The campaign in Bohemia, 1866

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■■-■— * *

^

\

SAARBRUCK TO PARIS, 1B70: A
Strategical Sketch.

By Lieut-Col. SISSON C. PRATT, late kjl Sketch**
ind Mjps. 51. net.

" This; is the first issue of a Special Campaign Strut planned
by the publishers, which soldiers, especially junior officers,
should find of very great value. The idea is to describe, from
a purely technical point of view, the famous campaigns oi the
19th centnry. and though it is probable that the editor will try
to confine comment mainly to the strategy of the wars dealt
with, readers may count upon the various writers affording
tseful tactical bints based on their reading of the material dealt
with." — Glasgow Herald.

lupplied »ilh

" Tbi« strategical sketch is the first volume of a Special Cam-
paign Series which promise? to be of great value as a military
clia book, and to the military student. Such a volume makes
(tody a pleasure, and we hope that it will have a long list of
■iiccessors." — Notts. Guardian

" A volume (the first) in the Special Campaign Series, sketch-
ing the strategy of the German invasion of France in 1870.
Others are to deal with the Iiusso-Turkish war, and if they
maintain the present high quality, tbe series (or a volume of it
certainly) ought to find a place, with the proverbial baton, in

y soldier's knapsack. The maps and sketches are clear, full,

excellent." — Pall Mall Gazette.

" The series will certainly make a unique place for itself on
" shelves, if all the volumes display the brilliant qualities of
initial volume." — Birmingham Post.

" CcL Pratt is first in the field with a volume on the war
which has been selected as the Special Campaign to be read up
by officers preparing for the Competitive Examinations for
Commissions in the Army to be held in September. 190;, and
lUrch. 1906. It is fortunate for those who have to prepare to

e the euminrr that Col. Pratt has

to tbe compilation of volumes on Military History.
that the Series will not only be useful for examination purposes,
a tbe nucleus of an interesting library for the military

-■■,-,. i-,r.: ■

-United Service Gazette,

" The hook will be of especial interest to military men at the

Chen another war is showing every day how steadily

— Manchestm

" So long a time has elapsed since a military history serif*
has been offered to British soldiers, that Messrs. Sonnenschein
may claim the credit of bringing to fruition a virtually new idea.
With the limitations common to all or almost all British military
writers, the book before us is of great merit. We should select
tor particular notice the vigorous and even dramatic account
of the Sedan Campaign. The book is well illustrated by a good
general map and numerous sketch maps." — Broad Arrow

" It gives a succinct account of the campaign, taking each
episode in turn, and criticising the strategy of either side. Num-
erous diagrams and maps help to elucidate the text of a little
book, which will be of obvious use to the student of military
tactics, hut may be stronglv recommended to a wider circle of
readera." — Yorkshihb Post.

" An excellent sketch of what remains the roost instructive
of modern wars, accompanied by admirable maps upon which
the student can follow the tactical as well as the strategical opera-
tions of the campaign. Altogether this is a very valuable book."
— United Sbrvicb Magazine.

" Lt.-Col. Pratt, in his strategical sketch, presents a com-
pendium of the drama of the Franco- Prussian war. from the open-
ing scene on the banks ol the Saar, to the fall of the curtain upon
beleagured Paris. The story, charged as it is with lessons
for the soldier and statesman, is no less instructive to the general
reader, in whose mind a careful study of the respective con-
ditions of the opposing forces will leave but little doubt that
victory was assured to the Germans before a shot had been
fired. . . . The student of military history need search no
further than the little volume under review in order to discover
the chief causes that led to the swift and complete collapse of ■
Power esteemed by Europe so formidable a lighter that at the
commencement of the war the great majority of maps intended
to illustrate the campaign were prujected eastward of the Rhine
The author's account of the German scheme of mobilization is
very interesting and suHRestive. So thorough is the organ isation
that every reservist in t'nc land knows the position assigned to
him at the call to arms." — Madras Mail.

" The intention underlying this Series is excellent, to bring
the main outlines of the campaign within the purview of many
officers who have neither the time nor the opportunity to study
for themselves a more detailed account. Special mention must
be made of the ten excellent sketches and maps included in the
volume. We would add that the form of treatment in this
excellent Series should bring these books into the hands of
good many others besides those with whom war it a business."
DARliniTON Times.

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877:
A Strategical Sketch.

By MAJOR F. MAURICE (The Sherwood Por-
ter*). With 3 Maps. Crown 8vo. 58. net.

" No strident who can find time to give Major Maurice's work
s doe attention should neglect a single page of the narrative.
*~e story is told so succinctly that the imagination is brought
play throughout, and y^t no single detail necessary for the
tit direction of the student's imagination is omitted. The
jnd, sober common -sense he displays throughout in dealing
rith tactical problems merits the highest commendations in
in which all sense of comparative hi'torical treatment
•> have vanished and given place to modern theories.
maps provided are exceptionally good and obviously
d with the greatest possible care." — Broad Arrow.

■ ■■ ■. second volume of a very useful Special Campaign
titt, and will prove of great value to officers of all ranks,
npeciatly to those who have leanings towards the study of
jilary history, a very necessary disposition in these days, when
« officer has to look to proficiency in his profession as the only
'sole means (or obtaining advancement. The moment appears
pitious for the publication of an account in English, and
! have carried Oot this work in a more capable
r than Major Maurice has done. The book is well got
1. well bound in a neat cover, and has several maps to assist
= jtuiieiit." — United Service Gazette.

npratentioni little liook— a companion to Ssarbruck
■ ■ fans. 1870 — deals merely with the strategy and major tactics
il the decisive part of the campaign in Europe. There is at the
nd a large scale map of the theatre of war in Bulgaria, based
n the Austrian survey in 1SS1 of the Balkan States." — ACADEMY.

" Written with well-considered conciseness and usefully
.nipped with illustrative maps, few hooks, if any. could be
«nd better fitted for military students and junior officers
-axons of a knowledge of the lessons which the campaign has
r a soldier." — Scotsman.

" This volume maintains the credit of the series admirably.
tajor Maurice does not pretend to give a complete history of
tjf war, but in fact, except that the final phase of the campaign
after the fall of Plevna is very rapidly summarized, the war is
very fully and minutely described indeed, considering the limit
set by the style of toe volume. The student is indebted to

Major Maurice for the perfection with which the text is related
to the first-class pocket maps, which are on more adequate
scales." — Glasgow Herald.

" There is little English literature dealing with this campaign,
and a comprehensive strategical sketch such as Major Maurice
gives in the present work was badly needed by the military
student. It is a comprehensive and methodical survey of the
whole campaign, and he has not failed to underline the points
of principal application to English students." — Manchester
Guardian.

" Of very great value as a military class book. There is no
other way of aquiring the art of war than lay studying the
great campaigns of the past, and such a book as this renders
the task much simpler and the subject much more intelligible
to junior officers." — Nottingham Guardian.

"Asa strategical sketch of a great war here is an excellent
example. The main outlines of the campaign are described,
together with the crucial episodes, but the chief aim is to advance
what has been termed the science of war. A number of maps
and diagrams serve to illustrate the text and enhance consider-
ably the value of the book as a means of military instruction."
—Leeds Mercury.

««

Major Maurice makes the Russo-Turkish campaign deeply
interesting, and brings the lessons of Plevna home to islanders
to whom that struggle means much. The maps and plans are
extremely clear and are not overburdened with detail."— West
Sussex Gazette.

FREDERICKSBURG:

War.

A Study

With Maps and Plans.

" The story is very effectively told by Major Redway. a
listinguished member ol that increasing band of British officers
o satisfactorily disprove the once general impression, that
i oi high intellectual abilities and abundant professional
" not too rarely to be found in our army. The
student of military history will be well rewarded by following
this succinct narrative assimilating the tactical lessons of the
great battle. He will see that the final success was the prize
of the most capable general. He was an undoubted master of
war. and his opponent Buraside decidedly his inferior in military
capacity." — Pall Mall Gazette.

" Major Redway's narrative is full of instruction for every
thoughtful and even for every well-read soMier. His criticisms
are lair, temperate and made with an appreciation of the real
nature of war which we look for in vain in most of our historians
of war." — Broad Arrow.

" This is the third volume of the ' Special Campaign ' series of
books which are now being published by the above named enter-
prising firm, and in full maintains the standard of excellence
established by its predecessors. In a pocket at the end of the
book are four excellent maps of the Eastern Theatre of War and
of Fredericksburg and its neighbourhood, all particularly
dear, and none of them, as is often the case, overladen with
detail." — United Service Magazine.

' It is no faint praise to say that its merits as a literary study
of war rival those of its predecessors." — Army and Navy

CaaoncLx,

" Rich in interest for soldiers who wish to understand how a
powerful enemy may be beaten by raising the price of success,
and wearing out rather than overthrowing his forces. Well
baaed historical studies concisely written, and finished with a
good equipment of instructive special maps, the work forms a
valuable accession to the scenes in which it appears." — Scotsman.

" Major Redway has made a very valuable addition to the
.*eial Campaign Series, and also a more than useful contribution
o the history of the American Civil War. For he has evidently
!, pains and indubitable skill to the study of the mass
J available to the student, and han produced a story
If -contain etl. careful, vivid, as well as specialty adapted by its.

method for the military student. All the important movements
and dispositions of the troops on either side are lucidly detailed,
and can be followed on the maps, of which there are five as admir-
able specimens of cartography as one would expect in a much
more ambitious military work." — Glasgow Herald.

" The present volume presents a striking contrast to the story
of a European campaign, From Saarbr&ck to Paris, with which
the series commenced, and Major Redway has done his work
admirably. His chapter on the ' American soldier — his social
status and professional ability ' is one of the best studies on the
subject that ever came under our notice."— Guardian.

" The very fact that in the American War the South was so over-
matched in wealth and resources makes all the more interesting
a close study of their tactics and their strategy, influenced as
these on both sides were by political as well as military considera-
tions. The ' Campaign Series ' ought to be found in every
military library." — Yorkshire Post.

" The book offers an instructive contrast in methods adopted
by an unskilful general on one side and by a great master oi war
on the other." — Manchester Guardian.

" While dealing mainly with the technical details of the cam-
paign, the author's narrative is so lucid and so skilfully told
that it may be followed with enjoyment and ease by the tyro, as
well as the expert in military matters." — Dundee Advertiser,

IAGENTAAND SOLFERINO, 1859.

COL. H. C. WYLLY, C.B. (late Sherwood
Foresters). With Maps and Plans. Crown 8vo. 5/. net.

I cud Campaign series form an interesting addition to

tore of war. From the popular and historical side

few campaigns have escaped exhaustive treatment, but there

is still room for guidance as to Hie tactical and strategical

It are plentifully available. The Special Campaign

s will here prove of value. The book is the first serious

«udy of the war in Northern Italy which has appeared in the

English language," — Scotsman.

I My's careful study of this short, and, on the side of
the French, skilfully conducted war will be fresh ground to
most of his readers. Officers and military students will find
Cut Wvllv's book a useful addition to tlieir working library." —
Manchester Giahdijiv.

" Col. Wylly has had the advantage of nil the official accounts

hi Eun-jpi- mi the li:mi!li[i^ or tin- i-usilcuiSmj

armies. And, with his own ripe experience to guide him. h.

has produced a book of considerable practical value." — York

shire Post.

l-:

■

This 15 the fourth volume oi the Special Campaign series—

led to supply military men, and more particularly

or officers, with technical and critical descriptions of the

ous campaigns of the nineteenth century. That which Col.

Wylly has made the subject of his study possesses several

i special interest." — Glasgow Herald.

We have before spoken of the practical value to military
tnd junior officers of the Special Campaign series
■ hicli draw the professional lessons of a scries of operations so
clearly and simply that the merest tyro can profit by them.
None o* them have been more interesting and instructive than
No 4. Nothing could be better than the unbiassed and straight-
forward way in which Col. Wylly details the plain facts of
what was done, both in the movement oi troops and in handling
them in contact with the enemy." — Notts Guardian.

" This makes the fourth volume in

I it has already done so much

military history and to aid officers 10

iliat subject that are no

■ in the profession of arm:

iSlCLS.

the Special Campaign

further the study of
prepare for the many

1 required for a success -
" — Army and Naw

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

1866

THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN
SERIES

Price 5*. net each,

I. SAARBRCCK TO PARIS : The
Franco-German War. By Col.
S issoN C. Pratt, late R. A.

II. THE RUSSO.TURKISH WAR,
1 877. By Major F. Maurice.

III. FREDE RICKSBURG : A STUDY IN

WAR, 1862. By Major G. W.
Rio way.

IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA

and SOLFERINO, 1859. By Col.
H. C Wylly, CB.

V. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.
By Col. Simon C. Pratt, late R.A.

VI. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA
1866. By Lt.-Col. G. J. R.
GlOnickk.

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. 6

THE CAMPAIGN IN
BOHEMIA

1866

By
LT.-COL. G. J. R. GLUNICKE

WITH MAPS AND PLANS

LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM
Niw Yo«i : THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

■9°7

PREFACE

Although the war which is the subject of this volume
had the most far-reaching consequences in the re-estab-
tishment of the German empire and the altered equili-
brium of the European powers, it seems never to have
attracted great attention in England ; indeed, the author
has been surprised to find, in military circles as well as
in general society, how little the history of this war is
known. And yet within a few years after its conclu-
sion many books and pamphlets were written in Austria,
Prussia and France, sharply criticising or eagerly de-
fending the strategy and tactics of that memorable
four weeks' campaign.

The narrative is based on the histories of the war
written by the Prussian aud the Austrian general staffs,
and the plans of the battlefields are reproductions of
those drawn by Prussian officers detailed for their survey
daring the time of the armistice aud the simultaneous
occupation of Bohemia that preceded the conclusion of
peace. A map of Germany showing her subdivisions
before the war has been added. This will appeal to
students more readily and more effectively than an
ordinary chapter on the geography of the country

xiv PREFACE

The author hopes that this historical essay will be
found capable of interesting as well as instructing those
whom he has had the privilege of reckoning among
his pupils, and that it will also be found useful by those
students of military history who have so far looked in
vain for an account at once accurate and concise of the
events of this particular campaign.

G. J. R. GLUNICKE
Mostyn Hall,
May, 1907.

WORKS CONSULTED:

Der Feldzug von 1866 in Deutschland. Redigirt von der Kriegs-
geechichtlichen Abterlung dee Groesen Qeneralstabe.

Osterreichs Kdmpfe im Jahre 1866. Nach Feldacten bearbeitet
duroh das K.K. Generalstabs-Bureau fur Kriegsgeschichte.

CONTENTS

CHAP. PAGE

I The Causes of the War .... 1

II The Opposing Powers 17

HI Mobilisation and Initial Movements . . 35

IV Comments on the Prussian Plan of Campaign . 57

V Invasion of Bohemia 75

VI Events on June 28 and 29 . .99

VII Austrian Retreat 125

VIII The Battle of Koniggratz .149

IX The Retreat and Pursuit .... 173

X The End — The Combat of Blumenau . . 199

Appendix I 209

II 211

III 217

»»

IV 218

99

XV

xvi CONTENTS

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS

FACES
PAGE

I. Sketch of the Projected March of the 2nd

Prussian Army 70

II. Sketch of the Positions of the Units of the
1st Prussian Army on the 24th and 25th
of June . • . 78

III. Sketch of the Positions of the Opposite Forces

on the Evening of the 26th of June . . 84

-, < IV. Map of Germany in 1866 . n . . . \

V. Map of Theatre of Operations n .

-, <4- VI. Plan of Podol-Munchengratz . « .

a I VQ. Plan of Trantenau and Soor . «

^ VULL Plan of Nachod, Skautz and Schweinschadbl.

< ^ IX. Plan of Podkost . 4 . . . ~

"*■ * X. Plan of Gitschin . . 4 . . / i

•" <* XL Plan of Koniginhof . . * .

4 y XII. Position of Forces on the Evening of the 2nd

of July . . « .

Xm. Plan of Koniggbatz . y

v vv XIV. Plan of Blumbnau . . +

J

*3

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

B

CHAPTER I

The Causes of the War

Yon any student of Military History who is not
satisfied with merely following the events of the great war
of 1800 and learning the lessons conveyed by the first
battles fought under new conditions of fire tactics, but
who also wishes to glean and understand the interesting
circumstances which brought about that momentous
struggle, it is necessary to submit with patience to the
perusal of a concise narrative of the political events
which took place in the Germanic body after 1848.

In that year, ever memorable on account of the wave of
revolution which swept through Europe and made even
the lime-honoured throne of the Hapsburgs shake in
its very foundations, the fervent wishes of thousands
•A enlightened German patriots were raised in hopeful
expectation of a better and worthier political existence
than that afforded by the rotten conditions of the old
" Bund," which after the wars against Napoleon had
been patched up again in its obsolete and anti-national
form by princes who disregarded, when smiled on by
victory, the promises of constitutional institutions
which they had proffered to their subjects in the hour
of deep distress and slavish misery under the foreign

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

political
hat the

l-hn first

May. 1849

yoke. The clamour of the whole nation for a politi

renovation rang out bo loud and unmistakable that
governments were obliged to allow the election of the first

National Assembly which met at Frankfurt-

ay ' ' A on-the-Main, and was composed of delegates

from all states and provinces of Germany. This assembly

was much divided between monarchical and republican

principles, but after long labours it produced
■ completed proposal of a German con-
stitution based on the following institutions. There was
to be a "Reichstag" consisting of two bodies- (1) a
" Staatcnhaus," composed of members nominated in
equal numbers by the governments and by the people's
representatives of the various stares ; (2) a " Volkshaus,"
composed of deputies elected by the whole nation : a
monarchical imperial power was to be invested with the
prerogative of a merely suspensive veto.

During the debates on these subjects two parties
gradually formed themselves ; the Great- Germanics
(Pan-Germans), who wanted to retain in the German
empire the German provinces of Austria, and the Little-
Germanics, who wanted to exclude Austria from the Dei
empire, and wished for a closer amalgamation imdi
the hegemony of Prussia, which, in 1813, had certain!;
led the van in the great national rising against Na]
Icon's dictatorship and had made the greatest sacrifii
in the battles which drove the foreign legions from
German soil.

In April 1849 a deputation of

National Assembly offered to King Frederick
William IV. of Prussia the dignity of Emperor of the
Germans, but he refused it on the ground that he could

April, 1849

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

5

only accept the imperial dignity with the consent of all
the German governments, and at the personal request
of all the princes of the Bund. A number of deputies
were recalled by their governments after this demon-
stration and the passing of the draft of the new German
constitution, or seceded voluntarily from the Frankfurt
National Assembly, and a so-called Rump Parliament,
formed at Darmstadt by democratic, members only, was
dissolved.

In February 1850 the King of Prussia

iBso 7 ' a1 "' tnP iwo P rua8 ' an houses of deputies took

the oath on a revised constitution, and the

Prussian government now endeavoured to create a new

German confederation with the exclusion of Austria : this

object was actively supported by a party in favour of a

hereditary imperial throne. A so-called "Three Kings'

League "' was formed between Prussia, Hanover and

Saxony, and was at once joined by the princes of most of

the small German states ; but it was soon practically

dissolved againbythe secession of Hanover and Saxony,

who feared the grasping ini]>erious supremacy of Prussia.

a parliament was opened at Erfurt, and

witlun a month completed the task of

producing the constitution for a new German

League.

Austria had in the meantime been endangered in her
very existence by the rebellions in Vienna and Prague,
and still more so (chiefly) by the nearly successful
•traggle of the Hungarians for national independence,
and by the rising of her North Italian provinces ; but
when her government had at length been relieved from
its flsjHgjMliniii position— mainly by the armed assist-

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

ance of Rusaia — it had at once protested against the
attempt of the King of Prussia to establish any new
form of union in Germany : it declared that the reso-
lutions of the Erfurt Parliament were invalid, that the
old relations of all the German states amongst each
other under the ascendency of Austria remained in full
strength, and that at the most it would consent to
some modifications of the old constitutions. Accord-
ingly, it invited all the German governments to a
congress at Frankfurt to enter upon discussions on such
points, but, in reply, Prussia denied the existence of the
old Federal Constitution, and the princes of the numerous
petty states which had formed the new League assem-
bled at Berlin. Although at this " Congress
of Princes " the Elector of Hesse-Kassel
declared his withdrawal from the League, the other
princes accepted the Prussian proposal of a permanent
" Princes' Conference."

Austria opposed and counteracted these aspirations
of Prussia by the reopening of the Frankfurt Bundestag
on September 2 : the controversy between the old and
a new Germany was to be decided by force of will or by
force of arms, the struggle was to be between Austria
and Prussia, and the " mau of blood and iron " who had
then already set Ins mind on the solution of that question,
was soon to appear on the political arena of Ger
many.

In consequence of a rising of the people of H*
Kassel in defence of their constitution against th<
prince, the Elector, the latter left his country
appealed for help to the Bundestag, ^whicli granted
armed assistance, and appointed the Austrian General

uer-

esse.

their
and

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

Haynau, as military dictator of the principality. Prussia
[, and nearly all the Hessian officers resigned
. . . their co tn missions, hi consequence there

was a rupture between Fnissia and Austria,
and the Emperor Nicholas of Russia was
appealed to by both aides : he was closely related to
■ ■! Prussia, but, being intent on continuing to
play the part of protector nf Austria, whose monarchical
Ion he had saved by the defeat of the Hun-
garian national armies, he decided in favour of the
claims of the reactionary Austrian Government, who
also obtained the support of the Kings of Bavaria and
Wiirtemberg. The Bundestag now decided upon mili-
tary proceedings against Hesse, i.e. to suppress the
popular rebellion by force of arms, and ordered Austrian
and Bavarian troops to enter the principality for that
purpose. The Prussian Government now also sent troops
■■■. and seemed, at the time, determined to
oppose the execution of the mandate of the Bundestag :
it remained for the King to decide between armed
resistance to Austria and the humiliation of the com-
plete abandonment of Prussia's claim to leadership in
any German union. For some time conflicting influences
King hesitate, but his army was not then in
a to fight with any prospect of success against
the Austrian forces, which were returning victorious
from the fighting in Italy, and he was also intimidated
aded position taken up by the Czar in favour of
Austria. In consequence he had to consent
1850 ' t° the disastrous and mmuHatuig Conwn/tono/
in which he submitted to Austria's

TV rrwlui ■ .'.ntinrir folt Hie National ilin-

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

categorical demands for the dissolution of the Prussian
League, the recognition of the Federal Diet (the old
Bund) of 1615 as still existing, and the evacuation of
Hesse by the Prussian troops ; he also had to accept
settlement of affairs in Hesse and in Schleswig-Holstein
by the Federal Diet. The Austrian Prime Minister had
even desired to obtain, in addition, the concession that
the entire Austrian empire should form part of the
German Federation, but this proposal of a Central
European power of seventy millions of inhabitants con-
trolled by the Cabinet of Vienna did not suit the views of
foreign powers : England protested that such an amal-
gamation of forces would upset the balance of power in
Europe, and France expressed the same opinion in threat-
ening language, so that the project had to be dropped,

The sacrifice of her political dignity and importance
to which Prussia had thus been forced by Austria was
bitterly resented by the educated classes of the great
Frederick's proud nation, and was felt, with great disap-
pointment and deep humiliation, by all true German
patriots as the deathblow to their hopes and aspirations.
In Prussia this unfortunate event was followed by the
introduction of a reactionary system of governmei
marked by subservience and hypocrisy, by petty perse-
cution and mean oppression ; her best, most intellectual
and enlightened citizens suffered under a hateful police
regime, 1 their highest and noblest political aims were

grace so keenly that lie committed suicide after having presented
liis official report.

1 The author's iiiathenialii-al professor at school had undergone
twelve years imprisonment in a fortrcsn bpMOM as sluilent he had
indulged in expressing too libival ideas in speeches and in draft* of
puiiipHleln -ti/i-.l |.v |ii.

o

d
>f

:

d
t

e
.1

:

i.
ice

fas

m£

an

he
art

se-

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

.he objects of suspicion and vague apprehension to the
birri of a degraded government : no more could be
loped for Prussia's or Germany's liberty under existing
circumstances, all hope bad to be deferred to a future
period.

King Frederick William IV. died and was
im7 *' Bucc e e <led by his brother William, the Prince
Regent, who, in 1850, had been strongly
opposed to Prussia's submission to the Convention of
Mini ut z, and who had the firm conviction that his country
s entitled to hold a higher place in Germany and in
FiinifM- than she had enjoyed in his brother's reign. He
a certainly a firm believer in the divine right of kings,
■ ut did not object to a certain amount of liberalism,
md when, as Regent, he dismissed his brother's narrow-
lindod, reactionary, Austrophobe ministry, he raised
lopes anew which had been given up in 1850. But
soon there arose a conflict l>etween him, when King, and
his parliament on account of heavy extra grants of
money demanded for the reorganisation of the army,
the reason fur which was not evident to the representa-
tives of the people, and which met with very strong
opposition. In his difficult position the King, wishing
to strengthen himself, appointed as Foreign Minister
and President of the Cabinet Otto von Bismarck, who
had been a member of the United Prussian Parliament in
, and from 1351 Prussia's representative at the
jikfurt Bundestag, where, in constant contact with
i overbearing Austrian colleague, he had formed the
that nothing but the military overthrow
Donld give to Germany any tolerable system
f national government., or secure tn Prussia even her

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

legitimate share of influence in the concert of the great
powers. In 1858 he had been sent as Ambassador to
St. Petersburg, where he managed to establish those
friendly relations between Russia and Prussia which
in later years were so eminently useful, bo indispensable
to his policy; and in May, 1862, he had occupied the same
post at the- French Court, when he had his first oppor-
tunity of forming hi.* opinion of Napoleon as a politician.
As Prima Minister he met the refusal of the Prussian
Lower House to pass the military budget by a dissolu-
tion, and, aided by the War Minister, General von Roon,
influenced the King in cynical disregard of all consti-
tutional rights to rule without parliament, being deter-
mined to carry out, against and in spite, of all opposition,

his plans, which could not even be hinted at
1861 ' *° tne P" ?' 6 without the chance of raising

Austria's suspicions. When a congress of
German princes was assembled at Frankfurt by the
Emperor Francis Joseph with the object of remodelling
the constitution of the Federation, King William was
induced hy Bismarck to refuse the most pressing am
flattering invitations to attend, so that the meetii
dissolved without any result.

Frederick VIII, King of Denmark, dii
"""gg^ In accordance with the London Protocol

1852 — not recognised by the German Bundi
tag — he was succeeded as king of the whole monarch
by Christian IX, who accepted the recently passed
Danish constitution, by which the duchy of Schies 1
was incorporated as an integral part, of the hangdoi
This step produced great excitement all over Germai
where public opinion was strongly in favour nt the 0O1

that
more
the i
syste
That

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR n

plete separation of Schles wig- Hols tein from Denmark
to be independent duchies under Prince Frederick of
ibiifg, and to he attached to the German
Federation as it then existed. But Bismarck intended
that Schleswig and Hobtein should be incorporated
more or less directly with Prussia, and should be made
the means of the destruction of the existing Federal
i-stern and of the expulsion of Austria from Germany.
That another petty state should lie added to the number
of those whicli acted as Austria's vassals and instruments,
mold in bis eyes have been detrimental to the interests
of Prussia, and lie determined to prevent this calamity
n spite of all the short-sighted opposition of her tinsus-
> people.
Austria and Prussia, as signatories of the London
Protocol, were obliged to recognise the succession of
Christian IX, but the public opinion of Germany de-
manded from the Federal Diet the at least temporary
:, of the two duchies. Under the influence of
S and Austria, the Diet determined on the oceupa-
BoUtein only as belonging to Germany, for
which purpose Hanoverian and Saxon troops were
A and despatched. Now Prussia and Austria
lemanded of Denmark to renounce the constitution of
tfovomber u opposed to former stipulations (1852), by
which she had promised to respect the ancient rights and
aim* of the two duchies, and when this demand met
with refusal from the Danish Government,
i^6j* t ' Prussian and Austrian troops entered Schles-
wig. The war thus commenced was tiisiur-
afly dixa* tfous to Denmark, and was concluded by the
peace of Vienna (I Ictober 30), by which she was obliged

12 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

to give up Sc hies wig and Holstein in favour of the Allies,
and undertook to recognise the validity of the arrange-
ments which would be made by them fur the governmer
of the two provinces.

After the Federal troops originally charged by thi
Bund with the ejection of the Danes had been recallet
on the motion of Prussia and Austria, these two powers
settled on a joint government for the two duchies,
whilst the question of the succession was being eagerly
discussed at the Federal Diet, in diplomatic negotiations
and in the press, the Austrian and Prussian joint-
commissaries soon found themselves in regrettable con-
flict. In order to terminate this unsuitable arrangement
and to avoid further recurrence of friction, the final
decision on the status of the two duchies was adjourned

sine die, and the Convention of Gastrin was
"|g* ' concluded between Prussia and Austria, by

which it was stipulated that the two powers
reserved for themselves the joint sovereignty over the
two duchies; that Austria was to undertake provisionally
the ad mini strati 011 of Holstein. Prussia that of Schleswig ;
that Kiel was to be a Federal port under the command
of Prussia, who was also to have a line of communication
and of postal and telegraphic connection through Hol-
stein. In execution of this treaty Prussia occupied
Schleswig, whilst Holstein received an Austrian governoi
and garrison. This arrangement averted the immediate
outbreak of war, peace was made possible for a few
months longer, and thus Bismarck gained time to per-
suade his hesitating king to the adoption of extrern
measures and to carry out some arrangement ■
Austria's enemy outside Germany.

Jol-
lied
nor
iate
few
per-
of extreme
ment with

THE CAUSES OF THE WAR

13

T having been constituted as one kingdom a few
lara previously, mainly by the intervention and assist -
c of Napoleon, was longing for the possession of the
■ovince of Venetia which still remained in the hands of
1, and the prospect of attaining that coveted object
ight well tempt Italian statesmen into an alliance with
ssia. But Bismarck, knowing that they could not act
mut Napoleon's permission, paid a visit to this
whit thought himself a master in the arts of
policy, and induced him in private interviews — no doubt
by verbal promises of an indemnification in the shape of
territories on the French north-east frontier — to put no
obstacle in Italy's way, if her statesmen should be witling
t.i join Prussia, Napoleon evidently thought that Austria
would prove a match for both powers allied, and that
in Mae of an undecided struggle he would be able to act
as mediator at the price of German territory west of the
Rhine. Alter long negotiations a treaty of defensive
and offensive alliance was concluded between
^£ ' Prussia and Italy. As soon as this act was
notified by Napoleon to the Austrian Govern-
ment, the latter offered to Italy the province of Venetia
as price for her neutrality, hoping to compensate them-
taking Silesia from Prussia. The offer was
aclined.

1 the meantime Austria had not ceased to advocate

e recognition of the Prince of Augustenburg as Duke of

j-Holstein and his reception as a sovereign

1 the German Federation, but Prussia had stipu-

i her conditions, if this were to happen, as follows :

r military forces of the two duchies would form an

1! part of the Prussian army and navy, the adminia-

14

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

tration of the post and telegraph was to be under the
Prussian ministerial department, and a few important
military posts on the northern frontier were to be
handed over to Prussia for protection against Danish
aggression. The Austrian Government had permitted
the inhabitants of Hofstein to agitate in favour of the
pretender, and at public meetings a demand was made
for the convocation of the provincial estates. Bismarck
thereupon had taxed Austria with abetting revolution and
had demanded explanations, which were refused by the
Emperor, and on March 16 the Austrian Government
announced that they should refer the affairs of Schleswig-
Holstcin to the Federal Diet. As this step was a clear
breach of the Convention of Gastein, King William was
greatly offended by it, and now fell in more willingly
with the warlike policy of his minister, although
the party at Court in favour of peace was still very
strong. In fact, public opinion in Germany generally and
even in Prussia was greatly incensed against Bismarck,
who was denounced as the criminal instigator of fratri-
cidal war of Germans against Germans : the word
Bwderkrieg was the chief topic of the man in the
street. He had aroused general hatred and indignation,
and even the King had become exceedingly unpopular,
especially in his own capital, as the author can well
remember , the parliament had fought obstinately
against the still more obstinate minister, until it was
prorogued onoe more. An attempt on bis life was made
in the streets of Berlin.

Warlike preparations had begun on both
sides, when invitations to a Congress were
issued jointly by France, England and Russia; but the

May as

intended mediation of the powers was frustrated by the
demand of Austria, that no proposal should be discussed
which might involve an increase of power or territory
to one of the states invited. At the same time Austria
proposed to the Federal Diet to proceed to the settlement
of the affairs of Schleswig-Holstein, and convoked the
H i.i 1st tin Estates by the governor of that province.
Bismarck now declared the treaty of Gastein to be
broken, and ordered the Prussian troops in Schleswig to
enter Holstein, whereupon General von Gablenz with-
drew the Austrian force into Hanoverian territory.
Diplomatic relations were broken ofl between Austria
and Prussia on June 12, and Austria declared in the
Federal Diet the step taken by Prussia as a
breach of the internal peace of the Federa-
she then demanded and obtained by a large
majority of votes the mobilisation of the entire army of
the Federation, exclusive of the Prussian army corps.
Thereupon the representative of Prussia declared that
this act was equivalent to the dissolution of the Federal
■ i left Frankfurt. On the following day Prussia
i of Saxony, Hanover and Hesse-Kassel to
withdraw from the decision of the Federal Diet, to keep
(bur troops on the peace footing and to join a new
League under the leadership of Prussia. As this demand
was refused, Prussian troops marched into these terri-
i the war had begun.

Jtt

THE OPPOSING POWERS

17

corap
fered
whicl

CHAPTER II

A, The Prussian Military System

After the Prussian army and nation had
been laid prostrate in 1806 by the defeats at
Jena and Auerstadt, and after the ignominious treaty of
Tilsit had been concluded, which reduced Prussia to
comparative insignificance, General Scharnhorst prof-
the idea to replace the hitherto professional array,
ich had stood quite outside the people and apart
im i!, by a national army ; in fact, to create a nation
in arms by making every citizen consider it not only his
first duty, but his great privilege to give bis personal
ice for the defence of his country and its institutions,
execution of this principle every citizen was declared
■ iHii^rv service from his 17th to his 45th year
of age, and this system lias remained in force ever since.
By virtue of this law every man pronounced physically
fit had to serve for two years with the colours, whilst
'iuring the remaining years of his liability he passed
through various classes of reserves. The actual term of
lervioe In the line and the re-serves had originally been
at twenty years, but had by 1860 been reduced to
■e years ; the yearly contingent of recruits, originally
St K>,000 from the number of troops which Prussia

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

had been permitted to maintain by the treaty of Tilsit,
had been adhered to, although the population had
doubled under careful administration. This number
had been chosen as representing J per cent, of the popu-
lation in 1807, but at the same percentage the yearly
contingent of recruits in 1860 should have been 80,000.
The King after his succession to the throne desired to
obtain this higher establishment, but met with strong
opposition. Of course, a system of general liability to
military service should be worked in such a way that the
industrial and commercial life and work of the nation
are disturbed by its requirements in as small a degree as
possible, but the military interests demand that all men
be trained, whilst with the colours, so thoroughly that
they can be employed again at any moment with the
certainty of proving themselves efficient. In Germany
two years are considered sufficient for such training, and
this period has recently been adopted again by the
Government instead of the term of three years favoured
by King William, who thought this length of time in-
dispensable and insisted on its introduction in spite of
the strong opposition of his parliament, and even against
the advice of his war minister, who did not consider the
difference worth the conflict wliich it caused between
the crown and the people : the yearly contingent of
recruits was raised from 40,000 to (13,000.

