LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA.
Class
MCDOWELL AND TYLER
CAMPAIGN OF BULL RUN
JAMES B. FRY,
RETIRED.
Assistant Adj t-General, with Rank of Colonel.
Brevet-Major-General U. S. A.
Adj t-Gen l to Gen l McDowell, from May to Nov., 61.
NEW YORK:
D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER,
1884,
COPYRIGHT, D. VAN NOSTKAND, 18S4.
PREFACE.
AMEMOEIAL volume of the late General Daniel
Tyler contains an account by him of the Bull
Bun campaign of 1861. This account does great
wrong to the commanding General in that campaign.
The volume is edited by the distinguished author
Donald G. Mitchel. The title page says that "two
hundred copies of this volume have been privately
printed by Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, New Haven."
It is stated in the preface that " the volume opens
with a fragment of autobiography written at the in
stance of his esteemed friend Major-General George
W. Cullum, who proposed preparing from it his biog
raphy for the West Point Alumni Association. This
fact will explain its comparative reticence with respect
to his private lite, and its fullness in military and en
gineering details. It is believed that he had fully in
tended its completion, but the cares of business and
the infirmities of age unfortunately forbade. Yet his
friends will recognize in this fragment his straight
forwardness; his sturdy outspoken positiveness of
opinion ; his ever- active energy ; and they will not be
sorry to see, in this record of his, traces of his courage
in maintaining his own convictions of his directness
225759
4 PREFACE.
of speech, and of his honest wrath at what he counted
(perhaps sometimes hastily) vaporous incompetence,
wherever encountered."
The contents of memorial volumes privately printed
are not, usually, proper subjects for criticism. But
this is an exception. De mortuis nil nisi bonum is
a worthy maxim ; but the living are entitled to some
thing. General Tyler wrote an account of the cam
paign of Bull Kun, and sent it to General Cullurn
for history. General Cullum has not published it, but
it has been printed, distributed, deposited in public
libraries, and reviewed in at least one newspaper.
The subject treated by General Tyler is public, his
toric and important. For the foregoing reasons it
has been deemed fair to subject his Autobiography to
examination by the records, notwithstanding he is
dead and his contribution to history appears in a memo
rial volume. When a man writing of those associated
with him in the defence of his country, makes defama
tory allegations which are contradicted by official re
ports and sworn statements his own among them,
recorded twenty years before dead or alive, his mis
takes should be pointed out.
J. B. F.
NEW YORK CITY, May, 1884.
INTRODUCTORY.
r PHE New York Evening Post some weeks
*- ago contained a communication entitled
"New Memoirs of the War of the Rebel
lion" "Reminiscences of a Gallant Soldier."
Under these striking captions a review was
given of what is called a memorial volume,
"in part an autobiography of the late Gen
eral Daniel Tyler." The printing of this
volume, it is said in the Post, "illustrates
and confirms the correctness of a remark often
made, that the true and full history of theWar of
the Rebellion cannot be written until sufficient
time has elapsed to allow the many diaries,
letters and private papers of the chief partici
pants in its stirring scenes to be made accessible,
consequent upon their death, to the gene
ral public. For this volume contains a new
and unpublished account of the first battle of
Bull Run, July 20, 1861" (should be 21), "and
of the preceding skirmish of Blackburn s Ford,
July 17" (should be 18), " written by the
subject of this memoir, who, it will be remem
bered, was in immediate command of the
troops engaged in the skirmish, and second
6 INTRODUCTORY.
in command under McDowell on the day of the
battle." It is due to McDowell, as well as to
history, that the account of Blackburn s Ford
and Bull Run here mentioned, written by
Tyler himself, under date of May 1, 1881, to
be used after his death, and now given to the
"general public" by his friends, should be
somewhat carefully considered. It is strange
that a man of Tyler s ability and experience
could, without referring to the records, write,
in his memoir, an account of military operations
which took place nearly twenty years before.
Feeling some apprehension in writing from
memory, he says : " This ends my recollections
of the battle of Bull Run, and of my official con
nection therewith Since it is now some twenty-
three" (it was not twenty) " years since this
unfortunate battle was fought, I may have
made some mistakes, although I think not ;
but before completing this memoir I purpose
to examine the official reports of that battle,
converse with such officers as were connected
with me in the contest, and correct any mis
takes or errors which may be contained in this
part of my memoirs." That he did not suc
ceed in correcting all the mistakes and errors,
if he made any examination at all, will appear
further on.
MCDOWELL -HIS APPOINTMENT-
HIS ARMY-TYLER.
WHEN the year 1861 opened, McDowell,
forty -three years of age, and in the full
vigor of manhood, was a major in the Adjutant-
General s Department. His habits were unex
ceptionable, and he was blessed with good health
and great physical power. Schooled, as a youth,
in France, and graduated from the Military
Academy (1838), he was always a close student
of his profession, and was well informed upon
general subjects, but was without political
antecedents or acquaintances. He was one of
the most active soldiers of his day and gained
distinction in the Mexican War. Full of energy
and patriotism, when the crisis approached in
1861, he was positive in his opinions and clear
and forcible in the expression of them. He
insisted that all efforts to conciliate would fail,
that the Southern States, one after another,
would be dragged into secession, that war was
inevitable, and that it was the plain duty of the
8 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
government to prepare for it with all possible
dispatch. He was on duty in Washington
inspecting the regular troops assembled there
prior to the inauguration of President Lincoln.
Highly esteemed by General Scott and gaining
the confidence and friendship of Secretary
Chase, it is not strange that McDowell was the
first junior officer to attract attention from that
administration which met rebellion at the thresh
old of the White House on the 4th of March,
1861. He was assigned to mustering and .organ
izing the militia of the district, and was in com
mand of the Capital during part of April and
May. The seventy-five thousand three-months
men called for by the President s proclamation
of the 15th of April were assembling at the Cap
ital, and it was necessary to have commanders
for them. McDowell was appointed Brigadier-
General in the regular army, May 14, 1861 . Prior
to that, Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield, Inspector-
General, an officer in whom General Scott re
posed great confidence, was assigned to com
mand in Washington. Mansfield was McDow
ell s senior. He entered the army in 1822, and
held the grade of colonel, whereas McDowell
entered in 1838, and (prior to his selection
for brigadier) was only a major. Though he
thought highly of McDowell, General Scott
was not in favor of his sudden advancement to
the grade of brigadier -general, and was quite
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 9
unwilling that he should be put above Mans
field. As soon, therefore, as practicable after
the President promoted McDowell, General
Scott insisted that Mansfield should be promo
ted to the same grade with the same date (May
14 , thus preserving the military superiority
of the latter. The Secretary of War expressed
to McDowell a purpose to appoint him Major-
General, but McDowell was unwilling under
the circumstances to accept so high a grade.
After the troops had been thrown across the
Potomac by Mansfield during the night of May
23-4, General Scott was told that he must send
either Mansfield or McDowell there to com
mand. He did not wish to send either, but
was wholly unwilling to relieve Mansfield from
command in Washington. Hence he ordered
McDowell. But he advised McDowell to make
a personal request of the Secretary of War not
to be assigned to that command. McDowell
thought he could not do that. He had just
been appointed a General Officer, and he felt
bound to enter promptly and cheerfully upon
the first duty to which the government assigned
him. His refusal piqued General Scott, and
created, on his part, a coldness towards Mc
Dowell.
The enemy was at that time concentrating
south of the Potomac almost in sight of the
dome of the Capitol. McDowell s assignment
10 MCDOWELL AND TYLEK.
not only deprived Mansfield of a part of his
command, but of the most conspicuous part,
that in front of the foe. A little jealousy of
McDowell arose in the army circles about the
headquarters of General Scott, and Mansfield
himself was dissatisfied. In his diary of Sept.
8, 1862, Secretary Chase made the entry,
" General Mansfield came in and talked very
earnestly. * * He spoke of Gen. Scott, said
he had not treated him well ; had placed
McDowell in command over the river last year,
superseding himself. * * He felt himself
wronged, but did his duty to the best of his
ability," etc. (Warden s "An account of the
private and public services of Salmon P.
Chase," p. 466.)
As the Union forces arrived in Washington
from the north they necessarily reported to
Mansfield, and became for the time a part of
his command. He attended diligently to the
duty of equipping and preparing the troops
for the field, but every officer and enlisted man
who was sent across the Potomac changed the
relieved importance of Mansfield and McDowell
by reducing the command of the former arid
increasing that of the latter. In his testimony
before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, McDowell says : General Mansfield felt
hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command
he had divided in two and a portion sent over
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 11
there. I got everything with great difficulty.
