CARTHAGE
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THE STORY OF THE NATIONS
1
SUBSCRIPTIO]
EDITION
«
Cbc ^lorp of tfje illations
CARTHAGE
THE STORY OF THE NATIONS.
A SERIES OF POPULAR HISTORIES.
Rome. IJy Arthur Oilman, M.A.
The Jews. By Prof. J. K. Ho.swer.
Germany. By Rev. S. Baring- 36.
Goui.u, M.A. 37.
Carthage. By Prof. Alfred J.
Church.
Alexander's Empire. By Prof. 39.
J. P. Mahafiy. 40,
The Moors in Spain. By Stanley
Lane-Poolk. 41.
Ancient Egypt. By Prof. George 42.
Kawlinsun.
Hungary. By Prof. Armk.ius
Va^hikky.
The Saracens. By Arthur Gil-
wan, M.A.
Ireland. By the Hon. Emily 45.
Lawless.
Chaldea. By Zenaioe A. Rag(5zin. 46.
The Goths. By Henry Bradley.
Assyria. By ZiNAiDE A. Rac;o- 47.
ZIN.
Turkey. By Stanley Lane- Poole.
Holland. By Prof. J. E. Thokold
KdGKkS.
Mediaeval France. By Gustave
Masson. 51.
Persia. By S. G. W. Benjamin. 52.
Phoenicia. By Prof. G. Rawlinson.
Media. By Zenaide A. Raggzin.
The Hansa Towns. By Helen
Z I M M E K N .
Early Britain. By Prof. Alfred
J. Church. 54-
The Barbary Corsairs. By 55,
Stanley Lane-Poolf,. 56.
Russia. By W. R. iMomn.L, M.A. 57.
The Jews under the Romans. By
W. D. MuRULSON.
Scotland. By John Mackintosh,
LL.D.
Switzerland. By Mrs Lina Hug
and R. Stead.
Mexico. By Susan Hale. fio.
Portugal. By H. Morse Stephens.
The Normans. By Sarah Orne 61
jEWivr r.
The Byzantine Empire. By C. 62.
W. C. Oman.
Sicily : Phoenician, Greek and 63.
Roman. l!y tin; late Prof. K. A.
Freeman. 64.
The Tuscan Republics. P.y Bella
JJuffv.
Poland. By W. R. Mokfill, M.A. 65.
Parthia. By Prof. Geor(;e
Rawlin.son.
The Australian Commonwealth.
By GkKvn i.E Tregarthen.
Spain. l!y H. E. Watts.
Japan. By David Murray, Ph.D.
South Africa. By George M.
Theal.
Venice. By Alethk.a Wiel.
The Crusades. By T. A. Archer
and C. 1>. King^ford.
Vedic India. By Z. A. Ragozin.
The West Indies and the Span-
ish Main. By James Rodway.
Bohemia. By C. Edmund
Maurice.
The Balkans. By W. Miller,
M.A.
Canada. By Sir J. G. Bourinot,
LL.D.
British India. By R. W. Frazer,
LL.D.
Modern France. By Andr6 Le
Bon.
The Franks. By Lewis Sergeant.
Austria. By Sidney Whitman.
Modern England. Before tlie Re-
form Bill. By Justin McCarthy.
China. By Prof. R. K. Douglas.
Modern England. From the
Reform I'.ill to the Accession
of Edwaid VII. By Justin
McCarthy.
Modern Spain. By Martin A. S.
Hum e.
Modern Italy. By Pietro Orsi.
Norway. ]!y H. H. Boyesen.
Wales. By O. M. Edwards.
Medieval Rome. By W. Miller,
M.A.
The Papal Monarchy. By
William Dakkv, D.D.
Media;val India under Moham-
medan Rule. By Stanley
Lane-Pooi.k.
Buddhist India. By Prof T. W.
Rhym-Davids.
Parliamentary England. By
F^dwari) Jenks, M..\.
Medi.eval England. By Mary
BAri';soN.
The Coming of Parliament. By
L. Cecil Jane.
The Story "of Greece. From the
Eiirliest Timt-s to a. I). 14. By
K. S. .Shuckhukchi.
The Story of the Roman Empire
(h.c. 29 to A.I). 476). By H.
SrUAUT J()NK>;.
London: T. FISHER UNWIN, Adelphi Tkrrace, W.C.
VOTIVE BAS-kKl.IEK TO I'ERSEI'IIONE.
CARTHAGE
OR
THE EMPIRE OF AFRICA
ALFRED J. CHURCH, M.A.
PROlIiSbOK U1-- LAIIX IN LMVEKSIIY COLLEGE, LONDON, AUTHOR OF -SIOKIES
IKO.M HOMER," ETC., ETC
117 77/ THE COLLABORATION 0I<
A R T H U R GIL M A N , M . A .
NINI n IMPRESSION
LONDON
T. F 1 S II f-: R F N W I N
I ADl'Ll'lll '11':KRACE
NEW YORK: G. V. I'UTiNAM'S SONS
Ninth htip' ession
Copyrii^ht by 7'. Fisher Univin, 1892
l^l'or Great Britain)
Copyriiikt by G. P. Putnam^ s Sons, 1892
(f'or tin' Vnileii States of America)
5KLh
9U
^c^7^f^2 ^0:
PREFACE.
It is difficult to tell the story of Carthage, because
one has to tell it without sympathy, and from the
standpoint of her enemies. It is a great advantage,
on the other hand, that the materials are of a manage-
able amount, and that a fairly complete narrative may
be given within a moderate compass.
I have made it a rule to go to the original authori-
ties. At the same time I have to express my obliga-
tions to several modern works, to the geographical
treatises of Heeren, the histories of Grote, Arnold and
Mommsen, Mr. Bosworth Smith's admirable " Car-
thage and the Carthaginians," and the learned and
exhaustive " History of Art in Phoenicia and its
Dependencies," by Messieurs Georges Perrot and
Charles Chipiez, as translated and edited by Mr.
Walter Armstrong. To this last I am indebted for
most of the illustrations of this book.
I have had much help also from Mr. W. W. Capes'
edition of " l.ivy " xxi., xxii.
X PREFACE.
I have not thought it necessary to discuss the
critical questions which have been raised about the
DuiHan column (p. 135). The inscription, as it at
present exists, may be supposed to bear a general,
though not a faithful, resemblance to the original.
A. C
CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.
B.C.
Carthage founded by Dido . . ..... 850
The Campaigns of Malchus ....... 550
The Battle of Alalia 536
First Treaty with Rome 509
First Battle of Himera 480
Second Treaty with Rome ....... 440
Hannibal invades Sicily ........ 410
Third Treaty with Rome ....... 405
Capture of Agrigentum ........ 406
Treaty between Carthage and Dionysius .... 405
Renewal of the War ......... 397
Siege of Syracuse by Himilco ..... . . 396
Return of Himilco to Africa ....... 396
Mago invades Sicily ........ 393
Treaty of Peace with Dionysius ...... 392
Renewal of the War 383
Dionysius attacks Carthage ....... 368
Death of Dionysius . . . , .... 367
The Conspiracy of Hanno ....... 340
The Battle of Crimessus ........ 339
Death of Timoleon ......... 337
Agathocles defeated at Himera ...... 310
He transfers the War to Africa . . . , .310
He returns to Sicily ........ 307
Pyrrhus invades Sicily ....... 278
He leaves Sicily ......... 276
Beginning of First Punic War ....... 264
Defeat of the Carthaginian Fleet by Duilius at Mylae „ . 260
Victory of Regulus at Ecnomus ....... 256
XU CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE.
B.C.
Landing of Regulus in Africa , 256
Defeat of Regulus by Xantippus ...... 255
The Siege of Lilybceum begun ...... 249
Defeat of the Roman Fleet under Claudius at Drepanum . . 249
Hamilcar Barca comes into Sicily 247
Death of Hannibal 247
Defeat of Carthaginian Fleet by Catulus at ^Egusa . . . 241
Conclusion of First Punic War 241
War of the Mercenaries 241-236
Hamilcar Barca invades Spain 236
Death of Hamilcar • . . 229
Assassination of Hasdrubal ....... 221
Capture of Saguntum by Hannibal and Commencement of Second
Punic War . 218
Battles of Ticinus and Trebia 218
Battle of Trasumennus . . . . . . . . 217
Battle of Cannae 216
Hannibal winters in Capua . . . . . . . 215
Roman Conquest of Syracuse . . . . . . .212
Hannibal takes Tarentum . . . . . . . 212
Defeat and Death of the Scipios in Spain . . . . .211
Hannibal marches on Rome — Fall of Capua . . . . 211
Publius Scipio goes to Spain . . . . . . .210
He captures New Carthage ....... 209
Death of Marcellus 208
Hasdrubal enters Italy ........ 207
His defeat at Metaurus ........ 207
Scipio sails to Africa ........ 204
Hannibal returns to Carthage 203
Defeat at Zama ......... 202
End of Second Punic War 201
Death of Hannibal 1S3
Roman Embassy at Carthage . 174
The Third Punic War begins ...... 149
Fall of Carthage 146
PROVINCIAE
CARTHACINIENSIBUS
SUBDITAC
London: T. Fisher Unwin, Paternoster Square. E.G.
CONTENTS.
PART 1.
LEGEND AND EARLY HISTORY.
I.
The Legknd of Dido .....
Tlie huilding of Carthage, 5— Dido and /lineas, 7.
3-i
II.
The Growth ok Cartitagk
9-1
The Tyrian traders, 11 — Malchus and Mago, i; — Treaties
Willi I\uiiie, 15 — Carlhaginian possessions, 17.
PART II.
CARTHAGE AND GRKECK
I.
HaMIT.CAR and HaNN11!AI,
2 I -.•54
llamilcar's army, 25 — The fate of llamilcnr, 27 — Ilaiinilial
before Selinus, 29 — Attack on llinicra, 31 — I lannibal's venge-
ance, 33.
XIV CONTENTS.
PAGB
II.
Carthage and Dionvsius (406-405) . . 35-45
Siege of Ai^rigentum, 37 — Execution of the generals, 39 —
Agrigenlum evacuated, 41 — Gela abandoned, 43 — Tlie plague
at Carthage, 45.
III.
Carthage and Dionysius (397) . . . 46-63
Siege of Motya, 47 — Muiya assauhed, 49 — liimilco's ad-
vance, 51 — Battle of Catana, 53 — Siege of Syracuse, 55 —
Plague in Himilco's camp, 57 — Hiniilco's escape, 59 —
Carthage saved, 63.
IV.
Thk Last Struggi.k with Dionvsius . 64-69
Mago defeated, 65 — Defeat of Dionysius, 67— The end of the
war, 69.
V.
Carthage and Timoleon .... 70-74
Timolcon declares war against Carthage, 71 — iJatile of tlie
Crimessus, 73.
Carihage and Agathoci.i:s .... 75-91
Agathocles in extremities, 77 — Agatliocles invades Africa, 81
— Revolt of Ijoniiicar, 85 — I'yrrluis, Sy — I'yrrhus leaves
Sicily, 91.
pjy,'? HI.
THE INTERNAL HISIURY OK CARTHACiE
I.
Carthaginian r)iscovERL:RS .... 95-101
Along the African Coast, 97- (uitilla>, 99— A siiange tale, lOI.
CONTENTS. XV
J-AGt
II.
Tine Constitution and Religion of Carthage 102 i i.^
Magistrates of Carthage, 103 — Estates of the realm in
Carthage, 105 — Justice and religion, 109 — Cartliaginian
Deities, 113.
III.
TnK Revenue and Trade op^ Carthage . 115 125
Carthaginian Mines, 117 — Trade, 119 — Ivory and precious
stones, 121 — Art and literature, 123 — Wealth and luxury, 125
/'.'/AT /F.
CARTHAGE AND ROMi:.
I.
The War in Sicilv and on the Sea . 129-140
The Romans gain Messana, 131 — Capture of Agrigenluin, 133
—Battle of Mylie, 137— Battle of iiciiumus, 139.
II
The Invasion of Africa .... 1 41-151
Defeat of Ilamilcar, 143 — Xanlippus, 143 — Dufeat of
Regulus, 147 — Horace on Regulus, 149 — Revenge for
Regulus, 151.
II!.
In Sicily Ag.mn . . ... 152-165
Roman Losses at sea, 153 — Uoman disasters, 157 — The
Romans gain Kryx, 159 — liasdrubal's successes, 161 — Battle of
/legates Island, 163— Conclusion of War, id;.
XVI Cuy TENTS.
IV.
Carthage and her Mercenaries . . 166-177
Revolt of the mercenaries, 167 — Siege of Utica. 171 —
Massacre of prisoners, 175 — End of war with mercenaries, 177.
V.
Carthage and Spain ..... 178-184
Hamilcar in Spain, i79^Hannibal, 181 — Siege of Sagun-
turn, 1 8 J.
VI.
From ihf, Rbro to Italy .... 185-194
Passage of the Rhone, 187 — Route over the Alps. 1S9 — Rocks
split with vinegar, 193.
VTI.
The First Campaign in Italy . . . 195-205
Scipio retires to the Trebia, 199 — Sempronius eager to
fight, 201 — The Carthaginians victorious, 205.
VIII
Trasumknnus ...... 206-211
Lake Trasumennus, 207 — Slauglilci "' 'lie Rom.Tiis, 209 —
Hannibal's policy, 21 i.
IX.
Fabius and his Tactics .... 212-217
Hannibal a master of stratagem, 213 — Fabius and Minu-
cius, 215 — Varro and I'aullus in command, 217.
CONTENTS. XVll
PAGE
X.
Caunm ....... 218-224
Hannibal's army, 219 — The struggle, 221 — Will he match on
Rome ? 223.
XT.
After Cann^ ...... 225-231
Mago at Carthage, 227 — Hannibal's prospects, 229 — Taren-
tum gained, 231.
XII.
The Turn of the Tide .... 232-244
Attempted relief of Capua, 233 —Capua lost to Hannibal, 235 —
Carthage loses Sicily, 237 — Roman successes in Spain, 239 —
Death of the Scipios, 241 — Capture of New Carthage, 243.
XIII.
The Tast Chance of Victory . . 245-252
The death of Marccllus, 247 — Nero's gieat march, 249 — Otle
from Horace, 251.
XIV.
The Last Struggle 253-264
Scipio and Syphax, 257 — Hannibal recalled, 259 -Zania, 2()i
— Terms of peace, 263.
XV.
Hannibal in Exii.n .... 265-271
Hannibal with Antiochus, 267 ilaiinilial in llilliynia, 269 —
Character of Il.innihal, 271.
XVlll
CONTENTS.
XVI.
Thr T^egin'ning of tup. End . . . 272-379
Cato's hostility to Carthage, 273 — Africaniis the Younger, 275
• — Expedition against Carthage, 277 — War declared, 279.
X\II.
The Siege anp Fat.t. of Carthage . . 280-301
The walls of Carlhage, 281 — The Romans lose their ally Masi-
nissa, 2S5 — Scipio in command, 2S9 — Attack on the Me-
gara, 293— Engagements between the fleets, 295 — Fighting
in the city, 297 — Successors of Carlhage, 301.
Index .
303
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
PAOI
VOTIVF. HAS-REIJEF TO PF.KSFrHONF. . . F7fliitisp7ecf
CARIHAGINIAN STELE FROM SULCI (SARDINIA). . . l6
PLAN AND SECTION OF A CARTHAGINIAN TOMB AT
MALTA 17
PHfENlCIAN SARCOPHAGUS FOITND AT SOLUN'lE (SICILV) 23
ONE OF THE TOWERS OF ERYX 36
CAKIHAGINLAN PLATTER-SILVER .... 40
THE WALL OF MOTYA 48
VOTIVE BAS-RELIEF 10 lERSEPHONF . . . 61
AFRICAN AQUEDUCT 79
RURAL CISTERNS . . .... 83
PLAN OF IHE RUINS OF U'MCA . . . 87
VOTIVE STELE FROM CARTHAGE (HIPPOPOTAMUS) 98
VOTIVE STELE TO TAN IT . I07
A SI KLE TO TAN IT . , . II O
VOTIVE STELE TO TANIT FROM CAR I HAGE . Ill
VOTIVE .STELES FROM CARTHAGE . . II3
CARTHAGINIAN COIN . II5
CARTHAGINIAN COIN (ELECTRUM) , . I 16
XX
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.
CARTHAGINIAN COIN (SILVER)
VOTIVE STELE FROM CARTHAGE .
WRITING-CASE
VOTI\E STELE (BULL)
DUILIAN COLUMN ....
RESERVOIRS OF CARTHAGE
CROSS SECTION OF CISTERN WALL. (FROM DAUX)
STELE AT LILYB7EUM
COIN : THE TEMPLE AND RAMPARTS OF EKVX
PHCENICIAN WALL AT ERYX .
POSTERN IN THE WALL OF ERYX
PLAN OF HARBOUR AT UTICA
MAP OF PENINSULA OF CARTHAC,
CROSSING THE ALPS
ITALIA SEPTENTRIONALIS
TREP.IA
italia meridionalis
the triple wall of thapsus
the great wall at thapsus
port of carthage (from sarcophagi)
the harbours of carthage (according to beul.l':
harbours of carthage (according to daux)
arrangements of the berths (according 'to
beul6)
plan of wall at bvrsa
african coliseum
PAGB
ii6
121
123
124
'35
142
'43
»55
J 59
161
162
169
173
191
197
203
255
281
2S3
2S7
290
291
293
293
299
PART 1.
LEGEND AND EARLY IILSTORY
1.— The Lkgenu ok Dido.
11.— TlIF CiROWTH OK CaKIHAGH.
Unforiunaiely we know very liitle about the history of this
period ; and that little is difficult to assign to any particular
time. Our chief authorities are Justin, a writer of uncertain
date, who wrote an epitome of an earlier work composed by
one Trogus Pompeius (B.C. 85-15?) ; and Polybius, who gives
us the te;;t of the treaties made between Carthage and R^nc.
Of Polybius we shall have something to say heiCaftsr.
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE,
THE LEGEND OF DIDO.
•• Malgernus, King of Tyre, died, leaving behind
him a son, Pygmalion, and a daughter, Elissa or Dido,
a maiden of singular beauty. Pygmalion, though
he was yet but a boy, the Tyrians made their
king. Elissa married Acerbas, whom some also call
Sichaeus, her mother's brother, and priest of Her-
cules. Among the Tyrians the priest of Hercules
was counted next in honour to the king. Acerbas
had great wealth, which he was at much pains to hide,
so that, fearing the king, he put it away, not in his
dwelling, but in the earth. Nevertheless the thing
became commonly known. Thereupon King Pyg-
malion, being filled with covetousness, and heeding
not the laws of man, and having no respect to natural
affection, slew Acerbas, though he was brother to his
mother and husband to his sister. Elissa for many
days turned away her face from her brother, but at
last, putting on a cheerful countenance, feigned to be
reconciled to him. And this she did, not because she
hated him the less, but because she thought to fly
from the country, in which counsel she had for abettors
4 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
many nobles of the city, who also were greatly dis-
pleased at the king. With this purpose she spake to
Pygmalion, saying, ' I have had enough of sorrow.
Let me come and dwell in thy house, that I be no
more reminded of my troubles.' This the king heard
with great joy, thinking that with his sister there
would also come into his hands all the treasures of
Acerbas. But when he sent his servants to bring his
sister's possessions to his palace she won them over
to herself, so that they became partakers of her flight.
Having thus put all her riches upon shipboard, and
taking with her also such of the citizens as favoured
her, she set sail, first duly performing sacrifice to Her-
cules. And first she voyaged to Cyprus, where the
priest of Jupiter, being warned of the gods, offered
himself as a sharer of her enterprize on this condi-
tion, that he and his posterity should hold the high
priesthood for ever in the city which she should
found. From Cyprus also she carried off a com-
pany of maidens, that they might be wives for
her people. Now when Pygmalion knew that his
sister had fled he was very wroth, and would have
pursued after her and slain her. Nevertheless, being
overcome by the entreaties of his mother, and yet
more by fear of vengeance from the gods, he let
her go ; for the prophets prophesied, ' It will go ill
with thee, if thou hinder the founding of that which
shall be the most fortunate city in the whole world.'
" After these things Queen EHssa came to Africa,
and finding that the people of those parts were well
affected to strangers, and had a special liking for
buying and selling, she made a covenant with them,
THE BUILDING OF CARTHAGE. 5
buying a piece of land, so much as could be covered
with the hide of an ox, that she might thereon refresh
her companions, who were now greatly wearied with
their voyage. This hide she cut into small strips that
she might thus enclose a larger piece. And after
wards the place was called Byrsa, which is, being
interpreted, the Hide.
" To this place came many of the people of the land,
bringing merchandize for sale ; and in no great space
of time there grew up a notable town. The people
of Utica also, which city had been before founded by
the men of Tyre, sent ambassadors, claiming kindred
with these new comers, and bidding them fix their
abode in the same place where they themselves dwelt.
But the barbarous people were not willing that they
should depart from among them. Therefore, by
common consent of all, there was built a fair city, to
which the builders gave the name of Carthage; and it
was agreed between Elissa and the people of the land
that she should pay for the ground on which the said
city was founded a certain tribute by the year. In
the first place where they were minded to lay the
foundations of the city there was found the head of
an ox. Of this the soothsayers gave this interpreta-
tion, saying, ' This signifieth a fruitful land, but one
that is full of labour, and a city that shall ever be a
servant to others.' Therefore the city was moved to
another place, where, when they began to dig founda-
tions again, there was found the head of a horse.
Thereupon the prophets prophesied again : * This
shall be a powerful nation, great in war, and this
foundation augurcth of victory.'
6 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
"After these things, the city greatly flourishing and
the beauty of Queen Eiissa (for she was very fair)
being spread abroad, larbas, King of the Moors, sent
for the chief men of Carthage to come to him ; and
when they were come he said, * Go back to the
Queen, and say that I demand her hand in marriage;
and if she be not willing, then I will make war upon
her and her city.' These men, fearing to tell the
matter plainly to the Queen, conceived a crafty device.
' King larbas,' said they, ' desireth to find some one
who shall teach his people a more gentle manner of
life ; but who shall be found that will leave his own
kinsfolk and go to a barbarous people that are as the
beasts of the field ?' The Queen reproved them, saying,
' No man should refuse to endure hardness of life if it
be for his country's sake ; nay, he must give to it his
very life, if need be.' Then said the messengers,
' Thou art judged out of thine own mouth, O Queen.
What therefore thou counsellest to others do thyself,
if thou wouldst serve thy country.' By this subtlety she
was entrapped, which when she had perceived, first she
called with much lamentations and many tears on the
name of her husband Acerbas, and then affirmed that
she was ready to do that which the will of the gods had
laid upon her. ' But first,' she said, ' give me the
space of three months that I may lament my former
estate.' This being granted to her, she built, in the
furthest part of the city, a great pyre, whereupon she
might offer sacrifices to the dead, and appease the
shade of Acerbas before that she took to herself
another husband. Upon this pyre, having first offered
many sheep and oxen, she herself mounted, having a
DIDb AND MNEAS. )
sword in her hand. Then looking upon the people
that was gathered about the pyre, she said, ' Ye bid
me go to my husband. See then, for I go.' There-
upon she drave the sword into her heart, and so fell
dead."
Such was the legend of the founding of Carthage
as Virgil found it when he was writing his great
poem, the yEneid. He took it, and boldly shaped it
to suit his own purposes. This is how he tells it.
".^ncas, saved by the gods from the ruin of Troy to
be the founder of Rome, comes after many wander-
ings to the island of Sicily, and thence sets sails for
Italy, the land which has been promised to him. But
Juno, who cannot forget her wrath against the sons
of Troy, raises a great storm, which falls upon his
fleet and scatters it, sinking some of the ships, and
driving the rest upon the shore of Africa, near to the
place where Elissa, who is also called Dido, had newly
founded her city of Carthage. By her he and his
companions are hospitably received. But this is not
enough for Venus, his mother. ' For,' says she to
herself, 'haply the mind of the Queen and her people
will change concerning my son, and they will deal
unfriendly with him and the men of Troy.' There-
upon she devises this device. She causes her son Cupid,
or Love, to take upon him the shape of Ascanius, the
young son of yEneas ; but Ascanius himself she carries
to her own bower in Cyprus, and there lulls him to
sleep. Meanwhile yEneas is entertained by the Queen
at a great banquet, and tells the story of the fall of
Troy and of his wanderings : and as he tells it. the false
8 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
Ascanius sits in the Queen's lap, and breathes into her
heart the spirit of love. After this comes Juno to Venus,
and says to her: ' Why should there be enmity between
me and thee ? I love Carthage, and thou lovest the
men of Troy. Let us make an agreement that these
two may join together in one city ; and to this end
let Dido take .^neas for her husband.' To this Venus
gave her assent ; and so it was contrived.
"But the thing pleased not Jupiter that vEneas
should so forget the greatness to which he was called.
Therefore he called Mercury, that was his messenger,
and said to him : ' Go to the Trojan chief where he
now lingers at Carthage, forgetting the city which he
must build in Italy, and tell him that he must make
ready to depart.' So Mercury bore the message to
yEneas ; and /Eneas knew that the will of the gods
was that he should depart, and bade his companions
forthwith make ready the ships. This they did ; and
when the time came, though it was sorely against his
tvill, ^neas departed, knowing that he could not re-
sist the will of the gods. And when Dido saw that
he was gone, she bade them build a great pyre of
wood, and mounting upon it, slew herself with the
very sword which ^Eneas had left in her chamber."
II.
THE GROWTH OP' CARTHAGL.
