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WAR BOOKS
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN
THE CAMPAIGl^J^
^
OF SEDA
AUGUST-SEPTEMBER 1870
BY
GEORGE HOOPER
For many years a member of the Daily Telegraph Staff
.*^'^' P
HO ODER AND STOUGHTON
LONDON NEW YORK TORONTO
MCMXIV
r
CONTENTS
PAGE
Introduction xi
CHAPTER I
The Causes of the War
French Demands for the Rhine — Luxemburg
— An Interlude of Peace — The Salzburg Inter-
view— The Emperor seeks Allies — ^The Hohen-
zoUern Candidature — The French Government
and the Chamber i
CHAPTER II
The Gathering of the Hosts
German Mobilization — French Mobilization —
War Methods Contrasted 37
CHAPTER III
Stage Thunder
The Combat at Saarbriick — Preparing to go
Forward — Positions on August 4th — The Moral
and Political Forces 52
vi CONTENTS
CHAPTER IV
Invasion in Earnest
The Combat on the Lauter — French Position
on the Saar — German Position on the Saar . .
CHAPTER V
Two Staggering Blows
I. Woerth — The Battle Begins — Attack on
Woerth — Attack on the French Right — Attack
on Elsasshausen — MacMahon Orders a Retreat
— The Close of the Battle. 2. Spicheren — The
Germans Begin the Fight — The Red Hill Stormed
— Progress of the Action — Frossard Retires . .
CHAPTER VI
Vacillation in Metz
The Emperor Resigns his Command— The
German Advance — The German Cavalry at
Work — The Germans March on the Moselle . .
CHAPTER VII
Von Moltke Keeps the Whip Hand
The French Propose to Move — The Battle of
Colombey-Nouilly — Von Golz Dashes in — The
CONTENTS vii
PAGE
End of the Battle— The French Retreat— The
Germans Cross the Moselle — ^The Cavalry Beyond
the Moselle — Orders for the Flank March — The
Emperor Quits the Army 12 1
CHAPTER VIII
The French Retreat Thwarted
Vionville-Mars la Tour — The Vionville Battle-
field— The French are Surprised — The Third
Corps Strikes In — Arrival of Bazaine — Bredow's
Brilliant Charge — The Fight becomes Stationary
— Arrival of the Tenth Corps — The Great Cavalry
Combat — End of the Battle 142
CHAPTER IX
Pressed Back on Metz
Marshal Bazaine — The Battlefield of Grave-
lotte — The German Plans — The Battle of Grave-
lotte — Prince Frederick Charles at the Front —
Steinmetz Attacks the French Left — Operations
by the German Left Wing — General Frossard
Repels a Fresh Attack — The Last Fights near St.
Hubert — The Prussian Guard on the Centre and
Left — The Capture of St. Privat . . . ; . 162
viii CONTENTS
CHAPTER X
The State of the Game, and the New
Moves
The King Marches Westward — The Cavahy
Operations — The Emperor at Chalons and
Reims — MacMahon Retires to Reims — The
Chalons Army Directed on the Meuse ....
CHAPTER XI
The Grand Right Wheel
The Cavalry Discover the Enemy — Move-
ments of the French — The Marshal Resolves,
Hesitates, and Yields — Movements of the Ger-
mans— Effects of MacMahon's Counter-orders —
German and French Operations on the 29th —
The Combat at Nouart — The State of Affairs
at Sundown — ^The Battle of Beaumont — The
Surprise of the Fifth Corps — The FHght to
Mouzon 212
CHAPTER Xn
Metz and Strasburg
The Battle of Noisseville 240
^ CONTENTS ix
i
PAOB
CHAPTER XIII
? Sedan
German Decision — Confusion in the French
Camp — The Movements of the Germans — The
Battlefield of Sedan — The Battle of Sedan —
MacMahon's Wound and its Consequences-
Progress of the Battle on the Givonne — The
March on St. Menges — The Eleventh and Fifth
Corps Engage — The Condition of the French
Army — The French Cavalry Charge — General
de Wimpffen's Counter stroke — The Emperor
and his Generals — King William and his
Warriors — How the Generals Rated Each Other
— The Generals Meet at Donchery — Napoleon
III. Surrenders — the French Generals Submit —
The End 248
MAP AND PLANS
I. Battle of Woerth.
II. Battle of Spicheren.
III. Battle of Colombey-Nouilly.
IV. Battle of Vionville-Mars la Tour.
V. Battle of Gravelotte.
VI. General Map (End Paper.)
VII. Battle of Sedan (End Paper)
1
THE CAMPAIGN OF
SEDAN
INTRODUCTION
In July, 1870, fifty-five years after the Allied Annies,
who had marched from the decisive field of Waterloo,
entered Paris, a young diplomatist. Baron Wimpfen,
started from the French capital for Berlin. He was
the bearer of a Declaration of War from the Emperor
Napoleon III. to William I., King of Prussia; and
the fatal message was dehvered to the French Charge
d' Affaires, M. le Sourd, and by him to the Prussian
Government on the 19th of July. Thus, once again,
a Napoleon, at the head of a French Empire, was
destined to try his strength against the principal
German Power beyond the Rhine.
Yet, under what different conditions ! The Em-
peror was not now the Napoleon who surrounded the
Austrians at Ulm, broke down the combined forces
of Austria and Russia at Austerlitz, and extorted a
peace which set him free to overthrow, at Jena and
Auerstadt, the fine army left by Frederick the Great,
and allowed to crystallize by his weak successors.
Nor did the late Emperor find in his front a divided
Germany, and the mere survival of a great miUtary
organization. He found a united people, and an
army surpassing in completeness, as it did in arma-
ments— the victors of Prague, Rosbach, and Leuthen.
The Germany known to the Congress of Vienna had
disappeared — the deformed had been transformed.
xii Introduction
The little seed of unity, sown early in the century, had
grown into a forest tree. The spirit of Arndt had
run through the whole Teutonic nation, which, after
the turmoil of 1848 had subsided, and the heavy hand
of Russia had been taken off by the Crimean War,
found a leader in the strongly- organized kingdom of
Prussia. When the weak and hesitating will of
Frederick William IV. ceased, first, by the operation
of a painful disease, and then by extinction, to disturb
the course of his country's fortune, Prussia, in a few
years, became practically a new Power. King
William I., who crowned himself with his own hands
at Konigsberg, began his task, as a ruler, in a grave
and earnest spirit, holding that kingship was not only
a business, but a trust, and taking as his watchwords,
Work and Duty. No monarch in any age, no private
man, ever laboured more assiduously and conscienti-
ously at his metier, to use the word of Joseph II.,
than the King of Prussia. He became Regent in
1858, when Napoleon III. was engaged in preparing
for his Italian campaign against the House of Austria.
French policy, with varying watchwords had run
that road for centuries ; and, during the summer of
1859, it was the good fortune of the Emperor to win
a series of victories which brought his army to the
Mincio, and before the once famous Quadrilateral.
The German Bund had taken no part in the fray,
but the rapid successes of the French aroused some
apprehensions in Berlin, and there went forth an
order to mobilize a part of the army, which means
to put each corps on a war- footing, and to assemble
a force in Rhenish Prussia. Whatever share that
demonstration may have had in producing the sudden
arrangement between the rival Emperors, who made
peace over their cigarettes and coffee at Villafranca,
the experiment tried by the Berlin War Office had
one important result — it brought to light serious
defects in the system then practised, and revealed
the relative weakness of the Prussian army. From
that moment, the Regent, who soon became King
by the death of his brother, began the work of
Introduction xiii
reforming the military system. For this step, at least
from a Prussian standpoint, there was good reason ;
since the kingdom, although it was based on a strong
and compact nucleus, was, as a whole, made up of
scattered fragments lying between great mihtary
Powers, and therefore could not hope to subsist
without a formidable army. The relative weakness
of Prussia had, indeed, been burnt into the souls of
Prussian statesmen ; and King WilUam, on his
accession, determined that as far as in him lay, that
grave defect should be cured. A keen observer, a
good judge of character and capacity, his experience
of men and things, which was large, enabled him
at once to select fit instruments. He picked out
three persons, two soldiers and a statesman, and
severe ordeals in after years justified his choice. He
appointed General von Roon, Minister of War, and
no man in modern times has shown greater quaUties
in the organization of an army. He placed General
von Moltke at the head of the General Staff, which
that able man soon converted into the best equipped
and the most effective body of its kind known to
history. It rapidly became, what it now is, the brain
of the army, alike in quarters and in the field. Fi-
nally, after some meditation, he called Herr Otto von
Bismarck from the diplomatic service, which had
revealed his rare and peculiar qualities, and made
this Pomeranian squire his chief poUtical adviser
and the manager of his deUcate and weighty State
affairs.
Thenceforth, the long-gathering strength of Prussia,
the foundations of which were bedded deep in the
history of its people, began to assume a form and a
direction which great events revealed to astonished
and incredulous Europe. The experiment undertaken
by the King and his chief councillors was rendered
less difficult by that effect of the Crimean War which
so materially lessened the influence of Russia in
Germany. The intimate and friendly -relations sub-
sisting between the two Courts remained unbroken,
and to its preservation in fair weather and foul,
xiv Introduction
Prussia owed, to a large extent, the favourable con-
ditions surrounding the application and development
of her poHcy. It seemed as necessary to Prussian,
as it now does to German interests, that the Russian
Government should be, at least, benevolently neutral ;
and probably the art of keeping it so was profoundly
studied by Herr von Bismarck when he filled the post
of Ambassador to the Court of St. Petersburg. The
large military reforms designed by the King and his
advisers aroused an uncompromising opposition in
the native Parliament, which was only overcome
by the firmness with which King William supported
his outspoken and audacious Minister. The victory
was secured by methods which were called, and were,
unconstitutional. The control of the Chamber over
the Budget was placed in abeyance, by a clever
interpretation of the fundamental law. It was held
that if the Deputies could not agree with the Govern-
ment respecting the estimates of the current year,
the law which they had sanctioned in the preceding
year still remained valid. Thus the taxes were
collected, appropriated and expended, just the same
as if the Chamber had not virtually " stopped the
supplies " in order to defeat the measures which were
intended to give the army stability, numbers, effi-
ciency and cohesion. The whole transaction ran
counter to English maxims and customs ; but it
should be remembered that Parliamentary Govern-
ment, and especially government by party, were
never, and are not even now established in Berlin.
The net result of the contest was the renovation and
the strengthening of the National Army to an extent
which, while it did not exceed, perhaps, the expecta-
tions of those who laboriously wrought it out, left
some Powers of Europe ignorant, and others incredu-
lous respecting its value.
Not that the military institutions of Prussia,
dating back from the "new model," devised during
the stress of the Napoleonic Wars, had been funda-
mentally altered. Nothing was done except to
increase the numbers, close up and oil the machinery, Mt
Introduction ^v
render its working prompt and easy by prudent
decentralization, give it a powerful brain in the
General Staff, and impart to the whole system a
living energy. The art of war, if the phrase may be
allowed, was, in accordance with venerable traditions
rooted in the HohenzoUern House, taken up as a
serious business ; and that deep sense of its im-
portance which prevailed at the fountain head, was
made to permeate the entire frame. That is the real
distinguishing characteristic of the Prussian, now
the German army, as contrasted with the spirit in
which similar labours were undertaken by some
other Powers. The task was a heavy one, but the
three men who set about it were equal to the task.
King William, with a large intelligence, a severe yet
kindly temper, and a thorough knowledge of his
work, threw himself heart and soul into the business,
and brought to bear upon its conduct that essential
condition of success, the " master's eye." General
von Roon framed or sanctioned the administrative
measures which were needed to create an almost
self-acting and cohesive organism, which could be
set in motion by a telegram, as an engineer starts a
complicated piece of machinery by touching a lever.
Von Moltke, as chief of the General Staff, supplied
the directing intellect, and established a complete
apparatus for the collection and classification of
knowledge, bearing upon military affairs, which might
be applied wherever needed. These men, working
with ** unhasting, unresting" diligence, founded
a school of war, not based on " the law of the Medes
and Persians which altereth not," but upon the vital
principle that a good army should possess in itself
such a power of adaptation, as will make it always
abreast with the latest genuine discoveries in tactics,
arms, material appliances, and discipline. Also the
army was treated as a great school in which officers
and men alike were teaching and learning from dawn
to sunset, throughout the allotted period of service.
The principal trio had other and able helpers, but they
were the main springs moving and guiding the
xvi Introduction
marvellous product of constant labour applied by
rare capacity.
The ultimate, although not the immediate, effect
of the French successes at Magenta and Solferino,
was the creation of an Italian kingdom, which included
within its boundaries, Naples, Sicily, the States of
the Church, except Rome, and of course the Duchies
on the right bank of the Po. The price of compliance,
exacted by the Emperor Napoleon, whose plans had
been thwarted, was the cession to him of Nice and
Savoy. Venice and the territory beyond the Mincio
remained Austrian for several years. While the map
of Italy was in course of construction, the political
conflict in BerHn raged on with unintermitted
violence. Simultaneously the Austrian Emperor was
induced to assert his claims to predominance in
Germany, but the plans laid, in 1863, were blighted
by the prompt refusal of William I. to take any
share in them. It was the first symptom of reviving
hostihty between the two Powers, although a httle
later, on the death of the King of Denmark, they
were found, side by side in arms, to assert the claims
of the German Bund upon Holstein, Schleswig and
Lauenburg, and avert the occupation of those
countries by the troops of Saxony and other minor
States alone. The campaign which ensued brought
the new model of the Pussian army to the test of
actual experiment. But the brave adversaries they
had to encounter, if stout in heart, were weak in
numbers ; and Europe did not set much store by
the victories then achieved by Prussia. The public
and the Governments were intently occupied with
the Secession War in the United States of America,
and the astounding expedition to Mexico, which was
designed to place an Austrian Archduke on " the
throne of the Montezumas," under illustrious French
patronage. Thus the quality of the troops, the great
influence of the famous " needle-gun," the character
of the staff, and the excellent administrative service
escaped the notice of all, save the observant few.
The pohtical aspects of the dispute were keenly
Introduction xvii
discussed. Lord Palmerston and Lord Russell were,
at one moment, disposed to fight for the Treaty of
1851 ; but the Danish King committed grave blunders ;
Russia stood aloof, the Emperor Napoleon IIL
distinctly refused to enter the hsts, and the House of
Commons was decidedly averse to war. Here it
should be noted that the French Emperor, meditating
on the value to him of the rival Powers in Germany,
had determined to stand well with both. He hoped
to please Austria by making the brother of Francis
Joseph Emperor of Mexico, and to keep open the
possibilities of an alliance with Prussia, by throwing
no obstacles in her way on the Eider.
Then began the great strife between the two
Governments which had wrested the Elbe Duchies
from the Dane. When the short war ended, certain
divisions from each army were posted in the conquered
country, and the rivalry which animated the two
Courts was carried on by diplomats and statesmen.
Prussian policy, since the days of Frederick H., had
leaned always towards, if not an alliance with Russia,
yet the maintenance of a solid understanding with
that growing Power. Herr von Bismarck, who was
a deep student in the history of his own country, and
who had always nourished large ideas, kept steadily on
the well-trodden path, but imparted to his methods
a boldness, an inventiveness, and an energy most
unusual in Prussian statescraft. The Polish insurrec-
tion of 1864 gave him an opportunity which he did not
neglect, and while the poor patriots were assisted
from the side of Galicia, on the Posen frontier they
were ruthlessly repressed, the Russian and Prussian
troops making common cause, and crossing the
frontier whenever that step seemed needful. The
ill-fated Poles, of course, were defeated ; Prussia
had recorded a fresh claim upon the benevolent
neutrality of Russia, while Austrian " ingratitude,"
never forgiven in St. Petersburg, took a deeper tinge
in the eyes of the Czar. The Prussian Government
had not long to wait for their reward. During the
summer of 1865, the abiding quarrel between Vienna
xviii Introduction
and Berlin, respecting the future status of the con-
quered or restored Duchies, nearly came to an open
rupture. Neither side, however, was ready for a
blow, and the " Convention of Gastein," which Bis-
marck, in a letter to his wife, defined as a mode of
" pasting together the cracks in the building," was
devised to gain time. The Prussian army, still
incomplete from the royal and the military point of
view, had been augmented after the Danish war,
and the new levies of horse and artillery had not
acquired the requisite instruction. So the summer
and autumn of 1865 wore away, revealing the spectacle
of King William and Herr von Bismarck battling
fiercely with the Parliament, and not so clearly dis-
playing Von Moltke and Von Roon labouring hourly
to bring the machine intrusted to their charge up
to the highest attainable efficiency. There were
other reasons for delay. As it was more than probable
that the South Germans, and possible that the King
of Hanover would not rank themselves with Prussia,
but go with Austria and the Bund, an ally was
wanted who would divide the forces of the largest
Power. That ally was found in the newly united
kingdom of Italy.
But before the Italian envoy astonished the
diplomatic world by his apparition at Berhn, in
March, the controversy between Austria and Prussia
had gone on rapidly, step by step, nearer towards
a rupture. Count Mensdorff, on behalf of the
Emperor Francis Joseph, set up a claim to full Hberty
of action in the Duchy of Holstein, and began openly
to favour the pretentions of the Duke Frederick of
Augustenburg to the Ducal Chair. That position
was vigorously contested by Herr von Bismarck,
who put an opposite construction on the Treaty,
which created what was called the " condominium."
The consequence was a frequent and animated ex-
change of despatches, containing such " arguments "
as seemed proper to the occasion. Into the merits
of this dispute it is needless to enter now, since
the whole drift of the verbal struggle shows that
Introduction xix
while Prussia was intent on providing a solid ground
on which to fight out a long-standing quarrel —
" inevitable," said Von Moltke, " sooner or later," —
Austria was by no means inclined to shrink from a
test directly applied to her position in Germany.
Whatever line she had taken her rival would have
discovered, or tried to discover, an opposing course ;
but it so happened that, whether by chance or mis-
calculation. Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Foreign
Minister, managed his case so as to give advantages
to his abler antagonist. In the last days of February
a great council was held in Berlin. Not only the King
and his chief Minister, but General von Moltke and
General von Manteuffel, from Schleswig, took part
in its deliberations. It was the turning point in the
grave debate, so far as Prussian action was concerned ;
for the decision then adopted unanimously was that
Prussia could not honourably recede, but must go
forward, even at the risk of war. No order was given
to prepare for that result, because the organization of
the army was complete, and moreover, because " the
King was very adverse to an offensive war." Never-
theless, from that moment such an issue of the dis-
pute became certain to occur at an early day. Yet
neither party wished to fight over the Duchies ;
each felt that the cause was too paltry. The Austrians,
therefore, extended the field by appealing to the
Bund, a move which gave Herr von Bismarck the
advantage he so eagerly sought. He answered it
by resolving to push, in his own sense, the cause
of federal reform. Learning this determination early
in March, M. Benedetti observed to Herr von Bismarck
that it would insure peace. " Yes," answered the
Minister-President, — " for three months," a very
accurate forecast by a prophet who could fulfil his
own prediction, and who desired to fight the adversary
promptly, lest a reconciliation should be effected
between Vienna and Pesth, and Hungary, from a
source of weakness, should thus become a tower of
strength.
A few days later, March 14th, General Govone, from
XX Introduction
Florence, arrived in Berlin. His advent had been
preceded by attempts, on the part of Bismarck, to
discover how the French would look on a Prusso-
Italian aUiance. The subject was deUcate, and even
after the General's arrival, it was officially stated
that he had come, exclusively, to study the progress
in small arms and artillery ! The pretence was soon
abandoned, and the negotiations were avowed ; but
the conclusion of a treaty was delayed for some days,
because no specific date could be fixed on for the
outbreak of war, Prussia having determined, at least
to make it appear, that she was not the aggressor.
At length a form of words was devised, which satisfied
both Powers, stipulating that Italy was to share in
the war, providing it began within " three months,"
and the Convention was signed on the 8th of April.
Not, however, before it had been well ascertained that
France had really helped on the Prussian alliance
and desired to see war ensue, although, avowedly,
she did not interfere, giving out that she stood
neuter, and that the understanding which might
be ultimately come to between France and Prussia
would be determined by the march of events, the
extension of the war, and the questions to which it
might give rise. This language foreshadowed the
policy which the Emperor, if not M. Drouyn de
Lhuys, desired to follow ; and as Russia, recently
obHged in the Polish troubles, was friendly, if not
allied, Herr von Bismarck was convinced that no
foreign power would array itself on the side of Austria,
unless the campaign were prolonged.
Henceforth, the aim of each disputant was to secure
a vantage-ground in Germany. Austria had partially
collected troops in Bohemia and Moravia, and had
secretly stipulated with several States to call out four
Federal corps d'armee ; while Prussia, who could
wait, being always ready, had only carried her pre-
parations forward to a certain extent. M. von Beust,
the Saxon Minister, then intervened with a proposal
that the Diet should name arbiters, whose decision
should be final ; a suggestion instantly rejected by
Introduction xxi
the principals in the quarrel. The Emperor Napoleon
III., towards the end of May, when Prussian mobiUza-
tion had practically been completed in eight corps,
produced his specific — the characteristic proposals
that a Conference should be held in Paris to study
the means of maintaining the peace. Prussia accepted
the offer, but Austria put an end to the hopes of
Napoleon, by stipulating that no arrangement should
be discussed which would augment the territory or
power of any party of the Conference, and in addition
that the Pope should be invited to share in any
dehberations on " the ItaUan Question." These
pretensions, by excluding, what everyone wanted,
the cession of Venetia to Italy, decided the fate of
the Conference. " They desire war at Vienna," said
Von Bismarck to Count Benedetti. " These condi-
tions have been conjured up solely for the purpose
of giving the States in South Germany time to com-
plete their military preparations." And when the
news came officially from Paris that the Austrian
answer had killed the project, the Minister President
shouted in the French Ambassador's presence " Vive
le Roi ! " The solution was war. The Prussian
army, for once, had been mobilized by slow degrees.
More than a month elapsed between the first precau-
tionary and the final steps, but by the 12th of May
the entire active army had been summoned to arms.
The Conference project was a last attempt, made,
indeed, after all hope of arresting the conflict had
vanished, ahke in Vienna and BerHn ; and it was
followed by events in Hoist ein, which put an end to
the period of suspense, and formed a prelude to the
war. Practically, but without actual fightings
General von Manteuffel compelled the Austrian
brigade, under Field-Marshal von Glablenz, to retreat
swiftly over the Elbe. The pretext for this strong
measiue was the fact that Austria, by her sole will,
had summoned the Estates to meet at Itzehoe, and
had thus infringed the rights of King William !
Thereupon Austria requested the Diet at Frankfort
to call out all the Federal Corps ; and her demand
xxii Introduction
was complied with, on the 14th of June, by a majority
of nine to six. The Prussian delegate protested, and
withdrew, leaving Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtem-
burg, the two Hesses, and several minor States, in
open combination against Prussia. But the same
stroke which isolated the latter, also destroyed the
German Bund, invented by the kings and statesmen
of 1815, to preserve internal tranquilHty, and safe-
guard the Fatherland against France. The arrange-
ment implied the co-operation of two Powers ; one
purely German, yet subordinate ; the other parcel
German, and mainly consisting of divers peoples
outside Germany ; and it fell to pieces at a blow,
because the time had arrived when one of the two
must attain supremacy. Side by side with the secular
dynastic conflict arose in the nation that longing
for unity which could only be accomplished by a
thoroughly German Power.
That Power was Prussia, trained for the task by
the steadfast labours of two hundred years. The
army she had formed did its work swiftly. Pouring
through Saxony and over the Silesian Mountains, the
King and his son, July 3rd, crushed the Austrians,
on the memorable field of Sadowa, near Koniggratz.
The Hanoverian troops, after winning the fight at
Langensalza, had been obUged to surrender, and in
South Germany the army employed to overcome the
Confederates was equally victorious. On the 22nd
of July, so swiftly had the main body moved, the
Prussians were in front of Vienna and Presburg on
the Danube. Four days afterwards, the Emperor
Napoleon having struck in with an offer of mediation,
which was accepted, the preliminaries of a peace
were signed at Nikolsburg, on the 26th of July, and
the final treaty was settled and ratified at Prague, on
the 23rd of August, long after King William and his
formidable Minister were once more in Berhn. By
this instrument, Austria was excluded from Germany ;
a Northern Confederation, reaching to the Main,
was founded ; Hanover, the Elbe Duchies, Hesse-
Cassel, and other territories, were annexed to Prussia ;
Introduction xxiii
and a formal statement was inserted, declaring that
Napoleon III., to whom Austria had ceded Venetia,
had acquired it in order to hand over the city and
Terra Firma, as far as the Isonza, to Victor Emmanuel,
when the peace should be re-established. Prussia
thus became the acknowledged head of Germany,
at least as far as the Main ; and the national longing
for complete unity was about to be gratified in a
much shorter time than seemed probable in 1866.
Naturally, the astonishing successes won by Prus-
sian arms against the Federal Corps, as well as the
Austrians, compelled the South German States to sue
for peace, and accept public treaties, which, while
leaving them independent, brought them all, more
or less, within the limits of a common German
federation. But something more important was
accomplished at Nikolsburg. Herr von der Pfordten,
the Bavarian Prime Minister, repaired thither towards
the end of July, and Bismarck was in possession of
information, including a certain French document,
which enabled him to state the German case in a
manner so convincing and terrifying, that the
Bavarian agreed to sign a secret treaty, bringing
the army within the Prussian system, and stipulating
that, in case of war, it should pass at once under the
command of King William. That which Von der
Pfordten conceded the Ministers of Wurtemburg and
Hesse Darmstadt could not refuse, and thus provision
was made, on the morrow of Sadowa, for that con-
centration of armed Germany which overwhelmed
France in 1870-71. So that, although nothing
formally constituting a United Germany had been
done, Prussia, by securing the control of all her
forces, and knowing that a strong and deeply-rooted
public sentiment would support her, was satisfied
that, providing time could be gained in which to
arm, instruct and discipline upon the Prussian model
the South Germans and the troops raised from the
annexed provinces, she would be more than a match
for France. South Germany, indeed, had long known
her relative helplessness against the French. Perhaps
xxiv Introduction
it would be more correct to say that the real peril
was more perceptible to the soldiers and statesmen
than to the people, many of wham were strongly
imbued with democratic ideas of the French type.
Yet, although they hungered for what they under-
stood as liberty and independence, they were still
German, and did not fail to see that their cherished
desires could not be gratified either under French
patronage or French prefects. The soldiers and
statesmen had early perceived the full secret of South
German dependence. The Archduke Charles, who
had great knowledge and harsh experience to guide
him, pointed out that the French posts on the Rhine
had placed the country south of the Main at the
mercy of France. " As long as the Rhine frontier
from Huningen to Lauterbourg remains in her hands,"
wrote a Prussian staff-officer at a later period, " Ger-
many is open on the Rhine frontier to an invasion
directed upon the Southern States." No stronger
testimony to the sense, if not to the reality, of
insecurity could be adduced than the remarkable
fact that, even so far back as the Crimean War, the
then King of Wurtemburg, in conversation with Herr
von Bismarck, set forth, significantly, the feelings,
the hopes and the dread of South Germany. " Give
us Strassburg," he said, " and we will unite to encoun-
ter any eventuality ... for until that city shall
become German, it will always stand in the way of
Southern Germany, devoting herself unreservedly
to German unity and to a German national policy."
Hence it will be seen that, beyond the Main, there
were traditional, yet very real fears of French invasion;
and that these apprehensions had no small share in
facihtating the acceptance of the secret mihtary
treaties, and in shaping the course of subsequent
events.
Thus much it seems needful to state, in order that
some portion of the earlier transactions which had a
great influence in bringing on the war of 1870, may
be recalled to the reader's mind. The short, sharp
and decisive duel fought between Austria and Prussia
Introduction x^v
for leadership in Germany, created a profound im-
pression throughout Europe. Austria was irritated
as well as hiunbled ; Russia, although the Czar
remained more than friendly, was not without appre-
hensions ; but the French ruler and his ministers
were astounded, indignant and bewildered. The
telegram, which reported the Battle of Sadowa,
wrenched a " cry of agony " from the Court of the
Tuileries, whose policy had been based on the con-
jecture or belief that Prussia would be defeated, and
would call for help. The calculation was, that
Napoleon III. would step in as arbiter, and that while
he moderated the demands of Austria, he would
be able to extort territorial concessions from Prussia
as the reward of his patronage. M. Drouyn de Lhuys
would have had his master strike in, at once, and
cross the Rhine, or occupy the Palatinate ; but the
Emperor was not then in the mood for heroic enter-
prises ; he feared that his army was not " ready,"
and, besides, he still thought that by arrangement
he could obtain some sort of compensation from
Prussia, at the expense of Germany. But all he did
was to pose as mediator at Nikolsburg ; and Herr von
Bismarck, who had done his utmost to keep him in a
dubious frame of mind, regarded it as " fortunate "
that he did not boldly thrust himself into the quarrel.
The " golden opportunity " slid by ; M. Drouyn de
Lhuys resigned ; and Imperial France acquiesced,
publicly, in the political and territorial arrangements
which, for the first time, during the lapse of cen-
turies, laid broad and deep the foundations of German
Unity, and, as a consequence, rendered inevitable
a Franco-German War.
CHAPTER I
The Causes of the War
The Treaty of Prague, the secret military conventions
signed at Nikolsburg, the ascendancy secured by Von
Bismarck, now elevated to the dignity of a Count,
together with the complete removal of alien Powers
from Italy, wrought a radical change in the political
relations of the European States. Excluded from
Germany, although including powerful German ele-
ments, the dominions of Austria still extended to the
verge of Venetia and the Lombard plains ; but as
the Prussian statesman had already hinted, her
future lay eastward, and her centre of gravity had
been removed to Buda-Pesth. In the South German
Courts, no doubt, there was a bias towards Vienna,
and a dishke of Prussia ; yet both the leaning and
the repugnance were counterbalanced by a deeper
dread of France rooted in the people by the vivid
memories of repeated and cruel invasions. Russia,
somewhat alarmed by the rapid success of King
William, had been soothed by diplomatic reassurances,
the tenour of which is not positively known, although
a series of subsequent events more than justified the
inference made at the time, that promises, bearing on
the Czar's Eastern designs, were tendered and accepted
as a valuable consideration for the coveted boon of
benevolent neutrality, if not something more sub-
stantial. Like Russia, France had lost nothing by
the campaign of 1866 ; her territories were intact ;
her ruler had mediated between Austria and Prussia ;
and he had the honour of protecting the Pope, who
as a spiritual and temporal Prince, was still in pos-
session of Rome and restricted territorial domains.
2 The Campaign of Sedan
But the Napoleonic Court, and many who looked
upon its head as a usurper, experienced, on the
morrow of Sadowa, and in a greater degree after the
preface to a peace had been signed at Nikolsburg, a
sensation of diminished magnitude, a consciousness
of lessened prestige, and a painful impression that
their political, perhaps even their military place in
Europe, as the heirs of Richeheu, Louis XIV., and
Napoleon, had been suddenly occupied by a Power
which they had taught themselves to contemn as
an inferior. Until the summer of 1866 the Emperor
Napoleon fancied that he was strong enough to play
with the Prussian Minister a game of diplomatic
finesse ; indeed, he seems to have thought that the
Pomeranian gentleman would be an easy prey ; but
having thus put it to the proof, he did not concur in
the maxim that it is as pleasant to be cheated as to
cheat, especially when the result is chiefly due to
complaisant self-deception. On the other hand,
Herr von Bismarck had no longer any delusions
concerning Louis Napoleon. If, at an early period,
when the English Radicals were considering whether
the new Emperor was " stupid," a proposition they
had taken for granted theretofore, he had over-
estimated the capacity of the self-styled " par venue,"
later experience had reduced the estimate to just
proportions, and had produced a correct judgment
upon the character of one who, down to the last, was
always taken for more than he was worth. If any
one knew him well, it was probably his cousin, the
Due de Morny, and M. St. Marc Girardin has pre-
served a sentence which is an illuminative com-
mentary upon so many curious transactions during
the Second Empire. " The greatest difficulty with
the Emperor," said De Morny, " is to remove from his
mind a fixed idea, and to give him a steadfast will."
His fixed ideas were not always compatible one with
another. He professed great devotion to the *' prin-
ciple of nationalities" ; yet he desired to carry the
French frontiers as far as the Rhine, adding further
German populations and Flemish towns whose
The Causes of the War ^^
inhabitants are not French to those acquired by Louis
XIV. He wished for peace, no doubt, when he said
that the Empire was synonymous with that word,
but he also hungered for the fruits of war ; and,
knowing that his internal position and his external
projects required, to uphold the one and realize the
other, a strong and complete army, he had neither
the wit to construct a trustworthy instrument, nor
the ceaseless industry needed to make the most of an
inferior product, nor that absolute independence of
the party whose audacity gave him his crown, which
would have enabled him to select, in all cases, the
best officers for the higher and highest commands.
Before, and during the war of 1866, he wavered
between two lines of policy, hoping to combine the
advantages of both ; and when it was over he de-
manded compensation for his "services'* as an
alarmed spectator, although he had made no bargain
for payment, but had stood inactive because he
conjectured that it would be the more profitable
course.
French demands for the Rhine.
In making that calculation he erred profoundly.
M. Benedetti, the French Ambassador to the Court
of Berhn, was instructed as early as the first week
in August, 1866, to claim the left bank of the Rhine
as far as, and including the important fortress of,
Mainz. " Knowing the temper of the Minister-
President," and knowing also, as he had repeatedly
told his Government, that all Germany would resist
any proposal to cede the least portion of territory, he
first sent in a copy of M. Drouyn de Lhuys' despatch,
and afterwards called on the Minister. Prince von
Bismarck, in 1871, pubhshed in the official news-
papers his account of the famous interview, which
shews that Benedetti, as he had pledged himself to
do, resolutely pressed the large demand. He was
told that it meant war, and that he had " better go
to Paris to prevent a rupture." Unmoved, he
4 The Campaign of Sedan
replied that he would return home, " but only to
maintain a proposition the abandonment of which
would imperil the dynasty." " The parting words."
of the Prussian statesman to Count Benedetti, as
nearly as they could be remembered by the man who
spoke them, were calculated to suggest grave re-
flections. " Please to call His Majesty's attention
to this," said Herr von Bismarck. '* Should a war
arise out of this comphcation, it might be a war
attended by a revolutionary crisis. In such a case
the German dynasties are likely to prove more solid
than that of the Em.peror Napoleon." It was a
menace and a prophetic warning, which touched a
sensitive fibre in the heart of the French ruler, who,
after a conversation with Count Benedetti, wrote, on
the I2th of August, a remarkable letter to M. de
Lavalette, who became the ad interim successor of
M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Expressing his fears lest " the
journals" should taunt him with the refusal of his
demand for the Rhine provinces, he directed that
the report should be contradicted, flatly ; and he
added, " the true interest of France is not to obtain
an insignificant increase of territory, but to aid
Germany in constituting herself after a fashion
which will be most favourable to our interests and
those of Europe." Neither Dodona nor Delphos
could have been more oracular. Alarmed as he was,
he did not altogether recede from his position, but
occupied it in a different way. On the i6th August
a fresh set of proposals was forwarded to Count
Benedetti, comprising a regular scale of concessions —
the frontiers of 1814 and the annexation of Belgium,
or Luxemburg, and Belgium; or the Duchy with
Belgium, without Antwerp, which was to be declared
a free city." The last-named device was designed
" to obviate the intervention of England " when
the projected act of violence was committed. " The
minimum we require," wrote the French Govern-
ment to M. Benedetti, " is an ostensible treaty which _
gives us Luxemburg, and a secret treaty which,
stipulating for an offensive and defensive alliance,
The Causes of the War 5
leaves us the chance of annexing Belgium at the
right moment, Prussia engaging to assist us by force
of arms, if necessary, in carrying out this purpose."
If Herr von Bismarck asked what he should gain by
such a treaty, the answer was to be that he would
secure a powerful ally, and that " he was only desired
to consent to the cession of what does not belong to
him." The official papers on which these state-
ments are founded were discovered and acquired
by the Germans in Cercay, M. Rouher's chateau,
during the war of 1870 ; neither their authenticity
nor the construction put on them have ever been
contested ; and they show, plainly, what was the
kind of projects nourished by the French Court in
1866-67. '^^^ precise manner in which Count von
Bismarck actually dealt with them has not been
revealed, but he kept a rough copy of the project
drawn up by Benedetti, which was handed to him
by the French Ambassador in 1867, and the boxes
of papers found at Cercay gave him the draft treaty
itself annotated by the Emperor. Practically, the
secret negotiation dropped, was not renewed for
several months, and was only " resumed, subse-
quently, at various times," without producing any
other result than that of letting Bismarck know the
plans which were conceived in Paris, and inducing
him to keep the Napoleonic Government in play.
There can be no doubt on one point. The Prussian
statesman did, at various periods, probably at
Biarritz in 1865, when he captivated Prosper Merimee,
and afterwards, while .refusing point-blank to cede an
inch of German soil, ask his interested auditors why
they could not indemnify themselves by seizing
Belgium. But a grim smile of irony must have
lighted up his face when he pointed to a prey which
would not have to be ceded, but caught and over-
)Owered by main strength. He was tempting,
)robing, playing with the Frenchman, employing
^hat he called the "dilatory" method, because
le wanted time to equip the new and still imperfect
Germany ; and, considering their own dark schemes,
6 The Campaign of Sedan
can it be said that they deserved better treatment ?
Having direct knowledge of the steps taken by
France in August, 1866, the earUest recorded formal
attempt to procure secret treaties on the basis of
territorial concessions, with what searching comment
must Bismarck have read the astonishing diplomatic
circular, signed by M. de Lavalette^ and sent out on
the 2nd of September, at the very time when the
dark proceedings just briefly sketched were in full
swing ! It was a despatch framed for pubhc con-
sumption, and intended to present the Imperial
policy in a broad, generous, and philosophic light,
having no relation to the course which, either then
or afterwards, the French ruler followed. Louis
Napoleon told the whole world that France could
not pursue " an ambiguous policy," at the moment
when he was meditating the forcible acquisition of
Belgium. The Emperor painted himself as one who
rejoiced in the change effected by the war, perhaps
because it shattered the treaties of 1815. Prussia,
he said, had insured the independence of Germany ;
and France need not see in that fact any shadow
cast over herself. " Proud of her admirable unity,
and indestructible nationality, she cannot oppose
or condemn the work of fusion going on in Germany."
By imitating, she took a step nearer to, not farther
from, France ; and the Imperial philosopher pro-
fessed not to see why public opinion " should recog-
nize adversaries, instead of allies, in those nations
which — enfranchised from a past inimical to us — are
summoned to new life." But there was consolation
for those alarmed patriots who could read between
the lines. Petty states, they were assured, tended
to disappear and give place to large ag£;lomerations ;
the Imperial Government had always understood,
that annexations should only bring togeth'^sr kindre(
populations ; and France, especially, cou)d desired
only such additions as would affect her mternal]
cohesiveness — sentences which, like fingei-posts,
pointed to the acquisition of Belgium. The war of
1866, it was admitted, showed the necessity of
The Causes of the War 7
perfecting the organization of the Army ; yet smooth
things were predicted by the Imperial soothsayer,
for, on the whole, the horizon, in September, as
scanned from Paris, seemed to be clear of menacing
possibilities, and a lasting peace was secure ! The
despatch was, in fact, prepared and administered as a
powerful anodyne. By keeping the French moderately
quiet, it suited the purposes of Bismarck, who, well
aware of the uneasiness which it covered, felt quite
equal to the task of coping with each fresh attempt
to obtain " compensation " as it might arise. Per-
haps Louis Napoleon was sincere when he dictated
this interesting State paper, for it is not devoid of
some " fixed ideas " which he cherished ; yet pro-
bably it may take rank as a curious example of the
subtle tactics which he often applied to deceive him-
self, as well as to cajole his people and his neigh-
bours. At all events, his will, if he willed peace,
did not endure for he soon sanctioned and set in
motion renewed projects, for he intended to push
forward the boundary posts of France.
Luxemburg
As he found Prussia pohte yet intractable, and
prompt to use plain language, if concessions were
demanded, the Emperor Napoleon formed, or was
advised to form, an ingenious plan whereby he hoped
to secure Luxemburg. He entered into secret nego-
tiations with Holland for the purchase of the Duchy.
The Queen of Holland, a Princess of the House of
Wiirtemberg, was a keen partisan of France. She it
was, who, in July, 1866, uttered a cry of warning
which reached the Tuileries. "It is the dynasty,"
she wrote, " which is menaced by a powerful Ger-
many and a powerful Italy, and the dynasty will
have to suffer the consequences. When Venetia
was ceded, you should have succoured Austria,
marched on the Rhine, and imposed your own con-
ditions. To permit the destruction of Austria is
more than a crime, it is a blunder." Perhaps the
B
8 The Campaign of Sedan
notion that Luxemburg could be acquired by pur-
chase came from this zealous, clear-sighted, and
outspoken lady. Wherever it may have originated,
the scheme was hotly pursued, negotiations were
opened at The Hague, the usual Napoleonic opera-
tions were actually begun to obtain a plebiscite from
the Duchy ; Count von Bismarck was discreetly
sounded by M. Benedetti, with the usual indefinite
result, and the consent of the King of Holland was
obtained without much difficulty. At the same time
there was a strong current of opposition in the Dutch
Government, and Prince Henry, the Governor of
Luxemburg, made no secret of his hostility. The
King himself was subject to recurring tremors caused
by his reflections on the possible action of the Prussian
Court ; and his alarms were only mitigated or allayed
from time to time by assurances based, in reality, on
M. Benedetti's "impressions" that the Chancellor
was not unfavourable to the plan of cession. The
truth is that M. Benedetti did not accurately perceive
the position which Bismarck had taken up from the
outset. It might be thus expressed : " Luxemburg
belongs to the King of Holland. It is his to keep or
give away. If you want the Duchy, why don't you
take it, and with it the consequences, which it is for
you to forecast." The French Court and its Ministers
still laboured under the behef that they could manage
the Berlin Government, and they put their own in-
terpretation on the vague, perhaps tempting lan-
guage of the Chancellor. At a certain moment, the
fear, always lurking in the King of Holland's breast,
gained the mastery, and he caused the secret to be
disclosed to the public. " He would do nothing
without the consent of the King of Prussia ; " and
by revealing the negotiations he forced on a decision.
The incident which terrified the King of Holland was,
no doubt, startUng. M. Thiers had made a strong
anti-German speech in the Chamber, and M. Rouher
had developed his theory of the " trois tron9ons,"
or triple division of Germany. The Chancellor, who
had acquired full knowledge of French pretensions
The Causes of the War 9
from French Ministers, answered both statesmen by-
printing, in the foreground of the Official Gazette,
the treaty which gave King WiUiam the control of
the Bavarian Army, in case of war. That fact also
produced a decisive effect upon the Dutch monarch,
who saw in this characteristic indirect retort to the
French parhamentary display a menace specially
directed against himself. Hence the revelation
sufficed to thwart the bargain, then so far finished
that signatures were alone wanting to render it
binding. The German people fired up at the bare
mention of such a proposal as the cession of a German
province. M. de Moustier, vexed and taken aback,
called on Bismarck to restrain the passions of his
countrymen, and vainly urged the Dutch monarch
to sign the treaties. On the morning of the day
when he was to be questioned in the Reichstag,
Bismarck asked Benedetti whether he would authorize
the Minister to state in the Chamber that the treaties
had been signed at The Hague. The Ambassador
could not give the required authority, seeing that
although the King, under conditions, had pledged
his word to the Emperor, the formal act had not been
done, because Prussia had not answered the appeal
for consent from The Hague. On April i, 1867, while
Napoleon was opening the exhibition in Paris, Herr
von Bennigsen put his famous question respecting
the current rumours about a treaty of cession. If
the French were not prepared for the fierce outburst
of Teutonic fervour, still less could they rehsh the
question put by Herr von Bennigsen and the answer
which it drew from the Chancellor. The former des-
cribed the Duchy as an " ancient province of the
collective Fatherland," and the latter, while " taking
into account the French nation's susceptibilities,'*
and giving a brief history of the position in which
Luxemburg stood towards Germany, made his mean-
ing clear to the French Court. " The confederate
Governments," he said, " are of opinion that no
foreign power will interfere with the indisputable
rights of German States and German populations.
1^ The Campaign of Sedan
They hope to be able to vindicate and^protect those
rights by peaceful negotiations, without prejudicing
the friendly relations which Germany has hitherto
entertained with her neighbours." Napoleon and
his advisers were not likely to misconstrue language
which, although it lacked the directness of Von
Bennigsen's sentences, obviously meant that the
French scheme could not be worked out. Indeed, a
few days earlier, the Chancellor had used a significant
phrase. Answering a question in the Chamber, he
said : "If the previous speaker can manage to
induce the Grand Duke (of Luxemburg) to come into
the North German Federation, he will be able to say
that he has called an European question into exist-
ence ; what more, Time alone can show." The
phrase could hardly have escaped the notice of M. de
Moustier, and coupled with the second reply, already
quoted, gave rise to indignation not unmixed with
alarm. At first the Emperor seemed determined
not to recede, and he took counsel with his generals,
who could not give him encouragement, because they
knew that the Government was absolutely without
the means of making even a respectable defence
against an invasion. The period of suspense at the
Tuileries did not endure long. Shortly after the
scene in the Reichstag, the Prussian Minister at The
Hague brought the matter to a crisis by a message
which he delivered to the Dutch Government. The
King of the Netherlands, he is reported to have said,
can act as he pleases, but he is responsible for what
he may do. If he had beheved that the meditated
cession was a guarantee of peace, it was the Minister's
duty to destroy the illusion. " My Government,"
he added, " advises him in the most formal manner,
not to give up Luxemburg to France." The blow
was fatal; the King, of course, took the advice to
heart, and such a stroke was all the more deeply felt
in Paris because there the Emperor, who had con-
sidered the end gained, now knew from Marshal Niel
that it would be madness to provoke a war. Yet,
unless a loophole of escape could be found, war was
The Causes of the War H
imminent. M. de Moustier discovered a safe and
dignified line of retreat. The Chancellor had referred
to the treaty of 1839 which governed the status of
Luxemburg ; M. de Moustier took him at his word,
and virtually brought the dispute within the purview
of Europe, by formally demanding that the Prussian
garrison should be withdrawn. He held that since
the German forces were practically centred in the
hands of Prussia, Luxemburg, no longer a mere
defensive post, had become a menace to France. In
this contention there was much truth, seeing that the
new Confederation of the North, and its aUies in the
South, constituted a political and mihtary entity
far more formidable and mobile than the old Bund.
When the Chancellor refused a demand, which his
adversaries assert he was at one time prepared to
grant, the French Government, declaring that they
had no wish for other than friendly relations with
Berlin, appealed to Europe. The dispute ended in
a compromise arranged as usual beforehand, and
settled at a conference held in London. The garrison
was withdrawn, the fortifications were to be razed,
and the Duchy, like Belgium, was thenceforth to be
neutral ground, covered by a collective guarantee of
the Powers ; but it still remained within the German
Zollverein.
There were at work several influences which largely
operated to determine a peaceful issue. The French
possessed no real Army, and the Emperor had only
just begun to think about the needful military organi-
zation on a new model ; he had, besides, on hand an
International Exhibition, by which he set great
store ; and in addition a summons to withdraw a
garrison did not provide a casus belli certain to
secure the support of public opinion. Nor did the
Prussian Government consider the moment oppor-
tune, or the question raised a suitable ground on
which to determine the inveterate cause of quarrel
between France and Germany. Upon this subject
Dr. Busch has recorded some characteristic observa-
tions made by the Chancellor, at Versailles, in 1870.
12 The Campaign of Sedan
" I remember," he said, " when I was at the Paris
Exhibition of 1867, I thought to myself ' How would
it have been by now, if we had fought out the Luxem-
burg quarrel ? Should I be in Paris, or the French
in BerHn ? ' We were not nearly as strong then as
we are now. The Hanoverians and Hessians of that
day could not have suppHed us with so many good
soldiers as to-day. As for the Schleswig-Holsteiners,
who have lately been fighting Hke Hons, they had no
Army at all. The Saxon Army was broken up, and
had to be entirely reconstructed. And there was but
little to be expected from the South Germans. What
splendid fellows the Wiirtembergers are now, quite
magnificent ! but in 1866 no soldier could help
laughing at them, as they marched into Frankfort
like a civic guard. Nor was all well with the Baden
forces ; the Grand Duke has done a great deal for
them since then. Doubtless public opinion through-
out Germany was with us, if we had chosen to make
war about Luxemburg. But that would not have
made up for all those shortcomings." It is plain
from this retrospective comment, which comes in
aid of other evidence, that the great conflict, de-
ferred to 1870, was nearly brought about in 1867,
and that France was saved from utter rout, at that
early period, by the operation of a set of influences
over which neither of the principal actors had full
control. The Franco-Dutch negotiation was the last
attempt which the Emperor Napoleon made to obtain
territory by direct or furtive diplomatic processes.
In the early stages of the risky business he had full
confidence in his own ascendancy, not to say " pre-
ponderance" in European councils. He was rudely
undeceived. Herr von Bismarck had tempted him
with all kinds of suggestions, but the Emperor him-
self, his Ministers and Ambassadors had been content
to take the " impressions," which they derived from
confidential conversations, for definite, binding pro-
mises. One French agent correctly described the fact
when he said that " Herr von Bismarck is ready, not
to offer us compensations, but to allow us to take
The Causes of the War 1^
them ; " he might have added, " if we can and at our
own risk." There is no pubhshed evidence that the
Prussian statesman ever offered to cede Luxemburg,
or sanction the annexation of Belgium, or preclude
himself from adopting, at any conjuncture, the line
which appeared most accordant with German interests.
On the contrary, long after the interviews at Biarritz
and in Paris, and the battle of Sadowa, Napoleon III.,
to use his own terms, wanted, at least, " une certitude
relative " that the Prussian Government would not
interpose any obstacle in the way of French "aggran-
dizement "in the North. He asked, not for words,
but an act which he could never obtain ; and the
Luxemburg incident proved to him conclusively that
nothing could be gained by making demands on the
Court of Prussia. In 1867 and afterwards in Nov-
ember, 1870, according to Dr. Busch, Bismarck
described with his usuad frankness the hesitation of
the Emperor. He had not understood his advan-
tages, in 1866, when he might have done a good
business, although not on German soil, was the
earlier commentary. The later was more illumina-
tive. " In the summer of 1866," said Bismarck,
" Napoleon had not the pluck to do what was the
right thing from his point of view. He ought — well,
he ought to have taken possession of the subject of
Benedetti's proposal [Belgium], when we were march-
ing against the Austrians, and have held it in pawn
for whatever might happen. At that time we could
not stop him, and it was not likely that England
would attack him — at least he might have waited to
see." On this it may be observed that the influence
of Lord Cowley and Lord Clarendon would probably
have sufficed to turn him from such a plan had it
entered into the Emperor's mind ; and had he
delivered the blow, in defiance of their protests or
without consulting them, England, at that time,
would have been enraged at the treachery, and would
have certainly occupied Antwerp. The Emperor
was a man who caressed audacious projects which he
had not always the nerve and courage to carry out
14 The Campaign of Sedan
What is more astonishing, he did not or could not
provide the means essential to the accomplishment
of his desires. Thus the precedent afforded by
his conduct in 1866 was followed in 1867, and
in each case the result was the same — vexatious
failure.
An Interlude of Peace
The war-clouds sank below the horizon, the Paris
Exhibition was duly opened, sovereigns and princes,
statesmen and generals, journeyed to the French
capital, and the Court of the Tuileries gave itself up
to amusement, gaiety, and dissipation, neglecting
nothing which could give pleasure to its illustrious
guests. It was the last hour of splendour, the sunset of
the Empire. Yet the brilliant scenes, which followed
each other day by day, were even then flecked with dark
shades. If politics were evaded or ignored in the
palace, they were not absent from the highways.
Pohsh hatred found vent in the attempt of Berezowski
to slay the unfortunate Emperor Alexander II., and
M. Floquet shouted in his ear as he passed through
the Courts of Justice, " Vive la Pologne ! " The
crime and the insult augured ill for the future of that
Franco- Russian alliance which Charles X. endeav-
oured to estabhsh and certain French statesmen
have always sighed for. M. Hansen records a sharp
observation made by Prince Gortchakoff during the
Polish insurrection which the Western Powers re-
garded with friendly eyes. The Vice- Chancellor held
that France and Russia were natural aUies, because
their interests were the same. "If the Emperor
Napoleon will not admit it," he roughly said, "-so
much the worse for him. Governments vanish,
nations remain." Still, in 1867, he did not find the
nation more favourable than the Government had
been in 1864. Twenty years later, although Russia
had become less unpopular, at least with the poli-
ticians, and a yearning for a Russian alliance had
The Causes of the War 1^
gathered strength, the ultras proved how Uttle they
understood some conditions essential to its gratifica-
tion by clamouring for the pardon and liberation of
Berezowski ! The Prussian King and Queen were
not exposed to any outrage, and the Parisians gazed
with curiosity upon Bismarck and Moltke, whom
they admired, and had not yet learned to detest ;
but the sparkling and joyful assemblies, although the
actors, on both sides, were doubtless sincere at the
time, nevertheless suggest a famous incident in the
French Revolution which figures on historical pages
as " le baiser de 1' amourette." And underneath the
shining surface were concealed gnawing anxieties and
fears. The Emperor Napoleon had dreamed that he
could found a Mexican Empire, and he had induced
the Austrian Archduke MaximiUan to accept at his
hands an Imperial crown. The enterprise, which
was pushed on by French troops, not only failed,
but irritated England, who had been deceived, and
offended the United States, whose Government,
victors in a civil war, would not tolerate the estab-
lishment of the " Latin race" in the centre of the
huge continent. Not only had it become necessary
to recall the troops, but to bear a still deeper mis-
fortune— if the word may be applied to the conse-
quences of a reckless and unscrupulous adventure.
It was while opening the Exhibition that the earliest
hints reached the Emperor of an event which dealt
him a heavy blow ; and. on the eve of the day fixed
for the distribution of prizes to the competitors he
had assembled, came the confirmation of the dreaded
inteUigence, whispered weeks before. The gallant
Archduke and Emperor Maximilian, who had fallen
into the hands of the triumphant and implacable
Mexicans, had been tried and shot, a deed which his
French patron was powerless to avenge.
The Salzburg Interview
The tragedy of Quaretaro reacted upon European
politics, and incidentally emphasized afresh the
16 The Campaign of Sedan
perennial antagonism between France and Germany.
Still smarting from the wounds of 1866, Austria
hungered for an ally, and the Saxon Count von Beust,
whom the Emperor Francis Joseph had made his
Chancellor, was eager to try one more fall with Count
von Bismarck. Swayed by political reasons, the
Austrian Emperor not only did not resent the death
of his brother, but was even willing to welcome as his
guest Louis Napoleon, who had so successfully seduced
the Archduke by dangling before him the bait of an
Imperial crown. The French Emperor and his
Empress, therefore, travelled in state through South
Germany to Salzburg, where they met their Austrian
hosts. The occasion was, nominally, one of condo-
lence and mourning, and the vain regrets on both
sides were doubtless genuine. Yet it so chanced that
the days spent in the lovely scenery of Salzburg were
given up to gay mirth and feasting — not to sorrow
and gloom ; and .that the irrepressible spirit of
politics intruded on the brilliant company gathered
round an open grave. Both Emperors felt aggrieved ;
one by the loss of his high estate in Germany and his
Italian provinces, the other because his demand for
the Rhenish territory had been rejected, and he had not
been allowed to take Belgium or buy Luxemburg.
The common enemy was Prussia, who had worsted
Austria in battle, and France in diplomacy ; and at
Salzburg, perhaps earlier, the ground plans were
sketched for an edifice which the architects trusted
might be built up sufficiently large and strong to
contain, at least, two allies. The sketch was vague,
yet it was definite enough at least to reveal the designs
of the draughtsmen ; and the Emperors returned
home still in jubilation.
Perhaps the Emperor Napoleon suffered some pangs
of disappointment. " Austria was his last card," says
M. Rothan, who, from the French standpoint, has so
keenly studied the period preceding the war of 1870.
He wanted an offensive and defensive alliance, which
Austria would not accord, Count von Beust fearing
that so grave a fact would never escape the lynx-eyes
The Causes of the War 1^
of Bismarck, who, when it came to his knowledge,
would not fail to provoke a war before either ally had
fully, or even partially, completed his military pre-
parations, then so much in arrear. Not only were
they backward in 1867, but Austria, at all events,
was still unprovided in 1 870 . The Archduke Albrecht ,
who visited Paris during the month of February of
that year, impressed the fact on the Emperor Napo-
leon. " The story runs," says M. Rothan, " that,
after having quitted the study of His Majesty, the
Archduke returned, and, through the half-opened
door, exclaimed, * Sire, above all things do not
forget, whatever may happen, that we shall not be
in a fit state to fall into hne before a year.' " Hence,
it may well be that the Austrian Chancellor was even
then determined, in case of a conflict, to shape his
policy in accordance with the first victories ; and that
the meditations of the Emperor Napoleon, as he re-
crossed the Rhine, were tinged with bitter reflections
on his pohtical isolation. A little later, when he
knew that Bismarck had discovered the drift of the
conversation at Salzburg, his anxieties must have
become more poignant. That Chancellor, who had
secured afresh the good will of Russia, and beheld
with satisfaction the effect of the Imperial display
on Germany, enlarged, in a circular despatch, on the
proof thus once more afforded that German national
feehng could not endure " the mere notion " of
** foreign tutelage," where the interests of the Father-
land were concerned. Germany had a right to
mould her own fortunes and frame her own con-
stitution. So that, as Von Beust had foreseen, the
dreaded Chancellor had promptly turned to account
even the colloquies of Salzburg. " France, with one
hand," he said, " presents us with soothing notes,
and with the other permits us to see the point of her
sword." There was no open quarrel between the
two antagonists, but each suspected and closely
watched the other. M. Rothan, himself a vigilant
and zealous official, furnishes an amusing example.
In November, 1866, he learned from " a Foreign
18 The Campaign of Sedan
Minister accredited to a South German Court," what
was to him the appalHng fact that the Imperial work
of mediation at Nikolsburg had been counteracted,
" even before it had been sanctioned by the Treaty
of Prague." He referred to the now famous mihtary
treaties. M. de X , his informant, he says,
obtained his knowledge of the secret by a sort of
inquisitorial method, " a la fa9on d'un juge d' instruc-
tion," that is, he aihrmed the existence of the docu-
ments, and thus extorted confessions, express or
impHed. " The Bavarian Foreign Minister," he said,
blushed ; " the Minister of Wiirtemberg was con-
fused ; the Minister of Baden did not deny it, and the
Minister of Hesse avowed everything." Further,
M. de X asserted that, when it was no longer
necessary to keep France in good humour, Prussia
would enforce the clauses which gave her supreme
command, and would bring the Southern Armies into
harmony with her own organization. Apparently,
this authentic information did not obtain a ready
belief in the autumn of 1866 ; but it alarmed and
disturbed the French Court, and the pubhc confirma-
tion of the unwelcome report, less than a year after-
wards, visible to all men in the actual reorganiza-
tion of the Southern Armies, together with the failure
to purchase Luxemburg, still further increased the
suspicion, deepened the alarm, and aroused the in-
dignation of the Emperor at the slights inflicted on
France, who, as the " predominant " Continental
power and the ** vanguard of civilization," always
considered that she ought to have her own way.
The Emperor seeks Allies
In the beginning of 1868 the principal parties were
engaged in preparing for a conflict which each con-
sidered to be inevitable ; and the other Powers,
great and small, more or less concerned, were agitated
by hopes and fears. Russia desired to recover her
freedom of movement in the East, and especially
to throw off what Prince Gortchakoff called his '" robe
The Causes of the War 19
de Nessus," the clause in the Treaty of Paris which
declared the Euxine to be a neutral sea. Austria
aimed at the restoration of her authority in Germany,
and was not yet convinced that her path lay eastward.
Italy had many longings, but her pressing necessity
was to seat herself in the capital of the Caesars and
the Popes, once again occupied by the French, who
had re-entered the Papal States to expel the Gari-
baldians. It was in the skirmish at Mentana that
the new breech-loading rifle, the Chassepot, " wrought
miracles," aQCording to General de Failly, and estab-
lished its superiority over the " needle gun." Hol-
land, Belgium, and even Switzerland were troubled
by the uncertain prospect which the Imperial theory
of " large agglomerations " had laid bare ; Spain
was in the throes of a revolutionary convulsion ;
and England — she had just mended her Constitution,
and had begun to look on Continental politics with
relative indifference, except in so far as they affected
the fortunes of " parties," and might be used strateg-
ically as a means of gaining or holding fast the
possessions of power. Yet so strained were the re-
lations of France and Prussia that General von Moltke
actually framed, in the spring of 1868, the plan of
campaign which he literally carried out in 1870 —
a fact implying that even then he considered that his
Government was sufficiently prepared to encounter
the new and imperfectly developed scheme of Army
organization and armament originally devised by the
Emperor and Marshal Niel, and modified to satisfy
the objections and suspicions raised in a deferential
Senate and an obhging Chamber of Deputies. For
while the Opposition distrusted the Emperor, the.
whole body shrank from the sacrifices which Caesar
and his Minister of War considered necessary to the
safety of the State from a defensive, and absolutely
indispensable from an offensive point of view. The
prime actors in the drama expressed a love of peace,
perhaps with equal sincerity ; but as Germany
thirsted for unity, all the more because France, true
to her traditional policy, forbade it, the love so loudly
20 The Campaign of Sedan .
avowed could not be gratified unless Germany sub-
mitted, or France ceased to dictate. "' I did not
share the opinion of those politicians," said Bismarck
in July, 1870, " who advised me not to do all I could
to avoid war with France because it was inevitable.
Nobody," he added, " can exactly foresee the pur-
poses of Divine Providence in the future ; and I
regard even a victorious war as an evil from which
statesmanship should strive to preserve nations. I
could not exclude from my calculations the possi-
bility that chances might accrue in France's con-
stitution and policy which might avert the necessity
of war from two great neighbour races — a hope in
connection with which every postponement of a
rupture was so much to the good." The language is
a little obscure, but the meaning will be grasped
when it is remembered that his remark on the
"chances" referred to the probable grant of in-
creased freedom to the French Parliament, which he
thought would fetter the Court and thwart the
politicians. That forecast was not justified by the
event, since it was the partially liberated Chamber
and the Liberal Ministry which so hastily sanctioned
the declaration of war. The truth is, however, that
each rival nationaUty inherited the liabilities con-
tracted in the past. The French had been accus-
tomed for more than two hundred years to meddle
directly in Germany and find their allies, either
against Austria, Prussia, or England ; and the habit
offcenturies had been more than confirmed by the
colossal raids, victories, and annexations of Napo-
leon I. A Germany which should escape from French
control and reverse, by its own energetic action, the
policy of Henri IV., Richelieu, Louis XIV., his
degenerate grandson, Louis XV., and of the great
Napoleon himself, was an affront to French pride,
and could not be patiently endured. The opposing
forces which had grown up were so strong that the
wit of man was unable to keep them asunder ; and
all the control over the issue left to kings and
statesmen was restricted to the fabrication of means
The Causes of th*.
wherewith to deUver or sustain thv
choice of the hour, if such choice were
To that end the adversaries had, in
themselves after the last French failuR
any material compensation, not even what
called such a rag of territory as Luxemburg,
forth, keeping an eye on Prussia, the French i.
ment sought to gain over Austria and Italy, ar
a defensive alliance which, at the fitting n.on.
might be converted into an offensive aUiance strc
enough to prevent the accomplishment of Germa
unity, win campaigns, and enable each confederate
to grasp the reward which he desired. Carried on
dunng more than two years, the negotiations never
got beyond a kind of vague prehminary understanding
which signified the wilhngness of the three Courts
to reach a definite, formal treaty if they could. But
obstacles always arose when the vital questions lying
at the root of the business had to be solved. Italy
demanded and Austria was wilhng that she should
have Rome. To that France steadfastly demurred
even down to the last moment, as will presently be
seen. Austria also, besides being unready, in a
mihtary sense, was visited by the chronic fear that,
if she plunged into war against Germany, Russia
would at once break into her provinces from Lithu-
ania and the Pohsh Quadrilateral, and settle the
heavy account opened when Prince Schwarzenberg
displayed his "immense ingratitude" during the
Cnmean War. Nor was the Court of Vienna exempt
from apprehensions growing out of the possible, even
probable conduct of half-reconciled Hungary. Count
von Beust also deluded himself with the notion that
the Prussian treaties with the South German States
were mere " rags of paper," and nourished the fond
behef, except when he had a lucid interval, that the
South German people would not fight for the Father-
land. Waiting on Providence, the would-be con-
federates, at the same time, counted on the fortune
of war, arguing that France was certain to win at
first, and that one victory under the tricolour would
campaign of Sedan
^ alliance instantly to maturity, and
^ tolled into the field. Based on such
^iidations, and opposed by such solid
J grand design was doomed to fail ; in-
jver got nearer to completion than an
J of letters by the Sovereigns ; grounded on
ly eve, and went to pieces on the day of battle,
verted from Luxemburg, the French Government
no . relax its efforts to pave the way for the annexa-
n of Belgium. During the spring and summer of
.869 a successful effort was made to secure political,
commercial, and strategic advantages by obtaining
a certain control over the Belgian railways, notably
the line which runs from Luxemburg to Liege, and
thence to the North Sea ports. These proceedings,
of course, did not escape notice at Berlin, where the
ends in view were perfectly appreciated ; but they
form only a petty incident in the great struggle, and
can only be mentioned with brevity in order to indi-
cate its growth. It may be stated here that, in 1873,
the German Chancellor reversed the process, and
secured for his Government the control of the Luxem-
burg lines. Another railway question which cropped
up in May, 1870, was the famous railway which, by
means of an ingenious tunnel within the Alps near
St. Gothard, placed Germany in direct communica-
tion with Italy through neutral territory. Count von
Bismarck openly said it was a Prussian interest, and
the Northern Confederation paid a part of the cost,
which aroused indignation in France. At one
moment it seemed possible that this enterprise would
serve as a casus belli ; but the French Government,
after careful deliberation, decided, in June, 1870,
that they could not reasonably oppose the project,
although it certainly was regarded at the Foreign
Office in Paris as a further proof of German antagon-
ism, and a sort of bribe tendered to Italy. Since the
beginning of the year France had been in the enjoy-
ment of certain Liberal concessions made by the
Emperor, and confirmed, in May, by the famous
" plebiscite," which gave him a majority of more
The Causes of the War 23
than five millions. Now, although the Emperor's
reflections on this triumphant result of an appeal to
universal suffrage were embittered by the knowledge
that large numbers of soldiers had helped to swell
the million and a half of Frenchmen who voted " No,"
still the Foreign Minister and his agents, according
to M. Ollivier, were so elated that they exclaimed
with pride, " Henceforth, all negotiations are easy to
the Government," since the world thoroughly under
stood that, for France, peace would never mean
" complaisance or effacement." Yet Prince Napoleon,
in his brief sketch of these critical months, says plainly
that the Government concerned itself less with fore-
seeing the political complications which might lead
up to war, than with the best mode of proceeding
when war arrived. So true is this, that a general was
sent to Vienna to discuss the bases of a campaign
with the Austrian War Office. But in the spring of
1870 fortune seemed to smile on official France ;
and on the last day of June M. Ollivier, instructed by
the Foreign Minister, considered himself authorized
to boast before the admiring deputies that the peace
of Europe had never been less in danger than it was
at the moment when he delivered his optimistic
declaration. In England, also, the Foreign Secretary
could not discern " a cloud in the sky."
