation for me to think that one day history, which, in the long j 
run, flatters nobody, will aay to whom we are indebted for such an ■ 
election." He alluded to Monsieur, who was embittered loyoud 
measure by the decline of his influence. Benjamin Constant, afraid of 
reaction, warned his party of the danger of overthrowing a Ministry 
on whose merits he insisted, while Camille Jordan deplored the appai^ 
ently irreparable breach of the Ministry with the Left. The elections in 
France coincided with revolutionary movements in Spain, Italy, andfl 
Germany. ™ 

Under the double pressure of homo and foreign influence, tliree 
Ministers, Deoases, de Serro, and Portal, hesitated no longer to change 
the electoral law. De Serve went back to his former idea of the 
representation of property by classes, and, with the help of Broglie,| 
be completed, by tbo end of October, 1619, a comprehensive mcasura 



1S19] 



Difficulties of Decazes and de Serre 



61 



of parliamentaiy reform by which he endeavoured to introduce an 
element of Btability in tho electoral system by favouring landed property. 
There was to be a Chamber of hereditary Peera, with an endowment of 
3>.'>00,000 francs. Tlie Chamber of Deputies was to be composed of 456 
members, of 80 years of age and upwards, paying in direct taxes 600 
francs, and elected for seven years by a complicated electoral system 
luder which the wealthier classes had a double vote. 

At the time when liroglie joined in this scheme he was already 
separated from his friends of the I^ft. In 1817 be had founded with 
them the SociH^ des Amis de la Prase, which soon became the meeting- 
place of Republicans and Bonapartista. Decades dissolved this &ociety 
in 1819; Broglie* driven by Benjamin Constant bo explain his position, 
8ud that the society had always been illegal and that tliero was 
nothing for it but submission. He knew that his oVn step-father 
d'Argcnson, Manuel, and Lafayette, were allied with conspirators and 
pretenders, and thought it his duty to terminatu liis political connexion 
with them. Meanwhile Decazes, when he realised tlrnt the consent of 
Dessoles, Gouvion Saint-Cyr, and Baron Louis was not to be obtained 
for a reform of the electoral law, tried through VIllMe and Corbii^ro 
to come to an understanding with Richelieu, who was then, travelling 
in Holland. He sent him (November, ISltt) a confidential agent bearing 
& note from the King and a letter from himself, explaining the situation 
md enclosing a drafts by Barante, of the proposed legislative measures. 
At the same time Decazes approached Royer-CoUard, to itiditce him to 
join the ministry. Royer-CoUard also was alarmed by the election of 
Grcgoire, but met every proposal to deal with the situation by remarking 
that no legislative enactment could save the monarchy: the evil oarae 
from men, not from things ; to perish was also a solution. But Decazes 
was so anxioxis for his assistance that he offered him the Presidency of 
the Council and his own resignation, whereupon de Sen-e remarked 
that self-sacrifice consisted in standing by the colours and not in 
fiying from them. Royer-CoUard liltimelf was of opinion that no 
Prime Minister was possible but Richelieu, and insinuated that he 
might then take the Education Department himself. His interview 
with Dccaxes took place on November 15. The next day de Serre 
offered the War Office to Broglie. The latter replied that he could 
^re no assistance and only do harm ; that he had no influence with 
the Lltnu; and that his vindication of liberty would be looked upon 
•■ a relapse into error. When ho broke with the Left he changed, 
wt his opinions, but liis party. Nobody would believe in his dis- 
interestedneas, if he accepted office. On the day on which Broglie 
declined, Richelieu's answer arrived. He wrote to the King that he, 
- q*»king in the presence of God, did not deem liiniself capable of 
uadertAking the task ; but he promised his general support. 

De Serre thenimfolded his wholescheme to Royer-CoUard, who neither 



62 



Reconstrurtum of the Ministry 



[1819-20: 



favoured nor opposed it ; lie still tbought it possible to overcome the 
objection of Hicbelieu to take office. So late us November 17 de Serre 
^vrote to Deoazes that be still hoped " to make the Pope " ; i.e. to 
poiBUade Royer-CollaKl to form a ministry. On that very day, after 
de Serre had produced hia plau to the Cabinet, Ueasoles, Gouvion Saint- 
Cyr, ami Louis resigned. Koyer-Collard refused at the last moment to 
join the Government. De Serre g-ave up the intended increase of tlie 
Ministry, but succeeded in obtaining the appointment of Roy, I^tour- 
Maubonrg, and Pas(|uier, on whom the King specially insisted, as 
Ministers of Finance, War, and Foreign Affairs respectively. Do Serre 
having declined the Presidency of the Council, that position was given 
to Decazes. 

Koyer-Collard expressed his disapproval and disappointment in a 
letter to de Setre, who replied that the constitution of the Ministry 
was the result of the refusiil of Royer-CoUard hiraHelf to take office. 
Ixiuis XVIII wrote to Decazes that the delight of the Comto d'Artoia 
and the Duchess of AngoulSmc made liim fear he had been guilty of 
folly. The attempt to rally the Left Centre round the standard of 
lie Serre hsid failed. 'I'he Cabinet, reconstructed in a Royalist sense, witli- 
out conciliating the Royalists, was now dependent on the Right Centre. 
Vill&le declined to make any concessions to it. Chateaubriand, in the 
name of the Ultras, stated, as the comlitious for their support of 
electoral reform, reorganisation of the National Guard, muuicipJil reform, 
alteration of the system of promotion in the army, reduction of taxation, 
re-establishment of the religious Orders, and compensation for the victims 
of the Revolution. 

The speech from the thione insisted on the necessity of araendraenta 
in the Chart-er in order to save the country from the disquietude caused 
by annual elections. Eight days later the Right moved to annul the 
election of Gregnire. The Ministers would have been willing to exclude 
him on a point of f<»rm. The Left, wJio liad tried to make him resign, 
would have accepted tliis solution. But Laine, representing on this 
occasion the Right as well as the Right Centre, in a memorable speech 
insisted on the exclusion on grounds of personal unworthincss ; only the 
extreme Loft voted against ex[nilsii*n. During the debate on a Govern- 
ment motion for a vote on account, pending the introduction t>f the 
estimates, the Ultras were so violent that Vill^le became alarmed and 
persnatled his friends to vote witli the Government against the Lttftand 
a few Ultras. Two great speeches by Paaquier and Decazes accentuated 
the difference between the Government and the Left, which organised 
petitions in favour of the existing electoral system. A fatal blow vna 
now given to the Ministry by the phyaicAl breakdown of de Serre, who, in 
Januarj-, 1R20, was obliged to go to Nice to recruit his shattered health. 

Before he left, he reluctantly consented to a moditicatioa of his 
electoral plan. The schetne finally put forward was that of de Serre,. 



I 

I 

1 



1 



1830J 



Alurder of the Duke of Berry 



63 



with anienilmcnts by Uichelieu, Piisqiiier, and Lainr. CftUeges of the 
arrondi$»€ment€ were to select colleges of the Departments out of the 
most highly taxed landowners; septennial general elections and the re- 
dnction of the ago qualification were dropped; but the annual election 
of onc-flfih of the deputies was to be suspended for five years. The 
measurer accepted by the King, was to be introduced on February 14. 
On the evening of February 13, 1820, the Duke of Berry was stabbed 
at the door of the Opera House by Louvel. Overcome by grief, Decazes, 
who bad hurried to the scene, scarcely perceiveil that the wife of the 
dying Prince turned away from him in horror. On the next day his 
impeachment, " as an accessory to tbe murder," was proposed. Chateau- 
briand wrote. " The hand that struck tbe blow is not the most guilty." 
*Tho whole Kight, in fact, held Decazes responsible for the caUistrophe. 
On February 15 the Government asked for exceptional laws in restraint 
of liberty, and the re in trod action of the censni-ship for five yeai-s, and. 
at the same time introduced their measure of electoral reform. 

The I^eft Centre were not consulted. Royer-CoUard, ('amille Jordan, 
and lieugnoi made it a condition, before consenting to the temporary 
meaaurefi of security, that the existing sj-stem of election should be 
maintained. In the Upper House, Doctrinaires and Royalists rejected 
the proposal to restore the censorship. Every attempt at conciliation 
made by Decazes was fruitless. " VV'e have all been killed with the 
Duke." be wrote to do Scrre. With the consent of the King he went 
to Richelieu on February 18, to whom, at the request of Decazes, 
Monsieur promised the support of himself and his friends, saying, 
**I will be the first of your soldiers." 

Without confidence in this assurance Richelieu threw himself into the 
breach. The King's jiowere of resistance wore broken by the tears and 
tuppUcatious of his family. He dismissed the favourite, who was made. 
AmLftssador in I..ODdon and a Duke. Thus disappeared from tbe 
ptrliamentary stage a man, who to exceptional ability and great 
^^perwnal cliarm united a clear apprehension of the requij-ements of the 
^Bnodem State. Deoazes in 1820 was only forty years old; hut, although 
^^K lived to an advanced age he never recovered political power. 
Though he cannot be numbered among great and creative statesmen, 
he was an excellent administrator, energetic, hard-working, and of a 
* '•nn^'iUalory disposition. His greatest achievement, the Ordinance of 
•"■I N-mber, 181*i. which finally led to his fall, secured years of peaceful 
■' %. loi'tuent to the Government of the older branch of the Hourhons. 

After his return to power, Richelieu placed the moderate Royalist 
Stateon at the Home Oflice and Monnier at the head of the police; 
^^Ktalts replaced de Serre ad inti^tm; Pasquier, who remained at the 
^F^iveign Office, brilliantly vindicated the ministerial policy in the 
t'himber. The Doctrinaires continued in the Council of State. De 
Sure charged them with having, by their conduct, brought about the 



sacrifice of Decazes to the Ultras. De Serre's friends were of a BimUar 
opinion; in their letters to hiiii thtjy termed Koyei*-Cnllard the jcreatesl 
master of destruction. Decazes recommended that iJroglie should be 
secured to the Ministry as the least Doctrinaire of the Doctrinaires, now 
that de SeiTe no longer belonged to theni. BrogUe described the 
situation as desj)erate, and the King's rule as at an end. *' Richelieu," 
wrote Royer-Collard, " i» the hwt bulwark " ; all opposition was dangerous 
and ha would have nothing to say to it, but he would never agree to 
tbo electoral proposals of the Government as they stood ; and, in the 
debates on the exceptional laws, the hostility of the Doctrinaires became 
clear, Koyer-('ollard comi»arod these meiiBurca to money raised at 
usurious interest, which ruins the creditor; the nuUificatioa of the.! 
repi-esentative system by the reintroduction of privilege would prove 
deadly ; ihe royal Htaiidard, which was hoisted on September 5, 1816, 
was sinking in the hands of incompetent leaders. 

The Left, encouraged by the success of the Revolution in Spain, 
and animated by the fiery eloquence of General Foy, who acted aa 
mediator between them andtho Doctrinaires, attacked the Government 
with ever increasing violence. The Right I'eluctantly provided a feeble 
and precarious majority. Guizot wrote to de Serre that the monarchical 
and Liberal reform which he intended was doomed ; he ought to resign 
and clear liimseU of responsibility, as he no longer had powtT. Royer- 
Collard held similar language : "1 dreamt of an alliance between order 

and liberty, between Legitimacy and the Revolution 1 am now awake." 

But de Serre had taken his stand. He thought there were signs that 
both groups of the Right would come to an understanding for the 
defence of monai-chy. Should that come to pass he would gladly see 
them in power. Till then the only course was to fight on. The notion 
of deserting his post seemed to him cowardly. Since March there was 
absolutely no prospect of carrying de Sorre's project, either as proposed 
by Decazes or in its original shape. On April 17 the Government, in 
agreement with Villi-le, Corbiore, and Laine, introduced a titird scheme, 
according to which two different classes of electoral colleges were to be 
created in each Department; those of the arrondi»»emettta, with a 
franchise of 800 francs, were to elect aa many candidates as the 
Department had deputies ; that of the Department, consisting of the moat 
highly taxed fifth nf the voters, was to elect the deputies from these lists. 

The recognition of property, defined by Benjamin Constaot no lesa 
than by the Doctrinaires themselves " as the natural, necessary ineqaalityt 
on which tlv exercise of political rights reposed," had been the root- 
idea of the electoral law of 181T. The project of 1820, which intro- 
duced the dual vote, transferred political preponderance from the middle 
class to landed property, which, in spite of all upheavals and changes, to 
about half of its original extent remained in or had returned into the 
bands of the old nobility. The Left saw in the new proposals an inju 



I 



I 



'1820] 



New electoral proposals 



65 



to the industrial as opposed to the landed interest, and a preparatoiy 
step towards t!»e reintroductiou of priviliige. They attiickcd thti with- 
drawal of the project of Deoazes aa iUegal, with the support of Royer- 
('ollard. 
The Ultras considere<l the measure inadequate and the expression of 
he mind of the Centre. Id another speech, on May 17, Royer-Collard 
hamcterided liberty and legitimacy as inseparable ideas, and equality 
s tlie coruer-Hlone of Frerioh liherty. He re[iiidiaU:d, as before, the 
doctrine that the sovereif^n people represented persons and individual 
wills, not society, its rights and interests. Coiistitiitioual theory should 
make no distinction lietweeu owners of large and sranll properties; 
I*r»iperty as such was the nioml guarantee of civil capacity. " All tJie 
interests and right** of the oomraunity are represented by the Lower 

Ehaniber. Equality of electors and of votes and direct election are 
ise[Mimble. Klection by majority is aloro valid. The repreaeiitalion 
f luiiiarities is a fraud, a violation of the CharttT, a <.vm;i d'etat against 
equality and tlie representative eyatem; it is the Conntor-rovolution." 
I'asquier retorted on the 18lh that equality, the fundamental principle 
of the Charter, whs idroiitly set at nought, 27,900,000 souls being dis- 
franchised as against about 80,000 voters. He charged Roy er-Co Hard 
irith confounding civil rights, which were equal for all, and political' 
rights, which were not. 
M Tlie strongest pressure was brought upon de Serre, who returned at 
^^lliis time to Paris, by Binglie, Goizot. and Royer-Collard not to ancrilico 
himself " to the mutilated Bill and the wretched Ministry." " We have 
ini[>ertfihable recollections in ooniinon. We have revealed our souls to 
each other," wrote Royer-Collard. For a whole week, in silence, do Serre 
listened to orators who accused one another of conspiring with the 
I^^Left against monarchy, and with the Right in tho interest of the 
^Koant«rH% volution. The excitement was tremendous, in the gallery, 
^^t the dooirs of the House, throughout the country, in the army itself, 
which Laflltte, Lafayette, and d'Argeiison were attempting to corrupt, 
vbile VitroUes intrigued for Monsieur. On Alay '27 Lafayette spoke. 
^K^le contended that the obligations of the Charter were reciprocal ; the 
^Bncolour was insulted by the (-migrH, the conquests of the Revolution 
^^BHatened. It would not be well to dnve the young generation to the 
^Hlmice of the sacred symbols of trntli and justice. Do Sorro rose. 
^Bfie now began, in the words of Broglie, bis Homeric struggle against 
^^the Left, which attacked him with fury, against the Right, which 
bniided him as a. truitor, against his former allies now incensed against 
him; ho stood alone amongst colleagues, all of whom had sought his 
iaoistaiice and yet weru divided by his presence. The hand of death 
WM npoa him ; nevertheless he fought with a cool courage and mental 
■ctivity never surpassed. Lafayette, he said, had alluded to the Revo- 
lutioQ. '* Ha\'e not those times," he continued, " left to tbe honourable 
c. X. tr. K. ti 




member sorrowful experiences and jji'tilUiihle rucoUecliuii4? Ho luiut 
have felt, more thau once, witb death ixt Im heart aud tlio blush of 
shame on his cheek, th.it when once the mosses aro roused, it is not ouly 
impossible to arrest th*jiu in ;i cureer of crime, but that one may be 
often forced to follow them, perhaps sometimes to lead/' 

Royer-Collard again repudiated any counexioD with the doctnue of 
the aovereig'n people, and. after insisting once more ou his views about 
direct election and equality of votes, admitted the necessity of modi- 
fieatirms in the Act of 1817. In oi-der to avoid the pioposed two 
different systems of election and the double vote, Camiile Jordan moved 
an Hmendment to oreate as mitny elet^^tonil colleges as the Department 
ha*\ deputies. This idea was now approved by the Left Centre and 
the Left, although the Left knew very well that the diviaion of 
electora by arroHdisKemenit would miso up local inAuencos against the 
revolutionary projiagancla. The Chamber consented, by a majority 
of one, to coit&ider this amendment. If I his were accepted by the 
Government, they must renounce alliancti with the whole UoyaJist 
part)' and break up their majority, while Camiile Jordan could only 
offer the steady support of his friends, who were a minority in the 
Opposition. I)e Sen-e moved its rejection ; describing the measure of 
(Decazes, which ^vas in reality his own, as that which would stem the 
'tide of revolution in France and elsewhere by means of a powerful, 
generously interpreted representative system. Neither the light nor 
his disconcerted colleagues dai-cd to repudiate do Sori-o. The amend- 
ment of Camiile Jordan was lost by ten votes. On June 3 the first 
clause of the electoral law, regulating the electoral colleges, was carried 
by five. On that morning Koyer-C'ollard and Guizot let du Serre know 
that five-sixths of the Left were willing to vote for the clause, on 
condition of immediate dissolution, the election of the present 258 
members by colleges of the arronJi^semeni, and that of 172 additional 
membei'8 by colleges of the Oejiavtment, but on a i-ednced franchiae 
wliich would render impossible a predominant representation of re- 
actionary interests. 

Immediately after the vot* the demonstrations in favour of the 
deputies of the Left, which had gone ou daily since May Itj. assumed 
the eharaoter of revolt. The Ministry placed the troops nmler the 
command of Marshal Macdonald. Ofticers of the Guard in plain clothes 
and returned republican exiles, among them an agent of Lafayette, took 
part in these riots. On June C (Camiile Jordiin pn>posftd that the 
Chamber be adjounied till the safety of the nationiil representation, 
threatened by the Royalists, wassecured. De SeiTe denied the existence 
of danger, but cbai'ged the Left with endeavouring to obtain, by incitement 
to disorder, what they could not get by parliamentary methods. Mannel 
replied that justice oouhl not ha expected from de Serre: the Ministry 
was no longer able ti save the couiiti-y. The Keeper of the Seals did 



1820] El€cU>ral scheme mnended and passed 



67 



sot waver for an instant. He lie]d his ground against Becjamiu 
CoQstitnt, CaHimir F^ner, nnd T^afTitti*. 

Louvel's execution madu thit* a critical time, but the Government 

mastered disorder. (Juizot ackno\vledg«s that this was done firmly and 

moderatelyi without violating freedom of debate. While the Goyern- 

meitt were concerned about the maintenance of order, two deputies of 

the Li'ft Centre, < 'ourvoLiier and Hoin, gave notice of two further 

amendmentd. That of Courvoisier rejected the double vote. The 

iimeDdment of Boin, which was considered privately by de Serre, Villelo, 

and Corbiore, was substantially the pi-oj.T08al whiuh Koyer-Collard and 

Juizot made to du Serre on June 3. Itut it iixe<l the fmnehist> for the 

depBTtmental colleger at a qualification of 1000 francs, equal to that 

cf the deputies. It further gave to the members of these colleges the 

double vote. This amendment waa carrii^d, on June H, by 185 against 

66 vot«s of the Left and the extreme Koyalists. In the Peers the law 

once more underwent severe criticism from Liberals and Doctrinaires, 

(Speoially from Barante and Broglie. 1'hey regi-etted the omission of 

provisions for general elections and the reduction of the age qualification. 

Tbey however admitted that the gains outweighed the losses and that 

4e Serre's project of 1819 wiw revived in essentials. With the assistance 

flf the moderate Royalists the Ministry wore victorious. A fortnight 

>fter the measure became law. Laiiu- offi-red Vilh>le in the nauui of 

Richelieu a seat in the Cabinet. Villelc declined for the present, 

peading tho elections^ in order to keep himself free from the appearancQ 

of having sought a position for himself. 

During the debate on the budget the Left ab^tainod from voting, on 
Ibe ground that the (^barter had been violated : and all legal opposition 
18 at an end. Two only of their newspapers had escaped censure. 
Ceneral Koy and Laffitte were now dismissed from their posts. The 
Rijfht, however, reniainod dissfitisfied. so long aa members of the definite 
Opposition were alone touched. The adverearies they most feared were 
liow who bad once fought side by side with tliem in the interests of the 
Bontrchy. The memoirs of Pasquier prove that Monsieur, Villele, and 
fftfbiere insisted, as the price of their alliance with the Richelieu 
Ministry, on a complete broach with tho Doctrinaires. The aversion 
fell for tbem by Uichelieu and Pasquierwas not lessened by the manner 
n which lloyer-Collard, Camille .Jordnn, and TJuizot, although Coun- 
cillors of Stiite, worked against the Ministers during the debate on the 
Mg«t. Guizot, although not a deputy, had made himself conspicuous 
atbelobbyand elsewhere by encouraging resistance. De Serre charac- 
tffittd Camille .lorrlan's tone aa an appeid to revolution. His position 
*«■ iDore diflficnU as reganls Royer-CoUard, with whom, as with IJarante 
•rf Broglie, he had remained on terms of intimate friendship. Tho 
<tfiKbraent ai Royer-Collard to the dynasty was beyond suspicion; in 
ciitieal moments ho hail« mora than onco, stood by de Serre. Hut 



68 



Royalist reaction 



[1820-1 



feelings of comradeship, the rticullecttoii of so m&ny battles fought 
in comiuuu, failed after the refusal of Royer-Collattl to take oftiL-e and 
to secure for the Government the solid support of a majority in the 
Ce litre. ^ 

On .hily 17, a few days before the close of the session, the Keeper of" 
tlie Seals diamiiwed Guizot, Camille .foixlan.atid Rtiyei-Collard from the 
Council of State, "on the ground of violent and continued opposition 
to the measures of the Government against the enemies of the monarchy." 
Uoyer-CiiUfti-d and Guizot declined honors and iKteuniary compensa- 
tions. Biimnte soon after resigned his ncwly-aequired diplomatic 
poiiition and. with Broglie, went into Opposition. •' We are about to 
undertake a diffiL^ult ta^k," said de Serre to lianiiite in a last conversftM 
tiori ; *• we intend to govern by reasonable methods while leaning on 
the Itight." The task turned out more difficult than he thought. After 
the re-enactment of the temporarj- laws of exception the chiefs of the Left 
foL'raed a committee to assist those who might be attacked, which soon 
was organised as a secret, anti-dyna^tic society in touch with similar 
associations, such as tlie ChaTbonnerie, the Chevaliers de la Liberte, etc. 
A far-reaching military plot, which was primarily organised to revolu- 
tionise Paris and then to bring about a change of dynasty, and was to 
break out on August 19, had been discovered by the Government in good 
time. The guilty were bi-ought before a tribunal of the Peers, which 
did not pass judgment till July, 1821. In consetjuence, however, of the 
i!pirit in the army, the Peers and the Government were afraid to pi-oceed 
iigainst sevoml deputies strongly suspeatetJ of having knowledge of this 
conspiracy and of being ['rivy to the riots of June, 1H20. Hence 
d'Argenson, Manuel, Koy, Corcellea^ and above all Lafayette, escaped 
trial. The mildness of the sentences on those convicted was attributed 
by both parties to the weakness of the Administration. It was in reality 
largely due to the influence of llroglie, who, in his memoirs, takes the 
credit for it. 

When, on September 29, 1820, a posthuraoua heir, the Duke 
Hordeaux, was born to the bereaved dyna.sty, Richelieu and dc Serre. 
prL'ssed by the Koyalists and against the advice of Pasquier. decided in 
favour of partial instead of general elections. Guizot, in a widely-read 
pamphlet, called upon the King to place himself at the head of the 
Kevolution in order to overthrow the Counter-revolution. The advice 
came too lato. A royal proclamation utis issued calling on the electors 
to choose tried Royalist candidates. An overwhelming Royalist ma- 
jority was returned, recalling the days of the CJtamhre introuvtihle. This 
ni.ijority was not satisfied when Richelieu, in order not to separate from 
colleagues, apjwinted Villele and Laine Ministers without portfolios, 
Lauriston head of the llousohohl. ('■oi-bit*>re to the Ministry of I'dueation, 
Chateaubriand ambassador at Berlin, Ravez President of the Chamber, 
and favoured Uoyalist claims in the services. He hoped to conjure 



no 

J 




ftway diflioulties by legislation directed mainly towards the develot*- 
meat of material interacts. In the raeantinie he had to meet foreign 
complications. 

The policy of observatiou, which, in opposition to the Emperor 
Alexander but in afifreement with the other Powers, had been adopted 
by France as regaitls the military revolution in Spain and the restora- 
tion of the constitution of Cadiz, was no longer posaible in prosoiice of 
an identical movement in Naples. Richelieu, who at Aix-la-Cbapelle 
had led France to adhere to the Quadruple Alliance, which was based 
on the maintenance of the treaties, proposed a conference, but tried in 
vain, by mediation between King Ferdinaml luid his Noapolitan subjects, 
ttt prevent Austrian intervention. The Congress met at Troppau. In 
spite of the protests of England, of reservations of the French pleni- 
potentiaries concerning limitations of the right of intervention and the 
arbitriir}' action of the other three Powers, the French representative 
at I^ihach nevertheless signed the protocol sanctioning the action o£ 
Austria against Naples. 

The attitude of the Ministry at Troppau and at Laibach gave 

dissatisfaction to both the extreme parties at home. The feeling was 

u bitter that, when the light sentences passed on the conspirators of 

August 19 were interpreted by the Left as a tacit avowal that prttofs 

ifl^iiist them were wanting, dc Serre retorted by accusing the entire Left 

of being accessory to conspiracy- Hut it was in vain that the Ministry 

mdeavoured to meet the wishes of the Right. The ritias would not 

U conciliated, and refused to vote the censorship for longer than three 

cnoQths after the opening of the next sessiim. Nevertheless de Serre 

mlv iged Richelieu to reco nstruct his Cabinet In a Royalist sense. This 

xtrice was ba a ed o n the supposition that the influence of the moderate 

Rgr^btejgoald preponderate in a future combination* in the event. o£ 

l|| r3e ttuge of the frrun, v.liii^li llic King's ill-liealth showed could not 

far di:> taut. He hiid slipped fruui the hands of Richelieu into those 

rf Midain&~~de Cayla ; Monsieur now felt himself .strong enough to 

nqoire that the compensation for the {migri», which Richelieu for 

fiiiAHctal reasons wished to defer, should be introduced during the next 

WHJon. 

At the partial elections of October, 1821, tbe Right again increased 
tlieir majority by more than 50 votes, of which 20 belonged to the 
f'ltnw. while the Ministry obtained only 20 votes for their own group, 
lli« Right Centre. De Sen-e tried in vain to prevent the return of 
Royer-CoIIanl. wlio during the la«t session had repeatedly opposed raeas- 
"iw advocated by his former friend. The Ministry now onlyexisted in 
wiuequeiice nf the divisions in the ranks of their Royalist opponents. 
'Ultras resolved to overthrow' it by an alliance with the Left against 
cenwrehip. The address to the King, drawn up by the Ultras, was a 
ition of waragainst the (Jovernment. Itexpressed the hojie, which 



wa* in reality an insult, that the foreign policy would be so conductc<l 
as rot to lower the honnur of the nation ami the dignity of the Oown ,■ 
it uliaigeii the Ministry with having hionght about an agricultural crisis 
iby their Jilatory action in not prahibiting the importation of corn; hq(I 
■^it oftHed for measures to fullil the promises of the Charter. Thia last 
- paragi-aph indicatt^d thy puUuy which ensured the support of the Ltft. 
The l.Utraa now approached Hoyer-Collard, who repaid de Serre for 
opposing his election by carrying the Left Centre over to the coalitioD 
and thus enHuring the defeat of the Government. The King, deeply 
offended by the addre».s returned a haughty answer. A dissolution 
might still save the situation. Five Ministers, headed by Pasquier, 
nrged this course, and offered to resign if their advice were not accepted. 
In these circuinslancos Hiolielieii wmild lutve luid U^ reconstruct bis 
Ministry with \'iilelu, Gorbieru, and other menibora of the Kiglit; but 
the attitude of the C'hiiraber shut out all possibility of an understanding J 
with the I'ltnis. Mindful of the pledge given by Monsieur when thefl 
Ministry was formed, Kichelieu resolv(-'d to claim his mediation. He 
went to the Prinw, explained the ffiotions conduct of the I'llras, and 
aaked for the fullllmcnt of bis solemn promise. Monsieur evaded the 
question, ajid pressed for a Ministry under ViUele. Ilichelieu turned 
away in indignalioii, exolaiuietl to Pasquier, '* Ho lias broken his plighted 
word — the word of a gentleman," and i-eported to tlie King the substance 
of the interview. " What can you expect? " said Louis X VllI in answer, 
*' ho conspired against Louis XVI. he conspired against roe, he will end 
hy conspiring against himself." But the King also, broken in health 
and spii'its, was now ready to accept Villelo. 

Richelieu and his colleagues resigned on December 12, 1821 ; and 
the Government of the Right Centre became a thing of the past. I 
had succeeded, in spite of the most uusorupiiluus opposition, in dia- 
jaruiing revolution, reorganising the army, regulating the finan 
I reviving credit, and laying solid foundations for constitutional govern' 
I nient. The integrity of its administration, the rare gifts and high 
moral standard of ib* leaders, the eloquent genius, ih« finft characler and 
governing power of de Serre, the fwtiotic self-devotion of Richelieu, 
abrtvc all the serious endeavour to apply to politics an elevated ideal of 
morality, deserved a better fate than the ungrateful desertion vif those 
whose paSBions they condemned and whose true interests they 




jLon vif thosefl 
they aerved^l 



CHAPTER m 



REACTION AND REVOLUTION IN FRANCE 




E more anient of tlie Rov^Hst-s wlm hail gone intx) exilo, either 
untAtily or by compulsion, together with the rnyal Hou8C had hoped 
r its rBstoration id 1814-5 to share in ita triumph and its power* 
id to inflict upon Revolutionaiy France a signal revenge. Wiihin 
year, 181fi-6, their excesses, often blnodthirsty, against the men 
and inHlilutinns of the preceding rSijime had lirnuglit them into dis- 
credit. Louiij Will and his Ministers Decazes aud Kichelieu had 
tut themsclvcfi off from these infatuated and uncompromising allies, 
in fear lest the anger wliich they had arou«ed in the nation shoidd 
rwoil upon the monarchy. For four years, till 1820, the country was 
govvmed without their aid or in their despite. But in their turn the 
Liberals, who hiul in this crisis beeonie the principal support of the 
noaarchy, seemed to be turning traitora to it, and to be leading hack 
tl»e eounlry, afiir the evacuation of France by the Allies in 1818, to the 
adventurous policy of the Empire and the crimes of the Terror, wheu 
bjr degrees they opened their ranks to Bonapartists or to regicide Ue- 
pablioans such a« the Abbt? Greguire. Tlio iis.sa--vsi nation of the Duke of 
Berry, which was laid to their charge, Ijecame in 1820 for the RoyalLsta 
fsibered around the Comte d'Artois the occasion of a return of unex- 
pected good fortune. Louis XVIII, Richelieu, and de Serre made 
in>cal to their devotion; and the nation itiielf, through fear of con- 
*pintcioft and of revolution, gave them, by (he eleetiuna of November 13^ 
y^i^. a fresh lease of credit. It is true, however, that these elections 
»tre the result of an electoral law paK.<ied on June 12, IHliO, with the 
pttrpose of suppressing tlie secrecy of the Iwllot. and of correcting the 
ponible errors of electors, by taking from them the choice of one-lialf 
Aft deputies, and entrusting it to the twelve thousand most heavily 
twed hindowners in France. 

Viclortnus for all these reasons, what use were the Royalists likely 
IIm time to make of their victory in 1821 '? Their programme had 
*l"iyB been a design of revenge upon the Revolution, and an attempt 
*t rtoonatitu ti u g llie aiiaieii rSijim^.. 




To carry out tUis progi-amme, they counted chiefly upon proceeding by 
a re»bomtiun uf the rights and doctrines of thti Ultrainoitlane Catholic 
Church. Tlieir hopes and tho basis of their calculations rested on the 
onncealnicnt of their ambitions and intrigues by a moral alliance between 
altar and throne, by a caoiijaign against atheiam and immorality, by a 
diflin teres ted zeal for the welfare u£ souls and of society at large. Their 
chief instriimont was tho " Congregation " of the Rue du Hac, which 
siacc 1814, under tho direction of a Jesuit, Pero Ronsin, had gathered 
together laymen and priests, the nobility, the Uoyalist magistracy, and 
the young blood of the schools. The " priest- jwirty,"' as it was after- 
wards called, eveu more Royalist than rehgious, organised branches in 
tho provinces, conducted countless missious at home, or retreats with 
magnificent ceremonial like those of the Abbe Forbiu Janson on Mont 
Valerien. U seemed to be conducting a crusade in a land of pagans. 
Declamatory journalists, editors of sueh organa as the Drapeau- Hhinr, 
the BibUotheque CdMofijiie, eloquent and dogmatic poleraista, Lamennais. 
who between 1817 and 1820 brought out his Enaat/ on Indtffereiiee ia 
Mntterit of Retu/i'>n, and Joseph de Maistre, author of 7>u Pupe, did 
not hesitate to claim for the Uoman Church the control of Fi-ance, 
won back from the Revolution. 

F'rom the beginning of 1821 a majority in the Chamber urged the 
King to strengthen ''the authority of religion in tho hearU of the 
people, and to purify existing morals by a .sy.stcm of Christian and 
monarchical education." This majority now formulated its programme 
— a religious monarchy founded upon a strict alliance of polttics and 
religiou, and upon the spiritualisation of society. Thus, under the 
pretext of reforming morality in France, they intended to remake their 
country according to their liking, Ui replace the prefectoral adminis- 
ti-ation of the Empire by the old gln^ralUHy to restore to the Church 
its autbority in civil mattera, to break down the revolutionary legislation 
on the question of marriage and of succession, and finally, to restore to 
tlte aristocracy, wheu replaced in the possession of the property forfeited 
at the time of their emigration, their inilueuoe at Court and their 
authority in tho provinces. 

At that time tlie Royali.st party was already beginning to listen to 
the counsels of one of the most illustrious of its members, Chateaubriand, 
who by his speeches and through the medium of the Press had from 
1818 to 1820 been preparing the way for his victory. Tliis brilliant writer 
hoped to induce the French, in love with glory no less than with equality, 
to accept the programme of his friends by offering them opportunities in 
Europe, and a policy of action and of revenge. It was the time when 
the people of Naples and of Piedmont were rising against their rulers, 
who pereisted in refusing tlicm liberty and reform. With a view to 
establishing his power in the Italian Peninsula, Motternich was endea* 
vourlng to obtain from Europe authority to interfere at Naples against 




1 



the democratic party. Acting as envoy of Louis XVIII in Prussia, 
since November 80, 1820, €]mt*;aubnaiid, at Berlin, had been demand- 
iiig- on behalf uf France an analogous mission in Italy. "Tlic white 
ooukade will be established when it haa once more Tuced Uie foe. A 
bold measure of high policy, which flatters the solf-cstcem of the French, 
will by that means alone ensure great popularity."' 

Such were the broad lines, the element^} of the scheme by which 
in 1821 the French aristocracy — restored to power by force of circnm- 
Btancea, confiiTned in that power by legislation touching the Press, and 
by the elections, which were favourable to their aims — hoped to satisfy 
their dejfiires of revenge and to assert the claims of privilege against the 
new society. 

Louis XVIII and his Ministers, in this period of trouble and unrest, 
bad seemed to participate in the plot, tlie King by dismissing Decozes ; 
the Due de Richelieu, the First Minister, by making room in the Ministry 
for two leaders of the extremist party, Villfeloand C'orbiero. "I prefer,'* 
Richelieu had written after the experience of 1818, ♦* Royalist fanalt- 
ci«ra to Jacobinism." However, as his ally de Serre, a brilliant orator 
and adroit minister, remarked, "While governing with the help of tiie 
Right, Richelieu yet wished to govern tiu'fA moderation.'^ He reckoned 
on some measure of patience in the Koyalists, and believed that by 
;ifying them he could give them satisfaction. 

In order to satisfy their religious zeal, he placed one of their own 

jn, Corbi6re, atthe head of the Council of the University (December 21, 

20). He approved the Ordinance of February 27, 1821, which gave 

President almast absolute power over the teaching stiff, and sui^ 

sped the control of instruction to the Bishops, giving them [>er- 

lion to inspect the Colleges and to employ State subsidies for the 

lefit of religious Houses. Professors of too Liberal views, such as 

Tissot and Cousin, were shut out from the CuUego of France and 

Sorbonne, while at the same time an aUi was summoned to the 

^directorate of the most imijortant Academy, that of Pavis. 

Besides authority over the schools, the Church was destined sliortly 

rive other benefit* from the law of May, 1821. The Ministry had 

lised the fact that th*;ro were not enough Bishops in France, and 

^ the clergy lacked the resources necessary for their own use and 

^maintenance of their places of woi-ship. They accordingly proposed 

tft creato twelve new bishoprics. It Wcame necessiuy to make still 

further concessions to the part)- of the Congregation, which had already 

[Iwn encouraged by those promises, and to declare that the King would 

[ikiiTtly proceed to the creation of eighteen additional sees- In the 

,<vnrae of the discussion upon this law, the Ministry were forced to break 

•ith the most eminent of the Liberal monarchists. Royer-Collard and 

Ounille Jordan, who accused them of compromising the monarchy and 

tbo Church to serve party ends. And yet they did not succeed in 



I 



s&tisCying the more ardeut Royalists ^DeUlot, Donnadicu, Caataibikjao — fl 
who were eager to proclaim the eupenority of religious authority over ■ 
that of the Chambers, and the right of the Crown under the old order 
to regulate without consulting tlic nation the relations between f'hnrch 
and State. Kichelitiu had liopod to create a miiiiatry of " recouciliiitiou _ 
and of pardon *' — vain hope, in faoe of a party over-excited by victory M 
and eager to obtain from it a.11 possible resulta, in {nee t«o of the just 
alarm of the natioa and the Liberal deputies aroused by the reussertiou 
of these claims. 

When a year had passed a crisis brought about by foreign affairs 
nuidltied the situation. Europe, in 1821. was disturbed more than ever 
by the revolt of the Spariiaitla against their King, Ferdinand VII, and 
by the struggles of the Greeks against the Sultan. The French nation 
was in a state of irritation at the inaction of the Government. The 
Liberals demanded that succour should be given to the Greeks, the 
Uoyalist« that support should be afforded to the Legitimist cause in 
Spain, and all wore at aoy rate agreed in deninnding some manifesto* ■ 
tion of French power abroad. It was not the fault of Uichelicu's Ministry 
that uo sutili mauifestation touk place. In spite of the joint represen- 
tations of the Secretary of State and of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Pa.sqnier and Uayneval, the leader of the ('abinet inclined to action in the 
East and on the Rhine, in concert with the Tsar, Alexander I. But at 
the last moment, alarmed by the attitude of England and the other Euro- 
pean Powera, Alexander drew buok ; the Fremdi people held the Ministry _ 
responsible ; deputies from the extreme Right and the extreme Left alike fl 
united in their reproaches of Richelieu and their efforts against him. 
They accused him iu the address to the Crown of " having purchased 
peace by sacrifices incompatible with the honour of the nation and the ■ 
dignity of the throne " (November 2i), 1><21). After a violent speech 
complaining of treachery, be resigned office ; and on ]^ecemberl!2 Louis 
XV'III appointed V'illMe and Corhifeie as his successors. Richelieu 
was not long to survive tiiis undeserved check. lie died the following - 
year. f 

Still it might seem as if the retirement of the monarchists of the 
Riglit would simplify the situation. Did it not give victory above all 
to the Royalists of the Left, the exti-omists, leaders of the " priest- m 
party," as it was called ? Wei-c they not thenceforth in a position 
to realize their hopes and their programme in its entirety"? While 
Matthieu de Montmorency was appointed to the charge of Foreign 
Affairs and Chateaubriand to the Embassy in London, Uie Duke of 
Belluno, a Marshal of the Empire, was made Minister of War. on 
the undcretanding that he was to prepare and carry out in the imme- 
diate futui'e a foreign enterprise intended to achieve glorioua results, 
" offered to the nation in exchange for privileges restored, 
seemed propitious ; and the necessary elements united for a 



The honrl 
i restoration I 



i21-2J 



Policy of VUieie 



76 




of the old order, to be eflfected by the aid of the refurbished glories 
the Kevoluiion and of tlie Empire. 

llowuver, the chie£ of tills CutHnet, the Comta de VUIdle, who for 

six years waH destined tu goverii, tirst iii the naue of Louis XVIII iind 

then in that of Charles X, was not one of thoso leaders wlio follow theii 

troops. A practical and dexterous man of affairs, he had a tirm grasp 

of realities; unlike ttio Royalists who had jdaccnl him in jwwer, he bad 

not lo6t the recollection of the defeat which hiji party had experienced 

in 1816 as a result oC their inisiiHe of victory. His dreaius were of a 

progress more sure, if les» da^^zUiig, to be slowly realised without 

alarming the nation. lie desired, in common with the Koyalistfi, the 

storation of the old order ; but liia policy was to effect it little by 

tie. rather than at a rush. **To know where it is best to go, without 

r taking a wrong turning, to make a step towards the goal on 

ery possible occasion, never to get into a jjositiun from which it is 

issary to retreat — such/' he said, "is the net;d of the monieut." 

On the other band, Villele counted less upon tlie glory of a foreign 

policy, active and conseijuently costly, to confirm and strengthen the 

restoration of the aniiien rSffimt, than upon the results of a good 

internal administration, by means of which the monarchy might succeed 

restoring to a conquered Franco sound Bnances and prosperity in 

:ce«88ion to defeat. Thus, for seven years, Franco was to submit to 

*tiie programme of tho estremists, the Uoyalists, and the clergy of 

Lthe atuien regime ; but it was carried iuto eKecutlon by Villele, 
h^ meiuis of an adioit s^-stem whit-b oft«n aronsed the anger of theue 
UDjKLtient Koyalials, but which lulled the nation into a seuse of weli- 
teing. 

The Chief Minister had the merit of keeping constantly in mind the 
hat that his friends owed their power to the forces of reaction and 
■Uriu, aruiisetl in tho country by the dagger of an assassin who had 
mortally wounded a member of tho royal family. To keep this fear 
nnke, in order to establish his authority, was his first care. In this he 
Huxeeded. The Liberals, finding themselves compelleil to prudence, 
organised themselTes into secret societies ; and the Kepublicans. imitatr 
ing tlie Neapohtans, actually formed in 1821 the Charbonnerie fratifaise^ 
itfaicfa avowedly aimed at giving back " to the French nation the free 
oterctite of tlie right to choose its sovereign." In order to give battle 
to tlie ancUn ritfime and its Dourbon protectory, tliey recruited their 
•oldiera and captain.s without hesitjition from among the ofiicers. com- 
^^■lisrioned and non-conimissioned, of the old Imperial army. Villdle 
^■riwrwdd particular skill in the discovery,exaggerntion,and signal punish- 
^^Bwit of these conspiracies. For a long period he destroyed any sympathy 
"Inch the liberals might still retain throughout the country. With a 
ttigictraoy obedient to its ordera, the Ministry devoted itself assiduously 
to representing isolated movements, no sooner known than crashed, aa 



76 



Suppression of conspiracy 



[1821-2; 



forming part of a permanent couapiracy oigatiised by the Liberals, not 
only against the monarchy, but against society it«elf. 

Some yfiuiig men belonging to the military school of Saumnr were 
arrested in December, 1821. for having planned a rising in favour of 
Napoleon II, a rising which liatl never even gone so far as a single overt 
act. At Belfort and Neubreisacb the King's lieutenant arrested officers 
and ex-ofticera on mere suspicion. At Marseilles two old soldiei-s, Valle 
and Sicard, were discovered carrying papers which revealed plans of 
oonspiracy. There was a singular coincidence, to say the least, between 
the coining into power of the new Ministiy and the sudden discovery of 
tliese conspirators. 

Three months afterwards a general not in active service, named 
Berton, after having endeavoured to enrol superior officei-s from the 
Hreton regiments, started with a handful of men to attempt the suiprise 
of Saumur (February 28 and 24) and then of Thouars. This enters 
prise had hardly been move than a disorderly skirmisli, at the end of 
which Berton, w!io waa fortunate enough at first to escaiie, fell into & 
trap set by the police (June, 1822). At the beginning of March the 
l^oplo in Paris, excited by the Catholic missions at the Church det 
J-*etits Ph'ea and the law-students of the Latin Quarter, made a demon- 
stntlion, but offei-ed no effective resistance to the police force. About 
the same time the colonel of a regitDcnt garrisoned at La JRocbeUe, a 
former 6migr^, arrested four non-commissioned officers on suspicion of 
desiring lo enrol their men in the secret suoieLies. Finally, at the 
moment when senteDce was to be passed at Colmar on the Belfort 
rebelti, another officer on the retired list, Caron, a colonel of dragoons, 
made a last attempt to raise regiments in the east (June to July, 1822). 

Sentences of death, pronounced in emulation of each otiier by the 
civil magistrates and the Courts-nmrtial, fell pitilessly throughout the 
year upon those who were associated with these political plots. The four 
sergeants of 1-a Rochello were executed at I'aris on September 21 ; 
Caron at Strassbui^, September 1 ; Berton and two of his accomplices 
at Poitiei*. October 6 and 7; VftUe, at Toulon, had aiicended the 
scaffold on June 10. It seemed that the Ministers were eager to multiply 
these trials and executions. Since certain deputies of the Liberal Oppo 
sition, Lafayette among others, and D'Argenson, had openly associated 
themselves with tlicsc enterpriser, which otherwise were devoid of danger, 
this supplied a fair pretext for exhibiting them publicly as crimiuals. 
The indictnient wIiIlOi the King's Prncuiator. Marchangy, f()rninlated, 
in order to obtain the condemnation of the tour .sergeants of La 
Rochelie, left no doubt as to the iiitoutions of tlio Government. Its 
chief aim was to terrorise the French people ''by this vast conspiracy 
against social order, against the families of citizens, which tlneatened to 
plunge them once more intoall the horroisof anarchy." While keeping 
up the appearance of saving society, ViUele gained forthwith the power 



I 



\ 




S] 



Press Lmv. — New Electiojis 



77 



to govera it in accordance with the wishes of his friends. The threat 
of anarchy, exploited by the judges in his service, allowed him to 

, organise a despotiijiu. 

Onjlanuay 2, 1822, Peyronnet. tiie Keeper of the Seals, brouglit 

'before the Chamber of Deputies ihe draft of a Press Law which would 
place the direetiun of public opinion iu the hands of tliose in authority. 

1^0 newspaper was to appear for the future without royiil sanction. 
Every sheet was to be laid upon the table of the King's Procurator, who 
waa to have the right to examine "tendencies," and to sus}>end or 
even to suppt-oss dangevou.s publications. At the same tinm Villelo 
revived another proposal prepared by his predecessors, dealing with 
journalistic misdemeanours: the tnals of these cases were transferred 
from tlie juries to the niagititrntcs of iho royal Courts, who could receive 
onters from Government. The first article of the law was expressly 
designed to punish with great severitj', imprisonment for five yeans or 
bca\y fines, all writings and illustrations ** wliich outmged or turned 
into ridicule the religion of the State, or which excited hatred or con- 
tempt of any cla.is." It bceamo olear that this legislation aimed at 
arnung tlir ( 'lown against tlw Press \yith cxtraordinarj' powei's in favour 
o^^e'aii-'t'xii' } ^uLii till- ('liiircb_i_it.jvaa._the weapon prepart*d for 
tba wra r wkicii thu MinistL-rs wished to declare against the secular and 
ie^Iuig spirit of the society established by the Revolution. 

On March 13, 1822, this twofold law wiis passed in its entirety by 
& majority of fifty. Public opinion, already terrified into submission 
lo the lloyaliat designs, Iwcame thus for the future dependent on 

■ the mercy of the Cwwn, its Minist«ra, and the ministers of the 
Church. In vain, during discussions which frequently became very 
violent, the champions of liberty. Henjamin Constant and Rnyer- 
CoUard, protested in magnifictinl speeelies "against this Parliamentary 
Jacobinism, this arbitrary legislation which recalled the principles of 
ibe revolutionary tribunals." To avert this reproach Villele had taken 
his precautions better than had the authoi's of the White Terror. 
He had had iho wit to pi oserve at least the outwaixl forms of legality. 
Tlic laws which he passed were oppressive; but they were laws for 
whicli he had prepared puUic opinion, and gained tlie support of 
Parliament. 

By a further step this Parliament, thanks to fresh elections, became 

fin May, 1832, still more favourable to his designs. The Administration 
had skilfully bandied the electoi*s, who were less numerous than hitherto; 
Ic had uoroinated as presidents of the electoral colleges avowed and 
lona monarchisla, and called U£>on Government officials to support the 
Government candidates. Of 86 deputies, o4 were elected whose pio- 
gramme w^os clearly favonmble to the Ministry. A revenue law which 
ViUele had proclaimed in the month of January, imposing heAvy duties 
upon icnpoTted goods — a law which pleased the landowners and large 



raanufacturei-s, who found it "quite reasonnble to see the majority of 
the citizens of a State sacrificed to a minority of LiidivLduitls "—had not 
been without its sharo in the populiiiitv and success of the Ministr}'. 
The tvro Chambers passed it with onthu.sia.Hm (July, 1S22). 

I'he opportunity was a good one for tiuisbing' the task of the sub- 
jection of the schools to the Ohurch, which had been begun in 18-1. 
The Fresidontof the Council of the Univereity, who was alrcHdy endowed 
with great powers, became once more, as in the time of tlie Empire, a 
Grand Master (by a decree of June 5, 1822), invested with absolute 
police rights over the teachiiig-st-ufi and the cui'riculum of tlie schools; 
and when a Bishop, Krayssinous, was summoned to this office, the 
pretensions of the clerical party were fuither strengthened. In bis 
first cii-cular, the new Grand -Master demanded that the entire youth 
of France should before all else be educated "on. religious and 
monarchical principles," and that no teacher should continue in his 
ftppointraeut who did not accept ilus decree of the ("hurch. Shortly 
afterwards Guizot, a Protestant, and Cousin, a philosopher, were com- 
pelled to relinquish their professorial chairs at the Sorl)onne. The 
School of Medicine was closed in Noveinbi;r, 1822, and only rcopeiied 
after the oxcluaion of Jussicu and Vauquelin. the lecturers who bad 
held heretical opinions. It was the turn next of the ^mU JVormale, 
whose pupils, were dispersed tlu-uiiph the provinces. And yet tJie ei- 
tremistfi considered Frayssinous timid and irresolute t 

What the priest-party would have liked was the entire orerthrow 
of the University. Schools that were wholly ecclesiastical were being 
multiplied, and were kept up by subsidies giunted by the communes and 
Depiirtmeivts. 'the Grand Master himself encouraged this development. 
The smaller seminaries — those in which, with the complicity of the 
Bishops, the Jesuits were giving their lessons free — drew away pupila 
from the secular schools and from the UniveJ-sity. It seemed as if 
the friends of the monarchy, in order to bring about the restoration of 
the aticien rf-^hne^ were not afraid of returning to the Middle Ages. 

The country, glad of a dearly-bought and firmly-established peaoe 
after the long wars of the Kevolution and the Empire, while deprived of 
the councils of a free Pi-esa, uud of all electoi-al rights, allowed Villele 
and his pitrty to dis[)ose of power and opinions, and to bi'eak down the 
Opposition whose sole refuge was in the Chamljer of Peers. At the end 
of the year 1822, after one year of goveniment, the t'abinet was able 
to point out to its friends with pride the task accomplished with sueh 
rapidi:ty and, above all, with such discretion. " The security of the 
citizens and the action of the laws were completely established ; the 
thiaiiees were on a fair way to prosperity ; the charges on the taxpayers 
were diminishing : and the treasury was becoming rich." Without (rio- 
tion and with the consent of a s;atistied people, Villele was capturing the 
public conscience and turning it towards the old order and the Clmroh. 



I 



I 




m 



3] Chateaubriand and t/te warltJce policy 



79 



These successes emboldened the more ardent Royalists, '*a mere 

hftndful/' as the Miiii^ttir said, but active, Ixild, and stirring. Tliey 

Ufttened eajrerly to Cliateaubriaud. who fi-om Loudon had long Iwen 

preactiiug to thetn a i>olicy of war that might add to the solid rather 

than dazzling progress made by their party the prestige of military 

"The idea of restoring to our anna their formor strength and 

^ I lour erinstantly dominiited me," wrote, s^>eaking of this time, the 

author of Mfmoires d'outre tombe. An opportunity presented itself. 

llit^ King of Spain, Ferdinand VII, threatened with the loss of his 

fciiigilom in uddilion to that of hit) colonies, by the advice of Russia 

imitiiired the aid of Louis XVIII. In the councils of the King the 

«xuemtAt£ intrigued to bring about intervention beyond the i'yreneee 

on behalf of absolute rule. In obedience to their demands Mont- 

nuieDcy proposed to Ijouis XV'ill to nend out to the cxtreraiatA in 

^^bwn roonevi ammanttion, and arms. VilKMo gained time by agi-eeing 

^Kit France should join a Congress which was to bo held in Italy for 

^^n BetUcmcnt of these matters in favour of the King of Spaiu. who 

^^Hs still further involved in difficultiea by the revolt of July 7, 1822, 

inUadrid. 

"This Congress," said Chateaubriand, "is our secret and our hope." 
Re disputed with his own chief, Montmorency, tlie honour of rcprc- 
notiQg France there. The point at istsue was which of the two should 
(use war to be decided upon at the Congress, so as tn earn for himself 
Ute honour of having conferred a great benefit upon the monarchy 
tnd upon the country. ViU<-le forced Montmorenoy^s hand, appointed 
Cbtetabriand as envoy to Verona, and obtained for himself the presi- 
ifHAj of the Council in order that by means of the rivalry of the two 
vppooenti* and this new authorUy he might pi-eservo his mastery over 
fcnign [Ktlitics. Satisticd with the present state nf affairs, and disturbed 
^ the projects which were being hatched abroad, he feared for the 
fvtun of his schemes if France were invulveil in foreign war. Until 
tb month of December, 1822, he prevented Montmorency, who dis- 
olt^ him neverthelesB^ from arranging with Austria and Russia for 
ihs intervention of the French by sending their army beyond the 
Pynmeea. Louis XVIII even granted, on December 25, VillMeV 
fsqtieil for the disiiiiHSttl of Montmni-pTicy. Did the Minister think to 
fcwl arooro complaisant colleague in Chateaubriand, the successor xvhom 
1* nominated three days later? What is certain is that the nomination 
■>* the great writer to a position, from which he hoped to dictate laws 
loill Europe, almost coincided with Louis XVIITs declanition of wjir 
•giinst the rebeU in Spain (January 2», 1823). 

Chateftobriand. though ever a }M>et in his dreams of glory, seemed 
to trimnph over the methodical and prudent politician who had given 
Itti a place in his ** little ministry." Almost immediately the nation 
*>i ftlile tn hail the awakening of the army and of French influcncei 



80 War in Spain. — VilTele and Chateaubriand [1822 



to acclaim tho victories of the generals of the Empire, Belluno, Reggio, 
Molitor, iMoncey, who under the leadership of a Prince of the Blood 
recaptured Madrid from the revolution, and who at the Trocadero, near 
Cadiz, completed in six months the defeat of the Spanish LiboraUt. The 
return of the Duke of AngoulC-mo and bis army on December 2, 1823, 
waa the signal for a series of banquets and illuminations, in short, of a 
/^te rationale. At Pans men forgot that this army had been the instru- 
ment of a cfirapaign against a people's liberty. Their only thought 
was of joy at the successful effort which had restored to I' ranee "all 
her military gloiy and diplomatic influence. " By this questionable 
achievement, the Restoration found itself more firmly established than 
by the more genuine services rendered by the monarchy, which had been 
engaged since 1815 in the work of repai-ation, liquidation of losses, and 
adjustment of the balance-sheet after the wars of the Empire. "The 
glory and prusperity of my country," proudly wrote Cliateaubriand. 
"date from my inclusion in the Ministry." 

But VillMe, who gained by these successes, kept a watch on the 
warlike notion of liis colleague in order to restrain it within bounds. 
111! was aware that in the department of Foreign Affairs negotiations 
were on foot with Russia to engage the unoccupied Army of Spain 
I in other struggles for national victories. In his interviews at Court 
Chateaubriand, when commenting upon the successes in Spain, hinted 
to the King the question of the Rhine frontier. He sowed the seeds for 
A new liarvest of glory and of war. On June S, 1824, Vill^Ie demanded, 
of tho King his dismissal and obtained it. The motive skilfully all 
for bis removal was not the fear of a war which would have caused 
monarchy and the Ministry to lose all the lienefitof the recent victories. 
The King reproached Chnteanbriund with his opposition to the financial 
measures of the Cabinet^ of which he was a member. In reality he was 
sacrificing him to the pacific policy of the President of the Council. 
Vill^le, as a practical man. thoroughly understood how to reaji the 
rewards of an enteii^rise abroad, which he had been unahl« to prevent 
but wliich he was determined to keep within bounds, and of the popu- 
larity which it brought the Bourbons, which he considered to be now 
sufriiNeiit; he undei-stood also how to obtJiin at liome fi-esh victories 
discreetly won for tlie benedt of his own party. His programme had 
never been that of the impatient Royalists : it was not his aim to offer 
A further bribe of glory to Kmnce in order to re-establish at a blow the 
whole of the old order, the absolute power of the Crown, the privileges 
of the nobility, the domination of the Church. " to lead tho nation, 
Chateaubriand's phrase runs, "to reality by the way of dreams." I: 
vain did the leaders of the extieme Right, La Bourtlonnayo, Delal 
Vftublanc, General Donnadieu. and the journalists of llieir party 
writcra for the Draptitu Blanc and La Quottdit-nne — reproach him \vi 
his temporisation as if it were betrayal. It Ivas by winding pat! 



IS lor 
nded J 
ege« 
ithM 
mes.^ 





S23-I] Peers created. TJte Chamber of Deputies dissolved 81 



without noiso or nulward show, that ihtj Minister of T-ouis XVJII and 
e Church continued the restoration of the ancien rCgime. 

In order to proceed in le^al form^ his flrat ooiicem was to strengthen 
is niajoritj- in the two Chambere. He aili-oitly quoted the example 
of a free countrj' like England which nevertheless was obedient to its 
constitution, when he laid before the King in 1823 the mcasuicH he had 
chotien. The Chamber of Peers, in opposition to this progressive reaction, 
hftd been since 1H20 tlie a.'iyluni and refuge of LibcriUi.sm. Cuinpused 
for the greater part of men attached to the modern system and 
hostile to all forms of despotism, such men as Count Mold, the Due 
de Broglie, the Baron de llaratite, and tlmlr friends, it had opjioscd 
the legislation against the Press and the intervention iigiiinst the people 
in Spain. In December, 1823, after having enrolled in this body the 
generals who had conquered in Spain, Vill61e advised Louis XVIII to 
nominate 27 peers, chosen from among his most faithful friends. The 
opposition in the Upper Chamber seemed broken. 

At the same moment Viili^le procured the dissolution of the Chamber 

of Deputies by a royal ordinance. He had never indeed lacked a 

majonty, but he believed that the moment had come to make cert^iin of 

\\ for a longer jieriod. By urging the fact that the ISritish Pa:Uament 

was appointed for seven yeai-a, Vill^le hoped in a moment of national 

enthusiasm to prevail upon a still more obsequious Chamber to suppress 

the article in the Constitution relating to the annual displacement of 

^dfputies by fifties. The elections were fixed for February 25 and 

^■larch 6. 1824. The Minister did not omit to influence them in his 

^Birour by the choice of presidents of the electnval colleges, by the action 

^Pof his subordinates, and by the revision of the electoral lists- The 

rtsnlt proved better than his hopes. Among 43i membei-s elected the 

Liberals numbered only 17 representatives, who were lost in the midst 

of this Koyalist Convention. In the month of April, 1824, Villdle 

brought forward a proposal before the two Chambers, in which they 

were asked to modify Article 37 in the Charter, and to declare that 

thenceforward the new Chamber would sit for seven yoara. Under the 

ipecious pretext of importing into France the constitutional customs of 

England, he easily obtained from a docile and satisfied majority the vote 

which nasurcd him a long continuance of power. 

The great difference between France and England, which Villfile did 

Dot mention, was that under lus Government tliere no longer existed 

ihher public opinion, or a free Pross, or free elections. Tlie journals of 

the Left, such as Le PUote and Le CoumVr, succumbed under incessant 

pn>«ecations. A lioyalist association was formed to buy up bodily the 

press, whicli was ruined by tiie fines inflicted. The Government 

money and authority at the disposal of a party. The Chamber, 

for seven years, in a country reduced to silence by threats or 

ibery, was no longer anything but an instrument of despotism, nil the 

C II. u- X. 



82 Proposed Conversion of ifie FrencJt JJefH [182« 

more dangerous because it sat for a longer period. Villele had reckoned 
wt^ll ; and when this Septennial Aot had been passed, the demands he 
miulo upon this Ohambre retrouvCe were for services rather than for vot«s. 

The work upon which he was then eiijra'^ed with the help of the 
body of lioputie-s was the grand liquidation of cLaime which the Uoyalists 
had looked for ever since their return from exile. When he returned 
with thero, Louis XVIII had refused them the hope of res^aiulng the 
possessions they had lost during the H<tvoliitton. Ho had proclaimed 
"all rights of property inviolable and sacred." He had thus given an 
absolntc giiarantoe that the bnldera of national possessiouH should retain 
their lauds. Nevertheless the lloyalists asked whether the restored 
monarchy had no duties towarda those dispossessed owners, those faith* 
ful adherents who had sacriHcod their fortunes in defending ita cause. 
Louis XVIII and his counsellors could not ignore these counter-claims* 
but they were bound by their promise. They tirst attempted to indemnify 
the former emu/reB by reserving for them the best places and offices at 
Court, in the army, and in the Ministry. Thus they gained some years' 
respite. Hut the progress which the Royaliatiiarty had made since 1821 
reawakened their grievances and increased their demands. How were 
they to be satisfii^d without disturbing the nation ? 

Vill61e, that '^^ grand aideur d" nffairea^^^ as Chateaubriand called him, 
evolved in 1824 the necessary expedient. Thanks to the i)eacet which 
the expedition to Spain bo speedily concluded had not seriously in- 
terrupted, the finances of the State were ina prosperous condition. The 
French Government stock at 5 per cent. !iad risen stea'dily since the great 
disasters at the end of the Empire. It touched par on February 15 ; it 
rose to 1(15 in the month of March. This movement was partly attribu- 
table to a general rise which took place all over Europe. IJut it was 
also the proof and result of the relief in French finances brought about 
b}' the industry of tho nation and tho good administration of the Ministers 
of Louis XVin. The occasion was a good one for ruihiclng tho interest 
on the National Debt- Tliis debt stood at 2.800.000,000 francs, which 
at the rate of 5 par cent, required an annual payment of 140,000,000 
francs. By reducini* the rate to 4 per cent, an annual saving to the 
Tre:isury would be oflfected of 28,000.000. without reckoning the advan- 
tage to the State, when liquidating itfi debt> of no longer being obliged 
to buy its stock above par. 

The Minister did not hesitate. On April fi he proposed to the 
ChambeY-H to lower the rate of interest to 3 per cent. He offered 
to holders of stock 8 per cent, bonds at 76 francs instead of lUO froiios* 
which was the equivalent of converting 5 per cent, to 4 per cent. He 
made [day with " the fruits produced by the wisdom of the King and the 
good fortune of France," the marvellous effect "of an operation which 
would attest the general prosperity and put an end to the disastrous 
discrepancy between the interest on capital invested in stock and the 




interest yielded by capital employed in agriculture, commerce, or mnim- 
facluix^" "If you wish to give fresh life to these three pillarj* of 
prosiwrity, direct towartlB thorn the Uow of weulth," he urged. Public 
economy. pi-otit« for the nation at large and for general iiidusti y — were 
these not enough to justify this conversion at the expouse of holders 
of stock ? 

The only jjoint wliiob Vilh!'lo failod to metttiou. in obedience to bis 
lactici) of prudent compromise and partial oonuealmeut in the measures 
he brought forward, was the employment of these 28 millions, set free 
ty public economies. If be had applied them to the development of the 
public wealth, nothing could have been better. But he kc'pt them back 
for a jwculiar application, which waa the final end and essential object 
of his financial enter[irisR. It was reported and known that Villelo was 
■rranging with foreign financiers for a new French loan, the interest 
opon wliich wjis to bo paiiJ hy tlio antir-ipatt'd economy. The loan wiis 
for 1,000,000,000 fnincs; and its pni-pose was the indemnification of the 
ttiUjfr^. In the discuitsion which took place in the Chambers, the 
Liberals, abt)ve all Casimir pL-rit^r. denounced the iniquity of this opera- 
Uon, which rubbed the hoUlera of stock in order to satisfy oue special 
class of the nation, a minority of privileged individuals, who liad been 
ponished in time past for having conspired with foreign Powera to 
recover theirown privileges. However, the majority which the elections 
of 1K'24 bad provided for the Government appi*oved the proposed action^ 
and passed the law on May 4. 18:24. 

The Chamber of Peers threw it out on June 3. This Chamber was 
rqled by old public olllcere nf the Kmjiiri', men of the Revolution, stmli 
u Count Koy, Mollien, Fasqiiior, and Talleyrand, who were irrecoa- 
cilalily hostile to the imigr^t. Their opposition, enfeebled as it was 
by the nomination of new Pefrs, to which the Minister bad recently 
p.'r;«naded the King, would havo lieeu insufticient, if Chateaubriand, 
who was jealous of VtUelo, and dissatisfied with tho foreign policy 
»hich the Minister forced upon him, had not wrecked the proposed 
niBHuro bj using his influence in the Royalist circles of the higher 
ritsml»er. He paid for this intrigue by the loss of his past on June 6. 
Hut this was the beginning of a war to the death between him and the 
Ministry which he had attempted to overthrow, and which dismissed 
!iim for bis obstinacy and infidelity. 

Tlius the camixiign whn.se8ucoeRs Villele considered certain mot \vith 
owm obstwdes than he had imagined among obstructionists of his own 
fwrty. Before many days had passed, he was to undergo a fresh experience 
fl the same kind. In working for tbf aristocracy he did not forget the 
Church; but his intention wjw to make use rtf the snme crooked paths 
tn wrve her. Modem France, the France of the lievolution, was still 
kvttle to the rcIigio\i8 Orders that had been dispersed at the end of 
the eighteenth century, above all to the Jesuits who had been expelled 




by the monarchy itself. This Villdle knew. He judged it more 
prudent not to mention to the people the re-estahUshment of the 
monasteries, but to leave their membcra scattered in a secular society to 
gain the mastery over the seminaries, the University, the education of 
the young, and even over the administration, so as slowly to extend 
their control over public opinion and government. 

Ilut he tht>ijght that the hour had come for working on behalf of 
the religious budies wlio were not auspcctcil by the people on the; same 
grounds. On April 8, 1824, a royal ordinance confirmed the privileges ol 
the Brothers of la Doctrine chrHirnney giutited in 1819, and, by exacting 
of all teachers total submission to the Bishoiw, prepared for them a kind 
of raonopnly of primary education. Some time afterwanls, on June 12, 
the Minbitry requested the Chambers to resign their right in favour of the 
Crown and to authorise it once fur all to grant permission for the establish- 
ment of convents when it seemed advisable. The nuns, who were for the 
most part devoted to works of charity or to education, did not awaken 
in France the same distrust as the monks. VUlele hoped that in their 
favour the monarchy might l)e gmnlod uncontTOlled authority to foster 
the development of their wnik and wealth, and that a precedent might 
be thus created for hereafter depriving the law and the Chambci'S 
of the direction of religious bodies in general. This was the beginning 
of a period in which the Roman Church, clucHy with the help of the 
French Catholios, was to re-establish throughout the world her tmo]», 
which had been scattered iu the preceding century by unbelief and 
revolution. It was of the highest importance that she should find 
in France a monarchy and Ministers capable of assisting her without 
being obliged to render accounts to the Freuch nation, faithful to her 
laws and unfettered by those of the State. 

The ('bamber of Peere, which was obstinately Liberal in sentiment, 
though strongly monarchical, saw through the schemes of Villele and 
baffled his calculations. "If we decide to-day," said Baron Pasquier, 
" that i-eligions bodies of women can be established by simple royal 
ordinances, the force of circumstances will drive us to make the same 
decision for the religious bodies of men. The sanction of law is 
necessary." A majority of the Peers adopted his opinion. The Ministry 
had gained nothing by their adroitness. In spite of all their precautions 
against alarming the country, and their selection of docile Chambers, 
their plans on behalf of the Church and the aristocracy came for the time 
to a full stop. Yet, to a certAtn extent, these difhculties must have 
enlightened those of the Royalists who reproached Villele with his tem- 
porising policy, and who waxed angry over his hesitat ions. This repulse 
proved his wisdom, lie had faileil ; but defeat, in the conditions under 
which he made war, while making sure of retreat, left him with the 
hope of revenge. Time was working for him. 

In point of fact, the reign of Louis XVIIf was drawing to an end. 



I 



The liealth of the old King, who was broketi by gout ami long since in- 
capable of walking, became rapidly worse during the summer of 1824. 
He yet made an efTort to appear iu public on August 25, his saint's 
iy,and to continue tiil Sejitember 12 his royal functions. Kut then his 
mgth gave way aud fever supervened. After three days of aeute 
ifferings and of rei*eated crises, Louis XVIII died on September 16. The 
iion o £ Charles X .4.hc Comte d'Artois, who had always looked with 
more favour than liis brother upnn the hopes and aims of ilie more 
uncom promising Royalists, was to fu rnish VillC'lo with a new point of 
sn ppon. Though Che new reign, in accordance' with custom, began hy 
ineai^ures of concession, yet the promotion of the throe Bishops of Bourges, 
Amiens, and Evreux to the House of Peers, and the enforced retirement 
of the whole body of general officers of the old army, left no doubt 
as to the intentioiis of Charles X. ^is sovereignty cbiimed tn ]i. i 
gorernment by divine right, supporting and supported by the Chua^li 
iir^^ir attempt to wean men's minds from the recollection of the 
RcTolmioii and the Empire. 

X rumour spread immediately that the President of the Council, 
taking up his plans afresh with a confidence that nothing could shake, 
bad collected in the Departmenta detailed reports as to the amount, 
nature, and value of the properties contiscated in accordance with the 
laws of the Revolution. This time he boldly resolved to couple a 
Bcberoe for the indemnification of the fmufrfn with the plan for the 
conversion of stock whiijli he had prelmled by measures of economy 
in the administration of finances. Charles X came himself on 
December 22 to declare in the Chambers the intentions of hts 
Ministers. ** The King my brother," he said, **found great consolation 
in preparing the way for closing the last wounds left by the Revolution. 
The moment has come for executing the wise plans which ho had 
ceived. The state of our finances will permit as to accomplish 
'this great act of justice and of policy without increasing the taxes 
or injuring the public credit." On January 3, 1823, Martiginic, a 
fonner secretary of .Sieyus, who had becnme a (Councillor of Sute as 
ft nward for his Royalist principles (1822), and Director-General of 
Registration, read in the Chambers the statement of grounds for the 
project on behalf of the fmigrig. 

With Charles X on their side, the obstinate and confident Ministry 
no longer hesitated to serve the aristocrats who had striven against the 
Revolution with the aid of foreign help. The fminrfs were victims who 
BUDe to claim back their own; and it was inoumbt^nt on the Ministry 
(Ogive them their due. "It is important." said Villdle. "that by 
one memorable and universally useful example we should teach the les- 
■oa that great injustices shuuld receive in course of time signal repara- 
tion." By this language it wiis easy to measure the sense of security that 
»n up in the Cabinet in the course of one year. The emigration 



86 



Law for Q^npenaaiian to £!inigrds [1825 




was not sufficiently remote for the French to have forgotten the f:ict 
that Ihcso nobles hiid euiisplred at Versailles against the nation for the 
maintenance of their pnvUege». and Uiat tliey went away without com- 
pulsion, and at the dictates of levity or fashion, to form fresh conspira- 
ctes ujMin the tlireattned frontier. Modern Fi-ancc conld not help being 
moved by the words of an orator of the Right, who seemed to define 
the tendency of his party and of tho Ministry. "The country is 
founded upon religion — its altars wera thrown down. Tho country 
is founded njion the King and lh(fsu who surround him — and he had 
disappeared in the slonn." 

Villelc, it is true, allege<l other arguments, drawn, as his custom 
was, from policy rather than justice. He represented his design as a 
measui'e of reconciliation and amnesty ; and it was oa this ground 
that later it succeeded in winning approval. Would not the holders 
of the ^tonfiscated ostates ho still mom firmly guaranteed than by the 
Charter against all cliums of the former pnjprietors, when the £migr6% 
should have received a just and sulisfuctfiry indemnity? '-Security for 
present holders, satisfaction for the ^»ii//r^» " — this would bring about 
forgiveness and reconciliation around the restored throne, at tho hands 
of a King faithful to his promises of pai'don and to the cause of his 
best servants. 

In spite of thd skill of this reasoning, one hard fact nevertheleSiS 
stioick public opinion and remained finn afterwardsin nicn's memories — 
the sura total of the indemnity, l.OOU.OOO.OOO francs, which was the 
valuation ba^nd upon the rovonucs produced hy tho estates confiscated 
in 17**0. " There could he no question of restoring such a capital sum 
to the dispossessed families." That was admitted by the authors of the 
measure themselvea. Still loss was it jxvssiblo to despoil llie holders 
of these estates by na act of expropiiation which would have roused 
the whole of France. But, if 30,000,000 of interest were added to the 
National Debt in favour of t}ie ^mli/nn, securing to them the interest 
instead of the capital, this would nut even augment the burden of the _ 
debt. For these 30 millions nearly balanced the economy whicli tho Stat« 
proposed to make on the same daj- by the conversion of stock. Clover 
as the operation was, was it possible for the ftliiiiatry permanently to con- 
ceal the fact that ihey were tiikiug from the stockholders 28,000,000, a, 
sum which nearly corresponded to a capital of 1.000,000,000, in order to 
make it over to their friends, tho aristocratic party, those courtiers who 
\\w\ aln'ady been enriched by all the favours of Royalty ever since ISlTi? 
In principle and in fact, this double law, intended for the proBt of the 
nobles, was a blow, almost a defiance, aimed at the whole nation. 
Geueral Foy and Hunjaniin Constant opposed it in eloquent speeches, and, 
even in the Chamber of Peei-s, the opposition of Itroglte and Chateau- 
briand was no less active. Nevertheless it jMissed the two Assemblies in 
the middle of April, 1826, by a majority of neitily one bundled. 




The decisive success of the Ministi-y encouragerl the Crown to make 
larger (lay by day the place which seemed reserved for, and due to, the 
Church in a society which was being little by little won over to a rlffim« 
of privilege and (if divine right. 

In his Ust days Louis XVI 11 had created a Ministry of Ecclesiastieali 
Affairs, and had entrusted it to the head of the University', Ilishop 
de Frayssiiious, in oi-der to lay stress on the high place that Catholi- 
cism was to hold in the State, which had determined to hand ovtr.v 
all the schools to the Church. Charles X followed in his steps. On 
January 4, 1825, he allowed the Church to reintroduce in the Chamber 
of Peers the IlilL touching the religious bodies of women which had been 
thrown out the previous year. The Assemblies wero once mure invited 
to rob themselves, in favour of the monarchy and \\& Ministers, of all 
right of control over the development of the religious bodies and of 
their property. Hurlinj^ a new defiance at the Revolution, the Bishop 
diirfd to say, " I am far from being the enemy of perpetual vows. 
Liberty has been for many of l!ie nuns a torture." If he did not demand 
their immediate reestablish ro en t, it was not thi-ough principle but policy, 
and because Vilh'do was unwilling *' that he fehonlrJ cxpofto himself to Ije 
broken by the resistance of the laity." Thoy lulled France to sleep ia 
order to get her into their power, and they were successful. In the 
Chamber of Deputies the law was passed at a single sitting, and almast 
without oppasition. The Chamber of Peers itself gave way. 

Another law came np for consideration almost at the same moment, 

intended to perfect the system of stifling public expression of opinions, 

llie Liberals, in spite of the threatii that overhung' their journals, at- 

tenaptefl onoe more to put the nation on its guard against the progress 

made by the priest-party. To prohibit discussion on religious mutters, 

VillAle and his colieaguesevolved the " lawof sacrilege," which was pas«ed 

on April 15, 1825. It was not apparently dii-eoted against the LiLerals, 

bat against mrilefactors whom the Ministry wished to visit with special 

penalties, even with death, for orimes, thefts, and profanations committed 

ia cburtrhes. In point of fact, it was never carried into execution. The 

Irae object of the proposer of the measure was to establish by this 

Gntt attempt a class of religious offences and corresponding exceptional 

ptnalties. •* To-morrow," wrote Bruglie, who, with BaninLe. Pascpiier, 

and Mole, opposed this unsuccessful attempt, "you -will be asked to 

pierce with a red-hot iron the tongue which has committed blasphemy, 

trt close the pulpits where error makes heiself hoard, to violate openly 

the great principle of the liU-rty of forms of worship." 

lliia "to-morrow" WAS actually inaugurated in the month of May, 
1925, by a significant manifestation. In his first speech Charles X had 
uaounced his intention of re-establishing the custom of consecration, of 
pn«trating himself "at the steps of the altar where Clovis received the 
liCKd unction." On April 2t} be requested the Chambers to send 



<lcpiities to Reims to tiike jiart on May 29 iu this ctireuiouy, to which nil 
tho great peraonages of State aiul foreign monarcha wure bidden. The 
holy vessel was rediscovereil, thougliit hiul been publicly destroyedduriiig 
the Revolution ; and on May 16 the Moniteur aLuou]iced to tlie uatiou this 
precious find. A commiHsioa of architeetd and other functionaries was 
installed at Reims to give to the preparations all the traditional splendour. 
Whan the day arrived, the Bishops of France handed over to Charles X 
the sword of Charlemagne, with the ho[io *' that ho would protect and 
defend the churches, repair disorders, preserve what h-.id been re- 
established," and, in short, strengthen the restoration of tlirono and altar. 
Mniiarcliy by divine right, Nup[>ortcd by tho nobility and clergy, once 
more took possession of France, and from that day Charles X believed 
himself charged with a sacred mission to guard, in direct communion 
with God, tlie welfare of his subjects and tlie honour of the throne. 

But from that day also the country began to awake to the perception 
of this domination of the clergy. The Royalist poets, Laroartine, 
Victor Hugo, Soumet, and Buour-Lormiau celebrated the consecration. 
Bfiranger mocked at this "consecration of Charles the Simple," and his 
popular song made more enemies for the monarchy than the official 
poetry made friends. The Liberal press, the Oonetitutiannel, the Courritr 
FratifaU, reopened a violent campaign against the enterprises of a cloi^y 
" under Jesuit orders." 

The editors of these journals were arraigned before the tribunals but 
acquitted by the magistrates, who were thoraselves uneasy at the ultm- 
Diontane doctrines professed by tlie French clujgy. Finally, when the 
great Liberal orator, General Foy, died suddenly in the month of 
November, 182.'>, an immense crowd thronged to his funeral ceremony. 
A subscription set on foot immediately afterwards to raise a monument 
to him produced in six months nearly 1,000,000 francs. By uniting 
their cause with that of the ultramontane Church party, the Bourbons 
issued a challenge to the nation and put a dangerous weapon into the 
hands of the champions of Liberal ideas. This new form taken by the 
Opposition ought to have warned the Ministers. It was not without 
reason that Casimir Perier said in the Chamber : " We are only seven 
in this house, but we have the nation behind us." Villele however did 
not pause ; and with his colleagues he brought forwaixl at the beginning 
of 18*26 a proposed law of successions, which modified tlie rules of equal 
division of the inheritance among children prescribed by the Civil Code. 
This project gave to the oldest son a right over that part of the 
inheritance whicli was outside the portion left in eijnal parts to the 
children, and which the Code put at tho disposal of tho fiither under 
the title of quotifi diaponibU. As on the other hand, by the permission 
of entails for the future, it became possible to lie up tins wealth in 
perpetuity, the nation saw in this legislation a step towards the re- 
establishment, by the custom of the right of the eldest, of the estates 



\ 



\ 




of the nobility of tbe ancien r/ffhne. In vain did the Minister plead 
that it was to tho general advantage to prevent the breaking up of patrt- 
moiiies, and to maintain in the country on behalf of agriuuilure a great 
binded aristocracy. He did not disarm all those who began to recognise 
and to dread the return of the old order, under the legal forms and with 
the modifications devised by Villele. It was the Chamber of Peers, 
composed of men of the Revolution and the Empire^ which offered 
tbe most dctcrminod opposition (March, 1820). 

Tbe Opposition unmistakably gathered force in the course of this 
year, when it heard from the lips of the Minister of Religion himself of 
the authorisation secretly granted to the Jesuits to return to the Church 
of France, and to teach in the seminaries of the State (August, 182C). 
It seemed that for the future the Churcli, and witli it the State, were 
to be at the mercy of those parties who had resolved to efface the 
last traces of the Revolution. ViUele, roused by this opposition, de- 
]>artcd from his policy of prii<lcncc. He had recourse to measures 
of severity and made a Press Law which was called in mockery '»the 
Uw of justice and love." 

This law, whichwas brought forwai-d by the Ministry on ^eceinber29, 
lg26, aa fi simple "police law" with regard to the Press, whicnwasae- 
simSecl as "having reached a pitch of utterly unbridlud licence," was in 
reality a bold return to the customs of the old monarchy, which had been 
sovereign arbiter in Franco on all printed matter. Orders were to he given 
to thcprint ere of journals , who were thenceforward to be held responsible, 
ud to the proprietors, to submit five days before publication all writings 
irhich emanated from their presses, in order that the Government might 
examine them and pemitt the circulation of those alone which had been 
ttmnped with the government mark. Severe penalties and the right given 
to the magistrates to t^ike official proceedings in the case of anything 
which might seem of defamatory character threatened the future freedom 
of thought and pen in France. It was no longer merely newspapoi-s, 
bDtssim.phleta_of all sorts and books ingeneral.which the Crown intended 
ki,8idij ect to its decrees. **lt would be the same thing," said Casimir 
P^rier, a deputy moreover of moderate Liberal views, '■ to propose a law 
(or tbe suppression of printing in France for the good of IJelgium." " it 
is a law of barbarism," added Chateaubriand. It was not only in the 
Chamber and the Opposition but in the, French Acudeniy and in the 
wmiUy at Urge that emotion ahowetl itself. The Nfinistry believed they 
WDold defeat opposition by measures of severity which deprived of their 
oCcas writers such as Villemain and Mlchand (.lanuary 17, 1827). And 
tl first they seemed to succeed: the eloquence of Benjamin Constant 
Hi insutHcient to win over a majority in the Chamber, which was cum- 
PWd of friends or dependents of Villele. IJut the Chamber of Peers 
gi»e the Liberals u complete revenge, and on April 17 forced Peyronnet, 
^ Keeper of the Seals, to withdraw the law for fear of its rejection. 



This check should have given Villcle a finfU warning. The with-| 
drawal of the law provoked an oiitburat of jtiy in Paris; tUuminations 
and lireworks blazetl furth that \tiry evtiiiing in many purta of tlte town. 
Ten day* later, when Charles X held a reWew of the Oarde NutioHoU 
at the Tuilerica, in the rankH of several It^gions there iiroso uhes of ^ 
*' Down with the Ministers, down with the Jesuits !" After a (iallican B 
Royalist, MoatloHier, had denounced to the country by books nnd pcti- 
tiona the progress of the priest-party and tlie religious bodies, all the^ 
Lil^ei'alisra in France, alarmed at and convinced of the existence of afl 
conspirflcy between tho Ministers and the .Jesuits, jiroclaimed itself pre- 
pared to defend freedom of thought and the Iv'ew Order. 

Villele, driven by npp^wition and the counsels of his party further 
and further from the patlis of prndenco and discrecicin, imagitied that he 
would gain the victory this time by drastic and authoritative action. 
The Q'lrde Nalionnh wiis forthwith disbanded (April 29). TheHi-tlEfl 
da^'S after the Chandwrs had risen (June 24, 1827), a royal ordinance, 
ontiiitcrsigncd by ViUele, Corbiere, and Peyronnet> re-established the ccn* 
sonjhip over aU jounials and periodical writings. And the censoi'S, who 
were appointed by the Minister of the Interior, received instructions to 
show themselves inexoi-ablo towaiils all Liberal or Opposition journals. 
Ptihlic opinion had no longer any medium of expression. It could only 
m;tko itftctlf felt on extraordinary occasions, such as the funeral of the 
Kepublican Deputy, Manuel, whose hearse was drawn to Pere Lachaise 
by the youth of the Liberal party amid the applause of the Parisian mob 
(April 24, 1827). Despotism at that time seemed to httvo gained vic- 
tory and acceptance. The penple in the provinces, and the army en- 
gaged in manipuvres at St Omer, acclaimed Cliarles X,who was making 
a triumphal progress in the north which had l>een arranged by his 
Ministers. The pro3i>ority of industrial enterprise and of public finance 
which was being strengthened in various ways, and particularly by the 
exhibition of products of industry held at the Luuvi-e on August 1, 1827, fl 
justiJied V'Utele in his own eyes and those of the King for having main- ™ 
tained order at the expense of liberty. He boasted, and for the time 
being it seemed credible, that in tliis i-eactionarv ciunpaign he wnidd 
liave the last word, and that the an<nt'7t rigime^ thanks to his skill and 
perseverance, would be decisively restored. 

Its defeat, however, was near at hand. It was brought about by 
those HoyalistA whom, to all appearances, its pulley ought to liave biuind 
closely to it. Since the enforced resignation of Chateaubriand, Villele 
had definitely alienated and had been nnable to win back a group of 
extremists, pohitu9 as he called them, obstructionists who fought him 
and his policy without intermission. This irreconcilable and dangerous 
nppaiition was founded mthout doubt upon wounded or dissatisfied 
ambitions; it was to be explained iu part u{}on the groand of p 
refnaed, and of jealousies aroused against men who had been too loni 



1827] 



Coalition of Royalists tvilh Liberahi 



91 



and too oxcliisively in possession of royal favoura. Ltut other atid 
loftier motives cooperated. Chateaubriand and hid friends, more violent 
partisans of the throne and Che Chnroh thun Villele, reproaohod him with 
not seeking by means of b policy of j»loiious uclivity abroad to secure a 
more rapid triumph for the iinti-Uerolution movement. T hey dein uiided, 
l ik^ the L iberals, liberty of the Press, in order to tight him and to win 
o ver na tional opinion. They professed, like the Liberals, aident sym- 
pftlhy rt)r Greece, who for tlie piust ijvu yiWirs luul beuuatruggUng forjier 
independence, under the eyes of Europe, at first hostile, then iaiiifferent. 
Their incessant atLicks shook the Ministry of ViUole more than the 
oppositinn of tlie Liliemls, who owed to them their rare euceessca in the 
electious. When in the month of November it became known that at 
Nkv&rino the French Admiral, Rigny, striking a blow for French glory, 
had prevailed upon the Kuglish and Russian Admirals to destroy the 
fieet of the Paaha of Egypt, which had been put at the disposal of the 
Soltaii to use against the Grei^ks, all VillMe'a eiiemiea, Itoyalist and 
Libenil alike, united in raising a cry of victory against the Ministry. 
It seemed that it was chiefly the policy of the Ministiy which the can- 
non of Xararino had overthrown (1827). ,i 

Villele still believed himself Htrong enough to eliminate from his 
majoritv tlicse contumacious and troublesome Royalists. Mo threw over 
the Chamber which in 1824 ho had estabhshcd for a term of seven years, 
and sent it hack for re-election on November 5, 18:27. At the same 
time be nominaicd to the Higher Chamber 76 new Peel's, in order to 
create for himself there a more docile majority. The elections guve the 
victory to his opjionenta. fii spite of the law of the double vote and 
llje raising" of tJie ijualilieations necessary for a voter, many Liberals, 
upheld by an awakening of public opinion and supported by the Royalists 
in tl»e electoral colleges, by tho manufacturijig industry, the financiers, 
ud the merchants, were enabled after seven years of exclusion to regain 
poaKMion of the Chamber of Deputies. On December 6, 1827, Villele 
lent in his resignation. 

Ha retired, the victim of a singular coalition which rendered the' 
Cing*s task of choosing a successor hig-hly difficult. His conquerors were 
surh Liberals as Lafayette, Chauvelin, Etienne, Bignoii. Keratry, the two 
Oujiins, iMauguin, .\lexandro de Laborde, Odier, and Lefevre, men who 
w.-nj almost republicans. On the other hand, there were also the ex- 
':::iii»te whom Villele had most persistently combated, Hyde de Keu- 
tiUe, Berlin do Vans, editor of the Dehatu^ Itavez, La Uourdonnaye, and 
DeUlot. From such representatives of the two extreme parties united 
in Opposition, though absolutely different in aims and principles, no 
bttii 's' '^try could be formed. There was no other (iovernment 
po«i ' I I one analogous to that which had just been overthrown, 
■lin alike to tho party of ultra- Royalists and to that of the Liberals 
praperly so called. 



Charles X entrusted the task and responsibility of governing to 
the Vicomte de Martignac (January 4, 1828). In chooBing Iiira the 
King gave satisfaction to the Liberals, who were happy, in the first 
place, at seeing the direction of ecclesiaKtieal afifairs separated from that 
of public instruction, which was under the directoi-ship of Vatiraesail. _ 
In the second place they received a guarantee when the presidency of ■ 
the Courts of justice was taken from I'oyronnet and restored to a 
Liberal Peer of France, Count Portalis. Moreover, the presence of 
Hyde de Neuville, a friend of Chateaubriand, at the head of naval affairs, 
and of Count de La Feri-onays, ambassador to Kubsl.'l and fiiend of tlie 
Tsar, at the head of foreign affaira, seemed to the Royalists to be a 
pledge of glorious action abroaJ. In reality Martignac, the chief man M 
in this new combination, bore more resemblance to Villele than to the ™ 
majority of the Chamber elected in oppoaition to the ex-Minister. 