I HAVE said that it was a bold change by which
Virgil sought to shape the legend of Elissa or Dido
to suit the purpose of his own poem. Bold indeed it
was, for he brings together in the Queen of Carthage
and the Hero of Troy, persons who must have been
separated from each other in time by more than two
hundred years. Ascanius, he tells us himself in the
^neid, was to found Alba, and at Alba the kingdom
should remain for three hundred years, till the
priestess of Vesta should bear a son to Mars, who
should found the great city of Rome. There must
therefore have been more than three hundred years
between the coming of yEncas into Italy and the
founding of Rome. But, on the other hand, it was
commonly agreed that Carthage was not a hundred
years older than Rome. If we are to follow Justin,
from whom I have taken the legend told in the first
chapter, its foundation may be put in the year 850;
but it must not be supposed that this date is as cer-
tain as that of the Declaration of American Inde-
pendence, or that of the Battle of Waterloo.
The legend tells us that the first founders of Car-
thage came from Tyre. Very likely this is true- ; it.
10 THE STORY OP CARTHAGE.
is certain that they belonged to the nation of which
Tyre was the chief city, the Phoenicians, This people
dwelt in the little strip of land (not much larger than
the American State of New Hampshire, or about
twice the size of the English county of Yorkshire)
which is called Palestine, and which occupies tlie
south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean coast. The
inland tribes of this people, who are known to us ir
the Bible history under the name of Canaanites, weie
subdued and nearly destroyed by the Hebrews, when,
after their escape from slavery in Egypt, they invaded
the country about fourteen hundred years before
Christ. But many of the dwellers of the coast
remained unsubdued. In the south were the Philis-
tines with their five cities, almost always at war with
their Hebrew neighbours, sometimes almost conquer-
ing them,^ and sometimes, as in the days of David
and Solomon, paying tribute. In the north, again,
were the great cities of Tyre and Sidon. Between
these and the Hebrews there seems to have been
commonly friendship. They were a nation of sea-
men and traders, and they had to import the food ^
which they did not wish, or perhaps were not able, to
grow for themselves. For this food they paid either
with the produce of their own artists and handicrafts-
' Tlius we read (i Samuel xiii.) tliat the Israelites were obliged ta
go down to the Philistines to sharpen their tools, and that only the
king and the king's son possessed sword and spear.
^ Thus we find Solomon paying Hiram, king of Tyre, for the help
that he had given in the building of the Temple with wine and oil. And
more than a thousand years after, the men of Tyre are unwilling to
remain at enmity with King Herod, because their country is " nourished
from the king's country."
THE TYRIAN TRADERS. II
men, with timber cut in the cedar forest of Lebanon,
or work in bronze and iron, or rich purple dyes, or
with merchandize which they had themselves im-
ported. As traders, indeed, they travelled very far,
and while seeking new markets in which to buy and
sell, they made great discoveries. They went as far
south, some say, as the Cape of Good Hope, certainly
as far as Sierra Leone ; and as far north as Britain,
from which they fetched tin, and probably copper.
But I shall have more to say of this hereafter. It
was, however, chiefly the coasts of the Mediterranean
that they were accustomed to visit ; and along these
it was that they established their trading posts. It
is the story of the most famous of these posts that I
have now to tell.
The word Carthage — in Latin Carthago, and in
GvQQkKarchedon — contains in another form, changed to
suit European tongues, the word Kirjath, a name fami-
liar to us in the Bible in the compounds Kirjath-Arba
and Kirjath-Jearim.i Kirjath means "Town," and the
name by which Carthage was known to its own
inhabitants was Kirjath - Hadeschath, or the " New
Town " — 7iew, to distinguish it either from the old
town of Tyre, from which its settlers had come forth,
or from the older settlement of Utica, older by nearl)-
' These resemblances of Carthaginian and Hebrew names are very
interesting, and show us how close was the kindred between tJie Jews
and the Canaanite or Phuenician tribes, enemies to each other though
they mostly were. The chief magistrates of the city, for instance, had
the title of Sliophetivi, the Hebrew word for '"judges," which the
Romans changed into Suffdes. One of the Hamilcars again, of whom
I shall have to speak hereafter, bore the surname of Barca, and Barca
is the same as the Hebrew Barak, or " lightning."
12 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
three hundred years, which lay about fifteen miles to
the north-west.
The " New Town " was built in a little bay of the
great natural harbour, the finest and most com-
modious that is to be found along the whole of the
north coast of Africa, which is now called the Bay
of Tunis.i The site was very happily chosen. A
river, the Bagradas (now the Mejerda) was near.^
The land was well watered and fertile, rich with corn
and wine and oil. It is a proof of its natural ad-
vantages that within two centuries of its total de-
struction, Carthage became the third city of the Empire,
and that its modern successor is one of the largest
and most prosperous of all the purely Mahometan
cities of the world.
Of the city's early history we know very little ;
indeed, it may be said, nothing. More than two
centuries are an absolute blank. We hear nothing
for certain of Carthage and its doings, though we
may guess that it was busy trading, and sometimes
fighting with its neighbours and with the inhabitants
of the African coast, of Sicily, and of Spain. Then
about the middle of the sixth century B.C. (but the
date is quite uncertain) we hear of a certain king or
chief who bore the name of Malchus.3 Malchus
made war against the African tribe:, in the neighbour-
hood of the city, and subdued many of them. From
' The present city of that name occupies a site a little to the south-
east of the ancient Carthage. There was a Tunis or Tunes in classical
times, but it was always a small town.
* Its actual mouth was at Utica.
^ Note again the Hebrew names. The high priest's servant whose
ear Pcier cut ofT at Guthsemanc "was named Malchus."
MALCHUS AND MAGO. I3
Africa he crossed over into Sicily, and conquered a
part, doubtless the western part, of the island. From
Sicily, again, he went on to Sardinia. There he was
beaten in a great battle. The Carthaginians, who
were always cruel and often unjust to their defeated
generals, condemned him to banishment. Malchus
refused to obey, and led his army against his native
city. The magistrates sent out his son Carthalo to
intercede with him, but in vain ; Carthalo was seized
by his father, and actually crucified in sight of the
city walls. After a while the city was compelled to
surrender ; but Malchus was content with putting to
death ten of his chief opponents. Those whom he
spared not long afterwards brought him to trial, and
condemned him to death.
After Malchus came Mago, who still further in-
creased the military power of the city. His reign or
chief magistracy — Carthage once had kings, but it is
not easy to say when the title was abolished ; in-
deed it is sometimes given to the chief magistrate
down to a late period of her history — may be said
to cover the latter part of the sixth century B.C. And
now for the first time, the State takes a definite place
in history. The inhabitants of Phocaea, one of the
Greek colonies on the western coast of Asia Minor,
had fled from their native city rather than submit
to the rule of the Persians, binding themselves by
an oath never to return till a lump of iron which
they threw into the harbour should rise to the top
of the water. But before they had been long gone,
home-sickness proved stronger than their oath, and
more than half of them returned. The remainder
r4 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
pursued their journey with their wives and children,
and settled at Alalia in Corsica, a place which had
been already colonized by Greeks. There they took
to the trade of piracy, a more respectable employ-
ment, it must be remembered, then than now. After
five years the Carthaginians and the Etruscans, Rome's
neighbours on the north, and then an independent and
a powerful nation, combined against them. A great
sea-battle followed. The Phocaeans had the sixty
ships in which they had migrated from their native
town ; their enemies had double the number, half
coming from Carthage, half from the sea-ports on the
Etrurian coast. The victory fell to the Greeks ; but
it was a victory which was as bad as a defeat ; for
they lost forty out of their sixty ships, and they were
compelled to leave their new settlement and to seek
refuge elsewhere. This battle is supposed to have
happened in the year 536 B.C.
Twenty-seven years later we hear of Carthage
again. Polybius ^ tells us that he had himself seen
in Rome copies of the three treaties which had been
made between that State and Carthage. The oldest
of the three, written, he says, in language so anti-
quated that even the learned could scarcely under-
stand it, was concluded in the year 509, the next
after that in which the kings had been driven out
from Rome. The provisions of this treaty are in-
teresting. " The Romans and their allies shall not
sail beyond the Fair Promontory." The " Fair
Promontory " was to the north of Carthage. Polybius
thinks that the Romans were forbidden by this
' See the account of him in the Introduction to Part iv
TREATIES WITH ROME. 1 5
article of the treaty to sail southwards to the country
of the Little Syrtis (now the Gulf of Cabos), then
one of the richest in the world, and for that reason
called the Markets. It seems more probable that
" beyond the Fair Promontory " meant ivestward of
it, and that it was specially intended to protect the
Carthaginian markets in Spain. " Merchants selling
goods in Sardinia and Africa shall pay no customs,
but only the usual fees to the scribe and crier." The
Carthaginians, it seems, were, so far, " free traders."
" If any of the Romans land in that part of Sicily
which belongs to the Carthaginians, they shall suffer
no wrong or violence in anything." Finally, Cartha-
ginians bind themselves not to injure any Latin city,
whether it was subject to Rome or not. Some years
later — how many we cannot tell — we hear of another
treaty made between the same parties. The con-
ditions are now much less favourable to Rome. Two
other limits besides the Fair Promontory (unfor-
tunately we do not know what places are meant by
them) are imposed on the Roman traders. These,
too, are now forbidden to trade either in Sardinia or
Africa. They must not even visit these countries
except to get provisions or to refit their ships. In
Sicily and at Carthage they were allowed to trade.
The Carthaginians claim the power to take prisoners
and booty out of any Latin city not subject to Rome.
The city itself, however, they must yield up. In other
words, they were not to get a footing in Italy. It
is clear that in the interval the power of Carthage
had increased and that of Rome had decreased.
The latter city did indeed suffer many losses during
i6
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the first hundred years after the driving out of the
kings. So much we may see even from the flattering
accounts of the Roman historians.
We can thus get some idea of the power and
dominions of Carthage. It has power over much of
the coast of Africa, though it still continues to pay
a ground rent for the soil on which its capital was
rAKTIt \r,INIAN STKI.E FROM SUl.ri (SAK HI N' I a),
built. We hear, indeed, of this payment having been
refused in the days of Ilasdrubal and Hamilcar, sons
and successors of Mago, of the African tribes making
war for the purpose of enforcing it, and compelling
the Carthaginians to renew it. Sardinia it claims as
entirely its own. This island is said to have been
conquered by the Ilasdrubal and Hamilcar mentioned
CARTHAGINIAN POSSESSIONS.
r?
above, Hasdrubal dying of his wounds in the course
of the war. Of Sicily it has a part, of which I shall
say more hereafter. Malta probably belongs to it.
^\\\\\\\\\\\\<>^^vv\\>;i!^X^^^\C^^
Of Spain, which was afterwards to form an important
portion of the Empire, for the present we licar
nothing.
10 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
While Carthage was thus busy extending and
strengthening its dominions, it narrowly escaped a
great danger from what was then the most powerful
empire in the world. In the year 525 Cambyses, the
second king of Persia, conquered Egypt, a task which
he seems to have accomplished with great ease. He
then looked about for other countries into which he
might carry his arms. The great cities of Cyrene
and Barca, lying about five hundred miles to the west
of the mouths of the Nile, submitted to him. He
thought that he might push his conquests still further
in the same direction and make Carthage itself a
tributary. But a distance of two thousand miles and
more was too much for his army, and the conquest
would have to be made by his fleet. Here he met
with an obstacle which he could not overcome. The
fleet consisted for the most part of Phoenician ships,
and the Phoenicians refused to take part in the expe-
dition. "We are bound," said they, "to the Cartha-
ginians by solemn oaths. They arc, too, our children;
and it would be wicked in us to make war against
them." The Great King was obliged to be content
with this answer and to give up his scheme.
PART 11.
CARTHAGE AND GREECE.
I.— Hamilcar and Hannibal.
11.— Carthage and Dionysius (406-405).
III.— Carthage and Dionysius (397).
IV.— The Last Struggle with Dionysius.
v.— Carthage and Timoleon.
vr.— Carthage, Agathocles and Pvrrhus
Here our chief authority is Diodonis Siculus, a Greek writer
who " flourished " about the beginning of our era. He was a
native of Sicily, and in his Universal History, or " Historical
Library," as he seems to have called it himself, wrote an
account of the world from the earliest time down to his own
day. With this work he took much pains, travelling over
many of the countries of which he intended to write the
history, and collecting the works of authors who luid treated
the same subjects before him. Much of his History is lost,
but the ten books from the eleventh to the twentieth have been
recovered. As he was naturally very much interested in the
affairs of his own island, he seems to have taken special pains
with this part of his work, which includes the one hundred
and seventy-five years from the beginning of the second
Persian war (480) down to the year 305. He had before him
the best authorities, as, for instance, Timoeus, who wrote the
History of .Sicily from the earliest times down to 264 (he
himself died in 256, at the age of ninety-six) ; but he had not
much judgment in using his materials. Still, his book is of
very great value for this portion of our story. Fragments, too,
of the lost books that followed the twentieth have been
preserved. Justin also tells us something about this time, so
th.1t, on the whole, we have plenty of authorities.
HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL.
Stctt,Y would naturally be the place in which Car-
thage would first seek to establish a foreign dominion.
At its nearest point it was not more than fifty miles
distant ; its soil was fertile, its climate temperate ; it
was rich in several valuable articles of commerce. We
have seen that, in the treaty which was made with
Rome about the end of the sixth century B.C., the
Carthaginians claimed part of the island as their own.
It is probable that this part was then less than it had
been. For more than two hundred years the Greeks
had been spreading their settlements over the country ;
and the Greeks were the great rivals of the Phoenicians.
If they were not as keen traders — and trade was
certainly held in less estimation in Athens, and even
in Corinth, than it was in Tyre and Carthage — they
were as bold and skilful as sailors, and far more ready
than their rivals to fight for what they had got or for
what they wanted. The earliest Gieck colony in
Sicily was Naxos, on the east coast, founded by
settlers from Euboca in 735. Other Greek cities
sought room for their surplus population in the same
field ; and some of the colonics founded fresh settle-
ments of their own. The latest of them was Agri-
22 THE STORY OP CARTHAGE.
s^entum on the south coast, which owed its origin to
Gela, itself a colony of Cretans and Rhodians. As the
Greeks thus spread westward the Carthaginians retired
before them, till their dominions were probably reduced
to little more than a few trading ports on the western
coast of the island. As long, indeed, as they could
trade with the new comers they seemed to be satisfied.
They kept up, for the most part, friendly relations
with their rivals, allowing even the right of inter-
marriage to some at least of their cities.
But in point of fact they were only waiting their
opportunity, and the opportunity came when the
Persians invaded Greece for the second time. Some
historians tell us that it was agreed by the two
powers that a combined effort should be made, that, while
Persia was attacking the mother-country of Greece,
Carthage should attack its important colonies in Sicily.
Others insist that there is no proof of any such agree-
ment having been made. It is not easy to see what
proof we could expect to find. But there is nothing, 1
think, improbable about it. The Phoenician admirals
in the service of the Great King who had refused to
obey Cambyses when he ordered them to sail against
their kinsmen in Carthage, may very well have
managed a matter of this kind. Anyhow it is clear
that Carthage knew that the opportunity had come,
and eagerly seized it. One of the family of Mago,
Hamilcar by name, was appointed commander-in-
chief. He set sail from Carthage with a force which,
when it had been joined by auxiliaries gathered from
Sicily and elsewhere, amounted, it is said, to three
hundred thousand men. There would have been even
riicENiciAN SARCoriiAGUS TouNU AT s(n,uNri': (sicily),
hamilcar's army. 25
more had not the squadron which conv^cyed the
chariots and the cavalry been lost in a storm. The
number is probably exaggerated — the numbers in
ancient history are seldom trustworthy- — but we may
take as genuine the list of the nations from which the
army was recruited. The land-force consisted, wc
hear, of Phoenicians, Libyans, Sardinians, Corsicans
Iberians, Ligyes, and Helisyki. The first four names
need little explanation. The Phoenicians were
native Carthaginians and men of kindred race from
the mother-country of Phoenicia, from Cyprus, and
from other settlements on the Mediterranean shore.
Sardinia, we know from its mention in the treaty of
509, belonged to Carthage ; Corsica had probably been
since acquired. The Iberians were Spaniards, over
whose country Carthage was gaining some influence.
The Ligyes were the Ligurians from the north-
west of the Italian peninsula ;' the Helisyki may
have been Volscians, neighbours of Rome on the
south-east and for some time its most formidable
enemies.
Hamilcar reached Panormus (now Palermo) in
safety with the main body of his fleet. " The war is
over," he is reported to have said, thinking that only
the chances of the sea could have saved Sicily from
such an army as his. At Panormus he gave his army
three days' rest, and repaired his ships. Then he
marched on Himera. There he dragged his ships on
shore, and made a deep ditch and a rampart of wood to
protect them. His forces he divided between two camps.
The crews of his fleet occupied one, his soldiers the
' Tlie niudcrn ricdmont.
26 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
Other. The two covered the whole of the west side
of the city. A force from the city which encountered
his advance guard was driven in, and Theron, the
tyrant of Agrigentum, who had been appointed to
take command of the garrison by Gelon of Syracuse,
the most powerful monarch in the island, sent off in
hot haste for help to his chief Gelon had everything
ready, and marched at once with an army far greater
than any other Greek state could then have raised,
fifty thousand infantry and five thousand horse. After
thoroughly fortifying the camp which he had pitched
near the city, he sent out his cavalry to attack the
foraging parties of the Carthaginians. These suffered
a signal defeat ; and the people of Himera now
grew so confident that they actually threw open
the gateways which, in their determination to
make a desperate resistance, they had at first bricked
up.
The conclusive battle was not long delayed, and
Gelon is said to have won it by the help of a curious
stratagem. His scouts had intercepted a letter from
the people of Selinus to Hamilcar, in which there was
a promise that they would send on a day named a
force of cavalry to his assistance. Gelon instructed
some of his own horsemen to play the part of the
cavalry of Selinus. They were to make their way into
the naval camp of the Carthaginians, and then to
turn against their supposed allies. A signal was
agreed upon which they were to show when they were
ready to act. Gelon's scouts were posted on the hills
to watch for it, and to communicate it to the main
body of his army in the plain. The fight was long
THE FATE OF HAMILCAK 27
and bloody ; it lasted from sunrise to sunset, but the
Carthaginians had lost heart, and the Greeks were
confident of victory. No quarter was given, and by
night, one hundred and fifty thousand men (it must
surely be an impossible number! ) had fallen. The rest
fled to the hills, and were there compelled by want
of water to surrender to the people of Agrigentum.
Of the fate of Hamilcar nothing was ever certainly
known. Some said that he had been slain by the
pretended allies from Selinus ; others that, being busy
with a great sacrifice at which the fire was piled high
to consume the victims whole, and seeing that the
fortune of the day was going against him, he threw
himself into the flames and disappeared. His body
was never found, but the Greeks erected a monument
to his memory on the field of battle; and the Cartha-
ginians, though never accustomed to be even commonly
just to their beaten generals, paid him, after his death,
honours which it became a custom to renew year by
year. The rest of the story is curiously tragic. Twenty
ships had been kept by Hamilcar to be used as might
be wanted, when the rest of the fleet was drawn up.
These and these only escaped out of the three thou-
sand vessels of war and commerce, which Hasdrubal
had brought with him. But even these did not get
safe home. They were overtaken by a storm, and one
little boat carried to Carthage the dismal news that
their great army had perished.' The city was over-
' Note how a similar story is told of the return of Xerxes from Greece,
after his defeat in the Persian War. According to Herodotus (on
excellent authority, as he was born in 484, i.e. four years before the war)
Xerxes returned by land with a considerable part of his army ; neverthe-
less the Romnn poet Juvenal writes —
28 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
whelmed with dismay and grief. An embassy was
at once sent to Gelon to beg for peace. Peace was
granted, but on hard conditions. Carthage was to pay
a ransom of two thousand talents, to build two chapels
in memory of the event, and, one writer tells us,
to abolish the hideous practice of human sacrifices.
If this last condition was ever agreed to, it was
certainly not kept.
It has been said, and one would like to believe,
that the great battle of Himera, by which the Greek
colonies in Sicily were relieved from the pressing
fear of Carthage, was fought on the very same day
on which the Persians were defeated at Salamis.
Carthage could not have been long in recovering
from this loss, for we find her able soon afterwards
to dictate a treaty to Rome, but she did not meddle
with Sicilian affairs for many years. But in 410 a
Sicilian town, Egesta, invited her aid against their
neighbours of Selinus.^ Both towns were near the
Carthaginian settlements ; and it was possible that
these might suffer, if Sclinus, which was said to be
the aggressor, were allowed to become too powerful.
But probably the desire to avenge the defeat of
seventy years before was the chief reason why Car-
thage promised the help that was asked. It so
happened, too, that Hannibal, grandson of the Hamil-
" Through shoals of dead, o'er IjiHows red with gore,
A single ship the beaten monarch bore."
But then Juvenal wished to point the moral of " the vanity of human
wishes."
' Curiously enough it was a quarrel between these same two towns
that had been the immediate cause of the disastrous expedition of
Athens agaias*. SNvracuse.
HANNIBAL BEFORE SELINUS. 2g
car who had perished at Hi mora, was the senior of
the two first magistrates of the city. He had been
brought up in exile — for Gisco, his father, had been
banished after the defeat of Himera — and at this
very city of Sehnus. " He was by nature," says the
historian, " a hater of the Greeks," and he did all he
could to persuade his countrymen to undertake the
war.
After some negotiations which came to nothing,
Hannibal sent a force of 5,000 Africans and 800
Italian mercenaries to Sicily. The army of Selinus,
which was busy plundering the territory of their
enemies, was surprised, and lost a thousand men
and all the booty which it had collected. Selinus
now sent to Syracuse to beg for help, and Egesta,
on her part, made a fresh appeal to Carthage. This
appeal was answered in a way that took the Sicilians
by surprise. Hannibal had collected a great force of
Spaniards and Africans. This he carried to Sicily in a
fleet of as many as 1,500 transports, escorted by sixty
ships of war. It numbered, according to the smallest
estimate, 100,000 men, and was furnished with an
abundance of all the engines used for sieges. The
general lost no time. Without a day's delay he
marched upon Selinus, invested it, and at once began
the assault. Six towers of wood were brought up
against the walls ; battering-rams headed with iron
were driven against them, while a multitude of archers
and slingers showered arrows and stones upon their
defenders. The fortifications had been allowed, during
a long period of peace, to fall out of repair ; and the
Italian mercenaries were not long in forcing their
30 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
way in. These were driv^en out again with great loss,
and for a time the assault was suspended. The
besieged sent their swiftest horsemen to beg for
instant help from Syracuse, Gela, and Agrigentum.
It was promised, but while it was being prepared
Hannibal was pressing his attack with the utmost
fury. A great part of the wall was thrown down by
the battering-rams ; but the people of Selinus still
fought with the courage of despair. For nine days
and nights the struggle went on, every street, almost
every house, being fiercely contested. At last the
numbers of the barbarians overpowered resistance.
Between two and three thousand of the armed men
escaped ; about twice as many of both sexes were
made prisoners ; the rest were massacred. As many
as sixteen thousand bodies are said to have been
counted.
At the very time when Selinus was taken, the
advance guard of the Syracusan army reached Agri-
gentum. They tried to make terms with the con-
querors. An embassy was sent to Hannibal, begging
him to ransom the prisoners and respect the temples
of the gods. Hannibal replied, " The men of Selinus
have not been able to keep their freedom, and must
make trial of slavery. As for the gods, they have
left Selinus, being wroth with its inhabitants." To
a second embassy, headed by a citizen who had
always been on friendly terms with Carthage, he
made a gentler answer. The survivors might return,
dwell in their city and till their lands, paying tribute
to Carthage. The walls were razed to the ground, and
according to some accounts, the whole city was de-
ATTACK ON HIM ERA. 3I
stroyed. To this day the ruins of the temples show
the marks of the crowbars by which the columns were
overthrown.
But Selinus was not the real object of Hannibal's
expedition. That was to be found elsewhere, at
Himera, where, seventy years before, his grandfather
had perished. To Himera, accordingly (it lay on the
opposite, i.e. the north coast, of the island) he marched
without delay. Forty thousand troops he posted at
some distance from the city, probably to deal with
any relieving force from the other Greek cities. With
the rest of his army, now increased by twenty thou-
sand auxiliaries from the native Sicilians, he sur-
rounded the walls.
He did not intend, however, to wait for the slow
operation of a blockade, but attacked the town as
fiercely as he had attacked Selinus. The walls were
battered and undermined, and more than one breach
was made in them. At first he was repulsed. The
people of Himera fought with all the courage of their
race, and they had the help of four thousand soldiers
from Syracuse and elsewhere. The Carthaginians
were driven back, and the breaches repaired. This
success emboldened them to attack the besiegers.
Leaving a sufficient force to guard the walls, they
sallied forth, and fell on the hostile lines. Taken by
surprise, the Carthaginians gave way. Their very
numbers were against them, for they were too closely
thronged to be able to act, and suffered almost
more, says the historian, from each other than from
the enemy. The assailants, who numbered about ten
thousand, were roused to do their best by the thought
32 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
of their helpless kinsfolk, women and children and
old men, who were watching them from the walls.
At first it seemed as if Himera was to be another
Marathon. As many as six thousand of the besiegers
(to take the smallest and most reasonable computation)
were slain. But the pursuit was pushed too far.
Hannibal brought down his army of reserve from the
hills on which it had been posted, and fell upon the
victorious Greeks. A fierce fight ensued, but the
people of Himera and their allies were overpowered.
The main body of them retreated into the city, but
three thousand were unwilling or unable to leave
the field, and, after performing prodigies of valour,
perished where they stood.
