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BOHN'S STANDARD LIBRARY
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN
" The policy of your Government will bring you to Jena," said
M. de Moustier to Herr von BiBmarck during the Crimean War.
" Why not to Waterloo ? '* was the prompt and prophetic reply.
Wo Kraft und Muth in deutseher Seele flammen.
THE
CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN
THE
DOWNFALL OF THE SECOND EMPIRE
AUGUST— SEPTEMBER 1870
BY
GEORGE HOOPER
HISTORY OP THB CAMPAIGN OF s8zS*" BTC.
AUTHOR OP "WATERLOO: THB DOWNFALL OF THB FIRST NAPOLEON: A
WITH MAP AND PLANS
LONDON
GEORGE BELL AND SONS
1908
77
Hy
r.lSTORti
FinA publMed in Stw, 1887.
Squinted in Bohn'* Standard Library, 1897. 1906, 1998.
^ * * ., » • •
^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * V
CHISWICK PRESS : CHARLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.
PREFACE.
WHEN it was decided to publish a new and cheaper
edition of Mr. G^eorge Hooper's "Sedan," the
question arose whether anything should be added to it.
My father had intended, should a new edition be called
for, to revise and correct the work, and to famish it with
an index. After due consideration it has been decided to
make no additions to the book, except the index, which
has been carefully compiled. A few errors that had crept
into the text of the original edition have been corrected ;
but in other respects the volume remains as it was left
by its author.
Wynnabd Hoopeb.
South Kensington,
October, 1897.
225642
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION.
THE War of 1870-71 was opened by a campaign of
thirty days, complete in itself, and the author must
plead the dramatic unity of the great event as a reason foi
treating it in a separate form. Although the foundation
of those ulterior successes which enabled the Germans to
proclaim the King of Prussia Emperor in Germany, and to
do so in the palace of Louis XIY., yet, from an historical
point of view, the astonishing series of battles and marches
which ended in the Investment of Metz, and the Capitula-
tion of Sedan may be regarded as standing apart, because
they carried with them the Downfall of the Second Empire.
The Campaign of Sedan, in this respect, is the supplement
of the Campaign of Waterloo ; but, of course, there is no
resemblance between Napoleon III. and Napoleon L, nor
in the political and military conditions and results of the
two catastrophes.
The materials at the disposal of any author who ventures
to narrate the campaign are abundant and yet incomplete.
The History of the War prepared by the Cierman StafE is
minute even to weariness, but it must always stand as the
authentic foundation of every narrative. Unreadable to
the general public, it is invaluable to the soldier-student,
and to all who wish to know what the German Army is
like, and how it wages war. It need scarcely be said that
the StafE narrative is the basis of this book, which is an
PKSFACB. vii
endeavour to present its essence in a succinct and readable
form. Unhappily, the French accounts are wanting in pre-
cision, so that it is difficult to comprehend how thej fought
their battles, and impossible to ascertain accurately what
was their numerical strength at any moment. The de-
ficiency is serious, because it mars the completeness of the
story, and frustrates every attempt to do them full justice.
For, if the Army, as an Army, was wasted by incapable
commanders, the soldiers fought well and did nothing to
derogate from their old renown. They had to encounter
better commanders, more numerous and better soldiers,
and they were beaten, but they were not disgraced. The
whole lesson of the war is lost, if the fact is ignored that
the German Army, from top to bottom, was superior in
every way to that of Napoleon III., as well as more
numerous ; and that what made it superior was the spirit
of Duty, using the word in its highest sense, which ani-
mated the host, from the King, who was its shining ex-
emplar, to the private who was proud to rival his King.
The contrast, which this war exhibited, between the
French and German methods of making and using an
Army is so violent, that it becomes pamful, and imparts
an air of one-sidedness to the narrative. But the facts
must be stated, although the bare statement suggests par-
tiality in the narrator. I have, nevertheless, tried to be
impartial, and in doing my best, I have found it impossible
to read the abounding evidence of Imperial neglect, rash-
ness and indecision, without feeling pity for the soldiers
and the nation which had to bear the penalties. The
Fr^ch Army has been remodelled and increased enorm-
ously ; the secular quarrel between Germany and France
is still open ; and some day it may be seen whether the
Bepublicans, out of the same materials, have been able to
create an Army such as the Imperialists failed to produce.
• ••
Viu PREFACE.
Whether they have succeeded or not, it may be fervently
hoped that the deep impression which the examples of
thoroughness, revealed by the wars of 1866 and 1870, made
on our own country will never be effaced ; and that the
public will insist that our small Army, in every part, shall
be as good as that which crossed the French frontier in
1870, and triumphed in the Campaign of Sedan.
Kensington, April 6th, 1887.
CONTENTS.
PAGB
iNTBODUCnON 1
Chapter I.
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR.
French Demands for the Rhine— Lnxemburg — An Interlude
of Peace— The Salzburg Interview — The Emperor seeks Allies
— The HohenzoUem Candidature— The French Government
and the Chamber 17
Chapter II.
THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS.
German Mobilization — French Mobilization^War Methods
Contrasted 66
Chapter III.
STAGE THUNDER.
The Combat at Saarbriick — Preparing to go Forward —
Positions on August 4 — The Moral and Political Forces . . 72
Chapter IV.
INVASION IN earnest.
The Combat on the Lauter— French Position on the Saar—
German Position on the Saar 64
Chapter V.
TWO STAGGERING BLOWS.
1. Woerth— The Battle Begins— Attack on Woerth—
Attack on the French Right— Attack on Elsasshausen—
CONTENTS.
PAOB
MacMahon Orders a Retreat — The Close of the Battle. 2.
Spicheren— The Germans Begin the Fight-The Red Hill
Stormed— Progress of the Action— -Frossard Retires ... 96
Ghafteb VI.
VACILLATION IN METZ.
The Emperor Resigns his Command — The German Advance
— The German Cavalry at Work — The Germans March on
the Moselle 131
Chapteb VII.
VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND.
The French Propose to Move — The Battle of Colombey-
Nonilly— Von Golz Dashes In^The End of the Battle—The
French Retreat — The Germans Cross the Moselle— The
Cavalry Beyond the Moselle — Orders for the Flank March —
The Emperor Quits the Army 145
Chapteb VIII.
THE FRENCH BETREAT THWARTED.
Vionville-Mars la Tour— The Vionville Battlefield— The
French are Surprised — The Third Corps Strikes In — Arrival
of Bazaine^Bredow's Brilliant Charge — The Fight becomes
Stationary — Arrival of the Tenth Corps — The Great Cavalry
Combat— End of the Battle 167
Chapter IX.
PRESSED BACK ON METZ.
Marshal Bazaine— The Battlefield of Gravelotte— The
German Plans — The Battle of Gravelotte — Prince Frederick
Charles at the Front — Steinmetz Attacks the French Left —
Operations by the German Left Wing— General Frossard
Repels a Fresh Attack— The Last Fights near St. Hubert —
The Prussian Guard on the Centre and Left— The Capture
ofSt. Privat 188
CONTENTS. Xi
PAGB
Chapter X.
THE STATS OF THE GAME, AND THE NEW MOVES.
The King Marches Westward — The Cavalry Operations —
The Emperor at Chalons and Reims — MacMahon retires to
Heims — ^The Chalons Army Directed on the Mease .... 228
Chapter XI.
THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL.
The Cavalry Discover the Enemy — ^Movements of the
French— The Marshal Resolves, Hesitates, and Yields —
Movements of the Germans — Effects of MacMahon's Connter-
orders — German and French Operations on the 29th — The
Comhat at Nonart — The State of Affairs at Simdown — The
Battle of Beaumont — The Surprise of the Fifth Corps — The
Flight to Mouzon 244
Chapter XII.
HETZ AND STRASBURO.
The Battle of Noisseville •••276
Chapter XIII.
SEDAN.
German Decision — Confusion in the French Camp— The
Movements of the Germans — ^The Battlefield of Sedan — The
Battle of Sedan — MacMahon's Wound and its Consequences
— Progress of the Battle on the Givonne— The March on St,
Menges — The Eleventh and Fifth Corps Engage — The Con-
dition of the French Army — The French Cavalry Charge —
General de Wimpffen's Counter stroke — The Emperor and
his Generals— King William and his Warriors — How the
Generals Rated Each Other — The Generals Meet at Don-
chery— Napoleon III. Surrenders — The French Generals
Submit— The End 286
APPENDICES.
I. The German Field Armies — II. The French Army —
III. The Protocol of Capitulation— IV. A List of the Prin-
cipal Works Consulted for the Campaign of Sedan .... 339
Index ••••••• 359
Xii CONTENTS.
'■ Map and Plans.
L Battle of Wobbth.
II. Battle of Spicheren.
III. Battle of Colombey-Nouilly.
IV. Battle of Vionville-Mars la Toub.
V. Battle of Gravelottb.
VI. Battle of Sedan.
VII. General Map.
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
INTRODUCTION.
IN Jtdy, 1870, fifty-five years after the Allied Armies,
who had marched from the decisive field of Waterloo,
entered Paris, a young diplomatist. Baron Wimpfen,
started from the French capital, for Berlin. He was
the bearer of a Declaration of War, from the Emperor
Napoleon III., to William I., King of Prussia ; and the
fatal message was delivered to the French Charg^ d'Affiures,
M. le Sourd, and by him to the Prussian Government on
the 19th of July. Thus, once again, a Napoleon, at the
head of a French Empire, was destined to try his strength
against the principal German Power beyond the Bhine.
Tet, under what different conditions! The Emperor
was not now the Napoleon who surrounded the Austrians
at Ulm, broke down the combined forces of Austria and
Bussia at AusterHtz, and extorted a peace which set him
free to overthrow, at Jena and Auerstadt, the fine army
left by Frederick the Great, and allowed to crystallize by
his weak successors. Nor did the late Emperor find in his
front a divided Germany, and the mere survival of a great
military oi^nization. He found a imited people, and an
arm^^ surpassing in completeness, as it did in armaments
••• •
• • •
m. •• • •— — —
INTRODUCTION.
— ^the yictors of Prague, Bosbach, and Leuthen. The
Germany known to tlie Congress of Vienna had disappeared
— ^the deformed had been transformed. The little seed of
unity, sown early in the century, had grown into a forest
tree. The spirit of Amdt had run through the whole
Teutonic nation, which, after the turmoil of 1848 had
subsided, and the heavy hand of Russia had been taken off
by the Crimean War, found a leader in the strongly-
organized kingdom of Prussia. When the weak and
hesitating will of Frederick William lY. ceased, first, by
the operation of a painful disease, and then by extinction,
to disturb the course of his country's fortune, Prussia, in
a few years, became practically a new Power. King
William I., who crowned himself with his own hands at
Konigsberg, began his task, as a ruler, in a grave and
earnest spirit, holding that kingship was not only a
business, but a trust, and taking as his watchwords. Work
and Duty. No monarch in any age, no private man, ever
laboured more assiduously and conscientiously at his
metier, to use the word of Joseph IL, than the King of
Prussia. He became Begent in 1858, when Napoleon ITT.
was engaged in preparing for his Italian campaign against
the House of Austria. French policy, with varying watch-
words, had run that road for centuries ; and, during the
summer of 1859, it was the good fortune of the Emperor
to win a series of victories which brought his army to the
Mincio, and before the once famous Quadrilateral. The
German Bund had taken no part in the fray, but the rapid
successes of the French aroused some apprehensions in
Berlin, and there went forth an order to mobilize a part of
the army, which means to put each corps on a war-footing,
and to assemble a force in Bhenish Prussia. Whatever
share that demonstration may have had in producing the
sudden arrangement between the rival Emperors, who
INTRODUCTION. 8
made peace oyer their cigarettes and coffee at Villafranca,
the experiment tried by the Berlin War Office had one
impori^t result — ^it brought to light serious defects in the
system then practised, and revealed the relative weakness
of the Prussian army. From that moment, the Begent,
who soon became Eing by the death of his brother, began
the work of reforming the military system. For this step,
at least from a Prussian standpoint, there was good reason ;
since the kingdom, although it was based on a strong and
compact nucleus, was, as a whole, made up of scattered
fragments lying between great military Powers, and
therefore could not hope to subsist without a formidable
army. The relative weakness of Prussia had, indeed, been
burnt into the souls of Prussian statesmen; and Eing
William, on his accession, determined that as far as in him
lay, that grave defect should be cured. A keen observer,
a good judge of character and capacity, his experience of
men and things, which was large, enabled him at once to
■elect fit instruments. He picked out three persons, two
soldiers and a statesman, and severe ordeals in after years
justified his choice. He appointed General von Boon,
Minister of War, and no man in modem times has shown
greater qualities in the organization of an army. He
placed General von Moltke at the head of the General
Staff, which that able man soon converted into the best
equipped and the most effective body of its kind known to
history. It rapidly became, what it now is, the brain of
the army, alike in quarters and in the field. Finally, after
some meditation, he called Herr Otto von Bismarck from
the diplomatic service, which had revealed his rare and
peculiar qualities, and made this Pomeranian squire his
chief political adviser, and the manager of his dehcate and
weighty State affairs.
Thenceforth, the long-gathering strength of Prussia, the
4 INTBODUCTIOK.
f onndatioiiB of which were bedded de^p in the history of its
people, began to assume a form and a direction which great
events revealed to astonished and incredulous Europe.
The experiment undertaken by the King and his chief
councillors was rendered less difficult by that effect of the
Crimean War which so materially lessened the influence of
Russia in Germany. The intimate and friendly relations
subsisting between the two Courts remained unbroken, and
to its preservation in fair weather and foul, Prussia owed,
to a large extent, the favourable conditions surrounding
the application and development of her policy. It seemed
as necessary to Prussian, as it now does to German interests,
that the Bussian Government should be, at least, benevo-
lently neutral ; and probably the art of keeping it so was
profoundly studied by Herr von Bismarck when he filled
the post of Ambassador to the Court of St. Petersburg.
The large military reforms designed by the King and his
advisers aroused an uncompromising opposition in the
native Parliament, which was only overcome by the firmness
with which King William supported his outspoken and
audacious Minister. The victory was secured by methods
which were called, and were, unconstitutional. The control
of the Chamber over the Budget was placed in abeyance,
by a clever interpretation of the fundamental law. It was
held that if the Deputies could not agree with the
Government respecting the estimates of the current year,
the law which they had sanctioned in the preceding year
still remained valid. Thus the taxes were collected,
appropriated and expended, just the same as if the Chamber
had not virtually " stopped the supplies" in order to defeat
the measures which were intended to give the army stability,
numbers, efficiency and cohesion. The whole transaction
ran counter to English maxims and customs ; but it should
be remembered that Parliamentary Government, and
INTRODUCTION. 6
especially government . by party, were never, and are not
even no"v established in Berlin. The net result of the
contest was the renovation and the strengthening of the
National Army to an extent which, while it did not exceed,
perhaps, the expectations of those who laboriously wrought
it out, left some Powers of Europe ignorant, and others in-
credulous respecting its value.
Not that the military institutions of Prussia, dating
back from the " new model," devised during the stress of
tbe Napoleonic Wars, had been fundamentally altered.
Nothing was done except to increase the numbers, close
up and oil the machinery, render its working prompt
^jid easy by prudent decentralization, give it a powerful
brain in the General Staff, and impart to the whole system
a living energy. The art of war, if the phrase may be
allowed, was, in accordance with venerable traditions
rooted in the HohenzoUern House, taken up as a serious
business ; and that deep sense of its importance which
prevailed at the fountain head, was made to permeate the
entire frame. That is the real distinguishing characteristic
of the Prussian, now the German army, as contrasted with
the spirit in which simUar labours were undertaken by
some other Powers. The task was a heavy one, but the
three men who set about it were equal to the task. King
William, with a large intelligence, a severe yet kindly
temper, and a thorough knowledge of his work, threw
himself heart and soul into the business, and brought to
bear upon its conduct that essential condition of success,
the ' * master's eye.' ' General von Boon framed or sanctioned
the administrative measures which were needed to create
an almost self-acting and cohesive organism, which could
be set in motion by a telegram, as an engineer starts a
complicated piece of machinery by touching a lever. Von
Moltke, as chief of the General Staff, supplied the directing
6 INTRODUCTION.
intellect, and established a complete apparatus for the
collection and classification of knowledge, bearing upon
military affairs, which might be applied wherever needed.
These men, working with ** unhasting, unresting" diligence,
founded a school of war, not based on "the law of the
Modes and Persians which altereth not," but upon the
vital principle that a good army should possess in itself
such a power of adaptation, as will make it always abreast
with the latest genuine discoveries in tactics, arms, material
appliances, and discipline. Also the army was treated as
a great school in which officers and men alike were
teaching and learning from dawn to sunset, throughout
the allotted period of service. The principal trio had other
and able helpers, but they were the main springs moving
and guiding the marvellous product of constant labour
applied by rare capacity.
The ultimate, although not the immediate, effect of the
French successes at Magenta and Solferino.was the creation
of an Italian kingdom, which included within its boundaries,
Naples, Sicily, the States of the Church, except Eome, and
of course the Duchies on the right bank of the Po. The
price of compliance, exacted by the Emperor Napoleon,
whose plans had been thwarted, was the cession to him of
Nice and Savoy. Venice and the territory beyond the
Mincio remained Austrian for several years. While the
map of Italy was in course of reconstruction, the political
conflict in Berlin raged on with unintermitted violence.
Simultaneously the Austrian Emperor was induced to
asseii) his claims to predominance in G-ermany, but the
plans laid, in 1863, were blighted by the prompt refusal of
William I. to take any share in them. It was the first
symptom of reviving hostility between the two Powers,
although a little later, on the death of the King of
Denmark, they were found, side by side in arms, to assert
INTRODUCTION. 7
the claims of the German Bund upon Holstein, Schleswig
and Lauenburg, and avert the occupation of those countries
by the troops of Saxony and other minor States alone. The
campaign which ensued brought the new model of the
Prussian army to the test of actual experiment. But the
brave adversaries they had to encounter, if stout in heart,
were weak in numbers ; and Europe did not set much store
by the victories then achieved by Prussia. The public and
the Governments were intently occupied with the Secession
War in the United States of America, and the astounding
expedition to Mexico, which was designed to place an
Austrian Archduke on " the throne of the Montezumas/'
under illustrious French patronage. Thus the quality of
the troops, the great influence of the famous "needle-
gun," the character of the staff, and the excellent adminis-
trative services escaped the notice of all, save the observant
few. The political aspects of the dispute were keenly
discussed. Lord Palmerston and Lord Bussell were, at
one moment, disposed to fight for the Treaty of 1851 ; but
the Danish King committed grave blunders ; Bussia stood
aloof, the Emperor Napoleon III. distinctly refused to
enter the lists, and the House of Commons was decidedly
averse to war. Here it should be noted that the French
Emperor, meditating on the value to him of the rival Powers
in Germany, had determined to stand weU with both. He
Loped to please Austria by making the brother of Francis
Joseph Emperor of Mexico, and to keep open the possibilities
of an alliance with Prussia, by throwing no obstacles in
her way on the Eider.
Then began the great strife between the two Governments
which had wrested the Elbe Duchies from the Dane. When
the short war ended, certain divisions from each army were
posted in the conquered country, and the rivalry which
animated the two Courts was carried on by diplomats and
6 INTRODtrCTION.
statesmen. Prussian policy, since the days of Frederick II.,
bad leaned always towards, if not an alliance with Bussia,
yet the maintenance of a solid understanding with that
growing Power. Herr von Bismarck, who was a deep
student in the history of his own country, and who had
always nourished large ideas, kept steadily on the well-
trodden path, but imparted to his methods a boldness, an
inventiveness, and an energy most unusual in Prussian
statescraft. The Polish insurrection of 1864 gave him an
opportunity which he did not neglect, and while the poor
patriots were assisted from the side of Galicia, on the Posen
frontier they were ruthlessly repressed, the Russian and
Prussian troops making common cause, and crossing the
frontier whenever that step seemed needful. The ill-fated
Poles, of course, were defeated; Prussia had recorded a
fresh claim upon the benevolent neutrality of Bussia,
while Austrian "ingratitude," never forgiven in St.
Petersburg, took a deeper tinge in the eyes of the Czar.
The Prussian Government had not long to wait for their
reward. During the summer of 1865, the abiding quarrel
between Vienna and Berlin, respecting the future status of
the conquered or restored Duchies, nearly came to an open
rupture. Neither side, however, was ready for a blow, and
the " Convention of Gastein," which Bismarck, in a letter
to his wife, defined as a mode of " pasting together the
cracks in the building," was devised to gain time. The
Prussian army, still incomplete from the royal and the
military point of view, had been augmented after the
Danish war, and the new levies of horse and artillery had
not acquired the requisite instruction. So the summer
and autumn of 1865 wore away, revealing the spectacle of
King William and Herr von Bismarck battling fiercely
with the Parliament, and not so clearly displaying Yon
Moltke and Yon Boon labouring hourly to bring the
INTRODirCTION. 9
machine intrusted to their charge up to the highest
attainable efficiency. There were other reasons for delay.
As it was more than probable that the South Germans, and
possible that the Xing of Hanoyer would not rank them-
selves with Prussia, but go with Austria and the Bund, an
ally was wanted who would divide the forces of the largest
Power. That ally was found in the newly united kingdom
of Italy.
But before the Italian envoy astonished the diplomatic
world by his apparition at Berlin, in March, the controversy
between Austria and Prussia had gone on rapidly, step by
step, nearer towards a rupture. Count Mensdorff , on behaU
of the Emperor Francis Joseph, set up a claim to full
liberty of action in the Duchy of Holstein, and began
openly to favour the pretentions of the Duke Frederick of
Augustenburg to the Ducal Chair. That position was
vigorously contested by Herr von Bismarck, who put an
opposite construction on the Treaty, which created what
was called the "condominium." The consequence was a
frequent and animated exchange of despatches, containing
such ** arguments " as seemed proper to the occasion. Into
the merits of this dispute it is needless to enter now, since
the whole drift of the verbal struggle shows that while
Prussia was intent on providing a solid ground on which
to fight out a long-standing quarrel — "inevitable," said
Von Moltke, " sooner or later," — ^Austria was by no means
inclined to shrink from a test directly applied to her posi-
tion in Germany. Whatever line she had taken her rival
would have discovered, or tried to discover, an opposing
course ; but, it so happened, that, whether by chance or
miscalculation, Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Foreign^
Minister, managed his case so as to give advantages to his
abler antagonist. In the last days of February a great
council was held in Berlin. Not only the King and his
10 INTRODtrCTION.
chief Minister, but General von Moltke and General von
ManteufFel, from Schleswig, took part in its deliberations.
It was the taming point in the grave debate, so far as
Prussian action was concerned; for the decision then
adopted unanimously, was, that Prussia could not honour-
ably recede, but must go forward, eyen at the risk of war.
No order was given to prepare for that result, because the
organization of the army was complete, and moreover,
because ** the King was very adverse to an offensive war.'*
Nevertheless, from that moment such an issue of the dis-
pute became certain to occur at an early day. Yet neither
party wished to fight over the Duchies ; each felt that the
cause was too paltry. The Austrians, therefore, extended
the field, by appealing to the Bund, a move which gave
Herr von Bismarck the advantage he so eagerly sought.
He answered it by resolving to push, in his own. sense, the
cause of federal reform. Learning this determination early
in March, M. Benedetti observed to Herr von Bismarck
that it would insure peace. *' Yes," answered the Minister
President, — " for three months," a very accurate forecast
by a prophet who could fulfil his own prediction, and who
desired to fight the adversary promptly, lest a reconciliation
should be effected between Vienna and Pesth, and Hungary,
from a source of weakness, should thus become a tower of
strength.
A few days later, March 14th, General Govone, from
Florence, arrived in Berlin. His advent had been preceded
by attempts, on the part of Bismarck, to discover how the
French would look on a Prusso-ItaHan alliance. The
subject was delicate, and even after the General's arrival, it
was officially stated that he had come, exclusively, to study
the progress in small arms and artillery ! The pretence
was soon abandoned, and the negotiations were avowed ;
but the conclusion of a treaty was delayed for some days*
INTRODUCTION. 11
because no specific date could be fixed on for the outbreak
of war, Prussia having determined, at least to make it
appear, that she was not the aggressor. At length a form
of words was devised, which satisfied both Powers, stipulat-
ing that Italy was to share in the war, providing it began
within " three months," and the Convention was signed on
the 8th of April. Not, however, before it had been well
ascertained that France had really helped on the Prussian
alliance and desired to see war ensue, although, avowedly,
she did not interfere, giving out that she stood neuter, and
that the understanding which might be ultimately come to
between France and Prussia would be determined by the
march of events, the extension of the war, and the questions
to which it might give rise. This language foreshadowed
the policy which the Emperor, if not M. Ihrouyn de Lhuys de-
sired to follow; and as Russia, recently obliged in the Polish
troubles, was friendly, if not allied, Herr von Bismarck
was convinced that no foreign power would array itself on
the side of Austria, unless the campaign were prolonged.
Henceforth, the aim of each disputant was to secure
a vantage-ground in Germany. Austria had partially col-
lected troops in Bohemia and Moravia, and had secretly
stipulated with several States to call out four Federal
corps d'arm^e; while Prussia, who could wait, being always
ready, had only carried her preparations forward to a
certain extent. M. von Beust, the Saxon Minister, then
intervened with a proposal that the Diet should name
arbiters, whose decision should be final ; a suggestion in-
stantly rejected by the principals in the quarrel. The
Emperor Napoleon III., towards the end of May, when
Prussian mobilization had practicably been completed in
eight corps, produced his specific — the characteristic pro-
posal that a Conference should be held in Paris to study
the means of maintaining the peace. Prussia accepted the
12 INTRODTTCTION.
offer, but Austria put an end to the hopes of Napoleon, bj
stipulating that no arrangement should be discussed which
would augment the territory or power of any 'poxij of the
Conference, and in addition that the Pope -should be invited
to share in any deliberations on "the Italian Question/'
These pretensions, by excluding, what everyone wanted, the
cession of Venetia to Italy, decided the fate of the Con-
ference. " They desire war at Vienna," said Von Bismarck
to Count Benedetti. " These conditions have been conjured
up solely for the purpose of giving the States in South
Germany time to complete their military preparations."
And when the news came officially from Paris that the
Austrian answer had killed the project, the Minister Pre-
sident shouted in the French Ambassador's presence "Vive
le Roi ! ** The solution was war. The Prussian army, for
once, had been mobilized by slow degrees. More than a
month elapsed between the first precautionary and the
final steps, but by the 12th of May the entire active army
had been summoned to arms. The Conference project was
a last attempt, made, indeed, after all hope of arresting the
conflict had vanished, alike in Vienna and Berlin ; and it
was followed by events in Holstein, which put an end to
the period of suspense, and formed a prelude to the war.
PracticaUy, but without actual fighting. General von Man-
teuffel compelled the Austrian brigade, under Field-Marshal
von Glablenz, to retreat swiftly over the Elbe. The pre-
text for this strong measure was the fact that Austria, by
her sole will, had summoned the Estates to meet at Itzehoe,
and had thus infringed the rights of King William ! There-
upon Austria requested the Diet at Frankfort to call
out all the Federal Corps; and her demand was complied
with, on the 14th of June, by a majority of nine to six.
The Prussian delegate protested, and withdrew, leaving
Austria, Bavaria, Saxony, Wurtemburg, the two Hesses,
INTRODUCTION. 18
and several minor States^ in open combination against
Prussia. But tlie same stroke which isolated the latter,
also destroyed the German Bund, invented by the kings
and statesmen of 1815, to preserve internal tranquillity,
and safeguard the Fatherland against France. The arrange-
ment implied the co-operation of two Powers ; one purely
German, yet subordinate ; the other parcel German, and
mainly consistiog of divers peoples outside Germany ; and
it fell to pieces at a blow, because the time had arrived
when one of the two must attain supremacy. Side by side
with the secular dynastic conflict arose in the nation that
longing for unity which could only be accomplished by a
thoroughly German Power.
That Power was Prussia, trained for the task by the
steadfast labours of two hundred years. The army she
had formed did its work swiftly. Pouring through Saxony
and over the Silesian Mountains, the King and his son,
July 3rd, crushed the Austrians, on the memorable field of
Sadowa, near Koniggratz. The Hanoverian troops, after
winning the fight at Langensalza, had been obliged to sur*
render, and in South Germany the army employed to
overcome the Confederates was equally victorious. On the
22nd of July, so swiftly had the main body moved, the
Prussians were in front of Vienna and Presburg on the
Danube- Four days afterwards, the Emperor Napoleon
having struck in with an offer of mediation, which was
accepted, the preliminaries of a peace were signed at
Nikolsburg, on the 26th of July, and the final treaty was
settled and ratified at Prague, on the 23rd of August, long
after King WiUiam and his formidable Minister were once
more in Berlin. By this instrument, Austria was excluded
from Germany ; a Northern Confederation, reaching to the
Main, was founded; Hanover, the Elbe Duchies, Hesse-
Cassel, and other territories, were annexed to Prussia ; and
14 INTBODT7CnOK.
& formal statement was inserted, declaring that Napoleon
m., to whom Austria had ceded Yenetia, had acquired it
in order to hand over the city and Terra Firma, as far as the
Isonzo, to Victor Emmanuel, when the peace should be re-
established. Prussia thus became the acknowledged head
of G-ermanj, at least as far as the Main ; and the national
longing for complete unity was about to be gratified in a
much shorter time than seemed probable in 1866.
Naturally, the astonishing successes won by Prussian
arms against the Federal Corps, as well as the Austrians,
compelled the South German States to sue for peace, and
accept public treaties, which, while leaving them independ-
ent, brought them all, more or less, within the limits of a
common German federation. But something more import-
ant was accomplished at Nikolsburg. Herr von der Pf ordten,
the Bavarian Prime Minister, repaired thither towards the
end of July, and Bismarck was in possession of information,
including a certain French document, which enabled him
to state the German case in a manner so convincing and
terrifying, that the Bavarian agreed to sign a secret treaty,
bringing the army within the Prussian system, and stipulat-
ing that, in case of war, it should pass at once under the
command of Kiug William. That which Von der Pfordten
conceded the Ministers of Wurtemburg and Hesse Darm-
stadt could not refuse, and thus provision was made, on
the morrow of Sadowa, for that concentration of armed
Germany which overwhelmed France in 1870-71. So that,
although nothing formally constituting a United Germany
had been done, Prussia, by securing the control of all her
forces, and knowing that a strong and deeply-rooted public
sentiment would support her, was satisfied that, provid-
ing time could be gained in which to arm, instruct and
discipline upon the Prussian model the South Germans and
the Ixoops raised from the annexed provinces, she would be
INTRODUCTION. IS
more than a match for France. South Gkrmanj, indeed,
bad long known herrelative helplessness against the French.
Perhaps it would be more correct to saj that the real peril
was more perceptible to the soldiers and statesmen than to
the people, many of whom were strongly imbued with
democratic ideas of the French type. Yet, although they
hungered for what they understood as liberty and independ-
ence, they were still German, and did not faH to see that
their cherished desires could not be gratified either under
French patronage or French prefects. The soldiers and
statesmen had early perceived the full secret of South
German dei)endence. The Archduke Charles, who had
great knowledge and harsh experience to guide him, pointed
out that the French posts on the Shine had placed the
country south of the Main at the mercy of France. *' As
long as the Bhine frontier from Huningen to Lauterboui^
remains in her hands," wrote a Prussian staff-officer at a
later period, " Germany is open on the Bhine frontier to an
invasion directed upon the Southern States.'' No stronger
testimony to the sense, if not to the reality of insecurity
could be adduced, than the remarkable fact that, even so
far back as the Crimean War, the then King of Wurtem-
berg, in conversation with Herr von Bismarck, set forth,
significantly, the feelings, the hopes and the dread of
South Germany. "Give us Strassburg," he said, "and
we win unite to encounter any eventuality .... for until
that city shall become German, it will always stand in the
way of Southern Germany, devoting herself unreservedly
to German unity and to a German national policy.'' Hence
it will be seen that, beyond the Main, there were traditional,
yet very real fears of French invasion; and that these
apprehensions had no small share in facilitating the accept-
ance of the secret military treaties, and in shaping the
course of subsequent events.
16 nrrRODucTioN.
Thus much it Beems needful to state, in order that some
portion of the earlier transactions which had a great in-
fluence in bringing on the war of 1870, may be recalled to
the reader's mind. The short, sharp and decisive duel
fought between Austria and Prussia for leadership in
Germany, createda prof oimd impression throughout Europe.
Austria was irritated as well as humbled ; Russia, although
the Czar remained more than friendly, was not without
apprehensions ; but the French ruler and his ministers were
astounded, indignant and bewildered. The telegram, which
reported the Battle of Sadowa, wrenched a ** cry of agony **
from the Court of the Tuileries, whose policy had been
based on the conjecture or belief that Prussia would be de-
feated, and would call for help. The calculation was, that
Napoleon IIL would step in as arbiter, and that while he
moderated the demands of Austria, he would be able to
extort territorial concessions from Prussia as the reward of
his patronage. M. Drouyn de Lhuys would have had his
master strike in, at once, and cross the Bhine, or occupy
the Palatinate ; but the Emperor was not then in the mood
for heroic enterprises ; he feared that his army was not
" ready,'' and, besides, he still thought that by arrangement
he could obtain some sort of " compensation " from Prussia,
at the expense of Germany. But all he did was to pose as
mediator at Nikolsburg ; and Herr von Bismarck, who had
done his utmost to keep him in a dubious frame of mind,
regarded it as ** fortunate " that he did not boldly thrust
himself into the quarrel. The " golden opportunity " slid
by ; M. Drouyn de Lhuys resigned ; and Imperial France
acquiesced, publicly^ in the political and territorial arrange-
ments which, for the first time, during thelapse of centuries,
laid broad and deep the foundations of German Unity,
and, as a consequence, rendered inevitable a Franco-German
War.
CHAPTER L
THS CAUSES OV THB WAB.
•
THE Treaty of Prague, the secret militarj oonventions
signed at iN'ikolsburg, the ascendancy secured by Yon
Bismarck, now elevated to the dignity of a Count, together
with the complete removal of alien Powers from Italy,
wrought a radical change in the political relations of the
European States. Excluded from Germany, although in-
cluding powerful G-erman elements, the dominions of
Austria still extended to the verge of Yenetia and the
Lombard plains ; but as the Prussian statesman had already
hinted, her future lay Eastward, and her centre of gpravity
had been removed to Buda-Pesth. In the South German
Courts, no doubt, there was a bias towards Yienna, and a
dislike of Prussia ; yet both the leaning and the repugnance
were counterbalanced by a deeper dread of France rooted
in the people by the vivid memories of repeated and cruel
invasions. Bussia, somewhat aJarmed by the rapid success
of King William, had been soothed by diplomatic re-
assurances, the tenour of which is not positively known,
although a series of subsequent events more than justified
the inference made at that time, that promises, bearing on
the Czar's Eastern designs, were tendered and accepted as
a valuable consideration for the coveted boon of benevolent
neutrality, if not something more substantial. Like Bussia,
c
18 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
France bad lost nothing by the campaign of 1866; ber
territories were intact ; ber ruler bad mediated between
Austria and Prussia ; and be bad tbe honour of protecting
the Pope, who, as a spiritual and temporal Prince, was
still in possession of Bome and restricted territoiial do-
mains. But tbe Napoleonic Court, and manj who looked
upon its bead as a usurper, experienced, on tbe morrow
of Sadowa, and in a greater degree after tbe preface to a
peace bad been signed at Nikolsburg, a sensation of di-
minished magnitude, a consciQUsness of lessened prestige,
and a painful impression that their political, perhaps even
their military place in Europe, as tbe heirs of Bicbelieu,
Louis XIY., and Napoleon, bad been suddenly occupied by
a Power which they had taught tbemselyes to contemn as
an inferior. Until the summer of 1866 tbe Emperor
Napoleon fancied that be was strong enough to play with
the Prussian Minister a game of diplomatic finesse ; in-
deed, he seems to have thought that the Pomeranian gentle-
man would be an easy prey ; but having thus put it to
the proof, he did not concur in the maxim that it is as
pleasant to be cheated as to cheat, especially when tbe re-
sult is chiefly due to complaisant self-deception. On the
other band, Herr von Bismarck had no longer any delusions
concerning Louis Napoleon. If, at an early period, when tbe
English Badicalswere considering whether the new Emperor
was "stupid," a proposition they bad taken for granted
theretofore, he bad oyer-estimated the capacity of tbe self-
styled " parvenu," later experience bad reduced tbe estimate
to just proportions, and bad produced a correct judgment
upon tbe character of one who, down to the last, was always
tcJi^en for more than be was worth. If any one knew him
well, it was probably bis cousia, the Due de Momy, and
M. St. Marc Girardin has preserved a sentence which is an
illuminative commentary upon so many curious trans-
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 19
actions during the Second Empire. " The greatest difficulty
with the Emperor/' said De Momj, " is to remove from his
mind a fixed idea, and to give him a steadfast wilL" His
fixed ideas were not always compatible one with another.
He professed great devotion to the " principle of nation-
alities ; " yet he desired to carry the French frontiers as far
as the !Bhine, adding further German populations and
Flemish towns whose inhabitants are not French to those
acquired by Louis XIV. He wished for peace, no doubt,
when he said that the Empire was synonymous with that
word, but he also hungered for the fruits of war; and,
knowing that his internal position and his external projects
required, to uphold the one and realize the other, a strong
and complete army, he had neither the wit to construct a
trustworthy instrument, nor the ceaseless industry needed
to make the most of an inferior product, nor that absolute
independence of the party whose audacity gave him his
crown, which would have enabled him to select, in all cases,
the best officers for the higher and highest commands.
Before, and during the war of 1866, he wavered between
two lines of policy, hoping to combine the advantages of
both ; and when it was over he demanded compensation for
his *' services " as an alarmed spectator, although he had
made no bargain for payment, but had stood inactive be-
cause he conjectured that it would be the more profitable
course.
Frevich demcmdsfor the Rhine,
In making that calculation he erred profoundly. M.
Benedetti, the French Ambassador to the Court of Berlin,
was instructed as early as the first week in August, 1866,
to claim the left bank of the Bhine as far as, and including
the important fortress of Mainz. ** Knowing the temper
20 THE CAMPAIGN OF 8EDAN. [CHAP. I.
of the Minister-President/' and knowing also, as he had
repeatedly told his GoTornment, that all Germany would
resist any proposal to cede the least portion of territory, he
first sent in a copy of M. Dronyn de Lhuys' despatch, and
afterwards called on the Minister. Prince von Bismarck,
in 1871, published in the ofGidal newspapers his account of
the famous interview, which shows that Benedetti, as he
had pledged himself to do, resolutely pressed the large de-
mand. He was told that it meant war, and that he had
" better go to Paris to prevent a rupture/* Unmoved, he
replied that he would return home, '* but only to maintain
a proposition the abandonment of which would imperil the
dynasty/' '' The parting words " of the Prussian statesman
to Count Benedetti, as nearly as they could be remembered
by the man who spoke them, were calculated to suggest
grave reflections. *' Please to call His Majesty's attention
to this," said Herr von Bismarck. " Should a war arise
out of this complication, it might be a war attended by a
i^evolutionary crisis. In such a case the German dynasties
are likely to prove more solid than that of the Emperor
Napoleon." It was a menace and a prophetic warning,
which touched a sensitive fibre in the heart of the French
ruler, who, after a conversation with Count Benedetti,
wrote, on the 12th of August, a remarkable letter to M. de
Lavalette, who became the (id interim sucoessor of M.
Drouyn de Lhuys. Expressing his fears lest " the journals "
should taunt him with the refusal of his demand for the
Bhine provinces, he directed that the report should be con-
tradicted, flatly ; and he added, '* the true interest of France
is not to obtain an insignificant increase of territory, but to
aid Qermany in constituting herself after a fashion which
will be most favourable to our interests and those ol
Europe.^ Neither Bodona n<Mr Belphos could have been
mikra tfnicalar. Alarmed as h» was, he did not uitofgsther
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 21
recede from liis position, but occupied it in a different way.
On the 16th. of August a fresh set of proposals was forwarded
to Count Benedetti, comprising a regular scale of con-
cessions — the frontiers of 1814 and the annexation of
Belgium, or Luxemburg and Belgium, or the Duchj with
Belgium, without Antwerp, which was to be " declared a
free city." The last-named device was designed ** to
obviate the intervention of England " when the projected
act of violence was committed. " The minimumwe require,"
wrote the French Government to M. Benedetti, " is an
ostensible treaty which gives us Luxemburg, and a secret
treaty which, stipulating for an offensive and defensive
Alliance, leaves us the chance of annexing Belgium at the
right moment, Prussia engaging to assist us, by force of
arms, if necessary, in carrying out this purpose." If Herr
Yon Bismarck asked what he should gain by such a treaty,
the answer was to be that he would secure a powerful ally,
and that ** he was only desired to consent to the cession of
what does not belong to him." The official papers on which
these statements are founded were discovered and acquired
by the Germans in Cercay, M. Rouher's chateau, during
the war of 1870 ; neither their authenticity nor the con-
struction put on them have ever been contested ; and they
show, plainly, what was the kind of projects nourished by
the French Court in 1866-67. The precise manner in which
Oount von Bismarck actually dealt with them has not been
revealed, but he kept a rough copy of the project drawn up
by Benedetti, which was handed to him by the French
Ambassador in 1867, and the boxes of papers found at
Cercay gave him the draft treaty itself annotated by the
Emperor. Practically, the secret negotiation dropped, was
not renewed for several months, and was only " resumed,
subsequently, at various times," without producing any
other result than that of letting Bismarck know the plans
22 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP, I.
which were conceiyed in Paris, and inducing him to keep
the Napoleonic Gh>Yemment in play. There can be no
doubt on one point. The Prussian statesman did, at yarious
periods, probably at Biarritz in 1865, when he captiyated
Prosper Merimee, and afterwards, while refusing point-
blank to cede an inch of German soil, ask his interested
auditors why they couldnot indemnify themselyes by seizing
Belgium. But a grim smile of irony must haye lighted up
his face when he pointed to a prey which would not haye to
be ceded, but caught and oyerpowered by main strength.
He was tempting, probing, playing with the Frenchman,
employing what he called the '' dilatoiy " method, because
he wanted time to equip the new and still imperfect Ger«
many ; and, considering their own dark schemes, can it be
said that they deseryed better treatment ?
Haying direct knowledge of the steps taken by France in
August, 1866, the earliest recorded formal attempt to pro-
cure secret treaties on the basis of territorial concessions,
with what searching comment must Bismarck haye read
the astonishing diplomatic circular, signed by M. de
Layalette, and sent out on the 2nd of September, at the
yery time when the dark proceedings just briefly sketched
were in full swing ! It was a despatch framed for public
consumption, and intended to present the Imperial policy
in a broad, generous, and philosophic light, haying no rela«
tion to the course which, either then or afterwards, the
French ruler followed. Louis Napoleon told the whole
world that France could not pursue " an ambiguous policy,"
at the moment when he was meditating the forcible ac-
quisition of Belgium. The Emperor painted himself as
one who rejoiced in the change effected by the war, perhaps
because it shattered the treaties of 1815. Prussia, he said,
had insured the independence of Germany ; and France
need not see in that fact any shadow cast oyer herself.
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 28
'* Proud of ber admirable unity, and indestructible nation-
alitj, she cannot oppose or condemn the work of fusion
going on in Germany." Bj imitating, she took a step
nearer to, not farther from, France ; and the Imperial philo*
sopher professed not to see why public opinion "should
recognize adversaries, instead of allies, in those nations
which — enfranchised from a past inimical to us — are
summoned to new life." But there was consolation for
those alarmed patriots who could read between the lines.
Petty states, they were assured, tended to disappear and
give place to large agglomerations ; the Imperial Gbyem-
ment had always understood that annexations should only
bring together kindred populations ; and France, especially,
oould desire only such additions as would not affect her
internal cohesiyeness — sentences which, like finger-poster,
pointed to the acquisition of Belgium. The war of 1866,
it was admitted, showed the necessity of perfecting the
organization of the army ; yet smooth things were predicted
by the Imperial soothsayer, for, on the whole, the horizon,
in September, as scanned from Paris, seemed to be clear of
menacing possibilities, and a lasting peace was secure f
The despatch was, in fact, prepared and administered as a
powerful anodyne. By keeping the French moderately
quiet, it suited the purposes of Bismarck, who, well aware
of the uneasiness which it covered, felt quite equal to the
task of coping with each fresh attempt to obtain '* com*
pensation" as it might arise» Perhaps Louis Napoleon
was sincere when he dictated this interesting State paper,
for it is not devoid of some " fixed ideas " which he
cherished; yet probably it may take rank as a curious
example of the subtle tactics which he often applied to de-
ceive himself, as well as to cajole his people and his neigh-
bours. At all events, his will, if he willed peace, did not
endure for he soon sanctioned and set in motion renewed
24 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
projects, for he intended to push forward tlie boundary
posts of France.
LuxemUmrg,
As he found Prussia polite yet intractable, and prompt
to use plain language, if concessions were demanded, the
Emperor Napoleon formed, or was advised to form, an in-
genious plan whereby he hoped to secure Luxemburg. He
entered into secret negotiations with Holland for the pur-
chase of the Duchy. The Queen of Holland, a Princess of
the House of Wurtemburg, was a keen partizan of France.
She it was, who, in July, 1866, uttered a cry of warning
which reached the Tuileries. " It is the dynasty," she
wrote, " which is menaced by a powerful Germany and a
powerful Italy, and the dynasty will have to suffer the con-
sequences. When Yenetia was ceded, you should hare
succoured Austria, marched on the Bhine, and imposed
your own conditions. To permit the destruction of Austria
is more than a crime, it is a blunder." Perhaps the notion
that Luxemburg could be acquired by purchase came from
this zealous, clear-sighted, and outspoken lady. Wherever
it may have originated, the scheme was hotly pursued,
negotiations were opened at the Hague, the usual Napoleonic
operations were actually begun to obtain a pl^iscite from
the Duchy ; Count von Bismarck was discreetly sounded by
M. Benedetti, with the usual indefinite result, and the con-
sent of the King of Holland was obtained without much
difficulty. At the same time there was a strong current of
opposition in the Dutch Government, and Prince Henry,
the Governor of Luxemburg, made no secret of his hostility.
The King himself was subject to recurring tremors caused
by his reflections on the possible action of the Prussian
Court ; and his alarms were only mitigated or allayed from
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 25
time to time by assurances based, in reality, on M. Bene-
detti's "impressions" tbat the Chancellor was not un-
favourable to the plan of cession. The truth is that M.
Benedetti did not accurately perceive the position which
Bismarck had taken up from the outset. It might be thus
expressed : " Luxemburg belongs to the King of Holland.
It is his to keep or give away. If you want the Duchy,
why don't you take it, and with it the consequences, which it
is for you to forecast." The French Court and its Ministers
still laboured under the belief that they could manage the
Berlin Government, and they put their own interpretation
on the vague, perhaps tempting language of the Chancellor.
At a certain moment, the fear, always lurking in the King
of Holland's breast, gained the mastery, and he caused the
secret to be disclosed to the public. ** He would do nothing
without the consent of the King of Prussia ; " and by re-
vealing the negotiations he forced on a decision. The
incident which terrified the King of Holland was, no doubt,
startling. M. Thiers had made a strong anti-German
speech in the Chamber, and M. Rouher had developed his
theory of the " trois tron9on8," or triple division of Ger-
many. The Chancellor, who had acquired full knowledge
of French pretensions from French Ministers, answered
both statesmen by printing, in the foreground of the
** Official Gazette," the treaty which gave King William the
control of the Bavarian army, in case of war. That fact
also produced a decisive effect upon the Dutch monarch,
who saw in this characteristic indirect retort to the French
parliamentary display a menace specially directed against
himself. Hence the revelation sufficed to thwart the bar-
gain, then so far finished that signatures were alone wanting
to render it binding. The German people fired up at the
bare mention of such a proposal as the cession of a German
province. M. de Moustier, vexed and taken aback, called
26 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
on Bismarck to restrain the passions of his countrymen, and
vainly urged the Dutch monarch to sign the treaties. On
the morning of the day when he was to be questioned in the
Reichstag, Bismarck asked Benedetti whether he would
authorize the Minister to state in the Chamber that the
treaties had been signed at the Hague. The Ambassador
could not give the required authority, seeing that although
the King, under conditions, had pledged his word to the
Emperor, the formal act had not been done, because
Prussia had not answered the appeal for consent from the
Hague. On Apnl 1, 1867, while Napoleon was opening the
Exhibition in. Paris, Herr von Bennigsen put his famous
question respecting the current rumours about a treaty of
cession. If the French were not prepared for the fierce
outburst of Teutonic fervour, still less could they relish
the question put by Herr von Bennigsen and the answer
which it drew from the Chancellor. The former described
the Duchy as an " ancient province of the collective Father-
land," and the latter, while "taking into account the
French nation's susceptibilities," and giving a brief history
of the position in which Luxemburg stood towards Ger-
many, made his meaning clear to the French Court "The
confederate Q-overnments,*' he said, " are of opinion that
no foreign power will interfere with the indisputable rights
of G-erman States and German populations. They hope to
be able to vindicate and protect those rights by peaceful
negotiations, without prejudicing the friendly relations
which Germany has hitherto entertained with her neigh-
hours." Napoleon and his advisers were not likely to
misconstrue language which, although it lacked the direct-
ness of Yon Bennigsen's sentences, obviously meant that
the French scheme could not be worked out. Indeed, a few
days earlier, the Chancellor had used a significant phrase.
Answering a question in the Chamber, he said : — " If the
CHAP. T.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 27
previous speaker can mana^ to induce the Grand Duke
(of Luxemburg) to come into the North Gkrman Federa-
tion, he will be able to say that he has called an European
question into existence ; what more. Time alone can show."
The phrase could hardly have escaped the notice of M. de
Moustier, and coupled with the second reply, already
quoted, gave rise to indignation not unmixed with alarm.
At first the Emperor seemed determined not to recede, and
he took counsel with his generals, who could not give him
encouragement, because they knew that the Goyemment
was absolutely without the means of making even a re-
spectable defence against an invasion. The period of sus-
pense at the Tuileries did not endure long. Shortly after
the scene in the Beichstag, the Prussian Minister at the
Hague brought the matter to a crisis by a message which
he delivered to the Dutch Government. The King of the
Netherlands, he is reported to have said, can act as he
pleases, but he is responsible for what he may do. If he
had believed that the meditated cession was a guarantee of
peace, it was the Minister's duty to destroy the illusion.
" My Government," he added, " advises him in the most
formal manner, not to give up Luxemburg to Prance."
The blow was fatal ; the "King of course, took the advice to
heart, and such a stroke was all the more deeply felt in
Paris because there the Emperor, who had considered the
end gained, now knew from Marshal Niel that it would be
madness to provoke a war. Yet, unless a loophole of
escape could be found, war was imminent. M. de Moustier
discovered a safe and dignified line of retreat. The
Chancellor had referred to the treaty of 1839 which
governed the status of Luxemburg ; M. de Moustier took
him at his word, and virtually brought the dispute within
the purview of Europe, by formally demanding that the
Prussiaji garrison should be withdrawn. He held that
;
28 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
since the German forces were practically centred in the
hands of Prussia, Luxemburg, no longer a mere defensive
post, had become a menace to France. In this contention
there was much truth, seeing that the new Confederation
of the North, and its allies in the South, constituted a
political and military entity far more formidable and
mobile than the old Bund. When the Chancellor refused
a demand, which his adversaries assert he was at one time
prepared to grant, the French Government, declaring that
they had no wish for other than friendly relations with
Berlin, appealed to Europe. The dispute ended in a com-
promise arranged as usual beforehand, and settled at a
conference held in London. The garrison was withdrawn,
the fortifications were to be razed, and the Duchy, like
Belgium, was thenceforth to be neutral ground, covered by
a collective guarantee of the Powers ; but it stiU remained
within the German ZoUverein.
There were at work several influences which largely
operated to determine a peaceful issue. The French
possessed no real army, and the Emperor had only just
begun to think about the needful military organization on
a new model ; he had, besides, on hand an International
Exhibition, by which he set great store ; and in addition a
summons to withdraw a garrison did not provide a ccutis
belli certain to secure the support of public opinion. Nor
did the Prussian Government consider the moment oppor-
tune, or the question raised a suitable ground on which to
determine the inveterate cause of quarrel between France
and Germany. Upon this subject Dr. Busch ha& recorded
some characteristic observations made by the Chancellor, at
Versailles, in 1870. ** I remember,** he said, " when I was
at the Paris Exhibition of 1867, 1 thought to myself ' how
would it have been by now, if we had fought out the Luxem-
burg quarrel? Should I be in Paris, or the French in
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 29
Berlin ? ' We were not nearly as strong then as we are
now. The Hanoverians and Hessians of that day could not
have supplied ns with so many good soldiers as to-day.
As for the Schleswig-Holsteiners, who have lately been
fighting like lions, they had no army at all. The Saxon
army was broken up, and had to be entirely reconstructed.
And there was but little to be expected from the South
Germans. What splendid fellows the Wurtembergers are
now, quite magnificent ! but in 1866 no soldier could help
laughing at them, as they marched into Frankfort like a
civic guard. Nor was all well with the Baden forces ; the
Grand Duke has done a great deal for them since then.
Doubtless public opinion throughout Germany was with
us, if we had chosen to make war about Luxemburg. But
that would not have made up for all those shortcomings."
It is plain, from this retrospective comment, which comes
in aid of other evidence, that the great conflict, deferred to
1870, was nearly brought about in 1867, and that France
was saved from utter rout, at that early period, by the
operation of a set of influences over which neither of the
principal actors had full control. The Franco-Dutch n^o-
tiation was the last attempt which the Emperor Napoleon
made to obtain territory by direct or furtive diplomatic
processes. In the early stages of the risky business he had
fuU confidence in his own ascendancy, not to say ** prepon-
derance*' in European councils. He was rudely unde-
ceived. Herr von Bismarck had tempted him with all
kinds oi suggestions, but the Emperor himself, his Ministers
and Ambassadors had been content to take the " impres-
sions," which they derived from confidential conversations,
for definite, binding promises. One French agent cor-
rectly described the fact when he said that "Herr von
Bismarck is ready, not to offer us compensations, but to
allow us to take them ; " he might have added, '* if we can
30 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I*
and at our own risk." There is no published evidence that
the Prussian statesman ever offered to cede Luxemburg, or
sanction the annexation of Belgium, or preclude himself
from adopting, at any conjuncture, the line which appeared
most accordant with German interests. On the contrary,
long after the interviews at Biarritz and in Paris, and the
battle of Sadowa, Napoleon III., to use his own terms,
wanted, at least, " une certitude relative " that the Prussian
Grovernment would not interpose any obstacle in the way
of French "aggrandizement" in the North. He asked,
not for words, but an act which he could never obtain ; and
the Luxemburg incident proved to him conclusively that
nothing could be gained by making demands on the Court
of Prussia. In 1867 and afterwards in November, 1870,
according to Dr. Busch, Bismarck described with his usual
fi-ankness the hesitation of the Emperor. He had not
understood his advantages, in 1866, when he might have
done a good business, although not on German soil, was
the earlier commentary. The later was more illuminative.
" In the summer of 1866," said Bismarck, " Napoleon had
not the pluck to do what was the right thing from his point
of view. He ought— well, he ought to have takenpossession
of the subject of Benedetti's proposal [Belgium], when we
were marching against the Austrians, and have held it in
pawn for whatever might happen. At that time we could not
stop him, and it was not likely that England would attack
him — at least he might have waited to see." On this it
may be observed that the influence of Lord Cowley and
Lord Clarendon would probablj have sufficed to turn him
from such a plan had it entered into the Emperor's mind •
and had he delivered the blow, in defiance of their protests,
or without consultmg them, England, at that time, would
have been enraged at the treachery, and would have certainly
occupied Antwerp. The Emperor was a man who caressed
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 31
audacious projects wliich he had not always the nerve and
courage to carrj out. What is more astonishing, he did
not or could not provide the means essential to the accom-
plishment of his desires. Thus the precedent afforded by
his conduct in 1866 was followed in 1867, and in each case
the result was the same — vexatious failure.
An Interlude of Peace.
The war-clouds sank below the horizon, the Paris Exhibi-
tion was duly opened sovereigns and princes, statesmen and
generals, journeyed to the French capital, and the Court
of the Tuileries gave itself up to amusement, gaiety, and
dissipation, neglecting nothing which could give pleasure
to its illustrious guests. It was the last hour of splendour,
the sunset of the Empire. Yet the brilliant scenes, which
followed each other day by day, were even then flecked
with dark shades. If politics were evaded or ignored in
the palace, they were not absent from the highways.
Polish hatred found vent in the attempt of Berezowski to
slay the unfortunate Emperor Alexander II., and M.
Floquet shouted in his ear as he passed through the Courts
of Justice, " Vive la Pologne ! " The crime and the insult
augured ill for the future of that Franco-Eussian alliance
which Charles X. endeavoured to establish and certain
French statesmen have always sighed for. M. Hansen re-
cords a sharp observation made by Prince GortchakofE during
the Polish insurrection which the Western Powers regarded
with friendly eyes. The Vice-Chancellor held that France
and Kussia were natural allies, because their interests were
the same. " If the Emperor Napoleon will not admit it,"
he roughly said, " so much the worse for him. Govern-
ments vanish, nations remain." Still, in 1867, he did not
find the nation more favourable than the Government had
been in 1864. Twenty years later, although Bussia had
32 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
become less unpopular, at least with the politicians, and a
yearning for a Russian alliance had gathered strength, the
ultras proved how little thej understood some conditions
essential to its gratification bj clamoring for the pardon
and liberation of Berezowski! The Prussian King and
Queen were not exposed to any outrage, and the Parisians
gazed with curiosity upon Bismarck and Moltke, whom
they admired, and had not yet learned to detest; but
the sparkling and joyful assemblies, although the actors,
on both sides, were doubtless sincere at the time, never-
theless suggests a famous incident in the French £evo-
lution which figures on historical pages as " le baiser de
Tamourette." And underneath the shining surface were
concealed gnawing anxieties and fears. The Emperor
Napoleon had dreamed that he could found a Mexican
empire, and he had induced the Austrian Archduke Maxi.
milian to accept at his hands an Imperial crown. The
enterprise, which was pushed on by French troops, not only
failed, but irritated England, who had been deceived, and
offended the United States, whose Government, victors in
a civil war, would not tolerate the establishment of the
** Latin race '* in the centre of the huge continent. Not
only had it become necessary to recall the troops, but to
bear a still deeper misfortune— if the word may be applied
to the consequences of a reckless and unscrupulous adven-
ture. It was while opening the Exhibition that the earliest
hints reached the Emperor of an event which dealt hiTiri a
heavy blow ; and, on the eve of the day fixed for the dis-
tribution of prizes to the competitors he had assembled,
came the confirmation of the dreaded intelligence, whispered
weeks before. The gallant Archduke and Emperor Maxi-
milian, who had fallen into the hands of the triumphant
and implacable Mexicans, had been tried and shot, a deed
whiiM^ his French patron was powerless to avenge.
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 33
The Salzburg Interview.
The tragedy of Quaretaro reacted upon European politics,
and incidentallj emphasized afresh the perennial antagon-
isia between France and Germany. Still smarting from
the wounds of 1866, Austria hungered for an ally, and the
Saxon Count von Beust, whom the Emperor Francis
Joseph had made his Chancellor, was eager to try one more
fall with Count von Bismarck. Swayed by political reasons,
the Austrian Emperor not only did not resent the death of
his brother, but was even willing to welcome as his guest
Louis Napoleon, who had so successfully seduced the Arch-
duke by dangling before him the bait of an Imperial crown.
The French Emperor and his Empress, therefore, travelled
in state through South Germany to Salzburg, where they
met their Austrian hosts. The occasion was, nominally,
one of condolence and mourning, and the vain regrets on
both sides were doubtless genuine. Tet it so chanced that
the days spent in the lovely scenery of Salzburg were given
up to gay mirth and feasting — ^not to sorrow and gloom ;
and that the irrepressible spirit of politics intruded on the
brilliant company gathered round an open grave. Both
•emperors felt aggrieved ; one by the loss of his high estate
in Germany and his Italian provinces, the other because
his demand for the Ehenish territory had been rejected,
and he had not been allowed to take Belgium or buy Luxem-
burg. The common enemy was Prussia, who had worsted
Austria in battle, and France in diplomacy ; and at Salz-
burg, perhaps earlier, the ground plans were sketched for
an edifice which the architects trusted might be built up
sufficiently large and strong to contain, at least, two allies.
The sketch was vague, yet it was definite enough at least
to reveal the designs of the draughtsmen ; and the Emperors
returned home still in jubilation.
34 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
Perbaps tbe Emperor Napoleon suffered some pangs of
disappointment. " Austria was his last card," says M.
Bothan, who, from the French standpoint, has so keenly
studied the period preceding the war of 1870. He wanted
an offensive and defensive alliance, which Austria would
not accord. Count von Beust fearing that so grave a fact
would never escape the lynx-eyes of Bismarck, who, when
it came to his knowledge, would not fail to provoke a war
before either ally had fully, or even partially, completed
his military preparations, then so much in arrear. Not
only were they backward in 1867, but Austria, at all events,
was still unprovided in 1870. The Archduke Albrecht, who
visited Paris during the month of February of that year,
impressed the fact on the Emperor Napoleon. " The story
runs," says M. Bothan, ''that, after having quitted the
study of his Majesty, the Archduke returned, and, through
the half-opened door, exclaimed, * Sire, above all things do
' not forget, whatever may happen, that we shall not be in a
fit state to fall into line before a year.* " Hence, it may
well be that the Austrian Chancellor was even then deter-
mined, in case of a conflict, to shape his policy in accord-
ance with the first victories ; and that the meditations of
the Emperor Napoleon, as he re-crossed the Ehine, were
tinged with bitter reflections on his political isolation. A
little later, when he knew that Bismarck had discovered
the drift of the conversation at Salzburg, his anxieties must
have become more poignant. That Chancellor, who had
secured afresh the goodwill of Bussia, and beheld with
satisfaction the effect of the Imperial display on Germany,
enlarged, in a circular despatch, on the proof thus once
more afforded that German national feeling could not en-
dure " the mere notion " of ** foreign tutelage " where the
Interests of the Fatherland were concerned. Germany had
a right to mould her own fortunes and frame her own con-
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES 07 THE WAR. 35
stitation. So that, as Yon Biiest had foreseen, the dreaded
Chancellor had- promptly turned to account even the col-
loquies of Salzburg. " France, with one hand," he said,
" presents us with soothing notes, and with the other per-
mits us to see the point of her sword." There was no open
quarrel between the two antagonists, but each suspected
and closely watched the other. M. Bothan, himself a
vigilant and zealous official, furnishes an amusing example.
In November, 1866, he learned from " a Foreign minister
accredited to a South German Court," what was to him the
appalling fact that the Imperial work of mediation at
Nikolsburg had been counteracted, "even before it had
been sanctioned by the Treaty of Prague." He referred to
the now famous military treaties. M. de X , his in-
formant^ he says, obtained his knowledge of the secret by
a sort of inquisitorial method, "a la fa^on d'un juge
d'instruction," that is, he affirmed the existence of the
documents, and thus extorted confessions, express or
implied. " The Bavarian Foreign Minister," he said,
blushed ; " the Minister of Wiirtembei^ was confused ; the
Minister of Baden did not deny it, and the Minister of
Hesse avowed everything." Further, M. de X asserted
that, when it was no longer necessary to keep France in
good humour, Prussia would enforce the clauses which gave
her supreme command, and would bring the Southern
armies into harmony with her own organization. Appar-
ently, this authentic information did not obtain a ready
belief in the autumn of 1866 ; but it alarmed and disturbed
the French Court, and the public confirmation of the un-
welcome report, less than a year afterwards, visible to all
men in the actual re-organization of the Southern armies,
together with the failure to purchase Luxemburg, still
farther inc^ased the suspicion, deepened the alarm, and
aroused the indignation of the Emperor at the slights in-
86 THE CAMPAIGN OF 8EDAN. [CHAP. I.
flicted on France, who, as the ** predominant " Continental
power and the " vanguard of civilization/' always considered
that she ought to have her own way.
The Emperor seeks AUies.
In the beginning of 1868 the principal parties were en-
gaged in pi^eparing for a conflict which each considered to
be inevitable ; and the other Powers, great and small, more <
or less concerned, were agitated by hopes and fears.
Bussia desired to recover her freedom of movement in the
East, and especially to throw off what Prince Gortchakoff
called his " robe de Nessus," the clause in the treaty of
Paris which declared the Euxine to be a neutral sea. |
Austria aimed at the restoration of her authority in G-er-
many, and was not yet convinced that her path lay east. I
ward. Italy had many longings, but her pressing necessity
was to seat herself in the capital of the Caesars and the
Popes, once again occupied by the French, who had re-
entered the Papal States to expel the Gkiribaldians. It; was
in the skirmish at Mentana that the new breech-loading |
^fle, the Chassepot, ''wrought miracles,'' according to
General de Failly, and established its superiority over the ;
" lieedle gun.'' Holland, Belgium, and even Switzerland
were troubled by the uncertain prospect which the Imperial
theory of '' large agglomerations " had laid bare ; Spain
was in the throes of a revolutionary convulsion ; and Eng-
land — she had just mended her constitution, and had
begun to look on Continental politics with relative indiffer-
ence, except in so far as they affected the fortunes of '
** parties," and might be used strategically as a means of
gaining or holding fast the possession of power. Yet so
strained wei*e the relations of France and Prussia that
General V*^ Moltke actually framed, in the spring of 1868,
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 37
the plan of campaign which he literallj carried ont in 1870
— a fact implying that even then he considered that his
Government was sufficiently prepared to encounter the new
and imperfectly developed scheme of army organization
and armament originally devised hy the Emperor and
Marshal Niel, and modified to satisfy the objections and
suspicions raised in a deferential Senate and an obliging
Chamber of Deputies. For while the Opposition distrusted
the Emperor, the whole body shrank from the sacrifices
which Csesar and his Minister of War considered necessary
to the safety of the State from a defensive, and absolutely
indispensable from an offensive point of view. The prime
actors in the drama expressed a love of peace, perhaps with
equal sincerity : but as Germany thirsted for unity, all the
more because France, true to her traditional policy, forbad
it, the love so loudly avowed could not be gratified unless
Germany submitted, or France ceased to dictate. ** I did
not share the opinion of those politicians," said Bismarck
in July, 1870, " who advised me not to do all I could to
avoid war with France because it was inevitable. Nobody,"
he added, " can exactly foresee the purposes of IXvine Pro-
vidence in the future ; and I regard even a victorious war
as an evil from which statesmanship should strive to pre-
serve nations. I could not exclude from my calculations
the possibility that chances might accrue in France's con-
stitution and policy which might avert the necessity of war
from two great neighbour races— a hope in connection with
which every postponement of a rupture was so much to
the good." The language is a little obscure, but the
meaning will be grasped when it is remembered that his
remark on the " chances " referred to the probable grant
of increased freedom to the French Parliament, which he
thought would fetter the Court and thwart the politicians.
That forecast was not justified by the event, since it was
88 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP, I.
tbe partially-liberated Chamber and the Liberal Ministry
which 80 hastily sanctioned the declaration of war. The
truth is, however, that each rival nationality inherited the
liabilities contracted in the past. The French Had been
accustomed for more than two hundred years to meddle
directly in (Germany and find there allies, either against
Austria, Prussia, or England ; and the habit of centuries
had been more than confirmed by the colossal raids,
victories, and annexations of Napoleon L A Germany
which should escape from French control and reverse, by
its own energetic action the policy of Henri IV., Bichelieu,
Louis XIV., his degenerate grandson, Louis XY., and of
the great Napoleon himself, was an affront to French
pride, and could not be patiently endured. The opposing
forces which had grown up were so strong that the wit of
man was unable to keep them asunder ; and all the control
over the issue left to kings and statesmen was restricted to
the fabrication of means wherewith to deliver or sustain
the shock, and the choice of the hour, if such choice were
allowed.
To that end the adversaries had, indeed, applied them-
selves after the last French failure to obtain any material
compensation, not even what M. Bouher called such a ra^
of territory as Luxemburg. Thenceforth, keeping an eye
on Prussia, the French Government sought to gain over
Austria and Italy, and form a defensive alliance which, at
the fitting moment, might be converted into an offensive
alliance strong enough to prevent the accomplishment of
German unity, win campaigns, and enable each confederate
to grasp the reward which he desired. Carried on during
more than two years, the negotiations never got beyond a
kind of vague preliminary understanding which signified
the willingness of the three Courts to reach a definite,
formal treaty if they could. But obstacles always arose
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 39
when the vital questions lying at the root of the business
had to be solved. Italy demanded and Austria was will-
ing that she should have Borne. To that France stead-
fastly demurred, even down to the last moment, as will
presently be seen. Austria also, besides being unready, in
a military sense, was visited by the chronic fear that, if
she plunged into war against Germany, Bussia would at
once break into her provinces from Lithuania and the
Polish Quadrilateral, and settle the heavy account opened
when Prince Schwarzenberg displayed his " immense in-
gratitude " during the Crimean war. Nor was the Court
of Vienna exempt from apprehensions growing out of the
possible, even probable conduct of haK-reconciled Hungary.
Count von Beust also deluded himself with the notion that
the Prussian treaties with the South German States were
mere "rags of paper,'* and nourished the fond belief,
except when he had a lucid interval, that the South German
people would not fight for the Fatherland. Waiting on
Providence, the would-be confederates, at the same time,
counted on the fortune of war, arguing that France was
certain to win at first, and that one victory under the tri-
colour would bring the inchoate alliance instantly to
maturity, and the armies it controlled into the field. Based
on such conjectural foundations, and opposed by such
solid obstacles, the grand design was doomed to fail ; in-
deed it never got nearer to completion than an exchange
of letters by the Sovereigns; grounded on the very eve,
and went to pieces on the day of battle.
Diverted from Luxemburg, the French Government did
not relax its efforts to pave the way for the annexation of
Belgium. During the spring and summer of 1869 a
successful effort was made to secure political, commercial,
and strategic advantages by obtaining a certain control
over the Belgian railways, notably the line which runs
40 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
from Luxemburg to Liege, and tlience to the North Sea
ports. These proceedings, of course, did not escape notice
at Berlin, where the ends in view were perfectly appreciated ;
but they form only a petty incident in the great struggle,
and can only be mentioned with brevity in order to indicate
its growth. It may be stated here that, in 1873, the
German Chancellor reversed the process, and secured for
his GK>yemment the control of the Luxeqiburg lines.
Another railway question which cropped up in May, 1870,
was the famous railway which, by means of an ingenious
tunnel within the Alps near St. Grothard, placed Germany
in direct communication with Italy through neutral terri-
tory. Count von Bismarck openly said it was a Prussian
interest, and the Northern Confederation paid a part of
the cost, which aroused indignation in France. At one
moment it seemed possible that this enterprise would
serve as a casua heUi ; but the French Government, after
careful deliberation, decided, in June, 1870, that thej
could not reasonably oppose the project, although it
certainly was regarded at the Foreign Office in Paris as a
further proof of German antagonism, and a sort of bribe
tendered to Italy. Since the beginning of the year France
had been in the enjoyment of certain Liberal concessions
made by the Emperor, and confirmed, in May, by the
famous " pl^iscite,*' which gave him a majority of more
than five millions. Now, although the Emperor's reflec-
tions on this triumphant result of an appeal to universal
suffrage were embittered by the knowledge that large
numbers of soldiers had helped to swell the million and a
half of Frenchmen who voted "No," still the Foreign
Minister and his agents, according to M. Ollivier, were so
elated that they exclaimed with pride, "Henceforth, all
negotiations are easy to the Government,*' since the world
thoroughly understood that, for France, peace would never
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 41
mean " complaisance or effacement." Yet Prince Napoleon,
in his brief sketch of these critical months, says plainly
that the Government conceraed itself less with foreseeing
the political complications which might lead up to war,
than with the best mode of proceeding when war arriyed.
So true is this, that a General was sent to Vienna to dis-
cuss the bases of a campaign with the Austrian War
Office. But in the spring of 1870 fortune seemed to smile
on official France ; and on the last day of June M. Ollivier,
instructed by the Foreign Minister, considered himself
authorized to boast before the admiring Deputies that the
peace of Europe had never been less in danger than it was
at the moment when he delivered his optimistic declaration.
In England, also, the Foreign Secretary could not discern
" a cloud in the sky."
The Hohenzollem Gandidcdure,
One week later, not only M. Ollivier and Lord Granville,
but Europe, nay, the whole world, saw plainly enough the
signs and portents of discord and convulsion. On the 3rd
of July the Due de Gramont learned from the French
Minister at Madrid that Prince Leopold of Hohenzollem-
Sigmaringen, with his own full consent, had been selected
as a candidate for the vacant throne of Spain, and that, at
no distant date, the Cortes would be formally requested to
elect him. The French Government quivered with indig-
nation, and the political atmosphere of Paris became hot
with rage. Not that the former were unfamiliar with the
suggestion. It had been made in 1869, considered, and
apparently abandoned. Indeed, the Emperor himself had,
at one time, when he failed to obtain the Ehenish pro-
vinces, proposed that they should be formed into a State
to be ruled by the King of Saxony, and at another, that
42 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
the Soyereign sHould be the Hereditary Prince of Hohen-
zoUem-Sigmaringen ; the very Prince put forward by
Marshal Prim. He had been grievously hampered and
perplexed in the choice of a Sovereign of Spain by some
Powers, especially by France; but now the Imperial
Government turned the whole tide of its resentment, not
upon Madrid, but Berlin, which, it was assumed, aimed at
establishing an enemy to France beyond the Pyrenees.
Explanations were demanded directly from the Prussian
Government, but M. Le Sourd, the charge d'affaires, cotdd
extract no other answer than this — ^that the Prussian
GK>vemment knew nothing about the matter. The Due
de Gramont, who had succeeded Lavalette, in May, as
Minister for Foreign Affairs, regarded the statement as a
subterfuge, and forthwith determined to fasten on the
King a responsibility which he could not fasten on the
Government. The Due de Gramont was not a wise coun-
sellor ; he was deep in negotiations having for their object
an offensive and defensive alliance against Prussia, and
he was hardly less moved by a noisy external opinion
than by his own political passions. He ordered M. Bene-
detti, who had only just sought repose at Wildbad, to
betake himself at once to Ems, whither King William,
according to custom, had repaired to di-ink the waters.
The French Ambassador reached the pleasant village on
the Lahn late at night on the 8th of July, and the next
day began a series of interviews with the King, which
take rank among the most curious examples of diplomacy
recorded in history.
Before the ambassador could commence his singular
task, an event had occurred in Paris which seemed to
render a war unavoidable. The politicians of the French
capital had become feverish with excitement. Not only
did a species of delirium afiUct the immediate advisers of
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAB. 43
the Emperor, but the band of expectantiB, who, more
ardent Imperialists than he was, still believed that nothing
could withstand the French army ; while the opposition,
loving France not less, but what thej called liberty more,
were eager to take advantage of an incident which seemed
likely to throw discredit on the Bonapartea. Wisdom
would have prevented, but party tactics demanded a move-
ment in the Chamber which took the innocent-looking
form of an inquiry. The Government dreaded, yet could
not evade, the ordeal, and M. Cochery put his question on
the 6th of July. Had the Due de Gramont been a clever
Minister, or had he represented a Government strongly
rooted in the national respect and affection, he would have
been able to deliver a colourless response, if be could not
have based a refusal to answer upon public grounds. The
truth is, he was carried off his feet by the sudden storm
which raged through the journals and society, and it may
be surmised that, even then, despite the plebiscite, fears
for the stability of the dynasty had no small share in
determining his conduct. Yet, it must be stated, that he
was only one of the Council of Ministers who sanctioned
the use of language which read, and still reads, like an in-
direct declaration of war. After expressing sympathy with
Spain, and asserting, what was not true, that the Imperial
Government had observed a strict neutrality with regard
to the several candidates for the crown, he struck a note
of defiance : " We do not believe," he exclaimed, " that
respect for the rights of a neighbouring people obliges us to
endure that a foreign State, by placing one of its princes
on the throne of Charles Y., should be able to derange, to
our injury, the balance of power in Europe, and to imperil
the interests and honour of France." The pacific sentences
uttered by M. Ollivier on this memorable occasion were
forgotten ; the trumpet-blast of the Due de Gramont rang
44 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
through the world, and still rings in the memory. Prussia
was not named by the Minister, bnt eyeryone beyond the
Bhine knew who was meant by the " German people,"
and a ** foreign Power ; " while, as Benedetti has stated in
a private despatch to Gramont, the King deeply felt it as
a " provocation."
Not the least impressive characteristic of these proceed-
ings is the hot haste in which they hurried along. M.
Benedetti neither in that respect nor in the swiftness and
doggedness which he imparted to the negotiations, is to
blame. The impulse and the orders came from Paris ; he
somewhat tempered the first, but he obeyed the second
with zeal, and, without overstepping the limits of propriety
in the form, he did not spare the King in the substance of
his demands. Nor, in the first instance, were they other
than those permitted by diplomatic precedent ; afterwards
they certainly exceeded these limits. The first was that
the King himself should press Prince Leopold to withdraw
his consent : indeed, direct him so to do. The answer was
that, as King, he had nothing to do with the business ;
that as head of the HohenzoUem family he had been con*
suited, and had not encouraged or opposed the wish of the
Prince to accept the proffered crown ; that he would still
leave him entire freedom to act as he pleased, but that his
Majesty would communicate with Prince Antoine, the
father of Prince Leopold, and leiirn his opinion. With
this reply, unable to resist the plea for delay, the ambassa-
dor had perforce to be content. Not so the Lnperial
Government. The Due de Gramont sent telegram on
telegram to Ems, urging Benedetti to transmit an explicit
answer from the King, saying that he had ordered Prince
Leopold to give up the project, and alleging, as a reason
for haste, that the French could not wait longer, since
Prussia might anticipate them by calling out the army.
