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Full text of "McDowell and Tyler in the campaign of Bull Run, 1861"




LIBRARY 



UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA. 



Class 




MCDOWELL AND TYLER 



CAMPAIGN OF BULL RUN 



JAMES B. FRY, 

RETIRED. 

Assistant Adj t-General, with Rank of Colonel. 

Brevet-Major-General U. S. A. 
Adj t-Gen l to Gen l McDowell, from May to Nov., 61. 



NEW YORK: 
D. VAN NOSTRAND, PUBLISHER, 

1884, 



COPYRIGHT, D. VAN NOSTKAND, 18S4. 



PREFACE. 

AMEMOEIAL volume of the late General Daniel 
Tyler contains an account by him of the Bull 
Bun campaign of 1861. This account does great 
wrong to the commanding General in that campaign. 
The volume is edited by the distinguished author 
Donald G. Mitchel. The title page says that "two 
hundred copies of this volume have been privately 
printed by Tuttle, Morehouse and Taylor, New Haven." 
It is stated in the preface that " the volume opens 
with a fragment of autobiography written at the in 
stance of his esteemed friend Major-General George 
W. Cullum, who proposed preparing from it his biog 
raphy for the West Point Alumni Association. This 
fact will explain its comparative reticence with respect 
to his private lite, and its fullness in military and en 
gineering details. It is believed that he had fully in 
tended its completion, but the cares of business and 
the infirmities of age unfortunately forbade. Yet his 
friends will recognize in this fragment his straight 
forwardness; his sturdy outspoken positiveness of 
opinion ; his ever- active energy ; and they will not be 
sorry to see, in this record of his, traces of his courage 
in maintaining his own convictions of his directness 

225759 



4 PREFACE. 

of speech, and of his honest wrath at what he counted 
(perhaps sometimes hastily) vaporous incompetence, 
wherever encountered." 

The contents of memorial volumes privately printed 
are not, usually, proper subjects for criticism. But 
this is an exception. De mortuis nil nisi bonum is 
a worthy maxim ; but the living are entitled to some 
thing. General Tyler wrote an account of the cam 
paign of Bull Kun, and sent it to General Cullurn 
for history. General Cullum has not published it, but 
it has been printed, distributed, deposited in public 
libraries, and reviewed in at least one newspaper. 
The subject treated by General Tyler is public, his 
toric and important. For the foregoing reasons it 
has been deemed fair to subject his Autobiography to 
examination by the records, notwithstanding he is 
dead and his contribution to history appears in a memo 
rial volume. When a man writing of those associated 
with him in the defence of his country, makes defama 
tory allegations which are contradicted by official re 
ports and sworn statements his own among them, 
recorded twenty years before dead or alive, his mis 
takes should be pointed out. 

J. B. F. 

NEW YORK CITY, May, 1884. 



INTRODUCTORY. 

r PHE New York Evening Post some weeks 
*- ago contained a communication entitled 
"New Memoirs of the War of the Rebel 
lion" "Reminiscences of a Gallant Soldier." 
Under these striking captions a review was 
given of what is called a memorial volume, 
"in part an autobiography of the late Gen 
eral Daniel Tyler." The printing of this 
volume, it is said in the Post, "illustrates 
and confirms the correctness of a remark often 
made, that the true and full history of theWar of 
the Rebellion cannot be written until sufficient 
time has elapsed to allow the many diaries, 
letters and private papers of the chief partici 
pants in its stirring scenes to be made accessible, 
consequent upon their death, to the gene 
ral public. For this volume contains a new 
and unpublished account of the first battle of 
Bull Run, July 20, 1861" (should be 21), "and 
of the preceding skirmish of Blackburn s Ford, 
July 17" (should be 18), " written by the 
subject of this memoir, who, it will be remem 
bered, was in immediate command of the 
troops engaged in the skirmish, and second 



6 INTRODUCTORY. 

in command under McDowell on the day of the 
battle." It is due to McDowell, as well as to 
history, that the account of Blackburn s Ford 
and Bull Run here mentioned, written by 
Tyler himself, under date of May 1, 1881, to 
be used after his death, and now given to the 
"general public" by his friends, should be 
somewhat carefully considered. It is strange 
that a man of Tyler s ability and experience 
could, without referring to the records, write, 
in his memoir, an account of military operations 
which took place nearly twenty years before. 
Feeling some apprehension in writing from 
memory, he says : " This ends my recollections 
of the battle of Bull Run, and of my official con 
nection therewith Since it is now some twenty- 
three" (it was not twenty) " years since this 
unfortunate battle was fought, I may have 
made some mistakes, although I think not ; 
but before completing this memoir I purpose 
to examine the official reports of that battle, 
converse with such officers as were connected 
with me in the contest, and correct any mis 
takes or errors which may be contained in this 
part of my memoirs." That he did not suc 
ceed in correcting all the mistakes and errors, 
if he made any examination at all, will appear 
further on. 



MCDOWELL -HIS APPOINTMENT- 

HIS ARMY-TYLER. 



WHEN the year 1861 opened, McDowell, 
forty -three years of age, and in the full 
vigor of manhood, was a major in the Adjutant- 
General s Department. His habits were unex 
ceptionable, and he was blessed with good health 
and great physical power. Schooled, as a youth, 
in France, and graduated from the Military 
Academy (1838), he was always a close student 
of his profession, and was well informed upon 
general subjects, but was without political 
antecedents or acquaintances. He was one of 
the most active soldiers of his day and gained 
distinction in the Mexican War. Full of energy 
and patriotism, when the crisis approached in 
1861, he was positive in his opinions and clear 
and forcible in the expression of them. He 
insisted that all efforts to conciliate would fail, 
that the Southern States, one after another, 
would be dragged into secession, that war was 
inevitable, and that it was the plain duty of the 



8 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

government to prepare for it with all possible 
dispatch. He was on duty in Washington 
inspecting the regular troops assembled there 
prior to the inauguration of President Lincoln. 
Highly esteemed by General Scott and gaining 
the confidence and friendship of Secretary 
Chase, it is not strange that McDowell was the 
first junior officer to attract attention from that 
administration which met rebellion at the thresh 
old of the White House on the 4th of March, 
1861. He was assigned to mustering and .organ 
izing the militia of the district, and was in com 
mand of the Capital during part of April and 
May. The seventy-five thousand three-months 
men called for by the President s proclamation 
of the 15th of April were assembling at the Cap 
ital, and it was necessary to have commanders 
for them. McDowell was appointed Brigadier- 
General in the regular army, May 14, 1861 . Prior 
to that, Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield, Inspector- 
General, an officer in whom General Scott re 
posed great confidence, was assigned to com 
mand in Washington. Mansfield was McDow 
ell s senior. He entered the army in 1822, and 
held the grade of colonel, whereas McDowell 
entered in 1838, and (prior to his selection 
for brigadier) was only a major. Though he 
thought highly of McDowell, General Scott 
was not in favor of his sudden advancement to 
the grade of brigadier -general, and was quite 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 9 

unwilling that he should be put above Mans 
field. As soon, therefore, as practicable after 
the President promoted McDowell, General 
Scott insisted that Mansfield should be promo 
ted to the same grade with the same date (May 
14 , thus preserving the military superiority 
of the latter. The Secretary of War expressed 
to McDowell a purpose to appoint him Major- 
General, but McDowell was unwilling under 
the circumstances to accept so high a grade. 

After the troops had been thrown across the 
Potomac by Mansfield during the night of May 
23-4, General Scott was told that he must send 
either Mansfield or McDowell there to com 
mand. He did not wish to send either, but 
was wholly unwilling to relieve Mansfield from 
command in Washington. Hence he ordered 
McDowell. But he advised McDowell to make 
a personal request of the Secretary of War not 
to be assigned to that command. McDowell 
thought he could not do that. He had just 
been appointed a General Officer, and he felt 
bound to enter promptly and cheerfully upon 
the first duty to which the government assigned 
him. His refusal piqued General Scott, and 
created, on his part, a coldness towards Mc 
Dowell. 

The enemy was at that time concentrating 
south of the Potomac almost in sight of the 
dome of the Capitol. McDowell s assignment 



10 MCDOWELL AND TYLEK. 

not only deprived Mansfield of a part of his 
command, but of the most conspicuous part, 
that in front of the foe. A little jealousy of 
McDowell arose in the army circles about the 
headquarters of General Scott, and Mansfield 
himself was dissatisfied. In his diary of Sept. 
8, 1862, Secretary Chase made the entry, 
" General Mansfield came in and talked very 
earnestly. * * He spoke of Gen. Scott, said 
he had not treated him well ; had placed 
McDowell in command over the river last year, 
superseding himself. * * He felt himself 
wronged, but did his duty to the best of his 
ability," etc. (Warden s "An account of the 
private and public services of Salmon P. 
Chase," p. 466.) 

As the Union forces arrived in Washington 
from the north they necessarily reported to 
Mansfield, and became for the time a part of 
his command. He attended diligently to the 
duty of equipping and preparing the troops 
for the field, but every officer and enlisted man 
who was sent across the Potomac changed the 
relieved importance of Mansfield and McDowell 
by reducing the command of the former arid 
increasing that of the latter. In his testimony 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War, McDowell says : General Mansfield felt 
hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command 
he had divided in two and a portion sent over 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 11 

there. I got everything with great difficulty. 
Some of my regiments came over very late ; 
some of them not until the very day I was to 
move the army." When he appealed to Mans 
field to hurry forward the troops, the excuse 
was they were not supplied with baggage wag 
ons. When this was reported to the Quarter 
master General, his answer was that he could 
furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did 



ERRATA. 