At this crisis came twenty-five Syracusan ships of
war, which had been taking part in the war then
being carried on between Athens and Sparta. At
first the besieged were full of hope. It was rumoured
that, besides the ships, the Syracusans were coming to
their help with a levy e7i masse. But then came a
most disquieting report. Hannibal was filling, it was
said, his own ships with the picked troops of his army,
and intended to fall upon Syracuse when that city
should be stripped of its able-bodied men. The
Syracusan commander dared not stay at Himera in
the face of this alarm. The ships of war must, he
said, sail home at once. But they would take as
many of the helpless population of Ilimcra as they
could hold. The offer was accepted ; for dreadful as
it was thus to leave their homes, it was the only hope
of escape that the poor creatures had. The ships
were filled till they could hold no more. Then tlie
HANNIBAL'S VENGEANCE. 33
Syracusan general marched out of the town in such
haste, we are told, that he did not even stop to bury
his own dead. Many of tiic inhabitants who could
not be received on board the shi[)s accompanied him
on his march, preferring this to waiting for the return
of the fleet ; for this was to come back and carry off
the rest of the population.
It was well for them that they did so. The next
day the Carthaginians renewed the assault. The
besieged were sadly reduced in numbers and weary,
for after the battle of the day before they had spent
the night in arms upon the walls. Still they held out.
All that day the battle was kept up. On the morrow
the ships came back, but at the very moment of their
coming in sight a great part of the wall was broken
down by the battering-rams, and the Spaniards in Han-
nibal's army rushed in. A general massacre followed,
and was continued till Hannibal issued strict orders
that all that remained were to be taken alive. It was
no feeling of mercy that prompted these orders. The
women and children were divided among the con-
querors ; the men were taken to the spot where
Ilamilcar had been last seen alive, and there to the
number of three thousand cruelly slaughtered, an
expiatory sacrifice to the spirit of the dead. Himera
itself was utterly destroyed. The walls and houses
were razed to the ground ; the temples were first
plundered and then burnt.
The rest of the Greek cities in Sicily must have
trembled lest the fate which had fallen on Selinus
and Himera should overtake themselves. Jkit for the
time, at least, their fears were relieved. Hannibal
4
4
THE STORY 01' CARTHAGE
had done what he came to do, had avenged the
defeat of Himera, the death of his grandfather, and
his father's exile, and he v/as satisfied. He sent the
native Sicihans who had joined him to their homes,
dismissed many of his mercenaries, and, after leaving
sufficient force to hold the territory which he had
occupied, carried the rest of his army to Carthage.
He brought with him much spoil and many trophies,
and his countrymen received him with the highest
honours. He had won in a few weeks' time victories
that surpassed all that had ever been gained by
Carthac^e before.
II.
CARTHAGE AND DIONYSIUS (406-405).
Hannibal's success in Sicily had encouraged the
Carthaginians to hope that the whole island might
yet be theirs. They resolved on making another
expedition, and appointed Hannibal to the chief
command. At first he declined the office, pleading
his advanced age, but consented to act when Himilco
son of Hanno, a kinsman of his own, was joined with
him in the command. The two generals sent envoys
to treat with the chiefs in Spain and the Balearic
Islands ; they went themselves to enlist troops among
the African tribes and in the various Phoenician
settlements along the coast. Mercenaries were also
hired from other countries, and especially from Italy.
The Italians in Hannibal's former army, thinking
themselves badly treated by the general, had taken
service with Syracuse, and were, as their late general
knew, a very formidable force. At last in 406 — four
years, /.(?., after the first expedition — the invading force
set sail. They numbered, on the lowest calculation,
120,000; one writer puts them down at nearly three
times as many. They were carried across in more
than a thousand transports ; and these again were
convoyed by a fiect of one hundred and twenty ships
36
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
of war. The Greeks, taught by experience, were
resolved not to be behindhand this time with their
preparations for resistance. Forty Carthaginian ships
had been sent on in advance to Sicily. Against these
the Syracusans sent a squadron of equal strength.
The two fleets met near the famous promontory
ONK UK rill'; lowKKs oi' Kt:\ X.
of Eryx. After a long struggle the Greeks were
victorious, and sank fifteen of the enemy's ships, the
rest retiring to the African coast. Hannibal, hearing
of the reverse, sailed out with fifty fresh ships. Before
this new force the Syracuse squadron retired. It was
now evident that the invasion could not be prevented.
SIEGE OF AGRIGENTUM. 37
All that remained was to make the best possible
preparations for resisting it. Syracuse sent embassies
begging for help to the Greeks in Italy and to Sparta,
as well as to all the communities of the same race in
the island. The city which felt itself most in danger
was Agrigentum, the richest and most populous place
in the island after Syracuse, and, indeed, scarcely
inferior to that. The Agrigcntines lost no time in
preparing for defence. They engaged Dexippus, a
Spartan, who was then at Gela with a body of 1,500
soldiers, and they also hired the Campanian mer-
cenaries, eight hundred in number, who in the former
invasion had served under Hannibal. It was in May,
406, when the great Carthaginian host appeared
before their walls. Hannibal began by offering condi-
tions of peace. He proposed an active alliance ; if
this did not please the Agrigcntines, it would be
enough if they would be friendly to Carthage, but
take neither side in the war which she was preparing
to wage. The Agrigcntines, unwilling to desert the
cause of their countrymen, refused both offers. Then
the siege began. The town had a very strong
position, which had been carefully improved. It was
built on a range of hills, rising in some places to the
height of more than a thousand feet. On the slope
of these hills a wall had been built, or, in some places,
hewn out of the solid rock. Only one place was
practicable for an assault. Against this the Cartha-
ginian generals brought up their engines, especially
two towers, from which they attacked the defending
force upon the walls. The fighting lasted throughout
the day without any result ; at night the besieged
38 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
sallied forth and burnt the enemy's engines. Hanni-
bal then determined to use the stones of the tombs —
which, as usual, were outside the walls — to build
mounds from which he might renew the attack. The
most splendid of these tombs was the sepulchre of
Theron, who had reigned in Agrigentum some eighty
years before, and had borne a part in repelling the
first Carthaginian invasion. While the men were
busy in pulling it down it was struck with lightning.
A religious panic followed. The sentinels declared
that they were haunted by the spectres of the dead
whose graves had been violated. A pestilence broke
out in the camp. Great numbers died, and among
them Hannibal himself, and the prophets declared
that the gods were thus sharing their wrath at the
impiety which had been committed. Himilco ordered
that no more tombs should be pulled down. As an
expiation of what had been done, he sacrificed a child
to Saturn or Moloch, and threw a number of animals
into the sea as an offering to Neptune. Meantime he
pressed on the siege, damming up one of the rivers
by which three sides of the town were surrounded.
While he was thus engaged the relieving force arrived ;
it comprised auxiliaries from Magna Gra^cia^ and from
most of the Greek cities in the island. The general's
name was Daphna:us, and he had with him thirty
thousand infantry and five thousand cavalry. A
squadron of thirty ships of war sailed along the coast,
keeping pace with the army. Himilco sent against
them his Spanish and Italian troops. A battle was
' The name commonly given to the collection of Greek colonies in
Southern Italy. See " The Story of Rome," page 39.
kXECUftON OF THE GENERALS. j^
fouj:^ht on the western bank of the Himera, and was
obstinately contested. In the end the Greeks were
victorious, routing the enemy with the loss of six
thousand men. The whole force indeed might, it was
thought, have been destroyed but for the caution of
Daphnasus, Remembering how the men of Himera
had been attacked and slaughtered in just such a
moment of victory, he held back his men from pursuit.
The same fear that Himilco, who of course had vast
forces in reserve, might take them at a disadvantage,
kept the Agrigentine generals from sallying forth
upon the fugitives as they hurried past the walls.
When the relieving force had entered the city, there
was naturally much talk among the soldiers about
the events of the day. Some loudly accused the
generals of cowardice ; others even declared that
they had been bribed. The populace rushed to
the market-place and held a public assembly, be-
fore which the Agrigentine generals were put upon
their trial. Menes of Camarina, one of the leaders
of the relieving force, was the chief accuser. The
furious people would not listen to any defence from
the accused. Four out of the five were seized and
stoned to death ; the fifth was pardoned on account
of his youth.
At first Daphn;tus thought of attacking the Car-
thaginian camp ; but the place was too strongly
fortified, and he contented himself with scouring the
roads with his cavalry and cutting off the supplies.
The distress soon became very great ; many died of
starvation, and the mercenaries crowded round
1 Umilco's tent, clamouring for their rations, and dc-
4f>
THiE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
daring that unless they were satisfied they would
take service with the enemy. The general had just
heard that the Sx'racusans were taking a convoy of
CARTHAGINIAN VLATTKR-SILVEK.
provisions by sea to Agrigentum. His only hope of
relief was in getting hold of this. He entreated the
mutineers to wait for a few days.givingthem meanwhile
as pledges the costly drinking-cups and plate of the
AGRIGENTUM EVACUATED. 4I
Carthaginian officers. The Syracusan fleet had no
expectation of being attacked, as Himilco had never
attempted to claim command of the sea. They were
taken by surprise and completely defeated. Eight of
the ships of war were sunk, the others chased to the
shore, and the whole of the convoy captured. This
event changed the whole aspect of affairs. It was
A|jrigentum that was now in distress. Before long
the Italian mercenaries in the city departed. They
alleged that their time of service had expired ; but
it was said that Dexippus, their commander, had been
bribed by the besiegers to tell them that there was
no food in the city, and that they would find more
profitable service elsewhere. That there was no
food was too true ; for when the generals came
to examine the stores, they found that there was
nothing to be done but at once to abandon the
city.
That very night the plan was carried out. Guarded
by the troops from the pursuit of the Carthaginians, the
whole population of Agrigentum, with the exception
of some who could not and others who would not
leave their homes, crowded the road that led eastward
to Gela. At dawn Himilco entered the city. It was
one of the richest cities in Greece, and from its foun-
dation three hundred years before it had never had
an enemy within its walls. The houses were full of
pictures and statues, of rich furniture, of gold and
silver plate. The treasuries of the temple were rich
with the offerings of many generations of worshippers.
Himilco spared nothing. Everything that was valu-
able, sacred property as well as profane, was carried
42 THE STORY OF CARTHAGft.
off.^ The richest citizen of Agrigentum, unwilling to
leave his native country, had taken refuge in the
shrine of Athene. When he found that its sacredness
would not protect him, he set it on fire and perished
in the ruins. Himilco, who took the city just about
mid-winter (i.e., eight months after his first landing in
the island), occupied it till the spring of the following
year. When he was ready to take the field again, he
levelled the houses to the ground and defaced the
temples. This done he marched against Gela, ravaged
the country, which indeed there was no attempt to
defend, and then assailed the city. Gela was for the
time left to its own resources ; it was neither so well
placed nor so strongly fortified as Agrigentum. Still
it held out bravely, the women, who had refused to
be sent away to a place of safety, being conspicuous
by their courage.
Meanwhile Dionysius, the Syracusan commander,^
had collected a relieving force numbering, to take
' The most precious possession — indeed, the only one mentioned by
name — seems to have Ijcen the famous " Bull " of the tyrant I'halaris,
which dated back to about a century and a half before. The IJull had
been made by Perillus, a native worker in brass, as an instrument of
torture (victims were enclosed in it and roasted alive). The artist
is said to have been the first who suffered in it. This may be a fable ;
and, indeed, the story is told of more than one inventor of instru-
ments of cruelly, as, for instance, of Dr. Guillotine, contriver of
the machine which bears his name. But the existence of I'halaris
and his cruelty, and his use of this particular engine of torture,
seem to be historical facts, for they are alluded to by Pindar,
who was not much later in point of time. We shall hear of the Bull
again.
' This was the famous tyrant, the first of the name. He had tai<en
advantage of the discredit brought on his rivals by the Carthaginian
victories to establish himself in su])reme power at Syracuse.
GELA ABANDONED. 43
the lowest estimate, thirty thousand infantry and a
thousand cavalry, and accompanied by fifty decked
vessels. With this he marched to the help of Gela,
and pitching his camp between the Carthaginians and
the sea, endeavoured to cut off their supplies. After
twenty days' skirmishing, in which little good was
effected, he determined to make an attempt upon
the camp. The assault was to be delivered simul-
taneously from three places — from the sea, from the
western side of the city, and from that part of the
wall which was especially threatened by the siege
engines. The sea-front of the camp was the weakest ;
and here the attack, which was not expected, was
successful for a time, and, but for the failure of the
other movements, would probably have decided the
day. The division that was to operate on the west
was too late, for by the time it came into action
the fight at the sea- front was over. That which
was told off to attack the siege-works, and was
commanded by Dionysius himself, never came into
action at all.
Nothing now remained but to leave Gela to the
same fate which had overtaken Agrigentum and
Himera — to abandon it to the fury of the enemy.
This was done the same night, Himilco having been
put off his guard by a request from Dionysius that
he would grant a truce the following day for the
burial of the dead. All that had strength for the
journey left the city. Camarina was evacuated in
the same way. Both cities were plundered and
destroyed.
It now seemed as if the whole of Sicily were within
44 TtlE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the grasp of Cartliage. The only first-rate town that
remained to be conquered was Syracuse. We are
inclined to ask, " Why did not Himilco march upon
Syracuse after the fall of Gela and Camarina ? " just
as we shall be inclined to ask hereafter, " Why did
not Hannibal march upon Rome after Cannae?''
Doubtless he remembered that, a few years before,
the most powerful expedition ever sent forth by a
Greek state had been destroyed before the walls of
this same city. It must have been difficult, too, to
feed and pay so vast an army. But probably his
strongest reason was the second breaking out of
the plague. It had raged in his camp through the
summer of the year before ; and now that the
hot weather had returned it probably ^ broke out
again. Anyhow we know that when he returned to
Carthage he had lost half his army by sickness.
Whatever the cause, he sent unasked to Syracuse
envoys to treat for peace. Dionysius was only
too glad to listen, and a treaty was concluded on
these terms : —
1. Carthage was to keep her old settlements, and
those of the Sicanian tribes.
2. Selinus, Agrigentum, Ilimera, Gcla, and Cam-
arina, might be reoccupied by such of their old in-
habitants as survived. But they were to be unwalled,
and were to pay tribute to Carthage.
3. Lcontini, Messana, and the Sikxl tribes, were to
be independent.
4. Syracuse was to be under the rule of Dionysius.
' I say " probably " because the fact is not expressly stated by the
historian (Diodorus Siculus), though it is strongly implied.
THE PLAGUE AT CARTHAGE, 45
5. Prisoners and ships taken by either party were
to be restored.
Successful as the campaign had been it ended in
disaster to Carthage. The army carried back the
plague with it. Carthage and the neighbouring dis-
tricts caught the infection, and multitudes perished.
III.
CARTHAGE AND DIONYSTUS (397).
We have seen that the rule of Dionysius, in Syracuse
was one of the articles of the treaty of 405. Such
foreign support, of course, did not tend to make him
popular, and as soon as he felt himself strong enough,
he threw it off. In 397 he called an assembly of the
Syracusans, whom he was then doing his best to
conciliate, and proposed war against Carthage.
"Just now," he said, " Carthage is weakened by the
plague ; but she has designs against us which she will
carry out on the first opportunity. We had better
deal with her before she has recovered her strength."
The people greatly approved the proposal ; all the
more because Dionysius allowed them to plunder the
property of Carthaginian citizens who where residing in
Syracuse, and the ships of Carthaginian merchants that
happened to be in harbour. News of what had been
done spread over the island, and produced something
like a massacre. Carthage had used her victory
cruelly, and her misdeeds were now remembered
against her. Carthaginian rule was oppressive, espe-
cially in the amount of tribute which was exacted ; and
Carthaginian habits and ways of life seem to have been
particularly offensive to the taste of the Greeks. The
SIEGE OF MOTYA. 47
result was a rising in the Greek cities vvhicli had been
made tributary by the last treaty. Most of the Car-
thaginian residents perished. The example of the
Greeks was soon followed by the native Sicilians, and
in a very few days the dominions of Carthage in the
island were reduced to her strongholds on the western
coast.
All this happened before war had been formally
declared. This declaration Dionysius did not omit
to make. He sent envoys to Carthage with a message :
if she would restore freedom to the Greek cities of
Sicily she might have peace ; otherwise she must pre-
pare for war. For war Carthage was but ill prepared.
The losses of the last campaign, and of the pestilence
which had brought it to an end, had been terrible.
Still it was impossible to accept the condition
which had been offered, and the government prepared
to resist. Of money, at least, they had an unfailing
supply, and with money they could always purchase
men. Some members of the council were at once
sent off with large sums to hire mercenaries in
Europe.
Dionysius, probably without waiting for the return
of his envoys, marched to the west of the island.
Mis object of attack was Motya, the chief harbour and
arsenal of Carthage in Sicily. He was joined on his
way by the whole force of all the Greek cities, and his
army numbered eighty thousand infantry and upwards
of three thousand cavalry, while he had a fleet of two
hundred ships co-operating with him. Motya was
strongly situated on an island divided from the main-
land by a chnnnel six furlongs broad. This channel
48
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
was ordinarily crossed by a mole. But the mole
could be removed in time of necessity, and this was at
once done. Dionysius, after reconnoitring the place in
company with his engineers, set about a siege. The
harbour and all the shore were blockaded, and the
channel, or at least part of the channel, was filled up,
so that the engines might be brought up to the walls
of the city. On the other hand, Himilco, who had
been put in command of the Carthaginian force, was
rilK WALL OK MO I
not idle. lie sent ten ships from Carthage to Syra-
cuse itself, and destroyed much of the shipping in the
harbour. He then made a more formidable attack on
the besieging force at Motya. Taking command in
person of a squadron of a hundred ships he crossed by
nignt from Carthage to Selinus, and sailing thence
along the coast appeared at daybreak off Motya, sank
or burnt the blockading squadron, and made his way
into the liarbour. The Greek ships were drawn upon
MOTYA ASSAULTED. 49
land, and Dionysius did not venture to launch them.
The harbour was too narrow for him to use his numbers
with advantage. But he constructed a road of planks
across a neck of land which divided the harbour from
the sea, and made his men drag his ships along this.
When Himilco endeavoured to interrupt the work he
was driven off with showers of missiles from the Syra-
cusan force on land, and by the arrows discharged
by the catapults. Catapults were a new invention at
the time, and probably caused something of the con-
sternation which is felt by savages at the first sight
of firearms. Himilco, whose fleet was only half as
strong as that opposed to him, did not venture to
give battle, but returned to Carthage.
The attempt at relief having thus failed, Dionysius
pushed the siege vigorously. The walls were battered
with the rams, while the catapults, with a constant
discharge of arrows, drove the garrison from the walls.
Towers were wheeled up against the fortifications.
They had six stories, each of them filled with men,
and were as high as the houses of the town. The
people of Motya, on the other hand, defended them-
selves vigorously. They raised great masts with yard-
arms, from which men, protected from the missiles of
the besiegers by breastworks, threw ignited torches
and bundles of flax steeped in pitch on the engines
that were being used against the walls. Some of these
were set on fire, and the assailants had to turn their
attention to extinguishing the flames. Still the attack
went on, and before long the rams made a breach in the
wall. A fierce battle followed. The Greeks burned
to avenge the cruelties that had been done to their
s
50 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
countrymen ; the Phcenicians, who could hope for no
mercy, and who had no way of escape open to them
cither by sea or land, resisted with the courage ol
despair. When they had to give up the walls, they
made barriers across the streets, and defended every
liouse as if it had been a fort. The Greeks brought
their siege-towers into the streets, and from them
made their way into the upper stories of the houses.
Still the people of Motya did not lose courage, but
fought with a resolution which reminds us of the Jews
when they defended Jerusalem against the Romans
under Titus. The Greeks suffered heavily in this
street fighting. Their opponents were utterly reckless
of their lives, and they knew the place where they
were fighting. At last a stratagem succeeded where
force had failed. For several days the Greeks had
retired from the conflict as evening approached, the
signal for retreat being given by a trumpet, and the
people of the town came to regard this as the regular
course of things. But one night Dionysius sent a
picked force to renew the attack after dark. This
detachment established themselves in some of the
houses before the besieged were aware of what had
happened ; the rest of the army poured across the
channel now filled up, and Motya was taken. One
of the horrible massacres which make these wars so
terrible followed. Dionysius tried in vain to stop it,
not so much from any feeling of mercy, as because
prisoners might be sold for slaves, and would bring in
considerable sums of money. The soldiers paying no
heed to his orders, he made proclamation that such of
the inhabitants as still survived should take shelter in
HIMILCO'S ADVANCE. 5I
the temples. This was effectual. The soldiers then
began to plunder. This Dionysius did not attempt
to hinder. Wishing to encourage his men for the
campaign which lay before them, he gave up to them
all the booty in the town. To the leader of the party
which had surprised the town he made a present of
about ;^400, and was liberal in his gifts to all who had
distinguished themselves.
Carthage meanwhile had been preparing a formid-
able force with which to re-establish her dominion in
Sicily. It amounted to one hundred thousand men,
taking again, as being the most probable, the smallest
estimate. Thirty thousand more joined it after it had
landed in Sicily. Himilco was appointed to the
command. Aware that Dionysius had his spies in
Carthage, he gave to the captain of each transport
sealed orders directing them to sail to Panormus.
They were attacked on their way by a Syracusan
squadron, which sank fifty of their number, and with
them five thousand men and two hundred chariots.
Himilco then came out with his war-ships, and the
Syracusans retired. The Carthaginian general marched
along the coast to Motya, and recovered it without
any difficulty. Dionysius did not venture to attack
him, but retired to Syracuse.
Himilco now conceived a very bold scheme,
nothing less than to make his way to Messana, in
the extreme north-east of the island. It had an
admirable harbour, capable of holding all his ships,
which numbered more than six hundred. It was near
the mainland of Italy, from which he hoped to draw
fresh forces, and it commanded the approach from
52 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
Greece. He marched along the north coast, his fleet
accompanying him, and pitched his camp at Pelorum,
^he extreme north-eastern point of Sicily, which was
about twelve miles from the city. The Messanians
were struck with terror. Their walls were out of
repair ; they had no allies at hand, and part of their
own military force was absent at Syracuse. The
first thing was to send away the women and children
and the most precious of their possessions. Then they
prepared for defence. Some were encouraged by
remembering an old oracle, " The sons of Carthage
shall bear water in the streets of Messana," which they
took to mean that there should be Carthaginian slaves
in their city. They sent a military force to the spot
where Himilco was encamped, with instructions to
resist any attempt to occupy the country. Himilco
at once sent a squadron of two hundred ships to
attack the town, which would now, he reckoned, be
almost stripped of defenders. An opportune north
wind carried the ships rapidly to their destination —
more rapidly than the Messanian soldiers could follow
them. Himilco's hopes were fulfilled. His ships
landed the troops which they carried. These made
their way into the city through the spaces in the
walls, and the place was captured almost without a
struggle. Some of the Messanians fell in a vain
attempt at resistance; many took refuge in the neigh-
bouring forts; two hundred and more had recourse to
the desperate expedient of swimming the strait be-
tween their city and Italy. Fifty succeeded in the
attempt. Himilco, after trj'ing in vain to capture the
forts, marched on Syracuse,
n.\TTLE OF CATANA. 53
His first object was the city of Catana, which
lay on the southern slopes of Mount ^tna. His
original plan was to march his army along the coast,
with the fleet keeping pace with it. But this plan
could not be carried out. A severe eruption of yEtna
took place at the very time of his march, and the
stream of lava which poured down the eastern or sea-
ward slopes of the mountain made it necessary for
him to make a circuitous march round the western
side.
Dionysius at once took advantage of this division
of the Carthaginian forces, resolving to attack the
fleet while it was unsupported by the neighbourhood
of the army. He marched with his own army along
the sea-coast nearly as far as Catana, while Leptines,
the Syracusan admiral, sailed alongside with the fleet.
Mago, who was in command of the Carthaginian
ships, felt at first no little dismay at the sight of the
combined force which was coming to meet him. He
had, however, no alternative but to fight ; and indeed
his fleet was a very powerful one, numbering, along
with the transport ships, which were furnished with
brazen beaks for purposes of attack, as many as five
hundred ships. The Syracusan admiral, who probably
bore the character of being too adventurous, had been
strictly ordered by Dionysius to keep his fleet in close
order, and on no account to break the line. It was
only thus that he could hope to hold his own against
the superior numbers of the enemy. These orders
he disregarded. Picking out thirty of his fastest
sailers, he advanced far ahead of the rest of the fleet,
and boldly attacked the Carthaginians. At first he
5( THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
was successful, sinking many of his antagonists
But the numbers which were brought up against
him were overwhelming. It became more and
more difficult to manoeuvre ; at close quarters, when
it was possible for the enemy to board, one ship,
however skilfully commanded, was not much better
than another. Before long Leptines was glad to
escape to the open sea with such of the ships as
were left to him. The rest of his fleet, who had
thus lost the leadership of their admiral, and who
came on in disorder, made but little resistance to the
enemy. More than a hundred ships were taken or
destroyed. Nor was the near neighbourhood of the
army on shore of much service to those who tried to
escape from the wrecks. The Carthaginians had
manned a number of boats which intercepted the
fugitives, and slaughtered them in the water before
the eyes and within the hearing of their countrymen.
.VIore than twenty thousand men are said to have been
lost by the Greeks in this battle.
Dionysius was strongly urged to meet liimilco at
once before the news of the disaster to the fleet had
become known through Sicily. At first he was in-
clined to follow the advice. But more cautious
counsels prevailed, and he retreated on Syracuse.
This was probably a mistake. Not only did he
disgust many of his allies, but he lost an op])ortunity
of inflicting a great blow on the enemy. Immediately
after the battle bad weather came on, and the Cartha-
ginian fleet could not keep the sea. Had the Greek
army still occupied their position on the shore they
might have inflicted immense damage on their
SIEGE OF SYRACUSE. 55
opponents. As it was, Himilco came up with Iiis
army in time to assist his fleet. His own ships, and
those which had been captured from the Greeks, were
drawn up on the shore and repaired. The men had
some days given them for rest and refreshment ; and
he then marched on to Syracuse. Before starting for
this last stage he sent envoys to the Httle town of
^tna, where the Italian mercenaries of Dionysius
were strongly posted, inviting these troops to change
side and take service with himself They were
strongly inclined to do so, but could not. They had
given hostages to their master, and their best troops
were actually serving in his army. They were thus
compelled to refuse the offer, and Himilco was
obliged to leave them in his rear.