The Hohenzollern Candidature
One week later, not only M. Ollivier and Lord Gran-
ville, but Europe, nay, the whole world, saw plainly
enough the signs and portents of discord and convul-
sion. On the 3rd of July the Due de Gramont learned
from the French Minister at Madrid that Prince Leo-
pold of HohenzoUern-Sigmaringen, with his own full
consent, had been selected as a candidate for the
vacant throne of Spain, and that, at no distant date,
the Cortes would be formally requested to elect him.
The French Government quivered with indignation,
and the political atmosphere of Paris became hot
with rage. Not that the former were unfamiliar
24 The Campaign of Sedan
with the suggestion. It had been made in 1869,
considered, and apparently abandoned. Indeed, the
Emperor himself had, at one time, when he failed to
obtain the Rhenish provinces, proposed that they
should be formed into a State to be ruled by the King
of Saxony, and at another, that the Sovereign should
be the Hereditary Prince of HohenzoUern-Sigmar-
ingen ; the very Prince put forward by Marshal Prim.
He had been grievously hampered and perplexed in
the choice of a Sovereign of Spain by some Powers,
especially by France ; but now the Imperial Govern-
ment turned the whole tide of its resentment, not
upon Madrid, but Berlin, which, it was assumed,
aimed at estabhshing an enemy to France beyond
the Pyrenees. Explanations were demanded directly
from the Prussian Government, but M. Le Sourd, the
charge d'affaires, could extract no other answer than
this — that the Prussian Government knew nothing
about the matter. The Due de Gramont, who had
succeeded Lavalette, in May, as Minister for Foreign
Affairs, regarded the statement as a subterfuge, and
forthwith determined to fasten on the King a re-
sponsibiHty which he could not fasten on the Govern-
ment. The Due de Gramont was not a wise coun-
sellor ; he was deep in negotiations having for their
object an offensive and defensive alliance against
Prussia, and he was hardly less moved by a noisy
external opinion than by his own political passions.
He ordered M. Benedetti, who had only just sought
repose at Wildbad, to betake himself at once to Ems,
whither King William, according to custom, had
repaired to drink the waters. The French Am-
bassador reached the pleasant village on the Lahn
late at night on the 8th of July, and the next day
began a series of interviews with the King, which take
rank among the most curious examples of diplomacy
recorded in history.
Before the Ambassador could commence his
singular task, an event had occurred in Paris which
seemed to render a war unavoidable. The politicians
of the French capital had become feverish withj
The Causes of the War 25
excitement. Not only did a species of delirium afflict
the immediate advisers of the Emperor, but the band
of expectants, who, more ardent ImperiaUsts than he
was, still beUeved that nothing could withstand the
French Army ; while the Opposition, loving France
not less, but what they called hberty more, were
eager to take advantage of an incident which seemed
likely to throw discredit on the Bonapartes. Wisdom
would have prevented, but party tactics demanded
a movement in the Chamber which took the innocent-
looking form of an inquiry. The Government
dreaded, yet could not evade, the ordeal, and M.
Cochery put his question on the 6th of July. Had
the Due de Gramont been a clever Minister, or had
he represented a Government strongly rooted in the
national respect and affection, he would have been
able to deliver a colourless response, if he could not
have based a refusal to answer upon public grounds.
The truth is, he was carried off his feet by the sudden
storm which raged through the journals and society,
and it may be surmised that, even then, despite the
plebiscite, fears for the stabihty of the dynasty had
no small share in determining his conduct. Yet, it
must be stated, that he was only one of the Council
of Ministers who sanctioned the use of language
which read, and still reads, like an indirect declaration
of war. After expressing sympathy with Spain, and
asserting, what was not true, that the Imperial
Government had observed a strict neutrality with
regard to the several candidates for the crown, he
struck a note of defiance : *' We do not believe," he
exclaimed, " that respect for the rights of a neigh-
bouring people obliges us to endure that a foreign
State, by placing one of its princes on the throne of
Charles V., should be able to derange, to our injury,
the balance of power in Europe, and to imperil the
interests and honour of France. ' ' The specific sentence
uttered by M. Ollivier on this memorable occasion
were forgotten ; the trumpet-blast of the Due de
Gramont rang through the world, and still rings in
the memory. Prussia was not named by the Minister,
26
The Campaign of Sedan
but everyone beyond the Rhine knew who was meant
by the " German people," and a " foreign Power ; "
while, as Benedetti has stated in a private despatch
to Gramont, the King deeply felt it as a " provocation.*'
Not the least impressive characteristic of these
proceedings is the hot haste in which they hurried
along. M. Benedetti neither in that respect nor in
the swiftness and doggedness which he imparted to
the negotiations, is to blame. The impulse and the
orders came from Paris ; he somewhat tempered the
first, but he obeyed the second with zeal, and, with-
out overstepping the limits of propriety in the form,
he did not spare the King in the substance of his
demands. Nor, in the first instance, were they other
than those permitted by diplomatic precedent ; after-
wards they certainly exceeded these limits. The
first was that the King himself should press Prince
Leopold to withdraw his consent : indeed, direct him
so to do. The answer was that, as King, he had
nothing to do with the business ; that as head of the
HohenzoUern family he had been consulted, and had
not encouraged or opposed the wish of the Prince to
accept the proffered crown ; that he would still leave
him entire freedom to act as he pleased, but that His
Majesty would communicate with Prince Antoine, the
father of Prince Leopold, and learn his opinion. With
this reply, unable to resist the plea for delay, the
Ambassador had perforce to be content. Not so the
Imperial Government. The Due de Gramont sent
telegram on telegram to Ems, urging Benedetti to
transmit an explicit answer from the King, saying
that he had ordered Prince Leopold to give up the
project, and alleging, as a reason for haste, that
the French could not wait longer, since Prussia might
anticipate them by caUing out the Army. The Am-
bassador, to check this hurry, prudently warned his
principals, saying, that if they ostentatiously prepared
for war, then the calamity would be inevitable. " If
the King," wrote De Gramont, on the loth of July,
" will not advise the Prince to renounce his design^
well, it is war at once, and in a few days we shall be
I
The Causes of the War 27
on the Rhine." And so on from hour to hour. A
httle wearied, perhaps, by the pertinacity of the Am-
bassador, and nettled by the attempt to fix on him
the responsibihty for the Spanish scheme, the King
at length said that he looked every moment for an
answer from Sigmaringen, which he would transmit
without delay. It is impossible, in a few sentences,
to give the least idea of the terrier-like obstinacy
displayed by M. Benedetti in attacking the King.
Indeed, it grew to be almost a persecution, so
thoroughly did he obey his importunate instructions.
At length the King was able to say that Prince
Antoine's answer would arrive on the 13th, and the
Ambassador felt sure of a quahfied success, inasmuch
as he would obtain the Prince's renunciation, sanc-
tioned by King William. But, while he was writing
his despatch, a new source of vexation sprang up in
Paris — the Spanish Ambassador, Seiior Olozaga,
announced to the Due de Gramont the fact that Prince
Antoine, on behalf of his son, had notified at Madrid
the withdrawal of his pretensions to the crown. It
was reasonably assumed that, having attained the
object ostensibly sought, the French Government
would be well content with a diplomatic victory so
decisive, and would allow M. Benedetti to rest once
more at Wildbad. He himself held stoutly that the
** satisfaction '* accorded to the wounded interests and
honour of France was not insufficient. The Emperor
and the Due de Gramont thought otherwise, because,
as 3^et, no positive defeat had been inflicted, person-
ally, upon King WiUiam. The Foreign Minister,
therefore, obeying precise instructions from St. Cloud,
directed Benedetti to see the King at once, and
demand from him a plain declaration that he would
not, at any future time, sanction any similar proposal
coming from Prince Leopold. The Due de Gramont' s
mind was so constructed that, at least a year after-
wards, he did not regard this demand as an ulti-
matum ! Yet how could the King, and still more
Bismarck, take it in any other light ? Early on the
13th the King, who saw the Ambassador in the public
28 The Campaign of Sedan
garden, advanced to meet him, and it was there that
he refused, point blank, Louis Napoleon's prepos-
terous and uncalled-for request, saying that he neither
could nor would bind himself in an engagement
without limit of time, and applying to every case ;
but that he should reserve his right to act according
to circumstances. King William brought this inter-
view to a speedy close, and M. Benedetti saw him no
more except at the railway station when he started
for Coblenz. Persistency had reached and stepped
over the limits of the endurable, and King William
could not do more than send an aide-de-camp with a
courteous message, giving M. Benedetti authority to
say officially that Prince Leopold's recent resolution
had His Majesty's approval. During the day the
Ambassador repeated, unsuccessfully, his request for
another audience ; and this dramatic episode ended
on the 13th with the departure of the King, who had
pushed courtesy to its utmost bounds.
During that eventful 13th of July Count Bismarck,
recently arrived in Berlin from Pomerania, had seen
and had spoken to Lord Augustus Lof tus in language
which plainly showed how steadfastly he kept his
grip on the real question, which was that France
sought to gain an advantage over " Prussia," as some
kind of compensation for Koniggratz. The Due de
Gramont also conversed with Lord Lyons in Paris,
and induced him to set in motion Lord Granville,
from whose ingenious brain came forth a plausible
compromise wholly unsuitable to the exigency, and
promptly rejected at Berlin, but having an air of
fairness which made it look well in the pages of a
Blue Book. It was a last effort on the part of dip-
lomacy, and served well enough to represent states-
manship as it was understood by the Cabinet to which
Lord Granville belonged. On the evening of that day
Count Bismarck entertained at dinner General von
Moltke and General von Roon ; and the host read
aloud to them a telegram from Ems, giving an account
of what had occurred, and the royal authority to
make the story public. " Both Generals," writes
The Causes of the War 29
Dr. Moritz Busch, " regarded the situation as still
peaceful. The Chancellor observed — that would
depend a good deal upon the tone and contents of
the pubhcation he had just been authorized to make.
In the presence of his two guests he then put together
some extracts from the telegram, which were forth-
with despatched to all the Prussian Legations abroad,
and to the Berlin newspapers in the following form :
' Telegram from Ems, July 13th, 1870. When the
inteUigence of the Hereditary Prince of HohenzoUem's
renunciation was communicated by the Spanish to
the French Government, the French Ambassador
demanded ot His Majesty the King, at Ems, that
the latter should authorize him to telegraph to Paris
that His Majesty would pledge himself for all time
to come never again to give his consent, should the
HohenzoUems hark back to their candidature. Upon
this His Majesty refused to receive the French
Ambassador again, and sent the aide-de-camp
in attendance to tell him that His Majesty had
nothing further to communicate to the Ambas-
sador.' "
Substantially, it was the grotesque pile of mis-
representation built up on this blunt telegram —
M. Benedetti read it next morning in the Cologne
Gazette, and took no exception whatever to the brief
and exact narrative it contained — which set the
Parisians on fire. Travestied in many ways by
calculating politicians, as well as gossips, the message
became a " Note," or a " despatch," imputing the
extreme of intentional rudeness to King William, and
imposing the depth of humiliation, publicly inflicted
upon France through her representative, who, all the
time, was not only unconscious of any insult, but
emphatic in his acknowledgments of the King's
courtesy, kindness, and patience. Probably Count
Bismarck wrote his telegram for Germany, but its
effect in satisfying the Fatherland, was not greater
than its influence upon the fiery French, who never
read the text until months afterwards, and in Jvily,
30 The Campaign of Sedan
1870, were set aflame by the distorted versions
freely supplied by rumour's forked tongue.
The French Government and the Chamber
War was now plainly inevitable, yet the decisive
word still rested with the Imperial Government. In
Paris there were two currents running strongly in
opposite ways, and, for a moment, it seemed possible
that the tide which made for peace would overpower
the surging stream which drove onwards towards war.
More than one half the Ministry believed, and some,
M. OUivier for one, said that the retreat of Prince
Leopold, with the consent of the King, a great diplo-
matic victory for France, was enough, and had, in-
deed, brought the quarrel to an end. At midday,
on the 13th, M. Robert Mitchell, meeting M. Paul de
Cassagnac, said, " I have just left OUivier, and,
thank God, peace is secured." " My father," was the
reply, " has just quitted the Emperor ; war is resolved
on." The statement was not then exact, but it may
be accepted as a forecast. For, in truth, it was only
at noon the next day that the Ministers asembled
in council at the Tuileries to answer the momentous
question which so profoundly agitated their minds.
They sat six hours ; they were divided in opinion ;
yet, although Marshal Leboeuf was authorized to call
out the reserves — he had threatened to resign unless
that were done — the Ministers separated with the
understanding that a peaceful line of action should be
adopted, based on a demand for a Congress of the
Powers to sanction the principle that no member of
any reigning house should accept a foreign throne.
The Due de Gramont's brief account of this notable
Council shows that the hankering after war was
powerful therein ; since he says that " the Govern-
ment decided, not without hesitation, but influenced
by a love of peace, to propose this pacific solution."
But all, or some of the Ministers, and still more the
Emperor, stood in dread of two things : they were
alarmed lest the " dynasty " should be injured by a
The Causes of the War 31
course which bore the semblance of a forced retreat,
and they could not rely with confidence on the sober
opinion of the Chambers. The Court war-party
operated upon the Senators and Deputies through
M. Clement Duvernois, a schemer, and M. Jerome
David, by birth and training a fanatical Bonapartist,
the second accentuating the questions of the first, and
giving to his own language a substance which made
retreat almost impossible. Both these men had a
double object. They intended to extort a declaration
of war, and, at the same time, expel Emile OUivier,
together with what they called the Parliamentary
element, from the Ministry. The energetic, aggressive
and relentless group were really the mouthpieces of the
Emperor and Empress, and in a less degree of M.
Rouher, who had been deposed by the new Imperial
Constitution, and of the Due de Gramont, who all
through the business desired to secure a prolongation
of peace, solely because it would give him time to
ripen the projects of alliance with Austria and Italy,
and also to make war, lest " la Prusse," aware of his
design, should choose her own hour for battle. It so
chanced that Marshal Lebceuf, after despatching the
orders calling out the reserves, received a note from
the Emperor, which, he says, seemed to suggest a
regret at the decision adopted by the Council ; and
thinking, innocent man, that some constitutional
scruples had sprung up in the Imperial mind, the
Marshal begged that the Ministers might be sum-
moned once more. That night they met again,
talked for an hour, and had nearly resolved that the
mobilization of the Army should be deferred, when
papers were placed in the hands of the Due de Gra-
mont. The exact contents of these documents have
not been described, but they seemed to have contained
some report of language held by Count Bismarck
which exasperated the war party ; and, in an instant,
the Council resolved on war. That same night,
M. Robert Mitchell, walking in the garden of the
Foreign Office, asked M. OUivier why he did not
esign. The Minister gave a host of plausible reasons
^2 The Campaign of Sedan
having no real weight ; adding these prophetic words :
" Whatever happens, I am sacrificed ; for the war
will sweep away the regime to which I have attached
my name. If we are beaten, God protect France !
If we are victorious, God protect our liberties ! "
So that, having a clear perception of the future, this
Minister, at least, met the Chambers on the morrow.
The exciting events of the past week, imperfectly
understood and carelessly or purposely misrepresented,
had aroused a tempest of passion in Paris and France,
which, by its violence and uproar, overpowered, but
could not wholly silence, the voices of sagacity and
sober judgment. The Senate was unanimous for war.
In the Chamber the Opposition waged courageously
a desperate contest, so desperate from the outset,
that even M. Thiers, perhaps because he told un-
pleasant truths, could not command an unbroken
hearing, while M. Gambetta only secured one by
making a rare display of forensic tact, basing himself
on Parliamentary ground, and tempering his appeal
for " more light " with evidences of his indisputable
patriotism. The Due de Gramont favoured the
Senators with a version of the facts, which was
neither complete nor candid. M. Emile Ollivier
allowed an unhappy phrase to escape from his lips —
he went into the war " d, co^ur leger^ A committee
was appointed to inspect the diplomatic documents
on which the Court relied ; it was easily satisfied, and
late in the night, sustained by a large majority, the
policy of the Government was amply sanctioned.
Perhaps a sentence spoken by M. Guyot Mont-
payroux best illustrates the predominant feeling.
" Prussia," he said, " has forgotten the France of
Jena, and the fact must be recalled to her memory."
Thus was war declared by these infuriated legislators
on the night of July 15th. M. Thiers, who desired
a war with Prussia " at the proper time," has left on
record his judgment that the hour then selected was
" detestably ill-chosen." Yet even he and M. Gam-
betta were both anxious that " satisfaction " should
be obtained for Sadowa ; while the thought which
The Causes of the War 33
animated the Court is admirably expressed in the
phrase imputed to the Empress who, pointing to the
Prince Imperial, said, " This child will never reign
unless we repair the misfortunes of Sadowa." Such
was the ceaseless refrain. The word haunted French
imaginations incessantly, and it was the pivot on
which the Imperial policy revolved, and it exercised a
spell scarcely less powerful and disastrous upon
Monarchists like M. Thiers, and Republicans Hke
Gambetta and Jules Favre. Still, it may be said
that France was divided in opinion. Consulted
through the Prefects, only sixteen departments were
for war ; no fewer than thirty- four were adverse,
and the remainder could not be said to hold with the
one or the other. Nor should it be overlooked that
these estimates of popular feeling were transmitted by
functionaries who have always a wish to please the
superior Powers. Germany, on the other hand, was
united as it had never been since 1813. King William
was applauded everywhere. When he reached Berlin
on the evening of the 15th, he was met at the railway
station by the Crown Prince, Count von Bismarck,
General von Moltke, and General von Roon. There
the decision was formally taken to accept the chal-
lenge, the fact was repeated to the crowd wjho had
assembled, and whose shouts were loud, deep, and
prolonged ; and that same night went forth the
brief telegraphic orders which from one centre touched
a thousand springs, and called into instant being an
Army, perfectly organized, equipped, trained and
suppHed. So that when Baron Wimpfen, a secretary
of legation, entered Berlin on the 19th of July, and
handed to M. Le Sourd the French declaration of war
the sole official document on the subject received
by Prussia, as Von Moltke bluntly remarks — that
work had already begun which finished in little more
than a fortnight, enabled the King to break into
France at the head of more than three^ hundred
thousand soldiers.
Only one word more need be said on this subject —
the causes of the war. Clearing away the diplomatic
34 The Campaign of Sedan
mist which hides the realities, the student will dis-
cover two deadly opposites ; on one side the deter-
mination of France to insist on a right of meddling
with internal German affairs, and even of prescribing
the form or forms which the national aggregate should
assume ; on the other, the fixed resolve of the German
people that the French should no longer dictate or
pretend to dictate beyond the Rhine, that an end
should be put to the policy of seeking pohtical profits
by fomenting the spirit of discord in the petty German
Courts ; and that, if possible, by dint of " Kraft
und Muth," Germany should secure palpable safe-
guards against French invasions, and resume pos-
session of the strongholds and dependent territories
which were acquired, in times of adversity and dis-
union, by Louis XIV. Thus, the causes of war were
deeply rooted in essential facts. The moment to be
chosen, if it can be said to have been chosen, was for
statesmen to decide. The Imperial Government,
down to the last hour, sought to form a combination
adverse to Prussia, intending to wage war at its own
time, j [Prussia refused to be made the victim of a triple
alUance, and taking a fair advantage of the imperious
conduct of the French Court, seized the golden oppor-
tunity, promptly answered the declaration of war
and struck down the French Empire before its hesi-
tating and unprepared allies could move a finger to
avert a defeat which neither attempted, nor dared
attempt to repair. Austria, the unready, stood in
fear of Russia : Italy, the ambitious, demanded the
right to enter Rome. " We can grant nothing of the
kind," said the over- confident Due de Gramont, so late
as July 30th. " If Italy will not march," he ex-
claimed, " let her sit still." Abundant evidence exists
to prove that war between France and Germany was
solely a question of time, and Prussia cannot be blamed
justlyjfor selecting or seizing the hour most suitable
to her and least suitable to her adversaries. The
Due de Gramont asserts that neither the Emperor nor
the Government nor France, desired war — certain y
not just then ; but they intended to make war at a
The Causes of the War 3^
time and under conditions chosen by themselves.
He admits that it was the duty of the Imperial
Government to evade a war, but also prepare for a
war as much as possible ; and, failing to do the former,
he further confessed many months afterwards, that
too much confidence in the Army and in its untested
military virtues, and the dazzling splendour of a
glorious past dragged France, its Government and its
representatives, into an unequal struggle. " We be-
lieved ourselves too strong to stoop," he says, " and
we knew not how to resist the system of provocations
so ibly combined and directed by the Cabinet of
Berlin." A frank confession, especially from the
pen of a statesman who was himself endeavouring to
combine a system of aUiances, and who was anticipated
by the Power against whom his plans were directed.
M. Prevost Paradol, who in a moment of weakness
had accepted from the Emperor the post of Minister
at Washington, saw more clearly into the future than
the Due de Gramont and some of his colleagues. On
the very afternoon of the day when the unhappy
journaHst killed himself, he saw a countryman, the
Comte d'Herisson, and his language to the young
man showed how deeply he was moved, and with
what sagacity he estimated the near future. In his
opinion, expressed on the loth of July, war was even
then certain, because not only " la Prusse " desired
war, but because, as he said, " The Empire requires
war, wishes for it, and will wage it." The young
Frenchman to whom he spoke made light of the peril,
and said he should like to travel in Germany and
study in the Ubraries of her conquered cities. But
the Minister checked his natural exaltation, saying :
" You will not go to Germany, you will be crushed in
France. Believe me, I know the Prussians. We
have nothing whatever that is needed to strive with
them. We have neither generals, men, nor materiel.
We shall be ground to powder. Nous serons broyes.
Before six months are over there will be a Revolution
*Ji France, and the Empire will be at an end." Mourn-
ng over the error he made in laying down his sharp
f
36 The Campaign of Sedan
critical pen to put on a diplomatic uniform, and
maddened by the retrospect and prospect, Paradol, a
few hours after uttering his predictions, escaped from
unendurable misery by a pistol-shot. It was like an
omen of the coming catastrophe.
.
CHAPTER II
The Gathering of the Hosts
German Mobilization
The great contest, thus precipitated by the formal
defiance which Baron Wimpfen bore from Paris to
Berlin, excited deep emotion aU over the worid. The
hour had at length struck which was to usher in the
deadly struggle between France and Germany. Long
foreseen, the dread shock, Uke all grave calamities,
came nevertheless as a surprise, even upon reflective
minds. Statesmen and soldiers who looked on,
while they shared in the natural feelings aroused
by so tremendous a drama, were also the privileged
witnesses of two instructive experiments on a grand
scale — the processes whereby mighty Armies are
brought into the field, and the methods by means of
which they are conducted to defeat or victory. The
German plan of forming an Army was new in regard
to the extent and completeness with which it had
been carried out. How would it work when put to
the ultimate test ? Dating only from 1867, the
French scheme of organization, a halting Gallic
adaptation of Prussian principles, modified by French
traditions, and still further by the political exigencies
besetting an Imperial dynasty, having little root in
the nation, besides being new and rickety, was in an
early stage of development ; it may be said to have
been adolescent, not mature. No greater contrast
as ever presented by two parallel series of human
ctions than that supplied by the irregular, confused,
d uncertain working of the Imperial arrangement
of forming an Army and setting it in motion for
37
3^ The Campaign of Sedan
active service, and the smoothness, celerity, and
punctuahty which marked the German " mobihza-
tion." The reason is — first, that the system on
which the German Army was built up from the
foundations was sound in every part, and that the
plan which had been designed for the purpose of
placing a maximum force under arms in a given
time, originally comprehensive, had been corrected
from day to day, and brought down to the last
moment. For example, whenever a branch or
section of a railway line was opened for traffic, the
entire series of time-tables, if need be, were so altered
as to include the new facility for transport. The
labour and attention bestowed on this vital condition
was also expended methodically upon all the others
down to the most minute detail. Thus, the German
staff maps of France especially, east of Paris, actually
laid down roads which in July, 1870, had not yet
been marked upon any map issued by the French
War Office. The central departments, in Berhn,
exercised a wide and searching supervision ; but they
did not meddle with the local military authorities
who, having large discretionary powers, no sooner
received a brief and simple order than they set
to work and produced, at a fixed time, the result
desired.
When King William arrived in Berlin, on the even-
ing of July 15th, the orders already prepared by
General von Moltke received at once the royal
sanction, and were transmitted without delay to the
officers commanding the several Army Corps. Their
special work, in case of need, had been accurately
defined ; and thus, by regular stages, the Corps
gradually, but swiftly, was developed into its full
proportions, and ready, as a finished product, to
start for the frontier. The reserves and, if needed,
the landwehr men filled out the battalions, squadrons,
and batteries to the fixed strength ; and as they
found in the local depots arms, clothing, and equip-
ments, no time was lost. Horses were bought, called
in, or requisitioned, and transport was obtained. As
The Gathering of the Hosts ^^
all the wants of a complete Corps had been ascertained
and provided beforehand, so they came when de-
manded. At the critical moment the supreme
directing head, relieved altogether from the dis-
tracting duty of settling questions of detail, had
ample time to consider the broad and absorbing
business problems which should and did occupy the
days and nights of a leader of armies. The composi-
tion of the North German troops, that is, those under
the immediate control of King William, occasioned
no anxiety ; and there was only a brief period of
doubt in Bavaria, where a strong minority had not so
much French and Austrian sympathies, as inveterate
Prussian antipathies. They were promptly sup-
pressed by the popular voice and the loyalty of the
King. Hesse, Wiirtemberg, and Baden responded so
heartily to the calls of patriotism that in more than
one locality the landwehr battalions far exceeded their
normal numerical strength, that is, more men than
were summoned presented themselves at the depots.
The whole operation of bringing a great Army from
a peace to a war footing, in absolute readiness, within
the short period of eighteen days, to meet an adversary
on his own soil, was conducted with unparalleled order
and quickness. The business done included, of course,
the transport of men, guns, horses, carriage, by rail-
way chiefly, from all parts of the country to the
Rhine and the Moselle ; and the astonishing fact is
that plans devised and adopted long beforehand
should have been executed to the letter, and that
more than three hundred thousand combatants —
artillery, horse, infantry, in complete fighting trim,
backed up by enormous trains — should have been
brought to specified places on specified days, almost
exactly in fulfilment of a scheme reasoned out and
drawn up two years before. The French abruptly
declared war ; the challenge was accepted ; the
orders went forth, and " thereupon united Germany
stood to arms," to use the words of Marshal von
Moltke .It is a proud boast, but one amply justified
by indisputable facts.
40 The Campaign of Sedan
French Mobilization
How differently was the precious time employed
on the other side of the Rhine. When the Imperial
Government rushed headlong into war, they actually
possessed only one formed Corps d'Armee, the 2nd,
stationed in the camp of Chalons, and commanded
by General Frossard. Yet even this solitary body
was, as he confesses, wanting in essential equipments
when it was hurriedly transported to St. Avoid,
not far from Saarlouis, on the Rhenish Prussian
frontier. Not only had all the other Corps to be
made out of garrison troops, but the entire staff had
to be provided in haste. Marshal Niel, an able
soldier, and the Emperor, had studied, at least, some
of Baron Stoffel's famous reports on the German
Army, and had endeavoured to profit by them ; but
the Marshal died, the Corps Legislatif was intractable,
favouritism ruled in the Court, the Emperor suffered
from a wearing internal disease, and the tone of
the Army was not one instinct with the spirit of self-
sacrificing obedience. In time it is possible that the
glaring defects of the Imperial military mechanisip
might have been removed, and possible, also, that
the moral and discipline of the officers and men might
have been raised. Barely probable, since Marshal
Leboeuf believed that the Army was in a state of
perfect readiness, not merely to defend France, but
to dash over the Rhine into South Germany. His
illusion was only destroyed when the fatal test was
applied. Nominally, the French Army was for-
midable in numbers ; but not being based on the
territorial system, which includes all the men liable
to service in one Corps, whether they are with the
colours or in the reserve, and also forms the supple-
mentary landwehr into local divisions, the French
War Office could not rapidly raise the regiments
to the normal strength. For a sufficient reason. A
peasant residing in Provence might be summoned
to join a regiment quartered in Brittany, or a work-
man employed in Bordeaux called up to the Pas de
The Gathering of the Hosts 41
Calais. When he arrived he might find that the
regiment had marched to Alsace or Lorraine. During
the first fortnight after the declaration of war
thousands of reserve men were travelling to and fro
over France in search of their comrades. Another
evil was that some Corps in course of formation were
spht into fragments separated from each other by
many score miles. Nearly the whole series of Corps
numbered from One to Seven, were imperfectly
suppHed with a soldier's needments ; and what is
more astonishing, the frontier arsenals and depots
were sadly deficient in supphes, so that constant
applications were made to Paris for the commonest
necessaries. There were no departmental or even
provincial storehouses, but the materials essential
for war were piled up in three or four places, such as
Paris and Versailles, Vernon and Chateauroux. In
short, the Minister of War, who said and beUeved
that he was supremely ready, found that, in fact,
he was compelled almost to improvise a fighting
Army in the face of an enemy who, in perfect order,
was advancing with the measured, compact, and
irresistible force of a tidal wave.
The plan followed was exactly the reverse of the
German method. East of the Rhine no Corps was
moved to the frontier, until it was complete in every
respect, except the second fine of trains ; and con-
sequently, from the outset, it had a maximum force
prepared for battle. There were some shght ex-
ceptions to the rule, but they were imposed by
circmnstances, served a real purpose, and disappeared
when the momentary emergency they were adapted
to meet had been satisfied. West of the Rhine, not
one solitary Corps took its assigned place in a perfect
state for action. All the battahons of infantry, and
of course the regiments, were hundreds short of their
proper strength. Before a shot had been fired,
L General de Failly, at Bitsche, was obliged to send a
HLdemand for coin to pay the troops, adding notes won't
I V.^ass — " les billets n'ont point cours." General
I ! rossard, at St. Avoid, reported that enormous
\
42 The Campaign of Sedan
packages of useless maps had been sent him — maps
of Germany — and that he had not a single map of
the French frontier. Neither Strasburg, Metz, Toul,
Verdun, Thionville, nor Mezieres, possessed stores of
articles — such as food, equipments, and carriage —
which were imperatively required. The Intendants,
recently appointed to special posts, besieged the War
Office in Paris, to relieve them from their embarrass-
ments— they had nothing on the spot. The complaints
were not idle. As early as the 26th of July, the troops
about Metz were living on the reserve of biscuits ; there
were sent only thirty-eight additional bakers to
Metz for 120,000 men, and even these few practitioners
were sadly in want of ovens. " I observe that the
Army stands in need of biscuit and bread," said
the Emperor to the Minister of War at the same date.
" Could not bread be made in Paris, and sent to
Metz ? " Marshal Leboeuf, a day later, took note of
the fact that the detachments which came up to the
front, sometimes reserve men, sometimes battalions,
arrived without ammunition and camp equipments.
Soldiers, functionaries, carts, ovens, provisions,
horses, munitions, harness, all had to be sought at
the eleventh hour. These facts are recorded in the
despairing telegrams sent from the front to the War
Office. The very Marshal who had described France
as " archiprete," in a transcendent state of readiness
for war, announced by telegram, on the 28th of July,
the lamentable fact that he could not move forward
for want of biscuit — " Je manque de biscuit pour
marcher en ayant." The 7th Corps was to have been
formed at Belfort, but its divisions could never be
assembled. General Michel, on the 21st of July, sent
to Paris this characteristic telegram : " Have arrived
at Belfort," he wrote : " can't find my brigade ;
can't find the General of Division. What shall I do ?
Don't know where my regiments are"- — a document
probably unique in military records. Hardly a week
later, that is on the 27th, Marshal Leboeuf became
anxious respecting the organization of this samj^
Corps, and put, through Paris, some curious questioi^
The Gathering of the Hosts 43
to General Felix Douay, its commander. " How far
have you got on with your formations ? Where are
your divisions ? " The next day General Douay
arrived at Belfort, having been assured in Paris by
his superiors that the place was " abundantly pro-
vided" with what he would require. After the war,
Prince Georges Bibesco, a Roumanian in the French
Army, attached to the 7th Corps, pubhshed an ex-
cellent volume on the campaign, and in its pages he
describes the " cruel deception " which awaited Douay.
He writes that, for the most part, the troops had
** neither tents, cooking pots, nor flannel belts ; neither
medical nor veterinary canteens, nor medicines, nor
forges, nor pickets for the horses — they were without
hospital attendants, workmen, and train. As to the
magazines of Belfort — they were empty." In the land
of centraUzation General Douay was obHged to send a
staff and several men to Paris, with instructions to
explain matters at the War Office, and not leave the
capital without bringing the articles demanded with
them. Other examples are needless. It would be almost
impossible to understand how it came to pass that the
French were plunged into war, in July, 1870, did we
not know that the military institutions had been
neglected, that the rulers relied on old renown, the
" glorious past " of the Due de Gramont, and that the
few men who forced the quarrel to a fatal head, knew
nothing of the wants of an Army, and still less of the
necessities and risks of war.
War Methods Contrasted
As the story is unfolded, it will be seen that the
same marked contrast between the principles and
methods adopted and practised by the great rivals
prevailed throughout. The German Army rested
I on solid foundations ; the work of mobilization was
^conducted in strict accordance with the rules of
Rbusiness ; allowing for the constant presence of a
I V-ertain amount of error, inseparable from human
I I 'tions, it may be said that "nothing was left to
44 TThe Campaign of Sedan
chance." The French Army was loosely put
together ; it contained uncertain elements ; was not
easily collected, and never in formed bodies ; it was
without large as well as small essentials ; it " lacked
finish." And similar defects became rapidly manifest
in the Imperial plan for the conduct of the war. Here
the contrast is flagrant. The Emperor Napoleon,
who had lived much with soldiers, who had been
present at great military operations, and had studied
many campaigns, could not be destitute of what the
French call " le flair militaire." He had, also, some
inkling of the political side of warfare ; and in July,
1870, he saw that much would depend upon his ability
to make a dash into South Germany, because, if he
were successful, even for a brief time, Prussia might
be deprived of South German help, an4 Austria might
enter the field. There was no certainty about the
calculation ; indeed, it was almost pure conjecture,
seeing that Count von Beust and the Archduke Albert
had both warned him that, " above all things," they
needed time, and that the former had become
frightened at the prospect of Hungarian defection,
and a Russian onfall. Yet it was on this shadowy
basis that he moved to the frontier the largest available
mass of incomplete and suddenly organized batteries,
squadrons and battalions. He and his advisers were
possessed with a feverish desire to be first in the
field ; and the Corps were assembled near Metz,
Strasburg, and Belfort, with what was called a reserve
at Chalons, on the chance that the left might be made
to join the right in Alsace, and that the whole, except
the reserve which was to move up from Chalons, could
be pushed over the Rhine at Maxau, opposite Carls-
ruhe, and led with conquering speed into the country
south of the Main. Before he joined the head-
quarters at Metz, on the 28th of July, the Emperor i;
may have suspected, but on his arrival he assuredly [ '
found, that the plan, if ever feasible, had long passed /
out of the range of practical warfare. He reapec^
nothing but the disadvantages which spring frorr
grossly defective preparation, and " raw haste haJ'
The Gathering of the Hosts 45
sister to delay." He knew that he was Commander-
in-Chief of a relatively weak and ill-found Army,
and he acquiied the certainty at Metz, that, unless
he were conspicuously victorious, neither Austria
nor Italy would move a man.
His mighty antagonist, on the other hand, was
advancing to the encounter with such large resources,
and so thoroughly equipped, that no fewer than three
Army Corps were left behind, because even the
admirably managed and numerous German railway
lines were not able to carry them at once to the banks
of the Rhinie. Moreover, General von Moltke, the
Chief of the Great Staff, had, in 1868-69, carefully
reasoned but plans, which were designed to meet each
probably contingency, either a march of the French
throu^li Belgium, an early irruption into the Rhenish
provJ:hces, or the identical scheme upon which the
Enriperor founded his hopes ; while, if the French
aPiOwed the Germans to begin offensive operations on
F'Vench soil, then the method of conducting the
invasion, originally adopted, would come into play.
Ii'he memorandum on this great subject, the essential
:f)ortions of which have been published by its author,
Von Moltk», is, for breadth, profundity, and insight,
one of the most instructive to be found in the records
of war. This is not the place to deal with its general
or detailed arguments. For present purposes, it is
sufficient to set forth the main operative idea. The
contention was, that an Army assembled on the Rhine
between Rastadt and Mainz, and on the Moselle below
Treves, would be able to operate successfully, either
on the right bank of the main stream, against the flank
of a French Army, which sought to invade South
Germany ; or, with equal facility, concentrate on
the left bank, and march in three great masses through
the country between the Rhine and Moselle, upon the
French frontier. Should the French make a precipi-
\tate dash into the German country towards Mainz,
', then the Corps collected near that fortress would meet
\ ;hem in front, and those on the Moselle would threaten
] heir communications or assail them in flank. The
46 The Campaign of Sedan
soundness of the reasoning is indisputable ; its
application would depend upon the prompt concen-
tration of the Armies, and that had been rendered
certain by careful and rigorously enforced prepara-
tions. The great Prussian strategist had calculated
the movement of troops and railway trains to a day ;
so that he knew exactly what numbe:r of men and
guns, within a given area, he could count upon at
successive periods of time ; and, of course, he was
well aware that the actual use to be nriade of them,
after the moment of contact, could not be foreseen
with precision, but must be adapted to circumstances.
But he foresaw and prepared for the contingency which
did arrive. " If," he said, ** the French desired to
make the most of their railways, in order to hasten
the assembly of all their forces," they would be
obliged to disembark, or as we now say, " detrain,"
them, " at Metz and Strasburg, that is, in two princi pal
groups separated from each other by the VosgeSj."
And then he went on to point out how, assembled
on the Rhine and Moselle, the German Army wouljd
occupy what is called the " interior lines " between
them, and " could turn against the one or the other, ors
even attack both at once, if it were strong enough."
The grounds for these conclusions, succinctly
stated, were the confirmation of the frontier, an
angle flanked at each side by the neutral states
of Switzerland and Luxemburg, restricting the space
within which operations could be carried on ; the
possession of both banks of the Rhine below Lauter-
bourg ; the superior facihty of mobihzation secured
by the Germans, not only as regards the rapid transi-
tion of Corps from a peace to a war footing, but by
the skilful use of six railway lines running to the
Rhine and the Moselle ; and, finally, the fact that,
fronting south between those rivers, the advancing
German Army would be directed against an adversary
whose line of retreat, at least so far as railways wen ^
concerned, diverged, in each case, to a flank
any probable front of battle. The railway frc
Strasburg to Nancy traversed the Vosges at Saverr
'i
The Gathering of the Hosts 47
the railway from Metz to Nancy on one side, and
Thionville on the other, followed the valley
of the Moselle ; and as the important connecting
branch from Metz to Verdun had not been con-
structed, it follows that the French Army in Lorraine
had no direct railway Hne of retreat and supply.
The railway from Metz to Strasburg, which crossed the
Vosges by the defile of Bitsche and emerged in the
Rhine valley at Hagenau, was, of course, nearly
parallel to the German front, except for a short
distance west of Bening. The frontier went east-
ward from Sierck, on the Moselle, to Lauterbourg on
the Rhine, and thence southerly to Basle. The hill
range of the Vosges, starting from the Ballon d' Alsace,
overlooking the Gap of Belfort, runs parallel to
the river, and extends in a northerly direction beyond
the French boundary, thrusting an irregular mass
of uplands deep into the Palatinate, ending in the
isolated Donnersberg. It follows that the main
roads out of, as well as into, France were to the east
and west of this chain, and it should be observed
that the transverse passes were more numerous
south than north of Bitsche, and that, practically,
while detachments could move along the secluded
valleys, there was no road available for large bodies
and trains through the massive block of mountain
and forest which occupies so considerable a space of
the Palatinate. Thus, an Army moving from Mainz
upon Metz would turn the obstacle on the westward
by Kaiserslautern and Landstuhl ; while if Strasburg
were the goal, it would march up the Rhine valley
by Landau, and through the once famous Lines of
the Lauter. If two Armies, as really happened in
1870, advanced simultaneously on both roads, the
connection between them is maintained by occupying
Pirmasens, which is the central point on a country
\road running from Landau to Deux Ponts, and
\another going south-east to Wissembourg.
V The influence of this mountain range upon the
Vffensive and defensive operations of the rival Armies
Till be readily understood. The French could only
48 The Campaign of Sedan
unite to meet their opponents in the Prussian pro-
vinces at or north of Kaiserslautern ; while the
Germans, assuming that their adversaries assembled
forces in Alsace, as well as in Lorraine, would not be
in direct communication until their left wing had
moved through the hill-passes and had emerged
in the country between the Sarre and Meurthe.
It has been seen that the available French troops,
including several native and national regiments from
Algeria, had been hurried to the frontier in an imper-
fect state of organization and equipment. There
were nominally seven Corps d'Armee and the Guard ;
but of these, two, the 6th and 7th, were never united
in the face of the enemy. Marshal Canrobert, com-
manding the 6th, was only able to bring a portion of
his Corps from Chalons to Metz ; and General Douay,
the chief of the 7th, had one division at Lyons, and
another at Colmar, whence it was sent on to join the
1st Corps assembling under Marshal MacMahon near
Strasburg. The principal body, consisting of the
2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps, ultimately joined by the
greater part of the 6th, and the Guard were posted
near and north of Metz ; while the 5th occupied
positions on the Saar, and formed a sort of link,
or weak centre, between the right and left wings.
Nothing indicated cohesion in this array, which,
as we have shown, was adopted on the vain hypo-
thesis that there would be time to concentrate in
Alsace for the purpose of anticipating the Germans
and crossing the Rhine at Maxau.
No such error was made on the other side. The
German troops were divided into three Armies. The
First Army, consisting of the 7th and 8th Corps,
under the veteran General von Steinmetz, formed
the right wing, and moved southward on both banks
of the Moselle. The Second Army, composed of
the Guard, the 3rd, 4th, and loth Corps, commanded
by Prince Frederick Charles, was the central body,
having in rear the gth and 12th Corps as a reserve.
They were destined to march on the great roads lead-
ing from Manheim and Mainz upon Kaiserslautern.
The Gathering of the Hosts 49
The Third Army, or left wing, under the Crown
Prince, was made up of the 5th and nth and the
two Bavarian Corps, together with a Wiirtemberg
and a Baden Division. Each Army had one or
more divisions of cavalry, and, of course, the due
proportion of guns. By the 31st of July, the whole
of these troops, except the Baden and the Wiirtem-
berg Divisions, were on the west of the Rhine, with
foreposts on the Saar, below Saarbriick, in the
mountains at Pirmasens, and on the roads to the
Lauter ; the great mass of troops being close to the
Rhine. The advantages, in point of concentration,
were already secured by the German Staff ; the
First Army alone, one half at Treves, and the other
strung out between the Moselle and the Nahe, was
in apparent danger ; yet little apprehension was
felt on that score, because the country through
which it moved was highly defensible — its right
was covered by neutral Luxemburg, and part of
the Second Army was sufficiently forward to protect the
left.
A week earlier, there had been, indeed, a slight-
perturbation in Berlin, where the headquarters
still remained. By unceasing observation, a careful
collation of reports, a dihgent use of French news-
papers, the King's Staff had arrived at a tolerably
accurate estimate of the strength, positions, and
internal state of the French Corps. They were
cognizant of the prevailing disorder, and were well
aware that not one Corps had received its full com-
plement of reserve men. Arguing that the enemy
would not have foregone the advantages of mobili-
zation unless he had in view some considerable
object, such as an irruption into the Palatinate,
the Staff modified the original plan, as it affected
the Second Army, and, on the 23rd of July, directed
the Corps of which it was composed to quit the
railway trains transporting them on, and not beyond,
the Rhine. This was purely a measiu^e of pre-
caution, the contingency of which had been foreseen ;
yet one which was needless, as the French had already
^0 The Campaign of Sedan
learned that they could not take the offensive in
any direction. No other changes were made, and
the only result of this modification was that the
soldiers had to march farther than they would have
marched, and they probably benefited by the exer-
cise. During this period, the bridge at Kehl had
been broken, the boats and ferries removed from
the Rhine from Lauterbourg to Basle, the railway
pontoon bridge at Maxau protected, a measure
suggested by the presence of river gunboats at
Strasburg, and an unremitting watch had been
kept on the land frontier by small detachments
of horse and foot. Not the least surprising fact is
that no attempt was made by the French to destroy
the bridges over the Saar at Saarbriick, or penetrate
far beyond that river on its upper course. On
the other hand, parties of German horse and foot
made several incursions between Sierck and Bitsche,
and one small party rode as far into Alsace as
Niederbronn. It was not until the end of the month
that large bodies of cavalry were sent to the front
to begin a career demonstrating afresh, if a demon-
stration is needed, the inestimable services which
can be performed by that indispensable arm. The
German Army had been placed in the field in little
more than a fortnight, although the ist and 6th
Corps were still en route from the far north. The
Crown Prince reached Spires on the 30th, and the
next day, the King, with the Great Staff, left Berlin
for Mainz. He had restored the " Order of the
Iron Cross," and had warmly expressed his gratitude
for the unexampled spirit manifested by the whole
German nation, " reconciled and united as it had
never been before." Germany might find therein,
he said, " a guarantee that the war would bring her
a durable peace, and that the seed of blood would
yield a blessed harvest of liberty and unity."
Here it may be stated that a French squadron
had appeared off the coast of Denmark on the 28th^
of July, but only to disappear with greater promptitude-
thereby relieving the timid from any apprehensi*-^"
:;rnJ
The Gathering of the Hosts ^1
of a descent. Large German forces were set free
to face westward, and in a brief space, not only
the French marines and sailors, but the ship guns,
were vehemently required to fight in severe battles
and defend the capital of France.
yt
CHAPTER III.
Stage Thunder
The Combat at Saarbriick
King William did not reach Mainz until the
forenoon of the 2nd of August ; and it is
characteristically remarked in the official history
of the war, that the journey from Berlin had been
relatively slow, because it was necessary to fit the
six supplementary trains bearing the great head-
quarters into a series of military trains in such a
way as would not retard the transport of troops.
It is a small fact, but an apt illustration of the pre-
ference uniformly given to essentials in the Prussian
arrangements for war. Soon after the Staff had
arrived in the " Deutsche Haus," lent by the Grand
Duke, whose son, Prince Louis, the husband of the
British Princess Alice, commanded the Hessian
Division, unexpected information greeted them.
Telegrams reported first that a .serious action was
in progress at Saarbriick, and later that the Prussian
troops had withdrawn from the town.
This was the famous combat, known at the time
as the bapteme de feu of the unfortunate Prince
Imperial. The Emperor Napoleon entered Metz
on the 28th of July, and took the command of the
" Army of the Rhine." Until that moment, the
seven Corps d' Armee in the field were under the orders
of Marshal Bazaine, who received his instructions
from Paris through Marshal Leboeuf. They were
to act strictly on the defensive, advice which may be
said to have been needless, since, as we have shown /
not one of the Corps was in a condition to marc^
52
Stage Thunder 53
and fight. When the Emperor appeared on the
scene, no great change for the bettei' had taken
place, and there was still a dearth of real information
respecting the strength and position of the enemy,
while the reports brought in contained an enormous
percentage of error. Nevertheless, there was a
vague feehng at headquarters that something must
be done to satisfy a pubHc opinion which thought
that the French Armies should have been already
beyond the Rhine ; and on the 30th of July Marshal
Bazaine received orders to cross the Saar and occupy
Saarbriick. The task was to be intrusted to General
Frossard, supported by troops on the right and
left, drawn from the Corps of De Failly and Bazaine.
Yet this modest operation dwindled down, when
discussed in a sort of Council of War held the next
day at Forbach, into a simple cannonade, and the
occupation of the heights on the left bank ! The
Emperor was told that his project could not be
executed, and resigning himself, as he always did,
to the inevitable, he warned MacMahon that no
movement should be made on his side before the
lapse of eight days. The ostentatious movement
on Saarbriick was to be made on the 2nd of August.
Now, at that date, the place was occupied by frac-
tions of the 8th German Corps, posted on both banks
of the river above and below the town. They con-
sisted of four battalions of foot, several squadrons
of horse, and one battery, and the nearest immediate
support was some miles to the rear, near Lebach.
Colonel von Festal had held the position from the
outset of the war, and was allowed to remain, at
his own request, although a considerable Army
stood in his front at no great distance, that is
the three leading Corps of the Army of the Rhine.
But on the 2nd Count von Gneisenau was in command
of the German outposts, and had orders, if pressed,
to retire upon Lebach, but he stood fast, and even
assumed the offensive, in order to ascertain exactly
what the pressure might be, and test the intentions
of the adversary. Against him, in the forenoon.
^4 The Campaign of Sedan
advanced Frossard in the centre, Bazaine on the
right, and De Failly, who had crossed the river
at Saareguemines, on his left. It was a wonderful
spectacle. The Emperor and the Prince Imperial
were present on the hills to behold so vast an array
moving out in parade order, to fight a sham battle
with real shot and shell, against a dozen companies
and six guns. It is not necessary to enter into a
detail of this combat ; it is sufficient to say that
the Prussians held on to the left bank until they were
obliged, after an hour's fighting, to retire before the
development of several brigades. Finally, when
a French battery on the Reppertsberg had opened
fire on the bridges and the town. Count von Gneisenau
withdrew his troops, first to a place near the town,
and afterwards to a position farther in the rear.
At other points on the river the French had failed
to pass, but in the evening they sent parties into
Saarbriick, then unoccupied. The French in this
skirmish lost eighty-six, and the Prussians eighty-
three, officers and men killed and wounded. It was
the first occasion on which the soldiers of Napoleon
III. had an opportunity of testing the qualities of
the German Army, and they found that their secular
adversaries, disciplined on a different model, and
broken to new tactics, were as hardy, active, and
formidable as those of Frederick the Great.
After this striking example of stage thunder, there
was a pause — the French did not pursue the retreating
companies of the 40th and 69th, hold the town, or
even destroy the bridges, Indeed, General Frossard,
in his pamphlet, explains that although so few were
visible, there must have been large numbers of the
8th Prussian Corps near at hand, and insists that
they were held back because the adversary did
not wish to show his strength ; so that the result
actually had an unfavourable influence on the French
— it inspired in them a feeling of apprehension.
They dreaded the unknown. Without exact, and
with what was worse misleading, information, the
Marshals and Generals were bewildered by every
Stage Thunder 55
adverse strong patrol, which boldly marched up and
even looked into their camps ; and out of these
scouting parties they constructed full Corps ready to
pounce upon" them. No master mind at head-
quarters'filled them with confidence, or gave a firm
direction to their soldiers. At a very early period,
even in the highest ranks, arose a querulous dread
of " Prussian spies," and a belief that the hills and
woods concealed countless foes. The apprehensions
had no solid foundation, since the First Army was
not nearer the Saar than Losheim and Wadern, and
the only troops in the immediate front of General
Frossard were those composing Gneisenau's weak
detachment, which retired some miles on the road
to Lebach. Yet the feeble operation of the 2nd of
August induced the Great Staff to concentrate the
First Army at Tholey, that is, nearer to the main line
of march of the Second Army, and on the left flank
of the probable French advance. None took place,
and thenceforward the swift and measured develop-
ment of the German movement southwards went
steadily onwards.
Preparing to go forward
After reviewing the general position of the opposing
Armies, the German headquarters fixed on the 4th
of August as the day on which offensive operations
should be begun. It was known in a sufficiently
authentic way, that there were between Metz and
the Saar, four French Corps and the Guard, the left
being at Bouzonville, south of Saarlouis, and the
right at Bitsche ; that the ist Corps was south of
Hagenau, in Alsace, and that the two remaining
Corps were still incomplete, one being at Chalons,
the other at Belfort. It was therefore determined
that the Prussian Crown Prince should cross the
Lauter on the 4th, while Prince Charles and General
von Steinmetz, at a later date, should move upon
Saarbriick, and grapple with the main Imperial
Army as soon as they could bring the foe to battle.
^^ The Campaign of Sedan
Practically, the skirmish on the 2nd put everyone
on the alert. Acting, as was usual in the German
Army, on their own discretion, yet still in the spirit
of their instructions, the divisional and Corps com-
manders at once sprang forward to support Gneisenau ;
so that on the 3rd, the front lines of the First Army
were nearer to the enemy than had been prescribed,
and General von Steinmetz came up from Treves to
Loshiem.
During this period, the Second Army had continued
its movement upon Kaiserslautern, and its cavalry
had already established a connection with the First
Army. It was not the intention of General von
Moltke, who really spoke with the voice of His
Majesty, that the Saar should be crossed until a
later day. He seems to have been under the impres-
sion that the French might still assume the offensive ;
he therefore held back the somewhat impetuous
Steinmetz, and so ordered the movements that both
Armies should take up positions between Tholey and
Kaiserslautern, which would enable them to act in
concert. Thus, on the 3rd, the vast array between
the Rhine and the Moselle was in motion, left in
front, in other words, the Prussian Crown Prince was
the most forward, while the centre and right were
drawn together, preparatory to an advance in a
compact form. The French, it was noted with sur-
prise, had not only refrained from breaking the
substantial bridges over the Saar, but had left un-
touched the telegraph wires and stations on both
banks of the stream, so that, says the official narrative,
the Staff at Mainz were kept constantly informed
by telegrams of the enemy's doings and bearing
near Saarbriick. Such negligence would not be
credited were it not thus authentically recorded by
the General who found it so profitable.
By the 4th of August, the entire front of the Armies
advancing towards the Saar was covered by several
regiments of cavalry, actively engaged on and near
the river, especially at Saarbriick, in closely watching
the French, and sending information to the rear.
Stage Thunder 57
There was not a point between Pirmasens and Saar-
louis which escaped the notice of these vigilant and
tireless horsemen. Behind them came the masses
of the First and Second Armies, which latter, on the
4th, had passed " the wooded zone of Kaiserslautern,"
and had approached so closely to the First, that a
species of controversy for precedence arose between
Prince Charles and General von Steinmetz. Fearful
of being thrust into the second hne, the eager old
soldier wanted to push forward on Saarbriick, and
reap the laurels of the first battle, or, at all events,
keep his place at the head of the advance. General
von Moltke, who had his own plans of ulterior action,
which were not those of Steinmetz, in order to settle
the dispute, drew what he supposed would be an
effective line of demarcation between the two Armies.
He also added the ist Corps, which had come up
from Pomerania, to the First Army ; the 2nd, loth
and i2th to the Second ; and the 6th to the Third
Army. While directing the Crown Prince to cross
the Lauter on the 4th, General von Moltke did not
intend to pass the Saar until the gth, and then to act
with the whole force assembled on that side. In
fact, rapidly as the business of mobilization, the
transit by railway, and the collection of trains for so
vast a body of men, horses, and guns, had been
performed, the work was not in all respects quite com-
plete, nor had the soldiers been able, good marchers
as they were, to cover the ground between them and
the adversary, before the date assigned.
Yet Von Moltke proposed, and Von Steinmetz
disposed, although he is acquitted by his chief of
any deliberate intention to act prematurely. The
latter, obhged to make room for Prince Charles, gave
directions which brought his two leading Corps within
reach of the Saar and his advanced guards close to
Volkingen and Saarbriick in actual contact with the
French outposts ; and that disposition led to a
considerable battle on the 6th, a coUision not antici-
pated at the headquarters in Mainz. It is, however,
pointedly declared that at the moment when he
^^ The Campaign of Sedan
thrust himself forward Steinmetz did not know what
were the plans which had been formed in that exalted
region, to be carried out or modified according to
events, and therefore withheld from him. The broad
scheme was that the Third Army should, after crossing
the Vosges, march on Nancy, and that the First
should form the pivot on which the Second Army
would wheel in turning the French position on the
hne of the Moselle. Practically that was done in the
end, and it was facilitated, perhaps, by the two
battles fought on the 6th of August, which shattered
the French, and obliged them to act, not as they
might have wished, but as they were compelled.
Positions on August 4
For the sake of clearness, the positions occupied by
the rival Armies on the morning of the 4th may be
succinctly described. The French stood thus : On
the right, two divisions of the 5th Corps, one at
Saareguemines, the other at Grossbliedersdorff ; in
what may be called the centre, three divisions of the
2nd Corps, on and over the frontier immediately
south of Saarbriick ; three divisions of the 3rd Corps
echelonned on the high-road from Forbach to St.
Avoid, with one division at Boucheporn ; on the
left, three divisions of the 4th Corps, one at Ham, a
second at Teterchen, and a third at BouzonviUe.
The Guard were in rear of the left at Les Etangs.
The position of the cavalry it is difficult to determine,
but they were not where they should have been —
feeling for and watching the enemy. Nor is it easy
to ascertain the numerical strength of the French
Army at any given moment, because the reserves
and battalions, as they could be spared from garrisons,
were constantly arriving ; but on the 4th there were
about 150,000 men and 500 guns in front of Metz.
That fortress, however, like all the other strong
places on or near the frontier, such as Toul, Verdun,
Thionville, and Belfort, had no garrison proper, or
one quite inadequate to its requirements.
Stage Thunder 59
The German Armies on the 4th were posted in this
order : The Crown Prince's was behind the Khngbach,
south of Landau, assembled at dawn for the march
which carried it over the frontier ; the Second, or
Central Army, under Prince Charles, was in line of
march through the Haardt Wald by Kaiserslautern,
the advanced guard of the 4th Corps being at Hom-
burg, and that of the 3rd at Neunkirchen ; while the
Guard, the loth, 12th, and 9th were still north or
east of Kaiserslautern, which they passed the next
day. The First Army, held back by orders from the
Great Staff, was cantonned between Neunkirchen,
Tholey, and Lebach. In front of the whole Hne,
from Saarlouis to Saareguemines, were several brigades
of cavalry, from which parties, both strong and weak,
were sent out constantly to discover and report on
the positions and doings of the enemy. The three
Armies, as far as can be estimated from the official
figures, brought into the field at the outset of the
campaign, say the 4th of August, the First, 83,000
men and 270 guns ; the Second, 200,000 men and
630 guns ; and the Third, 170,000 men and 576 guns,
an overwhelming array compared with that mustered
by the adversary. These totals include only the
active Army. The aggregate from which they were
drawn amounted to the enormous sum of 1,183,389
men and 250,373 horses, which, of course, includes
garrisons, depots, and landwehr in course of forma-
tion. It has been laid down on indisputable authority
that the number available for active operations,
namely, that which can be put into the field, is,
in all cases, as it was in this, less than half the nominal
effective. The proportion of mobilized, to what may
be called immobilized, troops in the French Army
was for the moment, at all events, necessarily some-
what lower than in the German, because the Imperial
military system, as we have already explained, was
so clumsy, as well as so incomplete.
^>0 The Campaign of Sedan
The Moral and Political Forces
One other fact may be asefully noticed, because it
had a considerable influence on the campaign. It is
this — -the moral force, represented by public opinion
in politics, and in the Armies by what the French
call the moral, which has nothing to do with morals,
but means cheerfulness, good will, confidence — had
passed wholly over to the German side. Public
opinion, which ran in a strong and steady current,
condemned the declaration of war, although a certain
superstitious belief in the invincibility of French
soldiers, at least when opposed to Germans, still
prevailed, even among mihtary men who ought to
have been better informed and less under the sway of
prejudice. While Germany was united and hearty,
and willingly obeyed an executive which no one
questioned, while Saxony and Hanover, Wiirtemberg
and Bavaria vied in patriotic ardour with Pomerania
and Brandenburg ; there was no such complete and
consentaneous feeling in France ; and there was, on
the one hand, a powerful, ambitious, and indignant
group of Imperialists, who thirsted for the possession
of office, which they strove to snatch from Emile
Ollivier and his semi-Liberal colleagues, and on the
other, outside all the Imperialist sections, the re-
pressed, enraged, and sturdy republicans of Paris,
who, it is not too much to say, waited for the first
decisive defeat of the Imperial Armies to overturn
an arbitrary system of government which they
detested on account of its treacherous origin and
dreaded, as well as despised, while they writhed
beneath its power. Jerome David and Clement
Duvernois were resolved to expel the so-called con-
stitutionalists ; and Gambetta, Favre, and their
friends were equally determined, if an opportunity
occurred, to destroy the Empire, root and branch.
There were no such elements of weakness beyond the
Rhine.
Nor, as we shall see, did the conduct of the Empress
Eugenie, in her capacity as Regent, supply strength
Stage Thunder 61
to the Government or impart wisdom to its councils.
She had one dominant idea — the preservation of the
dynasty — and aided by a wilUng instrmnent, the
Comte de PaUkao, she was the prime agent in the
work of depriving the French nation of the best and
last chance of saving Paris from investment and
capitulation. If the political conditions were adverse
to the Imperialists in respect of unity and moral force,
they were not less so when estimated from a military
standpoint. The French Army we will not say lost
courage, but confidence, from the moment when it
was brought to a standstill. The soldiers knew quite
as well as the generals why, on the 4th of August,
the larger host under an Emperor Napoleon, was
pottering to and fro, driven hither and thither by
orders and .counter-orders, in the country north of
Metz and why the smaller, commanded by Marshal
the Duke of Magenta, was still south of the Lauter.
They knew also, from daily experience, how imperfect
the Armies were, because the weakness of the bat-
talions, the scarcity of provisions, the defects of equip-
ment i the lack of camp utensils were things which
could not be hidden. They were also inactive and
unable to develop the power which springs up in a
French Army when engaged in successful offensive
operations ; they deteriorated hourly in morale.
The Germans gained confidence at every step they
took towards the frontier, not only because they were
animated by a formidable patriotic spirit and were
eager for battle with their ancient foes, but because
each battery, squadron, and battalion had its full
complement of men, because they put trust in their
royal chief and his illustrious assistant, and because
they were intensely proud of an almost perfect war-
apparatus, in which each officer and soldier was able,
so sohd yet elastic was the system of training, to
harmonize obedience to orders with, when the need
arose, discretionary independent action. So that
as the huge but perfectly articulated masses of the
German Armies moved swiftly and steadily to the
frontier behind which the adversary awaited them.
62 The Campaign of Sedan
they bore along in their breasts that priceless belief
in themselves and their cause which had so often
carried troops to victory, even when they were few
and their foes were many. The contrast is painfully
distressing ; but it is also profoundly instructive,
because when closely scrutinized it reveals the open
secrets which show, not only how Empires are lost
and won, but what severe duties a great self-respecting
people must perform to obtain securities for the right
of cementing and preserving National Independence.
CHAPTER IV
Invasion in Earnest
The first blow struck in the war — for the parade at
Saarbriick does not deserve the name of a blow — was
delivered on the Lauter by the Crown Prince. The
French Army in Alsace, commanded by Marshal
MacMahon, had been collected at Strasburg from the
garrisons in the Eastern region. At first it consisted
of the 1st Corps, which included four infantry divi-
sions, troops of the Line, to which were added, before
the end of July, three regiments of Zouaves, and three
of native Algerians, which were distributed among
the French infantry brigades. There were three
brigades of cavalry, ninety-six guns, and twenty-four
mitrailleuses, the Emperor's pet arm. The Divi-
sional Commanders were Ducrot, Abel Douay,
Raoult, and Lartigue ; and the horsemen were under
the orders of Duhesme. The 7th Corps, nominally at
Belfort, under Fehx Douay, actually distributed in
several places, one division being at Lyons, another
at Colmar, was also within the command of Mac-
Mahon ; so that, on the 4th of August, he was
at the head of two Corps, one of which was many
miles distant from his headquarters. He had, how-
ever, moved forward with Ducrot and Raoult to
Reichshofen and Lartigue to Hagenau, while Abel
Douay was pushed still further northward at Wissem-
bourg, which he reached on the 3rd, but with a
portion only of his troops. In fact, at that date,
the Army of MacMahon was strung out between the
Lauter and Lyons, and even the portion which may
be described as concentrated, consisted of fragments
posted or on the march between Wissembourg and
63
64 The Campaign of Sedan
Hagenau. That very morning, the ist Division of
the 7th Corps started by railway from Colmar to join
the Marshal. It was upon this scattered array that
the Crown Prince was advancing. MacMahon, who
had intended to assume the offensive himself on the
7th of August, did not know how near and how
compact was the host of his foes. Abel Douay, estab-
lished on the Lauter, was obHged to part with several
battalions to keep up his communications, through
Lembach, with the main body. He sent out a party
on the evening of the 3rd, and early on the 4th, yet
each returned bearing back the same report — they
had seen and learned nothing of the enemy. Indeed,
it would be difficult to find a single instance in which
the researches of the French were thrust far enough
to touch the Germans, all their reconnoitring excur-
sions being carried on in a routine and perfunctory
manner. Nevertheless, they had a strong force of
cavalry in Alsace as well as Lorraine ; but it was
mostly in the rear, rarely much, never far in front.