Their origins wore similar; as advocate at Bordeaux, or Mayor of 
Toulouse, botli had been in 1815 in the South determined chanipioua 
of Legitimism. Afterwards, when in 1821 the Koyalist party, composed ■ 
of the former i'mujrfti and extremists, came back into power, and 
Villele was called to be its leader, Martignac was conspicuous in the 
front rows of the majority. He was created Vicorate by Court favour, 
whicli recognised in him an active and eloquent coadjutor of the meas- 
ures prepared by Villele. This man, whom, by contrast with his former 
chief, men were now regarding almost as a Libeml, had counselled the 
Chamber to severe measures against the Press in 1822, had encouraged 
and aided Louis XX'III in bis struggle against the Spanish Kevolutioafl 
in 182S. It was he too who had brought forward in the Chamber the 
law of 1821 for a septennial Parliament, and so furnished Villele with 
this instrument of power and reaction. Soon, in 1825, the King sum- 
moned !iim to his counsels as a reward for his services, and commis- 
sioned him witli the task of pleading before the Cliauibcr the cause 
of the fmif/ri% and of supporting the proposed measure which was to 
restore to them 1,000.000,000 francs by way of indemnity. And in 1827, 
in the debate upon the Press, we find him once more giving his support 
to legislation of a kind " to prevent crimes by severity and ft-ar." There 
was nothing in his past to cause men to anticipate a new change of 
front in policy. W hon the principal actor had been hissed off the stage fl 
by the public, the same play went on with an undei^tudy. " 

In order to win acceptance, the new chief had the skill, it is true, to 
revive the earlier and more successful tactics of Villele, to uKindon 
measures that were openly reactionary, and to reassure the nation by ^ 
timely concessions. He had all the necessary (jualificatlons. As ftfl 
piirlianientary orator he was full of charm ; he was a tactful and pleasant ' 
politician, wlio seemed chosen to sootho by his eloquence the alarm of 
parties and the country at large, to disarm hostility by his graciousnessi 
and to bring about the necessary reconciliations. 




i28] 



Policy of Martignac 



93 



Royer-CoUard, the respected leadep of the Libernl Royalists, was 

imraoned immediately to the Presidency of tho Chamber. 'X\\edociri- 

ire piofessors, his pupils or his friends, who had been persecuted for 

four years, Guixot, Villemain, and Cousin, wore allowed to reLum to 

their posts, "with tranquillity in their breasts and liberty for tliought." 

The restoration of authority to these eminent rupresentatives of the 

Liberal party, the withdrawal of royal favour from the Prefects and 

le chief of police. Franehet, who had been plotting for clerical domi- 

ition. and from Frnyssinous, who was suspected of having banded 

^ver ecclesiastical affairs to the Jesuits, and the suppression of the 

" tsthinet noir " — all this soomcd to foreshadow a new system. Charles X 

»igned himself with regret. " Martignac," he said, "ia meeting the 

evolution halfway with his cowardice." 

It was not, however, either cowardice or total change of method on 

part of the Minister, who wiis reduced to depend for existence ujMjn 

concessions and his skill in steering between two parties. It was 

merely the necessary recoil. We find him, moreover, promising to the 

depnlies greater honesty in the elections by the law upon the revision 

of llio electoral lists ; but at the sumo time he declared that ho would 

nevertheless retain for the Government '* such authority as they deemed 

indispensable for the conduct of the elections." The annual revision of 

the list of voters would no longer be left to the arbitrary decision 

tlie Prefects, but be subject to appeal either to the tribunals or 

the Council of State (March 20-July 10, 1828). Before long 

dgnac brought forward a lawconcerniiig the Press (April 14, 182iJ), 

rhich stands as the exact measure of his Liberal intentions. He 

ipprcssed the censorship of newspapers which he had himself been 

strumental in establishing in 1822, to which he had set his approval 

I second time in lfi27, aivd for whose abolition the parties of the Left 

iid the extreme Right were clamouring. Ho swept away "preliminary 

lorisatinn" and "offences of tendency." But he did not restore to 

^e juries the trials of press cases, and he gave to the ordinary tribunals, 

wbich were always under the thumb of the Government, a severe code, 

right of suspension for three months, and of imposing heavy fines 

!ie payraeut of which was secured by tho preliminary deposit of an 

exorbitant sum. " This is a new Bastille, '* remarked some of the 

Liberals, ** with liberty for its pass-word." 

This verdict was not far from the truth. The task which .Mar- 
loc was attempting was the mainteuance of monarchical authority, 
thened by the fact that it was willing to rid itself Ijetimes of 
men and institutions most disliked by a sensitive and uneasy 
nlilic opinion. The reproach of tacking made against him is unjust. 
le merely threw overboard such ballast as was necessary. This also 
w» the motive which impollod him to publish on June 17 two royal 
ordinances countersigned by the Minister of Religious Worship and the 



Minuter of Ecclesiastical AfTatw. The one, direuted ag&iDst the Jesuit 
forbade the giving of instruction by any religious body nut autboim-d 
by the State, and reported to tlie University eight CoUegtui sii.s{iected 
of giving clandestine instraction. The other attacked the smaller 
semiusries, which since the Empire, in spite of the mnuopoly of ilte^ 
University, had been allowed to Attract students under the pretexin 
of prepariDf^ candidates for tlie priesthood. This oulinnnce compelled 
their pupils to wear ecclesiastical costume, and limited the numt«ra 
of the children in their schools to 20,000, all told, for the whole 
of France. In short, it restricted them to their proper aims and 
duties. If the UniveTsity had been at that time an inHtitntion bostUe 
to the Church, as wiia alleged by the priest-party, the measures of 
Martigtiac's Cabinet, which announced the intention of reserving to it 
tlio entire education of the middle classes in France, would doubtless 
have Iwen vigorous acts of scculflrist policy. Hut the State si-stcm of 
odncation whioh these ordinances strengthened was butsed upon principles 
which were essentially religious and Catholic, and many clerical pro-' 
fessorfi were on the staff of teachera. 

These laws were doubtless instrumenta useful to the monarchy, but; 
it wag a monarchy which was still the eldest daughter of the iloly See^ 
and they contained no real Liberal principles, still less principles of the 
Hovolution. Above nlU they were not weiipoiia dii-octed against the 
Church. Judging by the applause tlkey aroused amoug the Liberals,, 
and tlie indignation evinced by the opposite camp, it might have beea^ 
thought that they were. However, Slartignao had acted with the fa 
authority of Charles X ; and those secret counsellors of the King who 
were most devoted to the *' Cocgregation," Bishop de Frayssiuoust 
Father Konsiu, and the deputy Kavez, bad themselves pronounced thesft.M 
oonceasions to opinion to be opportune. 

i'he hostile section, however, of the extreme Right, who had 
thought that by overthrowing ViU^le they would clear their own path 
to power and bring about tlie triumph of their ambitions, were a^ricved 
that, apart from some concessions of detivil, they had received nothing 
but a set-back. The Uishopa protested against the ordinances of June. 
An " assoeiatlun for the defence of the Catholic religiou " was organised, 
with Bonald and Dambray as its chiefs. Lamennais, the eloquentfl 
champion of ritramontatiisiu, was incensed at the "progress of the 
Revolution," and wished the Church of Home to break publicly with a 
monarchy handed over by its Ministers to the Jacobins. The Koyalist 
joumaU, the QuotUlirnne and the Gazette de France^ declared war uj^a ■ 
the Cabinet which had had the audacity to give counsels of prudence to f 
their party. To Martignac's temporising policy they opposed a method 
which had brouglit failure to the Royalists in 1816, and had been con- 
demned by VilUle in 1821 — the establishment by force of a kind of 
Toyal dictatorship, an act of defiance to the nation. ** Those who gi 



I 

KM 

'•1 




1S2&-9] 



The Liberals equally dissatisfied 



95 



the Kinp such a(Wic€ ftre ruad,'' Mnrtigiiac wrote at the end of 182H. 
*• Yoiir Majesty 3 Ministers are firmly convinced that the course they 
pro[)OHe is the only way to i-estore power and dignity to the monarohy." 
Deserted and thwarted by tho mure violent Koyaliata, tho Ministry, 
I on the other hand, were unable with tlii^ programme to give a&suranco 
mjft satisfaction to the Liberals. I'hey had an InBlinctive feeling that 
F"MartiR"nac was not working for the cause of liberty. They never 
1 accoiYled him more than a "conditional conlidence." Victorious lie- 
yond their hopes in the elections of 1827, they were stronger in the 
Chamber than they had been for seven yeara. They were supported 
by a new generation, by Uie publicists of the Q-lobe^ Thiers, Mignet, 
DulmitN Jouffroy. Kemusat, Duvergier do Hauranne, and were detail 
mined that once for all the Crown should cease its seci-et or open 
attempts to restore the anrien r^t/ime^ or to make war upon the new 
»od lay society. They demanded of the Liberal Ministor as the price 
of tlieir actual support a formal declaration of his adhesion to the 
revolutionary principles of 1780 ; but they fouud that Martignac was 
in no hurry to give tl to thorn. In this frame of mind they awaited 
the end of the year 1S2R for a decisive turn in affairs which was to be 
brought about by the Iaw of elections. 

The deputies of the Left could not bo under any real misappre- 
beoHion as to the causes of the unhoped-for success they had won in 
tie elections of 1827. When Villele sent the Chambers back to the 
country, io the conditions under which tho suffrage was exercised — tho 
doofalATote and official control — the Minister, with his long career of 
itiocestt behind liiin. had thought himself certain of the result. His 
BDtieipatioDS were falsified, becaiiso in many of the Departments, in- 
otuding Paris, the Opposition of the extreme Uight held out support 
tocuididatos from the Left. Thus the Liberal Opposition w;w at- the 
Urey of those allies whose desires were the exact contrary of their own. 
They were eager to escape fi-om so onemna and pi-ecarious an alliance. 
Bid to consolidate a victory thus won by a suqirise attack. Thus they 
lemtd for Martignac to bring forward a new electoral law which would, 
W increasing the number of electors, give Uicm a firm foothold in the 
wontry. 

Martignac, at the beginning of 1829, did not bring forward the 
Uw they wished. With his wonted skill, deeming it as he did u 
ptimary neoeaaity to gniu time, he brought before the Chambers 
twn prn{K«als touching communal and departmental administration 
(Keimiary 9, 1829"). He offered freer and more widely representative 
dwtion&i bat only in the councils of the Communes. Cantons, and 
fiff^rimeots. He refused to extend them to the central Assembly. 
Hi purpose was sufficiently clear. ''Are you not," he said. '*con- 
anned nn behalf of this crowil of educated, industrious, and energetic 
Ma whom public life admonishes and arouses, who are impelled 



towards public affaii-s by their social position, the consciousness o( 
their own ability, and the force of example? What means bare, 
you of satisfying their natural and legitimate impatience? Open fodl 
them a iiew career at their doors. They are ambitiomj to win men's 
suffrages iu tbeir honour, (iive them the means to satisfy this nobl« 
ambition at home, and draw round them a circle of honour within whicU 
thoro is profit and glory to be won by remaining." Men might reaUn 
have thought that tliey had returned In the anclen rfffime and tlioQ 
da3^of Targot. To a nation which hiul known the Oovgtituantf and the 
Convention, and which was being constantly reminded by Thiers and 
Miguet aud the other Liberals of the glorious memories of the great 
national assemblies, Martignac vouchsafed the concession of provincial 
assemblies, lie admitted that he was seeking " to divide the current 
of mens minds in order to made its actions loss forceful and less 
impetuous." J 

Thus on April 8, 1829, the jiarty of the Left declared open 
war against him by throwing out his measure, or rather by forcing liim 
to withdraw it. The Royalists of the extreme Kight, '* irritated bri 
these concessions to democracy," had taken part in the struggle witll 
equal violence. What was not snfliciently Liberal for the one side was 
too much so for the other. From that time thif Ministois, who bad just 
lost by the defection of the Left the sole majority by whoso aid they 
could resist the influences of the Court and tlie demands of the ex- 
tremists, and who were reduced to luakitjg Liberal pro tes tuitions at the 
tribune., while defending reactionary measures imposed upon them by 
the secret counselloi's of the King, were, in spite of their skill, really 
powerless to fulfil their mission. Their weakness became obvious 
in the summer of 1821), in the course of the discussion of the Budget. 
Without a party in the Clsambor, without credit at Court, without 
support in public opinion, Martignac had failed in this fifteen months' 
attempt, which indeed was foredoomed from the beginning. j 

In point of fact, the period from April 8 to August 0, 1829iJI 
witnessed the second victory of this strange coalition, formed in the 
lost days uf Villele's Ministry, a coalition composed of extreme parties 
who could not govern in union. Under Martignac. the system of 
prudent reaction and prudent temporisation, wliich had for so long been 
practised by Villcle, showed clearly that it had had its day. , 

Charles X thus found tiimself forced in 1829 to make a cboioa| 
decisive for the future of his monarchy, between the two parties whose 
ephemeral coalition had ruined the policy followed by his ^linisters 
ever since 1821. Like Louis XV^III in 181i>, he was compelled to 
declare himself on the side of the no-comi)ro raise Uojiilist party, who 
were impatient to complete without half- measures or diplomacy the 
restoration of the old order, of privilege, and of the ultramontane 
Church, or on the side of meu who, like Remusat, had for their 







programme *'to defend the Uevolution and continue it without the 
re%"olutionary spirit." Tlie crma had not uliatiged after tliirteen years ; 
it was the same at the end as at tlie begluuing. The solution, however, 
was more difficult for Charles X than it had been for Kis brother. 

Charles had neither the subtlety o£ mitid uor the sceptical prudence 
of Louis XVUI. Fickle and volatile from youth, ('harles was, by 
the habits of his riper age, passed amid the flatterius of tlie ultra- 
Boyalists who sunx)uudQd bim. by liis conviction that Providence 
would guide him by mysterious ways towards the acci»nipliKhment of 
the divijie mission with which he believed himself charged, by his lack of 
reflexion ami his obstinacy, ill fitted to make the necessary concessions. 
Moreover, those which he would liave to luake to the Liberals, if he 
parateU himself from the u lira- Roy ulisls, would thenceforth be greater 
n those which would have been sufficient for his brother. Defeated 
d occupied by the enemy, tired of revolutions and of war, France in 
1816 hungered less for liberty than for reix)se. Since then new genera- 
tions had arisen with the design and the desire to take up once more 
bjr teacltiug and action the national task which France seemed to have 
ijiandoned through fatigue. Against the royal will of the liourboiis, 
restored by means of foreign aid, which had seemed to be the foundation 
of the Charter they had granted, these younger Liberals put forward 
Ibe righta of the nation, in their eyes the only true foundation of that 
Charter. More and more. Liberalism invoked principles irreconcilable 
with the ideas that the restored Bourbons, especially Charles X and his 
friends, held concerning the rights of the C'rown. "There is no way of 
ikaling with these people," said the King to Martignac on April 9, 1829. 
"It is time to call halt." On August 9 he entrusted Prince de Polignao, 
liis ambassador in Lnndoti aiul his favourite, with the task of forming a 
Ministry. The period of halting was past. This was a declamtion of 
var, not an act of negotiation. 

The Journal ileB DH-ata, a Royalist paper of moderate principles, 
dealt with the King's decisi<m on August 16 in an article which was 
nfaBequently made the ground of a prosecution. In alluding to the 
three Ministers — Polignac. an Cmiffrd and accomplice of Georges in his 
MMMpirecieH with foreign Powers, Honrmont, a hero of the wars in the 
Vendee, who deserted in the face of the enemy after the flundred Days, 
Li Ilonrdonnaye, who took part in the Wliite Terror — the writer said : 
"Coblenz, Waterloo, 1815 — those are the three principles, the three 
penon&gcs of the Ministry. Squee/.e and wring this Ministiy, and you 
*iU get nothing from it but humiliations, misfortunes, and dangers." 
While at Paris the whole of the Liberal press raised a cry of defiance 
ipinst the Crown, at Lyons the people acclaimed Lafayette as the 
icpahlicon and national hero. Companies were formed in Britannyand 
tlMwbere for the defence of the Charter by the refusal to pay taxes. 
Tbough he had decided to attempt tiie restoration of the ancien 

9. M- a. X. ' 





rdffime by some drastic act of authority, Polignftc, the trusted champioa 
of the ^migrewy nevertheless at first felt eomc hesitation. He proclaimed 
his intention ** to reorganise society, to give back to the clergy their 
weight in state affairs, to eroate a jiowoi-ful avistocracy, and to surround 
it with privileges," but ho took no action. Was this the fault of his 
colleague, La Bourdonnaye, Minister of the Interior, who, after having 
for let) years clamoured fur war to tlie tleath against the Revolu- 
tion, showed himself as incapable of undertaking as of conceiving 
a plan of action, and retired on November 17? Tlie lack of decision 
seems in fact to be due to Polignao also. '* He has made up his mind," 
said an opponent, " but he does not know exactly to what." The serious 
thing was that, having the temperament of a mj-stic and a timchiug 
contidence in Providence, he looked to heaven rather than to his own 
resources for the necessary help, and even for the signal. Foreign 
Ministers, Lonl Stuart do Rothesay, and Vlll^le himself, watclied bim 
march slowly towards a battle without any plan but with smiling. 
serenity and the confidence of a Bomnambulist. ^1 

On March 2, 1830, he convened the Chambers. He laid before them 
a programme of external policy, which circumstances offered him, and 
which he thought would be decisive for the success of his plans. At 
first he had thought that events in the East, the victories gained by the 
Russians over the Turks, would permit to France a glorious intervention 
in European politics, and to Charles X an act of vigorous self-assertion 
at home. He had formed a plan in concert with the Cabinet at 
St. Petersburg, — a general rearrangement of Europe, beginning with 
Turkey and ending with the Hhine ; but the Peace of Adrianople, which 
wa.s rapidly arranged for Nicholas 1 by the mediation of Prussia, had up- 
set his arrangements (November, 1829). P'ailingawar upon the Hhine, 
Polignac meditated an enterprise in Algiers, where the Bey had since 
182" refused to make any ruparatioii to the King of France, who had 
been insulted in the person of his ambassador. He *' made preparations 
for it with a prodigality of resources and a superabundance of precautions 
which betmycd that a greater interest was at stake than th^ national 
honour or the advantage of conf]nest." He wished to increase his power 
abroad in order to be able to strike a strong blow at home. 

" If this Algerian enterprise," wrote Talleyrand. '' is an expedient to 
facilitate government at home, it is a great mistake." The Chamber 
which Polignac hoped to bend to his designs was forewarned and un- 
willing to follow bim. The future belonged to the moderate Royalists, 
friends or disciples of Royer-Collard, who were equally afraid of the 
dictatorshif) which the party of the extreme Right and the Cabinet were 
endeavouring to establish, and of tho revolution for wlilcb the jonrnala 
of the Left^ the National^ the Olobe, the Republicans, and the Rona- 
partiata, were now praying. " We must strike hard and soon," Royer- 
Collard insisted to his friends. Their hope was that Parliament, between 




a monarchy ready for a coup d'etat to establish its rights and the 
natioti forced to act vigoi-ousiy in dofoiico of its own, might kUU perliapa 
be able to prevent the coulliut by a ^m attitude. Ou these grounds an 
Idress was drawn up, voted by 221 Liberal deputies, and presented to 
le King on March 18, 1830. It was an address of rtJi^roach to the Crown 
>r its resistance to ttie pef>ple*s wishes by its choice of a non -represent- 
ative Government instead of one chosen in consultation with them ; and 
at the same time it was a declaration of the deputies' principles. 

Charles X took the address as a defiance of the Crown. To set up 

standard, as be said, he authorised his Ministers firet to prorogue, 

L»nd afterwards todissolve,thisrehelliousChamber,and ordered I'eyronnet, 

IB man of battle, to take all suitable measures for the elections (May 16, 

[1830). Pci'haps he was still reckoning on the moral effect of the expedi- 

aon which was shortly to be undertaken in Algiers. He was certainly 

led that he would escape the lot of his brother I-fOUis XVIFI 

^ftilwtaUing with energetic action a factious Opposition. 

But, contrary to his hopes, the majority of the nation took sides with 

tiie deputies who were sent back to them. Their re-election was the 

iratchword given in the month of July. The election was completed 

on July 19, and 53 new members were added by the will of the electors 

to the Opposition of 221, who had in the month of March resolutely 

demanded the dismissal of the Polignac Ministry. That Ministry had 

DOW in the Parliament only 100 supporters, determined but powerless. 

Thia counter-stroke exaspenited the King and those around bim. He 

vas incensed, like a King of the old order, that the nation could have and 

express a will different from his own. Force still remained to him, and 

be used it. Under the pretext that the Charter by virtue of Article 14 

lleft to the Crown the right of providing for the safety of the State by 

'ordinances issued at his own discretion, Charles X resolved upon a special 

ict of authority supported by this legal form. On July 25 he published 

three ordinances, one to dissolve this Chamber, which had l»een regularly 

elected, before it had met, the second to establish a new electoral law 

which would permit tlie monarchy to reduce to submission or to remove 

front the lists obstinate electors, the ihinl tu crush the Opposition press. 

On July 26, 1830, the printers and journalists, eager to proclaim 

the sovereignty of the people against that of the Bourbons, summoned 

the people of Paris to armed insurrection. At the same time they 

tarited the Chamber of Deputies, the authorised representatives of the 

uUoQ, to defend their rights and those of the people. To the Ministers 

who, believing themselves sure of Paris, while attempting an extra- 

oidinftry act of authority, had left the Government with insufficient 

forces, and to the King himself who was on the point of departing for a 

bnntiDg expedition at Kambouillet> this popular insurrection canio as an 

cQlire surprise. To the citizen classes and many of the depnties, who 

•ere defenders of the law, but constantly mindful of the recollections of 



the Terror, the sight of the people of Paria niider arras brought alarm 
and dismay. However, by July 28 the jmojilc had succeeded in gaining 
the master}' over the royal troops in the HOtel de VUle; the next day 
(July 29) the insurgents, led by former officers and young men from the 
schools, forced the Duke of llagusa toevacnnte the Limvre, the Tuileries,^ 
and before longParia itself. After having attempted vainly negotiatious 
with the CourtatSaiot-Cbud, which, now that it was too late, threw over 
Polignac iind the ordinances, the deputies and Peters were fain to rally to 
the victorious Revolution and to proclaim the downfall of the Uourbons. 
It was on lichalf of the Charter that the people had risen. By the 
popular victory the Clmrtcr ceased to bo an act of royal favour conceded 
to obedient subjects. It became a national Constitution, a sovereign 
guaiuntee of the rights of the people. 

Legitimism had tinally succumbed, ruined by the faults and excesses 
of its partisans. As for a return to the old order — religious, soctaU or 
political — France would have none o£ it. The obstinacy of the Royalists, 
who had attempted this enterprise at first by cunning methods, and 
afterwards boldly, had inflicted a double injury upon the {Jrown. lu 
the first place, its fall resulted. Hut, worse stiU, it caused men to forget 
all the services which the restored monarchy had reiideied to France since 
1815— the rapid evacuation of a territory occupied by foreign armies, the 
liquidation of the cost of a long war, financial prosperity favourable to 
the development of Industry and commei'ce. In short, peace with honour. 



Nothing was fated to survive of this short-livodrf^jime but the lasting 
glory of the literary and artistic achievement which testified to a real 
renaissance of the French genius. The honour belongs especially to 
Chateaubriand, whose influence and exsunple were mure potent in his 
writings than his political life. Though Madame de Stael, after having 
by her powerful imagination exercised a considerable influence upon the 
opinions of her day, and after having welcomed atCoppet the beginning 
of the reign of Knmanticism, died in 1817, the author of Le^ Gtiiie dit 
CJiristianiame and of /«'*( Mnrt^nr livod on in undiminished glory, to be 
the guide of successive generations of writers iii the new paths which both 
these authoi-s in their different ways had opened, by breaking the narrow 
mould of classical form. The representation of nature, the expression of 
the deepest emotions of the soul, and the discovery of the beautiful, 
instead of being a convention and tiuditinn, became the living sources of 
a lyrical stream which fertilised all at once the French genius. 

This peiiod saw the rise of a constellation of poets formed in the 
school of Chateaubriand or of foreign lyrical wvitere, Schiller, Byron, 
Manzoni. The Miditation» of Lamartine, who, after a peaceful and 
happy youth, became a poet at thirty years of age owing to a short- 
lived passion, served in 1820 as the signal, the firstfrujta of that 
harvest which was to prove so abundant. While LamarUne, iu his 




.1815-30] 



Poets and plat/wru/kts 



101 



Nouvelle* M6dkation9 (1823). reuewod liis cojifeasioiis of sorrow, soothed 
his grie& by turning them to song, and sought for consolation in a 
hymn of faith, Let Harmoniet (1830), Victor Hugo, son of a general 
of the Einpiiv, still a cliiftsiciiit iind a Uoyalist, celcbmted the monarchy 
in his OdeM (1822), in which at twenty yoar« of ago ho stiowed the force 
of his talents. Alfred do Vigny, an officer out of love with military 
glory, and almost with humanity itself, at twenty-six years old, began 
with his Pohnea (1822), followed up in 1820 by the Po^mes antirjues et 
modern4ra, the sober and eloquent work of a solitary life consecrated to 
thought informed by beauty and force of expi-esslon, to the mission of 
a poet in human society. The greatest names of the lyrical cycle of 
tbe nineteenth century in France beucefortli command the attention 
of the public. 

Around them groups soon began to form, either at the Abbe aux 
)i5. in the company of Chateuuljriand, Hallanche, Ampere, and their 
tieud Madame Keeamier, or at the Arsenal, where dwelt Charles Nodier, 
who brought back from his travels the inspiration of English and 
German Romanticism (1823). In theHc circles talents were discovered 
and encouraged. Sainte-Beuve appears, who drew his inspiration from 
llie French |x>eta of tlie sixteenth century, Ijefore tbe Classical piriod, 
and made his first trial of romantic poetry wilh Joseph Delomu^ arid the 
Ctnioleaiotu (1829-30) ; the two brothers Iilmileand Antony Deschampa 
came forward with their writings in the M'tue Frim^aiae in 1823. In 
Uiis society wliich Stendlial (H. Beyle) frequented, publishing in 1822 
his liacine et Shake»peare^ Victor Hugo was growing up, contributing 
lo the new litoraturo his Bailndea in 1826 and his OrienlaUa in 1829. 
And towards the end of this period, in 1830, French poetry counted 
two recruits whose names were to increase in glory, Alfred de Masset 
with his Contes d'Egpa^ne et d'ltalie, and Theopbile Gautier with his 
PremUret Poiniee (1830). 

Apart from this lyrical awakening, the renaissance, of which Roman- 
tidsm with its fervours and its fruitful throee seems to have been the 
dominant characteristic, made itself felt in every department of art. 

LId the theatre tlie drama of the new school was inaugurated with the 
Cromwell of Hugo (1827), the prologue of which was a dcKance of 
»11 rules and ancient ti-adltions, and set the author in the front ranks 
of hJA companions in tbo strife. Hemani (February 25, 1830) was the 
great battle of Romanticism, following on CromwelU the declaration of 
war. It had been preceded by skirmishes of some importance. The 
rly works of Merimee, the plays Clara Qazul (1825) Ax\d Jac<iuerxe 
|[1628>, already gave examples of dramas akin in form to the chuBsical 
Bodoua, clothed in familiar and picturesque forms drawn from 
life or from history. In 1821* Alexandre Dumas produced liis 
Brrt romantic play, Henri III et m Cour, and was engaged upon Antony 
(1881). Vigny set himself to enter these lists with Chattert<yn. 



102 Historical novels and histories [1S15-30 

In its turn the Freiicli novel of timt period opened for itself all the 
paths which it was to follow further in the course of the century. First 
historical novels began to spring up, perhaps owing to the example 
of Walter Scott and the English. In the hands of great artists, this 
style at once counted among it« achievenienta powerful works, the Oinq- 
Mar» of Alfred do Vigny (1826), the Chronir^ite da CharUg IX, by 
Merimee (1823). and shortly after iVo^r*- Dame de Pari »,hy Hugo (1831). 
Moreover in Adolphf, hy llenjamin Constant (lb:il>) and Le liougeet U 
iVbtr, by Stendhal (1831)» wo have profound studies, in the form of 
novels, of the psychology and plillosophy of individuals and of histoty. 
The lyrical novel also took its rise with the first works of George Sand ; 
and the ComMie Humaine of Balzac, with Its powerful piesenta»ent of 
a complete society, is a world in itself. 

History itself, in this gieat movement of ideas, this revolution of 
form, had a fresh birth owing to the efforta of great writers, who made 
it their task to ransack the pages of the past for new sources of life and 
of truth. Fired by Chateaubriand, Augustin Thierry strove to rediscover 
tlie character and the soul of vanished generations. He wrote the 
ConquSte df. V Anffleterrr- par les Normnnds in 182.'>, and in the hitters 
upnri the History of France, which ho pnlilished from 1820 to 1827 in 
the Co^trrier JVanpdia and the Cense^tr Europ^en^ he helped to awaken 
in France a passion for national history, a tai^te for ancient chronicles 
and for truth. Guizot, who was more strictly a philosoplier working 
upon ideas, but who was also an anxious seeker after truth, told the 
history of the lUvohtiion d" Aii^letrrre (1827-8) in order to draw 
from it a lesson based upon the documents; and as one of his lecture 
courses he prepared the JJiatairi de la CiviiitatMn en Europe. Villemain, 
a successor to Madame de Stacl, procUimed, though in an incomplete 
and superficial fashion, a new method of literary history. Last, Jules 
Michelet, like Quinet, who was also engaged from 1827 with the 
philosophy of history in his Ovrnmentaires sur Herder, took up the 
Scienza Nuova discovered by Vico to devote himself to it entirely. 
Appointed professor immediately after the close of his student j'eara, 
inspired by Chateaubriand, learned moreover, and a child of the people, 
in his nUfory ofFranae he united the conditions of a great work, which 
are rarely found combined to so high a degree — science and poetry. 
The work did not see the light till "the brilliant morning of July, 
1830." liut it was in this friiitfnl period of the Rostoration tliat tlie 
author found his inspiration and the resources of his genius. 

Thia period can in no sense be measured by the political struggles, 
the intrigues of Court or of Cabinet, the dark plottiugs of the priest- 
party or the conspiracies of the Republicans. What we must look to is 
the intense vitality which grew up in the whole sphere of the intellect. 
Through the orators and polemists it penetrates and in some sort 
expands the domain of politics. The resplendent eloquence of lioyer- 








Pollard, Caraille Jordan, neiijaniin Constant, General Foy, de Serre. 
lud Cbuuteaubriand, was not always understood by their party, but was 
always listened to. The youth of France thronged to tbe Sorbonne, 
round Guizot, Villcmain, Cousin, and Jouffroy. Perhaps theirs was not, 
Btrictly speaking, instruction, liut in fact, by the sincerity and tlie 
ulent of the masters, b}' the eagerness and tbe intellect of the pupils, 
instraction it was. In tlie ihluk of the party aU-ife, where pamphlets 
had their birtli, those of Paul-Louis Courier and of LamennaiH appeared 
iu sudden glory, destined long to survive the struggle which gave them 
birth. Extraordiuary talent wim shown in jnunialLsm, and in jnurnnl- 
istic criticism; and the brilliant writers of the Globe deserve cspeciail 
uentiou. 

Lastly, life itself, quickened by this fever of growth, gave back to 
the artists in their turn their perception of life. T\\e jiaintere of tlie 
"flamboyant" school, in place of the neutral tones which the school of 
David had too long imposed upon them, called for emotion and move- 
ment. GiJricault gave the signal in 1814, and still more lu 1819 with 
his Raft of the Metluaa. Delacroix, a great genius who combined with 
iDxpiratinn a severe artistic conscience, startled men with his Dante'* 

'ark (1822), and carried them away with the Mansafres of Scio (1824). 

Qg&ne Deveria in 18ii7 was spnjading upon his canvas the colours 
o( his Birth of Henry U^. Ingres alone stood firm against them, 
biking his stand upon draughtsmanship, proving by hi» portraits of 
what value it was to pre8er\-e the ancient methods. And in sculptors 
Boch as Kude and Diivid d%\ngen», and in musicians such as Auber 
ud Rossini, who recreated opera in 1828 and 1829, the same victorious 
ftffort to realise the nationaJ dream of glory and of liberty can be 
recognised. 





CHAPTER IV 



ITALY 




Italy had befin the most distinguished victim of the ruling principles 
of the Congress of Vienna, and ui tlae miiiiIoii!i deaires of its membere. 
Austria came forth from the Congress the actual ruler of the Peaiusula, 
as mistress of the rich provinces of Lombardy and Venetia, and immensely 
superior in armed forces to tho minor Italian States which she con- 
fronted. Hence the policy of the latter was controlled by fear, th« 
most efficient of guardians. Now that the right of miglit had been 
vindicated and that satibfaction had bocu given to the paltry ambitions 
of the ruling families, restored to hereditary thrones by the logic of 
legitimist theory, it seemed us thougli Italy must perforce live at peacet 
submissive to her rulers, relapsing into the sleepy indifference in which 
she had lain for conturies past. Hut certain bodies may be comprosHed, 
though not crushed ; indeed, from their compression they derive a new 
strength, an elastic force, which increases their energy. Equality before 
the law, liberty of conscience, freedum of speech and of the press, free 
access to all posts, and above all the right to national self-government 
— these were not passing phantoms called up by the Revolution, and 
itti shortrlived passage over Italian soil had not been without effect. It 
wail a fatal error to ignore, or to feign to ignore, the fact that the 
people was no longer a cojifuscd and passive crowd, but rather an 
organic body with aspirations and desires which would soon become 
demands. Contempt for the peuple was uo longer a pai't of the accepted 
order of things ; it had become an insult, and like every other insult, it 
produced reaction and rebellion. Hence, about thirty years after the 
Treaties of Vienna there set in a period of reform which was in direct 
opposition to tlie leading principles of those treaties. This period 
closed with the risings of 1848 and 1849, which in their turn consti- 
tuted an open and .systematic attack upon Austria, the authority to 
which the Congress had placed Italy in practical subjection. 

Let us now proceed to examine the causes which, during this time o£ 
despotic rule exercised or inspired by Austria, helped to bring about 
so radical a change and to train minds for those brave doedfi wluoh 

Wi 



1815-46] 



Austrian policy in Italy 



105 



altered the course of Italian history. What was it that, from 1815 to 
It^, kept alive the sparks of patiiotism, which afterwards burst into so 
Doarvellous a flame? In the sphuro of action tha period of rsform was 
heralded by cuius piracies, acd in the field of thought by a general 
intellectual inovemeui, which affected philoeophy, literature, and art. 

Prince Metteruich, convinced that every point yielded to the demands 

of the Liberal party would ncceissitate further concetutiona, had adopted 

in Italy a [H>licy of unqualiHcd absoluti-sm. Ho declared that such 

concessions would lead, in the first place, to the union of Italy as a single 

republican 8tate,and, in the second, to fierce discord between the hetero* 

geoeous parties into which this Stiite miiHt split, in consequence of the 

diversity of its inhabitants. In order to escape tliis danger he determined, 

from tiie outset, to destroy jn thtj Italian people the very germs of civil 

life, and to stamp out even the desire for seU-goverument. The means 

tor the execution of this purpose were ready to his hand in the provinces 

sobjecb to Austria. For tlio other States, he had provided in Mndena 

ud in Tuscany Austrian Archdukes, in Parma an Austrian Arch- 

docliess, and had premised tu them and to the other rulers of the 

Peninsula Austrian aid at the first sign of a revolutionary outbreak. 

Coder this yoke life in Italy was always hard, and at times intolerable. 

The letters- patent of April 7, 1815, placed a Viceroy at the head 

Qf the new kingdom of Loiubardy and V'enetia ; but, in order bo facilitate 

idmiuistratioii, it divided this kingdom into two States, separated by the 

Mincio — the Milanese on its right, and the Venetian on its left. Each 

Slate was ruled by a Governor, one having Iiis headquarters in Milan, 

liw other in Venice, both being in due dependence on the Aulic Council. 

Thas the new kingdom was one in naiue only, and Its territories were, 

in fact, two provinces, subject to Vienna. AH its business was trans- 

»cted in the distant capital : naturally there were many delays ; and this, 

idded to Austrian ignorance of Italian affairs, counteracted all the 

idvantages which might have accrued to this kingdom from connexion 

»iUi an important State. The taxes were exceptionally heavy. The 

bngdom of Lombardy and Venetia, of which the population formed 

ooe-eigbth and the territory one-eighteenth of the Austrian Empire, 

na forced to contribute one-fourth of the state taxes; and every 

Jear, after meeting the local expenditure, Lombardy forwarded thirty- 

^r, and Veneiia twcnty-thrco, millions of lire to Vienna. In 1817 

Btteruiob complained to tlio Emperor: "There is little of the in- 

^■trial spirit in the kingdom of Lombardy and Venetia ; in spite of 

^B iiuu:«ased demands for consumption, Italy receives from foreign 

MiBtries the greater part of the neceesities of every-day life." But the 

■Jitem of taxation was designed to repress, in the interests of Aibitrian 

•tatifaotures, every attempt at improvement of home industries. Thus, 

ncQ in the matter of trade, this provinoe, destined to so brilliant a future 

iBdao fall of latent force, was treated as a conquered territory. 



106 Austrian rule in LortiUtrdy mid Venetia [1S15-46 

To education Austria devot«d a zeal unknovrn in the rest of Italj. 
Id 1846, out of 2247 lownsliifw, tbero were only fifty which had no 
elementary school for boys. Secondary schools were estahlisheJ in the 
chief towns of each district. But political manipulaLion prevented this 
praiauworlhy and generous system from bearing good fruit. Francis I 
had once said, " I require obedient subjects, not enlightened citizena." 
And Cantii tells us tliat, in accordance witli this maxim, the schools 
were content to promote mediocrity aiid to discoui-ago superior talent. 
Mazzini may perhaps exaggerate when, in the Apogtolato popolare. he 
declares that the catechism used in the elementary schoohi taught tluit 
"gnhjects should conduct themselves towards their aovereign as faithful 
slaves towards their ma.ster." Nevertheless, it is certain that an attempt 
was made to destroy all jtatriotic feeling in tlic minds of children ; and. 
Wfl can still read in the geographical text-books used at that time th» 
dognxalic assertion that Loinbardy and Venetia form geographically a> 
part of Austria. The university chairs were filled from Vienna ; these 
posts were won by competition, in which the fittest took no part and 
novices and charlatans prevailed. However, in the faculties of mathe- 
matics and of medicine there were brilliant minds, who triumphed over 
soorn and neglect. 

The rigour of censorship was extreme. The chief censorial tribunal 
was at Vienna, on wtiich were dependent provincial inspectors with very 
limited [Miwcry. To Vienna, therefore, the manuscripta of many original 
works and of all modern histoiies were transmitted. The action of 
the censors was potty and vexatious ; they even corrected Dante ; 
Filatigicri's Scirnza delta Letfiilazione was prohibited and mutilated; 
the tragedies of Alfieri were condemned. There were no political 
newspapers, with the exception of the privileged Gazettes of Milan and 
of Venice, which were composed in the government offices. The police 
system, which coat five millions, was a vast and complicated network 
from which nothing escaped; oa the slightest suspicion it made or 
unmade a man; no appointment was ratitied, no favour was granted, 
without recourse to tlie reports of unworthy agents or officious spies. 
The impediments arising from centralisation, the pedantic arrogance, 
and the aggressive intei-ference of the officials, were galling to tho 
citizens, who hud not forgotten the promptness, the generosity, and the 
adaptability characteristic of tho French rule. Hence Mcttcrnich, in 
one of hia reports to the Emperor, was obliged to utter this frank 
warning: "Your Majesty is aware that the delay in tho conduct of 
business, our supposed wish to Germanise entirely the Italian provinces, 
the composition of tlie tribunals, the dnily nomination of Austrlans for 
the posts of magistrate and other public offices, are causes of constant 
irritation which counteracts all the advantages accruing from our 
government, as compared with that of the other Italian States.*' 

Fate was less cruel to the reconstituted duchy of Parma, whioh^ 



I 



1815] Govemvkenl of Panttay Afodena, and Tuscany 107 

bordered uiwn Lomljardy. Ita new ruler, the Arcliduchess Marie-Louiaei 

wag amiabLe aud well-disposed. Uuder her jOfoverumeut, Parma Haw her 

impaired finances restored, magnifiicent buildinga erected, a new and 

wider system of education established, justice strengthened and purified. 

But, either from Hlial affection, or from motives of self-interest, she 

submitted lo the will of Austria. She was raoroover, iudoleut and 

dissolute, allowing herself to be swayed by the Austrian envoys. And 

«ltbough Count von Neipperg, who was first her lover and afterwards 

ha husband, exercised a healthy iaduence on her conduct of affairs, his 

Bflocessor, Baron VVerklein, "a man of small intelligence, solely devoted 

to amassing wealth," soon counteraettrd tho good results of the fii-st 

ptaoeful years. Thus even tho people of Parma oamo to suifcr from the 

^nny of an intriguing- police, from the in.satiii.bla greed of public 

tfficiais, and from the ignorance and arbitrary rule of bigotry. 

The inhabiLinta of Modena from the becrintiinc: were less fortunate. 
Their ruler, Francis IV, was a Cesare Borgia, without tho distinction, the 
narage.and the will-power of that unscrupulous politician. Francis had a 
eertainamountnf intellectooinhined with boundless ambition and a proud 
uid cruel disposition, and he defined authority as despotism. From tho 
line of his accession he showed himself for what he was ; he granted 
narked privileges to the nobility aud clergy-, the tmditioiial supports of 
liu; throne according to legitimist theory, and ho revoked all laws aud 
ordinances subsequent to 1791. Throughout his reign he ruthlessly 
[dimdered his subjects, spent large sums on convents, entrusted to 
the Jesuits the cducatitm of the young, enrolled himself as a champion 
of intolerance, poraiKinting the Jews whom he virtually deprived of citizen- 
rfiip. and reduced the independence of tho magistrates to a mockery. 
Acts of liberality, which sprang from his natural love of display, for 
txample* the institution of tlie Monti-farinu, wliioh sold corn to tho 
poor at a reduced price, arrauj^ments for the care and protection of 
idiotis and of the deaf and dumb, and his patronage of literature and 
(be exact sciences, were set off by the use which be made of the eight 
niUioiu of lire annually extorted from his subjects. A great part of 
lias went lo swell his ample private fortune ; the rest served to maintain. 
the police, the system of spies, and the prisons. Hence it is not 
inrpriHing that so early as 1 81 7 the Austrian ('ommissioner at Rovigo, 
b his report to Vieuua on the slate of Modena, should speak of 
''extjeme discontent," and should stat« that " a dangci-ously largo 
tUfflber of tho inhabitants wished to revert to the former rcf/ime/' 

In Tuscany the Government was that of beuevoleut despotism. In 
■Boordancc with the mild traditions of this province, the House of 
Ufraine endeavoured to maintain ita position by an eiisy-going policy, 
thicfa was soothing rather than irritating, insidious rather tlmu oppres- 
STB. It tried to divert from dangerous channels the strong current of 
■tiUAQtiial force, and to employ it in schemes for material welfare. Henoa 



i^i^k 



mediocrity reigned supreme ; and Gino Capponi complained of " the 
profound melancholy of the mind coiidemued to iuautioii and constraint/' 
The keen-eyed, sharp-toiigued people, who prided themselves on being no 
man's dupes, lashed their patnarchul despotism with light and cutting 
derision which defied all attempts to ijuppress it. A large class of 
officials, ignorant, idle, arrogant, and vexatious, made themselves felt in 
every act of common life. They were called the eedieini, as if the receipt 
of their wages on the sixteenth of the mouth was their most im]H)rtant 
fuuction. The army was as inefficient as the bureaucracy; few in numbers, 
without discipline, aelf-respect, or warlike spirit, the soldiera were 
commonly known amongst tliemselves by the significant nick-name of 
"mice." Count Vittflrio Fossombroni, the Premier, was a faithful 
repi'esetttative of the spirit of the Govemmonl: an acnte inteUlgencet 
a profound sceptic, whom studied iudolencc had rendered incapable of 
any effort in thought or action. His sole aim was a long, easy, and 
cheerful life. When Iuh olRce hours were over he laid aside all care for ■ 
business, saying with a smile, "To-morrow, to-morrow! diuiier will spoil, 
the Stiite can wait.*' 

In Piedmont^ which had remained faithful to its ancient dynasty, it 
must be admitted that the return of tiie exiled Princes was greeted with 
sincere and geneml entliusiasm. On May 20, 1814, after a period of 
French rule, Turin saw once more the members of its royal House. 
Massimo d'AzegHo, then in his sixteenth ye:ir, was in the ranks of the 
civil guard drawu up to receive them. In his lUcordi he gives the follow- 
ing description of this return so long and universally desired : " 1 was oq ^ 
guaril in the Piazza Castello, and 1 can distinctly recall the appearance V 
of the King and his staff. Their dress was old-fashioned, almost 
grotesque; for they wore imwder, ptg-tails, and hats dating from tlie 
time of Frederick II ; but to me, and to all present, they seemed both 
beautifully and correctly attired; prolonged and resounding acclamations 
assured the good Prince beyond doubt of the affection and sympathy of 
his most loyal subjects of Turin." But discontent followed closely on 
the heels of this short-lived joy. On entering the city, Victor Emanuel 
declared that he felt as though he had been asleep for fifteen years; and 
be certainly began to treat his subjects as though fae had awakened from 
pi-olongcd slumlicr. His famous edict of May 21 ran as follows: 
"Setting aside all other laws, henceforward our subjects shall obey the 
Royal Constitutions of 1770. together with the statutes made by our 
Royal Predecessors before June 23, 1800." This edict ignored the 
hai-d-wou reforms of recent times and re-established a medieval system of 
privileges and disabilities, of restriction and repression. The people 
were divided into "pure " and "impure," the former being those who^ 
had refused to accept honours or posts from the French. These aloneS 
were selected for appointments; and as they were of a low stamp, the i 
Ministry, the law-courts, tbe army, and the offices, were filled with 



1816] 



The Papal States. — Naples 



109 



mediocre and igiioraut meu, all inexperienced, and many of thcoi dis- 
k>uest. The latter, i.e. the ** impure,*' though nut subjected to actual 
measares of revenge — for this would have been contrary to the benevolent 
nature of their sovereign — suffered, so Cesare Ualbo tells us, every mond 
and intelleotuul indignity abort of persecution aud phj-sical torture. 
NeTerlbeless, amid the disiUasious of the Restoration, the Piedmontoso 
Ittuaiucd loyal to the ancient House of Savoy. But the educated 
ebMee in particular did not hesitate to shovr their scornful impatience of 
a Court which wavered between the influence of a retrograde aristocracy 
and of a bigoted, zealous, and aggressive clergy. This should hare 
mrned the rulers that, though they themselves might hiive slumbered, 
th«ir subjects had remained awake and had made progress. 

But the worst Governments in Italy were those of the Papal States 
tod the kingdom of Naples. Even writers who were not ill-disposed to 
the Holy See recoguised that its administration was more harmful in ita 
nsolte and more oppressive than that of Austria, Austria had set np a 
despotic rule, rigid and harsh to the point of cruelty, but regulated by 
find laws and supported by a system of finance which was not intoler- 
able to the prosperous inhabitjinta of Kombardy and Veuetiii. The 

^urcb, on the other baud, had restored a Governmeut far more 
ic, and rendered moi-e destructive and oppressive by its internal 
confusion — a blind, changeable, and capricious Government, whose 
npftcity worked by means of an arbitrary system of taxes, too onerous 
for ita needy subjects. Vannncci declare.^ that from 1818 to 1848 
there was no justice in Rome ; the judges wore corrupt, there was no 
lal safety. A Bishop's tipstaff had the power to arrest; three 
of police spied upon the subjects; there wtjre eiglity thousand 
ivfaaroofi and conflicting laws in operation ; and the administration was 
tehtos of heterogeneous institutions. D'Azeglio's fieeor<ii give a living 

Itare of Rome as it was then, a complex of fraud, favouritism, and 
eovardico. The author blushed in the presence of his foreign friends 
to think that he was an Iti^Han. The Restoration had strengthened 
Utt Holy Office, extended the ecclesiastical exemptions, re-established 
tttulst and revived the tortures of the mallet and the lioree. In short, 
(fat condition of the people had become such as to occasion the remarkable 
ivtdiotion of Marquis Crosa, tho Sardinian envoy, to Count Solaro 
delU Margherita: *' It is only reasonable to suppose that, if the present 
■tats of things continues in Rome, some fundamental crisis will take 
jlkoe ; the most probable issue is that the great city will become merely 
wecclesiastical capital, retaining only the shadow other temporal power." 
Ferdinand IV had reascended the throne of Naples with false 
fnCBMionj in his mouth. The declaration of May, ISlft, had pro- 
tfcimrd individual and civil freedom^ security of property, access for 
■n alike to all posts, and judicial independence. But at the same time 
Fcnliiuuid, in whom failure to respect the most solemn oaths was a fixed 



110 



Ferdiwind IV and Naples 



[181S 



halut-, was negotiating with the Emperor of Austria for a treaty of 
alliance which should contaiu the following secret clause: '*!Siuoetbe 
engagemeata for the internal peace of Italy, on which their ^Eajesties 
enter by this trealvi bind them to preserve their respective States and 
BubjectB from reaction and from the risk of hasty innovationg, which 
would conduce to fresh disturbances, it is agreed between the two High 
contracting parties that His Majesty the King of the Two Sicilies, in 
restoring the Government of hU kingdom, will not admit any change 
that is not in accordnnco vni\\ the ancient institutions of the monarchy 
and with the principlus adopted by His Imperial Majesty and Royal 
Highness for the internal administration of his Italian Provinces." 
Thus the principles of Austrian government were established in tlie 
kingdom of Naples. The instrument chosen to enforce them was the 
Prince of Canosu, formerly agent of (Jueeu Caroline, chief of the 
8a»fedi$tu a patron of brigands, and a bitter enemy of all progreea 
and of Liberal ideas. Even at that time some of the important office 
in the State were filled by able and cultivated men. To such, for 
example, wore due the new codes, which in pivrte show a profomtj skill 
in the science of legislation. But what was the advantage of soond 
laws? The corruption of almost all those chosen to enforce tliem 
was such lus to disgust the foreign envoys accredited to the Neapolitan 
Court. The camorrieti and the brigands were protected by, and in turn 
protected, those whoae duty it wa.s to suppress them ; Uie judgments 
of the magistrates were conditioned, on the one band, by fear of thi' 
executive, and, on the other, by the lavish bribery of the interested 
parties. In short, administrative life on every side presented those signs 
of decadence, corruption, and baseness which led William Gladstone, a 
generation lat^^r, in his crashing attack on the Hourbona of Naples, to 
speak of their Government as the "negation of God." 

In ibce of this determined and powerful organisation of despotism, 
what could the Italians do? What means had tliey to make their 
protests heard, what platform to proclaim their wrougs, what tribunal 
to vindicate their rights? Every lawful way was closed to them; all 
public demonstrations were prohibited ; conspiracy was the only weapon 
of the governed against their governors. The use of this weapon haa, 
lieen severely censured ; some have laid stress on i\& intrinsic immnralJtj^H 
othera have thiown doubts uiwn its ciBcacy. Already Ugo Fosco^H 
had declared that to restore Italy the "sects," or secret societies, must 
be destroyed. But in wluit other field, in what other form, ooidd 
patriota of that tUy manifest the love which they bore to Italy? Tl 
Italian conspiracies and insurrections are to be considered, not as 
isolated events, but as incidents in a general movement. Viewe*! 
this light, as confused and obscure embotliments of the ideals whi 
later book a more legitimate and definite form, as explosions of indi 
tion leading to reprisals, which again awakened noble wrath and 



1815-46] 



The Secret Societies 



lil 



mapuaiiimoua revolts, it ia Dot possible to deny their value ; they mnst 
1)6 reganled as an indispensable preliminary of the painful labour of 
8 nation's redemption. 

The Italians have ever been, and perhaps are still, a people singu 
larly prone to faction. The mystoiy and the surprises of coiispiraoy 
attract their fervid imagination and satisfy their mute rebellious in- 
stinct, resultirg from long years of servitude which, even at the 
present day. reiidei-s all exereiae of authority difficult among a jieople 
that ia by nature kindly, industrious, and generous. Towards the close 
of the Napoleonic era, when the decline of the military glory which 
had dazzled the multitude revived the desire and the hope for liberty, 
Duraerous secret societies were already scattered in different parts of 
the Peninsula. Tims, even before the fall of Napoleon, in Bologna 
the Haffffi, in Mantua the Centri, the Anti-Eugeniani in Milan, the 
Mtutotwria in Upper Italy, the Carhanari in Naples, were developing 
their subterraneous and intricate eKislencc. Thfse societies fostered, 
diverse aapiratinna, but all were united in opposition to the constituted 
sathnritics dependent on tho l-'rench. Later, when by tho decrees of 
the Congress of Vienna the Italians had been excluded from all prospects 
of free government, these societies multiplied, and tlioir activity became 
more intense and more audacious. By reason of their essential secrecy 
their history is obscure, if not impenetrable; and it is impossible to 
give a correct account of their number, their acts, and their power. We 
fiiid trustworthy information concerning them in the important collection. 
of the Secret Papers of the Austrian Police, taken from the Venetian 
trchives, and published by Daniel Manin. Kiom these we learn that 
national independence was the common aim of all these societies; but 
it ia also clear that their action was not eo-oi-ilinated, and that they 
bid no clear or identical vision of tho fututo beyond the attainment 
of this end. From the same papers it is clear that the *' sects*' 
pamMBe<1 numerous ailherents ; fur instance, from the report of a 
Bourbon general we learu that^ in the city of Lecce alone, the Adetji 
ind similar societies could reckon forty thousand members, the majority 
flf whom were armed. 

The roost widely-spread and influential was that of the Oarboneria., 
vfaicfa had its headquarters in tho kingdnm nf Naples. CoUctt^i defines 
it u " a vast society of landowners, who desired peace and improved 
tonditions.'* It was already flourishing in the time of King Joachim, 
»ho was forced to take measurfs against it ; but after the restoriitio[i of 
file Boorbons it extended its action and increased its power. Many of 
the prosperous middle-class belonged to it ; but the majority of its 
■Msbers were soldiers who hoped for advancement, provincials, lawj-ers 
in setrch of employment, and finally, those who, by reason of their 
political views or of tho positions which they had occupied during the 
French regime, were opposed to or mistrusted the Goveinment of the 




Restoration. At Naples ita leaders were waiting till an accident should 
set in motion the accumulated force of silent indignation and suppressed 
di^icontenfe. The signal was given in July, 1820, when men's minds 
had been unusually stirred by means of the success of the Spanish 
Revolution. 

On July 2, two sub-lieutenants, MoifUi and Salvati, followed by 
a force of 127 boi-senien, left Iheir quarters at Nola and set out for 
Avellino crj'ing, '* Long live God, the King, and the Constitution," 
and flying the tricoloui- banner of the Carbonari, black, red, and 
blue. At Avellino they were joined by otliers, and, inducing the 
Governor to join them, they started for the capital. They were few 
in number; it was but a small pronnnnamiento on the part of the army 
and of the revolutionary societies, which could easily have been sup- 
pressed by tl]o forces controlled by the Government. But the Ministers 
were weak and undecided : and the Bourbon King, like most of the later 
representatives of liia House in Naples, was a coward. When the news 
reached him. he was in the Bay, having embarked on a luxurious yacht 
to meet his son, the Duke of Calabria, who was coming fi-ora Sicily. On 
hearing the unexpected news, he was seized with an agony of terror, 
declared that he would fly to Sicil}', or remain at sea, and was with 
difficulty pereuaded to land. MeanwJiJle, profiting by the delay caused 
by the timidity and uncertainty of the authoiitieSn the baud of rebels 
increased in number and opened communications with other centres 
of rebeliiou. In the night of July 4-5 the Carhonaro general, Guglielrao 
Pepe. knowing that he was suspected, escaped fiom Naples, stirred up 
the people to riots, and placed liiroself at the head of the rebels. The 
King summoned his Ministers and asked their advice. Terror-stricken 
and incapable, they all thought it beat to yield and appear to support 
a movement which thoy were not in a position to check. Very early 
on the morning of the 0th, five Carbonari, arrived at Court, and, iaS 
ilie name of the people, whom they represented as being all in arms, 
imposed upon their sovereign a Coustitutiou, the Spanish Constitution 
of 1812 (described in a later chapter), which was popular aud ready to 
hand. The Duke of Aseoli intimated the King's assent; and when the 
good people of Naples rose from their beds they learnt that their Gov- 
ernment was changed, that constitutional rule had been substituted for 
absolutism. Many were under the delusion that this was the beginning 
of a uew era ; and the patriotic poet, Gabriele Uossetti, intoxicated with 
joy, saluted the dawn of Parthenopean liberty with a hymn which soon 
was on the lips of all: "Thou art fair with the stars in thy looks, 
sparkling like living sapphires, and sweet is thy breath, thou crimaon 
herald of the dawn. From the neighbouring height with a smile of 
rnpturous longing thou do3t proclaim that in the balmy garden of Italy 
servitude is at an end." 

But, in their dreams of hope fulfdled, these patriots forgot the 




1820] 



Ferdinand at Laihach 



113 



»aIoufl vigilance of Austria and the innate treachery of Fertlinancl. 

'Krom the outset, the new order wad weakcne<l and discredited by 
internal agitation, by the domination of the rictorloua Carboneria, by 
the childisli extravagnnce of the Liberals, who were devoid of experience 
and intoxicated wttli rhetoric. Nevertlielesd, it h iK>st3tble tliat the 
Constitution would have stood fimi and gained in strength if the Akill 
and power u£ Austria, tliat watehful sentiueK had not at once been 
employed for its destruction. So early as July 'M> I'riuce Metternich 
had sent a circular to the German Courts to infonn them that Austria 
could not tolerate the Revolution of Naples, iind that, if need arose, she 
would send an army to suppress it. Before attempting this intervention 
she needed the consent of the other Great Powers; at the Conference tif 
Troppau Metternich sot himself to obtain a free hand for Austria, that 
she might be at liberty to stifle throughout the Peninsula such ideas and 
morements as might result in the triumph of independence. As for 
Ferdinand, who, shortly before, at the opening of Parliament, together 
with tlie princes, had sworn on the (lospels to respect the Constitution, 
he bad lost no time in secretly iiiforining the sovereigns asseuibled 

I It Ti-nppau of his intention " to leave his kingdom and to resume 
absolute power with the helj) of the Austrian army." Accordingly, 
in the following November, he received an invitation to Laibach to 
diseuiw in ('ongress the political affairs of his kingdthm. The Parliament 
was unwilling to allow him to go; but he addressed to the Chamber 
im elaborate epistle, a signal monument of falsehood and treachery, 
declaring that he wshed to go to Laibach solely **in order to act as 
peacemaker for the common good, and to obtain the sanction of the 
Powera for the newly-acquired liberties"; and he added, with formal 
solemnity, "I declare to you, and to my nation, that I will do every- 
liiing to leave my people in the possession of a wise and free Consti- 
tation." His Parliament, deceived by this declaration, permitted him 
to cross the borders. He proceeded to Laibach and denounced the 
Constitution to those who dreaded the dissemhiation of Libeml ideas 
M mach as, or more than, himself. It was not di£Scult to come to 
an understanding. The Congress, which maintained that it waa its 
right and its duty to concern itself with tlie peace of Europe, and 
that the condition of the kingdom of the Two Sicilies was dangerous 
for the Powci-s, agreed that an Austrian army should be sent to restore 
order in Naples. 

T\te Neapolitan Parliament did not hesitate to declare war. General 
Pepe was eager for it ; the best of Ferdinand's subjects desired it, believ- 
ing, with patriotic credulity, that their King had been constrained by 
the Powers at Laibach ; the O'lrfxmari clamoured for it ; and war was 
procUimed — not by a valorous resolution of the people, nor, as Cnlletta 
»»T», from a desire for glory, but in lightness of heart. Pepe placed 
huDself at the head of the army, which was not inferior in numbers to 



0. K. ■. X. 



Uiat of Austria; and the troops mot on March 7, 1821, near Rieti, The 
untrained, undisciplined soldiers had no confidence in their own power 
to resist the shock of the euciuy, luid broke before the battle had well 
begun. This defeat at a blow changed the position of affairs. Humble 
and inglorious submUsion followed in all ^>arts : in the Parliament^ 
which had but yesterdny shown itself ao pruud and inflexible, only 
twenty-six deputies Imd the courage to vote for a protest drawn up 
in emphatic and haughty torm» by Giusepjw Poerio. On March 23 
the Austrian anny entered Naples to restore absolute government; 
shortly afterwarcU Ferdinand returned, hiiving broken his journey at 
Florence to place, in expiation of liis treachery, a votive lamp in the 
Church of the Annunciation. Such was the inglorious end of the 
Neapolitan Revolution. But the Haroe of patriutiisiii, once kindled, 
was not yet extinguished, whatever might be the illnsions of the easy 
victors of the day. And these worked with blind obstinacy to keep it 
alight by inaugurating a period of violence, persecution, and cruelty. 

Whilst, between the treacherous intrigues of the Bourbons on the 
one hand and the imprudence of the relxils on the other, the breath 
of liberty, which bad passed over the fair FarthenopeaD soil, was dying 
away, there broke out a second revolution in the extreme north of Italy, 
in Piedmont. Kven here the' Carlio?tari Imd many adhcrenta, cfl[iocially 
in the ranks of the ariuy. Moreover, otliur sccrot societies had sprung 
up, drawing their recruits from among the better classes of the popula- 
tion. All these socielies, whether their programme was more or less auda- 
cious, united in one common aim expressed in the cry for the expulsion of 
the Austrians from llidy and for a Constitution. The good and gentle 
disposition of Victor Emanuel had leil people to hope that when the 
moveinent was declared he would end by joining it, especially as it was 
controlled by men of rank and birth in whom he could trust. Such were 
Count Carlo ili San Marzano, his aide-de-camp, Giacinto di CoUegnOi 
commander of the artillery, (Jnglielmo MofTa di Lisio, Colonel Regis, 
the Piince della Cisterna, Sauturre di SanLaiosa, the Maniuis of Prie, 
and othera^ who were in favour at Court or held important posts 
in the Government. In this circle of leaders and amongst all those 
eager for change the news o£ the Neapolitan Revolution produced the 
utmost excitement. On July 29, 1820, Silvano Costa di Beauregard 
wrote: "We stand on the brink of n precipice; innumerable placards 
demand a Constitution similar to that of the Spanish Cortes. The 
King is assailed by anonymous memorials demanding a Constitution. 
. . . Words fail to doscrilie the universal conditions of feverish ex- 
citement. The events in Naples have completely turned our heads." 
The conspirators had planned a rising for the moment when the 
Austrian army should bo occupied with the Neapolitan revolutionaries. 
No serious preparations were made, but there was abundant enthusiasm. 
Much was hoped from Prinoe Carlo Alberto di Carignano, the heii^ 



I 



I 



I 




1821-33] 



Carlo Albctio 



115 



• ftpparont to the thi-one, whom the conspirators believed to be their 
l«ider, and whose action, in their opinion, would cany the army with 

I bini, and with tlie army tho King. 

Concerning this Prince, who, although at the time he did not respond 
to the prayers of the revolutionists, afterwards sacriiiccd himself in orJer 
to keep faith with thum, thoie haa raged the fiercest controversy. On 
the one hand, his behaviour in this conjuncture was the occasion for 
charges, which found a popular echo in ilerohet's pooin, "Carignano, 
thy name is held accursed by every nation"; on the other, it found 
iupporters and admirere, who even went the length of asserting " that 
his action in 1 821 was the boldest and moat courageous of all \m political 
life." His was a strange character, full of seeming contradictions, which 
led Carducci, in a celebrated poem, to call hi in "-the Italian ITamlet." 
But the contradictions were only apparent. Ft wils his conduct in 1821 
and 1833 that provided his enemies with an opportunity of attacking 
the memory of one who bestowed on Italy that generous gift, the 

I Statuto. It is said that in 18-1 he betrayed hia friends, after 
promising to help them in the movement ; that in the 1833 he pemecuted 
the Liberals, condemning some to exile and others to death. But, after 
many years of discussion, the exact nature of his promise still remains 
in doubt; we do not know whether it was a desire wliich tho revolution- 
aries interpreted as au intention or an intention which the force of 
circumstances transformed into an unsatisfied desire. 

It is certain that, by education, inclination, friendship, and habits 
nf thought, he was in sympatliy with the ideals of Ualljo, San Marzano, 
kod Collcgnn; but it is also certain that to their tii-st advances ha 
made the following unequivocal reply, " My conduct will always be 
determined by my duty and my loyalty to the person of the King." 
It was this conception of his duty towards his sovereign and the 
traditions of his House, which deterred him from taking too active a 
ilurc in the development of the rising ; and his prudence, which some 
called weakness, served him in good stead at this juncture, seeing that 
the movement, which had originated in a desire for reform, had exceeded 
the limits intended by those who hail beeu its chief promoter, and that 
ii would have involved him in a rebellious faction, and cut short a career 
idvantogeous to his country. 

With regard to his severity towards the rebels in 1S33, it was 
txcearive and therefore reprehensible ; but his critics should remember 
tbftt this was at the beginning of his reign, when he was, on the one 
hudf exposed to tho suspicion^ of Austria, who would n^surcdly have 
remoTed any Italian prince who showed Liberal teuflencies, and on tho 
ekber. firmly convinced that these revolutiouar}'' outbreaks would end 
by weakening the prestige of a dynasty and of an array which ho 
ImeBaw would l>e called to accomplish a task of national importance. 
It is indisputable that, throughout his lifC) be was ruled by one clear 



and domiDanl passinn, namely^ hatred of Austria ; and this feeling, 
given the conditiona of Italy, was patriotic, aixd justifiable. His 
political career began and ended with the expression of this sentiment; 
— first, when, as a young boy on reading the famous proclamation of 
Schwarzenberg lie exclaimed, "To avenge this shame wo must drive the 
Austrians from Italy " ; and, lastly, after Novara (18411), on his way to 
voluntary exile, when " pale with the pallor of death and of hope," at 
Nice he declared to the sou of Sauton-e di Saiitarosa, '* If, at any lime, 
at any place, a constituted Government should raise a force a^inst 
Austria, the Austrians may be sure of finding me, a simple soldier, 
in the ranks of her enemies." This hatred of Austria, and the convictioa 
that-, to be efficaciouA, it must be shown in valorous and warlike action, 
formed the sole article of hi& faith, and the programme of his career as 
a king : a faith which was only to end in the gloomy silence of Oporto 
with his life; a programme which he bequeathed in the agony of 
defeat, uufullilled but not abandoned, to the more fortunate bands of 
his young son. 

The iusuri'ection in Piedmont advanced up to a certain point 
■with the cry of "Long live the King." On March 10, 1821, before' 
the news of the defeat of Rieti, which had occurred on the 7th, Uie 
garrison of Alessandria hoisted th« tricolour fiag, and demanded tlie 
Spanish Constitution and war against Austria, who held the King 
in her bondage. The conflagration quickly epi-ead ; on the 12th the 
garrison of Turin followed the example of Alessandria. The authorities, 
undecided and timorous, raised no opposition; nor did Victor Emanuel 
follow the advice of those few who counselled him to plaoe himself at the 
head of the loyal troops and to quell the bold attempt with one decisive 
blow. On the one hand, be was unwilling to break the promises which 
he had made to Austria, whose decision to maintain absclutii>m in Italy 
had been recently repoited to him by San Marzano on his return from 
Laiback ; on the other, he could not bring himself to shed the blood 
of his subjects in fratricidal warfare. He therefore decided to abdicate 
in favour of his brother, Carlo Felice; and, since the latter happened 
to be then at Modena, he entrusted the Regency to the Prince of 
Carignano, who, surrounded by rebels who demanded a Constitution, 
struggled hard and long, but finally j'ielded. He writes : " I told 
them that it was not in my power to make any change in the 
fundamental laws of the State, which must await the decrees of the 
new King ; thftt anything I might do would be null and void ; but 
that, ia order to prevent a massacre and the disorders with which 
we were threatened, I would allow them to proclaim the Spanish 
Constitution, pending the command of their sovereign." So it came to 
pass : and the announcement of this concession was proclaimed from the 
balcony of the royal pahice to the assembled crowd. That night the 
inhabitants of Turin seemed mad with joy. But tlieir exultation did 



Failure of the rebellion in Piedmont 



117 






w 



not last ; for» witbin five days, a decree of Carlo Kelioe arrived from 
lodona whorehy he annulled the stops taken without his coiiseut. and 
commanded Carlo Alberto to leave Turin immediately. The latter, 
obliged to pursue one of two courses, to desert the insurgents, or to 
declare himself a rabol against the King, the head of liis House, chose 
the former, and obeyed. His unexpected departure threw confusion 
among the rebels, despite the heroic and judicious firmness displayed by 
Santarosa: and the pai-ty of absolutism, encouraged by the approval of 
its sovereign, gained vigour and courage. The battlefield of Novara saw 
the fratricidal strife which Victor Emanuel had feared; soldiers of 
Piedmont under Gcneml de La Tour attiicked other soldiers of Piedmont 
commanded by Colonel Regis ; the former, with the assistance of a body 
ctf Austrian trooj^Kt which had crossed the Ticino, had no difGculty ia 
compelling tbe latter to retreat. 

Thus faded the vision of liberty, which had passed, like the phantom 

of a dream, over the lands of Piedmont. Tbe greater part of the 

fugitives hastened to Genoa, and sought safety at sea, hoping to roach 

Ipiin, where the Revolution was still successful. There the young 

azziui saw them, " poverty-stricken, of warlike aspect, their faces lined 
with profound and poignant grief." One of them went up to the 
mother of the future conspirator, and held out his hand, with the words, 
•* For the exiles of Italy I " The lady, with streaming eyes, pressed some 
money into his palm. "■ For the firet lime on that day," writes Mazzini, 
"there was vaguely presented to my miud, I will not say the thought of 
country and of liberty, but the thought that it was possible, and therefore 
ft duty, to fight for the freedom of one's country." 

In the remaining districts of Italy, during the years 1820 and 1821, 
although there were no actual revolutionary outbreaka, there were 
freqneut conspLi-acies which alarmed the Govci'nincnts. Especially in 
the provinces of Lombardy and Venetia the police found many traces 
of conspiracy; and these untoward discoveries, which they purposely 
exaggerated, produced fresh tortures and fresh victims. Among the 
latter the most dustiugui.shed was ( 'ount Federico Confalonieri. There 

no doubt that ho was at the head of the Liberals in Lombardy, and 

at he waa in correspondence with the party of action in Piedmont ; 

U in spite of the acute and painstaking i-esearchcs of d'Ancona, we 
do not know to what extent he was actually committed, or how far 
be had carried the organisation of the Liberals. It is certain that 
fait condemnation, together with that of others, was the result of a 
dBliberste intention to provide criminals, rather than the legitimate 
bnK of a well-founded accusation. Confalonieri was not arrested until 
December 13, 1821, when the i-ovolutiou in Piedmont had subsided, 
tad the calm of terror was everywhere restored. He bad no keen sense 
o( guilt towards Austria, and watched with indifFeronee the threatening 
oloads of suspicion as they gathered around him. On the evening before 




118 



Condemnation of Con/alonieri 



I 



his arrest, the wife of General Bubna, who was on intimate terms with 
the Countess, went to his liouse, with the intention of conveying him 
in her own carriage to the frontier. And, a few days before, (ieneral 
Bubna himself, on meeting him in Milan, had said significantly, ^My 
dear Count, 1 dreamt that you were in Switzerland." But both hint 
and invitation were unheeded by him, for lie was unwilling to leave bis 
beloved wife, and perhajjs imagined tlint he would have no difliculty in ■ 
proving his innocence. Ilia trial consisted in a prolonged, subtle, and ■ 
laborious attempt on the part of the public pi-osecutor, Salvotti, to 
build up the specious pi-oof of a crime of high treason. i*rince Mettcrnich 
encour^^d the legal ardour of his Milanese officials with the following 
words : ** It is of the utmost importance that this leader of the Liberal 
party should never at any time reappear on the scenes as a victim of 
arbitrary power." And, in obedience to those genera! instruolions, 
false charges wore invented, suspicions were treated as proofs, and the 
silence of pretended accomplices xv&s regarded as hostile evidence. In 
short, everything was done to give an appearance of justice to the death 
sentence of Coafalonieri. The sequel to this trial was heartrending. 

His wife, the generous and beautiful Teresa (^asati, addressed a 
petition to the Emperor; she herself, her brother, and her father-in-law, 
proceeded to Vienna in order to sue for mercy ; and, undaunted by the 
fii-st refusal, with tears, prayei-s, and, above all, witb the sympathetic 
help of Mai-ia Teresa, she obtained a commutation of the sentence of 
capital punishment in favour of imprisonment for life. 

The Count was to be sent to Spielberg. But, on his way thither, he 
was to have one more experience of the jierfidious methods and the uneasy 
suspicions of Austria. Whilst passing through Vienna on his melancholy 
journey to the fateful castle, he noticed a sudden change in the cruel 
treatment to which he had hitherto been subjected. Every con- 
sideration was shown Mm; ho enjoyed comforts which were almost 
luxuries, and which formed a striking contrast to the fetters which. 
he had worn until the previous day. These were the blandishments 
of the astute rulers of Austria, who hoped by these means to 
obtain from him revelations, and above all to learn what had passed 
between the conspirator in Lombardy and Carlo Alberto. One 
evening during his sojourn in thia city the door of his chamber was 
thrown open and there appeared the figure of Prince Metlernjch, 
whom he had known iti Paris at the time of tho wedding of Marie- 
Louise. The wily Minister made use of all his arts, drawing dazzling 
pictures of freedom and advancement in order to induce the prisoner 
to speak. But the latter held iirm, and with high-bred courtesy evaded 
the attacks of his skilled antagonist. After the conversation had lasted 
for some time the two parted with the formal politeness of men of 
the world, the one to go to a ball at which he was expected, the other 
to a dungeon, from which he foresaw that he would never be released. 




1821-30] 



Repressive measures in Italy 



119 



Confalonieri waa imprisoned in the grim Moravian eaatle together with 
Gaetano Castillia, Giorgiu Pallavicmo, Pietro Borsien, and uthcrs con- 
victed of the same offence. 

The repressive moasui-es adopted by the Governments subsequent to 
the risings of 1820 and 1821, although terribly severe in some districts, 
as. for instance, in the Milanese which had a melancholy pre-eminence, 
uevertheless failed to exUiifjuish the lires of rebellion which smouldered 
beneath the peaceful and picturesque aspect of the Peninsula ; indeed, 
in many cases they fanned and fed them. Here and there they were 
manifested in the form of risings which awakened the fears of the police, 
who avenged themselves by excessive and unjustifiable severity. In 
18"28, for instance, the inhabitants of (^ilento in the province of Salerno, 
weary of the oppression of FenUnand's successor, the dissolute and 
Ixgoted Francis I, took up arms and broke into rebellion. Colonel 
GngUelmo del Curretto was aent by the King to repress the rising. As 
a reward for the unexampled cruelty of which tie made a parade, carrying 
from village to village in iron cages the heads of his victims, he received 
from bis grateful sovereign the title of Marquis and a generous pension. 

The French Kovolution of 1830 naturally added fuel to the flames 
of Italian patriotism. The false hope wa^s widely entertained that Paris 
would give active support to the efforts of the Liberals ; this hope had 
been specially encouraged by General Pepe, who, by skilful persuasion, 
had obuined from General Lafayette the promise of anus and money. 
The illusion had greater hold on Central Italy, where it was not long 
in producing tangible effects. On it were based the rsish hopes of Ciro 
Menotti. a tradesman of Mndena, a high-minded man with generous 
ideas. Distrustful of popular risings with republican aims, he bad 
deemed it opportune to profit by the ambitions of Duke Francis IV, who 
coveted an extension of his narrow dominions. Menotti entered into 
communication with the Duke, and found no difficulty in persuading 
him that the French Kevolution. renewing the age of unrest in Italy, 
would give lura the opportunity of extending his principality and adding 
Bo bia power. Thus the Uuke joined the band of conspirators ; but the 
oon&dent attitude of Austria, and the timid and uncertain policy of the 
new Government of Louis- Philippe, soon convinced him of the vanity 
of his dreams and of the aims of Menotti's adherents. Fearful of having 
compromise<l himself witli the Cabinet at Vienna, to give a signal proof 
of his loyalty as an Austrian Archduke he became the accuser nnd 
violent persecutor of the very party to which he had given such extensive 
pledgea> When the conspirators assembled at the house of Menotti in 
order to receive their final orders, a regiment of ducal troops surrounded 
tlw house, and practically destroyed it, making prisonors of the con- 
Vfumtore, most of whom had been wounded in the fray. The next 
momiug Francis IV wrote to the Governor of Reggio: " Last night it 
■BR discovered that a terrible plot had been made to overthrow me. 



The conspirators are in my hands. Send the Rxecutioner.'* The execu- 
tioner wau immediately dispatched ; but hitt arrival at Modena coincided 
with the news that a revolution had broken out in the neighbouring 
Bologna. The Duke, terror-stricken and uncertain of what the future 
would bring forth, look refuge In the fortniss of Maiilua, dragging at 
his heels the unfortunate Menotti, a prisoner iii fettei-s, whose execudoa 
was thus deferred for a fewdaj-s. 

The rcvolutionbts in Bologna had also been relying on help from 
France ; they invoked also the principle of non-intervention, proclaimed 
by the new French (lovcrnmexit of July, ISilO. At the very time of this 
outbreak Marshal Sebostiani, Foreign Aliiiist^r of Louis- Philippe, made 
this public declaration : "The Holy Alliance rested upon the principle 
of intervention, which destroyed the independence of all the minor 
States. The coatraty principle, which we have approved, and which 
wo shall uphold, assures universal liberty and independence." Relying 
on this support, the revolutionarj- movement, which had begun at 
Bologna, soon spread to all Kotnagna, Emilia, the Marches, and part of 
IJmbrin. Tho temporal jiower of the Pope was tottering ; Francis fled 
from Modena, and Marie-Louise from Parma, and the tricolour waved 
triumphant from the lower Po to the upper Tiber. But Prince Metter- 
uich did not hesitate to come forward again as arbiter of the destiny of 
Europe, and to frustrate the designs of Louis-Philippe's Ministers. 
In a peremptory manner he sent instructions to the Austrian ambas- 
sador in Paris: " We beg that the French Government will not em- 
barmss tho protective action which wo may bo commissioned from 
the highest quarters to take." At tho same time he commanded the 
Austrian troops to invade the provinces of Central Italy. The parlia- 
mentary eloqueui^e of General Sehastiani was exchanged for the more 
prudent diplomacy of Casirair Perier, who, wishful to prevent war, 
sought for a path of dignified retreat: and in less than two mouths 
there remained no trace of the rising which had been so unexpected, 
and, withal, so imposing in appearance. 

This outbreak and all procedlug risings had failed because tljey 
originated with purely local organisations. As a rule, the aim of the 
conspirators and the means whereby they sought to attain it, were 
limiteil U> the boundaries of a province or of a tract of land corre- 
sponding to the ancient historical divisions of the Peninsula. That the 
efforts of the Piedmonlese might assist the inhabitants of Calabria, that 
the causes of discontent, and lience of revolt, were common to all, that 
the multitudes of the north should combine with those of tlio soutli 
in a war of liberation was a conception which had not yet penetrated 
to the masses, though it had occurred to a fe»- individuals. In 1821 
the risings in Naplus and in Piedmont had advanced, as it were, on 
parallel linos, without joining hands ; and, if tlie Picdmontese interested 
themselves in the struggle betweeu Austria and Najiles, it was only to 



m 



take advantage of it as weakening their own adversary. General Pepe, 
wbo had foreseen the advantage o( a simultaneous outbreak, says in his 
memoirs with regard to these risings, " If the Piedmontesc had rebelled 
on the firat of March, instead of on the tenth, or if they had informed 
me of tht;ir [>lans, afTaii'S ill Italy would ha%'e lakcii a mure fortunate 
turn than would be generally believed." The sense of brotherhood was 
absent or feeble ; and the want of this unity of heart and will carried 
with it the want of unity in action, and prevented the fusion of those 
furcea which were scattered, tense and eager, throughout the country. 
A power was needed capable of drawing together all the threads of the 
revolutionary organisation, and of inducing all conspirators, high and 
low, to transform themselves into representatives of the sacred rights of 
nationality. This power was found in Giuseppe Mazzint. 

Hia political ideals had grown to maturity during the months of his 
hoprisonmcnt on suspicion as a Carbonaro (1830). He had meditated 

ply, and hiul seeu the defects of the Italian conspiracies and insur- 
rections ; the people must first be educated, then made to feel the 
iodignity of oppression, dniwn to a unanimous rebellion, and taught to 
think not only of their own district but of the whole of Italy as of 
ibeir native country. Aco-ording to him no real olistacles existed "for 
iwentj'-eix million men, who wished to rise and fight for their country." 
Oa bis release from prison in 1831 the Sardinian Government offered 
biiD the choice betwet-n exile aiid police supervision ; and he tuok up his 
Ittulquartersin Marseilles. There he founded "■ Young Italy,"' the society 
Tlitch was to bo the instrument of the realisation of his ideas. He 
called it by this name because his appeal was specially addressed to youth. 
*• Place youth at the head of the insurgent multitude," he said, "you 
know not the secret of the power hidden in tlkusc youthful hearts, nor 
the magic influence exercised on the masses by the voice of youth. 
You will find among the young a host of apostles of the new religion." 
A man of burning faith, of blameless life, creative in thought, heedless 
of the stumbling-blocks of practice, a writer of rich and vigorous prose, 
foil of movement and fire, he was bora to win proselytes ; and before 
long enthusiastic followers ranged themselves around the banner, on one 
■ide of which he had inscribed the words, '* Liberty, Equalitj', and 
Homanitv," and on the other, ** Unity and Independence "; magic words 
which summed up the programme of the future patriotic mLssion of the 
fMiliff^t For two years tlie band was limited in number. It was a 
hftffoio enterprise; a few young men, with no aid of family ov xveallh. 
Bid. excepting their leader, of no great ability, proposed to mould 
t^ d«atinies of their country and prepared for war agaiast a great 
■ibtuy Power. But in their veins was the feverish ardour which 
Iwrirri bad inspired. With untiring industry they laboured for years ; 
thcj organised centres of "Young Italy" wherever an opportunity 
ted itself, spreading wide the net of their conspiracy. The 



opinions of tlie society were published and disseminated by means of a 
newspajjer which appeared ac long and irregular intervals. In this 
IStiizztni and hi» ooiaradcs advised the young men of Italy to lay aside 
their trivial writings and love poems, and, instead, to devote their literary 
skill to advancing the good of the people by sacrifices of every kind; 
they were urged to travel, to bear frum land to land and from village to 
village the torch of liberty, to expound its advantages to the jwople, 
to establish and consecrate iu cult. They were told to "climb the 
mountains and share the humble food of the labourer; to visit the work- 
sho|i8 and the artiitan.s. hitherto neglected; to apeak to them of their 
rights, of their memories of the past, of their past glories, of their 
former commerce; to recount to tliem the endless oppression of which 
they were ignorant, because no one took it on himself to reveal it." 
And this appeal found a ready response. At the beginning of 1833, 
owing to the efforts of Mazzini, the society reckoned 60,000 members. 

But far more efficacious than the immediate outcome of the i 
orgaiused conspiracy were the permanent results of his patient aud^ 
burning exhortations, which were destined for some time to work \ 
secretly in men's hearts, rather than iu action on the battlo-field. The , 
unfortunate issue of the proiiuficiamieuto of the Piedmont militia ia J 
18S8, and the still more unfortunate result of the Invasion of Savoy,^ 
which was attempted in the following year by a haudful of fanatics, 
under the leadership of the inexperienced Ilamortno. proved that the 
time was not yet ripe for a serious outbreak, and that common-sense waa 
not the most conspicuous virtue of the followers of Jilazzini. But thej 
fiery words of the apostle —who seemed to di-aw fresh life, fresh courage,j 
from defeat, and, undismayed by the horroi-s of torture and imprison- 
ment, declared that " ideas grow quickly when watered with the bloc 
of martyrs" — illuminating the civic consciousness of Italy, fulfdlod thetr 
educative function and produced mora effect than a victory or than the 
fall of a tyrant. This was sliown in' 1844 by the glorious and touching 
episode of the two Handicra brothers, AttiUo and Emilio. They 
were officers in Venice, sons of an Austrian admiral who had played 
a most important part in suppressing the revolt in Romagna. Killed 
with enthusiasm by the writings of Mazzini, they resolved to devote 
their lives to the liberation of their own country. They had won 
over to their designs Doiuenico Moi-o, auother Venetian officer of the 
navy ; and these tlu-ee, leaving the Austrian ships which they com- 
manded, went to Corfii, there to wait until the news of some event 
in the Peninsula should call them to action. There broke out in 
Calabria one of those trifling insurrections which were then of such 
frequent occurrence in the kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and which were 
invariably repressed without delay. A false or exaggerated account 
caused the Bandiera to attach more than due importance to the event, 
and they decided to hasten to the assistance of the rebels. They were 



vaa_ 
thefl 

ou-fl 

yodm 




jotned by a few ntlier patrioUs, and the little band of nineteen landed at 
Cotniiie Biid set out for Casenza. lint, betrayed by a companion, they 
were quickly surrounded by Bourbon trooj^ts, and after a abort struggle 
all were captured. Nine of tlioin, including the brotbere Bandiera, 
Buffered tbe extreme penalty, and dieil bravuly, crying, as they fell 
bencatb tbe bullets of King Ferdinand's soldiers, " Long live Italy." 
Such beroism was not exceptional at a tiuio when berolsm came naturally. 
Hut it was the Brst time that a band uf Venetian youtlis bad chosen for 
the field of tboir patriotic exertions a remote district in the south of I Uly ; 
tins was the first solemn manifestation of tbe brotherhood which linked all 
tbe peoples scattered from the rugged Alps to the sun-bathed shores of 
tbe blue Ionian Sea. Among tbe little band which fell crushed by the 
odious tyranny of the Bourbons in the valley of tbe Rovito, tborc were 
BatirM of Perugia, of Homagna, of Froeinone, and of Modena ; and the 
divereity of tbe districts to which the victims belonged was eloquent 
proof that one programme and one banner bad begun to concentrate the 
i^urations of the Italians, hitherto disunited. 

Meanwhile, tbe sympathies of the l-ibomls wcreawakiining in favour 
of Carlo Alberto, tbe sovereign who had once so cruelly disappointed 
them, and who in 1831 bad succeeded Carlo Felice on tbe tbi-one. The 
harsb and almost ferocious reaction of 18:33, uccasioned by a conspiracy 
iu ttie army of Piedmont, bad not succeeded in destroying their affection 
for lum ; and tbe reforms which bo bad afterwards effected in his States 
hid sufficed to revive it, especially amongst tbe more moderate of his 
nibjectfi. Tbe promulgation of the Civil Code, which iucludnd many 
of the principles uriginattid by the French Revolution ; that of the 
Pen&i Code, which acknowledged the equality of all citzens before 
tbe law; tbe wise and lenient financial administration ; the erection of 
Boitable buildings for the service of tbe State, prisons, luuatic asylums, 
wd hospitals; tbe foundation of important institutions of different 
kinds, such as the Savings Bank, the Commission of National History, 
aodthe Department of Statistics — indicated a movement towards more 
Dotahle and radical changes. Men understood that the King must 
poeeed with caution, that, as he biraseU asserted, he constantly stood 
** between tbe daggers of the Carhonari and the poisoned chocolate of 
the Jesuits." But, on the other liand. there was ground for hope in 
one who could write thus to Count Giuseppe Ricci : " Ah, Kicci, tbe 
fonn of Governmcnta is not eternal, we shall march with the times." 
He was hampered by religious scruples and by tbe influence of the 
pittti ; but all understood that, if these ties could have been severed, 
1 wereD relaxed, he would have made more generous concessions and 
i vould hare wielded an avenging sword against the prolonged and 
AaiDBful oppression of Austria. "'At present," ho exclaimed, " I should 
be OQwiUing to commit any action contrary to the precepts of our holy 
nligion, but I feel assured that to iny dying day the words ' Patriotism ' 





and * Freedom from Foreign KuIb' will cause my heart to throb." 
Hence the Churoh must heraftlf make smooth tho way for the bold 
thoughts which seethed within his breast; tho Church must first seem 
to approve the enterprise which attracted him. Thia was shortly to 
come to pass through Caitlinal (iinvaimi Maetai Ferretti, who became 
Pope on Juue 10, 1840, with the title of Pius IX. 

i 

During this period of thirty years, literature, which joined hands^ 
with politics, y>Iayed an im|>ortaut part in the movement of preparation. 
Oti tht; fall of the Italian kingdom tlie Romantic School established 
itself ; it stood forth as a protest against tho old order, against the 
tyranny of tradition, as a sjrmbol of the sympathy between letters and 
the spirit of modei-n society. Hence wo see tliat, in the struggle between 
the liomacittcs and the Classicists, which was at its height in the early 
days of Austrian rule, the Libcmls sided with the-Uomanties and the 
reactionaries with the Chujsicists. The Koraantics came to regard 
literature as a weapon against despotism and a means of spreading 
patriotic ideas. Firat and foremost among the organs of this new 
intellectual tendency was the Conciliatore, a review which took up the 
broken couree of tho Ca^A and which succeeded in living to one hundred 
and eighleun numbers, despite the suspicion, the vigilance, aud the 
hostility of the police. The names of its contributors are significant of 
its spirit ; among them there were Pellico, Berchet, Romagnosi, Porro, 
and Confalonieri, all of wlioin risked life aud fortune in the conspiracies 
and rebellions of that time. Between the lines of the literary criticisms, 
of the articles on art, or of tho discussions on political economy, we can 
decipher the visions, the wishes, the impulses of citizens who dreamed of 
a free and peaceful Ttaly ; and the dreams had a fervour which was 
evident through their disguise, and aroused the suspicions of the 
Government. The word romantic, says Pellico, was acknowledged to 
be synonymous with Liberal, and no man dared call himself a classicist 
unless he were an extremist or a spy. 