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 45
The ambassador, to check this hurry, prudently warned
his principals, saying, that if they ostentatiously prepared
for war, then the calamity would be inevitable. " If the
King," wrote De Gramont, on the 10th of July, " will not
advise the Prince to renounce his design — ^well, it is war at
once, and in a few days we shall be on the Ehine." And
so on from hour to hour. A little wearied, perhaps, by
the pertinacity of the ambassador, and nettled by the
attempt to fix on him the responsibility for the Spanish
scheme, the King at length said that he looked every
moment for an answer from Sigmaringen, which he would
transmit without delay. It is impossible, in a few sentences,
to give the least idea of the terrier-like obstinacy displayed
by M. Benedetti in attacking the King. Indeed, it grew to
be almost a persecution, so thoroughly did he obey his im-
portunate instructions. At length the King was able to
say that Prince Antoine's answer would arrive on the 13th,
and the ambassador felt sure of a qualified success, inas-
much as he would obtain the Prince's renunciation,
Eanctioned by Eang William. But, while he was writing
his despatch, a new source of vexation sprang up in Paris
— the Spanish Ambassador, Senor Olozaga, announced to
the Due de Gramont the fact that Prince Antoine, on be-
half of his son, had notified at Madrid the withdrawal of
his pretensions to the crown. It was reasonably assumed
that, having attained the object ostensibly sought, the
French Government would be well content with a diplo-
matic victory so decisive, and would allow M. Benedetti to
rest once more at Wildbad. He himself held stoutly that
the '' satisfaction *' accorded to the wounded interests and
honour of France was not insufficient. The Emperor and
the Due de Gramont thought otherwise, because, as yet, no
positive defeat had been inflicted, personally, upon King
William. The Foreign Minister, therefore, obeying precise
46 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
instructions from St. Cloud, directed Benedetti to see the
King at once, and demand from liim a plain declaration
that he would not, at any future time, sanction any similar
proposal coming from Prince Leopold. The Due de G-ra-
mont's mind was so constructed that, at least a year after-
wards, he did not regard this demand as an ultimatum !
Tet how could the King, and still more Bismarck, take it
in any other light ? Early on the 13th the King, who saw
the ambassador in the public garden, advanced to meet
him, and it was there that he refused, point blank, Louis
Napoleon's preposterous and uncalled-for request, saying
that he neither could nor would bind himself in an engage-
ment without limit of time, and appl3ring to every case;
but that he should reserve his right to act according to
circumstances. King William brought this interview to a
speedy close, and M. Benedetti saw him no more except at
the railway station when he started for Coblenz. Per-
sistency had reached and stepped over the limits of the
endurable, and King William could not do more than send
an aide-de-camp with a courteous message, giving M.
Benedetti authority to say officially that Prince Leopold's
recent resolution had his Majesty's approval. During the
day the ambassador repeated, unsuccessfully, his request
for another audience ; and this dramatic episode ended on
the 18th with the departure of the King, who had pushed
courtesy to its utmost bounds.
During that eventful 18th of July Count Bismarck,
recently arrived in Berlin from Pomerania, had seen and
had spoken to Lord Augustus Loftus in language which
plainly showed how steadfastly he kept his grip on the real
question, which was that France sought to gain an advant-
age over ''Prussia," as some kind of compensation for
Koniggratz. The Due de Gramont also conversed with
Lord Lyons in Paris, and induced him to set in motion
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 47
Lord Granville, from whose ingenious brain came forth a
plausible compromise wholly unsuitable to the exigency,
and promptly rejected at Berlin, but having an air of fair-
ness which made it look well in the pages of a Blue Book.
It was a last efEort on the part of diplomacy, and served
well enough to represent statesmanship as it was under-
stood by the Cabinet to which Lord Granville belonged.
On the evening of that day Count Bismarck entertained at
dinner General von Moltke and General von Boon; and
the host read aloud to them a telegram from Ems, giving
an account of what had occurred, and the royal authority
to make the story public. " Both Generals," writes Dr.
Moritz Busch, "regarded the situation as still peaceful.
The Chancellor observed — that would depend a good deal
upon the tone and contents of the publication he had just
been authorized to make. Li the presence of his two
guests he then put together some extracts from the tele-
gram, which were forthwith despatched to all the Prussian
Legations abroad, and to the Berlin newspapers in the
following form : — ' Telegram from Ems, July 13th, 1870.
When the intelligence of the Hereditary Prince of Hohen-
zollem's renunciation was communicated by the Spanish
to the French Government, the French Ambassador de-
manded of His Majesty the King, at Ems, that the latter
should authorize him to telegraph to Paris that His
Majesty would pledge himself for all time to come never
again to give his consent, should the HohenzoUerns hark
back to their candidature. Upon this His Majesty re-
fused to receive the French Ambassador again, and sent
the aide-de-camp in attendance to tell him that His
Majesty had nothing further to communicate to the
Ambassador.' "
Substantially, it was the grotesque pile of misrepresenta-
48 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
tion built up on this blunt telegram — ^M. Benedetti read
it next morning in the ** Cologne Ghkzette/* and took no
exception whatever to the brief and exact narrative it con-
tained — which set the Parisians on fire. Travestied in many
wajs by calculating politicians, as well as gossips, the
message became a '' Note," or a ** despatch/' imputing the
extreme of intentional rudeness to King William, and im-
posing the depth of humiliation, publicly inflicted, tipon
France through her representative, who, all the time, was
not only unconscious of any insult, but emphatic in his
acknowledgments of the King's courtesy, kindness, and
patience. Probably Count Bismarck wrote his telegram
for Germany, but its effect in satisfying the Fatherland,
was not greater than its influence upon the fiery French,
who never read the text until months afterwards, and in
July, 1870, were set a-flame by the distorted versions freely
supplied by rumour's forked tongue.
N^
The French Oovemment cmd the Chamber,
^ War was now plainly inevitable, yet the decisive word
still rested with the Imperial Government. In Paris there
were two currents running strongly in opposite ways, and,
for a moment, it seemed possible that the tide which made
for peace would overpower the surging stream which drove
onwards towards war. More than one-half the Ministry
believed, and some, M. OUivier for one, said that the retreat
of Prince Leopold, with the consent of the King, a great
diplomatic victory for France, was enough, and had, in-
deed, brought the quarrel to an end. At midday, on the
13th, M. i^obert Mitchell, meeting M. Paul de Cassagnac,
said, '' I have just left OUivier, and, thank God, peace is
secured." " My father," was the reply, '* has just quitted
the Emperor ; war is resolved on." The statement was not
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAB. 4fy
then exact, but it may be accepted as a forecast For, in
truth, it was only at noon the next day that the Ministers
assembled in council at the Tuileries to answer the momen-
tous question which so profoundly agitated their minds.
They sat six hours; they were divided in opinion; yet,
although Marshal Lebceuf was authorized to call ont the
reserves — he had threatened to resign unless that were
done — the Ministers separated with the understanding that
a peaceful line of action should be adopted, based on a
demand for a Congress of the Powers to sanction the prin«
dple that no member of any reigning house should accept
a foreign throne. The Due de G-ramont's brief account of
this notable Council shows that the hankering after war
was powerful therein ; ^since he says that ** the Oovemment
decided, not without hesitation, but influenced by a love of
peace, to propose this pacific solution." But all, or some
of the Ministers, and still more the Emperor, stood in dread
of two things: they were alarmed lest the ''dynasty"
should be injured by a course which bore the semblance of
a forced retreat, and they could not rely with confidence
on the sober opinion of the Chambers. The Court war-
party operated upon the Senators and Deputies through
M. Clement Duvemois, a schemer, and M. Jerome David,
by birth and training a fanatical Bonapartist, the second
accentuating the questions of the first, and giving to his
own language a substance which made retreat almost im-
possible. Both these men had a double object. They
intended to extort a declaration of war and, at the same
time, expel Emile OUivier, together with what they called
the Parliamentary element, from the Ministry. The ener-
getic, aggressive and relentless group were really the
mouthpieces of the Emperor and Empress, and in a less
d^pree of M. Bouher, who had been deposed by the new
Imperial constitution, and of the Due de Gramont, who all
s
50 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. I.
thioagh the biuiiiess desuned to secure a proloiigation of
peace, solelj because it would gixe him time to ripen the
projects of aHiauoe with Aastria and Italy, and also to
make war, lest '* la Pmsse," aware of his design, should
choose her own hoar for battle. It so chanced that Marshal
Leboeuf , after despatching the orders calling out the re-
serves, reoeiTed a note from the Emperor, which, he- sajs,
seemed to suggest a regret at the decision adopted b j the
Council; and thinking, innocent man, that some constitu-
tional scruples had sprung up in the Imperial mind, the
Marshal begged that the Ministers might be summoned
once more. That night they met again, talked for an hour,
and had nearly resolved that the mobilization of the army
should be deferred, when papers w^fe placed in the hands
of the Due de Gramont. The exact contents of these
documents have not been described, but they seemed to
have contained some report of language held by Count
Bismarck which exasperated the war party ; and, in an
instant, the Coundl resolved on war. That same night,
M. fiobert Mitchell, walking in the garden of the Foreign
Office, asked M. GUivier why he did not resign ? The
Minister gave a host of plausible reasons having no real
weight; addingthese prophetic words: " Whatever happens,
I am sacrificed ; for the war will sweep away the regime to
which I have attached my name. If we are beaten, Qod
protect France! If we are victorious, God protect our
Uberties ! "
So that, having a clear perception of the future, this
Minister, at least, met the Chambers on the morrow. The
exciting events of the past week, imperfectly understood
and carelessly or purposely misrepresented, had aroused a
tempest of passion in Paris and France, which, by its
violence and uproar, overpowered, but could not whoUy
silence, the voices of sagacity and sober judgment. The
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 51
Senate was unanimous for war. In the Chamber the
opposition waged courageously a desperate contest, so
desperate from the outset, that even M. Thiers, perhaps
because he told unpleasant truths, could not command an
unbroken hearing, while M. Gambetta only secured one by
making a rare display of forensic tact, basing himself on
Parliamentary ground, and tempering his appeal for "more
light " with evidences of his indisputable patriotism. The
Due de Gramont ^voured the Senators with a version of
the facts, which was neither complete nor candid. M.
Emile Ollivier allowed an unhappy phrase to escape from
his lips — ^he went into the war "d ecevr leger" A com-
mittee was appointed to inspect the diplomatic documents
on which the Court relied ; it was easily satisfied, and late
in the night, sustained by a large majority, the policy of
the Government was amply sanctioned.
Perhaps a sentence spoken by M. Guyot Montpayroux
best illustrates the predominant feeling. "Prussia," he
said, " has forgotten the France of Jena, and the fact must
be recalled to her memory." Thus was war declared by
these infuriated legislators on the night of July 15th. M.
Thiers, who desired a war with Prussia "at the proper
time," has left on record his judgment that the hour then
selected was " detestably ill-chosen." Yet even he and M.
Gambetta were both anxious that " satisfaction " should be
obtained for Sadowa ; while the thought which animated
the Court is admirably expressed in the phrase imputed to
the Empress who, pointing to the Prince Imperial, said,
" This child will never reign unless we repair the misfor-
tunes of Sadowa." Such was the ceaseless refrain. The
word haunted French imaginations incessantly, and it was
the pivot on which the Imperial policy revolved, and it
exercised a spell scarcely less powerful and disastrous upon
Monarchists like M. Thiers, and Bepublicans like Gambetta
52 THE CAMPAIGN 07 SEDAN. [CHAP. t.
and Jules Favre. Still, it may be said that France was
divided in opinion. Consulted through the Prefects, onlj
sixteen departments were for war ; no fewer than thirty-four
were adyerse, and the remainder could not be said to hold
with the one or the other. Nor should it be overlooked
that these estimates of popidar feeling were transmitted by
functionaries who have always a wish to please the superior
Powers. Germany, on the other hand, was united as it
had never been since 1813. King William was applauded
everywhere. When he reached Berlin on the evening of
the 15th, he was met at the railway station by the Crown
Prince, Count von Bismarck, General von Moltke, and
General von Boon. There the decision was formally taken
to accept the challenge, the fact was repeated to the crowd
who had assembled, and whose shouts were loud, deep, and
prolonged ; and that same night went forth the brief tele-
graphic orders which from one centre touched a thousand
springs, and called into instant being an army, perfectly
organized, equipped, trained and supplied. So that when
Baron Wimpfen, a secretary of legation, entered Berlin on
the 19th of July, and handed to M. Le Sourd the French
declaration of war — the sole official document on the sub-
ject received by Prussia, as Yon Moltke bluntly remarks —
that work had already begun which finished in little moro
than a fortnight, enabled the King to break into Fnuice at
the head of more than three hundred thousand soldiers.
Only one word more need be said on this subject — ^the
causes of the war. Clearing away the diplomatic mist
which hides the realities, the student will discover two
deadly opposites ; on onft aidft the determinfttion ^f fra.noA
affairs^andeven of prescribin^f the form or fftnaB yfl^^^*
the national aggregate shoujd AftSWiftfe; on the othec
fixed resolve of the Q^maUupoaide that the French sh ould
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 63
no longer dictate or pretend to dictate bevond the Rhine .
that an end should t^ p"t. tn fha pn licy of oeekii^ politica l
profits by fomenting the spirit of discord in the pett y
^nnan Courts ; and that, if possible, by dint ^ " Kraft
nnd Muth/' Germany should secure palpable safeguards
against French invasions, and resume possession of the
strongholds and dependent territories which were acquired,
in times of adversity and disunion, by Louis XIY. Thus,
the causes of war were deeply rooted in essential facts.
The moment to be chosen, if it can be said to have been
chosen, was for statesmen to decide. The Imperial Gk>yem-
ment, down to the last hour, sought to form a combination
adverse to Prussia, intending to wage war at its own time.
Prussia refused to be made the victim of a triple alliance,
and taking a fair advantage of the imperious conduct of the
French Court, seized the golden opportunity, promptly
answered the declaration of war, and struck dovni the
French Empire before its hesitating and unprepared allies
could moTC a finger to avert a defeat which neither at«
tempted, nor dar6d attempt to repair. Austria, the unready,
stood in fear of Eussia : Italy, the ambitious, demanded
the right to enter Bome. " We can grant nothing of the
kind,*' said the over-confident Due de Gramont, so late as
July 30. "If Italy will not march," he exclaimed, " let her
sit still." Abundant evidence exists to prove that war
between France and Germany was solely a question of
time, and Prussia cannot be blamed justly for selecting or
seizing the hour most suitable to her and least suitable to
her adversaries. The Due de Gramont asserts that neither
the Emperor nor the Government nor France, desired war
— certainly not just then ; but they intended to make war
at a time and under conditions chosen by themselves. He
admits that it was the duty of the Imperial Government to
evade a war, but also prepare for a war as much as possible;
54 THE CAMPAIGN OP SEDAN. [CHAP. T.
and, failing to do the former, he farther confessed many
months afterwards, that too much confidence in the army
and in its untested military virtues, and the dazzling
splendour of a glorious past dragged France, its Goyem-
ment and its representatives, into an unequal struggle.
" We believed ourselves too strong to stoop," he says,
f* and we knew not how to resist the system of provocations
so ably combined and directed by the Cabinet of Berlin."
A frank confession, especially from the pen of a statesman
who was himself endeavouring to combine a system of
alliances, and who was anticipated by the Power against
whom his plans were directed. M. Prevost Paradol, who
in a moment of weakness had accepted from the Emperor
the post of Minister at Washington, saw more clearly into
the future than the Due de Gramont and some of his col-
leagues. On the very afternoon of the day when the un-
happy journalist killed himself, he saw a countryman, the
Oomte d'H^risson, and his language to the young man
showed how deeply he was moved, and with what sagacity
he estimated the near future. In his opinion, expressed on
the 10th of July, war was even then certain, because not
only " la Prusse '* desired war, but because, as he said,
" The Empire requires war, wishes for it, and will wage it."
The young Frenchmen to whom he spoke made light of
the peril, and said he should like to travel in Germany, and
study in the libraries of her conquered cities. But the
Minister checked his natural exultation, saying, " You will
not go to Germany, you will be crushed in France. Believe
me, I know the Prussians. We have nothing whatever
that is needed to strive with them. We have neither
generals, men, nor materiel. We shall be ground to powder.
ifau8 serans hroyes. Before six months are over there will
be a Revolution in France, and the Empire will be at an
end.^' Mourning over the error he made in laying down
CHAP. I.] THE CAUSES OF THE WAR. 55
his sharp critical pen to put on a diplomatic uniform, and
maddened by the retrospect and prospect, Paradol, a few
hours after uttering his predictions, escaped from unendur-
able misery by a pistol-shot. It was like an omen oi the
coming catastrophe.
CHAPTER n.
THB OATHBBINa OF THB HOSTS.
Oerman Mobilization,
THE great contest, thus precipitated by the formal de-
fiance which Baron Wimpfen bore from Paris to
Berlin, excited deep emotion all over the world. The hour
had at length struck which was to usher in the deadly
struggle between France and Germany. Long foreseen^
the dread shock, like all grave calamities, came never-
theless as a surprise, even upon reflective minds. States-
men and soldiers who looked on, while they shared in the
natural feelings aroused by so tremendous a drama, were
also the privileged witnesses of two instructive experiments
on a grand scale — ^the processes whereby mighty armies
are brought into the field, and the methods by means of
which they are conducted to defeat or victory. The German
plan of forming an Army was new in regard to the extent
and completeness with which it had been carried out. How
would it work when put to the ultimate test ? Dating only
from 1867, the French scheme of organization, a halting
Gullic adaptation of Prussian principles, modified by French
traditions, and still further by the political exigencies be-
setting an Imperial djmasty, having little root in the
nation, besides being new and rickety, was in an early
stage of development; it may be said to have been ad-
CHAP, n.] THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. 57
olescent, not mature. No greater contrast was ever pre-
sented by two parallel series of human actions than that
supplied by the irregular, confused, and uncertain working
of the Imperial arrangement of forming an Army and
setting it in motion for active service, and the smoothness^
celerity, and punctuality which marked the German " mo-
bilization." The reason is — first, that the system on which
the German Army was built up from the foundations was
sound in every part^ and that the plan which had been
designed for the purpose of pladng a maximum force
under arms in a given time, originaUy comprehensive, had
been corrected from day to day, and brought down to the
last moment. For example, whenever a branch or seciaon
of a railway line was opened for traffic, the entire series of
time-tables, if need be, were so altered as to include the
new fadlity for transport. ^ The labour and attention be-
stowed on this vital condition was also expended methodic-
ally upwr^all the others down to the most minute detail.
Thus, the German stafE maps of 'France, especially east of
Paris, actually laid down roads which in July, 1870, had
not yet been marked upon any map issued by the French
War Office. The central departments, in Berlin, exercised
a wide and searching supervision ; but they did not Meddle
with the local military authorities who, having large dis-
cretionary powers, iio sooner received a brief and simple
order than they set to work and produced, at a fixed time,
the result desired.
When King William arrived in Berlin, on the evening
of July 15, the orders already prepared by General von
Moltke received at once the royal sanction, and were trans-
mitted without delay to the officers commanding the several
Army Corps. Their special work, in case of need, had
been accurately defined ; and thus, by regular stages, the
Corps gradually, but swiftly, was developed into its full
58 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. II.
proportions, and ready, as a finished product, to start for
the frontier. The reserves and, if needed, the landwehr
men filled out the battalions, squadrons, and batteries to
the fixed strength ; and as thej found in the local depots
arms, clothing, and equipments, no time was lost. Horses
were bought, called in, or requisitioned, and transport was
obtained. As all the wants of a complete Corps had been
ascertained and provided beforehand, so they came when
demanded. At the critical moment the supreme directing
head, relieved altogether from the distracting duty of
settling questions of detail, had ample time to consider the
broad and absorbing business problems which should and
did occupy the days and nights of a leader of armies. The
composition of the North German troops, that is, those
under the immediate control of King William, occasioned
no anxiety ; and there was only a brief period of doubt in
Bavaria, where a strong minority had not so much French
and Austrian sympathies, as inveterate Prussian anti-
pathies. They were promptly suppressed by the popular
voice and the loyalty of the King. Hesse, Wurtemberg,
and Baden responded so heartily to the calls of patriotism
that in more than one locality the landwehr battalions far
exceeded their normal numerical strength, that is, more
men than were summoned presented themselves at the
dep6ts. The whole operation of bringing a great Army
from a peace to a war footing, in absolute readiness, within
the short period of eighteen days, to meet an adversary on
his own soil, was conducted with unparalleled order and
quickness. The business done included, of course, the
transport of men, guns, horses, carriage, by railway chiefly,
from all parts of the country to the Bhine and the Moselle ;
and the astonishing fact is that plans devised and adopted
long beforehand should have been executed to the letter^
and that more than three hundred thousand combatants-*
CHAP. II.] THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. 59
artillery, borse, infantry, in complete fighting trim, backed
up by enormous trains — should have been brought to
specified places on- specified days, almost exactly in fulfil-
ment of a scheme reasoned out and drawn up two years
before. The French abruptly declared war ; the challenge
was accepted ; the orders went forth, and *' thereupon
united Germany stood to arms," to use the words of
Marshal von Moltke. It is a proud boast, but one amply
justified by indisputable facts.
I^ench Mobilizaiian.
How differently was the precious time employed on the
other side of the Ehine. When the Imperial Q-ovemment
rushed headlong into war, they actually possessed only one
formed Corps d'Arm^e, the 2nd, stationed in the camp of
Chalons, and commanded by General Frossard. Yet even
this solitary body was, as he confesses, wanting in essential
equipments when it was hurriedly transported to St. Avoid,
not far from Saarlouis, on the Bhenish Prussian frontier.
Not only had all the other Corps to be made out of garrison
troops, but the entire staff had to be provided in haste.
Marshal Niel, an able soldier, and the Emperor, had
studied, at least, some of Baron Stoffel's &,mous reports on
the Gherman Army, and had endeavoured to profit by
them ; but the Marshal died, the Corps L^gislatif was in-
tractable, favouritism ruled in the Court, the Emperor
suffered from a wearing internal disease, and the tone of
the Army was one not instinct with the spirit of self-sacri-
ficing obedience. In time it is possible that the glaring
defects of the Imperial military mechanism might have
been removed, and possible, also, that the moral and disci-
pline of the officers and men might have been raised.
Barely probable, since Marshal Lebceuf believed that the
60 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. U.
Army was in a state of perfect readiness, not merely to de-
fend France, but to dash over the Rhine into South Ger-
many. His illusion was only destroyed when the fatal test
was applied. Nominally, the French Army was formidable
in numbers ; but not being based on the territorial system,
which includes all the men liable to service in one Corps,
whether they ore with the colours or in the reserve, and
also forms the supplementary landwehr into local division|^,
the French War Office could not rapidly raise the regim^ts
to the normal strength. For a sufficient reason. A peasant
residing in Provence might be summoned to join a regiment
quartered in Brittany, or a workman employed in Bordeaux
called up to the Pas de Calais. When he arrived he might
find that the regiment had marched to Alsace or Lo]p*aine.
During the first fortnight after the declaration of war
thousands of reserve men were travelling to and fro over
France in search of their comrades. Another evil waerthat
some Corps in course of formation were split into fragments-^
separated from each other by many score miles. Nearly
the whole series of Corps, numbered from One to Seven,
were imperfectly supplied with a soldier's needments ; and
what is more astonishing, the frontier arsenals and depots
were sadly deficient in supplies, so that constant applica-
tions were made to Paris for the commonest necessaries.
There were no departmental or even provincial storehouses,,
but the materials essential for war were piled up in three
or four places, such as Paris and Versailles, Yemen and
Chateauroux. In short, the Minister of War, who said and
believed that he was supremely ready, found that, in &ict,
he was compelled almost to improvise a fighting Army in
the face of an enemy who, in perfect order, was advancing
with the measured, compact, and irresistible force of a tidal
wave.
The plan followed was exactly the reverse of the German
CHAP. IT.] THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. 61
method. East of the Ehine no Corps was moyed to the
frontier, until it was complete in every respect, except the
second line of trains ; and consequently, from the outset, it
had a maximum force prepared for battle. There were
some slight exceptions to the rule, but they were imposed
by circumstances, served a real purpose, and disappeared
when the momentary emergency they were adapted to meet
had been satisfied. West of the Ehine, not one solitary
Corps took its assigned place in a perfect state for action.
All the battalions of infantry, and of course the regiments,
were hundreds short of their proper strength. Before a
shot had been fired. General de Pailly, at Bitsche, was
obliged to send a demand for coin to pay the troops, adding
notes won't pass — " les billets n'ont point cours." General
Frossard, at St. Avoid, reported that enormous packages of
useless maps had been sent him — maps of Germany — and
that he had not a single map of the French frontier.
Neither Strasburg, Metz, Toul, Verdun, Thionville, nor
Mezieres, possessed stores of articles — such as food, equip-
ments, and carriage — which were imperatively required.
The Intendants, recently appointed to special posts, be-
sieged the War Office in Paris, to relieve them from their
embarrassments — ^they had nothing on the spot. The
complaints wec^^notjdie. As early as the 26th of July,
the troops about Metz were living on the reserve of
biscuits ; there were sent only thirty-eight additional bakers
to Metz for 120,000 men, and even these few practitioners
were sadly in want of ovens. ** I observe that the Army
stands in need of biscuit and bread," said the Emperor to
the Minister of War at the same date. " Could not bread
be made in Paris, and sent to Metz ? " Marshal Lebceuf ,
a day later, took note of the fact that the detachments
which came up to the front, sometimes reserve men, some-
times battalions^ arrived without ammunition and camp
62 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. II.
equipments. Soldiers, functionaries, carts, ovens, pro-
visions, horses, munitions, harness, all had to be sought at
the eleventh hour. These facts are recorded in the de-
spairing telegrams sent from the front to the War Office.
The very Marshal who had described France as ''archi-
pr^te," in a transcendent state of readiness for war, an-
nounced by telegram, on the 28th of July, the lamentable
fact that he could not move forward for want of biscuit —
** Je manque de biscuit pour marcher en avant." The 7th
Corps was to have been formed at Belfort, but its divisions
could never be assembled. General Michel, on the 21st of
July, sent to Paris this characteristic telegram : '* Have
arrived at Belfort," he wrote: "can't find my brigade;
can't find the General of Division. What shall I do P
Don't know where my regiments are " — a document prob-
ably imique in military records. Hardly a week later, that
is on the 27th, Marshal Leboeuf became anxious respecting
the organization of this same Corps, and put, through
Paris, some curious questions to General F^lix Douay, its
commander. ** How far have you got on with your format
tions ? Where are your divisions ? " The next day General
Douay arrived at Belfort, having been assured in Paris by
his superiors that the place was " abundantly provided "
with what he would require. After the War, Prince
Georges Bibesco, a Boumanian in the French Army, at-
tached to the 7th Corps, published an excellent volume on
the campaign, and in its pages he describes the "cruel de-»
ception " which awaited Douay. He writes that, for the
most part, the troops, had " neither tents, cooking pots, nor
flannel belts ; neither medical nor veterinary canteens, nor
medicines, nor forges, nor pickets for the horses — they
were without hospital attendants, workmen, and train.
As to the magazines of Belfort — they were empty." In
the land of centralization General Douay was obliged to
CHAP. II.] THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. €S
send a staff and several men to Paris, with umtmcticms to
explain matters at the War Office, and not leave the capital
without bringing the articles demanded with them. Other
examples are needless. It woold be almost impossible to
understand how it came to pass that the French were
plunged into war, in Jnlj, 1870, did we not know that the
military institutions had been n^lected« that the rulers
relied on old renown, the " glorious past " of the Due de
Gramont, and that the few men who forced the quarrel to
a fatal head, knew nothing of the wants of an armj, and
still less of the necessities and risks of war.
War Methods Coninuted.
As the story is unfolded, it will be seen that the same
marked contrast between the principles and methods
adopted and practised by the great rivals prevaUed through-
out. The GTerman Army rested on solid foundations ; the
work of mobilization was conducted in strict accordance
with the rules of business ; allowing for the constant
presence of a certain amount of error, inseparable from
human actions, it may be said that ** nothing was left to
chance.'' The French Army was loosely put together ; it
contained uncertain elements ; was not easily collected, and
never in f onited bodies ; it was without large as well as
small essentials; it "lacked finish." And similar defects
became rapidly manifest in the Imperial plan for the con-
duct of the war. Here the contrast is flagrant. The
Emperor Napoleon, who had lived much with soldiers, who
had been present at great military operations, and had
studied many campaigns, could not be destitute of what
the French call *• le flair militaire." He had, also, sonie
inkling of the political side of warfare ; and in July, 1870,
he saw that much would depend upon his ability to make
64 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. II.
a dash into South Germany, because, if he were successful,
eyen for a brief time, Prussia might be deprived of South
German help, and Austria might enter the field. There
was no certainty about the calculation, indeed, it was
almost pure conjecture ; seeing that Count von Beust and
the Archduke Albert had both warned him that, ** above
all things," they needed time, and that the former had
become frightened at the prospect of Hungarian defection,
and a Russian onfall. Yet it was on this shadowy basis
that he moved to the frontier the largest available mass of
incomplete and suddenly organized batteries, squadrons
and battalions. He and his advisers were possessed with
a feverish desire to be first in the field; and the Corps
were assembled near Metz, Strasburg, and Belfort, with
what was called a reserve at Chalons, on the chance that
the left might be made to join the right in Alsace, and that
the whole, except the reserve which was to move up from
Chalons, could be pushed over the Rhine at Maxau, oppo-
site Carlesruhe, and led with conquering speed into, the
country south of the Main. Before he joined the head-
quarters at Metz, on the 28th of July, the Emperor may
have suspected, but on his arrival he assuredly found that
the plan, if ever feasible, had long passed out of the range
of practical warfare. He reaped nothing but the disad-
vantages which spring from grossly defective preparation,
and '' raw haste half-sister to delay." He knew that he
was commander-in-chief of a relatively weak and ill-found
Army, and he acquired the certainty at Metz, that, unless
he were conspicuously victorious, neither Austria nor Italy
would move a man.
His mighty antagonist, on the other hand« was advanc-
ing to the encounter with such large resources, and so
thoroughly equipped, that no fewer than three Army
Corps were left behind^ because even the admirably man-
CHAP. U.] THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. 65
aged and numerous German railway lines were not able to
cany them at once to the banks of the Bhine. Moreover,
General von Moltke, the Chief of the Great Staff, had, in
1868-69, carefully reasoned out plans, which were designed
to meet each probable contingency, either a march of the
French through Belgium, an early irruption into the
Bhenish provinces, or the identical scheme upon which the
Emperor founded his hopes ; while, if the French allowed
the Germans to begin offensive operations on French soil-,
then the method of conducting the invasion, originally
adopted, would come into play. The memorandum on
this great subject, the essential portions of which have
been published by its author, Yon Moltke, is, for breadth,
profundity, and insight, one of the most instructive to be
found in the records of war. This is not the place to deal
with its general or detailed arguments. For present pur-
poses, it is sufficient to set forth the main operative idea.
The contention was, that an army assembled on the Bhine
between Bastadt and Mainz, and on the Moselle below
Treves, would be able to operate successfully, either on the
right bank of the main stream, against the flank of a
French Army, which sought to invade South Germany; or,
with equal facility, concentrate on the left bank, and
march in three great masses throi^h the country between
the Bh^e and Moselle, upon the French frontier. " Should
the French make a precipitate_dash into the German
country towards Mainz, then the Corps collected near that
fortress would meet them in front, and those on the
Moselle would threaten their communications or assail
them in flank. The soundness of the reasoning is indis-
putable; its application would depend upon the prompt
concentration of the Armies, and that had been rendered
certain by careful and rigorously enforced preparations.
The great Prussian strategist had calculated the move-
66 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. H.
ment of troops and railway trains to a day ; bo that he
knew exactly what number of men and guns, within a
given area, he could count upon at successive periods of
time ; and, of course, he was well aware that the actual use
to be made of them, after the moment of contact, could
not be foreseen with precision, but must be adapted to
circumstances. But he foresaw and prepared for the
contingency which did arrive. " If," he said, " the French
desired to make the most of their railways, in order to
hasten the assembly of all their forces," they would be
obliged to disembark, or as we now say, '* detrain " them,
" at Metz and Strasburg, that is, in two principal groups
separated from each other by the Yosges." And then he
went on to point out how, assembled 'on the Bhine and
Moselle, the G-erman Army would occupy what is called
the " interior lines " between them, and " could turn
against the one or the other, or even attack both at once,
if it were strong enough."
The grounds for these conclusions, succinctly stated*
were the conformation of the frontier, an angle flanked at
each side by the neutral states of Switzerland and Luxem-
burg, restricting the space within which operations could
be carried on ; the possession of both banks of the Khine
below Lauterbourg ; the superior facility of mobilization
secured by the Germans, not only as regards the i^pid
transition of Corps from a peace to a war footing, but by
the skilful use of six railway lines running to the Bhine
and the Moselle ; and, finally, the fact that, fronting south
between those rivers, the advancing Q^erman Army would be
directed against an adversary whose line of retreat, at least
so far as railways were concerned, diverged, in each case,
td a -flank of any probable front of battle. The railway
from Strasburg to Nancy traversed the Vosges at Saveme ;
the railway from Metz to Nancy on one side, and Thion-
CHAP. II.] THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. 67
yille on the other, followed the yalley of the Moselle ; and
as the important connecting branch from Metz to Verdun
had not been constructed, it follows that the French Army
in Lorraine had no direct railway line of retreat and supply.
The railway from Metz to Strasburg, which crossed the
Yosges by the defile of Bitsche and emei^ed in the lUiine
valley at Hagenau, was, of course, nearly parallel to the
German front, except for a short distance west of Bening.
The frontier went eastward from Sierck, on the Moselle to
Lauterbourg on the Bhine, and thence southerly to Basle.
The lull range of the Yosges, starting from the Ballon
d' Alsace, overlooking the Gkip of Belfort, runs parallel to
the river, and extends in a northerly direction beyond the
French boundary, thrusting an irregular mass of uplands
deep into the Palatinate, ending in the isolated Donners*
berg. It follows that the main roads out of, as well as
into, France were to the east and west of this chain, and
it should be observed that the transverse passes were more
numerous south than north of Bitsche, and that, practically,
while detachments could move along the secluded valleys,
there was no road available for laj-ge bodies and trains
through the massive block of mountain and forest which
occupies so considerable a space of the Palatinate. Thus,
an army moving from Mainz upon Metz would turn the
obstacle on the westward by Eaiserslautem and Landstuhl ;
while if Strasburg were the goal, it would march up the
Bhine valley by Landau, and through the once &.mous
Lines of the Lauter. If two armies, as really happened in
1870, advanced simultaneously on both roads, the connec«
tion between them is maintained by occupying Pirmasens,
which is the central point on a country road running from
Landau to Deux Pouts, and another going south-east to
Wissembourg.
The influence of this mountain range upon the offensive
$8 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. II.
and defensiTe operations of the rival armies will be readily
understood. The French oould only unite to meet their
opponents in the Prussian proTinces at or north of Kaisers-
lantern ; while the Germans, assuming that their adver-
saries assembled forces in Alsace, as well as in Lorraine,
would not be in direct communication until their left wing
had moved through the hill-passes and had emerged in the
country between the Sarre and Meurthe.
It has been seen that the available French troops, in-
cluding several native and national regiments from Algeria,
had been hurried to the frontier in an imperfect state of
organization and equipment. There were nominally seven
Corps d'Arm^ and the Guard ; but of these, two, the 6th
and 7th, were never united in the face of the enemy.
Marshal Canrobert, commanding the 6th, was only able to
bring a portion of nis Corps from Chalons to Metz ; and
General Douay, the chief of the 7th, had one division at
Lyons, and another at Colmar, whence it was sent on to
join the 1st Corps assembling under Marshal MacMahon
near Strasburg. The principal body, connsting of the 2nd,
3rd, and 4th Corps, ultimately joined by the greater part
of the 6th, and the Guard were posted near and north of
^etz ; while the 5th occupied po6iti<ms on the Saar, and
formed a sort of link, or weak craitre, between the right
and left wings. Nothing indicated cohesion in this array,
which, as we have shown, was adopted on the vain hypo-
thesis that there would be time to concentrate in Alsace
for the purpose of anticipating the Germans and crossing
the Bhine at Maxau.
, No such error was made on the other side. The G^ermau
troops were divided into three armies* The First Army,
consisting of the 7th and 8th Corps, under thr>^teran
General von Steinmetz, formed the right wing, and moved
Qouthward ou both banks of the MoseHer^The Second
CHAP, n.] THE GATHERING OT THE HOSTS. 69
Army, composed of the Goard, the 3rd, 4th, and 10th
Corps, oommanded by Prince Frederick Charles, was the
central body, haying in rear the 9th and 12th Corps as a
reserve. They were destined to march on the great roads
leading from Manheim and Mainz upon Kaiserslautem.
The Third Army, or left wing, under the Crown Prince,
was made up of the 5th and 11th and the two Bavarian
Corps, together with a Wurtemberg and a Baden Divi-
sion. Each Army had one or more divisions of cavaliy,
and« of course, the due proportion of guns. By the 31st
of July, the whole of these troops, except the Baden
and the Wiirtemberg Divisions, were on the west of
the Rhine, with foreposts on the Saar, below Saarbruck,
in the mountains at Pirmasens, and on the roads to the
Lanter ; the great mass of troops being dose to the Bhine.
The advantages, in point of concentration, were already
secured by the German Staff ; the First Army alone, one-
half at Treves, and the other strung out between the
Moselle and the Nahe, was in apparent danger ; yet little
apprehension was felt on that score, because the country
through which it moved was highly defensible — its right
was covered by neutral Luxemburg, and part of the Second
Army was sufficiently forward to protect the left.
A week earlier, there had been, indeed, a slight perturba-
tion in Berlin, where the head-quarters still remained.
By unceasing observation, a careful collation of reports, a
diligent use of French newspapers, the King's Staff had
arrived at a tolerably accurate estimate of the strength,
positions, and internal state of the French Corps. They
were cognizant of the prevailing disorder, and were welL
aware that not one Corps had received its full complement
of reserve men. Arguing that the enemy would not have
fo 'egone the advantages of mobilization unless he had in
view some considerable object, such as an irruption into
70 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP, II.
the Palatinate, tlie Staff modified the original plan, as it
affected the Second Armv, and, on the 23rd of July,
directed the Corps of which it was composed to quit the
railway trains transporting them on, and not beyond* the
Bhine. This was purely a measure of precaution, the
contingency of which had been foreseen ; yet one which
was needless, as the French had already learned that they
could not take the offensive in any direction. No ther
changes were made, and the only result of this modifica-
tion was that the soldiers had to march further than they
would have marched, and they probably benefited by the
exercise. During this period, the bridge at Kehl had been
broken, the boats and ferries remoTed from the Bhine
from Lauterbourg to Basle, the railway pontoon bridge at
Maxau protected, a measure suggested by the presence of
river gunboats at Strasburg, and ' an unremitting watch
had been kept on the land frontier by small detachments
of horse and foot. Not the least surprising fact is that no
attempt was made by the French to destroy the bridges
over the Saar at Saarbriick, or penetrate far beyond that
river on its upper course. On the other hand, parties of
German horse and foot made several incursions between
Sierck and Bitsche, and one small party rode as far as into
Alsace at Niederbronn. It was not until the end of the
month that large bodies of cavalry were sent to the front
to begin a career demonstrating afresh, if a demonstration
is needed, the inestimable services which can be performed
by that indispensable arm. The German Army had been
placed in the field in little more than a fortnight, although
the 1st and 6th Corps were still en route from the fax
North. The Crown Prince reached Spires on the 30th,
and the next day, the King, with the Great Staff, left
Berlin for Mainz. He had restored the "Order of the
Iron Cross," and had wai-mly expressed his gratitude for
CHAP. II.] THE GATHERING OF THE HOSTS. 71
the unexampled spirit manifested by the whole German
nation, " reconciled and united as it had never been before."
Germany might find therein, he said, ** a guarantee that
the war would Ji^ring her a durable peace, and that the
seed of blood would yield a blessed harvest of liberty and
unity."
Here it may be stated that a French squadron had
appeared off the coast of Denmark on the 28th of July,
but only to disappear with greater promptitude, thereby
relieving the timid from any apprehension of a descent.
Large German forces were set free to face westward, and in
a brief space, not only the French marines and sailors, but
the ship guns were vehemently required to fight in severe
battles and defend the capital of France.
CHAPTEE in.
STAGE THXTNDEB.
The Conibat at Saarhriich.
Kma WILLIAM did not reach Mainz until the fore-
noon of the 2nd of August ; and it is characteristic-
ally remarked in the official history of the War, that the
journey from Berlin had been relatively slow, because it
was necessary to fit the six supplementary trains bearing
the great head-quarters into the series of military tnCins in
such a way as would not retard the transport of troops.
It is a small fact, but an apt illustration of the preference
uniformly given to essentials in.the Prussian arrangements
for war. Soon after the Staff had arrived in the ** Deutsche
Haus," lent by the Grand Duke, whose son. Prince Louis,
the husband of the British Princess Alice, commanded the
Hessian Division, unexpected information greeted them.
Telegrams reported first that a serious action was in
progress at Saarbriick, and later that the Prussian troops
had withdrawn from the town.
This was the famous combat, known at the time as the
BojptSme de feu of the unfortunate Prince Imperial. The
Emperor Napoleon entered Metz on the 28th of July, and
took the command of the " Army of the Rhine." Until
that moment, the seven corps d'armee in the field were
under the orders of Marshal Bazaine, who received his
CHAP. III.] STAGE THUNDER. 78
instructions from Paris through Marshal Lebceuf . They
were to act strictly on the defensive, advice which may be
said to have been needless, since, as we have shown, not
one of the corps was in a condition to march and fight.
When the Emperor appeared on the scene, no great
change for the better had taken place, and there was still
a dearth of real information respecting the strength and
position <^ the enemy, while the reports brought in
contained an enormous percentage of error. Nevertheless,
there was a vague feeling at head-quarters that something
must be done to satisfy a public opinion which thought
that the French armies should have been already beyond
the Rhine; and on the 30th of July Marshal Bazaine
received orders to cross the Saar and occupy Saarbruck.
The task was to be intrusted to General Frossard, supported
by troops on the right and left, drawn from the Corps of
De Failly and Bazaine. Yet this modest operation dwindled
down, when discussed in a sort of Council of War held the
next day at Forbach, into a simple cannonade, and the
occupation of the heights on the left bank ! The Emperor
was told that his project could not be executed, and
resigning himseK, as he always did, to the inevitable, he
warned MacMahon that no movement should be made on
his side before the lapse of eight days. The ostentatious
movement on Saarbruck was to be made on the 2nd of
August. Now, at that date, the place was occupied by
fractions of the 8th German Corps, posted on both banks
of the river above and below the town. They consisted
of four battalions of foot, several squadrons of horse,
and one battery, and the nearest immediate support was
some miles to the rear, near Lebach. Colonel von Pestel
had held the position from the outset of the war, and
was allowed to remain, at his own request, although a
considerable army stood in his front at no gpreat distance.
74 THE CAMPAIGN OP SEDAN. [CHAP. III.
that is, the three leading corps of the Army of the Bhiner
But on the 2nd Count von G-neisenau was in command of
the German outposts, and had orders, if pressed, to retire
upon Lebach, but he stood fast, and even assumed the
ofFensire, in order to ascertain exactly what the pressure
might be, and test the intentions of the adversary.
Against him, in the forenoon, advanced Frossard in the
centre, Bazaine on the right, and De Failly, who had
crossed the river at Saareguemines, on his left. It was a
wonderful spectacle. The Emperor and the Prince Imperial
were present on the hills to behold so vast an array moving
out in parade order, to fight a sham battle with real shot
and shell, against a' dozen companies and six guns. It is
not necessary to enter into a detail of this combat ; it is
sufficient to say that the Prussians held on to the left bank
until they were obliged, after^an hour's fighting, to retire
before the development of several brigades. Finally, when
a French* battery on the Reppertsberg had opened fire on
the bridges and the town. Count von G-neisenau withdrew
his troops, first to a place near the town, and afterw^ds to
a position further in the rear. At other points on the river
the French had failed to pass, but in the evening they sent
parties into Saarbriick, then unoccupied. The French in
this skirmish lost eighty-six, and the Prussians, eighty-
three officers and men killed and wounded. It was the
first occasion on which the soldiers of Napoleon III. had an
opportunity of testing the qualities of the German Army,
and they found that their secular adversaries, disciplined on
a different model, and broken to new tactics, were as hardy,
active, and formidable as those of Frederick the Great.
After this striking example of stage thunder, there was
a pause — the French did not pursue the retreating
companies of the 40th and 69th, hold the town, or even
destroy the bridges. Indeed, General Frossard, in his
CHAP, in.] STAGE THUNDER. 75
pamphlet, explains that although so few were visible,
there must have been large numbers of the 8th Prussian
Corps near at hand, and insists that they were held back
because the adversary did not wish to show his strength ;
BO that the result actually had an unfavourable influence
on the French — ^it inspired in them a feeling of apprehen-
sion. They dreaded the unknown. Without exact, and with
what was worse, misleading information, the Marshals and
Generals were bewildered by every adverse strong patrol,
which boldly marched up and even looked into their camps ;
and out of these scouting parties they constructed full corps
ready to pounce upon them* No master mind at head-
quarters filled them with confidence, or gave a firm direction
to their soldiers. At a very early period, even in the highest
ranks, arose a querulous dread of " Prussian spies," and a
belief that the hills and woods concealed countless foes.
The apprehensions had no solid foundation, since the First
Army was not nearer the Saar than Losheim and Wadern,
and the only troops in the immediate front of Q^neral
Frossard were those composing Gneisenau's weak detach-
ment, which retired some miles on the road to Lebach.
Yet the feeble operation of August the 2nd induced the
Great Staff to concentrate the First Army at Tholey, that
is nearer to the main line of march of the Second Army,
and on the left flank of the probable French advance.
None took place, and thenceforward the swift and measured
development of the German movement southwards went
steadily onwards.
Preparing to go forward.
After reviewing the general position of the opposing
armies, the German , head-quarters fixed on the 4th of
August as the. day on which ofEensive operations should be
7S THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. {CHAP. IH.
b^un. It was known in a sufficiently authentic way, that
there were between Metz and the Saar, four French Corps
and the Guard, the Left being at Bouzonville, south of
Saarlouis, and the Bight at Bitsche; that the 1st Corps
was south of Hainan, in Alsace, and that the two
remaining Corps were still incomplete, one being at Chalons,
the other at Belf ort. It was, therefore, determined that
the Prussian Crown Prince should cross the Lauter on the
4th, while Prince Charles and G^eneral von Steinmetz, at a
later date, should move upon Saarbruck, and grapple^with
the main Imperial Army as soon as they could bring the
foe to battle. Practically, the skirmish on the 2nd put
everyone on the alert. Acting, as was usual in the German
Army on their own discretion, yet stiU in the spirit of
their instructions, the diyisional and Corps commanders at
once sprang forward to support Gneisenau^ so that (m the
3rd, the front lines of the First Army were nearer m;o the
enemy than had been prescribed, and General von S:teinmetz
came up from Treves to Loshiem.
During this period, the Second Army had continued its
movement upon Eaiserslautem, and its cavalry had already
established a connection with the First Army. It was not
the intention of General von Moltke, who really spoke with
the voice of His Majesty, that the Saar should be crossed
until a later day. He seems to have been under the im-
pression that the French might dtill assume the offensive;
he therefore held back the somewhat impetuous Steinmetz,
and so ordered the movements that both armies should
take up positions between Tholey and Kaiserslautem,
which would enable them to act in concert. Thus, on the
3rd, the vast array between the Bhine and the Moselle, was
in motion, left in front, in other words, the Prussian Crown
Prince was the most forward, while the centre and right
were drawn together, preparatory to an advance in a
t CHAP. III.] STAGE THUNDER. 77
compact form. The French, it was noted with surprise, had
not only refrained from breaking the substantial bridges
over the Saar, but had left untouched the telegraph wires
and stations on both banks of the stream, so that, says the
official narrative, the Staff at Mainz were kept constantly
" informed by telegrams of the enemy's doings and bearing
near Saarbruck. Such negligence would not be credited
were it not thus authenticaJly recorded by the General who
found it so profitable.
By the 4th of August, the entire front of the Armies
adyandng towards the Saar was covered by several
i regiments of cavalry, actively engaged on and near the
river, especially at = Saarbruck, in closely watchilig the
French, and sending information to the rear.^ There was
not a point between Pirmasens and Saarlouis which escaped
the notice of these vigilant and tireless horsemen. Behind
them camethe masses of the First and Second Armies, which
latter, on the 4th, had passed " the wooded zone of Kaisers-
lautem," and had approached so closely to the First, that
^ a species of controversy for precedence arose between Prince
Charles and General von Steinmetz. Fearful of being
thrust into the second line, the eager old soldier wanted to
push forward on Saarbruck, and reap the laurels of the first
battle, or, at all events, keep his place at the head of the
advance. General von Moltke, who had his own plans of
nlterior action, which were not those of Steinmetz, in ordet^
* to settle the dispute, drew what he supposed would be an
effective line of demarcation between the two Armies.
He also added the 1st Corps, which had come up from
Pomerania, to the First Army ; the 2nd, 10th and 12th
to the Second, and the 6th to the Third Army. While
directing the Crown Prince to cross the Lauter on the
4th, C^enaral von Moltke did not intend to pass the
Saar until the 9th, and then to act with the whole force
78 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. III.
assembled on that side. In fact, rapidly as the business
of mobilization, the transit by railway, and the collection
of trains for so vast a body of men, horses, and guns, bad
been performed, the work was not in all respects quite
complete, nor had the soldiers been able, good marchers as
they were, to cover the ground between them and the
adyersaiy. before the date assigned.
Yet Yon Moltke proposed, and Yon Steinmetz disposed,
although he is acquitted by his chief of any deliberate
intention to act prematurely. The latter, obliged to make
room for Prince Charles, gave directions which brought his
two leading Corps within reach of the Saar and his adraneed
guards close to Y51kingen and Saarbruck in actual contact
with the French outposts ; and that disposition led to a
considerable battle on the 6th, a collision not anticipated
at the head-quarters in Mainz. It is, however, pointedly
declared that at the moment when he thrust himself forward
Steinmetz did not know what were the plans which had
been formed in that exalted region, to be carried out or
modified according to events, and therefore withheld from
him. The broad scheme was that the Third Army should,
after crossing the Yosges, march on Nancy, and that the
First should form the pivot on which the Second Aimf
would wheel in turning the French position on the line of
the Moselle. Practically that was done in the end, and it
was facilitated, perhaps, by the two battles fought on the
6th of August, which shattered the French, and obliged
them to act, not as they might have wished, but as they
were compelled.
PosUioTis an August 4.
For the sake of clearness, the positions occupied by the
rival Armies on the morning of the 4th may be succinctly
CHAP, ni.] STAGE THUNDER. 79
described. The French stood thus: On the right, two
divisions of the 5th Corps, one at Saareguemines, the other
at Grossbliedersdorff ; in what may be called the centre,
three divisions of the 2nd Corps, on and over the frontier
immediately south of Saarbriick ; three divisions of the 3rd
Corps echelonned on the high-road from Forbach to St.
Avoid, with one division at Bouchepom ; on the left, three
divisions of the 4th Corps, one at Ham, a second at
Teterchen, and a third at Bouzonville. The guard were in
rear of the left at Les Etangs. The position of the cavalry
it is difficult to determine, but they were not where they
should have been — feeling for and watching the enemy.
Nor is it easy to ascertain the numerical strength of the
French Army at any given moment, because the reserves
and battalions, as they could be spared from garrisons,
were constantly arriving ; but on the 4th there were about
150,000 men and 500 guns in front of Metz. That
fortress, however, like all the other strong f>laces on or near
the frontier, such as Toul, Verdun, ThionyiUe, and Belf ort,
had no garrison proper, or one quite inadequate to its
requirements.
The German Armies on the 4th were posted in this
order: The Crown Prince's was behind the Klingbach,
south of Landau, assembled at dawn for the march which
carried it over the frontier ; the Second, or Central Army,
under Prince Charles, was in line of march through the
Haardt Wald- by Kaiserslautem, the advanced guard of
the 4th Corps being at Homburg, and that of the 3rd at
Neunkirchen ; while the Guard, the 10th, 12th, and 9th
were still north or east of Xaiserslautern, which they
passed the next day. The First Army, held back by
orders from the Great Staff, was cantonned between
Neunkirchen, Tholey, and Lebach. In front of the whole
line, from Saarlouis to Saareguemines, were several
80 THE CAXPAION OF SEDAN. [CHAP. 11/.
brigades of cavalry, from which parties, both strong and
weak, were sent out constantly to discover and report on
the positions and doings of the enemy. The three Annies,
as far as can be estimated from the official ^ores, brought
into the field at the outset of the campaign, say the 4th of
August, the First, 83,000 men and 270 guns ; the Second,
200,000 men and 630 guns ; and the Third, 170,000 men
and 576 guns, an overwhelming array compared with that
mustered by the adversary. These totals include only the
active Army. The aggregate from which they were drawn
amounted to the enormous siun of 1,183,389 men and
250,873 horses, which, of course, indndes garrisons, depots,
and landwehr in course of formation. It has been laid
down on indisputable authority that the number available
for active operations, namely, that which can be put into
the field, is, in all cases, as it was in this, less than half the
nominal effective. The proportion of mobilized, to what
may be called immobilized, troops in the French Army
was for the moment, at all events, necessarily somewhat
lower than in the Qerman, because the Imperial military
system, as we have already explained, was so clumsy,
as well as so incomplete.
The Moral cmd PolUieal Forces.
One other fact may be usefully noticed, because it had
a considerable influence on the campaign. It is this — ^the
moral force, represented by public opinion in politics, and
in the Armies by what the French call the moral, which
has nothing to do with morals, but means cheerfulness,
good will, confidence — ^had passed wholly over to the
(German side. Public opinion, which ran in a strong and
steady current, condemned the declaration of war, although
a certain superstitious belief in the invincibUity <tf French
CHAP, m.] STAGE THUNDER. 81
soldiers, at least when opposed to Germans, still preYailed,
even among military men who ought to have been better
informed and less under the sway of prejudice. While
Germany was united and hearty, and willingly obeyed an
executive which no one questioned, while Saxony and
Hanoyer, Wurtembei^ and Bavaria vied in patriotic ardour
with Pomerania and Brandenburg; there was no such
complete and consentaneous feeling in France ; and there
was, on the one hand, a powerful, ambitious, and indignant
group of Imperialists, who thirsted for the possession of
office, which they strove to snatch from Emile Ollivier and
bis semi-Liberal colleagues, and on the other, outside all
the Imperialist sections, the repressed, enraged, and sturdy
republicans of Paris who, it is not too much to say, waited
for the first decisive defeat of the Imperial Armies to over-
turn an arbitrary system of government which they de-
tested on account of its treacherous origin, and dreaded,
as well as despised, while they writhed beneath its power.
J^r6me David and Clement Duvemois were resolved to
expel the so-called constitutionalists ; and Gambetta, Eavre,
and their friends were equally determined, if an oppor-
tunity occurred, to destroy the Empire, root and branch.
There were no such elements of weakness beyond the
Bhine.
Nor, as we shall see, did the conduct of the Empress
Eugenie, in her capacity as Eegent, supply strength to the
Government or impart wisdom to its councils. She had
one dominant idea — ^the preservation of the dynasty — and
aided by a willing instrument, the Comte de Palikao, she
was the prime a^ent in the work of depriving the French
nation of the best and last chance of saving Paris from in-
vestment and capitulation. If the political conditions were
adverse to the Imperialists in respect of unity and moral
force, they were not less so when estimated from a military
e
82 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Ill/
standpoint. The French Army we will not say lost courage,
but confidence, from the moment when it was brought to
a standstill. The soldiers knew quite as well as the
generals why, on the 4th of August, the larger host,
under an Emperor Napoleon, was pottering to and fro,
driven hither and thither by orders and counter-orders, in
the country north of Metz, and why the smaller, com-
manded by Marshal the Duke of Magenta, was still south
of the Lauter. They knew also, from daily experience,
how imperfect the Armies were, because the weakness of
the battalions, the scarcity of provisions, the defects of
equipment, the lack of camp utensils were things which
could not be hidden. They were also inactive and unable
to develop the power which springs up in a French Army
when engaged in successful offensive operations ; they
deteriorated hourly in morale. The Germans gained con-
fidence at every step they took towards the frontier, not
only because they were animated by a formidable patriotic
spirit and were eager for battle with their ancient foes, but
because each battery, squadron, and battalion had its full
complement of men, because they put trust in their royal
chief and his illustrious assistant, and because they were
intensely proud of an almost perfect war-apparatus, in
which each officer and soldier was able, so solid yet elastic
was the system of training, to harmonize obedience to
orders with, when the need arose, discretionary inde-
pendent action. So that as the huge but perfectly articu-
lated masses of the German Armies moved swiftly and
steadily to the frontier behind which the adversary awaited
them, they bore along in their breasts that priceless belief
in themselves and their cause which had so often carried
troops to victory, even when they were few and their foes
were many. The contrast is painfully distressing ; but it
is also profoundly instructive, because when closely scruti-
CHAP. III.] STAGE THUNDER. 83
nized it reveals the open secrets which show, not only how
empires are lost and won, but what severe duties a great
self-respecting people must perform to obtain securities
for the right of cementing and preserving National In*
dependence.
CHAPTEE IV.
TKTASION IN EARNEST.
THE first blow struck in the war — ^for the parade at
Saarbruck does not deserve the name of a blow — ^was
deliveredon the Lauter by the Crown Prince. The French
Army in Alsace, commanded by Marshal MacMahon, had
been collected at Strasburg &om the garrisons in the
Eastern region. At first it consisted of the 1st Corps,
which included four infantry diyisions, troops of the Line,
to which were added, before the end of July, three regi-
ments of Zouaves, and three of native Algerians, which
were distributed among the Fi'ench infantry brigades.
There were three brigades of cavalry, ninety-six guns, and
twenty-four mitrailleuses, the Emperor's pet arm. The
Divisional Commanders were Ducrot, Abel Douay, Baoult,
and Lartigue ; and the horsemen were under the orders of
Duhesme. The 7th Corps, nominally at Belfort, under
F^lix Douay, actually distributed in several places, one
division being at Lyons, another at Colmar, was also within
the command of MacMahon ; so that, on the 4th of August,
he was at the head of two Corps, one of which was many
miles distant from his head-quarters. He had, however,
moved forward with Ducrot and Baoult to Eeichshofen and
Lartigue to Hagenau, while Abel Douay was pushed still
further northward at Wissembourg, which he reached on
CHAP. IV.] INVASION IN EARNEST. 85
the 3rd, but with a portion only of his troops. In fact, at
that date, the army of MacMahon was strung out between
the Lauter and Lyons, and even the portion which may be
described as concentrated, consisted of fragments posted or
on the march between Wissembourg and Hagenau. That
very morning, the 1st Division of the 7th Corps started by
railway from Colmar to join the Marshal. It was upon
this scattered array that the Crown Prince was adyancing.
MacMahon, who had intended to assume the ofFensiye him-
self oil the 7th of August, did not know how near and how
compact was the host of his foes. Abel Douay, established
on the Lauter, was obliged to part with several battalions
to keep up his communications, through Lembach, with
the main body. He sent out a pai*ty on the evening of the
3rd, and early on the 4th, yet each returned bearing back
the same report — ^they had seen and learned nothing of
the enemy. Indeed, it would be difficult to find a single
instance in which the researches of the French were thrust
far enough to touch the Germans, all their reconnoitring
excursions being carried on in a routine and perfunctoiy
manner. Nevertheless, they had a strong force of cavalry
in Alsace as well as Lorraine ; but it was mostly in the
rear, rarely much, never far in front. On the other hand,
the Baden horsemen had looked, unseen themselves, into
the French cavalry camp at Selz, and the scouts on the
hills had signalled the successive arrival of battalions and
artillery at Wissembourg. It must be stated, however,
that the Germans did not know, precisely, until they came
in contact with them, what forces were in, or were within
reach of Wissembourg.
The object of the German forward movement was two-
fold — if MacMahon had crossed the Vosges to join the
Emperor, Strasburg was to be invested, and the rest of the
Third Army was to pass through the hills to the Saar and
86 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IT.
effect a juiietion with tlie Second. If the Marshal were
still east of the hills, then he was to be assailed wheieyer
found. Consequently, the whole Armj was set in motion,
but it was by a gift of fortune, who, howeyer, rarely &yours
the imprudent, that they were enabled to defeat the di-
yision exposed to their onset. At four and six in the
morning, the Corps moyed out on a broad front stretching
from the hills to the Bhine. Bothmer's Bayarians, on the
right, marched direct on Wissembourg, followed by the
other diyisions of the Bayarian Army. Next in order, to
the left, came the 5th Corps, which was directed upon
Altenstadt; the 11th, which pushed through the Bien
Wald; and the Badeners, whose object was Lauter-
bourg ; while the remainder of the Army was still far to
the rear.
The Comhat <m the Lauter.
Wissembourg, a picturesque old town, standing upon
the Lauter at a point where it enters the plain, is defended
by walls not armed with guns, and surrounded by deep
ditches filled from the stream, one arm of which curyes
through the place. There were three gates. Under the
archway of the northern, named after the town of Hagenau,
passed the gpneat road ^ni Strasburg, which, turning to
the eastward, quitted the ramparts by the gate of Landau.
The western gate, a mere entrance cut through the wall,
haying in adyance a small lunette, receiyed the road from
Pirmasens. It took its name from the fort of Bitsche, but
the track from that place came down the folded hills by
the Col du Pigeonnier, or Doye-cote Neck, and joined the
Strasburg highway just outside the Hagenau gate. Be-
yond the waUs were factories, pottery fields, and mills;
aboye and below were the once famous Lines of the Lauter
CHAP. IV.] INVASION IN EABNEST. 87
thrown up on, and following the right bank of the stream
through the forest to Lauterbourg ; while on the foot-hills
were vines, which do not add to the beautj of anj scene,
and hop-gardens; and here and there the usual rows of
stiff trees bordering, yet not shading, the roads. Distant
about a mile or so to the eastward is a spur of the Yosges,
the C^isberg, thrust into the plain, falling steeply towards
it, and crowned by a substantial chateau, seated above
terraces difficult of access. From this elevation were visible,
spread out like a map, the woodlands stretching towards
the Bhine, the roads to the east and south, and the town,
with its railway station, now silent, near the gate of
Landau.
As Abel Douay had only available about eight thousand
troops, he could not defend the approaches through the
Bien Wald, or prevent a turning movement round his right
flank. Still, had he not been imder a delusion respecting
the proximity of the enemy, he could and would have de-
stroyed the few bridges over the Lauter, and so disposed his
troops as not to be surprised. But his scouts had reported
that the foe was not near, and thus, when the Bavarian
advance appeared on the hills at eight o'clock and opened
fire from a battery, the French soldiers were engaged in the
ordinary routine of camp labours. Startled by the guns,
they ran to their arms with alacrity; but an encounter
begun under such conditions is always disadvantageous to
the assailed. General Douay, an able soldier, came to a
rapid dedsion. He placed two battalions in the town,
another with a battery at the railway station, and posted
the rest and twelve guns on the slopes of the Geisberg.
The walls and ditches of the tovm, the railway buildings,
and part of the Lauter Lines, brought the Bavarians to a
stand, and the combat of small arms and artillery on this
point continued amid the vineyards and hop-grounds, while
88 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [COAP. IT.
the German centre and Left were swinging round tlirough
the forest. The operation occupied considerable time, as
two hours passed by, from the firing of the first gun, before
the leading battalions of the 5th Corps were brought into
play. At length, they came into action against the railway
station, and as the 11th Corps had also developed an attack
on the Geisberg from the east, it was evident that the
combat could not last long. The combined efforts of the
Bavarians and the Prussians, after severe fighting and
some loss, drove the French out of the station, and captured
the town, together with a battalion of the French regiment
of the Line, the 74th, which was cut off, and forced to sur-
render. The assailants had penetrated by the gates after
they had been broken in by artillery, and thus the town
was won. It was really the strong pivot of the defence, and
its resistance delayed the onset upon the Geisberg for some
time. In the meantime. General Abel Douay had been
killed by the explosion of the ammunition attached to a
mitrailleuse battery ; and the command had devolved upon
General Pelle.
The whole stress of the action now fell upon the Geisberg
and its castle. The height was steep, the building pierced
for musketry and strong enough to resist anything but
cannon-shot. The front was approached by successive
terraces, and there was a hop-garden near by on the
Altenstadt road. The main body of the French and all
their artillery, except one disabled gun which had been
captured after a sharp fight, were on the hills to the south,
threatened every moment on their right flank by the de-
velopment of the 11th Corps which had entered the area
of battle. The little garrison in the castle made a stout
resistance, slew many of the assailants, who swarmed upon
all sides, and compelled the more daring among them to
seek shelter at the foot of the walls. Then the Germans
CHAB. IV.] INVASION IN EARNEST. 89
with great labour brought up in succession four batteries,
by whose fire alone they could hope to master the obstinate
defenders who had manned even the tiled roof with rifle-
men. Surrounded, threatened with the weight of twenty-
four guns, and seeing their comrades outside in full retreat,
the garrison which had done its uttermost, surrendered as
prisoners of war. They were two hundred, had killed and
wounded enemies amounting to three-fourths of their own
number, and had seriously injured G-eneral von Elrchbach,
the commander of the 5th Coi*ps. When the castle had
fallen the French retired altogether. Making only one
show of resistance they disappeared among the hiUs, and
what is remarkable were not pursued, for the Crown Prince
riding up, halted all the troops and even the cavalry who
were in full career on the track of the enemy. The Ger-
mans lost in killed and wounded no fewer than 1,550
officers and men ; but the French loss is not exactly known.
They left behind, however, nearly a thousand unwounded
prisoners, their camp, and one gun.
It may fairly be said of this combat, especially considering
they were surprised and greatly outnumbered, that the
French sustained their old renown as fighting men and that
the first defeat, although severe, reflected no discredit on the
soldiers of the 1st Corps. By no chance could they have
successfully withstood the well-combined and powerful on-
sets of their more numerous adversaries. Nevertheless,
the death of Douay, the defeat, and the disorganization of
the division had a profound moral effect, keenly felt at
Metz and more keenly in Hagenau and Eeichshofen.
Marshal MacMahon called for instant aid from the 7th
Corps ; and the Emperor, moved by the news, decided to
send him the 5th Corps, which General de Failly was at
once ordered to assemble at Bitsche and then move up the
great road to Eeichshofen. In the German head-quarters
90 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IV.
and camps, on the contrary, tbere was rejoicing and that
natural accession of confidence in the breasts of the soldiers
now pressing towards the Saar which springs up in fuller
vigour than ever when they learn that their common
standard has floated victoriously over the first f oughten field.
The First and Second Armies were still distant from the
rocky steeps and thick woods where they also were to gain
the day ; but the Third Army, which, by the way, was a
fair representative of South and North G(ermany, had
actually crossed the frontier, had penetrated into Alsace,
through woods and field-works and over streams renowned
in story, and had inflicted a sharp defeat upon the Gallic
troops, whose rulers had challenged the Teutons to wager
of battle.
It is admitted that, on the evening of August 4th, the
Germans had lost touch of the adversary. The reason was
that the 4th Cavalry Division, which had been ordered
up by the Crown Prince early in the day, had found the
roads blocked by an Infantry Corps, and the vexatious
delay prevented the horsemen from reaching the front
before nightfall. So difficult is it to move dense masses of
men, horses, and guns, in accurate succession through a
closed country, along cross-roads and field-lanes. The few
squadrons at hand were not strong enough to pursue on
the several roads which radiate from Wissembourg, and
the defect could not be remedied until the next day. It
was known that the fugitives could not have followed the
southern roads, yet there were hostile troops in that direc-
tion, and it was surmised that they must have retreated
into the highlands by the western track, yet they might
have traversed another way, lying under the foot of the
hills. On the 5th of August, the cavalry, starting out at
daylight, soon gathered up accurate information. General
von Bemhardi, with a brigade of Uhlans, rode forward on
CHAP. IV.] INVASION IN EARNEST. 91
the highway, into the Hagenau forest, where he was stopped
bj a broken bridge guarded by in&ntry ; bat he heard the
noise of trains, the whistling of engines, and, of course, in-
ferred the movement of troops ; while on the east, nearer
the Bhine, the squadrons sent in that direction were turned
back both by in&ntrj and barricaded roads. Towards the
west, a squadron of Uhlans crossed the Saner at Gunstett,
a place we shall soon meet again ; while Colonel Schauroth's
Hussars found the bridge at Woerth broken, were fired on
by guns and riflemen, and saw laige bodies in motion on
the heights beyond the stream. Hence it was inferred that
the army of MacMahon was in position about Beichshof en,
an inference confirmed by the reports from the Bavarians
who had marched on Lembaeh, from the 5th Corps whose
leading columns attained Preuschdorf, with outposts to-
wards Woerth, and from the Badeners on the left, who
found the enemy retiriug westward. At night, the Crown
Prince's Army had not wholly crossed the frontier. In
front, were Hartmann's Bavarians at Lembaeh, the 5th
Corps before Woerth, the 11th, on the railway as far as
Surburg ; the Badeners on their left rear behind the Selz ;
Yon der Tann's Bavarians at Ingolsheim, and the head-
quarters and 4th Cavalry Division at Soultz, otherwise
Sulz. The 6th Corps — ^having one division at Landau,
formed a reserve. MacMahon's troops, except Conseil-
Dumesnil's division of the 7th Corps, near Hagenau,
were all in position between Morsbronn and Neehwiller
behind the Sulz and the Sauer, a continuous line of water
which separated the rival outposts. The Emperor had
placed the 5th Corps at the disposal of MacMahon, yet he
finally detained one-half of Lapasset*s division at Saaregue-
mines, and drew it to himself ; while that of Guyot de
Lespart was sent, on the 6th, towards Niederbronn, and
Goze's, not wholly assembled at Bitsche on the 5th, re-
92 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IV.
mained witli General de Faillj, who, at no moment in the
campaign — such was his ill-fortune — ^had his entire Corps
imder his orders.
French Position on the Soar.
We may now revert to the positions occupied bj the
rivals on both banks of the Saar, in order to complete the
survey of an extensive series of operations which stretched
without a break, in a military sense, from the Bhine
opposite Bastadt, towards the confluence of the Saar and
Moselle. If the German Head-Quarter Staff at Mainz,
considering how well it was served, and what pains were
taken to acquire information, remained in some doubt as to
the positions and projects of the Imperialists, at Metz, ill-
served and hesitating, all was bewilderment and conjecture.
Neither the Emperor Napoleon, nor his chief adviser
Marshal Lebceuf , seemed capable of grasping the situation
now rapidly becoming perilous to them ; they had, indeed,
fallen under an influence which tells so adversely on inferior
minds — dread of the adversary's combinations ; and, per-
plexed by the scraps of intelligence sent in from the front,
they adopted no decisive resolution, but waited helplessly
on events. No serious attempt was made to concentrate
the Army in a good position where it could flght, or
manoeuvre, or retreat, although, as General Frossard and
Marshal Bazaine both state such a central defensive position
had been actually studied and marked out, in 1867.
Whether the occupation of the country between Saareg^e-
mines and (Etingen would have produced a favourable
effect on the campaign or not, it would have prevented the
Army from being crushed in detail, and have given another
turn to the war. But there was no firmness nor insight at
Metz. The oirders issued by the Emperor look like the
CHAP. IV.] INVASION IN EARNEST. 98
work of an amateur who had read much of war, but who
possessed neither the instincts of the born soldier, nor the
indefatigable industry and business-like skill of a man who,
thrust into an unwonted employment, compelling him to
&ce hard realities, endeavours to cope with them by a steady
and intelligent application of the principles of common
sense.
On the morning of the 4th, the Emperor did no more
than shift his left wing a little nearer to his centre, by
bringing General de Ladmirault into closer contact with
Marshal Bazaine, leaving Frossard in front of Saarbruck,
and directing De FaiQy to assemble two divisions at
Bitsche, and report to Marshal MacMahon. The notion
prevailing in the Imperial head-quarters was, that the Ger-
mans designed to inarch upon Nancy, which was not their
plan at all, and that the 7th Corps, reported to be on the
march from Treves, might make an ofEensive movement to
protect Saarlouis, forgetting, as Frossard observes, that
their rule was concentration and not isolated operations ;
and that the railroad from Saarbruck afforded the only
serious inlet into Lorraine. In the evening the news of
Abel Douay's defeat and "wound," not death, reached
Metz, and created alarm, but did not cause any serious
modification of the Imperial plans. The next day the
Emperor, still retaining the supreme direction of the Army,
and keeping the Guard to himself, formally handed over
the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Corps to Marshal Bazaine, "for
military operations only;" and the 1st, 6th, partly at
Bitsche, and 7th, mainly at Belf ort, to Marshal MacMalion.
The incomplete 6th Corps, under Marshal Canrobert, had
not yet moved out from the camp at Chalons. Thus,
there were practically two Corps remote from the decisive
points, and one in an intermediate position, so handled by
the Imperial Commander as to be useless. Not only was
94 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IV
the force called out for war scattered over an extensive
area, but — ^and the fact should be borne in mind— the
fortresses were without proper and effectiye garrisons, and,
what was equally important, thej had no adequate stores
of provisions, arms, and mimitions ; while the great works
at Metz itself, upon which such reliance had been placed,
were far from being in a defensive condition. Early on
the 5th, in answer to a suggestion from Frossard, who
was always urging concentration, the Emperor directed
him, yet not until the 6th, to fix his head-quarters at For-
bach, and draw his divisions round about in such a manner
that, when ordered, he might remove his head- quarters to
St. Avoid ; instructions which left him in doubt, and in-
spired him with anxiety. During the evening, however,
acting on his own discretion, he thought it fit to place his
troops in fresh positions, somewhat to the rear on the up-
lands of Spicheren, with one division, upon higher ground
in the rear, yet that step, though an improvement, did not
remove his apprehension respecting his left flank, which
had been weakened by the withdrawal of Montaudon's
division of the 3rd Corps to Saareguemines. General
Frossard has been much censured, but he was a man of
real ability, and almost the only general who, from first to
last, always took the precaution of covering his front with
field works.
Oerman Position on the Soar,
We have indicated, in the preceding chapter, the stages
attained by the First and Second German Armies on the
4th ; and have now only to repeat, for the sake of clearness,
a summary of their array on the evening of the 5th. The
several Corps of the Second were still moving up towards
the Star. The 4th Corps was at Ein5d and Homburg,
CHAP. IV.] INVASION IN EARNEST. 96
the Guard near Landstuhl ; the 9th about Kaiserslautem,
and the 12th a march to the rear. Further westward,
the 10th halted at Ousel, and the 3rd was in its front,
between St. Wendel and Neunkirchen. The First Army
remained in the villages where it was located on the 4th,
that is the 7th and 8th between Lebach and Steinweiler,
with one division of the incomplete First Corps at Birken-
feld. On the evening of that day, however. General
Steinmetz issued an order of movement for the next,
which carried the leading columns of the 7th and 8th
close to Saarbruck, and, as a consequence, brought on
the battle of Spicheren, the narrative of which sanguinary
and spirited fight will fall into its natural place later
on. As the main current of the campaign flowed Metz*
ward, it will be convenient to recount, first, the opera-
tions of the Crown Prince's Army, which though in a
measure subsidiary, produced more telling and decisive
effects upon the fortunes of the French, than the engage-
ment which broke down their foremost line of battle on
the Saar.
CHAPTEE V.
TWO STAOGEBIHO BLOWS.
I. — Woerth.
ALIEIE in Alsace and Lorraine, the actions wMcli made
the 6th of August a date so memorable in this
swiftly moving war were undesigned on the part of the
assailant and unexpected on the part of the assailed. In
other words, as G-eneral von Moltke did not intend to throw
the force of his right and centre against the main body of
the Imperialists until all the Corps were closer to the
frontier and to each other, so the Crown Prince proposed
to employ the day in changing front from the south to the
west and then direct his serried lines upon the front and
flanks of MacMahon's Army, which he confidently expected
to find in position behind the Sulz and the Sauer, covering
the road to Bitsche. The despatches of the French Marital
also show that he counted on a day's respite, since his
orders to De Failly were that the two divisions commanded
by that ill-used officer were to march on the 6th to join
the 1st Corps, so that they might be in line to fight a
battle on the following day. But De Failly, harassed by
fluctuating orders from Metz, shifted hither and thither,
now to the right, now to the left, and never permitted to
keep his Corps in hand, was unable to do more than start
one division on the road to Eeichshof en, while he assembled
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 97
the other at Bitscbe, and left one-lialf the third on the
Saar to share the misfortunes of Napoleon and Bazaine.