As stated above, ''very male subject of
the state was legally liable to service if pro-
nounced physically fit, but there were various cases of
exemption. Those young men who had attained a
certain educational standard, and who were able and
willing to clothe, equip and maintain themselves during

Personnel

ie
n

THE OPPOSING POWERS

their service with the colours, were only liable to one
year's service, were called volunteers, and could choose
the branch of the service and the regiment in which
they liked to serve. If smart in drill and all other
matters military, they were appointed and admitted as
officers of the reserve of the regiment after duly passing
an examination in military subjects, serving a term of
probation during manceuvres and being elected by the
officers of the regiment. This part of the system pro-
vided and still provides a very strong and efficient
reserve of officers, at present well above 50,000.

The officers of the standing army are obtained from
the pupils of the higher cadet schools, which give a
partly literary, partly military education — free to sons
of officers — and by volunteers of a high educational
standard and certain means, who, after a year's practical
training in the unit, are sent as under officers for another
year to one of the Fahnrich&sckulen, the course at
-miliar to that at our Royal Military College.
As the number of officers required in the large standing
army is exceedingly great and the pay of the lower
grades ts extremely small, the supply is never excessive,
to that entrance does not depend on a competitive
examination, but the colonel of any regiment has it in
his power to refuse admission to a would-be candidate
for a commission : they are called amrtiageurs or officer
aspirants.

The armv was essentially territorial, us the
Organisation . J . ' *

men of each army corps were recruited from

only one province, whilst the Guards were recruited
from the whole kingdom ; there were thus eight army
' tops of Guards, each consisting of

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

two divisions of infantry and additional corps troops.
Each division consisted of two brigades of two regiments
each, and the regiment was divided into three battalions
of four companies ; to each division was attached one
regiment of cavalry and one Abteiluwj of field
artillery, four batteries of six guns each. The corps
troops belonging to each army corps consisted of one
Abteilung of horse artillery of three batteries and one
Abteilung of field artillery of four batteries (thus there
were fifteen batteries or ninety guns in each army
corps), one battalion of jager (sharpshooters— men
drawn mostly from the Royal Forest service), one
battalion of pioneers (engineers), one battalion of train
(Array Service Corps), besides a cavalry brigade of three
regiments. Each army corps also had nine ammuni-
tion columns, one pontoon column and three or fi
field hospitals.

The strength of an infantry battalion on the peace
footing was about GOO men, which on mobilisation was
raised to 1,000 by the addition of the youngest class of
reserves ; the other classes were formed into reserve
battalions, the cadres of which were maintained in peace
time in the regimental reserve (Landwehr) districts,
where all reservists, including reserve officers, of any
regiment residing in the locality had to report thi'i
selves once a year on a certain date.

When mobilised the whole army totalli
Armament j^y^, men ^^ 1000 ^ The inf(ml

were armed with the new needle-gun, the first breed
loader used in Europe, introduced since 1858 and trie
in action for the first time in 1864 in the Danish war.
It had an efficient range of only 600 to 700 paces, and in

iini-
our

cts,
my

:

,tPV

,h.

led

ballistical properties it was inferior to the Austrian rifle ;
in consequence it had attracted so little notice, and so
many doubte were entertained as to its value, that within
the eight years since its introduction in the Prussian army
no other great power had taken into consideration the
advisability of providing its battalions with a rifle of
the same description. The new weapon was certainly
*till vltv primitive, for firing at more than 300 paces
was considered a waste of ammunition, and only picked
EMU wi-re allowed to use a greater range at special
objects. But in spite of these undoubted initial short-
comings the needle-gun afforded the immense advantage
that it could be loaded not only rapidly, but also when
the man was prostrate, and this superiority showed
itself in a very striking manner in the disproportion of
the losses of the opposing forces on the field of battle.
The possibility of its misuse in the shape of extravagance
in the expenditure of ammunition and consequent bad
shooting was counteracted by a severe fire discipline
the careful individual training of the men, which was
testified to by the fact that only two millions of cartridges
were used in this campaign by the Prussian infantry :
I omupurison of this number with the lists of Austrian
casualties shows that the figure is equivalent to an
expenditure of fifty bullets for every man put hors de
combat. This is a very low average when compared
with the number of bullets used by the. British army in
the Crimean War, viz. 740 for each casualty.

The Prussian artillery were armed with 4-pounder,
S-pounder and 12-pounder bronze guns, of which 40 per
d ; their effective range didnotexceed

G«> paces, and on the whole they did not do good

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

service ; they were also badly handled tactically, bei
generally kept behind the infantry columns, so that they
often came into action too late.

B. The Austrian Military S\.-ni:M

Conscription

The system by which the Austrian army
recruited, maintained and completed
to war strength was that of conscription on the French
model, which implied that every individual unwilling
to render military service had the liberty of purchasing
a substitute from amongst those wbo had drawn a
lucky number at the recruit lottery. The total length
service amounted to eight years in the line and ti
years in the reserve, but as a rule men were kept onb
three years with the colours.

Military history has shown that this system, besid'
providing only a small number of reserves to fill up
cadres on mobilization, produces a lower intellectual
and mora! standard in the mass of an army than is
provided by the system of universal service such as
bad obtained in the Prussian monarchy, and the truth
of this conclusion has been acknowledged by the fact
that all the continental countries of Europe and Japan
have since adopted the Prussian system. But there
was another factor which came into consideration, the
great difference between the homogeneous nature of the
Prussian units and the composite character of the
Austrian forces ; for the latter consisted of men of various
nationalities not at all friendly towards each other,
some of which had in fact not many years before fought
obstinately against their own war-lord. In consequence

big

hey

i a
lot

two
ruy

des

the

JUT OPPOSING POWERS 25

of the political differences and quarrels between the
component parts of the vast empire, Italian regiments
were garrisoned in Bohemia, Hungarian regiments in
Venice, so that the calling in and the joining of the
reserves presented great difficulties in the case of mobil-
isation, which was thereby much complicated and delayed.
Again, Ihe war organisation of the Austrian army was
not necessarily the same as the peace distribution and
composition of the forces, but the ordre de bataiUe. was
fortuitous and arbitrary. The consequence was that
at the outbreak of war some large units might find them-
selves under generals who did not know their subordinate
commanding officers nor the standard of training they
had attained in their regiments : this fact would naturally
be felt as a serious defect and drawback in the mechanism
of the conduct of operations.

In absolute and still more in relative

and strength the Austrian military forces were
Organisation j n f er jor to those of Prussia, for with a popu-
lation of 35 millions the total strength of
the army oould only be raised to 000,000 men, whilst
KB the strength or the Prussian forces produced
by a population of only 18 millions. In fact, the military
organisation of Austria might have sufficed for ordinary

s of war, especially when the armed assistance of all
ttiH other German states could be secured, and therefore
her statesmen ought to have prevented political situa-

s such as placed her then in opposition to Prussia

1 with Italy, wliich latter power, though still in its

infancy, could place in the field more than 300,000 men.

On the peace establish merit the army was organised

in seven army corps, each consisting of four brigades of

■

26

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

two regiments of infantry and one jager battalion, each
with one battery of eight guns attached to it. The
infantry regiment had four battalions, but only three of
them were included in the brigades, whilst the fourth
battalions were used for garrison purposes ; thus each
brigade in the field army had seven battalions, and an
army corps had twenty -eight battalions and thirty- two
guns to which were added the following corps troops :
one cavalry regiment, six batteries called the reserve
artillery, one company of engineers and one field ambu-
lance. The order for mobilisation arranged the field
army in ten army corps, of which seven were formed as
northern army to act against Prussia, with a cavalry
complement of four divisions of six regiments each.

The infantry were armed with the rifled
muzzle-loader, model Lorenz, which had a
lunger range and a less elevated trajectory than the
Prussian needle-gun : it fired an expansive bullet, modi
Podewils. But since the Italian campaign in 1859,
when the French infantry had been most successful
their attacks with the bayonet, the Austrian infantry
had been trained and taught to rely entirely on this
mode of fighting, and the Government, in its craze for
economy, had only made a yearly allowance of twenty
rounds per man for musketry training, so that the men
could neither shoot straight nor the officers judge
distances. If this had not been the case, the natural
tactics for the Aiistrians, with their greater range rifle
and greater number of rifled guns— they had no smooth-
bore weapons — would have been to avoid close combat
as much as possible, to engage the enemy's artillery
2,000 paces, to make their infantry advance to abou'

;

27

GOO paces from the enemy outside their effective range
of fire, to overwhelm them with a steady, well-aimed
fire from that distance, and thus to prepare the final
attack. Instead of proceeding in this rational way, the
Austrian infantry almost invariahly tried the attack
without previous preparation by fire : their generals per-
haps were influenced by the opinion of Colonel Schonfeld
who had been military attache at the Prussian head-
quarters in the Danish war, and who had reported
that a Prussian corps was such a rabble of reservists
that they would not be able to resist the attack of an
Austrian corps for twenty minutes.

Artillery fire at 2,000 paces against the Prussian 1
artillery would have been most advantageous to them, i
for as the shells from their guns had not a flat trajectory,
they were not well suited for use against infantry
advancing from a greater distance. Their artillery -
nevertheless established a reputation for their fire
efficiency, hut this was really only due to the fact that
they frequently had fixed objecte for targets, sueh as
woods and farms. They kept up fire very constantly,
bat iliil not inflict considerable losses, nor did they
succeed in checking the forward movement of the
Prussian lines.

Such were the organisation, strength and

of the properties of the forces which

were to oppose each other on battlefields where the mam

power of decision in the infantry combat was, for the

shifted from the columns to the skirmishers'

thus marking a most important tactical progress.
r or the new infantry fire by breach -loaders demanded

quick deployment of columns into skirmishing

Summary

lilies, and as this movement took a long time with batta-
lion columns, the employment of company columns now
became a case of necessity, and the company became
the fighting unit : the company officer at last found
his proper position as one of the strongest elements and
props of the modern conduct of combat.

C. Military Condition of Austria's Allies

The following German states had de-
j kingdoms
of Bavaria, Saxony, Hanover and Wiir-
temberg, the grand-duchies of Baden and Hesse-
Darmstadt, the duchy of Nassau and the electorate of
Hesse-Kassel. The armed forces of all the southern
states composed the VII and VIII Bumlcs Corps under
the command of Prince Karl of Bavaria, and contained
the following contingents : —

52,000 Bavarians, 16,250 Wurte m be rgers— 10,850
Badish, 9,4(X) Hessian3 (Darmstadt), 5,400 Nassovians :
total 94,1 xx I.

The Saxon army, about 24,000 strong, was intended
to join the Austrian army in Bohemia : they had always
enjoyed a high reputation for efficiency. The army
of Hanover, also of good quality, was 18,000 strong,
and endeavoured to join the southern forces ; the
contingent of Hesse-Kassel 7,000 strong, joined the
composite VIII Corps under Prince Alexander of
Hesse.

Thus the total strength of the armed forces provided
by Austria's allies was 143,000, but the fighting value

THE OPPOSING POWERS

of the majority of them was not equal to the numerical
strength.

I). Possible Results of Hostilities.
That the war against Prussia was expected by the
Austrian generals to be full of danger and difficulty
was proved by the conduct of Archduke AJbrecht, the
son of the famous Archduke Charles, who defeated
Napoleon at Aspern. He did not wish to have the
chief command in Germany, but claimed that same
position in Italy ; Benedek was to make room for him

I there, and also to let liim have his well experienced
chief of the staff, the Archduke John. After a short
Benedik, vain and weak as he was, allowed
himself to be persuaded by the Emperor to accept the
more important command, but without insisting on
having the full power of directive indispensable in such
! it is true, it was hinted to him that probably
Mating differences would be settled by the
campaign in Italy and thus actual fighting be avoided
the north. He also allowed General Kriznianic
to be imposed upon him as Ids chief of the staff:
this officer was in the confidence of Archduke Albrecht,

I who therefore had an interest in having him attached
to Benedek. Krizmanic had been present at the battle
■ '( BoUerinoas sub-chief of the staff of the first army,
and had shown himself so totally incompetent that any
• -ut in its proper senses would have been very
careful not to have employed liim again, but as favourite
Ubrecht he represented the small but
powerful war party. Being a clever, cunning, astute
Croatian, he had known how to get into favour with

_

His Imperial Highness by ostentatious adoration
late Archduke Charles.

There were decided pessimistic feelings amongst the
higher Austrian military authorities ; they were well-
founded and foreboding omens of the worst calamities :
for man can only conquer when he has self-confidence
and cheerful courage unclouded by doubt, such as was
possessed by the triumvirate in Berlin, who enjoyed the
unshaken confidence of their king in spite of all intrigues
in the royal family and court circles.

E. Political Conditions in Europe.

It was very fortunate for Germany that in 1866
neither France nor Russia were ready to take action,
the former through the difficulties created by the ill-
fated Mexican expedition,' the latter through the after
effects of the last Polish revolution in 1863 ; for if these
two states, as in the seven years' war, had joined Aus-
tria, which her government might have attained by
holding out to them the possiblity of acquiring respect-

fOHM

towards subjects of the three nations. After the occupation of
La Vera Cm* Mid rwultk'm negotiations with the President Jnarei,
England ami Njnin withdrew from tin* operations ; t he French, after
severe fighting, took Pueblo in May, 1MA3, and entered Mexico.
Ati nKScuihly nf notable"- then proclaimed a monarchy, and Maii-
milian, a brother of [he Austrian Eni|H*ror. nceepl'-tl (In* imperial
crown offered to hira by Na|ioleon. In spite of the continued
presence of French troops, the republican force-; rendered successful
resistance to tin- establishment of the iiri|n*ri;ii authority, and when,
after the conclusion of the war of mocMOQ, I80S, the (lovoriiriient
of the United St'ile.-. dcmiUHlcd the ivitlirlnm.il of I In* French forces,
the fate of the now monarchy huh waled. Maximilian refused to
leave together with them, was besieged at Qnerelaro, taken prisonir,
put before ,1 court-martial and shot (June, ISO").

THE OPPOSING POWERS

31

ively the frontier of the Rhine and the boundary line
of the lower Vistula, Prussia might have been crushed
and almost annihilated, as had been the wish and the
object of the Cabinet of Vienna in 1850. If Austria had
then annexed Silesia, if Saxony had regained the terri-
tory given to her by Napoleon in 1807 and restored to
Prussia by the Congress of Vienna in 1815, if Han-
over had been extended to the Rhine by the acquisition
■ if Westphalia, the remnants of Prussia would once
again— »s in 1807 — have become the focus of resistance
to reactionary government, and the supremacy of
Austria would hardly have lasted ; for the princes and
the people of the German states objected even more
strongly to the latter than to the hegemony of Prussia.
The final result of these combinations would probably
have been the resuscitation of Prussia with the help of
Russia, as in 1813, which then would have meant to
Austria the loss of Silesia, Galicia and Hungary, and
would have opened for Russia the door to the Balkan
jK'uiusula and Constantinople, even if Prussia had
obtained complete possession of a badly clipped Ger-
many. The destruction of Austria would have been
the natural consequence of her obstinate desire for
Aggrandisement, for she cannot protect herself under
normal conditions against Russia by her own forces,
unaided by the power of Germany.

P. Prussia's Aims, Difficulties and Possibilities
The object of Prussia's policy was, as shown in the
i'lL'tion, the acquisition of Holstein and Schlcswig
and the military hegemony in North Germany : pro-
posals embodying these demands were made to Austria

32

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

up to the last moment. Tliis deliberate statement of
a definite object marked a great progress in Prussian
policy, for since the death of Frederick the Great clear
aims had boon wanting or they had been stupidly
chosen, as in the period from 1786 to 1806, when the
Prussian policy started without a definite plan and
ended with a deplorable disaster. Likewise there was
no independent policy between 1806 and 1850 : it was
dictated alternately from Vienna or St. Petersburg, and
when it was devised in Berlin up to 1862, it was pusil-
lanimous, therefore hurtful rather than resultless. This
lack of independent, energetic action during fifty years
had reduced Prussia to a condition of universal low
estimation, and it was found very difficult to conduct
a strong foreign policy by the minister who wanted to
carry out a cool and practical system of policy without
dynastic senti mentality and submission to court influ-
ences. Intrigues and rivalries were so powerful that
when the war broke out in spite of their machinations
and counter efforts, even the most necessary matters
had not been considered, the most indispensable meas-
ures had not been prepared. Thus the court had hoped
up to the last moment that Hesse and Hanover would
concede the demanded neutrality of their contingents,
and in consequence the Government had omitted
provide for the eventually necessary administration
these territories and to form a decision about the fate
of their armed fortes. It would also seem that it would
have been correct and natural to have exploited the
political conditions of the South German states : Bava-
ria wanted to take the leadership amongst them,
this claim was refuted by the others. These attt

of

.te

i, but

turn.

THE OPPOSING POWERS

formed by Napoleon in 1806 as members of tbe Rbein-
bund, and exploited bybitn with an iron hand till 1813
to the advantage of France, were quite unfitted for
independence, and thus had to fall under Austrian,
French or Prussian supremacy : they were the certain
prey of the power which acted rapidly, boldly, powerfully.
Under these circumstances it would appear to have been
advisable to have occupied Frankfurt at once, to have
forced Baden ' and Hesse -Darmstadt to hand over their
OOBtfngeots, and to have invaded Wiirtemberg, with
the alternative proposal of alliance or absorption. The
road to Munich would then have been open, and Austria
being then powerless to help Bavaria, a Prussian army
corps with South German auxiliaries could have been
on the Bavarian frontier of Austria on the Danube
by July 22, the day on which the armistice was
DOBclttded. Such energetic procedure would have made
any intervention on the part of France quite impossible
and illusory, but it would have been useless to propose
such projects to King William, who, imbibed with legiti-
rnistic ideas, would have considered such a modusajendi
aa much too forcible and unjustifiable. We do not
meet in the actual political combinations the boldness
of ideas and resolution, the rapidity of execution and
the formidable intensity of action of a Frederick the
Great : everything remained w thin the limits of medi-
ocrity. But then one must make the allowance that
Prussia was only awaking from a long sleep of peace
and from her political lethargy, which had been the result
of exhaustion caused by the French occupation and

■ I linden wnn not disinclined lo net on the side
grand-duke was the son-in-law of King William.

34

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

extortions from 1806 to 1813. The state recovered
during that period of political stagnation from the fear-
ful material misery produced by the Napoleonic wars,
the population gradually regained something of the
former comfort and prosperity, and thus became once
again more active and more hopeful, and enterprising
enough to throw off the dangerous system of passive
endurance and inactive indifference.

MOBILISATION AND INITIAL MOVEMENTS

Mobilisation and Concentration of Forces

. The first order for mobilisation had been
given in the beginning of May, and the
army corps affected by it were ordered to assemble as
follows : the 6th Corps at Neisse, the Dth at Schweid-
nits, the 3rd and 4th between Cottbus and Torgau, but
the 8th Division (half of the 4th Corps) was to remain at
first at Erfurt. The 8th Corps was to concentrate at
Koblenz with the exception of the 32nd Brigade, which
was to assemble at Wetzlar. The Guards Corps was to
assemble in Berlin, and of the 7th Corps the 1 3th Division
ll Mimli'ii and Bielefeld, the 14th at Miinster and Hamm. '■

"n i he whole such concentrations of large bodies of '
troops are not advisable before the beginning of their
transport towards the frontier, but in this case the
nature of the strategical deployment (dcr Aufmarsek)
Mttld not be fixed upon unlil it was known whether
Bavaria and the other German states would be hostile or
ii'-titral.

When in the course of the month of May it became

probable that Prussia would practically stand by herself,

nment knew that they would have to encounter

the following forces : 36,000 men in North Germany,

100,000 men in South Germany, 2tJ0,000 Austrians and
Saxons.

The main task was to oppose the latter with a force
sufficiently strong to ensure decisive victory over them,
as such an event would easily paralyse the badly prepared
and organised South German contingents, and as the
seven army corps, including the Guards, in the eastern
part of the monarchy did not seem sufficient for that
purpose, the 7th and 8th Army Corps also were ordered
to take part in the campaign against the Austriaus, with
the exception of the 13th Division, which was to be the
nucleus of a special army intended for the eventual
defence of the Rhine-lands or for offensive movements
against the contingents of the smaller states.

On the eastern theatre of operations it would have
been desirable to have massed the whole army in one
position which would equally well cover Berlin and
Breslau, and the most suitable point for that object
would have been the neighbourhood of Gorlitz. But
the concentration of a quarter of a million of men at. one
point by means of only two or three lines of railway
would have taken a few weeks, therefore nothing re-
mained but to assemble two separate armies for the
protection of Brandenburg and Silesia. It was evident
that a concentrated Austrian army might fall with full
force upon one of the two halves, but the geographical
formation of the theatre of war could not be altered, nor
the fact that an enemy in Bohemia stands between
Silesia and Lusatia.

The territory of Saxony could not be used for the
movement of troops before the declaration of war, so
that the lines of railway available for this purpose

I

MOBILISATION

practically ended at Zuitz, Hallo, Herzlxifi, Gorlilz. I
Schweidnitz, and Neisse ; the troops had to be detrained
at these places, which formed a curved line of a length
of about 280 miles ; whether the concentration of the
separate corps bi two armies would have to be done by
marches along the frontier or by means of operations
towards a common centre depended on the final decision
with regard to the choice between the offensive and the
defensive.

On May 14 General Moltke, head of the Prussian
General Staff, reported to the King that on June 4th
270,000 men would be ready to march into Saxony and
Bohemia ; he advised to declare war on that day and to
begin the invasion on the 5th : the King emphatically
refused to do this. In consequence the troops, after
detraining, had to be placed in cantonments near the
terminus stations of the various lines along the frontier.
This procedure was in a way a compromise between
tiic military requirements and the reluctance of the
King to begin the war.

On May 16 orders were issued to brbig the 2nd Army
'orps from Pomerauia into cantonments at Herzberg,
le Guards were to march into quarters between Baruth
id Luckau ; the 3rd and 4th Corps were still between
Torgau and Luckau, and a special corps of cavalry was
formed of the cavalry regiments of these four corps,
■hich now were constituted as the 1st Army under the
mmand of General Prince Frederick Charles. 1
On May 24 orders were given that the 6th Army

1 The "o. called " red prince," father of H.B.H. the Duoheu of

,

i*

i\i

.

40 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Corps should occupy cantonments about Waldenburg,
the 5th round Landshut, their corps cavalry in one
division round Striegau : these troops were to be the
2nd or Silcsian Army under the command of the Crown
Prince of Prussia, who as Frederick III succeeded his
father William as Etnperor of Germany in 1888. For
the protection of the frontier of Upper Silesia, the south-
eastern portion of the province, two small separate
detachments were formed near Oderberg, one under
General Knobelsdorf, the other under General Count
■Stolberg.

The 1st Army Corps, located in East Prussia, re-
ceived orders to get ready for gradual transport to
Gbrlitz, where it was to form a link between the 1st and
the 2nd Army, and to be ultimately apportioned to the
one or the other according to circumstances.

Previous orders given to the 8th Army Corps were
now altered ; its two divisions, after assembling at Koln
and Koblenz respectively, were to be transported by
rail via Hanover to Halle, where they were to go into
cantonments. The 14th Division of the 7th Corps was
to be carried by rail to Zeitz, and to form, together with
the two divisions of the 8th Corps, a third army, the
Army of the Elbe, under General Herwarth von Bitten-
(eld.

The brigade Beyer of the 8th Corps, detached
Wetzlar, was reinforced till it became a strong division
of eighteen battalions with some artillery and cavalry.
The division Goben was at Minden, and the division
Manteufel entered Holstein from Schleswig on June 7.

The division Beyer should have been ordered to march
at once on the outbreak of hostilities for Frankfurt am

INITIA L MOVEMENTS

41

Hanau so as to isolate the Hessians. But the Court in
Berlin entertained to the last, aa before mentioned, the
hope of inducing the King of Hanover and the Elector
gf Heme-K&ssel to conclude a treaty of neutrality, and
the opinion prevailed that in such a case the divisions
(ioebd and Beyer were sufficiently strong to contain and
neutralise the South German forces. But as the division
Manteufel would, under any conditions, have been in a
better position at Eisenach or Erfurt than in Holstein, v
it ought to have been sent and arrived there as early as
June lo, which might have caused the Hanoverians
to forego their attempt of breaking through to the south.
A reserve corps was formed at Berlin composed of
twenty-four battalions of infantry, twenty-four squad-
BOH Ukl one reserve artillery regiment of eight batteries :
they were intended to occupy the line of communication
hoi were capable of employment in the field army.

During these moves the railway lines transported
in twenty-one days, 197,000 men, 55,000 horses, and
,300 vehicles, including guns, over distances varying
from 140 to 420 miles without any accident or serious
irregularity.

Bi-iwcen May 30 and June 8 the 2nd, 3rd and 4th

closed in to the left to get nearer to the 2nd Army,

during the same days the three divisions of the

my of the Elbe were brought to this river from Zeitz

Halle, and went into cantonments on both its banks,

ween the Mulde and the Elster. The last parts of

1st Army Corps had arrived at Goriita on June 6, and

the following day the corps started to march on

;hberg. The original extent of the armies had now

shortened by nearly one half.

42

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Concentration of Austrian Forces
In the beginning of June the bulk of the Austrian
North Army was assembled in Moravia, where Field-
Marshal 1 Benedek had his headquarters at Olmiitz, whilst
the I Army Corps only was in the north of Bohemia.
There were four army eorps on the direct line Vienna-
Neisse, near Briinn and Zittau, the II Corps to the
west of this line near Zwittau, the VI to the east of it
at Prerau. These two corps, with the IV between them
on the direct line, were probably meant to form the first
line of the ordre de hotaUle for the advance into Silesia
with the III, X, and VIII Corps as reserves, the latter
as far south as Auspitz and Austerlitz ; three large
cavalry divisions were in cantonments between these
groups : it would have been more appropriate to have
had them pushed forward to Pardubitz and Hohen-
mauth in order to establish in that way a connection
with the I Corps stationed on the river Isor, where it
was waiting for the arrival of the Saxon Corps. Benedek
had written to the Crown Prince of Saxony, who was in
command of the latter, that he intended to commence
his march to Josephstadt on about June 10, to effect a
junction there with his own and the I Corps under
General Count Clam Gallas, but at that date many units
had not yet arrived, and the arrangements for transport
mid supplies were tar from complete. Then again the
Austrian War Office had informed the Bavarian Govern-
ment that the North Army would by the end of June be
concentrated in the north-east of Bohemia between the
Elbe and the Iser, and had asked for the early assembly

1 !'■ kl zi'ii t-im im<

•■ the Austrian title.

INITIAL MOVEMENTS 43

of the Bavarian troops and additional forces from the
VHIth Bundescorps (Wurtemberg, Baden, etc.), in the
neighbourhood of Baireuth-Schweinfurt, so as to be in a
position ready to join the Austrians. But on June 18
Benedek waa informed that the Bavarian Government
had no intention of sending their troops into Bohemia,
a decision which might have been foreseen ; for it was
at least unreasonable to expect that Bavaria and the
other South German states would send their forces to
swell the Austrian army, and thus leave their own
provinces undefended and open to the unhindered incur-
■MB .if the Prussian Western Army. The mere suggestion
of such a step tends to show bow the Austrian Govern-
ment were used to treat the interests of the smaller
German states.
The first reliable news about the disposition of the
istnan forces was received at Berlin on June 11, when
t became known that the main force, viz. six army
, was still in Moravia, whilst only one was in Bo-
1 : the Austrian military journal later on made the
>llowing statement on this point : " The army though
mpletely assembled was not strong enough numer-
ill v for an aggressive advance, but the concentration
had kept Prussia in uncertainty, and had thus
bliged her to separate her forces." But as a matter
f fact, all doubts about the possible movements of the
1 vanished as soon as this news was received,
for an invasion of Prussian territory could now only
lake place in Silesia.
It has just been stated that the hope of the Austrian
about the co-operation of the Bavarians had
1 disappointed by their refusal to come to Bohemia ;

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

-

the Saxons also would have liked a junction with the
Bavarians for the defence of their own email country,
which now they had to give up without striking a blow
for it, to go and fight as auxiliary troops in Bohemia, a
lamentable position for a brave army fond and proud of
their own country.

As the only line of advance into Silesia

Positions possible for the Austrians now lay in the
for direction of Neisse, a position taken up

NecMstry behind the river of that name would defend
the whole of Silesia, as they could not ad-
vance on Breslau by going round this position without
giving up their communications. The position was good,
as its left rested on the fortress Neisse, and if the Aus-
trians tried to attack the right, they would have the
fortress (Jlatz and the mountain chain on the frontier
behind them. The Crown Prince Frederick, opposed
as he was to the main strength of the Austrian army,
fully appreciated his danger, and selected the positioi
behind the Neisse, which he thought strong enough t
enable him to oppose the force of an attack even by ovi
whelming numbers. He therefore asked for and i
ceived permission to occupy that position, but as I
two army corps might be attacked by five or even six,
his army was strengthened by the 1st Army Corps,
which at Hirschberg and Warmbruiin hud to w;i(< h llu>
roads leading across the mountains from Fricdland,
Reichenbach and Trautenau. The Guards Corps was
now also allotted to the 2nd Army and was to occupy
the left flank of the new position. But at that time it
was still in Berlin, and the 1st Reserve Army Corps was
then only forming in the neighbourhood of that capital.

posea
urny,
sition

is his

n six,

INITIAL MOVEMENTS

Thus the army was not yet by any means complete, and
all its operative dispositions were only pointing to a
purely defensive protection of their own country, cer-
tainly not to offensive operations.

We have noted already that about June 10 the Aus-
trian North Army had arrived nearly complete in
Moravia near Olmiitz and Briinn, and might have been
assembled — with but little altered arrangements— j list
as well in Bohemia for the offensive against the Prussian
army, then still engaged, as we have seen, in moving to
places of assembly and new positions. The Austrians
then enjoyed a further advantage inasmuch as their
forces were all close together, whereas the different
component parts of the Prussian army could then
scarcely support each other under the difficulties pre-
sented by the geographical features of the country.
IV Prussians therefore were not ready before the
Austrians, but unfortunately the latter had assumed
the certainty of being forestalled so strongly, that the
opinion prevailed amongst their generals that their
army could only be safely assembled in a fortified camp
many marches distant from the frontier. This first
assembly of the Austrian army was a mistake produc-
tive of the most serious consequences, which they
could only have mended, if they had boldly crossed the
frontier against the army of the Crown Prince, as soon
as the details of its disposition became known to them.

tlew In consequence of the resolution to have

P on boos the position behind the Neisso occupied by

""^ the Silesian army, the following movements
had to be made :—

The 6tb Corps to Steinau via Reichenhach, Frauken-

46 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

stein and Ottmachau ; the oth Corps to Grottkau via

: Schweidnitz and Lauterbach ; the 1st Corps to Munster-
berg via Kupperberg, Schweidnitz and Nimptsch ; the

■ Cavalry Corps moved to Strehlen via Melkau. A detach-
ment of the 1st Corps of six battalions, four batteries
and two cavalry regiments was left at Waldenburg to
watch the passes between Landshut and Charlotten-
brimn. All these movements were completed by June 18,
by which day the greatest part of the Guards also had
arrived at Brieg, and all preparations were made for a
rapid concentration, if it should suddenly become

n-

The following movements were made in the
Army : the 3rd Corps marched into the district LSwen
berg, Fricdeberg ; the 4th Corps to Lauban and Grejffen-
berg ; the 2nd Corps took up quarters between Reiehen-
bach.GorlitzandSeidenberg ; the Cavalry Corps on both
banks of the Bober about Lowenberg ; the roads across
the mountains via Ldbau, Zittan, Friedland and Reichen-

berg were occupied, and a separate detachment
pushed forward to Waimbrunn. These moves also
were finished by June 18.

The Army of the Elbe of course had not been able to
move on account of Saxony blocking its nearer approach
to Bohemia. Now, if the Saxon corps should retire into
Bohemia to join the Austrian army, the Army of the
Elbe could follow them, but if the I Austrian Corps,
now near the Saxon frontier, shonld join the Saxon
troops and together with them occupy one of the many
naturally strong positions near Dresden, their united
strength of about fifty battalions, with ten cavalry
regiments and twenty-four batteries, would paralyse the

INITIAL MOVEMENTS 47

Army of the Elbe ; therefore, to provide for this case,
orders were given for the new reserve corps forming near
Berlin to be moved towards Torgau without delay :
this move would raise the strength of the Prussian
forces on the Elbe to sixty-two battalions with nine
cavalry regiments and forty-four batteries.

Thus the whole Prussian army was posted in three
groups near Torgau, Gflrlitz and Neisse respectively,
which places were 93 and 115 miles distant from each
other. The forward march into Saxony therefore now
became a necessity, not only from political causes, but
also because it made possible the strategical deployment,
that is in this case the co-operation of the 1st Army and
the Army of the Elbe on the line Bautzen -Dresden in
hut few marches, by numerous and converging roads.
After that junction had been effected, there were only
two armies to be manoeuvred, so that they could co-
operate for the final decision, a task not easy but capable
of accomplishment.

B. Movements in Hanover and Hesse-Kassei.
It has been stated at the end of the first chapter that
the war actually began with the march of Prussian
troops into Hanover, Hesse-Cassel and Saxony on
June 16, and it seems advisable to narrate in short out-
lines the minor preliminary events in the north-west of
Germany, before beginning the detailed account of our
main subject, the Campaign in Bohemia.

General Vogel von Falkenstein had been

ci'h^w appointed to the command of the small Army

of the West, which consisted of the divisions

Beyer, Goben and Manteulel, with orders not only to

48 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

bring about the surrender or the destruction of the
Hanoverian army.

The division Goben occupied the town of Hanover
on June 17, after the Hanoverian army — 12,800 men
with 18 guns— had already withdrawn to Gottingen
on its march towards the south to join the Bavarian
j ££"v< troops who were expected to have advanced to Meinin-
gen : they had destroyed the railway behind them.
The division Manteufel left Holstein on the 16th,
wt H*-.L~f mg the Elbe at Harburg, and then marched on Hanover.

»The division Goben could have reached Gottingen
complete by the 20th, but their advance was slow. On
the 21st the Hanoverian corps started from Gottingen
£- j trK% * OT Eisenach via Miihlhausen, but instead of hurrying on
across the railway line to Erfurt, the Staff wasted time
with requests for help being sent to the VHIth Bundes-
corps at Frankfurt and to Prince Karl of Bavaria,
the Commander-in-Chief of the Bavarian forces.

On the 22nd General Eatkenstein and the diviuii
? Goben arrived at Gottingen, the division Manteufel
'at Nordheim and Norten. Goben should have been
ordered to send at once all his artillery and cavalry after
the Hanoverians to retard their march, and then to
hurry forward his infantry to attack them wherever thi
were met with : their strength, condition and positioi
were known. At the same time General Falkenstein
ought to have wired orders to General Beyer to leave
one battalion at Kassel and march with the remainder
of the division via Fulda to Hanau and Frankfurt,
Manteufel, on the other hand, should have been ordered
to hurry to Mulhhausen as quickly as possible, so as to

them.

lover.

iniien

On

;en
on
me
es-

,,

on

Id

en

ter

:

s

INITIAL MOVEMENTS

49

support Gotten if needed, and to join him to encounter
the Bavarians at Meiningen.

