The campaign of Magenta and Solferino, 1859

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fl^:^Trft»ws^

Jnns of Court jVfilifart/ Xibrary,

' No. /^ _

INNS OF COURT RIFLE VOLUNTEER MESS,

I, PAPER BUILDINGS,
TEMPLE,

^BAARB

■^ Str;

lAARBRUCK TO PARlb, 1870: A
Strategical Sketch.

By Lieut.-Col. SISSON C. PRATT, late r>. Stetchw
and Maps. 5s. net.

" This; is the first issue o£ a Special Campaisn Series planned
by the publishers, whicii soldiers, especially junior officers,
should find of very great value. The idea is to describe, from
a purely technical point of view, the famous campaigns of tlic
igtb century, and though it is probable that the editor will try
to confine comment mainly to the strategy ol the wars dealt
with, readers raay count upon the various writers afiordini;
useful tactical hints based on their reading o£ the material dealt
with." — Glasgow Herald.

" A clear and useful little work, plentifully supplied with
maps. " — Athen«um.

" This strategical sketch ia the first volume at a Special Cam-
paign Series whicli promises to be of great value as a military
class book, and to the miUtary student. Such a volume makes
study a pleasure, and we hope that it will have a long list of
_ "—Notts. Guardian

" A volume (the first) in the Special Campaign Series, sketch-
ing the strategy of the German iavasion of France ia l8?a
Others are to deal with the Russo-Turkish war, and if they
maintain the present high quality, the series (or a volume of it
certainly) ought to find a place, with the proverbial baton, in
every soldier's knapsack. The maps and sketches are clear, full,
and excellent."— Pall Mall Gazette,

" The series will certainly make a unique place for itself on
our shelves, if all the volumes display the briUiant qualities of
the initial volume." — Birmingham Post.

" Col. Pratt ia first in the field with a volume on the war
which has been selected as the Special Campaign to be read up
by officers preparing for the Competitive Examinations for
Commissions in the Army to be held in September, 1905, and
March, 1906. It is fortunate for those who have to prepare to
face the examiner that Col. Pratt has now turned his attention
to the compilation of volumes on Military History. It is hoped
that the Series will not only be useful for examination purposes,
but may form the nucleus of an interesting Ubrary for the military
■tndent." — United Service Gazetik.

" The book will be of especial interest to miUtary men at the
present time, when another war is showing every day how steadily
■uccess preponderates on the side of a nation that has plans and

" So long 3, time has elapsed since a military history
haa been offered to British soldiers, that Messrs. Sonneascheiu
may claim tils credit at bringing to fruition a. virtually new idea.
With the limitations common to all or almost all British military
writers, the book before us is of great merit. We should select
for particular notice the vigorous and even dramatic account
of the Sedan Campaign. The book is well illustrated by a good
general map and numeroas sketch maps." — Bhoad Arrow

" It ^iwes a succinct account of the campaign, talcing each
episode m turn, and criticising the strategy oi either side. Nnm-
erouB diagrams and maps help to elucidate the text of a little
book, which will be of obvious use to the student of military
tactics, but may be strongly recommended to a wider circle (rf
readers," — Yorkshirb Post.

" An excellent sketch of what remains the most instructive
of modern wars, accompanied by admirable maps ujjon which
the student can follow the tactical as well as the strategical opera-
tions of the campaign. Altogether this is a very valuable book."
— UsiTED Service Maowinh.

" Lt.-Col, Pratt, in his strategical sketch, presents a com-
pendium of the drama of the Franco-Prussian war, from the open-
ing scene on the banks of the Saar, to the fall of the curtain upon
beteagured Paris. The story, charged as it is with lessons
for the soldier and statesman, is no less instructive to the general
reader, in whose mind a careful study of the respective con-
ditions of the opposing forces will leave but little doubt that
victory was assured to the Germans before a shot had been
fired. . . . The student of miUtary history need search no
further than the little volume under review in order to discover
the chief causes that led to the swift and complete collapse of a
Power esteemed by Europe so formidable a fighter that at the
commencement of the war the great majority of maps intended
to illustrate the campaign were projected eastward of the Rhine.
The author's account of the German scheme of mobilization ia
very interesting and siigRestive. So thorough is the organization
that every reservist in the land knows the position assigned to
hira at the call to arms." — Madras Maiu

" The intention underlying this Series is excellent, to bring
the main outlines of the campaign witliin the purview of many
officers who have neither the time nor the opportunity to study
for themselves a more detailed account. Special mention must
be made of the ten excellent sketches and maps included in the
volume. We would add that the form of treatment in this
excellent Series should bring these books into the hands of a
good many others besides those with whom war is a business." —
DAJU-innTON Times.

I

I

I

THE RUSSO-TURKISH WAR, 1877:
A Strategical Sketch.

By MAJOR F. MAURICE (The Sherwood For-
esters). With 3 Maps. Crown 8vo. 5s. net.

tt

No student who can find time to give Major Maurice's work
its due attention should neglect a single page of the narrative.
The story is told so succinctly that the imagination is brought
into play throughout, and yet no single detail necessary for the
right direction of the student's imagination is omitted. The
sound, sober common-sense he displays throughout in dealing
with tactical problems merits the highest commendations in
an age in which all sense of comparative historical treatment
seems to have vanished and given place to modem theories.
The maps provided are exceptionally good and obviously
prepared with the greatest possible care." — Broad Arrow.

If

This is the second volume of a very useful Special Campaign
Series, and will prove of great value to officers of all ranks,
especially to those who have leanings towards the study of
military history, a very necessary disposition in these days, when
the officer has to look to proficiency in his profession as the only
reliable means for obtaining advancement. The moment appears
propitious for the publication of an account in English, and
no one could have carried out this work in a more capable
manner than Major Maurice has done. The book is weU got
up, well bound in a neat cover, and has several maps to assist
the student." — United Service Gazette.

" This unpretentious little book — a companion to Saarbruck
to Paris, 1870 — deals merely with the strategy and major tactics
of the decisive part of the campaign in Europe. There is at the
end a large scale map of the theatre of war in Bulgaria, based
on the Austrian survey in 1 881 of the Balkan States." — Academy.

" Written with well-considered conciseness and usefully
equipped with illustrative maps, few books, if any, could be
•found better fitted for military students and junior officers
desirous of a knowledge of the lessons which the campaign has
for a soldier." — Scotsman.

" This volume maintains the credit of the series admirably.
Major Maurice does not pretend to give a complete history of
the war, but in fact, except that the final phase of the campaign
after the fall of Plevna is very rapidly summarized, the war is
very fully and minutely described indeed, considering the limit
set by the style of the volume. The student is indebted to

Major Manrice for the perfection with which the text is :
to the lirst-class pocket mai>s, wMth are on more ad
scales." — Glasgow Herald.

" There is Utile EngUah literature dealing with this campaign,
and a comprehensive strategical sketch such as Major Mannce
gives in the present work was badly needed by the miUtary
student. It is a comprehensive and methodical survey of the
whole campaign, and he has rtot failed lo untkrUno the points "]
of principal application to EngUsh students." — ManchesterJ
Guardian. I

" Of very great value as a military class book. There is no I
other way of aquiring the art of war than lay studying the
great campaigns of the past, and such a book as this readers
the task much simpler and the subject much more intelligible
to junior officers," — Nottingham Gitahdi.yn.

" As a strategical skateh of a great war here is an excellent
example. Tiie main outUnes of the campaign are described,
together with the crucial episodeS; but the chief aim is to advance
what has been termed the science of war. A number of maps
and diagrams serve to illustrate the text and enhance consider- ,
ably the value of the book as a means of military instruction."
— Lebds Mercorv.

" Major Maurice makes the Russo-Turkish campaign deeply '
interesting, and brings the lessons of Plevna home to islanders
to whom that struggle means much. The maps and plans are
extremely clear and are not overbiudened with detail." — Wbst
SusSBX Gazbttb.

FREDERICKSBURG: A Study in
War.

By Major G. W. Redway. With Maps and Plans.
Crown 8vo. 5/. net.

" The story is very effectively told by Major Redway, a
distinguished member of that increasing band of British officers
who so satisfactorily disprove the once general impression, that
men of lugh intellectual abilities and abundant professional
knowledge, are not too rarely to be found in our army. The
student of military history will be well rewarded by following
this succinct narrative assimilating the tactical lessons of the
great battle. He will see that the final success was the prize
of the most capable general. He was an undoubted master of
war, and his opponent Bumside decidedly his inferior in military
capacity." — Pall Mall Gazette.

" Major Redway 's narrative is full of instruction for every
thoughtful and even for every well-read soldier. His criticisms
are fair, temperate and made with an appreciation of the real
nature of war which we look for in vain* in most of our historians
of war." — Broad Arrow.

" This is the third volume of the ' Special Campaign ' series of
books which are now being published by the above named enter-
prising firm, and in full maintains the standard of excellence
estabUished by its predecessors. In a pocket at the end of the
book are four excellent maps of the Eastern Theatre of War and
of Fredericksburg and its neighbourhood, all particularly
clear, and none of them, as is often the case, overladen with
detail." — United Service Magazine.

' It is no faint praise to say that its merits as a literary study
of war rival those of its predecessors." — ^Army and Navy
Chronicle.

" Rich in interest for soldiers who wish to understand how a
powerful enemy may be beaten by raising the price of success,
and wearing out rather than overthrowing lus forces. Well
based historical studies concisely written, and finished with a
good equipment of instructive special maps, the work forms a
valuable accession to the scenes in which it appears." — Scotsman.

" Major Redway has made a very valuable addition to the
Special Campaign Series, and also a more than useful contribution
to the history of the American Civil War. For he has evidently
given time, pains and indubitable skill to the study of the mass
of material available to the student, and has produced a story
self-contained, careful, vivid, as well as specially adapted by its

method for the military student. All the important movements
and dispositions of the troops on either side are lucidly detailed,
and can be followed on the maps, of which there are five as admir-
able specimens of cartography as one would expect in a much
more ambitious military work." — ^Glasgow Herald.

'* The present volume presents a striking contrast to the story
of a European campaign. From Saarbrilck to Paris, with which
the series commenced, and Major Redway has -done his work
admirably. His chapter on the * American soldier — his social
status and professional ability ' is one of the best studies on the
subject that ever came under our notice." — Guardian.

" The very fact that in the American War the South was so over-
matched in wealth and resources makes all the more interesting
a close study of their tactics and their strategy, influenced as
these on both sides were by political as well as military considera-
tions. The ' Campaign Series ' ought to be found in every
military library." — Yorkshire Post.

** The book offers an instructive contrast in methods adopted
by an unskilful general on one side and by a great master of war
on the other." — Manchester Guardian.

'* While deaUng mainly with the technical details of the cam-
paign, the author's narrative is so lucid and so skilfully told
that it may be followed with enjoyment and ease by the tyro, as
well as the expert in military matters." — Dundee Advertiser.

THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA

AND SOLFERINO
1859

THE SPECIAL CAMPAIGN
SERIES

Price 5*. net, each,

I. SAARBROCK to PARIS i The
Franco-Gkrman War. By Col.
S18SON C. Pratt, late R.A.

II. THE RUSSO.TURKISH .WAR,
1877. By Major F« Maurice.

III. FREDERICKSBURG : A STUDY IN

WAR, 1862. By Major G. W.
Redway.

IV. THE CAMPAIGN OF MAGENTA

and SOLFERINO, 1859. By Col.
H. C. Wylly, C.B.

In preparation,

V. THE CAMPAIGN IN BOHEMIA,

1866. By Lt.-Col. J. F. G.
GlOnicke.

VI. THE WATERLOO CAMPAIGN.

By Col Sisson C. Pratt, late R.A.

SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES. No. 4

THE CAMPAIGN OF

MAGENTA AND

SOLFERINO

1859

COLONEL H. C.

LONDON

SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & CO., LIM

New Yo«i: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY

■907

PREFACE

The campaign of 1859 in Northern Italy was one of the
first of the epoch-making, rapidly conducted wars which
marked the latter half of the nineteenth century. It
was, moreover, as has been pointed out by the author
of Imperial Strategy, the "first war in Europe which
conveyed some preliminary indication of what railways
can accomplish. The success of the French Army in
this short and briUiant, if rather lucky, campaign was
largely due to the efficient service of the southern rail-
ways." A study of the events of the war and of the
various considerations which led to the somewhat un-
expected determination to make peace, leads one to the
conviction that, while a lavish expenditure on the out-
break of war can so far repair the neglect of the years of
peace and plenty that armies may be improvised for a
campaign of short duratio^, neither hurried organisa-
tion nor make-shift armies are equal to a protracted efEort,
or to oppose the forces of those who have used the
long years of peace to prepare for the days of war.

So far as I am aware this is the first study of the war,
compiled from official sources, which has yet appeared
in the English language. Several short accounts of the
events of the campaign were published within a few

xi

xii PREFACE

months of its conclusion, but all these were based upon
contemporary and unoj£cial accounts. In this short
history I have followed, at a respectful distance, the
general arrangement of the French official account,
while I have taken the descriptions of the country and
of the battlefields almost entirely from the writings
of the different newspaper correspondents. of that day.
The large map is a copy of a portion of one in " la
campagne de Napoleon III en Italiey

H. C. W.

LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED

Campagne de Napoleon III en Italiey 1869 ; — ^B6dig6e an d6p6t

de la guerre.
Der Krieg in Italien 1859 : — Generalstabs-Burean fur Kriegs-

geschichte.
Der Italieniache Feldzug dea Jahrea 1869 ; — General C!ount von

Moltke.
La campagne d^Itcdie de 1859 ; — Baron de Bazancourt.
Relation historique et critique de la campagne d^ItaUe en 1859 ;

— ^Ferdinand Lecomte.
Der Italieniache Krieg 1859 ; — ^W. Riistow.
Oreai Campaigns: — ^Major C. Adams.
Operations of War : — General Sir E. B. Hamley, K.C.B.
A Study of the Italian Campaign in 1859 ; — ^Major Miller, R.A.
The War in Italy : — ^The author of the Times Letters.
La guerre modeme : — V. Derr^cagaix.
Magenta : — ^Lt. -General von Caemmerer
Campagnea modemea : — Lt. CoL J. ViaL
Studea aommairea dea hataiUea d^un aikle: — Ch. Romagny et

Piales d'Axtrez.
Modem Italy: — Retro OrsL
Un aouvenir de Solferino : — J. H. Dunant.
Docum^enta ofjwida aur la campagne d^ Italic en 1859 :
Skizze dea Fddzugea 1859 in Italien : — von einem siiddeutschen

Ofi&zier.

xiu

xiv LIST OF WORKS CONSULTED

■' ■ ■■ r ■' ~ ■ ^' ■■■■■■■■i.i- — -!■■—■ ■■■■■■■ ■^ ■ — . ■ ■

Ufe of Napoleon HI ;— P. G. HiU.

Lettres d^Italie: — Am^d^e Achard.

A Oerman view of the Italian War : — ^from the U,S. Mag, for

Sept 1859.
La Ouerre d^Italie 1859 ; — Alfred Duquet.
TJie Italian campaign of 1859 ; — Edinburgh Review, 1859.

ERRATA

Plan VI. Solpbbino
For Dcsanzo, read Desenzano
Dele, R. Chiese.

CONTENTS

FAQE

CHAPTER I
Pbbfabations for Wab 3

CHAPTER II
The Austrian Advance to the Sbsia . . .17

CHAPTER in
Action at Montebbllo 43

CHAPTER IV

The Flank March by the Allies and the Fightinq at

Palestbo . .65

CHAPTER V

The Austbians Recboss the Ticmo and the Fbench

Occupy Robecchbtto 89

CHAPTER VI
The Battle of Magenta 113

CHAPTER Vn
The Action at Melbgnano 145

XV

•

xvi CONTENTS

PAOB

CHAFTEB Vm

MOTEMMNTS Of THM VtH FBKSCB CoSFS— ACTHKr AT CaSTK-

NXDOU) — ^AvSrUANS RXTBSAT BSmSD THX MiSCIO. 167

CHAPTER IX
Thb Battle op Somsixo 191

CHAPTER X
Thi Pxacs of ViLLArmANCA 227

APPENDIX A.
Obdxb of Battle of thx thsxs Asmos o:ir 4th June

18fl9 235

APPENDIX R

Obdxb of Battls of the thkxs Abmos ox ^TH JjnSTK

18fl9 238

LIST OF MAPS AND PLANS

[In focket at end a/ book].

I. Qinhul Maf of thb Thsatbb of Wab or Nobthxbh
Italy

II. Plan of thi Action at Montsbsllo

III. Plan of thb Action at Palbstbo on Hat 31

rv. Plan of thb Battlb of BIaobnta

V. Plan of thb Action at Mblbqnano

VI. Plan of thb Battlb of Soltbbino

PREPABATIONS FOR WAR

B

CHAPTER I

PBEPABATIONS FOR WAR

Fob centuries the nations of Europe had treated Italy
as their battlefield. Swiss mercenaries, German lanz-
knechts, French and Spanish men-at-arms have all
at various periods trampled Italy under foot and looked
upon her as a conquered country ; campaign has fol-
lowed upon campaign, and in few of these have the
natives of the country had any real or abiding interest,
while in all of them have they most grievously suffered.

With the close of the war of the Spanish Succession,
Austria became the possessor of the Spanish dominions
in Italy, and, giving up the Two Sicilies to the Bourbons,
ruled the smaller states of the Peninsula. By the
terms of the Peace of Utrecht, Victor Amadeus II of
Savoy and Piedmont had obtained Sicily ; but in con-
sequence of the attempts of Cardinal Alberoni, the
Spanish Minister, to recover the lost Italian provinces,
the Emperor Charles VI had insisted upon Amadeus
ceding Sicily to him, and taking in exchange the Eong-
dom of Sardinia, and thus^the title of " King of Sardinia *'
was borne henceforward by those who ruled in Piedmont
and Savoy.

The invasions of Buonaparte shattered temporarily
the power of Austria, while they introduced the teachings

THE CAMPAIGN OF

of the Revolntion to the down-trodden peoples of North-
ern Italy and turned their thoughts to the " Risorgi-
mento." The Kingdom of Italy, which Napoleon had
created and whose crown he had assumed, fell with
him, and the former governments were at once restored.
The Congress of Vienna gave Lomhardy and Venetia
to Austria and Genoa t-o Savoy, while members of the
House of Habsburg reigned in Parma, Modena and
Tuscany. In 1831 Charles Albert became King of
Sardinia, and by him the idea of a tree and united Italy
was fostered and encouraged. When in 1848 the news
of the revolutions in Prance and Austria reached Italy,
Venice and Lombardy rose in revolt, drove the Austrian
troops under the guns of the Quadrilateral and asked
help of Piedmont. Tuscany sent troops, Ferdinand
of Naples promised assistance, the Pope sent 17,000
men, and thus encouraged and supported Charles
Alhert took the field against the Austrians ; successful
at Goito, the Italians were defeated by the veteran
Radetzky at Curtatone, Custoza and Novara, where-
npon Charles Albert capitulated and abdicated the
throne in favour of his son Victor Emmanuel.

It was the Crimean War which first gave Piedmont
an opportunity of asserting herself among the nations
of Europe. Count Cavour had now become Prime
Minister, and it seemed to him that by intervening
in so momentous a struggle, his country would acquire
an increased importance among the Powers ; and in
spite of many difficulties he succeeded in ejecting an
alliance with England and Prance, under which 15,000
Piedmontese troops proceeded to the Crimea under
Qeneial La Marmora. At the Congress of Paris in

rth- ■

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERTNO, 1859 5

I 1856 Cavour drew attentioii to the danger which now
threatened Italy in general, and Piedmont in particular,
pointing out that the military occupation by Austria
of the greater part of the Peninsula was effectually
destroying the political balance of power in the various
states.

In the summer of 1858 Napoleon III met Count
Cavour at Plombieres, where a treaty of alliance was
drawn up, under which it waa agreed that France
should come to the assistance of Piedmont in the event
of the latter being attacked by Austria. At a reception
of the CoTfs Diplomalique on January 1, 1859, the
Emperor of the French used the following words to
the Austrian ambassador : " Je regretle que les relations
entre nous eoienC si jnauvaises ; dites cependant d
voire souverain que meg sentimetUs pour lui ne sont
pas changis." In face of the attitude now assumed
by France and Piedmont, Austria despatched fresh
troops to various points on the Piedmontese frontier,
to which measures Cavour replied by asking Parliament
for a special credit and by calling upon Garibaldi to
raise a corps of volunteers. England and Kussia now
suggested that all difficulties should be laid for settle-
ment before an international congress, to which pro-
posal the French Emperor acceded. Austria, however,
insisted that Piedmont should first disarm, and on
April 23 she followed up this demand by an ultimatum
to be answered within three days. On the 26th the
ultimatum was rejected, and after a delay, occasioned
by renewed efforts at mediation on the part of England,

, the Austrian troops crossed — on April 29 — the frontier

[ between Lombardy and Piedmont,

THE CAMPAIGN OF

tach of ^H

Before detailing the preparations which each
the three Powers had made and was still perfecting
agMnst the impending struggle, it may be weU to offer
some description of the country wherein great events
were about to transpire. " That portion in which
the more active part of the campaign took place lies
between Turin and Mantua, and may be described in
general terms as a plain, ninety miles long and thirty
broad, with the River Po forming its southern boundary.
It is crossed from north to south by several rivers — the
majority of them with wide gravelly beds and very
empty during the heats of summer ; sometimes two
OF three channels separated by islands and sandbanks.
The Po ia considerably larger than any of its tribu-
taries, and at Valenza, below its junction with the
Sesia, the stream in winter ia 550 yards wide. Tracts
of marshy ground, thick with bushes and trees, border
the Po on either side, and the embankments, made to
preserve the country from inundations, have caused
the bed of the river to raise itself above the original
level. In 1859 the land was very closely cultivated —
vines, corn and rice — and was intersected in every
direction by irrigation channels. The whole country
was Uke one vast orchard, being planted closely with
young fruit trees, impeding the view in every direction.
Villages were numerous and each one bad its cemetery
beside it — square enclosures with atone walls eight to
fifteen feet high, entered by an iron gate with a grated
opening on either aide . The roads were of three classes —
strade reale or postale, strade provinciale, and strade
communale ; the first were excellent, the second good,
while the third were often mere tracks, quickly be-

I

I
I

1

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 7

g impassable in bad weather 01 under much traffic.
Host of the railways were only single lines."

In view of the support, moral and material, which

Napoleon had given or was pledged to afiord Piedmont
in her quarrel with Austria, there can be no doubt
that the rapid passing of events preliminary to the
outbreak of hostilitiee, found the French army danger-
ously unprepared. It is true that on January 1, 1859,
the effective strength of the French forces amounted
to close upon 562,000 men, but of these some 163,000
were en conge renouvdable ; the artillery was deficient
of nearly 25,000 horses, which had to be purchased
between the beginning of the year and the commence-
ment of the war ; while this arm of the service was at
this very time engaged in the process of re-annament
with a new rifled field-gun. The infantry was almost
equally unprepared ; the issue of a new rifle had, it
IB true, been just completed, but the arsenals contained
in January — barely four months before the Austrian
ultimatum reached Turin — only fourteen million rounds,
which had been manufactured and stored as practice
ammunition for the annual course of musketry which
was to have begun in February. The stores contained
clothing, equipment and camp equipage for rather
less than four hundred thousand men ; there was any
amount of transport material in the parks at Vernon
and Chateauroux, but men, horsee and mules were
wanting ; and as lat« even as the beginning of April,
the reserve supplies of rations and forage were wholly
insufficient for the large force which might well be
Lexpected to take the field within a few days.

expenditure these deficiencies were in great measure
made good. By recalling men to the Colours, by
volontary re -engagements, by calling in the men of
the 1857 class still remaining to be incorporated and
also the contingent for 1858, the total effective strength
of the French Army was raised to a grand total of
639,000 men. By large purchases of remounts and
by the transfer to the artillery of 4,000 men from the
two other arms, the whole of the artillery of the four
firflt corps of the Army of Italy was completely organised
within twenty days ; sixty batteries were to have
been armed with the new rifled gun diuing the financial
year 1859, but events marched so rapidly that the
execution of this intention had perforce to be abandoned,
and France eventually took the field with only thirty-
two batteries armed on the new system. Orders for
a hundred million rounds of small arm ammunition
were placed with different manufactories, while con-
tracts for the soldiers' clothing, tentage and equipment
were given out, and were taken up and executed with
Buch dispatch that, on the actual outbreak of war,
almost everything necessary was ready for issue to the
unite under orders for Italy. The Transport Depart-
ment was greatly expanded in regard to personnel,
while later on, during the course of the campaign, an
auxiliary train of civihan employes with private wagons
was organized and proved of the greatest service. In
regard, too, to Commissariat supplies, immense orders
for biscuit were placed in London and Liverpool, while
Colonel Saget, of the French General Staff, was fortu-
nately able to arrange with the Sardinian government

I

AGENT A AND SOLFERINO, 1859

for seveateea days' rstions For 100,000 men, with forage
for 10,000 animals, to be ready stored for the use of
the French tooops at ax different depots on Italian

Ever since the disastrous campaign of 1849 the military
organization of the Kingdom of Sardinia and the
development of its warlike resources had been the chief
care of successive governments. The creation of the
new army had be«n the work of the last ten anxious
years ; it had been entirely remodelled and had lost
that exclusive class-colouiing which had formerly
distinguished it, and which had doubtless contributed
in some degree to its failure in the last struggle with
Austria. As the Piedmontese Army was to be the
nucleus round which soldiers from all parts of Italy
were to group themselves, it was felt that it could not
remain so exclusively aristocraticj but must be popular-
ised, and whatever was effected in this direction was
generally and justly attributed to General hs, Marmora.
By a patient process of years a cadre was thus formed
on a sufficiently broad and expansive basis to include
the elements from the rest of the Peninsula in the event
of an Italian war of independence.

The Kingdom was divided into five military divisions —

Turin, Chambery (Savoy), Alessandria, Genoa and Cag-

iiari (Sardinia)— and into two subdivisions — Novara and

Nice. The peace strength of the army was 49,000 men

Lwith 80 guns, and it was capable of expansion to nearly

i'87,000 with 160 guns on the outbreak of war. This

liorce was distributed among 90 battalions of infantry,

19 regiments of cavalry and 15 batteries, and was or-

THE CAMPAIGN OF

ganised in one cavalry diviBion and five infantry divisiona ,
each of two brigades, the whole being under the imme-
diate command of King Victor Emmanuel.

With the publication of the Emperor Napoleon's
speech of January 1, great preparations for war were
at once put in hand by the Sardinian government ;
suppUes were hastily thrown into the fortresses of
Gasale and AleBsandria ; fortified camps were prepared ;
the defences of Yalenza were atrengthened ; large
purchases of animals and clothing were made ; and
60,000 rifles were ordered in France to replace the
smooth-bore muskets with which the Italian infantry
was armed. The agitation began to spread all over
the Peninsula and especially in Upper and Centra!
Italy, " The Itahan National Society," which had
been formed under Garibaldi, La Farina and Pallavicino
to promote the Italian movement, had succeeded in
establishing an understanding with all the most in-
fiuential men, and by their exertions thousands of youths
were enabled to come into Piedmont to enlist. In
the month of March alone close upon 6,000 volunteers
were enrolled by the commissioner specially appointed
for that purpose in Turin— half of these being from
Lombardy and the remainder from Central Italy, and
altogether it is computed that some 14,500 men were
voluntarily enlisted.

The Piedmontese were no match single-handed for
the large forces which Austria had already ranged^or
was in process of concentrating — upon their eastern
frontier. It was therefore necessary to take up some
strong defensive position wherein they could await
the arrival of the French troops, which, on the declara-

I

ion of war, would at once begin to arrive in Piedmont,
either by Suaa through and over the passes of the Alps
or by sea by way of Toulon and Genoa. General Niel,
aide-de-camp to the Emperor of the French, had been
Bent early to Turin to concert meaaurea of defence with
General La Marmora, and by them it was decided that
a position should be taken up on the right bank of the
Dora Ealt«a, between the village of Mazze and the Po,
as it was considered that the Austrians would be unlikely
to risk an advance on Turin from the east, but would
more probably move on the capital by Vercelli, threat-
ening at the same time the dehouches of the French
columns from the Alps. The Italian forces were con-
sequently thus disposed :

One division covering the valley of the Scrivia and
Genoa.

One division occupying Alessandria.

One division occupying Casale, watching the line
of the Po at Valenza and maintaining communication
between Casale and Alessandria ; this distribution
thus left only two infantry divisions, the cavalry and
Garibaldi's corps to oppose the passage of the Dora
Baltea. It was hoped, however, that the march of
the Austrians from the Ticino might be ao delayed as
to extend over five or six days, by which time the
French Army — debouching rapidly from the passes
of the Alps and using the two available lines of railway —
might well be able to place the best part of three divisions
in line with the Piedmontese.

The Austrian Army — having a peace atrength of
( 334,000 and a strength on a war footing of 720,000— was

organiBed in four armies and twelve corps : at the end
of 1858 the Second Army — strength 44,837 men with
104 gnus — tinder Count Gyulai, formed the normal gar-
rison of Northern Italy, with the Vth, Vllth and Vlllth
Corps, of which it was composed, occupying Milan,
Verona and Padua respectively. The infantry was
in proceaa of re-armament with a new rifle, but only a
small number of these had been issued and many units
did not receive the new weapon untO actually on the
march to the theatre of war. Already in November,
1858, matters were beginning to assume so threatening
an aspect, that it was decided to raise the strength
of the Second Army to 76,000 men with 200 guns, and
further to arrange for the dispatch to Italy at short
notice of the Ilird Corps, but on a peace footing only,
taking steps, however, for increasing the number of
the effectives of these four corps to a total of 170,000
; at ten weeks' notice. Gyulai represented that
such a force was quite inadequate to guard against
all possible eventualities, and reminded thejWar Ministry
that similar half-measures in 1848 had obliged his pre-
decessor Radetzky temporarily to loosen his hold upon
Lombardy. These representations were, however, dis-
regarded, and the Ministry proceeded to carry out
the scheme already suggested. The Illrd Corps waa
moved to Italy early in January, and on its arrival the
following was the disposition of the four Austriancorps :—

The Vth Corps, with one brigade of the Illrd, between
the Ticino and the Adda ;

The Vllth Corps between the Mincio and the Adige ;

The Vlllth Corps in the Legations and in Venetia;
while of the remaining brigades of the Illrd

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 13

CorpB one waa in Brescia, one in Bergamo, one
in Cremona and one in Lodi and Crenaa,'
On February 15 the Ilnd Corps foUowed the Illrd
I to Italy and arrived in Milan on March 3.

It now appearing to be inevitable that Austria would,
I in the event of war, have to deal both with France
and Piedmont, orders were issued on April 5 and 6 for
the five corps already in Italy to be at once brought
up to war strength, and on the I3th the IXth Corps also
left Vienna for the front.

Towards the iatt«r end of April the five corps (Ilnd,
• Ilird, Vth, Vllthand Vlllth), already standing ready
behind the Ticino, were made up as follows :

ArmrOTpL

IHilakMi. 1 BrlgwloL

B«WU„^

Bquadrani.

Onu.

Und . . .

2

4

20

40

mid. . .

2

4

24

8

r.6

vth . . .

2

5

24

8

64

vnth . .

2

4

18

4

48

vmth . .

2

4

20

4

48

Reserves

1 Infantry

BiviBion .

3

14

31

28

1 Cavalry

DiviBion .

2

24

16

Artilleiy

116

12 drrieiona. 26 brigades. 120 battationa. 51} squEtdrons.
L 416 guns.

There were also 46 battalions of occupation or garrison
I troops, with a few guns and a small body of cavalry.

' At this period the Ilird Corps oontained 5 brigades.

THE CAMPAIGN OF '59

The total strength of the Austriaii forces In the Peninsula
amounted to nearly 230,000 men, but from this total
Bonie 70,000 must be deducted, required for the main-
tenance of order and for garrison duty in the Austrian
poBsessiona in Italy, leaving barely 160,000 men available
to take the offensive beyond the frontier.

On April 25 the Imperial forces were thus distributed :
the Ilnd Corps between S. Angiolo and Lodi, the Ilird
Corps at Pavia, the Vth between Pavia and Milan,
the Vllth between Bereguardo and Abbiategraaso
on the Ticino, and the Vlllth at Piacenza. The two
brigades of the Cavairy Division were in Crema and
Manerbio, while of the Reserve Infantry Division, one
brigade was on its way to join the Ilnd Corps and the
other two were in Brescia and Bologna. On April 27,
reports were received at Austrian Headquarters that
French ships had already arrived in Genoa, that the
disembarkation of men and material was proceeding
rapidly, and that French troops were marching to Italy
through Savoy. Gyulai had already arranged for the
violation of the frontier to commence on the 30th, but
on the morning of the 29th these orders were cancelled
and the passage of the Ticino was at once begun by the
Vllth and Vth Corps at Bereguardo, while the Ilird,
Vlllth and Ilnd, concentrating at Pavia, crossed the
river by the stone bridge at that town and by pontoons
which had previously been thrown across.

By night on the 30th practically the whole of Austria's
striking force had arrived upon hostile territory.

I

THE AUSTRIAN ADVANCE TO THE SESIA

CHAPTER II

THE AUSTRIAN ADVANCE TO THE SESIA

In the meantime the French had quietly, but with
dispatch, continued their preparations for placing their
army upon a war footing and for holding it in readiness
for an iWiedi^te advanL

A large number of the veteran troops quartered in
Africa were ordered to be transferred to France, their
places being taken by less experienced soldiers, and
eight divisions of infantry and one of cavalry were
standing ready by the middle of April, behind the Alps
or between Lyons and the sea, to a4vance into Italy
through the mountain passes or by sea to Glenoa. By
April 21 the French Government had fully made up
its mind as to the hostile intentions of Austria, and on
that date orders were issued for the formation of four
army corps which, with the Imperial Guard, were to
be known as " the Army of the Alps " — ^a title almost
immediately altered to that of " the Army of Italy."
Of this army the Emperor Napoleon III himself took
command, while the subordinate commands were filled
as follows : —

The Imperial Guard — General Begnaud de Saint Jean
d'Angfly ;

17 o

l8

THE CAMPAIGN OF

■

and the ^M

The 1st Army Corps — Marshal Count Baragaey
d'Hilliere ;

The Ilnd Army Cotjb — General de MacMahon

The Ilird Army Corps — Marshal Canrobert ; and
IVth Corps — Gteneral Niel. The command of the artil-
lery was held by General le Boeuf, and that of the
en^pneers by General Prossard. The Illrd and IVth Corps
were directed to move into Italy by the Alps, while
the two divisions of the Imperiab Guard and the Ist
and Ilnd Corps were ordered to Marseilles and Touion
for embarkation for Genoa. The Ilnd Corps was very
largely composed of troops serving in Africa, whose
transfer to French soil had not yet been quite com-
pleted, and these were consequently ordered to proceed
direct to Genoa from Algerian porta.

Of the available cavaby one division was attached
to the Ist and another to the Illrd Corps, while to the
Ilnd and IVth a brigade each only was allotted.

On April 25 the following movements were initiated ;
the division Bouat of Canrobert's Corps was entrained
at Lyons, reached railhead at St. Jean de Maurienne,
and by the 28th had crossed the Mont Cenis and de-
bouched at Snsa.^ Bourbaki'a Division of the same
corps was directed on Brian^on, and ordered to move
at once into Piedmont, and by the 28th Ducrot's Brigade
of that division had surmounted the Mont Gen^vre.
On the 25th the division Renault of the Illrd Corps
marched on Montmelian in the direction of Mont Cenis,
The IVth Corps followed close behind the Illrd and was
succeeded by the cavalry of both.

I

■ Bouat died almoat immediately o
oded by Trochu,

simatroke and wan s

I

The movements by sea were executed with equal
rapidity. Bazaine's Division of the lat Corps was already
on the 29tli beginning to disembark at Genoa ; the divi-
sions Ladmirault and Forey were put on board tlio
transports as fast as they reached Toulon and Marseilles,
as were alflo the troops of the Imperial Guard arriving
at these porta from Paris, while transports were working
between Genoa and the Algerian ports conveying the
matured soldiers of the Army of Africa. The cavalry
division of the Guard, having been trained from Paris
to Marseilles, followed thence by march route the
Comiche road to Genoa.

While these various movements were in course of
execution, the formation of a Vth Corps was under-
taken ; this was placed under the orders of Prince
Napoleon, and the two divisions of which it was com-
posed were commanded by Generals D'Autemarre and
Ubrich. The Ist Division was entirely made up of
troops from the African garrisons, while the 2nd was
formed of regiments from Paris.

In preparing for a campaign beyond the frontiers of
the Empire, it was imperative that the defence of the
country, whence so large a force was to be withdrawn,
should be neither neglected nor overlooked. To keep
order in the interior of France and to safeguard her
borders the following dispositions were made : Marshal
de Caatellane was placed in command of three infantry
divisions— one at Besan^on and two — with a cavalry
division — at Lyons ; Marshal Magnan was at the head of
four divisions of infantry, of which two were in Paris,

le at Lille and one at M6zierea ; while Marshal Pelis-
Duke de MalakofE, united under his command

favr £vMkatt«| ixSaatry and four of cSTsby, i
. Mete, LnDPvilk and 1

1 tliA.1 if 1^. near aj^roach of war
• ol Fruifif in gKAt measare tai[s«pared
' witii iies anraftnt foe, extrsoFdinanlj
I tad hmn madr vitliiQ the coarse of
a noaUi to aloae ixst ihc pmOons ocmditdoD of nn-
iBlfi nM to wiatk t^ cwoiitTy tad been permitted to
f•fa^l■B after tb* tenmnatino of the Crimeaii War. Ex-
pMJ Www baa omt and otct »fu^ tAught nations and
iDtfiridiuh tliat th« (»{^ect«d vwk of vears cannot be
nade p>od in a fev fevfiish dars when war is imminent ;
ia BUmy rcapects tlie Frenrli armins were ajiytbing but
tlioroiiglily tqoipped for a stem campaign, but the fact
mnuinfl that in something like twntT-five days an army
of 1(10,000 men of all arms had been collected in France
and in Algeria and set down in Piedmont^ ready, so far
as the caaaal otnerrei could jodge, for all the exigen<ues
of war.

It will be noticed that while the advance of the Aub-
trian* on the 29th — when they crossed the frontier
between Lombardy and Piedmont — actually opened
the campaign, the fitst infringement of ejdsting treaties
came from France, whose troops advanced into Savoy
on the 25tli- Some days, however, before that date,
it was known that war was inevitable ; it is true that
Austria's ultimatum was not presented in Turin before
tlie 23rd, but to the parties most nearly concerned its
contents was well known as early as the 21st. The
result made itself felt ; before the memorandum was even
presented, the railway had carried French troops to the

I

p

< wp.rfi nniii

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 21

iedmontese frontiet, while many thousand soldiers
were concentrated in Toulon and Marseilles. Ten
steamers of the Messageries were lying in the Joliette
Harbour ready to take troops on board ; a number of
old paddle-wheel ships converted into transports were
moored close by. Several line- of- battle ships and large
transports were already on their way to fetch the African
divisions, while other ships, chartered for the conveyance
of stores, were loading with the utmost expedition.
Thus, if in the ultimatum a time-Umit, not of three days
but of twenty-four hours, had been fixed, the French
divisions, having already had a day's stait, would have
still been in Piedmont at the end of the shorter period.
By the 26th, when the time fixed by the ultimatum had
expired, the French had had full five days to prepare,
and before the Austrian envoy left Turin with Cavour's
reply, French troops already stood upon Italian soil.