On arriving at Syracuse his first step was to make
a great demonstration of force. He sailed into the
Great Harbour with all his fleet. There were more
than two hundred ships of war, which he had adorned
with the spoils of those captured off Catana, and
nearly two thousand others of all kinds and sizes.
The harbour, though measuring more than a mile
and a half one way and two miles and a half the
other, was absolutely crowded with them. The army
is said to have numbered three hundred thousand ;
but this is doubtless an exaggeration. Altogether the
display of force was overwhelming, and the Syracusans
did not venture to show themselves outside either
their harbour or their walls.
The Carthaginian general prepared to blockade the
city, building three forts, which he stored with wine
and other provisions. His merchants were sent at
56 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the same time to Sardinia and Africa to fetch new
supplies. Dionysius, on the other hand, sent to Greece
and Southern Italy in the hope of collectin^j a force of
volunteers and mercenaries.
The tide of success now began to turn against
Carthage. One of Himilco's corn-ships was approach-
ing his camp when five of the Syracusan ships sallied
forth from the Inner Harbour and captured it. The
Carthaginians sent out a squadron of forty ships to
drive off the assailants. On this the Syracusans manned
their whole fleet, attacked the hostile squadron, sink-
ing twenty-four out of the forty, and capturing the
admiral's ship. They then paraded their force in
front of the Carthaginian position, and challenged the
invaders to a general engagement. The challenge
was not accepted.
And now, for the third time, pestilence, the old ally
of the Greeks, appeared to help them. Himilco had
shown himself as careless of the relifjious feelings, not
only of his foes, but also of his friends, as his prede-
cessors had done. He had broken down the tombs
outside the city to get materials for his forts, and he
had robbed such temples as, being without the line of
fortifications, had fallen into his hands. One specially
rich and famous shrine had been thus treated, that of
Demetcr and Persephone.' It was to this impiety
that the disasters were generally attributed ; but the
natural causes at worlc were sufficient to account for
them. An enormous force was crowded together.
It was the most unhealthy season of the year ; and
the heat of the summer, that was now coming to an
' Ceres nnrl Proserpine.
PLAGUE IN niMILCO'S CAMP. 57
end, had been unusually great. The plague that now
broke out in the army seems, from the description
that the historian gives of it, to have been much of
the same type as the disease now known by that
name. It began with swellings, and ended, after a
most painful illness of five or six days, almost inva-
riably in death. The danger or the fear of infection
prevented due attention to the sick, or even the burial
of the dead. We are told that as many as one hun-
dred and fifty thousand corpses at one time lay
rotting on the ground. The marvel is, if this or any-
thing like this be true, not that so many died, but
that so many survived.
The Syracusans did not fail to take advantage of
the distress of the invaders. Dionysius planned a
simultaneous attack by sea and land. Leptincs, with
a Spartan officer, was put in command of a squadron
of eighty ships, and Dionysius himself directed the
movements of the troops. He marched out of the
city at night, and delivered an unexpected attack
about daybreak on the landward side of the Cartha-
ginian camp. At first he suffered a reverse ; but this
he had fully planned, for it enabled him to get rid of
a body of disaffected mercenaries. Put in tne front,
and deserted by the troops which should have sup-
ported them, they were cut to pieces by tlic Cartha-
ginians. But when Dionysius advanced in force,
these, in their turn, were driven back, and one of the
forts was captured. Meanwhile the Syracusan ships
attacked on the other side. The Carthaginian ships
were but ill manned, a great part of their crews having
doubtless perished in the plague. Anyhow tliey suf-
58 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
fered a crushing defeat, and the army, weak itself, and
distracted by the assailants on the other side, could
give them no very effectual help. Many of the ships
were deserted. To these the Greeks set fire. The
flames spread from vessel to vessel till nearly the
whole of the fleet, both war-ships and merchantmen,
was in a blaze. They even spread to the camp,
which itself was, at least in part, consumed. In short,
the victory of the Syracusans was complete, and
Dionysius encamped that night near the temple of
Zeus, in which Himilco had lately had his head-
quarters.
Reduced to these straits, the Carthaginian general
resolved to open communications with Dionysius
personally, and without the knowledge of the people
of Syracuse. He offered three hundred talents if he
would allow him to remove to Africa what was left of
his army. Dionysius replied that it would be quite
impossible to conduct so extensive an operation as
the removal of the whole of the army without excit-
ing the suspicion of the people. But Himilco himself
and the Carthaginian officers would be allowed to
escape. He was not anxious to push the Cartha-
ginians to extremities. Their friendship might be
useful to him on some future occasion, for his own
power was not very firmly established, and he had
more than one proof of late that there was a strong
party at work in Syracuse to overthrow it. Himilco
accepted these terms. It was arranged that he and
the other native Carthaginians should depart secretly
on the fourth night following, and Dionysius led back
his army to the city. The money was duly sent, and
HIMILCO'S ESCAPE. 59
at the time appointed, Himilco, with his officers and
friends, and such of his troops as belonged to Car-
thage, embarked. They filled, it is said, forty ships
of war. Their escape did not pass unnoticed. News
of what was going on was taken to Dionysius. As he
seemed to be tardy in his movements, the Corinthian
ships that were in harbour acted for themselves, pur-
sued the fugitives, and captured some of the worst
sailers in the squadron.
The army that was thus shamefully abandoned by
its general fared, perhaps, better than might have
been expected. The native Sikels at once left the
camp, and thus anticipating the attack of the Syra-
cusans, reached their homes for the most part in
safety. The Spaniards offered such a bold front to
their enemies, that Dionysius was glad to take them
into his own service. The rest of the army surren-
dered, and were sold as slaves.
Himilco did not long escape the punishment which
was due to his treachery and cowardice. All Carthage
was plunged into mourning by the terrible disaster
which had happened. Every house, every temple,
was closed ; all rites of worship were stopped, and
private business was suspended. The city crowded
to meet the ships which were bringing back Himilco
and his followers, and inquired the fate of friends
and relatives. When the whole truth was known, a
cry of wailing went up from the crowd. The general
himself landed from his ship clad in the meanest
garb. Stretching his hands to the sky, he bewailed
aloud the disasters which had fallen on himself and on
his country. The only consolation whicli he ccjuld
6o THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
offer was that he had been conquered not by the
enemy, but by the will of heaven. At the same time
he publicly confessed his own impiety, and took
the blame of what had happened on himself. After
visitini^ every temple in the city with this confession
on his lips, he went to his own house, blocked up his
doors, and, refusing admission even to his own chil-
dren, starved himself to death.
The misfortunes of Carthage were not yet at an
end. She had seemed to be on the point of subduing
all Sicily, and indeed only one city remained to be
taken ; and within a few months she had to fight for
her own existence. Her African allies and subjects,
with whom she seems to have been exceedingly un-
popular, rose by one consent against her. An army
numbering one hundred and twenty thousand was
soon raised. They made their headquarters at Tunes,
and for a while, so superior was their strength, kept
the Carthaginians within their walls. For a time the
city was in despair. Besides the visible dangers that
threatened, the people dreaded the anger of heaven.
Their general had grievously insulted the gods of
Greece. He had made a dwelling-house of one temple
at Syracuse, and had robbed another. The govern-
ment at once set itself to calm these fears. The
offended gods, especially Dcmcter and Persephone,
who had never before been worshi[)pcd in Carthage,
were [)ropitiatcd by sacrifices in Greek fashion, which
the handsomest youths of Greek race that could be
found were appointed to perform. This done, they
applied themselves to the business of defending the
city. And indeed the danger was soon over. 'J'he
CARTHAGE SAVED.
63
hosts that threatened them were nothing more than
irregular levies, who could not agree among them-
selves, and who had no leaders worthy of the name.
Provisions soon failed them, for they had no ships,
whereas the Carthaginians had command of the sea,
and could import as much food as they wanted from
Sardinia. Nor was it only in this way that their vast
wealth served them. They used it also to buy off
some of their most formidable enemies. In the course
of a {ew months the great Libyan army broke up,
and Carthage was safe.
IV.
THE LAST STRUGGLE WITH DIONYSIUS.
The power of Carthage was now limited to a small
region in the western part of the island. But she was
not content to remain within these borders ; and she
seized the first opportunity of seeking to extend
them. Dionysius had set himself to reduce the native
tribes — always hostile to the Greeks, and always
ready to swell the forces of an invader. The Sikels
(there were two tribes of the natives, Sikels and
Sikanians) had established a new settlement at Tau-
romenium. Dionysius did his utmost to capture this
place, but was repulsed with much loss, and was him-
self wounded. Some of the Greek cities now threw
off their allegiance ; and the Sikels generally rose
against him. The general in command of the Car-
thaginian districts — Mago by name — who had been
doing his best to make himself popular among sub-
jects and neighbours, at once took the field, and
ventured to march as far eastward as Messana.
Dionysius encountered him on his way back, and after
a fierce battle defeated him, Mago losing as many
as 8000 in the struggle. Carthage, however, was now
beginning to recover her strength; and was resolved
to make another effort to regain, at least, part of the
MAGO DEFEATED. 65
island. She drew from her usual recruiting grounds
— Africa, Sardinia, and Italy — a force of 80,000 men,
and sent it into Sicily, with Mago again in command.
Mago marched through the country of the native
tribes, calling them all to take up arms against
Dionysius, but failed with one at least of the most
powerful chiefs. Receiving this check he halted.
Meanwhile, Dionysius had collected a force of
20,000 ; with this he marched against the invaders,
and making common cause with the Sikel chiefs, soon
reduced them to extremities. The battle which Mago
wished to force on him, and which some of his own
followers desired, he declined. The Carthaginians,
encamped as they were in their enemies' country,
found their supplies fall short, and were obliged to
sue for peace. It was granted ; but one of the condi-
tions was that the Sikels, valuable allies in past time
to Carthage, should now be subjects of Syracuse. So
far the war ended in a distinct loss to the Phoenician
power.
The next war seems to have been ^^lovokcd by
Dionysius. His position at Syracuse was now firmly
established, and his power had steadily increased.
He was now desirous to consolidate it by finally
expelling his remaining rivals from the island. The
dependencies of Carthage were, as usual, disaffected.
Dionysius listened to their complaints, encouraged
them to revolt, and received them into alliance with
himself Carthage sent embassies to complain 0/
these proceedings, and receiving no redress, resolved
upon war. Foreseeing that it would be a formidablr
undertaking, they made more than ordinary prcpara-
6
66 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
tions. Besides hiring, as usual, a large force of mer-
cenaries, they also raised a body of troops of their
own citizens, a most uncommon circumstance, and
indicating their sense that it was a critical time to
which they had come. The war seems to have been
carried on — why and how we do not very clearly know
— both in Italy and Sicily. Of the operations in Italy
we know little or nothing. In Sicily two great battles
were fought. The first was at Cabala. In this
Dionysius inflicted a severe defeat on his opponents,
killing, it is said, more than io,ooo, and taking as
many as 5,000 prisoners. The survivors were com-
pelled to take refuge on a height where there was
no supply of water. Mago, the general, had fallen
in the engagement. The Carthaginians began ne-
gotiations for peace. Dionysius replied that he
would grant it only on these conditions, that they
should evacuate all the towns in Sicily, and should
pay an indemnity for the expenses of the war. The
terms seemed harsh beyond endurance ; but it was
necessary to temporize. The generals in command
replied that they were not competent to make so
important a treaty on their own authority, especially
as the surrender of Carthaginian towns was con-
cerned. They must refer the matter to the autho-
rities at home, and they begged for a few days' truce.
This Dionysius readily granted. Meanwhile the Car-
thaginians prepared for resistance. They gave a
magnificent funeral to the remains of Mago, and
appointed his son, a mere youth in years but singu-
larly able and brave, to take the command. Every
hour of the time was spent in drilling the troops and
DEFEAT OF DIONYSIUS. 67
making them ready to renew the war. When the
truce expired, they marched out of their camp and
offered battle to Dionysius. The engagement took
place at Cronium, and ended in disaster to the Greeks.
Dionysius commanded one wing, and his brother
Lcptines, of whom we have heard as admiral of the
Syracusan fleet more, than once before, led the other.
Dionysius, who had the best troops of the army under
him, was for a time successful ; Leptines was de-
feated and slain. When his death became known
throughout the army there was a general panic. The
Carthaginians gave no quarter, and by the time that
the darkness put an end to the pursuit, 14,000 Greeks,
it is said, had perished. The Carthaginians, however,
did not pursue their victory, but retired to Panormus.
Anxious to secure what they could before fortune
turned against them, they sent an embassy to Syra-
cuse offering peace. Dionysius was glad to accept
their terms. These were, that a thousand talents
should be paid by way of indemnity, and that Car-
thage should have, besides their own towns, Selinus
and its territory, and all that had belonged to Agri-
gentum west of the Halycus.
This treaty was kept for fifteen years. Then Diony-
sius saw another opportunity of attacking his old
enemy Carthage was again suffering from the evils
which seem to have troubled her over and over again
— pestilence, and revolt among her African subjects.^
• Eleven years before we hcnr a story of how the Carthaginians sent
an expedition to Italy ; and how, after it had been broui^ht to a success-
ful end, a terrible plague broke out at home, so lcrril)le that Carthage
was lik<ly to lose her dominions, both Africa and Sardinia revolliiij^
68 TH.T STORY OF CARTHAGE.
On the ground that the Carthaginians had trespassed
beyond their boundaries, he marched into their terri-
tory with an army of 38,000 infantry and 3,000
horse. Selinus, Entellus, and Eryx, either were
conquered or capitulated ; and he then laid siege to
Lilyb^Eum, a flourishing port near the promontory of
that name. At first he pressed the siege with vigour,
but found that the place was too strongly garrisoned
to be soon taken. Then came news that the docks
at Carthage had been burnt. Thinking that all the
enemy's fleet must have perished, he sent many of
his own ships home, keeping a squadron of 130 at
Eryx. The Carthaginians, who seem not to have
suffered so much as had been thought, manned two
hundred ships and sent them to Sicily. The Greek
admiral was taken by surprise, and lost more than
half his squadron. As winter was now approaching
a truce was concluded. Before the time for another
campaign had come, Dionysius was dead.'
ag.iinst her. "At this time," snys tlic liistorian I)iiHh)rus, "lliere
fell on the Cartiiaginian.s many troubles by the ordering of the gods,
strange terrors and unceasing panic fears, making men think that
the enemy had entered into the city, so that they leapt armed out of
their houses, an<l fell u|ion one anuiher, slaying some and wounding
some."
' lie (lied, it was said, from the effects of a banquet which he had
given to celebrate the success of one of his tragedies in a competition at
Athens. An oracle had told him that he should die when he got the
better of them that were better than he. He had understood this to
mean the Carthaginians, and, says liie historian, somewhat ai)surdly,
had always been careful not to push too far his victories over them
But the real meaning of the prophecy was quite different. lie was a
bad ]ioet, and yet, by the verdict of flattering judges, was jutiged to be
better than poets who were really better than he. When his tragedy
\|Vas successful, tl^e oracle was fuUilled. an<i he die(|.
THE END OF THE WAR.
69
The war was not finished by his death, but nothing
more of much consequence seems to have happened
About a year afterwards peace was concluded, and for
the next twenty years the " story of Carthage " is
almost .1 blank.
CARTHAGE AND TIMOLEON.
I SAID in my last chapter that for twenty years and
more after the death of Dionysius the story of Car-
thage is "almost a blank." We know, however, so
much about her as to be sure that she was gaining
strength in Sicily. The condition of the Greek cities
in that island was going from bad to worse. Most of
them had fallen into the hands of tyrants, and these
tyrants were always intriguing or fighting against
each other. Carthage all the while was steadily
watching her opportunities and extending her power.
In 344 she had become so dangerous that some
Syracusan citizens, who had been banished by the
younger Dionysius, son of the tyrant of that name of
whom so much was said in the last chapter, resolved
to call in the aid of Corinth. Corinth was the mother-
city of Syracuse,^ and the tie between the two had
always been close. The Corinthians listened to their
request, and, as it happened, had at hand just the
man who was wanted. Timolcon was one of the best
and noblest of their citizens ; but he was the most
unhappy. He had had a terrible duty put upon him.
A brother whom he had loved had tried to make
' Tlie founder and first colonists of Syracuse bad come from Corinth.
TtMOLEON DECLARES WAR AGAINST CARTHAGE. 7I
himself tyrant in Corinth, and Timoleon had ordered
him to be put to death, or, as some say, had killed
him with his own hand. After this dreadful act done
to save his country, he had shut himself up in his
house. When the Syracusan envoys came with their
request, he was glad to go, and his countrymen were
glad to send him.
It was but a small force that Timoleon could get
together for his enterprise — ten ships of war, and
seven hundred mercenaries. The Carthaginians sent
a squadron to intercept him. This he contrived to
escape, and landed in Sicily. The tale of his wonder-
ful achievements does not belong to my story. It
must be enough to say that he gained possession
of Syracuse, though one of his opponents had actually
introduced the Carthaginians into that city ; that he
gave it free government, and that he did the same
service to other Sicilian towns. To gain means for
these enterprises he is said to have plundered the
Carthaginian territory. However this may be, we
may be sure that Carthage would not look upon these
proceedings with favour. War was declared before
long, and the Carthaginians exerted themselves to
the utmost to meet their new enemy. They collected
an army of 70,000 (it may be noticed that the num-
bers become smaller and more credible as we go on),
well furnished with the artillery of the time, and
supplied with abundance of provisions. As usual,
this army consisted for the most part of mercenaries,
but it contained also a numerous force — one historian
puts it at ten thousand — of native Carthaginians.
The fleet transported it safely to Lilybiuuni, and it
72 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
at once commenced its march eastward. Timoleon
had but a small force with which to meet this great
host. In Syracuse he could not raise more than three
thousand ; of mercenary troops, after he had sent
away a thousand laggards and cowards, he had about
as many more. But he boldly marched out with his
six thousand, and found the enemy encamped on the
river Crimessus.
It was nearly midsummer, and the heat of the sun
had drawn up from the low ground near the river a
thick fog. The Greeks could see nothing of the
enemy's camp, but they could hear the confused hum
of many voices rising up from it. As the sun grew
stronger, the mist began to lift from the valley, though
it still lingered on the hills ; and as it cleared away
the river could be seen, and the great Carthaginian
army in the very act of crossing it, with the four-horse
chariots in front, and after them a solid body of
infantry, ten thousand in number, splendidly armed
and bearing white shields. These were the native
Carthaginians, and their march was orderly and slow.
After them came the mixed crowd of hired troops,
disorderly and unruly, struggling who should first
cross the river. Timoleon saw his opportunity, while
the army of the enemy was still divided, some being
actually in the river, and some on the further shore.
The native Carthaginians were just struggling up the
bank and forming themselves in line, when the Greek
cavalry fell upon them. At first charge after charge
was made in vain. The chariots of the enemy were
driven furiously backwards and forwards in front of
the army, and the Greek horsemen had to do their
BATTLE OF THE CRIMESSUS. 73
very best to prevent their own lines beinc^ broken by
them ; on the Hnes of the enemy they could make
no impression. Timoleon, who had about him a
small force of Syracusans and picked mercenaries,
came up to the help of his cavalry. They were no
longer, he said, to attack the front line of the enemy —
that with that he would himself engage — but were to
fall upon the flanks. Putting his men into as compact
a body as possible, something, we may guess, like the
phalanx with which the Macedonians won so many
victories, he charged the enemy. But even he for
a time could do nothing. The iron breastplates, the
helmets of brass, the great shields which covered
almost the whole of the body, resisted the Greek
spears. At this moment fortune, or, as the Greeks
would have said, Zeus the cloud-compeller, helped
him. Suddenly a storm, with loud peals of thunder
and vivid flashes of lightning, burst from the hills.
The mist, which had been hanging about the heights,
came down again upon the plain, and brought with it
a tempest of rain and wind and hail. The Greeks
only felt them behind ; the Carthaginians had them
dashing in their faces ; the rain and hail and lightning
blinded them ; the thunder would not allow them to
hear the words of command. Then the ground grew
slippery beneath their feet ; and the heavy armour
became a hindrance rather than a protection. They
could hardly move from place to place ; they found it
difficult to stand ; when once they had fallen it was
impossible to rise. Then came a new trouble. The
river, partly swollen by the rain, partly, it is said,
dammed back by the multitude of troops that were
74 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
crossing it, overflowed its banks, and the heavy-armed
Carthaginians stumbled and rolled about in the water.
First the front line was cut to pieces ; then the whole
vanguard was broken ; finally the army gave way.
Many were cut down in the plain, many drowned in
the river, and yet more intercepted by the light troops
as they were attempting to reach the hills. Ten
thousand lay dead upon the field, and of these no less
than three thousand were Carthaginian citizens. The
city had never suffered such a loss before. It was
not now Africans or Spaniards, but her own children
for whom she had to mourn.
Even after this crushing defeat the war was not at
an end. The Greeks were, as usual, divided among
themselves ; and the enemies of Timoleon invited
Carthage to continue the war, and promised their
own help. Another battle was fought, and with the
same result. Then Carthage asked for peace. It was
granted on the condition that she should keep herself
to the western side of the Halycus, and that she
should not pretend to interfere with the government
of the Sicilian cities.
VI.
CARTHAGE AND AGATHOCLES.
TiMOLEON died in 337 ; for twenty years and more
there was peace in Sicily ; then the Greeks fell out
among themselves. Carthage was called in to help
one of the parties. Timoleon had restored Syracuse
to freedom ; but it had fallen again into the hands of
a tyrant, Agathocles. Thousands of the citizens had
been banished by the usurper ; and these, under the
leadership of a certain Deinocrates, made a treaty
with Carthage. In 309 a powerful expedition set
sail for Sicily. There was a contingent of native
Carthaginians numbering two thousand, among whom
were some of the noblest-born of the citizens, African
and Italian mercenaries, and a thousand slingers from
the Balearic Islands. Its start was unlucky. A great
storm sank sixty of the ships of war, and more than
two hundred transports, and the rest of the fleet
reached Sicily in a sadly battered condition. It was
easy, however, to find recruits in the island, and
Hamilcar, who was in command, had soon under
him an army of 40,000 infantry and 5,000 horse.
Agathocles met him at a place famous in the history
of Sicilian wars, the river Himera. The battle that
followed began well for the Greeks. Some troops
76 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
which Agathoclcs had put in ambush near the
river fell upon a Carthaginian detachment as it was
crossing the stream, laden with plunder, and drove
them in confusion to their camp. Their commander
thought it a good opportunity for a general attack.
At first everything went well ; the Greek army
assaulted the Carthaginian camp, and at one time
seemed likely to take it. Then the fortune of the
day changed. The l^alearic slingers were brought
into action, and killed and wounded many of the
assailants. These still kept up the attack, but at this
moment appeared a fresh squadron from Africa, and
took them in the rear. The defenders of the camp
took fresh courage ; the attack was finally repulsed,
and soon changed into a rout. Five miles of level
ground lay between the two camps ; the Carthaginian
cavalry could act on this with freedom, and they
made dreadful havoc among the fugitives. Another
cause, and this a strange one, increased the Greek
loss. The battle was fought in the heat of summer
and at midday. Many of the fugitives had made for
the river rather than for their camp, and they reached
it in a state of raging thirst. The water was salt, or
at least strongly brackish, but they drank greedily
of it, and with fatal results. Many unwounded
corpses were lound upon the banks. The total loss
of the Greeks was seven thousand, that of the Cartha-
ginians not more than five hundred. Agathocles shut
himself up in Gela, hoping thus to divert Ilamilcar's
attention from Syracuse, where the people would then
gain time to gather in their harvests. The Cartha-
ginian general began the siege, but seeing that he had
AGATHOCLES IN EXTREMITIES. 77
little chance of taking the place, soon changed his
p^an. I lis first step was to win over the other Greek
cities by kind treatment and liberal offers. Many of
them joined him ; their own danger was imminent,
and they hated Agathocles.
Reduced to the last extremity, for nearly all Sicily,
with the exception of Syracuse, was lost to him, this
extraordinary man conceived one of the boldest
devices which history records. He determined to
transfer the war to Carthage itself. That city, he
knew, was not prepared for an attack, and its African
subjects were always ill-affcctcd, and he believed, and
rightly believed, that it could be best attacked. This
scheme he kept a profound secret. The measures
that he took for carrying it out were most skilful,
and, it must be added, most unprincipled. He began
by choosing the force which he was to take with him
most carefully. The greater part of it was cavalry.
Horses he had no means of transporting to Africa,
but he hoped to find them there, and the men were
ordered to furnish themselves with bridles and saddles.
He had to guard against a revolution in Syracuse
during his absence ; and he was careful to take
hostage for good behaviour from all the mo.-,t power-
ful families in the city ; putting one brother, for
instance, in the garrison, and enlisting another in his
own army. Then he wanted money. He gave notice
that any citizen who might be unwilling or unable to
endure the hardships of a siege was at liberty to
depart. The offer was accepted by numbers of the
rich. They had the means of living clsewlierc, and
they hated the rule of the tyrant. They were accord-
78 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
ingly permitted to depart, and to take their property
with them. But Agathocles sent some of his mer-
cenaries after them. The unhappy men were robbed
and murdered, and the tyrant found himself amply
provided with means.