Some of my regiments came over very late ;
some of them not until the very day I was to
move the army." When he appealed to Mans
field to hurry forward the troops, the excuse
was they were not supplied with baggage wag
ons. When this was reported to the Quarter
master General, his answer was that he could
furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did
ERRATA.
Page 10 ; seventh liDe from bottom, for " relieved
ead "relative."
Page 40 ; top line, for " latent" read "talent."
his wants partially supplied. He failed to
secure transportation to carry rations with
his army, and had to march trusting that
wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with
provisions and sent to follow him.
He met with much difficulty in getting officers
of experience to command divisions and bri
gades. His division commanders were, Briga
dier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.;
Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon. New Jer
sey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman
and Miles of the regular army.
10 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
not only deprived Mansfield of a part of his
command, but of the most conspicuous part,
that in front of the foe. A little jealousy of
McDowell arose in the army circles about the
headquarters of General Scott, and Mansfield
himself was dissatisfied. In his diary of Sept.
8, Ifi2. Secretary Chase made the entry,
" Gc -~~~o in an( j talked very
earn : *
he
Me 1
SUJ
wr<
ab:
pr
Chase," p. 4ou. ;
As the Union forces arrived in w a^^^
from the north they necessarily reported to
Mansfield, and became for the time a part of
his command. He attended diligently to the
duty of equipping and preparing the troops
for the field, but every officer and enlisted man
who was sent across the Potomac changed the
relieved importance of Mansfield and McDowell
by reducing the command of the former arid
increasing that of the latter. In his testimony
before the Committee on the Conduct of the
War, McDowell says : General Mansfield felt
hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command
he had divided in two and a portion sent over
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 11
there. I got everything with great difficulty.
Some of my regiments came over very late ;
some of them not until the very day I was to
move the army." When he appealed to Mans
field to hurry forward the troops, the excuse
was they were not supplied with baggage wag
ons. When this was reported to the Quarter
master General, his answer was that he could
furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did
not want it till the troops should move. The
result was, the troops which McDowell was to
lead had not all been sent to him by Mansfield
before the day fixed by General Scott for
McDowell s advance. Some of them did not
join until the Sunday before he advanced, and
some not until the very Tuesday on which
he marched to the front. It was only by
great exertion that he succeeded in having
his wants partially supplied. He failed to
secure transportation to carry rations with
his army, and had to march trusting that
wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with
provisions and sent to follow him.
He met with much difficulty in getting officers
of experience to command divisions and bri
gades. His division commanders were, Briga
dier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.;
Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon. New Jer
sey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman
and Miles of the regular army.
MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
At that time Tyler was in Ms sixty-second
year, having been graduated at the U. S.
Military Academy in 1819, and appointed 2d
Lieutenant of Artillery. He remained in the
service as lieutenant until 1834, when he
resigned, dissatisfied at President Jackson s
refusal to appoint him captain in the new
ordnance corps. He was the veteran of Mc
Dowell s army in 1861 . The organization of that
army was: Tyler s (1st) Division, 4 brigades,
9,936 men, four batteries of artillery and a
squadron of cavalry ; Hunter s (2d) Division, 2
brigades, 2,648 men, two and a half batteries of
artillery, and 5 companies of cavalry ; Heintz-
leman s (3d) Division, 3 brigades, 9,777 men,
two batteries of artillery ; Miles (5th) Di
vision, 2 brigades, 6,207 men, three batteries of
artillery, and Runyon s (4th Reserve) Division,
5,752 men, not divided into brigades. Notwith
standing the fact that three of the division
commanders Hunter, Heintzleman and Miles
had spent their lives in the military service
which Tyler had left twenty-seven years before,
and were not greatly his juniors in years,
McDowell gave Tyler the first and largest
division, and entrusted him with the honor of
the advance in the movement upon the enemy.
This is evidence of what may be asserted as a
fact, that McDowell placed confidence in Tyler
and tfea.ted him with profound respect. It hap-
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 13
pened that in two instances during the cam
paign, Tyler s official action met with McDow
ell s disapproval. The first was in relation to
the engagement which Tyler brought on at
Mitchell s and Blackburn s fords, July 18 ;
and the second was the delay which occurred
in Tyler s advance in the early morning of
July 21. McDowell s official expressions con
cerning these occurrences, though not severe,
created a bitterness towards him, on Tyler s
part, which , though occasionally breaking out,
found full vent only through the agency of his
friends after his death, which occurred Novem
ber 30, 1882.
Tyler opens his account of the first Bull Run
by saying : u The first campaign of the War of
the Rebellion, was gotten~np by Gen. McDow
ell and his friends, and was intended to make
him the hero of a short war and of a campaign
begun and ended in the first battle of Bull
Run. All the accounts of that battle thus far
intended for history I refer to Mcolay s and
Prince de Joinville s" (does he mean Comte de
Paris?) "were either written or inspired by
General McDowell and his friends, intending,
so far as possible, to shield his military reputa
tion from the condemnation it so richly de
serves." It is not necessary to comment upon
14 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
this extravagant assertion further than to say
that, if true, the man must have great merits
who can command so many and such able friends
and historians. Tyler continues : "McDowell
has been an expensive ornament to the military
service ; and his courtier-like services in the
salon have immeasurably exceeded his military
services in the field. Commencing at the head
of the army on the breaking out of the late war,
at the end he stood at the foot of the list in
the estimation of the army and the public."
This, no doubt, is a specimen of Tyler s writing
to which the editor of his memorial volume
refers as having Tyler s " impassioned ring."
The right name for it is slander. Having re
lieved himself of this spiteful tirade against a
distinguished officer, who was promoted to the
grade of Major-General long after the war was
over and the claims of its leaders had been
carefully weighed by the government and the
people, Tyler, with characteristic inconsistency,
closes this personal abuse by saying : " In my
account of the battle of Bull Run, I shall only
state what was personal to myself or the troops
under my command." In other words, having
said the worst I can of the man I hate, I shall
now proceed to be just, and shall speak only
of what is personal to myself and my com
mand.
The assertion that the Bull Run Campaign
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 15
" was gotten up by General McDowell and his
friends," is true only in the sense that the peo
pie of the North are the friends referred to. In
a more restricted sense, it would show that
Tyler misunderstood or misrepresented the sen
timent of the time. To suppose that a young
general, without military prestige, without po
litical antecedents having never even voted or
attended a political meeting, never written or
made a speech on a political question in his life
unknown to the country, unacquainted even
with the President or any of his cabinet before
the commencement of the war, should have
stirred up the public press, inflamed the pub
lic mind to force the government to order
an advance into Virginia, is to give an insig
nificant source to a great movement. Mc
Dowell had no such commanding power as to
have a campaign set on foot for his special
benefit. He was simply an instrument used
for purposes which had their origin quite out
of his sphere and beyond the reach of his mod
erate influence. This campaign resulted logi
cally from acts in the history of the country
which can be attributed to no one person, to no
one party. It was the resultant of great politi
cal and social forces which had many of them
moved the nation years before the outbreak
of the rebellion.
There was an unmistakable public demand
16 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
for the advance upon Manassas in July, 1861.
Even General Scott, who held out against it for
a time, was at last forced to yield. Nothing
but blindness or malice can explain the charge
that the campaign was gotten up by McDowell
and his friends for the purpose of making a
hero of him. The assertion is unjust to the
Northern masses, who, impatient under the
wickedness and insolence of the outbreak, de
manded an immediate clash of arms in vindica
tion of outraged loyalty/ The responsibility
for publishing such a charge rests with Tyler s
biographers.
THE ADVANCE.
Tyler says :
" In the order directing the movement of the
army I was instructed to concentrate my com
mand at or near Vienna on the night of the
15th." *
He should have said on the 16th.
This mistake as to date is not a slip of the pen.
It is carried out through his narrative. He says
he was engaged at Blackburn s Ford the 17th ;
and it is a salient point in his narrative, dis
cussed further on, that "it was the delay of
three days succeeding the affair at Blackburn s
Ford that lost the battle of Bull Run." To
get these three days, he counted back from
the well-known 21st of July, and made the
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 17
affair at Blackburn s Ford come off on the 17th,
instead of the 18th,
This error of dates is of no other conse
quence, in the present connection, than to give
one of several instances of Tyler s defective
memory in dealing with questions of the cam
paign.
Another is found in his statement of the
orders under which he marched from Vienna.
