x
JOHN
CHANCELLOR
BOYLEN
^7
C/ c
CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Canada s Hundred Days
With the Canadian Corps from Amiens
to Mons, Aug. 8 - Nov. 11, 1918.
By
J. F. B. Livesay
With Portrait and Maps
TORONTO I
THOMAS ALLEN
1919
COPYRIGHT, CANADA, 1919
BY THOMAS ALLEN, TORONTO
PRINTED IN CANADA
CONTENTS
PART I. AMIENS
PAGE
I. The Situation on the West Front 1
II. The Canadian Corps Ready for Battle 6
III. From Arras to Amiens 15
IV. The Battle Opens 24
V. Operations : Aug. 8 34
VI. Operations : Aug. 8. Continued 42
VII. Operations : Aug. 9-11 52
VIII. Operations : Aug. 12-20 61
IX. Operations : The Canadian Cavalry Brigade 70
X. Sidelights of Battle ; 77
XL Lessons of the Battle 86
XII. French Scenes 96
PART II. ARRAS
I. Planning Attack on Hindenburg Line 109
II. Wayside Scenes 116
III. Operations : Aug. 26-27 122
IV. Operations : Aug. 28 133
V. Operations : Aug. 29 143
VI. Operations: Sept. 1-3; Drocourt-Queant Line 151
VII. Operations: Sept. 1-3; Drocourt-Queant Line.
Continued 159
VIII. After the Battle 168
IX. No Man s Land 176
v
vi CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
PART III. CAMBRAI
PAGE
I. Confronting the Canal du Nord 185
II. The First Battle of Cambrai 193
III. The Plan of Attack 201
IV. Marching up to Battle 211
V. Operations : Sept. 27 219
VI. Operations : Sept. 27. Continued
VII. Operations : Sept. 28-29 240
VIII. Operations : Sept. 30-Oct. 2 253
IX. Operations : Sept. 30-Oct. 2. Continued 263
X. After the Battle 274
XL The Corps Commander 286
XII. Capture of Cambrai 298
XIII. Conclusion of the Battle of Cambrai 310
PART IV. VALENCIENNES TO MONS
I. Battle Pieces 319
II. Operations : Oct. 6-16 326
III. The Advance on Denain
IV. Operations: Oct. 20-30 348
V. Capture of Valenciennes
VI. Welcome to the Deliverer
VII. Capture of Mons
VIII. The Mons Road
IX. Into Germany 40
Index 409
ILLUSTRATIONS
PAGE
Sir Arthur W. Currie, K.C.B., K.C.M.G., Canadian Corps
Commander Frontispiece
Map to illustrate Battle of Amiens
Map to illustrate Battles of Arras and Cambrai
Map to illustrate operations, Cambrai to Mons 384
Vll
PREFACE
THIS book has been written to give the Canadian people
a clearer, fuller, conception of the wonderful work of the
Canadian Corps during the Hundred Days. To that
consideration every other has been subordinated.
By identifying so far as possible the actual battle position
of individual battalions it is hoped to stimulate local pride
and interest in their respective territorial or recruiting areas.
Difficulties were here encountered, both through absence of
detailed official narratives and limitations of space, but if full
justice has not been done each fighting unit, it is not from lack
of application and goodwill.
With this prime consideration always in mind, it has been
sought to make the book intelligible to the general reader as
well as to the military student and pains therefore have been
taken to explain at length for the former military technicalities
and terminology that come within the common knowledge of
the latter.
Whenever practicable the original and official sources
drawn upon for description of operations have been quoted.
Such may at times be a little tedious but is preferable to loose
paraphrasing which, while denying the reader an inspection
of the documentary evidence, makes heavy drafts upon his
credulity. Thus the Official Report of the Corps Commander
covering these operations has been reproduced practically in
full, paralleling in its proper place the general narrative.
This might be expected to make for confusion and overlapping,
but in practice it has not altogether worked out that way, for
whereas the Official Report deals mainly with technical
aspects, the book itself seeks to clothe these with the pulsating
life and color of the battlefield. The alternatives must have
been either to have buried the Official Report in a lengthy
Appendix, or to have omitted it altogether. It is felt the
IX
x CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
right course has been followed because whatever the book may
suffer from these occasional breaks in the story, this loss is
overwhelmingly counter-balanced by placing before the reader
in an accessible form this extremely valuable and compellingly
interesting report, carrying with it the authority of an
authenticated historic document.
Among official or semi-official narratives of which free use
has been made are those of the 1st Canadian Division, the 4th
Canadian Division, the 4th Canadian Infantry Brigade, as
well as several battalion narratives. Valuable material has
been drawn from the narrative of the First Army, published
by the London Times, entitled, "The Final Blow of the First
Army in 1918."
The author is greatly indebted to a number of friends of
all ranks in the Canadian Corps for information and sugges
tions. Special acknowledgement must be made of the very
efficient work of Lieut. J. I. P. Neal, Canadian Corps Survey
Section, who throughout these operations superintended the
Corp Maps Section, and has now prepared the accompanying
maps and plans.
WINNIPEG, CANADA,
AUG. 26, 1919.
J.F.B.L.
AMIENS
AMIENS
CHAPTER I
THE SITUATION ON THE WEST FRONT
ON July 18, 1918, Marshal Foch, supported by new
American levies, struck his hammer blo\# on the Marne.
We shall hear a good deal in history of Chateau Thierry
and the great victory, but it remains that at the end of July
the West Front the traditional West Front of Flanders,
Picardy and the Somme was intact, unpierced, to all seem
ing an impregnable wall built by German blood and iron.
But it was not the line of 1917. The spring offensive had
cramped its defenders into a narrower, a more perilous ring.
In the north the enemy bivouacked on the field of Passchen-
daele and from Mount Kemmel cast his shadow over the
Channel ports; to the south he was knocking at the gate of
Amiens and thrusting through Montdidier at Paris; only in
the centre, at Souchez, on Vimy Ridge and before Arras,
where through all those fateful days of March and April the
Canadian Corps had kept watch and guard, the line of 1917
stood firm.
There is abundant evidence that at the end of July, while
the enemy regarded the situation in the south as serious and
was preparing to admit that his last great offensive had failed,
he still held the West Front the Somme, the Hindenburg
Line and the valley of the Lys to be invincible, and counted
on the British armies frittering away their strength upon its
formidable defenses as they had in 1916 and 1917. Further
than that, he had actually in preparation a new offensive on
the Amiens-Montdidier front with which he hoped to restore
the military balance in his favor. It was only after the Battle
i
2
CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
of Amiens, in which the Canadian Corps took so glorious and
leading a part, that he began to despair.
Ludendorff clearly admits this in his book. "The defeat
of our arms on Aug. 8 in the Franco-British offensive near
Albert and north of Montdidier finally resulted in our losing
hope for a military victory," he writes. "Conferences were
held with Chancellor von Hertling, Admiral von Hintz, the
foreign minister, and Field Marshal von Hindenburg, on Aug.
14, 15 and 16, and there was also a meeting of the Crown
Council at which I clearly stated that the war could not be
won militarily."
The "kick-off" of Aug. 8 at Amiens was the first general
offensive attempted by the British armies in 1918, and the
events leading up to it must be briefly rehearsed in order to get
a true strategic picture. This can best be done in the words of
Field-Marshal Haig, as contained in his famous "Victory Dis
patch" of Dec. 21, 1918. After describing the weakened con
dition of the forces at his command following the enemy
offensive, he says : "The German attacks, though they had
failed to break the Allied line, had stretched the resources of
the Allies to the uttermost; while before Amiens and Haze-
brouck they had brought the enemy within a short distance of
strategic points of great importance. In these circumstances
the possibility of an immediate renewal of the enemy s offensive
could not but be viewed with grave anxiety. . . .
"At the commencement of the period under review, early
in May, the Allied High Command repeatedly expressed the
opinion that the enemy would renew his attack on a large
scale on the front Arras-Amiens-Montdidier. The strategic
results to be obtained by the capture of Amiens, the separation
of the French and British armies, and an advance toward the
sea along the valley of the Somme, were very great, and might
well have proved decisive. The enemy s opening offensive
(in March and April) had already brought him within a
measurable distance of success in this direction, and had car
ried his armies through practically the whole of our organized
lines of defense.
THE SITUATION ON THE WEST FRONT 3
"In short, the enemy still possessed a sufficient superiority
of force to retain the initiative, and it was known he would be
compelled to act within a comparatively limited time if he
were to turn his superiority to account before it passed from
him. These were the two main factors which had to be taken
into consideration when deciding the policy of the British
armies during the late spring and early summer. The com
mon object of the French and ourselves was to tide over the
period which must elapse until the growth of the American
armies and the arrival of Allied reinforcements placed the
opposing forces once more on a footing of equality."
The situation was an anxious one, but, as it turned out, the
enemy was in no condition to push a new offensive and when
it did come at last he elected for a direct thrust at Paris from
the Aisne front. Launched at the end of May, this great
offensive swept steadily on until, despite the desperate resist
ance of the French, reinforced by British and American troops,
the Marne was reached, and it culminated on July 15 with
the opening east and south-west of Rheims of what was to
prove the last enemy blow on the grand scale. On July 18
Foch struck his shattering counter-stroke.
Meanwhile the British armies on the West Front had been
engaged in what Field-Marshal Haig describes as a period of
active defense. This included local attacks, the building of a
new system of railways behind Amiens, and the digging of five
thousand miles of trench. The lesson of the necessity for great
depth of defense had been hardly learned in March.
Coming to July he says: "Two months of comparative
quiet worked a great change in the condition of the British
armies. The drafts sent out from England had largely been
absorbed, many of the reinforcements from abroad had
already arrived, and the number of our effective infantry divi
sions had risen from forty-five to fifty-two (this in addition to
nine British divisions engaged on the Marne) . In artillery we
were stronger than we had ever been."
As a consequence we entered early in June on more ambit-
4 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
ious local offensive operations, in which the Australians had a
considerable share. "By the end of July," he goes on, l( the
reconstitution of the British armies had been completed, and
the success of their various local operations had had a good
effect. I had once more at my command an effective striking
force, capable of taking the offensive with every hope of
success when the proper moment should arrive."
That moment now approached. "At a conference held on
July 23," Field-Marshal Haig writes, "when the success of
the attack of July 18 was well assured, the methods by which
the advantage already gained could be extended were discussed
in detail. The Allied Commander-in-Chief asked that the
British, French and American Armies should each prepare
plans for local offensives, to be taken in hand as soon as pos
sible, with certain definite objectives of a limited nature.
These objectives on the British front were the disengagement
of Amiens and the freeing of the Paris-Amiens railway by an
attack on the Albert-Montdidier front. The role of the French
and American armies was to free other strategic railways by
operations farther South and East. .
"It would depend upon the nature of the success which
might be obtained in these different Allied operations whether
they could be more fully exploited before winter set in. It
was subsequently arranged that attacks would be pressed in a
converging direction towards Mezieres by the French and
American armies, while at the same time the British armies,
attacking towards the line St. Quentin-Cambrai, would strike
directly at the vital lateral communications running through
Maubeuge to Hirson and Mezieres, by which alone the Ger
man forces on the Champagne front could be supplied and
maintained."
Such a movement would also threaten the group of German
armies in Flanders, and, therefore, "it was obviously of vital
importance to the enemy to maintain intact his front opposite
St. Quentin and Cambrai, and for this purpose he depended
upon the great fortified zone known as the Hindenburg Line."
THE SITUATION ON THE WEST FRONT 5
It is necessary to keep this in mind, as it is the key to the extra
ordinary fierce resistance the enemy maintained throughout
the critical days of the Battle of Cambrai.
Summing up the general scheme of British operations,
Field-Marshal Haig says : "The brilliant success of the Amiens
attack was the prelude to a great series of battles, in which,
throughout three months of continuous righting, the British
armies advanced without a check from one victory to another."
This period was divided into two well-defined phases, the
first being the breaking through of the Hindenburg Line, and
the second the pushing of the enemy before us from his hastily
prepared defenses. "The second phase had already reached
its legitimate conclusion when the signing of the armistice put
an end to the operations. Finally defeated in the great battles
of Nov. 1 and 4, and utterly without reserves, the enemy at
that date was falling back without coherent plan and in wide
spread disorder and confusion."
CHAPTER II
THE CANADIAN CORPS READY FOR BATTLE
IT is the purpose of this book to trace the leading part the
Canadian Corps played in the Battle of Amiens and in the
subsequent great offensives that carried it from Arras
through the Drocourt-Queant Line, across the Canal du Nord,
over the stricken field of Cambrai, and thence to Valenciennes
and Mons. In those proud days of victory, no less than in the
long stern years of trench warfare, it lived up to its great
reputation. Its deeds speak for themselves. As that tried
soldier, the King of the Belgians, remarked in Mons, there is
no corps in Europe of higher renown. In the words of its
commander Sir Arthur Currie: "In the last two years of
strenuous fighting the Canadian Corps never lost a gun. never
failed to take its objective, and has never been driven from a
foot of ground it has once consolidated."
What was the Canadian Corps doing in the spring and
summer of 1918? Little was heard of it during the great
spring drive, nor through May, June and July. People at
home were asking what was the matter. Had it not yet got
over its bloody wounds of Passchendaele? Was it not to be
thrown in to stiffen the weakening line? On Aug. 8 it was to
burst again upon their consciousness almost with the force of
a blow.
After the hard-won victory of Passchendaele in October,
1917, the Canadian Corps returned to its old line before Lens
and on Vimy Ridge, where an offensive had been planned just
before it had been moved north. Corps Headquarters returned
to Comblain 1 Abbe and remained there throughout the winter
and spring months, the time being employed in holding and
strengthening the Vimy front and in assimilating reinforce
ments to make good the wastage. When the March offensive
THE CANADIAN CORPS READY FOR BATTLE 7
came, it was anticipated that the attack would develop north
of Arras, and the sector became vitally important because if
this pivot of our defense went, there might be no stopping
short of the sea.
Behind this there was another vital consideration. This
story may be apocryphal it does not matter, for in essence it
is true. Foch was asked to use the Canadian Corps to stem the
tide of invasion. "No," came the reply so the story goes-
"I cannot afford to do that. By their valor the Canadian
troops won back at Vimy the most valuable of our remaining
coal fields. These are the nerve centre of France. We can
not afford to entrust their defense out of the hands of my Cana
dians."
In his despatch of July 8, 1918, Sir Douglas Haig wrote
that behind Vimy Ridge "lay the northern collieries of France
and certain tactical features which cover our lateral communi
cations. Here . . . little or no ground could be given
up." In the same connection the Canadian Corps Com
mander, Sir Arthur Currie, in his Interim Report on the opera
tions of the Corps during 1918, writes: "A comparative shal
low advance beyond the Vimy Ridge would have stopped the
operation of the collieries, paralysing the production of war
material in France. . . On the other hand, a deep penetra
tion at that point, by bringing the Amiens-Bethune railway
and main road under fire, would have placed the British Army
in a critical position by threatening to cut it in two and by
depriving it of vital lateral communication. The tactical and
strategical results to be gained by a moderate success at that
point were so far reaching in effect that, notwithstanding the
natural difficulties confronting an attack on that sector, it was
fully expected (i.e., before the March offensive developed)
that the German offensive would be directed against this, the
central part of the British front."
He goes on to tell of the great defensive works built up by
the Canadian Corps on the Vimy front during the winter in
anticipation of the 1918 enemy spring drive, a story of interest
8 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
in itself, but not to be described in detail here. It must suffice
to say that if the blow had fallen in this sector the result would
have been far different to what befell at St. Quentin.
After March 21 the pressure became very great and there
was a tendency to throw in Divisions of the Canadian Corps
wherever needed. "Thus, under the pressure of circum
stances," writes Sir Arthur Currie of the situation at the end
of March, "the four Canadian Divisions were to be removed
from my command, placed in two different armies (Third and
First), and under command of three different Corps (VI,
XVII and XIII). This disposition of the Canadian troops
was not satisfactory, and on receipt of the orders above referred
to I made strong representation to First Army, and offered
suggestions which to my mind would reconcile my claims
(from the standpoint of Canadian policy) with the tactical
and administrative requirements of the moment."
As a consequence the 1st., 3rd. and 4th. Canadian Divi
sions were reunited under his command and given a very
extended line. "From April 10 until relieved (May 7) the
Corps held a line exceeding 29,000 yards in length; the 2nd.
Canadian Division, then with the VI Corps, was holding 6,000
yards of front, making a total length of 35,000 yards of front
by the four Canadian Divisions. The total length of the line
held by the British Army between the Oise and the sea was
approximately 100 miles; therefore the Canadian troops were
holding approximately one-fifth of the total front. Without
wishing to draw from this fact any exaggerated conclusion, it
is pointed out that although the Canadian Corps did not, dur
ing this period, have to repulse any German attacks on its
front, it nevertheless played a part worthy of its strength dur
ing that period."
But although the Canadian Infantry did not take active
part in repelling the great enemy drive, its other arms were
worthily represented. At 1 1 p.m. on the night of March 22-
23, in the blackest hours of the Somme fighting, word came to
Canadian Corps Headquarters for the 1st. Canadian Motor
THE CANADIAN CORPS READY FOR BATTLE 9
Machine-Gun Brigade, then in the line on the Vimy sector, to
be withdrawn and move south to the Fifth Army area. By the
following midnight all its batteries were in action on a 35-mile
front east of Amiens, having travelled over 100 miles during
the day.
Sir Arthur Currie describes its activities as follows : "The
1st. C.M.M.G. Brigade (Lt.-Col. W. K. Walker), under
orders of the Fifth and later of the Fourth Army, was ordered
to fight a rearguard action to delay the advance of the enemy
and to fill dangerous gaps on the Army fronts. For 19 days
that Unit was continuously in action north and south of the
Somme, fighting against overwhelming odds. Using to the
utmost its great mobility, it fought over 200 square miles of
territory. It is difficult to appraise to its correct extent the
influence, material and moral, that the 40 machine-guns of that
Unit had in the events which were then taking place. The
losses amounted to about 75 per cent, of the trench strength of
the Unit, and to keep it in being throughout that fighting, I
authorized its reinforcement by personnel of the Infantry
branch of the Canadian Machine-Gun Corps."
Fighting over the same ground, and with equal gallantry,
was the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, attached to the British
Cavalry Corps. The brilliant work of both arms in the desper
ate and successful effort to stem the enemy hordes will ever be
a proud chapter in Canadian military annals.
On May 7 the Canadian Corps, with the exception of the
2nd. Canadian Division, still in the line in the Third Army
area, was relieved and placed in General Headquarters
Reserve in the First Army area. This movement is explained
by the Times History as follows: "After consultation with
the Commanders of the First and Second Armies at the more
northern portions of our line, it was determined that each
should contribute what divisions could be spared to form a
General Reserve for the British Army for use where it might
be required. The Canadian Corps formed part of this force
and was intended for counter-attack in case the enemy broke
10 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
through the British front. Its place of assembly was in front
of Amiens."
Early in May Canadian Corps Headquarters moved to
Pernes and on May 25 to Bryas. There followed a period of
intensive training in the tactics of the offensive, the three divi
sions not in the line being concentrated in the area Monchy
Breton-Lignereuil-Le Cauroy-Dieval-Auchel-Chateau de la
Haie. While they are there we may enquire briefly into the
causes that led to the recognition of the Canadians as a corps
d elile, to be used as storm or shock troops in desperate or
critical adventures.
Canada s first contingent has been described as a mob of
amateur soldiers passionately inspired to give their all for a
great cause. Discipline was lax, the officers unproved, and
though the stuff was there, it took time to transmute it into the
perfect fighting machine it became. Take the simple matter
of saluting. To men of democratic birth and habit of mind,
saluting had in it something of kow-tow to the young officer
it seemed an insult to his men, the tried comrades of his civil
life, and they in turn might resent the implication of a social
distinction that had no existence in fact. And so, for long,
saluting was a perfunctory affair.
But there came certain officers who explained patiently and
carefully that saluting was of the essence of military life-
that the constant exercise it affords of vigilance and smartness
is part and parcel of the making of a good soldier. At the end
of the war there was no smarter saluting in the British Army
than that of the Canadians, as there were no better marching
regiments, no superior Staff work, no alerter Intelligence, nor
more scientific gunnery.
The Canadian Corps owes an immense debt to its former
Commander, Sir Julian Byng, who first welded it into a per
fectly co-ordinated fighting machine, knit together in spirit
and applying to all its problems and difficulties the idea of a
common loyalty to the Corps. It was not long when in the
shock of battle the Canadian Corps came into a full apprecia-
THE CANADIAN CORPS READY FOR BATTLE 11
tion of its own strength and superiority over the foe. Pass-
chendaele had been the fast of these occasions. On that field
fell many brave young Canadians, but the Corps went on to
victory, not daunted by loss nor unduly elated by success.
A number of special causes contributed to the pre-eminence
of the Canadian Corps "As good as the old Guards," they
said in London. One was that it was at full strength through
out. Where owing to the waste of war other Corps were
obliged to cut down the number of their bayonets, the Cana
dian Corps always maintained its forty-eight Battalions of
Infantry, divided into twelve Brigades and four Divisions,
with unusual strength in Artillery and Corps Troops. Right
up to the Battle of Cambrai reinforcements of trained men
were always forthcoming, and this proved the wisdom which
resisted proposals to create the Sth. Canadian Infantry Divi
sion, and then a sixth, with the ultimate prospect of two weak
Corps of three Divisions each. By a rather happy chance this
proposal went so far as the actual formation in the depots in
England of the 5th. Division, whose trained units proved
highly valuable reinforcements, while the 5th. Canadian Divi
sional Artillery was brought over to France intact and thus the
Canadian Corps had at its disposal no less than five artillery
divisions, besides a number of heavy artillery brigades,
throughout these operations.
Much of the success during the intensive fighting to follow
was due to the great strengthening the Canadian Corps
received during the winter and spring of 1918. On Aug. 8 the
Corps went into action stronger numerically than any other
Corps in Europe. How this was brought about, and in face of
what dangers, is best explained in Sir Arthur Currie s own
words: "At this time (i.e., the winter of 1917-18) the British
Army was undergoing far-reaching alterations in its organ
ization. The situation as regards man-power appeared to be
such that, in order to maintain in the field the same number of
Divisions, it was necessary to reorganize the Infantry Brigades
from a four-battalion basis to a three-battalion basis.
12 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Although the situation of the Canadians regarding reinforce
ments appeared to be satisfactory so long as the number of
Divisions in the field was not increased, a proposal was made to
adopt an organization similar to the British, that is, to reduce
the number of Battalions in the Canadian Infantry Brigades
from four to three. Concurrently with this change, it was pro
posed to increase the number of Canadian Divisions in the
field from four to six.
"I did not think that this proposal was warranted by our
experience in the field, and I was quite certain that, owing to
the severity of the losses suffered in modern battles, the man
power of Canada was not sufficient to meet the increased
exposure to casualties consequent on the increased number of
Canadian Divisions in the field.
"I represented very strongly my views to the Minister,
Overseas Military Forces of Canada, and, on further consider
ation, it was decided to drop this project and to accept instead
my counter-proposal, viz., to increase the establishment of the
Canadian Infantry Battalion by 100 of all ranks, to proceed
with the reorganization of the Engineers and Machine-Gun
Services, and to grant the various amendments suggested by
establishments of other Arms and Branches. I am glad to be
able to say that my proposals regarding the reorganization of
Engineer Services, Machine-Guns, etc., as well as the increase
of strength of the Infantry Battalions, received the favorable
consideration and support of the Commander-in-Chief."
Commenting on this, the Canadian Overseas Minister, Sir
Edward Kemp, says: "The Canadian Corps in the existing
formation had proved itself a smooth-running machine of
tremendous striking power, and any radical alteration in its
constitution might have resulted in a reduction of such power
without any compensating advantages. At a time of national
crisis, such as that in the spring of 1918, it would not have been
permissible to allow sentiment to stand in the way of any
change likely to further the common cause. Every soldier
would have been prepared to sacrifice the pride which he had
THE CANADIAN CORPS READY FOR BATTLE 13
in his particular Brigade and in the Corps as a whole. At the
same time it should be a matter of deep gratification to all
Canadians that, for practical reasons, it was possible to avert
what, from a sentimental point of view, would have almost
amounted to a national calamity, namely, the breaking up of a
Corps, which as such had gained a unique position among the
armies of the Western Front."
For six Divisions meant two weak Corps instead of one
strong one. It must have meant loss of that corps spirit that
made the Canadian Corps a thing apart. More valuable even
than its material strength was the fact that it was perhaps the
only corps in the British Army to maintain its identity through
out all its units its Divisions, its Brigades, its Battalions, its
leaders, its staff and the whole body of officers and rank and
file. Other Corps had little about them permanent but their
name and their staff. They became the clearing-house for
Divisions brought from all quarters, used for a special pur
pose, and then removed elsewhere. This resulted inevitably
in lack of corps spirit, so conspicuously present throughout the
Canadian Corps.
The average Canadian citizen thinks in terms of the "Can
adian Forces," or the "Canadian Army"; he does not appre
ciate just how every Canadian soldier cherishes the idea of the
"Canadian Corps." It may serve to make the point clear by
quoting from the report of Sir Edward Kemp referred to
above. "The word Corps is an abbreviation of the term
Army Corps, and at present is a very uncertain and indefinite
military term. In the military sense to-day it means a forma
tion consisting of a Headquarters, from two to six Divisions,
and a varying number of Corps Troops composed of all arms,
and is ordinarily commanded by a Lieutenant-General. Army
Corps in the British Army during this war have never been
stable units, varying month by month (and often day by day)
as to their composition, Division and Corps Troops being very
frequently transferred from corps to corps.
"The Units composing the Canadian Corps have, however,
14 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
been so far fortunate as to have been mostly under the same
Commander and administered by the same staffs. Canadian
Units and Formations have been taught to look upon them
selves as belonging to the Canadian Corps, and whilst away
from the Corps have been spoken of as being attached to other
Corps; and in consequence a very true esprit de corps has
sprung up amongst all Canadian Units administered by the
Canadian Corps Headquarters."
We have seen how the Corps Commander fought hard to
preserve the Corps as an entity. It meant something more
than a hundred thousand men or so of all arms. In illustration
a little digression may be permitted. At a later day a certain
infantry unit had the honor of first entering Cambrai. A
newspaper correspondent proceeded to congratulate a com
pany officer on the work of his battalion. "Don t say that," he
said. "It isn t the Fifth Canadian Mounted Rifles; it isn t
even the Eighth Brigade or the Third Canadian Division-
it s the good old Corps that s captured Cambrai ; you know our
motto, One for all and all for one. There was something
rather fine about this at such an hour, when men s emotions
run high, but it was the instinctive spirit of the Canadian
soldier.
CHAPTER III
FROM ARRAS TO AMIENS
THE Canadian Corps was fortunate that it had in Sir
Arthur Currie a chief it both loved and trusted, a bril
liant citizen soldier it was proud to follow anywhere.
But its greatest asset lay in the unconquerable spirit of the rank
and file, bred to free open skies, adaptable to changing circum
stances, seasoned by many battles, inured to hardship, sub
mitting willingly to stern discipline thus transmuting these
clerks, artisans, lawyers, farmers, railway-men, lumber-jacks
and the like, into as fine a body of professional troops this war
has produced but troops that all so happily sought only in
victory the hour to lay aside the sword and return to the
plowshare.
And now before them was a splendid adventure. On July
1, the 2nd. Canadian Division was at last relieved from the
line, the 3rd. Canadian Division taking its place. It had passed
under orders of the VI Corps on March 28, relieving the 3rd.
British Division in the Neuville Vitasse Sector just south of
Arras, and on the night of March 31 extended its front south
wards by relieving the left battalion of the Guards Divi
sion. The front held extended from south of the Cojeul river,
east of Boisleux St. Marc, to the slopes of Telegraph Hill,
6,000 yards. The 2nd. Canadian Division held this front for
an uninterrupted period of 92 days, during which time it
repulsed a series of local attacks and carried out no less than
27 raids, capturing three officers, 101 other ranks, 22 machine-
guns, and two trench-mortars, and inflicting severe casualties
on the enemy. The aggressive attitude adopted by this Divi
sion during those critical days and under such adverse con
ditions had a most excellent effect on the troops generally, and
it certainly reduced to the lowest point the fighting value of
15
16 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
two German Divisions, namely, the 26th. Reserve Division
and the 185th. Division.
On June 30, when the 2nd. Canadian Division was about
to leave the Third Army Command, General Byng sent the
following letter to M a j.- General Sir Henry Burstall: "I
cannot allow the 2nd. Canadian Division to leave the Third
Army without expressing my appreciation of the splendid
work it has done. Knowing the Division of old, I had great
anticipations of offensive action and thorough field defense
work. These anticipations were more than realised and the
2nd. Canadians have now added another page of lasting record
to their history. I can only hope that they are as proud of their
work as I was of again having them under my command."
It returned under orders of the Canadian Corps on Domin
ion Day, but its rest was brief, for on July 6 the Canadian
Corps was warned to be prepared to relieve the XVII Corps
in the line, being released from G. H. Q. Reserve on July 10
and completing the relief by July 15. Disposition at that time
was as follows :
Headquarters Canadian Corps, Duisans (First Army
Area) ; 2nd. Canadian Division, in the line, Telegraph Hill
Section; 1st. Canadian Division, in the line, Feuchy-Fampoux
Section; 4th. Canadian Division, in the line, Gavrelle-Oppy
Section.
Under VI Corps. (Third Army Area) .
3rd. Canadian Division, in the line, Neuville-Vitasse Sec
tion.
The general policy adopted was to foster in the mind of
the enemy the idea of a pending attack in order to retain or
draw his reserves into this area, and consequently active patrol
ling was carried out by day and night and raids were constantly
engaged in. The artillery executed a vigorous programme of
harassing fire and counter-battery work. From prisoners it
was learned that the enemy expected an attack and that troops
had been frequently rushed forward to defend the Drocourt-
Queant Line.
FROM ARRAS TO AMIENS 17
On July 20 the Corps Commander was informed of the
plan for the Amiens offensive. Then came the admirable
piece of work that led the enemy to believe the Corps was
going to Flanders. To quote Sir Douglas Haig: "Prelimin
ary instructions to prepare to attack east of Amiens at an early
date had been given to the Fourth Army Commander, General
Sir Henry Rawlinson, on July 13, and on July 28 the French
First Army, under General Debeney, was placed by Marshal
Foch under my orders for this operation. Further to
strengthen my attack, I decided to reinforce the British Fourth
Army with the Canadian Corps, and also with the two British
divisions which were then held in readiness astride the Somme.
In order to deceive the enemy and ensure the maximum effect
of a surprise attack, elaborate precautions were taken to mis
lead him as to our intentions and to conceal our real purpose.
Instructions of a detailed character were issued to the forma
tions concerned, calculated to make it appear that a British
attack in Flanders was imminent. Canadian battalions were
put into line on the Kemmel front, where they were identified
by the enemy. Corps headquarters were prepared, and
casualty clearing stations were erected in conspicuous positions
in this area."
So much depended on the secrecy of the movement and in
the deception of the enemy that the precautions taken were
very elaborate. "On July 21," says Sir Arthur Currie, "I
attended a conference at Fourth Army Headquarters, where
the operations contemplated were discussed. The Fourth
Army Commander dwelt upon the importance of secrecy.
The operation as outlined at the conference was of lim
ited scope, and was designed to relieve the pressure on Amiens
and free the Amiens-Paris railway line, thus improving the
situation at the junction of the French and British Armies. A
large number of Tanks were to be made available for this
operation. The methods for maintaining secrecy and mis
leading the enemy were discussed. I pointed out that I had
been considering a scheme for the capture of Orange Hill
3
18 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
(east of Arras), and it was agreed it would help materially to
deceive everybody if preparations for this scheme were still
continued. . .
"The following day a conference of Divisional Com
manders and members of the Corps Staff was held at Canadian
Corps Headquarters, where the outline of the scheme for the
capture of Orange Hill was explained, and the Divisional
Commanders and heads of branches and services concerned
were asked to make all preparations for this attack as quickly
as possible. It was stated that Tanks would be available for
the operation and it was therefore essential that all concerned
should familiarize themselves with the combined tactics of
Infantry and Tanks. I explained that demonstrations had been
arranged with the Australians and that it was my wish that
the greatest possible number of officers should witness them.
"In the meantime the enemy was to be harassed on the
whole Canadian Corps front by Artillery and Machine-Gun
fire, and numerous raids were to be carried out to secure posi
tive identifications (thus leading the enemy to anticipate an
early attack in force). Further conferences were held from
time to time at the Fourth Army Headquarters, where plans
were made for the necessary reliefs and moves, and the neces
sity of the maintenance of secrecy emphasized.
"On July 26 the Fourth Army Commander stated that the
plans originally put forward, and which had been approved
by the Commander-in-Chief, had been modified by Marshal
Foch, in that the First French Army would now co-operate
with the Fourth British Army and be responsible for the right
flank of the attack. On July 27 the general boundaries and
the objectives of the first day were fixed, and movements of
the Canadian Corps and Tank Units were arranged. It was
decided notably that Units were to leave their areas without
knowing their destinations, and that it would be given out
freely that the Canadian Corps was moving to the Ypres front,
where the Second Army expected a German attack.
"With a view to deceiving the enemy, two battalions of the
FROM ARRAS TO AMIENS 19
Canadian Corps were to be put in the line in the Kemmel
area, and two Canadian Casualty Clearing Stations were to be
moved to the Second Army area. Canadian Wireless and
Power Buzzer Sections were to be despatched to the Kemmel
Sector, and messages were to be sent worded so as to permit
the enemy to decipher the identity of the senders.
"Meanwhile the Canadian Divisions were busy preparing
their scheme of attack on Orange Hill, and numerous Tanks
were ostentatiously assembled in the vicinity of St. Pol. . .
On July 29 the XVII Corps was ordered by First Army to
relieve the Canadian Corps in the line during the nights of
July 31 -Aug. 2, reliefs to be completed by daylight on Aug. 2.
. . This Army order stated plainly that the Canadian Corps
would be prepared to move to Second Army, which, as indi
cated above, was then holding the northern section of the
British front.
"The 27th. Canadian Infantry Battalion and the 4th. Cana
dian Mounted Rifle Battalion respectively, from the 2nd. and
3rd. Canadian Divisions, were moved by strategical train to
Second Army area where they were placed in the line. They
did not rejoin their Divisions until Aug. 6. On this day, July
29, the Canadian Divisional Commanders were personally
informed of the operations which were to take place on the
Fourth Army Front, and they were instructed not to discuss
the operations with any of their subordinate Commanders.
On July 30 Canadian Corps Headquarters moved to Molliens-
Vidame, and the transfer of the Canadian Corps from First
Army area to Fourth Army area began.
"When this move was well under way and in order to con
tinue to deceive our troops as to their eventual employment, a
letter issued by First Army was repeated to all Canadian Divi
sions and communicated by them to their formations and
Units, stating that the Canadian Corps was being transferred
to the Fourth Army area, where it would be held in G. H. Q,
Reserve and be prepared in case of attack to:
"1. Move south at short notice to assist the French on the
Rheims-Soissons front.
20 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"2. Support either the First French Army or the Fourth
British Army."
It has seemed worth while to describe these measures at
length for in their result they furnished the greatest surprise
attack of the war. There were some curious developments.
Certain foreign officers, attached for liason purposes to the
Canadian Corps, hurried north to secure good billets at the
new Corps Headquarters. An indignant message came to
British G. H. Q .from the Belgian G. H. Q. staff to the effect
that the Canadian Corps was being moved to Belgian territory
without notice of any kind, whereas common courtesy should
have suggested that the Belgian Army be notified in order that
it might be in a position to make arrangements for the comfort
and well-being of the Canadian troops.
Necessarily the destination was a profound secret, and
officers of even high rank within the Corps who knew it might
be counted on the fingers. One by one the Divisions moved,
roundabout routes being followed, and, until it developed the
general direction was south, the men for the most part thought
they were going back to the Salient. Thus at the end of July
the 3rd. Canadian Division came out of the line and moved
west to the vicinity of Doullens, where it entrained under
sealed orders, battalion commanders even not knowing whether
they were going north, south, east or west.
As an example of how it was done, the 8th. Brigade, C. M.
R., detrained at Prouzel and marched that night to Hebecourt,
where they lay hid next day, marching the following night to
the Bois de Boves, west of the Avre, arriving on Aug. 2, the
rest of the division being behind them. On that night they
moved up into the Gentelles trench system, behind the
Australian support line, where there was accommodation for
a large body of troops. Absolutely no movement was per
mitted during the day, not a single man being allowed out of
the trenches and dug-outs, except for reconnaissance. The
7th. and 9th. Brigades joined the 8th. on Aug. 6. All roads
were packed, the brigade taking five hours to get from Boves
to Gentelles Wood an hour and a half s march.
FROM ARRAS TO AMIENS 21
Even the confidential men employed with the Corps Gen
eral Staff were equally mystified. Corps Headquarters was at
Duisans when early in the morning of July 30 they were
ordered to prepare for an immediate move. There was much
speculation. Some declared it was to Kemmel, others to Sois-
sons; while one ingenious theory was that the Canadian Corps
was to be shipped to Zeebrugge there to fall on the enemy rear
in Flanders. The long train of sixty or seventy lorries moved
off with no other guide than a transport officer on a motor cycle
who declined to talk. That evening Corps Headquarters was
established at Molliens-Vidame better known to the Cana
dian soldier as "Molly-be-damned" -a dozen miles due west
of Amiens.
There followed a week of strenuous preparation. "Red
tabs" are not popular in the army but no one who watched the
staff officers of the Canadian Corps then and through the over
charged weeks to follow could have anything but admiration
and wonder. There is no Sunday in the army; and there are
no specified hours, except that a man works until he can see no
more, catches a few hours sleep, and goes at it again; fourteen
hours a day week in and week out was quite normal ; in active
operations officers of the General Staff and "A" and "Q"
branches would work right through the 24 hours. All had not
the wonderful physique of the Corps Commander whom one
left studying battle reports at two in the morning and heard at
breakfast that he had been in the field at six o clock.
It was a breathless bustle at "Molly-be-damned," not least
so for the staff of the Canadian Artillery, which had to work
out in detail the ranges and the barrage of the great opening
show. Then the Intelligence branch had the collection and
collation of last-minute information, whether from our air
craft or by prisoners. Three clerks of the General Staff
worked in a tent by themselves all were under canvas and it
rained a good deal engaged day and night in copying out
operation orders, which in great detail must all be prepared
and in the hands of the various commanders. These three
CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
clerks for a whole week led the life of Trappist monks, refus
ing converse with their fellows. Finally about noon of a
Thursday "Come Sergeant, tell us when the show is to open,
that s a good fellow," one wheedler petitioned. "The show
opened at twenty minutes past four this morning and by now
we are 6,000 yards inside the Boche lines,"
On Aug. 7 the first echelon of Corps Headquarters moved
to Dury, a village on the Paris road three miles south of
Amiens. A faint buzzing went round among the messes that
there would be an attack within the next day or two Friday
was generally selected. That afternoon the Corps Commander,
Sir Arthur Currie, had a talk with the two Canadian corres
pondents. Before him was a large scale map and the barrage
map. It was all very clear and lucid. We take up our line
here; our first objective is there; "zero" hour was named (and
this of course a dead secret from all but the privileged few) ;
our final objective for the day over there constituting a world
record for a first day s advance!
One was struck with the speaker s simplicity and his quiet
confidence and certainty. He, of course, knew the Canadian
Corps and what it could do. It was a finely tempered weapon.
It had been proved before in the tightest corners in the
Somme, at Vimy, and more recently at Passchendaele. where it
had gone in and conquered; gone in against the better judg
ment and advice of the Corps Commander himself but gone
in where others had failed, to win.
And now added to this war experience were the long
patient intensive months of preparation; the knowledge that
the artillery support was to be the greatest known; and that all
units went into the field actually over strength, with ample
reinforcements on the spot to make good casualties. He knew
his men oh, abundantly he knew them and trusted them ; he
knew, too, their leaders, from the Divisional Commanders
down to the platoons, and had the assurance there would be no
botching.
And yet when all this was admitted there was something
FROM ARRAS TO AMIENS 23
astonishing in this calm certainty; for our Intelligence people
had it straight the enemy was massed in that very sector for a
new offensive had they not but the day before attacked in
force the III Corps immediately north of the Somme? In all
the history of the West Front nothing so ambitious had been
proposed, let alone accomplished. The biggest things in which
the Canadian Corps had been engaged were but small affairs
beside this; and then there was the memory of other shows
that had promised great things but had turned out but half-
successes or flat failures, had we but had the courage to adrm t
as much.
But confidence of that kind is infectious. After the talk
was over we agreed on our luck in being in for the biggest
thing yet.
CHAPTER IV
THE BATTLE OPENS
SO at last all is ready. The story goes that the Corps Com
mander was asked how soon could he deliver the Corps in
fighting trim at the appointed place. "By the tenth," he
had said. "Too long; do it by the eighth." And he did it; an
epic feat.
It meant hardship. Some units only reached the ground
to go straight into action. But everything was there. Every
field battery in place, with ammunition to burn; all the
imperial "heavies"; the tanks, great and small; cavalry, supply
columns, signallers, ambulances everything.
And it was all done secretly and by night. For an entire
week the men of Canada were passing south from their old
front, taking circuitous and puzzling routes. None knew
where they went. They moved by night, sleeping by day,
without gossip or undue curiosity. That was essential to the
greatest surprise attack the war had produced. They were
going into a fight, and they were ready. They sang as they
marched a thing they had not done for two years.
Foremost that night of nights was one s sense of wonder at
how it had been done; how, by many tangled threads of rail
way and lorry and march, all that great and intricate machine
more complex far than Wellington had gathered on the field
of Waterloo had been assembled in perfect order to the
minute.
From Canadian Corps Headquarters at Dury a cross-road
runs through St. Fuscien and thence downhill into Boves,
where we pass over the Avre. Except for a scurrying
despatch-rider, all traffic is going the one way miles on miles
of lorries and dark masses of marching men. The night pre
sents a sky clear and starry, with light just sufficient to illumine
24
THE BATTLE OPENS 25
the track and silhouette the regulated avenues of trees insepa
rable from a French highway. Far above is the drone of our
air craft. "Heine" is not over, or the curious scene could
scarce escape his attention. The white roads are chequered
with moving oblongs of black. All Canada is on the march.
So down a steep hill into the interminable street of Boves
that leads at length to the Avre. It is a puny stream, its
ancient stone bridge no bigger than a good-sized western cul
vert. Later on our men are to bathe in the Luce, waist deep
in its biggest pool. These rivers are poor affairs but they have
been inscribed by the blood of her sons upon the roll of
Canada s history. Their trickling streams turn decrepit mill-
wheels, but their names march on down the generations the
Somme, the Avre, the Luce, the Scarpe, the Cojeul, the Sensee,
the Scheldt, the Souchez or the Lys.
On the far side lies the hamlet of St. Nicholas and thence
it is a long climb over chalk uplands to the wood of Gentelles.
Up the winding hill go all the impedimenta of war marching
battalions, traction-engines towing great guns, ammunition
trains, long lines of Red Cross lorries; everywhere the pungent
odor of petrol. From every little wood belch forth men. They
march silently. They might be phantoms, dim hordes of
Valhalla, were it not for the spark of a cigarette, a smothered
laugh. There is no talking. All is tense excitement. For
miles and miles in a wide concentric sweep every road and
lane and bypath is crowded with these slow-moving masses.
Over the bare hillsides lumber the heavy tanks, just keeping
pace with the marching men. Should the enemy of a sud
den lay down a barrage, our losses must be appalling sheep
for the slaughter.
On these light chalky uplands the recent rain has drained
away and the going is good. At length, somewhat footsore, we
pass through a gaunt village unhappy Gentelles where
stars shine down through skeleton rafters and all is ruin. Pre
sently the troops are defiling into their appointed place, the
Australian support line. For Australian units still man the
26 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
trenches in front of us, lest an enemy raid give the show away.
So rigid have been the precautions that none of the Canadian
officers and men on leave have been recalled. Not for days
later do some staff officers rejoin their headquarters, a bitter
disappointed lot. Berlin thinks we are in Flanders; London
that we are in the south. All is well.
The sky is clear and empty. Only the stars shine down.
These and an occasional flicker in the east and the long-delayed
rumble of a bursting shell. For against the eastern horizon is
the usual pyrotechnic of trench warfare neither more nor
less. Once every few minutes one of our heavy howitzers send
across a shell; a dull report and then a wobbling vibration,
before it steadies down upon its course. More seldom Fritzie
makes reply the perfunctory business of the night- -a shrill
messenger ending in a roar of explosion.
The night is very still. It seems incredible that all this
unpreventable hum and bustle can have failed to reach an alert
enemy. The watch hand is creeping round half past three-
four ten past four an interminable laggard. It is to be the
greatest barrage of the war. What will this stunning experi
ence be like? One can only imagine.
*
"Zero" is set for four twenty, and the pointer has barely
reached that figure when behind us there goes up a mighty
flare, and simultaneously all along the line, ten miles to north
and to south of us, other flares light up the countryside. At
the same instant there breaks out the boom of our heavy guns,
the sharp staccato of sixty-pounders, the dull roar of howitzers,
and the ear splitting clamor of whizz-bangs a bedlam of
noise. Shells whistle and whine overhead; they cannot be
distinguished one from another, but merge into a rushing
cataract of sound.
In front, right athwart the horizon so far as the eye can
reach spreads out a hell of flame and fire and bursting charge,
reverberating back to us in mighty unison that the battle has
begun. Bright from out this fiery furnace break out quick
THE BATTLE OPENS
flashes, shooting into the air and there dividing into twin red
balls the S. O. S. call of the German trenches for artillery
support. But answer there is none; our counter-battery work
is too perfect; their batteries are neutralized; not an enemy
shell comes across; in that murky inferno all is confusion and
terror.
For a minute the din is stunning, but the ear quickly
becomes accustomed. The heavens are lighted up across
their broad expanse by a continuous sheet of lightning, playing
relentlessly over the doomed lines. Now the faint light of
dawn shimmers in the east and soon blots out the fire-works.
A lark rises high, carolling. Our own men can be plainly
made out walking leisurely or so it seems forward, tanks
lumbering ahead. Already some of our field batteries gallop
past hard after the infantry. It is a perfect plan working out
without a hitch. The heavy batteries behind raise the barrage
step by step ahead of the men. All is co-ordinated to victory.
Then down comes the fog, blotting out the spectacle, but sav
ing many casualties.
The attack is such a complete .and overwhelming surprise
that the enemy s initial defense is feeble. Many of his batteries
fall into our hands wearing their tarpaulin hoods, their crews
deep in their dug-outs. Our own artillery comes off almost
scatheless, except among the galloping whizz-bangs, one too
venturous being put out of action by a direct hit at point-blank
range. By nine o clock these field-guns are three miles inside
the enemy front line.
Six hours was set for the lifting of the barrage, but long
before that its work is done and the enemy in headlong flight.
After them go the whippet tanks little uneasy beasts of steel
and petrol that can do their twelve miles an hour across country
when the going is good, and here, over these great rolling up
lands and gentle valleys, it is perfect.
The fog lifts. It is eight o clock. The cavalry, a wonder
ful sight, appear on the scene. They have come up from
Hangest-sur-Somme and have lain over night in the great park
28 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
of Amiens. Like a jack-in-the-box they have sprung from
nowhere miles on miles of gay and serried ranks, led by the
Canadian Cavalry Brigade; Lancers too, and many famous
British regiments. This is the day so long awaited; surely
this is their chance to pass through the broken enemy line, to
harry and raid his back area. As is the cavalry way, they do
reckless and incredible things, and heavy is the price they are
to pay. They pass south of Villers-Bretonneux Villers-Bre-
tonneux of bright memory in darkest days of the March
retreat, now in the hands of the stout Australians, neighbors
on our left.
Already prisoners are coming back, in little knots, in
squads, in whole detachments, sometimes under guard, oftener
left to their own device, mounting soon into the thousands-
slouching figures in field-gray, among them grizzled veterans
and mere striplings, but for the most part in the prime of life
and of good physique. With them a number of officers, some
swearing bitterly, others, jaunty and spruce, still rubbing the
sleep out of their eyes, in good spirits. "You Canadians have
no business down here," says one in excellent English. "We
were told you were in Flanders ; how I would like to hang our
fools of Intelligence officers!"
Intermingled with them come our walking wounded. "A
good blighty!" cried a grinning lad, wounded in the wrist.
"How is it going? Fine. You can t see his heels for the dust!"
He is in kilts, a Highlander from the Pacific Coast, one of the
3rd. Brigade. He tells us how a piper, atop of the tank
"Dominion," led into action his battalion, the 16th. Canadian
Scottish.
The battle has streamed away to the east and the battlefield
of a few hours ago is as peaceful as an Ontario landscape after
storm, whose bolts and flashes still play over the distant
horizon. The most striking thing about the battleground is the
extraordinary good target our gunners made. This was partic
ularly so along the enemy front line and support. In our north-
THE BATTLE OPENS 29
ern area immediately west of Marcelcave this ran over a
wide sweep of prairie, pock-marked throughout with shell
holes in regular sequence, like one of those round boards on
which children play at marbles.
Nothing could have lived there. Nothing did live, as is
attested by hundreds of Boche dead among the ungarnered
wheat; it had afforded good cover to snipers and now to
corpses. Here since March the tide of battle ebbed and flowed
and the crop will not pay the reaping. Some of our men
engaged in "mopping-up" are laden with great store of Boche
gear. Hereabouts too we captured many heavy guns.
Dead horses testify to the heavy shelling which caught our
cavalry as they pushed forward. They offered a clear target to
distant gunners. Where a line of infantry, patiently working
its way along, is almost indistinguishable from the dun color
of the landscape, horsemen stand out boldly against the sky
line.
This plateau, unlike the heavy wooded area on our centre
and right, which fell only after a bitter struggle, offers no
natural impediment. And the enemy, over-confident of his
power in the open field and with the fixed idea of breaking
away from trench warfare, had been to but small pains to dig
himself in. His trenches were rudimentary and the barrage
wiped out much of their outline. There was surprisingly little
wire. More might have been done, because a vast amount
of it was captured it lay in rolls everywhere. But the Boche
was lazy and arrogant; the wondrous superman caught nap
ping.
It was over these trenches our air men performed so gal
lantly. They were to aid the attack by bombing the front and
support lines, but the mist came down in such dense folds that
they must either abandon their job or take perilous risks. So
they flew as low as fifty to a hundred feet, sweeping the
trenches with their machine-guns. Their losses were heavy.
Extraordinary to relate, an enemy trench-mortar secured a
direct hit on one of them, cutting it in two. Their crumpled
30 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
frames lie here and there upon the plateau. Plodding across
the fields are little knots of stretcher-bearers and burial parties.
Occasionally a shell breaks among them, but they carry on
their task unheeding.
From that high level one looks over what had been the
smiling land of France, dotted with bosky villages and grace
ful church spires. Along these roads children came singing
from school, and from this plateau of Santerre was garnered
much of the nation s agrarian wealth. Below that eminence in
the distant days of peace the broad valleys shone in the sun
like the bright pattern of a patchwork quilt the many hues of
the ripening grain ; wheat, oats and barley, millet, vetch and
beans, undivided by hedge or fence but melting one into the
other in their erratic little squares and oblongs undistin
guished indeed save by the bright hues of nature s pallette.
Now all is desolation. The hand of the Hun lies heavy on
the land. Tottering walls and empty shells are all that are left
of the villages ; church towers are levelled in sad heaps of stone
and mortar, or, less happy, expose to heaven scarred flanks and
desecrated altars. Not a living soul is to be seen save men in
khaki. Upon this road stands a monument : "To the heroes of
the army who on this spot made their heroic stand in the war
of 1870" -mentioning them lovingly by name, Officier this
and Soldat that; it has been torn in two by a shell.
Already in a dug-out, wherein a few hours before the
Boche sat secure, a forward dressing-station is established.
Here first aid is given to all and sundry, our men and Boche,
stretcher cases and walking wounded. Prisoners reinforce our
over-taxed stretcher-bearers, working in parties under their
own officers, good-natured, ingratiating. The Y.M.C.A. is
here too, and serves out indiscriminately hot tea, biscuits, cho
colate and cigarettes. There is a little grumbling because the
Boche fare as well as our own men, but it is a free hand-out
and the supply seems inexhaustible. Especially are the tired
troops grateful for the cigarettes, a scarce commodity.
THE BATTLE OPENS 31
A young farmer from the Ottawa Valley, a walking case,
tells of his experiences. He is full of the battle and with diffi
culty is persuaded to go back three or four days it is all so
long ago! "Our battalion, the Second, was at rest a few
miles west of Arras," he says. "We knew something was in the
air. Two days before we moved, all the pay-books were col
lected, and when we got them again a notice was pasted on the
back warning us to be careful in our talk with the French
people and ending up with, Keep Your Mouth Shut.
"On the evening of Aug. 4 we got our moving order and
marched about three hours to a small station where we en
trained in box cars, labelled, forty men or sixteen horses. We
had our rations and bunked on the straw. No, we hadn t the
faintest notion where we were going, but the talk was back to
Ypres.