At the moment of advance the French Army was
divided into two great wings with no prospect of reunion
or support until each had arrived in Piedmont. The
left wing, composed of the Ilird and IVth Corps, was
therefore placed temporarily under the command of
Marshal Canrobert, while the right wing — the 1st and
Ilnd Corps — was under the orders of Marshal Bara-
guey d'Hilhers. The two forts of Exiles and of Esseil-
Ion command respectively the eastern exits of the passes
of Mont Gen^vre and Mont Cenis, and, by arrangement
with King Victor Emmanuel, these were handed over
to mixed gatrisona of French and Italian troops.

Having set in motion the troops of the left wing, which
was ordered to concentrate at Turin and thence to march
.by divisions to the position on the Dora Baltea, Marshal

lUr As w« iw™*'faf at tfas ITUl Ctm^t, sumehtd Sosa
^ Ab h^ ef 1^ ^^ nui Tum tim EbUowins day,
^ri BMrni ml; st anse biiit heie Go c^ I>or& Bslteft
mA EjBg Victor Emnaaael iimi GeneBLla Siel and
y^g^Bnl. Having smcftillr tixamtntid the groond,
the |C» wihal came to th« cuaulimon that owisg to its
ai^A, to tfafi small aumbers «vaiiab[» for holding it,
aiH to the configorstiuD of the gruond itaeii. the posititHi
mm not specially Eavountble for deface. On the right
tk posttton vas good : tanked by the Bi'm Po. there
^w beyood the Dors Balt«a ;ui opun plain completely
dBvioatcd by the tir« of guns placed an the right bank.
Ib the rear o£ the right the groond was very broken,
uid covered with houses, trees and hedges, assisting
neatly in the defence ; a viU^ge called Verolengo was
itself strongly entrenched and could only be forced
with great difficulty, while this village, with that of Ter-
jtr**-, stood out like two bastions connected by a
c«nal as by a curtain. The left at Maize was on a hill
commanding the ground to the front and too precipi-
toas for frontal assault. In front again the bed of the
Dora, enclosed between two hi^h banks quite 2,000
^ruds apart, also assisted in the defence of the position
sdecUd by the Sardinians ; while the railway, running
pitallel to the course of the river, permitted of reinforce-
ments being brought up to any portion of the line which
Blight be threatened. Such were the considerations
which had influenced the Italians in the choice of the
position wherein to await the advance of the Austhans ;
(Hit the following serious defects were pointed out by
llAishal Caoiobert.

MAGENTA AND SOLPBniNO, 1859 23

The town of Rondissone formed the centre of the
position ; the high road from Turin to Milan ran through
it, and the ground in rear — flat and open — offered
no obstacle where an enemy might be detained or
defenders rallied. If the centre were forced the right
would be turned, the left compromiaed, and the second
line would be taken in reverse. Lastly the river, the
only obstacle covering Rondissone, here formed several
small channels almost everywhere fordable at that season
of the year ; the banks abo were thickly wooded and
piecipitx)ua. Then, too, although the left was strong,
it could easily be turned by the Austrians following the
high road, which crossed the river twelve miles north of
Mazze.

Such were the faults of the position, but it is possible
that none the less it would have been retained, had the
Ilird and IVth French Corps been able to join hands
with their allies as early as had been anticipated. The
weather, however, had been deplorable, and the passage
of the Alps had been so greatly delayed, that, should the
Austrians only march rapidly on the Dora Baltea, there
eeeraed no prospect of reinforcing the defenders with
anything but very weak detachments of the French left
wing. These considerations led Marshal Canrobert to
ask that the position on the Dora be abandoned, and that
Turin should be defended at Alessandria and Casale,
since the occupation in force of the last-named place
in particular, might cause anxiety to the Austrian com-
mander for his left and for his communications in the
event 0! his advance by way of VerceUi. Thus, too, the
capital would be covered, Genoa safeguarded, the
, unmolested arrival of the French detachments would

N> Mwniwd ftnd the jonetMB of die allied annies be p

'thtm id«<M of MarabaJ Cunbert were approved by
ttM> KitiX And by (he Emperor, and the poattLon oa tin
Ihini IUImi. wh«rfl La Mitrmoa had aiieadf cod-
sirrwtwl jiii|H'rtkiit defenave wm^ was definitely
fthliii(t<4i4Hl, lty thd use of thenulwsy the troops were
hi)4'IIy wHIuIkwii. Kiid niuler the diiectioii at General
t^Hwutnl wkhVm wrrv liefinn cm the left bank of the Po
tit (.^walf. It* the hii|i«> of thereby causing Coant Gyolai
tv MivTf lltHi ftn mlvfttuw was contemplated against
tiik Hf flunk plit'tilil b« march on Torin.

In iHtiiwuu^nt'^' *>( lhr«n dispositions the following
iltWilHittW *tH«K I'UtT ill the poBilions of the Italian

^apA fiwiJqiwth'ni at S»ii Salvatore.

Ut'lNvMrni lUptcllHirito) at Sail Halvatore.

tjttl .. iPHtiti) Hi Aliwutndria.

^ „ (Oumtiih') at Valt'iiM.

^^t II (Oitldiiti) at CiATole.

hu „ ((Slichiitrit Ht ('iu>h]i> and Frassineto.

TW (^vulfv mvi«it«n. with two batteries of horse
«»Mll*'tt U'lualHwl t»\ {\w l><'r» Haltea, forming the
(tt^t^titi' li'lt n»il k'lwrvUm thi' Aiialrian right, and
tU>t<(l|ilHt ^\w vIUhn^-" i>t (.Vii^X''- Maiidria di Chivasso

UHll.Kll,..,. >,l.

•itikiMAhotiM have oomme need,
> MtUii that the Italian forces
If Hi ' i">l and it wiui clear thejefore

iM^ \'-' L i> ol •W'^HNM in the (.^ming cam-

^y0 W tit imbti^ ttltnt ttuJ M(KHlitiuu»ly. To cross

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 25

into the Lomellina — as the southern portion of the
country between the Sesia and the Ticino is called —
was not the only line of advance open to Count Gyulai ;
he could have advanced either by the north or by the
south bank of the Po — ^the one led to the capital, the
other to the enemy's forces and lines of communica-
tion.

It is interesting, therefore, to study the memorandum
prepared by the Austrian Generid Staff and dated
April 20, of which the following are extracts: "The
military situation may shortly be sunmied up as follows :
our enemies in the first line are Sardinians, in the second
the French. The Sardinians, 60,000 strong, having been
somewhat abruptly disturbed in their military prepara-
tions and plans, have a double object in view : first, to
preserve intact their capital ; second, to secure their army
from defeat until the arrival of the French. Probably
they will consider that both of these objects are not to
be attained, and, having to select, will possibly prefer
to sacrifice Turin for a time, in the general interests of
the war, to exposing their army to an unequal contest
in its defence, which may entail its destruction. It is
to be feared, therefore, that the Sardinian forces will be
found concentrating under shelter of their fortresses on
the strong ground south of the Po, with the further pur-
pose of covering the defiles and communications between
Genoa and Alessandria. Should this anticipation not
be realized — should the Sardinians have divided their
forces in pursuit of a double objective and should they
have preferred to concentrate on the Dora Baltea,
which river has recently been prepared for defence,
with a view to cover Turin directly — ^the problem to be

L.

solved by the Imperial Armj will be considerably
simplified.

" In either of these cases, assuming the Sardinian
Army to be inferior in numbers as well as in quality, the
decisive result of early collision would seem still more
certain than if the remedy for inferiority were sought
by enlisting such artificial aid as is presented by the
permanent fortifications south of the Po. On the other
h»nd it may be safely assumed that every nerve will
be strained by the French to arrive sufficiently early
nn Sardinian soil to support their allies in the impend-
ing struggle. . , , Assuming that our ultimatum will
on delivery be immediately telegraphed to Paris, it
may be calculated that the French will move within
twonty-Iour hours from that time ; and considering
further the character of the communications across the
Alps on one hand, and the difficulty attending the mari-
time transport of so large a body of men on the other —
though the distance does not exceed three hundred
miles — we may safely calculate that the Sardinians,
unless they retire on Genoa or Susa, will, during the
first six days, be entirely unsupported, and that in no
probable case will our operations be exposed to serious
danger from the arrival of the French — under proper
precautions — for a fortnight at least. Assuming, there-
fore, that our proper objective must be sought in the
Sardinian Army, and not in the Sardinian capital, in the
first instance, from considerations precisely similar to
those which influence our adversary, the question ia
how best to utilize the time at our disposal for the
purpose in view — the destruction of the Sardinian Army.
It would seem advisable that the advance upon

the position pteauined to be occupied by tke enemy

should be made by both banka of the Po ; the army thus
operating d ckeval along the river, with a view to secure
the passages as we proceed and to enlist the largest
possible number of communications for the rapid transit
of our forces towards the objective. . . . The first
objective points, marking the earhest phase of the
operations, are Valenza and Tortona. It is deemed
essential that the permanent passage at the former
town should be seized at once, and if the bridge be
destroyed or impaired, steps taken to restore immediate
communication with the north bank of the Po. The
construction of works on the south bank of the river
will be commenced at once.

" If the enemy stands here, dispositions for attack
Bhould be issued to the army. If he prefers to cling to
the high ground about Occimiano, the passage of the
river will be effected and the Ilnd and Ilird Corps will

, cross at Valenza to the south bank.

. It may be expected that Valenza will pass

Kinto the hands of the Imperial Army on the 28th and

■TTottona on the 29th. On the 30th or 31st at latest

■the army should be concentrated for attack on the Sar-
' oians in a probably entrenched position. ... It

I may be estimated that the Imperial Army may reach
the Sardinian capital about May 3, and further opera-
tions would then be dictated by circumstances which

, cannot now be foreseen.

* In case of repulse at Occimiano, the army would
retire upon Valenza, where the necessary preparations

|lor its retreat to the north bank will have been made
. and the army generally would take up a defensive

poeitifm in the LomeDiDa, holding the pass^es of the i
Fo and Sefia, and leaning with its right upoD Vercelli, I
whicli should be stieothgened for that purpose."

It will be seen from the above that the Austrian
General Stafi had formed a tolerably correct appreciatioa
of the situation likely to arise out of an outbreak of
war, and of the best means of dealing with it ; the want
of decision apparent in the movementA about to be
described is therefore the more inexplicable.

In spite of the fact that on April 26 Count Gyulm
telegraphed to Vienna his determination to remain
purely on the defenave, in view of the approaching con-
centration of the French and Italian armies, the Aus-
trian forces continued to advance westwards after
crossing the Ticino. On the night of the 30th the out-
post line was on the river Terdoppio, the Vlllth Corps
being at Cava — Zinasco — Piave d'Albignola— Corana ;
the Ilnd at Gropello ; the Vllth at Gambolo— Vigevano ;
the Vth at Gailasco — Trumello ; and the Ilird Corps
at Domo, while the Cavalry remained in Fa via. Orders
were given to the engineers to fortify the line of the
Oravellone stream, to bridge it in several places, to "
improve all approaches to the several crossings of the
T^tano, to lay a semi-permanent bridge at Vigevano,
and to prepare bridge-heada at Vigevano and San
Martino — on the -Milan -Trecate -No vara road. { The
bridge-head prepared at Vigevano consisted of five
separate field works, while that at San Martino com-
prised three lunettes.)

On May 1 Army Headquarters was at Garlasco and
the Austrians moved forward to the line of the Agogna^-
the VlUth Corps being at San Nazzaro, the Ilird at

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 29

mello and Ferrara, the Ilnd at San Giorgio, the
Vth at Mortara, and the Vllth between Albonese and
Cilavegna. The commander of the last-named corps
caused two squadrons and two companies to be pushed
on to Novara, where a requisition for 100,000 rations
was made and complied with, and where a number of
maps were seized. This day the Cavahy Division got
no further than Trumello on the Terdoppio.

Urban, commanding the Reserve Division, sent a
brigade to Barlassina on the Milan-Como road, owing
to the reported irruption of Italian Free troops into
Lombardy from that direction.

On this date Gyulai was informed that in a fortnight's
time another corps would be dispatched to the scene
of operations.

On May 2 the advance was continued until the Im-
perial Army stood on the line of the Sesia, the different
corps being distributed as follows : the Vlllth at Piave
de Cairo, thelllrd at Torre dei Beretti, the Vth at Candia,
the Vllth occupying San Angelo — Eobbio— Palestio —
Torrione — ^Rosasco, sending an advanced post to Ver-
celli and reconnoitring the roads towards Trino and
Casale ; the Ilud Corps was at Mede, and Array Head-
quarters at Lomello.

This day one of Urban's brigades arrived in Como,
being supported by a battaUon in Barlassina.

In front of the Vlllth and Vth Corps only were any
of the enemy to be seen ; the weather, which had been
favourable at the commencement of the advance, had
now changed again for the worse, and the Sesia was
greatly swollen.

Count Gyulai issued for May 3 march orders of which

30

THE CAMPAIGN OF

the general object is anything but clear. The Vlllth
CorpB was directed to send troops on to the island
opposite Carabio in the hope that the Allies would believe
that an attempt was to be made to cross the Po at Sale
and at Porto Comale, while the Vth Corps was to make
demonstrations at different points along the Sesia and
Po, in order to delude the enemy into the belief that a
crossing might be attempted at Frassinetto. It would
seem that the idea of all these movements and demon-
strations was to cover a real attempt to cross the Po in
the direction of Alessandria. At Army Headquarters
it was intended that the Ilird Corps should seize the
bridge at Valenza, and that another should at the same
time be thrown across at Basaignana ; the Ilnd Corps,
followed by the Vlllth, was to pass over the river here,
while the Ilird, Vth and Vllth crossed at Valenza,
These corps were then to assault and capture the heights
of San Salvatore, and having efiected the overthrow
of the Italian Army would then press on against the
French.

Early in the morning the artillery of the Tlird Corps
opened lire against Valenza, but the commander, Count
Schwartzenberg, seems to have been doubtful in regard
to his orders, for we find him writing to Army Head-
quarters to inquire whether the railway bridge was to
be captured or merely destroyed. The Vth Corps only
received its orders at 5.30 a.m., and the commander
then pointed out that both rivers were so full that it
would be no easy matter to send even cavalry across ;
that all boats had been removed by the enemy ; and
that it would be difficult to make a realistic feint of
crossing when no bridging material of any kind was on

I

Ms charge. By midday, however, the Sesia had fallen
and was crossed in several places by Paumgartten's
division, which pushed on to Villanova, Terranuova
and Caresana, leading to some sharp sldrmishing. At
Cambio and Comale troops of the VTIIth Corps were
also put across the Po in pontoons, but saw few signs of
the enemy.

On this date a bridge and bridge-head were commenced
at Vaccarizza below Pavia, which were intended, in the
event of a future retirement on Pavia, to cover the
conununicationa and protect the passage of the army
over the river. Vercelli waa occupied by the Vllth
Corps with outposts on the Casate and Trino roads.

Urban had returned this day to Brescia by rail, but
on receipt of intelligence that the Panua government
had been overturned, he waa ordered to proceed to that
city and restore order.

Previous to crossing the Ticino the Austrian Com-
mander-in-Chief had received vague reports as to the
dispatch and arrival in Italy of the leading French
troops, but it waa not until May 3— at an hour when
Count Gyulai had already issued his orders for the
demonstrations on the Po and Sesia — that he was in
receipt of telegraphic despatchea from Vienna informing
him that — " fifty thousand Frenchmen had been directed
on Casale and Alessandria on May 1 " — " that Bouat'a
division had already arrived in Turin over the Mont
Cenis" — "that 10,000 men were being daily forwarded
via Toulon, 8,000 via Marseilles and 7,000 via Brian^on "
— and it was doubtless in consequence of these reports
_,that Gyulai telegraphed to Vienna on the evening of

; 3rd that "the approach of the French prevented

32

THE CAMPAIGN OF

i&." The ■

his intention of breaking through at Baaaignana."
Ilini Corps (Schwartzenberg) was accordingly directed
to destroy the bridge at Valenza, but the rain was now
very heavy, the rising wat«r drowned the mines which
had been already piepared, and the destruction of the
bridge was delayed for several days.

Oq the 4th Gyulai learnt that the IXth Corps was
being sent into Italy ; this had, at the outbreak of war,
been employed in the protection of the Adriatic littoral,
and on May 10 its transport to Italy via Venice com-
menced, one brigade moving daily, Ita place was taken
by the Xth Corps from Vienna.

Early on the morning of the 4th the Brigade Boer of
the Vlllth Corps crossed the Po at Porto Comale without
opposition, and at once commenced the construction
of a pontoon bridge. The remaining three brigades
followefl, Caatelnuova was occupied, and parties were
sent forward in the direction of Voghera, Ponte Curone
and Tortona, while the Corps Headquarters was estab-
lished at Cecoaa. It had been intended that Ponte
Curone should be occupied in force, but the heavy rain,
which had now been faUing continuously for fifteen
hours, had thrown many obstacles in the way of forward
movement ; later in the day, however, the Brigade
Philippovic sent a small force towards Voghera to
destroy the rail and telegraph, while arrangements were
also made for a mixed force (1 battalion, i squadron,
and 2 guns) to proceed next day to Tortona, there
to levy requisitions. To support the Vlllth Corps,
the Ilnd wsa moved, half to San Nazzaro and half to
Lomello.

The stream had risen so much in front of the Vth

I

I

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 33

CorpB at Ftasainetto that the fords were rapidly be-
coming impassable, and Count Stadion accordingly
recalled the whole of his troops to the left bank.

Of the Vllth Corps a whole division was now concen-
trated in Vercelli ; one squadron of the mounted troops
with this corps was at Villate and another at Novara,

Late at night orders were issued from Gyulai'a Head-
quarters for entirely fresh dispositions on the morrow,
but no hint was vouchsafed of the reasons for any change
or of the purpose for which it was made ; in the orders,
however, given to the Vlllth Corps (Benedek) it was
remarked that the Commander-in-Chief " proposed to
move with the rest of the army from the line of opera-
tions Pavia— -Lomello and to take up that of Milan —
Vercelli." The Vlllth Corps — ^to which the Brigade
Lippert of the Ilnd Corps was attached — was to cover
the left wing of the army during the operations now
impending, commence the construction of a bridge-head
at Porto Cornale, and at the same time push out parties
towards Sale, Tortona, Ponte Curone and Voghera, and
prevent information of the Austrian movements leaking
through to the enemy.

The main portion of the Imperial Army was ordered
to move as follows on May 5 : the whole of the Vllth
Corps was to concentrate in Vercelli, occupy San Ger-
mano and Stroppiana, each with half a brigade, and send
forward strong parties towards Desana, Biella and the
line of the Dora Baltea. Vercelli was to be prepared
lor defence, and the local authorities were to be required
to supply 1 10,000 rations daily ; work on the bridge-
head at San Martino was to be continued ; while the
I Vth Corps was to move to Robbio, the Ilird to Candia

L

and Coz20, and the Ilnd to Uortara and Ce^nago. All
bridging materi&ls and pontoons — ^less five pontoons
li>(t at dornale — were to reach Lomello on the 5th and
Mortara on the 6th. Supplies for the Vlllth Corps
ware to Iki forwarded via Pavia and San Nazzaro— foE_
iho rest of the army by Milan and Novara.

Tlio floods oil the Po destroyed the bridge which had;
bei'ii laid at fiornale and still prevented the destruction ol'
the railway bridge at Valenza, so that early on the mom-
ing of the r>th the orders already issued for the move to-,
woidit the Dora Baltea were cancelled, but the cont-
niander of the Vlllth Corps was directed that, in the
event of any lnwtilc advance before communication was
roBtorpd, ho should retire on Piacenza, eventually reji
ing the main army through Pavia. Nothing further
was to be done in regard to the bridge-head at Comale,
but every poHsible means was to be taken to deceive
tho enemy ft« to the isolated situation of the Vlllth
(JorpB. In these circumstances Benedek showed himself
very aolivc, sending requisitions into Tortona and
detttruying the telegraph line and two bridges over the
Hcsrivia near Uiitt town.

By the morning of the 6th the river had fallen con-
iidurably, and by 2.30 p.m. communication between
tli« north and south bank was restored, when the troops
oommunord tlioir retirement. By 11 p.m. all the Vlllth
Oorpfl had re crossed and occupied Piave de Cairo,
MczKanabigli and San Nazzaro, the Ilnd Corps evacuat-
ing tho last-named place and occupying Cergnago and
San Oiorgio.

The following movements took place on the 7th :
one division of the Vllth Corps took up the line San

I

ermaiio — Gaacine di Stra — Desana — Asigliaao — Per-
tengo— Stroppiana, the remaiEder being concentrated
in Vercelli. Mortara and Novara were sufficiently forti-
fied to prevent their falling by a amp de main.

The Vth Corps heldfrom Rosasco to Confienza through
Robbio ; the Headquarters of the Ilird Corps pro-
ceeded to Cozzo, having its brigades at S.Paolo, Lena,
Celpenchio and Candia. The enemy appeared in some
force about Valenza and Monte and their artillery came
into action. The Ilnd Corps moved to Nicorvo. This
day the bulk of the Vlllth Corps marched to Mortara,
but the brigade Lippert, detached from the Ilnd Corps,
was, with one of the brigades of theVIIIth Corps, placed
under the orders of General Lang, who, with Ma Head-
quarters at Lomello, waa directed to watch the line of
the Po from Mezzana Corti to Breme and give timely
notice of any hostile advance in the direction of Piacenza.
In the event of the Allies crossing the river in strength
in his front, Lang was to retire on Mortara and there
make a stand to cover the left flank of the army.

The bridge at Vaccarizza was now ready, but the bad
weather had seriously hindered the completion of the
bridge-head.

The communication and supply lines of the different
units of the army were again altered as follows : For
Lang's division — Pa via — San Nazzaro— Lomello ; tor
the Ilnd and Ilird Corps — Abbiategrasso— Vigevano —
Mortara ; for the remainder of the army — Magenta —
Novara,

On May 8 the Vllth Corps pushed a brigade on from
San Germano to Tronzano, but beyond this it was found
that the roads leading west and north had been cut,

whOe the bridge over the Dora Baltea waa said to have
been mined. Various reports of the presence of the
enemy were received ; a thousand horee were
be in front of Troozano ; 25,000 Frenchmen were
reported to be in Bielta, while the Emperor of the French
and the King of Italy were believed to be at Rondiasone
on the Dora Baltca with Durando's division — which
last, however, was at this moment actually in Valenza.
A strong patrol was sent on to Biella and parties to Ivrea,
and from their reports it was clear that the Allies were
in no strength in this neighbourhood. The Brigade
Gablentz of the Vllth Corps sent a small force of all
arms to reconnoitre the bridge-head at Casale, and
this engaged the troops holding it and exploded a maga-
zine in the works ; the bridge-head was at the time held
by six battalions. In support of the Illrd and Vllth
Corps, the Ilnd moved from Nicorvo via Robbio to
Verc«!li, where it bivouacked south of the town. The
Vth Corps — whose mission it was to destroy the railway
between Vercelli and Casale — crossed the Sesia at Pales-
tro and occupied the line Asighano— Caresana with a
brigade at Costanzana.

The Illrd Corps — less a small mixed foree left to
connect with Lang's division and watch the Sesia from
its junction with the Po to Mantie — marehed to Torrione.
The Vlllth Corps moved to Robbio, arriving, however,
very late, owing to its line of march crossing that of the
Ilnd and Illrd Corps at Robbio and Nicorvo,

The arches of the bridge at Valenza were this day at
last destroyed.

On this day Count Gyulai both wrote and telegraphed
to Urban, directing him to make a strong demonstration

I

^Eithe diret

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 37

B the direction of Stradella with the object of drawing
off the attention of the enemy in front of the main army,
and of obtaining information as to the strength and
dispositions of the Allies in the mountains to the south-
west of that town. Urban was, however, enjoined on
no account to lose sight of the fact that his main duty
was to maintain order in Lombardy and Venetia, and
that he was not to move far from his base at Pavia or
from the nearly completed bridge-head at Vaccarizza.
Gyulai concluded by remarking that, while he was toler-
ably certain that the main force of the enemy was con-
centrated about Alessandria, and although he was satis-
^^ed as to the efficacy of the steps he had taken for the se-
Bifpzity of his left flank, still a hostile movement on Pavia
^■pould be so useful to the enemy that everything possible
Hsnst be done to binder or prevent any such attempt.
In the orders for the 9th — issued at 8.30 the previous
evening — it had been directed that the Vllth Corps
should concentrate about San Germano with outposts
in Santhia and Tronzono and with patrols pushed still
further westward ; that the Vth Corps should move to
Tricerro with advanced troops in Trino and towards
Casale, and that the Ilnd, Illrd, and Vlllth Corps should
support these movements. Lang was also ordered to
cross the Po in strength and endeavour to clear up the
situation about Voghera.

These movements were actually in progress on the
morning of the 9th, when fresh orders were issued can-
celling all advance and directing the retirement of the
different corps behind the Sesia, and by evening the
-vhole of the troops — with the exception of the Vth
lorps — were across that river.

THE CAMPAIGN OF

1

ivemest, ^|

In justdfication of this audden retrograde movemeBt,
Count Gyulu forwarded to Vienna a long dispatclL
dated the 9tli, of which the followiag is an epitome :
he commenced by reiterating the words of his letter of
April 25 wherein he had stated his conviction that
an energetic offensive in the direction of Alessandria
wae very difficult in view of the strength of the allied
forces — while a reverse would entail very eerious conae-
quencea ; that the offensive could only be undertaken
to prevent or delay a junction of the French and Italian
armies ; and that such a consummation was only pos-
sible had the Auatrians been in sufficient force to hold
the Italians to the defences at Alessandria and at the
flame time to engage and defeat the French. A per-
manent separation of the Allies was impracticable, as a
junction could easily take place further west, when the
French could have advanced from Turin by Vercelli
and Novara against Milan — a movement which Gyulai
could not have prevented and which would have neces-
sitated a retirement on Fiacenza or even further. This
retreat, moreover, by the right bank of the Po on a
single road, with all the impedimenta of a large army
and with possible insurrection on the flank in Tuscany,
would have presented immense difficulties and would
have taken a long time to carry out.

Directly the French appeared upon the scene, Gfyultu
stated that he became convinced any offensive against
Alessandria must be abandoned, and that he must take
up some position to cover Lombardy and prevent a
liostile advance on Piacenza. Such a position he
daimed to have discovered between Mortara and Ver-
celli, where, moreover, the army was spread over a fertile

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 39

piovince. The enemy's advance would either be re-
stricted to a very narrow front between the Po and the
Apennines, or to a crossing of the river where the Aus-
trians could fall upon and crush him during the move-
ment.

After detailing the orders he had given for the 9th —
described as a ^^ reconnaissance " (by four army corps),
Gyulai concludes his despatch by saying he has just
heard that the Dora Baltea line has been abandoned on
his moving in that direction, and that the French are
advancing on Alessandria to threaten Fiacenza ; that
consequently his previous orders for a westward move
have been cancelled, and that the corps have been
directed to concentrate about Mortara where he proposes
to await developments.

ACTION AT MONTEBELLO

CHAPTER III

AOnON AT MONTEBELLO

While the events were transpiring which have been
described in the latter part of the preceding chapter,
the different portions of the French Army had gradually
and unhindered been drawing closer to their allies.

By May 1 three French corps — ^including that under
the command of Prince Napoleon — ^had already disem-
barked at Grenoa, and one of these — ^the 1st — ^was on its
way to Novi via Staglieno, Pontedecimo and Voltaggio.
Of the two corps moving into Piedmont through the
passes of the Alps, the Ilird was already strung out
along the line Susa — Turin — ^Alessandria, while the head
of the other was across the mountains. On the 2nd the
1st Corps was at Pontedecimo, Buzzola, Voltaggio and
Serravalle; the Ilnd was at Bolzanetto, San Quilico
and Campomarone ; the Imperial Guard was at Genoa
while Trochu's division of the Ilird Corps reached
Alessandria on this date.

The Italian Headquarters was still at San Salvatore,
the 1st Division was at Occimiano and Yalenza, the
2nd and 3rd were in Alessandria, the 4th in Ozzano,
and the Yth in Frassinetto, Yalenza and Bassignana.
On May 3 Garibaldi's Free Corps arrived in Casale, he
having been earnestly entreated by Cialdini to come

48

there with all speed, as the advance of the Austrian Vth
Corps had caused Cialdini anxiety for the safety of his
bridge defences.

On the 4th the lat French Corps was at Rigoroso,
Arquato and Serravalle ; the Ilnd at Gavi, Carosio
and Voltaggio ; the Ilird was partly in Turin and
partly in Alessandria, while the lYth was still between
Susa and the capital.

The French were gradually closing up during tiie
ensuing days, until on the 7th the head of the Ist Corps
^marching on the right bank of the Scrivia — ^had
reached Cassano ; the Imperial Guard foUowing had
arrived at Buzzola ; the Ilnd Corps was at Tasserolo
juat south of Novi ; and the Illrd and IVth Corps
were both in Alessandria, less one brigade which the
last-named corps had dropped at Susa.

Some slight changes had been made in the disposi-
tions of the Piedmontese Army ; the lat Division
was in San Salvatore, the 3rd on the line Valenza —
Mugarone— Bassignana, covering Alessandria, where
was the 2nd Division ; while the Ith and 5th were
between Frassinetto and Monte, covering Casale.

The French military authorities had been thoroughly
alive, not only to the evil moral effect of a hostile
occupation of Turin even of a few days' duration, but of
the resultant danger of the interruption of communica-
tions between Susa and Alessandria ; it must therefore
have been with equal astonishmeat and rehef that the
Allies heard on the 9th that the Austrians had suddenly
withdrawn the bulk of their troops behind the Sesia.
By the 13th the Austrians had all returned by forced
marches to the Lomellina, occupying ground between

I
I

"iJie Sesia and the Ticino ; the Illrd and VTIth Corps

were on the Sesia — the latter atUl holding Vercelh — the
Vlllth was on the Po, the Ilnd and Vth in rear at
Albonese and Tmmello. Urban alone, with troops of
the Reserve Division, was on the south bank of the Po
at Casteggio, while Piacenza was left to its own ganiaon
and to the IXth Corps, which was now drawing near
to that city. Meanwhile the Allies were rapidly con-
centrating in two strong masses on either side of the
Tanaro — the 1st, Ilnd and Ilird French Corps in Sale,
Voghera and Tortona, the IVth and Sardinians about
Casale and Valenza, and the Imperial Guard at Ales-
[ sandria, bridges having been thrown across the Scrivia
kind the Tanaro to facilitate inter-c^mmunication.

The first phase of the campaign had thus ended with-
out initial advantage to the Austrians. The object
of Gyulai's hasty invasion of Piedmont was less the
defeat of the isolated Italian Army, than the capture of
the capital and the possible overthrow of the French
detachments debouching from the passes of the Alps.
But such an operation exposed the Austrian flank to
attack by the armies disembarking at Genoa, and there
can be no doubt that the true object of the invasion
ahould have been the defeat of the Italian Army standing
behind the Po and the Tanaro. The Austrian advance,
instead of being by the left bank of the Po, should have
been by the right ; a force should have occupied the
defiles of the Scrivia and observed Alessandria— thus
checking the French advance from Genoa — and the
I bulk of the Austrian Army should have forced the pas-
I toga of the Tanaro, and, having defeated the Italians,

46

THE CAMPAIGN OF

would then have stood ready to deal with the divided
forces of their allies. But while the Fiedmontese divi-
sions still stood unsupported, Gyulai evinced no inclina-
tion to attack them either in front or on the strategic
flank, feints only were made in various directions. No
single advantage had been secured, the initiative had
been Burrendered, and the morde of the Imperial troops
had been seriously impaired.

Within the course of the next few days Count G-yulai
learnt that two additional corps — ^the Ist (Clam Gallas)
and the Ilnd (Weigl) were being sent into Italy, and
on May 17 he was informed that the Emperor Franz
Josef himself would probably shortly assume command
of the troops of the Second Army.

On May 14 Urban Bent forward a brigade under
Colonel Wallon by Casteggio towards Voghera ; nowhere
was the enemy found in any strength, but a few patrols
of Italian lancers were seen in the neighbourhood of
Voghera. The Austrians heard here, however, of the
arrival in Alessandria of the Emperor Napoleon (he
had actually joined his army that very morning), and
from information locally obtained and transmitted to
the Austrian Headquarters, Gyulai seems to have now
formed the conclusion, on what, in the light of subse-
quent events, seems wholly insufficient basis, that the
Allies had the intention either of attempting a crossing
at Valenza or Frassinetto, or of advancing by Voghera
and Stradella. To meet such diapositions Gyulai drew
up the following scheme, viz : should the enemy cross
at Valenza he proposed to engage him in front with
the Vlllth, Vth and Ilnd Corps, while the Ilird, with

I

I

I

*«ne division of the Vllth, was to take him in flank by
Sartirana and Semiana, the other division of the Vllth,
covering the flank at Vercelli and Paleatro. In the
event of theAlliesattempting to effect the main crossing
at Frasainetto, the Illrd Corps was to hold them in
front as long as possible, while the VITth attacked them
in flank from Robbio and the Vlllth from Sartirana —
the Ilird Corps being supported by the Vth, and the
Vllth by the Ilnd Corps. Again, should the enemy
advance by Voghera on Stradella, the Vlllth waa to
fall back fighting — first to the line of the Agogna,
then to the Terdoppio and finally to Pavia. The Vllth
Corps was to retire by Nicorvo, Vigevano and Bere-
guardo, finally forming a reserve between Pavia and
Piacenza,

^0n May 19 Vercelli was definitely abandoned and
the railway bridge was destroyed, the army moving
more to the left ; the Ilnd Corps marched to San Gior-
gio and Cergnago, the Vth to watch the line of the Po
from the Agogna to Mezzana Corti, the Vllth moved
to Mortaia with a brigade on the Agogna between Castel
d' Agogna and Nicorvo and a strong post on the Palestro-
Vercelli road ; the Ilird Corps occupied Tnimello, and
Army Headquarters was at Garlasco. By this date

(four brigades of the IXth Corps, with Headquarters,
had arrived in Piacenza.
Count Stadion, commanding the Vth Corps, had been
flent to Vaccarizza in view of carrying out a recon-
naissance in force against the enemy's right, and he
now furnished the following report : that there were
i regiments of French cavalry between Alessandria
i Toitona ; that €0,000 men were preparing to cross

the Po ; that French troops had moved on Bobbio by
the valley of the Trebbia, and that either on the 19tii
or 20th a cTosaing would be attempted between Casale
and CerveBuia, when the troopB moving by the Trebbia
would fall upon the rear of the AuBtrians on the south
bank of the Po.

Every report that came into Army Headquarters at
GarlaAco seems to have confirmed the impiesaion that
the AlUes would shortly attempt the passage of the
Sesia and Fo, and Gyulai persuaded himself that the
endeavour could only be made in one of three direc-
tions : the first — which he considered the least probable
— ^from the line of the Sesia, when the attack would fall
upon the Vllth Corps, supported by the Vlllth, Ilnd,
and Ilird ; secondly, by Cambio and Valenza, to be
opposed by the Vlllth, supported by the Ilird, Ilnd,
and Vllth ; and thirdly, an advance against Stradella,
the Po being crossed at Spessa covered by feints on the
Sesia and at Valenza, to be met by the Vth Corps, sup-
ported by the Illrd, Ilnd, and Vlllth, crossing at
Pavia and Bereguardo.

It will be observed that Gjmlai does not seem to have
considered the possibiUty of any advance other than
against his immediate front or left.

On the 20th the Allies were distributed as follows : —
Sardinians : the 4th Division and the Cavalry Division
had moved forward towards Vercelli ; the 3rd Division
crossed the Po at Casale and occupied Caressana, Strop-
plana and Fezzana ; the 2nd moved to Gazzo and
Motta dei Conti on the Sesia ; the 1st to Casale, where
was now the King's Headquarters ; the 5th remained
betweeo Frassinetto and Giarole. French ; the IVth

I

I

I

MAGENTA AND S0LFERINO,i8sg

49

the

^^^Sag

^HCbtps (Niel) was at San Salvatore and Valensa ;

Ilnd (MacMahon) was between Sale and Piovera ; the
Guard at Alessandria ; the Ilird Corps (Canrobert)
between Castello and Viguzzolo ; the lat Division of
the Vth Corps had a regiijient each in Voghera, Tortona
and Bobbio ; the 1st (Baraguey) was at Casei, Caatel-
nnovo and Voghera. Forey's division in Voghera was

*eovered by ten aqiiadrona of the Sardinian Cavalry Bri-
gade under Sonnaz ; three sijuadrona held the line of
the Coppa River between Verretto and Caat«ggio,
another was on the high groand to the right at Code-
vUla, four squadrons at Pizzale and Calcababbio watched
the Staflora and the bridge at Oriolo, while the remain-
ing two squadrons were in Voghera, where also five
fdottms of the Ist Chasseurs d'Afrique bad arrived on
the 18th.

The Allies therefore were distributed in three groups :
between Vercelli and the junction of the Sesia and Po ;
between Casale and the Tanaro ; and between the Staf-
fers, the Po, the Tanaro and the Voghera^Alessandria
road. Of this last group, Forey's division and part of
D'Autemarre's (of the Vth Corps) were practically in
contact with the troops under Stadion, but the French-
men were closely supported by the rest of the lat Corps
at Pontc Curone and at Casei.

It being considered by GjTilai that Urban's presence
was no longer required at Stradella, since the IXth
Corps was now sufficiently closed up to secure the safety
of the left flank of the army, he was ordered back to.
the Po to assist in preparing and holding the bridge-
head now nearing completion at Stella. He had reached
~larbiane!lo on his way to Vaccarizza when he was

50

THE CAMPAIGN OF

the orders ^1

directed to return and place himself under the
of Count StadioQ who was about to endeavour to clear
up the situation from Voghera westwards. For this
purpose the following troops had been put at Stadion's
disposal : the brigades Gaal and Hess and the brigade
Eils of Paumgartten's division — all three of Stadion's
own corps ; the brigades Braum of the ISth Corps
and SchafEgotsche of the Reserve Diiidaion — these
under Urban — and the brigade Boer of the Vlllth
Corps, then at Vaccarizza.

Stadion directed that the advance should be made
in three columns : the left column — the two brigades
under Urban — marched by the main road from Broni
to Caateggio ; the centre column — which Count Stadion
accompanied^was commanded by Pamngartten, who
had with him the brigades Gaal and Bils, and moved
by Barbianello on Gasatisma ; while Hess formed the
right colmnn with his brigade and marched by Verrua
and Branduzzo on Orioio, The troops with Urban
were the only ones who knew the country, and accord-
ingly a battalion from Schaffgotache'a brigade was
attached to the other two columns, while Urban's
deficiencies, thus caused, were made good by giving
him two battalions from Boer's brigade, Boer himself
moving up to Barbianello in reserve with two battahons
of infantry and the reserve artillery.