Tho dramatic output, which at that time was nnusually abundant 
partook on the whole of the romantic and patriotic character. The tast 
of that generation revealed itself in the foreign masterpieces chosen fc 
translation; Ferrario's rendering of Schiller's Cantpiracy of Fiegco tkut 
William Tell kindled afresh the desire for independence and the hatrec 
of despotic rule. In original drama Pellico showed that under the veil 
of fiction and through the story of the past it was passible to toucl 
the wounds of the present and to illustrate the hopes of the future.1 
And it is probablo that tho moving legend of Paolo and FrancescaJ 
produced less effect on the public than the impetuous words of 
former in Act I, and his cry : 

For thev, for thuc, mother ot valiant sons, my Italj, 
If hatred riM to wrotig tliee, I will draw my sword. 



Nor was Manzoni forgetful of the condition of his country whilst 
composing the Adelchi and the ConU di Carmagnola. In the latter the 
evils of internal strife and the eagerness of foreigners to protit by it arc 
set forth tn the celebrated chorus of the Imttle of Maclodio ; and its noble 
flow of rebukes and exhortations, which were inspired by the political 
sentiments of the author, secured for these verses the popularity of a 
patriotic hymn. 

' In the Adelchi the allusions to the present situation were so \ia- 
mifitakable that the Censor exercised without mercy in several passages 
his right of suppress ioti, writing ia the margin of the manuscript, " For 
what does Signer Manzoni take us? Does bethink that wecannot perceive 
hit meaning?'' But Henedettiand Niccolini advancedstill more boldly on 
the same roads; the Ooladt Hiemo of t}ie former, written between 1820 
uid 1821, aroused a real enthusiasm ; the love of a Colonna for the 
dftugbtcr of Cola was only an episode in the play ; the real subject of 
the tragedy was political revolt ; and the inspiration of the poet was 
oatiirally liberal and anti-Papal in character. Hence, by an ana- 
^ironi^m which was not wholly illogical, and which often tended to 
enhance the effect, the play is representative of the feeling of revo- 
lutionary Italy. Niccolini, a more subtle artist, attacked the crimes 
ud outrages of Austrian rule under a Krench mask in &iQvanni da 
Proeidai and in Antonio Fosearini he revealed his passion for liberty, 
which after\vards burst foith audaciously in Arnaldo da Brescia, wherein 
Iw «et forth how the Emperor and the Pope, acting together, had 
been the cause in the past and in the present of the servitude of Italy. 

Even historical works were pervaded by this spirit of opposition to 
the Governments whic}i liad been set up after the Napoleonic era. For 
instiuice Cantu, aUhough instructor in a R'lyal-Imperial College, was 
n free in the descriptions and the judgments of his Hintortf of Qomo 
ihit the censors of Milan and of Como were obliged to alter or suppress 
put of the work. He was followed by Collolta, who, in his ffUtorif 
tfthe Kingdom of I^aples. o[>enly denounced the disappointments and 
betnyais of the Revolution of 1820. This work is an indictment of 
tha Boarbon Ferdinand I, the production of a merciless inquisitor, who 
•pttres no pains to expose before the public all the wrongs committed 
h^ this King and his (jroveniraent. The book is in itself a historieal 
«rait« beoauae its publication proved that, although some Italians might 
|iMch resignation to the will of God, and submission to such princes 
m He may send, yet there \vere others who dared to make a solemn 
protest, and demonstrate that such misfortunes were not caused by 
Providence, but rather by the weakness of the raany.and tho wickedness 
of a few. 

Throughout the peninsula there was circulated a literature of 
iVTolt, the sole aim of which was to inspire men with patnotic feeling 
nd toinstigftte rebellion — lyric poems, which wore really hymns of war ; 



126 The literature, of remit [I8ii5~46 

stories, which incited men lo deeds of vengeance; reviefrs and jouroaU 
which were in fact the organs of the revolutionary spirit. 

Among the most noteworthy of such lyrical poems are the Canti 
Italitri of Amedeo Ravina. which, ciieulated iu maiiuscnpt form in 1821, 
entailed a sentente of death foi- the author, though he contrived by 
fortunate chances to escape the penalty. With civic enthusiasm, which 
was more remarkable than his poetic inspiration, he prayed in these 
songs for the union of all Italy, for the restriction of the Papacy to the 
spiritual dominion, and for tlie security of freedom. The same notes vera 
sounded more skilfully by Berchet, who, havingescaped from the clutches 
of the Ausbriun Government in Milan, lived as an exile in France and 
England. lUs Profu'jhi <ii Parga, which appeared in London in 1824, 
and of whitili thousands of manuncriptor printed copies were circulated, 
enjoyed a success which equalled or surpiissed that of the best poems 
of Monti or Foacolo. The moving and pathetic subject of this poem 
had been praised by Goethe, and had tomptod Byron. Such lines as 
these, " No, by Heaven, we will not servo the tyrant," " Perchance t})e 
day is not far distant on which all men will chU eacli other brother," 
expressed the agony of suffering and the cry of the oppressed. His 
other romantic poems aimed a direct blow against Austria. These were 
collected in ono volinne, bearing on tlit3 frontispiece the symbol of a 
lamp, which was being filled with £resh oil, and the siguihcant mott 
alere Jlammam. His Huent, sentimental, and limpid style enabled hi i 
to accomplish the patriotic aim which he set before himself, and whicl 
was revealed by the effigy and the motto. Clarina, one of these poeras» 
immediately became very popular. The heroine encourages her lover 
to fight as a volunteer for the redemption of Italy, but the attempt 
fails through cowardice on the part of the leaders ; thus Clarina, 
mourning for her exiled love, seemed to pensnnify ill-fated Italy, j 
And in an almanac for 1832, which was addressed To the worjun o^l 
Ttaiy, they were reminded of the duty to follow her example: "Let i 
the words of poor Clarina to her betrothed dwell iu your souls.'* The 
same ideals inspire Bcruliet's other works: his fa«/«*i>, which delighted 
Mazzini, his hymn, AW armi^ AW armi..., wliich celebrates Ciro Monotti's 
revolt at Modena,, in short, every expression of his poetic afflatus, so 
that he was known tn his contemporaries and tfl posterity as the Italian 
Tyrtaeus. His companion in exjlo was (rabriela Uossetti, who sang of 
the wrong suffered by Greece and Poland, of the French revolt against 
Charles X, but, more than all, of his Italy — following on his lyre her 
agonising alternations of hope and despair, of courage and deprcasioa. 
And amid this goodly company may also be noted : — Tommaseo, Torti, 
Prati, Grossi, Scalvini, and lastly, Alessandro Pocrio and Goffredo 
Mameli, two heroes who fell sword in hand, the former before Venice 
in 1848, the latter before Rome in 1849. Meanwhile, lirofferio, Giusti, 
and others, wrote satires attacking the Governments with ridicule, whicU. 



tfaH 
ic^ 




I8id-ic] Leopardl. — Silnh Pdlico's Mie Pi'igioui 127 

frequently proves a more efficient weapon than the fury of n rigliteous 
indignation. Even Leopardi, the greatest lyric master of the day, 
■Itbough absorbed in struggles and revolts more Intimate and personeil, 
wu inspired at times by the prevailijig spirit of patriotic fervour; and 
hi« ode to Italy, and Bruto Minore, by recalling to Italians their pant 
history, throve light and glory on the duly which lay in the present. 
Bat the poet, with hia melancholy, hlii pesiiniism, hLt philosophy of despair, 
ap[>ealud but little t4> a generation of quickly -kind led outhusiasnis, 
romantic, and greedy of hope. His merit was hartUy recognised until 
aome years after his untimely death (1837). 

Silvio Pellico's Mie Prlyiimi^ for its intrinsic merit and for its popu- 
larity throughout Europe, deserves an important place amongst the 
polemical prose of this period. The strength of this book lay In its 
modemtion. PelLico does not attack with raneoiir the men who had 
LUJustly kept him in prison for ten years, nor does he stop to glorify 
H|be cause for whic^h he had fiu£fertid. On the contrary, he begins with 
tlie declaration that he had no intention of dealing with politics, just as 
a Inver might refufte to speak of the lady who has wronged him. Pellico 
reUten only the Odyssey of his sufferings and misfortunes and In the most 
temperate language. But this dispassionate account of l)is sorrows, which 
iron the sympathy of all good men, constituted a formidable attack upon 
fcia enemies and those of his uountry. Every tear shed was a drop of 
hitred stored up ag.ain8t the foreign tyrants ; he thought only in his 
recital of moving his readers to pity, and left the feeling of scorn and 
viger, the desire fur revolt and freedom, to mature of iUi own accord 
from the contemplation of the terrible ten yeai-s spent in Spielberg. 

There appeared other more aggressive works on this theme, both in 
the field of ttction and biography. For instance, (ruerrazzi's sensational 
masnce. VAsseiHo di Fireme, seemed an open challenge. The author 
Mid to Mazzint, *'I wrote this book because I could not fight a biittle.*' 
Tke JPrrcurtore^ a Liberal newspaper, secretly published, recommended 
it " to all loyal Italians who would learn to what disgrace, and to what 
iofiuDoajs tyranny, their country had long been subjected by the mad 
Wly or by the avarice of vile and ambitious foreigners." The Precuncre 
want on to say that the book had already inspired such terror that the 
Argoa-eyed police were ransacking houses and buildings to hunt out and 
4eftroT the copies. No less effective were the EUotc Fieramoeca and the 
Keaii ds* Lapi of d'AzegUo. But no prose work, possibly not oven the 
wonAxury articles nf Vnitnt/ Itahf^ exercised so powerful an inHuence nA 
Pk3lioo*a calm narrative of his exjwriences. Hence, it was truly said 
Uttt this tiny volume was more harmful to Austria than a lost battle. 
tlnn the work of many revolutionary societies, or the results of many 

Tawany formed an important centre of literary activity; it was, 
peHiape, the only one where authors ventured to speak their minds in 



public. Here Leopuld II, who ImtJ succeeded to the throne in lft24, 
seemed wishful to continue the tolerant regime of his fattier, FerdiuandlU. 
Ill 1819, Pietro Vieusseux, a tmder of Oneglia of Si»:iss desoent, had 
settled at Florence. He, in concert with Gino Cappoui, Costmo Ridolfit 
and Niccolini, had founded a scientific and literary society, open to all 
who took pleasure in free and illuminating discUKsion. This literary 
reunion gave birth to the Antoloi/ia, a review founded by Cappom in 
imitiitioii: of the English periodicals. It had a wide circulation ; its 
contributors and correspondents were drawn from the most diverse 
achnoU, the connecting link being the unilication of Italy. Such were 
Haffaelc Lambruschini, the piiest, Gabriele Pepe, the Carbonaro^ Carlo 
Troya, the '* Neo-Guelf," Niccolini, the ".^Vuti-GueU," the classical and 
restrainod Giordani, and JMazzini, the impetuous Radical. It was a hive 
of contlicting doctrines, of varying idcaU, converging towards a frontal 
attack upon the dominant reaction under Austrian influence, and 
working trtgothcr in the generous purpose of the dissemination of 
culture, of striking all fetters from the conscience, of redeeouug the 
common country, and re-establishing its dignity as a nation. 

Philosophers were inspired with the same fervour, not only in their 
actitJiiH and their jiractice, but also in those of their writings which were 
rather of a speciilative character. Indeed in attacking the sensational 
philosophy which Iiad held sway in Italy at tlie time of Gioia and 
Komagnosi, Antonio Rosmini tried to divert the Itiliana from this 
echuol of thought, which, by declaring the senses to lie the only source 
of truth, destroj'ed men's faith in absolute justice, in an ideal order 
depending on ininuitable principles, and hence, in the otemal right to 
independence and freedom. The writing aud the actions of the Abbot 
Rosmini were in perfect harmony ; the Jesuits were his spiritual, and the 
AustrianH his political, foes: suspicions and pomecutions drove him from 
his home in Koveredo ; in 1848 he pleaded boldly and eloquently but in 
vain before the Pope for the long-flesirod confederation of the Italian 
Statos. The priest Vinpenzo Ginlmrti, although in his scientific vie\T8 
opposed to Rosmini, was united with him in the love of Italy, for whom 
Giolwrti suffered so mucli, and in whose cause his writings, described in 
a later chapter of this volume, had so great an influence. 

Science did not fail to play her part in the promotion of the 
national cause. She helped it indirectly, chiefly thiwigh the medium of 
scientific congresses. A group of Liberals had succeeded, not without 
difficulty, in por-jnading Leo|iold II that scientific congresses wouldJ 
increase his reputation and that of Tuscany, which had always showiij 
itself favoumble to learning. Accordingly, in 1889, such a congress 
held under his auspices at Pisa. The circular letter of invitation con-1 
tainiug the programme was drawn up by Vieusaeux, who was anything] 
but a man of science; and this participation of the founder of the( 
Antologia, the moderate but energetic advocate of Liberal ideas, causell 



1810-46] 



Scientific eongreases. — Muaic 



129 



men to question the orLhodnxy of the meeting. In fact, those tyrannical 
rulera who were most subsorvient lo Austi-ia tried to frustrate thescheiiiB; 
the learned men in the Papal States were strictly forbidden to attend 
the congress^ and a threat of exconiniunication gave the good-natured 
Leopold ground tov reflexion. But, in spit« of all these obstacles, 

(the meeting took i)lace. There were many discourses, watched over by 
the spies of various Governments, who reported that the most sucuessfiil 

[vere those which digressed the furthest from subjectji of a scientitia 

[ttalure. The enthusiasm reached its height on the day of the consecra- 
tion of a inonnmcnt to Galileo, when Rosmini made a speech exposing the 
thame of Galileo's celebrated trial by the Inquisition. Thus a harmless 
meeting of learned men, of which the ostensible aim was " the advitncc- 
ment of natural science," was transformed into a solemn manifesta- 
tion of national feeling. The example set by the Grand i)ukii of 
Tuscany was followed by other Princes, whose Jimbition was equal to 
or greater than his own ; Ferdinand II and Carlo Alberto finally per- 
mitted similar congresses to be held, which if they did not advance the 
ends of science, proved very favourable to those of politics, since they 
«&tabllshed intercourse between the most distinguished men in the 
country and provided an opportunity for the revelation and co-ordini^ 
tion of the impulses which led to the assertion of the most sacred rights 
of nationality. 

Moreover, painting and sculpture, by their choice of subjects, took 
their part in the great enterprise ; but even more effective was music, 
which made a direct appeal to the passions of the people. At that time 
the performance of opera proved very disturbing to the authorities, 
insenie cases through the intention which governed the inspiration of 

|lhe master, in otliers by the interpretations which the public delighted 
to pat upon certain innocent passages. For instance, Gioachino Hossini 
WIS anything but a revolutionist; nevertheless his WlUiam Tell was 
(oaad to contain revolutionary music, full of political signiOcauce, of 
vhieh be himself was quite unconscious. In the most solemn scene 
this druna, when the representatives from tlie three Cantons, after 

^tveuing ** in the name of their sorrows " to vindicate their liberty at all 
«cBto, hail tlie sun as it rises over the eternal Alps with that august 
ud terrible name upon their lips, from the deep voices of the cliorus, 
aiul from the bass chords of the orchestra there seemed to proceed a 
■eoacing and formidable presage and an irresistible call to deeds of 
prowea a and of self-sacrifice. Vincenzo Bellini, again, had the nature 
of an artist with all its heedlessness and nonchalance ; for him politics 
lad no meaning. Nevertheless his audience was so intimately touched 
by hia music, it acted so powerfully upon their noblest impulses, that 
Ihey endowed it with a significance which it did not in fact possess ; and 
tW cry of the Puritana roused the pit like a stirring shout of war and 
vieUirT. Tlte Censors and the Governments were active in forbidding the 
c a. « X- B 



130 



MusiciaTt8 and librettists 



performance of certHiii plnys, Aiitl in correcting the roost danguruoa 
phrases of certaiu libretti; but the one measure merely irritated the 
public, and the other, by its clumsy perveraion of the text, provoked ft 
contemptuous amile, or n;duubiud the fervour of applause and protest. 
On the other hand, the note of patriotism, which pervaded the musio 
of Verdi, was sincei-o and deliberate. This was uaderetood by bis 
contemporaries ; and the stuiiendous chorus of Nabucco seemed then 
and i-s Htill the most paasionato appeal to a distant Katherland. Hi» 
Ernani, ijiven at Venice in 1844, founded ou the romantii; drama of 
Victor Hugo, itself the symbfhl of revolt for an entire school of Uteiu- 
tnro, contains the m<wt perfect musical expression of the spint of free- 
dom. The men of ltJ4B found in it a magnanimous rebellion agaiuat 
tyranny, n denunciation of violence, and the cry of a people vising 
againtiit their tymnts. In the Lomhardi, who sigh for their distant 
homes, and sadly call to mind the streams and meadows of their native 
lands, they discovered a foi-ocast of coming events i and in AtlU4i, tha 
wclL-known passage in which tbii Uoman general Aetius offers tho 
whole world to the leader of the Huns* provided that he may himself: 
retain ItiUy, waa clearly intended to excite the multitude by the simpls! 
and univeraal language of hai-mony. 

Thus we see that as in the life of action, ao in that of thought, bold' 
and vigorous forces worked for the regeneration of Italy. The people, 
who at the opening of the Congress of Vienna had desired only peace, 
were now determined, at all costs, to free tlieraselves from the yoke under 
which they lay. Metternieh had declared that Italy n-as merely a geo- 
gmphiod expression, an ill-fated phrase which implied a still more ill- 
fated policy. At the beginning of 1846, everything combined to show 
the author of this phrase and this policy that Italy was something more 
than a word written upon a map, that it was a nation conscious of its 
rights, rich, if not in material strength, in the fervour of self-sacrificei, 
and certain thereby, sooner or later, to achieve its desires- 




CHAPTER V 



I 



THE PAPACY AND THE CATHOLIC CHURCH 

Pius VII, on his retarn to Rome in 1814, was greeted witit demon- 
stntions of exubciunt joy. The Uoraan:; had always helit his person in 
fcttiDg revureuco. The raemory of su many trials boriio with patience 
uid fortitude threw a halo round the mi^, noble-minded Pontiff. He was 
known to be animated by the best intentions; and thu future seemed 
bright with hope. As in the early years of Uie reign, the government 
^n devolved upon Cardinal Consalvi, Secretary of State, who remained 
responsible for the homo and foreign policy of the Papacy. The 
Minister who influcQCud so powerfully the course of events, both in' 
Chnrch and State, was not onlya remarkable but a singularly attractive 
penonality. 

Krcole Consalvi was bom in Homo in 1767, and was a scion of the 
4i>cient House of the HrunaecJ of Pisa. .\l Krascati, and subsequently 
in Rome. Consalvi studied jurisprudence aud theology, and in 1788 
began his ecclesiastical career, in which he rose steadily. He always 
ttcributed his selection of this career to profound conviction, and his life 
VIS without blemish ; but he was never ordained a priest. It was not 
bll he had reached the age of forty-three, when he was made a Cardinal, 
that he took minor Orders. Consalvi received a good classical education, 
lie loved music and poetry, was the friend of Cimarosa, travelled widely 
ia Italy, and always remained a great favourite in tlie circles of the 
IttJing Roman aristocracy. At the wish of Pius Vf he exchanged in 
179:! administrative for judicial work, and was appointed to the high 
offifie of Vditore to the Court of the Rota. When Rome became the 
tUIying-point of the French exiles, they found no ^Tarme^ friend than 
Coiualri. 

Thia easy-going, somewhat worldly, manner of life came to an end in 
n%, when, after the foundation of the Cisalpine Republic. Pius VI 
appointed him Assessor to the Congregation which was to reform the 
Papal army in agreement with ita commandei's, the Austrian generals. 
The undertaking proved a failure. The Papal troops were beaten, and 
tlie Court of Rome, coming to terms with the French, agreed to the 

131 




132 



Election of Pius VII. — Cvnsalvi [I79a-1800 




fatal articles of Tolentlno, by which the Pope reoognii^ed the Cisalpine 
UepLiblic aad gave up tlie Legations. The asMHSbi nation of the Fi-ench 
general Uuphot by L'apal soldiers in 1T98 led to the occupation of 
Uomc and to the proclamation of the Hepublic. Consalvi, who was 
held responsible for what had occurred, had to surreuder the Castle 
of St Angelo; and, as he scorned flight, he waa made prisoner, and 
taken to the frontier in the eoDfipany of convicts. 

After a short stay at Naples, he joined the imprisoned Pius VI near 
Florence; but, the permission to remain with him having been refused, 
he went ou to Venice. He was in that city during the victories of the 
second Coalition, at the death of the Pope, and at the time of the Con- 
vocation of the Conclave. Consalvi owed bin nomination as Secretary 
to the Conclave to the influence of the Cardinal of York» second son 
of the Chevalier de St George. Austria and Naples occupied the Pon- 
tifical States; even Spain demanded Papal territory for Parma; while 
Naples claimed Ponte-Corvo and lieneveuto. But Consalvi headed a 
strong opposition to the Austrian catidldnte, Cardinal Mattci ; and on 
March 14, 1800. the election of Cardinal Chiaiamonti (Pius VII) was 
carried. Ecclesiastical independence was thus asserted. One of the first 
steps taken by the new Pope was the appointment of Consalvi to be Pro- 
Secretary of State, Austria now refused to allow the coronation of the 
Pope to take place in St Mark's, because she would have no part in 
an act which symbolised the assumption of the Temporal Power; and 
Marquis (ihislleri, the £raj>eror's ambas-sador, claimed once more the 
Legations for Austria. The Pope, who persisted in his refiisal and in 
his intention of returning to Rome, had to choose the sea route, because 
he was not allowed to pass through the Legations, which Austria 
demanded. Before he reached Rome, couditious had altc'red- Tlie 
Victory of Bonaparte at Mai-engo on June 14 had prompted Austria and 
Naples unconditionally to restore the States of the Church. Prance, 
on the other baud, seized the Legations, and for fourteen years remained 
mistress of Italy. In the month of August Consalvi was made a Cardinal, 
and the affairs of the Papal State wei-e entrusted to him. 

The saintly, pious, conciliatory Pope had great common sense, but 
no superior gifts of miiul. A certain irresolution made him dependent 
upon the adviceof others. Consalvi's influence gave its cliaracterLo hU 
Pontificate. Their relations to each other thenceforward were always 
of the most intimate diameter. Cuusalvi has been called the soul of Uie 
Pope, the man who held the double key to his heart- The personal 
sympathy of Pius VII never failed him. 

His contemporaries describe Consalvi at the time as being a tall, 
good-looking man, of chai-ming nv^nners, lively disposition, genuine 
kindness of heart, great natuml dignity, and, while true to his friends, 
incapable of hatred. His unusual ability, bis extraordioary powers of 
work, and dexterity in business, justified the contideuce of the Pope. 




Consalvi was aecesaiblo to inocicrti ideas on political questions, and there- 
fore exposed to the.attacksof the reactionaries. Hut Pius Vil knew 
well that he would uphold the spiritual sovereignty of the Curia in 
its unrestricted integrity. Ho had acted accordingly in I'aris dnring 
the negotiations for the Concordat, and had always maiiil.iinoil the 
claims of the Papacy to it« Teinpoml Power. The circumstance that 
i« represented these principles was the true cause of his resignation 
in 1806, which the Pope was compelled to accojit under pressure 
from Napoleon. But the preceding six years of administration had 
sufficed to bring Consalvi into conflict ■with the representatives of 
the estabtiHhed hierarchy. Although a Papal decree had restored the 
I-riestly rule throughout the Pontifical State, and brought intfj force 
lite ordinances which had been disregarded during the Revolution, the 
amnesty which, notwithstanding many restrictions, granted a certain 
compensation to those who had bouglit national proi>erty, the taxation 
of the secular clergy, and the fact that a policy of retaliation was 
carefully avoided, impressed upon tho Papal restoration a statnp of high 
statesmanship and moderation, which the reactiouaries never forgave. 
The hopeless financial situation was the stumbling-block. The already 
impoverished people were loaded with increased taxation ; yet the State 
«i8 unable to pay the creditors more than half their due. The oppo- 
titiou to Consalvi was led by Cardinal Braschi ; but^ notwithsUvuding 
their intrigues, Consalvi remained, after his resignation, the cfinfidant 
(A the Pojje up to tho moment when he left Rome. Ho clearly 8aw» 
boTevor, that Pius himself could not master his opponents, to whom 
the suppression of an abuse was a perilous innovation, and who objected 
to the most urgent and beneficial reforms, such as free trade in corn, the 
i^ulation of the public debt, and an improved monetary system. 

Six months after the forcible removal of the Pope in July, 1809, 
Consalvi was summoned to Paris, and, together with Cardinal di Pietro, 
cwnpolled to travel under military escort. Incensed by his^stubborn 
opposition, Nai«4eon divested him' of the insignia of his rank and 
dieclared both hi4 stipend and his private fortune to be forfeited. In 
Jane, 1810, he was rtilegated to Umms fof a [leriod of two years and 
eight months. His memoirs were written at this time. They are not 
biiiicei-e. but they were jotted down under the sting of the persecution 
ho 8a£fercd at the hands of the Emperor, aud are not conststeut with his 
wlier estimate of Napoleon. 

U was Consalvi who steeled tlio opposition of the Pope at Fontaine- 
bleau, where he spent eleven months — from February, 1813, till the 
loUowing January. Again an escort conducted htm into exile at 
lloiers. The defeat and downfall of Napoleon, however, soon set him 
fc«e. He actually met the Itlnipcrur at FrOjus. on the road to Elba, 
»hen he himself was returning to Italy. They did not speak ; but, when 
N&poleoo recognised him, he remarked to the Austrian who accoin[>anicd 



him: "Thia man, who never would b&comc a priest, is more of a priest 
tlian all t!io others." 

Cousalvt had been absent from Homo since 1809, nor did he enter it 
now. He met the Pope at Cesena and foUowctl bim to Foligno, where, 
**in the j^y of his lioart," i'ius VII reinstated him as Secretary of Stjite. 
For the mowciit, however. Cardinal Pacca took liis place, and Consalvi 
hastened back to Paris. Thence he proceeded by London to Vienna, to 
represent the Pojje at tlie (Niiigreas. 

Tlie interregnum in liotnc from January to May, 1814. between the 
i-etrocession of liome to the Vope and his return, had generated a series 
of complications, destined to hamper tho future activity of Consalvi. His 
opponent. Cardinal Rivamla, who acted as Papal legate in the abeence 
of the Pope, inaiigomted the reaetiou by suppros-siiig the French laws, 
with the exception of those relating to mortgages. Cardinal Pacca 
adhered to tliis policy. He had been Nuncio at Cologne from 1786 to 
1793, after that at Lisbon, and, undi-r Pius VU, the very soul of the 
opposition to Napoleon. He i*cstored the Inquisition, which tribunal so 
bite as 1816 passed a sentence of death at Kavenna. Wis most pei'sonal 
work, however, waa the restoration of the Society of Jesus. In the 
Bull nf Angnst 7, 1M14, Pins VII indirectly characterised the suppi-ession 
of the Ortlcr a* a grievous crime. Pacca considered himself happy to 
be a means of reparation, because he reproached himself with having 
approved, in his youth, the Provindales of Pascal. 

The Congregation of the Index nnw proceeded against all publi- 
cations of a politioid character ; and before long 737 accusations of 
heresy were received. The supporters of the previous administration, 
and chiefly the priesta, wore treated with uncomprumisiiigsoverity; many 
were dej»osed, called npon to disavow their views, punished or expeUed, 
and deprived of their incomi-s. Consalvi was perfectly aware that the 
protests of the Powers assembled in, Vienna, against a policy of 
vougnanee in Rome, were well founded. Ha i-eealled to l*acca the fact 
that in 1800, in similar ciru urn stances, he had persuaded Pius VII to 
grant an amnesty, and, while safeguarding principles, to excu.se and par- 
don individuals in considcratinn nf the- oircunt-stauces in which they 
bad been placed. In bitterness of soul he asked how he was to win back 
the temporal possessions of the Papacy, when a system was at work which 
must lead to the loss )if even that portion whit.'li was left. He partly 
accomplished his object, aud iu August, 1814, a limited amnesty was 
proclaimed. Vet he remained isolated. His influence could not save 
individuals ; he had to inxilogiwe for his outspcikennes:*. and promise 
amendment. His fall would have been certain, could he liave been 
replaced at the Congress. 

However, Consalvi remained indispensable, though continuing to 
bo misunderstood. During the Congress of Vienna he had triumjihed 
through methods- which he had already outlined at Venice in 180U iu 




%a appeal to the Emperor Paul of Russia. To the jealousies of the 
C'aiholic dovereignd aiuI their inroads on ecclesiastical territory he 
opposed the goodwill of tlio hctt^iwlox Powerst Uu&sua, Etiglaiidi luid 
Pruseia. The majority of the diplomatists at Viunua, c^jpecially the 
EuglUh aud the Uiiasiaiis, pressed for uoiistttutioiial guarantees, the 
^uting uf a general umuetity, suid the cuutirnitttiuu of the siiculamatioii. 
faiKil 8ubjects were not to be hunded over "like sheep," and especially 
the t^egations weiti to bo constitutionally govorned. 

Coiisalvi's opposition to this laat pi'eteusion won the support of 
MftteJ-nieh. lie iirsiKted on tlte iiiipriMiibility of making distinctions 
between Papal subjcettiit and ai^ued that a constitution dmwn up for 
the entire Papal .SuUes would hardly suit Austria. In consequence the 
proposal was dropped, and Consalvi avoided binding proiciises. At tho 
same time, however, in a report to Cardinal Pacca, he said that he 
himself in 1800 had introduced that limited pjirticiputinn nf the laity 
in the govorument, now claimed by tho Poweis at Vienna, and that in 
hid opinion it was a matter of common decency to concede it. If, after 
twenty-five years of sopurution, obsolete methods were to l»o employed la 
ruling the Legations, the Papacy would be courting disaster. 

Against Conaalvi's opinion, Paeca had obtained in 1814 the con- 
demnation of the Kreemasous ami the Carioiutri. Tlio existence of 
secret societies spread all over Italy wiw indeed a serious danger. 
The Freueh at the time of tho Republic had made use of Uieni. The 
eiample proved contagious. The Counter-revolution from 1708 to 1799 
L opposed the Sanfedists to the Jacobins. This secret society took 
r its name ivota the terrible Uiiids of Cardinal Uuffo, and since his 
time had existed in the States of the Church. The Sanfedists formed 
I kind of secret [wlioe, whose denunciations were nominally directi^d 
^siost secret societies but pnictically used aguinst all inoouvcnicnt 
persons or views. The Sanfedista liated Liberalism, but also Austria, 
Mettemich. and Consalvi, who tried to master them, but being tumble 
to do so. had tiually to tolciute them. So early iia 18H the " Guelfs," 
tnd with them the idea of an independent Itiily, catne to the front. 
jJt is not without cause that they were thought to have held com- 
nanicationa with Napoleon at Elbiu But by i'acca and those who 
l^rituvd his vie^rs all sovereij^ns and stjiteemen fmm Joseph II to 
'Stein, the Tugendhund in Cicrmany, tiie I'roteataut Bible Societies, 
tiu iiberflla — everybody in fact who did not hold their opinions — were 
^•tamped as Freemnsons. 

Mettemich had no such delusion, but he deemed it his interest to 
ipport it. Austria liad become the dominant Power in Italy and the 
'Cne great obstacle to the realisation of the national hopes, lie needed 
^e co-operation of the Italian Courts, and notably that of the Curia. 
le came to an undt-nttandliig with (^onHalvi uii the ground of solidar* 
■gainst the lievolutiou. Their long, intimate, almost affectionate 



coiTespoadence, which stretohes from 1815 to 1819. leaves somehow the 
impression that ^(e^t«rQiuh hail thu host of the bargain. His constant 
warnings to Consalvi to remain firm, to uphold a heftllhy moral code, to 
defend principles and the sacred foundations of society, of the throne and 
the altar, have a perceptible tone of command. Still, in 1815, Cousalvi 
refused to join the Italian League of Defence, aa well as the Holy 
Alliance. Thu IFoly Alliance, he said, had no creed. Moi-eover the 
Po[}e was bound to the strictest neuti-allty with regard to all nations, 
and could not dream of asserting his rightft by the sword. But in 1816 
Lebzeltern reported from Rome tlmt Consalvi was now practically won 
over to the interests of Austria, and wanted her support. 

The Matupruprio of July 6, ISlfi, jirociaimed the programme of Con- 
salvi for the centralisation of government, a bureaucracy on Napoleonic 
lines. The feudal rights and customs were abolished, with the exception 
of tlie game laws. The baronial jurisdiction ytill in part survived, but 
was found so inconvenient and so expensive tlmt in, nearly every case it 
was voluntarily relinquished. The customs, laws, and privileges of com- 
munes, towns, and provinces were also aboUsliecl. Tho Papal territory, 
which included three million inhabitants, was subdivided into twenty-one 
Legations under Cardinals, or Delegations under Delegates. To them 
the Governors, who were selected from the "prelature," were subject, 
and only exercised the inferior jurLsdiction. Over all wei-e the ordinary 
Courts, the CDui-t of Appeal, and lastly tho Rota Romana and the 
Congregations. The councillora of each commune chose the cori}oration, 
but wave themselves chosen by the Legates, and their appointment was 
rutiried by tlic Oonsulta in Rome. If a vacancy occurred, the members 
were to exercise the right to complete their numbera, subject to the 
approval of authority. Consalvi agreed that every province should 
have a council of laymen; but even those wei'O nominated at Rome. 
They had no executive power, and could only give advice on prescribed 
topics. Consequently the whole bureaucratic system rested upon the 
priesthood and upon the prefatura. This order or Ciiste of laymen, 
wearing the ecclesiastical g.wh and observing the rule of celibacy, was 
no longer confined to members of noble or wealthy families. The 
positions in the administration and the tribunals reserved for ita 
members were no longer lucrative. Tlie priesthood looked upon it with 
contempt. The education of its members was as deOcieut as tlial of the 
clergy; and both, having lost their property, were subsidised by the State. 

By the sale of Church property Napoleon had succeeded in bringing 
the finances of the old Papal States into order, and in reducing the 
National Debt from seventy-four to thiity-threc millions of ticudi; and, 
although the Papal States had hardly any exports, their revenue was 
raised from three to six millions by the improvement of their commerce. 
After the Restoration, the States of the Church were chargod with part 
of the debt of the kingdom of Italy — though with reduced interest. 



I 
I 

I 

I 

I 
I 
I 

( 




Consalvi. moreover, bad to endow both tho Roman Congreg'ations and the 

Cardinals, and also to compensate Cor losses iucurred the 18^4 mnnastei-ies 

and 612 nunneries, which were restored. In 181(i the deficit amounted 

to 1,200,000 acudi. In 1821 Austria still owed the payments due for 

the garrisons, which under protest of the Pope occupied Ferrara and 

Comacctiio. Members of the Bonaparte family advanced the necessary 

funds for the i-eception in Rome of the Emperor Francis in 1819. Jn 

these eircumstnuccs the chief sources of revenue, tobacco and salt, were 

leased for a period of twelve years. Taxes in arrear were collected by 

coeroion, and others levied in advance. Expenditure was covered by 

frc«h loans. This method of administration led to systematic and 

exLensive malversations and fraud on thci part of tho tax-farmera. In 

1817, orders for pensions ov grants bearing a forged signature of the 

Pope were paid from the public chest. In 1820, 11,000 crimiuals were 

ia State prisons and the cost of their maintenance wiw leased^ with the 

rwult that they were nearly starved, and timt the usurera pocketed large 

profits. Conscription had been abolished, and the army numbered 7000 

men. But there, also, the administration was no better. Dishonesty 

developed into a system. Consalvi was perfectly aware of it. When 

iieasked for a serious investigation, the Mitii!:;ter ot Finance was wont 

to withhold the necessary explanations. At the same time tho constant 

increase of taxation added to his unpopularity- 

Since mauufiu:tHrcs were non-existent., and commerce was confined 
i(> tgricultural products, such as hemp, wool, aud cattle, Fius VII in 
1801, in the interests of agriculture, had suppressed the AniMtia, an 

^iutitution which had prohibited the export of corn aud enforced severe 
ic^uktiong on the home market At tirst this measure, wliicb granted 
bw trade in corn, seemed eminently just. The consequence, however, 
*te that Rgriculturc languished, because the soil passed out of the hands 
of un&ll landowners into those of large proprietors. They in turn leased 
tho land and controlled the market, because they wore able to discover 
mjB of escaping the weight of communal taxation. They found it 
more profitable to raise stock than to till tbe land. To meet the 
(Llliculty, the Government restored the AttnQtift, a measure promptly 
followed by deamess, bread rinta, and disturbances. Nevertheless, 
CoQsalW succeeded, at the end of his administration, in Utlaneing the 
fioances, bat at the cost of the total neglect of public education. The 
Clerical Middle Schools tauglit hardly anything but Latin. The pro- 
boBOtsof the two great Univei-sities of Rome aud Bologna, and of five 
■tmUler ones, had to use prescribed text-books. It required a special 
tarention of Consalvi to obtain leave from the Censorship that Settele, 
.fnjfeasor of Astronomy, should be allowed to explain tho system of 
tJopernicua, if only as a hypotliesis. 

After the abolition of the Napoleonic Code, the decisions of Common 
Uw remained in force, modilied by Canon Law and tbe Apostolic 



138 



L<xw, — Justice. — Brigamkige 



[1815-33 



Constitations. IHiese contradicted ench other, thus causing bo}K'lo-M 
confusion. Coiisalvi called upon Ilai-tolucci^ a legist of gi-eat rrj.utc, 
to work nut a codo of Civil Law; but it was never sanctioned lij iLu 
Congregagtong Economica. The suggested nUea of legal procedure wei 
never enforoud; and the se[)arattou of judicial from adminislratii 
functions was not carried out- The Cardinal Lugatcs eucroache<l uy 
the domain of juntioe by arbitrary intervention. The adniiuislrauc 
hod it6 own 6{>ecial and seimmte jurisdiction, and the clergy appeal 
to episcopal Courts, among them to the Inquiuition, wliich condeii 
all offences against religion. The Uditore iSlantiWjMJ}, also^independei 
of all tribunals, and, under the immediate authority of the Poix^, w 
the highest judge of Appeal in ecclesiaatical matters. The Ootuulti 
another ccclciiiastjcai tribunal, passed sentencos of death or hard hibiii; 
for life on political criminals who had incited the jieople to relK'Uioi 
even if they Iiad done so by the more distribution of pamphlet 
witliont having recourse to arms. The Roman Courts were venal, 
favonritiftiu prevailed. Laws were unable to stop that organised 
bi'igandage, wliich in the Uontan moiuitaim: had even withstood th^j 
power of the French. Entire tracts of country were in a state of wo^^f 
and the brigands, though feared, were invested with aromautic liolo. I^^ 
1818 a terrible famine broke out winch, more especially in the Apen- 
nines, led the stur\'ing population to revolt. Military measures hiid 
failed. The brigands even di-ew recruits fi-om the ranks of the i'api^J 
soldiery and police. The police itself was untrustworthy, aud, mor^| 
over, hampered by the rights of sanctuary vested iu a cerUuu numbc^^ 
of convents and churches. 

In these oircumstuncest Consalvi determined to entor into porsonil 
negotiations with tiie brigands. He made a kind of treaty with tliui 
They consented to submit to one year's imprisoniufut, if tht* Statu wuul 
then guarantee them suflicient means to begiu a peaceful existent 
Home thus witnessed the extraordinary sight of the entry of three larj 
waggons full of brigands. Masooco, the must feared of all, wa8 nccoi 
panied by his wife, and the Duchess of Devonshire thought tit 
present her with her own necklace. Other bitnds followed the exatni 
of submisfiioi) and the outlook seemed hopefiU, when a terrible epilt 
followed. Masocco was to negotiate with Ccsari, the leader of the 
recidcitrant band, but was shot down by his rnniniand. In order 
revenge the death of his friend, Amariui seized upon tho family 
Cesari and, tearing them from the hands of the police, murdered 
women and young girls with his own band, lie then gave lltmself 
to justice. Cesari held out for some time, and mui^lered all thusd of 
prisoners who were Papal subjects. In the end, a lioman carabiti 
shot him near the place whore his family had fnllon. In the 
twenties trav*-llers were still stopped by robbers iu brund da" 
When the C^/r^mwn^faMpui to duui 



Dnkstic measDi-es had to be taken by the Government :igaiust the 
GuniUis of the i-obbcrs aa well as against those wUu harboured them, 
ud their stronghold, Sonino. was destroyed. 

It was the fate of Consalvi's Bystem of bureaucratic tuteUige, that 
\he capable and trained ofliciiils, which it pre8upp<jsed, were non-existent. 
U)i the one hand, the reforms which he granted were not carried out; 
«i the other, the pi*eseure he brought to iHiitr was interpreted as 
despotic interference. The loss of innumerable local liberties and 
privileges turned the aristocracy, who had benelited by them, aj^iust 
Cousalvi. They joined in oppa<iitian with tlie Cmdinalj* and Biijbnpg, 
who complained o£ the curtailment of their spiritual juriKdiction. 
The Cardinals who were must hostile to Cousalvi were Severnli, 
Sonuglia, Litta, Mattei, Pacc-a, della Geuga, and Caatlglione, the 
list two of whom were destined in time to wear the tiara. In 1818 
Cotint Apponyi, the Austrian ambiL-vsatlor. states unhcHitatingly that 
the Sacred College was animated with feelings of bitter enmity against 
Consalvi. It came to such a pass that at Vellctri Mattei set up a dis- 
tiopt administration and jurisdictinn, and gave orders that all decrees 
which did not suit him should be burnt by the hangman. The Legates, 
Rivamla, Severoli, i^ouiagUa, in letlets and pampldets openly denounced 
the Guvemment as hostile to religitm. Paccii persecuted all those who 
bad held office under Napoleon ; della Genga, Vicar-General of liome, 
•aforced all the old pennl htws against the Jews. Consalvi refrained 
from taxing Roman Princes and capitalists more heavily because be 
had been frankly told that they would refuse to pay. It was impossible 
b) contend against such a sea of difficulties. With an aged and ailing 
I'ope, Consulvi had to be content with half-measures so fai' as ijiternal 
tdministration was concerned. 

His diplomatic skill on the contrary was displayed to full advantage 
io many successful negotiations with the Powers. The jx-'Hoil, which 
liv been termed the era of the Concordats, opened iu 1816. but the 
experience of Consalvi dated back as far as 1801, when he was sent to 
Paris to negotiate the French Concordat with the First Cutisul. The 
reiultit of Napoleon's policy had Iieen that the Catholic Church in 
Krance, deprived of its property, depiindent upon the State, hampered 
by the Oi*ganic Articles, and hopelessly crippled as to its episcopid 
fivedou, was driven towards Rome and l>ecame. what it never had been, 
Ultaraootane ; and upon Napoleon's fall the Concordat was at once 
atUcked. 

The first attack was made by antagonists of Consalvi, by the Zdanti. 
Chi May 30, 1814, della Genga arrived in Paris as Papal ambassador 
te the Allied sovereigns. He found that they had already left, and 
iMded his instructions to the Fi-euch Government, who welcomed ro- 
<'riniination8 against the ecclesiastical policy of Napoleon. The Papal 




grievances were summed up under five headings: liberty of worship 
and of tho Press ; the Codfi Ntiftoleon in its dealings with divorce, usury, 
etc.: tho Organic Articles; the appointment of laymen as Ministers of 
Public Worehip. Finally the repeal of the Concordat was recommended; 
"■ for in order to save France from a schism, the Pope hod been forced to 
accept whatever could be obtained from a Government which considered 
religion as a branch of politics and wassecretly bent upon its destruction." 

A few days after this dangerous stt^p Consalvl arrived at Paris. 
He made an enemy of della (ienga b^' explaining in bitter terms how 
unnecessary and even detrimental bis action had been. Forced to goon 
to London, he did not return to Paris until July. He found the reactioa 
at the helm. The Abbe do Montosquiou, a.s Minister of the Interior, 
which then included the administration of Public Worship, and Tallev- 
rand, as Minister of Foreign Affairs, backed, in the name of the King, 
the views of dclla (ienga. The Concordat was assumed to have been 
extorted and was to be revised before Pius VII would crown the King 
at Ketms, a ceremony which never took place. In order to save the 
personal dignity of the Pope, all transactions which had passed between 
France aud the Holy See since 1797 were declared null and void, Uie 
French invasion having impeded his liberty of action. The King 
promised to restore and to endow the 132 old bishoprics, if, on hb 
part, tho Pope consented to summon the iJishops of the Concordat, the 
EvSquei de eircoiutancf.^ as Montesqniou called iheni, to tender their 
resignation. Of the Bishops who had been deposed in 1801 and who 
had refused to resign, only ten or twelve were still alive. They con- 
sidered themselves to be alone legitimat^i, and looked upon the othew 
as xntntt, and upon the Pope as a prevaricateur. 

C'onsfllvi was horrified to hear that a liishop. Cortois de Pressigny, was 
on his way to Kuiue as Envoy Extraordinary. The Cardinal realised what 
was at stake, if the Pope was to own to a mistake in his government of 
the Church. Ho forestalled Pressigny by a special courier. He imploreil 
both the Pope and Pacca not to concede the reinstatement of tlic deposed 
Bishops, except by granting fresh canonical institutions as well assei»arat« 
Bulls. ConsalvL further advised tliat time sliould be gained, and that 
firmness should be combined with assurances of goodwill towards the 
person of the King, always well received in France. In a letter, dated 
from Vienna, Consalvi wrote to Pacca that France was really little known 
in Rome. As a proof of it he enclosed the text of new Organic Articles 
far more stringent than those of Napoleon, which Louis XVIII, in the 
month of. August, had proposed to his Cabinet. However, Consalvi 
gave up the Concordat in Its oiiginal form, because Ilome was anxious 
to secure the concessions of the King. Consequently, he proposed altera- 
tions based on the Concordat of 1516, or even an entirely new agreement. 
The question was still under consideration in Rome, when the return 
from Elba postponed all ecclesiastical negotiations until 1816. 





1814-5] 



Great Britain, — Ireland. — Russia 



141 



After the Congress at Vienna, Consalvi, on his return to lionie, was 
again the official head of the fJovernment. hut while at Vienna, and 
later duiiag the negutiatiouti with Eugland, his liberty of action had 
been checked by contrary influences. lie had only spent twenty -pix days 
in I^ndon. They sufficed to enlist all his syni]iathie8 for Etigland, wliere 
the friendly attitude of Pius VII since 1800 had «ot been forgotten. 
I [I Vienna the Knglish had fought for tlie interests of the Papacy. Since 
the dAvs of Pitt the great probli^iii uC Catholic Emancipation occupied 
the minds of politicians. Lord Castlereagh entered into a close friend- 
ship with Consalvi. lie still hoped to bring about an undemtanding 
with Kume on the Unes of the Hill which had been thrown out iti 
1813. The conditions of that Hill, described in a later chapter, were 
submitted to Quarantotti, the Vice- Prefect of the Propaganda. With 
certain limitations he accepted them in February, 1814. 

But the influence of O'Connell was now in the ascendant. The Irish 
fejecte*! all iuterference in their religious concerns on the part of a 
Protestant King. They declared Quarantotti's rescript to be nothing 
else than the vitjlatiuu of the Irish Church discii)liue concerning the 
election of llishops. In vain Consalvi warned the Curia not to sacrifice 
Emancipation, which was already anything but popular in England, to 
tbe obstinacy of the Irish. The Pope was himself desirous that tlie 
Iriflb Bishops should be brought to make concesaions. Nevertheless, the 
Poj>e did not x>ersuade the Irish to concede anything on the questions 
itisaue. 

Consalvi's next task, in 1815, concerned Russia. It had been pro- 
pDied to appoint a Metropolitan at Vilna. The Congregation in Rome 
refused to acquiesce, because the powers with whichhe was to be endowed 
would have reduced the Pope to a flgurc-hcad. When, at the same time, 
all other concessions were refused Consalvi intervened. He needed the 
goodwill of the Emperor Alexander in temporal matters, and won his 
ftTour by conceding him the right to propose candidates for sees. It 
WW done, not in so many woixls, but virtually, by the support given by 
the Pope to tlie candidates of the schismatic sovereign, notwithstanding 
llut de Maistre. in 1816, and Consalvi, so late as 1823, suspected the 
Archbishop of Mohileff of schismatic leanings. The Polish Constitution 
of 1815 placed the Catholic Church under Imperial patixinage. The 
hierarchy was to be endowed with inalienable landed property and tlie 
Bishops luu] seats in the Royal Senate. 

Among the Catholic States Sjiaiii gave the example of fierce 
roKtioQ. The Nuncio Gravina exercised a fateful influence over Kerdi- 
ttod VII, the worst sovereign restored to power on the fall of Napoleon. 
Ills Government identified itself with the Inquisition, and with the 
eoforcement of orthodoxy. The Jesuits re-entered Spain, and the 
nUgioiu Orders again took possession of their convents. All who had 
liought ecclesiastical property were compelled to make full restitution 



k 




Thm detBT «< 

«jth the «U8fw 
tb Ctwb. Tfce Sftmtk 
ia» of Uie lacrafehjr. TW 
odwr liHid. tiUj radved UmM, aakw dbe 



7W*nrji5 [tSiS-T 



dm Ind 




eerteriafltigj 

■i OeMnlvi, on the 
Sciteww pet- 
peri^ I& 
Apffl. I^n. fovr BalU wtn witBm^j psUidbed, wiwiwtiing the 
ttiormiaig Mixxutcr Gsny to do ao. Mofowf aa aCor w«s made of ao 
Mtttordijaftfy wwlwiMtiiwI aontrihntioa of tUrty iwillinnH for the next 
lis yaMi, ttivJ tlw hk ol i inlaw otber aniifMiatiral wf aaue a far State 
parptmm. OnruawMnea Jl edrKad aoecea do dhyGMMtiniaauaseoaible 
Buui« wbo plaiolj slMMred tiu iotentioa ol (fiseoanleBaiieu^ leactioo. 
It iria, bowerer, impoimhie either then or later to liraak down the 
fanatinU aad nltimatelj naeleas reaistaaee of the clergr. It arms not ttie 
faoU of CiMualvi that it raiMd a stonn of anu-cl«ncal pasaioo which 
■wept over Catholic Spain, resalting in fierce riois, ciril wars, and 
revfrfuttorM ruinous to the country and the ilynastv. 

Among the Italian Princes the pious Victor Eokanoel, King of 
Kanltnia, [lait] boonge to tba I'ope. lie besought the Koiaan authoritiM 
to ease bia conacienoe by a special brief confirming the secnl^irtsniioos 
of omiTants and (^horcfa property, which had occnrred during the 
rovnlutionary period. The indiiltii by which the Oown luul held the 
righl uf nominating the liiiibops were not ratified; bat ihe same righta 
were granted by a new Bnll. In return, the King was to restore the 
e«elesiaaliea.1 juriKilirlinn and the convents. Further he was to make 
impnrUtnt financiul concesbiuns and prohibit the tcuohiug of Gailicaa 
dtwtrinea. Oo these bases a Concordat was aftenrards signed by Leo XII. 
Meanwhile a new spirit awoke in Piedmont. A memorandum of Lhe 
I'nisidonl of Lhe Sun:ite declared tluit the aspirationfl of Home were a 
danger to the State. The apjwiutnient of a Nuncio at Turin wirt 
refoaod. In 181(i Consalvi complained of arbitrary appointments to 
Chapters and bcncAoes, notwithstAuding all the oonoessions which lud 
been gmnte<]. So early as 1815 the fultire leaderof lhe Catholic reaction, 
Count Joseph de Maigtra. Minister to the Court of St Petersburg, ad vise^^ 
the King to put himself at the head of the Italians. Ho warned him tdH 
olwiorve the spirit born of the Revolution and to appoint men who repre- 
sunti'd it t(i (KiKtrt in the Civil Service and oven to positions at Court. 
He advocated the man-iage of the heir to the throne with a Russian 
PrinwAH, 80 as to escape from dependence on Austria, llis advice wa^H 
unhetMhid, and (^hiiilea Alliurt w«t»e<i a bride in Florence. ^ 

In 'IHisoany, though in a somewhat milder fonn, the old administra- 
tion revived, which in 178ti had produced friction between the Curia 
and tho Grand Duke, afterwartls the Emperor Leopold. His adviser, 
Soli^one lUcci, Bishop of Prato and Pistoia, had, on the ere of the 




Revolution, made a fruitless attempt to reform the Church on Jansenist 
priuciptes. The scheme faileJ, but the tniUition survived. The clergy 
remained subject in all temporal matters to the jurisdiction of the StiiUj, 
whicli rocalledthe Orders but continued to superintend the manngoment 
of their projwrty. 

Since the days of Pius VI i-elations with Naples had been strained. 
The King refused to send the customary tribute to St Peter, on the 
plea that all feudal dues had ceaaed to exist. The Pope retaliated 
by threatening him with the wrath of God ; he refused confirmation 
to 86 out of 130 Bishops in the Two Sicilies when the King showed 
His intention of carrying on tlio strife. A ('oneordat Imcanie an 
tnperative necessity, and was concluded in 1818, thanks to a personal 
voders tanding between the Minister Medici and Consulvi, at Terraciua. 
It was entirety in the interest of the Curia. The King presented 
the candidates for tlie 85 bishoprics. The Pope examined liis selec- 
tions and moreover exeroised a considerable influence in the appoint- 
ments to minor posts. Intercourse with Rome was freed from all 
enn'^traint, and the spiritual jurisdiction of the King was cnnsi(h;r,ibly 
limited. The ecclesiastical fJnurts resumed their sittings, anri the cou- 
Tenta, in so far as endowments were still available, were restored. 
&lucation was nnder the control of the llishops. They could call upon 
the Government to interfere with t!ie dissemination of peruiuioua books, 
fieolestastical property that had not been sold was restored to the 
Church, which had the right of adding to its possessions. The Pope was 
to receive 12.000 ducats a year out of the income of the bishoprics; and 
the clergy were promised a compensation for the loss of exoinption from 
tuation. The skill of Consalvi was met halfway by the King's g-reat 
dvire to use the Church as a support of absolutism. Many of the 
fllkoses favourable to Rome were, Iiowever, restrioled in the following 
»nirs; and the apostolic Legation of the King, which gave him certain 
direct jiowers over the Church, was maintained in Sicily in eoutraventinn 
of an article of the Concordat. 

In France, in the autumn of 1815, after Richelieu had become 
Chief Mini9t<T, Hhmas, the confidant of tho King, carried to Rome 
proposals for a fresh Concordat. Even when toned down and in their 
oldiBale foi-m, they involved most far-reaching concessions. The Pope 
WW not pressed for any retractation concerning 1801, but was simply 
M^ed to re-establish the Concordat of 1516, whereby Leo X had, iu 
ntimi for oonsidoruble material benefits, transfened to the C^wn 
the right of ecclesiastical appointment which bad belonged to the 
Cti^iters. Louis XVI II offered in return to abolish the Organic 
Articles appended to tlio Concordat of 180t, in so far au tliey were 
in voDtradiotion with Canon Law and the doctrioe of tho Church. 
H« further intended to establish a large number of new bishoprics 
v>d to endow them accoi*dingly, either with State securities or 



144 



Settlement with Frame. — Austria 



[18HVS 




settlemeDto on landed property. In ui^ut cases the Pope and the 
Kiug should be empowered to depose or transfer UUhopa without tlioir 
consent. Furtlier concessions wore promised. In June, 1817, Piaa VII 
sigtied the Concordat, which met nearly all hia wifthes. Ho pro- 
inulgateil it to the Chriatian world, and in July issued Bulls fixing 
the areas of the new sees. But the renewal of his protest with re^rJ 
to Avignon and the Venaisslo gave rise to an exceedingly hitter 
feeling in France ; and the fact that this Concordat, involving as it 
did changes in internal administration, required the approval of the 
Chainbora, had heeti igaoted in Itumo and overlooked in Parij*. It met 
there with a lieree opposition, baokud by public opinion. Bishops who 
saw their sees menaced appealed to Galilean liberties, and the new 
delimitation of the dioceses was rejected. The Liberals raised a cry 
againiit a return to the Middle Ages, against an attack on religious 
liberty, and against tampering with the Charter. Riclielieu was forced 
to abandon the Concoi-dat in the shape approved of by the King. Tbe^ 
new scheme contained alterations which Rome deemed inacceptable.fl 
Consalvi complained, not without cause, that the French Government 
had not kept faith. It Imd forced tlie Pope, much against his wilU 
to cancel the Concordat of 1801, and it now rejected a new treaty. 
But it was entirely owing to the moderation of Consalvi that the 
French episcopate consented to a peaceful arrangeraent with Home. 
The Pope was brought to accept as sole compensation the gradual 
increase in the number of bishoprics, to be carried into effect in 
accordance with constitutional forma. In August, 1819, this temporary 
confirmation of the Concordat of 1801 became definite. 

The momentous episode led to fresh complications. Mettemioh was 
greatly displeased by the far-going concessions of the Catholic Powers 
to the Curia. In the Austrian hereditary States the ecclesiastical 
legislation of the latter days c>f Maria Teresa and Joseph II had been 
in practice softened, but it wiis still in force. Fmncis I tolerated no op- 
position to it and ruled his Italian kingdom in the same spirit. Ho found 
the Napoleonic Concordat of 1803 still in force in Lomhardyand upheld 
it in 8]»ile of the disapproval of Rome. In Venetian territory, where 
Canon Law liad boon adopted after tlie fall of the Republic, be met will 
opposition from the clergy, who considered the Austrian laws, especiidl^ 
those relating to marriage, an encroachment on ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
Nevertheless they were uiiheltl. The Pope elected an administrator 
for the vacant Patriarchate of Venice, and Consalvi warmly supported 
him. In 1816, however, the Kmperor installed a ricar of his own 
choice. He insisted on the Plaeetum regmm, i.e. the necessity of royal 
sanction for the publication of i'apal or Ecclesiastical decrees, and declared 
that Bishops in his dominions wei-e not hound to visit Rome, either for 
examination or for consecration. The Jesuits and other Orders were not 
recalled. Thecatechism was taaght only in the churches; the schools werft 



conti'oUed by the State. CoDsalvi hud hoped to conclude a Concordat 
with xVustria; hut be had nu cUauce o( success. The Emperor was devout 
and a sinoei'e believer, but immovable in ecclesiastical matters, lu 1816 
Mett«rnich was instructed to claim from Konie for the Austrian Crown 
the right to nominate to all the episcopal sees and high ecclesiiistical 
posts in the Venetian territory and in Hagnsa, as well as tosiibiliviJe the 
dioceses in Lomljardy, in Venice, Tyrol, and the Vorarlberg. Metternlcb 
constantly represented to Home that he was unable to contend against 
the Febronian principles largely held by the Austrian bureaucriicy and 
even by the clei^y. But he was himself so far from holding tho ultra- 
montane views of his latter years that tho pretensions of the Curia had 
no more decided opponent. In 1817 he went to Italy, and Consulvi 
anxiously expected him in Rome. Jletternich did not come. "The 
extraotflinary compliance which Franco had shown in sottling the 
Concordat" induced him, on the contiary, to break off all official corre- 
spondence with Consalvi. He wrote to the Emperor Francis, explaining 
how he intended to prufit by the " consternation " cansed by his not 
appearinjj at the Papal Court to obtuin by means of a private and 
coufidoutial correspondence all the concessions claimed by his sovereign. 
I In 1810, after thus preparing the ground, he accompanied Francis 
'to Komo. IMus V!I avoided all point^ of controversy, and expressed 
such moderate and reasonable opinions that the Kmperur wished ho had 
a Bishop liko the Pope to oppose the exorbitant pretensions of tho 
Curia. Mettemich came to the desired nnders tan ding with Consalvi. 

Already in 1815 ecclesiastical affairs in Germany had occupied the 
attention of the Congress at Vienna. Mettcrnich had forced Consulvi 
to promise not to enter upon private negotiations with German I'rinces 
vitbout hia consent. He himself wanted a German Concordat to be 
concluded at the liundeataff at Frankfort. Ilia confidant was his 
cousin Henry von Wessenberg, the friend and Coadjutor of Dalberg, 
the Prince Primate. Through Wessenberg he bojjed to induce Germany 
to accept principles " which are really ours, without our seeming to 
ifflpoee them." What Mettemich, Dalberg, Wessenberg, and their fol- 
loweis strove for was a German national Church, according to the doctrine 
of FehroMut, of the GalHcans, the Emperor Joseph, and the resolutions 
of Ems. 

It was found impossible in Vienna to recast the ecclesiiistical 
orgaoisatioQ of Germany. Consalvi demanded in vain the restoration 
of the Holy Roman Empire, the reinstatoroeut of the ecclesiastical 
•leotorates, and tho restitution of Church property. When his demands 
remained unlieeded, he entered a l^apal protest. Equally little was 
obtained at Frankfort. Dalberg died in 1817. His (still uncontiroied) 
Coadjutor at Constance, Wessenhei-g, was summoned to Homo to answer 
for his conduct regarding ecclesiastical reforms. He was called upon 
to retract ; and, notwithstanding the intercession of tho Grand Duke of 



r. M. n. T. 



10 



tin 



Bavarian Omcordai 



[1 a 14-7 




I 



Hit*lHii ntitt IiIh MilftoUan by bis clergy, he was not made a BUhop, bat. 
WW )hit (•tin) i-niy. )hn dioowe wu auitpreswd. From that tirae Wemenberg 
tsiMtRiul III (iliiy K i>»rl in eocloeiflstitial politicG. Ilia disgrace ia Rome 
MtlMOit ihp plud of a German Concordat to be abandoned. Mt^tternich 
4^tMt iuit|i(M(iil iiH It pm^iblGi compromiRe that fteparat« Concorrtati« should 
\iHi iitii\tM lip oil a common basis, as no single I'rince would be so Uind 
A* ut iiiitki) gfoHUir iioiicortaiuns to the Curia than the other (renuui 

tUvartn wu the firat to demand her own separate Qattonai Church. 
HtM\v iIm* iliiwiilntioii of tlio Kmpire the Havarian territonal alterations 
tiiSU till* von«o<|Ut'iil new snUiivision of hislioprics had necessitated an 
St mio ml find 1 11); « ii li Uonie. Tht* Attempt, however, had repeatedly failed. A 
^^^||)l lt't'.'4 until 1)10 U^inning of the nineteentii century Bavaria hod ^ 
U-'vw Rlcadilx rt'rtotii^nrtry in domestic affairs, though predisposed to a State 
1 1m»vh. 'i\\v nuwt inii^wtant puH-ly Herman Catholic State passed as 
\vA\\a %\w i»»4\M»)ilu^Ul of Ibo Counter-reformation. It was transformed 
tn iJlo vUm^ »>( N«p.d<^m by a foreigner of great abilities, the Savoyard 
C ^' *wl)j»dM. Thin Voltairian stateRman secularised and refonsed 

», s*Vv \h»\ *w lost Tyr«l. At the Congress of Vienna Bavam 

\tkJ( %Vii,s'^'t^i\\\h UU^ureii for the exclusion of ecclesiastical affairs from 1 
IW vs^^i' 'f tbe Diet. Mnnlgelaa wanted a Bavarian Concordat 

y^^H »Sv , ^ after the Napoleonio oxnmple, hut he overrated the 

^> 

^^V . - « 

*M(1^»M\ 'i' *il Hiivnriii'" ri'oIi»i<itt>«tioi\l rt<torm!;. viz., the equal treatmenrt 
yA l'*luiWhp». seiMiliu- control of At lu'«tls, and recognition of mixed 
Wrtt+lWit' Tb« CVfiwn IMnpp, Marahid Wrede, the King's daughter, 
tVn'lIln' Augusta, who wiw a triond of the Jcsiuits and was now marrwd 
til tlii< r.mpiTor Kmncts. Mptlprnl»'h, and nil Churth influences, combioed 
ntfi%ln*( Miintgehis: nnd in Kebruary. 1817, he was suddenly dismissed. 
It ivniaincil all impoiluut for the Curia to inllnence the attitude of the 
titiiiiiiin Protestant riinetv* by exacting from Bavana the greatest poasi- 
blii tMiitociwions. Ilie ph\n sncoociU-d, owing not a little to llie mismaa- 
(iffiuiu'nt of Haffelin, the Bavarian Minister in Rome. lliifiFelin was a 
prliMt, who had formerly belonged to the freethinking lUuminati, and vas 
iinw rrciitcd a Cardiual in recqgnitinn of his aoeomtDodating conduct. 
The Zftamti of the Otf ^ tf ni t m i^yii 4ifari MtUtiaatici tnmvd the 
Bavarian Concordat on the principle that not tlte ecclesiastical laws ol 
(he conntrr but Canon Law alone should obuin in Bavaria. In return 
for the grant of two arcbbbbopric* aod six Ksboprics to be filled by the 
Xing^i nomination, Bavatw eoooedcd the rigbt of the Bishops to soperrise 
seboob and Borab and to deiaand from the State the suppression of 
penucious books; new monasteries nugfat be founded and Canon Law 
was to take precedence of Bnarian State Law. It m Ibe moMoomplelB 



^^H »Sv , ^ after the Napoleonio oxnmple, but he overrated the 

I. ,s' »\f Ihtpal poworAnd wnH blind t«^ the reviving Ultramontane J 

1^, . \j;; Ml the Catholic worlil. Wlinn, in 1814, he resumed negotiati o^J 
isv * ^^«V1'^^n^at, Pius VII rt'pltpd to his overtures by demanding ^^H 




1S1I 



Difficulties itnlh Bavaria. ~ Prussia 



147 



submiasion made by a modern State. At the same time tlie Curia 
reoeivetl the jtromise tbat the ('cnicordat sliouUl become part of the 
GouKtilutiou o£ ihe kiugdora. This was settled iu 1817, consequently 
before the KreDcb Concordat was, against the wish of the Pope, brought 
before the French Chambens and rejected. 

The Bavarian Constitution established equality for the three reli- 
gious denominations, religioun freedom aud liberty of conscience, State 
control over education and over the admiaist ration of Church property, 
taxation of all citizens. All these provisions were contrary to Canon 
lt&\\\ but they already existed in the religious edict of 1800. In 1818, 
the Constitution and the Concordat were simultaneously promulgated. 
The treaty with Rome excited much indignation, and the Kiiig himself 
repented of his concessions. As yet the Fope had uot conttrmcd the 
episcopal ap[^iotments, which the King had made only on the strength 
of a papal indult, which granted him that right for ever. Rumour 
Bpoke already of a achism. becauac Catholics were forbidden by the I'ope 
to take the unconditional oath to the Constitution. In these circum- 
stances Consalvi re-inmcd tlie direction of the difHeult negotiations. 
lie saved the chief clauses of the Concordat by obtaining a statement 
from tlie Kiug, to the effect tliat the Constitutional oath referred only 
to civil life, not to Divine laws or Catholic doctrine- Rut an edict was 
promulgated which " interpreted " the Conconlat by repudiating its in- 
tentioDS and reaSirming the previuUH conditions of ecclesiastical affairs. 
The antagonism between spiritual and secular authority remained latent 
for the moment. The Concordat, still in force in Bavaria, secures for 
the Church her independence and provides for public worehip and the 
laaintenauce of the clergy at the expense of the State. The Jesuits are 
excluded from the country. 

I'ruFtsia, Hke the whole of I^rotestant Germany, had been regarded 

siocd the I'eace of Westphalia as a mission couutry. The chiefs of the 

mission wore the BishopH, and, in cAse of the complete secularisation 

of a bishopric, it was governed by an apostolic vicar. Prussia was not 

foffoed to regulate the ecclesiastical conditions of her Catholic subjects 

aniil she bad absorbed tlie ecclesiastical Statc^j on the Rhine and in 

Westphalia. The Catliolica complained that for twenty-five years the 

western bishoprics had been left vacant, that the episcopate had nearly 

died out, tbat the Catholic Churcli in the Prussian Stnto had (won 

oonpletely wi-eched by the courae of political events, so that, with the 

exception of the faith itself, everything had to lie entirely reconstructed. 

U wss fortunate that the great historian Niebuhr was appointed Prua- 

>iu Slinister to the Holy See. Niebuhr cccuf>ied a singular positiou. 

We was a sincere Christian, inclined towards mysticism. In the 

Citholic Church, as he understood it, the Temporal Power was doomed. 

But his Conservative oroi^d taught him to respect what existed. He 

*spected from Governments civil reforms; ha held that the State 




liK ////)*</<*!• Th^ ^irtti^ ir r^f CpptfT JSOoe nsiBsa 

%i^f,A ^»v* 'If^. '' rinn^h n rn^-^^rtnm. voA kumiii 3ok JKanpt aecien- 
Ac'i-' 4» ,*Af<%r.tM. H«^ iiinr*«t !^>>min^, * -via iud ^xni^^id. fai» 'fi^oK aC 
>K»///'/!*»v^ 4n(f !-!» lo'nqn. ' H** i.ifrv "due "iu maniiifc m liJmaig tdia 

-ww.rt *nii><t *h<> *v^^>**''rtV ^f "''*t7 ^**''' Canhiiiici ind b» looiffifi t^on 
iri-^h ,rt4ilT*tivn<^^, v; /.'.v«:>i*t>uir^. On diH S^Iime jod in. Wescpfaalia it 
T»vi,/* -m.y nftrfrt ''.tt.rtrtUfta ■1i«*:T»»ftrAi. yj^hnhc wished far adeq^miie 
;,»V7,«o<vn '->r oa <U;>'yvrt if *:iv? Mftrjj. roc 'l-uoaiiii jchnojfc amymaiBtt, 
%^.r\ ^/tmmnrtvi :'-'»r ':a<> */'tni^Ar<i',n -'»f pr.ri8wt. He liuimeti Oir cfae Bidiopa 
fir.**. ,'.^!*i" "''' v.-.-".-V'MA i,/'^''.i*»flia«r.i.vi.i '^rjnir^. SfJj-.alii dui Bi^ioptt axezciae 
fih.4 .'./Sn ..-. »rt Ajxil,rtn-.'w '>r 'yranniiial aL-tr.ner. ^6m ClmEch. not tfas 
?t*;iiA w,'-...'! (iviTAr vLf-vI m*rr.Ai^ alreaiij f-7cmeii die sobiect of 
t\<'.'M-t: w.-.h fc/.m.>. >I .*^'■.^■p pr'-.ry*>«d thio aiarrlfbe^a becweffli Catholics 
%'!,t,--.,t\ V- ..■■5r;^t .f. ^r.**. ••7^ ^^ *,hi* rjtate. TrhrtrL oonCTaciai acconfin^ to 
'.*!-.'„-, \/\v._ xkA •.f■,a^, M r^tjfar'U dftCiArationa of anUicr and aeparatioa 
'iif.^fi fA V /hf.!*,/-! '■Iftf.ifU. ThiA 'iompromUe proTed i £iilnre. It wu 
'//,ly xh*-:t j-At*. fA ^*l^^>:T <t.r^fft And lon^ n*?^jtiaaoELi tiuu the conTsn- 
\.;uu \*-'t,nf.t:%\ S'tn*,^,^ ^',A th^, diria. ^Iftscribed in i Ucer chapter, wis 
(irri'/'t't Mf.. 'f h^; «:ica;nplA^ of Fr%i:ce and Hararia had be«a sufficient 
Wfirriiri;; a^^airi^t a ^ -orf/irdat.. 'Ih^ election of the Btdhops was left to 
f.(i« f fifijit^tM, who w*:r'! i'.u\f,\j%fA hy Papal brief to propose onlTworthy 
);«irt;o(i4 for ill'; ¥.\u^* a|iproval. The i'ope gratefnllT accepted the 
<ifirlowm'!nU off'TfifJ hy thfi Stat/;, and gave hia consent to the new 
(lioriHiui arruH. I(arflf;iili';r;('fi pr<;!ieiiC''; in Home (1821) settled the re- 
rmiitiiti^ r|inir:iilli<;H with ViwmvA. 

Ihitidviir iniidi: KiaHtiati v\i\\\i\%^ which caused the negotiations fori 
(ioticorditt with ihat. kiii^fdom to U; abandoned. It was only in 1S24| 
iindiT \a\k\ XII, Uiiil ('niiH(ilvi> concfjHsions were reluctantly accepted. 
Thn llatiovoriiiii <lt*Vf!i-nriM!nt tlicruby kept the right of veto on Bishops 
rhnNcn for liiir two OiitlioMc HmiH. 

Conmilvi imd tho I'opo liiid a woroo cxjKsrience in dealing with the 
CnniiiiiNHion of Kmnkroilin tHI'J, which wiw entrusted with the eccleei- 
nNtiriil iilTiiii-H of Iho Hniiilhir (ioi-iiiFtii StiiU^Nof the ecclesiastical province 
of lhi< I'pprr Ithiiii', liciuhid by Hmhiti and Wiirttembeig. It was pro- 
pMHpiI (hut llio piiiiHli priimU aiul HiNliupij sliould present three candi- 
diiii'N for n hJHtiiiprir, nf whom Iho Hovcrci^n should select one. The 
Moii'opoliliin wuN to iu<iM>|t|. him, ill Hpito of Pajml objections^ if such 
\V(«n« roiiHiih'ri'd unfoimdt'd, or if Iho Pope's disapproval was not made 
known wiihin the liiiiilcd \\\\\v. This proposnl wits rejected in Rome as 
(I'l'iMtMirtbUi to iht' rhuivh. Tiio INipo tloi'lini'd to invest Protestant 
I'viiu't'rt with It Kind of piUnmuLTO ovi-r CiithoUo IMiurches which he had 
it'fiiMi'd lo Nitpoh'on. in tht>si< t>iiviinisluiu'os nothing was attained ex- 
oopl \\ fit'Mh diHtnlintioii of tho diotvso^. 'I'ho ttvo new episcopal sees 
wriv only lUlod niuKv l.oo \II. IS'JT-1*. 

\\w ntlbhMi.-o of MvMlornioU. who, ffiMu ISUVWcame in ecclesiastical 



181&-30J 



The Netherlands, — Switzerland 



149 



matters more friendly to the Curia, brought about in Iladen a turn 
of eventa highly favourable to Home ; the Grand Duchy accepted 
conditions similar to those existing in I'russla. The conditions were 
offered as an ultimatum to the other States, and finally accepted. 

Tlirough these four treaties, with Bavaria, Prussiii, Hanover, and the 
ecclesiastical Province of the Upper Rhine, the Catholic Church in Ger- 
many, excluding the mission country administered by the Propaganda, 
waareoiganised and endowed. Conaalvi did not arrive at asimilar result 
either with Switzerland or with the Notliorlands. The I'ope and ttte 
Belgion Bishops in 1815 had condemned the Constitution of the Netlier- 
lands on the ground that liberty of religious worship and of the Press 
TRW not acceptable to Catholics. The Constitution, however, was carried 
against them. The request of the Netherlands, that the Concordat of 
1801 existing in Belgium should be extended to Holland, was refused by 
the Curia in 1818, on the ground that there was no reason to renew such 
concessions. Negotiations which lasted for nine years ended iu 1827 
with the extension of that Concoidiit to the Nellierlands, but exulutUng 
from it the right of the State to select Bishops, which was refused to a 
non-Catl>oltc King. At the same time, a Bull sanctioned a revision of 
diocesan areas. The Government delayed the execution of the Treaty, 
and the Kevolution of IH:^0 rendered it inoperative in Belgium. With 
tlie support of the Belgian Liberal Catholics, who adopted the doctrines of 
Umennais, the Catliolic Church iu Belgium, after 1830, was separated 
fiom the State, but kept its privileges. The Bishops were nominated by 
the Pope and chose their palish priests independently of the Government. 
The negotiations relating to a bishopric of Luzern were wrecked 
lir jealousies in the Swiss Confedenitiun and by the pretensions of 
(^igarcbical magistrates to supervise, not only the administration of 
Church property, but also the education of the clergy in the seminaries, 
^■•lul their correspondence with Rome. The King of Sardinia had to 
^■Mnome conscientious difUculties, before he finally consented to meet 
^Bh vishes of Geneva and to add a few parishes of the bishopric of 
Chanobery, situated in his territtjry, to the bishopric of Freiburg. Every 
Swiia Canton legislated independently, in Church matters as in others. 
1ft these negotiations no hierarchical pretension was in theory sacrificed 
*o the State. The conflicting chums tacitly survived. The Zelantl^ 
l»»ever, brought the serious charge against Consalvi that he was a 
mere opportunist, and had, for the sake of a modut vivendi, not pressed 
nlwina he might have established. The Pope was aged and infirm : the 
nnviction of statesmen, that after him negotiations woulil become still 
Bore diiBculL, facilitated the task of Consalvi ; and even the icactionary 
pontificate of Leo XII was compelled to uphold the policy which he 
W inaugurated. 

The era of the Concordats was also that of the Congresses. The ro- 
ictiooftry Powers succeeded in subduing by militarj' force the revolutiona 



in Sjwin. Portugal, Naples, and Piedmout. The uece&sity, as GonU 
pat it to ChateAubriand, of opposing the ftlliance of European Powers 
to tho pro g r tM of diAoi^nisatioa and to the common danger of 
oomipinciea, ako governed Metteniich*H policy towards Home. The 
poritioo of Cons&lvi never proved more difficult than during the revo- 
lution at NRples. which spread to the Papal endavei, Benevento and 
Pnnte-C-orvo, and threatened the Patrimony itself. The Spanish Consti- 
tution of lfll2 Imd been proclaimetl tn Naples^ and hail found ftupfKirters 
in Ifome, even among the Cardinals. The Sanfedi^U hoped to rid 
themselves by a Coiinter-rerolution of the ^"stem called by them the 
tyranny of Conaalvi- They wished to establish a constitution wliich 
recognised no other denomination than the Koman Catholic religion. 
The elections were to be carried out with religious ceremonies, and 
aecnlar pric«)t8 were to be eligible as deputies. Proclamations and 
posters in thifi ftense were to be seen side by side with manifestos of 
the Carbonari proclaiming death to tlie priestft and calling for a 
republic. Hut the Austrian.-i put the revolution down in a conple of 
weoka. During this crisis, wliich threatened him in a twofold manner, 
Conaalvi showed extraorditiary moderation and presence of mind. 

In the States of the Olmrch the "sects " were so leniently treated 
that even murderers escaped their juat punishment. Consalvi resolutely 
stopped the cruel inquisitorial m:ethods followed by the Cardinals 
San Severino and Ruanoni in the Rnmagna. He informed Prinoe 
Metteniich that order had Ijoen restored in Rome and in tho pro\incoa. 
He asserted, for the Pope, the right of absolute neutrality and did 
his utmost txi prevent tlie Austnans from marching into Papal territttry 
and occupying Ancona; but he miih unsuocessful. At Laibach and 
Verona the Papal Nuncio, Cardinal Spina, upheld this policy of 
non-intervention, to which Consalvi remained faithful, even when in 
Spain and Portugal an anti-Roman movement threatened schism and 
wns supported by part of the clergy. The convents were suppressed ; 
some of the revenues of tlie Curia %vere curtailed and others abolished ; 
the Nu7icio in Madrid received his passports; the Patriarchate in 
Portugal was arbitrarily reduced to Metropolitan rank, and Church 
priijwrty wa4 confiacated. Nevertheless in 1B2.3, after tho French occai>a- 
tion of Spain, the Curia refused to inflict ecclesiastical censures. As in 
1821 with n'gard to Naples, ao now Consalvi unhesitatingly declared 
tbnt ini'ffoeiive threats would compromise the Pope and eveu ex{>oae 
hint tn ridioule. 

I'ntil Uio rising in Naples was put down, Pius VII refrained from 
renewing expressly against the Carhonari his former condemnation of 
tho tVocmaaons. When, at Ti-oppau in 1821, the three Powers, .\u$tria, 
Russia, nnd I^russia, demamtcd of the Italian Courts the gradual intro- 
duction of indispensable reforms, ('onsalvi rejected tliis interference in 
internal affairs of tho States of the Church as incnmp:itiblo with Papal 





indepeiulence. Hid owu position tnwaitlii his opponents would thereby 
liave iMtcume more dliBcult. Hij warued .Mtilternich that, if ihe Popo 
supported, evon indirectly, coiuilitutioiial i'e£orma in the kiri^dom of 
the Two Sicilies, he oould not refuse similar institutions in the States 
of the Church, nor could lio condemn the Spanish ('oustituttun of 1812, 
wbicb admitted no otlioi" than the Catlnilic religion. Rlettenucih's 
proposal for common action againiit the fievolutiou, and especially fur 
tbo etitablitilung' of a central committee to supervise and punish polillcid 
offences in the Italian {^>eaini>ula, wim rejected in 1823 at Verona, in. 
consequence of the combined oppositioa of the Papal and Tusottn 
Governments. 

On August 21, 1823, Coosalvi lost his father, friend, and maatdr, 
Piui} V'll. Although Beriously ill himself, be attended the Pope in bis 
last sickness. After the custoniary prayers by the bedside he could not 
control himself, sank on Wis knees, buret into teai-s and ki&scd the feet 
of the Pontiff. Uowever diffurtrnt the mild Pius VH, so strong in mis- 
fortune and so conciliatory in action, was fi'om his energetic and resolute 
MiniBler, each possessed that constanc}' of purpose, kindni^ss cif liuart, 
and devotion to duty, whiob left on tliis ponti&^ato a mark of g^mudeur, 
sod won for its head the reverence and love of mankind. Consitlvi 
himself died on Jannaiy 24, 1H24. In his will ho desired that all the 
preaentB be bad received should be sold, and the money employed to 
pay for tlie monument of the Pope, in the church of St Peter, on 
which Thorwaltlsen wsis at wurk. Metternich acknowledges that, during 
ttie most trying moments uf their luug relations, Ccusalvi never failed 
ia perfect courtesy, and never betrayed a sign of disappointment, lie 
left this world with tlio sentiments of sincere piety which had domi- 
uat«d his life. 

Pius VII, as well se Coosalvi, was a lover of art. lu the year 1822 
^Braccio Nw>vo of the Vatican Museum %ra8 opened. The excavations 
vere continued without stint. Canova and Thorwaldseu were favourites 
of the Pope. In the old convent of Sau Isidoro, the German school of 
pwoters revived Christian art. Here Overbeck of Liibeck, Pforr of 
Vnitdkfort, Cornelius of Diiaseldorf, Scliadow, Veit, Fiihricb, and others, 
M a mouaatic life, and lived only for art. When the brotherhood 
^perwd, its members canieil their tradition far and wide. Thei-e 
*ii no literary life, but Consalvi never gave up the predilections of his 
Twtb for classical poetry. Amongst the many foreigners who visited 
Rmdc, one of the most distinguished was Klixabeth, 1) o wage r-Duuh ess 
ol Devonshire, a lady of great charm and cultiviition of mind, who 
Wtiae Consalvi's devoted friend and ardent admirer. Iler house was 
^ <%ntre of the world of ai'tists luid men of letters. The Duchess 
"k beloved by the Romans as the benefactress of the poor, and oidy 
wrrived the CaNlinal by two months. 

Auuibale duila Geuga, the new Popo of the Zeianti^ was elected on 



152 



Reaction under Leo XII 



[1823-9 



September 28, 182S, against the will of Austria, and took tbe name o( 
Leo XII. His biographera relate that soon after his election^ b'''*g 
ill at the Quirinal, he sent for tlie dying Consalvi, who, during the 
Conclave, had enei-geiically opposed his candidature. After an inter- 
view of two hom-8 the Pope appointed the Cardinal Prefect of the 
Propaganda, expressing his admiration for his views, and the wish to 
Iwnefit by his advice. For this it was too late. Cardinal della Sc< 
maglia, a man of eighty, who ha<I covete<I power for forty years, was 
made Secretfl.ry of State. The severe, almost monastical system of 
Leo XII destroyed much that Corsalvi had painfully constructed. 

Leo Xll's iirst encyclical repudiated toluralion as indifference, and 
censured the Bible Societies. The secret societies were solemnly con- 
demned in 1826. Cardinal Rivarola, the originator of the reiiction 
of 1H14, and Legate at Haveniia, endeavoured without legal procedure 
and by secret inquisitorial methods to root out the Carhoneria. In 
three months he condemned 508 persons. In seven cases he pronounced 
seinences of death, which however were not carried out. Under the 
*'' Pre-:tHo Politico" 308 persons wero placed under police 8U[)ervision 
and forced to spiritual oI>servance8. In Faenza, where it had come 
to open wtiv between the Sanfedists and the Cnrhonari. Uivarola had 
recourse to llie iduji of arrangirig marriages between hostile families. 
The people humorously called them marriages between cats aud dogs. 
An attempt to assassinate Kivarola, who Hed to (ienoa, caused him to 
he replaced by the prelate Invernizzi at the head of u comniissioo 
which, by a system of paid infonners, filled the prisons. Seven execu- 
tions at Kavenna and two in Rome spread terror amongst the people, 
who, in the first-named city, fled into the country on the day of the 
executions. Inveruizzi now nliiinged his tactics. He promised a pardon 
to members of the "sects," in exchange for a voluntary confession, and 
did not further mnlest the thousands who came pouring in, but left tbem 
exposed to the suspicion and revenge of tbe Saufodistfi. A Spaniard, 
Marco y Catalan, was against ]iis own will appointed Governor of Kome, 
and even regulated worldly <iniusement«, so that, for instance, waltzing 
was forbidden. The persecution of the Jews, who were confined to the 
Ghettos throughout the States of the Church, and ttia restriction pro- 
venting them from buying property, induced all tbe rich Jews to 
emigrate. By mean:) of Motuproprhs of October, 1824, and December, 
1827, Leo XII abolished tbe organisation of his predecessor. The 
Provincial Councils were suppressed. Civil offutnlera were tried by a 
single judge. The episcopal jurisdiction was extended to all cases 
concerning ecclesiastical persons or property, blasphemy, breaches of 
the commandments of the Church, or sins against the seventh Com- 
mandment. A congregation for studies supervised the entire educa- 
tional s-ystem, which was entrusted to a great extent to the Jesuits, 
and paralysed initiative. 





The Pope wished to do everything by himself, and workyd iitces- 
santly. He mistrusted his ofTtcials as a class to such an extent that he 
instituted a Vontfregazione di Vufilama^ which was to watch them and 
to examine the eoniplaints made against them. The effect was to de- 
velop a system of delation. Moreover, notwithstandiug the diminution 
of taxaUon and earnest endeavours of the Pope, the finances, duiing 
this pontiilcate of five yeai's. becatne more and more confused, and 
Consalvi'fi financial successes were undone. The Pope, who lived most 
Iruj^ally himself, lavished money upon public works, especially upon 
churches and convents, and begau the rebuilding of the Hasiliea of 
St Paul without the walls, which was destroyed by five. 

Leo XII was a friend of ecclesiastical reform, and conferred the 

Cardinars hat on the sole represenlative of such views in the lioman 

prelatare of that time. This personage was Giuseppe Antonio Sala, a 

prelate of the Dataiia, who had l;een frequently employed by Pius VII 

and Consah'i in the negotiations with France and Germany. Sala had 

already outlined plans of reform under Pius VI, and at the time of the 

French invasion his diary throws a lurid light on the condition of the 

Roman secular clergy and of the convents. The Kevolution scorned to 

hJD to be a judgment of Heaven. ^* Kire and sword must be applied." he 

ays, ** to purify the clergy ; there is no other hope." But Sala equally 

Wed the Jansenisto, the French, the Concordat of 1801, and regai-tled 

vnty attempt to adapt modern views to the Church as an unmixed 

nkmily. In 1800 at Venice, and again in 1815 in Rome, lie advocated 

Melttiastical reforms in a Roman spirit, by strict adherence to the 

dMTws of Trent. Atthe same time he insisted on the absolute separa- 

^ between the spiritual and the tempoml, terming the latter *' merely 

tccidental and secondary." Sala wished to see the administration of 

IbeStAtea of the Church entrusted nearly exclusively to well-qualified 

hj-mcD. A serious attempt to L'urry out tliese proposals for reform 

w«B never made, but some of the numberless measures adopted by 

Im XII, and also his dislike for the prelature, show how great the 

influence of Sala must in fact have been. 

lo matters of foreign jtolicy the Austrian influence now waned 
More the French. Chateanbriand iKicamo French ambassador in Rome 
in 1828. At the same time the Ministry of Martignac in Paris broke 
•iA the clerical reaction, and the June Ordinances were published, 
»liich placed the small seminaries under the control of the Univereity, 
lintted the number of ecclesiastical students, and prohibited religious 
Oidere not recognised by law, consequently also the Jesuits, from 
t'ltctiing. Leo XII promulgated a Brief approving the Ordinances. 
In ft conversation with Chateaubriand, he reiterated that they did not 
iiijiirc religious interests. He described O'Conneirs attitude as incon- 
*i<i?nte and violent, and denied his assertion that a Concordat with 
togland was pending. Things were not ripe for that. " Jesus Christ," 



he added, " never spoke of the forma of govornmcnt, but simply eujoined 
obediunco to authority." 