"Next morning we passed through a biggish town and some
one said it was Abbeville, and from there until noon the rail
way followed a river valley. We detrained at a little station
where we had tea with our bully beef and then marched two or
three hours. It was very warm, and raining. Finally we came
to a village we knew not what. There we had tea and expected
to spend the night, but were ordered to march again. We
rested once in a field and all of us, officers included, supple
mented our ration with raw turnips.
"At about ten that evening we crowded on to lorries. Once
going up a long hill we stuck in the mire and got off to lighten
the load. Away back on the main road behind us we could see
a solid line of headlights, like a gigantic serpent endless lor
ries laden with troops. Early next morning, just after dawn,
we got off at a village and marched into a wood, where we
bivouacked all day. It was full of troops and guns and horses.
Showers kept sweeping over us and the ground was sodden,
but we were dead tired and slept most of the day.
"That evening a few men were picked out from each
platoon to stay behind as a reserve about enough from the
whole battalion to make up a company. For the first time we
were served out fresh meat which we packed along. Then
CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
when evening came we started a long heavy night march. The
roads were choked with moving columns of men, guns and
lorries. We passed down a steep hill through a village and at
two o clock in the morning came to a wood where we were to
stay. Dog-tired we lay down in the damp and pulled our
ground-sheets over us. Shortly after sun-up the Boche started
to shell the wood. The whole wood was packed with men like
sardines. We ran across the 38th. Battalion, another Ottawa
unit, and sang out to them. We met many of our old chums
and had a good time. We hoped for a day s rest but that fore
noon were put on fatigue, packing up water and ammunition.
We slept in that afternoon.
"In the evening a canvas bag was handed round to each
man and we were given two days iron rations, with Mills and
smoke bombs. I was getting pretty well loaded down, for
being one of the machine-gun unit I was carrying twenty
pounds of ammunition there were seven of us : the N. C. O. ;
No. 1 , carrying the Lewis gun ; No. 2, carrying the spare parts ;
and the rest of us the ammunition. Each platoon was given a
map and our officer and sergeant explained the lie of the land
and our objective, and we were told to take particular note of
the Luce river, which we were to cross. This was the first hint
we had as to where we were ; some of us had an idea that we
were due east of Amiens, but we were further south. Batteries
were coming up and taking their positions.
"At half past ten we were off again and marched up towards
the line, getting to our positions at one in the morning of Aug.
8. We understood the British were holding the sector, and
were surprised when we heard it was the Australians. Rising
ground lay between us and the front line a mile away. We
were tired out and opened cans of bully beef and beans and
had a little breakfast. Then we lay down but it was bitter
cold. No body of men could have been fitter physically; we
were in fine trim and excellent spirits, and had confidence the
Canadians would go through anything they were up against.
But we knew we were in for a hard job and a lot of us wouldn t
be there next night. We weren t exactly keen on going in,
THE BATTLE OPENS 33
but meant to do the job right. Our officer was out in front
reconnoitering while we were asleep. He was a fine chap and
we felt he knew what he was about and we could follow him
with confidence. At about a quarter to four the corporal came
around with a shot of rum, which was welcome, for we were
cold all through.
"At four twenty a 6-inch naval gun set the ball rolling,
followed by 12-inch howitzers and the terrible racket of a
whizz-bang battery right in the valley behind us. We waited
twenty-five minutes, our Third Brigade jumping-off first
they were the Canadian Highlander battalions. The tanks
were a great sight. All night long we had heard them puffing
and groaning as they took up their position and wondered why
the Boche didn t too. But our bombing planes flew overhead
drowning their noise.
"We couldn t see anything of the battle because of the slope
in front of us, but soon we were off, and as we reached the
front line we passed the time of day with the Australian boys.
The mist came down but lifted again an hour or two later and
by that time we were working along through wheat fields.
Over on our flank we saw some Boche machine-gunners beating
it back, fighting as they went, and we started to work round
them. Our own gun was now in action. Suddenly I spotted a
Boche machine-gun 75 yards dead ahead of us. We threw
ourselves down and tried to outflank him, but he got me here
and killed our No. 1. Our N. C. O. took the gun and another
man my harness and ammunition. Our section commander
was hit and had to go out, but he took out with him a Boche
machine-gun officer, who had surrendered. He was hit in the
leg and was leaning on his arm. I beat it out too and ran
across this dressing-station. There won t be room in the lorries
so after my arm is dressed I shall hike back to a Casualty
Clearing Station."
He didn t say much about himself, this lad, but he had been
through some of the hottest fighting of the war. "Our bar
rage," he said, "didn t seem anything like so bad as what the
Boche put down on us in March 1917."
4
CHAPTER V
OPERATIONS : AUG. 8
THE impressions of an onlooker recorded above are of a
rather confused scene, the rough and tumble of battle,
where but a fraction of the canvas comes under the eye
and no just estimation can be formed of the picture as a whole.
In reality it has been all worked out beforehand in minutest
detail and every piece falls into its place almost automatically.
The plan and course of the first day s operations can be best
followed in the words of the Corps Commander :
u The front of attack was to extend from Moreuil to Ville-
sur-Ancre on a front of approximately 20,000 yards. The
dispositions of the troops participating in the battle were as
follows :
"(a) On the right from Moreuil to Thennes (inclusive)
-The First French Army under orders of Com-
mander-in-Chief, British Army.
" (b) In the centre from Thennes (exclusive) to the
Amiens-Chaulnes Railway The Canadian Corps.
"(c) On the left from the Amiens-Chaulnes Railway to
the Somme The Australian Corps.
"(d) The left flank of the Australian Corps was covered
by the III (British) Corps attacking in the direc
tion of Morlancourt.
"The object of the attack was to push forward in the direc
tion of the line Roye-Chaulnes with the least possible delay,
thrusting the enemy back in the general direction of Ham, and
so facilitating the operations of the French on the front
between Montdidier and Noyon."
The French on our left were not to attack until our move
ment had been well advanced. The battle front of the Cana
dian Corps exceeded 8,500 yards in a straight line, from a point
34
OPERATIONS : AUG. 8 35
about half a mile southwest of Hourges to the Amiens-
Chaulnes Railway, crossing the Luce river about half a mile
north of Hourges and then trending in a northerly direction
west of Hangard, through the western edge of Hangard Wood,
to east of Cachy, whence it swung off to the northeast, joining
the Australian line on the railway just east of Villers-Breton-
neux.
For the purpose of the operation the following units were
placed under the Canadian Corps Commander: 3rd. Cavalry
Division (including the Canadian Cavalry Brigade) ; 4th.
Tank Brigade; and 5th. Squadron, Royal Air Force. A
mobile force was organized consisting of the 1st. and 2nd.
Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigades, the Canadian Corps
Cyclist Battalion, and a section of 6-inch Newton Mortars
mounted on motor lorries. This force was named the Cana
dian Independent Force, placed under command of Brig.-
General R. Brutinel, and given the task of co-operating with
the cavalry in the neighborhood of the Amiens-Roye road,
covering the right flank of our right division and maintaining
liason with the French.
"I was notified," continues Sir Arthur Currie, "that two
British Divisions were held in Army Reserve, and could be
made available in the event of certain situations developing.
The total Artillery at my disposal amounted to 17 Brigades of
Field Artillery and nine Brigades of Heavy Artillery, plus
four additional batteries of long-range guns."
The Canadian Corps was disposed as follows :-- -On the
right the 3rd. Canadian Division, Major-General L. J. Lip-
sett, in liason with the French; in the centre, the 1st, Canadian
Division, Major-General A. C. Macdonell; on the left, the
2nd. Canadian Division, Major-General Sir Henry E.
Burstall, in liason with the Australians ; in reserve, behind the
3rd. Canadian Division, the 4th. Canadian Division, Major-
General Sir David Watson.
The Australian Corps, Lieut.-General Sir J. Monash, had
two divisions in line, the 2nd. Division on the right in liason
36 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
with our 2nd. Division, and the 3rd. Australian Division on
the left, resting on the south bank of the Somme, with the Sth.
and 4th. Australian Divisions in support. North of the
Somme the III (British) Corps had the 58th. and 18th. Divi
sions in line and the 12th. Division in support. It may be
explained here that in recording all dispositions, objectives
and the line held, it is the practice to name Units as from the
right flank, on the south in the present case, to the left, or north.
The objectives of the Canadian Corps for the first day
were :
(1) The Green Line, just east of the line Hamon Wood-
Courcelles - Marcelcave - Lamotte en Santerre
(north of the Amiens-Roye railway).
(2) The Red Line, just east of Mezieres-Maison
Blanche-Camp Vermont Farm and the high
ground east of Guillaucourt, on the Amiens-
Chaulnes railway.
(3) The Blue Line, comprising the outer defenses of
Amiens, which ran east of the line Hangest-Ques-
nel-Caix-Harbonnieres.
The latter was not intended as the final objective for the
day, and the Cavalry was to exploit beyond it if possible. The
average depth of penetration necessary to capture the Blue
line was 14,000 yards.
The ground was very difficult, most of our forward area
consisting of bare slopes exposed to enemy observation from
the high ground south of the Luce River and east of Hourges.
On our right the Luce river and its marshes, from two to three
hundred yards in width, provided an obstacle impassable to
troops. Here the only practicable access to the jumping-off
line was by the bridge and road from Domart to Hourges, a
narrow defile about 200 yards long commanded throughout
by the high ground immediately to the east and especially
from Dodo and Moreuil woods. These conditions rendered
the assembly of troops prior to the attack very difficult, Some
distance west of our front line, woods, villages and sunken
OPERATIONS: AUG. 8
roads gave a certain amount of cover in the preparatory stage,
and in Gentelles Wood space was found for tanks as well as
troops.
"Opposite our front," says Sir Arthur Currie, "the ground
consisted of a rolling plateau cut diagonally by the deep valley
of the River Luce. This river flows almost due west through
a strip of wooded marsh land some 300 yards wide, from which
the sides of the valley rise steeply. Numerous ravines, gen
erally running north and south, cut deep into the plateau, the
ground between these ravines forming, as it were, tactical
features difficult of access and more or less inter-supporting.
Woods and copses are scattered over the area and many com
pact and well-built villages surrounded by gardens and
orchards formed conspicuous landmarks. The remainder was
open, unfenced farm land, partly covered with fields of stand
ing grain. The hostile defenses consisted chiefly of uncon
nected elements of trenches, and a vast number of machine-
gun posts scattered here and there, forming a fairly loose but
very deep pattern."
Our Intelligence had reported that the enemy had 24 bat
talions (less than three Divisions) in the forward area and
about six battalions in support, the latter belonging to Divi
sions on the French front, but known to be situated within the
area we were to attack. It was believed that the enemy had
four Divisions in reserve immediately available, and that two
of these were west of the Hindenburg Line.
The Canadian Corps Commander outlines the battle plan
as follows: "The general scheme of attack was to overrun
rapidly the enemy s forward area to a depth of about 3,600
yards under cover of a dense artillery barrage which would
begin at "zero" hour; then without halting to seize the Red
Line, relying on the help of tanks to overcome the machine-gun
defenses. At that moment the cavalry was to pass through the
infantry and seize the area so far as the Blue Line, supported
on its right flank by the Canadian Independent Force. The
cavalry was to be followed as quickly as possible by the 4th.
38 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Canadian Division, passing through the 3rd. Canadian Divi
sion on the right, and by reserve Brigades of the 1st. and 2nd.
Canadian Divisions in the centre and on the left. Every effort
was to be made to exploit success wherever it occurred. Spe
cial arrangements had been made to support the attack beyond
the Green Line as long as possible with heavy artillery, and
sections of field artillery were detailed to advance in close
support of the attacking infantry.
"The attack had been synchronized with the Australians,
who were to jump off at the same hour as the Canadian Corps.
The First French Army was to submit the Bois de Moreuil to
a 45-minute bombardment before developing infantry action,
but the General Officer Commanding had agreed that the
bombardment should only begin at "zero" hour.
"The Canadian Corps being, as it were, the spearhead of
the attack, the movements of other formations were to be syn
chronized with ours."
It will be seen from the above that a great deal depended
upon the artillery, and before detailing the work of the
infantry, it will be well to give some little account of this
triumph of scientific gunnery. Between six and seven hundred
guns were massed on the Canadian Corps front, and the bar
rage laid down was the greatest of the war to date, far exceed
ing that at Vimy Ridge.
In the first place, the difficulties attending the accumulation
of all kinds of ammunition for the operation in such a short
space of time were very great. The nearest Army dump from
which our gunners could draw ammunition was so far away
that lorries could not make more than one trip a day. Advance
refilling points had not been selected, and the dumping of
ammunition at these points did not really begin until Aug. 3.
There was a great shortage of lorries, a considerable number
of the heavy Artillery Brigades (Imperial) arriving only two
or three days before the attack. When the lorries of these
brigades became available there was not sufficient petrol to
keep them in operation. It may be said in parenthesis that
OPERATIONS : AUG. 8 39
there was a shortage of petrol throughout this operation, the
Canadian Independent Force in particular being put out of
action for a considerable time from this cause.
Add to this the fact that all traffic had to go over two roads
the Amiens-Roye road and the Amiens-Villers Bretonneux
road, the latter being also used for Australian supply and the
general congestion can be realized. Nevertheless, though only
after incredible exertions, many lorries running continuously
for forty-eight and even sixty hours, a great quantity of
ammunition was gathered together, six hundred rounds per
gun being available. Great credit is due the administrative
branches of the Canadian Corps of whom the D.A. and
Q.M.G., Brig.-General G. J. Farmar, was an Imperial officer
of outstanding talent and energy.
The barrage would have been wonderful if the ground had
been known and prepared and every feature of the artillery
problem carefully studied out in advance. It was nothing less
than marvellous when the facts are taken into account that
many of the batteries were only brought up a few hours before
the engagement opened, that it was impossible for them to
expose their presence by any attempt at registration, and that
the barrage had to be plotted out entirely from maps and by
triangulation. The guns were in dormant batteries, unregis
tered and without permanent emplacements when "zero" hour
struck.
It was a triumph for Canadian gunnery. Five days only
were available for preparation, and great credit is due the
G.O.C., Major-General E. W. B. Morrison, his Staff and
Divisional Brigade and Battery Commanders, with their rank
and file. The Canadian Divisional Artillery Commanders
were as follows: 1st, Brig.-General H. C. Thacker; 2nd.,
Brig.-General H. A. Panet; 3rd., Brig.-General J. S. Stewart;
4th., Brig.-General W. B. M. King; and 5th., Brig.-General
W. O. H. Dodds. Great credit is also due the Imperial and
Canadian Heavy Artillery, Brig.-General R. H. Massie,
whose counter-battery work was so magnificent that the enemy
artillery was smothered, and we overran many batteries that
40 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
never got into action and whose crews were deep in dug-outs.
Much of the credit for this was due the Corps Counter-Battery
Officer, Lt.-Col. A. G. L. McNaughton, and his staff.
Sir Arthur Currie describes the first day s operations in the
following terms : "At 4.20 a.m., Aug. 8, the initial assault was
delivered on the entire Army front of attack, and the First
French Army opened their bombardment. The attack made
satisfactory progress from the outset on the whole front.
"East of Hourges, opposite the 3rd. Canadian Division, the
high ground which dominated our front and a portion of the
French front had been seized quickly by the 9th. Canadian
Infantry Brigade (-Brig.-General D. M. Ormond), and the
way was opened for the Canadian Independent Force and the
4th. Canadian Division.
"The very complete arrangements made by the 3rd. Cana
dian Division to keep the bridge open, and to repair the road
completely, allowed the reserves to go forward without delay.
The heavy task of the Canadian Engineers was remarkably
well carried out.
"By the afternoon the Canadian Corps had gained all its
objectives, with the exception of a few hundred yards on the
right in the vicinity of Le Quesnel, where stiff resistance was
offered by unexpected reserves, but this was made good the
following morning. The day s operations, in which the four
Canadian Divisions took part, represented a maximum pene
tration of the enemy s defenses of over eight miles and included
the capture of the following villages : Hangard, Demuin,
Beaucourt, Aubecourt, Courcelle, Ignaucourt, Cayeux, Caix,
Marcelcave, Wiencourt, 1 Equipee and Guillaucourt. In
addition to these, the Independent Force assisted the French
in the capture of Mezieres, which was holding up their
advance.
"The surprise had been complete and overwhelming. The
prisoners stated that they had no idea that an attack was
impending, and captured documents did not indicate that any
of our preparations had been detected. An officer stated that
the Canadians were believed to be on the Kemmel front.
OPERATIONS : AUG. 8 41
It will be interesting to reproduce here the following
extract from Sir Douglas Haig s "Victory Dispatch": "At
4.20 a.m. on Aug. 8 our massed artillery opened intense fire on
the whole front of attack, completely crushing the enemy s
batteries, some of which never succeeded in coming into action.
Simultaneously British infantry and tanks advanced to the
assault. The enemy was taken completely by surprise, and
under cover of a heavy ground mist our first objectives on the
line Demuin-Marcelcave-Cerisy, south of Morlancourt, were
gained rapidly.
"After a halt of two hours on this line by the leading troops,
infantry, cavalry and light tanks passed through and continued
the advance, the different arms working in co-operation in a
most admirable manner. At the close of the day s operation
our troops had completed an advance of between six and seven
miles. The Amiens outer defense line, including the villages
of Caix, Harbonnieres and Morcourt, had been gained on the
whole front of attack, except at Le Quesnel itself. Cavalry
and armored cars were in action well to the east of this line and
before dawn on Aug. 9 Le Quesnel also had been taken. North
of the Somme the enemy was more alert, as the result of the
recent engagements in this sector, and succeeded by heavy
fighting in maintaining himself for the time being in the vil
lage of Chipilly.
"East of the line of our advance the enemy at nightfall was
blowing up dumps in all directions, while his transport and
limbers were streaming eastwards towards the Somme, offer
ing excellent targets to our airmen, who made full use of their
opportunities. Over 13,000 prisoners, between 300 and 400
guns, and vast quantities of ammunition and stores of all kinds
remained in our possession.
"The brilliant and predominating part taken by the Cana
dian and Australian Corps in this battle is worthy of the
highest commendation. The skill and determination of these
troops proved irresistible and at all points met with rapid and
complete success."
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS: AUG. 8. CONTINUED
IN years to come the Canadian historian will be amply
repaid for a patient and minute exploration of the Canadian
battalion narratives. Written on the field, expressed in the
terse and concise language of the soldier, these when collected
together must form an invaluable body of information, and
from that storehouse of tactical movements and isolated acts
of gallantry a complete and detailed picture of every battle in
which Canadian troops have taken part can be correctly
portrayed. But. even were the material immediately available,
such a work must fill many volumes. And yet all the life and
color, the spirit and the essence of battle is contained super
latively in these annals of the battalion, of the company, and of
the platoon the true infantry fighting unit; and therefore it
is proposed within the circumscribed limits of the present
volume to incorporate so far as may be practicable occasional
accounts of the performances of individual units, as being
typical of them all.
As has been seen above, the 3rd. Canadian Division had a
particularly hard task on our right flank, where the ground was
not only extraordinarily difficult, but the plan of the battle
imposed that the French attack on our right should be en
echelon to our success if the term may be used rather than
parallel to our advance.
At the kick-off the 9th. Brigade, Brig.-General D. M.
Ormond, was on our extreme right, along the Roye road, with
the 8th. Brigade on the left of the Divisional area (in contact
with the 3rd. Brigade of the 1st. Canadian Division), the 7th.
Brigade being in support. The 9th. Brigade had very hard
fighting from the start, having to make good along the narrow
causeway from Domart After crossing the Luce the ground
42
OPERATIONS: AUG. 8. CONTINUED 43
rose up steeply to the edge of the plateau, here intersected by
many gullies, swept by heavy machine-gun fire from Dodo
wood on the opposing slope.
Owing to the fog many of the tanks lost direction, and the
infantry were left to their own resources. Both the 43rd. Bat
talion, Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg, and the 116th.,
Central Ontario, had stiff fighting through the woods, being
for a time held up by machine-gun posts. When the mist lifted,
however, the tanks put in very effectual work, reducing these
strongholds, while our intensive barrage prevented the enemy
sending up reinforcements. The Brigade captured many
prisoners and guns of all calibres. This advance was pushed
on down the Roye road through Hamon Wood, where heavy
opposition was again encountered, but the troops engaged were
not to be denied and secured their objectives on the Red Line
on schedule.
On the Brigade left the 58th. Battalion, Western Ontario,
had very heavy fighting, being confronted by many machine-
gun nests. In reducing these gallant deeds were accomplished.
Thus Cpl. Harry Garnet Bedford Miner, of Ridgetown, Ont,
rushed an enemy machine-gun single-handed, killing the entire
crew and turning the gun on the enemy. Later, with two
others, he attacked another enemy machine-gun post and suc
ceeded in putting the gun out of action. Although wounded,
Cpl. Miner refused to withdraw, and rushed single-handed an
enemy bombing post, bayonetting two of the garrison and put
ting the remainder to flight. He was mortally wounded in the
performance of this deed.
On the left of the 9th. Brigade the objectives of the 8th.
Brigade lay through the village of Hangard across the Luce
river at Demuin. This brigade, Brig.-General D. C. Draper,
had been formed in Dec., 1915, from the 1st. and 2nd. Cana
dian Mounted Rifle Brigades, when the exigencies of trench
warfare demanded the service of every available infantryman,
and, unlike the Canadian Cavalry Brigade, continued as
infantry throughout the war. It consisted of the 1st., 2nd.,
44 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
4th., and 5th. C. M. R. Battalions, and with it will always be
associated the terrific fighting of Sanctuary Wood in June,
1916.
On the morning of Aug. 8 the 1st. C. M. R., recruited from
the Canadian prairie west, led off the attack, capturing their
objective of Hangard village. The artillery barrage moved at
the rate of 100 yards every three minutes, thus allowing the
infantry to deal with any enemy encountered. Stubborn
resistance was offered in places, but for the most part enemy
machine-guns and trench-mortars had been done in by our
artillery fire. Owing to the heavy mist the tanks assigned in
support failed to reach the assembly positions in time to jump
off with the infantry, but the barrage had destroyed the wire
and the assault was pushed home with relatively slight loss.
Indeed, the battalion suffered only 63 casualties though they
captured 375 prisoners besides inflicting heavy casualties.
Hangard village being gained, the 2nd. C. M. R., a British
Columbia unit, leap-frogged over and proceeded to attack
Demuin which lay just south of the Luce river in a very strong
position, flanked by a high range of hill to the east and south.
Canadian Engineers under heavy fire built a footbridge over
the river and the village was carried after hard fighting. Here
the attack was taken up by the 7th. Brigade, Brig.-General H.
M. Dyer, that had come up in support, and so fast was the
assault pushed ahead that each of the two battalions in the
line, the 42nd., Royal Highlanders of Canada from Montreal,
and the 49th., from Edmonton, captured an entire enemy bat
tery. Tanks now took part in the advance over the open roll
ing land eastward and all objectives were gained on time.
The 4th. Canadian Division followed the 3rd. Canadian
Division down the Roye road, crossing the Luce at Domart,
and attacked through the 3rd. Division, after the latter had
gained its objective of the Mezieres-Cayeux Road. The
advance was continued with the llth. Brigade, Brig.-General
V. W. Odium, on the right, the 12th. Brigade, Brig.-General
J. H. McBrien, on the left, and the 10th. Brigade, Brig.-Gen-
OPERATIONS: AUG. 8. CONTINUED 45
eral R. J. F. Hayter, in reserve in the centre. Before the
infantry jumped-off at 12.10 p.m., the cavalry and some tanks
had gone through, towards the old Amiens defense system.
The guns had shot themselves out over the 3rd. Canadian Divi
sion s advance, and therefore the only artillery support for the
troops was that of a few batteries which had followed them
along, coming into action when the advance was held up.
The first real opposition came from Beaucourt village, but
this was overcome, and our men pushed forward to Beaucourt
wood, held by the enemy in force, his very heavy machine-gun
fire holding up both our advancing Brigades. Here a very
gallant infantry attack finally cleared up the situation and the
line went forward once more. Considerable opposition was
met and overcome by the 12th. Brigade before they finally
reached the Blue Line. On the right the enemy was making a
stout stand at Le Quesnel, and the fact that here the French
were not abreast of us made the situation more difficult, and
that evening this village remained in the hands of the enemy.
The 1st Canadian Division, the "Old Red Patch," occupied
the centre of the Corps line of attack, and in describing its
operations free use will be made of the very interesting narra
tive of the operations of the Division in the battles of 1918,
prepared and published by its Staff, though considerable con
densation is necessary to keep within available space limits.
The valley of the Luce, after bisecting the 3rd. Division
front, ran in a generally easterly direction for 2,500 yards,
made a sharp bend to the northeast for 1,000 yards, and then
east again to its source, approximately 14,000 yards from the
front line of the 1st. Division, or practically the final objective
of the first day. For a thousand yards in breadth, in front of
our line, lay Hangard Wood, strongly fortified by the enemy.
To reach the first objective, the Green Line, 6,000 yards dis
tant, the troops must attack down a slope, through Hangard
Wood and the enemy front and support trenches, across a
wooded valley known as Morgemont Wood, then capturing
the high ground on which was situated the German main line
46 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
of resistance, then through a sharp valley known as Pantaloon
Ravine in which were many machine-gun positions, and fin
ally on to the forward slope of the north bank of the Luce. On
the extreme right of the divisional area, a thousand yards short
of the Green Line, northeast of Demuin, was the little village
of Aubercourt.
Between the Green and the Red Lines on this sector was
the valley of the Luce, heavily wooded, and throwing off deep
ravines, with the village of Ignaucourt on the river 1,000
yards beyond the Green Line and 2,000 yards short of the Red
Line. The Blue Line throughout our front followed the old
Amiens Defense Line, a single trench line, disused and shallow
for the most part. On the 1st. Division front, between the Red
and Blue Lines, the frontage narrowed to 1,200 yards and
offered a depth of 5,000 yards. For the first 3,000 yards was
the river, then the considerable town of Caix, and 1,000 yards
east the old Amiens Defense Line, the final objective.
The 1st. Canadian Division attacked on a one Brigade
front, the tasks allotted being the capture of the Green Line
by the 3rd. Brigade, Brig.-General G. S. Tuxford, the Red
Line by the 1st. Brigade, Brig.-General W. H. Griesbach, and
the blue line by the 2nd. Brigade, Brig.-General F. O. W.
Loomis. Thus the attack was to take the form of three
separate, distinct blows.
The 3rd. Brigade attacked with the 16th., 13th. and 14th.
Battalions in line and the 15th. and 5th. Battalions in support
-the latter being detached from the 2nd. Brigade, detailed to
take the final objective, if absolutely necessary. Twenty-two
tanks supported the Brigade in its attack. Three batteries
from the Machine-Gun Battalion advanced with the infantry,
and at 5.20 a.m. the 2nd. Brigade of Canadian Field Artillery
followed in support. Little serious fighting took place until
the main resistance line was reached. Here in his trenches the
enemy put up a stiff fight, casualties being heavy on both sides,
but the Highlanders were not to be denied, and the Green
Line was reached well on time.
OPERATIONS: AUG. 8. CONTINUED 47
The character of this fighting is illustrated by the heroic
deed of Pte. John Bernard Croak of the 13th. Battalion, a
native of Glace Bay, Cape Breton. Having become separated
from his section he encountered a machine-gun nest, which he
bombed and silenced, taking the gun and crew prisoners.
Shortly afterwards he was severely wounded but refused to
desist Having rejoined his platoon, a very strong point was
encountered, containing several machine-guns. Pte. Croak.
however, seeing an opportunity dashed forward alone and was
almost immediately followed by the remainder of the platoon
in a brilliant charge. He was the first to arrive at the trench
line, into which he led his men, capturing three machine-guns
and bayonetting or capturing the entire garrison. He was
again severely wounded, this time mortally.
When his company was held up by heavy fire from three
machine-guns, which were seriously delaying the advance, Cpl.
James Herman Good of the same battalion, a native of
Bathurst, N.B., realising the gravity of the situation, dashed
forward alone, killing several of the garrison and capturing
the remainder. Later on, Cpl. Good, while alone, encountered
a battery of 5.9-inch guns, which were in action at the time.
Collecting three men of his section he charged the battery
under point-blank fire and captured the entire crews of three
guns.
The 13th. Battalion, Montreal Highlanders, was recruited
in part from the Maritime Provinces. Equally stiff fighting
was encountered by the 16th. Battalion, Canadian Scottish of
Western Canada, and the 14th. Battalion, Royal Montreal
Regiment. The battalions supporting this successful attack of
the 3rd. Brigade, the 15th., recruited from the 48th. High
landers of Toronto, and the 5th., Saskatchewan, had sharp
work mopping up, the wood being full of enemy dug-outs.
The 1st. Brigade began to move forward at 5.10 a.m., and
at 8.20 crossed the Green Line and carried the attack forward.
This brigade also attacked with three battalions in line, the
2nd., from Ottawa, the 3rd., recruited from Toronto district,
48 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
and 4th., Central Ontario, with the 1st, Western Ontario, in
support. Its attack was carried out without artillery support,
except for the bombardment of distant points by heavy guns.
Six tanks were allotted to it, but 18 actually went in, as 12 of
the 22 that attacked with the 3rd Brigade were still in action.
The objective, the high ground east of Cayeux and the cross
ings of the Luce at this village and at Ignaucourt, was secured
between 11 and 11.30a.m.
In the meantime the 2nd. Brigade had been marching for
ward, and attacked with the 7th. Battalion, British Columbia,
and 10th. Battalion, of Alberta, on the right and left of the
Luce river, with the 8th. Battalion, recruited from the Prov
ince of Manitoba, in support, and the 5th. Battalion, recruited
from the Province of Saskatchewan, in reserve. Fourteen
tanks advanced with the infantry, of which six reached the
final objective. Except on the extreme left, little resistance
was encoutered by this Brigade, the enemy being demoralized.
The 2nd. Canadian Division, on the left of the Canadian
line and in liason with the Australians, launched its attack
from a narrow front, but widened out from Marcelcave to the
north of the Amiens-Chaulnes railway toward Lamotte-en-
Santerre, in order to obtain freedom of manoeuvre for its
attack on the towns of Wiencourt and Guillaucourt on this
railway. It had here to follow high open ground over a
plateau cut by deep valleys and resistance was very deter
mined. The 2nd. Canadian Division was on a single Brigade
front, the 4th. Brigade in the line, the 5th. Brigade behind,
ready to pass through, and the 6th. Brigade in reserve. The
4th. Brigade, Brig.-General R. Rennie, was to capture Marcel-
cave and establish a line 500 yards east. With it were two com
panies of the 14th. Battalion Tank Corps, one Army Brigade
of Artillery, and two batteries of machine-guns. There were
also Canadian Engineers for investigating and repairing dug
outs.
The troops moved forward in a mist, and instead of fol
lowing the tanks, they found it necessary to lead the way. On
OPERATIONS: AUG. 8. CONTINUED 49
the right was the 18th. Battalion, Western Ontario, with the
19th. Battalion, Central Ontario, on the left, in close touch
with the Australians. At 6.23 a.m. the barrage lifted from
Marcelcave and the troops rushed the village. Its capture
was completed by 7.20 by the 19th. and 21st. Battalions, the
latter being from Eastern Ontario. While leading his Bat
talion into action, Lt.-Col. Elmer W. Jones was killed by
machine-gun fire, the command of the 21st. Battalion devolv
ing upon Maj. H. E. Pense.
Meantime the 18th. Battalion had done good work towards
Morgemont wood. All battalions in the Brigade had hard
fighting, the 20th Battalion, of Toronto, though in support,
suffering heavy casualties while mopping-up.
The 5th Brigade, Brig.-General J. M. Ross, advanced in
support of the 4th. Brigade. Owing to the very heavy fog
prevailing at the kick-off, units of the latter advanced rapidly
without encountering opposition, passing in this way over
wooded areas where the enemy lay hid until they had gone
through. As a consequence the 5th. Brigade, following up at
about 6 a.m., ran into heavy and quite unexpected machine-
gun and rifle fire, progress being slow and its units losing
heavilv in both officers and men. The tanks were on ahead and
tt
the infantry had to fight it out alone.
In this way the 26th. Battalion, New Brunswick, Lt.-Col.
A. E. G. McKenzie, was badly cut up in Snipe Copse, south of
Marcelcave, losses of officers being very great. A Lieutenant,
a junior subaltern in his company, found himself in command
of it before reaching his objective and was later recommended
for the greatest bravery and skilful leadership, inspiring his
men to fresh exertions. So heavy were the casualties in the
Battalion, that at one time it was seriously checked. The
Officer Commanding, however, gathered together the battalion
staff, including cooks and batmen, and led them into the
assault, thus saving the situation, and the Battalion continued
on to its objective.
The 24th. Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Montreal, of the
5
50 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
same Brigade, was also in line, and lost heavily in the early
morning. The tanks suffered heavily, as the open, level coun
try made them fair targets once the mist had lifted. The 5th.
Brigade, in face of stiffening opposition, pushed on its attack,
and captured its objective of the Red Line, Wiencourt and
Guillaucourt. All its units had hard fighting, Lt.-Col. Wyse
of the 25th. Battalion, Nova Scotia, being wounded, while the
22nd., French Canadians, though in support, had a number of
casualties.
Towards evening the 6th. Brigade, Brig.-General A. H.
Bell, went through the 5th. Brigade and captured its final
objective, the old Amiens defense line, with the 31st. Battalion,
Southern Alberta, on the right, and the 29th. Battalion, British
Columbia, on the left. In close support were the 27th. Bat
talion, Manitoba and 28th. Battalion, Saskatchewan. The
fighting was stiff and the 28th. was drawn into it before the
Blue Line was won.
Notwithstanding the very hard going, the 2nd. Canadian
Division thus captured all its objectives on time. Although,
owing to its prolonged period in the line, it had not had the
same months of training in open warfare as our other Divi
sions, its troops proved themselves readily adaptable to the new
conditions.
The 2nd. Australian Division, on our immediate left, made
good progress, advancing beside us through Bayonneviller to
east of Harbonnieres, but south of the Somme the 3rd.
Australian Division was held up a good deal by the failure of
the III British Corps to make any substantial progress north
of that river. This Corps had been subjected to a heavy attack
two days before and had only succeeded on Aug. 7 in regaining
ground lost and was in no condition to push with vigor a new
offensive on the grand scale.
Thus ended the first day of the battle, in which all four
Canadian Divisions had been engaged, the greatest penetra
tion, east of Caix, representing a depth of 16,000 yards from
the jumping-off line and thus constituting a record first day ?.
OPERATIONS: AUG. 8. CONTINUED 51
advance on the West Front. Over six thousand prisoners had
been captured, exceeding our total casualties, with a vast quan
tity of guns and material of all kinds, including two complete
enemy Divisional Headquarters, with valuable plans and
documents. As had been done at Vimy, where captured bat
teries had been renamed the 1st., 2nd., and 3rd. Tan-Ger
manic" Batteries, we put to immediate use the captured guns,
with their great store of ammunition, but in this case every gun
on our front being captured, two complete "Pan-Germanic"
Artillery Brigades were formed, a Colonel of Artillery being
sent up to take command. Captured documents confirmed
what this massing of artillery in the front line indicated,
namely, that we had anticipated the enemy offensive against
Amiens by two days only. Had it been otherwise, and the
line been held lightly but in depth, our captures must have
been far less and we should not have so overwhelmed the
defense in our first rush. Tougher righting was ahead.
CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS: AUG. 9-11
WE have seen how on the opening day all the objectives
had been captured except the town of Le Quesnel on
our extreme right, a strong position the enemy was able
to hold because the French were not up on our flank. Plans
for the renewal of the attack next day depended on an early
clearing up of this situation by the 4th. Canadian Division, and
accordingly the llth. Brigade was entrusted with the task.
The 75th. Battalion, recruited from Central and Western On
tario, advanced by night to the assault, while the 87th. Bat
talion, the Grenadier Guards of Montreal, was to make a flank
march across the enemy front, passing south of the Roye road,
and thence falling on the enemy s flank.
These battalions had to take up their positions for the
attack in the dark by the stars and their maps and compasses, a
difficult operation, but, starting off at 4.30 a.m., they were on
their appointed ground by six o clock, when aided by an
intensive barrage, the attack was successfully pushed home.
An amusing incident was the wager made between the
Brigadier and Lt.-Col. C. C. Harbottle of the 75th. as to which
should first occupy the enemy divisional headquarters known
to be in Le Quesnel. The battalion commander won out by a
short space and the Brigade had to be content with less pre
tentious headquarters.
To return to the narrative of the Corps Commander : "On
the following day, Aug. 9, the advance was continued with the
3rd., 1st. and 2nd. Canadian Divisions in the line, the 4th.
Canadian Division being held in Corps Reserve. Substantial
progress was made, and by evening the average depth of our
advance was about four miles, with a maximum of six and a
half miles at some points. The following additional villages
52
OPERATIONS: AUG. 9-11 53
were captured : Le Quesnel, Folies, Bouchoir, Beaufort,
Warvillers, Rouvroy, Vrely, Meharicourt and Rosieres. The
Infantry and Tanks of the 3rd. Canadian Division and the
Canadian Independent Force co-operated with the French in
the capture of Arvillers.
"During the day the enemy s resistance stiffened consider
ably, and whatever gains were made resulted from heavy
infantry righting against fresh troops, with only a few tanks
available for support. This advance had brought our troops
within the area of the trenches and defenses occupied prior to
the Somme operations of 1916. These trenches, while not in a
good state of repair, were, nevertheless, protected by a consid
erable amount of wire, and lent themselves readily to a very
stubborn machine-gun defense."
The battle had indeed assumed an entirely different char
acter. Although an average of six thousand yards was gained
during the day, it was only at cost of very heavy ding-dong
fighting. With the best will in the world it took time to bring
up the artillery. Canadian railway troops were engaged in
pushing up the rail-head from Amiens but progress was slow.
In face of fresh enemy divisions, it w r as necessary to proceed
with utmost caution and not expose our troops to needless
losses unless the gain was positive. But the spirit of the men
continued wonderful. In fact Sir Arthur Currie found in his
visits to advanced dressing stations many of our wounded
anxious to get back into the line.
The day s attack had been designed to open early in the
morning, the glimmer of dawn being the favorite hour of the
Canadian Corps. But until Le Quesnel fell this plan had to be
postponed, and changes were also necessary in the alignment
of the divisions, our 2nd. Division extending its area further
south, forcing the 1st. Division to side-slip south about 5,000
yards. All this took time and the kick-off did not therefore
take place until well on in the day.
The task assigned the Corps on Aug. 9 was not so formid
able to all seeming as that accomplished on the previous day.
54 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
It meant an attack on a five-mile front to a depth of about
three and a half miles. The objective was the Bouchoir-Rouv-
roy-Meharicourt road. The country was almost flat, very
open, with only a few villages and small woods scattered over
it. The attack was to be carried out by the 3rd., 1st., and 2nd.
Divisions from right to left. The 3rd. Division had to advance
down the Roye road and capture Folies and Bouchoir. The
1st. Division had the villages of Beaufort, Warvillers and
Rouvroy on its front, while the 2nd. Division was responsible
for Vrely, Rosieres and Meharicourt.
On the right, as has been seen, the 3rd. Division not only
secured their objectives but went out of the Corps area to assist
the French in capturing Arvillers.
In the centre, on the 1st. Division front, the 1st. Brigade
was sent in to capture Beaufort and Rouvroy and the 2nd.
Brigade against Warvillers. The 1st. Brigade attacked with
the 1st. Battalion, Western Ontario, and 4th. Battalion, Central
Ontario, in the line, the 2nd. Battalion, Ottawa, in support,
and the 3rd. Battalion, recruited from Toronto district, in
reserve. The attack was supported by two batteries of
machine-guns and the 1st. Brigade of Field Artillery covered
the advance. From the outset the attacking troops came under
heavy machine-gun fire, from the high ground on the right.
In order to deal with it the right-flank troops of the 1st. Divi
sion were deflected south, the 2nd. Battalion being pushed
forward to fill the gap, thereafter fighting right through to
the objective.
The 2nd. Brigade was able to make rapid progress in the
early stage of the attack, outstripping the troops on its right by
the time Warvillers was reached. This village and the woods
immediately to the south of it were captured by the aid of
tanks with but little difficulty. But on the extreme right in the
early stage of the attack, serious resistance was encountered,
coming from a nest of machine-guns in Hatchett Wood. The
2nd. Brigade attacked with the 5th. Battalion, Saskatchewan,
and the 8th. Battalion, of Winnipeg, and there came up in
OPERATIONS: AUG. 9-11 55
support two battalions of the 3rd. Brigade, the 15th., recruited
from the 48th. Highlanders of Toronto, and the 14th., Royal
Montreal Regiment.
The intensive fighting on this front was fruitful of many
individual deeds of gallantry. Thus, when his platoon came
unexpectedly under fire of numerous machine-guns, Acting-
Sergeant George Frederick Coppins of the 8th. Battalion, a
native of London, England, finding that it was not possible
to advance nor retire, and when, no cover being available, it
was apparent that the platoon must be annihilated unless the
machine-guns were at once silenced, called for four volunteers
to follow him and leapt forward in the face of intense machine-
gun fire. With his comrades he rushed straight for the
machine-guns. The four men with him were killed and Cpl.
Coppins wounded. Despite his wounds he reached the hostile
machine-guns alone, killed the operator of the first gun and
three of the crew, and made prisoners four others.
Bold initiative on the part of Sergt. D. Zengal, 5th. Bat
talion, of Woolford, Alta., saved the lives of many of his com
rades. He was leading his platoon forward gallantly to the
attack, east of Warvillers, but had not gone far when he
realized that a gap had occurred on his flank, and that an
enemy machine-gun was firing at close range into the advanc
ing line. Grasping the situation, he rushed forward some 200
yards ahead of the platoon, tackled the machine-gun emplace
ment, killed the officer and operator of the gun, and dispersed
the crew. Later, when the battalion was held up by very
heavy machine-gun fire, he displayed much tactical skill and
directed his fire with destructive results. Shortly afterwards
he was rendered unconscious by an enemy shell, but on recover
ing consciousness he at once continued to direct harassing fire
on the enemy.
Twelve tanks supported the 1st. Canadian Division this
day, six with each Brigade, and all did valuable service. In
addition the Divisional Commander secured some whippet
tanks from the Cavalry Corps, and these were of assistance in
clearing Beaufort wood.
56 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Meanwhile on our left, in touch with the Australians, the
2nd. Canadian Division had exceedingly stiff fighting. At 11
a.m. the 5th. Brigade attacked on the right, and the 6th.
Brigade on the left, with the 4th. Brigade in reserve. The
5th. had in line the 25th. Battalion, Nova Scotia, on the right,
and the 22nd. Battalion, French Canadians, on the left, and
advanced under very heavy fire on Meharicourt. Earlier in
the day this town had been ridden over by the 8th. Hussars,
but it was again in the hands of the enemy. The position was
studded with machine-gun posts, the enemy being in great
strength along the ravine from Vrely to Meharicourt, and the
men fought their way forward slowly, reducing these strong
holds in succession.
The two battalions worked their way forward with the
greatest gallantry, and finally stormed Meharicourt at 5 p.m.,
clearing the village and establishing a line in front of it. They
were here, however, exposed to the point-blank fire of a battery
at Maucourt. The 24th. Battalion, Victoria Rifles of Mont
real, and the 26th. Battalion, New Brunswick, came up in sup
port and the line was consolidated. Brig.-General J. M. Ross
was severely wounded, being incapacitated for several months,
command of the 5th. Brigade devolving upon Lt.-Col. T. L.
Tremblay, of the 22nd. Battalion.
On our extreme left the 6th. Brigade had before it the con
siderable town of Rosieres, supported by the railway embank
ment, and here the enemy was in great force, having estab
lished numerous machine-gun posts in the suburbs. Although
the general attack of the 2nd. Canadian Division was not to
take place until 1 1 a.m., the battalion on our left, the 27th., of
Manitoba, attacked at 8 a.m., in conjunction with the Aus
tralians and not to hold up their advance. In its advance the
battalion was exposed to enfilade fire from both flanks and
fought its way forward with the greatest difficulty but with
grim determination. It was indeed one of the hardest fights of
its history, and it suffered heavy casualties before its troops
entered the town at a quarter past one that afternoon. Here
many prisoners and much booty was captured.
OPERATIONS: AUG. 9-11 57
On the Brigade right, the 29th. Battalion, of Vancouver,
did not kick-off until 11 a.m., synchronizing its advance with
that of the Sth. Brigade on its right. It was held up too by
heavy flank fire from the direction of Rosieres, and had a hard
battle all the way, suffering 250 casualties. In Rosieres the
battalion captured an 11 -inch naval gun mounted on a railway
truck. In the afternoon the 6th. Brigade proceeded to the
capture of its final objective for the day.
In the high church tower of Rosieres one of our Batteries
established an "O-Pip" (Observation Post), and this elevation
gave a fine view of the battle both north and south. About a
mile east of Rosieres could be seen lying on the track an entire
enemy train, which, laden with reinforcements, had been cap
tured by Imperial cavalry. This church tower was a conspic
uous mark to the enemy batteries further east and not many
hours passed before they brought it down.
On our left Australian troops had stormed Lihons, thus
thrusting a sharp salient into the enemy defense, and their line
thence fell back northwesterly through Rainecourt and Proyart
to Morcourt on the Somme. The enemy, however, attacked in
great force, and the Australians were obliged to fall back from
both Lihons and Proyart, converting for the time being our
position at Meharicourt into a salient.
Fighting of the same character continued next day, Aug.
10. "The attack was continued on the morning of Aug. 10,"
says Sir Arthur Currie, "with the 3rd. Canadian Division on
the right and the 4th. Canadian Division on the left, the 1st.
and 2nd. Divisions being held in Corps Reserve. After the
3rd. Canadian Division had taken the village of Le Quesnoy,
the 32nd. (British) Division, which had come under the Cana
dian Corps on the night of Aug. 9-10, passed through it and
advanced the line somewhat further from the old British
trenches west of Parvillers and Damery. The 4th. Canadian
Division during the day succeeded, after very hard fighting, in
occupying Fouquescourt, Maucourt. Chilly and Hallu."
The capture of Fouquescourt was particularly valuable in
58 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
view of preparations in progress for an attack on the strong
enemy positions between that village and the Roye road.
Desperate fighting took place on the 4th. Canadian Divisional
front, where our left flank still presented a pronounced salient.
On the Divisional right, the 10th. Brigade fought its way for
ward through a maze of enemy machine-gun positions, in face
of intensive artillery fire. All its battalions were heavily
engaged at one stage or another, these being the 44th., New
Brunswick, but originally recruited in the West; the 46th.,
South Saskatchewan; the 47th., Western Ontario; and 50th.,
Calgary.
The 12th. Brigade, Brig.-General J. H. McBricn, carried
on the attack on the left of our line from the neighborhood of
Meharicourt, storming Maucourt and Chilly with the railway
at Hallu the objective. The going was extraordinarily diffi
cult, through a maze of trenches and wire, studded with
machine-gun posts. The 78th. Battalion of Winnipeg fought
its way right through to Hallu. The 38th. Battalion, Ottawa,
also saw very heavy fighting in this sector, and in fact the whole
Brigade greatly distinguished itself, the other battalions being
the 72nd., British Columbia, and the 85th., Nova Scotia.
The 1 1th. Brigade came up in support and was also heavily
engaged, and here the 102nd. Battalion, British Columbia,
held a critical position in face of very heavy loss. But the
enemy was able to bring up more artillery and the salient was
found untenable. "During the night of Aug. 10-11 a strong
enemy counter-attack developed against a part of the front of
the 4th. Canadian Division east of Hallu," says the Corps
Commander. "This counter-attack was beaten off, but owing
to general conditions the line at that point was slightly with
drawn to the railway embankment immediately to the west of
Hallu. Subsequent upon this slight withdrawal, and with a
view to reducing the existing salient forward to Chilly, the
line was further withdrawn to the eastern outskirts of that
village.
"On Aug. 11, at 9.30 a.m.," he goes on, "the 32nd. Division
OPERATIONS: AUG. 9-11 59
launched an attack against Damery. but was not successful.
The 4th. Canadian Division improved their line by advanc
ing it locally to reduce the Chilly salient, which was still very
pronounced. During the night of Aug. 11-12 the 32nd. Divi
sion and 4th. Canadian Division were relieved by the 3rd. and
2nd. Canadian Divisions respectively."
On. Aug. 13 Sir Arthur Currie addressed a special order
to his Command, as follows :
"The first stage of this Battle of Amiens is over, and one
of the most successful operations conducted by the Allied
Armies since the war began is now a matter of history.
"The Canadian Corps has every right to feel more than
proud of the part it played. To move the Corps from the
Arras front and in less than a week launch it in battle so many
miles distant was in itself a splendid performance. Yet the
splendor of that performance pales into insignificance when
compared with what has been accomplished since "zero" hour
on Aug. 8.
"On that date the Canadian Corps to which was attached
the 3rd. Cavalry Division, the 4th. Tank Brigade, the Sth.
Squadron, R.A.F. attacked on a front of 7,500 yards. After
a penetration of 22,000 yards the line to-night rests on a 10,000
yard frontage. Sixteen German Divisions have been identi
fied, of which four have been completely routed. Nearly 150
guns have been captured, while over 1,000 machine-guns have
fallen into our hands. Ten thousand prisoners have passed
through our cages and Casualty Clearing Stations, a number
greatly in excess of our total casualties. Twenty-five towns and
villages have been rescued from the clutch of the invaders, the
Paris-Amiens railway has been freed from interference, and
the danger of dividing the French and British Armies has been
dissipated.
"Canada has always placed the most implicit confidence in
her Army. How nobly has that confidence been justified, and
with what pride has the story of your gallant success been read
in the homeland! This magnificent victory has been won
60 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
because your training was good, your discipline was good,
your leadership was good. Given these three, success must
always come.
"From the depths of a very full heart I wish to thank all
Staffs and Services the Infantry, the Artillery, the Cavalry,
the Engineers, the Machine-Gunners, the Independent Force
(consisting of the Motor Machine-Gun Brigades and the
Cyclists), the Tank Battalions, the R.A.F., the Medical Ser
vices, the Army Service Corps, the Ordnance Corps, the
Veterinary Corps, and the Chaplain Services, for their splen
did support and co-operation, and to congratulate you all on
the wonderful success achieved. Let us remember our gallant
dead, whose spirit shall ever be with us, inspiring us to nobler
effort, and when the call again comes, be it soon or otherwise,
I know the same measure of success will be yours."
CHAPTER VIII
OPERATIONS : AUG. 12-20
THE heroic though fruitless assault of the 32nd. British
Division upon the immensely strong enemy positions in
front of Parvillers and Damery is worth recording in
more detail, because it opened the way for a magnificent feat
of arms on part of troops of the 3rd. Canadian Division.
Two and a half miles northwest of Roye right athwart the
Amiens-Roye road rises the 100-metre eminence known, from
the singular shape of the wood at its foot, as the Bois-en-Z, or
Zed Wood. It formed an. important feature of ancient
defenses in this region and to this day the galleries hewn from
the living rock still exist in the base of the hill. The enemy
when on the defensive prior to the battles of the Somme in
1916, was quick to seize its value and made of it the pivot of
his defense in front of Roye, a considerable railway centre.
Linked up with the villages to the north it formed a chief out
work of his Roye-Chaulnes line. Its importance was so
generally recognized that in the early stage of the present
battle a squadron of the Fort. Garry Horse had made a reckless
dash down the Roye road in the hope of galloping the position
-a fatal ride described in detail on a subsequent page.
The enemy held in force Andechy, a village a mile south
west of the Zed Wood (which for a few hours had been in
the hands of our cavalry on Aug. 10), Damery, three-quarters
of a mile to the northeast of the wood, and Parvillers, the same
distance due north of Damery. His right flank, though some
what compromised by the capture of Fouquescourt recorded
above, a village a mile and three-quarters north and a little
east of Parvillers, still rested firmly on the wood immediately
north of Parvillers with the little hamlet of Maison Bleu just
beyond, and received additional support from the fortified
61
62 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
village of La Chavette, a mile and a quarter northeast of
Parvillers and therefore the same distance southeast of
Fouquescourt. Running for a thousand yards south of
Damery and so northeast of Zed Wood, is Damery Wood.
For military purposes of an earlier age this old Roman
road had been led right over the crest of Zed Wood, and on
each side for a mile or two west the enemy had lined it with
trenches and wire, with machine-gun positions sweeping what
was in effect a natural glacis. The same defense system, with
a double line of trench, had been carried from the Roye Road
west of Damery and thence west of Parvillers.
As is usual in this part of the country, each of these villages
is perched upon a slight elevation, rising from 90 metres at
Damery to 95 at Parvillers, crowned with the dense foliage
of the village park. Immediately east of this line the ground
rises gently up, to fall away in a little dip and then rise again
to the villages of Goyencourt and Fresnoy-lez-Roye, the
former being about 1,200 yards and the latter 2,000 yards
northeast of Damery, and these could not have been placed
better to afford support to both Damery and Parvillers, either
by infantry or artillery. Goyencourt is on a slightly higher
level than Damery, but the ridge intervening prevents direct
observation and was to form the key to the battle tactics of our
troops who finally captured it.