It will be noticed that while the force allotted to
Stadion for an important operation was drawn from
four different units — owing to Gjndai'a disinclination
to make any temporary alteration in the general dis-
position of his forces— the error of mixing up minor units,
strange to one another and their commanders, was still

I

furUier accentuated by the man in immediate command
of the whole.

Urban reached San Giulietta without any opposition,
beyond that from some armed peasants, and was ordered
at 11 a.m. to push on and capture Casteggio, being
promised the support of the brigade Gaal should he need
it. Casteggio was occupied in like manner, the few
Italian vedettes being easily dislodged, and Urban then
resolved to move on rapidly and seize Montebello, and,
if possible, GenestreDo. where he was ordered to stand
fast while the right and centre columns advanced upon
Voghera. While Urban was moving on Montebello,
Gaal, who had been directed to support him and who had
reached Casatisma, left there at 12.30 and marched on
Hontebello in two columns — one by the main road,
the other by the Coppa valley and Verretto ; a reserve
was left in Casatisma and the brigade Bils remained in
Robecco.

About 1.30 p.m. Stadion met Urban in Montebello,
which that officer had just occupied, and there decided
that, as the enemy seemed nowhere in strength, the
day's operations should cease with the further occupa-
tion of Genestrello, a tactical position of no little im-
portance, standing as it did on an outlying spur of the
Apennines and commanding the open country up to
the Staffora River, The centre and right colunms,
moving by cross-country roads, had made but indifferent
progress and Stadion accordingly issued the following
orders for security :—

Urban to send back one brigade to Casteggio, which
was to be placed in a state of defence ; the other brigade

I be posted between Genestrello and Torrazza Coste

52

THE CAMPAIGN OF

1, and to ^1

with cavalry advanced on the Vogliera road,
reconnoitre towards Codevilla.

Gaal'g brigade to hold the railway bridge just north
of Montebello, and also the line of the Coppa with out-
posts covering Cast«ggio — where the reserve was to be
placed — and maintain communication with Urban on
the left and on the right with Hess in Branduzzo. Bila
was to remain in Casatisma.

These arrangements had been made about 2.30 and
orders conveyed to Pamngartt«n and Hess, when heavy
gun firing was heard from the direction of QeneBtrello ;
the battalion holding the railway bridge north of Monte-
bello was at once directed to advance along the railway
to the assistance of the troops engaged at Genestrello,
while Paumgartten was ordered to push on Qaal'a
brigade to Montebello and Bils to Caateggio, the
battalion already in Casteggio to advance to Mon-
tebello.

What had happened was that the advance guard in
occupation of Genestrello had been suddenly attacked,
before any steps had been taken to fortify either that
village or Mont«bello in rear.

General Forey had heard at 12.30 in Voghera of
Stadion's advance and at once moved out with two
guns and two battalions of the 74th (Eeuret's brigade),
which happened to be ready, leaving orders for the
remainder of the division to follow him as quickly aa
possible. Arrived at the bridge crossing the Fossagazzo,
where two battalions of the 84th were already on out-
post, Forey placed his guns in position with a battalion
of the 84th on either flank, and held the rest of hia
troops in reserve. On the right of the road the squadiona

I

I

' of Italian cavalry, of the regimenta of Novara and
Montferrat, were drawii up.

For some little time the French were greatly out-
numbered, and were in no little peril. Braum, advanc-
ing by the railway, drove the battalion of the 74th out
of the farm and hamlet of Caacine Nuova and occupied
it, but the 74th, supported by a battalion of Blanchard's
brigade which had now come up, returned to the attack
and again possessed themselves of the farm which waa
I now strongly held, wliile Blanchard extended a battalion
■"Of the 9l8t Regiment between the railway and the main
fttoad to strengthen the centre. The whole of Forey'a
' -division had now arrived from Voghera, and that general
was prepared to take the offensive. With Beuret to
the right of the road and Blanchard on both sides of
the railway, Forey threw forward his right, attacked
and captured Genestrello, when Schaffgotsche fell back,
hotly pressed, on MontebeUo. Bils was called up ;
Braum, who had been fiercely struggling for the re-
capture of Cascine Nuova, was directed to fall back
on MontebeUo where Gaal had taken up a position to
cover the retirement of Schaffgotsche's men ; while
Hess, who with five battahons had been unable to do
more than hold his own on the Staffora against one
and a half French battahons, was ordered to retire on
Casteggio, and there take up a defensive position.

Preparations for holding MontebeUo had already been

made by some of Gfaal's troops and a battalion of Bils'

brigade, when the men falhng back from Genestrello

already made their appearance. There was some con-

I fusion before a decision was come to as to which troops

iirere to remain in occupation of the village and which

54

THE CAMPAIGN OF

to fall back to Gasteg^o, when the French advance^

energetically pressed by Forey, already reached the
high ground close to Montebello. Beuret's brigade.
was ordered to attack on the south-west, while Blan-
chard, moving along the railway, safeguarded the left.
Both brigades were soon heavily engaged among the
vineyards and terraces ; the fighting — much of it at the
closest quarters — continued for two hours ; the houses
of the village were carried one by one, and finally the
cemetery, commanding the road to Casteggio, was
stormed, carried with the bayonet and cleared of its
defenders. It was here that General Beuret fell mortally
wounded.

Bils, in position on the right bank of the Coppa,
covered the Broni and Stradella road, while HesB,
deploying to the right between the road and the
railway, guarded the Casatisma road ; between these
two brigades the Austrian battahons fell back practically
unmolested, Urban on Stradella and Faumgartten on
St«lla.

To both combatants reinforcements were drawing
near when the action closed ; Bazaine was hurrying
up from Ponte Curone with three regiments of infantry
and had reached Genestrello, while Fehlmayr's brigade
of the IXth Corps had left Broni for Casteggio, but
was halted by Stadion at Borgo San Giuhetta,

The action had been principaDy confined to the infan-
try, but the Italian cavalry was of the greatest service,
made repeated charges on the Austrians, and did all
possible to check their advance until the French had
collected force sufficient to meet it. Artillery could
only play a secondary part in such a thickly cultivated

i
i

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERTNO, 1859 55

'uid wooded country. Forey — as has been described —
placed two guns on the Fossagazzo bridge to support
Ms attack on GenestreUo ; he afterwards posted two on
the high ground to the right, and employed others
near Cascine Nuova, from which the high ground about
Montebello is to some extent visible. The Austriana
had two guns on a piece of open ground near the church
of Montebello, others on a spur of the hill along which
mna the road between the village and the post-road.
Heie they had constructed a slight breastwork to give
cover to the men — ^an excellent position but for the
fact that the ground in front was much hidden by trees.

The following are the numbers engaged and the losses
BUstMned : —

Alhes :

\

Two aiz-gun batteries — one only engaged.

Cavalry

Inltiatry

Killed
Wounded

Artillery
Cdvalry
Infantry

105 (officers and men]

The numbers which actually took part in the action
were, however, very much less : e.g., the brigade Biis,

Lover 4,000 strong with eight guns, was not engaged

iflt all.

Killed

Wounded

IdjBBing

331 (officers and men)

Iq this miBmauaged aHair Stadion certainly failed
to distinguish himself ; be made no real use of his
reserves and was over cautious ; he had, however, a
very difficult task, but all that can be said is that if
the movement was injudicious, its execution was in-
different. Forey, on the other hand, acted with much
decision and boldness ; he took the oflensive even
with inferior numbers, disregarded the chance of his
left being driven back, used every available man for
advancing his right, and gained the day by his bold, if
somewhat hazardous, attack. The result of the recon-
naissance, carried out in so dispirited a manner, was
to confirm the Austrian Commander-in-Chief in the
false ideas he had formed as to the intentions of the
Allies, for even as late aa May 23 he telegraphed to
Vienna that " the main forces of the French were be-
tween Alessandria and Voghera, and that preparations
were being made to strike the first blow in the direction
of Piacenza," and this in spite of the fact that news of
the operations conducted by Garibaldi in the north
had already reached Austrian Headquarters at Garlasoo. .

On May 17 Garibaldi, who had been accorded the
rank of Major-General, was at BieUa, where he had
collected a force of six battahons of volunteers number-
ing 3,120 men.

On the 20th he wtis at Gattinara, and, without opposi-
tion and almost unnoticed, he crossed the Sesia next
day at Romagnano, owing to the fact that the attention
of the Austrians had been diverted to the Lower Sesia
by the operations which will be described later. Gari-
baldi left Borgomauero on the 22nd, and marched via

I

I

Aroiia on Castelletto, arriving on the 24th at Varese,
where he proceeded to raise and organize fresh bodies
of volunteers. Garibaldi's movements had, however,
not been altogether unnoticed : the Military Governor
of Milan piomptlj moved out all bis available troops
towards Varese, and Gyulai now directed Urban to
assume the direction of the operations about to be
undertaken in North Lombardy, taking with him the
brigade Rupprecht of his Reserve Division. Urban,
moving rapidly, reached Camerlata on the 24th, and
lost no time in assuming the offensive against the
invader. On the night of the 26th he marched upon and
attempted to surprise Varese, but news of his move-
menta had leaked out, and Garibaldi was ready to re-
ceive him. The attack was unsuccessful, and Urban
fell back upon Rebbio, being followed up all the way
and losing considerably. Here he learnt that his other
brigade (Schailgotsche) was being sent to him together
with the brigade Augustin of the IXth Corps. Hardly
had portions of these reinforcements joined him, when
he was again heavily attacked, and was eventually
forced to retire on Monza. On the 29th, however, he
moved forward on Varese with all three brigades and
wasableto occupy that town, Garibaldi having withdrawn
his forces in order to attempt the capture of the small
fort at Laveno on the Lake Maggiore. Laveno held out,
and Garibaldi, returning towards Varese, foimd Urban
in possession, and that his own position had become
very critical, hemmed in as he was in the angle between
the Ticino, Lake Maggiore and the Swiss frontier, and
_with his one exit— at Sesto Calende- — closed by a force
E all aims which Urban had already sent thither.

58 THE CAMPAIGN- OF

On June 3, however, Urban hurriedly fell back upon
Gallarate, leaving Garibaldi and his Free Corps to re-
occupy Varese, where for the present they may be left.

Already on May 18 the Italians had collected pon-
toons and other materials at Valenza for the re-establish-
ment of communication, which had been interrupted by
the partial destruction of the railway bridge. The
Auatrians, however, opened a cannonade which de-
stroyed several pontoons and caused any proposed at-
tempt at bridging to be abandoned. Vercelli had been
evacuated on the 19th by the Austrians, who left only a
half brigade of the Vllth Corps under Colonel Ceschi,
to observe the line of the Sesia in front of Villata and
Torrione. The ith Italian division (Cialdini) occu-
pied Vercelli, and on the 21at two small colunuis forded
the Sesia— one above and one below the town — and
drove back insignificant parties of the Austrians to
Orfengo on the Novara road. On the following day
Zobel, commanding the Vllth Corps, moved the rest
of the division to which Ceschi's troops belonged to-
wards Orfengo and Borgo VercelH, while his other
division was concentrating on Robbio. Cialdini with
this force in his front and a rising river in his rear judged
it best to withdraw, and on the 23rd the Italians accord-
ingly re-crossed the river and returned to Vercelli.
King Victor Emmanuel, to support Cialdini's advance,
had sent the Ist Division {Castelborgo) towards
Candia, the 3rd {Duiando) to Careaana, while the 2nd
(Fanti) occupied some islands in the Sesia opposite
Motta dei Conti, the idea being to facilitate Cialdini's
opeiations by diawing the enemy's attention upon the

I three other divisions. The Ist Division returned on the
23rd to Casale, and on the night of the 24th-25th
Reisehach, commanding a division of the Austrian
Vllth Corps, brought up one of his brigades to support
a brigade of Lilia'a division at Candia, Here Reischach
established during the night a batt«ry of four 12-pounder8
and four howitzers, opened early in the morning on
Fanti's men on the islands, and drove them back to the
right bank.

The Emperor of the French bad early realized that
any attempt to force the passage of the Po and Lower
Sesia, where the Austrians were ready to oppose a cross-
ing, would be exceedingly hazardous, if not indeed alto-
gether impossible. On the Austrian left and centre,
where the Po could not be passed without a bridge, an
advance was evidently awaited. There remained only
the Austrian right which had lately been greatly weak-
ened and was covered only by the Sesia, whose upper
waters could everywhere be forded by infantry.
For a few days there was no movement of troops on

' either side ; it was the lull before the storm.

In regard to the events above described, Moltke ex-
I presses admiration for the rapidity with which Forey
collected his division, answered attack with counter-
attack, and so snatched victory out of a threatened
I defeat. Unlike his adversaries he employed the whole
strength of his force and won the day. But it cannot
be overlooked that had the Austrians only made proper
use of their unquestioned superiority in numbers, Forey
must have been defeated. Up to 2 p.m. Schaffgotsche
alone was numerically stronger than the French, after

6o

THE CAMPAIGN OF

wliich hour the latter may not have had inferior num-
bere actually on the spot, although Forey had to employ
part of his force to hold Hess in check on the left. At
Montebello itself the two forces were about equal, but
at the time when the Austrians actually commenced their
letzeat, they possessed at Casteggio a very greatly
superior force.

It is said that the Austrians from all time have been
partial to such so-called reconnaissances, but under-
takii^s of this description are only of value when it ia
intended that they should lead to a battle for wliich
every preparation has been made. If the results of a
recoimaissance are unfavourable, the operation cannot
be quickly enough broken off, whereas if they disclose
favourable conditions the opportunity must be seized
at once, since they may alter within a very few hours.

Stadion was bound to retire, no matter what imme-
diate advantage he gained, since three French corps were
within a few hours' march of Voghera ; the Austrian
Army, on the other hand, was on the further side of
the Po, with no nearer communication between the two
banks than that at Vaccarizza — a matter of three
marches. It must be considered how far an undertak-
ing is justifiable which entails heavy casualties without
compensating results. It is perhaps not impossible
that atadion's movements were in a measure hampered
by some such considerations.

What indeed had he gained 1 He had gleaned no
reliable information as to the real strength of the enemy,
since he was opposed by only one division, while he
could not be certain that even the force with which he
had been actually in contact would remain on the spot,

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 61

sinoe he himself fell back on the next day behind the
Po. All he knew for certain was that on May 20 a con-
siderable portion of the French Army was on the Ales-
sandria-Piacenza road in the neighbourhood of Voghera ;
as much might have been learnt by an officer's patrol
intelligently handled.

THE FLANK MARCH BY THE ALLIES AND THE

FIGHTING AT PALESTRO

3 FLANK MARCH BY THE ALLIES AND THE FIGHTING AT
FALESTBO

The Emperor of the French having completed — practi-
cally imhindered— the concentration of hia troops at
AlesBandria, now commenced the carrying out of a
flank march from right to left under cover of the Po
and of the Seaia, so turning the Austrian right on the
Novara-Milan road. While all students of the military
art are probably agreed that thia movement waa well
designed and admirably executed, the reasons by which
it was determined have been greatly criticized.

According to the French Official History of the War in
Italy, the scheme, if aucceasful, piomised great results ;
Milan must thereby fall into the hands of the Allies,
and if Gyulai should attempt to effect a crossing of the
Ticino at Bereguardo and Vigevano, the French and
Sardinians, in possession of the left bank, should be able
to fall in full strength upon isolated Austrian corps which
might endeavour to pass over the river. If the Aus-
triaos should cross at Favia, in order to retire upon
Belgiojoao and Pizzighettone, they would have to make
a serious flank movement across the front of the Allies,
who should be able to cut thera in two and drive them
into the Po, If they, however, retired on the right bank

THE CAMPAIGN OF

of the Po by Pavia and La Stella, the Allies — croBsing
the Adda at Lodi — could seize the pasaages and drive
the Austrians into the Duchies. Finally, if having
crossed the Ticino, the Austrians should there offer
battle/all that they would gain from a victory would be
the recovery of their menaced communications, while a
defeat would revive for them at Pavia and Piacenza the
disaster of Ulm.

Moltke has the following remarks : " Any operations
by the right bank of the Po required that an army
200,000 strong should advance practically by a single
road between the river and the mountains, since that by
Bobbio, through the Trebbia valley, could not be of
much assistance. Between Alessandria and Piacenza,
the road ofiera a succession of strong positions, and to
occupy these in defence the Austrians, already concen-
trated towards their left, could at any moment debouch ,
by the bridge at Vaccarizza, Finally Piacenza itself
must present many difficulties to further onward move-
ment.

' ' The attack of the Allies might have been directed from
Valenza and Casale against the front ; an advance here,
however, led over a country made difficult by a network
of rice 'fields straight at the Austrian entrenched posi-
tions. The enemy could in one day mass their main
force behind the Agogna, while, if the worst came to the
worst, and the Austrians found themselves driven from
their positions back to the left bank of the Ticino, they
could there again take up a defensive position.

" There remained then a third poasibihty — to turn
the Austrian right. For this the railway came to the
help of the French, while at Vercelli and Novara they

I

m

^M MA
^nvonld meei

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 67

ronld meet no more than the extreme right of the hostile
force. 80 far, all was plain sailing ; it was later that
the difficulties began. Communication with Genoa
mu8t then be given up, that with Turin must become
aeriously endangered. The Allies would have their baoka
to Switzerland— a neutral country. The one indispen-
sable condition for the success of the movement was that
the Allies should win all their battles^ — that conseguenUy
tactics must take the jdace of strategy.

" Napoleon, however, could trust his army and he
was numerically superior to the Austrians. He acted
quickly, suddenly and with energy, and the advantage
is generally with those who thus act, and not with those
who merely stand and wait."

Riistow finds it difficult to decide why Napoleon made
up his mind to a line of advance which, if unsuccessful,
promised disaster, and which, ii all turned out well,
offered the moat meagre results. He comes to the con-
clusion that by advancing by Vercelli — Novara— Milan,
the Emperor hoped to gain the latter city without blood-
shed, believing that GjTilai would fall back over the
Ticino without fighting so soon as he saw that his fiank
was turned. The other reason put forward by Kilstow
for Napoleon's action is a political and — it must be con-
fessed — an ungenerous and somewhat sordid one. He
points out that on this flank the troops under Garibaldi —
men gathered from all parts of Italy and for the most
part red-hot republicans— had pressed forward almost
to within sight of the capital of Lombardy, and he sug-
gests that Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel deliberately
selected the advance by the left in order by their own
presence to minimise the effect of Garibaldi's operations.

THE CAMPAIGN OF

Hamlej considers that the Allies incuired grave risks
by the movement on Novara. " Had they moved from
the Sesia on Mortara and Lomello, and thence on Vige-
vano and Pavia, they would have perfectly covered both
lines to Tmin by Casale and Vercelli ; and the restora-
tion of the bridge of Valenza behind them would have
given the means of passing the Po, and would have
materially strengthened their line of operation. Such
an operation, in accordance with the circumstances of
the case, wovdd have given the army firm grounds from
which to manoeuvre for the passage of the Ticino, with
better chances of obtaining a decisive strategical success,
and with none of the risk of fatal disaster incurred by
the flank march."

The whole of this interesting question is discussed
at considerable length in Great Cam'paigns, and the
author of that book lays stress on two points which no
doubt weighed greatly in the decision come to by the
Kmperor Napoleon : (1) that the difficulty and danger
of tho liunk march were not ho great as have been esti-
tiiuUid, and that they were virtually reduced to the thirty
iiiileN of ruud wliich intervene between Casale and Novara,
i^i) tltat the nervous anxiety already displayed by the
Auntrian commander for the safety of his communica-
liunf d()ubtlt^8a added vigour and boldness to the offensive
i))i(trationH of his adversary It is pointed out that the
Aiintj-laii left K'stwl on the strong fortress of Piacenza,
hikI Uiut any attempt to turn this flank and the line of
\\w 'hiiiiio would liavn etktailed bridging the Po between
I tiitl Hlroiit^hold and I'avia at a point or points narrowly
wuUthl^d and ittrongly guanled. Again, to force the
iiUMNKH'' *'' '''^' l'i>wer Sesia or of the Po, between the

J

esia and the Ticino, by attacking the Austrian centre,
might have led to exposing the French in detail to the
attack of the four Austrian corps, whose concentration
cotdd easily and quickly have been effected opposite
any threatened crossing point, There remained the
third course — the flank march to turn the enemy's right ;
this offered the prospect of an unopposed passage of the
npper Ticino, which— owing to the extravagant ideas of
the danger of the flank march held by the Austrian
Staff — had been left practically undefended. The author
of Great Campaigns writes : " The problem had all
along been how to invade Lombardy with the least
possible risk. Of the three doors by which such an
invasion could be attempted, two were closed, and one,
which led circuitously into Lombardy, but direct upon
the capital, was alone open. Doubtless to enter by this
placed the French Army relatively in a worse strategic
position, inasmuch as, if victorious, the enemy would be
^^efeated, not mined ; while if they themselves were
^■fcpulsed, they would be in a position of grave danger.
^V, . , The question, however, arises — what had been
^gained with reference either to tactical or strategic ad-
vantage ? It may be answered thus : that the enemy's
preparations and plans had been thwarted. He was
called upon to act without being able to dehberate. A
battle, if fought, would be engaged under circumstances
which enlisted every chance in favour of the French,
1 the high road to and close to Lombardy, where the
; of the people was such as to render Gyulai
iady anxious for his communications."

B has further been much discussion as to whether
e idea of an advance by the left was a sudden resolve

TO

THE CAMPAIGN OF

made on finding the Austrians in strength in the south,
or whether the Emperor Napoleon and his mihtary ad-
visers had formed this decision from the first. Colonel
Saget, who in 1809 was head of the Bureau Pdiiique
of the French Headquarter Staff, is said to have stated
a year later to a Prussian officer in Paris that during the
halt in Alessandria, the left flank march was constantly
the subject of discussion among the marshals and the
officers of the Headquarter Staff. Wliile General della
Eocca too has mentioned in hia Reminiscences, that
soon after arriving in Alessandria, Napoleon III had dis-
cussed with Victor Emmanuel his plans for moving by
the left, in the presence of Marshal Vaillant and of della
KoGca himself.

I

On May 26 the Emperor of the French, accompanied
by Marshal VaiUant, Generals Frosaard and La Marmora,
visited VerceUi and at once issued orders for the execu-
tion of the great turning movement upon which he had
decided.

The Italian Army, holding the left of the position, was
directed to mask the flank march of the French columns
by attacking the right of the Austrians — formed by
Lilia'a division of the Vllth Corps — and throwing it back
upon Robbio. The Ilird French Corps {Canrobert) waa
directed to support this advance and for this purpose was
moved by rail and march route to Caaale, where it was
concentrated by the 29th.

On the 28th all the other units of the French Army
began to conform to the general movement northwards,
D'Autemane's division only, of the Vth Corps, remain-

jDg ontil the 30th, in the vicinity of Voghera with cavalry
on the Stiadella road, so as to conceal all trace of with-
drawal. Frossard had begun on the 27th the construc-
tion of trestle bridges over the Sesia at Vercelli, above
and below the railway bridge of which the two centre
arches had been destroyed by the Austriana ; while the
Italians commenced the building of a third bridge still
higher up the river. Next day Cialdini's division crossed
over and occupied some works forming a bridge-head.
On the 29th the Italians were concentrated in Vercelli,
the Ilird and IVth French Corps and the Guard were at
Casale, the Ilnd Corps was at Valenza, the lat at Sale
and Baasignana, while the Emperor's Headquarters was
at Alessandria.

On the 30th three more Italian divisions commenced
the passage of the Sesia, while Canrobert was ordered
to cross at Frarolo as soon as the Austrians should have
been driven from Palestro. The 4th Division (Cialdini)
was to march upon and capture Palestro and there
strongly establish itself ; the 3rd (Durando) was to seize
VinzagUo ; the 2nd (Fanti) having captured Casahno and
Coniienza was to turn then upon Vinzaglio and hold
that village, while Durando moved thence to support
Cialdini at Palestro. The Ist Division following the 2nd,
was to form a reserve in Casalino, while Cucchiari
remained with the 5th Division in Casale.

The four villages thus menaced were held by detach-
ments of the brigades Weigl and Dondorf— having their
headquarters at Robbio and Mortara respectively — of
Lilia's division, whose nearest supports were the Ilnd
Corps at Caatel d'Agognaand Keischach's brigades of the
Vllth Corps at Cozzo and Candia.

72

THE CAMPAIGN OF

It was the anniveraary of the battle of Goito — the one
Italian success in the disastrous campaign of 1848.

Palestro was occupied by three companies, two guns
and one troop of Hussars, while in Vinzaglio and Con-
fienza there was only half a company of infantry for the
garrison of each village, but all these could be reinforced
within an hour from Robbio by ten companies from
Weigl's brigade, fourteen of Dondorf s and by fourteen
guns ; the numbers given as holding the villages do not,
of course, include the patrols and outlying picquets
which would fall back upon them. Palestro, the most
important of the group, stands on the road from Vercelli
to Robbio at a point where the Sesia, wliich here flows
close by the road, makes a sharp bend to the east ; the
village itself stood on a height commanding the plain
which was covered with rice-fields and cut up by deep,
broad irrigation channeb and crossed only by the main
road and by the tracks which assisted communication
between the villages.

Some 1,600 yards from Palestro was a bridge on the
stream called the Roggia Gamara, in front of which the
road had been cut in several places. This bridge was
held by a small Austrian picquet, which, however, on
the advance of the Italians quickly fell back to the high
ground in rear. Cialdini now prepared for the attack on
the plateau upon which Palestro stood, placed four guns
on the road and advanced with the Regina brigade in the
first line and the Savona brigade in the second. The 7th
Bersagheri and the two battalions of the 9th Regiment,
well led, succeeded in establishing themselves on the
edge of ths plateau, but could get no further owing to the
heavy musketry and gun fire from the defender of the

I

I

I

village. Lilia had heard about 12.30 of the advance of
the Itahans, and at once dispatched reinforcements
to all the villages threatened. Weigl himself pro-
ceeded to Palestro, but on arrival found that the village
had been carried and tha't the Austrians had ralhed at
the Eoggia Borghesa, the edge of which they were hold-
ing. Weigl now attempted to carry forward his rein-
forcements to the recapture of the village and did indeed
succeed in establishing himself temporarily among some
of the houses at the ea8t«rn outlet. Cialdini, however,
was able with his superior numbers to attack energetically
again, both from the south and from the Vinzaglio direc-
tion, and Weigl was forced to retreat — covered by part
of Dondort's brigade — upon Robbio which he reached
about 5 p.m.

While Cialdini was moving upon Palestro, the 3rd
Division (Durando), reinforced by two regiments of
cavalry, had marched towards VinzagUo, the position
of which is very similar to that of Palestro. Durando
for some reason delayed his attack until midday, by
which time reinforcements of five companies of infantry
and two guns had reached Vinzaglio via Confienza.
Here again the superior strength of the Italians prevailed ;
the viUage was attacked on three sides and the Austrians
managed to draw oil in good order. Part reached
Confienza in safety, the remainder with the two guns
sought to retire by the Vinzaglio -Palestro road, but
were heavily fallen upon by the Italians, then in posses-
Bion of Palestro, and were driven in great disorder across
the rice-fields upon Confienza, being obliged to abandon
their guns in the heavy ground.

Fanti achieved his object — the occupation of Con-

74

THE CAMPAIGN OF

fienza — without fighting ; hie movements were alow,
and he waa further delayed near Borgo Vercelli by ain
encounter between his advanced troops and a squadron
ol Austrian cavalry, which had left Novara early that
morning to feel for the enemy. Fanti had consequently
reached no further than Casalino while fighting was in
progress at Palestro and Vinzaglio, and waa not able to
be of any assistance, but his advance probably hastened
theretirement of the troops holding Conlienza.

Castelborgo's division reached the vicinity of Con-
fienza late in the afternoon, and the King slept that
night at Torrione.

While the Italians had been fighting, the French Army
waa safely prosecuting the preliminary operations for
the flank movement on Novara. Canrobert's three
divisions were concentrated at Prarolo by 2 p.m., on
tile 30th, and as soon as he knew of the success of the
Italians, Canrobert commenced the construction of a
bridge over the Sesia. The operation was covered on
the left bank by the 3rd Zouaves, who belonged to
the Vth Corps (Prince Napoleon) and had been sent
to Canrobert, but were to act next day under the orders
of King Victor Emmanuel. (For this purpose the
Zouaves bivouacked that night at Torrione.)

The Italians strengthened themselves in the villages
they had occupied and prepared for an advance next
day upon Robbie.

The Austrian Army Headquarters at Garlasco had
been kept acquainted with all that had taken place,
and Gyulai — though still convinced that the attack
was a mere feint to draw his forces northwards — decided
to strengthen his right, and towards evening ordered

I

I

liilie two divisions of the Ilnd Corps to move to Mortara
from Cergnago and San Giorgio. Late that night the
Commander-in-Chief himself rode over to Mortara in
order to confer with Zobel. He found that the staff
ol the Vllth Corps was still quite in the dark as to the
numbers by which the Austrians had that day been
opposed and as to the designs of the enemy. In order then
to clear up this dangerous uncertainty, Zobel was ordered
to attack early next raoming with the division Lilia
of his own corps and the division Jellacic of the Ilnd ;
but it was carefully impressed upon him that a recon-
naissance in force was all that was required of him.

Afl a consequence of these orders Count Gyulai was
now about to send two divisions against the allied army,
which in and about the immediate neighbourhood of
Vercelii numbered fourteen divisions of infantry and
seven brigades of cavalry ; while on the right banks of
the Po and Lower Sesia there now stood only four
French divisions against which Gyulai had still massed
ten divisions of infantry and one of cavaby.

During the night of the 30th, Zobel had conferred with
Lilia at Robbio, and it had been decided that the force
should advance next raoming in three columns ; the
centre column (the brigades Dondorfand Koudelka) to
move by the direct road from Robbio to the east of
Falestro, and the left (Szabo) by the Castel d'Agogna-
Bosasco road against the south of the village ; these two
columns, numbering thirteen battalions with one rocket
and three field batteries, were thus to attack Palestro
in front and flank. The right column under Weigl,
and composed of only two battalions and four guns
■'With a troop of cavalry, was to operate against Con-

76

THE CAMPAIGN OF

fienza, and it there successful, to move thence on Vin-
zaglio. The greater part of the remainder of Weigl'a'
brigade was held back in Robbio in reserve.

The attacks were intended to be delivered simul-
taneously ; Weigl was, however, apparently allowed
rather too much time for his longer march and was the
first engaged, but by ten o'clock all three Austrian
colunma had come in touch with the Italian outposts
before the intended advance of the enemy upon Robbio
had begun. The picquets in front of Palestro were at
once driven in and the Auatrians established themselves
along the line of the Roggia Borghesa, where, however,
they were much exposed to and suffered considerably
from the fire of the Italians on the plateau. Here for
some time success inclined now to one side, now to the
other, until Zobel sent Koudelka's brigade in on the
right, when the determined advance of these fresh troops
drove back the Italians, while Szabo, pressing on from
the south, threatened to establish himself in the out-
Ijang houses of the village. The Italian right was now
in imminent danger of being thrown back, while Szabo's
guns had opened a violent cannonade upon the bridge
near Prarolo, where Canrobert was then passing his
divisions over the Sesia. Afraid now of being driven
from his position, Cialdini sent an urgent appeal for
assistance to the Ilird Corps and to the 3rd Zouaves.
(This last-named corps had early that morning, taken
up a position on Cialdini's extreme right, to the south
of Falestro, and along the road leading from that village
to Prarolo.) Zobel, however, was not inclined to
press whatever advantage he had gained ; it was clear
to him that the enemy was present in overpowering

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 77

atrength ; the Italians were very strongly entrenched in
the village, Szabo's artillery was no match for the gima
which Bourbaki had now brought into action against
him, and at this moment a report was received from
Weigl, that he had been unable to carry Confienza.
Zobel therefore directed that the fight be broken off
and that the two flank colunma shoidd retire respectively
upon Rosasco and Robbio ; about 1 p.m. the main
column withdrew but little molested by the enemy,

Weigl on the right had been given a task impossible
of attainment ; at or in rear of Confieuza were two
Italian divisions, the 2nd and 1st, and Fanti, who
had made all his preparations for an advance on Robbio,
received timely notice of Weigl's approach, so that when
this small colunm — barely a thousand strong — drew
near, it found itself opposed to a force of close upon
20,000 men with a numerous artillery, and was unable
to advance beyond the Busca. By this time too
Canrobert had passed two of his divisions across the
Sesia, and Renault had dispatched four battaUons to
support Cialdini's left, while Trochu had sent his Ist
Brigade to assist the 3rd Zouaves. The whole of the
Imperial Guard was now in Vercelli, as was also the
Ilnd Corps, while the Vth had left Borgo Vercelli,
and was marching in the direction of Novara.

Against such a superior force success was hopeless,
and Weigl was lucky to be able to effect his retirement
on Robbio as easily as he did.

The 3rd Zouaves, finding themselves under fire, had
deployed four companies, and these advancing on
Cialdini's request for help, soon found themselves in

intact with the skirmishers of the 7th Austrian Jagers,

who had croBsed a canal, only passable at a narrow

bridge called the Ponte della Brida, and were at some
distance in front ot it. Four guns had followed them
over and four more had come into action on the banks of
the Sesia close by. The left of the Jagers was covered
by a stream called the Seaietta ; this the Zouaves
unexpectedly forded and, climbing the bank, drove
in the skirmishers and fell with the bayonet upon the
flank of the Jagers. These attempted to fall back upon
a battalion in rear, but Boiirbaki's guns hod been
firing into this corps during its advance and had thrown
it into disorder ; the Zouaves were not to be checked
and burst in upon the guns, capturing five. The shat-
tered remnants of Szabo's br^ade retreated upon the
narrow bridge over the canal ; but the Zouaves, now
joined by two Italian battalions, reached it simultan-
eously, and here wrought terrible havoc, numbers of
Austrians being bayonetted or drowned in the canal.
Two more guns were here captured by the Italians.

Szabo collected hia brigade about 2 p.m. in Rosasco,
but in justice to this corps it should be mentioned that
it largely consisted — as did many of the other units of
the Austrian army — of young soldiers, many of whom
hardly knew how to handle their arms, and that the
regiments were filled with men recruited in Italy.

On thisday the Austrianfl lost 2,1 18 in killed, wounded
and missing, and the Allies, 601j of which number the
casualties in the 3rd Zouaves amounted to 46 killed and
233 wounded.

While the action was still in progress, Gyulai had
ordered the commanders of thelind and Illrd Corps
each to send a division to Bobbio to serve both as a

I

I
I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 79

support to the troops faUing back before the French,
and as the nucleus of a fresh force which was to attack the
Allies early next day and endeavour to drive them back
on Vercelli. These orders were changed in so far as
they referred to the Ilird Corps, of which one division
(Martini) marched to Mortara, the other (Schonberger)
to Castel d'Agogna, Liechtenstein had reached San
Angelo with the division detailed from the Ilnd Corps,
when he met fugitives of Szabo's brigade and learnt
through Zobel that the action had ceased. He accord-
ingly arranged to reheve Reiachach'a division, which
had extended to its right up to Celpenchio and San Paolo
Leria, and generally to cover the left o£ the division Liha
of the Vllth Corps in Robbio.

Qyulai does not appear to have even yet grasped the
fact that the whole of the aUied forces were gathering
on his right flank, for he issued inatrnctiona for the
Vlllth Corps to hold Breme and Sartirana in greater
strength, the Vth Corps was directed to occupy Otto-
biano and Fenara each with a brigade, and all troops
in that neighbourhood were ordered to be on their
guard against any attempt to cross the river at Candia
and Frassinetto.

On the evening of the Slst Gyulai telegraphed to
Vienna that he had cancelled the orders for attack next
day, as the enemy appeared to be in overwhelming force.

Of the reinforcements recently ordered from Austria
to Italy, the Ist Corps (Count Clam) was directed on
Magenta — one brigade to Monza — the Xth to Adria,
Monsehce and Nogara, while the Xlth was ordered to
proceed to Borgoforte.

8o

THE CAMPAIGN OF

On this night the Allies were thus disposed
front line ran from Cameriano to Palestro ; on the left,
the IVth Corps at Cameriano lay d ckeval the Vercelli-
Novara road. In the centre stood three Italian divisiona,
while on the right was the Ilird French Corps and the
4th Italian division. The Ilnd Corps was at Borgo
VercelK, the Imperial Guard in Vercelli, the 1st Corps
was at Casale, D'Autemarre's division of the Vth
Corps was partly at Tortona, partly in Alessandria,
while the 5th Italian division occupied Casale, Val-
enza and Alessandria.

It had been originally intended that the Italians]
should move on Eobbio at daybreak on June 1, drive
out the Austrians and pursue them to this side of Nicorvo,
so as to gain possession of the bridge over the Agogna,
while King Victor Emmanuel, retaining a substantial
part of his force at Robbio, should there occupy a good
position whence to command the roads leading to
Rosasco and San Angelo. Canrobert was to occupy
Palestro with two divisions, and Confienza, Vespolate
and Borgo Lavezzaro with the other. The IVth Corps
(Niel) was to move direct on Novara ; in fact, the move
on Robbio was intended merely to mask the march of
the main strength of the army on Novara.

The result of the action at Palestro — which ensured
the succesfl of the flank movement — had necessitated
some alterations in these arrangements, and it was now
considered that the move on Novara was sufficiently
covered by the forces under the King and Marshal Can-
robert, and that everything showed that the Austrian
centre was at Mortara and that the attention of the
enemy was still fixed upon the Fo and the Lower Si

i

lediuj

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 81

(he Novara road therefore was practically open. Since
Novara would henceforth be the new base for the army,
it was of the utmost importance to cover Vercelli and
the Sesia bridges, and General Froasard at once com-
menced the construction of a bridge-head on the left
bank at Vercelli.

Novara was held only by two battalions of infantry
and two guna, and these, attacked at daybreak by
Failly's division of the IVth Corps, fell back on the bridge
at San Martino. Niel passed through the town and
drew forward his whole corps upon the Mortara road ;
the 3rd Division (Failly) was placed at Olengo, the 2nd
(Vinoy) to the right of the Mortara road at La Biccoca,
and the 1st (De Luzy) at Torrione Quartara with the
right resting on the Agogna. The llnd Corps encamped
between the IVth and Novara, and Desvaux'a cavalry
division reconnoitred to Vespolate, Trecate and Galliate
without seeing anything of the enemy.

The French Headquarter Staf! could now no longer
hope that so extended a movement had altogether
escaped notice and fully expected that an attack would
be made upon the Allies by the Austrians, but against this
the former were now well prepared.