No such hesitation and infirmity of purpose characterized
the conduct of the German commanders. They had well-
defined plans, indeed » and issued clear and precise orders,
yet both the one and the other were so framed that they
could be modified to deal with unexpected incidents, and
adapted at once to the actually ascertained circumstances
of the moment, which is the very essence of war. The
spirit of the German training gives a large discretion to
superior officers, who are taught to apply the rules issued
for their guidance to the military situation which, in the
field, is certain to vary from day to day, or even from hour
to hour. Moreover, a German general who attacks is
certain to receive the ready support of comrades who may
be near, while those more remote, who hear the sound of
battle or receive a request for help, at once hasten forward,
reporting the fact to, without awaiting orders from, su-
perior authority. Nothing testifies more effectively to the
soundness of the higher education in the Prussian military
system than the fact that it is possible not only to confer
these large powers on subordinates, but to encourage the
use of them. At the same time it must be acknowledged
that, in any army where the officers do not make the study
of war their daily and hourly business, and where the best
of the best are not selected for command and staff duty,
the latitude enjoyed by the Germans could not be granted,
because its capricious and unintelligent use would lead to
needless bloodshed, the frustration of great designs, and
perhaps shameful defeat.
It has been already stated that both commanders had
intended to assume the offensive and fight a battle on the
7 th, the Crown Prince proposing to bring up the greater
part of his Army and envelop the French, and Marshal
98 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
MacMahon, who thought he was dealing with the heads of
oolumns, having drawn up a plan to attack the Germans in
front with the 1st and turn their right flank with the 5th
Corps. Had he known how strong and how compact was
the array of his opponent he never could have framed a
scheme which would have transferred to the enemy all the
advantages possessed by himself. The contingency of a
forward movement on his part had been foreseen and
guarded against, and the precautions adopted on the
evening of the 5th would have become far more formidable
had the next day passed by without a battle. But those
very protective measures, as will be seen, tended to pre-
cipitate a conflict by bringing the troops into contact on
the front and left flank of the French position. Marshal
MacMahon had selected and occupied exceptionally strong
ground. He posted his divisions on a high plateau west of
the Sauer and the Sulz, between Neehwiller and Eberbach,
having Froeschwiller as a kind of redoubt in the centre,
and the wooded slopes of the hills running steeply down to
the brooks in his front. The left wing, where General
Ducrot commanded, was thrown back to guard the passages
through the woodlands, which led down the right bank of
the Sulz from Mattstal into the position. The centre
fronted Woerth, which was not occupied, and the right,
without leaning on any special protective obstacle, was in
the woods and villages south-east of Elsasshausen, with re-
serves in the rear which, says the German official narrative,
together with the open country, were a sufficient guard
against a direct flank attack, an opinion not justified by
the result* The Sauer was deep, the bridges had been
broken, and the ascents on the French side were prolonged,
except on one point, and swept by musketry and cannon.
Among the vines and copses, in the villages and farmsteads,
everywhere protected by open ground, over which an
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 99
assailant must pass, stood the French Armj — ^Ducrot on
tlie left, facing north-west, Eaoult in the centre, Lartigue
on the right, having behind him. Conseil - Dumesnil's
division of the 7th Corps. Pell^, who succeeded Abel
Douay. was in reserve ; and the cavalry were partly in tear
of the right, and partly, behind the centre. The official
German history speaks of the position as especially strong,
regards the mass of troops seated there, put down at forty-
five thousand men, as amply sufficient for a vigorous
defence, and contends that the defect of numbers was
balanced by a respectable artillery and the superiority of
the Chassepot over the far-famed needle-gun. A Bavarian
soldier-author, Captain Hugo Helvig, however, says that
the groimd held by the French had all the disadvantages
of so-called " unassailable *' positions — ^it had no issues to
the front, consequently the defenders could not become the
assailants ; its right was '' in the air " and its left " rested
on that most doubtful of all supports to wings — a wood."
Thus the Bavarian captain differs from the General Staff.
The fact seems to be that the position was so formidable
that it could only be carried by onsets on both flanks, which,
of course, implies that the assailant must have the control
of superior numbers. Another point to be noted is that
the great road to Bitsche was a prolongation of the front
and in rear of the left, and that, as happened, in case of a
severe defeat, the temptation would be all powerful to re-
treat by cross roads on Saveme, that is, away from instead
of towards the main body of the Imperial Army. Marshal
MacMahon had hoped to be the assailant, but he held that
if the German Army continued its march southward beyond
Hagenau, he would have to retreat, a movement the
Crown Prince was not likely to make, since the orders
from the King's head-quarters were to seek out and fight
the enemy wherever he might be found, a rule which
100 THE CAMPAIGN OF 8EDAV. [CHAP. V.
govemed all the German operations up to the fatal day of
Sedan.
Early on the morning of the 6th, the German columns
were approaching, from the north and the east, the strong
position just described. Hartmann's Bavarians, after
marching westward through the Hochwald to Mattstal,
had turned south .down the Sulzbach. The 5th Corps, in
position overnight at Preitschdorf , had, of course, strong
advanced posts between Goersdorf and Dieftenbach, while
Yon der Tann's Bavarians were on the march from Ingols-
heim, also through the lower Hochwald road, by Lamperts-
loch upon Goersdorf and the Saner. Further to the left,
the 11th Corps and Yon Werder's combined divisions
were wheeling up to the right, so as to extend the line
on the outer flank of the 5th Corps. The Hochwald rose
five or six hundred feet above the battlefield. Like most
uplands, it was intersected by vales and country roads, and
nearly every hollow had its beck which flowed into the
principal stream. This was the Sauer. Rising in hills
beyond Lembach, it ran in a southerly direction along the
whole German front, receiving the Sulz at Woerth, and
dividing into two streams opposite Gunstett. These greater
and lesser brooks, though spanned by few bridges, were well
supplied with mills, which always facilitate the passage of
streams. Large villages, also, filled up the valley bottoms
here and there, and the country abounded in cultivation.
Through this peopled and industrious region the main
roads ran from north to south, generally speaking, the road
and railway from Bitsche to Hagenau, and on to Strasburg,
passing in rear of MacMahon's position close to Niederbronn
and Beichshofen, and another highway to Hagenau, a
common centre for roads in these parts, descended from
Lembach, and, after crossing, followed the right bank of
the Sauer. Thus there were plenty of communications in
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGfeRM?a BtO^P^Si lOl
all directions, despite the elevated, wooded and broken
character of a district, wherein all arms could move freely,
except cavalry.
The BaMh Begins,
The action was brought on by the eagerness of each side
to discover the strength and intentions of the other. In
this way, General vonWalther, at daybreak, riding towards
the Sauer, hearing noises in the French camp, which he
construed to mean preparations for a retreat, ordered out a
battery and some infantry, to test the accuracy of his ob-
servations. The guns cannonaded Woerth, and the
skirmishers, finding the town unoccupied, but the bridge
broken, forded the stream, and advanced far enough to draw
fire from the French foot and four batteries. The Prussian
guns, though fewer, displayed that superiority over the
French which they maintained throughout, and the ob-
servant officers above Woerth knew, by the arrival of the
ambulance men on the opposite hills, that their shells had
told upon the enemy. The skirmish ceased after an hour
had passed, but it served to show that the French were
still in position. Opposite Gunstett there stood a Bruch-
Miihle, or mill in the marsh, and in this place the Germans
had posted a company, supported by another in the vines.
Their purpose was to protect the left flank of the 5th
Corps, and keep up a conne<^tion with the 11th, then on
the march. The French sent forward, twice, bodies of
skirmishers against the mill, supporting them the second
time by artillery, and setting the mill on fire ; but on
neither occasion did they press the attack, and the Germans
retained a .point of passage which proved useful later in
the day.
These afEairs at Woerth and Gunstett ceased about eight
» • »
10a\ ^ :'.'; ; - vXHj:i CA^JPi^iG^ OF sedan. [chap. v.
o'clock, but the cannonade at the former, echoing among
the hills to the north, brought the Bavarians down the
Sulz at a sharp pace, and thus into contact with Ducrot's
division. For General Hartmann, on the highlands, could
see the great camp about Froesch wilier, and, directing his
4th Division on that place, and ordering up the reserve
artillery from Mattstal, the General led his men quickly
down the valley. An ineffective exchange of cannon-shots
at long range ensued ; but as the Bavarians emerged into
the open, they came within reach of the French artillery.
Nevertheless they persisted, until quitting the wood, they
were overwhelmed by the Chassepot and fell back. A stiff
conflict now arose on a front between Neehwiller and the
Saw Mill on the Sulz, and even on the left bank of this
stream, down which the leading columns of a Bavarian
brigade had made their way. In short, Hartmann's zealous
soldiers, working forward impetuously, had fairly fastened
on to the French left wing, striking it on the flank which
formed an angle to the main line of battle, and holding it
firmly on the ground. The French, however, had no thought
of retiring, and besides, at that moment, they had the
vantage. When the combat had lasted two hours, Geneiul
von Hartmann received an order directing him to break it
off, and he began at once his preparations to withdraw.
The task was not easy, and before it was far advanced a
request arrived from the Commander of the 5th Corps for
support, as he was about to assail the heights above Woerth.
It was heartily complied with, all the more readily, as the
roar of a fierce cannonade to the south swejpt up the valley ;
but as the Bavarians had begun to withdraw, some time
elapsed before the engagement on this side could be
strenuously renewed.
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 103
Attach on Woerth,
We have already said that the Crown Prince, not having
all his Corps in compact order, did not intend to fight a
battle until the next daj. But what befell was this. The
officer at the head of the staff of the 5th Corps reached
the front after the reconnaissance on Woerth was over.
Just as he rode up, the smoke of Hartmann's guns was
visible on one side, and the noise of the skirmishers at
Gunstett on the other. In order to prevent the French
from overwhelming either, it was agreed, there and then,
to renew the contest, and shortly after nine o'clock the
artillery of the 5th Corps, ranged on the heights, opened
fire. At the same time, a portion of the 11th Corps,
hearing the guns, had moved up rapidly towards G-unstett,
and three of their batteries were soon in line. Thus, the
Bavarians rushed into battle in order to support the 5th
Corps, this body resumed the combat to sustain the
Bavarians, and the advanced guard of the 11th fell on
promptly, because the 5th seemed in peril The Prussian
artillery soon quelled, not the ardour, but the fire of the
French gunners ; and then the infantry, both in the centre
and on the left, went steadily into action, passing through
Woerth, and beginning to creep up the opposite heights.
They made no way, and many men fell, while further down
the stream, opposite Spachbach and Gunstett, part of the
troops which had gone eagerly towards the woods, were
smitten severely, and driven back headlong over the river.
Still some climg to the hollow ways, Woerth was always
held fast, and when the foot recoiled before the telling
Chassepot, the eighty -four pieces in battery lent their aid,
averted serious pursuit, and flung a shower of shells into
the woods. It was at this period that the defect of the
French position became apparent. If the hardy Guuls
104 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
could repel an onset, they could not, in turn, deliver a
counter stroke, because the advantages of the defensive
would pass, in that case, to the adversary. But the Ger-
mans across the Sauer, who still held their ground, had
much to endure, and were only saved by the arrival of fresh
troops, and by seeking every available shelter from the in-
cessant rifle flre. In the meantime, the 11th Corps was
marching to the sound of the guns. General von Bose,
its commander, had reached Gunstett in the forenoon, and,
seeing how matters stood, had called up his nearest division,
had ordered the other to advance on the left, and had in-
formed Von Werder that an action had begun, in conse-
quence whereof the Badeners and Wurtembergers were also
directed on the Sauer.
It was about one o'clock when the Crown Prince rode up
to the front and took command. He had ridden out from
Soultz at noon, because he plainly heard the soimds of
conflict, and on his road had been met by an officer from
Von Kirchbach, bearing a report which informed the Com-
mander-in-Chief that it was no longer possible to stop the
fray. At the time he arrived, the advanced brigade of Von
der Tann's Bavarians had thrust itself into the gap between
Preuschdorf and Goersdorf , and had brought three batteries
into action, but the remainder of the Corps were still in the
rear. The Crown Prince thus found his front line engaged
without any reserve close at hand, and that no progress had
been made either on the centre or the wings ; but he knew
that the latter would be quickly reinforced, and that the
former, sustained by two hundred guns, constituted an
ample guarantee against an offensive movement. No better
opportunity of grappling with a relatively weak enemy was
likelv to occur, and it was to be feared that if the chance
were offered, he would escape from a dangerous situation
by skilfully extricating his Army. The Crown Prince,
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 106
therefore, determined to strike home, yet qualifying his
boldness with caution, he still wished to delay the attack in
front and flank until the troops on the march could reach
the battlefield. No such postponement was practicable,
even if desirable, because the fighting Commander of the
5th Corps had already, before the advice came to hand,
flung his foremost brigades over the Sauer. So the action
was destined to be fought out, from beginning to end, on
places extemporized by subordinate officers ; but they were
adapted to the actual facts, and in accordance with the
main idea which was sketched by the Chief. It may be
said, indeed, that the battle of Woerth was brought on,
worked out, and completed by the Corps commanders;
and the cheerful readiness with which they supported each
other, furnished indisputable testimony to the soundness
of their training, the excellence of the bodies they com-
manded, and the formidable character, as well as the
suppleness of the military institutions, which, if not
founded, had been carried so near to perfection by Von
Soon, Yon Moltke and the King.
Begun in the early morning by a series of skirmishes on
the river front, the action had developed into a battle
at mid-day. The resolute Yon Kirchbach, acting on his
own responsibility, had thrown the entire 5th Corps into
the fight ; yet so strong was the position occupied by
the defenders, that a successful issue depended upon the
rapidity and energy with which the assaults on both flanks
were conducted by brigades and divisions only then enter-
ing one after the other upon a fiercely contested field. At
mid-day, the French line of battle had been nowhere broken
or imperilled. Hartmann's Bavarians on one side had
been checked; the advance brigade of the 11th Corps,
on the other, had been driven back over the Sauer, and
Lartigue's troops were actually pressing upon the bridges
106 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
near the mill in the marsh, which, however, they could not
pass. The enormous line of German guns restrained and
punished the French infantry, when not engaged in silenc-
ing the inferior artillery of the defender. But no impres-
sion had been made upon the wooded heights filled with
the soldiers of Ducrot, upon Eaoult's men in the centre
above Woerth, or on Lartigue's troops, who, backed by
Conseil-Dumesnil, stood fast about Morsbronn, Eberbach,
and Elsasshausen. So it was at noon, when the hardihood
of Yon Kirchbach forced on a decisive issue. Passing his
men through, and on both sides of Woerth, he began a
series of sustained attacks upon Eaoult, who stiffly con-
tested every foot of woodland, and even repelled the assail-
ants, who, nevertheless, fighting with perseverance, and
undismayed by the slaughter, gradually gained a little
ground on both sides of the road to Froeschwiller. By
comparatively slow degrees, they crept up the slopes, and
established a front of battle ; but the regiments, battalions,
companies, were all mixed together, and, as the officers fell
fast, the men had often to depend upon themselves. While
these alternately advancing, receding, and yet again advanc-
ing troops were grappling with the centre, Hartmann re-
newed his onsets, part of Von der Tann's Corps dashed
over the Sauer, filling up the gap in the line, and joining
his right to Hartmann*s left; and the leading brigades
of a fresh division of the 11th Corps, moving steadily
and swiftly over the river below Gunstett, backed by all
the cannon which the nature of the ground permitted the
gunners to use, assailed the French right with measured
and sustained fury, and, indeed, decided the battle.
Attack on the French right.
The French were posted in great force on their right
— ^where they had two divisions, one in rear of the other.
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 107
between the Sauer and the Eberbach, haying in support a
powerful brigade of horsemen, Cuirassiers and Lancers,
under General Michel. The infantry, as a rule, faced to
the eastward ; while the attacking columns not only fronted
to the westward, but also to the north-west; in other
words, they fastened on the front from Spachbach, struck
diagonally at the outer flank from Morsbronn, and even
swept round towards the rear. The area of the combat on
this part of the field was included on an oblong space
bounded on the west by the Eberbach, and on the east by
the Sauer, having Morsbronn at the south-eastern angle
and outside the French lines ; Albrechtshauser, a large
farmstead, a httle to the north of the former, and opposite
Gunstett; and beyond that point to the north-west the
undulating wooded uplands, called the Niederwald, whence
the ground slightly fell towards Elsasshausen, and rose
again to a greater height at Froeschwiller, the centre and
redoubt of the position. As the 22nd Division of the 11th
Corps came up from Durrenbach, they broke obliquely
into this oblong, the direction of their attack mainly follow*
ing the cross road through the forest from Morsbronn to
Elsasshausen, while their comrades pierced the woods to
the north of the great farmstead. No difficulty was en-
countered in expelling the handful of French from the
village, but at the farm the Germans had a sharper combat,
which they won by a converging movement, yet the de-
fenders had time to retire into the forest. Thus two useful
supports were secured, almost perpendicular to the French
flank, and the pathways leading towards Eeichshofen were
uncovered. General Lartigue at once discerned the peril*
and, in order that he might obtain time to throw back his
right, he directed General Michel to charge the left flank of
the Germans before they could recover from the confusion
consequent on a rapid and irregular advance through the
108 THE CAMPAIGN OF. SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
villages, outbuildings, and hopfields, and array a less
broken front.
The French cavalry appear to have considered that their
main function was restricted to combats in great battles.
The traditions handed down from the days of Kellerman
and Murat and Lasalle survived in all their freshness, and
the belief prevailed that a charge of French horseman,
pushed home, would ride over any infantry, even in serried
formation. They had disdained to reckon with the breech-
loader in the hands of cool, well-disciplined opponents;
and as their chance of acting on their convictions had
come, so they were ready and willing to prove how strong
and genuine was their faith in the headlong valour of
resolute cavaliers. Instead of using one regiment, Michel
employed both, and a portion of the 6th Lancers as well.
He started forth from his position near Eberbach, his
horsemen formed in echelon from the right, the 8th Cuiras-
siers leading in column of squadrons, followed by the 9th
and the Lancers. Unluckily for them, they had to traverse
ground unsuitable for cavalry. Here groups of trees, there
stumps, and again deep drains, disjointed the close forma-
tions, and when they emerged into better galloping ground,
indeed before they had quitted the obstructions, these
gallant fellows were exposed to the deadly fire of the
needle-gun. Nevertheless, with fiery courage, the Cuiras-
siers dashed upon the scattered German infantry, who,
until the cavalry approached, had been under a hail of
shot from the Chassepots in the Niederwald. Yet the
Teutons did not quail, form square, or run into groups —
they stood stolidly in line, hurled out a volley at three
hundred yards, and then smote the oncoming horsemen
with unintermitted fire. The field was soon strewn with
dead and wounded men and horses ; yet the survivors
rushed on, and sought safety by riding round the Gkrman
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 109
line or through the village, where they were brought to bay,
and captured by the score. Each ' regiment, as it rode
hardily into the fray, met with a similar fate, and even the
fugitives who got into the rear were encountered by a
Prussian Hussar regiment, and still further scattered, so
that very few ever wandered back into the French lines.
As a charge Michel's valiant onset was fruitless ; yet the
sacrifice of so many brave horsemen secured a great object
— ^it enabled General Lartigue to throw back his right, re-
arrange his defensive line in the woods, and renew the con-
test by a series of violent counter-attacks.
A furious outburst of the French infantry from the
south-west angle of the Niederwald overpowered the Ger-
man infantry, and drove them completely out of the farm-
stead so recently won. Yet the victors could not hold the
place, because the batteries north of Q-unstett at once
struck and arrested them with a heavy fire, which gave
time for fresh troops to move rapidly into line, restore the
combat, and once more press back the dashing French in-
&ntry into the wood. On this point the fighting was
rough and sustained, for the French charged again and
again, and did not give way until the Germans on their
right, forcing their way through the wood, had crowned a
summit which turned the Hne. The sturdy adversary, who
yielded slowly, was now within the forest, and the €brman
troops on the left had come up to Eberbach, capturing
MacMahon's baggage, thus developing a connected front
from stream to stream across the great woodland. In
short, nearly all the 11th Corps was solidly arrayed, and
in resistless motion upon the exposed flank of Mac-
Mahon's position, while part of the Wurtembergers, with
some horse, were stretching forward beyond the Eber-
bach, and heading for Beichshofen itself. The Germans^
indeed, had gained the north-western border of the wood-
110 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CIIAP. V
land, and General von Bose had ordered the one-half of
his guns and his reserve of foot to cross the Sauer, and
push the battle home. His right was now in connection
with the left of the 5th Corps, which had continued its
obstinate and sanguinary conflict with Raoult's division on
both sides of the road from Woerth to Froeschwiller, with-
out mastering much ground. As the Bavarians were
equally held at bay by the French left, the issue of the
battle plainly depended on the vigorous and unfaltering
energies of the 11th Corps.
Attack on Elscbsshausen.
That fine body had been in action for two hours and a
half, and, despite a long march on to the field, was still
fresh, its too impetuous advanced brigade, alone, having
been roughly handled, and thrust back earlier in the day.
The task now before them was the capture of Elsasshausen,
which would open the road to Froeschwiller, take off the
pressure from the 5th Corps, place Ducrot's steadfast
infantry in peril, and enable the whole available mass of
German troops to close in upon the outnumbered remnant of
MacMahon's devoted Army. For these brave men, although
obliged to give ground, were fighting in a manner worthy
of their old renown, now dashing forward in vehement
onslaughts, again striking heavy blows when overpowered
and thrust back. Lartigue*s and some of Baoult's troops
stood on the right and left of Elsasshausen, supported by
batteries on the higher ground, and two cavalry brigades
in a hollow near the Eberbach. The foremost infantry
occupied a copse which was separated from the main forest
by a little glade, and this defensive wooded post had, so
far, brought the extreme right of the 11th Corps to a
stand. About half -past two, the centre and left had come
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. Ill
up to the north-western edge of the Niederwald, and thus
the French in the copse had fresh foes on their hands.
Thej replied bj a bold attack upon the adversary, whose
front lines of skirmishers were immediately driven in.
The gallant effort carried the assailants into the great
wood, but not far ; for behind the flying skirmishers, on
both sides of the road, were troops which had more or less
maintained a compact formation. Instead of yielding
before the French advance, the Q-erman infantry, accepting
the challenge, came steadily forward along the whole front,
bore down the skirmishers, dispersed the supporting bat-
talion, and, following the enemy with unfaltering steps,
crossed the glade, and drove him into, and out of, the
copse- wood, which had hitherto been an impassable obstacle.
As the entire line rushed forward, they arrived at the skirt
of the wood, and, coming at once xmder the fire of the
French guns on the heights, and the infantry in Elsass-
hausen, they suffered severe losses. Then their own artil-
lery drove up and went into action, setting the village on
fire, yet not dismaying its garrison. The tension was so
great, and the men fell so fast, that General von Bose
resolved to risk a close attack upon an enemy whose
position was critical, and whose endurance had been put to
so exhausting a strain.
Thereupon, at the welcome signal, the bands of dis-
ordered foot soldiers — for nearly every atom of regular
formation had long disappeared — dashed, with loud shouts,
into the French position, carrying the village at a bound,
and, pushing up the hillsides, took two guns and five
mitrailleuses. The troops of the 11th had now crossed
the deep road running south-westward from Woerth, had
effected a junction with groups of several regiments be-
longing to the 5th, which formed a sort of spray upon
the inner flank; and had besides, as already noted, ex-
112 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
tended soutli- westward towards the road to Eeiclisliofen.
Once more the French strove, if .not to retrieve a lost
battle, at least to insure time for retreat. They fell upon
the Germans along the whole line, making great gaps in
its extent, and driving the adversary into the forest ; but
here, again, the artillery saved the foot, and, by its daring
and effective fire, restored the battle, giving the much-
tried infantry time to rally, and return upon their tracks.
The Germans had barely time to recover from the con-
fusion into which they had been thrown by a furious onset,
than the four Cuirassier regiments, commanded by General
Bonnemains, were seen preparing to charge. Unluckily for
these stout horsemen, the tract over which they had to
gallop was seamed with deep ditches, and barred by rows
of low trees, so that not only could no compact formation
be maintained, but the cavaliers were not, in some in-
stances, able to reach their foes, who were well sheltered
among the vine-stocks, and behind the walls of the hop-
gardens. Moreover, the German infantry were assisted by
batteries of guns, which were able to begin with shells, and
end with grape-shot. The cavalry did all they could to close ;
but their efforts were fruitless, and the enormous loss they
endured may be fairly regarded as a sacrifice willingly
made to gain time for the now hardly bested army to
retire.
MacMahon Orders a Metreat,
Indeed, the hour when a decision must be taken had
struck, and MacMahon, who had cleverly fought his battle,
did not hesitate. He determined to hold Froeschwiller as
long as he could to cover the retreat, and then fly to
Saveme. For, although neither Hartmann nor Von der
Tann, despite their desperate onsets, had been able to shake
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGEBING BLOWS. 113
or dismay Ducrot, still, he was well aware that Baoult's and
Lartigue's divisions had been driven back upon Froesch-
willer, and he could see from the heights one fresh column
of Bavarians moving towards Neehwiller, on his left, and
another descending from the Hochwald to join the throng
on the right bank of the Sulz. Moreover, two brigades
of Wurtembergers had come up to support the 11th
Corps, and one part of them, with horsemen and guns,
threatened Eeichshofen,. a Bavarian brigade, as we have
said, was heading for Niederbronn. In addition, some of
Ducrot's intrenchments were carried by a Prussian
Begiment on the right of the 5th Corps, and it was
evident that the fierce struggle for Froeschwiller would be
the last and final act of the tragedy. Yet, so slowly did
the French recede, that an hour or more was consumed in
expelling them from their last stronghold ; and except on
that point, their does not seem to have been any serious
fighting. The reason was that the place was held to
facilitate the withdrawal of such troops as could gain the
line of retreat, and although the disaster was great, it
would have been greater had not Baoult, who was wounded
and captured in the village, done his uttermost to with-
Btand the concentric rush of his triumphant enemies.
The Close of the Battle,
No specific and detailed account, apparently, exists, of
this last desperate stand. But it is plain that, as the
French centre and right yielded before Von Kirchbach and
especially Von Bose, as the impetuous infantry onsets were
fruitless, as the cavalry had been destroyed and the French
guns could not bear up against the accurate and constant
fire of their opponents, so the Germans swept onwards and
almost encircled their foes. When Ducrot began to retire,
z
114 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
the Bavarians sprang forward up the steeps and through
the woods, which had held them so long at bay ; the stout
and much-tried 5th Corps pushed onward, and the 11th,
already on the outskirts of Froeschwiller and extending
beyond it, broke into its south-eastern and southern de-
fences ; so that portions of all the troops engaged in this
sanguinary battle swarmed in, at last, upon the devoted
band who hopelessly, yet nobly, clung to the final barrier.
How bravely and steadfastly they fought may be inferred
from the losses inflicted upon the Germans, whose officers,
foremost among the confused crowd of mingled regiments
and companies, where heavily punished, whose rank and
file went down in scores. Even after the day had been
decided, the French in Froeschwiller still resisted, and the
combats there did not cease until five o'clock. But in the
open the Q-erman flanking columns had done great execu-
tion on the line of retreat. A mixed body of Prussian and
Wurtemberg cavalry had ridden up on the extreme left,
one Bavarian brigade had moved through Neehwiller upon
Niederbronn, and another had marched through Froesch-
willer upon Eeichshofen. The horsemen kept the fugi-
tives in motion and captured materiel ; l^e first mentioned
Bavarian brigade struck the division of General Guyot de
Lespart, which had reached Niederbronn from Bitsche;
and the second bore down on Beichshof en. The succouring
division had arrived only in time to share the common
calamity, for assailed by the Bavarians and embarrassed by
the flocks of fugitives, one-half retreated with them upon
Saverne, and the other hastily retraced its steps to Bitsche,
marching through the summer night. The battle had been
so destructive and the pursuit so sharp that the wrecks of
MacMahon's shattered host hardly halted by day or night
until they had traversed the country roads leading upon
Saverne, whence they could gain the western side of the
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 116
Vosges. Nor did all his wearied soldiers follow tliis path
of safety. Many fled through Hagenau to Strasburg,
more retreated with the brigade of Abbatucci to Bitsche,
and nine thousand two hundred officers and men remained
behind as prisoners of war. The Marshal's Armj was
utterly ruined, Strasburg was uncovered, the defiles of the
Vosges, except that of Phalsbourg, were open to the invader
who, in addition to the mass of prisoners, seized on the
field, in some cases after a brilliant combat, twenty-eight
guns, five mitrailleuses, one eagle, four flags, and much
materiel of war. The actual French loss in killed and
wounded during the fight did not exceed six thousand;
while the victors, as assailants, had no fewer than 489
officers and 10,153 men killed and wounded. It was a
heavy penalty, and represents the cost of a decisive battle
when forced on by the initiative of Corps commanders
before the entire force available for such an engagement
could be mai'ched up within striking distance of a confident
and expectant foe.
One other consequence of an unforeseen engagement was
that the 5th Division of cavalry, which would have been
so useful towards the close of the day, was unable to enter
the field until nightfall. The Crown Prince and General
Blumenthal, not having the exact information which might
have been supplied by horsemen who rode at the heels of
the fugitives, remained in doubt as to the line or lines of
retreat which they followed. It was not until the next
day that reports were sent in which suggested rather than
described whither the French Army had gone. Prince
Albrecht, who led the cavalry, had hastened forward to
Ingweiler,on the road to Saveme, but he notified that, thougl
a considerable body had fled by this route, the larger par
had retired towards Bitsche. Later on the 7th he entered
Steinburg, where he was in contact with the enemy, but, as
116 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
infantry were seen, he was apprehensive of a night attack
from Saveme, and judged it expedient to fall back upon
Buchswiller. The division had ridden more than forty
miles in a difficult country during the day. Prom the
north-west came information that the patrols of the 6th
Corps had been met at Dambach, and that the French were
not visible anywhere. The explanation of this fact is that
one division of the 6th, directed on Bitsche, had, in antici-
pation of orders, pushed troops into the hills, and had thus
touched the right of the main body. The reason why
neither MacMahon nor De Failly were discovered was that
the Marshal had fallen back to Sarrebourg, and that the
General had hurried to join him by Petite-Pierre; and
thus contact with the enemy was lost by the Germans be-
cause the defiles of the Yosges were left without defenders.
2. — SpicTieren.
As the critical hours drew nearer when the capacity of
the Emperor Napoleon and Marshal Leboeuf, applied to
the conduct of a great war, was to be put to the severest
test, so their hesitation increased and their inherent unfit-
ness for the heavy task became more and more apparent.
Marshal Bazaine had been intrusted with the command of
three corps " for military operations only," yet the supreme
control was retained in Metz, and the Corps commanders
looked more steadily in that direction than they did towards
the Marshal's head-quarters at St. Avoid. Along the
whole front, at every point, an attack by the enemy was
apprehended. General de Ladmirault was convinced that
the 7th Prussian Corps would strive to turn his left ;
Marshal Bazaine was disturbed by the fear that the same
body of troops would come upon him from Saarlouis;
General Froesard felt so uncomfortable in the angle or
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 117
curve on the Saar, which he occupied, that he vehemently
desired to see the Army concentrated in the position of
Cadenbronn, a few miles to the rear of Spicheren ; Qeneral
MontaudoD, who had a division at Sarreg^emines, was
certain that the enemy intended to' swoop down upon him ;
and General de Failly was in daily alarm lest the Prussians
should advance upon the gap of Rohrbach: At Metz all
these conflicting surmises weighed upon, we might almost
say collectively gaverned the Emperor and the Marshal,
who issued, recalled, qualified, and again issued perplexing
orders. It is true that, owing to the supineness of the
cavah-y, and the indifference of the peasantry on the border,
they were without any authentic information ; but if that
had been supplied it is very doubtful whether they would
have been able to profit by it ; and they were evidently
unable to reason out a sound plan which would give them
the best chances of thwarting the adversary's designs or of
facing them on the best terms. The sole idea which pre-
vailed was that every line should be protected ; and thus,
on the 5th, the Guard was at Courcelles ; Bazaine's four
divisions, hitherto echeloned on the line from St. Avoid
to Forbach, were strung out on a country road between St.
Avoid and Sarreguemines ; De Ladmirault, who had been
ordered to approach the Marshal, misled by the apparition
of Prussian patrols, gave only a partial effect to the order ;
while Frossard, on the evening of that day, instead of the
next morning, made those movements to the rear which
attracted the notice of his opponents and drew them upon
him. At dawn on the 6th, " the Army of the Ehine " was
posted over a wide space in loosely-connected groups ; yet,
despite all the errors committed, there were still three
divisions sufficiently near the 2nd Corps on the Spicheren
heights to have converted the coming defeat into a brilliant
victory. That great opportunity was lost, because the
118 THE CAMPAION OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
soldierlj spirit and the warlike training, in wMcli the
French were deficient, were displayed to such an aston-
ishing degree by the Germans whom thej had so unwisely
despised.
The watchful cavalry on the right bank of the Saar had
noted at once the retrograde movement which General
Frossard effected on the evening of the 5th, and the German
leaders were led to infer from the tenour of the reports
sent in, that the whole French line was being shifted to the
rear, which was not a correct inference at that moment.
Yet it was true and obvious that Frossard had withdrawn
from the hills in close proximity to Saarbruck. In ordei
to ascertain, if possible, how far and in what degree the
French had retired, small parties of horsemen crossed the
river soon after daylight, and rode, not only along the
direct route to Forbach, until they were stopped by cannon
fire, but swept round the left flank, and even looked into
the rear, observed the French camps, and alarmed both
Marshal Bazaine and General de Ladmirault. Above
Sarreguemines they tried to break up the railway, and did
destroy the telegraph ; and thus, by appearing on all sides,
these enterprising mounted men filled the adversary with
apprehensions, and supplied their own Generals with sound
intelligence. Some information, less inaccurate than usual,
must have reached the Imperial head-quarters at Metz,
seeing that a telegram sent thence, between four and five
in the morning, warned Frossard that he might be seriously
attacked in the course of the day ; but it does not appear
that the same caution was transmitted to Bazaine, with or
without instructions to support his comrade. It is a nice
question whether the geneitil conduct of the war suffered
the greater damage from the active interference or the
negligence of the Emperor and his staff.
While the cavalry were keeping the French well in view,
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 119
the leading columns of the 7th and 8th Corps were moving
up towards the Saar, and one division of the Third was
equaUj on the alert. General von Bheinbaben had al-
ready ridden over the unbroken bridges, had posted
some squadrons on the lower ground, and had drawn, a
sharp fire from the French guns. The German staff were
astonished when they learned that the bridges had not
been injured. The reason was soon apparent. The
Emperor still cherished the illusion that he might be able
to assume the offensive, a course he had prepared for by
collecting large magazines at Forbach and Sarreguemines
on the very edge of the frontier; and his dreams were now
to be dispelled by the rude touch of the zealous and master-
ful armies whose active outposts were now over the Saar.
The Battle-field.
The ground occupied by the 2nd Corps was an undulat-
ing upland lying between the great road to Metz and the
river, which, running in a northerly direction from the
spurs of the Vosges, turns somewhat abruptly to the west
a couple of miles above Saarbruck on its way to the Moselle.
The heights of Spicheren, partly wooded and partly bare,
fall sharply to the stream in the front and on the eastern
flank, while on the west lies the hollow through which the
highway and the railroad have been constructed. The
foremost spur of the mass, separated by a valley from the
Spicheren hills, is a narrow rocky eminence, which Frossard
names the Spur, and the Germans call the Botheberg, or
Eed Hill, because its cliffs were so bright in colour, and
shone out conspicuously from afar. On the French right
of this rugged cliff were dense woods, and on the left the
vale, having beyond it more woods, and towards Forbach,
farms, houses and factories. The upper or southern end
120 THE CAKPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. T.
was almost dosed by the large yillage of Stiring-Wendel,
inhabited by workers in iron, and having on the outskirts
those unseemly mounds of slag with which this useful in-
dustry defaces the aspect of nature. The village stands
between the road and railway, and as the heights rise
abruptly on each side, all the approaches, except those
through the woods on the west and north-west, were com-
manded by the guns and infantry on the slopes. It should
be noted that west of the neck which connected the red
horse-shoe shaped hill with the central heights in front of
Spicheren village, there is a deep, irr^ular, transversal
valley, which proved useful to the defence. General
Frossard placed Laveaucoupet's division upon the Spicheren
hills, in two lines, and occupied the Bed Hill, which he
had intrenched, with a battalion of Chasseurs. In rear of
all stood Bataille's division at (Etingen. On the left front,
Jolivet's brigade of Vei^^s division occupied Stiring, and
Yalaze's was placed to the west of Forbach, looking down
the road to Saarlouis. As Frossard dreaded an attack'
from that side, especially as the road up the valley from
Bosseln turned the position, his engineer-general threw up
a long intrenchment, barring the route. It was in this
order that the 2nd Corps stood when some daring German
horsemen trotted up the high road to feel for it, while
others, on the west, pressed so far forward that they dis-
cerned the camps at St. Avoid. Below the front of the
position, and just outside Saarbruck, the foot-hills, £ep-
pertsberg, Gkklgenberg, Winterberg, and so on, and the
hollows among them were unoccupied by the French, and
it was into and upon these that Kheinbaben pushed with
his cavalry and guns, which, from the Parade ground, ex-
changed shots with the French pieces established on the
Bed Hill or Spur.
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 121
The Ctermans begin the Fight.
Oti the German side, the determination to lay hands
upon, and arrest what was supposed to be a retreating
enemy, was identical and simultaneous; and it is the
spontaneous actiyity of every officer and soldier within
reach, to share in the conflict which is the characteristic
of the day's operations. General Kameke, commanding
the 14th Division, 7th Corps, when on the march, heard
that Frossard had drawn back, and, asking whether he
might cross the river, was told to act on his own judg-
ment ; so he pressed southward. General G-oeben, chief
of the 8th Corps, had ridden out to judge for himself, and
finding his comrades of the 7th ready to advance, offered
his support. General von Alvensleben, commanding the
3rd Corps, a singularly alert and ready officer, ordered
up his 5th Division, commanded by General von Stiilp-
nagel, but before the order arrived. General Doering,
who had been early to the outposts, had anticipated the
command, because he thought that Kameke might be
overweighted. General von Schwerin, later in the day,
collected his brigade at St. Ingbert, and sent a part of
them forward by rail. In like manner General von
Bamekoff, commanding the 16th Division, 8th Corps,
hearing the sound of artillery, had anticipated the desire
of Goeben, and by mid-day his advanced guard, under
Colonel von Eex, was close upon the scene of action.
General von Zastrow, who had permitted Kameke to do
what he thought fit, applied to Von Steinmetz for leave to
push forward the whole 7th Corps, and the fiery veteran
at once complied, saying, "The enemy ought to be
punished for his negligence," a characteristic yet not
necessarily a wise speech, as the business of a General is
not to chastise even the negligent, unless it serves the main
122 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
purpose of the operations in hand. Thus we see that the
mere noise of battle attracted the Germans from all
quarters ; and hence it happened that the fronts of the
two armies, then in line of march, hastened into a fight by
degrees — in detachments, so to speak — which would have
produced a heavy reverse had all the French brigade and
divisional commanders who were within hail, been as
prompt, persistent and zealous as their impetuous oppo-
nents.
Until near noontide, there had been merely a bickering
of outposts, chiefly on the north-western side ; and it was
only when the 14th Division crossed the river and moved
up the foothills, that the action really began. At this
time it was still supposed that the battalions, batteries, and
sections of horsemen visible were a rear-guard, covering
what is now called the "entrainment" of troops at Forbach;
for the greater part of Laveaucoupet's soldiers were below
the crests, and in the forest-land, while Jolivet's brigade
made no great show in and about the village of Stiring.
Kameke's young soldiers went eagerly and joyously into
their first battle. They consisted of six battalions, led by
General von Fran9ois, and were soon extended from the
Metz road on the German right, to the wooded ascents
east of the Eed Hill, which, in reality, became the main
object of attack. The plan followed was the favourite
tactical movement, so often practised with success — a
direct onset on the enemy's front, and an advance on both
flanks. These operations were supported by the fire of
three batteries, which soon obliged the French gunners on
the Eed Spur to recede. An extraordinary and almost
indescribable infantry combat now began over a wide space,
sustained by the battalions of the 14th Division fighting
by companies. On one side they endeavoured to approach
Stiring ; in the centre they were a long time huddled
CHAP, v.] TWO STA60ERIN6 BLOWS. 123
together under the craigs of the Botheberg; further to
the left thej dashed into the Giffert Wald, and emerged
into comparatively open ground, only to find ihemselYes
shattered by a heavy fire, and obliged to seek cover. For
the battalions engaged soon discovered that» instead of
a rear-guard, they had to encounter half a corps cTarmee ;
and, although reinforcements were rapidly approaching,
yet, as the afternoon wore on, it became evident that the
assailants could only maintain their footing by displaying
great obstinacy, and enduring bitter losses. After two
hours' hard fighting five fresh battalions, belonging to
Yon Woyna's brigade of Kameke's division came into
action on the right, and sought to operate on the French
left flank, some following the railway, others pressing
into the thick woods on the west. The density of the
copses threw the lines into confusion, so that the com.
panies were blended, and, as guidance was almost im-
possible, trust had to be reposed in the soldierly instincts
and training alike of of&cers and men, and on the genuine
comradeship so conspicuous throughout all ranks of the
Prussian Army. Practically, at this moment, the French,
although beset on all sides by their enterprising foes, had
a distinct advantage, for they smote the venturesome
columns as they emerged here and there, and it may be
said that, between three and four o'clock, the German
artillery on the Galgenberg and Folster Hohe, held the
French in check, and averted an irresistible offensive
movement. Yet the German infantry were tenacious;
when pressed back they collected afresh in groups, and
went on again ; and General Frossard was so impressed by
the audacity of his foes, that he brought up Bat-aille's
division from CEtingen, and directed Valaze to quit the
hill above Forbach, and reinforce the defenders of Stiring.
Indeed, threatened on both flanks, the whole of the 2nd
124 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
Corps was gradually drawn into the fraj, and its com-
mander, though somewhat late, appealed for aid to Mar-
shal Bazaine, who himself did not feel secure at St. Avoid.
The Bed Hill Stormed.
Shortly after three o'clock, General von Francois, obey-
ing the orders of his chief, Von Kameke, resolved to storm
the Eed Hill. The German leader was under the im-
pression that the French were yielding on all sides, which
was not strictly correct, for the fresh troops were just
coming into action, and the Germans were superior, alone,
in the range and accuracy of their superb artillery. The
gallant Fran9ois, sword in hand, leading the Fusilier
battalion of the 74th Begiment, climbed the steep, spring-
ing from ledge to ledge, and dashed over the crest, and
drove the surprised French chasseurs out of the foremost
intrenchment, and fastened themselves firmly on the hill.
The Chasseurs, who had retired into a second line of
defences, poured in a murderous fire ; General von Fran9ois,
heading a fresh onset, fell pierced by five bullets, yet
lived long enough to feel that his Fusiliers and a company
of the 39th, which had clambered up on the left, had
gained a foothold they were certain to maintain. There
were many brilliant acts of heroism on that day, but the
storming of the Bed Hill stands out as the finest example
of soldiership and daring. Nor less so the stubbornness
with which the stormers stood fast; especially as the
French, at that moment, had thrown a body of troops
against the German left, so strong and aggressive, that
the valiant companies in the Giffert Wald were swept
clean out of the wood.
Fortunately, at the same time, the advanced guards
of the 5th and 16th Divisions, already referred to, had
CHAP, v.] l-WO STAGGERING BLOWS. 125
crossed the Saar. General Yon Goeben, who had also
arrived, took command, and formed a strong resolution.
He decided that, as the battle had reached a critical stage,
it would be unwise to keep reserves ; so he flung everything
to hand into the fight, on the ground that the essential
thing was to impart new life to a combat which had become
indecisive, if not adverse to the assailant. Accordingly,
the artillery was brought up to a strength of six batteries,
and one part of the fresh troops was sent to reinforce the
left, and another towards the Bed Hill. Shortly afterwards,
Von Goeben had to relinquish the command to his senior,
Von Zastrow, the commander of the 7th Corps ; but the
chief business of the principal leaders consisted in pushing
up reinforcements as they arrived ; the forward fighting
being directed by the Generals and Colonels in actual con-
tact with the enemy.
Progress of the Action.
For two hours, that is, between four and six o'clock, the
front of battle swagged to and fro, for the French fought
valiantly, and, by repeated forward rushes, compelled their
pertinacious assailants to give, or repelled their energetic
attempts to gain, ground. A German company would dash
out from cover, and thrust the defenders to the rear ; then,
smitten in front and flank, it would recede, followed by the
French, who, taken in flank by the opportime advent of a
hostile group, would retreat to the woods, or the friendly
shelter of a depression in the soiL Nevertheless, in the
centre, and on their own left, the Germans made some pro-
gress. A battalion of the 5th Division mastered the
defence in the Pfaffen Wald on the French right ; a group
of companies crowned the highest point in the Giffert
Wald ; and the new arrivals, drawn alike from the 8th
126 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. V.
and the 8rd Corps, pushed up the ravine on the east, and
the slopes on the west of the Bed Hill, until their com-
bined fire and frequent rushes forced the French out of
their second line of intrenchments on the neck of high
land which connected the Bed Hill with the heights of
Spicheren. The French strove fiercely, again and again, to
recover the vantage ground, yet could not prevail; but
their comrades below, in the south-west comer of the
Giffert Wald, stoutly held on, so that the fight in this
quarter became stationary, as neither side could make any
progress.
On the German r^ht, during the same interval of time,
there had been sharper alternations of fortuna Here the
French held strong positions, not only in the village of
Stiring-Wendel, but on the hillsides above it, and especially
on the tongue of upland called the Forbacher Berg. The
assailant had succeeded in taking and keeping the farm-
steads on the railway, the " Breme d'or " and the " Baraque
Mouton ;" but the efforts of General von Woyna to operate
on the French left had been so roughly encountered that he
drew back his troops to a point far down the valley. In fact,
General Frossard had strengthened Yerg^, who held fast to
Stiring, by Yalaz^'s brigade, and General Bataille had also
sent half his division to support his comrade. The conse*
quence was that the German projects were frustrated;
while, on the other hand, their heavy batteries on the
Folster Hohe had such an ascendancy that the French
could not secure any advantage by moving down the vale..
Yet they were not, as yet, worsted in the combat at any
point, save on the salient of the Bed Hill. Upon that
eminence the German commanders now determined to send
both cavalry and guns. The horsemen, however, could gain
no footing, either by riding up the hillsides, or following
the zigzags of the Spicheren road, which ascends the eastern
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 127
face of the promontory. The artillery had better fortune.
First one gun, and then another, was welcomed by the shouts
of the much- tried and steadfast defenders ; eight pieces first
succeeded in overcoming all obstacles; finally, four other
guns, completing the two batteries, came into action, and
their fire was efficacious in restraining the ardour of the
French, and rendering the position absolutely secure from
assault. But they suffered great losses, which were in-
flicted not only by the powerful batteries on the opposite
height, but by the Chassepot fire from the front and the
Giffert Wald. The Q-erman commanders had discovered
by a harsh experience that the battle could not be won
either by an offensive movement from the centre, or flanking
operations on the left, because the neck of highland south
of the Eed Hill was too strongly held, while the deep valley
interposed between the forests and the Spicheren Downs
brought the flanking battalions to a halt, under cover. It
was then determined to employ the latest arrivals, the
troops of the 6th Division, in an effort to storm the For-
bacher Berg from the Metz road valley, and at the same
time to renew a front and flank attack upon Stiring-
Wendel.
Here we may note two facts which are apt illustrations
of that efficiency, the fruit of wise forethought, which pre-
vailed in the German host. One is that a battery, attached
to the 1st Corps, arrived on the Saar, by railway, direct
from Konigsberg, on the confines of East Prussia, and,
driving up, actually went into position, and opened fire
from the Folster Hohe. It was the first light battery
commanded by Captain Schmidt, whose exploit was, then,
at least, without parallel. The other is that the 2nd
battalion of the 53rd Eegiment, starting at six in the
morning from Wadem, actually marched, part of the time
as artillery escort, nearly twenty-eight miles in thirteen
128 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Y,
hours, and, towards sunset, stood in array on the field of
battle. The like goodwill and energy were displayed by all
the troops ; but this example of zeal and endurance deserves
special record.
Frossard Betires,
The final and decisive encounters on this sanguinary
field were delivered on the western fronts. Four battalions
were directed along or near the Metz road upon the heights
above Stiring, while the troops on the extreme Glerman
right, which, it will be remembered, had suffered a reverse,
resumed their march upon the village. These simultaneous
onsets were all the more effective, because the French
commander was alarmed by the advance guard of the 13th
Division, which, having moved up from Bosseln, was now
near to Forbach itself. He had become apprehensive of
being turned on both flanks, for Laveaucoupet was, at that
moment, engaged in a desperate, although a partially suc-
cessful strife against the Germans in the Giffert Wald.
The flank attack on the Forbacher Berg, skilfully con-
ducted, drove back the adversary, yet could not be caiTied
far, because he was still strong and it was growing dusk.
In like manner, Stiring itself was only captured in part.
On the other hand, so vehement a rush was made upon the
Giffert Wald that the French once more penetrated its
coverts. Practically, however, the battle had been decided.
General Frossard, receiving no support from Bazaine's
divisions, greatly disturbed by the news that the head of a
hostile column was close to Forbach, imable to oust the
Germans from the Red Hill or effectively repel their onsets
on the Metz road had, half an hour before a footing on the
Forbacher Berg was won, given orders for a retreat upon
Sarreguemines, so that the furious outburst of French
CHAP, v.] TWO STAGGERING BLOWS. 129
«
valour in the Giffert Wald was only the expiring flash of
a finely-sustained engagement, and the forerunner of a
retrograde night march.
Indeed, General Frossard is entitled to any credit which
may accrue from the stoutness with which he held his main
position until nightfall. He himself assigns the march of
Yon Golz from Eosseln upon Forbach as the reason for his
retreat. Having been obliged to leave the heights north-
west of Forbach practically undefended, in order to support
Verg^ in Stiring-Wendel, he lost, or thought he had lost,
control over the high road and railway to Metz, and felt
bound to retire eccentrically upon Sarreguemines, a move-
ment which it is not easy to comprehend. It is true that
the guns of Von Golz, firing from the hills above Forbach,
drove back a train bringing reinforcements from St. Avoid,
but a couple of miles to the r^ar was Metman's entire
division ; and it was from and not towards this succour that
the main body of the French took their way. The most
astonishing fact connected with this battle is that during
the whole day three of Bazaine's divisions were each within
about nine miles of the battlefield. It was not the Marshal's
fault that not one assisted the commander of the 2nd Corps.
Each had been directed to do so, but none succeeded.
General Montaudon did, indeed, move out from Sarregue-
mines, but halted after covering a few miles. General de
Oastagny , as soon as he heard the guns, and without wait-
ing for orders, marched his division from Puttelange ; but,
unluckily for him, the sound led him into the hills, where
the dense woods and vales obstructed the passage of the
sound. Hearing nothing he returned to Puttelange, but no
sooner had he got there than the roar of artillery, more in-
tense than ever, smote his ear. The ready veteran at
once set out afresh, this time following the route which
would have brought him into the heart of the Spichereu
130 THE CAMPAIGN OF SKBAN. [CHAP. V.
position. He was too late; nigbt came on apace, the
distant tumult died down, be endeavoured to communicate
with Frossard, but his messenger only found Metman, who,
coming on from Marienthal, had halted at Bening, and
did not move upon Forbach until nearly dark. Thus
were three strong divisions wasted, and a force which would
have given the French victory, spent the day in wandering
to and fro or in weak hesitation. General de Castagny was
the only officer who really did bis utmost to support the
2nd Corps ; for Metman awaited orders, and they came too
late. During the nigbt, or early in the morning, they all,
except De Castagny, who was called up to St. Avoid,
assembled near Puttelange, wearied and disgusted with
their fruitless exertions ; and there they were joined by the
2nd Corps.
The G-ermans bivouacked on the field. They had had in
action twenty-seven battalions and ten batteries, and the
day's irregular and confused fighting had cost them in
killed and wounded a loss of no fewer than 223 officers and
4,648 men ; while the French lost 249 officers and 3,829
men, including more than two thousand prisoners. The
great disproportion is due to the fact that the Germans
were the assailants and that throughout the day and
on all points they fought the battle with relatively small
groups, parts of the 7th, 8th, and 3rd Corps, which
arrived in succession on the scene. That the victory was
not more complete must be ascribed to the improvised
character of the conflict. Both Woerth and Spicheren were
accidental combats due to the initiative of subordinate
officers, a practice which has its dangers ; but the success
attained in each case is a striking proof that the discipline
and training of all ranks in the German Army had created
a living organism which could be trusted to work by
itself.
CHAPTER VL
TACILIiATION IN MBTZ.
TWO sucli staggering and unexpected blows filled the
civil population with terror, the aspiring soldiers at
head-quarters with anger, and the Imperial Commander-
in-Chief with dismay. Disorder, consternation, and
amazement reigned in Metz. And no wonder. From
Alsace came the appalling news that the 1st Corps had
been hopelessly shattered and that the Marshal was already
fleeing for safety, by day and night, through the passes of
the Yosges. Strasburg reported the arrival of fugitives
and the absence of a garrison. " We have scarcely any
troops," wrote the Prefect ; " at most from fifteen hundred
to two thousand men." The chief official at Epinal asked
for power to organize the defence of the Yosges at the
moment when the passes were thronged with MacMahon's
hurrying troops. It was known that General Frossard
had been defeated and that he was in full retreat, but
during twenty-four hours no direct intelligence came to
hand from him. That Be Failly, left unsupported at
Bitsche, would retire at once was assumed, but the orders
directing his movements did not reach him until, after a
severe night march, he had halted a moment at Lutzelstein,
or, as the French call the fort, La Petite Pierre. From
Yerdun and Thionville arrived vehement demands for
132 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. fCHAP. VI.
arms and proyisions; and from the front towards the
Saar no report that was not alarming. Taming to the
south-east, the Imperial head-quarters did not know
exactly where Douay's 7th Corps was ; and in an agony of
apprehension ordered the General, if he could, to throw a
division into Strasburg, and " with the two others '* cover
Belfort. When the telegram was sent one of these had
been heavily engaged at Woerth, and the other was at
Lyons not yet formed I The anxiety of the Emperor and
his assistants was embittered by the knowledge that not
one strong place on the Rhine had a sufficient garrison ;
and that the rout of MacMahon had not only flung wide
open the portals of Lorraine, but had made the reduction
of ill-provided Strasburg a question of weeks or days. So
heedlessly had the Ollivier Ministry, the Emperor and
Empress rushed into war, at a time when even the
fortifications of Metz were glaringly incomplete, when the
storehouses of the frontier fortresses were ill-supplied,
when arms and uniforms were not or could not be furnished
to the Mobiles; when, in short, nothing could be put
between the Germans and Paris except the troops hastily
collected in Alsace and Lorraine — ^now a host in part
sh ittered, in part disordered, and the whole without resolute
and clear-sighted direction.
Prince Louis Napoleon, sitting passively on his horse in
the barrack-yard of Strasburg, in 1836, was defined by a
caustic historian as a "literary man " whose characteristic
was a "faltering boldness." . The phrases apply to the
Emperor in Metz. It may be said that he could use the
langua^ employed by soldiers, that he had some military
judgment, but that, when called on, he could not deal at all
with the things which are the essence of the profession he
loved to adopt. After a lapse of more than thirty years, he
found himself, not alone in a barrack-yard facing an
CHAP. VI.] VACILLATION IN METZ. 133
"indignant Colonel/' but at the head of a great, yet
scattered and roughly handled Army, with formidable
enemies pressing upon his front, and equally formidable
enemies pouring through the rugged hill paths upon his
vulneirable flank, and threatening the sole railway which
led direct through Chalons to Paris. He was now a man,
old for his years, and a painful disease made a seat on
horseback almost intolerable. He could not, like his uncle
in his prime, ride sixty miles a day, sleep an hour or two,
and mount again if needful. He was an invalid and a
dreamer, who had, against his fluctuating will, undertaken
a task much too vast for his powers. The Contemptuous
words applied to him by Mr. Kinglake seem harsh, still, in
very truth, they exactly describe Louis Napoleon as he was
at Strasburg in 1836, and as he sat meditatively at Metz in
1870. Yet, be it understood, he never at any period of his
career was wanting in coolness and physical couragei
though what Napier has finely called " spi'inging valour "
had no place in his temperament. He was scared by the
suddenness of the shock and the rapidity of events, and he
wa« bewildered because he was incapable of grasping, co-
ordinating, or understanding the thick-coming realities
presented by war on a grand scale; and stood always too
much' in awe of the unknown. He could not ** make up his
mind," and in the higher ranks of the French Army there
was not one man who could force him to make it up and
stand fast by his resolution. But, inferior as they were
when measured by a high standard, it is probable that any
one of the Corps Commanders, clothed with Imperial
power, would have conducted the campaign far better than
the Emperor. Another disadvantage which beset him was
a moral consequence inseparable from his adventurous
career. He could not add a cubit to his military stature ;
but he need not have " waded through slaughter to a
134 THE CAMPAI6K OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VI.
throne/* In Paris before he started for the frontier, in
Mets on the morning of Angast 7th, he must have felt, as
the Empress also felt, that his was a dynastj which could
not stand before the shock of defeat in battle. He had,
therefore, to consider every hour, not so much what was
the best course of action from the soldier's standpoint, as
how anv course, advance, retreat or inaction, would affect
the political situation in Paris. Count von Bismarck's
haughty messf^ through M. Benedetti in 1866, if
Benedetti faithfully delivered it, must have come back
to the Emperor's memory in 1870. Bemind the Emperor,
said Bismarck, that a war might bring on a revolutionary
crisis ; and add, that '* in such a case, the German
dynasties are likely to prove more solid than that of the
Emperor Napoleon." It was a consciousness of the weak
foundations of his power, breeding an ever-present dread
alike in the capital and the camp, which, making him
ponder when he should act, falter when he should be
bold, imparted to his resolutions the instability of the
wind.
It is on record that the first impulse of the Emperor and
his intimate advisers was to retreat forthwith over the
Moselle and the Meuse. General de Ladmirault was
ordered to fall back on Metz ; the Guard had to take the
same direction; Bazaine, who had responsibility without
power, was requested to protect the retirement of Frossard,
who, driven off the direct, was marching along the more
easterly road to Metz, through Gros Tenquin and Faulque-
mont, which the Germans call Falcouberg ; De FaiUy was
required, if he could, to move on Nancy. MacMahon, it
was hoped, would gather up bis fragments, and transport
them to Chalons, where Canrobert was to stand fast, and
draw back to that place one of his divisions which had
reached Nancy. Paris was placarded with the Emperor's
CHAP. VI.] VACILLATION IN METZ. 185
famous despatch ; and the Parisians read aloud the ominous
sentences which heralded the fall of an Empire. ''Marshal
MacMahon/' said the Emperor, ** has lost a battle on the
Sauer. General Frossard has been obliged to retire. The
retreat is conducted in good order.*' And then followed
the tell-tale phrase, used by Napoleon I. himself on a
similar occasion — " ToTit pent $e retablir,** aU, perhaps, may
come right again. But so inconstant was the Imperial
will, that the hasty resolve to fly into Champagne faded
out almost as soon as it was formed ; for the next day the
dominant opinion was that it would be better to remain on
the right bank of the Mosella MacMahon and De Failly
accordingly got counter orders, indicating Nancy as a point
of concentration, and based on a feeble notion that they
could both be drawn to Metz ; while once again Canrobert
was told to bring the infantry of the 6th Corps up to the
same place by rail. Orders and counter orders then
showered down on De Failly — thus, he was and he was not
to move on Toul — ^but the enemy's movements dictated the
future course of a General rendered as powerless as his
superiors were vacillating ; and finally both the Marshal
and his luckless subordinate, as well as Douay's 7th Corps,
made their way deviously to the camp of Chalons.
The Emperor resigns his command.
When the Emperor suddenly revoked the order to retire
upon Chalons, he was influenced partly by military, but
cbiefly by political considerations. Bemonstrances were
heard in the camps, remonstrances arrived from Paris, and
the combined effect of these open manifestations produced
an order to establish the Army in position behind the
French Nied, a stream which, rising to the southward,
flows parallel to the Moselle, and, after receiving the
136 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. TT,
German Nied, runs into the Saar below Saarlouis. The
weather had been wet and tempestuous; the retiring
troops, exhausted by night marches and want of food,
struggled onward, yet showed signs of " demoralization ; '*
in other words, were out of heart, and insubordinate.
Frossard's men, who had passed the prescribed line before
receiving the new instructions, had to retrace their steps ;
and Decaen, now in command of the 3rd Corps, begged for
rest on behalf of his divisions. Yet the three Corps and
the Q-uard occupied, on the 10th, the new position which,
selected by Marshal Leboeuf , extended from Pange to Les
Etangs. It was intended to fight a battle on that ground,
and the men were set to work on intrenchments, some of
which were completed before another change occurred in
the directing mind. The position was found to be defective ;
and, on the 11th, the entire Army, abandoning its wasted
labours, moved back upon the outworks of Metz itseK,
almost within range of its guns. Thus had three precious
days been spent in wandering to and fro at a time when the
military situation required that the Army should be trans-
ferred to the left bank of the Moselle, and placed in full
command of the route to Chalons, even if it were not com-
pelled to fall back further than the left bank of the Meuse.
One explanation, drawn by the official writers of the
German Staff history, from French admissions, is that,
instead of Metz protecting the Army, the Army was
required to protect Metz, seeing that the forts were not in
a state to hold out against a siege of fifteen days ! The
Imperial Commander had not even yet quite made up hitf
mind ; but, late on the 12th, finding the burden too severe,
and the clamour of public opinion too great, he appointed
Marshal Bazaine Commander-in-Chief of *' the Army of the
Rhine." It was a damnosa kcereditas; for the campaign
was virtually lost during ten days of weakness and vadUa-
CHAP. VI.] VACILLATION IN METZ. 137
tiOB, and especiallj by the want of a prompt decision
between the 7th and the 10th of August, while there was
yet time.
As we have said, the main reason was political. The
eager aspirants for power, and the friends of the Empress
in Paris, ousted the Ollivier Ministry on the 9th, and the
new combination, with the Comte de Palikao at its head^
felt that they could not retain office, that the " dynasty "
even could not survive unless the Emperor and the Army
fought and won. Everything must be risked to give the
dynasty a chance. The Eegency and the Camp fell under
the influence of hostile public opinion, which had already
begun to associate the name of Napoleon, not only with
the reverses endured, but the utter want of preparation
for war, now painfully evident to the multitude as well as
to the initiated. Yet so menacing and terrible did thd
actual facts become that even the Emperor could not resist
them, and, in handing over the command to Bazaine on the
18th, he ordered that unfortunate, if ambitious, officer to
transfer the Army with the utmost speed to the left ban^
of the Moselle, place Laveaucoupet's Division in Metz, and
gain Verdun as quickly as possible. It was too late, as we
shall see; for the Prussians were ready to grasp at the
skirts of a retreating Army, and once more thwart the
plans of its leaders. In order to track the course of events
to this point, the narrative must revert to the morrow of
Spicheren.
The German Advance.
On the morning of the 7th of August, some French
troops were still in Forbach, and Montaudon's Division
had not departed from Sarreguemines. The fronts of the
two invading armies were hardly over the frontier, and the
(»
138 THE CAMPAIOK OF 8EDAK. [CHAP. VI.
chiefs had not jet learned the full extent of the double
shock inflicted on the adversarj. A thick fog enveloped
the Spicheren battlefield, and clung to the adjacent hills
and woods, and through the mist the patrols had to feel
their way. No serious resistance could be offered bj the
FroDch detachments at any point ; Forbach, together with
its immense stores, was occupied at an early hour ; while,
so soon as the vigilant cavalry saw the rear-guard of Mont-
audon quit the place, they rode into Sarreguemines.
Patrols were pushed out along the roads towards Metz, but
no advance was made, partly because the respective Corps
composing both the German Annies were still on the
march, and partly because the Staff, mistaken respecting
the route followed by MacMahon, had ordered several
movements with the object of intercepting and destroying
his broken divisions. The consequence was that the leading
columns stood fast while the Corps to the rear and left
were brought up to and beyond the Saar. MacMahon and
De Failly, as we have seen, were hurrying southward, and
thus Yon Moltke's precautions proved* needless. Ihiring
the 8th, the cavalry, despatched far and wide, between St.
Avoid and the Upper Saar, found foes near the former, who
at once retired, but none on the course of the river. The
next day, the horsemen, still more active, sent in reports
which satisfied the cautious Chief of the Staff that the
French had really fallen back on Metz, yet inspired him
with some doubts respecting their intentions. He thought
it possible that they might assume the offensive in the hope
of surprising and routing part of the German Armies — a
project actually discussed by the Emperor and Bazaine,
but soon thrown aside. Von Moltke, however, determined
to guard against that design, kept his several Corps within
supporting distance; and, on the 10th, began a great
movement forward. The First Army» in the post of
CHAP. VI.] VACILLATION IN METZ. 139
danger, was to serve as a pivot upon whicli the Second,
effecting a wheel to the right, swung inwards towards the
Moselle above Metz. Yon Steinmetz, much to his disgust,
had to halt about Carling, with his supports towards Teter-
chen and Boulaj, and the 9th Corps in support at For-
bach. On his left, the Second Army was advancing in
echelon on roads between Harskirchen, near Saar Union,
where the 4th Corps touched the outposts of the Crown
Prince's Army, and Faulquemont, where the 3rd Corps
stood on the railway, having on its left the 10th about
Hellimer, and the Ghuard at Gueblange. The 12th was
still on the Saar, and the 2nd, awaiting its last bat-
talions, in Bhenish Prussia. Thus the two Armies stood
on the 11th, covered by brigades of cavalry, whose opera-
tions, better than anything else, illustrate the audacious,
yet elastic and painstaking, methods employed by the Ger-
mans in war.
The German Cavalry aJt Work.
Never before had the principle that cavalry are the eyes
and ears of an army been more extensively applied. We
have already seen these well-trained horsemen watching the
line of the Saar, and even looking into the rear of the
French camps ; we shall now see them literally infesting
the country between the Saar and the Moselle without let
or hindrance from the French cavaliers. After Spicheren,
the German cavalry divisions were distributed along the
front of the Corps in motion ; and the hardy reiters were
soon many miles ahead of the infantry, some penetrating
up the easy western slopes of the Vosges, where they f oimd
no enemies, others riding towards Nancy and the points
of passage over the river below that town ; and others
again hovering pertinaciously on the rear of the backward
140 THE CAMPAIGN OP SEDAN. [OHAP. VI*
moying French Corps, picking up stragglers, capturing
prisoners, interrogating o£Scials, and inspecting, from
coigns of vantage, the camps and positions of the enemy.
In this way they learned that the Emperor had visited
Bazaine at Faulquemont; that the greater part of the
French were Metzward, and that on the left towards the
hills there were none to be seen. The cavalry divisions
rode out long distances, detaching flanking parties and
pushing patrols to the front, so that the whole range of
country between the right and left of the Infantry Corps
was thoroughly searched by these indefatigable and
daring explorers. Thus, a troop of Uhlans, starting from
Faulquemont, rode as far as the woods near Berlize, and
keeping well under cover, yet quite close to the enemy,
took note of his positions at and beyond Pange, .saw large
bodies moving from Metz to take ground behind the Nied,
and learned that reinforcements, the leading brigades of
the Canrobert's Corps, in fact, had arrived at Metz.
Another patrol of lancers, moving on the St. Avoid road,
confirmed the report that the French had occupied the
Nied line ; while, on the opposite flank, a Hussar patarol
found no enemy about Chateau Salins, but laid hands on
the bearer of important despatches. On the 11th, the
screen of inquisitive norsemen became thicker and more
venturesome, trotting up to the river SeiUe itself at
Nom^ny, on the road to Pont a Mousson. The mounted
men of the First Army had hitherto been held back, but
now che two divisions, passing forth on the flanks, ap^
preached and examined the left of the French line. One
troop arrived near Les Etangs just in time to see De Lad-
mirault's Corps folding up their tents, and soon beheld the
French march off towards Metz ; indeed the deep columns
were moving in that direction from the left bank of the
Nied. The Uhlans followed De Ladmirault through Les
CHAP, VI.] VACILLATION IN MFrZ. 141
Etangs until they saw him go into position at Bellecroix
close to the. place. In like manner, other Uhlans, operating
farther up the stream, found the camps and intrenchments
abandoned, so that it became certain, on the evening of the
1 1th, that the French Army had been drawn back under
the gims of Metz. The next day the activity of the
•navaliers increased, and they pressed forward until they
-were in contact with the French outposts, and were able to
x)bserve the whole new position between Queleu and Belle-
-croix, working up on the left to a point within three miles
x>f Metz, and proving that as far as the right bank above
the town, the country was unoccupied. On the 12th,
Uhlans had ridden into Nancy, on one side, and, on the
other, a body of Cuirassiers actually found the gates of
Thionville open, captured a garde mobile belonging to the
garrison, and brought off a Prussian reserve man who had
been detained in the town. At Dieulouard a patrol crossed
the Moselle on a bridge just constructed by the French,
and were only driven from the railway, which they had
.begun to destroy, by infantry — the last detachments of
Canrobert's Corps allowed to get through by train from
Chalons. A daring attempt was made upon Pout h.
Mousson by some Hussars ; but here General Margueritte,
sent with his Chasseurs d'Af rique from Metz, drove back
the invaders, killing a great number. These examples will
suffice to give some idea of the admirable use which the
Germans made of their cavalry, to conceal their movements,
harass the enemy, and, above all, gain priceless information,
while the adversary, whose horse were idle, could obtain
none. The dash made by Margueritte to relieve Pont h.
Mousson is the one solitary instance of alertness shown by
the French, and even he and his troopers were withdrawn,
leaving the river line above Metz wholly unprotected, and
the bridges unbroken !
142 [the campaign of sedan. [chap. ti.
The Oermans March on the Moselle.
From these wide-ranging enterprises, conducted by Veen
and resolute soldiers, the Great Staff obtained nearly as
minute a knowledge of the French proceedings as thej
possessed themselves, and were enabled to direct the inarch
of the (German Armies with firmness and precision. Their
great object was to secure the unguarded line of the
Moselle by seizing, as rapidly as possible, all the points of
passage above Metz, and the only doubt entertained at
head-quarters was suggested by the apprehension that the
energy displayed by the cavalry might attract attention to
these undefended spots. Accordingly, while the First
Army, again, was ordered to protect the right of the Second,
by advancing on the Nied, taking up groimd between
Pange and Les Etangs, the Second was to move upon the
SeUle, and endeavour to secure the bridges at Pont k
Mousson, Dieulouard and other places, sending the cavalry
once more in force over the stream. Yon Moltke's calcu-
lation was that if the French attacked Yon Steinmetz,
Prince Charles could form up and threaten their flank ; if
they tried to operate against the Second Army by ascending
the Moselle, Yon Steinmetz could then assail them in line
of march, as they must cross his front ; while if passing
through Metz they moved up the left bank, Prince Charles
could effect a junction with the Crown Prince, and Yon
Steinmetz could cross the MoseUe and attack the French
rear. The combination was strong, but the Emperor, as
we have stated, had then no idea of assuming the offensive
in any direction, his only anxiety being to seek a temporary
shelter behind the Meuse.
Throughout the 13th, the German Corps, horse and foot,
sprang forward, displaying that alacrity and hardihood
which had marked their conduct from the outset of the
CHAP. VI.] VACILLATION IN METZ. 143
war. The Dragoon brigade of the Guard swooped down
upon Dieulouard, and finaUj sundered the direct railway
communication between Chalons and Metz. Two other
cavahy brigades, forming the 5th Division, entered Pont
k Mousson early in the morning, and were followed by half
the 10th Corps from Delme. In order to hide, as &r as
possible, the movements of the Second Army, an entire
division of cavalry, the 6th, was employed ; one brigade
extending from Courcelles sur Nied, to Bomy on the
Moselle, and the other posted at Yemy supporting the
front line, and linked itself by patrols to the 5th at Pont
i Mousson. The 1st Division of Cavalry, during the fore*
noon, crossed the Nied at Pange, and occupied the villages
to the right and left, so that a continuous line of mounted
men stretched from the Nied to the Moselle. Behind this
barrier, the several Corps toiled forward in full security.
At the dose of the day, however, only one-half the 10th
Corps was over the Moselle, the other moiety being one
inarch to the rear ; the head of the 3rd Corps stood at
Buchy ; the 9th at Hemy ; the 12th at Chemery ; the
2nd, now complete, at St. Avoid ; the Guard at Ldmon*
court, and the 4th at Chateau Salins.
By this time, the Third Army, except the 6th Corps,
and the Baden Division which had been directed upon
Strasburg, had made its way through the defiles of the
Vosges, had emerged into the valley of the Upper Saar,
and was, therefore, in direct communication with the
Second Army ; so that the German host occupied a wide
region extending from Sarrebourg to villages in front of
Metz ; yet at the vital points the Corps stood near enough
to support each other should it be necessary to assemble
on a field of battle. The passage of the Yosges had been
obstructed only by nature and the forts of Bitsche and
Phalsbourg. These were turned, and the hardships of
144 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VI.
cross roads and restricted supplies had been overcome.
The divisions trickled through the vallejs on a broad front,
gathering up as thej touched the Saar and the country of
lakes about Fenestrange. As Phalsbourg did not command
the railway, that important highway fell into the hands of
the Overmans. The tunnels in the Zom valley west of
Saveme had not been destroyed, and the whole line was
complete, yet it could not be used for the transport of
troops and stores until a later period. On the 13th, when
the First Army was closing in on the French outside Metz,
and the Second heading for the Moselle, the Third quitted
the Upper Saar, and, once more expanding, approached on
a broad front the valley of the Meurthe. During the
next day, when their comrades were hotly engaged with
the enemy, they reached the banks of that stream, and
their forward cavalry rode into the streets of Lun^ville and
Nancy, the old capital of Lorraine. At this critical
moment. Marshal MacMahon was hastening to Chalons ;
De Failly, after having been ordered hither and thither
from hour to 'hour, had received final orders — ^he was to
join the Marshal; but Douay's 7th Corps, although
Dumont's Division had arrived, increasing the total to
about 20,000 men and 90 guns, had not yet been, and was
not for three days, directed from Belfort upon the great
camp in the plans of Champagne.
CHAPTEE Vn.
TON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND.
WEABT of his task, weakened in body hj a painful
malady, depressed in mind by a series of disasters,
and worried by advice from Paris, the Emperor Napoleon,
on the evening of the 12th of August, transferred to
Marshal Bazaine the burden which he could no longer
bean Whatever may have been his other aptitudes, he
was not born to command Armies in the field nor had
he that power of selection which may enable an inferior to
choose and clothe with his authority a superior man. Had
a Badetzky, instead of an Emperor, commanded the
Austrian Army in 1859 it is probable that the stability of
the ^* dynasty *' would have been tried by defeat and the
unity of Italy deferred until a later day. Whether the
!gmperor Napoleon recognized his incompetence, or whether,
as he often did, he yielded to pressure, matters little except
to the students of character. He nofliinally gave up the
command, yet retained a certain indefinite control, and he
placed at the head of his Army a Marshal who, although
the senior in rank . to the recently promoted Marshal
Leboeuf, the late Chief of the Staff, was still the junior of
Marshal Canrobert ; both, fortunately, were loyal men, and
the latter ready to serve under his junior. Yet it is doubt-
ful whether Bazaine ever exercised that moral ascendency
146 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
which is essential at all times, and never more so than at a
crisis when the fate of Armies depends not only on wise
direction, but prompt and willing obedience. The Marshal,
appointed on the 12th, did not take up his command until
the next day, and then he was required to remedy in less
than twenty-four hours the deep-seated mischief produced
by a fortnight of terrible blundering. His special task
was to transport the Army over the Moselle. Pour days
earlier that might have been done without a shot being
fired, because even if the German horse had come up to
look on they must have been idle spectators as their in-
fantry comrades were far in the rear. The fatal error was
committed when the Emperor did not overrule all opposi-
tion, and, adhering with unswerving firmness to his first
thought, neither halt, ponder, nor rest until the Moselle
flowed between him and his foes. The military position
on the morning of the 7th dictated that step ; his adver-
saries believed or surmised that he would take it, because it
was the right step to take. Nor can we doubt that,*as
Commander-in-Chief, Louis Napoleon, who had a little of
" le flair militaire," saw at once the proper course, but that,
as Emperor, he dared not, on reflection, run the risk. It
was a false calculation, even from a political standpoint, be-
cause, so long as he was in the field with, or at the head of
an Army, his republican and monarchical enemies would
not have moved, and time would have been gained. By
retiring promptly over the Moselle, and leaving Metz to
defend itself, he might have been defeated in battle or
manoeuvred back upon Paris ; but there would have been
no Sedan and no Metz, and even the Parisians would have
hesitated to plunge headlong into civil war when a French
Army was still afoot, and a formidable host of invaders,
pressing on its weaker array, was "trampling the sacred
soil.*' The fate of the campaign about Metz was, then,
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 147
really decided wlien the Emperor did not avail himself of
the days of grace, beat down all opposition, and compel
his Marshals and Generals to march their troops over the
Moselle. Neither Bazaine nor any one officer present
with the Army is entitled to be called a great captain ;
but whatever he was, the blame of failure does not rest on
him alone ; it must be shared, in a far greater degree, by
those who preceded him in command. It is necessary to
insist on this fact, because one of the most valuable
lessons taught by the campaign would be lost were the
capital error committed by the Imperial Staff, when the
order for retreat was countermanded and five days were
wasted in abortive operations, not described with the
emphasis it deserves. Campaigns have been lost as much
by postponed retreats as by rash advances ; and it was the
ill-fortune of the French Generals in August, 1870, to
present egregious examples of both forms of fatal error.