On the other hand, the Baden horsemen had looked,
unseen themselves, into the French cavalry camp at
Selz, and the scouts on the hills had signalled the
successive arrival of battalions and artillery at
Wissembourg. It must be stated, however, that the
Germans did not know, precisely, until they came in
contact with them, what forces were in, or were
within reach of Wissembourg.
The object of the German forward movement was
twofold — if MacMahon had crossed the Vosges to
join the Emperor, Strasburg was to be invested, and
the rest of the Third Army was to pass through the
hills to the Saar and effect a junction with the Second.
If the Marshal were still east of the hills, then he was
to be assailed wherever found. Consequently, the
whole Army was set in motion, but it was by a gift
of fortune, who, however, rarely favours the impru-
dent, that they were enabled to defeat the division
exposed to their onset. At four and six in the morn-
ing, the Corps moved out on a broad front stretching
from the hills to the Rhine. Bothmer's Bavarians, on
Invasion in Earnest ^^
the right, marched direct on Wissembourg, followed
by the other divisions of the Bavarian Army. Next
in order, to the left, came the 5th Corps, which was
directed upon Altenstadt ; the nth, which pushed
through the Bien Wald ; and the Badeners, whose
object was Lauterbourg ; while the remainder of the
Army was still far to the rear.
' The Combat on the Laiiter
Wissembourg, a picturesque old town, standing
upon the Lauter at a point where it enters the plain,
is defended by walls not armed with guns, and sur-
rounded by deep ditches filled from the stream, one
arm of which curves through the place. There were
three gates. Under the archway of the northern,
named after the town of Hagenau, passed the great
road from Strasburg, which, turning to the eastward,
quitted the ramparts by the gate of Landau. The
western gate, a mere entrance cut through the wall,
having in advance a small lunette, received the road
from Pirmasens. It took its name from the fort of
Bitsche, but the track from that place came down
the folded hills by the Col du Pigeonnier, or Dove-cote
Neck, and joined the Strasburg highway just outside
the Hagenau gate. Beyond the walls were factories,
pottery fields, and mills ; above and below were the
once famous Lines of the Lauter thrown up on, and
following the right bank of the stream through the
forest to Lauterbourg ; while on the foot-hills were
vines, which do not add to the beauty of any scene,
and hop-gardens ; and here .and there the usual rows
of stiff trees bordering, yet not shading, the roads.
Distant about a mile or so to the eastward is a spur
of the Vosges, the Geisburg, thrust into the plain,
falling steeply towards it, and crowned by a substan-
tial chateau, seated above terraces difficult of access.
From this elevation were visible, spread out like a
map, the woodlands stretching towards the Rhine,
the roads to the east and south, and the town, with
its railway station, now silent, near the gate of Landau.
66 The Campaign of Sedan
As Abel Douay had only available about eight
thousand troops, he could not defend the approaches
through the Bien Wald, or prevent a turning move-
ment round his right flank. Still, had he not been
under a delusion respecting the proximity of the
enemy, he could and would have destroyed the few
bridges over the Lauter, and so disposed his troops
as not to be surprised. But his scouts had reported
that the foe was not near, and thus, when the Bavarian
advance appeared on the hills at eight o'clock and
opened fire from a battery, the French soldiers were
engaged in the ordinary routine of camp labours.
Startled by the guns, they ran to their arms with
alacrity ; but an encounter begun under such con-
ditions is always disadvantageous to the assailed.
General Douay, an able soldier, came to a rapid
decision. He placed two battahons in the town,
another with a battery at the railway station, and
posted the rest and twelve guns on the slopes of the
Geisberg. The walls and ditches of the town, the
railway buildings, and part of the Lauter Lines,
brought the Bavarians to a stand, and the combat
of small arms and artillery on this point continued
amid the vineyards and hop-grounds, while the
German centre and left were swinging round through
the forest. The operation occupied considerable time,
as two hours passed by, from the firing of the first
gun, before the leading battalions of the 5th Corps
were brought into play. At length, they came into
action against the railway station, and as the nth
Corps had also developed an attack on the Geisberg
from the east, it was evident that the combat could
not last long. The combined efforts of the Bavarians
and the Prussians, after severe fighting and some
loss, drove the French out of the station, and captured
the town, together with a battalion of the French
regiment of the Line, the 74th, which was cut off,
and forced to surrender. The assailants had pene-
trated by the gates after they had been broken in by
artillery, and thus the town was won. It was really
the strong pivot of the defence, and its resistance
Invasion in Earnest ^7
delayed the onset upon the Geisberg for some time.
In the meantime, General Abel Douay had been
killed by the explosion of the ammunition attached to
a mitrailleuse battery ; and the command had
devolved upon General Pelle.
The whole stress of the action now fell upon the
Geisberg and its castle. The height was steep, the
building pierced for musketry and strong enough to
resist anything but cannon-shot. The front was
approached by successive terraces, and there was a
hop-garden near by on the Altenstadt road. The
main body of the French and all their artillery, except
one disabled gun which had been captured after a
sharp fight, werdk)n the hills to the south, threatened
every moment on their right flank by the development
of the nth Corps which had entered the area of battle.
The little garrison in the castle made a stout resistance,
slew many of the assailants, who swarmed upon all
sides, and compelled the more daring among them to
seek shelter at the foot of the walls. Then the Ger-
mans with great labour brought up in succession four
batteries, by whose fire alone they could hope to
master the obstinate defenders who had manned even
the tiled roof with riflemen. Surrounded, threatened
with the weight of twenty-four guns, and seeing their
comrades outside in full retreat, the garrison, which
had done its uttermost, surrendered as prisoners of
war. They were two hundred, had killed and
wounded enemies amounting to three-fourths of their
own number, and had seriously injured General von
Kirchbach, the commander of the 5th Corps. When
the castle had fallen the French retired altogether.
Making only one show of resistance they disappeared
among the hills, and what is remarkable were not
pursued, for the Crown Prince riding up, halted all
the troops and even the cavalry who were in full
career on the track of the enemy. The Germans lost
in killed and wounded no fewer than 1,550 oflicers
and men ; but the French loss is not exactly known.
They left behind, however, nearly a thousand un-
wounded prisoners, their camp, and one gun.
^S The Campaign of Sedan
It may fairly be said of this combat, especially
considering they were surprised and greatly out-
numbered, that the French sustained their old renown
as fighting men and that the first defeat, although
severe, reflected no discredit on the soldiers of the
1st Corps. By no chance could they have successfully
withstood the well-combined and powerful onsets of
their more numerous adversaries. Nevertheless, the
death of Douay, the defeat, and the disorganization
of the division had a profound moral effect, keenly
felt at Metz and more keenly in Hagenau and Reichs-
hofen. Marshal MacMahon called for instant aid
from the 7th Corps ; and the Emperor, moved by
the news, decided to send him the '5th Corps, which
General de Failly was at once ordered to assemble at
Bitsche and then move up the great road to Reichs-
hofen. In the German headquarters and camps, on
the contrary, there was rejoicing and that natural
accession of confidence in the breasts of the soldiers
now pressing towards the Saar which springs up in
fuller vigour than ever when they learn that their
common standard has floated victoriously over the
first fought en field. The First and Second Armies
were still distant from the rocky steeps and thick
woods where they also were to gain the day ; but the
Third Army, which, by the way, was a fair representa-
tive of South and North Germany, had actually
crossed the frontier, had penetrated into Alsace,
through woods and fieldworks and over streams
renowned in story, and had inflicted a sharp defeat
upon the Gallic troops, whose rulers had challenged
the Teutons to wager of battle.
It is admitted that, on the evening of the 4th of
August, the Germans had lost touch of the adversary.
The reason was that the 4th Cavalry Division, which
had been ordered up by the Crown Prince early in the
day, had found the roads blocked by an Infantry
Corps, and the vexatious delay prevented the horse-
men from reaching the front before nightfall. So
diflicult is it to move dense masses of men, horses,
and gims, in accurate succession through a closed
Invasion in Earnest ^^^
country, along cross-roads and field-lanes. The few
squadrons at hand were not strong enough to pursue
on the several roads which radiate from Wissembourg,
and the defect could not be remedied until the next
day. It was known that the fugitives could not
have followed the southern roads, yet there were
hostile troops in that direction, and it was surmised
that they must have retreated into the highlands by
the western track, yet they might have traversed
another way, lying under the foot of the hills. On
the 5th of August, the cavalry, starting out at day-
light, soon gathered up accurate information. General
von Bernhardi, with a brigade of Uhlans, rode for-
ward on the highway, into the Hagenau forest, where
he was stopped by a broken bridge guarded by
infantry ; but he heard the noise of trains, the whist-
ling of engines, and, of course, inferred the movement
of troops ; while on the east, nearer the Rhine, the
squadrons sent in that direction were turned back
both by infantry and barricaded roads. Towards
the west, a squadron of Uhlans crossed the Sauer at
Gunstett, a place we shall sobn meet again ; while
Colonel Schauroth's Hussars found the bridge at
Woerth broken, were fired on by guns and riflemen,
and saw large bodies in motion on the heights beyond
the stream. Hence it was inferred that the Army of
MacMahon was in position about Reichshofen, an
inference confirmed by the reports from the Bavarians
who had marched on Lembach, from the 5th Corps
whose leading columns attained Preuschdorf, with
outposts towards Woerth, and from the Badeners on
the left, who found the enemy retiring westward.
At night, the Crown Prince's Army had not wholly
crossed the frontier. In front, were Hartmann's
Bavarians at Lembach, the 5th Corps before Woerth,
the nth, on the railway as far as Surburg ; the
Badeners on their left rear behind the Selz ; Von der
lann's Bavarians at Ingolsheim, and the headquarters
md 4th Cavalry Division at Soultz, otherwise Sulz.
The 6th Corps — having one division at Landau,
formed a reserve. MacMahon' s troops, except
70 The Campaign of Sedan
Conseil-Dumesnil's division of the 7th Corps, near
Hagenau, were all in position between Morsbronn
and Neehwiller behind the Sulz and the Sauer, a con-
tinuous line of water which separated the rival out-
posts. The Emperor had placed the 5th Corps at
the disposal of MacMahon, yet he finally detained
one half of Lapasset's division at Saareguemines, and
drew it to himself ; while that of Guyot de Lespart
was sent, on the 6th, towards Niederbronn, and
Goze's, not wholly assembled at Bitsche on the 5th,
remained with General de Failly, who, at no moment
in the campaign — such was his ill-fortune — had his
entire Corps under his orders.
French Position on the Saar
We may now revert to the positions occupied by
the rivals on both banks of the Saar, in order to
complete the survey of an extensive series of opera-
tions which stretched without a break, in a military
sense, from the Rhine opposite Rastadt, towards the
confluence of the Saar* and Moselle. If the German
Headquarter Staff at Mainz, considering how well it
was served, and what pains were taken to acquire
information, remained in some doubt as to the posi-
tions and projects of the Imperialists, at Metz, ill-
served and hesitating, all was bewilderment and
conjecture. Neither the Emperor Napoleon, nor his
chief adviser Marshal Leboeuf, seemed capable of
grasping the situation now rapidly becoming perilous
to them ; they had, indeed, fallen under an influence
which tells so adversely on inferior minds — dread of
the adversary's combinations ; and, perplexed by
the scraps of intelligence sent in from the front, they
adopted no decisive resolution, but waited helplessly
on events. No serious attempt was made to concen-
trate the Army in a good position where it could fight,
or manoeuvre, or retreat, although, as General Frossard
and MarshalJBazaine both state, such a central defen-
sive position had been actually studied and marked
out, in 1867. Whether the occupation of the country
Invasion in Earnest ^] 71
between Saareguemines and (Etingen would have pro-
duced a favourable effect on the campaign or not, it
would have prevented the Army from being crushed
in detail, and have given another turn to the war.
But there was no firmness nor insight at Metz. The
orders issued by the Emperor look like the work of an
amateur who had read much of war, but who possessed
neither the instincts of the bom soldier, nor the
indefatigable industry and business-hke skill of a man
who, thrust into an unwonted employment, com-
pelling him to face hard realities, endeavours to cope
with them by a steady and intelligent application of
the principles of common sense.
On the morning of the 4th, the Emperor did no
more than shift his left wing a little nearer to his
centre, by bringing General de Ladmirault into closer
contact with Marshal Bazaine, leaving Frossard in
front of Saarbriick, and directing De Failly to assemble
two divisions at Bitsche, and report to Marshal
MacMahon. The notion prevaiUng in the Imperial
headquarters was, that the Germans designed to
march upon Nancy, which was not their plan at all,
and that the 7th Corps, reported to be on the march
from Treves, might make an offensive movement to
protect Saarlouis, forgetting, as Frossard observes,
that their rule was concentration and not isolated
operations ; and that the railroad from Saarbriick
afforded the only serious inlet into Lorraine. In the
evening the news of Abel Douay's defeat and
"wound," not death, reached Metz, and created
alarm, but did not cause any serious modification of
the Imperial plans. The next day the Emperor, still
retaining the supreme direction of the Army, and
keeping the Guard to himself, formally handed over
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps to Marshal Bazaine, " for
mihtary operations only " ; and the ist, 5th, partly
at Bitsche, and 7th, mainly at Belfort, to Marshal
MacMahon. The incomplete 6th Corps, under Mar-
shal Canrobert, had not yet moved out from the camp
at Chalons. Thus, there were practically two Corps
remote from the decisive points, and one in an
72 The Campaign of Sedan
intermediate position, so handled by the Imperial Com-
mander as to be useless. Not only was the force called
out for war scattered over an extensive area, but —
and the fact should be borne in mind — the fortresses
were without proper and effective garrisons, and,
what was equally important, they had no adequate
stores of provisions, arms, and munitions ; while the
great works at Metz itself, upon which such reliance
had been placed, were far from being in a defensive
condition. Early on the 5th, in answer to a sugges-
tion from Frossard, who was always urging concen-
tration, the Emperor directed him, yet not until the
6th, to fix his headquarters at Forbach, and draw his
divisions round about in such a manner that, when
ordered, he might remove his headquarters to St.
Avoid ; instructions which left him in doubt, and
inspired him with anxiety. During the evening,
however, acting on his own discretion, he thought it
fit to place his troops in fresh positions, somewhat to
the rear on the uplands of Spicheren, with one division,
upon higher ground in the rear, yet that step, though*
an improvement, did not remove his apprehension
respecting his left fiank, which had been weakened
by the withdrawal of Montaudon's division of the
3rd Corps to Saareguemines. General Frossard has
been much censured, but he was a man of real ability,
and almost the only general who, from first to last,
always took the precaution of covering his front with
field works.
German Position on the Saar
We have indicated, in the preceding chapter, the
stages attained by the First and Second German
Armies on the 4th ; and have now only to repeat, for
the sake of clearness, a summary of their array on
the evening of the 5th. The several Corps of the
Second were still moving up towards the Saar. The
4th Corps was at Einod and Homburg, the Guard
near Landstuhl ; the 9th about Kaiserslautern, and
the 12th a march to the rear. Further westward.
Invasion in Earnest 73
the loth halted at Cusel, and the 3rd was in its front,
between St. Wendel and Neunkirchen. The First
Army remained in the villages where it was located
on the 4th, that is the 7th and 8th between Lebach
and Steinweiler, with one division of the incomplete
First Corps at Birkenfeld. On the evening of that
day, however, General Steinmetz issued an order of
movement for the next, which carried the leading
columns of the 7th and 8th close to Saarbriick, and,
as a consequence, brought on the battle of Spicheren,
the narrative of which sanguinary and spirited fight
will fall into its natural place later on. As the main
current of the campaign flowed Metzward, it will be
convenient to recount, first, the operations of the
Crown Prince's Army, which, though in a measure
subsidiary, produced more telling and decisive effects
upon the fortunes of the French, than the engage-
ment which broke down their foremost hne of battle
on the Saar.
D2
CHAPTER V
Two Staggering Blows
I. — Woerth
Alike in Alsace and Lorraine, the actions which made
the 6th of August a date so memorable in this swiftly
moving war were undesigned on the part of the
assailant and unexpected on the part of the assailed.
In other words, as General von Moltke did not intend
to throw the force of his right and centre against the
main body of the Imperialists until all the Corps were
closer to the frontier and to each other, so the Crown
Prince proposed to employ the day in changing front
from the south to the west and then direct his serried
lines upon the front and flanks of MacMahon's Army,
which he confidently expected to find in position
behind the Sulz and the Sauer, covering the road to
Bitsche. The despatches of the French Marshal also
show that he counted on a day's respite, since his
orders to De Failly were that the two divisions com-
manded by that ill-used officer were to march on the
6th to join the ist Corps, so that they might be in
line to fight a battle on the following day. But De
Failly, harassed by fluctuating orders from Metz,
shifted hither and thither, now to the right, now to
the left, and never permitted to keep his Corps in
hand, was unable to do more than start one division
on the road to Reichshofen, while he assembled the
other at Bitsche, and left one half the third on the
Saar to share the misfortunes of Napoleon and Bazaine.
No such hesitation and infirmity of purpose character-
ized the conduct of the German commanders. They
74
Two Staggering Blows 75
had well-defined plans, indeed, and issued clear and
precise orders, yet both the one and the other were so
framed that they could be modified to deal with
unexpected incidents, and adapted at once to the
actually ascertained circumstances of the moment,
which is the very essence of war. The spirit of the
German training gives a large discretion to superior
officers, who are taught to apply the rules issued for
their guidance to the mihtary situation which, in the
field, is certain to vary from day to day, or even from
hour to hour. Moreover, a German general who
attacks is certain to receive the ready support of
comrades who may be near, while those more remote,
who hear the sound of battle or receive a request for
help, at once hasten forward reporting the fact to,
without awaiting orders from, superior authority.
Nothing testifies more effectively to the soundness of
the higher education in the Prussian military system
than the fact that it is possible not only to confer
these large powers on subordinates, but to encourage
the use of them. At the same time it must be
acknowledged that, in any Army where the officers do
not make the study of war their daily and hourly
business, and where the best of the best are not
selected for command and staff duty, the latitude
enjoyed by the Germans could not be granted, because
its capricious and unintelligent use would lead to
needless bloodshed, the frustration of great designs,
and perhaps shameful defeat.
It has been already stated that both commanders
had intended to assume the offensive and fight a battle
on the 7th, the Crown Prince proposing to bring up
the greater part of his Army and envelop the French,
and Marshal MacMahon, who thought he was dealing
with the heads of columns, having drawn up a plan
to attack the Germans in front with the ist and turn
their right flank with the 5th Corps. Had he known
how strong and how compact was the array of his
opponent he never could have framed a scheme which
would have transferred to the enemy all the advan-
tages possessed by himself. The contingency of a
76 The Campaign of Sedan
forward movement on his part had been foreseen and
guarded against, and the precautions adopted on the
evening of the 5th would have become far more
formidable had the next day passed by without a
battle. But those very protective measures, as will
be seen, tended to precipitate a conflict by bringing
the troops into contact on the front and left flank of
the French position. Marshal MacMahon had selected
and occupied exceptionally strong ground. He posted
his divisions on a high plateau west of the Sauer and
the Sulz, between Neehwiller and Eberbach, having
Froeschwiller as a kind of redoubt in the centre and
the wooded slopes of-the hills running steeply down to
the brooks in his front. The left wing, where General
Ducrot commanded, was thrown back to guard the
passages through the woodlands, which led down the
right bank of the Sulz from Mattstal into the position.
The centre fronted Woerth, which was not occupied,
and the right, without leaning on any special protective
obstacle, was in the woods and villages south-east of
Elsasshausen, with reserves in the rear which, says
the German oflicial narrative, together with the open
country, were a suflicient guard against a direct flank
attack, an opinion not justified by the result. The
Sauer was deep, the bridges had been broken, and the
ascents on the French side were prolonged, except on
one point, and swept by musketry and cannon.
Among the vines and copses, in the villages and
farmsteads, everywhere protected by open ground,
over which an assailant must pass, stood the French
Army — Ducrot on the left, facing north-west, Raoult
in the centre, Lartigue on the right, having behind
him Conseil-Dumesnil's division of the 7th Corps.
Pelle, who succeeded Abel Douay, was in reserve ;
and the cavalry were partly in rear of the right, and
partly behind the centre. The oflicial German history
speaks of the position as especially strong, regards
the mass of troops seated there, put down at forty-
five thousand men, as amply suflicient for a vigorous
defence, and contends that the defect of numbers was
balanced by a respectable artillery and the superiority
Two Staggering Blows 77
of the Chassepot over the far-famed needle-gun. A
Bavarian soldier-author, Captain Hugo Helvig, how-
ever, says that the ground held by the French had
all the disadvantages of so-called " unassailable "
positions — it had no issues to the front, consequently
the defenders could not become the assailants ; its
right was " in the air" and its left " rested on that
most doubtful of all supports to wings — a wood."
Thus the Bavarian captain differs from the General
Staff. The fact seems to be that the position was so
formidable that it could only be carried by onsets on
both flanks, which, of course, imphes that the assailant
must have the control of superior numbers. Another
point to be noted is that the great road to Bitsche was
a prolongation of the front and in rear of the left,
and that, as happened, in case of a severe defeat, the
temptation would be all powerful to retreat by cross
roads on Saverne, that is, away from instead of
towards the main body of the Imperial Army. Mar-
shal MacMahon had hoped to be the assilaant, but he
held that if the German Army continued its march
southward beyond Hagenau, he would have to retreat,
a movement the Crown Prince was not likely to make,
since the orders from the King's headquarters were
to seek out and fight the enemy wherever he might
be found, a rule which governed all the German
operations up to the fatal day of Sedan.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the German
columns were approaching, from the north and the
east, the strong position just described. Hartmann's
Bavarians, after marching westward through the
Hochwald to Mattstal, had turned south down the
Sulzbach. The 5th Corps, in position overnight at
Preuschdorf, had, of course, strong advanced posts
between Goersdorf and Dieffenbach, while Von der
Tann's Bavarians were on the march from Ingolsheim,
also through the lower Hochwald road, by Lamperts-
loch upon Goersdorf and the Sauer. Further to the
left, the nth Corps and Von Werder's combined
divisions were wheeling up to the right, so as to extend
the line on the outer flank of the 5th Corps. The
"^^ The Campaign of Sedan
Hochwald rose ave or six hundred feet above the
battlefield. T-ike most uplands, it was intersected
by vales ai>cl country roads, and nearly every hollow
had its Ivick which flowed into the principal stream.
This was the Sauer. Rising in hills beyond Lembach,
it ra^n in a southerly direction along the whole German
frpnt, receiving the Sulz at Woerth, and dividing into
-'two streams opposite Gunstett. These greater and
lesser brooks, though spanned by few bridges, were
well supplied with mills, which always facilitate the
passage of streams. Large villages, also, filled up
the valley bottoms here and there, and the country
abounded in cultivation. Through this peopled and
industrious region the main roads ran from north to
south, generally speaking, the road and railway from
Bitsche to Hagenau, and on to Strasburg, passing in
rear of MacMahon's position close to Niederbronn
and Reichshofen, and another highway to Hagenau, a
common centre for roads in these parts, descended
from Lembach, and, after crossing, followed the right
bank of the Sauer. Thus there were plenty of com-
munications in all directions, despite the elevated,
wooded and broken character of a district, wherein
all arms could move freely, except cavalry.
The Battle Begins
The action was brought on by the eagerness of each
side to discover the strength and intentions of the
other. In this way. General von Walther, at day-
break, riding towards the Sauer, hearing noises in
the French camp, which he construed to mean
preparations for a retreat, ordered out a battery and
some infantry, to test the accuracy of his observations.
The guns cannonaded Woerth, and the skirmishers,
finding the town unoccupied, but the bridge broken,
forded the stream, and advanced far enough to draw
fire from the French foot and four batteries. The
Prussian guns, though fewer, displayed that superior-
ity over the French which they maintained through-
out, and the observant officers above Woerth knew.
Two Staggering Blows 79
by the arrival of the ambulance men on the opposite
hills, that their shells had told upon the enemy. The
skirmish ceased after an hour had passed, but it
served to show that the French were still in position.
Opposite Gunstett there stood a Bruch-Miihle, or
mill in the marsh, and in this place the Germans had
posted a company, supported by another in the vines.
Their purpose was to protect the left flank of the 5th
Corps, and keep up a connection with the nth, then
on the march. The French sent forward, twice,
bodies of skirmishers against the mill, supporting
them the second time by artillery, and setting the
mill on fire ; but on neither occasion did they press
the attack, and the Germans retained a point of
passage which proved useful later in the day.
These affairs at Woerth and Gunstett ceased about
eight o'clock, but the cannonade at the former,
echoing among the hills to the north, brought the
Bavarians down the Sulz at a sharp pace, and thus
into contact with Ducrot's division. For General
Hartmann, on the highlands, could see the great camp
about Froeschwiller, and, directing his 4th Division
on that place, and ordering up the reserve artillery
from Mattstal, the General led his men quickly down
the valley. An ineffective exchange of cannon-shots
at long range ensued ; but as the Bavarians emerged
into the open, they came within reach of the French
artillery. Nevertheless they persisted, until quitting
the wood, they were overwhelmed by the Chassepot
and fell back. A stiff conflict now arose on a front
between Neehwiller and the Saw Mill on the Sulz, and
even on the left bank of this stream, down which the
leading columns of a Bavarian brigade had made their
way. In short, Hartmann' s zealous soldiers, working
forward impetuously, had fairly fastened on to the
French left wing, striking it on the flank which formed
an angle to the main line of battle, and holding it
firmly on the ground. The French, however, had no
thought of retiring, and besides, at that moment, they
had the vantage. When the combat had lasted two
hours. General von Hartmann received an order
80 The Campaign of Sedan
directing him to break it off, and he began at once
his preparations to withdraw. The task was not
easy, and before it was far advanced a request arrived
from the Commander of the 5th Corps for support,
as he was about to assail the heights above Woerth.
It was heartily comphed with, all the more readily,
as the roar of a fierce cannonade to the south swept
up the valley ; but as the Bavarians had begun to
withdraw, some time elapsed before the engagement
on this side could be strenuously renewed.
Attack on Woerth
We have already said that the Crown Prince, not
having all his Corps in compact order, did not intend
to fight a battle until the next day. But what befell
was this. The officer at the head of the staff of the
5th Corps reached the front after the reconnaissance
on Woerth was over. Just as he rode up, the smoke
of Hartmann's guns was visible on one side, and the
noise of the skirmishers at Gunstett on the other.
In order to prevent the French from overwhelming
either, it was agreed, there and then, to renew the
contest, and shortly after nine o'clock the artillery
of the 5th Corps, ranged on the heights, opened fire.
At the same time, a portion of the nth Corps, hearing
the guns, had moved up rapidly towards Gunstett,
and three of their batteries were soon in fine. Thus,
the Bavarians rushed into battle in order to support
the 5th Corps, this body resumed the combat to
sustain the Bavarians, and the advanced guard of the
nth fell on promptly, because the 5th seemed in
peril. The Prussian artillery soon quelled, not the
ardour, but the fire of the French gunners ; and then
the infantry, both in the centre and on the left, went
steadily into action, passing through Woerth, and
beginning to creep up the opposite heights. They
made no way, and many men fell, while further down
the stream, opposite Spachbach and Gunstett, part
of the troops which had gone eagerly towards the
woods, were smitten severely, and driven back head-
82 The Campaign of Sedan
long over the river. Still some clung to the hollow
ways, Woerth was always held fast, and when the
foot recoiled before the telling Chassepot, the eighty-
four pieces in battery lent their aid, averted serious
pursuit, and flung a shower of shells into the woods.
It was at this period that the defect of the French
position became apparent. If the hardy Gauls could
repel an onset, they could not, in turn, deliver a
counter stroke, because the advantages of the defen-
sive would pass, in that case, to the adversary. But
the Germans across the Sauer, who still held their
ground, had much to endure, and were only saved
by the arrival of fresh troops, and by seeking every
available shelter from the incessant rifle fire. In the
meantime, the nth Corps was marching to the sound
of the guns. General von Bose, its commander, had
reached Gunstett in the forenoon, and, seeing how
matters stood, had called up his nearest division, had
ordered the other to advance on the left, and had
informed Von Werder that an action had begun, in
consequence whereof the Badeners and Wiirtem-
bergers were also directed on the Sauer.
It was about one o'clock when the Crown Prince
rode up to the front and took command. He had
ridden out from Soultz at noon, because he plainly
heard the sounds of conflict, and on his road had
been met by an officer from Von Kirchbach, bearing
a report which informed the Commander-in-Chief
that it was no longer possible to stop the fray. At the
time he arrived, the advanced brigade of Von der
Tann's Bavarians had thrust itself into the gap
between Preuschdorf and Goersdorf, and had brought
three batteries into action, but the remainder of the
Corps were still in the rear. The Crown Prince thus
found his front hue engaged without any reserve
close at hand, and that no progress had been made
either on the centre or the wings ; but he knew that
the latter would be quickly reinforced, and that the
former, sustained by two hundred guns, constituted
an ample guarantee against an offensive movement.
No better opportunity of grappling with a relatively
Two Staggering Blows ^^
weak enemy was likely to occur, and it was to be
feared that if the chance were offered, he would escape
from a dangerous situation by skilfully extricating
his Army. The Crown Prince, therefore, determined
to strike home, yet qualifying his boldness with
caution, he still wished to delay the attack in front
and flank until the troops on the march could reach
the battlefield. No such postponement was practic-
able, even if desirable, because the fighting com-
mander of the 5th Corps had already, before the
advice came to hand, flung his foremost brigades-
over the Sauer. So the action was destined to be
fought out, from beginning to end, on places extem-
porized by subordinate officers ; but they were
adapted to the actual facts, and in accordance with
the main idea which was sketched by the Chief. It
may be said, indeed, that the battle of Woerth was
brought on, worked out, and completed by the Corps
conunanders ; and the cheerful readiness with which
they supported each other, furnished indisputable
testimony to the soundness of their training, the
excellence of the bodies they commanded, and the
formidable character as well as the suppleness of
the miUtary institutions, which, if not founded, had
been carried so near to perfection by Von Roon, Von
Moltke and the King.
Begun in the early morning by a series of skirmishes
on the river front, the action had developed into a
battle at mid-day. The resolute Von Kirchbach,
acting on his own responsibihty, had thrown the
entire 5th Corps into the fight ; yet so strong was the
position occupied by the defenders, that a successful
issue depended upon the rapidity and energy with
which the assaults on both flanks were conducted
by brigades and divisions only then entering one
after the other upon a fiercely contested field. At
mid-day, the French line of battle had been nowhere
broken or imperilled. Hartmann's Bavarians on
one side had been checked ; the advance brigade of
the nth Corps, on the other, had been driven back
over the Sauer, and Lartigue's troops were actually
S4 The Campaign of Sedan
pressing upon the bridges near the mill|in the marsh,
which, however, they could not pass. The enormous
line of German guns restrained and punished the
French infantry, when not engaged in silencing
the inferior artillery of the defender. But no im-
pression had been made upon the wooded heights
filled with the soldiers of Ducrot, upon Raoult's men
in the centre above Woerth, or on Lartigue's troops,
who, backed by Conseil-Dumesnil, stood fast about
Morsbronn, Eberbach, and Elsasshausen. So it was
at noon, when the hardihood of Von Kirchbach forced
on a decisive issue. Passing his men through, and
on both sides of Woerth, he began a series of sustained
attacks upon Raoult, who stiffly contested every
foot of woodland, and even repelled the assailants,
who, nevertheless, fighting with perseverance, and
undismayed by the slaughter, gradually gained a
little ground on both sides of the road to Froesch wilier.
By comparatively slow degrees, they crept up the
slopes, and established a front of battle ; but the
regiments, battalions, companies, were all mixed
together, and, as the officers fell fast, the men had
often to depend upon themselves. While these
alternately advancing, receding, and yet again
advancing troops were grappling with the centre,
Hartmann renewed his onsets, part of Von der Tann's
Corps dashed over the Sauer, filling up the gap in
the line, and joining his right to Hartmann's left ;
and the leading brigades of a fresh division of the
lith Corps, moving steadily and swiftly over the
river below Gunstett, backed by all the cannon which
the nature of the ground permitted the gunners to
use, assailed the French right with measured and
sustained fury, and, indeed, decided the battle
Attack on the French Right
The French were posted in great forceTon their
right— where they had two divisions, one in rear of
the other, between the Sauer and the Eberbach,
having in support a powerful brigade of horsemen,
Two Staggering Blows S6
Cuirassiers and Lancers, under General Michel. The
infantry, as a rule, faced to the eastward ; while the
attacking columns not only fronted to the westward,
but also to the north-west ; in other words, they
fastened on the front from Spachbach, struck dia-
gonally at the outer flank from Morsbronn, and even
swept round towards the rear. The area of the
combat on this part of the field was included on an
oblong space bounded on the west by the Eberbach,
and on the east by the Sauer, having Morsbronn at
the south-eastern angle and outside the French lines ;
Albrechtshiiuser, a large farmstead, a little to the
north of the former, and opposite Gunstett ; and
beyond that point to the north-west the undulating
wooded uplands, called the Niederwald, whence the
ground slightly fell towards Elsasshausen, and rose
again to a greater height at Froeschwiller, the centre
and redoubt of the position. As the 22nd Division
of the nth Corps came up from Diirrenbach, they
broke obliquely into this oblong, the direction of
their attack mainly following the cross road through
the forest from Morsbronn to Elsasshausen, while
their comrades pierced the woods to the north of
the great farmstead. No difficulty was encountered
in expelling the handful of French from the village,
but at the farm the Germans had a sharper combat,
which they won by a converging movement, yet the
defenders had time to retire into the forest. Thus
two useful supports were secured, almost perpendicular
to the French flank, and the pathways leading towards
Reichshofen were uncovered. General Lartigue at
once discerned the peril, and, in order that he might
obtain time to throw back his right, he directed
General Michel to charge the left flank of the Germans
before they could recover from the confusion conse-
quent on a rapid and irregular advance through the
villages, outbuildings, and hopfields, and array a less
broken front.
The French cavalry appear to have considered that
their main function was restricted to combats in
great battles. The traditions handed down from
86 IJlMThe Campaign of Sedan
the days of Kellerman and Murat and Lasalle sur-
vived in- all their freshness, and the belief prevailed
that a charge of French horsemen, pushed home,
would ride over any infantry, even in serried forma-
tion. They had disdained to reckon with the breech-
loader in the hands of cool, well-discipHned opponents ;
and as their chance of acting on their convictions had
come, so they were ready and willing to prove how
strong and genuine was their faith in the headlong
valour of resolute cavaHers. Instead of using one
regiment, Michel employed both, and a portion of
the 6th Lancers as well. He started forth from his
position near Eberbach, his horsemen formed in
echelon from the right, the 8th Cuirassiers leading in
column of squadrons, followed by the gth and the
Lancers. Unluckily for them, they had to traverse
ground unsuitable for cavalry. Here groups of trees,
there stumps, and again deep drains, disjointed the
closd formations, and when they emerged into better
galloping ground, indeed before they had quitted the
obstructions, these gallant fellows were exposed to
the deadly fire of the needle-gun. Nevertheless, with
fiery courage, the Cuirassiers dashed upon the scat-
tered German infantry, who, until the cavalry ap-
proached, had been under a hail of shot from the
Chassepots in the Niederwald. Yet the Teutons did
not quail, form square, or run into groups — they
stood stolidly in line, hurled out a volley at three
hundred yards, and then smote the oncoming horse-
men with unintermitted fire. The field was soon
strewn with dead and wounded men and horses ;
yet the survivors rushed on, and sought safety by
riding round the German line or through the village,
where they were brought to bay, and captured by the
score. Each regiment, as it rode hardily into the
fray, met with a similar fate, and even the fugitives
who got into the rear were encountered by a Prussian
Hussar regiment, and still further scattered, so that
very few ever wandered back into the French lines.
As;a charge Michel's valiant onset was fruitless ; yet
the^sacrifice of so many brave horsemen secured a
Two Staggering Blows ^7
great object — it enabled General Lartigue to throw
back his right, rearrange his defensive line in the
woods, and renew the contest by a series of violent
counter-attacks.
A furious outburst of the French infantry from
the south-west angle of the Niederwald overpowered
the German infantry, and drove them completely
out of the farmstead so recently won. Yet the
victors could not hold the place, because the batteries
north of Gunstett at once struck and arrested them
with a heavy fire, which gave time for fresh troops
to move rapidly into line, restore the combat, and
once more press back the dashing French infantry
into the wood. On this point the fighting was rough
and sustained, for the French charged again and
again, and did not give way until the Germans on
their right, forcing their way through the wood, had
crowned a summit which turned the line. The sturdy
adversary, who yielded slowly, was now within the
forest, and the German troops on the left had come
up to Eberbach, capturing MacMahon's baggage,
thus developing a connected front from stream to
stream across the great woodland. In short, nearly
all the nth Corps was solidly arrayed, and in resistless
motion upon the exposed flank of MacMahon's posi-
tion, while part of the Wiirtembergers, with some
horse, were stretching forward beyond the Eberbach,
and heading for Reichshofen itself. The Germans,
indeed, had gained the north-western border of the
woodland, and General von Bose had ordered the
one half of his guns and his reserve of foot to cross
the Sauer, and push the battle home. His right was
now in connection with the left of the 5th Corps, which
had continued its obstinate and sanguinary conflict
with Raoult's division on both sides of the road from
Woerth to Froeschwiller, without mastering much
ground. As the Bavarians were equally held at bay
by the French left, the issue of the battle plainly
depended on the vigorous and unfaltering energies of
the nth Corps.
^^ The Campaign of Sedan
Attack on Elsasshausen
That fine body had been in action for two hours and
a half, and, despite a long march on to the field, was
still fresh, its too impetuous advanced brigade, alone,
having been roughly handled, and thrust back earlier
in the day. The task now before them was the cap-
ture of Elsasshausen, which would open the road to
Froeschwiller, take off the pressure from the 5th
Corps, place Ducrot's steadfast infantry in peril, and
enable the whole available mass of German troops to
close in upon the outnumbered remnant of Mac-
Mahon's devoted - Army. For these brave men,
although obliged to give ground, were fighting in a
manner worthy of their old renown, now dashing
forward in vehement onslaught, again striking heavy
blows when overpowered and thrust back. Lartigue's
and some of Raoult's troops stood on the right and
left of Elsasshausen, supported by batteries on the
higher ground, and two cavalry brigades in a hollow
near the Eberbach. The foremost infantry occupied
a copse which was separated from the main forest
by a little glade, and this defensive wooded post had,
so far, brought the extreme right of the nth Corps
to a stand. About half-past two, the centre and
left had come up to the north-western edge of the
Niederwald, and thus the French in the copse had
fresh foes on their hands. They repHed by a bold
attack upon the adversary, whose front lines of
skirmishers were immediately driven in. The gallant
effort carried the assailants into the great wood,
but not far ; for behind the flying skirmishers, on
both sides of the road, were troops, which had more
or less maintained a compact formation. Instead
of yielding before the French advance, the German
infantry, accepting the challenge, came steadily
forward along the whole front, bore down the skirm-
ishers, dispersed the supporting battalion, and,
following the enemy with unfaltering steps, crossed
the glade, and drove him into, and out of, the copse-
wood, which had hitherto been an impassable obstacle.
Two Staggering Blows ^^
As the entire line rushed forward, they arrived at
the skirt of the wood, and, coming at once under the
fire of the French guns on the heights, and the infantry
in Elsasshausen, they suffered severe losses. Then
their own artillery drove up and went into action,
setting the village on fire, yet not dismaying its
garrison. The tension was so great, and the men
fell so fast, that General von Bose resolved to risk
a close attack upon an enemy whose position was
critical, and whose endurance had been put to so
exhausting a strain.
Thereupon, at the welcome signal, the bands of
disordered foot soldiers — for nearly every atom of
regular formation had long disappeared — dashed,
with loud shouts, into the French position, carrying
the village at a bound, and, pushing up the hillsides,
took two guns and five mitrailleuses. The troops of
the nth had now crossed the deep road running south-
westward from Woerth, had effected a junction with
groups of several regiments belonging to the 5th,
which formed a sort of spray upon the inner flank ;
and had besides, as already noted, extended south-
westward towards the road to Reichshofen. Once
more the French strove, if not to retrieve a lost
battle, at least to insure time for retreat. They fell
upon the Germans along the whole line, making great
gaps in its extent, and driving the adversary into the
forest ; but here, again, the artillery saved the foot,
and, by its daring and effective fire, restored the
battle, giving the much-tried infantry time to rally
and return upon their tracks. The Germans had
barely time to recover from the confusion into which
they had been thrown by a furious onset, than the
four Cuirassier regiments, commanded by General
Bonnemains, were seen preparing to charge. Un-
luckily for these stout horsemen, the tract over which
they had to gallop was seamed with deep ditches, and
barred by rows of low trees, so that not only could no
compact formation be maintained, but the cavahers
were not, in some instances, able to reach their foes,
who were well sheltered among the vine-stocks, and
90 The Campaign of Sedan
behind the walls of the hop-gardens. Moreover, the
German infantry were assisted by batteries of guns,
which were able to begin with shells, and end with
grape-shot. The cavalry did all they could to close ;
but their efforts were fruitless, and the enormous
loss they endured may be fairly regarded as a sacrifice
willingly made to gain time for the now hardly bested
Army to retire.
MacMahon Orders a Retreat
Indeed, the hour when a decision must be taken
had struck, and MacMahon, who had cleverly fought
his battle, did not hesitate. He determined to hold
Froeschwiller as long as he could to cover the retreat,,
and then fly to Saverne. For, although neither
Hartmann nor Von der Tann, despite their desperate
onsets, had been able to shake or dismay Ducrot,
still, he was well aware that Raoult's and Lartigue's
divisions had been driven back upon Froeschwiller,
and he could see from the heights one fresh column
of Bavarians moving towards Neehwiller, on his
left, and another descending from the Hochwald
to join the throng on the right bank of the Sulz.
Moreover, two brigades of Wiirtembergers had come
up to support the nth Corps, and one part of them,
with horsemen and guns, threatened Reichshofen,
a Bavarian brigade, as we have said, was heading
for Niederbronn. In addition, some of Ducrot's
intrenchments were carried by a Prussian regiment
on the right of the 5th Corps, and it was evident that
the fierce struggle for Froeschwiller would be the last
and final act of the tragedy. Yet, so slowly did the
French recede, that an hour or more was consumed
in expelling them from their last stronghold ; and
except on that point, their does not seem to have
been any serious fighting. The reason was that
the place was held to facilitate the withdrawal of
such troops as could gain the line of retreat, and
although the disaster was great, it would have been
greater had not Raoult, who was wounded and
Two Staggering Blows ^1
captured in the village, done his uttermost to with-
stand the concentric rush of his triumphant enemies.
The Close of the Battle
No specific and detailed account, apparently,
exists, of this last desperate stand. But it is plain
that, as the French centre and right yielded before
Von Kirchbach and especially Von Bose, as the
impetuous infantry onsets were fruitless, as the cavalry
had been destroyed and the French guns could not
bear up against the accurate and constant fire of
their opponents, so the Germans swept onwards and
almost encircled their foes. When Ducrot began
to retire, the Bavarians sprang forward up the steeps
and through the woods, which had held them so
long at bay; the stout and much-tried 5th Corps
pushed onward, and the nth, already on the outskirts
of Froeschwiller and extending beyond it, broke into
its south-eastern and southern defences ; so that
portions of all the troops engaged in this sanguinary
battle swarmed in at last, upon the devoted band
who hopelessly, yet nobly, clung to the final barrier.
How bravely and steadfastly they fought may be
inferred from the losses inflicted upon the Germans,
whose officers, foremost among the confused crowd
of mingled regiments and companies, were heavily
punished, whose rank and file went down in scores.
Even after the day had been decided, the French in
Froeschwiller still resisted, and the combats there
did not cease until five o'clock. But in the open the
German flanking columns had done great execution
on the line of retreat. A mixed body of Prussian
and Wiirtemberg cavalry had ridden up on the extreme
left, one Bavarian brigade had moved through Neeh-
willer upon Niederbronn, and another had marched
through Froeschwiller upon Reichshofen. The horse-
men kept the fugitives in motion and captured
materiel ; the first-mentioned Bavarian brigade
struck the division of General Guyot de Lespart,
which had reached Niederbronn from Bitsche ; and
^2 The Campaign of Sedan
the second bore down on Reichshofen. The suc-
couring division had arrived only in time to share
the common calamity, for assailed by the Bavarians
and embarrassed by the flocks of fugitives, one half
retreated with them upon Saverne, and the other
hastily retraced its steps to Bitsche, marching through
the summer night. The battle had been so destruc-
tive and the pursuit so sharp that the wrecks of
MacMahon's shattered host hardly halted by day or
night until they had traversed the country roads
leading upon Saverne, whence they could gain the
western side of the Vosges. Nor did all his wearied
soldiers follow this path of safety. Many fled through
Hagenau to Strasburg, more retreated with the
brigade of Abbatucci to Bitsche, and nine thousand
two hundred officers and men remained behind as
prisoners of war. The Marshal's Army was utterly
ruined, Strasburg was uncovered, the defiles of the
Vosges, except that of Phalsbourg, were open to the
invader who, in addition to the mass of prisoners,
seized on the field, in some cases after a brilliant
combat, twenty-eight guns, five mitrailleuses, one
eagle, four flags, and much materiel of war. The
actual French loss in killed and wounded during the
fight did not exceed six thousand ; while the victors,
as assailants, had no fewer than 489 officers and
10,153 ^^611 killed and wounded. It was a heavy
penalty, and represents the cost of a decisive battle
when forced on by the initiative of Corps commanders
before the entire force available for such an engage-
ment could be marched up within striking distance of
a confident and expectant foe.
One other consequence of an unforeseen engagement
was that the 5th Division of cavalry, which would
have been so useful towards the close of the day, was
unable to enter the field until nightfall. The Crown
Prince and General Blumenthal, not having the exact
information which might have been supplied by horse-
men who rode at the heels of the fugitives, remained
in doubt as to the line or lines of retreat which they
followed. It was not until the next day that reports
Two Staggering Blows 93
were sent in which suggested rather than described
whither the French Army had gone. Prince Albrecht,
who led the cavalry, had hastened forward to Ing-
weiler, on the road to Saverne, but he notified that,
though a considerable body had fled by this route,
the larger part had retired towards Bitsche. Later
on the 7th he entered Steinburg, where he was in
contact with the enemy, but, as infantry were seen,
he was apprehensive of a night attack from Saverne,
and judged it expedient to fall back upon Buchs-
willer. The division had ridden more than forty
miles in a difiicult country during the day. From
the north-west came information that the patrols
of the 6th Corps had been met at Dambach, and
that the French were not visible anywhere. The
explanation of this fact is that one division of the
6th, directed on Bitsche, had, in anticipation of
orders, pushed troops into the hills, and had thus
touched the right of the main body. The reason
why neither MacMahon nor De Failly were discovered
was that the Marshal had fallen back to Sarrebourg,
and that the General had hurried to join him by Petite-
Pierre ; and thus contact with the enemy was lost
by the Germans because the defiles of the Vosges
were left without defenders.
2. — S picker en
As the critical hours drew nearer when the capacity
of the Emperor Napoleon and Marshal Lebceuf,
applied to the conduct of a great war, was to be put
to the severest test, so their hesitation increased and
their inherent unfitness for the heavy task became
more and more apparent. Marshal Bazaine had been
intrusted with the command of three Corps " for
military operations only," yet the supreme control
was retained in Metz, and the Corps commanders
looked more steadily in that direction than they |did
towards the Marshal's headquarters at St. Avoid.
Along the whole front, at every point, an attack |by
the enemy was apprehended. General de Ladmirault
94 The Campaign of Sedan
was convinced that the 7th Prussian Corps would
strive to turn his left; Marshal Bazaine was dis-
turbed by the fear that the same body of troops would
come upon him from Saarlouis ; General Frossard
felt so uncomfortable in the angle or curve on the
Saar, which he occupied, that he vehemently desired
to see the Army concentrated in the position of
Cadenbronn, a few miles to the rear of Spicheren ;
General Montaudon, who had a division at Sarre-
guemines, was certain that the enemy intended
to swoop down upon him ; and General de Failly
was in daily alarm lest the Prussians should advance
upon the gap of Rohrbach. At Metz all these
conflicting surmises weighed upon, we might almost
say collectively governed, the Emperor and the
Marshal, who issued, recalled, qualified, and again
, issued perplexing orders. It is true that, owing to the
supineness of the cavalry, and the indifference of
the peasantry on the border, they were without any
authentic information ; but if that had been supplied
it is very doubtful whether they would have been
able to profit by it ; and they were evidently unable
to reason out a sound plan which would give them
the best chances of thwarting the adversary's designs
or of facing, them on the best terms. The sole idea
which prevailed was that every Une should be pro-
tected ; and thus, on the 5th, the Guard was at
Courcelles ; Bazaine' s four divisions, hitherto eche-
loned on the line from St. Avoid to Forbach, were
strung out on a country road between St. Avoid
and Sarreguemines ; De Ladmirault, who had been
ordered to approach the Marshal, misled by the
apparition of Prussian patrols, gave only a partial
effect to the order ; while Frossard, on the evening
of that day, instead of the next morning, made those
movements to the rear which attracted the notice of
his opponents and drew them upon him. At dawn
on the 6th, " the Army of the Rhine " was posted
over a wide space in loosely connected groups ; yet,
despite all the errors committed, there were still three
divisions sufficiently near the 2nd Corps on the
Two Staggering Blows ^^
Spicheren heights to have converted the coming
defeat into a brilUant victory. That great opportunity
was lost, because the soldierly spirit and the warhke
training, in which the French were deficient, were
displayed to such an astonishing degree by the
Germans whom they had so unwisely despised.
The watchful cavalry on the right bank of the
Saar had noted at once the retrograde movement
which General Frossard effected on the evening of
the 5th, and the German leaders were led to infer
from the tenour of the reports sent in, that the whole
French line was being shifted to the rear, which was
not a correct inference at that moment. Yet it was
true and obvious that Frossard had withdrawn from
the hills in close proximity to Saarbriick. In order
to ascertain, if possible, how far and in what degree
the French had retired, small parties of horsemen
crossed the river soon after daylight, and rode, not
only along the direct route to Forbach, until they
were stopped by cannon fire, but swept round the
left flank, and even looked into the rear, observed
the French camps, and alarmed both Marshal Bazaine
and General de Ladmirault. Above Sarreguemines
they tried to break up the railway, and did destroy
the telegraph ; and thus, by appearing on all sides,
these enterprising mounted men filled the adversary
with apprehensions, and supplied their own general
with sound intelligence. Some information, less
inaccurate than usual, must have reached the Imperial
headquarters at Metz, seeing that a telegram sent
thence, between four and five in the morning, warned
Frossard that he might be seriously attacked in the
course of the day ; but it does not appear that
the same caution was transmitted to Bazaine, with
or without instructions to support his comrade. It
is a nice question whether the general conduct of
the war suffered the greater damage from the active
interference or the neghgence of the Emperor and his
staff.
While the cavalry were keeping the French well
in view, the leading columns of the 7th and 8th Corps
96 The Campaign of Sedan
were moving up towards the Saar, and one division
of the Third was equally on the alert. General von
Rheinbaben had already ridden over the unbroken
bridges, had posted some squadrons on the lower
ground, and had drawn a sharp fire from the French
guns. The German staff were astonished when they
learned that the bridges had not been injured. The
reason was soon apparent. The Emperor still
cherished the illusion that he might be able to assume
the offensive, a course he had prepared for by col-
lecting large magazines at Forbach and Sarreguemines
on the very edge of the frontier ; and his dreams
were now to be dispelled by the rude touch of the
zealous and masterful armies whose active outposts
were now over the Saar.
The Battle-field
The ground occupied by the 2nd Corps was an
undulating upland lying between the great road to
Metz and the river, which, running in a northerly
direction from the spurs of the Vosges, turns some-
what abruptly to the west a couple of miles above
Saarbriick on its way to the Moselle. The heights of
Spicheren, partly wooded and partly bare, fall sharply
to the stream in the front and on the eastern flank,
while on the west lies the hollow through which the
highway and the railroad have been constructed.
The foremost spur of the mass, separated by a valley
from the Spicheren hills, is a narrow rocky eminence,
which Frossard names the Spur, and the Germans
call the Rotheberg, or Red Hill, because its cliffs were
so bright in colour, and shone out conspicuously
from afar. On the French right of this rugged clilf
were dense woods, and on the left the vale, having
beyond it more woods, and towards Forbach, farms,
houses, and factories. The upper or southern end
was almost closed by the large village of Stiring-
Wendel, inhabited by workers in iron, and having on
the outskirts those unseemly mounds of slag with
which this useful industry defaces the aspect of
Two Staggering Blows ^7
Nature. The village stands between the road and
railway, and as the heights rise abruptly on each
side, all the approaches, except those through the
woods on the west and north-west, were commanded
by the guns and infantry on the slopes. It should
be noted that west of the neck which connected the
red horse-shoe shaped hill with the central heights
in front of Spicheren village, there is a deep, irregular,
transversal valley, which proved useful to the defence.
General Frossard placed Laveaucoupet's division
upon the Spicheren hills, in two lines, and occupied
the Red Hill, which he had intrenched, with a battalion
of Chasseurs. In rear of all stood Bataille's division
at (Etingen. On the left front, J olivet's brigadejof
Verge's division occupied Stiring, and Valaze's was
placed to the west of Forbach, looking down the
road to Saarlouis. As Frossard dreaded an attack
from that side, especially as the road up the valley
from Rosseln turned the position, his engineer-general
threw up a long intrenchment barring the route. It
was in this order that the 2nd Corps stood when
some daring German horsemen trotted up the high
road to feel for it, while others, on the west, pressed
so far forward that they discerned the camps at
St. Avoid. Below the front of the position, and just
outside Saarbriick, the foot-hills, Reppertsberg, Gal-
genberg, Winterberg, and so on, and the hollows
among them were unoccupied by the French, and
it was into and upon these that Rheinbaben pushed
with his cavalry and guns, which, from the
Parade ground, exchanged shots with the French
pieces estabHshed on the Red Hill or Spur.
The Germans begin the Fight
On the German side, the determination to lay
hands upon and arrest what was supposed to be a
retreating enemy, was identical and simultaneous ;
and it is the spontaneous activity of every officer
and soldier within reach to share in the conflict which
is the characteristic of the day's operations. General
^8 The Campaign of Sedan
Kameke, commanding the 14th Division, 7th Corps,
when on the march, heard that Frossard had drawn
back, and, asking whether he might cross the river,
was told to act on his own judgment ; so he pressed
southward. General Goeben, chief of the 8th Corps,
had ridden out to judge for himself, and finding his
comrades of the 7th ready to advance, offered his
support. General von Alvensleben, commanding the
3rd Corps, a singularly alert and ready officer, ordered
up his 5th Division, commanded by General von
Stiilpnagel, but before the order arrived. General
Doering, who had been early to the outposts, had
anticipated the command, because he thought that
Kameke might be overweighted. General von
Schwerin, later in the day, collected his brigade at
St. Ingbert, and sent a part of them forward by
rail. In like manner, General von Barnekoff, com-
manding the i6th Division, 8th Corps, hearing the
sound of artillery, had anticipated the desire of
Goeben, and by mid-day his advanced guard, under
Colonel von Rex, was close upon the scene of action.
General von Zastrow, who had permitted Kameke
to do what he thought fit, apphed to Von Steinmetz
for leave to push forward the whole 7th Corps, and
the fiery veteran at once complied, saying : " The
enemy ought to be punished for his negligence," a
characteristic yet not necessarily a wise speech, as
the business of a general is not to chastise even the
negligent, unless it serves the main purpose of .the
operations in hand. Thus we see that the mere noise
of battle attracted the Germans from all quarters ;
and hence it happened that the fronts of the two
Armies, then in line of march, hastened into a fight
by degrees — in detachments, so to speak — which
would have produced a heavy reverse had all the
French brigade and divisional commanders who were
within hail been as prompt, persistent and zealous
as their impetuous opponents.
Until near noontide, there had been merely a
bickering of outposts, chiefly on the north-western
side ; and it was only when the 14th Division crossed
1^
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im
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100 The Campaign of Sedan
the river and moved up the foothills, that the action
really began. At this time it was still supposed that
the battahons, batteries, and sections of horsemen
visible were a rear-guard, covering what is now called
the " entrainment " of troops at Forbach ; for the
greater part of Laveaucoupet's soldiers were below the
crests, and in the forest-land, while J olivet's brigade
made no great show in and about the village of
Stiring. Kameke's young soldiers went eagerly and
joyously into their first battle. They consisted of
six battalions, led by General von Fran9ois, and were
soon extended from the Metz road on the German
right, to the wooded ascents east of Red Hill, which,,
in reality, became the main object of attack. The
plan followed was the favourite tactical movement,
so often practised with success — a direct onset on the
enemy's front, and an advance on both flanks. These
operations were supported by the fire of three bat-
teries, which soon obliged the French gunners on
the Red Spur to recede. An extraordinary and
almost indescribable infantry combat now began over
a wide space, sustained by the battalions of the 14th
Division fighting by companies. On one side they
endeavoured to approach Stiring ; in the centre they
were a long time huddled together under the craigs
of the Rotheberg ; further to the left they dashed
into the Giffert Wald, and emerged into comparatively
open ground, only to find themselves shattered by
a heavy fire, and obliged to seek cover. For the
battalions engaged soon discovered that, instead of a
rear-guard, they had to encounter half a Corps
d'Armee " and, although reinforcements were rapidly
approaching, yet, as the afternoon wore on, it be-
came evident that the assailants could only maintain
their footing by displaying great obstinacy, and
enduring bitter losses. After two hours' hard fighting,
five fresh battalions, belonging to Von Woyna's
brigade of Kameke's division came into action on
the right, and sought to operate on the French left
flank, some following the railway, others pressing into*
the thick woods on the west. The density of the
Two Staggering Blows 1^1
copses threw the hnes into confusion, so that the
companies were blended, and, as guidance was almost
impossible, trust had to be reposed in the soldierly
instincts and training alike of officers and men, and
on the genuine comradeship so conspicuous through-
out all ranks of the Prussian Army. Practically, at
this moment, the French, although beset on all sides
by their enterprising foes, had a distinct advantage,
for they smote the venturesome columns as they
emerged here and there, and it may be said that,
between three and four o'clock, the German artillery
on the Galgenberg and Folster Hohe, held the French
in check, and averted an irresistible offensive move-
ment. Yet the German infantry were tenacious ;
when pressed back they collected afresh in groups,
and went on again ; and General Frossard was so
impressed by the audacity of his foes, that he brought
up Bataille's division from (Etingen, and directed
Valaze to quit the hill above Forbach, and to rein-
force the defenders of Stiring. Indeed, threatened
on both flanks, the whole of the 2nd Corps was
gradually drawn into the fray, and its commander,
though somewhat late, appealed for aid to Marshal
Bazaine, who himself did not feel secure at St. Avoid.
The Red Hill Stormed
Shortly after three o'clock, General von Francois,
obeying the orders of his chief. Von Kameke, resolved
to storm the Red Hill. The German leader was under
the impression that the French were yielding on all
sides, which was not strictly correct, for the fresh
troops were just coming into action, and the Germans
were superior, alone, in the range and accuracy of
their superb artillery. The gallant Frangois, sword
in hand, leading the Fusilier battahon of the 74th
Regiment, chmbed the steep, springing from ledge
to ledge, and dashed over the crest, and drove the
surprised French Chasseurs out of the foremost in-
trenchment, and fastened themselves firmly on the
hill. The Chasseurs, who had retired into a second
102 The Campaign of Sedan
line of defences, poured in a murderous fire ; General
von Frangois, heading a fresh onset, fell pierced by-
five bullets, yet lived long enough to feel that his
Fusiliers and a company of the 39th, which had
clambered up on the left, had gained a foothold they
were certain to maintain. There were many brilliant
acts of heroism on that day, but the storming of the
Red Hill stands out as the finest example of soldier-
ship and daring. Nor less so the stubbornness with
which the stormers stood fast ; especially as the
French, at that moment, had thrown a body of
troops against the German left, so strong and aggres-
sive, that the valiant companies in the Giffert Wald
were swept clean out of the wood.
Fortunately, at the same time, the advanced
guards of the 5th and i6th Divisions, already referred
to, had crossed the Saar. General von Goeben, who
had also arrived, took command, and formed a
strong resolution. He decided that, as the battle
had reached a critical stage, it would be unwise to
keep reserves ; so he flung everything to hand into
the fight, on the ground that the essential thing was
to impart new life to a combat which had become
indecisive, if not adverse to the assailant. Accord-
ingly, the artillery was brought up to a strength of
six batteries, and one part of the fresh troops was
sent to reinforce the left, and another towards the
Red Hill. Shortly afterwards Von Goeben had to
relinquish the command to his senior, Von Zastrow,
the commander of the 7th Corps ; but the chief
business of the principal leaders consisted in pushing
up reinforcements as they arrived ; the forward
fighting being directed by the generals and colonels
in actual contact with the enemy.
Progress of the Action
For two hours, that is, between four and six o'clock,
the front of battle swagged to and fro, for the French
fought valiantly, and, by repeated forward rushes,
compelled their pertinacious assailants to give, or
Two Staggering Blows 1^3
repelled their energetic attempts to gain, ground.
A German company would dash out from cover, and
thrust the defenders in the rear ; then, smitten in
front and flank, it would recede, followed by the
French, who, taken in flank by the opportune advent
of a hostile group, would retreat to the woods, or the
friendly shelter of a depression in the soil. Never-
theless, in the centre, and on their own left, the
Germans made some progress. A battalion of the
5th Division mastered the defence in the Pfaffen
Wald on the French right ; a group of companies
crowned the highest point in the Giffert Wald ; and
then new arrivals, drawn alike from the 8th and
the 3rd Corps, pushed up the ravine on the east, and
the slopes on the west of the Red Hill, until their
combined fire and frequent rushes forced the French
out of their second line of intrenchments on the neck
of high land which connected the Red Hill with the
heights of Spicheren. The French strove fiercely
again and again, to recover the vantage ground, yet
could not prevail ; but their comrades below, in the
south-west corner of the Giffert Wald, stoutly held
on, so that the fight in this quarter became stationary,
as neither side could make any progress.
On the German right, during the same interval of
time, there had been sharper alternations of fortune.
Here the French held strong positions, not only in
the village of Stiring-Wendel, but on the hillsides
above it, and especially on the tongue of upland
called the Forbacher Berg. The assailant had suc-
ceeded in taking and keeping the farmsteads on the
railway, the " Breme d'or" and the " Baraque
Mouton " ; but the efforts of General von Woyna to
operate on the French left had been so roughly en-
countered that he drew back his troops to a point
far down the valley. In fact. General Frossard had
strengthened Verge, who held fast to Stiring, by
Valaze's brigade, and General Bataille had also sent
half his division to support his comrade. The conse-
quence was that the German projects were frustrated ;
while, on the other hand, their heavy batteries on
104 The Campaign of Sedan
the Folster Hohe had such an ascendancy that the
French could not secure any advantage by moving
down the vale.
Yet they were not, as yet, worsted in the combat
at any point, save on the sahent of the Red Hill.
Upon that eminence the German commanders now
determined to send both cavalry and guns. The
horsemen, however, could gain no footing, either by
riding up the hillsides, or following the zigzags of
the Spicheren road, which ascends the eastern face
of the promontory. The artillery had better fortune.
First one gun, and then another, was welcomed by
the shouts of the much-tried and steadfast defenders ;
eight pieces first succeeded in overcoming all obstacles;
finally, four other guns, completing the two batteries
came into action, and their fire was efficacious in
restraining the ardour of the French, and rendering
the position absolutely secure from assault. But
they suffered great losses, which were inflicted not
only by the powerful batteries on the opposite height,
but by the Chassepot fire from the front and the
Giffert Wald. The German commanders had dis-
covered by a harsh experience that the battle could
not be won either by an offensive movement from
the centre, or flanking operations on the left, be-
cause the neck of high land south of the Red Hill
was too strongly held, while the deep valley inter-
posed between the forests and the Spicheren Downs
brought the flanking battalions to a halt, under cover.
It was then determined to employ the latest arrivals,
the troops of the 5th Division, in an effort to storm
the Forbacher Berg from the Metz road valley, and
at the same time to renew a front and flank attack
upon Stiring-Wendel.