Page 10 ; seventh liDe from bottom, for " relieved 
ead "relative." 

Page 40 ; top line, for " latent" read "talent." 



his wants partially supplied. He failed to 
secure transportation to carry rations with 
his army, and had to march trusting that 
wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with 
provisions and sent to follow him. 

He met with much difficulty in getting officers 
of experience to command divisions and bri 
gades. His division commanders were, Briga 
dier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.; 
Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon. New Jer 
sey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman 
and Miles of the regular army. 



10 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

not only deprived Mansfield of a part of his 
command, but of the most conspicuous part, 
that in front of the foe. A little jealousy of 
McDowell arose in the army circles about the 
headquarters of General Scott, and Mansfield 
himself was dissatisfied. In his diary of Sept. 
8, Ifi2. Secretary Chase made the entry, 
" Gc -~~~o in an( j talked very 

earn : * 

he 
Me 1 

SUJ 

wr< 

ab: 

pr 

Chase," p. 4ou. ; 

As the Union forces arrived in w a^^^ 
from the north they necessarily reported to 
Mansfield, and became for the time a part of 
his command. He attended diligently to the 
duty of equipping and preparing the troops 
for the field, but every officer and enlisted man 
who was sent across the Potomac changed the 
relieved importance of Mansfield and McDowell 
by reducing the command of the former arid 
increasing that of the latter. In his testimony 
before the Committee on the Conduct of the 
War, McDowell says : General Mansfield felt 
hurt, I have no doubt, in seeing the command 
he had divided in two and a portion sent over 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 11 

there. I got everything with great difficulty. 
Some of my regiments came over very late ; 
some of them not until the very day I was to 
move the army." When he appealed to Mans 
field to hurry forward the troops, the excuse 
was they were not supplied with baggage wag 
ons. When this was reported to the Quarter 
master General, his answer was that he could 
furnish the transportation, but Mansfield did 
not want it till the troops should move. The 
result was, the troops which McDowell was to 
lead had not all been sent to him by Mansfield 
before the day fixed by General Scott for 
McDowell s advance. Some of them did not 
join until the Sunday before he advanced, and 
some not until the very Tuesday on which 
he marched to the front. It was only by 
great exertion that he succeeded in having 
his wants partially supplied. He failed to 
secure transportation to carry rations with 
his army, and had to march trusting that 
wagon-trains would be made up, loaded with 
provisions and sent to follow him. 

He met with much difficulty in getting officers 
of experience to command divisions and bri 
gades. His division commanders were, Briga 
dier-General Daniel Tyler, Connecticut Vols.; 
Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon. New Jer 
sey Vols., and Colonels Hunter, Heintzleman 
and Miles of the regular army. 




MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 



At that time Tyler was in Ms sixty-second 
year, having been graduated at the U. S. 
Military Academy in 1819, and appointed 2d 
Lieutenant of Artillery. He remained in the 
service as lieutenant until 1834, when he 
resigned, dissatisfied at President Jackson s 
refusal to appoint him captain in the new 
ordnance corps. He was the veteran of Mc 
Dowell s army in 1861 . The organization of that 
army was: Tyler s (1st) Division, 4 brigades, 
9,936 men, four batteries of artillery and a 
squadron of cavalry ; Hunter s (2d) Division, 2 
brigades, 2,648 men, two and a half batteries of 
artillery, and 5 companies of cavalry ; Heintz- 
leman s (3d) Division, 3 brigades, 9,777 men, 
two batteries of artillery ; Miles (5th) Di 
vision, 2 brigades, 6,207 men, three batteries of 
artillery, and Runyon s (4th Reserve) Division, 
5,752 men, not divided into brigades. Notwith 
standing the fact that three of the division 
commanders Hunter, Heintzleman and Miles 
had spent their lives in the military service 
which Tyler had left twenty-seven years before, 
and were not greatly his juniors in years, 
McDowell gave Tyler the first and largest 
division, and entrusted him with the honor of 
the advance in the movement upon the enemy. 
This is evidence of what may be asserted as a 
fact, that McDowell placed confidence in Tyler 
and tfea.ted him with profound respect. It hap- 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 13 

pened that in two instances during the cam 
paign, Tyler s official action met with McDow 
ell s disapproval. The first was in relation to 
the engagement which Tyler brought on at 
Mitchell s and Blackburn s fords, July 18 ; 
and the second was the delay which occurred 
in Tyler s advance in the early morning of 
July 21. McDowell s official expressions con 
cerning these occurrences, though not severe, 
created a bitterness towards him, on Tyler s 
part, which , though occasionally breaking out, 
found full vent only through the agency of his 
friends after his death, which occurred Novem 
ber 30, 1882. 



Tyler opens his account of the first Bull Run 
by saying : u The first campaign of the War of 
the Rebellion, was gotten~np by Gen. McDow 
ell and his friends, and was intended to make 
him the hero of a short war and of a campaign 
begun and ended in the first battle of Bull 
Run. All the accounts of that battle thus far 
intended for history I refer to Mcolay s and 
Prince de Joinville s" (does he mean Comte de 
Paris?) "were either written or inspired by 
General McDowell and his friends, intending, 
so far as possible, to shield his military reputa 
tion from the condemnation it so richly de 
serves." It is not necessary to comment upon 



14 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

this extravagant assertion further than to say 
that, if true, the man must have great merits 
who can command so many and such able friends 
and historians. Tyler continues : "McDowell 
has been an expensive ornament to the military 
service ; and his courtier-like services in the 
salon have immeasurably exceeded his military 
services in the field. Commencing at the head 
of the army on the breaking out of the late war, 
at the end he stood at the foot of the list in 
the estimation of the army and the public." 
This, no doubt, is a specimen of Tyler s writing 
to which the editor of his memorial volume 
refers as having Tyler s " impassioned ring." 
The right name for it is slander. Having re 
lieved himself of this spiteful tirade against a 
distinguished officer, who was promoted to the 
grade of Major-General long after the war was 
over and the claims of its leaders had been 
carefully weighed by the government and the 
people, Tyler, with characteristic inconsistency, 
closes this personal abuse by saying : " In my 
account of the battle of Bull Run, I shall only 
state what was personal to myself or the troops 
under my command." In other words, having 
said the worst I can of the man I hate, I shall 
now proceed to be just, and shall speak only 
of what is personal to myself and my com 
mand. 
The assertion that the Bull Run Campaign 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 15 

" was gotten up by General McDowell and his 
friends," is true only in the sense that the peo 
pie of the North are the friends referred to. In 
a more restricted sense, it would show that 
Tyler misunderstood or misrepresented the sen 
timent of the time. To suppose that a young 
general, without military prestige, without po 
litical antecedents having never even voted or 
attended a political meeting, never written or 
made a speech on a political question in his life 
unknown to the country, unacquainted even 
with the President or any of his cabinet before 
the commencement of the war, should have 
stirred up the public press, inflamed the pub 
lic mind to force the government to order 
an advance into Virginia, is to give an insig 
nificant source to a great movement. Mc 
Dowell had no such commanding power as to 
have a campaign set on foot for his special 
benefit. He was simply an instrument used 
for purposes which had their origin quite out 
of his sphere and beyond the reach of his mod 
erate influence. This campaign resulted logi 
cally from acts in the history of the country 
which can be attributed to no one person, to no 
one party. It was the resultant of great politi 
cal and social forces which had many of them 
moved the nation years before the outbreak 
of the rebellion. 
There was an unmistakable public demand 



16 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

for the advance upon Manassas in July, 1861. 
Even General Scott, who held out against it for 
a time, was at last forced to yield. Nothing 
but blindness or malice can explain the charge 
that the campaign was gotten up by McDowell 
and his friends for the purpose of making a 
hero of him. The assertion is unjust to the 
Northern masses, who, impatient under the 
wickedness and insolence of the outbreak, de 
manded an immediate clash of arms in vindica 
tion of outraged loyalty/ The responsibility 
for publishing such a charge rests with Tyler s 
biographers. 

THE ADVANCE. 

Tyler says : 

" In the order directing the movement of the 
army I was instructed to concentrate my com 
mand at or near Vienna on the night of the 
15th." * 

He should have said on the 16th. 

This mistake as to date is not a slip of the pen. 
It is carried out through his narrative. He says 
he was engaged at Blackburn s Ford the 17th ; 
and it is a salient point in his narrative, dis 
cussed further on, that "it was the delay of 
three days succeeding the affair at Blackburn s 
Ford that lost the battle of Bull Run." To 
get these three days, he counted back from 
the well-known 21st of July, and made the 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 17 

affair at Blackburn s Ford come off on the 17th, 
instead of the 18th, 

This error of dates is of no other conse 
quence, in the present connection, than to give 
one of several instances of Tyler s defective 
memory in dealing with questions of the cam 
paign. 