The French Propose to Move,
When Marshal Bazaine took over the command, on the
morning of the 18th, he was required to do in haste what
his superiors might have done at leisure. The prolonged
indecision of the Imperial mind, held in suspense down to
the last moment and against its better judgment, between
the alternative of attack or retreat, was disastrous ; no
margin was allowed for error of design, error in execution,
and — ^the unforeseen. The Emperor had ordered Coffin-
ieres, the Governor of Metz, to build as many bridges as
he could above and below the place, and the General
declares, what no one disputes, that he did construct from
twelve to fifteen bridges, which provided seven lines of
march over the stream. He also mined the permanent
bridges above the fortress, so that on the 12th facilities
148 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
for crosfidi!^ abounded, and the means of destruetion were
prepared. Then came in the unforeseen. Bain had fallen
heavily, and consequentlj the Moselle rose, flowed over
the trestle bridges, damaged the rafts, disconnected the
pontoons with the banks, and spread far and wide over the
approaches^ In short, the increase in the volume of water
was so great and unusual, if not imparalleled, that the
calamity was attributed to the Germans — ^they must, it
was said, have destroyed the sluices near Marsal and have
allowed the lake water of that region* free access to the
Moselle — as if they did not wish to cross the river them-
selves! Be the cause what it might, there was the
obstruction ; so that the first information received by the
Marshal was that the retreat, which he had been ordered
to execute, could not begin until the next day, except by
Canrobert's 6th Corps, which was near permanent bridges.
Consequently, the Army remained another day on the
right bank. The Corps were in position between forts
Queleu and St. Julien, Frossard on the right, Decaen in
the centre, and De Ladmirault on the left, the Guard being
in rear of the centre behind Borny, where Marshal
Bazaine had set up his head-quarters. Practically the
line was a curve extending from the Seille to the banks of
Moselle below Metz; and the defensive obstacles were a
watercourse with steep banks, patches of dense woods, two
ch^teaus, or country houses, which were readily made de-
fensible, and of course the villages and farms scattered
over the pleasant fields. The main body of the Army was
covered throughout its front by outposts thrown forward
towards the Metz-Saarbriick railway on the right, beyond
the brook in the centre, and about Yremy, Nouilly, and
Servigny on the left. So they stood all day, some of them
aware that the Germans were dangerously near ; more who.
were anxious to get over the river; and yet others who
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 149
would have staked everything upon the risk of a battle, so
intolerable is suspense to men of ardent and excitable
temperaments. The night passed over quickly, and on
the 14th, yet not until a late hour in the forenoon, the
Corps began to file off to the rear. Canrobert was already
across; Frossard sent his guns and horsemen over the
town bridges, while his infantry splashed through the
meadows and over the partially submerged temporary con-
structions; and leaving Grenier's division to cover his
retreat, De Ladmirault set out for the left bank over the
Isle Chambiere. The Marshal at Bomy, with his old
Corps, now under Decaen, and having the Guard in sup-
port, remained to protect the extensive and perilous move-
ment to the rear in the face of a watehful and intrepid
enemy.
Beleased on the evening of the 12th from the impera-
tive orders which held him fast, and directed to move for-
ward upon the French Nied, General von Steinmetz
advanced the next day with characteristic alacrity. Two
Corps, the 7th and the 1st, were posted on a short line
between Fange and Les Etangs, the 8th being held back
at Varize on the German Nied, and the two cavalry divi-
sions being thrown round the flanks. General von Golz,
who commanded the twenty- sixth brigade, took the bold
step of transferring it to the left, or French, bank of the
stream, and he thus came into contact with the outposts of
Decaen's 3rd Corps. Nevertheless, along the whole line,
on the evening of the 13th and morning of the 14th,
each side maintained a strictly observant attitude, and
held aloof from hostile action; the French because they
wished to glide oft unassailed, the Germans because their
Commander-in-Chief desired to ecure a solid footing for
the Second Army on the left bank of the Moselle before
the French retired. Watched as these were by keen-
150 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VIT.
sighted horsemen, they could not stir without being seen ;
and so soon as the state of the Moselle permitted a move-
ment to the rear, the fact was reported to the G-erman
chiefs. A Hussar party notified, about eleven, that Fros-
sard's outposts were falling back ; a little later that the
tents were down ; and then that columns of all arms were
retiring. So it was in the centre and on the left ; Decaen's
Corps remained, but two divisions of De Ladmirault's
Corps, it was noted, were no longer on the ground they
had held in the morning. General von Manteuffel, infer-
ring that De Ladmirault might have gone to join in an
attack upon the 7th Corps, at once put two divisions under
arms, a fortunate precaution, though suggested by an
erroneous inference. In front of the 7th Corps, the facts
admitted of no misinterpretation. The enemy was plainly
in retreat, and General von Golz felt that it was his
duty to interrupt the process. Therefore, about half-
past three, notifying his intention to the Divisional Com-
manders of his Corps, and requesting support from the
1st, a request promptly granted, Von Golz sprang for-
ward to attack the French, in full reliance upon the
readiness and energy with which his superiors and com-
rades would follow him into the fray. His bold resolve
did stop the retreat, and his onset brought on, late in the
afternoon,
The Battle of Colonibey-NouUly,
The scene of this sharp but severe conflict was the gentle
uplands immediately to the eastward of Metz, and a little
more than cannon- shot beyond the forts which forbid access
to that side of the place. The village of Bomy, indeed, is
nearly on a line with the Fort des Bordes, and no point of
the area within which the action raged is more than three
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 161
miles from the fortifications. The ground slopes upward
from the Moselle, rising into undulating hills, the summits
of which are two or three hundred feet above the bed of the
stream. Near to Metz these elevations are clothed with
copses devoid of underwood, the great patches of verdure
extending on a curve from Grimont close to the Moselle, as
far as the right bank of the Seille. To the northward are
more woods just outside the battlefield, the area of which
was, from north to south, included between them and the
railway to Saarbruck. A little to the north of this line,
near Ars-Laquenexy, a village on the road from Sarregue-
mines, were the sources of a rivulet which flowed northward
along the whole front of the French position, receiving on
its way brooks which trickle down the hollows in the hills
to the eastward. The heights east of the stream were bare
of wood, and the most prominent objects were the village
and church tower of St. Barbe on the crown of a rounded
hill to the north-east. From this elevated hamlet another
brook rose, and found its way along the bed of a gully to
Lauvalliers, where all the watercourses united, and, under
the name of La Vallieres, ran thence to the Moselle. The
French troops, four divisions of Decaen's Corps, were posted
in the woods, and on the heights above the first- mentioned
rivulet from the neighbourhood of Ars-Laquenexy to the
point where all the streamlets joined. The outposts were
in Mercy le Haut, sometimeS called Mercy les Metz, in the
woods facing Ars-Laquenexy, in the Chateau D'Aubigny
and Montoy, beyond the brook, in Colombey, a village on
the south bank, and in Nouilly, a large village in the St.
Barbe ravine. Beyond the confluence of the hill streams
stood a division of De Ladmirault's Corps upon the high
ground east of Mey, and it was this body which had its
outguards in Nouilly. Although it was divided by the
brook Valliferes on the left, the French position was strong.
152 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VH.
chiefly because the approaches were through defiles, over
open ground, or up steep banks, but also because the woods
afforded shelter to the infantry of the defenders. Three
great roads intersected the field — one from Pange, through
Colombey, to Bomy, a second from Saarbruck, which, after
passing La Planchette, ran, at Bellecroix, into the third,
which came from Saarlouis, and passed through Lau-
valliers, entering Metz near the fort called Les Bordes.
The Germans, early in the morning, were on the hiUs to
the eastward, the 1st Corps being beyond St. Barbe, and
the 7th near, and west of, Pange, with outposts well
forward, and both cavalry and infantry in practical contact
with the enemy, into whose position they looked from all
sides.
Von Oolz Bashes In.
It was the spectacle of a departing and decreasing host
which made the eager Yon Golz, without awaiting per-
mission, dash impetuously forward with his brigade. So
energetic was the onset that the French were at once
driven out of the Chateau d'Aubigny, Montoy, and La
Planchette. The usual tactics were applied, the companies
working together, turning a flank where the f rojit was too
strong, and following up a success until the weight of fire
brought them to a halt, or even thrust them back. The
batteries attached to the brigade came at once into action
and persisted, though they were hard hit by the French.
But the advance of Yon G-olz was not to be arrested, and
the impetus of his first movement forward carried part of
the brigade over the ravine and watercourse, and into the
village and inclosures of Colombey. That point, however,
was the limit of his progress, for the French developed
strong lines of skirmishers in the woods, and although
<
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 153
thej were unable to expel the audacious intruders, these
were obliged to expend all their energy upon holding what
thej had won. On the right, that is to the north of
Colombej, the assailants were brought to a stand on the
eastern edge of the ravine, and at this early stage the farms,
gardens and houses of Colombej formed a salient offensive
angle exposed to the brunt of the French fire from the side
of Bom J.
At the first indication of a combat. General von
Manteuffel, two of whose divisions were already under arms,
sent their advance guards down the hills and through the
hollow ways from St. Barbe ; joined his line of battle on to
the right of Yon Golz and fell smartly on the outpost of
Grenier's division which De Ladmirault had left about Mey
to cover his retrograde march upon the MoseUe. The
noise of combat, also, and the appeals sent in from the
daring brigadier, put the rest of the 7th Corps in motion,
so that the 14th as well as the 13th Division sprang to
arms and approached the fight. General von Zastrow,
however, did not quite approve of the temerity of his
subordinate ; but seeing that the Corps was committed
to an engagement, he permitted General von Glumer to use
the twenty-sixth brigade on the right and General von
Woyna to employ the twenty-eighth on the left while he
held the twenty-seventh in reserve. In like manner, the
French turned fiercely on their adversaries. Canrobert and
Frossard were over the Moselle, but Decaen's four divisions
were speedily arrayed ; the Guard behind them fell in and
marched Brincourt's brigade towards the Seille to protect
Montaudon's right ; and De Ladmirault instantly counter-
marched his two divisions, moving De Lorencez towards the
north-east, hoping to turn the right of Manteuffel, and
ordering De Cissey, who had partially crossed the Moselle,
to reinforce Grenier at Mey. About five o'clock, then, in
154 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
consequence of the hardihood of a brigadier, a furious action
raged along the whole French front, towards which com-
rades were hurriedly retracing their steps, and upon which
adversaries were hastening forward with equal ardour.
The rapid development of an attack, which had in it some
elements of a surprise, alike unwelcome and unexpected,
and the tenacity with which a few battalions clung stead-
fastly to the advantage gained, astonished but did not
disconcert the French, who frankly answered the challenge
of their foes. Nevertheless, the opening movements of the
1st Corps were as successful as those of Von Golz. The
artillery, always foremost in this campaign, going straight
and swiftly to the front, soon had batteries in position, pro-
tected by cavalry, while behind them on the roads from
Saarlouis and Saarbruck the infantry were quickly moving
up. The leading battalions of the Ist Division poured
through and round Noisseville and NouiUy, pressing back
the French skirmishers and, following them fast, actually
stormed the barricaded village of Mey, directly under
Grenier's main position in the wooded hill above. The
2nd Division directed upon Montoy, Lauvalliers and the
mills at the confluence of the streams, fell on with alacrity ;
but the resistance was so keen that although they soon
wrested the eastern, they suffered great loss and were once
promptly repulsed by the defenders, when attempting to
master the western bank. Yet, aided by the fire of batteries
concentrated south of the St. Barbe ravine, these per-
ristent troops ultimately crowned the ascent, and established
the front of battle on the French side of the brook through-
out its length. From one point, however, the French could
not be dislodged. There was a cross road leading from
Colombey to Bellecroix. It was a hollow way, bordered by
trees two or three deep, and having in front, by way of
salient, a little fir wood. This position effectually frustrated
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 156
every effort of the Germans either to debouch from Colom-
bey or push forward towards Bellecroix. Naturally strong
and valiantly held, it was not carried until nearly seven
o'clock, and then only by the repeated onsets of the twenty-
fifth brigade which Yon Zastrow, about half -past five, had
permitted to take a share in an engagement which he did
not like, but which he was bound to sustain. Thus was
Von €k)lz succoured and partially relieved from the heavy
pressure put on him ; a pressure further mitigated by the
advance of the twenty-eighth brigade, 7th Corps, on his
left, and the capture of the wood of Bomy. Still further
to the left the 18th Division of the 9th Corps, which had
marched up from Buchy on hearing the cannonade, and
some cavalry appeared on the field towards dark and thus
added to the disquietude of Montaudon on the French
right who, however, held fast to his main position above
Grigy.
The action on the French right and centre may fairly be
regarded as an indecisive combat, although the front
occupied in the morning had been driven inwards, and the
daring assailant had won some ground. On the French
left the combat had been equally fierce, but less favourable
to the defenders. General de Ladmirault, indeed, when
obliged to turn and succour his comrade and subordinate,
Grenier, had at once resolved to assume the offensive. It
was a timely determination, for Grenier's troops had been
pushed back and shaken, and, if left without aid, they
would have been driven under the guns of St. Julien. But
the approach of De Cissey, and the threatening direction
imparted to De Lorencez, at once altered the aspect of
affairs : for De Cissey struck in with vigour, and the Ger-
man troops which had entered Mey retreated fast upon
Nouilly ; then General von Manteuff el, hastening the march
of his brigades which were still on the way to the field
156 THE CAMPATO^- OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
formed bis line to the north-west, between Servignj,
NouiUj, and the mills at the confluence of the brooks, with
a reserve at Servignj. As the guns, like the troops, arriyed
successively, thej were arrayed on the new line, and, before
De Ladmirault could develop his flank attack effectively, the
1st Corps bad ninety guns in position between LauvaJliers
and Poix, which enabled them to bar any infantry advance
upon St. Barbe. The effect of this disposition was to frus-
trate the aggressive designs of De Ladmirault, but he is en-
titled to the credit of having saved his exposed division,
and also of having made the only movement during the day
which had the semblance of a real endeavour to strike for
victory against a foe whose troops and artilleiy were plainly
coming up in detachments along the whole line. Nor can
it be denied that his vehement onset drove back the G(«r-
mans, and recovered a large extent of ground up to the
skirts of Nouilly and the water mills. Moreover, it gave
great assistance to Aymard's Division of Decaen's Corps,
and enabled it, at one moment, to scatter the companies
operating in the angle formed by the streams, and drive
them headlong over the ravine upon Lauvalliers. But the
advent of German battalions, and the action of the guns,
finally restored the combat, and as the twilight deepened
into darkness the German right once more gained the
ascendency, and the French divisions retired to their
bivouacs nearer to Metz.
Long after the sun had set, portions of the 1st Corps
still arrived on the scene ; but then the battle was over.
General de Ladmirault, three years afterwards, naturally
proud of his conduct, insisted that the French had won the
day. The German accounts, however, place the fact beyond
dispute, since they show that the leading troops of the
1st Corps did reach Vautoux, Mey, and Villers TOrme,
which proves that the adversary must have retired towards
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 157
Bellecroix and the banks of the Moselle. No doubt the
Germans were wisely drawn back, at a late hour, and on
that ground the French put in a claim to the victory. For
General Steinmetz had ridden on to the field just as the
ocmtest was coming to an end. He was angry because a
battle had been fought, and apprehensive lest a counter-
attack in force should be made at dawn ; so he ordered
the Ist and 7th Corps to retire upon the positions they
occupied on the 13th. Nevertheless, Von Zastrow, who did
not receive the order, insisted that his Corps should bivouac
under arms on the battlefield, so that the wounded might
be collected, and the honour of the Army Tindicated.
The End of the BcOtle.
In this action the French lost not quite four thousand,
and the Germans nearly five thousand men ; on both sides
more than two himdred officers had been kiUed or wounded.
General Decaen, commanding the 3rd Corps, mortally, while
Bazaine and Castagny were slightly hurt. The French had
actually on the field, including the Guard in resenre, with
one brigade in the front line, three Corps d' Arm^ ; for,
though Lorencez did not press far forward, still the whole
force under De Ladmirault was present, and in action.
The Germans brought up successively two Corps and one
Division, but a large portion of the 1st could not reach
the scene of actual fighting until dark. It is. impossible to
ascertain exactly, and difficult to estimate the numbers
engaged; but one fact is manifest — that the German
assailants were numerically inferior, especially during the
first two hours ; that the disproportion was only lessened
between six and seven; and that, at no time, were the
French fewer in number. Marshal Bazaine emphatically
states, in his report to the Emperor, that he held his
158 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
position without emplojing the Guard, which is true, but it
is not less true that the whole front of his line was driven
in ; and that he stood at the close within the range of the
heavy guns in the forts. The French fought well, but they
fought a defensive battle, and that is why they exacted from
the assailant a much heavier penalty than he inflicted on
them. The retreat of the Imperialists was delayed ; but in
the Great Head-quarter Staff serious misgivings began to
spring up, and a fear lest the habit of bringing on im-
provised battles might not become a real source of danger.
An able and enterprising General in command of the
French at Spicheren and Bomy would have read a severe
lesson to German advance-guards, and would have made
them pay for their temerity.
Not until a late hour did the news of the battle reach
the king, who had established his head-quarters at Hemy,
on the railway. Prince Frederick Charles, at Pont a
Mousson, was only informed of the event the next morning.
His Army, the Second, had been engaged in marching up
to and towards the Moselle, and at eventide the several
Corps halted at these points. The 4th Corps was over
the Seille, and not far from Custines and Marbache, places
just below the confluence of the Meurthe and Moselle ; the
Guard had one division a little lower down at Dieulouard ;
the 10th Corps, entire, was at Pont k Mousson, with
a brigade to the westward; the 3rd, the 9th, and the
12th, were facing the Moselle between Pont a Mousson
and the left of the First Army, prepared eithei to frustrate
a French advance up the right bank — a possible movement
always present to the mind of Von Moltke — or cross the
river. The 2nd Corps had come up to Falquemont ; and
a Beserve Landwehr Division, under General Kummer,
was being organized at Saarlouis. To complete the survey,
it should be added that Gneisenau's Brigade, sent to
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 169
surprise Thionville, an enterprise which failed, was return-
ing to rejoin the First Army ; and that on the eYening of
the 14th, the foremost troops of the Crown Prince's Army
were some squadrons of cavalry in Nancy, and an infantry
brigade in Lun^viUe.
The French Retreat.
Throughout the night the wearied French divisions,
which had been either engaged in combat or standing
under arms, filed over the Moselle, and the Emperor
took up his quarters at Longeville, outside the town.
Marshal Bazaine's order, dated the 13th, directed the
whole Army on the road to Gravelotte, whence one portion
was to continue by Mars la Tour, and the other turn off to
the right and march on Conflans. The rigorous construc-
tion of the Marshal's order yields that interpretation, but
he contended, at his trial, that he merely indicated the
general lines of retreat upon Verdun, and that the Staff
and Corps Commanders should have used any and every
road or track which would have served the main purpose.
There are, or at least were, in 1870, only two roads out of
Metz available for the mai'ch of heavy columns of troops of
all arms and large trains — ^the excellent highway to Grave-
lotte, which is a long defile, and the road through Woippy,
turning the uplands on the north. All the intermediate
lanes or cross-roads are rugged and narrow, and only one,
that passing by Lossy, has or had any pretension to the
character of an inferior village road. Guns and carts can
move along and up them in Indian file, but not easily if
numerous, and nowhere at a good pace. Thus, even, on the
14th, the Corps of Frossard and Canrobert, who both
started late, found the Gravelotte road so encumbered by
trains that they could only make their way slowly, and did
160 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
not arriye at Rozerieulles until after dark. The Emperor was
still at Longeville, anxiously awaiting the issue of the fight
which reyived all his apprehensions. Metz was excited and
alarmed, and the streets were crowded during the afternoon
and evening, with passing soldiers, guns, baggage wagons
and proTision carts. Night brought no rest, for the G-uard
and the 3rd Corps came hastily oyer the riyer, and were
densely packed inside the town and outside the ramparts
in the space between the walls and Meant St. Quentin;
while General de Ladmirault was engaged until morning in
passing his divisions across the Isle Ohambiire, and
Metman had also strayed from Bellecroix to that side
of the town.
Marshal Bazaine had quitted Bomy at dusk. He rode
through Metz " with di£Bculty,'* and made his way to the
Imperial head-quarters. Here Napoleon, who was in bed,
welcomed him with his usual kindness, and when the
Marshal explained his fears lest the Germans should cut in
on his line of retreat, and referring to his wound, b^^ed
to be superseded, the Emperor, he writes, " touching my
bruised shoulder and the fractured epaulette, gracefully
said, ' It will be nothing, an affair of a few days, and you
have just broken the charm.**' Apparently, Napoleon
still clung to the belief that the allies he had sought would
come to his aid. '* I await an answer from the Emperor
of Austria and the King of Italy," he said ; " compromise
nothing by too much precipitatioUj and, above all things,
avoid fresh reverses.'* He counted on one sovereign whom
he had defeated in battle, and another whom he had helped
to enlarge his kingdom, and he counted in vain, partly
because he was unsuccessful, but chiefly because the
national political interests of both countries prevailed
over the gratitude felt by Victor Emmanuel, and the
desire to turn the tables on the House of HohenzoUem
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 161
which was still strong in the House of HapBburg<*
Lorraine.
** You will drag us out of this hornet's nest. Marshal,
won't you ? " exclaimed an officer, as Bazaine quitted the
Imperial quarters. It was a task beyond his strength.
When day dawned a thick fog shrouded the valley of the
Moselle, and before the camp at Longeville was astir, a
shell from the opposite bank burst near a tent, '' cut a
Colonel in two," to use the soldatesque language of Marshal
Canrobert, " carried ofE the leg of a battalion commander,
and wounded two officers standing near a drummer." The
lucky shot came from a patrol of German cavahy, which
had ridden forward as far as the railway station, unopposed,
and its commander, observing a camp at Longeville, had
brought his guns into action, and proved, once again, that
the hornets were abroad and making a bold use of their
offensive weapons. A battery hastily ran out, and the
heavy metal of St. Quentin drove off the intruders ; but they
had learned that the foe was over the river before they
retired. Soon afterwards, by Bazaine's order, a mine was
fired, and one section of the railway bridge was destroyed.
Then the retreat was continued. Finding the road
obstructed by an endless stream of carts and waggons.
Marshal Leboeuf turned aside, and struggling on, amid
transport vehicles, threaded his way by Lossy and Chatel
St. Germain to Vem^ville, where about seven in the evening
he had assembled the tired infantry Divisions of Castagny
and Montaudon ; but his cavalry and reserve artillery did
not reach the bivouac until night ; while Aymard's Division
was forced to halt in the defile, and Metman was at
Sansonnet in the Moselle valley. Frossard, followed by
Canrobert, had marched during the day as far as Rezonville,
where both halted ; and the Guard with the Emperor and
Prince Imperial attained Gravelotte. General de Lad-
M
162 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
mirault did not fftir at all on the 15tb, he put a strict
oonstruction on Bazaine's orders, and affected also to be
uncertain whether he was to continue his retreat or not.
But he had allowed Lorencez to press through the town
and thruBt himself into the Lessy defile, where his troops,
unable to get on, had to pass the night. These disjointed
and irregular movements testify to the confusion of a
hurried retreat, to the flurry which had got the upx>er
hand, and to the absence of anything like a firm control
over troops and generals. How could it be other-
wise? The Emperor still commanded, or was believed
to command, and it is plain that at no time did the
Marshal secure prompt and cheerful obedience, or inspire
confidence, always essential to success, and never more so
than when an Army has to be extricated from what
the Imperial Quardsman graphically called a '^ hornet's
nest''
The Oemum$ cro$8 the Moselle.
Far otherwise had the hours been employed by the
(German host Early in the morning King William had
ridden from Hemy to the heights above the battlefield,
and there the Head-quarter Staff, from actual observation,
were able to form a correct judgment on the actual state
of affairs. At first they took precautionary measures
against a possible counter attack, and it was not until
eleven o'clock that, evidence sufficient to convince Yon.
Moltke haring come in, decisive steps were taken. All the
Corps of the Second Army were directed upon or over the
Moselle, the 1st Corps was moved to Courcelles-Chaussy;
and the 7th was posted at Courcelles sur Nied to guard
the railway line and the depots ; and the 8th was on its
left, echeloned on the Luneville road. At nightfall the
CHAP. VII.] VON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 163
3rd Corps had crossed the Moselle between Pagny and
Nov^uit, where thej found the bridge intact; the 10th
had one division at Pont a Monsson and one westward at
Thiaucourt; the Guard was at Diculouard, and the 4th
Corps astride the river at Marbache-Custines. The 2nd
Corps had come up to Han snr Nied. The Crown Prince's
advanced troops were at Nancy, St. Nicholas on the
Meiuthe, and Bajon on the Upper Moselle.
The Cavalry beyond the Moselle,
But the most interesting and effective operations were
those carried out by the 5th Cavalry Division, commanded
by G-eneral vcm Bheinbaben. They had traversed the Mo-
selle on the 14th, and were directed to gain the Yerdun
road in order to ascertain the exact whereabouts of the
French. At the same time the 3rd Cavalry Division at-
tached to the First Army was instructed to pass the river
below Metz and push out towards Briey ; but the French
had removed all the boats, no crossing could be effected,
and the division was employed elsewhere. No such ob-
stacles arrested the 5th Division. It consisted of three
strong brigades under Von Bedem, Von Barby, and Von
Bredow, in all thirty-six squadrons, and was accompanied
by two batteries of horse artillery. Leaving Barby at
Thiaucourt to await the arrival of Bredow coming up from
the Moselle, Bedem marched through the fog at four in the
morning to La Chaus^, whence he detached two squadrons
towards the Verdun road. During their absence Von
Bedem, riding on towards Xonville, discovered and was
fired on by a body of French cavalry on the hills about
Puxieux. These were French dragoons detached from De
Forton's division, then en route for Mars la Tour, and
they .were reinforced from the main body as soon as the
164 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VII.
vedettes bad opened fire. The Frencli, led bj Prinoe
Murat, ascended the hill, and soon after the Germans bad
brought a battery to bear Murat withdrew his men, fol*
lowed by Von Bedem. On crowning the ridge De Forton's
division was plainly seen moving in the valley, or halting
near Mars la Tour, supported by twelve guns. Yon Be-
dern, who did not think it prudent to attack, retired until
a fold of the hills gave him protection. Here he was
joined by two squadrons of hussars, which had approached
Bezonville, captured nine prisoners, and when pursued had
got deftly away. The sound of the cannon had attracted,
the rest of the brigade, and Yon Bedem again moved to-
wards Mars la Tour, and again drew off without a fight.
But by this time the cannonade had called up both Barbj
and Bredow, so that there were soon thirty-four squadrons
and two batteries on the ground. The French General, De
Forton, who believed erroneously that German infantry
occupied Fuxieux, was of opinion that he had fought a
successful skirmish; jet instead of closing with enemies
who were actually close to the line of retreat upon Yer-
dun, he fell back as far as Yionville, and went into
camp. Three French divisions of horse in the van of the
retiring Army allowed a German division to sit down
within a short distance of the Yerdun road and many miles
from all infantry support. On the other hand, a squadron
of Uhlans pushed almost to Conflans, and stumbling on
Du Barail's division, was smartly punished ; but a captain
of hussars, during the evening, rode towards Bezonville
and halted close enough to see Frossard*s fantassins cooking
their suppers. Meantime, the Prussian Guard Cavalry,
moving north-west from Dieulouard, had placed its ad-
vanced brigade at Thiaucourt ; and a squadron of Guard
Uhlans had audaciously summoned the Governor of Toul
to surrender. No such memorable examples of activity can
CHAP. VII.J YON MOLTKE KEEPS THE WHIP HAND. 165
-be found in the record of the French cavalry, which had
forgotten the traditions of Napoleon the Great.
Orders for the Flaiik March,
That evening General von Moltke issued a set of memor-
able instructions to General von Steinmetz and Prince
Frederick Charles. The First Army was to leave a corps
at Courcelles sur Nied, and place the others at Arry and
Pommerieux, between the Seille and the Moselle. " It is
only by a vigorous offensive movement of the Second
Army," wrote Von Moltke, " upon the routes from Metz to
Verdun by Fresne and Efcain that we can reap the fruits of
the victory obtained yesterday. The commander of the
Second Army is intrusted with this operation which he will
conduct according to his own judgment and with the
means at his disposal, that is, all the Corps of his Army."
It was further announced that the King would transfer his
head-quarters to Pont a Mousson in the afternoon of the
16th. Preparations were thus made to place the whole
force on the left bank of the Moselle, except the 1st
Corps, the 3rd Division of Cavalry, and the 2nd which
was still two marches from the river. In this way Von
Moltke hoped to keep the whip hand of his opponents,
and cut them off from the shelter they sought beyond the
Meuse.
The Envperor Quits the Army.
Before narrating the battle which the French style
Eezonville and the Germans Vionville-Mars la Tour, we
may turn to the Imperial head-quarters at Gravelotte at
dawn on the 16th, because the scene presents so vivid a
contrast to that in the German camp. When Marshal
Bazaine saw the Emperor on the preceding evening walking
166 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VIL
meditatiyelj up and down before hk quarters, he was sur-
prised by the question, " Must I go ? " The Marshal
frankly admitted that he had not been informed respecting
the situation* in front, and asked him to wait. "The
answer," writes Bazaine, appeared to please him, and
turning to his suite he said, loud enough to be heard by all,
" Gentlemen, we will remain, but keep the baggage packed."
The troops, sad and depressed, continued to defile before
the inn ; no shout, no vivat was evoked by the sight of the
sovereign and his son. Yet that night the Emperor had
made up his mind. In the morning he summoned
Bazaine, who found him in his carriage with the Prince
Imperial and Prince Napoleon. The baggage had already
gone on in the night, and the lancers and dragoons of the
Guard, commanded by General de France, were in the
saddle ready to serve as an escort. Bazaine rode to the
side of the carriage, and the Emperor said, " I have resolved
to leave for Verdun and Chalons. Put yourself on the
route for Verdun as soon as you can. The gendarmerie
have already quitted Briey in consequence of the arrival of
the Prussians " — a singularly erroneous statement, but one
showing how ill-informed the head-quarters were from
first to last. The Emperor then drove ofE from Gravelotte
by the road to Conflans, through the wooded ways which
were so soon to be the scene of a sanguinary encounter.
Three hours after he started Von Kedern's guns opened
suddenly on the French cavalry camp near VionviUe, and
began, by a stroke of suiprise, the most remarkable and
best-fought battle of the campaign.
CHAPTEE VnL
THE FBBSTOH BETBBAT THWABTSD.
VionviUe — Mars la Tour.
THAT feebleness and hesitation which had been so
conspicuous on the side of the French from the out-
set of the campaign were not likelj to cease when dangers
and difficulties increased with every passing hour. The
Emperor, while he commanded, had been incapable of
taking, not merely a bold, but any resolution, and the
mental qualities of Marshal Bazaine were not sufficiently
far above the average to enable him to remedy the mis-
chievous effects of the long course of erroneous conduct to
the heritage of which he succeeded. Moreover, neither
Bazaine nor any other French commander, despite recent
experiences, had formed a correct estimate of €(erman
energy and enterprise. Least of all could they believe that
a single Corps and two divisions of cavalry would venture
to plant themselves across the road to Yerdun. The evil
consequences were increased by the inactivity of the
cavalry, and the bad, unsoldierlike habit of making per-
functory reconnaisances carried only a mile or so to the
front and on the flanks. Marshal Bazaine's phrase — " les
reconnaissances doivent se f aire comme d^hdbitude '' — reveals
the whole secret. At Wissembourg, on the 4th of August*
General Abel Douay's horsemen returned from a short ex-
168 THE Campaign of sedan, [chap. viii.
cursion and reported that no enemy was near ; and at eight
in the morning of the 16th, General Frossard was infonued
bj the patrols which had come in that there was no adver-
sary in force on his front. The German horse were near
at hand, yet De Forton's cavaliers had not felt out as far as
their bivouac. Marshal Bazaine's original intention was
that the two corps ordered to follow the Mars la Tour road
should start at four o'clock; and Frossard had his men
out in readiness to move at that hour when a fresh order
postponed the march until the afternoon. During the
night Marshal Lebceuf, alarmed at the absence of two
divisions and at the continued sojourn of De Ladmirault in
the Moselle valley, had suggested that it would be better
to stand fast until the several Corps had been once more
brought within supporting distance ; and Marshal Bazaine
had readily yielded to the suggestion. Still no measures
were taken to ascertain whether foes were approaching or
not, and the soldiers, horse and foot, took up their ordinary
camp duties as they would have done had they been at
Chalons in time of peace. The actual situation, if they
had known it, required that every horse, man and gun
should have been in motion at dawn, yet they all lingered ;
and it may be said that neither superiors nor subordinates
were alive to the peril in which they stood — not of defeat,
still less rout, the odds available against German enter-
prise were too great, — but of a blow which would make
them reel and, perhaps, turn them aside from the paths to
the Meuse.
The Vionville Battlefield,
The road from Gravelotte to Verdun passes by the
villages of Bezonville, Vionville and Mars la Tour through
a generally open and undulating country. The ground
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 169
slopes irregularly and gentlj upward on all sides from the
highway ; the villages on the route are in the hollows or
shallow valleys. North and south of Bezonville a ridge
separated two ravines, the lai^er, on the east, formed by
the Jur^e brook, had its origin north of Gravelotte, the
smaller on the west, came down also from the northern
uplands, and parallel to its bed ran the principal road from
Gorze to Eezonville. At the southern declivity of the
ridge, and extending eastward as far as the Moselle, were a
series of forests — the Bois de Vionville, Bois St. Amould,
the Bois des Ognons, the Bois des Chevaux. To the west
and south-west of Eezonville the country was generally
open ; but there was a clump of trees shading a pool near
Vionville, and, north of the high road, were larger patches
of woods, named after the village of Tronville. North
also of the highway, and within the French lines, wood-
lands covered the hill sides towards St. Marcel, the hamlet
of Villers aux Bois being seated on the highest ground.
Along this upper plateau are traces of a Eoman road,
running due west, the ancient route from Verdun to Metz ;
traces visible also in the fields nearer to the fortress. The
French occupied the higher stretches on the eastern and
north-eastern edge of this irregularly undulating and
wooded region. General Frossard was posted on the left
of the line in front of Eezonville ; Canrobert on the heights
towards St. Marcel ; Leboeuf had his troops about Vem^-
ville, the (fuard stood at, and in rear of Gravelotte, and
the careless cavalry brigades under De Forton and Vala-
bregues had set up their camps west of Vionville, and
thence kept a listless watch towards the heights and
hollows, west and south-west, just in their immediate
front.
170 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Till.
The French are Surprised.
Suddenly, about nine o'clock, they were struck by eliells
fired from a battery which seemed to have sprung out of a
rounded hill a few hundred yards to the west of Yionville.
The missiles fell among the tents and burst about a
squadron filing up in watering order to the tree-shaded
pool. In quick succession three additional batteries ap-
peared on the crest and opening fire added to the confusion
below. Murat's dragoons broke and fled and, accompanied
by the baggage train, horses, carts, men, galloped and ran
off towards Bezonville; and De Gramont's troopers,
further to the rear, mounted and retired in good order up
the northern slopes, halting on the right of the 6th Corps.
The batteries, six in number, then moved up to a height
closer in to Yionville and smote the infantry camps. They
were promptly answered by the guns of Frossard's Corps,
while his brigades stood to their arms, formed up and
sprang forward with alacrity. About the same time, a
solitary German battery, visible to the south, fired a few
rounds into the French left and then withdrew over the
crest unable to bear the storm of Chassepot bullets which
were poured from the aroused and irritated infantry.
The collision, so unwelcome to the French, had been
brought about in this wise. Prince Frederick Charles had
ordered the 8rd and 10th Corps and the 6th Division
of Cavaby to start early in the morning and strike the
Verdun road west of Bezonville. As General von Voights-
Bhetz, commanding the 10th, intended to move upon St.
Hilaire, beyond Mars la Tour, he instructed Von Bhein-
baben to reconnoitre in the direction of Bezonville, in-
creased his horse artillery, and supported him with an in-
fantry detachment from Thiaucourt. About the same
time that the 10th Corps advanced its foremost brigades
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 171
from Thiaucourt, and the rest from Pont k Mousson, the
3rd Corps and the 6th Division of Cavalry also made
for the hnis west and sonth of Yionville, the right division
proceeding by Gorze, and the left, by Buxieres, towards
Tronville. Thus these two Corps were moving on two
parallel curves, the 3rd being next to the enemy, and
ihe 10th on the outer and larger arc. The Prince and
his Ghenerals did not anticipate a battle, but they all hoped
to fall in vdth and punish a rear-guard, or, by striking far
to the westward, intercept and compel the French Army
to halt and fight before it reached the Meuse. It v^as
Kheinbaben's abrupt and thorough home-thrust which
revealed the fact that the French had not passed Eezon^
Tille, or, at least, that a large part of the Army was near
that village. His advance-guard, three squadrons and a
battery, had moved within musket-shot of De Forton's
camp ''without encountering a single patrol ; " and, taking
advantage of such supineness, his artillery, hastening for-
ward, created the panic near YionviUe, which has already
been described. Frossard's Corps, which always behaved
well, speedily took up defensive positions. Bataille occu-
pied Vionville and Flavigny, and the high ground above
the villages; Verge prolonged the line to the left, and
placed one brigade facing south to front the Bois de Yion-
yille, and connect the array with Lapasset's brigade on the
ridge which, from the north, overlooked the Bois St.
Amould and the ravine leading to Gorze. The 6th Corps,
encamped north of the main road, continued the hne on
that side, and rapidly developed a front facing- south-west
between the highway and the Roman road. The sound of
the cannonade was heard as far off as Jamy and Conflans,
st<artled LeboBuf at Yem^ville, and aroused the Marshal,
busy in his quarters at Gravelotte,
1 72 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VUI.
The Third Corps strikes in.
Sheiubaben's bold horsemen and gunners bad done
their work ; they had gained for the oncoming infantry
that species of moral advantage which always accrues from
a surprise. As they fell back to more sheltered positions
behind the swelling hills, the right wing of the 3rd
Corps, under Stulpnagel, entered the field from the south ;
the left wing, directed by the fiery Alvensleben himself,
came down into the arena from the south-west, and several
batteries, urged on by Yon Bulow, dashed up and formed
the centre of the assailants. Indeed, the guns were in
action before the infantry could march over the distance
between their starting points and the outward spray of the
French line of battle ; so that for an appreciable interval
the groups of batteries had to depend upon themselves.
Yet not for long. StiilpnageVs battalions plunged into
the dense woods on the right, and waged a close combat
with the skirmishers of Jolivet's br^de, who were slow to
give ground. Beyond the thickets, the left wing of the
division drove Yalaz^'s skirmishers from an eminence, the
highest in those parts, and a battery was speedily in action
on its bare summit. By degrees, as they came up, the
battalions of the 10th Brigade went forward on the left,
or western, flank of the height, where the contest, con-
ducted with vigour on both sides, eddied to and fro, until
the German onset, repeated and sustained, gained the
mastery, and cleared the slopes so effectually that five
other batteries, driving up the hill as fast as they could
clear the defile, took ground on its top, and gave support
to the companies in the wood and on the open down.
About an hour was consumed in this desperate work, made
all the more arduous because the German infantry pushed
eagerly into the fight, not in compact masses, but one
CHAP. VIIL] the FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 173
battalion after another as each straggled up to the front.
Major-General Doering was killed, and many officers went
down in this sanguinary strife : one battalion which dashed
forward to resist a French attack at a critical moment lost
every officer. But as it retired, broken and wasted, the
French were smitten in turn by its comrades, forced to
give way, and the p si ion was, at this heavy cost, secured.
For the troops engaged in the forest had now attained the
northern edge of the Bois de YionvUle, the batteries on
the lofty hill were safe, and* Stulpnagel's Division was
solidly established upon the most commanding uplands in
that part of the field.
To their left rear was the 6th Cavalry Division; but
between them and the fields west of Vionville were no in-
fantry, only lines of guns, protected by a few squadrons of
horse. For the 6th Infantry Division, coming on from
Buxi^ries, had gradually wheeled to the right until they
faced to the east, the 11th Brigade crossing the high road,
north of Tronville, the 12th moving upon Vionville; so
that they formed a line of attack directed upon Bataille's
division which held Vionville and Flavigny, having on its
right, beyond the Verdun road, the division of Lafont de
Villiers belonging to Canrobert's Corps. While Stulpnagel
was striving to obtain a grip of the woods and heights on
the French left, Buddenbrock, the other divisional com-
mander, acting under the eyes of his chief, threw the
weight of his division upon the two villages which covered
what was then the French centre. Vionville was first
carried by the usual turning movement, and its capture
was followed by the outburst of a still more murderous
conflict. The French had brought up more and heavier
pieces, and these poured a crushing fire into the village.
The Germans answered by continuing the attack on the
French infantry. Tet so confused was the engagement on
174 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VIIl.
the bare bill side, so completely was it a ** soldiers' battle,"
such was the swaying to and fro of the mingled companies
which, crushed and mangled, yet welded themselves to-
gether and pressed on, that, once more, the official German
historian renounces the task of minute description. But
the effect of the hurly-burly was soon manifest— Bataille's
entire division, unable to endure the torment, and seeing
its General fall wounded, went about and retired ; Yalaze's
brigade, " taken in flank," says Frossard, by a German
battery, and losing its gallant commander, also marched
off through Rezonville ; and the nearest brigade of Oan-
robert's Corps likewise receded, either under pressure or
weakened in purpose by example. The Germans paid a
great price for the immense advantage secured; but as
Flavigny fell into their hands, as the left of Stulpnagel's
Division joined in its capture, and as the front of battle
was now no longer an arc but its chord, the prize was well
worth its cost. The sole reinforcements which had arrived
to aid the 3rd Corps, were two detachments, parts of the
same brigade, abd pertaining to the 10th which, on their
way to join that Corps then moving westward, had turned
aside, attracted by the magnetism of the cannonade. How
much of the success obtained was due to the valour, devo-
tion, and endurance of the artillery may be gathered from
the French narratives. No troops could have fought with
greater hardihood and dash — ^not fleeting, but sustained —
than the infantry of the 3rd Corps, all Prussians from
the Mark of Brandenburg. But they had their equals
among the dauntless gunners, deserving to be called
" tirailleurs d^artUlerie" who literally used their batteries
as battalions, dragging them up to the very outward edges
of the fight, often within rifle-shot, and when pressed, re-
tiring some scores of paces, then halting and opening at
short range upon their pursuers. The line, composed of
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH BETREAT THWARTED. 175
groups of batteries, especially in the forenoon, was the
backbone of tbe battle.
Arrival of Bazaine.
Just as Frossard's infantry, yielding to the vehement
presstire, retreated behind Eezonville, Marshal Bazaine
appeared on the scene, and rode into the thick of the con-
test. At Frossard*s request he directed a Lancer regiment,
supported by the cuirassiers of the Guard, to chaige and
check the pursuers. The Lancers went forth with great
spirit, but soon swerved aside, broken by the in&mtry fire.
The Guard horsemen, however, led by General du Preuil,
rode home upon the eager and disordered companies who
were marching to the east of the flaming vill^e of Flavigny.
But these foot soldiers, reserving their fire until the mailed
cavaliers were within two hundred and fifty yards, plied
them with shot so steadily that the squadrons swerved to
the right and left, only to fall under the bullets from the
rear ranks which had faced about. ''The cuirassiers,"
says General du Preuil, " were broken by the enemy's in-
fantry, which received them with a murderous fire. After
the charge, the wreck of the regiment rallied at Eezonyille,
haTing left behind on the field 22 officers, 24 boub offidersy
about 200 men and 250 horses. When the regiment was
re-organized, instead of 115 mounted men per squadron,
there were only 62 ! " Colonel von Bauch had close to
Flavigny two Hussar r^ments ; with one he pressed on
the flying cuirassiers, and with the other charged the
French infantry struggling rearward. Bazaine had just
brought up, and was posting a battery of the Imperial
Guard, when the Hussars charged down upon him, taking
the battery in front and flank. It was here that the Mar-
shal was surrounded, separated for a moment from his
176 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VHI.
staff, and obliged, as he himself says, to '' draw his «word."
Two squadrons of his escort came to his relief, and a rifle
battalion opened upon the Prussian horse, who had to
retreat, leaving behind the battery which they had tem-
porarily seized. General Alvensleben had ordered up the
6th Division of Cavalry, but when they arrived, Bazaine
had brought forward the Grenadier Division of the Guard
to replace the 2nd Corps in the front line, for Jolivet's
brigade, on the French left, had also retired to the high
ground in its rear. The 6th formed up to the south of
Flavigny and advanced, but they could not make any im-
pression upon the re-invigorated enemy, and they drew
back, having lost many officers and men. " This demon-
stration, apparently without any result," says the official
German account, " was still useful, since it provided the
artillery with an opportunity so vehemently desired of
pressing up nearer to the front." In fact, the lines of the
artillery were now between the edge of the wood of Vion-
ville and Flavigny, and to the right, left, and front of
Yionville itself — a distinct approximation towards the
French infantry and guns ; so that there were changes on
both sides, with the difference that the French brought up
fresh troops, while the same German guns, horsemen and
infantry continued the struggle.
The crisis of the battle had now arrived ; for General
von Alvensleben, in order, to diminish the violent pressure
on his left, which was beyond the Verdun road, had been
obliged to thrust his sole reserve of infantry into the
deadly encounter. Colonel Lehmann, commanding a
detachment of the 10th Corps, consisting of three bat-
talions and a half, had come up to the outskirts of the
field in the forenoon, and he was directed to take post near
Tronville. When, in consequence of the reverse inflicted
on Frossard, Bazaine arrayed the Guard in front of
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 177
IBezonville and Canrobert put bis reserre brigades into line
on tbeir right, and both estabUshed their reserve artiUery
on the heights to the north and east, Alvensleben sent
forward Lehmann's battalions, which, with great difficulty,
managed to keep their ground in the copses of Tronville
beyond the Verdun road. It was about two o'clock in the
afternoon and the German leader had no reserves, every
foot soldier and gun was engaged, while the greater part of
the 10th Corps was still remote from the field. Luckily for
him, the reports of the fugitive peasantry and the steady
advance of the German right through the southern woods,
aroused in the mind bf Bazaine a fear that he might be
turned on his left, a fear shared by at least one of his
subordinates. He, therefore, caused the Guard Voltigeurs
to form front to the south in the Bois des Ognons, so as to
watch the ravines, down one of which the Mance flowed to
Ars, and in the bed of the other the Jur^e ran to Nov^ant.
Lapasset, who barred the road from G^rze, was reinforced
by a regiment of Grenadiers, and Montaudon's division of
the 8rd Corps was taken from Leboeuf and placed near
MaJmaison, a little to the north of Gravelotte. Thus the
French line, instead of standing north and south, faced
generally to the south-west, between the Bois des Ognons
and the high ground north of the copses of Tronville. At
this time Leboeuf, with one division and a half — ^for Metman
had not yet joined him — was moving south-west from
Yem^ville, and Be Ladmirault's divisions — for he had
quitted the Moselle valley in the morning — were only just
showing their leading troops towards Doncourt. Never-
theless, Canrobert, who had developed a strong line of
guns as well as infantry on the right of Picard's Grenadiers,
both on the face and flank of the German left, determined
to attempt the recapture of YionviUe and Flavigny. He
was led to do so by a belief that the partial cessation of the
178 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VIII.
German fire indicated exhaustion, and, aided by the whole
of his artillery, he certainly delivered a formidable onset
carried up to the very outskirts of the two villages. It was
then that Alvensleben called upon the cavalry to charge,
solely with the object of gaining time and relieving the
wearied foot, and hardly-treated gunners.
Bredow'8 Brilliant Charge.
Bredow's heavy brigade, the 7th Cuirassiers of Magde-
burg, and the 16th Uhlans of Altmark, eight squadrons,
from which two were withdrawn on the march to watch
the Tronville Copses, was selected to assail Canrobert's
destructive batteries and stinging infantry. Yon Bredow
drew out his two regiments, led them into the shallow but
protecting hollow on the north of Yionville, and, without
pausing, wheeled into line on the move, so that the array
of sabres and lances fronted nearly eastward. Then break-
ing into a headlong gallop the troopers rushed like a
torrent over and through the infantry on their broad track
and into the batteries, near the Boman Boad, which for
the moment they disorganized. But now the French horse
swarmed forward on all sides, and the survivors of Yon
Bredow's heroic men, having cheerfully made the heavy
sacrifice demanded from them, turned about to retreat
through the French infantry, punished as they rode back
by De Forton,Gramont, Murat andYalabr^guewho brought
up three thousand dragoons, chasseurs and cuirassiers
against the remains of the devoted brigade. Yon Bredow
sought safety behind Flavigny, whither Yon Bedem had
ridden up with a regiment of hussars, but he did not attack
because the hostile cavalry halted in their pursuit. The
charge had cost the Magdeburgers and Altmarkers U
oflioers and S68 men, nearly oiie-half the strength with
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 179
wliicli thej started on their astoiiiBhing ride ; but the
glorious remnant had the proud satisfaction of knowing
that the two regiments had put an end to offensiye attacks
from the side of Eezonyille» that their infantry comrades
of the Brandenbui^ Corps had received effectual succour in
time of need, and that the steadfast artillery had gained
precious moments which they used to prepare for fresh
exertions.
The Fight hecomea Stationary.
Daring the next three hours, and, indeed, to the end
of the day, the combat on the German right and centre
remained stationary, varied by desperate attempts to win
ground from the Imperial Grenadiers which cost many
lives and achieved no marked success. Seven fresh
batteries, however, came successively into action, so that
about four o'clock, the German line of guns, between the
wood of Yionville and Flavigny had been increased to more
than a hundred pieces and their fire efiEectually stayed
the French from advancing. Some portions of the 7th,
8th and 9th Corps, which had struggled up from the
Moselle valley during the sultry afternoon, entered the
woods, were pushed up the ravine road from Gorze, or
were thrown forward in front of the big battery which was
the mainstay of the left wing. Prince Frederick Charles
himself arrived about four o'clock. He had ridden straight
from Pont k Mousson on learning that a serious engage-
ment was afoot, and as he cantered up to the front he was
heartily welcomed by the men of the 3rd Corps which he
bad commanded for ten years.
Arrival of the Tenth Corps.
Surveying the scene from the lofty upland above the
wood for a timei he rode off to another eminence vmx
180 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VIII.
Flayign J, because the stress of battle was then on the left
wing, where the rest of the 10th Corps, so long absent
from the field, had appeared just in time to encounter the
fresh troops which had been led forward by Marshal
Lebceuf and General de Ladmirault. When Yon Bredow*s
Brigade rode against Canrobert's Corps, Yon Barby's horse
were sent to guard the extreme left against a surprise from
the masses of French troops gathering on the Doncourt
hills. Thej pushed far northward, and sustained a
cannonade from the enemy, who soon forced them to
retreat; for Lebceuf, with Aymard's Division — ^Bazaine
had now called for Nayral's as well as Montaudon's —
moved down towards the Tronville thickets, and Ladmirault,
whose in|antry had at length reached him from the Moselle
valley, sent Q-renier forward in line with Aymard. These
two divisions, driving the horsemen back towards TronviUe,
at once assailed the woodlands, so often named, and com-
bining their attack with that of Tixier, whose division
formed the right of Canrobert's Corps, they expelled the
German infantry from the northern section of the wood.
Lehmann's Hanoverians and the wreck of the Branden-
burgers gave ground slowly, but, after an hour's severe
bush-fighting, the left of the 3rd Corps was obliged to
yield, and nothing restrained the advancing French infantry
save the terribly effective fire of theGl^rman gunners, upon
whom the brunt of the battle fell. As the most forward
German guns were retired south of the highway, Grenier
sent three batteries over the ravine, and fortune seemed,
for the first time, to favour the Imperial soldiers. But,
at this trying moment, the 20th Division of the 10th
Corps — ^the men had already marched that day twenty-
seven miles — appeared on the heights of Tronville. General
von Kraatz, its commander, brought with him eight
battalions, four squadrons, and four batteries, an opportune
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 181
reinforcement, which had been led thither because the
summons, given by faint reverberations of a heavy can-
nonade, heard at Thiaucourt, had been clenched by the
arrival of a note written on the field of battle.
The artillery, as usual, took the lead, hastening to the
field across country, and, before the infantry could advance
twenty-four guns in action north of Tronville, checked the
French skirmishers, and obliged Grenier's batteries to re-
cross the ravine. Then the foot went into the wood, and
soon chased the French from all the copses except a patch
on the north. At this time, General de Ladmirault, who
had been joined by heavy masses of cavalry, had on the
heights, near the farm of G-reyfere, abundance of artillery
and De Cissey's Division. On his right ran a deep and
steep ravine towards Mars la Tour ; he was about to cross
this obstacle, and had, in fact, entered the hollow, intending
to sweep down upon the German left, when he became
aware that a strong hostile body was approaching from the
west. It was General von Schwarzkoppen, commanding a
division of the 10th Corps. He brought on to the field the
38th brigade, diminished, however, by detachments to five
battalions, two companies of pioneers, twelve guns, and
six sqTiadrons of Dragoons of the Guard. General de
Ladmirault's proceedings had been closely watched by
some German horse, and his advance-guard of Chasseurs
d'Afrique had been driven out of Mars la Tour by the
Dragoons of the Guard. Seeing the oncoming enemy, he
hastily recrossed the ravine, and placed De Cissey and his
artillery in position to resist any attack. The intelligence
that an enemy had shown himself on the west had run
along the French line, and had induced Grenier and
Leboeuf to suspend their apparently prosperous onset, thus
diminishing the pressure upon Von EIraatz in the Tron-
ville wood, and also on the artillery, which had been so
182 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. VIII.
long engaged near Vionyille. Gleneral Schwarzkoppen
had, during the day, marched to St. Hilaire on his way to
the fords of the Mense; but, hearing the cannonade, he
halted, sent out patrols, and finally moved off towards the
battle, guided bj columns of dust, clouds of smoke, and the
deep-toned muttering of the rival guns. When he reached
Mars la Tours, Yoights-Bhetz, the Corps Commander, rode
up. Both he and Prince Frederick Charles, who watched
the fight from a hill above Flavignj, were under the delusion
that the French right could be taken in flank by an attack
from Mars la Tour; and Yon Wedell, who commanded the
newly-arrived brigade, was ordered to fall on. But, for
once, the German Staff did not show their far-famed skill;
for they did not reconnoitre the ground, nor had they
observed the formidable array of De Cissey's brigades. Von
WedeU's men dashed forward with alacrity, but found in
their path a deep hollow, which covered the French front,
as well as flank, on that side. Nevertheless, the battalions,
in two lines, hurried down one bank and up the other, and
then met an entire French Division. A brief and bloody
fight at close quarters — the opposing lines were separated
in some places by only fifty yards — ensued ; but so con-
tinuous and deadly was the French fire that the sturdy
Westphalians had to yield. Their dead and dying covered
the summit, and filled the hollow way ; two-thirds of the
16th Eegiment were left on the field, and the whole brigade,
shattered into a shapeless crowd of fugitives, hurried to
the rear. Then forward to their succour came bounding the
2nd Dragoons of the Guard, Colonel von Auerswald at
their head, spurring headlong to the front through the
disordered crowd, taking the hedges and ditches in their
stride, and galloping furiously into the midst of the
pursuing French, who had leaped forward from the right
of Grenier's Division. It was a hopeless charge — ^a ride to
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 183
certain death — but the readiness of the Dragoons saved
the right of the brigade ; yet at great cost, for they left
dead on the field their brave Colonel, a Major, and three
Captains. Nine officers in all, and seventeen men were
killed; four officers and sixty men were wounded; while
one officer and five men were captured. Two of Count
Bismarck's sons, privates in this regiment, rode in the
charge; the eldest, Herbert^ was shot in the thigh,
the youngest, Wilhelm, a stout trooper, lifted a wounded
comrade on to his horse, and carried him off the field.
The charge of the Dragoons enabled the broken
battalions to draw oft towards TronviUe, but the guns in
position still held on near Mars le Tour, west of which,
towards Yille sur Yron, a horse battery and a squadron of
the 2nd Dragoons of the Guard were engaged in a smart
skiinnish with a body of Chasseurs d'Afrique. This en-
counter was followed shortly afterwards by
The great Ca/valry Combat.
Ladmirault had sent six regiments of horse over the gully
on his right — Legrand's Hussars and Dragoons, Du Barairs
solitary regiment of Chasseurs d'Afrique, and the superb
brigade of Lancers and Dragoons of the G-uards commanded
by General de France. On the other side Yon Barby's
brigade had approached Mars la Tour during the fatal
attack upon De Ladmirault's infantry, and soon after it was
joined by two squadrons of the 4th Cuirassiers, the 10th
Hussars, and the 16th Dragoons. Sweeping round to the
north of the village, Barby formed up his troopers in the
narrow space between the Yron and the Grey^re ravine,
while Legrand and his comrades showed their compact
masses to the north. The French regiments were placed
in echelon, Legrand's Hussars, led by General Montaigu,
184 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [COttAP. VIH.
on the left, €k>iidrecoiirt'8 Dragoons on his right rear, and
next the Guard Lancers and Dragoons. The Chasseurs
d' Afriqne were behind alL The first shock fell upon the
13th Dragoons which, having taken ground to the right,
had only time to wheel partiallj into line before Montaigu's
Hussars rode through the squadron's interrals, and it
would haTe fared ill with the Prussians had not Colonel
Ton Weise plunged in with the 10th Hussars and overset
the French. Yon Barbj on the left, at the head of the
16th Uhlans and 19th Dragoons, met the French Guard
Cavalry in foil shock, and then ensued a furious confused
fight upon the whole line. Each side endeavoured to fall
upon a flank, and the squadrons swayed to and fro amid a
huge cloud of dust. Suddenly, a squadron of Prussian
Guard Dragoons, returning from a patrol, came riding
across country from the west and struck the flank of the
French Guards. Du Barail's Chasseurs d'Afrique and
Gondrecourt's Dragoons dashed into the meUe, but the
Westphalian Cuirassiers drove like a wedge into the oppos-
ing ranks, and the 16th Dragoons fell upon and smote
them in flank and rear. L^rand was killed, Montaigu
wounded and a prisoner, and the French cavalry, wheeling
about, rode out of the fight, throwing into disorder a
brigade of Chasseurs, which had been sent by General de
Cl^rambault to cover the retreat. The €h»llic horse had
brilliantly sustained their reputation, yet they were over-
matched by the Teutons, who also lost three commanding
officers. But Yon Barby was able to reform his victorious
squadrons on the plateau and withdraw them at leisure,
watched, but not pursued, by a squadron of Dragoons be-
longing to De Cl^rambault's division. General Ladmirault
surveyed the field from the heights of Bruville, and came
to the conclusion that no more could be accomplished by
the French right wing. He had only two divisions, his
CHAP. VIII.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 185
cavalry had been defeated, and he " discovered " between
Tronville and Yionville " an entire Corps d'Armfe." So he
rested and bivouacked on the hills about the Grey^re farm.
The forces of his next neighbour on the left, Lebceuf , had
been reduced to Aymard's division, for Marshal fiazaine
had called away Nayral to support Montaudon near Bezon-
ville; indeed, at one moment he had abstracted one of
Aymard's brigades, but, yielding toLebceuf s remonstrances,
he sent it back.
End of the BaMle.
It was now past seven o'clock, and both sides were ex-
hausted by the tremendous strain which they had borne so
long ; yet the battle continued until darkness had settled
over the woods and villages and fields. For Bamekow's
division and a Hessian brigade had entered the woodlands
and pressed forward on the G-orze road, creating new alarm
in. the mind of Bazaine, who throughout the day was
governed by his belief that the Germans intended to turn
his left and cut him off from Metz. So that when Colonel
von Bex pushed boldly up the ravine against Lapasset and
his flankers opened fire from the edge of the Bois des
Ognons, the French Commander drew still more troops to
that flank. Between RezonviUe and the ridges near Grave-
lotte he had, by eventide, placed the whole of the Guard,
Frossard's Corps, Lapasset's brigade, and one-half of
LebcBuf s Corps. Fearing the storming columns which ever
and anon surged outward from the woods towards the com-
manding heights south of Eezonville, Bourbaki brought up
fifty-four guns and arrayed them in one long battery. The
closing hours of the day witnessed a stupendous artillery
contest, which was carried on even when the flashes of flame
alone revealed the positions of the opposing pieces. The
186 THB CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. YIII.
thick smoke increased the obscnrily, and yet within the
gloom bodies of Gkrman infantiy, and even of horse, sallied
from the woods or vales and vainly strove to reach the
coveted crests or storm in npon Bezonville itself. At the
very last moment a violent cannonade bnrst forth on both
sides, yet to this day neither knows why it arose, where it
began, or what it was to effect. At length the tired hosts
were quiet ; the strife of twelve hours ended. The Qerman
line of outposts that night ran from the Bois des Ognons
along the Bois St. Amould, then to the east of Fiavigny
and Yionville through the Tronville Copses ; and after the
moon rose upon the ghastly field the cavalry rode forth and
placed strong guards as far westward as l^rs la Tour and
the Yron. The French slept on the ground they held, the
heights south of Bezonville, that village itself, and the
ridges which overlook the highway to Yerdun as far as
Bruville and Grey^re. It had been a day of awful carnage^
for the French had lost, in killed and wounded, nearly
17,000, and the Germans 16,000 men.
It is impossible to state exactly the numbers present on
the field— probably, 125,000 French to 77,000 Germans.
The latter brought up two complete Corps, the 3rd and
10th, two divisions of cavalry, the 5th and 6th — ^these
sustained the shock and bore the chief loss — a brigade of
the 8th Corps, the 11th Begiment from the 9th, and
foiur Hessian regiments of that corps under Prince Louis,
the husband of the British Princess Alice. They also had,
in action or reserve, 246 guns. The French mustered the
Imperial Guard, the 2nd Corps, three divisions and one
regiment of the 6th Corps, three divisions of the 3rd, and
two of the 4th Corps, five divisions of cavalry, and 390
guns ; so that on the 16th, they were, at all times, numeric*
ally superior in every arm. When Alvensleben came into
action a little after ten o'clock with the 3rd Corps and
CHAP. Vm.] THE FRENCH RETREAT THWARTED. 187
two diTisions of cavairj — ^perhaps 33,000 men — Hiej bad in
their front the 2nd and 6th Corps, the Guard, and the
Beserve Cavahy — ^not less than 72,000, the guns on the
French side being always superior in number. The 3rd
Corps, less one division, was at ten o'clock only three miles
from the field ; these and half the 4th Corps arrived in the
afternoon, adding more than 50,000 men to the total, while
the Germans could only bring up the 10th, and parts of
the 8th and 9th, fewer than 40,000, some of them
marching into line late in the evening. The French
Marshal, who fought a defensive battle, did not use his
great strength during the forenoon, or in the afternoon
when his right wing had wheeled up to the front. The re-
sult was an " indecisive action " — ^the phrase is used by the
official €(erman historian — ^and that it was indecisive must
be attributed, at least in part, to the fact that Marshal
Bazaine, nor he alone, stood in constant dread of an over-
whelming inroad of " Prussians " on his left, with intent to
cut him off from Metz and thrust him, unprovided with
munitions of all kinds, on to the Briey-Longuyon road.
But it may be inferred from the mode in which the battle
was fought by the French commanders, from the first shot
to the last, that the Germans had obtained a moral
ascendency over the leaders and the led, and that such an
ascendency had a great influence upon the tactics, as well as
the strategy, of Marshal Bazaine and his subordinates in
command. Nothing supports the correctness of this inference
more strongly than the fact that an Army of 120,000 men
considered a great success had been achieved when it had
resisted the onsets of less than two-thirds of its numbersi
and had been driven from its line of retreat I
CHAPTER IX.
PBESSED BACK OK METZ
DAEKNESS had set in, and the last shot had been
fired, when Marshal Bazaine rode back to his head-
quarters at Gravelotte. There he became impressed with
the scarcity — " penurj " — of munitions and provisions ;
there he acknowledged to the Emperor that the direct road
to Verdun had been closed, and that he might be obliged
to retreat by the north ; and there he wrote the order which
was to move his entire Army the next day nearer to Metz.
The troops began their retrograde march as early as four
o'clock, by which hour Prince Frederick Charles was up on
the hill above Plavigny, intently watching his antagonists.
Eezonville was still occupied by infantry, a cavalry division
was drawn up between that village and Vemdville until late
in the forenoon, and the marches of troops to and fro kept
the cautious German Commanders, for some time, in a state
of uncertainty.
It has now to be shown how they had employed the 16th
outside the area of the conflict, where the several Corps
stood in the evening, and by what means the G-reat Staff,
on the 17th, acquired the knowledge that the " Army of the
Bhine " had retired upon the line of hills immediately to
the westward of Metz.
The movement of troops comes first under notice. On
I
s
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 189
the extreme left the 4th Corps haying crossed the
Moselle at Marbache, had pushed forward in a south-
westerly direction, part of the Corps making a dashing but
fruitless attempt to intimidate the garrison of Toul, so im-
portant because it barred the railway to Chalons, and at the
end of the day was still under orders to march upon the
Meuse. The Q-uard, preceded by its cavalry, advanced from
Dieulouard to several points half-way between the Moselle
and the Meuse, the right being at Bemecourt and the left
about Beaumont. The 12th Corps, Saxons, crossed the
Moselle at Pont a Mousson, and had one division there and
one about Eegnieville en Haye. The 2nd Corps, still
approaching the Moselle by forced marches, had attained
villages east of the Seille. It will be readily understood
that, as the 4th and 2nd Corps were so far distant
from the centre of action west of Metz, they could hardly
be moved up in time to share in the impending struggle ;
and they, therefore, for the present, may be omitted from the
narrative. It was otherwise with the remaining Corps, and
it was the aim of the Great Staff to bring them all up to
the Verdun road.
From the very earliest moment. General von Moltke
held the opinion that the full consequences of the action on
the 14th could only be secured by vigorous operations on
the left bank of the Moselle ; and as the reports came in
from the front on the 16th, that sound judgment was more
than confirmed. The Eoyal head-quarters were transferred
in the forenoon to Pont a Mousson, whither King William
repaired ; and Von Moltke, who had preceded the King,
found information which led the general to the conclusion
that a new chapter in the campaign had been opened.
Accordingly, he desired to push up to the front the largest
possible number of troops, so that he might, if such a de-
sign were feasible, have ample means wherewith to shoulder
190 THE CAMPAION OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
off the French to the northward, and sever their communi-
cations with Chalons. At this stage, the idea of shutting
them up in Metz had not yet been conceived. The 7th,
8th and 9th were ordered to hasten forward on the
road towards Yionville, and some part of them, as we have
seen, were engaged on the 16tL Extra bridges were erected
on the Moselle, the roads were cleared of all impediments,
and the results rewarded the foresight, energy and goodwill
displayed by officers and men. The 12th Corps was
eighteen, and the Guard twenty-two miles from the battle-
field, but so keen and intelligent were their commanders,
that, inferring from the information they received what
would be required of them, they stood prepared to execute
any order as soon as it arrived. The former body, indeed,
marched oft northward in the night, and sent word of the
fact to the Guard, which led the commander to assemble
the divisions on the instant and stand ready to step forth.
So that when the formal orders were brought, the Guard
started at five in the morning, when the Saxons were already
on the road. The 8th Corps, or rather its remaining
division, were on the way at dawn, preceded by the 9th»
and followed by the 7th from its cantonments on the
left bank of the Seille. Thus the whole available portions
of the Second and First Annies were in motion, to sustain
the 3rd and 10th, if they were attacked on the 17th ; to
act, as circumstances required, if the French abandoned
the battlefield.
Prince Frederick Charles, who had slept at Gk>rze, took
horse at dawn, and reached his watch-tower on the hill
south-west of Flavigny at half-past four o'clock, early
enough to distinguish by the increasing light the French
line of outposts between Bruville and Bezonville. About
six o'clock the King joined the Prince, and at the same
time the 9th Corps took post near the right wing of thA
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 191
3rd. What the staff had now to determine was whether
the French intended to retire or attack, and if thej retired
whither they went. Patrols, busy on all sides, gave in con-
tradictory or rather discordant reports, which for some time
left it doubtful whether the retreat was not actually being
carried out by Oonflans on the Briey road; but by de-
grees the head-quarters arrived at the conclusion that the
French would not attack, that they had not withdrawn far,
and that the task of grappling with them must be deferred
until the next day. Soon after noon, when General
Metman, acting as rear guard, quitted Eezonville, there
were on or near the field no fewer than seven German
Corps and three divisions of cavalry; so that had the
French renewed the battle for the Verdun road, even early
in the morning, they would have found it a severe task to
make their way at least along the southern or Mars la Tour
high road. About eight in the morning G-eneral von
Moltke had dictated an order on the height near Flavigny,
in obedience to which the 7th Corps marched by Borny
and Ars upon Gravelotte, following the Mance brook, and
occupying the woods on the right and left; while the
8th, already in part on the field, ascended the water-
course and ravine which gives access to Bezonville. The
object of the double movement was to accelerate the retreat
of the French from these places. It was not accomplished
without some wood-fighting, but about half-past three
General Metman withdrew his flankers, and glided out of
sight beyond the ridge near Point du Jour. But the firing
had alarmed Yon Moltke, who, dreading lest the fiery
Steinmetz should bring on a general or even partial en-
gagement, sent him positive orders to stop the combat.
The veteran, however, pressed forward himself with Von
Zastrow, Von Kameke and their staff officers. Emerging
from the woods into the open, they beheld across the deep
192 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
ravine the iVench camps on the opposite plateau, and eyen
discerned the works thrown up by the careful Frossard to
cover his guns and infantry. A mitraiUeuse at once
opened fire on the group of horsemen, and drove them awaj,
but not before they had seen enough to prove, when com-
bined with the cavalry reports from the north-west flank,
that the French Army was encamped on the heights to the
west of Metz, and had not attempted to withdraw by any of
the still open roads towards M^zi^res or Chalons. There-
fore, the German armies halted, and the Generals had a
little leisure to frame a plan of operations for the 18th.
Marshal Bazaine.
Human ingenuity has imputed various motives to the
French Marshal, some of them being discreditable to his
loyalty, all based on a low estimate of his character as a
man, and capacity as a soldier. His own account is that he
did not persevere in trying to effect his retreat, either by
force or skill, partly because the Army was not well sup-
plied with food and munitions, and partly, as is apparent
from his evidence and books, because he had formed a
military theory which he proposed to work out near Metz
to the disadvantage of the enemy. He held that he had a
strong post on the flank of the German communications,
and that, if he could make his adversaries waste their
troops in repeated attacks upon " inexpugnable'* positions*
he might be able to resume the offensive when the Army
at Chalons should take the field. Secretly, we suspect, he
had become imbued with a belief or apprehension that what
the French call the moral of the Army had been seriously
impaired ; that their staying power in action was not what
it should have been, and that they could not be trusted to
perform so delicate an operation as a long flank march
CHAP. IX.] PBESSED BACK OV METE. 193
within reach of a foe exalted hj victoiy, aided bj a potweifal
and audacious cavalry, and an infantij capable of marching
twenty miles a daj, and enjoying the adTantage of greatly
superior numbers. As usoal, the motives of Baasaine were
''mixed/' but there does not seem any good reason to
believe that he was selfishly disloyal to the Emperor,
faithless to France, or insensible to the charms of " glory."
His chief defect was that he did not possess sufficient
military competence to command a large Army — a defect
he shared with his comrades of high rank ; and his misfor-
tune was that he succeeded to an inheritance of accumu-
lated error entailing severe penalties, from the infliction of
which only a rare genius, like that of the First Napoleon,
could have saved himself and his Army.
Active war^e had now continued for a fortnight, and
at sundown on the 17th of August the "Army of the
Bhine" found itself obliged to form front facing, not
Berlin, but Paris ; while the formidable Armies of King
William, with their backs to the French capital, turned
their eyes towards the Bhine.
The Battlefield of Oravelotte.
Whatever may have been his motives. Marshal Bazaane
directed his Army to retire upon a position of exceptional
strength on the heights to the westward of Metz, which look
towards the wooded ravine of the Manoe brook throughout
its course, and beyond its source over the undulating plain
in the direction of the river Ome. This ridge of upland
abuts on the Moselle near Ars, is covered at its broad
southern end by the Bois de Yaux, is intersected by the
great highway from Metz to Verdun, which is carried
along a depression where the wood terminates, and over
the shoulder above Gravelotte. North of the road the
high ground, with a westerly bias, runs as far as Aman*
o
194 THE CAMPAIGN OP SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
Yillers, and thus trending slightly eastward, ascends to St.
Privat la Montagne and Boncourt, and back to the Moselle
bottom lands below Metz. The left of the position,
opposite the Bois de Yaux, is curved outwards, its shape
being indicated by the high road, which, after bending
round and creeping up the hill as far as Point du Jour,
turns abruptly to the west, and crosses the Mance upon a
causeway east of Gravelotte. This bulwark, occupied by
Frossard's Corps, from near Point du Jour to St. Buffine
in the lowlands, was made more formidable by shelter-
trenches, field works, and gunpits. The two houses at
Point du Jour were pierced for musketry, and the immense
quarries in the hill-side, at the elbow of the ridge facing
the Mance, were filled with troops. IShe only mode of
reaching the front was either up the narrow causeway by
St. Hubert, or across the deep ravine. Behind this strong
front the ground sloped inwards, so that the troops and
reserves could be, and were, screened from view as well as
from fire. In the bottom stood the village of Bozerieulles ;
and above, the eminences on which the engineers had
planted the forts of St. Quentin and Plappeville. The
hollow through which the highway ran was bordered
with vineyards, and near to Metz villages and houses
clustered thickly astride of the road. On the right of
Frossard were the four divisions forming the Corps of
LeboQuf , extending as far as the farm of La Folie, opposite
Verndville. Here the ground was high and open, yet also
sloping to the rear as well as the front, and its chief
strength lay in the strongly-built farmsteads of St. Hubert,
seated on the roadside just above Q-ravelotte, in those of
Moscow and Leipzig, standing on the bare hiU-side ; and
in the Bois de Genivaux, a thick wood, which 'filled the
upper part of the Mance ravine. Beyond the 3rd Corps
lay the 4th, under De Ladmirault, having its left in
CHAP. IX.] pressed' back ON METZ. 195
the farm and chateau of Montigny le Grange* and its
right at, and a little north of, Amanvillers, a considerable
village, planted in a depression at a point where one of the
roads from Metz quits the deep defile of Chatel St. Ger-
main, and bends suddenly westward to join, at Habon-
ville, the road to Briey. The track of the railway, then
unfinished, ascends this wooded gully, and winds on to the
open ground at AmanviUers. The country in front of the
ridge, from that place to Boncourt, is an extensive open
descent, which has been compared to the glacis of a
fortress, at the foot of which stand the villages of Habon-
» viUe, St. Ail, and St. Marie aux Chenes. On the southern
edge of this succession of bare fields is the Bois de la
Cusse, which was not, strictly speaking, a continuous wood,
but a sort of common irregularly strewed with copses ;
and on the north were the valley of the Ome and the woods
bordering its meandering course. The 6th Corps, Can-
robert's, occupied and guarded the right flank, having an
outpost in St. Marie, and detachments in the villages
beyond Eoncourt ; but placing its main reliance on St,
Privat, which, looked at from the west, stood on the sky line,
and, beingnearly surrounded by garden walls, had the aspect
of a little fortress. The Imperial Guard, considered as a
reserve, was drawn up in front of the fort of Plappeville,
on the east side of the deep ravine of St. Germain. The
fort of St. Quentin looked well over, and protected the
^ whole of the French left, and served especially as a support
to Lapasset's Brigade at St. Euffine, which faced south.
Here the edge of the position touched the suburbs of Metz,
and was within cannon-shot of the right bank of the
Moselle, opposite Jussy.
It will be seen that the battlefield may be divided into
J two portions, differing from each other in their external
aspects. The bold curved ridge held by Frossard rose
196 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX,
between two and three hundred feet above the bed of the
Mance, having in rear ground still higher, and was backed
by the mass upon which stands Fort St. Quentin. It was,
indeed, a natural redoubt open to the rear, covered along
its front by the steep sides of a deep ravine, and accessible
only by the viaduct built over the brook, a solid embank-
ment, except where a vaulted opening allowed the stream
to pass. On the French side of the bridge was the strong
farmstead of St. Hubert, well walled towards the assailant ;
and further north the thick woods of Genivaux, which ran
near to and beyond the farm of Leipzig ; so that while a
deep gully protects Frossard, Lebceuf had defensive out-
posts in the wood, which he intrenched in a series of
recessed field works, and in the stout farm buildings,
which stormers could only reach by passing up gentle
acclivities, every yard whereof could be swept by fire. The
right half of the line was different in every respect from the
left — for there was no wood, and the whole front, from
Amanvillers to Roncourt was, for practical purposes,
though not so steep, as free from obstacles as the slope of
the South Downs. The left and centre were supplied with
artificial defences, but the right, which did not rest on any
natural support, and might be turned, was not fortified by
field works, because Marshal Canrobert's intrenching tools
had been, perforce, left behind at Chalons. The great
defects of this " inexpugnable " position were that it had
bad lateral communications, no good lines of retreat, and a
weak right Bank. Marshal Bazaine, who misjudged the
formidable strength of his left wing, and gave his opponent
the credit of contemplating an attack on that side, had
taken post in Fort Plappeville, where he placed the reserves,
and whence he could not see the right, which it does not
appear that he had ever examined. The penalty for so
grave an error was the loss of the battle.