Fulkeiistein, thinking that the Hanoverian corps
could not be stopped, prevaricated and attempted to
make for the second part of his task, viz. the occupation
of Frankfurt, which lie had been ordered to carry out
after dealing with the Hauoverian force. Much
valuable time was lost in exchange of telegrams with
the Headquarters Staff at Berlin, and Falkenstein disre-
garded or misconstrued several instructions sent by
Moltke ; but on the 24th, in obedience to the King's
emphatic orders, he at last sent General Fliess with
six battalions and one battery to Gotha, and General
Goben with six battalions, two squadrons and two
batteries from Kassel by rail to Eisenach, so that 11,000
men were assembled there by the morning of the 25th.
whilst in the meantime Bavarian cavalry had reached
Meiningen,

After a confused succession of negotiations
and misunderstandings the Hauoverian
Staff decided to retire on the 27th beliind the river
Unstrut at Merxleben, and General Fliess advanced"* 1 ' ""■
with about 9,000 men to Langensalza, where he thought* * •( ty
he had to deal with only the rearguard making a stand
to appose him : a serious fight ensued, which ended with
!( of the Prussian force, after they had lost
■It officers and 772 men kilted and wounded ; the Hano-
verians, with about 16,000 men in action, had lost 102
officers and 1,327 men. During the following night
General Fliess was asked by the Hanoverian Staff to
grant an armistice on the condition of free departure
ul their forces to the south in return for a promise not

to fight against Prussia for two months. This request
was refused, and on the next morning General Fliess
was already reinforced by seven battalions and two
batteries from Eisenach ; in the afternoon eleven ad-
ditional battalions and four batteries were advanci
on Langensalza, and by the evening the Hanoverian
army was already surrounded by nearly 40,01)0 men.

In consequence the King of Hanover, to
of the avoid further useless fighting, consented to
Hanover- capitulate. The King of Prussia allowed

special honourable conditions in appreciation
of the brave resistance shown in the battle, and in order
to remove the possibility of a future bitter remembrance
of dishonourable treatment ; as a matter of fact, 456 out
of a total of 751 officers entered the Prussian service
and were received with the utmost cordiality and hearti-
ness. The troops were sent to Celle and Hildesheim
on June 30 and July 1 : then they were dismissed to
their homes.

When General Falkenstein, on his arrival

at Hanover, learnt that the Hanoverian
army was already at Gottingen, he ought to have
followed them with the utmost energy, without giving
his troops any rest : he ought to have repaired the
strategical contretemps by a tactical coup de force
he ought to have sacrificed the last man and have
attacked, beaten, scattered and pursued the enemy at
all costs, an enemy — above all — who retreated from
their own country unwilling to leave it. with hesitating
step. He had received orders to render the Hanoverians
and Hessians harmless by attack or by capture, there-
fore it was his duty to carry out these orders rapidly.

ir

i

here-
.idly,

INITIAL MOVEMENTS 51

even if a junction with the Bavarians had been already
effected, and it was utterly incorrect and inexcusable to
Hi'si'.t from iiinl neglect this primary obligation, because
he thought he could not. overtake the fugitives. Self-
willing and self-opinionated, he answered Molt Ice's sug-
gestions by rude, evasive assertions, and hardly obeyed
the King's direct orders.

In the meantime the electorate (Kurfiir-
crfKuseT * ten * UB ») Hesse had also been occupied.
General Beyer, who was quartered about
Wetzlar with his division of 19,000 men, had been
directed to prevent the assembly of troops in the princi-
pality and, in case this had already been effected, to
attack, disarm and disperse them, before they could effect
a junction with other hostile contingents. On June 15
he received telegraphic orders to commence the march
on Rassel on the next day : there were at that time at
Wiesbaden a Nassau contingent of 5,000 men, 12,000
Hessians at Darmstadt, one Hessian regiment at Hanau,
another at Fulda, and the other 4,000 near Kassel. J*' ff^
General Beyer marched on the 16th through Giessen to
Bet too ha use n, and then on towards Fritzlar and Kassel ; s - '
but he would have done better, if at Giessen
he had seized the station and the rolling stock,
and then sent a few battalions to Kassel by rail ; with his
main body he should have hurried to and secured Frank-
furt, have fallen upon the regiment at Hanau, and con-
tains! the Nassau and Darmstadt troops. One brigade
advancing from Hanau via Fulda would have sufficed
to make Hesse-Kassel acknowledge and accept the
Prussian command, whibt eleven battalions with two
batteries could hold Frankfurt. The verbal text of his

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

instructions empowered the general to act in this way*
and he might thus have occupied Kassel already on the
16th or 17th. If he had held Frankfurt and driven the
Hessians smartly out of Darmstadt, the Vlllth Buncles
Corps would hardly have been formed, for Baden would
have readily joined Prussia, and this would have marie
Wiirtemberg hesitate and retain its contingent for home
defence. However, General Beyer reached Kassel on
the 19th and was then placed under the orders of
General Falkenstein, so that he got implicated in the
general confusion, which lasted till the capitulation r.f
the Hanoverian army.

C. Positions and Movements on Both Sides
on the Bohemian Frontier

The Amtrians were in Bohemia and
Moravia 947,000 men strong, of whom the
I Army Corps, reinfnrrnl up to 30,1100, was concentrated
at Jung Bunzlau, and was to be joined by the Saxon
corps of about 24,000 men. The other Austrian corps
were in Moravia, the II at Wildenschwerdt aim" Zittau,
the IV at Troppau, Teschen and Sternberg, the VI in
and round Olmiitz, the III in and around Briinn, the
X in Briinn and Meseritsch, the VIII farthest back
near Auspitz and Austerlitz.

The Prussians were along the frontier 254,000 strong :
the 1st Army, consisting of the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Army
Corps and one cavalry corps, around Gflrlitz with 93,000
men ; the Army of the Elbe, composed of the 8th Army
Corps and the 14th Division, 46,000 strong, near Torgau ;
the 2nd Army, containing the Guards, the 1st, 5th and

'INITIAL MOVEMENTS

53

6th Army Corps with one cavalry division, on the Neiase
between Brieg and Patschkau, with a total of 115,000
men.

On the morning of June 16 the Army of
of C Drtsden tne ^" )e crosaed tlie Saxon frontier and
reached Dresden on the 18th ; two days later
a division of landwehr of the Guards arrived there with
orders to remain in Saxony. The Saxon army had left
Dresden for Bohemia on the 17th, and was to take up
quarters about Chlumetz.

The " ® a tne ^ tu Geueral-in-Chief Benedek

Aus(rians received information from Vienna that the
bulk of the Prussian army was still on the
Elbe ; in consequence he determined to march off into
Bohemia to take up the position Josephstadt-Miletin,
and this movement was to be covered on the right flank
against the fortress Glatz by the II Light Cavalry
Division. The information, if accepted as true, ought to
have determined him to march into Silesia ; for, if it
was correct, it was possible for him to reach the neigh-
bourhood of Schweidnitz before the enemy's main forces,
and to attack them with concentrated strength.

The X Army Corps with one cavalry division was
to march on the right of the first line, the III Corps in
the centre, another cavalry division on the left. In the
second line were the VI Corps from Olmiitz on the
rigfif , t ho VI If Corps in the centre, and the II Corps with
the army artillery reserve on the left : one brigade of this
corps with a regiment of lancers was left at Wildensch-
werdt for the protection of the railway ; the IV Corps
and the HI Cavalry Division followed in the third line :
it was hardly possible from the start., that the intended

rendezvous of the whole army on the Upper Elbe could
be reached before July 2.

On June 21 General Clara Gallas, commanding the
I Army Corps, who had posted the Saxon troops in
the neighbourhood of Chlumetz-Pardubitz, received
from the Commander-in-Chief the order to keep both
corps in position at Jung Bunzlau and not to concentrate
to the rear, which makes it appear that Benedek still
hoped to get to the river Iser before Prince Frederick
Charles. But on the 20th he had learnt that four
Prussian army corps and one cavalry division were c
the Neisse, and that some of these troops were on the
move against the nearest passes in the giant mountains
The (Ricscngebirge) leading into Bohemia.
Prussians a matter of fact, orders had been sent from
Advance Berlin directly after the occupation of Saxony
that the different armies were to concentrate on the
Bohemian frontier, and that the declaration of war was
to be handed to the Austrian outposts on crossing the
frontier. On June 22 the additional order was received
that the ultimate junction of the armies was to be effected
at or near Gitschin (Jicin), but that the 6th Corps was
to remain near Neisse until further orders. On the
23rd the main bodies of the 1st Army and the Army of
the Elbe crossed the frontier, but the corps composing
the 2nd Army were still a few marches distant from it.
It was then known at the Headquarters of the General
Staff that the Austrian army was also on the march
towards the same locality ; if they managed to arrive
in great strength at the passes out ol which the troops
of the Crown Prince had to debouch, his success was
certainly doubtful. The 6th Corps left behind at Neisse

INITIAL MOVEMENTS

55

had orders to make feint movements via Neugtadt and E </.***>**

Ziegenhals, but was on the 24th directed to march into

the district of Qlatz to take up a position fronting south,

so as to secure the rear and the flank of the 2nd Army :

a rumour had spread that the Austrians intended to

break through in that direction. On the 25th the 1st

Army Corps reached Libau on the road to Trautenau,

the Guards were at Neurode and Wunschelberg, thesis tf**-

5th Corps at Glatz, all ready for the great movement

into Bohemia.

This juncture appears to us as the proper time to
insert a short chapter dealing with the discussions on
the various points on which Moltke's plan of campaign
has been criticised, attacked and condemned by various
writers, French, Austrians and Germans.

COMMENTS ON THE PRUSSIAN PLAN

OF CAMPAIGN

CHAPTER IV
Comments on the Prussian Plan op Campaign

To obtain a solid starting point for criticism, we
ought to take into first consideration the fact that, by
the initial arrangements and preliminary disposition of
troops, Brandenburg and Silesia had to be covered, and
that any crossing of the frontier by the enemy had to
be prevented, as this was an absolute necessity from the
political and therefore also from the military point of
view, not only with reference to Austria, but also with
regard to Saxony and the other hostile or uncertain
German states. But these considerations were well
known and appreciated at the time. The armies which
had to advance separately from Silesia and Lusatia,
were in the beginning certainly not in a very favourable
condition to give mutual support to each other, but near
the Elbe or on the Iser each of them might, in case of
hike the risk of being attacked by considerably
superior forces ; for Moltke was fully conscious of the
advantages accruing from the possession of the needle-
gun and of the superior fire tactics of his Prussians ; he
could take these into full account, when important
political considerations demanded the most determined
military offensive.

There were three ways in which the invasion could be

6o

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

carried out : (1) The way in which it was done ; (2) by
advancing with the main forces through Lusatia, whilst
Silesia was covered by only a small force ; (3) by advanc-
ing the main armies through Sileaia whilst covering
Lusatia by a small force. Moltke selected the first of
the three, because it afforded the armies more freedom of
movement, better chances of obtaining fair quarters
and ample provisions ; the plan adopted was also
likely to facilitate the deployment after the passage
of the mountain passes, as troops can more easily de-
bouch into the plain by six than by three roads, and
certainly it was sure to shorten the time required for
the passage through the mountains. There are also
strategical advantages in starting armies on a broad
front instead of bringing them up in formations of great
depth, for the manoeuvring and co-operating are much
facilitated by an extensive general front of advance.
In making bis choice in favour of advancing on two
lines, Moltke may have been influenced by these reasons
drawn from the principles uf the science of war, and also
by his opinion of the opposing general, who had to act
according to them. He had to expect that his advance
thus arranged would lead to operations on exterior tines
against an enemy occupying the interior line, and he
was probably well aware of the warning which Napoleon
expressed against such operations, when he said : " To
operate from directions wide apart, and between which
there is no direct communication, is a fault which
generally leads to others," It was surely also probable
that Benedek would take advantage of his favourable
position. Moltke's task then would be to encircle his
opponent with all his forces and thus to throttle him,

THE PRUSSIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 61

Benedek's task would be to prevent such a blow and to
singly defeat the separate armies which were acting on
tlii? principle of converging and concentrating on the
interior line, which is the same as Napoleon's strategic
method to " divide the army for movement and sub-
sistence and to unite it for battle."

Benedek failed to take the advantage offered by his
position, but he need not be specially blamed on that
account, and Moltke was justified by events in the
history of war in greatly doubting the success of the
operations from the interior line. If the guarantee of
victory lay in the timely adoption of that line, then the
Austrians in the Danube campaign of 1809 ought to
have signally beaten Napoleon. Not many generals
have known, how to use the advantages of the inner line,
and the great emperor himself, although he professed to
condemn the exterior lines, preferred adopting them.
when he knew, he was the stronger. In the days of
Leipzig he lost the campaign on the interior line, and
in spite of all his successes in the first months of 1814 he
could not save his cause. Acting on the interior line
requires a leader of rare qualities; it makes, very gTeat
demands on his readiness of decision and on the marching
power of his troops, and has therefore also great dis-
advantages. Above all, the general must have the
power of making his troops move about regardless of
fatigue and privations. Napoleon did this in 1814, and
lie could do it, because he was monarch as well as general-
in-chief, and his corps were then not numerous; but even
he had failed to do so in 1813, owing to the greatly larger
forces to be handled in that campaign and to the poor
quality of many of his regiments.

Moltke in 186ti ilid not foresee everything, but he
certainly knew that Benedek was not a Napoleon, and,
considering that the latter had succumbed in the Leipzig
campaign when acting nn the interior line, be could hope
that Benedek would not fare much better in the same
position with still larger forces than Napoleon had had
to move. In 1809 the Austrian Archduke Charles tried
to operate on the interior line in the campaign of Ratis-
bon, but he split up his large forces, and, in spite of the
great advantages of a superior position up to the 17th
and even 18th of April, he was by the 21st at the mercy
of Napoleon, who had crushed hia isolated left wing and
driven it out of the field,

Benedek then was not likely to show himself more
capable than Charles had been in the execution of this
most difficult role of commanding armies acting on the
interior line, and besides, he had shown at Solferino,
under smaller conditions and within the scope of tactics,
that he did not know what to do and how to act on the
interior line ; otherwise he would, after defeating the
Piedmontese, have thrown round three-fourths of his
forces and made them play their part in the decisive
stage of the battle. In fact, Benedek was deficient in
the very qualities needed for such a part- — ready (
ception of ideas, independence of decision and initia-
tive

The principles of strategy should of course not be
despised, but the preceding examples show that tactical
considerations point more to the realities of action and
to the manipulation of principles than to the obedience
to mere theory. Moltke never stuck t
ciples except one to which all others 1

stuck timidly to prin-
thers had to give way,

THE PRUSSIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 63

vie. to push forward to the junction of armies, which
he always effected at the decisive hour.

Benedek had his forces assembled according to all the
rules of the art of war and of its principles oe/ure the
decisive time, but at the decisive time, June 27-30 they
were scattered and out of hand.

To have drawn together in Silesia the bulk of the
Prussian forces, after the Austrian line of operation
had become known, would have taken very much time
with the railway system such as it was then, and it would
have been the worst step which Moltke could have taken ;
for during that time the Austrians would have had the
finest opportunity for threatening Berlin, for which
purpose the Saxon army corps was standing ready,
like an advanced guard, at a distance of only six days'
march. The hostility of Saxony and the proximity of
her forces demanded from the out9et the direct protection
of Berlin in that direction, for the possibility of their
reinforcement by Bavarian troops could not be excluded.
This fear for the safety of the Prussian capital of course
vanished as soon as the evacuation of Saxony by her
troops became known at the Prussian Headquarters, but
this was not before the middle of June. If at that time
the assembly of the bulk of the forces in Silesia combined
with a secondary force in Saxony and Lusatia had been
decided upon (or vice versa), the translocation of troops
necessitated thereby would — with the railway system of
Hint period — have taken eight to ten days, a loss of time
which was of great consi deration, as there was the fear
of having to meet at any point the united Austro-Saxon
army, who, in the salient angle between Saxony and
Silesia, had everywhere shorter roads and better con-

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

ditions for operations. If Moltke's plan was adhered to,
the two Prussian armies would within those eight or ten
days most probably be on Bohemian soil, and ready to
seek a decision, and this did happen almost within that
time.

Prussia had known very early that Austria was
arming, but at the time when Moltke fixed on the plan
of operations he did not know where Austria would
assemble her main army. The circumstance that
Prussia from political reasons had first to wait for the
voteofthe " Bund " — i.e. June 15 — was for Austria and
her allies of advantage : by that date the Austrian forces
were already assembled at Olmiitz. Without taking
into consideration these political combinations and the
actual geographical configuration of the hostile states,
nobody can understand and judge Moltke's dispositions
From these reasons the Prussians had to take into
consideration the following three points : (1). The Aus-
trians might direct their main operations against Silesia
or Lusatia ; (2) it was not impossible that the Austrians
might anticipate a Prussian attack in both directions ;
(3) Prussia had not only to reckon with the Saxon army
threatening Berlin, as it were like an advanced guard,
but also with the possibility that Bavarian rein force me nta
could arrive by rail within twenty-four to forty-eight
hours. Therefore the dispositions to be taken had to
provide for the protection of Siiesia and Lusatia, which
had to be maintained till the actual commence merit of
hostilities : then, of course, it was too late for a change of
positions. It may be casually mentioned that as early
as June 10 rumours were current in the Army of the Elbe
that Bavarian troops bad been detrained at Wurzen

THE PRUSSIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 65

(circa twenty miles east of Leipzig). These rumours were
repeated during the next days, and on the 16th and 17th
reports even were brought to the vanguard, that strong
Bavarian forces had arrived in Saxony ; in consequence
cavalry was sent forward to get reliable information.
Whilst the Prussians took up their assembly positions
at Torgau, Gorlitz and Waldenburg up to June 10, they
heard of the assembly of the Austrian North Army at
Olmiitz, which was completed by the 14th. This arrange-
ment could not but rouse the suspicion that Benedek
intended an offensive movement against Breslau via
Glatz ; but at the same time the Austrians assembled
also considerable forces in the very north of Bohemia.
Originally Moltke had distributed his forces so that five
army corps were to advance through Saxony from
Lusatia, three from Silesia, whilst he kept the Guards
Corps at his disposal to be used according to circum-
stances.

Up to June 16 it could not be seen, whether the Aus-
trians would turn from Olmiitz against Silesia or towards
Lusatia, or whether they would operate in such a manner
as to be able to turn from the interior line against both
sides. The safest plan therefore for the Prussians was
to take the offensive at once to make the enemy's choice
more difficult, and thus they started operations on that
day ; the Austrians likewise on the next day marched off
from Otmiitz in three columns — not towards Silesia,
but to the north of Bohemia. As the Prussians had no
reliable news as to this movement, the safest plan for
them in their uncertainty was to paralyse it by an
energetic offensive. However, it was possible that the
2nd Army in Silesia would have to meet the first shock,

66 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

and therefore the Guards Corps was allotted to it.
It certainly was not advisable to remain inactive till the
Austrians had shown their final intentions of attack, for
a sudden and rapid interchange of main bases was not to
be thought of on account of the deficient railway system.
Therefore the only chance of success at this stage lay in
the capacity of manoeuvring most rapidly and with all
precaution as to security. The Austrian operations
against Regenaburg in 1809 have already been mentioned,
and Moltke had made a special study of them, so he was
not likely to commit the same mistake as was then made
by Archduke Charles, especially as there was neither
spare time nor superiority of forces available.

After the movements had once started, the main
question was as to which of the two opponents would be
ready first to strike with assembled forces. The Austrians
wanted to be on the safe side on this point, and therefore
marched in massed armies from Moravia into Bohemia
the Prussians preferred the more comfortable way of
advancing in separate bodies with the initial general
direction on Gitechin. Although it was not known that
the assembly of the Austrian forces at Ohniitz was based
on the idea of defensive action, it could be calculated that
even if they intended taking the offensive, the Prussians
could be on the line of the river Iser a day or two before
them ; for the distance from Torgau, Gorlitz and Walden-
burg was about nine days' march, that from Olmtitz
a march of eleven days. But if once five Prussian army
corps were standing on the Iser before the Austrians,
it coidd be expected that the latter would turn their
main forces against this Prussian army which otherwise
would threaten their left flank in any other movement.

!

i

THE PRUSSIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 67

In the worst case the Prussians would have had to fight —
in this strategically and tactically favourable position—
a defensive battle, which they could well risk against
superior numbers on account of their better firearms.
The Austrians would have had to put at least six army
corps against the Prussian force so as to obtain a superi-
ority of strength, but it was certainly doubtful, whether
then their other two corps could have repelled the
attacks of the four corps from Silesia. One must not
play one's hand therefore with only strategical principles,
but strategy has to take into calculation what can be
performed from a tactical point of view ; the considera-
tion of the two together only can show, whether the plan
for a campaign is correct or not. Since 1864 the Prus-
sians were fully convinced of the superiority of their
arms and tactics, and against such an enemy it is doubly
dangerous to operate on interior lines; for superiority of
numbers and of strategical leading can utterly fail
against superior tactics. Moltke always affirmed that
strategy accepts with thanks any success of tactics, even
if it had not been intended or expected.

On the day (June 23) on which the Prussian armies
entered Bohemia the Austrians were on the line of
Landakron ; the point to be marched on was fixed at
Gitschin, five days' march for each of the two Prussian
armies : the Austrians were seven days' march from it ;
besides, as the former were marching on two lines, their
could lie expected to be more rapid than
those of the enemy. Although all this was not known
beforethedrawingupofthe plan of campaign, an approx-
imate calculation was justifiable, as it could be modified
on the arrival of detailed information. As far as events

68 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

could be foreseen or guessed at, the order given for the
advance on the 22nd was therefore well-founded, and the
operations could well be baaed on even the approximate
certainty that from their two starting points they
would be sooner at the goal than the enemy could reach

Although the plan of marching into Bohemia had been
settled upon before the 22nd, yet that day is the one of
the great decision for the operations. As the Austrians
till then had marched from Ira irt z to Landskron, it was
to be assumed that their main army would not turn
towards Glatz-Breslau nor send off large forces in that
direction. The continuation on the line of march
chosen would bring the Austrians first of all to the Elbe
between Koniggriitz and Josephstadt ; what they would
undertake then, whether they would continue the march
towards Luaatia with flank protection against Silesia
or vice versa, could not be made out before the 22nd.
but the two alternatives had to be taken into considera-
tion ; however, it was then certain that they could not
develop superior forces against the 2nd Army (Silesian)
by the 27th, nor against the 1st Army by the 29th.

Iu consequence the following steps were necessary
The 1st Army and that of the Elbe had to operate with
energy towards the Iser in order to gain the advantage
of time over the enemy, if they also should be marching
for the same line ; the 2nd Army had to start at such
time that they could have the mountains behind thei
by the 27th, and to provide for the possibility thai
fighting should begin in the last days of the month, botl
armies had to be given a preliminary or temporary aim
operations, which implied for both only the

ng

ich
US

iat

3

THE PRUSSIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 69

direction, and perhaps could later on serve as point of
junction. The actual circumstances being well considered,
Gitschin would seem the most appropriate point.

The 1st Army and the Army of the Elbe could be
joined together any day after their advance into Bohe-
mia, as they were moving (on one line) abreast almost
in contact of each other.

But there were difficulties with regards to the 2nd
Army, for it was possible that its different corps might
be attacked separately, and the movements towards the
necessary later co-operation with the other two armies
could not be foreseen or prearranged. It was necessary
to make the best assignment of the different roadB to
the four army corps, and to time their several marches
so that they could be in a position for mutual support.

The most difficult point was the fixture of time for the
start, for it depended partly on the news received about
the enemy's march, partly on the localities reached by
the other two armies. For if the 2nd Army crossed
too soon, it might get into a dangerous position, in so
far as no pressure from the other two armies would as yet
have been felt by the Austrians ; if they crossed too late,
the latter could unmolested move nearly their whole
force against the 1st and the Elbe Armies. Making
the right choice of the objective point of advance and
fixing the right time for the start of the various units
are looked upon as the marks of a good general : genius
as well as carefully studied calculation are required for
this difficult task.

The right time for starting the march of the 2nd Army
occurred when the 1st Army arrived near Beichenberg.
For this calculation the positions of the most distant

70 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Prussian corps (5th, tith and Guards at Glatz, Riickerts
and Neurodc) were decisive. The 1st Army was about
Reichenberg on the evening of the 24th : in four days it
could be well beyond Gitschin, but by that time the 2nd
Army could stand on the Elbe. Therefore the 5th and
the Guards Corps were ordered to start on the 26th,
the 1st Corps at Liebau on the following day.

The plan for the march into Bohemia of the 2nd Army
could thus be settled in advance, but the time of actual
execution depended on eventual later considerations.
Accordingto the plan, the 1st Army Corps was to reach
the Aupa at Trautenau on the 27th, the Elbe at Arnau
on the 28th ; the 1st Division Guards was to be at Diters-
bach on the 26th, at Eipel on the Aupa on the 27th, at
Koniginhof on the Elbe on the 28th ; the 2nd Division
Guards was to reach Politz on the 26th, Kosteletz on
the 27th, Koniginhof on the 28th ; the 5th Army Corps
at Reinerz on the 26th, at Nachod on the 27th, at Grad-
litz on the 28th ; the 5th Corps followed by the 6th.
If the direction towards the line Lands kron-Josephstadt
waB followed, the 2nd Army in the execution of ita
movements would probably meet with considerable
hostile forces, especially the most southern column
{5th and 6th Corps), which seemed most exposed to
danger. Care had to be taken therefore, that the different
corps could support each other as early aa possible
during the operations, and the most southern column
was made the strongest. Thus careful arrangements
had been made for all details, but some faults were
committed in the execution. On account of a mere
rumour, the Commander-in-Chief of the 2nd Army
posted the 6th Corps at Habelschwerdt on the 27th, so

Sketch J.

Vrojected March of the 2nd Abmt
] 25th to the 28th June.

I

FBOM THB

J

<J0*^\vvJv

ScA\AtftldUA\^

Suit

5

I I I I I I 1

rO

10nw{*A

[To fact pag$ 70

■ I

that it was one day's march behind at the critical time ;
similarly, the 1st Corpslost one day's march on the 27th
by going — unnecessarily— back to the starting point
after the unlucky engagement at Trautenau. In conse-
quence of these two contretemps the position of the
2nd Army was not very enviable on the 28th, and on
that day Benedek might have scored a considerable
success in that direction.

With regard to the mutual support between the
columns on the march, this order did not refer to the
army corps of the 2nd Army on the 26th, because on
that day they were in three parallel valleys without
transversal communications ; but if the enemy had
made his appearance, he would have been in the same
unfavourable circumstances. If no hindrance bad
occurred, the 2nd Army would have reached the Aupa
on the 27th after a hard day's frontal march, and the
Elbe on the 28th after a short day's march in the same
order. The chief danger could then have been con-
sidered as surpassed ; the lines of march of the two
Guards Divisions were so arranged that already on the
27th one of them could have supported the 5th Army
Corps over Hronow, both couldhave done so on the 28th. .
And they were also able to lend support to the north,
which they actually did at Trautenau. This ought to
satisfy a critical observer, that everything possible had
been done by the Chief Command to assure complete
cohesion, exact co-operation and mutual support; and
if in two instances the instructions on these three points
were neglected, the fault cannot be ascribed to the
Chief Command.

Now it has been stated by critics that not only Moltke's

72 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

original plan was faulty, but also his operations, because
he contradicted himself and his orders of June 22 by the
later determination to keep the armies longer separated,
when he stated that it seemed advantageous to keep up
even after June 30 the separation wliich at first had been
unavoidable. The idea and the order to get all the
forces joined at Gitschin had been based on the assump-
tion and calculation that the decisive action might
take place in that neighbourhood ; when the expectation
of meeting the collected Austrian forces there bad proved
incorrect, it was the right thing to keep the armies
separate, and wait for the moment, when their junction
would become necessary. Again, in originally assuming
that Gitschin might become the point of rendezvous for
the forces, Moltke was not very far out in his calculation,
for the war was decided only two days' march from that
place.

The question has also been asked, whether it was part
of the secret of Moltke" b strategical combinations that
during the crisis from the 25th to the 2'Jth he and the
General Staff were not with the army but in Berlin, so
that the generals in command were managing matters
according to their own fancies : for instance, one of them
concentrated his army at Miinchengratz instead of
pushing it forward to Gitschin, and thereby separating
the I Austrian and the Saxon Corps from the rest of
their forces, and endeavouring to effect a junction with
the 2nd Army ; whilst another detached the 6th Army
Corps into the southern part of the county of Glatz
the mere rumour of an Austrian invasion in that direc-
tion, thereby extending his front line to a length of fifty
miles.

i

THE PRUSSIAN PLAN OF CAMPAIGN 73

The answer to these criticisms is the following : There
WW no factor of danger or inconvemence in the stay of
Moltke and the General Staff at Berlin, which was in
constant telegraphic connection with the three armies
and not far away by rail, until the moment arrived for
the tactical co-operation of all the forces, i.e. June 29.
On the contrary, this procedure was very appropriate,
because Prussia was, at the same time, carrying on
another campaign in North -Western Germany, the
events of which in those days had come to a critical
point, and which was also directed by the General Staff.
Therefore Berlin was decidedly the most convenient
place for the King and Moltke. The " managing after
their own fancies " on the part of generals in command
did hardly go beyond the degree of independent action
generally allowed to such leaders of separate armies.
Now everybody knows that mistakes were made, but
the defaulters were not aware of their errors at the
time. And have not the most fatal mistakes been i
committed on the Austrian side during those very days,
in spite of the presence of their Headquarters t

Another question has been asked, viz. how events
would have been shaped, if the Prussian Staff had from
the outset renounced the idea of concentrating the three
armies, and if the 2nd Army had been ordered to observe
what was going on from the position Nschod-Neustadt.
With an effective of 115,000 men and 342 guns it
would have been opposed to 167,000 Austrians with
632 guns, and this disparity of numbers would have
made a general battle unadvisable for the 2nd Army,
unless previous engagements had furnished undoubted
data on the relative fighting efficiency of the opposed

74

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

forces, and given to the Prussian troopB the feeling of
superiority. For if this has once been established on
one side, accompanied by a feeling of incompetence or
inferiority on the other side, this (inequality increases
rapidly ; for as Napoleon has often maintained, moral
impressions in war have a more decisive influence than
mere numbers. The fact would soon have been estab-
lished that the Austrian losses in fighting were fourfold
those suffered by the Prussians, and that therefore the
2nd Army was superior in fighting value to the opposing
Austrian main force. It seems impossible that under
these circumstances Benedek could have turned against
the 1st Army ; he would have endeavoured to secure his
line of retreat to Vienna, and would probably have
directed the Crown Prince of Saxony to approach the
Northern Army by way of KolJin and Czaslau. Evi-
dently the 2nd Army would then have been in a position
to endanger Benedek's retreat to Briinn, and to force
him to make rapid marches, generally accompanied by
confusion and disorder. If decisive engagements had
taken place about June 26-28, the 2nd Army could
have reached Briinn by July 3, and the 1st Army have
gained Iglau by the same date,

All this might have happened, and the success under
these circumstances would have been much greater than
that actually achieved, but the question is : Would it
have happened ? The concentration of the three
armies was planned and executed according to I
rules of a correct system, and it is idle to say that rules
are crutches good for lame people, but not made f
those who can run.

INVASION OF BOHEMIA

<*#

A. Advance of the 1st Army and the Army op the
Elbe into Bohemia

Prussians

On June 23, when the leading columns of
army had reached Opocno,
Wildenschwerdt and Kunstadt, the I Corps ■
was assembling on the Iser, and the Saxon Corps,
24,000 strong, arrived there on the 25th ; both had been
advanced from their first assembly position at Jung-
Bunzlau.

The 1st Prussian Army was marching on
Reiehenberg, the Army of the Elbe on Rum-
burg ; detachments of Austrian cavalry were
retiring before them towards the Iser. On the 24th the
Austrian advanced posts were pushed back to Turnau,
and the Crown Prince of Saxony, who was now in com-
mand of the two corps, received the following telegram
from the Austrian Headquarters in the afternoon :
" Your troops are intended to oppose the enemy advanc-
ing from Reiehenberg or from Gabel. In this task you
will be either supported by troops arriving successively.
HI ymi will have lo retire on the main army, in case of
being attacked by greatly superior forces." Oa the
24th the 3rd and 4th Divisions of the 1st Prussian Army

78

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

got to Kxatzau, the 5tli and 6th Divisions to Reichen-
berg, the 7th to Gablonz, the 8th to Eibicht, the 14th
Division (of the Elbe Army) advanced to Zwickau, the
15th and 16th to Haida. On the 25th the 15th Division
reached Gabel, the 16th Brims, the 14th Kunersdorf,
and General Herwarth, in command of these divisions,
received orders from Prince Frederick Charles, who had
been appointed Commander-in-Chief of both armies, to
advance to Niemes and Oschotz on the following day.
The Prince intended the 8th Division to carry out at the
same time an extensive reconnaissance beyond Liebenau,
whilst the other divisions of the 1st Army were to mark
time in order to await the moving up into line of t
right wing.

Herwarth in consequence ordered his advanc<

? guard to march beyond Niemes as far as Plauschnit?

and to push detachments forward to Hulinerwaaser a

Hirschberg ; the 15th and lGth Divisions were to f

as far as Niemes, the 14th was to advance on the left, t>

Oschotz.

Action at "^' ie advanced guard — five battalion*

Huh n«- five squadrons and two batteries —

was8er passing through Niemes came upon i

Austrian cavalry patrols, who retired into the wood i

front of Huhnerwasser. A Blight cavalry skirmish \

followed by a short engagement, in the course of v

an Austrian battalion was driven out of the place a

pursued into a wood beyond it. Herwarth ordered a

halt, and outposts were placed towards Miinchengratz

Weisswasser and Gablonz. In the evening there was a

outpost engagement caused by the reconnaissance <

an Austrian jager battalion from Munch en gratz.

Sketch II.

?osition8 of the divisions of the 1st army
on the 22nd, 23rd, and 24th June.

». V.

PSuJLciiW^ •£

:.3

MMfhrl^iA/

° -.^-rs w ..* yw

vZiW c^ V"' -v '%*?

'^O/YVCYtt

4.

°*«JtW

SooiXc/

5 o

J i i * ■ ■ 1

tO ttUVCA

[To /oot />ay« 76.

INVASION OF; BOHEMIA

79

were driven back with some loss by superior numbers :
the fall of night only put an end to desultory firing.
The total loss of the Prussians during the day was 50
killed and wounded, whilst the Austrians had 277 killed,
wounded and missing.

When the advanced guard of the 8th
to Turnau Division, detailed for a reconnaissance in

force, issued from Liebenau, they were met
by some advanced Austrian cavalry with one battery,
who retired on Tumau after an eventless artillery duel.
The Prince had then already sent orders to the 7th Division
to advance to Turnau and to occupy the important
defile at that place, whilst the 8th was to advance to
Preper and push forward outposts towards PodoL ?