With Leo XII, who died, hated by the people, on February lO.ri 
1829, the nttempt Ut force medieval conditions ujion the iStates o(\ 
tlie Chiinjb ilid not end. CaaCiglione, a decrepit old man, wiw elected] 
Fope ou March 31 and took the name of Pius VIII. Chateaubriand, 
who got hold of the diary of a Conclavist, »ays that a letter of th«>] 
Vicar-General of the Jesuits — Vavaiii — which he thus came to know,' 
opened his eyes. ^ 1 had thought Pascal a calumniator, who had be- 
queathed us an everlasting lie. P^iscal did not exaggerate. The letter 
of Pavaiii. worthy of l-Iscobar, deservoH a place in the ProvmmUe9. The 
Society, inspected even by the Sacred College, but recently re-estaUidied 
and luiiversally detested, nevertlieless thinks itself entitled to dispose 
of the tiara and to meddle in everything. Their audacitj'ia great." Cha- ■ 
teaubriand, who left Kome soon after, advised the Conclave to choose a 
Poi>e suitable to the time. In his rcpoi-ts he predicts tlie future unity 
of Italy and scorns the confuiiion of ideas which mistook an irresi&tible 
movement for the machinations of a handful of Jacobins. The primary 
oause of the decline of the Papal G-overnmeiit was its financial conditioa. 
"The taxes," he says, "amount to fifty millions, and hardly leave the 
landowner one per cent, of his Income : the duties bring next to 
nothing; smuggling is universal. The Duke of Modena has erected oq 
his own territory a warehouse for goods subjiict to duty, which after 
nightfall are smuggled into Bolognese tcrritor)-. Italy is ripo for 
revolution." Such were his last words on the eve of the crisis of 1S30. 

Pius VIII and his Secretary of State, Albani, to whom the Pope 
owed his election, only governed for twenty months. Pius YIII got rid 
of the system of spies which his predecessor bad organised, but did not 
prevent Albani, who was anj-thing but esteemed, from strengthening 
the Sanf<Bdists, and continuing irritating political inquiries, thereby 
strengtbt'tiiiig the revolutionary sooietics. KiotA and disorder at Cesena, 
Imola. Bologna, preceded the storm of 1830 in the litates of the Church. 
Pius VIII lived to see Catholic Emancipation in England, and did not ■ 
hesitate to recognise the July Alouarchy. He died ou November 30, 
1H30, with a last useless apjieal for peace in Italy. While the Conclave 
was sitting for the election of his succeasor, tlui Iloman police frustrated 
a plot headed by the brothers Bonaparte. With the assistance of di;*- 
eontented nflicers^ thoy had intended to raise the cry of " Italy, Rome, 
Liberty,'' and revolutionise the Eternal City. The Bonapartos lied. 
On February 2. 1831, Mauro t'apellari, a monk and a theologian, was 
elected, and took the name of Gregory XVI. He came from Belluno ia ■ 
the Venetian territory.and was the author of wriUng3 defending the Papal 
sovereignty and infallitiility as well as the monarchical constitution of 
the Church. As Ins Secretary of State he appointed Bemetti, who had 
already filled that post for a short time under Leo XJI. 



1-2] 



Rising in the Papal States 



155 




On February 4 the Ruvolutiou brake out in Bolugna, spreading over 
the Homagna, the Marches, and even over t'mbria. Papal soldiei-s pa^ssed 
over to the enemy. Hii-eci mercenaries perpetrated all kind^ of cruelty 
in Bimiiii. Kaveiina, Foili, and Ceseiui- Tlie Le;,''atu fled fiom Bologna, 
where tlie Italian tricolour was hoisted, and a provisional Goveniinent 
appointed. The representative of the Pope, Cardinal Bcnvoauti, was 
t&ken prisoner. Within a fortnight four-fifths of the States of the 
Church had fallen away, and the National Congress at Hologua openly 
proclaimed the object of the movemotit to be the unity of Itiily. I'hey 
counted upon the support of France, which, however, failed completely, 
Louis-Philippe ha\*ing bound himself to the principle of uon-intervontioit. 
Gregory X.VI demanded help from Austria, which had just suppressed the 
revolution in Parma and Modena. The Austrian troops entered Bologna 
oa March 21, and ten days aftern'ards the rising was suppressed. 

Consalvi had consistently rejected the interference of foreign Powers 
the duuiestic affairs of the Puixil Slates. Gregory XVI had himself 
led for foreign aid and was thus no longer able to make good any 
ilar claim to independence. A memorandum which was drawn up in 
Rome in 1831 by the ambassudoi-s of France, Austria, Russia. Prussia, 
jointly with the representative of England iu Florence, demanded an 
extended amnesty, laymen in the civil service^ the ostablishiiieut of 
nozucipal and provincial Councils elected by the people, the institution 
of a Council of State, and of a Consiilta for the Finances, composed of 
laymen. This was a si'quel l« thy Motuprvprio of 181G, and equally 
doomed to failure. Ueraetti bad to pretend to accept these proposals. 
With the exception of tliirty-eight cases he conceded the amnesty; 
and on July 5 a Motuproprio of the Pope granted a provincial ajid 
mwiieijial iieprosentfttion which the Powers considered to be sufficient. 
The restrictions of 1810 were adhered to. Tho Government named the 
Councillors, Home and the neighbourhood being excluded. Improve- 
nwnts were made in the administration of justice. In the provinces the 
Courts were composed of laymen. Courts of Appeal were instituted, and 
Xhe monstrous Uditore Santittimo was abolished. The Legates were 
^ to be ecclesiastics, but their ofHcials were to be laymen, that is to 
^lay, members of the prelature. However, provincial protests showed 
^^HMithese reforms remained a dead letter. But tho representative of 
^Rtogland alone realised the danger, and predicted trouble. 
^P The situations in the legations very soon led to anarchy. With the 
ttMption of Comacchio and Ferraiu. the Austrians had evacuated the 
P«I«d territory in July, ISJU. bnt in January, 1832, they were recalled 
<7tlie Legate-Cardinal Albaiii. Thereupon Cii»iniir Pcricr, the energetic 
Minister of Louis-Philippe, issued a proclamation to the inhabitants of 
ti* rebellious little seaport of Anconji, whither he sent a Frenoli fleet, 
^nuioe, he said, had come to support the cause of the people against 
<^l»tiaiu, and to resist the encroachments of Austria. With the 



156 



Austrian and French intervention 



[1832-45 



I 



support of the Liberal Government in England, against the will of 
the Continental Powers, French troops landed in Ancona, where they 
remained till 1838. Mett«rnicb termed this intervention a violation of fl 
internatiniial law. Lord Palinfnstun defended it, and, finally, the Papal 
Goveriiiticnt itsulf had to submit. The assassination of the Pa{>al 
Governor of Ancona, the rallying-place of the Liberals, induced 
Gregory XVI to put the town under an interdict; and tho attitude 
of France cliaiig«d after Pener's death, on Miiy 16. The French troops 
drove the LiberaU out of the city and helped to restore the Papid 
authorities. Hernetti, supported by Metteruich, refused all further 
reforms with the explanation that they could only be granted by a 
Governruent which was perfectly free. For his defence the Pope counted 
en Ilia 5000 mercenaries, mostly Swiss, and on the voluntary militia 
which, under the name of Centurions, were employed by Bernetti in the 
Romagna in preference to regular troojjs. These dreaded forces of the 
Sunfedists, which noniinullyoost nothing, were maintained at the expense 
of the Liberals, and exercised a reign of terror which d'Azeglio has called 
a disgrace to mankind mid to religion. In the exceptional tribunals, 
wliich had been constituted, the same persona acttrd as accusers and 
judges. The proceedings were secret. Kepres.sion waa the policy of the 
Government and became more accentuated when Gregorj'XVI dismissed 
Bernetd in 1836 and appointed the Genoese, Lanibruschiui, Secretary 
of State. Even the Pope had to bow to tha despotic will of the new 
Miui»ter. 

Mattera were so far settled that at the terrainatiou of the Austrian 
occupation in 1888 the Papal administration was restored in the Lega- 
tions under the rule of Cardinal-Legates, who, like Amat and Grimaldl 
at Ravenna and ForU, did their utmost to lighten tho burden of tlie 
system. One rising, at V'iterbo, was suppressed with inexni-able severity 
by the Delegate Antonelli, the future Secretary of State of Pius IX. 
The apparent restoration of order, which enabled the Pope to travel 
through the Marches, proved delusive. In 1848 bodies of freebooters 
gathered in the Uomagna. Mastai, IMshop of Imola, and two Cardinals, 
who happened to be with him, were very nearly taken prisoners by 
Rilmtti, a leader of these l)ands. Hibotti escaped. The severe Legate 
Spinola was superseded by the still sterner Cardinal Vannicelli. In 
May, 1844, seven sentences of death were carried out ; and his rule was 
so inflexible that the ('ardinal-Logates Amat in Ravenna and Gizzi 
in Forli helped the victims of his Courts-martial to fly, and pi-otesied 
against proceedings which could have no effect in pacifying the country. 
The insurgents addressed from Rimini in 1845 an appeal to the Pajml 
Government, praying once more in moderate language for the redress 
of grievances impossible to bear. They demanded a general amnesty 
and a new civil and penal code, abolition of confiscation of landed 
property and of sentence of death fur crimes of treason, emancipation of 



I 



I 



laymen from ecclesiastical jurisdiction and f rum the luquiiiition in raattera 
of faith ; the trial of political offences by ordinary Courts; election for 
municipal Councils subject to the ratification of the Pope. The muni- 
cipal Councils were to propose candidates for the provincial Councils ; 
these in their turn to nominate for the Council of State. But the three 
Aasemblies were to have merely consultative functiona. The petitioners 
further demanded the right of financial control, and admission to the 
civil service for laymen who did not belong to the prelature. Public 
education, with the exception of reliji^ious instructiou, was to be removed 
from the control of the Bishops atid olei-gy; the Preventive Censure on 
puldications was not to Jbe abolished, only restricted. Foreign troops 
were to be disbnnded, and a national guard forme<l. Iteforms, such as 
Uie experience of well i-egulaled States might show to be beneficial and 
adapted to the spirit of the agc< should be gradually introduced. 

The document was drawn up by Karini, who became afterwards the 
Minister of Plus IX. On many points it was in harmony with the 
Uotuproprio of 1816 and the reform projects of 1831. This statement 
of claims gives a truer picture than any olaborato description of the 
condition of the Papal States under Gregory XVI. But we miiy add 
that in 1840, the year of the Pope's death, the annual deficit amounted 
to 900.000 «ntM. The National Debt had risen by 20,000,000. The 
"Prutestof Himini " against the blind fanatical party which had cap- 
tured the Po^je was addressed in the name of the Roman population 
to the Princes and the people of Europe, and Wiis read all over Italy. 
L&mbruschini, who once more suceoeded in suppressing the rising, 
Claimed in a special pamphlet the intention of yielding in any way to 
the Revolution. The secular GoTemraeotremained unchanged, committed 
t04 policy of repression, filling the prisons, setting np permanent Court«- 
ouirUal, aud, in the last resort, counting upon the support of Austria. 



The spiritual authority of the Pontiff, however, had in this period 
to deal with questions in comparison with which the interests of the 
tluMtened Temporal Power appeared comparatively unimportant. In 
tlw early twenties of the nineteenth century religious views within tho 
Citholic Church took a turn which produced modem Ul tram on tan ism. 
"Hie new tendencies stood in direct contradiction to those of the 
intb oenttiry, to the Jansenist movement and the Fcbronian ideas 
succeeded it. 
Since the rule of Fleury, Jansenism was dead in France. Individual 
snista survived for a long time in private life, under the sting of 
ion, in several bishoprics and universities. In Luuvain, whence 
senism had stirteil, Quesnel was supported. Van Espen taught there, 
jJnd his disciple. Nicolas von Honthcira, wrote under the name of 
ythroniu*. Ilontheim, who was CJoadjutor of Trier, and an excellent 
■nnn, endeavoured, under the influence of Galilean doctrines, to create a 



Germiin national eccleaiaatical law. He staned, in hU work, Ht statu 
e<'ctc9i'te ft ih le<jitima potentate Romani ponttiieta (1763 ), from the a^sum}*- 
tiou that I'upiil authority, chielly owing to the forged Decretals, had 
exceeded its original Hmiu, had b«en changed into monarchical rule, and 
ahodM l>e restored to its original pasition as it eicisted in the eight first 
centuries of the Church. The Papal monarchy nhould be replaced by 
an episcopal govomraent. The Pope was to keep the first place among 
Bishops ; his Primacy was to be maintained for the preservation of tho 
unity of the Church. But Christ was the sole Monarch of the Church, 
guiding her through the Holy Ghrist, saving hur from errur. The in- 
fallibility of the Church was, however, not ^n.ii\falii^ilit<u revetationi$^ 
but tHreetionu; and, on this bafiis, an understanding between Catholics 
and Protestants, Hontheini's chief object, could be arrived at. For this 
pmctical end he recommended the instiniction of the people, the convo- 
cation of a National Council, the intro<hietion of National Synods. An 
assembly of Catholic Princes and Bishops of Gernmny should be called 
together and a Statute finally limiting the power of the Primacy should 
be issued. The phcetum retjium and the appellatio ah ahu«u were to be ^ 
the legal barriers erected against the encroaolimenta of the Curia. " 

Febronim was read in all Catholic countries, attacked and defended, 
and finally condemned by Clement XITI in 1764. The author retracted 
in 1778, at the imperious demand of Pius VI. The retractation was 
ambiguous; but Hootheim diod in 1790, at peace with Rome. He had 
lived to see the four ATchbisho[>sof Trier, Mainz, Cologne, and Salzburg 
draw up at the Congress of Ems, in 1786. 28 articles which, in ft 
Kebroninn spirit, regulated and partly trausfonned the position of the 
German Metropolitan Chnmhea towards Rome. Should the Pope not 
accept the " PunctatJons of Ems " within two years, a German National 
Council W!W to lie summoned, so as to assure their application. 

Joseph II, who himself desired tho establishment of a national 
Church placing the episcopate and the clergy under the tutelage of thflfl 
Stat*, when called nijon by the four German Archbwhopa to carry out the 
resolutioiisuf Ems, expressed his entire agreement, on condition, however, 
that tho Bishops should previously be brought to concur. This was 
never accomplished. The subjentlon to P.apal control was in reality * 
guarantee of independence for these Bishoixi and for the high eccleaiastical 
dignitaries in the Kmpire. They were afraid of losing it, shouM they 
be submitted to the strict rule of tlio Ntetropolitan authorities or to 
that of tho State, as was the case in Austria. Their opposition, and the 
doubtful attitude of the Electors of Mainz and Trier, who negotiatpd 
privately with the Curia, shattered the plan for the organisation of tho 
German Church even before tho death of Joseph 11. On the eve of the 
Revolution, a reform introduced by ecclesiajitioal Princes who ruled in 
accordance with the principle* of the A^fklil'^t-fUJ. and of whom not one 
showed intellectual sujieriority or dignit*' '^^ ui anachronism. 



As Nunc! at Cologne, I'acca had Lhed to obstruct In every possible 
way a movement which he termed a conspiracy ajjainaL the Church. He 
himself and his followers indite riminateiy ascribed it to the JiinMenist^, 
the Galiicans, the Fhilosophcre, thtj Freuinasoiis. Iledenounced FglroTtiu$ 
as an itifaiuous book ; he accused Pius VI of Deglecting the duties of hiti 
supreme office, because he lieaitated until 1789, before ho threatened the 
fnnr Archbishops with censure, with the reservatiou that innovations in 
Church discipline should really bo intended. But it cannot be denied 
that I lontheim, Gerhard van Swieten, and the priests and lliuologians 
of their school, supported many things which the Jansenists of the days 
of the Abbe de Saint-Cyran and Pascal would have emphatically 
condemned as the very root of the evil against which they had raised 
tJie standard of religious reform. Nevertheless Jansenism was held 
chiefly responsible for the Kational Church movement. 

After the eighteenth century, all the reactionary poweis of the 

Church were arrayed against the Jansenist and Febronian doctrines. 

This opposition became a system aftor the Uestoration had Ix^come an 

ucomplished fact in continental Europe. It had been preceded by the 

Romantic movement, an iutellectual phase which made for peace in 

the religious strife. The reaction of sentiment against the exclusive 

■nd dry ideals of eighteenth century logic, the love of the past, the 

Tcrival of the science of history, were so many elements favourable to 

CKiholicism. In the domain of religion Rumaiiticisui checked con- 

tioversy. The struggle against unbelief inclined all Christians to place 

nninon faith above merely denorai national differences. The Breton 

Chateaubriand, who knew no other creed than the Homan Catholic, 

Mvertheless called the book which inaugurated Krench Komanticisra 

n* &eniuM of Ofirittiauity. In the whole work there is only one passing 

•UusoD to the Papacy. When 'Ify yeats later Chateaubriand reiterated 

Ineoofesston of faith, it sounded like a protest, which Itomanticism 

*oulil have endorsed, against the aggressive attitude of lui altered time t 

•"I belong to the general community of all mankind, who since the 

erouinn of the worhl have prayed to God. Independent of all powers 

'ii'^-l<t Him. I am a Christian, without ignoring my weaknesses, without 

tbiniiiig myself better than other men, without l>eing a persecutor, 

>o ii]i)aisitor, an informer, without wishing to accuse my brother or to 

ctlun Miy neighbour. I am not a sceptic, disguised as a Christian, 

wliu I . •I'a religion a useful means of compulsion for the people. 

Iufvliin the Gospel, not in the interest of despotism, but as a comfort 

lor the sorrowing . Those who nowadays would bind the Catholic 

•"Kgion to a particular form of government, and place her in opposition 

to icidoce and progress, severing her from society as it now stands, 

*wld drive nations towards Protestantism instead of realising that this 

% the highest order, the \iiry essence of reason, ia, in 




The same views inspired the Gernuin Romantics. Their greatest 
poet, Noralis, xrx& a Catholic in feeling, died a Protestant, and direc 
the hope of the future towards au eternal iueflabie community, a Uvin, 
Christianity. Their greatest convert, Fhedrich Leopold Stolberg, ncv 
reviled the faith be abandoned, and mentions Bossuet's eirenical Expn 
tion de la Foi CatKolique as the book wliich decided his retnni to the ol 
Church. Their greatest political writer, Joseph GKSrres, raised himsei 
to the rank of a •"• European Power," not only because he attack 
Napoleon, bat because he represented the cause of nationality and 
liberty against absolulLsm. Romanticism became hostile to the Govem- 
meats, when in Europe the Restoration became identified with the 
reaction. 

The Restoration required a theory strong enough to justify i 
existence. It was provided before the Counter-revolution began. 1 
eiciMunders were la^-men who had been driven by the excesses of the 
Revolution into unrelenting hostility to modeni methods of government. 
De Maistre, the greatest of these reactionaries, called the Revolution 
diabolical; "the Counter-revolution," lies-ij-s, "is nothing if not Divine.*' 

Chronologically, Karl I.udwig von Halter, tlio Swiss convert and a 
jurist, was one of the tiret representatives of the new political philosophy. 
His work, The Restoration of PoUtieal Science^ was directed against the 
doctrines of the Contrat Social. According to Haller, the State is a 
society of penons who««e individual requirements produce general laws. 
The«e rest on the necessity for help and protection, w^hicb can only be 
accorded by an authority provided with adequate force. The sovereiga 
is only bound by Divine and natural laws. The obedience of the subject 
b limited by the reciprocal demands of order and liberty. Opposition 
to authority may be legitimate, but is rarely advisable. Division of 
powers, representation of the (wople, and "'jMipcr constitutions" are 
discaixled. State Assemblies are restricted to the right of suggestion. 
The possession of power, even in republics, is not a mere ch&nce, or 
a simple fact. It is the consfqueuce of the government of the world, 
and every sovereign rules " by the Grace of God." The chief object of 
the ecclesiastical State is not to promote justice or well-being, but to 
inform doctrine. A community of the faithful requires a Church, and a 
Church must have a hierarchy. Its maintenance neoeasitatus landed 
property and temporal power, tn dangerous times ecumenical Councib 
ai-e recommended, but placed under the authority of the Head of the 
Church on earth. The liberty and welfare of individuals is subordina 
to doctrine. 

The publication of Haller's book in 181(> was regarded as a political' 
e%'ent. The Vicomte de lionald had tiught similar theories so early 
as 1790. He is the advocate of the alliance between the throne and 
the altar, of the religious and monarchical sovereignty, according to 
the patriarchal ordinance of the family. All cognition is dependent oa 



tie 

i 



fie 

1 





1815-21] 



Joseph de Maiatre: Dii Pai^e 



161 



revelation. Man has not the right to substitute his own undersliiiidiiig 
for the genei'iU reason, which ia the gift of God and the source of 
the traditions preserved and handed on by the spiritual authority. 
Absolute governineiil- is best in the State as well as in the Church. Its 
support is the nobility, which has set an example of self-aacrilice and of 
strict obedience to duty, in contrast to the modern, craving for enjoyment, 
luxury, and gain. The raaiat«nance of pvimofjeuiture, the direction of 
education by the Church, the abolition of the French Charter, '' a work 
of madness and darkness," the indissolubility of marriage, arc couditiona 
laid down by Honald for the success of the Counter-revolution. 

In such theories a far more powerful mind, the Savoyard Count 

Joseph de Maistre, greeted the expression of his own views. From 1802 

nniil 1817 he represented at the Court of St Petersburg his landless King, 

who did not understand him, and left him in want. During these years ho 

wrote Du Pape, De tEglhe Gaiticane, Lea Soirht de Saint-Pktertbourg^ 

which have furnished modern Ultramontanism with its general stock 

I of ideas and doctrines. Already, in 1815, de Maistre maintained that, 

oatjiide his system, thedefence of Christianity was impossible. According 

to him the origin of political institutions is not hntnan but Divine. 

Generations, past, present, and future, form a whole. A nation is not 

a chance result but a living organism. Individual reason may err, but 

Uie general reason of mankind is infallible. It ia entrusted with a 

treasure of tradition,of Divine origin, which corroborates ('hristiim truth. 

Sovereignty, whatever name it may assume, comes from (iod, and its 

nsencc n to be not despotic but absolute. It is based, not on human 

law, bat on the unfathomable will of God. Legitimate kings are His 

delegates and for that very reason subject in spiritual mattei's to the 

representative of spiritual sovereignty — the Pope. There is only one 

true Church, and that ia the Catholic. The Pope is its absolute and 

i infallible head. It is not a mistake but a folly to place a Council above 

i Pope, for mthotit him all decisions are null and void ; the duty of 

obedience is the first duty of all. The originators of rebellion and of 

tevolotion alike are the Protestants and their kinsmen the Jansenists, in 

■eaond line the Gallicans. Perhaps, says de Maistre, we laymen shall 

be able to provide the Pope with weapons which may prove a!l the 

more useful, Ijecause they were forged in the rebel camp. De Maistre 

hardly overrated his powers. He possessed the mind and the wit of 

Voltaire as well as a splendid eloquence, capable of every fonn of expres- 

ann. He was philosophically trained, and read Plato. Bacon, Maithus, 

Cant, in their own tongue, ivs woU as the Mystics and the Fathers of the 

\ Church. He used and misused history for his owu ends, as one who 

knew it well. He did tint live to witness the triumph of that regenerated 

religion, which he liad preached, and which according to him was only 

another name for the restored theocracy. His book Du Papt was the 

only one which he himself published, before his death in 1821. Tlie 



C. K. K. X. 



It 



ll« too iMid bsj^as bi Ittawjr eaner vi& la attack OB ifaa Gallieuis 
Oft (It* JanMMflU, aad am Ae Oi^vuie Aitida*. la ISIX, m \m Airty- 
fairtii fw. ha wtwetoady ■imiad Aa mend MJaaliy. Becvaao ISIT 
aad 1H29 Ukm foOovad tfaeiaven] volawaof Ut Amimt riad^ZrvMa 
«i» maiUr* ds Hdig'wn. Indiffrivnee, ■iiiiiiiTiag ta Ub, is Ae cnlf ali b 
•qiuliaaUou o( Error aad I'ruth. the root of w5Sl the avil of the day. 
*• WUt u truUi, MoMUor r Abbe ?" de Mustre bad a^ed :*" Aaoalj One 
wlw cuuld bsT« i^rea an aiuv«r did not cbooae to doao.* LameauaU 
roUjrt* : ^ Mali hu ifi bii nnatihln iutalligenoe ao iiiNniWa tait for troth. 
||« Lw Ui Mftreb I'll' it tjtttMda luiiiaelf ia the Mimw cMMnoMK, that is io 
tiv>M ^rwnJ |*o«tulattti on which neuij all men agrae. The ooofideoce 
in th«f authf>rit/ of tliat jurl^meDt is not accidental or cfaaageaUe; it is 
iniuilij iu our fiMturi;. Ttte qaestion is not to prove its infftUiUHtj. It 
fa aaOMaut to rpj^mU to the fact that such au authority exists because 
it la imp'Maihli} t^i niacli beyond it. Now, all truths indispensable to 
■unkind Itave nrij^innlly been revealed by God, preserved by trHditioD* 
and ftafpi^uardriit by thn ftntlinrity which ih evolved by the ^eneml consent 
of niankincj. l-'iniilly, they devuln|»e(i into Christtanity. nre set before 
Da in the Cntholiu Church, and are embodied in ber Head. Throogb 
th» l*r>|Mi nhtiiu individual reaaon reoeiven ihe truth. All authrn-ity, all 
toniptmil pownr and lovereip^ty, are founded on him. He decides tbo 
prohliiniN of Hnionoe, tbo fate of States, he is the living tradition of 
tiianlflnil." I'liu lirinl appeal to mankind in the key to Lainennaia* 
aytiinm. Whun Munnrchy iind l^ajmcy had failed bim, he turned to the 
ptinpb), to Dtinini^niry. 

'I'hu Riruif^le liutud tun yoars. Even Charles X opposed the demand 
nf lluimld, of Iiiuni<ntmiH, and of the posthumous works of de Maistre, 
llml, hti nliiiiilil inlii|)t hiM jfovomment to Theocrai-y. At the moment 
wliiin 1/»,IMM> m<rloNiiiHliuul i>oMta wore viicniit, Lamenunis sugfg'ested tliat 
all eduflfttlon ithniihl be ontrnsted to the clergy, and declared the 
I'nlveraily, tit iho Iioad of wliii'h was ii niilil and sensible Bishop, to be 
a lintlMid of atheiHm. (.'onseqiiently, in 1S2(>, nearly all the Bisbopsaud 
AriihbiK)tn|iH of l^'miioe uniloil in defenou of the rights and principles of 
the (hitluM\n Chnroh, oontinunlly ntlnckcd nod insulted by Lamennaia. 
When tlio Miniitry of Mtirti|;nno, with the consent of Kome, determined 
Io vliwo oduoational wtwlilishnu-uts dinHitcil by the Jesuits or by other 
non-4Uthoriaed oon^regationit. the breach between Lamenntus and the 
Monari'hy was oomploted. With the work entitled i>e« progrei de la 
it" * ti rff fj ywrrw ttntrt V£^iu (^1829) be openly joined the 

t>l I. Hr i>J-«diotad Um eolUp«e ol the existing onlor of things 

and cUini«vt1, in the inuneof Catht'tioa, liberty of the PrsiSi of oon^ieienoe. 
lud oi eitucaliua. 



I 



I 





1820-31] 



The wi'iters of L'Aveiiir 



163 



Me did tint alteutpt to explain the suddentieijs of the cbauge. He 
wrote that liberty, which had been claimt'd by atlieisra, was hencoforn-ard 
to be demanded in the name of God. He welcomed the Kevolution of 
18.t0 ;u} the beginning of the liberation of the Church from the tyranny 
of the State. Separ.ition from the State was the condition of saU-atioa 
and the design of Providence. With the aid of the rising generation* 
of Lacordaire, of Charles de Montalerabert, and encouraged by the 
Revolution in Belginra, and by Catholic Emancipation in England, 
Lamcnnais fniindiMl the iicwi>jHi[i(-r L'Avenir. It welcomed alt revolu- 
tions, those already accomplished, and those yet to come. It advocated 
liberty of oonsoience, revision of the Concordat, and suppression of 
the Bwiffet <ie» Ctdtes. The Catholic democracy was bound to accept 
the entire Catholic doctrine and the absolute power of tlie Pope, to 
vhom the prerogatives of the Bishops were unconditionally surrendered. 
The revised Constitution of 1830 guaranteed freedom of education: the 
yonng collaborators of Lamennais grasped the occasion and formed the 
A^tnce CathoUque. A year had not passed before they had exliauated 
the patience of the Government, which they pressed to intervene in 
Polind, as well as that of the episcopate, which they continually charged 
with being indifferent and devoid of principle. An episcojMil petition 
wkad in 18iil for the interference of Rome. At the same time, the 
proclamation of the theories of L'Avenir coincided with risings in 
lulr. Ijftcordaire, who always reniained an advocate of Italian unity, 
id not deny to the subjects of the Pope the right to regulate their 
own destinies: *' a free spot on earth," so he wrote in L'Ave7nr, " will 
•Iwsys be found for the Pope." Pressed by the disapproval of the 
episcopate and by the intei-ference of the Government, the contributors 
to VAvtmir now likewise appealed to Kome. Already, in 1820, La- 
■■Maiiais, addressing himself to de Maistre, had deplored the hesitations 
<■( the Holy See, which would not realise that the traditional methods 
Wl become inadequate, and failed to comprehend de Maistre's splendid 
fkfence of the Papal Power. De Maistre, agreeing with Lamennais, 
'Uvrered that he felt lisbanied of ('athoUcism, tliat he based greater 
'■Bpeson England tlian, for instance, on Austria or on other countries, 
*liere the truth was permitted to decay. De Maistre was dead when, 
W 1824, Leo XII received Lamennais at the Vatican. The idea of con 
(wring the Cardinalate upon bim, wss given up, owing to distrust of his 
<kctr>De on the part of Uoman theologians. 

Lamennais, together with Lacordaire and Montalembert, returned 
^ Home in 18^1, nith a promise of entire submission to the decision 
"l the Pope. Gregory XVI was reigning. Threatened by the Revo- 
Iwion, pressed by the Powers to concede reform,- supported only by 
Heign bftyonets, he refused then and later to alter his system of govern- 
•Sit. The supposition that he would foster an alliance between the 
Ouiroh and Democracy as suggested by Lamennais was inconceivable. 



Tfie Pajiftcy condemm Lamennais Ci8:«-7 

Never tEielusB the Pope hesitated to pronounce judgment. I.>acordatrc 
was the lirst to see the hopelesaneas of the cause. He left his frietids, 
returned to France, and soon afterwards entered the Dominican Order. 
On bis way from Rome, at Munich* where ho was welcomed by the 
survivors of German (Jathollc Romanticism aa the cbampiou of the 
(Church, Lamennais received the crushing intelligence of Uomau dis- 
approval. The Encyclical Mirari vos of the month of August, 1832, 
condemned liberty of conscience, of religious worehip, freedom of the 
Press, separation of Chui-cb and State, '*and other hateful errors — 
deliramenta — of those, who, possessed by an undue love for liberty, did 
their utmost to undermine authority." Not a stouc reuiaincd in its place 
of the edifices constructed by VAvtnir. The Papacy, whose unlimited 
authority de Maistie and Lamennais had proclaimed, and which the 
latter sought to separate from tlie Guvcrumeuts and to place at the head 
of nations, utterly failed him. It adhered to the power's that be, con- 
demned the Rcvolutinti in Poland in exclmnge for Russian intervention 
in favour of the Temporal [*ower, and pla<;ed the gospel of democracy 
under a Ixin. Lamennais had left Rome with tho impression that it 
was ** la plus hideusc doarpie qui ait jamai* touill^ V<xilhumain." He had 
always been a fanatic at heart, a solitary, melancholy, and, to those who 
knew him well, a gentle, di-eainer. Without liist<irical training, or a 
true notion of the essence of religion, in the violent tension of subdued 
passion, with an erroneous view of the world, surrounded with the pathos 
of splendid rhetoric, Lamennais reduced the religious problem to a 
mere question of power. The theocrat of 1820 had raised misgivings 
even in the mind of de Maistre, when he demanded the abdication of 
the State before the one ruling Church. Lamennais, after having 
thrown the monarchy overboard, attacked the entire epiiicopate and the 
traditions of ages, out of which the French Church hat! grown, be- 
cause they constituted an obstacle to ecclesiastical absolutism. There 
remained the Pope. He called on the Pope to place himself at the 
bead of democmcy, and to establish a new order oiE tbiugs ou the ruins 
of pi«senl institutions. 

Gregory XVI was not a man of remarkable intelligence, and Ins 
reign prepared the downfall of the Temporal Power. But he very 
rightly rfimarked to Montalembert in 1837, referring to Lamennais, 
*'Thi8 Abbe wanted to give me a power" (the Pope extended bis 
arms) " — a power with which 1 should not have known what to do." 
His successor, Pius IX, ari-ived at a different conclusion. The Council 
of 1870 became, in the liistory of the Church, a posthumous triumph 
of the Lamennais nf 1820. 

The formation of a Catholic party likewise dated from him. The 
short existence of L'Avenir had been sufficient to show the value of a 
Catholic combative press and organisation in the struggle nf the hour. 
Not one of bis disciples followed him in his breach with Rome. Tliey 




1814^0] The Liberal Catholics and UUrmnontanism 165 



I 



did not, however, lay down llie weapon which lie liad placed in their 
hands. MoDtalembert, Laconlaire, ami their frientla. inaugurated the 
struggle for freedom of uJucatioii on the groumls of coiistitutional 
rights. They were called •' Liberal Catholics," because they understood 
how to make the requirements of the modern State serve their purpose, 
and marched to victory with the watchword, *' Equal rights for all '* ; 
but their religions doctrine remained Cltramontane. Their example 
was followed in Ciermany, when the Prussian Government in 1837 had 
become involved in a quarrel with the Archbishops of Cologne and I'osen 
oonceming mixed mariiages. In the contest between SUite righu 
and ecclesiasticsil law Prussia resorted to violent measures, which 

(threatened the religious peace of the German Catholics. Gorres, whose 
national aspirations based on the roi^^sion of Prussia in Germany were 
abattered, passed into the ecclesiastical camp. His Athanamt* opeued 
the attack on the ill-advised Government, which had to give way. 
The ** KSlner Wtiren^' led to the lasting formation of a German 
Catholic political party. Its logical development caused it, as had 
been the case in France, to accentuate Roman Jn contrast to nationalist 
tendencies, and to support the temporal power of the Papacy. Owing 
to this change, relifjious interests were subordinated to political 
exigencies, and Catholics who under these conditions refused to join the 
party were exposed to seeing their orthodoxy disputed. Long before 
titesc results became apparent, when the Catholic cause \vm still upheld 
by a close union among its representatives, the Papacy was confronted 
^L with another necessity — that of coming to terms with the Italians. 
V The Catholic Riaorgimento l)ecame a force to be taken into account. 
This movement takes its rise from Napoleon's creation of an Italian 
^m kingdom. However incomplete the plan may have been, it yet suggested 
H to the Italians the idea of unity, and foreshadowed its realisation by the 
H gnnt of a constitution, a code, a civil service, and an army. At Klba. in 
' 1814, the idea of placing himself at the head of an United Italian St-ate 
was not uncongenial to Napoleon. It was taken up in 1815 by Muml. 
Pellegrino Kossi, tho futnro Mini.ster of IHus IX in his Liberal A,\y&, 
ugned on April 4, 1815, as Commissioner-General of the King of Naples, 
> proclamation calling on the Italians to fight for their IndependeDce. 
Marat's declaration of wiir against Austria, and his fall, simplified the 
Uik which Metteruich had in view. 
H Tlirough Austrian influence, nuder the rule of the reinstated 
™ dynasties, Italy actually fell under foreign domination. No one more 
fully realised for Italy the consequences of the Congress of Vienna than 
de Maistre. In 1814 ho lilcarly foresaw that the division of Italian 
•eftitories would necessarily lead to war. " Beware of the ItJilian spirit," 
1» wrote from St Petersburg to Turin. "The King of Sardinia must put 
aimself at tlie Ik-afl of the Italians. Should ho Ixicome an obstacle, the 
'>*JeU Austria would take his place." Do Maistre described tlie House 




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fiiiti'.f jL- 1,1 • i-.:.;:u y ".i.'J.' I'jr. 'Hi'; pr<;i»<:;jt u'':a'r:iies5 of IliW iras doe 
fi«(i )// On; '.'.y M*(»*':(.' ■. '/( ^/> lii': ';;';rj.O'r '"^t- to the decline of literature. 
l.'f i.hi. I.i/.iii' ij.i Jij.'l i/t«'li';';jii.y of t,li<j Iii;fii';r clisses. The visioa of 
tii'AitiU 'fi.t- Mf M .-.ijiH:':!!'!!! of luly, li^ riifjiins of a primaer in science 
(Mi<l III •III, I'fiiii'li-'l ii|ii(ii it:\v^'\i>n. 'I'iif; Pu^x; WHS to be not onlr the 
litint i\\ I.Ik- iiinviMiitl riiui'iii, hut tLlt'i lit'; Iiuul of the Italian League, 
lie will) hv itf^hl, lJi<-- |i;iliM-ti.il iiiMl.'tr iiiid jicacc-maker of Europe, the 
it|iiilliiiil liiiliu' 'if iiiiiriliinit, iJii; \>rtiU:i:\.iiv of Ihu Latin race, and the 
liiilt ol thii liii|iiiiiiirii. 

I Im' .li'itiiitii iriilihiMl (Jim diiiip;iir nf iliiiHd vicvvH and attacked Gioberti, 
wliH irjiliml III hill fi'iilft/imu-ni, and liiUu' in the GeBuita modemo. In 



m 



Cemre Balbo. — Massimo d* Azeglio 1 67 



U)6 ProUgontum he termed the suppression of the Society of Je^us just 
and opportune> and MOttted its though less voheniently tlmn in }ti47 and 
in the Qtsuita motUrno, of haviug- destroyed the ancient discipline, the 
liierai'ohical order in the Churuh, iiiid thereby wn>ught incxtriciiblo 
confusioQ in tho minds of men. He spoke in aUiolutc contrast with 
de Maistre, who advised tho Papacy to use *' its Janissaiies," bt'caiwe 
a sect, like tho Froeniiisoiis, could only bo opposed by n corporation, 
sQch as the Jesuits, and becauso tUo doctiiue of the Jesuita was essea- 
tially tho Catholic doctrine. 

Gioberti'a view was, ciuiously enough, not unaympatbeUc to Gregory 
XVI. Neither he himself, a Camaldoleae monk, nor his SecretAry of 
State, the Bamabite monk Larabruachini. were friends of the JesniU. 
Theiner, the learned Gormiui thenlngian, vr.ia commissioned by Gregory 
XVI to justify tho fiUpiire.s3ion of the Order, with the aid of tho material 
contained in the Papal archives. Pellcgnno Hossi, who, in 184o. was 
appointed by Guizot French ambassatinr to tho Holy Scb, encountered 
fen" diflicultiea, when, notwitlujtamliiig the op[H>sitiMii of tbe Fionch 
Catholic party, he obtained the promise of the suppression of the Jesuits 
in Kmnce. The promise was rendered nugatory by the paseive resistance 
of tbe Society itself, wliich rightly counted on the future victory of the 
Prench UltramonDanes. This victory was won after the fall of Louis- 
Philtpjie, in the days of Pius IX. 

In the year 1843 another Piodmontoso, Count Cesarc Balbo, attempted 

to deal with similar questions. Th« .S^«raJtr« d' Italia were dedicated 

to Gioberti, but tbe sober-minded political thinker banished the Primato 

into the realm of dreams. Balbo's chief problem was how the liberation 

of ItJily from foreign rule was to be effeoted. The twofold position 

of the Popes and their consequent relations to Catholic Christendom 

disi^nalitied thom to lead a nioveinoiitt whose object was independence. 

For ita realisation Balbo counted ou pcUtical eventualities. The collapse 

oE tbe Ottoman Empire, the ambitious plans of Uussia, pointed to an 

Austrian mission in the near East^ and oompunsatiou on the Dnnnhe 

(of the provinces lost iu Italy. Until suuh au occasion arose, I$albo 

recommended a I*ombard Federation, headed by Piedmont. He dis- 

coiuitcnanccd revolutionary methods or appeals for foreign aswislance. 

fie advorated a moiJerate policy, and directed the efTorts of his country- 

tua to the elevation of the moral stjmdard, an iacreiise uf culture, and 

w improvement of internal conditiDna. 

Maraimo d' Azeglio, Manznni's son-in-law, in his Ultimi casi rfi 
imaffna, which appeared in 1846, spoke mth reverence of Catholicism 
•*lo( its head, but ruthleAsly expnsed all the consequences of Pai>al 
•israle, princiijolly in the Romagna. He showed the arrogance and 
■ac^Jtcity of the Delegates, the arbitrariness of tho administration, the 
chifttic proceedings of the Courts of law, and the impotence of the 
;me authurity iu Rome. D" Azeglio speaks as an eyewitness, 




like the Uolognese Marco Minghetti, who corrobonites his facts. The 
Preeetto Politico di Prima Clasae was in force against all those who were 
not actually condemned, but merely snspected. Whoever came under 
this edict of police was uot allowed to leave his residence, had to be at 
home at certain hours, to report himself once a fortnight to the police 
inspector, to go to confession erery month, and show his certiticate 
of confession to the police. Finally, be had to submit once a year to 
three days of spiritual exercises in a convent selected by his Bishop. 
Whoever did not keep theae rules was sentenced to tliree years* penal 
servitude. This Precetto Politico caused the condemnation on one 
occasion, in the Romagna alone, of 229 persons. 

In 1832 was published a plan of reform, drawn up by the most 
learned priest in Italy, the Catl^olic philosopher and founder of an 
Order, Antonio Kosmini. Some of the ideas of Sala can be traced in 
Roainini'ii Oinque Ptaghe della Santa OJiiesa. His proposals of reform 
are an energetic protest against the worldhness of the Church and 
the decay of the priestly ideal. Sala liad advocated the separation o£ 
the spiritual from the temporal domain. Rusmini recommended the 
participation of the laity in the elections of Itishops and parish pricsu, 
reform of the education of the clergy, and, if not a total separation 
between Church and State, at least the greatest possible independence 
for the Church, and renunciation of earthly advantages. By acknow- 
ledging the constitutional system iu au Italian Confederation, Rosmini 
still thought it po^ible to preserve the Temporal Power and to secure 
the primacy for the Pope amongst the Italian Princes. 

Fully recognising that his system was crumbling away, and that 
a younger generation would have to deal with altered conditions, 
Gregory XVI died on July 1, 184(>. The ardent longing of Rosmini 
and of his friends for reform in Church and State, the national 
aspirations of the Italian patriots for unity, liberty*, and independence, 
the hopes of the world, centred on the new wearer of the Tiara. 

An astonishingly short Conclave, the shortest hold for three hundred 
years, resulted in the election of tho Bishop of Imola, Caitlinal Count 
Giovanni Maria Mastai-Ferretti, who ascended the Chair of St Peter as 
Pius IX. lie was only fifty-four years of age, and known to be pious, 
kind-heai'ted, and of a bright, genial disposition. It was rumoured that 
he was a student of the works of Gioherti, Balbo, and d'Azeglio. The 
most tragical pontificate of modern tiroes opened with a generous 
amnesty. It was welcomed with boundless hope, and Italians cherished 
the belief that the dream of the Middle Ages was realised, and that at 
last they witnessed the advent of H Papa Anffelieo. 



I 
I 

I 




CHAPTER VI 



GREECE AND THE BAL1CA.V PENINSULA 



Tb£ Treaty of Bucharest, concluded on May *28, 1812. between the 

Russian Emf»eror and tho Ottomftn Sultati, marks an important epoch 

in the deTelopmcDt of what was to become known, a few years later, 

HA the Eiistern Question. By this instrument the Russian fiontier wna 

advanced to the Pruth and to the northern, or Kilia, branch of tho 

Daoabe. More st^ificaut still, the claim of Kusaia to interfere between 

tlip Sultan and his Christian subjects, foreshrtdowed in the Treaty of 

Kutchuk Kainardji of 1774, received a new sanction in the iifth aitiele, 

which confirmed " the contracts and conventions which had been counted 

among tho privileges of Moldavia,'' and in the eighth article, wliith 

stipulated for certain concessions to the insui^ent Servians. Whatever 

the viewa of the Powers interested in setting bounds to the southward 

advance of Russia, the times were not propitious for any active protest 

agiunst an arran^ment which, for years to come, was to make .MoUlavia 

and Wallachia practically Russian provinces, and act the scaI on claims 

which} sooner or later, would lead to furtlicr encroachments of the 

Orthodox empire on the Turkish power. 

The Eastern Question, during the next fateful years, was obscured 
by the vaster issues raised by the titantic stnif»gle which ended in the 
downfall of Napoleon. Tho Emiieror Alexander I, moreover, had been 
placed by the outcome of the Moscow campaign in the van of united 
Europe ; and, whatever the suspicions that might be entertained of his 
ttllimate designs in the East, the supreme necessity of maintaining an 
Wbroken front against the common revolutionaiy enemy served for many 
y*«re to prevent these suspicions fa-om finding open expression. The 
peiils involved in the probnble break-up of the Ottoman empire were, 
lAdeod, fully appreciated by st^itesmen. For Great BriUiin, anxious 
fnr the security of her Mediterranean power and of the trade-routes to 
India, the integrity of that empire had long been a political axiom ; and 
Jupoleon's dreams of Eastern conquest, which at Tilsit he had shared 
*iUi Alexander, had, in spite of the vast spaces dividing tho Tsars 
frontiers from those of the British flag, already begun to inspire in 

18U 



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.- ■ - i_- ii._— I nrar lirmuL x-vards 

.. ..'iri. . ■- :.-=ii*:r :u^ -irrai^raiUB: if Eorope 

-ij. .::!■: j^ -imni-j- =2-jf "Lt- a±a>ua it Bsssia's 

.•.:..;. 4 v:: _-? it'&kZii^fis Tr<-tiuL jkx^ 4-TiXered 

iu^ j-iLy^^^x..: ■: tir Jmaagn TEmiiguIicies, 

■-■ ■:.:.*:,=-rr.- i .::.l :s tt.v t> "tltr liuuk SfA. bat 

^ .;r* .-Iia:^ h ai -TTJii* TTUuii TTMLfi oaiTy 

'..,- :!.••!*? 'r 'iir- i»c*n:i."ni» lutuirimir she Slav 

41; i.-.'i:::.-;u_i. .i:.l 'Liir-aiiKmuf^ Tita. iuwulatinn, 

r:.;i: ;-. .'.uvu-^-^: iT* "At- m.i-iin h'* pi:IicT of 
i| iij.r.:-i.i-iim( hmt^ ^irs±rSBr^ ij Jks&crsa than 
" ■■'■ ■' '" •■■',-■ ■- 

' /-.-■ 'il ..i'. lli'-lii.;- '.1: i.licrJU. -lu 71-r-!]«-n: ir in^m gaining 

"..*. I.-...,.-. f ' 1; ,.,.-■ i,.-.:]jj.j. ,-:;uii\t --iiiiiui'U uiiL ±"qcT ffl^tt psttnted 

. --i ...i^y. ,', .,^ '.:.-,- ■. ., 11. '. i_lc* -iir itt.*'mruiL jmctta of the I 

»' •-■>- ■ -.i- '.'... ■iiji.-.n Lii*: iit"--L* :ttT;:i ui»*iri*i*-£ Ji» ;c fotcceeded ! 

-i ..^.(■•.. .;, .... ,ji,-j,i^»r< .'.i-.^'iib:, y.iiii u*-';-! LJiL :;itaz nl'i LS EoTOpe | 

'■«■'. '- ' .■- V. v-.ii,; .1; A'M iL "uUt :fr.'Ti''r,^tc-~^=*-~ wi u alien 

.. '.,:..-. .■.ivi_j.^. ■. ->-.i'. '.v;*- i'l b-._ IJii.-iiiTti:. :ecwitfa ic&^aeroisand 

''^ ■ . .' .■•■ •'■■'. -..M'*.- -,.^1 .-' i7-:i:itii7. fx ':«ir»*!n.ic*m laythe 

.'. ^. i-.....i.. ■/<■•,.■ •,' vo-... 1*_L^ vti lite :oat re tt&ie Ottoman 
■' •■' V. .. .t V. ;,*, •..->;* Tl Li -: -.ia:i» i:c ^iti -mwlieTer; and 

...v ■-^. .. '.* ' v- *'-*^'. :.;./,;..-> Lti :.^-_I iz. -^iiii «J*r:ioCoi Church a 
''■' ■ ' --^ ■ ■■ • ; ■'.: y/.'-.r:-:.^ "it =.ija ::' icit*-b;«5 populations 

•• ." - ^ -■ ■■«'•; '<...;;•; V. -..'.;.i-^r:. Tt:- ^^:v-^e&. mucaally con* 
■A- J. .-.,.■ t ..-, ■/..,. .!;, »-.■;,•(: •,;,vi *:*-:a-!isi:-=d -rii-'iin the State; and 
'■' ' "-■ J- . y.\:i: •/..'.<.■:.•■-. \:.h t'/u.':y.'^ :f x=d;ouaj interests and 
,.•. < ,' . / ,"...:\',:. '.,* .,,'[;. 'lo ;':.« ^IuasuIsu. his creed was the 
>:'..:■: ..,.') ,,.->...'.*'.■,.', ',* h..j 'yj^-.ciious preeminence; to the Greek, 
* tiii.'.-\',j f //.,.: );.•. •^i^.,-M\tH'.ti i,i liU riatiorial existence, and, since the 
«)..'!'<-, .,r t.,.' :u\,.it,-.t: <A \\'..y Ua-v»iit hal fallen upon the Ottoman 
I.M.J...' . 11.' .-I.- 1 ;. :vu'.\i',t 'if III ; h'.jj'j.-* and ambitions. Moreover, though 
iIm-; ' i.ii :t..^M ■:'.i\' wii.liiK i,li(; SuU; wa-s cnrlowed with extensive privi- 
J'.|;i. ■. It (,',■-■' ■-:■ 'I- ;i.j ;i;^.iiii;:i, liiluM)^ HO rigliU. The Patriareh of Con- 
.:i.iijiii>i.|.li.. .,.'. \.i,i. II ■.jiiiii'iMi: rii-^an of the Sultan for the government 
lA i|it. t t,\i,i,i\i,i I liiu>li lini.li ill Hpirituiil and temporal matters, exer- 
it.iijil II viili.; ).ip'.v<j iliiui In; ]i;ii| iiiijnycd under the Byzantine Caesara; 
lull lit.i ii.JiiiiKii In ilii'. SiilLiui was, niiiK) the less, tliat of a slave. The 

uiiHii' Hilt) (iiir, III V iii't (l( j.;irfs, of livury Christian rayah. From the 

i:iiiilr-iii|>hiMiii I'lliiiiiicn iiT liis iuiii(|iu!r()ra ho had obtained a greater 
iiiiitirtiiii> III liliitii I ilhiii I lint, i-iijo villi by dissiiluiits in any other cuuntiy 
III h;uiii|ii> < 'iiiliiilii- 1 III lii-lithil itiid l*i-oli.>stants in Austria might envy 



Decline of the Ottovian Power 



171 



him his privileges. Ho was free to exercise lii^ religion, to educate 
himself as he pleased, to fiocuraulate wealth ; however humble his origin, 
in a 9}'5tem which accounted nothing of birth, he could hold high office 
in the Government, become dragoman to the I'orte, or vot/vode of a 
province, and be addressed by the Sultan himself as " Illustrious Prince." 
Vet he remained essentially u slave, liable at any moment, by some 
caprice of gii'ed or suspicion on the ^>ai't of his master, to be hurled 
irom wealth and power into penury or dealb. 

A system so inherently bad could fail to be fatal only unrJer very 
peculiar conditJoiie. So long m a succession of great Sultans wielded the 
Bword of the Prophet and led the hosts o£ Islam to ever fresh conquests, 
it had worked well enough. The Christian population were well content 
to be free of the burden of military service ; and the blood-tax {huriUch)^ 
with which, each year, they bought the right to exist, supplied the 
Sultans with the sinewa of war. There could be no question of serious 
distfTection within the Khalifa empire, when out«iido it the Christiau 
Powers could barely hold their own against his arms. But it is essential 
to the health of a dominiuu based upon a milititnt religion that it 
should advance. Victory Is the evidence of its Divine sanction ; and the 
moment it Ijcgins to recoil the very qu;Uities of fanaticism which gave 
it strength may prove a source of weakuess. Tlie eighteenth century 
witnessed the rapid crumbling of the Ottoman Power, and the inrtial 
ruin revealed the faulty foundation on which it was and is based. The 
blight of Byzantium had fallen upon the house of Othman : the Com- 
manders of the Faithful no longer themselves rode at the head of their 
vmiea; and to the masterful rulers of the typo of Mohammad H and 
Saleiman the Magnificeat had succeede<L a feeble raoe, recluses of the 
lurem, the puppets and victims of their own slaves. This atrophy 
of the central power suffered a system to grow up which proved too 
itroDg far the eiforts of the few Sultans who had the strength of mind 
ind tJio irill to attempt to arrest the process of decay. The Janissaries, 
ODOe the mainstay of the Sultan's power at home and of hl^ expeditious 
tbroftd. had learned their stiength, and phiyed at Constantinople the 
part of the Praetorians at Home. As a military force they had become 
Aselefls; but, when the reformingSultan, Selim III (1789-1807), attempted 
to iDtrnduce European discipline and drill, they rose in insurrection, 
Wd him a prisoner in his palace, and, to prevent his rescue by the 
i^inary troops, murdered him. 

While the Sultan was thus held powerless in his capital, plentiful 
opportanity was given for the play of individual ambitions among his 
Ticegerenta in the provinces. The centralised and eflfeciive autocracy, 
*liicb hm been rendered possible in modern Turkey by the telegraph 
ud railways, had never existed in the Ottoman government. Tlie 
noTernoTTi of provinces were left undisturlied, so long as they furnished 
*uii tolerable regularity the tribute duo in money or in kind, and aii 



■i W iIwoiib I wekfii l of besda as CTidenee of tbetr loyml zeal. The vast 
fpMM td dw empire aads nj effectrre coatroi impossible; and $ueh 
«— pJaJBtt as penetiated from th« imtlying conieiB of the empire to the 
eoakl easily be met hf offending Pashus with bribes judiciously 
It tha3 beeune easy for unquiet and ambitious spirits to 
go far towards earring' out for chemselTes within the empire princi- 
p«lJfiieH. and eren eagres* recogouiing but a nominal subjection to 
Ibe Saltan and threateaing, abonld tiie Porte endeavoar to assert its 
Kweretgnty. to make their indep^ideiiee effective, and su produce the 
dnaded duntption o£ the Ottoman Power from within. In 1604, 
Pasvan Oglo. Puba of Widdia. bad risen in revolt, and the Janissaries 
settled about Belgrade had joined him. The Parte, in de.six:ration, had 
armed the Servian rayaha. Turks, Albanians, and Serl» combined bi-ul 
era^Md tbe Moasulman reTolt ; bat the Servians in their turn now used 
the occasion to strike, under the swineherd Kara George, for their own 
independence. In spite of the concessions granted in the Treaty of 
liuchare^it, which satisfied neither party, ihe hostilities dragged on, and 
only ended in 1817 with the grant of autonomous government to ServU. 
Meanwhile, Ali, Pasha of Janloa, who had helped the Sult^in against 
Pasvan Oglu. was busy building up, by intrigue, by bribes, by violence, 
the power which, on the eve of the revolution in Greece, had all but 
made him arbiter of the fate of the whole Balkan peninsula ; aud in 
Kgj'pt Mchcmet All was laying the foundations of the power which 
ultimately enabled him to measure his strength successfully agaiust the 
Commrtnder of tlio Kaithful, and, for a time, to rule supreme over an 
empire which stretched from the Soudan to the Taurus Mountains. 

Among the solvent forces which threatened the stJibUity of tho 
Ottoman empire, however, the more or less successfiU efforts of ambitious 
Pashas to take advantage of the weakness of the central authority wero 
not the most important. More significant were the first stirrings of tbe 
racial movement, which, in tbe cast of Europe especially, was destined to 
play so larga a part in the historic diania of the coming age. The Greeks 
of the Morea, urged on by the promises of Russian agents^ had risen in 
1774, only to find themselves abandoned to the fury of the Mussulmans 
when it suited the pnlicy of the Empress Catharine to make peace with 
tlie Porte. Hut the new apiiit, of which this abortive rising had been 
the expression, survived and developed, encouraged by the very im- 
provement in tbe general condition of the Greek population which 
resulted from the relaxation of the tyranny of the central power. In 
their village eoniniunitles, which the Turks hati suffei-ed to survive, the 
Greeks had the elements of the vigorous local life which suited their 
genius; in the Orthodox ('hurch they possessed the organisation necessary 
to bind them together in the sense of a cnnimnn naiionalitv- Long 
before the outbi-eak of the insun-ection the wealthy island communities 
of iho Aegean and the Adriatic, though nominally forming pait of the- 



1 




Ottoman empire, had enjoyed a pmctical independence temijered only 
by the obligation to send to Constantinople an annual tribute in money 
and in sailors to man the imperial navy. Their armed trading-brigs 
— carrying from 20 to 30 guns, and some nearly as large as frigates — 
many of which, since the Treaty of Kutohuk Kainardji, had sailed under 
the Uossian ensign in order to secure the privileges conceded in the 
Straits and the Black Sea, were destined to pluy a decisive part in the 
struggle for independence- 

In the ^torca and on the mainland there was indeed no such 
practical autonomy as in the islands; but here too the weakness of the 
mdministration liad sufltirud a spirit of independence to grow up which 
asserted itself in the only way open to it — brigandage. In the wild 
society of the Halkan peninsula public opinion, so far as itconld be said 
to exist, had nothing but udminition for robbery under arms, which 
among the Orthodox rayaJiM was surrounded by a religious and patriotic 
halo when directed against the Mussulman oppressors. Thief (klephty 
and hero (jmlikar) became in popular parlance all but interchangeahla 
terms : and the barbarous exploits of famous bandits were celebrated by 
the peasants in a thousand songs and legends. Nor had the attitude of 
the Ottoniaa Government tended to discourage this point of view. The 
difficulty of maintaining order suggested to the Sublime Porte the expe- 
dient of setting a thief to catch a thief; and it was only necessary for 
& brigand chief to become sufficiently powerful and wealthy to ensure 
his being made a Paslia. if a Mussulman, or, if a Christian, to he taken 
into the [Miy of the Governnieiit as a captain of the militia (^armtttoli} 
establiithed tn [wliee the mountain districts. The famous AU of Jauiua 
himself, who lived to be courted by Napoleon and patronised by the 
British Government, begun his strange career as an outlaw and a rob- 
ber; and of the wild leaders, who afterwards adorned and disgraced the 
Qational revolt of the Greeks, the greater number bad been trained in 
hi} service. 

Into this savage and unquiet society had early been borne echoes 
of the revolutioEiary turmoil tii Kntnce. AH Pasha, a tricolour oockade 
ticked to his turUm, t)ibifeUn£,of Liberty and Fraternity to a comrais- 
noQer of the Ki'ench Republic, while keeping an eye on the Ionian 
Ulanrls, n'as indeed no more serious than All drinking to the health of 
the Thiotokot^ with an eye on the dominion o£ Greece. But Janina w;is 
not the only road by which ideas from the outside world penetrated 
into the fasbiesses of Hellas. Ou the educated Greeks of the Dispersion 
ibft influence of the Revolution was profound ; and it gave a new stimnlus 
WUie efforts already l)eing made to preserve and reconstruct tha glori- 
ous tnditioQS which the main body of the race had all but lost. The 
B»tioQaI problem was, moreover, not as yet complicated by those sec- 
tieoal jealousies which have since made the Macedonian Question the 
dmpur of Europe. Whatever the eleuienls which in \h& course of ^es 



174 The Hellenic movement: its literary side 



I 
I 



had gone to make up the populaiion of Greece, the Orthodox Church 
had abtwrbed thera Into herself and made them the iuherltors, if Dot of 
Hellas, »b least of the Empire of R}'7,aDtiura. In the Danuhian princi* 
palitiea, it is true, the oppresijions of the Greek hospodars and their 
agentti had made the name of Greek stiiik in the nostnls of the Houmaa 
peasantry ; hut in the south of iho ijeninsula Bulgar, KuLzo-Vlauh^ and 
Orthodox Albanian, had not yet learned the virtue of racial, as distinct 
from religious, hate ; and, Greeks hy creed, they felt themael\-es aUo 
Greeks by nationality. Rhigos, whose stirring revolutionary songis did 
so much to rouse in. Greece the passion of revolt, and wh(j«e execution 
in 17Jt4 made him the proto-martyr of the new Hellenic nationality, was;! 
a Vlitch who had found his iaspiration in Paris. 

Like 80 many subsequent revolutionary agitations, the Helleuio 
movement, which culmtriated in an anned mitioual uprising, received its 
first impulse from a propaganda purely liuguitstic and literary. To the 
enthusiasts of the Greek revival the first step towards gathering np 
the broken threads of the national tradition seemed to be to make the 
modern Greeks familiar with the ^reat monuments of their heroic post. 
The Church preserved Uw them the memory of the Orthodox enipii-e ; 
bat a new force was necessar}' to carry the national imagination back, 
behind "the grandeur that was Rome" to *'the glory that was Greece," 
and substitute) for the uationid »tylu uf Romans (^Hvumaioi') the for- 
gotten name of Hellenea. But the Greek language miiTored very accu- 
rately the heterogeneous constitution of the Greek race. The Helleuic 
foundation sur^-ived, but overlaid nibh elements representiug each 
succeeding wave of barl>ariam which had swept over and left its jetsam 
on the soil of Greece. To the peasant of the Morea,as to the townsman 
of Athens, the Greek of the literary masterpieces of antiquity was an 
unknown tongue ; and, if this is no longer the case, the cliange is due 
to the conscious linguistic rtivoliition which is for ever associated with 
the name of Adamantios Korais. He too,like Rhigas,had studied at Paris; 
and be made it his life's mission to interpret to his fellou'-eountn,'men 
the Hellenic literature which he hud there learned to love and admire. 
What Author's Bible did for Germany, the English Bible for England, ^ 
the Welsh Bible for Wales, that Koraia did for modem Greece by his " 
iranslationa of the Classics into a language which was, as it were, a 
compromise between the patois still used in ordinary conversation and 
the stately language of the originals. His success proved once for all 
that, where rivalry of races is in question, literary monuments are fl 
factors not to be ignored by far-seeing statesmen. The effort was 
grotesque enough when, with the name of Hellenes, the pupils of Ali 
of Janina assumed tlio style and affocfced the attributes of Homer's 
heroes; but tlie fiction appealed to the imagination of a Europe which 
knew only, and knew familiarly, the Greece of Plato and of Pericles. 
It gave an impetus to the wave of PhtlheUcnism which did so much to 



I 




1812-5] Turkey, Rmsia^ ami t/ie (Jongress of Vienna 175 



solve the practical question of the liberation of Greece from Ottoman 
misgovornmcnt; and it supplied to the infant State, born after so much 
travail, a lang-iiage and a tradition which linked it consciously with an 
iospiring^ pa^^l- 

Of the extent and importance of this racial and religious movement 

innide the Ottoman empire European statesmen^ untiL the eve of the 

War of Indejiendence, Lad little idea. Thei'e was, however, in the 

futuation revealed between the I'eace of Bucharest and the opening of 

tite Congress of Vienna enough to alarm thosR interested in avoiding a 

renewed rupture between Russia and Turkey, and to suggest to them the 

expediency of bringing the integrity of the Ottoman empire under the 

giianinti-e of t!ie treaties established by tlie Congress. That this was 

not accomplished was due, in the first instance, to the obstinate pride 

of the Porte itself. The privileges gianted to the Servians under the 

Treaty of 1812 had been left, perhaps purposely, vague and ill-defined ; 

the Ottoman (Jovernmcnt interpreted them according to iU own ideas; 

uid Russia complained, with reason, that the continued oppressions of 

the Turkish officials constituted a breach of the treaty. Jiut tliis was 

not all. By two secret articles annrxed to the Ti-eaty of Huehiirest, 

Kiissia, iu exchange for the demolition of the forts at Kilia and IsmaiUa 

QCi the Danube, was to obtain permanent possession of the road from 

tile Black Sea to Ti6ls through the valley of the PbiLsis, the use of 

which had been granted to her by the Porta in order to facilitate the 

Rii>wsian ojH'rations in the war with Persia. These articles the Sultan 

hod refused to ratify ; and the relations of the two countries had come 

to be fixed by the public treaty only. RuHsia, however, refused to 

evftcuate the territoiy iii question, and not only laid claim to almost all 

the highlands between the Caspian and the Black Sea acquired by 

coDqnest or by concessions from chiefs claiming sovereignty, but aimed 

at acquiring the lowlands of the Black Sea littoral, which Turkey 

Msert^d to be hers by long possession and undoubted right. As Sir 

Robert Liston pointed out, the crisis need never have arisen ; for Russia 

night W(dl have evacuated a position which she could always take again 

tbmild occasion arise. Unfortunately the Sultan liad l>acked his demand 

■ith a threat of war; Russia, refusing to be bullied, had replied by 

extending her pretensions; and at the period of the Congress of Vienna 

Butters had reached a deadlock. Tn vain the Brilish Government urged 

<H»n the Poi-te that the European guarantee of the integrity of Turkey 

mujii depend upon the settlement of these outstanding questions, "since 

>t i* impossible to guarantee the possession of a territor}' the limits of 

vhich are not fixed." It was proposed that the matters at issue should 

^'•' settled by the joint interventiim of Austria, Kmnce, and Great 

Britain. To this the Kmperor Alexander gave a provisional assent; 

bat the Saltan remained obdurate ; and, in the hurry of the close of the 

after Napoleon's return from Elba, the whole question was 



shelved. The relations between Russia and the Ottoman empire were 
thus left in a 6tat« of tension, which before long, during the Greek 
revolt, was to pixiduce effects justifying the fears of those who now 
sought to end it. 

Between the Congress of Vienna and the outbreak of the Greek 
revolt, the Eastern Question was obscured for the world of diploroacr 
by the more alisorbing problem of preserving western Eurojie from 
any fresh outburst of the suppressed revolutionary forces. Meanwhile 
the sectional elements of Greek disaffection were being gathered &q4I 
oi-ganistfd in the great armed secret society, tlie Hetmria Philike^ founded" 
al Odessa lu 1814, against which Metternich ia vain warned the Ottoman 
Government; in Kgj-pt Mehemet Ali, taugbtthe value of western arma- 
ments by Ills experience in the Napoleonic wars, was gradually building 
up hia power; and Ali of Janina, adding, by force or by fraud, pashalik 
to pashalik, was preparing, in his extreme old age, for the master-stroke 
which should sever the bond connecting him with the Sultan, and 
establish him as an independent sea-power on the Mediterranean. The 
times were obviously not unfiivourable for such a design. Ali, with ' 
characteristic instinct, had backed the winning side, and contributed in 
his own sphere to the ruin of Napoleon's power. He now proceeded to 
exploit the gratitude of the Powers, and of Great Britain especially, for 
hiri own ends. In the course of the war with France he had succeeded in 
gaining possession of most of tlio towns on the Adi-iatic const of Albania, 
still formingpart of the Venetian territory. Voniza, Prevesa,and Butrinto 
had in turn fallen to him; and in 1814 he was busy building forts along 
the coast, some of which were a menace to any Power holding the Ionian 
Islands. Of the former Venetian possessions on the coast, the little town 
of Parga alone, with its excellent harbour, had so far defied his power. 
ICarly in 1814 he had laid siege to it, and, in March, had succt^eded in 
bribing the commandant, a Greek in French service, to surrender it 
lo liim, when the inhabitants rose, expelled the French garrison, and 
liiindcd over the place to the British, who continued to hold it. Tlie 
fate of the place was now bound up with the destiny of the Ionian 
Islands. In a inemoi-andum written in December, 1814, Colonel (after-^ 
wards Sir Uichard) Church jiointedout to Lord Castlei'eagh the import- 
ance to Great Britain of retaining her grasp on these islands. The 
armed Greek trading-ships would, he argued- transfer themselves to the 
Ionian Islands, if these were placed under the Britifih ensign, and would 
thus increase the British sea-jiower in the Mediterranean. At the same 
time, by garrisoning the islands Kngland could prevent a flank attack 
by Fmnce or Kussia upon the Ottoman empire. Furtlier, if the towns 
captured b}* Ali Pasha on the coast of tlie mainland were taken from him 
and, with Paiga. placed under tlie British flag, the door would always 
be open for British entry into the Balkan peninsula in case of need. 
Unfortunately for the reputation of the British GorernmeDt, tb 



^ 




1814-22] Great Briiam and AH. Ali deposed 



177 



advice waa only followed in part. By the Convention, signed at Paris on 

November 5, 1815, between Great biitaint Russia, Austria, and Prussia, 

the Ionian Islands were indeed placed, not under British Bovereignty — 

since both the Emperor Alexander and the English genend who bad 

taken over the islands bad promised them *>a free and independent 

government " — but under Uritisli "protection,'* whioh, as Capi,tdi«tria8 

suj^gested, ** should be so arranged that Great Britain would have 

virtual if not nominal sovereignty." 'Die fate of Parga. however, was 

different. So eui'ly an September, 1814, Ali Iiad written to Loid 

Caatlereagh claiming it on the ground of the guarantee given in 1802, 

and bad followed this up by dispatching to England a miijsion fortified 

by a letter from the British ambassador at Constantinople. Sir Robert 

Listen, ill wliioh he called to the niemoiy of Ministers the Pasha's 

**siipereminent qualities" and bis services against the Fi-ench. The 

positioa was a difficult one. The town bad been freely delivered by the 

Pargiots to the British, with a view to preserving them from the very 

man who now claimed its delivery on the ground of a guarantee solemnly 

given. The choice lay between maintaining for ever a British garrison 

la a pbuje whiob seemed to Ministers of a value quite LQcommensurate 

with the risk of complications to which it was likely to give rise, and 

surrendering a population which liad placed itself confidently tinder 

British protection to a ruler who, in spite of his "superemiuent 

qiudities," was notoriously an unscrupulous ruffian. The latter couree 

w»s adopted, on the plea that in oc-oupying the town the English bad 

nwde no promise of doing so [wrmanently : the Pargiots were offered an 

asvlum in the islands, and, by a Convention signed by the British and 

Turkish commissioaers on May 17, 1817, the last citadel of" Greek 

independence was handed over to Ali Pat^ba; although this C Convent ion, 

H well as that of Nu.vember 5, 1815, was not ratified by the Sultan 

UDtU April :;4. 1819. 

The " Lion of Janina " was now at the height of his power : the 
irild bill-tribes of Albania and Greece were subdued by the bloody 
justice of a tjTant who wouUI allow no robbery but his own. Kormany 
years the Porte, gratified by tbo mm-e regular inflow of tribute from 
JUbania and by the bribes which All knew how to place at critical 
BKunents, had shut its eyes to the menace of the Pasha's growing power. 
Thii, however, became at length so obvious* that bis enemies at Court 
ooeded but a suitable pretext for rousing the Sultan to action. This 
*a« afforded in 1820 by the unsuccessful attempt of Ali to procure the 
■■BsaiDation of his enemy Pachobey, a member of the Sultan's bouse- 
luld. A decree of depoRition was now issued against the sacrilegious 
AU, who had dared '• to fire shots in Constantinople, the residence of 
tW Khalif. and the centre of security " ; and the bulk of the Ottoman 
loroes, under Kurshid Pasha, were "dispatched to enforce it. For two 
yetra the intrepid Ali held his owu^ though betrayed by the vassahi 



CM. a. X. 



IS 



178 Death of AIL — Livasion of YpsiUinti 

whose allegiance he had maintained by teiTor alone, and even by his 
own sonss whose heatlii were none the less destined to ^11 to the Sultan '« 
rengeance. At lasl^in the spring of 1822, the old " Lion," tmp^Kid in liis 
island castle of Janina and still, in spite of the outbreak of the Greek 
revolt, surrounded by KursLid's hosts, waa forced to sue for terms. He 
received the measure be had so often dealt to oUiers. Kurshid granted 
him an interview, ivceived him graciously, and dismissed tiim with tho 
most friendly assurances. As he left the tent be was stabbed in the 
back ; his head was cut off and sent to Constantinople. 

Meanwhile, to the Helairi.st«, the pitiocciijiation of the Ottoniau 
forces in Aibiinia presented the best possible oppr>rtunity for execuUng 
tbo plans which had been long matnring. The oi'ganisation of the 
revolt being reudy* it only reiimined to find a leader. The firat to be 
approached was Capodistrias. who refused on the gruujid that the times 
were not propitious for such a mnvemeut. lu any case he may well 
have thought that, as Foreign Minister to the Emperor Alexander, he 
could best serve the Greek cause by remaiiiinpf where he was. The 
leadei-ship rejcijted by Capodistrias was accepted by Prince Alexander 
Ypsilanti, son of a former bospodar of Wallachia and member of an 
old I'hanariot family which bnasted its descent fr«>m the Imj^erial 
Comnent. The prince, who had fought with distinction in the war 
against Napoleon and bad been a popul^ir figure during the gaieties of 
the Congress of Vietrua, was an ulVicer in the Russian service and aide- 
de-camp to the Tsar. This alone would have suggest^ to the world 
the powerful backing of Russia ; and, when the prince, accompanied by 
other Greek officers in the Russian service, croaaed the I*ruth into 
Moldavia on March 6, 1821, be issued a proclamatiou 'u\ which, while 
calling on the people to rise against the Ottoman tyranny, ho speoificallj^ 
statad that he; had the suppoi-t of " a Great Power." ^| 

It is this claim alone which gives to the Greek rising in the Princi- 
palities any iuipartunce in history. For the rest, Ypsilanti's enterprise 
was futite alike in its avowed aim, in its execution, and in the scene be 
bad aelectfid for its base. The restoration of the Greek emi>ire of the 
£a8t was not likely to appeal to Russia; the summons to the Vlach 
peasantry to rise in such a cause was unlikely to find any re^fmnse 
among a people who hated the Greeks worse than the Turks, since they 
had for many geueratious been their immediate task-masters ; and. lastly, 
the incompetence of Yjisilanti himself ruined any chances which, in 
view of the usual unpreparcdness of the Ottoman Government, a rapid 
advance might have given him. Instead of pressing forward boldly to 
Bucharest and ocenpying the Hue of the Danube before the Turks could 
gather an armament, he loitered at Jaasy, gratifying his vanity and 
offending his followers by playing the monarch, while alienating the 
sympathy of all right-thinking men by his criminn,l weakness in con- 
doning the hideous massacres of inoffensive Mussulinans at Uabitz, Jassy, 




I 



* 



and elsewhere, by which the Gi-eek cause wns disgraced. As for the 
jtruiniseU support of Kussia, on which ho find expreu^ed nuch ooiiSdtint 
r«ti;in(:e, he was Roon undeii'.eived. iMetternich at Laibach liad Utile 
difficulty in persuading- the Emperor Alexander, repentiiijj of liis earlier 
encouragement of Liberalism, that Yi^silanti and his followers were but 
revohitionistN of the usual dangorous type ; and a letter, signed by 
Cai>*«Ii3tria3, was dispatched to the Greek leader, upbraiding him for his 
inisufiQ of the Tsar's name, and ordering himat once to lay down hii^nrms. 
He would have been well advised to obey. Instead, ho declared that the 
Tsar's public disavowal of him was but a stratagem to preserve the peace 
of Euroi)e, and thai he had been secret!}- assured of Russian support. 

The pretence did not save him. Di^enstom broke out between the 
Greeks and those Vlach boyars who had joined them. The Ottoman 
forces meanwhile pressed on into the Principalities, nowhere meeting 
with effective resistance, until, on June 1% IHilU the crushing defeat 
of the main Greek foree at Dragiushan ended the revolt in Wallachia. 
ypsilanti himself, on a false pretext, deserted his followers and fled 
BCi'oes the Anstrian frontier, to bo kept a close prisoner for seven years 
by a Governmoiit wliii;h Imd little sympathy with revolutionary leadere. 
In Moldavia the rising was quelled with equal ease. When it was clear 
that no aid was to be expected from Russia, the boyai^ deposed the 
hospodar Michael Suti^o, wlio had supported Vpsilauti : and he escaped 
acrotM the frontier. The Turks entered .Ja.<«yon June ^^5 : and the Greeks 
who still remained t^igftthor retired to the l*ruth. Here, at Skaleni, in a 
camp hastily entrenched, they made their last stand, displaying a course 
Agpunst overwhelming odds which did much to retrieve the disgrace and 
folly which had charaoteriised the movement as a whole. With the 
crashing of this forlorn hope, the rising in the north came to an end, aud 
togetberwithit tlie dream of re-estidjlishing the Greek empire of the East. 

To Metternich the Tsar's public disavowal of sympathy with the 
Greek insurgent^ and the subsoquent oollapsc of Ypsilanti's movement, 
seemed to remove all immediate peril of dangerous complications in 
Mxtcrii Europe. To the diplomatic world the revolt in the ilorea, 
»hich liad come to a heail at the beginning of April, 1H21, appeapisd 
a matter of comfKirative utiimporUmcc, whicli might well be allowed to 
bnro iUelf out •' beyond the [wle of civilisation." It was not long, 
bowevcr, before what bad seemed at first but another local lising of tlic 
ni/ahs against Turkish misgnvernmont, began to assume a character 
Uiil pro;>ortions which filled the Eui-opean chancerioe with apprehension. 
Afohbishop Oermanos raised the standard of the Cross at Patras on 
April 2. 1821 ; and not many weeks had passed before the world 
V^;an to realise how essentially the insuiTection iti southern Greece 
dif^red from that which had failed so egregfiously in the Priucipalities. 
The ffetairia, in fact, had never approved of Ypsilanti's misdirected 
Mterprise ; and its agents had been active in stirring up a general 




insurrection in tho^e piirts of the empire where, as yet, no conscions 
diviifions of race and of inlercste separated a |^x>pulation united in 
common hatred of the inlidel and the oppressor. The rising in the 
Principalities was a class movement, which would in any case have 
broken on the stubborn LostiUty of tho population it pretended to 
emunoipate ; the rising* in the Morea was the general upheaval of a race 
opainst alien rule — the first of those nationalist revolutions which, during 
the nineteeutU century, were to transform the map o( Europe. What 
gave to the war of Greek independence its peculiar character of ferocity 
was, that — as usual in tho East — race was confounded with religion, and 
that to the hatred of the opprej^ed for the oppressor was added that 
of the true believer for the infldel. 

Tiiougli the apostles of Greek independence had long been agitating 
in the Morea and the islands, the rising was not the outcome of any 
carefully devised plan; nur, when itbroke out, was there aJiy organisation 
prepared to direct it It began in isolated outrages on Ottoman officials 
and ma-ssacres of small bands of Albanian Mussulman mercenaries, 
which culminated in April in a general insurrection of the Christian 
population and the promiscuous slaughter of all Mussulmans. Within 
six weeks of the outbreak of tho ]-ovolt not a Mohammadan was left in 
all the Morea, save the remnant who had succeeded in escaping into the 
fortified towns. These, too, as one by one the strong places were 
starved into submission, were massacreJ with ever}' aggravation of 
cruelty and treacher}'. The drst phase of ttie rising culminated in the 
storming of Tripolitza, the capital of tlie Vilayet, followed by tlie 
butchery in cold blood of 2000 Mussulman prisonera without distinction 
of age or sex. liy the close of the year, with the exception of some 
half-dozen foitresses closely invested by wild hordes of brigands and 
peasants, the whole Vilayet of the Morea had passed from tho obedience 
of the Sultan, and the insurrection hod spread beyond the Isthmus of 
Corinth, througliuut continental Greece, and over the mountain passes 
into Thessaly and Macedonia. 

The details of the war that followed, however much they apj>ealed 
to the romantic spirit of the age, are of very subordinate interest in the 
history of Europe ; and it must suffice to notice the general chanicter 
of the struggle, reserving for more particular mention those ovcnts which 
more especially influenced the attitude of the European Powers towards 
it. Broadly, tho war may be divided into three periods: the first 
(1821-4), during which the Greeks, with the asnistance of volunteers from 
western Europe, were pitted against the Ottoman Government alono ; 
the second, from March, 1824. when the disoiplined forces of Mchcmet 
All of Egj-pt were thrown into the scale against tho insurgents ; the 
third, from the effective intervention of the European Powers, in the 
autumn of 1827, to the close. For many months the war was no 
more than a chaotic struggle between hostile hordes of barbarians. 



I 




1821-6] 



Causes of the Greek success 



181 



The few educated Phaiiariot Greeks, like Demetrioa YpsJlanti or Prince 
Mavrocordato, who at the first news of the outbreak had hastened to 
place themstilvea at the head of the uattoiial cause, proved quite incom- 
petent as Leaders in irregular warfare and powerle&a to control the bai^ 
barous spirit of cruelty which they deplored. Their woU-meant efforts 
to provide the nascent Hellenic Stiite with a Libeiul Constitution on 
the most approved western model were not more successful ; and the 
real h-adere of the jwople during the earlier stages of the war were the 
brigi\nd chiefs and the primates and deniogeronts whose ti-aditional 
local authority saved the structure of Greek society from dissolving 
into utter anarchy. 

Two main factors contributed to the succoas of the Greeks. The 
detention of the flower of the Ottoman forces, under Kursliid Pasha, 
the ablest of the Sultan's generals, before .Ali's island stronghold of 
Janina, enabled tlie revolt to make uninterrupl^d headway during the 
first critical mouths. The revolt of the islands, by cutting off from the 
Ottoman Government its only reserves of gofid seamen, a-ssumd to the 
insurgents the command of tho sea. lu size of ship:^ and weight of metal 
the Turks were superior; but, when their line-of-battle ships at last 
pat to sea, manned by motley and untminud crows of Algorino pirates, 
Genoese mercenaries, and ConstitntiuopoUtau quay-porters, they fell an 
easy prey to tlie swift-sailing brij^s and fire-ships of the Greeks. " The 
Greeks," wrote Wellington, "have the superiority at sea; and those 
who have this superiority must bo successful." This truth was abun- 
dantly illustrated in the course of the war. The great expedition of Ali, 
Pasha of Drama, which in the summer of 1823 threatened to crush the 
insurrection in the Morea, was forced to retire owing to the failure of 
the Ottoman fleet to come to its support, and, taken at a disadvantage 
in the defile of Dcvernaki, was exterminated on August 6. The heroic 
defence of Missolonghi (May 7, 1825-April 22, 1826) was rendered 
possible only by the fact that the Greek admiral Miaoulis could enter 
the lagoons and throw supplies into the town. The appearance ia the 
summer of 1824 of the well-equipped fleet of Mehemet Ali of Egypt 
changed the fortune o£ the war at sea, just as, in the following year, 
Ibrahim's disciplined troops turned it on land, .\gainst the barbaric 
honlcs of Drnmali or of Rcshld. the Gi'cek klcphta and peasants had more 
Uian held their own ; they were powerless against the modern arma- 
ment and modern tactics of the Egyptian leader. From the moment of 
Ibrahim*8 landing in the Morea it was realised that, if the Greeks were 
to be saved from practical extermination, they must oppose western 
methods to western methods; which meant, in effect, that those of the 
European Powers which desired their preservation must intervene. 

The attitude of the Powers at tlie outset of the revolt has already 
been described- So long as it waa merely a question of an internal 
revolt against the Ottoman Government, none of them was disposed 



. '- *ifUtftttth,j <;r E/tfripf. BifTtm [1821-1 

,, v.^-_-.i<T ,T, ,,r^_..p^j^,^^ -viiioh Tvnniii iiavp i;axried with it incalculable 
■■'"-'»■'; 'w.'H'i tn.l ^ila^^ii in ;enn:\nlv the "rhoie intematioiial atracture 
-n ^1- r,\.'- -aralilisiifift 'ir -|ii» K;irnprtin AilKince. Bat the rapid march 
•r .-,.-..:. -nt^n -Milriti^il ■li»' (tiiit'v It .iiiHit'ne»a which had triumphed at 
'>Trnn,. . .ift hnr,e>i u' M»;tteriiii'h -vero liosheil by the initial triumphd 
yf W nfliirTpnt;*, iii'l -In* iinlicv ot lertvtnjf rhe revolt to bum itself 
^t^t - >>i-.inH -,hf ;w1p if -iviUsjiiioti " wns frustrated by the refusal of 
-y,^ T.aT*kri T«»nr)l*'.* -o fnllnn' -iie leini iit their (nivemmentB. In Europe 
Iff .9ir-r^ -hf" .ipw-^ ■!■* :(!*• •• r'^siir'icriim or Greece" had been received with, 
*r 'p'j'onT-^r >f 'itilioiiiiiled •^nthusiiwrn. which grew wicheauh uew victory 
yf h" .n<';ri'i"ii iriin. 

F,v-T,- niiiQ^ in -.hf t</'mn^T xnd cnnditiona of the times tended to 
'»Ti/'OMr)*Tt» rJii-* Piii'ilipll»'nii' .inlinir. Of the acciml eonditioiis obtaining 
,1 -)\f '.f.-tiV. 'he '.v.>«rt^rn Wiir'.d waa th^n even more i:ompletely ignorant 
r.Hn no-r: !)iu ill (''hri'itt'n'ltini sympathLsed withtbia revultof Cbriatians 
^y-tm"*- .ii'''"!!^! ■Tjiir-^nsion ; ortntinental LilieraLs. gauged by ^'lettemich's 
y.l:''». ;'-i'irKl \ voirn-- for tluvlrown grievances in championing the cause 
>;i 1 Tiafkm ^^riorrlln:^ ro be free; and the cultured claaaea, educated 
airww* "ifliisiv-ly in the lore of ol;wsiciii antiquity, for^t the long 
fAr,*nrU-i of ''^'■.rrii|.tif>n and deg!'a<lation. and saw in the rough peasants 
f4 i-h*! \UiT^.% and inarinftrs of the wlamid only the dest^ndiuits of 
I^onid4.-i and (hly-t^onA. Philhellr^nic societies, of which the members 
WAro '\r^■vIl frtrn all ftlasfw^s, sprang up all over western Europe; and 
wifhin -1. f"v montht of thn, outbreak of the revolt money and volunteers 
w'T'i P'liirippv in iff thn as'*istanf:e of the Cireeka. Vetenmsof Napoleon's 
di-*f;^rrii"l iirTrii's, likf; f.oloijfl Kabvier, English officers, like Colonel 
Tliorrr-t-i Kfird'Ti aii'l Sir Ridiard Church, brought to the insurgeuts the 
irivnln;ibt'> »\'\ nf tb'-ir military experience. In the autumn of 1823 
(lyr'irr. t)rf< most rf]i'\»ti\('.i\ and romantic figure of the age, himself came, 
prcpiirfd lo givo his lif<; for tho cauae which he had already illustrated 
Jiy iii-i i;*»niiix. In spit^i of the (wtentatious neutrality of the Powers, 
llii> \\i-u KIT«>n<li r-oitld ytM]y complain that the Ottoman Government 
wiiH (iL;liliiii; mil llm fircf^kH oiily, lint all Europe. 

Till' (IiIm fiM-i Ihf rortc wnH HtMrU largely to blame. The news of the 
inimMiii'VM of MiiHHulirnuiH in ibn Mor(>a was received in Constantinople 
wilh Mni> nf HiM^o iiiilt)Mi-HtH nf hlnnd-liwt, inspired at once by panic and 
liv rutHiliiM'Jtn. In whirli Dm usuully I'lisy-natiired Turks are liable. A 
will) f'l V I'mi ri'lidiiilion wiMit up; iind Sultan Mahnmd, though a man of 
mnili'i.tip mill I'nmiiiiiiitivi'ly i'tdii;liUMU'd views, allowed himself to be 
cidiiiil iiwny by ii piiioxyf^ni of rii-je into cruelties which were as 
im|>i>liiii> 11" Ihey «oi.' hmrilile. Tlioiigli prepiiratinna for suppressing 
ibe li-jiniy were bmrirMl on wiili f.'verwh haste, nothing was ready; and 
(lie Suliitn (1)<Mi):l)i lu stiike lernu- into the insuri^ents by an example 
wliii'li none eenlil f;ul to nndei-stiuul. Ily ibe law of the Ottoman 
iMn)Mii> tite ralti^nvb ttf (\nis(;intinople w.is ivsr-onsible for the good 



Execution of Gregorhs. AUUttde of Jiui<nia 183 



bebavioar of his Hock, iiy the Sultan's orUei-s, then, on the morning of 
Euter Eve (April 22, 1821) the venerable Grugorios wa^ seized, imme- 
itely after the morniDg Eucharist, »iul, with two of \m Bt»hops, all 
^Ihree in their sacerdotal vetitmeutti, haugud before the gate of the 
patriarchal palace. The bodies, after remaining for a fevk^ days were cut , 
dora, dra^^d bv a ifewisb rabble through the streets, and thrown liito^ 
tbe Bosphorus. The effect of this outrage n-as immcuse. Even the 
HtDperor KrnnoLS was roused to protest against this ignominious doing 
Ui'iiMth of a Christian prehite ; while Mctternich deplored the barbarous 
folly which had intmdueed a new and more perilous element of discord 
into a situation alrea<ly sulTiciently delicate. lit Uiissiii public indignation, 
knew no bounds. The body uf Gregurius had been picked up by a passing 
GrM-k morchant-veftsel and carried to Odessa, where It was buried u-ith 
(be honours of a martyr; and throughout Uussia a cry arose for a crusade 
igiinst the infidel, to avenge the head of the Orthodox Church and 
parge the metj-oiiolitun see of Orthodox Cbristondom of the pollution of 
iheUuasulman occupation. For a moment Alexander wavt-red, but the 
um found him, not in Russia, but at Laiback, where Metteruich waisaL 
kind to persuade him that the revolt in Greece wiis but the work of the 
iUDe**aecLs " whose evil machinations it was his glorious mission to have 
fnstnted in other [»art^ of Europe, and to point out that a war witli 
Turkey would imperil the whole fobric of that Confederation of Eui-ope 
tltt(A It had been the Tsar's life-mission to build up. Tiiis reasoning was 
sufficient to convince the Kmpemr, who had no desire for war ; his will 
pTBTtUed over that of his people ; and the immediate peril was over-])ast. 