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 197
The German Plans,
Before starting from the hill over Flavignj for Pont k
Mousson on the afternoon of the 17th, General von Moltke
had issued an order to Prince Frederick Charles and Yon
Steinmetz, indicating the operations which were to begin
the next morning. Their purport was that while the
7th Corps stood fast, and the 8th leant towards the
right of the Second Army, the Corps composing it should
move forward, left in front, facing north. It was a
general direction, intended to place the troops in such an
array as would enable them to strike and stop the French,
if they still sought to reach Chalons by the northern roads,
or by a right wheel bring the whole German force to bear
ux>on the enemy if he were found in position before Metz.
By six o'clock on the morning of the 18th, King William
and his staff were once more on the height near Flavigny,
soon after which' time the whole Army was in movement,
and a sputter of musketry had begun on the extreme right
between Frossard's foreposts and those of the 7th Corps
in the woods. The 8th had come up near to Bezon-
▼ille; the 9th was moving between that village and St.
Marcel; the Q-uard was passing Mars la Tour; and
the 12th was on the road to Jarny. Behind, in second
line, were the lOth and 3rd, the 5th and 6th divisions
of cavalry being attached to the latter Corps respectively ;
while the 2nd Corps, which had bivouacked at Pont &
Mousson, had started on another forced march, in order,
should there be a battle, to enter the field before dark.
The morning wore away, and, except on the right where
his left was visible and his skirmishers active, no
evidence of the enemy's presence could be found. The
Saxon cavalry division, scouting northward and west-
ward, lighted only on stragglers and patrols ; the horse-
198 THE CAMPAIGN OF 8EDAK. [CHAP. IX.
men and staff officers out in front of the other Corps
watching as well as thej could the moyements of the
French, sent in divergent statements, leaving it doubtful
where their main bodj was, and what it was doing or in-
tended to do. G-reat uncertaintj, in short, prevailed until
after ten o'clock, and even then General von Moltke and
the staff were under the impression that the French right
was near Montigny la Grange; but, believing that the
adversary would fight, an order went forth at 10.30 a.m.,
which finally brought the German Armies into line facing
eastward. Meantime Prince Frederick Charles had, by
degrees, also arrived at the conclusion that the French
would accept battle, and, at half-past ten, he likewise in-
structed General von Manstein to move towards La Folie
and begin an attack with his artillery, provided the enemy's
right was not beyond Amanvillers. Immediately after-
wards, while Yon Moltke still believed that the flank he
wished to turn was at the last-named village, the Prince
acquired certain information, from a Hessian cavalry
patrol, that the French right rested on St. Privat la
Montague. By such slow degrees was the long-sought
flank discovered. Orders were then given directing the
12th and the Guard to wheel to the right and move on
St. Marie aux Chenes and Habonville; but before they
could come into line, Manstein's guns were heard, and Yon
Moltke became apprehensive lest the exciting sounds of
conflict would carry away the impetuous Steinmetz, lest
the First Army, always so eager for battle, might strike in
prematurely and injure a combination which depended so
much upon a simultaneous onset. Accordingly, the rein
upon that General was tightened, and he was told that he
might use artillery, yet not do more with his infantry than
attract the notice of the enemy and keep his attention on
the strain. But so thoroughly were the chiefs of the
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 199
German Corps imbued with the same principles of conduct,
that the Prince Bojal of Saxony and Prince Augustus of
Wurtemberg had already, in anticipation, prepared to play
the part which was to be assigned them. Having learned,
from their own scouting parties, where the French right
stood, and having heard the guns at Vem^ville, they had
both wheeled their divisions to the eastward, and pushed
out their advance Guards. Thus they were ready to march
at the moment when the order arrived ; in fact, the order
was in course of execution before it reached the officers to
whom it had been addressed. Meantime, acting on the
first instructions from the Prince, drawn up when he
believed the right rested on Amanvillers, General von
Manstein, a little before noon, had begun
T^e Battle of QraveloUe,
At this moment, it should be noted, the French camps
on the right centre and right did not know that an
enemy was within a long mile of their bivouacs. The usual
patrols had been sent out and had returned — even scouts
selected by the local officials for their knowledge of the
country — to report that they had not seen anybody.
Marshal Canrobert, in his evidence on the Bazaine court-
martial, expressly testifies to the fact, and adds that the
first intimation he received came from the boom of hostile
guns on his left front. The troops of Ladmirault's Corps,
encamped on both sides of Amanvillers, were peacefully
engaged in cooking their noontide meal, when General von
Manstein, who seems to have been endowed with some of
the impetuosity of his namesake, who figured in the wars
of Frederick II., riding ahead of his corps, caught sight of
the quiescent camp. The temptation could not be with-
stood. From the hills near Yerneville he could not see the
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAIf . [CHAP. IX.
troops at St. Privat, but he had been informed hy the
Hessian Cavahy that the French were there. He had
been formallj enjoined to attack if the enemy's right was
near La Folie ; it was much to the north of that farm ; yet
Manstein, unable to neglect the opportunity of startling a
negligent camp by an outburst of fire, sent the solitary
battery which had accompanied him into instant action
from a rising ground east of Yerncyille. The first shot
was fired at a quarter to twelve, and its successors roused
the French line from St. Privat to the centre, for Frossard
and Lebceuf seemed to have been on the alert. General
von Blumenthal, with the leading infantry battalions, was
at that time moving on the farm of Chantrenne, and he
was stopped by the lively musketry salute which greeted
his men. Manstein, seeing that his guns were too distant
from their living targets, now ordered the battery forward,
and it was soon joined, first by the divisional then by the
corps artillery ; the whole finally forming a long line of
fifty-four pieces, each battery having, as it dashed up,
wheeled to the right and opened fire. The movement was
a grave error, for the long rounded hill on which the
batteries stood fyced south-east, offered no shelter except
on its low right shoulder, and the guns were exposed to a
fire from the front, the flank, and even from the left rear.
Two batteries were slewed round to the left, but that did
not remedy the original mistake. There were no infantry
at hand to keep down the fire of the French foot, which,
lurking in the hollows, sent a hail of bullets among the
guns. Committed to this false position, the superb Ger-
man artillerymen did their utmost to make it good ; but
no heroism could avail against its cruel disadvantages.
General Blumenthal, indeed, had carried the Chantrenne
farm, but the enemy, at the first shot, had thrown a
garrison into another homestead named Champenois,
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 201
whenoe the chassepots smote the front of the batteries.
The Hessians, also, had developed a powerful attack
through the Bois de la Cusse towards the railway embank-
ment and Amanyillers, thus taking off some of the severe
pressure from the devoted gunners. But the French
infantry crept nigher and nigher ; under the rush of shells,
shrapnel, and bullets, officers, men, and horses fell fast and
faster. Bj concentrating their aim the Germans crushed
one or silenced another battery ; by using shell they some-
times scattered oncoming infantry; still the penalty of
haste and a wrong direction had to be paid. The left
battery, disabled, was caught in the tempest and borne
down by a rush of French foot. Two pieces were dragged
away by hardy men and wounded horses ; two were left
on the field ; and two were captured. Yet this astonishing
artillery, though horribly shattered, continued to hold its
ground. It was saved, at a later moment, from a per-
severing attack on its vulnerable flank by the steady onset of
an infantry battalion, which lost nearly half its strength
in succouring the guns. Then, for the position was really
untenable, all the batteries, except three on the right,
where there was a little shelter, at length drew reluctantly,
in succession, out of the shambles and went rearward to
refit. It was half-past two ; they had been more than two
hours in the jaws of death, and had lost no fewer than 210
officers and men and 370 horses. So audaciously, if some-
times unwisely, was this grand arm employed in battle
that no one need be astonished to learn how Canrobert,
who loved a picturesque phrase, called his dreaded and
admired opponents, " tirailleurs d^ artilleries
Prince Frederick Charles at ths Front.
Manstein, who was to have attacked the French right,
had dashed somewhat impetuously against the right centre*
202 THE CAMPAIOK OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
and for some two hours Ids Corps sustamed the brunt of
the engagement, for the G-uards and the Saxons were still
on the march, the first heading for Yern^ville and Habon-
▼ille, the second on St. Marie aux Chenes, into which Gan-
robert had hurried three battalions. North of the artillery,
whose bloody adventure has been described, the Hessian
diyision, under Prince Louis, posted astride of the railway
embankment, which, running from Amanvillers to Habon-
ville, cut the line of troops at right angles, held the copses
of the Bois de la Oasse, and, supported by thirty guns,
formed the backbone of the German attack in that exposed
quarter. Further south, the other half of the 9th Corps,
the 18th Division, had its reserves near Yem^ville, with
troops established in Chantrenne and L'Envie; but they
could make no way, because the French were solidly
planted in Champenois, in the Bois de Gbnivaux, in a
spinney projecting to the westward of La Folic, in that
farm and on the higher ground above. About half-past
two the contest in the centre had become defensive on the
part of the 9th Corps, and the energies of the leaders
and the troops alike were taxed to retain the ground
already occupied and extricate the artillery. Prince
Frederick Charles, on learning just before noon, from the
cavalry reports, where the French right actually stood,
became anxious when he heard at St. Marcel the uproar of
a hot artillery engagement, and he rode off at once towards
the sound and smoke which rose in clouds above the
woods. On reaching Habonville he was able to survey the
conflict, and also discern, in outline, the enemy's position
at St. Privat. The great head-quarters were still imper-
fectly informed, yet they wished to restrain precipitate
action and prevent a home-thrusting central attack until
strong bodies could be launched against the French right.
The Prince, however, saw that the combat could not be
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 203
broken off, and he set himself to make all secure by
placing a brigade of the Guard, as a reserve, to assist the
9th Corps, which was all that Manstein requested, and
bj ordering up four batteries from the 3rd Corps, the
infantry masses of which were not far from Yem^ville.
Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg had preceded the Guard
Corps, and as soon as General Pape, commanding the
1st infantry division, arrived with the advanced guard it
was arranged that his four batteries should go into action
to the south-west of Habonville, that is on the left of the
much-tried Hessians, and cover the march of the Guard
towards St. Marie. The spot first selected for the guns
was found defective, and the batteries, at a gallop, took up
new ground further to the left, to the south-west of St.
Ail. Thereupon, that village was occupied by the Guard ;
Prince Augustus sent for the corps artillery, and soon nine
batteries were arrayed between the two villages, on a
diagonal line pointing to the north-west, that is, so dis-
posed as to bring to bear a heavy fire on St. Privat, a
succour which gave further relief to the gunners of the
9th Corps. For not only Canrobert's cannon, but his
infantry, lurking in the shallow valleys along the front,
now directed their shells and bullets upon the Guard
batteries. Although the French did not attempt any
heavy stroke, they were active and enterprising, and kept
their swarms of skirmishers within a thousand yards of
the guns, but, as the official historian remarks, over and
over again, beyond the range of the needle-gun. Before
three o'clock the Guard Corps was up, and the 12th, or
rather half of it, had approached near St. Marie. Such
was the condition of the battle on that side ; and it is now
necessary to describe the daring operations of the First
Army, on the German right wing.
204 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAK. [CHAP. IX.
Steinmetz Attacks the French Left.
It will be remembered that the 7th and 8th Oorps,
commianded by Yon Steinmetz, upon whom it was neces-
sary to keep a tight hand, had been brought up to the
south and west of Gravelotte, the left of the 8tJi touch-
ing Manstein's right. The 7th provided the outposts
which lined the fringe and salient of the Bois de Yaux, and
these troops were engaged in an intermittent and bickering
contest with the French infantry thrown out upon that
flank. The 1st Division of Cavalry, from the right bank,
crossing the Moselle at Borny, rode up about noon as a
support, and General von Fransecky, preceding the 2nd
Corps, assured the King, whom he found near Flavigny,
that one division would arrive in time to form a reserve for
the First Army. Yon Steinmetz, on a height near Grave-
lotte, nervously observed the French, sent in repeated in-
formation that they were moving off, and evidently desired
to adopt the tactics which he had applied on two previous
occasions. He was ordered to be still, and when the guns
spoke atYem^ville, Yon Moltke, knowing their effect upon
the veteran warrior, intimated afresh that he must stand
expectant yet awhile. Permission was given, as already
mentioned, to use his guns ; but when the despatch was
handed to Steinmetz he had already opened fire with the
batteries of the 7th Corps, arrayed to the south, and of
the 8th to the north of Gravelotte ; and the infantry had
been moved eastward to the edge of the region just clear
of the French fire. The troops in the Bois de Yaux were
reinforced, the mill of the Mance and the gully itself were
occupied, and an ample force was posted above the ravine
to protect the line of guns.
The expectant attitude, always distasteful to Yon Stein-
metz, was not, and in the nature of things could not be
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON HETZ. 205
long maintained by the First Army. The generals on the
spot knew more accurately what had occurred in the centre
than the G-reat Staff when the order to look on was written.
G^eneral von Gk)eben, knowing how deeply Manstein had
committed the 9th Corps, felt bound to attack in order
that he might detain and provide employment for the
French left. From a point near Gravelotte he could see
the masses of troops held in reserve by Leboeuf and
Frossard, and, with the ready assent of his immediate
chief he pushed forth columns from both his divisions. On
the south of the high road the soldiers disappeared in the
deep gully of the Manoe, their path marked by puffs of
smoke as they drove back the French skirmishers, and re-
appeared climbing the opposite slope leading to the huge
quarries below Point du Jour ; but here, struck and repelled
by the defenders, they vanished again into the depths, where
they held on to the gravel pits in the bottom. Nearer the
high road, one battalion wedged itself in to the quarries
close to St. Hubert ; while beyond the highway, the (Jer-
mans dashed through the wood, established themselves on
its eastern border above and about the farmstead, and
stormed the stone parapets set up by the French foreposts
at the confluence of the two streamlets which form the
Mance. Farther they could not go, because LeboBuf 's men
stiffly held the eastern patch of woodland, while the open
ground towards the Moscow farm was swept by musketry
flre from the deep banks in the cross-roads, from the shelter
trenches above, and from the loopholed buildings of the
farm. But the attack on the Bois de Genivaux aided
the men of the 9th Corps, who, from Chantrenne, had
entered its northern border, and compelled the defenders
of the lines in front of Moscow to turn upon the new assail-
ants. Then the companies which had gathered about St.
Hubert became engaged in a destructive contest, for the
206 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
walls were high and well garnished, and the northern point
of attack was more or less commanded by the higher ground
towards Moscow. On the south front, howeyer, there
proved to be more chances of success. '
Belying, perhaps, on Frossard's infantry and guns, the
discharges from which commanded the high road, the
garrison had forgotten to barricade the gates, doors, and
windows ; and when the place had been cannonaded by the
southern line of guns, the assailants, who had suffered
great loss with unflinching hardihood, came on with an
irresistible rush, and carried the farm by storm. The feat
was accomplished about three o'clock ; and the work done
gave a solid support to the German right wing. At this
time, the German guns, so well fought, having taken more
forward positions, had mastered the French artillery, which
sank into comparative silence. There were seventy-eight
pieces in action on the south of the high road, and fifty-four
on the north, and their superiority is admitted and recorded
by Frossard himself, who saw his batteries idle or with-
drawn, his reserves smitten, and its defenders literally
burnt out of the farm buildings at Point du Jour. Yet
the French left was not shaken, it was hardly touched, by
a vehement attack which had given the Germans a better
defensive position, indeed, but still one only <m4he verge of
Frossard's stronghold, and affording no facilities for a rush
against the fortified lines occupied by the 3rd French
Corps, in the thickets of Genivaux and on the brow of the
bare hills.
The capture of St. Hubert was nearly coincident with
that stage in the heady fight before Yern^ville which saw
the Hessians embattled on the Bois de la Cusse, the exposed
axtillery of the 9th Corps in retreat from a false position,
uid the opportune appearance of the Guard about Habon-
ville and of the Saxons to the north-west of St. Marie. In
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 207
front of their main line the French held the latter village,
were well forward in the hollows west of Amanvillers, stood
fast in the farms of La Folie, Leipsic, Moscow, Ohampenois,
and that portion of the Bois de Genivaux which covered
the eastern arm of the Mance. The fight had raged for
more than three hours, and they had only lost possession of
the L'Envie and Ohantrenne, places distant from their
front, and St. Hubert, which, no doubt, was a dangerous-
looking salient within a few hundred yards of the well-de-
fended ridge where the high road turned at right angles
towards the blazing farm of Point du Jour. From end to
end, therefore, and it was between seven and eight miles in
length, measured by an air-line, the whole of Bazaine's
formidable position was intact. The Imperial Guard, the
effective reserve, still stood on the heights east of Chatel St
Germain, behind the left, and six miles from the right
where the battle was to be decided.
Operations hy the Oerman Left Wing.
The two Corps, forming the left wing of the German
Army, had been guided far more by the reports brought in
by daring cavalry scouts, than by the orders received either
from Prince^ederick Charles or Von Moltke, because these
latter were necessarily less well-informed than the Corps
commanders who were the first to receive the information.
Yet the latter, of course, while taking their own line con-
formed to the governing idea, which was that the French
right flank, wherever it was, should be turned. Moving
eastward from Jarny, with the 12th Corps the Crown
Prince of Saxony learned before two o'clock, that Eoncourt
was the extreme northern limit of Canrpbert's Corps, and
he, therefore, varied a head-quarter's order to march upon
St. Marie, by directing one division, the 23rd, under Prince
203 THE CAHPAIGN OP SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
Gkorge, to march down the right bank of the Ome, throngh
Aubon^, and turn to the right upon Boncourt. One brigade
of the 24th Diyision he directed on St. Marie, keeping the
other back as a support. About the same time the whole
of the Guard, except one brigade detached to back up the
9th Corps, had formed up near Habonville, and their
batteries, as we have seen, had taken up a position which
enabled them to smite St. Privat. When, therefore, General
Pape had moved up the Guards by the ravine west of St.
Marie he found the Saxons ready to co-operate with him in
driving out the French battalions occupying the pretty
viUi^e which has the air of a small rural town. It sits at
the foot of the long bare incline leading down from St.
Privat, traversed by a straight road bordered, as usual, by
tall scraggy trees ; and nestling amid gardens and walled
inclosures shines out a cheerful white spot in the diversified
landscape. From this point, St. Privat looms dark and
large on the hill-top, larger and darker lookiug than it
really is. To the southward of that village, beyond a dip,
down and up which the cottages creep, stands the farm-
stead of Jerusalem, and further south the ground rolls
away towards Amanvillers. More than a mile of open
country separates St. Privat from St. Marie, affording no
lurking places to either side, except such as can be found in
the gentle swelling and falling of the fields ; indeed, to the
casual observer the smoothness of the surface seems broken
only by the poplars on the highway. "West of St. Marie
there is a shallow ravine, and beyond it copses, and south,
as we know towards Vem^ville, more copses, ruddy brown
farmsteads, and white villages. At this moment the battle-
smoke puffed out, curled, rose in fantastic clouds, or rolled
along the ground, upon the hill-sides and above the thickets
and bams ; about St. Marie, however, the air as yet was
untainted by the sulphurous mists of combat so rank a mile
CHAP. IX.] PBESSED BACK ON METZ. 209
away, but the garrison stood painfully expectant of the
coming fray. For though the Guards were hidden the
Saxon brigade to the north-west was visible, and the
skirmishers driven from St. Ail, told how the " Prussians "
were mustering for the onset.
Suddenly lines of skirmishers appear, gun after gun
drives up, the Saxon artillery reinforcing the pieces which
the Guard can spare, until three distinct lines of batteries
are formed and open on the village. The German Generals,
who judged the place to be stronger and more strongly
garrisoned than it was, had brought to bear overwhelming
forces — ^probably also to save time ; so that, after enduring
a hot cannonade from seventy-eight guns, the French bat-
talions, who had borne the bombardment and had spent
abundance of ammunition in return, did not await the
shock of the storming columns sent against them, but fled
by the eastern outlet to their main body. The Guard and
the Saxons, who had come on with ringing hurrahs, swept
into the place on all sides ; some prisoners were taken, but
the greater mass of the defenders and the French battery
which had kept up a flank fire on the approach to the
south fBuce of the village, got safely up the hill. When
they were inside St. Marie the assailants were able to see
that " the adversary had done nothing to increase, by arti-
ficial means, the defensive value of a post, naturally strong ;
and had even neglected to barricade the roads and paths by
which it is entered." The truth is that the occupation of
St. Marie by the French was an after thought, and that
although defensible in itself the place was far too remote
from the main French line of battle to be supported ; and
the garrison, which no doubt, in a different temper, might
have died fighting in the streets and houses, yielded when
they felt the hail of shells and saw the impending storm-
daud of infantry ready to burst upon them. The de-
P
210 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
fenders hastened towards Boncourt and St. Privat, losing
men from the fire of their exulting enemies, who followed
on the eastern side until stopped by the chassepot and the
guns on the hills. Thus a point of support was secured in
that quarter, about half -past three, but no advance could
be made until the artillery had prepared the way, and the
turning column had made further progress in its march.
Nevertheless, the Saxon troops on the north of St. Marie
and some who had been engaged in its capture, carried
away by their ardour and the sight of a retreating foe,
pursued so far and were so promptly reinforced that a
fierce infantry fight ensued. For a French brigade, led by
General P^chot, dashed out of their Unes, struck roughly
on the front and turned the left flank of the Saxons who,
being obstinate, held the slightly uneven meadow lands
with great difficulty and much loss. Although they were
aided by their own batteries and those of the G-uard which
had been moved forward on the front between St. Ail and
Habonville, and whose fire smote diagonally the French
columns rushing out of Boncourt and St. Privat, yet the
Saxons were overmatched ; and, after much labour, as they
were nearly all spread out in skirmishing order. General
Nehrdorff, who comprehended the situation, and saw the
waste of effort, gradually drew them back to the original
line. The French counter attack, swift and sharp, was
well sustained, and the bold Saxons paid a heavy price for
their temerity. While this combat was in progress, the
Crown Prince of Saxony from a height in front of Aubou^,
gazing intently towards Boncourt, made an important dis->
covery — ^he saw troops in movement to the north of that
village, and, in fact, Canrobert*s outposts extended nearly
to the Ome. Thus, after a long search, yet not before
four o'clock, the extreme right of the French Army was at
length found, and thereupon the turning column of horse.
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 211
foot, and guns, one-half Prince George's division, was
ordered to take a still wider sweep northward ere it
wheeled in upon the French rear. As it marched stealthily
on its way, the Saxon artillery developed a long line of
batteries pointing towards Roncourt, protected by Crau-
shaar's brigade, which made a lodgment in the western
block of a deep wooded ravine on the left of the guns, and
stood ready to dash forward when their comrades emerged
from the villages and copses behind the French right. In
the centre the troops of the 9th Corps had stormed and
occupied the farm of Champenois, had tried again, with-
out success, to win the eastern tracts of the Bois de
Genivaux, and, supported by 106 guns, had maintained a
sanguinary contest with Leboeuf's steady brigades, en-
sconced over against them in the farms, thickets, and
hollow ways. About five o'clock the fury of the battle
diminished for a moment, in the centre, on the left, and
even on the right, where, down to that hour, it had raged
with a spirit and vigour which must now be described.
General Froseard Bepels afresh Attack.
The enormous defensive strength of the position held by
General Frossard's Corps does not seem to have been
thoroughly understood by anyone except that accomplished
engineer. Marshal Bazaine did not perceive its value, for
he was perpetually afraid that the Germans would break
in upon it, either from the Bois de Vaux or by the high
road, and his apprehensions or prejudices were confirmed
when a column of troops was seen to be ascending the
river-road from Ars towards Jussy, near St. Euffine.
General von Steinmetz, on the other hand, who had peered
out from every available height between the Bois des
Ognons and Gravelotte, although each attack which he
212 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
had directed had been repelled, thought he discerned
Bjmptoms of weakness and even of retreat. The truth is
that Frossard's men were well hidden, not less bj the
natural features of the ground than bj the trenches which
he had dug and the breastworks which he had thrown up.
Jf his batteries were silent or withdrawn it was because,
although overpowered in the gun fight, they were jet still
able to arrest the onsets of infantry ; and if the French
fantassins were inyisible, it was because they were lying
down or arrayed on the reverse of the ridge. The hot-
tempered General of the First Army, however^ surmised,
after the capture of St. Hubert, that troops had been
detached to aid the distant right, or that a moment had
come when, if pressed home by an attack of all arms. Point
du Jour could be carried and the French driven headlong
into Metz. Under the influence of this delusion he rode
up to Q^neral von Goeben, who was watching the battle
near Gravelotte. Captain Seton, an Indian officer who
was present, noticed the violent gestures and rapid talk of
Steinmetz because they offered so strong a contrast to the
steady coolness of the younger warrior. At that moment
he was expounding opinions and issuing orders which
brought on one of the most brilliant and destructive
episodes in the battle. Goeben had already sent forward
Gneisenau's brigade, partly on and partly north of the
road, but they were needed to feed the combat, support
the weakened and scattered companies, and secure St.
Hubert.
What Steinmetz now designed was a home-thrust on
the French position ; and, accordingly, he ordered several
batteries of the 7th Corps and Yon Hartmann's cavalry
division to cross the Gravelotte defile and plant themselves
on the gentle acclivities to the south of the road. Now
the highway runs first through a cutting, is then carried
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 213
on an embankment, and only near St. Hubert are the
gentle southern slopes above the gully accessible to horses
and guns« But this narrow track swarmed with troops,
into the midst of which came the cavalry and artillery.
The infantry gave way and four batteries arrived on the
opposite side of the defile, followed by the 9th Uhlans.
But so deadly was the storm of shot which burst from the
French position— for cannon, mitrailleuse, and chassepot
went instantly to work — that two of the batteries were at
once driven into the ravine below. The Uhlans actually
xode out into the open, took up a position, and remained
until it was plain to all that the lives of men and horses
were bein^ uselessly sacrificed. The other regiments,
" well peppered," had already gone " threes about " before
clearing the defile, and the Uhlans, who were dropping
fast, rode back, as well as they could, to Gravelotte or the
jsheltering woods. A more extravagant movement has
rarely been attempted in war, or one less justified by the
evident facts of the situation as well as by the deadly
results. Yet two batteries actually remained, one, under
Captain Hasse, in the open, about seven hundred yards
from the French lines of musketry ; the other, commanded
by Captain Gnugge, covered in front by the low wall of
the St. Hubert garden, but lending a flank to the adversary
at the top of the road. Captain Hasse and his gunners
were stubborn men; they fought their battery for two
hours, in fact, until nearly aU the men and horses were
down. Even then Hasse would not retire, and one of his
superiors was obliged to hurry up fresh teams and forcibly
drag the guns away. But the battery under the wall held
on, and did good service by firing on the French about the
Moscow farm.
The failure of these mistaken attacks and the retreat of
guns and horsemen seems to have shaken the constant
214 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
Gknnan infantry, for thej gave ground everywhere but at
St. Hubert, and the French came on with such vigour that
General Steinmetz himself and his staff were under a
heavy fire. Fortunately three fresh battalions plunged
into the combat ; but they could not do more than sustain
it ; for every attempt made to approach the French, either
towards the Moscow farm or Point du Jour, met with a
speedy repidse. Indeed, do?m to five o'clock, the point of
time at which we have arrived, along the whole line, no
progress whatever had been made by the G-erman right
wing, which held on to St. Hubert, the ravine of the Mance,
and the western portion of the Bois de Gknivaux, but
could not show a rifle or bayonet beyond in any direction.
It was only the powerful German artillery which still
remained the superb masters of the field, so far as their
action was concerned.
It was at this time that King William and his staffs
which included Prince Bismarck, rode up to the high
ground above Malmaison, where he established his head-
quarters in the field, and whence, until nearly dark, he
watched the battle. Over against him, concerned respect-
ing his left, and ignorant of the state of the battle on his
right, was Marshal Bazaine, in the fort of Plappeville,
whither he had returned from St. Quentin, which com-
manded a wide view to the south and south-west. He
says that he gave General Bourbaki discretion to use the
Guard wherever it might be wanted. But that officer knew
little more than the Commander-in-Chief. An hour or two
earlier, taking with him the Grenadier Division of the Guard,
he had started towards the north, following a hilly road
east of the St. Germain ravine. He had seen the immense
mountain of white smoke which towered up in the north-
west, but the current of air, hardly a wind, apx)arently blew
from the south-east, since at Plappeville he could not hear
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 215
the roar of the guDs, and the view was so obstructed that
he could not obtain even a glimpse of the country about
St. Privat. H^ had to leave behind him the Voltigeurs
and. Chasseurs of the Q-uard, who were partly in reserve
and partly posted to support Leboeuf , who called up one
regiment from Brincourt*s brigade. Bazaine had also sent
some guns to support Lapasset in his contest with the
troops which Von Q-olz had marched up from Ars to the
woodlands and vineyards opposite St. Euffine. The
French at this stage were still in good spirits. K Leboeuf
^was a little anxious behind his farmsteads, his woods, and
skilfully-disposed re-entering echelons of shelter trenches ;
Frossard, who soon after relieved his front ranks from the
reserve, was content; and De Ladmirault, as was usual
with him, believed that he might be almost considered
victorious, and only required a few battalions of the Guard
to insure his success. The ammunition on both sides was
m
running out here and there; indeed, Canrobert declares
that he was compelled to borrow from De Ladmirault;
still there was enough to last out the day. Over the seven
or eight miles of flame and smoke and tumult, for a brief
interval, came what may be called a lull compared with
the deafening tempest of sounds which smote on the ear
when the rival combatants raged most fiercely.
The last Fights near 8t Hubert.
For some time longer the German right wing did little
more than defend its somewhat irregular hue of front.
The 2nd Corps, which had been marching every day
since it quitted the Saar, had attained Eezonville, and
Sing William placed it under the orders of Von Steinmetz.
As the minutes flew by, the head-quarter staff on the hill
near Malmaison were impressed by a fact and an appearance
216 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
— the increase of the yiyacity and Yolmne of fire towards
the north — ^where the Guard had begnn its onset on St.
Privat — and the symptoms of wavering* which seemed,
and only seemed, to be visible on the French left.
The King, therefore, sanctioned a fresh and formidable
advance npon Frossard's brigades by all the troops which
Von Steinmetz could spare for the enterprise. But the
main object of Yon Moltke, we infer, was to prevent, by
striking hard, the despatch of any assistance to Canrobert,
and thus assist, by a resolute advance, upon one wing, the
decisive movement then approaching its critical stage on
the other. The 2nd Corps was, therefore, brought up
to Gravelotte, and all the available troops of the 7th
and 8th were held in readiness to assail, once more, the
enemies beyond the Mance.
But the French, who, though wearied, were still un-
daunted, anticipating their foes, became the assailants.
Their silent guns spoke out in thunder, the heights were
shrouded in a canopy of smoke, and the bolts hurled from
the batteries fell like hail on the woods, and sent such an
iron shower as far forward as the hill-top where the King
and his great men stood, that Yon Boon prevailed on the
King to ride further back. The lively French skirmishers
dashed forth into the open, strove hard to reach St. Hubert,
drove the German foreposts headlong down the steeps into
the Mance gully, filled the high road with a rushing,
clamorous crowd of fugitives, and even caused terror and
commotion in the rear of Gravelotte, so vehement and un-
expected was the stroke. Fortunately for the Germans,
the principal bodies of troops in St. Hubert and the woods
were unshaken, and their rapid fire, as well as the responses
sent from the artillery, checked the violent outfall. Then,
as the sun was getting low, the fresh German brigades
struck in. The men of the 7th Corps went down into
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 217
and over the Mance valley, and stormed u^ the eastern
bank. The 2nd Corps, eager to win, pressed along the
highway, with their drums and trumpets sounding the
charge, or moved on the south side. They passed onward
in a tumult, and boldly tried to grapple with the strong
lines of the defence. Not only their commander, Eransecky,
and Steinmetz, but Yon Moltke himseK rode into the defile
to witness and direct this huge and uproarious column of
attack. But neither their numbers, and they were many,
nor their valour, which was great, nor the unfaltering
devotion of their officers could resist the smashing fire of
cannon and mitrailleuse and chassepot which the French
brought to bear upon them. Some daring spirits pressed
close up towards the ditches and breastworks, a few clung
to the banks and bushes on the brow of the slope near
Point du Jour. A dense mass collected near St. Hubert,
where Fransecky and Steinmetz, in the thick of the throng,
saw the bands who had hurried to the front break off, turn
and hasten rearward, while fresh troops still pressed upward
through the confused crowds of fugitives. So for some
time, in the twilight, the strange fight went on. As it
grew darker, the outlines of Lebceuf s cleverly-designed
shelter trenches near the Moscow farm were drawn in lines
of musketry fire, and gradually nothing, save the flashes of
guns and rifles, could be seen in the gloom. At length,
when friend could not be distinguished from foe, when no
breach could be made in the French line, which, except the
outpost of St. Hubert, remained what it had been in the morn-
ing, the Generals placed strong guards on their front, and
stood prepared to renew the battle with the dawn. General
Frossard, who had engaged all his reserves, was proud of his
achievement, and not less of the foresight he displayed in
providing artificial cover for his men. That had made the
position, from the Great Quarries to the farm and copse of
218 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX
La Polie, impregnable, and renders it all the more difficult
to comprehend how Marshal Bazaine could have shown
such manifest distrust of the fastness which protected his
left wing. The attack on St. Buffine by Von Golz was
merely a diversion shrewdly designed to increase the
Marshal's alarms, and its relative success shows how
correctly Von Moltke estimated his adversary's abilities as
a soldier. He reaped an ample reward, since long before
the last shot was fired in the neighbourhood of St. Hubert,
the French had been worsted at the other and distant
extremity of the vast field of battle.
The. Prussian Guard on the Centre and Left,
It may be said, indeed, that not one, but several battles
were fought on the 18th of August, in the long space
between the Bois de Vaux and the Forest of Moyoeuvre.
They were inter»dependent, because one mass of combatants
held fast another, and the essence of the German plan was
that three-fourths of the French Army should be nailed to
the positions they had taken up, while the remainder were
crusted by the pressure of superior forces. The original
design of Von Moltke was framed on the supposition that
the French right stood near Amanvillers, and that he
would be able to fling upon an exposed flank two Corps
d'Armee. Before the error was discovered, several hours
had been consumed ; the Guard had been obliged to prolong
the front fighting line; only a part of the Saxon Corps
could be spared to engage in the turning movement, and
the ground which they had to traverse grew longer and
longer as the day waxed shorter. The extent of country
over which the various armies operated, and the smoke
which obscured the view, prevented a correct appreciation
of the situation of affairs at a given moment, and the
German commanders were liable to be deceived, and were
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 219
deceived by appearances. The knowledge that so brief an
interval of daylight remained, and an anxiety to make the
most of precious moments, quickened the tendency to
decisive action, and thus brought about the rash and
premature attack which was so destructive, and nearly
proved so fatal to the Prussian Guard.
Their magnificent divisions of Infantry, it will be
remembered, stood between St. Ail and St. Marie, except
one brigade which had been annexed to the 9th Corps.
It was intended that they should remain quiescent untU the
Saxon column broke out upon the French right in the
direction of Bouoourt, and for a brief interval of time,
after five o'clock, the action in the centre as well as on
the left was confined to a deliberate cannonade. Prince
Augustus of Wurtemberg, who was then near St. Ail
gazing alternatively on the ebb and flow of Manstein's
battle in the Bois de la Cusse and towards the Bois de
Genivaux, and on the aspect of the field about St. Privat,
thought he saw French troops moving south from Bon-
court. Combining this impression with the fact that, as
we have already stated, a long line of Saxon guns had
been arrayed due north of St. Marie, he rapidly formed
the opinion that the turning column was on the point
of striking the enemy, and that the moment had come
when the Guard should be employed. He was also some-
what affected by the condition of the combat in the centre,
and, perhaps, as much by the waning day which left so
narrow a margin of time for decisive activity. He ap-
pealed to Prince Frederick Charles and easily converted
the Commander-in-Chief of the Second Army to his
views. So the order went forth that the Guard should
attack, and having set Budritzki's division in motion
from St. Ail, Prince Augustus rode to St. Marie. There
General von Pape revealed to him his misconception — the
222 TUE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
During part of the period thus occupied General Pape,
holding one brigade in reserve at St. Marie, attacked with
the other on the north of the high road. Starting at a
quarter to six o'clock, this body of Guardsmen crossed the
road facing north, and then wheeling in succession to the
right, went obstinately forward. The French fire, from the
outset, was close and deadly ; officers of all ranks fell fast ;
companies were reduced to straggling groups or scattered
files ; the whole line was soon dispersed here and there ;
but they still pressed on. One moiety trended to the right
another to the left, and General yon Pape, watchful,
active, and fortunate, for he was not hit, led fresh battalions
to fill up the gaping intervals. Soon after the foremost
bands had got within seven hundred yards of St. Privat,
where, in places, at least, the slope afforded shelter, the
reinforcements arrived ; and it may be said that thence-
forth a continuous, yet thin line, curved inwards at the
northern end, and fringed with smoke and fire, stretched
irregularly over the vast glacis-like declivities from opposite
Amanvillers to the outskirts of Eoncourt, where the Saxons
prolonged the ragged and shapeless, but redoubtable array.
Against this mere thread of riflemen, not even when they
were weakest, the French directed no bold attack, perhaps
because they had no reserves and stood in respectful awe
of the hostile artillery which drew nearer and nearer as the
evening wore on, until the black batteries formed a second
line to the intrepid infantry.
It was about seven o'clock. St. Privat was in flames,
the black and tawny smoke of the burning village, boiling
upwards, stood out against the obscured sky in strong con-
trast to the swelling clouds of rrhite vapour, through which
leaped incessant sparkles from hundreds of rifles, and the
broader flashes of the cannon. At no preceding period of
this dreadful day had the battle raged with such intensity^
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 223
for now along the whole front of eight miles there was a
deafening roar and crash and tumult, and a murky atmo-
sphere conceab'ng the ghastly sights which make these
fields of carnage so appalling to the lively imagination,
which seeks in vain to realize its multitude and variety of
horror. Yet there was an element of grandeur a.nd
sublimity in the exhibition of courage, constancy and for-
titude upon such a stupendous scale. " It is a good thing
that war is so terrible," said General Robert Lee, " other-
wise we should become too fond of it." Here, among these
woods and villages of Lorraine, war showed in abundance
its attractive and repulsive forms.
The CapttMre of 8t Privat,
Marshal Oanrobert had discerned the approaching
Saxons, who were now marching from the north upon Kon-
court, Montois, and Malancourt. He felt that his right
had been turned, and looked in vain for the expected succour.
Bazaine, he says, had promised to send a division of the
Guard. Bourbaki, astounded by the spectacle which met
his eyes, when he emerged from the wooded defiles west of
Saulny, had, as we have seen, allowed himself to be at-
tracted, for a moment, towards De Ladmirault, had then
retraced his steps, and had taken a position to cover the
high road to Woippy, the so-called northern road from
Metz which goes to Briey. He had with him, according to
his own statement, three or four thousand Grenadiers and
some artillery ; but he did not arrive in time to frustrate
the Saxons and Prussian Guards. The Marshal, a little
after seven, or even before, felt that he could not stand.
He complains of failing ammunition, declares that the
German artillery had obtained a complete mastery over
his guns, and that his fiank was turned. ** At this moment.
if
224 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. IX.
he says in bis own picturesque fashion, '* a valiant officer,
who has since been killed before Paris, and who was
called P^chot, arrived at St. Privat [from Boncourt]
with the 9th battalion of Chasseurs, the 6th and 12th of
the line. He dashed forward to stop the enemy ; but,
as the enemy flung at us masses of uron, and did not
come himself, as it was shells which came instead, we
could not hold on. P^chot warned me, and we were
obliged to retire. We did so by moving in echelon from
the centre, and, in good oi*der, I emphasize the phrase, we
gained the heights beside the wood of Saulny." The
Oerman Staff acknowledge that the rearward movement
was admirably done ; but the succinct narrative vouchsafed
by the Marshal to the Court which tried Bazaine, gives only
a vague glimpse of the closing scene.
When the "valiant P^hot" retired from Boncourt
before the Saxon inroad, he skilfully put his brigade into
the. forest of Jaumont, on the right rear of the original
line. Colonel Montluisant, the gallant artilleryman, having
received a welcome supply of ammunition, sent up from St.
Quentin by the order of Bazaine, posting his batteries in
lines one above the other on the terraces near the wood of
Saulny, opened a sustained fire to cover the retreat.
Bourbaki, although Canrobert did not know it at the tiine.
such was the confusion and so thick was the air, bad
moved his batteries and Grenadiers near enough at dusk to
bring both musketry and cannon-shot to bear upon the
Germans. In St. Privat, glowing like a furnace, and as
the darkness became deeper, shedding a wild light upon the
scene, there were still stout and obstinate soldiers who
either would not, or could not, follow the retiring brigades.
Upon these devoted troops, as the sun went down behind
the dark border of woods beyond the valley of the Qme,
the mudi-tried Prussian Guards and the leg-weaiy Saxons
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 225
threw themselves with all their remaining vigour ; and in
rear of them, yet far down the slope, stepped one Division
of the 10th Corps. The guns reinforced had again been
dragged forward, some overwhelming St. Privat, others
pounding Montluisant, or facing south-east, and smiting the
French about Amanvillers. Then, with loud hurrahs, the*
assailants broke into St. Privat, pursued the defenders
amid the burning houses, captured two thousand prisoners,
who were unable to escape from the buildings, and de»
veloped their lines in the twilight on the plateau beyond.
The capture of St. Privat enabled the Q-erman artillery to
press on once more, each battery striving to gain the fore-
most place. For Canrobert's retreat exposed the right
flank of De Ladmirault's Corps, and, under a scathing fire,
he was obliged to throw it back, protected by Bourbaki on
the hill, and supported by a,, brigade promptly despatched
towards that side by Leboeuf , who, all through the eddying
fight, showed a fine tactical sense and great decision. How
far the Germans were able to push their advantage it is-
difficult to say, since General Gondrecourt, who was near,
the place, maintains that some of De Ladmirault's soldiers
remained through the night in Amanvillers ; whereas the
Germans assert that they broke into part of the village.
Be that as it may, Montigny la Grange, La Folie, and the
posts thence to Point du Jour, for certain, were held by the
French until the morning. Marshal Leboeuf has stated
that he summoned his Generals in the evening, and said to
them : " The two Corps on our right, crushed by superior
forces, have been obliged to retire. We have behind us,"
he added, " one of the defiles through which they (* cette
troupe ') may retreat. If we give back a step the Army is
lost. The position, doubtless, is difficult, but we will
remain." He declares that the attack continued until
midnight, and that not one of his men budged a foot, which
22G THE CAMPAIOK OF 8EDAK. [CflAP. IX.
is true ; but Canrobert's men did fly in disorder to Woippy,
and De Ladmirault confessed that there was " some dis-
order '* in his Corps, and that what remained of them in
the wood of Sauhiy stood to their arms all night. The
General states his case in an extraordinary manner.
** Night/' he says, " surprised us in this situation, having
g^ned the battle, but not having been able to maintain our
positions.'' What he meant to assert was that he, De Lad-
mirault had won the battle, but that the defeat of Can-
robert had obliged him to retire. The truth was that some
troops remained in Montigny la Grange, but that the rest,
or nearly all of them, where huddled together in the wood
of Saulny, whence they retreated at dawn.
During the night each Corps commander received from
Marshal Bazaine an order to occupy certain positions under
the guns of Metz. Canrobert, De Ladmirault, and the
Guard, marched in the night, or very early in the morning,
to the places assigned them ; Leboeuf began his movement
at dawn, but Frossard kept outposts on his front line long
after daylight. During the forenoon, however, the Army
of the Bhine had gained the shelter of a fortified town,
which they were not able to quit until they marched off to
Germany as prisoners of war.
The effective strength of the German Armies present on
the field of Gravelotte was 203,402 men, and 726 guns ; it
would not be easy to calculate how many were actually en-
gaged in the fight, but the forces held in reserve were con-
siderable. The number on the French side has been put as
low as 120,000, and as high as 150,000 men, and probably
about 530 guns. The loss of the Germans in killed and
wounded was 20,159, and 493 missing. The French loss is
set down at 7,853 killed and wounded, and 4,419 prisoners,
many of whom were wounded men. The disproportion is
tremendous, and shows once again that, armed with the
CHAP. IX.] PRESSED BACK ON METZ. 227
breecHIoader, the defender is able to kill and injure nearly
two to one. There were killed or mortally wounded in the
German ranks no fewer than 5,237 officers and men, while
the aggregate for the French is only 1,144. The loss of
officers and men in the Prussian G-uards, nearly all inflicted
in half an hour before St. Privat, reached the dreadful
total of 2,440 killed or mortally injured, and of wounded
5,611 1
CHAPTER X
THB 8TATB OF THE GAME, AND THE NEW MOTES.
THE huge, stubborn, vehement and bloody conflict
waged in the rural tract between the northern edges
of the Bois de Yaux and the Forest of Jaumont, which the
French Marshal called the " Defence of the Lines of Aman-
villers," the French Army, " the Battle of St. Privat," and
the GFermans the battle of '' Oravelotte-St. Privat," estab-
lished the mastery of the latter over " the Army of the
Bhine." Marshal Bazaine had not proved strong enough
to extricate the Army he was suddenly appointed to com-
mand from the false position in which it had been placed
by the errors and hesitations of the Emperor and Marshal
Lebceuf . He had not been able to retrieve the time wasted
between the 7th and 13th of August, by imparting, after
that period, energy and swiftness to the movements of his
troops, or, if he possessed the ability, of which there is no
sign, he did not put it forth. Certain words imputed to
General Changarnier, correctly or otherwise, hit the blot
exactly. " Bazaine," the General is represented as saying,
** was incapable of commanding so large an Army. He
was completely bewildered by its great numbers. He did
not know how to move his men. He could not operate with
the forces under his orders." So simple an explanation did
not, of course, satisfy those who could only account for a
CHAP. X.] THE STATE OF THE GAMfi. il29
stupendous calamity by accusing tlie Marshal of treason.
But on the 19th of August, the Emperor was still on the
throne, and whatever thoughts may have passed through
the mind of Bazaine after Sedan, it is inconceivable that
he wilfully sacrificed the Army before that event. He was
misinformed, he could not grasp the situation, he formed
.conjectures, without any solid basis, and acted on them;
he was oppressed by the comparative want of provisions
and munitions ; and, above all, he could not resist the mag^
netism exerted by a stroiighold like Metz, a magnetism
which is likely to prove fatal to other weak captains wh6
will have to handle armies, counted by hundreds of
thousands, in the vicinity of extensive fortified camps. Th0
consequences of the battles of Colombey, Vionville and
XJravelotte are sufficiently accounted for by a recognition of
the errors which, from the outset, placed the Army of the
Bhine in a position whence it could have been extricated by
a Napoleon or a Frederick, but not by a Bazaine ; and only
quenchless wrath, born of defeat, or " preternatural susi
picion," too rife in the Freiich Army, could seek an explana-
tion in personal ambition or treason. The war was beguii
without the preparation of adequate means ; the operationli
projected were based on miscalculations, political and
military ; the Generals were selected by f avom* ; and whed
the collision of Armies took place, the French were out^
numbered, out- marched, out-fought, and out-generalled&
Bazaine was no more a traitor than Prince Charles of Lor-
raine in Prague, the King of Saxony in Pima, br even poot
Mack in TJlm. He was a brave soldier, and an excellent
corps commander, but he was very far from ranking among
those captains, and, according to the first Napoleon, they
are few, who have the faculty and knowledge required to
command 300,000 men. Upon his subsequent conduct^
being beyond ita scope, this history has nothing to sayi
280 THB CiOf PAIOK OF SEDAN. [CHAP. X.
moreorer, it would acquire a volume to illuminate that
dreadful labTrintht the ** Proems Bazaine." All we require
to note is that, as a result of a series of errors, the whole of
which did not faU to the Marshal's share, one French Armj
had been routed and driven headlong to Chalons, and
another, the larger and better, had been worsted in combat
and forced to seek shelter within the fortified area of Metz.
The German leaders forthwith resolved, and acted on the
resolve, to take the largest advantage of success. When the
broadening daj showed that the French were encamped
under the guns of the forts, and that they did not betray
the fointest symptom of fighting for egress on any side, the
place was deliberatelj invested. On the 18th, the cavalrj
had cut the telegraph between Metz and Thionville, and
partially injured the railway between Thionville and Lon-
guyon ; and the French had hardly repaired the wire on the
19th before it was again severed. Soon the blockade was
so far completed that only adventurous scouts were able at
rare intervals to work their way through the Oerman lines.
As early as the forenoon of the 19th, the King had decided
to form what came to be called the " Army of the Mouse "
out of the Corps which were not needed to uphold the
investment of Metz, and thus place himself in a condition
to assail the French Army collecting at Chalons. The
new organization was composed of the Guard, the 4th
and the 12th Corps, and the 5th and 6th Divisions of
Cavalry ; and this formidable force was put under the
command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, who had shown
himself to be an able soldier. Consequently, there remained
behind to invest Bazaine, seven Corps d'Armee and a
Division of Beserved under General von Kummer, which
had marched up from Saarlouis, and was then actually
before Metz on the right bank of the Moselle east of and
belowihe town. The main strength, six Corp8» were posted
CHAP. X,] THE STATE OF TBB GAME. 231
on the left or western bank, and the supreme command
•was intrusted to Prince Frederick Charles. Not a moment
"was lost in distributing the troops so that they could support
each other, and in sealing up the avenues of access to the
place. A bridge over the Moselle, covered by a t^te de
pont was constructed above and below Metz; defensive
positions were selected and intrenched, and throughout the
whole circuit, in suitable places, heavy solid works, as well
as lighter obstructions, were begun. If the enemy tried to
reach Thionville by the left bank he was to find an oi^anized
defensive position in his path, and the troops beyond the
Moselle were to assail his right flank. If he endeavoured
to pass on the other shore, similar means would be applied
to bar his way. Field works would arrest his attack, and
his left flank in that case would be struck. Egress to the
west was to be opposed by abbatis, trenches and other
obstacles. Bemilly, then the terminus of the railway, and
the site of a great magazine, was to be specially guarded ;
but if any " eccentric" movement were attempted on the
eastern area, the Generals were to evade an engagement
with superior forces. It is not necessaiy to enter more
minutely into the blockade of Metz, which henceforth be-
comes subordinate to the main story. We have followed,
so far, the fortunes or misfortunes of the Army now sur-
rounded by vigilant, skilful and valiant foes; but the
active interest of the campaign lies in other fields, and
bears us along to an undreamed-of and astounding end.
The King Marches Westwa/rd,
One Army had been literally imprisoned, another re-
mained at large, and behind it were the vast resources of
France. Three Marshals were cooped up in the cage on the
Moselle ^ one, MacMahon, and the Emperor were still in
282 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. X.
the field ; and upon the forces with them it was resolved
to advance at once, because prudence required that they
should be shattered before they could be completely or-
ganized, and while the moral effect of the resoundiag blows
struck in Alsace and Lorraine had lost none of its terrible
power. Therefore the King and Q-eneral von Moltke
started on the morrow of victory to march on Paris through
the plains of Champagne. The newly-constituted Army
of the Mouse, on the 20th, was in line between Commercy
and Briey, moving towards Verdun on a broad front, with
the cavalry so well forward that on the 22nd the Guard
Uhlans were over the Meuse. At the same time the
Crown Prince of Prussia, who had continued his march
from the Meurthe and Upper Moselle, was astride the
Meuse between Void and Gondrecourt, with infantry in
front at Ligny and a cavalry patrol as far forward as Vitry.
His columns had passed by roads south of Toul, from the
Moselle valley on to the Omain, and as Toul refused to
surrender when, a little later, it was bombarded by field
guns, a small detachment was left to invest it until cap-
tured French garrison guns could be hauled up from
Marsal. On the 23rd the Meuse Army was up to the right
bank of the river, and the whole of the Third had entered
the basin of the Omain. Both Armies advanced the next
day further westward and continued the movement on the
25th — a critical day on which they attained positions it
becomes necessary to note more minutely. The 12th
Corps, having failed on the 24th to carry Verdun by a
coup de main, halted at Dombasle on the 25th, with its
cavalry at Clermont in Ai^onne and Sainte-Menehould.
The Guard was on the Aisne at Triaucourt, the 4th near
by at Laheycourt, the Second Bavarians on their left front
at Possesse, the 5th Corps near Heiltz TEveque, the Wur-
temberg Division at Sermaize on the Omain, the 11th
CHAP. X.] THE STATE OF THE GAME. 233
Corps close to Vitry on the Marne, the 6th Corps at Vassy
on the Blaise, and the First Bavarians at Bar le Due,
whither the Xing had come on the 24th, by way of Coin-
mercy, from Pont a Mousson. Thus the whole force was
inarching direct on Chalons, left in front; that is, the
Third Army, as a rule, was a march in advance of the
Saxon Crown Prince.
The Cavalry Operations.
During the period occupied in reaching these towns and
villages the cavalry had been actively employed scouting
far in advance and on the flanks ; and what they did forms
the most interesting and instructive portion of the story.
As early as the 17th a troop of Hussars captured a French
courrier at Commercy, and from his despatches learned that
the Cavalry of Canrobert's Corps had been left behind at
Chalons, that Paris was being placed in a state of defence,
that all men between 25 and 35 had been called under
arms, and that a 12th and 13th Corps were to be formed.
Another patrol was able to ascertain that at least part of
De Failly's troops had retreated by Charmes, and that other
hostile bodies had gone by Yaudemont and Neuf chateau ;
they were hurrying to the railway station at the latter place
and at Chaumont. At Mdnil sur Saulx, on the 18th, the
indefatigable horsemen seized many letters, and a telegram
from M. Chevreau, Minister of the Interior, stating that
the Emperor had reached Chalons on the 17th — he really
arrived there on the evening of the 16th, having driven
from Gravelotte in the morning — and that " considerable
forces " were being collected in the famous camp on the
dusty and windy plains of Champagne. Thus, day after
day, the mounted parties preceded the infantry, spreading
far and wide on all sides, so that as early as the 19th some
284 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. X.
Hussars actually rode within sight of French in:&intry
retreating from St. Dizier, and on the 21st captured men
belonging to the 6th Corps near Vitry. The next day the
2nd Cavalry Division rode out from four-and-twenty to
six-and-thirty miles, entering, among other places, Chau-
mont, where, from the station books, they learned that De
Failly's infantry had gone on, three days only before, in
twenty trains, while Brahaut's Cavalry followed the road.
On the 23rd the 4th Division of Cavalry had passed St.
Dizier and ridden into the villages to the east of Chalons
itself. Thence Dragoons were sent forward and these
picked up information to the effect that the French Army
had quitted the great camp. Beports to this effect had
already reached head-quarters, and had moved Yon Moltke
to tell General von Blumenthal, the Crown Prince's chief
of the staff, that it would be most desirable to have prompt
information showing whither the enemy had gone. The
4th Cavalry Division, which, on the 24th, was at Chalons
camp, now abandoned, burnt, and desolate, pushed a party
towards Beims, and there found that the French Army
had departed in an easterly direction. Before this vital
information arrived at the great head-quarters the King
and Yon Moltke had determined that the two Armies
should, at least for the time, still move westward on the
lines appointed ; and on the evening of the 25th, therefore,
they occupied the positions already described. But at this
moment the Army of MacMahon stood halted at Bhetel,
Attigny, and Youziers, within two marches of the Meuse,
between Stenay and Sedan !
In order to learn why they were there we must turn to
the camp at Chalons, which had been the scene of dramatic
events, fluctuating councils, and fatal decisions, the fitting
forerunners of an unparalleled disaster. .
CHAP. X.] THE STATE OF THE GAME. 235
The Emperor at CJudona and Reims.
Immediately after the first defeats befell the French
Armies on the frontier, Greneral Montauban, Comte de
Palikao, summoned by the Empress, found himself
abruptly made the head of a G-ovemment. He took, of
course, the post of Minister of War. The Empress had
been Begent from the day when the Emperor quitted
Paris, and she exercised, or appeared to do so, a great
influence on the course of events. The first act of the new
Minister was to collect the materials out of which might
be formed a fresh Army, a task in the execution of which
he displayed considerable energy. The rapid march of the
invader had intercepted, as we have related, one infantry
division of Canrobert's Corps, all his cavalry "except a
squadron," as he pathetically exclaimed, and more than
half of his artillery. These remained in the camp of
Chalons, and the Army formed was composed of these
men, the 12th Corps, one division of which consisted of
Marine Infantry ; then the Ist and 5th Corps, which had
come at racing speed from Alsace ; and finally of the 7th
from Belfort, which reached Chalons by way of Paris.
There were in addition two regiments of Chasseurs
d'Af rique, and subsequently a third — Margueritte's gallant
brigade. Greneral Lebrun estimates that the aggregates,
including non-combatants, amounted to about 130,000
men. It will be duly noted that this Army came almost
from the four winds, driven thither by the terrible pressure
of defeat, and that many of the new troops were recruits,
without discipline or training. They were collected
together on an open plain, and had barely assembled
before the viviCeious German cavalry were report^ to be
and, though in small force, were close at hand. When the
Emperor arrived on the night of the 16th, by far the
236 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. X
greater part of the troops were still distant ; some speed-
ing on their way from Chaumont and Joinville, others
travelling from Belfort, and some from Cherbourg and
Paris. They dropped into the camp in succession after the
17th, and we may note that the 7th Corps never entered
Chalons at all, but was sent on to Beims, which it reached
on the 21st. Out of this assembly of soldiers Marshal
MacMahon had to organize an Army. Moreover, the
intendants, charged with the duty of supplying the troops,
had only just come up. To increase the confusion many
thousand Mobiles, who had been at an early date sent
thither from Paris, behaved so badly — some reports of
their ape-like tricks are almost incredible — that they were
speedily returned to the capital, although the Emperor and
Marshal Canrobert, who had commanded them, would
have preferred, the former for political reasons, that they
should be distributed in the northern garrison towns.
Nothing more need be said of the Army of Chalons except
that, although it contained some admirable troops, none
finer than the Marines, whose only fault was that they
could not march, yet that it was unfit to engage in any
adventure whatever, especially one so perilous and toilsome
as that into which it was soon plunged.
Weary, perturbed, broken in health and spirits, yet
outwardly serene. Napoleon III. slept on the night of the
16th in the pavilion of the camp, which he had often
visited when it was orderly and brilliant, which he now
revisited as a fugitive, passing silently, almost furtively,
through its disorder and gloom. With him was Prince
Jerome Napoleon, who saw the fortimes of his house, like
Balzac's peau de chagrin, shrinking visibly day by day, and
whose fertile mind was alive with expedients to avert the
fatal hour. He resented the bigotry of the Empress, who
would not surrender Eome as a bribe to the Italian Court ;
CHAP. X.] THE STATE OF THE GAME. 237^
lie was pondering over and, indeed, opehlj suggesting the
abdication of the Emperor. Sleeping also in that pavilion
was the youth, Louis, who is barely mentioned in the
French accounts after the 2nd of August; whose public
life began in the tumult of a national catastrophe and
ended so tragically among the savage Zulus.
Daylight brought no respite to the Emperor. He saw
around him silent and unsympathetic throngs of soldiers
bearing the marks of defeat and rout, and it is said that he
was even jeered by the Parisian Mobiles, who had pre-
viously shouted in the ears of the astonished Oanrobert,
«' A Paris ! A Paris ! " instead of " X BerHn I "
Then came from the capital General Trochu, who had
been appointed to command the newly-formed 12th Corps,
and was destined, in case of accident, to succeed MacMahon.
In conversing with the Emperor the General developed a
plan of action, which astonished yet did not altogether
displease his Majesty. Succinctly stated it was this : That
the Emperor and the Army should return to Paris, and
that General Trochu should be named Governor of the
capital. The Emperor, as usual, listened, doubted, demurred,
yet did not refuse to contemplate a scheme which promised
to place him, once more, at the head of affairs, but he gave
no decision. Marshal MacMahon was summoned ; he was
to command the Army which, according to the plan, was to
be organized near Paris; and when consulted he spoke
favourably of Trochu as a man and a soldier, and readily
accepted the command of the Army. Prince Napoleon, so
soon to set out for Florence, if he did not suggest, supported
the nomination of Trochu, on the ground that a revolution
might break out at any moment in Paris, and that the
General was the man to put it down. It was during the
prolonged debate on these perplexing questions that some
one said — " the Emperor neither commands the Army nor
288 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. X.
goyems tlie State ; *' whether the words dropped from the
lips of Napoleon IIL or his cousin, Marshal MacMahon,
who was present, could not remember ; but whoever uttered
them thej were trua There was a subsidiary and much-
disputed question — ^what shoidd be done with the noisy
Mobiles, who so eagerly desired to re-enter Paris P In the
end it was agreed that, although the Emperor, for political,
and MacMahon, for military reasons, desired to give them
a taste of much needed discipline in the northern fortresses,
these obstreperous battalions should be sent to the capital.
Thus it came about that Marshal MacMahon took command
of the Army and that Trochu became Qovernor of Paris.
The new Governor, with his letter of nomination in his
pocket, set out on his return journey ; but while he went
slowly by rail, M. Pietri, using the telegraph, informed the
Empress of what had been done, and alarmed her and the
Minister of War by reporting the intelligence that the
Emperor and the Army were to move on the capital.
Thereupon, two hours before the luckless Trochu set foot
in Paris, Palikao had sent a remonstrance by telegram,
dated 10.27 p.m on the I7th. " The Empress," he said,
*' has communicated to me the letter in which the Emperor
annoimces that he wishes to move the Army from Chalons
to Paris — ^I implore the Emperor to give up this idea,
which will look like a desertion of the Army of Metz." If
fchere was a " letter " Napoleon must have written it on the
16th, during his journey, which is not likely; but the
document referred to was, no doubt, Pietri's tel^ram to
the Empress. Some answer must have been sent from the
pavilion at Chalons, after Trochu departed, for when he
saw M. Chevreau, at midnight, the Minister said promptly
— " The Emperor will not return" ; and when the General
azhibited his proclamation to the Empress, beginning with
''Preceded by the Emperor," she instantly exclaimed.
CHAP. X.] THE STATE OP THE GAME. 289
''Yon cannot state tbat, becauBO it is not a fact; the
lEmperor will not come." Thns the Trochn plan was
frustrated ; yet the remarkable thing is that the Emperor
liad not made np his shifting mind ; for on the 18th,
as Marshal MacMahon aMrms, Napoleon intimated his
intention to start the next day. Still we find a telegram
from him to Falikao, dated the "18th, 9 h. 4 m.," pre-
sumably in the morning, in which he says, " I give in to
your opinion," so that his resolutions fluctuated from hour
to hour. A most singular historical figure, at this juncture,
is the once-potent Napoleon III. Virtually exiled from
his capital, and not permitted, if he wished, to command
liis troops, he was condemned to " assist," as the French
say, at the capture of armies, the downfall of his dynasty,
and the wreck of a nation.
These lugubrious debates, held almost within sight of
the battlefield of Valmy, went on from day to day. " What
should be done with the Army ? " was the question which
trod on the heels of "What shall be done with the
Emperor ? " or rather both were discussed together. On
the 18th came a despatch from Bazaine, stating that the
Marshal had fought a battle two days before, that he had
" held his positions," yet that he was obliged to fall back
nearer to Metz in order that he might replenish his supplies
for men and guns. This message had crossed one from
MacMahon announcing his appointment, conveying the
important information that he was stiU under the orders of
Bazaine, and asking for instructions. The answer came
the next evening, and it expressly declared that, being too
remote from Chalons, Bazaine left the Marshal free to act
as he thought fit. That telegram, it was the last which
came direct by wire from Metz, raised the great military
question. Falikao had already begun to insist that Meta
should be relieved. The Marshal admits that he was
240 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. X.
undecided for the moment ; for if he started for the Meuse
Paris would be uncovered, and the sole remaining French
Army put in great peril; whereas, if he did not march
eastward and Bazaine did march west, then the latter
might be lost. In his anguish of mind, not knowing that
the wire had been cut, he appealed, by telegram, to Bazaine
for his opinion. At the same time, on the 20th, he for-
warded a message to Palikao, which stated the case most
dearly. His information, and it was in substance correct,
led him to believe that the roads through Briey, Verdun,
and St. Mihiel were intercepted by the Germans ; 4Uid he
added that his intention was to halt until he learned
whether Bazaine had moved by the north or the south — ^the
idea that he might be shut up closely in Metz had not then
matured in MacMahon's mind. In the meantime he saw
plainly the dangers to which he was exposed by remaining
on the plain of Chalons ; and, therefore, on the 21st moved
the whole Army to Beims, a long march, which tried the
inexperienced troops, and filled the oountxy roadfl with
hundreds of stragglers.
MacMahon Retires to Beims,
That very morning M. Rouher, inspired by a desire
to talk with his old master, arrived at Chalons, and pro-
ceeded with the soldiers to their new destination. In the
evening, at the Imperial quarters, MacMahon was sum-
inoned to consider afresh the oft-debated questions of the
hour. M. Bouher explained to the Marshal his views,
which were, in reality, those of Palikao, for the President
of the Senate was oppressed with the feeling that Bazaine
must be relieved. But at this moment MacMahon was
firmly resolved to march on Paris, and, possessing exact
information, he stated his case, on the occasion, with great
CHAP. X.] THE STATE OF THE GAME. 241
force and clearness. He was bound to assume, he said,
that Bazaine was surrounded in Metz by 200,000 men;
that in front of Metz, towards Verdun, stood the Saxon
Crown Prince with 80,000 men ; that the Prussian Grown
Prince was near Yitrj at the head of 150,000 men ; and
consequently that if he risked a march eastward into the
midst of these armies, " I should," he continued, '' find
myself in a most difficult position, and experience a disaster
which I desire to avoid." A most just estimate, formed
on reports which were defective upon one point only — the
Prussian Crown Prince was still about Ligny, but his
cavalry, as wiU be remembered, had looked in upon Yitry.
Moreover, the Marshal adhered to his opinion that the
Army of Chalons should be preserved, because it would
furnish the groundwork for an organized force 300,000
strong. M. Bouher, who acquiesced, then suggested that
the Emperor should issue a proclamation explaining
the reasons why the Army of Chalons moved on Paris;
which, being done, Bouher went his way, and MacMahon
drew up the order of march towards the capital
The Chalons Arm/y directed on the Meuse,
The morning of the 22nd was spent in preparation, but,
before the final orders were issued, the Emperor received
the &tal despatch, dated Ban Saint Martin [Metz], August
19, which Marshal Bazaine had been able to send through
the German lines. After a brief description of the battle
of Gravelotte, which ended, he said, in a change of front
by the 6th and 4th Corps, the right thrown back, to ward
off a turning movement, and reporting that he had drawn
in the whole Army upon a curved line, from LongeviUe to
Sansonnet, behind the forts, he stated that the troops were
wearied by incessant combats, and needed rest for two or
242 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. X.
three days '* The KiDg of Prussia, with M. de Moltke,"
he went on " were this morning at Bezonville, and eyery-
thing goes to show that the Prussian Army is about to
feel up to (va tater) the fortress of Metz. I count always
upon taking a northern direction, and turning, by Mont-
medy, into the road from Sainte-Menehould to Chalons, if
it is not too strongly occupied. In the contrary case, I
shall continue upon Sedan, and even upon Mezieres, to
reach Chalons." The Emperor sent this despatch to Mac-
Mahon, who inferred from it that Bazaine was about to
start, and that, after crossing the Mouse at Stenay, be
should find him in the neighbourhood of Montm^dy. He,
therefore, withheld the orders directing the Army on Paris,
and issued those which turned its face to the East.
Further, he transmitted a telegram addressed to Bazaine,
stating that, in two days, his Army would be on the Aisne,
whence, in order to bring succour, he would operate accord-
ing to circumstances. Soon afterwards a despatch arrived
from Palikao, saying that the ** gravest consequences "
would follow in Paris were no attempt made to help
Bazaine ; but the Marshal had already taken his decision,
though with a dubious mind, because he knew better than
the Comte de Palikao, who was extremely ill-informed,
what dangers would beset his path, and how slight was the
chance that the Army inclosed in Metz would be able to
burst through the investing lines. The Emperor remained
in a passive condition; he did not approve, he did not
oppose ; but he shared, as a sort of interested spectator, in
a venture determined by the operation of political motives,
and devoid of a sound military basis.
For the moment, at least. Marshal MacMahon remained
steadfast to his latest resolution; and on the 23rvl the
French Army moved out from its camp near Beims. It
was not directed on the Verdun road, because the Com-
CHAP. X.] THE STATE OF THE GAME. 243
mander-in-chief was well aware that if he was to gain
Stenay, that goal could only be attained by evading the
Saxon Prince's Army, which would necessitate a flank
march on routes farther north. The first day's journey
was short, for the Army halted on the river Suippe» facing
north-east, with a cavalry division in front towards Grand
Pre. At this early stage provisions were so scarce that
Ducrot, commanding the 1st Corps, and Lebrun, who had
the l2th, complained to the Marshal, who advised them to
do as he did when retreating from Beichshof en — ^live upon
the inhabitants. Tet the stress was severe, the country
incapable of furnishing sufficient supplies, and MacMahon,
yielding to the pressure, believed that the better course
would be to follow the railway. He, therefore, moved
next day to Bhetel wfth the 12th and 5th, while the Ist
halted at JunivUle, and the 7th near Vouziers, Margue*
ritte's flanking cavalry remaining hard by on the left bank
of the Aisne. A short march on the 25th brought all the
Corps astride the river, between Ehetel and Youziers, with
cavalry outposts at Le Chesne and G-rand Pr^. The move-
ment had begun badly ; but before following this Army
farther on its devious path, we must return to the German
head-quarters at Bar le Due, where, at length, it had be-
come known that the French were not retreating on Paris,
but were advancing towards the Meuse I
GHAFTEB XL
THX GKAHB BIGHT WHKEL.
T T ha« long been a weU-authenticated &ct that Mm-
X Mahon's inarch eastwaid from Beims took the German
head-quarter staff by surpnse. The reason was that they
could not belieye in the probabilitjTof a moTement which,
from their point of Tiew» had no defence on military
gprounds. So that Marshal MacMahon with a fair, and
General Yon Moltke with full knowledge of the facts, reaUj
aniyed at identical conclusions when they surveyed the
situation with what we may call cold scientific eyes. The
influences which governed the Marshal's decision could not
be known at Bar le Due on the 25th of August ; but it was
none the less apparent to the cautious Yon Moltke that his
adversary had committed a greaterror. The Qerman was
surprised, he was even somewhat embarrassed, but he
never lost his presence of mind, and he was not unpre-
pared.
Indeed, the subject had been discussed already by him-
self and his colleagues. As early as the 23rd, Prince
Frederick Charles intercepted a letter from an officer of
high rank belonging to the Metz Army. The writer ex-
pressed a confident hope that succour would soon arrive
from Chalons. Thereupon the Saxon Prince was directed
to keep a sharp look-out towards Beims, and break the
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 245
railway between Thionville and Longujon in more places
than one. The next day, at Lignj, the Great Staff met
and conferred with the Crown Prince. It was then that
Quartermaster-General von Podbielski was the first to
suggest that if a march from Beims towards Bazaine was
barely admissible on military grounds, it might be ex-
plained by political considerations, and consequently, the
General thought, the German Armies should close to their
right. The reason was not deemed sufficient, and the
Armies went on as pre-arranged. Not until eleven in the
evening of the 24th did the wary Yon Moltke consider that
he had accumulated information sufficient to justify a ten-
tative change of plans. He learned from his own cavalry
patrols that Chalons had been deserted; from a Paris
newspaper, captured on the 24th, that MacMahon was at
Beims with 150,000 men ; and finally he got a telegram,
dated Paris, the 23rd, and received at Bar le Due via
London. " The Army of MacMahon," it said, ** is concen-
trated at Beims. With it are the Emperor Napoleon and
the Prince. MacMahon seeks to effect a junction with
Bazaine.'' Still Yon Moltke doubted. The straight line
to Metz was barred, would the enemy venture to face the
risks involved in a circuitous march close to the Belgian
frontier ? If he did the German Armies must plunge into
the Argonne; but at present the General decided that
enough would be done were the Army turned to the north-
west, and were a keen watch kept upon its own right by
sending the cavalry, if possible, as far as Youziers and
Bnzancy. Such were the morning orders. Here it may
be noted that Yon Moltke spent the afternoon in framing
a plan, solely for himself, based on the shrewd assumption
that MacMahon might have quitted Beims on the 23rd,
and might be over the Aisne already. If he moved on
continuously he could not be caught on the left bank of
246 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XT.
the Mease. Therefore Yon Moltke drew out tables of
marches which, had they all been performed, as they easily
might haye been, would have concentrated, in full time,
150,000 men at Damvillers, east of the Meuse, and within
easy reach of the Army blockading Metz. Two corps,
from that force, were also called on to co-operate. They did
move out as far as Etain and Briey, but not being wanted
they soon returned to their cantonments on the Ome and
the Yron. Thus the plan was not carried out, but it was
prepared, indeed, served as a basis, during the next two
days, and was ready for execution ; and it reveals, once
more, the astonishing foresight and solid ingenuity which
watched with sleepless eyes over the conduct of the German
Armies.
After he had finished the scheme by means of which he
intended to thwart MacMahon, in any case, fresh intellig*
enoe arrived — newspaper articles and speeches in the
Chamber which declared that the French people would be
covered with shame were the Army of the Bhine not re-
lieved ; and above all a telegram from London, based on a
paragraph in " Le Temps," of August 23rd, stating thatMac-
Mahon, although by such a movement he would uncover
the road to Paris, had suddenly determined to help
Ba^aine, and that he had already quitted Beims, but that
the news from Montm^dy did not mention the arrival of
French troops, meaning troops from Metz, in that region.
Yon Moltke was not deeply impressed by the articles and
speeches, although he begun to give some weight to Pod-
biebki's shrewd remark ; but the positive statement in the
tel^pram did move him, and he and the Quartermaster-
General hastened to lay the matter before the King. The
result was that those definite (orders were issued which
produced the great right wheel and sent the whole force
towdxdfl tlie north. Nevertheless, the strategist still insists
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 247
that, on the eyening of the 25th, he had no information
which gave sure indications of the enemy's whereabouts.
The Cavalry Discover the Enemy,
These were soon forthcoming. The cavalry, set in
motion at dawn, over a wide space and far in advance of
the new direction, were not long in regaining touch of
MacMahon's Army. For the horsemen rode out quickly,
and speedily searched the country side from Dun on the
Meuse to the heart of the camp at Chalons, accumulating
in their excursions information almost sufficient to convince
the circutnspect Von Moltke. This sudden display of
activity and daring is a splended spectacle. The wind
howled through the woods and swept the bare tracks, and
heavy storms of rain deluged the country from Bar le Due
to Rhetel, but the swift march of these superb reiters was
neither stayed by the blast, the dripping woods, nor the
saturated cross-roads. No hardships, no obstacles slackened
their speed, and large were the fruits of their energy, en-
durance, and astuteness. Here we may observe, and it is
Bi remarkable fact, that hitherto the Saxon leader's cavalry
had been directed only towards the west. The horsemen
of the Third Army had ridden within sight of Eeims and
on the south, or left flank, had approached closely to the
Aube. Those attached to the Saxon Prince's command
had felt out to their immediate front and towards the
Prussian Crown Prince's left, but had not examined the
districts to their right front. A cavalry regiment had
made a tiring forced march towards Stenay, but not a
trooper was directed on Grand Pr^, or on Varennes, until
the 25th. Yet there were French horse on Q-rand Pr^ on
the 24th, and it is evident that had only one division been
despatched towards and through Varennes immediately
248 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XI.
after the Saxon Prince's troops had crossed the Meuse,
above and below Verdun, the presence of MacMahon's
Army on the Aisne must have been discovered, and the
report handed in at head-qnarters on the morning, or at
latest the afternoon, of the 25th. That would have been
done had General von Schlotheim, the chief of the staff
with the Meuse Army, been as careful to reconnoitre the
country on his right as Yon Blumenthal was to send out
horsemen to the flank as well as the front of the westward
moving host. It was not done, and the error of judgment
involved the loss of f our-and-twenty hours.
The error was promptly and amply repaired. While
each corps in the mighty Army, having wheeled to the
right, was tramping north in the driving rain through the
muddy forest roads to gain the distant bivouacs assigned
them, the cavalry divisions had come up with, watched,
touched, astonished, and bewildered the French, making
the 26th of August a memorable day in their camps.
Near the Meuse the ubiquitous patrols discovered troops
at Buzancy ; upon the central road which rons beside the
Aire, the foremost squadron saw infantry and cavalry in
Grand Pr^ ; upon the Aisne, two adventurous parties press-
ing up close to the flank and rear of Youziers, were able to
observe and report the presence of large bodies of all arms
encamped to the east of the town, and to specify the
positions which they held. No attempt was made to
attack, and there was no firing except a sputter of carbine-
shots discharged by a French at a German patrol which
had approached the left bank of the Aire near Grand Pr£
The whole line of horsemen, from the Meuse to the Aisne,
was in constant communication, and their scouting parties,
eager to see and not be seen, found their designs favoured
by the abounding woods and the undulations of the land.
Thus, in one day, a thick fringe of lynx-eyed cavalry was
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAIH) RIGHT WHEEL. 24S
thrust in close proximity to the adversary many miles in
front of the Grerman Corps, plodding their arduous way
along the plashy tracks and by-ways of the Argonne.
Movements of the French,
No such bold and prudent use was made of the French
cavalry by Marshal MacMahon, whom we left with his
Army still lingering near the Aisne. The misgivings which
oppressed him at Keims did not diminish during his halt
at Eihetel ; and they deepened as he moved towards the
Meuse. But no doubts, based on the absence of intelligence
from or concerning Bazaine and the difSicuIty of supplying
the Army, will account for the misuse which he made of
his cavalry. The danger he had to dread lurked in the
region to the south, yet after the 24th the duty of covering
the exposed right flank and of gleaning exact information
was imposed upon the brigade attached to the 7th Corps.