He then embarked his force, which filled sixty
ships of war. The first necessity was to avoid the
blockading squadron, which was much stronger than
his own. Just at the right time a fleet of corn-ships
appeared off the harbour. The Carthaginians left
their post to pursue them, and Agathocles took the
opportunity to get out of the harbour. For a time
the Carthaginian admiral expected an attack, thinking
that the Syracusan fleet had come out to fight for the
corn-ships ; then seeing that it was sailing in the other
direction, he gave chase. The result was a double
success to Agathocles. The corn-ships got safely into
harbour, and relieved the city, which was already
beginning to suffer from scarcity ; and the squadron,
which had got a considerable start, escaped. The
escape, indeed, was a narrow one. The race lasted for
five days and nights. On the morning of the sixth
day the Carthaginian fleet unexpectedly appeared close
at hand. Both sides strained every nerve ; but the
Greeks won the race. They reached the land first,
but the foremost of the Carthaginian ships were close
upon them. In the skirmish that followed these were
too weak to act with any effect, and Agathocles not
only landed in safety, but was able to fortify a camp,
close to which he beached his ships.
But he had in his mind a yet bolder stroke. He
burnt his ships. Forced thus to give up all iiope of
AGATHOCLES INVADES AFRICA. 8 1
escape, the army must now conquer or perish. At
first they were in despair ; but Agathocles did not
give them much time to think about their situation.
He led them to attack a district in which the
wealthiest citizens of Carthage had their farms and
country houses. It was a region of rich pastures, of
oliveyards and vineyards, and the Sicilians were
astonished at the plenty which they saw. Two towns
fell easily into their hands, and their despair was soon
changed into confidence. At Carthage there was the
utmost dismay. It was commonly believed that the
whole force in Sicily had perished, for no one could
suppose that Agathocles could have ventured to leave
Syracuse in danger and attack Africa. Some were
for treating for peace ; others advised delay till the
truth could be found out. When news of what had
really happened arrived, they were, of course, greatly
encouraged, and prepared to attack the invaders.
In the first battle that took place, it is interest-
ing to see the list of combatants on either side.
Agathocles, besides his own Syracusans, had Sam-
nites, Etruscans, and Celts (probably Gauls) in his
army. The whole amounted to about eleven thou-
sand, but many of them were insufficiently armed.
There was no little discouragement among them,^
and the result seemed doubtful. The day, indeed,
might have gone in favour of Carthage but for
' A strange story is told of the device by which Agathocles endcs.
voured to give confidence to his men. He had a number of tame owls
which he let loose in the court. The birds settled on the shields and
helmets of the soldiers. The owl was the sacred bi^d of Athene
(Minerva), and the soldiers looked upon this incident as a proof of the
goddess* favo'ir.
7
82 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the misfortune of the death of one of her generals,
and the treachery of another. The two Suffetes
of the year were Hanno and Bomilcar. Hanno
was in command of the Sacred Band of native
Carthaginians. Eager to break the opposing line,
where Agathocles himself was in command, he
exposed himself too rashly, and was killed. Bomil-
car had designs of making himself a tyrant in
Carthage, and felt that the defeat of the invaders
would not help him in his object. He seems even
to have had a treacherous understanding with the
enemy. To his own officers he pretended that the
death of his colleague made it necessary to retreat.
The Carthaginian mercenaries soon took to flight ;
the Sacred Host held its ground for a long time, but
was at last compelled to retreat. The camp fell into
the hands of the Greeks.
Agathocles continued his successes, and carried
the war almost up to the walls of Carthage. Mean-
while things had been going well with him at Syracuse.
Hamilcar had made a night attack upon the city, had
failed, and had been taken prisoner. His head was
cut off", and sent to Agathocles in Africa. Carthage
suffered defeat after defeat in a series of battles, which
it would be tedious to relate. At last the people
found out one cause, at least, of their ill-fortune.
Bomilcar had all along been playing the part of
a traitor. He now thought that the time was come
for seizing the prize of absolute power which he had
always had in view. He ordered a review of the
troops in the city, When it had been held, he dis-
missed all that were not pledged to support him.
iilLkiMfiWiiliJk
REVOLT OF BOMILCAR. 85
Keepint^ the remainder, five hundred native Carthagi-
nians and five thousand mercenaries, he proclaimed
himself king, and commenced a massacre of all his
opponents. If Agathocles outside the walls had known
of what was going on, and had arranged an attack
for the same time, Carthage was lost. The battle in
the streets raged fiercely. Bomilcar and his adherents
forced their way into the market-place. But the place
could not be held. It was surrounded on all sides by
lofty houses, which were occupied by the friends of
the government, and from which showers of javelins
were discharged on the revolters. Bomilcar was
compelled to retreat into the New City. Finally a
truce was agreed to. An amnesty was promised, and
the rebels laid down their arms. But Bomilcar was
too dangerous a person, and had done too much harm,
to be allowed to escape. The rulers of Carthage,
never much troubled by scruples, moral or religious,
broke their oath and crucified him. The tide of
success did not turn at once. Agathocles took
Utica,^ the largest of the Phoenician cities in Africa
after Carthage, and a number of other towns, till
Carthage was almost stripped of allies and subjects.
Agathocles was now recalled by urgent affairs to
Syracuse. He left his son Archagathus in command
of the African army. Archagathus was too ambitious,
and undertook enterprises, especially against the
' Another strange story is told of the device which he used in
approaching this city. He had captured tiiree hundred of the chief
citizens. These he suspended alive on a tower which he brought up
close to the gates, and which he ha<l fdled wilh archers and slingcrs.
The defenders of Utica could not defend themselves against this attack-
without wounding or killing tlicir own countrymen.
86 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
wandering tribes of the interior, for which his strength
was not sufficient. Carthage, on the other hand, was
now under wiser rule. The army was divided into
three corps, each of which carried on separate opera-
tions against the invaders. Archagathus suffered a
great defeat under the walls of the city, and was also
weakened by the revolt of many of his allies. His
father now returned from Sicily, and for a time re-
stored the balance. But an attack on the Carthaginian
camp proved to be a failure. Then occurred a strange
succession of changes of fortune. The Carthaginians,
in celebrating their last victory after their own hideous
fashion with human sacrifice, set fire to their camp.
When the confusion was at its highest, some African
mercenaries, who had taken service with Agathocles,
deserted to the Carthaginians. Their approach was
taken as an hostile attack, and a general panic followed.
When the mistake was discovered, some were ad-
mitted into the city, and there made the very same
panic among the Greeks which they had just made
among the Carthaginians. Agathocles lost more
than four thousand men through this mishap. His
African allies now left him, and he began to despair
of success. He had no hope of being able to get terms
from the enemy, and no means of carrying away his
army. His plan was to depart secretly, taking the
younger of his two sons with him. But Archagathus
the elder discovered the scheme, and revealed it to
the army. The soldiers, furious at the thought of being
thus deserted, mutinied, seized Agathocles and put him
in chains. Everything was now in disorder. Finally,
Agathocles contrived to escape from confinement, and
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PYRRHUS. 8g
to make his way to Sicily. The army bcintj thus
abandoned, revenged itself by murdering his sons, and
then made peace with Carthage. They gave up all the
towns which they had captured, and received three
hundred talents, a free passage for such as wished to
go, and service in the army of Carthage for such as
preferred to remain. The city had been besieged for
four years. It was now safe, and, indeed, seems to
have soon recovered her old strength. A few years
afterwards we find her helping her old enemy
Agathocles — in return, no doubt, for substantial
advantages — to make himself supreme over Sicily.
The last Greek antagonist with whom Carthage
had to deal might well have been the most formidable
of all. Pyrrhus, king of Epirus,^ was of the kindred of
Alexander the Great, through Alexander's mother,
Olympias. He had conceived a scheme of conquest
which should be like that achieved by his famous
kinsman. But as Alexander had gone eastward, so
he would go westward. His famous conversation with
his philosophical adviser will show us what were his
plans, and I will give it, as Plutarch tells it, in dialogue
form :
CiNEAS. The Romans, my lord Pyrrhus, are said to
be great warriors, and to rule over many nations. If,
by the favour of God, we conquer them, what use shall
we make of our victory ?
Pyrrhus. That is an easy question to answer.
There will be no city, Greek or barbarian, that, if
Rome be once conquered, will be able to withstand
us. We shall certainly gain the whole of Italy, of
' The modern Albania.
go THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the greatness, excellence, and wealth of which you, of
all men, cannot be ignorant.
CiNEAS (after a brief silence). After gaining Italy,
what shall we do next ?
Pyrrhus (not yet seeing his drift). Close to Italy
is Sicily, stretching out her hands to us, a wealthy
island and a populous, and easy to subdue. Since
the death of Agathocles it has been all confusion, for
lack of government in the city and the folly of them
that lead the people.
CiNEAS. That is like enough. When we have con-
quered Sicily, shall we come to an end of our wars ?
Pyrrhus. Heaven prosper our undertakings so far !
Well, then, who would not go on to Africa and Car-
thage, Carthage which will then be in my grasp?
Did not Agathocles, though he had to run away, so
to speak, from Syracuse, with only a handful of ships,
come very near to taking it ?
We are not concerned just now with the rest of the
conversation, or with the moral which Cineas drew from
it.i It was a splendid plan, and Pyrrhus was one who
had all the genius that was wanted to carry it out.
Hannibal, no mean judge in such a matter, thought
him the greatest general 2 that had ever lived. But
the beginning of his great enterprise was the hardest
part of it — too hard, indeed, for him to accomplish.
' Briefly it was this : " Master of Carthage," said Pyrrhus, " I shall
come and make myself lord of Greece." " Doubtless," said Cineas;
" and what then ? " " Then," answered the king, with a laugh, " then
we will sit down and enjoy ourselves." " Why not sit down NOW ? '
was the philosopher's reply.
' Another version of tne stor} puts Alexander first and Pyrrhus
second.
PYRRHUS LEAVES SICILY. Ql
He spent his strength in vain on Rome. He defeated
her armies, but he could not conquer her. Rome, we
may say, saved Carthage from conquest. These two
were to fight for the mastery of the West.
His own dealings with Carthage may be briefly
told. After two campaigns in Italy, in which he had
won much glory but little else, he passed over into
Sicily in the spring of 27S. The Greek cities had
invited him to come ; they wanted him to help them
against their old enemy Carthage. At first he carried
everything before him, but Carthage offered him a
large sum of money and a fleet which should co-
operate with him in his enterprises. He refused these
terms. Nothing, he said, would satisfy him — and we
cannot but admire his fine feeling for the honour of
the Greek name — but that Carthage should quit the
island altogether and make the sea the boundary
between Greece and herself. After this his good
fortune left him. The Greeks grew weary of their ally.
They plotted against him, and he retaliated with
severities which made them hate him still more.
Then he failed in an attempt to storm the fortress of
Lilybaeum ; and even his reputation as a soldier was
damaged. At last there was nothing left for him but
to go. " How fair a wrestling ring," he said, as he
looked back from his ship upon the island ; " how fair
a wrestling ring, my friends, are we leaving to Rome
and Carthage ! " In the fourth part of my story I
shall tell the tale of this wrestling match.
PART III.
THE INTERNAL HISTORY OF CARTHAGE.
I. — Carthaginian Discoverers.
11. — Constitution ano Religion of Carthage.
III. — Revenue and Trade of Carthage.
I.
CARTHAGINIAN DISCOVERERS.
The " Story of Carthage " is mainly a story of war
Of the people themselves and of their life we hear very
little indeed, and that little either from enemies or
strangers. But there are some exceptions, and of
them the most interesting is the account of the voyage
of colonization and discovery made by Hanno, an
account which has been preserved ; not indeed in his
own language — for of the Carthaginian tongue we have
but a few words remaining — but in a Greek translation.
The date of Hanno is not certain. He is supposed to
have been either the father or the son of the Hamilcar
who fell at Himera. There is little to make the one
supposition more probable than the other. On the
whole, I am inclined to accept the earlier time. Car-
thage was certainly more prosperous, and therefore
more likely to send out such an expedition before the
disaster of Himera than after it. In this case the
date may be put as 520 B.C. Hanno's account of
his voyage is interesting enough to be given in full.
I shall add a few notes on points that seem to require
explanation.
" It was decreed by the Carthaginians that Hanno
g6 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
should sail I beyond the Pillars of Hercules^ and
found cities of the Liby-Phenicians.3 Accordingly
he sailed with sixty ships of fifty oars each, and a
multitude of men and women to the number of thirty
thousand 4 and provisions and other equipment.
" When we had set sail and passed the Pillars, after
two days' voyage, we founded the first city and named
it Thymiaterium. Below this city lay a great plain.
Sailing thence westward we came to Soloeis,5 a
promontory of Libya, thickly covered with trees.
Here we built a temple to Poseidon ; 6 and pro-
ceeded thence half-a-day's journey eastward, till we
reached a lake lying not far from the sea, and
filled with abundance of great reeds. Here were
feeding elephants and a great number of other wild
animals.
"After we had gone a day's sail beyond the lakes we
founded cities near to the sea, of which the names
were the Fort of Caricon, Gytta, Acra, Melita, and
Arambys. Sailing thence we came to Lixus,7 a
' The history of the voyage is called Periplus or "Circumnavigation."
The Greek narrative exists in a MS. in the Library of Heidelberg, and
was first published in 1533.
' The Straits of Gibraltar.
3 A mixed population springing from marriages of Carthaginians
with native Africans, and regarded with much jealousy by the authorities
of Carthage.
* This number is probably exaggerated. It need not, however, be
supposed that all the colonists were conveyed in the sixty ships. These
were probably ships of war which convoyed a number of merchantmen,
which discharged their cargoes of passengers as the various colonies were
founded.
5 Cape Caiitin.
* The Latin Neptune, perhaps the Phoenician Dagon.
' The Wadi Draa.
ALONG THE AFRICAN COAST. 97
great river which flows from Libya. On its banks
the Lixitae, a wandering tribe, were feeding their
flocks. With these we made friendship, and remained
among them certain days. Beyond these dwell the
Inhospitable Ethiopians, inhabiting a country that
abounds in wild beasts and is divided by high moun-
tains, from which mountains flows, it is said, the river
Lixus. About these mountains dwell the Troglodyt.ne,
men of strange aspect.^ Of these the Lixitae said
that they could run swifter than horses. Having pro-
cured interpreters from these same Lixitae, we coasted
for two days along an uninhabited country, going
southwards. Thence again we sailed a day's journey
eastward. Here in the recess of a certain bay we
found a small island, about five furlongs in circum-
ference. In this we made a settlement, and called its
name Cern^.2 We judged from our voyage that
this place lay right opposite to Carthage,3 for the
voyage from Carthage to the Pillars was equal to the
voyage from the Pillars to Ccrnd. After this, sailing
up a great river which is called Chretes,^ we came
' Possibly negroes.
' Cern^ is probably to be placed at the mouth of the Rio de Ouro.
Some of the French charts give the name of Heme, which is said to
resemble a name used by the natives.
3 There is some doubt as to the meaning of this expression. Mr.
Bunbury suggests that it may mean that the distance from Carthage to the
Straitsof Gibraltar, and from the Straitsagain to Cerne being equal, thesa
two would be the sides of an icosceles triangle, of which the base would be
the line drawn between Carthage and Cerne. It must be remembered that
the ancients had nothing like the correct notions which we have since been
enabled to form of the relative positions of the various countries of the
world. From Cerne Hanno made two voyages of discovery, which he
now proceeds to describe.
* The Senegal, wiiich opens out into such an expanse near its mouth.
8
98
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
to a lake, in which are three islands greater than
Cernd. Proceeding thence a day's sail, we came to
the furthest shore of the lake. Here it is overhung by
great mountains, in which dwell savage men clothed
with the skins of beasts. These drove us away, pelting
us with stones, so that we could not land. Sailing
thence, we came to another river, great and broad, and
full of crocodiles and river-horses. Thence returning
back we came again to Cerne ; and from Cerne we
sailed again towards the south for twelve days,
VOTIVE STELE FROM CARTHAGE (HIPPOPOTAMUS).
coasting along the land. The whole of this land is
inhabited by Ethiopians. These would not await our
approach, but fled from us ; and their tongue could
not be understood even by the Lixitac that were with
us. On the last day, we came near to certain large
mountains covered with trees, and the wood of these
trees was sweet-scented and of divers colours. Sailing
by these mountains for the space of two days, we came
But there is a difliculty about the mountains, which it is not easy to
identify with anything in the lower course of this river.
GORILLAS. 99
to a great opening of the sea; and on either side of
this sea was a great plain, from which at night we saw
fire arising in all directions. Here we watered, and
afterwards sailed for five days, until we came to a
great bay, which the interpreters told us was called the
Western Horn.» In this bay was a large island, and in
this island a lake of salt water, and again in this lake
another island. Here we landed ; and in the daytime
we could find nothing, but saw wood ashes ; but in the
night we saw many fires burning, and heard the sound
of flutes and cymbals and drums and the noise of
confused shouts. Great fear then came upon us, and the
prophet bade us leave this place. We sailed therefore
quickly thence, being much terrified ; and passing on
for four days found at night a country full of fire. In
the middle was a lofty fire, greater than all the rest, so
that it seemed to touch the stars. When day came
we found that this was a great mountain which they
call the Chariot of the Gods.2 On the third day
of our departure thence, having sailed by streams of
fire, we came to a bay which is called the Southern
Horn.3 At the end of this bay lay an island like
to that which has been before described. This island
had a lake, and in this lake another island, full of
savage people, of whom the greater part were women.
Their bodies were covered with hair, and our inter-
preters called them Gorillas. We pursued them, but
the men we were not able to catch ; for being able to
climb the precipices and defending themselves with
' The Gulf of Bissagos.
' Mt. Sagres.
' Slierboro' Island and .Sound, a liltlo distance soiitli of Sirrra I.eone-
100 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
stones, these all escaped. But we caught three
women. But when these, biting and tearing those
that led them, would not follow us, we slew them,
and flaying off their skins, carried these to Carthage.
Further we did not sail, for our food failed us."
This account was set, we are told, by Hanno on his
return to Carthage in the temple of Chronos or Saturn
— the same, as has been already said, as the Moloch
of Scripture.
The elder Pliny, after mentioning the voyage of
Hanno, which he strangely enough supposes to have
extended as far as the borders of Arabia, says, "At
the same time Himilco was sent to discover the
northern coasts of Europe." Unhappily, we possess no
account of Himilco's voyage that can be compared to
the "Circumnavigation" of Hanno. All that we know
of his narrative comes to us from Avienus, a very
indifferent Latin poet, who wrote about geography
towards the end of the fourth century of the Christian
era. And what Avienus professes to quote from him
has a very incredible look. It took him four
months to sail from Carthage to a country which was
probably Britain ; not, as we might suppose, on
account of rough seas and stormy winds, but because
there are no breezes to make a ship move, or because
there were such quantities of seaweed that it was held
by them as much as if it were passing through a wood.
Perpetual fogs covered everything. Besides these
difficulties the sailor had to steel himself against the
terrible sight of strange sea-monsters with which these
waters abounded. Avienus professes to have seen
the narrative of Himilco, and to quote from it directly.
A STRANGE TALE.
101
The ancients were not very scrupulous in such mat-
ters, and it is just possible that Avienus took his
information at second hand. It has been suggested
that the Carthaginians, jealous about their trade and
afraid that other dealers should meddle with their
markets,! instructed Himilco to write such an account
of his voyage as would deter every one else from
following in his steps. It is certainly not sluggish
seas and winds not strong enough to move a ship
which arc the obstacles a traveller sailing north
would chiefly have to dread. However this may be,
Himilco the discoverer is little more than a name
to us.
' It may possibly have been one of the reasons why the Carthaginians
were ready to attack the Phocreans at Alalia that these bold sailors had
visited Tartessus (probably Gades), had made friends with its king, and
so intruded into regions which the city of merchants considered to be
its own.
II.
THE CONSTITUTION AND RELIGION OF CARTHAGE.
We know something of the Constitution of Carthage,
for Aristotle has given a chapter to the subject in his
book bearing the title of " The Politics." This is
itself a curious fact. The Greeks had but little esteem
for any country besides their own — Egypt, from which
they got most of their learning, perhaps excepted.
And not only does he write at some length about it,
but he praises it highly. He quotes and, on the whole,
agrees with a general opinion that " in many respects
it is superior to all others." And he gives very excel-
fent reasons for this superiority. It is a sure proof,
he thinks, " that a State is well ordered when the
commons are steadily loyal to the constitution, when
no civil conflict worth speaking of has arisen, and
when no one has succeeded in making himself
tyrant,"
Aristotle speaks of Carthage having " kings," and
this name as given to the chief magistrates of the
city often occurs in history. But they were not kings
in the common sense of the term. They did not
resemble, for instance, the kings of the Eastern world,
of Assyria, of Persia, or of Egypt. They are, indeed,
MAGISTRATES OF CARTHAGE. IO3
expressly compared to the kin^s of Sparta ; and
these, we know, had but very limited power, and
were little more than high priests and permanent
commanders-in-chief. One important difference be-
tween the two constitutions was that, in Sparta, the
dignity was hereditary in two families, while in Car-
thage it was elective. " They must belong," he says,
" to one of certain distinguished families, but they
succeed to the throne by election, not by seniority."
But it does not appear that this election was annual.
On the contrary, once chosen they were chosen for
life. These two magistrates were called by the Romans
"Suffetes,"' a corruption of the word Shophetim, or
"Judges."
Next to the kings came the generals. The two
offices might be held together, but they were often
separate. A king did not command an army or a
fleet unless he was specially appointed to the post.
Sometimes a general would be made king while he
was absent on service. Hanno, who commanded the
great exploring and colonizing expedition before
described, is said to have been a king.
Below these high officers of State came a legislative
body which, to borrow a name made familiar both by
ancient and by modern history, we may call the
Senate. In this Senate there were two bodies, the
smaller 2 and more powerful being chosen out of the
larger. Perhaps we may compare this Upper Council
' Possibly " SufTetes " was a reminiscence of the Latin word suffectus,
which was used wlien a magistrate was elected to fill a vacancy occur-
ring at some casual time.
- It consisted of a hundred members.
104 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
to the cabinet or ministry in the Constitutions of
England and the United States of America. We are
told that it was called into existence to meet the
danger which sooner or later overtook most of the
Republics of the ancient world. " When the House of
Mago became dangerous to a free state, an hundred
judges were chosen from the senators, who, upon the
return of generals from the war, should demand an
account of things transacted by them, that they being
thereby kept in awe, should so bear themselves in their
command in the war, as to have regard to the laws at
home." The members of the Council seem to have
been chosen by what are called Pentarchics, i.e., bodies
of five, by the Greek writer. We do not know what
these were, but we may guess that they were com-
mittees that had the charge of various important
parts of government, as finances, trade, military
matters, police, etc. Whether they were divisions of
the Council or the Senate we cannot say. But
one thing is certain, viz., that the Council was a re-
markably unchanging body. It followed one line ot
policy, we may say for centuries, with extraordinary
consistency, and this it could hardly have done
except it had kept up the same character by renew-
ing itself. It is clear that there were no regular
changes of government, no passings of power such
as we see in the United States from Republicans
to Democrats, or in England from Liberals to Con-
servatives.
About the powers of the larger assembly or Senate
we know nothing for certain. Probably it was legis-
lative while the Council was executive. It was the
ESTATES OF THE REALM IN CARTHAGE. I05
Congress or Parliament, while the C'ouncil was the
Ministry or Cabinet.
Finally, there was a general assembly of the people.
About this, too, we know very little. We may guess
that its power was limited to approving or rejecting
measures that were brought before it, all such
measures being first considered in the Senate. In the
same way the people had the right of approving or
disapproving of appointments to offices. Aristotle
evidently thought that they were in much the same
position as the people at Sparta ; and of the people
at Sparta we know that they had not much to do
with the government of the country.
These were the actual "estates of the realm" in
Carthage — the Kings or Suffetes, the Senate with its
two chambers, so to speak, and the Popular Assembly.
It remains to ask, " Was there a nobility .? " Probably
there was, and probably it was something like that
which exists in England. There were, indeed, no
inherited titles, but still the same families remained
powerful in the State. Probably they remained
powerful as long as they remained rich. There was
no bar of birth that prevented any one from be-
coming a member of this nobility. Ability and
wealth, perhaps either of these in a very marked
degree, would pass any one into it.
Aristotle says that the offices of State were unpaid.
This does not of necessity imply that these were not
lucrative. They would bring patronage and oppor-
tunities of making money. He also says that the
highest offices — and he names those of King and
General — were put up for sale. Perhaps he means
I06 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
that they were obtained by bribery, though this is
not the natural interpretation of his words. As he
says afterwards that one of the abuses of the Cartha^
ginian Constitution was that several offices were held
by one man, we may suppose that though nominally
unpaid, they could be, and often were, made a source
of profit. Probably the decay of Carthage was due
to the corruption and greed of money, which are sure
to be developed sooner or later in a wealthy State.
Rome, when the virtue and patriotism of its citizens
decayed, fell into the hands of a despotic ruler ;
Carthage, following the same course of decay, fell
under the domination of a few wealthy citizens.
One of the points of the resemblance which Aristotle
sees between Carthage and Sparta was the practice of
having Common Meals. But Sparta was a compara-
tively small State. The actual number of citizens
living at the capital, when we have deducted those
who were under or above the military age, and who
vvere therefore excused from the Common Meals,
could not have much exceeded a thousand. Car-
thage, on the other hand, was one of the most populous
cities of the ancient world. When it was taken by the
Romans, long after it had begun to decay, it contained
seven hundred thousand inhabitants. How many of
these were citizens we cannot conjecture ; but the
number must have been too great to admit of a system
of Common Meals. Probably these were limited to
the ruling class. Aristotle speaks of them as being
held by the " clubs " or " companies." What Livy
says quite agrees with this. Hannibal, then in exile,
sent an emissary to stir up the war-party at Carthage
VOTIVE bTELE TO TANIT.