If Gfyulai attacked towards Vercelli, the Italians,

the lat and Illrd Corps were strongly posted to meet

him — with the right on the Sesia and the left covered by

the diflScult ground about the Agogna — while the troops

. at Novara could seriously menace the flank of any such

pattack. If, on the other hand, Gyulai attacked on the

ine Mortara — Novara the advantage to the Allies would

at least equally great ; the blow could only be

ilivered on a narrow front, easy to defend and with

THE CAMPAIGN OF

both flanks covered by rivera ; La Biccoca and Olengo
were strongly held, and the troops at Vercelli could
menace the line of the Austrian retreat on Mortara
while keeping open that of the Allies by Vercelli.

The first report of the advance upon Novara was in
Gyulai's hands at 8.30 a.m. and by 10 o'clock the fol-
lowing orders had been issued : the Ilnd Corps to march
to Mortara and go into bivouac on the east of the town ;
Lilia's division of the Vllth Corps at Eobbio to fall back
on Castel d'Agogna and there form a reserve tor Rei-
Bchach'a division of the same corps which was west of
San Angelo ; Schonberger's division of the Illrd Corps,
hitherto at Castel d'Agogna, to move at once on Robbio
and take over the duties of Lilia's division ; Martini's
division of the Ilird Corps to send a brigade each to
Albonese and Nicorvo ; while finally,' Mensdorfl's
cavalry division was to concentrate in Borga Lavezzaro,
to patrol towards Nibbiola and Garhagna and keep touch
with the Ilird Corps. Little more than an hour later
fresh orders were issued to Schwartzenberg, who was now
directed to send Martini's division to Vespolate to hold
the enemy in check, supporting it with that of Scbon-
berger to the north of Mortara. By the night of June 1 ,
therefore, Gyulai had drawn at least some of his
divisions northwards to meet the enemy about Novara,
whose strength he now estimated at from 50,000 to
60,000 men ; his troops in this quarter now faced west
and north, his outpost line being here drawn along the
Agogna to Nibbiola, then at right angles across the main
road to the Terdoppio, then to Cassalnovo and from here
to the Ticino. To the south Stadion (Vlllth Corps) was

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 83

diiected to draw in as much as possible to Lomello,
employing chiefly mounted troops on his outpost line,
and all corps commanders were warned of the prob-
ability of an early and general retirement behind the
Ticino.

Meanwhile the small force driven from Novara had
fallen back upon and occupied the bridge-head at San
Martino, whence the commander was calUng for rein-
forcements. These were to be furnished by Count
Clam with the still incomplete 1st Corps which was
hurrying up by forced marches from Milan ; and at 2 a.m.
on the morning of the 2nd Clam had occupied Magenta
and thrown a brigade into San Martino.

It would seem then that Gynlai had now begun to
hope that Clam and Urban between them might be able
to hold back the left of the Allies until the Austrian
Commander should be able to pass his corps over the
Ticino and mass them about Magenta for the defence
of the capital of Lombardy.

In discussing the attack by the Austrians in the second
day's fighting about Palestro, Moltke has much to say
of the ignorance of the Austrians in regard to the forces
by which they were likely to be opposed. He admits
that possibly the nature of the country prevented the
Austrians from recognising that they had in their
front the whole Italian Army, but the action of the 30th
should have at least made them realise that very con-
siderable forces were already on the left bank of the Sesia.
They can hardly have supposed that the Italians would
have thus cut themselves off from their base and exposed
themselves isolated to certain defeat, while their allies

I

84 THE CAMPAIGN OF

were maiching on Fiacenza. Being where they
the Italians must be supported by the French, and after
the events of the 30th at latest, the Austrians should,
Moltke considers, have had no more anxiety whatever
about their southern flank. The French must now
either cross at Valenza andCasale or follow the Italians —
the latter being the more hkely procedure. Leaving
then two divisions at Robbio and one at Cozzo, the whole
of the remainder of the Austrian Army — even including
the IXth Corps — might in one march have been con-
centrated between Mortara and Garlaaco. If the French
crossed in their front, the two Bobbio divisions should
have been able to hold the Italians, while 90,000 Aus-
trians fell upon the French engaged in the passage of the
river. If, on the other hand, the French followed the
Italians, it was certain that they would not attempt to
cross the Ticino without either attacking the Austriana •
or being themselves attacked.

Before anything it was, however, vital that the Aub- •
trians should concentrate. 1

Speaking of Napoleon's resolve to push part of his |
army at once on to Novara after the second action at
Palestro, Moltke points out that, however sound theso
dispositions may have appeared to the French, there
was the danger of being forced back into the mountains
in the event of a check at Novaia ; that Novara and
Palestro were half a day's march apart, that the initia-
tive lay with the opponent, and that had demonstrations
been made at the same time upon each portion of the
divided French forces, it would not have been easy to
recognise which was the real attack, Moltke, however,
sees in the position of the Allies just one of those dangers

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 85

wliich every army must occasionally face when a great
stake is being played for ; one of those crises which cannot
be avoided, and which history, after the event, describes
as either a bold midertaldng or an error in strategy.
Since, however, neither portion of the divided army
was likely to be greatly inferior in strength to whatever
might be brought against them. Napoleon could well
afford to leave something to chance without risking
too much.

THE AUSTRIANS RECROSS THE TICINO AND
THE FRENCH OCCUPY ROBECCHETTO

THE FRENCH

" There are two passages over the Ticino in the neigh-
bourhood of Novara— that of Buflalora and that of
Turbigo. The first ia the principal one and over it runs
the main road from Novara to Milan. A magnificent
bridge of large granite blocks, constructed in 1810 by
the French, connects the two banks of the river. The
other passage at Turbigo is from five to six miles up the
river and serves as an auxiliary means of communica-
tion between the two sides of the Ticino. Although
tolerably frequented in the time of the Austrians, and
provided with the inevitable passport and custom-
house offices, it could only boast of a ferry-boat ; the
ini-mtion being to discoarage as much as possible the
intercourse between Sardinia and Lombardy and re-
strict it to a few main arteries of communication. It
was between these two passages that the Allies had to
choose, for they were the only points on the river in the
neighbourhood of their position to which regular roads
led, and were consequently the only ones accessible to
a large army.

" The Ticino, like most of the feeders of the Po, is
akirted on both sides by a plateau which, according to

the capricious windings of tlie stream, approaches and
recedes, leaving sometimes only a narrow space between
it and the river, and at other places a distance of a
couple of miles. This plateau evidently indicates the
old bed of the river, through which the waters have
gradually eaten their way. Both at Ponte di Buffalora
and Ponte di Turbigo the river approaches close to
the plateau on the right bank. Owing to the action of
the stream this latter has been worn away and shows a
bold, precipitous line towards the river which runs forty
to seventy feet below it. On the left bant, on the c
trary, the plateau is at some distance from the rivet,
leaving a space of more than a mile, which, by means of
irrigation, has been converted into a rich plain covered
with crops and trees. The right bank consequently
completely commands the left, which is therefore not
defensible.

" The Austrians, well aware of this circumstance and
yet anxious to have a ■poirU d'ap'pui in case of need, con-
structed a iete de poni on the right bank at San Martino
on the road to the Ponte di BuSalora. Coming from
Novara this road passes through a well-cultivated dis-
trict abounding in crops of every kind, especially Indian
com, and studded with mulberry and willow trees.
This lasts as far as the village of Trecate, which is just
half-way from Novara to the Ticijio. Soon, after leaving
Ttecat« the aspect of the coimtry changes ; the signs of
cultivation disappear, and an open, heathy country,
with here and there a solitary tree, follows, through
which the road runs in an almost straight line to the
plateau overhanging the Ticino. Just at the edge of the
plateau, overlooking the river and commaQding a mag-

i

1

■aificent view over tlie opposite bank, is a cliister of
tLooBea. This is San Martino, so called from an old
inn of the same name. Besides this inn there were
buildings which served formerly aa the Sardinian custom-
house and police office, to which in later years the rail-
way station had been added ; here was formerly the
limit of the Sardinian territory and the seat of the
frontier authorities. Beyond San Martino the road
descends abruptly towards the bridge which is scarcely
two hundred yards distant from it.

" This then was the point chosen by the Austrians for
a (ete de porU, Evidently they attached great impor-
tance to the position, for no labour had been spared to
convert the approach to the Ticino into a formidable
looking entrenchment. Not only were the cluster of
houses and the railway station included, but likewise a
solitary house a quarter of a mile further north. The
whole space thus closed in comprised an area of at
least half a square mile, and all this ground was con-
verted into a large work, carried back on both flanks to
the very edge of the plat«au, and provided with a
wide ditch, parapets, and embrasures for seventeen
guns.

" While 30 much care had been taken to guard the
approaches to the Ponfce di Bufialora, nothing was done
by the Austrians to defend the passage at Turbigo,
except removing the ferry-boat which served aa the
means of communication at that place. This ciicum-
etance alone would have been sufficient to point out the
passage of Turbigo as the one to be preferred ; not that

I the {ete de pont at San Martino was very formidable — it
loked more so than it was ia reality — but however weak.

92 THE CAMPAIGN OF '

it was sufficient to allow a few thousand determined men
to defend themselves for some time, even against
superior forces, and thus gain time for the Austrian Army
to come up and occupy a position behind the Ticino
on the road to Milan. Besides this obvious reason for
effecting a passage at Ponte di Turbigo rather than at
Ponte di Buffalora, there were two even more cogent
grounds for this choice. The first of these was that
Ponte di Turbigo is six miles higher up the river and was
consequently so much further removed from the main
body of the Auatriana, which had to come up from
Mortara and Vigevano ; thus there was more chance
of g ainin g the opposite bank before any large body of
Austrian troops could be brought to oppose this passage.
The second was that by crossing at Turbigo without
delay, it was possible to gain not only the left bank of
the river, but likewise the opposite bank of the Naviglio
Grande Canal and thus to overcome this formidable
obstacle and open the road to Milan. The canal is here
only one and a quarter miles from the river and its
banks are less steep and precipitous than lower down ;
the Naviglio Grande issues from the river opposite
Oleggio and runs parallel to the Ticino, at a distance
varying from half a mile to four nules, until it reachea
Abbiategrasso where it takes a sudden turn in the
direction of Milan."

On the afternoon of June 2 Greneral Camou received
orders to endeavour to effect the passage of the Ticino
at Turbigo with the 2nd Infantry Division of the
Imperial Guard, while Espinasse, with the 2nd Division
of the Ilnd Corps, moved on Trecate and San Martino.

I

Gatnon reached the river bank at 3.45 p.m. and saw
nothing of the enemy beyond a very few scouts, who had
occupied a small house on the left bank and who with-
drew as soon as the Chasseurs of the Guard commenced
to cross in small boats. Gamou placed twelve guns on
the high ground to the left of the road and twelve more
on the river bank ; by these the whole of the approaches
to the spot where he proposed to throw a bridge — on the
site of the old ferry— were thoroughly commanded.
Covered by these guns and four companies of chasseurs,
who were passed over to the left bank by five o'clock, the
construction of the bridge was at once commenced under
the supervision of Greneral Frossard, who had accompanied
Camou. While the work was in progress the Ist Brigade
(Mandque) took up a position on the high ground to
right and left of the road and the cavalry reconnoitred
towards Villa Fortuna. At 7.30 the bridge was finished,
some temporary works had been thrown up for its pro-
tection, and so far the only hostile troops which had been
Been were some mounted men of the Ist Corps, who
quickly fell back.

Maneque now crossed over with his brigade — Decaen
taking the positions he vacated — and as the French
troops became visible on the left bank a squadron of
Austrian cavalry was seen to hurriedly leave Turbigo ;
it was learnt that these were some of Urban's men from
Gallarate. During the night Turbigo itself was occu-
pied — the wooden bridge over the Grand Canal having
been found intact — and at daybreak on the 3rd, while
Turbigo was being rapidly placed in a state of defence,
Camou's troops were thus disposed ; two battaUons
under Manfique in front of Turbigo, two others on the

light bank under Decaen, tvo in the works at the bridge
on the Ticino, and two battalions occupying the bridge
over the Grand Canal.

The Emperor had thus secured, with unexpected
facility, a crossing place over both the river and the
canal ; but before preparing to pass over the whole of
the allied army it was of the first importance to learn
something definite of the movements of the enemy, and
Niel waa ordered to carry out a reconnatsaance in force
in the direction of Mortara on the morning of the 3rd.
Niel took with him Luzy's entire division and one brigade
of that of de Failly, the whole of the remainder of the
rVth Corps being held in readiness to follow him if
required. The three brigades left La Biccoca at sunrise
in two columns, one marching on Vespolate by the road
and railway, the other moving on Terdobbiate and Tor-
naco by Olengo ; arrived at Garbagna it was reported to
the right column that the enemy, who had been in
strength at Vespolate, had moved on Tomaco ; but at
Veapolate the French learnt that the town had been
evacuated at .3 a.m., and that the enemy had moved off
in the direction of Vigevano.

It was at once apparent that the Austriana were mass-
ing on the Ticino, but on which bank was as yet uncer-
tain, and to guard against any attempt upon him by the
right bank the Emperor decided to keep the Ist, Ilird,
and IVth Corps in front of Novara, while with the Ilnd
and the Imperial Guard he prolonged his line to the left
and secured the passages of the Ticino.

MacMahon was consequently directed to concentrate
the whole of the Ilnd Corps at Turbigo, while Mellinet's
division of the Guard was ordered to move on at once upon

^te and San Maitino, relieving Espinai
to rejoin MacMahon.

June 2 was to find the irresolution and vacillation of
the Austrian Commander at their worst. During the
small houra of the morning he issued orders for the
Vllth andlind Corps to move at once — the former to
Olevano (south of Mortara) and the latter to Mortara.
Stadion was directed to make every preparation for the
retirement of the Vth and Vlllth Corps behind the
Ticino at the shortest possible notice, and a few moments
later Gyulai informed Count Clam that he was about to
effect his retirement across the river and that the Ilnd
and ITIrd Corps would cross at Vigevano and faU into
line on the left of the 1st Corps, He ordered Clam at
once to recall Urban from Vaiese.

The Vllth Corps commenced its retirement at 9 a.m.,
covered by Weigl's brigade, and fell back practically
unopposed, part by Nicorvo and the remainder by
Castel d'Agogna. The Ilnd Corps, moving by Ceretto
and Castel d'Agogna, had almost reached Mortara, when
its commander received fresh instructions, from which ' ■
it appeared that the withdrawal over the Ticino had
•now been cancelled.

At 11.30 the Vllth Corps was ordered not to march on
Olevano, but to remain at Castel d'Agogna, detaching
a brigade to Nicorvo and reoccupying Robbio with a
battalion. Zobel, however, who only received this order
onthe Agogna, considered its execution to be impossible,
since he was convinced that Robbio was ere this in the
occupation ot the enemy ; he contented himself there-
fore with dropping Weigl's brigade in Ceretto, and
occupying San Angelo, Castelnovetto and Celpenchio
with detachments of cavalry and infantry.

i

I

At this hour Gyulai announced that for tlie

he should remain on the right bank of the Ticino and
that Urban was to pursue his operations against Crari-
baldi, but at midday Gyulai again changed his mind and
telegraphed to the Emperor Franz Josef that he had now
ordered the retirement of the army behind the river,
and that he hoped by next day to have taken his stand
between Magenta and Pavia.

The Ilnd Corps was the first to re-cross the Ticino ; it
passed the river at Vigevano, and late at night went into
bivouac at Soria, The Vllth Corps marched to Vige-
vano from Caatel d'Agogna ; was greatly delayed near
Mortara by its route crossing that of the Ilnd Corps ;
reached its bivouac on the right bank, thoroughly worn
out, between 10 p.m. and midnight, and finally marching
next morning by Abbiategrasso reached Gaggiano,
where it was to be held in reserve.

The Illrd Corps, which waa still about Nicorvo, Borgo
Lavezzaro, Nibbiola and Vespolate, was informed of the
movements of the Ilnd and Vllth Corps, and was
ordered to retire on Vigevano as soon as the Vllth Corps
had cleared the bridge, and, having crossed over, to
move towards Abbiategrasso, taking up a position south
of Ozero. The passage of the river at Cassalnovo was
to be safeguarded ; the bridge and bridge-head at Vigevano
were to be held as long as possible, and to be destroyed if
evacuation became imperative. The Cavalry Division
was to move with the Ilird Corps and march on the
4th from Abbiategrasso to Magenta, to be there placed
at the disposal of Count Clam.

Late on the 2nd, Gjmlai communicated to Clam his
intention of retiring next day, and informed him

i

FDold be reinforced in Magenta on the 3id day by the
Ilnd Corps and on the 4th by the Cavahy Division.
01am was directed to send half a brigade, with cavaky, '
to Castano to watch the crossings at Turbigo and Torna-
vento ; he was ordered to hold the bridge-head at San
Martino at all costs, while H the garrison were forced
to retreat the guns were to be apiked, the magazine
blown up and the bridge destroyed. He was also
informed that Army Headquarters would next day be
at Rosate and that the Vth Corps would also be there,
while the Vlllth would reach Binaaco.

During the night of the l3t-2nd the Commander of
the 1st Corps had been malting great efforts to push
troops up to San Martino, and by early morning of the
latter date the strength of the force holding the bridge-
head — aJl belonging to his 2nd (Cordon'a) Division— was
five battalions with fourteen guns, five of which were
guua of position ; there was in addition half a'rocket
battery ; a squadron of cavalry had been sent towards
Turbigo, while between Buffalora and Ponte di Magenta,
on the left bank of the Grand Canal, was a reserve of
two battalions of infantry with a horse-battery. During
the forenoon of the 2nd, dam himself reached San
Martino and went round the defences, of which he
formed a very poor opinion. Not only did he consider
the works of weak profile, but the construction was
faulty; the perimeter was so great that, in his opinion, at
least three brigades would be required adequately to
man the works — which were, moreover, quite open to
attack on either flank — while the crops and undergrowth
I so h^h in the immediate neighbourhood as to
□it of hostile approach quite undetected. Clam,

THE CAMPAIGN OF

however, decided that the place must be held at
coata, and gave orders for such improvements to
carried out as time and means permitted.

The unsatisfactory state of the defences at Saa
Martino was not improved by the unfortunate condition
of the men who were to hold them. These had out-
marched their supplies and were moreover greatly
exhausted by the exertions they had recently undergona..
Clam made what arrangements he could, gave ordeni
that requisitions were to be made on the inhabitants,
and returned to Magenta.

Towards evening a report reached the Headquarters
of the 1st Corps from San Martino that the enemy were
estabhshing some guns in battery on the Trecate road ;
Clam at once sent his Chief of Staff forward to investigate
this report, which on arrival ho found to be coniirined ;
he learnt also at San Martino that requisitions had pro-
duced but very few supplies and that the worn-out troops
were practically without rations. Applications for
supphes had been made to Abbiategrasso, where there
was a depot ; but the local supply officer had reported
that his stores were inconsiderable and that for the
issue of what little he had he was wholly without trans-
port of any kind. At this time (8 p.m.) a report was
forwarded by the Officer Commanding the squadron
which had been sent towards Turbigo, that the Allies
had already there thrown a bridge over the river and
were that day in occupation of the left bank.

Clam had now at once to make up his mind as to how
he should act, for there was no time to acquaint Gyuisi
with this new development and await his instructions
it seemed to the 0£Bcer Commanding the Ist Corps

I

ii;rucuouH ; h
Corps tha^H

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 99

by Dontinuing to bold the bridge-head at San Martino be
was in danger of exposing his troops at Magenta to an
attack in overwhelming force, while the defenders of
San Martino were engaged with an enemy advancing
from the direction of Trecate ; if Cordon's men in San
Martino were driven from the defences — of which Clam
had already formed 30 low an opinion — their retreat on
Magenta would be no easy one, since the road for a con-
siderable distance was carried along an embankment.
He had no immediate prospect of support, for although
he had been informed of the approach of the Ilnd Corps,
there was no reason to believe that it could reach
Magenta before the night of the 3rd. About 10 p.m.
therefore Clam gave orders for the bridge works to be
evacuated and for the bridge to be blown up at day-
break. The five big guna could not be brought away, so
these were spiked ; the troops were withdrawn from the
entrenchments and drawn up in a defensive position on
the left bank. At dawn the bridge was blown up, but
the damage done was inconsiderable ; the mines had been
laid in the second pier from the left bank so as to bring
down the two arches which it supported, but although
the two arches were displaced, the top of the pier only
gave way, and the bridge, though temporarily impassable
for cavalry and artillery, was quite fit for the passage of
infantry. Whatever the cause of the failure, the result to
the Allies was moat important, for they had now two
undisputed communicationa with the left bank. Clam
gave orders that another attempt should at once be made
to more thoroughly effect the demohtion of the bridge,
but the officer commanding the engineers stated that
lie had no tnoie powder ; there was none procurable in

THE CAMPAIGN OF

Magenta and urgent requisitions were sent tor some toJ
Pavia ; in the meantime, and in view of a possible forced
retirement to the line of the Grand Canal, the engineers
were directed to prepare for demolition all the bridges
over it between Bernate and Kobecco.

Early on the morning of the 3rd, Cordon left for
direction of Turbigo to endeavour to discover in what
strength the enemy had crossed. He took with him
four complete battalions and portions of two others, a
horse battery and part of the rocket battery which had
formed a portion of the armament of the defences at
San Martino.

Gyulai had issued the following instructions to the
two corps composing the left wing of hia army : " The
Vnith Corps to move to-day (the 2nd) to Trumello, the
division of the Vth Corps, now in San N'azzaro to
Garlasco ; on the 3rd both corps to cross the Ticino at
Bereguardo. Sternberg's division of the Vth Corps to
march from Mortara via Gambolo to Borgo San Siro
where orders should reach them."

In accordance with the above, Stadion'a divisions
bivouacked for the night at Garlasco and Borgo San
Siro, while the Vlllth Corps marched at 4.30 from
Lomello through Ottobiano and halted for the night
in Tnunello.

The decision to cross the Ticino was also communicated
to the IXtb Corps and the commander was directed to
leave some troops between StradeUa and Piaceaza and
to place the remainder of his force between Castelpuste
Orlengo and Corte Olona ; the Po was to be watched
below Vaccarizza, and the IXth Corps was to arrange the
safe passage of all sick and wounded down the

idges

cth^l
what^l

i

the liver fat J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 loi

"Twats to Borgoforte, whence they would be forwarded
via Mantua to Verona.

At 8 p.m. Gynlai received a telegram stating that
Feldzeugmeister Baron Hesa was being sent by the
Emperor to confer with Gyulai on the spot, that he had
started for Milan where he expected to arrive at mid-
night and where full information regarding the move-
ments and dispositions of the units compoBing the
Second Aimy was to be sent him. Gyulai at once dis-
patched a special officer to Milan with the following
report (this officer appears, however, to have missed
Baron Hess) : —

I" The Army will to-morrow (3rd) be thus disposed :
" The Ist and Ilnd Corps and the Cavalry Division in
Magenta, with one brigade at Castano, to watch
the passages of the Ticino at Tornavento and
Turbigo.
" The Ilird Corps at Abbiategraaso.
" The Vllth Corps in reserve at Gaggiano.
" The Vth Corps between Morimondo and Besate.
" The Vlllth Corps in reserve west of Binasco with
one division in Beceguardo.
"The IXth Corps between Piacenza and Corte Olona
with one brigade in Piacenza and one in the
bridge-head at Vaccarizza.
" These arrangements permit of a frontal defence of the
Ticino in case — which is improbable — the enemy should
attempt to cross between Magenta and Bereguardo. He
is, however, far more likely to turn our flank by crossing
at Turbigo and Tornavento."

About five o'clock on the morning of the 3rd, Hess
let Gyulai at Bereguardo and two hours later — in con-

t02

THE CAMPATGIf OF

sequence of what Gynlai appears afterwards
described as more or less of a " mandate " — the Vth and
Vinth Corps were ordered to stand fast wherever the
order to do so shonld reach them ; the Illrd was directed —
if its passage of theriverwas already completed — to take
up a position on the left bank with Diirfeld'a brigade in
Vigevano, but, if it had not already crossed, the whole
corps was to remain in Vigevano.

At 9 a.m. Gyulai heard through the Ilnd Corps in
Soria, that the Allies had already bridged the Ticino at
Turbigo and that they were in strength on the left bank ;
that Clam had decided to withdraw from San Martino
and destroy the bridge ; and that the Ilnd Corps was
moving at once on Magenta. An hour lat«r came the
disturbing news that the attempt to blow up the bridge
had failed, while it was suggested that the Ilnd and
Vllth Corps should march as speedily as possible north-
wards towards the San Martino-Milan road.

Orders were then sent to Cordon that he should pro-
ceed no further northward until the Ilnd Corps should
have drawn nearer to Magenta, but a report now came
in from him that he had reached and occupied Cuggiono
at 7 a.m. and had pushed patrols towards Turbigo,
Castano and Buscate ; he had, however, as yet learnt
nothing definite as to the strength of the allied forces at
Turbigo. Cuggiono was occupied by one battalion,
three guns and half a squadron of cavalry ; in Bemate
was one battalion and another was in Ponte nuovo di
Magenta, but the two battalions which had been sent to
Inveruno had moved out, without orders, in the direction
of the enemy and Cordon knew nothing of their where-
abouts,

1

J

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO. 1859 103

About this hour — between 9 and 10 a.m. — Hesa finally
withdrew his objections to the movements eastwards of
the corps still on the right bank of the Ticino, and it was
therefore directed that they should be carried out as
previously ordered ; but the interference with the " man
on the spot " had of course entailed a cessation of all
movement during not lees than six hours.

Clam was iniormed, but was given strict orders not to
push too far to the north as this would weaken the line
almost to breaking point ; Gyulai expressed his intention
of attacking in force the flank of the enemy should hia
main body cross at Turbigo, but he pressed Clam for
detailed information of the strength of the Allies at that
point.

At 3 p.m. Gyulai left Rosate with his staff for Magenta,
and during the course of the day the retirement of the
ind Army behind the Ticino was continued and was
implished as follows : —

The Ilird Corps began at daybreak to evacuate its
positions in front of Mortara ; Hartung's brigade moved
on Vigevano by Tomaco and thence down the valley of
the Terdoppio ; Metzlar marched by Cassalnovo, and
Ramming direct on Vigevano where Diirfeld's brigade
had already arrived. Here, however, the passage of the
river could not be proceeded with for several hours. This
was caused in some degree, no doubt, by bad staff work,
but also by the contradictory orders which had been
issued, and by the fact that the difficultiea of communica-
tion had in some cases delayed the receipt of instructions
and in others had prevented their receipt altogether.
The Ilnd Corps which had reached and bivouacked at
Bona appears to have been strung out between that

X04 rffE CAMPAIGN OF

pbee sod the Ttano ; liedtteostdn was prepanug to
oontiirae his mucli on Magenta <m the morning of the
3rd, wlun be fcMisd that de Ckvaby Diviaon, the head
erf Uie Vnth Corps (Beiscliach's division), and the
bafjgage of botli wen dosing op to him from the bridge
in rear. Liechtenstein then allowed the cavaky to pass
through his corps, bnt directed Reischach to halt and
foQow the Hod Corps.

(The cavalry moved straight on Hagenta and went in
to bivooac behind the town on the high groimd. ) Of the
Ilnd Corps, Kintal's brigade occupied Robecco and
Ponte Vecchio each with two battalions, while the others
moving on Magenta went into camp, Baltin and Szabo to
the right and left of the road respectively and KoudeUca
in rear of the town.

The bulk of the VKth Corps only cleared the bridge at
Vigevano about U a.m, and reached Abbiategrasao at
two o'clock. Here Lilia halted while Reischach marched
on to Cerella and there spent the night. As Abbiate-
grasso had been allotted to the Illrd Corps, Zobel
moved out Lilia's division to Casteletto where it arrived
between one and two in the morning of the next day. In
consequence of all these delays— under the circumstances
not altogether unavoidable— the Ilird Corps was not
across the bridge until after 4 p.m. and did not
reach Abbiategraseo until long after night had
fallen.

The Vth Corps had already reached the bridge at
Bereguardo with the head of Sternberg's division, while
that of Paumgartten had just left Garlasco, when —
about 8 a.m. — the order to stand fast was received.
When about 11.20 this was again cancelled, Stadion

ring to ^1

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 105

began passiiig otct liis hngades and four of them ^ had
crossed the river soon after 3 p.m. Bils was directed
to follow after the Yillth Ckurps. Stadion took up the
fine — ^Morimondo — Ooionate — ^Binasco — ^Fallavecchia —
Besate for the night.

Benedek idik the Ylllih corps left Trumello at 2
p.m., crossed the bridge at Bereguardo during the early
hours of the ith, and established himself at Bereguardo
and Motta A^sconti.

The units of the IXih Corps were too scattered to
admit of their being collected to cross to the other side
of the Po on the 3rd, but all arrangements were made,
the outposts were gradually withdrawn, and the corps,
with the exception of Fehlmayr's brigade, which re-
mained in Stradella, was concentrated about Piacensa
on the 4th.

To complete the tale of the Austrian movements on
the 3rd, it only remains to say that on this day Urban
withdrew the bulk of his troops from Yarese to Qallarate,
sending some mounted men further south towards
Lonate Pozzolo, whence news of the action which this
day took place was conveyed to him.

It is now time to return to the operations of the
French.

About 2 p.m. on the 3rd, MaoMahon with his 1st
Division (La Motterouge) arrived at the bridge at
Turbigo, and crossing the river accompanied by General
Camou, he mounted the tower of Robecchetto ; from
here he saw Cordon's advanced troops within a few hun-

^ It will have been notioed that the Ist, Vth, Vlllth, and
IXth Corps had eaoh five brigades, the other oorps four only.

io6

THE CAMPAIGN OF

dred yards hurr)diig to seize the village, behind which
MacMahon had proposed establishing his corps in
bivouac. Robecchetto is rather more than two miles
from Turbigo on the road to 6ui!alora, and, like both
villages, is situated on the edge of the plateau skirting
the valley of the Ticino ; there are two loads from
Tuibigo to Robecchetto — one leading to the southern,
the other to the western portion of the village, while the
road to Bufialora leaves the village in an easterly
direction. The occupation of Robecchetto was to the
French of the fiist importance— both to coverthe bivouao-
of the Ilnd Corps and to ensure the success of any]
further movement on Buffalora and Ii{agenta.

On his return to Turbigo from the front, MacMahon
found that a regiment of Turcos was at the head of the
column, and he at once sent them forward to occupy
the village or dislodge its defenders. The 1st battalion
of Turcos, formed in column of divisions and preceded
by two companies of skirmishers, was to attack the
village from the south ; the 3rd battalion, forming the
left column and similarly disposed, was to attadk it
from the west ; while the 2nd, somewhat in rear, was
to form a reserve to both. The other regiment, the
45th, of this brigade, and later the 2nd brigade of La
Motterouge's division, were sent forward — the 2nd
brigade by Castano — in support of the Turcos, who
were closely followed by a battery of artillery. Arrived
at Robecchetto the French found the Austrians in posi-
tion at the entrance and were received by a brisk fire,
but the Tuicoa rushing forward without firing, threw
themselves on the Austrians with the bayonet. In a
few minutes the village was cleared and the Austrians

4

F

^H were re

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 107

I

were retreating on BufEalora. In order to check the
pursuit Cordon brought up some guns which stopped
the TurcoB tor a moment, but the French artillery replied
and the rout was soon complete. Equally unsuccessful
was a demonstration made by some of Urban's cavalry
on the left, from the direction of Castano ; it was met
by a battalion of the 65th of the line with two guns
and thrown back.

One field gun fell into the bands of the French, whose
loea is given in MacMahon's report to the Emperor as
8 killed and 42 wounded ; the casualties among the
Austrians amounted to 25 killed, 46 wounded and 35
missing — the greater part of these losses occurring in
the 14th Jager Battahon.

The Ilnd Corps was by this time across the Ticino,
and its brigades bivouacked in a semi-circle round the
north-west and south of the village of Turbigo with
Camou's division in rear.

GeneialvonCaemmerer.inhisworkitfajento, mentions
certain facts in connexion with the retirement of the
Austrians across the Ticino which I have not found
elsewhere. He states that immediately after the actions
at Palestro, there was a serious difierence of opinion
between Gyulai, the Commander-in-Chief, and Kuhn,
his Chief of the Stafi, as to the course to be adopted.
Qyulai was in favour of complete retirement behind
the Mincio, and for this proposal von Caemmerer has
a good deal to say that is not altogether unfavourable.
It is true that by such a, retirement the whole of Lom-
bardy was handed over to the invaders, but a similar
course of action had been pursued in 1848-49, and had

io8

THE CAMPAIGN OF

led to final victory and to the abdication ol the
King of Sardinia. If the Austrians were inclined thua
to postpone the ultimate decision until the whole of their
Ist, Xth and Xlth Corps had joined the army, they
would then have had the preponderance in strength
on their side, and a victory would have enabled them
to drive back the Alliea to the west, while their forces
at Borgoforte and Piacenza could have advanced to-
wards Genoa, "Here," says von Caemmerer, "was a
very practical method of bringing the campaign to a
successful conclusion." Had the retreat been arranged
on the night of June 1, it could have been carried
through without intermption.

Kuhn, on the other hand, urged his chief repeatedly
to take the ofEenaive in the direction of Novara, and
declaiBB that twice— on the nights of May 30 and June 1
— ^he drafted orders for such an advance. On the
latter occasion the attack— to be made by the Hlrd, Vth
and Vlllth Corps^was only practicable, he declared,
up to 3 p.m. on the 2nd, since strong reinforcements
were being rapidly pushed up to the Alliea at Novara.

The result arrived at was a compromise, in that,
for the present the army was only ordered to retreat
behind the Ticino.

Moltke does not appear altogether to share von
Oaemmerer's views as to the advantages of a retirement,
for he considers that 90,000 men might well have been
concentrated on June 1 at Mortara ready to assume the
offensive against Palestro and Olengo. The situation
of the enemy invited such a measure, and if the reten-
tion of the right bank of the Ticino was intended, no
other course was possible. If the worst befell, the

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 109

Austrians possessed a number of fortified crossings by
which to fall back, or even the entrenched position
at Mortara in their rear ; while even if pressed back to
Pavia the ground about there was very favourable to
the employment of their numerous cavalry for covering
their' retreat.

To the objection that the Allies at Palestro stood on
the flank of any Austrian movement on Novara, it is
pointed out that this flank was protected by the Agogna
and by the 'Austrian troops at Bobbio. The French
^ere certainly already nearer to Milan than were their
enemies ; all the more reason then for a speedy termina-
tion of the situation, which could be more quickly
arrived at by the right than by the left bank.

THB BATTLE OF MAQSNTA

CHAPTER VI

THE BATTLE 07 MAOBNTA

In Older that the operations ef June 4, which are
known as the Battle of Magenta, may be properly under-
stood, it will be as well to give some description of the
ground on the left bank of the Tidno.

^^ Between the river and the village of Magenta there
is first a flat plain for a mile and a half, then a steep
irregular bank, some sixty feet high, with a flat table-
land on the top ; the former is intersected by numerous
irrigating channels and belts of trees and bushes, the
latter is cultivated for vines and corn with young fruit
trees planted very closely together. The railway and
post road run very straight across the plain and are liable
to be swept by artillery fire from the high ground, all
along which, at the edge of the bank, there are favourable
positions for guns. The plateau which skirts the Ticino
on its left bank, runs from Turbigo down to Bufialora
parallel to the course of the river. At BuSalora the
ridge makes a sweep away from the river for a quarter
of a mile, after which it again resumes its original direc-
tion. In this it continues for about a mile and a half,
and then throws out a spur towards the river, behind
which lies the village of Ponte Vecchio. Thus from
Buffalora to Ponte Vecchio a semi-circle of positions is

118 J

114

THE CAMPAIGN OF

formed, facing the river and about one and a quarter
miles in length. The breadth of the ridge is nowhere
more than iiOO yards, and beyond it begins the Lombard
plain corresponding to the plain of Novara. One and
a half railea in rear of the ridge lies the village of Magenta ;
at the latter point converge aU the roads coming from
that part of the Ticino and unit* with the main road,
which runB to Milan.

" The Grand Canal, which from Turbigo to Bufialora
runs at the foot of the ridge, penetrates the latter at
the village of Buffalora, and keeps a hundred to a hundred
and fifty yards behind it all along this position. The
stream runs nearly four miles an hour, and in the neigh-
bourhood of Magenta it has steep banks at each side
covered with thorny bushes. Altogether it forma an
obstacle quite impassable except at the bridges ; of
these five must be noticed.

" Between the bridge over the Ticino and the ridge
there is a space of about a mile of low fiat ground,
evidently formerly part of the bed of the river, but
now canalized and rendered fertile by cultivation. It
forms a succession of corn and rice-fields, of which the
latter were now under water. Through these low lands
two roads led up to the ridge ; one, which is the old
road to Milan, starts from the left of the present main
road and, leading in a succession of bends through the
low lands, crosses the ridge and canal just before entering
the village of Bufialora. The canal bridge here is
completely commanded by the houses of Buffalora,
may be swept by artillery fire from the high
about the vilhige.

" The second bridge over the canal is that of

I

I

tlota, and ^M
h ground ^M

of Ponte ^M

I

Nuovo di Magenta, by which the great chausece c
the canal. This Toad, starting from the Ticino bridge,
slopes gradually down to nearly the level of the high
ground which forms the sides of the valley and through
which the canal is led. At the canal bridge there are
four buildings — one in each angle between the road and
the canal ; those on the left or east bank of the canal
are particularly strongly built and formed in 1859 the
Austrian Custom-house.

" The railway bridge is about 500 yards below Ponte
Nuovo and crosses the canal at a lower level. The
railway, which crosses the Ticino by the same bridge as
the cAaiujee, instead of sinking to the valley as that does,
runs on an embankment across it, rising with a uniform,
but very gradual gradient to the point where, through
a cutting, it enters the high banks which frame in the
valley. This long and uniform slope is seen in its whole
length from the high ground and lies completely exposed
to the fire of guns. At the cutting a quantity of earth
had been quarried out to form the embankment over
the plain ; here a sort of redoubt had been thrown up.

The fourth bridge is Ponte Veccliio di Magenta,
near which there is a tolerably large village on both
banks of the canal ; the part on the right bank consists
of older and less substantial buildings than that on the
left. There is no direct road to Ponte Vecchio from
the Ticino bridge, but roads run along both sides of the
canal at the top of the cutting through which it flows
from Ponte Nuovo.

" The fifth bridge is at Robecco, a large and important
village built on both sides of the canal. Prom Ponte
Tecchio downstream the canal becomes shallower and

ii6

THE CAMPAIGN OF

more rapid and ita banks are less high and steep. As
it gradually diverges from the river, the breadth of the

high ground enclosed between it and the low rivet
valley widens gradually from near Buffalora, where it
begins to have a breadth of two miles, In cultivation
and character the plateau — often called the plateau of
Carpenzago — resembles the ground between Turbigo
and Magenta, The low ground or valley bed of the
Ticino, though not absolutely impassable, is practically
unfit for the passage of troops."