Another is found in his statement of the 
orders under which he marched from Vienna. 
On this point his latest statement is that 
he was "to move at early dawn in the direc 
tion of Centre vill e, ma Flint Hill School- 
house." In his testimony in 1862 (Committee 
on Conduct of the War, pp. 198-199), he says : 
u My line of march was by Vienna to Flint 
Hill, and from thence I had authority from 
General McDowell to take either route by Fair 
fax Court-house, or the route by Germantown, 
as my judgment should indicate." 

The order given him will be found on page 
304, Rebellion Records. It is as follows : 

1. u Brigadier- General Tyler will direct his 
march so as to intercept the enemy s communi 
cation between Fairfax Court-house and Cen- 
treville, moving to the right or left of German- 
town, as he may find most practicable. 

"On reaching Centreville turnpike he will 
direct the march of his leading brigade either 
upon Centreville or Fairfax Court-house as the 
indication of the enemy may require. The 



18 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

Second Brigade will move on the road in the 
direction not taken by the First. The rear 
brigades will be disposed of by the Division 
Commander as circumstances may require. 

" Should he deem it best a brigade may be 
senfc on Fairfax Court-house direct from Flint 



It will be noticed that he was to direct his 
march so as "to intercept the enemy* s com 
munication" between Fairfax Court-house and 
Centreville. To do this he was to go either to 
the right or left of Germantown not to Fair 
fax Court-house as he might see fit. 

The discretionary authority for him to send 
one of the rear brigades direct on Fairfax 
Court-house from Flint Hill has been converted 
in his mind into authority for him to go there 
himself which would have been inconsistent 
with the object of his movement, to intercept 
the enemy s communication between the Court 
house and Centreville. He omits all reference 
to this prime object of his march, and it may 
be added, he failed to accomplish it, and has 
never in his reports or letters explained this 
failure. 

Apparently not appreciating the importance 
of the part assigned him, Tyler says : 

" I moved quietly on towards Centreville, 
arriving in sight of that place about four 
o clock in the afternoon." 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 19 

The enemy, too, bears witness to the quiet 
ness of the movement. Captain Del-Kemper, 
commanding their rearguard, says (p. 439, Re 
bellion Records): "The enemy seemed not 
disposed to press us closely, and we reached 
Centreville without incident worthy of note 
about 12 M.," and General Bonham says (p. 
450, Rebellion Records): "The column thus 
fell back in perfect order to Centreville. The 
enemy not venturing to attack my rear 
guard." 

In his testimony before the Committee on 
the Conduct of the War, Tyler, speaking of 
his march from Vienna, says : 

u We continued our march until about four 
o clock in the evening, and then bivouacked 
for the night. I think that was the first mis 
fortune of our movement. I think, if we had 
gone on to Centreville that night, we should 
have been in much better condition the next 
day." 

This failure to go to Centreville was not the 
first misfortune of our movement. An earlier 
one, just pointed out, was Tyler s quiet march 
and failure to intercept the enemy s communi 
cation. 

Tyler says he was ordered by McDowell to 
halt and bivouac between Germantown and 
Centreville. But he omits to say that Tie had 
reported to McDowell that his troops could go 



20 



MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 



no further. McDowell reported this fact at the 
time (July 17) to Army Headquarters (see p. 
305, Rebellion Records). He there stated to 
General Scott" I " (McDowell) " endeavored 
to pursue beyond Centreville, but the men 
were too much exhausted to do so." 

Whatever there was of misfortune in our not 
going to Centreville that night was due mainly 
to Tyler s representations of the condition of 
his troops. 




BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 21 

BLACKBURN S FOED. 

Tyler says : 

"On the night of the 16th [17th] a small 
movement of troops could be seen at Centre- 
ville ; but nothing, in my opinion intimating 
that there was to be any great resistance at 
that point, and at daybreak on the morning of 
the 17fch [18th] it appeared to me that Centre- 
ville had been abandoned by the rebel troops, 
which was found to be the case, for Schenck s 
brigade leading, marched that morning into 
Centreville and occupied it without tiring of a 
gun." 

According to both Tyler s own report (p. 310, 
Rebellion Records) and Richardson s testi 
mony before the Committee on the Conduct of 
the W ar, p. 19, it was not Schenck s, but Rich 
ardson s, brigade that led the march into Cen 
treville. Tyler says: " My division moved 
from its encampment at 7 A.M. At 9 A.M. 
Richardson s brigade reached Centreville and 
found that the enemy had retreated the night 
before." * 

Richardson says : * * " then on the morn 
ing of the 18th my brigade took the lead." 
***** 

Tyler continues his narrative, saying : 
u I reported the condition of things to Gen. 
McDowell about 7 A.M., and asked for instruc- 



22 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

tions ; but up to 11 o clock A.M. I heard noth 
ing from the commander of the army." 

On p. 312, Rebellion Records, will be found 
a copy of the order given Tyler, in writing, the 
morning of the 18th. It is as follows : 

" HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT NORTH 
EASTERN VIRGINIA. 

"Between Germantown and Centremlle, 

" July 18, 1861. 8.15A.M. 
" GENERAL : 

"I have information which leads me to be 
lieve you will find no force at Centreville, and 
will meet with no resistance in getting there. 

" Observe well the roads to Bull Run and to 
Warrenton. Do not bring on an engagement, 
but keep up the impression that we are moving 
on Manassas. 

1 go to Heintzleman s to arrange about the 
plan we have talked over. 

" Very respectfully, &c., 

"IRVIN MCDOWELL, 

"Brigadier General. 
" Brigadier General Tyler" 

The receipt of this order is not denied. It 
was carried to Tyler by McDowell s senior aid- 
de-camp, Major afterwards General Wads- 
worth (see pp. 46-47, "Report of Committee 
on the Conduct of the War"). McDowell s 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 23 

headquarters, when that order was written, 
were not far from Tyler s, both being between 
Germantown and Centreville. It is hardly 
possible he did not receive it before eleven 
o clock. 

The route over which Tyler moved on the 
18th of July, was the direct road from Centre 
ville to Manassas Junction. That road crossed 
Bull Run at MitclieW s Ford not Blackburn s 
Foil though a road branching off to Tyler s 
left crossed the Eun at Blackburn s Ford, a 
short distance below Mitchell s Ford, and led 
on thence, though not so directly, to Manassas 
Junction. 

Tyler s attack covered both fords, but his 
artillery was directed mainly against Mitchell s 
Ford. These fords were in supporting distance 
of each other, and the passage of either could 
be effected only by overcoming all the resist 
ance at both as well as the reserve in their rear. 
The article in the "Post " says : " No one can 
arise from the perusal of Tyler s account with 
out feeling satisfied that the great blunder of 
that unfortunate campaign was, the almost 
unaccountable failure of McDowell to allow 
Gen. Tyler immediately to follow up the affair 
at Blackburn s Ford as the latter desired." 

Immediately after writing the order of 8.15 
A.M. to Tyler, McDowell went to the extreme 
left for the purpose alluded to in the note. 



24 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

The note contains all the orders given by Mc 
Dowell to Tyler on the 18th, till after the 
latter had, of his own motion, passed through 
Centre ville and gone down to Bull Run, brought 
on an engagement and been repulsed. That af 
fair, from beginning to end, was Tyler s, brought 
on, continued and ended by him in McDowell s 
absence ; and all of Tyler s acts in relation to 
it, were either against McDowell s orders or 
without his knowledge. The claim that Tyler 
desired to follow up the affair at Blackburn s 
Ford, but was not allowed by McDowell to do 
so, is without foundation. Tyler s report (p. 
311) written (July 27, 61), shortly after the 
affair, when the facts were fresh in his mem 
ory, refutes the claim and shows that lie or 
dered the withdrawal, and that he had no 
desire to follow up the affair. On the contrary, 
it shows a purpose to exculpate himself for 
having made the attack, and to throw the 
responsibility on his brigade commander, Rich 
ardson. He says : u The moment Ayres opened 
his fire, the enemy replied with volleys which 
showed that the whole bottom was filled with 
troops, and that he had batteries established 
in different positions to sweep the approaches." 
* # This attack on Captain Ayres accom 
plished the object I desired, as it showed that 
the enemy was in force and disclosed the posi 
tion of his batteries ; and Jiad I been at hand tlie 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 25 

movement would have ended here" * * " Hav 
ing satisfied myself that the enemy was in 
force and also as to the position of his batteries, 
/ ordered Colonel Richardson to witJidraw It Is 
brigade." * * That is Tyler s official state 
ment made at the time, of his object in going to 
Blackburn s Ford, of what he found there, of 
his withdrawal, and of his reasons for with 
drawing. His sole and entire responsibility is 
fully confessed in his testimony, 1862, before 
Committee on Conduct of the War, pages 199, 
200. He says: " As soon as /found out the 
condition of things 7 sent back for Ayres bat 
tery * * and had it brought and put into 
position 7 then took Richardson s 

brigade and filed it down there to see what there 
was in the bottom. * * I sent some skir 
mishers into the woods. * * 7 saw an open 
ing where we could have a chance to get in a 
couple of pieces of artillery, and /ordered Cap 
tain Ayres" * * The substance of Tyler s 
own report and testimony is that lie directed 
everything. The conclusion from all the facts 
is unavoidable that it was Beauregard, not 
McDowell, who prevented him from going on. 
Richardson says (p. 313), after the disastrous 
repulse of the 12th N. Y. Volunteers : U I now 
reported to General Tyler, and proposed to him 
to make a charge with the three remaining 
regiments for the purpose of carrying the 



26 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

enemy s position. The General replied that the 
enemy were in large force and strongly fortified, 
and a further attack was unnecessary." In 
addition to the foregoing official reports, Tyler 
made a sworn statement on this subject. In his 
testimony before the Committee on the Conduct 
of the War (p. 200), given January 20, 1862, he 
says further: 4 1 ordered Captain Ayres to take a 
couple of howitzers and go into that opening 
and throw some canister shot into the woods. 
The very moment he came into battery, it ap 
peared to me that there were five thousand 
muskets h red at once. It appears by Beaure- 
gard s report he had seventeen regiments in 
front there. Having satisfied myself that the 
enemy was in force and also as to the position of 
his batteries, / ordered Colonel Richardson to 
withdraw his brigade, which was skillfully, 
though unwillingly accomplished." 