When the 7th Division reached Turnau. General
Fransecky found it unoccupied, and was told that an
Austrian cavalry division had left the place in the
morning for Munchengratz. The bridge across the Iser,
which was partly destroyed, was at once repaired, and
a pontoon bridge also thrown across the river.

In the Saxo-Austrian Headquarters a
Orders telegram from the Commander-in-Chief had

arrived at 2 p.m. : it contained the order
to hold Munchengratz and Turnau at all costs. The
Saxon Crown Prince and General Count C'lam Gallas
came to the conclusion that the best way in which the
object of this order couid be obtained was to occupy, on
the next morning, a certain position north of Stchrow,
and when the news arrived that Turnau had already
been occupied by the Prussians, it was arranged to com-
mence the execution of this operation that very evening
by retaking Tumau by a surprise attack, and by occupy-

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Comment

ing the height of Swigau opposite Podol, so as to secure
the advance to Sichrow on the morrow.

From the circumstances narrated it can

easily be seen that the time for the execution
of this plan had been allowed to pass, for even in posses-
sion of the defiles at Swigau and Sichrow, their troops
in the farther advance would have had the 1st Army in
front, the Elbe Army on their flank and the Iser behind
them.

The advanced guard of the 8th Division reached
Preper at 6 p.m., and a reconnoitring patrol reported
that Podol was occupied by the enemy. The order was
given to take the place and secure the passages across
the river.

One company of the 4th jager Battalion
p«Joi° too ' i * ne barricades m * ne village, another

cleared the Swigau heights of the enemy
and also entered the village ; the small Austrian garrison
retired, and the riflemen, following them, crossed all
four bridges over the Iser. Reinforced by two com-
panies of infantry, they took up a position on the other
side, and the engagement seemed finished. But at 9.30
these advanced companies were attacked by troops of
the Austrian brigade Poschacher, which had been
detailed to occupy the heights of Swigau (which com-
manded the passage of the Iser), and which had only
then arrived. The Prussians were driven back across
the bridges, and when another Austrian battalion was
reported to advance against the village from the west, the
officer in command decided at 11 p.m. to retire from the
place. But the Brigadier-General Bose, who in the
bivouac at Preper had heard the increasing rifle fire at. 10

INVASION OF BOHIi.MIA

o'clock was now coming up with two battalions of
infantry, and although he was told of the superior
numbers of the Austrians, he determined to attack at
once, considering rightly that this important passage
had to be taken at all costs, and that, if put off, it would
probably demand much greater sacrifice. The Austrians
made several counter-attacks in column formation,
which were repeatedly repulsed by volleys delivered
four deep at thirty paces distance. When two more
battalions arrived, they were led forward to attack the
bridges, but at sixty paces were met by frontal and
enfilading fire, which cheeked the advance. The briga-
dier himself seizing a rifle led them forward to the
attack with the bayonet, drove the Austrians across the
chief bridge, beyond which three companies took up a
position. By this time the Austrian General Count
Clam had brought up details of two more brigades, and
several attempts were made to retake the bridges, which
had al! been lost, but in vain. The fighting ceased after
1 o'clock in the morning.

General Bose had correctly recognised
Comment „ . J °

the full importance of the passage over the

Iser. Its possession opened the shortest route to Git-
schin and threatened the junction of the Saxo-Austrian
Corps with the great army, and it was now impossible
for Count Clam to carry out his projected offensive
movement against Turnau.

The material result of this engagement was as satis-
factory as the strategical advantage gained by it, for
the loss on the Prussian side was only 12 officers and
118 men trilled and wounded, whilst the Austrians had
lost 6 officers and 537 men killed and wounded, besides
6 officer* and 504 men prisoners.

.

82 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

B. Movement of the 2nd Prussian Army.

and Prussian Whilst the Elbe Army had thus gained
Army on the road to Miinchengratz by the- combat
the Frontier &% Hiihnerwasser, and the 1st Army had
taken the defile of Podol and occupied that of Turnau,
the Bilesian Army also had taken a step farther forward
towards the intended general junction. On the evening
of the 26th the 1st Army Corps was at Liebau and
Schomberg, the cavalry division at Waldenburg, the
Guard Corps at Dittersbaeh and Pickan, the 5th Corps
at Reinerz and Jorker, the 6th Corps at Glatz, and the
Headquarters of the Crown Prince at Braunau. Thus
the Guards were in the centre between the two points
where the 1st and the 5th Corps had to cross the moun-
tains on the frontier, and fourteen miles distant from
each of them, and could therefore support either of
them when debouching on Austrian territory.

During the day some small cavalry skirmishes had
taken place, and Nachod had been occupied by two
battalions of the advanced brigade of the 5th Corps,
after the small Austrian detachment holding the town
had retired from the place on being shelled. The
various Austrian advanced cavalry detachments re-
ported correctly to Josephstadt early in the afternoon
that the Prussian army was advancing in three widely
separated columns.

To oppose their deployment and advance

Comment on Austrian soil three corps could be used

Austrian a ^ ouce on ^ e 27th, viz. the VI, X and

Dispositions IV, and could be reinforced by the evening

by the III and VIII Corps. But the Chief of

INVASION OF BOHEMIA

63

the Staff had already, on the start of the march from
Moravia, made it Ins Axed object to lead the army
into a position on the right bank of the Elbe between
Josephstadt and Kt'Jniginiiof, with a flank covering line
Horitz- Mile tin, to accept battle there, just as Daun
would have done 100 years before. The march into
Bohemia was not part of a well-considered, obstinate
defensive, nor of a bold, self-confident offensive, which
would point the way into the enemy's, country, but it
was a middle course, which leads but too often to an
abyss.

Benedek had indeed replied to the imperial order of
the 1'ith to begin operations with the assurance that he
would direct the army to Josephstadt, to offer battle
in that neighbourhood, or, under favourable circum-
stances, to take the offensive, and, in case the hoped-
for junction with the Saxons and Bavarians should have
been affected, to do this for certain in order to find and
fight (lie main army of the enemy. Up to that moment
the Chief of the Staff wanted to adhere to his precon-
ceived idea of assembling the army in the position
Jaromir-Miletin, and to see its salvation in the agony
of passive expectancy. Merely to cover this strategical
junction, the X Corps was to advance to Trau-
tenaii. the VI from Opocno to Skalitz : ail available
forces ought to have been rapidly assembled and pushed
forward to drive back the invading enemy. The
txaaequetux of these half measures was a series of un-
successful, unfortunate actions.

Not till 8 p.m. on the 2'ith the following orders were
issued by the Austrian Staff : —

" The VI Corps will march at 3 a.m. from Opocno

84 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

to Skalitz, where a position is to be taken up ; an ad-
vanced guard is to be pushed forward towards Nachod.

" The X Corps is to march at 8 a.m. to Trautenau
where it takes up a position provisionally. After the
.^uj] troops have passed Kaile, the brigade posted there is
to be drawn in. This disposition lias the object to cover
the not yet completed assembly of the army at Joseph-
ntadt, which, however, is not to exclude an energetic
attack on the enemy, if the opportunity occurs. A
pursuit, however, must be kept within the limits of this
chief object. I expect early reports on the strength
of the forces opposed to the VI and the X Corps."

Evidently the strategical assembly was considered to
be the chief point, the enemy and his doings were deemed
of secondary importance.

It was known to the Staff that Nachod had been
occupied by the enemy in the afternoon ; the order to
the VI Corps should therefore have run : " The enemy
have occupied Nachod, the VI are to find out their
strength." This would have given General Ramming
complete liberty of action in attaining his object.

The VIII Corps, assembled near Kfiniggratz, also re-
j ceived orders to march via .Tisephstadt into the bivouacs
abandoned by the X Corps about Schurz. but when
already on the march next morning, this corps was
stopped by the counter order to proceed via Jaromir to
. Czaslawek and Dolan, and to encamp there with the
eventual destination of supporting the VT Corps.

Furthermore the IV Corps, which had already reached
Lanzow after crossing the Elbe, was directed back to
Jaromir, whilst the Illrd Corps continued the march
from Koniggratz towards Miletin,

Positions of the Units of the Opposing Armies
on the Evening of the 20th June.

■*<

Sketch 1

/fi*ut«^UJA*

WJULuJUrt
Sen. <f

A'

X

■ 3Xli

Ml*.?

StAV

fo

100

[To face paQt

— ; - ^v

'*

. I

<5

"% *

*»V At* -J C •

L

INVASION OF BOHEMIA

85

In the 2nd Prussian Army the dis-
thc 2nd positions for the 27th were as follows :
The 1st Corps was to advance to Trautenau
and, if possible, push its advanced guard
forward to Arnau, the main body of the 5th Corps was to
march on Nachod. The two divisions of the Guard
Corps were to advance so that each of them could act as
reserve to one of the other two corps.

No objection can be raised against these dispositions
for the following day, but it seems difficult to explain
why no rCile was assigned to the cavalry of the Guard.
These regiments should have been pushed forward
beyond Eipel to Studenz and Raatseh to observe the 1 '-?*
roads leading northward from Josephstadt. Altogether
the Prussian cavalry was not made full use of, at least
not in the beginiung of the campaign.

The general object and guiding aim of these disposi-
tions seems to have been to advance with three corps
by way of Arnau, in order to effect a junction with the
lat Army, and to leave the 6th Corps in Glatz for the
protection of that county The theoretical idea of the
converging movement from exterior lines of operation
put all other considerations in the background, and
obscured the chances of attaining more far-reaching
results by other methods ; for the 1st Army could
evidently be supported much more quickly if the whole
2nd Army occupied a position west of Josephstadt,
and thereby interrupted the Austrian line of retreat to
Vienna.

tC. Events on June 27
i of the 1st Prussian Army and of the

Elbe Army did not meet the enemy on that day ; the
5th Division of the 1st Army was moved from Gablonz
to Eisenbrod ; the Oth Division closed up to near the 7tt
and 8th, which remained on the Iser between Podol a
Turnau; the 2nd Army Corps got near Liebcnau.
advanced guard of the Elbe Army remained at Hiihner
wasser, its three divisions came up as far as Bohmisch
Aicha.

According to reports received at the headquarters
of the 1st Army, Miinchengratz was still occupied by
one Austrian brigade, the Saxon Army Corps and a
cavalry division ; it had been observed that entrenching
was being done, which seemed to indicate that General
Count Clam intended to hold the place and to await
reinforcements, but in the course of the day he decided
to retreat on the morrow.

The 1st Prussian Army Corps, under
TwuteMu General B°nin. started for Trautenau at
4 a.m., one division from Liehau, the other
from Schonberg, whilst a separate detachment marched
on the right flank via Schatzlar to Obex Altstadt, north-
west of Trautenau. The two divisions had orders to
join at Prauschnitz and there to rest for two hours,
under protection of the advanced guard, which was to
occupy Trautenau.

The left column arrived at Prauschnitz at 8 a.m., but
the march of the right column had been so much delayed
that the head of the advanced guard furnished by that
column did not appear near the town till 10 a.m., and
the cavalry of the vanguard found the bridge over the
Aupa barricaded and occupied by dismounted cavalry,
who, however, retired on the approach of infantry.

They retreated through the town, which was then occu-
pied by the Prussians. But at that juncture the Aus-
trian brigade Mondl arrived on the heights of the
Galgenberg and Hopfenberg, which rise with steep
slopes south and east of the town high above the banks
of the river Aupa. Two battalions of the advanced
guard deployed to attack this position, but, though
supported by some companies of the flank detachment
and the enfilading fire of two batteries, they made no
progress. At 11.30 General Benin detailed five battalions
and one battery under General Buddenbrock to advance
in the direction of Hohenbruck-Alt Rognitz, to attack
the flank of the enemy's position. At the same time
he sent urgent orders to the battalions of the advanced
guard to press the attack on the heights to the utmost.
As the plateau is only accessible by deep valleys with
steep sides, the advance of Buddenbrock's battalions
was extremely difficult, and so slow that the heights
were taken by the renewed efforts of the reinforced
advanced guard before the outflanking force arrived.
At 1 p.m. they began to emerge from the ravines, and
to attack the flank of the retreating Austrians, but only
three and a half battalions continued the frontal attack,
as the other three and a half battalions were withdrawn to
Trautenau, evidently under the impression that the
crisis had passed. By 3 p.m. the Prussian battalions
occupied the position Hohenbruck-Alt Rogm'tz, whilst
the brigade Mondl, by order of General Gablenz, com-
manding the X Army Corps, was falling back to
position at New Rognitz, where they were to await re
forcements.

At 1 p.m. the 1st Guard Infantry Division had arrived

-

— **■ at Parschnitz on their march to Eipel, but their assist-
ance was declined by General Bonin, as he thought the
fight was progressing well, and he had only one brigade
opposed to him. A3 the fire ceased about 3 o'clock the
battle seemed over, and the Guard Division continued
their march.

But at 3.30, when the remaining three and a half
battalions of the frontal attack had all been recalled to
Trautenau by a signal given by mistake, Buddenbrock's
battalions were attacked on the left by the newly arrived
brigade Grivicic, and in front by the brigade Mondl ;
after a vigorous resistance they began to retreat at about
4 p.m., when they were in danger of being quite out-
flanked. The advance of the enemy was temporarily
checked by four battalions, who came up into a line
stretching from the heights south-east of the Kapelie
to the edge of the wood north-east of Kriblitz. But
the enemy was now reinforced by the brigade Wimpfen,
and forty guns opened fire on these heights and the town,
from which the troops were withdrawn towards Parsch-
nitz at 4.30. For some time two battalions of the 43rd
Regiment repulsed all attacks of the brigade Wimpfen,
but when at 6.30 another Austrian brigade, that of
Knebel, joined in the attack from Ait Rognitz, a retreat
on Parschnitz was commenced and covered by two
battalions, whose determined attitude prevented the
Austrian* from issuing from the town till 9 p.m., when
they followed the general retreat. The Austrians made
no attempt at pursuit, for three companies of the 41st
and 43rd Regiments remained quite unmolested at the
eastern end of Prauschnitz till 3.30 next morning
And yet the retreat of the whole army corps was

INVASION OF BOHEMIA So

continued through the night, till the troops, utterly
exhausted, reached the places of bivouac on the northern
side of the mountains twenty-four hours after they had
left them.

It seems hopeless to try to find any excuse for such
senseless proceedings, which worthily crowned the
follies committed during the battle.

The army corps suffered all day long
from the initial mistake of not occupying
the heights commanding the town, and the outlets of the
two defiles directly after the arrival of the left column.
Opposed for hours by only one brigade, the army corps
profited in no way by its great numerical superiority.
Whilst the greater portion of the corps remained inac-
tive north of the Aupa, the actual fighting was carried on
by single disconnected battalions detached from different
brigades without any central control ; they were indeed
reinforced at times, but by driblets and in a fitful fashion.
The infantry fought most obstinately, but almost
without any support from the other arms, for the greatest
part of the artillery remained in their initial positions,
from which their fire could not reach the actual field of
action. Out of twenty-five battalions only nine were

k seriously engaged, as can be proved by the list of losses.
The withdrawal of units from the fighting line merely
on the ground of a temporary cessation of fire was
naturally followed by the most serious consequences,
and seems quite inexcusable, not to speak of the fact that
a bugle signal sounded by mistake caused three and a half
battalions to retire from the firing line at a time, when
their presence could not be spared. Evidently no
serious attempt was made to restore the battle, when the

90

Austrians were enabled by their reinforcements to take
the offensive, and the various units seem to have com-
menced and continued the retreat without any orders
or attempts to stop them. And yet the retreat was
carried on with the knowledge and almost under the
eyes of the General, who, during the greatest part of the
day, had been two and a half miles from the ground
where the turn of fortune took place. If at least the
two denies had been kept guarded during the night by a
position taken up on the heights between Nieder-Alt-
stadt and Welhota, the General could have waited there
without danger for the advance of the Guard Corps to
disengage him, or could have repeated the attack in the
morning. Neither the defeat nor the retreat were
reported to the Crown Prince, who had only received
news of a victory gained by 1 o'clock.

The Austrians in a force of 28 battalions and 72 guns
lost 183 officers, 4,231 men killed and wounded, 8
officers and 365 men prisoners ; the Prussians, 25
battalions strong with 96 guns, lost 56 officers and 1,196
men killed and wounded, 86 men missing.

It has been already mentioned that

Nachod General Ramming, commanding the VI
Austrian Army Corps, received at Opocno the
order to advance to Skalitz on the 27th and to push one
brigade forward to Nachod. This order, issued at
Josephstadt at 8 p.m., did not reach Ramming till
1.30 a.m., although the distance between the two places
is only about nine miles : a clear proof that the proceed-
ings of the Austrian Staff were\not very business-like,
and not calculated to deal with critical situations where
rapidity of execution is of the utmost importance

INVASION OF BOHEMIA 91

The faultiness of the order itself has already beeD pointed
out.

Ramming had 28,000 infantry, 4,000 cavalry and 88
guns ; General Stcininetz, commanding the 5th Prus-
sian Corps, 22,000 infantry, 2,000 cavalry and '."J
guns.

At 2.15 a.m. Ramming issued orders that the brigade
Hertweck was to march on Wyaokow, the brigade Jonak
via Wrchowin to Kleny, the brigade Rosenzweig to
Skalitz, and the brigade Waldstadter to the same place
by a different road.

The brigades were late in starting. Ramming rode
at 5 a.m. from Opocno to Skalitz, then to Kleny, where
he was informed that the 1st Reserve Cavalry Division
had had to give up Wysokow ; at 8.30 he gave orders
that the brigades Rosenzweig and Jonak, the cavalry
division and the artillery reserve, should be drawn up
at Kleny.

Hertweck ought to have marched to Wysokow on the
ridge of hills, but in the intention not to be separated
from the main body of the army corps he took the
direction towards Kleny, so that his brigade, at 7.30,
arrived at Sonow, where they found detachments of the
Prussian advanced guard, which consisted of five and a
half battalions under General Lowenfeldt. Hertweck
deployed his advanced troops near the church at Wen-
zelsberg, and formed up his brigade astride the road.
After keeping up a useless musketry fire for nearly an
hour, the heights held by the enemy were attacked, but
without success ; the brigade had to fall back across the
road to Sonow.

Hertweck had requested Jonak, who had arrived at

■

Domkow, to come to his assistance. His brigade came
into the fighting line north of Sonow at 9.30, then the
brigade Rosenzweig prolonged the left wing east of
Promodow, and the brigade Waldstadter also received
later on the order to attack Wysokow. The artillery
reserve, i.e. the corps artillery, which ought to have
prepared the general attack, did not arrive at Skalitz
till 11 a.m., together with a cavalry brigade.

The Prussian battalions had been driven back behind
the road to Neuatadt, and they maintained with diffi-
culty the uneven fight against twenty-one Austrian
battalions, whilst only two batteries kept up their fire
against thirty-two guns till 12 o'clock. At that time the
position of the Prussians became very critical, but
momentary relief was afforded by a successful charge of
a cavalry brigade on the right flank : they not only drove
the cavalry brigade Solms on the Austrian left back to
Kleny, but also broke several rallying squares of the
infantry on the left flank.

Then, soon after 12 o'clock, the leading battalions of
the 10th Prussian Division arrived on the battlefield,
and attacked first the left wing of the brigade Rosenzweig.
An attack of the brigade Waldstadter at 2 p.m. was
repulsed, and the whole Austrian force was now steadily
driven back, as more Prussian battalions were gradually
joining the advance. At 3 p.m. General Ramming
gave the order for the retreat to Skalitz, which was
covered by a cavalry brigade of the reserve and part of
the corps artillery. The Austrians had lost 227 officers
and 3,419 men killed and wounded, 5 officers and 2,008
men prisoners, also 8 guns and 2 colours. The Prussians
had lost (32 officers and 1,046 men killed and wounded,

INVASION OF B0HFM1A

93

Comment

14 men missing : the cavalry charge accounted for 20
out of the 62 officers.

The retreating enemy was not pressed
hy the Prussian troops, who went into
bivouac on the battlefield. This step seems to be open
to criticism, for five out of the eight regiments engaged
(3,000 each) had only lost about 100 officers and men
each. Strategy demanded that Hamming's corps should
have been destroyed or scattered and that Skalitz
should have been occupied, which should then have
caused the Grown Prince to draw together the Guard
Corps complete at Eipel and Kaile before the end of
the day. By these two moves the two corps would
have been approached to a distance of only eight miles,
and would thus have formed a strong central body
in the Silesian army. It has been said that this action
on the part of Steinmetz shows an example of the
difference between a good leader of troops and a genius:
the former carries out the orders received with energy
and success, the latter, not satisfied with such a result,
makes it the stepping-stone to unexpected, more far-
reaching actions.

The causes of the Austrian defeat are not difficult to
find. The faultiness of the initial orders was followed
by the slowness in their transmission, and then again by
the want of prompt decision and rapid action on the
part of the General. If he bad started from Opocnoc at
3 a.m. with a cavalry regiment and some of his artillery,
he might have been on the plateau near Wysokow as
early as the Prussians. The chief mistake lay in the
fact that the Austrian brigades fought without connect-
ion and unison of purpose, just as the different units of
the 1st Prussian Army Corps fought at Trautenau on

94

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOUT MI A

the same day. Here also was missing a direct, personal
control, the same as on that battlefield, for Ramming
was mostly near Kleny instead of being in a central
position amongst his fighting troops, as Steinmetz was
on his side.

If we consider the events of the day from a tactical
point of view, we see that one Prussian brigade of not
quite six battalions with two batteries resisted for four
hours the attacks of a force which gradually increased
to twenty-one battalions. The Austrian musketry fire
was bad, whilst the Prussians were firing deliberately
and with good resuJt, as can be gathered from the com-
paratively high percentage of the Austrian losses : their
officers judged distances well and the sights were properly
adjusted.

With regard to the shock tactics in which the Austrians
boastingly confided, the experience of this battle showed
that the Prussians attacked with the bayonet as often
as the Austrians, and with greater success.

The condition of the VI Austrian Corps after the
battle is clearly demonstrated by the following message
which General Ramming sent, at 5.30 p.m., to Field-
Marshal Eenedek : —

" It is my duty to report that, without assistance, I
shall not be able to oppose any attack to-morrow morn-
ing : I therefore beg to be relieved by the VIII Corps
before to-morrow. My cavalry are so utterly ex-
hausted that they are not capable of any movement."

These words show plainly, what the result would have
been, if Steinmetz had executed a vigorous pursuit with
all those regiments which had only been undei
short time and had suffered small losses.

under fire a

INVASION OF BOHEMIA

95

»0n the same day took place a slight en-
Oswiedm g u g eni eut on the frontier of Upper Silesia, ?
near the boundary line of Western Gah'cia.
The various railway bridges along the frontier had been
destroyed at the commencement of hostilities, but it
was thought that the task of covering Upper Silesia
could be most easily accomplished by an offensive
movement into the enemy's territory. To carry out
this idea, a detachment of four and a half battalions of
infantry, two squadrons of cavalry and two guns, crossed
the frontier with the intention of occupying Oswiecim.
The enemy were driven out of the village, but repeated
attempts to take the station buildings proved a failure,
whereupon the detachment retreated and recrossed the
frontier, after sustaining aloss of 6 officers, 166 men killed
and wounded.

On the 27th General Count Clam had
thTlser" determined to retire from Miinchengratz,
and to cover the northern flank during that
movement he had ordered one brigade to occupy Pod- ;

kkost, which afforded a strong position for the defence of
an important defile against the advance of hostile forces
from the north. A cavalry division was to start at
4 a.m. on the 28th, to reconnoitre towards Sobotka and
Gitschin, the main body of the army corps was to follow
at 5 a.m., leaving the brigade Leiningen as rearguard to
take up a position at Miinchengratz.

At the Headquarters of the 1st Prussian Army the
disposition of the enemy's forces doea not seem to have
been known, for on the 25th Prince Frederick Charles
had written to General Herwarth : " In consideration of
the very deficient information about the strength and

position of the Austrian troops at Prag and Leitmeritz,
it is distinctly necessary to cover the right flank." To
attain this object the Guard Landwehr Division, which
was following the advance of the Elbe Army, should
have been strengthened by cavalry and artillery, and
directed towards Leitmeritz and Prag via Wernstadt and
Raudnitz. The general situation in fact demanded
such a movement, for the occupation of this city would
have given to the invading army an excellent depot and
a new basiB.
Combat of ^ ne P" 11 ™ a ' so presumed (entrenching
Miiiichen- had been reported) that the Austrians meant
613 2 to hold Miiiicliengratz, and ordered the Elbe
Army to advance from Niemes, so that its forces could
attack the front of the position at 9 a.m. on the 28th,
wlii 1st the 1st Army was to fall upon the flank and rear
of the Austrian defence. For that purpose the 5th
Division, under General Tiimpling, was to advance to
Rowensko and to reconnoitre towards Gitschin.

The attack of the advanced guard of the Elbe Army
took place as ordered : at 10 a.m. General Leiningen had
to retreat across the Iser, put on fire the bridge between
Kloster and Miincliengratz, and was at 11 a.m. forced to
retire from the strong position on the Musky mountain
east of the town, because the danger of being outflanked
from the north and perhaps cut off became then immi-
nent. He retreated on another brigade left behind for
his security by the main body, and both together followed
the latter to Sobotka.

In the meantime the Austrian detachment sent
reconnoitre towards Gitschin had met a small Prussi
force sent forward with the same object ; after a sligl

INVASION OF BOHEMIA

97

be.

engagement the latter retired in the direction of Rowen-
sko. Thus warned of the threatening approach of the
1st Prussian Army, General Clam had Gitschin occupied
by one brigade the Bame evening.

This day's fighting had caused the Austrians the loss
of 20 officers and 1,634 men, including 5 officers and
1,211 men taken prisoners, whilst the Prussians had lost
8 officers and 333 men.

In the evening the bulk of the I Austrian Corps was
at Sobotka, the Saxon Corps about Brezno and Unter-
Bautzen, the Elbe Army about Miinchengriitz, the 1st
Prussian Army east of the Iser on the roads to Gitschin.

Late at night on the 27th the telegraph had announced
at Miinchengratz that the Headquarters of the Austrian
army would arrive at Gitschin on the 28th, in the
morning the Crown Prince of Saxony had received the order
to begin with both his corps the march towards a junction
with the great army. On the 28th the Austrian Head-
quarters evidently still expected to be at Gitschin on
the 29th and 30th, as the two corps were ordered to
march early on the 2S)th to Gitschin and Podhrad.

In execution of General Clam's disposi-
tions, the brigade Ringelshetm had arrived late
in the evening of the 27th at Podkost ; their outposts
were attacked about 11 p.m. and driven back a short
distance. The firing ceased at 1 a.m. ; at 3 a.m. the
attack began again, but was unsuccessful, as the defile
was blocked by a strong castle and the heights on both
sides well occupied. At 7 a.m. the castle was abandoned
and the brigade withdrawn in the direction of Gitschin,
which was reached at 1 p.m. ; the object of covering the
flank of the I Army Corps leaving Munchengratz had
been attained.

Podkost

t ^

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29

mm

CHAPTER VI

Events on Jon

28

i. an the 28th the Crown Prince of

Burkwsdori' Prussia had received the news of the un-
(M ' successful result of the battle of Trautenau.
In consequence Steinmetz could not be supported by
one of the divisions of the Guards, but their whole
strength had to be employed to disengage the 1st Army
Corps and to open the defile of Trautenau. In the
supposition that this corps would renew on the 28th the
attempt to debouch from the mountains, and in ignor-
ance of the fact that it had gone back to Liebau and
Schoniberg, the Crown Prince at 2 a.m. issued orders to
General Prince August of Wurtemberg, commanding
the Guards to continue the inarch to Kaile, and, in case
of the fight continuing at Trautenau, to proceed there
and give assistance. In execution of this order the
2nd Division at Koste lee paraded at 4.3*1 and marched
offtoEipel, where it arrived at 7. 45 behind the 1st Guard
Brigade, when the 2nd Brigade had already passed
through, and the advanced guard was approaching
i H'rr-Kiuit-sch,

General Gablanz had reported to Field-Marshal Bene-
dek, at 9,16 p.m. on the 27th, the dispositions he had
made after the battle at Trautenau, had expressed

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Comments

apprehensions about his right flank, and asked for
supports to occupy Prausnitz in order to secure that
side. At 6 a.m. on the 28th he received the reply that
four battalions of the IV Corps would forthwith be sent
to occupy Prausnitz, Kaile and Eipel ; but by a mis-
take these battalions were directed to a place, Prausnitz,
five miles west of Koniginhof, and Benedek was not
informed of it. Then at 7 a.m. G-ablenz received orders
to leave Trautenau, to hasten his retreat to Prausnitz,
and there to take up a position facing east to oppose
strong columns of the enemy moving in that neighbour-
hood.

This partial retrograde movement could

be of no ultimate advantage ; the corps had
suffered great losses, after which it could not be supposed
to be strong enough to oppose attacks from north and
east by two forces each probably superior in numbers.
The corps should have been— after the is-sue of (lie
battle of Nachod — taken back to Koniginhof or, via
Pilnikau, direct behind the Elbe.

A tangible mistake was also made in the dispositions
for the march of the 2nd Guard Division from Kostelee :
instead of leaving the corps artillery and the heavy
cavalry hrigade to march behind the infantry, they
ought to have been sent on to Eipel at a trot, so as to be
near the plateau of Staudenz, the only spot in that
locality where they could be of much use. Tie &OWH
Prince also should have hurried there to have obtained
a personal insight in the conditions of the important
engagement to be fought.

Directly after receipt of his orders Gablenz

had sent off his transport towards Prausnitz,

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29

103

the brigades Knebel and Wimpfen were to folJow with
the corps artillery, the flank was to be covered by a
regiment of cavalry with one battery, ordered to march
via Alt-Rognitz to Staudenz, and there to take up a
position. The brigade Mondl was to form the rearguard,
and the brigade Grivicic was to march from the hills at
Kriblitz via Alt-Rognitz to Raatsch, and take up a
position there : this should have been done on the pre-
vious evening or early in the morning.

The approach of the flank-guard to Staudenz was
observed and reported by the Prussian cavalry, upon
which Prince Wurtemberg gave the extraordinary
order for his advanced guard to fall back and take a
position behind the Aupa, instead of going to see himself
what was happening. He sent word to the Army Head-
quarters that the connection with the 1st Corps was not
yet established, and that he would assume a waiting
position, until he could arrange further action in concert
with that corps. This decision was clearly contrary to
his orders, which directed him to proceed to Kaile before
entering upon any farther movements.

At 9 a.m. he ordered the advance on Burkeradorf.
His advanced guard passed through Staudenz at 9.30,
and then came in view of the Austrian corps artillery,
which took up a position at Burkeradorf, flanked on
both sides by the brigade Knebel and the cavalry regi-
ment : an artillery duel ensued. At 11.30 the Guards
attacked Burkeradorf and took it ; the brigade Knebel
with the batteries retired to Altenbuch. where they were
joined by brigades Wimpfen and Mondl : they all then
retreated towards Pilnikau.

The brigade Grivicic on the march to Raatsch, left

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

without news or instructions, had passed Alt-Roguitz
and Riideradorf, when it was attacked at 12 o'clock by
parts of the 2nd Guard Division : the struggle was fierce
and obstinate, but by 3 p.m. the Austrian brigade was
so completely routed, that only 2,000 men succeeded
in getting away to Pilnikau. The Guards had lost
28 officers and 685 men, 15 and 402, respectively, in
the two regiments which did most of the fighting. The
Austrian loss amounted to 55 officers and 1,079 men
killed and wounded ; (!8 officers, 2,1*17 men were taken

prisoners.

During the righting, simultaneously with which an
engagement took place at Skalitz, the Crown Prince had
been on a hill near Kostelec, and after receipt of the
news that Skalitz had been taken, had hastened to Eipel,
where he learnt that his 1st Corps was at Liebau on
Prussian ground. He now determined to assemble his
army on the following day, the 29th, on the plateau
north of Kdniginhof.

If Prince August had not retarded the

advance of the 1st Guard Division by more

than an hour, and if the cavalry brigade and the corps

artillery had been to the front, only small parts of the

Austrian X Corps would have escaped captivity.

The most profitable way of supporting Steuunetz
at Skalitz would havo been to occupy Staudenz ; if this
had been done early, part of the Guards could have
taken the Austrians in the rear, whilst they were being
attacked in front by Steinmetz.

In consequence of the report which General

SltaSti* R aQumn 8 had 8ent to Benedek after the

engagement fought at Nachod, the VIII

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29

IiVustrian Corps had relieved the VI Corps in the posi-
tions which the troops occupied after the fighting and
the retreat to Skaiitz, which had not been pressed by the
Prussians: the Archduke Leopold was put in command
of the two corps. The IV Corps also had been brought
up as further support from Josephstadt.

At 10.30 Benedek arrived at Skaiitz, and saw Prussian
troops at Dubno and on the Schafberg, but drew the con-
clusion that a direct attack on Skaiitz was not intended,
but rather a turning movement via Chwalkowitz. He
therefore gave the order that, in case no fighting should
occur by 2 p.m., the VI Corps was to move south from
Trebesow,and to be followed by the VIII Corps. Directly
after this order had been written out by the head of the
Army Staff, Benedek gave the Archduke the verbal
order to march off at once, and when on his drive back
to Josephstadt he saw General Ramming, he ordered
him also to begin the movement at once : a psychologist
might find it hard to explain such contradiction of
purpose at ft most important moment. The second
order was not executed.

The brigade Schulz of the VIII Coips was posted at
and about Skaiitz, forming the right wing ; the brigade

kKreyssern was in the centre, and the brigade Fragnern
on the left wing. The position had a length of only about
2,500 yards, which allowed eight men per yard ; the
Aupa, with steep rocky banks, was behind it, and 500
yards in front of the left wing there was a wood I

Ramming would have acted more wisely, if, after his

retreat on the previous evening, he had occupied the

heights on the right bank of the Aupa, but he hoped to

: soon relieved, and had evidently not taken the

io6

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

trouble to study the local geography ; nor had the chiel
staff officer of the VIII Corps inspected the position.
Anyhow, General Fragnern, in command of the left wing,
should have occupied Zlitsch to secure the bridge over
the Aupa behind that village, as it gave easy access to
the hue of retreat.

Directly after Bencdek had on parting given
the Archduke the order to retire from his
position, the latter directed verbally one battalion to re-
connoitre the forest of Dubno, and, if it should be
occupied by hostile troops, to drive them out ; this
movement, as will be seen, brought on the engagement
which was to have been avoided.

Steinmetz had received orders to take Skalitz, One
brigade of the 6th Corps had arrived as reinforcement
of the 5th Corps, and two more brigades were expected
during the day ; but, to judge from their watchfires at
m'ght, the Austrians seemed to be several army corps
strong. In view of these conditions of comparative
strength, Steinmetz determined to seize the heights at
Studnitz, north of Skalite, in order to facilitate his
junction with the promised division of Guards, and to
be able, in case of necessity, to fall back on the Guards
towards Kostelec ; but to evacuate Wysokow was
dangerous, because an Austrian force coming from
Neustadt (south) could then gain the plateau and wedge
in between liiin and the approacliing main body of the
Oth Corps. To obtain exact information on the possi'
bility of such a move, he sent at 5 a.m. a regiment of
cavalry to reconnoitre the whole countryside towards
Neustadt, and on receipt of the report that no enemies
could be seen in that direction, he ordered General

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29 107

Lowenfeldt, at 7 a.m., to march off to Studnitz with six
battalions, to effect a junction with the expected divi-
sion of Guards, and to advance together with them
against Skalitz. The advanced guard of the 5th Corps,
three battalions and two batteries with a regiment of
cavalry, deployed at 8 a.m. between Starkosch and the
railway, the 9th Division was on the Nachod road, and
on the left of it the brigade Hoffmann of the 6th Corps ;
the 9th Division had received the general direction to
advance north of the highroad behind the advanced
guard.