On the night of June 3 the positions of the allied forces

i as follows : —
The Right : The 1st French Corps and the 1st and

4th Piedmontese divisions at Lumelogno.
The Centre : The Ilird and IVth French Corps, the
Cavalry Divisions Desvaux and Partouneaux
and Caasaignolles' brigade of the Cavalry of the
Guard at Novara.
The Left : The divisions Mellinet and Camou of the
Guard at Trecate and the Ilnd Corps at Turbigo,
The Reserve : The 2nd and 3rd Piedmontese infantry
divisions and Sambuy's Piedmontese cavalry
division at Galliate.
As the Emperor was still uncertain whether Gyulai
was concentrating on the right or left bank of the Ticino,
he decided to place his army on the line Olengo —
Magenta ; on the right the 1st Corps to hold the road
and rail leading from Mortara to Novara, posted in the
strong positions of Olengo and on the Biccoca — occupy-
ing more or less the battle-ground of 1849. Baragney
d'Hilliei's right to be on the Agogna, where, moreovet.

aa _

ha M

i

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 117

he would be supported by Deavaiix's cavalry division,
while Partouneaux would cover the left of the Ist Corps
and maintain communication with the IVth. In the
centre the IVth Corps at Trecate and the Ilird at San
Martino would watch the roads leading from Vigevano
by Sozzago and Cyrano to the upper Ticino, and join
hands by the Olengo road with the Ist Corps and with
the Ilnd by the bridges at San Martino. On the left,
the Ilnd Corps at Magenta would safeguard its own left
flank with its brigade of light cavalry and be supported

I on its right rear by the Guard at BufEalora.

I It seemed to Napoleon that whether the Austriana
attacked on the left or right bank, he was now strong
enough on either to be able to hold his ground until he
could transfer to the point threatened the preponderance
of strength be undoubtedly possessed, although tem-
porarily debarred from its full use by the river, over
which, however, his communications were being hourly
improved.

■ On the night of the 3rd, Mellinet arrived at Trecate,

[ and Espinasse at once rejoined the Ilnd Corps in the
neighbourhood of Robecchetto.

On the morning of the 4th the different units of the
allied army had already marched off to take up the
positions assigned to them, when it became known
that the Austriana had completely evacuated the
left bank, and were moving on Milan ; the Emperor
then found himself obliged in some degree to modify
his earlier dispositions and to thrust forward to en-
gage the enemy those troops which were nearest to
him.

The Piedmontese divisions were ordered to cross the

ri8

THE CAMPAIGN OF

river at Turbigo and to follow the steps of MacMahon'a
corps, while the Ilird and IVth Corps were directed to
puah on as rapidly as possible and reach the scene of
action by way of the passages at San Martino. Circiim-
Btanoes, however, did not allow of the imintemipted
flow of reinforcements to the troops actually in contact
with the forces of Count Clam. Of the Piedmonteee
army only two diviaions were able to cross at Turbigo — ■
the 2nd (Fanti) and the 3rd (Durando). Of these the
latt«r did not reach the scene of the battle at all, while
the other — Fanti — only arrived at Mesero at 6 p.m.,
too late to exert any appreciable influence upon the
result of the day's fighting. As a matter of fact the
roads and bridges about Turbigo were greatly blocked,
while Urban'a presence south of Gsllarate — menacing
the flank and rear of the troops advancing on Magenta —
required that one division should show front to him
while the other covered the debouchures from the bridges.
In like manner the IVth Corps marching from Novara
to Trecate, blocked the road by which Canrobert
should have reached the Ticino, and he consequently
was only able, very late in the day, to bring two brigades
into action, while only Vinoy's division of the IVth Corps
reached the field at all.

To oppose the Allies the nearest troops were those
immediately under the command ot Count Clam, and
these comprised Urban'a three brigades, whatever units
of the 1st Corps it had been possible to gather together,
the whole of the Ilnd Corps, and a portion of the Vllth.
These numbered 44,780 infantry, 3,803 cavalry and 178
guns, and the various units were on the evening of
June 3 disposed as under : —

I

MAGEN.TA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 119

Of Urban' B force the brigade Rupprecht was at
Varese with detachments at Somma and Tradate, while
the brigades oF Schaffgotscbe and Bra u in (the last
detached from the IXth Corps) were respectively south
and north of Gallarate.

Cordon's troops had passed the night south of Mar-
callo, but as the men had practicaUy been without
either rest or rations since they arrived from Austria,
Clam withdrew them early on the 4th to Magenta,
leaving only a very few companies to watch that front.

Buidina (of Montenuovo's division of the 1st Corps)
bad altogether some seven battalions under hia com-
mand and was posted on both sides of the canal about
Ponte Nuovo and the railway bridge.

Part of Eeznicek's brigade of Cordon's division —
some 1,500 men— was on the east bank of the canal in
and near Bu£alora with its right at Bernate.

Of the Ilnd Corps Kintzl's brigade was in Robecco
with two battalions in Ponte Vecchio on the west bank ;
the brigades of Szabo, Baltin and Koudelka were in

I

The Cavalry Division was in Corbetta, while the
brigades of Gablentz and Lebzeltern, of Reischach's
division of the Vllth Corps, were near Cerella.

Further ofi and at Gyulai's disposal were the follow-
ing : Lilia's division of the Vlltb Corps — 7,600 men
with 16 guns— at Castelletto ; the Ilird Corps- 21,536
men and 56 guns — was at Abbiategrasso, Ozero and
Soria ; while the Vth Corps, further off still, between
Coronate and Besate, numbered 25,092 men and 72
guns, exdusive of the brigade Bils en rovte to Pavia.
The Vllltb and IXth Corps were too far distant for

THE CAMPAIGN OF

their s

* to be of any value on this day, but e

t even
without them the commander of the Second Army
niight have been able to count upon some 107,000
infantry, over 5,000 cavahy and 400 guns being avail-
able in and about Magenta at aome time duriag June 4.

Against theae the Allies could muster in the first line —
viz.": the Imperial Guard, the Ilnd and Illrd Corps —
55,783 infantry, 6,068 cavalry and 144 guns, to hold any
Austrian attack in check until the IVth Corps and the
divisions of the Piedmontese Array- — numbering alto-
gether 73,388 infantry, 4,909 cavahy and 147 guns —
should have had time to fall into line with them.

During the night reports came in to Glam from Ber-
nate, that the enemy appeared to be withdrawing from
Turbigo and to be moving down stream towards San
Martino ; as the Austrian outposts in this direction also
annoimced that large numbers of the enemy were gather-
ing on the right bank of the river, the Commander of the
Ist Corps seems to have come to the conclusion that the
main attack would be delivered on the line San Martino —
Milan — an impression which was strengthened by re-
ports from the cavalry sent out to the north, who stated
— even up to quite late on the morning of the 4th— that
Ouggiono and Inveruno were clear of the enemy.

At 9.15 a.m., however, Bernate reported that the
strength of the allied force about Turbigo appeared to
be increasing, and Clam accordingly ordered forward
Baltin'a brigade of Herdy's division of the Ilnd Corps
to Bufialora. This brigade was there drawn up facing
both west and north — at Bufialora along the canal as far
as Bemat« and thence fronting the north on the line
Bemate — Casate — -Meaero. The canal bridge at Bufia-

I

I
J

MAGENTA AND SOLPERmO, 1859 t21

•lora was now at once blown up, apparently without
orders from superior authority ; a 6-pounder was placed
betind the ruined bridge, seven others being in reserve
in the village ; while four 12-poundcr8 were placed on
the plateau at the northern exit from BufEalora.

At 9.45 Clam reported as follows to Gyulai : " Two
strong coliamns are advancing against the stone bridge
over the Ticino and five other columns have been re-
ported on the Novara-San Martino road ; these appear
to be the Imperial Guard. At Ponte Nuovo, at the

I railway bridge and in Bufialora I have nine battahons

I of infantry, five 12-pounder8 and eight rockets, while at
Robecco and Ponte Vecchio there is now Kintzl's bri-
gade. In the event of an attack upon Magenta, I shall
send a brigade of the Ilnd Corps to Buffalora, keeping
the other two brigades of that corps and Eeznioek's of
the 1st in reserve near Magenta. The Cavalry Division
remains at Gorbetto sending out strong patrols towards
Cuggiono and Inveruno." He then reports Gordon's
overthrow on the previous day and winds up by saying
that " the enemy do not seem to have crossed in strength
at Turhigo, although fresh reports point to some increase
in the hostile forces at that point." On receipt of tbb
message Gyulai directed Eeischach'a division of the
Vllth Corps to move via Gorbetto on Magenta, where he
should act as a support to Cordon and where he would
receive further instructions from Clam. At the same
time Clam was directed to make use of the divisions of
Cordon and Beischaoh to attack such of the Allies as
had already crossed at Turbigo and drive them back ;

m il, however, the enemy were in too great force. Clam was
break ofi the action and take up a defensive position

THE CAMPAIGN OF

about Magenta in view of recommeacing the action
the morrow with greatly increased numbera and with a
proportionately better hope of BUccess. By the time,
however, that this message reached its destination,
fighting had already broken out on the main road at the
eastern end of the Ticino bridge, and Clam then con-
sidered that the instructions therein contained could no
longer be carried into execution.

Mellinct had been ordered to leave Trecate at 8 a.m.
for San Martino in order there to cover the construction
of a pontoon bridge which was to be thrown across the
Ticino just above the stone bridge ; hia 2nd brigade
(Wimpffen) ' left first and was followed two hours later
by Mellinet himself with his 1st brigade (Cler). Wimp-
fien reached the river about 10, and perceiving Austrian
riflemen on the left bank, he at once passed over several
companies and two guns — the latter being carried across
by hand — and, covered by these advanced troops, the
rest of the 2nd brigade crossed over and took up a posi-
tion on the further side. Here the skirmishers of either
force became at once engaged, while Wimpffen's two guns
also came into action, opposing two Austrian pieces which
were in battery a few hundred paces from the canal
bridge on the west bank, and which, together with the
Austrian skirmishers, fell back behind the canal, when
Wimpften was able to push forward small parties to
Buflalora and Ponte Nuovo.

Mellinet now arrived upon the scene, and having re-
ceived strict orders from the Emperor not to become seri-

' It should be reraombered that two Austrian generals aJao |
bore this name : the Commander of the First Army at SoUerino
and a brigade conuuander in SchaSgotache's Corps.

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO. 1859 123

mslj engaged until MacMahon's attack was developed
on the left, he directed Wimpfien to recall his troops
and to maintain his position on the east bank some 500
yards in front of the bridge. At this moment, however,
L the Emperor, who had just arrived at the junction of the
I Bufialora and Magenta roada, heard heavy musketry
fire from the north, and concluding that MacMahon must
now be seriously engaged, he ordered Mellinet to attack
and endeavour to carry the villages of Ponte Nuovo and
BuSalora.

It will be as well now to see what occasioned the firing
which led to the renewal of Mellinet' a attack.

MacMahon had been instructed by the Emperor to
leave his bivouacs at 9 a.m., and at that hour his 1st
DivBion (La Motterouge) left Robecchetto by the Bu3a-
lora road. About midday the division, accompanied
by MacMahon in person, had passed through Cuggiono
and found the Austrians deployed in front of Casate.
The Turcos at the head of the division attacked at once
and captured the village, the enemy retiring through
Bemate, where they were rallied. Bernate too was
carried in the same way with a rush, and the Austrians
fell back upon Builalora with the Turcos in close pursuit.
In spite of MacMahon's orders to halt at two hundred
yards from the village to give time for the arrival of the
whole division, the Turcos pushed on ; some of their
leading companies rushed on the heels of the fugitives
into the outskirts of Buffalora and into an entrenchment
to the east of the village, while two companies of the
2nd battalion seized a house close to the canal. The
3rd battalion remained in reserve. The 4th regiment
t of the line followed escorting the divisional artillery, some

of the guiiB of which were brought into action on the
little plateau of Bemate, and engaged two of Baltin'a
batteries at a range of about 1,200 yards. The 2nd
brigade (de Polhea) was formed up rather on the left
rear of the toremoBt troops midway between Bemat« and
Marcallo.

Camou's division of the Gnard, following La Motte-
rouge, debouched from Caaate and took post in rear of
the lat Division, the left of which was covered by the
cavalry of General Gaudin de ViUaine, who was directed
to keep touch with MacMahon's 2nd Division under
Espinaase.

This general had been ordered to move on Magenta
by Caatano, Buscate, Inveruno, Mesero and Marcallo,
and reached the first-named village at 11.15, when,
expecting shortly to come in touch with the enemy, he
halted and deployed for attack from column of route.
Hia lat brigade (Gault) was moved off to and opened out
in the fields on the right of the road, while hia 2nd (de
Castagny) was in echelon on the left of the road, which
was given up to the artillery, and finally a dense cloud of
akirmishers covered the left flank of the division . Arrived
at Inveruno there was another halt, and it being found
that passage across the fields was no longer practicable,
the whole column again took to the road, and it was 1.30
p.m. before the advance guard reached Mesero, where it
waa met by a heavy fire and where Espinasse made pre-
parationa for attack.

Wimpfien'a renewedattack had by now been launched :
of his brigade, the 3rd regiment of grenadiers advanced
along the foot of the railway embankment, while the 2nd
regiment moved upon BufEalora ; the whole of the Ist

^ff kigade of

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 laj

Pbigade of tlie Eame diviBton was not as yet svaiUble,
but its regiment of zouaves was massed to the left of tJie
Bufialora road, while a battalioa of the Ist grenailiera
formed the reserve. It was about 1,30 ; the 3rd grena-
diers moved straight upon the small work which coveted
the railway bridge and stormed over the parapet, turn-
ing out the defenders, who fled to the further bajik of the
canal leaving the railway bridge in the hands of the
French, But those of the Auatrians who were holding
the houses of Ponte Nuovo now poured a heavy fire
into the rear of the open work ; at this moment the
supporting battalion of the 3rd grenadiers came up and
turning sharply to the left it moved up the canal bank,
and engaged under cover of the trees and brushwood,
covering this part of the field, the Auatrians holding the
village. Ponte Nuovo was, however, occupied in consider-
able strength, the bank and buildings about the road and
railway bridges being defended by Burdina's battalions,
supported by Szabo's brigade, and it was as much as the
French could do to hold on to the ground they had
gained. At this moment Cler, commanding Mellinet's
Ist brigade, was directed to advance ; hia zouaves rushed
forward with great Man and carried the bridge and
the houses adjoining it, the zouaves and the grenadiers
pursuing the Austrians, who fell hack in at>me confusion
upon Szabo's brigade. It was here that General Bur-
dina fell mortally wounded.

The road and railway bridges were thus in possession
of the French ; on the left, however, matters had not
gone so well. Arriving in front of Buffalora the 2nd
grenadiers found that the bridge had been destroyed
&nd that the bouses on the east bank were occupied in

126

THE CAMPAIGN OF

strength by the greater part of two battalions of Baltin's
brigade, and here all onward movement by the French
was temporarily checked.

It was 2 p.m. : Gyulai had juat now reached Magenta
and learnt of the outcome of the fighting at the canal
bridges, and he at once ordered up Reischach's division
to retake Ponte Nuovo. Passing through Magenta,
the division formed in two lines ; in front was Gab-
lentz's brigade, its left covered towards BufFalora by a
battalion of Szabo's brigade, while in rear were the batta-
lions of Lebzeltem. The advance of these fresh troops
was heralded and prepared by the fire of four guns.
Before, however, Reischach'a troops could enter into
the fight the aituation had become worse for the
Austrian s.

The rapid advance of Clei's brigade had taken Szabo
in flank, and these troops — which had already on a pre-
vious occasion been severely handled — fell back upon
Magenta, so closely followed by the zouaves that the
defence of Magenta was hurriedly taken in hand. On
the north of the main road Liechtenstein had brought
up three battalions of Koudelka's brigade, which engaged
the French at this point, but they were gradually forced
back behind the track connecting Buffalora with the
main road. The French had now several battahons and
four guns on the east bank of the canal and on either
side of the road, and it appeared as though there was
nothing to prevent their unopposed march upon Magenta.

It was at this time that Reischach advanced upon
Ponte Nuovo and that the fresh troops thus introduced
into the fight sufficed to at least check the French
advance. Three of Gablentz's battahona fell upon the

I

t of the zouaves, drove them back upon the guns and
captured one which was in action on the north side of
the road. General Cler was killed, the French were
repulsed, and in spite of the efforts of a handful of
chasseurs d ckeval of the Guard, who repeatedly charged
the Austrian flank, the grenadiers and zouaves were
forced back fighting to the houses of Ponte Nuovo. But
the losses of the Austrians had not been slight ; Rei-
schach himself had been wounded, and Gablentz halted
to reform his scattered troops before continuing to press
his advantage. This delay was enough to change again
the issue of the combat and to give time for the entry into
the fight, first of Picard's brigade of the Ilird Corps and
later of those of Itlartimprey and La Charri^re of the
IVth.

At this critical moment, when the French in this
part of the field had fallen back before the Austrian
reinforcements, the distant sounds of gun and rifle fire
which had been heard beyond Buffalora, and which had
decided the Emperor to launch Mellinet to the attack,
had unaccountably died down. MacMahon seeing and
hearing nothing of Espinasse on hia left, and fearing for
the result of an attack upon him, while unsupported,
by the forces lie had found in his front, had given orders
that the Turcoa should be recalled from before Buffalora
and that the artillery should cease fire. The guns with-
drew to Bernate and de Polhes' brigade extended in
their front, while Lefebvre strung his brigade out to the
left to endeavour to gain touch with the right of Mac-
Mahon's 2nd Division. In the meantime Espinasse was
continuing his leisurely advance ; his 1st brigade (Gault)
occupied Marcallo, Eeznicek's battalions retiring before

ia8

THE CAMPAIGN OF

it, and here Egpinaase intended again to halt, occupyingj
the village with his Ist brigade, while his 2nd was com-
ing up in rear. He proposed to leave his convoy in the
village, and seems to have been under the impression that
he was being closely followed by the divisions of the
Piedmonteae Army. Once concentrated, it was his in-
tention to advance direct upon Magenta. Happily at
this moment MacMahon Limself rode up and ordered
Espinasse to take ground more to his right so as to join
on to La Motterouge — keeping his extreme left only on
Marcallo. After leaving Marcallo, however, both bri-
gades — now in line — seem to have shghtly brought up
their left shoulders, since Marcallo was now beyond
Castagny's left and both were fronting rather in-
wards — that is towards the angle of the canal and the
main road. In rear of the two divisions of the Ilnd
Corps, Camou had formed his division in line of bat-
talion columns at deploying intervals. To Castagny'a
left front, Mensdorfi's cavalry guarded the Milan road,
while Lilia's divison of the Vllth Corps had reached and
occupied Corbetta on the line of retreat,

It was about 3.30 p.m. when the head of Renault's
division of the Ilird French Corps reached the canal
where the Guard was holding on to the houses of Ponte
Nuovo on the right bank and to the railway buildings.
Wimpffen had succeeded in preventing Gablentz from
crossing the bridge and retaking the entrenchment, but
Wimpffen was now menaced by a regiment of Kintzl'a
brigade which was moving up the right bank from
Carpenzago and Ponte Vecchio to take him in flank,
Fidard's brigade now came up and entered the entrench-
ment just as Kintzl's men arrived at the southei

uthern para*J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 129

pet. These were greeted with a murderous fire and the
Frenchmen then, pouring timiiiltuously over the earth-
works, drove the enemy before them as far as the nearest
buildings of Ponte Vecchio, where further pursuit was
checked by the timely destruction of the bridge over the
canal. His right being thus cleared, Wimpffen added
Picard's remaining battalions to his own, still stru^ling
for foothold, and managed to seize and retain a amaU
group of farm buildings situated to the south of the rail-
way line and about 600 yards beyond the canal. In like
manner the houses on the left bank were recaptured and
held — in spite of the eflorts of one of Lebzeltern's regi-
ments — and three batteries of the artillery of the Guard,
taking up a position about Ponte Nuovo, seemed by their
fire to assure its possession to the French.

Reisohach's men were, however, not yet finished with :
his left wing, strengthened by Szabo's brigade, again
charged forward ; the farm was retaken by the Austrians,
and the defenders were driven back to the canal bank.
The debouchures of the bridges on the main road and
railway were still in the hands of the French, but the
troops were greatly exhausted by the continuous fight-
ing, and it was feared that a fresh attack might effect
their overthrow, when about 4.45 General Niel arrived
on the scene with Martimprey's brigade of Vinoy'a divi-
sion. Two of these fresh battahons were at once sent
forward to the recaptiu« of the farm, and the rest of the
brigade, under Martimprey, was ordered to push on to
Magenta ; La Charriere now appearing with three batta-
lions, he was directed to send two in support of Picard
and with the other to follow those attacking the farm.

While the French right wing was thus struggling to

130

THE CAMPAIGN OF

assure the passage of the approaches to the i

to the capital, the left wing under MacMahoo was once

again in action.

Returning from Espinasse to La Motterouge, Mac*
Mahon ordered this division to move straight upon Buf-
falora, and Lefebm^'s brigade was soon visible upon the
high ground just north of that village. By this time —
it was nearly 4 p.ra — some men of the 2nd grenadiers had
swum across the canal, a temporary bndge had been
thrown over, and Baltin, seeing that there was some
danger of his being crushed between WimpfEen and La
Motterouge, evacuated BuSalora and fell back upon
Cascina Nuova — rather less than midway between Bufia-
lora and Magenta. Thus when Lefebvre's men entered
BufFalora from the north, they found that it had just
been occupied by Mellinet's grenadiers.

In the hope of being able to isolate and fall upon one
of the two Turbigo columns, Clara now brought Baltin's
brigade across towards Marcallo, and these battalions —
uniting with those of Reznicek and a stray battalion
from Koudelka's brigade — attacked Castagny. The
leading French battahons were easily thrown back, but
the Austrian movement upon Marcallo, defended by
Gault, was beat«n back and the Austrians retired upon
Magenta.

While fighting was thus going on along the whole
semi-circle, a fresh Austrian attack from the south,
menaced once more the possession of the canal bridge
aud main road. When Gyulai ordered up Reischach to
retake Ponte Nuovo, he had himself then ridden off to
Bobecco to hasten the advance and direct the attack of
the nird Corps. Airived there, he ordered Sohwut-

J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 131

■Iwuberg to advance on Ponte Vecchio by both banks of
the oanal with his whole foice. Ramming, accordingly,
led his brigade by the east bank and moved upon Ponte
Vecchio, Hartung followed on the west of the canal,
while still further out to the west Wetzlar conducted
his men across the swamps and rice-ficlds of the Ticino
valley in the endeavour to cut the French communica-
tions at the San Martino bridge. In rear of all followed
Diirield'a brigade supporting Hartung on the right bank
of the Grand Canal.

The French also had received a small reinforce-
ment for the desperate fighting which was about to be
reopened for the possession of Ponte Vecchio : Jannin's
brigade of Renault's division had just. crossed the river
and was moving along the main road.

By now Vinoy had succeeded in recapturing the farm
buildings to the south of the railway and was moving
upon Ponte Vecchio, from the attack on which — on
the western bank — Picard had just fallen back. The
arrival now of Schwartzenberg's corps inade matters
once more serious, and by Hartang's advance Picard
was driven back to the entrenchment at the bridge.

All efforts of both combatants seemed to be now con-
centrated on Magenta and Ponte Vecchio, where it
appeared the final issne would be fought out. Reznicek
occupied the northern outskirts of Magenta ; what
was left of Baltin's brigade, with the battalions driven
from Cascina Nuova, was falling back upon the same
point to reform ; on the Magenta road Martimprey was
driving Gablentz and Lebzeltem before him, and Szabo

s retiring on Magenta where Koudelka and Burdina's
ides had already taken up poaitiona. On either side

132

THE CAMPAIGN OF

of the canal Schwartzenberg's infantry was preparing
to assault Ponte Veccliio ; Ramming and Diirfeld
were marching up the east bank to oppose Vinoy, while
Wetzlai, unable to cross the swamps by the Ticino, was
moving nearer to the canal.

When the brigades of Espinasse hurled back the attack
of Baltin and Eeznicek on the French left, they followed
up the Austriana almost to within view of the town of
Magenta, but here — taking post behind the railway em-
bankment— the Austrians were able to rally, and the
French battalions, failing to make any impression upon
their adversaries, found themselves once more compelled
to fall back. But Clam seemed now unaccountably to
have renounced any attempts against the French left,
and recalled the troops of the 1st and Ilnd Corps to the
defence of Magenta itself. During the pause which now
ensued MacMabon reformed his line of battle and bring-
ing round his right, directed La Motterouge upon Cascina
Naova, whose walls and outbuildings were then still
held by the three battalions which had retired from
Bofialora ; while on either flank of the buildings stood
fragments of Szabo's, Baltiu's and Lebzeltem's brigades.
Upon this farm now converged the attack of several
battalions ; the 45th regiment of the line, on the right
of MacMabon's 1st Division, rushed upon it with the bay-
onet, while several companies of Martimprey's column
joined also in the assault. Cascina Nuova was captured
and here some 1,500 prisoners were taken. There was
now no obstacle between the Ilnd Corps and Magenta ;
La Motterouge was ordered to attack from the direction
of Buffalora, Espinasse from Marcallo, while Camon,
deployed in rear of the two, was to support both attacks.

I

J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO. 1859 133

It was now 6.30 p.m. : Eapinasse formed his leading
brigade ia two coIumnB ; he himself accompanied that
which moved direct upon Magenta by the Marcallo
road, while Gault^-circling round to the eaat^ — was to
approach Magenta from the Milan direction ; Castagny's
brigade followed Espinasse more slowly and at some dis-
tance in rear. Magenta was ill-adapted for defence ;
by the gradual pressure applied by MacMahon, the Aus-
triana were forced from the outworks and driven to the
houses of the little town. Within its walls all was oon-
fusion ; scattered detachments of all arms and of every
unit filled each street and opeu space, while some troops
of the Ist and Ilnd Corps bad already passed hurriedly
•through the town and retired on Corbetta. On the
right of La Motterouge, Martiraprey bad rapidly pushed
on at the head of two battalions and, crossing the rail-
way, he entered upon a desperate struggle for the pos-
session of the church and cemetery, in the course of
which the general himself was seriously wounded and
his battalions lost half their effectives,

After a protracted struggle Vinoy had captured Ponte
Veccbio but had been driven out by Diirfeld's brigade,
and altogether the possession of this village changed
hands some six times. On all ades fresh troops were
reaching the field ; the head of the Vth Austrian Corps
was in sight ; Bataille's brigade of the Ilird (Can-
robert's) Corps had arrived at the Ticino ; Fanti's div-
Bion of the Piedmontese Army was now visible on the
high ground north of Marcallo. The French artillery,
however, was now gaining the upper hand ; General
Anger had suceeeded in establishing a long line of guns
Loa the left bank of the canal and had brought the whole

134

THE CAMPAIGN OF

ground between Ponte Vecchio and Mf^nta under a
heavy fire.

Towards 7.30 o'clock Espinasse ordered the final
advance of his division upon Magenta, and his two
columns entering from the north and east, while La
Motterouge, closely followed by Camou, penetrated from
the west, bloody fighting took place — in the streets, in the
churches and from house to house. Here General Espin-
asae was killed. The Austrians were driven from the
town and fell back in great confusion upon Corbetta,
covered by Lilia, by Mensdorfi, and by Lippert of the
VllJth Corps who had at this moment reached the scene
of action.

About Ponte Vecchio, however — on the left bank —
the battle still raged. Bamming, having thrown a
battalion into the village, had marched oa Magenta,
but Schwartzenberg's remaining brigades were fighting
hard for victory. The village was captured and re-
captured ; Vinoy was driven out by the Austrians,
and they in turn were driven out by him, and at times
portions of Ponte Vecchio were in possession of both
combatants. On the right bank, too, the tide of battle
rose and fell ; the arrival of reinforcements gave a
fleeting success first to one side, then to the other ;
at one time it seemed that here at least victory would
crown the splendid efforts of Hartung and Dilrfeld,
when the French finally flung two &esh battalions
into the fight and secured success for the AUies in this
portion also of the bloody field. Wetzlar's attack
was paralysed by the heavy fire of the French, and
the Austrians fell back in some disorder upon Robecco,
closely followed by their adversaries, whose

I

lose pursuit J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 135

was, however, checked by the brilhant efforts and
repeated charges of the 10th Austrian Hussars over
ground quite unsuited to the action of cavalry. Marshal
Canrobert himself was nearly captured by these gallant
horsemen.

In the battle the losses of the combatants were as
follows :—

Preooh. Offioora.
AuHtriana. „

64. 221.

ed. Klilwi, Wnuniitd, Mtilng.

Rank and File. 656. 3,029. 665.

„ 1,304, 4.137. 4,500.

I
I

{Those shown as " miBsing " among the Austrians
included prisoners.) The Times correspondent with
the Allies states that " all the French and many of the
Austrian wounded had been removed during the night,
but on the third day after the battle some were found
lying about the field and brought in. This was owing
in a great measure to the idea which had been inculcated
in the Austrian soldiers, that the AlUea ill-treated and
killed the wounded ; so they hid themselves, thinking
the chances of starving preferable to certain death.
Numbers concealed themselves in the cellars of the
houses of Magenta and in the farmhouses near which
they had been wounded."

On this night the French and Piedmonteae bivouacked
practically where the close of the battle found them ;
Renault (Ilird Corps) and Vinoy (IVth) at Ponte
Veochio on either side of the canal, where they were
joined during the night by the divisions of Trocbu and
Bourbaki of the Ilird Corps. Of the Imperial Guard,
Mellinet was at Buffalora and Ponte Nuovo, Camou
was in rear of Magenta, while the whole of the Ilnd

136

THE CAMPAIGN OF

Corpe occupied the town. The lemaining two divisiona
of the TVth passed the night at Trecate, the 1st Corps
at Olengo ; while of the Piedmont«se divisions, Fanti
was at Marcallo and the others at Ttirbigo and Galliate.
The Imperial Headquarters was at San Martino, that
of Victor Emmanuel at Villa Fortuna.

01 the Austrian corps the 1st, Ilnd, and Vllth were
in or about Corbetta and Cerella, the Ilird and Vth
were at Bobecco, Mensdorff at Bareggio, and Head-
quarters at Abbiategrasso ; the nearest unit of the
Vlllth Corps was at Bestazao, and the IXth Corps was
still south of Pavia.

During the whole of the 4th, Urban had done nothing
beyond assisting to delay — -by the mere fact of the
presence of two of his brigades south of Gallarate —
the advance of the Piedmontese divisions. His instruc-
tions, however, had been of the vaguest, for all that
he had been told was that Clam, if he considered it
advisable, would attack the AlUes at Turbigo, but that
if on the other hand he retired on Magenta, Urban
should take the opportunity of striking at the flank
of the French, were they then to advance.

About midday on the 4th, Urban leamt from the
commander of a detachment which he had placed at
Femo, that fighting appeared to be going on south of
Cuggiono, but that touch could not be established with
the troops of the 1st Corps. Urban now moved the
two brigades with him by Busto Aisiido and Vanzaghello
to beyond Magnano where he remained for the rest
of the day, unable to advance and yet making no attempt
to rejoin the main army.

A consideration of the numbers actually engaged <

I

I

engaged on fl

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 137

peither side^ seema to prove that a battle was not anti-
cipated on the 4th, either by the Allies or by the
Aiistiians. It appears to be clear that the situation
was not thoroughly appreciated by the Austrian Com-
mander-in-Chief, and that he was drawn into a general
action through not supporting at the outset, and with
sufficient forces, the lieutenant who had been surprised
by the advance of MacMahon.

By the morning of the 4th, Gyulai knew that a crossing
had already been effected at Turbigo and that there
was nothing to prevent the passage of the Trecate
columns (already reported) at San Martino. Had
then the bridges over the canal at Bemate, Buifalora,
Ponte Nuovo and Ponte Vecchio been destroyed — and
Clam had already on the night of the 2nd given orders
that all ot them were to be prepared for demolition^
the junction of the two French columns must have
been greatly hindered and delayed, and Gyulai might
have had time to array largely superior forces between
Marcalto and Bufialora to oppose MacMahon ; might
have watched the line of the Grand Canal with com-
paratively few troops ; and could himself have moved
in strength, by Robecco and Carpenzago, against the
flank of the aUied columns crossing at San Martino.

Eiistow suggests the following dispositions for the
morning of the 4th (it being accepted that the canal
bridges, except that at Bobecco, had by then been all
destroyed) : one of Clam's divisions at Cuggiono to
check the advance of the Turbigo column ; Liechten-
stein's corps to hold the canal line with weak detech-

' French, 48,01
kand 176 guns.

1 and 87 guoa; AuBtrians, 61,018 men

138

THE CAMPAIGN OF

mente at Bemate, BuSalora, PoDte Nuovo and Ponte
Vecchio, the remainder in reserve on the chaussee;
another of Ciam's divisions and Zobel's corps as main
reserve in Magenta, for employment when necessary
against MacMahon ; while Schwartzenberg's corps
at Robecco to be held in readiness to strike at the
flank of the San Martino colunms — whence too it could
be drawn in to Magenta should it be found impossible
to prevent the junction of the allied forces.

In a letter published in a German newspaper shortly
after the war, and generally attributed to Count Gyulai,
the following statement occurs : " The battle of Magenta
was in no way an accident. When the Austrian Com-
mander gave up the advantage offered by his excellent
position at Robbio and Mortara against the oblique
line of operations of the enemy, and when he had, as
a consequence of this, also renounced all idea of the
indirect defence of the Tlcino by Pavia and Bereguardo,
he decided on a direct defence behind the river. This
could be carried out in two ways ; either from a position
outside the Milan-Magenta road or by a flank attack —
of the same nature as the one from Mortara based on
Pavia and Bereguardo — against the line Vercelli —
— No vara."

The first of these alternatives was, he says, rejected,
because in case of a reverse a retreat must have been
made by Milan and Brescia. It was proposed then
to remain in the vicinity of the Po to occupy with the
help of the points Vaccarizza, Piacenza, Brescia and
Borgoforte interior lines between the forces of the enemy
in the north and those approaching from the south. It
was also decided, on giving up the Lomellina, to make

1

GENTA AND SOLFERINO. 1859 139

, flank movement against the line Novara — Milan.
Gynlai then eu^ests that when thia retreat commenced
on June 2, the orders given to the different corps
hod provided for the ofiensive being assumed against
the enemy's flank whenever opportunity offered, and
for retirement, if necessary, behind the Abbiategrasso-
Milan canal. He hints that the sudden intervention
of Hess upset these plana, and that the army thus reached
its positions lat« and assumed a formation which had
not been intended, with the result that the battle com-

^lnenced and was sustained, not — as had been planned —
ty the whole army, but by a portion of it only.
Moltke insists that the Austrians should under no
circumstances have joined battle on the 4th. The
Allies would certainly have been able to complete
their petsaage of the river undisturbed, but this could
not by then have been prevented. He considers that
all was not then lost, for if the Austrians had only
concentrated somewhere north of the Abbiatcgrasso-
Milan canal, the Allies must have attacked them
before marching on Milan. One primary condition
however, for not fighting on the 4th was that the Aus-
trians should under no circumstances bo drawn into a
premature action ; if Clam was attacked, he should
have been withdrawn towards Abbiategrasso. Moltke
maintains that neither the French nor the Austrians
intended to fight at Magenta, and that the Austrians
permitted themselves to be drawn into the action through
supporting Clam. If, however, they stood to fight
at Magenta, they should have fought behind the line
of the canal, since the river and canal were so close
L.together that if an attempt were made to hold both,

THE CAMPAIGN OF

the canal must follow tlie Iobb of the river line. The
position, too, behind the canal was the more Gommandiiig,
could have been held by fewer troops, and would have
permitted of larger forces being employed againat
Turbigo.

Even as late as the monung of the 4th when he was
already engaged, 01am should have been recalled,
and the decisive action postponed until the day fol-
lowing. Kuhn, the Austrian Chief of the Stafi, cal-
culates that on the Sth the Austriana would have had
a superiority of 45,000 men with 296 guns, and, according
to Moltke, the night of the 4th was for Napoleon a
very aimous one. He muat have known that he had
only been engaged with a portion of the Austrian Army,
and that even that, though defeated, remained in
threatening proximity. The whole of Gyulai's force
could be brought up next day to renew the action, and
this, as we shall see, was actually decided upon.

A considerable portion of the allied army was still
on the right bank, while the passage at San Martino
on the exposed flank might well have been endangered
by an Austrian success in the morning about Ponte
Nuovo, All that night the Allies were passing infantry
and artiUery over the river in readiness for accepting
battle next day under the best possible conditions.

Von Caenunerer thoroughly approves of the decision
to strike at the allied flank between the Ticino and
Magenta, but finds serious fault with the execution,
and especially with the ever present idea that an attack
by the Allies in the front had still to be guarded against.
He rightly complains of the multiplicity and excessive
detail of the orders issued by the Austrian Headquartei

J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 141

Staff to suboidinate commandeis, but he finds fault
with Gyulai for not giving dam precise directions
as to which side of the canal he was to take his stand.

On neither side in this battle did everything fall out
quite as had been arranged or intended, but on the battle-
field the French certainly displayed superior fighting
powers, as their leaders showed better generalship.
On the other side the Austrians were brought piecemeal
into action ; there seemed at times something almost
like a reluctance to engage ; and throughout reserves
were kept far too much in hand — caution, as on pre-
vious occasions, prevailing over enterprise.

THE ACTION AT MELEQNANO

At 8.30 p.m. on the night ot the battle, Gyulai — who
at that hour was still in Robecco — issued orders for
the renewal of the action on the morrow. The Illrd
Corps waa directed to hold on to Robecco at all coats,
the Vth Corps being placed in rear of the village in
support ; Schwartzenberg was given the conamand
of both these corps. The 1st, Ilnd, Vllth, and Vllltb
Corps were directed to hold the position about Corbetta,
and these were all placed at the disposal of Count Clam.
Schwartzenberg' s line of retreat waa by Abbiategrasso,
that of Clam by Gaggiano, Shells were atOl falling
in Robecco while these orders were being dispatched,
and Army Headquarters withdrew to Abbiategrasso,
where the details of the operations of the next day were
worked out.

From a fragmentary order — which was then drawn
tip but does not appear to have ever reached the Illrd
Corps, for which it waa intended — it seems that GjTdai's
intentions were sometbiog as follows : in the event
of the Allies moving forward in the morning, he pro-
posed remaining altogether on the defensive until they
should debouch from Magenta, when he intended
falling upon them with the whole of his reserves —

146

THE CAMPAIGN OF

driving them back and endeavouring to enter Magenti
with them. The Austrian Commander-in-Chief giv«
no hint as to what was likely to be the result of t
possible recapture of Magenta, and then proceeds
issue instructions as to retreat upon the line of thi
3-Milan canal, should a retirement becom

Late that night, Melczer, who was commandinj
Milan, was ordered to evacuate the capital, sending
all munitions and supplies by rail to Verona and the
troops to Lodi, whither also any of Clam's oncoming,
troops were to be directed ; the railway bridge ovet,
the Adda at Cassano was to be destroyed.