The weakness of the position is that immediately in front
of it lies a wide plateau, with a uniform elevation of 100
metres, distant about a thousand yards from both Damery and
Parvillers, and, what was worse from the point of view of the
defense, thrusting in a tongue between them. On this higher
ground is situated the old British front line of the Somme, but
it is bare and open affording no natural cover. To make a
frontal attack necessitated descending from the plateau and
then advancing up the reverse slope against the villages,
everywhere exposed to artillery and machine-gun fire. The
only shelter was an old but still deep support trench running
east and west and leading directly out of our defense system
into Damery village.
OPERATIONS: AUG. 12-20 63
It was against this immensely strong position that the 32nd.
Division was sent in to attack. This British Division had
been brought hastily down from the north, covering part of
the distance by marching, and the troops were tired out when
they took over from our 3rd. Division on the night of Aug.
9-10. During Aug. 10 elements of the Division improved the
line with a view to securing a better jumping-off ground.
There was no sleep at night for the enemy kept up a deluge of
artillery fire liberally besprinkled with gas shells.
At half past nine in the morning of Sunday, Aug. 11, the
Division launched an attack extending over its whole front,
supported by a not very successful barrage. The troops
attacked with the utmost gallantry but were met by a withering
and crushing fire, and at no point made an advance of more
than a hundred yards beyond our trench system. The Units
engaged included Devon troops and Highland Light Infantry,
and our men who witnessed the slaughter said it was an inspir
ing sight to see these attempting to dig in under the hail and
fury of fire.
Finally the Division fell back, having suffered nearly two
thousand casualties, and the following night was relieved by
the 3rd. Canadian Division. The heavy loss was due
primarily to the Divisional Artillery putting down their bar
rage too far ahead of the troops, with the result that their men
were not following the barrage sufficiently closely. No troops
in the world could have shown greater fortitude or pertinacity,
the attack being persisted in long after its hopelessness was
revealed.
The 3rd. Canadian Division took over again therefore on
Sunday night, Aug. 11-12. The Divisional Commander,
Major-General L. J. Lipsett, at once set about his preparation
for the attack. He decided that our left sector in front of
Parvillers, offered best prospects for an initial success. Plans
were carefully prepared for a massing of artillery and for this
purpose the divisional artillery had the support of the 5th,
Canadian Divisional Artillery, with some heavy batteries.
64 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Monday and Tuesday were devoted to fighting the way
step by step through the old trench system up to the northern
and western edge of Parvillers and Damery. This was done
under unremittant and intense enemy fire, both day and night,
our troops continually having to put on their gas masks. Nor
was this all. On Monday the enemy made two determined
counter-attacks, and on Tuesday night counter-attacked three
times, but on each occasion was beaten off. Finally all was
ready and it was decided to open the attack on Parvillers on
Wednesday night.
The assault was assigned to the 7th. Brigade, and one bat
talion, the 42nd., Royal Highlanders of Montreal, Lt.-Col. R.
L. H. Ewing, started in by making a detour north of Parvil
lers, bombing as they went. So soon as this movement was
well under way, the Princess Patricia s Light Infantry, Lt.-
Col. C. J. T. Stewart, initiated a similar attack south of
Parvillers, thrusting in along the high spur alluded to above.
By dawn both battalions were established on the northern and
southern outskirts of the village respectively.
At a quarter past six our massed artillery laid down a
hurricane barrage for fifteen minutes. The two battalions
then rushed the village, joining hands fifteen minutes later,
with combined casualties of but five men since the kick-off of
the previous night. But the heavy fighting was yet to come.
Leaving the 42nd. to mop up the village, the P. P.L.I.
pushed on to the east, and prepared to fight off a determined
counter-attack developing from La Chavette to the northeast;
but they were immediately appraised of another attack coming
at their rear from Damery. Nothing daunted, they formed
front both ways and fought their way back into Parvillers,
though the enemy was coming on four deep from two direc
tions. The 42nd. came up to their support, and soon the other
two battalions of the Brigade, the Royal Canadian Regiment
and the 49th. of Edmonton, were on the ground helping to
consolidate the position.
During the course of the day the enemy attacked again and
OPERATIONS: AUG. 12-20 65
again but finally desisted, the P.P. L.I. estimating 500 dead on
their front. The village was honeycombed with subterranean
passages, and in mopping up these three platoons of the 42nd.,
about 90 men, not only killed a hundred of the enemy as they
strove to fight their way out, but captured and sent to the rear
402 prisoners. These two battalions suffered heavy casualties
but they were incurred after the village had been stormed.
One officer remarked that there had been no harder infantry
fighting since Mouquet Farm.
Many individual feats of valor characterised this fight for
Parvillers, such as that of Pte. Thomas Dineson, of the 42nd.
Battalion, a native of Denmark but who enlisted in Montreal.
During ten hours of hand-to-hand fighting, which resulted in
the capture of over a mile of strongly garrisoned and stub
bornly defended enemy trenches, he displayed conspicuous and
continuous bravery. Five times in succession he rushed for
ward alone and single-handed put hostile machine-guns out of
action, accounting for twelve of the enemy with bomb and
bayonet. His sustained valor and resourcefulness inspired his
comrades at a very critical stage of the battle.
At a critical period of the counter-attack, when his platoon
was isolated and almost surrounded, Sergt. Robert Spall, of
the P. P.L.I., seized a Lewis gun and jumping upon the para
pet of the trench his platoon was holding, poured in a wither
ing fire on the oncoming enemy ranks, inflicting many casual
ties. He then led his men along the trench into a sap, 75 yards
from the enemy, where picking up another Lewis gun, this
gallant N.C.O. again climbed the parapet and by his fire at
point-blank range checked the enemy advance. He was here
fatally wounded, but his courage and resourcefulness had
saved his platoon. Born in Suffolk, England, he was brought
by his parents to Montreal when a child, and at the outbreak
of the war was engaged in business in Winnipeg.
In the meantime another battle had developed almost unex
pectedly at Damery, on the front of the 9th. Brigade. The
52nd. Battalion, for the most part lumbermen and prospectors
66 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
recruited at Fort William and Port Arthur, held the line
immediately opposite the village. On Wednesday night the
enemy made a half-hearted attack, and at nine o clock next
morning, Aug. 15, a platoon was sent up the support line,
described above, bombing as they went, to test out the enemy s
resistance. They reported back all clear. The Battalion Com
mander, Lt.-Col. W. W. Foster, made a personal reconnaisancc
with one runner, and, satisfied that the village could be carried,
ordered an attack at five minutes notice. One company on
the right went forward south of the village, a second company
followed up the support trench and a third skirted the village
on the north, with the remaining company in support. Very
shortly Damery was in our hands. A few of the enemy were
found in dug-outs and one of these lunged his bayonet through
the sleeve of Col. Foster s tunic before the latter shot him
down.
Suspecting a trap, he led his battalion east of the village
and formed up behind the ridge, with one company pushed
well out on either flank. In the meantime the 1 16th. Battalion,
Centre Ontario, was pushing forward on his left and the 43rd.
Battalion, Winnipeg, in close support of the 52nd.
The movement was carried out barely in time for there
broke on the doomed village an intense enemy cannonade of
heavy and light guns. But not a shell touched our men, lying
behind the ridge. Gas, laid down in the village, floated back
on a west wind over their heads. Then, after the preparation
was considered complete, dense waves of field-gray, converg
ing on Damery from both Goyencourt and Fresnoy, flooded in
to an easy victory. They came in full marching equipment
with their blankets, evidently expecting to break through. Not
less than four enemy battalions came against our little force.
They came confidently on to one of the most terrible slaughters
of the war, for our magnificent artillery, assisted by French
batteries on our right, laid down an intense barrage in the cen
tre of their massed advance, and right across its entire length,
extending as far back as the Goyencourt-Fresnoy road.
OPERATIONS: AUG. 12-20 67
The front waves were caught between the barrage and the
village and must either fight their way through or surrender.
They fought with desperate courage. Our centre fell back a
little to the edge of the village, while both our flanks, some
what advanced and wheeling in, poured a murderous rifle and
machine-gun fire into the penned enemy mass. He was
doomed. A few fought through to the village and fell beneath
our bayonets; some 250 surrendered; the rest died. The dead,
conservatively estimated at over one thousand, were piled up
rampart high, for our range was never more than 200 yards.
This was at one o clock in the afternoon. At four o clock
the enemy again made a massed attack, so vital was the position
to the defense of Roye. But by this time the Cameron High
landers of Winnipeg had come up in support with a company
on either flank of the 52nd. and secured Damery Wood. The
enemy was driven back with further slaughter. Among our
wounded was Lieut-Col. Urquhart, who had so gallantly
brought up his Battalion, the 43rd. Assistance too had been
rendered from the direction of the Roye road by the "Inter
national Company," half French and half Canadian, who
formed the liason between us. Our gallant French neighbors,
indeed, fired by our success, pitched in that evening and
stormed Zed Wood. By a singular chance the immediate
neighbors of the 52nd. Canadian Infantry Battalion were the
52nd. French Chasseurs, and an interchange of compliment
and congratulation took place on the very fine work of both
sides.
The remainder of the Battle of Amiens, so far as the Cana
dian Corps is concerned, is thus described by the Corps Com
mander: "On the nights of Aug. 15-16 and 16-17 the 1st.
Canadian Division relieved the 3rd. Canadian Division, the
latter being withdrawn to Corps Reserve. Progress was made
during the night of Aug. 16-17, the enemy being driven out of
Fransart by the 4th. Brigade, Brig.-General R. Rennie, and out
of La Chavette by the 1st. Canadian Division, our line on the
right being advanced in co-operation with the French.
The relief of the 2nd. Canadian Division by the 4th. Cana-
68 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
dian Division was carried out on the nights of Aug. 15-16 and
16-17, the former being withdrawn to Corps Reserve on Aug.
17. The operation which had been projected for Aug. 16, had
been postponed and it had been decided to transfer the Cana
dian Corps back to the First Army, the move to begin by
strategical trains on Aug. 19.
"Aug. 18 was quiet along the front, but on Aug. 19 the 4th.
Canadian Division carried out a minor operation near Chilly,
which greatly improved our line in that neighborhood. Four
hostile counter-attacks to recover the newly-won ground were
beaten off during the night.
"On Aug. 19, the 2nd. and 3rd. Canadian Divisions started
their move to First Army, and on the night of Aug. 19-20 the
relief of the 1st. Canadian Division commenced. This relief
was completed on Aug. 22, and the 1st. Canadian Division was
placed in Corps Reserve. On Aug. 22 I handed over command
of the Canadian Corps front to the G.O.C., Australian Corps,
and my headquarters moved north to Hautecloque, opening
there at 10 a.m. on the same day.
"Between Aug. 2 and 22 the Canadian Corps fought against
15 German Divisions; of these 10 were directly engaged and
thoroughly defeated, prisoners being captured from almost
every one of their battalions; the five other divisions fighting
astride our flanks, were only partially engaged by us.
"In the same period the Canadian Corps captured 9,131
prisoners, 190 guns of all calibres, and more than 1,000
machine-guns and trench mortars. The greatest depth pene
trated approximated to 14 miles, and an area of over 67 square
miles containing 27 towns and villages had been liberated.
"The casualties suffered by the Canadian Corps in the 14
days heavy fighting amounted to-
Officers Other Ranks
Killed 126 1,688
Missing 9 436
Wounded 444 8,659
Total 579 10,783
OPERATIONS: AUG. 12-20 69
"Considering the number of German Divisions engaged,
and the results achieved, the casualties were very light."
The capture of Fransart by the 2nd. Canadian Division
was a brilliant piece of work. On Aug. 19 orders were issued
to the 4th. and 5th. Brigades, to push forward and establish a
line which should deny to the enemy the defenses of the rail
way east of Fransart, and also clear the village, thus enabling
the 1st. Canadian Division, which was attacking on the right
in co-operation with the French, to obtain their objective of
La Chavette. The 19th. Battalion, Central Ontario, Lt.-Col.
L. H. Millen, attacked at half past four in the afternoon and
successfully carried out the operation, establishing a line well
forward of the village, capturing many prisoners and machine-
guns and much material. By half past seven the line had been
consolidated.
This Battalion was assisted by two companies of the 18th.
Battalion, Western Ontario, on the right, who after the attack,
were used to protect and hold the extended right flank, caused
by the Division on the right not having been able to advance
simultaneously.
During these operations since Aug. 8 casualties among
officers were very heavy. In addition to casualties among
Battalion Commanders mentioned previously, Lt.-Col. C. E.
Bent of the 15th. Battalion, of Toronto, was severely wounded,
the command devolving until his return some weeks later on
Maj. J. D. Garvan. Lt.-Col. W. S. Latta of the 29th. Bat
talion, of Vancouver, was also severely wounded.
CHAPTER IX
OPERATIONS : CANADIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE
REFERENCE has been made to the wonderful spectacle
afforded by the British Cavalry Corps when on the morn
ing of Aug. 8 it rode up on to the plateau of Santerre.
This arm had done good service in the first Battle of Cambrai,
and had proved of vital value in the great retreat of the pre
vious March, and now it looked as if they were to have the
opportunity of breaking through the enemy line. That was not
to be, but they nevertheless by their dashing tactics contributed
very materially to the demoralization of the enemy, partic
ularly on Aug. 8 and 9.
In making his acknowledgements Field-Marshal Haig,
himself a brilliant cavalry leader, writes as follows:- The
fine performance of the cavalry throughout all stages of the
operation deserves mention. Having completed their assem
bly behind the battlef ront by a series of night marches, on the
first day of the attack they advanced 23 miles from their points
of concentration and by the dash and vigor of their action,
both on this and subsequent days, rendered most valuable and
gallant service." And again : "The cavalry were again able
to demonstrate the great advantage their rapid power of con
centration gives them in a surprise attack. Operating in close
contact with both armored cars and infantry, they pushed
ahead of the latter and by anticipating the arrival of the Ger
man Reserves assisted materially in our success."
The Third Cavalry Division was placed in this operation
at disposition of the Canadian Corps Commander, but as the
battle developed, with the opportunity for exploitation offer
ing more and more in the Canadian sector, Corps Boundaries
were not strictly observed. Thus, on Aug. 9 the First Cavalry
Division, led by the 8th Hussars, came into the Corps area on
70
CANADIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE 71
our left flank and took Meharicourt at the gallop, while a little
to the east of Rosieres Imperial Cavalry captured a whole
train of enemy reinforcements, some five or six hundred Sax
ons, that had been rushed up the line.
The Third Cavalry Division was led into battle by the
Canadian Cavalry Brigade, Brig.-General R. W. Paterson,
consisting of the Royal Canadian Dragoons, Lt.-Col. Van
Straubenzee (afterwards killed in action during the advance
on Le Cateau), Lord Strathcona s Horse (Royal Canadians),
Lt.-Col. MacDonald, and the Fort Garry Horse, Lt.-Col.
Stephenson. Both the R.C.D s and the Strathcona s form part
of the Canadian permanent force, the former with depot in
Toronto and a distinguished fighting record going back to the
North-West Rebellion of 1885 and including South Africa;
while the latter is the famous force recruited and maintained
by Lord Strathcona during the South African war, its depot
originally being at Winnipeg but more recently removed to
Calgary. While in the militia list the 34th. Fort Garry Horse
of Winnipeg is only a junior organization, its war record
entitles it to rank as a veteran force. One of its notable exploits
was in the First Battle of Cambrai, November, 1917, when one
of its squadrons was the only cavalry unit to get across the
Scheldt canal, its wonderful fight there being a matter of
public record.
A number of other mounted units sailed from Canada,
including the various battalions of the Canadian Mounted
Rifles, later formed into the 8th. Canadian Infantry Brigade,
and never remounted. But the three regiments named, while
all demounted and taking their part as infantry in the early
defensive days of trench warfare, were reorganized as the
Canadian Cavalry Brigade when the prospect of our offensives
on the west front opened the way for cavalry co-operation. The
brigade formed a complete unit with its own Canadian Royal
Horse Artillery, machine-gun squadron and field ambulance,
and the intensive training in shock tactics it had received made
it admirably fitted for the work ahead of it.
72 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
The Third Cavalry Division, also including the 5th. and
6th. Brigades, was billeted in the area of Hangest-sur-Somme,
when on the night of Aug. 6-7 it moved up to Amiens, reaching
there at three in the morning, and lying all next day in the city
park. At eight o clock in the evening of Aug. 7 the Canadian
Cavalry Brigade took the road through Longeau up to the
woods west of Villers-Bretonneux, where it remained until
after the battle opened. At a quarter to six on the morning of
Aug. 8 the advance began, passing south of Marcelcave across
the Luce River at Ignaucourt, and then taking up a battle-line
west of Beaucourt and Cayeux, the R.C.D s being on the right
at the former point with the Strathcona s on the left and the
Fort Garry s in reserve, each regiment engaged having two
squadrons in line and its third in support.
The enemy occupied Beaucourt in force, holding up the
advance of our infantry along the Roye road. At noon the
R.C.D s were lying in shelter behind the ridge about a thou
sand yards northwest of the village when the order came to
attack. Picketing their horses "A" and "C" squadrons ad
vanced on foot and fought their way into the outskirts of the
village. But enemy machine-gunners, strongly fortified in the
church tower, could not be dislodged. Word was passed back
to a battery of the R.C.H.A., who galloped up into action,
unlimbering their guns under a storm of machine-gun fire, but
quickly reducing the stronghold by shell fire at point-blank
range. Many prisoners and much booty were captured with
the village, which was held by the R.C.D s until relieved at
three o clock by our infantry.
Meanwhile the Strathcona s had not been idle. Riding
down from Cayeux and refusing Beaucourt on their right, they
attacked the considerable village of Le Quesnel, but the charge
was stopped by the enemy s machinC-guns in a sunken road.
The two squadrons swung right and left, and here the major
leading the charge got in advance of his men and with one
corporal defended himself in the scrub for eleven hours, finally
rejoining his command under cover of night.
MAP SHOWING
ADVANCES MADE BY
FRENCH,
AND
AUSTRALIAN CORPS.
DURING
BATTLE OF AMIENS
T? AUGUST 1918.
Scale ofiiilea
I o I 2 3
LEGEND
Advances made by I^CanadianDivisionshownthus
.. 32 Imperial
CANADIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE 73
The squadron that had swung off to the right crossed the
Roye road and galloped into Fresnoy-en-Chaussee, surprising
the garrison in rear and rounding up 150 prisoners. The
enemy came back in force and the troop withdrew, rejoining
the regiment with all its prisoners. In this village was pre
sented the curious spectacle of a trooper leading a pack of
ammunition mules, galloping with his reins over his arm ind
emptying his carbine into the enemy.
All next day, Aug. 9, the Brigade lay in support in the
wood south of Cayeux. On Aug. 10 it was supposed the enemy
was falling back on Roye and at noon the Brigade advanced to
the high ground looking down over the battlefield on the east,
the Fort Garry s and R.C.D s being in line and the Strathcona s
in support. They advanced through Le Quesnel, Warvillers,
Beaufort, Folies, Bouchoir and Le Quesnoy, taking up a posi
tion across the Roye road west of La Cambuse, a hamlet fifteen
hundred yards southwest of Damery.
In front was the formidable 100-metre hill and wood
known as Zed Wood, an immensely strong position, as has been
described above. Erroneously as it turned out, General Pater-
son was informed that our infantry had taken Damery and the
French were in possession of Andechy, and on the supposition
that the enemy was falling back on the Somme through Roye-
when the capture of the position must be of immense import
ance as enabling us to push in on his rear and thus secure a
considerable tactical success he was in his own mind quite
justified in ordering that Zed Wood be taken at all costs.
A squadron of the Fort Garry s was detailed for the job
and its commander went forward to reconnoitre. The terrific
fire he thus drew only confirmed the hazard of the enterprise,
but the attempt must be made. The squadron swept down the
road with the intention of galloping the wood. But it was to
certain destruction. The enemy held strong trench lines,
crowded with infantry and studded with machine-guns, along
each side of the highway, while from the encircling heights
they poured in a withering shell fire. Owing to the trenches
74 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
and wire it was impossible to get off the road. The men rode
on. One trooper got within a hundred yards of the wood
before he too fell. Some empty saddles returned and at night
half a dozen wounded men crawled back into our lines.
"Nothing like it s been seen in this war," said a veteran
Canadian infantryman who was a spectator. "Neither Regina
Trench nor Passchendaele was a patch on it. Those boys rode
as if they were demented. Death stared them in the face before
they had gone a hundred yards; but they just kept going."
Better fortune came to the other squadron of the Fort
Garry s, Major Strachan, V.C. Advancing along the fatal
road, the squadron while still west of Le Quesnoy came under
very heavy machine-gun fire from the direction of Damery. It
swung off the road south crossing into the French infantry
lines, and then, galloping over trench and wire, captured the
village of Andechy, and with it a very large enemy supply
depot and a considerable number of prisoners. The squadron
held the village in the face of repeated counter-attacks until
ordered to withdraw, bringing off all its prisoners.
Mention may be made here of the brilliant exploit of a
sergeant and five men of the Canadian Light Horse, recruited
in the west, but which did not form part of the Canadian
Cavalry Brigade, being included in the Canadian Corps
Troops, and as such accompanied the Corps throughout these
operations. On Aug. 9, while co-operating along the Royc
road with Lancers and Scots Grays, this little party dashed
out, shot up and stampeded an entire enemy convoy. Two of
the men were killed, but the sergeant and the other three
rejoined their troop.
On the night of Aug. 11 the Canadian Cavalry Brigade
went back to Amiens and two days later returned to its depot
at Hangest-sur-Somme. This was to be the last occasion it
was to fight on the same field with the Canadian Corps. There
after it vanished into the blue, though from time to time reports
came through of gallant deeds, notably its capture of Le
Cateau.
CANADIAN CAVALRY BRIGADE 75
The purpose of the cavalry was to push on through the
anticipated break in the enemy lines and cut loose in his back
areas, destroying dumps and communications. The opportu
nity never came. What was accomplished, gallant though it
was, had little more than a localized effect, and after three
days, when it was clear the line could not be broken, the
cavalry was withdrawn. It had suffered heavily, but it had
given proof of the greatest dash and initiative, tackling jobs
that perhaps could have been accomplished at less cost by the
slower-moving infantry.
It has been said that the day of the Cavalry is over; that in
the execution of its chief functions it has been either super
seded or neutralized; that whereas the work of reconnaissance
is now carried out by aircraft, assisted by the telephone and
wireless telegraphy, the opportunity of using cavalry in shock
tactics becomes less and less as modern weapons are perfected,
together with the now universal system of defense by trench
and wire systems, supported by concentrated machine-gun fire;
and finally it is pointed out that if the battle fronts of the future
are to be continuous as in this war, the scope of the cavalry
must be confined to two periods; the preliminary, before the
opposing lines are joined in battle; and the final, when one side
is giving way and the cavalry can be used with advantage to
harry his retreat and raid his communications.
In this war the value of the cavalry in the early stage in
the retreat from Mons was fully demonstrated ; but the armis
tice cut short its fast developing opportunities which it was
hoped would turn the retreat into a rout. Nothing developed
in the Battle of Amiens to seriously impair the force of these
criticisms. A few of the brilliant cavalry exploits have been
noted above, but even the most hardy champion of the cavalry
will not contend that the battle was won by the cavalry, or that
it would have been lost without them that the general result
of the first two day s fighting would even have been seriously
compromised had they been absent altogether. Apply the
same test to the claims of the infantry and the artillery, and the
76 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
answer is obvious; and in lesser degree the tanks also proved
indispensable above all the tanks economized infantry losses.
In the last analysis it was the man with the machine-gun, the
man with the rifle and the man with the bomb and bayonet,
that won our battles; always predicating powerful artillery
support.
CHAPTER X
SIDELIGHTS OF BATTLE
THE first fury of the battle being spent, there comes a pause
ten days have been continually on the move or in the firing
and a rest for many of the tired troops who for a week to
line. The battalions rest on the line they have reached, troops
relieving them carrying on forward. Throughout these opera
tions weather has been perfect and for once in our favor.
There are no rains to ruin the operation as happened in the
Salient a year before. Reinforcements and supplies, all gath
ered beforehand, are brought up with automatic regularity;
but over everything is a sheet of white dust.
The men lie now in the shelter of woods, many sleeping in
enemy blankets in enemy dug-outs, but the majority bunk on
the ground, each man scooping for himself a shallow trench,
as it might be the first excavation for a grave, proof against
flying shrapnel. With night bombing going on and by day
the enemy s heavy artillery searching likely bits of cover, safety
lies in the open ground, but human nature feels less exposed
under shelter of trees, and so the woods are populous. Bone-
weary, they sleep off their fatigue.
But soon the battalion band strikes up; animated groups
gather, talking over the battle and exhibiting their souvenirs-
iron-crosses, automatic pistols, field-glasses, old-fashioned key-
winding watches, officers swords, regimental rings, shoulder-
straps and buttons cut off protesting prisoners, queer wooden
tobacco pipes quaintly carved all manner of gear. A knot
of men are gambling with sheafs of boldly printed paper
marks ten marks to the franc is their rate of exchange, not
foreseeing the time but a few months away when in Belgium
each of those marks is to be worth one franc thirty centimes.
The men are in the best of moods and willingly talk about their
exploits. 77
78 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
First we come across Brutinel s Independent Force. This
consists of two Canadian Motor Machine-Gun Brigades, a
six-inch Newton Mortar Section and a Wireless Section, all
mounted in armored cars, together with the Canadian Corps
Cyclist Battalion. The Force came straight up to the line and
went into action with no rest. For three days they were hard
at it and Saturday night was their first sleep. "It was good
fun," said one of them. "The first chance we ve had to do any
fighting in our proper capacity. Did you hear how one of our
cyclists took a village down on the Roye road? He was
scouting and rode through the village full tilt, steering with
one hand and with the other emptying his automatic into the
flabbergasted Fritzies; he kept going right through and when
one of our armored cars came up behind the whole garrison
surrendered. Good sport it was along the Roye road that
day some real hunting."
The Amiens-Roye road here traverses a difficult country,
bisected by ravines and bordered by woods offering excellent
positions for machine-gun nests. Here at times the armored
cars were held up and lost heavily. An enemy gun made a
direct hit on one car, killing three of the crew and cutting off
the arm of the gunner. Removing the body of the driver,
this man, Corp. Cruise of Ottawa, swung round the shattered
car, bringing it safely back into our lines. Then he died.
Less tragic was the experience of the crew of a ration
lorry which in the twilight ran through our lines on the Roye
road and only pulled up when challenged by an enemy sentry.
Him they bayonetted. But it was too good to last. The Boche
came back with bombs and put the lorry out of commission.
Our men, however, though all wounded, crawled back to our
lines in the darkness. Faced with loss of their rations, the
unit advanced and recaptured the lorry, towing it back in
triumph.
Padres are strictly non-combatant and unarmed. But
when the 78th. Battalion, of Winnipeg, captured Hallu they
found their chaplain, Capt. d Easum, already in possession
SIDELIGHTS OF BATTLE 79
with eight prisoners. "I went up there to help the boys
through," he said, "with cigarettes and things, but found I d
blundered in ahead of the battalion. There was nothing else
to do but put a bold face on it and these fellows here thought
they were surrounded." The padre had a bullet wound in
his cheek and four through his tunic "a perfectly good coat
ruined!" "Old Front Line" they called him, and told how at
Passchendaele strictly against orders he was in the front line
burying our dead when up comes the divisional senior chap
lain. A reprimand was due, but "Have you another
spade?" -was all the Colonel said.
Here is another story of a Padre. Father R. MacGillivray
of Antigonish, N.S., chaplain of the 5th Brigade, while minis
tering to the wounded where they fell on the field of battle
south of Vrely, was forced to take shelter in a shell-hole, where
he found the remnants of a company of which all officers
were casualties. An enemy field battery a few hundred yards
away was firing over open sights. Grasping the situation,
Father MacGillivray called out, "Boys, we may as well die
fighting." He leaped from the shell-hole and rushed the
battery, followed by his brave boys. The boys say he terrified
the Huns as with a wild war whoop and brandishing his cane
he landed in their midst. The rest of the story is short as all
hands went up with the cry of "Kamerad." The prisoners
were numbered off and the guns were marked, "Captured by
the 26th. Battalion." Some wag remarked it should have been,
"Captured by Canadian Chaplain Service."
In the dense mist of the kick-off on Thursday, a section
of five men of the 13th. Battalion, Montreal Highlanders,
got separated from their unit and groping their way about
came suddenly upon an enemy trench fully manned. The
corporal, no whit abashed, gave the word to fire, when one
after another over a hundred Boche came tumbling out of
the trench, hands up. The five men safely delivered the batch
at the divisional cage.
So great was the number of prisoners on the first day that
80 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
we could not spare escorts. They were told to go to the rear
and for the most part went quietly. Two mounted men marsh
alled back over a thousand from the Divisional to the Corps
cage. But they were not all like this. Three stout Wurtem-
burgers seized a broken-down tank and turned its guns on the
back of our men, inflicting casualties. They put up a stiff
defense, but presently out of the blue a bombing plane
swooped down and dropped a bomb neatly on top of the tank.
Nothing was more inspiring to our men than the fine co
operation of the tanks, commanded by Imperial officers.
Each ran his own show, and although there was a good deal
of confusion in the fog, a gallant and resourceful lot they
were. Many were our tried comrades, for they had fought
with us at Vimy. "We will go anywhere with the Canadians,"
said one of them. "Such a show as you put on has never been
seen in this war." Much the same thing was said on a later
day by an officer of an Imperial heavy battery. "We would
sooner be with you than with anyone, for we know that your
wonderful infantry will exploit to the last yard the work of the
gunners."
But the tanks suffered heavily, particularly in the wooded
country. This is what a staff officer of the llth. Brigade
witnessed. A tank section of three was advancing in line ahead
of our infantry when from the next field a battery opened
at point-blank range. The first tank burst into flames its
course was run; the second stopped and the third also burst
into flames. Then the second tank moved forward again-
stopped burst into flames. Out of the man-hole crawled
two men, suffocating. A third thrust his arm from a gun-port,
waving back the infantry; flames licked out to his hand
In the early stage of the advance the 54th. Battalion from
the Kootenay came upon a wood alive with Boche, strongly
entrenched in defenses the tanks had overrun. It was im
possible to pass by without being mown down by flank fire.
Seeing that his three companies in line were closely engaged,
the battalion commander, Lt.-Col. A. B. Carey, of Nelson,
SIDELIGHTS OF BATTLE 81
B. C., took personal command of the reserve company, or
ganized it for defense and then led it in attack on a corner
of the wood in face of heavy machine-gun fire. That por
tion of the wood thus cleared, the other companies were
enabled to outflank it, capturing the garrison and proceeding
to their objectives.
These incidents, selected at random, might be multiplied
an hundredfold, and they leave untouched the record of public
honors, of V.C. s and the like. They were garnered from
these tired men, gathered round their campfires, stitching
rents made by barbed wire or drying out their sweaty shirts.
Wonderful indeed their spirit. For the most part they went
into battle after long marches and sleepless nights, and only
their superb condition, fine discipline and unquenchable
ardor carried them through. To go perhaps two or three
days without sleep and but little food will try the stoutest
heart. It was precisely into such a state of mind that during
a lull in the battle one s enquiries were directed. Crossing
the Channel but a few days before one had been struck by the
fact that the nearer one got to the front line, the clearer was the
note of confidence. In London as in Montreal or Winnipeg
-the defeatist had been at work. One had met but a day or
two before a highly-placed Canadian officer who despaired of
victory; and as for the politicians, with them it had become
a question whether the "Sammies" were to be in time to save
us whether we could keep going till the spring of 1919.
But these fellows had taken the measure of the Boche. and
they knew that he was beaten, if not this year, then surely
the next.
But even here are discriminations. Hot-blood youth
doesn t care how long the war goes on ; it is his great adventure ;
to him it is "a lovely war." But fathers of families, staid
citizens enlisted only from an imperative sense of duty; these
have a different angle. "Shan t we have peace this fall?" asks
a tough old Blue-nose. One points out that we can have a
peace at any time, but such a peace as is only a truce. "Never
7
82 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
that," he replies. "We ll fight it out here and now; I
can t leave it to my boy."
"We re all fed up with the war, that s a cinch," says the
N. C. O. of a Saskatchewan battalion. "None of us like it,
but we ll carry through to October, 1919 if that s your
date or 1920 if we must; but the peace must be the real
thing. We must rub Fritzie s nose in the dust good and
plenty."
And then there is the company of adventurers, old pros
pectors from the mountains, trappers of the wild, shanty-men
from the back-woods, men whose whole life has been a gamble
with death; and for these, war is the greatest game of all.
"This is a real good show and we shan t be satisfied till we re in
again," says one. And there is a private who fought with the
52nd. Battalion in front of Damery military medal and bar,
who works on survey parties out of Edmonton, Alta. "The
best fun I ever had," he said. "I ve had many a moose fight
and have tussled with the grizzly in the Rockies, but this
beat all. I used up two of our rifles and then grabbed a
Boche fired all my ammunition and two bandoliers more,
borrowing off the men who came up in support. My rifle
got so hot I had to work the bolt with my foot. The longest
range was two hundred yards, most of it seventy-five to a
hundred and every shot a bull. One of our Lewis guns fired
off thirty-four pans. I d never seen so many dead in my life;
it was like spraying a potato patch. Our colonel is a real
general or our number would have been up.
The men are wonderful; so too are the battalion officers,
and one cannot withhold one s admiration from the juniors,
who shared the dangers of the rank and file as their casualties
show and yet carried the added responsibility of leader
ship. Here is the story of a posthumous V. C., Lieut. Brill-
ant of the 22nd. Battalion, French-Canadians: "For the most
conspicuous gallantry and almost superhuman devotion to
duty during the operations of Aug 8 and 9," the official record
goes. "He was in charge of a company which he led during
SIDELIGHTS OF BATTLE 83
the two days with absolute fearlessness and extraordinary
ability and initiative. At about one o clock in the afternoon
of Aug. 9, just after the day s attack had begun, his company s
left flank was held up by an enemy machine-gun. He rushed
in and captured the gun, personally killing two of the gun
crew. While doing this he was wounded in the thigh but
he refused to be evacuated. A little after three o clock
the same day his company was held up by heavy machine-gun
fire from a machine-gun nest in a group of houses. He per
sonally reconnoitred the ground, organized a party of two
platoons and rushed straight for the machine-gun nest. Here
150 Germans and IS machine-guns were captured. The Lieu
tenant personally killed five Germans and being wounded
a second time, now in the shoulder which he had immediately
dressed, again refused to be evacuated.
"About six in the evening of the same day he saw a field gun
firing on his men with open sights from a neighboring wood.
He immediately organized and led a rushing party towards
the gun. After progressing about 600 yards he was seriously
wounded in the abdomen. In spite of this third wound, he
continued to advance some 200 yards when he fell uncon
scious from exhaustion and -loss of blood. His wonderful
example throughout the day fired his men with an enthusiasm
and fury which largely contributed towards the battalion s
noble achievements." This was in the attack on Meharicourt.
He died that night.
Another posthumous V. C. was Lieut. James Edward Tait,
of the 78th. Battalion of Winnipeg, "for most conspicuous
bravery and initiative in attack." The advance on Hallu
having been checked by intense machine-gun fire, Lieut. Tait
rallied his company and led it forward with consummate skill
and dash under a hail of bullets. A concealed machine-gun,
however, continued to cause many casualties. Taking a rifle
and bayonet Lieut. Tait dashed forward alone and killed the
enemy gunner, crying, "Come on boys: the 78th. don t mind
machine-guns!" Inspired by his example his men rushed the
84 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
position, capturing 12 machine-guns and 20 prisoners. Later,
when the enemy counter-attacked our positions under intense
artillery bombardments, this gallant officer displayed outstand
ing courage and leadership, and, though mortally wounded by
a shell, continued to direct and aid his men until his death.
Owing to the exigencies of the British Press censorship
in France, whose instruction from G. H. Q. was that for a
certain period the participation in this great battle of the
Canadian Corps must not be published, the people of Canada
learned of the victory two or three days before they became
aware of the conspicuous part taken in it by their sons
and brothers. It was indeed a Canadian Corps battle, planned
by the Corps and "zero" hour fixed by the Corps. What that
part was is best summed up in the words of an impartial
critic, the special correspondent in France of the London
Times. Reviewing the course of events a few weeks later
he says: "In the first scene of our offensive, which began
Aug. 8, the actors were chiefly overseas. Men from the British
Isles took only a small part of the attack north of the Somme
to protect the flank of the Australians. South of the river,
below here on the main battlefront. the honor of the first ad
vance was shared by the Australians and Canadians. In
structure it was chiefly a Canadian battle. It was their ad
vance on the Luce that was the core and crux of the operation,
and on their progress depended the advance of the Australians
on their left and that of the successive French armies on their
right, each of which was thrown in only as the advance above
it prospered. The Canadians, I think, are right in claiming
that the fighting of these first two days was the biggest thing
Canada has done in the war, not excepting the recapture of
Vimy Ridge. Certainly nothing could have been better."
The Canadian Corps, flushed with victory, was to go
on to bigger things yet. The impression one bore away of the
Amiens show was of a kind of picnic; there, indeed, the
viands were war rations, and the skittle-alleys, machine-gun
emplacements; but where, nevertheless, there was, after the
SIDELIGHTS OF BATTLE 85
dreary months of the trenches, a sense of change and holiday;
sight of green fields and growing things ; a clatter of movement
and good humor. We were going back to quite a different
thing to the long road stretching from Arras to Cambrai,
a field of bloody footsteps, mire and death.
CHAPTER XI
LESSONS OF THE BATTLE
WAR is the last thing to go according to programme,"
said Thucydides, and the maxim never had a more
striking application than in this battle of Amiens.
The enemy were preparing to attack when upon them fell the
avalanche. It was all very disconcerting. For the moment
they were overwhelmed. Those of their front line troops who
escaped capture "had their wind up," and spread consternation
behind. Besides they had lost all their guns. Except stout
machine-gunners in strictly localized defenses, we met very
little organized opposition the first day. And our great store
of prisoners, guns and material of all kinds was precisely due
to the enemy having been massed forward for the assault set
for a couple of days later.
But as we went forward, conditions began to change in their
favor. It is another maxim of war that an attack weakens
in its thrust as it progresses; so at the end of the third day,
our blow having lost some of its first impetus, being restricted
in its full swing by the course of the battle on either flank,
and meeting more and more determined resistance from the
enemy who had thrown in a number of fresh divisions and
again gathered together a respectable body of artillery our
advance perceptibly slowed down. We were coming too into
a bad country. Hitherto, as we have seen, the enemy s organ
ized defense had been rudimentary; he had paid little atten
tion to his trench system and there was a minimum of wire.
But now we were to advance into the old Somme battlefield,
traversed by ancient trench lines, festooned by rusted wire,
and passing off solid ground to marsh lands, while in our
immediate front lay the strong defense line linking up Roye
and Chaulnes.
86
LESSONS OF THE BATTLE 87
It was with these considerations before him that Sir Arthur
Currie made very strong representations to the high command
to the effect that the Canadian Corps having successfully
accomplished its allotted task as storm troops, should be pulled
out of that area before its bright temper became dulled, to be
used in a similar operation on another front, for which he
suggested the Bapaume sector as most suitable.
However, it was decided that the Corps should do more
spade work until at least the French offensive had developed
further in the direction of Roye. There was a prospect, too,
that the offensive on our left flank, reduced north of the Somme
to a static condition before Bray, and thus in turn holding
back our immediate neighbors, the Australians, might develop
more favorably; when the attacking front would broaden and
the Canadian Corps be relieved from its salient, offering
new opportunities for further successful exploitation towards
the Somme.
The desultory righting that followed desultory not that
it was easy but because it led nowhere in particular proved
very expensive for the Canadian Corps, whose task, subjected
as it was to a galling enfilade fire, resolved itself into the storm
ing of individual villages. In fact there was the prospect
that we were going to run into another blind alley after the
fashion of the offensive of 1916. "On to the Somme", was the
talk in the ranks, but without a true appreciation of the
difficulties.
When therefore the word reached us that we were to be
relieved by French divisions, there was general satisfaction.
We understood of course that it meant we were to have a go
in elsewhere. It is worth noting here that Field-Marshal Haig
in his "Victory Dispatch" endorses the opinion submitted
by the Canadian Corps Commander. "By the evening of
Aug. 12," he writes, "our infantry had reached the old Ger
man Somme defenses of 1916, on the general line west of
Damery, east of Lihons, east of Proyart, having repulsed with
severe loss determined counter-attacks in the neighborhood
CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
of Lihons. North of the Somme we were on the western
outskirts of Bray-sur-Somme.
"The derelict battle area which now lay before our troops,
seared by old trench lines, pitted with shell holes, and crossed
in all directions with tangled belts of wire, the whole covered
by the wild vegetation of two years, presented unrivalled
opportunities for stubborn machine-gun defenses. Attacks
carried out on Aug. 13 proved the strength of these positions,
and showed that the enemy, heavily reinforced, was ready
to give battle for them. I therefore determined to break off
the battle on this front, and transferred the front of attack
from the Fourth Army to the sector north of the Somme,
where an attack seemed unexpected by the enemy. My inten
tion was for the Third Army to operate in the direction of
Bapaume so as to turn the lines of the old Somme defenses
from the north. The French First Army now ceased to be
under my command.
"Meanwhile, south of the Somme, our pressure was to be
maintained, so as to take advantage of any weakening on the
part of the enemy and encourage in him the belief that we
intended to persist in our operations on that front. During
the succeeding days, local attacks gave us possession of Dam-
ery, Parvillers and Fransart, and made progress also at other
points."
In fact, our whole conduct of the war had changed under
the masterly direction of Foch. Our attacks henceforth
were to be restricted in their objectives and only to be devel
oped as their successful progress opened out without too great
cost further fields for exploitation, In effect, the Battle of
Amiens was now broken off, so far as the British forces went,
and there immediately opened the less ambitious but locally
successful attack in the direction of Bapaume. Then in turn
came the Battle of Arras and the breaking of the Hinden-
burg Line by the Canadian Corps. Thereafter the whole
fabric of the enemy defense began to give way and it was the
beginning of the end.
LESSONS OF THE BATTLE 89
Before leaving the battlefield some tactical considerations
are worthy of note. It cannot be said that in its broad aspects
the battle presented any new tactical features; it merely ap
plied successfully the plan Sir Julian Byng had originated for
his Third Army in the First Battle of Cambrai of the preced
ing November. He failed, relatively at least to his hopes,
because he had not at his disposal sufficient forces to exploit
his initial success, nor even to properly defend the ground won.
But that did not invalidate his plan, which consisted of a sur
prise attack, unaccompanied by artillery preparation, the
free use of tanks being counted on to break the road for the
infantry, combined with an intensive barrage laid down on
the enemy front and support lines and battery positions.
That plan changed the nature of the combat on the West
Front, converting it from trench fighting to open warfare;
the enemy was quick to adopt it in his March offensive; and
with perfect success, his means being adequate to his purpose.
It was now for the first time successfully employed by the
British arms. The plan was developed to its highest extent by
the employment of a tremendous barrage, designed to carry
the infantry deep into enemy territory; by the presence of an
unprecedented number of tanks, including the newly perfected
"whippets" ; by the bringing up of the Cavalry Corps ; and last,
but not least, by the co-operation of the Independent Force
under General Brutinel of Canadian Motor Machine-Gun
Brigades and Cyclists.
Brutinel s Independent Force, as we have seen, did valuable
and particularly gallant work along the Roye road, where in
the early stage of the battle it acted as the liason between the
French and our own Third Division. But it too was denied
the chance of breaking through, and because its operations
were necessarily confined to metalled roads, held everywhere
in great strength by the enemy, its offensive role was limited.
Its 1st. Brigade was fighting over the same ground where it
had won imperishable fame in the March retreat.
Over one hundred heavy tanks were assigned to the attack,
90 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
and of these two-thirds had become casualties from one cause
and another by the end of the third day. Some were "walk
ing wounded" cases only, but many were destroyed by direct
hits. Without question the tanks played a great and formid
able part in this battle, and if the war had continued another
year no doubt they would have become a still more effective
arm. But that they were not vital to success was proved by the
Canadian Corps later on, when its supply of tanks, at first
scanty, rapidly was reduced to the vanishing point.
The tank indeed, and its tactical management, was still
in process of evolution even up to the close of hostilities.
It was perhaps Britain s greatest material contribution to
the war. Early tanks failed, or achieved but a moiety of
success, because they were too slow and too vulnerable. The
enemy, after his first shock of surprise, affected to take them
lightly, but nevertheless captured documents proved that he was
anxious, commanders being warned to be prepared, to pay spe
cial attention to anti-tank defense, and to train men with the
anti-tank guns a magnified rifle weighing thirty-five pounds
of which several fell into our hands in the Amiens show. The
great width and depth of the Hindenburg ditch was design
ed to stop tanks. After the considerable French success with
tanks southwest of Soissons in July and our own in the present
battle, his alarms increased. His own tanks were a failure,
because of poor design, the flat underbody preventing the
climbing of obstacles. And he never had enough to make them
really formidable.
In the Amiens show the tanks were massed and the wast
age was so great that replacements on the same scale were
difficult, especially as the widening of the battle line made an
effective tank concentration more and more out of the question.
In the Arras offensive very few tanks were in our line, and in
the Battle of Cambrai, because of the impassable nature of
canals and rivers encountered, they were almost entirely
absent. Very few in fact were left at all in the closing stages
of the great offensive, and a localized concentration to over-
LESSONS OF THE BATTLE 91
come machine-gun resistance became impossible. Had it
been otherwise our casualties would have been lighter.
For the tank is the ideal weapon for destroying machine-
gun nests. Time after time in the Amiens show tanks were
driven right over these emplacements, either killing or captur
ing their garrisons. If war comes again in our time, the tank
has a great future. The "whippets" have a special mission of
their own, the up-to-date cavalry. But the heavy tank must
also have sufficient speed to keep well ahead of infantry on
necessity, strong enough armor-plating to resist all but direct
hits by field-guns, powerful offensive armament to overcome
strong fortified posts, and such bulk and engine-power as
can traverse not only natural obstacles (except canals and
rivers) but the protective ditches dug by the enemy.
Above all they must have wider range of vision and be
in direct communication not only with their own units but
with other arms, especially infantry. For at present the tank,
once started, is a law unto itself and too often becomes de
tached. In the darkness and fog of the early morning of Aug.
8 they often lost their way, overrunning their objectives or
missing them altogether. Compasses were useless because
of the mass of metal and shut in that fiery box a general sur
vey is impossible. One tank was observed coming back from
the front line when its commander supposed he was working
forward.
Even in the last days of the war, there appeared to be
two schools of thought in regard to tank tactics. One, as
exemplified in the Amiens show, was that long lines of tanks
should go in ahead of the infantry and overrun the enemy.
In manycases theysailed right overdug-outs and past machine-
gun posts they could not see in the mirk, so that our infantry
following up had a hard time of it. And the trouble was
that when a tank was wanted to reduce such a fortified point,
the infantry had no means of making their need known. The
other was that the tanks should be held in leash close up behind
the infantry, to be employed on individual work as required.
92 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
A quite possible development might be that each brigade, or
even each battalion, would have its own tank section, to work
in tactical conjunction. Extraordinary gallant men, these
tank crews; the "suicide club" our boys called them; one of
our officers, a very brave man, went forward in one of them
to reconnoitre. When finally he was let out he shook his fist
at his hosts; "Never again, demon, will I enter your scalding
bowels!"
Tank crews, indeed, were under a terrible strain, both
physical and mental, greater even than that of the stokers of
a battleship in action. In that confined space, filled with
poisonous gases, the atmosphere was all but insupportable.
Tank crews have been known to come out of their fortress
and thrown themselves on the ground in utter exhaustion
amid the full fury of an enemy barrage. A full day s battle
such as Aug. 8, played them out, and there was great difficulty
in getting the tank crews back into shape for the battle of
the following day. That, indeed, was to some extent the cause
for our delay in continuing the offensive on Aug. 9. In such
a case the strategist, laying out his battle for the morrow, is
apt to overlook the purely physical element of his problem.
Where the fighting is to be continuous over a period of days
it is necessary to furnish relief crews for the tanks.
A good number of Canadians were scattered through the
tank crews, but it was an Imperial service, the great majority
of officers and men being Old Country. If the war had gone
on a Canadian Tank Division would have been created. As
it was, complete mutual confidence existed between our in
fantry and the tanks. As explained, these were limited in
their scope, but that was the inherent defect of the machine
and not of the crew.
So important was the part of the tank in the battle that this
rather lengthy digression may be permitted. We have seen
that there was nothing particularly novel about the tactics
of the Amiens show, but the whole plan was brought to the
highest perfection and the employment of a fresh and thor-
LESSONS OF THE BATTLE 93
oughly trained body of troops such as the Canadian Corps
assured success in advance.
As it turned out, the weight of the battle fell on the Cana
dian Corps, but that was not the original design. The Fourth
Army was to advance on its entire front, with British troops
on the left, the Australians in the centre and Canadians on
the right, the most difficult ground perhaps being assigned to
the latter. When this movement had well developed, the
French First Army was to take up the battle on our right.
But this programme was diverted by reason of the situation
north of the Somme. Here the enemy had attacked the III
British Corps in great strength two days before, and was
bringing up reserves for a further thrust in the development
of his intended general offensive against Amiens. It turned
out therefore that instead of making much progress, troops
in this sector had all they could do to hold their own. The
hope of recovering the strong point of Bray needlessly given
up in March fell to the ground. As a consequence the left of
the Australian Corps was obliged to conform, and though its
centre pushed well forward and its right kept pace with our
selves, it was unable to attain tactical freedom of manoeuvre.
On the other hand, our right, the French battle went so
well after it had gained momentum, that it spread far to the
south, eventually including Montdidier, and the effect of this
was to make the Canadian area the pivotal centre of the en
tire battle front. At all stages, and until we gave over to the
French, our line was in greater or less degree a marked
salient, and this of course exposed our men to enfilade artill
ery fire, now from one flank, now from the other, and some
times from both. It is necessary to have a clear picture of
this in order to appreciate the sterling character of their work,
especially in such tactical adventures as the capture of Chilly,
Hallu, Parvillers, Damery, Fransart and La Chavette.
Their success was not brought about by accident. Skilled
and patient staff work, perfect organization by both "A" and
"Q" branches, the devoted efforts of the Canadian Engineers
94 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
and Army Service Corps, fine qualities of leadership from
divisional commanders right down to the veteran N. C. O s-
all these contributed; but the greatest factor of all were the
men themselves, highly disciplined, fresh from a period of
intensive training, and conspicuous in the qualities of initi
ative and resource that had stood the Canadian soldier in
such good stead on many a hard-fought field. One need not
speak of their courage the common heritage of the nations
but they possessed in a peculiar degree the quality of the race
that declines to envisage defeat and will not be denied victory.
The moral effect of this great victory was far-reaching. For
the first time for many a long day troops of the British armies
had taken the offensive on the grand scale and had demon
strated that man for man, in leadership and technical equip
ment, they were the superior of the enemy. That was the great
contribution that the Canadian Corps and with them the
Australians made to the cause of the Allies on Aug. 8; they
restored confidence in the British arms weakened in morale
and repute in the sight both of our Allies and the enemy
since the sad days of March not only to the rank and file
of the armies themselves but to the world at large.
Looking back over but a few months yet this nevertheless
a gulf fast obliterating memory and almost impassable to the
imagination from the sure vantage ground of British vic
tories in every theatre of the war, it seems all but incredible
that in those days immediately preceding Amiens, and not
withstanding the demonstration of the French on the Marne,
doubts actually existed of the ability of the British armies
to carry out a successful offensive. Yet so it was. These
doubts, totally without justification as the event proved,
were finally dispelled on Aug. 8.
Thus ended the "L. C. Operation," as it was named by the
Canadian Corps Staff, for the battle-cry on the morning of
Aug. 8 was, "Remember the Llandovery Castle" -the hospi
tal ship sunk in the Irish Sea just before with Canadian medi
cal officers and nurses on board.
And what did the enemy think of it? Von Hutier, who
LESSONS OF THE BATTLE 95
commanded in this front, was brother-in-law of Ludendorff,
and the best face must be put on it. "We were up against the
elite of the French Army and the celebrated Canadian Corps,"
said the German Higher Staff.
It is not generally known that this great Battle of Amiens
was intended to be the last British offensive on the West Front
in 1918, and it was only because of the unexpected success
attained that our offensives were everywhere continued. The
original programme granted a reasonable measure of success
such as should free the Amiens-Paris railway was that there
after the troops should settle down into winter quarters, and
await the coming of the American armies to renew the offen
sive in the spring of 1919. This bold stroke, in which the Ca
nadian Corps had so striking a part, not only opened the flood
gates of victory but saved for us the long weary months of
trench warfare and the heavy casualties they entail.
With Ludendorff Aug. 8 is obviously an obsession. We
have seen above something of his opinion. "The eighth of
August," he says in another place, "marked the downfall of
our righting strength and destroyed, our hopes of strategic
amelioration. To continue the war was to start a gamble. The
war had to be ended."
He returns again and again to the fatal day. "The eighth
of August (1918) is the black day of the German Army in the
history of the war. I have experienced none worse except
during the events beginning with Sept. 15, which took place on
the Bulgarian front and sealed the fate of the Central Powers.