Here we may note two facts which are apt illus-
trations of that efficiency, the fruit of wise forethought,
which prevailed in the German host. One is that a
battery, attached to the ist Corps, arrived on the
Saar, by railway, direct from Konigsberg, on the
confines of East Prussia, and, driving up, actually
went into position, and opened fire from the Folster
Two Staggering Blows 1^^
Hohe. It was the first light battery commanded by
Captain Schmidt, whose exploit was then, at least,
without parallel. The other is that the 2nd battahon
of the 53rd Regiment, starting at six in the morning
from Wadern, actually marched, part of the time as
artillery escort, nearly twenty-eight miles in thirteen
hours, and, towards sunset, stood in array on the
field of battle. The like good will and energy were
displayed by all the troops ; but this example of
zeal and endurance deserves special record.
Frossard Retires
The final and decisive encounters on this sanguinary
field were delivered on the western fronts. Four
battahons were directed along or near the Metz road
upon the heights above Stiring, while the troops on
the extreme German right, which, it will be remem-
bered, had suffered a reverse, resumed their march
upon the village. These simultaneous onsets were
all the more effective, because the French commander
was alarmed by the advance guard of the 13th
Division, which, having moved up from Rosseln,
was now near to Forbach itself. He had become
apprehensive of being turned on both flanks, for
Laveaucoupet was, at that moment, engaged in
a desperate, although a partially successful strife
against the Germans in the Giffert Wald. The flank
attack on the Forbacher Berg, skilfully conducted,
drove back the adversary, yet could not be carried
far, because he was still strong and it was growing
dusk. In hke manner, Stiring itself was only cap-
tured in part. On the other hand, so vehement a
rush was made upon the Giffert Wald that the French
once more penetrated its coverts. Practically, how-
ever, the battle had been decided. General Frossard,
receiving no support from Bazaine's divisions, greatly
disturbed by the news that the head of a hostile
column was close to Forbach, unable to oust the
Germans from the Red Hill or effectively repel their
onsets on the Metz road had, half an hour before the
E 2
106 The Campaign of Sedan
footing on the Forbacher Berg was won, given orders
for a retreat upon Sarreguemines, so that the furious
outburst of French valour in the Giffert Wald was
only the expiring flash of a finely-sustained engage-
ment, and the forerunner of a retrograde night
march.
Indeed, General Frossard is entitled to any credit
which may accrue from the stoutness with which he
held his main position until nightfall. He himself
assigns the march of Von Golz from Rosseln upon
Forbach as the reason for his retreat. Having been
obliged to leave the heights north-west of Forbach
practically undefended, in order to support Verge in
Stiring-Wendel, he lost, or thought he had lost, con-
trol over the high road and railway to Metz, and felt
bound to retire eccentrically upon Sarreguemines, a
movement which it is not easy to comprehend. It
is true that the guns of Von Golz, firing from the
hills above Forbach, drove back a train bringing
reinforcements from St. Avoid, but a couple of miles
to the rear was Metman's entire division ; and it
was from and not towards this succour that the main
body of the French took their way. The most aston-
ishing fact connected with this battle is that during
the whole day three of Bazaine's divisions were each
within about nine miles of the battlefield. It was
not the Marshal's fault that not one assisted the
commander of the 2nd Corps. Each had been directed
to do so, but none succeeded. General Montaudon
did, indeed, move out from Sarreguemines, but halted
after covering a few miles. General de Castagny,
as soon as he heard the guns, and without waiting for
orders, marched his division from Puttelange ; but,
unluckily for him, the sound led him into the hills,
where the dense woods and vales obstructed the
passage of the sound. Hearing nothing he returned
to Puttelange, but no sooner had he got there than
the roar of artillery, more intense than ever, smote
his ear The ready veteran at once set out afresh,
this time following the route which ^. would have
brought him into the heart of the Spicheren position.
Two Staggering Blows 1^7
He was too late ; night came on apace, the distant
tumult died down, he endeavoured to communicate
with Frossard, but his messenger only found Metman,
who, coming on from Marienthal, had halted at
Bening, and did not move upon Forbach until nearly
dark. Thus were three strong divisions wasted, and
a force which would have given the French victory
spent the day in wandering to and fro or in a weak
hesitation. General de Castagny was the only officer
who really did his utmost to support the 2nd Corps ;
for Metman awaited orders, and they came too late.
During the night, or early in the morning, they all^
except De Castagny, who was called up to St. Avoid,
assembled near Puttelange, wearied and disgusted
with their fruitless exertions ; and there they were
joined by the 2nd Corps.
The Germans bivouacked on the field. They had had
in action twenty-seven battalions and ten batteries,
and the day's irregular and confused fighting had
cost them in killed and wounded a loss of no fewer
than 223 officers and 4,648 men ; while the French
lost 249 officers and 3,829 men, including more than
two thousand prisoners. The great disproportion is
due to the fact that the Germans were the assailants
and that throughout the day and on all points they
fought the battle with relatively small groups, parts
of the 7th, 8th, and 3rd Corps, which arrived in
succession on the scene. That the victory was not
more complete must be ascribed to the improvised
character of the conflict. Both Woerth and Spich-
eren were accidental combats due to the initiative
of subordinate officers, a practice which has its dan-
gers ; but the success attained in each case is a
striking proof that the disciphne and training of all
ranks in the German Army had created a living
organism which could be trusted to work by itself.
CHAPTER VI
Vacillation in Metz
Two such staggering and unexpected blows filled the
civil population with terror, the aspiring soldiers at
headquarters with anger, and the Imperial Com-
mander-in-Chief with dismay. Disorder, consterna-
tion, and amazement reigned in Metz. And no
wonder. From Alsace came the appalling news that
the ist Corps had been hopelessly shattered and that
the Marshal was already fleeing for safety, by day
and night, through the passes of the Vosges. Stras-
burg reported the arrival of fugitives and the absence
of a garrison. ; " We have scarcely any troops,"
wrote the Prefect, " at most from fifteen hundred
to two thousand men." The chief official at Epinal
asked for power to organize the defence of the Vosges
at the moment when the passes were thronged with
MacMahon's hurrying troops. It was known that
General Frossard had been defeated, and that he was
in full retreat, but during twenty-four hours no direct
intelHgence came to hand from him. That De Failly,
left unsupported at Bitsche, would retire at once was
assumed, but the orders directing his movements did
not reach him until, after a severe night march, he
had halted a moment at Lutzelstein, or, as the French
call the fort, La Petite Pierre. From Verdun and
Thionville arrived vehement demands for arms and
provisions ; and from the front towards the Saar no
report that was not alarming. Turning to the south-
east, the Imperial headquarters did not know exactly
where Douay's 7th Corps was ; and in an agony of
apprehension ordered the General, if he could, to
throw a division into Strasburg, and " with the
108
Vacillation in Metz 109
two others " cover Belfort. When the telegram was
sent one of these had been heavily engaged at Woerth,
and the other was at Lyons not yet formed. The
anxiety of the Emperor and his assistants was em-
bittered by the knowledge that not one strong place
on the Rhine had a sufficient garrison ; and that the
rout of MacMahon had not only flung wide open the
portals of Lorraine, but had made the reduction of
ill-provided Strasburg a question of weeks or days.
So heedlessly had the OUivier Ministry, the Emperor
and Empress rushed into war, at a time when even
the fortifications of Metz were glaringly incomplete,
when the Storehouses of the frontier fortresses were
ill-suppHed, when arms and uniforms were not or
could not be furnished to the Mobiles ; when, in short,
nothing could be put between the Germans and Paris
except the troops hastily collected in x\lsace and
Lorraine — now a host in part shattered, in part
disordered, and the whole without resolute and clear-
sighted direction.
Prince Louis Napoleon, sitting passively on his
horse in the barrack-yard of Strasburg, in 1836, was
defined by a caustic historian as a " literary man"
whose characteristic was a " faltering boldness." The
phrases apply to the Emperor in Metz. It may be
said that he could use the language employed by sol-
diers, that he had some military judgment, but that,
when called on, he could not deal at all with the
things which are the essence of the profession he
loved to adopt. After a lapse of more than thirty
years, he found himself, not alone in a barrack-yard
facing an " indignant Colonel," but at the head of
a great, yet scattered and roughly handled Army,
with formidable enemies pressing upon his front, and
equally formidable enemies pouring through the
rugged hill paths upon his vulnerable flank, and
threatening the sole railway which led direct through
Chalons to Paris. He was now a man, old for his
years, and a painful disease made a seat on horseback
almost intolerable. He could not, like his uncle in
his prime, ride sixty miles a day, sleep an hour or
110 The Campaign of Sedan
two, and mount again if needful. He was an invalid
and a dreamer, who had, against his fluctuating will,
undertaken a task much too vast for his powers.
The contemptuous words applied to him by Mr.
Kinglake seem harsh, still, in very truth, they exactly
describe Louis Napoleon as he was at Strasburg in
1836, and as he sat meditatively at Metz in 1870.
Yet, be it understood, he never at any period of his
career was wanting in coolness and physical courage,
though what Napier has finely called '* springing
valour " had no place in his temperament. He was
scared by the suddenness of the shock and the rapidity
of events, and he was bewildered because he was
incapable of grasping, co-ordinating, or understanding
the thick- coming realities presented by war on a grand
scale ; and stood always too much in awe of the
unknown. He could not " make up his mind," and
in the higher ranks of the French Army there was
not one man who could force him to make it up and
stand fast by his resolution. But, inferior, as they
were when measured by a high standard, it is prob-
able that any one of the Corps commanders, clothed
with Imperial power, would have conducted the
campaign far better than the Emperor. Another
disadvantage which beset him was a moral conse-
quence inseparable from his adventurous career. He
could not add a cubit to his military stature ; but
he need not have " waded through slaughter to a
throne." In Paris before he started for the frontier,
in Metz on the morning of August 7th, he must have
felt, as the Empress also felt, that his was a dynasty
which could not stand before the shock of defeat in
battle. He had, therefore, to consider every hour,
not so much what was the best course of action from
the soldier's standpoint, as how any course, advance,
retreat or inaction, would affect the political situation
in Paris. Count von Bismarck's haughty message
through M. Benedetti in 1866, if Benedetti faithfully |
delivered it, must have come back to the Emperor's
memory in 1870. Remind the Emperor, said Bis-
marck, that a war might bring on a revolutionary]
Vacillation in Metz HI
crisis ; and add, that " in such a case, the German
dynasties are likely to prove more solid than that
of the Emperor Napoleon." It was a consciousness
of the weak foundations of his power, breeding an
ever-present dread aUke in the capital and the camp,
which, making him ponder when he should act, falter
when he should be bold, imparted to his resolutions
the instability of the wind.
It is on record that the first impulse of the Emperor
and his intimate advisers was to retreat forthwith
over the Moselle and the Meuse. General de Lad-
mirault was ordered to fall back on Metz ; the Guard
had to take the same direction ; Bazaine, who had
responsibiUty without power, was requested to pro-
tect the retirement of Frossard, who, driven off the
direct, was marching along the more easterly road
to Metz, through Gros Tenquin and Faulquemont,
which the Germans call Falconberg ; De Failly was
required, if he could, to move on Nancy. MacMahon,
it was hoped, would gather up his fragments, and
transport them to Chalons, where Canrobert was to
stand fast, and draw back to that place one of his
divisions which had reached Nancy. Paris was
placarded with the Emperor's famous despatch ; and
the Parisians read aloud the ominous sentences which
heralded the fall of an Empire. " Marshal Mac-
Mahon," said the Emperor, " has lost a battle on the
Sauer. General Frossard has been obliged to retire.
The retreat is conducted in good order." And then
followed the tell-tale phrase, used by Napoleon I.
himself on a similar occasion — " Tout pent se retablir,"
alL, perhaps, may come right again. But so incon-
stant was the Imperial will, that the hasty resolve
to fly into Champagne faded out almost as soon
as it was formed , for the next day the dominant
opinion was that it would be better to remain on the
right bank of the Moselle. MacMahon and De Failly
accordingly got counter orders, indicating Nancy as
a point of concentration, and based on a feeble notion
that they could both be drawn to Metz ; while once
again Canrobert was told to bring the infantry of the
112 The Campaign of Sedan
6th Corps jUp to the same place by rail. Orders and
counter orders then showered down on De Failly —
thus, he was and he was not to move on Toul — but
the enemy's movements dictated the future course
of a General rendered as powerless as his superiors
were vacillating ; and finally both the Marshal and
his luckless subordinate, as well as Douay's 7th Corps,
made their way deviously to the camp of Chalons. ,
The Emperor Resigns His Command
When the Emperor suddenly revoked the order to
retire upon Chalons, he was influenced partly by
military, but chiefly by political considerations.
Remonstrances were heard in the camps, remon-
strances arrived from Paris, and the combined effect
of these open manifestations produced an order to
establish the Army in position behind the French
Nied, a stream which, rising to the southward, flows
parallel to the Moselle, and, after receiving the German
Nied, runs into the Saar below Saarlouis. The
weather had been wet and tempestuous ; the retiring
troops, exhausted by night marches and want of
food, struggled onward, yet showed signs of " demoral-
ization ; " in other words, were out of heart, and
insubordinate. Frossard's men, who had passed the
prescribed line before receiving the new instructions,
had to retrace their steps ; and Decaen, now in com-
mand of the 3rd Corps, begged for rest on behalf of
his divisions. Yet the three Corps and the Guard
occupied, on the loth, the new position which, selected
by Marshal Lebceuf, extended from Pange to Les
Etangs. It was intended to fight a battle on tliat
ground, and the men were set to work on intrench-
ments, some of which were completed before another
change occurred in the directing mind. The position
was found to be defective ; and, on the nth, the
entire Army, abandoning its wasted labours, moved
back upon the outworks of Metz itself, almost within
range of its guns. Thus had three precious days been
spent in wandering to and fro at a time when the
Vacillation in Metz 113
military situation required that the Army should be
transferred to the left bank of the Moselle, and placed
in full command of the route of Chalons, even if it
were not compelled to fall back further than the
left bank of the Meuse. One explanation, drawn by
the official writers of the German Staff history, from
French admissions, is that, instead of Metz protecting
the Army, the Army was required to protect Metz,
seeing that the forts were not in a state to hold out
against a siege of fifteen days ! The Imperial com-
mander had not even yet quite made up his mind ;
but late on the 12th, finding the burden too severe,
and the clamour of public opinion too great, he
appointed Marshal Bazaine Commander-in-Chief of
" the Army of the Rhine." It was a damnosa hcered-
Has ; for the campaign was virtually lost during ten
days of weakness and vacillation, and especially by
the want of a prompt decision between the 7th and
the loth of August, while there was yet time.
As we have said, the main reason was political.
The eager aspirants for power, and the friends of
the Empress in Paris, ousted the Ollivier Ministry on
the 9th, and the new combination, with the Comte de
Palikao at its head, felt that they could not retain
office, that the " dynasty " even could not survive
unless the Emperor and the Army fought and won.
Everything must be risked to give the dynasty a chance.
The Regency and the camp fell under the influence
of hostile public opinion, which had already begun
to associate the name of Napoleon, not only with
the reverses endured, but the utter want of prepara-
tion for war, now painfully evident to the multitude
as well as to the initiated. Yet so menacing and
terrible did the actual facts become that even the
Emperor could not resist them, and, in handing
over the command to Bazaine on the 13th, he ordered
that unfortunate, if ambitious, officer to transfer
the Army with the utmost speed to the left bank
of the Moselle, place Laveaucoupet's Division in
Metz, and gain Verdun as quickly as possible. It
was too late, as we shall see : for the Prussians were
114 The Campaign of Sedan
ready to grasp at the skirts of a retreating Army,
and once more thwart the plans of its leaders. In
order to track the course of events to this point,
the narrative must revert to the morrow of Spicheren.
The German Advance
On the morning of the 7th of August, some French
troops were still in Forbach, and Montaudon's Division
had not departed from Sarreguemines. The fronts
of the two invading Armies were hardly over the
frontier, and the chiefs had not yet learned the full
extent of the double shock inflicted on the adversary.
A thick fog enveloped the Spicheren battlefield, and
clung to the adjacent hills and woods, and through
the mist the patrols had to feel their way. No
serious resistance could be offered by the French
detachments at any point ; Forbach, together with
its immense stores, was occupied at an early hour ;
while, so soon as the vigilant cavalry saw the rear-
guard of Montaudon quit the place, they rode into
Sarreguemines. Patrols were pushed out along the
roads towards Metz, but no advance was made,
partly because the respective Corps composing both
the German Armies were still on the march, and
partly because the Staff, mistaken respecting the
route followed by MacMahon, had ordered several
movements with the object of intercepting and
destroying his broken divisions. The consequence
was that the leading columns stood fast while the
Corps to the rear and left were brought up to and
beyond the Saar. MacMahon and De Failly, as we
have seen, were hurrying southward, and thus Von
Moltke's precautions proved needless. During the
8th, the cavalry, despatched far and wide, between
St. Avoid and the Upper Saar, found foes near the, i
former, who at once retired, but none on the course I
of the river. The next day, the horsemen, still more J
active, sent in reports which satisfied the cautious 1
Chief of the Staff that the French had really fallen
back on Metz, yet inspired him with some , doubts
Vacillation in Metz 115
respecting their intentions. He thought it possible
that they might assume the offensive in the hope
of surprising and routing part of the German Armies
— a project actually discussed by the Emperor, and
Bazaine, but soon thrown aside. Von Moltke, how-
ever, determined to guard against that design, kept
his several Corps within supporting distance ; and,
on the loth, began a great movement forward. The
First Army, in the post of danger, was to serve as a
pivot upon which the Second, effecting a wheel to
the right, swung inwards towards the Moselle above
Metz. Von Steinmetz, much to his disgust, had to
halt about Carling, with his supports towards Teter-
chen and Boulay, and the 9th Corps in support at
Forbach. On his left, the Second Army was advan-
cing in echelon on roads between Harskirchen, near
Saar Union, where the 4th Corps touched the outposts
of the Crown Prince's Army, and Faulquemont, where
the 3rd Corps stood on the railway, having on 1 its
left the loth about Hellimer, and the Guard j at
Gueblange. The 12th was still on the Saar, and the
2nd, awaiting its last battalions, in Rhenish Prussia.
Thus the two Armies stood on the nth, covered by
brigades of cavalry, whose operations, better than
anything else, illustrate the audacious, yet elastic
and painstaking, methods employed by the Germans
in war.
The German Cavalry at Work
Never before had the principle that cavalry are
the eyes and ears of an Army been more extensively
applied. We have already seen these well- trained
horsemen watching the line of the Saar, and even
looking into the rear of the French camps ; we shall
now see them literally infesting the country between
the Saar and the Moselle without let or hindrance
from the French cavaUers. After Spicheren, the
German cavalry divisions were distributed along the
front of the Corps in motion ; and the hardy reiters.
were soon many miles ahead of the infantry, some
penetrating up the easy western slopes of the Vosges,
116 The Campaign of Sedan
where they found no enemies, others riding towards
Nancy and the points of passage over the river below
that town ; and others again hovering pertinaciously
on the rear of the backward moving French Corps,
picking up stragglers, capturing prisoners, interro-
gating officials, and inspecting, from coigns of vantage,
the camps and positions of the enemy. In this way
they learned that the Emperor had visited Bazaine
at Faulquemont ; that the greater part of the French
were Metzward, and that on the left towards the
hills there were none to be seen. The cavalry
divisions rode out long distances, detaching flanking
parties and pushing patrols to the front, so that the
whole range of country between the right and left
of the Infantry Corps was thoroughly searched by
these indefatigable and daring explorers. Thus,
a troop of Uhlans, starting from Faulquemont, rode
as far as the woods near Berlize, and keeping well
under cover, yet quite close to the enemy, took note
of his positions at and beyond Pange, saw large
bodies moving from Metz to take ground behind the
Nied, and learned that reinforcements, the leading
brigades of the Canrobert's Corps, in fact, had arrived
at Metz. Another patrol of lancers, moving on the
St. Avoid road, confirmed the report that the French
had occupied the Nied Hne ; while, on the opposite
flank, a Hussar patrol found no enemy about Chateau
Salins, but laid hands on the bearer of important
despatches. On the nth, the screen of inquisitive
horsemen became thicker and more venturesome,
trotting up to the river Seille itself at Nomeny, on
the road to Pont a Mousson. The mounted men
of the First Army had hitherto been held back, but
now the two divisions, passing forth on the flanks,
approached and examined the left of the French line.
One troop arrived near Les Etangs just in time to see
De Ladmirault's Corps folding up their tents, and
soon beheld the French march off towards Metz ;
indeed the deep columns were moving in that direction
from the left bank of the Nied. The Uhlans followed
De Ladmirault through Les Etangs until they saw
I
Vacillation in Metz 117
him go into position at Bellecroix close to the place.
In like manner, other Uhlans, operating further up
the stream, found the camps and intrenchments
abandoned, so that it became certain, on the evening
of the nth, that the French Army had been drawn
back under the guns at Metz. The next day the
activity of the cavaUers increased, and they pressed
forward until they were in contact with the French
outposts, and were able to observe the whole new
position between Queleu and Bellecroix, working up
on the left to a point within three miles of Metz, and
proving that as far as the right bank above the town,
the country was unoccupied. On the 12th, Uhlans
had ridden into Nancy, on one side, and, on the
other, a body of Cuirassiers actually found the gates
of Thionville open, captured a garde mobile belonging
to the garrison, and brought off a Prussian reserve
man who had been detained in the town. At
Dieulouard a patrol crossed the Moselle on a bridge
just constructed by the French, and were only driven
from the railway, which they had begun to destroy,
by infantry — the last detachments of Canrobert's
Corps allowed to get through by train from Chalons.
A daring attempt was made upon Pont a Mousson
by some Hussars ; but here General. Margueritte,
sent with his Chasseurs d'Afrique from Metz, drove
back the invaders, killing a great number. These
examples will suffice to give some idea of the admirable
use which the Germans made of their cavalry, to
conceal their movements, harass the enemy, and
above all, gain priceless information, while the
adversary, whose horse were idle, could obtain none.
The dash made by Margueritte to relieve Pont a
Mousson is the one solitary instance of alertness
shown by the French, and even he and his troopers
were withdrawn, leaving the river line above Metz
wholly unprotected, and the bridges unbroken !
The Germans March on the Moselle
From these wide-ranging enterprises, conducted
118 The Campaign of Sedan
by keen and resolute soldiers, the Great Staff obtained
nearly as minute a knowledge of the French proceed-
ings as they possessed themselves, and were enabled
to direct the march of the German Armies with firm-
ness and precision. Their great object was to secure
the unguarded line of the Moselle by seizing, as
rapidly as possible, all the points of passage above
Metz, and the only doubt entertained at head-
quarters was suggested by the apprehension that the
energy displayed by the cavalry might attract atten-
tion to these undefended spots. Accordingly, while
the First Army, again, was ordered to protect the
right of the Second, by advancing on the Nied, taking
up ground between Pange and Les Etangs, the Second
was to move upon the Seille, and endeavour to secure
the bridges at Pont a Mousson, Dieulouard and other
places, sending the cavalry once more in force over
the stream. Von Moltke's calculation was that if the
French attacked Von Steinmetz, Prince Charles could
form up and threaten their flank ; if they tried to
operate against the Second Army by ascending the
Moselle, Von Steinmetz could then assail them in
line of march, as they must cross his front ; while
if passing through Metz they moved up the left
bank. Prince Charles could effect a junction with the
Crown Prince, and Von Steinmetz could cross the
Moselle and attack the French rear. The combina-
tion was strong, but the Emperor, as we have stated,
had then no idea of assuming the offensive in any
direction, his only anxiety being to seek a temporary
shelter behind the Meuse.
Throughout the 13th, the German Corps, horse and
foot, sprang forward, displaying that alacrity and
hardihood which had marked their conduct from the
outset of the war. The Dragoon brigade of the
Guard swooped down upon Dieulouard, and finally
sundered the direct railway communication between
Chalons and Metz. Two other cavalry brigades,
forming the 5th Division, entered Pont a Mousson
early in the morning, and were followed by half ^.
the loth Corps from Delme. In order to hide, as M
1
Vacillation in Metz 119
far as possible, the movements of the Second Army,
an entire division of cavalry, the 6th, was employed ;
one brigade extending from Courcelles sur Nied, to
Borny on the Moselle, and the other posted at Verny
supporting the front hne, and linked itself by patrols
to the 5th at Pont a.Mousson. The ist Division
of Cavalry, during the forenoon, crossed the Nied
at Pange, and occupied the villages to the right
and left, so that a continuous line of mounted men
stretched from the Nied to the Moselle. Behind
this barrier, the several Corps toiled forward in full
security. At the close of the day, however, only
one half the loth Corps was over the Moselle, the
other moiety being one march to the rear ; the head
of the 3rd Corps stood at Buchy ; the 9th at Herny ;
the I2th at Chemery ; the 2nd, now complete, at St.
Avoid ; the Guard at Lemoncourt, and the 4th
at Chateau Sahns.
By this time, the Third Army, except the 6th
Corps, and the Baden Division which had been
directed upon Strasburg, had made its way through
the defiles of the Vosges, had emerged into the valley
of the Upper Saar, and was, therefore, in direct
communication with the Second Army ; so that the
German host occupied a wide region extending from
Sarrebourg to villages in front of Metz ; yet at the
vital points the Corps stood near enough to support
each other should it be necessary to assemble on a
field of battle. The passage of the Vosges had been
obstructed only by nature and the forts of Bitsche
and Phalsbourg. These were turned, and the hard-
ships of cross-roads and restricted supphes had been
overcome. The divisions trickled through the valleys
on a broad front, gathering up as they touched
the Saar and the country of lakes about Fenestrange.
As Phalsbourg did not command the railway, that
important highway fell into the hands of the Germans.
The tunnels in the Zorn valley west of Saverne had
not been destroyed, and the whole hne was complete,
yet it could not be used for the transport of troops
and stores until a later period. On the 13th, when
12L The Campaign of Sedan
the First Army was closing in on the French outside
Metz, and the Second heading for the Moselle, the
Third quitted the Upper Saar, and, once more expand-
ing, approached on a broad front the valley of the
Meurthe. During the next day, when their comrades
were hotly engaged with the enemy, they reached
the banks of that stream, and their forward cavalry
rode into the streets of Luneville and Nancy, the
old capital of Lorraine. At this critical moment.
Marshal MacMahon was hastening to Chalons ; De
Failly, after having been ordered hither and thither
from hour to hour, had received final orders — he
was to join the Marshal ; but Douay's 7th Corps,
although Dumont's Division had arrived, increasing
the total to about 20,000 men and 90 guns, had
not yet been, and was not for three days, directed
from Belfort upon the great camp in the plains of
Champagne.
J
CHAPTER VII
Von Moltke Keeps the Wrap Hand
Weary of his task, weakened in body by a painful
malady, depressed in mind by a series of disasters,
and worried by advice from Paris, the Emperor
Napoleon, on the evening of the 12th of August,
transferred to Marshal Bazaine the burden which
he could no longer bear. Whatever may have been
his other aptitudes, he was not born to command
Armies in the field ; nor had he that power of selection
which may enable an inferior to choose and clothe
with his authority a superior man. Had a Radetzky,
instead of an Emperor, commanded the Austrian
Army in 1859 i^ is probable that the stabiUty of
the " dynasty " would have been tried by defeat
and the unity of Italy deferred until a later day.
Whether the Emperor Napoleon recognized his
incompetence, or whether, as he often did, he 3delded
to pressure, matters little except to the students of
character. He nominally gave up the command,
yet retained a certain indefinite control, and he
placed at the head of his Army a Marshal who,
although the senior in rank to the recently promoted
Marshal Leboeuf, the late Chief of the Staff, was still
the junior of Marshal Canrobert ; both, fortunately,
were loyal men, and the latter ready to serve imder
his junior. Yet it is doubtful whether Bazaine ever
exercised that moral ascendency which is essential
at all times, and never more so than at a crisis when
the fate of Armies depends not only on wise direction,
but prompt and wiUing obedience. The Marshal,
appointed on the 12th, did not take up his command
until the next day, and then he was required to
121
122 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
remedy in less than twenty-four hours the deep-seated
mischief produced by a fortnight of terrible blundering.
His special task was to transport the Army over
the Moselle. Four days earHer that might have been
done without a shot being fired, because even if the
German horse had come up to look on they must
have been idle spectators as their infantry comrades
were far in the rear. The fatal error was committed
when the Emperor did not overrule all opposition,
and, adhering with unswerving firmness to his first
thought, neither halt, ponder, nor rest until the
Moselle flowed between him and his foes. The
miUtary position on the morning of the 7th dictated
that step ; his adversaries beUeved or surmised that
he would take it, because it was the right step to take.
Nor can we doubt that, as Commander-in-Chief,
Louis Napoleon, who had a little of " le flair mihtaire,"
saw at once the proper course, but that, as Emperor,
he dared not, on reflection, run the risk. It was a
false calculation, even from a poHtical standpoint,
because, so long as he was in the field with, or at the
head of an Army, his repubUcan and monarchical
enemies would not have moved, and time would have
been gained. By retiring promptly over the Moselle,
and leaving Metz to defend itself, he might have been
defeated in battle or manoeuvred back upon Paris ;
but there would have been no Sedan and no Metz, and
even the Parisians would have hesitated to plunge
headlong into civil war when a French Army was
still afoot, and a formidable host of invaders, pressing
on its weaker array, was " trampUng the sacred
soil." The fate of the campaign about Metz was,
then, really decided when the Emperor did not avail
himself of the days of grace, beat down all opposition,
and compel his Marshals and Generals to march their
troops over the Moselle. Neither Bazaine nor any
one officer present with the Army is entitled to be
called a great captain ; but whatever he was, the
blame of failure does not rest on him alone ; it
must be shared, in a far greater degree, by those
who preceded him in command. It is necessary to
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 123
insist on this fact, because one of the most valuable
lessons taught by the campaign would be lost were
the capital error committed by the Imperial Staff,
when the order for retreat was countermanded and
five days were wasted in abortive operations, not
described with the emphasis it deserves. Campaigns
have been lost as much by postponed retreats as by
rash advances ; and it was the ill-fortune of the
French Generals in August, 1870, to present egregious
examples of both forms of fatal error.
The French Propose to Move
When Marshal Bazaine took over the command,
on the morning of the 13th, he was required to do
in haste what his superiors might have done at
leisure. The prolonged indecision of the Imperial
mind, held in suspense down to the last moment
and against its better judgment, between the alterna-
tive of attack or retreat, was disastrous ; no margin
was allowed for error of design, error in execution,
and — the unforeseen. The Emperor had ordered
Coffinieres, the Governor of Metz, to build as many
bridges as he could above and below the place, and
the General declares, what no one disputes, that he
did construct from twelve to fifteen bridges, which
provided seven lines of march over the stream.
He also mined the permanent bridges above the for-
tress, so that on the 12th facilities for crossing
abounded, and the means of destruction were pre-
pared. Then came in the unforeseen. Rain had
fallen heavily, and consequently the Moselle rose,
flowed over the trestle bridges, damaged the rafts,
disconnected the pontoons with the banks, and
spread far and wide over the approaches. In short,
the increase in the volume of water was so great
and unusual, if not unparalleled, that the calamity
was attributed to the Germans — they must, it was
said, have destroyed the sluices near Marsal and
have allowed the lake water of that region free
access to the Moselle — as if they did not wish to cross
124 The Campaign of Sedan
the river themselves. Be the cause what it might,
there was the obstruction ; so that the first inform-
ation received by the Marshal was that the retreat,
which he had been ordered to execute, could not
begin until the next day, except by Canrobert's
6th Corps, which was near permanent bridges. Con-
sequently, the Army remained another day on the
right bank. The Corps were in position between
forts Queleu and St. Julien, Frossard on the right,
Decaen in the centre, and De Ladmirault on the
left, the Guard being in the rear of the centre behind
Borny, where Marshal Bazaine had set up his head-
quarters. Practically the line was a curve extending
from the Seille to the banks of Moselle below Metz ;
and the defensive obstacles were a watercourse with
steep banks, patches of dense woods, two chateaux,
or country houses, which were readily made defen-
sible, and of course the villages and farms scattered
over the pleasant fields. The main body of the Army
was covered throughout its front by outposts thrown
forward towards the Metz-Saarbruck railway on the
right, beyond the brook in the centre, and about
Vremy, Nouilly, and Servigny on the left. So they
stood all day, some of them aware that the Germans
were dangerously near ; more who were anxious to
get over the river ; and yet others who would have
staked everything upon the risk of a battle, so
intolerable is suspense to men of ardent and excitable
temperaments. The night passed over quickly, and
on the 14th, yet not until a late hour in the forenoon,
the Corps began to file off to the rear. Canrobert
was already across ; Frossard sent his gtins and
horsemen over the town bridges, while his infantry
splashed through the meadows and over the partially
submerged temporary constructions ; and leaving
Grenier's division to cover his retreat, De Ladmirault
set out for the left bank over the Isle Chambidre.
The Marshal at Borny, with his old Corps, now under
Decaen, and having the Guard in support, remained
to protect the extensive and perilous movement to
the rear in the face of a watchful and intrepid enemy.
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 125
Released on the evening of the 12th from the
imperative orders which held him fast, and directed
to move forward upon the French Nied, General von
Steinmetz advanced the next day with characteristic
alacrity. Two Corps, the 7th and the ist, were posted
on a short line between Pange and Les Etangs, the
8th being held back at Varize on the German Nied,
and the two cavalry divisions being thrown round the
flanks, General von Golz, who commanded the twenty-
sixth brigade, took the bold step of transferring it
to the left, or French, bank of the stream, and he
thus came into contact with the outposts of Decaen's
3rd Corps. Nevertheless, along the whole line, on
the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th,
each side maintained a strictly observant attitude,
and held aloof from hostile action ; the French
because they wished to ghde off unassailed, the Ger-
mans because their Commander-in-Chief desired to
secure a solid footing for the Second Army on the
left bank of the Moselle before the French retired.
Watched as these were by keen-sighted horsemen,
they could not stir without being seen ; and so soon
as the state of the Moselle permitted a movement
to the rear the fact was reported to the German
chiefs. A Hussar party notified, about eleven, that
Frossard's outposts were falhng back ; a little later
that the tents were down ; and then that columns
of all arms were retiring. So it was in the centre and
on the left ; Decaen's Corps remained, but two
divisions of De Ladmirault's Corps, it was noted,
were no longer on the ground they had held in the
morning. General von Manteuffel, inferring that De
Ladmirault might have gone to join in an attack
upon the 7th Corps, at once put two divisions under
arms, a fortunate precaution, though suggested by
an erroneous inference. In front of the 7th Corps,
the facts admitted of no misinterpretation. The
enemy was plainly in retreat, and General von Golz
felt that it was his duty to interrupt the process.
Therefore, about half-past three, notifying his in-
tention to the Divisional Commanders of his. Corps,
126 The Campaign of Sedan
and requesting support from the ist, a request
promptly granted, Von Golz sprang forward to attack
the French, in full reliance upon the readiness and
energy with which his superiors and comrades would
follow him into the fray. His bold resolve did stop
the retreat, and his onset brought on, late in the
afternoon.
The Battle of Colomhey-Nouilly
The scene of this sharp but severe conflict was the
gentle uplands immediately to the eastward of Metz,
and a little more than cannon-shot beyond the forts
which forbid access to that side of the place. The
village of Borny, indeed, is nearly on a line with the
Fort des Bordes, and no point of the area within
which the action raged is more than three miles from
the fortifications. The ground slopes upward from
the Moselle, rising into undulating hills, the summits
of which are two or three hundred feet above the bed
of the stream. Near to Metz these elevations are
clothed with copses devoid of underwood, the great
patches of verdure extending on a curve from Grimont
close to the Moselle, as far as the right bank of the
Seille. To the northward are more woods just
outside the battlefield, the area of which was, from
north to south, included between them and the
railway to Saarbriick. A little to the north of this
line, near Ars-Laquenexy, a village on the road from
Sarreguemines, were the sources of a rivulet which
flowed northward along the whole front of the French
position, receiving on its way brooks which trickle
down the hollows in the hills to the eastward. The
heights east of the stream were bare of wood, and the
most prominent objects were the village and church
tower of St. Barbe on the crown of a rounded hill
to the north-east. From this elevated hamlet
another brook rose, and found its way along the bed
of a gully to Lauvalliers, where all the watercourses
united, and, under the name of La Vallieres,' ran
thence to the Moselle. The French troops, four
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 127
divisions of Decaen's Corps, were posted in the woods,
and on the heights above the first mentioned rivulet
from the neighbourhood of Ars-Laquenexy to the
point where all the streamlets joined. The outposts
were in Mercy le Haut, sometimes called Mercy les
Metz, in the woods facing Ars-Laquenexy, in the
Chateau D'Aubigny and Montoy, beyond the brook,
in Colombey, a village on the south bank, and in
Nouilly, a large village in the St. Barbe ravine.
Beyond the confluence of the hill streams stood a
division of De Ladmirault's Corps upon the high
ground east of Mey, and it was this body which had
its outguards in Nouilly. Although it was divided
by the brook Vallieres on the left, the French
position was strong, chiefly because the approaches
were through defiles, over open ground, or up steep
banks, but also because the woods afforded shelter
to the infantry of the defenders. Three great roads
intersected the field — one from Pange, through
Colombey, to Bomy, a second from Saarbriick,
which after passing La Planchette, ran, at Bellecroix,
into the third, which came from Saarlouis, and
passed through Lauvalliers, entering Metz near the
fort called Les Bordes. The Germans, early in the
morning, were on the hills to the eastward, the ist
Corps being beyond St. Barbe, and the 7th near, and
west of, Pange, with outposts well forward, and
both cavalry and infantry in practical contact with
the enemy, into whose position they looked from all
sides.
Von Golz Dashes In
It was the spectacle of a departing and decreasing
host which made the eager Von Golz, without awaiting
permission, dash impetuously forward with his brigade.
So energetic was the onset that the French were at
once driven out of the Chateau d'Aubigny, Montoy,
and La Planchette. The usual tactics were apphed,
the companies working together, turning a 'flank
where the front was too strong, and following up ^
128 The Campaign of Sedan
success until the weight of fire brought them to a
halt, or even thrust them back. The batteries
attached to the brigade came at once into action and
persisted, though they were hard hit by the French.
But the advance of Von Golz was not to be arrested,
and the impetus of his first movement forward carried
part of the brigade over the ravine and watercourse,
and into the village and inclosures of Colombey,
That point, however, was the Hmit of his progress,
for the French developed strong lines of skirmishers
in the woods, and although they were unable to expel
the audacious intruders, these were obliged to expend
all their energy upon holding what they had won.
On the right, that is to the north of Colombey, the
assailants were brought to a stand on the eastern
edge of the ravine, and at this early stage the farms,
gardens and houses of Colombey formed a salient
offensive angle exposed to the brunt of the French
fire from the side of Borny.
At the first indication of a combat, General von
Manteuffel, two of whose divisions were already under
arms, sent their advance guards down the hills and
through the hollow ways from St. Barbe ; joined his
Une of battle on to the right of Von Golz and fell
smartly on the outpost of Grenier's division which
De Ladmirault had left about Mey to cover his retro-
grade march upon the Moselle. The noise of combat,
also, and the appeals sent in from the daring brigadier,
put the rest of the 7th Corps in motion, so that the
14th as well as the 13th Division sprang to arms and
approached the fight. General von Zastrow, how-
ever, did not quite approve of the temerity of his
subordinate ; but seeing that the Corps was com-
mitted to an engagement, he permitted General von
Gliimer to use the twenty-sixth brigade on the right
and General von Woyna to employ the twenty-eighth
on the left while he held the twenty-seventh in reserve.
In like manner, the French turned fiercely on their
adversaries. Canrobert and Frossard were over the
Moselle, but Decaen's four divisions were speedily
arrayed ; the Guard behind them fell in and marched
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 129
Brincourt's brigade towards the Seille to protect
Montaudon's right ; and De Ladmirault instantly
counter-marched his two divisions, moving De
Lorencez towards the north-east, hoping to turn the
right of Manteuffel, and ordering De Cissey, who had
partially crossed the Moselle, to reinforce Grenier at
Mey. About five o'clock, then, in consequence of
the hardihood of a brigadier, a furious action raged
along the whole French front, towards which com-
rades were hurriedly retracing their steps, and upon
which adversaries were hastening forward with equal
ardour.
The rapid development of an attack, which had in
it some elements of a surprise, alike unwelcome and
unexpected, and the tenacity with which a few
battalions clung steadfastly to the advantage gained,
astonished but did not disconcert the French, who
frankly answered the challenge of their foes. Never-
theless, the opening movements of the ist Corps
were as successful as those of Von Golz. The artillery,
almost foremost in this campaign, going straight and
swiftly to the front, soon had batteries in position,
protected by cavalry, while behind them on the roads
from Saarlouis and Saarbriick the infantry were
quickly moving up. The leading battalions of the
ist Division poured through and round NoisseviUe
and Nouilly, pressing back the French skirmishers
and, following them fast, actually stormed the barri-
caded village of Mey, directly under Grenier' s main
position in the wooded hill above. The 2nd Division
directed upon Montoy, Lauvalliers and the mills at
the confluence of the streams, fell on with alacrity ;
but the resistance was so keen that although they
soon wrested the eastern, they suffered great loss
and were once promptly repulsed by the defenders,
when attempting to master the western bank. Yet,
aided by the fire of batteries concentrated south of the
St. Barbe ravine, these persistent troops ultimately
crowned the ascent, and estabUshed the front of
battle on the French side of the brook throughout its
length. From one point, however, the French could
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Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 131
not be dislodged. There was a cross road leading
from Colombey to Vellecroix. It was a hollow way,
bordered by trees two or three deep, and having in
front, by way of salient, a httle fir wood. This
position effectually frustrated every effort of the
Germans either to debouch from Colombey or push
forward towards Bellecroix. Naturally strong and
valiantly held, it was not carried until nearly seven
o'clock, and then only by the repeated onsets of the
twenty-fifth brigade which Von Zastrow, about
half-past five, had permitted to take a share in an
engagement which he did not hke, but which he was
bound to sustain. Thus was Von Golz succoured
and partially relieved from the heavy pressure put
on him ; a pressure further mitigated by the advance
of the twenty-eighth brigade, 7th Corps, on his left,
and the capture of the wood of Borny. Still further
to the left the i8th Division of the gth Corps, which
had marched up from Buchy on hearing the cannonade
and some cavalry appeared on the field towards dark
and thus added to the disquietude of Montaudon on
the French right who, however, held fast to his main
position above Grigy.
The action on the French right and centre may
fairly be regarded as an indecisive combat, although
the front occupied in the morning had been driven
inwards, and the daring assailant had won some
ground. On the French left the combat had been
equally fierce, but less favourable to the defenders.
General de Ladmirault, indeed, when obliged to turn
and succour his comrade and subordinate, Grenier,
had at once resolved to assume the offensive. It
was a timely determination, for Grenier' s troops had
been pushed back and shaken, and, if left without aid,
they would have been driven under the guns of St.
Julien. But the approach of De Cissey, and the
threatening direction imparted to De Lorencez, at
once altered the aspect of affairs : for De Cissey
struck in with vigour, and the German troops which
had entered Mey retreated fast upon Nouilly ; then
General von Manteuffel, hastening the march of his
132 The Campaign of Sedan
brigades which were still on the way to the field
formed his Hne to the north-west, between Servigny,
Nouilly, and the mills at the confluence of the brooks,
with a reserve at Servigny. As the guns, like the
troops, arrived successively, they were arrayed on
the new line, and, before De Ladmirault could develop
his flank attack effectively, the ist Corps had ninety
guns in position between Lauvalliers and Poix, which
enabled them to bar any infantry advance upon St.
Barbe. The effect of this disposition was to frustrate
the aggressive designs of De Ladmirault, but he is
entitled to the credit of having saved his exposed
division, and also of having made the only movement
during the day which had the semblance of a real
endeavour to strike for victory against a foe whose
troops and artillery were plainly coming up in detach-
ments along the whole line. Nor can it be denied
that his vehement onset drove back the Germans,
and recovered a large extent of ground up to the
skirts of Nouilly and the water mills. Moreover, it
gave great assistance to Aymard's Division of Decaen's
Corps, and enabled it, at one moment, to scatter the
companies operating in the angle formed by the
streams, and drive them headlong over the ravine
upon LauvalHers. But the advent of German bat-
talions, and the action of the guns, finally restored
the combat, and as the twiUght deepened into dark-
ness the German right once more gained the
ascendency, and the French divisions retired to their
bivouacs nearer to Metz.
Long after the sun had set, portions of the ist Corps
still arrived on the scene ; but then the battle was
over. General de Ladmirault, three years afterwards,
naturally proud of his conduct, insisted that the
French had won the day. The German accounts,
however, place the fact beyond dispute, since they
show that the leading troops of the ist Corps did
reach Vautoux, Mey, and Villers TOrme, which proves
that the adversary must have retired towards Belle-
croix land the banks of the Moselle. No doubt the
Germans were wisely drawn back, at a late hour,
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 133
and on that ground the French put in a claim to the
victory. For General Steinmetz had ridden on to
the field just as the contest was coming to an end.
He was angry because a battle had been fought, and
apprehensive lest a counter-attack in force should
be made at dawn ; so he ordered the ist and 7th
Corps to retire upon the positions they occupied on
the 13th. Nevertheless, Von Zastrow, who did not
receive the order, insisted that his Corps should
bivouac under arms on the battlefield, so that the
wounded might be collected, and the honour of the
Army vindicated.
The End of the Battle
In this action the French lost not quite four thou-
sand, and the Germans nearly five thousand men ;
on both sides more than two hundred officers had
been killed or wounded. General Decaen, commanding
the 3rd Corps, mortally, while Bazaine and Castagny
were sUghtly hurt. The French had actually on the
field, including the Guard in reserve, with one brigade
in the front line, three Corps d'Armee ; for, though
Lorencez did not press far forward, still the whole
force imder De Ladmirault was present, and in action.
The Germans brought up successively two Corps and
one Division, but a large portion of the ist could not
reach the scene of actual fighting until dark. It is
impossible to ascertain exactly, and difficult to esti-
mate the numbers engaged ; but one fact is manifest
— that the German assailants were numerically
inferior, especially during the first two hours ; that
the disproportion was only lessened between six and
seven ; and that, at no time, were the French fewer
in number. Marshal Bazaine emphatically states,
in his report to the Emperor, that he held his position
without employing the Guard, which is true, but it
is not less true that the whole front of his line was
driven in ; and that he stood at the close within the
range of the heavy guns in the forts. The French
fought well, but they fought a defensive battle, and
134 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
that is why they exacted from the assailant a much
heavier penalty than he inflicted on them. The
retreat of the Imperialists was delayed ; but in the
Great Headquarter Staff serious misgivings began to
spring up, and a fear lest the habit of bringing on
improvised battles might not become a real source of
danger. An able and enterprising General in com-
mand of the French at Spicheren and Borny would
have read a severe lesson to German advance-guards,
and would have made them pay for their temerity.
Not until a late hour did the news of the battle
reach the King, who had estabHshed his headquarters
at Herny, on the railway. Prince Frederick Charles
at Pont a Mousson, was only informed of the event
the next morning. His Army, the Second, had been
engaged in marching up to and towards the Moselle,
and at eventide the several Corps halted at these
points. The 4th Corps was over the Seille, and not
far from Custines and Marbache, places just below
the confluence of the Meurthe and Moselle ; the
Guard had one division a little lower down at Dieu-
louard ; the loth Corps, entire, was at Pont a Mousson,
with a brigade to the westward ; the 3rd, the 9th,
and the 12th, were facing the Moselle between Pont
a Mousson and the left of the First Army, prepared
to frustrate a French advance up the right bank —
a possible movement always present to the mind of
Von Moltke — or cross the river. The 2nd Corps had
come up to Falquemont ; and a Reserve Landwehr
Division, under General Kummer, was being organized
at Saarlouis. To complete the survey, it should be
added that Gneisenau's Brigade, sent to surprise Thion-
ville, an enterprise which failed, was returning to
rejoin the First Army ; and that on the evening of
the 14th, the foremost troops of the Crown Prince's
Army were some squadrons of cavalry in Nancy, and
an infantry brigade in Luneville.
1
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 135
The French Retreat
Throughout the night the wearied French divisions,
which had been either engaged in combat or standing
under arms, filed over the Moselle, and the Emperor
took up his quarters at Longeville, outside the town.
Marshal Bazaine's order, dated the 13th, directed the
whole Army on the road to Gravelotte, whence one
portion was to continue by Mars la Tour, and the other
turn off to the right and march on Conflans. The
rigorous construction of the Marshal's order yields
that interpretation, but he contended, at his trial,
that he merely indicated the general lines of retreat
upon Verdun, and that the Staff and Corps Com-
manders should have used any and every road or
track which would have served the main purpose.
There are, or at least were, in 1870, only two roads out
of Metz available for the march of heavy columns
of troops of all arms and large trains — the excellent
highway to Gravelotte, which is a long defile, and the
road through Woippy, turning the uplands on the
north. All the intermediate lanes or cross-roads
are rugged and narrow, and only one, that passing
by Lessy, has or had any pretension to the character
of an inferior village road. Guns and carts can
move along and up them in Indian file but not easily
if numerous, and nowhere at a good pace. Thus,
even on the 14th, the Corps of Frossard and Can-
robert, who both started late, found the Gravelotte
road so encimibered by trains that they could only
make their way slowly, and did not arrive at Roze-
rieulles until after dark. The Emperor was still at
Longeville, anxiously awaiting the issue of the fight
which revived all his apprehensions. Metz was
excited and alarmed, and the streets were crowded
during the afternoon and evening with passing
soldiers, guns, baggage wagons and provision carts.
Night brought no rest, for the Guard and the 3rd
Corps came hastily over the river, and were densely
packed inside the town and outside the ramparts in
the space between the walls and Mount St. Quentin ;
136 The Campaign of Sedan
while General de Ladmirault was engaged until morn-
ing^in passing his divisions across the Isle Chambiere,
and Metman had also strayed from Bellecroix to that
side of the town.
Marshal Bazaine had quitted Borny at dusk. He
rode through Metz " with difficulty/' and made his
way to the Imperial headquarters. Here Napoleon,
who |Was in bed, welcomed him with his usual kind-
ness, and when the Marshal explained his fears lest
the Germans should cut in on his Hne of retreat, and
referring to his wound, begged to be superseded, the
Emperor, he writes, " touching my bruised shoulder
and the fractured epaulette, gracefully said, ' It will
be nothing, an affair of a few days, and you have
just broken the charm.' " Apparently, Napoleon
still clung to the belief that the allies he had sought
would come to his aid. " I await an answer from the
Emperor of Austria and the King of Italy," he said ;
" compromise nothing by too much precipitation,
and, above all things, avoid fresh reverses." He
counted on one sovereign whom he had defeated in
battle, and another whom he had helped to enlarge
his 'kingdom, and he counted in vain, partly because
he was unsuccessful, but chiefly because the national
political interests of both countries prevailed over
the gratitude felt by Victor Emmanuel, and the desire
to turn the tables on the House of Hohenzollern which
was still strong in the House of Hapsburg-Lorraine.
" You will drag us out of this hornet's nest. Mar-
shal, won't you ? " exclaimed an officer, as Bazaine
quitted the Imperial quarters. It was a task beyond
his strength. When day dawned a thick fog shrouded
the valley of the Moselle, and before the camp at
Longeville was astir, a shell from the opposite bank
burst near a tent, " cut a colonel in two," to use
the soldatesque language of Marshal Canrobert,
" carried off the leg of a battalion commander, and
wounded two officers standing near a drummer."
The lucky shot came from a patrol of German cavalry
which had ridden forward as far as the railway
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 137
camp at Longeville, had brought his guns into action,
and proved, once again, that the hornets were abroad
and making a bold use of their offensive weapons.
A battery hastily ran out» and the heavy metal of
St. Quentin drove off the intruders ; but they had
learned that the foe was over the river before they
retired. Soon afterwards, by Bazaine's order, a
mine was fired, and one section of the railway bridge
was destroyed.
Then the retreat was continued. Finding the road
obstructed by an endless stream of carts and wagons,
Marshal Leboeuf turned aside, and strugghng on,
amid transport vehicles, threaded his way by Lessy
and Chat el St. Germain to Verne ville, where about
seven in the evening he had assembled the tired
infantry divisions of Castagny and Montaudon ;
but his cavalry and reserve artillery did not reach
the bivouac until night ; while Aymard's Division
was forced to halt in the defile, and Metman was at
Sansonnet in the Moselle valley. Frossard, followed
by Canrobert, had marched during the day as far as
Rezonville, where both halted ; and the Guard with
the Emperor and Prince Imperial attained Gravelotte.
General de Ladmirault did not stir at all on the 15th,
he put a strict construction on Bazaine's orders, and
affected also to be uncertain whether he was to con-
tinue his retreat or not. But he had allowed Lorencez
to press through the town and thrust himself into
the Lessy defile, where his troops, unable to get on,
had to pass the night. These disjointed and irregular
movements testify to the confusion of a hurried re-
treat, to the flurry which had got the upper hand,
and to the absence of anything like a firm control
over troops and generals. How could it be other-
wise ? The Emperor still commanded, or was be-
lieved to command, and it is plain that at no time
did the Marshal secure prompt and cheerful obedience,
or inspire confidence, always essential to success, and
never more so than when an Army has to be extri-
cated from what the Imperial Guardsman graphically
called a " hornet's nest."
F 2
138 The Campaign of Sedan
The Germans Cross the Moselle
Far otherwise had the hours been employed by the
German host. Early in the morning King Wilham
had ridden from Herny to the heights above the
battlefield, and there the Headquarter Staff, from
actual observation, were able to form a correct
judgment on the actual state of affairs. At first
they took precautionary measures against a possible
counter attack, and it was not until eleven o'clock
that, evidence sufficient to convince Von Moltke
having come in, decisive steps were taken. All the
Corps of the Second Army were directed upon or
over the Moselle, the ist Corps was moved to Cour-
celles-Chaussy ; and the 7th was posted at Courcelles
sur Nied to guard the railway line and the depots ;
and the 8th was on its left, echeloned on the Luneville
road. At nightfall the 3rd Corps had crossed the
Moselle between Pagny and Noveant, where they
found the bridge intact ; the loth had One division
at Pont a Mousson and one westward at Thiaucourt ;
the Guard was at Dieulouard, and the 4th Corps
astride the river at Marbache-Custines. The 2nd
Corps had come up to Han sur Nied. The Crown
Prince's advanced troops were at Nancy, St. Nicholas
on the Meurthe, and Bayon on the Upper Moselle.
The Cavalry Beyond the Moselle
But the most interesting and effective operations
were those carried out by the 5th Cavalry Division,
commanded by General von Rheinbaben. They had
traversed the Moselle on the 14th, and were directed
to gain the Verdun road in order to ascertain the
exact whereabouts of the French, At the same time
the 3rd Cavalry Division attached to the First Army
was instructed to pass the river below Metz and push
out towards Briey ; but the French had removed all
the boats, no crossing could be effected, and the
division was employed elsewhere. No such obstacles
arrested the 5th Division. It consisted of three strong
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 139
brigades under Von Redern, Von Barby, and Von
Bredow, in all thirty-six squadrons, and was accom-
panied by two batteries of horse artillery. Leaving
Barby at Thiaucourt to await the arrival of Bredow
coming up from the Moselle, Redern marched through
the fog at four in the morning to La Chausee, whence
he detached two squadrons towards the Verdun road.
During their absence Von Redern, riding on towards
XonviUe, discovered and was fired on by a body of
French cavalry on the hills about Puxieux. These
were French dragoons detached from De Forton's
division, then en route for Mars la Tour, and they
were reinforced from the main body as soon as the
vedettes had opened fire. The French, led by Prince
Murat, ascended the hill, and soon after the Germans
had brought a battery to bear Murat withdrew his
men, followed by Von Redern. On crowning the
ridge De Forton's division was plainly seen moving in
the valley, or halting near Mars la Tour, supported
by twelve guns. Von Redern, who did not think it
prudent to attack, retired until a fold of the hills
gave him protection. Here he was joined by two
squadrons of hussars, which had approached Rezon-
ville, captured nine prisoners, and when pursued had
got deftly away. The sound of the cannon had
attracted the rest of the brigade, and Von Redern
again moved towards Mars la Tour, and again drew
oS without a fight. But by this time the cannonade
had called up both Barby and Bredow, so that there
were soon thirty-four squadrons and two batteries
on the ground. The French General, De Forton, who
believed erroneously that German infantry occupied
Puxieux, was of opinion that he had fought a success-
ful skirmish ; yet instead of closing with enemies
who were actually close to the line of retreat upon
Verdun, he fell back as far as Vionville, and went into
camp. Three French divisions of horse in the van of
the retiring Army allowed a German division to sit
down within a short distance of the Verdun road
and many miles from all infantry support. On the
other hand, a squadron of Uhlans pushed almost to
140 The Campaign of Sedan
Conflans, and stumbling on Du Barail's di vision, Jwas
smartly punished ; but a captain of hussars, during
the evening, rode towards Rezonville and halted
close enough to see Frossard's fantassins cooking their
suppers. Meantime, the Prussian Guard Cavalry,
moving north-west from Dieulouard, had placed its
advanced brigade at Thiaucourt ; and a squadron of
Guard Uhlans had audaciously summoned the
Governor of Toul to surrender. No such memorable
examples of activity can be found in the record of the
French cavalry, which had forgotten the traditions
of Napoleon the Great.
Orders for the Flank March
That evening General von Moltke issued a set of
memorable instructions to General von Steinmetz
and Prince Frederick Charles. The First Army was
to leave a Corps at Courcelles sur Nied, and place the
others at Arry and Pommerieux, between the Seille
and the Moselle. '' It is only by a vigorous offensive
movement of the Second Army," wrote Von Moltke,
" upon the routes from Metz to Verdun by Fresne
and Etain that we can reap the fruits of the victory
obtained yesterday. The commander of the Second
Army is intrusted with this operation which he will
conduct according to his own judgment and with the
means at his disposal, that is, all the Corps of his
Army." It was further announced that the King
would transfer his headquarters to Pont a Moussoji
in the afternoon of the i6th. Preparations were thus
made to place the whole force on the left bank of the
Moselle, except the ist Corps, the 3rd Division of
Cavalry, and the 2nd, which was still two marches
from the river. In this way Von Moltke hoped to
keep the whip hand of his opponents, and cut them off
from the shelter they sought beyond the Meuse.
The Emperor Quits the Army
Before narrating the battle which the French style
Rezonville and the Germans Vionville-Mars la Tour.
Von Moltke keeps the Whip Hand 1*1
we may turn to the Imperial headquarters at Grave-
lotte at dawn on the i6th, because the scene presents
so vivid a contrast to that in the German camp. When
Marshal Bazaine saw the Emperor on the preceding
evening walking meditatively up and down before his
quarters, he was surprised by the question, " Must I
go ? " The Marshal frankly admitted that he had
not been informed respecting the situation in front,
and asked him to wait. " The answer," writes
Bazaine, appeared to please him, and turning to
his suite he said, loud enough to be heard by all,
" Gentlemen, we will remain, but keep the baggage
packed." The troops, sad and depressed, continued
to defile before the inn ; no shout, no vivat was
evoked by the sight of the sovereign and his son.
Yet that night the Emperor had made up his mind.
In the morning he summoned Bazaine, who found
him in his carriage with the Prince Imperial and
Prince Napoleon. The baggage had already gone on
in the night, and the lancers and dragoons of the
Guard, commanded by General de France, were in the
saddle ready to serve as an escort. Bazaine rode to
the side of the carriage, and the Emperor said, " I
have resolved to leave for Verdun and Chalons.
Put yourself on the route for Verdun as soon as you
can. The gendarmerie have already quitted Briey
in consequence of the arrival of the Prussians" — a
singularly erroneous statement, but one showing how
ill-informed the headquarters were from first to last.
The Emperor then drove off from Gravelotte by the
road to Conflans, through the wooded ways which
were so soon to be the scene of a sanguinary encounter.
Three hours after he started Von Redern's guns
opened suddenly on the French cavalry camp near
Vionville, and began, by a stroke of surprise, the
most remarkable and best-fought battle of the
campaign.
CHAPTER VIII
The French Retreat Thwarted
Vionville — Mars la Tour
That feebleness and hesitation which had been so
conspicuous on the side of the French from the out-
set of the campaign were not hkely to cease when
dangers and difficulties increased with every passing
hour. The Emperor, while he commanded, had
been incapable of taking, not merely a bold, but any
resolution, and the mental qualities of Marshal Ba-
zaine were not sufficiently far above the average to
enable him to remedy the mischievous effects of the
long course of erroneous conduct to the heritage of
which he succeeded. Moreover, neither Bazaine nor
any other French commander, despite recent experi-
ences, had formed a correct estimate of German energy
and enterprise. Least of all could they believe that
a single corps and two divisions of cavalry would ven-
ture to plant themselves across the road to Verdun.
The evil consequences-were increased by the inactivity
of the cavalry, and the bad, unsoldierhke habit of
making perfunctory reconnaissances carried only a mile
or so to the front and on the flanks. Marshal Ba-
zaine's phrase — " les reconnaissances doivent se faire
comme d' habitude " — reveals the whole secret. At
Wissembourg, on the 4th of August, General Abel
Douay's horsemen returned from a short excur-
sion and reported that no enemy was near ; and at
eight in the morning of the i6th. General Frossard
was informed by the patrols which had come in that
there was no adversary in force on his front. The
German horse were near at hand, yet De Forton's
142
.A
The French Retreat Thwarted 143
cavaliers had not felt out as far as their bivouac.
Marshal Bazaine's original intention was that the
two Corps ordered to follow the Mars la Tour road
should start at four o'clock ; and Frossard had his
men out in readiness to move at that hour when a
fresh order postponed the march until the afternoon.
During the night Marshal Lebceuf, alarmed at the
absence of two divisions and at the continued sojourn
of De Ladmirault in the Moselle valley, had suggested
'that it would be better to stand fast until the several
Corps had been once more brought within supporting
distance ; and Marshal Bazaine had readily yielded
to the suggestion. Still no measures were taken to
ascertain whether foes were approaching or not, and
the soldiers, horse and foot, took up their ordinary
camp duties as they would have done had they been
at Chalons in time of peace. The actual situation,
if they had known it, required that every horse, man
and gun should have been in motion at dawn, yet they
all lingered ; and it may be said that neither superiors
nor subordinates were alive to the peril in which they
stood — not of defeat, still less rout, the odds available
against German enterprise were too great — but of a
blow which would make them reel and, perhaps,
turn them aside from the paths to the Meuse.
The Vionville Battle-field
The road from Gravelotte to Verdun passes by the
villages of Rezonville, Vionville and Mars la Tour
through a generally open and undulating country.
The ground slopes irregularly and gently upwards
on all sides from the highway ; the villages on the
route are in the hollows or shallow valleys. North
and south of Rezonville a ridge separated two ravines :
the larger, on the east, formed by the Juree brook,
had its origin north of Gravelotte ; the smaller, on the
west, came down also from the northern uplands, and
parallel to its bed ran the principal road from Gorze to
Rezonville. At the southern declivity of the ridge,
and extending eastward as far as the Moselle, were a
144 The Campaign of Sedan
series of forests — the Bois de Vionville, Bois St.
Arnould, the Bois des Ognons, the Bois des Chevaux.
To the west and south-west of Rezonville the country
was generally open ; but there was a clump of trees
shading a pool near Vionville, .and, north of the high
road, were larger patches of woods, named after the
village of Tronville. North also of the highway,
and within the French lines, woodlands covered the
hill sides towards St. Marcel, the hamlet of Villers
aux Bois being seated on the highest ground. Along
this upper plateau are traces of a Roman road, run-
ning due west, the ancient route from Verdun to Metz ;
traces visible also in the fields nearer to the fortress.
The French occupied the higher stretches on the
eastern and north-eastern edge of this irregularly
undulating and wooded region. General Frossard was
posted on the left of the line in front of Rezonville ;
Canrobert on the heights towards St. Marcel ; Leboeuf
had his troops about Verneville, the Guard stood at,
and in rear of, Gravelotte, and the careless cavalry
brigades under De Forton and Valabregues had set
up their camps west of Vionville, and thence kept a
listless watch towards the heights and hollows, west
and south-west, just in their immediate front.
The French are Surprised
Suddenly, about nine o'clock, they were struck by
shells fired from a battery which seemed to have
sprung out of a rounded hill a few hundred yards to
the west of Vionville. The missiles fell among the
tents and burst about a squadron filing up in water-
ing order to the tree-shaded pool. In quick succession
three additional batteries appeared on the crest and
opening fire added to the confusion below. Murat's
dragoons broke and fled and, accompanied by the
baggage train, horses, carts, men, galloped and ran off
towards Rezonville ; and De Gramont's troopers,
further to the rear, mounted and retired in good order
up the northern slopes, halting on the right of the
6th Corps. The batteries, six in number, then moved
The French Retreat Thwarted 145
up to a height closer in to Vionville and smote the
infantry camps. They were promptly answered by
the guns of Frossard's Corps, while his brigades stood
to their arms, formed up and sprang forward with
alacrity. About the same time, a solitary German
battery, visible to the south, fired a few rounds into
the French left and then withdrew over the crest un-
able to bear the storm of Chassepot bullets which
were poured from the aroused and irritated infantry.
The collision, so unwelcome to the French, had been
brought about in this wise. Prince Frederick Charles
had ordered the 3rd and loth Corps and the 6th
Division of Cavalry to start early in the morning and
strike the Verdun road west of Rezonville. As
General von Voights-Rhetz, commanding the loth,
intended to move upon St. Hilaire, beyond Mars la
Tour, he instructed Von Rheinbaben to reconnoitre
in the direction of Rezonville, increased his horse
artillery, and supported him with an infantry detach-
ment from Thiaucourt. About the same time that
the loth Corps advanced its foremost brigades from
Thiaucourt, and the rest from Pont a Mousson, the
3rd Corps and the 6th Division of Cavalry also made
for the hills west and south of Vionville, the right
division proceeding by Gorze, and the left,by Buxieres,
towards Tronville. Thus these two Corps were
moving on two parallel curves, the 3rd being next to
the enemy, and the loth on the outer and larger arc.