At the time that these orders were in course of
preparation, Gyulai seems to have had no conception
of the degree of demorahzation of some of the units
under hia command. Clam had just dispatched a
staff officer to Army Headquarters conveying a report
of the deplorable condition of the portion of the army
under his orders, when, about midnight, he received
Gyulai 's instructions relative to the renewal of the
battle on the morrow. Clara then sent oft the following
statement, which reached Abbiategrasso about 1.30 a.m.
on the 5th, and which— together with one of similar
purport and couched in much the same terms from
Zobel — decided Gyulai to renounce all idea of resuming
the oiiensive : "I have this moment — 11.45 p.m. —
received from Rittmeister Zichy the general orders for
to-morrow and feel myself urgently compelled to state
that it ia quite impossible that the instructions therein
contained can bo carried out, since their execution
would only result in the complete and ii

1

I

irreparable J

min of the aimy. Some of the troops are so absolutely
disorganised that a complete company — far less a
whole battalion — cannot be got together.^ Many
days are required for rallying. The troops of ail units
are completely mixed up and scattered in difierent
places. The only way to save the army is to retreat
as quickly as possible. Under these circumstances
it is quite impossible for me to comply with the in-
structions received, and I shall therefore continue
before dawn the retirement on Binasoo which I have
already ordered. I have made dispoaitions to this
end as far as can be done, and it is impossible for me
to countermand them. I therefore urgently and humbly
^^^nquest that the orders now received may be can-
■eelled."

^B At 3 a.m. then on the 5tli, Army Headquartera
^HJBSued the following orders for the retreat :—
^H The Ilird Corps to move by Abbiategrasso to Mori-
^^ft mondo on the 5th, and to Favia on the 6th.

^^K The Vth Corps on the 5th to Fallavecchio and Basiano
^^H and next day to Fosaarmato.

^^r The Vllth Corps to Rosate and Gudo Visconti on
the Bth, and on the 6th to Campo Morto
and Gualdrasco.
The Ilnd Corps to move on the 5th by Guggiano to
Tainate, and on the following day to Torre
Vecchia.
I The Vllth Corps to Piave on the 5th, and Landriano
on the 6th.

7 ofBcers and 3,411 men of seven different regiments had
d direct on ICIan, besides individii&la of other corps.

148

THE CAMPAIGN OF

^ The 1st Corps to Piave on the 5th, and Torre Veochia 1

on the 6th,

The Cavaby Division to move by Bareggio to Gudo
Gambaredo on the 5th, and on the next day
to Siziano.

Army Headquarters was to be on the 5th at Binasco,
and on the 6th at Belgiojoso.

Before, however, any orders regarding the intended
retreat had reached the Ilird and Vth Corps, fighting
had again broken out at Carpenzago during the early
hours of the 5th. Both sides declare .that the action
was initiated by the attack of the other, but the prob-
ability is that it resulted naturally from the propinquity
of the advanced troops of both. However this may
be, HartuTig'a brigade of the Illrd Corps advanced
from Robecco and vigorously attacked Ponte Vecchio,
the 14th Austrian Regiment of infantry— which had
already greatly distinguished itself and suffered heavy
losses the previous day— advancing with great dash
against Bataille's brigade, which found the outposts
at Ponte Vecchio. The French were here, however,
in great strength, and the Austriana were repulsed, but
were not pursued beyond Robecco.

The Austrian losses in this Httle affair are not forth-
coming in any detail, but they can hardly have been
leaa than those of the French, who admit having had
13 officers and 216 men killed and wounded.

The French made no organised advance until the 6th,

' It should be noted that this corps was still anTthing but
complete ; the brigade Hoditz was in Bergamo, Pasztbory
between Verona and Milan, and Bninner between Verona and

I

I

Verona and ■

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 149

when the Emperor Napoleon threw forward strong
columns on either flank— the one to regain touch with
the main body of the enemy retreating south, the other
to endeavour to cut off Urban, who had been reported
to be about Monza. The Ilird and IVth Corps moved
accordingly upon Abbiategrasso, which they found to
be evacuated and where they leamt that the Austriai^
were retiring upon Pavia and Lodi, while the Ilnd
Corps with Desvaux's cavalry and the Piedmontese
advanced on Rho and Garbagnate, whence a force of
all arms was launched in pursuit of Urban.

We have abeady seen that this commander had
passed the whole of the 4tb in a state of hesitation and
inactivity, and it was not until the following morning
that he made any movement. He then advanced to-
wards Caatano and Turbigo, and there at once found
himself confronted by the Piedmontese dlAnsions, which
had crossed the canal and were moving on Magenta,
He then appeared to realize the gravity of the general
situation and his own immediate peril, and at once
retired to Castegnate, sending orders to Rupprecht to
withdraw from Somma and Varese — the troops at Somma
to Gallarate and Castegnate, those at Varese to Tradafe.
On the 6th Urban learnt that Milan and Monza had
been evacuated by the Austriaos, and he at once fell
back with all speed to escape the net which was being
spread for him.

MacMahon's 2nd Division (now commanded by
Decaen vice Espinasse killed in action) moved up from
Magenta on Garbagnate, the Piedmontese on 8an
Lorenzo, while Garibaldi— whom recent events had
rescued from a somewhat critical situation — descended

150

THE CAMPAIGN OF

from Varese by Como and Barlasema ; but Kupprecht's i

brigade, forming Urban's rearguard, just managed, by'
hard marching, to slip through the converging forces.
During the night of the 6th all three brigades crossed
the Lambro at Canonica, and pushing on at daybie '
on the 7th made for the Adda by Vimercate.

On the 7th the Allies entered Milan, and early next
morning Napoleon and Victor Emmanuel rode in at the
head of their victorious armies, receiving a tremendous
reception from the Milanese ; an eye-witness, however,
remarks : " On seeing this indescribable scene of grati-
tude, joy, happiness, homage — one might almost say
worahip— it could not be forgotten that within fifty
yards of the scene of this wild enthusiasm is the Casa
Creppi, on the balcony of which stood Charles Albert
and Victor Emmanuel when, after the disasters o{
August, 18i8, they were fired upon from the crowd'
below."

On the night of the 7th the Imperial Headquarters
was at Quarto Gaguino, the Guard was at Casa Pobietta,
the lat Corps at San Pietro d'Olmo, the Illtd at Gaggiano,
the IVth at Corsico, while the Piedmontese were at
Nerviano, Parabiago and Lainate, the Royal Head-
quarters being at the last-named place. The Ilnd
French Corps was in Milan, while the cavalry divisions
of Desvaux and Partouneaux occupied Magenta. " There
are two great arteries of communication which intersect
Lombardy from west to east, from the Ticino to the
Mincio, thm forming two chief lines of operation in that
country. One is the high road from Ponte di Bufialoia
to Milan and from thence to Treviglio, Caicio,

I

io, Brescia H

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1839 151

Vand the Mincio ; tlie otlier more to the south from Pavia
by Belgiojoso, Pizzighettone, Cremona and Bozzoio to
Mantua. By the flanking movement of the AUies and
the battle of Magenta the Austriana were cut off from
the first of these two lines and pressed towards this
latter, which they have always considered as their chief
line of operations. Running as it does in the vicinity
of the Po, it has been provided with a series of strong-
holds, all of them erected at the passages of the con-
fluents of the Po, which come down from the north almost

■ at right angles to the latter,

I " The object being to out-manoeuvre rather than to
beat the Austrians, who were retreating on the southern
line towards the Mincio, the northern was chosen by
the Allies for theirs. Again, keeping the object to be
attained in view, nothing could be more appropriate
than this choice and the plan based on it. The northern
line of operations runs in a straight line, almost to the
Mincio, is consequently shorter than the southern, to
which besides the Austrians had, under the most favour-
able circumstances, two marches from Abbiategrasso.
Thus there was every possibility of reaching the
Mincio line as soon as, if not sooner than, the

The Austrian troops remained twenty-four hours in
the positions which they had been told to reach on the
6th, the outposts occupying a line drawn from the Ticino
through Giovenzano and Carpiano ; Roden's brigade
of the Vlllth Corps held Melegnano with outposts at
San Giuliano on the Milan road, and both Roden and
Mensdorff received the strictest orders to push patrols
1 all directions and right up to the very gates of the

I

I

capital, llie upper A4<ls about Treviglio v
by the brigades of Hoditz and Brunner.

The Austrian retreat was contiDiied on the 7th as
follows : —

Vlllth Corps with four brigades to the right bank
of the Adda at Lodi — Roden remaining in Meleg-
nano.

Vllth Corps to the left bank of the Adda at Lodi.

Ist Corps to hold the line of the Adda from Lodi to
Treviglio with three brigades of Montenuovo's
division, one of these three being Teuchert's,
made up from the late garrison of Milan.

Hoditz to hold the bne of the railway from Brescia
to Gorlago.

The Cavalry Division to Lodi, bivouacking on the left
bank of the Adda on the Pandino road.

All these were placed under the orders of Benedek,
commanding the Vlllth Corps.

The llnd Corps was to move to Borgbetto.

The Illrd Corps, with the troops from Pavia — the
latter under General Pokorny — ^to bivouac be-
tween San Angiolo and Bargano : these two corps,
with the remainder of the Ist, moving by the
same road after crossing the Adda, were placed
under Schwartzenberg's command.

The IXth Corps marched to Codogno, while of the Vth
one division (Sternberg's) moved to Campo
Binaldo, and Paumgartten's to Santa Cristina.

From the above it will be seen that the retirement
of the Aiistrian Army was to be carried out in tiiree
great columns ; that on the right, under Benedek, by
Lodi, Soncino, Manerbio to Montechiaro ; the centre,

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, iSgg 153

under ScWartzenberg, by Borghetto, Bertonico and
Robecco to Valeggio, Volta and Roverbello ; white the
third or left column, accompanied by the heavy baggage
and other impedimenta, moved by Pizzighettone, Cre-
mona and Piadena towards Mantua. The difierent
columns were directed bo to time their marches aa to
reach their destinations on the 11th and 12th, but the
Vlllth Corps, which was as yet intact, was, with the
Cavalry Division, to follow a day's march in rear of
the Vlltti Corps, acting as a rearguard and maintaining
touch with the enemy.

Benedek was given the following instructions : in
the event of the pursuit not being pressed he was to
take up a position about Montechiaro, occupying Ponte
San Marco and Calcinato in strength ; if, however, be
were closely followed, he was to withdraw by Castiglione
delle Stiviere behind the Mincio, making towards Valeg-
gio with the bulk of his troops while covering his flank
with a small force near Lonato. Should, on the other
hand, his retirement by Leno and Montechiaro appear
likely to involve him in any danger, he was to use
his discretion as to retiring by Aaola and Goito.

It was the intention of Gyulai, should the retreat of
the Second Army not be molested, to concentrate be-
tween Castiglione and Lonato — holding Ponte San Marco
and Montechiaro aa advanced poste— whence he esti-
mated that the line of the Mincio could best be defended,
while retaining one corps for the defence of the lower
Cbiese and Oglio.

Urban, who had this day regained touch with the
main army, was directed to send all his heavy ordnance
and other stores to Peschiera under the escort of one

154

THE CAMPAIGN OF

of Ma brigades, which, on completion

to return and take up a position on the Chiese at Ponte
San Marco and so safeguard the right flank of the army.
With his two other brigades Urban was ordered to cross
into Valtelin by Edolo and the Apnea paaa, crush the
revolution which had there broken out and restore order,
taking measures at the same time for safeguarding his
ultimate retreat into the southern Tyrol by Mounl
Tonale.

The strength of the garrison of Piacenza was raised,
for the Austrian Commander-in-Chief hoped eventually
to use the fortress as the pivot of an energetic offensive,
which appeared to Gyulai not to be impossible in view
of the serious losses which he believed the French to
have suffered at Magenta, Bergamo and Brescia were
for the present to be held, the garrison of the former to
effect its ultimate retreat by Romano to Antignate,
there joining on to Montenuovo's troops from Treviglio,
and withdrawing thence to Bagnolo ; the troops from
Brescia were later on to retreat behind the Chiese, hold-
ing the bridges at Ponte San Marco, Calcinato, and
Montechiaro.

During the night of the 7th-8th, Gyulai received
from the Emperor Franz Josef stringent orders to stand'
fast on the Adda, or, in the event of that river being
already passed in retreat, at least to take up a position
on the high ground between Piacenza and Lodi, and
upon these orders Gyulai isued very early on the morning
of the 8th the following instructions for the resumption
of the offensive — instructions which, however, did not
reach some units until they had already recommenced
their retirement ; Pavia, which was already evi

%

I

lommenoea h
evacuated^^l

9 to be reoccupied by one brigade of the Vth Corps,
the remaining brigades taking up & position about Corte
Olona. The Illid Corps was to stand fast at San
Angiolo, sending one brigade to Landriano and stretch-
ing oat a hand to Boden'a brigade of the Vlllth Corps
in Melegnano. The 1st and Ilnd Corps were to remain
in Boighetto, while the Vllth and ATIIIth Corps and
the Cavaky Division were to halt in Lodi, sending out
strong patrols towards Milan, Paullo and Melzo, and
establishing a chain oE posts on the right bank of the
Adda covering the north-west of Lodi. Roden was to
place Melegnano in a state of defence and join hands
with the brigade in Landriano ; the IXth Corps was to
concentrate in Codogno ; while Bergamo and Brescia
were to be held until the army should resume its retreat.
The brigades of Hoditz and Branner were placed at
the disposal of Urban, who was now ordered to concen-
trate his £ve brigades at Treviglio and Canonica ; while
Montonuovo was directed to halt on the Adda, with
Pandino as his centre, and watch the line of the river
from Lodi to the Milan-TrevigUo road — if possible,
occupying Paullo and sending strong reconnoitring
parties to Melzo and Gorgonzola.

Early on the 8th, it becoming apparent that the Allies
were advancing towards the Lambro from Milan, Benedek
ordered up Boer's brigade from Lodi to support Boden
in Melegnano, where Berger, the divisional general, was
himself in command. Berger had been instructed to
offer resistance only to weak detachments of the enemy,
and to fall back before any show of real strength.

The report of the advance of the Allies, and of the
taeasurcs which Benedek had adopted, reached Army

Headquarters io Codogno about 1 p.m., and Gynlu *
at oQce issued orders for striking at the enemy's flank
on the morrow. The Vlllth, supported by the Vllth
Corps, was to hold the enemy at Melegnano, while the
Ilird, 1st, and Ilnd struck at his right or western flank ;
the Vth Corps was to advance along the left bank of
the Ticino in the direction of Rosate, thus guarding the
Austrian left, while the IXth Corps was to form a general
reserve at San An^olo. These dispositions, however,
did not commend themselves to Baron Hess, who con-
sidered that any ofFei^ive effort was hopeless in view
of the numerical superiority of the enemy, and after a
long discussion with Gyulai the idea of the offensive
was — apparently under some pressure — abandoned.

The Allies seem to have been well iniormed of the
movements of the Austrians, and especially of the occu-
pation of Melegnano by Roden, and of the efforts which
that commander was making to put the town in a state
of defence. The Emperor Napoleon was, however, imable
to satisfy himself whether the intention was merely
to cover the further retreat of the Austrians, or whether
the town was meant to serve as a base for an offensive
movement against Milan. On the evening of the 7th,
therefore, Marshal Baraguey d'HiUiera received orders
to take steps towards clearing up the situation. The
Marshal was instructed to endeavour — with the assist-
ance of the Ilnd Corps — to intercept the Austrians
retiring from Binasco and Landriano on Lodi, and for
this purpose he was to move at 4 a.m. on the 8th to-
wards Melegnano, halting either at San Dooato or San
Giuliano ; during the 8th, however, further orders
reached Baraguey, under which he was to carry Ik

er oraera h

ry Meleg- H

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 157

^^^L&no the same day. For this purpose MacMahon'a ^
coipe was placed under his orders, while GEeneial Niel
was also detailed to support the movement.

Baraguey's lat Division (the brigades Dieu and
Blanchaid) having reached San Donato, branched off
by Civesio, Viboldone and Mezzano and ntade for
Riozzo, in view of establishing itaelf at Cerro to cut
oft the retreat of the Austrians from Melegnano by the
right bank of the Lambro. The 2nd Division (the
brigades Niol and de Negrier) quitted the main road
at San Giubano and marched down the Lambro by
Zivido and San Brera to gain the Austrian right flank ;
while the 3rd Division (the brigades Goze and Dumont)
moved down the main road straight upon Melegnano,
but being greatly delayed by the congested state of
the road, it was not until 5.45 p.m. that this division
arrived within sight of the town. The road by which
the 3rd Division moved was broad and straight and
was bordered throughout by wide ditches, crossed here
and there by atone bridges leading out to the fields,
which were seamed by irrigation cuts and covered with
high crops and trees, the field of view being thus greatly
restricted.

Roden's brigade had been in occupation of Melegnano
since the evening of the 6th, and considerable time and
labour had been expended in putting the place in a
state of defence ; the churchyard lying to the front
of the town had walls six feet high, and these had been
provided with banquettes, while a farm on the opposite
side of the main road had been fortified. The ckaussee

' MacMahon had been created a Marahal of Prance and Duke

^f Mogeata far hia ahare in the victory oE the 4th.

THE CAMPAIGN OF

ted across ^1

itself had been cut and a strong barricade erected a
it, and at the northern entrance of the town an earth-
work had been thrown up and fonr guns there placed
in position ; the walb, too, to the north had all been
loopholed. Melegnano was held by the 2nd and
3rd battalion of the 11th Infantry Regiment— the
whole of the 3rd battaUon holding the Milan front,
while the 2nd gave one company for the defence
of the cemetery and half another for that of the
farm. Four companies of this regiment guarded
the west and south-west towards Landriano. The
Grenadier Battalion of the same regiment formed
the local reserve, and was posted on the east
side of the town. A general reserve, of two batta-
lions, one and a half batteries and a few cavalry, was
placed to the south-east of Melegnano in the angle
between the Lodi and Mulazzano roads. The out-
posts which had held the line Mezzano-^San Brera — ■
Colturano fell back before the advance of the French
columns.

Melegnano ia divided by the Lambro into two parts
of unequal size ; it is, moreover, a very straggling town,
formed of groups of detached buildings, making it
difficult to defend, and with an old castle in the larger
or western portion of the town, surrounded on three
sides by a moat.

About 6 p,m. Baraguey ordered Bazaine (3rd Division)
to attack ; a company of zouaves extended on either
side of the main road, and two guns came into action
on the chauesee itself, engaging the Austrian guns behind
the earthwork. Very soon Bazaine — considering that
the vigour of the Austrian artillery fire was slackening-

U

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 159

H

^^^epared to assault ; the knapsacks were thrown down
on the road, three companies of zouaves deployed to
the right, followed by two battalions of the 34th regi-
ment of the line, while the remainder of the zouaves,
supported by the 33rd, charged up the road straight
at the barricade. The French artillery ceased firing,
and the 2nd brigade — halting at the spot where

■the road had been cut — remained in reserve.
[ In the meantime the 2nd Division (Ladmirault)
tkad barely reached San Brera when firing was heard on
its right ; pushing on rapidly, the 10th battalion of
chasseurs and the I5th regiment of the line were soon
able to join hands with Bazaine's zouaves, and forcing
back the Austrians in this quarter, possessed themselves
of the outskirts of the town between the river and the
San Brera road.

The divisional artillery had accompanied General
Forey, and was established about 1,200 yards from the
village with infantry on either flank and the rest of the
brigade in reserve. The other brigade had just de-
bouched from Mezzano. MacMahon during this time
was endeavouring, in accordance with hia instructions,
to gain the extreme right and rear of the Austrians.
His 2nd Division (Decaen) leading, he marched by
Linate and Bettola and reached Mediglia about 4 p.m.,
La Motterouge — some considerable distance in rear —
making for the same spot by Monticello and Carpianello.
Decaen moved on Balbiano and was preparing there to
halt when the guns of the 1st Corps were heard in action,
and he at once resimied hia march, pushing on through
) with the idea of placing his division astride

1 Melegnano-Lodi road.

THE CAMPAIGN OF

yai to the'^l

Hk ITtk Ooqis (Hiet) naAe a wide detoar t
«Bat» aad tlie two ln£ng (firisioDS readied and halted
at Cbipno, -miSt die tlnrd, poahing {nrther south,
wnved at GnigBaBO and Uirew forward artillery and
infan^ towards lAadnaiw. Here about 6 p.m. the
IVth Corps heard the aoand of the firing at Melegnano,
but no sttonpt whatever was made to advance or co-
opezmte further, in the absence of orders other than
Utoee issned ; " That the IVth Corps was to be held
in readiness to assist the 1st Corps — if reqmred."

Bazaine's leading battalions had now made repeated
assaolts upon the front of the town ; driven back
more than onoe by a murderous fire from the Austrians
in the booses and behind the enclosures, the zouaves
and 33rd returned again and again to the attack ; first
the cemetery and then the lanna were captured and the
two main streets were occupied, when Ladmirault,
penetrating at the same time from the east, drove in
upon Bazaine's men the defenders of that Sank. There
was desperate fighting hand to hand, the Austrians
oilering a gallant resistance to overwhelming numbers
and nearly capturing in the melee the Eagle of the 33rd.
One of the Austrian guns at the northern entrance of
the town was dismounted by a shell and captured by
the French, but the others were successfully brought off.

Berger now ordered Roden to evacuate Melegnano
covered by Boer's brigade, which had come up and
was in position in rear of the town, holding the Casa
Bemada and deployed towards Eiozzo.

Ladmirault, collecting portions of three of his bat- I
talions, sent them towards the Mulazzano road, with I
orders to cross it and endeavour to cut the Austrian \

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 161

but these were received by ao heavy a fire
from Boer's men that they were not able to advance ;
MacMahon's gima, however, had reached the Mulazzano
road more to the east, and were able seriously to harass
the final retirement of the Auatrians upon Lodi. Ro-
den's brigade passed through that of Boer— who had
by now been mortally wounded— and the remains of
the two Austrian brigades were able to efiect their
retreat, practically unmolested, under the cover of a
violent rainstorm which had long been threatening,
and which now burst over the field.

The French had pushed their attack ao quickly that
the greater part of the town was already in their hands
while many isolated bodies of the enemy were still
holding out in the houses and enclosures, and to this
circumstance may in large measure be attributed
the many captures which were effected. That the
brigades under Boer and Roden did well is unquestion-
able ; the French were in six times greater strength,
and if the " missing " are left out of count, the Austrians
inflicted a greater loss than they themselves suffered,
while they were able to diaw off without serious hind-
rance. For this last they were indebted to the failure
in combination of the Ist and Ilnd Corps and to the
extraordinary inaction of Niel, but as Baraguey d'Hil-
Uers states in hia report; on the action to the Emperor :
" Pour que ces combinaisons fussenl avoir un plein
autxes, U fallait que le temps ne manqudt pas d leur
devdoppement, et, en me prescrivant d'operer le jour
meme de man depart de San Pielro iTOlmo, Votre
Majesti rendait ma tache pins difficile."

The French acknowledge a loss of 153 killed, 734

wounded (70 officers were killed and wounded) and 64a
misaing, while the Austrian casualties are given as 120
Idlied, 240 wounded, and 1,114 missing, of whom some-
thing over a hundred only were able to rejoin their
units a few days after the action. J

Of the three French corps engaged at MelegnantJ
the let occupied the town that night ; the Ilnd bivouacked I
at Dreasano, the IVth at Carpiano ; while of the Austrians
the IXth Corps, with Army Headquarters, waa in
Codogno, the Vllth and Vlllth and part of the lat in
Lodi ; at Borghetto was the rest of the 1st and the whole
of the Ilnd, while the Ilird was at San Angiolo and the
Vth at Corte Olona.

Moltke does not see that any object whatever was
gained by the Austrians standing fast at Melegnano,
their action being only j ustified if they had any intention
of moving forward across the Lambro, and there was
certainly at this time no idea of resuming the offensive
against the concentrated army of the Allies. All the
Austrians really needed to do was to halt and endeavour
to glean some intfiUigence of the enemy's movements ;
it was, above all things, important to avoid juat then
the moral effect of heavy losses accompanied by defeat.

Lecomte says that to derive any real advantage,
the Allies should have advanced upon Melegnano forty-
eight hours earlier, when Lodi and Pizzighettone might
well have been for Gyulai what the passage of the
Beresiua was for the First Napoleon. He blames Bara-
guey d'Hilliera for assaulting Melegnano and thereby
incurring such heavy casualties, pointing out that he
;, as stated in his report on the action, ■

>n, directed H

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 163

to " choBser Vennemi de Mdegnano^'* but to " vnJkarce'pier
les Autrichiens qui ae retirent de Binasco et de Lan~
driano sur LodV^ This mission, Lecomte submits,
might well have been accomplished by holding Boden in
front with a small force, and outflanking him on the left
with both the 1st and Ilnd Corps.

MOVEMENTS OF THE VTH FRENCH CORPS-
ACTION AT CASTENEDOLO— AUSTRIANS
RETREAT BEHIND THE MINCIO

i

'^QETIS OF THE " :

ACTIOS AT CAiTE:: •

EETSEAT BEli...

CHAPTER VIII

MOVEMENTS OF THE VTH FRENCH CORPS — ACTION AT
CASTENEDOLO — ^AUSTRIANS RETREAT BEHIND THE
MINdO

It was stated in the first chapter that on the mobilization
of the " Army of Italy," a Vth Corps had been formed
and placed mider the command of Prince Napoleon,
and that Generals D'Autemarre and Uhrich had been
appointed to lead the two divisions of which it was
composed. So far but little has been heard of the move-
ments of this corps, to which a special mission had been
confided, and it may be as well to give a short accomit
of its operations before proceeding with the narrative
of the events in Lombardy subsequent to the action at
Melegnano.

Prince Napoleon had disembarked at Genoa on May
12, but the moiety of his command was taken from him,
when — ^within a week of his arrival upon Italian soil —
D'Autemarre's division was placed under the orders of
the Commander of the 1st Corps, and thenceforth took
part in the operations described in the preceding chap-
ters. There only remained, therefore, under the imme-
diate orders of the Prince, Uhrich's division and the
cavalry brigade of General Dalmas de Lap^rouse, and
with these troops the Commander of the Vth Corps

167

THE CAMPAIGN OF

WS8 directed to re-embaric and proceed to Leghorn foi
the oocupatioD of Toscauy, which had been abandoned
by it« Grand Buke, and for which protectioD against
the Austnana had been sought by Tuscan envoys sent
to the Emperor Napoleon. The mission confided to
the Prince was to eSect a diversion in the south and so
cause the enemy to divide his forces, and further to
preserve the neutrality of the Papal States ; it was
authoritatively stated that no attempt to violat* tha
territory of the Pontifi would be made by the Alhea
provided Austria exercised equal consideration. It
was also anticipated that the presence in Tuscany of
even a weak corps would tend to prevent the Austrians
from drawing supplies from Central Italy ; while the
Prince would be able to assist in the organisation of the
military forces of the Duchies. For the furtherance
of this end, the Prince was to assume command of the
Tuscan troops under General Ulloa and of the varioua
bodies of volunteers under command of General Mezza-
capo.

The Prince reached Leghorn on the 23rd, and, three
days later, Uhrich's division was disembarked, the
mounted troops of Laperouae only arriving on May 30.

The Commander of the Vth Corps occupied the posi-
tions to the west of the Apennines with his 2nd
brigade (du Bourguet), so aa to watch the Duchy of
Modena with the assistance of the local troops and volun-
teers ; while the Ist brigade (Grandchamp), with the
cavalry, was concentrated in Florence. Reconaissances
were pushed in all directions, and the French troops
were kept constantly exercised, ready for the part which
all hoped they yet might take in the more active

I
I

ve work J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 169

of the campaign. After the battle of Magenta, Prince
NapoIeoQ asked sanction to cross the Apennines and
establish touch with the main army of the AUies— driving
the Austriana back to the right bank of the Po. As a
matter of fact, however, the enemy had by now already
prepared to evacuate the Duchiea ; Ancona waa given
up, the garrisons of Pavia and Piacenza were withdrawn
early in June, and on the 12th the troois at Bologna
fell back upon Ferrara, preparatory to retiring across
the Po. The Duchess of Parma now fled to Switzerland,
while the Duke of Modena joined the staff of the Emperor
Franz Josef,

On June 12 the Vth Corps commenced its march to
the north, passed the Apennines, by bad roads and in
tempestuous weather, about the 16th, and by the 27th
Uhrich's division was concentrated in Parma. It was
not, however, until the end of the month that the Vth
Corps was ultimately reunited at Piadena.

No forward movement was made by the AUies either
on the 9th or 10th, and the time was passed by the
troops in the rest they so much needed, and by the
Emperor Napoleon in perfecting his arrangements for
the advance. To teach the Mincio from the Ticino, it
was necessary to cross aU the northern tributaries of
the Po^ — each of which — the Adda, the Serio, the Ogho,
the Mella and the Chiese— forma an excellent defensive
line for an army retreating eastward. It was not yet
definitely known to what extent the Austriana liad
realty sufiered at Magenta, and it waa confidently
expected that Gyulai would stand on the Adda, whose
I torrent can only be passed at the bridges of Vaprio and

Caasano, Lodi and Fizzighettone. The roads which
lead across the river at the two latt«r placea are that
from Milan to Crema by Melegnano and that from Pavia
to Mantua, and it waa only by these roads that the
Second Army waa conducting its retreat. It was known,
too, that the bulk of the army was about Lodi, and it
waa presumed that Gyulai would await attack on the
lower portion of the Adda,

Keconnaissances sent along the Lodi road soon made
it clear that the town waa evacuated and that the Aua-
trians— abandoning all attempt to defend the line of the
river^were in full retreat, and the Emperor Napoleon
then resolved to follow by the northern road, crossing
the Adda at Vaprio and Cassano. Vaprio waa given
up to the troops under Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi,
while the bulk of the French corps prepared to cross at

I

K the

■

■ pie

In pursuance of these intentions it was necessary first
to recall the 1st, Ilnd, and IVth Corps to the Milan —
Cassano hne. On the Uth the Ist Corps waa directed
on Linate and Limito, MacMahon moved on Faullo
and Gavazzo, while Niel took, in Milan, the place of
Caniobert who marched to Melzo.

The ItaUan Army, starting on the 10th, reached Monza
on that day and Vimercate on the 11th, intending to
reach the Adda on the day following.

Canrobert reached Cassano on the 12th, but the four
bridges— road and railway — over the Muzza canal and
the Adda, had been destroyed by the troops of the
enemy retiring from Milan, and three pontoon and other
bridges had to be thrown across ; this work was com-
pleted long before dark and the Ilird Corps, crossing

J

MA GENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 171

[over, reached Treviglio that night. The Ist Corps
occupied Melzo, Pozzuolo and Vignate, the Ilnd Albig-
nano and Tniccazzano ; the Vth Corps bivouacked at
Pioltello, while the Guard waa at Gorgonzola. The
Italians, crosaiog the Adda at Vaprio, had occupied
Ciserano, Cologno, Lurano, Pagazzano, Morengo and
Bomano — thus covering the front and left of the Ilird
Corps.

On the 13th MacMahon moved over to the left bank
and reached Caravaggio ; the Ist Corps marched to Tre-
viglio, which Canrobert vacated, moving to Mozzanica ;
while in rear Niel with the IVth Corps reached Albignano,
Trecella and Pozzuolo, and the Guard Le Fomaci—
both these last ready to cross next day. On the 14th
the Guard, with the Imperial Headquarters, marched to
Treviglio ; the Illrd Corps crossed the Serio at Moz-
zanica and pursued, from Antignate, the Soncino road,
leaving the Calcio road free for the Ilnd Corps following
in rear. The Ist Corps moved up to Mozzanica, while
the IVth marched to Caravaggio. Thus the French
Aimy had its front on the Oglio covered by the Ilnd
and nird Corps at Urago and Soncino, while the Goard,
the Ist and the IVth Corps were massed a short distance
in rear. On this day the Italian divisions on the left
leached Coccaglio and Caategnate, thus threatening

L the Austrian right and extending a hand to Garibaldi.

r Any intention which Gyulai might have entertained
on the 8th of striiving at the flaijk of hia enemy was
definitely abandoned on the full results of the action
at Melegnano becoming known, and late that night

I orders for the continuance of the retreat were issued

I as under: —

172

THE CAMPAIGN OF

The 1st Corps to move from Borghetto on Bertonico,
cross the Adda and take up a position beyond
Gombito.
The Ilnd Corps — also from Boi^betto — to move
north and hold as long as possible the passages
over the Muzza on the Borghetto — Lodi and
Lodi — Castelpuste Orlengo roads — eventually
retiring on the last named place.
The Vth Corps to move to Castelpuste Orlengo.
The IITrd Corps to form a reserve to the Ilnd Corpa
behind the Muzza, letiring eventually on Castelpuste
Orlengo.

The Vth and IXth Corps were each to give a battalion
for the strengthening of the Piacenza garrison, and
Urban was directed to abandon the projected expedition
to the Valtehn and to retire from Canonica, Romana,
Urago and Bagnolo to IHontechiaro. It was found,
however, to be impossible to carry out the above orders
in their entirety, and consequently the movements on
the 9th were unimportant.

It was now ordered that the strong places Fiacenza,
Pizzighettone and Cremona were to be evacuated, and
their fortifications, as far as possible, dismantled, and it
was calculated that the garrisons thus set free, from
those and similar places, would add some 14,000 men to
the eftectives of the Second Army.

To effect the required concentration on the Chiese
the following orders were issued on the 9th : —

The Vllth Corps to move on the 10th by Crema,
Orzinovi, Leno to Montechiaro — arriving on the
14th.
The Vlllth, with Mensdorfi's Cavahy Division, to

I

I

1059 173

move on the 11th by Crema, Orzinovi, Manerbio
to Montechiaro — arriving on the 14th,
The lat to move on the lOth by Soresina, Castel
Visconti, and MotteUa to Carpenedolo— arriving
on the 13th.
The Ilnd to move on the 10th by Soresina, Castel
Visconti and Gabbiano to Carpenedolo — arriving
on the 13th.
The Ilird to move on the 10th by Soresina and Acqua-
lunga to Carpenedolo — arriving on the 14th.
^L The Vth to move on the 10th by Zanengo, Farfengo,
^H Quinzano and Pralboino to Casalmore — arriving

■ on the 14th.

Urban to move on the 12th by Urago d'Oglio, Con-

ticelle to Castenedolo — arriving on the 14th.
The IXtb Corps to reach Acquanegra (west of Cre-

Imona), on the 10th, and to move thence by
Cigognolo, Piadena and Marcaria to Piubega^
arriving on the 14th.
Army Headquarters to move on the 10th by Soresina
and Verolanova to Carpenedolo — arriving on
the 14th.
In issuing the above, Gyulai expressed his intention,
if the enemy did not harass the retreat, of concentrat-
ing the whole of the Second Army in the Lonato —
Castiglione position.

Late on the evening of this day Benedek represented
that for the Vllth and Vlllth Corps to hold the passages
of the Adda until the llth would, from the proximity
of the Allies, probably bring on an action, and sanction
was therefore accorded to his proposal to evacuate hia
asition during the night of the 9th-10th ; but he was

THE CAMPAIGN OF

i to remai^l

enjoined to bum the bridges bebind him and
with both corps on the left bank during the lOth. The
Ilird Corps was at the same time ordered to move to
the left bank and to destroy the bridges after crossing.

The march orders for the 10th were carried out with
some slight alterationa ; the Cavalry Division which
was to have marched on the llth withdrew from
Lodi on the 10th and reached Grema. The 1st Co!
bivouacked at Azzanello mstead of at Castel Vii
conti.

The garrison of Piacenza — some 9 battalions of in-
fantry, If squadrons, 2 batteries, 1 company of garrison
artillery and 2 of engineers, under Major-General
Roesgen — quitted the fortress at 2 p.m. The Com-
mander had been ordered to join the army by way of
Brescello and Borgotorte ; but a revolt had broken out
in Parma, the town of Fiorenzola was already in the
hands of the revolutionary party, and Roesgen wisely
decided on retreating by Pizzighettone and the left
bank of the Po, and was able to join the Vth Corps
the same night. Of the guns in the fortress, 91 were
sent by water to Borgoforte, 5 by land to Mantua, while
about 130 others were destroyed or spiked ; the two
outer forts were blown up, and one pier and two arches
of the Trebbia bridge were destroyed.

The Commandant of Brescia was directed to stand
fast, if possible, until the 11th, when he was to retire
with the garrison to Lonato, after sending all the
railway rolling stock to Verona and blowing up the
two bridges on the Chiese at Ponte San Marco.

On the 11th the moves were carried out as previously
arranged, with the exception that the Ilird Corps thiB

•om

Vr^ AND SOLFERINO, 1859 175

pday reached Padernello beyond Acqualunga, while

Urban, who was not to have retired before the 12th,

but whose position at Vaprio — Canonica had been

somewhat threatened, fell back — one brigade by Co-

logno — Romano, the other by Morengo ; but the Serio

being in flood, the only bridge available was that at

Mozzanica and the crossing was greatly delayed, with

L the result that the brigades only reached Antignate,

I.Bomano and Fara. On this day, too, Montenuovo's

f division fell back behind the Serio and held an outpost

line on that river from Crema to Sola.

On the 11th three more strong places were evacuated
by the Austrians. Early in the aft«moon the heavy
gnns of Pizzighettone were either destroyed or sent off
to Mantua ; the bridge over the Adda was set on fire
and the garrison withdrew. In the sanae way Cremona
was evacuated, the guns being removed to Mantua ;
while Brescia was also denuded of troops and munitions,
the bridges over the Chiese being blown up as soon as
the garrison had crossed at Ponte San Marco.

The retirement of the Austrians on the 12th was
carried out without any interference from the Alhes,

»An(i, so far as the Austrian information went, none of
the enemy's regular troops had passed the Adda up to
midday, althoi^h some of Garibaldi's men had been
seen in the neighbourhood of Coccaglio. Urban had
this day reached Chiari and Cizzago, and had sent a
small force of all arms towards Pontoglio to watch the
crossing there and patrol towards Palazzolo. This
detachment at once reported that Palazzolo had been
occupied in force since the previous day, that reinforce-
. meats had arrived there during the night — of which

4,000 men had pushed on to Brescia — and further
Garibaldi was advancing on Pontoglio.

The somewhat premature evacuation o£ Brescia had
left Urban in a critical position, since his right and rear
were both threatened by Garibaldi's troops. He was
accordingly ordered to fall back as rapidly as possible
behind the Mella, while Eeznicek's brigade was directed
to move on the evening of the 12th to Azzano-Capriano,
secure the crossing at that spot and push strong patrols
towards Brescia.

News coming in to Army Headquarters this evening
that Brescia had been occupied by 13,000 Italians
under Garibaldi and Cialdini, decided Gyulai to effect
some alterations in hia dispositions for the 13th : the
Vlltb Corps marched to Castenedolo, the Vlllth to
Offlaga and Cignano, Mensdorfi to Faverzano, the Ilird
Corps stood fast at Pademello, the Ilnd at Quinzano
and the Vth at Verolanova and Pontevico, while the
IXth Corps marched to Marcaria and Bozzolo. Rezni-
cek had pushed forward very early on the roads leading
to Biescia, maintaining communication in rear with
the Vllth Corps, but on Urban crossing the Mella and
estabhshing himself in Poncarale, Bagnolo and Capriano,
Reznicek fell back upon the Ist Corps.