For Margueritte's division of Chasseurs d'Afrique was, on
the 25th, suddenly drawn from the right and sent forward
to Le Chesne in front of the centre pointing towards Sedan
or Stenay ; while Bonnemain's division of heavy cavalry
moved slowly close in rear of the 1st Corps, where it was
useless. The incidents of the memorable 26th, when even
minutes were priceless, quickly demonstrated the gravity of
the error. On that day, at the close of a brief march, the
12th Corps stood at Tourteron, the 5th at Le Chesne, the
Ist at Semuy, and the 7th a little east of Vouziers. Mar-
gueritte moved on to Oches, and Bonnemain's was at
Attigny, on the left bank of the Aisne.
Now Douay, who commanded the 7th Corps, had become
anxious, for he was on the outward flank. He sought some
security by sending a brigade, under General Bordas, to
Buzancy and Grand Pr^, and his strongest regiment of
250 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XT.
Hussars to scout along the two rivers which unite at Senuc.
The Hussar patrols came in contact with the German, and
it was one of them which emptied its carbines at the hostile
and inquisitiye dragoons of the 5th Cavalrj Division. Be-
tiring hastily on G-rand Pr^ the French Hussars handed
in reports which so impressed General Bordas that he at
once contemplated a retreat on Buzancy, and forwarded the
alarming message to his Corps Commander. General Douaj
instantly inferred that the dreaded German Army was not
distant, and, ordering Bordas to retreat on Vouziers, he sent
the baggage and provisions to the rear, and drew up his
divisions in line of battle, at the junction of the roads from
Grand Fr^ and Buzancy. Just before sunset a horseman
rode up with a message that, after all, Bordas had not
retired from the village which he occupied, though he
believed the road to Youziers was intercepted, and that the
enemy might be upon him at any moment. The remedy
applied was to send forth General Dumont with a brigade
to bring him in. While Dumont marched in the darkness
Douay and his staff passed the night at a bivouac fire
listening eagerly to every sound, and starting up when the
step of a wayfarer or the cUnk of a horseshoe fell on their
ears. About three in the morning of the 27th Dumont
brought in Bordas and his brigade, together with a few
Germans who, pressing too far forward at eventide, had
been captured. Nor did the effect produced by the enter-
prising German cavalry end here. General Douay had sent
in to MacMahon a report of the exciting incidents ; and
with the morning light came the information, that the
Marshal had directed the whole Army to draw near and
support the 7th Corps. So it fell out that the mere ap-
pearance of the German cavalry had arrested the French.
But at the same time their leaders were also told by fugitive
country folk — ^nothing definite could be extracted from the
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 251
prisoners taken at Grand Pr^ — that the Prussian Crown
Prince was at Sainte-Menehould, and that another army —
whence derived, in what strength, or by whom commanded
they coidd not imagine — was advancing from Yarennes.
The Ma/rshal Resolves, Hesitates, cmd Yields.
We now touch on the moment when the decision was
adopted which impelled the French Army on its final
marches towards defeat and captivity; a decision mainly
due to the extreme pressure exerted by the Comte de Palikao
and the Begency. Marshal MacMahon had transferred his
head-quarters to Le Chesne-Populeux, a village on the
canal which connects the Aisne and the Mouse. The 12th
Corps was there, with the 5th in its front at Brieulles sur
Bar ; the 7th, as before, at Youziers, and the 1st in its rear
at Yoncq ; Margneritte's horse at Beaumont, and Bonne-
main's still about Attigny. The information placed before
the Marshal by the inhabitants and his own officers seemed
to justify those apprehensions which he had so strongly ex-
pressed at Beims, and he began to feel again that he was
marching towards that " disaster which he wished to avoid."
In the midst of a prolonged survey of the position, he was
summoned by the Emperor who, having received some
authentic information, declared that the Prussian Crown
Prince had turned from the road to Paris and was then
advancing northwards. With Napoleon III. MacMahon
remained for a long time, and came back to his head-
quarters resolved to retreat upon M^zi^res. Indeed, he
issued orders on the spot, directing all the Corps to retire
behind the canal the next day, and take post at Chagny,
Yendresse, and Poix. Then, at half-past eight in the
evening of the 27th, he dictated to Colonel Stoffel a telegram
designed for the Minister, in which he said that there was
262 THE CAMPAIGN OF SKDAN. [CHAP. XI.
one hostile Armj on the right bank of the Meuse and
another marching upon the Ardennes. ** I have no news
of Bazaine/' he went on. ** If I advance to meet him I
shall be attacked in front by a part of the First and Second
German Armies, which, favoured by the woods, can conceal
a force superior to mine, and at the same time attacked by
the Prussian Crown Prince cutting off my line of retreat.
I approach Mezieres to-morrow, whence I shall continue
my retreat, guided by events, towards the west." Colonel
Stoffel relates that, just as he was about to carry the tele-
gram to Colonel d'Abzac, with orders to forward it at
once, Qeneral Faure, chief of the staff, came in ; and Mac-
Mahon, seizing the telegram, said, "Here is a despatch
which I have written to the Minister." Faure read, and
begged the Marshal not to send it, for, said he, ** You will
get an answer from Paris, which, perhaps, will prevent you
from carrying out your new plans. You can transmit it
to-morrow, when we are already on the road to M^ziferea"
The Marshal answered, " Send it," and it was sent
The reply, so shrewdly foreseen by General Faure, was
handed to the Marshal about half -past one on the morning
of the 28th. It was dated, " Paris, August 27, 11 p.m.,"
addressed to '* the Emperor,*' and began with these tell-tale
words, " If you abandon Bazaine," wrote the Comte de
Palikao, ' la revolution est dans Paris,' or Paris will revolt,
and you will be attacked yourseM by all the enemy's forces."
He asserted that Paris could defend herself, that the Army
must reach Bazaine ; that the Prussian Crown Prince,
aware of the danger to which his Army and that which
blockaded Metz, was exposed by MacMahon's turning
movement, had changed front to the north. " You are at
least six-and-thirty, perhaps eight-and-forty, hours in ad-
vance of him," the Minister continued. " You have before
you only a part of the forces blockading Metz, which, seeing
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 253
you retire from Chalons to Beims, stretched out towards
the Argonne. Your movement on Eeims deceived them,
fiverybodj here feels the necessity of extricating Bazaine,
and the anxiety with which your course is followed is ex-
treme." The Marshal's will broke down under this strain.
He could not bear the thought that men might in future
X)oint to him as one who deserted a brother Marshal.
Against his better judgment he revoked the orders already
issued, enjoining a retreat upon M^zi^res, and put all his
Corps in motion for the banks of the Mouse. To complete
the narrative of this decisive event, it may here be said
that, on the 28th, at Stonne, as the Marshal himself has
admitted, the Emperor made a last desperate appeal against
the change of plan. Another despatch from Palikao, dated
half -past one in the morning of the 28th, this time addressed
to the Marshal, had come to hand at Stonne. '' In the
name of the Council of Ministers and the Privy Council,"
it said, " I request you [* je vous demande '] to succour
Bazaine — ^profiting by the thirty hours' advance which you
have over the Crovra Prince of Prussia. I direct Vinoy's
Corps on Beims."
It is probable that the purport, or a copy of this telegram,
was sent to the Emperor, for he twice, through his own
officers, reminded the Marshal that the despatches of a
Minister were not orders, and that he was free to act as he
thought expedient, and implored him to reflect maturely
before he gave up his intention to retreat So much must
be said for Napoleon III. — ^that, at Metz, on the morrow of
Woerth and Spicheren, and at Stonne, when the toils were
fast closing round him, his military judgment was prompt
and correct. But the Marshal had decided ; and the prayers
of an Emperor did not avail against the gloomy forecasts,
the impassioned language, and the formal request or demand
of a Minister of War whose telegrams exhibit the depth of
254 THE CAMPAIGN OP SEDAN. [CHAP. XI.
his ignorance oonoeming the actual situation. It is not
surprising that he was ill-inf ormed, seeing how difficult it
was for officers on the spot, German as well as French, to
obtain exact knowledge; but it is amazing that an ex-
perienced soldier and Minister of War should not be aware
of his own incompetence to direct^ from his closet in Paris,
an army in the field. Palikao combined the qualities of
the Dutch Deputy with those of the Aulic Councillor ; and
the troops of Marshal MacMahon tramped on to meet their
approaching ruin. The positions they attained on the 28th
will be more conveniently specified later on ; for it is time
to follow, once more, the footsteps of the hardy and iax^
marching Germans, who were now across the direct path of
MacMahon's Army.
Movemente of the Chrma/ns.
How, by long and laborious marches, the toc^h foot
soldiers, almost treading on the heels of their mounted
comrades, gained ground on the adversary must now be
succinctly narrated. On the 26th, the 12th Corps reached
Varennes, and the Saxon Prince established his head-
quarters at Clermont in Argonne. The Guard went on to
Dombasle, and the 4th Corps to a point beyond Fleury.
Such were the marches of the Army of the Mouse. In the
Third Army, the Bavarians made a wet and weary night
march in the wake of the 4th Corps, attaining Triauoourt
and Erize la Petite ; but for the moment, the 5th, the
6th, and the Wurtembergers stood fast. The reason for
this apparent hesitation was that Yon Moltke was not yet
quite convinced. King William remained at Bar le Due
all the forenoon. Thither came the Crown Prince and
General von Blumenthal from Ligny, and, at a council
held in the great head- quarters, both of them declared xm^^
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 255
equivocally in favour of the northern march, urging that it
would be wiser to delay the movement on Paris than run
the risks of a battle in the north unless it could be fought
by all the forces which could be got together. These
opinions prevailed, and it was decided that the Bavarians
should start at once, and that the next day the other Corps
of the Third Army should proceed to Sainte-Menehould and
Vavray. General von Blumenthal, indeed, had formed a
strong judgment on the situation. A few hours after the
consultation at head- quarters, writes Dr. William Eussell
in his " Diary," " taking me into a room in which was a
table covered with a large map on a scale of an inch to a
mile, he (Blumenthal) said, * These French are lost, you
see. We know they are there, and there, and there — and
Mahon's whole Army. Where can they go to? Poor
foolish fellows ! They must go to Belgium, or fight there
and be lost ; ' and he put his finger on the map between
M^zieres and Carignan." It is a remarkable fact that
General Longstreet judging only from the telegrams which
reached the United States about this time, arrived at the
same conclusion.
King William, during the afternoon, journeyed to Cler-
mont ; while the Crown Prince drove to Eevigny les Vaches,
which he made his head-quarters until the 28th. Before
losing sight of Bar le Due, we may quote from Dr. Russeirs
pages one other sentence, which afEords a brief glimpse of
the great political leader in this war. In the forenoon on
the 26th, the graphic Diarist '' saw Count Bismarck stand*
ing in a doorway out of the rain whifling a prodigious
cigar, seemingly intent on watching the bubbles which
passed along the watercourse by the side of the street ; '*
but probably with his thoughts far away from the evanes«
cent symbols of men's lives. He had entered the town
with the King on the 24th, and feared that the royal staff
256 THE CAMPAION OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XI.
would linger there for several days, '' as in Capua ; " yet,
in a few hours, this playful censor of delay was speeding
North, like the Armies, to play a conspicuous part in a
sublime tr^edy at Sedan.
In his quarters at Clermont, G^eral von Moltke still
disposed of the Meuse Army and the Bavarians in a man-
ner which would enable him to effect, if necessary, that
concentration at Damvillers which we saw him meditating
and devising on the afternoon of the 25th, at Bar le Due.
Thus, on the 27th, the Guard, which came up to Mon&ku-
con, and the 4th Corps to Germouville, were each directed
to throw bridges over the Meuse, so that there should be
four points of passage in case of need. The Bavarians
followed from the rear as far as Dombasle and Nix^ville,
and the other Corps of the Third Army turned frankly
northward, the 5th pushing its advance-guard to Sainte-
Menehould. At the same time the Saxon Corps had
crossed the Meuse at Dun and established a brigade firmly
in Stenay. The cavalry had been as active and as useful
as ever. They had covered the march of the Saxon Corps
by occupying Grand Pr^, Nouart, and Buzancy, coming
into contact with the French at the last-named village.
G^eral de Failly, who, early in the morning, had moved
to Bar, observed hostOe cavaliers beyond the stream, and
sent Brahaut's brigade to drive them off and seize prisoners.
That brought on a smart skirmish, during which De Failly
received orders to retreat on Brieulles ; but Brahaut was
driven from Buzancy by the fire of a horse battery ; and
the unlucky French General made no prisoners. There
was no other rencontre during the day, but the German
cavalry on all sides rode up close to the enemy's posts and
kept the leaders well informed. From the reports sent in.
Von Moltke inferred that there had been a pause in the
French movements ; at all events, that none of their troops
CHAP. XL] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 267
had crossed the Meuse ; and, as he knew that the Saxons
were in Dun and Stenaj, he thought himself, at length,
justified in believing it possible that he might strike Mac-
Mahon on the left bank. Consequently, he abandoned the
Damvillers plan, and sent back to Metz the two Corps
which had been detached from the blockading army.
Therefore, while the Saxons stood fast, for one day, the
Bavarians were directed to march, on the 28th, upon
Varennes and Vienne le Chateau; the Guard upon Banth^-
ville; and the 4th Corps on Montfaucon — ^the general
direction for all the Corps being Vouziers, Buzancy, and
Beaumont. During that day these orders were fulfilled,
each Corps duly attaining its specified destination; the
Guard and 4th Corps, before they started, taking up the
bridges thrown over the Meuse. Four divisions of cavalry
were out prying, through the mist, into every movement
of the 5th and 7th French Corps, whose left flank, it was
ascertained, was absolutely unguarded, so that the German
horse looked on, and, in some cases, were misled by the
astonishing confusion displayed by the enemy's vacillating
motions.
Effects of MacMahon*8 Oov/nter-Ordera,
The fatal decision adopted at Le Chesne on the night of
the 27th brought disorder and disaster upon the French
Army. The wise resolve to retreat on M^zi^res, strangely
as the statement may sound, had rekindled the fading
spirits of the French soldiers. As soon as the fact was
communicated to them they sprung with alacrity to per-
form the task of preparation. The ojQBicer who bore the
order to the 7th Corps started from Le Chesne at six o'clock,
and by nine at night the baggage, the provision transport,
the engineers' park, were actually in motion for Chagny,
B
268 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XI.
fchrougH the long defile which leads to Le Chesne. The
cavalry were despatched to watch the flanks, and the
infantry in silence and darkness glided towards their first
halting place, Quatre Champs. ** Every man," says Prince
Bibesco, who was an eye-witness, " marched with a firm
step. All seemed to have forgotten the cold, the rain, and
the anxiety of the preceding days." They drank in hope
with the refreshing air, and then their hopes were sud-
denly extinguished ; for as they were near Quatre Champs,
at half-past five in the morning, an aide-de-camp from
MacMahon rode up to General Douay and told him the
latest decision — ^the Army was to move upon the Mouse.
The orders brought by the ill-omened messenger were
that the 7th Corps, that very day, should move to Nouart,
which it was not destined to reach; the 5th Beauclair,
which it could not attain ; that the 12th should gain La
Besace, and the 1st Le Chesne, both of which marches were
duly performed. Bonnemains' heavy brigade of horse was
sent to Les Grands Armoises, and Margueritte's towards
Mouzon, but afterwards to Sommauthe. The 7th Corps,
fearing greatly for its baggage train, already far away, set
out again and only reached Boult-aux-Bois, the men on
short rations, the horses without a feed of oats. The same
troubles beset the other corps which had despatched their
trains northward. But the largest share of ill-fortune be-
fell De Failly. He was ordered to march by way of
Buzancy upon Nouart and Beauclair — ^indeed, to get as
far forward as he could on the road to Stenay. The
Marshal knew it was occupied, for he told De Failly to
expect a sharp resistance before he could carry it. But
when within sight of Harricourt and Bar his adventures
began. He discerned hostile cavalry in his path; they
were vigilant Uhlans of the Guard. De Failly halted ; the
cavalry increased, became enterprising, and some shots
CRAT. XI.] THE GRAND BIGHT WHEEL. 269
were exchanged ; but in the end the French General, find-
ing that he could not rely upon the support of Douay, who
was resting his wearied men at Boult-aux-Bois, and believ-
ing that the direct road to Nouart was commanded by the
enemy, he turned aside and, through narrow muddy lanes,
made his way by Sommauthe to Belyal and Bois les
Dames, the last division not arriying at the camp until
eight in the evening. Nevertheless, his appearance at and
Bouth of Bois les Dames so imposed on the German cavalry
scouts that they retired from Nouart in the afternoon.
The movements and halts of both French corps bad been
observed, and when night fell the Germans at Bayonville
saw the French bivouac fires beyond Buzancy and in the
direction of Stenay. At this time there were no hostile
GTerman infantry west of the Meuse nearer than Banthe-
ville; for the troops on the fiank of the French, from
. Vouziers to Dun, were wholly horsemen. No more valuable
.demonstration of the priceless value of cavalry was ever
made than that afforded by the Teutons during this
campaign. They were more than the "eyes and ears of
the Army ; " they were an impenetrable screen concealing
from view the force and the movements of the adversary,
who was stni engaged in pushing up his troops in the
hope of compelling the French to fight a decisive battle on
the 30th. That hope, entertained by Von Moltke on the
28th, was not fulfilled, because, at the last moment, Mac-
Mahon turned his Army from Stenay upon Mouzon. On
that day the King moved on to Varennes, and the Prince,
bis son, to Sainte-Menehould.
Oerman and French Operations on the 29th,
The position of affairs on the evening of the 28th was
somewhat perplexing, because the earlier reports sent in to
260 THE OAMPAION OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XI.
head-quarters indicated, what was the fact for a brief
interval, that the French were retiring northward. Bnt
no sooner had orders been issued to fit that state of things
than certain information came to hand which showed that
•the Meuse was again their immediate objective; and it
was then that, bj abstaining from provocation, Yon Moltke
judged it possible to move up troops sufficient to fight
with advantage on the 30th, somewhere west of Stenaj.
The Saxon Prince, acting within the discretionary limits
allowed him, decided to cross the Meuse with the 12th
Corps, and bring up the Guard and 4th to Buzancj and
Nouart, but to evade a battle, and content himself with the
fulfilling the task of obtaining intelligence. The orders
were issued, and, while they were in execution, one body of
cavalry tracked the 7th Corps during its painful march to
Oches and St. Pierremont, and saw the divisions settling
down in their bivouacs; and another made prize of Le
Capitaine Marquis de Grouchy bearing despatches from
MacMahon to De Failly. This was an important capture,
for it not only deprived the unfortunate General of vital
orders, but it placed in the hands of Yon Moltke the
arrangements which the Marshal had drawn up to guide
the motions of his Corps. Out of this mishap grew a fresh
misfortune for the French.
Marshal MacMahon, on the morning of the 28th, framed
his plans on the supposition that he would be able to pass
the Meuse at Stenay, and kept the heads of his columns
pointing south-west ; but learning at a later period that
the Saxons were posted at that place in force — his reports
said 15,000 men — ^he was again, at midnight, obliged to
change his scheme, and he resolved to pass the river at
Mouzon and Eemilly. He, therefore, sent out orders
directing the 12th Corps and Margueritte's cavalry to
Mouzon, for, having no pontoon train, he was compelled to
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 261
seek permanent bridges ; the 1st Corps and Bonnemains'
horse to Bancourt; the 7th to La Besace, which, as we
have seen, they did not reach, but halted at Oches and St.
X^erremont ; and the 5th to Beaumont, which place they
entered after weary marches and a sharp action. These
were the orders for the day which, with other useful
documents, were found in the pockets of De Grouchy. No
special interest pertains to the march of the 1st Corps.
The 12th found its way safely to Mouzon, crossed the river,
and occupied the heights on the right bank, while Q^neral
Margueritte despatched some of his Chasseurs on the
Stenay road. What then happened ? The Chasseurs re-
turned and reported that they had seen no enemy, although
at that moment Stenay was held by the enemy's horse and
foot. "They committed," writes General Lebrun, then
commanding the 12th Corps, '* the fault which in former
wars was made a ground of reproach against the French
cavalry." When in sight of Stenay they saw no Q^rmans
and turned back instead of pushing on to and beyond the
town, or trying to do so ; and the corps commander justly
regards this laxity as a grave fault. So Lebrun, resting at
Mouzon, could learn nothing, either from spies or his
famous Chasseurs, respecting an enemy then within a few
miles. The irony of the situation was complete when, a
little later, the Zieten Hussars from Stenay rode up to
Margueritte's vedettes, and found him although he could
not find them. In that &.shion the French made war in
1870. General de Failly and his 5th Corps were more
severely treated, for their ill-luck and misdirection brought
upon them
The Combat <xt Nouart,
Acting on verbal instructions, given on the night of the
28th, at Belval, by a staff officer from the head-quarters at
2« THB CAMPAIGV O^ SEDAN. [cttA?. XI.
Sionxie, De FaiDj set out the next morning towards Beaa-
iort and Beauclair, two Tillages a few miles south-west of
Stenaj. He did not know, as we do, that the Af«»-a^ft1
had changed his plans, and that the officer bearing the
countermanding order had fallen into the hands of a
German patrol. The French Q^neral did not break up
his camp and quit Belval until ten o^clock in the morning,
which gaye the Saxons, who had been brought over the
Mouse from Dun, plenty of time to watch his moyements.
Indeed, he could see them, troops of all arms, on the
heights of Nouart, moving, as he judged, in an easterly
direction, which was an error, possibly arising from some
torn in the road, for the whole 12th Corps were over
the Meuse between Dun and Nouart. General de Failly
disposed his troops in two columns, one of which marched
towards Beaufort by country roads; the other, with the
General, consisting of Guyot de Lespart's division and two
regiments of Brahaut's cavaliy, made for Beauclair.
Their road lay through the valley of the Wiseppe, a
sluggish stream meandering through a marshy bottom
land and passing Beaufort on its way to the Meuse. The
route through Nouart was barred by the Germans, and
when the leading French squadrons, crossing the valley to
gain the main road, began to ascend the slopes, they
suddenly came under a smart fire from infantry and guns.
The French Hussars flitted fast back across the meadows,
and De Failly at once stopped the march of both columns,
putting his infantry and guns in position, and resting them
principally upon two small villages. Then ensued, about
noon, an indecisive but vexatious combat, for the Germans
did not intend to attack in force, but simply harass and
delay the 6th Corps ; and De Failly, uncertain respecting
the numbers which might be hidden by the woods, dared
not retort, especially as he was remote fr^m the French
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 263
Army and without support from any other corps. So, for
several hours, the fight went on. The object of the
Saxons, who descended into the valley, was simply to
detain the French, and, although the assailants trayersed
the brook and the high road, pushing forward a few com-
panies and supporting them by an artillery fire from the
heights, they did not come to close quarters. General de
Pailly was of opinion that he had repelled an attack, and
that the enemy did not renew it because the French were
so strongly posted ; but the truth is that Prince George of
Saxony not only held back his superior force because he
had been enjoined to abstain from a serious engagement,
but was himself misled by erroneous reports respecting
the state of a:ffairs towards Stenay. Soon after four
o'clock De Faijly also drew off ; he had then just received
a duplicate of the order directing him upon Beaumont.
He sadly deplores the mischance, and pathetically relates
how aU his wearied troops reached Beaumont '* during the
night," except the rear-guard, which did not enter the
camp until five o'clock on the morning of the 3(Hh.
The State of Affairs at Sundown.
Thus, for the French, terminated another day of error
and loss, which left three Corps still on the left bank of
the Mouse. When the sun went down, the German horse
were close to every one of them except the 12th, which, it
wiU be remembered, was on the right bank near Mouzon.
The active cavalry moved in the rear of the 1st Corps,
seizing prisoners at Yoncq, riding up to Le Chesne, and
keeping watch through the night upon the wearied 7th
Corps, as it sought repose in the camps of Oches and St.
Pierremont. The German Infantry Corps, meantime, had
been closing up for the final onslaught. The 12th Corps
264 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XL
wa43 in and about Nouart, covered by outposts and patrols,
which stretched away to Stenay. The Guard w^s at
Buzancy, the 4th Corps at Bemonville ; the 5th Corps was
at Grand Pr^, with the Wurtembergers near at hand ; the
Bavarians had come up to Sommerance and its neigh-
bourhood on both banks of the Aisne; the 11th Coi*p8
stood at Monthois on the left, while the 6th Corps was
in the rear at Yienne le Chateau. The head-quarters of
Eong William were set up in Grand Pr^, under the old
gloomy castle, the Prussian Prince was near by at the little
village of Senuc, and the Saxon Prince at Bayonville.
Thus, in three days, the whole Army had drawn together,
facing north, and was ready, at a signal, to spring forward
and grapple with the enemy who had committed himself
so rashly to a flank march in the face of the most redoubt-
able generals, and the best instructed, disciplined and
rapidly-marching troops in Europe.
Examining attentively the reports which reached him
from all points of the extensive curve upon which the
cavalry were so active, and poring over the map, General
von Moltke at length formed a definite judgment on the
position as it appeared to him through this medium. He
inferred that the Army of Chalons was marching in a
north-west direction towards the Mouse ; that its principal
forces were then probably between Le Chesne and Beau-
mont, with strong rear guards to the south; and the
practical result of his cogitations was that the German
Armies should move upon the line Le Chesne-Beaumont in
such a way as might enable them to attack the enemy
before he reached the Meuse. Therefore, the Saxon Prince's
Army, except the Guard, which was to become the reserve,
was to march early on Beaumont, two Corps of the Third
Army were to support the Saxon onset, but the left of that
Army was to march on Le Chesne. As a matter of fact.
CHAP. XI.] THE ORAKB RIGHT WHEEL. 265
the French, in part at least, were nearer the Meuse than
Von Moltke supposed, for the 12th Corps was on the right
bank, and the 1st at Eaucourt ; while the 7th was at Oches,
the 5th at Beaumont, and there were no troops at Le Ghesne
except stragglers. MacMahon took in the situation; he
was resolved to pass the river " coute que coute " : and his
chance of doing so, even then, depended on the rapidity
with which his troops could march. The 5th Corps was
struck and routed the next day, but the French Army did
succeed in effecting a passage over the stream.
The Battle of Beaumont,
The German Armies had now fairly entered the Ar-
dennes, formerly the northern district of the old province
of Champagne. It is a land of vast woods which crowd
one upon another between the Bar and the Mouse.
Xiooking from some smooth hill-top, the landscape, in
summer, wears the aspect of a boundless forest, the dark
furrowed lines of shadow alone indicating the hollows,
gullies, ravines, and defiles. Here and there may be seen
a church or chateau, or a glimpse may be caught of a road
bordered by tall trees. The woods are so dense that
infantry, still less guns and horsemen, cannot work through
them, or move at all, except upon the high roads, lanes
and tracks, worn by the villagers and farm people. Marshy
brooks lurk under the green covert, and rivulets burrow
their way through steep banks. Yet there are open spaces
in the maze of verdure, farmsteads and fields, and rounded
heights whence the tourist may contemplate the extensive
panorama. It is not a country which lends itself easily to
military operations, but one more suitable to the sports-
man than the soldier. The boar of the Ardennes is still
famous and it is on record that a certain Herr von
266 THB CAVPATGV OF SEDAN. [CHAF. XI.
Bismarck, onoe upon a time, hunted the wolf through the
snow in the very region where he was hunting the French
in August, 1870.
It was amidst these thickets, dingles, and almost path-
less wilds that the French had to retreat and the Ghermans
to pursue. We have seen that General de Faillj's Corps
was struggling all night to reach what they hoped would
be a comparative haven of rest at Beaumont, a bourgade
upon the high road from Le Chesne to Stenaj, planted
down in a hollow, surrounded by gardens, and having in its
centre a fine church visible from afar. Here he pitched
his tents, so that his tired soldiers might recover from the
fatigues they had endured in useless marches; and he
thought, in his simple way, that he might safely defer his
march until the afternoon. Tet Marshal MacMahon had
visited the camp early in the morning, and if he used
language to De FaiUy, as he probably did, similar to that
which he employed at Oches, it should have quickened the
General's movements and saved him from defeat. For,
after visiting Beaumont, MacMahon, much concerned for
the 7th as well as the 5th Corps, rode into the camp at
Oches. The trains had entered the defile leading to Stonne,
some hours earlier, preceded and escorted by the brigades of
Conseil Dumesnil's Division, and the 2nd Division was
just about to start, leaving the 3rd as a rear-guard. " You
will have 60,000 men upon your hands, this evening," he
said, ** if you do not succeed in getting beyond the Mouse."
Urging Douay to get rid of his heavy convoy, and " coute
que coute," cross the river, he indicated Villers below
Mouzon as the point of passage, and rode away. The mis-
fortunes of the 7th Corps, also much tried, will be related
later ; but it may be said that they did not reach Mouzon,
for their outlet from the toils proved to be the southern
gate of Sedan 1
CHAP. XI,] THE GfRAlTD BIGHT WHEEL* 26^
The Surprise of the 6th Corps.
Inspired by the hope of closing with the enemy, the
German Armies were astir at dawn, and soon loDg columns
of men and gans were tramping steadily northward ; but,
for the present the narrative is concerned only with the
Saxon 12th, the Prussian 4th, and Yon der Tann's
Bavarians. These troops advanced through the forests,
the Saxons near the Mouse, the 4th in the centre by
Nouart and Belval, and the Bavarians, from their distant
bivouac at Sommerance, upon and beyond Sommauthe.
Now it was originally designed that the two Corps, on the
right and centre, should attack simultaneously, and to
insure this, each column, on arriving at the skirts of the
forest, was directed to halt under cover until it had ascer-
tained that the others on each flank had also gained the
edge of the woods. But it turned out that the Saxons,
from the start, were delayed by various obstacles which
impeded not only the artillery, but the infantry. The
leading division of the 4th Corps met with fewer ob-
structions on its route through Belval, and thus arrived
first on the scene of action. On the line of march in the
forest, intelligence was picked up which quickened its
motions, and a squadron sent forward confirmed the state-
ment that the French about Beaumont reposed in thought-
less security. The Corps Commander, Von Alvensleben I.,
— ^for there were two who bore the name in this Army, —
an officer ever ready to go forward, was present with the
advance-guard of the division, and not likely to hold it
back. So the soldiers advanced in silence. On approach-
ing the open country, the Hussars in the front glided out
of sight, and a company of Jagers crept towards the selvage
of the wood, and, from a hillock near a farm, they saw,
only six hundred paces distant, a French camp, and beyond
268 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XI.
other camps. The cavalry horses were picketed, the
artillery teams had not returned from seeking water, the
soldiers were either resting or employed on the routine
work of a camp. What should be done ? Here was an
absolutely unguarded Army Corps, ignorant that an enemy
was within short musket range. The divisional commander
had orders to await the arrival of lateral columns, but he
felt that the Frenchmen might discover his unwelcome
presence at any moment. He had only a brigade on the
ground, yet the temptation to seize an opportunity so un-
expected, was almost irresistible. He, therefore, decided
to attack as soon as his brigade could deploy, and his bat-
teries plant themselves in a favourable place. Suddenly
the men in the French camp were all in motion. G-eneral
von Alvensleben inferred that the proximity of his troops
had been perceived, whereas the activity displayed, as we
learn from De Failly, was caused by an order to fall in
before starting for Mouzon. Without waiting, however,
until the battalions in rear could reach the ground, Alven-
sleben opened fire, and the shells bursting in their camp,
gave the first warning to the French that their redoubtable
adversaries were upon them. General de Failly says that
the grand-guards had not had time to signal the enemy's
presence, and that his own information led him to believe
that the Germans had marched upon Stenay. The ver-
dict of Marshal MacMahon upon his subordinate is that
" General de Failly was surprised in his bivouac by the
troops of the Saxon Crown Prince."
The French soon recovered from their disorder, swarms
of skirmishers rushed out towards the assailants, some
batteries went rapidly into action ; and the combined fire
of shells and buUets wrought havoc among the Prussian
gunners and the infantry, hitting even those on the line of
march. They did not yield to the pressure ; and when the
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 269
Pi-encli delivered a determined attack it was repelled by
volleys and independent firing. Then the French got
several batteries into position on the hill side north of
Beaumont ; the Germans were reinforced by the arrival of
guns and foot, for the other division of the Corps came up
and at once deployed on the right of its comrades. At
this time, a little after one o'clock, the Saxons on the right,
next the Meuse, and the Bavarians on the left, who had
been marching since five o'clock in the morning, had also
begun to take part in the fight. King William and his
vast Staff, posted on a hill off the road from Buzancy, and
his son, on a similar elevation near Oehes, were closely
watching the battle, discernible thence in its general smoky
features, at least by the King.
General de Eailly had no desire to fight a regular en-
gagement. His aim was to put his troops in order and
offer as much resistance as might be required to cover his
retreat upon Mouzon, distant only six miles. He, there-
fore, relied on his line of guns above the village, and they
were effective, for some time ; but he showed great appre-
hension lest his left, or Meuse flank, should be turned.
Seeing the German lines develop and grow stronger, in
men and guns, feeling the new power brought to bear by
the Saxons, who, cramped for want of room, were pressed
close to the river, and, hearing the Bavarian guns on his
right, he made one more vigorous effort to arrest the
4th Corps. Thick lines of skirmishers, followed by sup-
ports in close order, dashed forward with such valour
and impetuosity that they drove in the covering infantry
and charged to within fifty paces of the guns. The danger
was great, but the Germans rapidly flung everything near
into the contest, gained the mastery, compelled the gallant
Frenchmen to wheel about, followed them promptly, cap-
tured the soui^em camp^ and then poured into Beaumont
270 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. £CHAP. XI.
itself upon all sides. But the chassepot had told, and the
Germans paid heavily, as they always did and were ready
to do, for their persistent courage and well-tempered
audacity. With the town fell the other camps ; and then»
for a time, the infantry combat ceased. But the artillery
advanced, as usual, and engaged in a long duel with the
powerful line of batteries established by the French to
facilitate the retreat of their in&ntry and arrest pursuit.
Although not able to stand up against 150 guns, they did
not retire until their infantry had got into another position
between the Yoncq brook and the Mouse. Then the bat-
teries cleverly withdrew in succession, and before the 4th
Corps could advance, De Failly's troops disappeared in the
woods, and were seen no more until they were reached
beyond the hills and thrust headlong into Mouzon.
While the 4th Corps was pulling itself together after the
onset, De Failly had been compelled by the impenetrable
wood of G-ivodeau to divide his forces, the left and the
reserve artillery following the main route to Mouzon took
post above YiUemontrey, dose to the Mouse, and derived
support from guns and infantry which Lebrun had put
into position on the high land in an elbow of the river on
the right bank. The right wing hurried round the western
side of the Givodeau thickets, and found a post upon
a plateau beyond. In the meantime. General Lebrun had
ordered two brigades of infantry, commanded by Cambriels
and YUleneuve, and a cavalry division, to cross the river at
Mouzon, but Marshal MacMahon, riding up, ordered back
Cambriels, and all the horse except two regiments of cuiras-
siers. Those we shall presently meet again. The German
right wing vainly endeavoured to drive De Failly from
YiUemontrey, and, after repeated attempts and much loss,
desisted from the enterprise ; but kept a strong force at
hand and a large number of guns in action*
CHAP. XI.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 271
Meantime a singular incident bad occurred to the west
of Beaumont. Just as the Bavarians were about to join
in the attack on the camps by throwing themselves on the
French flank, thej were fired on from a farm called La
Thibaudine and a hamlet named Wamiforet. They were
astonished because the presence of an enemy there was not
even suspected. The enemy was also astonished and still
more frightened. The combat was caused by a French
brigade, which had wandered from its line of march. It
seems that the advance brigade of Conseil Dumesnil's
division preceding the transport of the 7th Corps, a series
of wagons, nine miles in length, had been ordered by
MacMahon, who met them, to move by Yoncq instead of
La Besace, and that, when the rear brigade came up to the
point of divergence, the marker left to give information
having disappeared, these unfortunate troops went forward
on the great road to Beaumont. A staff officer arrived
just as the action began, and he was leading the errant
troops back, when the Bavarians emerged in view. The
conflict which ensued was sharp, but it delayed the 7th
Corps and ended in the rout of the French, who fled as
best they could through Toncq towards Mouzon. About
this time Douay was at Stonne ; the Uhlans of the Guard
had followed him step by step, and bringing a horse
battery to bear on his rear guard, had induced General
Dumont to halt, deploy the brigade, and in his turn open
fire; but General Douay promptly appeared and stopped
the action, having made up his mind that the pressing
duty of the hour was to get over the Mouse in accordance
with the Marshal's desire. So the 7th, after some hesita-
tion, retired upon Baucourt, hoping thence to gain Villers
below Mouzon; yet, being pursued by the Bavarians,
they were overtaken and attacked outside Baucourt,
and, hearing that the bridge was broken, they turned.
272 THE CAMPAION OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XI.
some upon BemiQj, and others through Torcj into Sedan
itself.
The Flight to Mouzan,
When the left wing of the 4th Corps, pressing to-
wards the defile of the Yoncq and the slopes above it,
sought to discover the French on that side, they were at
first sharply punished; but, following on, they came up
and closed with their adversaries. One brigade of Bavarians
had been sent to the 4th Corps and moved on the left
flank of the toilsome advance. For the ground was difficult,
the obstacles numerous, and the French, though shattered
and dispirited, still displayed a fighting front. But at
length, late in the afternoon, the Germans mastered a hill-
top whence adverse artillery had fired upon the assailants;
and then these fairly entered the plain before Mouzon.
Here, however, the French occupied an isolated hill, called
Le Mont de Brune, close to and almost overhanging the
Faubourg of Mouzon, from which its summit is less than
a mile distant. Unluckily for them they formed front
facing eastward, apparently anticipating an attack on that
side ; but the Germans promptly turned the flank from the
south and south-west, and drove the defenders down the
steep slopes towards Mouzon, capturing ten guns. The
victorious forward movement brought the leading com-
panies in front of Yilleneuve's brigade and the Cuirassiers
in the plain. The Germans halted, and opened a steady
fire, when suddenly they beheld the 5th Cuirassiers coming
down on their left flank and rear. Captain Helmuth, who
commanded the three companies exposed to this ordeal,
made the left company face about in time, and then for-
bidding his men to form rallying squares or groups,
ordered them to stand fast as they were, and only open fire
when he gave the signal. The gallant French horsemen, as
CHAP. XI.] T^E GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 273
Tvas their wont, rode straight upon the infantry ; but the
independent firing opened on them at point blank range,
broke the impetus and crushed in the head of the charg-
ing squadrons. Colonel Contenson fell mortally wounded
inrithin fifteen paces of the infantry line; and, although
some fiery spirits dashed into their ranks, and one engaged
in single combat with Captain Helmuth until he fell
pierced by ball and bayonet, yet the whole mass of
cavaby was routed with immense loss, and driyen into the
Meuse.
For, by this time, the wreck of De Failly's Corps was in
fuU retreat on all sides, and troops, artillery, transport
trains, and stragglers, were crowding on towards the bridge.
When his right was turned by the movement upon the
Brune hill, and still further by the march of the Bavarian
brigade upon Pourron, De Failly quitted his post at Yille*
montrey, which enabled the right division of the 4th
Corps, the Saxon regiments fighting by its side, and the
artillery to push on by the main road to Mouzon. After
the first surprise of the Beaumont camp, the French had
mainly stood, here and there, to facilitate their retreat,
and the contest, which went on all the afternoon among the
woods and hills and ravines, was really a running fight.
The Germans had pursued with relentless pertinacity.
Their soldiers had been marching all day, but they seemed
to be tireless, for they never halted until the fugitives were
over the Meuse, or the darkness forbade further motion.
De Failly had been surprised and thrust in disorder over
the river, and when the evening closed the Germans were
in possession of the faubourg of Mouzon, and of the bridge
at its western end. The 7th Corps, cut off from ViUers,
had moved, in a state bordering on panic, upon Kemilly ;
but there they found Bonnemains' cuirassiers, the tail of a
division belonging to the 1st Corps, and a baggage column.
274 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAJtf. [CHAP. XI.
The Meuse had been dammed to fill the ditches of Sedan,
and not only were the fords rendered useless, but the
swelling stream was unusually high. Douay, halted at
seven o'clock, became impatient after dark, and at ten
rode down to the bridge. He found the cuirassiers engaged
in passing oyer the feeble construction. '' The horses,"
writes Prince Bibesco, " affrighted, because they could not
see the shaking planks hidden by the water, and shifting
under their steps, moved with hesitation, their necks ex-
tended, their ears erect. Sitting upright, shrouded in their
large white cloaks, the cuirassiers marched on silently, and
appeared to be borne on the stream. Two fires, one at each
end of the bridge, flung a ghastly light on men and horses,
and, flickering on the helmets, imparted a fantastic aspect
to this wierd spectacle." At length the white horsemen
passed over ; but when the turn of the artillery caine the
horses were still more recalcitrant, and the passage was so
slow that, at two in the morning of the 31st, only three
batteries and two regiments of foot had passed the Meuse.
Douay then learned that the Marshal had ordered all the
Army to assemble at Sedan, and he moved the rest of his
Corps over the bridge at Torcy. These few details will
give some idea of the terrible disorder which prevailed
throughout the French Army.
On the evening of the 30th the Germans were upon
the Meuse. The 4th Corps was before Mouzon; one
Bavarian Corps at Baucourt, the other at Sommauthe ; the
5th and 11th Corps about La Besace and Stonne; the
12th was near the Meuse in front of Beaumont, and the
Q-uard just behind them; the Wurtembergers were at
Verri^res, and the 6th Corps well out to the west at
Youziers. On this flank also were the 5th and 6th Cavahy
Divisions threatening and watching the French com-
xnunications ; while the 12th Cavalry Division was astride
CHAP. XT.] THE GRAND RIGHT WHEEL. 275
tKe Meuse at Pouillj, and one of its squadrons, evading
and passing through Margueritte*s vedettes, had discovered
and reported the presence o^ French troops on the Chiers
near Carignan, and the movement of trains on the railway
towards Sedan.
So ended this ominous day. The Army of the Meuse
had lost 3,500 men in killed and wounded, but they had
routed one French Corps, and fractions of two others,
and they had captured forty-two guns. The French loss
is set down at 1,800 killed and wounded, but the Germans
aver that, included among the 3,000 acknowledged to be
missing, there were 2,000 who bore no wounds.
CHAPTEE Xn.
KBTZ AND STBASBTIBO.
AT the very moment when the Army of Ohalons, in-
stead of marching on its way to Montm^y, found
its Corps huddled together at Sedan, between the river and
the Belgian frontier, some information of the moTement
undertaken by MacMahon, who yielded his better judgment
to the importunate entreaties (les instances) of Palikao,
reached Marshal Bazaine in Metz. He had already, on
the 26th of August, collected a large mass of troops upon
the r^ht bank, in order to break out towards ThionviUe ;
but the rain poured down all day in torrents, and, after a
consultation at the Farm of Grimont with his Marshals
and Generals, whose opinions were adverse to the sortie
projected, he issued an order directing the Army to resume
its former quarters. But, on the 29th, a messenger who
had crept through the German lines, handed to the Marshal
a despatch from the officer commanding in Thionville,
Colonel Tumier, stating that General Ducrot, with the Ist
Corps, should be " to-day, the 27th," at Stenay on the left
of the Army, General Douay on his right being on the
Mouse. Bazaine seems to have had doubts respecting
the authenticity of this missive, the handwriting of which
his staff did not recognize ; but the next morning, about
eleven, an agent of his own came in from Verdun. He was
the bearer of a telegram from the Emperor — it was reallj
CHAP. XII.] METZ AND STRASBURG. 277
the message drawn up by MacMabon on the 22nd of
August, copied, apparently, in cipher, by Napoleon, and
intrusted to Bazaine's emissary. The despatch, which had
so date, stated that the sender would march towards
Montmedy, and when on the Aisne, would act according
to circumstances, in order to succour the Metz Army.
I^egarding the second document, though antecedent in
point of time, as a confirmation of the first which he had
received. Marshal Bazaine, on the 30th, issued the orders
which, the following day, led to
The Battle of Naisseville,
His plan, succinctly described, was to break through the
line of investment on the right bank of the Moselle by
directing three Corps, the 3rd, 4th, and 6th, principally
upon St. Barbe, and he hoped, if successful, to march them
forward upon Kedange, while the G-uard and the 2nd
Corps followed the track by the river. He estimates the
force which was available for battle at 100,000 men, but he
probably had more ; at any rate, the delays which had oc-
curred on the 14th of August, and were in part repeated on
the 31st, shows how arduous is the task of issuing with
such masses from a fortified town and position astride of a
river. The weather was not favourable, for the continuous
rain had soaked the ground, and at dawn a thick fog, which
hung about for several hours, impeded the operations. The
G-ermahs had been more than usually on the alert since
the abortive attempt on the 26th, and had thought it
expedient to include Noisseville within the line of defence.
The noise and preparations in Metz did not escape their
notice, but the dense mist concealed much from their
searching gaze. Yet they saw and heard enough, both on
the eastern and western &onts of Metz, to warrant a belief
278 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XII.
that a resolute onset was impending. As the fog bank
rolled away, the batteries and the massing of troops became
visible, and General von Manteuffel transmitted the results
of his careful observations to Yon Steinmetz and Prince
Frederick Charles, both of whom made instant arrange-
ments to support the 1st Corps and the other troops on
the right bank. The forenoon passed by, and, except some
slight skirmishes and a brief artillery dud, no action ensued.
About midday the French sat down to cook, and the smoke
from their fires rose in clouds, indicated their position, but
hid them from view ; at the same time, although the sun
was shining, the culinary haze' concealed the workmen en-
gaged in throwing up shelter for the heavy guns drawn from
the forts ; and the Gkrman leaders arrived at the conclu-
sion that the onslaught would be deferred until the next
day ; their soldiers also fell to cooking, and some fractions
recroseed the Moselle to join their main body ; but their
attention to the phenomena before them was not relaxed.
Tet the afternoon began to wear away. It was not until
half -past two that Marshal Bazaine gave that signal for
attack which was nevertheless not obeyed until another
hour and a half had been consumed. The signal was a
salvo from the battery of heavy guns placed behind the field
works hastily thrown up in front of Fort St. Julien. The
battlefield of the 31st was one with which we were made
acquainted when Yon Golz took upon himself to arrest the
retreat of the French over the Moselle on the 14th of August.
It extended from Mercy les Metz by Colombey, NoisseviUe,
and Failly to Malroy on the Moselle. The French assailants,
therefore, had to cross the ravines east of Bomy and work
up both banks of the Yallieres brook which, rising near
St. Barbe, enters the Moselle opposite the Isle Chambiere.
The 6th Corps, Canrobert's, was to attack by the river road
towards Malroy ; De Ladmirault, with the 4th, was to move
CHAP. XII.] METZ AND STRASBURG. 279
by Failly and Yr6mj to outflaDk St. Barbe on its right,
while the left of that position was to be carried by Leboeufs
3rd Corps ; and Frossard, with the 2nd, was to follow and
cover the right flank of Lebceuf . The Guard, the cavalry,
and reserve artillery were to stand between Fort St. Julien
and the Bois de Grimont, and all the baggage was to be
ready in the Isle Chambi^re. The Germans were prepared
to meet such an attack, but, as we have said, they had come
to believe that it would be deferred.
Suddenly, about four o'clock, the dead silence was broken
by a salvo from the heavy guns, followed by the fire of De
Ladmirault's batteries. H^en the action began along the
whole front, the Germans at once developing a powerful
line of fifty guns about Servigny and Poix, far in advance
of the main line o£ defence, and bringing other pieces to
bear from different points. Nevertheless, favoured by the
broken ground and resolute to win, the French infantry
persistently advanced untU about six o'clock they had driven
in all the foreposts, and had^ gained possession on their
right of Noisseville, the garrison of which village they
curiously complain held out longer than they were entitled
to do. The capture of Noisseville facilitated the principal
attacks which were directed upon Servigny and Poix,
villages which served as redoubts guarding the avenues to
St. Barbe, the culminating point in the region. At the
same time the French right had pushed well forward to-
wards Eetonfay, the object being to protect the flank of
the 3rd Corps, now in motion upon the central posts of the
German line. Here the contest was severe, and in the end
the great line of guns which had held De Ladmirault at bay
so long, unable to bear the musketry fire in front and flank,
was compelled to withdraw behind the villages. But,
although the French infantry came up boldly on both flanks,
as well as in front, they were, unable to overcome the sturdy
280 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Xn.
defenders, in whose possession the villages remained at
dark. The French left under Ganrobert had made repeated
attacks upon Faillj, which met with no success, and he
halted at Chieulles and Yanj : so that the movement near
the Mouse had secured but little ground. At dark the
French had not done more than occupy a line extending
from Canrobert*s right in front of Yillers TOrme to Noisse-
ville, and thence by Flanville to Oh&teau d'Aubignj. £j
this time General von Manteuffel had been reinforced bj
two brigades of Landwehr, and the 25th Division, under
Prince Louis of Hesse, which had crossed the Moselle,
and considerably strengthened his right wing. Then
occurred a remarkable incident. General Avmaxd, about
nine o'clock, creepmg silently up to Servigny, flung forward
his division, and, without firing a shot, burst in upon
the surprised Germans, engaged in preparmg the de-
fences, and carried the place. Astonished and enraged.
General von Gayl immediately gathered up a force, and
breaking, in his turn, upon the enemy, drove him out and
recovered possession before ten o'clock. Aymard's is an
example of a night attack well performed ; but the weak
defence of what had been skilfully won, was not so credit-
able to the French.
During the night General Manstein, with the other half
of the 9th Corps, crossed the Moselle, halted in rear of
the German right wing, and thus enabled the Hessian
Division to take post behind St. Barbe. A dense fog again
filled the valley at dawn, but at an early hour General von
Manteuffel, holding his ground in the centre and on the
right, brought his batteries to bear upon Noisseville and
promptly assumed the offensive. The place was strongly
occupied and stoutly defended. Although the Germans
broke in for a moment they were speedily expelled, and
several hours elapsed before the village fell into th^
CHAP. XII.] METZ AND STRASBTJRG. 281
hands. But tkroughout the day, except towards Eupignj
and Failly, the French stood on the defensive. For the
G-ermans arrayed 114 guns on the hills, crushed the adverse
artillery, and prevented the French infantry from making
any combined attack. The position on their right was soon
rendered less safe by the arrival of a brigade of the 7th
Corps which, coming up from Laquenexy, drove the French
out of Flanville. This demonstration on the right of
Marshal Leboeuf's line, together with the terrible fire of
the German artillery, induced him, about eleven o'clock, to
draw ba<3k the whole of his troops and allow his adversary
once more to occupy Noisseville. On the French left.
Marshal Canrobert's soldiers had been forced back upon
Ohieulles, and the attacks upon Failly had wholly failed.
Prince Frederick Charles who, at Malancourt, had heard
the opening cannonade at Sedan on the morning of the
1st, took up his post of observation on a hill towards the
Moselle before eight o'clock, and provided for the arrival of
strong reinforcements, should they be needed, from the
left bank, but only the 10th Corps passed the Moselle and
was stationed between Argancy and Antilly. The retreat
of Marshal Leboeuf had been followed by that of the other
corps, and a little after noon the French Army was march-
ing back to the camps and bivouacs whence it had advanced
on the 31st. The great sortie had signally failed in opening
a road through the investing lines. The French had 3,647
officers and men killed and wounded, including in the latter
category four Grenerals, one of whom, Maneque, mortally.
The German loss was 2,976 killed and wounded. Marshal
Bazaine estimates the number he put in the field at 100,000 ;
the German authorities say they began the fight with
40,800 men and 1 38 guns ; and at the end of the encounter
had over the Moselle 73,800 men and 290 guns.
Marshal Bazaine and his troops re-entered their prison
282 THE CAMPiUGN OP SEDAN. [CHAP. XII.
on the afternoon of the daj when the white flag was hoisted
on the Citadel of Sedan ; and with his and their subsequent
misfortunes we have nothing more to do in this work.
I^either is it our business to consider whether by marching
up instead of down the right bank he could have escaped
with some portion of his Army safe and sound to the South,
of France. That he did his uttermost to push through on
the 31st is the contention of the German staff, but it is
doubtful whether on the second day the same spirit pre-
vailed. All the knotty questions suggested by the military
situation about Metz and elsewhere at the end of August
could only be adequately discussed by entering upon a
history of transactions with which we have no present con-
cem. The essential fact is that the French Marshals tried
to break the barrier and failed at a moment when even their
success could not have prevented the capitulation at Sedan.
The attempt demonstrated the immense advantages of a
carefully prepared defensive position combined with a
readiness to use artillery in the front line from the first, and
an equal readiness to become the assailant whenever a
useful opportunity occurred. But to the mind of this
writer the moral of the Metz episode in the great war is the
danger attending these large intrenched camps, which will
certainly exert in the future, as they have in the past, an
irresistible attraction upon inferior commanders, and will
task the intellect, and the ingenuity and the firmness of
the greatest to put them to a proper use. Neither Bazaine
nor any colleague in superior command could be described
as a man of genius, and to such soldiers, while war is
conducted on a vast scale and armies in the field are
numbered by the hundred thousand, places like Metz will
not cease to become traps in which frustrated or beaten
armies will be caught and captured, sometimes, it may be,
by force or stratagem ; usually by stress of famine. Mean-
CHAP. XII.] METZ AND STRASBURO. 283
time the issue of the war will be decided, as it always has
been, hy the l>ell^erent who is able to keep the field.
Although huge Armies had penetrated so swiftly into
France on the morrow of the frontier victories, there were
still, besides the fortress of Metz, which was in an exceptional
case, sereral other strongholds which stood out defiant
upon the main lines of the German communications. They
were Yerdun, Toul, Bitsche, Phalsburg, Strasbui^, and, at
a later stage, BeKort. Each of these, except the last-
named, required to be, and were, watched or invested by
troops drawn from the active Armies or the reserves in
Germany ; but they had little or no influence upon the
colossal events which decided the issue of what we have
called the Campaign of Sedan. Strasburg alone was a
cause of any anxiety, because the Germans were eager to
obtain possession of a fortress the fall of which would give
them undisputed command of the Ehine, and become of
great value in the event of unlooked-for and improbable
reverses. General von Werder, with the Baden Division,
after the battle of Woerth, had been sent to invest the
town, and he arrived before it on the 11th. It is not
intended to relate in these pages the siege of Strasburg,
which properly belongs to the story of the Franco-German
war as a whole. The point to note is that the regular
siege was preceded by a useless bombardment. The
engineer desired to proceed in the orthodox way ; the chief
of the staff wished to try the more violent method. He
insisted that a bombardment would terrify the inhabitants,
and make them exert such a pressure on the Governor,
General Uhrich, a gallant veteran, as would compel him to
surrender. The dispute was determined by an appeal to
the Great Head-quarters, then at Pont k Mousson, and
General von Moltke, who desired that the place should bo
taken in the shortest possible time, and that the 40,000
284 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XII.
men before it might be ayailable for other operations,
decided in favour of the bombardment. The consequence
was that dreadful sufferings were inflicted upon the
inhabitants of Strasburg, and terrible devastation brought
upon the town, but that the cruelty did not attain the end
in view ; and that the wise engineer was permitted to apply
his method at a moment when, had his advice been adopted,
the besieging Army would have been near the success which
was ultimately attained. The bombardment of Strasburg
was not only an error regarded from a military point of
view, it was a great political blimder ; for who can doubt
that the agonies endured in the last days of August, 1870,
and the resentment created by the awful destruction of life
and property, have materially helped to render inveterate
that hostiUty to German rule which even now reigns in
Strasburg as strong as ever. Strasburg would have been
captured, probably at an earlier date, had there been no
bombardment, humanity would have been spared a heart-
rending spectacle, and Germany would have profited by
showing some deference towards the feelings and some
regard for the Uves of the people whose town it was
intended to restore to the Eeich, and over whom she had
determined to rule. It was only on the 26th, when the
King had just turned northward from the Omain to hunt
after MacMahon, that Von Werder, finding Uhrich resolute,
decided to proceed by way of a regular siege. After the
end of the month the fortress ceased to be, in any sense, a
danger to the German Armies, which, whether closed around
Metz or marching westward through France, could afford
to await, with calmness, the certain surrender of Strasburg,
an end which might have been attained just as quickly had
the wisdom of King William's statesmen been called in to
sustain the sound judgment of General Schulz, the accom-
plished Engineer.
CHAPTER XIII.
SBDAK.
Oerman Decision.
WHILE Strasburg was enduring the agonies of a
siege and bombardment, and tbe " Army of the
Rhine," already oppressed by " la question des vivres," was
chafing in its restricted camps under the cannon of Metz ;
while Paris was quivering with excitement and barely
restrained from bursting into open revolt, the victorious
German host was closing steadily, yet swiftly, round the
distracted and misguided Army of Chalons. It was pressed
in so closely on the Belgian frontier that, during the after-
noon of the 30th, before De Failly had been driven over
the Mouse, Count Bismarck sent a formal communication
to the German Minister at Brussels, in which he expressed
a hope that, should MacMahon lead his soldiers across the
boundary, the Belgian authorities would immediately de-
prive them of their arms. At night, in his quarters at
Buzancy, King William sanctioned a decisive order to his
son and the Saxon Prince. The troops were to march at
dawn, attack the enemy wherever he could be found on the
left and right bank of the Mouse, in order that he might
be crushed up as much as possible between the river and
the Belgian border. The Saxon Prince was to operate
beyond the Meuse, with two Corps ; the Prussian Prince
/
286 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
on the front and left ; movements designed to bar the road
to Montmedj, prevent any attempt to recross the river, and,
eventually, to interpose the German left wing between the
French and Mezieres. " Should the adversary enter Belgium
and not be immediately disarmed, he is to be followed at
once without waiting for fresh orders." These were not the
final instructions which led to the investment of an Army,
but they prepared the way towards, and foreshadowed the
accomplishment of that astonishing result.
Confusion in the French Gwnvp.
Marshal MacMahon, perplexed, but not dismayed, by
the events of the 30th, remained for some time in doubt.
" I do not know what I shall do," said the Marshal early
in the evening to Ducrot's aide-de-camp. " In any case,
the Emperor should at once start for Sedan." At that
time the Emperor was in the camp of Ducrot, who, instructed
to protect the retreat of the Army either by Douzy or by
Carignan, that is, towards Sedan or Montm^dy, had divided
his Corps between those two places. At a later period,
when darkness had set in, MacMahon, seated at a bivouac
fire, on the heights above Mouzon, sent for General Lebrun,
and directed him to retreat, at once, upon Sedan, not by
the highway, which was crowded with fugitives and wagons,
but by cross roads leading upon Douzy. ** We have had a
bad time," said the Marshal, ''but the situation is not
hopeless. At the most, the German Army before us cannot
exceed in numbers sixty or seventy thousand men. If they
attack us, so much the better ; we shall be able, doubtless,
to fling them into the Meuse." The Marshal, who never
spared himself, and seemed to live without sleep, rode back
to Sedan, and Lebrun, stumbling along devious tracks, in
the darkness, and apparently in dubious military array,
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 287
fearing all the time that he might be attacked, entered
Douzy at eight in the morning, and did not reach Bazeilles,
his destination, imtil ten o'clock.
Meantime Ducrot, embarrassed by the presence of the
Emperor, awaited anxiously, at Carignan, the final orders
of MacMahon. He respectfully urged His Majesty to
depart by train for Sedan, but the Emperor refused — " he
wished to be with the Corps which covered the retreat."
He was astonished and incredulous when the rout before
Mouzon was described. " It is impossible," he repeatedly
exclaimed, ** our positions were magnificent ! " In the night
he yanished from Carignan ; and it was only some hours
after he had gone that Ducrot was informed of his
departure by train. The General then, in concert with
Margueritte, whose cavalry were on the Chiers, resolved to
retreat in the morning, without waiting longer for orders,
and to move upon Bly, because he assumed that MacMahon
would certainly direct the Army on M^zi^res. He was
mistaken. On reaching Villers-Cemay, about four in the
afternoon of the 31st, Ducrot learned that he was to retire
upon Sedan, and not upon Mezi^res, '' whither I have not
any intention of going," said the Marshal's despatch. In
fact, the two Divisions of the 1st Corps, left at Douzy on
the 30th, had been already ordered to retire on the
(Jivonne, Lebrun, whom we saw follow in their wake,
after his painful night march, did not destroy the bridge
over the Chiers ; so that, when he was passing Francheval,
Ducrot actually saw the enemy — they were Saxon horsemen
— issuing from the village, and cutting in upon the baggage
and transport trains.
On that memorable 30th, when the Emperor informed
the Empress by telegram, from Carignan, that there had
been an '' engagement of no great importance," an officer
destined to be conspicuous, dropped in upon the Army ; it
288 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
ivas De Wimpffen. He has been defined bj General
Lebrun, who was with him at St. Cjr, as a man of firm
will, and ** an unlimited confidence in his own capadtj.'*
Indeed, he had come to restore victory. When he passed
through Paris, the Comte de Palikao was good enough to
tell him — so he writes, although Palikao " thinks " he
could not have so expressed himself — ^that MacMahon
chimed in too easily with the su^estions of the Emperor,
which was not the fAct ; that His Majesty was in a false
position, and that he caused the greatest embarrassment.
'* Send me to the Army," said De Wimpffen, ** I shaJl
impart the needed boldness and decision." So he was sent
to supersede De Failly in command of the 5th Corps,
carrying in his pocket a letter which authorized him to
succeed MacMahon in command of the Army, should any
accident befall the Marshal It was this audacious per-
sonage who supervened on the 30th, and to his horror,
found the Army he might have to guide and govem, filing
to pieces under his eyes. He met troops in flight from
Mouzon ; they were frightened, famished, and could hardly
be persuaded that the ''Prussians" were not at their heels.
As evidence of the reigning disorder, De Wimpffen says
that he collected on the 30th, three regiments belonging to
the 5th, 7th, and 12th Corps, some squadrons of De Failly's
cavalry, and several hundreds of men belonging to the 1st
Corps, who obeyed a non-combatant officer. The General
led them during the night to Sedan. A like confusion
prevailed on all sides, as the soldiers, hungry and thoroughly
wearied, fell asleep as they dropped on the ground in their
dreary bivouacs,
^he Emperor entered Sedan about midnight.^ The
Marshal urged him to embark afresh in the train, aSa seek
security in M^ziferes, where General Vinoy was expected,
and where he did, indeed, arrive that night with t&e advance
CHAP. Xm.] SEDAN. 289
guard of one division of the 13tli Corps. The Emperor
refused to quit Sedan, but the Prince Imperial had been
sent away. The movement of Vinoj was delayed several
hours, because a train running to Avesnes, and bearing the
young Prince, "his baggage, his escort, and his suite,"
barred the way to M^zieres.
When morning dawned upon the discomfited Army,/
Marshal MacMahon had not ceased to ponder. As he saidl
before the Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry in 1872, j
he had no intention of fighting a battle at Sedan, but he /
wished to supply the Army afresh with provisions and \
munitions ; and he spent part of the day in considering
what he should do on the morrow, and in watching from
the citadel the march of his foes. There were, he believed, /
a million rations in Sedan, but eight hundred thousand of
these were stored in wagons at the station, and as shells
reached them from beyond the Mouse, the station-master
sent away the train to M^zi^res. With it went a company
of engineers, instructed to blow up the bridge at Donchery ;
but frightened by the shells, the driver halted long enough
to drop the engineers, and then hastily fled with the powder
and tools. The Marshal did not hear of the mishap until
ten o'clock at night, and when another company of engineers
reached the bridge, they found it in possession of the enemy!
Early in the morning, before that event occurred. Captain
des Sesmaisons, carrying a message from Vinoy, entered^
Sedan, after having been fired on by a German battery
established near Prenois. He saw the Emperor in the
hotel of the Sub-Prefect, delivered his message, and received
a despatch from His Majesty directing Vinoy to concentrate
his troops in Mdzi^res. Anxious that the Captain should
return in safety, the Emperor gave him a horse, and traced
on a map the road he should take, observing that the Army
would retire by that route the next day; that the road
290 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XHI.
would be open and safe, as it was new, had not been
marked on the map, and was unknown to the enemj.
But we learn from the German Staff history, that this
recently opened road, although not laid down on the
French, was duly figured in the German map, a contrast
between diligence and negligence not easily paralleled.
The Captain saw MacMahon, who then, nearly midday,
seemed resolved to march on M^ziires, and beUeyed that
he could crush any opposition.
At this moment General Douay arriyed, and gave a new
turn to his thoughts. Douay had surveyed the position in
front of his camp with an anxioxui eye, and had noted that,
unless reinforced, he could not hold the cardinal point —
the Calvaire d'llly. He got additional troops in the end.
"But," said the Marshal, who seemed to share Douay's
apprehensions, " I do not want to shut myself up in lines ;
I wish to be free to manoeuvre.'* " M. le Mar^chal, to-
morrow the enemy will not leave you the time," was the
General's answer. According to Captain des Sesmaisons,
H was Douay's comments on the position which made the
Marshal modify his judgment, and think of fighting where
he stood rather than of retreating on M^zieres. The Cap-
tain rode back to his General, and carried with him a
gloomy account of the condition and outlook of the Army
of Chalons. No troops were sent forth to watch the Meuse
below Sedan and communicate with Vinoy. Later in the
day, an old soldier who lived in the neighbourhood, sought
out General Douay and told him that the enemy was pre-
paring to pass the Meuse at Donchery — a fact, it might be
thought, which could not escape the notice of the watchers
in Sedan — and then it was that the General occupied the
position between Floing and Illy, and began to throw up
intrenchments as cover for men and guns. He had not
done so hitherto, because his soldiers, thoroughly exhausted
CHAP. Xm.] SEDAN. 291
by incessant marches, sleepless nights, want of food, and
rear-guard combats, needed some rest. Enough has been
said to indicate the lamentable weakness of mind at head-
quarters, and the dire confusion prevailing throughout the
limited area between the Belgian frontier and the Mouse,
within which the French soldiers were now potentially in-
closed. It is time to show a difEerent example of the
practice of war.
The Movements of the Oermans,
The decision adopted by the Great Head-quarters at
Buzancy were, as usual, anticipated, and the Commander-
in-Chief of the Mouse Army, before the formal orders
reached him,fhad directed the Guard and the 12th Corps
to cross the river, by the bridge at Pouilly, constructed
on the 30th, and a new one made at L^tanne soon after
daybreak on the 31 st.^ The Saxon cavalry commander,
indeed, taking with him a squadron at dawn, rode down
the right bank, then shrouded in fog, as far as Mouzon,
entered the town with four lancers, and crossed the bridge
to the faubourg. Thereupon a Prussian battalion instantly
passed over and took possession of the town. This adven-
turous squadron had actually captured prisoners and many
wagons loaded with provisions. When the two divisions
of cavalry, preceding the infantry advance, rode towards
Douzy and Carignan, they struck the tail of Lebrun's
Corps, and fired into the distant columns which Ducrot,
on the other side of the Chiers, was leading by the hill
roads to Erancheval. In fact, by noon the Guard horse-
men were masters of Carignan and such provision stores
as the French had not time to destroy ; and the Saxons,
.passing through Douzy, had fallen upon a convoy on the
right bank. The fire of infantry forced them back upon
292 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XtU.
the town, but they held that and the nnbroken bridge
until the adyance gpiard of the 12th came up in the
afternoon and established themselyes in the place. The
Prussian Guard meanwhile, after a long march, had reached,
with its leading battalions. Form aux Bois and FranchevaU
the main body halting between Sachy and Missincourt,
and the cavalry remaining in the rear. TThus, the Saxon
Prince's Army had secured all the bridge! over the Chiers
and the important passage at Mouzon, where the 4th
Corps stood on both banks of the Meuse.^ The outposts
formed a chain from the right bank of the river in front
of Dousy, through Francheval to the Belgian frontier, at
that point only nine miles from the Chiers, and sixteen
from the Mouse. This narrow belt of territory was thus
barred against French enterprise ; the road to Montm^y
and Metz was definitely closedJ The Saxon Prince did
not push farther westward, because he knew that the Great
Staff had planned a passage of the Meuse below Sedan for
the next day, and, therefore, he did not wish to alarm the
French. Enough had been done and his troops needed
rest, especially the Guard, the whole of which had marched
during the day upwards of thirty miles, and the advance
g^uaids more. No wonder the French were astounded at
the "prodigious marches" made by Germans, whom
they had considered to be incapable of such energy and
endurance. Some share of the French disasters must be
IMitributed to that fatal form of error — contempt for the
enemy.
Not less success attended the operations of the Prussian
Crown Prince, whose business it was to secure possession
of the left bank of the Meuse, and, if practicable, bring
batteries to bear upon the French troops. We have alreadj
described the effect produced by the horse artillery batteries
established under the protection of the cavalry at Frenois
CHAP. XIII.] 8EDAK. 298
upon the railway officials who sent oft the provision trains,
and iipon the drivers who ran away with the powder and
tools required to destroy the bridge at Donchery. Behind
the cavalry the whole Army was soon in motion. The
Wurtembergers marched from Verri^res to the neighbour-
hood of Flize, where they became engaged with Vinoy's
outposts, and induced them to bum the bridge over the
Meuse. The 11th Corps moved upon Donchery, and,
during the afternoon, not only secured the important
bridge at that place, but constructed a second. The 5th
Corps stood close in rear of the 11th, and the Second
Bavarians halted at Baucourt. On the extreme left the
6th Corps, covering the rear, went to Attigny, Semoy,
and Amagne ; the 5th Division of Cavaky was at Tour-
teron, and the 6th at Poix, both scouting over the rail-
way to Beims, and one breaking the line at Faux.
The 1st Bavarian Corps, which led the infantry advance
upon the Meuse, moved early from Baucourt upon Bemilly
and Aillicourt. They had only started at eight o'clock,
yet their guns were in position opposite Bazeilles before
the last division of Lebrun's Corps, marching from Douzy,
could gain the village. The guns opened at very long
range, and Lebrun, who was on the watch, was so im-
pressed that he ordered the division to turn back and enter
the position by Daigny, where there was a bridge over the
Givonne. The French drew out their guns, which led Von
der Tann to reinforce his own, so that there was soon a
powerful line of batteries in action, and some houses in
Bazeilles broke out into flames. Then the Bavarian in-
fantry brigades arrived to support the advance guard, and
the French threw out infantry to annoy the hostile gunners.
Presently a sharp-eyed artilleryman observed that barrels
of powder had been brought down to the railway bridge,
apparently with intent to blow it up. Thereupon General
294 THB CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Xm.
Ton Steph&n diiected a Jiger battalion to frustrate this
design ; and just as the French were lowering some barrels
under the furthest arch, the Jagers, dashing on to the
bridge, fell upon the working party, drove it off, and
poured the powder into the Mouse. In this daring fashion
was the railway viaduct saved from destruction under the
noses of the 12th Corps. Yon der Tann, having the fear
of Yon Moltke before his eyes, desired to save the bridge
but not engage beyond the stream. The Jagers, however,
who, in the judgment of their comrades, held a post of
peril, were promptly supported, and the forward spirit
gaining the upper hand, the little troop, driving in the
French skirmishers, actually held for some time the fringe
of Bazeilles ; but not being supported by the General, who
refused to disobey orders and bring on a premature en-
gagement, the hardy adventurers had to retire with loss, to
the right bank. Yet they secured the bridge from des-
truction, and to this day, apparently, General Lebrun
cannot luiderstand how it came to pass that MacMahon's
orders were not executed. The French say that the powder
was spoilt and that no fresh supply could be got from
Sedan; but no efEort is made to explain why, when the
Bavarians threw a pontoon bridge over the Meuse, just
above the railway crossing, Lebrun's people did nothing to
prevent it. The truth is that they could not prevent one
bridge from being preserved, and the other from being
built.
The gain on the day's resolute operations, therefore, was
the acquisition of three permanent bridges oyer the Meuse,
two above and one below Sedan ; the seizure of all the
passages across the Chiers ; and the concentration of both
Armies upon the right and left banks of the river within
striking distance of the French troops packed up in a
narrow area about Sedan. The Crown Prince brought his
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN^ 295
head-quaxters to Cli^merj, aud the King went through that
place on his way to Vendresse. At Ch^mery, "a brief
conference was held between the Generals Von Moltke Von
Podbielski, and Von Blumenthal, relative to the general
state of the campaign and the next steps which should be
taken." It was a notable meeting, and few words, indeed,
were required to indicate the finishing touches of an enter-
prise, so unexpectedly imposed on them, and so resolutely
carried out by these skilful, far-seeing, and audacious
captains. They had come to the conclusion that the French
had before them only one of two courses — ^they must either
retreat bodily into Belgium, or sacrifice the greater part of
their Army in an endeavour with the remainder to reach
Paris by way of M^zieres. There was a third — ^to remain
and be caught — ^but a finis so triumphant was not foreseen
by the trio of warriors who met in the village of Oh^mery.
The BaMlefield of Sedan.
The battlefield of Sedan may be described as the space
lying within the angle formed by the Mouse, and its little
affluent, the Givonne, which flows in a southerly direction
from the hills near the Belgian frontier. After passing
Bazeilles and its bright meadows, the greater river meanders
towards the north-west, making, a little below Sedan, a
deep loop inclosing the narrow peninsula of Iges on three
sides, and then running westward by Donchery, Dom le
Mesnil and Flize to M^zieres. From the northern end of
the loop to the Givonne, the ground is a rugged, undulat-
ing upland, attaining its maximum of height a little south
of the Oalvaire d'llly, at a point where the Bois de la
Garenne begins to clothe the steep slopes on the south and
east. Lower still is a deep defile, called the Fond de
Givonne, through which, turning the wood, runs the high-
296 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
waj from Sedan to Bouillon, a town on the Semoy in.
Belgium. The eastern face of the position, therefore, was
the line of the Ghivonne, a belt <^ cottages, gardens,
factories and Tillages ; the southern and south-western was
the fortress and the Mouse ; the north-western, front was
on the hiUs between Floing and Illy, and the lowlands on
the loop of the Mouse. The interval between Hlj and the
Givonne was, at first, neglected because the French held
that no troops could work through the dense forest and
broken ground The issues from this man-trap were the
narrow band of territory between the head of the Meuse
loop and the wooded Belgian frontier; the high road to
Bouillon ; the routes eastward to Carignan up the Chiers,
and the gate of Torcj on the south. They were all difficult,
and in the nature of defiles which can only be traversed
slowly, even in time of peace, by large bodies of men,
horses, guns and wagons.
Within this remarkable inclosure the French Army sat
down on the 31st of August. The 12th and the IstOorps,
Lebrun's andDucrot's, held the line of the Givonne, looking
east and south-east, because Lebrun had to guard the
Meuse at Bazeilles. The 5th Corps, now under De
Wimpffen, was partly in the ** old camp," close under the
fortress, and partly behind the 7th, which, as we have said,
occupied the rolling heights between Floing and lUy with
a strong outpost in St. Menges, at the head of the Meuse
loop on the road which led to Mezieres through Vrigne aux
Bois — the road supposed to be unknown to the Germans,
because it was not laid down on the French maps. The
cavalry posted in rear of the 7th were the divisions of
Margueritte, Bonnemains and Amiel, while Michel was
behind Ducrot's left at the village of Givonne. The sun
set, and the night passed, yet Marshal MacMahon expressed
no decision. Believing that the enemy's numerical strength
CHAP. XUI.] SEDAN. 297
had been exaggerated, or that he could break out in any
direction when he pleased, or trusting to fortune and the
opportunities which might offer during the conflict, perhaps
imagining that Yon Moltke would grant hiin another day,
the Marshal became the sport of circumstance which had
escaped his control. " The truth is," he said to the
Parliamentary Commission, "that I did not reckon on
fighting a battle on the ground we occupied. I knew already
that we had no provisions, and that the place was barely
supplied with munitions, but I did not yet know on which
side I ought, on the morrow (the 1st) to effect my retreat."
The unfaltering adversary had no such doubts, and his firm
purpose brought on not only the Battle, but the Investment
of Sedan. For the information which reached the Great
Head-quarters during the evening of the 31st, induced Yon
Moltke to quicken the operations. He inferred that no
attempt would be made by the French to break out by
Carignan ; that they might try to reach Mezi^res or pass
into Belgium ; and as he was eager to frustrate their
escape by any route, he instructed the Prussian Crown
Prince to set his Corps in motion during the night. The
Prince immediately issued the needful orders, and directed
Yon der Tann to attack with his Bavarians at dawn,
without awaiting the arrival of the 12th Corps, so that
Lebrun in Bazeilles being held fast, the attention of the
French might be attracted towards that side. The Saxon
Prince, being duly informed, entered with characteristic
spirit and daring into the plan, and not only determined
to be early on the scene of action with the 12th and the
Guard, but to push the latter well forward, so as to antici-
pate the French should they endeavour to gain the Belgian
border. Thus a common motive animated the German
chiefs who, in taking firm steps to gain a decisive result,
were so well seconded by their tireless and intrepid soldiers.
298 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
The.Battle of 8edan.
A thick white mist filled the vallej of the Mease on the
morning of the Ist of September, 1870, so thick that Yon
der Tann's Bavarians, marching towards the railway bridge
and the pontoons above it, could not see many steps ahead,
as in two columns they moved at four o'clock in careful
silence through the dense and clammy atmosphere. At
that very time General Lebrun, whose anxieties kept him
awake, started up, and rushing forth, made the first bugler
he encountered sound the call, which roused the wearied
troops sleeping on the hills between Bazeilles and Balan.