And now, some twenty years after these oc 
currences, and in the face of his own testimony 
and official reports, Tyler, apparently having 
learned nothing and forgotten much of what he 
knew concerning them, says (p. 54, Memoirs) : 
" From what I knew then and ascertained 
afterwards, I think my four brigades could 
have whipped Beauregard before sundown." 
* "When the skirmish commenced at 
Blackburn s Ford, Beauregard was surprised, 
and at that time he could not before sunset have 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 



concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field." 
Fortunately he gives his reason for this extrav- 
gant afterthought. It is, that < the entire South 
Carolina contingent of Beauregard s army was 
down in the Occoquan region; its mission was to 
protect the route of Fredericksburg, and it was 
a kind of independent command under its South 
Carolina general, and not within striking dis 
tance for a battle on the seventeenth" (eight 
eenth it ought to be). This is an unaccount 
able error. It shows in what dense ignorance 
of the campaign Tyler lived and died. The 
Records of the Rebellion, Vol. II., hereinbefore 
referred to, published some time before Tyler s 
death, contain the reports of Generals Beaure- 
gard, Longstreet, Bonham and their subordin 
ates (pp. 440 to 458). They prove that the South 
Carolina contingent, which Tyler says was a 
kind of independent command under its South 
Carolina general, and could not be brought 
within striking distance, was actually in Ms 
immediate front! that the 2d, 3d, 7th and 8th 
South Carolina regiments under Gen. Bonham 
was the force upon which Tyler s artillery com 
menced the attack. The other South Carolina 
regiment was in D. R. Jones brigade at the 
next ford, a short distance below. " The South 
Carolina contingent" was not only in front of 
Tyler on the 18th, but four regiments of it un 
der Gen. Bonham had been in his immediate 



28 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

front at Fairfax Court House when the latter 
was at Fall s Church. It was these South 
Carolina troops Tyler was expected to intercept 
on his first day s march ; and, strange as it may 
appear in the ligh t of Tyler s latest assertion that 
"the entire South Carolina contingent was 
down in the Occoquan region," lie was told at 
the time he arrived at Centreville that they 
were in his front. In his testimony before the 
Committee on the Conduct of the War, Janu 
ary 20, 1862, p. 199, Tyler says: "On arriving 
at Centreville I found that the enemy had 
evacuated their fortifications and that Cox s 
division, as I was told by their people, had 
passed over Stonebridge, and Bonham, with 
the South Carolina and Georgia troops, had 
passed down by Blackburn s Ford" It is 
not necessary to pile up evidence on this point. 
I was McDowell s Adjutant-General in that 
campaign. After he had gone to the left of his 
line on the morning of the 18th, I went to the 
front and arrived at Tyler s advanced position, 
overlooking Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords, 
just before he sent Ay res forward into the skirt 
of woods along the Run. Desiring to learn all 
I could about the enemy, I accompanied the 
cavalry under Brackett which went as support 
for Ayres guns. When the enemy opened 
upon us it seemed to me, as it did to Tyler, 
that "there were five thousand muskets fired 



BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 29 

at once." Ayres saw instantly that his com 
mand could not exist long in such musketry 
fire, and without waiting for orders he promptly 
limbered up; and Brackett,who had dismounted 
his men, remounted them and all went at full 
speed across the open bottom-land to the high 
ground in rear whence Ty]er had sent them. I 
am quite certain that no one present thought at 
the time that Beauregard could not concentrate 
1,500 men, that Tyler with his four brigades 
could whip him before sundown, or even that 
all of McDowell s army, if concentrated for the 
effort, could go to Manassas junction by way of 
Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords. 

Foreseeing the bad effect Tyler s repulse 
would have upon the troops, and wishing to 
avert the depression which he knew would fol 
low from Tyler s having been driven back, Mc 
Dowell, when he learned of the affair after it was 
all over, gave Tyler verbal orders to reoccupy 
the high ground where his command had been 
engaged. But Tyler, from misunderstanding the 
orders, or from lack of disposition to do any 
thing more there, did not carry out the verbal 
orders, and just after midnight (18th-19th) 
McDowell gave him written orders as follows 
(p. 306, Records of the Rebellion) : 



30 MCDOWELL AND TYLEE. 

" HEADQUARTERS, ETC., 
" Centrevitte, 

"July 19, 1861. 12.30 A.M. 
"BRIGADIER-GENERAL TYLER, 

Commanding 1st Division: 
"There seems to be a misunderstanding on 
your part of the order issued for a brigade of 
your division to be posted in observation on 
the road leading to the place where your com 
mand was engaged yesterday, July 18. It was 
intended that the movement should have been 
made long before this. The train of subsistence 
came up long ago. I have given no order or in 
struction of a change in this matter. I thought 
that the brigade was posted as desired until 
just now, when Major Brown, who is just re 
turned from your headquarters, informs me 
that no action under these orders has been 
taken. Give orders which will cause the brig 
ade to be there, where the previous instructions 
indicated, by dawn this morning. 

" Very respectfully, 

"IllVIN MCDOWELL." 

As to Beauregard having been surprised by 
Tyler, there is abundant proof to the contrary. 
He was kept informed of what passed in 
Washington, knew of our advance, knew the 
organization and composition of McDowell s 
army, etc. In his report of August, 1861, p. 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 31 

440, he says: " Opportunely informed of the 
determination of the enemy to advance on 
Manassas, my advance brigades, on the night 
of the 1 6th of July, were made aware of the 
impending movement." In his report of July 
17, to Jefferson Davis, he says, p. 339 : "I 
have fallen back on the line of Bull Run, and 
will make a stand at MitcheW s Ford?" His 
special orders, No. 100, from Manassas Junc 
tion, dated July 8, p. 447, 448, show the steps 
he took ten days before to meet the very at 
tack by which Tyler claims he was surprised. 
Beauregard s report, p. 440, says, on the morn 
ing of the 18th of July (the day when Tyler 
attacked Mitchell s and Blackburn s Fords): 
" My troops resting on Bull Run, from Stone 
Bridge to Union Mills, a distance of about 
eight miles, were posted as follows," and he 
proceeds to specify the forces of artillery, in 
fantry and cavalry, stationed at six of the 
crossings of the stream, and the reserves held 
to support the troops at Mitchell s, Black 
burn s and McLean s fords, which a bend in 
the river enabled him to place about equidis 
tant from all. His own headquarters were near 
the Reserve. He says further: " On the 
morning of the 18th, finding the enemy was as 
suming a threatening attitude, in addition to 
the regiments whose positions have already 
been stated, I ordered up from Gamp Pickens, 



MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 



as a reserve in rear of Bonham, the effective 
men of six companies of Kelly s 8th Louisiana 
Volunteers, and Kirkland s llth North Caro 
lina Volunteers, which having arrived the night 
before en route for Winchester, I had halted 
in view of the existing necessities of the ser 
vice." The foregoing extracts show that Beau- 
regard knew when and by what routes we were 
coming ; that to meet us, he had posted his 
whole army behind Bull Eun, his Reserves 
and his own headquarters near the places 
which Tyler attacked. Yet years after comes 
a statement from Tyler, that at that time 
Beauregard could not, before sunset, have 
concentrated fifteen hundred men on the field, 
that he had surprised him, and that he with 
his four brigades could have whipped Beaure 
gard before sundown. Tyler s command con 
sisted of four brigades fifteen regiments of 
infantry, four batteries of artillery some of 
the guns of heavy caliber, and many of them 
rifled, and a squadron of cavalry an effective 
force for duty of over 10,000 men an army 
in itself. It will be noticed in McDowell s 
order of the 18th, to Tyler, heretofore quoted, 
he says: U I go to Heintzleman s to arrange 
about the plan of moving against the enemy s 
right," which plan as the note says, he had 
talked over with Tyler. If that plan had been 
acted upon by McDowell, as Tyler supposed it 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 33 

would be, Tyler could no longer have been in 
the advance. But being in advance at the 
time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears 
to have resolved, practically, to take the di 
rection of the campaign into his own hands. 
So he moved against Longstreet at Black- 



EEBATA. 