On the 14th the Austrians occupied the following
places : —

Urban in Castenedolo.

The Ist Corps in Bagnolo.

The Vllth at Montechiaro with a brigade in Calcinate.

The Vlllth and Cavalry Division in Leno.

The Vth in Gottolengo and Isoiella.

The Ilird in G^mhara.

I

A

MAGENTA AND SOLFERJNO, 1859 177

! nnd in Pralboino.
The IXth in Marcaria.

On the 15th MacMahon crossed the Oglio at Calcio
and took up a position in front of Urago, the Imperial
Guard and Ilird Corps closing up to him in rear and
forming a second line at Komano, Covo and Fontanella ;
the remainder of the French corps did not move, but
the Italians reached Brescia, with Garibaldi's troops in
their front moving towards the Chiese.

During Urban's occupation of Vaprio — Canonica,
Garibaldi had been at Bergamo, hesitating to advance
fnrther without support, but learning on the 12th that
Vaprio had been vacated, he pushed forward by Marti-
nengo and Palazzolo, crossed the Ogho and, as has been
already stated, entered Brescia on the morning of the
13th. Next day, finding that the head .of the Itahan
divisions in rear were in touch with him, he advanced
to San Eufemia, where it was evident that he must, ere
long, become engaged with Urban's troops. These
were disposed as follows : one brigade {Eekert, formerly
Schaffgotsche) in Caatenedolo with outposts towards
Brescia, Gintowt's brigade more to the east on the
Montechiaro road with the reserve artiUery, with
Rupprecht to the north watching Ciliverghe and Rezzato.

Late that night Garibaldi was ordered by the King
to advance on the 15th towards Lonato and to repair
the bridge at Bettoletto, for which operation he was
promised the support of Sambuy's cavalry. Garibaldi
prepared to carry out these instructions, but having
Lleamt in the morning that Urban was in Castcuedolo,

178 THE CAMPAIGN OF

it was necessary to guard against any attack on the right
flauk. Counting on the speedy arrival of the promised
cavalry, Garibaldi sent the whole of his 1st Regiment
to contain Rupprecht, occupied Bettola and CiHverghe ^
with a battaUuD of the 2od, and moved himself with fl
the rest of his force towards Bettoletto. H

In the orders for the 15th which had been sent to ^
Urban, he had been directed to stand fast at Castenedolo
until 11 a.m., at which hour it was arranged that the
1st Corps would cross the Chiese. Urban had made all _
his arrangements for withdrawal accordingly, but before H
he had marched ol^ he was attacked by Garibaldi's H
troops. The skirmishers of the Ist Regiment of the ■
Cacciatori delle Alpi came upon Rupprecht's advanced
troops between 7.30 and 8 a.m. and drove them in, but
reinforcements coming up the ItaHans in their turn
were forced back to the hne of the raOway. Fearing
now that his retreat might be threatened from the
direction of Ciliverghe, Urban sent thither one battalion,
two gnns and a squadron of cavalry, and these engaging
the single battalion of Garibaldi's 2nd Regiment threw
it back in some disorder.

In the meantime Cialdini had been hurried forward
with the 4th Itahan Division and reached San Eufemia
just as the action came to a close. Urban wisely deciding,
under all the circumstances, not to press the shght
temporary advantage he had gained. He accordingly
broke off the action about 3 p.m. and fell back upon h
Calcinate. Galdini bivouacked at Rezzato and San ■
Eufemia and Garibaldi about Bettoletto. H

L Neither side experienced much loss in this afFajr, H
the Austriana having 12 killed, 89 wounded and 8 H

I

missing ; while the Italians lost 15 killed, 120 wounded
and had 73 men taken prisoners.

While the above action was in progress, the Ist Aus-
trian Corps had reached Chiarini, but as the brigades
were preparing to bivouac, a report arrived from Urban
of the attack made upon him and of the consequent
threatened turning of the Austrian right. Clam there-
upon sent two of his brigades towards Calcinato and
another to Vighizzolo, but finding Urban's retreat was
unmolested these brigades returned to Chiarini. The
Cavalry Division moved to Rho, the Vlllth Corps to
Monteehiaro, the Vth to Carpenedolo, the Illrd to
Castel Goffredo, the Ilnd to San Cassiano, the IXth
to Gazzoldo, and Army Headquarters to Caatiglione
delle Stiviere.

After eleven days of retreat the Second Army was
now established in an admirable position behind the
Chieae, ready again to offer battle to the Alhea. The
dehberation, too, with which the retirement had been
conducted, had allowed time for the Austrian nuhtary
authorities to initiate, and to some extent to carry
through, arrangements for increasing and reorganising
the Austrian forces ; and the opportunity may perha^
here well be taken of describing, as briefly aa possible,
the general scheme of reorganisation, whereby it was
hoped that success — which now for ao many weeks
had eluded the army — might yet be attracted to its
I l)anners.

On May 26 an Imperial rescript had emanated from
L Vienna, directing the caUing out of the First Army,
kuid stating that the Emperor Eranz Josef himself would

i8o

THE CAMPAIGN OP

I

proceed to Italy and there asaume the command-in-
chief of both armies, so soon as the First should be ready
to take the field ; until then the force already in Italy,
as well as all details en rojtte thither, were to remain as
heretofore under Gyulai'a command. Feldzeugmeister
Count Wimpffen was placed at the head of the First
Army, while the commands of the Third and Fourth
Armies, intended for the defence of the Austrian fron-
tiers, were confided respectively to Prince Liechtenstein
and Count Schlick. On May 30 the Emperor himself
proceeded to Verona, accompanied by the Imperial
Headquarters Stafi, and while exercising a general
supervision over the operations, for the actual conduct
of which Gyulai was apparently still in the main re-
sponsible, he occupied himself principally in the perfect-
ing of the arrangements for the increase and reorganisa-
tion of the Austrian forces akeady in the field or
approaching thereto. A statement of the composition of
the different armies aa newly organised will be found in
the appendices, but it may be convenient to state here
that the First Army was to consist of the Ilnd, llird,
IXth, Xth, and Xlth Corps and the Cavalry Division of
General Zedtwitz, while the Second Army contained
the Ist, Vth, Vllth, and Vlllth, with the Cavalry
Division under Mensdorfi.

On June 16 the Emperor Franz Josef took over the
command of the Second Aimy, so as to bring its move-
ments into line with those of the First Array, which
had by this time arrived in the theatre of war, Gyulai's
idea of making a stand on the Chiese was now no longer
entertained and he received orders to move on this day
towards the Mincio, in readiness to cross to the left

I

I

on the 17th and take up the positions which had
been aaaigned to the corps under his command.

To cover the retirement of the Second Army, Urban
was directed to establish himself on the 16th between
Lonato and CastigJione, following the rear of the army,
partly by Peachiera, partly by Volta and Valeggio. On
the 18th it was intended that Urban's division should
be broken up, Rupprecht'a brigade going to strengthen
the garrison of Verona, while the others were to be
distributed among the various corps of the reconstituted
armies.

The following movements were to commence on the
17th :—

Second Aemy.

The Vllth and Vlllth Corps to move between Pes-
chiera and Valeggio and to be jointly responsible
for that portion of the line of the Mincio.

The Ist Corps to Somma compagna to form a reserve.

The Ilnd Corps to march to Mantua there to be
incorporated in the First Army,

The Ilird Corps to Quaderni and to watch the line
of the river from Valeggio to Pozzolo.

The Vth Corps to Villafranca to forra a reserve.

The IXth Corps to march to Mozzecane and join the
First Aimy, linking on to the outpost line of the
Ilird and carrying it on to juat above Goito.

The Headquarters of the Second Army to move to
Custoza.

First Army.
wThe Xlth Corps to march from Mantua to Tormene

l82

THE CAMPAIGN OF

and establish outposta about Goito — joining those 1
of the IXth Corps. The Cavalrj- Division of Zedt-
witz to move to about San Zeuone. The Head- |
quarters of the First Army to Mozzecane.

Garrisons for Mantua and Legnago were to be found I
by the Ilnd Corps, while the 1st provided those of
Peschiera and Verona,

In accordance with the foregoing, Gyulai directed |
that on the 16th the Vllth Corps should march to |
Desenzano, the Vlllth Corps and the Cavahy Division
to Guidizzolo, the lat to Peschiera, the Illrd to Goito,
and the Vth to Volta, while Urban moved to Lonato |
and Castiglione.

From reports which had reached Gyulai on the night
of the 15tb, it appeared that the Allies were standing
fast in front, while an outflanking movement on a large
scale was in course of execution, and that it was in-
tended to move large forces by Lake Garda to operate
on the north of the Mincio position. The Imperial
Headquarters thereupon decided that the retreat of
the Second Army— then already commenced— should
be countermanded and that Gyiilai should reoccupy
the Lonato — Castiglione position with a view to striking
a decisive blow at the Allies before the Vth Corps, under
Prince Napoleon, could join them from the south.

In accordance with this determination the Vllth
Corps was ordered to move to Lonato extending its
right to the lake, the Vlllth Corps to Castiglione, the
1st to Castel Venzago as a reserve (with the Cavalry
Division at Guidizzolo) to the Vllth and Vlllth Corps.

Urban was to join the Vlllth Corps, and Gyulai's
Headquarters waa to be at Pozzolengo. T

poeitioua were to be mamtained dumg the 17tli>
and the Ist Corps and Urban'a troops were to be
hurled against the enemy's flank ; in the event of the
Allies being driven back to the Chiese, the crossings at
Ponte San Marco and at Montechiaro were to be once
more held. Should the positions of the Vllth and
Vlllth Corps be attacked in force, the Illrd Corps
from Goito and the Vth from Volta were to be used, as
seemed beat, either to strike at the enemy's flank or to
strengthen the Lonato — CaatigUone position.

The Vlth Corps, then in Tyrol, was to endeavour to
threaten the enemy's flank from the Upper Chiese
valley, moving by Storo on Vestone and Salo ; the Com-
mander was advised that the army would probably
move forward towards Brescia on the 2l8t, and he
was particularly enjoined to concentrate in as great
strength as possible about Veatone on the 20th.

These counter-orders were evidently quite unexpected,
and some of the units of the Second Army had already
covered some considerable distance in their retreat to
the Mincio before the fresh orders overtook them. It
was then impossible for the directiona to be comphed
with in full that day, and it was not until the 17th
that Gyulai was able to report that the Lonato — Casti-
glione position had been reoccupied as directed.

On this day the First Army was in position behind
the Mincio — the IXth Corps between Roverbella and
Belvidere, the Ilnd in and south of Mantua, the Xth to
the east of^Mantiia, the Xltli in reserve about Tormene ;
the Cavalry Division was on its way to Verona, and
Army Headquarters waa at Mozzecane.

The Commander of the Vllth Corps now asked for

H lab

L

another divioion to strengthen his right, and Urban was
ordered to move on the 18th to Desenzano, pushing
one brigade to Padenghe and stationing another on the
northern side of Desenzano. GyuJai particularly asked
sanction to concentrate his troops for the purpose of
more effectual support, pointing out that Lonato — the
key of the position — was held by the Vllth Corps,
which had recently, from various causes, been greatly
reduced in numbers, and that the distance at which
the 1st Corps was posted effectually prevented anything
like timely support. To this a reply was given that
there was no intention of really holding the position,
which would only be maintained so long as the enemy
made no serious attack upon it. Gyulai was also in-
formed that the army would probably be withdrawn
behind the Mincio on the 20th, and the orders iasued
to the Vltb Corps in Tyrol were now cancelled.

On this day, the 18th, Urban's division, now com-
manded byEupprecht, made the moves ordered on the
previous day, while the other units of the Second
Army remained halted. Early in the afternoon, however,
orders were issued that the withdrawal of the Second
Army behind the Mincio was to be so carried out that
all the units should have crossed and reached their
allotted positions by midday on the SIst, the Ilird
Corps to Pozzolo, the Vth to Valeggio, the Vlllth to
Prentina and Salionze, the 1st, Vllth, and Cavalry to
Quademi, Mozzecane and Malvicina in reserve.

On the 18th Count Gyulai tendered the resignation of
his command and Ms place was filled by Count Schlick,
lately commanding the Fourth Army.

On the 20th and 21st the retreat was resumed ; a

I

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 1S5

large nnmba of cammgi hjid been pv^sred o^er tiie
IGncio, yiz : —

Two bridges at Pesdiiexa ;
One bridge „ S^raize ;
One „ „ Mcmzambano ;

One „ „ Yak^o ;

One „ „ PozEolo ;

Three bridges ,, Gmto ;

and by the latter date boA annies were in position on
the left bank from Peschiera to Hantoa, having, to all
appearance, no other intention than to dispute with the
enemy the passage of the river

The Xth Corps, drawn well back behind the left,
covered that flank from any attack from the right bank
of the Po.

In the meantime the Allies had resmned their measured
advance after the action at Oastenedolo ; on the 16th
the 1st, Ilnd, and Illrd Corps, with part of the Guard,
crossed the Oglio, when the most advanced points occu-
pied by the French wereChiari, Castrezzato, Comezzano
and Orzinovi. The rest of the army was on or behind
the Oglio. The Emperor was at Calcio, while the King
was at Castegnate with his divisions in and about
Brescia. On the 17th the Italians advanced in two
columns, the 1st and 2nd Divisions by the Castenedolo
road, the 3rd and 4th towards Bezzato. The French
arrived on the Mella and pushed Desvaux's cavalry on to
Bagnolo and Montirone, and the next day the Emperor
reached the right bank of the Chiese ; the marching was
slow but the heat was extreme. The French were now

^^C\ availa

disposed in order of battle : Baragaey d' Hilliers vaa

on the left moving on Lonato and Chstiglione, Mac-
Malion in the centre at San Zeno and Borgo SatoUo,
and Niel on the right at Bagnolo ; in the rear was the
Guard at Brescia with Canrobert at Poncarale.

The army halted on the l!)th and 20th, and received
a cavabry reinforcement in the shape of a brigade of
cavaky of the Guard under General Morris.

Reconnaissances sent out on the 19th found that Mon-
tecluaro was occupied, but on the morrow it became
known that the position had been completely abandoned.
Moving forward again on the 21at the IVth Corps
crossed the Chiese at Mezzane and occupied Carpene-
dolo with the flanks covered by the cavalry under Par-
touneaux and Deavaux ; the Ilird Corps closed up in
rear of the IVth, remaining, however, on the right bank ;
while the Ilnd Corps occupied Montechiaro, with the
1st behind the river at Rho. Of the Piedmontese one
division (3rd) was at Desenzano, with the 1st and 5th
in support at Lonato. Victor Emmanuel held his
2nd Division in reserve with his Headquarters at Cal-
cinat-o, while the Imperial Headquarters was with the
Guard at Castenedolo. On the 32nd MacMahon agaia
moved on, occupying Caatiglione, while the Guard
crossed to Montechiaro.

No forward movement was made on the 23rd, but
reconnaissances were sent out to cover thoroughly the
whole country between the Chiese and the Mincio ;
while from the hills about Caatiglione the brothers
Goddard repeated a balloon ascent which they had
made two days before from Castenedolo. From all
available sources of information it seemed clear that there

J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, iSgg 187

considerable movement among the Austriana ;
that Solferino, Cavriana, Guidizzolo and Medole were
occupied, and that heavy columns were about Goito
and Pozzoiengo. To the Emperor all this seemed
merely to prove that the Austrians— anxious to dis-
cover the points where the passage of the Mincio was
likely to be attempted — were supporting, in consider-
able strength, the troops which they had thrown forward
to gain information ; and the Emperor Napoleon can
hardly be blamed if it failed to occur to him that the
Aastrians — having evacuated the strong positions on
the Chiese and permitted their occupation by the Allies
— should now be about to offer battle with the Mincio
at their backs and in a position far inferior to that which
they had voluntarily given up.

It was, however, the imexpected which was about to
happen, and which was to result in the greatest battle,
in point of numbers, which had, up to then, been fought
I since Leipzic,

I Moltke has discussed the question whether Piacenza
I should have been evacuated, or whether, as some have
held, it should have been made use of as a strong flank
position, whence Lombardy might have been successfully
defended. A retreat behind the Po would have put an
end to all pursuit, while the Sth and Xlth Corps might
have joined the army by way of Mantua and Borgoforte.
Had the Allies then stiU held on their way to the Mincio,
the Auatrians could have moved on their right flank
from or below Piacenza, or could even have returned to
, the right bank of the Ticino and cat the conununica-
^-tions in rear of the French and Italian armies. Against

all this must be said that, since the Austrians were
not pursued, they wece in no immediate need of the pro-
tection of the fortress, and that flank movements when
executed from beyond a certain distance lose much of
their value. A position on the flank behind the canal
must have checked the march of the Allies on Milan ;
whereas one behind the Po would have had no effect
on their onward movement. By holding fast at Pia- i
cenza, the Anstrians were not drawing nearer to their j
reinforcements, while they were allowing the enemy
time to strengthen his hold on Lombardy. Moltke
considers that the evacuation of Piacenza was justified,
since its fortifications wece not sufficiently completed
for it to stand alone ; but none the less a bad impression
was made by its enforced abandonment.

There is very much to be said in favour of a stand on
the Chiese, as Gyulai had intended. The left bank
everywhere commanded the right, the northern flank
of the position could not be turned, while if the left
flank were attempted, there was there admirable ground
for the employment of the Austrian cavalry in support
of the main army attacking across the river. At the
worst the fortresses of the Quadrilateral were only one
day's march in rear, and if the hilly country behind
the Chiese increased the difficulties of retreat, it added,
at least in equal measure, to those attending an advance.

1
I

L

THE BATTLE OP SOLFERINO

CHAPTER IX

THE BATTLE OF SOLFERINO

In order to discover something definite about the dis-
positions of the Franco-Italian Army, and also to regain
touch, which had been temporarily relaxed, the Com-
mander of the Second Army sent out on the night of
the 21st a strong patrol, consisting of two squadrons
of cavalry and two horse-artillery guns, under Major
von Appel of the 12th Uhlans. This patrol was ordered
to cross the Mincio at Monzambano and make for Poz-
zolengo, move next day by Rivoltella to Lonato, and
return by way of Castiglione, Guidizzolo and Volta
toValeggio. Major von Appel was not, however, able
completely to fuM all that had been confided to him ;
he came everjrwhere upon the enemy in considerable
force, and was never able to pierce the screen behind
which their main strength was concealed. But from
the reports which this officer sent in during his tour,
rather than perhaps from the general conclusions to be
drawn from his expedition as a whole, the Imperial
Headquarter Staff came to the conclusion that only
fart of the Allied Army was on the left bank of the Chiese
— ^viz. the Italians to the north in the neighbourhood of
the Lake of Garda by Desenzano and Lonato, and some

m

192

THE CAMPAIGN OF

^ isl

of tlie French troops in the hilly country about Esenta,
Caatiglione and Carpenedolo.

With the retirement of the Auatriana behind the
Mincio, the Emperor Franz Josef and his military advisers
had apparently by no means relinqniahed all idea of a
return to the ofieusive ; the numerous bridges which
bad been constructed, ot which were already in existence,
over the river had all been retained ; many commanding
positions on the right bank had been occupied and
entrenched, and from these and other signs and prepara-
tions, it aeems tolerably clear that the Auatrians were
only awaiting an opportunity, following upon the con-
centration of their armies, once again to endeavour to
fail upon and overwhelm the enemy. The whole force
under the Emperor Franz Josef was now indeed strength-
ened and recuperated, and its concentration eftected,
and it was resolved to assume the offensive while the
enemy was engaged in the passage of the Chiese, and
before the 60,000 men — said to be threading the passes
of the Apennines — could strike at the lower reaches of
the Po and turn the Austrian left flank. Lato then ofi
the 22nd, after the return of the Emperor to Villafranca
from an inspection of the position of the 1st Corps at
Quaderni, orders were sent out directing the advance of
the armies across the Mincio on the 24th. Before,
however, these orders had much more than started on
their way to the corps concerned, the date of the intended
movement was changed, in the hope of falling upon the
AUiea before their passage of the Chiese had been com-
pleted.

The Army Order detailing the proposed movement
is too long to quote verbatim, but the following comprisea

cc
cc

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 193

its zDAin points: "The Imperial Army will resume
the offensive on the 24th, and the operations, wherein
both armies will be engaged, will consist in — (1) Crossing
the Mincio ; (2) the overthrow of the enemy in the
immediate neighbourhood; (3) the advance to the
Chiese ; (4) the preliminaries to an action on the Chiese
should the enemy there concentrate.
Movements of the Second Army.
The Vlllth Corps will cross at Salionze, being pre-
viously joined in Peschiera by a brigade of the Vlth
Corps (Major-General Reichlin-Meldegg ^), and will
move on Pozzolengo.

" The Vth Corps will cross at Valeggio and move on
Solferino.

" The 1st Corps will cross at Valeggio in rear of the
Vth, and will move on Volta and Cavriana.

"MensdoriFs Cavalry Division, and in its rear the
Vnth Corps, will cross at Ferri after the Ilird Corps,
and will move, the Cavalry to the east of Cavriana,
the Vllth Corps to Foresto.

" Movements of the First Army.

" This army, as the left flank, will at first remain
refused and will protect Goito from any possible attack.
As soon as the movement of the Second Army has
developed, the Ilird Corps will cross at Ferri, moving on
Guidizzolo.

" The IXth Corps will cross at Goito and also move
on Guidizzolo.

" In rear of the IXth Corps will cross Zedtwitz's
Cavalry Division and then the Xlth Corps, which will

^Hiis brigade actually joined during the night of the
22nd>23rd.

O

k

194 THE CAMPAIGN OF

move to tLe west of Cereta. The Cavalry DiTiaion will

protect the left flank towards Medole with detachmenta.
pushed forward to Casaloldo and Caatel Goffredo.

" The Ilnd Corps will detach two brigades to the IXtt
Corps and these will move to Marcaria to protect the
left.

" The passage of the river to begin at 9 a.in. with
the Second Army, and at 10 a.m. with the First,

" In the event of a reverse both armies will retire in
the same manner and re occupy their original positions
behind the Mincio.

" On the 24th the Imperial Headquarters will be at
Valeggio.

" Movements for the 25th : Second Army.

" The Vlllth Corps and Eeichlin's brigade to Lonato
and Desenzano.

" The Vth Corps to Esenta.

" The 1st Corps to Castiglione delle Stiviere.

" The Vllth Corps to Le Fontane.

" MensdorfE's Cavalry Division, supported by the Vth
Corps to Montechiaro.

" First Army.

" The IXth Corps to between Carpenedolo and Acqaa:
Fredda.

" The Ilird and Xlth Corps to Carpenedolo and San
Vigiho.

" Zedtwitz's Cavaby Division to Acqua Fredda and
Casalmoro.

" Of the two brigades of the Ilnd Corps one to move
to Acquauegra and one to Asola.

" Movements to commence at 9 n.m, Iuq)t'rial lltad-
quarterd at Guidizzolo."

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, i8;

195

I

Then follows the after-order, directing that the cross-
ing on the 24th be now carried out on the 23rd, and
that the forward movement detailed for the 25th should
now be commenced on the 24th.

The Offic«r Commanding the Vlth Corps in Tyrol was
also enjoined to conform to the movements above
indicated by marching towards Salo and Gavardo, and
the Commandant of Mantna was ordered to prepare
a bridge and bridge-head at Borgoforte. From a con-
sideration of all the above, one is led to the conclusion
that the offensive waa resumed on the presumption that
on June 23, at least a considerable portion of the Allied
Army had yet to cross the Chiese, and that what had
already passed over was Uttle more than strong advanced
guards. The Austrian main stroke then was to be
directed upon Castiglione and the three passages of the
Chiese at Ponte San Marco, Montechiaro, and Carpene-
dolo ; for this purpose two corps (Vth and Ist) were to
advance on Sollerino and Cavriana along the Castighone
road; two other corps (IXth and Illrd) with the same
objective to Guidizzolo ; Mensdorfi was to maintain
connexion between the two armies ; two corps (VTIth
and Xlth) were to be held in reserve at Foresto and
Cereta ; while the flanks were to be covered by the
Vnith Corps at Pozzolengo and by Zedtwitz and part
of the Ilnd Corps between Medole and Marcatia.

By the evening of the 23rd the passage of the Mincio
the onward march of the Austrian corps to their

itinationa were completed in accordance with the
ers which had been issued.

In this date the Austrians were able to count upon
following numbers : —

igS

THE CAMPAIGN OF

With the Second Army ; the Ist (including Reichlin'u
brigade), Vth, Vllth and Vlllth Corps and Mensdorfl'a
Cavaky Division numbered 102 battalions, 36 squadrons
and 49 batteries— a total of 86,273 men, 11,023 horaeB
and 392 guna.

With the First Army : the Ilnd, Ilird, IXth, Xth,
and Xlth Corps and Zedtwitz's Cavalry Division com-
prised 121i battalions, 52 squadrons and 45 batteries — '
a total of 103,375 men, 11,608 horses and 360 guns, or
a grand total for both armies of 189,648 men, 22,631.
horses and 752 guns.

The Allies acknowledge to the following numbers : — -

With the French — including the Vth Corps but ex-
clusive of some 8,900 cavalry and infantry with Generd
Ulloa — there were 198 battahons, 80 squadrons and 432
guns, or 118,019 men and 10,206 horses.

With the ItaHans there were 96 battahons, 37 squad-
rons and 90 guns or 55,584 men and 4,147 horses, making
a grand total of 173,603 men, 14,353 horses and 632 guns.

It is now necessary to give some description of the
ground over which this great battle was about to be
fought. " The Mincio, issuing from the Lago di Garda,
runs due south, while the direction of the hills on both
banks runs at right angles almost towards it ; those on
the right bank, with which alone we have to do here,
coming down from the north and north-west, strike
the Mincio in a south-easterly direction. The hilly
country on the right bank of the Mincio, thus forms
a tolerably regular parallelogram from north-west
to south-east, the four angles of which are Lonato,
Feschiera, Volta and Castiglione. This paraUelogram of

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 197

s ia about twelve miles in length and eight in width,
■sod is divided longitudinally by the Bedone, a little
Istreani coming out of the hills between Lonato and
ICaatigUone and running into the Mincio,

" The hills rise gradually from the shores of the lake in
I successive irregular wave lines, the last towards the plain
r towering high above the rest, and forming, as it wore,
a mighty wall round the west and south sides of the paral-
lelogram. The south side, above all, is remarkable
for its height and steepness all along its length from
Castiglione to Volta. Being formed of a succession of
long steep ridges, strongly indentated, it looks from the
plain like the ruins of some Titanic stronghold, destroyed
by time and overgrown with grass. Two points, higlier
than the rest, stand in the centre of this line of ridges.
These two points are Solferino and Cavriana. Both
detached from the others, and sloping down precipi-
tously towards the plain, they resemble two bastions,
while the lower, but scarcely less precipitous, slopes of
I San Casaiano between them may well represent the
I' curtain of these gigantic bastions.

" From the interior another range of hills runs down
towards the outer one. It skirte the north or left bank
of the little stream Redone, and comea down with it
from the neighbourhood of Lonato, in an almost south-
erly direction, to within a mile from the heights of Sol-
ferino. It there makes a sudden bend to the north-
east, runs on for a couple of miles in thb direction, and
then breaks ofi. At the point where it breaks off Ilea
Pozzolengo, and at the point where the ridge approaches
nearest to Solferino, stands in an isolated position the
» diarch of Madonna della Scoperta. Sotferiao and

CavrianaontlLe outer ridge and Pozzolengo andMadorma
della Scoperta on the inner, mack the position of the
Auatrians in the Mincio hills. The relative positiona
of these four points is such that if a line were drawn
round them, it would give the figure of a truncated cone ;
t'avriana and Pozzolengo forming the base of it towards
the Mincio, and Solferino and Madonna della Scoperta
the top towards Castiglione and Lonato. With the
exception of the road near the lake to Peschiera, the
others leading through this hiUy country to the Mincio
all touch one or more of these points ; consequently
their possession shuts the hUls of the Mincio to an advanc-
ing army,

" While they thus in their ensemUe give the command
of the Mincio hills, each of these four points forma the
centre of a group of ridgea branching out from that
centre. The position of the Austrians in the hills must
thus be represented as a colossal natural redoubt with
four bastions, each of them with numerous outworks
and only assailable at the angles.

" From whichever side the traveller approaches the
Mincio hills, one of the first objecta which will attract
his attention is a square, weather-beaten towet on a
high conical hill covered with green turf. It is the
Spia d'ltcUia, so called because from it the eye can pry
over a large part of the Lombard plain, over the shores
of the Lago di Garda, and over the Mincio far beyond
the spires and domes of Mantua. The hill on which
it is built, called the Bocca di Solferino, rises abniptly
to the north-west of the village to which it has given
its name. After attaining two-thirds of its height, it
throws out two spurs like two horns, one to its left —

I

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 ^99

sharp, narrow, precipitous, showing a bold outline
towards the plain and falling off suddenly. It is called
Monte di Cipressi, from a row of these trees which crown
its summit conspicuous from afar. The other to the
right, having no particular name, but commonly called
Monte della Chiesa with the church of St. Nicholas on
the top. Stretching out in the direction of Castiglione,
it rises abruptly from the valley of the Redone, and
throws out towards this river a lower, but equally abrupt,
branch similarly crowned with a church — that of San
Pietro. On the other side — ^that is towards the plain —
it slopes down more gradually towards the Monte di
Cipressi. In the hollow between the two Ues the little
hamlet of Pozzo di Solferino, as the villagers call
it. The spurs, although forming part of the group
of the Bocca, are separated by a depression in the
ground from the Bocca itself, and this depression has
been used to lead the roads from Castiglione over the
group to the village of Solferino behind it. There are
two of these roads — one which runs along the plain at
the base of the hills and, leaving the village of Grole to
its left, tarns up between the Monte di CSpressi and the
Monte deOa Chiesa to the hamlet of Pozzo di SoUerino,
and ero ao cs the ridge between the Bocca di SoUerino
and the McmtedeDa Chiesa ; the other, leaving Casti^ione
and the oviter ridge to its right, winds along the bills
ahnost parallel to the former, and rising in a steep
incfine hetweea Monte della Chiesa mnd the nmMer
span ci 8m Pietro, tops the ridge at the sane pc^nt as
the rmd ihwa^ the fdatn. Both roods untied th«f«;
run down to the viDage of ikMemo, 3mi whene; the
two anile, rise the walk of the ehm^ of St. 5idkolM^

THE CAMPAIGN OF

I p..

K hii]

occupying the whole summit of the Bocca. These walla,
about 20 to 30 feet high, enclose, besides the church,
a belfry, the schools and the dwelling of the parish priest,
which occupy three sides. In front of the church is a
large open plot of ground, and to the right of it the hill,
protected only by a low waU, descends abruptly towards
the hill road which runs up to its foot. Beyond the
walls of St. Nicholas the summit ot the Bocca presents
a narrow green plateau with another much whiter
looking enclosure at its edge ; this is the cemetery of
Solferino. Beyond the cemetery, but separated from
it by a depression in the ground, begin the scale or ladders
of Solferino, a succession of steep, precipitous ridges
between the plain and the valley of the Redone, which
extend as far as the little village of Gtole.

" The hill group of Solferino forms then a succession
of formidable positions, ea«y to defend and very diffi-
cult to approach. In the two roads are deep and narrow
defiles, flanked by the spurs between which they run
up to the top of the ridge. By the ridge itself the
advance is scarcely less dangeroas, for each ridge is
commanded by the foDowing one. Besides this, each
is bkewise separated from the other by a strong depres-
sion in the ground, forming, as it were, the ditch to each
of these successive positions.

" While the position of Solferino is thus well pro-
tected in front and on the flanks, it is not less so in the
rear ; for, from the foot almost of the Bocca hill, rises
another ridge sloping down terrace-hke towards the
scattered houses of the village of San Cassiano in the
plain. Between this ridge and the base of the Bocca
hill, the road from San Cassiano to the village of Solferiiio

OLFERTNO, 1859 201

I

[ runs up. While the slopes of San Cassiano are held,
it is, therefore, like the roads in front, a defile. The
ridge of San Cassiano extends, in an almost uninterrupted
line, to Cavriana, the sister group of Solferiuo, which

L liad been chosen by the Austrians for their re-

" Of a similar conformation as Solferino, the slopes
of San Cassiano are to it what the scale are to Solferino
—a kind of natural outwork. Both look down on what is
calledtheCampodiMedole, an open plain devoid of trees,
through which the main road from CastigHone passes
to Goito. This road, coming out of Gastighone to the
left of the Mincio hills, runs for about half a uule through
a country like the rest of Upper Lombardy, covered
with vineyards and mulberry trees, but less cut up by
canals than other portions of it. There being a scanti-
I ness of water, the vegetation is not very rich and the
ground more open and adapted to military movements.
After running through this country for a mile and a
half, the road enters the Campo di Medole just at the
point where a cross road, intersecting the plain, runs
in a straight line to Medole. The main road continues
for about two and a half miles in this open plain until
it comes to the outskirts of the village of Guidizzolo,
where the trees begin again. The open plain is scajitily
cultivated with only here and there a com or a maize
field and the rest bad pasture ground. About a mile
from the southern outskirts of the Campo di Medole
runs the road from Medole to Guidizzolo, and, parallel
almost to the main road to Goito, another from Car-
penedolo by Medole to Ceresara in the direction of
Mantua."

I

In the orders given out overniglit for tlie onward
movements of tlie two armies on the 24:th, Count ScHick
had directed that the Vlllth Corps should move off
at 8 a.m., the others at 9, while Wimpffen ordered hia
Ilird and IXth Corps to march at 9, the cavabry at 10,
and the others to conform to these movementa

The Emperor Napoleon, on the other hand, in issuing
hifl orders for the same day had directed that the
following movements should commence not later than
3 a.m. : —

The 1st Corps from Esenta to SoHerino.

The Ilnd Corps from Castiglione to Oavriaua.

The llird Corps from Mezzane to Medole.

The IVth Corps with the cavalry of Partouneaux and
Desvaux — from Carpenedolo to Guidizzolo.

The Imperial Guard, with Headquarters, to Castiglione.

The Itahan Army to move on to Pozzolengo, main-
taining touch with the 1st Corps by means of the 2nd
Division (Fanti). which had bivouacked north of Esenta.
The Auatrians then on June 24 were to leave the line
Pozzolengo^SoKerino — Guidizzolo and gain the line
Lonato — Castiglione — Carpenedolo ; while the AUies
were on the same date to abandon the positions
Lonato- — Castiglione — Carpenedolo and move forward
to the line Pozzolengo — Solferino — Guidizzolo. The
result of such movementa, executed the same day and
on the same lines, could orJy be a general action,
wherein the advantage must lie with that side which
had taken the initiative. The Allies started from
five to six hours earlier than their adversaries,
and the latter were consequently taken greatly by
surprise.

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 203

The events now about to be described may most
conveniently be divided into three parts : —

1. The operations between Solferino and the lake of
Garda — between the Piedmontese on the one side and
the Vlllth and part of the Vth Austrian Corps on
the other, viz. the operations in the north.

2. Those against Solferino and Cavriana — ^the 1st
and Ilnd French Corps and the Imperial Guard being
pitted against the Vth, Vllth and 1st Austrian Corps,
viz. the operations in the centre.

3. The battle in the plain, wherein Niel and Canrobert
fought against the Ilird, IXth, and Xlth Corps of the
first Austrian Army, viz. the operations in the south.

The action commenced to the south ; the I Vth French
Corps, on the right of the AUied Army, left its bivouac
at 3 a.m., and its three divisions-de Luzy leading-
took the road from Carpenedolo to Medole. De Luzy's
front was covered by two squadrons of the 10th Chas-
seurs k Cheval, and these came upon some of the enemy's
light cavalry rather more than two miles from Medole
and drove them in, but their own further advance was
arrested by the fire of the Austrians who had occupied
the village with both infantry and artillery. Niel now
ordered de Luzy to advance his division and carry
Medole.

This important post had been occupied on the pre-
vious evening by two battaUons of the Austrian 52nd
Regiment, two guns and a few hussars belonging to
Blumencron's brigade of Crenneville's division of the
IXth Corps. SchafEgotsche had given orders for the
march to be continued at 9 a.m. on the 24th, but as

204 THE CAMPAIGN OF

early as 5 that morning Crenneville reported that hia
outposts at Morino, to the north-east of Medole, had
been attacked. Schaffgotsche then prepared to advance
at once on Medole, but almost immediately the report
was contradicted, and the Corps Commander, reluctant
to move before his men had had their morning meal,
decided to stand fast. At six o'clock, however, a report
was received direct from the front stating that fighting
had already for some considerable time been in progress
at Medole and that the Austrians had been driven from
the village. The defenders of Medole had ofiered for
something like three hours a very stubborn resistance
to greatly superior numbers, attacking on two sides
and supported by a powerful artillery. As soon as the
attack developedjMajor Urs, who commanded in Medole,
sent word to hia brigadier, Blumencron, then in camp
to the west of Guidizzolo, but that commander, being
himself unable to detect the sound of firing, decided to
take no action whatever and did not even forward a
report to his divisional chief. Driven at last from his
defences on the west of the village, Urs defended Medole
house by house, and when finally forced to fall back upon
the remainder of the brigade, he was able only to bring
off the equivalent of two companies with two officers
— nine-tenths of the latter and four-fifths of the men
being either killed, wounded or prisoners.

Lauingen's cavalry brigade had been formed up
rear of Medole — on the Ceresara side — to cover and
support the retirement of the infantry, but Lauingen
withdrew first half-way to Ceresara and, then, consider-
ing that the ground here was unsuitable for the move-
ments of cavalry, he fell back behind Ceresara

I

'a ; finally M

" retiiing altogether and arriving at Goito about 9 a.m.,
and taking thenceforth no part or interest in the action.
His divisional general, Zedtwitz, himself rode off in search
of him, and the result of the action of these two cavalry
commanders was the practical loss of the services of the
mounted troops on the Austrian left flank for the rest
of the day.

While the IVth Corps had been thus engaged at Medole
the Illrd Corps, under Canrobert, starting at 2.30 a.m.,

I crossed the Chiese opposite Visano and moved on Medole
by Acqua Fredda and Castel Gofeedo. This latter
place was reached about 7, and being occupied only by
a few mounted men was captured without difficulty,
and Canrobert, now hearing theguna in action atMedole,
ordered Renault's division to push on in that direction.