Yet it would seem that, outside the former village, no
adequate watch was kept, for when the leading Bavarians
emerged from the fog, they gained at once possession of
several houses, and even entered the principal street with-
out firing a shot. It was only when the enemy were within
the place, that the gallant Marine Infantry, posted in the
houses and behind barricades, abruptly arrested the intru-
ders by opening a smart fire. Then began a sanguinary
contest for the possession of Bazeilles, which raged during
many hours ; a series of street fights in which the inhabi-
tants took an active part; combats ebbing and flowing
through and round the market-place, the church, the larger
mansions, and the pretty park of MonviUers, washed and
beautified by the stream of the G-ivonne. Without a de-
tailed plan, the incidents of this terrible episode in the
battle, are unintelligible. Vassoigne and Martin des
Palliferes, before the latter was wounded on the 31st, had
devised a plan of resistance worthy of the gallant division
they led, and it may be said that the defence of Bazeilles
was the most creditable feat of arms performed by the
French on that dreadful day. During the earlier hours,
indeed, they kept the upper hand, driving the Bavariaois
CHAP. XIIL] SEDAN. 299
out of the village on all sides, but being unable to eject
them from two stone bouses abut^g on the chief street.
The Bavarian batteries beyond the Meuse could not open
fire until six o'clock, because the fog had shut out the view»
which even then was indistinct. About this time Greneral
Lebrun, who was quickly on the scene, had called rein-
forcements from the 1st and 5th Corps; but then the
Saxons had come up opposite La Moncelle, where one
battery, firing at long range, astonished Lebrun, who saw
that the shells from his own guns fell short, or burst in the
air. When the 12th assailed La Moncelle fresh Bavarian
columns had crossed the Meuse, and the fierce conflict
which began in Bazeilles, had extended to the park of
MonviUers, where the French fought steadily. After four
hours strenuous battle, no marked progress had been made
in this quarter, where three Bavarian brigades had fallen
almost wholly into skirmishing order, scattered amidst the
houses and lanes of the villages, and some part of the park
on the left bank of the Q-ivonne. Von der Tann bringing
over another brigade and the reserve artillery from the left
bank of the Meuse, called up a division of the 4th Corps
which he held back as a reserve. During the course of
this stubborn combat, the Saxon Corps had seized La Mon-
celle, and had brought ten batteries to bear on that village
and Daigny, their left flank being prolonged by two Bava-
rian batteries. The accuracy of their fire still further
astonished Greneral Lebrun, who confesses that he had never
seen such artillery. He and his staff, six or eight persons,
were on an eminence above La Moncelle. " The shells," he
writes, " cut off one branch after another, from the tree at
the foot of which I stood holding my horse ; " and he goes
on to say that in quick succession, one officer was killed,
two mortally wounded, and two men who bore his f anion
were hit. He was as much impressed by the ** avalanche
800 THE CAMPAIGN OF S£DAN. [CHAP. Xin.
de fer" as Marshal^ Canrobert himself. The infantry in
Bazeilles resisted superbly, but the Frendi General was
none the less amazed by the terrible fire of the German
guns. Between eight and nine the wave of battle was
flowing up the Givonne, for the Guard were now approach-
ing from Yillers-Cernay.
MacMahorCs Wound and iie Consequences,
Meanwhile, inside the French lines, the drama had
deepened, for the Commander-in-Chief had been wounded.
Marshal MacMahon has related how, before daybreak,
fearing lest the Germans should have moved troops over
the Mouse at Donchery, he had sent two officers to look
into matters in that quarter, and was awaiting their return
when, about five o'clock, he received a despatch fromLebrun,
which made him mount his ready-saddled horse and ride
towards Bazeilles. Arrived there he saw that the place
was well defended, and went to the leftintending to examine
the whole line of the Givonne, especially as Margueritte had
sent word that German troops were moving towards Fran-
cheval. Halting above La Moncell^ not far from Lebrun,
the Marshal has stated that while he was gazing intently
upon the heights in front of the Bois Chevalier, and could
not see anything, he was struck by the fragment of a shell.
At first he thought that he was only bruised, but that being
obliged to dismount from his horse, which was also wounded,
he fainted for a moment, and then found that his wound
was severe. Unable to bear up any longer he gave over
the command of the Army to General Ducrot, and was
carried to Sedan. That officer did not hear of the event
until seven or later ; it is impossible to fix precisely the
moment when the Marshal was hit, nor when Ducrot learned
his destiny, the evidence is so contradictory; but sometime
CHAP. XITI.] SEDAN. 301
between seven and eight Ducrot took the reins. His first
act was to order a retreat on M^zi^es ; Lebrun begged him
to reflect and he did, but soon afterwards became positive.
** There is not a moment to lose," he cried ; and it was
arranged that the retreat should be made in echelons,
beginning from the right of the 12th Corps. Neither
General knew the real facts of the situation, nor guessed
even how vast were the numbers of the enemy.
The retreat began ; it attracted the notice of Nappleon
m., who had ridden on to the field above Balan ; and it
roused Be Wimpffen. He carried in his pocket an order
from Palikao authorizing him to succeed MacMahon, if the
Marshal were killed or disabled. He had kept the fact
secret ; after the Marshal fell he still hesitated to use his
letter, but not long. The combat about Bazeilles was well
sustained ; the cavalry had been out a little way beyond
St. Menges and, as usual, after a perfunctory search, had
** seen nothing," the attack on the Givonne even was not
fully developed. Cteneral de Wimpffen, perhaps from mixed
motives, resolved to interfere and show his old comrades
how a man who really knew war could extricate a French
Army from perils in which it had been placed by weakness
and incompetence. He certainly thought himself a great
man, and he roughly stopped the retreat. Ducrot was in-
dignant, but he obeyed. Lebrun was not more favourably
affected by De Wimpffen's loud voice and overbearing
manner. " I will not have a movement upon M^zi^res," he
exclaimed. " If the Army is to retreat, it shall be on Carig-
nan and not on M^ziires." It ^ould again be observed
that the new Commander-in-Chief was quite as ignorant of
the facts as his predecessors, and even when he wrote his
book many months afterwards had not learned from sources
open to all the world how many men stood at that moment
betwe^i him and Carignan, nor was he at all acquainted
802 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Xim
with the difficult countrj through which he would have to
move. Ducrot's plan, which would have placed the Army
between the Mouse below Sedan and the forest on the
frontier, leaving a dear sweep for the guns of the fortress,
was far more sensible than that of his imperious riyal.
Still, to have a chance of success, it should have been begun
early in the morning, when the 5th and 11th German
Corps were struggling towards the woods; even then it
would have probably failed, but there would have been no
capitulation of Sedan. General de Wimpffen, although he
did not know it, was actually playing into the hand of Yon
Moltke, who desired above all things that the French Corps
on the Givonne should remain there, because he knew, so
great were his means, so firm his resolution, and so admir-
able as marchers and fighters were his soldiers, that the
gain of a few hours would enable him to surround the
Army of Chalons.
How far the retreat from the front line was carried,
when it was stayed, and in what degree it injured the
defence, cannot possibly be gleaned from the French narra*
tives, which are all vague and imperfect in regard to time
and place. We know that the Germans did not carry
BazeiUes until nearly eleven o'clock, and then only by dint
of turning movements executed by the Saxons and fresh
Bavarian troops from the direction of La MonceUe. General
Ducrot, in his account, places his stormy interview with De
Wimpffen at a little after nine ; and he says that when it
ended he spurred in haste towards his divisions — ^Pell^s
and L'H^riller's — ^and made them descend a part of the
positions which they had climbed a few instants before.
Lebrun is equally vague. He says in one place that when
De Wimpffen came up his first brigades had "partly"
crossed the Fond de Givonne, and in another, that the
Marine Infantry had abandoned Bazeilles, which they had
CHAP. Xin.] SEDAN. 803
not done before nine o'clock. G-eneral de Wimpffen's
recollections are still more confused and bis chronology
unintelligible; so tbat it is impossible to ascertain pre-
cisely what happened beyond the Givonne after Ducrot
ordered and his successor countermanded the retreat. If
we take the German accounts, and try to measure the
influence of the much-debated retreat by the resistance
which the assailants encountered, we may doubt whether
it had much greater influence on the issue than that which
grew out of the impaired confidence of the troops in their
antagonistic and jealous commanders. Nevertheless, it is
probable that the swaying to and fro in the French line
between BazeiUes and the village of Givonne, after nine
o'clock, did, in some degree, favour the assailants, and
render the acquisition of BazeiUes as well as the passage of
the brook less difficult and bloody. In any case, the inter-
vention of De Wimpffen can only be regarded as a mis-
fortune for the gallant French Army, which can hardly
find consolation in the fact that within four-and-twenty
hours he was obliged to sign with his name the capitula-
lation of Sedan.
This needful explanation and comment serves to illus-
trate the disorder, the infirmity of purpose, and the rival-
ries which existed in the French camp ; and we may well
agree with Marshal MacMahon when he says that the blow
which obliged him to relinquish the command was a griev-
ous event. Doubtless he would have taken a decided course
had he not been wounded, and would have marched, if he
could, with all his forces, either on M^zieres or Carignan ;
and besides, he says, there was Belgium near at hand. He
would not have tried to do all three at once. It is only an
Army, well compacted and educated from the bottom to
the top which can, without serious detriment, bear three
successive commanders in three hours.
S04 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XHl.
Progress of the BaUle on the Oivonne, \
While the French generals, almost in the presence of
the helpless Emperor, were using high words and thwart-
ing each other's plans, the German onset had proceeded on
all sides with unabated yigour. But, about nine o'clock,
or a little earlier, the French dashed forward so impetu-
ously that the foremost German troops on the Givonne as
far as Daignj, had to give ground ; and the batteries were
so Tcxed by musketry fire that they also fell back on some .^
points. In fact Lebrun's left and Ducrot's right came on I
with great spirit, and shook, but did not arrest long the ^
hostile Hne. It was not until this period that the French
in Daigny pushed a brigade on to the left bank of the
Givonne and occupied ground which, by the confession of
their staff officers, had never been reconnoitred. They
brought over a battery, and General Lartigue rode with
them. The brunt of the onslaught, falling upon the Saxon
infantry immediately in front, these were hard bested ; but
reinforcements arriving on either hand closed in upon the
enemy's flanks, and, not only was he routed from the field,
but, being swiftly pursued, his battery was captured, and
the Saxons following the French into Daigny wrested from
them the village, the bridge, and the opposite bank of the
brook. General Lartigue's horse was killed by a shell,
and he narrowly escaped capture, and was then, or shortly
afterwards, wounded. His chief of the staff. Colonel d'An-
dign^, hit twice, dropped in a field of beet-root. Shells
from his own side fell near him, and he was g^teful to
them because they drove away a pig which came and sniffed
at his wounds. Saxon soldiers gave him wine and lumps
of sugar, but one of them stole his watch and cross; in the
end he was tenderly carried to an ambulance. Some of
the Zouaves engaged in this combat about Daigny, cut off
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 305
from the main body of fagitives, turned northward, entered
the woods, and -reached Paris after traversing the Belgian
border.
The G-ermans owed their quick success at Daigny to the
fact that Lartigue was not supported, and to the fortunate
advent, at a critical moment, of the leading troops of the
Second Saxon Division, the whole of the 12th Corps being
now on the ground, engaged or in reserve. It need
scarcely be remarked that the batteries, as usual, preceded
the bulk of the infantry, for it was the Saxon guns which
extorted the admiration of Lebrun. The attack, which had
been made from his side, upon the Saxons and Bavarians
about La Moncelle, was equally brilliant at the outset, for,
as we have stated, the G-erman batteries were driven back
by the close musketry, and the French were advancing im-
petuously, when a Saxon regiment and part of a Bavarian
brigade striking into the fight, stopped the French and
drove them across the rivulet. Then the artillery returned ;
soon there were ninety-six guns in action; and the in«
fantry pressing on, restored the battle. But in Bazeilles
itseK the Marines had gained ground, and fresh troops
had to be poured into the village or upon its outskirts to
sustain the assailants, who were still held at bay by the
stout defenders. Yet the final stroke at the village was
delivered shortly after this check. The troops in Mon-
villers and La Moncelle simultaneously swept forward from
the orchards, and osier-beds, and gardens, until they
emerged on the heights beyond, and showed a front which
threatened the road from Bazeilles to Balan.
The French stronghold in the place was a large villa on
the north, which had resisted all day ; but now the freshly
arrived Bavarians penetrated into the garden and turned
the building on one side ; while the Saxons grouped in the
park of Monvillers, cutting a path through the hedges
306 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XTTl.
with their billhooks, appeared on the other. The French
then retreated; but the splendid defence of the whole
position had inflicted a heavy loss on the adversary.
In Bazeilles itself a conflict continued between the armed
inhabitants and the Bavarians, and soon after the whole
village was in flames. Whether it was set on fire purposely
or not is to this day a matter of bitter controversy ; but it
stands on record that only thirty-nine lay persons met their
deaths, during this long contest, from fire or sword. It
was not the interest of the Germans to create a furnace
across a line of road ; and one effect of the conflagration
was that the German pioneers, unable to quench it, were
compelled to open a line of communication with the troops
on the fighting line outside the burning village.
The French retired and reformed between the Fond de
Oivonne and Balan, whence their line ran northward, no
longer in the valley, but along the uplands to the Calvaire
d'lUy ; for the Prussian Guard, issuing from Yillers-Cemay
and Francheval, had thrust the French out of the village
of Givonne, and, long before Basseilles was finally mastered,
had established powerful lines of guns which harassed the
French troops in the Bois de la Gurenne. In fact, .by nine
o'clock, there were six guard batteries in action, and two
hours afterwards the number was increased to fourteen.
Givonne was seized a little later, and infantry support
afforded to the right of the 12th Corps; but Prince
Augustus, in conformity with his instructions, held the
main body of the Guard ready to march towards Fleigneux,
effect a junction with the Third Army, and bar the road to
Bouillon. From an eminence a little east of Givonne and
just south of La Yir^ farm, whereon eighteen guns stood,
the Prince, looking westward about nine o'clock, saw the
smoke of that combat near St. Menges, which he knew
marked the formidable intervention of the 5th and 11th
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. S07
Corps, whose operations in the forenoon must now be sue.
cinctiy described.
The March on St. Menges,
It will be remembered that, on receiving a pressing order
from Von Moltke, the Prussian Crown Prince directed the
two Corps just named and the Wurtemberg division to
move out in the dark and occupy the M^ziires road in
order to intercept the French should they endeavour to
retire upon that town. They promptly obeyed. The Wur-
tembergers crossed the Mouse on a bridge of their own
making, at Dom le Mesnil; the 5th and 11th at Donchery
by the permanent bridge and two improvised passages.
The object of the two Corps was to occupy the nearest
villages on the M^zieres road, Yrigne aux Bois and Yivier
au Court, both which were attained about half-past
seven, when the contest was fierce on the Q-ivonne. Here
the generals commanding, Yon Eirchbach and Yon G^rs-
dorf^ received that despatch from the Prussian Crown
Prince which directed them to march on St. Menges and
Fleigneux, for at head-quarters a strong hope had now
arisen that the Army of Chalons could be surrounded.
The 11th moved on the right, next the Mouse, the 5th
on the left ; but the roads were few between the river and
the forest — one column lost its way, and both Corps at the
head of the Loop had to use the same road. No French
scouts were out along this important line of communication.
Margueritte's horsemen had patroUed a short distance,
about six, but neither saw nor heard of the approaching
columns ; nor until the German Hussars, leading the err-
ing column ascending the Meuse from Montimont, had got
close to St. Menges, were they discovered by a French
patrol sent out at the suggestion 6f De Wimpffen.
808 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Xin.
The Wth and hth Corps engage.
The shots exchanged by the hostile cavaliers aroused the
French infantry in St. Menges ; bnt they offered no resist-
ance when the nearest German battalion attacked the
village, which was immediately occupied. Two companies,
prolonging the movement, effected a lodgment in Floing
and could not be expelled ; while three batteries, escorted
by the Hussars, dashed upon the ridge south of St. Menges,
partly protected by a copse, and opened fire on the French.
It was this initial combat which attracted the notice of
Prince Augustus of Wurtemberg, who looked with interest,
from his hill above the Givonne, upon the white battle
smoke which curled up beyond the heights of Illy. Shortly
afterwards seven additional batteries issued from the defile
and formed in succession on the hill — ^the same which had
filled General Douay with anxiety the day before — ^and
some infantry battalions followed; but the body of the
11th Corps was only just clearing the pass, and the 5th
was still behind. In order to protect the batteries, in*
fantry supports were advanced on either flank and in
front towards the Illy brook. General Margueritte, on the
Calvaire d'llly had watched this unwelcomed development
of artillery. Seeing the infantry spread out below, he
thought that his horse might ride them down and then
disable the line of batteries, which seemed to be without
adequate support. Accordingly, by his order, General de
Gulliffet led forth three regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique
and two squadrons of Lancers against the intrusive foot
and audacious gunners. But he never got near the bat-
teries. Swooping down the slope upon the infantry below
him, his men and horses soon fell fast, and although they
swept through the skirmishers, they were crushed by the
fire of the suppoi*ts and the guns on the hill and the
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 309
squads of infantry on either side. They endeavoured to
ride in upon the flanks, but their bravery was displayed in
vain, for nothing could live under the fire which smote
them, and they rode back, frustrated, to the shelter of
their own lines. The cavalry outburst had been repelled
by a few companies of foot on an open hill-side. So puis-
sant is the breech-loader in the hands of cool infantry
soldiers. But the French foot took up the game, and the
chassepot, deftly plied, forced the forward German skirm-
ishers to fall back on the villages and hills.
Gradually the two Corps arrived on the scene. Before
eleven o'clock the artillery of the 5th, preceding its in-
fantry, went into line on a second ridge to the westward,
and soon twenty-four batteries — that is, 144 guns — were
pouring an " avalanche de fer " into the French position,
and crossing their fire with that of the Guard batteries,
which showered their shells into the right rear of Douay's
men from the heights beyond the Givonne. About this
time, also, as reinforcements came up to Fleigneux, the
companies there moved westward towards Oily ; captured,
on their way, eight guns, many horses, much munition,
and above a hundred officers and men, who seemed intent
on escaping over the frontier, and finally entered Oily,
where soon afterwards they were gratified by the arrival of
a squadron of Prussian Hussars of the Guard. Thus was
the circle completed which placed the two Armies in com-
munication. In front of the right wing the two companies
which at the outset obtained a lodgment in Floing, were
at length supported and reheved. As the infantry from
the wooded region north of the Mouse Loop arrived, they
took the place of the battalions near the guns, and these
then went forward upon Floing, one after the other, and
by degrees got possession of the village. But the French
delivered a counterstroke so well pushed that the de-
810 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIH,
fenders of Floing oould not keep them back, and tbej were
only thmst out bj the timely intervention of three fresh
battalions from St. Menges. The French retired towards
the heights of Cazal, and for some time stopped the
further advance of their foes.
The battle was now practicallj won ; for the Germans
held Balan as well as Bazeilles, supported by one-half the
2nd Bavarian Corps brought np to aid the 1st; one
division of the 4th Corps was deep in the fight, and the
other in reserve, close at hand ; the line of the G-ivonne,
from end to end, was occupied on both banks ; the Guard
Cavalry, after vainly trying to charge np the Calvaire
d'lUy, were behind the 5th Corps ; south of the Meuse a
Bavarian division faced the fortress ; and to the west the
Wurtembei^ers interposed between Vinoy's troops in
M^ziires and Sedan. Above all, a little after one o'clock,
there were no fewer than 426 guns hailing shells upon
the unfortunate French, who were almost piled one upon
another in an area which did not measure two miles either
in depth or breadth. It stands on record that there were
in fuU action twenty-six batteries on the North, twenty-
four on the East, ten to the West of La Moncelle, and
eleven on the South between Wadelincourt and Yillette —
an array of force enough to crush out all resistance ; but
the conflict still -continued, for no one had authority suf-
ficient to stop the awful carnage.
The Condition of the French Army,
The main interest of the drama henceforth centres in
the despairing efforts of the French to avert the catastrophe
of Sedan. Early in the morning the Emperor Napoleon
mounted his horse and rode out with his own staff to
witness the battle. On his way towards Bazeilles he met
CHAP. Xin.] SEDAN. • 811
and spoke to the wounded Marshal, who was being carried
to the hospital in Sedan. Then the Emperor rode towards
the hills above La Moncelle, and for several hours he
lingered on the field, well under fire, for two officers were
wounded near him ; but he had no influence whatever on
the battle. Soon after taking command, De Wimpffen,
riding out of the Fond de Givonne, came plump upon
Napoleon as he watched the fight near Balan. " All goes
well. Sire," said the General ; " we are gaining ground ; "
and when His Majesty remarked that the left, meaning
the front towards St. Menges, was threatened, the Q-eneral
replied, "We shall first pitch the Bavarians into the Meuse,
9.nd then, with all our forces, fall upon the new foe.*' They
parted, the Emperor returning to Sedan, whence he did
not em'erge again that day, and the General careering
towards the fight. Then followed a sharp dispute between
De Wimpffen and Ducrot, in the presence of Lebrun, end-
ing in the order to stop the so-called retreat which had
scarcely begun. It is impossible to reconcile the conflicting
accounts of these officers ; but Be Wimpffen's own words
show that, at the time, he did not attach great importance
to the attack on Douay, for to that General he wrote, " I
believe in a demonstration upon your Corps, especially
designed to hinder you from sending help to the 1st and
12th Corps," and he asked him to aid Lebrun. Then he
went himself to the position held by Douay, in order to
expedite the despatch of reinforcements. " Come and see for
yourself," said Douay, on reaching the heights. '* I saw
quite a hostile Army extending afar," writes De Wimpffen,
".and a formidable artillery — "the big batteries of the
6th and 11th Corps — firing with a precision which, under
other circumstances," he adds, " I should have been the first
to admire." Prince Bibesco says that De Wimpffen pro-
mised to send troops from the 1st Corps to occupy the
312 THE CA.MPAION OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
Calvaire d'lllj, and then went away. As he was riding
back, in that state of emotion which the French describe
bj the phrase, ** le coeur navr^," he encountered Ducrot.
" The events which I predicted," said the latter, " have
happened sooner than I expected. The enemy is attacking
the Calvaire d'lllj. Douaj is greatly shaken. Moments
are precious. Hurry up reinforcements if you would keep
that position." "Well," retorted De Wimpffen, still
believing that he had only Bavarians to deal with, " look
after that yourself. Collect what troops you can and hold
the groxmd while I attend to the 12th Corps." Thereupon
Ducrot ordered up guns and infantry; while then, or
shortly afterwards, De Wimpffen called for troops from
Douay, who, believing the Calvaire was or would be
occupied by Ducrot's people, sent ofE three brigades, and
put his last division in front line. Apparently the cross
currents of wandering battalions met in the wood of
Garenne ; and it is not easy to see how any advantages
were obtained by the shifting to and fro which went on.
Ducrot was anxious to defend the Dly plateau; De Wimpffen
desired to break out towards Carignan. He fondled the
idea at one o'clock, when neither object could possibly
be attained ; but if there had been a chance left, the con-
flict between the two Generals would have sufficed to
destroy it.
That " Army " which De Wimpffen saw from the north-
western heights came on in irresistible waves. The French
infantry could not endure the thick and ceaseless hail of
shells from the terrible batteries. The French artillery,
brave and devoted, vainly went into action, for the con-
verging fire from the hostile hiUs blew up the tumbrils,
sometimes two at once, killed and wounded the gunners,
and swept away the horses. Ducrot's reinforcements,
despite his forward bearing and animated language, melted
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 318
away into the woods, and the last battalions and the last
two batteries led up by Douay were speedily forced to
retire. The Germans, already in the village of Illy, ad-
vanced to the Calvaire, while the troops of the 11th Corps
sallied out of Floing, deployed on both sides, and soon the
interval between the two villages was full of hostile troops.
General Ducrot pictures himself, and doubtless truly, as
using every effort by word and example to rally and hold
fast the foot ; but they could not be held ; they slipped ofE
and vanished under the trees. At this time the only strong
body of French was Li^bert's division above the terraced
hill which leads up to Oazal, and the cavalry of Margueritte
and Bonnemains lurking in the hoUows and under the
cover of trees. To these men Ducrot appealed, and his
appeal was nobly answered.
The French Oavalry Charge,
G(eneral Margueritte commanded five regiments of horse,
principally Chasseurs d'Afrique. At the request of Ducrot
he promptly moved out from cover, and prepared to charge ;
but wishing to reconnoitre the ground, he rode in advance,
and was hit in the head by a bullet which traversed his
face. Mortally wounded, he gave the command to De
Galliffet, and rode off, supported by two men, and grasping
the saddle with both hands, ''the star of his arm," as
Colonel Bonie poetically calls him. Then De Gtilliffet
performed his task, and rode straight into the intrusive
enemy. For half an hour, on the hill sides south of Floing,
and even the lowlands bordering the Meuse, the dashing
French horsemen dauntlessly struck at their foes. The
German infantry scattered in lines of skirmishers, were just
attaining the crest of the eminence, when the cavalry
dashed upon them. They broke through the skirmishers.
n4 THE GAMPAIOir OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XHi:
but fell in heaps under the fire of the compact bodies of
supports. Failing to crush a front, they essayed the flanks
and even the rear, and nothing dismayed, sought again and
again to ride over the stubborn adversary, who, relying on
his rifle, would not budge. The more distant infantry and
the guns, when occasion served, smote these devoted
cavaliers. Sometimes the Germans met them in line, at
others they formed groups, or squares as the French call
them, and occasionally they fought back to back. One
body of horse rode into a battery, and was only repelled
by the fire of a company of infantry. Another dashed
through a village on the banks of the river, and although
they were harried by infantry, and turned aside and
followed by some Prussian hussars, several rode far down
the river, and created some disorder in the German trains.
There were many charges, all driven home as far at least
as the infantry fire would permit, more than one carry-
ing the furious riders up to the outskirts of Floing. But,
in the end, the unequal contests everywhere had the same
result — ^bloody defeat for the horseman, who matched him-
self, his lance or sword and steed against the breech-loader
held by steady hands in front of keen eyes. Yet it is not
surprising that these daring charges excited the ungrudging
admiration and deep sympathy of friend and foe. They
did not arrest the march of the Qerman infantry, or turn
the tide of battle, or even infuse new courage into the
French soldiers, who were exposed to trials which few, if
any, troops could bear. But they showed, plainly enough,
that the "furia francese" survived in the cavalry of France,
and that, if the mounted men refused or disdained to
perform more useful work by scouting afar and covering
the front of armies, they could still charge with imabated
heroism on the field of battle. They were dispersed, and
they left behind heaps of dead and dying-one-half their
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 816
strength resting on the scene of their daring. Three
Grenerals, Margueritte, Girard and Tilliard, were killed,
and Salignac-Fenelon was wounded. The Germans say
that their own losses were small, but that among the Jagers
a comparatively large number of men were wounded by the
sword. These notable exploits were done about two o'clock
or a little later ; and, with slight exceptions, they mark the
end of desperately offensive resistance on the part of the
French.
During the next hour the Germans pressed their ad-
versaries close up to Sedan, " When the cavalry had been
driven back in disorder," says Ducrot in his sweeping
style, "the last bodies of infantry which had stood firm
broke and fled. Then on the right and left, with loud
hurrahs, which mingled with the roar of cannon and
musketry, the Prussian lines advanced." The statement is
too superlative. The cavalry in squads, wandered, no
doubt, from ravine to ravine, seeking an asylum, or tried
to enter the fortress. The remains of several brigades
were piled up in the wood of Garenne, and exposed to an
incessant shell fire. But Li^bert's division stoutly defended
Cazal, and gave back, foot by foot, until they also were
under the ramparts. Towards four o'clock the converging
German columns, despite frantic onsets from bands of
French infantry, especially on the Givonne front, had
thrust these over the deep hollow way, and the victors
were only halted when they came within range of the
garrison guns.
Oeneral de WimjpfferCa CounterstroJce,
Throughout the battle General de Wimpffen cherished
the idea that it would be feasible to crush "the Ba-
varians " and retreat on Carignan. At one o'clock he sent
316 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XHT.
a despatcb to General Douaj, telling the General to cover
his retreat in that direction. Douaj received it an hour
afterwards, and he then replied that "with onlj three
brigades, without artillery, and almost without munitions,"
the utmost he could do would be to retreat in order from
the field. That was near the moment when Li^bert began
to fall back, fighting stiffly, from OazaL At a quarter past
one De Wimpffen wrote a letter to the Emperor saying
that ** rather than be made prisoner in Sedan," he would
force the line in his front. " Let your Majesty," he said,
** place himself in the midst of his troops ; they will hold
themselves bound in honour to fray out a passage." His
Majesty took no notice of this appeal, and De Wimpffen
waited in vain for a reply ; but he spent the time in an en-
deavour to dash in the barrier in his front, direct an attack on
the Givonne, which failed; and to organize an onset on Bahm,
which partly succeeded. He went into Sedan and brought
out troops, and gathered up all he could from the errant frag-
ments of a broken Army. With these he fell fiercely an^ un-
expectedly upon the Bavarians in Balan ; refused to suspend
the fight when ordered by the Emperor to open negotiations
with the enemy ; and by degrees became master of all the vil-
lage except one bouse. But he could not emerge and continue
his onslaught, for the hostile artillery began to play on the
village; reinforcements were brought up, arrangements
were made to frustrate the ulterior aim of the French and
recover the lost ground. Against a resolute advance the in-
fantry led by De WimpfEen could not stand, and possession
of the village was regained just as the white flag went up
over the nearest gate of Sedan. Suddenly the firing ceased
on both sides. Although respectfully described by the
Germans, General de Wimpffen's last charge is scoffed at
by Ducrot and Lebrun, whom he had enraged by declaring
both guilty of disobedience. Lebrun, who was an eye-
J
CHAP. Xni.] SEDAN. 317
witness as well as a gallant actor in the forlorn hope, says
that they had not gone a quarter of a mile before the
column broke and took refuge in the nearest houses.
Looking back, De Wimpffen is reported by his comrade to
have said, "I see we are not followed and that there is
nothing more to do. Order the troops to retreat on Sedan."
The battle had, at length, come to an end. The German
infantry, both near Cazal and Balan were within a short
distance of the fortifications ; in the centre they stood
south of the Warren Wood ; to the eastward long lines of
guns crowned the heights on both banks of the G-ivonne ;
on the south, the gate of Torcy was beset, and behind all
the foremost lines were ample reserves, horse as well as
foot, which had never fired a shot. The number of
batteries had increased during the afternoon, for the
Wiirtemberg artillery was called over the Mouse and set in
array at the bend of the river above Donchery. Even the
high-tempered, if imperious, De Wimpffen was obliged to
admit that through this dread circle, neither for him nor
any other, was there an outlet. The agony had been
prolonged, but enough had been done to satisfy the
"honour" of the most obstinate and punctilious of
generals. The wearied, wasted, famished, and imnerved
French troops were thankful for the impressive stillness
and imwonted rest which came abruptly with the declining
sun, even though it set the seal on a horrible disaster^
The Emperor and his Oenerah,
Had Napoleon III. retained that Imperial authority
which he had been supposed to possess, the slaughter
might have been stayed some hours before. For early in
the afternoon he became convinced that the Army could
not be extricated, and that the time had come when it
818 THE CAMPAIGN OF SBDAN. [CHAP. XIU.
would be well to treat. His experiences, as a superfluous
attendant on the battle-field, were dolorous. The first
object which met his gaze was the wounded MarshaL The
depressing incident may hare called up visions of Italian
triumphs ; and, reflecting on the painful contrast, he may
have remembered what he said after returning from the
sanguinary victory of Solferino — ^that no more would he
willingly lead great Armies to war ; for the sight of its
horrors had touched the chord of sympathy with human
suffering which had always readily vibrated in his heart.
During several hours he watched the tempest lower and
break in fury ; he saw and felt its effects, for two officers
were shot at his side ; wherever he looked the clouds of
encircling battle smoke rose in the clear simshine; and
when he rode back into Sedan the terrible shells were
bursting in the ditches, and even on the bridge which he
traversed to gain his quarters. As the day wore on his
gloomy meditations took a more definite shape ; he wished
to stop the conflict, and he seems to have thought first that
an armistice might be obtained, and then that the King of
Prussia, if personally besought, would grant the Army easy
terms; for the idea of a capitulation had grown up and
hardened in his mind.
At his instigation, no officer has come forward to daim
the honour, some one hoisted a white flag. As soon as he
*heard of it, Qeneral Faure, Marshal MacMahon's Chief of
the Staff, ascended the citadel and cut down a signal so
irritating to his feelings ; but no one told the Emperor that
his solitary, independent, and Imperial action, since he
joined the Army of Chalons as a fugitive, had been thus
irreverently contemned. " Why does this useless struggle
still go on ? ** he said to Qeneral Lebrun, who entered his
presence some time before three o'clock. '' Too much blood
has been shed. An hour ago I directed the white flag to
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 319
be hoisted in order to demand an armistice.*' The General
politely explained that other forms were necessary — ^the
Commander-in-Chief must sign a letter and send a proper
officer, a trumpeter, and a man bearing a white flag, to the
chief of the enemy. Lebrun drew out such a form, and
started forth. Faure, who had just pulled down the white
flag, would not look at it ; De Wimpffen, seeing Lebrun
ride up followed by a horseman who carried a rag on a
pole, shouted out, '' I will not have a capitulation ; drop
that flag ; I shall go on fighting ; and then ensued their
adventures about Balan, which have been described. When
liebrun had gone, Ducrot, and subsequently Douay, visited
the Emperor. Ducrot found the interior of the fortress in
a state which he qualifies as " indescribable." " The streets,
the squares, the gates were choked up with carts, carriages,
guns, the impedimenta and debris of a routed Army.
Bands of soldiers, without arms or knapsacks, streamed in
every moment, and hurried into the houses and churches.
At the gates many were trodden to death." Those who
preserved some remains of vigour exhaled their wrath in
curses, and shouted "We have been betrayed, sold by
traitors and cowards." The Emperor stiU wondered why
the action went on, and rejected Ducrot's suggestion of a
sortie at night as futile. He wished to stop the slaughter ;
but he could not prevail on Ducrot to sign any letter.
Douay at first appeared disposed to accept the burden, but
De FaiUy or Lebrun induced him to revoke his consent by
remarking that it entailed the duty of fixing his name to
a capitulation. General de Wimpffen sent in his resigna-
tion, which, as the Emperor could not induce one of the
other generals to take his place, was absolutely refused.
The shells were bursting in the garden of the Sub-Prefec-
ture, in the hospitals, the streets, and among the houses,
some of which were set on fire. Li these dire straits the
320 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
Emperor at length resolved that the white flag should be
again unfurled, and should, this time, remain aloft in the
sunshine. Meantime, as evident signs indicating a desire
to negotiate had appeared at various points, and as the
white flag surmounted the citadel, the King directed
Colonel Bronsart von Schellendorf and Captain von Win-
terfeld.to summon the place to capitulate. When Bron-
sart intimated to the Commandant of Torcy that he bore a
summons to the Commander-in-Chief, he was conducted
to the Sub-Prefecture, " where," says the official narrative,
"he found himself face to face with the Emperor Na-
poleon, whose presence in Sedan imtil that moment had
been unkown at the German head-quarters." The arrival
of the Prussian officer seems to have occurred just as the
Emperor finished writing a letter to the King destined to
become famous. But he answered Bronsart's request that
an officer fully empowered to treat should be sent to the
German head-quarters, by remarking that General de
WimpfEen commanded the Army. Thereupon, Colonel
Bronsart departed, bearing a weighty piece of intelligence
indeed, but no efEective reply; and soon afterwards General
Eeille, intrusted with the Imperial letter, rode out of the
gate of Torcy and ascended the hill whence the King had
witnessed the battle.
King William and his Warriora.
An eminence, selected by the Staff because it commanded
an extensive view, rises a little south of Frenois— the site
has been marked on the map with a small pyramid — ^and
upon this, about seven o'clock, just as the fog was lifting,
King William took his stand. When the mists vanished,
the sun poured his dazzling splendour over the landscape,
and the air was so lucid that everything could be seen dis-
CHAP. Xni.] SEDAN, 821
tdnctlj through a powerful field-glass. "The sun shone
out in full power/' says Prince Bibesco. " The sun was
exceedingly powerful," writes Dr. Bussell. " The day had
become so clear '' — ^he is writing of the same period as the
Prince — " that through a good glass the movements of in-
dividual men were plainly discernible." And, a little
earlier, he says, " on the hills, through wood and garden/'
he was looking towards the Givonne, ** and in the valleys,
bayonets glistened, and arms twinkled and flashed like
a streamlet in moonlight." And so it continued to the
end. "The hills of the battlefield," writes Jh. Moritz
Busch, " the gorge in its midst, the villages, the houses
and the towers of the fortress, the suburb of Torcy, the
ruined [railway] bridge to the left in the distance, shone
bright in the evening glow, and their details became clearer
every minute, as if one were looking through stronger and
stronger spectacles." Through such a rich and transparent
atmosphere the King gazed from his height upon the city
wherein Turenne was bom, in September, 1611, and on the
battle which has made the little town on the Meuse, which
Yauban fortified, still more memorable. A glimpse of the
group on the hill is fortunately afforded by Dr. Bussell,
whose keen eyes on a battlefield seem to overlook nothing.
** Of the King, who was dressed in his ordinary uniform,
tightly buttoned and strapped," it is noted that he " spoke
but little, pulled his moustache frequently, and addressed
a word to Von Moltke, Boon, or Podbielski," who looked
X frequently through a large telescope mounted on a tripod.
"Moltke," he goes on, and the touch is characteristic,
" when not looking through the glass or at the map, stood
:■ in a curious musing attitude, with his right hand to the
; side of his face, the elbow resting on the left hand crossed
i towards his hip." A picture of Von Moltke, which, taken
; with what another observer calls his " refined and wrinkled
322 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIH.
face," deserves to live in the memory. Count Bismarck,
we are told, "in his white cuirassier flat cap with the
yellow band and uniform, stood rather apart, smoking a
good deal, and chatting occasionally with a short, thick-set,
soldierly-looking man in the undress uniform of a United
States' Lieutenant-G^eneraL" It was Sheridan. And near
these were many less famous personages, but representa- y
tive of " all Q-ermany," as one writer puts it. On another
hill a little further west, whither Dr. Eussell transferred
himself, was a second and notable group, which he sketches.
" The Crown Prince with his arms folded, and his flat cap,
uniform frock, and jack boots ; Blumenthal so spruce and
trim ; half-a-dozen princes and many aides-de-camp " were
all sharply and well-defined on the sky-line. - Thus these
two groups, " from mom to dewy eve," looked down, on,
and into a scene which nature and man had combined to
make at once beautiful and sublime.
It was towards the King's hill that General Eeille turned
when he rode out of the Torcy gate. Walking his horse up
the steep, he dismounted, and taking off his cap, presented
a letter to his Majesty. King William, breaking the Ini-
. perial seal, read these phrases, which, if somewhat dramatic,
are striking in their brevity : — ^
Monsieur mon Frfere,
N'ayant pu mourir au milieu de mes troupes, il
ne me reste qu' k remettre mon epee entre les mains de
Votre Majesty.
Je suis de Votre Majesty,
le bon Frfere,
Napol:£on.
S6dan, le l^ Septembre, 1870.
^ <*Not having been able to die in the midst of my troops,
nothing remains for me but to place my sword in the hands of your
Majesty."
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN 823
Only one half hour earlier had Colonel Bronsart brought
the startling information that the Emperor was in Sedan !
The King conferred with his son, who had been hastily
summoned, and with others of his trusty servants, all
deeply moved by complex emotions at the grandeur of their
victory. What should be done ? The Emperor spoke for
himself only, and his surrender would not settle the great
issue. It was necessary to obtain something definite, and
the result of a short conference was that Count Hatzfeldt,
instructed by the Chancellor, retired to draft a reply,
"After some minutes he brought it," writes Dr. Busch,
" and the King wrote it out, sitting on one chair, while the
seat of a second was held up by Major von Alten, who
knelt on one knee and supported the chair on the other."
The King's letter, brief and business-like, began and
ended with the customary royal forms, and ran as follows:
"Eegretting the circumstances in which we meet, I
accept your Majesty's sword, and beg that you will be
good enough to name an officer furnished with full powers
to treat for the capitulation of the Army which has fought
so bravely under your orders. On my side I have design-
ated General von Moltke for that purpose."
Gtenera^ Beille returned to his master, and as he rode
down the hill the astounding purport of his visit flew from
lip to lip through' the exulting Army which now hoped
that, after this colossal success, the days of ceaseless march-
ing and fighting would soon end. As a contrast to this
natural outburst of joy and hope we may note the provi-
dent Moltke, who was always resolved to "mak siker."
His general order, issued at once, suspending hostilities
during the night, declared that they would begin again in
the morning should the negotiations produce no result.
In that case, he said, the signal for battle would be the re-
opening of fire by the batteries on the heights east of
824 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [OHAP. XIII.
Fr^noifl. The return of peace, so fenrenilj desired bj the
Armj, was still iaa oft in the distance when the tired
yictors biTouacked in quiet, and dreamed of home through
the short summer night.
How the OeneraU Bated each other.
While General Beille, who performed his part with so
much modesty and dignity, rode back oyer the Mouse, the
Emperor still awaited, in the Sub-Prefecture, the adyent
of General de Wimpffen, who was fretting and fuming at
the €k>lden Cross within the walls. According to his own
confession he had become couTinced that the refusal of his
sovereign to head a sally from Balan had deliyered over
the Army to the mercy of the Germans, and violent despair
had taken possession of his soul. For had not the Comte
de Palikao sent him to overbear Napoleon ILL and the set
who surrounded him, and had he not failed to bend the
monarch to his will ? Twice, he repeats, with pride, " I
obstinately refused to obey ** the Emperor's invitation to
treat with the enemy; and because Napoleon IIL had
authoritatively interfered with his command he sent in
that letter of resignation which the Emperor refused to
accept. At first he seemed inclined to resist as well as
resent the conduct of his master, who had presumed to
consult others and, by hoisting the white flag, to take, as
the General haughtily says, " a decision contraiy to my
will." Let the Emperor sign the capitulation. Such were
the first thoughts of a man whose temper was imperious,
but whose better nature was not insensible to reason. He
quelled his wrath and threw off his despair, moved, as he
says, by the feeling that in defending the interests of the
Army he would be rendering a last service to his brave
companions in arms/ and to his country. So he went from
CHAP. Xin.] SEDAN. 325
the Golden Cross to tlie Sub-Prefecture. Still angry, he
loudly asserted as soon as he entered the room that he had
been vanquished in battle because, addressing the Emperor,
** your Generals refused to obey me." Thereupon Ducrot
started up, exclaiming, " Do you mean me ? Your orders
were only too well obeyed, and your mad presumption has
brought on this frightful disaster." " If I am incapable,"
retorted De Wimpffen, " all the more reason why I should
not retain the command." " You took it this morning,"
shouted Ducrot, also a violent man, *' when you thought it
would bring honour and profit. You cannot lay it down
BOW. You alone must bear (endosser) the shame of the
capitulation." " Le General Ducrot ^tait trJs exalte," he
says in his narrative, and he calls on his brother officers
who were present to testify that he used these brave words,
which, in substance, appear in De Wimpffen's account;
but the latter adds that he threw back the accusation, say-
ing, " I took the command to evade a defeat which your
movement wotdd have precipitated ; " and that he requested
General Ducrot to leave the room, as he had not come to
confer with him! What the quiet and well-mannered
Emperor thought of his two fiery and blustering Generals
is nowhere stated. The calm language in the pamphlet
attributed to Napoleon IIL, which shows, nevertheless,
how deeply he was vexed by De Wimpffen's selfish wish to
shirk his responsibilities at such a moment, takes no note
of the quarrel, and simply tells us how '' the General under*
stoSJmat, having commanded during the battle, his duty
obliged him not to desert his post in circumstances so
critical." Thus, when General Beille returned with King
William's letter, he found De Wimpffen in a reasonable
frame of mind and ready to perform, with courage and
^dress, the hard task of obtaining the best terms he could
for the French Army from the placidly stem Yon Moltke,
826 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
in whose heart there were no soft places when business
had to be done.
The Oenerah Meet at Danckery.
Late on the evening of September 1st a momentous
session was held in Donchery, the little town which com-
mands a bridge over the Mease below Sedan. On one
side of a square table covered with red baize sat General
von Moltke, having on his right hand the Quartermaster-
General von Podbielski, according to one account, and Yon
Blumenthal according to another, and behind them several
officers, while Count von Nostitz stood near the hearth to
take notes. - Opposite to Von Moltke sat De Wimpffen
alone ; while in rear, *' almost in the shade," were General
Faure, Count Castelnau, and other Frenchmen , among
whom was a Cuirassier Captain d'Orcet, ^ho had observant
eyes and a retentive memory. Then there ensued a brief
silence, for Yon Moltke looked straight before him and
said nothing, while De Wimpffen, oppressed by the number
present, hesitated to engage in a debate ** with the two men
admitted to be the most capable of our age, each in his
kind." But he soon plucked up courage, and frankly
accepted the conditions of the combat. What terms, be
asked, would the King of Prussia grant to a valiant Army
which, could he have had his will, would have continued to
fight? "They are very simple," answered Yon Moltke.
" The entire Army, with arms and baggage, must surrender
as prisoners of war." " Yery hard," replied the French-
man. "We merit better treatment. Could you not be
satisfied with the fortress and the artillery, and allow the
Army to retire with arms, flags and baggage, on condition
of serving no more against Germany during the war?'*
No. "Moltke," said Bismarck recounting the interview.
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 327
" coldly persisted in his demand/' or as the attentive
D'Orcet puts it, "Von Moltke was pitiless." Then De
Wimpffen tried to soften his grim adversary by painting
his own position. He had just come from the depths of
the African desert ; he had an irreproachable military re-
putation ; he had taken command in the midst of a battle,
and found himself obliged to set his name to a disastrous
capitulation. " Can you not," he said, " sympathize with
an officer in such a plight, and soften, for me, the bitter-
ness of my situation by granting more honourable condi-
tions ? " He painted in moving terms his own sad case,
and described what he might have done ; but seeing that
his personal pleadings were unheeded, he took a tone of
defiance, less likely to prevail. "K you will not give
better terms," he went on, " I shall appeal to the honour of
the Army, and break out, or, at least, defend Sedan."
Then the Grerman General struck in with emphasis, "I
regret that I cannot do what you ask," he said ; " but as
to making a sortie, that is just as impossible as the defence
of Sedan. You have some excellent troops, but the greater
part of your infantry is demoralized. To-day,, during the
battle, we captured more than twenty thousand unwounded
prisoners. You have only eighty thousand men left. My
troops and guns around the town would smash yours be-
fore they could make a movement ; and as to defending
Sedan, you have not provisions for eight-and-forty hours,
nor ammunition which would suffice for that period."
Then, says De Wimpffen, he entered into details respecting
our situation, which, " unfortunately, were too true," and
he offered to permit an officer to verify his statements, an
offer which the Frenchman did not then accept.
Beaten off the military ground, De Wimpffen sought re-
fuge in politics. " It is your interest, from a political stand-
point, to grant us honourable conditions," he said. " France
328 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIIT.
is generous and chiyalric, responsive to generosity, and grate-
ful for consideration. A peaoe, based on conditions which
would flatter the amour-propre of the Army, and diminiA
the bitterness of defeat, would be durable ; whereas rigorous
measures would awaken bad passions, and, perhaps, bring
on an endless war between France and Prussia." The new
ground broken called up Bismarck, ** because the matter
seemed to belong to my province," he observed when tell-
ing the story ; and he was very outspoken as usual. " I
said to him that we might build on the gratitude of a
prince, but certainly not on the gratitude of a people —
least of all on the gratitude of the French. That in France
neither institutions nor circumstances were enduring ; that
governments and dynasties were constantly changing, and
the one need not carry out what the other had bound itself
to do. That if the Emperor had been firm on his throne,
his gratitude for our granting good conditions might have
been counted upon ; but that as things stood it would be
folly if we did not make full use of our success. That
the French were a nation full of envy and jealousy, that
they had been much mortified by our success at Eoniggratz,
and could not forgive it, though it in nowise damaged them.
How, then, should any magnanimity on our side move
them not to bear us a grudge for Sedan. This Wimp^en
would not admit. " France," he said, " had much changed
latterly ; it had learned under the Empire to think more
of the interests of peace than of the glory of war. France
was ready to proclaim the fraternity of nations ; and more
of the same kind." Captain d'Orcet reports that, in
addition, Bismarck denied that France had changed, and
that to curb her mania for glory, to punish her pride, her
aggressive and ambitious character, it was imperative that
there should be a glacis between France and Germany.
"We must have territory, fortresses, and frontiers which
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 329
will shelter us for ever from an attack on her part."
Further remonstrances from De Wimpffen only drew down
fresh showers of rough speech very trying to bear, and
when Bismarck said ** We cannot change our conditions,"
De Wimpffen exclaimed, ** Very well ; it is equally impos-
sible for me to sign such a capitulation, and we shall renew
the battle."
Here Count Castelnau interposed meekly to say, on
behalf of the Emperor, that he had surrendered, personally,
in the hope that his self-sacrifice would induce the King to
grant the Army honourable terms. '' Is that all ? " Bis-
marck inquired. ** Yes," said the Frenchman. " But what
is the sword surrendered," asked the Chancellor ; " is it his
own sword, or the sword of France ? " " It is only the
sword of the Emperor," was Casteluau's reply. " Well,
there is no use talking about other conditions," said Yon
Moltke, sharply, while a look of contentment and gratifica-
tion passed over his face, according to Bismarck; one
*' almost joyful," writes the keen Captain d'Orcet. " After
the last words of Yon Moltke," he continues, " De Wimpffen
exclaimed, * We shall renew the battle.' * The truce,' re.
torted the German General, ' expires to-morrow morning at
four o'clock. At four, precisely, I shall open fire.' We
were all standing. After Yon Moltke's words no one spoke
a syllable. The silence was icy." But then Bismarck in-
tervened to sooth excited feelings, and called on his soldier
comrade to show, once more, how impossible resistance had
become. The group sat down again at the red baize-
covered table, and Yon Moltke began his demonstration
afresh. " Ah," said De Wimpffen, " your positions are not
so strong as you would have us believe them to be." " You
do not know the topography of the coimtry about Sedan,"
was Yon Moltke's true and crushing answer. " Here is a
bizarre detail which illustrates the presumptuous and in-
580 THE CAMPAIGN OP SEDAN. [CHAP. XHI.
consequent character of your people," he went on, now
thoroughly aroused. " When the war began you supplied
your officers with maps of G-ermany at a time when they
could not study the geography of their own country for
want of French maps. I tell you that our positions are
not only very strong-, they are inexpugnable." It was then
that De Wimpffen, unable to reply, wished to accept the
offer made, but not accepted at an earlier period, and to
send an officer to verify these assertions. " You will send
nobody," exclaimed the iron General. '' It is useless, and
you can believe my word. Besides, you have not long to
reflect. It is now midnight ; the truce ends at four o'clock,
and I will grant no delay." Driven to his last ditch, De
Wimpffen pleaded that he must consult his fellow-Generals,
and he could not obtain their opinions by four o'clock. Once
more the diplomatic peacemaker intervened, and Von Moltke
agreed to fix the final limit at nine. '' He gave way at last,"
says Bismarck, *' when I showed him that it could do no
harm." The conference so dramatic broke up, and each
one went his way ; but, says the German official narrative,
" as it was not doubtful that the hostile Army, completely
beaten and nearly surrounded, would be obliged to submit
to the clauses already indicated, the Great Head-quarter
StafE was occupied, that very night, in drawing up the text
of the capitulation " a significant and practical comment,
showing what stuff there was behind the severe language
which, at the midnight meeting, fell from the Chief of that
able tuid sleepless body of chosen men.
1h
Napoleon III. Surrenders,
General de Wimpffen went straight from the military-
conference to the wearied Emperor who had gone to bed.
But he received his visitor, who told him that the proposed
CHAP. Xin.] SEDAN. 881
conditions were hard, and that the sole chance of mitiga-
tion lay in the efforts of His Majesty. " General," said
the Emperor, ** I shall start at five o'clock for the German
head-qnarters, and I shall see whether the King will be
inore favourable ; " for he seems to have become possessed
of an idea that King William would personally treat with
him. The Emperor kept his word. Believing that he
would be. permitted to return to Sedan, he drove forth
without bidding farewell to any of his troops ; but, as the
drawbridge of Torcy was lowered and he passed over, the
Zouaves on duty shouted " Vive TEmpereur ! " This cry
was " the last adieu which fell on his ears " as we read in
the narrative given to the world on his behalf. He drove
in a droshki towards Donchery, preceded by General Eeille
who, before six o'clock, awoke Count Bismarck from his
slumbers, and warned him that the Emperor desired to
speak with him. ** I went with him directly," said Bis-
marck, in a conversation reported by Busch ; " and got on
my horse, all dusty and dirty as I was, in an old cap and
my great waterproof boots, to ride to Sedan where I sup-
posed him to be." But he met him on the high road near
Fr^nois, "sitting in a two-horse carriage." Beside him
was the Prince de la Moskowa, and on horseback Castlenau
and Beille. " I gave the military salute," says Bismarck.
■** He took his cap off and the of&cers did the same ; where-
upon I took off mine, although it was contrary to rule. He
said, * Couvrez-vous, done' I behaved to him just as if in
St. Cloud, and asked his commands." Naturally, he
waited to see the King, but that could not be allowed.
Then Bismarck placed his quarters in Donchery at the
Emperor's disposal, but he, thinking, as we know, that he
,would return to the Sub-Prefecture, declined the courtesy,
and preferred to rest in a house by the wayside. The
cott-age of a Belgian weaver unexpectedly became famous ;
332 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XHI.
p one-storied house, painted yellow, with white shutters and
Venetian blinds. He and the Chancellor entered the house,
and went up to the first floor where there was "a little
room with one window. It was the best in the house, but
had only one deal table and two rush-bottomed chairs/*
In that lowly abode they talked together of many things
for three-quarters of an hour, among others about the
origin of the war which, it seems, neither desired, the
Emperor asserting, Bismarck reports that ** he had been
driven into it by the pressure of public opinion," a very
inadequate representation of the curious incidents which
preceded the fatal decision. But when the Emperor began
to ask for more favourable terms, he was told that, on a
military question, Yon Moltke alone could speak. On the
other hand Bismarck's request to know who now had
authority to make peace was met by a reference to " the
Government in Paris;" so that no progress was made.
Then ** we must stand to our demands with regard to the
Army of Sedan," said Bismarck. G(eneral von Moltke was
summoned, and ** Napoleon III. demanded that nothing
should be decided before he had seen the King, for he
hoped to obtained from His Majesty some favourable con*
cessions for the Army." The German of&cial narrative of
the war states that the Emperor expressed a wish that the
Army might be permitted to enter Belgium, but that, of
course, the Chief of the Staff could not accept the proposal.
General von Moltke forthwith set out for Yendresse where
the King was, to report progress. He met His Majesty on
the road, and there " the King fully approved the proposed
conditions of capitulation, and declared that he would not
see the Emperor until the terms prescribed had been ac-
cepted ; '' a decision which gratified the Chancellor as well
as the Chief of the Staff. ** I did not wish them to come
together," observed the Count, ** until we had settled the
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 333
matter of the capitulation ; " sparing the feelings of both
and leaving the business to the hard military men.
The Emperor lingered about in the garden of the weaver's
cottage ; he seems to have desired fresh air after his un-
pleasant talk with the Chancellor. Dr. Moritz Busch, who
had hurried to the spot, has left a characteristic description
of the Emperor. He saw there " a little thick-set man/'
wearing jauntily a red cap with a gold border, a black
palet6t lined with red, red trousers, and white kid gloves,
" The look in his light grey eyes was somewhat soft and
(dreamy, like that of people who have lived hard. His
whole appearance,*' says the irreverent Busch, " was a little
unsoldierlike. The man looked too soft, I might say too
shabby, for the uniform he wore," phrases which suggest a
lack of sympathy with adversity, and severe physical as
well as mental sufTering. But imagination can realize a
picture of the fallen potentate, whose dynasty, crashing
down, drew so much with it, as he was seen by the cynical
Gkrman, talking to his officers, or to the burly Chancellor,
or walking alone up and down a potato field in flower,
with his white-gloved hands behind his back, smoking a
cigarette ; ** betrayed by fortune " or fate, as he believed,
but pursued, as others might say, by the natural conse-
quences of his marvellous adventures, and of a strange
neglect of the one source of strength on which he relied,
the Army. He had failed in the business upon the conduct
of which he prided himself ; he was a bankrupt Emperor.
. The French OeneraU Svhmit
While one scene in the stupendous drama was performed
at the weaver's cottage, another was acted or endured in
Sedan, where De Wimpffen had summoned the generals to
consider the dreadful terms of capitulation. He has given
884 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. XIII.
his own account of the incident ; but the fullest report is
supplied by Lebrun. There were present at this council of
war more than thirty generals. With tearful eyes and a
Toice broken by sobs, the unhappy and most ill-starred De
Wimpffen described his interriew and conflict with Yon
Moltke and Bismarck, and its dire result — the Army to sur«
render as prisoners of war, the officers alone to retain their
arms, and by way of mitigating the rigour of these con-
ditions, full i)ermission to return home would be given to
any officer, provided he would engage in writing and on
honour not to serve again during the war. The generals,
save one or two, and these finally acquiesced, felt that the
conditions could not be refused ; but they were indignant
at the clause suggesting that the 6fficers might escape the
captivity which would befall their soldiers, provided they
would engage to become mere spectators of the invasion of
their country. In the midst of these mournful deliberations
Captain von Zingler, a messenger from Yon Moltke, entered,
and the scene became still more exciting. "I am in*
structed," he said, " to remind you how urgent it is that
you should come to a decision. At ten o'clock, precisely, if
you have not come to a resolution, the German batteries
will fire on Sedan. It is now nine, and I shall have barely
time to carry your answer to head-quarters." To this sharp
summons De Wimpffen answered that he could not decide
until he knew the result of the interview between the
Emperor and the King." " That interview," said the stem
Captain, " will not in any way affect the military operations,
which can only be determined by the generals who have full
power to resume or stop the strife." It was, indeed, as
Lebrun remarked, useless to argue with a Captain, charged
to state a fact ; and at the General's suggestion De Wimpffen
agreed to accompany Captain von Zingler to the German
head-quarters. ^
CHAP. XIII.] SEDAN. 335
These were, for the occasion, the Chateau de Bellevue,
where the Emperor himself had been induced to take up
Lis abode, and about eleven o'clock, in a room under the
Imperial chamber, De Wimpffen put his name at the foot of
the document drawn up, during the night, by the German
StafE. Then he sought out the Emperor, and, greatly
moved, told him that " all was finished." His Majesty, he
writes, "with tears in his eyes, approached me, pressed my
hand, and embraced me ;'* and "my sad and painful duty
having been accomplished, I remounted my horse and rode
back to Sedan, ' la mort dans Tame.' "
So soon as the convention was signed, the King arrived,
accompanied by the Crown Prince. Three years before, as
the Emperor reminds us in the writing attributed to him,
the King had been his guest in Paris, where all the sover-
eigns of Europe had come to behold the marvels of the
famous Exhibition. " Now," so runs the lamentation,
** betrayed by fortune, Napoleon III. had lost all, and had
placed in the hands of his conqueror the sole thing left
him — ^his liberty." And he goes on to say, in general
terms, that the King deeply sympathized with his mis-
fortunes, but nevertheless could not grant better conditions
to the Army. " He told the Emperor that the castle of
Wilhelmshohe had been selected as his residence; the Crown
Prince then entered and cordially shook hands with
Napoleon ; and at the end of a quarter of an hour the King
withdrew. The Emperor was permitted to send a telegram
in cipher to the Empress, to tell her what had happened,
and urge her to negotiate a peace." Such is the bald
record of this impressive event. The telegram, which
reached the Empress at four o'clock on the afternoon of the
3rd, was in these words: "The Army is defeated and
captive ; I myself am a prisoner."
For one day more the fallen sovereign rested at Bellevue
336 THE CAMPAM09 OF 8EDAK. [CHAP. Xm.
to meditate an the caprices of fortune or tlie decrees of
fate« Bot that daj, at the head of a splendid compaDj <^
princes and generaUi, King William, crossing the bridge of
Doncherj, rode thronghoot the whole vast extent of the
Oerman lines, to greet his hardj warriors and be greeted
by them on the very scene of their victories. And well
thej desenred regal gratitade, for together with their com-
rades who surrounded Metz, by dint of long swift maurches
and steadfast valour, they had overcome two great Armies
in thirty days.
During the battle of Sedan, the Germans lost in killed
and wounded 8,924 officers and men. On the other hand,
the French lost 8,000 killed, 14,000 wounded, and 21,000
captured in the battle. The number of prisoners by
capitulation was 83,000, while 8,000 were disarmed in
liolgium, and a few hundreds, more or less, made their way
by devious routes near and over the frontier, to M^zieres,
Bocroi, and other places in France. In addition, were taken
one eagle and two flags, 419 field guns and mitrailleuses,
189 garrison guns, many wagons, muskets, and horses.
On the day after the surrender, the French soldiers, having
stacked their arms in Sedan, marched into the peninsula
formed by the deep loop of the Meuse — "le Camp de
Misire*' as thev called it — and were sent thence in sue-
ot^ssive batches, numbered by thousands, to Germany. Such
was the astonishing end of the Army of Chalons, which
had been impelled to its woful doom by the Comte de
Palikao and the Paris politicians. IHrected by GeneraL
Vinoy» who was an able soldier, the troops brought to
MtSai^res, escaped by rapid and clever marches from the
German cavalry and the 6th Corps, and formed the
nucleus of the improvised Army whidi afterwards defended
the capital*
CHAP. XIIT.] SEDAN. 337
The End.
On the 3rd of September the Emperor Napoleon III.
departed from Bellevue on his journey to the Castle of
Wilhelmshohe, near Cassel. The morning was wet and
gloomy, and a thunderstorm was gathering among the
hills of the Ardennes. The Imperial baggage-train had
been permitted to leave Sedan, and was drawn up on the
road ready to start. Columns of prisoners also were
moving out of the fortress and marching towards the
peninsula formed by the Mouse. It was a lugubrious
scene, and the superstitious might remark that as the sun
shone resplendently on the Q-erman victory, so his light
was obscured when the captive Emperor drove through the
muddy streets of Donchery and thence to the northward,
wrapped in the sombre mist and thickly falling rain. And
as he journeyed, disconsolately, in the forenoon, upon the
road to Bouillon, orders went forth from the German head-
quarters, where time was never lost, directing the conquer-
ing generals to leave the 11th and one Bavarian Corps
on guard over Sedan and the thousands of unhappy
prisoners, and resume, with all the rest, that march on the
capital of France which had been so abruptly interrupted
only eight days before. So the victors and the vanquished
went their different ways.
The Emperor travelled without haste, and on the evening
of the 4th he slept at Verviers. The next morning he
learned, in common with all Europe, indeed all the civilized
world, that the fires which seethe under the bright surface
of society in Paris had once more burst through the thin
crust of use and wont, and that the dynasty of the
Bonapartes had been utterly overthrown at a blow to make
way for the Eepublic. Like iutelligence reached the King
of Prussia, also, at his head-quarters, which, on the 5th,
z
888 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN. [CHAP. Xin.
were already in Beims. The contrast is painful. The
King saw his hopes of an early peace destroyed ; hut his
was a solidly planted throne and he was the leader of
irresistible armies. The Emperor knew that his fond
dream of founding an Imperial House had been dispelled
in an hour by a blast of national wrath; and, being a
kindly man, his agony was the keener because, as he
pathetically says, "he was separated from his son, and
knew not what fate had befallen the Empress." Backed
by such sad reflections, at the very time when his wife was
escaping to England, Louis Napoleon Bonaparte went, by
railway, from Verviers to Wilhelmshohe. There, during a
luxurious captivity of six months, he had ample leisure to
meditate on the causes which led to the catastrophe of
Sedan and the surrender of Metz ; and to ascertain, if he
could, why, after a second trial, ending in the third entry
of hostile troops into Paris, the French nation had lost its
belief in the saving qualities of a family bearing a name
which, if associated with undying "glory," has also become
indissolubly linked with bitter memories of lost provinces
and giganiic military disasters*
APPENDICES.
THE GERMAN FIELD AEMIES.
Commandeb-in-Chiev, King William of Pbttsbia;
Cliief of the StafE, General Baron you Moltke; Quarter-
master, General Podbielski; Inspector-General of Artillery,
General von Hindersin.
Present with the Great Head Quarters were the Minister
of War, General von Eoon; and the Federal Chancellor
and Minister President, General Connt von Bismarck-
Schonhausen*
FiBST Abmy.
Commandeb-in-Chief, General von Steinmetz ; Chief of
the Staff, Gen. von Sperling ; Chief Quartermaster, CoL
Count von Wartensleben.
First Corps}
Commandeb-in-Chief, General Baron von Manteuffel;
Chief of the StafF, Lieut.-Col. von der Burg. 1st Div.,
Lieut.-Gen. von Bentheim; 1st Brig., Major-Gen. von
Guyl ; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Falkenstein. 2nd
^ This Corpfi did not arrive until August 5
840 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Div., Major-Gkn. von Pritzelwitz ; 3rd Brig., Major-Gen.
Yon Memertj; 4th Brig., Major-Gbn. von Zglintski;
Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Bergemaan.
Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8
squadrons, 1,200 horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 com-
panies of Pioneers.
Seventh Corps,
Commandbb-in-Chief, General von Zastrow; Chief of
the Staff, Col. yon Unger. 13th Div., lieut.-Gen. Ton
Glumer ; 25th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron yon Osten-Sacken ;
26th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron yon Golz. 14th Div., Lieut.-»
General yon Kameke; 27th Brig., Major-Gen. yon Fran9oi8;
28th Brig., Major-Gen. yon Wojna; Commander of
Artillery, Major-Gen. yon Zimmermann.
Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8
squadrons, 1,200 horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3
companies of Pioneers.
Eighth Corps.
Commandbb-ik-Chief, General yon Goeben; Chief of
the Staff, Col. yon Witzendorff. 15th Diy., lieut.-G^n.
yon Weltzien ; 29th Brig., Major-G«n. yon Wedell ; 30th
Brig., Major-Gen. yon Strubberg. 16th Diy., Lieut.-
Gen. Bamekow ; 31st, Major-Gen. Count Neidhard yon
Gneisenau ; 32nd, CoL yon Eex ; Commander of Artillery,
Colonel yon Kameke.
Strength of Corps : 25 battalions, 25,000 men ; 8
squadrons, 1,200 horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; and 3
companies of Pioneers.
First Cavalry Division,
CoteM ANDES, Lieut. -General yon Hartmann. Briga!diers :
1st Brig., Major-Gen. yon Luderitz ; 2nd Brig., Major-
APPENDICES. 841
Gen. Ton Baumgarth (each was composed of one Onirassier
and two Uhlan regiments, and accompanied by a Horse
Artillery Battery).
' Strength : 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses, and 6 guns.
Third Cavalry Division,
CoMMANDBB, Lieut.-Gfen. Count von der Groben. Briga-
diers : 6th Brig., Major-Gen. von Mirus (one Cuirassier
and one Uhlan regiment) ; 7th Brig., Major-Gen. Count
yon Dohna (two Uhlan regiments).
Strength : 16 squadrons, 2,400 horses, 1 Horse Artillery
battery, 6 guns.
Strength of First Army,
Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns.
Ist Corps 25 8 14 84
7th Corps ..... 25 8 15 90
8th Corps 25 8 14 84
Ist Cav. Div. .... 24 1 6
3rd Cav. Div. .... 16 1 6
Total .... 75 64 45 270
The Second Abmy.
Commander-in-Chief, H.RH. Prince Frederick Charles
of Prussia ; Chief of Staff, Major-Qen. von Stiehle ; Chief
Quartermaster, Colonel von Hertzberg; Commander of
Artillery, Lieut. -G^en. von Colomier.
The Chmrd Corps,
Commandeb-in-Chief, Prince Augustus of Wurtem-
berg; Chief of the Staff, Major-Gen. yon Dannenberg.
842 THE CAMFA.ION OF SEDAN*
liit Diy., Major-Qen. yon Pape ; Ist Brig., Major-Gten. von
Eessel ; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Modem. 2nd
Div., Lieat.-Gkn. von Budritzki ; 3rd Brig., Colonel Knappe
vonKnappstadt; 4th Brig., Major-Gten. von Berger; Com-
mander of Artillery, Major-Gen. Kraft, Prince of Hohen-
lohe Ingelfingen.
Cavalbt Division: — Commander, Major-G«n. Count
von der Gk)lz ; let Brig., Major-Gen. Count von Branden-
burg I. (Life Guards and Cuirassiers) ; 2nd Brig., Lieut.*
Gen, Prince Albert of Prussia (two Uhlan regiments);
8rd Brig., Lieut.-Gen. Count von Brandenburg 11. (two
Dragoon regiments).
Strength of Corps: 29 battalions, 29,000 men; 32
squadrons, 4,800 horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; and 3
companies of Pioneers.
Second Corps}
Commandbb-in-Chibf, General von . Franseckj ; Chief
of the Staff, Colonel von Wichmann; Commander of
Artillery, Major-G«n. von Kleist. 8rd Div., Major-G^n.
von Hartmann; 5th Brig., Major-Gen. von Koblinski; 6th
Brig., Colonel von der Decken. 4th Div., Lieut,-Gen.
Hann von Weihern; 7th Brig., Major-Gen. du Trossel;
8th Brig., Major-Gten. von Eettler.
Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8
squadrons, 1,200 horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3
companies of Artillery.
Third Corps,
Commander-in-Chief, Lieut.-Gen. von Alvensleben II. ;
Chief of the Staff, Colonel von Voigts-Rhetz ; Commander
^ Came up to the front at the battle of Graveiotte. ^
APPENDICES. 843
of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Biilow. 6th Div., Lieut. -
Gen. von Stiilpnagel ; 9tli Brig., Major-Gen. von Doring ;
lOth Brig., Major-Gen. von Schwerin. 6th Div., Lieut.-
Gen. Baron von Buddenbrock ; 11th Brig., Major-Gen. von
Bothmaler ; 12th Brig., Colonel von Bismarck.
Strength of Corps : 25 battalions, 25,000 men ; 8
squadrons, 1,200 horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; and 3
companies of Pioneers.
Fowrth Corps,
Commandeb-in-Chief, General von Alvensleben I. ;
Chief of the Staff, Colonel von Thile; Commander of
Artillery, Major-Gen. von Scherbening. 7th Div., Lieut. -
G^n. von Schwarzhoff; 13th Brig., Major-G^n. von
Worries; 14th Brig., Major-Gten. von Zychlinski. 8th
Div., Lieut.-Gen. von Scholer; 15th Brig., Major-Gkn.
von Kessler ; 16th Brig., Colonel von Scheffler.
Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8
squadrons, 1,200 horses ; 14 batteries, 84 guns ; and 3
companies of Pioneers.
Ninth Corps,
Commandeb-in-Chief, General von Manstein ; Chief of
the Staff, Major Bronsart von Schellendorf ; Commander
of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Puttkammer. 18th Div.,
Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Wrangel ; 35th Brig., Major-Gen.
von Blumenthal ; 36th Brig., Major-Gen. von Below. The
Hessian Division (25th) : Commander, Lieut.-Gen. H.B.H,
Prince Louis of Hesse;. 49th Brig., Major-Gen. von
Wittich ; 50th Brig., Colonel von Lyncker.
Strength of Corps: 23 battaHons, 23,000 men; 12
squadrons, 1,800 horses; 15 batteries, 90 guns; 3 com-
panies of Pioneers,
844 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Tenth Corps.
Oommandeb-in-Chief, (General von Yoigts-Bhetz ; Chief
of the Staff, Iiieut.-Ool. von Capriyi; Commander of
Artillery, Colonel Baron von der Becke. 19th Div., Lieut.-
Gen. von Schwarzkoppen ; 37th Brig., Colonel von Leh-
mann; 38th Brig., Major-Gen. von Wedell. 20th Div.,
Major-Gen. Kraatz Koschlau ; 39th Brig., Major-G^en. von
Woyna ; 40th Brig., Major-Gen. von Diringshofen.
Strength of Corps: 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 8
squadrons, 1,200 horses; 14 batteries, 84 guns; 3 com-
panies of Pioneers.
Twelfth (Boydl Saxon) Corps.
Commakdbb-in-Chibf, General H.B.H. the Crown
Prince of Saxony ; Chief of the Staff, Colonel von Zezsch-
witz ; Commander of Artillery, Major-Gen. Kohler, 1st
Div., Prince George of Saxony ; 1st Brig., Major-Q^n. von
Craushaar; 2nd Brig., Colonel von Montb^. 2nd Div.,
Major-G^n. Nehrhoff von Holderberg ; 3rd Brig., Major-
Gen, von Leonhardi; 4th Brig., Colonel von Schulz.
[N.B. The Infantry Divisions were also numbered 23 and
24^ and the brigades 45, 46, 47, and 48, to fit them into
the general system.]
Strength of Corps: 29 battalions, 29,000 men; 24
squadrons, 3,600 horses; 16 batteries, 96 guns; 3 com-
panies of Pioneers. [The Cavalry formed the 12th Division,
commanded by the Count of Lippe; Brigadiers, Major-
Gen. Krug von Nidda and Major-Gen. Seufft von Pilsach.]
The Fifth Cavalry Division.
Commander, Lieut.-Gen. Baron von Eheinbaben ; 11th
Brig., Major-G«n. von Barby (a Cuirassier, a Uhlan, and a
APPENDICES. 345
Di-agoon regiment) ; 12th Brig., Major-Gen. von Bredow
(similarly formed) ; 13tli Brig., Major-Gen. von Eedern
(three Hussar regiments).
Strength of Division : 36 squadrons, 5,400 horses ; 2
batteries, 12 guns, Horse Artillery.
The Sixth Cavalry Division.
OoMMANDEB, Duke William of Mecklenburg-Schwerin ;
14th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von Diepenbroick-Gruter (a
Cuirassier and two Uhlan regiments) ; 15th Brig., Major-
Gen, von Bauch (two Hussar regiments).
Strength of Division : 20 squadrons, 3,000 horses ; and
1 Horse Artillery battery, 6 guns.
Strength of Second Army,
Battalions. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns.
Guard 29 32 15 90
2nd Corps 25 8 14 84
3rd Corps 25 8 14 84
4th Corps 25 8 14 84
9tli Corps 23 12 15 90
10th Corps 25 8 14 84
12th Corps 29 24 16 96
5th Cav. Div 36 2 12
6th Cav. Div 20 1 6
Total • ... 181 156 105 630
The Thied Abmy.
Commandbe-in-Chief, H.E.H. the Crown Prince of
Prussia ; Chief of the Staff, Lieut.-Gen. von Blumenthal ;
Chief Quartermaster, Colonel von Gottberg ; Commander
of Artillery, Lieut.-Gen. Herkt.
846 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Fifth Carps.
Com makdeb-ik-Ghief, Lieut.-G<en. von Kirchbach ; Chief
of the Staff, Colonel von der Esch; Commander of the
Artillery, Colonel €kbede. 9th Div., Major-Gen. von
Sandrart; 17th Brig., Colonel von Bothmer; 18th Brig.,
Major-Gten. von Yoigts-Bhetz. 10th Div., Lieut.-Gten. von
Schmidt; 19th Brig., Colonel von Henning auf Schonhoff;
20th Brig., Major-Gten. Walther von Montbarj.
Strength of Corps ; 25 battalions, 25,000 men ; 8 squad-
rons, 1,200 horses ; 14 batteries, 84 guns ; 3 companies of
Pioneers.
8ixth Corps.^
Commakdbb-in-Chief, General von Tumpling ; Chief of
the Staff, Colonel von Salviati ; Commander of Artillery,
Colonel von Bamm. 11th Div., Lieut.-G«n. von Gordon ;
21st Brig., Major-Gen. von Malachowski; 22nd Brig.,
Major-G^n. von Eckartsberg. 12th Div., Lieut.-Glen. von
Hoffmann; 2drd Brig., Major-GeD. Gundel ; 24th Brig.,
Major-G«n. von Fabeck.
Strength of Corps : 25 battalions, 25,000 men ; 8 squad-
rons, 1,200 horses, 14 batteries, 84 guns ; 3 companies of
Pioneers.
Eleventh Corps,
Commandeb-in-Chief, Lieut.-G«n. von Bose ; Chief of
the Staff, Major-Gon. Stein von Kaminski ; Commander of
Artillery, Major-Gen. Hausmann. 21st Div., Lieut-G^n.
von Scbachtmeyer ; 41st Brig., Colonel von Koblinski;
42nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Thile. 22nd Div., Lieut.-Gen.
von Gkrsdorff; 43rd Brig., Colonel von Konski; 44th
Brig., Major.G^en. von Schkopp.
^ This Corps did not cross the frontier until the' 6th of August.
APPENDICES. 347
Strength of Corps : 25 battalions, 25,000 men ; 8 squad-*
rons, 1,200 horses ; 14 batteries, 84 guns ; 3 companies of
Fi<kieers.'
First Bavarian Corps,
Commandbb-in-Chief, General von der Tann-Eathsam-
hausen ; Chief of the Staff, Lieut.-Col. von Heinleth ; Com-
mander of Artillery, Major-Gen. von Malais^. 1st Div.,
Lieut.-Gten von Stephan ; 1st Brig., Major-Gen. Dietl ; 2nd
Brig., Major-Gen. von Orff. 2nd Div., Major-Gen.