The English Colonials and the French broke deep into our
line between the Somme and the Luce, where our Divisions
were completely overrun. Six or seven German Divisions,
which could be described as thoroughly fit for battle, had been
defeated. Two or three Divisions and the remnants of the
defeated forces were ready to close the wide gap between
Bray and Roye." And he concludes by speaking of the con
templated retirement in this section of the line. "This move
ment," he says, "was decided upon the night of Aug. 9-10. If
it did not succeed a great allied victory was possible."
CHAPTER XII
FRENCH SCENES
ON the morning of Aug. 8 the first echelon of Canadian
Corps Headquarters moved to Gentelles, but already
this was too far behind the lines and almost at once an
other move was made to Demuin, on the Luce. In a ravine
about a thousand yards south of the village as had been plot
ted out by our Intelligence long before the battle opened was
an enemy regimental headquarters, and here the Corps stayed
a full week. As usual there were some elaborate dug-outs, but
not enough to accommodate all the staff, most of whom slept
under canvas.
This ravine winds among the folds of chalk hills, trending
south to the Roye road. A little further on lies a broken tank,
hit by an enemy gun that still stands a couple of hundred yards
away. The tank had been working its way along the ravine
when its career was stopped. Beside it are three graves. Arti
ficers are busy repairing its shattered treads and in an incred
ibly brief time it will trundle on its way again.
From the upland is a wonderful sunset, painting the heav
ens the color of blood. Upon the crest of the western slope,
black against the glow, is the scarred outline of Hamon wood,
where a few days before our Third Division had a tough fight.
Once it was gay with flowers but there lie now in the stained
pools of shell-holes only corpses rotting in their field-gray.
Our burial parties are over-taxed.
Descending the hill we come upon a lonely pit where a
gunner stands silent beside his "Archie," for these moonlight
nights "Heine" has a regular schedule of bombing visitations.
He is glad to talk and confesses himself something of a poet;
he produces a copy of verses, scribbled on the back of an
envelope happy soldier, spinning rhymes beneath the stars,
96
FRENCH SCENES 97
themselves his theme, and love of country and hate of the
destroyer !
We are dozing off in our tent sunk three feet beneath the
ground for safety from the flying shrapnel of these bombing
raids when on the silence a bugle rings out, a note weird as
that of the coyote under a prairie moon. "Lights out; lights
out!" passes the word. "Heine s coming." Sure enough he is.
But before we hear his angry insect hum, miles it seems above
us, there comes the quick rattle of the "Archies," the anti-air
craft guns. As heads poke out, shafts of light long beams of
whitest light shoot up from a dozen unexpected quarters,
searching the sky methodically for the bold intruder.
They sweep the sky indefatigably. Some one with night
glasses cries they are below him now they are nearer they
have got him! They focus on one spot and he stands out clear
enough, a flitting iridescent glow-worm. The "Archies"
redouble their fire ; we see the flashes bursting round him. His
machine-gun rattles back down the avenues of white light.
They lose him and catch him again. Suddenly a series of dull
explosions crrmp crrmp crrmp; as quick as you can
count. He is getting rid of his bombs; it is too hot for him.
Soon his drone dies away in the east, but not before there have
been more dull thudding reports, distinguishable from all
kinds of shell fire.
It is seldom they get him. In the air the vertical plane is
added to the gunner s problem, whereas on the surface his
equations are confined to the lateral and horizontal. But the
defense, especially the search-lights, captured by us from the
Boche, keep him high up, where his bombing becomes a thing
of chance, hit or miss. But on another occasion he gets a
bunch of our horses, picketed round the corner.
He is going back to his base to tell his story of destruction
-on a bare hillside and in a couple of hours he ll be back
reloaded. But the air is chill and blankets warm.
8
98 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Not content with their brilliant capture of Zed Wood,
recorded above, the French First Army are pushing on south
of us, now well up to our right flank. They are putting on a
little show of their own this afternoon in front of Roye. They
have taken Caesar s Camp west of the town, and now seek to
exploit their success from the south. Armed with a pass from
General Demetz, Commander of their 56th. Division, one has
the privilege of seeing something of it under guidance of a
charming French officer of Intelligence.
Roye lies low down in the valley and from the plateau on
which we stand nothing can be seen but the smoke of bursting
shells in its northern quarter, where already the French have
established themselves in the railway station. The battle itself
is in progress at our feet in the marshy tree-studded valley of
the Avre, being directed against the strongly fortified village
of St. Mard-lez-Triot. We can see nothing of it, save for an
occasional rocket marking the progress of the infantry, signal
for the barrage to lift; and for the angry explosions of enemy
shells along the trench lines on the opposing plateau, where
presumably are massed the French reserves.
It does not matter. In these bright weeks villages such as
this so recently impregnable strongholds are stormed every
day. Of greater interest is the spirit of -the French soldier, the
"poilu>" from whose soul speaks the ardent voice of France.
Our guide is explaining the difficulties of the attack up the
valley, past concrete machine-gun emplacements hidden in the
marshes. "We hardly hope to succeed here," he says, "But
it is a demonstration in aid of our advance further south." He
is wrong; soon a rocket goes up from the village itself. "Yes,
they have given us a tight corner; but what would you? some
one has to have it."
We have called him "Captain"; no, he is only lieutenant.
"A simple soldier, Monsieur, who at the outbreak of war was
a wine merchant in Burgundy. I had served my three years of
course, and joined as a sergeant. Now I have charge of the
Intelligence of the regiment."
FRENCH SCENES 99
"You have very gallant men," he goes on. "You are fresh
and full of go. We have been at it so long we are tired ; our
hearts are sad, but now before us is the end and we will see it
through. Alas ! for the poor people of this country. In March
I was in Montdidier and the women of the town crowded
round us. Are the Boche coming? they ask. We do not
know but it is better you should move out. Then comes the
question, What shall we take? What can they take? Their
men and their horses are all in the army; there remain only the
push-cart and the wheel-barrow. They take next to nothing.
And in a few days the Boche have destroyed everything
everything; wantonly, where their shelling has not completed
the ruin. On your way back go and see the ribs of Montreuil."
We are standing on top of an "O-Pip" (observation post),
built up by the Germans amid the trees on the valley slope.
Below lies a shattered village and ruined church St. Aurin.
"It is horrible to see all this," one says, "and to think that we
in Canada have escaped scot free only the lives of our men."
"Ah," he says, "but is not sorrow a strength to the character, a
completion of experience shall we not emerge a stronger
people for it all?"
We are in a trench examining a bayonet, a beautiful rapier-
like piece of polished steel. "How you bring your sense of art
and beauty into everything," one cannot help remarking.
"Look at your camouflage, what art it is, suiting itself per
fectly to the changing aspects of soil and landscape; while ours
too often is a matter of rule of thumb."
"That may be so." he replies. "But you have your admir
able perseverance. To each nation its own qualities. To the
Hun that of the beast."
Of a saddened countenance is the French soldier. The
tragedy of war has transmuted the once merry fellow. They
lack too the outward smartness of our infantry. But the spirit
is there. "On to the Rhine!" we cry to one of them. He
lights up at once. "That is the perfect word, Monsieur," he
says with a grin.
100 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
One takes away a sense of what the French Army has suf
fered and endured. Compared with ourselves, they lack
deplorably all manner of material and equipment their guns
worn out, ammunition depleted, their horses emaciated and
with few lorries for transport, the "poilu" himself a pack-mule
on the march. But after all these long years, when they have
borne the brunt in defeat and in victory, their men are incom
parable, their spirit unquenched.
It is Aug. 19 and we are back again in Dury, just twelve
days since we left this sad and dreary village. Nothing but
dust and troops and lorries. Occasionally through a tall gate
way is the glimpse of an old woman, doubled under a load of
straw. Much more rarely a child. One little estaminet is
open where they sell red and white wine of the sourest vintage.
All the villages of this part of France are ugly. Built right
out to the street are the stables and out-houses blank walls
pierced by inhospitable double gates. You enter your billet
through what is essentially the backyard, a manure pile in its
centre and cart shed on either hand. Back is the decent little
house, two-storied, very old, weather-stained, sadly lacking a
coat of paint and a rambler rose. You walk through across
the inevitable tiled floor to the back. Hey, presto! what a
change is here. A charming garden, stocked with good things
to eat, fruit trees and flowers, and behind a hedge and a field
rolling down into a green valley.
Nevertheless the cobbled streets are ugly beyond compare,
high gray blank walls, shuttered windows, smokeless chimneys
and clouds of dust shrouding the passing transport. Beyond
the village the landscape is bare, for not here are the nestling
red-roofed farmhouses of old England. It is a communal life,
dear to the French peasant heart. Madame may chat over the
wall to her neighbor, knitting the while and keeping an eye on
the simmering pot. The French peasant likes company and
he sits of an evening in the village park, sipping his glass and
swapping news with his cronies. Thus is explained the utter
FRENCH SCENES 101
ruin the invader has wreaked upon the countryside. His
target is not isolated farms but densely populated villages, con
taining within their scant area all the rural population. Better
for the French peasants if they had lived in scattered home
steads.
We have been away a bare fortnight. When we return all
is changed. Gossips and laughing children enliven the street.
Dury has little to show of scars. Here and there the Boche has
left his mark screaming bombs from out the night, or the
devastation of a long-distance gun. But it has suffered in fore
boding. Last spring the tide of battle lapped very close to its
thresholds. At any hour the enemy might select its humble
area for bombardment. All the bigger houses the Chateaux
-are long closed, their owners in happier climes. Only the
village folk have clung to their village. They had nowhere
else to go to their village and their poor chattels, their cow
and their waddling geese. The good Cure remains to watch
over his flock and deplore the ruined tower of his gray old
church. But now the foe is many miles away and the village
saved saved with the wrecked city of Amiens.
In those days we saw many villages in far worse plight.
There was Domart, a ruin swaddled in dust; dust, dust every
where, red dust from the brick of broken homes, bathing the
passing lorries along the Roye road. There was Marcelcave,
a cemetery of houses, only the skeletons, instead of decent
burial, loom white and gaunt against the sky. Constructed of
century old timber f raming, these still stand after the tiles and
plaster have melted into dust. Such stricken villages do not
present the magnificent ruin of Ypres > nor are they a flat and
disregarded desert like Neuville St. Vaast, at foot of Vimy
Ridge. But they are very horrible. There is something inde
cent about their stark ribs.
*
At midnight of Aug. 21-22 comes the moving order.
"Secret and Confidential Lorry No. so-and-so will be at
the door of your billet at 5.45 a.m. no breakfasts served in
102 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
messes after 6 a.m. destination unstated." On such occasion
the Camp Commandant is the best hated man in Corps, for
there seems a certain malignity in these midnight alarums. At
last one was going to put in a good night s sleep to catch up
needed arrears; but no, there will be little sleep this night,
with the problem of squeezing a gallon of gear into a quart
pot; treasured "souvenirs" must go into the discard.
Once again on the move, we discover we have a full day for
the relatively short jaunt to Hautecloque, south of St. Pol, and
can spend some hours in Amiens, a year ago the joyous con
gregation of young officers on leave, but now deserted, empty
streets echoing to the passing hoof-beat.
A truly pious nation, the French; a people of reverence
for the fine things of life. Their piety today takes other direc
tion than that of yesterday. It kneels at the shrine of an idea,
of France. In all their churches is to be seen the shining
figure of Jeanne d Arc. Their national heroine broods over
them, an idea that has triumphed in this war over material
fact, over 450-centimetre guns.
Every cross-road has its shrine, and in every little hamlet
the village church stands a monument of ancient art and piety,
the treasured storehouse of the community from generation
to generation, enriched by free fancy. However dull the
village street, there lifts out of its foliage a slender fretted
spire, or, maybe, a hoary tower, sign manual of the spiritual
life below. War has quickened that life. Not in vain calls
the church bell to matins and vespers. In no land is the beauty
of sacrifice as well understood as in France.
Thousands of these humble altars lie in ruin, more ruinous
than the ruined villages, singled out malignantly. It was not
by his design that the great cathedral of Amiens escaped almost
unscathed. Its topmost pinnacles are far below the level of the
immediate hills and yet for four months it has been the target
of long-range guns and bombing planes. Draw a circle of a
hundred yards around it and everywhere is destruction. The
FRENCH SCENES 103
glorious Gothic west front, still sandbagged many feet up, is
pitted with shrapnel. Good saints in their niches have lost
arms and legs. It is a miracle that it has so escaped, to be for
generations to come a shrine for pious pilgrims who may see
in its scarred but stately lines the symbol of the indomitable
nation that kept alight through storm and ravage and woe the
torch of civilization.
Only an ecclesiastical architect can write of such things at
every turn the layman exposes himself. But it is impossible
to pass by Amiens cathedral without catching something of its
spirit and its meaning.
The popular, the picture-postcard, view is the west front,
with its irregular twin towers, its great rose window and all
the lavish ornament of decorated Gothic. It is a fine example
of that kind of thing such an impression is here deliberately
cultivated as might be that of a woman attired for the chief
event in her life. But this ornate richness and luxury of treat
ment is not what appeals in the particular connection. Cur
iously enough it is restricted entirely to the west facade, for
the rest is art reduced to the finest simplicity of free-springing
perpendicular columns and arches, delicate tracery, flying
buttresses and high-shouldering roofs. Here and there this
austere and chaste expression breaks out into rebellious phan
tasies of gargoyle and quaint grotesque, roughly carved from
the solid block.
The aspect one loves is the intimate view of the basilica
from the foot of Rue Victor Hugo, a vista of gray stone and
purple slate, an impression of devout aspiring feeling that
deliberately carries the eye unchecked and unencumbered by
superfluous ornament up and up and up to the pinnacle of the
wonderful little Gothic spire super-imposed upon the cross of
the building that from any other view it is not visible from
the west front seems unmeaning and even absurd. From
earth to the high elysium is its message, and to pass thence into
the square and thus confront the florid elegance of the west
facade is to fall from heaven to earth again^
104 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
The same pure and simple beauty is to be found within.
Most of the old glass has been removed, and gone too is much
of the gilt and tinsel that too often obscure and distract the
noble lines of these buildings. The interior is reduced to its
simplest values, without ornament, such as it was conceived and
executed by its monk builders. It is a house cleansed by war
like unto the people of France. There is little but the bare
beauty of form and light, but the impression is of an immensity.
The nave is subdivided by lofty shafts and bold arches, simple
variations of the trefoil prevailing. Its surpassing beauty is
due to these gracious lines and their high uplift to the vault
ing of the ceiling. Wide untrammelled spaces and the clear
sunlight streaming through the tracery of great unglazed win
dows give the impression of open skies and "the wind upon
the heath." Not here the mystery of stained glass, dim per
spectives and glorious shrines, but the flinging wide of doors,
the sweeping down of cobwebs.
Back of the high altar and facing the rich frescoes of the
Lady Chapel is a simple relief dated 1628, "To the worthy
memory of Johannis Delagrange, one time episcopal ambas
sador and cardinal." He lies there in stone effigy and his
cardinal s hat at his feet. Another slab perpetuates the charity
he established for the poor children of the diocese. A worthy
man, this Lord Archbishop of Amiens; and a proud, without
doubt.
In and about this great temple Canadian and Australian
soldiers reverently wander; they see in it something mystic,
the pledge of their victory, its vast echoing spaces peopled by
their comrades who have laid down their lives.
Against this pile of gray stone wherein lies enshrined the
feeling of all the ages the Hun hurled his implacable hate. In
its drive of Aug. 8 and 9, the Canadian Corps captured half a
dozen 5.9-inch naval guns, with a range of 25,000 yards, and
there is reason to suspect some of these were the very long
distance rifles that sought to destroy the cathedral of Amiens.
Of direct hits possible to identify two at least are of this calibre.
FRENCH SCENES 105
One destroyed the northeast chapel of the ambulatory; another
the organ platform under the rose window, but the organ, a
famous piece, had been removed to the crypt.
Amiens cathedral is now safe. Yet another bond was thus
knit between the peoples of France and of Canada. Over the
great altar hang the flags of French regiments, and among
them the Stars and Stripes. The ensign of Canada might here
well find a worthy resting place.
ARRAS
107
ARRAS
CHAPTER I
PLANNING ATTACK ON HINDENBURG LINE
WE have seen that Canadian Corps Headquarters moved
from Amiens to Hautecloque on the morning of Aug.
22. Its stay here was of the briefest, a move being
made early next morning to Noyelle Vion, and the interest of
Hautecloque in the annals of the Corps lies solely in the fact
that here the plan of battle on the Arras front was prepared.
Great as had been the moral effect of the successful Amiens
offensive, followed up immediately by the attack of the Third
Army between Albert and Arras, what was to follow was
designed to be much more far-reaching in its effect, namely,
the breaking of the Hindenburg line and the driving in of
the enemy on territory he had occupied uninterruptedly since
1914. * ^
Sir Douglas Haig thus explains the design: "As soon as
the progress of the Third Army had forced the enemy to fall
back from the Mercatel spur, thereby giving us a secure south
ern flank for an assault upon the German positions on Orange
Hill and about Monchy-le-Preux, the moment arrived for the
First Army to extend the front of our attack to the north.
Using the river Sensee to cover their left, in the same way as
the River Somme had been used to cover the left of the Fourth
Army in the Battle of Amiens, the right of the First Army
attacked east of Arras, and by turning from the north the west
ern extremity of the Hindenburg Line compelled the enemy
to undertake a further retreat. It was calculated correctly that
this gradual extension of our front of attack would mislead
the enemy as to where the main blow would fall, and would
cause him to throw in his reserves piecemeal."
109
110 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
As we shall see, the entire operation was entrusted to the
Canadian Corps, strengthened at times by the addition of
British Divisions. The recommendation of the Canadian
Corps Commander made after the successful initial operations
of the Battle of Amiens, namely, that those operations should
be slackened to give time to organize a set piece attack on a
broad front in a surprise attack elsewhere, had therefore borne
its full fruit.
In this connection it is interesting to follow Sir Arthur
Currie s observations upon the general situation at this date.
"In sympathy with the severe reverses suffered on the Marne,"
he says, "and consequent upon the actions now fully developed
in the Somme salient, signs were not wanting that the enemy
was preparing to evacuate the salient of the Lys. This evacua
tion began under pressure of the First Army on Aug. 25.
"All these attacks and results, direct or indirect, enabled
the Allies to recover the ground they had lost in the course of
the German offensive operations (of the spring and summer).
The recapture of the ground was, however, of secondary im
portance as compared to the moral results of these successive
victories. The German Armies had been impressed in the
course of these operations by the superiority of our general
ship and of our organization, and by the great determination
of our troops and subordinate commanders.
"The Hindenburg System, however, was intact, and the
enemy Higher Command hoped and believed that behind this
powerfully organized area the German Armies might be col
lected and reorganized. Fighting the most determined rear
guard action in the Somme salient, they expected that our
armies would be tired and depleted by the time they reached
the forward area of the Hindenburg System.
"The Battle of Cambrai, now about to be begun, shattered
their hopes. By breaking through the Drocourt-Queant Line,
itself but a part of the Hindenburg System, the Canadian
Corps carried the operations forward to ground that had been
in the hands of the Germans since 1914. This advance con-
PLANNING ATTACK ON HINDENBURG LINE 1 1 1
stituted a direct threat on the rear of the German Armies north
and south of Cambrai.
"Dominated at all times, paralysed by the swift and bold
strokes on vital points of their line and by the relentless press
ure applied everywhere, the German Higher Command was
unable to take adequate steps to localize and stop our advance.
After the Drocourt-Queant Line was broken, the retreat of the
enemy became more accelerated, and our attacks met every
where with less and less organized and determined resistance.
The moral effect of the most bitter and relentless fighting
which led to the capture of Cambrai was tremendous. The
Germans had at last learned and understood that they were
beaten."
The operations now about to open, and which were not con
cluded until the fall of Cambrai on Oct. 9, regarded as one
great battle, ranks foremost in all the operations of the "Hun
dred Days." It entailed six weeks continuous righting, often
surpassing in intensity any battle in which Canadian troops
had ever been engaged, and never falling below the standard
of bitterest trench warfare; for when, as in mid-September,
there was a pause in the forward movement, our troops in the
front line were exposed in a sharp salient and had no rest by
day or night. Throughout this great battle the Canadian
Corps held the centre of the field, and was often dependent
eh ti rely upon its own exertions and resources. Its work con
tributed more than any other combined operation of this period
to the final downfall of the enemy arms. These are consider
able claims but they will be amply supported by the ensuing
narrative.
The task before the Canadian Corps is described by Sir
Arthur Currie as follows : "On Aug. 22 I received the details
of the operation contemplated on the First Army Front. The
plan was substantially as follows :-
"The Canadian Corps, on the right of the First Army, was
to attack eastwards astride the Arras-Cambrai road, and by
forcing its way through the Drocourt-Queant Line south of
112 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
the Scarpe to break the hinge of the Hindenburg System and
prevent the possibility of the enemy rallying behind this
powerfully organized defended area.
These operations were to be carried out in conjunction
with the operation of the Third Army then in progress. This
attack had been fixed for next Sunday, Aug. 25. It was repre
sented that this gave barely 48 hours to concentrate the neces
sary artillery, part of which was still in the Fourth Army area,
and that, furthermore, the Canadian Corps had sentimental
objections to attacking on the Sabbath Day. It was then
agreed the attack should take place on Monday, Aug. 26.
"On the evening of Aug. 22 I held a conference of Divi
sional Commanders at Corps Headquarters (Hautecloque)
and outlined the projected operation and my plans for carrying
it out.
u ln addition to a detailed knowledge of the ground, which
we had held before, we were particularly benefited by all the
reconnaissances and plans made for the capture of Orange Hill
during the period of simulated activity at the end of July. The
excellence of trench railways, rear communications, and
administrative arrangements in the area were also of great
value, and enabled the Canadian Corps to undertake to begin,
with only three days notice, the hardest battle in its history.
"Reinforcements had come up, and although all units were
not up to strength, they were all in fighting condition. The
efficiency of the organization peculiar to the Canadian Corps,
and the soundness of the tactical doctrine practised, had been
proved and confirmed.
"Flushed with the great victory they had just won, and
fortified by the experience acquired, all ranks were ready for
the coming task."
The first step must be the recapture of the territory over
run by the enemy in his spring offensive. The most important
feature was the conical hill rising out of the plateau between
the Scarpe and the Cambrai road known as Monchy-le-Preux.
This had been captured from the enemy by a very fine opera-
PLANNING ATTACK ON HINDENBURG LINE 113
tion of British troops who in April, 1917, had turned the posi
tion in a driving snowstorm as part of the programme carried
out south of the Scarpe immediately following the capture of
Vimy Ridge by the Canadian Corps.
In the face of furious counter-attacks lasting several days
the hill had then been held by the gallant Newfoundland
Regiment, who although cut to pieces clung desperately to the
position until support was forthcoming. It was one of the
tragedies of the spring of 1918 that Monchy-le-Preux was per
haps needlessly surrendered to the enemy. Those were days
of panic and the loss of the hill seriously embarrassed the
troops, including the 2nd. Canadian Division, holding the line
in front of Arras during the summer. It was certain that the
enemy would not give it up again without a desperate struggle.
There were other strong features, for the ground to be
attacked lent itself peculiarly to defense, being composed of a
succession of ridges, rivers and canals, which formed natural
lines of defense of very great strength. These natural posi
tions, often mutually supporting, had been abundantly forti
fied. Their organization was the last word in military engi
neering, and represented years of intensive and systematic
labor. Barbed wire entanglements were formidable, machine-
gun positions innumerable, and large tunnels had been pro
vided for the protection of the garrison.
"The four main systems of defense," says the Corps Com
mander, "consisted of the following lines :-
1. The old German front line system east of Monchy-le-
Preux.
2. The Fresnes-Rouvroy line.
3. The Drocourt-Queant line.
4. The Canal du Nord line.
"These, with their subsidiary switches and strong points, as
well as the less organized but by no means weak intermediate
lines of trenches, made the series of positions to be attacked
without doubt one of the strongest defensively on the Western
Front.
9
114 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"Broad glacis, studded with machine-gun nests, defended
the immediate approaches to these lines, and this necessitated
in each case heavy fighting to gain a suitable jumping-off line
before assaulting the main position.
"In addition to these systems, and as a preliminary to the
attack on the old German trench system east of Monchy-le-
Preux, it was necessary to capture the very well organized
British defenses which had been lost in the fighting of March,
1918. These defenses were intact to a depth of about 5,500
yards, and were dominated by the heights of Monchy-le-Preux,
from which the Germans were enjoying superior observation.
"Throughout these operations there could not be any ele
ment of surprise, other than that afforded by the selection of
the actual hour of the assaults. The positions to be attacked
formed the pivot of the movements of the German Army to
the south, and the security of the Armies to the north depended
also on these positions being retained. There was consequently
little doubt that the enemy was alert, and had made every dis
position to repulse the expected attacks. Therefore the plan
necessitated provision for very hard and continuous fighting,
the main stress being laid on the continuity of the operations.
"To carry this out, I decided to do the fighting with two
Divisions in the line, each on a one-brigade front, thus enabling
both divisions to carry on the battle for three successive days ;
the two other Divisions were to be kept in Corps Reserve, rest
ing and refitting after each relief. (The severity of the fight
ing did not, however, allow this plan to be adhered to, and on
many occasions the Divisions had to fight with two brigades
in the front line.) It was understood that British Divisions
from Army Reserve would be made available as soon as addi
tional troops were required.
"To maintain the utmost vigor throughout the operation,
the Divisions were directed to keep their support and reserve
brigades close up, ready to push on as soon as the leading
troops were expended."
Six terrible weeks were to follow. They were to test the
PLANNING ATTACK ON HINDENBURG LINE 115
Corps as it had never been tested before. Days were to come
in which it was to envisage defeat and triumph only by its
stern denial of such a possibility.
For all it was to be a fiery ordeal; but for none more than
the Corps Commander. He had taken on the task and for the
honor of the Corps, of Canada, and the good of the cause, he
must push it through to a victorious conclusion. Be sure there
were for him days of doubt and sorrow. But his lofty spirit,
certain of itself even as it was certain of the Canadian soldier,
triumphed over all. Some few in intimate touch with the
Corps Commander in the dark days may have guessed at a
burden that at times was almost overwhelming, of responsibil
ities that troubled the humane man; but to those who relied
upon him he showed only a serene fortitude, and quickened
their drooping spirits by the vitality of his faith.
One of his Divisional Commanders has written of "the
grateful thanks of all ranks of the Division to our chief, Sir
Arthur Currie, for the extraordinary skill and ability with
which he conducted these battles. And especially do we wish
to place on record our appreciation of the care and solicitude
which he has evinced at all times for our lives and general
well-being."
CHAPTER II
WAYSIDE SCENES
MEANTIME preparations are going busily on. On the
night of Aug. 19 the 2nd. Canadian Division began to
move back to its fighting-ground in front of Arras,
where it had arrived on March 30 in time to halt the enemy
assault on Arras, remaining in the same line with a brief inter
val until the move south was made. Units of this division now
found themselves back in the identical trenches they had held
so many weeks.
The 3rd. Canadian Division began its move the following
night and was followed immediately by the 1st. Division. But
our 4th. Division remained in the line in front of Roye until
Aug. 25, when it was relieved by the 34th. and 35th. French
Divisions, and did not rejoin the Corps until Aug. 28, after
the battle had opened.
The Canadian troops had been fighting in a country rela
tively little war-scarred, where green fields and growing things
were to be seen ; they had had the luck of an unbroken spell of
fine weather; granted the hard toil and ever present danger of
the soldier s lot, their excursion south had been something in
the nature of a break in the dull monotony of trench warfare,
an adventure full of life and color and movement.
Now they were coming back to No Man s Land, to the
pitiless desolation wrought by the static warfare of years, to
mud and wire and the clang of the gas alarm. Such was
to be their life until long weeks ahead they had passed over the
Canal du Nord, through the scarred wood of Bourlon, and
had fought their way again to green fields across the Scheldt
Canal.
But not the hardiest optimist nor the most imaginative
soldier in their ranks could at that time guess that anything
116
WAYSIDE SCENES 117
lay in front of them but another winter in the trenches. Pass
ing in trains and busses through August harvest scenes, their
eyes were blinded to the great panorama presently to unroll
before them the towers of Valenciennes, the slag-heaps of
Hainault, the belfry of Mons, the dark forests of the Ardennes
and the shining ribbon of the Rhine. They had had their
little excursion, their adventure, their holiday, and now, some
what grimly, they returned to a landscape rent by war from
the very form of nature, and to the dreary round of raid by
night and alarums by day.
....
We are camped in the orchard of Noyelle Vion, ten miles
west of Arras. It is unscourged by war and its people go
about their daily avocations, habituated to the continual shift
ing military population. We follow hard on an American
divisional staff their footprints are still fresh in the damp
orchard mould and they in turn some British troops. The
tradition of French Units there in the early months of the war
is already indistinct. English is the language of barter and
children lisp it.
One wonders whether this movement is welcome to the
peasants. The idea of being their saviors has passed into his
tory; we must be something of a nuisance. True, they are paid
for their billets; but in turn they must evacuate their homes or
crowd into narrow quarters. Home life ceased for these
peasants four years ago. They are the mere appendage of a
vast and complex military movement, restless, seeming pur
poseless, that at an hour s notice picks up the major population
of the village, whisks it from sight and memory (save perhaps
in a shy maiden heart), and before nightfall deposits a new,
strange, but still alien multitude in khaki.
Shops, houses, estaminets, have sunk their identity in the
bold conspicuous numbering of the billets. The maiden sisters
Dubuc, whose little dress-making parlor stood just back from
the street and was a favorite corner for gossip among the good
wives, have disappeared, God knows where. Peace will bring
118 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
them back, but the gate that looked down the cobbled street as
they plied their busy needle is now disfigured by the sign, "No.
37 billets for 18 men."
Mankind has the instinct to climb upward, survey what
lies below of the countryside, and catch maybe the sun s declin
ing rays. Back of the orchard gently rising ground leads one
up to one of the finest prospects in France ; not bold indeed, like
the view from Cassel, but on every hand undulating into purple
distances.
Peace here reigns. In the foreground women with kilted
skirts are milking. An old man steadily follows his plow. Up
the road, perched sideways on a farm horse, her sabots click
ing against the chain traces, rides a young girl, a white kerchief
bound coquettishly over her dark hair; going home to prepare
the evening meal. At the hour of vespers for countless genera
tions these same people have been doing these same tasks. The
war has not touched them visibly, save that it has snatched
from the village sturdy manhood and lusty youth.
Below lies a vista of dark plowed land, yellowing fields of
sugar beet, tender green of sprouting grain, and umbrageous
clumps enclosing trim villages. Nothing could be more syl
van, more caressing to the eye. But at our very feet is a line of
trench, leaving its white serrated scar, hastily thrown up in
those feverish spring days when it seemed Arras too must fall
in the general ruin.
What is that mass that gleams on the eastern skyline? The
glass shows the familiar lines of the broken towers of the great
church of Mont St. Eloi, a landmark for miles around, to be
seen at a later date quite as distinctly from the hilltop of
Monchy-le-Preux.
And then that faint outline must be Vimy Ridge with its
crowding memories. To the left stand out the wooded sum
mits bordering Notre Dame de Lorette. War is not so dis
tant. From an aerodrome in the valley rises a solitary airman
and awhile he disports himself in the blue. Soon the sharp
WAYSIDE SCENES 119
purr of his engine is overhead. He turns, careening his
machine, whose belly gleams ruddy in the blazing western sky,
a darting dragon-fly. Presently he is joined by the rest of his
bombing squadron. In perfect alignment, like flight of geese
over northern lake, they turn eastward on their grim errand.
a
In the little town of Duisans but a stone s throw west of
Arras a procession of clergy and pious laymen bearing banners
and tall candles pass up the hill to the church. This is a day of
thanksgiving for the villagers. The legend goes that in those
fateful days of August, 1914, when the Hun swept through
Arras into the country beyond, the aged Cure called together
the devout and earnestly they besought Our Lady that if She
would shield them from the invader, annual offerings would
be made at the shrine. A party of Uhlans rode up to the town
octroi post, enquired if troops were there, and then returned
whence they came. Shells fell about the outskirts, neighbor
ing villages were shattered, but not a pagan finger-mark
touched Duisans. Worn out with the load of the terrible
years the old priest died, but still the parish pays its annual
tribute. Presently are heard strains of Gregorian music.
*
In our orchard is much speculation as to when and where
the Corps will go in again. It rains a good deal, the ground is
clayey, and rash folk say any move will be to the good.
It is Sunday night, Aug. 25, "Heine" has been over, and one
of our fellows after him. An officer with a night glass claims
he saw him come down. An orderly comes to the tent with an
urgent message. . . In a few minutes we are pulling boots
on again and going down the hill to the Corps garage.
It is after midnight; the attack is to be at three o clock;
there is little time to spare. Soon Noyelle Vion is behind us
and we pass through Habarcq, famous, we have been told, for
its beautiful women. Presently we come out upon the broad
St. Pol-Arras highway; and broad it need be to take care of the
traffic this night. No lights are allowed, for all this road is
120 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
under direct observation; the moon, just past the full, keeps
slipping behind clouds, and we crawl forward slowly. We
pass gun-limbers pulled by six horses apiece, whose black feet
make a pattern on the wet shining road. Dense columns of
four swing steadily forward the identification patch is
French grey, and therefore the 3rd. Canadian Division, but
we can make out nothing further.
No stretch of the imagination can render Arras beautiful;
but there is a certain picturesqueness in the narrow streets
exposing to the night their gaping wounds. It is a tortuous
passage, and just where traffic space is most needed, a wall of
sand-bags has been built across the street. Past the ruined rail
way station we go; across a bridge and then up a long hill;
through ruins that once were the Faubourg Ronville and so
into other ruins that once was the village of Beaurains. In a
dug-out here is a Company Headquarters, where men going
up the line are being served hot tea, grateful and refreshing.
The car can go no further, but it is only a matter of a mile
to Telegraph Hill, which offers a good view of the battle. It
has begun to rain a driving rain from the west, cold and
cheerless and it is slow work picking one s way through wire
and trenches, stumbling over a soldier s grave or slipping into
a shell hole. "Zero" hour, in fact, bursts on our ear from a
field-battery unnoticed in a little wood a few yards behind us.
The battle is on, but nothing can be made out in the darkness.
The barrage we have been told is more intense than that even
of the opening of the Amiens show, but somehow it is not so
impressive. The front is narrower, and the horizon limited
by ridges ; there is not the same wide sweep of vision that made
the spectacle from Gentelles ever memorable.
Nevertheless it is effective, as the enemy s flares show. Very
soon there is the glimmer of dawn and gradually the battlefield
unfolds, as through a transparency. Getting back to the road
that runs from Beaurains to Neuville Vitasse, we meet already
some of our walking wounded. One of these drives before him
thirty prisoners. "They expected us today," he calls out, "but
WAYSIDE SCENES 121
we were an hour too early for them. These lazy beggars were
asleep in their dug-out. How is the battle going? Why, fine;
we re away over the hill by now." But he adds that the
machine-gunners are stout chaps and gave it his section bad.
Over the entrance to a dug-out is a boldly painted sign:
"THIS IS NEUVILLE VITASSE/ That ruin needed identifica
tion. Our 31st. Battalion, Southern Alberta, had captured
part of the village or the trench system that goes under that
name but the previous night, and fighting was still going on
in the other end. Further to the right we now bcc our men, a
straggling line, making good progress a mile or so inside the
enemy line.
But the enemy is shelling the sunken road going through
the village and one is well advised to take to a trench. In fact
it is a very different affair to Amiens, where our men sailed off
into the blue and were not brought up until they had got in
four or five miles. Our counter-battery work then silenced his
guns, but now he is putting up a fight for every yard of ground
and sending over big stuff on our support lines. Against the
skyline a tank lies derelict, and our line, now very thin, is
scattered into little groups, answering the enemy machine-gun
fire. Slowly troops in support work forward.
An Advanced Dressing Station is busy in the fold of the
hill just behind Neuville Vitasse. Long lines of our wounded
wait patiently, lying in the open on stretchers. Nearby is a
Brigade Headquarters. News that men of the 3rd. Division
have captured Monchy-le-Preux evokes a cheer. "Good old
C. M. Rs.," whispers a private of the 31st. One wonders if he
can make blighry his face is the color of parchment but he
lies there, waiting his turn, without complaint. A big fellow
in field-gray next him groans horribly.
Down the shell-torn road come long lines of stretcher-bear
ers. One of these little parties is scattered by a bursting charge.
The surgeons in their white aprons work on impassively.
CHAPTER III
OPERATIONS : AUG. 26-27
THE attack on the morning of Aug. 26 was to be launched
by the 2nd. Canadian Division, Maj. -General Sir Henry
E. Burstall, on the right and the 3rd. Canadian Division,
Maj. -General L. J. Lipsett, on the left, with a total frontage of
6,000 yards. The jumping-ofT line began at the Sugar Factory,
just south of Neuville Vitasse, passing north through that vil
lage, then a little east of Telegraph Hill, across the Arras-
Cambrai road (the Divisional boundary) just east of Tilloy-
lez-Mofflaines, thence northeast to the Scarpe river at Fam-
poux, north of which the line was taken up by the 51st. Divi
sion, for the purpose of this operation placed under orders of
the Canadian Corps Commander. This famous Highland
Division, as part of the XXII Corps, had been through all the
hard righting on the Marne in July, and had good reason to be
a little battle weary. To protect the flank of our 3rd. Division
the 51st. Division was to advance towards Mount Pleasant and
Roeux.
On our right the XVII Corps, the left Corps of the Third
Army, during the offensive of the preceding week had ad
vanced its line well forward of our right flank to the outskirts
of Croisilles, whence its front trended back northwesterly to
join up with us at Neuville Vitasse. This Corps was to follow
up any advantage the Canadian Corps might gain.
On the previous night, Saturday, Aug. 24, our 2nd. Divi
sion had secured a better jumping-off line by advancing its
outposts into the western edge of Neuville Vitasse, pursuing
this advantage by capturing the Sugar Factory and some
elements of trenches south of the village.
The original design was that our two Divisions should push
their attack due east, but after the battle was initiated this was
changed, the Cambrai road being made the Divisional bound-
122
OPERATIONS: AUG. 26-27 123
ary line, the direction being southeast. The first task set for
the 2nd. Division was the capture of Chapel Hill, and it was
then to work south through the old British support system and
join up with troops of the XVII Corps on the right on the
northern end of Wancourt Spur, the object being to throw a
drag-net round the enemy troops in their forward area towards
Neuville Vitasse. The left of the Division was to push for
ward simultaneously and capture the southern end of Monchy-
le-Preux. The 3rd. Division was to capture Orange Hill
first and then pass on to the attack on Monchy-le-Preux.
Both Divisions were to exploit their success as far as possible.
"After mature consideration, zero hour, which had been
originally set at 4.50 a.m. was changed to 3 a.m.," says Sir
Arthur Currie, "in order to take advantage of the restricted
visibility produced by moonlight and so to effect a surprise;
the attacking troops would thus pass through the enemy s for
ward machine-gun defenses by infiltration, and be in posi
tion to assault at dawn his line of resistance on the eastern
slopes of Orange Hill.
"The initial assault was to be supported by 17 Brigades of
Field and nine Brigades of Heavy Artillery. (Throughout
the Arras-Cambrai operations the Artillery allotted to the
Canadian Corps was at all times adequate, varying at times in
accordance with the tasks assigned. In the operation against
the Drocourt-Queant line the attack was supported by 20
Brigades of Field and 12 Brigades of Heavy Artillery.)
"The following Troops were attached to the Canadian
Corps for the operations :
"5th. Squadron, R. A. F.
"3rd. Brigade, Tank Corps (about 45 tanks to a Brigade).
"As a result of lessons learned during the Amiens opera
tions, it was laid down, as a general principle, that Tanks
should follow rather than precede the Infantry. The 3rd.
Tank Brigade was asked to supply, if possible, nine Tanks to
each attacking Division each day, and the necessity of exer
cising the greatest economy in their employment was impressed
on Divisional Commanders.
124 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"On Aug. 26, at 3 a.m., the attack was launched under the
usual artillery and machine-gun barrages. It made good pro
gress, the village of Monchy-le-Preux being entered early in
the day, after a very brilliant encircling attack carried out by
the 8th. Brigade (Brig.-General D. C. Draper). The trenches
immediately to the east of Monchy-le-Preux were found to be
heavily held, and were not cleared until about 11 a.m. by the
7th. Brigade (Brig.-General H. M. Dyer).
"Guemappe was captured at 4 p.m. and Wancourt Tower
and the top of Heninel Ridge were in our hands at 10,40 p.m.
The defenders of the latter feature fought hard, but eventually
succumbed to a determined attack delivered by the 6th. Bri
gade (Brig.-General A. H. Bell), under cover of an extem
porized barrage fired by the 2nd. Canadian Divisional Artil
lery (Brig.-General H. A. Panet). During the night this
Brigade captured in addition Egret Trench, thus securing a
good jumping-ofl line for the operation of the following day.
"The situation along the Arras-Cambrai road was at one
time obscure, following a change in the Inter-Divisional
boundary ordered when the attack was in progress. A gap
occurred for a few hours, but it was rilled as soon as discovered
by the Canadian Independent Force.
"The enemy fought strenuously and several counter-attacks
were repulsed at various stages of the righting, three German
Divisions being identified during the day and more than 2,000
prisoners captured together with a few guns and many
machine-guns.
"North of the Scarpe the 51st. (Highland) Division had
pushed forward east of the Chemical Works and Gavrelle
without meeting serious opposition."
Our average advance the first day was thus about 6,000
yards, converting what had been the sharp enemy salient thrust
to within two miles of Arras into a fairly uniform line pro
jected forward by our two Divisions on our right to within a
thousand or fifteen hundred yards of the old German front
line; and on our left, south of the Scarpe at Pelves, actually a
OPERATIONS: AUG. 26-27 125
little over that line, thus giving us virgin territory he had held
since 1914. It was an auspicious beginning.
On our right the XVII Corps, after some delay, had con
formed to our advance through Heninel. But on our left,
north of the Scarpe, the situation was not quite so satisfactory;
for the 5 1st. Division had orders to co-operate but not to
attack, and during the day did not advance more than a
thousand yards on the river, thus being at least as much behind
our men who had established themselves in the western out
skirts of Pelves.
Although the task of our 2nd. Division was not so spectac
ular as the work allotted to the 3rd. Division on their left, it
was far from easy. The enemy, alert to meet attacks already
developing in this sector, had pushed forward reinforcements.
Our advance developed well along the Cambrai road, but
when our troops sought by a turning movement to link up with
the XVII Corps, the fighting became very severe, each ridge
providing a separate battlefield, and already the enemy was
showing what lay in store for us when his main line of resist
ance was reached.
On the right, the 6th. Brigade, Brig.-General A. H. Bell,
attacked with the 29th. Battalion, of Vancouver, on the Bri
gade right, and the 27th. Battalion, of Winnipeg, on its left.
These battalions pushed forward due east on each side .of
Neuville Vitasse, the 27th. swinging round and closing in on
the back of the village, and then continued the advance to
Wancourt village, which was taken on schedule. Meantime
the 29th. Battalion had swung off at right angles in an endeavor
to secure contact with troops of the Third Army. This diffi
cult manoauvre was well carried out, a number of prisoners
and guns being captured in Neuville Vitasse.
Advancing to capture Wancourt Ridge, both battalions
were held up by terrific machine-gun fire, and proceeded to
make good a line of defense. The 31st. Battalion, Southern
Alberta, and the 28th. Battalion, Regina, now came up in sup
port, and with aid of an admirable shoot put on by the 2nd.
126 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Divisional Artillery, the ridge was finally cleared and Wan-
court Tower captured at half past four the same afternoon.
That night the Brigade pushed forward and captured a line
of trench ahead to furnish the 5th. Brigade with a good jump-
ing-off line next morning. The right battalion of the Brigade
was obliged to build up a flank to the south, as the British
troops had not come up.
Meantime the 4th. Brigade, Brig.-General R. Rennie, on
the left of the 6th. Brigade, after storming Chapel Hill,
had pushed on south of the Cambrai road, with Brutinel s
Brigade now on their left, overcoming heavy opposition at
Guemappe and along the swampy valley of the Cojeul. The
4th. Brigade attacked at 3.20 a.m. and by 6 a.m. had reached
its first objective, the 21st. Battalion, Eastern Ontario, on the
right, and the 20th. Battalion, Central Ontario, on the left.
The final objective was reached at 7.30 a.m. with Guemappe
captured later by the 21st. Battalion. The 19th. Battalion,
Central Ontario, and the 18th. Battalion, Western Ontario,
now came up in support and by seven in the evening the line
had been carried forward to the northern slope of the Heninel
Ridge.
On our left, on the 3rd. Canadian Division front, the
dramatic feature of the day was the capture of Monchy-le-
Preux, the commanding height known to every soldier on the
Arras front, and this brilliant exploit is deserving of descrip
tion in some detail. The attack was entrusted to the 8th.
Brigade, (Brig.-General D. C. Draper). At "zero" our
artillery put down a heavy rolling barrage, moving forward
at the rate of a hundred yards every four minutes, on the
enemy s front line and defenses, in conjunction w r ith defensive
barrages designed to prevent the enemy bringing up reinforce
ments. The 5th., 4th., and 2nd. C. M. R. Battalions jumped off
exactly at "zero," following closely upon the rolling barrage.
At twenty-five minutes past five, when visibility was good, the
1st. C. M. R. Battalion, Western Manitoba and Saskatchewan,
passed through the 4th. and 2nd. C. M. R. Battalions on our
OPERATIONS: AUG. 26-27 127
left, attacking the enemy positions between the Scarpe river
and the northern slopes of Monchy-le-Preux. The attack was
pressed with vigor, and by seven o clock our men had accom
plished their tasks and the final objectives were in their hands,
but they did not stop until they had advanced some distance
further east. The right flank swung round behind Monchy-le-
Preux, joining hands at eight o clock with the Sth. C. M. R.,
Eastern Townships, which had attacked on the right, captur
ing Orange Hill and then drifting parties up to the southwest
of the village. Seeing themselves thus cut off from support,
the garrison surrendered.
During the advance our troops encountered and overcame
stiff resistance, chiefly machine-gun fire and particularly from
the village. No sooner were they in possession of the hill than
the enemy turned upon it a furious bombardment, with trench
mortars and heavy guns. At eleven o clock, units of the 7th.
Brigade passed through the line and pressed on the advance,
leaving the Sth. Brigade to consolidate the position they had
so gallantly won.
In this brilliant encircling movement the 1st. C. M. R.
inflicted severe casualties on the enemy besides capturing a
large number of prisoners. Several heavy and light trench-
mortars, a great number of heavy and light machine-guns,
together with two 77mm. guns, fell into their hands.
There remains to be recorded a notable personal exploit.
After the encircling movement was completed but while the
enemy still held the hill crowned with the ruins of Monchy-le-
Preux, Lieut. Charles Smith Rutherford, Sth. C. M. R., a
native of Colborne, Ont., went forward alone to reconnoitre,
some distance ahead of his assaulting party. Entering the out
skirts of the village he walked straight into an enemy machine-
gun section, holding a pill-box, but which was not looking for
an attack from that quarter. "Surrender," he cried without a
moment s hesitation, though covered by enemy rifles. "You
are completely surrounded and our machine-gunners will open
fire on you if you do not surrender immediately." The enemy
128 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
officer disputed the fact and invited Rutherford to enter the
pill-box, but this he discreetly declined. There was a
moment s discussion and then the German officer said they
would surrender. "You have another machine-gun further up
the hill; order them to surrender or we ll blow them to bits."
And they did ; the entire garrison, consisting of two officers and
43 men with three machine-guns, surrendered to him.
His men then coming up, Lieut. Rutherford observed that
the right assaulting party was held up by heavy machine-gun
fire from another pill-box. This he attacked with a Lewis-gun
section and captured a further 35 prisoners with machine-
guns, thus enabling the party to continue their advance.
Orange hill, west of Monchy-le-Preux, was covered by a
strong enemy trench line, and some of the numerous dug-out*
were not mopped-up thoroughly as our infantry pushed ahead.
Father James Nicholson of Kingston, Ont, chaplain of the 5th.
C. M. R., went over with his Medical Officer and stretcher-
bearers after the infantry. Coming to a dug-out, the Padre
shouted down. "Don t shoot," cried a Boche officer; "we sur
render." And up tumbled seven officers and 40 men, piling
their arms. "But where are your men?" asked the leader,
looking round suspiciously. "Never mind; prepare to go to
the rear." They began to whisper together. At this moment
the M. O. arrived with his stretcher-bearers, but all unarmed.
"That is quite enough from you; one word more and off goes
your block," he said walking up to the Boche. Fortunately at
that juncture two of our men with rifles came up. "Shoot the
first man that opens his mouth," said the M. O., Capt. H. B.
McEwan, and they marched off to the rear.
After passing through the 8th. Brigade, the 7th. Brigade
had very stiff fighting along the valley of the Scarpe and also
towards the Bois du Vert and the Bois du Sart, from which the
enemy launched heavy counter-attacks during the course of
that afternoon and evening. But these were beaten off and our
line consolidated for the attack next morning.
"The attack," says the Corps Commander, "was renewed
OPERATIONS: AUG. 26-27 129
at 4.55 a.m. on Aug. 27 by the 2nd. and 3rd. Canadian Divi
sions, in the face of increased opposition, under a uniformly
good initial barrage.
"The 2nd. Canadian Division pushed doggedly forward
through the old German trench system, where very stiff hand-
to-hand fighting took place, and crossed the Sensee river,
after capturing the villages of Cherisy and Vis-en-Artois.
"The 3rd. Canadian Division encountered very heavy
opposition, but succeeded in capturing Bois du Vert, Bois du
Sart, and reaching the western outskirts of Haucourt, Remy,
Boiry-Notre-Dame and Pelves.
"The enemy throughout the day pushed a large number of
reinforcements forward, bringing up Machine-gun Units in
motor lorries in the face of our accurate Field and Artillery
Fire. Hostile Field Batteries in the open, firing over open
sights, showed remarkable tenacity, several remaining in
action until the personnel had been destroyed by our machine-
gun fire.
"Our casualties were heavy, especially on the 2nd. Cana
dian Division front, and after discussing the situation with the
G. O. C., 2nd. Canadian Division, and taking into considera
tion the uncertainty of the right flank of this Division, the
operations were, after 5.45 p.m., restricted to the consolidation
of the line then reached east of the Sensee river.
"North of the Scarpe, the 51st. (Highland) Division had
pushed forward and gained a footing on Greenland Hill, but
were forced to withdraw slightly by a heavy German counter
attack. During the night of Aug. 27-28 the 8th. Division (VII
Corps) took over the northern half of the 5 1st. Division front.
"As the enemy was still holding Plouvain and the high
ground north of the Scarpe, the 3rd. Canadian Division had
been compelled to refuse its left flank, and the front now held
by this Division was increased from about 3,700 yards to
about 6,000 yards."
The fact was that while during this day the Canadian
Corps advanced a maximum of about 4,000 yards along the
10
130 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Cambrai road, there was no corresponding advance by the
British troops on either flank, particularly on the north, where
the failure to hold Greenland Hill was a sad loss, as enemy
batteries on this elevation directed at us an enfilade fire
throughout this and the following days.
This situation was very clear to the onlooker on top of
Monchy-le-Preux, at times itself a warm spot. The main
supply of ammunition for both our Divisions was along the
Arras-Cambrai road, and this was subjected to a harassing fire
along its entire length. Several ammunition lorries were hit
south of Monchy, and casualties were suffered by our Ad
vanced Dressing Station in that vicinity, all the fire coming
from the north right across the supports of our 3rd. Division,
On our right the 2nd. Canadian Division had a hard day of
it right from the kick-off. The attack was made by the Sth.
Brigade on the right, which during the night had relieved the
6th. Brigade; and the 4th. Brigade on the left, immediately
south of the Arras-Cambrai road.
The Sth. Brigade had a terrible gruelling, fighting its way
through a dense maze of trenches and wire, and with its right
flank in the air. All its battalions were engaged and lost very
heavily, these being the 24th., recruited from the Victoria
Rifles of Montreal, the 22nd., French Canadians, the 25th.,
Nova Scotia, and 26th., New Brunswick.
Lt.-Col. W. H. Clark-Kennedy of the 24th., enlisted at
Montreal, showed this day conspicuous bravery and brilliant
leadership. He led his Battalion with great bravery and skill
from Crow and Aigrette trenches in front of Wancourt to the
attack on the Fresnes-Rouvroy line. From the outset the Sth.
Brigade, of which the 24th. was a central unit, came under
very heavy shell and machine-gun fire, suffering many casual
ties, especially among the leaders. Units became partially dis
organized and the advance was checked. Appreciating the
vital importance to the Brigade front of a lead by the centre
and undismayed by annihilating fire, Lt.-Col. Clark-Kennedy,
by sheer personality and initiative, inspired his men and en-
OPERATIONS: AUG. 26-27 131
couraged them forward. On several occasions he led parties
straight at the machine-gun nests, which were holding up the
advance. By controlling the direction of neighboring units
and collecting men who had lost their leaders, he rendered
valuable services in strengthening the line, and enabled the
whole Brigade front to move forward.