On this point his latest statement is that
he was "to move at early dawn in the direc
tion of Centre vill e, ma Flint Hill School-
house." In his testimony in 1862 (Committee
on Conduct of the War, pp. 198-199), he says :
u My line of march was by Vienna to Flint
Hill, and from thence I had authority from
General McDowell to take either route by Fair
fax Court-house, or the route by Germantown,
as my judgment should indicate."
The order given him will be found on page
304, Rebellion Records. It is as follows :
1. u Brigadier- General Tyler will direct his
march so as to intercept the enemy s communi
cation between Fairfax Court-house and Cen-
treville, moving to the right or left of German-
town, as he may find most practicable.
"On reaching Centreville turnpike he will
direct the march of his leading brigade either
upon Centreville or Fairfax Court-house as the
indication of the enemy may require. The
18 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
Second Brigade will move on the road in the
direction not taken by the First. The rear
brigades will be disposed of by the Division
Commander as circumstances may require.
" Should he deem it best a brigade may be
senfc on Fairfax Court-house direct from Flint
It will be noticed that he was to direct his
march so as "to intercept the enemy* s com
munication" between Fairfax Court-house and
Centreville. To do this he was to go either to
the right or left of Germantown not to Fair
fax Court-house as he might see fit.
The discretionary authority for him to send
one of the rear brigades direct on Fairfax
Court-house from Flint Hill has been converted
in his mind into authority for him to go there
himself which would have been inconsistent
with the object of his movement, to intercept
the enemy s communication between the Court
house and Centreville. He omits all reference
to this prime object of his march, and it may
be added, he failed to accomplish it, and has
never in his reports or letters explained this
failure.
Apparently not appreciating the importance
of the part assigned him, Tyler says :
" I moved quietly on towards Centreville,
arriving in sight of that place about four
o clock in the afternoon."
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 19
The enemy, too, bears witness to the quiet
ness of the movement. Captain Del-Kemper,
commanding their rearguard, says (p. 439, Re
bellion Records): "The enemy seemed not
disposed to press us closely, and we reached
Centreville without incident worthy of note
about 12 M.," and General Bonham says (p.
450, Rebellion Records): "The column thus
fell back in perfect order to Centreville. The
enemy not venturing to attack my rear
guard."
In his testimony before the Committee on
the Conduct of the War, Tyler, speaking of
his march from Vienna, says :
u We continued our march until about four
o clock in the evening, and then bivouacked
for the night. I think that was the first mis
fortune of our movement. I think, if we had
gone on to Centreville that night, we should
have been in much better condition the next
day."
This failure to go to Centreville was not the
first misfortune of our movement. An earlier
one, just pointed out, was Tyler s quiet march
and failure to intercept the enemy s communi
cation.
Tyler says he was ordered by McDowell to
halt and bivouac between Germantown and
Centreville. But he omits to say that Tie had
reported to McDowell that his troops could go
20
MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
no further. McDowell reported this fact at the
time (July 17) to Army Headquarters (see p.
305, Rebellion Records). He there stated to
General Scott" I " (McDowell) " endeavored
to pursue beyond Centreville, but the men
were too much exhausted to do so."
Whatever there was of misfortune in our not
going to Centreville that night was due mainly
to Tyler s representations of the condition of
his troops.
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 21
BLACKBURN S FOED.
Tyler says :
"On the night of the 16th [17th] a small
movement of troops could be seen at Centre-
ville ; but nothing, in my opinion intimating
that there was to be any great resistance at
that point, and at daybreak on the morning of
the 17fch [18th] it appeared to me that Centre-
ville had been abandoned by the rebel troops,
which was found to be the case, for Schenck s
brigade leading, marched that morning into
Centreville and occupied it without tiring of a
gun."
According to both Tyler s own report (p. 310,
Rebellion Records) and Richardson s testi
mony before the Committee on the Conduct of
the W ar, p. 19, it was not Schenck s, but Rich
ardson s, brigade that led the march into Cen
treville. Tyler says: " My division moved
from its encampment at 7 A.M. At 9 A.M.
Richardson s brigade reached Centreville and
found that the enemy had retreated the night
before." *
Richardson says : * * " then on the morn
ing of the 18th my brigade took the lead."
*****
Tyler continues his narrative, saying :
u I reported the condition of things to Gen.
McDowell about 7 A.M., and asked for instruc-
22 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
tions ; but up to 11 o clock A.M. I heard noth
ing from the commander of the army."
On p. 312, Rebellion Records, will be found
a copy of the order given Tyler, in writing, the
morning of the 18th. It is as follows :
" HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH
EASTERN VIRGINIA.
"Between Germantown and Centremlle,
" July 18, 1861. 8.15A.M.
" GENERAL :
"I have information which leads me to be
lieve you will find no force at Centreville, and
will meet with no resistance in getting there.
" Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to
Warrenton. Do not bring on an engagement,
but keep up the impression that we are moving
on Manassas.
1 go to Heintzleman s to arrange about the
plan we have talked over.
" Very respectfully, &c.,
"IRVIN MCDOWELL,
"Brigadier General.
" Brigadier General Tyler"
The receipt of this order is not denied. It
was carried to Tyler by McDowell s senior aid-
de-camp, Major afterwards General Wads-
worth (see pp. 46-47, "Report of Committee
on the Conduct of the War"). McDowell s
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 23
headquarters, when that order was written,
were not far from Tyler s, both being between
Germantown and Centreville. It is hardly
possible he did not receive it before eleven
o clock.
The route over which Tyler moved on the
18th of July, was the direct road from Centre
ville to Manassas Junction. That road crossed
Bull Run at MitclieW s Ford not Blackburn s
Foil though a road branching off to Tyler s
left crossed the Eun at Blackburn s Ford, a
short distance below Mitchell s Ford, and led
on thence, though not so directly, to Manassas
Junction.
Tyler s attack covered both fords, but his
artillery was directed mainly against Mitchell s
Ford. These fords were in supporting distance
of each other, and the passage of either could
be effected only by overcoming all the resist
ance at both as well as the reserve in their rear.
The article in the "Post " says : " No one can
arise from the perusal of Tyler s account with
out feeling satisfied that the great blunder of
that unfortunate campaign was, the almost
unaccountable failure of McDowell to allow
Gen. Tyler immediately to follow up the affair
at Blackburn s Ford as the latter desired."
Immediately after writing the order of 8.15
A.M. to Tyler, McDowell went to the extreme
left for the purpose alluded to in the note.
24 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
The note contains all the orders given by Mc
Dowell to Tyler on the 18th, till after the
latter had, of his own motion, passed through
Centre ville and gone down to Bull Run, brought
on an engagement and been repulsed. That af
fair, from beginning to end, was Tyler s, brought
on, continued and ended by him in McDowell s
absence ; and all of Tyler s acts in relation to
it, were either against McDowell s orders or
without his knowledge. The claim that Tyler
desired to follow up the affair at Blackburn s
Ford, but was not allowed by McDowell to do
so, is without foundation. Tyler s report (p.
311) written (July 27, 61), shortly after the
affair, when the facts were fresh in his mem
ory, refutes the claim and shows that lie or
dered the withdrawal, and that he had no
desire to follow up the affair. On the contrary,
it shows a purpose to exculpate himself for
having made the attack, and to throw the
responsibility on his brigade commander, Rich
ardson. He says : u The moment Ayres opened
his fire, the enemy replied with volleys which
showed that the whole bottom was filled with
troops, and that he had batteries established
in different positions to sweep the approaches."
* # This attack on Captain Ayres accom
plished the object I desired, as it showed that
the enemy was in force and disclosed the posi
tion of his batteries ; and Jiad I been at hand tlie
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 25
movement would have ended here" * * " Hav
ing satisfied myself that the enemy was in
force and also as to the position of his batteries,
/ ordered Colonel Richardson to witJidraw It Is
brigade." * * That is Tyler s official state
ment made at the time, of his object in going to
Blackburn s Ford, of what he found there, of
his withdrawal, and of his reasons for with
drawing. His sole and entire responsibility is
fully confessed in his testimony, 1862, before
Committee on Conduct of the War, pages 199,
200. He says: " As soon as /found out the
condition of things 7 sent back for Ayres bat
tery * * and had it brought and put into
position 7 then took Richardson s
brigade and filed it down there to see what there
was in the bottom. * * I sent some skir
mishers into the woods. * * 7 saw an open
ing where we could have a chance to get in a
couple of pieces of artillery, and /ordered Cap
tain Ayres" * * The substance of Tyler s
own report and testimony is that lie directed
everything. The conclusion from all the facts
is unavoidable that it was Beauregard, not
McDowell, who prevented him from going on.