By 11 a.m. Lowenfeldt had passed Studnitz and
reached the Schafberg, where he deployed his brigade,
occupying the Dubno farm with one battalion. Stein-
metz, who had just then received the intimation that
Only the heavy cavalry of the Guard would join him, at
once ordered Lowenfeldt to attack, and sent the same
order to the other unite.

Nine battalions rushed from various directions into
the above-mentioned wood, where the one battalion of
Austrians sent there by the Archduke was severely
handled and nearly annihilated ; the corps batteries
came up at Kleny, and began a lively artillery duel with
the Austrian guns posted east of Skalitz. As the brigades
Fragnern and Kreyssern had not received orders to
retreat, Fragnern sent supports into the wood, also
towards Zlitsch to cover the left flank, and south to-
wards the railway. They could not advance across the
embankment under the lire of infantry in the ditch of
the road opposite, and, as they gradually got Ere also in
flank and rear, were forced to retire to Skalitz : only a
few detachments managed to get back to their original

position. Then five battalions of the brigade Kreyasern
advanced against the railway embankment with the
same result. The retreat of the two brigades was
covered by the fire of two battalions and the corps
batteries, whilst brigade Schulz had begun its retreat
at 1 p.m. by order of the Archduke. At 3 p.m. the east
entrance of the town, obstinately defended by three
battalions, was taken by assault, rifle companies ap-
proached Klein-Skalitz, having passed the bridge near
Zlitsch. The brigade Rosenzweig of the VI Corps at
Trebesow covered the farther retreat of the VIII, and
finally fell back in its own turn to Schweinsohade], where
the IV Corps had arrived at 1 p.m. During the night
the VIII Corps reached Salncy; the VI Corps got to
Lanzow on the next morning.

The Austrians lost 184 officers and 3,106 men killed
and wounded, 21 officers and 2,266 men taken prisoners.
The Prussian fire had been very deadly : the brigade
Fragnern had 824 dead, 620 wounded; the brigade
Kreyasern 352 dead, 639 wounded. The Prussians
62 officers and 1,2'JO men killed and wounded ; 13
missing.

The Prussians camped near Skalitz, the Guai
Cuirassier Brigade went back to Kostelec, where thi
presence was perfectly useless : if they had crossed the
bridge at Zlitsch and occupied the plateau of Ratiboritz,
they would have covered the right flank of the 5th Corps,
have maintained the connection with the Guards Corps,
and been in a position to watch the Chwalkowitz road.
The Archduke Leopold received the on
to retreat to Salncy at 11 a.m., when t
roads were open to him for the movement, the mt

»de
lost
nen

,rd.

heir

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29 109

road and the one via Zwo] to Jaromir. He was not

talented, still less good-natured, rather irritable and
self-conceited, also without any war experience ; but he
was Chief Commandant of Marines and Director of
Engineers, also senior amongst the generals command-
ing army corps. When therefore he by chance heard
Benedek assign an independent command to General
Gablenz, he believed himself passed over purposely.
In this frame of mind lie sent the 4th Battalion Crenne-
ville into the forest, which provoked and brought on the
battle, during which he remained passive, because he
had no practice in handling troops. In consequence
there was no control or direction during the action, and
the brigadiers had to act each on his own idea. Frag-
nern preferred the wood to the narrow ridge for fighting,
other troops were attracted in the same direction by
the firing, and ultimately there were 14,000 men of
different nationalities crowded together on a small
space of ground, hindering each other even in the use
of their rifles, without direction or control, an easy
target to the encircling, much weaker enemy, with the
result that within an hour 3,000menwere lost. Neither
fire tactics nor shock tactics had anything to do with this
result ; it was only a case of order and firm control
defeating senselessness, lack of leading and the resulting
disorder. In spite of many defects, the position might
have been tenable, if the brigade Fragnern had been
posted behind Zlitsch on the heights near Castle Rati-
boritz, if Skalitz had been occupied by the brigade
Schulz, and if the ridge extending to Zlitsch and the
Aupa valley had been enfiladed by a few well-covered
"latteries at Skalitz.

no THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

The attack by the Prussians was started sensibly and
carried through with satisfactory energy : the line of the
Aupa was occupied as ordered, just as the line of the
Mettau on the previous day. But from the geographico-
strategical point of view communications are more
important than watercourses, and therefore orders
should have been given to capture the heights of Tre-
besow-Schweinschiidel in order to place the Guards
Corps at Staudenz into safe communication with the
5th and 6th Corps. The retreat of the VI and VIII
Austrian Corps could be watched from the hill near
Klein-Skalitz, and could not but invite a vigorous
pursuit in view of the condition of the Austrian troops,
evidenced by the large number of prisoners. It is
that farther advance had not been ordered, but surely
an independent commander must be allowed to use all
opportunities to inflict losses on the enemy, and a passive
restraint after a victorious fight is therefore not justified :
neither at Berlin nor at the Headquarters of the 2nd
Army could these local circumstances and conditions
be foreseen, judged and dealt with by special orders ,
these belong to the province of personal observation and
of the psychological instinct of what is possible and
attainable at the moment.

To reap the full advantage of the victory the Guard
Cavalry Brigade and the 10th Division could advance to
Chwalkowitz, the other three brigades against Schwein
schadel, both merely an hour's march from the Au;
The result would have been the defeat of the tl
brigades of the I V Austrian Corps, which would have
immensely increased the disorder and discouragement
already existing. Benedek had assembled about Ska-

rous
ops,
true
irely

up.,
hree
lave

EVENTS ON JUNE 2S AND 20 III

litz three army corps, not really in order to attack, but
to support and relieve each other, and this presumed
prudence and circumspection would then have resulted
in their retreat behind the Elhe, defeated and humiliated.
Even Jaronu'r, with its passage over the Elbe, might
perhaps have been before night in the hands of the
enemy.

If Steinmetz had been in Boiun's place at Trautenau,
he would, without doubt, not have hesitated a moment
to attack Gablenz with all his might and to drive him
back behind Prausnitz, for in that case the wording of
his order would not have put a limit to his energy and
natural thoroughness ; he was an eminent leader, but
without the exceptional fruitful talent given only to
nature's few favourites. The Archduke, on the other
hand, would not obey, and could not command.

The Crown Prince, who in the morning had gone to
the heights of Koste lee, where the reserve artillery of the
Guards Corps had arrived, moved his head quarters to
Eipel, but went to Trautenau himself. The three
brigades of the 6th Army Corps, which had reached
Riickerts, were ordered to continue the advance, to rein-
force the 5th Corps and cover the left flank of the army ;
Steinmetz was to command the 6th Corps together with
his own.

B. Events on June 29
Battle of Gitschin

The orders issued by Benedek seem to be

"TfS^ fo^ed *>n the surmise that he would

succeed in assembling his main forces west

of Josephstadt by the 30th, so as to make an offensive

movement against the 1st Prussian Army : the III Corps
was to march on the 29th from Miletin to Gitechin, one
cavalry division to Horiz, and on the 30th three or four
more corps were to follow in the direction of Lomnitz.
It seems as if he had still considered one or two corps
sufficient to hold the upper course of the Elbe and cover
his right flank in the intended movement to the west.
This communication from Benedek arrived at Gitechin
on tli » - 29th at 2 p.m., when Clam Gallas, in temporary
absence of the Crown Prince of Saxony, had the com-
mand of the two army corps ; he determined to defend
the position wliich had been chosen as follows : On the
left Lochow, on the road from Miincheiigratz, was held
by the brigade Ringclslieim, north-east of it the heights
of Prachow and Brada by the brigades Abele and Posch-
aclier with the brigade Leinuigen in reserve behind
Brada ; Eisenstadtl on the right was held by the brigade
Piret, and in the interval at Diletz there was a cavalry
division and the reserve artillery. The Saxon Corps,
which had left the neighbourhood of Unter- Bautzen at
3 a.m., had arrived near Podhrad before noon, and two ot
its brigades were detailed to move to Diletz in case of
an attack by the enemy.

Prince Frederick Charles was informed on the 28th,
by telegram from Berlin, of the probable location and
disposition of the Austrian corps, also of the advance
of the Crown Prince's forces, of which the 1st Army
Corps, however, were still at Liebenau and three brigades
of the Cth at Lewin. Under these circumstances it
seemed necessary that the 1st Army should advance
beyond the originally fixed rendezvous at Gitschin,
which the Prince had already resolved to do, when, at

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29

«3

7 a.m. on the 29th, he received a telegram from Berlin,
informing him that the King expected the 1st Army to

I disengage by an accelerated advance the 2nd Army,
tfeeD in ft difficult position. At 9 a.m. the following orders
were issued : The 3rd Division (Werder) marches via
Subotka to CJitschin, to be followed by the Tth Division
(Fransecky). The 5th Division (Tiimpling) is to start
ftt once, take Gitochin, and push forward advanced
guards beyond it, to be followed by the 4th Division
(Herwarth)andtheCavalryDivision (Alvensleben), The
6th Division (Manatein). the 8th Division (Horn) and the
Cavalry Division (Hann)areto take up positions at Ober
and Unter-Bautzen towards Jung-Bnnzlau.

The division Tiimpling left Rowensko
at 1.30 p.m., and its advanced guard reached
Libun at 3.30. The General resolved to hold the two
Austrian brigades on the steep heights of Prachow and
Brada by a containing attack by three battalions of the
10th Brigade, and to take Zames and Diletz with the
9th Brigade : this was carried out. But when the 2nd
Saxon Division arrived at Gitschin, they were ordered
by their frown Prince to recapture Diletz, which they
did, whilst the Austrian brigade Piret advanced from
Eisenstadtl against Zames. Against this attack Tiim-
pling was obliged to bring up the last battalion of his
reserve, but at that time Major Sternberg, of the Head-
ijUftitera Sitaff, brought Benedek'a order to avoid any
engagement with superior hostile forces, and to effect a
junction with the main army near Horiz and Miletin,
aa the four army corps previously pronused had mean-
while received a different destination. The Saxon
Crown Prince in consequence ordered a general retreat.

On the Miinchengratz road the brigade Ringelaheim
fought with alternating success from 5,30 against the
3rd Division Werder, which succeeded in gaining Wos-
trushno, and forcing the cavalry brigade to retire behind
Wohawee.. A counter attack made by General Ringel-
aheim at 8.15 was well delivered, but was defeated by
rapid firing : it had evidently been made to cover the
general retreat. The regiment Wurtemberg fell back
fighting and supported by the fire of some batteries, till
it arrived in a shattered condition at the gate of Gitschin,
the occupation of which was now committed to the
Saxon Life Brigade. In the meantime the Saxon
division had fallen back from Diletz to the Zebinberg,
and the brigade Piret, whose attack on Zanies had failed,
to the monastery of the Carthusians ; the greater part
of the brigades Poschacher and Abele had retired on
Gitschin, leaving at Poduls, on the Brada hill and at
Prachow, a few detachments, which were later on de-
stroyed on their retreat.

By 1 1 p.m. most parts of the town had been evacuated
by the troops crossing in all directions, but before the
Saxon Life Brigade had arrived to occupy it, a Prussian
battalion had entered from the west, but was again
driven out by 11.30. The Saxon Brigade marched off
at 12.30, and after a short engagement with its rearguard,
troops of the 3rd and 5th Prussian Divisions marched
into the town. This fighting in the dark had very
unpleasant results, for in the confusion caused by it the
Austrian brigades did not receive the dispositions made
for the retreat, and in consequence the unite of the
main body got mixed up retreating on Horiz and on
Miletin, whilst some, mixed up with the Saxons, retired
towards Smirdar.

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29

"5

The Austrians lost 184 officers, 4,704 men; theSaxonB,
26 officers, 566 men; the Prussians, 71 officers, 1,482
men.

The total strength of the two allied corps
was 66,000 nominally, but only four Austrian
and two .Saxon brigades, with only a portion of the
cavalry, took part in the engagement, about 42,000 men,
who were opposed by two divisions of a normal strength
of 36,000. This statement shows that the Allies could
have employed great superiority of strength in making
an attack on one road or taking a position of defence near
the junction of both roads ; but, instead of doing either,
they took up with 24,000 men the position on the
northern road from Eisenstadtl to Brada, which was
certainly strong in physical features and favourable
artillery positions, the occupation of which, however,
depended on the resistance which the brigade Ringel-
sheim could offer on the western road against the 3rd
Prussian Division : as soon as part of the latter obtained
possession of Wostnischno, the position at Diletz would
have had to be given up, even if the retreat had not been
ordered from headquarters.

The point has been raiser I that the Saxon troops should
not have been inserted in the midst of Austrian units,
but should have been placed separately on the left flank
between Prachow and Lochow ; but in comparing times,
it would appear that the 2nd Saxon Division, which was
the first to arrive, did not appear till after the fight had
commenced. Therefore all surmises of a better result
drawn from the assumption of the possibility of that
arrangement must fail to the ground.

IJiil it seems quite legitimate to criticise the way in

which Benedek's order was interpreted and acted upon :
" to avoid any fight with superior hostile forces and to
continue the retrograde movement to the main army
does not mean to break off a combat fully engage*
which should have been successful if properly con-
ducted ; in fact, it was less dangerous to carry on thi
fight than to get disengaged and retire , as nothing was foi
seen and prepared for that eventuality. Besides, such
orders are only to be obeyed implicitly, if the officer who
issues them has complete knowledge of the actual con-
dition of affairs, if he is present on the spot, or can be
immediately informed of the impossibility or difficulty
of executing his order : this was not the case here, and
the Saxon Crown Prince Bhould have taken the responsi-
bility of acting independently. But if the order for
retreat was not warranted by the circumstances of the
case, the dispositions made for it by the Staff were too
complicated, belated and therefore useless. In such a
case a pedantic chief of the Staff, fond of writing out
detailed orders, is of no good ; a few sharp words, a few
clear directions given on the spot from the saddle to
energetic adjutants must suffice to set the whole machin-
ery working in the new direction.

As it was certainly the fatal order for retreat which
caused the defeat of the Allies, the question arises, why
the attacking force was comparatively so small, seeing
that it was even apprehended that the Saxon Crown
Prince might have been reinforced by the III Austrian
Corps. Tins question implies a doubt in the correctness
of the conduct of operations by the Commander-in-Chief
an important battle of doubtful issue was fought
only about 20,000 men without the presence of a su]

to

rf.
m-

;he
■re-
:ch
'ho

issue was fought by
presence of a superior

commander, when the Prince had at his disposal a force
of about 130,000 men. The two divisions employed did
not belong to the same army corps, nor did those
ordered to follow them : the unity of the army corps
formation, so long established in the Prussian army, had

wen abolished at a critical period in this one army to
please and satisfy the idiosyncrasies and jealousy of

command of an imperious temperament.

A great mistake in the opposite direction had been
made in the useless assembly of great forces for the
capture of the position of Miinchengratz : the Prince
had only to march rapidly with close columns from
Reichenau to Qitschin to separate the Saxon Crown
Prince hopelessly from the Austrian main army. Again,
if one considers the fact that the large force of cavalry
was systematically left behind the infantry instead of
having the theatre of operations traversed and recon-
noitred by them, one can understand, how the patient
Moltke even lost his patience at last, and induced the
King to express an urgent demand for rapid and decided
advance.

The 7th Prussian Division (Fransecky) had heard at
the rendezvous at Sobotka the thunder of the guns at
Gitechin, had marched off in its direction at 6 p.m. and
advanced as far as Woharis.

Situation in Other Parts of the Theatre of Operations

The 2nd Prussian Army Corps was intended to reach
the Elbe on the 29th. The 1st Army Corps was moved
forward via Trautenau and was in bivouac round Pilni-
kau, the Cavalry Division following {!); it arrived at

Prausnitz-Kaile, to which place the Crown Prince
moved his

The Guards Corps and the 5th Corps did not reach
their points of destination without some fighting.

Benedek saw that the corps which had got into con-
tact with the columns of the 2nd Army on the left bank
of the Elbe had been driven across the river as the result
of the previous day's fighting, and he had ordy his IV
Corps still posted on the left bank, half a brigade (three
battalions) occupying Koniginhof, the other three
brigades at Dolan (four and a half miles from Skalitz).

Now for the first time the danger of the advance of
the 2nd Army seems to have been appreciated in the
Austrian Headquarters. The intended forward move-
menttowards the Iser had to be given up, and the units
which had been already sent off in that direction, viz.
the III Army Corps and the 3rd Reserve Cavalry Division,
received counter orders whilst on the march.

We have seen already that the I and the Saxon
Corps were ordered to join the main army at Horiz and
Milctin, where the III Corps was now told to remain.
The other units were to be concentrated in a position
on the plateau of Dubenetz (five miles west of Jaromir)
to face the army of the Crown Prince. The IV Corps
was provisionally to stay at Dolan, but not to engage
in an unequal fight, but rather retire to Salney heights
(four miles north west of Jaromir), where twocavalry divi-
sions were already posted facing east. The II Army Corps
was directed to occupy the heights from Salney to Kukus
(on the Elbe, six miles west of Skalitz), and to be pre-
pared to resist attack from east as well as from
north-west. Two brigades of the VIII Corps should

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29

119

form the reserve to the I V and II , its 3rd Brigade be on
the left of the II Corps facing north, the VI Corps to
extend the line to the left with the flank covered by two
cavalry divisions ; the X Corps was designated to be
the reserve for tliis flank. The Army Artillery Reserve
was to remain at Gross Biirglitz (seven miles west of
Jaromir), the Headquarters were established at Dubenetz
and the construction of battery epaulenients was com-
menced.

As the advanced IV Army Corps came across the
Elbe in the course of the day, as will be seen later on,
all the troops reached the positions allotted to them
during the afternoon and evening. The army was thus
able to receive on the 30th the attack of the Silesian
army. In a line of only six miles there were assembled
five corps and four cavalry divisions. Although the
ground within the area of the position was not favourable
to unhindered communication, yet it contained a con-
siderable strength of resistance on account of the Elbe
and the fair height of the hills towards north and east.
Ou the other hand, the main road from Trautcnau via
KonigimW to Gitschin had been given up, and it
was there that the columns of the Guards and the 1st
Corps were approaching.

Capture of Kbniginhot
In the night after the combat of Burkersdorf detach-
ments of the X Austrian Corps had held Upper Soor
occupied, but in the morning of the 29th they retired
in the direction of Koniginhof. The division Killer
was ordered to take this place, and was to be followed
by the division Plonski with the reserve artillery, which

.

130 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

had somehow wandered oS to Trautenau, perhaps to
look for the whereabouts of the missing 1st Corps.

When the vanguard of the ad vanccd guard (commanded
by Lt. -Colonel Count Waldersee, since known as Com-
mander-in-Chief in the China Expedition) approached
the northern suburbs of the little town, they received
fire from the small garrison, part of which had occupied
a brick-kiln, a cemetery, and some buildings outside the
suburbs. The Austrians at first resisted obstinately,
but when the one and a half battalions of the vanguard
were reinforced by the arrival of the mainguard and two
batteries, the Austrians were driven steadily into and
through the town, although four batteries of the brigade
Mondl had hurried up and opened fire from the hills
south of the town, but at too great a distance to be
effective. The upper bridge over the Elbe was occupied,
before it could be used for the retreat ; then the Aus-
trians retired through the town and across the lower
bridge towards Schurz (two miles south-east), leaving
421 prisoners behind them : ttiey had also had 48 killed
and 128 wounded, whilst the loss of the Prussians was
17 killed, 52 wounded.

As the Prussians had not the intention of crossing the
Elbe, they went into bivouac in the town and north of
it, placing the outposts along the bank of the river.

Combat o[ Schweinschadel

Situation in Opposed to the 5th Prussian Army Corps

Front of the outposts of the IV Austrian Corps were

temineti holding the line Langwasser-Trebesow.

General Steinmetz was allowing a rest during t

ring the hours

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29 121

of forenoon to his troops tired by the fighting of the two
preceding daya. The march to Gradlitz— to join the
other corps of the 2nd Army — was not to be commenced
till about 2 p.m., and although the destruction of the
enemy's forces must always be the main object in war,
Steinmetz intended, if possible, to avoid any fighting.
With this intention he wanted to march round the left
flank of the enemy's line of outposts through ZUtsch,
Ratiboritz and Wetrnik, and thus to gain the road
Ch walk owitz- Gradlitz. Only the brigade Wittich,
followed by a cavalry brigade, was to proceed as flank-
guard on the right bank of the Aupa to cover his own
flank march and to join the main body again at Miskoles.
Steinmetz began his march with the 5th Corps,
brigade Hoffmann of the 6th Corps and the Guards
Cavalry Brigade, when the three other brigades of the
6th Corps arrived at Skalitz from Nachod, and when
he disposed of about 50,000 men in case of a serious
encounter.

Under these circumstances a really good
commander would have at once conceived the
plan of attacking the enemy with energy in order to
drive him to the Elbe between Jaromir and Kukus, gain
the passages across the river together with him, ascend the
heights covered, as it were, by the fugitives, and to obtain
a firm footing between Salney and Schurz with seven
brigades whilst using one brigade to contain Jaromir.
Steinmetz had already severely shaken and disordered
the VI and the VIII, and if he succeeded in doing the
same with the IV Corps, then only the II Corps was
left to render serious resistance; anyhow, he could safely
reckon on the confusion which is caused by an unex-

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

isasters,
,ted and

icapab!e

pected event after a series of defeats and disasters,
especially when the surprise blow falls on defeated and
demoralised heterogeneous masses under incapable
leadership. The whole corps of the Guards could reach
Kbnigmhof on the next morning and be followed closely
by the 1st Corps : in that case the Austrian North Army
would have had to retreat without delay into the position
of Horenowes, and the junction with the Army of the
Iser would have become problematic

But Steinmetz was only bent on executing his flank
march, if possible without fighting, which
was taction lly impassible. His left flanking
column, the brigade Wittich, with three batteries and
one regiment of cavalry, came upon the Austrians at
3.30 at Klein-Trzebesow, when the advanced guard of
the army corps was passing the ravine at Wetrnik.
The Austrian artillery fire caused this advanced guard
to form up in line near Miskoles and part of it to advance
against Schweinschadel. The fire of five Austrian
batteries (forty guns) at last forced the general com-
manding the 10th Division to order the 19th Brigade,
which had already proceeded beyond Wetrnik, to form
up in line near Miskoles, and to order the attack on
Schweinschadel ; the brigade took the place and was
pushing on against Dolan, but had to come back to the
plateau of Miskoles in obedience to the special order
of the obstinate commanding general. At 7.30 the
march to Gradlitz was continued, whereupon the IV
Austrian Corps retired behind the Elbe, after having lost
1,450 men including 550 prisoners; the loss of the
Prussians amounted to 394 all told.

EVENTS ON JUNE 28 AND 29 123

The resolution of the Crown Prince to
Comment , , , , . . . ,

on the place the 2nd Army in position on the
vu"t^ plateau of Koniginhof was natural, therefore
to the purpose, for thereby the connection
with the 1st Army was actually established : Koniginhof
is only twenty-three miles distant, from Gitchin, and one
cavalry regiment was sufficient to keep open the com-
munication and perform the orderly service. But it
would have been more important to have watched the
neighbourhood of Josephstadt, and an immediate attack
seemed demanded by the situation, as explained above.
One chance had been lost, but the IV Austrian Corps
had anyhow retired behind the Elbe discomfited.
Troops who are constantly worsted are sure to feel a
steadily increasing reluctance to fight, whilst success
increases the readiness to meet dangers— every new
success is a cause of satisfaction : the 2nd Prussian Army
might have shown more enterprise. Perhaps General
Blumenthal, the Chief of its Staff, had planned an attack
on the left flank of the Austrian position, and directed the
march of the 1st Army Corps on Pilnikau on that
account ; if so, he had given up the idea, as Moltke did
not seem to wish for an attack before the junction of
the two armies.

AUSTRIAN RETREAT

CHAPTER VII

A. Events on Junk 30

On the * N tne mormn 8 King William left Berlin

Prussian for the theatre of war with General Moltke
e and his Staff. Shortly before the departure
lie had received the news that the 2nd Army had occupied
the line of the Elbe ; in consequence the following order
was sent during the journey to the two princes com-
manding the armies : —

" The 2nd Army is to hold the left bank of the Upper
Elbe with the right wing ready to join the 1st Army,
as the latter advances without delay in the direction of
Koniggratz. If hostile forces of any strength appear
on the right flank of this forward movement, General
Herwarth (Kibe Army) is to attack them and drive
them off from their main army."

Even before the receipt of this order Prince Frederick
Charles had determined to advance beyond Gitschin
on the road to Koniginhof in order to get nearer to the
2nd Army. Accordingly he had issued orders for hi3
divisions to start in the afternoon and proceed sufficiently
far so that the outposts of the 5th and 7th Divisions
wunlil he near Miletin and Horiz. The 14th, 15th and
tflti Divisions ware to reach the neighbourhood of Libau, i

128

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

and the Guard Landwehr Division was to march as
as Jung-Bunzlau.

As the 2nd Army had reached the line Aruaii-Konigin-
hof-Knkus, and the farther advance of the 1st Army
would necessarily lay open the passages across the Elbe,
the Ctowji Prince had ordered that serious encounters
were to be avoided on the 30th, that the different army
corps bad to provide for their own security, that the
passages across the river were to be reconnoitred and
that preparations should be made for a farther advance.
Having been left till then without any news from the
1st Army beyond the advance from Turnau, the frown
Prince also ordered that cavalry detachments be sent
off from the 1st Army Corps to estabbsh direct com-
munication : these were met at Arnau by a cavalry
regiment from the 1st Army sent off with the same
object. During the day there was a short artillery
duel across the Elbe between batteries of the n
Austrian and the 5th Prussian Corps at a distance of
4.U00 yards : the losses on both sides were trifling, but
a building in Gradlitz, at Steinmetz's headquarters, was
set on fire by shells.

On the ^ f-"^ m * ne mornm g the brigades Pii

Austrian and Abele and the reserve artillery arrived
1 e at Miletin ; Archduke Ernest, commanding
the III Army Corps posted there, had learned from
outpost reports, received at 3.30 and 5.30 a.m., that
Gitschin had been taken by the Prussians and had
telegraphed to Benedek : " I Army Cbrps and Saxons
on the march to Miletin, Gitschin occupied by the Prus-
sians." He now sent off the further message : "
tachments of the I Corps arriving already, unfit

ras

ret
red

AUSTRIAN RETREAT izg

fighting, ammunition park empty, no supplies, will
provisionally go into bivouac behind us." During the
morning the Headquarters and the brigades Poschacher,
Ringelsheim and Leiningen arrived at Horiz ; the
latter forming the rearguard had been molested on the
march by a few squadrons of Prussian Guard Lancers.
The Saxon Corps arrived at Smidar and with them
the Austrian cavalry division Edelsheim, which had,
without orders, left the I Corps after the combat at
Oitschin instead of covering its retreat : even if this was
partly the fault of the negligence of the corps command,
the division could easily have rejoined the headquarters
of the corps early in the morning, and taken up its
proper place and duties with the rearguard ; their
presence was not wanted by the Saxons, who had suf-
ficient cavalry with them.

At 11 a.m. Clam Gallas at Horiz gave out the order
tJiat the troops of the I Corps should be collected and
reformed by brigades there and at Miletin, that the men
should be provided with food, and that at 2 a.m. next
morning the farther retrograde march should be com-
menced towards Koniggratz. When, however, soon
after alarming news arrived about the appearance
of the enemy's cavalry at Wostromer, four miles from
Horiz, the continuance of the retreat was resolved upon,
because the troops were not fully formed, were exhausted,
without ammunition and not fit to fight, and Horiz was
left at about 1 p.m. There was evidently an absence
of characters whose courage is not broken by mis-
fortune, whose quickness of judgment and determination
EdOMMa in proportion to the danger; for otherwise
some means, however drastic, should have been devised

13°

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

and used to restore order and confidence and to

the disastrous expediency of flight. For this

exhausted the troops beyond measure, and they did

find the needed rest even at Sadowa, but remained

under arms till the fall of night, as the transport columns

of the army going back beyond that place kept the

whole neighbourhood alarmed.

Thus a panic had been produced by thi
Comment r , , r „ ,

appearance of a few squadrons of cavalry

This shows the advantage which under certain circum-
stances can be derived from cavalry, for " moral im-
pressions are decisive in war." On the other hand, it
shows the absurdity of the commanding authority
wishing to conduct movements from a distance, far
away from the impressions of the events of the moment.
If Prince Frederick Charles had been at Gitschin with
only a part of his cavalry on the evening of the 29th,
he would have used the last man and the last horse to
have wiped the Austrian Army of the Iser out of exist-
ence. Whence has arisen this strange manner of con-
ducting tactical movements from a distance ? Was
Schwarzen berg's headquarters in 1813 taken as an
example worthy of imitation ? The great Frederick
dictated the marching orders in his tent to the regimental
sergeant-majors before the night march and attack at
Soor ; Napoleon, on the evening before the battle of Jena,
helped to give light to his gunners as they repaired the
road up to the Landgrafenberg !
Retreat ^ ne ^ Corps was concentrated re
of the Miletin, and the brigades of the I Cc
North Army whj( , h h&d arfived ther „ m^^^ fl

Kdniggriitz at 5.30 p.m., whilst the III Corps v

AUSTRIAN RETREAT 131

was then ordered to fall back to Gross- Biirglita. The
other corps of the army were assembled, as we have
seen, on the plateau of Dubenetz, but they could not
possibly remain in this position fronting chiefly north
and east, as their flank and rear were threatened by the
approach of the 1st Prussian Army ; nor was it possible
any longer to attack either of the two hostile armies
without the oilier appearing in the rear during the
fight. The army had lost above 30,000 men in the first
engagements, and the troops were fatigued, exhausted
and deeply discouraged. Benedek therefore deter-
mined to take the army back to Koniggratz in the
night of June 30 to July 1, and he telegraphed to the
Emperor : " Debacle of the I and the Saxon Corps
forces me to commence the retreat in the direction of
Koniggratz. Headquarters to-morrow in that neigh-
bourhood."

The retreat waa to be executed in four
columns, and the start was to be made at
1 a.m. aa quietly and noiselessly as possible ; but as
the time taken by an army corps marching in column
of route to pass a certain point was at the least five
hours, it would have been more practicable to detail
at once two army corps, two cavalry divisions and a
great part of the reserve artillery to remain in the
occupied position provisionally, to observe the 2nd
Prussian Army and ta fall back slowly and gradually
on Horenowes and Smiritz. This arrangement would
have given time to the first starting corps to get thor-
oughly reordered and take up well-chosen positions
without hurry and confusion. On the other hand, it
wrong to make demoralised troops march at night, if

it can be avoided. In such condition troops alwa;
require constant control and supervision, which
night must, of course, be defective.

At the same time the Prussians also made
a^Fauit* miatakes, aa they omitted to reconnoitre,
scour and seize with their numerous cavalry
the district on the left bank of the Elbe east of Joscph-
3tadt. which would have been of the greatest utility
because the main lines of retreat to Moravia pass
through that district. The various passages across
the Elbe near Koniggratz would then have been in
possession of the 2nd Army directly after or even befoi
the end of the battle, and the consequences of such
occurrence can hardly be calculated. As the Gi
Cavalry Brigade had been allotted to the 5th Army
Corps, it should have remained already on the 29th
close to the Elbe, and, together with a brigade of the
6th Corps near Jaromir, should have carried out the
observation of Josephstadt and the strip of country
east of the Elbe as far as Koniggratz ; on the 30th the
cavalry division should have been added, which on
that day was perfectly useless at Kaile. It would also
have been better to have left the 6th Corps at Skatitz,
or to have moved it to Ryclinowek, than to make it
inarch to the plateau of Koniginhof. Concentration of
all forces for the decisive battle is certainly ad van tag*
and advisable, but the results of the events in the first
days of campaigning had justified the conclusion that
each of the two Prussian armies contained a greater
strength than the whole Austrian army united, so that
nothing should have been neglected to place the surplus of
strength in such a way as to deprive the enemy of the

AUSTRIAN RETREAT

133

most important tinea of retreat, and to furce him by a
rapid advance to such an acceleration of the retreat
as to turn it into dissolution and dispersal.

The Crown Prince had certainly resolved to cross
the Elbe on July 2, but he ought to have done so at
; when, on the 1st, he should have observed the de-
parture of the Austriana from their position at Dubenetz :
correct resolutions must and can only be taken on the
spot. Surely the North Army had not been withdrawn
without cause, and it should not have been left out of
sight for a moment. If the Crown Prince had followed
up the retreat smartly, it would have been well shattered,
and the capitulation of the I Army Corps would have
been the probable consequence ; the Saxons also would
have been pushed away from the North Army : alto-
gether greater results might have been achieved than
were gained by the battle on the 3rd.

The question has often been discussed,
on the whether Benedck's retreat to Koniggratz

Austrian was (, ne correct and recommendable move-
ment, and has generally been answered in
the negative with the following suggestions. The army
should have abandoned the right bank of the Elbe and
been taken across the river, the passage over which
was secured by the two fortresses. Behind them the
Austrian corps should have been posted and the Saxons
behind Pardubitz, to have given them the chance of
being put again into order and made fit again to give
battle. For it is the role allotted to fortresses by
strategy in the conduct of war, that they should furnish
the means to re-establish the destroyed equilibrium, to
seize again the initiative, to resume the offensive— in

short, to gain time to give battle again under improved
circumstances.

B. Events on Jdly 1

With the ^e re treat from the position at Dubenetz
Austrian commenced at 1 a.m. and was executed, on
mj account of defective dispositions, in great
disorder, with the most various cross movements which
might easily have been avoided, for time and space are
elements subject to calculation. Benedek, with his
staff, started from Dubenetz at 2.30 a.m. and rode via
Horenowes and Chlum to Koniggratz. Now already lie
had lost all confidence in himself, his staff and the army
in general : he could no longer deceive himself in that
he was lacking the most essential attributes of a great
leader ; the incapacity of the chief of his staff was quite
evident, and what could be expected of an army which,
composed of the most various nationalities and therefore
wanting in close cohesion, was deficiently armed, badly
trained and even more badly commanded !