Schumaker ; 3rd Brig., Colonel Hejle ; 4th Brig., Major*
Gen. Baron von der Tann.
Strength of Corps : 25 battalions, 25,000 men ; 20 squad-
rons, 3,000 horses (Cuirassiers and Light Horse) ; 16
batteries, 96 guns ; 3 companies of Pioneers.
Second Bavarian, Corps.
- Comkandes-in-Chief, General Bitter von Hartmann ;
Chief of the Staff, Colonel Baron von Horn ; Commander
of Artillery, Major-G^n. Lutz. 3rd Div., Lieut.-G«n. von
Walther ; 5th Brig., Major-Gen. von Schleich ; 6th Brig.,
Colonel Berries von Wissel. 4th Div., Lieut.-Gkn. Count
von Bothmer; 7tb Brig., Major-G«n. von Thiereck; 8th
Brig., Major-Gen. Maillinger,
. Strength of Corps : 25 battalions, 25,000 men; 20 squad-
rons, 3,000 horses (Cuirassier, Uhlan, Light Horse) ; 16
batteries, 96 guns ; 3 companies of Pioneers.
Ths Wurtemberg Division:
Commandeb-ik-Chief, Lieut. -G^n. von Obemitz ; Chief
of the Staff, Colonel von Bock ; Commander of Artillery,
Colonel von Sick $ 1st Brig., Major-Gen. von Beitstenstein ;
348 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
2nd Brig., Major-Gen. von Starkloff; 3rd Brig., Major-
Gen. Baron von Hugel.
Strength of Division : 15 battalions, 15,000 men ; 10
squadrons, 1,500 horses ; 9 batteries, 54 guns ; 2 companies
of Pioneers.
Baden Division.
Commandeb-in-Chief, lieut.-Gen. von Beyer ; Chief of
the Staff, Lieut. -Col. von Leszczynski; Commander of
Artillery, Colonel von Freydorf ; 1st Brig., Lieut.-Gen. du
Jarrhs, Baron von la Boche ; 2nd Brig., Major-Gen. Keller.
Strength of Division: 13 battalions, 13,000 men; 12
squadrons, 1,800 horses ; 9 batteries, 54 guns ; 1 Pioneer
company.
Second OavaJry Division. *
CoMMANDBB, Licut.-G^n. Count Stolberg-Wemigerode ;
3rd Brig., Major-Gfen. von Colomb (two regiments.
Cuirassier and Uhlan) ; 4th Brig., Major-Gen. Baron von
Bamekow (two regiments of Hussars) ; 6th Brig., Major-
Oten. von Baumbach (two regiments of Hussars).
. Strength : 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses ; 2 Horse Artillery
batteries, 12 guns.
Fourth Cavalry Division,
CoMMANDEB, General H.B.H. Prince Albrecht of Prussia,
senior; 8th Brig., Major-Gen. von Hontheim (two regiments.
Cuirassier and Uhlan); 9th Brig., Major-Gen. von Bem-
hardi (two Uhlan regiments); 10th Brig., Major-GJen. von
Krosigk (two regiments, Hussar and Dragoon).
Strength : 24 squadrons, 3,600 horses ; 2 Horse Artillery
batteries, 12 guns.
^ This Division came up after the 4th of August.
APPENDICES.
349
Strength of Third Army.
5th Corps • •
6th Corps . •
11th Corps . •
Ist Bavarian •
2nd Bavarian .
Wiirtemberg Div,
Baden Div.
2nd Cav. Div.
4th Cav. Div.
Total •
Batt^ions. Squadrons. Batteries.
25
25
25
25
25
15
13
. 153
8
8
8
20
20
10
12
24
24
134
14
14
14
16
16
9
9
2
2
96
Gnns.
84
84
84
96
96
54
54
12
12
576
Total of the Three Armies.
BattaUoDS. Squadrons. Batteries. Guns.
First Army .... 76 64 45 270
Second Army ... 181 156 105 630
Third Army. • • . 153 134 96 576
Grand Total .
409
354 246 1,476
By the end of August the 17th Division of Infantry and
the 2nd Division of Landwehr, under the Grand Duke of
Mecklenburg-Schwerin, in addition to the 3rd Eeserve
Division already on the spot under General Kunsmor, were
brought up to take part in the investment of Metz. The
troops sent forward to reinforce the Baden Division before
Strasburg were the Landwehr Division of the Guard, the
1st Eeserre Division, and the 1st brigade of reserve cavalry.
During August, counting all ranks, sick or well, and in-
cluding every species of non-combatant, the mean strength
of the Armies in the field was 780,723 men, and 213,159
horses.
850 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
n.
THE PEENCH AEMY.
Commandbb-ik-Chief, Thb Empbbob Napolbok m. ;
" Major-General " or Cliief of the Staff, Marshal Leboeuf ,
assisted hj General Lebrun and General Jarras; Com-
mander of Artillery, General Soleille;, of Engineers, General
Ooffiniires de Nordeck.
Impbbial Gvabb.
OoMM akdbb-in-Chief, General BourbaM ; Cliief of the
Staff, General d'Auvergne; Commander of Artillery,
General P^ d'Arros; Divisional Commanders: 1st Div.
(Voltigeurs), General Deligny;. Brigadiers: 1st Brig.,
General Brinoourt ; 2nd Brig., General Gtamier. 2nd Div.
(Grenadiers), General Pieard; Brigadiers: 1st Brig.,
General Jeanningros; 2nd Brig., General le Poitevin de
Lacroix.
Strength of Corps: 24 battalions; 24 squadrons —
(Desvaux's Div. of three brigades, commanded by Halna
du Pretay, De Prance, and Du Preuil, consisting of Guides,
Chasseurs, Lancers, Dragoons, Cuirassiers, and Carbineers)
«— 60 guns, and 12 mitrailleuses ; 2 companies of Engineers,
First Corps,
Commandeb-in-Chi£f, Marshal MacMahon, Duke of
Magenta ; Chief of the Staff, Gen. Colson ; Commander of
Artillery, Gen. Porgeot. Divisional Commanders: 1st Div.,
Gen. Ducrot ; 1st Brig., Gen. Wolff ; 2nd Brig., Gen. de
Postis du Houlbec. 2nd Div., Gen. Abel Douay^ 1st
APPENDICES. 851
Brig., Gen. Pelletier de Montmarie ; 2nd Brig., Gen. Pell^.
3rd Div., Gen. Eaoult ; Ist Brig., Gen. THdriller ; 2nd
Brig., Gen. Lefebvre. 4th Div., Gen. Lartigne ; 1st Brig.,
Lieiit.-Gen. Praboulet de Kerleadec; 2nd Brig., Gen.
Lacretelle.
Strength of Corps: 62 battalions — 45 deducting the
regiments left in Strasbui^; 28 squadrons — Duhesme's
brigade of Cuirassiers, Hussars, Chasseurs, Lancers, and
Dragoons — 96 guns and 24 mitrailleuses ; 5|- companies of
Engineers.
Second Corps,
Commandbb-in-Chief, General Frossard ; Chief of the
Staff, Gen. Saget ; Commander of Artillery, Gten. Gagneur .
1st Div., Gen. Verg^ ; Ist Brig., Gen. Letellier Valaz^ ;
2nd Brig., Gen. Jolivet. 2nd Div., Gen. Bataille ; 1st
Brig., Gen. Pouget; 2nd Brig., Gen. Fauvart-Bastoul.
3rd Div., G^n. de Laveaucoupet ; 1st Brig., Gen. Doens ;
2nd Brig., Gen. Micheler.
Strength of Corps : 39 battalions ; 16 squadrons — (Vala-
br^gue's Division, 4 regiments of Chasseurs and Dragoons)
— 72 guns, 18 mitrailleuses ; 5 companies of Engineers.
Third Corps,
Commandbs-ik-Chief, Marshal Bazaine; Chief of the
Staff, G^n. Manque ; Commander of Artillery, Gen. de
Bochebouet. 1st Div., Gen. Montaudon ; 1st Brig., Gen.
Baron Aymard; 2nd Brig., Gen. Clinchant. 2nd Div.,
Gen. de Castagny ; 1st Brig., Gen. Nayral ; 2nd Brig.,
Otea, Duplessis. 3rd Div., Gen. Metman ; 1st Brig., Gen.
de Potior; 2nd Brig., Gren.. AmaudeaiL 4th Div., Gen.
Decaen; 1st Brig., Gen. de Brauer; 2nd Brig., Q^n.
Sangld-Ferriere.
854 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Snd Brig., Oen. de Braner; 16 sqnadixms, all
Cnirasderi.
3rd Dir., Gen. de Forion ; let Brig., Gen. Pnnoe Mnrat ;
2nd Brig., Qen. de Gntmont ; 16 squadrons — (one brigade
of Dragoons, the other Cninumiers) — and 12 gnns.
Artilleiy Reserve : Gen. Cann, 126 gnns, 6 mitraiUeases,
and 8 companies of Engineers.
Stbbvoth ov Abmt.
Guard • • •
24
24
12
60
12
IstCorps . .
62
28
20
96
24
2nd Corps •
30
16
15
72
18
Skd. Corps • •
02
28
20
96
24
4tiiCoips . .
90
16
16
72
18
5tii Corps . .
39
16
15
72
18
0th Corps • •
49
24
20
114
6
7th Corps . •
38
20
15
72
18
Beserye Car. •
48
6
30
6
Reserve Art •
16
96
332 220 154 780 144
It is not possible to do more than guess at the numerical
strength of the French Corps, and consequently of the
French Army ; so great is the variation in the strength of
battalions and squadrons. The infantry of the several
Corps was continually augmented by the arrival of reserves,
so that, the losses at Spicheren notwithstanding, the 2nd
Corps was stronger by more than 2,000 men, five days after
the battle, than it was on the morning of the 6th ; Marshal
Leboeuf told the Parliamentaiy Commission that, on the
Ist of August, according to the '* states '* sent in to the
head-quarters, the effective of the Army of the Rhine, in-
cluding all the Corps in the field, was 243,171 men. But
APPENDICES. 863
Oten. Le Eoy de Dais. 2nd Div., Gen. Bisson ; Ist Brig.,
Gen. Archinard ; 2nd Brig., Gen. Maurice. 3rd Div.,
Gen. Lafont de Villers ; 1st Brig., Gen. Becquet de Sonnay ;
2nd Brig., Gen. Colin. 4tli Div., Gen. Levassor-Sorval ;
Ist Brig., Gen. de Marguenat; 2nd Brig., Gen. Comte de
Chanaleilles.
Strength of Corps : 49 battalions ; 24 squadrons — (Div,
of Salignac-Fenelon, three brigades Lancers, Hussars,
Chasseurs, and Cuimssiers) — 114 guns, 6 mitrailleuses,
and 5 companies of Engineers. [Only 40 battalions and
36 guns were able to reach Metz.]
Seventh Gorjps.
Commandbb-in-Chiep, General Fdlix Douay; Chief of
the Staff, G^n. Benson ; Commander of Artillery, Gen. de
Li^geard. 1st Div., Gen. Conseil Dumesnil ; 1st Brig.,
Gen. Nicolai ; 2nd Brig., Gen. Maire. 2nd Div., Gen.
Liebert ; 1st Brig., Gen. Guiomar ; 2nd Brig., Gen. de la
Bastide. 3rd Div., G^n. Dumont ; 1st Brig., Gten. Bordas ;
2nd Brig., Gen. Bittard des Portes.
Strength of Corps : 38 battalions ; 20 squadrons —
(Amiel's Div., five regiments, in two brigades, Lancers,
Hussars, and Dragoons) — 72 guns, 18 mitrailleuses, and 4
companies of Engineers. [One cavalry brigade of two
regiments never joined the 7th Corps.]
Reserve Cavahy.
1st Div., Gen. du Barail ; 1st Brig., Gen. Margueritte ;
2nd Brig., G«n. de Lajaille; 16 squadrons. Chasseurs
d'Afrique, and 12 guns. [Three regiments reached Metz
on the 10th of August, and the 4th at Mouzon on the
Mouse.]
2nd Div., Gen. Yiscomte de Bonnemains ; Ist Brig., Gen.
AA
856 THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Article 3. — ^AU other arms, as well as the nuUeriel of the
Army, consisting of flags (eagles and standards), cannons,
horses, military chests, army equipages, munitions, etc.,
shall be surrendered at Sedan to a Military Commission,
appointed by the French Commander-in-Chief, to be given
over immediately to the German Commissioner.
Article 4. — ^The fortress of Sedan shall be immediately
placed in its actual state, and, at the latest, by the evening
of September 2, at the disposal of His Majesty the King of
Prussia.
Article 5. — ^The officers who shall not have subscribed
the engpagement mentioned in Article 2, and the men,
after having been disarmed, shall be ranked in regiments
and conducted in good order into the peninsula formed by
the Mouse near Iges. The groups thus constituted shall
be handed over to the German Commissioners by the
officers, who will immediately give over the command to
the sous*officers. This arrangement will begin on the 2nd
of September and should be finished on the 3rd.
Article 6. — The military medical men, without exception,
will remain behind to take care of the wounded.
Done at Fr^nois, September 2, 1870.
(Signed) Von Moltee.
Db Wimppfbn.
IV.
A LIST OF THE PEmCIPAL WORKS CONSULTED
FOR THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Der Deutsch-Franzosische Krieg, 1870-71 . Redigirt von
der Ejriegsgeschichtlichen Abtheilung des Grossen General-
stabes.
The German Artillery. Captain HofEbauer.
APPENDICES. 857
Operations of the First Army. Major A. von Schell. ^ ViO
Operations of the Bavarian Army. Captain H. Helvig. -Tw^
Tactical Deductions from the War 1870-71. Captain A.
von Boguslawski. K-O
Our Chancellor ; Sketches for a Historical Picture. By
Moritz Busch.d/^ - 'J^
Bismarck and the Franco-German War, 1870-71. By
Dr. Moritz Busch^^'X:;' - —
^^ My Diary during the last Great War. By W. H. Busselt. y\ ^
L'Armee^u Ehin. Par le Marechal Bazaine,
Episodes de la Guerre de 1870 et le Blocus de Metz.
Par PEx-Marechal Bazaine.
AfPaire de la Capitulation de Metz. Proces Bazaine.
Metz, Campagne et N^gociations. Par un Officier su-
perieur de TArm^e du Ehin.
Journal d'un Officier de TArmfe du Ehin. Par Ch.
Fay.
(Euvres Posthumes autographes in^dits de Napoleon III.
Collected and published by the Comte de la Chapelle.
^ Sedan. Par le General de Wimpffen.
/.^ — ^ La Joumfe de Sedan. Par le General Ducrot.
(Guerre de 1870. Bazeill^s-Sedan. Par le General
Lebnm^^^^^^^______ —
^ Cftftipagne de 1870. Belfort, Eeims, Sedan. Le 7®
Corps de TArm^e du Ehin. Par le Prince Georges Bibesoo.
Journal d'un Officier d'Ordonnance, Juillet 1870 — Fevrier
1871. Par le Comte d'Herisson.
Campagne de 1870. La Cavalerie Fran9aise. Par le
Lieut. -Col. Bonie.
> Campagne de 1870-71. Si^ge de Paris. Operations du
13* Corps et de la TroisiJme Armee. Par le G^n^ral
' Vinoy.
Documents Eelatifs au Si^ge de Strasbourg. Publics
I par le General Uhrich.
860
TAB CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Army, German, First, as pivot,
138 ; also, 142, 144, 165.
Army, German, Seoond, and
First, all available men in
motion, 190.
Army, German, Third, Bavarians
of, at Trianoonrt, 254; move-
ments of, 255, 256.
Army, MacMahon*s, between
Rbetel and Vonziers, 243.
Army of the Mease (German),
composition of, 230; moving,
232, 233; movements of, 254,
255, 256; positions and losses,
274,275.
Army, Prussian, reform, 4, 5, 6.
Army of the Rhine (French),
positions at Spicheren, 117;
retired westward of Metz, 188 ;
facing Paris, 193; retires to
Metz, 226, 228; reasons for
defeat of , 229 ; in Metz, 285.
Amdt, the spirit of, 2.
Arry, village, 165.
Ars, village on the Moselle, 177,
191, 193, 215 ; road from, to
Jnssy, troops on, 211.
Ars-Laquenexy, village, 151.
Artillery, duel at Beanmont,
270; clever withdrawal of
Failly's, 270; French and
German, 312, 313; German,
at Noisseville, 281 ; effect of,
299 ; German, grand bnt disas-
trous conduct of, 201 ; Stein-
metz's attack with, 212, 2ia
Attigny on the Aisne, 234, 249,
251,293.
Aube, river, 247.
Aubou^, 208. 210.
Auerswald, Colonel von, 182, 183.
Austria, and the Italian question,
12; refuses Conference, 12;
crushed by Prussia, excluded
from Germany, 13; irritated
as well as humbled, 16; re-
quests Diet to call out Federal
Corps, 12.
Austrian Emperor, Francis Jo-
seph, and Schleswig-Holstein,
6, 7, 9; meets Napoleon III.
at Salzburg, 33, 34 ; Napoleon
III. appeals to, 160.
Aymard, General, 280.
Aymard*s division of Decaen's
Corps at Colombey, 156, 161 ;
at Vionville, 180. ^
Balan, 298, 305, 306; and
Bazeilles, Germans hold, 310;
the Emperor watching fight
near, 311 ; Wimpffen's effort
at, 316, 317, 324.
Ban St. Martin (Metz), Bazaine's
fatal despatch from, 241.
Banth^viUe, 257; Guards at,
259.
Bar le Due, King at, 25th Aug.,
233 ; German head-quarters,
243, 247 ; council at, 254, 255,
256.
Baraque Mouton, farmstead,
Germans take, 126.
Barby, General von, 163, 164 ; at
Mars la Tour, 180, 183, 184.
Barail, Du, at Conflans, 164 ; at
Mars la Tour, 183, 184.
Bamekow, General von, 121, 185.
Basle, 70.
Bataille, General, at Spicheren,
120, 123, 126; at VionviUe,
171, 173, 174.
INDEX.
361
Bavarians in Bazeilles, 298, 299.
Bayon on the Upper Moselle,
163.
Bayonville, 259, 264.
Bazaine, Marshal, ordered to
occupy Saarbriick, 72, 73, 74,
92, 93; at Spicheren, 116;
fears being turned, 118, 124;
has three divisions within nine
miles, 129 ; to protect Frossard,
134, 138, 140; promoted over
six Marshals, 145, 146 ; takes
command, 147; head -quarters
at Bomy, 148 ; unable to
- retreat over Moselle, protects
retreat, 149 ; slightly hurt at
Colombey-Nouilly, 157 ; retreat
of Army, 159-168; roused by
cannonade, 171 ; at Vionville,
175, 176, 177, 180, 185; at
Gravelotte, 188 ; motives ex-
amined, 192; military theory,
193 ; retires to strong position,
193 ; mis judgment of, 196 ;
battle of Gravelotte and retreat
on Metz, 199-227 ; incapable of
retrieving previous errors, 228 ;
suspicions against, not justified,
229, 230; leaves MacMahon
free to act, 239; anxiety to
relieve, 240 ; his fatal despatch,
241, 242 ; 252, 253 ; in Metz,
276-278,281,282.
Bazeilles, village, 287 ; terrible
combats in, 293-306.
Beaumont, 251, 257 ; 5th Corps at,
261 ; Failly reaches, 263-266
Failly surprised at, 237-271
retreat with running fight, 273
Germans in front of, 274.
Beauclair, village, 258, 262.
Beaufort, 262.
Belgian frontier, the, 245 ;
French Army pressed against,
285, 292, 295, 296, 297.
Belgium, French, and Prussian
proposals, 22; French to be
followed into, if not disarmed,
286, 297.
Belfort, 62, 64, 84, 93, 235, 236 ;
fortress untaken, Sept. 1st,
283.
Bellecroix, 141, 152, 160.
Belval, 261, 262, 267.
Benedetti, M. de, French Am-
bassador, and Bismarck, 10,
12, 19, 20, 21 ; goes to Ems,
42 ; interviews with King,
44-48.
Bennigsen, Herr von, asks ques-
tion about Luxemburg, 26.
Berlin, 1, 2, 3 ; political conflict
in, 6, 8 ; Council in, 9, 12 ;
King and Bismarck return to,
13; King reaches, 52; head-
quarters still at, 69.
Bernecourt, 189.
Beust, Count von, Saxon Minister,
makes proposals, 11; as Aus-
trian Chancellor, 33.
Brahaut's Cavalry, 234.
Bibesco, Prince Georges, cited,
62 ; about Douay, 258 ; Cui-
rassiers on flooded bridge, 274,
311 ; description of Sedan, 321.
Bismarck, Count Otto von, chosen
to advise the King, 3 ; experi-
ence at St. Petersburg, 4 ; deal-
ings with Prussian Parliament,
4 ; and Polish Insurrection,
1864, 8 ; Convention of Gastein,
8; and Parliament, 8; and
362
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Anstrian protection, 9; and
Benedetti, 10 ; Nikolsbnrg,
eecret military treaties with S.
German Statee, 14, 15 ; founda-
tion of German Unity, 16;
view of Napoleon III., 17, 18 ;
and Benedetti's demand for left
bank of Rhine, 20, 21 ; and Bel-
gium, 22 ; and Luxemburg, 25;
prints Bavarian secret treaty,
25 ; answers Bennigsen, 26;
retrospect on Luxemburg ques-
tion, 20, 90; with Moltke in
Paris, 1867, 32 ; utUizes Salz-
burg meeting to rouse German
feeling, 34, 35 ; desires to avoid
war, 37 ; publishes account of
Ems meeting, 47 ; meets King
William at nulway, 52 ; saying
to Benedetti on Napoleon's
dynasty, 134; on King's staff
at Malmaison, 214; seen by
Dr. Russell at Bar le Due, 255,
256; former hunting in Ar-
dennes, 266 ; sends to German
Minister at Brussels, 285 ; de-
scribed by Russell, 322; in-
fluence on terms of settlement,
327-^; meeting with Emperor,
331«|32.
Bismarck, Counts Herbert and
WUliam, 183.
Bitsche, fortress, commanding
pass in the Vosges, 67, 70, 76,
93,96, 97, 99, 114, 115, 116, 143;
still untaken Sept. 1st, 283.
Blumenthal, General von, at
Woerth battle, 115; carries
Chantrenne farm, 200; 234;
248 ; at Bar le Due, in favour
of northern march, 254, 255;
forecasts French fate, 255; at
conference of Ch^mery, 295 ;
with Crown Prince at Sedan,
322,326.
Bois Chevalier, 300.
Bois les Dames, De Failly goes
to, 259.
Bois de la Cusse, 195 ; Hessians
attack through, 202, 206 ; fight-
ing in, 219, 221.
Bois de la Garenne, 295, 306;
wandering battalions in, 312b
Bois de Genivaux, French in,
194, 196; German attack on,
205 ; French in, 206, 207, 211,
214.
Bois des Ognons (Vionville), 177,
185.
Bois de Vaux, 193, 194, 204;
attack from feared, 211, 218;
and forest of Jaumont, tract
between, 228.
Bois de Vionville, 169, 171, 17a
Bois St. Amould, 169^ 171.
Bonie, Colonel, 313.
Bonnemain's, General de, cavalry
charge at Woerth, 112 ; cavalry
at Sedan, 296 ; appeal to, by
Ducrot, 313.
Bonnemain's brigade to Les
Grands Armoises, 258; to
Raucourt, 261.
Bonnemain's division, 249, 251 ;
Cuirassiers crossing Meuse,274.
Bordas, General, 249.
Bordes, Fort des (Metz), 150; 152.
Bomy, 148, 149, 150, 152, 153,
155, 158, 160, 191.
Bose, General von, 104; at
Woerth, 110, 111, 113.
Bouchepom, 79.
INDEX,
863
Boulay, 139.
Bonlt-aux-Bois, 258, 259.
Bouillon, road to, northiern exit
from Sedan, 296, 306.
Bourbaki, General de, at Vion-
ville, 185 ; at Gravelotte, 214,
221, 223, 224, 225.
Bouzonville, 79.
Brahaut's, General de, Cavalry,
234, 256, 262.
Brandenburg, Infantry at Vion-
ville, 174, 179.
Bredow, General von, 163, 164 ;
at Vionville, his brilliant
Cavalry charge, 178; his bri-
gade, 180.
Br^me d'or, farmhouse, Germans
take, 126.
Brieulles but Bar, 251, 256.
Briey, 166, 187 ; road to, 195 ;
Germans on roads by, 240, 246.
Brinconrt, General, brigade of
Guards at Colombey, 153;
brigade, 215.
Bruch-Miihle, 101, 102.
Bruville, 184; French position
after Vionville, 186 ; outposts,
190.
Buchy, 143, 155.
Buddenbrock, General von, cap-
= tures Vionville, 173.
Budritzky's troops, 221.
Billow, General von, with bat-
teries at Vionville, 172.
Buzancy, 245; French in, 248,
249, 250 ; German and French
Cavalry skirmish, 256, 257, 259,
260, 264; King William and
staff watch Beaumont fight
from, 269; German head-
quarters, 291.
Busch, Dr. Moritz,cited, on Sedan,
321, 323; on Bismarck and
the Emperor, 331; 333.
Buxiferes, village, 171, 173.
Cadenbronn, 117.
Cambriels, infantry commander
at Beaumont, ordered back by
MacMahon, 270.
Camp de Mis^re, le, in the loop
of Meuse, 336.
Canrobert, Marshal, 68, 93;
at Chalons, 134, 135, 145;
on the Moselle, 148; over
Moselle,. 149, 153; halted
at Rezonville, 161 ; position
before Vionville, 169; his
brigade recedes, 174 ; recapture
of VionviUe and Flayigny,
177 ; intrenching tools left at
Chalons, 196; evidence on
patrols, Bazaine trial, 199;
his phrase about German
"tirailleurs dPartillerie" 201;
202 ; his cannon and infantry,
203 ; extreme French right,
207 ; outposts discovered, 210 ;
borrows from Ladmirault, 215;
looks for help from •JSazaine,
223, 224 ; retreat, -^25 ; to
Metz, 226 ; commands MoMes,
236, 237, 278; at Noisseville,
280, 281 ; 300.
Canrobert's Corps, 141 ; at Vion-
ville, 180; 6th Corps, 195;
Cavalry, 233, 235.
Capitulation of Sedan, the text
drawn up by Head-Quarter
Staff (German), 330.
Carignan, road to, eastern way
I out of Sedan, 296, 297 ; Emperor
864
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
vanishes from, 287; Guard
cavalry take, 291, dOl, 903;
Wimpffen proposes to retreat
on, 315.
Carling, Steinmetz at, 139.
Castagny, General de, misled
(Spicheren), 129; did his hest
hut was too late, 130 ; slightly
hurt at Colomhey-Noailly, 157;
at Vem^ville, 161.
Castelnan, Connt, at Donchery,
326; interposes, 329; with
Emperor, 331.
Causes of the war, summary of,
52, 53, 64.
Cavalry comhat at Mars la Tour,
183, 184.
Cavalry, French, its traditions,
charge at Woerth, 108 ; move-
ments of, 249 ; positions at
Sedan, 296; charge at Sedan,
313, 314, 315.
Cavalry, German, over the Saar,
118; at work, 139, 140, 141;
watchfulness of, 150; activity
beyond Moselle, 163, 164, 165 ;
movements, 247, 248, 250, 256,
257; value of cavalry, 259;
close on French rear, 263;
operations of, 233, 234, 291.
Cazal, 310 ; defended by Li^bert,
315, 316 ; Germans in, 317.
Chagny, 251, 267.
Chalons, reserve at, 64; Can-
robert still at, 93, 134, 135;
MacMahon and subordinates
retire on, 136, 141, 143, 144;
railway to, 189 ; roads towards,
192; French Army driven to,
230, 232, 233; camp at, 234,
235, 236; new army, dangers of.
240, 244, 245; camp, 247;
army of, 264.
Chamber, the French, sanctions
war, 15; speeches in, 246.
Chambi^re, Isle, 160 ; 278, 279.
Champenois, farm, garrisoned,
200, 202, 207; stormed and
taken, 211.
Changamier, Greneral, remarks on
Bazaine*s reported words, 228.
Chantrenne, farm, musketry
from, carried, 200; Germans
in, 202, 205, 207.
Charles, Prince Frederick, of
Prussia, commanding Second
Army, 69; change of orders, 70;
on the march, 78, 79 ; 158 ; 165 ;
at Vionville, 170, 171 ; arrives
from Pont k Mousson, 179, 180 ;
and Voigts-Rhetz at Flavigny,
182; 188, 190; general order
issued to, 197 ; instructs Man-
stein, 198; rides to sound of
battle at Gravelotte, 202, 203,
207, 219 ; in command of in-
vesting Army, 231 ; intercepts
letter, 244 ; 278, 281.
Charles of Lorraine, Prince, in
Prague, 229.
Charmes, 233.
Chassepot rifle, effect at Meutana,
36.
Ch&teaud'Aubigny, 151, 152,280.
Ch&teau de Bellevue, German
head - quartei-s, Emperor at,
Capitulation signed at, 335.
Chateau Salins, 140, 143.
Ch&tel St. Germain, 161 ; deep
defile, 195 ; Guard at, 207.
Chaumont, 233; railway station
books, 234, 236.
INDEX.
365
Cer^ay, M. Ronher's ch&teaa of,
papers found in, 21.
Ch^mery, village, 143; conference
of Moltke and Generals, 295.
Chevreau, M. de, Minister of
Interior, 233, 238.
Chieulles and Vany, 280, 281.
Chiers, the, 275, 287 ; bridges on,
292 ; passage over, 294.
Cissey, General de, at Colombey,
153 ; 155 ; VionviUe, 181 ; bri-
gades, 182; Gravelotte, 220.
Cl^rambault, General de, at
VionviUe, 184.
Clermont in Argonne, 232, 254.
Gochery, M., 43.
Coffini^res, General, Governor of
Metz, 147, 148.
Cologne Gazette, Ems telegram
published in, 47, 48.
Colombey, village, 150 - 157 ;
278.
Colombey-Nouilly, battle of, 150,
152-159; with VionviUe, and
Gravelotte, battles, conse-
quences of, 229.
Commercy ,232 ; important French
despatches captured, 233.
Conference project, Napoleon's,
11, 12.
Conflans, 159, 164, 166, 191.
ConseU • DumesnU, General, at
Woerth, 99 ; his men, 106 ; his
division, 266, 271.
Contenson, Colonel, kiUed in
charge at Mouzon, 273.
Convention of Gastein, defined
by Bismarck, 8.
CourceUes, 117; Chaussy, 162;
Snr Nied, 162, 165.
Craushaar's brigade, 211,
Crimean War, effect on relations
of Russia and Prussia, 2.
Crown Prince of Prussia, Frede-
rick William, commands ThiixL
Army, 69 ; at Spires, 70 ; leads
advance, 76, 77 ; at the Kling-
bach, 79; on the Lauter, 84;
attacks Wissembourg, 86 ;
checks pursuit, 89 ; position
after, 91 ; before Woerth, 96,
99; August 6th, 103, 104, 115 ;
139 ; 159 ; 232, 241 ; his Cavalry
near the Aube, 247 ; at Bar le
Due, 254, 255; to Ste. Mene-
hould, 259: ordered to attack
at Sedan, 285 ; his operations,
292 ; at Ch^mery, 294, 295, 297 ;
directs troops to M^zi^res road,
307 ; and his officers described
by RusseU, 322 ; conference
with King, 323.
Custines, vUlage, 158.
Czar of Russia, th% more than
friendly, 16 ; his^Di&tern de-
signs, 17.
Daigny, bridge at, over Givonne,
293 ; Germans fall back at, 304 ;
succeed at, 305»
Damvillers, 246, 256 ; phm of
abandoned, 257.
David, M. J^rdme, 49, 81.
Decaen, General, commanding
3rd Corps, 136 : at French
Centre, 148-151 ; his four di-
visions at Colombey, 153 ; mor-
taUy wounded, 157.
Declaration of War, 1, 52.
Delme, 143.
Despatches, important Frenchf
captured^ 233.
860
THE CAUPAIGN OF 8EDAK.
Diet of Frankfort, 12.
Dieolonard, 141, 142, 143, 168,
163, 164, 189.
Doering, Major-GenenJ von, at
Spicheren, 121 ; killed at Vion-
▼iUe, 173.
Dorabasle, 232, 254, 256.
Doin le Mesnil, 295, 307.
Donchery, failure to blow up
bridge at, 289 ; Germans pre-
pare to pass Menae at, 290, 293,
205, 300 ; bridge, SffJ ; meet-
ing of generals at, scene, 326,
327-330, 331, 336.
Doncourt, 177 ; hills, 180.
Douay, General Abel, divisional
commander, 84, 85; kiUed at
Wissembonrg, 86, 87, 88.
Douay, General F^lix, Chief of
7th Corps, 68, 131 ; 144 ; move-
ments of, 249, 250 ; ordered to
move on the Mease, 258 ; to
cross it, **coilt6 que ooAte,**^\,
274, 276 ; occupies Floing and
Illy, 290; shelled, 308, 309;
Wimpffen and, 311, 312, 313,
316 ; and the Capitulation, 319.
Douzy, village, Ducrot's corps at,
286, 287 ; Saxons pass, 291 ;
and hold bridge, 292.
Drouyn de Lhuys, M., Foreign
Minister, 16-20.
Dncrot, General, divisional com-
mander, 84 ; at Woerth, 98, 99,
106, 110 ; begins to retire, 113 ;
complains of scarcity, 243 ; 276 ;
Emperor in camp of, 286 ; urges
Emperor to go to Sedan, 287 ;
fired into, 291 ; holds the Gi-
vonne, 296 ; takes command of
Army, 300; superseded by
Wimpffen,301, 302; operations,
303, 304; disputes, 311, 312;
appeal to cavalry, 313, 315,
316 ; his description of interior
of Sedan, 319 ; altercation with
Wimpffen, 316, 317, 325.
Dumont, Creneral, division com-
mander of Donay's corps, 144 ;
sent after Bordas, 250; at Beau-
mont, 271.
Dun, on the Meuse, 247, 257, 259,
262.
Durrenbach, 107.
Duvemois, Clement, 49, 81.
Eberbach, village, 98, 106, 107,
108, 109, 110;stream, 107; 110.
Elbe Duchies, the, taketf from the
Dane, 7.
Elsasshausen, French right, 98,
106, 107 ; German attack on,
110, 111; set on fire, 112.
Emperor. See Napoleon.
Empress of the French, Eugenie,
fatal conduct in politics, 81 ;
made Regent, 137, 235-239,
Napoleon's telegram, 335.
England, irritated by Mexican
adventure, 32.
Epinal, 131.
Erize la Petite, 254.
Etain, 165, 246.
Failly, de. General, commander
of 5th Corps, 61, 73 ; at Saar-
brUck, 74, 92 ; fluctuating, 96,
97 ; joins MacMahon after
Woerth, 116; Spicheren, 117;
halts, 131; to j^ancy, 134;
counter-ordered, 135, 138, 144 ;
troops, 233 ; in twen^ trains^
INDEX.
367
234 ; movements, 256, 258, 259 ;
MacMahon*s despatches to,
captured, 260, 261 ; axjtion
at Nouart, 262, 263; in the
Ardennes, 266 ; camp at Beau-
mont attacked, 268 ; repels
attack and retires, 269, 270,
273; 285; 288.
FaiUy, village, 278, 279, 280, 281.
Faulquemont, 139 ; Emperor
visited by Bazaine at, 140 ; 158.
Faure, General, 252 ; 319 ; at Don-
chery, 326.
Favre, M. Jules, 52, 81.
Fenesti^ange, 144.
Flanville, 280, 281.
Flavigny (Vionvnie), 171, 173,
taken by Germans, 174, 176.
Fleigneux, 306, 307, 309.
Flize, Wiirtembergers engage
Vinoy*s outposts at, 293, 295.
Floing, north-west face of French
. position, at Sedan, 290, 296;
Germans in, 308, 309, 313.
Forbach, 79, 94, 117, 118, 119,
122, 123; 128, 129, 130; 137,
m, 139.
Forbacherberg, 126, 127.
Forton, General de, 163 ; falls
back on Vionville, 164, 168, 169 ;
want of patrols, 171 ; returns
cavalry charge, 178.
France, General de, 166, 183.
Fran9ois, General von, at Spich-
eren, 122, 124.
Fransecky, General von, at
Gravelotte, 204 ; 217.
Francheval, 287, 291, 300, 306.
Frederick II., the Great, his
Manstein, 199; compared, 229.
Frederick WiUiam IV. , 2.
French Court, the, projects of, 21.
French, the, propose to move,
147; unable to cross Moselle,
148, 149 ; retreat after Colom-
bey, 159 ; surprised by artillery
(Vionville), 170 ; advance, 214 ;
counter-stroke at Floing, 310.
French prisoners sent to Ger-
many, 336.
French Generals, examples of two
fatal errors, 147; meeting to
consider Capitulation, 324, 325.
Fr^nois, German battery in, fires
on Vinoy, 289 ; batteries at,
alarm French railway ofScials,
292 ; batteries on, to give signal
to renew, 323, 324.
Fresne, 165.
Froeschwiller, MacMahon's posi-
tion, 98, 102, 106, 107 ; road to,
110; 112; Raoult wounded at,
113; captured, 114.
Frossard, General, at Saarbriick,
73, 74, 75; takes position at
Forbach, 93, 94; on the Saar,
116-118 ; disposition of troops,
120 ; impressed, 123, 126 ; re-
tires, 128, 129, 130, 131, 134;
crosses Moselle, 148, 149, 153 ;
at Rezonville, 161 ; failure of
patrols, 168 ; at Vionville, 169 ;
retreat, 175, 176; field-works,
192, 195, 196 ; outposts begin,
Gravelotte, 197, 200; strong
position, 206-217; reserves, 226;
at NoisseviUe, 279.
Frossard's Corps, 159, 170, 171,
185, 194.
Furia Francese, 314.
Galgenberg, the (Spicheren), 120.
868
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Galliffet, General de, cfaargee at
St Menges, 308, 900 ; charges
with Chasfleors d'Afriqne, 313.
Gambetta, M., speaks against
war, 51, 81.
Garenne, the, 315.
Gayl, General von, tarns Aymard
out of Servigny, 280.
German military system con-
sidered— its risks, 97 ; mobili-
zation — Prussian, 56, 57 ; S.
German, 58.
Germans, movements of about
Sedan, 290-205, 310.
German unity, foundation of, 14,
16.
General Staff, the Prussian, brain
of the Army, 5.
Germonville, 256.
Gersdorf, Lieut. -Gen. von, 307.
George of Saxony, Prince, sent
down the Ome, 208 ; ordered to
sweep round French right, 211.
Giffert Wald, the (Spicheren), 123-
129.
Girard, General, killed in cavalry
charge, 315.
Girardin, M. St. Marc, estimate
of Napoleon, 18.
Givodeau, Wood of, 270.
Givonne, the stream, 287> 293,
295; held by Lebrun's and Du-
crot's corps, 296 ; battle on the,
298-304; in German hands, 310,
315-317.
Givonne, Fond de, and village,
295, 306-311.
Glablenz, Austrian Field-Marshal
in Holstein, 12.
Glilmer, Lieut. -General von, at
Golombey, 163-
Gneisenau, Major-Gen. von, 74,
75, 76 ; his brigade failed to sur-
prise Thionville, 158, 159; his
brigade sent on by Goeben, 212.
Gnligge, Captain, his battery at
St. Hubert, 213.
Goeben,Generalvon,atSpicheren,
supports Kameke, 121; takes
command, sends in reserves, 125;
at Gravelotte, attacks to employ-
French left, 205 ; Steinmetz
talks to, 212.
Goersdorf, 104.
Golz, Major-General Baron von,
129 ; attacks French retreat,
and begins Golombey-Nouilly
battle, 150 ; without orders,
152, 154, 155; 215, 218; 278.
Gondrecourt, General, 184 ; 225 ;
village, 232.
Grortschfldcoff, Prince, and the
Treaty of Paris, 36.
Gorze, village, 169, 171, 177, 179,
185, 190.
Gothard, St. , railway, a menace to
France, 40.
Govone, General, Italian envoy to
Berlin, 10, 11.
Goze, General, 91.
Gramont, Due de. Minister for
Foreign Affairs, sends Benedetti
to Ems, 42 ; speech in Cham-
ber, 43; presses demands, 45;
46 ; 53, 54.
Gramont, General de, 170, 178.
Grand Pr6, viUage, 243, 247, 248,
249, 250, 256, 264.
Granville, Lord, attempts at com-
promise, 47.
Gravelotte, French Army directed
towards, 159; 169; 171; 177;
INDEX.
869
191 ; battle-field described, 193,
194, 195 ; French position, 196,
199 ; 204 ; 206 ; German position,
206 ; Goeben and Steinmetz at,
212 ; darkness ends fight at St.
Hubert, 217 ; course of battle,
218-223 ; numbers and losses on
both sides, 226, 227 ; 229.
Gravelotte, Bazaine*s account of,
241.
Gravelotte, defile, road across,
212, 213.
Gravelotte, road from, to Verdun,
168, 169 ; road out of Metz,
159.
Gravelotte battle, various names
for, 228.
Great Staff, Grerman, leaves Ber-
lin with King, 70; at Mainz,
77; 142, 188; surprised at
MacMahon's eastward march,
244.
Grenier, General, his division,
149 ; at Golombey, 153, 154 ; at
Vionville, 180, 181.
Greyfere, farm, 181, 185, 186.
Grigy, 155.
Grimont, farm, 151 ; Bazaine con-
sults generals at, 277.
Grimont, Bois de, 279.
Grouchy, Le Capitaine Marquis
'de, despatches captured, 260.
Grossbliedersdorf, 79.
Guard, French, 215.
Guard, Prussian, and Saxon at
Gravelotte, 209-227.
Guard, losses at St. Privat, 227.
Gueblange, 139.
Gunstett, Uhlans cross Sauer at,
91; <Woerth), 100» 103, 106,
107> 109.
Habonville, 195, 202, 203, 206;
Guard at, 208, 210.
Hagenau, 84, 85, 89, 100, 115.
Ham, 79.
Hanover, King of, with Austria
and the Bund, 9, 13.
Han sur Nied, 163.
Hapsburg - Lorraine, House of,
161.
Harricourt, 258.
Harskirchen, 139.
Hartmann, General Bitter von,
at Woerth, 100, 102, 105, 106,
112; cavalry, 212.
Hasse, Captain, Battery at St
Hubert, 213.
Hatzfeldt, Count, 323.
Heiltz TEv^que, 232.
Hellimer, 139.
Helmuth, Captain, 272, 273.
Helvig, Captain Hugo, on French
position, 99.
Henry, Prince, Governor of Lux-
emburg, 24.
Herny, 143 ; King and Staff at,
162.
Hesse Darmstadt, included in
the Prussian military system,
14.
Hesse, Prince Louis of, Lieut-
General commanding Hessian
division, 72 ; at Vionville, 186 ;
holds Bois de la Cusse, 202 ; at
Noissevift, 280.
Hesse, Grand Duke of, 72.
Hessians at AmanviUers, 220, 221.
Hochwald, 100, 113.
Hohenzollern, Candidature of
Prince Leopold of, for the crown
of Spain, 41, 42 ; withdrawn,
45.
B B
870
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAK.
Holland, King of, discloBes the
designs on Lnxembnrg, 25.
Holstein-Sclileswig, 7.
Hungary and Austria, la
House of Belgian weaver, meeting
of Napoleon and Bismarck,
332.
House of Commons, English,
averse to war, 7.
If>^> peninsula on the Meuse,
295.
niy, village, 287, 308 ; 312, 313.
niy, Calvaire d*, 290; French
position, 295, 296, 306, 308, 310,
312 ; Grermans reach, 313.
Ingweiler, 115.
Investment of Bazaine, troops for,
230.
Iron Gross, The Order of the, re-
stored^ 70.
Isle Chambi^re, Ladmirault
crossing at, 160.
Italian Kingdom created, 6.
Italy, Victor Emmanuel, King of,
Napoleon appeals to, 160.
J&geni save railway viaduct,
294.
Jamy and Gonflans, sounds of
battle, 171 ; road to, 197, 207.
Jaumont, Pcchot retires to forest
of, 224.
Jerusalem, farm, 208.
JoinviUe, 236.
Jolivet's brigade, 120; at Spich-
eren, 122; at Vionville, 172,
176.
JunivUle, 243.
Jur6e, brook, 169, 177.
Jussy, village on Moselle, 195.
Kaiserslautem, 68, 76, 77, 79,
95.
Kameke, Lieut. -General von, at
Spicheren, 121, 122, 124; with
Steinmetz, 191, 192.
Kedange, 277.
Kehl, bridge of, broken, 70.
Kirchbach, (general von, 104,
105, 106, 113 ; at Sedan, 307.
Kinglake, Mr., character of Na-
poleon, 133.
Kraatz, General von, at Vion-
ville, 180, 181.
Kummer, General von, Landwehr
reserve, 158 ; 230.
La Besace, village, 258, 261, 271,
274.
Ladmirault, General de, 93; at
Spicheren, 116-118, 134; at
Golombey, 148-162; at Vion-
ville, 180, 181, 184, 185; at
Gravelotte, 194; 215, 223; at
Noisseville, 278, 279.
Ladmirault's Corps, 140, 177, 183,
199, 225, 226.
La Folic, farm, 194, 198, 200, 202»
207, 217, 225.
Lafont de Villiers, General,
173.
Laheycourt, 232.
Landstuhl, 95.
Langensalza, Battle of, 13.
La Moncelle, Saxons seize, 299,
300, 302; brilliant French
attack, 305 ; Emperor near,
311.
Lapasset, Grcneral, at Saargae-
mines, 91 ; brigade at Vionville,
171» 177, 185 ; at St. Ruffine,
195 ; contest with Goht, 216»
INDEX.
871
La Planchette, farm, 152.
Laqnenexy, 281.
Lartigae, General, 84, 09; at
Woerth, 105-113; at Sedan,
304,305.
La Thibaudine, farm, 271.
Lanter, and Lanterbourg, lines of,
76, 77 ; 86, 87.
Lanyalliera, 151, 152, 154, 156.
La Vallibres, stream, 151.
Laveauconpet, General, at Spicli-
eren, 120; 122, 128; to be
placed in Metz and Verdun,
137.
La Yir^ farm, Prince Angostits
at, 306.
Lebach, 73, 75, 79, 95.
Leboeof, Marshal, Chief of the
Stafi^ 49-50, 59-62 ; at Metz, 92 ;
116; unfitness for command,
117; 136; 145; 161 ; at Vion-
yille, 169, 171, 177, 180, 181 ; at
Gravelotte, 205, 211, 215, 217,
225,226; 228; withdrawn from
Noisseville, 279, 281.
Leboeuf's Corps, 185, 194, 196.
Lebrun, General, 235, 243, 261,
270;; retreat on Sedan, 286, 287,
288-294; at Bazeilles, 296-299 ;
301, 302 ; at Givonne, 304, 311 ;
condemns Wimpffen's efforts,
316, 317 ; arrangements for
Capitulation, 318, 319.
Lebrun's Corps, 291, 293.
Le Chesne-Populeux, 243, 249;
' MacMahon, head-quarters, 251,
; 257, 258 ; 263, 266.
Lee, General Robert, his saying
on war, 223.
Legrand, General^ at Mars la
Tour, 183, 184.
Lehmann, Colonel, at Tronville,
176, 177.
Leipzig, farm, 194, 196, 207.
L^moncourt, 143.
Le Mont de Brune, 272, 273.
L'Envie, farm, 202, 207.
Lespart, General Guyot de^ 91 ; at
Woerth, 141, 262.
Les Etangs, 140, 142, 149.
Lessy, cross roads by, 159, 161.
L^tanne, bridge constructed at,
291.
" Le Temps," paragraph in, 246.
L'H^riller and Pell^'s Division,
302.
Li^bert, General, 313, 315, 316.
Ligny, 232; Great Staff and
Crown Prince at, 245.
Loftus, Lord Augustus, 46.
Longeville, 241 ; camp, 161.
Longuyon, 230.
Longstreet, General (United
States), 255.
Lorencez, General de, at Colom
bey-Nouilly, 153, 155, 157, 162.
Lun^ville, 144, 159, 162.
Luxemburg, negociations, and
question, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28.
Lavalette, Napoleon's letter to,
20.
Mack, General, at Ulm, 229.
MacMahon, Marshal, assembling
1st Corps near Strasburg, 68 ;
scattered condition of command,
84, 85; at Reichshofen, 89-99;
at Woerth, 109, 112, 114;
back on Sarrebourg, 116 ;
ordered to Chalons, 134, 135,
138, 144 ; still at large, 231 )
at Rhetel, 234; at Chalons,
872
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
2M, 237 ; receives oommand of
army, 238; moves army to
Reims, 240 ; on the Aisne, 248 ;
tarns from Stenay to Moozon,
259 ; will pass the Mense, 265 ;
near Beaumont, 270, 271, 276,
284; 285; directs retreat on
Sedan, 286, 287 ; relations to
the Emperor, 288 ; aoconnt of
conduct, 297; wounded, gives
np command, 300; wound a
great misfortune, 303.
Magdebuig and Altmark r^-
ments, losses, 178, 179.
Mainz, 65, 67 ; 69, 72, 77, 92.
Malancourt, 223 ; 281.
Malmaison, 177.
Malroy on Moselle, 278.
Man^ue, General, mortally
wounded at Noisseville, 281.
Mance, brook, 177, 191, 193,
194, 195 ; gully, 205 ;. eastern,
207 ; ravine, 214, 216, 217.
Manstein, General von, at Grave-
lotte, 198-204, 219, 220 ; crosses
MoseUe, 280.
Manteuffel, General Baron von,
at Berlin Council, 10; makes
Austrians retreat beyond Elbe,
12; precaution, 150; joins in at
Colombey-Nouilly, 153, 155 ;
at Noisseville, 278, 280.
Marbache, 158; -Custines, 163,
189.
Margueritte, General, 141, 235,
243; 249; 251, 258; 260, 261;
275, 287 ; his cavaby, 296; 300;
307 ; on the Calvaire dllly, 308,
309; mortaUy wounded, 813.
Marines, French, in Bazeilles,
298,305.
Marsal, 148, 232.
Marshals of France, three caged
inMetz,231. iSee Bazaine, Can-
robert, Leboeuf.
Mars la Tour, French Army
directed on, 159, 163, 164 ; load
from Gravelotte to Verdun
passes, 168 ; battle of Vionville,
170; ravine, 181; German
Cavalry at, 183 ; German guns
hold on near, 183; cavalry
at, 186 ; Germans occupy, 191,
197.
Mattstal, 98, 100, 102.
Maxau on the Rhine, 64.
M^nil sur Saulz, letters seized
by German cavalry at, 233.
Mensdorff, Count, Austrian
Foreign Minister, 9.
Mercy le Haut, or Mercy les Metz,
151, 278:
Metman, General, at Spicheren,
129, 130 ; 160, 161 ; at Vion-
ville, 177 ; leaves Rezonville,
191.
Metz, 68, 76, 79, 82, 92, 93 ; de-
fences incomplete, 94 ; disorder
and consternation in, 131-135 ;
entire army moves back on,
136; (Colombey battle), 151,
152 ; excitement in, 159; Baz-
aine's army moves nearer to,
188 ; shutting up in, not thought
of, 190; Bazaine's theory about,
192; French Army by, 193, 195,
197 ; Steinmetz*s mistaken hope
of driving French into, 212;
magnetism of stronghold like,
229, 230; blockade of, 231 ; 239,
241, 242; 244-246 ; two oorpssent
back to, 257 ; army, 277 ; mili-
INDEX.
373
tary situation about, 282 ; for-
tress, 283, 336.
Metz, road from, to Strasburg, 67;
from Mainz to, 67; road at
Spicheren, 128 ; railway, 129 ;
roads out of, 159 ; road to, 194 ;
and Montm^dy road closed,
292.
Meurthe, valley of the, 144, 158,
232.
Mouse, the, 134, 136; 171 ; 189 ; 232,
MacMahon near, 234 ; crossing
at Stenay, 242, 246; Verdun,
248, 249; MacMahon's army
ordered to, 253 ; Germans on,
256, 257, 260, 262; French
Corps on left bank, 263, 270,
271, 273 ; dammed to fill Sedan
ditches, 274; 280; 285, 286;
: 289; passage at Mouzon held
by Saxon Crown Prince, 292 ;
pontoon over, 294; 295 ; loop of,
296 ; roads near, 307.
Mexico expedition, 7.
Mey, village (Colombey-Nouilly),
151-156.
M^zi^res, route for Chalons, 242 ;
MacMahon to retreat on, 251-
253, 255, 257 ; French to be cut
off from, 286 ; retreat to, given
up, 290, 295, 297, 301, 303 ; road,
307.
Michel, General, unique telegram,
62; at Woerth, 107, 108;
charges of his Cuirassiers, 109 ;
cavalry, 296.
Mitchell, M. Robert, 48, 50.
MobUeSf unfurnished with muni-
tions, 132; bad behaviour of,
returned to Paris, 236 ; reasons
- for, 238.
Mobilization, French, 59; defects
and difficulties, 60-63.
Mobilization, German, 2, 3, 57,
58, 59.
Moltke, General Baron von, Chief
of the Staff, 3 ; his work, 5, 6 ;
at Berlin Council, 10 ; in 1868
frames plan of campaign in
France, 37 ; remark on declara-
tion of war, 52 ; plans, 65, 66 ;
disposition after Saarbriick, 76-
78; intentions before Woerth,
96; caution, 138; 142; prepared
for French on right bank, 158 ;
directs Second Army on Moselle,
162; memorable instructions,
165 ; judgment confirmed, 189,
190; at Flavigny, 191 ; orders
on 17th, 197, 198 ; keeps back
Steinmetz at Gravelotte, 204;
207 ; his main object, 216 ; him-
self directs attack, 217; original
design of battle, 218 ; estimate
of Bazaine, 218 ; starts for Paris,
232, 234; Bazaine's despatch,
242; arrangements to meet
French move, 244-246, 254, 256,
257, 259, 260, 264; sanctions
bombardment of Strasburg,
283, 284; 294; at Conference
of Ch^mery, 295 ; quickens
operations, 297; 302, 307; with
the King, looking on Sedan,
described by RusseU, 321 ; de-
signated by King, suspends hos-
tilities, 323 ; meets the French
Generals at Bonchery, 325-330;
goes to King at Vendresse,
332.
Montaigu, General, wounded and
prisoner^ 184,
1
874
THE CAMPAION OF SEDAN.
Montanban, General. See Pali-
kao, Gomte de.
Montaadon, General, 94; at
Spicheren, 117, 129; 137; at
Colombey, 153, 155 ; at Vion-
▼ille, 177; near Rezonyille,
185.
Montfainoon, 256, 257.
Monthoiii, 264.
Montigny la Grange, 195, 198;
held by Freneh, 225, 226.
Montimont, 307.
Montlaisant, Colonel, 224, 225.
Montm^y, 242, 246, 276, 277,
286.
Montois, 223.
Montoy, 151, 152, 154.
MontpayToaz,M. Gnyot de, illns-
trates French feeling, 51.
Monvillers Park, Bazeilles, 298 ;
combats in, 299, 305, 306.
Morsbronn, 106, 107.
Moscow, farm, French position,
194, 205, 206, 207, 213; every
attempt on, repnlsed, 214 ; Le-
boeuf in, 217.
Moselle, river, 92, 134, 135, 136,
139, 141 ; German advance on,
142; Bomyon,143, 144; French
get over, 146, 147; in flood, 148,
149 ; Colombey, 150, 151, 153 ;
possible French advance up
right bank, 158; retreat on,
' 159 ; fog on, 161 ; Second Army
sent over, 162, 163, 169 ; valley,
179 ; crossed at Marbache, 189,
190 ; near Ars, 193 ; below Metz,
194; crossed at Bomy, 204; Ger-
mans on left bank of, 230, 231,
278, 280, 281.
Mouzon, 260, 261, 263; 269, 270,
272; Cnirasfliers eharge' at,
273 ; Germans at, 274 ; Mac-
Mahon at, 286; rout at, de-
scribed to Emperor, 287 ; Ger-
mans take, 291.
MoycBuvre, forest of, 218.
Mnrat, Prince,f ollowed byRedem,
164 ; his dragoons bolt, 170.
Nancy, 134, 139; Uhlans ride
into, 141, 144, 159, 163.
Napoleon I., the Great, cavalry
traditions of, 165 ; his genius re-
quired, 193 ; on competence of
captains for large command,
229.
Napoleon III. , Louis, declares war
on Prussia, 1 ; his policy and
position in Europe previous to
the war, 2-20; attempt on
Luxemburg, 22, 23; Russian
alliance, Paris exhibition, 31 ;
death of Maximilian, 32; at
Salzburg, 33, 34 ; suspects mili-
tary treaties, 35 ; seeks allies,
36 ; fears for the dynasty, 49 ;
resolves on war, 50; declares
war, 52; head-quarters at Metz,
64 ; 72 ; takes command, 73 ;
Saarbriick, 74; incapacity at
Metz, 82, 92, 93; Spicheren,
116, 117 ; confusion, 132; char-
acter unaltered from 1836, 133$
134; despatch to Paris, 135;
resigns command, 136; 138;
140 ; 145 ; fails to press retreat
over Moselle, 1^, 147 ; at
Longeville, 159; appeal to Aus-
tria and Italy, 160; at and after
Gravelotte, 161, 162, 166, 167;
and LebcBuf, 228, 229; 231; at
INDEX.
376
Chfaons and Reims, 235-242
interview with MacMahon, 251
military judgment correct, 253
in Ducrot-s camp, 286, 287; re-
fuses to retire to Sedan, yet
goes, 287 ; enters Sedan, 288 ;
refuses to leave, 289; and
Des Sesmaisons, 290; notices
retreat, 301 ; rides out early
to see battle, sees MacMahon
and goes under fire, 311 ;
and Wimpffen, 316; and his
generals, 317, 318; hopes to
appesd to the King, 318 ; Capi-
tulation arranged with generals,
319, 320 ; letter to King, 322 ;
awaiting reply, 324 ; Wimpffen
quarrels before him, 325; he
surrenders, leaves Sedan, meets
Bismarck, 331-333; meets King
and Crown Prince, telegraphs
to Empress, 335; departs for
Wilhelmshohe, hears of Paris
Revolution, 337 ; reflections,
338.
Napoleon, Louis, Prince Imperial,
baptism of fire, 73, 74 ; with
Emperor, 161, 166 ; at Chalons,
237 ; sent off, 239.
Napoleon, Frince Jerdme, 41 ;
with Emperor at Chalons, 236 ;
supports Trochn, suggests ab-
dication, 237.
Needle gun, the, 7.
Neehwiller, 98, 113, 114.
Nehrdorff, General, withdraws
Saxons, 210.
Neufch&teau, 233.
Neunkirchen, 79.
Nice and Savoy ceded to France,
Nied, the French, 135 ; German,
136; 140; 142; 143.
Niederbronn, 70; (Woerth), 113,
114.
Niederwald, the, 107, 108, 109,
111.
Nikolsburg, Treaty of, 13, 14, 16.
Noisseville, 164, 155, 156 ; battle
of, 277-279; Manteuffel attacks,
280 ; contest for, 281.
Nom6ny, 140.
Nostitz, Count, at Donchery
meeting, 326.
Nouart, 256, 258-264, 267.
NouiUy, 148, 151, 156.
Nov^ant, 163, 177.
Oches, 249, 260, 261, 263, 265;
MacMahon at, 266 ; Crown
Prince at, 269.
OUivier, M. Emile, pacific re-
marks, 43 ; thinks quarrel
ended, 48 ; political position,
prophetic words, 50; goes to
war ** d eo&ur leger,*^ 51 ; 81 ;
Ministry turned out, 137.
Oily, Germans occupy, 309.
Olozaga, Spanish Ambassador,
45.
Orcet, Captain d', and Donchery
meeting, 326, 327, 328.
Omain, the river, 232; 284.
Ome, the river, 193, 195, 208;
cantonments on, 246.
Operations, German and French,
August 29th, 259, 260, 261.
Palatinate, the, possible irruption
into, 70.
Pagny, 163.
Palikao, Comte de, General, Mon-
376
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
tanban, 81 ; 137 ; made by Em-
press Minister of War, 235; col-
lects new^aiQny, 235 ; telegram
to,fromEmperor,239; views,240,
242; responsible for disaster,
251 ; insists on help for Bazaine,
252, 253; utter ignorance of
situation, 254, 276; and Wimpf-
fen, 288, 324, 336.
Palli^res, General Martin des,
298.
Pange, French position, 136, 140,
: 12, 143, 149, 152.
Pape, Major-General von, 203;
Guard prepared to attack St.
Marie, 208, 209 ; at St. Marie,
219, 220; his Guards' attack on
St. Privat, 222.
Paradol, Provost, view of the war,
and suicide, 54, 55.
Paris, remonstrances from, 135;
and Parisians, 146 ; army of
the Rhine facing, 193; placed
in state of defence, 233 ; fears
of uncovering, 240 ; newspaper
informs Moltke, 245 ; road to,
246; ordersfrom,toMacMahon,
252, 253 ; ready for revolution,
285 ; Wimpifen at, 287.
Parliament, Prussian, opposition
to army reform, 4.
P^chot, General, falls on Saxons,
210 ; ' * valiant officer " attempts
to stop enemy, 224.
Pell6, General, takes command
on Douay's death, 88 ; at
Woerth, 99.
Pestel, Colonel von, at Saarbriick,
73.
Pirmasens, 69, 77, 86.
Pfaffenwald, the, 125.
Pfordten, von der, Bavarian
Minister, signs secret treaty, 14.
Phalsbourg, 115, 143, 144 ; French
fortress untaken, 283.
Pietri, M. , telegraphs to Empress,
238.
Plappeville, fort, 194 ; Guard at,
195 ; guns not heard at, 214,
215.
Podbielski, General von, 245, 246;
at conference of Chem^ry, 295 ;
with King William, 321; at
Donchery meeting, 326.
Point du Jour farm, 191, 194;
quarries below, 205; burnt, 206,
207 ; Steinmetzhopes tocapture,
212 ; repulses attack, 214 ; at-
tempts to storm, 217.
Poix, 156 ; German guns at, 279,
293.
Ponim6rieux, 165.
Pont k Moussdn, 141, 142, 143 ;
Prince Frederick Charles at,
158 ; 163, 171 ; Royal head-
quarters, 189 ; Moltke starts
for, 197 ; Moltke at, 283.
Porru au Bois, Prussian Guard in,
292.
Possesse, 232.
Pouilly, Germans at, 275 ; bridge
constructed, 291.
Preuil, General du, at Vionville,
175.
Preuschdorf, 104.
Provisions, French scarcity of,
243.
Prussia, King of. See William I.
Prussian Army, now German,
characteristics of, 5, 6 ; victories
in Denmark with needle-gun, 7;
augmented, 8 ; mobilizing, 11,
INDEX.
877
12; enters Anstria, fights Sa-
dowa, 13.
Pmsso-Italian Alliance, 10.
Puttelange, Castagny marches to,
129 ; French generals assemble
at, 130.
Pazienx, 163, 164.
Quarries of Amanvillers and St.
Hubert, 192, 205, 217, 218.
Quatre Champs, 258.
Quelen, Fort, Metz, 141, 148.
Railway, questions of control,
Belgian, Luxemburg, and St.
Gothard, 39, 40.
Rastadt, 65, 92.
Rations, in Sedan, sent away by
mistake, 289.
Ranch, Colonel von, at Flavigny,
Hussars capture battery and
surround Bazaine, 175.
Raucourt, 271 ; Douay retires on,
265; attacked, 274; 293.
Raoult, General, 99, 106, 110,
113.
Reconnaisances, French, inade-
quate, 167.
Redem, General von, before Metz,
163; follows Murat, 164; at
Flavigny, 178.
Red Hill, Rotheberg, or Spur at
Spicheren,119, 120, 122; storm-
ing of, 124, 125, 126, 127;
Spicheren road up, 128.
Reichshofen, 84, 96 ; and Nieder-
bronn, 100, 109, 112, 113, 114.
Reille, General, 320, 325, 331.
Reims, 234, 242, 244, 245, 246 ;
drd Army Cavalry in sight of,
247, 249; 251.
Remilly, 231, 260; disordered
French retreat to, 272, 273 ; 293.
Remonville, 264.
Reppertsberg, Spicheren, 120.
Revigny les Vaches, Crown
Prince's head-quarters, 255.
Rex, Colonel von, at Spicheren,
121 ; in Bois des Ognons, 185.
Rezonville, 164; road from Grave-
lotte to Verdun through, 168,
169; (Vionville battle), 170,
171, 177, 179, 186; 188, 190, 191 ;
197 ; 2nd Corps at, 215, 242.
Rheinbaben,Lieut. -GeneralBaron
von, at Spicheren, 119, 120;
effective operations on Verdun
road, 163; at Vionville, 170;
begins battle with battery, 171 ;
his work done, 172.
Retonfay, 279.
Rhetel, MacMahon's army at, 243,
249.
Rhine, the, and Moselle, 65;
bridges and ferries destroyed,
70 ; 76.
Roman road, Vionville, 169, 171.
Roncourt, high ground, French
position, 194 ; open descent to,
195 ; limit of French right, 207,
208, 210, 211 ; Saxons at, 222,
223,224.
Roon, General von, made War
Minister, 3 ; administrative
measures, 5, 6 ; causes King to
retire out of fire, 216; with
King, 321.
Rosseln, Von Golz marches from,
129.
Rouher, M., 38, 49 ; goes to Em-
peror at Chalons, 240 ; suggests
proclamation, 241.
878
THE CAXPATCnr OF 8EDAK.
lUw^rieiiUes village, 100 ; French
reserves in» 194.
Ropi^y, 281.
Ruflsell, Dr. William, diaiy dted,
deseription of Bismarck at Bar
le Dae, 265; of Sedan and the
King, 321 ; of Crown Prince,
Russell, Lord, Danish question,?.
Russia, 2, 4, 8, 11, 16.
Saar, 76; French positions on, 92;
German, 95, 118, 119; French,
136; 138, 139; upper, 143, 144.
Saarbourg, 116.
Saarbrttck, 70 ; affair at, 73, 77,
118, 119 ; road, 152.
Saarlouis, 77, 136; road from, 152,
158,230.
Sachy, guard at, 292.
Sadowa, battle of, 13, 14, 16.
St. Ail, 195; German batteries at,
203; 209, 210 ; and St. Marie,
Prussian Infantry Guard, 219,
221.
St. Avoid, 79, 94, 117, 120 ; Ba-
zaine at, 124, 129; Castagny
called to, 130; 138; 140; 143.
St. Barbe, village and church
tower, 151, 152, 153; ravine,
154. 156 ; 277, 278, 279, 280.
St. Dizier, 234.
St. Germain, ravine, 214.
St. Hilaire, 170, 182.
St. Hubert, farm, above Grave-
lotte, narrow causeway by, 194;
strong, 196 ; contest at, 205,
206, 207, 212; slopes near, 213 ;
Germans hold, 214 ; last fights,
215, 216 ; in twilight, 217, 218.
St. Julien, fort, 148$ 278, 279.
St. Maroel, 169.
St. Marie aux Chines, Canroberft
occupies, 195 ; Gennan Guard
advance on, 198, 202, 203 ; held
by French, 206, 207 ; described,
208; attack on road through,
209; abandoned, 209; Saxon
guns north of, 219; lagh road
to, 221 ; General Pape at, sends
out Guard, 222.
St. Menehould, 232, 242, 251.
St. Menges, 296, 301, 306 ; Ger-
mans occupy, 307, 308; and
push on, 309, 310, 311.
St Mihiel, 240.
St Privat la Montague, see (xrave-
lotte, 194-225.
St Quentin, Mount, fort, 159 ;
161 ; 194, 195; highest point of
position, 196 ; 214.
St Ruffine, 211, 215, 218.
Salignac-Fenelon, General, 315.
Salzburg, meeting of Austrian
and French Emperors at, 33.
Sansonnet, 161.
Sarreguemines, Montaudon at,
117 ; 118, 119 ; retreat on, 128,
129 ; 137, 138.
Saner, stream, and Sulz, 100, 107.
Saulny, 223; wood of, 224, 2*26.
Saveme, 99, 112; retreat on, 114,
115, 116 ; railway tunnels west
of, 144.
Saxon 12th Corps, 267 ; at Beau-
mont fight, 269.
Saxon horse cut off Lebmn*s bag-
gage, 287.
Saxon infantry at St. Marie, 210.
Saxons in Daigny, 304, 305.
Saxony, King of, in Pirna, cited,
229.
INDEX.
879
Saxony, Prince Royal of (Crown
Prince), at Gravelotte, 198 ; at
Aubon^, 207, 210 ; in com-
mand of Army of the Mease,
230, 241 ; 244 ; at Clermont in
Argonne, 254 ; to cross Meuse,
260; early march to Beaumont,
264; to attack, 285 ; anticipates
orders, 291 ; secures Chiers
bridges, 292, 297.
Saxony, Prince Greorge of, holds
French, 263, 207, 208.
Schellendorf, Colonel Bronsart
von, 320.
Schlotheim, General von, 248.
Schmidt, Captain, artillery feat,
127.
Schultz, General, engineer, 284.
Schwarzkoppen, General von, 181,
182.
Schwerin, General von, 121.
Sedan, 14SJ@4; Bazaine suggests
retreat onj 242, 249 ; 256, 266 ;
occupation of, 272, 274-276;
281; 286-289; 294; battle-field
described, 295, 297 ; battle of,
298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303 ;
Emperor returns to, 311 ; final
efforts, 316; end of battle, 317;
condition of interior, 319 ; losses
on both sides, 336.
Seille, river, reached by patrols,
140; 142; 148; 151; 158; 189.
Selz, 85.
Semuy, 249.
Senuc, 250 ; 264.
Sermaize, 232.
Servigny, 148, 155, 279, 280.
Sesmaisons, Captain, 289, 290.
Seton, Captain, remarks on
Steinmetz, 212.
Sheridan, General, U.S., 322.
Sierck, 70.
Spachbach, 103, 107.
Spicheren, Frossard takes post at,
94 ; 117 ; French position, 116,
117, 118; battle-field, 119, 120;
battle, 121-130; 137; temerity
of German advance guard, 158.
Spires, 70.
Solf erino, effect of French success,
6 ; Napoleon's saying after,
318.
Sommauthe, Bavarians in, 274.
Sommerance, 264.
Sourd, M. le, presents Declara-
tion of War, 1, 52.
Steinmetz, General von, com-
manding First Army, 68, 76-78,
95 ; characteristic speech of,
121; begins Spicheren battle,
122, 139, 142; advances, 149,
157 ; instructions from Moltke,
165, 191, 192, 197, 198 ; at Grave-
lotte, 204; 211-217, 278.
Steinburg, Woerth, 115.
Stenay, on the Meuse, MacMahon
hopes to cross at, 242, 243 ;
247 ; 256, 264, 268.
Stephan, General von, 294.
Stiring-Wendel, village (Spich-
eren), 120-124 ; 127-129.
Stoffel, Colonel, 251, 252.
Stonne, Emperor at, 253, 262;
defiles leading to, 266; Ger-
mans in, 274.
Strasburg, 66, 67; 131, 132; 143;
283; bombardment, 284; siege,
285.
Stiilpnagel,Greneralvon, at Spich-
eren, 121 ; at Vionville, 172,
173, 174
880
THE CAMPAIOK OF SEDAK«
Siiippe, river, 243.
Bulx and Saner, 96, 08.
Tann-Kathflamhansen, General
▼on der, hiji Bavarian troops,
01, 100, 104; at Beaumont
figlit, 267, 269, 271 ; fires on
Bazeillea, 293, 294 ; 297-299.
Teterchen, 139.
Thianconrt, 163, 164 ; cannonade
heard at, 181.
Thiers, M., speech against war,
61.
Thionville, 131; Grerman cuiras-
siers at, 141 ; 230, 231, 245, 276.
Tholoy, 75, 76, 79.
T411iard, General, 315.
Tirailleurs d^artUlerie^ 174; Can-
robert's phrase, 201.
Tixier's, General, division, Vion-
viUe, 180.
Toroy, 272, 274 ; 296, 317.
Toul, town and fortress, 135;
governor of, summoned by
Uhlans, 164, 189 ; siege of, 232,
283.
Tourteron, 249, 293.
Turenne, Vicomte de, bom at
Sedan, 321.
Tumier, Colonel, 276.
Treves, 66, 76, 93.
Triaucourt, 232, 264.
Trocliu, GenertU, proposition to
Emperor, 237 ; governor of Paris,
238, 239.
Tronville, village and woods, 169,
171, 173, 176, 177, 180-185.
Uhrich, General, governor of
Strasburg, 283, 284.
Uhlans, 140, 141, 213, 232.
Valahr^e, General, 169, 178.
Yalaz^, General, at Spicheren,
120, 123; at Vionville, 172,
174.
Yalli^reB, brook, 27&
Yalmy, battle-field, 239.
Varennes, 247, 254, 257.
Varize, 149.
Vassy, 233.
Vassoigne, General, 298.
Yauban, fortified Sedan, 321.
Yaudemont, 233.
Yautoux, 166.
Yerdun, 131, 169; road, 164, 165,
170, 176, 188-199, 193 ; Germans
moving towards, 232 ; 240, 241,
242; Napoleon's despatch from,
276, 277 ; fortress untaken,
283.
Yerg^, General, holds Stiring, 126,
129 ; at Yionville, 171.
Yem^ville, 161, 169, 177, 188, 199-
208.
Yerri^reSjWlirtembergers at, 274,
293.
Yerviers, Emperor at, 337.
Yictor Emmanuel. SeeltsXj^ King
of.
Yienne le Chftteau, 257, 264.
Yillette, 310.
Yillemontrey, 270, 273.
Yilleneuve, General, 270, 272.
Yillers au Bois, 169.
Yillers-Cemay, 287, 300, 306.
Yillers below Mouzon, 266, 271,
273.
YUlers TOrme, 156, 280.
YiUe sur Yron, 183.
Yinoy, General, 253, 289, 290;
and troops escape, 293 ; 336.
Yionville, 164; 166; -Mars la
INDEX.
381
Tour battle, 167-187 ; road to-
wards, after battle, 190, 229.
Vitry, 232, 233 ; cavalry capture
stray French, 234, 241.
Void, 232.
Voigts-Rhetz, Greneral von, com-
mander of 10th Corps, comes up
at Mars la Tour» 170, 182.
Volkingen, outposts in contact,
78.
Voncq, Germans take prisoners
at, 263.
Vosges, mountains, 66, 67 ; de-
files i>f, open, 115, 116; 131;
143.
Vouziers, MacMahon's army at,
234, 243, 245, 24S, 250, 257,
259.
Vr^my, 148, 279.
Yrigne au Bois, 307.
Wadem, remarkable march from,
127.
Wadelincourt, 310.
Walther, General von, begins
attack at Woerth, 101.
Wamifordt, hamlet, 271.
Warren Wood, or Bois de la Ga-
ronne, 317.
Wedell, General von, at Vion-
ville, 182.
Weise, Colonel von, 184.
Werder, General von, at Woerth,
100, 104 ; bombards Strasburg,
283 284.
William I., King of Prussia, Re-
gent in 1858, work and plans,
2, 3 ; military reform, 3, 4, 5 ;
council in Berlin, 9, 10; Ho-
henzoUem candidature, Bene-
detti at £ms, 42-45 1 leaves
Ems, 46 ; mobilization, 52 ;
restores Order of Iron Cross,
70; characteristic journey to
Mainz, 72 ; headquarters at
Hemy, 158, 165; at Pont k
Mousson, 189; joins Prince Fre-
derick Charles, 190 ; his armies
facing the Rhine, 193; on
Flavigny heights, 197, 204;
watches fight from Malmaison,
214; sanctions advance on Fros-
sard, 215, 216; 231; starts
for Paris, 232, 234; 242; con-
sulted, issues orders for grand
right wheel, 246 ; Bar le Due,
254; at Clermont, 255; Va-
rennes, 259 ; Grand Pr^, 264 ;
and staff on hill near Buzancy,
269 ; 284 ; orders to Crown Prince
and Saxon Crown Prince, 285 ;
at Sedan, 320, 321, 322, 323,
332 ; meets Napoleon, 335 ;
greets troops, 336 ; hears of
Paris Revolution, 338.
Winterfeld, Captain von, 320.
Wimpffen, General de, 1, 52;
arrives at Sedan, 288, 296;
takes command, 301, '302, 303,
307, 311, 312, 315-317; conduct
during negotiations and Capitu-
lation, 319, 325-335.
Wiseppe, stream, 262.
Wissembourg, 84, 85 ; K'v'silf^j 86-
90 ; 91 ; 167 ; road fron> Thauiiaii
to, by Pirmasens, 67.
Woerth, bridge broken, 91 ;
French position, 96 ; battle,
101-114; consequences, 115,
116.
Woippy, road out of MetztCf, IC^
223.
882
THE CAMPAIGN OF SEDAN.
Woyna, General von, at Spich-
eren, 123, 126; at Colombey,
163.
Wurtemberg, Prince Augnstus
of, at Gravelotte, 199, 203;
sends in Guard, 219, 220; at
Givonne, 306, 308.
Wurtemberg joins Prussian mili-
tary system, 14.
Wiirtembergers, 254, 2
Xonville, 163.
Yron, river, 183, 186.
Yoncq, 271, 272.
Zastrow, General von, at Spich-
eren, 121, 125; at Golombey,
153, 166, 157, 191, 192.
Zieten hussars, 261.
Zingler, Captain von, 334.
Zouaves escaped to Paris, 304.
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