Page 33 : Eighth line from top, for North Carol] 
read South Carolina. 



tnoughts. Out of reach of his commanding 
officer, he found as he claims, a state of things 
which warranted him in assuming the respon 
sibility of a different course from the one or 
dered. He had all the advantages of position 
a commanding bank on his side, skirted with 
timber and having open ground beyond. He 
says that the enemy was surprised, could not 
have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the 
field before sunset, and that he could have 
whipped the whole of Beauregard s army be 
fore sundown. Then, in the name of every 
thing that is soldierly, why did he not do it ? 
According to his own account he had the whole 
field to himself. No superior authority near. 



32 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

as a reserve in rear of Bonham, the effective 
men of six companies of Kelly s 8th Louisiana 
Volunteers, and Kirkland s llth North Caro 
lina Volunteers, which having arrived the night 
before en route for Winchester, I had halted 
in view of the existing necessities of the ser 
vice " mr " . , , , . 

rega 
com 
who 
and 
whi< 
a si 
Bea 
con< 

that ne naci surprised mm, ana tnar ne witn 
his four brigades could have whipped Beaure- 
gard before sundown. Tyler s command con 
sisted of four brigades iifteen regiments of 
infantry, four batteries of artillery some of 
the guns of heavy caliber, and many of them 
rifled, and a squadron of cavalry an effective 
force for duty of over 10,000 men an army 
in itself. It will be noticed in McDowell s 
order of the 18th, to Tyler, heretofore quoted, 
he says: "I go to Heintzleman s to arrange 
about the plan of moving against the enemy s 
right," which plan as the note says, he had 
talked over with Tyler. If that plan had been 
acted upon by McDowell, as Tyler supposed it 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 33 

would be, Tyler could no longer have been in 
the advance. But being in advance at the 
time, and the nearest to Manassas, he appears 
to have resolved, practically, to take the di 
rection of the campaign into his own hands. 
So he moved against Longs treet at Black 
burn s Ford, and what he forgot, against Bon- 
ham and the North Carolina troops at Mitchell s 
Ford. 

Having refuted Tyler s claims concerning 
facts and circumstances attending his a.ttack 
on the 18th, let us see how he would appear 
if the case had been as he states it in his 
memoirs, and whether it is not doing him a 
kindness to prove the error of his after 
thoughts. Out of reach of his commanding 
officer, he found as he claims, a state of things 
which warranted him in assuming the respon 
sibility of a different course from the one or 
dered. He had all the advantages of position 
a commanding bank on his side, skirted with 
timber and having open ground beyond. He 
says that the enemy was surprised, could not 
have concentrated fifteen hundred men on the 
field before sunset, and that he could have 
whipped the whole of Beauregard s army be 
fore sundown. Then, in the name of every 
thing that is soldierly, why did he not do it ? 
According to his own account he had the whole 
field to himself. No superior authority near. 



34 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

He had incurred the responsibility of opening 
an engagement against orders. Yet at the 
head of some ten thousand effective men of all 
arms, without using one-quarter of them, he al 
lowed himself to be repulsed, defeated, driven 
back, leaving his dead and prisoners, and be 
tween one and two hundred stand of arms in 
the hands of the enemy (p. 447). McDowell, 
as already stated, was far away, knew nothing 
of the affair, and did not reach the ground un 
til he met the troops returning to Centreville 
ridge late in the afternoon, when it was all 
over. If Tyler attacked at all, he should have 
done so in force and held his ground, and thus 
enabled McDowell to determine whether or 
not to follow up the blow with the whole 
army. 

The truth is, there was a surprise at Black 
burn s Ford on the 18th of July, 1861, but it 
was Tyler, not Beauregard, who was surprised. 
Twenty years after, in the bitterness and 
blindness of ill-will towards his Commanding 
General, and apparently in ignorance of what 
he ought to have known and what he might 
have learned from the records, especially his 
own contributions to them, if he did not know 
his friends are left to choose between admitting 
that, in his own judgment and against orders, 
he went unwittingly against the center of Beau- 
regard s entire army ; or that with a fine army 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 35 

of Ms own, he submitted to a defeat at the 
hands of part of the enemy s forces. That he 
was defeated is certain. 

The consequences of that defeat were seri 
ous. The effect was plainly seen. The feeling 
was universal that things had gone against us. 
The 12th New York Volunteers were paralyzed 
by the shock, and the depressing effect of the 
repulse was not confined to them ; the whole 
army felt it. The 4th Pennsylvania Infantry, 
and the 8th New York battery, their terms 
having expired, went home as the battle of the 
21st was about to begin. The troops began the 
advance from the Potomac, with a dread of 
being sent against "masked batteries." They 
felt that their fears on this point were now re- 
alizedj and they were so in fact, for they had 
been sent against "masked batteries." The 
possibility of making a front attack was thus 
destroyed by Tyler himself. He reported soon 
after the affair that he found the place "was 
strongly fortified, and the enemy in large force," 
p. 313. McDowell said in his report, p. 308 : " If 
it were needed, the experience of the 18th in 
stant shows we cannot, with this description 
of force, attempt to carry batteries such as now 
before us;" and Beauregard, p. 447, says: 
" The effect of this day s conflict was to sat 
isfy the enemy he could not force a passage 
across Bull Run in the face of our troops, and 



36 MCDOWELL AND TYLEK. 

led him into the flank movement of the 21st of 
July, and the battle of Manassas." 

As a matter of fact, there were no works im 
mediately at Blackburrts Ford. The belief at 
the time, however, was that it was strongly 
fortified, as Tyler thought, and it will be seen 
from the reports of General Bonham s officers 
that the adjoining position at Mitchell s Ford 
was fortified, and had been for some time. 

The purport of our reports and reconnais 
sances at the time was to the effect that of 
all the crossings over Bull Run, within our 
reach, including the Stone Ridge said to be 
mined the first unfortified one was the Sud- 
ley Spring Ford, where we crossed July 21 
(p. 330, Report of Barnard, Chief of Engineers, 
of McDowell s army). 



THE BATTLE OF BULL KUIs T , JULY 21, 1861. 

The task of whipping Beauregard s army, 
which Tyler, in the face of his failure, boasts 
he could have performed with four brigades 
on the 18th, was not undertaken by McDowell 
until the 21st, and then he was defeated. 

The Evening Post, quoting Tyler, says : " It 
was the delay of three days succeeding the af 
fair at Blackburn s Ford that lost the battle of 
Bull Run ; and for what purpose this delay 
occurred no proper explanation has been or 
can be made." 



BULL KUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 37 

It may be repeated here that the delay was 
from the evening of the 18th till 2 o clock on 
the morning of the 21st two instead of three 
days. When before the Committee on the 
Conduct of the War, January 20, 1862, Tyler 
was asked what " caused the disaster of 
that day?" July 21. He, under oath said, 
u Want of discipline and instruction in the 
troops." " Were there any other more proxi 
mate causes than that ?" asked the Committee. 
Here was an opportunity, if not an invitation, 
for Tyler to assert his u three" days delay at 
Centre ville, if that had been in his mind as a 
cause, but he did not give delay as a cause ; 
on the contrary, he gave as the "more proxi 
mate 1 cause " want of instruction and pro 
fessional knowledge among the officers, tlie 
company and regimental officers" During 
these " three" days Tyler asserts " there were 
no movements made to ascertain the force or 
position of the enemy, and the army had its full 
provision of seven days when it started from 
Washington, and was in no way in want of sup 
plies of any kind." 

The consequences of the two days delay at 
Centreville, the causes of the delay, and the 
responsibility for that delay, are important and 
independent questions. 

Johnson s army, over eight thousand strong, 



38 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

joined Beauregard between the night of Thurs 
day, the 18th, and the evening of Sunday, the 
21st. His leading brigade under Jackson arrived 
on the 19th. Bee s brigade and Johnston in 
person arrived on the 20th, and the remain 
der reached the field on the 21st, in time to 
take part in the action. General Scott, who 
controlled both McDowell and Patterson, was 
responsible for this change in the relative 
strength of the contending armies. The cam 
paign he required McDowell to make was 
based upon the condition that Johnston should 
not join Beauregard without having Patterson 
on his heels. McDowell would not have been 
justified in conducting his operations upon the 
assumption that the condition upon which the 
campaign was predicated by the General-in- 
Chief, was going to be violated. Nor did he 
know, until the 21st, during the battle, though 
he suspected it, that Johnston s forces had 
joined Beauregard. It must be admitted that 
it would have been better for McDowell if he 
could have executed on the 19th or 20th the 
plan of battle he acted upon on the 21st, and 
still better, perhaps, if he could have done so 
before Tyler s fiasco on the 18th. But that 
was not possible. Neither the preparation of 
his plan nor the state of his supplies permitted 
it. He did not form the plan, nor did he have 
the information upon which to base it, until 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 39 

the 20th. He did not learn until the night of 
the 18th that the enemy was going to defend 
the line of Bull Kun. If the state of his sup 
plies had permitted, he might have attempted 
to force that line by a direct attack on the 19th 
or 20th, as Tyler did on the 18th, but such an 
enterprise would have given no fair promise, 
and Tyler destroyed all possibility of its success 
by his disastrous failure on the 18th. Under 
all the circumstances a flank movement, instead 
of a direct attack, was an essential part of any 
plan which might be adopted. McDowell s 
first intention was to turn the enemy s right, 
but that intention had to be abandoned on 
the 18th. , Tyler says that between the 18th 
and 21st, "there were no movements made to 
ascertain the force or position of the enemy." 
Let the truth of what was done speak for 
itself. In his report, p. 330, Barnard, the Ch ief 
Engineer, says: fc At my interview with the 
Commanding General that evening, he informed 
me that he had convinced himself that the 
nature of the country to the left, or southard 
of Manassas, was unfit for the operations of 
a large army. I told him I would endeavor 
the next day to obtain such information as 
would enable him to decide on his further 
movement." No one deserves censure for the 
time which was consumed in obtaining that 
information. No army during the war had 