The Prince and his generals did not anticipate a
battle, but they all hoped to fall in with and punish
a rear-guard, or, by striking far to the westward, inter-
cept and compel the French Army to halt and fight be-
fore it reached the Meuse. It was Rheinbaben' s
abrupt and thorough home-thrust which revealed
the fact that the French had not passed Rezonville,
or, at least, that a large part of the Army was near
that village. His advance-guard, three squadrons
and a battery, had moved within musket-shot of De
Forton's camp *' without encountering a single patrol "
and, taking advantage of such supineness, his artillery,
hastening forward, created the panic near Vionville,
146 The Campaign of Sedan
which has already been described. Frossard's Corps,
which always behaved well, speedily took up defensive
positions. Bataille occupied Vionville and Flavigny,
and the high ground above the villages ; Verge pro-
longed the line to the left, and placed one brigade
facing south to front the Bois de Vionville, and con-
nect the array with Lapasset's brigade on the ridge
which, from the north, overlooked the Bois St.
Arnould and the ravine leading to Gorze. The 6th
Corps, encamped north of the main road, continued
the line on that side, and rapidly developed a front
facing south-west between the highway and the
Roman road. The sound of the cannonade was heard
as far off as Jarny and Conflans, startled Leboeuf at
Vemeville, and aroused the Marshal, busy in his
quarters at Gravelotte.
The Third Corps Strikes in
Rheinbaben's bold horsemen and gunners had done
their work ; they had gained for the oncoming
infantry that species of moral advantage which always
accrues from a surprise. As they fell back to more
sheltered positions behind the swelling hills, the right
wing of the 3rd Corps, under Stiilpnagel, entered the
field from the south ; the left wing, directed by the
fiery Alvensleben himself, came down into the arena
from the south-west, and several batteries, urged on
by Von Bulow, dashed up and formed the centre of
the assailants. Indeed, the guns were in action
before the infantry could march over the distance be-
tween their starting points and the outward spray of
the French line of battle ; so that for an appreciable
interval the groups of batteries had to depend upon
themselves. Yet not for long. Stiilpnagel's bat-
talions plunged into the dense woods on the right,
and waged a close combat with the skirmishers of
J olivet's brigade, who were slow to give ground.
Beyond the thickets, the left wing of the division
drove Valaze's skirmishers from an eminence, the
highest in those parts, and a battery was speedily in
The French Retreat Thwarted 1^:7
action on its bare summit. By degrees, as they came
up, the battalions of the loth Brigade went forward
on the left, or western, flank of the height, where the
contest, conducted with vigour on both sides, eddied
to and fro, until the German onset, repeated and sus-
tained, gained the mastery, and cleared the slopes so
effectually that five other batteries, driving up the
hill as fast as they could clear the defile, took ground
on its top, and gave support to the companies in the
wood and on the open down. About an hour was
consumed in this desperate work, made all the more
arduous because the German infantry pushed eagerly
into the fight, not in compact masses, but one battalion
after another as each struggled up to the front.
Major-General Doering was killed, and many officers
went down in this sanguinary strife : one battalion
which dashed forward to resist a French attack at a
critical moment lost every officer. But as it retired,
broken and wasted, the French were smitten in turn
by its comrades, forced to give way, and the position
was, at this heavy cost, secured. For the troops
engaged in the forest had now attained the northern
edge of the Bois de Vionville, the batteries on the
lofty hill were safe, and Stiilpnagel's Division was
solidly estabhshed upon the most commanding up-
lands in that part of the field.
To their left rear was the 6th Cavalry Division ;
but between them and the fields west of Vionville were
no infantry, only Unes of guns, protected by a few
squadrons of horse. For the 6th Infantry Division,
coming on from Buxieres, had gradually wheeled
to the right until they faced to the east, the nth
Brigade crossing the high road, north of Tronville,
the 1 2th moving upon Vionville ; so that they formed
a line of attack directed upon Bataille's division
which held Vionville and Flavigny, having on its
right, beyond the Verdun road, the division of Lafont
de Villiers belonging to Canrobert's Corps. While
Stiilpnagel was striving to obtain a grip of the woods
and heights on the French left, Buddenbrock, the
other divisional commander, acting under the eyes
148 The Campaign of Sedan
of his chief, threw the weight of his division upon the
two villages which covered what was then the French
centre. Vionville was first carried by the usual
turning movement, and its capture was followed by
the outburst of a still more murderous conflict. The
French had brought up more and heavier pieces, and
these poured a crushing fire into the village. The
Germans answered by continuing the attack on the
French infantry. Yet so confused was the engage-
ment on the bare hill side, so completely was it a
" soldiers' battle," such was the swaying to and fro
of the mingled companies which, crushed and mangled,
yet welded themselves together and pressed on, that
once more the official German historian renounces
the task of minute description. But the effect of the
hurly-burly was soon manifest — Bataille's entire
division, unable to endure the torment, and seeing
its general fall wounded, went about and retired ;
Valaze's brigade, " taken in flank," says Frossard,
by a German battery, and losing its gallant com-
mander, also marched off through Rezonville ; and
the nearest brigade of Canrobert's Corps likewise
receded, either under pressure or weakened in purpose
by example. The Germans paid a great price for the
immense advantage secured ; but as Flavigny fell
into their hands, as the left of Stiilpnagel's Division
joined in its capture, and as the front of battle was
now no longer an arc but its chord, the prize was well
worth its cost. The sole reinforcements which had
arrived to aid the 3rd Corps, were two detachments,
parts of the same brigade, and pertaining to the loth,
which, on their way to join that Corps then moving
westward, had turned aside, attracted by the magne-
tism of the cannonade. How much of the success
obtained was due to the valour, devotion, and endur-
ance of the artillery may be gathered from the French
narratives. No troops could have fought with
greater hardihood and dash — not fleeting, but sus-
tained— than the infantry of the 3rd Corps, all
Prussians from the Mark of Brandenburg. But they
had their equals among the dauntless gunners,
The French Retreat Thwarted 149
deserving to be called " tirailleurs d'artillerie," who
literally used their batteries as battalions, dragging
them up to the very outward edges of the fight,
often within rifle-shot, and when pressed, retiring
some scores of paces, then halting and opening at short
range upon their pursuers. The line, composed of
groups of batteries, especially in the forenoon, was the
backbone of the battle.
Arrival of Bazaine
Just as Frossard's infantry, yielding to the vehe-
ment pressure, retreated behind Rezonville, Marshal
Bazaine appeared on the scene, and rode into the
thick of the contest. At Frossard's request he
directed a Lancer regiment, supported by the cuiras-
siers of the Guard, to charg:e and check the pursuers.
The Lancers went forth with great spirit, but soon
swerved aside, broken by the infantry fire. The
Guard horsemen, however, led by General du Preuil,
rode home upon the eager and disordered companies
who were marching to the east of the flaming village
of Flavigny. But these foot soldiers, reserving their
fire until the mailed cavaliers were within two hun-
dred and fifty yards, plied them with shot so steadily
that the squadrons swerved to the right and left,
only to fall under the bullets from the rear ranks
which had faced about. " The cuirassiers," says
General du Preuil, " were broken by the enemy's
infantry, which received them with a murderous fire.
After the charge, the wreck of the regiment raUied at
Rezonville, having left behind on the field 22 officers,
24 sous-officiers, about 200 men and 250 horses.
When the regiment was reorganized, instead of 115
mounted men per squadron, there were only 62 ! "
Colonel von Rasch had close to Flavigny two Hussar
regiments ; with one he pressed on the flying cuiras-
siers, and with the other charged the French infantry,
strugghng rearward. Bazaine had just brought up,
and was posting a battery of the Imperial Guard,
when the Hussars charged down upon him, taking
150 The Campaign of Sedan
the battery in front and flank. It was here that the
Marshal was surrounded, separated for a moment
from his staff, and obhged, as he himself says, to
" draw his sword." Two squadrons of his escort
came to his relief, and a rifle battalion opened upon
the Prussian horse, who had to retreat, leaving behind
the battery which they had temporarily seized.
General Alvensleben had ordered up the 6th Division
of cavalry, but when they arrived, Bazaine had
brought forward the Grenadier Division of the Guard
to replace the 2nd Corps in the front line, for J olivet's
brigade, on the French left, had also retired to the high
ground in its rear. The 6th formed up to the south of
Flavigny and advanced, but they could not make
any impression upon the reinvigorated enemy, and
they drew back, having lost many offlcers and men.
" This demonstration, apparently without any re-
sult," says the official German account, " was still
useful, since it provided the artillery with an oppor-
tunity so vehemently desired of pressing up nearer to
the front." In fact, the lines of the artillery were now
between the edge of the wood of Vionville and Fla-
vigny, and to the right, left, and front of Vionville
itself — a distinct approximation towards the French
infantry and guns ; so that there were changes on both
sides, with the difference that the French brought up
fresh troops, while the same German guns, horsemen
and infantry continued the struggle.
The crisis of the battle had now arrived ; for
General von Alvensleben, in order to diminish the
violent pressure on his left, which was beyond the
Verdun road, had been obhged to thrust his sole
reserve of infantry into the deadly encounter. Colonel
Lehmann, commanding a detachment of the loth
Corps, consisting of three battaUons and a half, had
come up to the outskirts of the field in the forenoon,
and he was directed to take post near Tronville.
When, in consequence of the reverse inflicted on
Frossard, Bazaine arrayed the Guard in front of
Rezonville and Canrobert put his reserve brigades
into line on their right, and both estabUshed their
/i
The French Retreat Thwarted 1^1
reserve artillery on the heights to the north and east,
Alvensleben sent forward Lehmann's battalions,
which, with great difficulty, managed to keep their
ground in the copses of Tronville beyond the Verdun
road. It was about two o'clock in the afternoon and
the German leader had no reserves, every foot soldier
and gun was engaged, while the greater part of the
loth Corps was still remote from the field. Luckily
for him, the reports of the fugitive peasantry and the
steady advance of the German right through the
southern woods, aroused in the mind of Bazaine a fear
that he might be turned on his left, a fear shared by
at least one of his subordinates. He, therefore, caused
the Guard Voltigeurs to form front to the south in the
Bois des Ognons, so as to watch the ravines, down one
of which the Mance flowed to Ars, and in the bed of
the other the Juree ran to Noveant. Lapasset, who
barred the road from Gorze, was reinforced by a
regiment of Grenadiers, and Montaudon's division of
the 3rd Corps was taken from Leboeuf and placed near
Malmaison, a little to the north of Gravelotte. Thus
the French fine, instead of standing north and south,
faced generally to the south-west, between the Bois
des Ognons and the high ground north of the copses
of Tronville. At this time Leboeuf, with one division
and a half — for Metman had not yet joined him —
was moving south-west from Verneville, and De
Ladmirault's divisions — for he had quitted the
Moselle valley in the morning — were only just show-
ing their leading troops towards Doncourt. Never-
theless, Canrobert, who had developed a strong line of
guns as well as infantry on the right of Picard's
Grenadiers, both on the face and flank of the German
left, determined to attempt the recapture of Vionville
and Flavigny. He was led to do so by a belief that
the partial cessation of the German fire indicated
exhaustion, and, aided by the whole of his artillery,
he certainly delivered a formidable onset carried up
to the very outskirts of the two villages. It was
then that Alvensleben called upon the cavalry to
charge, solely with the object of gaining time and
V lONVlLLE-MARS LATQU R . ABOu ■ 4.P.M.
PlanW
The French Retreat Thwarted 1^3
relieving the wearied foot, and hardly treated
gunners.
Bredow's Brilliant Charge
Bredow's heavy brigade, the 7th Cuirassiers of
Magdeburg, and the i6th Uhlans of Altmark, eight
squadrons, from which two were withdrawn on the
march to watch the Tronville copses, was selected
to assail Canrobert's destructive batteries and sting-
ing infantry. Von Bredow drew out his two regi-
ments, led them into the shallow but protecting
hollow on the north of Vionville, and, without pausing,
wheeled into hne on the move, so that the array of
sabres and lances fronted nearly eastward. Then
breaking into a headlong gallop the troopers rushed
hke a torrent over and through the infantry on their
broad track and into the batteries, near the Roman
road, which for the moment they disorganized.
But now the French horse swarmed forward on all
sides, and the survivors of Von Bredow* s heroic men,
having cheerfully made the heavy sacrifice demanded
from them, turned about to retreat through the
French infantry, punished as they rode back by De
Forton, Gramont, Murat and Valabregue who brought
up three thousand dragoons, chasseurs and cuirassiers
against the remains of the devoted brigade. Von
Bredow sought safety behind Flavigny, whither
Von Redern had ridden up with a regiment of hussars,
but he did not attack because the hostile cavalry
halted in their pursuit. The charge had cost the
Magdeburgers and Altmarkers 14 officers and 363
men, nearly one half the strength with which they
started on their astonishing ride ; but the glorious
remnant had the proud satisfaction of knowing that
the two regiments had put an end to offensive attacks
from the side of Rezonville, that their infantry com-
rades of the Brandenburg Corps had received effectual
succour in time of need, and that the steadfast artillery
had gained precious moments which they used to
prepare for fresh exertions.
154 The Campaign of Sedan
The Fight becomes Stationary
During the next three hours, and, indeed, to the
end of the day, the combat on the German right and
centre remained stationary, varied by desperate
att-empts to win ground from the Imperial Grenadiers
which cost many hves and achieved no marked
success. Seven fresh batteries, however, came suc-
cessively into action, so that about four o'clock, the
German line of guns between the wood of Vionville
and Flavigny had been increased to more than a
hundred pieces, and their fire effectually stayed the
French from advancing. Some portions of the 7th,
8th and 9th Corps, which had struggled up from the
Moselle valley during the sultry afternoon, entered
the woods, were pushed up the ravine road from
Gorze, or were thrown forward in front of the big
battery which was the mainstay of the left wing.
Prince Frederick Charles himself arrived about four
o'clock. He had ridden straight from Pont a Mousson
on learning that a serious engagement was afoot, and
as he cantered up to the front he was heartily wel-
comed by the men of the 3rd Corps which he had
commanded for ten years.
Arrival of the Tenth Corps
Surveying the scene from the lofty upland above
the wood for a time, he rode off to another eminence
near Flavigny, because the stress of battle was then
on the left wing, where the rest of the loth Corps, so
long absent from the field, had appeared just in time
to encounter the fresh troops which had been led
forward by Marshal Leboeuf and General de Lad-
mirault. When Von Bredow's brigade rode against
Canrobert's Corps, Von Barby's horse were sent to
guard the extreme left against a surprise from the
masses of French troops gathering on the Doncourt
hills. They pushed far northward, and sustained a
cannonade from the enemy, who soon forced them to
retreat ; for Leboeuf, with Aymard's Division —
The French Retreat Thwarted l^^
Bazaine had now called for Nayral's as well as Mon-
taudon's — moved down towards the Tronville thickets
and Ladmirault, whose infantry had at length reached
him from the Moselle valley, sent Grenier forward in
line with Aymard. These two divisions, driving the
horsemen back towards Tronville, at once assailed
the woodlands, so often named, and combining their
attack with that of Tixier, whose division formed
the right of Canrobert's Corps, they expelled the
German infantry from the northern section of the
wood. Lehmann's Hanoverians and the wreck of
the Brandenburgers gave ground slowly, but, after
an hour's severe bush fighting, the left of the 3rd
Corps was obliged to yield, and nothing restrained
the advancing French infantry save the terribly
effective fire of the German gunners, upon whom the
brunt of the battle fell. As the most forward German
guns were retired south of the highway, Grenier
sent three batteries over the ravine, and fortune
seemed, for the first time, to favour the Imperial
soldiers. But, at this trying moment, the 20th
Division of the loth Corps — the men had already
marched that day twenty -seven miles — appeared on
the heights of Tronville. General von Kraatz, its
commander, brought with him eight battalions, four
squadrons, and four batteries, an opportune rein-
forcement, which had been led thither because the
summons, given by faint reverberations of a heavy
cannonade, heard at Thiaucourt, had been clenched
by the arrival of a note written on the field of
battle.
The artillery, as usual, took the lead, hastening
to the field across country, and, before the infantry
could advance, twenty -four guns in action north
of Tronville checked the French skirmishers, and
obliged Grenier' s batteries to recross the ravine.
Then the foot went into the wood, and soon chased
the French from all the copses except a patch on
the north. At this time. General de Ladmirault,
who had been joined by heavy masses of cavalry,
had on the heights, near the farm of Greyere, abun-
156 The Campaign of Sedan
dance of artillery and De Cissey's Division. On his
right ran a deep and steep ravine towards Mars la
Tour ; he was about to cross this obstacle, and had,
in fact, entered the hollow, intending to sweep
down upon the' German left, when he became aware
that a strong hostile body was approaching from
the west. It was General von Schwarzkoppen,
commanding a division of the loth Corps. He
brought on to the field the 38th brigade, diminished,
however, by detachments to five battalions, two
companies of pioneers, twelve guns, and six squad-
rons of Dragoons of the Guard. General de Lad-
mirault's proceedings had been closely watched by
some German horse, and his advance guard of
Chasseurs d'Afrique had been driven out of Mars la
Tour by the Dragoons of the Guard. Seeing the
oncoming enemy, he hastily recrossed the ravine,
and placed De Cissey and his artillery in position
to resist any attack. The intelligence that an
enemy had shown himself on the west had run
along the French line, and had induced Grenier and
Leboeuf to suspend their apparently prosperous onset,
thus diminishing the pressure upon Von Kraatz in
the Tronville wood, and also on the artillery, which
had been so long engaged near Vionville. General
Schwarzkoppen had, during the day, marched to St.
Hilaire on his way to the fords of the Meuse ; but,
hearing the cannonade, he halted, sent out patrols, and
finally moved off towards the battle, guided by
columns of dust, clouds of smoke, and the deep-toned
muttering of the rival guns. When he reached Mars la
Tour,, Voights-Rhetz, the Corps commander, rode
up. Both he and Prince Frederick Charles, who
watched the fight from a hill above Flavigny, were
under the delusion that the French right could be
taken in flank by an attack from Mars la Tour ;
and Von Wedell, who commanded the newly arrived
brigade, was ordered to fall on. But, for once, the
German Staff did not show their far-famed skill ;
for they did not reconnoitre the ground, nor had they
observed the formidable array of De Cissey's brigades.
The French Retreat Thwarted 1^7
Von Wedell's men dashed forward with alacrity,
but found in their path a deep hollow, which covered
the French front, as well as flank, on that side.
Nevertheless, the battalions, in two Hues, hurried
down one bank and up the other, and then met an
entire French Division. A brief and bloody fight at
close quarters — the opposing hues were separated
in some places by only fifty yard& — ensued ; but
so continuous and deadly was the French fire that
the sturdy Westphalians had to yield. Their dead
and dying covered the summit, and filled the hollow
way ; two-thirds of the i6th Regiment were left on
the field, and the whole brigade, shattered into a
shapeless crown of fugitives, hurried to the rear.
Then forward to their succour came bounding the
2nd Dragoons of the Guard, Colonel von Auerswald
at their head, spurring headlong to the front through
the disordered crowd, taking the hedges and ditches
in their stride, and galloping furiously into the midst
of the pursuing French, who had leaped forward
from the right of Grenier's Division. It was a
hopeless charge — a ride to certain death — but the
readiness of the Dragoons saved the right of the
brigade ; yet at great cost, for they left dead on
the field their brave colonel, a major, and three
captains. Nine officers in all, and seventeen men
were killed ; four officers and sixty men were
wounded ; while one officer and five men were
captured. Two of Count Bismarck's sons, privates
f)^ this regiment, rode in the charge ; the eldest,
Herbert, was shot in the thigh, the youngest, Wilhelm,
a stout trooper, hfted a wounded comrade on to his
horse, and carried him off the field. The charge^of
the Dragoons enabled the broken battalions to draw
off towards Tronville, but the guns in position still
held on near Mars la Tour, west of which, towards
Ville sur Yron, a horse battery and a squadron |of
the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard were engaged in a
smart skirmish with a body of Chasseurs d'Afrique.
This encounter was followed shortly afterwards
by
158 The Campaign of Sedan
The Great Cavalry Combat
Ladmirault had sent six regiments of horse over
the gully on his right — Legrand's Hussars and Dra-
godns, Du Barail's soHtary regiment of Chasseurs
d'Afrique, and the superb brigade of Lancers and
Dragoons of the Guards commanded by General de
France. On the other side Von Barby's brigade had
approached Mars la Tour during the fatal attack
upon De Ladmirault' s infantry, and soon after it was
joined by two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, the
loth Hussars, and the i6th Dragoons. Sweeping
round to the north of the village, Barby formed up
his troopers in the narrow space between the Yron
and the Greyere ravine, while Legrand and his
comrades showed their compact masses to the north.
The French regiments were placed in echelon,
Legrand's Hussars, led by General Montaigu, on the
left, Gondrecourt's Dragoons on his right rear, and
next the Guard Lancers and Dragoons. The Chas-
seurs d'Afrique were behind all. The first shock fell
upon the 13th Dragoons which, having taken ground
to the right, had only time to wheel partially into
hue before Montaigu' s Hussars rode through the
squadron's intervals, and it would have fared ill with
the Prussians had not Colonel von Weise plunged
in with the loth Hussars and overset the French.
Von Barby on the left, at the head of the i6th Uhlans
and 19th Dragoons, met the French Guard Cavalry
in full shock, and then ensued a furious confused
fight upon the whole line. Each side endeavoured to
fall upon a flank, and the squadrons swayed to and
fro amid a huge cloud of dust. Suddenly, a squadron
of Prussian Guard Dragoons, returning from a patrol,
came riding across country from the west and struck
the flank of the French Guards. Du Barail's Chas-
seurs d'Afrique and Gondrecourt's Dragoons dashed
into the melee, but the Westphalian Cuirassiers drove
like a wedge into the opposing ranks, and the i6th
Dragoons fell upon and smote them in flank and rear.
Legrand was killed, Montaigu wounded and a prisoner.
The French Retreat Thwarted 1^^
and the French cavalry, wheeling about, rode out of
the fight, throwing into disorder a brigade of Chas-
seurs, which had been sent by General de Clerambault
to cover the retreat. The Gallic horse had brilliantly
sustained their reputation, yet they were overmatched
by the Teutons, who also lost three commanding
officers. But Von Barby was able to re-form his
victorious squadrons on the plateau and withdraw
them at leisure, watched, but not pursued, by a
squadron of Dragoons belonging to De Clerambault' s
division. General Ladmirault surveyed the field
from the heights of Bruville, and came to the con-
clusion that no more could be accomphshed by the
French right wing. He had only two divisions, his
cavalry had been defeated, and he " discovered "
between Tronville and Vionville " an entire Corps
d'Armee." So he rested and bivouacked on the hills
about the Greyere fajm. The forces ot his next
neighbour on the left, Leboeuf, had been reduced to
Aymard's division, for Marshal Bazaine had called
away Nayral to support Montaudon near Rezonville ;
indeed, at one moment he had abstracted one of
Aymard's brigades, but, yielding to Leboeuf s remon-
strances, he sent it back.
End of the Battle
It was now past seven o'clock, and both sides were
exhausted by the tremendous strain which they had
borne so long ; yet the battle continued until dark-
ness had settled over the woods and villages and
fields. For Barnekow's division and a Hessian
brigade had entered the woodlands and pressed
forward on the Gorze road, creating new alarm in the
mind of Bazaine, who throughout the day was
governed by his belief that the Germans intended to
turn his left and cut him off from Metz. So that
when Colonel von Rex pushed boldly up the ravine
against Lapasset and his flankers opened fire from
the edge of the Bois des Ognons, the French com-
mander drew still more troops to that flank. Between
Rezonville and the ridges near Gravelotte he had, by
160 The Campaign of Sedan
eventide, placed the whole of the Guard, Frossard's
Coq)s, Lapasset's brigade, and one half of Leboeuf's
Corps. Fearing the storming columns which ever
and anon surged outward from the woods toward
the commanding heights south of Rezonville, Bour-
baki brought up fifty-four guns and arrayed them
in one long battery. The closing hours of the day
witnessed a stupendous artillery contest, which was
carried on even when the flashes of flame alone re-
vealed the positions of the opposing pieces. The
thick smoke increased the obscurity, and yet within
the gloom, bodies of German infantry, and even of
horse, sallied from the woods or vales and vainly
strove to reach the coveted crests or storm in upon
Rezonville itself. At the very last moment a violent
cannonade burst forth on both sides, yet to this day
neither knows why it arose, where it began, or what
it was to effect. At length the tired hosts were quiet ;
the strife of twelve hours ended. The German Hne
of outposts that night ran from the Bois des Ognons
along the Bois St. Arnould, then to the east of Flavigny
and Vionville through the Tronville copses ; and
after the moon rose upon the ghastly field the cavalry
rode forth and placed strong guards as far westward
as Mars la Tour and the Yron. The French slept
on the ground they held, the heights south of Rezon-
ville, that village itself, and the ridges which over-
look the highway to Verdun as far as Bruville and
Grey ere. It had been a day of awful carriage, for the
French had lost, in killed and wounded, nearly 17,000,
and the Germans 16,000 men.
It is impossible to state exactly the numbers pre-
sent on the field — probably, 125,000 French to 77,000
Germans. The latter brought up two complete
Corps, the 3rd and loth, two divisions of cavalry,
the 5th and 6th — these sustained the shock and bore
the chief loss — a brigade of the 8th Corps, the nth
Regiment from the 9th, and four Hessian regiments
of that Corps under Prince Louis, the husband of the
British Princess Alice. They also had, in action or
reserve, 246 guns. The French mustered the Imperial
The French Retreat Thwarted 161
Guard, the 2nd Corps, three divisions and one
regiment ot the 6th Corps, three divisions of the
3rd, and two of the 4th Corps, five divisions of
cavalry, and 390 guns ; so that on the i6th, they
were, at all times, numerically superior in every arm.
When Alvensleben came into action a little after ten
o'clock with the 3rd Corps and two divisions of
cavalry — perhaps 33,000 men — they had in their
front the 2nd and 6th Corps, the Guard, and the Re-
serve Cavalry. — not less than 72,000, the guns on the
French side being always superior in number. The
3rd Corps, less one division, was at ten o'clock only
three miles from the field ; these and half the 4th
Corps arrived in the afternoon, adding more than
50,000 men to the total, while the Germans could
only bring up the loth, and parts of the 8th and 9th,
fewer than 40,000, some of them marching into line
late in the evening. The French Marshal, who
fought a defensive battle, did not use his great
strength during the forenoon, or in the afternoon
when his right wing had wheeled up to the front.
The result was an " indecisive action " — the phrase
is used by the official German historian — and that it
was indecisive must be attributed, at least in part,
to the fact that Marshal Bazaine, nor he alone, stood
in constant dread of an overwhelming inroad of
" Prussians '* on his left, with intent to cut him off
from Metz and thrust him, unprovided with muni-
tions of all kinds, on to the Briey-Longuyon road.
But it may be inferred from the mode in which the
battle was fought by the French commanders, from
the first shot to the last, that the Germans had
obtained a moral ascendency over the leaders and the
led, and that such an ascendency had a great in-
fluence upon the tactics, as well as the strategy, of
Marshal Bazaine and his subordinates in command.
Nothing supports the correctness of this inference more
strongly than the fact that an Army of 120,000 men
considered a great success had been achieved when it
had resisted the onsets of less than two-thirds of its
numbers, and had been driven from its line of retreat !
CHAPTER IX
Pressed Back on Metz
Darkness had set in, and the last shot had been
fired, when Marshal Bazaine rode back to his head-
quarters at Gravelotte. There he became impressed
with the scarcity — " penury " — of munitions and
provisions ; there he acknowledged to the Emperor
that the direct road to Verdun had been closed, and
that he might be obliged to retreat by the north ;
and there he wrote the order which was to move his
entire Army the next day nearer to Metz. The
troops began their retrograde march as early as four
o'clock, by which hour Prince Frederick Charles was
up on the hill above Flavigny, intently watching his
antagonists. Rezonville was still occupied by in-
fantry, a cavalry division was drawn up between that
village and Verneville until late in the forenoon, and
the marches of troops to and fro kept the cautious
German commanders, for some time, in a state of
uncertainty.
It has now to be shown how they had employed the
1 6th outside the area of the conflict, where the several
Corps stood in the evening, and by what means the
Great Staff, on the 17th, acquired the knowledge
that the " Army of the Rhine " had retired upon the
line of hills immediately to the westward of Metz.
The movement of troops comes first under notice.
On the extreme left the 4th Corps having crossed the
Moselle at Marbache, had pushed f orthward in a south-
westerly direction, part of the Corps making a dasl '
ing but fruitless attempt to intimidate the garrison
Toul, so important because it barred the railway
Chalons, and at the end of the day were still unde
162
Pressed back on Metz 163
orders to march upon the Meuse. The Guard, pre-
ceded by its cavalry, advanced from Dieulouard to
several points half-way between the Moselle and the
Meuse, the right being at Bernecourt and the left
about Beaumont. The 12th Corps, Saxons, crossed
the Moselle at Pont a Mousson, and had one division
there and one about Regnieville en Haye. The 2nd
Corps, still approaching the Moselle by forced marches,
had attained villages east of the Seille. It will be
readily understood that, as the 4th and 2nd Corps
were so far distant from the centre of action west of
Metz, they could hardly be moved up in time to share
in the impending struggle ; and they, therefore, for
the present, may be omitted from the narrative.
It was otherwise with the remaining Corps, and it was
the aim of the Great Staff to bring them all up to the
Verdun road.
From the very earliest moment, General von
Moltke held the opinion that the full consequences of
the action on the 14th could only be secured by
vigorous operations on the left bank of the Moselle ;
and as the reports came in from the front on the i6th,
that sound judgment was more than confirmed.
The Royal headquarters were transferred in the
forenoon to Pont a Mousson, whither King William
repaired ; and Von Moltke, who had preceded the
King, found information which led the general to
the conclusion that a new chapter in the campaign
had been opened. Accordingly, he desired to push
up to the front the largest possible number of troops,
so that he might, if such a design were feasible, have
ample means wherewith to shoulder off the French to
the northward, and sever their communications with
Chalons. At this stage, the idea of shutting them up
in Metz had not yet been conceived. The 7th, 8th,
and 9th were ordered to hasten forward on the road
towards Vionville, and some part of them, as we have
seen, were engaged on the i6th. Extra bridges were
erected on the Moselle, the roads were cleared of all
impediments, and the results rewarded the foresight,
energy and goodwill displayed by officers and men.
164 The Campaign of Sedan
The I2th Corps was eighteen, and the Guard twenty-
two miles from the battlefield, but so keen and in-
telligent were their commanders that, inferring from
the information they received what would be re-
quired of them, they stood prepared to execute any
order as soon as it arrived. The former body,
indeed, marched off northward in the night, and sent
word of the fact to the Guard, which led the com-
mander to assemble the divisions on the instant and
stand ready to step forth. So that when the formal
orders were brought, the Guard started at five in
the morning, when the Saxons were already on the
road. The 8th Corps, or rather its remaining division,
were on the way at dawn, preceded by the 9th, and
followed by the 7th from its cantonments on the left
bank of the Seille. Thus the whole available portions
of the Second and First Armies were in motion, to
sustain the 3rd and loth, if they were attacked on the
17th ; to act, as circumstances required, if the French
abandoned the battlefield.
Prince Frederick Charles, who had slept at Gorze,
took horse at dawn, and reached his watch-tower on
the hill south-west of Flavigny at half-past four
o'clock, early enough to distinguish by the increasing
light the French fine of outposts between Bruville and
Rezonville. About six o'clock the King joined the
Prince, and at the same time the 9th Corps took post
near the right wing of the 3rd. What the staff had
now to determine was whether the French intended
to retire or attack, and if they retired whither they
went. Patrols, busy on all sides, gave in contra-
dictory or rather discordant reports, which for some
time left it doubtful whether the retreat was not
actually being carried out by Conflans on the Briey
road ; but by degrees the headquarters arrived at
the conclusion that the French would not attack, that
they had not withdrawn far, and that the task of
grappling with them must be deferred until the next
day. Soon after noon, when General Metman, acting
as rear-guard, quitted Rezonville, there were on or
near the field no fewer than seven German Corps and
Pressed back on Metz 165
three divisions of cavalry ; so that had the French
renewed the battle for the Verdun road, even early in
the morning, they would have found it a severe task
to make their way at least along the southern or Mars
la Tour high road. About eight in the morning
General von Moltke had dictated an order on the
height near Flavigny, in obedience to which the 7th
Corps marched by Borny and Ars upon Gravelotte,
following the Mance brook, and occupying the woods
on the right and left ; while the 8th, already in part
on the field, ascended the water-course and ravine
which gives access to Rezonville. The object of the
double movement was to accelerate the retreat of the
French from these places. It was not accomphshed
without some wood-fighting, but about half-past three
General Metman withdrew his flankers, and glided out
of sight beyond the ridge near Point du Jour. But
the firing had alarmed Von Moltke, who, dreading lest
the fiery Steinmetz should bring on a general or even
partial engagement, sent him positive orders to stop
the combat. The veteran, however, pressed forward
himself with Von Zastrow, Von Kameke and their
staff officers. Emerging from the woods into the
open, they beheld across the deep ravine the French
camps on the opposite plateau, and even discerned
the works thrown up by the careful Frossard to cover
his guns and infantry. A mitrailleuse at once opened
fire on the group of horsemen, and drove them away,
but not before they had seen enough to prove, when
combined with the cavalry reports from the north-
west flank, that the French Army was encamped on
the heights to the west of Metz, and had not attempted
to withdraw by any of the still open roads towards
Mezieres or Chalons. Therefore, the German Armies
halted, and the generals had a Httle leisure to frame
a plan of operations for the i8th.
Marshal Bazaine
Human ingenuity has imputed various motives to
the French Marshal, some of them being discreditable
166 The Campaign of Sedan
to his loyalty, all based on a low estimate of his char-
acter as a man, and capacity as a soldier. His own
account is that he did not persevere in trying to effect
his retreat, either by force or skill, partly because the
Army was not well supplied with food and munitions,
and partly, as is apparent from his evidence and
books, because he had forrned a mihtary theory which
he proposed to work out near Metz to the disadvantage
of the enemy. He held that he had a strong post on
the flank of the German communications, and that, if
he could make his adversaries waste their troops in
repeated attacks upon "inexpugnable" positions,
he might be able to resume the offensive when the
Army at Chalons should take the field. Secretly, we
suspect, he had become imbued with a belief or appre-
hension that what the French call the moral of the
Army had been seriously impaired ; that their staying
power in action was not what it should have been,
and that they could not be trusted to perform so
delicate an operation as a long flank march within
reach of a foe exalted by victory, aided by a powerful
and audacious cavalry, and an infantry capable of
marching twenty miles a day, and enjoying the
advantage of greatly superior numbers. As usual,
the motives of Bazaine were " mixed," but there does
not seem any good reason to beheve that he was
selfishly disloyal to the Emperor, faithless to France,
or insensible to the charms of " glory." His chief
defect was that he did not possess sufficient military
competence to command a large Army — a defect he
shared with his comrades of high rank ; and his
misfortune was that he succeeded to an inheritance
of accumulated error entaihng severe penalties, from
the infliction of which only a rare genius, Hke that of the
First Napoleon, could have saved himself and his Army.
Active warfare had now continued for a fortnight,
and at sundown on the 17th of August the " Army of
the Rhine" found itself obHged to form front facing,
not Berhn, but Paris ; while the formidable Armies of
King WilHam, with their backs to the French capital,
turned their eyes towards the Rhine.
Pressed back on Metz 167
The Battle-field of Gravelotte
Whatever may have been his motives, Marshal
Bazaine directed his Army to retire upon a position
of exceptional strength on the heights to the westward
of Metz, which look towards the wooded ravine of the
Mance brook throughout its course, and beyond its
source over the undulating plain in the direction of
the river Orne. This ridge of upland abuts on the
Moselle near Ars, is covered at its broad southern end
by the Bois de Vaux, is intersected by the great high-
way from Metz to Verdun, which is carried along a
depression where the wood terminates, and over the
shoulder above Gravelotte. North of the road the
high ground, with a westerly bias, rims as far as
Amanvillers, and thus trending sHghtly eastward,
ascends to St. Privat la Montagne and Roncourt, and
back to the Moselle bottom lands below Metz. The
left of the position, opposite the Bois de Vaux, is
curved outwards, its shape being indicated by the
high road, which, after bending round and creeping
up the hill, as far as Point du Jour, turns abruptly
to the west, and crosses the Mance upon a causeway
east of Gravelotte. This bulwark, occupied by
Frossard's Corps, from near Point du Jour to St.
Ruffine in the lowlands, was made more formidable
by shelter trenches, field works, and gunpits. The
two houses at Point du Jour were pierced for musketry,
and the immense quarries in the hill side, at the elbow
of the ridge facing the Mance, were filled with troops.
The only mode of reaching the front was either up the
narrow causeway by St. Hubert, or across the deep
ravine. Behind this strong front the ground sloped
inwards, so that the troops and reserves could be, and
were, screened from view as well as from fire. In the
bottom stood the village of Rozerieulles ; and above,
the eminences on which the engineers had planted the
forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville. The hollow
through which the highway ran was bordered with
vineyards, and near to Metz villages and houses
clustered thickly astride of the road. On the right of
Frossard were the four divisions forming the Corps of
Leboeuf, extending as far as the farm of La Folie,
168 The Campaign of Sedan
opposite Verneville. Here the ground was high and
open, yet also sloping to the rear as well as the front,
and its chief strength lay in the strongly built farm-
steads of St. Hubert, seated on the roadside just above
Gravelotte, in those of Moscow and Leipzig, standing
on the bare hill side ; and in the Bois de Genivaux, a
thick wood, which filled the upper part of the Mance
ravine. Beyond the 3rd Corps lay the 4th, under De
Ladmirault, having its left in the farm and chateau
of Montigny le Grange, and its right at, and a little
north of, Amanvillers, a considerable village, planted
in a depression at a point where one of the roads
from Metz quits the deep defile of Chat el St. Germain,
and bends suddenly -westward to join, at Habonville,
the road to Briey. The track of the railway, then
unfinished, ascends this wooded gully, and winds on
to the open ground at Amanvillers. The country in
front of the ridge, from that place to Roncourt, is an
extensive open descent, which has been compared to
the glacis of a fortress, at the foot of which stand the
villages of Habonville, St. Ail, and St. Marie aux
Chenes. On the southern edge of this succession of
bare fields is the Bois de la Cusse, which was not,
strictly speaking, a continuous wood, but a sort of
common irregularly strewed with copses ; and on the
north were the valley of the Orne and the woods
bordering its meandering course. The 6th Corps,
Canrobert's, occupied and guarded the right flank,
having an outpost in St. Marie, and detachments
in the villages beyond Roncourt ; but placing its
main reliance on St. Privat, which, looked at from
the west, stood on the sky line, and, being nearly
surrounded by garden walls, had the aspect of a little
fortress. The Imperial Guard, considered as a reserve,
was drawn up in front of the fort of Plappeville, on
the east side of the deep ravine of St. Germain, The
fort of St. Quentin looked well over, and protected the
whole of the French left, and served especially as a
support to Lapasset's Brigade at St. Ruffine, which
faced south. Here the edge of the position touched
the suburbs of Metz, and was within cannon shot of
the right bank of the Moselle, opposite J ussy.
Pressed back on Metz 169
It will be seen that the battle-field may be divided
into two portions, differing from each other in their
external aspects. The bold curved ridge held by
Frossard rose between two and three hundred feet
above the bed of the Mance, having in rear ground
still higher, and was backed by the mass upon which
stands Fort St. |Quentin. It was, indeed, a natural
redoubt open to the rear, covered along its front by
the steep sides of a deep ravine, and accessible only
by the viaduct built over the brook, a solid embank-
ment, except where a vaulted opening allowed the
stream to pass. On the French side of the bridge
was the strong farmstead of St. Hubert, well walled
towards the assailant ; and further north the thick
woods of Genivaux, which ran near to and beyond
the farm of Leipzig ; so that while a deep gully
protected Frossard, Leboeuf had defensive outposts
in the woods, which he intrenched in a series of
recessed field works, and in the stout farm buildings,
which stormers could only reach by passing up gentle
accUvities, every yard whereof could be swept by fire.
The right half of the Une wais different in every respect
from the left — for there was no wood, and the whole
front, from Amanvillers to Roncourt was, for practical
purposes, though not so steep, as free from obstacles
as the slope of the South Downs. The left and centre
were supplied with artificial defences, but the right,
which did not rest on any natural support, and might
be turned, was not fortified by field works, because
Marshal Canrobert's intrenching tools had been per-
force, left behind at Chalons. The great defects of
this " inexpugnable " position were that it had bad
lateral commimications, no good hues of retreat, and
a weak right flank. Marshal Bazaine, who misjudged
the formidable strength of his left wing, and gave his
opponent the credit of contemplating an attack on
that side, had taken post in Fort Plappeville, where
he placed the reserves, and whence he could not see
the right, which it does not appear that he had ever
examined. The penalty for so grave an error was the
loss of the battle.
Bo 2
170 The Campaign of Sedan
The German Plans
Before starting from the hill over Flavigny for Pont
a Mousson on the afternoon of the 17th, General von
Moltke had issued an order to Prince Frederick
Charles and Von Steinmetz, indicating the operations
which were to begin the next morning. Their purport
was that while the 7th Corps stood fast, and the 8th
leant towards the right of the Second Army, the
Corps composing it should move forward, left in front,
facing north. It was a general direction, intended to
place the troops in such an array as would enable
them to strike and stop the French, if they still sought
to reach Chalons by the northern roads, or by a right
wheel bring the whole German force to bear upon
the enemy if he were found in position before Metz.
By six o'clock on the morning of the i8th, King
William and his staff were once more on the height
near Flavigny, soon after which time the whole Army
was in movement, and a sputter of musketry had
begun on the extreme right between Frossard's fore-
posts and those of the 7th Corps in the woods. The
8th had come up near to Rezonville ; the 9th was
moving between that village and St. Marcel ; the
•Guard was passing Mars la Tour ; and the 12th was
•on the road to Jarny. Behind, in second line, were
the loth and 3rd, the 5th and 6th divisions of cavalry
being attached to the latter Corps respectively ; while
the 2nd Corps, which had bivouacked at Pont a
Mousson, had started on another forced march, in
order, should there be a battle, to enter the field before
dark. The morning wore away, and, except on the
right where his left was visible and his skirmishers
active, no evidence of the enemy's presence could be
found. The Saxon cavalry division, scouting north-
ward and westward, lighted only on stragglers and
patrols ; the horsemen and staff officers out in front
of the other Corps watching as well as they could the
movements of the French, sent in divergent state-
ments, leaving it doubtful where their main body was,
and what it was doing or intended to do. Great uncer-
tainty, in short, prevailed until after ten o'clock, and
Pressed back on Metz 1^1
even then General von Moltke and the staff were under
the impression that the French right was near
Montigny la Grange : but, believing that the adver-
sary would fight, an order went forth at 10.30 a.m.
which finally brought the German Armies into line
facing eastward. Meantime Prince Frederick Charles
had, by degrees, also arrived at the conclusion that
the French would accept battle, and, at half- past
ten, he likewise instructed General von Manstein to
move towards La FoUe and begin an attack with his
artillery, provided the enemy's right was not beyond
Amanvillers. Immediately afterwards, while Von
Moltke still believed that the flank he wished to turn
was at the last-named village, the Prince acquired
certain information, from a Hessian cavalry patrpl,
that the French right rested on St. Privat la Montague.
By such slow degrees was the long- sought flank dis-
covered. Orders were then given directing the 12th
and the Guard to wheel to the right and move on
St. Marie aux Chenes and Habonville ; but before
they could come into line, Manstein's guns were
heard, and Von Moltke became apprehensive lest the
exciting sounds of conflict would carry away the
impetuous Steinmetz, lest the First Army, always so
eager for battle, might strike in prematurely and
injure a combination which depended so much upon
a simultaneous onset. Accordingly, the rein upon
that general was tightened, and he was told that he
might use artillery, yet not do more with his infantry
than attract the notice of the enemy and keep his
attention on the strain. But so thoroughly were the
chiefs of the German Corps imbued with the same
principles of conduct, that the Prince Royal of
Saxony and Prince Augustus of Wiirtemburg had
already, in anticipation, prepared to play the part
which was to be assigned them. Having learned,
from their own scouting parties, where the French
right stood, and having heard the guns at Verneville,
they had both wheeled their divisions to the eastward,
and pushed out their advance Guards. Thus they
were ready to march at the moment when the order
arrived : in fact, the order was in course of executio i
172 The Campaign of Sedan
before it reached the officers to whom it had been
addressed. Meantime, acting on the first instructions
from the Prince, drawn up when he beheved the
right rested on Amanvillers, General von Manstein,
a httle before noon, had begun.
The Battle of Gravelotte
At this moment, it should be noted, the French
camps on the right centre and right did not know that
an enemy was within a long mile of their bivouacs.
The usual patrols had been sent out and had returned
— even scouts selected by the local officials for their
knowledge of the country — to report that they had
not seen anybody. Marshal Canrobert, in his evidence
on the Bazaine court-martial, expressly testifies to
the fact, and adds that the first intimation he received
came from the boom of hostile guns on his left front.
The troops of Ladmirault's Corps, encamped on both
sides of Amanvillers, were peacfefuUy engaged in
cooking their noontide meal, when General von
Manstein, who seems to have been endowed with
some of the impetuosity of his namesake, who figured
in the wars of Frederick II., riding ahead of his Corps,
caught sight of the quiescent camp. The temptation
could not be withstood. From the hiUs near Verne-
ville he could not see the troops at St. Privat, but he
had been informed by the Hessian cavalry that the
French were there. He had been formally enjoined
to attack if the enemy's right was near La Folie ;.
it was much to the north of that farm ; yet Manstein,
unable to neglect the opportunity of startling a negli-
gent camp by an outburst of fire, sent the solitary
battery which had accompanied him into instant
action from a rising ground east of Verneville. The
first shot was fired at a quarter to twelve, and its
successors roused the French line from St. Privat to
the centre, for Frossard and Leboeuf, seemed to have
been on the alert. General von Blumenthal, with the
leading infantry battalions, was at that time moving
on the farm of Chantrenne, and he was stopped by
the lively musketry salute which greeted his men.
Manstein, seeing that his guns were too distant from
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174 The Campaign of Sedan
their living targets, now ordered the battery forward
and it was soon joined, first by the divisional then by
the Corps artillery ; the whole finally forming a long
Hne of fifty-four pieces, each battery having, as it
dashed up, wheeled to the right and opened fire. The
movement was a grave error, for the long rounded hill
on which the batteries stood faced south-east, offered
no shelter except on its low right shoulder, and the
guns were exposed to a fire from the front, the flank,
and even from the left rear. Two batteries were
slewed round to the left, but that did not remedy the
original mistake. There were no infantry at hand
to keep down the fire of the French foot, which, lurking
in the hollows, sent a hail of bullets among the guns.
Committed to this false position, the superb German
artillerymen did their utmost to make it good ; but
no heroism could avail against its cruel disadvantages.
General Blumenthal, indeed, had carried the Chan-
trenne farm, but the enemy, at the first shot, had
thrown a garrison into another homestead named
Champenois, whence the chassepots smote the front
of the batteries. The Hessians, also, had developed
a powerful attack through the Bois de la Cusse towards
the railway embankment and Amanvillers, thus
taking off some of the severe pressure from the devoted
gunners. But the French infantry crept nigher and
nigher ; under the rush of shells, shrapnel, and bullets,
officers, men and horses fell fast and faster. By
concentrating their aim the Germans crushed one or
silenced another battery ; by using shell they some-
times scattered oncoming infantry ; still the penalty
of haste and a wrong direction had to be paid. The
left battery, disabled, was caught in the tempest and
borne down by a rush of French foot. Two pieces
were dragged away by hardy men and wounded horses;
two were left on the field ; and two were captured.
Yet this astonishing artillery, though horribly
shattered, continued to hold its ground. It was saved,
at a later moment, from a persevering attack onMts
vulnerable flank by the steady onset of an infantry
battalion, which lost nearly half its strength in succour-
ing the guns. Then, for the position wasi really
Pressed back on Metz 175
untenable, all the batteries, except three on the
right, where there was a little shelter, at length drew
reluctantly, in succession, out of the shambles and
went rearward to refit. It was half -past two ; they
had been more than two hours in the jaws of death
and had lost no fewer than 210 officers and men and
370 horses. So audaciously, if sometimes unwisely,
was this grand arms employed in battle that no one
need be astonished to learn how Canrobert, who
loved a picturesque phrase, called his dreaded and
admired opponents, " tirailleurs d' artillerie."
Prince Frederick Charles at the Front
Manstein, who was to have attacked the French
right, had dashed somewhat impetuously against the
right centre, and for some two hours his Corps
sustained the brunt of the engagement, for the
Guards and the Saxons were still on the march, the
first heading for Verneville and Habonville, the
second on St. Marie aux Chenes, into which Canrobert
had hurried three battalions. North of the artillery,
whose bloody adventure has been described, the
Hessian division, under Prince Louis, posted astride
of the railway embankment, which, running from
Amanvillers to Habonville, cut the line of troops at
right angles, held the copses of the Bois de la Cusse,
and, supported by thirty guns, formed the backbone
of the German attack in that exposed quarter.
Further south, the other half of the 9th Corps, the
i8th Division, had its reserves near Verneville, with
troops estabhshed in Chantrenne and L' En vie ; but
they could make no way, because the French were
solidly planted in Champenois, in the Bois de Geni-
vaux, in a spinney projecting to the westward of La
FoUe, in that farm and on the higher ground above.
About half-past two the contest in the centre had
become defensive on the part of the 9th Corps, and
the energies of the laders and the troops alike were
taxed to retain the ground already occupied and
extricate the artillery. Prince Frederick Charles, on
learning just before noon, from the cavalry reports,
where the French right actually stood, became anxious
176 The Campaign of Sedan
when he heard at St. Marcel the uproar of a hot
artillery engagement, and he rode off at once towards
the sound and smoke which rose in clouds above the
woods. On reaching Habonville he was able to survey
the conflict, and also discern, in outline, the enemy's
position at St. Privat. The great headquarters were
still imperfectly informed, yet they wished to restrain
precipitate action and prevent a home-thrusting
central attack until strong bodies could be launched
against the French right. The Prince, however, saw
that the combat could not be broken off, and he set
himself, to make all secure by placing a brigade of
the Guard, as a reserve, to assist the 9th Corps, which
was all that Manstein' requested, and by ordering up
four batteries from the 3rd Corps, the infantry masses
of which were not far from Verne ville. Prince
Augustus of Wiirtemberg had preceded the Guard
Corps, and as soon as General Pape, commanding the
ist infantry division, arrived with the advanced
guard it was arranged that his four batteries should
go into action to the south-west of Habonville, that
is on the left of the much-tried Hessians, and cover
the march of the Guard towards St. Marie. The spot
first selected for the guns was found defective, and
the batteries, at a gallop, took up new ground further
to the left, to the south-west of St. Ail. Thereupon,
that village was occupied by the Guard ; Prince
Augustus sent for the Corps artillery, and soon nine
batteries were arrayed between the two villages, on a
diagonal line pointing to the north-west, that is, so
disposed as to bring to bear a heavy fire on St. Privat,
a succour which gave further rehef to the gunners of
the 9th Corps. For not only Canrobert's cannon,
but his infantry, lurking in the shallow valleys along
the front, now directed their shells and bullets upon
the Guard batteries. Although the French did not
attempt any heavy stroke, they were active and
enterprising, and kept their swarms of skirmishers
within a thousand yards of the guns, but, as the
official historian remarks, over and over again, beyond
the range of the needle-gun. Before three o'clock
the Guard Corps was up, and the 12th, or rather half
Pressed back on Metz 177
of it, had approached near St. Marie. Such was the
condition of the battle on that side ; and it is now
necessary to describe the daring operations of the
First Army, on the German right wing.
Steinmetz Attacks the French Left
It will be remembered that the 7th and 8th Corps,
commanded by Von Steinmetz, upon whom it was
necessary to keep a tight hand, had been brought up
to the south and west of Gravelotte, the left of the
8th touching Manstein's right. The 7th provided the
outposts which hned the fringe and salient of the
Bois de Vaux, and these troops were engaged in an
intermittent and bickering contest with the French
infantry thrown out upon that flank. The ist
Division of Cavalry, from the right bank, crossing the
Moselle to Borny, rode up about noon as a support,
and General von Fransecky, preceding the 2nd Corps,
assured the King, whom he found near Flavigny, that
one division would arrive in time to form a reserve
for the First Army. Von Steinmetz, on a height near
Gravelotte, nervously observed the French, sent in
repeated information that they were moving off, and
evidently desired to adopt the tactics which he had
appHed on two previous occasions. He was ordered
to be still, and when the guns spoke at Verneville,
Von Moltke, knowing their effect upon the veteran
warrior, intimated afresh that he must stand expectant
yet awhile. Permission was given, as already men-
tioned, to use his guns ; but when the despatch was
handed to Steinmetz he had already opened fire with
the batteries of the 7th Corps, arrayed to the south,
and of the 8th to the north of Gravelotte ; and the
infantry had been moved eastward to the edge of the
region just clear of the French fire. The troops in the
Bois de Vaux were reinforced, the mill of the Mance
and the gully itself were occupied, and an ample force
was posted above the ravine to protect the Hne of
guns.
The expectant attitude, always distasteful to Von
Steinmetz, was not, and in the nature of things could
not be long maintained by the First Army. The
178 The Campaign of Sedan
generals on the spot knew more accurately what had
occurred in the centre than the Great Staff when the
order to look on was written. General von Goeben,
knowing how deeply Manstein had committed the 9th
Corps, felt bound to attack in order that he might
detain and provide employment for the French left.
From a point near Gravelotte he could see the masses
of troops held in reserve by Leboeuf and Frossard,
with the ready assent of his immediate chief he pushed
forth columns from both his divisions. On the south
of the high road the soldiers disappeared in the deep
gully of the Mance, their path marked by puffs of
smoke as they drove back the French skirmishers,
and reappeared chmbing the opposite slope leading
to the huge quarries below Point du Jour ; but here,
struck and repelled by the defenders, they vanished
again into the depths, where they held on to the gravel
pits in the bottom. Nearer the high road, one
battalion wedged itself in to the quarries close to St.
Hubert ; while beyond the highway, the Germans
dashed through the wood, established themselves on
its eastern border above and about the farmstead,
and stormed the stone parapets set up by the French
foreposts at the confluence of the two streamlets which
form the Mance. Farther they could not go, because
Leboeuf s men stiffly held the eastern patch of wood-
land, while the open ground towanis the Moscow
farm was swept by musketry fire from the deep banks
in the cross-roads, from the shelter trenches above,
and from the loopholed buildings of the farm. But-
the attack on the Bois de Genivaux aided the men of
the 9th Corps, who, from Chantrenne, had entered
its northern border, and compelled the defenders
of the lines in front of Moscow to turn upon the new
assailants. Then the companies which had gathered
about St. Hubert became engaged in a destructive
contest, for the walls were high and well garnished,
and the northern point of attack was more or less
commanded by the higher ground towards Moscow.
On the south front, however, there proved to be more
chances of success.
Relying, perhaps, on Frossard' s infantry and guns.
Pressed back on Metz 179
the discharges from which commanded the high road,
the garrison had forgotten to barricade the gates,
doors, and windows ; and when the place had been
cannonaded by the southern hne of guns, the assailants
who had suffered great loss with unflinching hardi-
hood, came on with an irresistible rush, and carried
the farm by storm. The feat was accomplished about
three o'clock ; and the work done gave a solid support
to the German right wing. At this time, the German
guns, so well fought, having taken more forward,
positions, had mastered the French artillery, whichi
sank into comparative silence. There were seventy-
eight pieces in action on the south of the high road,
and fifty-four on the north, and their superiority
is admitted and recorded by Frossard himself, who-
saw his batteries idle or withdrawn, his reserves
smitten, and its defenders Hterally burnt out of the
farm buildings at Point du Jour. Yet the French
left was not shaken, it was hardly touched, by a
vehement attack which had given the Germans a
better defensive position, indeed, but still one only
on the verge of Frossard' s stronghold, and affording
no facihties for a rush against the fortified hues
occupied by the 3rd French Corps, in the thickets of
Genivaux and on the brow of the bare hills.
The capture of St. Hubert was nearly coincident
with that stage in the heady fight before Vemeville,
which saw the Hessians embattled on the Bois de la
Cusse, the exposed artillery of the 9th Corps in retreat
from a false position, and the opportune appearance
of the Guard about Habonville and of the Saxons
to the north-west of St. Marie. In front of their main
line the French held the latter village, were well
forward in the hollows west of Amanvillers, stood
fast in the farms of La Fohe, Leipsic, Moscow, Cham-
penois, and that portion of the Bois de Genivaux
which covered the eastern arm of the Mance. The
fight had raged for more than three hours, and they
had only lost possession of the L' En vie and Chan-
trenne, places distant from their front, and St. Hubert,
which, no doubt, was a dangerous-looking sahent
within a few hundred yards of the well-defended ridge ^
180 The Campaign of Sedan
where the high road turned at right angles towards
the blazing farm of Point du Jour. From end to
end, therefore, and it was between seven and eight
miles in length, measured by an air-line, the whole
of Bazaine's formidable position was intact. The
Imperial Guard, the effective reserve, still stood on
the heights east of Chatel St. Germain, behind the
left, and six miles from the right where the battle was
to be decided.
Operations by the German Left Wing
The two corps, forming the left wing of the German
Army, had been guided far more by the reports
brought in by daring cavalry scouts, than by the
orders received either from Prince Frederick Charles
or Von Moltke, because these latter were necessarily
less well-informed than the Corps commanders who
were the first to receive the information. Yet the
latter, of course, while taking their own hne conformed
±0 the governing idea, which was that the French
right flank, wherever it was, should be turned.
Moving eastward from Jamy, with the 12th Corps
the Crown Prince of Saxony learned before two
o'clock, that Roncourt was the extreme northern
limit of Canrobert's Corps, and he, therefore, varied a
headquarters order to march upon St. Marie, by
•directing one division, the 23rd, under Prince George,
to march down the right bank of the Orne, through
Auboue, and turn to the right upon Roncourt. One
t>rigade of the 24th Division he directed on St. Marie,
l^eeping the other back as a support. About the same
time the whole of the Guard, except one brigade
detached to back up the 9th Corps, had formed up
near Habonville, and their batteries, as we have
seen, had taken up a position which enabled them to
•smite St. Privat. When, therefore, General Pape
had moved up the Guards hy the ravine west of St.
Marie he found the Saxons ready to co-operate with
him in driving out the French battahons occupying
the pretty village which has the air of a small rural
town. It sits at the foot of the long bare incUne leading
down from St. Privat, traversed by a straight road
Pressed back on Metz 1^1
bordered, as usual, by tall scraggy trees ; and nest-
ling amid gardens and walled inclosures shines out a
cheerful white spot in the diversified landscape.
From this point St. Privat looms dark and large on
the hill-top, larger and darker looking than it really
is. To the southward of that village, beyond a dip,
down and up which the cottages creep, stands the
farmstead of Jerusalem, and further south the ground
rolls away towards Amanvillers. More than a mile
of open country separates St. Privat from St. Marie,
affording no lurking places to either side, except such
as can be found in the gentle swelUng and falling of
the fields ; indeed, to the casual observer the smooth-
ness of the surface seems broken only by the poplars
on the highway. West of St. Marie there is a shallow
ravine, and beyond it copses, and south, as we know
towards Verneville, more copses, ruddy brown farm-
steads, and white villages. At this moment the
battle smoke puffed out, curled, rose in fantastic
clouds, or rolled along the ground upon the hill-
sides and above the thickets and barns ; about St.
Marie, however, the air as yet was untainted by the
sulphurous mists of combat so rank a mile away, but
the garrison stood painfully expectant of the coming
fray. For though the Guards were hidden the Saxon
brigade to the north-west was visible and the skir-
mishers driven from St. Ail, told how the " Prussians '*
were mustering for the onset.
Suddenly Imes of skirmishers appear, gun after
gun drives up, the Saxon artillery reinforcing the
pieces which the Guard can spare, until three distinct
lines of batteries are formed and open on the village.
The German Generals, who judged the place to be
stronger and more strongly garrisoned than it was,
had brought to bear overwhelming forces — probably
also to save time ; so that, after enduring a hot
cannonade from seventy-eight guns, the French bat-
talions, who had borne the bombardment and had
spent abundance of ammunition in return, did not
await the shock of the storming columns sent against
them, but fled by the eastern outlet to their main
body. The Guard and the Saxons, who had come
182 The Campaign of Sedan j
on with ringing hurrahs, swept into the place on all/
sides ; some prisoners were taken, but the greater/
mass of the defenders and the French battery which/
had kept up a flank fire on the approach to the
south face of the village, got safely up the hill. When
they were inside St. Marie the assailants were able
to see that " the adversary had done nothing to
increase, by artificial means, the defensive value of
a post, naturally strong ; and had even neglected to
barricade the roads and paths by which it is entered."
The truth is that the occupation of St. Marie by the
French was an afterthought, and that although de-
fensible in itself, the place was far too remote from
the main French line of battle to be supported ; and
the garrison, which, no doubt, in a different temper,
might have died fighting in the streets and houses,
yielded when they felt the hail of shells, and saw the
impending storm-cloud of infantry ready to burst
upon them. The defenders hastened towards Ron-
court and St. Privat, losing men from the fire of their
exulting enemies, who followed on the eastern side
until stopped by the chassepot and the guns on the
hills. 'Thus a point of support was secured in that
quarter, about half -past three, but no advance could
be made until the artillery had prepared the way,
and the turning column had made further progress in
its march.
Nevertheless, the Saxon troops on the north of
St. Marie, and some who had been engaged in its
capture, carried away by their ardour and the sight
of a retreating foe, pursued so far, and were so
promptly reinforced, that a fierce infantry fight
ensued. For a French brigade, led by General Pechot,
dashed out of their lines, struck roughly on the front
and turned the left flank of the Saxons who, being
obstinate, held the sHghtly uneven meadow lands
with great difficulty and much loss. Although they
were aided by their own batteries, and those of the
Guard which had been moved forward on the front
between St. Ail and Habonville, and whose fire
smote diagonally the French columns rushing out of
Roncourt and St. Privat, yet the Saxons were over-
Pressed back on Metz 183
matched ; and, after much labour, as they were
nearly all spread out in skirmishing order, General
Nehrdorff, who comprehended the situation, and saw
the waste of effort, gradually drew them back to
the original hne. The French counter attack, swift
and sharp, was well sustained, and the bold Saxons
paid a heavy price for their temerity. While this
combat was in progress, the Crown Prince of Saxony
from a height in front of Auboue, gazing intently
towards Roncourt, made an important discovery —
he saw troops in movement to the north of that
village, and, in fact, Canrobert's outposts extended
nearly to the Ome. Thus, after a long search, yet
not before four o'clock, the extreme right of the
French Army was at length found, and thereupon the
turning column of horse, foot, and guns, one half
Prince George's division, was ordered to take a still
wider sweep northward ere it wheeled in upon the
French rear. As it marched stealthily on its way,
the Saxon artillery developed a long Une of batteries
pointing towards Roncourt, protected by Craushaar's
brigade, which made a lodgment in the western
block of a deep wooded ravine on the left of the
guns, and stood ready to dash forward when their
comrades emerged from the villages and copses be-
hind the French right. In the centre the troops of
the 9th Corps had stormed and occupied the farm of
Champenois, had tried again, without success, to
win the eastern tracts of the Bois de Genivaux, and,
supported by io6 guns, had maintained a sanguinary
contest with Leboeuf's steady brigades, ensconced
over against them in the farms, thickets, and hollow
ways. About five o'clock the fury of the battle
diminished for a moment, in the centre, on the left,
and even on the right, where, down to that hour,
it had raged with a spirit and vigour which must now
be described.
General Frossard Repels a Fresh Attack
The enormous defensive strength of the position
held by General Frossard' s Corps does not seem to
have been thoroughly understood by anyone except
184 The Campaign of Sedan
that accomplished engineer. Marshal Bazaine did
not perceive its value, for he was perpetually afraid
that the Germans would break in upon it, either from
the Bois de Vaux or by the high road, and his appre-
hensions or prejudices were confrmed when a column
of troops was seen to be ascerding the river-road
from Ars towards Jussy, near St. Ruffine. General
von Steinmetz, on the other hand, who had peered
out from every available height between the Bois
des Ognons and Gravelotte, although each attack
which he had directed had been repelled, thought he
discerned symptoms of weakness and even of retreat.
The truth is that Frossard's men were well hidden,
not less by the natural features of the ground than
by the trenches which he had dug, and the breast-
works which he had thrown up. If his batteries
were silent or withdrawn it was because, although
overpowered in the gun fight, they were yet still able
to arrest the onsets of infantr^^ ; and if the French
fantassins were invisible, it was because they were
lying down or arrayed on the reverse of the ridge.
The hot-tempered General of the First Army, how-
ever, surmised, after the capture of St. Hubert, that
troops had been detached to aid the distant right,
or that a moment had come when, if pressed home
by an attack of all arms. Point du Jour could be
carried, and the French driven headlong into Metz.