By the afternoon, very largely due to the determined leader
ship of this officer and disregard for his own life, his Battalion,
despite its heavy losses, had made good the maze of trenches
west of Cherisy and Cherisy village, had crossed the Sensee
bed, and had occupied the Occident trench in front of the
heavy wire of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line. Under continuous
fire he then went up and down his line until far into the night,
improving the position, giving wonderful encouragement to
his men, and sending back very clear reports.
On the left of the 2nd. Canadian Division front the 4th.
Brigade had equally hard fighting. It captured Vis-en-Artois,
on the Arras-Cambrai road, early but was unable to cross the
Sensee river until late in the day. Undeterred by their losses
these fine Ontario Units fought their way literally step by step
until they had made good the east bank of the Sensee. The
fighting was very bitter in character, and the 21st. Battalion in
particular was little inclined to mercy after a Bochc prisoner
had shot down one of their officers.
From Monchy it was clear that a stern battle was in pro
gress up over the high ridge from Wancourt and Guemappe
and then down into the valley of the Sensee river, through the
strongly fortified villages of Cherisy and Vis-en-Artois. From
the opposite slope the enemy poured in a terrific fire, and from
time to time he threw in counter-attacks with his infantry. It
was slow and expensive work, but it was vitally necessary to
unmask the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the last line of resistance
which lay between us and our immediate goal, the Drocourt-
Queant Switch, itself an integral part of the Hindenburg
system.
Equally intense but of a different character was the fighting
132 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
on the front of the 3rd. Division on our left. We were now
fighting in the No Man s Land of 1917 and the ground was
everywhere torn up by shell fire and littered with old wire.
The 7th. Brigade had carried the line overnight in front of
the Bois du Vert and Bois du Sart, two woods crowning twin
heights a thousand yards apart north and south, Monchy being
two thousand yards west. A thousand yards northeast of Bois
du Sart lies Jigsaw Wood, with Hatchett Wood between.
The 9th. Brigade took up the attack at zero hour, the
immediate objective being these two woods, and if possible the
advance was to be pushed on into Boiry-Notre-Dame, a mile
further east. The two woods were taken in the first rush, but
the enemy meanwhile had brought down heavy reinforce
ments from Douai and counter-attacked three times in suc
cession from Jigsaw Wood, compelling us to refuse our left,
which here, as already explained, exposed a long flank to the
north.
In order to cope with the resistance, it was determined to
lay down a hurricane barrage on Jigsaw Wood, and for this
purpose four Brigades of Field Artillery and a dozen batteries
of heavy guns were concentrated on Orange Hill and opened
fire simultaneously. As luck would have it, the enemy had
just pushed in strong supports to their troops holding Jigsaw
Wood, and the slaughter was very great. Our bombing
planes, flying over the wood at the same time, added to the
destruction and confusion.
The enemy, however, had a strong second line of defense
and both Boiry and Jigsaw Wood remained in his hands this
day. On its right however, the 3rd. Canadian Division suc
ceeded in advancing its line north of the Cambrai road abreast
of our 2nd. Division at Vis-en-Artois. The battle was intensi
fying as it progressed, but there was harder fighting yet to
come.
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS : AUG. 28
(( T T was intended," says Sir Arthur Currie, "to continue
the battle on Aug. 28, with the 1st. Canadian Division on
the right and the 4th. (British) Division, then coming
under my command, on the left; the latter Division, however,
was unable to reach the battle position in time. As it was
undesirable at this stage to employ a fresh Division alongside a
Division which had been already engaged, the orders issued
were cancelled and the battle was continued by the Divisions
then in the line."
In fact there was no choice in the matter. As we have seen,
the 4th. Canadian Division was then only moving back from
Amiens. The enemy was pushing up reinforcements from
both Douai and Cambrai and evidently meant to throw every
available ounce into the scale to check us before the Drocourt-
Queant line was reached. He held an immensely strong posi
tion on the eastern slopes rising up from the Sensee river which
was continued by the Boiry defense line to the Scarpe. He had
shown a disposition to attack in force and the positions we
had won offered no facilities for a passive defense. We must
either go on or fall back on Wancourt Ridge and Monchy.
thus throwing away the fruits of two days hard fighting and
all the advantages of our surprise attack. It was not to be
thought of, and so until two fresh divisions could be brought
into the line the following night at earliest there was noth
ing for it but for our tired troops to press on.
The day s operations are described by the Corps Com
mander as follows : "At 9 a.m. on Aug. 28 the 3rd. Canadian
Division resumed the attack, followed at 12.30 p.m. by the 2nd.
Canadian Division. The objective for the day was the cap
ture of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, the possession of which was
vital to the success of our further operations.
133
134 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"On the left the 3rd. Canadian Division had pushed for
ward, capturing the Fresnes-Rouvroy line from the Sensee
river to north of Boiry-Notre-Dame, and had secured that
village, Jigsaw Wood and entered Pelves. They had, how
ever, been unable to clear the village of Haucourt."
In order to shorten their front and reduce to a minimum the
risk of a counter-attack from the north (the 51 St. Division
being still at Roeux), our 3rd. Division opened the day by an
assault at seven o clock on their extreme left, when by the cap
ture of Pelves they secured that bridgehead over the Scarpe.
This was brilliantly carried out by the 7th. Brigade, Brig.-
General H. M. Dyer, whose elements fought their way through
an intricate maze of trenches, despite the galling fire poured in
on them from the heights bordering the river valley further
east.
It was the scene of a very brilliant exploit. Sergt. John
Hutchinson of the 49th Battalion, of Edmonton, a native of
Newcastle, but who enlisted at Edmonton, led the way up an
enemy communication trench, which projected forward at
right angles from their main system. Bombing as he went, he
fought along the trench to the T point where it joined the main
trench, where he established himself and sent back word that
the left of the enemy sector based on the river was now in the
air. Reinforcements were rushed up and our men divided
right and left, along the main trench, and soon were in com
plete possession.
Across the bare open ground from the east the enemy sent
over three massed counter-attacks in order to restore their
line, but our men turned on them their own trench-mortars,
and the divisional artillery, being now apprised of the situa
tion, laid down so effective a barrage that the enemy was cut
to pieces, many dead being left on the field.
Combined with the operations of the 9th. Brigade, Brig.-
General D. M. Ormond, on the divisional right, this move
ment had the effect of turning the flank of the very strong
enemy position in Jigsaw Wood, which the previous day had
OPERATIONS: AUG. 28 135
resisted all our efforts. The garrison streamed back from the
wood across the open plateau and were mown down by the
rifle fire of our men in the main trench, the range being so
short that the shooting was exceedingly effective. Few of
them reached their support line.
Further to the right, the 9th. Brigade pushed ahead, and
the 52nd. Battalion, New Ontario, which the previous day
had captured Bois du Vert, now stormed Boiry village. This
was the battalion that had taken Damery in the Amiens show,
but probably its work on this day will rank in its annals as a
greater achievement, for the men had lost heavily on the
previous day and expected relief that night. Yet they went in
with a will and a cheer and nothing could stand before them.
Since Aug. 8 the Battalion had lost over half its effectives.
On the night of Aug. 28-29 the 3rd. Canadian Division was
relieved by the 4th. British Division and went out of the line
for a brief rest, after three days ding-dong righting in which
every Brigade was used to the uttermost, following close on the
hard work along the Roye road in the Amiens show. But
although not actually in the line, the general situation de
manded they should remain in close support, where they were
still exposed to enemy shell fire.
One of the most remarkable features of the present fighting,
indeed, arose from the fact that the enemy immediately before
us was in superior strength, as during the course of the battle
between Aug. 26 and Sept. 2 he brought into action no less
than eleven divisions, all of which were beaten in turn. Cou
pled with this the fact that at this stage we were but fighting
our way up through the fringe of his defense in an effort to
grapple with his main line of resistance, and it will be seen
that the situation of our divisions in the line weakened num
erically by their heavy losses, incessantly straafed by the
enemy s artillery and machine-gun fire, and subjected to suc
cessive waves of determined counter-attack from fresh troops
thrown into his line must have afforded constant anxiety to
the Corps Commander.
136 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
It followed inevitably that an exhausted division, so far
from going out to rest in a back area when relieved, must
"stand to," close up in support, ready for any event, and thus
be exposed to bombardment by day and bombing by night.
Curious indeed was the spectacle presented by every little
vale and depression in this area that lay separated by but a
single ridge from the battle line and the direct observation of
the enemy, but which nevertheless was crowded with infantry
in support, massed batteries of artillery, heavy and light,
trains of supply and field ambulances; with cheek-by-jowl
Divisional, Brigade and Battalion Headquarters, in dug-outs
and under canvas.
Such an area was included south of the Cambrai road be
tween Neuville Vitasse and Guemappe and from the com
manding vantage of Monchy-le-Preux lay spread out like a
map. It seemed impossible the enemy could fail to note this
great concentration, where a division lay within the compass
of a good-sized western ranch, and to pour down upon it a
devastating bombardment. But his gunners were fully occu
pied in dealing with our assaults on his front area, and beyond
throwing over occasional heavy stuff and maintaining a per
sistent searching fire along our lines of communication, there
was nothing in the way of a concerted artillery demonstration.
During these and the next few following days, too, our airmen
had so established their supremacy that hostile scouts durst
not venture over our lines in daylight. These conditions, how
ever, brought about relatively heavy casualties among troops
lying in support, and particularly among our burial parties.
The situation on our left, the 3rd. Division front, has been
dealt with first because the kick-off took place in the early
morning, while on the right, to which we now come, the 2nd.
Canadian Division did not open its attack south of the Cambrai
road until a little after noon.
"On the front of the 2nd. Canadian Division the fighting
was most severe," savs Sir Arthur Currie. "The wire in front
7
of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line was found to be almost intact.
OPERATIONS: AUG. 28 137
and although at some points the 5th. Brigade (Brig.-General
T. L. Tremblay) had succeeded in penetrating the line, the first
objective could not be secured, except one short length on the
extreme right. Subjected to heavy machine-gun fire from
both flanks as well as frontally, the attacking troops had suf
fered heavy casualties, which they had borne with the utmost
fortitude.
"At nightfall the general line of the 2nd. Canadian Divi
sion was little in advance of the line held the night before,
although a few parties of stubborn men were still as far for
ward as the wire of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line. Enemy rein
forcements were seen dribbling forward all day long."
The 5th. Brigade staff had suffered severely in the Amiens
show, when one shell had wounded Brig.-General Ross, and
killed the Brigade Major and a Staff Major of the 2nd. Divi
sion present, besides wounding the Brigade Intelligence
Officer. Lt.-Col. T. L. Tremblay, who had led the 22nd.
Battalion with such distinction at Courcelette and elsewhere,
was now Acting-Brigadier, later to be confirmed in that ap
pointment. The Brigade, exhausted and depleted though it
was by the hard fighting of the previous days, could not have
been handled with more resolution, and the response of the
men was magnificent, but they were up against an impossible
task.
All the battalions engaged lost very heavily, the casualties
of the Brigade during the two days fighting being about one
hundred officers and 2,500 other ranks. Every officer engaged
of the 22nd. Battalion, French Canadians, was a casualty by
nightfall of Aug. 28, including the Acting O. C., Major A. E.
Dubuc, with the entire headquarters staff of the battalion,
mostly by shell fire.
Lt.-Col. Clark-Kennedy, of the 24th. Battalion, whose bril
liant leadership the preceding day has been recounted above,
was seriously wounded. He again showed valorous leadership
in the attack on the Fresnes-Rouvroy line and Upton Wood.
Though severely wounded soon after the start, he refused aid,
138 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
and dragged himself to a shell hole, from which he could
observe. Realising that his exhausted troops could advance
no further he established a strong line of defense and thereby
prevented the loss of most important ground. Despite intense
pain and serious loss of blood he refused to be evacuated for
over five hours, by which time he had established the line in a
position from which it was possible for the relieving troops
to continue the advance.
Lt.-Col. John Wyse of the 25th. Battalion, Nova Scotia,
was wounded severely while leading his men, the command
devolving upon Major F. P. Day, Lt.-Col. A. E. G. Mc-
Kenzie, 26th Battalion, New Brunswick, was killed while
gallantly rallying his men, and thus every unit of the 5th.
Brigade lost its commanding officer, besides extremely heavy
casualties both among officers and rank and file, losses to the
26th. being nine officers and 350 men.
"I never saw so many machine-guns in my life," said the
Trench-Mortar Officer of the New Brunswickers after the
battle. "They were in three tiers, three miles wide, protected
by dense wire, their front plastered by shell fire. We attacked
again and again and in the intervals beat off enemy counter
attacks. If we d had tanks we d have been all right. What we
want is tanks, tanks and yet more tanks."
"It isn t rifles that shoot them guys," said a stretcher-bearer
at the Advanced Dressing Station. "Pretty well every man
that comes down here is done in by machine-guns. But most
of them are good blighties, with clean bullet wounds."
A good idea of the character of the fighting throughout the
day of Aug. 28 is given by the narrative of a soldier of the 22nd.
Battalion, as told the following day. "On Monday," he said,
"we were in support. Our total strength was about 850 of all
ranks, but when fifty men had been detached as stretcher-
bearers and burial parties, and a few men from each company
left in reserve as a nucleus at Battalion Headquarters, our
battle strength was reduced to 675.
"Ten o clock Tuesday morning we moved up to the attack
OPERATIONS: AUG. 28 139
between Guemappe and Cherisy, but were held up on the
ridge and lost heavily, by machine-gun fire, as did the 20th.
and 21st. of the 4th. Brigade, alongside of us. In the afternoon
we attacked again, taking our objective, Cherisy, and crossed
over the dry creek bed, where the Boche plastered us with fish
tails, gas and machine-guns.
"The Colonel and our Majors were wounded that day and
next day the battalion was run by subalterns. The command
went down to a Captain, but at nightfall of Wednesday not an
officer was left and the Sergt.-Major of one of the Companies
brought the battalion out.
"Courcellete was child s play to this. It was machine-guns,
not shell fire, and they raked us as we pushed up from Cherisy
and the river over the ridge. This was about two o clock
Wednesday afternoon. We got our first objective, the chalk
pit, and then went on to our final objective, the Fresnes-Rouv-
roy line, a thousand yards beyond and fifteen hundred from
the jumping-ofT line, but they caught us on the wire and only
15 or 20 reached it. We fell back because we had no officer,
bringing away our wounded."
Only three officers were left of the 35 this Battalion brought
out of the Amiens show, and they were in reserve. Up to bat
talion headquarters came a gunner, still carrying his machine-
gun, with two bullet holes through it. "Hallo! Lieutenant,"
he cried. "Here we are again, the glorious 22nd.!" ("Hallo!
Lieutenant. Hein le v l a le glorieux 22ieme!")
The glorious 22nd. ! The Battalion will go on. The body
perisheth but the spirit dieth not.
At Brigade Headquarters that evening there came a tele
phone call from the Sergeant-Major. "I am holding the line
with 15 men. What shall we do?"
"Carry on until your supports come up."
The following account is taken from the story of this Bat
talion: "The Epic of the 22nd.," by Sergt.-Major Corn-
eloup; La Presse, Montreal: "Col. Dubuc fell at head of his
men; Major Vanier lost a leg; Majors Routier, Roy and
140 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Archambault, Capt. Morgan, Lieutenants Lamothe and Lem-
ieux: such is the entire list of those who had been decorated
who were now extinguished, all the glory of the past being
aureoled in a bloody apotheosis. In spite of numerous desper
ate efforts to bring him in, Capt. Morgan remained for 36
hours in the sad No Man s Land. Out of the 22 officers who
took part in this homeric struggle, not one was spared. Of the
600 "shock troops" who went into battle, only 70 uninjured
answered the roll-call.
"The position won was held. A non-combatant, one of
those great natures of the elect, born for devotion, Dr. Albcric
Marin, Captain in the Medical Corps, saved the situation. He
was following the battle as a spectator, giving first aid to the
wounded, when he noticed that our soldiers, deprived of their
leaders, were hesitating. In a bound he leapt over the dead,
the wounded, those caught in the wire. Rallying this handful
of brave men, still hot from the ardor of combat, he carried
them along, electrifying them and inspiring them to hold their
ground among the resounding crashes which churned the
riven earth. In his own turn he fell, victim of gas.
"Our Chaplain, Father Desjardins, worthy successor of
the noble Father Crochetiere, was surrounded while smothered
in a gust of evil fumes."
Left of the 5th. Brigade, just south of the Arras-Cambrai
road in the valley of the Sensee, the 4th. Brigade, Brig.-Gen-
eral R. Rennie, made its third successive attack, having been
continuously in the line since the battle opened on Monday
morning. But the fighting strength was much reduced, and
for this reason the Brigade frontage was limited to 700 yards.
Attacking across the open slope, these fine Ontario troops
fought their way forward with the utmost gallantry, but the
men were tired, and the wire in front being uncut it was
impossible to reach the objective, and in face of strong enemy
resistance progress was slow. Casualties to officers were very
heavy. Every battalion was in line and suffered severely. In
addition the 31st. Battalion was sent up in support from the
6th. Brigade, which was in reserve.
OPERATIONS: AUG. 28 141
Tales of heroism and sacrifice were common these three
days, but one example must suffice. At one time when the
right flank of the 18th. Battalion, Western Ontario, was held
up by machine-gun fire, Lance-Cpl. W. H. Metcalf, a native
of Dennysville, Maine, realising the situation, rushed forward
under intense fire to a tank passing on the left. With his signal
flag he walked in front of the tank, directing it along the trench
in a perfect hail of bullets and bombs. The machine-gun
strong points were thus overcome, heavy casualties inflicted on
the enemy, and a very critical situation relieved. Later,
though wounded, he continued to advance until ordered to get
into a shell-hole and have his wounds dressed. This occurred
in the advance of the 4th Brigade on Vis-en-Artois.
But the men of the 2nd. Canadian Division did not die in
vain. If they had not done much to improve the line, they
had still held fast and had beaten back all through the day
wave after wave of hostile counter-attacks, intent on driving
them back over the Sensee. Our fresh troops now coming up
were to jump-off from the line they had so stoutly maintained,
were to carry on the battle into the heart of the enemy s defense,
and there establish the Canadian Corps as the first of the Allied
troops to break through the Hindenburg system, at no point so
formidable or so bitterly defended as here.
Their failure, glorious as it was, was due largely to matters
over which they had no control. We fought that day with our
right flank exposed, for the British had not come up to our
support. It was only late in the day that London troops
stormed the village of Croisilles.
This village was 4,000 yards southwest of our right flank,
and the 56th. British Division had fought their way up to its
outskirts during the battle of Bapaume on Aug. 24. Thus, for
four days, this line had remained static, and, whereas at the
opening of the battle of Arras on Aug. 26 the general line of
the Third Army was considerably in advance of our jumping-
off line, it was now refused. On Aug. 26 Scottish and London
troops, indeed, on our right flank, had captured the high
142 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
ground between Croisilles and Heninel, in face of strong
resistance, chiefly from machine-gun posts. But this did no
more than conform to our advance and, there being no corres
ponding advance on the following days, our right flank was
much exposed, particularly from the direction of Hendecourt.
The battle, in fact, was throughout a Canadian Corps battle,
receiving little or no support on either flank.
On the night of Aug. 28-29 the 2nd. and 3rd. Canadian
Divisions were relieved by the 1st. Canadian Division on our
right and the 4th. British Division on our left. This Division
consisted of first-rate English County troops, and, as we shall
see, their contribution to the general success of the Canadian
Corps through the hard fighting of the following days was in
every respect worthy of their reputation. And none could be
higher than that of the famous "Fighting Fourth," distin
guished even among the "Old Contemptibles," veterans of a
hundred well-fought fields. They still maintained their name
as "storm troops," and in the Canadian Corps found worthy
company.
CHAPTER V
OPERATIONS : AUG. 29-3 1
THE next four days were devoted to improving our line so
as to afford suitable jumping-ofl ground for the great
attack on the Drocourt-Queant Switch. It resolved it
self into desperate and often detached struggles for isolated
positions and sections of the enemy s defense. Before entering
into some of the details of these operations it will be well to
quote Sir Arthur Currie s narrative :-
"During the days succeeding the capture of Monchy-le-
Preux the enemy s resistance had been steadily increasing, and
it became clear that the Drocourt-Queant line would be very
stubbornly defended.
"On Aug. 28 instructions had been received fixing tenta
tively Sept. 1 as the date on which the Drocourt-Queant line
was to be attacked by the Canadian Corps, in conjunction with
the XVII Corps. The intention was to capture also the Canal
du Nord line in the same operation.
"It was therefore essential to secure, before that date, a
good jumping-off line roughly parallel to, and approximately
600 yards west of, the Drocourt-Queant line.
"This was indeed a very difficult task, entailing the capture
of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line, of the Vis-en- Artois Switch, and
of a number of defended localities of very great strength, not
ably the Crow s Nest, Upton Wood and St. Servin s Farm.
"The 2nd. and 3rd. Canadian Divisions were now ex
hausted, and during the night of Aug. 28-29 they were relieved
by the 1st. Canadian Division on the right, the 4th. (British)
Division (which had been placed under my orders on the night
of Aug. 26-27) on the left, and Brutinel s Brigade (formerly
the Canadian Independent Force) on the extreme left flank.
"The Heavy Artillery from now on concentrated on the
143
144 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
cutting of the broad belts of wire in front of the Drocourt-
Queant line, and the Engineers prepared the bridging material
required for the crossings of the Sensee river and the Canal du
Nord.
"During the day (Aug. 29) our line had been considerably
improved by minor operations. Brutinel s Brigade had
pushed forward on their front and captured Bench Farm and
Victoria Copse, north of Boiry-Notre-Dame. The 4th. (Brit
ish) Division in the face of strong opposition, had advanced
their line in the vicinity of Haucourt and Remy. North of
the Scarpe the 51st. Division had captured the crest of Green
land Hiii. :
"The command of the 51st. Divisional front now passed
to the G. O. C., XXII Corps; and during the night, Aug. 29-
30, the 1 1th. Division, which had been transferred to the Cana
dian Corps from I Corps, relieved Brutinel s Brigade in the
line, the command of that Division also passing to the G. O.
C., XXII Corps, on completion of the relief.
"This shortened the line considerably and relieved me of
the anxiety caused by the length and vulnerability of the north
ern flank.
"On Aug. 30, following the reported capture of Hcnde-
court by the 57th. Division, the 1st. Canadian Division attacked
the Vis-en-Artois Switch, Upton Wood and the Fresnes-Rouv-
roy line, south of the Vis-en-Artois Switch. The attack, a
daring manoeuvre organized and carried out by the 1st. Cana
dian Infantry Brigade (Brig.-General W. A. Griesbach),
under cover of very ingenious barrages arranged by the C. R.
A., 1st. Canadian Division (Brig.-General H. C. Thacker),
was eminently successful, all objectives being captured and the
entire garrison either killed or taken prisoner. Heavy counter
attacks by fresh troops were repulsed during the afternoon and
following night.
"On Aug. 31 the remainder of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line
south of the Arras-Cambrai road, including Ocean Work, was
captured by the 2nd. Canadian Infantry Brigade (Brig.-Gen
eral F. O. W. Loomis) .
OPERATIONS : AUG. 29-3 1 145
"In the meantime the 4th. (British) Division had doggedly
pushed ahead, crossing the valley of the Sensee river and cap
turing the villages of Haucourt, Remy and Eterpigny. This
advance was over very difficult, thickly wooded country, and
the righting was very heavy, particularly in the vicinity of St.
Servin s Farm, which, after changing hands several times,
remained in possession of the enemy until Sept. 2."
The brilliant fighting on the part of the 1st. Canadian
Division, Maj.-General Sir Archibald C. Macdonell, in the
days immediately preceding the great assault, is admirably
described in this Division s own narrative of its operations, as
follows: "On the night of Aug. 28-29 the 1st. Division
relieved the 2nd. Division, the G. O. C. of the 1st. Division
taking over the command of the line at midnight. The relief
was most difficult. The position of the 2nd. Division front
line was uncertain and it was necessary for the relieving troops
to form up in extended order and march forward until the
foremost troops of the battalion in line was reached. The 3rd.
Brigade, Brig.-General G. S. Tuxford, took over the right
sector, the 2nd. Brigade, Brig.-General F. O. W. Loomis, the
left, and the 1st. Brigade, Brig.-General W. A. Griesbach,
came into Divisional Reserve.
"The next day, Aug. 29, passed without incident, except for
fairly heavy shelling that was maintained on forward areas and
roads. On this day the plans of the Army Commander for an
extensive operation tentatively set for Sept. 1, were communi
cated to the Division. This new attack was to be made by
three Divisions, the object being to break the Drocourt-Queant
line, overrun the crossings of the Canal du Nord, and also seize
Bourlon Wood and the high ground to the north of it. In
the meantime the divisions in line were ordered to secure by a
series of minor operations the jumping-off line running from
Chateau Wood, on the right, crossing the Vis-en-Artois Switch,
and to the village of Eterpigny, on the left.
"In order to understand the task before the Corps as a
whole, and the 1st. Canadian Division in particular, a brief
11
146 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
description of the ground and the enemy defenses is necessary.
"On the evening of Aug. 29 our front line followed roughly
the valley of the Sensee river from Fontaine-lez-Croisilles to
Haucourt, where it bent back over a small ridge between this
river and the valley of the Cojeul, then over the high ground
east of Boiry-Notre-Dame, and continued in a generally north
westerly direction to the valley of the Scarpe. North of the
Scarpe the operations were carried out merely to protect the
flank of the main attack south of the stream, and need not be
considered here. While the valley of the Scarpe began to bend
to the northeast practically at our front line, the valley of the
Trinquis river began almost at once, and ran due east, joining
the Sensee valley 5,000 yards east of our line.
"From ten to twelve thousand yards beyond our line was
the valley and the waterway of the Canal du Nord, running
almost due north and south. Cutting the Canadian Corps front
in halves and running in a southeasterly direction straight to
Cambrai, a distance of thirteen miles, was the tree-lined Arras-
Cambrai road.
"The natural features, then, were these: Two valleys con
verging on our northern flank, forming an isolated triangle of
ground to be dealt with; then two more convergent valleys,
those of the Sensee and the Canal du Nord, with the high
ground between, forming a plateau on the right flank, with a
distance of 10,000 yards to go before the canal was reached,
and on the left breaking into more sharply defined valleys and
ridges as the junction of the valley was approached.
"With the exception of one small jog, the Arras-Cambrai
road formed the left flank of the 1st. Canadian Division. The
right flank ran 3,500 yards south of and parallel to this road.
"On the front of this division, therefore, the ground feat
ures were simple. First came the gradual upward slope along
the crest of which ran the Hendecourt-Dury road, and roughly
paralleling our front line. Then came a gentle valley, and in
this depression was the village of Cagnicourt on the right and
Villers-lez-Cagnicourt on the left, each being about 6,000 yards
OPERATIONS: AUG. 29-31 147
from our front line. Immediately east of Cagnicourt were two
small woods the Bois de Bouche and the Bois de Loison.
Then another ridge, and a sharp valley running in a north
easterly direction, with the villages of Buissy and Baralle
straggling through it across the entire 1st. Division front. And
finally the wooded valley of the Canal du Nord.
"While the natural features presented no great difficulties
-until the canal was reached the enemy had strongly forti
fied this ground, and it was these heavily-wired and strongly-
held trench systems that formed the great obstacle.
"Coming back to the preliminary task of Aug. 30, immedi
ately in front of the 1st. Canadian Division was the Fresnoy-
Rouvroy line, sited on the slope leading up to the Hendecourt-
Dury road. Two or three thousand yards east of this line was
the famous Drocourt-Queant line, a switch off the Hindenburg
line, which at this point ran in a generally southeasterly direc
tion some 1,500 yards south of our frontage. Running in a
southeasterly direction from Vis-en-Artois. and connecting the
Fresnes-Rouvroy and Drocourt-Queant lines, was the trench
system known as the Vis-en-Artois Switch. And, beginning at
the point where the Drocourt-Queant line crossed the Arras-
Cambrai road, and also running east, was a fourth line, known
as the Buissy Switch. This system of trenches ran immediately
southwest of the villages of Villers and Buissy, joining the
Hindenburg line in the vicinity of Inchy-en-Artois, a village
situated near the Canal du Nord and just south of the Canadian
Corps boundary.
"It will be seen, therefore, that the trenches to be taken by
the 1st. Canadian Division ran, in zig-zag fashion, practically
to the canal.
The Canadian Corps plan for the attack on the Drocourt-
Queant line depended on the divisions in line securing a jump-
ing-off position within reasonable distance of this objective.
The first thing, therefore, that the 1st. Canadian Division had
to do was to take the Fresnoy-Rouvroy line, the greater part of
the Vis-en-Artois Switch, Upton Wood and the two strong
148 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
obstacles known as Chateau Wood and the Crow s Nest, or, in
other words, to advance its line some 3,000 yards before launch
ing the big attack.
"As the Divisional Commander did not wish to incur any
risk of dissipating the strength of the two brigades earmarked
for the breaking of the Drocourt-Queant line, he decided that
the 1st. Brigade in Divisional Reserve should carry out this
preliminary operation. The date set was at dawn on Aug. 30.
"The task confronting the 1st. Brigade was no light one.
There was the strong Fresnes-Rouvroy trench line that already
had stopped one attack by the Canadians ; there was the Vis-en-
Artois Switch line, cutting this system diagonally; there was
the fortified obstacle presented by Upton Wood, lying between
the Fresnes-Rouvroy line and the Hendecourt-Dury road,
there was Cemetery Trench, running in a northeasterly direc
tion from our right flank and passing just east of Upton Wood.
"At first it was decided to attack this area f rontally. Later,
however, when the Brigade Commander heard that British
troops had captured the village of Hendecourt, thus breaching
the Fresnes-Rouvroy system just south of his right flank, he
evolved a daring plan for the attack. Two battalions, the 1st.,
Western Ontario, and 2nd., of Ottawa, were to assemble in the
vicinity of Hendecourt and attack northeast and north respec
tively, the first going up Cemetery Trench and the other roll
ing up the Fresnes-Rouvroy Trench from the south. The 3rd.
Battalion, recruited from Toronto district, was ordered to
attack astride the Vis-en-Artois Switch and burst the Fresnes-
Rouvroy line at its junction with that trench. The artillery
then worked out a complicated barrage, or rather two, one pro
tecting each of the attacks from the flanks, and then merging
together and sweeping eastwards.
"The attack opened at 4.40 a.m. All went smoothly and
the objectives were taken. Heavy fighting continued through
the greater part of the day, however, for soon after noon the
enemy launched a determined counter-attack under cover of an
organized barrage, and penetrated some portions of Upton
OPERATIONS : AUG. 29-3 1 149
Wood and Cemetery Trench. A portion of the 2nd. Battalion
in the Fresnes-Rouvroy line at once started another counter
attack, and so brought the enemy to a standstill, but did not
drive him out completely.
"An attempt on the part of the 3rd. Battalion patrols to take
the remainder of the Fresnes-Rouvroy line that lay between the
Vis-en-Artois Switch and the Arras-Cambrai road was not suc
cessful, owing to the strength with which the enemy was hold
ing it. Towards evening a portion of the 4th. Battalion, Cen
tral Ontario, was thrown into the fight to re-establish our new
line. By nightfall this was accomplished, and the enemy
driven out of those positions he had secured as a result of his
attack at midday.
"The next day, Aug. 31, the 2nd. Brigade, using the 8th.
Battalion, Winnipeg, completed the capture of the Fresnes-
Rouvroy line as far north as the Arras-Cambrai road, and then
in daylight and in the face of heavy machine-gun fire patrols
were rushed well forward of the captured line."
The enemy fought with desperate courage, throwing in his
reserves lavishly, these including Prussian Guard divisions and
a stout Marine division. Thoroughly alarmed by the manner
in which our advance was pushed steadily forward despite all
obstacles, he brought against us all his available reserves, from
both the Douai and Cambrai areas. This was the crucial point
of his whole line of defense, and once pierced, the entire Hin-
denburg System, north and south, the fruit of years of work in
which the lives of tens of thousands of Russian prisoners had
been squandered, would be turned and rendered worthless.
At this juncture it was worth to him, depleted of men as he
was, an Army Corps to prevent us crossing the Canal du Nord
and driving a wedge through his West Front at Cambrai.
To add to the difficulties of our troops in these days of fierce
preparation for the great assault, things were not going well on
our right flank. On Aug. 30 London and West Lancashire
troops had taken Bullecourt and Hendecourt, the report of
which had reached us and encouraged the attack on Upton
ISO CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Wood detailed above. "But the Germans," -so runs an
account "being unwilling to give up points so near their main
lines of defenses, attacked in great force, and by the evening
had driven back our troops to the western outskirts of these
villages and to the German trench line between them."
While our 1st. and 4th. Divisions were pushing forward
their line on the two following days, the situation on our right
was not improved, and when the great attack finally opened on
Sept. 2, the left brigade of the XVII Corps fell in line behind
our right brigade, and followed up its advance until the oppor
tunity opened of turning off south and capturing Queant.
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3, DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE
WE have now come to the morning of Sept. 1, the date of
the great assault as originally designed. But a change
had to be made in the plan. "On the night of Aug. 3 1 -
Sept. 1," says the Corps Commander, "the 4th. Canadian Divi
sion came into the line on a one Brigade front between the 1st.
Canadian Division and the 4th. (British) Division.
"The G. O. C. 4th. (British) Division having now reported
that he considered his Division unable successfully to attack
the Drocourt-Queant line on the front allotted to him, in view
of the losses suffered in the preliminary fighting for the jump-
ing-off line, I decided that the 4th. Canadian Division would
extend their front and take over 1,000 yards additional front
age from the 4th. (British) Division. This necessitated a
change of plan on the part of the 4th. Canadian Division, who
a few hours before zero had to place an additional Brigade
in the line for the initial assault. Accordingly, the 12th.
Brigade (Brig.-General J. H. McBrien) carried out the
attack on the right and the 10th. Brigade (Brig.-General R. J.
F. Hayter) on the left Divisional front, having first advanced
the line to conform with the 1st. Canadian Division.
"It was necessary to postpone the attack on the Drocourt-
Queant line until Sept. 2 on account of the additional wire
cutting which was still required, and the day of Sept. 1 was
employed in minor operations to improve the jumping-off line
for the major operation. The important strong point known as
the Crow s Nest was captured by the 3rd. Brigade.
"During the afternoon and evening of Sept. 1 the enemy
delivered violent counter-attacks, directed against the junc
tion of the 1st. and 4th. Canadian Divisions. Two fresh divi
sions and two divisions already in the line were identified in
151
152 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
the course of the heavy fighting. Our troops were forced back
slightly twice, but the ground was each time regained and
finally held. The hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of
the crest of the spur at this point really continued until zero
hour the next day, the troops attacking the Drocourt-Queant
line as they moved forward, taking over the fight from the
troops then holding the line."
For the doings of the 1st. Canadian Division on this day
there is still no better guide than the narrative already so freely
quoted, "Owing to the strength of the wire in front of the
Drocourt-Queant line, the date of the major attack was post
poned for one day, in order to give the heavy artillery further
time to carry out wire-cutting operations. In order, also, to
thicken the infantry attack, the frontage of the 1st. Division
was reduced by some 1,500 yards on the night of Aug. 31, the
2nd. Brigade side-slipping south. The 1st. Brigade was
relieved during the night, the 3rd. Brigade taking over the
right sector with the 15th. Battalion. 48th. Highlanders of
Toronto, and the 14th. Battalion, Royal Montreal Regiment,
and the 2nd. Brigade the left sector with the 5th. Battalion,
Saskatchewan. On the same night the 4th. Canadian Division
came into line between the 1st. Division and the 4th. British
Division.
"Once again, at dawn the next day, the whole infantry line
on the Corps front moved forward. This time the advance of
the 1st. Division front was only for a distance of 1,000 yards,
the new line being established within the same distance from
the Drocourt-Queant line a suitable striking distance for the
great attack set for Sept. 2. In spite of the short advance the
fighting was of the most bitter character. As soon as the pro
tective barrage died down the enemy commenced a series of
determined counter-attacks down an old trench against the
14th. Battalion. Four such attacks were beaten off by the gar
rison of the trench during the day, captured stick grenades and
Stokes mortars being used freely.
"On the left, on the front captured by the 5th. Battalion.
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3 153
the enemy flung two battalions against the position at 11.30
a.m., a heavy machine-gun and artillery barrage being used.
The two companies in the forward position were slowly forced
back to their original line. The Battalion Commander, Lt.-
Col. L. R. O. Tudor, however, at once counter-attacked with
his remaining two companies. After four hours of heavy
righting the whole position was regained and 125 prisoners
captured. The enemy was not satisfied, however, and once
again, at six o clock in the evening, he developed a strong
attack. This effort was beaten off except on the extreme left,
where two posts were captured by the enemy. Fighting in this
area continued intermittently throughout the night, and, as a
matter of fact, when the barrage opened in the morning for the
major attack on the Drocourt-Queant line, and the 7th. Bat
talion, Vancouver, passed through, the 5th. Battalion was even
then engaged in hand-to-hand fighting for the possession of
these posts.
"During the night of Sept. 1 and in the early morning hours
following, while the front was in a turmoil of shell-fire and
bombing, attack and counter-attack, swift rushes or stubborn
resistance, the infantry, artillery, machine-guns and tanks were
moving forward along the whole Corps front into their assenv
bly positions for the thrust that was designed to break the Dro
court-Queant line and secure the crossings of the Canal du
Nord."
Much the same situation was being combatted by the 4th.
Canadian Division, Maj.-General Sir David Watson, north of
the Cambrai road. Except for the tremendous finale of the
barrage, the night of Sept. 1 and the dawn next day might be
described as one continuous battle. Thus from the time the
leading Brigades of the 4th. Canadian Division took over the
line right up to "zero" hour they were involved in almost
continuous fighting, due to enemy counter-attacks and isolated
enemy posts, which were calculated to hamper our jump-off
and must therefore be reduced. It was in such a situation that
a valorous act was performed by Pte. Claude Joseph Patrick
154 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Nunney, of the 38th. Battalion of Ottawa. When his battalion
on this day was in the vicinity of Vis-en-Artois, preparatory to
the advance of the following morning, the enemy laid down a
heavy barrage and counter-attacked. Pte. Nunney, who was
at this time at company headquarters, immediately and of his
own initiative proceeded through the barrage to the company
outpost lines, and going from post to post encouraged the men
by his own fearless example. The enemy were repulsed and a
critical situation saved.
The 4th. Canadian Division had in the line the 10th. Bri
gade, Brig.-General R. J. F. Hayter, on the right, resting on
the Arras-Cambrai road, and on the left the 12th. Brigade,
Brig.-General J. H. McBrien, with the llth. Brigade, Brig.-
General V. W. Odium, in support, prepared to go through
after the attack had well developed. The left of the Division
was in touch with the 4th. British Division, which carried on
the Canadian Corps line north to the Scarpe.
**
It is a dark and stormy night and at times the artillery of
heaven drowns out even the roar of the guns. Making our way
on foot from Wancourt up over that ridge towards Cherisy,
we pass through seeming endless tiers of guns of all calibres
brought up in the night and waiting now impatiently upon
"zero." It was to be the greatest barrage of the war, and if
the artillery could not succeed in cutting lanes for the infantry,
we were bound to sustain a disastrous defeat.
Before every show one had been impressed with the faith
of our men in the victory of the morrow. For them it was not
a thing even debatable; certain objectives had been set the
Canadian Corps and they would be taken. It was perhaps
natural enough to men who had never known failure in attack,
but this was an occasion somewhat different. Exactly a week
ago the first phase of this battle had opened. For the first two
days it had gone well, a wedge 11,000 yards deep at its apex
being driven into the heart of the enemy s defense. But day
by day the task had hardened, until the whole line was involved
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3 155
in a furious battle not so much, often, to win more ground as
to hold what we had. There can be now no element of sur
prise, save in so far as the enemy cannot anticipate the weight
and fury of our bombardment. He is thoroughly on the alert
and his trenches swarm with men, brought up day by day fresh
from his reserves. He is fighting a last ditch battle on which
must depend the trend of events many miles beyond sound of
these guns. And, moreover, admitting the unquenched spirit
of the men, there remained the question of whether their
reserves of physical vitality can endure this last ordeal.
Such thoughts as these occur to one waiting upon the hill
side a little back of the charred village of Cherisy. Below us,
but indistinguishable in the night, lies the valley of the Sensee
river; beyond it, on the right, is a veritable graveyard of Cana
dian soldiers they await only the burial parties. We have
come so far, fought so hard, paid so dear, perhaps here for
the first time to meet defeat. And that in its most sanguinary
form, for it is a battle that can not be broken off at will of the
attacking force. Defeat and retreat is the only alternative of
victory.
The night wears away. Towards morning the sky clears
but mist still hangs low in the valley. On our left a furious
cannonade is in progress, but quite local in character; and
there is none of that tense stillness preceding a surprise attack.
"Heine" is overhead, flying boldly, and only darkness saves
the batteries massed behind the hill.
The night has turned to a gray obscurity when "zero" hour
strikes; when pandemonium is let loose. There is here again
something different from that famous morning at Gentelles
Wood twenty-five days ago a shrillness of concentration, a
ferocity of intense purpose, in our barrage; for the front is nar
row and the guns, set so close, are registered on a target even
more limited. And there is also the quick, the instant reply
from across the valley, as it might be a rolling echo, beating
back into our ears the roar of our own guns.
Shells come from all directions. They plow up our hill-
156 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
side and search systematically every sunken road, every line of
trench, where our supports are congregated. The wicked
crack of high explosive mingles with the soft purring explo
sion of gas shells to the uninitiated hardly to be distinguished
from the harmless "dud"; from the opposing slope reverberate
the dread rattle of machine-gun volleys; and at times these
minor notes are smothered by the tremendous detonation of
heavy guns.
The mist lifts a little and dimly can be seen the "trained
elephants," the life-saving tanks, making their way on the far
slope among the wire and the machine-gun posts. Two have
passed up and over the enemy defense and for a moment are
silhouetted against the dawn moving heavily forward. Then
their career comes to a sudden end. One, hit in the flank,
swings half round. For days to come they are to lie upon the
crest, smashed almost beyond recognition by a battery on the
reverse slope.
Daylight now picks out one familiar feature after another
-the Crow s Nest, a pyramidal hill half a mile north of
Hendecourt, Upton Wood, and the serrated outline of the
Hendecourt-Dury road. Our infantry are nowhere to be seen ;
they have passed over the crest; instead, dark in the valley, is a
moving mass soon to be distinguished as cavalry. The Dro-
court-Queant line is won.
*
We have won the Drocourt-Queant line, but the battle is
not over. All day long it sways to and fro, and only as dusk
gathers is victory secure. Here is the story in the words of the
Corps Commander: "At 5 a.m., Sept. 2, the major operation
against the Drocourt-Queant line was launched. Preceded by
an intense barrage and assisted by Tanks, the Infantry pushed
forward rapidly, and the Drocourt-Queant line (the first
objective) and its support line (the second objective), includ
ing the village of Dury, were captured according to pro
gramme. With the capture of the second objective the Field
Artillery barrage was shot out, and the attack further east had
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3 157
to be carried forward without its assistance. The enemy s
resistance, free of the demoralizing effect of our barrage, stif
fened considerably, the open country being swept continually
by intense machine-gun fire. In addition, the Tanks soon
became casualties from enemy guns firing point-blank, and the
advance on the left and centre was held up.
"Brutinel s Brigade, reinforced by a Regiment of Cavalry
(10th. Royal Hussars) and armored cars, endeavored to pass
through to capture the Marquion bridge on the Canal du
Nord. Wire, trenches and sunken roads, however, confined
the movements of the force to the Arras-Cambrai road; and
this was rendered impassable by machine-gun fire and by bat
teries firing over open sights.
"On the right, however, the 1st. Canadian Division pushed
forward despite very heavy machine-gun and direct artillery
fire, and captured the villages of Cagnicourt and Villers-lez-
Cagnicourt, and the Bois de Bouche and Bois de Loison to the
east of Cagnicourt.
"Taking advantage of the breach thus made by the Cana
dian Divisions, a Brigade of the 63rd. (Naval) Division,
XVII Corps, which had followed the attack behind the right
Brigade of our right Division, now turned south and advanced
in the direction of Queant.
"Further progress made by the 1st. Canadian Division in
the afternoon resulted in the capture of the heavily wired
Buissy Switch line as far south as the outskirts of Buissy; this
largely outflanked the enemy still holding out in front of the
Canadian 4th. Division, and compelled their retirement dur
ing the night behind the Canal du Nord.
"Although the crossings of the Canal du Nord had not
been captured, the result of the day s fighting was most gratify
ing. The Canadian Corps had pierced the Drocourt-Queant
line on the whole front of attack, and the extension of our
attack by the XVII Corps on the right had further widened
the breach and made possible the capture of a large stretch of
territory to the south.
158 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"To stem our advance, and hold the Drocourt-Queant line,
the enemy had concentrated eight fresh divisions directly op
posite the Canadian Corps, but the unparalleled striking power
of our Battalions and the individual bravery of our men had
smashed all resistance.
"The number of unwounded prisoners captured exceeded
5,000, and we had identified every Unit of the seven Infantry
Divisions and the one Cavalry Division engaged. Our In
fantry had penetrated the enemy s defenses to a depth exceed
ing 6,000 yards.
"In prevision of the attack on the Canal du Nord taking
place the same day, the Engineers had rapidly prepared the
bridges and roads, advanced the light railways, and pushed
forward the personnel and all material necessary for future
construction."
CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3; DROCOURT-QUEANT LINE CONTINUED
WE will let the 1st. Canadian Division again tell its own
story: "The attack of the 1st. Canadian Division was
carried out by the 3rd. and 2nd. Brigades from right
to left respectively, the 1st. Brigade being held in divisional
reserve.
"On the morning of Sept. 2, at five o clock, the artillery and
machine-gun barrage opened, and the infantry at once began
to move forward into what proved to be a day of bitter fight
ing. The 3rd. Brigade, at the time of the opening of the attack,
had two battalions holding the line, the 15th., recruited from
the 48th. Highlanders of Toronto, and 14th., the Royal Mont
real Regiment. The two remaining battalions, the 16th., Cana
dian Scottish of the West, and 13th., Montreal Highlanders,
carried out the assault on the Drocourt-Queant line, and were
then to be leap-frogged by the 15th. and 14th., who were to
capture Bois de Bouche, Bois de Loison and Cagnicourt. The
2nd. Brigade, on the left, were attacking on a one battalion
front, and were using two battalions the 7th., of Vancouver,
to capture the Drocourt-Queant system on their front, and the
10th., of Alberta, to carry the attack as far as the western
outskirts of Buissy. The 1st. Brigade was to continue the
attack from this point and secure the crossings of the Canal du
Nord.
"The attack proceeded rapidly, and according to plan up
to the time of the capture of the Drocourt-Queant line on the
Divisional front, in spite of a very heavy enfilade fire from the
right flank, southwest of the village of Cagnicourt. The
Tanks, of which there were 18 operating on the divisional
front, did great service in the capture of the Drocourt-Queant
system.
159
160 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"Strong resistance was met with by our troops east of this
trench line, and the attack slowed up very considerably. The
battle devolved upon platoon, company and battalion com
manders, and it was only by the initiative and determination
of all ranks actually engaged in the foremost lines that the
enemy was slowly but surely pressed back. On the right the
chief obstacle was the flanking fire from the south ; on the left
the strongly fortified village of Villers-lez-Cagnicourt and an
isolated factory on the Arras-Cambrai road were the centre of
resistance. By four o clock in the afternoon, with the assist
ance of batteries of artillery attached to battalions, and under
cover of machine-gun and Lewis gun fire, our line had been
established east of the villages of Cagnicourt and Villers-lez-
Cagnicourt.
"A supplementary barrage was arranged for six o clock
that evening, and under cover of it the infantry again advanced.
By this time the leading battalions of the 1st. Brigade the
3rd., recruited from Toronto district, and the 4th., Central
Ontario had become involved in the fighting. The struggle
for the capture of the Buissy Switch and for the sunken roads
leading south from Buissy was long and desperate, but by in
dividual perseverance our troops, at eleven o clock that night,
had reached a line running roughly north and south just west
of the village of Buissy.
"The 3rd. Brigade had suffered very heavy casualties dur
ing the day, and were therefore relieved during the night by
the 1st. Brigade, the 4th. Battalion going into line with the 2nd.
Battalion, Eastern Ontario, in support and the 1st., Western
Ontario, and 3rd. in reserve.
"At dawn, therefore, of Sept. 3 our line ran along the rail
way and road east of Bois de Bouche, as far as the Buissy
Switch, and then due north to the Arras-Cambrai road, with a
defensive flank thrown back along this road for a distance of
nearly 2,000 yards.
"After a day of intense hand-to-hand fighting this was a
result of which the Division was proud. In spite of the fact
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3. CONTINUED 161
that the enemy was very strong numerically as witness the
2,746 prisoners captured in 48 hours of battle and that he
fought desperately- a fact amply proved by the 500 dead in
the area in front of the Drocourt-Queant line and around the
villages of Cagnicourt and Villers-lez-Cagnicourt; in spite of
these obstacles and the high number of machine-guns with
which the enemy was armed, the line reached by the leading
troops of the 1st. Division was well in advance of that reached
by the flanking Divisions. In fact, throughout most of the day
the Division fought with both flanks in the air, although troops
of the 63rd. British Division succeeded in reaching Inchy that
evening.
"The Infantry was well supported by all the other arms of
the service. The Artillery, both in its concerted barrage fire
and in the work of its advanced batteries, was responsible for
the creation of many openings in the enemy s defenses. The
attached machine-gun batteries operating with the leading in
fantry had many opportunities of inflicting casualties on the
enemy opportunities that were seized and made the most of.
The tanks, too, were a great factor in the forcing of the Dro
court-Queant line. After our artillery barrage died down,
however, every one of the 1 8 tanks became a casualty.
"So ended the fight for the Drocourt-Queant line. There
still remained the Canal du Nord to be crossed."
Many a gallant deed was done that day, but none finer than
that of Lt.-Col. C. W. Peck, M.P. for Skeena, B.C., a man
well into middle-age who commanded the 16th. Battalion,
Canadian Scottish, recruited from Winnipeg to the Coast.
The 16th. Battalion, as has been seen, was given the task of cap
turing the Drocourt-Queant line on our extreme right flank,
which was in the air. Lt.-Col. Peck s command quickly cap
tured its first objective but progress was held up by enemy
machine-gun fire on his right flank. The situation being
extremely difficult, he rushed forward and made a personal
reconnaissance under heavy machine-gun fire. Having recon
noitred the position, he returned and reorganized his battalion,
12
162 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
and acting upon his knowledge thus personally gained, pushed
them forward and arranged the protection of his flank.
He then went out under the most intensive artillery and
machine-gun fire, intercepted the tanks, and gave them neces
sary directions, pointing out where they were to make for and
thus a way was opened for his battalion to push forward. He
subsequently gave the requisite support to his men by his mag
nificent display of courage and fine qualities of leadership. He
personally led the advance, although always under heavy fire,
and contributed largely to the success of the Brigade attack.
Col. Peck rallied his battalion at a critical moment by in
structing his piper always attached to his person to march
ahead with him into action, skirling his pipes. The piper was
wounded but another took his place. Some days later this
piper in the Casualty Clearing Station at Duisans, when asked
how he did, interrupted thus: "How is old Cy Peck?" and on
being told he was uninjured, cried, "Then if he s all right, I m
all right!" .
In its assault on the Drocourt-Queant line on the morning
of Sept. 2, the 7th. Battalion, of Vancouver, had, as we have
seen, a very hard task, and it was by the individual initiative
and daring of the rank and file that the positions were taken.
Thus Cpl. Walter Leigh Rayfield, a native of Redmond,
Wash., rushed ahead of his Company a trench filled with the
enemy, bayonetting two and taking 10 prisoners. Later he
located and engaged with great skill, under constant rifle fire,
an enemy sniper who was causing many casualties. He then
rushed the section of trench from which the sniper had been
operating, and so demoralized the enemy by his daring and
coolness that 30 surrendered to him, Again he left cover and
under heavy machine-gun fire carried in a badly wounded
comrade.
The 10th. Battalion, of Alberta, passed through the 7th.
at Villers-lez-Cagnicourt, but for a time were held up. After
an unsuccessful attack, Sergt. Arthur George Knight, a native
of Redhill, England, led a bombing section forward under a
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3. CONTINUED 163
very heavy fire of all descriptions, and engaged the enemy at
close quarters. Seeing that his party was still held up, he
dashed forward alone, bayonetting several of the enemy
machine-gunners and trench-mortar crews and, directing his
fire on the retreating enemy, inflicted heavy casualties.
In the advance of his platoon in pursuit, Sergt. Knight saw
a party of about 30 of the enemy go into a deep tunnel which
led off the trench. He again dashed forward alone and having
killed one officer and two N. C. O s, captured twenty other
ranks. Later on he routed single-handed another enemy party
opposing the advance of the platoon.
Sergt. Knight, who enlisted at Regina, died ot the wounds
he here received. In this brilliant action he was assisted partic
ularly by Pte. Eddie Hume, of Calgary. Corp. W. Paget, of
the same battalion, performed an exceptional bombing feat in
front of Cagnicourt on the same day, breaking up a strong
enemy point of resistance.