40 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

such an array of military engineering latent as 
McDowell had at that time. Barnard was the 
Chief, and under him were Woodbury, Wright, 
B. S. Alexander, A. W. Whipple, Abbott, 
Putnam, Prime, Houston, Snyder and O Rorke, 
of the Engineer Corps of the regular army. 
Their ability and zeal are beyond dispute. 
They devoted themselves to the examinations 
and reconnaissances for a proper plan of at 
tack. In seeking a route to the right, Barnard 
reports, p. 830 : " I, on the 19th, followed up 
the valley of Cub Run, until we reached a 
point west of 10 North, and about four miles 
in an air line from Centreville, near which we 
struck a road, which we believed to lead fco the 
fords" (near Sudley Springs). " Following it 
for a short distance, we encountered the ene 
my s patrols. As we were most anxious to 
avoid attracting the enemy s attention to our 
designs in this quarter, we did not care to pur 
sue the reconnaissance farther. We had seen 
enough to convince us of the perfect practi 
cability of the route. To make more certain of 
the fords, however, Captain Woodbury pro 
posed to return at night (that was the night 
of 19th), and with a few Michigan woodsmen 
from Colonel Sherman s brigade, to endeavor 
to find them. On returning to camp it was 
determined to send Captain Wright and Lieut. 
Snyder, engineers, with Captain Woodbury. 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 41 

At the same time the Commanding General 
directed Captain AVhipple, Topographical En 
gineer, and Lieut. Prime, engineer, to make a 
night reconnaissance of the Run between 
Warrenton bridge and Blackburn s Ford. 
Both these night expeditions failed. It was 
found the enemy occupied the woods too 
strongly on our side of the run to permit the 
reconnaissances to be accomplished. It was 
not our policy to drive in his pickets until we 
were in motion to attack. On laying before 
you the information obtained, the Command 
ing General believed himself justified in adopt 
ing the following plan of attack, which was 
decided upon on tlie 20^," that is, after the 
reconnaissances of the night of the 19th. 

On the 20th, McDowell issued orders for the 
advance to begin at half -past two on the morn 
ing of the 21st. It was not possible for him to 
form that plan or act upon it any sooner than 
he did. No critic, to this day, I believe, not 
even Tyler, has claimed that the plan was not 
good. What the result would have been of 
acting earlier upon a worse plan, no one can 
say with any certainty. 

Tyler says : " The army had its full provis 
ion for seven days when it started from Wash 
ington, and was in no way in want of supplies 
of any kind" on the 18th. The Record con 
tradicts him. The troops marched from the 



42 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

Potomac on the 16th with tliree days rations 
in their haversacks. Wagons were to follow 
the next day containing Jive days rations, but 
they met with difficulties and delay. Some of 
them arrived in time to distribute supplies to 
divisions on the evening of the 18th, others not 
until the 19th. The three days rations with 
which the troops began the advance on the 
16th ought to have lasted until the afternoon 
of the 19th, but, on account of the inexperi 
ence of the men, they were exhausted on the 
18th. The reports of the Chief Commissary, 
Clarke and his subordinates explain this mat 
ter, p. 336 to 344, Rebellion Records. Lieut. 
Hawkins, in charge of one of the three supply 
trains, says, p. 343, that on his arrival " there 
was immediate necessity for the distribution of 
the rations ; " and the officer in charge of an 
other of the trains, Lieut. Curtis, p. 340, says 
of his distribution on the 19th : "I found the 
men in almost a starving condition." Heintzle- 
man and others confirm this, and Schenck s 
report, (p. 360) shows that his brigade of 
Tyler s division was unfed on the 21st. 

An advance of the army beyond Centreville 
was not practicable until the supply trains 
came up and their contents were distributed. 
The distribution was completed to divisions on 
the 19th, and on the 20th McDowell ordered, p. 
325: "The commanders of divisions will give 



BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 43 

the necessary orders that an equal distribution 
of subsistence stores on hand be made immedi 
ately to the different companies in their re 
spective commands, so that they shall be pro 
vided for the same number of days, and that 
the same be cooked and put in the haversacks 
of the men. The subsistence stores now in the 
possession of each division, with the fresh beef 
that can be drawn from the commissary, must 
last to include the 23d instant." 

This was the first campaign of the war. The 
troops were not soldiers, but civilians in uni 
form ; most of them in service only for three 
months. Giving due weight to all the circum 
stances, there was no culpable delay at Centre- 
ville, and the time spent there between the 
evening of the 18th and 2 o clock on the morn 
ing of the 21st, was necessary to replenish the 
exhausted haversacks of the men and to gain 
information upon which to form a proper plan 
of battle. 

The enemy was strongly posted along Bull 
Run, his right at Union Mills, and his left 
at the " Stonebridge," where the Warrenton 
turnpike crosses the stream. His line was 
eight miles long. Centreville, around which 
McDowell s army was concentrated, was nearly 
opposite the center of Beauregard s line, and 
only about three or four miles from it. 



44 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

There was no misunderstanding as to the 
plan of battle. The parts of the different di 
visions were clearly set forth in McDowell s 
general order No. 22 of July 20, p. 226, and ex 
planations were given in detail at a conference 
on the evening of the 20th, at which division and 
brigade commanders were present. 

After explaining the situation and the object 
to be accomplished, the order says : u The First 
Division (General Tyler), with the exception of 
Richardson s brigade, will move at 2.30 A.M. 
precisely, on the Warrenton turnpike, to 
threaten the passage of the bridge, but will not 
open fire until full daybreak. 

"The Second Division (Hunter s) will move 
from its camp at 2 A.M. precisely, and led by 
Captain Woodbury, of the Engineers, will, after 
passing Cub Run, turn to the right and pass 
the Bull Run stream above the lower ford at 
Sudley Springs, and then turning down to the 
left, descend the stream and clear away the 
enemy who may be guarding the lower ford and 
bridge. It will then bear off to the right to 
make room for the succeeding division, 

"The Third Division (Heintzleman s) will 
march at 2.30 A.M. and follow the road taken 
by the Second Division (Hunter s), but will 
cross at the lower ford after it has been turned 
as above, and then going to the left, take place 
between the stream and the Second Division. 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 45 

"The Fifth Division (Miles ) will take posi 
tion on the Centreville Heights (Richardson s 
brigade will, for the time, form part of this di 
vision and will continue in its present position). 
One brigade will be in the village and one near 
the present station of Richardson s brigade. 
This division will threaten Blackburn s Ford, 
and will remain in reserve at Centreville. 

" These movements may lead to the gravest 
results, and commanders of divisions should 
bear in mind the immense consequences in 
volved." 

When this order was issued Sherman s and 
Schenck s brigades of Tyler s division were in 
camp in advance of Centreville, on the Warren- 
ton turnpike, which led directly to the enemy s 
left at the Stone-Bridge, about two and a half 
miles away. Keyes brigade of Tyler s di 
vision was just in rear of Centreville, a mile 
behind Sherman ; behind him, Hunter s divis 
ion, on his left, Miles division, and in rear 
of Miles, Heintzleman s division. It was only 
about a mile from the camps of Sherman and 
Schenck to the point where Hunter and 
Heintzleman were to leave the turnpike and 
take the country road to the right. Order 
ing Tyler, who occupied the turnpike (over a 
part of which all in turn had to move) to march 
at "2.30 A.M. precisely" McDowell s object 
was to have him clear the pike as far as the 



46 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

turn off, so as not to delay Hunter and Heintzle- 
mann. That was fully understood at the con 
ference held on the night of the 20th. Tyler 
had to move Sherman s and Schenck s brigades 
one mile along the pike to accomplish the ob 
ject of opening the roads to the following divis 
ions. Yet, without any opposition from the 
enemy, his advance was so slow as to hold 
Hunter and Heintzleman some four hours on 
the mile or two of the turnpike between their 
camps and the road on which they were to 
turn off for the flank march. There is abund 
ant proof of this fact in the official reports 
printed in Records of the Rebellion, and in the 
testimony before the Committee on the Con 
duct of the War, and the Committee itself con- 
iirms the assertion in its report It is not 
necessary to cite any other witness than 
Tyler himself. While not frankly admit 
ting the delay, he was not able before the 
Committee to deny or disprove it. He said, 
p. 202 : 

Q. " Were the rest of the divisions delayed 
by your movement ? 

A. "They were not/ more than absolutely 
necessary, under the circumstances." 

Q. "What time did your movement com 
mence 2" 

A. " At half-past two o clock/ 

Q. " You were to advance, how f ar 2 " 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 47 

A. "To the Stone-Bridge, about two and a 
half miles." 

Q. u At what time did the portion of the 
division under your command reach Stone- 
bridge?" 

A. "It reached there by six o clock, per 
haps a quarter before six." 

By this testimony from Tyler himself, he, 
with no opposition from the enemy, and no 
obstruction in the way, was about three hours 
and a half marching two miles and a half over 
a good turnpike. 