The situation, however, quite ajiart from the continued succesuus uf 
ibe Greeks, remained exti'emely critical. Though peace was preserved, 
linsBia replied to the gage of defiance flung down by the exocutiou of the 
P&triarch by withdrawing her represenUitive from CoJistantinople and 
concentrating 100,000 men on the frontiers of the Princiixilities. 
IKplomatic relations, she declared, could not be resumed until Turkey 
Ud uttsfied her just demands in respect of outstanding grievances, and 
j^vea guarantees for the cessation of furtlier outrages on the (Christian 
population, placed, by treaty, under the protet-tion of the Orthodox 
Tur. The Emperor Alexander, indeed, maintained that the withdrawal 
ofkii Minister made for peace ; for, had he remained, he would have had 
tonporttbe outrages passing imder liis eyes. Moreover, the Purte in a 
mawnt of temper might have ftut him into the Seven Towers. " 'Hiis 
pmvM," wrote hebzeltern to Mctternich on September IG, " that tlie 
Emperor does not know how narrowly ihc Minister escaped thi::j fate, 
tad thos« who do know are careful not to lull him." As for Mexandur's 
PMMal attitude, Lebzeltcm i-ei>orted him us saying: ^*I have no 
•nliiUon ; my Empire is already too big for me — I am not hloodthiraty, 
WurToijo knows it — and tins war wonlil not he to Itsssias interests." 

The whole uuergiws of the Powers interested in the maiuteuauce of 



r 




1 



the 9tatu9 qua in the Kikst were uow directed to restoring diplomatic 
relations between Russia and Turke}- iind so removing the peril of war. 
In this matter Metternich and Castlereagh, since Troppau poles ai>art 
in their general policy, found themselves once mure united. The con- 
ferences at Hanover, in October, which to the world seemed but one 
more conspiracy against popular liberties, were devoted to tlie discussion 
of the attitude of the two I'owere ton-ards the Turkish crisis, and ihe 
policy determined upon was perfectly simple and straightforward. 
Austria and Ciroat Britain agreed to bring pressure to bear upon the 
I'orte to remove the just causes of grievance which Ilussia had against 
iU by satisfying thosu of her churns which were bused upon undoubted 
treaty stipulations, and by guaranteeing to the Christian rajahs a 
tolerable measure of civil and political rights. To the success of this 
policy two obstacles presented themselves : the stubborn prido of the 
Ottoman Government, and the Cireek sympathies of Capodisirins, who 
was "-trying to serve one master and two causes," and using ■' Russian 
power for Greek ends." Capodisti-ias was, however, since Laihach, a 
dimiuishiug quantity ; and Metternich left no stone unturned in order 
to complete the overthrow of his influence. Before the assembling of the 
Congress of Verona, the Austrian Minister was free from a dangerous 
rival who latterly had only maintained his office by his " suppleness " and 
"the want of a man to take his place." 

The death of Castlereagh made no alteration in the policy of Great 
Urituin Inwards the Easiern Question; for George Canning took up the 
matter where his predecessor had dropped it and developed it on the 
lines which he had laid down. In a dispatch of September 27, 1822, to M 
the Duke of Wellington at Verona he made his attitude perfectly clear. 
British action in the Greek Question must be decided according to the 
general course of British policy since the conclusion of the war. " Our 
object in commc a with our allies has been to maintain peace, aware that 
a new war, in whatever quarter it might he kindled, might presently 
involve all Europe in its flames. Our object, as with respect to 
ourselves, has been to avoid all interference in tho internal concerns of 
any nation — an interference not authorised in our case, by the positive 
rights or obligations of Treaty, nor justified, as we think (except when 
a Treaty, or some very special circumstances may authorise it) by the 
principles of International Law." The Turkish Question had a double 
aspect. In the struggle between the Porte and its Greek subjects 
England " had neither the right to interfere nor the means of effectual 
interference" ; and, whatever her sympathies, she was bound to respect in 
the case of Turkey that national independence which she dcmandi^d that 
others should respect in herself. In tho outstanding issues between 
Russia and Turkey on the other hand, it was the duty and the right of 
England to mediate ; though "the rights which treaties give, treatieei 
must be held to limit." 



I 

4 




1822-3] Miissacre of Srio. — Drainali in U^. Morea 185 

Apart from the old standing grievance of tbe nou-execution of the 
secret clauses of the Treaty of Biichai'est, the main causes of complaint 
which Russia had against the Porte were two. Though the northern 
revolt had been completely suppressed, the Principalities wore still — 
contrary to distinct treaty arrangements with Russia — occupied and 
devastated by Turkish troo^M; and, equally contrary to the letter o£ 
existing treaties, certain Greek briga sailing under the Russian flag 
having been seized in the Dardanelles, the Porto had claimed the right 
to search all ships passing the Straits. To persuade the Porte to 
yield on these points became the immediate object of Great Hritnin 
and Austiia alike; and at Constantinople their representatives worked 
usidaously to this end. But, in the first half of the year 18:^:^, 
the events of the war were liardly calculated to produce a yielding 
temper in the Ottoman Government. On tho eve of the Congress 
of Verona, indeed, it seemed as though the Eastern Question would 
be settled for the time by the swift collapse of the revolt. On Apiil 
22 the hideous reprisals of the Ottomans culminated in the awful 
massacre of Seio, hy which the most Qourishing community of the 
Greek archipelago was niped out of existence ; and a few months later 
the unopposed march of the Pasha of Drama into the Morea promised 
to place insurgent Greece at tho moiey of the Sultan. The news of the 
massacre of Scio, as was natural, roused intense feeling in England; and 
public opinion was loud in favour of intervention to rescue the Greeks 
from the annihilation whicli seemed to be iiiipemUng. Canning, though 
Jus evident desire " to take the part of the Greeks" excited the anxiety 
of his colleagues in the Cabinet, set his face resolutely against this 
•gitation. He denied that Great Britain was under any obligation, or 
possessed the right, to interfere. As for demanding from the Poi-te 
guarantees for good government, by whose sanction were these guarantees 
to be made effective? If by that of Russia, the war, which it had 
beeu the main object of the Powers to avoid, would become a certainty; 
if by that of tho European Alliance, either its dignity would be com- 
promised in the event of the Ottoman Government refusing to accept 
its dictation, or a war woulil ressiilt "of which no human foresight could 
anticipatti the issue " — a dilemma which has been eversince the easenue 
of the Near Eastern Question. 

Tho situation was again profoundly modified by tho events of the 
autumn and winter of 1S22. The disastrous retreat of the Pasha of 
Dmma had left the Gi-eeks masters of the Morea, and in December 
Nauplia fell ; while, in western Hellas, the stuhlwrn defence of the Suliots 
had saved the Greeks from the destruction threatened by the parallel 
march planned by Kurshid. When Omar Vrioni, his lieutenant, at 
hut marched southward, the army of Dramoli was already destroyed; 
Petrobey, chief of the Maina, was able to hurry to the assistance of the 
defenders of ^lissolonghi with a thousand men; and on January 23, 





1823, after ao aaMceenfari wmmatt, Uv Ouoann eaonnuuier nuaed the 
siege of the towo and n6nd MrUmKlc. WUe cbs ITi—iii m ipia 
of iheir Mtieidal Ammmmh, •«»» Ikoe ge tm t en tfaak nam mi had, 
(bey had also onee aoi* grianl the rni—inil oC tfaa aeft£ » ronlt 
mainly dfut to the tenor inepiMBd fay (be Gi^ek ftieahige, ever ttnce^ aa. 
ihv evening of Jaoe ISt in » » mge lor Um ■imairr eC Saiv Ceoane 
had deetmjed the fhg'fthip c4 the Torkiah adiniral wub 
•oaU on Inard. With the Ottoniaa feaenb defeatwi aad 
sad Dui Otumtao fleet, domormlieed sod helplaaB. Ijing Cor i 
the gntu* of the I>«rf]4rie)lee, it wm clear that the Tisfca 
mastera of the sitaation, nor were liketj »ooa to beeaatt as. The 
situation was. in fact, exactly that contemplated in the i ttt ama i Qna ol 
OaatlerAagfa at Verona frir the evenCitAl inlerference of Gseat Brifiain — a 
ntaation pnrallel in manj particuUra with that created in the We» bj 
the revolt of the SpaDlab Colonieii. The reoognitioo of the md«p«Ddeiu» 
of ibe South American States became neccaury, owiDg to the need Cor 
ref^ulnrisiuK the great tra/le which bad apmng up betveen them and 
Great I)rit»tn during the n^vnliilionAry period, and which was aeriowly 
hampered hy the pirates who, owing no allegiance to any respotnible 
Goveruinr.nt, todk advantage of the obiiolete colonial lan-s of old Spain 
to prey iijioii thti romnierce of nil rintion». The case was aimilar in the 
Aegean and the Adriatic. The maritime Greeks, nominaUy subject to the 
Saltan, turned more and more to frank piracy* and, all Tarkiah Teas eto 
having hevn nwept frnra the Mcn, carrie<l into Nauplia as prizea of war the 
traderfl of all natioiiH imparUally. Since it was useless to make the 
Ottoman Ciovernmcnt lenponHible for n uUitc of things which they were 
powerless to control, it became nccflMftry to fix the responaibility on the 
dc facto Government of (ircece. On Miirch 25, 1K2^, accordingly, the 
British Goveniiment fm-miilly recn^niBud the Greeks as belUgerenbi. 
"The reoogniliun of the IjclUgerent character of the Greeks," wrote 
Canning, "was nocossltjited by tlio impossibility of treating as pirnU* a 
population of a million souls, utij of briiijfing within the boumU ol 
oiviUsi'd war a oontoAt wliicli had Imkin niiirked at the outset on both sides 
by disgusting hiirlwritios. " 

This lunguago, wliich in fnot impliud no more than what appeared on 
the surfiioc. soctnc<l to tha staU^smoti of the Alliance to veil a threat of 
most sinistor ini[i(irt to the Kiiroppan system. A year liefore. Prince 
Lioven had re-ported to tlio Tsar liis impi'tission that Canning waa *'more 
iuaular than lCnn>))Oiku." This opinion, which Canning himself would 
douhtlesM hivvti ctinsiderod a romjiIimunU seemwl now confirmed by a 
«tep whicli npp<>iiivil to advi'rUse tho intontiou of Great Britain to act in 
an international question not only indopundoutly of her aUius, but in 
A sense dinmctrioally op|MMed lo what, in their opinion, formed the 
fund.iniental principles of their union. Her attitude at Troppau, at 
Laibooh, tmd at Verona, had bouu one of protest; but the protest had 



I 
i 



I 



W23-3] Francis and Alexander al Czernovitz 



187 



not u yet been foUowed by aotire opposition. Now, for the Brat time, 

sire hail cast lier aegis over a revolutionary iDOVcment, and by doing so 

(i(>|<atx-atly ranged burself among the torces hodtUe to the ideals of the 

i^vmd Alliance. Mettornich, who had hitherto steadily opposed any 

Wicertcd intervention iu the a£faim of Turkey, now changed his attitude 

in bee of the apparent danger of an isolated intervention of Knglaud, 

iixl made approaches to Russia with a view to joint action. Ho found 

(he Emperor Alexander in a mood to r&spund to these advances. He 

bu) alvirays been, he said, in favour of joint action. So early as the 

1» ' _' of 1822 Prince Lieven, in a conversation with Lord 

I- I rry, had discussed the quostiou of a common protocol to be 

praenced to the Porte, demanding the fnltibnent of Russia's rights 

"ftothnrised by U-eaties and by the right of protection which these cou- 

»de over the (jteeks.'' Londonderry had refused to be a patty to any 

inAtmment demanding from tlie Sulum a guarantee of better adniinistra- 

boaof the Christian provinces, on the ground that tliis would have been 

to recogni&e the right of Russia to interfere in the internal nfifaii-sof 

Turkey. England, he said, had no common rights, and therefore could 

uke no common measures, with Ku-ssia, and in any case could never 

s^ a dnuumont containing the words '* Christian provinces under the 

pRitection of his Imperial Majesty." In view of this refusal, the 

recognition of the Greek tl;ig seemed to Alexander to argue the intention 

of fireal Britain to arrogate to herself alune that rit^ht of protection 

«■ i'-h she bad denied to Russia, and to take advantage of the Tsar's 

iiinns to the European Alliance to oust him from his legitimate 

iuJucnce in the ncnr East 

In these circumstances, Russia and Austria, hitherto estranged 
hf their conflicting interests in the Eastern Question, once more drew 
together. In October, 1823, the Emperors Francis and Alexander met 
u Czernovitz, where the whole question of an eventual intervention of 
tbe European Concert was discussed. That such an intervention would, 
•Doaer or later, be inevitable was now admitted. It wa« more difficult to 
decide what form it should take and on what principle it should be 
Uwd. The unexpected persistence of the Greeks had ruined Mettcmieh's 
fiiaa of isuUiting the war, which Canning had now brought ** within the 
faleof civilisation " ; it was no longer possible to treat the insurgents as 
oomnHm place rebels against legitimate authority. Tlie dilemma was 
kulaod a formidable one. To help the Sultan to crush his r«^l>ellinuR 
mMlfi was obviously impossible, even bad .\lcxander been himself out of 
•rmpathy with the sentiment of his people : to side with the insurgents 
igMnst the Ottoman Government would have been to give the lie to 
»^nr principle on which the European system had hitherto been based, 
rtumiag wrote eiultingly of the diplomatic " bog " in which the statosmon 
vi tho Alliance were floundering, and from which there was no escape. 
The conflicitng interests in the Eastern Question which were destined 



to resolve the great Alliance into its elements wei'e indeed act slow in 
revealing themselves. The Emperor Alexander was growing restive nnda^ 
the insulting persistence of the Ottoman (iovernment in refusing tfl 
redress the universally mlnjittod wrongs of Russia; hisraJiid, thougli be 
still clung to the idea of European solidarity, was tending more and 
mora in the direction of the tiaditional policy of the Ta&vs ; and thfl 
wa]>party at St Tetersburg, which had languished since the diauiissal'' 
of Capodisthas, was once more in the ascendant. Alexander learned, in- 
deed, at Czernovitz that the Turks had given way on some of the more 
important matt«ra In dispute — the evacuation of the principalides, and 
thrt free navigation of the Stmitji ; and in response to these concessions 
he sent Minciaky to Constantinople, as his agent to watch over the 
carrying out of the new treaties. The question which lay nearest to 
the heart of the Russian people, however, — that of the guarantees of 
good government for the Orthodov rayahi — remained unsettled ; and it 
was intimated to the Porte tliat the re-ejitablishment of full diplomatic 
relations must depend upon the satisfaction of still further claims. The 
meaningof this vague demand was revealed before the Tsarleft Czernovitz. 
He there made the informal suggestion that a f'onferonce of the Powers 
should be suraraoned to St Pet-ersburg to nrrange for a concerted inter- 
vention in the Turkish Question, on the basis of the erection of Greece 
and the islands of the Archipelago into three autonomous principalities^ 
utider Ottoman suzei-ainty. and guaranteed by the European Concert. 
The proposal was formally repeated in a Russian circular note of 
January, 1824, in which it was pointed out tlmt "the efforts of the 
Imperial Goveruraent to bring about a collective intervention were thta 
best proof of \Xs disinterestedness." f 

Neither Motteruich nor Canning was greatly impressed by this 
argument. Austria could not contemplate with equanimity the estab- 
lishment in the south of the Balkan peninsula of so mi-independent 
piincipidities. on the model of Moldavia and Wallachia, subject, if not 
to the formal protection, at Iea.st to the preponderant influence, of 
Russia. Metternich'ssensationalcountcr-movewas toproposethe erecttoo 
of Greece into a sovereign and independent State. As for Canning, be 
objected to Great Britain becoming a party to a conference, only that 
she might serve '* as a buffer between the colliding interests of Russia 
and Austria.'* Concerted intervention seemed to him impossible, in 
view of the utterly irreconcilable objects of the parties to it; and, %vere 
this intervention based, as Alexander desired, on the principles of the 
Holy Alliance, the logical outcome would be that Russia would claim 
to march into Turkey Aa Austria had marched into Naples, as the 
mandatary of Europe — the very issue which it had been the study of 
Austria as well as of England to avoid. Great Britain would be 
stronger, and her action more effectual, were she to remain outside any 
combination. 



By the time the Conference met, in June, 1824, CaniiiDg had some- 
frhat niodifieil hiu views. If both parties tu the struggle in Turkey 
were willing to submit to ite decialous, the Couferenue might prove 
serviceable as a board of arbitration whose verdict would be liaeked by 
the august sanction of the Concert, though all idea of an uUiinato 
appeal to force must be rigidly excluded. With this idea Sir Charles 
Itegot was allowed to attend the opening meetings of the Conference, 
and LD July Stratford Canning was sent ou a mission to St Petersburg. 
It was soon apparent, however, that the conditions essential for a 
peaceful interveutian did not exist. The Ottoman Government pro- 
tested against any intervenuon of the Powers in its affairs ; the Greeks 
refused to be bound by the decisions of a Conference which would in 
all probability suggest a settlement falling far short of their aims. In 
those circumstances, Canning, in November, finally decided to take do 
furtlier share in the common deliberations; and, when the discussion 
of the Russian circular of January. 1324, was entei-ed upon, Hagot 
withdrew from the sittings. The seal was tlins set ujion the breacli 
between Great liritain and the European Alliance; and tlie Emperor 
Alexander declared that all negotiations on the Eastern Question with 
the British Government were closed. 

The condition of things which Canning had foreseen now arose. 
England being removed, Austria and Russia were brought face to face; 
and it was soon clear that their interests were in sharp antagonism. 
-Meiternich, who early in 1825 had visited Paris and won over Charles X 
to bis views, aljsolutely refused to consider the Russian proposal for a 
aeries of semi-independent Greek States. For Axistriat he maintained, 
tliere were only two possible alternatives — the complete subjection or 
the complete independence of Greece. Russia, on tlie other hand, 
objected equally strongly to setting u]) an inde|)eudent C'hrlstian State, 
vhich might develop into a peril to her own influence. Under tlte.se 
circumstances the Conferences could but issue in a lame conclusion. On 
March 13, 1826, it was resolved to present a ^nint note to the Porte, 
offering the mediation of the Powers in the Greek Question. Since this 
offer was purely benevolent, and backed by no suggestion of coercion, 
it was, as might have been expected, indignantly refused. The new 
torn taken by the fortunes of the war in 1825 had, indeed, not tended 
to weaken the stubborn resolution of the Sultan. His own undisciplined 
troopH having proved unequal to the task of crushing the insurgents, 
Mfthmod bad humbled himself reluctantly and with misgiving to ask 
aid of his jiowerfiil vassal Mebcmet Ali of Egypt, who had responded 
by sending a disciplined army under his son Ibrahim, oscortcd by 
m powerful and well-equlp[>ed fleet, for the conquest of Greeoe. The 
inaobordi nation of his captains prevented Miiioulls from taking the 
Mussulman armada at a disadvantage before it could reach its point 
of concentration ; and Ibrahim reached Suda Bay in Crete without 



mishap at tlie clasc o( 1824. On Fobruai-y 24. 1825, he landed 
Uodon in the Morea. 

From this moment the fortunes of the insurgente seemed desperata^j 
Tba Greek bands evervwhciv hmke «iid fled l)eforc the onset of 
cipliiied troops; and the Egyptmit cummaudcr, who ^>'as to prove hu 
military capacity in more arduous enterprises, set to work with 6y6t«mati( 
ruthlessness to reduce the country to submission. The hori-ors of th< 
carher period of the war paled before those of its latest phase; an( 
even those who had heen left cold by the tales of mafisacre cor 
mitted by barbarians on one side or the other were roused to prutes 
by a policy which seemed to aim at the extermination of an entii 
population, and the colonisation of a Euro[>oan country, hallowed bj 
glorious associations, with Mussulman neg^roesand/f^/aA^e/i. AU EuropeT 
watched with breathless interest the defence of the little town of .Mts$o- 
loiiglii, iHjhind the mud rninparlH of whicli the forlorn hope of Greece 
seemed to be making* a. last heroic stand against the flood of barbarism. 

It was under thej^e conditions that tlio long silence between thofl 
Rnssinn and British Governments in the affaii's of the East was at" 
last broken. Canning took the initiative. His cousin Stratford 
fanning (Lord Stratford do Fiedcliffe) was commissioned, on taking 
up his post as ambassador at St Petersburg in the summer of 1825,, 
to suggest a joint intervention of the Powers, bnt Btill with th< 
stipulation that no coercion should be used against the Porte. Russif 
however, would listen to no proposal for intervention unless combine< 
with a williTignesa to use force, if necessary ; she would bo no party 
any repetition of the futile joint representations to the Porte which had' 
effected so little in the past; and declared that "intervention, once 
begun, must continue till its end is gained." The position thus defined, 
the Russian Government withdrew into its former attitude of mysterious 
reticence; but Prince Kieven, the Tsar's amlwissador to the Court of 
St James', was instructed to listen to any "confidential communications" 
whicb Canning might make on the subject, and to draw him on by 
hinting tliat, if Great Britain rnmlly refut>ed to consider the eventual 
necessity of using force. Russia would be prepared to settle the question 
alone. Thi* veiled threat, following on the ominous silence of the Kussian 
Empci-or, liad its efifect. Canning admitted that Russia and Great UritAin 
were the only Powers from whom a settlement of the Kastem Que«tioa _ 
could be expected, since Austria's attitude towards the Court of SiM 
Peteraburg had be«n " foolish and disloyal," and Prussia was too unim- 
poi'tant to be cnnsidyred in the matter. **Mr Canning and I," n-porled 
Lieven, "are on the path of confidences. The time has oome to act." 

The confidences wei-e interrupted by the death of the Emperor 
Alexander, which took place at Taganrog on Decemk-r 24, 1825; but 
Canning, now fully pei-^uaded tbab the road to a satisfactoty solution 
lay in a separate understanding with Russia, determined to open 



25, 




^ 



I 



negotiations with ilie now Emperor. In Jiuiuary. 182G. acconlitigly, tho 
Dukti of Welliiigtou was sent as special oavoy to St Fetemburg, to 
congratulate Nicholas I on hia accession, and at the same time to 
come to an understanding as to comtnou action in the affairs of 
the Ottoman enipii-e. For such a missiou the Duke was specially 
Adapted. His gi-eat reputation, and his known sympathy wiiJi the 
Earojjean system, made him a per»ona grata at the Russian Court ; 
vhile the changed situation in tho relations of the Powers obviated any 
danger of his running counter to ("Manning's policy. " Ttie Duke of 
\Vellington," wrote Canning, " would not have done for any pni-pose 
of mine a twelvemonth ago. No more would contidence in Russia. 
But now — tiie ultra system Iwing dissolved, by the carrj'ing of eveiy 
point which they opposed — the elementa of that system have beuonie 
useable for good pui-posea. 1 hope to save Greece through the agency 
of the Russian name u^wn the fears of Turkey without a war." The 
instruclinns of Wellington were to offer to the Tsar the mediation of 
(treat llritain between Russia and Turkey on the one hand,and between 
Turkey and the Greeks on the other. At the same time, if a Conference 
of the Powers were suggest«df he was to stave it off " by multiplying 
conditions."* 

The Emperor Nicholas was, indeed, as little inclined as Canning to 
submit tho Eastern Question to the continental Allies, by whnm he 
conceived that Alexander had been badly treated ; and lie was now, as 
on suliset}nent and more fateful occasions, anxious to settle the matter 
by a separate understanding with Great Britain. The mutual sympathy 
between Nicholas and Wellington, whose qualities were well calculated 
to draw them together, facilitated the negotiations; and on April 4, 
1826. was signed the Trotocol of St Petersburg, the fii-st formal step 
in the estal>lisliment of an independent Greece. According to this 
instrument Great Brilnin was empowered to offer to tlie Ottoman 
GoTernmcnt a settlement of the Greek Question based on the establish- 
loent of (ireece as a vassal and tributary State. Russia promised 
her co-operation "in any case"? but by Article III it was stipulated 
iliat, should the Porte reject the proffered mediation, the signatory 
Powers should take the earliest opportunity, cither separately or in 
coranioD, of establishing a reconciliation on tho basis of the Protocol. 

The changed attitude of tho liritish Government involved in the 
signature of this instrument was due largely to the well-founde<i dread 
of isolated action on the part of Russia. On the other hand, Canning 
JQHtificd an intervention to which he had refused to be a party, so long 
to it was repudiated by both sides to the quarrel, by the new attitude 
of tlje Greeks, who, cowed by Ibrahim's successes, had sought the " good 
offices" of Great Britain and had even suggested placing thcmselve-s under 
bcr protection. TJie teriys cmlwdied in tho Protocol were substantially 
tbnsc agreed U|K)n at a uoriference between Stiatford Canning and 





certain of the Greek leatlers, lield on tlie island of Perivolakia in January. 
In Dpite, however, of the apparent cordiality of the Anglo-Uussion 
entfrUe^ causes of friction were not long in showing themselves. The 
Emperor Nicholas, though prepared to act in concei-t with Great Britain 
in the Greek Question, wa.s fully determined to retain in his own hands 
the settlement of the specific grievances of Russia against the Porte, 
While Wellington waa yet at St I'etersburg, and dui-ing the negotiations] 
which led up to the April Protocol, Minciaky* the Russian agent at 
Coiistimtinople, was directed to present an ultimatinn to the Ottoman' 
Government demanding the evacuation of the Princi]^>alities by th« 
Turkish troops, the release of certain Ser\ian deputies, and the immediate | 
dispatch to the froutier of plenipotentiaries for the purpose of anungingj 
a final settlement. The ultimatum was dispatched on March 17, 1826;] 
and in a circular note of the 16tli the Uussian Government justified itftj 
action to the Powers. The ultimatum, it urged, concerned the afifairs of ^ 
Russia alone. Russia would be grateful If the Powers would prefw the 
Porte to make concessions, but asked no more than strict neutrality in 
case of war. As to (Jreece, the Emi>eror would know how to enforce on 
the Turks respect for the dictates of humanity and European peftoo. I 

The impression made upon tlie Rritish Government by this action 
was naturally not altogether favourable. It was felt that Wellington 
had to a certain extent allowed himself to be hoodwinked; smd thatfi 
undercover of friendly negotiations with a view to joint intervention,' 
HuRsia had taken the Hret step towards that isolated action which it wu 
the aim of British policy to forestall. The premature publication of 
the Protocol of April 4, which it had been intended to keep secret, 
increased the risk of war. Sultan Mahmud, not unnaturally, resent 
the intrusion of frosfa demands before he had time to consider those' 
already presented, and saw in them one more proof that Russia desired 
to drive him to extremities. His immediate answer was to hurry on 
military reforms which be hoped would put him in a position to 
defiance to the Tsar's threats. The measures he took to achieve his eadc, 
however, recoiled upon himself. The Janissaries, whose traditional 
privileges were threatened by the Sultan's plans, rose in revolt on, 
June 15; and, though Mahmud, with the aid of his Anatolian tr^op 
was able to crush the insurrection and to exterminate the turbulcril 
Prtetorians who had so long tyrannised over his predeoeaaors, tJi< 
immediate result was bo scrions'.y to weaken his available forces that h< 

was compelled to come to terms with Russia. On Oolober 7 

at Akkerman a treaty conceding all the demands of Russia \^ 
to the Principalities, the navigation of the Straits, and the cci 
of certain Circassian fortresses. Full diplomatic relations bet^ 
St Petersburg and Constantinople were now resumed, and tiio di 
war was aijaiii p<)stpi*ned. 

Meanwhile the Protocol bad not resulted in any e 



^ 



^ 



Canning resented the Iiattte with which its terras had been coram uiiieated 
to the <)ther Fowera, vm tending to revive "the principle o( an unasked 
authoritative interference of the AlUnnce," with which this, "a corporate 
movement in a particuUir ciase," had nothing to do. The Kinporor 
Nicholas, on the other hand, nuted the apparent reluctance of (ireat 
Britain to take notion, and liegan t<>su.spect that her mntivcs had huen 
solely to prevent any isolated action of liussia- Canning, indeed, wiiihed 
to hold the Protocol in reserve, and to use it only in the event of the 
Porte rejecting the separate mediation of England- Tlie stubboni 
spirit of Sultan Mahmnd soon made it clear that no mediation un* 
supported by a threat of force would have any chance of success. In 
view of tJie continued Turkish successes against the insurgents, it waa 
indeed haitUy rciwonahlo to expect any other attitude; and Russia 
continued to urge the necessity for enforcing the terras of the Protocol. 
In June Prince Lieven was instructed to point out the notorious plan of 
Tbruliini for extermitmling the Greeks of the Morea, and to ask whether 
the British Govenniient had represented to the Porte the intention of 
Russia and Kngiand to unite in preventing this. The attitude of the 
British Ministers in face of this direct appeal seemed to justify the 
nupicions of Itussia. Wellington, denying that the intention to depopu- 
late the Morea had been proved, declared that the objeot of the I'rotocol 
had been purely pacific, and that Great Britain had never departed from 
ber firm objection to the coercion of Turkey. 

A long correspondence Ijetween tho several chanceries followed. 
Metteniich, who had stigmatised the Protocol as a "feeble and ridiculous 
production," and regarded Canning's whole policy in the Eastern Question 
as fatal to the peace of Europe, based as this was upon the sanctity 
of treaties, was obdurate : and Prussia faithfully supjjorted his views. 
Charles X, on the other hand, in bis capacity of " Most Christian King,'' 
waB favoumble to an aimed intervention, which savoured of a crusade. 
By the end of August Canning, still to a certain degree actuated by 
dread of isolated action on the part of Russia, ventured a step forward. 
On September I he addressed a note to the Russian Government suggest- 
ing that Great Britain should point out to the Sultan that "the senti- 
ments of humanity and the iutevests of commerce " made it necessary for 
the two Powers to insist on his accepting their mediation on the basis of 
the Protocol and suggesting, in tho event of his refusal, to withdraw the 
British and Russian representatives from CousUmtinople, to establish 
diplomatic agents in Greece, and, possibly, to recognise the independence 
of tlie Mortia and the islands. To this note the Tsar replied by a 
general acquiescence, but suggested that, before threatening a breach of 
diplomatic relntinns, the two Powers should demand the eslablii>hment of 
10 armistice, so as to prevent the extermination of the Christian [lopula- 
tion. The particular claims of Russia had been satisfied by the Treaty of 
Akkermao ; and tho Rus&iaa Govcromcnt was aoxiQua not to renew the 

e. w. m. X. IS 




orisiis if this cnu1<I be avoidf-d without sacriticing the caase of the OreelEB. 
Only iu the evijiit of the armistic-c being refused were the Powers to take 
any coercive measures; and, as to their nature, on September 29 LieTen 
was instructed to point out to ('aniiing that the plan, suggested by 
himself, of isolating Ibraliim in tlie Moruu by intercepting succours from 
Egypt would be the easiest way of convincing the Porte without a 
declaration of war. This could be done by a uuion of the fleets of the 
Powers willing to share in the pacificatiou of Greece. 

Common action was delayed by the hope of still bringing into line, 
on the basis of the Protocol, all the Powers interested in the Eastern 
Question. But the Conference, opened in London in the spring of 1827, 
only emplMwised their irrer-.onc liable differences. Metternich protested 
as energuticully as ever against any coercion of Turkey, and repudiated 
"mediation" at the request of "rebels"; Prussia, as usual, followed 
obediently in bis wake; and the two Powers which alone seemed to 
remain faithful to tlie principles of Troppau withdrew from the Con- 
ference. 

The question of the conveision of the Protocol into a formal treaty, 
suggested so early aa January by France, was now seriously taken up. 
Russia was pt-epared lo adopt this courye, on condition that the ultimate 
appeal was to be to force. " We are invited," wrote Count Nesselrode, 
'* to sanction a principle. We invite the recognition of its consequences.*' 
'* It is part of their civil and religious sj'stem that Orientals never act 
save in obedience to nlxsolute necesttlly," Prince Lieven had written on 
January 21, 1827, at the same time pointing ont that the Porte was per- 
fectly able to distinguish between a mere ** demonstration " and a seiions 
business. This wiis a propositiun the truth of which a rich experience 
has since brought borne to all Ibe Powere. But Cunning was by no means 
willing to break with the tnuUtional UritJsh policy, and still objected to 
making the rejection of mediation by the Porte a etuvt helli\ and, 
on April 4, the Protocol wsis presented to the Sultan by the British 
and Uussian anibiissadors. The result wa.s what the Russian fJoveniment 
had expected. The Porto indignantly rejected the proffered mediation 
fts an impertinent interference in the affairs of Turkey and as irrecon- 
oilablo with the precepts of the Koran. Canning now realised that the 
only way to Iiold Kuasia to the spirit of the Protocol, and to prevent her 
ik-om doelaring war on her own account, was to forestall her by agreeing 
to Apply coercive measures. This rosnlutioa accentuated the crisis in the 
Cabinet produced by the illness of Lord Liverpool and the succession of 
Canning to the pi-omiership. In April, Wellington, who was opposed to 
the couvei-sion of the Protocol into a treaty, had refused a place in the 
new Government, and he was now in open opposition to the policy of 
Kussia, luul to any coercion of Turkey. This attitude was to produce its 
eftoct later ; for the present the Tory Cabinet was embarked on a course 
opposed lo the Tory tradition. 





iJ827] 



Treaty of London 



195 



I July 6, 1827, the Protocol of St Petersburg was cooverted into 
ruaty uf Loudon; Austria and Prussia refused to sign ; and tlie 
final settlement of the Greek Question was thus left to Great Britain, 
Ru^ia, aiid France. By the ostensible articles of the new treaty the 
three signatory Powers engaged to procure the aatoiiomy of Greece, 
under the auzerointyof the Sultan, without breaking o£f friendly relations 
with the Porte. By additional secret articles, however, suggested by 
Canning, it was agreed that, in the event of the Ottoman Government 
refusing the mediation of the Pnwers, comnietcial relations by nieaiis of 
Consuls should be established ^vith thu Greeks ; that an armistice should 
be proposed to both sides ; and that this should be enforced by all the 
means that might "suggest themselves to the prudence '" of the High 
Contracting Parties, lu general it was held that a " pacific " blockade 
of Ibrahim in the Morea, as already proposed, would be the readiest way 
of bringing him to terms ; and instructions to this effect were sent to the 
idmiials of the allied Powei's in Levantine waters, to whom necessarily a 
wide discretion wa8 left. 
'^m On August 1G the ambassadors of the three Powers presented a joint 
^note to the Porte, demanding the immediate arrangement of an armistice 
' with the Greeks, and threatening, in case of refusal, to take in common 
the measures necessary to enforce it. The Poi-te, as usual, met a 
dangerous situation by an attempt to procrastinate ; and Mettemich, 

»eucouraged by the death of Ciuining on August 8, still liopod to retrieve 
the situation. He was encoumged also by the language of the Kmperor 
Kicholas, who, while consenting to sign the Treaty of London, 
had expressed his deep regret at having to do so without two of his 
brother sovereigns of the Iloly Alliance, for which he still proclaimed 
his heurt-fclt attachment, and protested his abhorrence of the Greeka 
as "subjects in open revolt against their legitimate sovereign." In 
Metternitdi's view the impending catastrophe might yet be averted, if 
the Porte would consent to accept the good offices of Austria, and 
explain to the intervening Powers tliat it was the method, and not the 
substance, of their proposals that it resented. The Austrian uot« em* 
bodying these proposals was presented at Constantinople on October 20. 
Ft was too late. Tliat very afternoon the dilatory threads of diplomacy 
had been rudely torn, and the fate of Greece decided, in the Bay of 
^.Kavarino. 

^P The events leading up to the battle of Navarino demand a somewhat 

Bmore detailed treatment than the other episodes of the war, since they 

Hproduced a more immediate, profound, and lasting effect upon the 

general diplomatic situation. The t«rms of the Treaty of London had 

been communicated to the British and French admirals at Smyrna on 

August 11, 1827. They were empowered to propoae an armistice to 

combatants and to make it effective, by peaceful means if possible, 

force if necessary, .\dmiral Codringtou sailud at once for Nauplia, 




whore ho found Uie Greek Oorcniment, » wu to fae 

glad to accept th« aimwrioo. By the Tarlu, however, it 

with scorn : pre{iaratiofw were harried oo for r«dacii^ the cw 

stronghold* of Hjdis and Spezxia ; while at tba aaae t 

fltiul of iiinetj-two sail left AUxaodria and soeeeeded. «m SeptcMbar 7, 

in joining the Ottomvi scfQadron ia the harboor of XavmraKh. Codna^ 

ton arrived five dajs later, and informed the <^>ttoiBaii adwral tk 

attempt on bis [j&rt to te»ve the Iny would be reoisted hy Coivc 

British squadron was sooDJoin'^i hy the French, under Adimialde IGgnj. 
and the two admirala now communicated the terms of th« Trea&j of 
London to Ibrahim. The I'aHlia replioal tliat he could do nothing witboat 
the cnminatida of the Sultan, but, ]iending the arrival of inrrtiiMitinw 
from ( 'unntautinople, undertook that none of bis ships afaoald lai« 
the bay. Upon this the allied miuiulron withdrew, tearing a caagUa of 
guardfihips to watch the Oltonmn fleet. 

The situation was now sufTiiiiently critical; for the Greeks, haring 
placed themflelven in the right by accepting the armistice which the 
Turks had refused, were freu to continue hostilities. They took full 
advantage of their opportunity ; aud, on September 23, a Greek flotilla, 
under Ciiptain llajitingft, attacked and destroyed a Tuikiish squadron 
lying off Salona. To Ibrahim this seemed a gross breach of the Con- 
vention ; and he sailed out of the iiay of Nararino to avenge the 
disaster. Warned by the guardshipa, (^odrington intercepted the 
Turkish squadron and turned it back. On rcacliing Navarino, Ibrahim 
found his instructions awaiting him ; they were, to defy the Powers and 
remain where he was. The crews of the allied fleets watched the 
columns of smoke from the burning villagetj, which were the signals of 
his defiance. 

The allied fleet had, meanwhile, been completed by the arrival of 
the Ilusiiian squadron ; and the three admirals held a council of war at 
which it was decided to present an ultinintuni lo Ibrahim demanding 
fresh aecuritie.**, the return home of tho Ottoman aud Egyptian fleets, 
the cessation of hostilities, and the evacuation of the Morea. The 
answer was evasive: and CodringLoii, the senior ailmiral in command, 
decided to make a demonstration by sailing into the Bay of Navarino. 
On the morning of October 20, accordingly, the allied fleets entered the 
ba}*, unmolested by the Turkish forts, mid oast anchor opposite that of 
the Ottomans. No battle had been intended, though the ships were 
cleared tor action ; hut the refusal of the Turks to move some flro-ships 
which threatened the allied line led to an aUercatlon ; shots were 
exchanged, and the battle soon became general. By nightfall the 
Mussulman armada hud ceased to exist. 

Judged by its immediate and ultimate consequences, Navarino may 
be considered one of the deoisivo battles of history. Ibrahim, indeed, 
though his cause w&s now hoijeloss, still remained Arm in his dcGauce ; 




1827] 



Effects of the news of Navarino 



197 



"for Europe," ho^vever, as Metternich wrote, "the event of October 20 
began a new era." Russia ^ad, indeed, already proposed that, in view 
of the continued obstinacy of the Porte, the three Powers lihould pro- 
ceed to "vigorous measures^' for restoring order in Greece. In a 
dispatch of September 26, Nesselrode instructed Lieven to sound the 
British Government on this point. The Powei's were to offer their 
mediation for the last time, and, in the event of a fresh rofusal, to with- 
draw their ambiiiMjadors from Constantinople. Russia would then occupy 
the Dauubian Principalities until the Porte should submit. In the 
event of Great Britain raising difficulties, the Russian Government was 
prepared to act alone under Article III of tho Protocol of St Peters- 
burg. As to "tho ultimate destiny of Turkish territory in case of the 
&U of the Ottoman empii-e," Lieven might tliscuHs this with British 
Ministers, but was not to raise it. This dlspaLcb showed a singular 
want of appreciation of the change produced in the British Cabinet by 
the death of Canning. The new Ministers liad always disliked tho 
Treaty of July 6 ; they had no intention of pressing its provisions 
to their logical conclusion. Lieven did not judge it expedient even 
to mention tho suggested Russian occupation of the Principalities, still 
less to hint at the greater qnestion of the destiny of Turkey. The 
British Government objucted even to an effective blockade of tho Greek 
coast, and were supported in this by France ; the most that Lieven 
could obtain was a direction to the admirals " to police the waters of 
i the Levant so far as concerns the Ottoman Hag." This being ths 
temper of the liritish Cabinet, it is easy to realise the sensation caused 
I when the news reached London that Codrington, without waiting for 
iutractioas, had shattered the Ottoman sea-power. Tlio panic was not 
allayed hy the attitude of Russia. Tlie Emperor Nicholas, not unnatu- 
rally, regarded the common victory of Navarino as a proof of the unity 
of tlifi three Powers. He now proposed, in a dispatch signed by Nessel- 
rode on December 5, to follow up the blow by himself marching into 
the Principalities, while the Maritime Powers were to force tho iMrdii- 
nelles and impose the Treaty of London on the Sultan by threatening 
Constantinople itself. 

It is possible that a strong Minister like Canning would have bowed 

to the lo^o of events and realised that, for the moment at least, 

Navarino had hopelessly broken the traditional policy of Great Britain 

tovards Turkey. But Goderitih was now Prime Minister. Dudley 

Foreign Secretary ; and from neither could any but half-measures bo 

^Mpected. Moreover, though tho Tsar declared that in occupying the 

HPriucipalities he had in view no permanent annexation, the mood of 

^Holh France and Enj^land was one of unconquerable suapicion. In vain 

^Hie Imj>erial word was fortified on December 12 by the signature on 

behalf of all three Powers of a Protocol declaring that, should war re- 

t mtt, none of them would seek to derive from it any exclusive benefit, 




r 



198 The Porte repudiates the Treaty of Akktfrman [1827- 

whether oommercial or territorial. The British Governmeut clung to t 
ddnsion that war might yet bo prevented, .and entrencheJ itself behind 
tlie fiction that iiotbiiig had occun-ed ho^ielessly to oonipromiite the tra- 
ditional friendship botween Great Kritatn and the Sultan. In the King's 
Speech at the opening- of Parliament, January 29, 1828, the battle of 
Navariao was referred to as an " untoward event," which it was hoped 
would not disturb the Iiarraonious relatioas subHistiiig between His 
Majesty's (lovornraent and the Sultan I The folly of any such hope^ 
was soon patent to all the world. The somewhat shamefaced explanaM 
tions of the Powera wero met by the Porte with a vigorous protest 
against this "revolting outrage" on a friendly Power in time of peace, 
and a demand for compensation and an apology. Those were refused, 
even by Great Britain, which threw the blame on the Turks, as having 
been the aggressors in attacking a fleet entering a friendly harbour in 
lime of peace. Fnrther negotiatioua did uothing to improve the situa- 
tion ; the breach wjis obviously irreparable ; and tlie ambassadors of tbft^ 
three allied Powers withdrew from Constantinople. fl 

Tlie wrath of Sultan Mnhmud, hitherto with ditBoulty restrained, 
now burst forth with unmeasured violence. On December 20 he issued 
a solemn hatti-therif denouncing the cruelty and treachery of the Chri»- 
tiau Powers and calling the faithful to a holy war against the infidel. 
Uussia especially was singled out for denunciation; and the recently 
concluded Treaty of Alilterman was declared null and void. This 
was the opiwrtunity and the excuse for which the Emperor Nicholas 
had long waited. However much the other Powers might dread and 
diHlik^ the isolated intervention of Russia, the formal repudiation 
by the Ottoman Government of obUgations so recently contracted 
made it impossible to reseat such intervention. Navarino had, in 
fact, placed the diplomatic situation, and to all appearances the mili- 
tary situation, completely under the Tsar's control. And this state of 
affairs the Russian Foreign Office was at little pains to disguise. The 
repeated declarations of the Emperor Nicholas that he aimed at no 
permanent conquests, and the "sterile '' self-denying Protocol of 
December 12, might or might not serve to allay the anxieties of the 
Powers ; but, if they should refuse to allow the Tsar " to merge hia 
special grievances in the general cause," Count Nesselrode roundly 
declared in a dispatch of I>ecember 26, that he would act " telon «* 
convenances ct ses inth-Sts." 

The wisest course for the British Government, m these circumstances, 
would probably have been to yield to the logic of events and make the 
1)est of ft bad situation by joining with Russia in following up the vic- 
tory of Navarino, and so preventing her isolated action. This course 
was actually urged by France. But, at the beginning of January, 1828, 
Goderich was succeeded in the premiei-ahip by Wellington j the new 
Cabinet was opposed to Cauuing's policy in the Easteru Question ; and 




3828J 



Russia pi'epares for war 



199 



I 



I 



Wellington refused to take any action calcuUted to im]jeril theint«griiy 
of the Otlomtin domirions. He would adhere to the Treaty of London 
only on condition that its provisions should be carried out by peaceful 
means. Wlien, on Jaiumry fi, a RusHlaii dispatch announced the 
Emperor's intention of occupying the l^riiieipalitiea during the March 
following, with or without the consent of Great BrlUin. the British 
Government, after some weeks' delay, replied hy a fnrmiil protest against 
B course which would entuii the downfall of Turkey and the outbreak of 
a European war. At the same tiroo Wellington outlined a scheiny for 
the settlement of the Greek Question, based on the maintenance of 
effective Ottoman control over Greece. 

Meanwhile the diplomntlc situation was becoming more and more 
■trained. The Emperor Nicholfts declared that he would not recede one 
step, nnd that,tf England persisted in her indifference to the intt'reste of 
her ally, Kussia would consider herself free frrtm her engagements under 
the Treaty of .July ; and Prince Lieven enquired sftrcastically whether 
the British Cabinet eonsidorod the hatti-ttherif ordering a g<'ncral 
massacre "an act of internal administration. " But, though it was clear 
that war could no longer be prevented, all the Powers were etiually 
interested in avoiding a general conflagration. Within the British 
Cabinet itself voices were raised in favour of concession ; and Russia was 
by no means anxious to take a line which would have isolated her in 
hce of a hostile Europe. To the newer school of Kussian stHtcsmen, 
moroover, the traditional policy of Peter the Groat and Catharine had 
begun to appear of doubtful wisdnm, and the maintenance of Turkey iis 
a weak State under Russian influence of more solid advantage than the 
break-up of the Ottom.m empire, with all the unknown and pcriloua 
issues that this might involve. The dispatch of February 14, in which 
Count Nesselrode announced to the Powers Russia's intention of declaring 
war, was studiously conciliatory in tone- The insolent attitude of the 
Porte had left the Tsar no other alternative; but Russia, while making 
war for the redress of her just grievances, invited the Powers to take 
advantage of this to carry out the provisions of the Treaty of London, 
which she would, in any case, make tlie basis of her ultimate action. At 
the same time, in order to disarm thci suspicions of the Maritime Powers, 
the Tsar declared that he would respect tlio Treaty of June 10, 1801, 
regarding neutrals, which had been solemnly annulled by Alexander I in 
1809 ; and Count Heyden, the Russian admiral in the Mediterranean, 
was instructed to exercise his belligerent rights "provisionally and 
moderately." and, in the event of the London Conferences issuing in 
a plan in favour of Greece, to join his squadron with those of the other 
Powers. Thus the Treaty of London had become the instrument for 
producing the very situation it had been devised to prevent. Great 
Britain could not, in the circumsUiuces, deny the right of Russia to 

,e war ; and Kussia, so long as she adhered to the Treaty, had 





I 



mot tu {ear the ioterveotum of the other Powen. The noflt that 
WeUmgtou could do wa« to protest that the refusal of the ABies to 
(»>openU« with Kuaitu voold not justify her in fareakiii^ avaj Imn ihm 
Treaty aud »etUuig the Eactem (Question ■* teUm t» eammammaeeM t 

itUirSU." 

Tht Kuaian anny croawd the Fnith on May 6, 1828; but the wni 
\\ta.i followed waa t^ oo means the "nulitaiy promenade** that all 
Europe expectied to vitnen. The unexpected vitality of theafiiMnntly 
moribund Turkinti enipbs, and the superiatiTe fighting qnalities of tihie 
Tui'ktab troo{M. were once more proved ; and it vaa only a&er tvo 
hardly fought i:aDi[jaigfi« tltat General Diebttach vas able to dictate 
terms to the OiUnmiu f joveriiment at Adrianople. 

Meanwhile the Kmperor Nichulas continued his efforts to settle the 
Greek QufHtion in coocert with the other Powers. Wellington* however* 
wuK imi'-oriciUble. Hut [M>licy in the Eastern Question was directed 
wholly Ui tUt'. [>reRcrvation of the Turkish Power ; and Greece, ander the 
I'ri I li I. y of ra[>o']i»tria9,' elected by the national assembly in March, 
IHiilT, )>«-vinetl in danj^r of becoming a Uussian outpost set on the flank 
of Turkey. The Hrilish (ioverninent refused Uie Tsar's invitation to 
follow hia cxEinipLo in making a loan to the Greek Preiiident; and in 
June IliiiikiHHon, who tiad been throughout favourable to the Russian _ 
view, left the C'aUtiet, while Dudley was replaced by Aberdeen. For ■ 
the moment On-at llriuiin seemed to be committed to a complete reversal 
of ('unningH [Kjlicy irt the (Jreek Questinn. 

On Juno 16 tho Tsiir made a further advance by reDounctng alto- 
fjfethor Ilia character as a Iralligeront in tho Mediterranean. It waa not, 
hdWovcT, tho conciliatory attitude of Riisaia, but the unexpected reverses 
of hor arms which stirred tho Powers to further action, by giving thera 
Uio hope of settling the Greek Question in the sense least unfavourable ■ 
to thoir views, and so furcHtuUing the effects of the ultimate victory of I 
KusHla. Wi'Uington, moreover, believed that, were the affairs of Greece 
onoe settleil, RuH.siu would gladly make peace. 

Tht) plunipotuntinries of tho thi'co Powers had reassembled in 
London J nnd ihti ]iro]HiKj\l of the Fre^iicth Governraeiit, anxious to cover 
its waning rfipntuUnii at limtiii; by military prestige abi-oad, to intervene 
actively in order to so<!ure the evacuation of the Morea, was accepted 
by Wellington iw the most effeetivo countoi^move to the Ruetsian declara- 
lion of war. llo only stipulated tiiat Great Britain should not be 
ruipiired to take any active part in coercing hor old ally. Russia, for 
her partf saw no serious objection to a courao which would form a moat 
Niiluahlo divewion on the flank of her enemy. On July 19, 1828, 

> Count Capo (I'latrti, afivr hU election to the Prwldoncy, dropped bis title and 
Mwitmod HA* lltill»alMH) fonu ol bin territorial name. FoUovriug a common, though 
uol uulvoruU, i^ntotlM. w linve iuilopt«(l tbrougbout this HitUtry the style by which 
bi wu iiertiBiw uiwt wMely known. 



\ 



I 





1828] Ibrahim witlidraws. — Mettetmich interposes 201 

accordingly, waa aig-ued the Protocol of Ivondoii, by which the armed 
intervention of France was authorised and its objects detined. 

On AugUHt 30 a French expeditionary force, of 14,000 men undor 
General Maisoii, reiiched Fetalidi in the Gulf of Corinth, only to find 
that their purpose had been forestalled by the politic impetuosity of 
Sir Edward Codrington. Mehemet AH had, in fact* for some time been 
only waiting for an excuse to retire from a situation of wtiichhe realised 
the ever growing danger; and, when a British squadron appeared off 
Alexandria, he readily responded to the ulUmatum of the British ad- 
miral by signing, on August 9, a convention arranging for an exchange 
of prisonere and tho immediiite evacuation of tho Moroa. Ibrahim 
himself met the Freuch general with the news ; a review of the Turkish 
troops was held in his honour, on the eve of their embarkation ; and the 
task of the French troops resolved itself into making roads and keeping 
order in the Morea, pending the settlement of its fate by the Powers. 

The diplomatic situation moanwlule was bei]tg rapidly modified by 

the developtueuta of the war. In view of the unforeseen difficulties of 

the campaign of 18:!8» the neutrality of the Mediterranean, which 

deprived the Russian arms of the main advantage won at Navarino, 

became intolenibte to the Russian Goverument; and, in October, the 

Emperor decided to proclaim the blockade of the Dardanelles. This 

was greeted in England with a great outory, not only as a gross breach 

of faitli, but as a serious menace to British commerce. Uelations Iwtween 

the Cabinets of London and St l*etei-sbnrg became incrciteingly strained; 

arid a breach waa only prevented by the anxiety of Russia to preserve 

tbe Triple Alliance, though now "only nominal," until she should have 

tiLumphed over Iier difliculties. While protesting, therefore, against any 

separate action of France and Great Britain in the Greek Question, she 

expressed her continued willingness to act in concert with them if the 

Cabinets "could agree on a common course — and keep to it." Tho 

reproach implied In the latter phrase was not wholly unjustified ; for the 

policy of the British Government was, in fact, shifting nervously with 

every change of circumstance. The widening rift in the Triple Alliance 

liad brought Metternich onoe mora into the field; and correspondence 

paasod between ViiMina and London. Tho Austrian Chancellor was now 

thoroughly awake to the fact that the time was past for mere prot«ata 

Kgaiust any alteration of the status quo, and reitewed the proposal, 

originally advanced merely as a move in the diplomatic game, for the 

independence of Greece — a solution which, he maintained, would be more 

atttsfactory, not only to Europe but to the Ottoman Government, than 

the creation of a vassal State, since it would obviate the risk of tho 

constant interference of the Powers in tho affairs of Turkey. Nothing, 

Iwnrever, but the force of circumstanoes could coerce Wellington into a 

eouTBo which ho believed would imperil the ancient relations of amity 

between Great Britain and the Porte. If ho moved in the direction ol 



i 




the em&ncipatiun of Greece, it was against bis will, and because t he lo^o \ 
cf evente was too strong for him. That something must be done was 
abundantly clear. The fiwt dofinite step in the i-ecognition of Greek] 
independence bad been taken when, on November 16, 1828, the Con- 
ference of I-ondon signed a I'rotouol placing the Morea, with the adjacent 
islands of the Cyclades, under the guarantee of the Powers. Events iai 
Greece itself soon compelled a further measure of concesdioD. In tbe> 
autumn and winter of 1828-9, (teneral Churub had, in the face of 
enormous difficulties, caused mainly by the indifferent character of his! 
undii;ciplincd forces, succeeded in clearing western Hellas, north of 
the Gulf of Corinth, of the Turks. In these circumstances a further I 
Protocol of the London Conference, signed on March 22, 1829, extended) 
tlie fronlier to the lino of Arta-Vnlo, including in the country guaranteedj 
by the Powers a large part of ContineuUil Greece, together with the] 
important island of Euboea. Greece, under this instrument, was still to( 
be a tributary State, but autonomous, and governed by a Priuce selected] 
by the Powers. 

This settlement, which was very far from satisfying the Greeks, had] 
only been accepted by the British Government with reluctance, and foFj 
fear of a worse thing. To Piince Lieven Wellington explained with 
great candour that, in signing the Pmtocol, Great Britain had only had in 
mind to settle the Greek Question '* before the end of your war," in order 
to remove one of the greatest obstacles to peace. Against this view, , 
however, which assumed that the Russian war and the Greek cause wer«i 
absolutely distinct, Russia protested vigoi-ously, claiming the right, under! 
Article III of the Protocol of St Petersburg, to act "separately." Atj 
the same time, she undertook not to exact from the Porte anything mora 
than the terms of the Protocol of March 22. 

Circumstances soon placed her in a position to carry out her views. 
While the Powers were still hesitating and negotiating, the war in the 
Balkan Peninanla came to asuddenand dramatic end. This result was 
due entiri'ly to the audacious genius of the Russian commander. In the 
summer of 1829 Diebitsch with some 18,000 men had pressed on over the 
Balkans, leaving in his rear the unbroken armies of the Grand Vizier and 
the Pasha of Skuturi. This apparently rash strategy was successful. 
With his roar to the Black Sea, of which Russia held tho command, his H 
communications were assured; while tho mouutaiaslay bctwccu him and 
the Turks at Shumla, who were powerless to harm him. Constantinople 
lay at bis mercy ; and the Porte, buwiiig to the inevitable, signed with 
him, on September 14, the Treaty of Adriauople. In this, true tolua _ 
promise, the Russian Emperor stipulated for no territorial increase in'fl 
Europe. The cession of Anapi and Poti, however, marked a fresh stage 
in Uie Russian advance in Asia, which it was feared would end by giving 
her control of the Euphrates Valley route to India. In addition to 
this, the Danubian Principalities were created practically independent 




iS2ft-.*tO] Question of the boundaries of Greece 



203 



States ; the treaty rights of Russia in the Bosphorus and Dardimelles 
were once more confirmed ; and, last hut not least, the terms of the 
Protocol signed by the I'owera in coutereuce at London on March 22 
were embodied in the Treaty. 

The news of this outcome of the war was received in London witJi 
consternation. In Wellington's opinion* if the Treaty were allowed to 
stand, Turkey would cease for all practical purposea to exist. The 
PrineijMilities had virtually been annexed to Russia "during her good 
pleasure " ; the ahi'ogatiou of the Ottoman right of search in the Straits 
cut at the root of Turkish sovereign independence ; by the Russian 
advance in Asia the position of Persia, indispensable to the security of 
the Hritish rule in India, was threatened ; by the inclusion of the terms 
of the Miiroh Protocol Russia would reap whatever advantage was to bo 
gained by the recognition of Greek independence. It was this latter 
fact, together with the belief that the integrity of Turkey was already 
doomed^ that led the British GovernniBntyet another step forward in 
the emancipation of Greece. If Greece was to be taken from the 
effective control of the Sultan, it was lietter that she sbould be 
created an independent SUte, than a vassal principality like the 
Danubian States, looking to Russia for the protection of its interests. 
Mettt;rtiich again urged this view very sti'ongly ; and, Lhougli Wellington 
Btill hesitated, Aberdeen, in January, 1830, 8Up[)orted it as the solution, 
that *'aU Europe " expected. In the previous October both Wellington 
and Aberdeen had suggested that the new Greek State should be placed 
under the guarantee of the Treaty of Vienna, and Wellington subse- 
quently proposed to extend this guarantee to Turkey as well. This was, 
in the circumstances, not likely to appeal to the Russian Government; 
and, in order to prevent Russia from being placed in antagonism to the 
united opinion of Europe, the Emperor Nicholas consented to co-nperate 
with the other Powers in a setlleuient of the Greek Question which 
Kerned to deprive bim of the advantage gained at Adrianople. The 
acrifice was, indeed, more apparent than real ; for Cupodistriaa, lu the 
name of Greece, had indignantly rejected the terras of the Protocol of 
March 22, which gave but the shadow of iudependonee. Accordingly, 
on February 3, 1830, a new Protocol was signed in London embodying 
the terms which, in the altered circumstances, the Hritish Government 
was prepared to allow. In only one respect wore those more generous 
than those which the Greeks had indignantly rejected. The new 
State was to be independent, under Leopold of Coburg as "Sovereign 
Prince " ; but its frontiers were to bo more contracted even than those 
deBned by the .March Protocol, and only a fragment of Greece was to be 
restored to liberty. It was clear that, in recommending this settlement, 
it was the intention of the British Government to leave the new State at 
the mercy of the Porte. Capodistrias rejected it, as he had rejected 
that of March 22; and Prince Leo|>old, refusing to accept a task, which 



^ 




nnder this Protocol he declared would be impossible, resigned his 
candidature. 

Nor were those the only circumstances that forced the Powers 
to furtbt-T concessions. In July tlie affairs of Greece were over- 
shadowed by the revolution which hurled Charles X from the throne of 
Franca ; and the new and anxious problems thus raised made any settle- 
ment of the Kastorn Question for the time beiug better than none. 
The main obstac-le to a generous settlement had, moreover, been removed 
by the fall of the Tory Qovornment in November, 1830. Palmerston, 
who succeeded Wellington, had always been in favour of fixing the 
frontier of the new State at the line of Arta-Volo. On September 26, 
1831, ftccoixlingl}', a Protocol vyas signed establishing this as the northern 
boundary of Greece ; and, at the same time, the sovereignty was offered 
to Otto, second son of King Louis of Bavana. The King accepted the 
offer (or his son, a lad of seventeen, on condition that he should be King, 
and not merely aovereign prince, of Greece, and that the Powers should 
guarnntee a loan sufRcicnl to enable liim to carry on the government. 
These termsi were agreed to ; and, on May 13, 1832, the treaty 
was signed, but was antedated May 7 at the request of the Hritish 
Govenjmcnt, which on that day had suffered defeat in the House of 
Lords on the Ucform Bill and resigned. Thus a new Christian kingdom 
was added to the States system of Europe, and was placed, not under the 
guarantee of the general Concert, but under that of the three signatory 
Powers, Great Britain, France, and Husf^ia. Since the assassination of 
Capodistriaa (October, 1831) the country bad been plunged in anarchy, 
and the establishment of a recognised government was imperatively 
needed. On January 28, 1833, Otto, first King of Greece, landed at 
Nauplia, to attemjit the impossible task of restoiing, with the aid of 
Bavarian ofiicials and Bavarian mercenaries, law and order among a race 
of brigands and herdsmen. 




CHAPTER Vn 
SPAIN 

(1815-45) 

The course of the Peninsular War from June, 1813, described in a 

previous volume, produced a change in Napoleon'a attitude towards 

Ferdinand, witb whom he started negotiations which led to the Treaty of 

Valen^ay (December 11). By this treaty Ferdinand recovered the Crown 

of Spaiu, and undertook that the Hritish troops should not remain in the 

country after the withdrawal of the Krenoh. But the Regeuey atill 

existing in Spain and the CouucU of State both refused to acknowledge 

this treaty, on the ground of the decree passed by the Cortes ou January 1, 

1811, to the effect that uo engagomentii should be valid which might be 

made by Ferdinand during his captivity. The C'ortes, which were sitting 

at the time in Madrid, ratified tliis decision by their decree of February 2, 

1614, forbidding the recognition of Ferdinand as King until he should 

Bvrear to the Constitution. But Napoleon disregarded the disavowal of 

the treaty bv the Spajiish juitliorities, and, seeking in that moment 

of supreme trial to diminish his international difliculties, set Ferdinand 

freu to return to Spain (March 7). Ferdinand hastened to do so; andoa 

the i^2nd, while the Allies were atili struggling against the French troops 

la Catalonia, he entereil Spain. Hy his words, which were studiously 

v^iiei and by hia acts, he showed at once that be did not intend to 

tc^ct the system established in Spain during his absence. l)isobe3Tng 

die Cortes, he changed tlie route fixed for him by them, travelling first 

to Saragossa and thence to Valtiucia (April 16). A few days earlier (on 

the 12th), a group of sixty-nine deputies had presented to him an address 

nggesting the restoration of the aneien rigime. This was just what the 

King desired ; and, secure of the support of many soldiers and ofiicials, 

Ik ogned on May 4, in Valencia, a proclamation declaring " null and of 

00 effect" tlie Constitution and the decrees of the Cortes. This act, 

which was not made public for some days, was followed by the unexpected 

arrest in Madrid, on the night of thu 11th, of all tha Lilicral deputies. 

Thus begau the pei^ecutiona which marked the reaction. At the 

beginning of 1815 this reaction was complete ; and, in view of all the 

305 




206 



Tke Constitution of 1812 



PS 



uid 
thsJh 



circumstances, it mast be admitted that it was logical and ineTitablo« 
The Constitution of 1812 — notwithstanding the sincere belief of sor 
patriots, 8ach as the teamed Martinez Marina, that it was only tl 
restoralioti of tlio ancient Spanish Cortes and of a Liberal system wbicl 
had preceded absoluti^sm — meant, in fact, a complete change in poUtict 
oi^nisation. Its doctrines sprang on the one hand from the ideas whi< 
had formed the programme of the ** philanthropic " ministei-s in the 
eighteenth century, e^jiecially during the reigns of Ferdinand VI and 
Charles III, and, on the other hand, from the powerful influence of thqij 
F>ench Hevolulion, and also from the influence of the United Stat 
system, which made itself ft^lt thmugh the deputies from tlie Colonies.! 
From these sources the Constitution of 181 demerged as an ultra- Liberal 
code, some of whose chapters (namely III and IV of tit. II) are literal 
translations of pai^sages in the French Constitution of 1791 ; while 
other points, such as the separation of powers, it reflects doctrines 
English origin. Its leading principles were — thedeclarationof the Right 
of Man ; the sovereignty of the nation ; limited hereditary monarchyf 
the King being chief of the executive, controlled by the Constitutioi 
an^, in some of his functions, by the Cortes; the Cortes, set up as 
uattoual institution with legislative sovereignty; personal inviolability 
the deputies ; power to reform the Constitution ; elective municipalities; 
universal incidence of taxation, the exemptions of the privileged ol 
being abolished ; and other points of les8 immediate importance. To thf 
juiist bo lidded fuithcr I'efurniH niado by tho Cortes, such as the abolition] 
of the Inquisition — although religious offences were henceforth punishable! 
in the IJiahops' and the Civil Courts; the abolition of feudal jurisdiction, of J 
soigiiiorial rigbt«,and vassuhigcandof the XJ'OC'fsof nobility required front] 
those who wished to enter a military Order or to hold other posts of: 
honour; equality of rightsamongSpaniardsand Americans; the restriction 
of the number of religious comnninitics ; and the law abolishing eutaib. 

But the I'eforming party which had achieved these reforms in the 
Cortes of Cadiz, repi'cscntod only a minority — doubtless the most in- 
telligent; and cultivated part of tho population, but still only a minority. 
Against it were the fe ulings and interests not only of the royal Family — h 
attacked in its privileges uajd deeply wounded in Jta pride by these newB 
political principles — but also of many of the nobility and clergy, who 
had been injured in their interests and alarmed by the reforms passed in 
the Cortes and by the tone of tho philosophic ide^is of many Liberal 
momt)em ; nlthougti the Constitution declared that the Catholic religion 
was, and always should be, the sole religiou of the Spnnish nation. These 
national elements of opposition were aided by that general European 
movement of reaction against the spirit of the French KevolaLion 
which followed tho victory of the Allies over Napoleon. Thus upon 
Ferdinand's return to Spain the backward step was inevitable ; even if ■ 
the King had been hampered by scruples, he would have been driven 




to it hy the majority d£ his subjects and by the influence of the other 
sovereigns. 

But the peraonal character of Ferdinand and the blioduess of the 
alMolDtistft (hove the reaction to extremes. Louis XVIII and the 
hniffrfs did not venture to restore conipletoly tlie ancien rigime^ though 
Uiey had stronger reason to do &o. Ferdiuaiid did mure than restore his 
own absolute power ; he went back to a system which undid even the 
reforms of the eigliteentb century (as for example in the decree of 
.May 29, 181<% permitting the return of the Jesuits), and he stained 
ihe reaction with ferocious persecutions. This was hirgely due to 
the character of tljc King, rancorous, cruel, disloyal, ungrateful, and 
unscrupulous, as h« had already shown himself tti the conspiracies against 
his father and Gudoy and during lils residence in France. But from the 
national point of view it was a great error to break bo oompletely with 
the group of reformers. Although these were a minority within the 
coontry, they represented a genuine opinion, held by men of culture and 
intelligence, who would have provided the best element of administration 
under a king equal to his mission — men who, however mistaken iu the 
actual occasion of their reforms, repre»;ented something which it was 
madness to expunge cTitirely from the national life. These were also the 
men who had largely helped to organise the resistance against Napoleon, 
defending the throne for the King during his captivity in France. Uy 
merely cairying out what he had promised m his proclamation of 
May 4, 1814, the convocation of Cortes "to establish finnly and legally 
whatever the good of my people requires," by remembering that in the 
Baino document he had declared " that never in ancient Spain were her 
kings des^Mta nor did her good laws and constitutions allow it" — he 
would have saved the country niaiiy convulsions. Since the Liberals 
were sincere monarchists, and the Moderates, as afterwards appeared, 
were numerous among theui, the new monarchy might thus have been 
peBoefuUy and firmly established. But Ferdinand preferred to indulge 
bifl own and others' rancour, refusing to acknowledge auything that had 
been done in his at)scnco, and throwing himself into the arms of men 
generally incapable and blinded by political passion. 

Persecution, however, did not at first go so far as in the second 
reaction in 1824. It is true that the clergy and the violent absolutists 
committed excesses against the Liberals in many places, for example in 
Majorca, which liad been an important centre of refugees from tho 
Peninsula during the war of independence. But not much blood waa 
shed, notwithstanding ihe petitions of the extremists, who, in one of their 
periodicals, the Atalai/a, urged that "all the imprisoned Liberals should 

be at once hanged and afterwards the cases against them stated." 

Tins moderation was partly due to the intervention of Wellington. 

But, if no one wjis put to death, other penalties fell upon the 
nipporters of the Constitution. Almost all the deputies who still 



i 




208 



AbiiohUisi reaction in Spain 



[1814-S 



remained in Cadiz wei-e arrested^ tlieir houses searched, and their papers 
seized. Domiciliary visits were general. Every book of a Liberal 
flavour was destroyud and also every copy of the Constitution. The 
most absurd pretexts sufficed to condemn the suspected. The trials of 
the deputies were dropped after some delay, because the ordinary Courts 
found no ground for tlie Bent<im;e» desired by Lho absolutists. L>iHpleased 
at this, the King himself assumed juriadictiou in these cases and decided ^ 
thorn by a Royal Order of Deconiber 17, 1815, containing the list of thM| 
accused and their respective peualties, with the command that ''on that 
same night they should hi: tiiken from the [Hisonsand convoyed forthwilli 
to their respective destinations, so that in the morning tJie people of 
Madrid may find the thing accoraplishtjd." By virtue of this decision 
the must eminent members of the Cadiz Cortes who had failed to escajw 
abroad were sent, some to the African fortresses, others to castleaJj 
monasteries, or abbeys in Spain, there to sufiFor sentences, amounting ii^ 
some cases to eight years' iniprisonnient, with prohibition to receive any 
visit and exclusion for life from Madrid and the royal resideuot 
Although Ferdinand had promised Napoleon to respect the afrancetadc 
these also were victims of Uie political reaction, being exiled from !:jpaii 
or banished to a distance of twenty leagues from the capital with their 
families, to remain under the observation of the authorities. In conse- 
quence of this, many officers remained abroad for several yeai-s, in Franc 
or elsewhere. 

The political system established by the King was purely absolutisi 
The system of Ministers instituted by the Cortes was replaced by the 
previously existing Secretai^ships, subjoct to the will of the King and to 
tho authority of the Royal Council and C'haraber of Castile. This bodj 
and also the other C.^ouncila. notably those of the Indies, of the Ti-easuryJ 
and of the Religious Oidei's, wcro restored in the same fonn which thej 
liad possessed in 1805 according to the Laws of the Novitima ReoopilaeitJn. 
But this system of functionaries and offices was no more than a show, for 
behind them stood another power, the inner group or camarilla which 
the King had formed of his intimate adherents, among them thoJj 
notorious Escoiquiz, the Nuncio Gravina, the parvenu Duke of Alag6n, " 
besides one Chamorro, formerly a water-carrier — a sort of jester whose 
buffooneries amused the King — Ugarte, formerly a porter, and others of 
that stamp. This camarilla had much influence in affairs^ but not so 
much as to master the King's will. Although Ferdinand was certainly 
ignorant uf the instructions given by Charles I to his son Philip fl, hiai^ 
practised the jealous watchfulness which is advised in them, uain^^ 
the camarilla against the Secretaries and each member of the camarilla 
against all the rest: thus all watched each other, and the King was 
kept informed of the doings and intentions of all. Accordingly llie 
dismissals of Secretaries were so numerous that from 1814 to 1820 
more than thirty were deprived of oflico by the caprice or suspicion of 



any 

laiifl 
eir 

he 

to. 



1S16-8] 



Qaray^H financial reforms 



209 



the KiDg or the intrigm;j) of ooLleagueii. Dismissal was generally accom- 
pauiedbyexileorimjirisonment; aod Ferdinand, who sometimes affected 
a blunt candour, used to explain that some had been removed aa 
"shortsighted," othenj as '• long-handed," or "incapable," or "too 
clever," remarks which were often very true. With the members of the 
camariila be acted similarly ; thus even Ugarte, one of tlic most favoured, 
was imprisoned for some time in the alcazdr of Segovia, and the Canon 
OKtolaza, a iierce persecutor of the I^iboraU, was conHiied in 1818 in the 
monastery of Batuecas. But while they enjoyed the royal favour the 
Secretarit.'3 and the creatures of Ferdinand trafficked freely in offices and 
public affairs, nor w:is tlie King utilouched by tlie extreme political 
corruption of the period. One of the most scandalous examples of this 
corruption was the purchase from the Tsar of five ships of the lino and 
three frigates, almost all of wliich proved useless, notwithstanding their 
enormous cost of r)4,4D0.O0O pes,f>ta» (over two millions sterling). The 
IKrsons chiefly involved in this iiffuir wore the King liimst:U, Ugarle, the 
Russian ambassador Taticheff, aiul Eguia, Minister of War. 

The results of this Government were seen in a depressed and poverty- 
stricken country, commerce and industry ruined, the public service 
neglected, the Treasury bankrupt, the army and navy unpaid and 
starving, and the naval forces almost reduced to the King's pleasure- 
boats ou the Tagus and the pool of the Ketiru. The only relief offered 
for the extreme indigence of many naval officers, of whom one died of 
starvation at Kcrrol, was permission granted to them to support them- 
flelves by fishing (February 12, 1815). Meantime the King's i)ersonal 
guards were munificently paid and loaded with favoura. The situation 
iraa temporarily i-elieved by the appointment of Garu}' as Secretary of 
tlie Treasury (December, 1816). The annual deficit tlien exceeded 116 
million pesetas (between four and five millions sterling), excluding the 
interest on the debt. Garay presented a scheme which was completed 
by later decrees, fixing the revenue at 714 millions and substituting for 
the innumerable existing taxes a direct coutributiou valued at 250 
millions, preserving, besides, various monopolies and the dues levied on 
goods entering the towns. To increase the new contribution, ho abolished 
the exceptions or immunities enjoyed by some regions and by certain 
oluees, esijecially the clergy ; and he made arrangements for the gradual 
(eduction of the debt. The King, who was wasteful and exliaviigarit, 
welcomed this reform for the sake of the increa-so of revenue; and the 
Pope agreed to an annual contribution of thirty millions fi-om the clergy, 
beudas other taxes on ecclesiastical revenues. But the protests of the 
people against the single contribution, the disappointment nf the King 
whose treasury gained leas than he had expected, the intrigues of the 
clergy against the new impost, and perhaps other causes connected with 
the scandal of the Russian ships, brought about the fall of Garay (1818) ; 
fais plans were undone aud the Uuauces returned tu their former confusion. 

c- u, a. 1. 1* 



k 




210 Liberal conspiracie^anS^lSt^ections [iSi 



jelof 



While Garay was thus attempting 6uancial reforin, some slighfl 
relaxation of the geneml system of oppression look place towards the 
end of the period. This change was partly due to the Queen, Isabel ' 
Hraganza, Ferdinand's second wife, married in 1816. Although a deci 
of April 26, 1815, had forbidden the publicatioa of any periodical ex< 
the Gazette and the Diario de Madrid, some non-political periodicals 
were now tulemtcd. Among them the Cr^niea Ctentfjica y Literaria 
deserves special mention ; it was edited by tlie semi-Liberal Jose Joaquin 
de Mora, who together with AlcalA Galiano carried on in its pages a 
conti-oversy in favour of classicism and against the Spanish drama of the 
seventeenth century, which their adversary lidhl de Faber, a follower oi^ 
Schlcgcl, wished to restore to public favour. This controversy was thfl 
first episode in the literary conflicts which were to end after some years 
with tiie victory of Komantictsm. In fact, the dramas of CaldcrAii, I^ope, 
Tirso, and the rest, had never censed to be represented in Madrid, even 
during the prevalence of neo-classical taste in the eighteenth century Sh 
and, at the very time when BVibl was defending them, the great actol| 
MaiquL'Z included them in his repertorj', side by side with works of 
different quality translated from the French. While the intellectual 
repression was thus somewhat relaxed, primary schools were established 
in Madrid ; the public relief of distress was extended ; the picture-gallery 
founded by Khig .loseph was reorganised ; and Madrid was embellished 
by some considerable public works. M 

But this partial relief did not sufHce to cover the many defeott^ 
of the Government, Htitl less to satisfy the aspirations of the partisans 
of the Constitutiou or doceaHutaa, as they were called. To most men ofl 
Liberal ideas the Constitution of 1812 was an object of idolatry^™ 
sustained by the sentlmentalisin and etithusiastic idealism of the period. 
They believed public welfare ancl national prosperity to be impossible 

apart from the Code of Cadiz, Tltis bi-Hcf (which was shared by many 

foreigners, among whom were some English), together with the desire odH 
vengeance inevitably roused by Ferdinand's persecutions, produced re- 
peated insurrections whicli aimed at overtluowing absolutism. All tbe 
leadeis were military officera : Espoz y Mina in 1S14; Forlier in 181&j 
Richard, who attempted to assassinate the King, in ISIG ; Lacy in 18l7| 
All these attempts failed, and most of the lenders with their associat 
snfFm'Lfd death. Except in the ease of Richard, all these conspiracies 
and risings aimed merely at rc-storiug the Constitution under the rule of 
Ferdinnnd. preserving the strictest allegiance to monarchy, notwith- 
gtiinding the odious character of the King. Nevertheless, according to 
Alrald (ialiano and other contempoiuries, the Spaniards were beginning 
to feel contempt for Fei-dinand. Ah a!i Galiano, whose knowledge of 
men was very mde, wrote in 1818 tliat oven among vigorous opponents 
of the fallen Constitution he observed disgust at the state of things; 
"respect for the royal person," he adds, "had diminished.'* 



tbe 

"J 




1814-20] Spain and the Foreigii Powers 



211 



The military character of tlie insurreotions and the predominance of 
military lead«rs is expiaineJ by the fact that among the general popula- 
tion, little afifected by Liberal ideas, it was impossible to tind a siillioietit 
nnmber of armed adherents to effect a revolution, Avhile mihtary dis- 
cipline made of the soldiery a docile instininieut, and the officei-s, men 
of considerable cultivation, much affected by French ideas, and iudtguaiit 
at the pereecutiotis and at tbe uflicial neglect of the ai-my, furnished ready 
material for revolutdonarj'aotion. Later these conditions were lundified 
by personal struggles and by tlie ambitions of oommaudors, which pro- 
longed, as will presently appear, the era of those miUtary iusun-cctious 
which form so large a part of the history of Sjiain almost throughout the 
centuiy. Meantime the orgauisation uf the National Militia, by arming 
the hourgtoisie and the people, introduced a new civilian element into 
the revolutionaiy party. 

The failure of all the movements from 1814 to 1820 increased in 
Qvery case the severity of Ferdinand towards all who were suspected of 
Liberalism, and produced fresh victims. Even men like Escoiquiz and 
the f:tmouB i}\urriUe.To '• El Erapecinado " were banished for addressing to 
the King some observations on the iiiufficacy u( a system of terror and 
on the need of attracting the more advanced group by means of reforms. 
Thus opinion was being prepared for new explosions, which were soon to 
introduce a second constitutional period. 

The excesses of the reaction in Spain disgusted not only Spaniards but 
tl$o the sovereigns and Govornracntsof the (Ireat Powers. Louts XVIII 
clearly showed this disgust by refusing the aid of the Spanish troops sent 
bjf Ferdinand under Castauos after Napoleon's escape from Elba, wlnlo 
accepting the aid of other nations in the campaign of 1815. At the 
Congress of Vienna in 1816 the obstinacy of Spain incurred a rebuff, 
(lewrved by the King, but not by the Spanish people, which had taken 
it< full share in the overthrow of Napoleon's power and in a war which 
had roused the enthusiasm of all Europe. The claims of the Spanish 
rrpretientative, a diplomatist of moderate capacity named Gomez Lab- 
nwlor, wore disregarded ; Spain refused to sign the Final Act, and was 
Dot invited to join the Holy Alliance. In return Ferdinand refused to 
recognise or accede to the decisions of the Coalition of 1815. 

Buti if the Spanish monaichy was neglected abroad, at home in 
the Court of Mndrid the Powers contended for influence over the 
Government and strove to guide it« policy or win advantages. Great 
Britain and Russia were conspicuous in this effort through the persistent 
intrigues of their ambiissadors, Henry Wellesley and Count Taticheff. 
Riisua. favoured a moderate policy, partly from expediency, since an 
extreme system, by driving Spaniards to the brink of revolution, waw 
dangerous to Europe; [lartly because the Twar Alexander was still in 
that phase of semi-Liberal romanticism which he afterwards abandoned. 
The Ilritish Government and ambassador at that time supported abso- 




212 British and Russian vifluence at Madrid [isii 

lutism ; but on the other hand they were displeased with Ferdinand 
for his ingratitude towards Welliugtou and diaregard of Wollingtoii's 
prudent coutiaela, and for lua vexatious measures agaiust British 
commerco and even against llritish subjects living in the Peninsula. 
These motives of dissatisfaction, together with the strong Liberal feeling 
existing in England, produced vigornus attacks from the Opposition in 
Parliament upon Ferdiniiml and his councillors. These attacks injured 
English intluenco in Madrid for the time, and Tatichcfif contrived to 
obtain the supremacy, partly by means of Queen Isabel, whose desire 
for modeiutiou he supported. Thus came about the slight respite of 
two years (1816-8), which began with the elevation to power of Jose 
Leon y Pizarro, a man of sound intelligoueo and political experience, 
who was expected to give a more humane and Liberal turn to the 
Government, and which ended with the fall of Garay. To recover 
favour. Groat Britain supported the claims of tho Bourbon family in 
Italy, and obtained at last the Treaty of June, 1817, which secured the 
reversion of Parma, Piacenza, and Guastalla to the Infanta Marie-Louise, 
formerly Queen of Etruria, and her male descendants. The insurrection 
of the Araeriean Colonies offered a fresh opportunity to Great Itritain 
to gain influence over Spain. Tho open assistance lent by her to the 
insurgents as well as her influence in Portugal, which through her 
Colony of Brazil represented a powerful factor in the Trans-AtlanUo 
political problem, convinced the Spanish Government of tho need of 
closer relations with Great Bi-itain ; and at last, after a fruitless effort 
made with the su[:ipurt of Russia iji the permanent Commission of the 
Allied Powers, it attained this eud by the Treaty of September 17, 
1817, which opened to fJreat Britain the commerce of the Indies and 
prepared the way for the abolition of the slave-trade. But this did not 
destroy at the time the influence of Taticheff in tho Court, and especially 
in the camarilla^ some of whoso members were guided by him, nor did it 
prevent the intervention of other Russian politicians in Spanish policy. 
Among these was Prince Galitzin, an amateur of literature and art 
and intimate with the writers of the time, who resided in Madiid as a 
secret and busy agent of Russia. Among his friends was Mora, editor of 
the Cr6nica Cietitffica, who was induced by Galitzin to aid him in draw- 
ing up a memorial upon the political, military, moral, and economic 
state of Spain, persuading him that it was to be presented to Capo* 
disti'ias, with a view to obtaining the support of the Tsar in pending 
questions. Mora, induced by the intrigues of Galitzin, succeeded in 
bringing into the affair tho Secretary of Justice, the illiterate Lozauo de 
Torres, to whom he proposed a mission to the Courts of foreign Powers 
and an interview with Capodistnas. This mission was to be entrusted 
to Mora himself, in order to ascertain exactly what truth there was in 
rumours of conspiracies and plots against the Spanish State, rumours 
of which tho inept Sjmnish diplomacy seemed totally ignorant- The 




proposal haviug been accepted by the King, Mora started aecretly on 
April 20, 1819, for Italy, where according to Oalitzin he was to meet 
Capodistrias and show him the memorial. The interview with Uio 
Russian Minister did not take place ; but on his journey through Spain, 
Italy, and France, Mora became convinced that the Government of 
Ferdinand was discreilited in the opinion of Europe, and that overywliere 
conspiracies were aiming at a Spanish revolution, chiefly supported by 
American agents from the Spanish Colonies and from the United States, 
who hoped thus to aid the emancipation of Spanish America, and also by 
the Freemasons and the King of Sardinia himself. One of those who 
informed Mora of these movementa was Goday, who was then in Rome, 
his naturalisation in Austria being opposed by Ferdinand through the 
ambassador Cevallos. By the advice of Mora, given on the strength of 
the revelatioiis made in his dispatches, Ferdinand made one of Ids 
frequent changes of Secretaries ; but he refused to establish or subsidise 
in Madrid a xjohtical periodical which might counterbalance tlie polemics 
carried on by the English Press. Other advice given by Mora was also 
neglected; and when this improvised diplomatist urged the King to 
£saxm the conspirators by granting a Constitutional Charter on the 
lines of the French Oharte, and also an amnesty to the Liberals and 
proscribed afrunceiiados, ho was recalled from his mission and returned 
in disappointment to Madrid at the very time when Capodistrias was 
vridng to him from Paris — perhapsnot with serious intentions — inviting 
him to an interview lu the French capital. Meantime the United States 
Minister, Geoige Erving, was pressing upon the Spanish Government 
the cession of the Floridas, which was finally accomplished by the Treaty 
of 1619, ratified on October 20, 1820. In return Erving professed com- 
plete neutrality with regard to the Colonies, although it was well known 
that frequent help was sent from the United States to the insurgents, 
and that the American Freemasons boldly supported the movement 
with the knowledge and connivance of the Federal Government. 

According to Mora's communications agents from North and South 
America swarmed throughout Europe, with centres of aotion and 
rigilRnco established in Lisbon and in J^ondon to observe the movements 
of troops destined for America and to prepare for the outbreak of au 
iflsorrection on the eve of their departure: by these means, apart from 
the effecta upon Spain herself, the struggle in the Colonies would be 
closed. The Italian Carbonari were in coramunication with the Lodges 
of Philadelphia, and, in concert with William .Shalderque, the United 
States agent in Leghorn, had dispatched one of their number, the 
a;jitator Sertini, from Gonna to Uarcelona. Khalderqne had correspon- 
dents in several parts of the Peninsula, thix^ugh whom he distributed 
money to pre|>are the Revolution. Rumours of this American gold were 
earrent in Ca<liz at the end of 1819 and begiinung of 1B20; and 
KKDe Americans afterwards boasted of having thus contributed to the 




revolution. These riimoui's wore recalled mtin)* years afterwards by the 
anonymousauthor of the History of Fernando r'7/(184"2> ; but, although 
Mora's infonnatioii may have been partly true, it shoukl be noted thai 
AlciUa Galiano — wlio, like most converta, is very candid in his mcuioirs 
— absolutely denies that the conspiracy received such support, and dwells 
upon the Indigence of the Cadix conspirators, who, at the end of 1819, 
succeeded with preat trouble in collecting through the coutributious of 
some Cadiz merchantfi about 4000 dollars ; a sum quite insufiicient to 
suborn ofiicers and soldiers. The fact is, that whatever intere&t the 
Americans may have had in raising- hindrances in Spain against the 
reinforccmtmt of the Spanish forces in America, there existed in the 
Peninsula sufficient eleuienta for tlie support of more or less serious 
revolutionary action without external aid or incitement. 

The revolutionary movement gathered force gradually, as in other 
countries. We have already said that the majority of the intellectual 
element) although a minority of the whole population, had inoi'e or less 
pronounced Liberal tendencies, leaning either towards the doceafiittat or 
the afranee»ados. The intellectuals were joinod by many men of the 
middle class, especially merchants, some nobles and ecclesiastics, and 
many officers of the army. The list of the conspirators and Freemasons 
of that time, and the names of those who after the triumph formed the 
juntas and municipalities in Madrid aud the other capitals, clearly prove 
that in every class, and particularly in the bourgeoisie^ Liberal ideas 
claimed adhorenta. Even among those who had recognised the absolutist 
Government of 1814, and those who occupied public posts, partisans 
were to be found not perhaps of the Constitution of 1812, but at least of 
a modenit« constitutionalism, or of a moi-e Liberal monarchy. In Cadii 
the chief part of the population favoured these ideas, doubtless owing to 
the influence of the Cortes which had sat in that city. In some regions, as 
in Asturias, the most prominent men, and nlraost all the patriots who in 
1808 had organised resistance to the French, joined the Liberal move- 
ment, although afterwards many of them changed sides, becoming 
excessively Conservative. The general feeling of tlie young men was the 
same. Notwitli standing the vigilance of the authorities, the books of tlie 
Encyclopedists and the abundant political literature, not yet adequately 
studied, which had sprung from the discussions of 1^10-3, passed from 
hand to hand, as well as pamphlets and poems more or less seditious and 
inflammatory, in which young men socretly vented their aspirations for 
a vague liberty, all the more eagerly desired because not clearly defined. 
The refugees of 1814, chiefly living in England, carried on thence a per- 
sistent campaign (described in Mora's dispatches) against the alisniutism 
of Ferdinand and his eamarilla^ with the support of the English Liberal 
Press, which always by some means found entrance into Spain. The 
officers, who had been made prisoners in the War of Independence 
and had returned to Spain, constituted, as has been said, a considerable 





Liberal element, influenced as they wore by French ideas ; and some of 
them, as Kiego and San Miguel, were members of foreigu :ieci-et aocieUcs, 
SQch as that o£ the Freemasons. 

Freemasouary had existed iu Spain from the middle of the eighteenth 
centur}'. The persecutions of 1814 and the propaganda of the i-etuniiiig 
refugees greatly increased its range, first in dependence upon centres 
established in other countries, but afterwards with a separate organisa- 
tion. Not all the Masons \vere rcvolntionists, but all aided one another; 
and under the shadow of the Lodges tlie Radical elements steadily 
worked forre volution anddrew in fresh adherents, some of them convinced 
partisans^ others liardly understanding to what they were committing 
themselves. Alcala Galiano says that in 1817 Spanish freemasonry on 
the whole " was not yet determined to act vigorously and directly against 
t)je Government," although most of the malcontente and converts to 
Liberalism were becoming Masons. In tha insurrection of Lacy, which 
was supported by the Murcian Lodge, not all the coiiKpicators were 
Masona ; and the Cadiz Lodge hesitated before approving the conduct of 
the Lodge of Algeciras, wliich had welcomed the fugitives from Catalonia. 
Dut in 1819 matters took a nioi-e decided political turn. The Andalusiaa 
Masons, especially those of Cadiz and Seville, who had wide ramifications 
in the garrusoiis and in the army whiulL was being assembled at Cadiz to 
be embarked for America, decided under the indueuce of some enthusiasts 
to push on the revolution. Among the civilians, two young men took 
the lead in the conspiracy, Alcalii Galiano, son of the brave sailor killed 
at Trafalgar, and Mesdizabal, who was employed in the provisioning of 
the troops, a man then obscure but afterwards a leading figure in Spanish 
politics. 