Under the influence of this delusion, he rode up to
General von Goeben, who was watching the battle
near Gravelotte. Captain Set on, an Indian officer
who was present, noticed the violent gestures and
rapid talk of Steinmetz because they offered so
strong a contrast to the steady coolness of the younger
warrior. At that moment he was expounding
opinions and issuing orders which brought on one of
the most brilliant and destructive episodes in the
battle. Goeben had already sent forward Gneisenau's
brigade, partly on and partly north of the road, but
they were needed to feed the combat, support the
weakened and scattered companies, and secure St.
Hubert.
What Steinmetz now designed was a home-thrust
Pressed back on Metz 185
on the French position ; and, accordingly, he ordered
several batteries of the 7th Corps and Von Hartmann's
cavalry division to cross the Gravelotte defile and
plant themselves on the gentle acclivities to the
south of the road. Now the highway runs first
through a cutting, is then carried on an embank-
ment, and only near St. Hubert are the gentle
southern slopes above the gully accessible to horses and
guns. But this narrow track swarmed with troops,
into the midst of which came the cavalry and artillery.
The infantry gave way, and four batteries arrived
on the opposite side of the defile, followed by the
9th Uhlans. But so deadly was the storm of shot
which burst from the French position — for cannon,
mitrailleuse, and chassepot went instantly to work —
that two of the batteries were at once driven into
the ravine below. The Uhlans actually rode out
into the open, took up a position, and remained until
it was plain to all that the lives of men and horses
were being uselessly sacrificed. The other regiments,
" well peppered," had already gone " threes about "
before clearing the defUe, and the Uhlans, who were
dropping fast, rode back, as well as they could, to
Gravelotte or the sheltering woods. A more extrava-
gant movement has rarely been attempted in war,
or one less justified by the evident facts of the situa-
tion as well as by the deadly results. Yet two
batteries actually remained, one, under Captain Hasse,
in the open, about seven hundred yards from the
French lines of musketry ; the other, commanded by
Captain Gniigge, covered in front by the low wall of
the St. Hubert garden, but lending a flank to the
adversary at the top of the road. Captain Hasse and
his gunners were stubborn men ; they fought their
battery for two hours, in fact, until nearly all the
men and horses were down. Even then Hasse would
not retire, and one of his superiors was obliged to
hurry up fresh teams and forcibly drag the guns
away. But the battery under the wall held on,
and did good service by firing on the French about
the Moscow farm.
The failure of these mistaken attacks, and the
186 The Campaign of Sedan
retreat of guns and horsemen, seems to have shakensi
the constant German infantry, for they gave ground,
everywhere but at St. Hubert, and the French came
on with such vigour that General Steinmetz himself
and his staff were under a heavy fire. Fortunately^
three fresh battalions plunged into the combat ;
but they could not do more than sustain it ; for
every attempt made to approach the French, either
towards the Moscow farm or Point du Jour, met
with a speedy repulse. Indeed, down to five o'clock,,
the point of time at which we have arrived, along the
whole line, no progress whatever had been made by
the German right wing, which held on to St. Hubert,
the ravine of the Mance, and the western portion of
the Bois de Genivaux, but could not show a rifle
or bayonet beyond in any direction. It was only the
powerful German artillery which still remained the
superb masters of the field, so far as their action was-
concerned.
It was at this time that King WilHam and his
staff, which included Prince Bismarck, rode up to
the high ground above Malmaison, where he estab-
lished his headquarters in the field, and whence,,
until nearly dark, he watched the battle. Over
against him, concerned respecting his left, and
ignorant of the state of the battle on his right, was
Marshal Bazaine, in the fort of Plappeville, whither
he had returned from St. Quentin, which com-
manded a wide view to the south and south-west.
He says that he gave General Bourbaki discretion -to-
use the Guard wherever it might be wanted. But
that officer knew little more than his Commander-in-
Chief. An hour or two earlier, taking with him the
Grenadier Division of the Guard, he had started to-
wards the north, following a hilly road east of the
St. Germain ravine. He had seen the immense
mountain of white smoke which towered up in the
north-west, but the current of air, hardly a wind,
apparently blew from the south-east, since at Plappe-
ville he could not hear the roar of the guns, and the
view was so obstructed that he could not obtain
even a ghmpse of the country about St. Privat. He
Pressed back on Metz 187
had to leave behind him the Voltigeurs and Chasseurs
of the Guard, who were partly in reserve and partly
posted to support Leboeuf, who called up one regi-
ment from Brincourt's brigade. Bazaine had also
sent some guns to support Lapasset in his contest
with the troops which Von Golz had marched up from
Ars to the woodlands and vineyards opposite St.
Ruffine. The French at this stage were stUl in good
spirits. If Leboeuf was a Httle anxious behind his
farmsteads, his woods, and skilfully- disposed re-
entering echelons of shelter trenches ; Frossard, who
soon after reheved his front ranks from the reserve,
was content ; and De Ladmirault, as was usual with
him, believed that he might be almost considered
victorious, and only required a few battahons of the
Guard to insure his success. The ammunition on both
sides was running out here and there ; indeed,
Canrobert declares that he was compelled to borrow
from De Ladmirault ; still, there was enough to last
out the day. Over the seven or eight miles of flame
and smoke and tumult, for a brief interval, came
what may be called a lull compared with the deafen-
ing tempest of sounds which smote on the ear when
the rival combatants raged most fiercely.
The Last Fights near St. Hubert
For some time longer the German right wing did
little more than defend its somewhat irregular line
of front. The 2nd Corps, which had been marching
every day since it quitted the Saar, had attained
Rezonville, and King WiUiam placed it under the
orders of Von Steinmetz. As the minutes flew by,
the Headquarter Staff on the hill near Malmaison
were impressed by a ' fact and an appearance — the
increase of the vivacity and volume of fire towards
the north — where the Guard had begun its onset on
St. Privat — and the symptoms of wavering which
seemed, and only seemed, to be visible on the French
left. The King, therefore, sanctioned a fresh and
formidable advance upon Frossard' s brigades by all
the troops which Von Steinmetz could spare for the
enterprise. But the main object of Von Moltke, we
1
188 The Campaign of Sedan
infer, was to prevent, by striking hard, the despatch
of any assistance to Canrobert, and thus assist, by a
resolute advance, upon one wing, the decisive move-
ment then approaching its critical stage on the other.
The 2nd Corps was, therefore, brought up to Grave-
lotte, and all the available troops of the 7th and 8th
were held in readiness to assail, once more, the
enemies beyond the Mance.
But the French, who, though wearied, were still
undaunted, anticipating their foes, became the
assailants. Their silent guns spoke out in thunder,
the heights were shrouded in a canopy of smoke,
and the bolts hurled from the batteries fell like hail
on the woods, and sent such an iron shower as far
forward as the hill- top where the King and his great
men stood, that Von Roon prevailed on the King to
ride further back. The hvely French skirmishers
dashed forth into the open, strove hard to reach
St. Hubert, drove the German foreposts headlong
down the steeps into the Mance gully, filled the high
road with a rushing, clamorous crowd of fugitives,
and even caused terror and commotion in the rear
of Gravelotte, so vehement and unexpected was the
stroke. Fortunately for the Germans, the principal
bodies of troops in St. Hubert and the woods were
unshaken, and their rapid fire, as well as the re-
sponses sent from their artillery, checked the violent
outfall. Then, as the sun was getting low, the fresh
German brigades struck in. The men of the 7th
Corps went down into and over the Mance valley,
and stormed up the eastern bank. The 2nd Corps,
eager to win, pressed along the highway, with their
drums and trumpets sounding the charge, or moved
on the south side. They passed onward in a tumult,
and boldly tried to grapple with the strong lines of
the defence. Not only their commander, Fransecky,
and Steinmetz, but Von Moltke himself rode into
the defile to witness arid direct this huge and up-
roarious column of attack. But neither their num-
bers, and they were many, nor their valour, which
was great, nor the unfaltering devotion of their
officers could resist the smashing fire of cannon and
Pressed back on Metz 189
mitrailleuse and chassepot which the French brought
to bear upon them. Some daring spirits pressed
close up towards the ditches and breastworks, a few
clung to the banks and bushes on the brow of the
slope near Point du Jour. A dense mass collected
near St. Hubert, where Fransecky and Steinmetz, in
the thick of the throng, saw the bands who had
hurried to the front brea koff, turn and hasten rear-
ward, while fresh troops still pressed onward through
the confused crowds of fugitive. So for some time,
in the twilight, the strange fight went on. As it
grew darker, the outlines of Lebceuf's cleverly-
designed shelter trenches near the Moscow farm were
drawn in lines of musketry fire, and gradually nothing,
save the flashes of guns and rifles, could be seen in
the gloom. At length, when friend could not be
distinguished from foe, when no breach could be
made in the French line, which, except the outpost
of St. Hubert, remained what it had been in the
morning, the generals placed strong guards on their
front, and stood prepared to renew the battle with
the dawn. General Frossard, who had engaged all
his reserves, was proud of his achievement, and not
less in the foresight he displayed in providing arti-
ficial cover for his men. That had made the position,
from the Great Quarries to the farm and copse of
La Folie impregnable, and renders it all the more
difficult to comprehend how Marshal Bazaine could
have shown such manifest distrust of the fastness
which protected his left wing. The attack on St.
Ruffine by Von Golz was merely a diversion shrewdly
designed to increase the Marshal's alarms, and its
relative success shews how correctly Von Moltke
estimated his adversary's abilities as a soldier. He
reaped an ample reward, since long before the last
shot was fired in the neighbourhood of St. Hubert,
the French had been worsted at the other and distant
extremity of the vast field of battle.
190 The Campaign of Sedan
The Prussian Guard on the Centre and Left
It may be said, indeed, that not one, but several
battles were fought on the i8th of August, in the long
space between the Bois de Vaux and the Forest ofi
Moyoeuvre. They were inter-dependent, because one j
mass of combatants held fast another, and the!
essence of the German plan was that three-fourths i
of the French Army should be nailed to the positions :
they had taken up, while the remainder were crushed
by the pressure of superior forces. The original
design of Von Moltke was framed on the supposition
that the French right stood near Amanvillers, and
that he would be able to fling upon an exposed flank
two Corps d'Armee. Before the error was discovered,
several hours had been consumed ; the Guard had
been obhged to prolong the front fighting line ; only
a part of the Saxon Corps could be spared to engage
in the turning movement, and the ground which they
had to traverse grew longer and longer as the day
waxed shorter. The extent of country over which
the various armies operated, and the smoke which
obscured the view, prevented a correct appreciation
of the situation of affairs at a given moment, and
the German commanders were liable to be deceived,
and were deceived by appearances. The knowledge
that so brief an interval of daylight remained, and
an anxiety to make the most of precious moments,
quickened the tendency to decisive action, and thus
brought about the rash and premature attack which-
was so destructive, and nearly proved so fatal to
the Prussian Guard.
Their magnificent divisions of infantry, it will be
remembered, stood between St. Ail and St. Marie,
except one brigade which had been annexed to the
9th Corps. It was intended that they should remain
quiescent until the Saxon column broke out upon'
the French right in the direction of Roncourt, and
for a brief interval of time, after five o'clock, the
action in the centre as well as on the left was confinedi
to a dehberate cannonade. Prince Augustus oi
Wiirtemberg, who was then near St. Ail gazing alter-l
Pressed back on Metz 191
natively on the ebb and flow of Manstein's battle
in the Bois de la Cusse and towards the Bois de
Genivaux, and on the aspect of the field about St.
Privat, thought he saw French troops moving south
from Roncourt. Combining this impression with the
fact that, as we have already stated, a long line of
Saxon guns had been arrayed due north of St. Marie,
he rapidly formed the opinion that the turning
column was on the point of striking the enemy, and
that the moment had come when the Guard should
be employed. He was also somewhat affected by the
condition of the combat in the centre, and, perhaps,
as much by the waning day which left so narrow a
margin of time for decisive activity. He appealed
to Prince Frederick Charles and easily converted the
Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army to his
views. So the order went forth that the Guard
should attack, and having set Budritzki's division
in motion from St. Ail, Prince Augustus rode to
St. Marie. There General von Pape revealed to
him his misconception — the turning column was not ,
even then in sight, and unless preceded by bombard-
ment from all the batteries, a front attack on St.
Privat, Pape said, would have but a shght chance
of success. Why, then, was it dehvered ? Because
the other division of the Guard was actually at that
moment under fire and losing men by scores on the
open slope. It was a bitter moment for Prince
Augustus, whose error was to cost the Guard losses
which are counted by thousands. Moreover, General
Manstein, seeing Budritzki in motion, and De Cissey,
whose division formed De Ladmirault's right, wheel-
ing up diagonally on the flanks of the new foe, deter-
mined to despatch his Brigade of Guards, the 3rd,
straight upon Amanvillers, to resume the offensive
with his Hessians, and support, by all the means he
possessed, the daring onset initiated on his immediate
left. Practically, therefore, although other troops
were engaged at different points on the front of the 9th
Corps, the battle on the northern half of the field was
thenceforth fought out by the Saxons and the Guard.
The character of the unequal combat was the same
192
The Campaign of Sedan
from end to end of the line — superb, because it proved
the steadfast valour of Prussia's chosen infantry ;
awful, because the bare fields in the track of the
onslaught were soon literally strewed with thousands;
of dead and wounded. The charge of the 3rd Brigade |
towards Amanvillers was pushed with such unwaver-'
ing velocity that, although the ranks were thinned at
every stride, the hardy survivors, spread out in I
skirmishing order, carried their front to the brow'
of a hill within half a mile of Amanvillers. There'
they were stopped by the fire which smote them in
front and flank. Yet there they staj^ed undaunted,
and maintained a steady contest with antagonists
who, if they tried to dash forward, could not reach
the unyielding hne of the 3rd Brigade. On their
left the Hessians moved up on both sides of the
railroad cutting, and finally captured a house built
for the watchman at a level crossing. Comrades of
the 9th Corps, from the Bois de la Cusse, soldiers
who had been toiling for many hours, essayed to
reach the Guard, but they had not strength enough
left, and retired when they suddenly discerned, above
Amanvillers, two regiments of Grenadiers — ^it was
Bourbaki who had led Picard's battalions on to the
plateau, but who, distrusting appearances visible
about and beyond St. Privat, feared to plunge into
the fight at Amanvillers. Looking out from his hill,
Bourbaki may have seen the devoted march of
Budritzki's troops up the gentle slope in front of
St. Ail ; for these, what was left of them, were closing
on the spur which hes south-west of St. Privat, and
stretching out as far as the high road to St. Marie,
a long dark streak of fire and smoke and the broad
fields behind them black with the dying and dead.
For the constant Guards, undismayed, the remnant
of a splendid division, not only persevered and won
the little rounded hill, but rooted themselves under
its shelving terraces, while the left companies, next
the high road, found shelter in its ditches. They
had suffered most when beyond the effective range
of the needle-gun, in the belt where the chassepot had
rained balls as thick as hail. They could now retort
Pressed back on Metz 193
the fire, and at least keep their opponents at bay.
These battahons, hke those of the 3rd Brigade, had
dared all the deadly perils of the open ground ; they
had bought a relative success at a heavy price, and
were resolved to retain what they had won, their
line of fire extending from the high road to the rounded
eminence, or long hillock, south-west of Jerusalem.
Three batteries had driven up to aid the infantry ;
the main body of the Guard Artillery had advanced
eastward ; and the Hessians and 3rd Brigade pro-
longed the front of combat to the south.
During part of the period thus occupied General
Pape, holding one brigade in reserve at St. Marie,
attacked with the other on the north of the high
road. Starting at a quarter to six o'clock, this body
of Guardsmen crossed the road facing north, and then
wheeling in succession to the right, went obstinately
forward. The French fire, from the outset, was close
and deadly ; officers of all ranks fell fast ; com-
panies were reduced to straggling groups or scattered
files ; the whole line was soon dispersed here and
there ; but they still pressed on. One moiety trended
to the right, another to the left, and General von
Pape, watchful, active, and fortunate, for he was
not hit, led fresh battalions to fill up the gaping
intervals. Soon after the foremost bands had got
within seven hundred yards of St. Privat, where, in
places, at least, the slope afforded shelter, the rein-
forcements arrived ; and it may be said that thence-
forth a continuous, yet thin line, curved inwards at
the northern end, and fringed with smoke and fire,
stretched irregularly over the vast glacis-like decliv-
ities from opposite Amanvillers to the outskirts of
Roncourt, where the Saxons prolonged the ragged
and shapeless, but redoubtable array. Against this
mere thread of riflemen, not even when they
were weakest, the French directed no bold attack,
perhaps because they had no reserves and stood
in respectful awe of the hostile artillery which
drew nearer and nearer as the evening wore on, until
jhe black batteries formed a second line to the
iintrepid infantry.
194 The Campaign of Sedan
It was about seven o'clock. St. Privat was in
flames, the black and tawny smoke of the burning
village, boiHng upwards, stood out against the
obscured sky in strong contrast to the swelling
clouds of white vapour, through which leaped inces-
sant sparkles from hundreds of rifles, and the broader
flashes of the cannon. At no preceding period of
this dreadful day had the battle raged with such
intensity ; for now along the whole front of eight
miles there was a deafening roar and crash and
tumult, and a murky atmosphere concealing the
ghastly sights which make these fields of carnage
so appalling to the lively imagination, which seeks
in vain to reahze its multitude and variety of horror.
Yet there was an element of grandeur and sublimity
in the exhibition of courage, constancy and fortitude
upon such a stupendous scale. "It is a good thing
that war is so terrible," said General Robert Lee,
" otherwise we should become too fond of it." Here,
among these woods and villages of Lorraine, warj
showed in abundance its attractive and repulsiv
forms.
The Capture of St. Privat
Marshal Canrobert had discerned the approachingl
Saxons, who were now marching from the north upon
Roncourt, Montois, and Malancourt. He felt that
his right had been turned, and looked in vain for
the expected succour. Bazaine, he says, had pro
mised to send a division of the Guard. Bourbaki,
astounded by the spectacle which met his eyes,
when he emerged from the wooded defiles west of
Saulny, had, as we have seen, allowed himself to be
attracted, for a moment, towards De Ladmirault,
had then retraced his steps, and had taken a position
to cover the high road to Woippy, the so-called
northern road from Metz which goes to Briey. He
had with him, according to his own statement, three
or four thousand Grenadiers and some artillery ;
but he did not arrive in time to frustrate the Saxons
and Prussian Guards. The Marshal, a Httle after
seven, or even before, felt that he could not stand.i
Pressed back on Metz 195
He complains of failing ammunition, declares that
the German artillery had obtained a complete mastery
over his guns, and that his flank was turned. " At
this moment," he says in his own picturesque fashion,
" a valiant officer, who has since been killed before
Paris, and who was called Pechot, arrived at St.
Privat [from Roncourt] with the 9th battalion of
Chasseurs, the 6th and 12th of the Line. He dashed
forward to stop the enemy ; but, as the enemy flung
at us masses of iron, and did not come himself, as
it was shells which came instead, we could not hold
on. Pechot warned me, and we were obliged to retire.
We did so by moving in echelon from the centre,
and, in good order, I emphasize the phrase, we gained
the heights beside the wood of Saulny." The German
Staff acknowledge that the rearward movement was
admirably done ; but the succinct narrative vouch-
safed by the Marshal to the Court which tried
Bazaine, gives only a vague glimpse of the closing
scene.
When the '* valiant Pechot " retired from Ron-
court before the Saxon inroad, he skilfully put his
brigade into the forest of Jaumont, on the right rear
of the original Hne. Colonel Montluisant, the gallant
artilleryman, having received a welcome supply of
ammunition, sent up from St. Quentin by the order
of Bazaine, posting his batteries in lines one above
the other on the terraces near the wood of Saulny,
opened a sustained fire to cover the retreat. Bour-
baki, although Canrobert did not know it at the time,
such was the confusion and so thick the air, had
moved his batteries and Grenadiers near enough at
dusk to bring both musketry and cannon-shot to bear
upon the Germans. In St. Privat, glowing like a
furnace, and as the darkness became deeper, shedding
a wild light upon the scene, there were still stout
and obstinate soldiers who either would not, or
could not, follow the retiring brigades. Upon these
devoted troops, as the sun went down behind the
dark border of woods beyond the valley of the Orne
the much-tried Prussian Guards and the leg-weary
Saxons threw themselves with all their remaining
196 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
vigour ; and in rear of them, yet far down the slope,
stepped one Division of the loth Corps. The guns
reinforced had again been dragged forward, some
overwhelming St. Privat, others pounding Mont-
luisant, or facing south-east, and smiting the French
about Amanvillers. Then, with loud hurrahs, the
assailants broke into St. Privat, pursued the defenders
amid the burning houses, captured two thousand
prisoners, who were unable to escape from the build-
ings, and developed their lines in the twiUght on the
plateau beyond. The capture of St. Privat enabled
the German artillery to press on once more, each
battery striving to gain the foremost place. For
Canrobert's retreat exposed the right flank of De
Ladmirault's Corps, and, under a scathing fire, he
was obliged to throw it back, protected by Bourbaki
on the hill, and supported by a brigade promptly
despatched towards that side by Leboeuf, who, all
through the eddying fight, showed a fine tactical
sense and great decision. How far the Germans were
able to push their advantage it is difficult to say, since
General Gondrecourt, who was near the place, main-
tains that some of De Ladmirault's soldiers remained
through the night in Amanvillers ; whereas the
Germans assert that they broke into part of the
village. Be that as it may, Montigny la Grange, La
Folic, and the posts thence to Point du Jour, for
certain, were held by the French until the morning.
Marshal Leboeuf has stated that he summoned his
Generals in the evening, and said to them : " The
two Corps on our right, crushed by superior forces,
have been obhged to retire. We have behind us,"
he added, " one of the defiles through which they
(' cette troupe ') may retreat. If we give back a step
the Army is lost. The position, doubtless, is difficult, J
but we will remain." He declares that the attack
continued until midnight, and that not one of his
men budged a foot, which is true ; but Canrobert's
men did fly in disorder to Woippy, and De Ladmir-
ault confessed that there was "some disorder" in
his Corps, and that what remained of them in the
wood of Saulny stood to their arms all night. The
Pressed back on Metz 197
General states his case in an extraordinary manner.
" Night," he says, " surprised us in this situation,
having gained the battle, but not having been able
to maintain our positions." What he meant to assert
was that he, De Ladmirault had won the battle, but
that the defeat of Canrobert had obliged him to
retire. The truth was that some troops remained
in Montigny la Grange, but that the rest, or nearly
all of them, were huddled together, in the wood of
Saulny, whence they retreated at dawn.
During the night each Corps commander received
from Marshal Bazaine an order to occupy certain
positions under the guns of Metz. Canrobert, De
Ladmirault, and the Guard, marched in the night,
or very early in the morning, to the places assigned
them ; Leboeuf began his movement at dawn, but
Frossard kept outposts on his front line long after
dayhght. During the forenoon, however, the Army
of the Rhine had gained the shelter of a fortified town,
which they were not able to quit until they marched
off to Germany as prisoners of war.
The effective strength of the German Armies present
on the field of Gravelotte was 203,402 men, and 726
guns ; it would not be easy to calculate how many
were actually engaged in the fight, but the forces
held in reserve were considerable. The number on
the French side has been put as low as 120,000, and
as high as 150,000 men, and probably about 530 guns.
The loss of the Germans in killed and wounded was
20,159, and 493 missing. The French loss is set down
a-t 7,853 killed and wounded, and 4,419 prisoners,
many of whom were wounded men. The dis-
proportion is tremendous, and shows once again that,
armed with the breech-loader, the defender is able
to kill and injure nearly two to one. There were
killed or mortally wounded in the German ranks no
fewer than 5,237 officers and men, while the aggregate
for the French is only 1,144. The loss of officers and
men in the Prussian Guards, nearly all inflicted in
half an hour before St. Privat, reached the dreadful
total of 2,440 killed or mortally ^njured, and of
wounded 5,511 !
CHAPTER X
The State of the Game, and the New Moves
The huge, stubborn, vehement and bloody conflict
waged in the rural tract between the northern edges
of the Bois de Vaux and the Forest of Jaumont,
which the French Marshal called the " Defence of the
Lines of Amanvillers," the French Army, '' the battle
of St. Privat," and the Germans the battle of
*' Gravelotte-St. Privat," established the mastery of
the latter over " the Army of the Rhine." Marshal
BcLzaine had not proved strong enough to extricate
the Army he was suddenly appointed to command
from the false position in which it had been placed
by the errors and hesitations of the Emperor and
Marshal Leboeuf. He had not been able to retrieve
the time wasted between the 7th and 13th of August,
by imparting, after that period, energy and swiftness
to the movements of his troops, or, if he possessed
the abiUty, of which there is no sign, he did not
put it forth. Certain words imputed to General
Changarnier, correctly or otherwise, hit the blot
exactly. " Bazaine," the General is represented .as
saying, " was incapable of commanding so large an
Army. He was completely bewildered by its great
numbers. He did not know how to move his men.
He could not operate with the forces under his orders."
So simple an explanation did not, of course, satisfy
those who could only account for a stupendous
calamity by accusing the Marshal of treason. But
on the 19th of August, the Emperor was still on
the throne, and whatever thoughts may have passed
through the mind of Bazaine after Sedan, it is incon-
ceivable that he wilfully sacrificed the Army before
that event. He was misinformed, he could not grasp
198
The State of the Game 199
the situation, he formed conjectures, without any
soUd basis, and acted on them ; he was oppressed by
the comparative want of provisions and munitions ;
and, above all, he could not resist the magnetism
exerted by a stronghold like Metz, a magnetism
which is likely to prove fatal to other weak captains
who will have to handle armies, counted by hundreds
of thousands, in the vicinity of extensive fortified
camps. The consequences of the battles of Colombey,
Vionville and Gravelotte are sufficiently accounted
for by a recognition of the errors which, from the
outset, placed the Army of the Rhine in a position
whence it could have been extricated by a Napoleon
or a Frederick, but not by a Bazaine ; and only
quenchless wrath, born of defeat, or " preternatural
suspicion," too rife in the French Army, could seek
an explanation in personal ambition or treason.
The war was begun without the preparation of
adequate means ; the operations projected were
based on miscalculations, pohtical and military ; the
generals were selected by favour ; and when the
colUsion of Armies took place, the French were outnum-
bered, out-marched, out-fought, and out-generalled.
Bazaine was no more a traitor than Prince Charles of
Lorraine in Prague, the King of Saxony in Pima,
or even poor Mack in Ulm. He was a brave soldier,
and an excellent Corps commander, but he was very
far from ranking among those captains, and, accord-
ing to the first Napoleon, they are few, who have
the faculty and knowledge required to command
300,000 men. Upon his subsequent conduct, being
beyond its scope, this history has nothing to say ;
moreover, it would acquire a volume to illuminate
that dreadful labyrinth, the " Proces Bazaine." All
we require to note is that, as a result of a series of
errors, the whole of which did not fall to the Marshal's
share, one French Army had been routed and driven
headlong to Chalons, and another, the larger and
better, had been worsted in combat and forced to
seek shelter within the fortified area of Metz.
The German leaders forthwith resolved, and acted
on the resolve, to take the largest advantage of
H
200 The Campaign of Sedan
success. When the broadening day showed that the
French were encamped under the guns of the forts,
and that they did not betray the faintest symptom
of fighting for egress on any side, the place was
deUberately invested. On the i8th, the cavahy had
cut the telegraph between Metz and Thionville, and
partially injured the railway between Thionville
and Longuyon ; and the French had hardly repaired
the wire on the 19th before it was again severed.
Soon the blockade was so far completed that only
adventurous scouts were able at rare intervals to
work their way through the German lines. As early
as the forenoon of the 19th, the King had decided
to form what came to be called the " Army of the
Meuse" out of the Corps which were not needed to
uphold the investment of Metz, and thus place him-
self in a condition to assail the French Army collect-
ing at Chalons. The new organization was composed
of the Guard, the 4th and the 12th Corps, and the
5th and 6th Divisions of cavalry ; and this formid-
able force was put under the command of the Crown
Prince of Saxony, who had shown himself to be an
able soldier. Consequently, there remained behind
to invest Bazaine, seven Corps d' Armee and a Division
of Reserved under General von Kummer, which had
marched up from Saarlouis, and was then actually
before Metz on the right bank of the Moselle east
of and below the town. The main strength, six
Corps, were posted on the left or western bank, and
the supreme command was intrusted to Prince
Frederick Charles. Not a moment was lost in dis-
tributing the troops so that they could support
each other, and in sealing up the avenues of access
to the place. A bridge over the Moselle, covered
by a tete de pont, was constructed above and below
Metz ; defensive positions were selected and in-
trenched, and throughout the whole circuit, in suitable
places, heavy solid works, as well as lighter obstruc-
tions, were begun. If the enemy tried to reach
Thionville by the left bank he was to find an organized
defensive position in his path, and the troops beyond
the Moselle were to assail his right flank. If he
The State of the Game 201
endeavoured to pass on the other shore, similar
means would be applied to bar his way. Field works
would arrest his attack, and his left flank in that
case would be struck. Egress to the west was to
be opposed by abbatis, trenches, and other obstacles.
Remilly, then the terminus of the railway, and the
site of a great magazine, was to be specially guarded ;
but if any "eccentric" movement were attempted
on the eastern area, the generals were to evade an
engagement with superior forces. It is not necessary
to enter more minutely into the blockade of Metz,
which henceforth becomes subordinate to the main
story. We have followed, so far, the fortunes or
misfortunes of the Army now surrounded by vigilant,
skilful and valiant foes ; but the active interest of
the campaign lies in other fields, and bears us along
to an undreamed-of and astounding end.
The King Marches Westward
One Army had been literally imprisoned, another
remained at large, and behind it were the vast
resources of France. Three Marshals were cooped
up in the cage on the Moselle ; one, MacMahon, and
the Emperor were still in the field ; and upon the
forces with them it was resolved to advance at once,
because prudence required that they should be shat-
tered before they could be completely organized, and
while the moral effect of the resounding blows struck
in Alsace and Lorraine had lost none of its terrible
power. Therefore the King and General von Moltke
started on the morrow of victory to march on Paris
through the plains of Champagne. The newly
constituted Army of the Meuse, on the 20th, was in
line between Commercy and Briey, moving towards
Verdun on a broad front, with the cavalry so well
forward that on the 22nd, the Guard Uhlans were
over the Meuse. At the same time the Crown Prince
of Prussia, who had continued his march from the
Meurthe and Upper Moselle, was astride the Meuse
between Void and Gondrecourt, with infantry in
front at Ligny and a cavalry patrol as far forward as
Vitry. His columns had passed by roads south of
202 The Campaign of Sedan
Toul, from the Moselle valley on to the Ornain, and as
Toul refused to surrender when, a Uttle later, it was
bombarded by field guns, a small detachment was
left to invest it until captured French garrison guns
could be hauled up from Marsal. On the 23rd the
Meuse Army was up to the right bank of the river,
and the whole of the Third had entered the basin of
the Omain. Both Armies advanced the next day
farther westward and continued the movement on
the 25th — a critical day on which they attained
positions it becomes necessary to note more minutely.
The 12th Corps, having failed on the 24th to carry
Verdun by a coup de main, halted at Dombasle on
the 25th, with its cavalry at Clermont in Argonne and
Sainte-Menehould. The Guard was on the Aisne
at Triaucourt, the 4th near by at Laheycourt, the
Second Bavarians on their left front at Possesse, the
5th Corps near Heiltz TEveque, the Wiirtemberg
Division at Sermaize on the Ornain, the nth Corps
close to Vitry on the Marne, the 6th Corps at Vassy
on the Blaise, and the First Bavarians at Bar le Due,
whither the King had come on the 24th, by way of
Commercy, from Pont a Mousson. Thus the whole
force was marching direct on Chalons, left in front ;
that is, the Third Army, as a rule, was a march in
advance of the Saxon Crown Prince.
The Cavalry Operations
During the period occupied in reaching these towns
and villages the cavalry had been actively employed
scouting far in advance and on the flanks ; and what
they did forms the most interesting and instructive
portion of the story. As early as the 17th a troop of
Hussars captured a French courrier at Commercy,
and from his despatches learned that the cavalry of
Canrobert's Corps had been left behind at Chalons,
that Paris was being placed in a state of defence,
that all men between 25 and 35 had been called
under arms, and that a 12th and 13th Corps were
to be formed. Another patrol was able to ascertain
that at least part of De Failly's troops had retreated
by Charmes, and that other hostile bodies had gone
The State of the Game ^^^
by Vaudemont and Neufchateau ; they were hurrying
to the railway station at the latter place and at
Chaumont. At Menil sur Saulx, on the i8th, the
indefatigable horsemen seized many letters, and a
telegram from M. Chevreau, Minister of the Interior,
stating that the Emperor had reached Chalons on the
17th — he really arrived there on the evening of the
i6th, having driven from Gravelotte in the morning —
and that " considerable forces " were being collected
in the famous camp on the dusty and windy plains of
Champagne. Thus, day after day, the mounted
parties preceded the infantry, spreading far and wide
on all sides, so that as early as the 19th some Hussars
actually rode within sight of French infantry retreat-
ing from St. Dizier, and on the 21st captured men
belonging to the 5th Corps near Vitry. The next day
the 2nd Cavalry Division rode out from four-and-
twenty to six-and-thirty miles, entering, among other
places, Chaumont, where, from the station books,
they learned that De Failly's infantry had gone on,
three days only before, in twenty trains, while
Brahaut's Cavalry followed the road. On the 23rd
the 4th Division of cavalry had passed St. Dizier and
ridden into the villages to the east of Chalons itself.
Thence Dragoons were sent forward and these picked
up information to the effect that the French Army
had quitted the great camp. Reports to this effect
had already reached headquarters, and had moved
Von Moltke to tell General von Blumenthal, the
Crown Prince's chief of the staff, that it would be
most desirable to have prompt information showing
whither the enemy had gone. The 4th Cavalry
Division, which, on the 24th, was at Chalons camp,
now abandoned, burnt, and desolate, pushed a party
towards Reims, and there found that the French Army
had departed in an easterly direction. Before this
vital information arrived at the great headquarters
the King and Von Moltke had determined that the
two Armies should, at least for the time, still move
westward on the lines appointed ; and on the evening
of the 25th, therefore, they occupied the positions
already described. But at this moment the Army
204 The Campaign of Sedan
of MacMahon stood halted at Rhetel, Attigny, and
Vouziers, within two marches of the Meuse, between
Stenay and Sedan !
In order to learn why they were there we must
turn to the camp at Chalons, which had been the
scene of dramatic events, fluctuating councils, and
fatal decisions, the fitting forerunners of an un-
paralleled disaster.
The Emperor at Chalons and Reims
Immediately after the first defeats befell the
French Armies on the frontier, General Montauban,
Comte de Palikao, summoned by the Empress, found
himself abruptly made the head of a Government.
He took, of course, the post of Minister of War. The
Empress had been Regent from the day when the
Emperor quitted Paris, and she exercised, or appeared
to do so, a great influence on the course of events.
The first act of the new Minister was to collect the
materials out of which might be formed a fresh Army,
a task in the execution of which he displayed con-
siderable energy. The rapid march of the invader
had intercepted, as we have related, one infantry
division of Canrobert's Corps, all his cavalry " except
a squadron," as he pathetically exclaimed, and more
than half of his artillery. These remained in the
camp of Chalons, and the Army formed was composed
of these men, the 12th Corps, one division of which
consisted of Marine Infantry ; then the ist and 5th
Corps, which had come at racing speed from Alsace ;•
and finally of the 7th from Belfort, which reached
Chalons by way of Paris. There were in addition
two regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, and sub-
sequently a third — Margueritte's gallant brigade.
General Lebrun estimates that the aggregates,
including non-combatants, amounted to about
130,000 men. It will be duly noted that this Army
came almost from the four winds, driven thither by
the terrible pressure of defeat, and that many of the
new troops were recruits, without discipUne or training.
They were collected together on an open plain, and
had barely assembled before the vivacious German
The State of the Game 205
cavalry were reported to be and, though in small
force, were close at hand. When the Emperor
arrived on the night of the i6th, by far the greater
part of the troops were still distant ; some speeding
on their way from Chaumont and Joinville, others
travelling from Belfort, and some from Cherbourg
and Paris. They dropped into the camp in succession
after the 17th, and we may note that the 7th Corps
never entered Chalons at all, but was sent on to
Reims, which it reached on the 21st. Out of this
assembly of soldiers Marshal MacMahon had to
organize an Army. Moreover, the intendants, charged
with the duty of supplying the troops, had only just
come up. To increase the confusion many thousand
Mobiles, who had been at an early date sent thither
from Paris, behaved so badly — some reports of
their ape-like tricks are almost incredible — that they
were speedily returned to the capital, although the
Emperor and Marshal Canrobert, who had com^
manded them, would have preferred, the former for
poUtical reasons, that they should be distributed in
the northern garrison towns. Nothing more need
be said of the Army of Chalons except that, although
it contained some admirable troops, none finer than
the Marines, whose only fault was that they could not
march, yet that it was unfit to engage in any adventure
whatever, especially one so perilous and toilsome as
that into which it was soon plunged.
Weary, perturbed, broken in health and spirits, yet
outwardly serene, Napoleon III. slept on the night
of the i6th in the paviHon of the camp, which he had
often visited when it was orderly and brilliant, which
he now revisited as a fugitive, passing silently, almost
furtively, through its disorder and gloom. With him
was Prince Jerome Napoleon, who saw the fortunes
of his house, like Balzac's peaii de chagrin, shrinking
visibly day by day, and whose fertile mind was alive
with expedients to avert the fatal hour. He resented
the bigotry of the Empress, who would not surrender
Rome as a bribe to the Italian Court ; he was ponder-
ing over and, indeed, openly suggesting the abdication
of the Emperor. Sleeping also in that pavilion was
206 The Campaign of Sedan
the youth, Louis, who is barely mentioned in the
French accounts after the 2nd of August ; whose
pubHc Hfe began in the tumult of a national catas-
trophe and ended so tragically among the savage
Zulus.
Daylight brought no respite to the Emperor. Ke
saw around him silent and unsympathetic throngs of
soldiers bearing the marks of defeat and rout, and
it is said that he was even jeered by the Parisian
Mobiles, who had previously shouted in the ears of
the astonished Canrobert, " A Paris ! A Paris ! " in-
stead of " A Berlin ! '
Then came from the capital General Trochu, who
had been appointed to command the newly formed
I2th Corps, and was destined, in case of accident, to
succeed MacMahon. In conversing with the Emperor
the General developed a plan of action, which as-
tonished yet did not altogether displease His Majesty.
Succinctly stated it was this : That the Emperor
and the Army should return to Paris, and that
General Trochu should be named Governor of the
capital. The Emperor, as usual, listened, doubted,
demurred, yet did not refuse to contemplate a scheme
which promised to place him, once more, at the head
of affairs, but he gave no decision. Marshal Mac-
Mahon was summoned ; he was to command the
Army which, according to the plan, was to be organ-
ized near Paris ; and when consulted he spoke
favourably of Trochu as a man and a soldier, and
readily accepted the command of the Army. Prince
Napoleon, so soon to set out for Florence, if he did
not suggest, supported the nomination of Trochu, oq
the ground that a revolution might break out at any
moment in Paris, and that the General was the man
to put it down. It was during the prolonged debate
on these perplexing questions that some one said —
" the Emperor neither commands the Army nor
governs the State ; " whether the words dropped
from the lips of Napoleon III. or his cousin, Marshcil
MacMahon, who was present, could not remember ;
but whoever uttered them they were true. There was
a subsidiary and much-disputed question — what
The State of the Game 207
should be done with the noisy Mobiles, who so eagerly
desired to re-enter Paris. In the end it was agreed
that, although the Emperor, for political, and Mac-
Mahon, for mihtary, reasons, desired to give them a
taste of much-needed discipline in the northern
fortresses, these obstreperous battalions should be
sent to the capital. Thus it came about that Marshal
MacMahon took command of the Army and that
Trochu became Governor of JParis. The new
Governor, with his letter of nomination in his pocket,
set out on his return journey ; but while he went
slowly by rail, M. Pietri, using the telegraph, informed
the Empress of what had been done, and alarmed her
and the Minister of War by reporting the intelligence
that the Emperor and the Army were to move on the
capital. Thereupon, two hours before the luckless
Trochu set foot in Paris, Palikao had sent a remon-
strance by telegram, dated 10.27 P"^- ^^ t^^ 17th.
" The Empress," he said, " has communicated to me
the letter in which the Emperor announces that he
wishes to move the Army from Chalons to Paris —
I implore the Emperor to give up this idea, which will
look hke a desertion of the Army of Metz." If there
was a "letter" Napoleon must have written it on
the i6th, during his journey, which is not likely ; but
the document referred to was, no doubt, Pietri' s
telegram to the Empress. Some answer must have
been sent from the pavilion at Chalons, after Trochu
departed, for when he saw M. Chevreau, at midnight,
the Minister said promptly — " The Emperor will not
return" ; and when the General exhibited his
proclamation to the Empress, beginning with " Pre-
ceded by the Emperor," she instantly exclaimed.
" You cannot state that, because it is not a fact ; the
Emperor will not come." Thus the Trochu plan was
frustrated ; yet the remarkable thing is that the
Emperor had not made up his shifting mind ; for on
the i8th, as Marshal MacMahon affirms. Napoleon
intimated his intention to start the next day. Still
we find a telegram from him to Palikao, dated the
" i8th, 9 h. 4 m.," presumably in the morning, in
which he says, " I give in to your opinion," so that
208 The Campaign of Sedan
his resolutions fluctuated from hour to hour. A
most singular historical figure, at this juncture, is
the once-potent Napoleon III. Virtually exiled from
his capital, and not permitted, if he wished, to
command his troops, he was condemned to '' assist,"
as the French say, at the capture of Armies, the
downfall of his dynasty, and the wreck of a nation.
These lugubrious debates, held almost within sight
of the battlefield of Valmy, went on from day to day.
" What should be done with the Army ? " was the
question which trod on the heels of *' What shall be
done with the Emperor?" or rather both were
discussed together. On the i8th came a despatch
from Bazaine, stating that the Marshal had fought
a battle two days before, that he had " held his
positions," yet that he was obliged to fall back nearer
to Metz in order that he might replenish his supplies
for men and guns. This message had crossed one
from MacMahon announcing his appointment, con-
veying the important information that he was still
under the orders of Bazaine, and asking for instruc-
tions. The answer came the next evening, and it
expressly declared that, being too remote from
Chalons, Bazaine left the Marshal free to act as he
thought fit. That telegram, it was the last which
came direct by wire from Metz, raised the great
military question. Pahkao had already begun to
insist that Metz should be relieved. The Marshal
admits that he was undecided for the moment ; for
if he started for the Meuse Paris would be uncovered,
and the sole remaining French Army put in great
peril ; whereas, if he did not march eastward and
Bazaine did march west, then the latter might be
lost. In his anguish of mind, not knowing that the
wire had been cut, he appealed, by telegram, to
Bazaine for his opinion. At the same time, on the
20th, he forwarded a message to Palikao, which
stated the case most clearly. His information, and
it was in substance correct, led him to beheve that
the roads through Briey, Verdun, and St. Mihiel were
intercepted by the Germans ; and he added that his
intention was to halt until he learned whether Bazaine
The State of the Game 209
had moved by the north or the south — the idea that
he might be shut up closely in Metz had not then
matured in MacMahon's mind. In the meantime he
saw plainly the dangers to which he was exposed
by remaining on the plain of Chalons ; and, therefore,
on the 2ist moved the whole Army to Reims, a
long march, which tried the inexperienced troops,
and filled the country roads with hundreds of
stragglers.
MacMahon Retires to Reims
That very morning M. Rouher, inspired by a desire
to talk with his old master, arrived at Chalons, and
proceeded with the soldiers to their new destination.
In the evening, at the Imperial quarters, MacMahon
was summoned to consider afresh the oft-debated
questions of the hour. M. Rouher explained to the
Marshal his views, which were, in reality, those of
Palikao, for the President of the Senate was oppressed
with the feehng that Bazaine must be relieved.
But at this moment MacMahon was firmly resolved
to march on Paris, and, possessing exact information,
he stated his case, on the occasion, with great force
and .^clearness. He was bound to assume, he said,
that Bazaine was surrounded in Metz by 200,000
men ; that in front of Metz, towards Verdun, stood
the Saxon Crown Prince with 80,000 men ; that the
Prussian Crown Prince was near Vitry at the head of
150,000 men ; and consequently that if he risked a
march eastward into the midst of these Armies, " I
should," he continued, " find myself in a most
difficult position, and experience a disaster which I
desire to avoid." A most just estimate, formed
on reports which were defective upon one point only —
the Prussian Crown Prince was still about Ligny,
but his cavalry, as will be remembered, had looked
in upon Vitry. Moreover, the Marshal adhered to
his opinion that the Army of Chalons should be
preserved, because it would furnish the groundwork
for an organized force 300,000 strong. M. Rouher,
who acquiesced, then suggested that the Emperor
should issue a proclamation explaining the reasons
210 The Campaign of Sedan
why the Army of Chalons moved on Paris ; which,
being done, Rouher went his way, and MacMahon
drew up the order of march towards the capital.
The Chalons Army Directed on the Meuse
The morning of the 22nd was spent in preparation,
but, before the final orders were issued, the Emperor
received the fatal despatch, dated Ban Saint Martin
[Metz], August 19th, which Marshal Bazaine had
been able to send through the German lines. After
a brief description of the battle of Gravelotte, which
ended, he said, in a change of front by the 6th and
4th Corps, the right thrown back, to ward off a
turning movement, and reporting that he had drawn
in the whole Army upon a curved line, from Longeville
to Sansonnet, behind the forts, he stated that the
troops were wearied by incessant combats, and needed
rest for two or three days. " The King of Prussia,
with M. de Moltke," he went on " were this morning
at Rezonville, and everything goes to show that the
Prussian Army is about to feel up to (va tater) the
fortress of Metz. I count always upon taking a
northern direction, and turning, by Montmedy, into
the road from Sainte-Menehould to Chalons, if it is
not too strongly occupied. In the contrary case, I
shall continue upon Sedan, and even upon Mezieres,
to reach Chalons." The Emperor sent this despatch
to MacMahon, who inferred from it that Bazaine was
about to start, and that, after crossing the Meuse at
Stenay, he should find him in the neighbourhood of
Montmedy. He, therefore, withheld the orders
directing the Army on Paris, and issued those which
turned its face to the East. Further, he transmitted
a telegram addressed to Bazaine, stating that, in two
days, his Army would be on the Aisne, whence, in
order to bring succour, he would operate according
to circumstances. Soon afterwards a despatch arrived
from Palikao, saying that the " gravest consequences "
would follow in Paris were no attempt made to help
Bazaine ; but the Marshal had already taken his
decision, though with a dubious mind, because he knew
better than the Comte de Palikao, who was extremely
The State of the Game 211
ill-informed, what dangers would beset his path, and
how slight was the chance that the Army inclosed in
Metz would be able to burst through the investing
lines. The Emperor remained in a passive con-
dition ; he did not approve, he did not oppose ;
but he shared, as a sort of interested spectator, in
a venture determined by the operation of pohtical
motives, and devoid of a sound military basis.
For the moment, at least. Marshal MacMahon
remained steadfast to his latest resolution ; and on
the 23rd the French Army moved out from its camp
near Reims. It was not directed on the Verdun
road, because the Commander-in-Chief was well
aware that if he was to gain Stenay, that goal could
only be attained by evading the Saxon Prince's
Army, which would necessitate a flank march on
routes farther north. The first day's journey was
short, for the Army halted on the river Suippe, facing
north-east, with a cavalry division in front towards
Grand Pre. At this early stage provisions were so
scarce that Ducrot, commanding the ist Corps, and
Lebrun, who had the 12th, complained to the Marshal,
who advised them to do as he did when retreating
from Reichshofen — live upon the inhabitants. Yet
the stress was severe, the country incapable of
furnishing sufficient supplies, and MacMahon, yielding
to the pressure, believed that the better course would
be to follow the railway. He, therefore, moved next
day to Rhetel with the 12th and 5th, while the ist
halted at Juniville, and the 7th near Vouziers,
Margueritte's flanking cavalry remaining hard by on
the left bank of the Aisne. A short march on the
25th brought all the Corps astride the river, between
Rhetel and Vouziers, with cavalry outposts at Le
Chesne and Grand Pre. The movement had begun
badly ; but before following this Army farther on its
devious path, we must return to the German head-
quarters at Bar le Due, where, at length, it had be-
come known that the French were not retreating on
Paris, but were advancing towards the Meuse !
CHAPTER XI
The Grand Right Wheel
It has long been a well-authenticated fact that
MacMahon's march eastward from Reims took the
German headquarter staff by surprise. The reason
was that they could not believe in the probability of
a movement which, from their point of view, had no
defence on military grounds. So that Marshal
MacMahon with a fair, and General von Moltke with
full knowledge of the facts, really arrived at identical
conclusions when they surveyed the situation with
what we may call cold scientific eyes. The influences
which governed the Marshal's decision could not
be known at Bar le Due on the 25th of August ; - but
it was none the less apparent to the cautious Von
Moltke that his adversary had committed a great
error. The German was surprised, he was even
somewhat embarrassed, but he never lost his presence
of mind, and he was not unprepared.
Indeed, the subject had been discussed already by
himself and his colleagues. As early as the 23rd,
Prince Frederick Charles intercepted a letter froni
an officer of high rank belonging to the Metz Army.
The writer expressed a confident hope that succour
would soon arrive from Chalons. Thereupon the
Saxon Prince was directed to keep a sharp look-out
towards Reims, and break the railway between
Thionville and Longuyon in more places than one.
The next day, at Ligny, the Great Staff met and con-
ferred with the Crown Prince. It was then that
Quartermaster-General von Podbielski was the first
to suggest that if a march from Reims towards
Bazaine was barely admissible on military grounds,
212
The Grand Right Wheel 213
it might be explained by political considerations,
and consequently, the General thought, the German
Armies should close to their right. The reason was
not deemed sufficient, and the Armies went on as pre-
arranged. Not until eleven in the evening of the
24th did the wary Von Moltke consider that he had
accumulated information sufficient to justify a ten-
tative change of plans. He learned from his own
cavalry patrols that Chalons had been deserted ;
from a Paris newspaper, captured on the 24th, that
MacMahon was at Reims with 150,000 men ; and
finally he got a telegram, dated Paris, the 23rd, and
received at Bar le Due via London. " The Army of
MacMahon," it said, " is concentrated at Reims.
With it are the Emperor Napoleon and the Prince.
MacMahon seeks to effect a junction with Bazaine."
Still von Moltke doubted. The straight line to Metz
was barred, would the enemy venture to face the
risks involved in a circuitous march close to the
Belgian frontier ? If he did the German Armies
must plunge into the Argonne ; but at present the
General decided that enough would be done were the
Army turned to the north-west, and were a keen
watch kept upon its own right by sending the cavalry,
if possible, as far as Vouziers and Buzancy. Such
were the morning orders. Here it may be noted that
Von Moltke spent the afternoon in framing a plan,
solely for himself, based on the shrewd assumption
that MacMahon might have quitted Reims on the
23rd, and might be over the Aisne already. If he
moved on continuously he could not be caught on
the left bank of the Meuse. Therefore Von Moltke
drew out tables of marches which, had they all been
performed, as they easily might have been, would
have concentrated, in full time, 150000 men at
Damvillers, east of the Meuse, and within easy reach
of the Army blockading Metz. Two Corps, from
that force, were also called on to co-operate. They
did move out as far as Etain and Briey, but not
being wanted they soon returned to their canton-
ments on the Ome and the Yron. Thus the plan
was not carried out, but it was prepared, indeed.
214 The Campaign of Sedan
served as a basis, during the next two days, and was
ready for execution ; and it reveals, once more, the
astonishing foresight and soHd ingenuity which
watched with sleepless eyes the conduct of the
German Armies.
After he had finished the scheme by means of
which he intended to thwart MacMahon, in any case,
fresh intelligence arrived — newspaper articles and
speeches in the Chamber which declared that the
French people would be covered with shame were
the Army of the Rhine not reheved ; and above all a
telegram from London, based on a paragraph in
" Le Temps," of August 23rd, stating that MacMahon,
although by such a movement he would uncover the
road to Paris, had suddenly determined to help
Bazaine, and that he had already quitted Reims,
but that the news from Montmedy did not mention
the arrival of French troops, meaning troops from
Metz, in that region. Von Moltke was not deeply
impressed by the articles and speeches, although he
began to give some weight to Podbielski's shrewd
remark ; but the positive statement in the telegram
did move him, and he and the Quartermaster-General
hastened to lay the matter before the King. The
result was that those definite orders were issued
which produced the great right wheel and sent the
whole force towards the north. Nevertheless, the
strategist still insists that, on the evening of the 25th,
he had no information which gave sure indications
of the enemy's whereabouts.
The Cavalry Discover the Enemy
These were soon forthcoming. The cavalry, set in
motion at dawn, over a wide space and far in advance
of the new direction, were not long in regaining touch
of MacMahon' s Army. For the horsemen rode out
quickly, and speedily searched the country-side from
Dun on the Meuse to the heart of the camp at Chalons,
accumulating in their excursions information almost
sufficient to convince the circumspect Von Moltke.
This sudden display of activity and daring is a
splendid spectacle. The wind howled through the
The Grand Right Wheel 215
woods and swept the bare tracks, and heavy storms
of rain deluged the country from Bar le Due to
Rhetel, but the swift march of these superb reiters
was neither stayed by the blast, the dripping woods,
nor the saturated cross-roads. No hardships, no
obstacles slackened their speed, and large were the
fruits of their energy, endurance, and astuteness.
Here we may observe, and it is a remarkable fact,
that hitherto the Saxon leader's cavalry had been
directed only towards the west. The horsemen of the
Third Army had ridden within sight of Reims and on
the south, or left flank, had approached closely to
the Aube. Those attached to the Saxon Prince's
command had felt out to their immediate front and
towards the Prussian Crown Prince's left, but had
not examined the districts to their right front. A
cavalry regiment had made a tiring forced march
towards Stenay, but not a trooper was directed on
Grand Pre, or on Varennes, until the 25th. Yet there
were French horse on Grand Pre on the 24th, and it
is evident that had only one division been despatched
towards and through Varennes immediately after the
Saxon Prince's troops had crossed the Meuse, above
and below Verdun, the presence of MacMahon's
Army on the Aisne must have been discoveired, and
the report handed in at headquarters on the morning,
or at latest the afternoon, of the 25th. That would
have been done had General von Schlotheim, the
chief of the staff with the Meuse Army, been as careful
to reconnoitre the country on his right as Von Blu-
menthal was to send out horsemen to the flank as well
as the front of the westward moving host. It was
not done, and the error of judgment involved the loss
of four-and-twenty hours.
The error was promptly and amply repaired.
While each corps in the mighty Army, having wheeled
to the right, was tramping north in the driving rain,
through the muddy forest roads, to gain the distant
bivouacs assigned them, the cavalry divisions had
come up with, watched, touched, astonished, and
bewildered the French, making the 26th of August
a memorable day in their camps.
216 The Campaign of Sedan
Near the Meuse the ubiquitous patrols discovered
troops at Buzancy ; upon the central road which runs
beside the Aire, the foremost squadron saw infantry
and cavalry in Grand Pre; upon the Aisne, two
adventurous parties pressing up close to the flank and
rear of Vouziers, were able to observe and report the
presence of large bodies of all arms encamped to the
east of the town, and to specify the positions which
they held. No attempt was made to attack, and
there was no firing except a sputter of carbine-shots
discharged by a French at a German patrol which
had approached the left bank of the Aire near Grand
Pre. The whole line of horsemen, from the Meuse
to the Aisne, was in constant communication, and
their scouting parties, eager to see and not to be
seen, found their designs favoured by the abounding
woods and the undulations of the land. Thus, in
one day, a thick fringe of lynx-eyed cavalry was
thrust in close proximity to the adversary many
miles in front of the German Corps, plodding their
arduous way along the plashy tracks and by-ways of
the Argonne.
Movements of the French
No such bold and prudent use was made of the
French cavalry by Marshal MacMahon, whom we
left with his Army still lingering near the Aisne.
The misgivings which oppressed him at Reims did
not diminish during his halt at Rhetel ; and they
deepened as he moved towards the Meuse. But no
doubts, based on the absence of intelligence from
or concerning Bazaine and the difficulty of supplying
the Army, will account for the misuse which he made
of his cavalry. The danger he had to dread lurked
in the region to the south, yet after the 24th the
duty of covering the exposed right flank and of
gleaning exact information was imposed upon the
brigade attached to the 7th Corps. For Margue-
ritte's division of Chasseurs d'Afrique was, on the
25th, suddenly drawn from the right and sent forward
to Le Chesne in front of the centre pointing towards
Sedan or Stenav : while Bonnemain's division of
The Grand Right Wheel 217
heavy cavalry moved slowly close in rear of the
1st Corps, where it was useless. The incidents of
the memorable 26th, when even minutes were price-
less, quickly demonstrated the gravity of the error.
On that day, at the close of a brief march, the 12th
Corps stood at Tourteron, the 5th at Le Chesne, the
1st at Semuy, and the 7th a little east of Vouziers.
Margueritte moved on to Oches, and Bonnemain's
was at Attigny, on the left bank of the Aisne.
Now Douay, who commanded the 7th Corps, had
become anxious, for he was on the outward flank.
He'sought some security by sending a brigade, imder
General Bordas, to Buzancy and Grand Pre. and his
strongest regiment of Hussars to scout along the two
rivers which unite at Senuc. The Hussar patrols
came in contact with the German, and it was one of
them which emptied its carbines at the hostile and
inquisitive Dragoons of the 5th Cavalry Division.
Retiring hastily on Grand Pre the French Hussars
handed in reports which so impressed General Bordas
that he at once contemplated a retreat on Buzancy,
and forwarded the alarming message to his Corps
commander. General Douay instantly inferred that
the dreaded German Army was not distant, and,
ordering Bordas to retreat on Vouziers, he sent the
baggage and provisions to the rear, and drew up his
divisions in Une of battle, at the junction of the roads
from Grand Pre and Buzancy. Just before sunset
a horseman rode up with a message that, after all,
Bordas had not retired from the village which he
occupied, though he believed the road to Vouziers
was intercepted, and that the enemy might be upon
him at any moment. The remedy applied was to
send forth General Dumont with a brigade to bring
him in. While Dumont marched in the darkness
Douay and his staff passed the night at a bivouac fire
listening eagerly to every sound, and starting up
when the step of a wayfarer or the clink of a horse-
shoe fell on their ears. About three in the morning
of the 27th Dumont brought in Bordas and his brigade,
together with a few Germans who, pressing too far
forward at eventide, had been captured. Nor did
218 The Campaign of Sedan
the effect produced by the enterprising German
cavalry end here. General Douay had sent in to
MacMahon a report of the exciting incidents ; and
with the morning light came the information that the
Marshal had directed the whole Army to draw near
and support the 7th Corps. So it fell out that the
mere appearance of the German cavalry had arrested
the French. But at the same time their leaders
were also told by fugitive country folk — nothing
definite could be extracted from the prisoners taken at
Grand Pre — that the Prussian Crown Prince was at
Sainte-Menehould, and that another Army — whence
derived, in what strength, or by whom commanded
they could not imagine — was advancing from
Varennes.
The Marshal Resolves, Hesitates, and Yields
We now touch on the moment when the decision
was adopted which impelled the French Army on its
final marches towards defeat and captivity ; a
decision mainly due to the extreme pressure exerted
by the Comte de Palikao and the Regency. Marshal
MacMahon had transferred his headquarters to Le
Chesne-Populeux, a village on the canal which
connects the Aisne and the Meuse. The 12th Corps
was there, with the 5th in its front at Brieulles sur
Bar ; the 7th, as before, at Vouziers, and the ist in
its rear at Voncq ; Margueritte's horse at Beaumont,
and Bonnemain's still about Attigny. The informa-
tion placed before the Marshal by the inhabitants
and liis own officers seemed to justify those appre-
hensions which he had so strongly expressed at Reims,
and he began to feel again that he was marching
towards that " disaster which he wished to avoid."
In the midst of a prolonged survey of the position,
he was summoned by the Emperor who, having re-
ceived some authentic information, declared that the
Prussian Crown Prince had turned from the road to
Paris and was then advancing northwards. With
Napoleon III. MacMahon remained for a long time,
and came back to his headquarters resolved to retreat
upon Mezieres. Indeed, he issued orders on the spot.
The Grand Right Wheel 219
directing all the Corps to retire behind the canal the
next day, and take post at Chagny, Vendresse, and
Poix. Then, at half-past eight in the evening of the
27th, he dictated to Colonel Stoffel a telegram de-
signed for the Minister, in which he said that there
was one hostile Army on the right bank of the Meuse
and another marching upon the Ardennes. " I have
no news of Bazaine," he went on. " If I advance to
meet liim I shall be attacked in front by a part of
the First and Second German Armies, which, favoured
by the woods, can conceal a force superior to mine,
and at the same time attacked by the Prussian Crown
Prince cutting off my hne of retreat. I approach
Mezieres to-morrow, whence I shall continue my
retreat, guided by events, towards the west." Colonel
Stoffel relates that, just as he was about to carry the
telegram to Colonel d'Abzac, with orders to forward
it at once. General Faure, chief of the staff, caine in ;
and MacMahon, seizing the telegram, said, " Here is
a despatch which I have written to the Minister."
Faure read, and begged the Marshal not to send it,
for, said he, " You will get an answer from Paris
which, perhaps, will prevent you from carrying out
your new plans. You can transmit it to-morrow,
when we are already on the road to Mezieres." The
Marshal answered, " Send it," and it was sent.
The reply, so shrewdly foreseen by General Faure,
was handed to the Marshal about half-past one on
the morning of the 28th. It was dated, " Paris,
August 27, II p.m.," addressed to " the Emperor,"
and began with these tell-tale words, " If you abandon
Bazaine," wrote the Comte de Pahkao, ' la revolution
est dans Paris,' or Paris will revolt, and you will be
attacked yourself by all the enemy's forces." He
asserted that Paris could defend herself, that the
Army must reach Bazaine ; that the Prussian Crown
Prince, aware of the danger to which his Army and
that which blockaded Metz was exposed by Mac-
Mahon's turning movement, had changed frontjgto
the north. " You are at least six-and- thirty, perhaps
eight-and-forty, hours in advance of him," the
Minister continued. " You have before you only a
220 The Campaign of Sedan
part of the. forces blockading Metz, which, seeing
you retire from Chalons to Reims, stretched out
towards the Argonne. Your movement on Reims
deceived them. Everybody here feels the necessity
of extricating Bazaine, and the anxiety with which
your course is followed is extreme." The Marshal's
will broke down under this strain. He could not
bear the thought that men might in future point to
him as one who deserted a brother Marshal. Against
his better judgment he revoked the orders already
issued, enjoining a retreat upon Mezieres, and put
all his Corps in motion for the banks of the Meuse.
To complete the narrative of this decisive event,
it may here be said that, on the 28th, at Stonne,
as the Marshal himself has admitted, the Emperor
made a last desperate appeal against the change of
plan. Another despatch from Pahkao, dated half-
past one in the morning of the 28th, this time ad-
dressed to the Marshal, had come to hand at Stonne.
" In the name of the Council of Ministers and the
Privy Council," it said, " I request you [' je vous
demande'] to succour Bazaine — profiting by the
thirty hours' advance which you have over the
Crown Prince of Prussia. I direct Vinoy's Corps on
Reims."
It is probable that the purport, or a copy, of this
telegram was sent to the Emperor, for he twice,
through his own officers, reminded the Marshal that
the despatches of a Minister were not orders, and
that he was free to act as he thought expedient, and
implored him to reflect maturely before he gave up
his intention to retreat. So much must be said for
Napoleon III. — ^that, at Metz, on the morrow of
Woerth and Spicheren, and at Stonne, when the
toils were fast closing round him, his miUtary judg-
ment was prompt and correct. But the Marshal
had decided ; and the prayers of an Emperor did not
avail against the gloomy forecasts, the impassioned
language, and the fornal request or demand of a
Minister of War whose telegrams exhibit the depth
of his ignorance concerning the actual situation.
It is not surprising that he was ill-informed, seeing
The Grand Right Wheel 221
how difficult it was for officers on the spot, German
as well as French, to obtain exact knowledge ; but
it is amazing that an experienced soldier and Minister
of War should not be aware of his own incompetence
to direct, from his closet in Paris, an Army in the
field. Palikao combined the quahties of the Dutch
Deputy with those of the Aulic Councillor ; and the
troops of Marshal MacMahon tramped on to meet
their approaching ruin. The positions they attained
on the 28th will be more conveniently specified later
on ; for it is time to follow, once more, the footsteps
of the hardy and far-marching Germans, who were
now across the direct path of MacMahon' s Army.
Movements of the Germans
How, by long and laborious marches, the tough
foot soldiers, almost treading on the heels of their
mounted comrades, gained ground on the adversary
must now be succinctly narrated. On the 26th, the
12th Corps reached Varennes, and the Saxon Prince
estabUshed his headquarters at Clermont in Argonne.
The guard went on to Dombasle, and the 4th Corps
to a point beyond Fleury. Such were the marches
of the Army of the Meuse. In the Third Army, the
Bavarians made a wet and weary night march in
the wake of the 4th Corps, attaining Triaucourt and
Erize la Petite ; but for the moment, the 5th, the 6th,
and the Wiirtembergers stood fast. The reason for
this apparent hesitation was that Von Moltke was
not yet quite convinced. King WilUam remained
at Bar le Due all the forenoon. Thither came the
Crown Prince and General von Blumenthal from
Ligny, and, at a council held in the great head-
quarters, both of them declared unequivocally in
favour of the northern march, urging that it would
be wiser to delay the movement on Paris than run
the risks of a battle in the north unless it could be
fought by all the forces which could be got together.