The Committee, however, went a little fur 
ther, and asked, pp. 202, 203 : 

Q. "At what time did the rear of your di 
vision I do not mean to include Keyes brig 
ade, but the rear of that which was with you 
that morning pass the point where Hunter 
and Heintzleman turned off to the right ? " 

A. " We passed there before four o clock." 

Q. "Or in two hours after you started ? " 

A. "Yes, Sir!" 

The point from which the part of his division 
here mentioned (Sherman s and Schenck s brig 
ades) marched, and the point where Hunter and 
Heintzleman turned off, was one mile. Tyler 
marched that distance in two hours, and yet he 
went to his grave with a grievance because 
McDowell said in his report, p. 318: "There 
was delay in the First Division getting out of 



48 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

its camp on the road, and the other divisions 
were, in consequence, between two and three 
hours behind the time appointed a great mis 
fortune, as events turned out," and because 
further, that in his testimony, McDowell, p. 
42, refused to retract this part of his report, 
and said: "General Tyler has written me a 
letter complaining that my report does him in 
justice, and asking me to set him right in ref 
erence to this matter of delay. Under the cir 
cumstances, I did not feel that I could make 
any change." 

In view of Tyler s abuse and criticism of 
McDowell, the commander, it is proper to look 
for a moment at the part played in that battle 
by Tyler himself, McDowell s second in com 
mand, as well as his critic. He says, with his 
division alone, he could have whipped Beaure- 
gard s entire army before sundown on the 18th, 
if McDowell had not prevented. That boast 
has been disposed of. Certainly McDowell 
did not prevent him from fighting on the 
21st. What help did he give toward whip 
ping Beauregard on that day ? It has already 
been shown that he employed the three and 
a half hours between 2.30 and 6 A.M. in 
marching two and a half miles to the vicinity 
of the Stone bridge on the Warren ton turn 
pike. It was under cover of the demonstration 
he was to make at that point that Hunter and 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 



49 



Heintzelman were to effect their flank march 
and turn the enemy s left. 




POSITION OF TYLER FROM 6 A.M. UNTIL ABOUT 12 M. ON 21ST. 

The rebel position at Stone-Bridge was de 
fended by General Evans. Tyler s report, 
written six days after the battle, when every 
thing was comparatively fresh in his mind, and 
when he was not making an attack on his 
commander and the plan of battle, says (pp. 
348, 349, Rebellion Records) : 

"* * Soon after getting into position we 
discovered that the enemy had a heavy bat- 



50 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

tery, with infantry in support, commanding 
both the road and bridge approaches, on which 
both Ayres and Carlisle, at different times, tried 
the effect of their guns without success, and a 
careful examination of the banks of Bull-Run 
satisfying me that they were impracticable for 
purpose of artillery, these batteries had to re 
main comparatively useless until such time as 
Hunter s column might clear the approach by 
a movement on the opposite bank. During 
this period of waiting the 80-pounder was 
occasionally used with considerable effect 
against bodies of infantry and cavalry, which 
could be seen from time to time moving in the 
direction of Hunter s column and out of the 
range of ordinary guns." 

Twenty years later this condition of affairs 
had changed in Tyler s mind. In his mem 
oir, traducing McDowell, he says : 

" The enemy had a force guarding the bridge, 
but not so strong that a passage could not have 
been forced at any moment. He had a battery 
of light guns there in the early part of the day, 
but they were soon driven off by Ayres battery 
and the heavy eigh teen-pounder gun com 
manded by Lieutenant Lyford." 

So we see that the " heavy " battery and sup 
ports on which, according to Tyler, in 1862. 
Ayres and Carlisle fired in vain, and finally 
ceased firing, became by the same authority, in 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 51 

1881, " a light battery, which was soon driven 
off by our tire!" and, that, the waiting for 
Hunter s column to clear the opposite bank 
was not necessary, as we could have "forced 
the passage at any moment ! " 

In this instance the latest statement is the 
correct one. The truth is the Stone-Bridge was 
defended by a fractional brigade consisting of 
a regiment and a battalion of infantry, a squad 
ron of cavalry, and two pieces of light artil 
lery. 

Tyler s demonstration was so feeble that 
Evans was not long deceived by it. The latter 
says in his report, p. 559 : It was not later than 
eight o clock " when I perceived that it was. not 
the intention of the enemy to attack me in my 
present position, but had commenced his move 
ment to turn my left flank. I at once decided to 
quit my position and to meet him in his flank 
movement, leaving the skirmishers of the 
Fpurth Regiment of S. C. Volunteers, sup 
ported by the reserve of two companies to keep 
him engaged. I sent word to Colonel Phil. St. 
George Cocke that I had abandoned my posi 
tion at the bridge and was advancing to attack 
the enemy at the crossing of the Warrenton 
turnpike and the Manassas road. Observing 
carefully the movements of the enemy, * I was 

*The enemy here referred to is Hunter s, not Tyler s division. 



52 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

able to form my line of attack directly in his 
front, covered by a grove of woods, by 9 o clock 
a. m." It thus appears that the division which 
on the 18th could have whipped Beauregard s 
aimy before sundown, was confronted before 8 
a. m. on the 21st by some fifteen companies of 
infantry, two of cavalry, and two of artillery, 
and after 8 d clock was held in check " till about 
noon" p 369 by the skirmishers of the 4th 
S. C. Volunteers, supported by two companies 
of that regiment, four companies in all. This, 
in the face of orders to Tyler from McDowell, 
the delivery of which is proved by the records, 
to " press forward the attack" and in the face, 
too, of his duty in the matter, as admitted in 
his memoirs, p. 57, where he says, that when 
Hunter and Heintzelman had "attacked and 
forced the enemy to the vicinity of Stone 
Bridge, " I " was to force the passage of Bull 
Run at that point and attack the enemy in 
flank." It does not appear, nor does Tyler 
claim that he did press the attack in response to 
McDowell s orders. In fact Tyler, under oath, 
denied, but subsequently admitted, that he had 
received those orders. His testimony is as fol 
lows : January 20, 1 862, before the Committee 
on the Conduct of the War " I did not see 
General McDowell on the field, and I did not 
receive any order from him during that day, p. 
201. * * * 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 53 

I received no orders from General McDowell 
after I left him Saturday night," p. 203. 

"Question: Did you receive from General 
McDowell, through his aid, Mr. Kingsbury, 
orders to make a more rapid advance ? 

" Answer : No, Sir ! I did not, p. 206. 

January 22d, General Daniel Tyler, re-ex 
amined. " The witness said : I made one mis 
take in my testimony when before the Commit 
tee on Monday last. I then stated that I 
received no orders from General McDowell dur 
ing the day of the battle of Bull- Run. That 
was an error. I did receive an order from him 
about 11 o clock in the morning to press the 
attack." 

He says, "about 11 o clock." If the exact 
time could be ascertained it would be found 
that it was before eleven o clock. But be that 
as it may, the order was to press forward Jtis 
attack!" The how and the where were abso 
lutely at Tyler s discretion. He could app]y 
his troops as he judged best ; and if the enemy 
could be driven off and the passage be forced 
at any moment, as he would seem to intimate 
should have been done, there was nothing to 
keep him from doing it. The simple, emphatic, 
but general order about 11 A. M., was to "press 
forward Ms attack" Under this order, and in 
the exercise of his discretion, Tyler did not 
attempt to force the passage of the bridge, 



54 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

which was then defended by only four com 
panies. 

Let us see what Tyler did with his division in 
this affair. Sherman says in his official report, 
pp. 368-9 after reaching his position near the 
Stone-Bridge 6 A. M. : "here the brigade was 
deployed in line along the skirt of timber, and 
remained quietly in position till after 10 A. M. 
The enemy remained very quiet," &c., " There 
we remained till we heard the musketry fire 
across Bull- Run, showing that the head of 
Colonel Hunter s column was engaged. The 
firing was brisk, and showed that Hunter was 
driving before him the enemy till about noon, 
when it became certain the enemy had come to 
a stand, and that our forces on the other side 
of Bull-Run were all engaged artillery and 
infantry. Here you (Tyler) sent me the order 
to cross over with the whole brigade to the as 
sistance of Colonel Hunter. 

"Early in the day, when reconnoitering the 
ground, I had seen a horseman descend from 
a bluff in our front, cross the stream, and show 
himself in the open field ; and inferring we 
could cross over at the same point, I sent for 
ward a company as skirmishers and followed 
with the whole brigade. We found no diffi 
culty in crossing over, and met no opposition 
in ascending the steep bluff opposite." 

This shows that Sherman knew " early in the 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 55 

day" that he could cross the stream, but 
Tyler s orders for him to do so were not given 
until " about noon, when it became certain the 
enemy had come to a stand and that our forces 
on the other side were all engaged artillery 
and infantry." 

Surely this was not pressing forward the 
attack ? 