Part of Blumencron's brigade had also been in occu-
pation of Casa Morino, and MacMahon, advancing early
towards Cavriana from Castighone, came upon this
post and drove out its defenders ; but seeing now that
the Ist Corps on his left had been checked in its advance,
MacMahon decided to content himself with holding
his position for the present, in view of the large hostile
columns now visible in the plain to his front. He sug-
gested now to Niel that they should both take ground
to their left — MacMahon for the purpose of drawing
nearer to the Ist Corps and Niel to prevent any gap
occurring between the Ilnd and IVth Niel, then engaged
in front of Medole, promised to conform as soon as the
village should be captured and Canrobert had drawn
up to him on the right. As a temporary measure, how-
ever, the cavalry under Parte uneaux and Desvaux

was ordered to occupy the interval between Niel and
MacMahon. MacMabon then disposed his troops as
follows : one of the brigades of the division of La Mot-
terouge, deployed at right angles to the road, main-
tained touch between the Ilnd Corps and Deavaux's
cavalry, while the other remained in reserve behind the
Casa Morino ; Decaen's division formed to the left of
La Mottfirouge in the direction of the 1st Corps,

The hostile columns noticed by the Duke of Magenta
were the divisions of the IXth, Illid, and Ist Corpa
advancing westwards. Schaffgotache, however, seems
even now to have been in ignorance of the fact that
two complete French Corps were in his front, and still
thought that Medole had been occupied by little more
than the enemy's advanced troops, and that it« recapture
would scarcely delay the carrying out of the prescribed
movement on Carpenedolo. The Commander of the
IXth Corps directed hia 2Dd Division (Crenneville) to
march on Medole from its position to the east of Caaa
Morino, and of the three brigades of his Ist Division
(Handl) he placed one on the Rebecco-Medole road,
one still further south towards Ceresara, and the third
in reserve, and arranged with Schwartzenberg that the
Illrd Corps should move on Castiglione by way of Caaa
Morino. The country about here, however, being much
broken and enclosed, the various brigades failed to keep
touch, wandered apart and came independently into
action. Crenneville moving on Medole was threatened
on his right, was fired into on the left by Vinoy's
division of the IVth Corps— which had been pushed
well forward in the cultivation — and was unable
make any concerted attack.

I

J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 207

Handl's brigades — widely separated at the outset —
became more so as the advance was prosecuted and
arrived independently before Medole, where the French
had made careful preparations for their reception. At
9 a.m. the situation in this part of the field was as follows :
what was left of Crenneville's two brigades stood on the
main Mantua-CastigUone road and held a farm to the
south of it and immediately north of Baite, confronting
Vinoy's division of the IVth and the whole of the Ilnd
Corps ; atRebecco one of Handl's brigades was engaged
with one of de Luzy's, while further south another was
held in check by Le Noble, and Handl's third brigade,
which had already suffered greatly in the action, had
fallen back shattered to Guidizzolo. On the side of the
French, de Failly's division of the IVth Corps sup-
ported de Luzy towards Bebecco and Baite.

The head of Canrobert's columns reached Medole
shortly after nine o'clock, when the Conunander was
warned by Napoleon that an Austrian corps, of an
estimated strength of 20-25,000 men, which had left
Mantua on the 23rd, had its outposts at Acquanegra,
but at the same time Canrobert was ordered to support
Niel's right. Canrobert now pushed forward Jannin's
brigade towards Ceresara.

In the centre Baraguey d'HiUiers had been ordered
to march on the left of the Ilnd Corps from Esenta to
Solferino. His 2nd Division (Ladmirault) started the
first at 3 o'clock and by 6 a.m. had arrived in front
of the heights about Solferino, which were found to be
held by the enemy. Ladmirault formed his division
in three columns of attack — two to turn the flanks and

I

the third to assault in front — and covered by the fire
of the only four guns which had been able to traverse
the mountaui road followed by Ladmirault's infantry,
tlie 2nd Division prepared to attack the commanding
position held by the Austrian Vth Corps.

The 1st Division (Forey) had left Esenta about 4 a.m.,
passed through Castighone, and followed the road by
Le Grole, while Bazaine, with the 3rd Division, marched
in rear of Forey.

When on the afternoon of the 23rd the Vth Austrian
Corps had occupied Solferino with outposts on the billa
to the west, the picqueta furnished by Bils' brigade
reported the presence of large bodies of the enemy in
their front, and Stadion was satisfied that a general
action must take place on the morrow, and he therefore
fortified his positions as far as possible. These picqueta
at once noted and reported the French advance against
Medole early on the 24th, as also the movements of the
1st French Corps against Stadion's position ; but the
Austrian outposts were none the less driven in by the
French, and fell back upon the battalions occupying
Le Grole and the hills in the vicinity. Le Grole was in
turn captured after some very sharp fighting, and the
defenders then retired upon their reserves, holding the
next line of hills some 3,000 yards in front of Solferino.
The battle for the possession of these heights was pro-
tracted and bloody, but they were taken about 10
o'clock, and the French were then able to move for-
ward and place upon them several guns which engaged
the Austrian pieces about Solferino. Stadion had long
since informed Count Schlick of the attack which was
pressing upon him, and the Ist and Vllth Corps

I

)orps were J

^f MAi

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 209

moved up close in support, while Mensdorffs cavalry
left Brcgiiedolo and moved into the open country between
the Casa Morino and Caasiano.

On the left of the French centre Ladmirault was gain-
ing but little ground, and even that with great sacrifice,
but Baraguey now found himself able to send forward
his remaining division — that of Bazaine — as the Emperor
Napoleon, who had now himself reached thia part of
the field, had deployed the two infantry divisions of the
Guard in support. Already Bils' brigade, which had
suffered grievously, had begun to give ground, and the
brigades of Festetics and Puchner had fallen back to
the heights round the village of Solferino and had occu-
pied the houses, the cemetery and the Monte di Cipresai.
Here they had been reinforced by several battahons
from the brigades of Hoditz and Paszthory of the 1st
Corps, which had reached the scene of action. The
troops were all well covered behind walls and inside the
houses and ofEered for long a formidable resistance, but
the French were at last able, after great difficulties and
with immense loss, to bring a battery on to the heights,
and at a range of 300 yards to open fire upon the ceme-
tery and attempt to batt«r down its walla.

The Italian Army had passed the night of the 23rd
in the following positions : the 2nd Division (Fanti)
at Malocco maintained touch with Baraguey d'Hilhers ;
the 1st (Durando) and 5th (Cucchiari) were in bivouac
about Lonato ; the 3rd (MoUard) was at Rivoltella, while
the 4th (Cialdini) had been sent north towards T\to1
in supportof Garibaldi. The 1st, 3rd, and 5th Divisions
were each ordered to send forward on the 24th strong

210 THE CAMPAIGN- OF

reconnoitring colunmB towards Pozzolengo, and in accord-'

ance with these inBtructions Durando dispatched at i
a.m. a brigade, which, on reaching Venzago about 5.30,
dotached 2 battalions, 2 guns and 2 squadronfi towards
Pozzolengo, Tliese found Madonna della Scoperta occu-
pied by the enemy and their advanced troops became
engaged.

Cucchiari in like manner had sent forward a similar
detachment, which left Lonato at 3 a.m., passed through
Desenzano, followed the railway for some distance and
then turned south towards Pozzolengo.

Mollard sent out no fewer than four such reconnoitring
parties, and all came more or less in contact with the
Aitstrians in position in front of Pozzolengo and Madonna
della Scoperta ; but this breaking up of the Italian
forces into numerous small and independent columns,
effectually prevented King Victor Emmanuel from dia-
posing usefully of masses of troops, and exercised a bane-
ful influence upon the action of his anny as a whole, from
which it sufiered throughout the remainder of the day.

The Vlllth Corps had bivouacked on the night of the
23rd with all its brigades in and around Pozzolengo,
whence it was to have marched next day in three columns
upon Lonato and Desenzano. About 6.30 a.m., how-
ever, the advance of the Italians upon Pozzolengo was
detected and Benedek at once placed four brigades on
the hills covering the town from the west, holding
back in reserve the greater part of two complete bri-
gades. These arrangements were more than sufficient ;
the various Italian colunans attacked the positions held
by the Austrians, but were easily driven back upon the
brigades in rear. The Austrians then pursuing,

i

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 211

themselves of the high ground about San Martino, but
not being at the moment sufficiently strongly supported,
found it necessary to fall back. Benedek had by now
realised that he had no longer to deal with mere reconnoi-
tring parties, but that practically the whole ItaUan
Army was in his front, and deciding, if possible, to seize
the strong position of San Martino, he attacked it with
three brigades, and after heavy fighting succeeded in
there establishing himself.

He was not, however, to be permitted to remain there
undisturbed ; between 9 and 10 o'clock Cucchiari's
division advanced from the direction of Rivoltella, and
being joined by one of Mollard's brigades, threw itself
against the Austrians. The attack, at first successful,
was repulsed with loss and Cucchiari's troops fell back
across the railway to Rivoltella and San Zeno to reform.
By 10.30, then, all the ItaUan attempts in this portion
of the field had been heavily defeated, and for something
like two hours there was no resumption of hostilities in
this quarter. Benedek, however, did not dare to pursue ;
the Vth Corps on his left was still heavily engaged, and it
seemed best to the Commander of the Vlllth Corps not
to uncover his left flank by any premature advance.

Meanwhile the 2nd Piedmontese Division (Fanti)
was at last in movement from the vicinity of Malocco,
where it had long been awaiting orders. The Emperor
Napoleon had sent for the division to support Bara-
guey's attack upon Solferino, but while on the march to
the centre Victor Emmanuel, seeing the turn which events
had taken in the northern part of the field, directed
Fanti to move to the help of the Italians, ordering him
to place one brigade under the orders of Mollard, while

THE CAMPAIGN OF

6s Madonna™

Fanti himself proceeded with the other towards Madonna"
della Scoperta to assist Durando.

The Emperor Napoleon had now established himself
in front of the centre near the heights which Baraguey's
troops had captured, and he was convinced that here
lay the key of the whole of the Austrian position . Neither
on the right or left had any real impression as yet been
made upon the enemy's battle line, and the Emperor
now decided to attempt to help the efforts of his flanks

■ breaking through in the centre. He then ordered
d'Alton's brigade of Forey's division (which had not
yet been engaged) to advance, but it was received with
BO terrible a fire that it was unable to push far forward,
and General Forey, who bad himself led the brigade,
then called for reinforcements. These were at once
forthcoming : Camou's division of the Imperial Guard
was ordered to support Baraguey's corps — Picard'
brigade being directed along the heights to the left, while
that of Man^que supported d' Alton.

This fresh attack was irresistible ; covered by the
of two batteries of the artillery of the Guard, the Tower
and the Monte di Cipressi were now taken with a rush,
while further to the left Bazaine — whose batteries had been
pounding the walls of the cemetery— now sent forward
his infantry. Joined by some battalioM of Ladrairault's
division the cemetery was now stormed and finally
carried with the bayonet, and the defenders, falling back,
evacuated the village of Solferino, leaving several
and many prisoners in the hands of the French.

hile m

While these events were passing in the centre, MacMahMt '

_l

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 213

— hearing from Niel that he was about to move on Cav-
riana — was now able to take ground to his left and connect
with the Guard. He therefore gave instructions to La
Motterouge to march on Solferino, followed by the
2nd Division under Decaen. To obviate the danger of
any gap being thus formed between his own corps and
Dedvaux's Cavalry Division, MacMahon ordered the
cavalry of the Guard — which had been placed at his dis-
posal — ^to take post on his right. In the south General
Niel, who with his single corps had more than stood
his ground against the troops of Schwartzenberg and
Schaf^otsche, now, about 11 a.m., saw the heads of
the columns of another Austrian corps — that of Weigl —
entering upon the field from the direction of Castel
Grimaldo.

Vinoy had by this time turned Crenneville's men
out of the farm north of Baite, but to capture and hold
it, as also the line Rebecco— Baite — main road, against all
the attacks of the Austrians, had used up practically
the whole of Niel's reserves. At last, however, his
repeated calls upon Canrobert for co-operation met
with some response ; Renault's division of the Ilird
Corps had already been sent to cover de Luzy's right
flank south of Rebecco, and becoming easier in his mind
in regard to the approach of the mythical men from
Mantua, Canrobert placed one of Trochu's brigades at
Niel's disposal, retaining the other at Medole, while
Bourbaki's division remained near Castel Goffredo to
watch the roads from the south and south-east.

In the centre Ladmirault, whose division had suffered
heavily, was left to hold Solferino ; Bazaine was directed

214 THE CAMPAIGN OF

to foDow SUdioB, wbo had retired towards Pozzolengo ;
Farey*sdmBkin, witli the Gturd, was ordered on Oavriana ;
lAile MacHahon moved forward npoa Caasiano — which
was ooeopied wiAoot much difficulty — aad then stormed
tbe Monte Fontana in rear, held by two brigades of the
ViltJi Coips. This, too, was captured and guns brought
op to it. It was now aboat 2 p.m. MacMahon. then,
seeing that the Goard had not yet been able to get up
into line with him, and that the Auetrians were now
again threatening to strike between himself and Niel,
decided to make no onwud moveloent for the present
and to content himself with merely holding his ground.
The AustriaQs, however, made a desperate attempt to
r^ain possession of the hil], and for some time their
adversaries had considerable difficulty in retaining
poaaession, and it was not indeed until MacMahon had
ordered a general advance of his whole corps, supported
by a powerful artillery and a brigade of the Imperial
Guard, that the remnant of tbe two gallant AustriaD
brigades of Wallon and Wusaia were finally swept off
the Monte Fontana and hurled back to Cavriana, where
shells were already falling.

Supported now by the fire of forty-two guns, Niei in tl»
south was still holding out against his numerous foes, and
strengthened by the arrival of the brigade brought him
by Trochu, and which he placed in rear of his centre, he
even threw forward the few troops he still had in hand to
the attack of Guidizzolo. This village was, however,
held in great strength and the battalions which Niel had
sent against it were obliged to fall back upon Baite.
Canrobert bad now at last, abottt 3 p.m., satisfied him-

i

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 215

self that the right of the army was in no danger of sur-
prise, and he therefore drew Bourbald's division from the
neighbourhood of Castel Goffredo nearer to the IVth
Corps, whereupon Niel ordered Trochu to send Bataille's
brigade to the attack of Guidizzolo. The Conunander
of the First Austrian Army had, ere this, received orders
from his Emperor to endeavour to reUeve the pressure on
the centre by bringing round his left and then striking
with his whole strength at the flank of the French centre.
It was, however, abeady impossible to carry out the
Emperor's wishes. The Ilird and IXth Corps could not
now be withdrawn from the actions in their front and
set free to seek a fresh objective in a new direction ;
the cavalry had left the field ; and the Xlth Corps —
which as a body might yet have been used effectively —
had been drained away in driblets to fill up gaps and to
strengthen weak points. The few infantry reserves, too,
which now emerged from Guidizzolo, preparatory to
marching on Cassiano and Solferino, were charged and
checked by the French cavalry of the Guard connecting
MacMahon and Niel.

Bataille's brigade moved with great &an upon
Guidizzolo, but although the Austrians were driven in
and many prisoners were taken, the French were unable
to penetrate into the town.

In the centre, however, the Guard and the Ilnd Corps
had now captured Cavriana, and in the northern part of
the field only had the Austrians been able to hold — and
more than hold — their own.

The four brigades in Benedek^s front line had endured
and beaten back the attacks of the ItaUan divisions of

H 216

^M HoOu

^M oveitl

^M tiiis p

^F two hi

I

HofUrd and Coccliiari, and had iodeed so completely
oveitlirowTi them that about 1 o'clock the battle in
tJiis poftioD of the field had died down, and for some
two hours there was no more heard " the voice of them
that shoat fw mastery and the noise of them that cry,
being overcome." Benedek was still in ignorance of the
fact that Galdini's div-ision was detached and that
Durando was engaged about Madonna della Scoperta
with the right wing of the Vth Corps. He only kncT
with whom he had been fighting, and had no idea by
whom the action might be renewed.

After two o'clock, as the Italians were again gathering
for the attack, Benedek heard of the renewal of the
assault, in overwhelming force, upon Solferino, and
received an order from Count Schlick to endeavour to
make a diversion against the left of the French. Tliis was
shortly followed by a query from Imperial Headquarters
whether it was possible for the Vlllth Corps to detach
troops to the assistance of the Austrians about Solfenno.
Benedek wisely decided that neither of these proposab
were practicable and that he could best help to gain
the day by the defeat of the enemy already in hia front.
It was clear to him that the King of Italy had not yet
fully developed his attack and the force in his front
seemed to be momentarily increasing in strength. To
send any real help to Solferino he must detach at least two
complete brigades, and he did not feel any confidence
that he could at the moat hold his ground with the
troops then remaining, while the loss of his position
would entail that of Pozzolengo, in rear of which lay the
line of retreat of the Second Army.

About 3 p.m., the first reports reaching Benedek of the

J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 217

commencement of the retreat of the Vth Corps, he
withdrew four battalions from his position and sent
General Reichlin wi£h them to occupy some hills to the
south and south-west of Pozzolengo, so as both to secure
the right flank of the Vlllth Corps and also cover the
retirement of the Vth. Reichlin reached his intended
position about 4 p.m. — relieving there the rearguard of the
Vth Corps — and was almost inunediately attacked by
the brigade Piedmont of Fanti's division, wWoli, ordered
to support Durando, had pushed forward by Madonna
della Scoperta, then vacated by the troops under
Stadion. Since then Mollard, with Fanti's other brigade,
was at this moment preparing to attack San Martino in
front, while Cucchiari was operating against it from the
direction of Rivoltella and San Zeno, it will be realized
that Benedek's position was thus endangered from
three sides.

Shortly after four, o'clock the Vlllth Corps received
orders to retire and cross the Mincio at Salionze. Bene-
dek, however, was determined to hold his ground until
the Vth Corps had got well away and until he had sent
off his wounded and trains ; it seemed clear to him, too,
that any attempt to cross at SaUonze with his whole
corps must interfere with Stadion's retirement, so he
arranged for two brigades with the ammunition reserve
columns to pass the river at Peschiera.

About 5 o'clock a tremendous rain and thunder-
storm — accompanied by intense darkness — broke over the
whole field, and in other portions of it put an end to the
fighting and assisted the Austrian retreat ; in front of
San Martino, however, the battle was resumed and
continued to rage.

2i8 THE CAMPAIGN OF

Reichlin was driven from his position and forced to
retire on Monzambano, but the remainder of the corps
fought mi^nificently up to and during the retreat, which
Benedek only cotamenced about 9 p.m. — himself leading
one last desperate counter-attack which overthrew the
Italians and secured a practically unmolested retire-
ment for the much-tried Vlllth Corps. By 3 a.m. on
the 25th the pass^e of the Mincio was accomplished, as
arranged, at Sahonze and Pescbiers.

The First Army bad fallen back long before. As early
as 2 p.m. Wimpfien, having no cavalry at hand, seeing
no signs of the Ilnd Corps, and all bis reserves having
long since been thrown into the %ht, had reported to the
Emperor Franz Josef that he could no longer hold his
ground ; he directed that the IXth Corps should fall
back upon Goito, the Ilird by C-erlungo to Fern, while
the Xlth Corps covered the retreat of both and eventu-
ally retired by Goito to Roverbella. When about 3 p.m.
the Emperor heard of the capture of Solferino and Caasiano
and the retreat of the Vth and lat Corps, he gave instruc-
tions that the Vth Corps should fall back %hting to
Pozzolengo, and that Schlick — gathering up all the still
effective units of the Second Army — should take up'a
fresh position about Cavriana and hold his ground
there as long as possible. The Austrian Emperor did
not at that time regard the loss of Solferino as implying
the loss of the battle, and hoped that with the 1st and
VTIth Corps he might yet be able to hold back the
French in the centre, while the stroke which he had
ordered Wimpffen to make fell upon the flank of the
advancing enemy. But it was not long before news

I

J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 219

reached the Emperor at Gavriana that the First Army
had akeady begim to fall back and therewith vanished all
hope of re-establishing the fight. The Emperor then
ordered a retreat behind the Mincio, and Schlick — direct-
ing the Vllth to make as protracted a stand as possible at
Gavriana and at Volta — withdrew his remaining corps
from the battlefield.

The fatigue of the Allies, and the heavy storm which at
5 p.m. descended upon the field, put an end to the fight-
ing and checked all pursuit ; the Austrian corps fell back
unhindered, and by the evening of the 25th they had all
regained the positions on the left bank of the Mincio
which they had quitted on the morning of the 23rd.
Even then, however, the rest they so greatly needed
was not assured, for the Emperor Franz Josef directed
that in the event of any serious attack upon the line of
the Mincio on the 25th, the retreat should be continued to
the banks of the Adige.

The losses sustained by the units of both armies were
as follows : —

AUSTBIANS.
First Army: — OflQcers.

nird Corps 109 .

»»

»»

IXth
Xlth

Zedtwitz's Cavalry Div.
Second Army :—

1st Corps ....
Vth „ ....
Vllth „ ....

vnith,, ....

Mensdorff's Cavalry Div.

130

61

2

90'
124
34
79
10

Men.
3,098
4,219
2,140
37

2,734
4,318
1,844
2,636
172

Grand Total •

639 officers & 21,098 mea.

I

THE CAMPAIGN OF

Of which there

wore Uiled

. 94 offioera 2,198 men

„ wounded

. 500

10,307 .,

.. .. „

„ miseing

. 45

8,593 ..

Allii

s.

Killed.

Wounded.

lining.

Iniporwl Gnarc

181 . .

"Ot .

63

Ist Corpa . .

610 . .

3,1C2 ,

. 659

Ilnd „ . .

234 . .

986 .

. 275

nird „ . .

37 . .

257 .

19

IVth ,. . .

580 . .

3,421 .

. 502

Italian Army

GDI . .

3,572 .

. 1,258

Grand Total

2,313 . . .

12,102 .

. 2.776

Out of which the French had 117 officers killed and 6i4
wounded ; the Italians had 49 officers killed and 1G7
wounded. The casualties among the senior officers was
very heavy on both sides ; the Auatriana had four general
officers wounded, the French five and the Italians two,
and of these latter two of the French and one of the
Italians died of their wounds. Among, too, those of
junior rank, who this day died for France, there was one
who bore a name associated with the triumphs of the
First Napoleon upon Italian soil ; this was Lieut. -Col.
Junot, Duke of Abrantes, Chief of the Stafi to General
de Failly.

That lught the Allied Army bivouacked where the
end of the battle had left them — the troops of Victor
Emmanuel at San Martino, the Ist French Corps at
Solferino, the Ilnd at Cavriana, the IlIrd at Rebecco,
the IVth between Medole and Guidizzolo, the Guard
and Imperial Headquarters at Cavriana, and the cavalry
of Desvaux and Partouneaux about Guidizzolo.

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 221

Of the battle itself Hamley says : " There was no exhibi-
tion on either side of strategical art ; none of the move-
ments on either side since the battle of Magenta had
altered the chances of success ; and the result was alto-
gether due to tactics." He cites the battle of Solferino
as a good illustration of the necessity for moving as
compactly and as nearly in fighting order as possible
when in the vicinity of the enemy. " Both armies,"
he says, "had reconnoitred the country between the
Chiese and Mincio ; each expected to find its adversary
awaiting it behind the river ; neither anticipated the
encounter ; but the French Army was by far the best
prepared for it by the order of its march." Further
Hamley points out that the peculiar conformation of the
hill of Solferino — ^the back steep, scarped and accessible
by but one winding path and with nearly two miles of
broken ground between it and the hills about Gavriana
—minimised its advantage as an advanced post in front
of the general position ; he would have had it either left
altogether unoccupied or have advanced the whole line
of battle so as to include it.

The cause of the victory of the Allies at Solferino,
Moltke finds in the better leading of the French, but
above all in the fact that the Austrian Commander had
no general reserve anywhere at his own disposal. The
Austrian Army, too, had only quite recently been re-
organised, and the three years' term of universal military
service had been only some two years established, so
that the army was practically composed of recruits.
The supply arrangements of the Austrians were through-
out faulty and frequently came altogether to a stand-
still. The actual rations were insufficient for men

eodoiiog the hardships of field service, since they only
received hali a pound of meat a man per diem and
were not pennitt«d to cook their food oftener than
once in twenty-four houiB.

To the objection made by some that the Austrians
fought with a river at their backs, Lecomte points out
that in this particular case, where the Mincio waa
spanned by numerous bri<^e3 and also covered by two
fortresses, the usual dai^ers and inconveniencea of such
a position were reduced to a minimum. The best proof
of the correctness of his assertion is that the Austrian
retirement was easily and rapidly conducted, although
at the same time it is not improbable that a knowledge
of the riaka of their position induced them to fall back
full early.

Kiistow seeks the chief reasons for the Austrian over-
throw in the fact that owing to the Austrian force hav-
ing been divided into (wo armies, the Emperor Franz
Josef — nominally the Commander-in- Chief — had no
troops, and especially no general reserve, at his own dis-
posal, and that consequently each army fought for its
own hand. Further, up to and after 10 a.m. the Aus-
trian Staff refuiied to believe that a general action had
long since commenced, and thrust brigade after brigade,
as each came up, into the fight, where they were at
once overpowered by superior numbera at the particu-
lar point, 80 that when any real reinforcement was
required none was to hand. But Riistow very truly re-
marks that it was not gun or rifle or even tactics which
won the day at Solferino, but the offensive spirit which
was wanting in the Austrian leaders ; and in support of

^ k

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 223

this statement he points out that the Austrians, who
crossed the Mincio simply and solely to attack the Allies,
had'no sooner met them than they took up defensive
positions.

THE PEACE OF VILLAFRANCA

CHAPTER X

THE PBAOB OF VILLAFBAKOA

Aftbb the battle of Solf eiino — ^whereat the French olaim
to have captured 2 Colours^ 30 guns and 6,000 pris-
oners — ^no pursuit of the Austrians was attempted, even
on the 25th, on which day the Trench moved quietly
forward — ^the 1st Corps to the vicinity of Pozzolengo
and the IVth to Volta. The rest of the Allied Army
remained in the positions of the previous night with
the exception that the Ilird Corps replaced the 1st at
Solferino, leaving one of its divisions at Guidizzolo with
the cavalry of Desvaux and Partouneaux.

The Austrians, on recrossing the Mincio, had either
destroyed or prepared for destruction all the bridges
in their rear ; orders had been issued, as has been al-
ready mentioned, that in the event of serious attack the
Mincio line was not to be held, but that the army should
fall back behind the Adige ; on the morning of the 27th,
however, a fresh order was given out that the troops
should hold their ground, making none the less every
preparation for orderly retirement in case of need. In
the course of the day the Emperor Franz Josef visited
the Headquarters of both armies, and, in reply to in-
quiries, was assured by their Commanders that it was

227

THE CAMPAIGN OF

doubtful whetttei their men would stand against aay
real attack and the adviaability of retirement behind
the Adige was u^ed. The Emperor then finally de-
cided that the army should withdraw from the line of
the Mincio, and that night the outposts of both armies fell
quietly back ; leaving the bivouac fiies alight, the
Austriana retired, and duiing the course of the 28th
the Second Army was already in position on the left
bank of the Adige and about Verona, the First Aimy
falling into line the next day.

The Emperor Napoleon bad decided that, prior to
marching on Verona, it was necessary to reduce the fort-
ress of Feschiera, the posaession of which was important
to cover his main line of operations, to serve as a base
for any onward movements, and to assure, if such became
necessary, bis line of retreat. The siege operations
had been entrusted to the Italians, who took up a line
from Ponti to RivolteUa, and on the 26th Baraguey
d'HiUiers pushed one of his divisions on to Monzambano
in their support. On the 28th the 1st Corps crossed the
river to Caaa Prentina, while on the day following, Niel —
who for his share in the victory of Solferino had been
created a Marshal of France — moved to Botghetto and
Valeggio, the Italians eatabiishing on the 30th their
5th Division at Saliouze.

On July 1 the Headquarters of King Victor Em-
manuel were moved to Pozzolengo, his 3rd and 5th
Divisions were placed on the left of the lat Coijw, and
the investment of Peschiera was complete. On this day
the whole of the remainder of the French Army was
transferred to the left bank of the Mincio, crossing

I

I

I
crossing at J

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 229

BMoQEambano, Borghetto and Fozzolo, and occupied
poBitionB — ^the lat Corps at Oliosi, the Ilnd at Santa
Lucia, and the IVtli at Custoza ; the whole of the rest
of the French Army was about Valeggio, except Bour-
bald's division, which was at Gfoito. The cavalry were
occupied in pushing forward parties towards Mantua,
and also towards the Oglio to meet Prince Napoleon,
whose corps actually joined the main army on the 3rd.

On the 2nd MacMahon had moved to Villafranca and
Niel to Sommacompagna, while the Ist Corps occupied
Castelnuovo and Cavalcaaelle,

The measured movements of the' Allies, which had
given the enemy breathing time after the battle of
Solferino, are said to have been due, in the first instance,
to a deficiency of supphes and to the fact that these,
even when forthcoming, could not be brought up, as all
transport was required for the evacuation of the wounded
of both armies— one might almost say of all three, since
very many of the Austrian wounded had of necessity
been left on the field ; in the second instance, to the
tardy arrival of the material required for the prosecu-
tion of the siege of Peschiera. Already on June 16
orders had been sent to France to expedite the dispatch
of the necessary siege guna, for which the projectiles
and the fuzes were still in course of manufacture in
French arsenals. On Jidy 3, however, part of the siege
park arrived at Pozzolengo, and a week later the French
were able to commence the establishment of their bat-
teries before Peschiera.

A very brief account must now be given of the opera-
tions which had been carried out in the mountains of

TffE CAMPATCy OF

Tyrol and of tlioae which i

Wo I

! pn^ccted {

> unoii tlmt the Vltb Cbrps AutA wilfc I

alti^rnate a
<11"tiiti<il liy tliu vHoillAtiiiK methods i
II«itil<]iiiirt<<r KUfT, und that its CotnnutnHw had beoi
iirilnmil t<n mipport thu westward mDvemetit of Jane
U;i, wliloti culminated in the defeat at SoUenoo, by poob-
lii|t fiirwunl towHrdH Halo iind Oavardo. At this tiine
Aiuitriiiii gHrriHoiM were besieged in Rocca d'Anfo and
Ilnitiilliiii ; tlifi liittitr place toll and the required advance
III H«l» wiM iiiiw Bcarooly practicable and was not indeed
Miirrii'ii iMit, l.hti Vlth Corps falUtig back to cover the
upiiniHtiliiM tiu th» Upper Adigc.

On tlin aOth, Oialdini'n division had occupied Apnea,
Kiliili), lln*Mo, tjavoiiOTin and Salo, while Garibaldi's
|iri>ii[iii Imii nilvuiiriiil into the Valt«1in ; the principal
viil1i\vN and lliii wcMtwnrd approaches thereto, being
I'liiiN luiUI and surt<gtinnlcd, iliere was no longer any fear
fiir (III) li>rt< tlnn1( and n^iar of tlio Allied Army, since the
Villi (\)r|w WUH thuH bold complotely in checti:. The J
I rniiiiN miller (Hnldin! and Garibaldi — the latter was early 1
III July oX Tirimo with oloven battalions and several
liiili'IwiuliMii lAOiupiMiieH — were not to be the only force
Kvnllitblti for nervioe in the mountains. Another infan-
try diviiiinn, that of General Hugues, left France on
Jldy .'t, and wa« Bont on to Urescia, there to form a
»il|iprirt to tho Italian tjoojis operating in Tyrol.

Till' Uftvy, too, was ready to oilect a diversion by strik-
iti(( at Venice, which had been blockaded since June 1 |
by 11 Minall Hipiadron under Rear-Admiial Jurien de la |
Onivii^ro, On June 12 the main fleet sailed from Toulon j
iiiul uriivod III) iho 2Ut at Antivari, where, being joined j

MAGENTA AND SOLFERINO, 1859 231

by four Italiaji ships, Admiral Komain Desfoss^s now
united under hia command 50 ships of war, mounting
800 guns. From Antivari the fleet proceeded to the
Island of Loaaini, which had been chosen to serve as an
advanced base for future naval operations ; the island is
only a few hours' sail from Venice and is almost equi-
distant from Trieste, Pola, Fiume and Zara. The orders
given to the Admiral in command were to force an
entrance to the harbour of Venice, penetrate into the
lagoons and bombard the forts. The ships had only
embarked 1,000 infantry and artillery for landing pur-
poses, but it was the intention of the Emperor Napoleon
to send forward, at a favourable moment, a corps to
operate from Venice upon the Austrian communications.
General WimpSen — who had been promoted from bri-
gadier after Magenta — was nominated to the command
of the mihtary forces intended to be landed upon the
shores of the Adriatic, and a body of 8,000 men had been
ordered to embark in Algeria to form the nucleus of
Buch a force.

There are three main channels of approach to Venice —
that by the Lido, by Malamocco and by Chioggia, and
the last had been selected as the point where the fleet
should force an entrance.

The following then were the dispositions of the Emperor
Napoleon for carrying ou the war : on the left, by the
operations of Cialdini and Garibaldi, to threaten the
Austrian right and the line of the Adige; in the centre,
having possessed himself of Peschiera, to capture
Verona ; and with the fleet to attack and seize Venice,
nmng that town as a base whence to launch attacks upon
the Austrian line of communications.

333 THE CAMPAIGS OF

But at this niomeut the Emperor Napofem ^acovered
signs that the proaecutioD of tbe w»r mi^ poaaib^
roBult in \i» l)eing no longer confined to the time Fbwen
now engaged, and that France might be caOed npan to
fight nut only on the Adjge but abo on the Bhine. He
decichMl then that it would be inexpedient to li^ " ee
qii'U n'eat permit d un souverain de mettre en feu que poor
Findfpendance de son pays," and being deaiious of dis-
covering the vicwB of the Emperor of Anstiia, he sent
General Kleury to him at Verona on July 6, proposing
a iiit8|)oneion of arms. At the same time he wisely nude
all preparations for the continnation of the siege of Pes-
ohiora and for the protection of the besieging force ;
and with this object the French Army took up a position
iioxt morning on the hills bordering the Tione, having
it« Icit at Casteinuovo, where was the 1st Corps, its right
at Valeggio held by the Illrd, the centre being made up
by tlio ! Vtli ( iorps at Oliosi and the Ilnd at Santa Lucia ;
in roar wero the Vth Corps and the Imperial Guard.

In the meantime, however, General Fleury had re-
tiirnnd from Verona with the acceptance of the proposed
armiHtioe, and all hostile movements both bj land and
MA wore at once suspended. The terms of the armistice
signed on the 8Ui, provided for a suspenaion of arms until
August 15, and for lines of demarcation between the
rupnotive armies ; but on the 11th there was a meeting
botwoon the two emperors at Villafranca, and the condi-
tions of peace — finally ratified at Zurich in the following
November — were then discussed and afterwards drawn
up, By this treaty Austria was to cede Lorabardy to
Napoleon, who was then to hand it over to Piedmont ;
the Italian States were to be amalgamated into a con-

I

federation under the Pope ; but Venice, thougli forming
part of this confederation, was to remain under Austrian
rule.

Napoleon had entered upon the campaign announcing
his intention of " freeing Italy from the Aipa to the
Adriatic." It has been said, however, " that he wished
Italy to be free, but did not want ItaUan unity ;
rather did he desire the formation of a confederacy
wherein France could always make her own pre-
dominance felt in the Peninsula." Circumstances in the
end, however, proved to be too strong for him; the pro-
visional government in Florence suddenly determined
to unite Tuscany to Piedmont, and Romagna, Emilia,
Farma and Modena at once followed suit. " In the con-
vention of Plombi^res it had been agreed that in the
event of a kingdom of eleven million inhabitants being
established from the Alps to the Adriatic, Piedmont
would cede Savoy to France. As, however, by the treaty
of Villafranca, Venetia had remained under the Austrian
yoke, no more had been said about cession of territory,
but, by the aimexation of Central Italy, the number of
Victor Emmanuel's subjects was now augmented to
eleven million. In order to induce Napoleon to approve
of such an annexation, Cavoui ofiered him Savoy, but
the Emperor claimed Nice as well." These were ceded
to France in March, 1860, and thus, by a strange irony
of fate, Savoy, the cradle of the dynasty whose reigning
representative had made Italy a kingdom, and Nice
Garibaldi's native province, became the spoils of the Ally.

APPENDIX A.

ORDRE DE BATAILU: OE THE SARDINIAN ARMY

OH THE 4TH JUNE, 1869.

Caalelboigo.

it Bds. (GniutdiBn)
OolUuia.

Std BenUUeri .
1st GrgnsdlsD .
£iid
end Bde. (BaTor).

8ri D1VI310S.
Daruido.
Ut Bde. (Cuneo).

todBano^il
IMh Beglmant .

ToUlolScdlXvUon

2Dd Bde. (SttTOdi).

Totkl ol tth IHtUoh

Mil DlViaiOS.
ODOcUad.
iBt Bdt (0*BdB).
PattbMnga.

SthBeiBs0Wil

asdBds.UoaoI).

TotdoUHhUiUon

Total oIOftT-DlTiBiaD

■d "

ORDER

3 O

Flffj'ctivrs.

Men. Hor.-ii's.

5.4H3

'i.222

(lu MacJVlu.ti<.»xft .

1«< Infantry l>£9^£jit\
(le la Molleroii

1st Bdi'. Jji.»J'cl>vro _

AlK. TiraillFH.

45th R">rt. .
2n<I Btlo. (le 1»<»11»«^m

fl5th Rcgt. -

70tli .,

Artillery

Tot>u. 1

^

CS

2nd InfafUry

1st B<io. (Jaiilfc.
nth ChasHeui-**
7lHt R<^Kt. -
72ini ., ^•^^♦^.^

2ii<l Z«»uavPH
iHt Ktrangcr**

2ii<i ••

ArttUery

Ockudin d^

IT'illa.lM*'

4tli Cli»*»»«»i«
7tti

ft. c»m4

•*

>,:.! t

rental, iiicludlr^K Oo»-«
^ lory (1& R'^'^«> -
Of wlii<-h, actually e

2.:JOs) :

2U.2II* 2.;ioi> ;

1 5T la

2n<l 1
ith
lit

1

APPENDIX B.

OBDRB DE BATAILLE OP THE SARDINIAN ABMT

ON THE 24TH JUNE, 1859.

3rd Beni^ert
2nd Brigade.

arrf DIVISION.
Uollurd.

£ud BereagllFri

Artillery '.

Total .

I I

IE 11,161 400

.tflrigafle.
Wh Seglmeat

1

1

Bffeoti™.

1

1

4

_

_

_

_

2nd Brigade.

'

9

-

-

-

eth^^^B. :

Total . .

i

:

Is

=

E

J?_

>-

-i?.

i?;Hr

m

HA DiFiaiotr.

CnochUri.

iBt Brigade.

8tli BBtiaglteri ,
£nd Brigade.
Oozianl.
17tli Eeglment .

-

-

"

-

AtttUety . .
Total . .

z

z

li

-

-

JL

_*

la

M^

uo

DIVISION.

Sambny.

latBdo. Bonoai .

anflBdo. 8»i'olrom

HoiMArtmny.

Total . .

^

6

12

-

E

21.

i?

^-

M«

DEitB ALPI.

Garibaldi.

1st BogtiBeut . .

8

-

-z

z

r

Cavalry . .

^

1

-

_

_

Total . .

\*

\~

\^

V^Nia

^

j

tmM»m.

lirtBdt 1

—

ll«ML

=

=

ma Bd<

E

Alj

; TM4

—

1

lit Bde 1

IStill
gndBib

soth:

•-1,

=

z

e.<M£

-

1,

-

ethHiui

—

^

_

1 —

BSfl

-

-

21,(Sfl

sas

181.028

«BS

i

1

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