JUSTICE AND RELIGION. IO9
to action. His coming and the message which he
brought, was, we read, " debated first in societies and
banquets, and afterwards in the Senate." And we
find it stated by another historian that the Cartha-
ginians transacted their State affairs by night, and
in the evening and at night-time held their meetings
and societies. Perhaps we may say that modern
poHtics furnish an illustration in the " Caucus," a
meeting of influential persons by which the action of
the party is determined.
Justice seems to have been administered, not by a
general assembly of the people, as at Athens, but by
special Courts. We know the name of one of these,
" The Hundred and Four." * Possibly this may have
been the title of the whole judicial body, and that this
was divided into various Courts for the trial of dif-
ferent kinds of cases.
The Religion of Carthage was naturally in the main
that of the great city from which it was founded. The
supreme Deity was Baal Hammon, or Moloch. Dr.
Davis — from whose excavations among the ruins of
Carthage much has, of course, been learnt — tells us
that he did not find a single votive tablet in which the
name of this god did not appear. He was worshipped
with the horrible human sacrifices of which we hear
from time to time in Carthaginian history.^ These
• Not to be confounded with the Council of the Hundred.
' When Carthage was besieged by Agathocles, a sacrifice of t.vo
hundred children belonging to the first families in the country was
made to Moloch ; and three hundred men also voluntarily devoted
themselves in the same way. We hear of these sacrifices as prevailing
among the Canaanite, t.f. Phoenician, tribes wliom the Israelites drove
out of Palestine; and ipecial care was taUen to f<)rl)id this i)articula\
110
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
dreadful practices caused the Greeks to identify him
with Chronos or Saturn, who, in their own mythology,
was said to have devoured his own children.
Next in honour to Moloch was Melcart, the tutelary
deity of Carthage, as he was of its mother-city. Tyre
^ • — —»'»
A STELE TO TAN IT.
To the Greeks he was known as Hercules. His
kind of rite. So we read in Lev. xviii. 21, "Thou slialt not let thy
seed pass through the fire to Moloch." In spite of this prohibition
the practice gained ground among the Israelites. Solomon built a
temple to Moloch; and the reformer Josiali "defiled the Valley of
Ilinnom that no man miglit make his son or his daughter pass through
the fire to Moloch. '
VOTIVE SlKl.li IX) I'AMT KROM CARTHAGE.
CA R Til A n IMA X DEI TIES.
ii3
'Splendid temple at Tyre was one of the most famous
in the world. Missions with gifts and offerings seem
to have been regularly sent to it from Carthage.
Neither there nor elsewhere does the god seem to
have been represented in human form, Herodotus,
who describes the Tyrian temple as an eye-witness,
says nothing of any image, but describes, among the
many rich offerings with which it was adorned, two
pillars, one of pure gold, the other of emerald, shining
with grciit brilliancy at night.'
VOTIVK STELES FROM CARTHAf.R.
A sea-god, whom the Greeks naturally identified
with their own Poseidon, and the Romans with Nep-
tune, was worshipped at Carthage. He was the same
probably as Dagon, the fish -god, whom we know
to have been worshipped in the cities of the Philis-
tines. Ashtaroth, the Greek form of whose name
was Astarte, corresponded to Aphrodite or Venus.
Her Carthaginian name was Tanit. Of another
Carthaginian deity, known to the Greeks as Triton,
' This was probably ol green glass, which had long before been
manufactured in Egypt, and was lighted from within.
114 ^^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
we cannot recover the native name. As the Greek
Triton was a god of the sea, possibly this was only
another form of Dagon. We do not hear of any
separate order of priests ; but we find kings and
generals offering sacrifice — sometimes, as in the case
of Hasdrubal at Himera,' while battle was actually
going on.
' See p. 27
III.
THE REVENUE AND TRADE OF CARTHAGE.
The revenue of Carthage came from various sources
which may be mentioned in order.
I. Tribute from subject or dependent countries. The
Phoenician towns on the coast of Africa, both those
which were older than Carthage and those which
had been founded from it, paid tribute in money.
CARTHAGINIAN COIN.
Leptis, for instance, in the rich district of the Lesser
Syrtis, is said to have paid as much as a talent per
diem.^ The tribes of the interior paid their tribute in
kind, those who were settled and employed in culti-
vating the ground furnishing corn, the wandering
tribes such articles as dates, wild-beast skins, gold,
' This would amount to £^'),f)()^ 15s., or nearly §450,0001
TTf)
TflE STORY or CARTHAGE.
precious stones, etc. The foreign possessions of the
empire also paid in kind. Part of the stores which
they thus furnished was laid up in the provinces
CARTHAGINIA.V COIN (KLECTRUM).
themselves for the use of the army, and part was sent
to Carthage. The amount of these contributions is not
stated anywhere ; but it seems to have varied with
CARTHAGINIAN COIN (SILVER).
the needs of the government, and sometimes to have
amounted to as much as a half of the whole produce.
2. Customs duties are mentioned in the treaties be-
tween Carthage and Rome ; and the regulations about
CARTHAGINIAN MINES. II7
them arc precise. In the treaties with the Mtrurians,
of which we hear from Aristotle, we learn that it was
provided what articles might and what might not be
imported. Hannibal, when in power at Carthage
after the end of the Second Punic War, introduced a
great reform into the management of the customs,
which we learn from this passage to have been levied
on goods imported both by land and by sea ; and is
said, by putting a stop to dishonest practices, to have
improved the revenue so much, that it was no longer
necessary to tax individuals. That these duties were
heavy, we may learn from the fact that smuggling
went on between the Greek towns in the district
round Cyrene and the towns dependent on Carthage.
3. Mines. Carthage possessed mines in Spain and
Corsica. The richest of these were in the neighbour-
hood of New Carthage. In Polybius' time (204-122
B.C.), when they were worked by the Romans, they
produced about ^2,000 per day. They are said to
have been discovered by a certain Aletes, who was
supposed to have done so much for his country by
this discovery, that a temple was dedicated to him at
New Carthage. We must not suppose, however, that
all the mines (Diodorus says that all the mines known
in his time were first worked by the Carthaginians)
belonged to the State. Many of them were worked
by individual citizens to their great profit. The power-
ful Barca family is said to have derived from their
mines much of the wealth by which they were enabled
to become so powerful, and llaimihal is specially
mentioned as receiving a large income from mines.
Probably the State was the owner of some, and re-
Il8 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
ceived a royalty (or sum proportionate to the quan-
tity of metal raised) from the others.
The Commerce of Carthage may be conveniently
considered under its two great branches — the trade
ivith Africa, and the trade with Europe.
I. The trade with Africa. This was carried on with
the barbarous tribes of the inland country that could
be reached by caravans, and of the sea-coast. Of
both we hear something from Herodotus, the writer
who furnishes us with most of our knowledge about
these parts of the ancient world. His story about
the dealings with the tribes of the sea-coast runs thus.
" There is a certain country in Africa outside the
columns of Hercules. When the Carthaginians come
hither, they unlade their goods and set them in order
by the side of the sea. This done, they embark on
their ships again and make a smoke. And the people
of the country, seeing the smoke, come down to the
sea, and put gold beside the goods and depart to a
distance. Then the Carthaginians come forth from
their ships and look ; and if it seem to them that the
gold is of equal value with the goods, they take it and
depart ; but if it seem not equal, then they return to
their ships and sit still. Then the barbarians come
and add other gold to that which they put before,
until they persuade the Carthaginians. And neither
do any wrong to the other ; for the one touch not
the gold till it be made equal in value to the goods,
and the others touch not the goods before the sellers
have received the gold." ^ The Caravan routes are
' Heeren quotes from Captain I,yiin's " Narrative " a curiously similar
account. "In Soudan, beyond llie deseri, in the countries abound-
TRADE. Iig
described in a very interesting passage. The starting-
point is Thebes in Upper Egypt, where Herodotus
probably got his information ; and the route, in which
the stations — always places where water can be found
— are given with much detail, extend to the Straits of
Gibraltar in the west, and Fezzan, and probably still
more inland places, in the south.
The goods v/ith which the Carthaginian merchants
traded with the African tribes were doubtless such as
those which civilized nations have always used in their
dealings with savages. Cheap finery, gaudily coloured
cloths, and arms of inferior quality, would probably be
their staple. Salt, too, would be an important article.
Many of the inland tribes can only get this necessary
of life by importation, and the Carthaginians would
doubtless find it worth their while to bring it, not
necessarily from the sea, but from places on the route
where, according to Herodotus, it could be found in
large quantities.
The articles which they would receive in exchange
for their goods are easily enumerated. In the first
place comes, as we have seen, gold. Carthage seems
to have had always at hand an abundant supply of
the precious metal for use, whether as money or as
plate. Next to gold would come slaves. Even then
the negro race was the victim of the cruel system
which has not }'ct quite been rooted out of the world,
ing in gold, there dwells an invisible nation, who nie said to trade only
by night. Those who come to irafiic for their gold, lay their merchan-
dise ill heaps and retire. In the morning they find a certain (juantity
of gold-dust placed against every heap, which if ihey think suiricicnl,
they leave the goods ; if nut, ihcy let Ijoth rcniaiii unlil mure of the
precious ore is added."
120 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
though no Christian nation, at least ostensibly, prac-
tises it. The ancients, indeed, had other slaves
besides negroes. It was a horrible feature of the
slavery of these times that, through the practice of
selling, for private or public gain, prisoners of war and
the inhabitants of captured towns, men and women of
every race were reduced to bondage, and thus the
slave might be as well born and as well educated as
his master.! But these slaves were sure to be discon-
tented, and very likely, therefore, to be dangerous, and
the more gentle and docile negro soon came to be
prized. Fashion, too, favoured the quaint appearance
of the race, so curiously contrasted with the fair com-
plexion and chiselled features of the Greek. Thus in
Menander (342-291 B.C.), as he is represented to us by
Terence, we find a soldier saying to his lady-love,
" Did you ever find my good will to you halt ? When
you said you wanted a handmaid from Ethiopia, did
not I give up all my business, and find one for
you ? "
Ivory must have been another article of Cartha-
ginian trade, though we hear little about it. The
Greeks used it extensively in art, making some of
their most magnificent statues partly of it and partly
of gold ;2 and it seems to have been employed in early
' One Latin writer draws a distinction between slaves that were
•' learned " and that *' liad a smattering of learning." All the early
schoolmasters at Rome, almost without exception, had l)een slaves.
The elder Cato made a profit of taking in nohle Roman hoys to he
taught by an educated slave of his own.
' The great statues of Phidias, viz., of Zeus at OlymjMa, of Here at
Argos, and of Athene at Athens, were made of these two materials,
and therefore called chryselephantine.
IVORY AND PRECIOUS STONES.
121
times at Rome for the chairs of state used by the
higher magistrates. We do not precisely know where
this ivory came from first. Virgil speaks of the sub-
stance as coming from India, and the elder Pliny
says that the luxury of his times had exhausted all the
sources of supply except those of the farthest East.
We may be certain, however, that in the flourishing
days of Carthage her traders dealt largely in this
article, which indeed is found of the largest size and
finest quality in Africa. The elephant is still found
VOTIVE STELE KROM CARTHAGE.
over the whole of that continent south of the Sahara,
except where it has been driven away by the neigh-
bourhood of man. The Carthaginians had domesti-
cated it, a thing which has never since been done by
any African race.
Precious stones seem to have been another article
which the savages gave in exchange for the goods they
coveted. The carbuncle, in particular, came in such
abundance from Carthage into the markets of luirope
that it was called the " Carthaginian Stone." Perhaps
T22 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
we may add daUs to the list of articles obtained from
the interior.
The European trade dealt, of course, partly with
the things already mentioned, and partly with other
articles for which the Carthaginian merchants acted
as carriers, so to speak, from one part of the Mediter-
ranean to another, Lipara, and the other volcanic
islands near the southern extremity of Italy, pro-
duced resin ; Agrigentum, and possibly other cities of
Sicily, traded in sulphur brought down from the
region of Etna ; wine was produced in many of the
Mediterranean countries. Wax and honey were the
staple goods of Corsica. Corsican slaves, too, were
highly valued. The iron of Elba, the fruit and the
cattle of the Balearic islands, and, to go further, the
tin and copper of Britain, and even amber from
the Baltic, were articles of Carthaginian commerce.
Trade was carried on not only with the dwellers on
the coast, but with inland tribes. Thus goods were
transported across Spain to the interior of Gaul, the
jealousy of Massilia (Marseilles) not permitting the
Carthaginians to have any trading stations on the
southern coast of that country.
While we are writing of trade, we must not omit to
mention a curious statement about what has been
called the " leather money " of Carthage. The work
from which it comes bears the name of ^schines, a
disciple of Socrates. It is certainly not of his time,
but it is probably ancient. " The Carthaginians,"
says this author, whoever he may have been, " make
use of the following kind of money : in a small piece
of leather a substance is wrapped of the size of a
ART AND LITERATURE.
123
piece of four drachmae (about 3s.) ;
but what this substance is no one
knows except the maker. After
this it is sealed and issued for
circulation ; and he who possesses
the most of this is regarded as
having the most money, and as
being the wealthiest man. But
if any one among us had ever
so much, he would be no richer
than if he possessed a quantity
of pebbles." This unknown sub-
stance was probably an alloy of
metal, of which the ingredients
were a State secret ; and the seal
was a State mark. We have, in
fact, here a kind of clumsy bank-
note.
Of Carthaginian art and litera-
ture there is little to be said.
The genius of the Phoenicians did
not lead them to distinguish them-
selves in either way. As for art,
whatever grace is to be found in
the scanty remains that are left
to us of Carthaginian civilization,
is clearly due to Greek influence.
The coins, for instance, that are
figured on pp. 1 1 5, 1 16, arc evi-
dently the work of Greek artists.
About Carthaginian literature we
cannot speak so positively. That
there were libraries in the city
a
I
WRITING-CA I
124
TnE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
when it was taken by ihe Romans, we know for
certain, as we also know that the conquerors were
not sufficiently aware of their value to keep them
for themselves, but allowed them to be dispersed
among the African princes. But whether these libra-
ries contained a native Carthaginian literature, or
were furnished with the production of Greek genius,
we do not know. Of one Carthaginian work, in-
deed, we know something. We have its subject,
the name of its author, and, it may also be said, its
opening sentence. It was a book on agriculture,
VOTIVE STELE (BULI.).
written by one Mago, and it began, it is said, with
the remark that he who would make his farm
prosper should sell his town-house. So high a
reputation had it obtained, that when Carthage was
taken, the Roman Senate appointed a committee to
look after its translation into Latin. It was after-
wards translated into Greek. Roman writers made
much use of it, and Cicero speaks of it as the standard
work on its subject.
Of the domestic life of the Carthaginians we know
almost nothing. Where there is cireat wealth there
WF.ALTII AND LUXURY. T25
is sure to be great luxury. Of this we get, indeed,
a few hints from the historians. We have seen,
for instance, how, when one of the Carthaginian
generals were pressed for arrears of pay by his mer-
cenaries, he was able to give them security in the
rich gold and silver drinking-cups which belonged to
the Carthaginians on his staff. And Athena^us, a great
collector of gossip on all such matters, tells us that
Dionysius sold a splendid robe to a Carthaginian
millionaire for a hundred and twenty talents — the
almost incredible sum of nearly thirty thousand
pounds. And it seems to have been also true that in
Carthage, as elsewhere, " where wealth accumulates
men decay." Political and military talent she could
always command, but she trusted more and more to
her mercenaries, to those " silver spears " which are
sure, sooner or later, to break in the day of need.
PART IV.
CARTHAGE AND ROME
For the First and Second Punic Wars our cliief authorities
are Polybius and Livy. The first was a Cheek, and a great
friend of the younger Scipio, tiie conqueror of Carthage. He
was present at the capture of that city, but unfortunately the
part of his worlv which relates that event, and the history of
the Third Punic War generally, is lost. For the First Punic
War, which is the chief subject of the introductory chapters
of his work, and for the Second, he is our best authority, so
far as he goes. Here, again, unfortunately, much is lost ;
indeed, we have no complete book after the fifth, and this
takes us a little farther than the battle of Cannae. Consider-
able extracts have, however, been preserved of the lost books,
among them one containing a description of the battle of
Zama. Polybius was an admirable historian, painstaking and
just in the highest degree.
Livy (Titus Livius) lived in the last days of the Roman
Republic and the first of the Empire, since he was born B.C.
59, the very time of the first Triumvirate, and died in the
fourth year of Tiberius. He wrote a history of Rome in one
hundred and forty-two books, of which thirty-five only sur-
vive. Happily the ten books, twenty-one to tliirty, which
give a detailed account of the Second Punic War from the
beginning to the end, have been preserved, and epitomes
of the lost books exist, from which we get some valuable
information about the First and Third wars. Livy is a
great writer ; some excellent judges have even said that
his style is the very best to be found among prose writers
ancient or modern. It is certainly full of vigour and beauty;
but Livy is not a great historian. He was very careless,
never taking the pains, so far as we can learn, to visit the
scenes of the events which he describes, though they must
often have been within his reach, or attempting to realize
them to himself. For the Third Punic War our chief authority
is Appian, a native of Alexandria, who wrote there, in Greek,
a Roman history, in which he treated the affairs of every
country separately.
I.
THE WAR IN SICILY AND ON THE SEA.
We have heard more than once of Campanians
among the mercenaries who were accustomed to fight
both for Greece and for Carthage in the Sicih'an wars.
They seem to have been particularly unscrupulous,
for they would change sides when changing sides
seemed likely to give them better pay or better
prospects of victory. And this habit of theirs agrees
with the bad account we get of them in other ways.
These Campanians let out their swords for hire, not
so much because they were poor (as did the Arca-
dians in ancient times, and the Swiss and Scotch in
modern Europe), as because they liked the life of a
soldier of fortune. They were the youth of a disso-
lute people,^ and, not able to find the career they
liked at home, where they would have had to deal with
the Romans, they sought it abroad, and, as we have
seen, especially in Sicily. We shall not be surprised,
therefore, to find some of these Campanians behaving
in a most cruel and unscrupulous way to one of the
Greek cities. After the death of Agathocles, who,
' Capua, llie chief city of Campania, had a very bad reputation in
this way.
lO
IJO THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
tyrant as he was, was a man of energy, affairs in
SicUy had fallen into a state of great confusion.
Among other causes of trouble was a corJ>s of Cam-
panian mercenaries, who had been ii> the service of
the tyrant, and who, after his death, asserted their
independence, and set up in the trade of brigands.
They seized the city of Messana, slew or drove out
the citizens, and divided among themselves everything
that they possessed. For a time the Mamertines, or
" Servants of Mars " ^ (for this was the name that the
robbers had assumed), prospered greatly, spreading
their power over the neighbouring portion of the
island. Then came a check. Syracuse had again
fallen into the hands of an able ruler, one Hiero, of
whom we shall often hear again. Hiero reduced the
Mamertines to great straits, and they looked about in
despair for some one who could help them.
There were two parties among them, one favouring
Carthage, the other Rome. At first the latter pre-
vailed. An embassy was sent, offering submission
and begging for help. The request perplexed the
Romans not a little. It was quite a new thing for
them to look beyond the limits of Italy. There they
were now supreme ; but they dreaded undertaking
conquests outside it. And to grant this request would
of course embroil them with Carthage. On the other
hand, Carthage would become a dangerous enemy if
it were allowed to possess itself of Messana. It
would only have to conquer Syracuse to make itself
master of Sicily. The Senate debated the question
more than once without coming to any decision.
' " Mamers " is an Ilalian form of " Mars."
THE ROMANS GAIN MESSANA. I3I
Besides their fear of a new enterprise, they had, we
may hope, some scruple about taking to themselves
such very discreditable allies. From the Senate the
matter was referred to the people, and the people felt
neither the fear nor the scruple, but resolved that help
should be sent, and that the Mamertines should be
received as allies.
Meanwhile the other party at Messana had been
busy. They applied for help to Carthage ; and Car-
thage at once sent it. A peace was made with Hiero,
who was besieging the city. A fleet sailed into the
harbour, and a body of troops under Hanno occu-
pied the citadel. When the Romans, who were under
the command of Appius Claudius, one of the Consuls
of the year, arrived, they found themselves anticipated.
Unfortunately for Carthage, both the officers in charge
of the fleet and Hanno were wanting in foresight or
resolution. The former was seized at a meeting of
the citizens to which he had gone in the hope of
keeping the peace ; the latter consented to give up
the citadel if he were permitted to withdraw with
his garrison. Then the Romans became masters
of Messana without having to strike a single blow
for it
The Carthaginians were not disposed to accept
this state of things. Ilanno they crucified as having
shown in his conduct neither courage nor good judg-
ment. Then, in concert with Micro, they closely in-
vested the city. Claudius attempted to make terms ;
he was even willing to depart, if the Mamertines
might be allowed to remain. When these terms
were rejected he resolved to act. He marched out of
r32 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the city and offered battle. Hiero accepted it, but
after a long fight was driven back into his camp. The
next day he returned to Syracuse. Appius followed
up his victory, attacking and routing the Carthaginian
army, which immediately raised the siege of the city.
The next year a larger army was sent ; Hiero, who
had the sagacity to see with whom the victory was most
likely to be, submitted to Rome, becoming one of its
most constant and useful allies. Many other cities,
both Sicilian and Carthaginian, followed this example.
Carthage, on the other hand, increased her forces in
the island, making Agrigentum the base of her
operations and the place in which her military stores
were kept.
The next year the Romans besieged Agrigentum.
and kept the garrison closely within the walls. After
a blockade which lasted five months, Hannibal, one of
the Suffetes, who was in command, found himself
sorely pressed by famine, and sent urgent entreaties to
Carthage for help. In answer to these requests, a con-
siderable body of troops, with a number of elephants,
was sent to Sicily. Hanno, who commanded the
Carthaginian army in the field, was rendered superior
in force to the Romans by this reinforcement. He
cut off their supplies and reduced them to great
straits. Indeed, but for the help of Hiero they could
not have held out. Hanno now thought it time to
attack the enemy. He sent on his African light-
horse in advance, with orders to provoke the Roman
cavalry to an engagement, and by retiring before them
to draw them within reach of his whole army. The
stratagem succeeded. The Romans sallied furiously
CAPTURE OF AGRIGENTUM. I33
from their camp, drove the Africans before them, and
then, finding themselves in presence of Hanno's army,
were themselves driven back.
For two months the two armies lay quiet, with a
space of about a mile between them. Meanwhile the
famine in the city grew worse, and Hannibal, by fire
signals from the city (for the Carthaginians seem to
have had some system of telegraphing), and by mes-
sengers, made his colleague aware that he could
hold out no longer. The Romans were scarcely less
in need, so that both parties were eager to fight. The
battle that followed was long and obstinate. At last
the Carthaginian mercenaries, who composed the front
line, gave way, fell back upon the elephants behind
them, and threw the whole army into disorder. Only
a small part of the troops escaped. But Hannibal
with the garrison of Agrigentum was more fortunate.
Seeing that the Romans, rejoicing in their victory,
were guarding their lines very carelessly, he made his
way through undiscovered. The next day the Romans
marched into Agrigentum, where they found abun-
dance of spoil and many prisoners of war.
After this success the Romans began to think that
then it was within their power to make themselves
masters of the island. But the great obstacle was
that Carthage was still mistress of the sea, and that
even their own coasts were not safe from the ravages
of her fleet. If their hope was to be fulfilled they
must have a fleet of their own. Ships of course they
had, for the treaties ' with Carthage, made hundreds
of years before, had set limits beyond which they
' Sec pp. 14 1^'-
134 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
should not go ; possibly they had ships of war ; but
they had nothing which they could match against the
great five-banked vessels of the enemy. Fortunately
one of these came into their possession, stranded by a
storm or in an attack made upon their transports.
This they used as a model for their shipbuilders. In
the course of a few weeks, a hundred five-banked and
twenty three-banked vessels were built — of green wood,
it is said, and not likely to last, but still sufficient for
their purpose.
The first attempt of the new force was not fortu-
nate. A squadron of seventeen ships was taken at
Lipara, with one of the consuls, who was in command.
But the Carthaginians soon found that the Romans
were quite as formidable by sea as by land. Their
admiral, Hannibal, who was reconnoitring with fifty
ships, fell in unexpectedly with a superior force of the
Romans, lost the greater part of his fleet, and barely
escaped himself. Still, the greater experience of their
seamen would have given them the advantage but for
the device by which their enemies contrived to make
a sea-fight very much like a fight on dry land. Every
Roman ship was filled with a boarding apparatus. It
was like a gangway, eighteen feet long and four feet
broad, and was attached to a pillar of wood set up by
the bowsprit, from which it was dropped when the
two ships came in contact. The further end was
furnished with a sharpened bar of iron, which was
driven by the force of the fall into the enemy's deck,
and held it fast. If the ships were laid broadside to
broadside, the boarders jumped from all parts of their
own ship on to that of the enemy ; if prow only
DUIl.IAN COI.IMN.
BATTLE OF MYLAL. I37
touched prow, they went two and two along the
gangway.
The new apparatus was soon brought into use.
Hannibal (the same commander who had escaped
from Agrigentum) encountered the Roman Consul
DuiHus, and despising his enemy, bore down upon him
without taking the trouble to form his fleet in order.
The front ships, as soon as they came near the
Romans, were grappled by the new machines, and
the boarding parties poured in from the Roman ves-
sels. The Carthaginians were taken by surprise and
overpowered, and lost all the thirty ships that com-
posed the van. The rest of the fleet fared little better.
Whenever they tried to approach, the grappling-irons
hung over them. In the end they fled with the loss of
fifty more ships ; Hannibal escaping in an open boat.