These opinions prevailed, and it was decided that
the 'Bavarians should start at once, and that the
next day the other Corps of the Third Army should
proceed to Sainte-Menehould and Vavray. General
222 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
von Blumenthal, indeed, had formed a strong
judgment on the situation. A few hours after the
consultation at headquarters, writes Dr. William
Russell in his " Diary," " taking me into a room in
which was a table covered with a large map on a scale
of an inch to a mile, he (Blumenthal) said, ' These
French are lost, you see. We know they are there,
and there, and there — and Mahon's whole Army.
Where can they go to ? Poor foolish fellows ! They
must go to Belgium, or fight there and be lost ; '
and he put his finger on the map between Mezieres
and Carignan." It is a remarkable fact that General
Longstreet, judging only from the telegrams which
reached the United States about this time, arrived at
the same conclusion.
King William, during the afternoon, journeyed
to Clermont ; while the Crown Prince drove to
Revigny les Vaches, which he made his headquarters
until the 28th. Before losing sight of Bar le Due,
we may quote from Dr. Russell's pages one other
sentence, which affords a brief glimpse of the great
political leader in this war. In the forenoon on the
26th, the graphic Diarist " saw Count Bismarck
standing in a doorway out of the rain whiffing a
prodigious cigar, seemingly intent on watching the
bubbles which passed along the watercourse by the
side of the street ; " but probably with his thoughts
far away from the evanescent symbols of men's
lives. He had entered the town with the King on
the 24th, and feared that the royal staff would linger
there for several days, "as in Capua ; " yet, in a
few hours, this playful censor of delay was speeding
north, like the Armies, to play a conspicuous part in
a subUme tragedy at Sedan.
In his quarters at Clermont, General von Moltke
still disposed of the Meuse Army and the Bavarians
in a manner which would enable him to effect, if
necessary, that concentration at Damvillers which
we saw him meditating and devising on the afternoon
of the 25th, at Bar le Due. Thus, on the 27th, the
Guard, which came up to Monfaucon, and the 4th
Corps to Germonville, were each directed to throw
The Grand Right Wheel 223
bridges over the Meuse, so that there should be four
points of passage in case of need. The Bavarians
followed from the rear as far as Dombasle and Nixe-
ville, and the other Corps of the Third Army turned
frankly northward, the 5th pushing its advance-
guard to Sainte-Menehould. At the same time the
Saxon Corps had crossed the Meuse at Dun and
estabhshed a brigade firmly in Stenay. The cavalry
had been as active and as useful as ever. They had
covered the march of the Saxon Corps by occupying
Grand Pre, Nouart, and Buzancy, coming into
contact with the French at the last-named village.
General de Failly, who, early in the morning, had
moved to Bar, observed hostile cavaliers beyond the
stream, and sent Brahaut's brigade to drive them off
and seize prisoners. That brought on a smart skir-
mish, during which De Failly received orders to retreat
on Brieulles ; but Brahaut was driven from Buzancy
by the fire of a horse battery ; and the unlucky
French general made no prisoners. There was no
other rencontre during the day, but the German
cavalry on all sides rode up close to the enemy's
posts and kept the leaders well informed. From the
reports sent in, Von Moltke inferred that there had
been a pause in the French movements ; at all events,
that none of their troops had crossed the Meuse ;
and, as he knew that the Saxons were in Dun and
Stenay, he thought himself, at length, justified in
beUeving it possible that he might strike MacMahon
on the left flank. Consequently, he abandoned the
Damvillers plan, and sent back to Metz the two Corps
which had been detached from the blockading Army.
Therefore, while the Saxons stood fast, for one day,
the Bavarians were directed to march, on the 28tJfi,
upon Varennes and Vienne le Chateau ; the Guard
upon Bantheville ; and the 4th Corps on Montfaucon
— the general direction for all the Corps being
Vouziers, Buzancy, and Beaumont. During '« that
day these orders were fulfilled, each Corps duly attain-
ing its specified destination ; the Guard and 4th
Corps, before they started, taking up the bridges
thrown over the Meuse. Four divisions of cavalry
224 The Campaign of Sedan
were out prying, through the mist, into every move-
ment of the 5th and yth French Corps, whose left
flank, it was ascertained, was absolutely unguarded,
so that the German horse looked on, and, in some
cases, were misled by the astonishing confusion dis-
played by the enemy's vacillating motions.
Effects of MacMahon's Counter-Orders
The fatal decision adopted at Le Chesne on the
night of the 27th brought disorder and disaster upon
the French Army. The wise resolve to retreat on
Mezieres, strangely as the statement may sound, had
rekindled the fading spirits of the French soldiers.
As soon as the fact was communicated to them they
sprung with alacrity to perform the task of prepara-
tion. The officer who bore the order to the 7th Corps
started from Le Chesne at six o'clock, and by nine at
night the baggage, the provision transport, the
engineers' park, were actually in motion for Chagny,
through the long defile which leads to Le Chesne.
The cavalry were despatched to watch the flanks,
and the infantry in silence and darkness gHded to-
wards their first halting place, Quatre Champs.
" Every man," says Prince Bibesco, who was an eye-
witness, " marched with a firm step. All seemed to
have forgotten the cold, the rain, and the anxiety of
the preceding days." They drank in hope with the
refreshing air, and then their hopes were suddenly
extinguished ; for as they were near Quatre Champs,
at half-past five in the morning, an aide-de-camp
from MacMahon rode up to General Douay and told
him the latest decision — the Army was to move upon
the Meuse.
The orders brought by the ill-omened messenger
were that the 7th Corps, that very day, should move
to Nouart, which it was not destined to reach ; the
5th Beauclair, which it could not attain ; that the 12th
should gain La Besace, and the ist Le Chesne, both of
which marches were duly performed. Bonnemains'
heavy brigade of horse was sent to Les Grands
Armoises, and Margueritte's towards Mouzon, but
afterwards to Sommauthe. The 7th Corps, fearing
The Grand Right Wheel 225
greatly for its baggage train, already far away, set
out again and only reached Boult-aux-Bois, the men
on short rations, the horses without a feed of oats.
The same troubles beset the other Corps which had
despatched their trains northward. But the largest
share of ill-fortune befell De Failly. He was ordered
to march by way of Buzancy upon Nouart and Beau-
clair — indeed, to get as far forward as he could on
the road to Stenay. The Marshal knew it was occu-
pied, for he told De Failly to expect a sharp resis-
tance before he could carry it. But when within
sight of Harricourt and Bar his adventures began.
He discerned hostile cavalry in his path ; they were
vigilant Uhlans of the Guard. De Failly halted ;
the cavalry increased, became enterprising, and some
shots were exchanged ; but in the end the French
general, finding that he could not rely upon the
support of Douay, who was resting his wearied men
at Boult-aux-Bois, and beheving that the direct road
to Nouart was commanded by the enemy, he turned
aside and, through narrow muddy lanes, made his
way by Sommauthe to Belval and Bois les Dames,
the last division not arriving at the camp until eight
in the evening. Nevertheless, his appearance at and
south of Bois les Dames so imposed on the German
cavalry scouts that they retired from Nouart in the
afternoon. The movements and halts of both French
Corps had been observed, and when night fell the
Germans at Bayonville saw the French bivouac fires
beyond Buzancy and in the direction of Stenay. At
this time there were no hostile German infantry west
of the Meuse nearer than Bantheville ; for the troops
on the flank of the French, from Vouziers to Dun,
were wholly horsemen. No more valuable demon-
stration of the priceless value of cavalry was ever made
than that afforded by the Teutons during this cam-
paign. They were more than the " eyes and ears of
the Army ; ' ' they were an impenetrable screen con-
cealing from view the force and the movements of
the adversary, who were still engaged in pushing up
his troops in the hope of compelling the French to
fie:ht a decisive battle on the 30th. That hope
226 The Campaign of Sedan
entertained by Von Moltke on the 28th, was not
fulfilled, because, at the last moment, MacMahon
turned his Army from Stenay upon Mouzon. On
that day the King moved on to Varennes, and the
Prince, his son, to Sainte-Menehould.
German and French Operations on the 2gth
The position of affairs on the evening of the 28th
was somewhat perplexing, because the earlier re-
ports sent in to headquarters indicated, what was
the fact for a brief interval, that the French were
retiring northward. But no sooner had orders been
issued to fit that state of things than certain infor-
mation came to hand which showed that the Meuse
was again their immediate objective ; and it was
then that, by abstaining from provocation. Von Moltke
judged it possible to move up troops sufficient to
fight with advantage on the 30th, somewhere west of
Stenay. The Saxon Prince, acting within the dis-
cretionary limits allowed him, decided to cross the
Meuse with the 12th Corps, and bring up the Guard
and 4th to Buzancy and Nouart, but to evade a
battle, and content himself with the fulfilling the
task of obtaining intelligence. The orders were
issued, and, while they were in execution, one body
of cavalry tracked the 7th Corps during its painful
march to Oches and St. Pierremont, and saw the
divisions settling down in their bivouacs ; and another
made prize of Le Capitaine Marquis de Grouchy bear-
ing dispatches from MacMahon to De Failly. This
was an important capture, for it not only deprived
the unfortunate general of vital orders, but it placed
in the hands of Von Moltke the arrangements which
the Marshal had drawn up to guide the motions of
his Corps. Out of this mishap grew a fresh misfortune
for the French.
Marshal MacMahon, on the morning of the 28th,
framed his plans on the supposition that he would be
able to pass the Meuse at Stenay, and kept the heads
of his columns pointing south-west ; but learning at
a later period that the Saxons were posted at that
place in force — his reports said 15,000 men — he was,
The Grand Right Wheel 227
again, at midnight, obliged to change his scheme,
and he resolved to pass the river at Mouzon and
Remilly. He, therefore, sent out orders directing
the 1 2th Corps and Margueritte's cavalry to Mouzon,
for, having no pontoon train, he was compelled to
seek permanent bridges ; the ist Corps and Bonne-
mains' horse to Raucourt ; the 7th to La Besace,
which, as we have seen, they did not reach, but
halted at Oches and St. Pierrement ; and the 5th to
Beaumont, which place they entered after weary
marches and a sharp action. These were the orders
for the day which, with other useful documents,
were found in the pockets of De Grouchy. No special
interest pertains to the march of the ist Corps. The
12th found its way safely to Mouzon, crossed the
river, and occupied the heights on the right bank,
while General Margueritte despatched some of his
Chasseurs on the Stenay road. What then happened ?
The Chasseurs returned and reported that they had
seen no enemy, although at that moment Stenay
was held by the enemy's horse and foot. " They
committed," writes General Lebrun, then com-
manding the 1 2th Corps, " the fault which in former
wars was made a ground of reproach against the
French cavalry." When in sight of Stenay they
saw no Germans and turned back instead of pushing
on to and beyond the town, or trying to do so ; and
the Corps commander justly regards this laxity as a
grave fault. So Lebrun, resting at Mouzon, could
learn nothing, either from spies or his famous Chas-
seurs, respecting an enemy then within a few miles.
The irony of the situation was complete when, a
little later, the Zieten Hussars from Stenay rode up
to Margueritte's vedettes, and found him although he
could not find them. In that fashion the French
made war in 1870. General de Failly and his 5th
Corps were more severely treated, for their ill-luck
and misdirection brought upon them
The Combat at Nouart
Acting on verbal instructions, given on the night
of the 28th, at Belval, by a staff officer from the head-
228 The Campaign of Sedan
quarters at Stonne, De Failly set out the next morn-
ing towards Beaufort and Beauclair, two villages a
few miles south-west of Stenay. He did not know,
as we do, that the Marshal had changed his plans,
and that the officer bearing the countermanding
order had fallen into the hands of a German patrol.
The French General did not break up his camp and
quit Belval until ten o'clock in the morning, which
gave* the Saxons, who had been brought over the
Meuse from Dun, plenty of time to watch his move-
ments. Indeed, he could see them, troops of all arms,
on the heights of Nouart, moving, as he judged, in an
easterly direction, which was an error, possibly
arising from some turn in the road, for the whole 12th
Corps were over the Meuse between Dun and Nouart.
General de Failly disposed his troops in two columns,
one of which marched towards Beaufort by country
roads ; the other, with the general, consisting of Gtlyot
de Lespart's division and two regiments of Brahaut's
cavalry, made for Beauclair. Their road lay through
the valley of the Wiseppe, a sluggish stream mean-
dering through a marshy bottom land and passing
Beaufort on its way to the Meuse. The route through
Nouart was barred by the Germans, and when the
leading French squadrons, crossing the valley to gain
the main road, began to ascend the slopes, they sud-
denly came under a smart fire from infantry and guns.
The French Hussars flitted fast back across the
meadows, and De Failly at once stopped the march of
both columns, putting his infantry and guns in
position, and resting them principally upon two small
villages. Then ensued, about noon, an indecisive
but vexatious combat, for the Germans did not intend
to attack in force, but simply harass and delay the
5th Corps ; and De Failly, uncertain respecting the
numbers which might be hidden by the woods,
dared not retort, especially as he was remote from the
French Army and without support from any other
Corps. So, for several hours, the fight went on. The
object of the Saxons, who descended into the valley,
was simply to detain the French, and, although the
assailants traversed the brook and the high road,
The Grand Right Wheel 229
pushing forward a few companies and supporting
them by an artillery fire from the heights, they did
not come to close quarters. General de Failly was of
opinion that he had repelled an attack, and that the
enemy did not renew it because the French were so
strongly posted ; but the truth is that Prince George
of Saxony not only held back his superior force be-
cause he had been enjoined to abstain from a serious
engagement, but was himself misled by erroneous
reports respecting the state of affairs towards Stenay.
Soon after four o'clock De Failly also drew off ; he
had then just received a dupHcate of the order direct-
ing him upon Beaumont. He sadly deplores the
mischance, and pathetically relates how all his
wearied troops reached Beaumont " during the
night," except the rear-guard, which did not enter
the camp until five o'clock on the morning of the
30th. •
The State of Affairs at Sundown
Thus, for the French, terminated another day of
error and loss, which left three Corps still on the left
bank of the Meuse. When the sun went down, the
German horse were close to every one of them except
the 12th, which, it will be remembered, was on the
right bank near Mouzon. The active cavalry moved
in the rear of the ist Corps, seizing prisoners at
Voncq, riding up to Le Chesne, and keeping watch
through the night upon the wearied 7th Corps, as
it sought repose in the camps of Oches and St. Pierre-
mont. The German Infantry Corps, meantime, had
been closing up for the final onslaught. The 12th
Corps was in and about Nouart, covered by out-
posts and patrols, which stretched away to Stenay.
The Guard was at Buzancy, the 4th Corps at Remon-
ville ; the 5th Corps was at Grand Pre, with the
Wiirtembergers near at hand ; the Bavarians had
come up to Sommerance and its neighbourhood on
both banks of the Aisne ; the nth Corps stood at
Monthois on the left, while the 6th Corps was in the
rear at Vienne le Chateau. The headquarters of
King Wilham were set up in Grand Pre, under the
230 The Campaign of Sedan
old gloomy castle, the Prussian Prince was near by
at the little village of Senuc, and the Saxon Prince at
Bayonville. Thus, in three days, the whole Army had
drawn together, facing north, and was ready, at a
signal, to spring forward and grapple with the
enemy who had committed himself so rashly to a
flank march in the face of the most redoubtable
generals, and the best instructed, disciplined and
rapidly marching troops in Europe.
Examining attentively the reports which reached
him from all points of the extensive curve upon which
the cavalry were so active, and poring over the
map, General von Moltke at length formed a definite
judgment on the .position as it appeared to him
through this medium. He inferred that the Army of
Chalons was marching in a north-west direction
towards the Meuse ; that its principal forces were
then probably between Le Chesne and Beaumont,
with strong rear-guards to the south ; and the prac-
tical result of his cogitations was that the German
Armies should move upon the line Le Chesne-Beau-
mont in such a way as might enable them to attack
the enemy before he reached the Meuse. Therefore,
the Saxon Prince's Army, except the Guard, which
was to become the reserve, was to march early on
Beaumont, two Corps of the Third Army were to
support the Saxon onset, but the left of that Army
was to march on Le Chesne. As a matter of fact,
the French, in part at least, were nearer the Meuse
than Von Moltke supposed, for the 12th Corps was
on the right bank, and the ist at Raucourt ; while
the 7th was at Oches, the 5th at Beaumont, and
there were no troops at Le Chesne except stragglers.
MacMahon took in the situation ; he was resolved to
pass the river " coute que coute " : and his chance of
doing so, even then, depended on the rapidity with
which his troops could march. The 5th Corps was
struck and routed the next day, but the French Army
did succeed in effecting a passage over the stream.
The Battle of Beaumont
The German Armies had now fairly entered the
The Grand Right Wheel 231
Ardennes, formerly the northern district of the old
province of Champagne. It is a land of vast woods
which crowd one upon another between the Bar and
the Meuse. Looking from some smooth hill-top, the
landscape, in summer, wears the aspect of a bound-
less forest, the dark furrowed lines of shadow alone
indicating the hollows, gullies, ravines, and defiles.
Here and there may be seen a church or chateau, or
a glimpse may be caught of a road bordered by tall
trees. The woods are so dense that infantry, still less
guns and horsemen, cannot work through them, or
move at all, except upon the high roads, lanes and
tracks, worn by the villagers and farm people.
Marshy brooks lurk under the green covert, and
rivulets burrow their way through steep banks. Yet
there are open spaces in the maze of verdure, farm-
steads and fields, and rounded heights whence the
tourist may contemplate the extensive panorama.
It is :. '^t a country which lends itself easily to miUtary
operations, but one more suitable to the sportsman
than the .oldier. The boar of the Ardennes is still
famous anC' it is on record that a certain Herr von
Bisn arck, once upon a time, hunted the wolf through
the snow in the very region where he was hunting the
French in August, : 870.
It was amidst these thickets, dingles, and almost
pathless wilds that the French had to retreat and the
Germans to pursue. We have seen that General
de Failly's Corps was struggling all night to reach
what they hoped would be a comparative haven of
rest at Beaimiont, a bourgadeupon the high road from
Le Chesne to Stenay, planted down in a hollow, sur-
rounded by gardens, and having in its centre a fine
church visible from afar. Here he pitched his tents,
so that his tired soldiers might recover from the
fatigues they had endured in useless marches ; and
he thought, in his simple way, that he might safely
defer his march until the afternoon. Yet Marshal
MacMahon had visited the camp early in the morning,
and if he used language to De Failly, as he probably
did, similar to that which he employed at Oches, it
should have quickened the General's movements and
232 The Campaign of Sedan
saved him from defeat. For, after visiting Beau-
mont, MacMahon, much concerned for the 7th as well
as the 5th Corps, rode into the camp at Oches. The
trains had entered the defile leading to Stonne, some
hours earlier, preceded and escorted by the brigades
of Conseil Dumesnil's Division, and the 2nd Division
was just about to start, leaving the 3rd as a rear-
guard. " You will have 60,000 men upon your hands
this evening," he said, " if you do not succeed in
getting beyond the Meuse." Urging Douay to get
rid of his heavy convoy, and " coute que coute,"
cross the river, he indicated Villers below Mouzon as
the point of passage, and rode away. The misfortunes
of the 7th Corps, also much tried, will be related later ;
but it may be said that they did not reach Mouzon,
for their outlet from the toils proved to be the southern
gate of Sedan !
The Surprise of the $th Corps
Inspired by the hope of closing with -^-he enemy,
the German Armies were astir at dawn, and soon long
columns of men and guns were tramping steadily
northward ; but, for the present the narrative is
concerned only with the Saxon 12th, the Prussian
4th, and Von der Tann's Bavarians. These troops
advanced through the forests, the Saxons near the
Meuse, the 4th in the centre by Nouart and Belval,
and the Bavarians from their distant bivouac at
Sommerance, upon and beyond Somrriauthe. Now
it was originally designed that the two Corps, on the
right and centre, should attack simultaneously, and
to insure this, each column, on arriving at the out-
skirts of the forest, was directed to halt under cover
until it had ascertained that the others on each flank
had also gained the edge of the woods. But it turned
out that the Saxons, from the start, were delayed by
various obstacles which impeded not only the artillery,
but the infantry. The leading division of the 4th
Corps met with fewer obstructions on its route through
Belval, and thus arrived first on the scene of action.
On the Une of march in the forest, intelligence was
The Grand Right Wheel 233
picked up which quickened its motions, and a squad-
ron sent foPA^ard confirmed the statement that the
French about Beaumont reposed in thoughtless
security. The Corps Commander, Von Al vensleben I . ,
— for there were two who bore the name in this
Army — an officer ever ready to go forward, was
present with the advance guard of the division, and
not hkely to hold it back. So the soldiers advanced
in silence. On approaching the open country, the
Hussars in the front ghded out of sight, and a com-
pany of Jagers crept towards the selvage of the wood,
and, from a hillock near a farm, they saw, only six
hundred paces distant, a French camp, and beyond
other camps. The cavalry horses were picketed, the
artillery teams had not returned from seeking water,
the soldiers were either resting or employed on the
routine work of a camp. What should be done ?
Here was an absolutely unguarded Army Corps,
ignorant that an enemy was within short musket
range. The divisional commander had orders to
await the arrival of lateral columns, but he felt that
the Frenchmen might discover his unwelcome pre-
sence at any moment. He had only a brigade on the
ground, yet the temptation to seize an opportunity
so unexpected was almost irresistible. He, therefore,
decided to attack as soon as his brigade could deploy,
and his batteries plant themselves in a favourable
place. Suddenly the men in the French camp were
all in motion. General von Alvensleben inferred
that the proximity of his troops had been perceived,
whereas the activity displayed, as we learn from De
Failly, was caused by an order to fall in before start-
ing for Mouzon. Without waiting, however, until
the battahons in rear could reach the ground, Alven-
sleben opened fire, and the shells bursting in their
camp, gave the first warning to the French that their
redoubtable adversaries were upon them. General
de Failly says that the grand-guards had not had
time to signal the enemy's presence, and that his own
information led him to believe that the Germans had
marched upon Stenay. The verdict of Marshal
MacMahon upon his subordinate is that " General
I 2
234 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
de Failly was surprised in his bivouac by the troops
of the Saxon Crown Prince."
The French soon recovered from their disorder,
swarms of skirmishers rushed out towards the assail-
ants, some batteries went rapidly into action ; and
the combined fire of shells and bullets wrought havoc
among the Prussian gunners and the infantry, hitting
even those on the Une of march. They did not yield
to the pressure ; and when the French dehvered a
determined attack it was repelled by volleys and
independent firing. Then the French got several
batteries into position on the hill side north of Beau-
mont ; the Germans were reinforced by the arrival of
guns and foot, for the other division of the Corps
came up and at once deployed on the right of its
comrades. At this time, a little after one o'clock,
the Saxons on the right, next the Meuse, and the
Bavarians on the left, who had been marching since
five o'clock in the morning, had also begun to take
part in the fight. King WilHam and his vast Staff,
posted on a hill off the road from Buzancy, and his
son, on a similar elevation near Oches, were closely
watching the battle, discernible thence in its general
smoky features, at least by the King.
General de Failly had no desire to fight a regular
engagement. His aim was to put his troops in order
and offer as much resistance as might be required to
cover his retreat upon Mouzon, distant only six
miles. He, therefore, reHed on his hne of guns above
the village, and they were effective, for some time-;
but he showed great apprehension lest his left, or
Meuse flank, should be turned. Seeing the German
lines develop and grow stronger, in men and guns,
feehng the new power brought to bear by the Saxons,
who, cramped for want of room, were pressed close
to the river, and, hearing the Bavarian guns on his
right, he made one more vigorous effort to arrest the
4th Corps. Thick hues of skirmishers, followed by
supports in close order, dashed forward with such
valour and impetuosity that they drove in the cover-
ing infantry and charged to within fifty paces of the
guns. The danger was great, but the Germans
The Grand Right Wheel 235
rapidly flung everything near into the contest, gained
the mastery, compelled the gallant Frenchmen to
wheel about, followed them promptly, captured the
southern camp, and then poured into Beaumont
itself upon all sides. But the chassepot had told,
and the Germans paid heavily, as they always did
and were ready to do, for their persistent courage
and well-tempered audacity. With the town fell the
other camps ; and then, for a time, the infantry
combat ceased. But the artillery advanced, as
usual, and engaged in a long duel with the powerful
hne of batteries established by the French to faciUtate
the retreat of their infantry and arrest pursuit.
Although not able to stand up against 150 guns, they
did not retire until their infantry had got into another
position between the Yoncq brook and the Meuse.
Then the batteries cleverly withdrew in succession,
and before the 4th Corps could advance, De Failly's
troops disappeared in the woods, and were seen no
more until they were reached beyond the hills and
thrust headlong into Mouzon.
WhWe the 4th Corps was pulling itself together after
the onset, De Failly had been compelled by the im-
penetrable wood of Givodeau to divide his forces, the
left and the reserve artillery following the main route
to Mouzon took post above Villemontrey, close to the
Meuse, and derived support from guns and infantry
which Lebrun had put into position on the high land
in an elbow of the river on the right bank. The right
wing hurried round the western side of the Givodeau
thickets, and found a post upon a plateau beyond.
In the meantime. General Lebrun had ordered two
brigades of infantry, commanded by Cambriels and
Villeneuve, and a cavalry division, to cross the river
at Mouzon, but Marshal MacMahon, riding up, ordered
back Cambriels, and all the horse except two regi-
ments of Cuirassiers. Those we shall presently meet
again. The German right wing vainly endeavoured
to drive De Failly from Villemontrey, and, after
repeated attempts and much loss, desisted from the
enterprise ; but kept a strong force at hand and a
large number of guns in action.
236 The Campaign of Sedan
Meantime a singular incident had occurred to the
west of Beaumont. Just as the Bavarians were about
to join in the attack on the camps by throwing them-
selves on the French flank, they were fired on from
a farm called La Thibaudine and a hamlet named
Warniforet. They were astonished because the
presence of an enemy there was not even suspected.
The enemy was also astonished and still more
frightened. The combat was caused by a French
brigade, which had wandered from its line of march.
It seems that the advance brigade of Conseil Dumes-
nil's division preceding the transport of the 7th
Corps, a series of wagons, nine miles in length, had
been ordered by MacMahon, who met them, to move
by Yoncq instead of La Besace, and that, when the
rear brigade came up to the point of divergence,
the marker left to give information having disap-
peared, these unfortunate troops went forward on the
great road to Beaumont. A staff officer arrived just
as the action began, and he was leading the errant
troops back, when the Bavarians emerged in view-
The conflict which ensued was sharp, but it delayed
the 7th Corps and ended in the rout of the French,
who fled as best they could through Yoncq towards
Mouzon. About this time Douay was at Stonne ;
the Uhlans of the Guard had followed him step by
step, and bringing a horse battery to bear on his rear
guard, had induced General Dumont to halt, deploy
the brigade, and in his turn open fire ; but General
Douay promptly appeared and stopped the action,
having made up his mind that the pressing duty of the
hour was to get over the Meuse in accordance with the
Marshal's desire. So the 7th, after some hesitation,
retired upon Raucourt, hoping thence to gain Villers
below Mouzon ; yet, being pursued by the Bavarians,
they were overtaken and attacked outside Raucourt, and,
hearing that the bridge was broken, they turned, some
upon Remilly, and others through Torcy into Sedan itself.
The Flight to Mouzon
When the left wing of the 4th Corps, pressing to-
wards the defile of the Yoncq and the slopes above it,
The Grand Right Wheel 237
sought to discover the French on that side, they were
at first sharply punished ; but, following on, they
came up and closed with their adversaries. One
brigade of Bavarians had been sent to the 4th Corps
and moved on the left flank of the toilsome advance.
For the ground was difficult, the obstacles numerous,
and the French, though shattered and dispirited, still
displayed a fighting front. But at length, late in the
afternoon, the Germans mastered a hill-top whence
adverse artillery had fired upon the assailants ; and
then these fairly entered the plain before Mouzon.
Here, however, the French occupied an isolated hill,
called Le Mont de Brune, close to and almost over-
hanging the Faubourg of Mouzon, from which its
summit is less than a mile distant. Unluckily for
them they formed front facing eastward, apparently
anticipating an attack on that side ; but the Germans
promptly turned the flank from the south and south-
west, and drove the defenders down the steep slope
towards Mouzon, capturing ten guns. The victorious
forward movement brought the leading companies
in front of Villeneuve's brigade and the Cuirassiers
in the plain. The Germans halted, and opened a
steady fire, when suddenly they beheld the 5th
Cuirassiers coming down on their left flank and rear.
Captain Helmuth, who commanded the three
companies exposed to this ordeal, made the left
company face about in time, and then forbidding his
men to form rallying squares or groups, ordered them
to stand fast as they were, and only open fire when
he gave the signal. The gallant French horsemen,
as was their wont, rode straight upon the infantry ;
but the independent firing opened on them at point
blank range, broke the impetus and crushed in the
head of the charging squadrons. Colonel Contenson
fell mortally wounded within fifteen paces of the
infantry line ; and, although some fiery spirits dashed
into their ranks, and one engaged in single combat
with Captain Helmuth until he fell pierced by ball
and bayonet, yet the whole mass of cavalry was
routed with immense loss, and driven into the Meuse.
For, by this time, the wreck of De Failly's Corps
238 The Campaign of Sedan
was in full retreat on all sides, and troops, artillery,
transport trains, and stragglers, were crowding on
towards the bridge. When his right was turned by
the movement upon the Brune hiU, and still further
by the march of the Bavarian brigade upon Pourron,
De Failly quitted his post at Villemontrey, which
enabled the right division of the 4th Corps, the Saxon
regiments fighting by its side, and the artillery to
push on by the main road to Mouzon. After the
first surprise of the Beaumont camp, the French had
mainly stood, here and there, to facihtate their
retreat, and the contest, which went on all the after-
noon among the woods and hills and ravines, was
really a running fight. The Germans had pursued
with relentless pertinacity. Their soldiers had been
marching all day, but they seemed to be tireless,
for they never halted until the fugitives were over the
Meuse, or the darkness forbade further motion.
De Failly had been surprised and thrust in disorder
over the river, and when the evening closed the
Germans were in possession of the faubourg of Mouzon
and of the bridge at its western end. The 7th Corps,
cut off from Villers, had moved, in a state bordering
on panic, upon Remilly ; but there they found
Bonnemains' cuirassiers, the tail of a division belong-
ing to the ist Corps, and a baggage column. The
Meuse had been dammed to fill the ditches of Sedan,
and not only were the fords rendered useless, but the
swelling stream was unusually high. Douay, halted
at seven o'clock, became impatient after dark, and. at
ten rode down to the bridge. He found the cuirassiers
engaged in passing over the feeble construction.
"The horses,'* writes Prince Bibesco, ''affrighted,
because they could not see the shaking planks hidden
by the water, and shifting under their steps, moved
with hesitation, their necks extended, their ears erect.
Sitting upright, shrouded in their large white cloaks,
the cuirassiers marched on silently, and appeared to
be borne on the stream. Two fires, one at each end
of the bridge, flung a ghastly light on men and horses,
and, flickering on the helmets, imparted a fantastic
aspect to this weird spectacle." At length the white
The Grand Right Wheel 239
horsemen passed over ; but when the turn of the
artillery came the horses were still more recalcitrant,
and the passage was so slow that, at two in the morn-
ing of the 31st, only three batteries and two regiments
of foot had passed the Meuse. Douay then learned
that the Marshal had ordered all the Army to assemble
at Sedan, and he moved the rest of his Corps over the
bridge at Torcy. These few details will give some
idea of the terrible disorder which prevailed through-
out the French Army.
On the evening of the 30th the Germans were upon
the Meuse. The 4th Corps was before Mouzon ; one
Bavarian Corps at Raucourt, the other at Som-
mauthe ; the 5th and nth Corps about La Besace
and Stonne ; the 12th was near the Meuse in front of
Beaumont, and the Guard just behind them ; the
Wiirtembergers were at Verrieres, and the 6th Corps
well out to the west at Vouziers. On this flank also
were the 5th and 6th Cavalry Divisions threatening
and watching the French communications ; while the
12th Cavalry Division was astride the Meuse at
Pouilly, and one of its squadrons, evading and passing
through Margueritte's vedettes, had discovered and
reported the presence of French troops on the Chiers
near Carignan, and the movement of trains on the
railway towards Sedan.
So ended this ominous day. The Army of the
Meuse had lost 3,500 men in killed and wounded,
but they had routed one French Corps, and fractions
of two others, and they had captured forty-two guns.
The French loss is set down at 1,800 killed and
wounded, but the Germans aver that, included among
the 3,000 acknowledged to be missing, there were
2,000 who bore no wounds.
CHAPTER XII
Metz and Strasburg
At the very moment when the Army of Chalons, in-
stead of marching on its way to Montmedy, found
the Corps huddled together at Sedan, between the
river and the Belgian frontier, some information of the
movement undertaken by MacMahon, who yielded his
better judgment to the importunate entreaties (les
instances) of Palikao, reached Marshal Bazaine in
Metz. He had already, on the 26th of August, col-
lected a large mass of troops upon the right bank, in
order to break out towards Thionville ; but the rain
poured down all day in torrents, and, after a consulta-
tion at the Farm of Grimont with his Marshals and
Generals, whose opinions were adverse to the sortie
projected, he issued an order directing the Army to
resume its former quarters. But, on the 29th, a
messenger who had crept through the German Hues,
handed to the Marshal a despatch from the officer
commanding in Thionville, Colonel Turnier, stating
that General Ducrot, with the ist Corps, should be
" to-day, the 27th," at Stenay on the left of the Army,
General Douay on his right being on the Meuse.
Bazaine seems to have had doubts respecting the
authenticity of this missive, the handwriting of which
his staff did not recognize ; but the next morning,
about eleven, an agent of his own came in from
Verdun. He was the bearer of a telegram from the
Emperor — ^it was really the message drawn up by
MacMahon, on the 22nd of August, copied, apparently,
in cipher, by Napoleon, and intrusted to Bazaine' s
emissary. The despatch, which had no date, stated
that the sender would march towards Montmedy,
and when on the Aisne, would act according to
circumstances, in order to succour the Metz Army.
Regarding the second document, though antecedent
in point of time, as a confirmation of the first which
240
Metz and Strasburg 241
he had received. Marshal Bazaine, on the 30th, issued
the orders which, the following day, led to
The Battle of Noisseville
His plan, succinctly described, was to break through
the hne of investment on the right bank of the
Moselle by directing three Corps, the 3rd, 4th, and
6th, principally upon St. Barbe, aud he hoped, if
successful, to march them forward upon Kedange,
while the Guard and the 2nd Corps followed the track
by the river. He estimates the force which was
available for battle at 100,000 men, but he probably
had more ; at any rate, the delays which had occurred
on the 14th of August, and were in part repeated on
the 31st, shows how arduous is the task of issuing
with such masses from a fortified town and position
astride of a river. The weather was not favourable,
for the continuous rain had soaked the ground, and
at dawn a thick fog, which hung about for several
hours, impeded the operations. The Germans had
been more than usually on the alert since the abortive
attempt on the 26th, and had thought it expedient
to include Noisseville within the line of defence.
The noise and preparations in Metz did not escape
their notice, but the dense mist concealed much from
their searching gaze. Yet they saw and heard
enough, both on the eastern and western fronts of
Metz, to warrant a belief that a resolute onset was im-
pending. As the fog bank rolled away, the batteries
and the massing of troops became visible, and General
von Manteuffel transmitted the results of his careful
observations to Von Steinmetz and Prince Frederick
Charles, both of whom made instant arrangements
to support the ist Corps and the other troops on the
right bank. The forenoon passed by, and, except
some slight skirmishes and a brief artillery duel, no
action ensued. About midday the French sat down
to cook, and the smoke from their fires rose in clouds,
indicated their position, but hid them from view ;
at the same time, although the sun was shining,
the culinary haze concealed the workmen engaged
in throwing up shelter for the heavy guns drawn
242 The Campaign of Sedan
from the forts ; and the German leaders arrived at
the conclusion that the onslaught would be deferred
until the next day ; their soldiers also fell to cooking,
and some fractions recrossed the Moselle to join their
main body ; but their attention to the phenomena
before them was not relaxed.
Yet the afternoon began to wear away. It was not
until half-past two that Marshal Bazaine gave that
signal for attack which was nevertheless not obeyed
until another hour and a half had been consumed.
The signal was a salvo from the battery of heavy
guns placed behind the field works hastily thrown
up in front of Fort St. JuHen. The battlefield of the
31st was one with. which we were made acquainted
when Vol Golz took upon himself to arrest the retreat
of the French over the Moselle on the 14th of August.
It extended from Mercy les Metz by Colombey,
Noisseville, and Failly to Malroy on the Moselle.
The French assailants, therefore, had to cross the
ravines east of Borny and work up both banks of
the Vallieres brook which, rising near St. Barbe,
enters the Moselle opposite the Isle Chambiere. The
6th Corps, Canrobert's, was to attack by the river
road towards Malroy ; De Ladmirault, with the 4th,
was to move by Failly and Vremy to outflank St.
Barbe on its right, while the left of that position was
to be carried by Lebceuf's 3rd Corps ; and Frossard,
with the 2nd, was to follow and cover the right flank
of Leboeuf. The Guard, the cavalry, and reserve
artillery were to stand between Fort St. Julien and the
Bois de Grimont, and all the baggage was to be ready
in the Isle Chambiere. The Germans were prepared to
meet such an attack, but, as we have said, they had
come to believe that it would be deferred.
Suddenly, about four o'clock, the dead silence was
broken by a salvo from the heavy guns, followed by
the fire of De Ladmirault's batteries. Then the
action began along the whole front, the Germans
at once developing a powerful line of fifty guns about
Servigny and Poix, far in advance of the main line of
defence, and bringing other pieces to bear from
different points. Nevertheless, favoured by the
Metz and Strasburg 243
broken ground and resolute to win, the French
infantry persistently advanced until about six o'clock
they had driven in all the foreposts, and had gained
possession on their right of Noisseville, the garrison
of which village they curiously complain held out
longer than they were entitled to do. The capture
of Noisseville facihtated the principal attacks which
were directed upon Servigny and Poix, villages which
served as redoubts guarding the avenues to St. Barbe,
the culminating point in the region. At the same
time the French right had pushed well forward towards
Retonfay, the object being to protect the flank of
the 3rd Corps, now in motion upon the central posts
of the German line. Here the contest was severe,
and in the end the great hne of guns which had held
De Ladmirault at bay so long, unable to bear the
musketry lire in front and flank, was compelled to
withdraw behind the villages. But, although the
French infantry came up boldly on both flanks, as well
as in front, they were unable to overcome the sturdy
defenders, in whose possession the villages remained
at dark. The French left under Canrobert had made
repeated attacks upon Failly, which met with no
success, and he halted at Chieulles and Vany, so that
the movement near the Meuse had secured but little
ground. At dark the French had not done more
than occupy a Hne extending from Canrobert's right
in front of Villers I'Orme to Noisseville, and thence
by Flanville to Chateau d'Aubigny. By this time
General von Manteuffel had been reinforced by two
brigades of Landwehr, and the 25th Division, under
Prince Louis of Hesse, which had crossed the Moselle,
and considerably strengthened his right wing. Then
occurred a remarkable incident. General Aymard,
about nine o'clock, creeping silently up to Servigny,
flung forward his division, and, without firing a shot,
burst in upon the surprised Germans, engaged in pre-
paring the defences, and carried the place. Astonished
and enraged. General von Gayl immediately gathered
up a force, and breaking, in his turn, upon the enemy,
drove him out and recovered possession before ten
o'clock. Aymard's is an example of a night attack
244 The Campaign of Sedan
well performed ; but the weak defence of what had
been skilfully won, was not so creditable to the French.
During the night, General Manstein, with the other
half of the 9th Corps, crossed the Moselle, halted in
rear of the German right wing, and thus enabled
the Hessian Division to take post behind St. Barbe.
A dense fog again filled the valley at dawn, but at
an early hour General von Manteuffel, holding his
ground in the centre and on the right, brought his
batteries to bear upon Noisseville, and promptly
assumed the offensive. The place was strongly
occupied and stoutly defended. Although the Ger-
mans broke in for a moment they were speedily
expelled, and several hours elapsed before the village
fell into their hands. But throughout the day,
except towards Rupigny and Failly, the French stood
on the defensive. For the Germans arrayed 114
guns on the hills, crushed the adverse artillery, and
prevented the French infantry from making any
combined attack. The position on their right was
soon rendered less safe by the arrival of a brigade
of the 7th Corps which, coming up from Laquenexy,
drove the French out of Flanville. This demonstra-
tion on the right of Marshal Leboeuf's hne, together
with the terrible fire of the German artillery, induced
him, about eleven o'clock, to draw back the whole of
his troops, and allow his adversary once more to
occupy Noisseville. On the French left. Marshal
Canrobert's soldiers had been forced back upon
Chieulles, and the attacks upon Failly had wholly
failed. Prince Frederick Charles who, at Malan-
court, had heard the opening cannonade at Sedan
on the morning of the ist, took up his post of ob-
servation on a hill towards the Moselle before eight
o'clock, and provided for the arrival of strong rein-
forcements, should they be needed, from the left
bank, but only the loth Corps passed the Moselle
and was stationed between Argancy and Antilly.
The retreat of Marshal Leboeuf had been followed by
that of the other Corps, and a httle after noon the
French Army was marching back to the camps and
bivouacs whence it had advanced on the 31st. The
Metz and Strasburg 245
great sortie had signally failed in opening a road
through the investing lines. The French had 3,547
officers and men killed and wounded, including in
the latter category four Generals, one of whom,
Maneque, mortally. The German loss was 2,976
killed and wounded. Marshal Bazaine estimates the
number he put in the field at 100,000 ; the German
authorities say they began the fight with 40,800 men
and 138 guns ; and at the end of the encounter had
over the Moselle 73,800 men and 290 guns.
Marshal Bazaine and his troops re-entered their
prison on the afternoon of the day when the white
flag was hoisted on the Citadel of Sedan ; and with
his and their subsequent misfortunes we have nothing
more to do in this work. Neither is it our business
to consider whether by marching up instead of down
the right bank he could have escaped with some
portion of his Army safe and sound to the South
of France. That he did his uttermost to push
through on the 31st is the contention of the German
staff, but it is doubtful whether on the second day
the same spirit prevailed. All the knotty questions
suggested by the military situation about Metz and
elsewhere at the end of August could only be ade-
quately discussed by entering upon a history of
transactions with which we have no present concern.
The essential fact is that the French Marshals tried
to break the barrier and failed at a moment when
even their success could not have prevented the
capitulation at Sedan. The attempt demonstrated
the immense advantages of a carefully prepared
defensive position combined with a readiness to use
artillery in the front hne from the first, and an equal
readiness to become the assailant whenever a useful
opportunity occurred. But to the mind of this
writer the moral of the Metz episode in the great
war is the danger attending these large intrenched
camps, which will certainly exert in the future, as
they have in the past, an irresistible attraction upon
inferior commanders, and will task the intellect, and
the ingenuity and the firmness of the greatest to
put them to a proper use. Neither Bazaine nor any
246 The Campaign of Sedan
colleague in superior command could be described
as a man of genius, and to such soldiers, while war
is conducted on a vast scale, and armies in the field
are numbered by the hundred thousand, places hke
Metz will not cease to become traps in which frus-
trated or beaten armies will be caught and captured,
sometimes, it may be, by force or stratagem ; usually
by stress of famine. Meantime the issue of war will
be decided, as it always has been, by the belHgerent
who is able to keep the field.
Although huge armies had penetrated so swiftly
into France on the morrow of the frontier victories,
there were still, besides the fortress of Metz, which
was in an exceptional case, several other strongholds
which stood out defiant upon the main fines of the
German communications. They were Verdun, Toul,
Bitsche, Phalsburg, Strasburg, and, at a later stage,
Belfort. Each of these, except the last-named, re-
quired to be, and were, watched or invested by
troops drawn from the active armies or the reserves
in Germany ; but they had little or no influence
upon the colossal events which decided the issue of
what we have called the Campaign of Sedan. Stras-
burg alone was a cause of any anxiety, because the
Germans were eager to obtain possession of a fortress
the fall of which would give them undisputed com-
mand of the Rhine, and become of great value in
the event of unlooked-for and improbable reverses.
General von Werder, with the Baden Division, after
the Battle of Woerth, had been sent to invest the
town, and he arrived before it on the nth. It is
not intended to relate in these pages the siege of
Strasburg, which properly belongs to the story of
the Franco-German war as a whole. The point to
note is that the regular siege was preceded by a
useless bombardment. The engineer desired to pro-
ceed in the orthodox way ; the chief of the staff
wished to try the more violent method. He insisted
that a bombardment would terrify the inhabitants,
and make them exert such a pressure on the Governor,
General Uhrich, a gallant veteran, as would compel
him to surrender. The dispute was determined by
Metz and Strasburg 247
an appeal to the Great Headquarters, then at Pont
^ Mousson, and General von Moltke, who desired that
the place should be taken in the shortest possible
time, and that the 40,000 men before it might be
available for other operations, decided in favour
of the bombardment. The consequence was that
dreadful sufferings were inflicted upon the inhabi-
tants of Strasburg, and terrible devastation brought
upon the town, but that the cruelty did not attain
the end in view ; and that the wise engineer was
permitted to apply his method at a moment when,
had his advice been adopted, the besieging Army
would have been near the success which was ultim-
ately attained. The bombardment of Strasburg
was not only an error regarded from a miUtary point
of view, it was a great political blunder ; for who
can doubt that the agonies endured in the last days
of August, 1870, and the resentment created by the
awful destruction of hfe and property, have materially
helped to render inveterate that hostihty to German
rule which even now reigns in Strasburg as strong
as ever. Strasburg would have been captured,
probably at an earlier date, had there been no bom-
bardment, humanity would have been spared a heart-
rending spectacle, and Germany would have profited
by showing some deference towards the feeUngs
and some regard for the lives of the people whose
town it was intended to restore to the Reich, and
over whom she had determined to rule. It was only
on the 26th, when the King had just turned north-
ward from the Omain to hunt after MacMahon, that
Von Werder, finding Uhrich resolute, decided to
proceed by way of a regular siege. After the end
of the month the fortress ceased to be, in any sense,
a danger to the German Armies, which, whether
closed around Metz or marching westward through
France, could afford to await, with calmness, the
certain surrender of Strasburg, an end which might
have been attained just as quickly had the wisdom
of King'WiUiam's statesmen been called in to sustain
the sound judgment of General Schulz, the acconi-
pUshed Engineer.
CHAPTER XIII.
Sedan
German Decision
While Strasburg was enduring the agonies of a
siege and bombardment, and the " Army of the
Rhine," already oppressed by "la question des
vivres," was chafing in its restricted camps under
the cannon of Metz ; while Paris was quivering with
excitement and barely restrained from bursting into
open revolt, the victorious German host was closing
steadily, yet swiftly, round the distracted and mis-
guided Army of Chalons. It was pressed in so
closely on the Belgian frontier that, during the
afternoon of the 30th, before De Failly had been
driven over the Meuse, Count Bismarck sent a formal
communication to the German Minister at Brussels,
in which he expressed a hope that, should MacMahon
lead his soldiers across the boundary, the Belgian
authorities would immediately deprive them of
their arms. At night, in his quarters at Buzancy,
King Wilham sanctioned a decisive order to his son
and the Saxon Prince. The troops were to march at
dawn, attack the enemy wherever he could be found
on the left and right bank of the Meuse, in order
that he might be crushed up as much as possible
between the river and the Belgian border. The
Saxon Prince was to operate beyond the Meuse,
with two Corps ; the Prussian Prince on the front and
left ; movements designed to bar the road to Mont-
medy, prevent any attempt to recross the river, and,
eventually, to interpose the German left wing between
the French and Mezieres. " Should the adversary
enter Belgium and not be immediately disarmed
he is to be followed at once without waiting for fresh
orders." These were not the final instructions which
248
Sedan 249
led to the investment of an Army, but they prepared
the way towards, and foreshadowed the accom-
plishment of that astonishing result.
Confusion in the French Camp
Marshal MacMahon, perplexed, but not dismayed,
by the events of the 30th, remained for some time in
doubt. " I do not know what I shall do," said the
Marshal early in the evening to Ducrot's aide-de-
camp. " In any case, the Emperor should at once
start for Sedan." At that time the Emperor was
in the camp of Ducrot, who, instructed to protect
the retreat of the Army either by Douzy or by Carig-
nan, that is, towards Sedan or Montmedy, had
divided his Corps between those two places. At a
later period, when darkness had set in, MacMahon,
seated at a bivouac fire, on the heights above Mouzon,
sent for General Lebrun, and directed him to retreat,
at once, upon Sedan, not by the highway, which was
crowded with fugitives and wagons, but by cross
roads leading upon Douzy. " We have had a bad
time," said the Marshal, " but the situation is not
hopeless. At the most, the German Army before us
cannot exceed in numbers sixty or seventy thousand
men. If they attack us, so much the better ; we
shall be able, doubtless, to fling them into the Meuse."
The Marshal, who never spared himself, and seemed
to live without sleep, rode back to Sedan, and Lebrun
stumbling along devious tracks, in the darkness, and
apparently in dubious miUtary array, fearing all the
time that he might be attacked, entered Douzy at
eight in the morning, and did not reach Bazeilles,
his destination, until ten o'clock.
Meantime Ducrot, embarrassed by the presence
of the Emperor, awaited anxiously, at Carignan,
the final orders of MacMahon. He respectfully urged
His Majesty to depart by train for Sedan, but the
Emperor refused — " he wished to be with the Corps
which covered the retreat." He was astonished and
incredulous when the rout before Mouzon was de-
scribed. " It is impossible," he repeatedly ex-
claimed, " our positions were magnificent 1 " In
250 The Campaign of Sedan
the night he vanished from Carignan ; and it was
only some hours after he had gone that Ducrot was
informed of his departure by train. The General
then, in concert with Margueritte, whose cavalry
were on the Chiers, resolved to retreat in the morning,
without waiting longer for orders, and to move upon
Illy, because he assumed that MacMahon would
certainly direct the Army on Mezieres. He was
mistaken. On reaching Villers-Cernay, about four
in the afternoon of the 31st, Ducrot learned that
he was to retire upon Sedan, and not upon Mezidres,
" whither I have not any intention of going," said
the Marshal's despatch. In fact, the two Divisions
of the 1st Corps, left at Douzy on the 30th, had
been already ordered to retire on the Givonne.
Lebrun, whom we saw follow in their wake, after
his painful night march, did not destroy the bridge
over the Chiers ; so that, when he was passing
Francheval, Ducrot actually saw the enemy — they
were Saxon horsemen — ^issuing from the village, and
cutting in upon the baggage and transport train.
On that memorable 30th, when the Emperor in-
formed the Empress by telegram, from Carignan,
that there had been an " engagement of no great
importance," an officer destined to be conspicuous,
dropped in upon the Army ; it was De Wimpffen.
He has been defined by General Lebrun, who was
with him at St. Cyr, as a man of firm will, and " an
unlimited confidence in his own capacity." Indeed,
he had come to restore victory. When he passed
through Paris, the Comte de Pahkao was good enough
to tell him — so he writes, although Palikao '* thinks "
he could not have so expressed himself — that Mac-
Mahon chimed in too easily with the suggestions of
the Emperor, which was not the fact ; that His
Majesty was in a false position, and that he caused
the greatest embarrassment. " Send me to the
Army," said De Wimpffen, " I shall impart the
needed boldness and decision." So he was sent
to supersede De Failly in command of the 5th Corps,
carrying in his pocket a letter which authorised him
to succeed MacMahon in command of the Army,
Sedan 251
should any accident befall the Marshal. It was this
audacious personage who supervened on the 30th,
and to his horror, found the Army he might have to
guide and govern, falling to pieces under his eyes.
He met troops in flight from Mouzon ; they were
frightened, famished, and could hardly be persuaded
that the " Prussians " were not at their heels. As
evidence of the reigning disorder, De Wimpffen says
that he collected on the 30th, three regiments be-
longing to the 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, some squad-
rons of De Failly's cavalry, and several hundreds of
men belonging to the ist Corps, who obeyed a non-
combatant officer. The General led them during the
night to Sedan. A like confusion prevailed on all sides,
as the soldiers, hungry and thoroughly wearied, fell
asleep as they dropped on the ground in their
dreary bivouacs.
The Emperor entered Sedan about midnight. The
Marshal urged him to embark afresh in the train, and
seek security in Mezieres, where General Vinoy was
expected, and where he did. indeed, arrive that night
with the advance guard of one division of the 13th
Corps. The Emperor refused to quit Sedan, but the
Prince Imperial had been sent away. The movement
of Vinoy was delayed several hours, because a train
running to Avesnes, and bearing the young Prince,
" his baggage, his escort, and his suite," barred the
way to Mezieres.
When morning dawned upon the discomfited
Army, Marshal MacMahon had not ceased to ponder.
As he said before the Parliamentary Commission of
Inquiry in 1872, he had no intention of fighting a
battle at Sedan, but he wished to supply the Army
afresh with provisions and munitions ; and he spent
part of the day in considering what he should do on
the morrow, and in watching from the citadel the
march of his foes. There were, be believed, a million
rations in Sedan, but eight hundred thousand of
these were stored in wagons at the station, and as
shells reached them from beyond the Meuse, the
station master sent away the train to Mezieres.
With it went a company of engineers, instructed to
252 The Campaign of Sedan
blow up the bridge at Donchery ; but frightened by
the shells, the driver halted long enough to drop the
engineers, and then hastily fled with the powder
and tools. The Marshal did not hear of the mishap
until ten o'clock at night, and when another company
of engineers reached the bridge, they found it in
possession of the enemy ! Early in the morning, before
that event occurred, Captain des Sesmaisons, carrying
a message from Vinoy, entered Sedan, after having
been fired on by a German battery estabhshed near
Frenois. He saw the Emperor in the hotel of the
Sub-Prefect, delivered his message, and received a
despatch from His Majesty directing Vinoy to con-
centrate his troops -in Mezieres. Anxious that the
Captain should return in safety, the Emperor gave
him a horse, and traced on a map the road he should
take, observing that the Army would retire by that
route the next day ; that the road would be open and
safe, as it was new, had not been marked on the map,
and was unknown to the enemy. But we learn from
the German Staff history, that this recently opened
road, although not laid down on the French, was
duly figured in the German map, a contrast between
diHgence and negligence not easily paralleled. The
Captain saw MacMahon, who then, nearly midday,
seemed resolved to march on Mezieres, and believed
that he could crush any opposition.
At this moment General Douay arrived, and gave
a new turn to his thoughts. Douay had surveyed the
position in front of his camp with an anxious eye,
and had noted that, unless reinforced, he could
not hold the cardinal point — the Calvaire d'llly.
He got additional troops in the end. " But," said
the Marshal, who seemed to share Douay' s appre-
hensions, " I do not want to shut myself up in lines ;
I wish to be free to manoeuvre." " M. le Marechal,
to-morrow the enemy will not leave you the time,"
was the General's answer. According to Captain des
Sesmaisons, it was Douay' s comments on the position
which made the Marshal modify his judgment, and
think of fighting where he stood rather than of
retreating on Mezieres. The Captain rode back to
Sedan 253
his General, and carried with him a gloomy account
of the condition and outlook of the Army of Chalons.
No troops were sent forth to watch the Meuse below
Sedan and communicate with Vinoy. Later in the
day, an old soldier who lived in the neighbourhood,
sought out General Douay and told him that the
enemy was preparing to pass the Meuse at Donchery
— a fact, it might be thought, which could not escape
the notice of the watchers in Sedan — and then it
was that the General occupied the position between
Floing and Illy, and began to throw up intrench-
ments as cover for men and guns. He had not done
so hitherto, because his soldiers, thoroughly ex-
hausted by incessant marches, sleepless nights, want
of food, and rear-guard combats, needed some rest.
Enough has been said to indicate the lamentable
weakness of mind at headquarters, and the dire con-
fusion prevaihng throughout the limited are,a between
the Belgian frontier and the Meuse, within which the
French soldiers were now potentially inclosed. It is
time to show a different example of the practice of war.
The Moveme7its of the Germans
The decision adopted by the Great Headquarters
at Buzancy were, as usual, anticipated, and the
Commander-in-Chief of the Meuse Army, before the
formal orders reached him, had directed the Guard
and the 12th Corps to cross the river, by the bridge
at Pouilly, constructed on the 30th, and a new one
made at Letanne soon after daybreak on the 31st.
The Saxon Cavalry commander, indeed, taking with
him a squadron at dawn, rode down the right bank,
then shrouded in fog, as far as Mouzon, entered the
town with four lancers, and crossed the bridge to the
faubourg. Thereupon a Prussian battalion instantly
passed over and took possession of the town. This
adventurous squadron had actually captured prison-
ers and many wagons loaded with provisions. When
the two divisions of cavalry, preceding the infantry
advance, rode towards Douzy and Carignan, they
Struck the tail of Lebrun's Corps, and fired into the
distant columns which Ducrot. on the other side of
254 The Campaign of Sedan
the Chiers, was leading by the hill roads to Francheval.
In fact, by noon the Guard horsemen were masters
of Carignan and such provision stores as the French
had not time to destroy and the Saxons, passing
through Douzy, had fallen upon a convoy on the
right bank. The fire of infantry forced them back
upon the town, but they held that and the unbroken
bridge until the advance guard of the 12th came up
in the afternoon and established themselves in the
place. The Prussian Guard meanwhile, after a long
march, had reached, with its leading battalions,
Porru aux Bois and Francheval, the main body
halting between Sachy and Missincourt, and the
cavalry remaining in the rear. Thus, the Saxon
Prince's Army had secured all the bridges over the
Chiers and the important passage at Mouzon, where
the 4th Corps stood on both banks of the Meuse.
The outposts formed a chain from the right bank of
the river in front of Douzy, through Francheval to
the Belgian frontier, at that point only nine miles
from the Chiers, and sixteen from the Meuse. This
narrow belt of territory was thus barred against
French enterprise ; the road to Montmedy and Metz
was definitely closed. The Saxon Prince did not
push farther westward, because he knew that the
Great Staff had planned a passage of the Meuse
below Sedan for the next day, and, therefore, he did
not wish to alarm the French. Enough had been
done and his troops needed rest, especially the Guard,
the whole of which had marched during the day
upwards of thirty miles, and the advance guards
more. No wonder the French were astounded at
the " prodigious marches " made by Germans, whom
they had considered to be incapable of such energy
and endurance. Some share of the French disasters
must be attributed to that fatal form of error —
contempt for the enemy.
Not less success attended the operations of the
Prussian Crown Prince, whose business it was to
secure possession of the left bank of the Meuse, and,
if practicable, bring batteries to bear upon the French
troops. We have already described the effect
Sedan 255
produced by the horse artillery batteries established
under the protection of the cavalry at Frenois upon
the railway officials who sent off the provision trains,
and upon the drivers who ran away with the powder
and tools required to destroy the bridge at Donchery.
Behind the cavalry the whole Army was soon in
motion. The Wiirtembergers marched from Verrieres
to the neighbourhood of FHze, where they became
engaged with Vinoy's outposts, and induced them
to burn the bridge over the Meuse. The nth Corps
moved upon Donchery, and, during the afternoon,
not only secured the important bridge at that place,
but constructed a second. The 5th Corps stood
close in rear of the nth, and the Second Bavarians
halted at Raucourt. On the extreme left the 6th
Corps, covering the rear, went to Attigny, Semoy,
and Amagne ; the 5th Division of Cavalry was at
Tourteron, and the 6th at Poix, both scouting over the
railway to Reims, and one breaking the line at Faux.
The ist Bavarian Corps, which led the infantry
advance upon the Meuse, moved early from Raucourt
upon Remilly and Aillicourt. They had only started
at eight o'clock, yet their guns were in position
opposite Batzeilles before the last division of Lebrun's
Corps, marching from Douzy, could gain the village.
The guns opened at very long range, and Lebrun,
who was on the watch, was so impressed that he
ordered the division to turn back and enter the
position by Daigny, where there was a bridge over
the Givonne. The French drew out their guns,
which led Von der Tann to reinforce his own, so
that there was soon a powerful hne of batteries in
action, and some houses in Bazeilles broke out into
flames. Then the Bavarian infantry brigades arrived
to support the advance guard, and the French threw
out infantry to annoy the hostile gunners. Presently
a sharp-eyed artilleryman observed that barrels of
powder had been brought down to the railway bridge,
apparently with intent to blow it up. Thereupon
General von Stephan directed a Jager battahon to
frustrate this design ; and just as the French were
lowering some barrels under the furthest arch, the
256 The Campaign of Sedan
Jagers, dashing on to the bridge, fell upon the working
party, drove it off, and poured the powder into the
Meuse. In this daring fashion was the railway
viaduct saved from destruction under the noses of
the 1 2th Corps. Von der Tann, having the fear of
Von Moltke before his eyes, desired to save the bridge
but not engage beyond the stream. The Jagers,
however, who, in the judgment of their comrades,
held a post of peril, were promptly supported, and
the forward spirit gaining the upper hand, the little
troop, driving in the French skirmishers, actually
held for some time the fringe of Bazeilles ; but not
being supported by the General, who refused to
disobey orders and bring on a premature engagement,
the hardy adventurers had to retire with loss, to
the right bank. Yet they secured the bridge from
destruction, and to this day, apparently, General
Lebrun cannot understand how it came to pass that
MacMahon's orders were not executed. The French
say that the powder was spoilt and that no fresh
supply could be got from Sedan ; but no effort is
made to explain why, when the Bavarians threw a
pontoon bridge over the Meuse, just above the railway
crossing, Lebrun's people did nothing to prevent it.
The truth is that they could not prevent one bridge
from being preserved, and the other from being built.
The gain on the day's resolute operations, therefore,
was the acquisition of three permanent bridges over
the Meuse, two above and one below Sedan ; the
seizure of all the passages across the Chiers ; and the
concentration of both Armies upon the right and
left banks of the river within striking distance of
the French troops packed up in a narrow area about
Sedan. The Crown Prince brought his headquarters
to Chemery, and the King went through that place
on his way to Vendresse. At Chemery, " a brief
conference was held between the Generals Von
Moltke, Von Podbielski, and Von Blumenthal, relative
to the general state of the campaign and the next
steps which should be taken." It was a notable
meeting, and few words, indeed, were required to
indicate the finishing touches of an enterprise, so
Sedan 257
unexpectedly imposed on them, and so resolutely
carried out by these skilful, far-seeing, and audacious
captains. They had come to the conclusion that the
French had before them only one of two courses — ■
they must either retreat bodily into Belgium, or
sacrifice the greater part of their Army in an en-
deavour with the remainder to reach Paris by way
of Mezieres. There was a third — to remain and be
caught — but a finis so triumphant was not foreseen
by the trio of warriors who met in the village of
Chemery.
The Battlefield of Sedan
The battlefield of Sedan may be described as the
space lying within the angle formed by the Meuse,
and its little eflluent, the Givonne, which flows in a
southerly direction from the hills near the Belgian
frontier. After passing Bazeilles and its bright
meadows, the greater river meanders towards the
north-west, making, a httle below Sedan, a deep
loop inclosing the narrow peninsula of Iges on three
sides, and then running westward by Donchery, Dom
le Mesnil and Flize to Mezieres, From the northern
end of the loop to the Givonne, the ground is a
rugged, undulating upland, attaining its maximum
of height a little south of the Calvaire d'llly, at a
point where the Bois de la Garenne begins to clothe
the steep slopes on the south and east. Lower still
is a deep defile, called the Fond de Givonne, through
which, turning the wood, runs the highway from
Sedan to Bouillon, a town on the Semoy in Belgium.
The eastern face of the position, therefore, was the
line of the Givonne, a belt of cottages, gardens,
factories and villages ; the southern and south-western
was the fortress and the Meuse ; the north-western
front was on the hills between Floing and Illy, and
the lowlands on the loop of the Meuse. The interval
between Illy and the Givonne was, at first, neglected
because the French held that no troops could work
through the dense forest and broken ground. The
issues from this man-trap were the narrow band of
territory between the head of the Meuse loop and
258 The Campaign of Sedan
the wooded Belgian frontier ; the high road to
Bouillon ; the routes eastward to Carignan up the
Chiers, and the gate of Torcy on the south. They
were all difficult, and in the nature of defiles which
can only be traversed slowly, even in time of peace,
by large bodies of men, horses, guns and wagons.