North of the Cambrai road, our troops, after their initial
success, had before them an extraordinarily difficult task. The
4th. Canadian Division attacked in the first place the Dro-
court-Queant line in front of Dury. in itself a veritable fort
ress. This village is situated on the crest of a slope, which
here presents all the character of a smooth glacis, and across
this, each 75 yards deep, were three solid tiers of wire. Be
hind them, and on a higher plane, ran the sunken road from
Hendecourt to Dury, and in this road enemy machine-gunners,
ensconced in steel and concrete posts, swept the entire field of
approach.
Walking over this slope a day or two later, a British staff
officer remarked that the position was impregnable had the
enemy chosen to defend it. Ah, no! our dead tell the tale.
Extraordinary gallantry was shown by the troops. In storm
ing the sunken road, where tank aid was lacking, the 75th. Bat
talion, recruited from the Missisauga Horse of Toronto, suf
fered very severely, its loss in two days being 24 officers and 310
other ranks.
164 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
The 4th. Canadian Division attacked at 5 a.m. In spite of
numerous machine-gun nests inside our barrage, good progress
was made, and by dint of stiff fighting in many places the Dro-
court-Queant line in this sector was captured on time. Just
beyond the last trench of this system the 1 1th. Brigade and cer
tain battalions of the other two brigades were to leap-frog and
continue the advance, but the approach to the leap-frog line
and the ground for a great distance beyond it was swept by
terrific machine-gun fire from several angles. Our barrage
here had shot itself out in the first phase of the attack, and the
only other weapons left were powerless to support further
advance of the infantry under the circumstances. The second
phase of the attack was therefore postponed until the next
morning, but during the night the enemy retired to the far side
of the Canal du Nord.
The 1 1th. Brigade, while waiting to go through, was badly
cut up on the Arras-Cambrai road, where enemy machine-gun
ners lined the trenches on the slopes on either hand, just east of
Vis-en-Artois. The 10th. and 12th. Brigades lost heavily in
their advance, coming under enfilade fire from the flank.
But the spirit of the men was unconquerable, and even the
walking wounded had no thought but of victory. "The Boche
is fighting damned hard," said a Seaforth Highlander of Van
couver, 72nd. Battalion. "But our lot have taken three
trenches and are still going strong."
Beyond Dury the ground slopes back into a depression and
then over another bare hillside down again into a rolling val
ley, commanded from the right by the heights held in strength
by the enemy immediately west of the Canal du Nord and
north of Marquion, and from the left by the fortified triangle
of the three villages, Saudemont, Rumaucourt and Ecourt St.
Quentin, while the whole was swept by the enemy s heavy bat
teries situate on the east side of the canal on the commanding
eminence of Oisy-le-Verger, whence direct observation was
obtained west to Dury and along almost the entire Cambrai
road.
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3. CONTINUED 165
In front of these defenses, on the open ground which no
where afforded cover of any kind, was an elaborate system of
trench and wire, with permanent machine-gun posts, and it
was before these that the Division found it could make but very
slow progress.
Further to the left, the 4th. British Division had a task no
less difficult though different in character. On its immediate
front was a high bold hill strongly fortified, and its left flank
lay down in the valley of the Trinquis river and amid swamps
and marshes. The enemy clung all day in great force to the
village of Etaing which was not captured by this Division until
the following morning. In the first rush forward good pro
gress was made, many prisoners being captured. The men of
the Division were delighted to find themselves alongside of the
Canadians. "We helped you Canadians save Arras last
April," said a wounded man of the 1st. Hants. Battalion, "and
now we are pushing in with you again, but to a very different
tune."
After the close of the battle Sir Arthur Currie addressed a
message of congratulation to the 4th. British Division, as fol
lows: "Your task from the beginning was an exceedingly
difficult one. You took over in the middle of the battle and
advanced steadily each day over very bad ground against most
serious opposition, finishing up by what must be for you one of
the most satisfactory engagements in which you ever partici
pated. Your success on Monday last was in keeping with your
best traditions. The 4th. Division testified in the most forcible
manner to the fine fighting qualities of the troops comprising
it. To me it was a peculiar satisfaction to have the 4th. Divi
sion associated with us, because it was with them the 1st. Cana
dian Division received its first instructions in the art of war.
Monday s battle was not merely a success; it was a glorious
victory."
In the hand-to-hand fighting which characterized much of
this day s battle, loss among regimental officers and N.C.O s
was severe. Among the wounded were Lt.-Col. L. T. Me-
166 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Laughlin, of the 2nd. Battalion, of Ottawa, and Lt.-Col. C. C.
Harbottle, of the 75th Battalion, of Toronto.
Casualties in this fighting were very heavy, and it was only
by the greatest exertions and contempt of danger that our
stretcher-bearers were able to bring in our wounded. Thus
Pte. John Francis Young was acting as stretcher-bearer at
tached to D Company, 87th. Battalion, Grenadier Guards of
Montreal. This company in its advance over the ridge suf
fered heavy casualties from shell and machine-gun fire. Pte.
Young, in spite of complete absence of cover, without the least
hesitation went out and in the open fire-swept ground dressed
the wounded. Having exhausted his stock of dressings, on
more than one occasion he returned under intense fire to his
company headquarters for a further supply. This work he
continued for over an hour, displaying throughout absolute
fearlessness, and his courageous conduct saved the lives of
many of his comrades. Later, when the fire had somewhat
slackened, he organized and led stretcher-parties to bring in
the wounded he had dressed.
Our medical officers too displayed the greatest gallantry,
of which the following is an example. Capt. Bellender Sey
mour Hutcheson, who enlisted at Toronto, went through the
Drocourt-Queant line with his battalion, under most intense
shell, machine-gun and rifle fire. With an utter disregard to
personal safety he remained in the field until every wounded
man had been attended to. He dressed a seriously wounded
officer under terrific machine-gun fire, and with the assistance
of prisoners succeeded in evacuating him to safety. Immedi
ately afterwards he rushed forward, in full view of the enemy,
under heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, to attend a wounded
sergeant, and placing him in a shell hole proceeded there to
dress his wounds.
Similar devotion to duty was exhibited by the Chaplain
service. Thus Capt. Graham, chaplain of the 13th. Battal-
lion, Montreal Highlanders, when that unit suffered heavy
losses in front of Upton Wood, went out repeatedly in front of
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 1-3. CONTINUED 167
our infantry line, carrying in our wounded from off the wire.
He was subsequently wounded. Casualties among the Bat
talion Chaplains were particularly heavy during these opera
tions.
So ended the great battle. Following its conclusion the
Third Army south of us were able to march ahead, rescuing
village after village without firing a shot. Everywhere south
of us the enemy was falling back. Only to the north, behind
the flooded valley of the Scarpe and the Sensee, he clung to his
line.
CHAPTER VIII
AFTER THE BATTLE
FIGHTING went on during Sept. 3, 4 and 5, when the
enemy was forced back to the east bank of the Canal du
Nord all along the line, and the Canadian Corps came
into possession of the watery triangle formed by the Canal on
the east and the Sensee river on the north.
On our right, south of the Arras-Cambrai Road, the 1st
Canadian Division had not much difficulty during the day of
Sept. 3 in pushing forward to the line of the canal, to which the
western bank sloped gently down through water-meadows, the
only shelter being a few gnarled old pollards on the bank.
From Sains-lez-Marquion north the area was flooded and the
enemy had good protection for his machine-gunners in the
woods that thickly clothed the steep eastern bank.
North of the road our 4th. Division had a much harder
task and had sharp fighting before the area was cleared. On
the Divisional right the 10th. Brigade fought its way forward
to the canal through the enemy defense system resting on the
three villages of Saudemont, Ecourt St. Quentin and Rumau-
court, the latter being captured by the 44th. Battalion, formerly
of Winnipeg but now recruited from New Brunswick. These
villages had been untouched by war and contained great store
of ordnance and material, with a complete hospital train.
Tucked away behind the impregnable Drocourt-Queant line
and beyond the area we shelled, he had built up there a great
depot.
From a distance it looks as though a pocket handkerchief
might cover them. They stand intact, the churches rising
above the red-tiled roofs, the whole nestling in wooded groves.
The sight of these villages amid green fields is more eloquent
than anything that has gone before of the success of the battle,
168
AFTER THE BATTLE 169
for here, as in former years, the Boche had settled down for
the winter. He had filled them with his material of war.
But intact though they seem from a distance, on entering
there is evidence on every hand of the process of ruin. For
hardly is the enemy driven out than he pours upon them the
whole fury of his rage and disappointment. From across the
canal guns great and small keep up a ceaseless cannonade, and
for days gas hangs heavy in their narrow streets. A beautiful
spire is that of the church of Ecourt St. Quentin, but even as
one admires, a shell hits it fair and square and it disappears in
a cloud of dust. Nevertheless the fields are still green. Our
soldiers gather pumpkins in the village gardens. It is an
astonishing experience to pass into these lush pastures from out
the blight and the taint of No Man s Land.
Ecourt St. Quentin must ever figure in Canadian history as
the village where Canadian troops first rescued the unhappy
imprisoned French people. "Vive les Canadiens! Vive les
braves Canadiens!" -it was a glad cry from the heart soon to
grow familiar to our ears, but it was first heard at this village.
Forty-six persons, for four years held in slavery, hid for sev
eral days in one small cellar when the order had gone out for
the villagers to be evacuated. Half-starved, emaciated, but
very happy and voluble we found them.
Their deliverance was actually effected by Major-General
E. W. B. Morrison, G.O.C., Canadian Royal Artillery. A
young girl, a slender brunette, embraced him, kissing him on
either cheek. "In me," she cried, "my General, the French
people salute our savior!" With saddened hearts these poor
folk passed back through the desolation of No Man s Land,
where they had been wont to visit the fetes and feast days of
neighboring smiling villages Cagnicourt and Dury, Cherisy
and Vis-en-Artois, now not to be distinguished from the gen
eral ruin.
The llth. Brigade had some hard fighting, mopping up
along the canal bank, where enemy posts held out obstinately.
Brig.-General Odium finally cleared up the situation after he
170 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
had made a personal reconnaissance during which he was
wounded slightly.
Our 12th. Brigade had a very difficult task in the marshy
area between Ecourt St. Quentin and the Sensee River. The
85th. Battalion, Nova Scotia, in particular suffered heavy
casualties fighting its way through swampy ground, here
bisected with ditches and swept by the fire of enemy machine-
gun posts north of the river. They finally cleared the area
with the capture of Palluel, a village situate at the juncture of
the Canal du Nord and the Sensee, which from here east is
canalized.
But we were up against a dead wall. "The enemy had
blown up all the bridges on the night of Oct. 2-3," says Sir
Arthur Currie, "and was holding a commanding position on
the eastern bank of the Canal with a large number of machine-
guns. His artillery was very active, more especially from the
north, and it was impossible to send bodies of troops by day
light over the long and bare slopes bordered by the Canal.
"Our left flank was now very exposed to artillery fire from
the north, and the nature of the ground we were holding, the
strength of the obstacle in front of the Corps, and the resolute
attitude of the enemy, forbade any attempts to further exploit
our success.
"It was necessary to prepare minutely the details of the
operation required to attack successfully the Canal du Nord
line. Accordingly, no further attempts were made at this
time.
"In the night of Sept. 3-4 the 2nd. and 3rd. Canadian Divi
sions relieved the 1st. and 4th. Canadian Divisions respectively,
and the 4th. (British) Division was relieved by the 1st. (Brit
ish) Division, which had come under the Canadian Corps on
Sept. 1 and had been concentrated after that date in the
Monchy le Preux-Vis en Artois-Guemappe area.
"The left flank of the Corps was again very long, and in
accordance with the policy adopted the 1st. British Division
was transferred in the line from the Canadian Corps to the
AFTER THE BATTLE 171
XXII Corps. I handed over command of that sector
extending from Palluel (exclusive) to Etaing (inclusive) and
facing north to the G. O. C. XXII Corps at midnight, Sept.
4-5.
"The enemy had flooded the valley of the Sensee river and
all the bridges had been destroyed. Our Engineers were very
actively engaged in an effort to lower these floods and wrest
the control from the enemy.
"On the right flank the XVII Corps was engaged in heavy
fighting in and around Mosuvres, and all their attempts to
cross the Canal du Nord at that point had been repulsed.
"A thorough reconnaissance of our front had shown that
the frontal attack of the Canal du Nord line was impossible;
the eastern bank of the Canal du Nord was strongly wired and
was generally much higher than the western bank.
"The whole of our forward area was under direct observa
tion from Oisy-le- Verger and the high ground on the northern
flank, and any movement by day was quickly engaged by hostile
artillery.
"No battery positions within a range sufficient to carry on
the preparation of the attack, or to support it, were available,
and any attempt to bring guns forward of the general line Vil-
lers lez Cagnicourt-Buissy was severely punished; the battery
positions south and west of this general line were subjected to
intense gas shelling every night.
"The Canal du Nord was in itself a serious obstacle. It
was under construction at the outbreak of the war and had not
been completed. Generally speaking, it followed the valley of
the River Agache, but not the actual bed of the river. The
average width was about 100 feet and it was flooded as far
south as the lock, 800 yards southwest of Sains-lez-Marquion.
just north of the Corps southern boundary. South of this and
to the right of the Corps front the Canal was dry, and its bot
tom was at the natural ground level, the sides of the canal con
sisting of high earth and brick banks.
"The attack of the Canal du Nord could not, therefore, be
172 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
undertaken singly by the Canadian Corps, but had to be part
of a larger scheme.
"This required considerable time to arrange, and until
Sept. 27 no changes developed on the Corps front.
The obstacle which had stopped our advance also made
our positions very strong defensively, and advantage was taken
of this fact to rest and refit the Divisions. As much of the
Corps Artillery as could be spared was withdrawn from the
line to rest the men and horses.
"The line was held very thinly, but active patrolling at
nights and sniping were kept up. A complete programme of
harassing fire by Artillery and Machine-Guns was also put in
force nightly. The Corps Heavy Artillery (Brig.-General R.
H. Massie) carried out wire-cutting counter-battery shoots and
gas concentrations daily, in preparation for the eventual opera
tions.
"Light railways, roads, bridges and water-points were con
structed right up to the forward area, and the bridging
material which would be required for the Canal du Nord was
accumulated well forward. Ammunition dumps were estab
lished at suitable places.
"Detailed reconnaissance of the Canal and trenches were
carried out by aeroplane, and also by daring patrols, and all
available documents regarding the Canal construction were
gathered with a view to preparing the plans for the future
attack.
"On Sept. 13, Maj.-General (then Brig.-General) F. O.
W. Loomis took over command of the 3rd. Canadian Division
from Maj.-General L. J. Lipsett, who went to command the
4th. (British) Division; the former was succeeded in command
of the 2nd. Canadian Infantry Brigade by Brig.-General (then
Lt.-Col.) R. P. Clark."
The direct observation from Oisy-le- Verger to which ihe
Corps Commander alludes was very annoying to our troops.
The Arras-Cambrai road was still the main line of our com
munications, roads to the north being shot up by enemy bat-
AFTER THE BATTLE 173
teries now commanding our left flank from north of the river
for miles back, while the secondary roads further south had
been blown to pieces and it took time to repair them. A lorry
could not pass along the Cambrai Road without being sub
jected to shell fire and high explosive. But nothing could
daunt these lorry-drivers, the personnel of the Army Service
Corps, men bringing up ammunition, and the drivers of am
bulances. The road was strewn with wrecked lorries, but they
carried on their task, driving steadily at a speed of not more
than five or six miles an hour, picking their way among shell-
holes in the "paves" and giving no more heed to the dangers
encompassing them than if they were teaming in their own
home towns.
And this was not all. With the quieting down of the battle,
the air force with the Corps was reduced to the artillery observ
ation "busses" and a few scouting machines. The enemy took
advantage of this to send over an occasional "circus" which
for the time held command of the air in this sector.
Late in the afternoon of a September day one of these made
its appearance from the direction of Douai, flying high above
the plateau just west of the Canal. Against the leader a lone
fighting plane, whose wings bore the familiar red, white and
blue circles of the British R.A.F., launched his attack. Fast
and high he flew, but the enemy was higher still. Attacking
the enemy leader from an angle below, he fired off his machine-
gun, missed, and swung around. But at that instant the enemy
caught him with a volley, and his machine burst in flames.
Slowly it fell, and before it had fallen far, our gallant airman
jumped out and began to fall faster, faster, and still faster than
his machine, which followed him as might a leaf floating
gently to the ground. He fell into a swampy place and was
buried from human ken.
Encouraged by this success, the entire "circus" swooped
low down on to the Cambrai Road, flying westward just over
the tops of the trees, machine-gunning as they went. Then,
when they reached the crossroad to Dury, they swung off south,
174 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
down the Drocourt-Queant trench system, but a few feet above
the ground, blazing away into our men, crowded there in sup
port. Our "Archies" and even field batteries directed on them
a tremendous fusillade, and our men could be seen firing their
rifles. But only one shot seemed to take effect, an enemy
machine limping off like a wounded duck back over the canal.
The rest of the "circus" passed out of sight south.
But it was not always thus. "Old Joey," a slow-flying
artillery observation plane, was loafing one day along the
Canal du Nord, when down on him swooped an enemy fighting
machine, of far greater power and speed. "Old Joey" pursued
his course unperturbed until "Heine" was upon him then
swung smartly around, bringing the only gun to bear, and in a
minute "Heine" went crashing.
We had time to count the spoils. Since Aug. 26, the Cana
dian Corps and the British Divisions fighting under it, had
encountered and overwhelmed no less than eleven enemy divi
sions, while four other divisions had been engaged partially
and identifications secured of elements of three more. Five
complete trench systems were taken and the captured area
approximated 56 square miles, with an average penetration of
twelve and a quarter miles. Ten thousand, three hundred and
sixty prisoners of all ranks were captured and 22 villages,
while the material was great beyond reckoning, chief being
two 4.1 inch long naval guns, 89 heavy and field guns, ],016
machine-guns, 73 trench mortars, two searchlights and one
helio, besides wagons, horses, and vast quantities of ammuni
tion and engineering supplies.
But war is not all victory. There is the agony and sacrifice.
Busy across this rolling plain are our burial parties and it is
not only the Hun they bury. Some of our men lie stark and
huddled under lee of enemy machine-gun posts; others still
hang in the fastnesses of the wire. Long lines of Red Cross
lorries move to the rear.
Far across the seas, from Cape Breton to Vancouver Island,
from the International Boundary to remote northern outposts,
AFTER THE BATTLE 175
soon will flutter little yellow messages, bringing sorrow and
anguish to quiet firesides. But they have not suffered in vain;
by their exertions and their sacrifice they have brought the war
appreciably nearer its close.
It is a melancholy scene. Down the Cambrai road through
Vis-en-Artois, past Dury on the left and Villers-lez-Cagni-
court on the right, all is desolate. It is a typical No Man s
Land landscape. The countryside is pitted with shell-holes
and scarred with trenches. Avenues of trees along the road
show only blasted stumps. There is not a green thing. Every
where is the debris of war, the litter and the ruin. Broken
lorries, shattered remnants of an armored car, the twisted rails
of a light railway, scrap-iron of all descriptions, ammunition
boxes piled high these things cumber the roadside. Every
where are horses in various stages of decomposition. Here and
there are rows of our dead, awaiting burial parties. Over all
is a brooding stench of decay and stale gas.
CHAPTER IX
NO MAN S LAND
ON Sept. 3, the day after the Drocourt-Queant line is
smashed, the 1st. Echelon of Canadian Corps Head
quarters moves up from Noyelle Vion to Neuville
Vitasse.
We follow the headquarters of the 1st. Canadian Division,
and that in its turn had taken possession of a captured enemy
headquarters. Two miles east of Neuville Vitasse lies the
village of Wancourt, low-lying on the banks of the Cojeul. and
between them is the valley where our troops in support are
crowded. A secondary road, in shocking bad condition, runs
east from Neuville Vitasse downhill through this valley, and
so up over the Wancourt Ridge to drop down into the valley of
the Sensee at Cherisy. Continuing, it switchbacks over one
ridge after another through Hendecourt and Riencourt to
Queant. From the eastern suburbs of Arras, through its entire
length to Queant, the road bisects No Man s Land, which here
therefore has a depth of twelve miles. That is the segment of
total destruction and does not include the tattered fringe west
of Arras and east of the Canal du Nord to Cambrai.
About a thousand yards east of Neuville Vitasse, where this
road debouches from the slope into the valley, what is little
more than a track turns off to the right, passing up over the
Heninel Ridge in a general southeasterly direction. Like so
many roads in the district, this track, by the wear of centuries,
has become so worn down as to present the characteristics of a
sunken road or defile. A few hundred yards toward the ridge
the enemy had here established his divisional headquarters,
with an elaborate system of dug-outs on the west side of the
road, protected by the high bank from all but plunging fire.
The disadvantage of taking over enemy dug-outs in any
176
NO MAN S LAND 177
situation at all is that the defense is exposed in reverse, or, in
other words, enemy shells may explode right in their mouths,
facing that way. Nothing of the kind indeed happens here,
but it is a fact worth bearing in mind as a constant feature of
our advance. In the old days of trench warfare, when we thus
captured and consolidated an enemy trench system, we pro
ceeded at once to dig shelters on the opposite side, as being
less exposed. But in the advance that was now beginning and
was to gain more and more impetus as the weeks went by, there
was no time for anything of the kind. Not until we cleared the
entire trench system, and began to billet in inhabited villages,
did our men get any kind of comfort or shelter. For the most
part they slept in the open field, each man scooping out for
himself a shallow shelter, digging a pit at the bottom for drain
age.
This track leading up to Corps Headquarters is a villainous
mud-hole, and in the days to follow the most distinguished
visitors, including high French officials and our Army Com
manders, come to congratulate the Corps on its achievement,
as well as parties of Canadians from London, are all too apt
to mire their cars in its treacherous bottom. The dug-outs do
not accommodate all the staff, and some of its higher ranks live
and work in Armstrong huts erected along the sunken road,
but most of us are under canvas, the whole camp being neatly
camouflaged with particular view to the aspect from the sky.
We remain in this hideous spot, the very heart and core of
No Man s Land, most of September. For days on end it rains.
Tents are crowded close on every available piece of high
ground, but the floor of each must be sunk below the surface
and in effect becomes little better than the bottom of a shell
hole. Canadian Engineers are soon at work laying duck-walks
along the road, but whole sections disappear at night, passing
surreptitiously into these tents to afford an uneasy footing
above the standing water. Such mysterious depredations daunt
the indefatigable engineer not one whit, and about the time we
move on to Queant, the camp presents a neat and ordered ap-
13
178 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
pearance, with a solid roadbed built up from the ruins of
neighboring villages.
In early September, however, a worse situation cannot be
imagined. "Heine" is a fairly regular visitor at night and no
lights are allowed. The bugle call and the dreary cry of
"lights out lights out," is as regular as dinner hour. It is
impossible to take two steps in the dark without falling into a
shell hole or stumbling over wire. Very early in the morning
Fritzie has an uncomfortable habit of waking us up with a
fusillade, and during all these weeks he continues sending long-
range shells into Arras, plastering the railway station and
yards. At set intervals there is a whine overhead, and long
after comes the muffled sound of the explosion.
Back behind the camp, on top of Heninel Ridge, is the
Corps wireless plant, where Signals is at work day and night
From here a wide view of the surrounding country presents
itself. Northeast, across the valley, Monchy-le-Preux stands
out, a sentinel. At sunset a few misshapen tree trunks, stripped
of their foliage, etched sharp against the western glow, mark
the ridge of Neuville Vitasse.
*
For four years this desolated strip east of Arras has been
the battlefield. We are situate indeed in midst of the original
Hindenburg line.
In the dim days of creation there might have been such a
scene as this the earth void and formless. But to it are added
the despair and the melancholy of the blotting out of what once
was a smiling countryside. Villages dotted these hills, but
where once was the village park, now only are the maimed and
blackened stumps of trees and below a rubble of brick and
charred timber. Even the street outlines have disappeared;
ruthless necessity of military roads has cut straight through
the debris.
The soil is a good light loam on chalk. Generations ago
so it seems these broad uplands were intensively cultivated
by their thrifty peasant proprietors. Now the most careful
NO MAN S LAND 179
search fails to reveal the mark of a plow or any trace of the
hand of man. It is as if a malignant subterraneous power had
fretted the surface and robbed it of all form and meaning.
Pock-marked by shell holes, great and small, scarred by deep
trench systems old and new, each sunken road lined with the
foul mouths of dug-outs ; these once bright fields are as inani
mate as a corpse, shrouded in cerements of rusted barbed wire.
*
Dreary, desolate and gray, it is a landscape that crushes the
imagination and torments the spirit. In all these years of
trench warfare there has been only this nothingness in front of
the heroic defenders. Overhead screamed messengers of
death, plowing up the land around them. The filthy trench
and verminous dug-out was their sole alternative. It is in
credible that they should have endured, have fought on, have
abandoned themselves to such a life in such a place for an idea ;
with no hope, no prospect of alleviation or change save through
death and the hospital cot. In their miry squalor they could
not see the bright dawn of today. Yet they took everything in
trust. They grumbled ; they suffered ; but they endured ; they
fought on.
*
This frayed fringe of battle stretches from Flanders to the
Vosges, varying only in comparative terms of ruin. The Hun
may take of the life but not of the character of the French
people. There is something cosmic in their mute unconscious
resistance, not so much of the men, nor of the admirable women
and children, but of the soul of a nation that suffers but does
not despair.
In this brooding area are to be marked the distinctions
between the waning and cessation of life. Before us all has
gone, but in Arras still is some sign of life, and further back
the villagers, their roofs untiled and windows unglazed, carry
on the daily task, dulled even to a sudden burst of long-range
shelling or the rain of blind hate from a starry sky.
This No Man s Land is a technical term of the war whose
180 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
significance can be captured only through the imagination.
Here once a village flourished; mill-wheels turned and hither
creaking wagons drew loads of grain; here processions wound
up to the village church, gay for the marriage festival, or
white-bannered for the solemn pledge of youth and maid ; here
wended also the decent funeral cortege; here on his appointed
day M. le Maire made his oration on France and her free
spirit; here the good citizens chatted at evenings upon the
benches in the square ; and here worthy pupils, duly garlanded,
received their modest honors.
It is necessary to reconstruct these humble scenes to appre
ciate the devastation. The areas of such villages are wiped
out. Their familiar features have vanished. Vanished too are
their children. Some are dead. Some cower in cellars at the
fringe of No Man s Land. Some have been taken by the Hun,
homeless and afraid.
Here are fair lands of France. Here to the cry of the
plowman the yoked oxen strained and in due season the binder
reaped of the earth her abundance. Ordered stacks peopled
the valleys and into their fastnesses drove the threshing-
machine. In and out that pleasant scene ran the shuffle of
children s feet, and the bright thread of children s laughter.
All are obliterated. Blotted out are the village and the
countryside. There remains the anguish of a people that
would not be subdued. And in its hoarse note of defiance there
mingles as bitterest seed from the trodden grape the piti
able note of stricken childhood. Four years of war is an im
measurable span in the life of a child. It is an implacable
generation France is rearing on this borderland.
*
The scene is on the road from Valenciennes to Mons, long
weeks after. Our troops, streaming forward, crowd against
the left ditch another current trickling westward. It is the
French evacuees, returning from liberated Mons to seek their
homes but much against the wish and advice of the civil
authorities.
NO MAN S LAND 181
A woman, old and bent, is pushing a two-wheeled cart,
piled high with bedding, all she saved when evacuated. A
sturdy lad is yoked in front, throwing his weight on the rope.
We ask some questions. . . "And where are you going?"
"Back to our home, Monsieur," he cries joyfully, "back to our
home in Wancourt."
"In Wancourt!" These, too, must pass through the Dro-
court-Queant line.
CAMBRAI
CAMBRAI
CHAPTER I
CONFRONTING THE CANAL DU NORD
THERE comes a time when the spent athlete, having
passed his goal, throws himself panting on the ground and
relaxes his strained muscles; his heart labors visibly under
his bared chest. Thus the Canadian Corps, after nine days
intense fighting culminating in the capture of the Drocourt-
Queant line, abandoned itself to rest.
But it is rest of a comparative kind only; the cessation of
hand-to-hand fighting but not relief from the perils of war.
We have fought our way into this watery triangle or, one
should rather say, peninsula formed by the flooded area of
the Canal du Nord on the east and the Sensee and its marshes
on the north. On the east we have settled down to sniping,
raids and local shoots, and the enemy is equally active. On the
north he holds the entire country south and southwest of Douai
to the borders of Roeux, Gavrelle and Oppy, for here his great
system of defense is still intact and the British line has hardly
advanced from where it lay on Aug. 26.
Our troops holding the line have a lively time, and have to
improvise both defense and shelter. Daring things are done
in the way of reconnaissance, and Canadian Engineers in
particular spend the day and night crawling on their bellies
along the canal side, exploring for practical crossings, or flying
low over its course, careless of death. But relatively few
troops are actually in the line, because the position is one of
great natural strength, and the enemy is in no mood to attack
in force.
Exposed as they are, lying out for the most part in the
185
186 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
open, our troops in the line have a bad time of it. The 2nd.
Canadian Division is in line on the right, from Inchy to the
Arras-Cambrai road, and from there north the line is held by
the 3rd. Canadian Division. Casualties are heavy. Thus the
6th. Brigade has in the line from Sept. 6 to 16 the 31st. and
27th. Battalions, and the latter has 75 casualties in that period,
the loss of the former being even heavier, with a number of
men gassed.
The character of the fighting is well illustrated by the
following extract from the narrative of the 4th. Brigade, whose
command was here taken over by Brig.-General G. E.
McCuaig, Brig.-General R. Rennie having been appointed to
a command at Bramshott:- "The 2nd. Canadian Division was
held up at the Canal du Nord, with the enemy patrols on the
near (western) side. The troops then settled down to the work
of building a main line of resistance. The possession of Inchy
and Moeuvres was still in dispute and a counter-attack was
possible from that direction. On Sept. 12-13 the 4th. Brigade
relieved the 6th. Brigade in the front line. . .
"The occupied line extended from a few hundred yards
north of the Arras-Cambrai road along the Canal du Nord to
the lock, just north of Inchy. It was about two miles in length
and there were practically no trenches. Rifle pits and shelters
had been made by the other troops, but these were very meagre
and unconnected. There could be no movement from one pit
to another during the day. The enemy machine and field guns
were very busy, and for a while the troops suffered heavily,
despite the splendid camouflaging of their positions with
boughs and other covering.
"The first task was to build a support line. This was sited
on top of the ridge in front of the Buissy Switch. Large work
ing parties from both reserve and support Battalions were
engaged on this every night under direction of the Engineers.
When this support line was finished a front line was begun, a
section being built at a time. It was a period of dangerous and
difficult work by night and for lying low by day. There were
CONFRONTING THE CANAL DU NORD 187
several fierce patrol encounters by night around Baralle wood
and the big German dump."
Similar conditions exist north of the Arras-Cambrai road,
a particularly nasty spot being in the neighborhood of Ecourt
St. Quentin, where the enemy has direct observation from the
commanding heights east of the canal.
Of units not in the line, some are lucky enough to go back
to rest at Arras and beyond. But many are held in close sup
port in the old trench lines, living in enemy dug-outs. For
there is a continual straafing of this area day and night, and
our troops, though far removed from the battle line, suffer
many casualties. Thus Lt.-Col. G. R. Pearkes, V.C., of the
116th. Battalion. Central Ontario, was severely wounded by a
stray shell on the afternoon of Sept. IS in the Guemappe area.
"Rest" is no picnic in No Man s Land. In the first days
after the battle there is a listlessness among such battalions.
The men, thoroughly tired out, lie about among the trenches
and dug-outs they occupy, sleeping a great deal or gossiping
about the battle. Losses have been so heavy that there is not
the same elation that accompanies such a victory as Amiens.
Indeed, the men are decidedly pessimistic.
"Well, I guess the old Corps is pretty well done in this
time," says a grizzled miner from the Porcupine. "You just
mark my words ; we ll go out to rest in a day or two and shan t
do another tap till next spring. It s just like Passchendaele all
over again."
There is, in fact, a general sense of depression. We have
won our victory, but where have we landed? In the heart of
No Man s Land, stretching to our strained imagination in all
its horror through many bitter weeks of winter. For we have
no notion in our head but that the war is going on well into
1919. Presently perhaps where we lie the Boche will make
a stand; and we shall "dig in" for the winter the winter, the
winter, the abominable winter.
Such a feeling in early September is natural, inevitable.
But it may be here noted that much the same idea obtained
188 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
until well on into October, until indeed weeks after the Boche
had made his first proposals for an armistice. To take a still
greater leap ahead, few men in the Canadian Corps believed in
the armistice as an accomplished fact on the very night before
it was promulgated. The reason for this lay, no doubt, in the
fact that it was the fortune of the Canadian Corps to be fight
ing its way hard right up to what one may term the "zero
hour" of peace.
But the view of the man in the field is extraordinarily cir
cumscribed. His platoon is his home or, perhaps, you may
extend it to his company; other companies in his battalion are
next-door neighbors; he has a pretty good guess as to just what
they are about, and once in a while stops in his own work to
take a look over the fence into their yard. But the battalion
-we are speaking of the private soldier is the limit of his
range. And, indeed, company officers have but slightly wider
vision, and it is only the battalion officers who know about the
doings of the brigade. These limitations, but in widening
eddies, are to be found as one mounts progressively through
the brigade to the division, to Corps, and to the bright emi
nence of Army. Army knows it all, of course, or it wouldn t
be Army.
The point of all this is just simply that, in the varying
degree of one s opportunity whether one be private or cap
tain or colonel one is so engrossed in the immediate battle
picture that one fails to grasp the significance of the war map
as a whole. One may be certain that no battalion commander
engaged in the Drocourt-Queant line affair, gave a thought for
several days to what was going on north or south. So far as he
was concerned, the war was being fought and won or lost-
right then and there.
And how much more does not this apply to the private,
who has not seen a daily paper for a month and has not the
privilege of reading the news bulletin telegraphed dqily by
Army a fount of information that irrigates in its pnssage
thirsty minds at Corps, Division and Brigade; but has become
CONFRONTING THE CANAL DU NORD 189
a trickling stream before it reaches the Battalion, and dries up
entirely as it gets to Company H.Q.? He does know, though,
that over half his platoon are casualties, and the world is very
black.
Rumors of disaster chase each other round. "Let me tell
you sumpthin on the strict Q.T. The bally Brigade is all so
cut to pieces that its mother s son wouldn t know it. The
Sergeant, he says, we ll have to go out to Boulogne to refit-
good old Boulogne the sooner the better."
But there is a more hopeful note. "I hope to God they
won t leave us stuck here," says another. "Four days rain ; I m
fed up on No Man s Land, They say there s fine billets in
Cambrai. Why don t they let us have a go at that and put in
the winter there? Thai ud be something worth fighting for."
Cambrai exercises a curious psychological influence on the
Corps. It is the subject of talk in the mess, and the man in the
ranks regards it as some vague El Dorado. From the Bois de
Bouche, a considerable height about a mile southeast of Cagni-
court, we have a plain view of Bourlon Wood and hill, and we
know that right behind, in the valley of the Scheldt, lies the
fair city of Cambrai.
Cambrai, in fact, dominates our imagination. Ask a sol
dier its population, and he will say offhand, "Oh, about a
quarter of a million or so." And he has some idea of cambric
looms and that it was the capital of the old Frankish kings.
This interest is because it is the first considerable city confront
ing us that has lain hid in the enemy grip since 1914. Amiens
and Arras were familiar enough; familiar as the gay trysting
places of men on leave; less familiar in ruins. But Cambrai
has for us all the charm of the unknown, a name that stirs the
imagination and quickens our interest. We conceive a city of
beautiful streets and ancient palaces crowded with monuments
of art and war. No disappointment could have been greater
than Cambrai as at last we came to see it
But we have wandered afar from our gossiping soldiers.
In such case as this the veteran N.C.O s are invaluable.
190 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Eternal grumblers themselves, they will not allow it in their
men. "What re you talking about?" cries one. "The old
Brigade done in? Why, you wooden-head, this Brigade at
only half its strength can lick the tar out of any other brigade
in the Corps, and throw in a Boche division at that! This
battle was nothing. You should just have seen Regina Trench,
my boy, and then you could talk!"
With so many commissioned officers casualties, the value of
these tried and tested old Sergeants becomes more and more
apparent. Just about this time the Corps receives for the first
time reinforcements who, to make no bones about it, are con
scripts, drafts under the compulsory service act passed at
Ottawa a year ago, though they are to prove themselves as good
soldiers as any. It would seem that these men many of whom
were only held back by family circumstances from voluntary
enlistment had been snubbed and bullied on their training
grounds. They meet here a very different reception, for they
enter at once the brotherhood of arms. They are welcomed on
precisely the same footing as had been the volunteer reinforce
ments it was made very plain to them by these old Sergeants
that despite their intensive training in England they were very
green, nothing more than rookies, and must learn all over
again for which (with becoming modesty) they were dead
lucky to have come to the best school in France.
The N.C.O s enjoyed immensely this business of the break
ing in of the young idea young in war if not in years. But,
beyond the hazards of battle, their own ranks are depleted
because many of them are over in England taking the officers
course, to fill vacancies in their respective battalions. In the
recent fighting the percentage of casualties among officers has
been out of all proportion, and this loss made itself felt
throughout the fighting to follow. Anticipating a little again,
this curious fact may be recited. A certain battalion received
on Sept. 26 back from England 16 of its old N.C.O s who had
successfully taken their course, and all went into battle next
morning. Next day every one of them was a casualty, and
CONFRONTING THE CANAL DU NORD 191
within 48 hours the bulk of them were back again in Blighty.
But in a day or two there is a marked change. The men
begin to sit up and take interest in their immediate surround
ings. The Y.M.C.A. has opened up a canteen nearby and long
lines of men gather, a patient queue, waiting their turn for
cigarettes and biscuits and chocolate. Mail comes in won
derful is the efficiency of the Corps post-office throughout
these operations; mail comes in and there are letters from
home to be answered, letters one may be sure from mothers
and sweethearts, never more welcome than now. There are
other letters to write not so easy, taking much thought, but
inspired by such a loving kindness for the chum who died upon
the field, that when at last they reach a distant sorrowing heart,
they bring a brave message of comfort "He was the best pal I
ever had and he died a Hero; all through the battle I felt safe
because he was by me; and then I had to go on alone," ran one
we were privileged to see long afterwards.
But now a battalion band strikes up, a group of men gather,
a football makes its appearance. Laughter breaks out in the
crowd; the battle and anguish are forgotten; these again are
bright Canadian boys intent on having a good time. The
Y.M.C.A., "Soldiers Friend" indeed, produces the para
phernalia of baseball, and soon two picked teams are at it
hard, battling for the honor of the battalion, the men crowding
in behind the plate, yelling support and making side-bets on
each inning. Battalion officers umpire, and it is not hard to
see they have the confidence of their men.
It is a merry scene in the waning light. The Corps has
come to life again. "When you see this going on," remarks an
officer whose battle experience dates from Ypres in April,
1915, "you may be sure the men are ready to go in again.
These two battalions would put up a great scrap right tonight.
But 24 hours ago they were a pretty sad looking outfit."
We have seen how the 2nd. and 3rd. Canadian Divisions
had taken over the line of the Canal du Nord on the night of
Sept. 3-4. They pushed right down to the west bank, but this
192 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
being exposed to direct fire from the opposing wooded slopes,
it was held only by light patrols. The enemy showed a good
deal of activity and particularly in the region of Sauchy-
Cauchy did not hesitate to push his raiding parties across
under cover of night. Our outposts were thus continually en
gaged. Later on our 2nd. Division took over the entire Corps
front.
South of the Corps boundary, from Inchy-en-Artois to
Moeuvres, the situation of the XVII Corps was not so good,
for the enemy still clung fast to a strip on the west side of the
canal, and to the canal bed itself, in this sector unfinished and
dry. The enemy was in great force, and it seemed, indeed, as if
we were definitely held up on the west side of the canal.
It was in these circumstances that the Corps Commander
came to a momentous decision. Sir Arthur Currie was asked
to attack on the present Corps front, and thus turn the canal
from the north. He refused to make what he regarded as a
useless sacrifice of his men, pointing out the difficulties of the
position, the flooded area immediately in front of us, backed
by wooded slopes, and our exposed northern flank. But he
submitted instead alternative proposals, which finally were
adopted and led to the great battle of Cambrai.
CHAPTER II
THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI
FROM the Bois de Bouche, five miles distant, southeast by
east, Bourlon Wood looms up to view, dark and threaten
ing, precisely as it looms up from any surrounding pros
pect whatever. Between us lies the valley of the Canal
du Nord, with beyond the ground sloping up to Bourlon, bare
save for an occasional little wood, such as that of the Quarry.
Standing on the 75-metre elevation of the Bois de Bouche
and facing Bourlon, a little to the right and on the west side of
the canal lies the village of Inchy- en-Artois, and as far to the
left, 2,000 yards northeast of Inchy but on the east side of the
canal, is the village of Sains-lez-Marquion. Two thousand
yards south of Inchy, on the west side of the canal, is the vil
lage of Moeuvres, which not only proved impregnable during
every stage of the first battle of Cambrai, but only recently had
withstood the assaults of troops of the Third Army on our
right.
Immediately east of Inchy a canal stretch of 3,000 yards
was still uncompleted, and therefore dry. These works are not
situated in the valley bottom, but form an embankment on its
eastern slopes, and this stronghold is reinforced by a series of
lifting locks, each in itself a fortress, from 40 to 60 feet in
depth, edged by steep banks and masonry. Opposite Inchy,
from the top of the east bank, presenting an elevation of about
60 metres, the hill slopes steadily back and up to where at the
crest of Bourlon Wood it attains an extreme elevation of 110
metres, thus commanding a clear view of all movements west
of the canal as far as the Bois de Bouche.
All this slope presents for enemy machine-gunners a
natural glacis. Paralleling the Canal, running from two to
five hundred yards east of it, is the heavily-wired trench sys-
193
14
194 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
tern known as the Canal du Nord line. Midway between this
and the summit is the strongly fortified Marquion line. Over
the crest of the slope and back of Bourlon Wood is the Mar-
coing line. Bourlon Wood is a fortress in itself, its batteries of
artillery and machine-guns dominating the approach.
We are already familiar with the features north of Inchy
the flooded area, with all bridges demolished, and any
attempted crossing entirely dominated by the superior east
bank. Impregnable to assault from the west, the chain of vil
lages lying along the east bank, Sains-lez-Marquion, Marquion
and Sauchy-Lestree, screened by woods and swamps and ex
tending north to the high ground of the town of Oisy-le-
Verger, has to be reckoned with by an attacking force crossing
the canal further soutii and striking thence eastwards for
until this strip has been cleared of its garrison, it presents a
highly vulnerable flank.
Immediately south of Moeuvres runs the Bapaume-Cam-
brai road, a first-class highway though now shell-torn, passing
just under the southern slope of Bourlon Wood, through the
village of Anneux, and thence east to Cambrai through the
village of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, 1,500 yards east of the wood.
Three or four thousand yards further east the road parallels,
but at some little distance north, the Scheldt Canal, or, to give
it its French name, the Canal de 1 Escaut, and known also.
south of Cambrai, as the Canal St. Quentin.
A mile and a half north and a little east of Fontaine-Notre-
Dame is the village of Raillencourt, situate on the Arras-Cam-
brai road. This road, after crossing the Canal du Nord at
Marquion, runs in a straight line southeast through Raillen-
court and St. Olle into the Faubourg Caritimpre, where it joins
the Bapaume road at an acute angle, the combined road then
passing east across the Scheldt Canal into the City of Cambrai.
Two thousand yards east of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, the
Scheldt Canal, which up to now has followed a general north
erly course, swings off almost sharp to the east, and then, 2,500
yards further on, as it reaches the Faubourg Cantimpre, trends
THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 195
off again to the north. At the point where it turns east, the
strongly fortified Marcoing line, the last organized trench
system west of Cambrai, passes from the east to the west side of
the canal, and then takes a northerly course just east of Raillen-
court and between that village and Sailly, adjoining it to the
northeast. Thence it passes in a northeast direction to a little
west of Sancourt, where it joins up with another strong trench
system, running off at right angles west to link up with the
Canal du Nord line south of Sauchy-Lestree.
Forming a strong pivot of defense, the village of Hayne-
court lies at the junction of the Marcoing line and this western
trench line, 5,000 yards northeast of Bourlon village, itself
situate against the northwest slope of Bourlon Wood. Between
Bourlon and Haynecourt passes the Arras-Cambrai road, and
on this line, a thousand yards south of the road, is the consider
able elevation known as Pilgrim s Rest. One more tactical
feature may here be noted, this being the railway that after
crossing the Canal du Nord at Sauchy-Lestree, winds up the
hill through many deep cuttings, skirting Bourlon village on
the north and joining the Bapaume-Cambrai road a little east
of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, whence it follows the course of the
road into Cambrai.
There are thus three distinct trench systems, all running
more or less parallel to the Canal du Nord in a north and south
direction; first, the Canal du Nord line; then, midway up the
slope, the Marquion line; and, finally, behind Bourlon Wood,
the very strong Marcoing Line. Between these trench systems
the enemy had organized many series of fortified shell-holes,
protected by "spider-web" wire, and it was in fighting through
this maze, rather than in the actual storming of the trenches,
that our heaviest losses were to be incurred.
In these September days of waiting we are all studying the
campaign of the previous November, now known as the First
Battle of Cambrai. But different indeed are the plans and exe
cution of such operations one gathers from the men who fought
them from the stereotyped accounts of the contemporary his-
196 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
tones of the war ; for embalmed in the official reports, on which
these are necessarily founded, are often misstatements of fact
and distortions of perspective. The patient historian of the
future must dig below this surface if he is to discover truth in
all her aspects, unclouded by prejudice and untarnished by
self-interest
Bourlon Wood and the whole surrounding battlefield is to
enter so sharply, so poignantly, into the history of the Canadian
Corps, that a sketch of this first battle is an essential prelimin
ary to what is to follow. We shall be concerned not so much
with its course from day to day as with its general scheme and
the reasons for its relative failure.
After his brilliant success with the Canadian Corps at
Vimy Ridge, Sir Julian Byng received well-deserved promo
tion to the command of the Third Army, then vacant by the
removal of General Allenby to Palestine. It was not in his
nature to sit down to passive defense while hard fighting was
going on elsewhere; and so he evolved the plan of attack,
which, as we have seen in the account of the Amiens show, un
successful in result though in some degree it was, was neverthe
less destined to revolutionize conditions on the West Front,
sounding the death knell of trench fighting and preparing the
way for open warfare. Oddly enough that brilliant plan was
not only the germ of our present success, but seems also to have
supplied the inspiration for the great German offensive of the
spring of 1918.
Struck by the fact that the battle in the north was not going
so well as had been hoped. Sir Julian Byng, in July, 1917,
came to the conclusion that a diversion on the right flank of the
Third Army might not only draw enemy troops from the north
but might seriously interfere with any plans the enemy might
have for a counter-offensive on the large scale. He therefore
laid his plan before the British Commander-in-Chief, asking
that his divisions in the line be supported by six fresh divisions,
all the tanks and the whole of the cavalry; the idea being a
secret attack unheralded by the alarum-bell of a heavy and pro-
THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 197
tracted artillery preparation, as then was the fashion; a rolling
artillery barrage and the tanks being relied upon to break
down the way for the infantry, while the cavalry were to seize
any opportunity of passing through.
It is to be presumed that Sir Douglas Haig was sym
pathetic, but it was a new idea, never popular at G.H.Q., and
the dreadful righting in progress on the north seemed to deny
the diversion of the necessary troops. Shortly after this the
6th., 35th., 40th. and 50th. Divisions were sent north, and for
the time being the project was out of the question.
But Sir Julian, enamored of his idea, was not to be discour
aged, and early in the autumn he advanced it again. This
time he received encouragement, and was told he should have
the Canadian Corps for the operation. For just 36 hours the
Third Army Commander saw his great plan fructifying, with
to his purpose the Corps he had done so much to make what it
was, when there came the news that the Canadian Corps too
was ordered north. Passchendaele destroyed any chance it
had of taking part under its old leader in these new battle
tactics.
After this a rot set in for our cause; Russia had gone to
pieces and Italy was invaded; divisions had to be hurried to
her support from the West Front. But whatever the cause-
perhaps because there was need for desperate measures, and
the plan, while offering minimum risks, held out great pros
pects it came about that in mid-October Sir Douglas Haig
was finally converted and the Third Army authorized to go
ahead with its preparations. Instead of six fresh divisions,
however, the battle must be fought with divisions already bat
tle-weary, though all the tanks and cavalry were promised.
It is not to our purpose to deal with this very interesting
operation at length, except insofar as it has a direct bearing on
the second battle of Cambrai. The battle opened at dawn of
Nov. 20, so soon as there was light enough for the tanks to see.
There was a tremendous concentration of these, no less than
460 being on the line, and the whole attack had been carefully
198 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
rehearsed, each tank having its track at the jumping-off place
marked out with its number; while the troops to follow were
trained beforehand to manoeuvre with that particular tank.
These tanks were of an early model, and could not cross un
aided the Hindenburg line, here 14 feet wide and eight deep.
So the idea was conceived of a fascine or faggots suspended
from their bows, to be dropped into the trench, and over which
they climbed up the other side. This plan worked out per
fectly in practice.
The surprise was complete, and for a time everything went
well, the barrage jumping from trench to trench and the de
fense being overwhelmed. But the troops engaged, stoutly as
they fought, did not present a heavy enough mass of infantry
to accomplish the full purpose; nor, as their advance spread
out into an ever-deepening salient, had they sufficient reserves
to defend the line they had won.
The general direction of the attack was northeast, in the
direction of Cambrai across the Scheldt Canal between Mas-
nieres and Cantaing and through Marcoing; and north along
the Canal du Nord with the commanding heights of Bourlon
Wood as an early objective. Three possibilities were present.
One was the unlimited ; that is to say, such a surprise might be
effected that the Boche would be rolled back a considerable
distance. The second was that the Hindenburg Support line
(i.e., the Marcoing line) might be captured and consolidated.
And the third, more limited in scope, was for a raid on a glori
fied scale, capturing trenches and inflicting considerable loss
upon the enemy. In its result what was actually achieved lay
somewhere between the second and third possibilities.
At first everything, :is we have seen, went according to pro
gramme. On the right good progress was made, our troops at
one point establishing themselves across the Scheldt Canal.
But in the centre we were hung up for vital hours in front of
Flesquieres. On the left the attack went better, being pushed
forward astride the Canal du Nord to the Bapaume-Arras
road.
THE FIRST BATTLE OF CAMBRAI 199
But the advance, considerable though it was, had not gone
so far and fast as had been hoped. The enemy brought up
great masses of reserves, and was able to hold the Masnieres
line. No opportunity had been furnished the cavalry to break
through though, as h?,s been previously noted, one squadron
of the Fort Garry Horse actually crossed the Scheldt Canal.
Nevertheless the local success of the first two days was great,
the attack reaching the line of the Scheldt, Cantaing, Anneux
and Moeuvres.
It is possible enough that left to his own judgment Sir
Julian Byng would have been content to consolidate this posi
tion, offering as it did a favorable line as a future jumping-off
ground. But on Nov. 23 Sir Douglas Haig, no doubt anxious
to exploit as far as possible such a striking success, ordered that
Bourlon Wood be attacked from the south. The tired troops
again went forward and stormed the wood. There followed
five or six days fighting of a ding-dong nature, with varying
fortunes, during which the wood changed hands several times.
We seized but failed to hold the village of Fontaine-Notre-
Dame, which then established itself a tactical feature of first
importance to any force consolidating itself in Bourlon Wood.
Every student of the war will remember the thrill of pride
and hope of Nov. 20, 1917, and the following days; how at last
a ray of light seemed to have penetrated those dark months;
how the news was hailed with joy in every allied capital and
with corresponding foreboding in enemy countries; but how,
after ten days heroic effort, the storm broke upon the weary
but devoted troops, when five or six fresh enemy divisions
burst up the Banteux Valley, capturing Gonnelieu and pushing
in to Gouzeaucourt. Only the extraordinary gallantry and
tenacity of some of the divisions engaged, especially the
Guards, the 2nd., and the 47th. and 56th. Divisions, prevented
a disaster.
These three divisions held the Bourlon Wood line against
eight enemy divisions altogether, five in the frontal attack and
three in reserve. They held on throughout the day. In some
200 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
places the enemy drove in seven distinct attacks, but not one of
them reached our main line, although forward posts changed
hands. The great slaughter the enemy suffered there was at
that time regarded the most serious he had had in the war.
As it turned out, the success, limited though it was, proved
of very great strategic value at a critical time. The enemy was
thrown out of his stride for the rest of the year. Tactically,
too, the Third Army had the best of it. The Hindenburg
line south of Moeuvres was not only captured but held. They
suffered indeed 42,000 casualties in the fortnight s battle, los
ing 7,800 prisoners. But on the other hand they inflicted
casualties estimated at 80,000, capturing 11,000 prisoners and
170 guns, though against these must be set the 150 guns the
enemy captured on Nov. 30. But he used up in the battle 30
divisions against the 11 British divisions engaged, and many of
these were either brought down from the north or deflected
from Italy.