Tyler s division was the one of the three 
active divisions which had the shortest line 
to the battle-field (say 3 or 4 miles), and 
should have done the most fighting. The ob 
ject of the long and tiresome march (some 
twelve miles) of Hunter and Heintzelman, was 
by turning the enemy s left to open the way 
for Tyler s command, fresh and en masse, to 
reach the field of battle by a single stride. But 
it turned out that the divisions which did the 
marching had also to do most of the fighting. 

To return to Sherman : crossing the Run, he 
says : u I learned that General McDowell was 
on the field. I sought him out, and received 
his orders to join in the pursuit of the enemy." 
Though his brigade took an active part in the 
later phases of the action, Sherman saw nothing 
more of Tyler during the battle. Tyler says, 
in his report, p. 349, " I ordered Colonel Sher 
man, with his brigade, to cross Bull-Run, and 
to support the two columns already in action. 
Colonel Sherman, as appears by his report, 



56 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

crossed the Run without opposition, and after 
encountering a party of the enemy flying be 
fore Hunter s forces, found General McDowell, 
and received his orders to join in the pursuit. 
The subsequent operations of this brigade and 
its able commander having been under your 
own eye and direction, I shall not follow its 
movements any further." 

All of this time Tyler was not only under the 
obligations of the general plan of battle, but 
was under the special obligation of the order 
he had received, to press the attack. Yet he 
nowhere admits that he acted upon that 
order, on the contrary he still acted upon his 
own judgment. He says in his report p. 349: 
"As soon as it was discovered that Hunters^ 
division had ~been arrested, I ordered up Keyes 
brigade." Was it pressing the attack, or was 
it soldiership, if there had been no such orders, 
lying on the flank of an inferior force of the 
enemy to wait within the sound of Hunter s 
musketry for his division to be arrested? "I 
ordered Keyes brigade to follow Sherman, ac 
companying the movement in person, as I saw 
it must necessarily place me on the left of our 
line, the best possible position, &*c. I ordered 
Colonel Keyes to form into line on the left of 
Sherman s brigade," says Tyler. McDowell s 
adjutant General was sent to flnd Tyler and 
hurry him into action. En route he passed 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 57 

Sherman s brigade; met Tyler while Keyes 
brigade was still marching by Hank ; told him 
that we were victorious, to form line to the left 
and advance up the slope in front. Tyler con 
tinues in his report, p. 394 : "The charge was 
here ordered and the 2nd Maine and 3rd Con 
necticut regiments, which were opposed to this 
portion of the enemy s line, pressed forward 
to the top of the hill until they reached the 
buildings held by the enemy ; drove them 
out, and for a moment had them in posses 
sion. At this point, finding the brigade under 
the fire of a strong force behind breast- works, 
the order was given to march by the left 
flank across an open field until the whole line 
was sheltered by the right bank of Bull- Run, 
along which the march was continued, &c. 
The march was conducted for a considerable 
distance below the Stone-Bridge, &c." Keyes, 
in his report, p. 353, fixes the hour at which 
the first, and it may be said the last, active 
service of his brigade was rendered in the fight. 
He says after describing his crossing of the 
Run: " At about 2 p. M. General Tyler ordered 
me to take a battery on a height in front." 
After the attempt to do that, Keyes says in his 
report : "I ordered the Maine regiment to face 
to the left flank and move to a wooded slope 
across an open field, to which point I followed 
them. The balance of the brigade soon rejoined 



58 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

me, and after a few moments rest, I again 
put it in motion and moved forward to find an 
other opportunity to charge." This movement 
forward is the one l sheltered by the right bank 
of Bull-Run, already mentioned by Tyler, and 
this is the brigade which Tyler accompanied 
"in person, to the best possible position." 
Why he sent Keyes under the bluff to find an 
other " opportunity to charge," is not disclosed 
by the records of the rebellion. The fact is, that 
after that one "charge" was made by Keyes 
brigade, about 2 P. M. it filed off and marched 
along, under the bluff, and did no more fight 
ing. Keyes confirms this. He says in his 
report, p. 354: "I continued my march and 
sent my Aide, Lieut. Walter, to the rear* to 
inquire of General McDowell how the day was 
going ? The discontinuance of the firing in our 
lines becoming more and more apparent, I 
inclined to the right, and after marching six 
hundred or seven hundred yards farther, I was 
met by Lieut, E. Upton, Aide to General Tyler, 
and ordered to file to the right, as our troops 
were retreating. I moved on at an ordinary 
pace, and fell into the retreating column. 
* * " At the moment I received the order to 
retreat and for some time afterwards, it (his 
brigade) was in as good order as in the morning 

* McDowell was in front. 



BULL BUN CAMPAIGN, 



on the road." Military readers, especially 
those who are acquainted with the Bull-Run 
affair, can analyze the foregoing facts for them 
selves. It may be added that Keyes brigade 
of "about 2,500 men," as he reported it, 
shows : killed, no officers, 19 enlisted men ; 




FIELD ABOUT TIME UNION EETEEAT BEGAN, JULY 21ST. 

wounded, 4 officers and 46 enlisted men. Sher 
man s brigade which fought under McDowell s 
personal orders, lost : killed, 3 officers and 
117 enlisted men ; wounded, 15 officers, 193 
enlisted men. 



60 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

Neither Schenck s brigade of Tyler s divisio 
nor Tyler s Artillery, crossed Bull-Run durii 
the battle. After 8 o clock the Stone-Brid^ 
was defended by only a handful of skirmisher 
The turnpike was obstructed by some falL 
trees. Ordinary vigor and industry wou 
have carried the bridge and cleared the pi] 
in a few minutes. Tyler testifies, that about 
A. M. he received orders to press the attack, 
he had pushed his division, or merely tl 
fine regular batteries of Ayers and Carlis 
into the contest, as late even as 2 o clock, ] 
might have saved the day and averted tl 
consequences of his delay in the mornin 
Tyler s three brigades, Sherman s, Keyes ai 
Schenck s were from 6 o clock in the mornir 
concentrated near the Stone-Bridge, in front 
Evans until about 8 A. M. and on his flank ar 
not more than a mile from it, after he left tl 
Stone-Bridge and formed a line of battle perpe 
dicular to Tyler s front which he had done by 
A. M., to resist the attack of Hunter andHein 
zelman. Tyler was on the ground with the; 
three fresh brigades and his artillery in han< 
and with McDowell s orders to press the attacl 
anl was informed of the progress of the flankir 
divisions by his staff officers who observed tl 
movements from tree- tops, as Tyler says in h 
report. What he did under these circumstai 
ces is shown in the records of which an outlii 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 61 

has been given. His own services in that battle 
do not justify him, to say the least of it, in 
criticising McDowell. Except in the one par 
ticular of the delay in the morning, McDowell 
made no complaint against Tyler on the 21st, 
though he fully understood the facts in the case. 
The battle was lost, and he chose to let the 
blame rest upon his own shoulders rather than 
place any part of it upon his subordinates. 

The object of this article is to repel the 
direct and outrageous attack made upon 
McDowell, not to praise him. But the occasion 
seems appropriate for citing an analysis of him, 
made by Secretary Chase in a letter to a friend, 
dated Sept. 4, 1862. (Warden s " account of 
the private and public, services of Salmon P. 
Chase/ ) 

" McDowell has been unfortunate, but he is 
a loyal, brave, truthful, capable officer. He is 
a disciplinarian. While he never hesitated to 
appropriate private property of rebels to public 
use, he suppressed, as far as possible, private 
marauding as incompatible with the laws of 
civilized war, and equally incompatible with 
the efficiency of troops. Then he never drinks, 
or smokes, or chews, or indulges in any kind 
of license. He is serious and earnest. He 
resorts to no acts of popularity. He has no 
political aims, and perhaps not any very pro 
nounced political opinions, except the convic- 



62 MCDOWELL AND TYLER. 

tion that this war sprung from the influences 
of slavery, and that whenever slavery stands 
in the way of successful prosecution, slavery 
must get out of the way. He is too indifferent 
in manner. His officers are sometimes alien 
ated by it. He is too purely military in his 
intercourse with his soldiers. There is an 
apparent hauteur no, that is not the word- 
rough indifference expresses better the idea, 
in his way towards them, that makes it hard 
for them to feel any warm personal sentiment 
towards him, unless they find, what they 
hitherto have not found, that he leads them 
successfully, and the honor of serving under 
him compensates for their grief." 

The communication in the Post says : u The 
true and full history of the War of the Rebel 
lion cannot be written until sufficient time has 
elapsed to allow the many diaries, letters, and 
private papers of the chief participants in its 
stirring scenes to be made accessible by their 
death." Diaries, letters, &c., are valuable data 
for history,but as much cannot be said for recol 
lections recorded twenty years after stirring 
scenes, especially if they are prepared without 
referring to the reports, diaries, &c., made at 
the tim e. Death is valuable to history by giving 
to the public the diaries, letters, &c., of par 
ticipants in stirring military scenes, and also 
by putting an end to the new versions of those 



BULL RUN CAMPAIGN, 1861. 63 

scenes which, the participants issue from time 
to time as they pass on in life Vanity, interest 
and prejudice work against memory. The oper 
ations of war appeal strongly to the imagin 
ation, and latter day recollections in some 
instances illuminate, in others, obscure the 
truth. 



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