Richardson says (p. 313), after the disastrous
repulse of the 12th N. Y. Volunteers : U I now
reported to General Tyler, and proposed to him
to make a charge with the three remaining
regiments for the purpose of carrying the
26 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
enemy s position. The General replied that the
enemy were in large force and strongly fortified,
and a further attack was unnecessary." In
addition to the foregoing official reports, Tyler
made a sworn statement on this subject. In his
testimony before the Committee on the Conduct
of the War (p. 200), given January 20, 1862, he
says further: 4 1 ordered Captain Ayres to take a
couple of howitzers and go into that opening
and throw some canister shot into the woods.
The very moment he came into battery, it ap
peared to me that there were five thousand
muskets h red at once. It appears by Beaure-
gard s report he had seventeen regiments in
front there. Having satisfied myself that the
enemy was in force and also as to the position of
his batteries, / ordered Colonel Richardson to
withdraw his brigade, which was skillfully,
though unwillingly accomplished."
And now, some twenty years after these oc
currences, and in the face of his own testimony
and official reports, Tyler, apparently having
learned nothing and forgotten much of what he
knew concerning them, says (p. 54, Memoirs) :
" From what I knew then and ascertained
afterwards, I think my four brigades could
have whipped Beauregard before sundown."
* "When the skirmish commenced at
Blackburn s Ford, Beauregard was surprised,
and at that time he could not before sunset have
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861.
concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field."
Fortunately he gives his reason for this extrav-
gant afterthought. It is, that < the entire South
Carolina contingent of Beauregard s army was
down in the Occoquan region; its mission was to
protect the route of Fredericksburg, and it was
a kind of independent command under its South
Carolina general, and not within striking dis
tance for a battle on the seventeenth" (eight
eenth it ought to be). This is an unaccount
able error. It shows in what dense ignorance
of the campaign Tyler lived and died. The
Records of the Rebellion, Vol. II., hereinbefore
referred to, published some time before Tyler s
death, contain the reports of Generals Beaure-
gard, Longstreet, Bonham and their subordin
ates (pp. 440 to 458). They prove that the South
Carolina contingent, which Tyler says was a
kind of independent command under its South
Carolina general, and could not be brought
within striking distance, was actually in Ms
immediate front! that the 2d, 3d, 7th and 8th
South Carolina regiments under Gen. Bonham
was the force upon which Tyler s artillery com
menced the attack. The other South Carolina
regiment was in D. R. Jones brigade at the
next ford, a short distance below. " The South
Carolina contingent" was not only in front of
Tyler on the 18th, but four regiments of it un
der Gen. Bonham had been in his immediate
28 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
front at Fairfax Court House when the latter
was at Fall s Church. It was these South
Carolina troops Tyler was expected to intercept
on his first day s march ; and, strange as it may
appear in the ligh t of Tyler s latest assertion that
"the entire South Carolina contingent was
down in the Occoquan region," lie was told at
the time he arrived at Centreville that they
were in his front. In his testimony before the
Committee on the Conduct of the War, Janu
ary 20, 1862, p. 199, Tyler says: "On arriving
at Centreville I found that the enemy had
evacuated their fortifications and that Cox s
division, as I was told by their people, had
passed over Stonebridge, and Bonham, with
the South Carolina and Georgia troops, had
passed down by Blackburn s Ford" It is
not necessary to pile up evidence on this point.
I was McDowell s Adjutant-General in that
campaign. After he had gone to the left of his
line on the morning of the 18th, I went to the
front and arrived at Tyler s advanced position,
overlooking Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords,
just before he sent Ay res forward into the skirt
of woods along the Run. Desiring to learn all
I could about the enemy, I accompanied the
cavalry under Brackett which went as support
for Ayres guns. When the enemy opened
upon us it seemed to me, as it did to Tyler,
that "there were five thousand muskets fired
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 29
at once." Ayres saw instantly that his com
mand could not exist long in such musketry
fire, and without waiting for orders he promptly
limbered up; and Brackett,who had dismounted
his men, remounted them and all went at full
speed across the open bottom-land to the high
ground in rear whence Ty]er had sent them. I
am quite certain that no one present thought at
the time that Beauregard could not concentrate
1,500 men, that Tyler with his four brigades
could whip him before sundown, or even that
all of McDowell s army, if concentrated for the
effort, could go to Manassas junction by way of
Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords.
Foreseeing the bad effect Tyler s repulse
would have upon the troops, and wishing to
avert the depression which he knew would fol
low from Tyler s having been driven back, Mc
Dowell, when he learned of the affair after it was
all over, gave Tyler verbal orders to reoccupy
the high ground where his command had been
engaged. But Tyler, from misunderstanding the
orders, or from lack of disposition to do any
thing more there, did not carry out the verbal
orders, and just after midnight (18th-19th)
McDowell gave him written orders as follows
(p. 306, Records of the Rebellion) :
30 MCDOWELL AND TYLEE.
" HEADQUARTERS, ETC.,
" Centrevitte,
"July 19, 1861. 12.30 A.M.
"BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYLER,
Commanding 1st Division:
"There seems to be a misunderstanding on
your part of the order issued for a brigade of
your division to be posted in observation on
the road leading to the place where your com
mand was engaged yesterday, July 18. It was
intended that the movement should have been
made long before this. The train of subsistence
came up long ago. I have given no order or in
struction of a change in this matter. I thought
that the brigade was posted as desired until
just now, when Major Brown, who is just re
turned from your headquarters, informs me
that no action under these orders has been
taken. Give orders which will cause the brig
ade to be there, where the previous instructions
indicated, by dawn this morning.
" Very respectfully,
"IllVIN MCDOWELL."
As to Beauregard having been surprised by
Tyler, there is abundant proof to the contrary.
He was kept informed of what passed in
Washington, knew of our advance, knew the
organization and composition of McDowell s
army, etc. In his report of August, 1861, p.
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 31
440, he says: " Opportunely informed of the
determination of the enemy to advance on
Manassas, my advance brigades, on the night
of the 1 6th of July, were made aware of the
impending movement." In his report of July
17, to Jefferson Davis, he says, p. 339 : "I
have fallen back on the line of Bull Run, and
will make a stand at MitcheW s Ford?" His
special orders, No. 100, from Manassas Junc
tion, dated July 8, p. 447, 448, show the steps
he took ten days before to meet the very at
tack by which Tyler claims he was surprised.
Beauregard s report, p. 440, says, on the morn
ing of the 18th of July (the day when Tyler
attacked Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords):
" My troops resting on Bull Run, from Stone
Bridge to Union Mills, a distance of about
eight miles, were posted as follows," and he
proceeds to specify the forces of artillery, in
fantry and cavalry, stationed at six of the
crossings of the stream, and the reserves held
to support the troops at Mitchell s, Black
burn s and McLean s fords, which a bend in
the river enabled him to place about equidis
tant from all. His own headquarters were near
the Reserve. He says further: " On the
morning of the 18th, finding the enemy was as
suming a threatening attitude, in addition to
the regiments whose positions have already
been stated, I ordered up from Gamp Pickens,
MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
as a reserve in rear of Bonham, the effective
men of six companies of Kelly s 8th Louisiana
Volunteers, and Kirkland s llth North Caro
lina Volunteers, which having arrived the night
before en route for Winchester, I had halted
in view of the existing necessities of the ser
vice." The foregoing extracts show that Beau-
regard knew when and by what routes we were
coming ; that to meet us, he had posted his
whole army behind Bull Eun, his Reserves
and his own headquarters near the places
which Tyler attacked. Yet years after comes
a statement from Tyler, that at that time
Beauregard could not, before sunset, have
concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field,
that he had surprised him, and that he with
his four brigades could have whipped Beaure
gard before sundown. Tyler s command con
sisted of four brigades fifteen regiments of
infantry, four batteries of artillery some of
the guns of heavy caliber, and many of them
rifled, and a squadron of cavalry an effective
force for duty of over 10,000 men an army
in itself. It will be noticed in McDowell s
order of the 18th, to Tyler, heretofore quoted,
he says: U I go to Heintzleman s to arrange
about the plan of moving against the enemy s
right," which plan as the note says, he had
talked over with Tyler. If that plan had been
acted upon by McDowell, as Tyler supposed it
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 33
would be, Tyler could no longer have been in
the advance. But being in advance at the
time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears
to have resolved, practically, to take the di
rection of the campaign into his own hands.
So he moved against Longstreet at Black-
EEBATA.