At Koniggratz Benedek found Colonel
B Advice' S Beck^of the Adjutant -General's Staff, sent
from Vienna to take personal observations
of the condition of affairs, and a telegram from the
Emperor, which expressed His Majesty's confident belief
that, in spite of the news that the retreat to Koniggratz
had become necessary, the Commander-in-Chief's ener-
getic command and control would preserve order and
soon obtain favourable results. Benedek sent to the
Emperor at once the following historical message :
" Urgently request Your Majesty to conclude peace t
any price ; catastrophe for army unavoidable , Cutout

AUSTRIAN RETREAT 135

Beak returns at once." Benedek received t lie following
telegram in reply : '* Impossible to concludo peace. I
command— if it is unavoidable — to commence retreat
in the greatest order. Has a battle taken place ? "

Benedek had thought that better conditions of peace
could be obtained before a great defeat, which was
fairly certain, than after having sustained it; but he did
not know the Court, still less all the different contending
interests which were there at work. Only when, so to
say, the Prussian bayonets could be seen from St.
Stephen's spire, and when it became evident that with
an energetic, truly military conduct of operations on
the part of Prussia, Vienna and Pesth might fall almost
simultaneously, which would have rendered the further
existence of the dual monarchy uncertain and dependent
on King William's pleasure, only then were the authori-
ties in Vienna induced to give in.
Btnedck's At 11 p.m. Benedek sent to Vienna the
Unvarnished following telegraphic report : " The VI and
eport the X Corps have suffered tremendously, the
VIII also considerably; the I Corps, as I personally
verified to-day, and the Saxon Corps partly, ha vesuffered
much, and require several days to reassume complete
order ; the IV Corps also has lost. Thus out of eight
army corps only two are intact, and that without having
fought a general battle, after mere partial engagements ;
these two corps, as well as the reserves of cavalry and
artillery, are much fatigued. The great losses are to be
attributed to the fire of the needle-gun, the murderous
effect of which has made a deep impression on every-
body. All these facts and considerations forced me to
fall back in this direction. On the road I found the

immense transport of the army, which could no longer
be placed far enough back ; and if under these circum-
stances an energetic attack had been or were to be made
by the enemy, before the I and the Saxon Corps are
again solidly reformed, the result could not but be a
disaster. Fortunately the enemy have not been press-
ing to-day till this hour, so that I shall let the army rest
to-morrow and send off the transport in the front of tl
retreat ; but I cannot remain here longer, for on
following day already there would be scarcity of
ing water ; therefore, on the 3rd, 1 shall continue tl
retreat on Pardubitz. If I am not overtaken ai
headed off, if I can count again on the troops, and if an
opportunity offers for an offensive com iter- stroke, 1 will
undertake it ; but otherwise 1 will endeavour to bring
the army back to Olmiitz in as good a condition
pus,sible, and to execute Your Majesty's orders as far
it is within my power, and certainly with absolute
sacrifice."
Comment an ^' le ^* cfc mentioned in this telegram, ti

Prussian the enemy had not been pressing,

plainly the faulty inactivity of the Prussian
cavalry, whieh could have obtained immense successes
even in Benedelt's opinion. In connection with these
circumstances we may be allowed the following remarl

In the history of the war written by the Milit
Historiographical Department of the Prussian Genei
Staff, we find the astonishing statement that the Prussian
chief command remained in ignorance of the occupation
of the plateau of Dubenetz by the bulk of the Austrian
army, as well as of the hurried retreat of the
that position. How can this pretended ignorance

ing

:

ma

ian
;ses
nese
irks.
tary
leral

htion
;rian
le latter from
ignorance be

AUSTRIAN RETREAT

137

reconciled with the short artillery duel across the Elbe
on June 30, which surely was sufficiently realistic to
have attracted attention to the Austrian forces on the
right bank of the river ? If the departure of the Aus-
trians remained a secret to the Prussian outposts, no
small fault must be found with the careless way in which
reconnoitring must have been done.

The account goes on to say that it was surmised that
the main forces of the Austrians were in a position
behind the Elbe, with the fortresses Josephstadt and
Koniggratz on the flanks : the correctness or fallacy of
this surmise could easily have been ascertained by a
business-like, appropriate employment of the cavalry ; at
almost every step in the process of these events one can
see, how little the use of this arm was known and appre-
ciated by the generals in command.

In the 2nd Prussian army the 1st Army

Armies" ^'-orps was sent from Arnau to Ober-Prauss-
nitz, on the right bank of the Elbe, only
three miles to the west of it, whilst the Cavalry Division
was left at Neustadt instead of being at once pushed
forward to Burglitz. Only an advanced guard was sent
forward into the abandoned position at Dubenetz ; the
6th Corps was brought to G radii tz close to the 5th.
The divisions of the 1st Army marched at 3 p.m. to a
line abreast of Miletiu and Horiz, the Elbe Army reached
Hoch-Wesely, the Land wehr Division remained at Juiig-
Bunzlau. All these movements were wanting in assur-
ance and decision. Probably orders were awaited
from the King's Headquarters, now transferred to Castle
Sichrow, north of Munchengratz, where the impending

ival of the French ambassador was already an-

nounced. This warning of immediate diplomatic inter-
vention ought to have eaused increased vigour and
intensity of military activity.

0. Events on July 2.

-On Colonel Beck's return to Vienna the
Austrians. Emperor ordered the Generals Krizmanic,
Changes in Director of Operations, Clam Gallas, com-
manding I Army Corps, and Henikstein,
Chief of General Staff, to be relieved of their functions
and to be sent back to Vienna, although Benedek had
meanwhile despatched the following telegram : " As
Colonel Beck has probably reported, Krizmanic is not
equal to his task. Can only think of Baumgarten to
replace him. Request authority to make him director
of operations and to give Krizmanic command of
brigade." In reply to the Emperor's telegram, Benedek
again wired as follows : " Before executing order ven-
ture following proposal : Henikstein to command I
Corps, Baumgarten chief of general staff, Iiingelsht
to be detached to III Corps." The affair was settled by
a final message received late in the evein'ng, repeating
the order of recall of the three generals, and granting the
request about Baumgarten and Ringelsheim.

From this correspondence it is evident that
Benedek was without any power in the army
entrusted to his command : he was a figurehead directed
by the Adjutant-General Genneville, and his proposals
were simply neglected and sharply refused. But Mahan
says : " A government can act absolutely only through
thegcneral-in-chief ; if theydonottake him into

ly through
to account,

r act over his head without removing him from his
command, disaster will follow. Nothing is more
damaging to the affairs of state than petty personal
conflicts and paltry intrigues."

t is true the Austrian Government was in a difficult,
though self-created situation. Already after June 28 it
should have been evident that Be nedek's capacities did
not suffice for his task, after they had taken the itl-
ad vised step of removing Archduke John from his side.
Now, if they wanted to uphold him in the chief
Wmnwod, they ought to have sent the Archduke back
to him as chief of the staff, as he could then he spared in
Italy afterthe victory of Custozza, and invested him with
absolute full power to be able to check the increasing
disorder in the army. But if they wanted to replace
Benedek, they ought to have telegraphed to Archduke
AJbrecht to hand over the command of the South Army to
General Maroiciz, to come at once by special to take over
the command in the north and to bring John with him.
But the moat unsuitable line of action was to leave
Benedek in his position, and at the same time to humi-
liate bim by the refusal of his proposals, which would
show plainly to his numerous enemies, that his power
was gone, and invite every donkey to give the dead lion
a parting kick.

In accordance with the orders issued on

°Troops° fc ' le previous day, the troops did not leave
their position on the 2nd. and in the after-
noon, after receipt of the telegram ordering the suspen-
sion and removal of the three generals, Benedek reported
to the Emperor : " The army remains to-morrow in the
position near Koniggriitz ; the one day's rest and the

[.("

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

copious good food have had a good effect ; hope not to
need further retreat."

This decision would lead one to surmise that Benedelc
had become sick of the whole business and meant to
have the wishcd-for battle, although he foresaw that it
would spell defeat.

At4 p.m. the orders for the following day were issued,
which informed the army that they would remain in
their camps, and pointed out the various bridges by
which the Elbe would be eventually crossed above and
below Koniggriitz : passing through the fortress wa3
forbidden. The army was encamped in the north-
western quadrant of a circle of seven miles radius : the
Saxons on the left dank at Ncchanitz, Lubno and Prim ;
the HI Corps and the III Reserve Cavalry Division at
Sadowa ; behind them the X and the VI Corps with
the II Reserve Cavalry Division at Lipa and Wsestar ;
farther tu the right the VIII, IV and II Corps between
Nedolist and Trotiua, with advanced guards at
Maslowed and Horenowes ; the I Corps with the I
Light Cavalry Division at Kuklena, the Reserve Ar-
tillery at Nedelist.

On the evening of the 1st the army had still been in
the greatest, disorder : it was hardly known, where the
various corps were and in what condition. Reports had
to be awaited, which, of course, only came in during the
night and during the course of the morning ; then, about
noon, Benedek addressed a meeting of commanding
generals on all kinds of general subjects, and expressed
the hope that the army would have a few days to rest
and to regain confidence : not a word about any decided
plan ! And yet, at 3.30, he had evidently made up his

AUSTRIAN RETREAT

141

mind not to avoid the decisive battle, which he himself
had warned against as probable catastrophe.

At 11 p.m., that is after the receipt of the
Battle" Emperor's last telegram confirming his de-
cision about the three generals, Bencdek
issued the following disposition for battle, which was
sent to the commanding generals at 2 o'clock in the
morning :—

" To judge by movements of the enemy an attack

may be expected, which would in first line be directed

against the Saxon Corps. To meet this eventuality,

ill'.- fritlitwing dispositions are herewith commanded : —

" 1. The Saxon Corps occupies the heights of Popowiz

and Tresowiz.
" 2. To the left of it the I Light Cavalry Division.
" 3. To the right of it the X Corps.
" i. The III Corps to the right of the X to occupy

the heights of Lipa and Chlum.
" 5. The VIII Corps will form the support to the Saxon

Corps and be posted behind it.
" 6. The IV Corps takes post to the right of the III

on the heights between Chlum and Nedelist.
" 7. The II Corps occupies the extreme right wing.
. The VI Corps to be concentrated on the heights

near Wsestar, the I Corps at Rosniz.

. The General Reserve is composed of the I and

VI Corps, the five Cavalry Divisions and the

Army Artillery Reserve, which takes position

behind the I and IV Corps ; these troops are

at my exclusive disposal.

' 10. I shall be on the height of Chlum.

"II. Should the army be forced to retreat, the line

142

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Holiz-Hohenmauth is to be taken withoul
entering the fortress."

This disposition implied fighting a defen-
sive battle without opportunity of moving
and manoeuvring, with a fortress in the rear which,
closed and forbidden, hindered a retreat instead of help-
ing and protecting it. Probably Benedek in liis bad
temper did not cue what Krizmanie had drawn up,
perhaps he hardly read it : Baumgarten did not know of
his appointment til! next morning, when he took over
duties from Kriznianie on the battlefield. Besides,
Benedek was not only wanting in the clear perception of
strategic proportions and relations, but also in the
tactical capacity of handling large bodies of troops,
which requires experience besides innate talent. He
might have acquired it at Verona, where for years he
commanded 30,000 men ; but he never ordered manoeu-
vres, at which he should have commanded for practice,
but was always satisfied with tedious reviews, at which
he could indulge his love of petty fault-finding.

The disposition as detailed above was not adapted t
the actual situation : both wings were liable to be out-
flanked, therefore the reserves should have been plact
in a ready position to meet this danger. Topographic-
ally three points were eminent : Horenowes as point
iVapjnti of the right wing, Chlum as connecting it with
the centre, and the heights of Hradek as mainstay of the
left wing, a good position to cover the road to ]
dubitz.

The I Corps, with the I Light Cavalry Divisioi
was on the 2nd near Kuklena ; they should have n
as well as the VI Corps, directed to Prim and b

nobo

-.un-
even
main

under the orders of the Grown Prince of Saxony. The
VIII Corps should have been left at the passages across
the Elbe near Lochenitz, with orders to cross with the
II Reserve Cavalry Division in case detachments of
the enemy were to be seen there. On the morning of the
1st, K i iz manic had ridden with Benedek over the ground
at Horenowes, and yet he selected the line Chlum-
Nedelist and had it strengthened by batteries, although
nobody agreed with him. Being a pure theorist, he, of
:ourse. placed the reserves behind the centre, although
ren if the latter had to retire, they could still have
laintained the line Wsestar, Problus, Hradek, and
could have used the Pardubitzroad together with Konig-
gratz for the retreat if necessitated, as long as the left
wing could hold out.

Perhaps it would have been most appropriate, if the
right wing of the Austrian army (two army corps, two
cavalry divisions and two divisions of the artillery reserve)
had been ordered to defend the line Langenhof-Chlum-
Horenowes, and in case of necessity to retire behind the
Elbe and to hold the line between the two fortresses. The
left wing, under the orders of the Crown Prince of Saxony
(two army corps and two cavalry divisions), could then
have taken up a position round Nechanitz, with the line
of retreat to Prelauc ; the centre, consisting of four army
corps, could have been posted on the heights of Problus
and Hradek, with line of retreat on Pardubitz : its right
wing would have been covered by Koniggratz. To
facilitate an eventual retreat, bridges could have been
thrown across the river below the fortress, by which a

tarmy corps could quickly reach the road to Holic.
means of thus placing the chief position more to the

144

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

west, the distance between it and the 2nd Prussian Army
was so much increased that, after taking Horenowes, the
latter would probably only have taken up a position on
the Elbe above Koniggratz, and the 1st Army would
scarcely have taken the heights nf Pro blus- Prim- Hradek
before the evening. The Austrians would probably
have been beaten all the same, but their defeat would
perhaps not have been overwhelming.

The crisis of the war lay in Benedek's resolution to
accept the battle on the 3rd, yet it was by no means the
result of tactical or strategical considerations, but was
caused by the explosion of the latent conflict between
him and the Adjutant-General. In a way Benedek had
been morally forced into this resolution, and the attempt
to carry out a momentous and doubtful undertaking
which the commanding gBneral considers unwise, is likely
to fail in most cases. Benedek had received the pro-
mise that his measures would not be interfered with, but
it was not kept. The man who has to do the work, and
is responsible for it, should have full power to act ; thus
it was in the Roman Republic, and Wellington, in the
Peninsular War, held the same position as a Roman con-
sul, being political head and master of his army. In
Austria, with her inveterate system of general mistrust,
only the Emperor or a favourite archduke could com-
mand the army in the field without disastrous frictions.

If Benedek's proposals to the Emperor had been
accepted and authorised, he would probably have given
at once the order for the different corps to begin the
retreat at two o'clock in the morning, and the Prussian
armies would have found the district unoccupied by
troops, except a few weak rearguards ; then the mistake

AUSTRIAN RETREAT

145

would have become evident, which wag made by the
generals commanding the two armies in neglecting after
June 29 to utilise and profit by the favourable situation
in which they were then placed.

The King's Headquarters were established

at the at Oitschin in the morning of July 2. The
Prussian General Staff supposed that the Austrian
army had been withdrawn behind the Elbe,
and, acting upon this surmise, orders were issued that
General Herwarth with his three divisions should move
on Chlumetz to reconnoitre towards Prague, and to
secure the passage across the Elbe at Pardubitz ; that
the other corps of the 1st Army should take up a line
through Horiz, pushing a part of the left wing forward
to Sadowa. The 1st Army Corp. 1 ) was to move by
Mile tin to Biirglitz, the other corps of the 2nd Army to
remain on the left bank of the Elbe and to reconnoitre
towards the Anpa and the Mettan (sic .'). If it should
be found, that a concentric attack on the supposed posi-
tion of I he enemy between the two fortresses would
meet with excessive difficulties, or if the Austrian army
should have left that neighbourhood altogether, the
general advance towards Pardubitz would be continued.
Both army commanders were to send every evening
officers to the Headquarters to receive the orders for the
following day.

The last proviso seems to show that there was no
intention to act rapidly and with vigour.

However, before these orders were despatched, reports
came in from the advanced guards of the 1st Army
which rectified the suppositions about the position of
the Austrians and j usiilied the surmise, that at least^four

Austrian corps wore still behind the Bistritz, whereupon
Prince Frederick Charles determined to attack them on
the following day, and sent orders to General Herwarth
to march on Ncehanitz as early as possible with all
available troops ; he also ordered his own six divisions
to be at '2 a.m. on the two roads leading to KoiUggrSt*,
ready to attack the position on the Bistritz. The Prince
also sent a letter to the Crown Prince informing him of
his intention for the next morning, and requesting him
to advance from Kiiniginhof towards Josephstadt on
the right bank of the Elbe with one or more corps, t
to secure the left wing of the 1st Army. He mentioned
that his request was prompted by the fact that he did
not expect a timely arrival of the 1st Corps on account
of the distance it had to cover, and by the firm supposi-
tion, that no strong hostile forces would be eneountere
on the Aupa and the Mettau.

The Crown Prince received the letter at 2 a.m., and
ordered the 1st Corps to proceed via Mile tin and Gross-
Biirglitz to the support of the 1st Army ; the other three
corps were to act in accordance with the previous re-
ceived royal instructions.

Prince Frederick Charles also sent the Chief of his Staff
to Gitscliin to obtain the King's approval of his disposi-
tions, and to report the information received at the
Prince's headquarters. The King determined at once —
11 p.m.— to attack the enemy west of the Elbe with all
forces available, whether the whole Austrian army was
to be encountered or only a considerable portion of it.
In consequence orders were sent to the Crown Prince to
advance without delay with all hia forces against the
right flank of the enemy. Notification was transmitted

AUSTRIAN RETREAT

147

to General Bonin at the same time, warning him to hold
his corps ready to move at the first intimation from the
Crown Prince, or to act independently according to cir-
cumstances. The Crown Prince received the orders at
4 a.m., but owing to the distances separating the corps,
some could not start before 8 a.m., so that all these forces
could not be expected to give any effective assistance
before noon.

THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ

CHAPTER VIII
The Battle op Koniggratz — July 3

Prince Frederick Charles had gone at
Jtions 1 "^ an1- *° Milowitz, where he received at

B.45 news from General Herwarth, that he
would be near Nechanitz between 7 and 9 o'clock with
thirty -six battalions. Thus the co-operation of all
Prussian forces was assured, for we have seen that orders
to the same effect had been sent to the 2nd Army.

Under these circumstances it seemed advisable to
occupy the enemy in front without waiting by the
1st Army, to draw on and contain his forces so that the
double flank attack planned against him could be com-
pletely executed. Therefore, at 6 a.m., the Prince
ordered a forward movement of hia whole army, so as
to occupy a convenient position near the Bistritz : the
real attack w&3 not to be hurried on, as the corps of the
2nd Army had to march, ten to thirteen miles before
they could join in the fighting. The 8th Division was
to advance towards Sadowa, the 2nd Army Corps
abreast with and to the right of it ; the 5th and 6th
Divisions were to follow the 8th as reserve by the sides
of the highroad on which the artillery reserve was to

follow ; the Cavalry Corps was to take position behind
the right wing of tlie 2nd Division, and was to establish
connection with the Elbe Army ; the 7th Division was
to advance north of the 8th, as soon aa fighting should
begin at Sadowa, and to support it according to cir-
cumstances. Thus at (i a.m. the columns of the Elbe
Army and of the 1st Army were all advancing towards
the Bistritz.

At this time the order to march had in the 2nd Army
only been communicated to the Guards Corps and the
5th Corps ; the 1st Corps had been ordered at 5.45 by
its commanding officer, to get at once ready for an
advance in the direction of Sadowa ; but the 6th Corps,
ready in its bivouacs east of Gradlitz to start on the
first received orders for an advance on Josephstadt, had
not then received the new orders which directed it to
march on Welchow.

Strong detachments of the Austrian troops

Positions ' liK ' ^ cen I' us hcd forward to and beyond the

Bistritz as advanced guards and outposts,

and occupied the following positions ; —

On the extreme left Alt-Nechamtz, Neohanitz and
Hradek were held by one battalion each of the Saxon
Corps ; to the north of Nechanitz the outposts of the
X Corps held the right bank of the Bistritz ; one
brigade of the 111 Corps was at Sadowa, and Cistowes
was held by one of its battalions ; the line from the
Bistritz to Benatek, Horcnowes and Racitz, including
the wood in front of Maslowed, was held by detach-
ments of the IV Corps, and on the right, as far as the
Elbe at the village Trotina, behind the river of that
name, were the troops of the II Corps, whilst <

cavalry division had been left north of the river,
covering with its outposts the extreme right wing. 1

At 8 a.m. King William arrived on the
theCentre ne 'g Qtr °f Dub an ^ gave the order to force
the passage of the Bistritz.
To prepare the attack 100 guns gradually opened
fire, which at 9 o'clock was replied to by about the
same number of Austrian guns ; by &.30 more tlian
300 guns were engaged. The 7th Division advanced on
Bcnatok, and about the same time the 8th Division
crossed the Bistritz at Sowetitz and took the Skalka
wood, whereupon the Austrian advanced detachment
retired out of Sadowa, so that by 10 a.m. the whole
III Corps was in position between Lipa and Chlum :
the prodigious fire of its batteries forced the 8th Prussian
Division to seek protection in Ober-Dohalitz and in
the Hola wood. About the same time the 2nd Prussian
Corps had arrived at Mzan and Zawaldica, and placed its
eight batteries on the slope south-west of Mzan ; the 3rd
Division formed up in front of Mokrovaus, Dohalicka
and Unter-Dohalitz, on the right of the 8th Division,
whilst the 4th was posted behind the 8th in the Hola
wood. The brigades of the X Austrian Corps now
evacuated the villages on the Bistritz, and by 10 a.m.
retired into the main position at Langenhof, so that by
10.30 the Xand the III Corps were assembled about
Langenhof, Lipa and Chlum, where 160 guns were

' Parts of the Austrian position were artificially .- Irons; the ned by
five batteries — two north of Nrdelist, three from north-past to west

BfCbJ byabattiaon the edgi - of several wood*, «nd by a number

of fire trenches ; the wentem portion* of the villages of Lipa and
Chi ii in h.i'l alf-o bean put into a atkte of defence. The forces engaged
in the battle were 300,100 Austrian! (including 22,000 Saxons), and
BBOJM Prussians.

keeping up a steady fire against the Prussian batteries :
this lasted for a considerable time, until about 12 o'clock
the Princeordered the 5th and 6th Divisions to cross the
Bistritz in order to ensure the occupation of that
position. But by that movement six divisions were
massed on a line of only 7,000 paces' length, which
gives about ten men per pace, a depth which caused
very heavy losses from the Austrian artillery fire ; no
advance could be made against this fire, and at 1 p.m.
the position seemed so dangerous, that a retreat across
the Bistritz was seriously thought of.
Events on At 8.30 the 7th Prussian Division had
the Right arr ived at Benatek with a cavalry brigade
Austrian , , , ■ , .

Wing till protecting the left wing, and its four bat-
a p.m. teries had opened fire against the brigade of
the IV Austrian Corps, which was posted south-east of
Maslowed, and held the Swiep wood, south of Benatek
and Horcnowes, occupied by advanced battalions.
When General Festetic saw the direction of attack
assumed by the 7th Division, he sent two more batta-
lions into the wood ; before the.se arrived, four Prussian
battalions had attacked, and as two battalions of the
III Austrian Corps had just then been taken towards
Chlum, two battalions of the attack occupied Cistowes,
the other two got a footing in the western part of the
wood. The remaining battalions of the Austrian
brigade Brandenstein were now sent forward to retake
the wood, wliich they failed to do, as the Prussians
had been reinforced by two battalions : the Austrian
brigade retired to Maslowed.

Instead of giving up the wood, the possession i
which was not necessary for maintaining the ]

possession of
the position

THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ

»55

Chlum • Naslo wed -Horen owes, which Festetic had occu-
pied with his corps instead of the line Chlum-Nedelist
prescribed by the Chief of the Staff, the IV Corps and
the II as well were now employed in attempts to
retake it. These did succeed in driving the 7th Division
out of it, but only when the first divisions of the 2nd
Prussian Army arrived in tho vicinity of the battlefield,
and in consequence of the dislocation of the forces
found the approach to the rear of the Imperial army
at Racic and Trotina almost undefended.

When Festetic took up the position

Comment „ , __ , , , ,. .

Chlum-Horcnowes, he was under obligation

to send information to the Chief of the Staff, and no
excuse can be found for the fact that the IV Corps,
and subsequently the II. exhausted their forces
against the Swiep wood, for the object of the order
placing them so as to face north should have been
quite evident to them, because on the heights of
Dubenetz they had had the 2nd Prussian Army in
front of them only forty-eight hours before.
Details of '* a doubtM whether the attack on the
(he Fighting wood would have been carried on in the
in the Wood tru | y disastrous fashion, if Festetic had not
been severely wounded and his chief staff officer been
killed at an early hour, after which his successor in the
command made two brigades, which at Maalowed were
still facing north, follow the first two brigades in the
direction of the Swiep wood. One brigade took
Cistowes, hut the attack on the forest failed : instead
of incurring this waste of infantry, the artillery should
have been ordered to prevent the enemy from sallying
out of the forest. When the attacks were given

lying
1 up,

I5&

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

General Mollinari received warning from Benedek not
to let the IV Corps advance, as the time for a counter-
attack had not yet arrived. Nevertheless, he asked
General Prince Thun, commanding the II Corps, to
support him, who was posted then between Maslowed
and Horenowes. Mollinari acted directly contrary to
orders received, and Thun, who ought to have given
his whole attention to watehing and patrolling the
country to the north, was foolish enough to fall in with, his
requests. In consequence two of his brigades attacked
the forest at 11.30, and as the Prussians were now
gradually giving way, he sent another half-brigade
after them, when the news arrived that strong hostile
columns were approaching from the north. Now
Thun received orders to take position between Maslowed
and Sendracic, whilst five batteries were placed on the
height east of Horenowes to engage the artillery of the
Prussian Guards.

The 7th Prussian Division had lost the
wood about noon, and had fallen back to
Benatek, after suffering a loss of 2,120 men in its twelve
battalions ; there were then in the wood ten Austrian
battalions and forty-nine around Maslowed and
Horenowes, of which only thirteen were intact, whilst
twenty-eight had become practically useless : their total
loss amounted to 13,400 men, including about 5,000
taken prisoners.

For some time Benedek also had known, that rather
large bodies of the enemy were approaching from the
north, and it was quite time to bring forward the
VI Corps and the II Light Cavalry Division in order
to prevent a catastrophe.

■

Advance At 5 a.m. the Crown Prince had Oidsifld
and Attack that the 1st Cort>s followed by the cavalry
of the and ,. . . „ ' , ,, ' „ J

Prussian division HartmaiM should march to Gross-
A™"? Biirglitz. the Guards Corps to Jericek and
Lhota, the 6th Corps to Welchow, whilst observing
Josephstadt, and the 6th Corps — following the fith two
hours later— to Choteborek (three and a half miles
north of Horenowes.)

At 11.15 the Crown Prince arrived on the height of
Choteborek, observed the fighting on the Bistritz, aud
noticed that the 7th Division was in argent need of
support. The 1st Division of the Guards was then near
Choteborek, the 11th Division (Oth Corps) was, after
11 a.m., marching up against Racie, and the 12th
Division was arriving on the heights of Habrina. The
Crown Prince gave the order that the three divisions
should take the position of Horenowes, where several
Austrian batteries were placed : the four batteries of
the 11th Division at once opened fire on them.

In the meantime Benedek had planned a
Counter- counter-attack in the centre towards and
beyond the Bistritz, but it did not please
him that his right wing was so hotly engaged
in the Swiep wood, although its occupation had to
precede his absurd frontal attack. To carry it out lie
had brought forward his reserves (two army corps and
two cavalry divisions) to the foot of the heights of
Lipa and Langenhof. General Baumgarten, just re-
turned from the right wing, advised to send one of these
two corps to (liat. part to fill "the hole in the line of
battle," and Benedek ordered the VI Corps to march
up between Chlum and Nedelist, but soon after he sent

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

counter-orders to stop that movement. At 11.30 lie
received a telegram from the officer commanding i
Josephs tad t, stating tiiat Prussian columns were passing
west of that place with the evident intention of operat-
ing against the right flank of the army. Hereupon he
sent orders to the IV and II Corps to evacuate the
Swiep wood and to take up the partly entrenched hue
Chlum-Nedelist-Sendrasitz, in accordance with the
original dispositions. The execution of this order
could not but take up much time, as the troops after
the wood fighting were much acuttercd and mixed Up,
and Sendrasitz was quite three and a half miles from the
Swiep wood, nor were the generals commanding these
corps willing to execute the order, for Mollinari had taken
it into his head that by beating the 7th Prussian Division
he was smashing the left wing of the enemy, and would
be able to roll up their whole line : only after personally
remonstrating with Benedek did he order Ms corps to
assemble east of Chlum. Thun also said, he could not
understand, why they should again fall back into the
defensive : just then were heard the first reports of (lie
guns at Horenowes. Benedek now ordered Ramming
to march with his corps to the right wing and reinforce
it; this general replied, that he would do so slowly,
hoping that the order would be countermanded and the
frontal attack be executed. Then Benedek, contrary
to Baumgarten's warning that the time for a counter-
attack was not at hand, actually ordered Ramming
to stay with his corps, where he was. Benedek was by
this time so completely out of balance that he really
did not know what he was doing, and showed plainly
that he did not possess the qualities which make up

THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ

and distinguish a great commander. Soon after, at
2.30, he received news from the Grown Prince of Saxony
that the left wing had been obliged to retire.

Before 12 o'clock eight Prussian batteries,
th^North P oat *d ftt Zisehjwea, Racic and Ilabrina, had :'
opened fire against the five Austrian bat-
's on the dominating height south-east of Horenowes ;
after 12 they were reinforced by seven more
10 that then ninety guns were fighting against
forty Austrian guns. The 1st Division of the Guards
broke by its advance the flank march of the IV and
II Corps moving into their proper position, took
Horenowes at 1 o'clock, then advanced through the
wood against the artillery position, and forced the
Austrian batteries to retire.

The 6th Corps took Racic and the western edge of
the Horickaberg without difficulty, as the defending
brigade of the II Austrian Corps was posted between
Sendracic and Lochenic behind the Trotinka stream.
This brigade, soon outflanked on the left, retired to
Lochenic ; then three battalions were posted in this
village, and the other battalions retired behind the
Elbe ; the 2nd Light Cavalry Division took up a position
to the west of Lochenic, whilst the 12th Prussian
Division occupied Sendracic at 2.30. Another brigade
of the II Corps, on its return march from the Swiep-
wald, had not the time to get into proper order, and
reaehrd the line of trenches north of Nedelist with
only two battalions, which, however, soon retired from
that position. The 3rd Brigade of the same corps was
attacked on the return march by a cavalry brigade,
but repulsed the charge and got to Nedelist ; the 4th

Brigade, somewhat protected by the fire of three bat-
teries which had onKmbered near Maslowed and were
attracting the fire of the Prussian artillery on the height
of Horenowes, reached the heights so nth -east of
Maslowed, and finally Nedelist at 2 o'clock. The II
Corps by this time was scarcely any longer in a fit-
condition to fight.

Of the IV Corps, one brigade was then at Oistowes,
fronting towards the Swiepwald, a second brigade in
the line of trenches north of Chlum, with two battalions
of the II Corps close to its right, the other two brigades
north of Rosberic : near them to the south-west eight
batteries of the Artillery Reserve had taken position.
Two brigades of the III Corps were north of Rosberic
and in Chlum ; farther to the west there were stall the
lines of its two other brigades and of the X Corps,
with two reserve corps and two cavalry divisions behind
them. The front of the Austrian right wuig wss then
6,000 paces, that of the centre 4,000 paces.

Opposite to the right wing the front of the 6th Prussia!
Corps and of the 1st Guards Division extended froi
Trotinka hy Scndracic and Maslowed, where tweb
batteries were now in position against the Swiepwald,
which was now again occupied by the 7th Division.
Events on ^? orders received at midnight,

the Left position of the Saxon Armv Corps had

wing r 'rom fixed on *■ rkl £ e of hi,U " M * t ° f Po P 01
8 a.m. till and Trcsowic, but when early in the morn
3.30 p.m. j^ j t wag reronnn it rol | i it was found not
be favourable to the placing of a complete army col
on account of limited lateral communications, wl
the ridge farther east, between Nieilcr-Priin and Prubb

THE BATTLE OF KONIC.GRXtZ

x6j

wemed well suited for the purpose. The Saxon Grown
Prince asked for permission to modify hie instructions
accordingly : this was obtained. Only one brigade
was now ordered to hold the original position, and was
directed to hold Popowic and Tresovic, as well as the
bridges. Alt-Nechanitz and Nechanitz were to be held
also by advanced battalions, but, in the event of an
attack by superior forces, all the advanced detachments
were to fall back on the main position. About 8 a.m.
Alt-Nechanitz, and, after a lengthy skirmishers' fire
fight, Nechanitz also, had been abandoned by Saxon
jager battalions, who retired towards Lubno. Before
retiring they had destroyed the bridges over the Bistritz
or made them impassable, but General Herwarth, curi-
ously, was satisfied with repairing the one at Nechanitz
instead of rapidly constructing several passages : in
consequence the 15th Division did not cross the river
till 9.30, and it was 11 o'clock before it was formed up
for the advance, and its four batteries joined the two
of the advanced guard on the heights south of Lubno.
Remark "^e services of the engineers were alto-

about gether neglected in the Prussian army :
Engineers ^^ wgre ac ^ UB ]]y ^^j fa #>QHTe. the lines
of communication. And yet it stands to reason, that
the place of engineer companies iB with the advanced
guards, and that, though occasionally they may be
attached to artillery under special circumstances, they
should always be to the front, and be at hand to remove
obstacles, repair or make bridges, work hand mortars,
etc. In 1870 better use was made of the engineers,
and in the last war the Japanese have shown that they
knew the full value of that branch of the service : the

result of their experience has been that they intend to
raise the strength of engineers to three battalions
for each, division of infantry of twelve battalions.
This certainly expensive development of their scientific
corps might make ua consider, whether one company
R.E. is sufficient for the needs of a division of twelve '
infantry battalions.

Attack General Herwartli determined to attack

by the Pro bins, and with this object directed, at

Elbe Army u ^ the j 5th Djyjajon ^Jj on6 cava lry

brigade, via Hradek, against Obcr-Prim, and the 14th
Division, then still west of Nechanitz, against Problus,
by way of Lubno and Popowic. To meet this envelop-
ing movement, the Saxon Crown Prince determined to
make a counter-attack in the direction of Hradek : it
was undertaken at 12 o'clock by way of Ober-Prim by
the brigade of Life Guards (foot), but they were attacked
in the left flank and forced to retreat. Then brigade
Schulz, of the VIII Austrian Corps, attacked the out-
flanking enemy at Ober-Prim, brigade Roth prolonging
the line. Now the Crown Prince resolved to use also
the 2nd Saxon Brigade, and to renew the counter-
attack with all four brigades. It failed again, because
brigade Schulz, in the centre, came at 1 p.m. upon the
just arrived 30th Prussian Brigade, was burled back
by the latter in great disorder, and thus exposed the
left wing of the Saxon3, in consequence of which the
2nd Saxon Brigade had to retire ; the brigade Roth
was also entangled in the confusion and disorder, and
retired into the Brizerwald. Ober-Prim was taken by
the Prussians, upon which the Saxons took up a position
1 By new Array Orders.

THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ

163

on the plateau of Problus, where ten batteries were
unlimbered. The brigade Schulz took position to the
left on the heights of Bur, and the brigade Roth as
right wing at Roznitz. The brigade Wober at Char-
busic now occupied the Brizerwald with two battalions.

But in spite of all these precautionary movements,
the 14th and 15th Prussian Divisions took Problua
and the Brizerwald.

When the general commanding the I Austrian
Corps noticed that the Saxons were gradually aban-
doning the heights of Problua, he sent at 2.45 one
brigade to support them. It arrived near Bor after
3 o'clock, and attacked Problus, but was repulsed and
retired towards Ziogclschlag at 4 p.m., as the Austrian
centre had gone back meanwhile.