This battle of Mylce was one of the turning points
of the long struggle between the two powers. Car-
thage had ruled the sea for centuries, and now it was
beaten by a foe who had first taken to it only a few
months before.^
It is needless to give all the details of the long
struggle that followed. Hannibal met with his end
in the year of his defeat at Mylae. He had sailed to
Sardinia, and was there surprised by the Roman fleet,
losing many of his ships. As usual he escaped, but
this time in vain. He was seized by the survivors and
crucified.
' Diiilius received liij;li IioiiDurs at Rome, a liiimipli, a coliinin adorned
with the beaks of the captured vessels, and tlie singular jJiivilege of
being accompanied by a torch-bearer and a flutepl.iycr wlien he was
coming home t'rom dinner at night.
138 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
The next two years the war dragged on in Sicily
without any decisive event, though the advantage was
for the most part with Rome. But in 256 a great
battle was fought. The Roman Government, weary
of these tedious campaigns, resolved to carry the war
into Africa, and attack their enemy at home. With
this end in view they collected a fleet of as many as
three hundred and thirty decked ships. On these they
embarked their best troops. Each vessel had a crew
of three hundred seamen, and carried a complement
of one hundred and twenty soldiers. The Cartha-
ginian force was still larger, numbering three hundred
and fifty ships, and one hundred and fifty thousand
men. The two fleets met at Ecnomus, a promontory
of the southern coast of Sicily.
The Roman fleet was formed in the shape of a
triangle, with the apex or point towards the enemy.
At this point were the two huge ships, each rowed by
six banks of oars, in which sailed the two Roman
Consuls — Atilius Regulus, of whom we shall hear
again, and Manlius. Each side of this triangle was
made up of a squadron ; a third squadron, which held
the transports containing the cavalry in tow, formed
the base ; and there was yet a fourth, a reserve,
ranged in one long line so as to cover both flanks of
the squadrons before them.
The Carthaginians adopted very different tactics.
They arranged their ships in what may be called open
order, extending their line from the shore far out to
sea with the view of surrounding the enemy. The
shore squadron, or left wing, was under the command
of Hamilcar ; the rest of the fleet was led by the
BATTLE OF ECNOMUS. I39
Hanno whose army had been defeated before Agri-
gentum. The Roman fleet began the attack. Seeing
that the enemy had but a weak Hne of single ships,
they bore down upon the centre. Hamilcar had
foreseen this, and had given orders to his officers to
retreat as soon as the attack should be made. This
was done, and with the expected result. The Romans
eagerly pursued the flying enemy ; their order of
battle was broken, the two squadrons in advance
being separated from the third (that which had the
transports in tow) and from the reserve. Then the
retreating Carthaginians turned upon their pursuers.
An obstinate fight followed ; the Carthaginians had
the advantage in seamanship and in the speed of
their ships. But do what they might, they hardly
dared to come to close quarters. The Roman ships
were fitted with the dreaded grappling and boarding
machines. If these were once brought into use the
battle had to be fought by the soldiers, and there
was no chance of standing against the soldiers of
Rome.
While this struggle was going on, another com-
menced in the rear of the Roman fleet. Hanno bore
down with his ships upon the reserve squadron and
threw it into confusion. And then began a third,
the left or in-shore wing of the Carthaginian fleet
attacking the squadron which had the transports
attached to it. 15ut the Roman supcrioiit)- was
maintained everywhere. At close quarters the Car-
thaginians could not hold their own, and though
here and there they might sink a ship by a sudden
skilful charge, to close quarters they were bound
140 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
sooner or later to come. Hamilcar was the first to
retreat ; then Hanno, who had been pressing hard on
the transport squadron and the reserve, was attacked
";n his turn and forced to fly. Thus the Romans won
the second great naval victory. Twenty-six of their
ships had been sunk, but none were taken. The Car-
thaginians lost about a hundred, as many as sixty-
four having been captured with all their crews. Those
that escaped were scattered in all directions, and
there was now nothing to prevent the Romans from
invading Africa.
II.
THE INVASION OF AFRICA.
Hanno hastened home with the news of the disaster
of Ecnomus (though home, as we have seen, was not
the place to which a defeated Carthaginian general
would naturally desire to go), and bade his country-
men prepare for defence. But Carthage was, now as
ever, almost helpless when attacked in her own do-
minions. Her subjects were always disaffected and
ready to rebel ; and even her own colonies were not
permitted to protect themselves with walls. No
resistance could be offered to the invaders, who found
the country much the same as Agathocles had found
it fifty years before, a singularly rich and perfectly
defenceless region. They collected a rich booty, part
of which consisted of as many as twenty thousand
slaves. It is possible that if, instead of busying them-
selves with plunder, they had advanced on Carthage
at once, they might have finished the war at a single
blow.
If this had ever been possible, it certainly ceased to
be so when an order came from the Senate at Rome
that one of the consuls was to remain in Africa with
such forces as might be necessary to finish the war,
143
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
while the other was to return home with the rest of
the expedition. Regulus was left accordingly with
fifteen thousand infantry and six hundred horse and a
squadron of forty ships ; the rest of the force, with the
vast booty that had been collected, Manlius put on
shipboard and carried back to Italy.
RESERVOIRS OF CAR I HAGE.
The Carthaginians, on the other hand, were doing
their best to strengthen their force. They appointed
two new generals, and sent for a third from Sicily, who
at once came back, bringing with him between five and
six thousand men. It seems strange that the Romans,
who must now have been masters of the sea, made
DEFEAT OF IIAMILCAR. I43
no attempt to interrupt him. On his arrival the
Carthaginians resolved to take the offensive. The
wealthy citizens could not bear to see their estates
plundered and their country houses burnt to the
ground, and resolved to risk a battle. What might
have been the result if they had had skilful generals
is doubtful ; but, unfortunately, skilful generals could
not be found. Hamilcar and his colleagues marched
out of the city and took up their position upon a hill.
As their strength was in cavalry and elephants they
CROSS SECTION OF CISTERN WALU FROM DAUX.
ought, of course, to have remained on level ground,
where both these could have been brought into use.
The Roman general, whose military ability was great,
saw his advantage. Half the enemy's force was
useless in the position which he was occupying, and
in that position he resolved to attack him. He
ordered a simultaneous advance against both sides
of the hill on which the Carthaginian camp was
pitched. The cavalry and the elephants were, as he
Ixad foreseen, quite useless ; and though some of the
144 ^^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
mercenaries stood firm against the first charge, these
too gave way when they were taken in the rear. The
Romans won a decided victory, though they were
too weak in cavalry to inflict much loss upon the
enemy in his retreat. The next day they advanced
and took up a position at Tunes, a town which, as
we have seen, was not more than five miles from
Carthage.
The Carthaginians were in despair. Both their
fleet and their army had suffered terrible defeats, and
their subjects and allies were in rebellion — the Afri-
cans ravaging the territory of their late masters even
more mercilessly than did the Romans. In fact they
had nothing left to them but the city itself; and this,
crowded with the multitude of fugitives that had fled
into it from all the country round about, was threat-
ened with famine. Affairs were in this condition
when envoys arrived from Regulus, who was afraid
that his year of office might expire before the war
was finished, offering to treat for peace. Envoys
were at once sent from Carthage ; but they could do
nothing. The Roman general, probably aware that
the Senate at home would not sanction any great
concessions, demanded terms which it was impossible to
grant. The Carthaginian government felt that they
could not be more entirely humiliated by absolute
conquest, and they broke off the negotiation, resolving
to resist to the last.
Then came one of those singular turns of fortune
of which history is so full. The pride of the Roman
general was " the pride that goeth before a fall." The
Carthaijinians had not hesitated to use their almost
XANTIPPUS. 145
boundless wealth in hiring mercenaries from abroad,
and now there came to Africa a body of these troops
in command of one of those soldiers of fortune who
have had the luck to have great opportunities and to
make good use of them. Xantippus came from the
best school of soldiers in the world — Sparta. It was
a Spartan who had turned the tide when Athens
seemed likely to conquer Syracuse; and another
Spartan was to do the same service for Carthage
against Rome. Xantippus heard the story of the
late battle ; he saw the strength of the Carthaginian
forces, the numbers of their cavalry and of their
elephants, and he came to the conclusion — a conclu-
sion which he did not hesitate to announce to his
friends — that their disasters had been due, not to the
inferiority of their army, but to the unskilfulness of
the generals. The Senate sent for him. Introduced
into the council-chamber, he set forth the causes ol
the late defeat, and the strategy which ought to be
pursued in the future, with such clearness as to
convince his hearers. The generals were displaced,
and the " care of the army was committed " to the
Spartan.
Every one hoped much from the change, and
Xantippus soon began to show himself equal to his
task. Kven in drilling the troops — and this he began
to do at once — his skill was so manifestly superior to
ihat of his colleagues, that the soldiers began to feel
the utmost confidence in him. They loudly asked
that they might be led against the enemy, and that
the general who was to lead them should be Xantippus.
The other generals offered to give up their commands
II
146 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
to their comrade ; and the army, which numbered
twelve thousand foot and four thousand horse, and
which was accompanied by the enormous number of a
hundred elephants,^ was led out against the enemy.
Xantippus arranged the elephants in a single line in
front. Behind these he placed what Polybius calls
" the Carthaginian phalanx." Probably the desperate
condition of the country had brought a force of native
Carthaginians into the field. On the right wing were
posted the heavy-armed mercenaries. With them
were ranged also some of the light-armed troops and
of the cavalry. The left wing was made up entirely
of the two latter kinds of troops.
Regulus, on the other hand, when he saw that the
Carthaginians were bent on fighting, arranged his
line of battle with the special view of holding his
ground against the elephants, which his men greatly
feared. The light-armed troops were, as usual, posted
in front ; but behind them stood the legions in un-
usually deep and close order. The cavalry were
posted as usual on the wings. These tactics were
well contrived to resist the elephants, but laid the
army, with its narrow front, open to the flank attacks
of the powerful Carthaginian cavalry.
Xantippus began the battle by a forward movement
of his elephants against the Roman centre. His
cavalry charged at the same time on either wing. The
Roman horse, five hundredonly against four thousand —
■ It is not easy to imagine how a city wliicli was threatened v/ith
famine could supjiort a hundred elephants, each of which must have
required a daily ration of at least half a hundredweight of food, some
of it at least available for human consumption.
DEFEAT OF REGULUS. I47
if these numbers are right — was speedily overpowered.
The Roman left wing at first fared better. Charging
fiercely, with not the less zeal because they were not
called to encounter the dreaded elephants, they fell on
the heavy-armed mercenaries, routed them, and pur-
sued them as far as their camp. The centre, too, held
its own for a time. The front ranks, indeed, were
trampled down in heaps by the elephants, but the
main body, with its deep, close files, stood firm.
But they had to face about to resist attacks in front,
on the sides, and in the rear. One part, after driving
back the elephants, was met by the phalanx of native
Carthaginians, which was fresh and unbroken, and
indeed had not been in action at all ; another had to
resist the furious charges of the cavalry ; nor were
there any reserves to be brought up. The greater part
of the army fell where they stood : some crushed by
the elephants, others struck down by the javelins
showered on them by the nimble African horsemen,
some slain in more equal conflict with the Carthaginian
heavy-armed. The few that sought safety in flight
died but with less honour. The way to the fortified
post which they held upon the sea-coast (it was called
Aspis or Clypea from its resemblance to a shield)
was over a flat and open country ; the cavalry and the
elephants pursued the fugitives, and few reached the
fort. A solid body of two thousand men, however,
which had broken through the lucrcenaries, was able
to make good its retreat to Aspis. Five hundred
prisoners were taken, among them the Consul Rcgulus.
All the rest of the army, scarcely less than twelve
thousand in number, perished on the field or in the
148 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE,
flight The great historian, ^ from whom I have taken
this account, concludes his narrative of the campaign
with reflections on the changes of fortune which bring
men down in the course of a day from the heights
of prosperity to the depths of misery, and on the
marvellous results which the genius of a single man
can effect ; but he says nothing either here or after-
wards of the romantic story of the fate of the
prisoner Regulus. We are not certain to what year it
belongs — we are not even sure that it is true at all ;
on the other hand, it is too famous, too noble in its
meaning and moral, to be omitted. I may therefore
tell it now where it will fitly close the career of one of
the great soliers of Rome, the simple, frugal men who
were called from the plough to command the armies
of the republic.2
I do not know that the story can be better told
than in Horace's noble ode, perhaps the very noblest
that he ever wrote. Regulus, we may say, by way of
preface, after being kept in prison at Carthage for
several years, was sent to Rome to negotiate a peace,
under the promise to return if he failed. Among the
terms which he was to offer was that of a ransoming
' Polybius.
' The story was told in later times that Recjulus was sowing his fields
when the messenger came with the tidings of his election to the consul-
ship ; and the agnomen (a sort of second surname) of Scrnjiius was
said to have been given to the family from this circumstance. Among
the future heroes of his race whom ^neas sees is in his Elysian fields is
" Serranus o'er his furrow bowed." It is cruel to have to say that the
first Regulus that bore the name of Serranus was the son of the hero ;
and still worse to be told that the proper spelling of the word is
" Saranus," and that it probably comes from Saranum, an insignificant
town of Umbria.
HORACE ON REGULUS. I49
or exchanging of prisoners. When brought into the
Senate, which at first he refused to enter as being
now a mere Carthaginian slave, he strongly advised
his countrymen. At the same time he gave his voice
against peace generally.
With warning voice of stern rebuke
Thus Regulus the Senate shook :
He saw prophetic, in far days to come,
The heart-corrupt, and future doom of Rome.
" These eyes," he cried, "these eyes have seen
Unblooded swords from warriors torn,
And Roman standards nailed in scorn
On Punic shrines obscene ;
Have seen the hands of free-born men
Wrenched back ; th' unbarred, unguarded ga't,
And fields our war laid desolate
By Romans tilled again.
" What ! will the gold-enfranchised slave
Return more loyal and more brave ?
Ye heap but loss on crime !
The wool that Cretan dyes distain
Can ne'er its virgin hue regain ;
And valour fallen and disgraced
Revives not in a coward breast
Its energy sublime.
" The stag released from hunter's toils
From the dread sight of man recoils,
Is he more brave than when of old
He rangcil his forest free ? IJehold
In him your soldier 1 He has knelt
To faithless foes ; he, too, has felt
The knotted cord : and crouched beneath
Fear, not of shame, but death.
" He sued for peace 'ho' vowed to war ;
Will such men, girt in arms once more
Dash headlong on the Punic shore ?
No I they will buy their craven lives
With I'unic scorn and Punic gyves.
t5w The story op carthage.
O mighty Carthage, rearing high
Thy fame upon our infamy,
A city eye, an empire built
On Roman ruins, Roman guilt ? "
P'rom the chaste kiss, and wild embrace
Of wife and babes, lie turned his face,
A man self-doomed to die.
Then bent his manly brow, in scorn,
Resolved, relentless, sad but stern,
To earth, all silently ;
Till counsel never heard before
Had nerved each wavering Senator ; —
Till flushed each cheek with patriot shame,
And surging rose the loud acclaim ; —
Then, from his weeping friends, in haste.
To exile and to death he passed.
He knew the tortures that Barbaric hate
Had stored for him. Exulting in his fate,
With kindly hand he waved away
The crowds that strove his course to stay.
He passed from all, as when in days of yore.
His judgment given, thro' client throngs he pressed
In glad Venafrian fields to seek his rest,
Or Greek Tarentum on th' Ionian shore.'
What is the truth about the " tortures of barbaric
hate " we cannot say. The Romans had a horrible
story of how the hero on his return was cruelly put to
death. But then they were never scrupulous about
the truth when they were writing of their enemies ;
and about Carthage and its doings they were, we have
leason to believe, particularly apt to exaggerate and
even to invent. On the other hand, the Carthaginians
showed no mercy to their own generals when these
' I have availed myself of a translation by Sir Stephen Dc Vere.
'liell and Sons, 1SS3.)
REVENGE FOR REGULUS.
151
were unsuccessful ; and it is very probable that they
showed as little to an enemy, especially when he had
done them such damage and had treated them as
haughtily as had Regulus.
But there is at least equal authority for a story not
less horrible which is told against the Romans them-
selves, or rather against a Roman woman. The
Senate handed over two noble Carthaginians to the
wife of Regulus as hostages for the safety of her hus-
band. When she heard of his death she ordered her
servants to fasten the two prisoners in a cask, and to
keep them without bread and water. After five days
one of them died. The savage creature kept the living
shut up with the dead, giving him now a little bread and
water that his torments might be prolonged. But the
servants themselves rebelled against these horrible
doings, and informed the Tribunes of the people of
what was going on. By them the poor wretch was
rescued ; and the people would not allow nim to be
ill-treated an}' more.
HI.
IN SICILY AGAIN.
The Romans still retained their superiority at sea.
It is, indeed, a very strange thing that the Cartha-
ginians, though they had been sailors, and adven-
turous sailors too, for centuries, should have been
beaten almost at once on their own element by a
people that had had little or nothing to do with it.'
But so it was. News of the disaster that had hap-
pened to the army of Regulus was brought to Rome,
and a fleet was sent to carry off the garrison of
Clypea, which, it was said, still held out against the
enemy. It met and defeated the fleet of Carthage,
taking, we are told, as many as one hundred and
fourteen vessels out of a total of two hundred, and
carried the troops. But though the Romans seem to
have fought as well by sea as by land, still they were
not sailors. We shall hear several times in the course
' The fleet of Rome must have been, to a great extent, manned by
the Italian allies. Indeed, down to just a late peri(<d the se.iinen em-
ployed in it were called socii tiavaks, "naval allies." I'olybius, to
show the ignorance of the Romans in these matters, has a curious story
of how the crews of the ships first built during the war were taught to
row by practising on dry land. The practising, one imagines, would
not go very far in teaching them.
ROMAN LOSSES AT SEA. I53
of the next few years of terrible losses by shipwreck,
losses which we know to have been increased, if not
caused, by the obstinacy and ignorance of the officers
in command. So it seems to have been in the case
of the relieving fleet. The pilots warned the consuls
that the south coast of Sicily was dangerous, but
warned in vain. The result was a calamity of wb.ich
Polybius, a sober and sensible writer, says that " his-
tory can scarcely afford another example of so great
and general a disaster." Out of four hundred and
sixty-four vessels little more than a sixth part escaped.
The Carthaginians were proportionately encouraged,
and, fitting up a new fleet and levying another army,
resolved to have another struggle for Sicily. In the
first campaign, indeed, they lost Panormus, but in
those that followed they had a clear advantage.
Again the weather helped them. The Romans lost
another fleet, and for a time gave up all hope of being
masters of the sea, contenting themselves with keep-
ing only so many vessels afloat as were wanted to
carry supplies to their army. In the field, too, Car-
thage more than held her own. The havoc which the
elephants had wrought in the army of Rcgulus had
not been forgotten, and the Roman armies did not
venture to offer battle in any place where the ground
was suitable for the action of these formidable crea-
tures. It was not till they found out that it was easy
to make them as dangerous to their friends as they
could be to their foes that they dared to face them.
One of the Carthaginian generals was rash enough to
use the animals in attacking a town. The archers
showered arrows upon them from the walls till,
154 ^^^-^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
driven to madness by their wounds, they turned
round and broke down their own ranks. Many
fell into the hands of the Romans on this occasion.
A still greater gain was that they were no longer
feared.
And now began one of the most obstinate sieges
recorded in history. Lilybaeum was a strongly fortified
town near the Cape of the same name. Its wall was
unusually high, and its ditch unusually deep, while
the harbour could be approached only by a channel
through shallow lakes which stretched between it
and the sea. The Romans began by attacking a fort
on the south-western wall, and battered down six of
the towers upon the wall. Himilco, who was in com-
mand of the garrison, was unceasing in his efforts, re-
pairing the breaches, digging countermines, and watch-
ing continually for a chance of setting fire to the
Roman works. And he averted a worse danger in
the threatened treachery of the mercenaries. The
leaders of these troops were actually in treaty with
the Romans, when Himilco heard of what was going
on, and contrived to break it off A few days after-
wards came help from Carthage. No news of the
garrison at Lilybaeum had reached the city, and it was
feared that they were in distress. A fleet of fifty ships
was hastily fitted out and despatched to Sicily, with a
relieving force of ten thousand men on board. The
admiral in command waited for a favourable wind, and
then, with all his ships ready for action, sailed straight
into the harbour, the Romans being so surprised by
their boldness that they did not attempt to oppose.
Himilco, encouraged by this reinforcement, resolved
«TEI.E AT LILYK.KUM.
ROMAN DISASTERS. 157
to attack the besiegers. Sallying forth with nearly
his whole force, he fell on the Roman works ; but he
just missed his object : his troops were on the point
of setting fire to the engines and towers when he
found that they were suffering heavier loss than he
could afford, and withdrew them. But a few weeks
afterwards he succeeded. The works had been injured
by a violent gale, and some of the mercenaries saw
In the confusion thus caused an opportunity for
destroying them. Himilco approved their scheme.
These bands sallied from the gate and set fire to three
different places. The Romans were taken by sur-
prise ; and the wind blew such volumes of smoke into
their faces that they could see and do nothing. In
the end everything was destroyed, the towers being
burnt to the ground, and the metal heads of the rams
melted. After this loss they gave up all hopes ol
taking the place by storm, and resolved to trust to a
blockade.
Meanwhile the Carthaginian fleet lay at Drcpanum ;
and this the new consuls who came into office in the
year 249 resolved to attack. Publius Claudius, who was
in command, managed to reach Drepanum unobserved.
Adherbal, the Carthaginian admiral, was taken by
surprise, but did not lose courage. He manned his
ships at once, and sailing out of the harbour by the
opposite side to that by which the Romans were
entering, formed his line on the open sea outside.
Claudius had to recall his ships ; such as had entered
the harbour came into collision in backing out with
those that followed them, and there was great con-
fusion. Still the captains ranged them as well as they
15^ THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
could along the shore, with their prows turned towards
the enemy. But they had lost the choice of ground ;
the Carthaginians had the open sea and plenty of
room to manoeuvre. They could retreat when they
were hard pressed, and turn again when the oppor-
tunity occurred. When the Roman vessels ventured
to advance they were attacked in front, on the side,
and in rear. But a Roman ship that was in diffi-
culties had nothing behind it but the shore. If it
retired, it either grounded in the shallows or was
actually stranded. Nor was this disadvantage of
place counterbalanced by any superiority in the build
of the ships or in seamanship. The ships were
clumsy, the seamen unskilful. In the end Claudius
suffered a crushing defeat. He made his own escape
with thirty ships ; but all the rest, nearly a hundred in
number, were captured. The crews, too, were taken
prisoners, excepting a few who beached their ships
and jumped ashore.
Junius, the other consul, was even more un-
fortunate. He had a hundred and twenty ships of
war, with which he had to convey a fleet of eight
hundred transports. The Carthaginian admiral
forced him to cast anchor on a lee-shore (near
Camarina), where there was no harbour within reach
When it came on to blow the blockading squadron put
out to sea, and doubling Cape Pachynus escaped the
worst of the storm. The Roman fleet had not time,
or perhaps was not wise enough, to follow them.
Anyhow, it was completely destroyed. " Scarcely a
plank remained entire," says the historian. As a few
days before most of the ships in the harbour of
THE ROMANS GAIN ERYX.
159
Lilybreum had been burnt, Rome was now without a
fleet.
Still, the siege of Lilybaeum was pushed on. The
blockading army had now most of Sicily to draw
upon for stores, and was well supplied, while the town
could be provisioned from the sea. Though the
COIN : THE TEMI'I-E AND KAMTAKTS OK KKVX.
Romans gained possession by surprise of the strong
post of Eryx, the second highest mountain in Sicily
the war for some time dragged on without much
advantage to cither side.
And now appeared upon the scene one of the few
PTe?.t men that Carthage produced. Mamilcar, sur-
l6o THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
named 13arca,i was a very young man when he was
appointed to the command of the Carthaginian fleet
and army. But he had already made himself a name,
and he soon showed that he was fit for his post. He
established himself in a strong place in the north-west
of the island, between Panormus and Drepanum. It
was a lofty rock called Hercta (now Pellegrino\ and
seems to have united every kind of advantage. It was
so difficult of approach from the land that it could be
defended by a very small force. There was some
productive land in the neighbourhood. The climate
was cool and healthy ; and there was a deep and
spacious harbour. In this place, though the Roman
forces held all the neighbourhood, he maintained
himself for three years. His fleet — for Rome had
given up for the present the attempt to command the
sea — ravaged the southern coasts of Italy, and helped
to furnish him with supplies. On land he kept his
enemies engaged by perpetual surprises and strata-
gems. He won, indeed, no great victory over them,
but he kept them from doing an}-thing else, and the
siege of Lilyba^um made no progress. So anxious
were the Romans to drive him out of this stronghold,
that they at one time assembled as many as forty
thousand men to carry on their attacks upon him.
All, however, was in vain, and it was of his own free
will that at the end of three years he took up another
position. This was Eryx, the capture of which by the
Romans has been mentioned above. He put his army
on board the fleet, and suddenly carried it to the
place which he had fixed upon, and though the
• See page 1 1 .
HASDRUBAL'S SUCCESSES.
i6i
enemy still held the fort upon the top of the hills,
got possession of the town. Here he maintained
himself for two years, getting little help, it would
seem, from home, for one of his chief difficulties was
with his mercenaries, who were clamouring for the
PllCENIClAN WALL Al' KKVX.
pay which he could not give them, and whom he was
obliged to put off with promises. Still the Romans
could make no impression on him, and of course made
no advance in the siege of the Carthaginian fortresses.
12
l62
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
If Hamilcar could have been everywhere the war
might have had a different result, or, in any case,
might have been prolonged still more than it was.