Page 33 : Eighth line from top, for North Carol]
read South Carolina.
tnoughts. Out of reach of his commanding
officer, he found as he claims, a state of things
which warranted him in assuming the respon
sibility of a different course from the one or
dered. He had all the advantages of position
a commanding bank on his side, skirted with
timber and having open ground beyond. He
says that the enemy was surprised, could not
have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the
field before sunset, and that he could have
whipped the whole of Beauregard s army be
fore sundown. Then, in the name of every
thing that is soldierly, why did he not do it ?
According to his own account he had the whole
field to himself. No superior authority near.
32 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
as a reserve in rear of Bonham, the effective
men of six companies of Kelly s 8th Louisiana
Volunteers, and Kirkland s llth North Caro
lina Volunteers, which having arrived the night
before en route for Winchester, I had halted
in view of the existing necessities of the ser
vice " mr " . , , , .
rega
com
who
and
whi<
a si
Bea
con<
that ne naci surprised mm, ana tnar ne witn
his four brigades could have whipped Beaure-
gard before sundown. Tyler s command con
sisted of four brigades iifteen regiments of
infantry, four batteries of artillery some of
the guns of heavy caliber, and many of them
rifled, and a squadron of cavalry an effective
force for duty of over 10,000 men an army
in itself. It will be noticed in McDowell s
order of the 18th, to Tyler, heretofore quoted,
he says: "I go to Heintzleman s to arrange
about the plan of moving against the enemy s
right," which plan as the note says, he had
talked over with Tyler. If that plan had been
acted upon by McDowell, as Tyler supposed it
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 33
would be, Tyler could no longer have been in
the advance. But being in advance at the
time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears
to have resolved, practically, to take the di
rection of the campaign into his own hands.
So he moved against Longs treet at Black
burn s Ford, and what he forgot, against Bon-
ham and the North Carolina troops at Mitchell s
Ford.
Having refuted Tyler s claims concerning
facts and circumstances attending his a.ttack
on the 18th, let us see how he would appear
if the case had been as he states it in his
memoirs, and whether it is not doing him a
kindness to prove the error of his after
thoughts. Out of reach of his commanding
officer, he found as he claims, a state of things
which warranted him in assuming the respon
sibility of a different course from the one or
dered. He had all the advantages of position
a commanding bank on his side, skirted with
timber and having open ground beyond. He
says that the enemy was surprised, could not
have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the
field before sunset, and that he could have
whipped the whole of Beauregard s army be
fore sundown. Then, in the name of every
thing that is soldierly, why did he not do it ?
According to his own account he had the whole
field to himself. No superior authority near.
34 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
He had incurred the responsibility of opening
an engagement against orders. Yet at the
head of some ten thousand effective men of all
arms, without using one-quarter of them, he al
lowed himself to be repulsed, defeated, driven
back, leaving his dead and prisoners, and be
tween one and two hundred stand of arms in
the hands of the enemy (p. 447). McDowell,
as already stated, was far away, knew nothing
of the affair, and did not reach the ground un
til he met the troops returning to Centreville
ridge late in the afternoon, when it was all
over. If Tyler attacked at all, he should have
done so in force and held his ground, and thus
enabled McDowell to determine whether or
not to follow up the blow with the whole
army.
The truth is, there was a surprise at Black
burn s Ford on the 18th of July, 1861, but it
was Tyler, not Beauregard, who was surprised.
Twenty years after, in the bitterness and
blindness of ill-will towards his Commanding
General, and apparently in ignorance of what
he ought to have known and what he might
have learned from the records, especially his
own contributions to them, if he did not know
his friends are left to choose between admitting
that, in his own judgment and against orders,
he went unwittingly against the center of Beau-
regard s entire army ; or that with a fine army
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 35
of Ms own, he submitted to a defeat at the
hands of part of the enemy s forces. That he
was defeated is certain.
The consequences of that defeat were seri
ous. The effect was plainly seen. The feeling
was universal that things had gone against us.
The 12th New York Volunteers were paralyzed
by the shock, and the depressing effect of the
repulse was not confined to them ; the whole
army felt it. The 4th Pennsylvania Infantry,
and the 8th New York battery, their terms
having expired, went home as the battle of the
21st was about to begin. The troops began the
advance from the Potomac, with a dread of
being sent against "masked batteries." They
felt that their fears on this point were now re-
alizedj and they were so in fact, for they had
been sent against "masked batteries." The
possibility of making a front attack was thus
destroyed by Tyler himself. He reported soon
after the affair that he found the place "was
strongly fortified, and the enemy in large force,"
p. 313. McDowell said in his report, p. 308 : " If
it were needed, the experience of the 18th in
stant shows we cannot, with this description
of force, attempt to carry batteries such as now
before us;" and Beauregard, p. 447, says:
" The effect of this day s conflict was to sat
isfy the enemy he could not force a passage
across Bull Run in the face of our troops, and
36 MCDOWELL AND TYLEK.
led him into the flank movement of the 21st of
July, and the battle of Manassas."
As a matter of fact, there were no works im
mediately at Blackburrts Ford. The belief at
the time, however, was that it was strongly
fortified, as Tyler thought, and it will be seen
from the reports of General Bonham s officers
that the adjoining position at Mitchell s Ford
was fortified, and had been for some time.
The purport of our reports and reconnais
sances at the time was to the effect that of
all the crossings over Bull Run, within our
reach, including the Stone Ridge said to be
mined the first unfortified one was the Sud-
ley Spring Ford, where we crossed July 21
(p. 330, Report of Barnard, Chief of Engineers,
of McDowell s army).
THE BATTLE OF BULL KUIs T , JULY 21, 1861.
The task of whipping Beauregard s army,
which Tyler, in the face of his failure, boasts
he could have performed with four brigades
on the 18th, was not undertaken by McDowell
until the 21st, and then he was defeated.
The Evening Post, quoting Tyler, says : " It
was the delay of three days succeeding the af
fair at Blackburn s Ford that lost the battle of
Bull Run ; and for what purpose this delay
occurred no proper explanation has been or
can be made."
BULL KUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 37
It may be repeated here that the delay was
from the evening of the 18th till 2 o clock on
the morning of the 21st two instead of three
days. When before the Committee on the
Conduct of the War, January 20, 1862, Tyler
was asked what " caused the disaster of
that day?" July 21. He, under oath said,
u Want of discipline and instruction in the
troops." " Were there any other more proxi
mate causes than that ?" asked the Committee.
Here was an opportunity, if not an invitation,
for Tyler to assert his u three" days delay at
Centre ville, if that had been in his mind as a
cause, but he did not give delay as a cause ;
on the contrary, he gave as the "more proxi
mate 1 cause " want of instruction and pro
fessional knowledge among the officers, tlie
company and regimental officers" During
these " three" days Tyler asserts " there were
no movements made to ascertain the force or
position of the enemy, and the army had its full
provision of seven days when it started from
Washington, and was in no way in want of sup
plies of any kind."
The consequences of the two days delay at
Centreville, the causes of the delay, and the
responsibility for that delay, are important and
independent questions.
Johnson s army, over eight thousand strong,
38 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
joined Beauregard between the night of Thurs
day, the 18th, and the evening of Sunday, the
21st. His leading brigade under Jackson arrived
on the 19th. Bee s brigade and Johnston in
person arrived on the 20th, and the remain
der reached the field on the 21st, in time to
take part in the action. General Scott, who
controlled both McDowell and Patterson, was
responsible for this change in the relative
strength of the contending armies. The cam
paign he required McDowell to make was
based upon the condition that Johnston should
not join Beauregard without having Patterson
on his heels. McDowell would not have been
justified in conducting his operations upon the
assumption that the condition upon which the
campaign was predicated by the General-in-
Chief, was going to be violated. Nor did he
know, until the 21st, during the battle, though
he suspected it, that Johnston s forces had
joined Beauregard. It must be admitted that
it would have been better for McDowell if he
could have executed on the 19th or 20th the
plan of battle he acted upon on the 21st, and
still better, perhaps, if he could have done so
before Tyler s fiasco on the 18th. But that
was not possible. Neither the preparation of
his plan nor the state of his supplies permitted
it. He did not form the plan, nor did he have
the information upon which to base it, until
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 39
the 20th. He did not learn until the night of
the 18th that the enemy was going to defend
the line of Bull Kun. If the state of his sup
plies had permitted, he might have attempted
to force that line by a direct attack on the 19th
or 20th, as Tyler did on the 18th, but such an
enterprise would have given no fair promise,
and Tyler destroyed all possibility of its success
by his disastrous failure on the 18th. Under
all the circumstances a flank movement, instead
of a direct attack, was an essential part of any
plan which might be adopted. McDowell s
first intention was to turn the enemy s right,
but that intention had to be abandoned on
the 18th. , Tyler says that between the 18th
and 21st, "there were no movements made to
ascertain the force or position of the enemy."