About this time Edelsheim, who had reached the
heights of Techlowitz with his cavalry division to
cover the left- flank of the whole army, received orders
from Benedek to turn to the centre and fill a gap in that
part of the position : he went there with two brigades.

The order was senseless, for under the actual circum-
stances every effort had to be made to secure the line
of retreat to Pardubitz : the bridge north of Konig-
gratz should have been barred by other forces.

On the left wing of the Austrians not much more was
achieved by the Prussians, who remained almost
stationary at Problus, and even the 16th Division was
brought up to Stezirek, where it was not wanted,
instead of being sent with the whole cavalry of the
right wing to Kuklena, on the Pardubitz road. General
Herwarth had stayed at Nechanitz, and did not know,
what was going on in front of his divisions.

Comment
on the
Position

During these engagements the Prussians
" lost 1,657 men out of a total of 25.000 ; the

Saxons and Austrians, 4,500 out of 36,000. Advan-
tages were fairly even on both sides, as offensive and
defensive alternated, but the Prussians seem to have
shown greater fighting efficiency, as the Allies in superior
numbers were mostly in strong positions, and were well
directed by their commander, which was hardly the
case with the Prussians.

The Saxon Crown Prince selected the
position at Problus, which certainly had its
advantages, though it was not well adapted
to the strategical circumstances. As the VIIT Austrian
Corps had been placed under his orders, it would have
been more appropriate to allot to them the defence of
the heights of Problus, and to place the Saxons from
the beginning on the heights of Hradek, even if only to
serve the purpose of avoiding the always precarious
fact of mixing troops of different states and nationalities.
It is true that the frontal extent of the heights of
Problus is 8,000 paces, and that the VIII Corps was not
20,000 men strong, but the Austrian reserves were bo
near that a timely arrival of supports could be reckoned
upon. On the other hand, tactical considerations also
demanded this disposition of troops, as the dominating
heights of Hradek invited the enemy to use them as
starting and supporting point for outflanking the
Austrian left wing ; it was likewise demanded in order
to cover the road to Pardubitz, which was most necessary
for the retreat, especially if Koniggratz was shut to the
army, as had been specially stated in the general
orders.

THE BATTLE OF KONIGGRATZ

i65

Now, the position on the heights of Problus had been
chosen on account of its capacity for defence : what
was done ? Soon after the commencement of the fight
the Saxon Crown Prince sent forward at first one, then
gradually four brigades, to attack Hradek, and thereby
used up his troops, and exhausted them so much that
the intended defence itself became impossible. The
normal conduct of the defensive should be, to let the
enemy's forces get weakened and exhausted by attacks,
during that time to find out some weak spot, and then to
make a dash for it, unexpectedly and rapidly, as
Napoleon did at Austerlitz.

The conduct of the fighting in the Prussian divisions
was excellent, but their inaction after taking the heights
of Problus seems strange ; evidently the general com-
manding the force was not on the spot, so that the
energy slacked at the moment, when the greatest efforts
were demanded. The 14th Division could without
doubt have held Problus and the woods in front of it,
ao that the 15th could now have been directed towards
Kiiklena with the ( avalry Division, followed by the 16th.
The Elbe Army stopped moving, just when they should
have secured the most valuable results of their
suncc^. Who was to blame ?

About 2 p.m. the 1st Division of the
Prussian Guards had formed up behind
Maslowed. took by surprise a redoubt south
of the village, and dispersed the Austrian brigade in
that position ; then two battalions pushed into Chlum
from east and south, and scattered two Austrian batta-
lions in the village which trer? facing north and west :
the other five battalions of the brigade Appiauo were

but 1,00) yards south of the village. But the blame
for the miserable measures of defence does not fall on
General Appiano alone, Chlum formed the salient
angle in the Austrian line of battle, and the protracted
fight for the Swiepwald, as well as the artillery duel at
Horenowes, should have made it certain that the junc-
tion of the two Prussian armies would bo effected by
the capture of Chlum. But neither Benedek, though
on the height near the village gazing at Sadowa and
dreaming of counter-attack, nor any Staff officer, seems
to have thought it worth the trouble to examine the
measures for defence taken at Chlum or to observe the
surrounding ground. Benedek, who at the moment of
the surprise attack on the village was close to it, ordered
two battalions instead of a whole brigade to advance
on it ; the attack failed and could not be supported,
as the five battalions of Appiano's brigade near Rosberitz
were not only prevented from advancing by an attack
of a brigade of Prussian Guards, but were even forced
to give up that village also. Nothing was now more
necessary and important than to extend the left wing
so as to facilitate escape, to the south : the defeat was
now unavoidable, there could be only the question of
lessening it as much as possible, but no measure was
taken in that direction.
Advance About 1.30 the Prussian Crown Prince
°i h r0 ° P rt rof * e ^ rom Ch°teborek to Horenowes, which
Prussian had then been taken, ordering the 5th
Army Corps, meanwhile arrived, to follow him.
From Horenowes he rode towards Maslowed and
Chlum, and on hearing of the capture of the latter
place (3 p.m.), he ordered the 2nd Division of Guards,

THE BATTLE OF KONKGRATZ

isr

just arrived at Maslowed, to advance on Chlum and
Rosberite, and the artillery reserve of the Guards to
uiilimber on the heights east of Chlum. In the mean-
time, the 6th Prussian Corps had advanced from
Sendracic, taken Nedelist, and forced the remnants of
the II Austrian Corps to retreat behind the Elbe.

As soon as the attempts to retake Chlum had failed,
the two brigades of the III Austrian Corps, still at
Lipa, began to retreat to Langenhof and Roznitz, and
the X Corps followed this movement. Now Benedek
gave orders to Ramming to attack the heights of Chlum
with the VI Corps, which was absurd, for if troopB of
the 1st Prussian Army occupied the heights of Lipa,
now abandoned, and followed the retreating III and
X Corps to Langenhof, the VI Corps in its attack
would be fired on in flank and rear. When deploying
his regiiuenls Ramming received a new order, directing
him to attack Chlum and Rosbcritz : this he did with
two brigades. Rosberitz was taken, and both brigades
attacked Chlum, but were driven back, as the advanced
guard of the 1st Prussian Corps had arrived there in the
meantime. Once more Ramming ordered three brigades
to attack Chlum, but parts of one of them were thrown
into disorder by the retreating battalions of the III
and X Corps : of course this attack also failed with
enormous losses, whereupon the retreat of the decimated
VI Corps was much endangered by the advance of the
11th Prussian Division against Sweti, whilst the 12th
Division had already occupied Lochenitz and seized
the bridge over the Elbe at that place.

Altogether Bcnedck had but little tactical
skill, and now he had lost every traces of

Comment

i68

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

and the

circumspection. After the loss of Chlum and

abandonment of the heights of Lipa and Langenhof by

the III and the X Corps, the following dispositions

should have been made : the VI Corps to extend

between Sweti and Lochenitz to cover the right flank,

the III Corps with the Artillery Reserve to hold Wsestar,

the X Corps to join the Saxons under the orders of

their Crown Prince, to take the place of the I Corps,

which should have marched on Kuklena. Chlum and

Rosberitz were now no longer of any importance for

the army, threatened as it was now in both its flanks,

In the meantime, the I Corps had

Attempts deployed and tried, upon Benedek's orders,

to Retake TO regain ikismwiuii ■•{ Chlum and Rosberitz :

Chlum it i !■ i

as these two places are in the salient angle

between the heights of Langenhof, Lipa and Sweti,
which were already occupied by the Prussians, the
attack naturally proved a failure. In the twenty
minutes which this futile attempt lasted, the Austriaiis
lost, under the heavy converging fire to which they
were exposed, 270 officers, 10,000 men and 23 guns.
What would have been the use of the best breech-loaders
under such circumstances ?

The fact that, with such suicidal proceed-
ings, the Austrian army escaped utter des-
truction, is certainly not Benedek's merit, but the
result and consequence of the lack of decision and
energy of action on the part of the Prussian chief com-
mand. To command troops well means to perform
with a certain given strength things which it would
have been impossible to carry out with a smaller
But here it would have been possible

i.

:

.in ii m nuuiU

smaller force,
to do much

THE BATTLE OF KONIGCRATZ

169

more; nay, it can be safely maintained, that it was al-
most impossible to attain less than the actual result.

The course which the battle would take could be
foreseen, and was indeed foreseen by Moltke ; for when
the Ring began to feel uneasy about noun, on account
of the advance of the 1st Army being stopped, Moltke
remarked : " You are going to win to-day not only a
battle, but the whole campaign. 1 ' Therefore dis-
positions ought to have been made beforehand to have
fixed certain lines and limits for the advance of the
three converging armies, so as to forestall the disorder
and confusion which could not be avoided under the
circumstances.

Moltke indeed stated once that it had been intended
to throw the Austriana on to the Elbe, to cut them off
from Josephstadt and Koniggratz, and to annihilate
them if possible. But nothing had been done to bring
about such a result ; on the contrary, Moltke remained
perfectly passive all day long. The causes of many
omissions may be different, but the most important oue
was certainly Moltke's inexperience in the matter of
conducting a battle ; in fact, be had replied to a criti-
cism on General Hess' conduct at Solferino with the
remark that the chief of the staff had to direct the
armies to the suitable place for battle, that his
functions then ceased, and his place was taken by the
leaders of the troops. If the general is monarch at the
same time, as was the case with Frederick and Napoleon,
then the conduct of the battle is naturally wielded by
him, and all orders emanate from him as a matter of
course. But the King had no experience as a general,
and Moltke was too much a man of the world to push

170

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

himself forward too much ; besides, he did not on the
morning of the 3rd enjoy the same authority as in the
evening of the same day : only great merits, or at
least successes, confer authority.

At 4.30, after the last fatal attempts
"Battle * fl R a ' nat t'hlum and Rosberitz, all the
Austrian troops were in full retreat, when
parts of the 2nd Prussian Cavalry Division attacked
iffXufjZ. • * De ^ Austrian Reserve Cavalry Division at Stresetic :
as the Prussian cavalry were greatly inferior in numbers
at the first encounter, they had to retire to Langenhof,
but when more regiments came up to the attack and
the Austrian cuirassiers came under infantry fire from
Langenhof, they were driven back to Bor, pursued,
fallen upon by new squadrons, and finally retired to
Rosnitz. Two other regiments of the same Prussian
cavalry division came upon the III Austrian Reserve
Cavalry Division at about the same time and also near
Langenhof : here also the Austrian horsemen were
driven back after a sharp encounter ; they also had to
sustain infantry fire, and when pursued the various
masses of cavalry continually came under the fire of
Prussian batteries, some also met with fresh Prussian
squadrons, so that they suffered heavy losses, were
much broken tip, and scattered in all directions.

After these fights all parts of the Austrian army w
in full retreat across the Elbe, with the exception
the II and I Light Cavalry Divisions on the right
and left wing, and the II Reserve Cavalry Division
in the centre ; these divisions covered the retreat,
together with twenty-eight batteries, till about 6.30,
but the artillery duel with about thirty-four Pi

:

fat

■

THE BATTLE OF K0N1GGRATZ

i?i

July 4

men ;

batteries did not quite cease till the approach of
darkness.

The retreat of the Austrian troops was at first carried
out in quite orderly fashion, but the bonds of discipline
and the tactical units got loosened by the restricted
space on which such a mass of men, horses and vehicles
were hemmed in : the banks of the Elbe had been
inundated by the opening of flood-gates, and Konig-
gratz remained closed to the retreating troops till the
fall of night ; in consequence many troops were forced
to break off in the direction of Opatowic and Pardubitz.
The Prussian army corps did not advance beyond the
line Sweti- Briza -Charbusic, and were in bivouac for
the night as follows : The three divisions of the Elbe
Army, with their reserve artillery, at Problus, Prim and
Stezirek ; the infantry divisions of the 1st Army at
Bor, Problus, Wsestar, Lipa, Langenhof, Stresititz, and
at the wood of Sadowa ; their reserve artillery went
back to Klenitz, and the cavalry divisions were at
Rosnitz and Nechanitz. Of the 2nd Army, the 1st and
5th Corps were about Rosnitz, the Oth at Briza and
Sweti, the Guards between Wsestar and Langenhof,
the cavalry at Briza and Rosberitz. The outposts
during the night extended from Techlowitz by Stosser
anil Freihofen as far as Plotist.

The losses of the Prussians amounted to 359 officers
and 6,794 men ; those of the Austrians and Saxons
to 44,200, of whom 19,800 were taken prisoners.

The Austrians lost 160 guns and 5 colours, the
Saxons 1 gun. The losses of the Austrian army up to
July 4 were 70,987 men ; those of the Saxons, 3,100
men; those of the Prussians,, 15,533 men; therefore

172 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

the Austrians had lost more than a quarter, the Saxons
one-tenth, and the Prussians one-seventeenth part of their
original forces, and comparison allows us to form an
opinion on the skill of leadership and the fighting
capacity of the troops.

After the battle the Royal Headquarters were again
established at Horiz,and Moltke, with the General Staff,
even returned to Gitschin, instead of remaining on the
field of battle, e.g. at Dohaliczka. This is the greatest
mistake that can be committed, for only on the battle-
field it is possible to gain a full view and perception of
the situation, and to discuss, without loss of time, with
the generals the actual condition of affairs, and take
resolutions and order movements accordingly. And
thus indeed Moltke did act in the night after the battle
of Gravelotte !

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT

CHAPTER IX

The Retreat and Pursuit

Inactivity Critics have blamed the Prussian chief
of the command for not having begun the pursuit

Prussians ftt Qnce Qn fcfle ,j tn ^ ma king the 2nd Army
march on Prossnitz via Hohenbruck, and letting the
Elbe Army camp on the left bank of the river at Pardu-
bitz, whilst the 1st Army, which had suffered most
severely in proportion, could have followed the forward
movement on the following day. They say, that by
doing so the order in the organisation of the various
units would have been most quickly restored, and that
by rapidity of pursuit the Austrian army would prob-
ably have been destroyed, though it had escaped that

ate in the battle.

But only the troops of the Elbe Army had been moved
from the early morning of the 4th, with the intention of

I separating them from the other corps and thus avoiding
disorder : they reached Urbanitz and Libcan during .
the day. In the afternoon the order was given for the
other two armies to take up a position between Pardu-
bitz and Podebrad, after the morning had been spent .'
in making all arrangements which are necessitated by
a battle of such dimensions — as for the care of the
wounded, the disposal of the unexpectedly large number
of prisoners, the bringing up of the supply trains and

H

i 7 6

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOH E MI A

columns, completing the ammunition supply in the
regimental transports.

Again critics have said : " The order to march up
between Pardubitz and Podebrad was distinctly absurd ;
the forward march on Briinn should have been com-
menced with energy on the 4th with the endeavour of
cutting the Austrians off from Vienna, if they went off
aside to Olmiitz. It was the duty, and should have
been the business of the numerous cavalry, never to
lose the enemy out of sight and to find out the directions
they had followed. At the Royal Headquarters they
had no idea of the extent of the victory, but just on
that account energetic measures ought to have been
taken all the more keenly for a close pursuit, in order to
increase the results and prevent scarcity of provisions.
A few words or verbal messages on the evening of the
3rd would have sufficed to issue the necessary directions."

Retreat of ^ ne Te ^ Tea ^ °f * ne Austrians had been exe-
the cuted in three columns: the right wing column,

Ausfrians th{j jj Almy (-^ and ft ^ division got

toHohenbruck in the night of the 3rd, and continued
its march on the 4th to Kosteletz, with the rearguard
at Tynist ; the IV Corps had remained near Neu-Konig-
gratz ; the main column, I, III and VI Corps, with the
greatest part of the Saxons and the Artillery Reserve,
took the road to Hohenmauth, a portion remaining at
Holic ; the left wing column, VIII and X Corps, with
part of the Saxons and the greatest part of the cavalry,
had marched to Pardubitz, and its last detachments
had crossed the Elbe there between 6 and 7 a.m. : all
these troops left this town by the night of the 4th,
1 When turned about to face the pursuing enemy.

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT

177

part marching for Hohenmauth, there to join the main
column, the other part, including the Saxons, taking the
road to Zwittau.
Choice of ^' le cno ' ce between the farther direction of
Line of retreat lay between Vienna anil Olmiitz: onthe
Retreat j^q jjjjigg jq Vienna the army, in its condition
after the battle, would for certain have dissolved
itself, unless a halt could be made to re-establish order,
to reorganise unite, to obtain ammunition and other
necessaries ; but if that proved possible, one was again
sure to see the Prussians catching up the fugitives, and
there was no position north of the Danube, where a
permanent resistance could be offered, so that all the
land north of that river would fall into the hands of the
enemy. It is true, that at Vienna a direct connection
with the victorious Southern Army would be established,
whose assistance alone could equalise the enemy's
superiority; but it could hardly be expected, that the
Italians would allow of a large portion of that army to
be free for disposal in the north.

The fortified camp of Olmiitz offered, at only half
the distance, a safe place of refuge, where the army could
again assemble and refit. More than 100,000 men in
a flanking position could not but create great diffi-
culties to the enemy's advance towards Vienna, and
would protect a considerable portion of the Austrian
monarchy, or force him to divide his forces. Of course
the flanking position could only be effective, if the army
could again resume the offensive from it, which was
doubtful, as the moral condition of the troops hardly
warranted a renewal of offensive operations. It was
also doubtful, whether Olmiitz possessed all the resources

required for the complete refitting and provisioning of
the troops. However, Benedek decided in favour of
Olmiitz, and only ordered the X Corps and the greater
part of t!ie cavalry to proceed to Vienna for the pro-
tection of that city.

On July 5 Benedek arrived at Zwittau ;
July 5°" * ne rear g" ar d of hia right wing column
reached Wamberg, the centre column Lei-
tomischl, the left wing column Krouna.

On the part of the Prussians the cavalry division
Hartmann passed the Elbe near Pardubitz by fords, a
bridge at Nemcitz was repaired, and horse artillery
crossed the river by that means. Hartmann at once
commenced repairing the bridges at Pardubitz, which
was next occupied by the advanced guard of the 5th
Army Corps. The other troops of the 2nd Army halted
near Hradist and Opatowitz, with the exception of the
6th Corps, the 11th Division remaining on the battle-
field, the 12th in observation near Josephstadt. The
divisions of the 1st Army reached Prelauc and other
places on the Elbe, and those of the Elbe Army got to
Chlumetz and Zizelitz, with the advanced guard at
! Kladrub.

The field artillery of the 12th Division was ordered to
bombard Koniggratz from a distance of 5,000 paces,
but as no appropriate result could be obtained, the
firing was stopped in the evening.

As the time seemed to have arrived now to take
possession of Prague and its resources, the Elbe Army
received orders in the evening to direct the division
Rosenberg from Podiebrad to that city, and to occupy
the passages over the river at Elbe-Teimtz and Neu-

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT

Kolin : railways and rolling stock were to be protected
against destruction. It may be stated at once, that the
division marched via Sadska, and on July 8 reached
Prague, which was found abandoned by Austrian troops.
The occupation of this city was of great importance,
because the railway line, Turnau-Prague-Pardubitz,
could now be put in use. On the same day General
Miilbe, commanding at Dresden, received orders to
march with the division Bentheini via Tepljtz to Prague,
where he arrived on the 18th.

The Austrian Headquarters remained

at Zwittau, the rear of the right wing column

reached Wildenschwerdt, that of the centre colui

Leitomischl, the left wing column Policka.

Advanced Prussian cavalry reported Hohenmauth
abandoned by the enemy, the 5th Corps reached Holitz,
the 1st Corps Chrudim, the Guards went through
Pardubitz and Dasjtz to Zwing. The 1st Army did not •
move during the day except the Cavalry Corps, which
marched to Zdechowitz, and a newly formed strong
advanced guard of six battalions, three cavalry regi-
ments and three batteries horse artillery, which reached
Choltitz in the afternoon. The advanced guard of the
Elbe Army advanced to Elbe-Teinitz, the 14th Division
to Neu-Kolin, to give eventual support to the division
Rosenberg marching on Prague ; the other troops went
into bivouacs between Chlumetz and the Elbe.

The reports received from the advanced troops had
now made it certain that the main body of the enemy's
forces was retiring on Olmiitz, and King William deter-
mined to follow them there only with the left wing
army, and to direct the other two armies straight against

r8o

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Vienna, in order to bring the campaign t
elusion.

It was not the intention to lay reguli
strong place, nor could it be fully invested without i
dangerous splitting up of the Prussian forces ; therefore
the only task of the 2nd Army could be to cover the
advance of the 1st and the Elbe Army on Vienna.

It was assumed, though not correctly, that the de-
feated hostile army had still suflicient fighting efficiency
to be able to resume the offensive after a short rest in
the entrenched camp. As it was still numerically much
superior to the army of the Crown Prince.it was thought
that the latter might be forced to retreat. However,
all the previous fighting should have convinced the
General Staff that the fighting efficiency of their soldiers
was much greater than that of the Austrians, and the result
of the great battle following upon all the previous blows
could but have had very different effects on the morale
of the two armies. Anyhow, even if a temporary
retreat of the 2nd Army should have been necessitated,
it would have drawn the Army of Olmiitz in the direction
of Silesia and away from the chief operation, which it
was necessary to carry out rapidly, so as to appear on the
Danube before the Austrian Government could draw large
reinforcements from Italy, which could be done safely
after the victory of Custozza. The 2nd Army was
therefore ordered to take up such a position that it
could observe the enemy and fall back in case of attack
by superior numbers, or follow him, if he marched oS
towards Vienna. It would have been much better, and
more appropriate to the actual circumstances, to have
taken rapid and decisive action to prevent the junction

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT

181

of the North Army with the forces near the capital by
risking, without hesitation, another battle before the
disorder, confusion and disco uragement of the Austrians
could be effaced and supplanted by better conditions
and feelings. In spite of the great victory, the conduct
of the operations was still marked by strange, unaccount-
able timidity and half-heartedness.

The 2nd Army received the order to advance on
Mahrisch-Triibau and to establish a line of communi-
cation with Glatz via Mittenwalde, so that the line via
Koniginhof passing near the two Elbe fortresses could be
given up, and the bulk of the 6th Army Corps could be
drawn from that part to join the other corps of the
army.

During the farther progress of the retreat and pursuit
small skirmishes occurred occasionally, in most of which
numerous Austrians were taken prisoners.

July a ^ ne * H * J ^ rm y received orders to march on

Armistice Briinn on the road Policka-Kunstadt, the
Proposed Elbe Army to proceed to Iglau. On thia
day the Austrian General Gablenz, persona gralissima
at the Prussian Court, arrived at the Royal Headquar-
ters at Pardubitz with " instructions " from the Prime
Minister, Count MensdorrT, which proposed the imme-
diate conclusion of an armistice of at least eight weeks,
at the most of three months. If one takes in consideration
the actual situation at that time in Bohemia (as well as
in South Germany), it is hard to believe that the Austrian
Government had the illusion that Prussia would enter
upon such proposals. They had already ceded the
province of Venice to Prance, which offered the chance
of transferring considerable forces from the southern

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Jul 7 ii

to the northern theatre of war, and it could hardly be
expected that Prussia would blindly grant the time in
which to do this. The proposals were refused by the
King.

In the course of this day the Austrian
North Army was assembled at Olmiitz, with
the exception of the portions which had been directed
to Vienna. They had obtained a start of twenty-eight
miles on the 1st Prussian Corps, and of fifty miles on the
Guards Corps. But although by this uninterrupted
retreat of about 100 miles they had avoided all serious
righting, yet it had surely more and more deterior-
ated the moral and material fighting efficiency. The
overcrowding also of the camp at Olmiitz could not
but cause serious difficulties of all sorts. Besides, the
1st Prussian Army had reached the line Kunstadt-
Bobrau, and its advanced guard was within one day's
march of Briinn ; within a few days the last connection
of the North Army with Vienna could be interrupted
from Briinn at Lundenburg, and the capital itself be
then threatened. The 2nd Prussian Army had reached
the line Mahrisch-Triibau-Landskron, the Elbe Army
was at Iglau, Wollein and Pimitz.

The dangers of the situation were now perceived by
the Austrians, and it was resolved to draw the greatest
part of the North Army to Vienna, leaving only one
corps in Olmiitz, instead of leaving the greatest part
there, in order to operate in the rear of the enemy. This
change of plan was quite correct, because only a com-
plete change in the highest command and in the conduct
of the operations could possibly awaken new hope in the
discouraged masses, and nothing can be done without a

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT

■ 83

certain show of self -con tidence. Therefore, as the newly
appointed Commander-in-Chief, Archduke Albrecht, de-
manded the concentration of the army on the Danube,
Benedek had received the order to send oft by rail to
Vienna one corps after the other, with the exception
of one, as before mentioned, as long as the railway was
open; incase this should be interrupted, he was to march
on Vienna behind the river March with the troops not
yet despatched. In consequence the III Corps was
sent off on the 11th, and was to be followed by the
Saxon Corps. Benedek fixed upon the line Hullein-
Hradisch-Ostrau-Goding for the infantry and artillery
to march to Pressburg, and for the cavalry, which was
to start last and cover the flank and rear of the marching
troops, the road Prossnitz-Eisgrub-Walkersdorf, west
of the March. The VI Corps, which was to remain at
Olmiitz, was to protect, during the time of the departure
of the other corps, the railway line from Olmiitz to
Prerau ; the I Corps was to cover the neighbourhood
of this place, and for a similar purpose the brigade
Mondl had already been detached at Lundenburg.

From all the reports received at the Headquarters
of the 2nd Army, it had become known that the enemy
was in such a condition, that an offensive movement on
his part was not to be expected ; therefore, although
the despatch of troops to Viemia had not yet become
known, it was resolved for this army to occupy the line
Prossnitz-Urtechitz, instead of the line Littau-Konitz,
which would stop all communication between Olmiitz
and Vienna on the right bank of the March. However,
the line of communication with Glatz could then no
longer be considered secure, which was all the more

July i

precarious, as the railway connection with Tumau
blocked by Josephstadt, and damages on the
Prague-Pardubitz had not yet been repaired. Thus tl
troops of the 1st and the Elbe Army could only subsist b;
a continuous advance into districts which had not
sustained requisitions.

There was a small cavalry skirmish on the advance
Briirm at Tischnowitz, in which Austrian lancers
driven back by dragoons of the Prussian Guard.

Archduke Albrecht handed over the com'

maud of the South Army at Vincenza to
General Maroicic, and started for Vienna with Archduke
John, the Chief of his Staff. Briinn was occupied by
the advanced guard of the 1st Prussian Army, and the
King's Headquarters came to Czernahora. The ad-
vanced brigade of the 1st Corps, 2nd Army, reached
Oppatowitz, Hartmann'a cavalry being farther ahead.
The advanced guard of the Elbe Army reached Lispitz,
after the vanguard had had a slight encounter with the
enemy ; the mainguard reached Mahrisch-Budwitz
three divisions reached Startech, Trebitsch and Gross
Meaeritsch,

The Headquarters of the 2nd Army wi

moved forward to Oppatowitz. The
vanced guard of the Elbe Army entered Znaim, and
General Schceler had a temporary bridge made acros
the Thaya, close to the one destroyed by fire. The
King entered Briinn, where theSth, 6th and 7th Divisions
were billeted, and the advanced guard of the 1st Army
was pushed forward to Modritz. In the evening a
cavalry patrol, which had advanced up to the
Olmiitz, reported that they had not found any

July 13

)itz,

the
the
roes

?ere
ad-

and

the works of

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT

185

but that some forces were said to be encamped east of
the place.

Archduke AJbrecht arrived in Vienna. There were
on that day still 92,000 men with 364 guns about 01-
miitz, 41,000 men with 106 guns on the way to Vienna,
9,400 cavalry with 72 guns on the Thaya ; the X Corps,
16,700 men with 56 guns, near Vienna, including the
Brigade Mondl at Lundenburg. There were also on the
road from the southern theatre of war 57,000 men with
120 guns, so that all these forces, if assembled on the
Danube, would have formed an army of 216,000 men
with 718 guns. One may think about the chances of
the continuance of warlike operations as one likes, but
the safety of the Austrian states seems to have depended
lees on the doubtful efficiency of this army of the Danube
than on the actual dissension at the Prussian Head-
quarters produced by Bismarck's intrigues ; for from
the date of Count Benedetti's arrival there, all dis-
positions became marked by uncertainty arid their
execution defective, a proof of how dangerous it is to
introduce into the simple military headquarters the
turbulent current of court cabals

At the beginning of the hostilities the

Vienna" Austrian engineers began the construction of
a vast line of fortifications to form a bridge-
head at Florisdorf, north of Vienna, which is stated to
have been completed on July 13, and to have been armed
with 387 guns. The outer line had an extent of fourteen
miles — about 30,000 paces — the two reduits forming
the inner line an extent of together 15,000 paces
50,000 men were required at least to man thes

On July 14 orders were issued from I

Advance Royal Headquarters that the 1st Army
of the J , ^ „. , , , /

Prussian wa s to advance on V lenna by the three roads
Arinies Eibenschutz-Laa • Ernstbrunn, Diimholi-
Danube Ladendorf, Muschau-Nikolsburg-Gauners-
dorf, and that a detachment was to be
directed to Lundenburg to destroy the railway line
leading to Prerau, taking care to keep intact, or
even to repair on its advance the line leading to Gan-
semdorf. The Elbe Army was to advance on the two
roads Jetzelsdorf-Hollabrunn and Joslowitz-Enzersdorf-
ThaEeim and send a detachment to Maissau to demon-
strate against the Upper Danube, near Krems. The
main bodies of both armies were to cross the Thaya on
the 17th at Muschau and Znaim. All the pontoon
columns of the 1st and the 2nd Army were to be sent by
train to Briinn as soon as possible.

Of the 2nd Army the 6th Corps reached M. Triibau,
the Guards Oppatowitz oidy ; but the 5th Corps was
close to Laschkau, and the 1st Corps approaching
Prossnitz. The Cavalry Division halted at Kosteletz,
but its advanced detachments reported " no enemies "
at Ollschann or south of Prossnitz, whereupon Hartmann
sent a detachment to reconnoitre towards Tobitschau.
The consequence was a slight cavalry skirmish at Era-
litz : the report of it was accompanied by the informa-
tion that some infantry and artillery of the enemy were
advancing from Tobitschau. The first reports were
given to the Crown Prince by General Hartmann in the
afternoon at Neustift, from where he sent orders to the 1st
Army Corps to send the same evening one infantry
brigade with one battery to Tobitschau, f

li, in order to

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT

187

support the advance of the Cavalry Division on Prerau,

which was to be executed early on the 15th. Jn General
Hartmann's absence the main body of the Cavalry
Division was marched to Prossnitz, and the 1st Cuirassier
Regiment sent forward towards Tobitschau. When
darkness was setting in, the squadrons came upon
Austrian infantry formed in a square, which was attacked
vigorously, but not with great success : the regiment
was retired to Prossnitz, when more Austrian troops, -,
coming from fiiskupitz, opened infantry and artillery *
fire upon the cuirassiers. The infantry encountered
belonged to the flank-guard of the IT Austrian Army
Corps, which had started its march upon Goding under
the following circumstances

At noon on the 13th, Benedek had re-
ceived from the Archduke Albrecht this
telegram : " Have to-day taken over the
chief command. Order that without contradiction all
troops shall be started on the march to Presshurg on the
left bank of the March, to-morrow and on the nest day ;
ten battalions, one cavalry regiment and one battery are
to be left as garrison at Olrautz." But Benedek had
already ordered and commenced the march of four
army corps on the right bank of the March to Goding,
where they had to cross the river and then proceed to
Pressburg via Stampfen.

All the news received by the Prussian Crown Prince
during the day made it probable that the greater part of
the North Army had already left Olmutz for Vienna, and he.
therefore ordered the 6th Corps and the Guards to march
on Brunn, as it seemed unsuitable to him to assemble
bis whole army at Prossnitz. This resolution seems ill

Benedek
Olmiitz

x8S

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

advised, for the 1st and the 5th CorpB ought to have first
made sure whether the enemy had really left Olmiitz, and
in which direction he had gone. If it was found that he
had gone off to the south, he had to be followed as
rapidly as possible on the roads to Hradisch and Holies,
as the main object should have been to gain touch with
him at last. The distance from Koniggratz to Prossnitz
is eighty-four miles, which had been covered in eleven
days : thus the pursuit had not been particularly fast,
although it had the object of cutting off the North Army
from the South.

Combat of ^ e Austrian II Corps had started from
Tobitschau, Tobitschau at 2 a.m. and got to Krenisier
J y ' 5 without being molested, the IV Corps like-
wise, from Kojetein to Zdannek. The VIII Corps was to
move Irom Olmiitz to Kojetein, and started at i a.
brigade Rothkirch, with three squadrons, being the
advanced guard, whilst brigade Wober was to move as
flank-guard via Kralitz to Niemtschite. When the
advanced guard had entered Tobitschau, the flank de-
tachment received fire near a wood outside the place.
A part of the cavalry division Hartmann and one brigade
of the 1st Army Corps had arrived there. The Austrian
flank -guard of two companies, though reinforced by the
remainder of the battalion, was driven out of the wood
in which it had taken position. The brigade Rothkirch
now deployed on the heights north of the town, and its
battery opened fire on three Prussian batteries ; the left
wing had begun to retire, when Benedek ordered the
artillery reserve of the VIII Corps (four batteries) to
form up west of the road, to silence the Prussian guns.
They had scarcely commenced firing, when they were

fallen upon by the 5th Prussian Cuirassier Regiment,
who took two batteries whilst the other two had time to
escape. The Austrian infantry soon after began to
retreat,

Meanwhile the Austrian flank -guard, brigade Wober,
had come up and deployed, but when the approach of
strong columns from Prossnitz was observed, it retired
on the main body of the VIII Corps, which meanwhile
had deployed on the heights of Dub. An artillery duel,
without much result, was then carried on, till the 1st
Prussian Army Corps appeared deployed for the attack,
when Archduke Leopold ordered the retreat of his
corps behind the March, in obedience to instructions,
which caused him to march to Prerau. An attack of
eight Prussian squadrons on part of the infantry and
cavalry of the I Austrian Corps in marching column
at Prerau was repulsed, though successful at first, and
they had to retire : they lost 10 killed, 97 wounded, and
113 horses, but their unexpected appearance and attack
had produced the most complete confusion in the Aus-
trian columns, so that they brought back 5 officers and
250 men as prisoners. The total loss in the day's
fighting to the Prussians was 12 officers, 235 men ; whilst
the Austrians lost 1,956, including 1,070 missing. The
attack of the cuirassiers, wliich resulted in the capture
of 18 guns, 15 limbers, 7 ammunition wagons, 2 officers
and 168 men, only caused the loss of 10 men.
Comment ^ e ^1 Austrian Corps had meantime
on the marched unmolested from Olmiitz to Leip-
ituabon f ^ ^ ^ p russ ; an Cojpg na j occupied
Prossnitz, the Guards and the 6th Corps had arrived at
Boskowjtz and Lettowitz. By the fight at Tobitachau

the head of the 2nd Prussian Army had put a wedge
between the two echelons of the Austrian North Army,
had forced that part of it marching on the right bank of
the March to retire behind that river, and its cavalry
had even crossed it. But the favourable situation thus
created was not taken advantage of : the general in
chief command seems to have been blind to the fact that
he had in front of him the largest and most important
portion of the enemy's forces, that there was urgent
necessity not to let them escape, and that he could never
bring about a more decisive event. It surely was his
duty to keep in touch with the enemy, and to make full
use of every favourable opportunity to make an artacl
on the disheartened enemy's masses.