Within this remarkable inclosure the French Army
sat down on the 31st of August. The 12th and the
1st Corps, Lebrun's and Ducrot's, held the line of
the Givonne, looking east and south-east, because
Lebrun had to guard the Meuse at Bazeilles. The
5th Corps, now under De Wimpffen, was partly in
the " old camp," close under the fortress, and partly
behind the 7th, which, as we have said, occupied
the rolHng heights between Floing and Illy with
a strong outpost in St. Menges, at the head of the
Meuse loop on the road which led to Mezieres through
Vrigne aux Bois — the road supposed to be unknown
to the Germans, because it was not laid down on
the French maps. The cavalry posted in rear of the
7th were the divisions of Margueritte, Bonnemains
and Amiel, while Michel was behind Ducrot's left
at the village of Givonne. The sun set, and the
night passed, yet Marshal MacMahon expressed no
decision. Believing that the enemy's numerical
strength had been exaggerated, or that he could
break out in any direction when he pleased, or trust-
ing to fortune and the opportunitie,s which might
offer during the conflict, perhaps imagining that
Von Moltke would grant him another day, the Marshal
became the sport of circumstance which had escaped
his control. " The truth is," he said to the ParHa-
mentary Commission, " that I did not reckon on
fighting a battle on the ground we occupied. I
knew already that we had no provisions, and that
the place was barely supplied with munitions, but
I did not yet know on which side I ought, on the
morrow (the ist) to effect my retreat." The un-
faltering adversary had no such doubts, and his
firm purpose brought on not only the Battle, but
the Investment of Sedan. For the information which
reached the Great Headquarters during the evening
Sedan 259
of the 31st, induced Von Moltke to quicken the
operations. He inferred that no attempt would be
made by the French to break out by Carignan ; that
they might try to reach Mezidres or pass into Belgium ;
and as he was eager to frustrate their escape by any
route, he instructed the Prussian Crown Prince to
set his Corps in motion during the night. The
Prince immediately issued the needful orders, and
directed Von der Tann to attack with his Bavarians
at dawn, without awaiting the arrival of the 12th
Corps, so that Lebrun in Bazeilles being held fast,
the attention of the French might be attracted
towards that side. The Saxon Prince, being duly
informed, entered with characteristic spirit and daring
into the plan, and not only determined to be early
on the scene of action with the 12th and the Guard,
but to push the latter well forward, so as to anticipate
the French should they endeavour to gain the Belgian
border. Thus a common motive animated the Ger-
man chiefs who, in taking firm stej)s to gain a decisive
result, were so well seconded by their tireless and
intrepid soldiers.
The Battle of Sedan
A thick white mist filled the valley of the Meuse
on the morning of the ist of September, 1870, so
thick that Von der Tann's Bavarians, marching
towards the railway bridge and the pontoons above
it, could not see many steps ahead, as in two columns
they moved at four o'clock in careful silence through
the dense and clammy atmosphere. At that very
time General Lebrun, whose anxieties kept him
awake, started up, and rushing forth, made the first
bugler he encountered sound the call, which roused
the wearied troops sleeping on the hills between
Bazeilles and Balan. Yet it would seem that,
outside the former village, no adequate watch was
kept, for when the leading Bavarians emerged from
the fog, they gained at once possession of several
houses, and even entered the principal street without
firing a shot. It was only when the enemy were
within the place, that the gallant Marine Infantry,
260 The Campaign of Sedan
posted in the houses and behind barricades, abruptly
arrested the intruders by opening a smart fire. Then
began a sanguinary contest for the possession of
Bazeilles, which raged during many hours ; a series
of street fights in which the inhabitants took an
active part ; combats ebbing and flowing through
and round the market-place, the church, the larger
mansions, and the pretty park of Monvillers, washed
and beautified by the stream of the Givonne. With-
out a detailed plan, the incidents of this terrible
episode in the battle are unintelligible. Vassoigne
and Martin des Pallieres, before the latter was
wounded on the 31st, had devised a plan of resistance
worthy of the gallant division they led, and it may be
said that the defence of Bazeilles was the most
creditable feat of arms performed by the French on
that dreadful day. During the earUer hours, indeed,
they kept the upper hand, driving the Bavarians
out of the village on all sides, but being unable to
eject them from two stone houses abutting on the
chief street. The" Bavarian batteries beyond the
Meuse could not open fire until six o'clock, because
the fog had shut out the view, which even then was
indistinct. About this time General Lebrun, who
was quickly on the scene, had called reinforcements
from the ist and 5th Corps ; but then the Saxons
had come up opposite La Moncelle, where one battery,
firing at long range, astonished Lebrun, who saw
that the shells from his own guns fell short, or burst
in the air. When the 12th assailed La Moncelle
fresh Bavarian columns had crossed the Meuse,
and the fierce conflict which began in Bazeilles, had
extended to the park of Monvillers, where the French
fought steadily. After four hours' strenuous battle,
no marked progress had been made in this quarter,
where three Bavarian brigades had fallen almost
wholly into skirmishing order, scattered amidst the
houses and lanes of the villages, and some part of the
park on the left bank of the Givonne. Von der
Tann bringing over another brigade and the reserve
artillery from the left bank of the Meuse, called up a
division of the 4th Corps which he held back as a
Sedan 261
reserve. During the course of this stubborn combat,
the Saxon Corps had seized La Moncelle, and had
brought ten batteries to bear on that village and
Daigny, their left flank being prolonged by two
Bavarian batteries. The accuracy of their fire still
further astonished General Lebrun, who confesses
that he had never seen such artillery. He and his
staff, six or eight persons, were on an eminence above
La Moncelle. " The shells," he writes, " cut off one
branch after another, from the tree at the foot of
which I stood holding my horse" ; and he goes
on to say that in quick succession, one officer was
killed, two mortally wounded, and two men who
bore his f anion were hit. He was as much impressed
by the "avalanche de fer" as Marshal Canrobert
himself. The infantry in Bazeilles resisted superbly,
but the French General was none the less amazed by
the terrible fire of the German guns. Between eight
and nine the wave of battle was flowing up the
Givonne, for the Guard were now approaching from
Villers-Cemay.
MacMahon' s Wound and its Consequences
Meanwhile, inside the French lines, the drama had
deepened, for the Commander-in-Chief had been
wounded. Marshal MacMahon has related how,
before daybreak, fearing lest the Germans should
have moved troops over the Meuse at Donchery, he
had sent two officers to look into matters in that
quarter, and was awaiting their return when, about
five o'clock, he received a despatch from Lebrun,
which made him mount his ready-saddled horse and
ride towards Bazeilles. Arrived there he saw that
the place was well defended, and went to the left
intending to examine the whole fine of the Givonne,
especially as Margueritte had sent word that German
troops were moving towards Francheval. Halting
above La Moncelle, not far from Lebrun, the Marshal
has stated that while he was gazing intently upon
the heights in front of the Bois Chevalier, and could
not see anything, he was struck by the fragment of a
shell. At first he thought that he was only bruised.
262 The Campaign of Sedan
but that being obliged to dismount from his horse,
which was also wounded, he fainted for a moment,
and then found that his wound was severe. Unable
to bear up any longer he gave over the command
of the Army to General Ducrot, and was carried to
Sedan. That officer did not hear of the event until
seven or later ; it is impossible to fix precisely the
moment when the Marshal was hit, nor when Ducrot
learned his destiny, the evidence is so contradictory ;
but sometime between seven and eight Ducrot
took the reins. His first act was to order a retreat
on Mezieres ; Lebrun begged' him to reflect and he
did, but soon afterwards became positive. " There
is not a moment to lose," he cried ; and it was
arranged that the retreat should be made in echelons,
beginning from the right of the 12th Corps. Neither
General knew the real facts of the situation, nor
guessed even how vast were the numbers of the enemy.
The retreat began ; it attracted the notice of
Napoleon HI., who had ridden on to the field above
Balan ; and it roused De Wimpffen. He carried in
his pocket an order from Palikao authorising him
to succeed MacMahon, if the Marshal were killed or
disabled. He had kept the fact secret ; after the
Marshal fell he still hesitated to use his letter, but not
long. The combat about Bazeilles was well sustained ;
the cavalry had been out a little way beyond St.
Menges, and, as usual, after a perfunctory search,
had " seen nothing," the attack on the Givonne
even was not fully developed. General de Wimpffen,
perhaps from mixed motives, resolved to interfere and
show his old comrades how a man who really knew
war could extricate a French Army from perils in
which it had been placed by weakness and incom-
petence. He certainly thought himself a great
man, and he roughly stopped the retreat. Ducrot was
indignant, but he obeyed. Lebrun was not more
favourably affected by De Wimpffen' s loud voice
and overbearing manner. " I will not have a move-
ment upon Mezieres," he exclaimed. " If the Army
is to retreat, it shall be on Carignan and not on
Mezieres." It should again be observed that the
Sedan 263
new Commander-in-Chief was quite as ignorant of
the facts as his predecessors, and even when he
wrote his book many months afterwards had not
learned from sources open to all the world how
many men stood at that moment between him and
Carignan, nor was he at all acquainted with the
difficult country through which he would have to
1 ove. Ducrot's plan, which would have placed the
Ami}' between the Meuse below vSedan and the forest
on the frontier, leaving a clear sweep for the guns
of the fortress, was far more sensible than that
of his imperious rival. Still, to have a chance of
success, it should have been begun early in the
morning, when the 5th and nth German Corps were
struggling towards the woods ; even then it would
have probably failed, but there would have been no
capitulation of Sedan. General de Wimpffen, al-
though he did not know it, was actually playing into
the hand of Von Moltke, who desired above all things
that the French Corps on the Givonne should remain
there, because he knew, so great were his means, so firm
his resolutions, and so admirable as marchers and
lighters were his soldiers, that the gain of a few hours
would enable him to surround the Army of Chalons.
How far the retreat from the front line was carried,
when it was stayed, and in what degree it injured
the defence, cannot possibly be gleaned from the
French narratives, which are all vague and imperfect
in regard to time and place. We know that the
Germans did not carry Bazeilles until nearly eleven
o'clock, and then only by dint of turning movements
executed by the Saxons and fresh Bavarian troops
from the direction of La Moncelle. General Ducrot,
in his account, places his stormy interview with De
Wimpffen at a little after nine ; and he says that
when it ended he spurred in haste towards his divi-
sions— Pelle's and L'Heriller's — and made them
descend a part of the positions which they had climbed
a few instants before. Lebrun is equally vague.
He says in one place that when De Wimpffen came
up his first brigades had " partly " crossed the
Fond de Givonne, and in another, that the Marine
K
264 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
Infantry had abandoned Bazeilles, which they had
not done before nine o'clock. General de Wimpffen's
recollections are still more confused and his chronology
unintelligible ; so that it is impossible to ascertain pre-
cisely what happened beyond the Givonne after Ducrot
ordered and his successor countermanded the retreat.
If we take the German accounts, and try to measure the
influence of the much-debated retreat by the resistance
which the assailants encountered, we may doubt
whether it had much greater influence on the issue than
that which grew out of the impaired confidence of the
troops in their antagonistic and jealous commanders.
Nevertheless, it is probable that the swaying to and fro
in the French line between Bazeilles and the village of
Givonne, after nine o'clock, did, in some degree, favour
the assailants, and render the acquisition of Bazeilles
as well as the passage of the brook less diflicult and
bloody. In any case, the intervention of De Wimpffen
can only be regarded as a misfortune for the gallant
French Army, which can hardly find consolation in the
fact that within four-and-twenty hours he was obliged
to sign with his name the capitulation of Sedan.
This needful explanation and comment serves to
illustrate the disorder, the infirmity of purpose, and
the rivalries which existed in the French camp ;
and we may well agree with Marshal MacMahon
when he says that the blow which obliged him to
relinquish the command was a grievous event. Doubt-
less he would have taken a decided course had he not
been wounded, and wpuld have marched, if he could,
with all his forces, either on Mezieres or Carignan ;
and besides, he says, there was Belgium near at hand.
He would not have tried to do all three at once. It is
only an Army, well compacted and educated from the
bottom to the top which can, without serious detri-
ment, bear three successive commanders in three hours.
Progress of the Battle on the Givonne
While the French generals, almost in the presence
of the helpless Emperor, were using high words and
thwarting each other's plans, the German onset had
proceeded on all sides with unabated vigour. But,
about nine o'clock, or a little earlier, the French
Sedan 265
dashed forward so impetuously that the foremost
German troops on the Givonne as far as Daigny, had
to give ground ; and the batteries were so vexed by
musketry fire that they also fell back on some points.
In fact Lebrun's left and Ducrot's right came on with
great spirit, and shook, but did not arrest long, the
hostile hne. It was not until tliis period that the French
in Daigny pushed a brigade on to the left bank of the
Givonne and occupied ground which, by the confession
of their staff officers, had never been reconnoitred.
They brought over a battery, and General Lartigue rode
with them. The brunt of the onslaught, falhng upon
the Saxon infantry immediately in front, these were
hard bested ; but reinforcements arriving on either
hand closed in upon the enemy's flanks, and, not only
was he routed from the field, but, being swiftly pursued,
his battery was captured, and the Saxons following the
French into Daigny wrested from them the village, the
bridge, and the opposite bank of the brook. General
Lartigue' s horse was killed by a shell, and he narrowly
escaped capture, and was then, or shortly afterwards,
wounded. His chief of the staff. Colonel d'Andign6,
hit twice, dropped in a field of beetroot. Shells from
his own side fell near him, and he was grateful to
them because they drove away a pig which came and
sniffed at his wounds. Saxon soldiers gave him wine
and lumps of sugar, but one of them stole his watch
and cross ; in the end he was tenderly carried to an am-
bulance. Some of the Zouaves engaged in this combat
about Daigny, cut off from the main body of fugitives,
turned northward, entered the woods, and reached
Paris after traversing the Belgian border.
The Germans owed their quick success at Daigny
to the fact that Lartigue was not supported, and
to the fortunate advent, at a critical moment, of the
leading troops of the Second Saxon Division, the
whole of the 12th Corps being now on the ground,
engaged or in reserve. It need scarcely be remarked
that the batteries, as usual, preceded the bulk of the in-
fantry, for it was the Saxon guns which extorted the
admiration of Lebrun. The attack,, which had been
made from his side, upon the Saxons and Bavarians
266
The Campaign of Sedan
about La Moncelle, was equally brilliant at the outset,
for, as we have stated, the German batteries were driven
back by the close musketry, and the French were ad-
vancing impetuously when a Saxon regiment and part
of a Bavarian brigade striking into the fight, stopped
the French and drove them across the rivulet. Then
the artillery returned ; soon there were niney-six guns
in action and the infantry pressing on, restored the
battle. But in Bazeilles itself the Marines had gained
ground, and fresh troops had to be poured into the
village or upon its outskirts to sustain the assailants,
who were still held at bay by the stout defenders. Yet
the final stroke at the village was delivered shortly
after this check. The troops in Monvillers and La
Moncelle simultaneously swept forward from the
orchards, and osier-beds, and gardens, until they
emerged on the heights beyond, and showed a front
which threatened the road from Bazeilles to Balan.
The French stronghold in the place was a large
^villa on the north, which had resisted all day ; but
'now the freshly arrived Bavarians penetrated into
the garden and turned the building on one side ;
while the Saxons grouped in the park of Monvillers,
cutting a path through the hedges with their billhooks,
appeared on the other. The French then retreated ;
but the splendid defence of the whole position had
inflicted a heavy loss on the adversary.
In Bazeilles itself a conflict continued between
the armed inhabitants and the Bavarians, and soon
after the whole village v/as in flames. Whether it
was set-on fire purposely or not is to this day a matter"
of bitter controversy ■ but it stands on record that
only thirty-nine lay persons met their deaths, during
this long contest, from fire or sword. It was not the
interest of the Germans to create a furnace across a
line of road ; and one effect of the conflagration was
that the German pioneers, unable to quench it, were
compelled to open a line of communication with the
troops on the fighting line outside the burning village.
The French retired and reformed between the
Fond de Givonne and Balan, whence their line ran
northward, no longer in the valley, but along the
Sedan 267
Uplands to the Calvaire d'llly ; for the Prussian
Guard, issuing from Villers-Cernay and Francheval,
had thrust the French out of the village of Givonne,
and, long before Bazeilles was finally mastered, had
established powerful lines of guns which harassed the
French troops in the Bois de la Garenne. In fact,
by nine o'clock, there were six guard batteries in
action, and two hours afterwards the number was
increased to fourteen. Givonne was seized a Httle
later, and infantry support afforded to the right of
the 1 2th Corps ; but Prince Augustus, in conformity
with his instructions, held the main body of the
Guard ready to march towards Fleigneux, effect a
junction with the Third Army, and bar the road to
Bouillon. From an eminence a httle east of Givonne
and just south of La Vire farm, whereon eighteen
guns stood, the Prince, looking westward about nine
o'clock, saw the smoke of that combat near St.
Menges, which he knew marked the formidable inter-
vention of the 5th and nth Corps, whose operations in
the forenoon must now be succinctly described.
The March on St. Menges
It will be remembered that, on receiving a pressing
order from Von Moltke, the Prussian Crown Prince
directed the two Corps just named and the Wiirtem-
berg division to move out in the dark and occupy the
Mezieres road to order to intercept the French should
they endeavour to retire upon that town. They
promptly obeyed. The Wiirtembergers crossed the
Meuse on a bridge of their own making, at Dom le
Mesnil ; the 5th and nth at Donchery by the per-
manent bridge and two improvised passages. The
object of the two Corps was to occupy the nearest
villages on the Mezieres road, Vrigne aux Bois and
Vivier au Court, both which were attained about half-
past seven, when the contest was fierce on the Givonne.
Here the generals commanding. Von Kirchbach and
Von Gersdorf, received that despatch from the
Prussian Crown Prince which directed them to march
on St. Menges and Fleigneux, for at head-quarters a
strong hope had now arisen that the Army of Chalons
could be surrounded. The nth moved on the right,
268 The Campaign of Sedan
next the Meuse, the 5th on the left ; but the roads
were few between the river and the forest — one column
lost its way, and both Corps at the head of the Loop had
to use the same road. No French scouts were out along
this important line of communication. Margueritte's
horsemen had patrolled a short distance, about six, but
neither saw nor heard of the approaching columns ; nor
until the German Hussars, leading the erring column
ascending the Meuse from Montimont, had got close
to St. Menges, were they discovered by a French
patrol sent out at the suggestion of De Wimpffen.
The nth and ^th Corps Engage
The shots exchanged by the hostile cavaliers
aroused the French infantry in St. Menges ; but they
offered no resistance when the nearest German
battalion attacked the village, which was immediately
occupied. Two companies, prolonging the move-
ment, effected a lodgment in Floing and could not be
expelled ; while three batteries, escorted by the
Hussars, dashed upon the ridge south of St. Menges,
partly protected by a copse, and opened fire on the
French. It was this initial combat which attracted
the notice of Prince Augustus of Wiirtemberg, who
looked with interest, from his hill above the Givonne,
upon the white battle smoke which curled up beyond
the heights of Illy. Shortly afterwards seven addi-
tional batteries issued from the defile and formed in
succession on the hill — ^the same which had filled
General Douay with anxiety the day before — and
some infantry battalions followed ; but the body of
the nth Corps was only just clearing the pass, and
the 5th was still behind. In order to protect the
batteries, infantry supports were advanced on either
flank and in front towards the Illy brook. General
Margueritte, on the Calvaire d'llly, had watched this
unwelcomed development of artillery. Seeing the
infantry spread out below, he thought that his horse
might ride them down and then disable the line of
batteries, which seemed to be without adequate
support. Accordingly, by his order, General de
Galliffet led forth three regiments of Chasseurs
d'Afrique and two squadrons of Lancers against the
Sedan 269
intrusive foot and audacious gunners. But he never
got near the batteries. Swooping down the slope
upon the infantry below him, his men and horses soon
fell fast, and although they swept through the skir-
mishers, they were crushed by the fire of the supports
and the guns on the hill and the squads of infantry
on either side. They endeavoured to ride in upon the
flanks, but their bravery was displayed in vain, for
nothing could live under the fire which smote them,
and they rode back, frustrated, to the shelter of their
own hnes. The cava-ry outburst had been repelled
by a few companies oi foot on an open hill-side. So
puissant is the breech-loader in the hands of cool infantry
soldiers. But the French foot took up the game, and
the chassepot, deftly plied, forced the forward German
skirmishers to fall back on the villages and hills.
Gradually the two Corps arrived on the scene.
Before eleven o'clock the artillery of the 5th, preceding
its infantry, went into hne on a second ridge to the
westward, and soon twenty-four batteries — that is,
144 guns — were pouring an " avalanche de fer" into
the French position, and crossing their fire with that
of the Guard batteries, which showered their shells
into the right rear of Douay's men from the heights
beyond the Givonne. About this time, also, as rein-
forcements came up to Fleigneux, the companies there
moved westward towards Oily ; captured, on their
way, eight guns, many horses, much munition, and
above a hundred officers and men, who seemed intent
on escaping over the frontier, and finally entered
Oily, where soon afterwards they were gratified by
the arrival of a squadron of Prussian Hussars of the
Guard. Thus was the circle completed which placed
the two Armies in communication. In front of the
right wing the two companies which at the outset
obtained a lodgment in Floing, were at length sup-
ported and relieved. As the infantry from the
wooded region north of the Meuse Loop arrived, they
took the place of the battalions near the guns, and
these then went forward upon Floing, one after the
other, and by degrees got possession of the village.
But the French dehvered a countcrstroke so well
270 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
pushed that the defenders of Floing could not keep
them back, and they were only thrust out by the timely
intervention of three fresh battalions from St. Menges.
The French retired towards the heights of Cazal, and for
some time stopped the further advance of their foes.
The battle was now practically won ; for the
Germans held Balan as well as Bazeilles, supported
by one-half the 2nd Bavarian Corps brought up to aid
the 1st ; one division of the 4th Corps was deep in
the fight, and the other in reserve, close at hand ;
the line of the Givonne, from end to end, was occupied
on both banks ; the Guard Cavalry, after vainly
trying to charge up the Calvaire d'llly, were behind
the 5th Corps ; south of the Meuse a Bavarian
division faced the fortress ; and to the west the
Wiirtembergers interposed between Vinoy's troops in
Mezi^res and Sedan. Above all, a little after one
o'clock, there were no fewer than 426 guns hailing shells
upon the unfortunate French, who were ahnost piled
one upon another in an area which did not measure two
miles either in depth or breadth. It stands on record
that there were in full action twenty-six batteries on the
north, twenty-four on the east, ten to the west of La
Moncelle, and eleven on the south between Wadelincourt
and Villette — an array of force enough to crush out all
resistance ; but the conflict still continued, for no one
had authority sufficient to stop the awful carnage.
The Condition of the French Army
The main interest of the drama henceforth centres
in the despairing eftorts of the French to avert the
catastrophe of Sedan. Early in the morning the
Emperor Napoleon mounted his horse and rode out
with his own staff to witness the battle. On his way
towards Bazeilles he met and spoke to the wounded
Marshal, who was being carried to the hospital in
Sedan. Then the Emperor rode towards the hills
above La Moncelle, and for several hours he lingered
on the field, well under fire, for two officers were
wounded near him ; but he had no influence whatever
on the battle. Soon after taking command, De
Wimpffen, riding out of the Fond de Givonne, came
plump upon Napoleon as he watched the fight near
Sedan 271
Ba^^an. *' All goes well, Sire," said the General ;
" we are gaining ground ; " and when His Majesty
remarked that the left, meaning the front towards
St. Menges, was threatened, the General replied, " We
shall first pitch the Bavarians into the Meuse, and
then, with all our forces, fall upon the new foe."
They parted, the Emperor returning to Sedan, whence
he did not emerge again that day, and the General
careering towards the fight. Then followed a sharp
dispute between De Wimpffen and Ducrot, in the
presence of Lebrun, ending in the order to stop the
so-called retreat v^hich had scarcely begun. It is
impossible to reconcile the conflicting accounts of
these officers ; but De Wimpffen's own words show
that, at the time, he did not attach great importance
to the attack on Douay, for to that General he wrote,
" I believe it a demonstration upon your Corps,
especially designed to hinder you from sending help
to the 1st and 12th Corps," and he asked him to aid
Lebrun. Then he went himself to the position held
by Douay, in order to expedite the despatch of rein-
forcements. *' Come and see for yourself," said
Douay, on reaching the heights. '* I saw quite a
hostile Army extending afar," writes De Wimpffen,
" and a formidable artillery — the big batteries of
the 5th and nth Corps — firing with a precision which,
under other circumstances," he adds, " I should have
been the first to admire." Prince Bibesco says that
De Wimpffen promised to send troops from the ist
Corps to occupy the Calvaire d'lUy, and then went
away. As he was riding back, in that state of emotion
which the French describe by the phrase, " le coeur
navre," he encountered Ducrot. ** The events which
I predicted," said the latter, " have happened sooner
than I expected. The enemy is attacking the Calvaire
dTlly. Douay is greatly shaken. Moments are precious.
Hurry up reinforcements if you would keep that posi-
tion." ** Well," retorted De Wimpffen, still believing
that he had only Bavarians to deal with, ' ' look after that
yourself. Collect what troops you can and hold the
ground while I attend to the 12th Corps." Thereupon
Ducrot ordered up[guns and infantry ; while then, or
272 The Campaign of Sedan
shortly afterwards, De WimpfEen called for troops from
Douay, who, believing the Calvaire was or would be
occupied by Ducrot's people, sent off three brigades,
and put his last division in front line. Apparently the
cross currents of wandering battalions met in the wood
of Garenne; and it is not easy to see how any advan-
tages were obtained by the shifting to and fro which
went on. Ducrot was anxious to defend the Illy
plateau; De Wimpffen desired to break out towards
Carignan. He fondled the idea at one o'clock, when
neither object could possibly be attained ; but if there
had been a chance left, the conflict? between the two
Generals would have sufficed to destroy it.
That " Army " which De Wimpffen saw from the
north-western heights came on in irresistible waves.
The French infantry could not endure the thick and
ceaseless hail of shells from the terrible batteries.
The French artillery, brave and devoted, vainly went
into action, for the converging fire from the hostile
hills blew up the tumbrils, sometimes two at once,
killed and wounded the gunners, and swept away
the horses. Ducrot's reinforcements,despite his forward
bearing and animated language, melted away into the
woods, and the last battalions and the last two batteries
led up by Douay were speedily forced to retire. The
Germans, already in the village of Illy, advanced to the
Calvaire, while the troops of the nth Corps sallied out
of Floing, deployed on both sides, and soon the interval
between the two villages was full of hostile troops. Gen-
eral Ducrot pictures himself, and doubtless truly, as
using every effort by word and example to rally and hold
fast the foot ; but they could not be held ; they slipped
off and vanished under the trees. At this time the only
strong body of French was Liebert's division above the
terraced hill wliich leads up to Cazal, and the cavalry
of Margueritte and Bonnemains lurking in the hollows
and Tinder the cover of trees. To these men Ducrot
appealed, and his appeal was nobly answered.
TJie French Cavalry Charge
General Margueritte commanded five regiments of
horse, principally Chasseurs d'Afrique. At the re-
quest of Ducrot he promptly moved out from cover,
Sedan 273
and prepared to charge ; but wishing to reconnoitre
the ground, he rode in advance, and was hit in the
head by a bullet which traversed his face. Mortally
wounded, he gave the command to De GalUffet, and
rode off, supported by two men, and grasping the
saddle with both hands, ** the star of his arm," as
Colonel Bonie poetically calls him. Then De GalUffet
performed his task, and rode straight into the intrusive
enemy. For half an hour, on the hill sides south of
Floing, and even the lowlands bordering the Meuse,
the dashing French horsemen dauntlessly struck at
their foes. The German infantry, scattered in lines of
skirmishers, were just attaining the crest of the emin-
ence, when the cavalry dashed upon them. They
broke through the skirmishers, but fell in heaps under
the fire of the compact bodies of supports. Failing
to crush a front, they essayed the flanks and even
the rear, and nothing dismayed, sought again and
again to ride over the stubborn adversary, who,
relying on his rifle, would not budge. The more
distant infantry and the guns, when occasion served,
smote these devoted cavaUers. Sometimes the Ger-
mans met them in line, at others they formed groups,
or squares as the French call them, and occasionally
they fought back to back. One body of horse rode
into a battery, and was only repelled by the fire of a
company of infantry. Another dashed through a
village on the banks of the river, and although they
were harried by infantry, and turned aside and
followed by some Prussian hussars, several rode far
down the river, and created some disorder in the
German trains. There were many charges, all driven
home as far at least as the infantry fire would permit,
more than one carrying the furious riders up the
outskirts of Floing. But, in the end, the unequal
contests everywhere had the same result — bloody
defeat for the horseman, who matched himself, his
lance or sword and steed against the breech-loader
held by steady hands in front of keen eyes. Yet it is
not surprising that these daring charges excited the
ungrudging admiration and deep sympathy of friend
and foe. They did not arrest the march of the
274 Xhe Campaign of Sedan
German infantry, or turn the tide of battle, or even
infuse new courage into the French soldiers, who were
exposed to trials which few, if any, troops could bear.
But they showed, plainly enough, that the *' furia
francese " survived in the cavalry of France, and that,
if the mounted men refused or disdained to perform
more useful work by scouting far and covering the front
of armies, they could still charge with unabated heroism
on the field of battle. They were dispersed, and they
left ^behind heaps of dead and dying — -one-half their
strength resting on the scene of their daring. Three
Generals, Margueritte, Girard and 1 ilUard, were killed,
and Salignac-Fenelon was wounded. The Germans
say that their own losses were small, but that among
the Jagers a comparatively large number of men were
wounded by the sword. These notable exploits were
done about two o'clock or a little later ; and, with
slight exceptions, they mark the end of desperately
offensive resistance on the part of the French.
During the next hour the Germans pressed their
adversaries close up to Sedan. " When the cavalry
had been driven back in disorder," says Ducrot in his
sweeping style, " the last bodies of infantry which
had stood firm broke and fled. Then on the right
and left, with loud hurrahs, which mingled with the
roar of cannon and musketry, the Prussian lines ad-
vanced." The statement is too superlative. The cavalry
in squads, wandered, no doubt, from ravine to ravine,
seeking an asylum, or tried to enter the fortress. The
remains of several brigades were piled up in the wood
of Garenne, and exposed to an incessant shell fire. But
Liebert's division stoutly defended Cazal, and gave
back, foot by foot, until they also were under the ram-
parts. Towards four o'clock the converging German
colimins, despite frantic onsets from bands of French in-
fantry, especially on the Givonne front, had thrust these
over the deep hollow way, and the victors were only
halted when they came within range of tlie garrison guns.
General de Wimpffen' s' Coitnterstroke
Throughout the battle General de Wimpffen
cherished the idea that it would be feasible to crush
*' the Bavarians " and retreat on Carignan. At one
Sedan 275
o'clock he sent a despatch to (reneral Douay, telling
the General to cover his retreat in that direction.
Douay received it an hour afterwards, and he then
repUed that " with only three brigades, without
artiilery, and almost without munitions," the utmost
he could do would be to retreat in order from the
field. That was near the moment when Liebert began
to fail back, fighting stiffly, from Cazal. At a quarter
past one De Wimpfien wrote a letter to the Emperor
saying that " rather than be made a prisonerin Sedan,'*
he vvould force the line in' his front. "Let your
Majesty," he said, ** place himself in the midst of his
troops ; they will hold themselves bound in honour
to fray out a passage." His Majesty took no notice
of tliiii appeal, and De Wimpffen waited in vain for a
reply ; but he spent the time in an endeavour to dash
in the barrier in his front, direct an attack on the
Givonne, which failed ; and to organize an onset on
Balan, wliich partly succeeded. He went into Sedan
and brought out troops, and gathered up all he could
from the errant fragments of a broken Army. With
these he fell hercely and unexpectedly upon the
Bavarians in Balan ; refused to suspend the light
when ordered by the Emperor to open negotiations
with the enemy ; and by degrees became master of
all the village except one house. But he could not
emerge and continue his onslaught, for the hostile
artillery began to play on the village ; reinforcements
were brought up, arrangements were made to frus-
trate the ulterior aim of the French and recover the
lost ground. Against a resolute advance the infantry
led by De Wimpffen could not stand, and possession
of the village was regained just as the white flag went
up over the nearest gate of Sedan. Suddenly the
firing ceased on both sides. Although respectfully
described by the Germans, General de Wimpffen' s
last charge is scoffed at by Ducrot and Lebrun, whom
he had enraged by declaring both guilty of disobedi-
ence. Lebrun, who was an eye-witness as well as a
gallant actor in the forlorn hope, says that they had
not gone a quarter of a mile before the column broke
and took refuge in the nearest houses. Looking back.
276 The Campaign of Sedan
De Wimpffen is reported by his comrade to have said,
" I see we are not followed and that there is nothing
more to do. Order the troops to retreat on Sedan."
The battle had, at length, come to an end. 'The
German infantry, both near Cazal and Balan were
within a short distance of the fortifications ; in the
centre they stood south of the Warren Wood ; to the
eastward long lines of guns crowned the heights on
both banks of the Givonne ; on the south, the gate
of Torcy was beset, andbehind all the foremost lines were
ample reserves, horse as well as foot, which had never
fired a shot. The number of batteries had increased
during the afternoon, for the Wiirtemberg artillery was
called over the Meuse and set in array at the bend of the
river above Donchery . Even the high-tempered , if im-
perious, De Wimpffen was obliged to admit that through
this dread circle, neither for him nor any other, was there
an outlet. The agony had been prolonged, but enough
had been done to satisfy the " honour " of the most
obstinate and punctiHous of generals. The wearied,
wasted, famished, and unnerved French troops were
i [lankful for the impressive stillness and unwonted rest
which came abruptly with the declining sun, even
though it set the seal on a horrible disaster.
The Emperor mid his Generals
Had Napoleon III. retained that Imperial authority
which he had been supposed to possess, the slaughter
might have been stayed some hours before. For early
in the afternoon he became convinced that the Army
could not be extricated, and that the time had come
when it would be well to treat. His experiences, as a
superfluous attendant on the battle-field, were
dolorous. The first object which met his gaze was
the wounded Marshal. The depressing incident may
have called up visions of Italian triumphs ; and,
reflecting on the painful contrast, he may have remem-
bered what he said after returning from the sanguinary
victory of Solferino — that no more would he wilHngly
lead great Armies to war ; for the sight of its horrors
had touched the chord of sympathy with human
suffering which had always readily vibrated in his
heart. During several hours he watched the tempest
Sedan 277
lower and break in fury ; he saw and felt its effects,
for two ofiicers were shot at his side ; wherever he
looked the clouds of encircling battle smoke rose in
the clear sunshine ; and when he rode back into Sedan
the terrible shells were bursting in the ditches, and
even on the bridge which he traversed to gain his
quarters. As the day wore on his gloomy medita-
tions took a more definite shape ; he wished to stop
the conflict, and he seems to have thought first that
an armistice might be obtained, and then that the
King of Prussia, if personally besought, would grant
the Army easy terms ; for the idea of a capitulation
had grown up and hardened in his mind.
At his instigation, no officer has come forward to
claim the honour, some one hoisted a white flag. As
soon as he heard of it. General Faure, Marshal
MacMahon's Chief of the Staff, ascended the citadel
and cut down a signal so irritating to his feelings ;
but no one told the Emperor that his solitary, indepen-
dent, and Imperial action, since he joined the Army
of Chalons as a fugitive, had been thus irreverently
contemned. " Why does this useless struggle still
go on ? " he said to General Lebrim, who entered his
presence some time before three o'clock. " Too
much blood has been shed. An hour ago I directed
the white flag to be hoisted in order to demand an
armistice." The General politely explained that other
forms were necessary — the Commander-in-Chief must
sign a letter and send a proper officer, a trumpeter,
and a man bearing a white flag, to the chief of the
enemy. Lebrun drew out such a form, ancl started
forth. Faure, who had just pulled down the white
flag, would not look at it ; De Wimpffen, seeing
Lebrun ride up followed by a horseman who carried
a rag on a pole, shouted out, " I will not have a capitu-
lation ; drop that flag ; I shall go on fighting ; ' ' and
then ensued their adventures about Balan, which
have been described. When Lebrun had gone,
Ducrot, and subsequently Douay, visited the Emperor.
Ducrot found the interior of the fortress in a state
which he qualifies as " indescribable." " The streets,
the squares, the gates were choked up with carts.
278 The Campaign of Sedan
carriages, guns, the impedimenta and debris of a
routed Army. Bands of soldiers, without arms or
knapsacks, streamed in every moment, and hurried
into the houses and churches. At the gates many
were trodden to death." Those who preserved some
remains of vigour exhaled their wrath in curses, and
shouted " We have been betrayed, sold by traitors
and cowards." The Emperor still wondered why the
action went on, and rejected Ducrot's suggestion of a
sortie at night as futile. He wished to stop the
slaughter ; but he could not prevail on Ducrot to
sign any letter. Douay at first appeared disposed to
accept the burden, but De Failly or Lebrun induced
him to revoke his ■ consent by remarking that it
entailed the duty of fixing his name to a capitulation.
General de Wimpffen sent in his resignation, which, as
the Emperor could not induce one of the other generals
to take his place, was absolutely refused. The shells
were bursting in the garden of the Sub-Piefecture,
in the hospitals, the streets, and among the houses,
some of which were set on fire. In these dire straits
the Emperor at length resolved that the white flag
should be again unfurled, and should this time remain
aloft in the sunshine. Meantime, as evident signs indi-
cating a desire to negotiate had appeared at various
points, and as the white flag surmounted the citadel, the
King directed Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf and
Captain von Winterfeld to summon the place to capitu-
late. When Bronsart intimated to the Commandant of
Torcy that he bore a summons to the Commander-in-
Chief, he was conducted to the Sub-Prefecture,
" where," says the official narrative, " he found himself
face to face with the Emperor Napoleon, whose presence
in Sedan until that moment had been unknown at the
German headquarters." The arrival of the Prussian
officer seems to have occurred just as the Emperor
finished writing a letter to the King destined to become
fanious. But he answered Bronsart* s request that an
officer fully empowered to treat should be sent to the
German headquarters, by remarking that General de
Wimpffen commanded the Army. Thereupon, Colonel
Bronsart departed, bearing a weighty piece of
Sedan 279
intelligence indeed, but no effective reply ; and soon
afterwards General Reille, intrusted with the Imperial
letter, rode out of the gate of Torcy and ascended
the hill whence the King had witnessed the battle.
Kmg William and his Warriors
An eminence, selected by the Staff because it
commanded an extensive view, rises a little south
of Frenois — the site has been marked on the map with
a small pyramid — and upon this, about seven o'clock,
just as the fog was hfting. King WiUiam took his
stand. When the mists vanished, the sun poured his
dazzling splendour over the landscape, and the air
was so lucid that everything could be seen distinctly
through a powerful field-glass. " The sun shone
out in full power," said Prince Bibesco. " The sun
was exceedingly powerful," writes Dr. Russell.
"The day had become so clear" — he is writing of
the same period as the Prince — •" that through a good
glass the movements of individual men were plainly
discernible." And, a little earlier, he says, " on the
hills, through wood and garden," he was looking
towards the Givonne, " and in the valleys, bayonets
glistened, and arms twinkled and flashed like a
streamlet in moonlight." And so it continued to
the end. " The hills of the battlefield," writes Dr.
Moritz Busch, " the gorge in its midst, the villages,
the houses and the towers of the fortress, the suburb
of Torcy, the ruined railway bridge to the left in the
distance, shone bright in the evening glow, and their
details became clearer every minute, as if one were
looking through stronger and stronger spectacles."
Through such a rich and transparent atmosphere
the King gazed from his height upon the city wherein
Turenne was born, in September, 1611, and on the
battle which has made the little town on the Meuse
which Vauban fortified, still more memorable. A
glimpse of the group on the hill is fortunately afforded
by Dr. Russell, whose keen eyes on a battlefield seem
to overlook nothing. ** Of the King, who was
dressed in his ordinary uniform, tightly buttoned and
strapped," it is noted that he " spoke but little,
pulled his moustache frequently, and addressed a
280
The Campaign of Sedan
word to Von Moltke, Roon, or Podbielski/* who
looked frequently through a large telescope mounted
on a tripod. " Moltke," he goes on, and the touch is
characteristic, " when not looking through the glass
or at the map, stood in a curious musing attitude,
with his right hand to the side of his face, the elbow
resting on the left hand crossed towards his hip."
A picture of Von Moltke, which, taken with what
another observer calls his " refined and wrinkled
face," deserves to Hve in the memory. Count
Bismarck, we are told, ** in his white cuirassier flat
cap with the yellow band and uniform, stood rather
apart, smoking a good deal, and chatting occasionally
with a short, thick'set, soldierly-looking man in the
undress uniform of a United States' Lieutenant-
General." It was Sheridan. And near these were
many less famous personages, but representative of
** all Germany," as one writer puts it. On another
hill a little further west, whither Dr. Russell trans-
ferred himself, was a second and notable group,
which he sketches. " The Crown Prince with his
arms folded, and his flat cap, uniform frock, and jack
boots ; Blumenthal so spruce and trim ; half-a-
dozen princes and many aides-de-cajnp " were all
sharply and well-defined on the sky-line. Thus these
two groups, "from morn to dewy eve," looked down,
on, and into a scene which nature and man had
combined to make at once beautiful and sublime.
It was towards the King's hill that General Reille
turned when he rode out of the Torcy gate. Walking his
horse up the steep, he dismounted, and taking off his
cap, presented a letter to his Majesty. King William,
breaking the Imperial seal, read these phrases, which,
if somewhat dramatic, are striking in their brevity : — *
Monsieur mon Frere, — N'ayant pu mourir au milieu
de mes troupes, il ne me reste qu' a remettre mon epee
entre les mains de Votre Majeste.
Je suis de Votre Majeste,
le bon Frere,
Sedan, le l^r Septembre, 1870. NapOL^ON.
* " Not having been able to die in the midst of my troops,
nothing remains for me but to place my sword in the hands
of your Majesty. "
Sedan 281
Only one half hour earlier had Colonel Bronsart
brought the startUng information that the Emperor
was in Sedan ! The King conferred with his son,
who had been hastily summoned, and with others of
his trusty servants, all deeply moved by complex
emotions at the grandeur of their victory. What
should be done. The Emperor spoke for himself
only, and his surrender would not settle the great
issue. It was necessary to obtain something definite,
and the result of a short conference was that Count
Hatzfeldt, instructed by the Chancellor, retired to
draft a reply. " After some minutes he brought it,
writes Dr. Busch, " and the King wrote it out, sitting
on one chair, while the seat of a second was held up
by Major von Alten, who knelt on one knee and
supported the chair on the other." The King's
letter, brief and business-hke, began and ended with
the customary royal forms, and ran as follows :
" Regretting the circumstances in which we meet, I
accept your Majesty's sword, and beg that you will be
good enough to name an officer furnished with full
powers to treat for the capitulation of the Army which
has fought so bravely under your orders. On my side I
have designated General von Moltke for that purpose."
General Reille returned to his master, and as he
rode down the hill the astounding purport of his visit
flew from lip to Up through the exulting Army which
now hoped that, after this colossal success, the days
of ceaseless marching and fighting would soon end.
As a contrast to this natural outburst of joy and hope
we may note the provident Moltke, who was always
resolved to ** mak siker." His general order, issued
at once, suspending hostihties during the night,
declared that they would begin again in the morning
should the negotiations produce no result. In that
case, he said, the signal for battle would be the
re-opening of fire by the batteries on the heights east
of Frenois. The return of peace, so fervently desired
by the Army, was still far off in the distance when the
tired victors bivouacked in quiet, and dreamed of
home through the short summer night.
282 The Campaign of Sedan
How the Generals Rated Each Other
While General Reille, who performed his part with
so much modesty and dignity, rode back over the
Meuse, the Emperor still awaited, in the Sub-Pre-
fecture, the advent of General de Wimpffen, who was
fretting and fuming at the Golden Cross within the
walls. According to his own confession he had become
convinced that the refusal of his sovereign to head a
sally from Balan had delivered over the Army to
the mercy of the Germans, and violent despair had
taken possession of his soul. For had not the Comte
de Pahkao sent him to overbear Napoleon III. and
the set who surrounded him, and had he not failed
to bend the monarch to his will ? Twice, he repeats,
with pride, "I obstinately refused to obey" the
Emperor's invitation to treat with the enemy ; and
because Napoleon III. had authoritatively interfered
with his command he sent in that letter of resignation
which the Emperor refused to accept. At first he
seemed inclined to resist as well as resent the conduct
of his master, who had presumed to consult others
and, by hoisting the white flag, to take, as tiie General
haughtily says, " a decision contrary to my will."
Let the Emperor sign the capitulation. Such were
the first thoughts of a man whose temper was im-
perious, but whose better nature was not insensible
to reason. He quelled his wrath and threw off his
despair, moved, as he says, by the feeling that in
defending the interests of the Army he would be
rendering a last service to his brave companions "in
arms, and to his country. So he went from the Golden
Cross to the Sub-Prefecture. Still angry, he loudly
asserted as soon as he entered the room that he had
been vanquished in battle because, addressing the
Emperor, " your Generals refused to obey me."
Thereupon Ducrot started up, exclaiming, " Do you
mean me ? Your orders were only too well obeyed,
and your mad presumption has brought on this
frightful disaster." "If I am incapable," retorted
De Wimpffen, " all the more reason why I should not
retain the command." " You took it this morning,"
shouted Ducrot, also a violent man, " when you
u
I thoug
Sedan 283
thought it would bring honour and profit. You
cannot lay it down now. You alone must bear
(endosser) the shame of the capitulation." " Le
General Ducrot etait tres exalte/* he says in his
narrative, and he calls on his brother officers who
were present to testify that he used these brave words,
which, in substance, appear in De Wimpffen's account ;
but the latter adds that he threw back the accusation,
saying, " I took the command to evade a defeat which
your movement would have precipitated ; " and that
he requested General Ducrot to leave the room, as
he had not come to confer with him ! What the
quiet and well-mannered Emperor thought of his
two fiery and blustering Generals is nowhere stated.
The calm language in the pamplilet attributed to
Napoleon III., which shows, nevertheless, how deeply
he was vexed by De Wimpffen's selfish wish to shirk
his responsibilities at such a moment, takes no note of
the quarrel, and simply tells us how " the General
understood that, having commanded during the battle,
his duty obUged him not to desert his post in circum-
stances 30 critical." Thus, when General Reille re-
turned with King Wilham's letter, he found De Wimp-
ffen in a reasonable frame of mind and ready to perform,
with courage and address, the hard task of obtaining
the best terms he could for the French Army from
the placidly stern Von Moltke, in whose heart there
were no soft places when business had to be done.
The Generals Meet at Donchery
Late on the evening of September ist a momentous
session was held in Donchery, the little town which
commands a bridge over the Meuse below Sedan.
On one side of a square table covered with red baize
sat General von Moltke, having on his right hand
the Quartermaster-General von Podbielski, accord-
ing to one account, and Von Blumenthal, accord-
ing to another, and behind them several officers,
while Count von Nostitz stood near the hearth to
take notes. Opposite to Von Moltke sat De Wimpffen
alone ; while in rear, " almost in the shade," were
General Faure, Count Castelnau, and other French-
men, among whom was a Cuirassier Captain d'Orcet,
284 The Campaign of Sedan
who had observant eyes and a retentive memory.
Then there ensued a brief silence, for Von Moltke
looked straight before him and said nothing, while
De Wimpffen, oppressed by the number present,
hesitated to engage in a debate " with the t^^^o men
admitted to be the most capable of our age, each in
his kind." But he soon plucked up courage, and
frankly accepted the conditions of the combat. What
terms, he asked, would the King of Prussia grant to a
valiant Army which, could he have had his will,
would have continued to fight ? " They are very
simple," answered Von Moltke. " The entire Army,
with arms and baggage, must surrender as prisoners
of war." " Very hard," replied the Frenchman.
" We merit better treatment. Could you not be
satisfied with the fortress and the artillery, and allow
the Army to retire with arms, flags and baggage, on
condition of serving no more against Germany
during the war ? " No. " Moltke," said Bismarck,
recounting the interview, " coldly persisted in his
demand," or as the attentive D'Orcet puts it, " Von
Moltke was pitiless." Then De Wimpffen tried to
soften his grim adversary by painting his own posi-
tion. He had just come from the depths of the
African desert ; he had an irreproachable military
reputation ; he had taken command in the midst
of a battle, and found himself obliged to set his name
to a disastrous capitulation. " Can you not," he
said, " sympathize with an officer in such a pUght,
and soften, for me, the bitterness of my situation
by granting more honourable conditions ? " He
painted in moving terms his own sad case, a-nd
described what he might have done ; but seeing that
his personal pleadings were unheeded, he took a
tone of defiance, less likely to prevail. " If you will
not give better terms," he went on, "I shall appeal
to the honour of the Army, and break out, or, at
least, defend Sedan." Then the German General
struck in with emphasis, " I regret that I cannot do
what you ask," he said ; " but as to making a sortie,
that is just as impossilDle as the defence of Sedan.
You have some excellent troops, but the greater
Sedan 285
part of your infantry is demoralized. To-day,
duringr the battle, we captured more than twenty
thousand unwounded prisoners. You have only
eighty thousand men left. My troops and guns
around the town would smash yours before they
could make a movement ; and as to defending
Sedan, you have not provisions for eight-and-forty
hours, nor ammunition which would suffice for that
period." Then, says De Wimpffen, he entered into
details respecting our situation, which, " unfortu-
nately, were too true," and he offered to permit an
officer to verify his statements, an offer which the
Frenchman did not then accept.
Beaten off the mihtary ground, De Wimpffen
sought refuge in politics. " It is your interest, from
a political standpoint, to grant us honourable con-
ditions," he said. " France is generous and chivalric,
responsive to generosity, and grateful for considera-
tion. A peace, based on conditions which would
flatter the amour-propre of the Army, and diminish
the bitterness of defeat, would be durable ; whereas
rigorous measures would awaken bad passions, and,
perhaps, bring on an endless war between France
and Prussia." The new ground broken called up
Bismarck, ** because the matter seemed to belong
to my province," he observed when telling the story ;
and he was very outspoken as usual. " I said to
him that we might build on the gratitude of a prince,
but certainly not on the gratitude of a people — least
of all on the gratitude of the French. That in France
neither institutions nor circumstances were enduring ;
that governments and dynasties were constantly
changing, and the one need not carry out what the
other had bound itself to do. That if the Emperor
Lad been firm on his throne, his gratitude for our
granting good conditions might have been counted
upon ; but that as things stood it would be folly if
we did not make full use of our success. That the
French were a nation full of envy and jealousy, that
they had been much mortified by our success at
Koniggratz, and could not forgive it, though it in
nowise damaged them. How, then, should any
286 The Campaign of Sedan
magnanimity on our side move them not to bear i\s a
grudge for Sedan. This Wimpffen would not admit.
** France," he said, " had much changed latterly ;
it had learned under the Empire to think more
of the interests of peace than of the glory of war.
France was ready to proclaim the fraternity of
nations ; and more of the same kind." Captain
d'Orcet reports that, in addition, Bisrnarck denied
that France had changed, and that to curb her mania
for glory, to punish her pride, her aggressive and
ambitious character, it was imperative that there
should be a glacis between France and Germany.
" We must have territory, fortresses and frontiers
which will shelter us .for ever from an attack on her
part." Further remonstrances from De V/impffen
only drew down fresh showers of rough speech very
trying to bear, and when Bismarck said " We cannot
change our conditions," De Wimpffen exclaimed,
** Very well ; it is equally impossible for me to sign
such a capitulation, and we shall renew the battle."
Here Count Castelnau interposed meekly to say,
on behalf of the Emperor, that he had surrendered,
personally, in the hope that his self-sacrifice would
induce the King to grant the Army honourable terms.
" Is that all ? " Bismarck inquired. " Yes," said
the Frenchman. " But what is the sword sur-
rendered ? " asked the Chancellor ; "is it his own
sword, or the sword of France ? " " It is only the
sword of the Emperor," was Castelnau' s reply.
" Well, there is no use talking about other conditions," .
said Von Moltke, sharply, while a look of content-
ment and gratification passed over his face, according
to Bismarck ; one " almost joyful," writes the keen
Captain d'Orcet. "After the last words of Von
Moltke," he continues, " De Wimpffen exclaimed,
' We shall renew the battle.' * The truce,' retorted
the German General, ' expires to-morrow morning
at four o'clock. At four, precisely, I shall open
fire.' We were all standing. After Von Moltke' s
words no one spoke a syllable. The silence was icy."
But then Bismarck intervened to sooth excited feel-
ings, and called on his soldier comrade to show, once
Sedan 287
more, how impossible resistance had become. The
group sat down again at the red baize-covered table,
and Von Moltke began his demonstration afresh.
" Ah," said De Wimpffen, " your positions are not
so strong as you would have us believe them to be."
" You do not know the topography of the country
about Sedan," was Von Moltke' s true and crushing
answer " Here is a bizarre detail which illustrates
the presumptuous and inconsequent character of
your people," he went on, now thoroughly aroused.
"When the wai; began you suppHed your officers
with maps of Gt .nany at a time when they could
not study the geography of their own country for
want of French maps. I tell you that our positions
are not only very strong, they are inexpugnable."
It was then that De Wimpffen, unable to reply,
wished to accept the offer made, but not accepted
at an earher period, and to send an officer to verify
these assertions. " You will send nobody," ex-
claimed the iron General. "It is useless, and you
can believe my word. Besides, you have not long
to reflect. Jt is now midnight ; the truce ends at
four o'clock, and I will grant no delay." Driven to
his last ditch, De Wimpffen pleaded that he must
consult his fellow-Generals, and he could not obtain
their opinions by four o'clock. Once more the diplo-
matic peacemaker intervened, and Von Moltke
agreed to fix the final limit at nine. " He gave way
at last," says Bismarck, " when I showed him that
it could do no harm." The conference so dramatic
broke up, and each one went his way ; but, says the
German official narrative, "as it was not doubtful
that the hostile Army, completely beaten and nearly
surroimded, would be obliged to submit to the clauses
akeady indicated, the Great Headquarter Staff was
occupied, that very night, in drawing up the text
of the capitulation " a significant and practical com-
ment, showing what stuff there was behind the severe
language which, at the midnight meeting, fell from the
Chief of that able and sleepless body of chosen men.
Napoleon III. Surrenders
(General de Wirnpffen went straight from the
288 The Campaign of Sedan
military conferencejto the wearied Emperor who had
gone to bed. But he received his visitor, who told
him that the proposed conditions were hard, and that
the sole chance of mitigation lay in the efforts of His
Majesty. " General," said the Emperor, " I shall
start at five o'clock for the German headquarters,
and I shall see whether the King will be more favour-
able ; " for he seems to have become possessed of an
idea that King William would personally treat with
him. The Emperor kept his word. Believing that
.he would be permitted to return ( ,o Sedan, he drove
forth without bidding farewell tt^dny of his troops ;
but, as the drawbridge of Torcy was lowered and h^e
passed over, the Zouaves on duty shouted " Vive
I'Empereur ! " This cry was " the last adieu which
fell on his ears " as we read in the narrative given to
the world on his behalf. He drove in a droshki
towards Donchery, preceded by General Reille who,
before six o'clock, awoke Count Bismarck from his
slumbers, and warned him that the Emperor desired
to speak with him. " I went with him directly,"
said Bismarck, in a conversation reported by Busch ;
" and got on my horse, all dusty and dirty as I was,
in an old cap and my great waterproof boots, to ride
to Sedan where I supposed him to be." But he met
him on the high road near Frenois, " sitting in a two-
horse carriage." Beside him was the Prince de la
Moskowa, and on horseback Castelnau and Reille.
" I gave the military salute," says Bismarck. " He
took his cap off and the officers did the same ; where-
upon I took off mine, although it was contrary to
rule. He said, ' Couvrez-vous, done' I behaved to him
just as if in St. Cloud, and asked his commands."
Naturally, he wanted to see the King, but that could
not be allowed. Then Bismarck placed his quarters
in Donchery at the Emperor's disposal, but he,
thinking, as we know, that he would return to the
Sub-Prefecture, declined the courtesy, and preferred
to rest in a house by the wayside. The cottage of
a Belgian weaver unexpectedly became famous ; a
one-storied house, painted yellow, with white shutters
and Venetian blinds. He and the Chancellor entered
Sedan 289
the house, and went up to the first floor where there
was " a little room with one window. It was the
best in the house, but had only one deal table and
two rush-bottomed chairs." In that lowly abode
they talked together of many things for three-quarters
of an hour, among others about the origin of the war
which, it seems, neither desired, the Emperor assert-
ing, Bismarck reports that " he had been driven
into it by the pressure of public opinion," a very
inadequate representation of the curious incidents
which preceded the fatal decision. But when the
Emperor began to ask for more favourable terms,
he was told that, on a military question, Von Moltke
alone could speak. On the other hand Bismarck's
request to know who now had authority to make
peace was met by a reference to " the Government
in Paris ; " so that no progress was made. Then " we
must stand to our demands with regard to the Army
of Sedan," said Bismarck. General von Moltke was
summoned, and " Napoleon III. demanded that
nothing should be decided before he had seen the
King, for he hoped to obtain from His Majesty some
favourable concessions for the Army." The German
official narrative of the war states that the Emperor
expressed a wish that the Army might be permitted
to enter Belgium, but that, of course, the Chief of
the Staff could not accept the proposal. General
von Moltke forthwith set out for Vendresse where the
King was, to report progress. He met His Majesty on
the road, and there " the King fully approved the
proposed conditions of capitulation, and declared
that he would not see the Emperor until the terms
prescribed had been accepted ; " a decision which
gratified the Chancellor as well as the Chief of the
Staff. " I did not wish them to come together,"
observed the Count, " until we had settled the
matter of the capitulation ; " sparing the feelings of
both and leaving the business to the hard military men.
The Emperor lingered about in the garden of the
weaver's cottage ; he seems to have desired fresh
air after his unpleasant talk with the Chancellor.
Dr. Moritz Busch, who had hurried to the spot, has left
290 The Campaign of Sedan
a characteristic description of the Emperor. He saw
there " a Httle thick-set man," wearing jauntily a
red cap with a gold border, a black paletot lined
with red, red trousers, and white kid gloves, " The
look in his light grey eyes was somewhat soft and
dreamy, like that of the people who have lived hard.
His whole appearance," says the irreverent Busch,
" was a little unsoldierlike. The man looked too
soft, I might say too shabby, for the uniform he
wore," phrases which suggest a lack of sympathy
with adversity, and severe physical as well as mental
suffering. But imagination can realize a picture of
the fallen potentate, whose dynasty, crashing down,
drew so much with it, as he was seen by the cynical
German, talking to his officers, or to the burly Chan-
cellor, or walking alone up and down a potato field
in flower, with his white-gloved hands behind his
back, smoking a cigarette ; " betrayed by fortune "
or fate, as he believed, but pursued, as others might
say, by the natural consequences of his marvellous
adventures, and of a strange neglect of the one
source of strength on which he relied, the Army. He
had failed in the business upon the conduct of which
he prided himself ; he was a bankrupt Emperor.
The French Generals Submit
While one scene in the stupendous drama was per-
formed at the weaver's cottage, another was acted or
endured in Sedan, where De Wimpffen had summoned
the generals to consider the dreadful terms of capitu-
lation. He has given his own account of the in-
cident ; but the fullest report is suppHed by Lebrun.
There were present at this council of war more than
thirty generals. With tearful eyes and a voice
broken by sobs, the unhappy and most ill-starred De
Wimpffen described his interview and conflict with
Von Moltke and Bismarck, and its dire result — the
Army to surrender as prisoners of war, the officers
alone to retain their arms, and by way of mitigating
the rigour of these conditions, full permission to
return home would be given to any officer, provided
he would engage in writing and on honour not to
serve again during the war. The generals, save one
I
Sedan 2^1
or two, and these finally acquiesced, felt that the
conditions could not be refused ; but they were
indignant at the clause suggesting that the officers
might escape the captivity which would befall their
soldiers, provided they would engage to become mere
spectators of the invasion of their country. In the
midst of these mournful deliberations Captain von
Zingler, a messenger from Von Moltke, entered, and
the scene became still more exciting. *' I am in-
structed." he said, " to remind you how urgent it is
that you should come to a decision. At ten o'clock,
precisely, if you have not come to a resolution, the
German batteries will fire on Sedan. It is now nine,
and I shall have barely time to carry your answer to
headquarters." To thir. sharp summons De \Vimp-
ffen answered that he could not decide until he
knew the result of the interview between the Emperor
and the King." "That interview," said the stern
Captain, "will not in any way affect the miHtary oper-
ations, which can only be determined by the generals
who have full power to resume or stop the strife." It
was, indeed, as Lebrun remarked, useless to argue with
a Captain, charged to state a fact ; and at the General's
suggestion De Wimpffen agreed to .accompany Captain
von Zingler to the German headquarters.
These were, for the occasion, the Chateau de Bellevue,
v/here the Emperor himself had been induced to take up
his abode, and about eleven o'clock, in a room under
the Imperial chamber, De Wimpffen put his name at the
foot of the document drawn up, during the n^ight, by the
German Staff. Then he sought out the Emperor, and,
greatly moved, told him that " all was finishe^." His
Majesty, he writes, " with tears in his eyes, approached
me, pressed my hand, and embraced me ; " and " my
sad and painful duty having been accomplished, I
remounted my horse and rode back to Sedan, *la
mort dans I'ame.' "
So soon as the convention was signed, the King
arrived, accompanied by the Crown Prince. Three
years before, as the Emperor reminds us in the wnt-
ing attributed to him, the King had been his guest rn
Paris, where all the sovereigns of Europe had come
292 The Campaign of Sedan
to behold the marvels of the famous Exhibition.
" Now," so runs the lamentation, " betrayed by for-
tune. Napoleon III. had lost all, and had placed in
the hands of his conqueror the sole thing left him — his
liberty." And he goes on to say, in general terms,
that the King deeply sympathised with his misfor-
tunes, but nevertheless could not grant better con-
ditions to the Army. " He told the Emperor that
the castle of Wilhelmshohe had been selected as his
residence ; the Crown Prince then entered and cor-
dially shook hands with Napoleon ; and at the end
of a quarter of an hour the King withdrew. The
Emperor was permitted to send a telegram in cipher
to the Empress, to tell her what had happened, and
urge her to negotiate a peace." Such is the bald
record of this impressive event. The telegram, which
reached the Empress at four o'clock on the afternoon
of the 3rd, was in these words : " The Army is
defeated and captive ; I myself am a prisoner."
For one day more the fallen sovereign rested at
Belle vue to meditate on the caprices of fortune or
the decrees of fate. B^at that day, at the head of a
splendid company oi princes and generals. King
William, crossing "the bridge of Donchery, rode
throughout the whole vast extent of the German
lines, to greet 'his hardy warriors and be greeted by
them on the very scene of their victories. And well
they deserved regal gratitude, for together with their
comrades w^ho surrounded Metz, by dint of long
swift marches and steadfast valour, they had over-
come two. great Armies in thirty days.
During the battle of Sedan, the Germans lost in
killed and wounded 8,924 officers and men. On the
other hand, the French lost 3,000 killed, 14,000
wounded, and 21,000 captured in the battle. The
number of prisoners by capitulation was 83,000, while
3,000 were disarmed in Belgium, and a few hundreds
more or less, made their way by devious routes near
and over the frontier, to Mezieres, Rocroi, and other
places in France. In addition, were taken one eagle
and two flags, 419 field guns and mitrailleuses, 139
garrison guns, many wagons, muskets and horses.
Sedan 293
On the day after the surrender, the French soldiers,
having stacked their arms in Sedan, marched into
the peninsula formed by the deep loop of the Meuse —
" le Camp de Misere " as they called it — and were sent
thence in successive batches, numbered by thousands,
to Germany. Such was the astonishing end of the
Army of Chalons, which had been impelled to its woe-
ful doom by the Comte de Palikao and the Paris
politicians. Directed by General Vinoy, who was an
able soldier, the troops brought to Mezieres, escaped
by rapid and clever marches from the German cavalry
and the 6th Corps, and formed the nucleus of the im-
provised Army which afterwards defended the capital.
The End
On the 3rd of September the Emperor Napoleon III.
departed from Bellevue on his journey to the Castle
of Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel. The morning was wet
and gloomy, and a thunderstorm was gathering
among the hills of the Ardennes. The Imperial
baggage-train had been permitted to leave Sedan,
and was drawn up on the road ready to start. Col-
umns of prisoners also were moving out of the fortress
and marching towards the peninsula formed by the
Meuse. It was a lugubrious scene, and the superstitious
■ might remark that as the sun shone resplendently on
the German victory, so his light was obscured when the
captive Emperor drove through the muddy streets of
Donchery and thence to the northward, wrapped in the
j sombre mist and thickly faUing rain. And as he jour-
f neyed, disconsolately, in the forenoon, upon the road
to Bouillon, orders went forth from the German head-
quarters, where time was never lost, directing the con-
Iquering generals to leave the nth and one Bavarian
Corps on guard over Sedan and the thousands of un-
happy prisoners, and resume, with all the rest, that
march on the capital of France which had been so
abruptly interrupted only eight days before. So the
victors and the vanquished went their different ways.
The Emperor travelled without haste, and on the
evening of the 4th he slept at Vcrviers. The next
morning he learned, in common with all Europe,
294 The Campaign of Sedan
indeed all the civilized world, that the fires whic)
seethe under the bright surface of society in Pari
had once more burst through the thin crust of us
and wont, and that the dynasty of the Bonapart*
had been utterly overthrown at a blow to make w^
for the Republic. Like intelligence reached t)
King of Prussia, also, at his headquarters, whic
on the 5th, were already in Reims, The contrast
painful. The King saw his hopes of an early pea
destroyed ; but his was a solidly planted throne ar
he was the leader of irresistible armies. The Emper
knew that his fond dream of founding an Imperi.
House had been dispelled in an hour by a blast c
national wrath ; and, being a kindly man, his agor
was the keener because, as he pathetically says, " ]
was separated from his son, and knew not what fa
had befallen the Empress." Racked by such sa
reflections, at the very time when his wife was esca]
ing to England, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte went, b
railway, from Verviers to Wilhelmshohe. There
during a luxurious captivity of six months, he ha(
ample leisure to meditate on tLe causes which lee
to the catastrophe of Sedan and the surrender of
Metz ; and to ascertain, if he could, why, after • J
second trial, ending in the third entry of hosti^ j
troops into Paris, the French nation had lost i
belief in the saving qualities of a family bearing
name which, if associated with undying " glory," ha
also become indissolubly linked with bitter memori(
of lost provinces and gigantic military disasters. .
f
Wyman & Sons Ltd., Printers, London and Reading.
PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY
DC Hooper, George
306 The campaign of Sedan,
H78 August-September, I87O
191^
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