Notwithstanding the insignificance and timidity of those who 
ostensibly ruled tlio masonic society of Cadiz, matters were actively 
pushed on through the enthusiasm of a few men and the illusory hopes 
entertained by the military mtmibors of large monetary contributions 
and powerful aid from the Sovereign Chapter sitting in Cadiz. Among 
the aimed forces the movement was much aided by the rcpugnanoe 
generally felt in the army and navy against embarking for .America. 
This repugnance, which is not uncommon iu colonial wars and can be 
paralleled in the modern history of several countries, was justified in this 
case by the mismanagement of the eK[)edition and such 8i»udals us that 
of the purchase of Russian ships, which were destined for America. It was 
aUo believetl that the movement would be directed by General O'Domdl, 
Conde de La Bisbal, an Irishman b}' birth, commander of the cxpc- 
diUonsry army, whose ambiguous conduct and decided tolerance towards 
the conspirators seemed to show a disposition to revolt. But, when 
all was ready for the outbreak, La Bisbal — whether upon hisown initiative 
or upon the persuasion of Sarsfield, the second in command — arrested 
the commauders of battalions at Puerto de Santa Maria (Cadiz — July). 



i 




This blow upset for the moment the plans of the revolutionists ; but, 
contrary to expectation, it was not followed by regular prosecutions, 
nor did it prevent the reunion of the conspirators and the renewal of 
their efforts. These efforts at last won the adhesion of two officers, 
Colonel Quiroga, who was api>oint«d military leader of the insurrection, 
and Rafael del Riego, eornmaiider iif the regiment of Asturias. 

C)n January 1, 1820, the day previously fixed by these leaders, Riego, 
with the force under his command, proclaimed in the town of Cabezas de 
San Juan the Constitution of 1812; thereby acting against the plans of 
the civilian leatlera of the movement^ who, according to Alcala Galiano, 
were far from desiriiig merely the restoration of a political code which 
some of them regarded as defective. On the night of January 1. Hiego 
entered Arcos and seized the person of (ieneral Conde de Calderrin. He 
was there joined by tlie Inittalion of Seville, whose second in coraniaiid^ 
Francisco Osorio, had revolted on the same day. Quiroga, who had been 
prevented by a storm of rain from leaving the barracks on tlie date 
fixed, started ou January 2 and took possession of the town of San 
Kernando. where the Minister of Marine was made prisoner. This easy 
victory might have been followed by a naaieh into Cadiz, but for the 
hesitation and blundering of Quiroga, who let slip his opportunity. 
Thus the military authorities had timo to prepare for defence ; luid, 
although the coospiratoi-s within the city attempted without success to 
win over the scanty garrison, while Riego on his side led his troops into 
Puerto de Santa Maria and seized the arsenal of ("arraca,yet the revolu- 
tion stood still for many days and was threatened with complete failure. 
An expedition led by Riego to M41aga and Crtidoba, to inspirit the 
soldiers and win the adhesion of other places, proved fruitless, as well as 
an attempt made in Cadiz by agreement with some royalist officers 
(March 10). Kortunatt^ly for the constitutional causo, the hesitation 
which had prevailed throughout Spain upon the flnst news of Riego's 
pronunciainiento -was ended on February 21 by the revolt of Cornnna; an 
example quickly followed by all Galicia, Asturias, Saragossa, Uarcclona. 
and Pampeluna. La Bisbal himself, who was in Madrid at the time and 
had been commissioned by the Government to crush the (ionstitutionalists, 
revolted at Ocaiia, perhaps because be was now assured that the revolu- 
tion woidd succeed. 

All these events filled the Court with fear and the Liberals of Madrid 
with hope. It seeing inexplicable that from January 1 to February 21, 
on which dato Corunna seconded the movement of Cabezas de San Juan, 
the Government remained inactive, or merely attempted some feeble 
measures against the insurgents. From Doceinher, 1819, when the 
central authorities apparently discovered that an attempt was being 
made to renew the movement which had been checked by La Bislml aud 
Sarsfield in July, it was evident that, instead of vigorously crushing the 
symptoms of j-ebelUon, they were attempting to thwart it by timid 




1820] 



The revolution accomplished 



217 



reforms. They bejjaij by aimouncinp a new pcual code and the mitiga- 
tion of processes and jpenaltiets iu the case of political prisoners. This 
trifling promise satisfied no one, and nothing more was heard of it ; but 
on March 4, the gathering force of tlie rnvnlution being now evident^ a 
royal decree commanded that the Council of State sliauU! be reorganised 
and that the Council and the Judges should consult the King "as to 
That they thought expedient for the good government of the monarchy." 
On the Cth an order appeared announcing the convocation of the Cortes; 
and finally on the 7th, by advice of General Ballesteros, an extraordinary 
Gazette declared that the ('ortes would meet at once, and that the King 
"in accordance with the general will of the people had decided to swear 
ftdheuon to the Constitution of 1812." Thus, almost without bloodshed, 
the revolution of 1820 tnun]phed. 

According to an eye-witness, Meaonero Komanos, this Gazette pro- 
duced inde-scribable relief among the more cultivated and wealthy part 
of the population of Madrid, gniiidces and titles of Castile, military 
officers of every rank, rich proprietoi-s, bankers and all the commercial 
classes, lawyers, physicians, liteniry and scientific men. Mesonero states 
that in the expressions of rejoicing the lower classes took no share, 
being generally, as has been said, not veiy favounible to constitutaon- 
alism, either from ignorance of its moaning or from the weight of the 
Jong tradition of alwolutism. The intellectual character of tlie move* 
ment, partly aristocratic, partly Ixnirffeoiw^ appeared in the s^jontaneous 
meeting held on the same day in the town-hall by people of the 
classes already mentioned, when the new municipality of Madrid was 
appointed by acclamation. In Cadiz, where the news of the decree of 
March 7, followed by an order that the troops should swear to the 
Constitution, iind suddenly changed the position of the insurgents, the 
revolution still had a distinctly military character; and it was evident 
that the leaders, especially Riego, intended to make the most of the 
credit of having started the revolution and to establisli a riv;il power 
which should iKilance the civil power now being organised in Madiid. 
Utego and Quiroga sent emissaries tn the King, to congratulate him 
on having sworn to the Constitution and to offer liim the submission 
of the "Liberating Army." Both were raised to the grade of gen- 
eral, an honour which Hiego vta^ unwilling to accept, partly from real 
disinterestedness — a trait which in his childish, impulsive, and senti- 
nental character was compatible with the amlution which sometimes 
tamed his head — partly because he resented the grant of t!ie same 
lewMrd to Quiroga and to two other officers whom he thought less 
daierving than himself. But if some cleavage thus began to appear 
between the two forces, civil and military, which had risen from the 
revolution, no difference of opinion appeared in the spirit of generosity 
which at first marked the victory of the constitutionalists. In fact, not 
only was no excess committed against the supporters of absolutism ; but, 




although the deputies who in 1814 had urged the King to restoi 
absolutUin were arrested, the majority of the Cortes» which met in 1820,1 
desired that they should not be broug-ht to trial; and accordingly they] 
were set at liberty. The King took iho outh on March 9; and on thoj 
10th a royal proclamation appeared containing a phrase afterwai'da] 
famous : — *' Let us advance frankly, myself leading the way, along thft] 
constitutional path.*' Wu shall presently see how far the frankness o£] 
Ferdinand went. 

All the proscribed persons and i-efugees of 1814 naturally returnei:| 
to S^jain; and some of the most eminent — A rguelle8,Canga Argiiclles,; 
and others — were included in the first constitutional Government. The J 
Cortes having been summoned, there was an interregnum of fourmontlisl 
during which the administration was conducted in a strange fashion,, 
being divided between the Ministry and the provincial revolulionaiy] 
juntas, which did not disperse, one of them continuing to sit even in th»j 
capital of the monarchy. Side by side with these authorities, which! 
had a certain oflSeial character and continued the tradition of 1810-2, 
another power presently arose which in an unofficial and in-eguiar raan-j 
ner profoundly influenced public affairs — the power of the clubs otl 
"patriotic socjicties*' fonued upon Ki-cnch models. Some of these werol 
begotten by the enthusiasm of youth, others were formed with thei 
reasonable hope of instructing and guiding public opinion; but all] 
were swayed as a rule by the most impetuous radicalism. The niosbj 
famous societies of .Madrid were that of the Cafe Loreucinif entitled! 
"The Pati-iotic Society of the Friends of Liberty," that of the Cafe .| 
Gran Cruz de Malta, and that of the " Friends of Order," commonly] 
known as La Font-ana de Ort>, because it met id the basement of the Inai 
60 named. In this lost the leading orator was Alcalii Galiano, who had 
left Cadiz for Madrid. A characteristic mark of these societies — uot 
indeed confined to them, for it pervaded the political life of the time — ■■ 
was the abuse uf rhet«>ric which inflamed men's minds and won rapid 
popular triumphs. Oratory was supported by a formidable stream of 
patriotic and topical verse, and by music which provided a setting for 
political hymns and songs. Two of these had an extra.ordinary vogue: 
the hymn of Hiego, whose authorship was disputed among several 
claimants, the fact being that there were several hymns, of which ooa 
prevailed and became for half a centuiy the Liberal anthem; and, 
secondly, the Tn((/ala, so called from ita refrain (^Swalloiff W) which 
referred to the Constitution of 1812. 

Prominent in the J^iberalism of that time was the National Militia, 
which thenceforth played a large part in politics. The Code of 1812, 
which created this force, directed that it was to be formed in each 
province "of the inhabitants of the province in proportion to \Xa popu- 
lation and condition," not serving continuously but only " when circura- 
stanoed rei^uired." In the principal cities a number of nobles voluutarUjr 



joined this militia in 1820 side by etdo with the hourt/eoieie ; Mesonero 
meutions the uames of moro than sixteen oucieut aud illuabrioiu bouses 
on tlie roll of the Madrid militia. i 

Ou July 9 tlie Cortes were opened, meeting in a single Chamber like 
the Cortes of IBIO. Their coiupositiuu was fairly homogeneous, with a 
predominance of moderate LiberaU and men of cultivation and guuial 
weight, professors, writers, magistrates, noted students of science, as 
Lagasca, Azaola^ (Jiacar, and othei-a. Many deputies of 1812 were now 
re-elected, among them the group of Liberal priests which included 
Martinez Marina, Mufioz Torroro, Villanucva, Ruiz del Padrtfn, Mai-tell, 
and others. 

Although the deputies did uob all equally reverence the Constitutiou 
of 1812, some even desiring its reform or complete alteration, the 
opinion of the majority estiiblished as the symbol of the Liberal cnuHe the 
Code of Cadiz; its integrity was the fundamental doctrine upon which 
the Cortes b-ased their labours. In accordance with a precedent of 1812 
it was ordered (April 24) that tho text of the Constitution should be 
explained in the primary schools. Tho Cortes sat until November 9, and 
passed many important measures, among them the abolition of entails 
and of the settlement of estates, the 8Ux>pression of many religious Orders, 
the abolition of pecuniary subsidies to the Papal See, the regulation of 
the patriotic societies with a view to prevent excesses, and the puni'-^hmcnt 
of the priests who were conspiring against the ConstitutionaKioveroment. 
The Cortes of 1820, as well as the succeeding Cortes of this period, have 
been blamed as anti-olericf£l. Such was, in fact, their character; and in 
Ttew of the political situation this was natural, for the greater part of 
the clergy were anti-constitutional. Their sympathy with absolutism 
had been proved in the reaction of 1814, which, in spite of Garay'a 
unsuccessful opposition, committed the eiTor of ratifying the exemption 
from taxes of the clergy, who now selfishly aimed at escaping from 
public hardens even more completely than in the time of Philip 11, 
Finally, the absolutist traditions of the Church in past centuries aud, 
above all, the great struggles of the civil tribunals with the Church in 
the eighteenth century, together with the sti-ong and long-existing 
ztatioDal st^ntiment, wliioh demanded a reduction of the number of 
ecclesiastics, formed a powerful intellectual inheritance for the politicians 
of the time. Among the results were, beaides the already mentioned laws, 
the suppression of the Jesuits, the prohibition for tho future of religious 
vows, the confiscation of the property of the suppressed communities^ 
and the obligution of the clergy, botli regular and secular, tu military 
aervice. It is notable tliat tho confiscation was supported by such 
moderate Liberals as Martinez de La Rostt, Toreno, and one Bishop 
(Castrillo). Among the clergy themselves, there was a minority of 
reformers in ecclesiastical matters, represented by learned men like 
Archbishop Amat, Vlllanueva, and others, whose books formed the 



i 




doctrinal basis of this policy. The ideas expressed by Villanueva in 
his Letters to Ruque Leal were so well received tJiat the Governmeat 
named him Ambaasiidor in Rome; but the Vatican refiised to receive 
him. This episodct together with other causes, produced the rupture 
of relations with the Curia, which waa declared on January 23, 1823> 
wheu the Nuncio received his passports. 

Notwithstanding all their labom-s, the Cortes of 1820 satisfied nobody. 
The Radicals found them too moderate and cautious in reform ; the 
Moderates, and much more those who saw nothing but danger ia the 
revolution, found them too violent, especially in ecclesiastical matters. 
The latent division between the Liberals of 1812 and those of 1820 
now distinctlj* showed itself. The former were inclined to moderation, 
aiming at a riroi establishment of the Constitution, even at the cost of 
some raodificiitioii of its eliarauter. The latter, thorough revolutionaries, 
although only in some points really more radical than the Constitution 
itself, claimed to be the only true LibernLs ; and with the help of the 
patriotic societies and the personal influence of Kicgo, they obtained 
some concessions which were insufficient to satisfy them, and, in fact, 
rather deepened the dissensions. Thus, in the very year when the 
revolution triumphed, the Liberal forces were not only divided but 
embittered, and weakened for any coinbined action or resistance. 

A notable event gave the signal for rupture. The Ministers and 
the Moderates had from the beginning \-iewed with apprehension the 
attitude of the troops which had revolted in Andalusia. The continued 
maintenance of that arm)' was also a financiat burden which the Govern- 
ment thought snjKtrihious, since, the oath to the Conatitution having 
been taken throughout ypain, a military force for its defence seemed 
unnecessary. But the new Liberals, especially the friends of liiego, 
considered that the dissolution of that force would be not only a slur 
upou the oflicers who hud started the revolution, but also a positive 
imprudence, for it was known that the Constitution had many enemies ; 
and events afterwards proved that those who took this view did not 
exaggerate the danger. On the other hand the independent attitude of 
Riego, which became more pronounced every day, and the plans for armed 
resistance formed by some extremists in Madrid and by the majority in 
Cadiz supported by the Lodges, seemed to justify disbandment; and the 
Government pei-sisted in its intention. Riego was secretly summoned to 
Madrid to discuss the matter. The surprise was great in Madrid when 
Riego, travelling incognito, unexpectedly arrived on August 31. Ho 
did not observe the discretion demanded by his position, but showed his 
intemperance and vafiity in his conferences with the Ministers, at the 
pompous reception prepac-ed for liim by his partisans, at the banquet 
given in his honour by La Fontana, and at the function in the Teatro 
del Principe which he attended after the banquet. There was a dis- 
turbance ; and the Government iu growing alarm banished Riego and 



I 
I 



1820-2] 



Comuneros and Anilleros 



221 



some other officers to Asturias in order to cut the matter short. This 
act of energy produced a sedition, which was promptly suppressed. 
La Fontana closed its sittings, the exiled officers departed, and the 
"Liberating Army" was di3)»nded without offering resistance. 

Hut there was a definite divergence between the two Liberal groups. 
The parUsang of Riego expelled the friends of the Goveriinient from the 
Lodges; and a new maaonic centre vraa established, known as the comutieros^ 
a name borrowed from that given to the Castilian insurgents of 1520- 
The breach was delayed by the conclusion of an agreement at the end of 
1820 between the extremists and the Government, whereby Riego was 
recalled from exile and appoinLed Cftptaio-General of Ariigon, while 
gome of his friends entered the Ministry or obtained ofHcial posts ; but 
the beginning of 1821 brought a final rupture, and the establishment of 
the comuneros as a new secret society, opposed to the Freemasons, but 
imitating their organisation and ceremonies. This society was at first 
unimportant but afterwards gathered such strength that in 3822 it 
numbered 10,030 members, still maintaining its nltra-Liberal character 
and adhering to Riego. This split was fatal for the constitutionalists, all 
tlie more that it was complicated by the existence of other groups of 
con&icting viewa, always struggling with one another and exciting 
dissensions. Such were, first, the group of the afrancegados, who> after 
their return to Spain, anon showed themselves so moderate that they 
opposed the Liberals; secondly the societies of fariotturi, either modelled 
upon those of Italy, or actually founded by Ilalian refugees, such aa 
General Pepe, after the failure of the Neapolitan and I'iedmontese 
revolutions; and, thirdly, the republican legitimists and French adven- 
turers, such as Bessieres, Montarlot, Vaudoncourt, and oLhers, whose 
proceedings (to be mentioned later) were on the point of producing grave 
disturbances in Spain. Again, the moderate Liberals who desired a 
reform of the Constitution, such as Martinez de La Rosa, Toreno, Feliu, 
Case Manuel, and others, formed at the end of 1821 a aemi-scciet society, 
named " Friends of the Constitution," and nicknamed the aniiUros, from 
the gold ring which was their symbol. Their chief object was to 
strengthen and eidaige the power t»f the Government, in order Uv avoid 
anarchy. We shall presently trace the various incidents which marked 
the spread of the struggle between these several groups. 

These dissensions were cleverly turned to account by Ferdinand and 
the abnolutists. It is needless to say that the King had never, for a 
moment, sincerely accepted the revolution. The man, who in 1814 had 
not understood the force of accomplished facts and the meaning of 
Liberal opinion, could still less understiind them when he found himself 
violently deprived of his absolute power. Thus it is not strange that, 
immediately after swearing to the Constitution, the King began to 
plot against it* and that there were repeated collisions between him and 
the successive Liberal Governments. From the beginning of 1820 there 



i 




222 " The Kings pig-UUU' — The Pdwcrs [i830-i 

were variou* indtcatioiu of reaction in several places, inelading Madrid. 
In October the Kin^ refused to sanction the law for the exunction of 
Dunnerieti and dimination of monasterieSf and anlj yielded before the 
threst of a revolt and the decided attitude of the patriotic societies. On 
October 25, Kerdinand weut to the Kttcurial, whence he encooiaged anti- 
eonstitutional eonspiracies, at the name time carrying on, throng^ Alcala 
Galiano and Fray Cirilo, eX'General of the Frauciacans, negotiations 
with ttie Riidtcals, who with manifest folly accepted this ignoble and 
daogerous alliance, in order to overthrow the Government. As if these 
proceeding — publicly carried on — were not enough, there now appeared 
n«Ar the BHcurial an armed party calling themselves **■ Defenders of tho 
absolute King"; and finally, on November 15, the Ministers were 
astoninlicd by the royal nomination, contrary to the Constitution, of 
tho violent absolutist General Carvajal as Captain-General of Madrid. 
The actuiil holder of the post, General Vigodet, refused to give up the 
command ; there was a serious sedition in Madrid, a proof of the un- 
popularity of Ferdinand, who was obliged to annul the appointment, to 
dismuM his confessor, and to return to Madrid- At his entrance into 
tho city, the King heard mnny gruHS insults in which the natural in- 
dignation of the LilieniU at the royal duplicity found vent. Ferdinand, 
concealing his rage, awaited an oppoitunity to strike a blow at the 
Oovcrtimont. He found it at the reopening of the Cortes, on March 1, 
1821. Some days previously, the King had intimated that the Cortes 
ouglit to take niea*ure8 to prevent insults to his jiorson. At the opening 
ooromony he pronounced the usual speech, which had been com- 
posed by Argiiellos ; and nt the end he added a paragraph m which, 
after dechiring his loyiiUy to the ConsLitution, he bitterLy complained 
of tho insults) heaped upon him in the streets and in the clubs, and of 
llio baokwardiioss of tho executive in checking them ; this appendix 
beoftmo known as "the Kiug's pig-tail." Ita immediate result was the 
resignation of the Ministers and tho nomination of othei*s, among whom 
were soveml aniUero*. Ferdinand's notion was partly prompted by desire 
to rid himself of a Ministry which had discovered his intrigues with 
armed parties of Royalist insurgents. 

but these armed bands were not the chief danger for the Consti- 
tutionalista. Ferdinand, distrusting his Spanish partisans, had early 
applied to tho foreign sovereigns for help in overthrowing the Liberals. 
His lirst Applieation was made on October 25, ISiiO. the day on which 
he went to the Rseurial, in a letter carried to l^ouis XVIII by the 
Portuguetw> diptonintist :Saldanha: in it FenUnaud declared that he was a 
captive, and that Sjmin was about to plunge into anarchy, and be^ed the 
Frenoh King toobtnin thi<aid of the Allied Powers. Already in March, 
tho Tsar Alexander, alarmed by tlie success of the Spanish Revolution, 
had upon liis own initiative presented to tho Fowera a proposal for 
armed intervention in Spain : but Austria, Prussia, aud England, dreading 



the increase of Russian or French influence in the Peniusula, opposed 
it, as did also Louui XVIII hiraaelE, who was suiliciently occupied with 
the public affaii^ of his own kingdom. The revolutioci at Naples, where 
the Spanish Constitution of 181.2 was proclaimed, brought forward again 
the project of an auti-revolutionary combination of the Powers. At the 
Congress of Ti-oppau the matter was discussed both generally and with 
special reference to Italy ; and the Tsar took occasion to express to 
one of the French envoys his desire that France should do in Spain 
what Austria had done in Naples. But again the project fell through. 
Ferdinand, however, continued to solicit Louis XVIII; and eventia in 
Spain certainly told in favour of his applications. 

In fact the evident dialoyaltj' of the King had aroused Liberal 
sentiment ; and, on the other hand, the extremists redoubled their efforts 
to remove the Moderates from power. The conflict was twofold, and 
gave rise to the gravest occurrences. The Coitfs of 18*21, after the 
change of Ministry, continued their labours until June 30, passing some 
important laws concerning judicial administration, revenue, education, 
and other matters. Debates upon the failure of the Neapolitan and 
Pteduontese revolutions showed that the deputies did not grasp the 
bearing of these events upon Spanish affairs. Certainly the domestic 
situation was enough to absorb the attention of earnest constitutionalists. 
Thft armed bands of absoUitista daily increased ; the higher ranks of the 
clergy vehemently resisted the execution of the laws concerning eoelo- 
fiiastical matters. The Government used sometimes vigorous, sometimes 
mo<lerate, measures, but logically refrained from refusing to their enemies 
the advjiiitnges of Liberal government. The extremists regarded this 
as a weakness, allowing the absolutists to conspire and to hai-ass the 
Government. Hence followed various disturbances in several cities, and 
on the part of the Liberals a change from their generous bearing of 
earlier days towards those who were suspected of absolutism to one of 
violence and persecution. The gravest episode of this period of political 
excitement was the assassination of Vinuesa, parish priest of Tamajon, 
who was imprisoned in Madrid as author of a conspiracy, regarded by 
some as the dream of a madman, by others as a device deliberately 
contrived in concert with tlie King. After a long trial he had been 
oondemned to a term of imprisonment, which socrocd to the extremists 
a trifling punishment, indicative of royal bribery or pressure. On May 4 
the mob attacked t!m prison and murdered Vinuesa. In these outbreaks 
of political feeling refugees from abroad took no small part. Among 
them two Frenchmen were prominent — Heftsifircs, who attrmpted to 
start a Republican revolt in iJniTclona. and Cugnet dc Montarlot, 
who attempted to obtain the support of Riego for an invasion of 
France in order to XJi'omote a Frencli Republican movement. Some 
bistoriaos have denied the reality of these dealiugs, assuming that 
Montarlot was an agent of the French Government who hoped to 




compromise Riego by this pretended conspiracy, liut the fact of Mont- 
arIot*8 dealings with Riego and also with other extremists is certaia. 
Although the levity and quixotism of Ricgo seemed to invite such 
proposals, a letter written hy liini on August 12 to another French 
refugee, Vaudoncourt, who shared Montarlot's atma, proves that Riego 
recognised the duties of his position, and was not prepared for an en- 
terprise involving iuteniatioual complications. Nevei'theless the French 
Government complained to the Spanish Ministry of the real or sup- 
posed complicity of Riego in these fantaatic plots ; and, the complaint 
being supported by Ferdinand, Riego was harshly and rashly removed _ 
from his command in Ai-agon. This act produced in many placeafl 
seditions or demonstrations of extremists, who took for their banner the 
portrait of Riego. The deiuonsti'ation which took place in Madrid was 
dispersed by the police without bloodshed in the spot known aa Loa 
Pliit«ria3, near the Plaza Mayor (September 17). Rut the agitation 
continued and was reflected iu the Cortes themselves, which met in 
extraordinary session (September 24, 1821, to February 14, 1822), and, 
in spite of the violent discussions following the fall of the Ministry, 
devoted their attention to projects and laws of great importance, such 
as the administrative division of the Peninsula, customs and taxes, a 
proposed Penal Code, and public charity. 

In 1822 symptoms of growing disorder showed themselves boUi in 
the division of the Liberals and in the activity of armed bands of 
absolutists, which received from the French Government, not indeed 
oflicial aid— for Villelodidnot vontniroso far — but encouragement and ■ 
assumncc of impunitj" for the conspiracies planned iu France and lor 
the aid in money and arms thence derived. At the beginning of the 
year, Ferdinand, through his uiicW thw King of Naples, otice more 
solicited aid from the Powers; but as before, the matter, nntwith- _ 
standing the support of the Tsar, remained for the time undecided, la I 
the new Corles of 1822, the extremists, favoured by the law forbidding 
the re-election of former deputies, obtained a large majority, a serious 
matter under the circum&tanecs, and all the more so seeing that a 
Moderate, Martinez de La Rosa, was head of the Government. Tlie 
Cartes soon showed their tendency by appointing as their President 
Riego, who had no qualificattous for the post. The parliamentary 
conflict which at once began was complicated by seditions and repression ^ 
in the provinces. The number of hands was so great as to constitute a I 
state of civil war, carried on without quarter. In Aianjuez, in Valencia, 
and in Madrid itself, there were in May and June att«mpt« at absolutist 
demonstrations and risings, in the last of which (June SO), an officer 
of the King's Guard, a man of Liberal ideas, named Landahum, waa 
killed by his own sohliers. This event waa the prelude to a veritable 
insurrection, begun by four battalions of Guards, which left Madrid and 
encamped in the Pardo. Fearing an attack, tho people of Madrid made 



preparations ; and, when the biittalions from t}io Pardo silently entered 
Madrid, thoy were beaten off, chiefly by the etout resistaticie of the 
National Militia (July 7). The King, upon whoHO coniiivaiice the 
mutineers had reckoned, is said to have appeared after their defeat upon 
a balcony of the Palace and to havu encouraged the pursuit. The 
Guard was disbsmded, and a new Ministry of Radicals was formed. 

But the international danger was now taking definite shape. The 
French Goverumcnt, not aatisticd with indirectly supporting the Royal- 
ists, lent to Ferdinand a large sum through its ambassador La Garde to 
aid a countor-rcvolution. I^aflarde himsfilf, with the envoys in Madrid 
of Russia, Austria, Prussia, and other States, after tho events of July 7, 
addressed a note to the Minister of State, s])eaking of '* the honible 
situation of his Catholic Majesty and his family," and of " the dangers 
threateuing their august persons," and plainly dculuring that ''the 
relations of Spain with all Eurupe would depend upon the treatment 
of his Majesty." This threat was soon to be translated into the decision 
of the Congress of Verona, which was preparing to meet. 

The now Ministry attempted to strengthen the Liberal position by 
placing proved Liberals in important posts in Madj-id and in the 
provinces, and by vigorously pressing the war against the insurgent 
bands. These had seized La Sen de UrgeL a Catalan town, where they 
established a ** Supreme Regency of Spain during the captivity of Fer- 
nando VII." On August 16 this Regency addressed a proclamation to 
the country urging the liberation of the so-called "captive King," and 
also applied to Mettemich for help; but Metternich was not disposed 
for an intervention which might favour Russian plans. 

The proclamation of Urgel, the spread of the civil war, and the 
known attitude of the foreign Powei-s roused the activity of the Liberals. 
Arrests, seditions, orations in the clubs, attempts to rouse public 
feeling against the enemies of liberty, were redoubled, while the civil 
war increiised in ferocity on both sides, the cons tit utionalisbj gaining 
some success and forcing the Regency to lly to France. But the decision 
of the Congress of Verona modified the situation. Although the appli- 
cation of the Regents of Urgel was not entertained by Mettcruich, 
it was viewed with favour by the French envoys Montmorency and 
Chateaubriand, who, contrary to the instructions and desires of Villele, 
worked steadily tor an intervention, to be carried out by France. 
At the meeting of October 20 Montmorency asked the other envoys 
whether the Allied Powers would recall their ambassadors from Madrid 
if France should recall hers. and. whether, in case of war between France 
and Spain, Louis XVIII might reckon upon tlie aidof his allies. TlieTsai* 
replied in the ailirmative. offering a large army either to maintain order 
in France during the war, or to enter Spain; but the opposition of the 
Britbh plenipotentiary, Wellington, and of Mettemich, frustrated this 
plan. Yet the design was not abandoned ; and it now seemed certain that, 



c. M. y. X. 



1.^ 



h 



226 



Grmt Brilain, The oUter Great Powers [1822-3! 



should the Congress decide upon inter\'ention, France would be charged to 
execute it. Nothing was effected by Wellington's declaration — followtng 
the instructions of Canning — that his (iovernment would not lend itself 
to intervention, nor by the detachment of Great Britain from llie policy 
of the Holy Alliance. Although VilU-lc, supported b}* Louis XVIII, 
sought at least to postpone intervention, the forward policy prevtuled, 
and the CongressdeciJcd upon military intervention in Spain (October 80). 
Chateaubriand, who for dynastic and patriotic reasons desired war, having 
been appointed Minister (December 28), contrived to overrule Villele ;, 
and at the end of 1822 everything whs ready for action. 

Great Hiitain, touched in her international interests and also in-J 
fluonc'od by a strong popular sentiment favouring the Sjianish Liberals, 
attempted to obtain from the Spanish Government some concessions 
wliich might avoid intervention. Her anibaMsador A'Court, and after- 1 
■warils Lord Fit/roy Somerset, a special agent of Wellingtorrs, laboured. 
with that object. San Miguel and bis Ministry have been blamed for 
not yielding to tliis pressure; but this censure is undeserved. In the 
first place, the ultra-Libernl sentiment then dominant in Spain forbade 
the Govemraent to make concessions ; secondly, tho proposed cnneessiotis 
were presented under the form of pi-cssure by foreign jiations which 
contrary to all right desired to meddle with the internal affairs of Spain ; 
and in any case these concessions would scai-cely have prevented action, 
whicli iu the case of the Holy Alliance proceeded deliberately from 
enmity to constitutional principles, and enabled the French monarchists 
to gain credit for their dynasty by an easy triumph of arms. The 
Spanisli Liberals could not fail to see that they would he alone in the 
struggle : for the British Government, notwithstanding its sympathies, 
had declared that in case of war, it would remain neutral; and even in 
those critical days A'Court was pressing the Government for a settlement 
of the question concerning the injury inflicted u^jon British trade in 
America by the blockade of the insurgent Colonies. 

Early in January, 1823, the ambassadors of France, Russia, Austria, 
and Prussia, presented to the Spanish Government notes declaring their 
common attitude. They all demanded the abolition of the Conatitntiou 
of 1812. the liberation of the King, whom thoy regarded as a prisoner 
of the Liberals, and the cessation of the anarehy which, with manifest 
exaggeration, was described as prevailing in the country. But, except 
the Russian note, which seemed to suggest the need of simply restoring 
the absolutist regime, their representations pointed to a moderate 
monarchical S3'stem or even (as in the case of the Prussian note) declared 
that it was not for foreign nations to determine what political institutions 
should be established in Spain, the essential points being the restoration 
of public tranrpiillity and the safety of the King's pei-son. The languago 
Tras very vague except with reference to the Constitution, which was 
vigorously condemned. These notes produced a profound effect in the 




1823] French intervention. — The Kini) and the Cortes 227 

Cortes. The uiibounded indignjition of tlie Libemls showed itself in 
patriotic speeches. The Ministry replied to the notes by declining to 
displace the Constitution of 181 2, repudiating intervention aa contrary 
to the law of natious, Htid b«.>ldly refuting the charges brouglit against 
the Liberals. The result was the mthdrawal of the ambassadors from 
Spain, those of Russia, Prussia, and Austria departing on January 14, 
16, and 16, respectively; the French arabassadoi* soon followed, liaving 
Bpent his last days in promoting dissensions among the Liberals. 

The turn which matters wero taking was now evident; it was 
definitely shown a few days later in the speech read by Louis XVIII at 
the oxwning of the French Chamlwr, in which, after stating that the 
Spanish Government bad declined all accommodation, he declared that 
he had sent orders to recall his ambassador and that a hundred thousand 
Frenchmen were ready to enter Spain. Great Britain still strove to 
joevent the war, urging through her ambassador in Paris that the 
demands of the Powers were inadmissible in their actual form, and that 
propriety permitted no more than a " recommendation *' that the Con- 
stitution of 1812 should be modified. Hut Great Britain went no 
further; and the Spanish Government prepared for war. 

The diificulties of the situation were increased by want of money, by 
the existing civil war, by the certainty that the King was encouraging 
the insurrection of all his partisans, and by the doubtful fidelity of some 
military commanders. Yet fimr t}odies of troops were formed under 
Mitia, Morillo, HiillestoroSi and La Bisbal, while San Miguel hlniijelf 
served under Mina against the French. The offors made by certain 
foreigners in November, 1823, to form a foreign legion were only accepted 
by decree of the Cortes on April 30; and in May a contract was made 
with the self-styled English "geneiul," Sir Robert Wilson, for the 
organisation of the Legion with the aid of arms and stores furnished 
t^ E committee sitting in London, which dispatched an expedition com- 
nanded by Major Dickson and Tliomas Steele ; but all this produced 
no result- In Madrid the aliu-in w;is great; and in the middle of January 
it was increased by the advance to Guadalajara of an absolutist band led 
by BessiSres, the republican conspirator of 1821. 

The Cortes, considering Madrid unsafe, decided on February 15 to 
nigrato olsewhero with the King and the executive; but, when San 
Miguel laid the matter before him, Ferdinand refused to leave the capital ; 
snd the Ministry was dismissed and replaced by another in which the 
tvmuntroi had a majority. Hut the King failed to parry the blow. The 
Cortes returned to tlie matter, and on March 3 decided to move to Seville. 
The King pretended an illness, making it impossible for him to travel. But 
the Cortes, rejecting this and other subterfuges, insisted ; and on March 20 
they started for Seville with Ferdinand, the members of the e.\cuulive, 
and a few raiUtia troops. Eighteen days later the French crossed the 
Erontier. Their entry into Madrid (May 2.^) und their advance towards 



r 



Andalusia caused a proposal for another migration of the Court, from 
Serille to Cadiz. The King again refused; whereupon the Cortes, upon 
tlie proposal of Alcala (iialiauo, agreed (Junu 11^ to decl&re the King 
temporarily iiicapacilatod and to apjK)iiit a Regency which sIiouM act 
only until their arrival at Cadiz. This decision cuutaiued the disadvao- 
tagos of all half-measures, constituting as it did a slight upon the King 
and yet not diHarming him, since in three days he was restored to bis 
functions, itnt it showed that the King had completely forfeited the 
respect of the Liberals — his dethronement had been actually proposed in 
Madrid — aud it also showed that the Liberals still hoped for success. 
At that time they still counted upon most of the forces organised by 
San Miguel ; but these troops, witli the exception of tliose commanded 
by Miua. offered scarcely any resistance. It was not long before 
Morillo capitalated in (lalicia ('July 10) and Baltesteros in Andalusia 
(August 4) ; soon afterwards, in the midiUe of September, Riego was 
defeated aud taken piisoner. Only Mina in Catalonia, Plasencia in 
Kstremadura, and a few leaders in the eastern region, resisted with 
Btubborn energy to the end. The country, far from seconding their 
efforts, rather offered facilities everj'where to the French advance. Thus 
it was clearly proved that the constitutional system was not popular, and 
that at all events the mass of the people had not acquired any sense of 
the advantages of that system which some years later was to provide a 
basis for democratic parties- 
Cadiz, blockaded from June 24 and unaided from without, could not 
hope to escape a Bpeedy surrender. Although up to the end there were 
not wanting optimists, both real and pretended, to sustain enthusiasm, 
discouragement gradually spread among the soldiers and country-people ; 
and, partly owing to personal interests, partly owing to the intrigues of 
the King, who soon opened communications with Angouleme, largely 
also owing to the use of money, a capitulation was arranged stipulating 
for the liberation of the King from his "captivity," i.e. the control of 
the Liberals. On October 1 he passed over to the French camp, after ho 
had first promised a general pardon and the foi-raation of a moderate 
Government — a fresh piece of royal perfidy, as will presently appear. 

Thus closed the second period of constitutional government. It 
perished notso much from its errors, which have received excessive atten- 
tion, as from indifference to its principles in the mass of the population 
and in consequence of the European reactionary movement, which led to 
foreign intervention. If only the external acts of its political life are 
taken into account, it seems to have represented in Spain a mania for 
liberty which could only end in anarchy ; but, if its intellectual and 
legislative achievement be considered, it must be recognised that it did 
mach for tlio intelleotual progress of the country and also laid the 
foundation of institutions which for more than a century were to be the 
bnsis of Spanish juridical life, A systematic study, such as has never 




1823] 



Absolutist reaction 



229 



^et been made, of the laws paBsed and the projects discussed in the C-'ortes 
and of the abundant legal and political literature of the period will prove 
tliat in the minority, consisting uf highly educated men* there was a 
considerable fernoent of intellectual energy, which, whether well or ill 
directed, was full of hope. The influence of the Encyclopedists was uow 
shared by newer authora, amoug them Bentbam, who for some time gave 
character to our juridical pliilosophy. A great development of periodical 
literature also provided a vthiele for French doctriimirc ideas aud for 
the economic theories of the time, including Saiiitt^imonism. The institu- 
tion of the General Direction oE Studies (1821), the reform of the 
College of San Isidroand of the Seminary uf Nobles (1822), the establish- 
ment of the so-called "National Academy" on the model of the French 
Institute, the foundation (1820) of the original i4(cweo, destined afterwards 
to have a profound influence on Spanish culture, and of the famous school 
(Cuhffio de San Mateo') directed by Lista and Keinoao, which educated 
the liteiury youth who were soon to enthrone Komanticism — all these 
movements helped to lay the foundation of the new education, both 
higher and popular. 

But this intellectual movement was smothered for a time by a 
reaction more violent, blind, and cruel than that of 1814. Scarcely had 
the French entered Spain when its excesses began. Supported by the 
bayonets of Angoulerao the absolutists established in Madrid a Regency 
which proceeded to persecute tlio Liljerals with the aid of the voluntarios 
reali*ta», who formed a kind of opposing force to the National Militia and 
were the source of the future Carlist troops. On receiving news of the 
decree deprivingthe King of bis functions, tins Regeiiu^'publiahydadt^creo 
of general proscription (June^S), proclaiming the penalty of death for all 
the Liberal deputies and for most of those who were engaged in the 
Liberal cause. Scarcely had Ferdinand recovered his liberty when he 
substituted for his promises of pardon made in the Cadiz proclamation 
ft new order (October 4), more sweeping than the docreo of the Regency, 
passing sentence of death on almost all the supporters of the Constitu- 
tSoD and even on those who had simply showed attachment to Liberalism 
or had shouted Viva liiego or Mueran loe tervilen or any similar cry. 
This order, which was not pubLislied in the Gazttte, appeared in tlie 
Diario de Madrid and was posted at all the street cornere. The King's 
coafeasor Saez was placed at the head of the Ministry ; military 
committees were appointed to prosecute political prisoners; councQs 
known as juntas de ?ti f6 were instituted unofficially with objects 
retembling those of the Inquisition — for the King with curious incon- 
ristency refused to restore the Holy Ollice — and imprison ments, execu- 
tions, and acts of violence, were horribly multiplied- Many historians 
alao mention a kind of scrai-secret clerical society called the Society of 
the Exterminating Angel, having its centre in Catalonia but working in 
many places, terrorising Liberals and Freemasons with persecutions; but 



others, in the abaeiiee of authentic Jocuiuenta, Jeny or doubt its existence. 
1£ a legend, it is a characteristic legend, for by this or by similar meth- 
oda the extreme reactionaries, among them many of the clergy, avenged 
themselves cruelly on all whom they regarded as enemies. Riego, the per- 
Bonitication of Radical constitutionalism, was hanged with savage pomp. 

Angoulome at once protested against these excesses ; but he was 
powerless to check them, for ViUele, though always inclined to modera- 
tion, was ovenuled by Austria, Russia, and Prussia, which suppoi-ted the 
violence of the ahaulutists and urged the Kegency to leave no trace 
of constitutionalism when once the King had been released. The 
instructions to Angouleme wore decisive on this point; and Metternich 
used the plainest language to tlie Austrian ambassador in Paris in a 
dispatch of March 23. All that Angouleme did was to aid the escape 
of the deputies and the members of the Government who were in Cadiz. 
But the contiuaance of sanguinary punishments at once drew a protest 
from the British (iovernmcnt and at length one from the French. 
Chateaubriand himself, on March 17, 1824, threatened Kerdinaud with 
the withdrawal of the French troops, which were still in Spain : and at 
last the Russian ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, interposed, but only 
procured the dismissal of Padre Suez and a decree of amnesty (May 1). 
This decree was a sanguinary farce, containing so many exceptions that it 
scarcely pardoned anyone ; yet it angered the extreme absolutists. In 
effect the persecutions continued as before; and the fall of the French 
Ministry which included Chateaubriand (July), followed by the death of 
Lrf)uis XVI] I (September), removed the only slight check upon the 
extremists and increased their rigour towards the Liberals. An attempt 
at insuriection planned by Colonel Valdi-a and other refugees living at 
Gibraltar (August) furnished a pretext to justify this rigour. From that 
time to the end of 1829 the political history of Spain consists merely of 
a series of alt«rnatious between terrorism and relaxation of coercive 
measures, according as extremists or moderates prevailed with the King, 
OP as he desired to conciliate this party or that. 

The extremists found leaders in the royal family, namely the King's 
brother Don Carlos, and the latter's wife, Maria Franciaca of Hniganza. 
Whenever these two saw that Ferdinand was relaxinghis first rigour, they 
promoted or encouraged absolutist demonstrations and even revolts, such 
as that which was led by the restless IJessieres in 1825, and that which 
broke out in Catalonia in 1828, directed by a Supreme Junta established 
in Maiiresa. in order to free the King from "the disguised Liberals who 
swayed him." These demonstrations of force, although they were 
harshly chastised by Ferdinand, always produced a fresh period of 
pei-scftutinii for the Liberals. Hut the pure Royalists, now known as 
apovttJlicoe, were no longer satisfied with this. Distrusting the King, 
they now thought that their prinoiples could only besecuredif Ferdinand 
were replaced by his brother Don Carlos. Thixs a party, whioh at first 




1827-30] Fourth marriage of Ferdinand 



231 



had been distinguishodonly by its principles, booamo a personal party, 
wliich bi^gan to be palled Carlist. Tlio proulainatioii published at the 
end of 1827 by "a federation of pure Royalists" stated this plainly. 
Some nuideration bad been introduced int<j the Government through 
the personal influence of BiiUosteros, Minister of the Treasury, when the 
Queen, Maria Amalia of Saxony, third wife of Ferdinand, died (May 17, 
1829). She bad married the King- in October, 1819, eomewhat less 
than a year after the death of Isabel of Uraganza. 

The King being childless and feeble in health, the hopes that Don 
Carlos would bo bis successor gained force. But, the King showing a 
diapoeitiou for a fourth marriage, the conflict of ambitions in the 
royal family proceeiled without ilisguiae or shame. The confliot waa 
led by two women, the wife of Dou Carlos, Maria Franciaua, who liad 
alwa^-s exorcL'ied great influenne over the King, and Maria Carlota of 
Naples, wife of the Infante Don Francisco, another brother of Ferdinand. 
Dona Carlota had personal grievances to avenge, duo to her inferior 
position in the palace and to uligbts received fi"oni Dnfla Fraiicisca. 
The pereonal enmity of these two women had naturally separated them 
politically, so that Dona Carlota came to be regarded as a hope for the 
Liberals, althouijh in fact she was no less royalist than her rival. This 
political antagonism, exploited by both parties, gave to the question of 
the new marriage a bearing which was to have lasting consequences for 
Spain. The candidate preferred by Carlota was her siater the Neapoli- 
tan princess Maria Cristina, a beautiful and attractive woman. The 
partisans of Don (.arlos attempted to discredit her, representing her as 
an ardent Liberal, a proceeding which only had the effect of throwing 
her more and more into the arms of the non-apostolicals, thus deter- 
mining her place in politics. Tiut the King would not regard either 
these rumours or the calumnies wliich were cast upon the honour of the 
future Queen. Vanquished by her beauty, he chose her as Queen ; and 
Maria Cristina made her state entry into Madrid on December 11, 1829. 
On Iter journey through Fiance the Liberal refugees saluted her; and 
she promised to use her influence in theii" favour, desiring to win some 
Bympathy in order to counterbalance the influence of the aposUliot, 
The Liberals on their part were naturally drawn towards one who 
repre.«(ented the destruction of the Carlist preponderance in the Court. 

The new Queen soon became the arbiter of her husband's will, so far 
as this was possible with Ferdinand ; and favourable results would prol>- 
ably have followed for the LiljeraLs, but for an event which affected all 
Europe — tlie Freneh Revolution of 1830. Alarmed at the doctrinaire 
Liberalism of Louis-Philippe, Ferdinand committed the error of not 
recognising the new King; and the latter, reasonably offended, aided 
or at any rate did not hinder the conspiracioti which Aleala Galiano, 
Mina, and other refugees, some of whom came from England, were 
oontriving, encouraged by the spirit of liberty which stirred the nationa 



of Ktjrn|»ft aiid which in England inspired the policy of Palmerston. 
bat neither the Kronch nor the English Government officially supported 
tb« oODipiimtora, although the former was solicited by them ; and, so 
MOD M Kerdinuud rocognisnd Louis- Philippe, all forbearance towards the 
refugees aoaeod. The various expeditioas attempted in 1830-2 by Miua, 
Torrtjon, and othera, all failed ; and another period of terror made 
moil doubt whether the new Queen's influence could effect anything. 
'['hiN roAotion vra» directed by Calomarde, Minister of Justice, whose 
ttbuounkiilJHt Ei'iil went so far as to decree the closing of tho Universities, 
tllO fooiiN of tl)i« laU'nil 'spirit which stirred the youth. Persecutions 
Went redoubled a^^ainst Krvemasons and heretics, some being condemned 
to donth t and U»oks duspoeted of Liberalism were more strictly forbidden, 
Hlthkiu^h th(ty continued to circulate in numbers, propagating idoa^ which 
•SfMv Kiiuii U% Immu' truit. 

Itui u niiMT iiitrlo\t« questton engaged the attention of politicians. The 
iJitrtMi wmt with child, and, if she should bear a son, the triumph of Maria 
CiUltnitntid ht>r Nistt^r Would be complete: not so if a daughter were 
iMint, oMini* U% i\\v> ittntpof the law concerning tlie inheritance of the 
eniWli> (Nnitmrytothrimditionaloustomand law prevailing in theseveral 
hiiti|li«vt\l Hltilin* of Sixain, l*hilip V had in 1713 been obliged to publish — 
■ml withiiMi phtltMt — an aot (^auto acordado} which, by always giving the 
pivftM'OltiH) ul •uiK^ew»ion to the male line, aimed at preventing any union 
iif lhi> S|«iiilMh and Krench crowns in one person. This act has been 
itiilh'd (ho Simhiivh Sulio I^w. The international situation wliich caused 
(hi* now nilo htivinir piL-wed away. Chiirlcs IV, iu agreement with the 
(NirM KMiHMMbh'd in Mudrid, in 1789 abrogated the act and restored the 
Uw of M#fi> t\trtui*u whirh iwrmitted the succession of women. This 
niforiii, whioh wan in consonance with the national tradition, was not 

ImhlUliod lit thtf tiiutf, but kept soorot, although recorded in the archives 
loth of llm King and of (ho Cortes. Accordingly Cristina, in order to 
intiot ovt>ry tnuitlngtMtoy, induced the King to publish, on May 19, 1880, 
Ihii iirtfjimtlmi or liiw of 1789. Don Carlos was furious,aiid became more 
HO wluHi on OoloU'r 10 a girl n-as bom, who was named Maria Isabel 
Kiid wa* at onuo piixdniniotl Princess of Astnrias, that is to say, heiress 
III Lliti ihrniie. Theiiooforward the struggle between Don Carlos and 
tlin (jiiPiMi i<oittred in the i^ucstion whether the law of 1789 should be 
itinitiiaiiiml iiriihrogfttod. Cristina found little support in the Ministry, 
witnrti Cahinmrde rvpresentcd the interests and sentiments of the 
nfnut^Iintf, lint shn sought sup^tort in tlie army, flattering it and 
Altmnl.lnu' piirliHans its litttt she could. In September. 1832, Dona 
I'Vtiiiitiwiii and Cdlomaixlo, taking advantage of a serious illness which 
bronchi ihii King lo tho (Kiint of doatli, and favoured by the absence 
of (\irlnta wliii wiu in Seville at tho time, mastered the enfeebled spirit 
of Kenliiiiind, intimidated Cristina with the threat of a ci^'il war, and 
pn>unvt]d the abrogation of the law (September IS). But Ferdinand 





having recovered from this mortal attack, Carlota, who had hastened to 
the spot on learning what had passed, contrived to alter entirely the 
coarse of events. The abrogation of the law was annulled : the whole 
Ministry was changed; and Cristina was anthorised (October 6) to 
arrange State affiiira during the King's illness. The result was that 
the law of 1789 was restored and was solemnly promulgated a second 
time on December 31, and a Liberal turn wiis given to policy. The 
Universities were reopened ; and on October 15 a decree of amnesty, 
although containing numerous exceptions demanded by the King, per- 
mitted many refugees of 1824 to return to Spain. 

Thus the Liberals decisively attached themselves to Isabel and to 
Cristina, who became the object of a romantic devotion which had its 
literary nianifcstation in numerous occasional publications, interesting as 
indicating the spirit of the time, while the absotutists formed the party 
of Don Carlos. ConspimciBs and attempts at insurrection naturally 
followed, which led the Government to grant to Don Carlos " per- 
mission " to go to Portugal (May 13, 1833). Three days later he 
departed. The Coites having assembled in the ancient Spanish manner 
in June, the oath was taken recognising Isabel as heir to the throne, 
although Don Carlos protested in a note which he sent to his bmtiier 
on April 29^ upon hearing that the Cortes had lieen summoned. Soon 
afterwards, on September 29. the death of Ferdinand closed a reign full 
of cruelty and shsirue. 

If Cristiua, who was Queen Regent during the mirority of her 
datighter, had sincerely embraced the Liberal cause, the Spanish po- 
litical problem would have l>een simple and plain ; a struggle between 
Absolutists and Constitutionalists would have enabled tlie latter to 
organise a legitimate party following the development of ideas in Europe 
at large. But it happened otherwise. After winning horfirat triumph, 
Cri«tina took a retrograde step, evading reforms and accepting the 
guidance of such timid Moderates as Ceu Berrnudpz, whn had been a 
Minister of Ferdinand's, and generally inoliutni^ towards those who had 
no love for the Liberal programme. Slie did not perceive that public 
opinion wag not what it had been in 1814 and in 1823, and that con- 
stitutional and Liberal principles had made great advances among 
the masses who had formerly rejected them. Dona Lsabel, when she 
became QuecHj fell into the same error or was led into it by her 
eooncillora; and thus it was that, while other nations settled their 
internal struggles more rapidly and securely, the ptditical conflict in 
Spain was disastrously prolonged and assumed a double form, first in the 
ciril wars against declared absolutism or Carlism, secondly in the efforts 
to induce Cristina, her daughter, and the groups of courtiers, to accept 
frankly the Libend programme, eflfnrta which, meeting a violent resist- 
ance, produced seditious shocks and revolutions. In addition to this, 
Ibere still existed among the Liberals many of the faotora which had 



liegency of Criatina. — Quadruple AUiawe [1S33-40J 

Iiroduutiil liie divisiotu between the moderate and extreme sections; 
waitlM a uurUiiu indecUion as to aims, which, together with tho enti-anca 
ut iiiiw ideiut, \ed to tho t'ihg of jx>1itioal tendencies hitherto unknown. 
Thii nifii^ouH in Krnnce and Kn^laiid from 1824 to 18B3 had under' 

f[oiMi thi< iiifliiuricn oilhor nf Doctrinaires and Radicals, or el^e of Eng'- 
l«h inHlitutinnR and habits; and the roBulting' seutlmeuts affected and 
inipnirod that roventnoo for the cnnstitutton of 1812 which subsisted for 
ninny ytMUH. Thn iriliMunl hiHtory of tlie combinations and confiicta 
iii'n(hK!iMl liy Ihi.'Ha vurioua inUuences in Spanish Liberalism is most 
iiitiii*(i«Un^,', iiK|i]alning nuiny events which otherwise would bo obscure. 
Tho Alwoliitiittji, oven though tJiii spread of Liberal ideas was rapidly 
dhnliilnhing Ihotr mnkn. utill possessed for a long time a majority in 
Vrtriiiilii ilinti'ii'lM and in tliii rural jxipulation. Thcii- eau»c was identitied, 
not ftlwaVH jiiMlly. with local interests conccroing the maintenance of 
nnitlniit nifrot and sentiments of medieval independence. Thus thej 
tmiidmuMl, flhuimt dt'wu t*» onr own days, to be fonuidaUe euemies, 
whiwn dofimt tiiiNt mtich blood and treasure. 

'I'ho Kt»|f<on(\v of Orimlina may be divided into three periods. The firet 
(IHIU-A*) I* A jK^riod of timid reforms carried out rather to attract the 
l.lhi'raU and ronnlorliiihuieo tlie weight of the Carlist party, than by 
thOlU^vatr ohoieo of the Queen. It iuchides tho Ministries of Martinez 
i\i\ La lltwa and Ton^no : and it« legislative tendency is represented hj 
i\w eoUNliUitl<<nal eharirr known us the Ettatuto Real. The second 
ImmKhI ^ IMUl "> 1» luarktHl bv tho li»dii';U |x>licy and the large reforms 
iif MtMidiittlvd ami Calatravat together with a brief restontion of the 
iVdp y\\ ISld,MHin irplawnl by the Constitution of 1837. The third 
(vrlod 4,L'<88 40^ marks n tvturn to Moderatism, ending in a rerolu- 
liniiaiy movemtoit and the aUUeatiou of Cristina. Accompanyii^ 
lhtiNt« tiilPi-UA^ |Hdittv^l ti\-i!<iits and producing some of their principal 
(<)>iiKtdt>«, thv oivil vnar h>Uovs iti coa»«. having been begun by the 
rnrlixi |MU-1r WHW »fl*r th« ^mth ol Ferdiwuid. 

Wlunt MartiiH* dto Lk Ron ims Mlled to power (JaouarT. 1834) 
in ouli*r to gratify th» ljb«««U, vko v«r« disgosted at the anti* 
vHUutitMlioMd piwdaaatioa (tuUlshed by Cristina on October 4, 1888, 
tl)« Carlist** CkTgaiuatd a* soldiers in Xavarrv and tba Basque ProTinen 
hv thtffir ttp«i («vn«nd, KttiaalaearKi|fui. wK^ had been a colooel in the 
at«i^\oiUutaut«Kl * hmI daaoar. TW nev Mioistty promptly intzodnoed 
•MM i«KH«a«« anH\ng iKmi um wctaMiM of tlw amiusty to the ref agees, 
mmI* ftMvp^ t^ pnponb «C Pulwantea. ogned dn Tr«aty of 
AmU \K Wtii«M Qraal Bstelft, Fteto^^ aad S^ia. aacvnng British 
«M (■ lk» dottUa Nvolotkttt dyaasbe aad iii«ililBliiiiii1. viddi vaa 
I^^MucUrtklSttinMlMrStataa. Tlw adhwiaa of K»ac», comftwrtny 
U»'*Q«adraBl»AlliaM«w'*«ynd tba hopM of tb* Cntiaaa, ^Aa^gk 
it pfoAMod tta nttt«i« of iK|ihw>tSt nhtinai vttk Anttm» Bairia. 
V>l k iar« it o^r fctu w gU adruitagQa $ar Poctvgal. 



I 




Martinez de La Rosa. Carlist War 



235 



where, with the aid of Spanish troops, Don Miguel was defeated and 
Dofla Maria da Gloria was restored. Don Carlos, who was still in 
I*ortugnl, though closely pursued by General Rodil, escaped with the 
help of the British Admiral, who conveyed him to London. He was 
left in siioh freedom that some weeks later he was able to return to 
Spain and place himself at the head of his partisans (July 9), aided with 
arms and money by the French Legitimists. The Govemmeut sought 
armed help from Great Britain and France, but without success, 
for Great Britain refused to intervene or to allow France to inter- 
vene : and Louis-Philipjie, notwithstanding his engagements, showed 
himself more inclined to favour Don Carlos, in order to conciliate 
Austria, Prussia, and Russia. All that Alartinex de La Kosa could 
obtain was the loan of an Algerian legion, and permission to ral^e a 
British legion, which afterwards proved a valuable militarj' aid. More 
beneficial from the humane point of view was Lord Eliot'a Agreement 
with the two armies, Carlist and Liberal (April 23, 1835), so called 
because it was effected by the action of that British envoy, with the 
object of saving the lives of prisoners, who hitherto had been pitilessly 
sacrificed to the fury of both contending parties. An accident relieved 
the situation for the time, removing the chief danger. The Carlists 
occupied all Navarre and the Basque Provinces up to the line of the 
Ebro ; but they held no fortified place. The eastern Powere required, 
as a condition to their recognition of Don Carlos as King of Spain, his 
possession of such a military base; the same was demanded by foreign 
bankere disposed to provide a loan, aud by the courtiers of Don Carlos 
desirous of possessing a capitJil. In order to satisfy these three demands, 
Don Carlos ordered Zumalacarregui, contrary to the general's decided 
opinion, to take Bilbao. Five days after the beginning of the siege of 
that city, the Carlist general was wounded by a bullet, and being un- 
skilfully treated died on Juno 24, 1835. Tho Cnrlista were obliged 
to raise the siege tn July: this was the first notable success of General 
Espartcro, who was afterwards to boeome famous. 

In tho same month the Government was changed- Martinez de La 
Rosa, who was unequal to so serious and delicate a situation, could not 
resist the double pressure of tho Radicals and Moderates, besides the 
domestic and diplomatic difficulties of the Civil War. His whole policy 
is condensed in the already mentioned Ettatuto Heal, published in April, 
1834, resembling the French Charte of 1814. TIii3 concession from 
the sovereign to the nation denies the national sovereignty, which was 
the basis of the Code of 1812, contains no declaration of rights, and 
establishes a parliamentary system of two Chambers, or eKtamentos, one 
of pr6ctret or Senators, and one of Deputies, both absolutely dependent 
on the Crown, and really possessing no mope than the right of petition, 
like the ancient Spanish Cortes. It need not be said that a consti- 
tutionalism so limited did not satisfy the true Liberals, as presently 



i 



appeared in noisy conflicta between the Ministry and the large body of 
Radical deputies in the Lower House. Nor were extreme reformers 
satisfied with the niiiiitiLerial measures, resembling the Liberal legislation 
of lti20-3, and direct*:d against the intrusion of the clerj^y in politics 
and againfit the Kfiligious Orders. The extreme Radlcak, steeped in 
anii-cloiical ideas, and dreading the power of the enormous number of 
monks and nuns — 31,000 monks and 22,000 nuns according to the census 
uf iy3o — and Indignant at the support of Carlism and of abs^ilutist ideas 
by the Heligious Orders, simply desired their destruction. The agitation 
for that end, together with the accusation, frequent in the history of 
epidemics, that the cholera which then visited Madiid was produced 
through the poisoning of the water by monks, brought about in July, 
1834, a populflr se^Ution, in which sorao disorderly crowds attacked the 
monasteries and murdered seveml monks. The Government failed to 
check these acls of savagerj-, sliowing once more their weakness and 
vacillation. Early in 1835 and after the fall of Martinez de La Uosa 
tlie murders were repeated in other cities, unchecked by the firat 
measures of the new Ministry, which once more expelled the Jesuits 
and closed everj' monastery uf less than twelve monks. 

But the movement which liad begun with violence against the monks 
soon became an insurrection against the Government, whose moderation 
WES disliked ; and, the revolutionaiy movement spreading to almost all 
the provinces, tlie Goveniment was powerless, although anxious to 
chastise tlie relwls severely. In this crisis appeared the man who was 
to lead tlie Liberal forces, to remedy by a bold stroke the confusion 
of the Treasury, and to create new interests in defence of the consti- 
tutional system. This was .Mendizabal, whom we have already seen in 
Cadiz in 1819. He was now named Minister of the Treasurj- by Toreno. 
His arrival in Madiid in Soptcnibcr, 1835, from exile in England, and 
his fmnk doclamtions to the Queen and to the Ministers, produced a 
decisive change. The new-oonier undertook the Government and con- 
trived to pacify the revolution simply by publishing decrees which 
ftatisfied eomo aspirations of tho iidvanced party, granting pardon to 
all insurgents and reorganising some branches of the administration. 
He also promised in his programme of September 14 the restoration of 
the public credit, and the termination of the war " by the unaided rc- 
soui'ccs of the nation " ; and he contrived to inspire such confidence that 
tho Chambers, by a vote of December £-3, authorised him to reform the 
Treasury. This he accomplished by means of decrees, of which the most 
important arc, that of February lit, 1836, which declared all the real 
properly of tho extinguished Religious Orders to be for sale ; and that 
of March, which, supplementing another decree of October 11, 1835, 
suppressed with somcexceptinns the monasteries.diminisbod the nunneries, 
and conflscated the property of the suppressed Houses. 

The result of Mendizabal's policy soon appeared both in the war 



I 
I 




1836-6] 



MendizaboTs policy and fall 



237 



and in the opinion of the so-called Conservative classes. In the war, by 
increasing the army, improving its equipment, and paying attention to 
the soldiers, he eiicouraguct Uie Isabehnos, and rendered possible the 
improvement of tlie military situation in the north. Among the Con- 
servative classes the sale of eeclesiastical property, which took place 
under conditions more favourable for the purchaser than for the State, 
created a network of interests, which necessarily thenceforth told in 
favour of the preservation of Isabel's throne, «ince Don Carlos could not 
he expected to respect these purchases. Thus the Minister enlisted 
materiul interests as indirect BUppoii. for the legitimate dynasty. In 
international ulTaiis his Government had further important results: be 
gave greater influence in Spanish policy to Great llritain than to 
France ; whereas, notwithstanding the doubtful conduct of Lnuis- 
Philippe, irartinez de La Kosa and Toreno hn,d always leaned towards 
France, although unsuccessful in their requests for intervention. Assured 
of the co-operation of Mendizabal, whose political education had been 
English, as he often showed in bis conduct, the Uritish Cabinet 
prepared to act independently of Ki-ance, desiring at all costs to prevent; 
French intervention and tho execution of the supposed design of Louia- 
Phtlippe to marry one of his sons to Queen Isabel. A momentary 
breach between Thiers and Metternlcli threatened to thwart the British 
plans, although for tlie boue&t of Spain, since Thiers induced his 
sovereign to modify his former attitude of tolerance towards tho Carlists, 
to increase the French legion, and to permit the troops of Cristina 
to traverae French territory in executing an enveloping movement. 

In this condition of things a new revolution, caused by tho fall of 
the Mendizabal Ministry and the renewed preponderanceoftbe Moderates 
in the Government and m the Court (May 15, 1836), disturbed all com- 
binations. The dissolution of the (fortes, whose majority was advanced 
or '• Progressive," and the publication of a proclamation by Cristina 
vehemently accusing the supporters of Mendizabal, brought about an 
insurrection, which in August involved all that part of the Peninsula 
not dominated by the Carlists. The victory of the revolutionists led to 
the insurmctioiiof a part of the garrison of La Grauja, a royal residence 
then occupied by the Court. These troops, led by two sergeants, 
compelled Cristina to order the proclamation of the Code of CarliK 
(August 13). This revolution was largely attributed by the Modemtes 
to intrigues on the part of the British ambassador. Lord Clarendon. 

The state of anarchy, which had prevAiie<i in the country since May, 
1836, favoured tlie Carlists, who, though several times defeated by 
C'<irdolia, Narvaez, Evans, and other generals, recovered from their losses, 
and continued to maintain the war, at least in tho north. In Valencia a 
new leader had appeared, Ram^Sn Cabx-era. a man of remarkable military 
faculties, although not equal to his predecessor. He gave to the 
vtruggle in the eastern districts and in Aragon a ferocious character by 



...^ • — ' ■■ ■ ■■ -> - '--"r-rt^'W/ [1836-7 

--.~±~. — i_i .-_ : ^Li^rz^i^'^ reprisals b}' the 

.K. ^ 1— " i-i -- z_: —--TT. - mntber. which was 

- ■— - ._- . _:!. ~-: z-^- — r^^rtL- 7*niDfii. made a daring 

-.; . .:-■.: — -:T—r= z.- — -i^z^i^ i-nii.nr: deoisire results. 

._ . . — -_- . 11 zii:. —^i .C-— 7^_lr---i rr E^itnero after a 

■■_ — - -~- — r .: — -_ .. ..-T^-~Tr diisM conclude the 

-..- ' - — — i : . — .. - -- -z'S.- --■•EreiiVQueen, lent 

- :.- :.-- ----- — _- -.- 3pnsi Irf^on fought 

.._.;-: ~ ^* - til- niiitT hand, the eastern 

.' : ,- -^ Trr -*i.r ISoT was marked bjr 

.-_■■ . . • % _--:-. -r- _. :. unwd triumphantly wi^ 

- - — — r- T wo o&er expeditions in 

. — ■ -r . -_=^^ TXT' br the revolution of 

.rr -.. ^--. — -irT? [J important measures: 

.- --■ Tr^is^ of the Liberal cause, 

- - ■■ . . ;.: --■^-. wijch was pushed on by 

---*—- --.■^ fcnd br a forced loan of 

: . - — . r,urwT, insisting upon 

>i-. --- ^ ■ ^v -■. ■-■■*?: — a.'."zn:iilat*d by corpora- 

^ _ ■». - .ir- - ^..:aMv departing from the 

- . -T r.w-.i^L ::ti Cr-risiiiution of 1812, 

T^ . ■■■^ ." ST". Trhich agreed with 

-*. -i^-: -j.r;- liai of the national 

- -. - ■ • - -s.: "T c .••: riro Chambers, in 

^ - - . ..-, ::•: ».—.:::::- of ihe suffrage. 

^^^ - -- , -:^.--. ■ -:■: Tlr*,-t;Te character of 

^ ^ - -V - r~'— "■<•- ->•'' ^^'^ Cortes to 

- . ^- .- . •:~r^.' to 53mmon them in 
... :: 1^^ rbtf fuduence of the 

^ ^ .-^ ,. *. -■> - -3^ Constitution of 

jj.. , - , . - .iicileetual action exor- 

" '^ ' " ^ -*-». -^ r ...:-ia:i* I'luost from the 

"" "^ ,..,.-.» />iisc:Eution was not 

^ ,. ; ;u- kiv-.wieed Liberals; 
•iis[:iutional principle, 



ae^- ■ -» 



-A 



.i:v:::is: the sentiment of 



, : ..-'-j; 'K' Progressives, now 
,s,i. -■ \ VIM' .t:i insurrection, and 
^.i,. V iiotiij other expressions 
,. .. x^«;^ >> A group of officers 
; Xk.; v;- f';* movement, which 
;^w >•■'. .^v;i K-xjiected. produced 



the fall of Calatrava's Ministry, and the appointment of another 
with Kspartero himself as Premier (August 18, 1837). The presence 
of thcae troops in Madrid was due to the approach of two Carlist ex- 
peditions, one led by General Zarititegui and the other by Don Carlos 
himself. The former was defeated at the very gates of the capital and 
retired upon ViiUadoUd. The second, after traversiug Aragon, Catalonia, 
and Valencia, with varying fortunes, and having been reinforced hy Cabre- 
ra's troop9,appi'oachod MadriJ, and reached Vallecas at the moment when 
Espartero had left the place, called away by necessities elsewhere. Madrid, 
weakly garrisoned, was in great danger of captiii'o; but Cabrera, marchiug 
upon the capital on the morning of September 18, was stopped on the way 
by an order from Don Carlos. The motive of this order is not clearly 
known; but, from some oontemporary allusions, the following explana- 
tion seems probable. Criatina had for some time been negotiating with 
Don Carlos for the termination of the war by means of a marriage wliich 
should unite the two dynastic branches. The undei-s landing implied in 
these negotiations waft probably the reason of the expedition of Don Carlos, 
who, u[>on approaching Madrid, expccUid that the gates would be opened 
to hira by the Queen, and that a reconciliation and a change of policy 
would follow. But at the last moment, for unknown reasons, Cristina 
drew back, iiifomiiiig Don Carlos of hor altered resolution ; thus the 
plan fell through. The expedition retired through New Castile, joined 
temporarily the forces of Geueral Zariategui, and at last re-entered 
the Basque Provinces, pursued by Espartero and other generals. The 
Carlist cause had been morally defeated and undone. Fresh raids, 
attempted in 1838, were unsuccessful ; and, on the other hand, the firat 
movements in favour of peace appeared among tho troops of Don Carlos. 
In Aragon and Valencia alone Cabrera obtained in this year some 
guccessea, marked by barbarous cruelties to prisoners, which produL-ed 
further sanguinary reprisals by the Isabelinos in Valencia, Murcia, and 
Alicante. In political matters the year 1S88 is marked by a fresh 
predominance of Moderate tendencies in the Government, showing 
itaelf chiefly la a project of numiclpal law involving almost alwoluto 
centralisation, with the loss of the greater part of the political and 
administrative independence of the municipalities. This project was 
strongly opposed by the Progressives. In November a popular movement, 
probably fomented by the Moderiitcs, occurred in Seville, in which two 
generals were concerned, who thenceforth were to play a large part in 
politics, C6rdoba and Narvaez. The latter, who Imd distinguished 
himself in the Carlist War, alarmed the Liberals by his dictatorial 
tendencies and his ambition, whioh presently clashed with that of 
Espnrtcro, producing between the two generals a bitter personal enmity, 
which was afterwards to afTect events at least as much as political 
differences. N:irvae?-, being banished upon the accusation of Espartero, 
fled and left Spain. 




TJie year 1839 was to be fatal to the Carlist cause, already pro- 
foundly imdennined by vaiious causes of disarganisation, among them 
the personal iosiguificance of the Pretender, his departure from the 
aruiVi the gronp of intriguers who continually aroused his jealousy 
towards his best generals, his ingratitude towards these generals, and 
the administrative disorder whicti left the soldiers unprovided, while the 
expeuses of the Court increased. As usually happens in such case£, two 
parties were formed^ a Court party, uncompromising and fanatical ; and 
a military party prepared for compromise and ready to give an energetic 
and orderly impulse to the war, and to avoid alienating the sympathies 
of the people by violence, cruelty, and uncertainty of political aims. The 
leader of this party from the middle of 1838 was General Maroto, who 
was placed in command of the army by Don Carlos, and who soon won 
the firm attachment of the soldiers. The struggle between him and the 
courtiers began at once, producing frequent acts of disrespect and 
defiance of auUiority iu military matters, and calumnies which aimed at 
discrediting the General. When matters went so far that bis life was 
threatened, he took energetic measures, and arrested and shot several 
generals and courtiers who were plotting a military insurrection against 
him (February ID). This bold act impressed Don Carlos, deprived the 
courtiers of their preponderance, and was the prelude to negotiations 
with Espartero, initiated by Maroto, who placed himself at the head 
of the movement towards peace arising from weariness of a war of which 
the end co\ild not be discerned, and from disillusion concerning the 
person of Don Carlos. Several proposals, in which Great Itritain and 
France had a shait;, having been rejected by Espartero, the two generals 
at last concluded an agreement which was signed on August 31, 1839, at 
Vergara. Espartero undertook to recommend to the Cortes the con- 
firmation ormodificatiouof the /ttcro*, while the military grades and civil 
posts of the Carlists who submitted were to be recognised. Don Carlos, 
who had attempted in vain to carry with him the troops of Maroto by 
presenting himself to them, naturally declined to accept the agreement; 
but, although he still commanded the allegiance of considerable forces, 
he n-Lired to France without attempting any resistance. Cabrera 
maintained the \var for some montlis iu Aragon and Valencia; but 
repeated defeats at last oompelled him also to cross the frontier, accom- 
panied by many followers (.June 6, 1840). Thus closed the struggle 
which for seven years had stained the Peninsula with blood. 

At tliu titue when tins oceun-ed, the political contest between 
Moderates and Progressives was reaching an unexpected solution. The 
former, being masters of the situation, pushed forward the already 
mentioned project of Municipal Law, which waa passed by the Cortes 
of 1340. In order to pass into law, it only required the sanction of the 
Queen Regent, who on June 11 had started for Catalonia, probably with 
the double object of testing public opinion and of attempting to win 





18-10] 



Revolution. Abdication of Criatina 



241 



over Eapartero in order to effect a c<mp d'Stat which should overthrow 
the Constitution of 1837. But she found a grent part of the people 
opposed to tlie Municipal Law ; nud Esparbero, who had risen greatly 
in influence and popularity after the agreement of Vergara, and 
who had alreatly declared his adhesion to the Constitution, declined to 
play the game of the Moderates, and advised Cristma to refuse her 
sanction to the new law. The Kegent proraiHed to do so, hut after- 
wards changed her mind and sanctioned the law. This irregular conduct 
immediately produced a serious insurrection in Uarcelona (July IR). To 
apfjcnsc this, Cristina, with Espartero'a consent, appointed a Prngressive 
Ministry ; but soon afterwards in Valencia, whither the Court had 
moved, she replaced it by a Moderate Ministry. 

This change provoked a fresh revolution in Madrid, wliich soon 
spread to the provinces and compelled Cristina to approve the appoint- 
ment of a new Ministry, whose composition was suggested by the 
Revolutionists, with Eapartero as Premier. This humiliation, the Pro- 
grestuve pmgi-aniino uf the new Government, and the gross attacks made 
upoa the Regent iu an anonymous pamphlet attributed to tlie journalist 
Gonzalez Bravo, in which her second marriage with the guardsman, 
Mufloz, was denounced — an act whiuh she had pereistently denied in 
order not to lose the Regency — vexed her to such a degree that she 
found no other issue to the situation than abdication. Accordingly, 
on October 12, notwithstanding the prayers nud the counsels of the 
Ministers, she al>dicated. On this occasion she read an autograph 
speech, in which she entrusted to the Cortes the nomination of a Regent 
and attributed hor own abdication to differences of opinion with the 
Government concerning certain political reforms^especially the Municipal 
Law. Thus ended the Regency of Cristina, which began so hopefuUy, 
and was marred principally by her habitual insincerity and the blind- 
ness with which shti always listened to the advice of the Moderate Party. 
Apart from politics, it pleased her to protect literature and art ; thus 
her name is connected with an important movement, which took a 
decidedly romantic turn, guided by the Duke of Rivas, Gutierrez, 
Espronccda, Figaro, Zomlla, and many others. During the years 
1834—10 tbe«e authors express in their writings the Fretich and Knglish 
influences received during the emigration and diffused both by literary 
periodicals, such as EI Artista and No me olvides^ which began to multiply 
in Spain from 1834, and also by such uharacteristio associatious as the 
I^cei> (1837) and the Ateneo. 

Tho new Progressive period, initiated in Octol>er, 1840, marked on 
the one hand the culminating point of Progressive policy, following tho 
lines traced by the Liberals of 1820 and 1836, and of the popularity 
of Eapartero. offering the first example in Spain of those Governmenta 
directed by genonds which afterwards became frequent. On the other 
hand it was distinguished by the open appearance of new tendencies. 



c. M. n. K. 



10 



242 Rule of Espartero. — Brigadier Prim [1840-3 

which had already been germinating iu public opinion but were without 
suHicient strength to take form in acta of violent opposition. Such 
were the republican ideas which had been gradually forming a party 
and which in 1842 produced in Barcelona a formidable insurrection. In 
ibiH case republican interests, apparently the guiding motives, wore 
mixed with Local interests, stirred up by the m an ufac turd's of the city, 
who had suffered from the repression of contraband by the Customs 
Inspector Zurbano, a man poi>sesstiig Hspartero's confidence. This 
insurrection was only suppressed by the arrival of Espart«ro and the 
bombardment of tho city (December 4 ). 

But this was not the most pressing danger for Espartero, who was 
a straightforward man and a sincere Liberal, bat inexperienced and, 
although anything but a dictator in intention, drawn in fact to dictator- 
ship by his military education and by his ambitiuu, which was beiog 
ati'engthened aud increased by succeBs. The whole period of his rule 
from Outuber, 1840, to the end of June, 1843, is simply a struggle 
against the Moderates, against the ex-Kegent, and against Liberals who 
were dissatisfied or jealous of his pre ponde ranee. Tho opposition of 
Cristina showed itself at once in the proclamation from MaraeiUca 
(November K, 1840), which condemned the I'rogressive Government and 
prott;»ted against her forced abdication; this proclamation provided a 
watchword for all the enemies of Espartero and a pretext of hostility for 
all tlio Earu|>ean Governments except tliatof (treat Britain, which steadily 
supported the General. The nomuiatioii of Espartero as Regent by the 
Cortes of 1841 (May 8) deprived him of the support of those who 
desired the i-egeucy of a triumvirate. The appointment of Arguelles in 
July as guardian to the Queen drew a new protest from Cristina, who, 
as Isabel's mother, claimed the continuance of that charge as a right. 
The ex-Rcgent, surrounded in Frauco by Moderates, planned or 
encouraged conspiracies which came to a head in Pampeluna (October 2), 
and in Mudrid (October 7), where tlie generals Concha and Le6n led an 
attack upon the palace iu order to seize the person of the Queen, who 
was declared to bo heU! prisoner by the Espartcristas. Both attempts 
were frustrated ; but fresh movements took place in 1843 supported by a 
section of discontented Jjiberals. First, Brigadier Prim revolted at Reus 
and declared the Queen to btj of age; then, other troops mutiniud. led by 
personal enemies of the Regent, such as Nar^'aez, Concha, Serrano, 
Pezuela, and others. The counter-revolution spread, and Espartero^ 
abandoned by most of the troops, was obliged to fly. Ho embarked for 
England on Juno 30. Thus ended his Regency, and with it the pre- 
dominance of the Progressive party ; for, ultliough those members of that 
party wlio had aided the counter-revolution might fairly expect to reap 
part of )t« fruits — an expectation which seemed to be realised when the 
first Ministry included the Progressive Oi6zaga — yet the Moderates were 
not long in shaking them off. 



The leader of tlie Moderates from 1843 to 1846 was General Narvaez, 
a dictator by nature, so harsh and cruel in repression that it was said of 
him tlmt he never left alive an enemy wlio fell into his hands. AU 
the reforms effected by the Progressives were abrogated, as well as the 
Constitution of 1837, which gave place to a new Constitution, that of 
May 23, 184.'j, an essentially doctrinaire pact or composition between 
the sovereign and the nation, as the first phrases of the preamble indicate. 
The principle of popular sovereignty is implicitly denied, and the con- 
firmatiun of royal power appears in the provisions whereby the monarch 
recovered the right of nominating the Senate, while the ('ortes lost the 
privilegoof spontaneous assembly recogniaed by the Constitution of 1837, 
and in other details. Other points to be noted are the abolition of 
trial by jury for offences committed by the Press, a significant silence 
concerning the principle of uniformity of codes and fueros — doubtless 
intended to avoid rousing the suspicions of Navarresc and Basques ; and 
the couversiou of "judicial power" into simple ** administration of 
juaiice.'" Yet the Moderate reaction continued the centralising policy 
in the new Education Law of 1845, destroying the ancient independence 
of the Universities, and also continued In some degree the anti-clerical 
tradition ; for, although many of the laws passed since 183G were revoked 
and relations were renewed with the Papacy, the reopening of the 
religious Houses was definitely refused. The progress of toleration 
in Spain is shown in the fact that, notwithst^inding the victory of 
Moderatism. no check was set upon the Protestant propaganda which 
had made much way during the Progressive Oovemment. 

At the close of the period treated in this chapter, the dvnastic 
question assumed a new aspect with the abdication of Don Carlos in 
May, 1845, in favour of his son the Count of Montemnlin, and with the 
revival of the project for the marriage of the latter with Dona Isabel, 
who, contrary to the Constitution, was declared to be of age in 
MoTcmber, 1843. This project brings definitely forward the famous 
question of the Spanish marriages, which had been already raised, but 
which in its development and solution belongs to a later section of this 
ffiit<fry. 



CHAPTER Vni 



THE SPANISH 1>0MINI0NS IN AMERICA 



fc 



The first phase in the growth and organisation of the Spanish 
dominions in America may be isaiil to close with Uie publication of the 
New Laws for the Indies in 1542, fifty years aft^ir the first voyage of 
Columbus. In that half-ceotmy the vassals of the Crown of Castile, 
by occui>ation of coasta, table-lauda, and interior outposts^ had effectively 
staked out the limits of an empire twice the size of Europe. The New 
Laws declared that the IndiauB were free men, to be treated like the 
King-'s subjects in Castile ; but this attempt to repair the violence of 
conquest and of slavery by a sudden, revolution, abolishing native Indian 
institutions, was hasty and disastrous. The first Viceroy of New Spain 
suspended their execution on tlie plea of necessity ; but in that fairly 
settled country they were in some degree gradually enforced during the 
following twenty years. The tittorapt to enforce tUem in Peru led 
to a rebellion, a civil war, the Viceroy's deatb, and a long series of 
disorders. 

The decade 1570-80 closes more definitely in South America the 
period of conquest and of civil wars. In l/i7T the King sent a list of 
questions to all Governors in tho Indies ; their answers furnished a full 
statistical account of the whole Empire. The possibility of this col- 
leutiun iiiditiates. a cotisidenible degree of stability in both vice royal ties, 
iu the more recently acquired dominion of Peru as well as in the older 
viceroyalty of New Spain in North America, where the peaceful period 
may be dated a generation earlier. The era of consolidation, of ad- 
ministration following expansion, is <listinctly marked in South America 
by the Governmont of Kitincisco Toledo, Viceroy and legislator of 
Peru, who, in the laborious service of twelve years (I5ti9-81). five of 
them spent in travel, drew up an elaborate and admirable code of laws 
and cast the government of Peru into the furm which subsisted for 
two centuries. Thus, before tho close of the sixteenth century, the great 
wave of expansion had sjieiit itself; the framework of empire had been 
put into definite shape, both geographically and politically; and the 
kingdoms und provinces of the Crown iu the Indies invite survey as a 
system already fairly established. 

344 




The Spanish Indies in the year 1580 extended through the tropics 
and for into both temperate zones ; they poaeessed au unexampled 
diversity of natural features, climates, and altitudes — torrid coasts, vast 
tahle-lands, snow-fielda extruding through tJie central regions of heat, 
strips of sandy desert, trackleas forests and awaraps, river-aystems mys- 
terious in their magnitude — and an immense interior frontier e^-ery where 
bordered by savage tribes. The retention and administration of these 
dominions^ a task perhaps greater than their acquisition, can best be 
explai^ied by following the methods whereby, during the conquest, each 
atep in advance was secured. 

The administration of outlying regions was at first usually entrusted 
to au adelantado or frontier commander. Two tasks were particularly 
laidupon him — the reduction, conversion, and preservation of the natives, 
and tlie foundation of Spanisli towns. Every adelantado was legally 
required to found at Icnst three towns; and his lieutenants aimed at 
perj^«tuating their nioirory in the same way. Royal decrees prescribed 
the form of these foundations ; In choosing sites, injury to the natives was 
to be avoided j the plnxa or central square was marked out by the founder 
with solemn ceremony ; round it were set the public buildings — ealUdo 
(town-hall), church, hospital, and prison ; the streets were traced inter- 
secting at right angles and enclosing equal blocks; every man received 
a rectangular building-sitc wittiin the town and a piece of land without, 
thus becoming a vecini> or householder in the civic community; every 
veeitu) became an fticomendero, receiving an eturomiendtt^ a trust or fief 
of one or more villages of Indians, who were to pay him tribute or fixed 
labour in return for protection and Christian instruction ; these eneo- 
menderoa owed military service in case of need and were intended to 
form a knightly class, "to defend, enrich, and ennoble the kingdom and 
to care for the Indians." In most parts of Nnw Spain and of I'eru, 
where the natives were already subjected, these encomiendaa were valuable 
grants; but in remoter parts, especially the savage regions of the Kiver 
■Plate, they were precarious or useless, depending on the power or incli- 
nation of the encomendero to conquer or retain his supposed tributariea. 
The larger towns received the dignity of cities ; the smaller, often having 
only a dozen or a score of verhwg, were usually styled tnUas. Altliough 
the first settlers often had native wives, the Spanish towns were clearly 
diBlinguisbetlboth in law and in fact from Indian settlements or villages — 
Spanianis being legally excluded from the latter, just as Indians were 
excluded from Spanish townrs or confined to a special suburb with 
separate organisation; but all cities, towns, and villages were popularly 
comprised in the comprehensive and colourless term o{ jnuhlot or pobia- 
nf>n««, that Ls, settlements or inhabited places, clearly divided into 
puebloa de. EgpaHoht niid puebht de IndiQs. 

Considering that the first settlers, especially in South America, were 
adventurers, partly gathered from Portugal, Italy, Flanders, Germany, 



246 



Municipal institutions 



[isso-irsoj 



and the Levant, ais well as from Spain, men brutalized by long bsrdship, 
snvage warfare, and constant danger, the measure of ducc«tt attained by 
these municipal inBtitutioiis is remarkable. A ro^-al decree granted the 
rank of hidalgo to all the compauiuufj of Pizarro: but mea of such 
origin and life could hardly be gentle lords of their Indian vassaU; as 
eneomenilerot they were cruel tyrants, but as vecino* and oounclUors 
they knew how to fill their place, in the remoter provinces the eabildo 
or town-council was often the only stable authority in a wide district; 
on the death of a Governor it cither undertook his functions or uamcd 
his tempurar}' successor. Asuncion affonls an extreme example : a royal 
decree of 15S7 empowered the River Plate settlers to name tfaeiri 
(iovemor in case of vacancy; as conquest merged into settlement, the 
caf'Udo of Asuaci6u claimed that this power had [lassed to them, and 
pushed it far beyond the royal intention both in scope and iu date, d&- 
claiing vacAHcies without warrant and appointing Governors of Paraguay 
in liisregiird of Viceroy and of King; so lato as 1730 Asanei6n is 
like a city-stnte, alternating between anarchy, oligarchy, and elective 
monarchy. The calnido of Caracas, to which the right of governing 
during vacancies was renewed in 1676, arrested the Governor in 1725 
by viceregal order. 

The first regidore* or town-councillora were named by the adelantado ; 
but afterwards these posts were purchased from the King, frequently 
with the right of sale or transfer. Thus the cahildos might seem to 
have preserved little popular vitality; yet they were valued as a nieana. 
whereby Spaniards bom in the Indies might attain important and 
profitable po^iitions. In small towns even such an oligarchical and official 
body had a certain popular character; two alcaide*, and in larger towna 
other officials also, were annually elected from among the chief vecinon ; 
thus in Mexico twelve prominent magistrates were annually elected by 
the eabildo. The cahildo$ differed considerably in privileges and customs ; 
but (li<>y generally had thn power of summoning the civil and enclesiastical 
officials and the principal vecinox to a meeting called eabildo abierto^ 
or open eabildo, for the discussion of any pressing matter of general 
intei-cst. The history of these bodies helps to solve a difficult; tba 
countenance and aid granted by the Ci-own seem hardly sufficient to 
account for the subjection to royal authority of territories won so 
largely by individual effort and at private cost. In the cabUdoB the 
Crown and the settlers are seen working in co-operation ; by means of 
civic instiUiticns the royal autliority w;ls gradually extended, but never 
became so complete or universal as might appear. 

Although in the eighteenth century the Bourbon Kings, aiming at 
closer supervision over the Indies, restricted the number of munici- 
palides, seldom created new ones, and took care to ap[>oint some 
European rftjidore*, the eabildo remained throughout a valuable insti- 
tution, serving as a channel of public sentiment and ultimately providing 



I 



I 



1580-1780J Corjiorathns. — Roifal authority 



247 



a means of achieving indej>endL!nt gnvernment. In 1792 deputies from 
all the Venezuelau tnuuicipalitiea, invited by tlie cahUdo of Caracas, met 
to discuss certain fiscal {proposals of the Goveruor. 

AnoOier civic instilutiou tmiisplanted to the Indies was the conau- 
lado. This commercial chamber, already existing in live Spanish cities, 
was established in Seville in 1543, when the •*■ nnivei'sity" of tmcliTs to 
the Indies was authorised to elect annually a Prior and two Consuls, 
constitating a tribunal and chamber of commerce, supported by a small 
tax on tinde. Con»uieiJo» similarly constituted atid elected were estab- 
lished in Mexico and Lima to judge commercial suits and manage under 
legal rule the entire trade of both vicero^-alties, with power to appoint 
or admit as deputies in other towns local merchants, partly representing 
local trade. The connalaJo concerned itself not only with commerce, 
markcta, and prices, but also with means of comnninication, roads, 
bridges, navigation of rivers, improvement of ports ; it frequently aided 
the Crown with subHtdles for cuinmercial and military purposes; the 
aleabala or tax on sales was usiuOly fm-tned eitlier by the caf'iltio or by 
the eonaulado. Although tlie law required that one of the three coun- 
oillors of the Lima convulado should be a Creole, wholesale trade was 
generally in the hands of European merchants; and the eonaulado^ 
naturally favonring the established monopoly, was a conservative, a 
monarchical, and sometimes a renctionary, body. 