The order was given that the 5th Corps and the
cavalry division Hartmann should pursue the Austrian*,
and that the 1st Corps should observe Olmutz, but noth-
ing really was done, chiefly owing to the absence of the
commanding general from the scene of action : without
personal exertion nothing can be accomplished. General
Bonin brought up the 1st Corps at Tobitschau, but
neglected to follow up the advantage gained, and inflict
a serious, perhaps fatal blow on the enemy. Instead,
he retired to the bivouac, and even evacuated Tobit-
schau, leaving there only a rearguard. He then wasted
the 16th and 17th by a reconnaissance to Prerau, which
he might have taken already on the 15th, and he
destroyed the railway leading to Silesia.
Advance of During the fight at Tobitschau the 5th
Other TroopsPruBsi an Corps had occupied Proasnitz, the
on e 15 Cfua^ia an( j the 6th Corps had arrived at
BoftkawHx and Lcttowitz. The 1st Army had continued

THE RETREAT AND PURSUIT 191

the march towards Vienna : the advanced guard found
the Thaya bridge at Muscbau destroyed by fire, so that
only one cavalry regiment and two battalions could
cross the river during the afternoon. The 61h, 7th and '
8th Divisions were inarching on Pohrlitz, Gross Njemp- •
schitz and Klobank, but in consequence of an order-
from the Royal Headquarters directing the advance
on Lundenburg, the 7th Division was ordered to march
to Auspitz, the 5th from Briinn to Monitz, the 8th to
occupy Goding on the following day, and to secure the
railway and interrupt the transport on it of the enemy's
troops. On receipt of this order at Klobank, General
Hom, commanding the 8th Division, at once detailed
a detachment of 150 men of the 6th Lancers on the best
horses of the regiment, together with a section of mounted
engineers, to proceed to a point on the railway south of
Goding. They arrived there at 6 p.m., having seen
two trains pass from the north, removed some rails and
cut the telegraph : a third train then approaching,
halted and steamed back ; but when several bodies of
the enemy's infantry and cavalry came up, the detach-
ment retired and went back to Klobank, where they
arrived at midnight, having covered fifty-eight miles
since they left their bivouac at 3 a.m.

The appearance of Prussian troops at Goding caused
a telegraphic order being sent from Vienna to the effect
that the brigade Mondl, till then stationed at Lunden-
burg, should destroy the bridge at that place and go back
to Marchegg by rail the same night. The Elbe Army
continued the inarch on Znaim, which was occupied
during the day by the 14th Division ; its advanced
guard got to Jetzelsdorf, where it. had a slight skirmish

with cavalry and artillery, who retired after the exchange
of a few shots.

On the side of the Austrians the IV and the II Corps
had arrived unmolested at Zdaunck and Kremsier. "
When Eenedck, who was with the I and VIII Corps at
Prerau, as shown above, heard in the evening that
Goding had been reached by Prussian troops, he gave
up the idea of continuing his march in the valley of the
March, and issued the following instructions: the IV
Corps was to proceed to Mijava via Hradisch and Wclka,
the II Corps to Neustadt-on-the-Waag via Hradisch
, , and Strany, the I Corps from Prerau via Slawitschin
to the Wlar Pass, the VIII Corps to the Hrosenkau Pass
via Holleschau and Boikowitz; the VI Corps, still left at
Olmiitz, to Klobank via Leipnik, Meseritseh and Wsetin ;
the latter was to be followed by about 10,000 Saxoi
and men of the VIII Corps still remaining at
miitz.

The Headquarters of the 2nd Prussian
Army moved to Prodktz ; the Guards and
the Cth Corps, continuing the march in westerly direction,
7 reached Czernahora and Raltz ; the 5th Corps had to
march to Prerau, and was to be supported by a division
of the 1st Corps, and its flank to be covered to the south
by the Cavalry Division : by these wise dispositions the
heads of the two halves of the 2nd Army were forty-two
miles apart, and their line was forty-six miles north of
that occupied by the other two armies on this same day !
Prerau was, of course, found abandoned by the enemy,
whereupon the 10th Division and part of the 1st Corps
marched back to their bivouacs ; but, evidently with the
intention of doing something, they destroyed 1,000

eun j
>xona

o,.

Jujy 1 6

THE RETREAT AND PURSUTT

193

yards of the railway line and blew up the iron bridge
across a tributary of the March, whereby the connection
with Upper Silesia was interrupted) contrary to the
spirit of the instructions from the General Staff !

The 8th Division reached Gdding and put a bridge
aeross the March, the 7th Division occupied Lnnden-
burg, whilst the specially formed uiinmrril guard of the
1st Army, under Duke Wilhelm of Mecklenburg, was
stopped at Eisgrub, five miles to the rear of the 7th
Division, through the delay caused by throwing a bridge
across the Thaya. The 5th Division followed the 7th,
the Cavalry Corps advanced to Feldsberg, the (it I)
Division to Nicolsburg, the 2nd Army Corps to Dario-.'
witz, the Headquarters of the 1st Army moved to Paw-
lowitz, eleven miles north of Lundenburg. The divisions
of the Elbe Army reached various places round Laa,
having marched off to the left from their original direc-
tion in accordance with the latest instructions.

The Austrian IV Corps had reached Hradisch by a
night march, and proceeded as far as Ostrau ; the II
Corps got to Hradisch via Napagedl ; the I and VIII -
Corps, under Benedek, to Holleschau ; the VI Corps left i
Leipnik ; the II Saxon Division marched from Oimiitz
to Leipnik, and continued the march during the night to
Weisskirchen.

After Benedek had seen himself obliged to
attain his junction with the army near
Vienna by the long diiaur across the Little Carpathians,
he strove to make up for the unavoidable loss of time
by forced marches, which reflect greatly to the credit of
the endurance of his army. Thus, in spite of the diffi-
cult progress along mountain roads, the rearguards of

July 1

Ilia corps reached Welka (the IV), Strany (the
Boikowitz (the I and the VIII), Meseritsch (the VI).

The 1st Prussian Corps left Tobitschau and went bat
to its cantonments near Urtschitz, because these had
been fixed by orders received four days previously (stc/);
the 5th Corps and the Cavalry Division had a day's rest,
and were to start on the next day down the MaTch ; the
Guards and the 6th Corps reached Briinn. Of the 1st
Army the 8th Division went to Holies, the 8th to Gliding,
the 7th remained in occupation of Lundenburg ; the 2nd
Army Corps and the 6th Division marched forward
towards the Danube ; the Cavalry Corps advanced down
the March to Hohenau, sixty-three miles ahead of the
cavalry division Hartmann, with the 5th Corps ! The
advanced guard, under the Duke of Mecklenburg, went
south on the Vienna road, but finding Wilfersdorf on
that road occupied already by the advanced guard of
the Elbe Army, moved off five miles to its left to Haus-
kirchen. The three divisions of the Elbe Army reached
Erdberg, Ameis and Staatz ; the vanguard of its advanced
guard had a slight skirmish at Schrick with Austrian
cuirassiers.

Late in the evening the following orders
Orders werp ( ' e8 P at «hed from the Royal Headquar-
ters : " His Majesty intends to make a general
advance on the Danube; the 1st Army will march on
both banks of the March, and has the task of preventing
the retreat of hostile troops from Olmiitz to Pressburg.
The 2nd Army will assemble along the line Nikolsburg*
Lundenburg, and will immediately follow the move-
ments of the 1st and the Elbe Army. The 1st Army has
to take into consideration, that one of its divisions may

be ordered to advance from Malaczka, with forced
marches, on Pressburg, to obtain possession of it and of
the passage of the Danube, and, if possible, also of the
places Hamburg and Kitsee."

On July 12 a council of war had been held
at the Royal Headquarters at Czernahora,
in which the question of attacking the entrenched lines
of Florisdorf, north of Vienna, was discussed ; Moltke
wanted to get fifty heavy guns from Dresden for the
purpose of bombarding them, but their transport was
Calculated to take fourteen days, and thereupon Bis-
marck stated, that they could not lose so many days
without dangerously increasing the possibility of immi-
nent French arbitration proposals, and proposed to
effect the crossing of the Danube ; finally, the above
royal order decided in favour of this proposal rather
against military opinion. As a matter of fact, the lines
of Florisdorf were armed with old guns, and were so
extensive that they could not have been effectively
defended and might have been carried by assault,
as those of Diippel had been carried two years previously.
But Bismarck wanted to prevent the triumphal entrance
of the Prussian army in Vienna, in order to spare the
feelings of the Austrians, and to facilitate a reconciliation
in the future.

it ". . „ In conformity with these orders the follow-
ing movements were carried out by the
Prussian troops : on the west of the March the advanced
guard to Spannberg with the Cavalry Corps on its left,
behind them the 7th Division at Dreeing, the Gth at
Zistersdorf, the 2nd Army Corps near Feldsberg ; on the
eastern aide of the March the 8th Division was pushed

ig6 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

forward to St. Johann and the 5th to Holicz. The
? Elbe Army was concentrated on the line Aspern-Wi Iters-
dorf, with its advanced guard at Gaunersdorf. Of the
2nd Prussian Army the Guards and the 6th Corps con-
tinued their march south from Briinn, the 5th Corps
reached Kojetein, whilst the cavalry division Hartmann
pushed forward to Kremsier and Hullein. In front.
Olmiitz the 1st Corps took up the positions reqi
for the investment of the place.

The Austrian IV Corps got that day as far as Mijawa,
the II to Waag-Neuetadtl, the I and VIII were ap-
' proaching the valley of the Waag at Boikowitz, whilst
the VI reached Klobank. In the evening the II
Corps received special orders to hurry on to Pressburg
in order to support the brigade Mondl, which had gone
to Blumenau, and to secure the possession of Pressbi
which seemed endangered by the advance of considers'
hostile forces from Coding.

The Elbe Army was to keep during the
day their position about Aspern and Wilfers-
dorf, pending the approach of the two corps of the
2nd Army towards Muschau : the 1st Army also was not
to advance far beyond the line Malaczka-Gaunersdorf,
and in consequence its advanced guardand cavalry oal
took up a line near Schiinkirchen on the Weidenbach ;
the 8th Division, on the left bank of the March, advance
to Gross Schiitzen, the iith to Kuti ; the cavalry divisioi
Hartmann advanced to Napagedl, and was followed 1:
the two divisions of the 5th Corps : advanced cavalr
detachments took a large quantity of rolling stock at thi
station of Altstadt.

The II Austrian Corps continued its march <

maim
-nt of
uired

? one
urg,
able

road to Pressburg as far as Koztolan ; pitrt of the IV
halted at Mijawa, part was sent to Jablonitz on the
road Goding-Tyrnau ; the I Corps went down the
Waag to Trencsin, the VIII got to Choholna, whilst the
VI Corps reached Nemsova, leaving one Saxon division
behind at Klobank.

New I" "'" l' rLISS ' a ' 1 Headquarters no certain

Prussian information bad as yet been obtained as to

ers the number of Austrian troops which had

»been sent by rail from Olmiitz to Vienna, before the line
was interrupted, nor was it known, whether a reserve
army had already been formed behind the Danube of
the 4th (garrison) and the newly raised 5th battalions of
the infantry regiments. Again, it was not known, how
great a part of the Southern Army had lately been

I brought to Vienna from Italy, whence the Italian army
was reported to be inactive, and to do nothing to prevent
such withdrawal of forces from that theatre of war.
It was therefore not impossible, that by means of using
ail these resources a large army was already assembled
near Vienna, which, to save the capital, might sally out
on the Marchfeld from the lines of Florisdorf.

These considerations caused the Prussian Head-
quarters at Nikoteburg to issue the following orders
(abridged) : —

" It is the intention of His Majesty to concentrate the
army behind the Russbaeh, the Kibe Army at Wolkers-
dorf, the 1st Army behind Deutsch Wagram, the 2nd
Army as reserve at iSchiinkirchen.

" In this position the army is to be capable of opposing
an attack which the enemy might be able to undertake
with 160,000 men from Florisdorf; further, the army i.,

198 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

either to reconnoitre and attack the enemy's entrenched
lines at that place or, leaving a corps of observation
opposite the lines, to march off to Pressburg as quick);

" For this purpose all the available detachments mo'
to-morrow to the Weidenbach,and send their advant
guards forward to Wolkersdorf and Deutech Wagram. At
the same time the general commanding the 1st Army
has to make the attempt to take possession of Pressburg
by a surprise attack, and to secure the passage across the
Danube."

These circumstantial dispositions,
altogether the assembly of the whole
previous to the intended actions, seem to have
not justified by the circumstances. Prince Fredei
Charles and General Herwarth could have been shoi
ordered to surprise Pressburg and the Florisdorf brii
head respectively, early in the morning of the 21st, with
all available forces : these two armies alone possessed
quite enough fighting efficiency to cope with the Austrian
corps without waiting for the 2nd Army, whose much
delayed arrival near the probable scene of final opera-
tions was perhaps partly the cause of these orders for
assembly and concentration at a time, when circum-
stances demanded energetic decision and rapid action
to strike a few blows to influence the conditions of an
armistice, for which negotiations had commenced some
days previously to the issue of the order. Materials for
assaulting the Florisdorf lines and for bridging the
Danube had been got ready, and were partly already
Lundcnburg, where the railway line from Drot
Prague to Vienna was still interrupted.

*ry
iced

' already at
Dresden via

THE END— THE COMBAT OF BLUMENAU

CHAPTER X

The Combat of Blumenau — July 22

On the 20th the advanced brigade of the
Movements " Austrian Corps reached Tyrnau, where :

1,000 vehicles had been got ready to take
them on to Prcssburg without delay : there they arrived
at 8 p.m., and were posted aa reserve to the brigade
Mondl in the Muhlenthal (valley of the mill}. Mondl
was further reinforced on the 21st by four batteries anil
some cavalry, besides two jiigcr battalions, and, in the
course of the following night till 2 a.m., by nine battalions
of infantry, so that be commanded altogether twenty-
four battalions of infantry and three of jagera.

On the 21st the 7th and 8th Prussian Divisions were
joined at Stampfen, under the command of General
Franseeky, and at his request the cavalry division
Hann also was placed under his orders at Mmfhngg ;
the 8th Division then advanced the same evening as
far as south of Biaternitz.

Franseeky, who had under his orders

eighteen battalions, twenty-four squadrons
and seventy-eight guns, had found when reconnoitring

with General Bose, that an attack against the front of the
enemy's position would demand great sacrifice of life
on account of their strong artillery position, and had
therefore determined on a containing attack in front, to
have the enemy's right wing outflanked, and then to
join both attacks at the suitable moment. The outflank-
ing movement was to be made by Beneral Bose from
Bisternitz and Marienthal through the Miihlenthal into
the rear of the position of Blumenau ; he started on the
flank march at (i a.m. At 7.30 Fransecky received the
order to stop all movements at 12 a.m. noon, at which
hour the armistice had been arranged to begin* and at
the same time to inform the enemy of the agreed upon
cessation of hostilities.

He now ordered two containing attacks against the two
wings of the brigade Mondl to be carried out slowly, and
to be connected in the centre by the fire of ten batteries :
in the left attack a farm was taken at 1 1 a.m. by four
and a half battalions, who then advanced against a
ridge north of Blunienau, occupied by three Austrian
batteries, without gaining any further results ; the right
attack failed to make any impression on the infantry
holding the ground. In the meantime Bose's briga<
had carried out the flanking movement in two columns
of three battalions each, and had occupied, after 10 a.u
the southern slopes of the Gemsenberg, but the hurried
up troops of the II Austrian Corps maintained the
position between the Kalvarienberg and the Eisen-
briindl till noon, when hostilities ceased on both sides :
the Austrians had lost 489 men, the Prussians, 207 men.
Fransecky had expected to fight against
the one brigade Mondl of nine battalions

Comment

THE END

203

rith cavalry and artillery, not knowing that
' had been reinforced by a brigade of the
Corps, and that eight more battalions were
held in reserve, who had only arrived early that
morning. Under the actual circumstances he would
have done better, if he had advanced with one brigade
on Blumenau via Franzhof, and with another brigade
against the ridge west of Kaltenbrunn ; in fact, he should
have shortened the length of his whole line so as to
throw finally his whole infantry into the space between
the Kunstmuhle and the Danube, which was only 4,000
paces wide, instead of spreading his 16,000 men over a
line of more than 12,000 paces ; he might in that case
have taken the height* between the Schlossberg and
Kalvarienberg, and might have got to the Danube
bridge before 12 o'clock : however, this would not have
been a great advantage, and the losses would certainly
have been heavier.

Negotiations had been carried on for several
days at the Royal Headquarters at Nikola-
burg, with the immediate object of arranging a cessation
of hostilities for five days. The chief object was to
gain time for diplomacy. The course of events had
constantly changed a situation which could have been
treated as a base for negotiations. Now, when the
Prussian armies marched into the Marcbield — the
plain of Wagram — a new catastrophe was dangerously
The French Ambassador at the Court of
1 had arrived at Headquarters on the 13th, and
1 offered the intervention of his Emperor, and had
passed several times between the Royal Headquarters
and Vienna, before he could find the most necessary and

204

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

yet acceptable basis, upon which serious proposals <
peace could be made. The hostilities were to cease a
noon on Sunday, the 22nd, and were not to be recom-
menced before noon of the 27th. The armistice was
signed by the delegates from the two Headquarters
at the very time when the treaty was to take effect.
The cessation of hostilities was on the 26th supplanted
by the armistice of Nikola burg, after the preliminaries
of peace had been signed under the pressure of French
intervention.

The peace between Prussia and Austria

was concluded at Prague on August 26, and

contained the following conditions : —

1. The Emperor of Austria recognises the dissolution
of the German Bund, gives his consent to a new con-
stitution of German states without Austria, recogmses
in advance the changes in territory which Prussia is
going to carry out in North Germany, but imposes the
condition, that the kingdom of Saxony remains inta
and unimpaired as a member of the new North Germ
Confederation.

2. He transfers his share of the claims on Sehleswig-
Holstein to Prussia, on the sole condition that the
northern districts of Schleswig shall be reunited with
Denmark, if their population declare their wish of such
re-incorporation by free voting (cancelled in 1878).

3. Austria pays to Prussia a war indemnity of three
million pounds.

4. Prussia imposes the condition of the surrender
to Italy of the province of Venetia.

As by the first condition Prussia was given a free hand
to annex the territories of her late enemies amongst t

THE END

205

smaller states of Germany, the following were irrevocably
incorporated with the Prussian monarchy : the king-
dom of Hanover, the electorate of Hesse-Kassel, the
duchy of Nassau, and the free city of Frankfurt. By
these annexations Prussia was increased by one-fourth
of her size, and her population augmented from 19 to
23} millions.

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

SUMMARY OF EVENTS ON THE WESTERN
THEATRE OF WAR

After the capitulation of the Hanoverian army
n Juno 29, (lie King and Crown Prince were allowed
free departure and ! he army was dissolved ; the officers retained
arms and horses, I lie rank and file had fo give them up, and all
alike bad to promise not to serve again during the war against

The three Primiun divisions, amounting, together
Advance w ' tH c "n' ingenis from the allied smaller states,
to about 46,000 men, were henceforth called the
army of the Main, and under the command of General
Falkenstoin. Their advance into South Germany proved
everywhere victorious, although tho South German s totes
had more than 100, 000 men under arms, including one
Austrian brigade. The passage acroBs the Franconian Saale
was forced by successful engagements at five places on July 10.
After another Bma.ll light on the 13th, the Hessians of Darmstadt
and of Kaasel, joined by the Austrian brigade, were defeated on »„»,.. f £
tho 14th at Aachaffonbnrg : this was a rather important light. "j x± f-f„ ^J -
in which the Prussians Inst 17 officers, 163 men, whilst the Allies
had 23 officers, 687 men hilled and wounded, besides 21 officera,
1,738 men taken prisoners.

Frankfurt-on-the-Mnin was occupied on (he 10th, Darmstadt
on the 17th; aftor llie defeat of the Wurteuiberg contingent
and a few more successful engagements with the Bavarians,
Wuriburg and Niirnlien; wrue oceupii d by the Prussians, after
which nn armistice wum conohufed, which tonk effect frum

2io THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

August 2. Prussia concluded separate treaties of peace with the
different states which had each to pay a very small war
indemnity.

B. CAMPAIGN IN NORTH ITALY

The Italian army, nominally under King Victor Emanuel, was
defeated by the Austrians under Archduke Albrecht at Custozza
on June 24 : the Austrians lost about 6,500 killed and wounded,
r >" 1,500 prisoners ; the Italians had 4,200 killed and wounded,

but also 4,000 were taken prisoners. The defeat of the Italians
was caused by bad command : two of their divisions close to
the scene of fighting were not employed, two others had stopped
on their march at short distance from the field of battle, whilst
three more divisions gave way too soon and at once broke into
hasty flight ; hence the great number of prisoners lost by them.
They had to retreat across the Mincio, but were not pursued
by the Austrians, whose attention was soon occupied by the
events in Bohemia.

At sea also the Austrians were successful : their fleet, though
inferior in the number and the quality of ships, defeated the
Italian fleet at lossa on July 20.

APPENDIX II

ORDRE DE BATAILLE OF THE PRUSSIAN ARMIES ON
JUNE 16 UNDER THE COMMAND OP HIS MAJESTY
KING WILLIAM.

Headquarters of the King

Chief of the General Staff : General v. Moltke.
Quartermaster-General : Major-General v. Podbielski.
Inspector-General of Artillery : Lieut. -General v. Hinderein.
Inspector-General of Engineers: Lieut -General v. Wassersch-
leben.

1st Army

Under the Command of H.R.H. General Prince Frederick

Charles of Prussia

Chief of the Staff: Lieut. -General v. Voigts-Rhetz.

2nd Army Corps :

Lieut-General v. Schmidt
3rd Infantry Division : Lieut. -General v. Werder.
4th Infantry Division : Lieut-General Herwarth v. Bittenfeld.

5th Infantry Division :

Lieut. -General v. Tiimpling
6th Infantry Division :

Lieut -General v. Manstein
1th Infantry Division :

Lieut -General v. Fransecky

8th Infantry Division :

Lieut-General v. Horn

ill

Total Battalions.
26

Squadrons.

16

Guns.

78

. . 13

4

24

. . 13

5

24

. . 13

4

24

. . 10

4

24

212 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Cavalry Corps :

H.R.H. General Prince Albrecht of Prussia.
1st Cavalry Division :

Major-General Hann v. Weyhern ... 21 squadrons.
2nd Cavalry Division :

Major-General v. Alvensleben .... 20 „
5 batteries Horse Artillery . . . .30 guns.

Army Reserve Artillery :

Major- General Schwarz .
16 batteries 96 guns.

Total of strength of the 1st Army : —

69 battalions of infantry.
3 battalions of jagers.
74 squadrons of cavalry.
300 guns.
3 battalions of engineers.

2nd Abmy

Undeb the Command of General H.R.H. the Crown Prince

of Prussia

Chief of the Staff : Major-General v. BlumenthaL

Battalions. Squadrons. Guns.
14 Army Corps :

General v. Bonin.
1st Infantry division :

Lieut.-General v. Grossmann. . .
2nd Infantry Division :

Lieut.-General v. Clausewitz .
Reserve Cavalry Brigade :

Colonel v. Bredow

Reserve Artillery — 7 batteries :

Colonel v. Oertzen

Guards* Corps :

General Prince August of Wiirtemberg, R.H.
1st Guard Infantry Division :

Lieut-General Hiller v. Gartringen .13 4 24

13

5

24

13

4

24

—

12

6

m ^^^

_^^_

42

APPENDICES 213

Battalion!. Squadrons. Gnus.
2nd Guard Infantry Division :

Lieut. -General v. Plonski .... 14 4 24

1st Heavy Cavalry Brigade :

Major-General Prince Albrecht (son) — 8 6

Reserve Artillery — 5 batteries :

Colonel Prince Kraft of Hohenlohe-
Ingelfingen — — 30

5th Army Corps :

General v. Steinmetz.
9th Infantry Division :

Major-General v. Lowenfeldt . . 10 5 24

10th Infantry Division :

Lieut. -General v. Kirchbach ... 13 4 24

Reserve Artillery — 7 batteries

Lieut. -Colonel v. Kameke ... — — 42

Qth Army Corps :

General v. Mutius.
11th Infantry Division :

Lieut.-General v. Zastrow ... 13 1 18

12th Infantry Division :

Lieut-General v. Prondzynski . . 7 4 12

Reserve Artillery — 5 batteries

Colonel v. Scherbening .... — — 30

Cavalry Division of the 2nd Army :

Major-General v. Hartmann ... — 24 12

Total : 87 battalions infantry.
5 battalions jagers.
76 squadrons.
342 guns.
4 battalions of engineers.

Abmy of thb Elbe

General in Command : General Herwarth v. Bittenfeld.

Chief of the Staff : Colonel v. Schlotheim.

Battalions. Squadrons. Guns
14th Infantry Division :

Lieut -General Count Minister

Meinhovel 13} 4 24

214

THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Battalions. Squadrons. Gone.

13

13 —

8

9

24

12

6

36

42

15th Infantry Division :

Lieut-General v. Caustein
16th Infantry Division :

Lieut.-General v. Etzel .
Reserve Cavalry Brigade :

Major-General v. Kotze .... —
14th Cavalry Brigade :

Major-General Count v. d. Goltz . —
Reserve Artillery, 7th Army Corps :

Colonel v. Biilow —

Reserve Artillery, 8th Army Corps :

Colonel Hausmann —

Total : 36 battalions of infantry.
2 battalions of jagers.
26 squadrons.
144 guns.
1} battalions engineers.

1st Reserve Army Corps

Lieut.-General v. d. Miilbe.

Battalions. Squadrons. Guns
Combined Landwehr Infantry Division :

Major-General v. Bentheim .
Guard Landwehr Infantry Division :

Major-General v. Rosenberg-Grusze

zynski

Combined Landwehr Cavalry Division :

Major-General Count Dohna ... —

Total : 24 battalions of infantry.
24 squadrons.
54 guns.

12

12 —

24

f,4

APPENDICES 215

ORDRE DE BATAILLE OP THE IMPERIAL ROYAL
AUSTRIAN NORTH ARMY UNDER THE COMMAND
OF FELDZEUGMEISTER RITTER V. BENEDEK

Chief of the General Staff : Field Marshal- Lieutenant v. Henik-

stein.
Chief of Operations : Major-General v. Krismanic.
Director of Artillery : Field- Marshal- Lieutenant Archduke

William I.R.H.
Director of Engineers : Colonel v. Pidoll.

Battalions. Squadrons. Rocket

Infantry. Jager. Cavalry. Guns. Battery .

I Army Corps :

General Count Clam-Gallas. 30 5 5 88 1

II Army Corps :

Field-Marshal-Lieut. Count

Thun 24 4 5 72 1

III Army Corps :
Field-Marshal- Lieut. Arch-
duke Ernst I.R.H. . . 23 5 5 80 1

IV Army Corps :

Field-Marshal-Lieut. Count

Festeticz 24 4 5 72 1

VI Army Corps :

Field-Marshal-Lieut, v.

Ramming 24 4 5 72 1

VHI Army Corps :

Field-Marshal Archduke
Leopold I.R.H. ... 24 3 5 72 1

X Army Corps :

Field-Marshal v. Gablenz .25 3 — 72 —

I Light Cavalry Division :

Major-General v. Edelsheim — — 30 24 —

II Light Cavalry Division :

Major-General Prince Thurn

and Taxis — — 20 16 —

I Reserve Cavalry Division :
Field-Marshal-Lieut. Prince

Schleswig-Holstein . . — — 26 16 —

216 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

II Reserve Cavalry Division :

Major-Gerieral v. Zaiteek . — — 26 16 —

III Cavalry Division :

Major-General Count Cou-

denhove — — 26 16 —

Army Artillery Reserve :

Colonel v. Tiller ... — — — 128 —
Total strength of the North Army : —

174 battalions of infantry.
28 battalions of jager.
158 squadrons of cavalry.
744 guns.
6 rocket batteries.

The Royal Saxon Abmy Corps

General commanding : H.R.H. the Crown Prince of Saxony.

Inf. Jiger
Batt. Ball. Bqaadroni. Guns.

1st Division :

Lieut-General v. Schimpff. .8 2 2 12

2nd Division :

Lieut-General v. Stieglitz . . 8 2 2 12

Cavalry Division :

Major-General v. Fritsch • . — — 12 6

Reserve Artillery :

Colonel Kohler — — — 28

Total strength of the Saxon Army Corps : —

16 battalions of infantry.
4 battalions of jager.
16 squadrons of cavalry.
68 guns.

APPENDIX III

DETAILS OF THE LOSSES IN THE BATTLE OP KONIG-
GRATZ, JULY 3. 1866.

In the Pmjssian Abmibs

D(»d.

cere. " en -

Wounded.

UlHsd.

Total.

os-

Kan.

on

MM

on

Mm.

A. Losses of the 1st Army
H. LomoBof Uio Kiln- Army
C. Louses of Uio 2nd Army

52 1.013

22 328
26 489

1M

49
67

a,92i

1,174
1.093

~

HO
86

so*

71
81

5,054

1.5BT
1,181

09 .1,830 [280

9,888

-

270

j;.!i

8,794

i Austrian Akmy

Dead.

Wounded

Mine*!.

Total.

872

£.678

2.688

8,138

In the IV Army Corps .
Id the Saxon Army Corps

8.214

10,646

9«0

1,501

In the I Army Corps

6,617

In the III Army Corps .

In the TI Army Corps .

4,806

2,054

2,399

4,347

In the Cavalry Divusiona

1,678

Id the Engineers, Medical Service.eto.

142

13,920

26,419

44,200

APPENDIX IV

Some Stray Reflections

1. The campaign of the Italians had mainly miscarried,
because General Lamarmora misjudged (lie political military
situation. He thought that Austria would oppose her whole
Held army to the Prussians, and that. Italy would thus have time
lo take one of the fortresses of the quadrilateral after the other,
and in this way gain possession of the province of Venetia ; he
forgot, that if Austria should be victorious in the north, all hopes
of Italy would 1" ilunlir-d l< the ground. His aim should have
been to aid the Prussian invasion u.s unn:h us ] iossi hie, therefore
to carry out the Italian attack in such a way that at least the
Austrian army stationed in Italy — only three army corps —
would be cut off from Austria or l« pursued vigorously. The
Italian army ought to have reached the Seramering Pass by the
time the Prussians arrived at the Danube.

2. In Prussia an imposing army was put into the field and the
offensive was adopted, but the fact was left out of consideration
that the ultimate object could only be attained by crossing the
Danube, and that 80,000 men or more would be required to
secure the communications, to invest five fortresses and to gar-
rison Prague, Briinn and other large towns. For these objects
newly formed units were sufficient, but they should have followed
so closely behind the field army that its strength was never
seriously impaired. It is a rule that an invasion of the enemy's
country must he supported so as to prevent the field army
from being gradually consumed. Bui. tlic King had little con-
fidence in extemporised units formed of but partly trained men,
and would not listen to their employment; but in war iron MM*

APPENDICES

219

mpremo, and the peoplc'swar in France after Sudan
and the disappearance of the entire imperial arniy, has shown
that such extemporised troops can do good service, even on the
field of battle. Those who object to such a course being taken
in case of necessity, may argue that (ho strength of the army in
pramo should be increased ; but national BOonomn imitmll against,
this expedient, because work only — industry and commerce —
produces wealth and no war can be carried on without ample

3. Where should the executive functionaries of the Govern-
ment be during a war 7 This seems lo be a momentous question.
What was the proper place for Bismarck and Roon, the Foreign
Secretary and the War Minister * The Royal Headquarters or
Berlin, the seat of government and centre of administration ?
The conduct of the business of state during a war demands the
greatest energy, and does not allow of any waste of time. But
all the executive authorities are in the capital, where alone the
organisation of conquered provinces and the utilisation of their
resources can be initiated, especially if this eventuality has not
been taken into consideration before the outbreak of war. The
same is the ease with diplomatic incidents of nil kinds : in the
capital only are the permanent diplomatic officials with the
information they possess, and it is just the •■nfurccd separation
of the Foreign Minister from his monarch in the field which
affords the sometimes desirable expedient and excuse of inoffen-
sivB delay and procrastination. And the case of the War Miniate'
seems to be on the same footing : the formation and equipment
of new units, the arming of fortresses, the constant steady
refilling of magazines arc so important for the efficient progress
and conduct of the war that the War Minister should not leave
the capital for a moment. Did Frederick or Napoleon ever
take their ministers into the field 1

The following statement has been made by a famous historian :
" A king at the bead of an army who is a thoroughly good general
is almost irresistible; in the opposite case he is a UMOBOdoiM
incumbrance on the chief command, which is then beset by all
the evils of court life." The beet combination obtains, when
they are as great diplomat in U as gciii-rals, as Gustavua Adolphus,

I

220 THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA

Frederick and Napoleon. If thoy arc only generals, as Chs
their enterprises may easily become fruitlossor even pernicious ;
but the greatest dilemma is produced, when Ihey are neither
the one nor the other and yet want to conduct everything :
then a crowd of advisers must be carried a!ong with the head-
quarters, and court life with its intrigues supervenes.

How the presence erf powerful personages at headquarters can
influence the military events, is shown by the action of the
Crown Prince at the moment, when the 2nd Prussian Army
arrived before Olmiitz on its march southward to intercept the
retreat of the Austrians to the Danube. The officer who at
ti.30 '.in. on July 14 brought to him the orders from Head'
quarters, also handed to him letters from the King and from
Bismarck. The latter informed him that Benedetti, the French
Ambassador, had arrived, and that he himself was determined
to conclude peace with Austria in order to anticipate and pre-
vent the interference of France. This information evidently
determined the Crown Prince to proceed personally to Briinn
in order to put forward his own opinions. 1 Therefore, under
the pretext that the junction of the Austrian North and South
Armies could now no longer be prevented, bo set two army corps
marching towards Briiau, although under the actual circum-
stances forced marches in tho direction of Prosaburg were
required in order to push the Au.slrii.ms into the Little Carpathians
and to reach the passage of the Danube before them. Thus
military necessities and the action demanded by them were
entirely neglected on account of a matter of political concern,
the efficacy of the chief command and with it the possibility
of military success was placed in jeopardy : in order not to
offend the Crown Prince, his Chief of thecitafl pronounced the
clear and distinct orders received to be unintelligible and
regarded them, and thus court intrigues frustrated thuauprei
conduct of operations.

' I wish my readers to believe me. when I state that, Although
I have been letl to proffer these criticising remarks, my belief
trust in the Crown Prince us a leader of men was unbounded
that such was also the general feeling in his artiiy iu 1870
all officers aud the rank and file.

ief and

eil and
mo.igst

APPENDICES

The situation as just described is clearly shown by a report
from General Steinmetz to the Crown Prince on the same day :
" In the moral condition in which the Austrians are performing
their inarch from Olmiitz to Vienna, I consider it absolutely
necessary to pursue them rapidly and to attack them wherever
they are met with, and I foresee good results. I have authorised
Hartmann to push forward to Prerau."

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