Altogether, disappointing as the final result might have
been, the battle was a real victory. Had the Third Army been
permitted to embark on it with the support requested, includ
ing the Canadian Corps, and at a time of year when the days
were long, it is pretty certain that the highest expectations of
Sir Julian Byng would have been realized. As it was, labor
ing under every disadvantage, the soundness of his tactical
theory not only proved itself, but has served as the model for
all future operations on the grand scale.
CHAPTER III
THE PLAN OF ATTACK
THE problem of the Canadian Corps was entirely differ
ent. In front of us, across the canal, lay the high ground
from which Sir Julian Byng s men had been beaten back.
But the weakness of his position had not developed from
failure to push home those attacks. It came from the increas
ing exposed flank his drive north created for an active enemy
east of the Scheldt Canal.
On the other hand, provided we could cross the Canal du
Nord, overwhelm the enemy defense on the opposing slope and
seize the high ground, we should have attained a position not
only practical for defense but commanding the valley of the
Scheldt and the city of Cambrai lying within it. Once estab
lished on the high ground north of the city beyond the Mar-
coing line, and its fall must come about inevitably, without the
necessity of storming it, which would have involved not only
heavy casualties for ourselves, but must have resulted in its
partial destruction, from every point of view to be avoided so
far as possible.
But to carry out this operation successfully, it was essential
that our drive, necessarily of the spearhead type, be assured,
first, a degree of protection along its exposed left flank; and,
second, that there must be adequate support by troops operat
ing immediately on our right so as to prevent the creation of an
equally vulnerable right flank. On the left, therefore, any
plan of attack must include the mopping-up of the whole
peninsula east of the Canal du Nord and south of the Sensee,
thus placing that river between us and the enemy s army based
on Douai. But on the right all that was necessary was that as
our line advanced north of Cambrai, the ground should be
cleared as far east as the Scheldt Canal.
201
202 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
We have seen how the Corps Commander declined to com
mit his troops to a frontal attack on the Canal du Nord from
the area we were holding throughout September north of
Sains-lez-Marquion, where the flooded condition of the canal
and the high banks opposing us denied success, and how he
submitted an alternative plan. That plan is best explained in
his own words, as follows :-
"On Sept. 15 I received the details of a large operation to
be carried out later in the month by the Third and Fourth
Armies, in which the Canadian Corps was to co-operate by
crossing the Canal, and by capturing Bourlon Wood and the
high ground to the northeast of it, to protect the left flank of
the attack.
"The XXII Corps on the left was to take over the front
held by the Canadian Corps to a point 1,200 yards north of the
Arras-Cambrai Road, and the Canadian Corps was to take
over part of the front held by the XVII Corps (Third Army)
as far as Moeuvres (exclusive), which was to be the Canadian
Corps right boundary for the attack.
"By this side-slip to the south the right of the Canadian
Corps was to be placed opposite a dry portion of the Canal du
Nord on a front of about 2,500 yards. The Germans were
then holding in strength a strip of ground on the west side of
the canal, and every effort made by the XVII Corps to clear
this ground and reach the Canal banks had been repulsed.
"On Sept. 22 the task of the Corps was enlarged so as to
include, in addition to the objectives already mentioned, the
capture of the bridges over the Scheldt Canal, north of Cam-
brai, and the high ground overlooking the Sensee Valley. The
right boundary was not altered. To assist in carrying out the
above additional task, the llth. British Division and the 7th.
Tank Battalion were placed under my orders.
"The date of this operation was definitely fixed for Sept.
27, 1918, at dawn.
"It was decided that the 4th. and 1st. Canadian Divisions
would carry out the initial attack, capture the villages of
THE PLAN OF ATTACK 203
Bourlon and Marquion respectively, and immediately there
after seize Bourlon Wood and east of Bois-de-Cocret and
Dartford Wood.
"At this stage the 3rd. Canadian Division would pass
through the right of the 4th. Canadian Division and advance
from the line east of Bourlon Wood in an easterly direction
towards Neuville-St. Remy, in liaison with the XVII Corps.
"The llth. Division was to come up on the left of the 1st.
Canadian Division and advance in a northeasterly direction
toward Epinoy and Oisy-le- Verger. The 4th. Canadian Divi
sion on the right centre was to advance towards Blecourt and
the 1st. Canadian Division on the left centre was to advance in
the direction of Abancourt
"This attack was fraught with difficulties. On the Corps
battlef ront of 6,400 yards the Canal du Nord was impassable
on the northern 3,800 yards. The Corps had, therefore, to
cross the Canal du Nord on a front of 2,600 yards, and to
expand later fanwise In a northeasterly direction to a front
exceeding 15,000 yards. This intricate manoeuvre called for
most skilful leadership on the part of commanders, and the
highest state of discipline on the part of the troops.
"The assembly of the attacking troops in an extremely con
gested area known by the enemy to be the only one available
was very dangerous, especially in view of the alertness of the
enemy. A concentrated bombardment of this area prior to
"zero/ particularly if gas was employed, was a dreaded pos
sibility which could seriously affect the whole of the opera
tion and possibly cause its total failure.
"To meet such an eventuality careful arrangements were
made by the counter-battery staff officer to bring to bear a
specially heavy neutralizing fire on hostile batteries at any
moment during the crucial period of preparation. These
arrangements were to be put into effect, in any case, at "zero"
hour, to neutralize the hostile defensive barrage on the front
of attack.
"With the exception of the 2nd. Canadian Division, which
204 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
was now holding the entire front and would be in Corps Re
serve at the time of attack, every resource of the Canadian
Corps was to be crowded in that narrow space.
"The provision of an effective Artillery barrage presented
considerable difficulty owing to the depth of the attack and its
general direction. On the 4th. Canadian Division front partic
ularly, the depth to the initial objective was such that the bat
teries were compelled to move forward into captured ground
and continue firing the barrage from these new positions. Pro
vision was made for the advance of a number of batteries with
their Echelons to the Canal line and beyond whilst the attack
was in progress.
a A large number of Machine-Gun batteries were detailed
to supply the initial barrage and, later, to advance in support
of the Infantry.
"Provisions were also made for Engineer Units to move
forward immediately following the assaulting troops, to effect
immediate repair to the roads and crossings of the Canal in
order to enable the Artillery to move up in support of the
Infantry.
"The greatest precautions had been taken to ensure secrecy,
and camouflage had been used extensively to prevent detection
of the preparations of all kinds that were in progress.
"Further to conceal our intentions, i< was decided that no
preliminary fighting to secure a jumping-off line would take
place, and that the Germans would be left in possession of
their positions west of the Canal until the hour of the attack.
It was also hoped that, by letting the Germans retain this
ground, their defensive barrage would remain well west of the
Canal instead of being placed on the Canal itself, where the
banks offered a serious obstacle and reduced very considerably
the rate of advance of the assaulting troops.
"On our right the XVII Corps was to advance and capture
Fontaine-Notre-Dame, in conjunction with the capture of
Bourlon Wood by the 4th. Canadian Division.
"On the night of Sept. 25-26 the XXII Corps on the left
THE PLAN OF ATTACK 205
took over the front as far south as the Arras-Cambrai road,
and arranged to extend the Artillery and Machine-Gun bar
rage to their front so as to deceive the enemy regarding actual
flanks of the attack.
"The 4th. and 1st. Canadian Divisions went into the line on
their respective battlefionts.
"The 2nd. Canadian Division, on completion of the relief,
passed into Corps Reserve.
"During the night of Sept. 26-27 all final adjustments and
moves were made, and everything was ready before "zero"
hour.
"This was for everybody a night full of anxiety, but apart
from the usual harassing fire and night bombing nothing
untoward happened."
Before proceeding to the attack itself, a review of the gen
eral strategic plan of which it formed so vital a part, is not out
of place. The Fourth and Third British Armies were about to
launch a frontal attack on the Hindenburg System, hitherto
unbroken, from St. Quentin north to Cambrai. It was to be
the honorable function of the Canadian Corps, having already
passed through the Hindenburg line west of the Canal du
Nord, to press forward on the extreme left of this general
attack and thus turn the Hindenburg System from the north.
Its task was not so much to capture Cambrai which in fact
was outside our southern boundary as to drive forward along
the northern bank of the Scheldt and thus compromise enemy
communications north and south.
In our opening chapter sufficient extracts were made from
Sir Douglas Haig s Victory Dispatch to outline the general
plan. We may now with advantage follow him again : "The
details of the strategic plan . . upon which future opera
tions should be based were the subject of careful discussion
between Marshal Foch and myself. Preparations were al
ready far advanced for the successful attack by which, on Sept.
12, the First American Army, assisted by certain French Divi
sions, drove the enemy from the St. Mihiel salient and inflicted
206 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
heavy losses upon him in prisoners and guns. Ultimately, it
was decided that as soon as possible after this attack four con
vergent and simultaneous offensives should be launched by
the Allies as follows :
"By the Americans west of Mezieres;
"By the French west of Argonne in close co-operation with
the American attack and with the same general objectives;
"By the British on the St. Quentin-Cambrai front in the
general direction of Maubeuge;
"By the Belgian and Allied forces in Flanders in the direc
tion of Ghent.
"By these attacks, it was expected, as already indicated, that
the important German forces opposite the French and Ameri
cans would be pressed back upon the difficult country of the
Ardennes, while the British thrust struck at their principal
lines of communication. It was intended to take advantage of
the weakening of the German forces on this front to clear the
Belgian coast by a surprise attack. Success in any one of these
offensives might compel the enemy to withdraw to the line of
the Meuse.
"The results to be obtained from these different attacks de
pended in a peculiarly large degree upon the British attack in
the centre. It was here that the enemy s defenses were most
highly organized. If these were broken, the threat directed
at his vital systems of lateral communication would of necessity
react upon his defenses elsewhere.
"On the other hand, the long period of sustained offensive
action through which the British Armies had already passed
had made large demands both upon the troops themselves and
upon my available reserves. Throughout our attacks from
Aug. 8 onwards our losses in proportion to the results achieved
and the prisoners taken had been consistently and remarkably
small. In the aggregate, however, they were considerable, and
in the face of them an attack upon so formidably organized a
position as that which now confronted us could not be lightly
undertaken. Moreover, the political effects of an unsuccessful
THE PLAN OF ATTACK 207
attack upon a position so well known as the Hindenburg line
would be large, and would go far to revive the declining
morale not only of the German Army but of the German
people.
"These different considerations were present to my mind.
The probable results of a costly failure, or, indeed, of anything
short of a decided success, in any attempt upon the main de
fenses of the Hindenburg line were obvious; but I was con
vinced that the British attack was the essential part of the
general scheme and that the moment was favorable.
"Accordingly I decided to proceed with the attack, and all
preparatory measures, including the preliminary operations
already recounted, were carried out as rapidly and as thor
oughly as possible."
He then proceeds to describe the difficulties of the task
confronting the Fourth and Third Armies, continuing:- :< The
Battle of Cambrai, which on Oct. 5 culminated in the capture
of the last remaining sectors of the Hindenburg line, was com
menced by the First and Third Armies.
"Between the neighbourhood of St. Quentin and the
Scheldt, the Fourth, Third and First Armies in the order
named occupied on the evening of Sept. 26 a line running from
the village of Selency (west of St. Quentin) to Gricourt and
Pontruct, and thence east of Villeret and Lempire to Villers-
Guislain and Gouzeaucourt, both exclusive. Thereafter the
line continued northwards to Havrincourt and Moeuvres and
thence along the west side of the Canal du Nord to the floods
of the Sensee at Ecourt St. Quentin.
"On the First and Third Army fronts strong positions cov
ering the approaches to Cambrai between the Nord and
Scheldt canals, including the section of the Hindenburg line
itself north of Gouzeaucourt, were still in the enemy s posses
sion. His trenches in this sector faced southwest, and it was
desirable that they should be taken in the early stages of the
operation, so as to render it easier for the artillery of the
Fourth Army to get into position. On the Fourth Army front.
208 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
where the heaviest blow was to fall, the exceptional strength
of the enemy s position made a prolonged bombardment neces
sary. I therefore decided that a very heavy bombardment,
opened during the night of Sept. 26-27 along the whole front
of all three Armies, should be followed on the morning of
Sept 27 by an attack delivered by the First and Third Armies.
In this way the enemy might be deceived as to the main point
of the attack, the First and Third Armies would be enabled to
get nearer to their final objective, and the task of the Fourth
Army artillery would be simplified.
"On the morning of Sept. 26 French and American forces
attacked on both sides of the Argonne, between the Meuse and
Suippe rivers.
"At 5.20 a.m. on Sept. 27 the Third and First British
Armies attacked with the IV, VI, XVII and Canadian Corps
in the direction of Cambrai on a front of about 13 miles from
Gouzeaucourt to the neighborhood of Sauchy Lestree. The
success of the northern part of the attack depended upon the
ability of our troops to debouch from the neighborhood of
Moeuvres, and to secure the crossings of the Canal du Nord in
that locality. The northern portion of the Canal du Nord
was too formidable an obstacle to be crossed in the face of the
enemy. It was therefore necessary for the attacking divisions
to force a passage on a comparatively narrow front about
Moeuvres, and thereafter turn the line of the canal farther
north by a divergent attack developed f anwise from the point
of crossing. This difficult manoeuvre was carried out success
fully, and on the whole front of our attack our infantry, assisted
by some 65 tanks, broke deeply into the enemy s position."
This testimony to the work of the Canadian Corps from so
high a quarter is very satisfactory, though it was Inchy and not
Moeuvres that furnished the jumping-off spot. As has been
explained, this difficult manoeuvre had originated in the brain
of the Canadian Corps Commander. It was a daring plan
that success alone could justify. Every commanding officer in
the Corps to whom the secret had been entrusted was well
THE PLAN OF ATTACK 209
aware of that. Thus, the narrative of the 1st. Canadian Divi
sion, after an appreciation of the general strategic situation,
says : "The battle was divided into three main phases :
"First, on the left, the storming of the Canal du Nord and
the advance on Cambrai ; followed immediately by the second
phase, the great blow which shattered the Hindenburg line and
outflanked the defenses of St. Quentin; and, third, came the
general attack on the whole front which resulted in the capture
of Cambrai and St. Quentin, and forced the enemy to retire
behind the line of the river Selle.
"It was in the first phase of this battle that the Canadian
Corps was chiefly interested, for to the Corps was given the
task of forcing the Canal du Nord, capturing Bourlon Wood
and the high ground to the north of it, and then advancing on
Cambrai and seizing the crossings of the Scheldt Canal and
the Sensee river to the east and north of that city. This would
afford complete protection for the main attack to the south-
and this was the real objective of the Canadian Corps. . .
"The attack presented many unusual features. In the first
place the Canal du Nord was passable on the Corps sector on a
front of 2,500 yards only. This meant that four divisions had
to be got through this narrow defile, and in addition there
were engineers, artillery, machine-gunners and all the supply
trains of various descriptions. To add to these difficulties the
canal had to be bridged in many places, especially to permit
the passage of guns and limbers. . .
"At the very outset, therefore, the success of the battle
devolved upon the Engineers. While the infantry, under
cover of the artillery barrage, might carry the canal in the first
rush, it was essential that guns and ammunition be brought
forward across the canal as soon as possible. To do this bridges
were a necessity. The task set the Engineers was of vital
importance."
The plan, of course, was confided to the Army Command
ers. Sir Julian Byng, as has been seen, was in command of the
Third Army on our right, and on one of these September days
15
210 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
he came over to Corps Headquarters at Neuville Vitasse to
talk it over with Sir Arthur Currie. Mutual confidence and
esteem existed between the past and present Canadian Corps
Commanders. Sir Julian could speak with peculiar authority,
for no one knew this battlefield so intimately, had studied it to
such good purpose, nor could more fully appreciate its dangers
and difficulties. He had heard, he said, of the proposed plan
of attack, and as an old friend he could not refrain from point
ing out its hazards. Did Sir Arthur Currie think he could
really carry out the operation, because in his opinion the Cana
dian Corps was attempting the most difficult manoeuvre yet
attempted on a battlefield in this war?
They discussed the plan in detail, and Sir Julian went
away, if not convinced, at least immensely struck by its
audacity and brilliance.
CHAPTER IV
MARCHING UP TO BATTLE
WE come to the evening of Thursday, Sept. 26, the feast
of St. Cyprian. Our valley east of Neuville Vitasse is
now crowded with troops. On many occasions dur
ing the past four years men have massed here ; friend or enemy,
for attack or defense ; but never have they been so thickly, so
openly congregated. Nor will they be again, one may hazard,
so long as history is in the making.
But, until nightfall, there is little sign on the surface. No
place in the world is so empty as No Man s Land. It is
populated only as is a desert plain by an advancing horde of
locusts. They pass over, stripping every green thing as they
go, and leave it even more waste than it was before. One
recalls a little scene on the plateau just to the north a month
ago.
It was in the early afternoon, very hot and not a sign of
life, except that shells were bursting around Monchy-le-Preux
and a tremendous uproar was in progress over the slope to the
northeast, where the gray fog of our barrage was fast blotting
out the dark outlines of Sart Wood, But not a sign of life.
Suddenly a shrill whistle, and immediately men in kilts,
covered with khaki aprons, begin tumbling up, literally, from
the bowels of the earth ; from unexpected and unseen mouths
of dug-outs, so cunningly contrived by their late occupants,
the Boche, that they are quite unnoticeable even a few yards
away, for they lie flush with the ground, with no betraying
litter of excavation.
They stumble up awkwardly, for they are laden down
with their kit. The roll is called, a brief order, and they trudge
off toward the smoke and the uproar an extraordinary prosaic
business. In a few minutes the little plateau is as empty again
211
212 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
as a warren after the drumming alarm has sent the conies
scurrying to cover. But presently a flare goes up from the
wood.
Then it was the matter of a platoon, moving up from sup
port into line. Now it is battalions, brigades, whole divisions,
for the Corps is marching up to the great assault on the Canal
du Nord. The days are growing short; the sun sets by six
o clock, and an hour after it is dark. In the gloaming is a
scene of bustle and ordered confusion. The men laden down
for the battle, stand by in companies, waiting the word. A
great concentration of artillery is going forward and engineer
trains are pushing up with pontoons and bridging material,
steel and heavy timber.
It has been our good fortune to dine if such may be
termed the hasty meal in a bomb-proof shelter with the head
quarters of a battalion whose adjutant is a particular friend.
This battalion is to move into support and next day its objective
is Bourlon Wood. We gladly accept an invitation to march up
some way with it.
It is a long and tedious march of some dozen miles over
secondary roads and traversing ridge after ridge. The move
ment is diagonal, because we pass southeast out of our own
area into that of the Corps on our right to the jumping-off line
astride Inchy-en-Artois. The men whistle and sing, in the
best of spirits. They march by companies in column of four,
strung out over the white road tramp, tramp, tramp, under a
starlit sky. They march through the ghostly outlines of Wan-
court, over a plank road our engineers have built across the
Cojeul, and so up the steep climb of Wancourt Ridge. Here
the Colonel, who is riding ahead, orders a halt, and the men
have a ten-minute rest. They line the roadside, lighting cigar
ettes and chaffing one another.
On the left the Arras-Cambrai road around Vis-en-
Artois is being straafed by distant enemy batteries, and occa
sionally he turns a searching fire on our battery positions. But
it is nothing more than normal. Some bombing is going on
MARCHING UP TO BATTLE 213
north of the Scarpe, but it is too dark for effective work, or
our marching units would offer a conspicuous target. The
night is mild with a southwest wind. The moon, entering its
last quarter, a late riser, is hidden by scudding cloud. We
watch the battalion march by, a fine sight, for it has been
recruited up to strength. Steaming cook kettles bring up the
rear, with a hot meal ready for the men. Then we turn back,
for we too must be getting to our appointed place.
It is after midnight when we start out. It has begun to
rain, at first a drizzle and then a pitiless downpour, and it is
pitch dark. But as we climb out of Cherisy on the road to
Hendecourt, a stray enemy shell ignites one of our ammuni
tion dumps and makes the going better. From Hendecourt
the road runs over another ridge to Cagnicourt, whence it
turns sharp south, past the Bois de Bouche, then southeast
towards Inchy, becoming little better than a track. Midway
and on the right are Henley Copse and Bois d Inchy, on an
elevation but two thousand yards from the village and com
manding a view of the canal and battleground beyond.
This road is a quagmire, lined with trenches facing south,
part of the Hindenburg Support line taken by us three weeks
before. We are early and shelter for a time in a dripping dug
out. Our troops, wearied by their long march, are crowded
close in the trenches, in the woods, and behind the hill crests,
with perhaps a tarpaulin stretched over their heads. But at
four o clock the rain stops and a clearing sky promises a fine
day. We walk on to the little hill crowned by the Bois d Inchy,
where are some trenches and great variety of shell holes.
Two of our battalions lie in this little wood. The troops
are packed very close, the attacking divisions being squeezed
into a perilously narrow frontage, because the line of assault
is confined to less than a mile and a half on either side of
Inchy-en-Artois, which indeed is the boundary between our
4th. and 1st. Divisions. From where we stand the canal is but
3,000 yards away, and the Boche are holding this side of it,
their line running due north from the northwest corner of
214 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Mceuvres (taken recently by the XVII Corps), midway
between Inchy and the canal to west of Sains-lez-Marquion.
The first task of our infantry, therefore, is to overwhelm them
and thus make good the west bank of the canal itself.
But the limited area is also restricted in depth. Close
behind is a great concentration of artillery, which is about to
lay down what for its limited area is the most intense barrage
of the war. All the Canadian Corps artillery is here, with 700
rounds to each gun, as well as a large number of imperial
heavies." The attack offers an extraordinary difficult prob
lem. In the first place the character of the initial barrage is in
itself unique, for it is not the usual straight-away affair. Cov
ering first the actual crossing of the Canal du Nord, it is
designed then to protect the advance of the infantry on Bourlon
Wood on the one hand, while on the other it is to fan out in a
wide sweep to the north until finally it shall return from the
east on to the east bank of the canal, pinning in by its arc the
enemy garrison holding that side of the canal as far north as
Oisy-le-Verger.
But that description hardly succeeds. It is more than that.
The intention is that our 1st. Division, after crossing the canal,
shall swing off first northeast, then north, and gradually close
back on to the east side of the canal, thus taking from the rear
the enemy garrison whose position from frontal attack, west of
the canal, as has been before explained, is impregnable. To
provide a protective flank for this complicated operation a sta
tionary barrage is to be laid down some little distance east of
and parallel to the canal. As the sweep of the infantry
develops, a creeping barrage is to advance from south to north
between the canal and this stationary barrage, the latter being
lifted step by step as it is reached. It is extraordinarily ingen
ious and intricate, to be understood best by reference to the
barrage map itself.
Starting with a barrage 3,000 yards in width, it is to fan out
to 9,000 yards, changing form as it goes, and the least error in
synchronization by either gunners or infantry must result in
MARCHING UP TO BATTLE 215
disaster to our own men. This calls for an unprecedented con
centration of artillery in a restricted area, a little arc back of
Inchy, so hazardous in itself that should the enemy discover it,
and lay down a counter-barrage on these massed batteries, they
must be wiped out; and yet it is a risk in all its gravity essential
if the daring tactical manoeuvre as a whole is to have any pros
pect of success.
In order to give our troops room to deploy for the attack it
is necessary to leave them a clear space of 2,000 yards deep
west of the enemy line, and our battery positions are therefore
just that much further from the canal line. If adequate sup
port is to be given our men as they advance up the long slope
against Bourlon Wood, our batteries must crowd down as close
as possible to the canal so soon as its line is secure. From the
canal our field batteries can command a range to the extreme
limit of Bourlon Wood.
In order to accomplish this a novel device has been deter
mined upon and worked out in detail. This has been styled
an "extension barrage." Four brigades of our field batteries
are all limbered up, and at "zero" hour go off on the heels of
the infantry. By six o clock, forty minutes after the battle
opens, these are actually in position on the west side of the
canal, an hour ago in the enemy s hands. They thus extend the
effective range from the kick-off line from 6,500 to 8,500
yards, and as a back battery goes out of action through exhaus
tion of its effective range, its area of fire is taken over by one of
these front batteries, and then it too comes up to the canal
bank. This manoeuvre is made possible by the very effective
smoke barrage we lay down to screen enemy observation from
Bourlon Wood.
But the final objective lies considerably east of Bourlon
Wood, and it therefore becomes the imperative task of our
engineers to push practical crossings over the canal so that the
guns can follow up the infantry. Three hours was the utmost
they could be allowed for this task. For without efficient
artillery support, our attacking lines are apt to be driven back
216 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
down the slope, and in the final analysis the success of the
operation devolves upon the engineers.
But more even was required from the artillery than this
intricate and fanlike barrage. Enemy counter-barrage work
must be smothered, and for this purpose a great concentration
of "heavies" was provided both of our own and Imperial bat
teries. For three weeks our artillery observation planes had
been spotting the enemy s battery positions, and it had been
found that he was continually moving his batteries about,
having in all 105 battery positions in front of our attack. In
order to smother these by our counter-battery work it might be
presumed it would be necessary to concentrate fire on every
one of them, an impossible task. The problem was in fact and
practice solved in a brilliant fashion. Immediately the battle
opened our observers flew low over the enemy positions, re
porting by wireless not where his batteries were, but what posi
tions were empty, thus enabling our artillery to concentrate
their fire on occupied positions only, with what success will be
seen.
There are always tense minutes before "zero." It is a preg
nant hour. But never more so than this morning, for we are
packed so close that if the enemy is apprised of the attack and
lays down a barrage our slaughter must be fearful. For several
days he has been nervous. But our jumping-off line has been
camouflaged by deliberately destroying his wire far to the
north and south.
As the rain clears off the men make shift to get a meal. A
tot of rum warms their chilled limbs. Mist still hangs low in
the valley, but beyond the outline of the slope can be made
out. Officers consult their maps and compasses and get their
men to their jumping-off ground. Engineers are there with
infantry floats. The men carry scaling ladders. All is ready,
but the minutes are interminable.
At five o clock there is a faint flutter of dawn in the east.
Just then the enemy starts throwing up twin red balls of fire
the S.O.S. call he used in the Amiens show. But nothing
MARCHING UP TO BATTLE 217
comes of it. At last, at twenty minutes past five of the morning
of Friday, Sept. 27, the barrage opens. Some batteries are so
close that the noise is stunning. Five minutes later the men
push forward to secure the west side of the canal. The enemy,
complete though is his surprise, pours in a heavy shell fire.
This morning his S.O.S. signal is twin green balls, and soon
his entire front line for miles north and south becomes twink
ling green. He does not know where the main stroke is to
fall.
Within a very short time the canal is crossed, our men scal
ing the locks, bombing as they go, and soon the battle is stream
ing away up the eastward slopes. Prisoners, captured this side
of the canal, come in at once and testify to the complete sur
prise. They are from the 63rd. Naval Division and the First
Prussian Guards Reserve Division. Big fellows these, but
they do not look so terrible. We had been warned of them, for
two days before enemy aircraft had dropped leaflets among
our men: "Spare this terrible bloodshed," one read. "It is
time for peace, Canadians; you will be only slaughtered if you
go against our terrible Guards." The entire staff of an enemy
battery was captured before it had fired a shot.
One of our own gunners performed a wonderful exploit.
Realizing how essential it was to get the guns up as near the
canal as possible, Lt. H. H. Phinney of the 1st. Battery, C.F.
A., made a personal reconnaissance along the canal over-night,
and then under cover of darkness took his section of 18-pound-
ers in front even of our outpost line. He lost half his horses
and ammunition, but was able when "zero" struck to direct his
fire on an enemy machine-gun position across the canal at
point-blank range with open sights, destroying it entirely.
Canadian Engineers now work feverishly constructing
bridges, and the work goes forward with a will. Before nine
o clock the first battery crosses the canal. Prior to this, Lt.
J. A. Davin, of the 1st. Canadian Divisional Ammunition
Column, immediately after "zero" and under heavy shell fire
made a reconnaissance of the Canal du Nord in front of Inchy,
218
CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
located a practical crossing, and by his persistance, disregard
of danger and good leadership took over a column of wagons
and established his A. R. P. 1,000 yards east of the canal, where
he kept up a much needed supply of ammunition for the for
ward batteries until the bridges were built. Since Aug. 8, in
every battle, this officer had thus pushed forward his ammuni
tion dumps into the heart of the fighting.
Sergt. Chas. Glaysher, of the 1st. Canadian Division Signal
Column, had the honor of taking the first vehicle over the
canal. He established a report centre well east of the canal,
laying wires under heavy fire to the Brigade and Batteries.
His wireless aerials were shot down three times in half an
hour but on each occasion he re-erected them himself.
Our smoke barrage has now blotted out the distant scene.
At half past nine the tanks come back, their day s work done.
About noon, clear above the smoke, a gold and silver shower
goes up. It is the signal that Bourlon Wood is in our hands.
CHAPTER V
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27
PREPARATIONS for this battle have been entered into
at length because after all it was the plan and the arrange
ments for carrying it out that mattered ; those perfected,
as we have seen, and granted such an instrument as the Cana
dian Corps, efficiently supported by the veteran troops, ably
commanded, of the llth. British Division, and the battle
itself, up to a certain stage at least, went according to pro
gramme. The different puzzle-parts, all carefully worked
out beforehand, fell into their place in the picture until it pre
sented a perfected example of the art of war. It was not until
difficulties arose on our right flank that the scene became
blurred, and for a time threatened to ruin the general effect.
Sir Arthur Currie thus describes the opening operations :
"At 5.20 a.m., Sept. 27, the attack was successfully launched,
and in spite of all obstacles went well from the first.
"The barrage was uniformly good, and the 3rd. and 4th.
Canadian Divisional Artilleries, commanded respectively by
Brig.-General J. S. Stewart and Brig.-General W. B. M. King,
were successful in advancing into captured ground, and con
tinued the barrage as planned.
"Early in the afternoon the First Phase of the attack was
substantially over, and the readjustments of the fronts pre
paratory to the Second Phase were under way.
"On the extreme right, however, the XVII Corps had
failed to keep pace with our advance, and our right flank, sub
mitted to a severe enfilade machine-gun fire from the vicinity
of Anneux, had to be refused for a considerable distance to
retain touch with the left of the XVII Corps; therefore, the
encircling movement which was to have given us Bourlon
Wood could not be developed.
219
220 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"Fully alive to the gravity of the situation which would be
created on the flank of the Third Army by the failure to cap
ture and hold Bourlon Wood, the llth. Brigade (Brig.-Gen-
eral Odium) of the 4th. Canadian Division attacked from the
north side of the Wood and captured all the high ground,
pushing patrols as far as Fontaine-Notre-Dame.
"It is recalled here that Bourlon Wood, which is 1 10 metres
high, dominates the ground as far south as Flesquieres and
Havrincourt; and that its loss after very heavy fighting in
Nov., 1917, during the first battle of Cambrai, caused eventu
ally the withdrawal of the Third Army from a large portion
of the ground they had won by their surprise attack.
"A severe counter-attack launched from the direction of
Raillencourt, against the left of the 4th. Canadian Division,
was repulsed in the afternoon with heavy losses to the enemy.
"Owing to the situation on our right flank, already ex
plained, the 3rd. Canadian Division could not be engaged this
day. The 1st. Canadian Division and the llth. (British)
Division, however, made substantial gains after the commence
ment of the Second Phase, the former capturing Haynecourt
and crossing the Douai-Cambrai road, and the latter pushing
on and taking Epinoy and Oisy-le-Verger by evening."
To get a clear picture it is necessary to trace the Corps and
Divisional boundaries. The southern boundary of the Cana
dian Corps, and therefore of our 4th. Division, was to start
from the northwest corner of Mceuvres, and then run east
5,000 yards, trending a little south all the way, to a point mid
way between Anneux and Bourlon Wood. Thence it took a
wide sweep, following the south and southeastern slope of the
wood, to a point about 500 yards northwest of Fontaine-Notre-
Dame.
Thence the Canadian Corps southern boundary ran in
almost a direct line a little north of east to the Faubourg Can-
timpre, skirting Cambrai on the far side of the Scheldt, but
crossing over the canal at Neuville-St. Remy, north of the
City. Thus not only Anneux and Fontaine-Notre-Dame, but
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 221
the line of the Scheldt Canal southwest of Cambrai, were left
in the area of the XVII Corps.
The inter-divisional boundary between the 4th. Canadian
Division, Maj. -General Sir David Watson, and the 3rd. Cana
dian Division, Maj. -General F. O. W. Loomis, started east
from Inchy, and then trended off more to the northeast, pass
ing through Pilgrim s Rest and following the general direction
of Haynecourt. The northern boundary of the 1st. Canadian
Division, Maj. -General Sir Archibald C. Macdonell, will be
outlined when we come to a particular description of its opera
tions. For the time being we will confine ourselves to the 4th.
Division.
Draw a line from the point northwest of Fontaine-Notre-
Dame described above, a little west of north to 500 yards east
of Pilgrim s Rest, and we have the Third Objective of the 4th.
Canadian Division, marking the end of the First Phase. At
this point the 3rd. Canadian Division was designed to come up,
taking over the southern half of the area of advance marked
out for the Second Phase, roughly represented by the line from
Neuville-St. Remy to Sancourt, both inclusive. The 4th. Divi
sion was to continue its advance on the left of the 3rd. Division,
and therefore between the latter and the 1st. Division.
Owing to failure of the XVII Corps to come up on our
right flank, this plan never matured. The 4th. Division could
do no better than reach its Third Objective, from Fontaine-
Notre-Dame to Pilgrim s Rest, and the opportunity for fur
ther exploitation northwest of Cambrai by the 3rd. Division
was thus denied on the opening day. Better fortune attended
the 1st. Canadian Division, finely supported by the llth. Brit
ish Division, a deep salient being pushed into the enemy de
fense through Haynecourt and between Sancourt and Epinoy.
On the 4th. Divisional front the 10th. Brigade, Brig.-Gen-
eral R. J. F. Hayter, was entrusted with the storming of the
canal. The attacking units had been highly organized for the
work and the men went at it with a zip. The 50th. Battalion,
of Calgary, on the right and the 46th. Battalion, of Regina, on
222 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
the left the latter being in contact with the 4th. Battalion,
Central Ontario, of the 1st. Division jumped off at five min
utes past "zero" and carried the enemy line on the west side of
the canal in their first rush. Fixing their scaling-ladders, the
46th. climbed down into the dry bed of lock No. 4, where the
garrison was bombed into surrender, and the advance con
tinued unchecked.
The 44th. Battalion, New Brunswick, and 47th. Battalion,
Western Ontario, of the same brigade, now came up in sup
port. So soon as the canal was crossed, our troops, under cover
of a very efficient smoke barrage, rushed the Canal du Nord
trench system and then advanced up the slope to their first
objective, the Marquion line.
A pause was here made for fifty minutes, when the attack
was carried on by the 1 1th. Brigade on the right, and the 12th.
Brigade on the left, until the second objective was secured,
this being a line just west of Bourlon Wood but also including
Bourlon village, stormed by the 12th. Brigade. Owing to the
difficulties of the ground, no tanks got up here, though several
were employed further north by the 1st. Division, and the
infantry depended on the barrage and their own exertions.
No sooner had the llth. Brigade on our extreme right
reached the Marquion line than it became subject to a very
heavy enfilade fire from its right flank, owing to failure of
neighboring Imperial troops to take their objectives, as they
were held up in front of the formidable Hindenburg Support
line. Particularly galling machine-gun fire came from the
factory on the Bapaume-Cambrai road just east of this support
line, which here takes a bend south. This inflicted many
casualties, and the 1 1th. Brigade already was obliged to detach
elements to form a flank in this direction. As it advanced to
its objective of Bourlon Wood, it offered a more and more
exposed flank, into which the enemy poured a heavy artillery
and machine-gun fire, and launched a number of counter-at
tacks from the southeast. The 102nd. Battalion, British Col
umbia, was forced to swing south a thousand yards outside the
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 223
Canadian Corps area, taking the strongly-fortified factory on
the Bapaume-Cambrai road.
The 1 1th. Brigade lost very heavily, chiefly from machine-
gun fire, but pushed steadily on. Reaching their second ob
jective, immediately in front of Bourlon Wood, the brigade
held a line with on the right the 102nd. Battalion, in the cen
tre the 54th. Battalion, of the Kootenay, and on the left,
towards Bourlon village, the 87th. Battalion, Grenadier
Guards of Montreal. The 75th. Battalion, recruited from the
Missisauga Horse, of Toronto, was in reserve, but pressure was
so great on the right flank that it was brought up in support of
the 102nd., the battle headquarters of both battalions being
established together 1,000 yards west of Bourlon Wood. In
side of half an hour an enemy 5.9-inch shell made a direct hit
on the combined headquarters, Lt.-Col. F. Lister of the 102nd.
being badly wounded, as well as his adjutant, while the bat
talion signal officer was killed. The adjutant of the 75th. was
wounded and its signal officer also killed, and four or five other
battalion officers became casualties, as did four officers of the
British Divisional staff on our right who had come up to see
how the battle was going. The same shell killed or wounded a
number of signallers and runners.
The command of these two battalions now devolved upon
Lt.-Col. Thompson, of the Canadian Engineers, who had
joined the 75th. Battalion over night, having been recalled
from London for that purpose just as he was about to sail for
Canada on leave.
The 54th. Battalion on the immediate left fared equally
badly, for a single shell wounded Lt.-Col. A. B. Carey, killed
Major McDermott, Capt. Garland Foster, the adjutant, and
Capt McQuarrie, while two other officers were wounded.
This and the fighting of the succeeding days took very heavy
toll of our battalion officers, several units losing their first and
second officers in command, and company leaders right down
to the subalterns.
After the disaster referred to above, Lt.-Col. Thompson
224 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
moved his headquarters to the top of the hill. In the meantime
the 54th. had made a frontal attack on Bourlon Wood and got
through to its eastern slope. Here they were strongly counter
attacked, and came under a very heavy enfilade fire from Fon
taine-Notre-Dame, and therefore sent back for further assist
ance. Lt.-Col. Thompson detached two of the companies of
the 75th. in support, and these came under orders of Col.
Carey, whose wound was slight, enabling him to carry on his
command.
The remaining companies of the 75th. were held in reserve,
though exposed to very heavy fire, while the 102nd. worked
along the south and east of the wood, seeking to join hands
with the 54th., but were prevented by the commanding position
the enemy held at Fontaine-Notre-Dame. From here enemy
machine-gunners trickled back into the southeast corner of
the wood and inflicted heavy loss on our men clinging to its
southern outskirts, and the third company of the 75th. was
therefore sent up to form a defensive flank. During the course
of the afternoon and the evening the 102nd. beat back success
ive counter-attacks thrown in from the direction of Cantaing,
2,000 yards to the southeast.
About midnight information was received from head
quarters of the llth. Brigade that some of the enemy had re
established themselves in Bourlon Wood. As the 3rd. Cana
dian Division was to jump off at dawn from a line east of the
wood the third objective of Sept. 27 it became vitally
important to protect their rear by clearing out these enemy
elements. So the last remaining company of the 75th. Bat
talion was sent in to drive them out and establish a defensive
flank against Fontaine-Notre-Dame. Groping their way for
ward in the pitch dark, bombing as they went, and more than
once coming to close grips with cold steel, this company accom
plished its difficult task well before dawn broke, and Bourlon
Wood was at last finally in our hands.
While this was going on the 87th. Battalion had cleared
the southwest corner of the wood and held it throughout the
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 225
day. At night the Battalion attacked again with the object of
driving back the enemy into Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and this
was the scene of a very gallant exploit on part of Lt. E. M.
Preston, who, realizing that his platoon was under very heavy
machine-gun fire from the railway embankment to the east
and that unless this was silenced the entire advance must be
held up, called for two volunteers. Though under continual
heavy fire, directed by flares the enemy threw up, they crawled
on their hands and knees until they got within bombing dis
tance of the enemy post. Ordering his men to throw their
bombs, Lt. Preston rushed the post, killing or capturing the
garrison, and sending back word that the advance could go on.
On the left of the llth. Brigade, the 12th. Brigade, after
storming the stoutly held village of Bourlon, passed on up the
high ground, their right penetrating Bourlon Wood from the
north, while their left established contact with the 1st. Cana
dian Division at Pilgrim s Rest.
The 12th. Brigade did not achieve this success without very
hard fighting all day, and especially during the afternoon,
when as its elements were fighting their way up on the high
ground through wire and concrete machine-gun posts, the
enemy counter-attacked time after time, but was always beaten
back. This Brigade suffered too from the exposed right flank,
but the men clung stubbornly to the ground they held, exposed
though it was to heavy fire from Raillencourt in front and from
all along the Marcoing line as far south as the Bapaume-Cam-
brai road. All its battalions were engaged during the day,
these being the 38th., of Ottawa, 72nd., Seaforth Highlanders
of Vancouver, 78th., of Winnipeg, and 85th., of Nova Scotia.
The position then on the night of Sept. 27-28, so far as our
right was concerned, was that it held a semi-circular position
from southwest of Bourlon Wood, along its base to the east,
west of Fontaine-Notre-Dame, and thence running north to a
little east of Pilgrim s Rest. Around this whole area the
enemy s fire was concentrated, every foot of ground held being
raked from one or more directions. Losses of the troops en-
16
226 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
gaged, especially of the 1 1th. Brigade, were very heavy. None
but troops of the first class could thus have not only stood their
ground but consolidated the position under cover of night. To
a certain extent the plan had miscarried, but this was because
of events over which the Canadian Corps could exercise no
control. It went amiss through lack of support on our right,
but notwithstanding this the gain had been very substantial,
and in Bourlon Wood we held the key to the defenses of Cam-
brai.
Before proceeding to an account of what was going on in
the northern area of the Corps, a detailed account of the won
derful work of the Canadian Engineers will contribute to a
better view of the battle as a whole.
The engineer preparations for the operation were under
taken at five days notice, and were exceedingly difficult owing
to the nature of the ground. The problem involved the repair
of roads demolished by shell fire; the building of cross-coun
try tracks for infantry and horse transport to the front line; the
pushing forward of light tramways to the front line to facilitate
the delivery of ammunition, stores and supplies; the provision
of engineer material of all sorts and the construction of new
headquarters for battalions, brigades, divisions, etc., and dug
out accommodation and shelter for the troops as quickly as
they could be improvised. A difficult question was the provi
sion of water supply for the large number of horses, approxi
mately 40,000, assembled in a very congested area.
The great problem was to get the infantry and the guns
over the canal in the face of the enemy barrage, and to provide
sufficient facilities in the way of roads, bridges and tramways
as would ensure the supply of ammunition for the artillery
being sustained, and the supply of munitions, stores and rations
for the large number of troops engaged.
As it was clear that the enemy s barrage would fall natur
ally on the canal and be maintained there, the following were
provided for: Seven infantry footbridges of an unsinkable
type; ten crossings for guns and horse transport, five of which
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 227
had to be developed at once for heavy traffic even while the
continuous stream of guns and ammunition wagons was pour
ing over them. At least ten times Canadian Engineer officers,
flying at a height of about 500 feet, and subjected to heavy fire,
traversed the length of the canal involved, reconnoitering for
the best spots for tank crossings, bridge sites and infantry
crossings.
Such was the preparation. Following were the results:
Before "zero" hour 18 miles of roads had been repaired up to
the front lines and seven miles of tramways constructed. On
these tramways over 3,000 tons of ammunition per day were
being delivered to advanced dumps and battery positions. The
huge concentration of horses was provided with the necessary
water supply.
After "zero" all crossings were put through successfully in
spite of heavy artillery and machine-gun fire, the first guns
crossing the canal at 8.40 a.m. The engineers went over with
the infantry to get their footbridges across and the engineer
wagons with their six-horse teams were pushed forward so
rapidly that in several cases all the horses were killed by
machine-gun fire and the men got their material down to the
bridge sites by man-handling the wagons.
In one case a party of Boche machine-gunners, who had
been overlooked by the mopping-up parties, emerged from a
concealed tunnel and attacked the engineer party attempting
to bridge the canal. The engineer officer in charge took part
of his men and beat off the attack and at the same time kept the
work of construction going without interruption.
The bridges constructed were of all types ; pontoon, trestle,
heavy pontoon and heavy steel bridges for all traffic. A re
markable record was made in the erection of two heavy steel
bridges of 1 10 feet span under heavy fire. The materials were
got on the sites at two o clock in the afternoon, and the ap
proaches prepared and the bridges erected in 12 hours actual
work.
By early afternoon three new pumping installations had
228 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
been established on captured ground with sufficient horse
troughs to water 5,000 horses an hour. All materials were got
forward to the infantry and the positions gained consolidated.
About three miles of tramways had been constructed and were
in operation, and over 1,000 of our wounded were evacuated
on returning ammunition trains operated by Canadian Corps
Tramways.
The battle of the Canal du Nord was an Engineers battle.
The success of the whole operation depended upon the speed
with which the crossings of the canal were provided, and the
way in which they were repaired and improved during the
day, so as to enable the guns and infantry to be maintained in
the positions reached in their advance. The re-organization
the previous spring of the Canadian Engineers was thus fully
justified, and in the open warfare now about to open, the value
of their work became ever increasingly apparent.
CHAPTER VI
OPERATIONS : SEPT. 27. CONTINUED
NO better account of the operations on Sept. 27 of the
1st. Canadian Division is available than its divisional
narrative, already quoted so extensively. While the
difficulties of an exposed flank did not present themselves to the
same extent as were faced by the 4th. Division, this Division
was given a task so intricate in execution that the carrying of
it out to the letter must ever be a justifiable source of pride for
members of the famous "Old Red Patch."
"The Boundary," says this narrative, "between the 4th. and
1st. Divisions for the First Phase ran due east of Inchy, just
north of Quarry Wood, then, swinging slightly to the left, it
ran from 1,000 to 1,500 yards of Bourlon. The 1st. Division
left boundary was the Canal du Nord.
"The 1st. Canadian Division, then, had to cross the Canal
du Nord, seize the high ground to the north of Bourlon Wood
and "mop up" the valley of the canal as far north as the village
of Sauchee Lestree. Then, in the Second Phase of the battle,
it was to capture Haynecourt and the high ground north and
east of that village.
"The 1st. Division, therefore, in the First Phase of the
battle, had to attack from a front of 1,100 yards, gradually
extend this front until it became 6,000 yards when the final
objective was reached, and advance over 6,000 yards.
"The Divisional Commander decided to make the initial
attack with the 1st. Brigade on the right and the 3rd. Brigade
on the left. When the general line, Bourlon-Marquion, was
reached, the 2nd. Brigade would enter the fight between the
1st. and 3rd. Brigades, and would carry the battle right
through the Second Phase to the capture of Haynecourt and
the high ground north and east of that place. This meant that
229
230 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
each brigade had before it a distinctly different task. On the
right, the 1st. Brigade had before it a series of frontal assaults.
First it must cross the canal, then capture the Canal du Nord
trench, advance 2,000 yards and take the Marquion line; then
advance 1,500 yards to the railway cutting and embankment
that formed a natural trench line, and then across open country
to the final objective a total advance of 6,000 yards ending
with a frontage of 1,500 yards.
"The 3rd. Brigade attack on the left resolved itself into a
series of out-flanking and turning movements. After the first
rush across the canal on a 300 yard front, the brigade would
break the Canal du Nord trench line and then swing north and
even west in the attack on Sains-lez-Marquion, thus presenting
the unique spectacle of our troops attacking directly toward
our own lines. As a matter of fact, the artillery barrage here
first of all travelled forward in the usual way and then began
to drop back towards the guns the result being that our own
barrage was between our infantry and the guns. After the
capture of Sains-lez-Marquion the Brigade continued its
"rolling up" tactics by taking the Marquion line in enfilade
and attacking both Keith Wood and the village of Marquion
from the east in other words, taking the garrisons of these
places in the flank and rear. After crossing the Arras-Cambrai
road the brigade continued its flank attack on the Canal du
Nord and Marquion lines as far as the final objective for the
First Phase a total advance of 6,000 yards, and an extension
of front from 300 to 2,500 yards.
"The 2nd. Brigade had a still different task. Its units had
a four-mile march from the assembly position before they
entered the fight. Once in the battle, it had practically open
country before it, and attacked frontally, being required to
make an advance of roughly 3,500 yards on a front of 1,800
yards.
"The Division, as a whole, staged forward on Sept. 19, and
on Sept. 24 and 25 completed the march to the assembly areas.
On the night of Sept. 25 the 1st. and 3rd. Brigades relieved
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 CONTINUED 231
units of the 2nd. Division in the line, taking over their respec
tive battle fronts. Divisional Headquarters moved on Sept.
26 to battle headquarters in dug-outs in a railway cutting,
2,500 yards west of Inchy.
"Sept. 27 was the day set for the attack. The 10 previous
days had been spent by all units in a careful study of the coun
try, in planning their work and in outfitting for the battle.
The artillery were engaged in selecting battery positions and
in getting ammunition forward, while the Engineers had to
plan their share of the bridging of the canal.
"On the night of Sept. 26 all units moved forward to their
assembly positions. The night was exceedingly dark and a
steady rain fell until nearly dawn, which not only added to the
difficulties and discomforts, but made the going very slippery
all the morning.
"Owing to the extremely narrow front from which the
Division had to jump off, attacking infantry and machine-gun
ners, supporting artillery and bridging details of Engineers,
all had to be crowded into a small area. A heavy enemy con
centration on this front would have jeopardized the success of
the attack, but the enemy appeared to suspect nothing, and the
night was normal.
"The 1st. Brigade was assembled in depth on a front of
about 700 yards. The leading Battalion, the 4th. Central On
tario, was in the northeastern end of Inchy-en-Artois. The
1st. Battalion, Western Ontario, was in the lower end of the
Buissy Switch, some eight hundred yards in rear of the 4th.
The 2nd. Battalion, Ottawa, was behind the 1st. and the 3rd.,
recruited from Toronto district, behind the 2nd. The 3rd.
Brigade had to attack through a 300 yard defile, and so assem
ble on a one-battalion front. The 14th. Battalion, Royal Mont
real Regiment, assembled in Paviland Wood, with the 13th.,
Montreal Highlanders, 1,000 yards in rear in the Buissy
Switch. The 15th. Battalion, 48th. Highlanders of Toronto,
was north of the 13th., and the 16th., Canadian Scottish of
Western Canada, was holding the front line north of the assem-
232 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
bly area of the 14th. The 2nd. Brigade, as it did not come
into action until four hours after the opening of the attack, was
assembled just east of Cagnicourt, some 3,000 yards in rear of
the 3rd. Brigade.
"At twenty minutes after five on the morning of Friday,
Sept. 27, the attack opened under cover of an intense shrapnel
and smoke barrage. Some idea of the concentration of artil
lery may be gained from the fact that there was an 18-pounder
gun to every 21 yards of barrage on the front of the 1st. Divi
sion and that there were ten brigades of Field Artillery alone
whose 240 guns fired 118,062 rounds on this first day of the
battle. Supporting this Division, in addition to this, there
were 160 machine-guns firing in the barrage, while special
companies of Engineers were projecting smoke and boiling oil
into the village of Marquion, and on the high ground further
to the north. The sight, when the first gleams of daylight
revealed the battle, was weird in the extreme. The horizon,
as far as the eye could see, was nothing but masses and long
lines of leaping, billowing smoke dense white smoke shot
through at intervals with the flicker of bursting shrapnel, or
the black smudge of high explosive.
"The battle, as far as it concerned the 1st. Division, can be
visualized best by following the fortunes of the individual
brigades.
"The 1st. Canadian Infantry Brigade launched its attack
with the 4th. Battalion. The 4th. Battalion advanced 2,000
yards and captured the Canal du Nord and Marquion trench
systems on its front. The 1st. Battalion then passed through
it, taking up the fighting and carrying the line forward a dis
tance of 1,500 yards. Just as this Battalion completed its
allotted task, its right flank came under heavy machine-gun fire
from the railway 1,000 yards north of Bourlon village. At
this time the 2nd. and 3rd. Battalions, which had been follow
ing closely, passed through the 1st. Battalion. They were held
up almost at once by the enemy in the railway cutting and
embankment, but by hard fighting managed to clear this
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 CONTINUED 233
obstacle without assistance other than that offered by batteries
of the machine-gun battalion that came into action at this time.
Alhough the 4th. Division on the right was held up more or
less definitely on a line just east of Bourlon, the 2nd. and 3rd.
Battalions pushed on to the objective set for the conclusion of
the First Phase, and even succeeded in working patrols for
ward to within 1,000 yards of the villages of Raillencourt and
Haynecourt.
"The 1st. Brigade was assisted in its attack by four tanks
that did valuable service in the early stages of the attack, and
had attached to it three batteries of No. 1 Company of the 1st.
Battalion Canadian Machine-Gun Corps.
"While the infantry, tanks and machine-guns were advanc
ing along the whole front and while the canal was even under
machine-gun fire, the Engineers were rushing the work of
bridge building. With such speed was this done that at eight
o clock that morning batteries of the Divisional Artillery
began to cross in support of the infantry. By 10.30 o clock all
batteries of both brigades were east of the Canal.