The Tmsta or pastoral corporation, including in its brotherhood 
every owner of 300 sheep, was early estiblished in New Spain with a 
tribunal whose magistrates wore appointed by the cabitdo of Mexico. In 
'the great towns every trade was organised into a society with its saint 
and feast-day, sometimes also it^ militia company; eo/radiaa or religious 
guilds were universal and were early introduced among the Indians, 
providing unscrupulous clergy with a ready moans of extortion. The 
Universities of Mexico and Lima had all the privileges of Sa!nmanca; 
during the colonial period about twelve minor Universities were founded 
whose degrees were only valid in the Indies ; in places remote from a 
University the Jesuit Colleges had power to grant degrees. 

But in general the theory of government was one of supremo royal 
Bathority. "These and those kingdoms" (_eetog y e»o» rcino*) is the 
style ofiicially used of the King's dominions in Spain and in America. 
The King claimed to bo Emperor of the Indies, successor to >Ionle/,uma 
in New Spain and to the Incaa in Peruj the Indies wero not regarded 
as colonies ; they were ** kingdoms and provinces " inhabited by native 
Tassals and including certaiu Spanish settlements besides ; accordingly 
the government and well-being of '* the two commonwealths " (/a« dos 
np&blicm) of Spaniards and of Indians were to be secured by royal 
authoi-ity set over them ; the native dynasties having been replaced 
by His Catholic Majesty, the institutions of the ('asttlian monarchy 
were imported iato the Indies for the goverumeat of kingdoms and 



i 



248 Legislation. — The two Vkeroyallies [1580-1780 

provinces, just as municipal iti«titiittons had liecn imported for local 
administration and tlie security of conquests ; while for the government 
of the Indians some attempt was made to preeerve and adapt native 
institutions. Legislation consisted in c^Julai reaUs^ royal decrees issued 
in the King's name by the Council of the Indies, which had aupiome 
authority over all civil matters and scarcely limited authority over all 
ecclesiastical matters; for by papal Hull the entire patronage of the 
Indies was vested in the King ; and the Pope was precluded, except in 
reserved cases, from communicating directly with the ('hurcb in America, 
no Bull passing thither unless approved by the Council; even the tithes 
were granted to the King on condition of supporting the Church and 
teaching the Indians. The activity of the Council was all-pen-ading: a 
perpetual stream of a'dulag was showered uiHin the Governor of every 
kingdom in the Indies, treating with almost ludicrous minuteness the 
greatest and smallest matters of state, justice, religion, trade, finance, 
social conduct, etiquette, precedence, and private morality. 

Tiiere were two viceroy a! Uos. The Viceroy of New Spain, holding 
bis Court with royal state in Mexico, nominally controlled all the Span- 
ish dominions in North America and the Philippine Islands ; but in fact 
only the kingdum of New Spain was directly subject to hira : the Philip- 
pines, the kingdom of Guatemala, and the provinces of Yucatan and of 
New Biscay, were distinct Governments ruled by Captains- General, 

1/ supplying their annual deficit by a iituado or grant from the Mexican 
treasury, but only subject to viceregal intervention in case of disturb* 
ance or unoxjjecled vacancy. Tliere were three audienciu*^ at once 
administrative Councils and Courts of appeal, in the cities of Mexico, 
Guatemala, and Guadalajara: the oiiJoret, judges, and councillors in 
these Courts lieing lawyers sent from Spain. Every kingdom was 
divided into districts, each ruled by a correguior or alcalde majfor^ 
residing in the district capital, usually a ^* town of Spaniards '* ; every 
Indian village had its Indian councillors and oflScere. and also its Indian 
cacique, sometimes hereditary, sometimes nominated for life by the Vice- 
roy; a group of Indian villages was commonly placed under a Spanish 
deputy of the corre^idor, living in the principal village of the group. 
The Antilles, which were divided at different dates into two or three 
distinct Governments, were sometimes i-egarded as belonging Co the 

^ viceroyalty of New Spain, since they drew situadot from the Mexican 
treasury. Havana was regarded as the naval fortress of New Spain. 

The Viceroy of Peru, holding a more magnificent Court in Lima 
with higher rank and larger salary, had nominal control over dominions 
extending 3600 miles along the coast, from Panama to Valdivia, and 3000 
miles overland from Lima to liuenos Aires- Except (Caracas, wliich 
was attached to the Government of Santo Domingo and finaiieinlly 
supported by the Mexican treasury', all Spanish South America depended 
upon him. The kingdoms of Chile, Quito, New Granada, and Tierra 



* 



lii30-17S0] 



Governments and provinces 



249 



Firme, and tlie three River Plate provinces of Pamguay, Tucuman, 
and Buenos Aires, formed seven ilisUnct Government; but viceregal 
intervonliou was frequent, for Panama wa» the gate of Peru and the only 
authorised entrance to the South Sea and to tho interior of the C^ontinent, 
and de^Kjnded upon Peru not only for the salaries of ita ofSciaLs, but 
also for grain to feed its inhabitants; the kingdom of Chile got from 
Peru its annual tttuado and supplies of men and stores for the endless 
Aroucanian wiir on ita southern frontier: the Viceroy was also enjoined 
to prevent European trade to the interior through the forbidden port of 
Buenos Aires, a place carefnlly kept in poverty and supplying Its annual 
deficit by a tituado from Peru. The system of corregidoreti and of 
Indian villages generally resembled that of New Spain ; but, owing to 
the vast distances and the great mountain ranges, control ^vas more 
difficult and doubtful ; in great part of the wrrania or mountain 
provinces the Spaniards ^jaid little ivgard to Government; and in the 
provinces to the cast of the Andes the system could only be imperfectly 
applied owing to the savagery of the natives in the Chaco and on tho 
Pampa. Throughout most of that region there were uo Indian pucblo» ; 
and every Spanish town formed in effect a separate settlement continually 
exposed to attack by savages and obliged to take measut-es for its own 
preservation. Several towns perished, while others were often threatened 
with extinction by Indian attack. 

There was no complete uniformity in the system, which was often 
modified by local conditions. There was a tendency to preserve de- 
limitations and arrangements made by the earliest Governors, which 
were not everywhere alike. The terms corre^/iiJor and gohemador 
covered many gradations of power, dignity, and emolument. Important 
places on the coasts and frontiers were placed under Governors of higher 
rank and authority than the corregidorea, often possessing military 
command. The independence of the three Uiver Plate provinces was 
probably due to circumstances more than to theory; and Buenos Aires 
by her position gradually acquired a certain predominance over the 
others- The province of Charcas or Upper Peru held an amWgnous 
position, being subject to the close supervision of Limn and yet possessing 
an audiencia whoso jurisdiction included the whole River Plate region. 

Every official, from the Viceroy downwards, on leaving office was 
subjected to a residencia or enquiry into his conduct, hold by a special 
jmlge who tlii^w open his court to all complainants of whatever colour. 
This reiidtncia was in many cases, perhaps in most, a mere form ; in 
remote districts the judge was the magistrate's successor ; but there are 
many recorded instances of searching and thorough enquiry. In case of 
reported misgovernment a Visitor was often sent to examine a Governor's 
conduct and suspend him if necessary. 

The careful system of delegated and supervised authority was marred 
by the want of a permanent and well-paid civil service; a eorregidvr 



y 



k 



250 Legislatioii and Atlministraiion. — Potosi [ifiSO-irso 

liolding an ill-paid post for three or five years retnmed to private life 
with a fortune. This defect waa partly remedied by llio usual proiuntioii 
of deserving oflicials : but the reBtdencUi., sometimes protracted for 
yoarSt owing to thy juilgo'a death or an appeal to the Council, tended 
to interrupt continuity; for do one might take another office pending 
this enquiry. Lax and irresponsible adtninistration also arose from 
the impossibility o£ control at so great a distance fi-ora Europe 
and over such va$t regions. The o^cials themselves were unable to 
reconcile, execute, or even grasp, the multitudinous c^dulas, which 
were often ambiguous, inconsistent, or trivial. Many being soou abro- 
gated or amended, it wiis difTicuIt lo say what decrees were actually in 
force; the code of laws cummtuidcd to bo prepared in 1035 was not 
published till 1(380 and already required a commentary. In 1797 a 
Viceroy informs his successor that the Mexican palace contains 156 large 
volumes of royal cidulas issued since I'JOO. Thus Indian jurisprudence 
was a matter of long, profound, and inconclusive study. Although the 
general intent of the laws was clear and a Governor guided by equity 
and known rules could satisfy their spirit, there was a natural tendency 
to convenient neglect. The Viceroys always exercised a dispensing or 
suspending power ; the subordinate Gtovernors and corregidoret were no 
less independent; a royal cedula was kissed and placed on the head with 
the words, " I obey, but I do not execute " ; and in turn the white settlera 
rendered what obedience they chose. " Here all men govern," wiites 
the Peruvian Viceroy in 1689 ; " the people have more part in all 
political discussions than in any other provinces of the world; a council 
of war sits in every house." In 1744 UUoa writes, "Everyone here 
considers himself a sovereign." Sanctuary was a great abuse, for the 
house of any priest or of any caballero sheltered a fugitive from arrest; 
this latter privilege was jealously guarded by the Creole aristocracy, who 
bitterly resented its forcible abolition in Lima in 173U. 

but, if there was laxity in Lima, there was astonisbing^licenoe 
in the mining districts. The pride and the disgrace of Peru was the 
VxUa Imperial of Potosf, situated on a sterile plain 13.500 feet above the 
sea, beside a conical lull 2000 feet high, which from the discovery of its 
silver treasures in 1545 was the envy of the world- For many leagues 
round the soil produced nothing; yet in 1611 the population was 
estimated to be 100,000, including 60,000 Indians. The raincra and 
adventurers living among the snows in the tropics were even more 
reckless and lawless than most mining populations. The Basques, being 
the richest and most numerous merchant, prominent iu the eahildo and 
in the offices of the royal treasury and mint, were attacked by the 
Andalusians, aided by the Creoles ; frequent tumults grew into comlxiU 
under chosen leaders ; intermittent flghtiug coutinued, with many killed 
and woundetl, for forty years until in 1023 the Viceroy organised an 
armed force ta impose j^teace. But the strife revived, and there was no 



peace in Potosi till 1 7o(). The discovery of a rich mine at I'uuo in 1680 
pnxluccd still more scandalous scenes of bloodshed and disorder. People 
so careless of their own lives naturally did not spare their Indian 
lubourets, for everything was dear at Potosf except silver and human 
life. In lyOiJ the treasurer of Potosf estimated that only one-fourth of 
tfao silver extracted since 1545 Itad paid the King's dues ; the lowest 
estimate puU the contraband silver at one-half. Things were abnormal 
in these niinlng- districts, which but for their mineral wealth would have 
been abandoned to a few Indian shepherds ; but everywhere frequent 
disorders arose from the enmity between Spaniartls burn in Europe and 
Cfrioiiot, Creoles, or Spaniards born in America ; the former, nicknamed 
QachupintM in New Spain and Chapetonen in Pern, usually held the chief 
offices in Church and State ; tlie latter resented their inferiority none 
the less because it was partly due to indolence and want of education. 
The mestizoB iif mixed Kuropoau and Indian blood, often illegitimate in 
birth, and the mulatoa of mixed European and African blood, were 
people of ambiguous position, prone to vicious and disorderly ways, and 
the worst oppressyra of the Indians. 

The danger to life and health in emigration promoted the universal 
laxity. Of thirty -six Peruvian Viceroys from 1550 to 1801, ten died in 
office, and four on the return journey or immediately afterwards. The 
mortality among the Viceroys of New Spain was almost as great. To 
Cervantes the Indies are the refuge of scamps and broken, men, and 
Quevedo leaves his shai-per after a career of rascality preparing to cross 
the sea. By restricting emigration to licensed passengers of known 
character the Kings strove earnestly to prevent this evil; but the 
repetition of the royal cS<1ula$ shows their futility. By favour of the ship- 
captaina many unlicensed emigrants, among them not a few foreignersi 
reached the Indies ; many succumbed to pestilence at Portubello ; many 
got no farther th;in Cartagena, where tlie rhitpetonntias or immigrants* 
fevers swept them away; and the survivora were often rescued from 
homeless misery by the hospitable negroes and ended by marrying 
negresses. But many, reaching the interior, infested the mining districts 
and Indian froniiere, notwithstanding repeatt:d commauds that they 
should be anesLed and sent to Spiiiii or pressed into the army. 

In New Spain, a country more accessible, more normal, of sounder 
foundation and better government, the proverbial rule of life was Vivir 
y d^'ar ru-iV, "Live and let live." In Peru, which never shook off the 
taint of its baser mode of acquisition, the motto was Comer y dejar 
eomery " Eat and let eat." Officials were largely paid by perquisites, 
and were not required to decliua gifts ; but corruption went far 
beyond these Limits. Viceroys and Governors had great opportunities, 
particularly iu the distribution of patronage ; for they appointed 
many of the correffidoret^ filled temporarily all unexpected vacancies, 
and nominated all parish priests on the recommendaUon of the prelates. 



252 (hnflicl of auihorities, — The Church [1580-1780 

Many yielded to the temptation ; the upright and energetic, im- 
sujjportad by the audienaag, could do little against universal custom. 
AdiuitiistraLinii wrm ham}]>ored by tho multitude of officials and by tho 
disputes of competing authorities. The Viceroy might jireside in the 
audienda without power to speak or vote; the audienaia itiight report 
directly to the King, criticising the Viceroy; Viceroy and audiencia 
were constantly at vaiiance as to the vague limits of thoir functions. 
The oityof Mexico contained at least ten distinct tribunals. The three 
ecclesiastical Courts of the Inquisition, the Santa Cruzada, and the 
diooeso, frequently clashrd : the special (Courts of merchants, of soldiers, 
of priests, and of royal oJlicLaU, caused frequent disputes of jurisdiction; 
but most serious were the dissensions between Viceroys and Archbishops, 
between Governors and Uishops. The prelates held a political status, 
being charged to enforce the laws concurning conduct and humanity, 
and they not infrequently became Viceroys and Governors ; the disputes 
were waged with the weapons of the law and of excommunication, but 
sometimes also with lethal weapons. Quarrels between authorities wore 
frequent, and also popular seditions against authority accompanied by 
the cry TTfa el rey y mutra el mat fffblertto ; in fact, movements as 
serious as many, which in the nineteenth century have been dignified 
with the title of Revolution, were scarcely abnormal. In capital cities 
custom or convenience permitted in emergencies the assembly of the 
magistrates and chief veclnoa in a junta or convention, whose decisions 
had a quasi-constitutional force — a body somewhat resembling tho 
eabilda ablerto^ but more distinctly political and not merely municipal in 
character. In Mexico such a junta in 1628, following and sanctioning 
an episcopal protest and a popular sedition, deposed the Viceroy — an act 
which was accepted by the Crown. Such movements are not steps 
towards independence ; they are nither, like the acti^'ities of the cahUdos^ 
survivals of the individual or corporate vigour which marked the Con- 
quest- They can be regarded as pointing towards emancipation only in 
so far as tbey indicate the possibility of independent action inherent in 
the character and ways of the people. 

The same licence pervaded tho Church. The complaint recurs 
throughout that the clergy are recruited from two sources : some are the 
outcasts of S|Ktnish parishes and monasteries; others are Creoles, either 
idle and dissolute men driven by disgrace or want to take Ordens, or ehio 
men put into religion by tliiiir jiarents with a view to getting a doctrina 
or Indian parish iind making a fortune out of the Indians. Many 
benefices, including most of the doatrinaSy were by special dispensation 
in the hands of regular clergy almost exempt from episcopal control. 
The rule of celibacy was generally evaded ; religious duties were hurried 
through, and the instruction of Indians was reduced to an absurdity; 
amidst general immorality in the towns, the regulars set the worst 
example, making their mona-steries places of licence and pleasure. The 



rB80-1780] 



The Inquisilion 



253 



quadrennial cbaptei'S oE the Ordera held for the election of provincial 
pr«lat«s were scandalous scenes of disorder and strife — Creoles and 
Europoiina contending for these lucrative posts, which held the patron- 
age, subject to viceregal confirmation, of all the parishes administered 
by the Order: the victor was conducted home by the idlers of the town, 
waving banners and clashing castanets. From 1629 the different Orders 
were successively commanded to elect a European and a Citiole alter- 
nately. At the first Franciscan election held in I^ima in 1680 under 
this rule the Creole padres resisted the command, made a murderous 
attack upon the com misaary-gen oral uf their Order, and fought in the 
streets against the infantry sent to suppress the disturbance. The 
acandala of these chapters roour in viceregal and episcopal reports down 
to the nineteenth century. But there were largo exceptions to tJiese 
disordei-s ; the missions required and found self-sacrificing and devoted 
priests; the Franciscans were better than the otlier Orders; and the 
Jesuits observed admirable conduct, maintaining the aarae discipline as 
in Europe, expelling unworthy members and devoting themselves in 
their colleges to education, to study, and to religious and chantable 
ministrations. 

In a general view it would be misleading to dwell exclusively on 
the widespread irregularities in Church and titate: they are represented 
and deplored in oflicial and legal treatises which are themsulvea examples 
of laborious public service. In a large and geueral sense the I^atin 
heritage of organised life was preserved, and it would be easy tu 
multiply examples of upright and single-hearted zeal. 

The tribunal of the Inquisition, sitting in Mexico and Lima from 
1570 and in Cartagena from 1GU3, was a powerful organ of government, 
charged to supervise conduct and also to exclude strangers; but this 
latter commission seems to have been neglected ; for the foreignora 
who wei-e frequently brouj^ht before the Inquisition iu Cai'tagena 
were summoned not as aliens but as heretics. During the union of the 
Spanish and l*ortuguese Crowns (1580-1640) the Portuguese, though 
legally aliens, were tolerated in the Indies; and in ICOd the Inquisition 
of Lima received royal ordere to moderate its zeal against Portuguese 
Judaisers: but thirty years later thy tribunal reports to the King that 
the trade of Lima is dominated by suspected Portuguese, that the streets 
seethe with them, and that a Spanish shopkeeper can only succeed by 
partnership with one of them. A hot persecution followed ; torture 
produced evidence; one woman died upon the rack; finally, at an 
aulo de f^ held in ITiST sixty-three Portuguese were exhibited as 
convicted of Judaism, while eight carried palniK in token of triumphant 
acquittal ; eleven of the convicted suffered death. The accusation of 
Judaism was probably true in most cases; the retail trade of Lima 
was passing into (.lie hands of Portuguese Jews, until the Inquisition 
stepped in. John Hawkins* men, captured at Vera Cruz in 1567 and 



i 



254 



Coninierce. The fleets 



[1580-1780 



enslaved, were generously treated by their Spanish masters until the 
TnqiiJHition of Mexico atla<:ked them, when three were burnt and the rest 
su^ered various penalties. Of the English pirates taken wnthOxenham in 
1673 four suffered death, one of them by fire, through the Inquisition of 
Lima; and in 162J an Englishman, the agent of an English metchant 
of Seville, was hnrnt in (Cartagena. These seem to 1« the only instances 
of the torture or death of Knglishmen thrnugh the Inquisition in South 
America ; thirteen of the Eugliiihaien captured with Hichard Hawkins 
Id 1595, after being reconciled or admitted to the Church as penitents, 
were imprisoned by the tribunal at I^inia.but leleswed by ruyal command; 
and iho few Englishmen and Dutchmen brought before the tribunal and 
reconciled after 1600 were treated much more leniently than Spaniards 
and Portuguese. In the tiret twenty yeare 80 persons were executed out 
of 12fi/) judged by the tribunal In Lima ; *27U of these were ecclesiastics, 
accused sometimes of erroneous or ambiguous doctrine, sometimes of 
saying mass without possessing full Orders, sometimes of soliciting their 
penitents, a crime which recurs thmughotit the history of the tribunal. 
Among the charges against laymen are bhisphemous, immonil, or scanda- 
lous exjnessions. witchcraft, bigamy, and other domestic irregularities. 

Although composed for people inapt for commerce, careless o£ gain, 
and free in spending it, yet a third part of the Code of Laws for the 
Indies deals with commerce. The piticiso and limited course of trade, 
at first in some degree dictated by circumstances, was afterwards main- 
tained by authority for convenience of control and taxation, and for 
the exclusion of foreigners as well as for defence. At first trade was 
permitted from several Spanish ports ; but in fact ships seldom sailed 
except from the Guadalquivir; and the Indian trade was soon coufinod 
to Seville. Then, the law prescribing adequate armament being gener- 
ally evaded, so many ships, sailing singly, were taken by French corsairs, 
that about 1529 they were ordered to wait for one another and sail 
in company; about 1.550 this rule was more rigorously enforced, and 
convoy was ordered to the Canaries on iJie outward voyay^ and from the 
Azores on the return. This system was afterwards further developed; 
two fleets annually sailed from the Guadalquivir; one, generally called 
the ^oia^ accompanied by two war-ships, sailed to Vcni Cruz, where 
European goods were exchanged for silver, cochineal, indigo, and hides 
in the fair of Jalapa; the other, the fityia de Tir-rra Firmf^ was popu- 
larly called the ixrnvxdn or the galleons, being convoyed by the eight 
war-ships which constituted the armada real de la guardia carrera de 
la* IndifU or arrnadn del mar del Norte- In West Indian waters the 
few ships for the islands and for Venezuela were detached, while the 
main body sailed to Cartagena, a sleepy city wliich for a few weeks 
awoke to the activity of the fair in which the merchants nf New Granada 
dealt with those of Seville. Meantime the silver bars from Potosf had 
been oanied by llamas to the port of Arica, thence by the armadilla or 



1580-1780] The <jreat fairs. The Manila galleon 255 

little squadron to Callao, and thenco to Panarafi by the two slujis wliich 
constituted the armaiia tJel vmr del Sur^ a forco fir-st organised after 
Drake's capture of the one treasure-ship between Calliio and Panama; 
from Vanariia ihts silver was carried by mules uorthwurds to Portobello. 
On the atrival of tlie armada del mar del Norte from Cartageua, the 
pestilential village of Portobello, usually abandnned to a few negroes, a 
handful of oflicials, and a small garrison fref|iient]y relieved, became for 
six weeks one of the great centres of the world's trade. The agents of 
the Seville and Lima merchants (list mot t^ fis prices, and then the 
chesU of silver bars were exchanged fer bales of silk and cloth; but 
during the fair many died ; and, if war or accident detained the galleons 
for the winter, the pestilence swept away the crews and soldiera. 

Trade from Euixjpe to the \-iceroyaItj of Peru was rigidl}* confined 
to these fairs; European goods reaching Buenos Aires by this stmngely 
circuitous route, including a land journey of one thousand leagues 
from Lima, were worth aix times their original cost; but from 1620 the 
port of Ruanos Aires was allowed to export annually two shiploads 
of local produce, in exchange for European goods for local use, not for 
transport to the interior. Even this concession, o|»oning the w.'iy to 
contraband, was viewed with indignation by the "commerce," or c<jh«h/iI(/£>, 
of Lima. Regularity in the sailing of the fleets was impracticable ; the 
Jtotft was often intermitted, the armada still more often ; from 1H56, 
owing to the loss of Jamaica and other disasters on the Atlantic, pro- 
bably also to the decay of Potosi, the armada became in theory triennial, 
and from 16a5only occasional. These irregularities were partlyremedied, 
jierhapsjiartly caused, by frecjuent licences granted to singh- ships, known 
as "ixigister ships," to carry a limited cargo ; the licences were costly, 
and the limit was always exceeded. 

The rule tUrecting trade to Seville had one exception : a galleon, 
naually accora|)anied by a smaller ship, sailed annually from Manila 
to Callao till lo92, and thence for wai-d to Acapulco, laden with Chinese 
goods, principally silk and muslin, to return to Manila carrj-ing Govern- 
ment oflBciala and priests for the Philippine missions, also silver limited 
by law to 500,000 jcx-io*^ but amounting in fact to three or five times 
as much. The voyage from Acapulco to Manila and back occupying 
fourteen months, Acapulco had a tniiis- oceanic fleet of four ships, an 
annual fair which temporarily doubled the population, and a small 
colony of Chinese residents ; the arrival of the Manila galleon was one 
of the great annual events of New Sjtain, and this regular trade with 
Aliens — for it was in fact trade with China — is cited as one of the causes 
contributing to a sounder state in that kingdom. Though the ron»tdado 
of Seville repeatedly protested against this trade, as infringing Spanish 
monopoly, the Croin-n refused to suppress it, on the ground that its 
suppression would involve the abandonment of the settlements and 
missions in the Philippines together with the chance of evangelising 



China ; but the limited trade hitherto allowed between Peru and New 
Sjwiin was totally prohibited in 1631, the Seville trade having suffered, 
frura the Peruvian preference for Chinese goodg obtained through New 
Spain. 

Commerce with the Indies waa managed by the Ca9a de Contratam^n 
established at Seville, consisting of n tribunal and council with numerous 
officials, whose duty it was to supervise the preparation of the fleets and 
enforce the multitudinous and niimite regulutitnis by repeated visits on 
boiird ; on the dispatch o£ the fleets, to prevent the sailing of foreigners, 
unlicensed passengers, contraband goods, or freights exceeding the legal 
limits; and on their return, to make sure that none of the men had deserted, 
that there was no unregistered silver or other contraband, to see to the 
unlading and tho payment of duos and to prevent gold and silver from 
passing out o( Spain. The Cam appointed the officials of the fleet, until 
these posts were made vendible. The contulado, which ranked as a 
branch of the Casa, undertook part of its work. In 1718 the Casa, 
including the comttlado, was transferred to Cadiz, which had been since 
1680 the actual port of sailing. The imposts upon ti-ade were enormous, 
collected both in Seville and in the ports of arrival, and they tended to 
increase until the proverb ran tliat the King took one Jioia in every 
three. In 1G35 fresh dues wore imposed to support the amuula dei 
Sarlovento, a small permanent West India squadron^ to cruise about the 
islands and along the Spanish Main, and in case of need to convoy the 
fiota from Vera Crux to Havana. The tliree armadas, of the North Sea, 
of the South Sea, and of the Windward Isles, completed the Indian 
naval establishment; but they were always inefficient. The Spanianls 
wereequally weak in seamanshipand artillery ; there were many Gcnnans, 
Dutch, and English, among the gunners and sailors ; the commanders 
were often land officers; and, down to the eighteenth century, the 
war-ships were still unwieldy galleons, of a pattern long abandoned 
elsewhere, always cumbered with cai^o and passengers and incapable 
of serious fighting. 

The regular army in the Indies usually consisted merely of small ■ 
garrisons iu the chief ports, with some troops in the south of Chile 
and in the north of New Spain ; most of the soldiers were Creoles and 
meitizoB^ drafts from Spain being always speedily thinned by death and 
desertion. The garrisons, especially on the Pacific coast, were as 
inefficient as the fleet ; the soldier's trade was abhorred in the Indies ; 
and during the 2*>0 years fnllowing conquest there was a general 
disposition for peace. The militia furnished by the inhabitants of 
the towns varied much in numbers and in efficiency; negroes, though 
sometimes legally excluded from it, were generally admitted ; pure 
Indians were excluded, with .some exceptions. The interior Spanish 
settlements seldom contained regular soldiers ; the obligations of the 
tncomenderot were forgotten, as the nwnniendat diminished in number 



I 
I 
I 




1680-17S03 



Immigraixon. — Contraband 



257 



and value ; and Id fact the defence of such settlements fell n^K>n all the 
inhabitants, often aided by friendly Indians. 

In 1497 pardon was grunted to criminals who should go to Santa 
Domingo ; and during the succeeding generation any Spaniard might 
emigrate whose ancestry was not tainted with Judaism, Mohammndatiism, 
or heresy; nor were the Emperor's subjects or even other foreigners 
rigidly excluded; but this freciium was soon restricted. No one was 
allowed tu leave Spain for the Indies without tliL^ King's licence, wliich 
was only given sparingly to men of approved character. Doubtless 
the dread of losing population wjts a motive, but so also was the govorn- 
ment of the Indies. They were not to become European colonies ; the 
commonwealth of the Indians was to be preserved ; white men were to 
live under control in organised gron]^is in cities as servants of King 
and Church; every precaution was to be taken against the evil, con- 
stantly denounced by Kings and Viceroys, of Idlers and vagabonds 
living among the ludisins and bringing disrepute upon '' policy " and 
Christianity. 

These regulations were constantly broken ; gain tempted the ship- 
captains to carry contraband goods and inilicensed passengers in every 
fleet, notwithstanding the threatened penalty of death for this latter 
offence ; repeated cedula» denounce the constant arrival of unregistered 
silver, escaping the royal dues. Hut not only subjects committed 
irregularities; occasionally the King seized at Seville the silver of 
the merchants, giving in exchange promissory notes of doubtful value. 
The system of annual fairs, coupled with the great risk of shipwreck or 
of capturo by corsairs, induced a precarious uncertainty; profits were 
enormous and ruin frequent. Foreign goods might be sent to the 
Indies, provided that thoy were the genuine purchased property of 
Spaniards. Any Spaniard could trade with the Indies through a 
member of the "commerce" of Seville; but the members were forbidden 
to act as agents of foreigners. This prohibition wtxs disobeyed; and 
early in the seventeenth century a large part of the gooda sent westward 
was dispatched by foreigners through Seville merchants, who were never 
known to betray these secret and illegal trusts. 

The study of Spanish- American laws and institutions is in itself 
incomplete and therefore misleading; for the actual course of ovente 
is largely a history of infractions, evasions, and authorised exceptions. 
The Spanish seltlers genoniUy welcomed smugglers without inquiring 
too nicely whether they were corsairs and enemies of the Crown ; from 
the beginning of the seventeenth century the Dutch seated in Cura^oa 
almost monopolised the trade of Venezuela; in the Antilles the French 
down to 1697 and the English down to 1670 preferred piracy or war, 
but did not neglect contraliand, which continued after the conclusion of 
peace. The Portuguese in soutliem Brazil pushed an immense contra- 
band trade with the River Plate, and founded in 1678 the fort of 

C. ». R- X. 1* 



i 



258 Taxation. — Coinage. — Mining regulations [1580~1780 

Colonia del Sacrameato as a smuggling post, ten leagues from liuenos 
Aires across llio estuiiry ; lUiring tho foUoiving eighty-five years the 
place was live times laken by tliu Spaniards and five times rcsUired to 
the Portuguese on conclusion of peace. 

The internal taxation. waa gradually assimilated to the oppressive 
system prevailing in Spain; the alcabala, or tax upon all sales, was 
introiluced after 1573, notwithstanding protests which in Quito reached 
the pitch of iuautrectiou. Bread and corn were exempt from this tax, as 
well as arms, compounded medicines, trained horses, paintings, "because 
of the excellence of that art," and books in Latin and Spanish ; books 
were also exempt from import duty, but were subject to a strict censor- 
ship, " feigned and unseemly histories " l)eing excluded, llio other chief 
internal sources of revenue were the royal duos on minerab, tho sale 
of municipal and other oiftccs, the Indian tribute, stamped paper, the 
monopoly of playing-cai-ds, taxes upon all civil acid ecclef^iastieal 
salaries, part of tlie incomes of vacant benefices, the tithes which 
were partly applied to seculai- purposes, and the sale of the Bull of the 
Holy Crusade, granted by the l*ojje to support war against the infidel) 
but always renewed with occasional brief interruptions. This last very 
jjrofitahlc source of revenue was administered by a special treasury and 
tribunal in every capital; and the purchase of the Bull was pressed 
upon everyone in biennial courses of sermons. Froiiuently the King, 
pleading the necx^ssitiea of war against infidels and lieretics, applied 
to his subjects for loans and also for donativos or free gifts, meaning 
in fact heavy extra taxes. 

In New Spain silver at the mines paid t4D the King IJ per cent, plus 
one-tenth of the remainder, in I'eru 1^ per cent, and one-fifth of the 
remainder down to 1736, when, omng to tho decay of the mines, tho 
dues were reduced to the scale of New Spain. Mercury, required for 
the extraction of silver, was a royal monopoly, being sold by thc^ King 
to miners at bis own price ; it came partly from Europe, partly from the 
Peruvian mine of Guancavelica, belonging to the King, but worked by 
contractors. Tlie silver real, reputed one-eighth of an ounce, and worth 
about C,](/., was the unit in reckouiug small sums; but the general unit 
was the reputed silver ounce or piece of eight rmhn^ usually called 
simply pesoy equal to about -is. 4d. ; the Mexican mint has coined 
these dollars for 350 years. The ducat, a Spanish unit little used in the 
Indies, was, from Uie uiiildlo of the sixteenth century, not a coin but a, 
sum of money, namely eleven reaUa, about equal to t>«. 

Six Indian diggers were assigned to any mine-huuter, who on dis- 
covering a vein of silver had the right to stake out a space of sixty 
by forty yards ; an equal space belonged to the King and was always sold 
if found saleable; anyone on paying \^^ pesoa might then stake out 
a limited claim, which wits forfeited unless worked to a certain depth 
within a fixed time. The most numerous and most successful mine- 



L 



1580-1780] 



Fvrclgners. — Net Reventce 



259 



huntera tveing foreigners, it was decreed that foreigners should have 
tbese rightd equally with Spaniards aud Indians, also that Gcmian 
experts might be employed. These decrees are an instructive com- 
mentan,- both on the efficacy of the laws excluding foreigners and on 
the coiumou notion that Spaniards had an inordinate passion for gold and 
silver; about 1640 a competent writer says that " most of the calaiultiea 
of the Indians at GuanL>avelica are due to the cruelty, iniquity, greed, 
and depraved morals of the foreigners who flock thither." The way from 
Brazil could not be barred; uorwere the porta in fact effectively cloaed. 
The naturalisation of foreigners long established in the Indies was 
permitted from 15G2 ; yet the decrees excluding foreigners are constantly 
repeated. 

These large taxes prodncedadispropoi-tionatelysmall revenue. Some 
were farmud ; others were collected by the ordinary mug ist rates, who 
received a percentage on the amount ; there was much waste, careleaaneas, 
and dishonesty, in collection as in expenditure. Most of the revenue 
was spent in the Indies on the elaborate and costly civil and ecclesiastical 
establishment ; a snrplus came from the treasuries of the mining regions 
in New Spain and Pern ; but theae regions w^ere but a small part of the 
geographical area of the Empire, aud the greater part of their surplus 
was absorbed by the lojjs incurred in other provinces; frequently it was 
only by borrowing and sometimes by advancing money themselves that 
the Viceroys were able to remit to Spain the sums expected by the King. 
Complete records of the amounts so sent to Spain are not accessible, but 
before 1690 the annual dispatch seldom exceeded 1,500,000 pesos. From 
IfiOO to 1700 about 4,000,000 pesos pruUibly represents the usual 
amount, but much of this was lost by shipwreck aud disaster; during 
the eighteenth century the amount increased, and after 17(i0 It increased 
greatly, owing to the tobacco monopoly, the growth of trade, and the 
progress of raining in New Sp:un ; towards the close of the eighteenth 
century the Oown drew annually from the Indies about eight millions 
ci pe909, while the %ituados to Cuba, Manila, and other places, further 
abftorbed three or four millions. Ilut the actual average was probably 
considerably less thaii these usual amounts owing to periods of depression 
and to the occasional intermission of dispatch in war-time ; in the latter 
case the deficiency was not fully made good in succeed ing years. From 
1579 to 1650 the "royal dues at Potosl usually exceeded 1,000,000 />e«o*, 
and in eighteen of those years they approached or passed 1,500,000 : the 
subsequent decay of Potosi was more than balanced by the increased 
product of New Spain, which produced from 1775 about two-thirds of 
the revenue sent to Spain. In 1795 the Spanish-American mints coined 
thirty-eight million peuou^ of which twenty-four millions were struck in 
New Spain. In each of the following years the Mexican mint coined 
over twenty-five millions. 

The asiento de ne</roa or contract for supplying African slaves to tiie 



260 



Slavery and Uie slave-trade 



[1680-1780 



Indies, which in the eigbteeulti century became the object of international 
dijilomacy and war, hiw a separate history. The slave-trade, beiug 
repulsive to Spaniards, wtus gencmlly granted by contract to foreigners; 
in 1;J95 a Fleming undertook to pay 100,000 dumts a year for the 
monopoly, embarking annually 4250 slaves, of whom 3500 were by the 
contract to roach the Indies alive: iu 1600 the Portuguese Governor of 
Angola took the contract, the ratio of mortality being raised, 5000 
negroeti to bo embarked and SoOO liindtid iit Caiugeiia and Vera Cruz; 
similar contracts wero gmnted down to 1(>40, wlieii the revolt of Portugal 
interrupted the li-ade. Portugnese were now excluded ; Spaniards were 
unwilling; Dutch and English, though ready enough, were not acceptable 
agonta ; but af tor twenty yeara' interval a(ienoese house gave an increased 
price for the monopoly ; in 1676 the cnimtdado of Seville tflok the 
contract; in 1096 the Portuguese Company of Guinea undertook to 
land in six yeara and a lialf 10,000 tons of negroes at thrt>6 '* pieces" 
i^i.e. negroes) to the ton, paying 112 }>exoH per ton for the privilege ; in 
1701 the contract was transferred to the French Company of Ctuiuea 
for ten yoare; lastly, in 1713 it was granted as the price of peace to 
the Kngliiib South Sea Company, which undertook to send 4S0O pieces 
of proper height and ago annually for UO years, the sovereigns of Spain 
and of England eacli to receive one-fourth of the profit. 

The attempt to employ negroes in the Andes failed ; nor were they 
ever numerous in Chile or the River Plati' region or the Mexican table- 
land ; but in the tropics, u[Hiri from thu uiuuutains, they relieved the 
lusa enduring Indians in mines and pearl-fisheries as well as in ordinary 
labour. The nature of the country facilitating escape, bands of 
cimarrontii or runaway negroes early infested the woods and hills of 
Tiunu Firme ; but usually the negroes easily adopted the religion and 
cuBloms of tlioir new country, where they were generally treated with 
mon; humanity than among other Europcansi, especially when they were 
servantij to individuals; for a certain patriarchal character has always 
marked the Spanish household, the master regarding every dependent 
as a member of the family. A slave could legally purchase his freedom 
(or a moderate sum. whatever his original cost might he, and could 
compel a master convicted of harshness to sell him to another. In the 
coast towns of the tropics there were many free negroes and mulattos, 
who provided companies of militia. Humboldt found the negroes much 
Itetter treated in Culia than in Jamaica; in considering Spanish 
tivatment of the Indians this testimony should not be forgotten. 

The treatment and government of the Indians cannot be dismissed 
in a dogmatic summary^ owing to the divergence of actual fact from 
constitutional theory and also owing to the innumerable diversities of 
the Indians thnmsolvos. Tlio ^leople of .Vnahuac andof Cuzcoandsome 
of ilieir neighbours had dovoloiwd a considerable degree of mechanical 



h-^ 



15S0-178O] The Indian popuhtmi, — Mortality 261 

skill and social organisation; but within fifty leagitea of both these 
centres the natives descended through grades of lower culture to the 
most abject or ferocious savagery. Their relations with the Spaniards 
varied from hearty and loyal allegiance or complete subjection to 
independence and iiiterraittont warfare. Down to the eighteenth 
century few wliite settlers* except in a few Peruvian coast towns, were 
SBpiirated by more than 100 miles from savages, many of them cannibals, 
many of them inveterate eneoiies, raiding the froutiei towns to caiTy off 
Spanish women into savage concubinage and Spanish boys to he reared 
as Indian warriors, often to beconio the most intrepid and wily leaders 
against the Christians. The immense diiferences of natural features and 
climate meant corresponding diversities of [xipiilation ; there were wide 
differences between the people of the torrid coasU, those of the interior 
forests and awamps, those of the tropical table-lands, the mountaineers 
of the south teniperate region, and the nomads of the Pampa ; and 
smaller local divisions were infinite. la 18*i4, 120 living itlioms were 
reckoned in Mexico, of which 35 were distinct languages, besides 62 
extinct tongues; aliout 1790, 350 idioms, 35 of them distinct languages, 
were counted in Quito alone ; Azara, in 1801*. after years of observation, 
remarks that tho differences between tlie small tribes on the Paraguay 
are greater than the diflferences between European nations. 

But enquiry naturally turns to the peoples of New Spain and of 
Pert!, tribes more settled and advanced, though indolent, apathetic, 
inert, and careless of seU-preservation, when judged by European 
standards. Tlie shock of conquest and revolution, service as porters 
and auxiliaries in war, lalwur in mines and in the buihling of ships and 
cities, displacement of customs and sentiments, caused a great diminution 
of inhabitants. The brutal conquf;rors*of Peru, themselves daily exposed 
to hardship and death, wore indifferent to the lives of their auxiliaries ; 
even in Now Spain the extensive and solid Spanish cities are monuments 
of suffering and mortality continued after the conquest, the want of 
beasts of burden being supplied by raeu. But more wore killed by 
epidemics than by all these causes ; twice before l/)80 the indigenous 
plague of muzakuati swept New Spain with appJilHng mortality ; but 
more wide-spread and continuous were the ravages of tho newly- imported 
European fevers, small-pox and measles. In every fresh advance during 
three centuries these plagues accompanied the white men and destroyt-d 
at intervals one-sixth or one-fourth of the King's newly-sulxlued Indian 
vassals; even in the settled parts the peslilenoe continued without 
ceasing, and the frequent epidemic outbreaks were only less destructive 
than the earlier visitations. 

ITic '• commonwealth of the Indians *' was treated as distinct, the 
natives being regarded as a separate part of the body politic. The 
first object of Government was to " reduce " tho natives, to gather them, 
into considerable villages possessing Indian magistrates and a white 



i 



262 Government of the Indians [isso-iTSO 

priest ; they were thus to be made " politic ** people, to leara " civil life," 
and to be instructed in ClirEgtianity. " Uefore the IndiaDs can be made 
Cbriatiaiis, they must be made men," writes Toledu, who deijlorea the 
extreme difficulty of the task, saying that the Indians still live as they 
did under the tyranny of the Incaa, sunk in apathetio indolence and 
only working at command of theii' caciqum^ who exploit them ruthlessly. 
Even apologists and defenders of the Indians constantly repeat the aatuo 
verdict; "They are timid and pusillanimous people, indolent but sub- 
missive, of small understanding, imitative but not inventive I" 

In every Indian jtwhlv^ including the cercadot or native Buburbs 
of Spanish towns, the ludiaLis annually chose, in presence of the Spanish 
priests, councillors and two alcatdeg^ who had considerable summary 
powers to flog and imprison for diunkenness, immomlity, and theft, 
more serious cases being remitted to the nearest Spanish town; the 
lash was preserved from pre-Conquest times to chastise Indians in 
oases where white mou were fined. The Indians were legally clasiscd 
as ffente miserable, people unfit to take care of themselves, having the 
privileges and limitations of minors, forbidden to alienate property 
or make considerable contracts except through the oiTicial Protector; 
they were exempt from the Inquisition as being, like children, unable to 
grasp matters of doctrine, and, though nominally subject t-o episcopal 
Courts, in fact were never brought to account for doctrinal matters. 
But the curas, even the most devoted and humane, everywhere punished 
absence from mass with the lash, which is declared by a champion of the 
Indians to be indltpensable, since without it none would attend ; they 
were subjected to a roiluced number of fasts and feasts and a less rigid 
matrimonial table of affinity, ami were not required to purchase the Bull 
of the Santa Cruzada or to give" any offerings in church or dues for 
masses, baptisms, marriages, and funerals. They wera exempt from 
alcabala ; the payment of tithes was a disputed matter, only partially 
enforced with many relaxations ; apart from the turn of paid but 
forced labour, called tanJa in New Spain and mita in Peru, the only 
contribution to the State was the tribute or capitation tax paid by all 
males between 18 and 50 years of age ; this varied in different times 
and places from one peso to nine, paid in kind whcro metal was scarce. 
Though there were instances of hardship, the tribute was. not usually 
excessive, being much less than exactions endured before the Conquast, 
and it was commonly remitted in famine or other calamity; but to 
minor ofBeials it was a ready occasion for extortion. 

In return, the Indians were entitled to possess sufficient land for 
their support ; bnt Spanish gmziers often encroached and damaged the 
crops. The novel institution of individual property caused rauc:h per- 
plexity and litigation in Peru, the Indians carrying their trivial disputes 
to the atuiiencia and often dying on the long journey through various 
climates. A lioavy abuse from the beginning was the exaction by the 



1580-1780] 



Forced labour. JTumane laws 



263 



eneomenderos of unpaid and excessive personal service in lieu of paid 
tribute; to prevent tliis and other grievances, an encomendtro was for- 
bidileii to live on his encomienda^ ami was bound to inhabit a stone 
house in the capital of the district; yet this illegal personal service waa 
not wholly eradicated even in 1780. Hospitals were everywhere built 
for the Indians ; a paid Protector was appointed in every district, 
besides the chief Protector in the capital, who waa fipocially charged to 
secure justictf for them in the audienaia ; and humane treatmout was 
onceasingly enjoined upon all o£&clals. 

In the vicinity of the Spanish towns, apart from tho mines, the 
Indians seem to have been well treated and fairly content. Toledo in 
1S70 found that the only well-managed hospital in Lima was that 
established for the ludians. The mui*der of an Indian vnia punished 
by death. In 16B0 the Indians of the cercado of l^ima arc described 
as " instructed in policy and Christianity and espailolhudoa ao that they 
seem like 8paniards; they live in 200 houses and have among them 
eighty negro slaves, more than aro owned by all the other Indians of 
Peru." Though the general rule foibadu lire-arniy and horses to Tridlans, 
those of Lima furnished militia, both hoi'sc and foot. In the Peruvian 
coast valleys, destitute of mines and adapted to negro labour, the Indians 
readily learned nie'cliaiiieal arts and earned good wages in the armada 
and in the dockyards ; their villages were ruled tranquilly but rigorously 
by Indian alcaldes who excluded all Sjianiards and negroes. In Lima, 
Cuzco, aud La Plata, as in the Indiiiu quarter of Mexico, there were 
colleges for Indian nobles, although these foundations were sometimes 
neglected or diverted to other uaes. Many Indians flocked to the 
Spanish towns, either living at random, free from tribute, in the markets 
and in the courtyards of the houses, or else attaching themaelvea to 
Spuui^h families as hereditary aerfs- 

Although the laws of protection and tutelage admit the impossibility 
of treating ludituis like white men, yet from 1542 to 1000 SiMinish 
legislators aimed at making them equal to Spaniards by ordering the 
abolition of every kind of serfdom and of all forced labour, aud enjoining 
that negroes should bo substituted for Indian workmen ; but even these 
sweeping decrees contain ambiguous additions admitting necessary 
exceptions. Discretion in applying Uie laws is left to the Viceroys; 
where negroes are not available, Indiau labourcra must be used ; in any 
case idleness is nottobeallowed. In fact, the Conquest had brought with it 
a problem hitherto unfamiliar. Life under European conditions required 
labour in public work-s, in mines and factories, and above all ou farms : 
tiie few white settlers scattered in small groups were not prepared to 
perform this labour in countries already possessing a docile peasantry; 
but the peasantry, needing almost nothing, ignorant of the use of 
money, abiwed by the shock of subjection, and perplexed by stranga 
conditions, did not care at first to labour for wages. On the other 



264 Regulation of labour. Tk^- uiita of Potosi [i5ao-i780 



hancl, they were accustomed to worlc at command, for the polity of 
the Incas had rested upon serfdom and forced labour; royaJ decrees 
could not induce Governors or sctUcra to dispense wiLli institutions 
already existing and in their opinion necesitary. The attempt was 
abandoned; while unpaid uerviue in lieu of tribute vf^a alMulutely 
forbidden, serfdom and paid forced labour were both sulmitted; serfdom 
indeed was still discountenanced in many ambiguous decrees, aiid was 
rather tolenitt'd as an existing institution and authorised by prescription 
than distinctly legalised. The serfs, called ifanaconas in -Peru, were 
attached to the soil, could not bo sold, and wore entitled to payment 
and instruction. The repetition of theso rules indicates their frequent 
breach ; yet many serfs were well treated and content ; they were often 
in fact tenants sharing the crops with the Spanish landlord; many 
chose serfdom, especially as domosbic retainers, in order to escape mita 
and tribute. 

Forced labour in civic works, on farms, in mines and factories, was 
regulated by the mita or succession of labourers, whereby only a certain 
proportion of the men, varying in different provinces from one twenty- 
fifth to one-fifth, might be summoned from their homes at one time to 
serve for a fixed wi^e. Pro\nsion8 for their protection are repeated and 
multiplied; about 3010 it was forbidden in Pom to employ Indians in 
the sugar-factories, where they were liable to be hurt by machinery and 
by drinking spirits, or to employ them as woodcutters, since falling trees 
killed or injured them, although the usual exception is added that when 
royal galleons are being built Indian woodcutters may be indispensable. 
It may be questioned how far external care could protect people so little 
able to take care of themselves ^ — people who in former times had, on 
the death of an Inca, kUli^d tliemselvos in crowds; but in fact the 
deei-ees for their protection were evaded, especially in the Peruvian 
mining districts. The mita of Potosi, which was treated by Viceroys 
as a great matter of State, may be described in Illustration. About 
1676 Toledo assigned the 95,000 Indian villagers inhabiting seventeen 
districts as vnilayat for Potosi ; one-seventh of them were annually 
summoned to lalxiur in the mine one week in three; thus 13,500 Indian 
mitat^og were always present, of whom 4500 at a time worked under- 
ground, receiving a dally wage of four rentes or two sliilHngs, half tlie 
wage of ft free Indian. The mitayoi were to be carefully protected from 
hardship and danger: but humane regulations were frustrated by the 
greed and lawlessness of the mine-owners and by the rapid diminution 
of the mitayoa. In 1633 the 95,000 assigned by Toledo had dwiudled 
to 25,000. and in 1078 there remained less than 1700. In 1681 an 
energetic Viceroy ^vas sent with orders to restore the miUt, wlilch had 
lapsed from the disappearance of the Indians, to the great losa of the 
mining industry ; by a caitjful count of Indians and by adding fourteen 
districts, be enrolled 21,000 mitayoa, making an annual shift of 3000, 



1680-1780] 



Decrease of fndiayi population 



265 



who werQ now to work two weeks out of tliree. And then begins a 
fresh cycle of hardship, apatlietic submission^ and decrease, hastened by 
ft terrible epidemic of cholera in 1720. In 1788 the inteiidant of 
Cochabamba, a province adjoininf^ Fotosi, repurta that three of Itis 
Indian villages had been completely depopulated by the mtfa, and tliat 
of the Indians who annually went to PotosE one-third never returned; 
in explanation he describes the exhausting, dangerous, and unwholesome 
character of the work, and the fatal change of climate. The meroury 
mine of Guancnvoliea, ro(|niring about 000 lalwurers at a time, con- 
sumed its mitayoa even more rapidly than Potosi. But wori^e than 
either were the ohra'jes or cloth factories, in which the Indians were 
shut up unseen except by thuir exploiters and delivered over to a 
hopeless, grinding slavery, their legal pay being so manipulated on 
pretext of food, clothing, and payment of tribute, that they were always 
in the master'sdebt, owing him uneudingtoil; reiterated royal commands 
failed to release them. 

Viceregal and other reports are almost unanimous iu ascribing the 
decrease of Peruvian Indians to ill-treatment and dangerous or excessive 
lalxinr, to the long jouriieyn, sometimes of 150 leagues, from ibeir 
homes, and lo the interruption of domestic life; but there were other 
causes. It was the intei-est of corregid^r^ cura, and cacufU/; to resist an 
accurate census and frustrate the mila, keeping the Indians to be ex- 
ploited hy themselve.s; many Indians fled t» the uncunquered heathens, 
or to districts exempt from mila or to S[janish towns ; many bought 
immunity from mita ; many after their year of service remained at 
Potosi as free labourers, eitlier working in the mine and in the numerous 
accessory tasks or collecting surfaec silver and buying stolen silver 
to be sold again. In 1600 a free labourer iu the mine received a pe»o 
daily, besides what be could make by stealing ; the Peruvian rule of 
life. "Eat aud let eat," was extended to the Indians; and stolen ore 
was regularly sold by them in public mitrket to Spanish speculators. 
In IfilO the practice was regulated and authorised, every free Indian 
miner being allowed one load of ore daily ; the sale of this brought up 
hie daily earnings lo a niinitnum of l!i realen or 7 shillings. 

But in their own vjllngt's the Indians were often the victims of three 
tyrants, the eorrf'/idor^the oura, and the Indian cacique. The corregi- 
dore», being authorised to purehtLse mules and other necessaries for sale 
to the Indians, often bought the unsaleable stock of Lima tradesmen, 
spectacles, playing-cards, book.s toilette powder, velvet, sdk. compelling 
their Indian subjects to purchase these at the seller's price and reaping 
almost incredible protiCs at the cost of terrible suffering. But a nearer 
and more constant oppressor was the cura, usually a regular priest 
almost exempt from episcopal control; official reports show the intra 
unlawfully engaged in trade, exacting forbidden dues, compelling children 
to bring uSferiugs, multiplying festivals to increase extortion, sometimes 



266 



Grievances and insurrections 



[1S80-1780 



turning* Uie church into a cloth factory aad compelling the parishioners 
to labour all Sundays and feast-days. 

The worst destroyers of the Indian were epidemics and alcohol. 
From the most cultured to the roost savage all were the staves of in- 
toxication ; during any brief absence of the eura an Indian pueblo 
plunged into an oj^ of drunkenness and incestuous debauchery ; to 
the abstemious Spaniard tins vice branded the Indians as bestial people 
aDd justified the distiactiou uuivereally drawn bolweea Indians and gente 
derazHn. With all their denunciations of ill-treatment, some officials 
are vaguely conscious that the decay of Indians is a matter beyond their 
control ; one Viceroy attributes Uieir decrease to their subjection to 
atrangers ; an early historian of Quito, after describing the devasUliou 
of conqueat> is still at a loss to explain the total depopulation of large 
districts, and finally ascribes this to the secret judgment of God. 

Yet the grievniices wei-o great. " The Indians have scarce a tongue 
to complain ; if they attempt it, tboy are intimidated by the corregidor," 
writos the Vioeroy in 1681 ; appeal to the audieneia was generally 
fruitless ; one official would not condemn auother. Small disturbances 
and conspiracies were not uncommon and were little regarded by th« 
authorities ; but about 1730 these sporadic troubles became more 
frequent, partly owing to an attempt to make a census. In 17-12 an 
Indian of C'uzco, a fugitive from justice or injustice, taking an Inca 
name siiid proclaiming a rcstoiutirm of the Empire, organised a revolt 
or rather an invasion among the G/mnchot of the montaUt or forest 
region on the east and nortli-east frontier of the central Peruvian 
pi-ovince«, between 10* and 10" south latitude. Many missions were 
destroyed ; the Spaniards were confined to their towns and the frontier 
was thrust back forhalf-a-century ; yat the Viceroy reports that the cor- 
reffidcr of Tarma is needlessly anxious for strong measures, and that the 
case is ono for miasinnariea, not for arm.s. In 1750 an Indian conspiracy 
in Lima, not the firet, indicated stability rather than weakness; for 
the militia company of Indian nobles in proof of fidelity voluntarily 
attended the execution of the leaders. A rising of some pueblos in 
a neighhoring province with an attempt to raise the whole kingdom 
was more alarming; aJid the Viceroy suggests that it is perhaps unwise 
to allow the Indians on the proclamntion in Lima of a King's accession 
to represent in ceremonial procession the departed line of Incas. 

In 1780 the carupi^ oi an Indian pnehlo In tlie district uf Tinla to 
the south of Cuzco, after a vain attempt to represent Indian grievances 
to the King, invited the corregidor to his house, and, pretending a royal 
warrant, tried and executed him ; then, taking the Inca name of Tupac 
Amani and asserting a commission from the King, he seized the 
treasuries of two districts and raised a paid army of 17,000 men, which 
he led against Cuzco, claiming to be the deliverer of Indians, Creoles, 
and imitaoa^ but threatening death to all who should resist him. Other 



1780-4] Tupac Anharu* — Reform of govermiient 267 






leaders sprang up in the southern aerrania, notably ft baker calling 
himself the Inca Tupa Catari, who plunged with his followers into orgiea 
of drunkenness and homicide, killing white men^ women, and cbildrBn, and 
threatening itivJl war against Tupac Amaru. The latter, repulsed from 
Cuzco, turuud his arms agaiutit all except Indians; at first many megtizo$ 
and some Creoles favoured the rising, but they were soon alienated by 
massacre and outrage ; and after four months of aimless warfare and 
some vain attacks on small towns his diminished forces were defeated 
by a Spanish officer commanding 15,000 men, mostly loyal Indiana 
under their caciques. But meantime more serious troubles aiflicted 
Upper Peru (now Bolivia), extending even to Tucuman ; in some places 
only whites were killed, in others all mestizos and all Europeanised 
Indians of every sex and age, in one place every man wearing a shirt; 
one town was flooded by cutting an enibaiikment, and its 10,000 
inhabitants were drowned. Tupac Amaru's nephew, pretending a com- 
mission from Charles III, was still in conmiand of 15,000 men a year 
after the first outbreak, but was at last brought lo capitulate ; 100,000 
people are said to have perished in the troubles of 1780-3. Tupao 
Amaru was executed with medieval tortures, proof of the panic inspired 
by the rebellion. 

This movement cannot fairly be regarded as the attempt of an 
oppressed nationality to amend ita wrongs ; there was no general rising 
of the Indians and no cohesion among the insurgents. It is a yet 
greater error to regard this as the beginning of the struggle for inde- 
pendence ; whatever the first iutontiou of its authors may have been, 
the movement was in faet aimed, not at the emancipation of the Spanish 
settlements, but sit their destruction ; the rising was a partial movement 
in the "commonwealth of Indians/* whereas the later struggle for eman- 
cipation was a movement in the *' Commonwealth of Spaniards," to which 
most of the Indians were indifferent or hostile. 

This insurrection produced a reform — the abolition of corregidore* 
throughout the Indies except in New Gnmada, and the institution of 
intendtntes^ officials of high rank and character, ruling large provinces 
and directly responsible to the King; each intendeneia was divided 
into part id OK Tuhd by tubdelegadot. But there was one great defect, 
due to the chronic necessities of the treasury ; the suhdeUgadoa were 
paid by a percentage of the Indian tribute collected by them; and the 
old story of neglect and oppression by priests and officials continued. 

The history of the encomiendan illustrates the decrease of tlio Indians. 
Originally granted for two or sometimes three lives, after which term 
they were to pass to the ('rown, these fiefs began to fall in before the 
close of the sixteenth century; but the Viceroys retained a valuable 
patronage by renewing them, often to families other than the Gi'st 
possessors. Their action was received at first with vigorous reprimand, 
then with acquiescence; the Crown took to making these grants to 



268 Increase o/mestuos. — Indians in New Spain [i750-i864 



courtiers living in Spain ; and the principle of perpetuity, at first rejected, 
yraa in some dogi-eo admitted. The possession of ricb eneomiendas by 
ecclesiastical and charitable foundations impeded their extinction : yet 
during the seventeenth century iiiaiiy lapsed to the Crown. After 17ol, 
the Crown absorbed the remainder vvitliout much dif!icu1ty, depopula- 
tion having almost extinguished their ^'atue. About 1790, in Cliile. fifty- 
throe awr viy'mg fncomienda». eomprising 960 Indians, were extinguished ; 
the richest encomienda in Oocbabamba then couKisted of nine Indians; 
ill Paraguay the ProL«;ctor reported the existence of ^'22 eneoTHtentlaa, 
comprising about ^000 Indians, who were still illegally subjected to 
unpaid personal service for two months every year. But it must be 
remembered that, as ihe Indians decreased, the me*lizo» inereiised ; Indian 
women preferred uniun witli white men ; and many of those who passed 
for whit« were of mixed origin, Everj'where there was a limited society 
of well-to-do Creoles and Europeans who jealously guarded their purity 
of blood ; but only in the province of Buenos Aires, bordered by savage 
tribes^ was the hulk of the population Knropean. 

In New Spain the Indians fared better; the country was easier to 
control and more thickly populated, and the natives showed more 
endurance under the new conditions. The drainage canal of Mexico, 
employing thousands of forced labourers for two centuries, did not 
destroy population as did the mito of Potosf ; the great mining ora 
of New Spain was the settled age of the eight^-entli century, not, as 
in Peru, the age succeeding the Conquest. NotwithriUtnding much 
injustice and oppression, the Indians increased in number and improved 
in condition during the eighteenth century, es]]ecially after 1770, about 
which time the tanda was aliolishoil and all laliour made fi-ee; and 
in 180.5. according to Humboldt, the Indians, except in the oftraz/ct, were 
better off than the peasantrj'^ over a great part of northern Europe ; 
labour in the mines, though exhausting, was short and better jtaid tlian 
in Europe. The few remaining Indian cities and the two Indian 
quarters of Mexico, wirh their separate Indian cahtldos exercising 
authority over groups of subject Indian villagesi were treated witli 
dignity and consideration. So long as the Spanish power lasted, the 
people of the "free city " of Thwcala retained with unimportant modi- 
fications tbo privileges granted by Cortes, and even carried these 
privileges to the distant frontier settlement which they made in support 
of Spanish Imperial expansion; it may be doubted whether any other 
conqutjriiig power has ever observed such a treaty for three centuries. 
It is true that the attempt of Spanish legislators to endow the body 
of natives with polioia, to make them ^^eivil people" in the European 
sense, overshot the mark of possibility ; the unmixed Indians in general 
remained merely passive members of the body politic ; so late ns 1864 
the Mexican Indians are truly described as still depressed and iniliffereni. 
Yet the "New I^ws" for the liberation of the Indians promulgated 



V * 



1600-1700] 



The frontiers. — The missions 



269 



by the Hahsburg Empcjior were not ineffective ; thi-eo centuries after liis 
time an invading- Habsburg prince w:i3 put to death by a pure-blooded 
Indian acting as conatitutional head of the Mcitican commonwealth. 

The treatment of Indian subjects naturally leads to the frontier 
question, the attitude of Government towards the unsubdued gentiUt. 
To the north of New Spaiu and to the south of the River Plate and 
of Chile, there wore long irregular frontiers; seveml provineea of both 
continents contained savage enclaves ; moreover, there waa an immense 
undefined interior border-line, extending westward from tho mouth of 
the Orinoco to the Andes, thence irregularly southwards to SaJta, then 
in ft great curve round the Chaco, past Crirdoba to Santa Fe ; from thia 
point a narrow and ill-defined strip of Spanish settlement, bordered to 
east and west by savagery, extended northwards up the Parana and 
Pamguay tu a point nurtli of Aauncidn. 

The close of armed conquest in the sixteenth century did not end 
European expansion. As in other empirea, the safety of the frontiers 
demanded advance ; nor was the condition of the Papal grant of the 
Indies, the conversion of the heathen, ever forgotten. The extension 
of royal pnwer over regions properly belonging to the Crown waa an 
undoubted duty and privilege; and the beneficence of this work waa 
& political and religious axiom. But a sincere and partly successful 
effort was made to cany on this work witliout violence or bloodshed. 
Philip III commanded that attacks upon the heathen should cease and 
Aat advance should only be made thenceforth by the peaceful persuasion 
of missionaries. Abstinence from armed aggression became so much 
an established maxim that, in 16K0, a junta of Bishops and Governors 
met in Tucumiin to discuss whether it was lawful to make offensive war 
on the Chaco Indians, who constantly raided the towns. The initiation 
of the policy of pacific advance is marked by the royal invitation to 
some Italian Jesuits to undertake the pacification of the savage country 
on the upper Parana. Thus began in lt)Od the famous missions in 
the province of Guairo, generally known as the misaions of Paraguay, 
although they were remote and politically separate from the earlier 
settlement round Asuncion, and most of them lay outside the present 
limits of the Paraguayan Republic- 
Many of tho <i uaranfs, a people practising a rude agricultiire but other- 
wise BavagCK, living in little groups in the woods, menaced on the north 
by ferocious cannibals and on the east by the Paulistas, lawless Hrazilian 
Blave-raiders, were now gathered into " reductions," each ruled by a Jesuit 
priest with one or two aasistants. After a destructive i-aid of Paulistaa 
in 1630 fire-arms were introduced, and a regular Indian militia, both 
cavalry and infantry, wits formed; these troops were repeatedly sent by 
their Jesuit chiefs to save tho towns of Corriontes, Santa F6, and Asun- 
oi6o from attacks of savages, and to help the Spanish troops of Buenos 



Ih 



270 



Jesuit (fovernnieni in Gitaira 



[lGOO-1767 



A ires against the Portuguese. In 1705 the King formally thanked them 
for their service against the infidels ; ami in the following year they 
assaulted and took with reckless daring the Portuguese fort of Colonia. 
This curious commonwealth of some thirty Indian villages, exempt from 
outfiide control, and administered by elected Indian oll5ctals under the 
admirable rule of the priests, was the most orderly, stable, and contented 
community south of the trupius. In 1740 their inliabitants numbered 
144,0U0: but they were reduced by epidemics, by mortality in the 
military service of the King, and by the results of an iniquitous treaty 
ceding seven of the reductions to the hated Portuguese, whereby those 
seven villages were driven into revolt, followed by destniction tlu-()ugh a 
Hispano-Portugunso military expedition ; at the expulsion of the Jesuits 
in 1767 they numbered 110,000. After that event the reductions were 
handed over to civil administrators and young regulars of other Orders 
who hurried to seize the houses, gardens, and orchards of the JesuiU, 
caring little for the Indians ; and the province gradually relapsed into 
depopulation and barbarism. 

These missions, though secluded from intrusion, were not secluded 
from oliservation ; they were jealously watched by the authorities of 
Asuncion. Their merit is proved by the inspections and reports of 
Governors and Bishops, by the lettera of Jesuits to one another, by 
the analogy of their work throughout the Indies, by the exaggerated 
or trivial character of the charges brought against them in 1767, and by 
the reports of two separate royal commissionora sent to Guaira after the 
expulsion, who contrast the former sidmirable system with the succeeding 
disorder. A remarkable testimony to the general merits of the Jesuits 
ia afforded by the petition of the "substitute" American deputies to 
the Cortes of 1810, who demanded, among otber reforms, the restoration 
of the Company in America. 

Not only in (iuaira but on almost every frontier the missionaries, 
especially the Jesuits, pushed forwai-d the dominions of the King and 
the Church ; in their repeated expeditions into the Chaco and otber 
savage parta many lives were lost with small visible results; but in 
the regions of the Orinoco and the Amazon large tracts were reduced. 
Industrious and orderly communities, cited as models by neighbouring 
civil Governors and containing thrice the population of the Guaira 
uiissious, were formed among the .Mojos and Chiquitos between the 
head watei-s of the Pamguay and Madeira rivers ; and in the eighteenth 
century some impression was made even upon the ferocity of the Chaco 
Indians and of the Chiriguanes to the east of Upper Peru. This 
religious conquast was also a great political system, ordered uud paid 
for by the King; the missions on reaching a certain stability and 
order were genei-ally erected into doctrinal or settled Indian parishes ; 
and the reductions became /iHf6?o», regular vilUiges liable to tribute and 
sometimes subject to the ordinary civil administratiou. 



1767-1810] 



The expulsion of the Jesuits 



271 



The expulsion of the Jesuits in 17*>7 was tbc greatest blow inflicted 
on the Indies sinee the Coiit|Ut;8t. In the ptubloH de Ei<f)aH<jh'» their 
colleges contained the ablest, most industrious and most orderly subjects 
of the King, historians^ naturalists, geographers, teachei-s, ministers to 
the sick and poor; on the frontiers Lliey were the best teachers and 
protectors of the natives aud the llru^est pillars of the monarchy. It 
was also a great shock to the missions and to European influence on the 
frontiers. The otlier Orders could not supply their place at once, nor 
had the newcomers 150 years of experience to guide them. A great part 
of the ground lost was never regained ; indeed some interior parts of 
South America were less known to white men in 1850 than in 17fiO ; 
but between 1770 and 1810 niuoh progress was made in California and 
in the Orinoco region. In both these regions, especially In California, 
where there were apprehensions of foreign intrusion, the missions 
were followed by a kind of skeleton military occupation consisting in 
preiidiot, small posts placed at wide intervals, each garrisoned by 
twenty or thirty horsemen, generally recruited among the frontier 
oow-boys. 

The missions had their defects. ^ometimeB the method of peaceful 
persuasion was varied by armed raids, the missionniies indulging the 
tribal instincts of their neophytes by leading tham against their heathen 
neighboure to carry off children to bo reared as Christians ; moreover, in 
the older aud moi-o tranquil missions, as in the lioctn'mjg formed out of 
them, there was often a tendency to the covetous and selfish administra- 
tion found elsewhere. Yet HninlxildL, after long travel in 1799-1800 
among the Orinoco missions, though linding many faults, sums up 
decidedly in favour of "the great and useful establishments of the 
American missions," controlling countries four or five times as large 
as France and forming a vast zone round the European dominions ; 
this estimate does not include the extensive missions of California and of 
the northern provinces of New Spain. It may safely be alleged that so 
vast A region of savagery liaa never elsewhere been pacified with so much 
patience and so little violence, and tliat an immense indefensible frontier 
has never won comparative security at so little cost of life and treasure. 

It has sometimes been said that there is little to tell concerning the 
Spanish Indies between conquest and independence, two exciting epochs 
which overshadow the intervening period. Yet the exploration aud 
conquest of the wilderness, the spread of geographical knowledge and 
of European influence, the study and treatment of savage peoples — 
that process which in other continents has fixed the attention of the 
world — cannot be quite uninteresting in South America, where for two 
centuries such work was pursued by the quiet enterprise of priests 
travelling in paii-s, often perishing by obscure but not unexpected 
deaths, which are only recorded in tlie annals of their Orders. But 



i 



272 Effeci of foreign -wars. Buccaneers [isoo-nis 

the dmra and trumpet also woke the coasts and islands of tlie Spanish 
Indies; in every Spanish war since loOO the Indies have played a 
part, sometimes a preponderating pjirt- The French, the Dutch, and 
tho Knglish. all seized insular fragments of this Einpii-e and repeatedly 
attempted acquisitions on the mainland with little success. Fi-om 
1521 French sailors preyed upon the returning ships ; in 153T Havana 
was robbed liy a French corsair, and in tho following twenty years 
was twice sacked and burnt; Santiago do Cuba and Cartagena suffered 
the same fate. The French were followed by Dutch and English 
6mugglei*8, slave-traders, and corsairs. The Sijaiiish main was re- 
peatedly scorned ; lirat Dmke. afterwards Cavendish, raided the Pacific, 
till then a Spanish lake ; but these raids, though they showed the way 
to othere, had little permanent effect in themselves. More ignoble but 
more lasting were the enterprises of the seventeenth century ; the French 
htiucantera or cattle-huntere of Santo Domingo, already lawless anil lialf- 
sftvage, being driven to piracy by Spanish hostility, were joined by 
Dutch, Portuguese, and English adventurers, a rascally community 
loosely held together by greed of booty and enmity to Spain. French 
settlements in the islands and the English capture of Jamaica in ItJoS 
gave them a secure footing and oflicial protectrion ; from the captm-e 
of island caiavels and the occasional cutting o£f of a treasure-ship 
they passed to organised war in considerable fleets, sacking the Spanish 
towns on islands and mainland with murder, torture, arson, and outmg©. 
In 1670 Henry Morgan crossed the Isthmus with two thousand men 
and burnt Panama. Hut in that same year the Treaty of Madrid, 
whereby Spain recognised existing English possessions, deprived the 
Knglish buccaneers of ofTicial protection. Some now became pirates in 
the Pacific, whither Dutch expeditions had j>receded them ; otheiB joined 
the French buccaneers, who rioted in the Caribbean Sea down to the 
Peace of Ilyswick: in 1683 they even sacked Vera Cruz, committing 
every kiiid of atrocity. 

The War of the Spanish Saccession (1702-13) opens with Benbow's 
unsuccessful expedition against Cartagena; the aims of the English 
ajipear in the secret treaty miide in 1707 with the Austrian cbiimant 
"King Charles HI of Spain," to the effect that a joint Anglo-Spanish 
Company should be formed to trade with the Indies, or, if this could 
not be done, that the English should be admitted to trade with the 
Indies, and that alt other foreigners, hut especially the French, should 
bo completely excluded. Apprehensions concerning F'rench commercial 
rivalry were natural, for the French not only held the atiento dt negros, 
hut were also allowed during the war to send " register ships" round 
Cape Horn, practically monopolising trade with Peru. 

In 1718 Philip Y obtained peace by granting to tho English the 
anento de negrot for thirty years and also the right to send annually one 
loaded ship of limited tonnage to a fair in Cartagena or Portobello or 



Verft Cruz. Aftor the peace efforts wero made to suppress smuggling'; 
but uothing could hinder the vast system of oontrabuid now developed 
by the English under cover of the alave-ttade and of the luifio de permuo. 
English slave-depots were establislied ia the principal ports; goods were 
iiitroductid under pretext of clothing and feeding the negroes; each 
de[>ot became a great store of smuggled nieroliandise ; slaves were no 
longer brought in large numbera to fixed ports, but small ships at odd 
times carried negroes from .lamnica to various destinations, every ship 
a smuggler. In the occasional fairs the navio de permieo was loaded 
far beyond the limit and wiis accompanied by smaller ships which 
anchored out of sight. Free from the enormous dues laid upon Spanish 
merchandise, the English were able to undersell the lawful importer and 
reduce the legal fair to a nullity. In this contraband trade the chief 
delinquents were the Spanish merchants receiving the goods and the 
customs oflicials who had good reason to connive ; the English merchants 
came to regard it as by prescription a legitimate and regular business; 
and much indignation arose when a Spanish coastguard fleet was 
organised which impeded the trade and pushed tlie right of search to 
its extreme limits. After long friction and mUL-h negotiation between 
the two Courts, Great Britain declared war in 1789. During this 
■war the smuggling from Jamaica still continued. A body of 2.50 
Spanish smugglers on the Isthmus foi-raed a little army, supplied with 
arras and ammunition by the Erjglish enemy, controlling the municipal 
elections of Panama, and regularly navigating the Pacific; on being 
attacked they built o wooden fort, hoisting tho English flag, and were 
only exterminated by a regular military expedition. The Indies were 
wholly unprepared for defiance; the garrisons and military stores of 
Cartagena and Caliao were in a ludicrous state of neglect ; and the two 
** frigates " constituting the armada of the South Sea were ancient and 
shapeless barges built by negroes at (luayaquil. Yet two British expe- 
ditions, attacking from the North and South Seas in order to join hands 
across tho Isthmus, failed; and the efforts of Vernon and Anson secured 
no adequate success- 

The peace of 1748 favoured an attempt at reform and control. 
Already, since the accesshm of the liucirbons, somfthing had been 
done, notwithstanding the difficulties of war; tried public servants, not 
necessarily great nobles, were appointed Viceroys ; and the establishment 
of the viceroyalty of New Gmnada relieved the unwieldy Government 
of Peru. Yet a secret report presented to Ferdinand VI in 1744 after 
nine years' residence in South America by the two young astronomci'S 
and naval officers, Ulloa and Juan, reveals astonishing scandals ; no 
enemy uould have produced by way of satire a more scathing exposure 
of incompetence, dishonesty, corruption, neglect, waste, oppfcssion of 
natives, and universal immorality, both political and domestic. There 
is some internal evidence of rhetorical exaggeration and of the impulsive 

C H. B. X. IB 



274 Re/ontui of the eighteenth century [174S-1800 

egoism of youthful critics; in any case a confidential report which 
notes faulta with a view to reform obviously cannot be taken as a 
complete historical account; yet almost evety article in the indictment 
is supported by independent authority. A serious effort at reform was 
now made. Tliout^h ihejtota to Vera Cruz was continued biennially, the 
galleons and the fair of Fortobello were abolished in 1748, the trade 
of Peru thenceforth passing in register shijis round the Horn; the 
remaining eiwomiendas were ordered to bo vested iu the Crown, 
a reform gradually accomplished during the following fifty years; 
parishes served by regular clergy were Ui be given to seculars as 
vacancies arose, a replacement necessarily slow but aclually realised. 
Under Charles III frosli vigour appears; the privilege of sanctuary was 
restricted; the appolutmeiit of a Minister for the Indies fiimplified the 
cumbrous supervision of the Council. The efficiency of the administra- 
tion was greatly increased by the establishment of separate Govenimenta 
in the outlying parts of New Si>ain and also in Kuenos Aires, erected 
in 1776 into a vicoro^'alty comprising everytliing east of the Andes 
from r^ake Titicaca to Patagonia, with an auiiiencia in the capital 
from 1706, besides that in La Plata. Venezuela had become a separate 
Government under a CupUiin-General in 1731. The institution of 
intetidenciaB (17S1-5;, the first great alteration in the system of govern- 
ment since 1580, tended generally to closer responsibility and better 
administration. The organisation of the militia after 1767 indicates 
considerable efficiency, a very large part of the white and mixed popu- 
lation being enrolled. The eagerness of the Creoles to get commissions 
iu this militia, their addiction to genealogies, aud the general respect 
paid to descendants of cotufuistaiioren, indicate a certain historic senti- 
ment of Spanish loyalty. About 1775 the conmdado of Mexico lent 
to the Viceroy for the reformation of the mint 2,000,000 pexo» without 
security or interest; and a mining magnate of Now Spain gave to the 
King two full-rigged ships of the line, and lent him a million pe»o» 
without interest. 

One curious phase of tliis reform was an attempt to reduce into 
settlements the scattered white men of the frontiers, mountaineers, 
woodmen, ai;d shepherd -horsemen, detached from law and government ; 
a constant concern about the uncontrolled and vagabond character of 
these pioneei-8 of European intluence particularly marks the official view 
of expansion. Rut natural opportunity and the pastoral habita of 
Spaniards overcame regulation ; the ranchero» or frontier horsemen of 
New Spain, perpetually warring with savage Apaches and CumancheSt 
the Venezuelan UaneroH or horsemen of the plains, of mixed European, 
African, and Indian origin, the gauehoB of Ruenos Aires, many of them 
of pure European race, but half Indianised by a Ijarbaroua life and 
savage warfare, independent of all the world with a hoi-se, a lazo, and 
a knife, and the somewhat similar but loss savage huaaoa of Chile, are 



characteristic products of Spanish settlement. Rut sometliing was now 
done towards the suppression of violeut crime and the regulation of the 
frontiers. 

The great increase of trade enjoyed by Havana during the thii'teea 
months of British occupation in 1762-^ probably suggested a loosening 
of the shackles npon commerce. Krora 1704 niail-boaUs partly laden with, 
merchandise sailed from Corunnato the West Indies every month and to 
Buenofi Aires every two months ; in the following year trade with the 
Antilles wus opened to nine Spanish porta. This led to auch an increase 
of trade and of customs-dues that further concessions folIowe<l; from 
17T4 t!ic kingdoms of the Indies wore allowed to trade freely with one 
another. Finally in 1778 this privilege was extended to Spain, all 
St>aiiiai'ds being allowed to trade with any American port; efforts were 
made to link the chief towns with the coast by roads, a work hitherto 
neglected partly on the ground that roads facilitate invasion. Contula- 
doa were established in many capitals, replacing the deputies of the 
central consulado of Lima or of JMexico. Chambers of raining, supported 
from the public revenue, were instituted in Peru and Now Spain. 

But the reform of government Involved great coet and aiuch discon* 
tent among the Creoles : the tightening of authority was not welcomed, 
and still less the greater strictne^H in collecting old Ut-xes and thu im- 
position of new ones. In the British war of 1762-3 the temporary loss 
of Havana and Manila and oven the subsequent cession of the detached 
settlements in Florida were unimportant, except for the heavy fiiiaacial 
burden following the war and causing some sporadic unrest. The war of 
m^-H% undertaken by Charles III in support of the English-American 
colonists, indirectly shook the allegiance of some ot his own American 
subjects by pressure of taxation. The government monopolies of to- 
bacco and Hpirittj established in 1753 were now everywhere enforced, 
and many tobacco plantations were ordered to be destroyed. At Socorro 
in New Granada some malcontents revolted in 1780, assuming the name 
of comuncrony and ofifered the throne of New Granada to th& oidor vainly 
sent against them with a small force ; 1.^,000 men were soon under arms, 
demanding the abolition of the tobacco nionopnly and of certain taxes. 
They were pacified by concession of their demands; but, fresh disturb- 
ances arising, the leaders were arrested and the agreement wiis repudi- 
ated \yy the Viceroy. It is significant that, although the leaders invited 
the Indians in proclamations which talked of Tupac Amaru and of 
Peruvian independence, some Indians who joined the revolt were not 
welcomed ; the movement was practically confined to the commonwealth 
of Spaniards. In 1784 two agents of the mmimeros visited England in 
hopes of getting arms and support ; and the Spanish ambassador in 
London reported to his Government that they were believed to have had 
an interview with one of the Ministry. 

This mbvemeut and other smaller disturbances occurred at a critical 



i 



epoch. The successful revolt of the Bng-lish Colonies in North America 
was fyllowed hy a larger intercourse with foreigners and tlie partial 
infiltrntioii of Liberal and revolutionary ideas; a nervous apprehension 
in the Government showed itself in a ludicrous crusade against sus- 
pected books, in a new dread of education in the Indies, and in iwHticiil 
imprisonments. Tlie outbreak of the French Revolution naturally in- 
creased the political excitement among a section of educated Creoles 
and abo the suspicious activity of the authorities. The two generations 
which comprised the movement of oflficial reform and stricter administra- 
tion had also brought development in the cliaracter and attitude of the 
white or mixed population. A brief opening of Pacific trade to the 
French during the latter part of the war of 1739-48 had attracted some 
French wettlers to Chile, introducing an externtd iiiHuence greater than 
their mere numbers might seem to carry. The Peninsula sent an in- 
creasing number of immigrants, especially vigoraus and stubborn settlers 
from the Bosque provinces. After 1780 the word " colony " came into 
use^ doubtless borrowed from abroad, but perhaps implying a new 
theory and a recognition of changi;d conditions. The people were 
acquiring a new political self -consciousness since the time when in 
1702-13 the Indies had tranquilly awaited the issue of a dynastio 
struggle in Spain. 

The French war of 1793-6 and the British war of 179(>-1801 brought 
with them fresh financial burdens, especially repeated donativot ; the 
latter war aUo brought the plague of cruisers and privateers and the in- 
terruption of communication with Spain, leading to trade with neutrals 
and oven with the enemy ; for during this tjnerra de compadres, or war 
of comrades, numbera of Spanish ships under their own colours traded 
between the mainland and the British West Indies, carrying licences 
signed by British officers. Venezuela was most exposed to external in- 
fluence through communication with the United States, with Trinidad 
and Jamaica, and with Santo Domingo, once the metropolis of the Spanish 
Indies but now emerging from French rule into a stormy independence. 

In 1797 some European Spaniards confined in La Guaira for a 
revolutiouaiy attempt in Spain organised a conspiracy which drew in 
ftbont seventy inhabitants of that port, among them several officials, 
one of whom, Espana, htm given bis name to the movement. But the 
attempt found little general support ; most nf the Creoles, especially the 
landowners and cattle-mas tern, were conservative or indifferent; and to 
skilled foreign observers the Spanish monarchy still appeared unshaken. 
Although many now preferred to call themselves Americans rather than 
Creoles, the term Egpafloiet still included all the white population of the 
Indies ; and it was not until the outbreak of the i-evolutionary war that 
the terms Americans and Spaniards came to be used in opposition. 

At the opening of the nineteenth century the dominions of the 
Spanish monarchy extended through seventy-nine degrees of latitude. 



from Saa Francisco to Chiloe; in the extreme north and south the line 
was thin, but it was unbroken ; and the Castilian language was spoken 
through a distance equal to the luugth of Afiica. Over a great part of 
twocontinentsaheterogeneousjiopulatiou were not unwilling vassftlsuf the 
Spanish Crown ; whateverintornal reasons raayhaveexiatedforrevolution, 
the actual impetus came from without, for it was only upon the fall of 
tite Spanish monarchy in the Peninsula thai those American dominions 
were detached ; indeed it would be almost aa true to say that Spain fell 
away from the Indies as to say that the Indies fell away from Spain. 

Spanish rub in America is often regarded as a gigantic and short- 
lived mistake ; but in fact its long continuance is only less noteworthy 
than its vast extent and the gradual diffusion of Sjianish ideas and ways 
through that extent. Ono aspect of that rule is remarkable ; from 
the middle of tho sixteenth century the dominant note of the Spanish 
dominion is peace, a peace unknown in those regions before or after the 
Spanish era. Indian warfare, though serious enough to those inhabiting 
the threatened regions, was trivial compared to some disturbances of the 
J*ax Brilannica in the nineteenth century ; no external enemy ever 
penetrated more than a few leagues from the coast ; the army in Spanish 
Araorica was little more than n coastguard and a military police on some 
of the frontiers. If there la something of Oriental immobility in this 
long and peaceful continuance, there is also something of Latin stability 
and permanencu both in lowd methods and in general result. S|>ain 
in America inherited and preserved something of the majesty of the 
Roman Peace. 

In discussing the often-repeated accusation of Spanish oppression, it 
is noctissary to deiine what snrt of oppression ta meant : whether oppression 
of the Indians by the whites, or oppression of tho whites by tlie Spanish 
GoTemmont. If the former is meant, then the Creoles were as guilty as 
the Knropeans, and Ixjth were more guilty than the Spanish Government 
and its immediate represeutatives. If the latter, the resti-aiat of the whites 
was in fact the measure of protection enjoyed by the natives ; free immigra. 
tion and large autonomy granted to European settlers would have meant 
extermination or enslavement. Butthetheoryof a universal cnntrol which 
should foster both " commonwealths " and protect tho weaker was largely 
ineffective ; and in this failure lay tho troubles of the Indians. The 
difficulty of tho task is illustrated by the various judgments passed upon 
the work of the Spaniards. Some critics accuse thum of oppression ; 
others find that they solved the problem of the European attitude to 
conquered aliens ; while a modern historian blames the folly of Spain in 
striving to preserve luferiur peoples, and commends as natural and sensible 
the Anglo-American method of extermination. 

Accordingly, in dlscassing tho merits of tho Government towards the 
whites it should be cleai'ly grasped that colonisation in the usual sense 
was not intended by the Spanish Crown nor apparently desired by the 



Spanish people ; it is only permissible to blarae ihe Government for not 
encouraging colomsatton if the fact is facud that such eucoui-agcinent 
woulil havo moaiit the disappearance or complete enslavement of the 
natives. Nevertheless, althougli restraint of immigration and control of 
settlers were neccasary for the preservatiuti of the "commonwealth" of 
Indians, the whitos had diatijict giievances resembling those which 
weighed upon Spaiiiai-da in the Peninsula, espct:ially the slow and 
uncertain course of justice which left prisoners for years untried ia gaol, 
an extravagant and wasteful system uf ti^xatiuii, and a narrow resU-Jction 
of trade, accompanied by heavy imposts ; but the general rigour of 
Govern inotit was tempted by the discretion of rulers, while an over- 
active or troublesome Governor could bo removed by his subordinates or 
by a popular movement, generally withimpunity. The usual exclusion of 
Creoles from the highest posts was a grievanee ; but both its extent and 
its significance were much exaggerated during the struggle for iadepeud- 
ence, since a very large number of subtirdiuate posts some of them 
commanding large influence and dignity, were usually held by Creoles. 
In fact, almost all the revolutionary leaders were connected with the 
royal service through posts held cither by themselves or by their fathers. 
In Chile and in Buenos Aires the earlier stages of the revolution were 
largely directed by two Creole lawyers educated in Spain, of whom one, 
Rosas, was legal assessor to the Governor of Chile, the other, Belgrauo, 
was secretary of the consulado of lluenos Aires. 