Let the truth of what was done speak for
itself. In his report, p. 330, Barnard, the Ch ief
Engineer, says: fc At my interview with the
Commanding General that evening, he informed
me that he had convinced himself that the
nature of the country to the left, or southard
of Manassas, was unfit for the operations of
a large army. I told him I would endeavor
the next day to obtain such information as
would enable him to decide on his further
movement." No one deserves censure for the
time which was consumed in obtaining that
information. No army during the war had
40 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
such an array of military engineering latent as
McDowell had at that time. Barnard was the
Chief, and under him were Woodbury, Wright,
B. S. Alexander, A. W. Whipple, Abbott,
Putnam, Prime, Houston, Snyder and O Rorke,
of the Engineer Corps of the regular army.
Their ability and zeal are beyond dispute.
They devoted themselves to the examinations
and reconnaissances for a proper plan of at
tack. In seeking a route to the right, Barnard
reports, p. 830 : " I, on the 19th, followed up
the valley of Cub Run, until we reached a
point west of 10 North, and about four miles
in an air line from Centreville, near which we
struck a road, which we believed to lead fco the
fords" (near Sudley Springs). " Following it
for a short distance, we encountered the ene
my s patrols. As we were most anxious to
avoid attracting the enemy s attention to our
designs in this quarter, we did not care to pur
sue the reconnaissance farther. We had seen
enough to convince us of the perfect practi
cability of the route. To make more certain of
the fords, however, Captain Woodbury pro
posed to return at night (that was the night
of 19th), and with a few Michigan woodsmen
from Colonel Sherman s brigade, to endeavor
to find them. On returning to camp it was
determined to send Captain Wright and Lieut.
Snyder, engineers, with Captain Woodbury.
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 41
At the same time the Commanding General
directed Captain AVhipple, Topographical En
gineer, and Lieut. Prime, engineer, to make a
night reconnaissance of the Run between
Warrenton bridge and Blackburn s Ford.
Both these night expeditions failed. It was
found the enemy occupied the woods too
strongly on our side of the run to permit the
reconnaissances to be accomplished. It was
not our policy to drive in his pickets until we
were in motion to attack. On laying before
you the information obtained, the Command
ing General believed himself justified in adopt
ing the following plan of attack, which was
decided upon on tlie 20^," that is, after the
reconnaissances of the night of the 19th.
On the 20th, McDowell issued orders for the
advance to begin at half -past two on the morn
ing of the 21st. It was not possible for him to
form that plan or act upon it any sooner than
he did. No critic, to this day, I believe, not
even Tyler, has claimed that the plan was not
good. What the result would have been of
acting earlier upon a worse plan, no one can
say with any certainty.
Tyler says : " The army had its full provis
ion for seven days when it started from Wash
ington, and was in no way in want of supplies
of any kind" on the 18th. The Record con
tradicts him. The troops marched from the
42 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
Potomac on the 16th with tliree days rations
in their haversacks. Wagons were to follow
the next day containing Jive days rations, but
they met with difficulties and delay. Some of
them arrived in time to distribute supplies to
divisions on the evening of the 18th, others not
until the 19th. The three days rations with
which the troops began the advance on the
16th ought to have lasted until the afternoon
of the 19th, but, on account of the inexperi
ence of the men, they were exhausted on the
18th. The reports of the Chief Commissary,
Clarke and his subordinates explain this mat
ter, p. 336 to 344, Rebellion Records. Lieut.
Hawkins, in charge of one of the three supply
trains, says, p. 343, that on his arrival " there
was immediate necessity for the distribution of
the rations ; " and the officer in charge of an
other of the trains, Lieut. Curtis, p. 340, says
of his distribution on the 19th : "I found the
men in almost a starving condition." Heintzle-
man and others confirm this, and Schenck s
report, (p. 360) shows that his brigade of
Tyler s division was unfed on the 21st.
An advance of the army beyond Centreville
was not practicable until the supply trains
came up and their contents were distributed.
The distribution was completed to divisions on
the 19th, and on the 20th McDowell ordered, p.
325: "The commanders of divisions will give
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 43
the necessary orders that an equal distribution
of subsistence stores on hand be made immedi
ately to the different companies in their re
spective commands, so that they shall be pro
vided for the same number of days, and that
the same be cooked and put in the haversacks
of the men. The subsistence stores now in the
possession of each division, with the fresh beef
that can be drawn from the commissary, must
last to include the 23d instant."
This was the first campaign of the war. The
troops were not soldiers, but civilians in uni
form ; most of them in service only for three
months. Giving due weight to all the circum
stances, there was no culpable delay at Centre-
ville, and the time spent there between the
evening of the 18th and 2 o clock on the morn
ing of the 21st, was necessary to replenish the
exhausted haversacks of the men and to gain
information upon which to form a proper plan
of battle.
The enemy was strongly posted along Bull
Run, his right at Union Mills, and his left
at the " Stonebridge," where the Warrenton
turnpike crosses the stream. His line was
eight miles long. Centreville, around which
McDowell s army was concentrated, was nearly
opposite the center of Beauregard s line, and
only about three or four miles from it.
44 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
There was no misunderstanding as to the
plan of battle. The parts of the different di
visions were clearly set forth in McDowell s
general order No. 22 of July 20, p. 226, and ex
planations were given in detail at a conference
on the evening of the 20th, at which division and
brigade commanders were present.
After explaining the situation and the object
to be accomplished, the order says : u The First
Division (General Tyler), with the exception of
Richardson s brigade, will move at 2.30 A.M.
precisely, on the Warrenton turnpike, to
threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not
open fire until full daybreak.
"The Second Division (Hunter s) will move
from its camp at 2 A.M. precisely, and led by
Captain Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after
passing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass
the Bull Run stream above the lower ford at
Sudley Springs, and then turning down to the
left, descend the stream and clear away the
enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and
bridge. It will then bear off to the right to
make room for the succeeding division,
"The Third Division (Heintzleman s) will
march at 2.30 A.M. and follow the road taken
by the Second Division (Hunter s), but will
cross at the lower ford after it has been turned
as above, and then going to the left, take place
between the stream and the Second Division.
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 45
"The Fifth Division (Miles ) will take posi
tion on the Centreville Heights (Richardson s
brigade will, for the time, form part of this di
vision and will continue in its present position).
One brigade will be in the village and one near
the present station of Richardson s brigade.
This division will threaten Blackburn s Ford,
and will remain in reserve at Centreville.
" These movements may lead to the gravest
results, and commanders of divisions should
bear in mind the immense consequences in
volved."
When this order was issued Sherman s and
Schenck s brigades of Tyler s division were in
camp in advance of Centreville, on the Warren-
ton turnpike, which led directly to the enemy s
left at the Stone-Bridge, about two and a half
miles away. Keyes brigade of Tyler s di
vision was just in rear of Centreville, a mile
behind Sherman ; behind him, Hunter s divis
ion, on his left, Miles division, and in rear
of Miles, Heintzleman s division. It was only
about a mile from the camps of Sherman and
Schenck to the point where Hunter and
Heintzleman were to leave the turnpike and
take the country road to the right. Order
ing Tyler, who occupied the turnpike (over a
part of which all in turn had to move) to march
at "2.30 A.M. precisely" McDowell s object
was to have him clear the pike as far as the
46 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
turn off, so as not to delay Hunter and Heintzle-
mann. That was fully understood at the con
ference held on the night of the 20th. Tyler
had to move Sherman s and Schenck s brigades
one mile along the pike to accomplish the ob
ject of opening the roads to the following divis
ions. Yet, without any opposition from the
enemy, his advance was so slow as to hold
Hunter and Heintzleman some four hours on
the mile or two of the turnpike between their
camps and the road on which they were to
turn off for the flank march. There is abund
ant proof of this fact in the official reports
printed in Records of the Rebellion, and in the
testimony before the Committee on the Con
duct of the War, and the Committee itself con-
iirms the assertion in its report It is not
necessary to cite any other witness than
Tyler himself. While not frankly admit
ting the delay, he was not able before the
Committee to deny or disprove it. He said,
p. 202 :
Q. " Were the rest of the divisions delayed
by your movement ?
A. "They were not/ more than absolutely
necessary, under the circumstances."
Q. "What time did your movement com
mence 2"
A. " At half-past two o clock/
Q. " You were to advance, how f ar 2 "
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 47
A. "To the Stone-Bridge, about two and a
half miles."