"From zero hour on, the 1st. Brigade C.F.A. was attached
to the 1st. Infantry Brigade, and advanced with it throughout
the day.
"In the meantime the attack of the 3rd. Brigade was meet
ing with stiff opposition on the left. The 3rd. Brigade had
only a narrow gap of 300 yards on its front in which the Canal
du Nord could be crossed. The opening attack of this Brigade
was made by the 14th. Battalion. This Battalion cleared the
Canal on its front, and while one Company advanced with the
1st. Brigade the remainder swung to the left and cleared the
Canal du Nord line by attacking it in enfilade, and finally,
following the local backward barrage already referred to,
attacked the village of Sains-lez-Marquion from the east, cap
turing it soon after nine o clock.
"The 13th. Battalion here took up the battle, following the
same general plan put into operation by the 14th. Battalion.
The leading company carried on with the general attack to the
234 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
east, while the following companies, turning to the north,
attacked Keith Wood and the Marquion line. The resistance
was severe, the righting very heavy and progress was slow. In
fact, the 7th. Battalion, British Columbia, of the 2nd. Brigade,
and the 15th. Battalion, as well as a battalion of the 1 1th. Divi
sion, which were following in order to carry on the advance,
became involved in the fighting here.
"Although the Marquion line east of the village of that
name was captured, the village itself was still in the hands of
the enemy. As a result, the 15th. Battalion and Units of the
1 1th. Division, as well as the Engineers engaged in bridge con
struction, came under heavy machine-gun fire in crossing the
Canal north of Sains-lez-Marquion. Eventually, however, all
the area in the canal valley up to Marquion was cleared by the
15th. Battalion. A combined attack by the 13th. and 15th. Bat
talions then resulted in the capture of Marquion itself. The
15th. then pushed on rapidly, and by two o clock in the after
noon had reached the final objective of the First Phase.
"Four tanks assisted the 14th. Battalion in the initial attack
but were unable to proceed beyond the Canal du Nord line.
Three batteries of the Machine-Gun Battalion were attached
to the 3rd. Brigade for this operation.
"While this fighting was going on units of the 2nd. Brigade
were marching forward ready to intervene in the battle at the
appointed hour. The 7th. Battalion, the first to enter the fight,
had to leap-frog the 13th. Battalion, after that unit had cap
tured the Marquion Line. The 7th. found the 13th. hotly en
gaged, and assisted it in breaking the Marquion line. By this
time the artillery barrage had left the infantry far behind. A
local barrage was arranged and supplied by the 2nd. Brigade,
C.F.A., and under cover of this the 7th. Battalion was able to
move forward, the enemy s resistance rapidly weakening as our
troops advanced. The chief resistance beyond the Arras-Cam-
brai road was met with from machine-guns just north of Bois
de Crocret. Patrols were pushed forward and reached a line
over 2,000 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road. During
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 CONTINUED 235
the afternoon a small counter-attack by the enemy on the cen
tre was repulsed. The 8th. Battalion, Winnipeg, had followed
the 7th. in support, but were not called on for help.
"This ended the First Phase of the battle. By two o clock
in the afternoon, we had Bourlon Wood, and our line then ran
north and east from Bourlon village to within 500 yards of
Raillencourt, then north practically to Haynecourt, and then
swung back westward, meeting the Canal du Nord just north
of Sauchy-Lestree.
"The Second Phase called for an advance by four Divisions
in line, the 3rd., 4th. and 1st. Canadian and the llth. British
Division from right to left being ordered to continue the
attack. The 3rd. Division on the right and the llth. on the
left had followed the attacking divisions closely and were
ready to carry on the fight. The intervention of a new division
on each flank meant that the 4th. and 1st. Division would have
to close on the centre. It was found late in the afternoon that
the 4th. Division could not continue the advance that day. The
1st. and llth. Divisions, however, attacked about four o clock
in the afternoon according to programme.
"The continuation of the attack on the 1st. Division front
was carried out by the 2nd. Brigade. The 5th., Saskatchewan,
and 10th., Alberta, Battalions had assembled ready to advance,
and at 3.20 o clock the 5th. Battalion swept over the outpost
line and advanced very rapidly, meeting little resistance.
Haynecourt was soon captured. The 10th. Battalion here con
tinued the advance, but soon began to meet opposition. Owing
to the fact that the troops on the right were not advancing, the
5th. and 10th. Battalions had a heavy enfilade fire poured into
their flank. The enemy here were in great numbers appar
ently, and soon had field-guns as well as machine-guns firing
on our troops. In spite of this the 10th. Battalion pressed for
ward until held up by a heavy and continuous belt of wire just
west of the Douai-Cambrai road. Patrols, although under
heavy machine-gun fire, cut gaps through this wire by hand,
and then, in a sudden rush, overpowered the gun crews and
236 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
crossed the Douai-Cambrai road. East of the road, however,
five belts of wire were encountered, and, as the enemy fire was
steadily increasing, the advance was halted.
"The llth. British Division had advanced on the left and
had captured Epinoy, but on the right the situation was far
from secure. Here the Brigade found itself with an exposed
right flank of 4,000 yards. The responsibility of guarding this
flank developed upon the 5th. and 8th. Battalions, the 7th. be
ing in reserve. On the front of the 5th. Battalion the enemy
made three unsuccessful attacks at nightfall.
u The 1st. and 2nd. Brigades of field artillery supported the
2nd. Brigade throughout the afternoon s operations, and sup
plied protective fire throughout the night.
"This concluded the actual fighting on the first day of the
battle. But during all this day the engineers had been busy
bridging the Canal. This task was entrusted to the 3rd. Bat
talion Canadian Engineers. Five traffic crossings had to be
constructed and four footbridges. The first traffic crossing was
completed at 8.40 o clock that morning. All bridges, with one
exception, were completed by 6 o clock in the evening. The
early stages of the work were carried out under machine-gun
fire, many casualties being suffered."
After the 1st. Canadian Division had secured the east line
of the Canal du Nord as far north as Sauchy-Lestree, the 1 1th.
British Division was given the task of going through them at
this point and exploiting the success along their left or north
ern flank. Comprising the veteran 32nd., 33rd. and 34th.
Brigades, it did its job in a thorough businesslike way, captur
ing first Sauchy-Lestree, then on its left the high ground of
Oisy-le-Verger, and on the right pushing on into Epinoy.
Their left flank some little distance east of the canal was pro
tected by a barrage, and, after crossing over the canal, the 56th.
Division of the XXII Corps on our right, pushed up between
the Canal and the barrage, preceded by a rolling barrage and
mopping up the defenses.
The fighting in this important corner, which united at once
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 CONTINUED 237
the north and the south of the Sensee and the east and the west
of the Canal du Nord, was very severe. The Bois de Quesnoy
was full of machine-gun nests and concrete pill-boxes. The
enemy had a good field of fire, and the marshes, organized for
defense, assisted him. But the 56th. Division was not to be
denied and reached its objectives.
On our right the Third Army had crossed the canal and
captured part of the Hindenburg line. For the reasons set
forth above, opportunity had been denied the 3rd. Canadian
Division to go through the 4th. Canadian Division and storm
the Marcoing line, but the Division was brought close up in
support on the east side of the canal, and suffered many casual
ties. It was now to move up during the night to be prepared
to jump off at dawn.
Failure to carry the Marcoing line on the opening day gave
the enemy time to bring up reserves from Douai and elsewhere.
Aware now of our strategic plan to cut in north of Cambrai, he
massed his divisions in front of us, and for the next four days
contested the field with great determination and even at times
wrested from us ground we had won but had been unable to
consolidate. Had the battle gone as planned without impedi
ment he would have been obliged to fall back at once over the
Scheldt Canal northeast of Cambrai, abandoning the city, and
thus avoiding for the Canadian Corps the terrific struggle that
was now to ensue.
Many noteworthy feats of arms by all ranks were per
formed this day, both in the actual crossing of the Canal du
Nord and the advance on Bourlon Wood. Of these the follow
ing examples are selected from numerous cases as being char
acteristic of the conditions encountered and the spirit by
which they were overcome.
Brig.-General G. S. Tuxford, in command of the 3rd. Can
adian Infantry Brigade, found that his task was to cross the
Canal du Nord on a front of but 450 yards and then fan out on
a Brigade frontage facing due north as well as east, totalling
5,500 yards. While very gallant officers commanded the three
238 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Battalions engaged in the attack, these were all seconds-in-com-
mand and had not previously commanded their respective Bat
talions in an attack. This greatly increased the responsibilities
of the Brigadier, who kept in the closest touch throughout,
crossing the canal shortly after the attack was launched, under
heavy shell and machine-gun fire, while the enemy still held
part of the eastern bank. With an utter disregard to personal
danger he remained in the vicinity of the three Battalions,
directing their operations and dealing with difficult situations
as they arose. Much of the success of the work of this Brigade
resulted from its commander s conspicuous gallantry, splendid
initiative and fine leadership.
In the attack on Bourlon Wood by the SOth. Battalion, of
Calgary, Pte. R. Bloor, finding that heavy rifle fire was coming
from Quarry Wood, alone and of his own initiative attacked
the position, driving the enemy into his dug-outs and holding
him there until help came, when 146 officers and men, includ
ing an entire Battalion Headquarters staff, surrendered. He
died later of his wounds.
Capt. George Fraser Kerr, of the 3rd. Battalion, recruited
from Toronto district, while leading the left support company
in the attack on Bourlon Wood gave timely support by out
flanking a machine-gun nest holding up the advance on the
railway embankment, when he rushed up two platoons, out
flanking the enemy and capturing the garrison. When almost
on the Arras-Cambrai road the advance was again held up by
a machine-gun post, which he rushed single-handed, captur
ing four machine-guns and 31 prisoners, his men then being
100 yards behind him. This brilliant exploit prevented the
enemy withdrawing a number of guns which fell into our
hands.
During the attack of the 8th. Battalion, when a line of hos
tile machine-guns opened fire suddenly on his platoon, which
was in an exposed position and no cover available, Cpl. Alex
ander Brereton, of Winnipeg, at once appreciated the critical
situation and realized that unless something was done at once
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 27 CONTINUED 239
the platoon would be annihilated. On his own initiative, with
out a moment s delay, and alone, he sprang forward and
reached one of the hostile machine-gun posts, where he shot
the man operating the machine-gun and bayonetted the next
one who attempted to operate it, whereupon nine others sur
rendered to him. Inspired by this heroic example, his platoon
charged and captured the five remaining posts.
CHAPTER VII
OPERATIONS : SEPT. 28-29
^TM3E attack was continued on Sept. 28," says Sir
Arthur Currie. "The 3rd. Canadian Division cap
tured Fontaine-Notre-Dame (one of the XVII Corps
objectives), and, penetrating the Marcoing line, reached the
western outskirts of St. Olle. The 4th. Canadian Division cap
tured Raillencourt and Sailly, and the llth. (British) Divi
sion established posts in Aubencheul-au-Bac and occupied the
Bois de Quesnoy. The 1st. Canadian Division, in view of their
advance of the previous day which had produced a consider
able salient, did not push forward."
In other words, the day was spent by the Corps in straight
ening out its front by bringing up the right to a level with the
left. Developments of the previous day compelled a change
in the area allotted to the Canadian Corps. Instead of push
ing on in a northeasterly direction towards Neuville-St. Remy,
the 3rd. Canadian Division, with the 7th. and 9th. Brigades in
line, after passing through the 4th. Division at dawn, turned
south out of the original Corps area and stormed Fontaine-
Notre-Dame, whose possession was essential if the advance
were to be continued. Assisted by a hastily arranged but effi
cient barrage, the village was quickly reduced, and thus a
movement began which resulted in the Corps right being
extended still further south until it took in the west bank of the
Scheldt Canal.
As the battle developed our troops stormed and consolid
ated the tongue of land lying between the Bapaume-Cambrai
road and this canal, and thus, instead of leaving Cambrai on
our right, as originally intended, we advanced against its west
ern outskirts, faced by the canal. It is necessary to keep this in
mind that this change of Corps front bringing us under the
240
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 28-29 241
walls of Cambrai was due to the inability of the XVII Corps
to make good our right flank from Anneux through Fontaine-
Notre-Dame to the canal because when we finally captured
the city some little feeling seems to have developed among our
neighbors on the ground that it was supposed by them that
the Canadian Corps was outside of its proper area and had no
business to seize that honor. As a matter of fact, as the pro
gress of the battle will show, Cambrai was taken not by any
local success along the canal front, but because in the great
battle now developing north of it on the plateau east of the
Marcoing line, the Canadian Corps in the course of several
days fighting defeated in detail every available force the enemy
could bring up to its defense.
Fontaine-Notre-Dame once reduced, the 3rd. Canadian
Division pushed on to the assault on the Marcoing line, the
attack being entrusted to the 9th. Brigade, Brig.-General D.
M. Ormond. The line of attack was down a slope as smooth
and open as an artificial glacis, swept by enemy machine-gun
fire and by his artillery in well-placed battery positions behind.
The line itself was immensely strong, sown thickly with
machine-gun posts and covered by wide belts of wire. No
harder fighting had been seen since the storming of the Dro-
court-Queant line, and it resolved itself into a battle of
detached and often isolated infantry groups.
The attacking battalions lost very heavily; thus, the 52nd.
Battalion, of Fort William and Port Arthur, losing during the
day from 300 to 400 of its effective strength. This battalion
had seen very hard fighting ever since the kick-off of Aug. 8,
and its total casualties to the evening of this day were 50
officers and 900 other ranks. Weakened though it was and
exposed to more than one determined counter-attack, this bat
talion held the ground gained until evening, when it was re
lieved by the 58th. Battalion, Western Ontario, which went
through and after a bitter struggle captured that portion of the
Marcoing line fronting it.
The remaining battalions of the 9th. Brigade, the 43rd.,
17
242 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Cameron Highlanders of Winnipeg, and the 116th., Central
Ontario, encountered similar conditions and fought with the
utmost tenacity. Once the Marcoing line was stormed, our
troops battled their way forward into the valley lying between
it and the Arras-Cambrai road, though commanded by enemy
batteries on the heights beyond.
Meantime the 7th. Brigade, to the command of which
Brig.-General J. A. Clark had succeeded, on appointment of
Brig.-General H. M. Dyer to a command in England, was
encountering equally desperate resistance and suffering
severely, particularly in officers. That very gallant soldier,
Lt.-Col. C. J. T. Stewart, was killed while leading into action
Princess Patricia s Light Infantry. But this Brigade, whose
other units were the Royal Canadian Regiment, the 42nd. Bat
talion, Royal Highlanders of Canada from Montreal, and the
49th. Battalion of Edmonton, once again proved its mettle and
fought its way forward to its objective.
On the left of the 3rd. Division, the 4th. Canadian Divi
sion advanced their line generally and succeeded in practically
wiping out the salient in which our 1st. Division found itself,
but only after sanguinary fighting. The 10th. Brigade, Brig.-
General R. F. Hayter, attacked, leap-frogging over the 12th.
Brigade, and advanced to the Arras-Cambrai road, storming
the villages of Raillencourt and Sailly, between which ran the
Marcoing line. These two villages lie just under the brow of
the plateau and were veritable fortresses, to be won only after
hand-to-hand fighting, our men bombing their way along
trenches and reducing enemy strong points in succession.
In this heavy fighting Lt.-Col. R. D. Davies of the 44th.
Battalion, New Brunswick, who on the previous day had per
sonally led his battalion in its successful attack in front of
Inchy, again led the battalion, and notwithstanding heavy
casualties, took every objective. Towards evening the enemy
launched very heavy counter-attacks against the Brigade front,
and especially against the 44th. Losses were so heavy that the
line temporarily fell back. After having made a personal
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 28-29 243
reconnaissance, Col. Davies organized all elements of the Bat
talion, and, in co-operation with other units of the Brigade,
counter-attacked, driving the enemy out, re-establishing our
position and recovering our wounded lying on that front. His
personal example, disregard of danger and initiative inspired
all ranks to the greatest efforts under very difficult conditions.
The 50th. Battalion, of Calgary, of the same Brigade, when
attacking the Marcoing line in front of Raillencourt on the
same day, found itself up against heavy uncut wire and
machine-guns. Pte. W. H. Smith, finding that a machine-gun
crew and its supports was inflicting heavy casualties on the
Battalion, went forward voluntarily alone, sniping as he went,
until he was close enough to rush the post, capturing the gun
and 20 prisoners.
In work of this nature the support of our Machine-Gun
units was of vital importance, and magnificently did they
respond. Thus, Capt. Kenneth Weaver, 4th. Battalion, Cana
dian M. G. Corps, of Prince Albert, Sask., displayed conspic
uous gallantry on this day in front of Raillencourt. He com
manded three batteries of machine-guns, two suffering severely
early in the attack. He personally reorganized the batteries
under heavy fire, established strong defensive positions with
part of his guns, and after making a daring reconnaissance,
established the remainder of his guns in advanced positions,
bringing direct fire to bear on the enemy, and thereby establish
ing the advanced line of our troops at a most critical time.
Events on the front of the 1st. Canadian Division this day
may be summarized in the words of its own narrative, as fol
lows: "On Sept. 28 the 3rd. and 4th. Canadian Divisions
opened their attack on the right at six o clock in the morning.
The attack on the 1st. Division front was set for 9 o clock and
was to be carried out by the 10th. Battalion, of Alberta.
When 9 o clock came, although troops on neither the right nor
the left had caught up, and in face of very heavy artillery and
machine-gun concentration on their front, the 10th. Battalion
went bravely forward and calmly commenced to cut lanes
244 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
through the heavy enemy wire by hand. For two hours this
unequal fight went on in spite of swiftly dwindling numbers.
;< The fight was marked by many instances of individual
dash and gallantry, but none finer than the example set by
Capt. Jack Mitchell, M.C., of Winnipeg, who though
wounded twice by machine-gun fire, continued to pass up and
down in front of the wire, seeking a point of entry, and cheer
ing and helping his men. He was hit for the third time, this
time mortally, and carried out dying.
"When it was found late in the morning that the 4th. Divi
sion was held up some distance west of the Douai-Cambrai
road, the attack of the 10th. Battalion was given up. That
night the 8th. Battalion, of Winnipeg, relieved the 10th."
This was the scene of a brilliant exploit on part of Pte.
John Patrick Collins of Edmonton. When the 10th. Battalion
was held up by wire southeast of Epinoy he went ahead alone
and of his own initiative and although under heavy shell and
machine-gun fire and with no cover, proceeded laboriously to
cut a lane through 30 yards of wire. He was wounded ser
iously in the leg just as his task was completed, but our men
charged through the gap and captured their objective.
Very gallant work this day was that of an artillery officer,
Capt. James Creswell Auld, 1st. Brigade, C.F.A. Following
up the barrage he established his "O-Pip" (Observation Post)
on the right flank of the infantry near Sailly. Seeing that the
infantry were held up by machine-gun fire from the village, he
went forward, laying a telephone wire, until he could direct
the fire of his battery on the houses and barns where the enemy
was fortified. The battalion on the right was holding a line
with its flank exposed for some thousand yards to enfilade
enemy machine-gun fire, and had lost heavily both in officers
and men. Rushing forward he called upon the infantry to
follow, and carried the machine-gun post whence came the
fire. He was hit in the leg but refused to be evacuated until he
was unable to walk.
Further north the llth. British Division consolidated its
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 28-29 245
position along the south bank of the Sensee from the Bois de
Quesnoy, where it had established posts over night, to Auben-
cheul-au-Bac, where the enemy had an important rail crossing
over the river, defended by a strong trench system.
Throughout the day the enemy put up a very stubborn
resistance, throwing in fresh Divisions and endeavoring at all
hazards to prevent our forces debouching on to the high
ground between Cambrai and the Sensee marshes. Measured
by depth of penetration, the day s advance had been relatively
small, but the capture of the Marcoing line had been a great
feat in itself, and it left us with a practical jumping-off line,
from the outskirts of St. Olle on the south, through Sailly,
Haynecourt and Epinoy to the Sensee at Aubencheul-au-Bac.
East of this line and on considerably higher ground, ran
the Douai-Cambrai road, passing in a southeasterly direction
from Aubencheul-au-Bac a little east of Epinoy to 1,200 yards
east of Haynecourt, thence 2,000 yards east of Sailly to where
it crossed the canal into Cambrai at Neuville-St. Remy, 2,000
yards east of St. Olle. The Douai-Cambrai railway, after leav
ing the Sensee, takes a wide loop east of Epinoy, to a point not
far from the western outskirts of Abancourt, and thence, pass
ing through Sancourt, runs east of and practically parallel to
the road through Tilloy into the sharp northern angle of Cam
brai. This railway, with its high embankments and deep cut
tings, was to prove a strategic feature of the first importance
both to the attacker and defender, in both of which roles Cana
dian troops were to figure at one time or another during the
next few days.
"Heavy fighting characterized Sept. 29," says the Corps
Commander. "The 3rd. Canadian Division, the 4th. Cana
dian Division, and the 1st. Canadian Division all made pro
gress in the face of severe opposition. The 3rd. Canadian
Division pushed the line forward to the junction of the Arras
and Bapaume Road, the western outskirts of Neuville-St.
Remy and the Douai-Cambrai Road. They also cleared the
Marquion line from the Bapaume-Cambrai road southwards
246 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
towards the Scheldt Canal. These trenches were in the XVII
Corps area, but it was difficult for our attack to progress leav
ing on its flank and rear this strongly held position. The 4th.
Canadian Division captured Sancourt, crossed the Douai-
Cambrai Railway and entered Blecourt, but later withdrew
to the line of the railway in the face of a heavy counter-attack.
The necessity for this withdrawal was accentuated by the situ
ation on the left. The 1 1th. Division, in spite of two attempts,
had been unable to occupy the high ground northeast of
Epinoy. This had interfered materially with the progress of
the 1st. Canadian Division, and had prevented their holding
positions gained early in the day in the neighborhood of Aban-
court Station, the relinquishment of which, in turn, endan
gered the flank of the 4th. Canadian Division."
The 3rd. Division attacked with all three brigades in line,
the 9th. on the right, righting its way down to the Scheldt
Canal, the 8th. in the centre, and the 7th. on the left. Very
brilliant work was done by the 1st. C. M. R., of Saskatchewan,
in storming St. Olle in face of intensive machine-gun fire both
from that village and Neuville-St. Remy beyond, where one of
our staff officers described the rattle of machine-guns as
drowning out the roar of the artillery. In this attack the bat
talion lost 350 men but by two o clock in the afternoon had
cleared the village and pushed its line forward to the banks of
the canal at Cambrai.
Co-operating in the capture of St. Olle was the 116th. Bat
talion, Central Ontario, the assault gaining materially from
the very brilliant action of Lieut. Bonner who with one man
worked behind an enemy trench and bombed their way up it
from the rear. Two whizz-bang batteries, a dozen machine-
guns and a large number of prisoners were gathered in here.
From a church tower in St. Olle a clear view was offered of
the city lying in the valley across the canal, where clouds of
smoke indicated that the enemy was burning his dumps. In
the dip of ground to the west of St. Olle lay a number of our
field batteries in the open field, suffering heavy casualties from
OPERATIONS : SEPT. 28-29 247
enemy counter-battery fire. Overhead our battle planes pur
sued and drove back enemy scouting machines, bringing down
two within our lines, while a third was sent crashing by our
machine-gun fire. Behind the ridge, along a sunken road,
passed all manner of lorries, including our motor ambulances,
paying no heed to bursting shells. Well up to our battle line,
and marking by its curved formation the depth of the salient
we had pushed home, were our observation balloons the fam
iliar "sausages"; once in a while the intrepid observers not
inaptly named "balloonitics" -were forced to descend sud
denly by parachute, when their floating homes had been rent
by high explosive or set afire by the flaming arrows of a daring
enemy aviator. Back of all lay Bourlon Wood.
On the left of the 3rd. Division the 4th. Canadian Division
pushed in a very vigorous attack. Supported by a fine barrage
the 12th. Brigade attacked at 5.20 a.m. through the 10th Bri
gade, with the 38th. Battalion, of Ottawa, on the right, and the
72nd., the Seaforth Highlanders of Vancouver, on the left.
The 38th. Battalion was held up because troops on its right
were not up and it was exposed throughout the day to a flank
as well as frontal fire. Though suffering many casualties, this
battalion consolidated its line and beat off enemy counter-at
tacks. It suffered a severe loss when Lt.-Col. S. D. Gardiner,
whose brilliant leadership had been a great stimulus to all
ranks, sustained a broken hip and other wounds from which he
subsequently died.
The 72nd. Battalion pushed forward very gallantly, cap
turing Sancourt, and compelling the surrender of its garrison,
numbering more men than the entire battalion strength. Ad
vance was then made in the direction of Blecourt, where the
enemy was established in strong underground works with a
formidable system of machine-gun posts. Lieut. J. Mac-
Knight of B. Company, with five men, penetrated into the
village, and to this little advance party a hundred of the enemy
surrendered, being marched out in column of four. The com
pany coming up the rest of the garrison laid down their arms.
248 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
350 in all. An overwhelming counter-attack then developed
from down the Bantigny Ravine and our men fell back on San-
court, but taking with them 240 prisoners. "It is the first time
we ve had to chuck anything we ve once got hold of, and we
don t like it," said one of these Vancouver Highlanders. As
they fell back, four of our men too seriously wounded to be
brought back, could be heard putting up their last fight.
Lt.-Col. Kirkpatrick of the 72nd. Battalion set a fine exam
ple, rallying his men in the front line when the position was
critical in face of determined enemy counter-attacks.
The 85th. Battalion was pushed up in support, and passing
through Sancourt beat off two or three enemy counter-attacks.
During this period Lt.-Col. J. L. Ralston was wounded in the
cheek, temporarily losing the sight of one eye, but refused to
be evacuated, staying with his battalion until it came out of
the line some days later. The attack on the left had not devel
oped as well as had been expected, and both the 72nd. and 85th.
Battalions held a very exposed position. Our position in San-
court was however consolidated and provided an advanced
jumping-off point for the next day s battle.
At a critical period in the day s fighting Brig.-General J.
H. McBrien made a personal reconnaissance on horseback,
during the course of which he was slightly wounded in the leg,
but carried on until he had obtained the information required
to continue the attack.
Every battalion in the 12th. Brigade was engaged during
this day of exceedingly stiff fighting, the 78th. Battalion, of
Winnipeg, coming up in support and equally distinguishing
itself in beating off the overwhelming forces launched by the
enemy in his effort to prevent our securing footing on the
plateau. This battalion pushed out far on the plateau and for
a time was almost cut off. Most of its officers were casualties
and Brig.-General McBrien sent up two of his Intelligence
officers in support. Staff Capt. Barrie, formerly of the 72nd.
Battalion, and recalled after only three days leave to take part
in this battle, found himself isolated with 17 men south of
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 28-29 249
Cuvillers, but notwithstanding his wounds, from which he
afterwards died, he held the position against all assaults until
support came up. Staff Capt. Merston of Vancouver also did
very fine work.
Here once again the stubborn qualities of the Canadian
soldier were brought into full play, for it was only by the fine
tenacity of all ranks that the ground consolidated was held.
On the left, on the fronts of the 1st. Canadian and llth.
British Divisions, the attack was generally held up. The 2nd.
Brigade, to the command of which Brig.-General R. P. Clark
had succeeded on promotion of Maj. -General Loomis to com
mand the 3rd. Canadian Division, attacked with the 8th. Bat
talion, of Winnipeg, in the line, and good progress was at first
made in the direction of Abancourt, but as the troops on our
left failed to capture the high ground northeast of Epinoy,
this temporary success had to be abandoned.
The struggle for the plateau was now about to open. The
positions attained by the intensive fighting of the three first
days, Sept. 27-29, had brought us to the fringe of this plateau
whose possession must be followed by the fall of Cambrai and
the turning of the entire enemy line south in the direction of
St. Quentin. The position on our right had been made more
secure by the advance of the XVII Corps, which had captured
the village of Proville, across the Scheldt Canal, southwest of
Cambrai, and the anxiety regarding our vulnerable right flank
was at length removed. Before entering on a detailed account
of the fighting of the next two days Sept. 30 and Oct. 1 a
description of the battlefield is necessary.
As already explained, the ground in front of our line was
bisected first by the Douai-Cambrai road, and then, further
east, by the Douai-Cambrai railway. East of this railway lies
a rough quadrilateral or triangle, bounded on the west by the
railway and on the north by the Canal de la Sensee, while its
base is formed by the Scheldt Canal running generally north
east from Cambrai to the point beyond Estrun where it con
nects with the Sensee. The Canadian Corps front along the
250 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
line of the railway from the Scheldt to the Sensee extended
over about 10,000 yards, and its attacking direction was north
east, its objectives being on the right to seize the bridges of the
Scheldt and in its centre to seize the high land contained
within this triangle. The depth of the attack from Sancourt
northeast to Estrun is about 9,000 yards.
Superficially the ground favored the direction of the attack,
for the ridges all trend away to the northeast. Beginning at
the Scheldt the ground sloped gradually up towards the north
west over a bare slope to a ridge on the 75-metre level running
some 3,000 yards northeast from Tilloy. Roughly parallel to
this ridge 1,000 to 2,000 yards northwest, but with a little dip
intervening, is a high bare plateau running fmgerlike from the
railway between Tilloy and Sancourt northeast past Cuvillers
to midway between that village and Paillencourt. Two thou
sand yards east and a little south of Tilloy is the hamlet of
Morenchies, with the wood of the same name, low-lying on the
Scheldt. Following the Scheldt another thousand yards east
is the Pont d Aire, a very important tactical feature, being a
series of bridges over the Scheldt and its spillways, connecting
the northern bank with the industrial suburb of Escaudoeuvres.
Northeast another thousand yards is the town of Ramillies.
Still following down the bank of the Scheldt, 2,000 yards
northeast of Ramillies is the village of Eswars, whence a
ravine cuts due west into the plateau towards Cuvillers.
In the fighting to follow the area thus described, namely the
Scheldt on the right and the plateau on the left, fell within the
3rd. and 4th. Canadian Divisional areas respectively, the im
mediate objectives of the former being Tilloy, Morenchies and
Ramillies, and of the latter Eswars on the right and Cuvillers
on the left.
The dividing line between the 4th. Canadian Division and
the 1st. Canadian Division on its left was provided by the
strongly marked feature known as the Bantigny Ravine, run
ning northeast from Sancourt through Blecourt, 1,500 yards
distant, thence through Bantigny, 1,800 yards from Blecourt,
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 28-29 251
and so to the Sensee. Along the bottom of this defile runs a
wooded highway, affording excellent cover for enemy
machine-gunners, who were able to sweep the bare ridges and
plateaux on either side.
Rising gently up from Bantigny Ravine to the northwest,
a series of small detached spurs fill in the ground to where it
slopes down again on the north to the Sensee Canal, and in the
heart of these the strongly fortified village of Abancourt, 1,500
yards northwest of Bantigny, offered a formidable pivot of
defense. Between Abancourt and Epinoy, 3,000 yards west,
lies very high ground, commanding Abancourt and the Ban
tigny Ravine.
The position offered a tactical peculiarity in that its
strength lay rather with the ravines than on the ridges, whose
exposed surface was everywhere dominated by artillery and
machine-gun fire. It thus came about that our troops found
that their task had but begun when they stormed the ridges,
and that it was an infinitely harder task to cling on to the
ground they had won in face of a withering fire that at times
caught them in rear as well as in flank.
The skill with which the enemy continually filtered fresh
troops, for the most part machine-gunners, along the ravine
bottoms into the very heart of our defense, and in face of ter
rible punishment, was in its way a tactical masterpiece. But
the truth was he was prepared for the greatest sacrifices in
order to hold the plateau. He had actually brought divisions
out of the active battle line in front of the Third Army to the
south of us and in front of our neighboring Corps on the north
to throw in against the Canadian Corps.
It was a last ditch business. The spirit that animated him
is shown by the following Corps Order captured by us a few
days later : "Soldiers of the Corps : Up to the present time we
have given up to the enemy a certain amount of foreign land
of little value for military reasons, while causing him heavy
casualties. The British are seeking a decision and we, of this
Corps, have a most important section from the point of view of
252 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
a decision. Remember that here you are now defending your
home, your family and your dear Fatherland. Remember
how your homes will look if war is carried there and with it
invasion of the enemy s hordes. If you will stand fast, victory
will be ours as before, for you are superior to the enemy, who
now only shows a desire to attack with tanks, and these tanks
we shall destroy. Therefore: Carry-on! Use your rifle cold
bloodedly and cold steel with courage. I expect that every
man will do his duty in the decisive battle coming, from the
general to the youngest private."
It is curious to note how yet once again the German soldier
is told that it is only the tanks he has to fear. As has been seen,
in this great battle of Cambrai the Canadian infantry de
pended almost entirely upon their own efforts and their admir
able artillery. Nevertheless it is beyond question that the tank
became something of an obsession with the German soldier.
His morale in this direction was supported by every kind of
mechanical device, of which the anti-tank rifle was perhaps
the most efficient. At the crossings of the Canal du Nord south
of Marquion Canadian Engineers located 245 anti-tank mines,
which were destroyed by gun-cotton. Various devices were
used, a favorite being a loose plank left lying in the road which
required however the weight of a tank before setting off the
detonator. One of the few tanks at our disposal fell victim to
a mine of this character.
CHAPTER VIII
OPERATIONS : SEPT. 30-OCT. 2
^TAHE operation of Sept 30 was planned in two
phases," says Sir Arthur Currie. "In the first, the
3rd. and 4th. Canadian Divisions were to push for
ward across the high ground between the Scheldt Canal and
the Blecourt-Bantigny Ravine, when Brutinel s Brigade was
to pass through them and secure bridgeheads at Ramillies and
Eswars. The second phase, to take place on the success of the
first, provided for the seizing of the high ground overlooking
the Sensee river by the 1st. Canadian Division and the llth.
(British) Division. The attack commenced well, and the vil
lages of Tilloy and Blecourt were captured by the 3rd. and
4th. Canadian Divisions respectively. A heavy counter-attack,
however, against the 4th. Canadian Division and the left flank
of the 3rd. Canadian Division, assisted by exceptionally severe
enfilade fire from the high ground to the north of the Blecourt-
Bantigny Ravine, forced the line on the left bank to the eastern
outskirts of Sancourt. The second phase of the attack was not
carried out, and the net gains for the day were the capture
of Tilloy and some progress made on the right of the 3rd.
Canadian Division from Neuville-St. Remy south. Prisoners
taken during the day testified to the extreme importance, in the
eyes of the enemy, of the positions held by him and the neces
sity that they be held at all costs."
"Zero" hour was set for 6 a.m., before dawn. It was de
signed to lay down a rolling barrage on the narrow front
selected for the initial attack, and to protect the flanks by smoke
barrages, to blot out enemy observation in the ravines and on
the high ground to the north. For this purpose there was a
considerable concentration of our artillery. All our field bat
teries had suffered severely in the fighting of the previous days,
253
254 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
as the guns had to be pushed up in the open, taking advantage
indeed of what natural cover offered, but without prepared
emplacements. Casualties were proportionately severe. Thus
on one day the 12th. Battery, Canadian Field Artillery, lost
one officer, Capt. Ross, and four other ranks killed, and 18
wounded, and the llth. Battery, in an exposed position on the
Cambrai road, suffered a direct hit and had 27 casualties in
one day.
The gallant work of our gunners under these trying con
ditions is well illustrated by the following extracts from the
diary of the 13th. Battery, C.F.A.
"Sept. 27 Bourlon Wood show. Took position just after
dawn between Inchy and Canal du Nord ; i.e., across No Man s
Land, and from there took part in second phase of attack. This
was only possible by the smoke barrage which screened enemy
observation from Bourlon Wood, which had not at that time
been taken. Moved position same evening to just north of
Quarry Wood. Gunner McCallum wounded at guns, later
killed on way to dressing station. Corpl. R. Cameron, Corpl.
J. Mitchen, Bombadier King and Gunner A. Patterson
wounded at guns.
"Sept. 28 Moved guns to north side of Arras-Cambrai
road by a farmhouse one and a quarter miles west of Raillen-
court. Gnr. Painter wounded at guns, later died of wounds.
Same night bomb lit in wagon lines one and a half miles west
of guns, killing 28 horses and wounded Drivers Dawson, Mel
ville, Blackmore, Monroe, Baird, Clarke, Nelson, Hogg and
Cpl. Riddel ; Dawson died of wounds. Signallers Murray and
Klock wounded on Officer s Patrol ; Klock died of wounds.
"Sept. 29 Another show. Severe fighting, little progress.
Shell in wagon lines killed Driver Gagne and wounded Dvr.
W. Lawson, also killing eight horses. Moved up one section
in afternoon under Lieut. Stubbs and Simonds. At 1 1 p.m.
received orders to move up remainder of Battery to forward
section position on sunken road just south of Haynecourt for
show before dawn next day.
OPERATIONS : SEPT. 30-OCT. 2 255
"Sept. 30 Show "zero" hour 4.30 a.m. Enemy had
planned his decisive counter-attack with eight divisions on our
two division front to commence this morning at 5 a.m. Coun
ter-battery fire very intense; two guns out of action by shell
fire. Gnr. R. Leitch killed at guns; Sergts. H. Murray and
Foster and Gnr. W. Hershall wounded at guns. Terrific fight
ing by Infantry; attacks, counter-attacks, etc.; terrific casual
ties, especially in Infantry. Moved guns back in afternoon to
former position. Gnr. Spearn wounded during night by stray
shell at guns.
"Oct. 1 Another show. Progress slight on account of
reduced strength of units. Advanced battery 1,000 yards to
next little dip in front."
This battery was recruited in 1914 from Hamilton and
Brantford, Ont, and it is interesting to note that 34 "originals"
were still on strength at the armistice, while the democratic
character of the Canadian army is shown by the fact that 22 of
its N.C.O s obtained commissions.
The attack went well at first, but with dawn came a heavy
gale from the west which resulted in the failure of our smoke
barrage, and our men who had pushed out along the ridges
became exposed to a tremendous concentration of enemy fire,
presently supported by massed counter-attacks.
"They have a machine-gun to every ten yards of front,"
said a Brigade staff officer. "There has been nothing like it in
this war. From the ravines they pick off our men on the
ridges like crows. Over ninety per cent, of our casualties are
from machine-gun bullets."
The task assigned the 3rd. Canadian Division was to cap
ture Tilloy and Morenchies, and then push on to Ramillies.
In close conjunction the 4th. Canadian Division was also to
push out due east with Eswars as the final objective. The
attack on our right prospered from the start, troops of the 7th.
Brigade, including the P.P.L.Ps on the right and Royal Cana
dian Regiment on the left, capturing in succession Tilloy and
Morenchies, with elements even pushing on to the outskirts of
256 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
Ramillies. Our position along the Scheldt Canal was thus
consolidated and a wedge driven in between the garrison of
Cambrai and the German forces massed about the northern
plateau.
Unfortunately the same good fortune did not attend our left.
The attack was undertaken by the 1 1th. Brigade, to which the
85th. Battalion had been detached from the 12th. Brigade in
support. The 102nd. Battalion, British Columbia, was also
held in reserve, but was under very heavy fire throughout the
day and came into action at a later stage. The attack was car
ried out by the 87th. Battalion, the Grenadier Guards of Mont
real, on the right, the 75th. Battalion, Central and Western
Ontario, in the centre, and the 54th. Battalion, British Colum
bia, on the left.
A good advance was made along the plateau under cover
of darkness, but with dawn and the failure of our smoke bar
rage as related above, the attacking force was subjected to a
tremendous enfilade machine-gun fire from Blecourt and
Abancourt. The men in little knots began digging themselves
in on the bare upland, and there withstood wave after wave
of enemy infantry, advancing with the utmost courage to the
attack, although great holes were torn in their ranks by our
artillery and machine-guns. The position on our left was un
tenable and our men fell back fighting every step to the line of
the railway. This in turn brought to a halt troops on our right
and finally led to their partial retirement, but although at one
stage Tilloy was lost, we recaptured it before the end of the
day.
Tilloy will go down in the history of the P.P.L.I. as one of
its most famous fights. After every senior officer had fallen,
Capt. James Nesbit Edgar assumed command of the battalion.
At a critical hour, when three companies on the left were badly
disorganized under tremendous machine-gun fire, and had
even begun to withdraw from the position won, he went for
ward and rallied the men, leading them on to their objective.
By his cheerfulness, energy and disregard for danger he so
OPERATIONS : SEPT. 30-OCT. 2 257
inspired all ranks that they willingly followed him through the
most intensive shell and machine-gun fire, and it was due to his
unflagging work that enemy counter-attacks were beaten off
and Tilloy remained in our hands at the end of the hard-
fought day.
The character of the righting, described by those who took
part in it as the stiffest Canadian troops had ever faced, can
best be gathered by following the fortunes of one of the bat
talions engaged, this being the 75th. This unit, as we have
seen, had lost heavily in the successful attack on Bourlon
Wood. On the morning of Sept. 29 it moved up from Bourlon
to the Lillas farm on the Arras-Cambrai road 1,500 yards west
of Raillencourt and about as much southwest of Haynecourt,
bivouacking there for the night. Guides reported at 2.30 a.m.
for the attack on the Douai-Cambrai railway, the first objec
tive. On the way in to the jumping-off line two company
officers were killed at head of their companies, and only four
officers per company were left. In the darkness there was some
confusion but three minutes before "zero" every company was
in its appointed place, 500 yards in advance of our outposts
holding the line, and just west of the railway itself.
Our barrage opened 20 yards short of the railway and then
settled for ten minutes on the line of the embankment, follow
ing which our men went over. Three minutes later the enemy,
who had massed a number of divisions for an attack in force,
laid down an intensive barrage of 5.9-inch guns and Yellow
Cross gas on the very area our men had just left, but causing
not a single casualty. It was a much heavier barrage than our
own, but ours was magnificently uncannily even accurate,
destroying entirely the enemy s line of defense along the steep
railway embankment.
The second in command, Captain Duncan, a company com
mander, was killed almost at once as the battalion swept for
ward. A hail of machine-gun fire came from the exposed left
flank all along the Bantigny Ravine, and although a screen of
defensive posts was thrown out against Blecourt, no troops
18
258 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
could long stand up against such punishment. The battalion
fell back to the railway and clung there all day. Towards
evening Col. Thompson was ordered to withdraw his men to
the Marquion line, 2,000 yards back, but only 50 men were
left unwounded and every officer but himself had become a
casualty. Nevertheless what remained of this battalion went
into action again on the following day. The 54th. and 102nd.
Battalions took over the posts established.
In Blecourt besides numerous machine-guns were four
o
heavy guns and a special battalion of Wurternburger marks
men, stout fellows who made great play with their machine-
guns. The attack had failed, but nevertheless the line of rail
way had been attained and held, and the enemy s evident inten
tion of driving us back into Bourlon Wood had been frustrated
by our bold offensive. But it was clear that the battle was far
from won. We must either abandon what had been gained
with so much heroism and at such great cost, thus crippling
the general advance, or face the alternative of pursuing the
battle with weakened forces until we had gained a decision and
established ourselves upon the plateau. The issue is plainly
set forth by Sir Arthur Currie who then proceeds to trace the
fortunes of the crucial battle of Oct. 1, in the following
terms :-
"The tremendous exertions and considerable casualties con
sequent upon the four days almost continuous fighting had
made heavy inroads on the freshness and efficiency of all arms,
and it was questionable whether an immediate decision could
be forced in the face of the heavy concentration of troops which
our successful and, from the enemy s standpoint, dangerous
advance, had drawn against us. On the other hand, it was
known that the enemy had suffered severely, and it was quite
possible that matters had reached a stage where he no longer
considered the retention of this position worth the severe
losses both in men and morale consequent upon a continuance
of the defense. It was therefore decided that the assault would
be continued on Oct. 1, the four Divisions in line attacking
OPERATIONS : SEPT. 30-OCT. 2 259
simultaneously under a heavy barrage, co-ordinated by the
G.O.C., R.A. During the night the XXII Corps took over a
portion of the front held by the 1 1th. Division, the 56th. Divi
sion becoming responsible for the defense of the relieved front
at 6a.m., Oct. 1.
"The attack made excellent progress in the early stages, and
the troops reached the general line, Scheldt Canal (east of
Neuville-St. Remy)--Morenchies Wood Cuvillers Ban-
tigny (all inclusive).
"The decision of the enemy to resist to the last quickly
manifested itself. About 10 a.m. heavy counter-attacks
developed up the Bantigny Ravine from the direction of Pail-
lencourt. These, supplemented by enfilade fire from the high
ground just south of Abancourt, which still remained in the
enemy s hands, due to a certain extent to the inability of the
llth. Division on the left to make progress, were sufficient to
press back our advanced troops. Pockets of the enemy in Ble-
court and Bantigny continued to give trouble, and our line was
ultimately forced by greatly superior numbers out of Cuvillers,
Bantigny and Blecourt.
"To continue to throw tired troops against such opposition,
without giving them an opportunity to refit and recuperate,
was obviously inviting a serious failure, and I accordingly
decided to break off the engagement. The five days fighting
had yielded practical gains of a very valuable nature, as well
as 7,059 prisoners and 205 guns.
"We had gone through the last organized system of de
fenses on our front, and our advance constituted a direct threat
on the rear of the troops immediately to the north of our left
flank, and their withdrawal had now begun.
"Although the ground gained on Oct. 1 was not extensive,
the effects of the battle and of the previous four days fighting
were far-reaching, and made possible the subsequent advances
of October and November, in so far as the Divisions engaged
against the Canadian Corps drew heavily on the enemy s re
serves, which had now been greatly reduced.
260 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
"It is worthy of note that the enemy employed six Divisions
to reinforce the four Divisions already in the line, making a
total of ten Divisions engaged since Sept. 27 by the Canadian
Corps. In addition to their 10 Divisional Artilleries and large
number of heavy guns, these German Divisions had been rein
forced by 13 Marksmen Machine-Gun Companies.
"In the same period only three additional Divisions and
one Regiment were employed by the Germans to reinforce the
front from Honnecourt to Cambrai, a front of approximately
18,000 yards in length.
This comparison of employment of reserves showed
clearly that the enemy was greatly perturbed by the success of
our advance, and the serious threat it offered especially to his
northern defenses.
Throughout this phase very heavy calls had been made on
the Corps Artillery ( Major-General E. W. B. Morrison) and
the Canadian Engineers.
"With the exception of the advances of the 1st. Canadian
and llth. (British) Divisions in the second stage of the attack
of Sept. 27, all operations carried out during the five days took
place under cover of Artillery barrages. The amount of am
munition fired was exceptionally large, and it was only by the
most strenuous efforts on the part of all ranks of the Artillery
that the supply could be made to keep pace with the expendi
ture.
The success in this respect was to a large extent due to the
exertion and skill displayed by the Canadian Engineers
(Major-General W. B. Lindsay) in every branch of their
activities, notably in bridge-building and repair of roads."
The night of Sept. 30-Oct. 1 was bitter cold with torrential
rains, and for the most part the troops detailed for the attack
next morning had to tough it out in the open. "Zero" hour
was set for 5 a.m., while it was still dark, and it was hoped
that by a broad attack covering the entire Corps front between
the Scheldt and the Sensee the disastrous enfilade fire, which
had stopped and thrown back our attack on a relatively narrow
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 30-OCT. 2 261
front of the previous day, would be blanketed. This plan
postulated success all along the line and the development of a
weak spot anywhere must seriously compromise success else
where.
The attack at first succeeded admirably. On the right ele
ments of the 3rd. Division pushed on through Morenchies,
seized the bridgehead at Pont d Aire and established posts in
Ramillies.
The attack was entrusted to the 9th. Brigade, with the 43rd.
Battalion, Winnipeg, on the right, and the S2nd. Battalion,
Fort William and Port Arthur, on the left, advancing under
heavy machine-gun fire on the crest of the hill down the slope
towards Ramillies. The 58th. Battalion, Western Ontario,
and the 1 16th. Battalion, Central Ontario, came up in support,
all four battalions being very heavily engaged. The 116th.
pushed on into Ramillies, the attacking force rushing the
bridgehead in face of the point-blank fire of a whizz-bang
battery. Major Carmichael, who had succeeded to the com
mand of the battalion after Lt-Col. G. R. Pearkes had been
wounded and who himself had been wounded in the Amiens
show, led his men throughout, and even after he had been ser
iously wounded refused to be evacuated, staying with his com
mand for two hours until he was no longer able to direct his
men.
On the left of our 3rd. Division the 4th. Canadian Division
also drove home its attack, the 1 1th. Brigade advancing across
the plateau and storming Cuvillers. But, as has been related by
the Corps Commander, a weakness developed on the extreme
left, and in turn the 1st. Canadian Division fell back, forcing
the withdrawal of the 4th. Division, which found itself with
its left flank in the air. The 102nd. Battalion, British Colum
bia, which had led the attack with great gallantry, was for a
time in perilous danger of being isolated and cut off, and it
was only the utmost heroism of its men, supported by flanking
outposts promptly thrown out against Blecourt and Bantigny
by Brig.-General Odium, that saved it from disaster.
262 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
In a day of wonderful deeds, particularly striking was the
leadership of Lieut. Fraham Thomson Lyall, 102nd. Battalion,
a native of Lancashire who had enlisted at St. Catharines, Ont.
Finding himself in command of the company on the right
flank, now only 50 strong, by skilful dispositions he captured a
strong enemy position east of Blecourt, and with it 17 machine-
guns and 80 prisoners. This he fortified and clung steadfastly
to it until relieved, thus preventing the turning of our flank.
This officer had had a wonderful record throughout this battle.
After leading his platoon against Bourlon Wood, he rendered
invaluable support to the leading company, capturing a strong
point which held it up by a flank movement, taking one field
gun, four machine-guns and 13 prisoners, the rest of the gar
rison being killed. Later his platoon, much weakened by
casualties, was held up by machine-guns at the southern end of
Bourlon Wood. Collecting every man available, he led them
toward the strong point. Springing forward alone, he rushed
the position, killing the officer in charge, when the garrison
surrendered with five machine-guns. Having made good his
objective, capturing 47 more prisoners, he consolidated his
position and thus protected the remainder of the company.
During this battle Lieut. Lyall captured in all three officers
and 182 other ranks, one field gun and 26 machine-guns,
exclusive of heavy casualties inflicted.
CHAPTER IX
OPERATIONS: SEPT. 30-ocr. 2. CONTINUED
WHAT had happened on the left is described in the nar
rative of the 1st. Canadian Division, already drawn
upon so copiously: "Orders were issued on the night
of Sept. 30 for a synchronized attack on Oct. 1 by the four
divisions in line. The 1st. Divisional front was extended a
thousand yards to the south, making a total front of attack of
about 3,000 yards. During the night the 3rd. Brigade, Brig.-
General G. S. Tuxford, moved forward to the right and
assembled behind the 12th. Brigade, through whom they were
to attack. The attack of the 1st. Division was to be made by
the 3rd. and 1st. Brigades.
"The barrage opened at 5 o clock. On the right, the 13th.
Battalion, Montreal Highlanders, attacked and captured Ble-
court after very heavy fighting. On the left the 1st. Battalion,
Western Ontario, and 4th. Battalion, Central Ontario,
launched the attack for the 1st. Brigade, Brig.-General W. A.
Griesbach. The 1st. Battalion secured the line of the railway
north of Blecourt, but were unable to get beyond owing to the
intense fire from Abancourt. On the left the 4th. Battalion got
to within 200 yards of the railway, but were definitely held up
there. Further on the left the attack of the llth. (British)
Division had been stopped at the very start.
"In the meantime the 16th. Battalion, Canadian Scottish
of Western Canada, and 14th. Battalion, Royal Montreal
Regiment, passed through Blecourt and attacked on the right
and left. Cuvillers and Bantigny were captured by eight
o clock by these battalions respectively. Enemy activity on
the exposed left developed into counter-attacks against the
14th. Battalion, three being driven off. Both battalions were
now in untenable positions, enemy machine-gun concentrations
263
264 CANADA S HUNDRED DAYS
on the high ground west of Abancourt sweeping their left rear
and artillery firing at point-blank range from their front.
Under the circumstances a retirement was ordered, the enemy
being made to pay dearly for every foot of ground given up.
A short stand was made at Blecourt, but fresh enemy attacks
forced our line back to west of this village a line held with
the aid of artillery and machine-gun fire against continued
enemy attacks."
The fighting to which the 1st. Canadian Division was thus
exposed was peculiarly bitter and gave opportunity for many
deeds of heroism. Thus Capt. Chester Francis Cummins of
the 1st. Battalion, Western Ontario, while leading in his com
pany found that owing to the darkness his men were pushing
in ahead of our own barrage. He ran forward and under
heavy machine-gun fire checked and reorganized the men. In
the subsequent advance, in which his company suffered many
casualties, he was severely wounded in the arm, but with
indomitable spirit and almost superhuman effort he forced his
way forward, cheering and inspiring his men until again hit.
He nevertheless still pressed on, cheering and exhorting his
men, until he received a third and fatal wound.
In the attack on Abancourt, the 4th. Battalion, Central
Ontario, found itself held up by wire and machine-gun posts.
Sergt. William Merrifield of Ottawa, finding that his men
were being shot down by the deadly fire coming from two
enemy machine-gun posts on high ground on the flank, attacked
them both single-handed. He dashed from shell hole to shell
hole until h 