The severest crities of the Spanish dominion have been Spaniards, 
among whom a multitude of reformers denounce abuses, plead for the 
injured, and urge remedies; on the other hand its praise comes rather 
from foreigners. Vancouver in 1795 is no less unstinted in praise than 
Kichard Hawkins, prisoner in the Indies in 1594; observers such as 
Hnmbfildt and Depons, Instonaus suoh as Robertson, Helps, and 
Bancroft, thii'iigh unsparing in criticism and in the recital of damaging 
factJi, nevertheless leave the reader with a sense of sympathy and 
admiration. The facts demand some explanation ; here was an empire 
which, by the testimony of its own administrators, was honeycombed 
with continuous decay in all directions ; yet this empire survived re- 
peated external shocks, continually extended its influence, and after three 
centuries evoked the admiration of foreign observers. This vitality is 
not explained by the theoretic system of administration, nor yet by the 
practical neglect uf that system. Perha[M the explanation may partly 
be found in personal character ; for, the cumbi-ous liiauhiiiy of Govern- 
ment being used by officials and settlers as much or as little as they 
chose, matters were moulded in kingdoms and provinces by the character 
and wishes of Viceroys, Governors, ajid (HtloreJitin districts and parishes 
by those of Corregidoreu, €ura%, and Caciqutt. Examples constantly 
recur of admirable and loyal service, which has something Oriental in its 
simplicity and self-abandonment ; in emergencies the presence of one 




capable leader counterbalances all vices. Aj^in» the undefinable Spanish 
quality of hidalguta, wliich uuiniated the better part of the community, 
especially in New Spain* showed itself in a noble charity and hospitality, 
a liberal and careless use of wealth, imliffereiice to material results, and 
an old-fashioned uncaloulating loyalty, somelime:^ almost fautostic- 

There is something medieval in the Sjmnish dominion down to its 
close ; the Middle Ages supply the best parallel to its apparent incon- 
sistencies — high ideals and shameful victjs, tender humanityandshockiug 
feroeity. thoughtful provision and actual neglect, cult of formulas and 
indifference to facts, exaltation of ceremonial faith and shameless 
pi-ofligacy, a theory of all-jKirvading sovereignty and acquiescence in 
constant breaches of that sovereignty. The first Bourbon King in 1708 
impresses upon his Governors the conditions upon which Alexander VI 
granted the Indies to tho Catholic sovereigns ; in the age of the French 
lievolutioa the conversion of the ijentiU,» Is still the constant care of 
Kumpean Ministers and proconsuls; in the legal code reprinted in 
Madrid in 1791 the llrat law concerning the Indians is the testament of 
Isabel la CntdUca; the crude medieval note is almost startling Jn the 
formula whiL-li in the nineteenth century still summarised public duty, 
" the service of Hoth Majesties." This comparison with the medieval 
spirit may help to explain the strength of the Spanish sovereignty, a 
strength which lay perhaps more in the region of idciis than in that of 
facts; the service of God and the King was a comprehensive guido, 
appealing with diverse signihcunce to a Ca^tilian dnko or an Indian 
neophyte ; and, if to most men a trite counsel of perfection was meaning- 
less, still there were some to whom tlio most single zeal and devotion in 
Chui-ch or State was a matter of course, a duty performed \vjth tho 
utmost simplicity and indifference to reward. The " preservation of the 
two commonwealths of Spaniards and of Indians " was a matter of 
extreme difficulty, only attainable by the pursuit of an idea through 
all inij)erfections and by submission to religious restraint. In the 
Spaniard extremes meet; but the apparent eontnists are not due to any 
complexity iu Spanish character, but rather to its simplicity, a simplicity 
which follows with equal facility tho most diverse impulses and motives. 
During ages of weakness, poverty, and misgovernment in Spain itself, a 
Spanish character was impressed upon half of the New World; this 
has been done partly by la^vs and government, but much more by the 
genius of the Spanish nation, a genius which has been best lQt«rpret«d 
by the author of D&n Quixote. 



CHAPTER rX 

THE ESTABLISHifENT OF rNBEPEXDENCE Di 
SPANISH AMERICA 



Ai.THOCGH the example of successful colonial inaurrection in North 
Aioerita bad little immediate effect in South America, a link between 
north and Houlh is perhaps lu be found in Fmnciiico Miranda, a Spanish 
ollicor born in Caracan, who la said to have served with Washington and 
I^tifiiyyite. Leaving the Spanish army, he visited the L'nited States in 
17Hr», to cliiwufta with VVashingtou plans of South American emancipation. 
A fierwarda, travelling in ICurnpe,he wasreceived^with attention by Princes 
and MiniHlers and Morvcd as a genera! in the French revolutionary army. 
Hetwoen 1790 and 180(3 he urgud in turn upon France, (ireat Britain, 
and the United Status, a& each in succession was involved in disputes 
or war mth Spain, an expedition ty aid revolt in the Indies. In 17y6-8, 
PItt'H (iovernment contemplated extensive operations against South 
America ; and the Governor of Trinidad issued a pi-oclamation promising 
in case of resistance to Spanish Governors "all the succour to be expected, 
bo it with forces or with arms and ammunition." But the oocaaioii passed, 
partly because President Adams was unwilling to co-oj)crute, although 
ALtixander Hamilton, expecting to command an expedition, wrote to 
Miraticla. " the plan ought to be a Beet of Great Britain and an army 
lit' the United States." Meantime Miranda, while living in London and 
iinpnrtnning Ministers, was organising Uepublican secret sociotieJi among 
Sjifinish- Americans living in Spain and England; thus the gospel of 
emancipation, scarcely heard in the Indies, was l)eing propagated in 
I-auoiKJ ; from Kuro(je were to come almost ;dl the leaders as well as 
the ideas which guided the stniggle. In 1804-5 hostilities between 
Groat Britain and Spain seemed to bring Miranda's opportunity ; 
he bad repeated interviews with Melville, and with Sir Home Popham, 
who was to command a squadron to support him ; steps were taken with 
a view to an attack on Buenos Aires, and large operations were con- 
templated ; but in July, 180n, Pitt suspended the project, being at that 
time in hope of detaching Spain from France by means of the coalition 
then in course of formation, though ho intended to resume the schemu 

2^ 



in case of failure. Next year Mii-anda with 200 men sailed from Xew 
York with the knowledge of Jeffer^son aad Madison, and attempted 
without success a dcsceut upon the Vcuoauelan coast. Startinj^ again 
from Trijiidad and supported by the British Adminil of the West India 
Station, ho landed near Coro ; but, meeting' no welcome from the in- 
habitants and losing the support of the Adminil upon erroneous news 
of peace negotiatioim, ho abandoned the attempt. 

Meantime Pupluim, as noted in a previous volume, sailed from Cape 
Town without orders against the River Plate, caiTjdng ICiOO troops 
under Borcsford, who in June, 180G, mnrehod unresisted into Ruenoa 
Aires, an unwalled town of 50,000 inhabitants. On his approach the 
Viceroy fled helplessly to r<5rdoba, thereby in some sort alHlicating 
Spanish authority in tlie capital. lieresford, instead of pi^oclaiming in- 
dependence* named himself Governor, exacting from all odicials an oath 
of allegiance to the British Crown . But in six wueks he was overpowered 
and compelled to surrender by the townspeople, aided by a relief force 
which had been org-.ini:ied in the Banda Oriental by a naval officer 
named Liniers, acting in concert with the Cahildo nf Buenos Aires. 
This victory achieved by the people was followed by political action; 
the Cahildo^ to satisfy the popular demand, summonod the magistrates 
and chief vecino9 to a Junta, which entrusted the Government to Liniers, 
deposing the V'icei oy . Liniers was afterwards formally appointed Viceroy 
by the King. 

Further British o]wrations in 1807, also noted elsewhere, resulted, 
fiiKt, in the capture of the fortified town of Montevideo, but afterwards 
in the capitulation of Whitclocke at Buenos Aires and tlie retrocession 
of Montevideo. In spite of this disaster, an army of 10,000 men was 
assembled at Cork to act against Spanish America, probably by way 
of the Gulf of Mexico, under Sir Arthur Wellesley; but peace with 
Spain in 1808 caused the expedition to be diverted to the Peninsula. 
The avowed motive of Pitt's designs had been the opening of markets 
to British trade ; in fact British policy towards Spanish America was 
commercial rather tlian imperial ; but in 1806-7 Ministers appear to 
have been carried away into schemes of conquest by Popham's raid. 

Although no single step in the defence and reorganisation of liuenos 
Aires was entirely without precedent, this striking series of military and 
political events might almost seem to constitute a revolutionary de- 
velopment. The King's repre-sentativo had been set aside : invaaion had 
been twice rei>eUed; capitulations had been arranged; and Government 
had been reconstituted —largely thrnngh municipal and popular action. 
Opinion had been educated not only by internal movements, but also 
by external influence and example; for, during the seven months of 
British government in Montevideo, the first newspaper of the River 
Plate was there published in Spanish and English ; an active trade 
was carried on, the bay being crowded with British shipping and the 



people hurrying from distant Andine provinces to make their purchases 
Ijefare the evacuation ; muoh was done by the English to spreiid Libiiral 
notions of trade and of poUties. Moreovei'. aUhoutrh siliupance in tho 
cities was unshaken, many of the lawless inhabitants of the plains had ^ 
received with exultation the news of tho firet British invasion and of the ™ 
collapse of authority. On the other huud^ the Creole batt:ilion8 of 
citizen soldiers organised to resist tho English had not been {lisbandcd, ^ 
and the people were flushed with victory over a powerful invader. Some I 
modification of government was inevitable and h.id in fact been already 
initiated on the spot. Althongh the notion of independence waa as yet 
only silently nui-scd by a few theorists, tho lunteriahi of revolutionary 
thought and action had been prepared. Moreover, these events had 
been watched with eager interest thi*oughout South .\merica, especially 
in Chile, whence money had becu sent to aid resistance to the English. 
And it was largely owing to these preliminary niovRmentfi that, when 
the occpision came, Buenos Aires wsis able to achieve her independence 
by a peaceable and uninterrupted process, and that her forces were thus 
sot free to aid tho emancipation of (^hilo and to prosecute Uii^a 
strategical and political designs fur beyond the River Plate region. 

In 1H08 tho ground had been thus prepared in the sonthom continent, 
when the collapse of the Sjjanish rnouai-ehy initiated a long series of 
disorders and struggles in the Spanish kingdoms on both sides of the 
Atlantic. During the events which led to the establishment of Joseph 
Bonaparte in Madrid as King (1808), provincial Juntas sprang up in 
several Spanish cities ; in May the Junta of Asturias declared war 
against the French; the Junta of Seville with some success claimed 
supreme authority over Spain and the Indies. Within twenty days of 
his arrival, Josephfledfrom Madrid before Spanish armies. In September, 
a Central Junta of deputies from the provincial Iwdies met at Madrid; 
but in two mouths it was flying southwards, while Napoleon entered tho 
capital and restored -Tose-pli. The Central Junta in December, 1808^ 
united with the Seville Junta to form one body, which sat in that city 
for fourteen months, sinking lower in discredit while French armies 
overran Spain ; in Januarj*, 1810, the Junta, escaping to Cadiz, resigned, 
appointing a Regency of five to arrange for Cortes representing Spain 
and America; a deputy was to be chosen by the Governor and CahUdo 
of every American capital; but, pending their arrival, thcii- seats were 
to be occupied by .\mericans who happened to be in Cadiz. The Cortes, 
meeting in September, 1810. appointed as Executive a Regency of three ; 
in 1812 a Liberal Constitution waa prnirtulgated which subsisted till 1814, 
when Ferdinand, restored to tho throne, dismissed the Cortes and estab- 
lished absolutism: this system lasted till 1820, when the army destined 
for tho reconquest of America revolted and aided in restoring the Con- 
stitution of 1812. Amidst much disorder and some armed strife the 
Constitution stood, until in 1823 a French army entered Spain and 




1808-24 Spanish A7nerien, Ferdinand VFI and Joseph 283 

restored the absolute monarchy to its career of tyranny. During these 
vicissitudes South American emancipation whs achieved. 

Thus the fifteen years of struggle, revolt, and constitutional effort 
in America (1809-24) wore years of revolutions and constitutional effort 
in Spain; in fact, the revolution of America was worked out on both 
sides of the Atlauti«j. It was begun, not by a doHl»tmto revolt against 
Spain, but by au attempt to repair or replace the fallen monarchy. 
First, the monarchy which was the only constitutional link between 
Simiu and America disappeared: then Spain herself seemed to disappear, 
and tlie kingdoms uf the Indies felt themselves to stand alone, and 
attempted to provide for their own government. In so doing they 
found themselves in conflict with Spanish Governors and Peninsular 
authorities : the result of that conflict was separation. 

On the abdication of Charles IV in 1808, Ferdinand VII was pro- 
olatmed King in every Spanish -American capital with universal applause. 
Presently — in some places even before his proclanmtiou — French erais* 
Banes arrived with letters from the Minister and Council of the Indies^an- 
nouDoing the abdication of Ferdinand and the confirmation of all actual 
Governors and officials by Joseph, the new King. The news was every- 
where received with cries of \^va FfnianJo Sfpthno and with a burst of 
indignation at this French insult to the nation. Next came letters from 
the Juntas of Asturias and of Seville, each claiming to be a natioital 
Government and asking contributions to the defence of the mtilhor- 
country. Tlie national resistance was greeted with enthusiasm ; the 
offers of Princess Carlota of llrazil, sister of Ferdinand, to arrange for 
the provisional government of the Indies, met with no response; but 
donativoa poured in, and large sums were remitted to Spain. Thus, the 
first act of disobedience to the Council of the Indies was a revolt against 
the French intrudera; in the coureo of three years it was gradually 
turned into a revolt against Spanish authority by the force of circum- 
stances, by the agitation of a few separatist politicians, but most of 
all hy the unsympathetic or hostile attitude of the colonial Governors 
and of the successively improvised Governments of Spain. Joseph's 
confirmation brouglit suspicion upon the existing Governors, who were 
gener.iUy more inclined to await events than to lead or follow the 
popular movement. At Caracas the difference between the popular 
and the official attitude was emphasised by the arrival at La Guaira 
of a British frigate, announeint; the Anglo-Spanish alliance agiunst 
Napoleon, just after a French frigate had bi-ought news of King Joseph's 
accession. The Governor officially received the French captain and 
refused the demand of the English commander that the French frigate 
should be seized or given up to liira. On the other hand the Englishman 
was received with enthusiasm by the populace, who were only prevented 
by an armed guard from murdering Uie Frenchman in the streets. 



In the general tension and uncertainty a profound effect was pro- 
duced over the whole continent by a few sporadic disturbances, confined 
to limitod areas and apparently of Uttla importance in themselves. In 
Angust, ISOUf the andiencia of La Fiata in Upper Peru, after a long 
dispute with the Governor, deposed him and assumed his functions. 
This act of a royal Court, consisting uf European magistrates, and 
historically the strongest pillar of Spanish authority, followed many 
precedents and was haiilly unconstitutional ; under normal conditions it 
would have merely produced an interminable written " process,"' passing 
into oblivion with the royal appointment of a new Governor. Hut 
under existing conditions it meant a revolution ; and the neighbouring 
city of La Vnz^ catching the infection, proclaimed autonomy. A Creole 
otiioer conimisaioned from Lima snppressLMi and rigorouslvchaatised these 
disturbances. But the movement in Quito, although it was rather 
personal than constitutional in origin, had more significance and wider 
inQuence, both on account of the distinct statement of those motives of 
revolution which were afterwards everywhere professed, and also en 
account of the shock produced throughout the Spanish Kmpire by its 
tragic issue. In August, 1809, a group of citizens of Quito, constituting 
themselves into a Sovereign Junta, deposed the Governor and assumed 
his authority, alleging "the examp]« of our transatlantic brothei-s, the 
present unsettled state of Spain, the annihilation of the lawfully con- 
stituted authorities," and the danger of passing under French dominion. 
Troops sent by the Viceroys fram north and south found tlmt the 
movement hud already collapsed ; but the leaders, notwithstanding a 
previous promise of pardon, were imprisoned, and a year later were 
murdered during a riot in which many citizens were killed by soldiers. 
A new Junta was then formed under the presidency of the Governor, 
a Spanish nobleman aged eighty years, who had served the King in the 
Indies for forty years : in December, 1810, he was a second time deposed. 
Having retired to a convent, he was dragged thence by a mob and 
muidered in the streets. 

These and other confused local conflicts, although their general 
effect has been universally recognised, may seem rather to obsouro than 
to introduce the succeeding movements. But the course of events in 
Spain has a more obvious significance. In January, 1810, the Central 
Junta, before dissolving in Cadiz, issued a proclamation inviting the 
Indies to send deputies to the Cortes in the following terms : " You are 
no longer what you were, bowed beneath a yoke harder in proportion 
to your distance from the centre of power, regarded with indifference, 
vexed by gi-eed, and destroyed by ignoninee. After nominating your 
deputies, your destinies will no longer depend upon Ministers or Viceroys 
or Governors; they are in your own hands." This curious incitement 
to revolution reached .America ttigether with news, still more eloquent, 
that the Central Junta had dispersed and that the French had overrun 




1808-10] 



The revolution in Buenos Aires 



285 



Andalusia; already opinion had been prepared bj theorists, arguing that 
with the moniirchy all external authority had fallen, and that the self-styled 
ralers in Spain were merely intruders ; now, they argued, " Spain is loBt 
. . . tliere is no more Spain." Between April and .hily, 1810, hU over 
South America the principal municipalities, usually by means of cabildo 
abierto, and sometimeB under the presidency of royal Governors, soon to 
be displaced, formed Juntas to " preserve the authority of Ferdinand VII." 
Of the nnmerona councils thus formed the most important were those of 
Bogota, Cartagena, Caracas, Santiago de Chile, and Buenos Aires, which 
either themselves grew into revolutionary Governments or appointed 
supreme executive authorities. But only in Buenns Aires was the work 
uninterrupted ; and therefore it seems advisable to narrate first the only 
revolution whose course was continuous and free from external checks, 
and thus to provide an example, which is also a comiaeutar}' upon the 
Taried struggles of other provinces. 

On the news of the King's abdication, hia son Ferdinand was pro- 
claimed in Buenos Aires amidst a burst of indignation at Napoleon's 
pretensions. The offer of Princess Carlota of Brazil, Ferdinand's sister, 
to undertake provisionally the protectorate of the River Plate, was 
rejected ; and tlie message of the Seville Junta announcing the forma- 
tion of a national Government in the King's name was received with 
enthusiasm. Elio. the ultra-i-oyalist Governor of Montevideo, who 
afterwards perished in defence of absolutism in Spain, suspecting 
I,iniers, who was French by birth, of Uikewarmness, refused oljedience 
to the Viceroy and summoned a royalist Junta in Montevideo; the 
Cabiltio of Buenos Aires thereupon deposed Liniers, who was promptly 
reinstated by the new Creole battalions. Communications were broken 
off between these two cities, which, though both loudly proclaiming 
the same King, wore thus brought to a state of jia.'*sive hostility by 
the collapse of monarchy in Spain. The Central Junta of Seville in 
a manner sanctioned sedition by continuing Elio in command, thereby 
approving his independent attitude. 

The confusion of authority in Spain and in the Indies — the claims 
of Ferdinand, of Joseph, of Carlota, of the Sevilla Junta, the new and 
vague activities of the Cabildo, of the citizens, and of the victorious Creole 
battalions, the doubtful attitude and source of viceregal command — 
favoured the objects of a small group of men educated in Kuropo during 
the revolutionary period, who ^vere quietly working for independence ; and * 
thus, when Admiral Cisneros. a veteran of Trafalgar, arrivi-d as Viceroy 
appointed by the Central Junta, he found that in the viceroyalty, as 
in Spain, administration was passing from the hands of ofRcials to those 
of semi-municipal, scini-popular bodies. In fact, owing to the absence 
of external shocks and the greater vigour of the CViAtVrfo*, this evolution 
was more tranquil and in a sense more constitutional than in Spain, 
every step following precedents which badioyalsanction. CisneroshimseU 



286 Tiie example of Buenos Aires followed [1B0»-14 

was compelled by fiuancIaJ difficultiee to act as head of an antonomonE 
State iu admitting neutral ta»de. CircumstanceE and even Uie neoefisarr 
actions of devoted i-oyaliste were separating Spain from America; tbe 
orj' of I^ftf Fentando might cover the most oontrary opinions ; and. but 
iot sentiment and Imbit, there was no reason why a Viceroy appointed 
by a Junta in Seville, which was partly municipal, partly elected, and 
partly self-conntituted, tihould not be controlled or deposed by a sunilar 
Jundi in ituenos Aires. 

In these imstaUe conditions, tbe small party having the most definite 
and logical aim held strong ground ; and tbey were aided by eventR. 
In 18t*i* iu:\\'6 came of tbe revolutionan- movements in Upi»er Peru and 
in Quito : and Spain seemed to be binking under an overwhelming 
wave of Kjencb invasion- The Cahildo of Buenos Aires, now eq^lallT 
divided between Euroijeanj?^ and AmericanB, was the only effective 
Government, guided bowever Ijj' a jt^mall secret society of separatistB. 
Tbe commander of tlie Creole battaliOTS^^pproached by these men, 
promised to declare for indejjeudence ujxin the cajjture of Seville by the 
French- That event was announ<;ed in May, 1810, whereupon a ealildo 
oAiertQ decided that tbe C<iOildo should apjwint a governing Junta, 
on the gi'outid that Sjjain was submerged and that on the fall of the 
monarchy the ix>wer ]>a*>ed to the people. Cisneros was required t\> 
resign ; and on May 2fj a triumvirate of reiolutionaiy tendencies was 
appointed "to preserve the integrity of these parts of his American 
dominions to our beloved sovereign Ferdinand VII and his suc-cessors."*' 
Thus was effected the Moodless revolution of Buenos Aires., which at 
this point jjasses fjom the municijjal stage to the more difScolt task 
of forming a State, U) be treated later. 

Most of the interior provinces, though without any definite scheme 
of common action^ followed the lead of tbe capital. Liniets, leading a 
reactionary movement iii (.(Srdoba, was captured bya volunteer expedition 
from Huenos Aires and banged. But tbe attempt to unite tbe whole 
viceroyalty failed ; an Argentine eifiedition, offering to Paraguay in 
tbe name of Ferdinand VII independence and onion with Buenos Aires, 
found that the Paraguayan leaders bad virtually achieved independence 
and tltat tbey declined union. Elio, now named Viceroy by the Spanish 
Regency, still held Montevideo, which at last yielded to Argentine attack 
in 1814; but some local movements in the Banda Oriental, the pro- 
evince wliose capital is Montevideo, and a Brazilian invasion, withdrawn 
through British influence, indicated that union with Buenos Aires was 
doubtful. Upi>er Peru, invaded by Argentine forces as belon^g to 
their viceroyalty, was successfully defended by tbe Peruvian Viceroy 
with American troops and generals (1811-2); but on tbe other hand 
TucumAn was defended against royalist invasion from Peru. The theory 
of allegiance to a dethroned and captive King who had never reigned, 
although sincerely held by the great majority, could not long survive 



war against two Viceroys and the ho-stilit}' of every successive Govern- 
ment in Sj^iain. lu 1818 the royal syinbols were ditiiiscd; hut It was 
not until 1816 that a Congress at Tucuman proclaimed tlie indepeud- 
enceof the Argentine Provinces. In the following year this independence 
was securud by an expedition itiLu Chile which defeated the Peruvian 
royalists on the Pacific slope of the Aadea aud thus redeemed failure in 
Upper Pern. Tliis external action demands mention !iere, becnnsc it 
was the logical outcome and necessary safeguard of the Argentine revolu- 
tion, securing it against external molestation or recontjuest. In -.i hirger 
historical sense, however, this movement does not belong to Aigentiuo 
history but rather opens a fresh phaso of the struggle, initiating that 
regressive advance against royalisin in America in which every pjirt of 
the Continent w;ia concerned. Its couwe will therefore be traced later 
as part of the continental war. 

While the River Plate region was thus gradually achieving a 
revolution, confused indeed by domestic problems and disputes, but 
undisturbed by any external troubles beyond tlio need of frontier 
defence, the movement in other capitals had passed from the municipal 
stage into various phases of armed conllict between royalists and 
insurgents, as well as between contending parties and leaders among 
the insurgents themselves, lu 1811-2 revolutionary Governments were 
formed in Chile and also in the north of the Contiaeut; but, failing 
to win general popular adhesion, they all succumbed during the years 
1814-5 before the forces of royalism or reaction. It is impossible 
to give a lucid summary of these multifarious movements from 1811 
to the critical lulervjil of 181&-0, with all their vicissitudes of local 
ebullitions, wide-spread insuiTections and reactions, attemptii at govern- 
ment, sangiunary defeats, and collapse of newly-risen despots, oligarchies, 
councils, and congresses. Hut an attempt must be made U) follow the 
main conrse of events in those centres from which the Goveitimenta 
of inde|>endent States ultimately emerged. 

In Chile the earlier development, which began in 1808 with a reform 
of the Calitdo of Santiago by co-operation between the Governor, Colonel 
Garcia Carrasco, and the ciUzena, and culminated in the deposition of 
that (rovernor (August, 1810), wa« more tranquil than the movement in 
Buenos Aires and more typical of the orderly and quasi-constitutional use 
of Spanish institutions. The .lunta of Santiago went so far as to convene 
in tSll a Chilian Congress which appointed an executive triumvinite ; 
but this parliamentary effort produced, as in every similar case, disorder 
aud confusion, complicated byjealousics between Santiago and Coui-epcion; 
and in 1814 the nascent Republic of Chile» notwithstanding a brief effort 
of union among contending parties, was extinguished by invasion from 
Peru. 

The viccroyalty of Peru, in spito of some locil disturbances, was 
firmly held for the King throughout this period (1811-6) and down to 



te 



1820, separating the countiies of the southern hemisphere from the 
northern provinces of New Granatla and Venezuela, and effectually 
preventing ca-operation between north and south dnw-n to 1822. Thus, 
though the two movements intemcted upon each other hy way of 
esaniple and policy, the northern group of revolutions followed a distinct 
course, marked by greater violence, confusion, and bloodshed, and by 
moreastonishing vicissitudes of failure and recovery. Venezuela and New 
Granada, divided from each other by the eastern chain of the Andes, 
at first acted separately ; indeed the rugged mountain kingdom of New 
Granada was Itaelf broken both geographically aud politically into many 
centres of action, among which Bogota and Cartagena stood out as j-ival 
claimants for supremacy or separate aoveretgnty. Though perpetually 
shaken by internal discord and sporadic civil wars, a loose and ill-deltned 
league of piovinces maintained Ilepublican independence in New Gianada 
until the arrival of the Spanish army of reconqneat in 181"). Rat, in 
a large sense, the movementij of Venezuela and of New Granada tend to 
flow into one current whose course can best be traced by foUowiug tlte 
revolutions of Caracas. These also supply the main personal interest 
of the strnggle owing to the guidance of two distinguished Caraquefkos, 
first Miranda, the precursor of independence, and afterwards Bolivar, 
the Liberator. 
y^ Caracas, the cradle of tropical independence and the first focus 
of armed war against Spanish authority, had a more stormy history 
than any of her iieighbours, being twice captured by the royalists and 
twice rcco^'cred by the patriots. The movement began, as elsewhere, 
with a municipal revolution. After agitation carried on by separatists 
throughout 1809 and the dispatch of comraissionera to .seek help in 
England, the CahUdo of Caracas, with the addition of some elected 
Tnembera, became in April, 1810, " the Junta formed to preserve the rights 
of FerJinaud VII." The Governor, who at fust was nominally president 
of this Junta, was soon deported, with the Oidorea and priucipal oHicials ; 
and a few months later the revolutionists began oivil war by attacking 
the royalist city of Coro. The Cadiz Regency responded by declaring 
a blockade of Venezuelan ports and granting letters of marque to West 
Indian privateere — measures which definitely stamped the Caraquenoa 
as rebels and recognised or initiated a state of war between the Spanish 
authority and the insurgent Amerioans. The Caracas Junta, being 
generally recognised in Venezuela outside the royalist provinces, re- 
quested the Cahiliio* to elect a Congress, which in April, 1811, chose 
a small executive with Miranda, newly arrived from England, as Presi- 
dent. In July, 1811, the Congress, persuaded by Miranda, gave the first 
cxam|iIo to Spanish Americia of a proclamation of complete independence. 
But Monteverdo, a Spanish naval lieutenant^ lending a body of 
Creoles, swelled by friendly Indians, from the royalist province of 
Coro,uttained unexpected success in cousequenoe of the earthquake which 




1813-4] 



Royttlist successes. — Bolivar 



289 



on Holy Thursday, 1812,11x6 firatauniveraary of the meeting of Cougress, 
destroyed Caracas and killed 20,000 people in the revolution aiy towns, 
sparing the royalist places. The clergy preached Divine judgment to 
a terrified people ; Puerto Cabollo, the strongest fortress in the country, 
was abandoned by its commander, Bolfvar, a prominent member of the 
old Creole aristocracy; and in July, 1812, Miranda signed a capitula- 
tion securing free dcpnrture to tliu patriot leaders. On entering Caracas 
Mont«verde found Miranda in prison, where he had beeu confined by 
Bolivar and other officers- Miranda remained a prisoner — to die four 
years later in a Spanish dungeon — while Bolivar received a safe con- 
duct and passed to bis estates. The only Government now was in the 
hands of a few irresponsible royalist guerrilleroa ruling with capricious 
cruelty ; but henceforth Bolivar devoted his life and fortune to eman- 
cipation and reorganisation. He was at this time a childless widower 
of twenty-nine, educated in Europe, wlicre he had imbibed revolutionary 
ideas. Puny and ill-proportioned in body, of a worn, anxious, and 
melancholy countenance, possessing little military experience or skill, 
a true urban Creole ia candid vanity and unashamed sensuality, he 
moved some to repulsion, othei-s, including many of his British sub- 
ordinates, to devoted affection. Repeatedly beaten and apparently 
abandoning Ms associates, but always renewing the struggle, he was 
universally recognised as the chief inspiration of the movement and 
ultimately as the Liberator of five extensive Republics. 

Retiring now to New Granada, which in turn had declared for 
complete independence, he raised troops iu Cartagena and invaded 
Venezuela, proclaiming retaliation and war to the death, pardon to 
American enemies, but uo quarter to Spaniards. Thirteen months after 
Miranda's capitulation he entered Caracas, and assumed the title of 
JAbertador. But meantime one Boves, a Spanish sergeant who had been 
dismissed from the army for misconduct but had obtained a militia 
commission in the civil war, was gaining an extraordinary ascendancy 
over the half-«avage mounted herdsmen of the plains by superior skill, 
daring, and ferocity, by early successes and promises of booty and 
debauchery. Boves was almost the only white roan in his army of 4000 
llaneroSt whom he led in the name of the King to a savage war of 
barbarism against civilisation, of the desert against the towns. Crouch* 
ing almost invisible by their horaes' nocks, and charging with the lance, 
these half-naked barbi\riana were irresistible ; they spread panic through 
the country and approached the capital. In June, 1814, Bolivar suffei-ed 
a crashing defeat, which caused many of his troops to desert to the 
royalists and exposed Caracas to capture. Accordingly, having lirst 
killed his 880 royalist prisoners, he abandoned the place, leading a crowd 
of fugitives on a terrible flight of ses'enty leagues to Barcelona, where 
the inhabitants — such was the jealousy between cities — closed their 
houses against them. The Venezuelan Republic perished a second time ; 



C. M. B, X, 



10 



and Bolivar crossed the Andes once more, to serve tAie Congress of New 
Granada in reduciug ita unruly cities to ubedieuoe. 

But meantime Ferdinand had been preparing an expedition for the re- 
conquest of the insurgent provinces. Originally intended for the River 
Plate, it was diverted to tha Spanish Main, doubtless because tha 
royalists possessed no base in the Kiver I'latc after the fall of Monte- 
video in June, 1814. In April, t81o,a fleet of sixty transports convoyed 
by war-ships arrived at Cumanii cairying a. siege-train and 10,000 troops 
under the command of General Murillo, a man who had served as a 
sergeant of marines at the buttle of St Vincent and had fouj^fUt hia way 
up from th(* ranks; ho is said to have been recommended for this 
American command by Wellington. Finding the Venezuelan towns 
already reduced, and Bovos, who might have been a troublesome sub- 
ordinate, removed by death in battle, Morillo quietly moved westwaixlM, 
accepting tlie adhesion of the Venezuelans. Thence he passed to the 
invasion of New Granada. 

That country Imd passed five years of stormy independenoe in appa- 
rently futile disputes and even armed quarrels, due to the difficulty of 
consolidating the action of a crowd of municipalities, each with its Junta 
acting separately ; while a garrulous but disregarded Congress, largely 
consisting of idle lawyers, was discussing theories, passing minute enact- 
ments^ and talking iilwut Greece and Rome, a few of the leaders vaiidy 
striving for a strong central executive. Bogota, the ancient capital, and 
Cartagena, the chief poi-t, had become centies of independent Republican 
provinces, indifferent or hostile to the Congress. When Moiillo lauded, 
Bolivar hud just reduced Bogota by arms and was now besieging Carta- 
gena, also Republican, which in turn was at war with Santa Marta, a 
rival port which was naturally Royalist. Jn the south the Indian and 
('reole inhabitants of Paslo and Patia, stubbornly royalist, drove back 
from their mountains every patriot advance from the north and pre- 
served Quito for the King down to 1822. In these conditions, the 
Republic or RepLiblics of New Granada fell before Morillo. Bolivar, 
whose misdirected activities had opened the way to the enemy, fled to 
Jamaica. In the course of 1816, 125 persons wore executed as traitors 
in New Granada. In that year only the River Plate provinces remained 
independent; for the energy of the Peruvian Viceroy had not only 
preserved Peru, but had also recovered Chile by a campaign which 
ovcrwhelmL-d all resistjmce. Except iu the River Plate provinces the war 
might seem to be at an. end; for in every other centre the revolution 
lifter five years of effort appeared to be crushed and its leaders dead or 
driven into exile. This general collapse wa^ due perhaps less to external 
attick Uian to the weaknesses and defects of the new essays al govern- 
ment which had not sliown themselves preferable to the former system. 

In the south, in the security' of achieved independence, deliberate 
and tranquil preparations were being made with much military skill and 



political foresight foY a decisive move to counter this advance of rnyolism. 
And even in the noi-tli the ruin wan nul quite complete, allhuugb 
recovery was slow and indeed scarcely perceptible for nearly two years. 
Starting from points 6000 miles apai-t, two distinct movements o£ 
recovery from south and ncrth — the Argentino-Chilian movement, led 
by San iVIarttn and ('ochi-ane, and the Colombian movement-, led by 
Bolivar — deprived Spain of a continent. The former movement com- 
prised the lands south of the tropics, crushed the Spanish navy in the 
Pacific, and initiated but did not complete the revolution of Peru. The 
northern movement covered the whole tropical region and iinally included 
Peru and Upper Peru, taking up the struggle against these central 
Btrongholda of royalism at the point where San Martin hadlaid it down. 
These separate movements, which were finally enabled to meet and 
in some degree to morgo together by naval victories on the Pacific and 
by successful invasion of Peru, require seijai-ate narration. But it must 
be remembered that they were simultaneous and complementary to each 
other. Communications passed between the leaders; and the oi-der of 
events indicates that the earlier operations and successes of San Martfn 
not only encfuiragcd the more doubtful struggle in the north, but also 
suggested or guided in some degree the movements of BoUvar. More- 
over the invasion of Chile and Peru by San Martin has an essential 
connexion willi the invasion of New Granada by Morillo. Had llie 
Spanish expedition taken its intended route to the River Plate, the 
Argentine forces would ^have been requii-ed there for defence. The 
diversion of the expedition to the Spanish Maixi loft these forces free for 
external action. Perdinand was only able to strike at one point ; but 
there can bo no doubt that Morillo hoped, after pacifying New Granada, 
to advance southwards and, keeping up his strength by .Vmerican enlist- 
ment, to join hands with the royaliat forces of Peru and so overwhelm 
the insurrections iu Chile and the Uiver i'lato provinces. This plan was 
frustrated in part by the guerrilla warfare in the north, but in great 
part also by the advance upon Peru of Republican naval and military 
forces from the south, which fully engaged all the strength of the vice- 
royalty and even divided Aforilloa forces. Thus the invasion of I'eru by 
San Martin was tho American responso to the iavaaioa of New Granada 
by an army fi-om Spain. 

It will be convenient to describe the Bouthern movement first, since 
its earlier succeiisful advance rendered possible the later successes of 
Bolivar. San Martin, born in the River Plate region, the son of a Spanish 
official, was educated in Spain, and entered the army : a prisoner tirst iu 
France (ITU-l) and then iu England (17&7), a tighter in many cam- 
paigns from 171)3 to IHll, he brought with him valuable experience, 
when, having reached the rank of lieutenant-colonel, ho offered his sword 
to Buenos Aires and trauiplautcd thither tho revolutionary secret society 



292 Victoi'ica of San Martin and Cochrane [I817-20 



to which I16 had belonged in Spain. After holding command in the war 
of Uj.ipei* Peru, he solicited the Governorship of a sub-Andine province, 
where for two yeai-s, uncontrolled by the Buenos Aires authorities, he 
gathered and tiuiued the aniiy uf Argentine recruits and Chilian refugees 
which was to strike at Peru through Chile. In 1817-8, having led 
6U0O men from Mendoza over a pass 12,000 feet high, San Martin, in 
conjunction with the Chilian O'lliggins, defeated the royalista first at 
Chacabuco (February, 1817), and then, after a considerable reverse, in 
the decisive battle of Maipu (April, 1818), which practically won over 
Chile, though the war lingered on in the extreme south. 

In the same year a frigate escorting ten transports with 2000 troops 
sailed from Cadiz against Chile. One of the transports was carried hy 
its mutinous soldiers to Buenos Aires ; and the Clulians. thus forewarned, 
contrived to capture most of the transports and also the frigate, which 
became the flag-ship of an improvised Chilian fleet. In November, 1818, 
this Heet was placed under the command of Lord Cochrane, the finest 
living naval leader, who had already distinguished liimself by remarkable 
feats of war as a captain in the British navy. Being obliged to leave 
that service, he offered his sword to Chile ; and in tliree years he swept 
the Spanish flag from the Pacific. He was a seaman probably not far 
inferior to Nelson in skill, insight, and dash ; but his qualities as a 
commander were maned by an impracticable violence of temper and an 
intrusion of personal aims which produced coustant quarreb and un- 
dignified recrimination. His tirst serious effort, an attack uiwn C'allao, 
was unsuccessful; but in January, 1820, the strong fortress of Valdivia 
was captured through an extraordinary assault, led by his commander of 
marines. Miller, who had joined San Martin at the age of twenty-two 
after much active service in Spain and the United States. 

After the victory of Maipu two years elapsed before advance into 
Pern was rendered possible by Cochrane'a naval strength, by San Martin's 
military preparations and understanding with the Chilian Government, 
and by the posture of affairs in Europe. For in 1819 the Buonos Aires 
Government, disturbed by Gaucho rebellions, and alarmed by the pros- 
pect of invasion by the expedition then assembHng at Cadiz, recalled San 
Martin and his army. The revolt of the army of Cadiz and the conse- 
quent abandonment of that expedition enabled San Martin to disobey 
this command and to execute his long-designed acheme of advance to the 
north. In September, 1820, the *' Liberating array of Peru," under San 
Martin, was transported in Cochiane's squadron to the neighbourhood of 
Lima. Soon afterwards Cochrane achieved the astonishing feat of carry- 
ing off the frigate Emieralda, which was anchored under the guns of 
Callao ; and the finest battalion in the royal service, which had been 
sent southward by Morillo to aid the defence of Peru, deserted to San 
Martin, t>60 strong, chietly Creoles who had replaced dunng five yeara of 
war the Spaniards brought by Morillo. Thus the fii-st success of this 



invHsion iuflicted a blow not only on the viceroyaUy of I'eru, but on the 
SpauUb army of invasion in tlie north. Yet San Martm, disreganling 
the impatience of his men and the exaBperation of Cochrane, remained 
inactive and even watched royalist reiuforcemcnts marching into Callao. 
Expeditions to the north under Arenales, and to the south under Mil- 
ler, showed what could be done ; but San Martin argued that his mission 
vrau emancipatioa, not conquest, and that his miive presence would win 
over Lima. Herein he was riglit ; but ho was wrong in thinking that the 
possession of the capital would bring over the country, or that he could 
win Peru without beating the royalist officers who held all the interior 
and could recruit at leisure. The royalists evacuating Lima in July» 
1821, San Martin entered and proclaimed Peruvian independence, naming 
himself Protector with absolute power. After ocisembling a Congress as 
futile as the others and proposing a Peruvian monarchy under a Euro* 
pean prince, San Martin retired in 1822 into private life. Lima was 
reoccupied by the royalists, who liad deposed the Viceroy as nut suffi- 
ciently zealous and put in his place the veteran officer La Sema, who had 
been one of the defenders of Saragossa in 1809. Thenceforth the cman- 
cipatiou of Peru belongs to the story of Bolivar, who in 1822 brought 
the Venezuelan war to a successful end and moved south upon Peru. 

The separate narrative of the oorthcrn movement may now be 
resumed at the critical epoch of 1816. In that year the Uepublics of 
New Granada and Venezuela were reduced to a few patriot f/uernlla$ 
precariously struggling among a royaliat population in the ttanot or 
plains lying between the Orinoco and the belt of coast towns. Here 
Paez, au almost illiterate peasant, gathered a party of horsemen which 
be increased by small succeasest ^nd also by the unusual method of 
sparing the lives of his royalist prisoners, many of whom, formerly 
followers of Boves, now joined Paez on learning from him what ta 
Patria meant. Supplies were obtained from the unfortunate missions; 
and, when Bolivar, who with other refugees had been organising a fleet 
and a small expeditionary force in Hayti, appeared in the Uanoit^ he was 
at once recognised as chief. Although his carelessness in command was 
sometimes disastrous, his presence brought strength. The capture of 
Angostura in July, 1817. and of San Fernando in February, 1818, won 
for the patriots the line of the Orinoco. Confined to this region, and 
occupying a town bo royalist in sentiment that he was in danger of 
assassination by the women, Bolivar, hearing of the proposed intervention 
of the Powers in 1818, issued from his capital, Angostura, a proud declara- 
tion of independence and of equality with Spain, while to the Argentine 
Provinces he sent a message proclaiming the unity of South America. 

Vet no progress was made in the campaign of 1818 against Morillo, 
who had now returned from New Granada. The Uanerou were splendid 
giterriUtron, quick in sudden assault, surprise, or raid, wearing out the 



294 British niercetiaries. — Republic of Colombia [1818-22 

royalists with continual aiinoyance, and baffling purauit by disappearing 
into the plains and driving away the cattle, U\'ing on beef without salt 
or bread, expert in the craft of plain and liver, consummate horsemen 
and swimmers ; bnt they were as yet useless in the mountains, unfit for 
distant and decisive campaigns, and recognising no len^lcsr hut their 
"comrade" Paez. Moreover the Republican fleet, commanded by a 
Dutch Creole from Cura^oa and largely manned by British sailors, 
accomplished less than might have been expected. Bolivar gave a new 
turn to the war by engaging British troops, mostly disbanded veterans 
of the Peninsula and of Flandei*s. First came officers and sergeants to 
train Bolivar's men; then came soldiers. Before the end of 1818 at 
least (WOO British subjects arrived. Five-sixths of them perished in the 
war, sonic in sanguinary fights, some umler stress of labour as prisoners 
in the torrid climate of Panama, but most by famine, pestilence, and 
hardships, such iis they had never known in Emrnpcan warfare : they 
joined an army of almost naked men, destitute of baggJtgo. commissariat, 
surgeons, and ambulance, fighting in a tropical country of indescribable 
difticulty. where capture meant probable death and victory was fallowed 
by a general slaughter of prisoners, where the path of war led across 
plains which turned from desert to swamp with the change of season, 
through a labyrinth of deep rivcis infested by crocodiles and mosquitos, 
and over a vast mass of frozen mountains. 

Having installed a Vene^.uelan Congress at Angostura, Bolivar, in 
1810, led SOOO troops west\vard up the Orinoco behind the line of 
ro}'alist occupation, crossed the Andes, where many men and horses died 
of uold, liberated New Granada by tlie victory of Boyao/i, and entered 
Bogotii. After this stroke of large political strategy, he returned to 
Angostura and proclaimed the union of New Granada and Venezuela in 
the Republic of Colombia. In 1820 Morillo, having concluded an 
armistice with Bolivar, returned to Europe ; and in 1821 his successor 
was beaten in the battle of Caraholx), where Bolivar's British troojjs, 
who bore the brunt of the fight, suffered terrible loss. Venezuela was 
practically independent ; and the Liberator entered Caracas in triumph. 
The northern movement had readied \ts conclusioJi, and the Republic^ 
of Colombia had achieved real existence under the Presidency of Bolivar. 

But the Liberator still had a great task before him in the extirpa- 
tion of royalism from the Continent, fii-st by loose co-operation with San 
Martin, and then by taking up the continental war at the point where it 
was dropped by the Argentine leader. Peru, with its dependencies of 
Quito in the north and Upper Peru in the south, was still to occupy the 
Liberator for four years. That viceroyalty in fact constitnted a third 
geographical region, intermediate between north and south; and its 
emancipation forms the thifd and final phase of the struggle, the con- 
clusion of the successes gained first by San Martin and tiion by 
Bolivar. In 1822 San Martfn appeared to be in possession of Peru ; but 



^ 




1832-6] Bolivar takes up the task of San Martin in Peru 29o 

Quito was still royalist. Thither Bolivar now directed his forces; and. 
thirteen j-eara after her firet lovolutioimrv movement, Quito was freed 
through the victory of Pichincha (May, 1822), won by the Colombian 
Sucre, the most modest and humane of the revolutionary leadeiB, and 
probably the best general produced by South America. Then, after 
some revei-spA, fiuayac|nil and the adjacent provinces were secured with 
the help of troops sent from Peru by San Martin. At last in July. 1822, 
an interview took place in Guayaquil between the two chiefs, the 
Protector of Pern and the Libemtor of Colombia. To San Martin this 
interview was a disillusionmcDt; ho offered indeed to serve under Bolivar; 
bat in September^ 1822, he resigned his command and retired, after 
inviting Bolivar to lead his Colombian army inlo Peru aud complete 
the work of independence. Thus Bolivar took up the work where 
San Martin had left it. Cochrane, having fini.shed his task, had 
alrea<ly resigned his Chilian command, to pass into the service first of 
the Brazilians and then of the Greeks. A brief royalist occupation 
of the capital followed; in September, 1823, however, Bolivar entered 
Lima and proclaimed a constitution, but was soon appointed absolute 
Dictator by a moribund Congress. He had left Lima, to prepare for 
tlie field, when he heard thut a mutiny of Argentine soldiers had 
restored Callao and Lima to the royali.sts and that Sucre was in a pro- 
carious position in the Peruvian highlands. Retiring northwards, though 
almost prostrated with illness, he raised a fresh army in southern Colombia 
and movedsouth to join Snore. This southward march perhaps surpassed 
in difficulties and endurance all that went before; horses dragged up 
precipitous and almost pathless tracks to Alpine heights, whole battalions 
prostrate with mointtAin sickness, an entire division of .^000 luen groping 
helpless and agonised for a day from smiw-bliadness. — tliL-se were some 
of the inci<lents of the march. On August 5, 1824, the first shock took 
place at Junin, where the partial defeat of the patriots was turned into 
victory by a cavalry charge under Miller; in this skirmish, which lasted 
forty-five minutes, not a shot was fired ; but 360 royalists were killed h}' 
lance and sabre, and that night almost all the wounded died of cold. Three 
months later Sucre with 6000 patriots met 9000 royalists at Ayacucho 
between Lima and C'nzco, about midway between Buenos Aires and 
Caracas. In the battle 1000 pati'iots and 2100 i-oyalisLt fell; LaSenia,the 
lastSpanish Viceroy in the Indies, remained a prisoner; and a capitulation 
vaa signed which included the 23,000 royalist troops remaining in Peru. 

Ayacucho sealed the inder>Hndi;nac of Peru and of South America. 
Callao held out for fourteen months, and in Jjinuary, 1H26, within a month 
of its fall. Chiloe, the last royalist stronghold in America, surrendered 
to the Chilians. From that time the Spanish cause, though favonredby 
groups in the towns, was only upheld in the field by some ifuern'iUan and 
brigands in Chile and Venezuela, who were finally suppressed about 1830. 

in 1S24 Bolivar received with acquiescence a message from the 



Colomliian Congress, Informing' him that through absence in Peru he 
had ceased to behead of their State; but after Ayacucho he was supreme 
in two new Hepublics established in I'eniand Upper Peru. Ue formed 
Upper Peru into the Uepuhlic of Bolivia with a constitution under 
which three Legialativc Houses were established, and a President was 
appointed for life and empowered to nominate his snccessor. This 
" Bolivian Code" was in turn oceepted by HoHvia, Peru, and Colomtna 
in HoUvar's presence and abandoned iu his absence. Leaving Sucre aa 
Iloliviaii President, he was received in Lima(rebruary, 1825)as Dietator 
and Liberator and ruled there for more than a year, attempting to 
establish either a union or a confederation between Peni and Bolivia 
and also working for the assembly of a Pan-American Congress at 
Panama ; but the inefficiency of the Colombian Congress and the in- 
dependent attitude of the towns demanded his return northwards, while 
Paei, (jovenior of Venezuela, wrote entreating lua presence, declaring 
that he could not check the popular desire for separation from (Colombia, 
tlat people despising the distant Congress of Hogotii. All the authorities 
of Lima besought him to remain; and the Cahildo resigned in a body, 
declaring that upon his departure Peru must cease to exist. Bolivar 
Bp(>eared to hesitate; but in November, 1826, after nearly five years' 
absence in the south, he was triumphantly received in Bogota and some 
months later in Caracas- 
Successive Colombian Congresses renewed his supreme power; and 
for two years he was in fact sole ruler and legislator ; but he failed in 
his attempts to form a vast northern Republic and to unite it in 
federation with its southern neighbours. His deputies in Bolivia and 
Peru were dethroned after his departure; and la 1S29 the towns of 
Venezuela, oue after auuther, in cahildo abierio resolved on separation 
from Colombia and compelled their governor Paez to assume independent 
authority. In 1830 Guayaquil and Quito broke away to form the 
Republic of Ecuador. In 1829 Bolivar's Government, in the hope of 
securing union and stability, proposed to thy Uritish and French 
Ministers thsit on the Libcrntor'a death a Bourbon prince should reign 
over Colombia. In May, 1830, having assembled a Congress to settle 
future government, the Dictator resigned his o£Sce and retired to 
Cartagena, announcing his departure for Europe. But the Congress 
fell into (iontempt; the country was plunged into civil war; and the 
general voice seemed to bo recalling Bolivar to command when he was 
struck down by consumption. On December 10, 1830, he dictated 
a message exhorting Colombians io union ; a week later he died at the 
ago of forty-seven. The Hve Republics which had called him Liberator 
sank into the cycle of confusion, disortler, and rapid revolutions which 
is not even yet closed. Venezuela alone under the supremacy of Paez 
maintained for seventeen years comparative tranquillity, but upon his 
fall and exile vna plunged into similar disorder. 



The strange career of Bolivar almost baffles judgmeut ; it is the 
fltory of the emancipation of half a continent thi-ongli efforts chiefly 
guided by one man ; yet, in view of his moral and physical weaknesses, 
it is not easy to grasp the personal qualities which won for him the 
wtiPihip of the people and the love of liis aijsoelateij. To money he was 
iudiffei'ent ; a miUiou jpe«cv voted to him in Bolivia he spent upon the 
liberation of all the slaves in the Republic. Alone among the revolu- 
tionary leadei-s of South America, he formed around him a group of able 
men devoted to himself and to the public service. He himself wrote 
a biography of Sucre; and, although both men must have known that 
Sucre was the better commander, Bolivar rejoiced in his friends triumph 
as if it hiid been his own. Paez, though moist outspoken about his 
chiefs faults, always wrote to him in terms of tender intimacy, even 
while he was disavowing Bolivar's authority and leading the separation 
of Venezuela; and in his autohiogmphy, written forty years later, Paez 
repeats these expressions. Bolivar's design of combining several extensive 
Republics in one vast fedeiution has often been dismissed us a day -dream ; 
and in truth the physical and political difficulties were great. The road 
from Caracas to the south of Bolivia, traveling the scene of his activities* 
through gre.itand varied obstacles, measures 4300 miles ; and the groups 
of population through this vast region were divided by the historical 
cleavage resulting from sepamte settlement and separate government 
by Spain. The road from Camcas to Piura traversing his Republic of 
Colombia measures 2200 miles. Whatever might have been achieved by 
permanent and undis^ised personal rule, the effort to unite Venezuela 
under one CongresswithNewGranadawas impracticable; so was probably 
the inclusion of Peru in a scheme of federated Republics. Buta federation 
of Republics north of the Equator, which seems to have been his last 
design, might well, with a few more years of life, have been accomplished. 
His attempt to convoke a Pan-Amorican Congress cannot be dismissed 
u a grandiose absurdity; possibly he intended a closer union than was 
poesible. but combination for defence was a reasonable aim. Bolivar 
died, bitterly lamenting the failure of that constructive work which he 
valued above independence ; yet few men have achieved so much in bo 
short a time. 

Upon Bolivar's death and the division of Colombia into three 
Republics the Spanish-American States may bo said to have formed 
themselves geographically, following generally the former Spanish 
divisions. But political form had not yet been attained. Tliough 
repablican constitutions nominally existed, no central Government 
except jiersonal autocracy really prevailed anywhere. Paraguay had 
already sunk under a despotism, indescribable in its grotesque horror, 
which lasted for sixty years (1910-70) under three successive tymnts ; 
elsewhere, dictators, directors, and autocratic presidents succeeded one 



lii 



another with bewildering rapidity, each ruling irresponsibly in hig 
capital, but seldom possessing undisputed authority beyond a limited 
district ; for the delimitation of frontiers, which meant the separation of 
cerlftiii geographical areas from one another, did not necessarily imply 
the consolidation of each area into a compact community. The con- 
fltructive work of the oabildot in forming independent urban governments, 
essential as it wna to the niovemunt, was inimical to the formation of 
Urge territorial States; in 1828, Bolivar in his efforts at consolidation 
actually decreed the suppression of all municipalities ; and m Venezuela 
a junta convoked by Paez grassed a similar measure. 

The conflicting centripetal and centrifugal tendencies which divided 
every Stale were commonly styled Unitarism and Federalism, the latter 
word being strangely used in a sense almost opposite to its usual 
meaning and implying an effort not at union, but at separation. Muni- 
cipal leaders and military chiefs, having gome indistinct notion of the 
United States Constitution, believed that in detachment and subdivision 
they were imitating its peculiar merits. Thus Bolivar and others, who 
aimed at uniting separate bodies and might fairly be called Federalists, 
woi-e styled Unitarists, while the separatist efforts and independent ac- 
tivities of contending provinces and towns were described as Federalism. 
In the Uiver i'late region these tendencies were at first described by the 
more expressive names of Capitalism and Provincialism. 

The many separate efforts towards organisation, remarkably alike in 
their general character, rested upon local civic feeling comliined with 
attachment to the monarchy; the disappearance of this latter motive 
left no principle of uuiou. Except the Spanish divisions of kingdoms 
atid [irovinces, there were in general no clear guides to the military and 
political grouping uf population; and there was a natural though 
unfortunate sentiment against the maintenance or restoration of any* 
thing rosembling the Spanish centralising system. Comparison with the 
United States is misleading; in the first place Spanish America possessed 
no parliamentary system ; secondly New Granada alone is equal to the 
thii'teeu British Colonies in mere extent, besides presenting immensely 
greater difficulties of communication. As for union of the whole 
Continent, Caracas and Buenos Aires could communicate with Europe 
almost more easily than \vith each other. 

The task was further complicated by the awakening of the forces of 
disorder used and in some degree organised by the revolution, forces 
which had been increased by the ba-nLshment of the Jesuits and the 
dispersion of their neophytes. The half -barbarous population of tbo 
frontiers, which had held no place in the political scheme under Spanish 
authority, had discovered its strength ; those who had been vagabonds 
or scattered peasants, ignorant and careless of political matters, were now 
material ready to the baud of any ambitious politician or any rude 
chieftain who mighteoramand their allegiance by superior horsemanship, 




daring, and intelligence. Already during the revolution the forces of 
the cities and of the mlderueas, o£ civilisation and barbarism, of old 
order and new violence, were in a state of tension within the patiiot 
ranks. The authority of the royal Oovernors disappeared ; tlie more 
popular local system of civic govcnimcnt, already possessing a prescrip- 
tive power of self-modification to suit new conditions, remained. In, 
general these civic bodies faced their strange responsibilities with a cer- 
tain wholesome vigour and moderation ; but their limitations of action 
are obvious and easily paralleled. They were disturbed and diverted 
from their natural functions by those wider operations, both military 
and political, in which they could share only in a partial and sulK)rdi- 
nalo manner; and a^Tiin they were shiikeii and confused by the dis- 
orderly external forces organised ia rivalry or ia defence of them, which 
now penetrated into their councils. 

One point, which demands separate mention, is best illustrated by 
a Peruvian episode. Pachacamac, an Indian cacique, who for his ser- 
vices against Tupac Amaru had received a colonel's commission in the 
S[Mmish army and bad been promoted brigadier for services against the 
Argentine.*! in Upper Peru (1811-2), at one time even acting as Spanish 
Governor of a province, was induced in 1814 to join a revolutionary 
conspiracy in Cuzco ; he assembled a force of insurgent Indians, but was 
defeated and hanged. This is the only instance of anything like an 
organised or distinct Indian movement on behalf of the revolution in 
South America; and the oflicial Spanish report on this disturbance 
states that the Indians felt mora animosity towards Creoles than towai-da 
Europeans. This was natural, since their nearer and more numerous 
oppressors were Creoles, whereas the more remote and leas familiar 
power of Viceroys and Governors miglit possibly protect them. The 
Indians, so far as they took part in ttie struggle, were naturally divided, 
following their priests or other leaders who gained their confidence on 
either side. But throughout the Continent on the whole they were 
royalist, although in Peru many wore forcibly impressed as patriot sol- 
diers. In Colombia the natives^ moi-e barbarous In character, did little 
serious fighting, though both sides used them in pursuit and slaughter ; 
but some tribes near Ij&ke Maraeaibo, which enjoyed autonomy subject 
to payment of tribute, suffered heavily in fighting for the King. 

The Indians in resisting the revolution were defending their own 
distinct existence, which depended on the continuance of Spanish 
authority. The strange rhetoric with which the revolutionary leaders, 
ignoring their own European origin, strove to persuade themselves and 
the natives that they were i-edresaing the wrongs of the Conquest, re- 
venging At-.ihualpa, and restoring oppressed peoples, did not deceive the 
Indians. The revolution was mther a coniplotiori than a reversal of the 
Conquest, since it fixed the possession and dominion of the conquered 
oountries by the descendants of Spanish conquerors and settlers. Strik- 



M 



ing testimony to the merits of the Spanish native policy is found in two 
decrees by UoUvar (1828) ; one aimed at restoring the ruined Miasions ; 
another ordered the re-establishment of Indian tribute and of Protectors, 
since the new system which subjected the tudiaus to the ordinary taxes 
and nominally equalised them with other citizens not only exposed them 
to various wrongs and extortions, but was actually resented by some of 
them as a loss of dignity. 



The disorderly course of the tropical Republics after Bolivar's death 
need not be followed. But the two temperate regions of the River Platu 
and of Chile have a clearer history. The plains stretching northwest- 
ward to the Andes possessed no city which could rival Buenos Aires, 
and all those regions depended upon that port. Hence there was a 
general impulse in 1810-2 to follow the lead of Buenos Aires; but that 
impulse could scarcely create a uatiou. Governments experimentally 
formed in the capital and constantly changed, which retained with 
difficulty the adhesion of the capital ittelf, could not be expected to 
command that of the other provinces; and the cities of the interior, 
while not claiming complete independence, would not accept subordi- 
nation. The Gauchos of the Pampa, exercised in the recent wars and 
ready under leadership to. gallop against any authority, royal or republi- 
can, were at band, partly to aid. partly to dominate, this local sentiment. 
The leader who formed and directed these various forces against central- 
ised government was Artigas, once a cattle-raider, bandit, and smuggler 
on the Brazilian froutier, then (1798) a commander of mounted police 
distinguisbod by the ruthless efficiency with which he chastised his old 
associates. When the i-evolution began, he continued in tfie royal 
service ; but, unused to the discipline of regular war and resenting 
command, he deserted to the Argentines besieging Moiitevideo; soon 
taking offence against his new commanders, he proclaimed the inde- 
pendence of the Banda Oriental and made war indiscriminately on 
Argentine and Brazilian invaders, so that this ahle but capricious cut- 
tlu'ont is now revered ns the founder of Uruguayan or " Oriental '* 
nationality. His prowess and success attracted to him the chiefs of 
Santa Fo and of Entro Rios, Gaudio caudillos like himsulf. Thus, 
partly a bandit chief, partly the head of a loose league of half-pastoral, 
half-municipal Suites, he held three provinces detached from the Con- 
federation and hostile to IJuenos Aii-cs. After the fall of Artigaa in 
1818, provincialism, finding a centre in C6rdoba, was encouraged by the 
inefficiency of the unstiiblo central Government, which can only be 
indicated and illustrated by the following brief summary. 

The municipal stage of the Argentine Revolution closes with the 
appointment by the cabildo of a ruling Junta on May 25, 1810. 
Then begins a series of brief attempts at administration ; juntas, 
triumvirates, congresses, and directors, rapidly succeeding one another, 



the eabildo forming a fixed point and repeatedly resuming tlie task 
. of inventing a government. In 1814 a mission was sent to Europe 

P to find a King, a Spanish prince if possible, an Englishman if Spain 

should prove impraclicable ; and in iHln the Supreme Director Alvear 
wrote to the British Minister in Brazil: "These provinces desire to 
belong to Great Britain, to receive her laws, to obey her government, and 
live under her peaceful inflnence "; but tliis letter was never delivered. 
The Congress wliich in 1816 deci-eed the indejiendence of tlie Argentine 
I'rovinces seriously discussed the enthronement of an Inca as Emperor ia 
Cuzco — a proposal whose only real interest lies in the implied design to 
revive the former union of Pern and the River Flat*; others favoured a 
Bourbon or an English prince. In 1819 the Director Puyrreddu opened 
negotiations with Kmnce for the coronation of the Prince of Lucca in 
Buenos Aires. Kivadavia, a man of high character and capacity, intro- 
duced some order and dignity into the administration (1831-7); but he 
failed to conciliate the provinces, and even in Uuenoa Aires the respite 
from trouble was brief. 

War with Brazil (1825-8) for the possession of tho Banda Oriental 
was closed through the mediatjon of Great Britain, tlie disputed region 
being declared an independent Republic- Tlie indignation in Huenoa 
Aires over this treaty increased the confusion ; the resulting mutinies, 
revolutions, and personal qxiarrels, opened a way to a Gaucho chieftain, 
who by his wealth in land and cattle, his splendid horsemanship, and his 
mastery of the rudo code of Pampa chivalry, had established a kind of 
principality on the southern frontier and bad organised a little army of 
Gauchos and Indians; the step to supreme power was easy, and at last 
Buenos Aires sank into uneasy tranquillity under the dreadful rule of 
Juan Manuel Rosas (188S-52). 

Chile emerged earlier than the other States from the series of wars 
between chieftjiins, pronunciamientoa^ and purely personal dictatorships, 
and established in 1833 a presidential system, oligarchical, conservative, 
and Bometimoa autocratic in character, which subsisted in comparative 
tranquillity for fifty years, supported however by force against several 
risings, two of which (1851 and 1869) developed into sanguinary civil 
wars, followed by some modiCication of personal government. 



Tlie efforts made to solve or evade the most pressing political problems 
during the actual progress of the struggle for emancipation and tho first 
essays at reconstruction, have been already discussed. But the internal 
political movements of the succeeding generation demand some coninietit. 
The history of Spanish America since 1830 is the history of many 
separate States, varying in number from ten to sixteen as the centralising 
or decentralising tendency has prevailed. The European student of this 
history seems to be reading a language whose grammar he does not 
know ; political action moves on an unfamiliar plane ; and in the 



catalogue of names and evenls it is liaiil to unravel motives or results. 
Even the accepted political vocabulary is here used with a strange sense. 
"Nationality" cannot have quite its European meaning in a group of 
States whose urigin, luuguage, customs, and seutimcntij, are generally 
similar. There are indeed sometimes clear distinctions of cliaiacter and 
even some ethnological differences due to die greater or less mixture of 
Indian or African blood and, more recently, to European immigration; 
but frontiers have been rather defined by geography, by convonionce, by 
causes almost accidcntJLl, by historical jealousies; and the States are often 
kept apart by artificial i*ather than natural antipathies. " Ilevolution" 
does not mean constitutional change and need not mean change In 
methods of administration, but raei-ely a forcible attempt, whether 
successful or not, to replace rulers ; thus any seditious movement from a 
sanguinary civil war to the pronttnciamiento of a battalion is called 
a revolution. '* Constitution " does not mean the rule and principle of 
administration, but merely a frame or form controlled by personal 
action ; thus among so many States possessing parliamentary constitU' 
tions it may be doubtfd whether before 1880 a congress ever mot which 
was in any essential sonse either legislative or represontativo, and few 
rulers have dispensed with the support of bayonets. In fact, these States 
might appear to have maintained a certain equilibrium by means of 
tension ; the chief ruler, if he finds the machinery of state unworkable, 
having the prescriptive right to supersede forms by a coup c^VM^aud the 
people, when Government becomes intolerable, liaving the prescriptive 
right of i-ebellion. Bolivar declared that the workora for independence 
had ploughed the sea, and died exclaiming that he had not found lil)erty. 
In 1842 San Martin wrote to a Chilian : " The labour and the blood given 
for the independence of America have been, if not wasted, at any rate 
unfortunately spent in most of the new States, except in your countiy." 
These oounti-ies, with their medieval atniospherotcame sudtlenly under 
the influence of modern ideas. Their guides wore inspired by a mixture 
of philosophical theory, of French revolutionary sentimeut, and of 
Ul-undei-stood constitutional notions borrowed from England and the 
United States. The people, almost indifferent to the Anglo-Saxon 
exotic of elected Legislative Chambers, continued to regard government 
as a thing to be endured or, if found unendurable, to be forcibly altered. 
All the revolutionary leaders at some time or other favoured monarchy 
or practised despotism ; and it is generally through autocracy that some 
kind of order has been or is being evolved. And the real progress which 
has been effected should be generously recognised. The large emigration 
from Europe to Spanish America during the last generation shows that 
in some of the States political conditions are not usually unfavourable 
to industrious and peaeeful life. 

In Mexico— to uso the name taken by New Spain on emancipation 
— the revolution, which promised to bo more tranquil than elsewhere. 




1808-15] RevoU in Mexico. Bidalgo and Morelos 303 

WHS divert€<l and cnnfased by personal action. On receiving news of 
the Spanish Revolution in 1808, the Viceroy, actitig witli the cahildo^ 
summoned to a Junta the royal and mumcipal officialii with the chief 
veeinoi and declared war ag-ainet Napoleon. In view of rival messages 
from the JiinUia of Asturias and of Seville, this Mexican Junta declared 
that no obedience was due to any autboiity not emanating from the 
sovereign, and that the Government of New Spain resided in the Viceroy 
and actual magistrates; but money was sent to the Seville Junta to aid 
defence. The leaders of thi» early movement were already aiming at 
independence, either on principle or from u belief that Spain could not 
withstand the French ; but these aims could not yet be avowed amid the 
general sentiment in favour of the monarchy. The arrival of a French 
frigate caused a riot in Vera Cruz, and the cUsi>atche3 which she brought 
were ostentatiously burnt by the Viceroy. Had Charles IV succeeded in 
his design of escaping to Mexico, he would certainly have been welcomed 
with enthusiasm- The Viceroy was preparing to call a Congress of 
deputies from all the cabildoe to settle future government, when the 
European party, alarmed by this encouragement of Creoles and acting 
with the audiencia^ deposed the Viceroy — an act afterwards contirmed 
by the Central Junta. The Mexican treasury dispatciied further large 
sums to Spain, besides private contributions ; bnl a request for a loan of 
twenty million penos a few months later somewhat damped this enthn- 
siaam; and reports of Spanish disasters raised doubls. 

la 1801) a movement in ValladoUd was suppressed. In September, 
1810, the arrest was ordered of a few men who used to meet in Queretaro 
to discuss revolution under pretext of literary debate ; theifupon one of 
them, Hidalgo, priest of Dolores, called upon his parishioners, chiefly 
Indians, to follow him against the Europeans "who were betraying the 
couutr)' to the French." Booty and the crusading cry " Ferdinand and 
the Virgin of Guadalupe" brought recruits; the pillage of the rich 
mining town of Guanajuato increased their nnnibei's; and soon an 
undiaeipliued horde estimiiled at 80,000, chielly Iiiiliaiis and mestizo*, was 
moving upon Mexico. Hut Hidalgo, who was no soldier, did not attack 
the tenrified city. Tliough accompanied by capable ofticere and a 
nucleus of troops, he achieved few regular successes. He raised a great 
pari of the country and occupied some towns; but the whit© population 
WM generally against him, and in 1812 ho was taken and executed. His 
forces, already dispersing into parties of brigands, were reoi^anised by the 
lawyer Rayon and the priest \Iorelos. who becjime oommandor. Morelos 
proved a better leader than Hidalgo, but pursued a similar warfare 
for three years, principally iii the south. In 1815 he was taken and 
shot. The Spanish guerrilkro Mina, who had raised Navarre against 
Napoleon in 1S08 and had attempted to roueo a Spanish revolt against 
Ferdinand in 1814, made an effort to revive the inaunection by leading 
two hundred followers from the north into Mexico, hut after six months 



304 



Mexican Revolution. Iturbide 



[1817-23 



of guerrilla warfare he met the same fate. Iti January, 1817, the 
remaining leaders capitulated, accepting an amnesty, and the civil war 
was over; but many of the Indians had scattered into troops of brigaudSf 
destroying property and interrupting traffic ; and the whole country 
had been thrown Into a disorder whicli coutiuued oporadically for 
many years. 

'Fbe insurrection was rather a confused fitrufjgle between clasaes and 
colours than a war between rcy and patria. Tiiough the insurgent chiefs 
were separatists, most of their followers believed that they were serving 
God and the King: in fact, led by royal and religious emblems, they 
were more royalist than the champions of authority ; Hidalgo is said to 
have told them that Ferdinand was among them, shut up in a closed 
carriage. Mexico was the most orderly, prosperous, and intelligent of the 
American kingdoms, the most apt for tlie tranquil evolution of decent 
government. Whatever may be said for Hidalgo's character and mo- 
tives, he shattered this prospect by rousing the forces of ignorance and 
disorder and plunged the country back into barbarism. Under Morelos 
the movement became more regular aud attracted iu a great degree the 
sympathies of reformers, largely owing to the successes which rendered 
possible an attempt at republican government in the south ; but its 
spasmodic origin ond barbarous elemeuttt limited the range of action. In 
the later and successful revolution the Indians took no part. 

Meantime the revolutionary tendency was growing in the towns, and 
even in the viceregal camp ; Calleja, chief suppressor of the insurrection, 
was suspected of independent sympathies until ho was appointed Viceroy. 
The Creole Colonel Iturbide, while besieging an insurgent stronghold in 
1814, oouiided to a colleague bis desire for independence, adding the 
words, " but firat we must finish with these people." The constitutional 
restoration in Spain in 1820 and the election of Mexican Deputies to 
the Madrid Cortes produced a split in the European party. In 1821 
General Iturbide, one of the chief suppressors of the insurrection, 
proclaimed at Iguala his three pix>posals: (1) an independent Mexican 
Empire, the throne to be offered to Ferdinand, or in case of his refusal 
to another Spanish prince; (3) the exclusion of all religions but the 
Catholic; (3) the union of Mexicans and Spaniards. This scheme satisfied 
the army and rapidly gained adherents ; the Viceroy Apodaca, appointed 
under the absolutist rlgimey was deposed by the constitutionalists; 
aud the new Viceroy, O'Donojii, found liimself obliged to recognise the 
" plan of Iguala " by signing the Treaty of C6rdoba. Iturbide, entering 
the capital, installed a governing Junta, followed by a Congress. But 
the Spanish Cortes having repudiated the Treaty of Cfirdoba, this 
Congress was compelled by the populace to proclaim Iturbide Empernr 
of Mexico. Ten months later the Emperor was forced to abdicate by the 
military revolt of Santa Ana (1823). From that time the stormy history 
of Mexico is comprised iu the biographies of three men, Santa Ana, 



Juarez, ami I'orfirio Diaz; the aUernation of niilitiiry ^ri}/iunciam<<;n^-c?ji 

1111(1 republican or |jer8oriaI efforta beiiip conipliuated by tbe successful 
aggression of the United Staieti and the efforts of French ambition. The 
cyeU of disorder and recovery, of defeat and resitttance, closes with the 
beneliceiit despotiym of Diaz, who became President iu 1877 and Iiati 
ever since been the niler of Mexico. 

In Guatemala, as elsewhere, the Spanish revolution.s caused responsive 
movements in 1808-0; but these subsided until 1821. when Guatemala 
moved in sympathy with Mexico. Of the two parties, one favouring 
uuiou with Mexico, the other desiring complete independence, the latter 
prevailed, after one hundred and eighty cabildos had voted on tly 
matter. In the aubordinate provinces of Honduras, Nicaragua* San 
Salvador, and Costa Rica, some desired union with Mexico, some union 
with Guatemala, and some complete separation. This last question seems 
never to have been decisively settled. 

The Revolution of America as viewed from Enrojw falls into three 
periods. The first (1808-14) corresponds to a period of invasion, of 
rapid revolutions, of conetitutioual effort in Spain. During the years 
1808-10 the movements iu America were on the whole sympatlielio 
with those of Spain, but were gradually turned into an anti-European 
revolt, largely by the hostility of tlie successive Governments in Spain, 
which all professed to find rebellion in constitutional movements 
resembling those to which they owed their own origin, and, while 
proclaiming national and popular authority, demanded submission 
and obedience in America. In May, 1810, the Regency declared 
American ports open to neutral trade, but was obliged by the Cadiz 
monopolists to withdraw that decree ; in, fact, the Regency and the 
Cortes, partly dominated by the municipality and commerce of Cadiz, 
which regarded American trade as their perquisite, were compelled to 
assume a reactionary and aUjulutisl attitude, which left no choice 
between submission and independence. Twice the offer of mediation by 
Great Britain, welcomed by the American deputies, was declined by 
the Cortes. Such action was not compensated by the liberation of the 
Press (1810) or by the Constitution of 1812 which established elective 
Municipalities and elective Provincial Councils in America as in Spain. 
These measures favoured reform : and, in the conditions which followed 
in Spain, refomi in America meant revolution. In almost every debate 
on America in the Cortes European and Anierican deputies were on 
opposite sides ; an elaborate scheme of reform presented by the American 
deputies was shelved by a general declaration that Americans and 
Spaniards formed one nation. Even the constitution of the Cortes was 
a grievance; the Americans protested against the device of substitutes, 
declaring that the assembly should await the arrival of the elected 
deputies, and also that representation should be proportionate to 



c. M. a. X. 



20 



population — an arrangement whereby Spaniards in tlie S|janish Parlia* 
nient woulil have bueii outnumbered by Aumrlcatis ignorant of Spain 
and also ignoraut of every part of the Indies but their own. 

Dnring this period consideJ-able reinforcements were sent to Mexico ; 
but in gouoral there were few European troops in America, and tho 
struggle was mainly between Americans on both sides, though most of 
the royalist leaders were Eurojiean. Yet on the whole the royaliuta 
were successful except in Buenos Aii-es. 

The second period (1814-20) eorreaponda to Ferdinand's absolute 
Government in Spain. The King's promise to call Cortes in which 
America shouhl have satisfactory representation was presently followed 
by an attempt to suppress insurrection by dispatching European troops. 
But the Spanish monarchy was unequal to this effort, which would 
have required two or three strong naval squadrona. The only decided 
gain was the conclusion of tlie civil war in Mexico — a success winch rather 
opened than closed the door to political revolution. In South America, 
notwitlistAnding some initial successes, the royalist cause lost ground 
during this period. At its close the region south uC the tropics was 
practically free from Spanish dominion ; I'eru, tlie centre of royalism, 
was invaded ; and in the north of the continent only the Isthmus and 
the coast towns of Venezuela obeyed the King. 

In the third period (1820—4) the restoration of the Constitution in 
Spain introduced a certain moderation Into the struggle. Bolivar and 
Morillo agreed that tltenccfoitfa quarter should be given and that 
desertion should not be punished with death, since the war was a war 
of opinions, with friends and relatives in opposing ranks ; San Martiu 
concluded an armistice with an envoy from Spain ; a t!olomhian agent 
even entered Madrid, where he was courteously treated. It was noted 
that Spanish officers in Peru were less bitter against the insurgents than 
were their Creole colleagues ; and during the closing phiwe of the struggle 
several Spanish war-ships passed into American hands through the 
desertion or easy surrender of Spanish officers and crews. Although 
the Cortes in 1822 vehemently i-epudiated all notion of recognition, 
next year it was proposed iu negotiations between Spain and Buenos 
Aires that hostilities should cease for eighteen months, and that Buenos 
Aires sliould induce the South American Governments to contribute 
twenty million pesos in aid of Spanish resistance to the French. These 
proposals, which were closed by the French invasion of Spain, indicated a 
consciousness that constitutionalists in Spain and revolutionists in America 
were really fighting the same battle, and seemed to foreshadow the 
recognition of independence by the ootmtitutiunal Goveniment of Sjiaiu. 

After the revolt of the army at Cadiz in 1820 the royalista fought 
without further aid from Europe. Spain had dispatched 42,000 troops 
to America, including the West Indies, between 1811 and 1819. Of these 
** expeditionary troops " 2S,00U remained in 1820 ; in that year there were 



ta^ 



in America, besides volunteers, 87,000 disciplined royalist troops, counting 
both regulara and militia, 41,000 of them stationed in New Spain, 29,000 
in the West Indies and only 27,000 in South America. Of the 87,000 
perhaps about one-third were Europeans. After 1820 a group of offifera, 
veterans of Saragossa, Albuera, and Vittoria, fought on for Spain with 
troops chiefly raised aud trained in America : of the 9000 royalista who 
fought at Ayaeucho not more than 500 were Spaniai-ds born in Spain. 

Throughout the war, the first diplomatic object of insui^ent leaders 
and republican Governments was to obtain British support. In 1809-10 
Venezuelan envoys sought aid in London and arc said to have received 
officialassuranceofpi'otection against French interference. Such protection 
was the natural outcome of British policy, so long as French ascendancy 
in the New World wa.s to be feared ; indeed, the chief service of Great 
Britiiin to the revolution rewulled from the series of naval victories 
culminating in Trafalgar, which n:ade it impossible either for France or 
for Spain to operate ofFoctively across the Atlantic. But sinpe alliance 
with Spain now precluded any aid to insurrection, British commodores 
and West Indian (Jovornom were instructed to encourage recomiiliatiori 
between the insurgents and the Spanish Junta or Regency. Yet British 
offers of mediation were felt to giro some moral support to the in- 
surgents; and in 1817 a United States diplomatist, referring to these 
offers* 8a}*s that Great Britain had thiice interfered on behalf of Buenos 
Aires and adds that the British Minister in Rio de Janeiro favoured the 
Argentine revolution. In 1814 Great Britain by treaty with Spain 
ondertook to prevent her subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, 
and war-stores to the insurgents; yet Rritimh subject*! predominated 
among the [^European ofiiucrs of all nations who joined the insurgents 
on the conclusion of the great war. British ships, ignoring Spanish 
authority and the pretended Spanish blockade, traded with revolutionary 
porta; British commodores in the Pacific, who held a kind of diplomatic 
position, muititaiciing amicable relations with hotli contending parties^ 
generally leaned in sympathy towards the insurgents. 

In 1817-9 the Spanish Government not unnaturally complained 
of tliia attitude of an allied Power. Ageuls from the revolutionary 
Governments raised loans and enlisted soldiers in London undisturbed; 
whole regiments were formed in Great l^ritain, the officers wearing 
Venezuelan uniform in public ; ships, chartered for the Spanish Main, 
wereopenly loaded with military stores and artillery. Finally tlie ablest 
of British Bailors, accompanied by many British offii::ers aud seamen, 
led a fleet against the Spaniards. The mercantile interest generally 
favoured the insurgents, as also did the anxious and growing body of 
subscribei-s to the large loans continually being raised in Loudon by 
revolutionary authorities. Not until 1819 waa a tardy and ineffective 
measure passed, after much debate, to prevent enlistment for alien service. 



In Mfty, 1817, Fei-diimud, with the support of Ru«sia, auggeated to 
the Allied Powers that thuy Hhauld aid hiva la reducing the iusurgeuts. 
For nearly a year enniinunicatious parsed on the proposal. But the 
attitude of Great Britaint together with the many and obvious diffi- 
culties of arranging the terms of intervention, led to its abandonment. 
Great Britain waa, liowever, bouud hy alliance with the Powers and with 
Spain ; and, when, in February, 1819, the United States commuuicatod 
to her their intention of receiving a Consul from Buenos Aires and 
expressed a hope for the recognition of the new States by Great Britain 
and the Euiopean Powers, ('astlei-eagh replied that the hope of peace 
on the basis of Spanish supremacy with improved administration was 
still entertained by the European Alliance. In 1817-8 the United 
States sent Commissioners aud soon afterwards Consuls to Spanish 
America ; and in 1822 they recognised the national independence of 
Colombia, Chile, Buenos Aires, and Mexico. Meantime, as the ultimate 
success of Spain became more hopeless, particularly after 1820, Groat 
Britain found her ambiguous attitude more unsatisfactory and was 
drifting away from the policy of the European Alliance. Since 1790 or 
even since 1702 trade had been the cliief motive of British policy 
concerning Spanish America; and now the British trade which had 
recently sprung up suffered much from the confusion of authority and 
from the swarms of West Indian pirates, who, calling themselves royalist 
or patriot privateers, attacked unarmed ships of all nations. 

At the Congress of Verona (1822) the British envoy, Wellington, 
present-ed a note to the effect that Great Britain had been obliged to 
recognise the existence Je/atr^o of several Governments so far as to treat 
with them ; that pirates could only be extirpated by co-operation with 
tb« actual authorities on the const; and that such oo-operation must 
lead t« further recogiiition. To this suggestion the French envoy re- 
turned an ambiguous answer; the other Powers rejected any suggestion 
of recognition so long as Spain should maintain her claims. The 
subsequent proceedings of the Congress, the proposal of France to send 
an armed force into the PeninHula, the adhesion of the other Poweis, 
the protest and withdrawal of the British envoy, are related in other 
chapters of this volume. 

Great Britain, now detached from the European Alliance, was 
threatened with the danger of French supremacy not only in Spain, but 
also in the Indies, a danger similar to that which she had opposed by 
arms in 1702 13 and in 1808-14. In March, 1823, juat before the French 
invasion of Spain, Canning intimated to France that Great Britain con- 
sidered the separation of the (Colonies from S])ain as accomplished ; adding 
that their formal recognition was a question of time and circumstauces* 
that Great Britain intended no territorial acquisition in Spanish Amerioa, 
and that she waa satisfied that France had no such design. In August 
the French umy* having traversed Spain, was beaieging Cadiz ; and iu 



1823-30] 



.(tnmnff and the United SUtteB 



309 
> 



view of a proposed conference of the AUiea to settle the affairs \>t 
Spanish America, Canning anxiously sought the co-operation of tho 
United States in a policy which, while leaving the ground open for 
ail amicable uettlemeat between Spain and the Colonies, sliould oppose 
the acquidition of any part of Spanish Amorica by any otlier Power. 
The Uuited States Minister in London undertook to pledge hia Goveni- 
ment to this co-operation, if Great Hritain would protnptly recognise 
the independence of the new States. Canning declined immediate 
recognition ; and accordingly the two Governments, having certain 
objects in common but differing in their attitude both towards 
Spanish America and towanls the Kuropean continent, proceeded to 
tdce separate action. Co-operation was made more difficult by Canning's 
desire to prevent the Uuited States from obtiurjing complete supremacy 
over both American continents, and also by the determination of the 
United States to avoid any engagement which would limit their free- 
dom of action. In October, 1823, Canning told the French ambassador 
that Great Hritain would recognise the new States if Krance should 
employ force against them, and clearly signified uncompromiuing oppo- 
sition to any such actioa. In December, President Monroe addressed 
to Congress his famous message, aimed not particularly at France but 
at the designs of the Holy Alliance and at any possible European 
aggression or advance in America. Meanwhile, in the autumn of 1B23, 
Canning had prepared the way for closer relations with the new States 
by sending British Commissioners to visit Spanish America and by 
appointing British Consuls. Finally in January, 1825, Great Britain 
recognised the independence of Buenos Aires, Colombia, and Mexico. 
Canning, altliough his delay in recognition had lost him the co-opera- 
tion of the United States, had nevertheless succeeded in his main object 
of thwarting French designs beyond tho Atlantic. His apprebensiojis 
had not been unfounded, for Chateaubriand had intended that French 
princes should reign in Spanish America. 

Unhampered as were the United States by European connexions, 
their official attitude towards the new Stales actually constituted was 
more candid and generous thau that of Great Britain; but on the 
other hand it should bo noted that the United States, by prohibiting 
Mexican and Colombian designs for the liberation of Cuba and !*orto 
Rico, prevented the completion of emancipation and secured Spanish 
dominion in tho Antilles for seventy-five years longer. The action of the 
United States and of Great Britain fixed the status of the new Republics, 
although Spain kept up the pretence of prosecuting the war down to 
18.S0. About that date the Papal See, which at firet had denounced 
rebellion and commanded submission, established definite relations with 
the new Republics, a matter perhaps not less essential to them than the 
recognition by Spain which in turn they severally received in the course 
of the following five-and-twenty years. 



i 



CHAPTER X 



BRAZIL AND PORTUGAL 



/ 



On November 29,1807, the Regent Dora John» accompanied by his 
mother, tlio itisaue Queen Maria I, his wifo Carlota Joaquiua, his two 
sons and six daughters, with a numerous following of nobles and 
fimctionaries and tlie treasure of the kingdom^ set sail from the Tagus for 
Brazil. Thia event marks an epoch alike iu the history of Portu^l and 
of ite great ti-ansatlantlc Colony. 

On the following day, November 1^0, a French array undi^r Junot 
occupied Lisbon. Portugal had long been an object of special dislike 
to Napoleon on account of its traditioiial relations of friundbhip with 
England; and by a treaty concluded at Fontainebleau between France 
and Spain (October 29) it had been agreed that the two Powers should 
jointly invade Portugal and divide its teixiloiy between them. Feeling 
resistance to be bopwless, Doin John, after establishing a Council of 
Regency, betook himsolf with the entire roj-al family on board the 
fleet, and, leaving his country to the protection of England, sought 
refuge in Rio de Janeiro. The history of Portugal during the eventful 
years that elapsed between the date of this event and the Congress 
of Vienna has already been ti-eated in a previous volume. It is other- 
wise with the affairs of Brazil. The transference of the Court to 
Kio de Janeiro had such an influence, immediate and far-reaching, upon 
the position and the development of the Colony as to demand a brief 
notice. 

The Importance of Portugal at the close of the eighteenth century 
rested to no small extent upon her possession of Brazil. The mere areii 
of Brazil, with its 3700 miles of Atlantic sea-board and inland depth 
of some 2500 miles, was enormous; It was rich in fertile territury, in 
gold, and diamonds; and it |>03scs8ed in the liiver Amazon and its 
tributaries the most magnificent navigable river system in the world. 
That so small a people bad been able to occupy and administer success- 
fully this vast dependency across the seas is one of the wonders of 
history; unfortunately, as the ('olony had grown and thriven and had 
acquired a vigorous life of its own, the distant motherland bad never 

310 



1807-16] Brazil. Dom JohrCs advent and rule 311 



risen to Any high conception of ita duties to the daughter Sta,te. Ereii 
the ideas of Pombal upon political economy and freedom of commerce 
had been no more enlightened than thaso of his contomporaries, and hia 
reforms, nfUjr his fall, had ceased to be carried out. The traditiomd 
policy, which held that Colonies existed solely for tlie benefit of the 
home country, even after the severe blow it had received by the revolt 
of the Britiali North American Colonies, had continued up to 1807 to 
govern the relations between Portugal and Brazil. All intercourse and 
commerce Ixitween Brazil and foreign uiiLions way prohibited. The 
vessels of allies were occasionally permitted to visit certain ports ; 
but the crews *vere only allowed to land under supervision. All mauu- 
facturea, except that of sugar, were forbidden ; and the Crown drew 
vast revenues from the tithes, which under a Papal Hull it had appro- 
priated, and from the royalties of the gold and diamond mines. With 
the arrival of the Prince Regent and the establishment of the seat of 
govemmtmt at Rio, all tliis was abruptly changed. A royal decree of 
January 28. 1808, tlirew opsn the ports of Brazil to the commerce of all 
fi-iendly nations. Industries were freed from all restrictions ; and the 
exploration of the interior was encouraged. Supreme tribunals were 
created; and a Nation,il Hank, a Royal Printing Press, a Military 
Academy, and a Medical School wore established. Tliese reforms were 
in no small measure due to British influence, which was dominant in the 
Portuguese Court; and there can be no doubt that the concession of 
freedom of trade was highly advantageous to British coujmorce. 

The Brazilians welcomed the advent of the royal family with no 
little enthusiasm; and the measures taken by the Prince Regent for 
promoting the welfare of the country gave him at first considerable 
popularity. But Dom John, though well-meaning, was weak, indolent, 
and undecided; and ho had to provide for the crowd of needy adven- 
turers, ecclesiastics, nobles, and officials, who had followed him. The 
ex^Kinses of the Omrt were enormous, and compelled iho Regent to raise 
money by a lavish distribution of offices and honours. Titulary dis- 
tinctions had been hitherto almost unknown in Brazil, and they were 
now eagerly sought : and native Brazilians vied with emigrant I'ortuguese 
in soliciting royal favours and places. It was said that Dmn John 
conferred more honorary insignia while he was in Brazil, than had all the 
Kings of the House of Braganza who had preceded him. 

With the return of peace the Portuguese ho]>ed that the Court, 
whose prodigality continued to impose in its absence heavy charges on 
the impoverished tinauces of Portugal, would return to Lisbon ; but 
Dom John had become attached to his life at Rio de Janeiro, and 
pi-eferred to remain where he was. Oo March 20, 1816, the mad Queen 
Maria I died; and the Prince Regent, who had already, by a decree of 
January 16. 181G, declared Bi-azil to be a kingdom, on ascending the 
throne assumed the title of John VI. King of Portugal, Brazil, and the 



i 



Algarves. This elevation of Urazil to the rank of a kingdom, and the 
resolve o( the King to fix liis residence at its t^apital, caused tlie jjro- 
foundest dissatisfaction in Portugal, whicli saw itaeii in danger of 
becoming a dependency of its former colony. 

The position of John VI in Hrazil itself was, however, not free from 
disquietude. The additional burdens imposed upon the country had 
aroused considerable dissatisfaction in the northern provinces, especially 
iu Pernambuco. The revolt of the Spanish Colonics found an echo in 
BraKil, and already in 1814 a secret organisation was working for the 
establishment of a republican form of government. To render his 
position more secnre, Dom John took advantage of the peace in Europe 
to summon a Iwdy of 4500 veteran trooi*, who had served in the 
Peninsular War, to garrison Rio de Janeiro and Bahia. In 1817 the 
revolution broke out prematurely in Pernambuco ; but the rebels were 
unable to make any stand against tlie diaciplined force sent against ihem