Q. u At what time did the portion of the
division under your command reach Stone-
bridge?"
A. "It reached there by six o clock, per
haps a quarter before six."
By this testimony from Tyler himself, he,
with no opposition from the enemy, and no
obstruction in the way, was about three hours
and a half marching two miles and a half over
a good turnpike.
The Committee, however, went a little fur
ther, and asked, pp. 202, 203 :
Q. "At what time did the rear of your di
vision I do not mean to include Keyes brig
ade, but the rear of that which was with you
that morning pass the point where Hunter
and Heintzleman turned off to the right ? "
A. " We passed there before four o clock."
Q. "Or in two hours after you started ? "
A. "Yes, Sir!"
The point from which the part of his division
here mentioned (Sherman s and Schenck s brig
ades) marched, and the point where Hunter and
Heintzleman turned off, was one mile. Tyler
marched that distance in two hours, and yet he
went to his grave with a grievance because
McDowell said in his report, p. 318: "There
was delay in the First Division getting out of
48 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
its camp on the road, and the other divisions
were, in consequence, between two and three
hours behind the time appointed a great mis
fortune, as events turned out," and because
further, that in his testimony, McDowell, p.
42, refused to retract this part of his report,
and said: "General Tyler has written me a
letter complaining that my report does him in
justice, and asking me to set him right in ref
erence to this matter of delay. Under the cir
cumstances, I did not feel that I could make
any change."
In view of Tyler s abuse and criticism of
McDowell, the commander, it is proper to look
for a moment at the part played in that battle
by Tyler himself, McDowell s second in com
mand, as well as his critic. He says, with his
division alone, he could have whipped Beaure-
gard s entire army before sundown on the 18th,
if McDowell had not prevented. That boast
has been disposed of. Certainly McDowell
did not prevent him from fighting on the
21st. What help did he give toward whip
ping Beauregard on that day ? It has already
been shown that he employed the three and
a half hours between 2.30 and 6 A.M. in
marching two and a half miles to the vicinity
of the Stone bridge on the Warren ton turn
pike. It was under cover of the demonstration
he was to make at that point that Hunter and
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861.
49
Heintzelman were to effect their flank march
and turn the enemy s left.
POSITION OF TYLER FROM 6 A.M. UNTIL ABOUT 12 M. ON 21ST.
The rebel position at Stone-Bridge was de
fended by General Evans. Tyler s report,
written six days after the battle, when every
thing was comparatively fresh in his mind, and
when he was not making an attack on his
commander and the plan of battle, says (pp.
348, 349, Rebellion Records) :
"* * Soon after getting into position we
discovered that the enemy had a heavy bat-
50 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
tery, with infantry in support, commanding
both the road and bridge approaches, on which
both Ayres and Carlisle, at different times, tried
the effect of their guns without success, and a
careful examination of the banks of Bull-Run
satisfying me that they were impracticable for
purpose of artillery, these batteries had to re
main comparatively useless until such time as
Hunter s column might clear the approach by
a movement on the opposite bank. During
this period of waiting the 80-pounder was
occasionally used with considerable effect
against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which
could be seen from time to time moving in the
direction of Hunter s column and out of the
range of ordinary guns."
Twenty years later this condition of affairs
had changed in Tyler s mind. In his mem
oir, traducing McDowell, he says :
" The enemy had a force guarding the bridge,
but not so strong that a passage could not have
been forced at any moment. He had a battery
of light guns there in the early part of the day,
but they were soon driven off by Ayres battery
and the heavy eigh teen-pounder gun com
manded by Lieutenant Lyford."
So we see that the " heavy " battery and sup
ports on which, according to Tyler, in 1862.
Ayres and Carlisle fired in vain, and finally
ceased firing, became by the same authority, in
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 51
1881, " a light battery, which was soon driven
off by our tire!" and, that, the waiting for
Hunter s column to clear the opposite bank
was not necessary, as we could have "forced
the passage at any moment ! "
In this instance the latest statement is the
correct one. The truth is the Stone-Bridge was
defended by a fractional brigade consisting of
a regiment and a battalion of infantry, a squad
ron of cavalry, and two pieces of light artil
lery.
Tyler s demonstration was so feeble that
Evans was not long deceived by it. The latter
says in his report, p. 559 : It was not later than
eight o clock " when I perceived that it was. not
the intention of the enemy to attack me in my
present position, but had commenced his move
ment to turn my left flank. I at once decided to
quit my position and to meet him in his flank
movement, leaving the skirmishers of the
Fpurth Regiment of S. C. Volunteers, sup
ported by the reserve of two companies to keep
him engaged. I sent word to Colonel Phil. St.
George Cocke that I had abandoned my posi
tion at the bridge and was advancing to attack
the enemy at the crossing of the Warrenton
turnpike and the Manassas road. Observing
carefully the movements of the enemy, * I was
*The enemy here referred to is Hunter s, not Tyler s division.
52 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
able to form my line of attack directly in his
front, covered by a grove of woods, by 9 o clock
a. m." It thus appears that the division which
on the 18th could have whipped Beauregard s
aimy before sundown, was confronted before 8
a. m. on the 21st by some fifteen companies of
infantry, two of cavalry, and two of artillery,
and after 8 d clock was held in check " till about
noon" p 369 by the skirmishers of the 4th
S. C. Volunteers, supported by two companies
of that regiment, four companies in all. This,
in the face of orders to Tyler from McDowell,
the delivery of which is proved by the records,
to " press forward the attack" and in the face,
too, of his duty in the matter, as admitted in
his memoirs, p. 57, where he says, that when
Hunter and Heintzelman had "attacked and
forced the enemy to the vicinity of Stone
Bridge, " I " was to force the passage of Bull
Run at that point and attack the enemy in
flank." It does not appear, nor does Tyler
claim that he did press the attack in response to
McDowell s orders. In fact Tyler, under oath,
denied, but subsequently admitted, that he had
received those orders. His testimony is as fol
lows : January 20, 1 862, before the Committee
on the Conduct of the War " I did not see
General McDowell on the field, and I did not
receive any order from him during that day, p.
201. * * *
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 53
I received no orders from General McDowell
after I left him Saturday night," p. 203.
"Question: Did you receive from General
McDowell, through his aid, Mr. Kingsbury,
orders to make a more rapid advance ?
" Answer : No, Sir ! I did not, p. 206.
January 22d, General Daniel Tyler, re-ex
amined. " The witness said : I made one mis
take in my testimony when before the Commit
tee on Monday last. I then stated that I
received no orders from General McDowell dur
ing the day of the battle of Bull- Run. That
was an error. I did receive an order from him
about 11 o clock in the morning to press the
attack."
He says, "about 11 o clock." If the exact
time could be ascertained it would be found
that it was before eleven o clock. But be that
as it may, the order was to press forward Jtis
attack!" The how and the where were abso
lutely at Tyler s discretion. He could app]y
his troops as he judged best ; and if the enemy
could be driven off and the passage be forced
at any moment, as he would seem to intimate
should have been done, there was nothing to
keep him from doing it. The simple, emphatic,
but general order about 11 A. M., was to "press
forward Ms attack" Under this order, and in
the exercise of his discretion, Tyler did not
attempt to force the passage of the bridge,
54 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
which was then defended by only four com
panies.
Let us see what Tyler did with his division in
this affair. Sherman says in his official report,
pp. 368-9 after reaching his position near the
Stone-Bridge 6 A. M. : "here the brigade was
deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and
remained quietly in position till after 10 A. M.
The enemy remained very quiet," &c., " There
we remained till we heard the musketry fire
across Bull- Run, showing that the head of
Colonel Hunter s column was engaged. The
firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was
driving before him the enemy till about noon,
when it became certain the enemy had come to
a stand, and that our forces on the other side
of Bull-Run were all engaged artillery and
infantry. Here you (Tyler) sent me the order
to cross over with the whole brigade to the as
sistance of Colonel Hunter.
"Early in the day, when reconnoitering the
ground, I had seen a horseman descend from
a bluff in our front, cross the stream, and show
himself in the open field ; and inferring we
could cross over at the same point, I sent for
ward a company as skirmishers and followed
with the whole brigade. We found no diffi
culty in crossing over, and met no opposition
in ascending the steep bluff opposite."
This shows that Sherman knew " early in the
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 55
day" that he could cross the stream, but
Tyler s orders for him to do so were not given
until " about noon, when it became certain the
enemy had come to a stand and that our forces
on the other side were all engaged artillery
and infantry."
Surely this was not pressing forward the
attack ?
Tyler s division was the one of the three
active divisions which had the shortest line
to the battle-field (say 3 or 4 miles), and
should have done the most fighting. The ob
ject of the long and tiresome march (some
twelve miles) of Hunter and Heintzelman, was
by turning the enemy s left to open the way
for Tyler s command, fresh and en masse, to
reach the field of battle by a single stride. But
it turned out that the divisions which did the
marching had also to do most of the fighting.
To return to Sherman : crossing the Run, he
says : u I learned that General McDowell was
on the field. I sought him out, and received
his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy."
Though his brigade took an active part in the
later phases of the action, Sherman saw nothing
more of Tyler during the battle. Tyler says,
in his report, p. 349, " I ordered Colonel Sher
man, with his brigade, to cross Bull-Run, and
to support the two columns already in action.
Colonel Sherman, as appears by his report,
56 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
crossed the Run without opposition, and after
encountering a party of the enemy flying be
fore Hunter s forces, found General McDowell,
and received his orders to join in the pursuit.
The subsequent operations of this brigade and
its able commander having been under your
own eye and direction, I shall not follow its
movements any further."
All of this time Tyler was not only under the
obligations of the general plan of battle, but
was under the special obligation of the order
he had received, to press the attack. Yet he
nowhere admits that he acted upon that
order, on the contrary he still acted upon his
own judgment. He says in his report p. 349:
"As soon as it was discovered that Hunters^
division had ~been arrested, I ordered up Keyes
brigade." Was it pressing the attack, or was
it soldiership, if there had been no such orders,
lying on the flank of an inferior force of the
enemy to wait within the sound of Hunter s
musketry for his division to be arrested? "I
ordered Keyes brigade to follow Sherman, ac
companying the movement in person, as I saw
it must necessarily place me on the left of our
line, the best possible position, &*c. I ordered
Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of
Sherman s brigade," says Tyler. McDowell s
adjutant General was sent to flnd Tyler and
hurry him into action. En route he passed
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 57
Sherman s brigade; met Tyler while Keyes
brigade was still marching by Hank ; told him
that we were victorious, to form line to the left
and advance up the slope in front. Tyler con
tinues in his report, p. 394 : "The charge was
here ordered and the 2nd Maine and 3rd Con
necticut regiments, which were opposed to this
portion of the enemy s line, pressed forward
to the top of the hill until they reached the
buildings held by the enemy ; drove them
out, and for a moment had them in posses
sion. At this point, finding the brigade under
the fire of a strong force behind breast- works,
the order was given to march by the left
flank across an open field until the whole line
was sheltered by the right bank of Bull- Run,
along which the march was continued, &c.
The march was conducted for a considerable
distance below the Stone-Bridge, &c." Keyes,
in his report, p. 353, fixes the hour at which
the first, and it may be said the last, active
service of his brigade was rendered in the fight.
He says after describing his crossing of the
Run: " At about 2 p. M. General Tyler ordered
me to take a battery on a height in front."
After the attempt to do that, Keyes says in his
report : "I ordered the Maine regiment to face
to the left flank and move to a wooded slope
across an open field, to which point I followed
them. The balance of the brigade soon rejoined
58 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
me, and after a few moments rest, I again
put it in motion and moved forward to find an
other opportunity to charge." This movement
forward is the one l sheltered by the right bank
of Bull-Run, already mentioned by Tyler, and
this is the brigade which Tyler accompanied
"in person, to the best possible position."
Why he sent Keyes under the bluff to find an
other " opportunity to charge," is not disclosed
by the records of the rebellion. The fact is, that
after that one "charge" was made by Keyes
brigade, about 2 P. M. it filed off and marched
along, under the bluff, and did no more fight
ing. Keyes confirms this. He says in his
report, p. 354: "I continued my march and
sent my Aide, Lieut. Walter, to the rear* to
inquire of General McDowell how the day was
going ? The discontinuance of the firing in our
lines becoming more and more apparent, I
inclined to the right, and after marching six
hundred or seven hundred yards farther, I was
met by Lieut, E. Upton, Aide to General Tyler,
and ordered to file to the right, as our troops
were retreating. I moved on at an ordinary
pace, and fell into the retreating column.
* * " At the moment I received the order to
retreat and for some time afterwards, it (his
brigade) was in as good order as in the morning
* McDowell was in front.
BULL BUN CAMPAIGN,
on the road." Military readers, especially
those who are acquainted with the Bull-Run
affair, can analyze the foregoing facts for them
selves. It may be added that Keyes brigade
of "about 2,500 men," as he reported it,
shows : killed, no officers, 19 enlisted men ;
FIELD ABOUT TIME UNION EETEEAT BEGAN, JULY 21ST.
wounded, 4 officers and 46 enlisted men. Sher
man s brigade which fought under McDowell s
personal orders, lost : killed, 3 officers and
117 enlisted men ; wounded, 15 officers, 193
enlisted men.
60 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
Neither Schenck s brigade of Tyler s divisio
nor Tyler s Artillery, crossed Bull-Run durii
the battle. After 8 o clock the Stone-Brid^
was defended by only a handful of skirmisher
The turnpike was obstructed by some falL
trees. Ordinary vigor and industry wou
have carried the bridge and cleared the pi]
in a few minutes. Tyler testifies, that about
A. M. he received orders to press the attack,
he had pushed his division, or merely tl
fine regular batteries of Ayers and Carlis
into the contest, as late even as 2 o clock, ]
might have saved the day and averted tl
consequences of his delay in the mornin
Tyler s three brigades, Sherman s, Keyes ai
Schenck s were from 6 o clock in the mornir
concentrated near the Stone-Bridge, in front
Evans until about 8 A. M. and on his flank ar
not more than a mile from it, after he left tl
Stone-Bridge and formed a line of battle perpe
dicular to Tyler s front which he had done by
A. M., to resist the attack of Hunter andHein
zelman. Tyler was on the ground with the;
three fresh brigades and his artillery in han<
and with McDowell s orders to press the attacl
anl was informed of the progress of the flankir
divisions by his staff officers who observed tl
movements from tree- tops, as Tyler says in h
report. What he did under these circumstai
ces is shown in the records of which an outlii
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 61
has been given. His own services in that battle
do not justify him, to say the least of it, in
criticising McDowell. Except in the one par
ticular of the delay in the morning, McDowell
made no complaint against Tyler on the 21st,
though he fully understood the facts in the case.
The battle was lost, and he chose to let the
blame rest upon his own shoulders rather than
place any part of it upon his subordinates.
The object of this article is to repel the
direct and outrageous attack made upon
McDowell, not to praise him. But the occasion
seems appropriate for citing an analysis of him,
made by Secretary Chase in a letter to a friend,
dated Sept. 4, 1862. (Warden s " account of
the private and public, services of Salmon P.
Chase/ )
" McDowell has been unfortunate, but he is
a loyal, brave, truthful, capable officer. He is
a disciplinarian. While he never hesitated to
appropriate private property of rebels to public
use, he suppressed, as far as possible, private
marauding as incompatible with the laws of
civilized war, and equally incompatible with
the efficiency of troops. Then he never drinks,
or smokes, or chews, or indulges in any kind
of license. He is serious and earnest. He
resorts to no acts of popularity. He has no
political aims, and perhaps not any very pro
nounced political opinions, except the convic-
62 MCDOWELL AND TYLER.
tion that this war sprung from the influences
of slavery, and that whenever slavery stands
in the way of successful prosecution, slavery
must get out of the way. He is too indifferent
in manner. His officers are sometimes alien
ated by it. He is too purely military in his
intercourse with his soldiers. There is an
apparent hauteur no, that is not the word-
rough indifference expresses better the idea,
in his way towards them, that makes it hard
for them to feel any warm personal sentiment
towards him, unless they find, what they
hitherto have not found, that he leads them
successfully, and the honor of serving under
him compensates for their grief."
The communication in the Post says : u The
true and full history of the War of the Rebel
lion cannot be written until sufficient time has
elapsed to allow the many diaries, letters, and
private papers of the chief participants in its
stirring scenes to be made accessible by their
death." Diaries, letters, &c., are valuable data
for history,but as much cannot be said for recol
lections recorded twenty years after stirring
scenes, especially if they are prepared without
referring to the reports, diaries, &c., made at
the tim e. Death is valuable to history by giving
to the public the diaries, letters, &c., of par
ticipants in stirring military scenes, and also
by putting an end to the new versions of those
BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 63
scenes which, the participants issue from time
to time as they pass on in life Vanity, interest
and prejudice work against memory. The oper
ations of war appeal strongly to the imagin
ation, and latter day recollections in some
instances illuminate, in others, obscure the
truth.
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