But he could not be sure that his lieutenants would
be as able as himself. In 241 Rome made a great
POSTERN IN THE WALL OF KRYX.
effort to recover her supremacy at sea. The public
treasury was exhausted, as it might well be after
nearly five and tAventy years of war, but private citizens
came forward to supply what was wanting. Some
of the richest undertook to build each a ship ; 01
BATTLE OF AGATES ISLAND. 163
two or three of smaller means would join together.
Thus a fleet of two hundred five-banked vessels were
got together, and these of the very best construction.
With this Lutatius Catulus, the consul, sailed to Sicily.
The Carthaginians seem to have been unprepared, not
expecting indeed that the enemy, who had aban-
doned the sea for several years, should now seek to
recover the command of it. Catulus was therefore
able to possess himself unopposed of the harbours of
Lilybaeum and Drepanum. He pressed the siege of
the latter place with much vigour, and meanwhile
kept his crews busy with training and exercise, till he
made them expert and ready.
The Carthaginians, on the other hand, prepared to
act. The plan of Hanno, who was in command of
the fleet, was this. To take stores for the supply
of Hamilcar's army at Eryx, and, after landing
these, to take on board some of the best troops and
Hamilcar himself, who alone was equal to an army ;
and thus engage the Romans. It was the object ol
the Romans, on the other hand, to force an action
before this could be done. Catulus accordingly put
some of his best troops on board his ships and sailed
to iEgusa, an island opposite Lilybaium. Hanno was
at Hiera, another island, a little further out to sea,
The whole front was known by the name of the
./Egates (a word that has probably something to do
with the Greek word for a goat). Catulus intended
to give battle at once. Then, when the day for action
came, he began to doubt. The wind was stormy,
and was blowing from the west, and so would help the
movements of the enemy and hinder his own. On
164 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the Other hand, there was much to be lost by delay.
At present the Carthaginian ships were burdened
with the stores which they were carrying. If he did
not engage them at once they would rid themselves
of these, would take on board some first-rate troops
from the army at Eryx, and, above all, would
have the presence of the dreaded Hamilcar himself.
These thoughts made him resolve on battle. The
Carthaginians were already on their way eastward
when he put out to sea. His crews, become strong
and dexterous by practice, got their ships between the
enemy and the point for which he was making, and,
ranged in a single line, prepared to receive them.
The conflict was short and decisive. Hanno's ships
were encumbered with stores ; his crews were un-
skilled, for the fleet had been neglected, and the
troops on board were nothing better than raw levies.
In all these points the Romans were superior ; they
had nothing on board but what was wanted for the
battle ; their rowers were well trained, and their
fighting men of the best quality. At the very first
meeting they showed their superiority. Fifty of the
Carthaginian ships were sunk and seventy more taken
with all their crews ; the rest were saved by a sudden
change of the wind to the east which took them back
to their anchorage at Hiera.
The battle of the yEgates Islands brought the war
to an end. Carthage could no longer provision her
army in Sicily, and felt that it was useless to prolong
the struggle. Accordingly, Hamilcar was empowered
to make peace. The Romans were ready enough to
meet him, for they too were exhausted by the long
CONCLUSION OF WAR. 165
-Struggles, and after some negotiations a treaty was
made. The chief condition was that Carthage was
to give up all her positions in Sicily, and engage to
leave the island alone for the future. She had had a
hold on the island for at least four centuries, and
for nearly two had cherished hopes of winning it.
Sometimes she had been very near their accomplish-
ment. Now they had to be finally given up. This was
undoubtedly a great blow. We may call it the first
great step downward. A war indemnity of nearly
ii 800,000 was imposed. But Hamilcar was resolved
to save his honour. The Romans demanded that
the troops at Eryx should surrender. This demand
he resolutely refused, and it was given up. They
marched out with all the honours of war and were
carried back to Carthage ; and so, after a duration of
four and twenty years^ the First Punic War came to
an end.
IV.
CARTHAGE AND HER MERCENARIES.
We have seen more than once that Carthage
had much trouble with her mercenary troops. This
trouble now came upon her again, and in a worse
form than ever. The fact was that five and twenty-
years of war had exhausted even her vast wealth, and
she could not meet her engagements with the soldiers
whom she had hired. These, on the other hand, were
more powerful than they had ever been before. They
were not troops hired for a campaign, and discharged
after a few months' service, but a standing army
trained by a long war to know each other and to act
together ; and many of them had been taught the
art of war by a great soldier, Hamilcar Barca.
As soon as peace was concluded, Gesco, Governor
of Lilybaeum, had begun sending the mercenaries
to Carthage in small detachments. He hoped that
as they came they would be paid off and dismissed
to their homes. Had this been done, all would have
Dcen well. But the government eitlicr would not or
could not find the money. Shipload after shipload
of the men arrived till the city was full of them.
After a while, so troublesome and disorderly were
they, they were collected in a camp outside the walls,
kEVOLT OF THE MERCENARIES. 16/
and left there vvith nothing to do but talk over their
grievances and plot mischief.
When at last the money, or part of the money, was
forthcoming, it was too late. The troops had found
leaders, and the interest of these leaders was not
peace but war. One of them was a certain Spendius,
a runaway slave from Campania, who dreaded, ot
course, that when everything was settled he might be
sent back to his master, that is to torture and death.
He is said to have been a man of enormous strength,
and brave even to rashness. The other was a free-
born African, of the name of Matho. He had been
a ringleader in all the disturbances that had taken
place since the return of the mercenaries, and he
dreaded the vengeance of his employers. Matho found
his fellow Africans ready to listen to him ; and there
was probably much truth in what he said. " The
Carthaginians," he told his comrades, "are going to
send to their homes the troops belonging to other
nations ; when you are left alone they will make you
feel their anger." A pretext for open revolt was
soon found. Gesco, who had been sent to settle with
the troops, handed over the arrears of pay, but put off
the question of allowances for corn, horses, etc., to
another time. At this proposal there were loud cries
of discontent, and in a few minutes a noisy crowd of
troops was assembled. Spendius and Matho harangued
the assembly, and were received with shouts of ap-
plause. Any one else that attempted to speak was
killed. " Kill," says the historian, was the only word
that every one in this motley crowd, gathered from
almost every country of Western ]^2uroi)c, could under-
l68 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
stand. The two speakers were chosen generals.
Gesco and his staff were seized, fettered, and thrown
into prison. There was now open war between Car-
thage and her mercenaries.
The African towns at once joined the rebels. They
were always discontented with their masters, and this
discontent had now reached its height. The neces-
sities of Carthage during the war just ended had
compelled her to increase the taxes of her depen-
dencies, and to exact these taxes to the uttermost
farthing. The rent in kind paid by the cultivators
of the soil had been raised to a half of the pro-
duce, and the tribute paid by the towns had been
doubled ; and any default in payment had been cruelly
punished. So fierce was the wrath raised by this
oppression that the very women brought their orna-
ments— and her ornaments were no small part of
an African woman's wealth — and threw them into
the common stock. From these and other sources,
Spendius and Matho received so much money that
they settled all the claims of the troops, and had
still abundance of means for carrying on the war.
Two towns only, Hippo and Utica, remained loyal.
These were at once besieged. The mercenaries had
three armies in the field. One was before Hippo,
another before Utica ; the third held an entrenched
camp at Tunes. Carthage was thus cut off from all
communication by land with Africa : but she still
retained command of the sea.
The Carthaginian commander-in-chief, ITanno,^
' This Ilanno seems somehow to have got the title of " llie Great,"
but to have done very little to deserve it.
I ' ' c ^ 1
PLAN or HAKIiOUR AT U'lICA.
SIEGE OF UTICA. IJ^
marched against the rebel force that was besieging
Utica. He had as many as a hundred elephants
with him. These broke through the entrenchments
of the rebel camp, and the mercenaries fled in con-
fusion, Hanno, accustomed to have to do with half
savage enemies, who, once defeated, could not easily
be rallied, thought that the victory was won, and,
while he was amusing himself in Utica, allowed his
troops to be as idle and as careless as they pleased.
But the enemy were soldiers trained by Hamilcar
Barca, and accustomed to retreat and rally, if need
was, more than once in the same day. They rallied
now, and seeing that the Carthaginian camp was left
unguarded, attacked it, and got possession of a
quantity of stores, and, among them, of some artillery
which Hanno had sent for out of the city.
The conduct of the war was now committed to
Hamilcar. The strength of his force was a corps
of ten thousand native Carthaginians. Besides these
he had a body of mercenaries, a number of deserters
from the enemy, and seventy elephants. His first
operation was to relieve Utica. The chief difficulty
was to break the blockade which the rebel general
Matho had established round Carthage. The hills
at the land end of the isthmus on which the city
stood were held in force by the rebels ; as was the
only bridge over the river Macar. But Hamilcar had
noticed that a certain wind brought up such quanti-
ties of sand to the bar of the Macar as to make it
easily fordable. Taking advantage of this, he marched
his army across the river by night, and, to the sur-
prise of both friends and enemies, appeared in the
172 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
morninf^ on the other side, and hastened to attack the
rear of the rebel force that was guarding the bridge.
A strong detachment from the besiegers of Utica
advanced to support their comrades. Hamilcar was
marching with his elephants in front, his light-armed
troops behind them, and his heavy-armed in the rear.
On coming in sight of the enemy, he changed this
disposition. Spendius mistook the movement for a
flight, and ordered a charge. The rebels found the
heavy troops quietly waiting to receive them, while
the cavalry and the elephants fell upon their flanks.
They were soon broken. Six thousand were slain
upon the field of battle, and two thousand taken
prisoners. Hamilcar had broken the blockade ; but
Hippo and Utica were still besieged, and the rebels
were still in force at Tunes.
His success, however, had a good effect on the
African tribes. One of the chief Numidian princes
came into his camp with a force of two thousand
men, and Hamilcar felt himself strong enough again
to offer battle. The fight that ensued was long and
obstinate. At last the Carthaginians prevailed, chiefly
by the help of the elephants. Ten thousand rebels
were killed, and four thousand taken prisoners. To
these latter Hamilcar, with a wise mercy, offered
liberal terms. They might take service with Car-
thage, or they might go home. But if they were
found in arms again, they must expect no further
mercy.
The rebel generals were dismayed when they heard
of this politic act. Their only plan was to commit
their followers to deeds which could not be pardoned.
MAT OK PENINSULA OK CARTHAGE.
MASSACRE OF PRISONERS. 1/5
Accordingly they called an assembly of the soldiers.
Into this was brought a courier who professed tc
come with a despatch from the rebels in Sardinia.
This despatch contained a warning of a plot that was
being hatched in the camp for setting Gesco and the
other prisoners free. Then Spendius stood up to
speak. " Do not trust Hamilcar," he said. " His
mercy is a mere pretence. When he has got you all
in his power, he will punish you all. And meanwhile
take care that Gesco, who is a most dangerous man,
does not escape you." When he had finished speaking,
a second courier arrived, this time professing to come
from the camp at Tunes, and bearing a despatch to
much the same effect as the first. On this Antaritus,
a Gaul, who had shared the command with Spendius
and Matho, rose to address the assembly. He had
the advantage of being able to speak in Carthaginian,
a language of which most of his hearers, from long
service with the State, knew something. He told his
hearers that it was madness to think of concluding
peace with Carthage. Any one who advised such a
thing was a traitor, and they had better make it im-
possible by putting the prisoners to death.
This horrible advice was followed. Gesco and Jiis
fellow- prisoners, seven hundred in number, were
cruelly murdered, and from that time till the end of
the war no mercy was showed on either side.
For a time everything went ill with the Carthaginians.
Hanno had been joined with Hamilcar in the com-
mand ; but the two could not agree, and the army
suffered greatly in consequence. Sardinia was lost to
Carthage, and now Utica and Hippo revolted, after
176 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
massacring their Carthaginian garrisons. At this crisis
the foreign allies of the State stood faithfully by it.
Hiero of Syracuse gave them help. It was not to
his interest that Carthage should be destroyed. Rome
left without a rival would be too powerful, and Syra-
cuse would soon be swallowed up. And Rome,
without the same reason, behaved equally well. She
would not take possession either of Sardinia or of
Utica, though both were offered to her by the rebels.
And she allowed traders to send supplies into Carth-
age, while she forbad them to have any dealings with
the rebels.
And now the tide turned against the mercenaries.
They were besieging Carthage, but they were also
besieged themselves. Naravasus, a Numidian prince,
with his cavalry cut off all supplies from the country,
and they were reduced to the most frightful ex-
tremities. Spcndius and his colleagues endeavoured
to make terms. Hamilcar agreed to let the rebels go
free, with ten exceptions such as he should choose.
When the treaty was concluded, he said, " I choose
among the ten those that are now present." Spendius
and Antaritus were two of them.
The siege of Carthage was now raised, and Hamilcar
advanced against the camp at Tunes. He posted
himself on one side, while his lieutenant, Hannibal,
took up his position on the other. Spendius and his
fellow - prisoners were crucified before the walls.
Unfortunately Hannibal was an incompetent general.
Matho, who was in command of the rebels, made
a sally, stormed the camp, and took Hannibal him-
self prisoner. In retaliation for the death of Spendius
END OF WAR WITH MERCENARIES. lyj
he was fastened alive to the same cross on which the
body of the rebel leader was still hanging.
Carthage now made a last effort to bring the war
to an end. Every citizen that was of an age to bear
arms was forced to serve. Hamilcar and Hanno
agreed to forget their differences and to act together.
And now everything went well. Matho was com-
pelled to risk a battle, and was defeated and taken
prisoner. All the African towns, except Utica and
Hippo, at once submitted, and these, finding them-
selves alone, did not long hold out.
" Such," says Polybius, " was the conclusion of the
war between Carthaginians and their mercenaries,
after a continuance of three years and about four
months ; a war by far the most impious and bloody
of any that we find in history."
Carthage came out of the struggle much weakened.
Besides men and money she lost her province of
Sardinia. The Romans seem to have repented of
their moderation, and did not refuse the island when
it was offered them by the rebel mercenaries a second
time, and when Carthage prepared to retake the
island by force, Rome declared war. The unfortunate
State had to give way, and to pay besides an indemnity
of twelve hundred talents.
13
V,
CARTHAGE AND SPAIX.
When the war of the mercenaries was at last
over, Hamilcar Barca was left the greatest man in
Carthage. It was he who had saved the State at its
greatest need ; and it was to him the people looked for
guidance. For the next forty years, or thereabouts,
he and his family, or the party that was led by them,
called by their opponents the " Barcine Faction," had
the government in their hands. Hamilcar's one
object was to recover what Carthage had lost ; but it
was an object which it was difficult to attain. To
reconquer Sicily and the other islands of the Western
Mediterranean was hopeless. For four hundred years
and more Carthage had spent her strength in these
regions, and had never quite got them into her grasp.
Now they had passed for ever into hands which were
stronger than hers. Not only must no action be
taken directly against Rome, but nothing must be
done to rouse her jealousy. Another war with Rome
would be fatal, at least till Carthage had got back
her strength, and war had already been threatened.
Hamilcar had to look elsewhere, and he looked to
Spain. Carthage had already had dealings with this
country. She had trading ports along its coasts, and
HAMILCAR IN SPAI.X. Ijg
she had got some of her best troops from its tribes.
Hamilcar now conceived the idea of building up here
an empire which should be a compensation for that
which his country had lost elsewhere. This idea he
kept secret till he had begun to carry it into action.
He set out with the army, of which he seems to have
been permanent commander-in-chief, on an expedition
to complete the conquest of the African tribes dwel-
ling westward of Carthage. Little or nothing was
heard of him till the news came that he had crossed
over into Spain, and was waging war on the native
tribes. For nine years he worked on, making a new
empire for his country. We know little or nothing
about his campaigns, except that they were successful.
Not only did he make war support itself, but he sent
home large sums of money with which to keep up the
influence of his party, and he had still enough to spare
for bribing native chiefs. At the end of the nine
years he fell in battle. But he left an able successor
behind him in Hasdruba), his son-in-law, who had
been his colleague in his campaigns. Hasdrubal
carried out his plans, and completed the work which
he had begun. Here, too, we know nothing of de-
tails. That he was a good soldier we are sure, for
when the restless tribes of the African coast had
risen in arms after Hamilcar had crossed over into
Spain, he had been sent back by his chief, and had
soon reduced them to submission. But he seems to
have been still greater as a manager and ruler of men.
By pleasing manners, by politic dealing with the
native tribes, and by friendship formed with their
petty chiefs — he is said to have married a Spanish
iSo THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
princess — he furthered the cause of his country more
than by force of arms. The foundation of New
Carthage was his work. It had the best harbour on
the coast ; it was near the rich silver mines discovered
by Aletes, and it soon became the capital of the
new province. So powerful, indeed, was Hasdrubal
that he was suspected of a plan for making himself
absolute master of Carthage ; while the treaty with
the Romans by which the boundaries of the two
Empires were fixed at the river Ebro is spoken of as
having been made with Hasdrubal.
The jealousy of the Romans had indeed by this
time been roused. They saw with some alarm the
wonderful progress that the Carthaginian general was
making with the Spanish tribes, and they looked
about for friends for themselves. Saguntum, a town
partly Greek in origin (its name seems to have been
connected with that of Zacynthos, one of the islands
off the western coast of Greece), applied to them for
protection, and they readily promised it. A treaty
was concluded by which the river Ibcrus (now the
Ebro) was to be the eastern boundary of the Cartha-
ginian province, but it was stipulated that Saguntum,
which lay about fifty miles within these limits, should
be independent. Hasdrubal met his death by assas-
sination, lie had executed a Spanish chief for some
offence against his government, and one of the man's
slaves in revenge struck him down. He had held the
chief command in Spain for a little more than eight
years.
And now the greatest man that Carthage ever pro-
duced comes to the front. Some seventeen years
tlANNIBAL. l8l
before, when Hamilcar was about to cross over into
Spain, his son Hannibal, then a boy of nine, begged
to be allowed to go with him. The father consented,
but first he brought the boy up to the altar on which,
in preparation for the expedition he was about to
make, he was offering sacrifice, and bade him lay his
hand upon the victim, and swear eternal hatred to
Rome. We shall see how the lad kept his oath.
He was present at the battle in which his father
met his death ; and though then but eighteen years
of age, was put by his brother-in-law, Hamilcar's suc-
cessor, in high military command. "There was no
one," says Livy, " whom Hasdrubal preferred to put
in command, whenever courage and persistency were
specially needed, no officer under whom the soldiers
were more confident and more daring." And indeed
he was the very model of a soldier. He was bold,
but never rash, cool in the presence of danger, and
infinitely fertile in resource. To fatigue he seemed
insensible. He could bear heat and cold equally well.
Of food and drink he cared only to take so much as
satisfied the needs of nature. To sleep he gave such
time as business spared him ; and he could take it
anywhere and anyhow. Many a time could he be
seen lying on the ground, wrapped in his military
cloak, among the sentries and pickets. About his
dress he was careless ; it was nothing better than that
of his humblest comrades. But his arms and his
horses were the best that could be found. He was
an admirable rider, a skilful man at arms, and as
brave as he was skilful. Witli such a man in the
camp, there could be no doubt as to the successor of
[82 THE StORY OF CAKTHAGE.
Hasdrubal : the army at once elected him to the com-
mand. His strong resemblance to his father, whom
many of the soldiers still remembered, was not the
least of his many claims. And the government at
home could do nothing but confirm the election.
Hannibal's first operations were against some
Spanish tribes in the interior, occupying the country
on both banks of the Upper Tagus (the western por-
tion of what is now New Castile). A great victory
over a native army, which is said to have numbered
as many as a hundred thousand men, brought to an
end these campaigns, which occupied the autumn of
221 and the greater part of the following year.
In the spring of 219 Hannibal laid siege to Sagun-
tum. His first operations were successful. His quick
eye had spied the weak place in the town's fortifica-
tions, and he at once made it the object of his attack ;
but the Saguntines were prepared to receive him.
Indeed they more than held their own, and Hannibal
himself was dangerously wounded by a javelin thrown
from the wall. But he had the advantage of vast
numbers — his army amounting, it is said, to as many as
1 50,000 — while the garrison had not men enough to
guard the whole circuit of their walls. The battering-
rams were used with effect, and a breach was made.
Then came an attempt to storm, furiously made, and
furiously resisted. The townspeople are said to have
made great havoc among the besiegers by a curious
missile, which is described as having had a heavy iron
point and a shaft which was wrapped in tow and set
alight. In the end the storming party was beaten
back.
SIEGE OF SAGUNtUM. 183
Meanwhile an embassy arrived from Rome Han-
nibal refused to receive it. He pretended that it
ivould not be safe for the envoys to enter his camp.
He could not, he said, undertake to protect them from
his barbarian allies. The ambassadors proceeded, as
their instructions directed, to Carthage. Hanno, the
leader of the peace party, pleaded earnestly with the
Senate to yield to the demands of Rome. He ad-
vised that the army should be withdrawn from before
Saguntum, that compensation should be made to that
town, and even that Hannibal should be surrendered
as having broken the treaty. But he scarcely found
a seconder, and the ambassadors were sent away with
a refusal.
The siege meanwhile was being pressed on with
vigour. The garrison hastily built a new wall at the
spot where the breach had been made, but this was
easily thrown down ; and a party of the besiegers now
established itself actually within the city. The defence
was still continued, but it was manifestly hopeless.
Hannibal was willing to give terms. The Saguntines
might withdraw with their wives and children, each
person to have two garments, but leaving all their
property behind. While this offer was being dis-
cussed in an irregular assembly, for a number of
people had crowded into the Senate-house, some of
the chief citizens gradually withdrew. They lit a
great fire, and collecting all the public treasure and
all the private property on which they could lay their
hands, flung it into the flames, and then, with
desperate resolution, leaped into them themselves.
While this was going on, the Carthaginians forced
1^4 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
their way into the town. Every grown-up male was
slain. The booty was enormous. Enough was left,
besides all that the soldiers took, to bring a great sum
into the public treasury.
There could be now no doubt that war would
follow. The Romans, indeed, made all preparations
for it. Still, anxious, it would seem, to do all things
in order, they sent another embassy to Carthage.
The envoys were instructed to put to the Carthaginian
Senate the simple question, " Was it by the order of
the government that Hannibal attacked Saguntum ?"
The Carthaginian Senate refused to give a direct
answer. The speaker who represented their opinion
pleaded that the regular treaty between Carthage and
Rome made no mention of Saguntum, and that they
could not recognize a private agreement made with
Hasdrubal. "Upon this," says Livy, "the Roman
gathered his robe into a fold and said, * Here we bring
you peace and war: take which you please.' In-
stantly there arose a fierce shout, ' Give us which you
please ! ' The Roman, in reply, shook out the fold,
and spoke again, ' I give you war.' The answer from
all was, ' We accept it ; and in the spirit with which
we accept it, will we wage it.' "
Thus began the Second Punic War.
vr.
FROM THE EDRO TO ITALY
After the capture of Saguntum, Hannibal went into
winter quarters at New Carthage. He gave a furlough
to any of his Spanish troops that wished to visit their
homes. " Come back," he said, " in early spring, and
I will be your leader in a war from which both the
glory and the gain will be immense." The winter he
spent in maturing his great plan, which was nothing
less than to invade Italy. Carthage, he knew, had
been brought to the brink of destruction by being
attacked at home ; and this because her subjects had
been raised against her. Rome, too, had subjects who
were doubtless ill-content with her rule. Within the
last hundred years she had added the greater part of
Italy to her Empire. It was in Italy that he hoped
to find his best allies. We shall see how far his hopes
were fulfilled, how far they were disappointed.
In the spring he made a disposal of his forces.
Some fifteen thousand, chiefly Spaniards, he sent into
Africa. With his brother Ilasdrubal he left an army
of between twelve and thirteen thousand infantry, two
thousand five hundred cavalry, five hundred slingers,
and twenty-one elephants, besides a fleet of fifty-seven
ships, chiefly of the largest size. His policy in making
l86 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
these arrangements was to garrison Africa with Spanish,
and Spain with African troops. The force with which
he himself crossed the Ebro consisted of ninety thou
sand infantry and twelve thousand cavalry.
To cross the Ebro, which was still nominally the
boundary between Rome and Carthage, was formally
to commence hostilities. On the night before he
made the passage, Hannibal, who had lately returned
from a solemn visit to the temple of Melcarth at
Gades, had a dream. He saw a youth of godlike
shape, who said, " Jupiter has sent me to lead your
army into Italy. Follow me, but look not behind."
Hannibal followed trembling, but could not, after a
while, keep his eyes from looking behind. He saw a
serpent of marvellous size moving onwards, and de-
stroying the forest as it went. When he asked what
this might mean, his guide answered, " This is the de-
vastation of Italy. Go on and ask no more, but leave
the designs of fate in darkness."
Hannibal's numbers, indeed, were much diminished
before he reached the foot of the Alps, which was to
be the first stage in his journey. He had to conquer
the country between the Ebro and the Pyrenees, and
leave a large force to hold it ; and he felt it wise to
dismiss to their homes a number of men who were
unwilling or afraid to go on with him. It was with
fifty thousand foot and nine thousand horse that he
crossed the Pyrenees. From the Pyrenees he marched
v/ith little opposition to the Rhone. His route seems
to have led him to Ncmausus (now Nismes), while the
point at which he touched the river was probably
Roquemaure. Polybius describes it as being four
PASSAGE OF THE RHONE. 1 87
days' march from the mouth. He found the further
bank occupied by a strong force of the neighbouring
Gauls. His guides informed him that some twenty-
five miles higher up the river there was an island, and
that when the stream was divided it was shallow and
comparatively easy to cross. Accordingly he sent
Hanno, son of Bomilcar, with a party of his army to
cross at this place, and to take the enemy in the rear.
Hanno found no one to oppose him. His Spanish
troops, men accustomed to the water, put their clothes
and arms on bladders, and swam to the further bank,
pushing these before them ; the Africans, who had not
had the same experience, crossed upon rafts. Han-
nibal meanwhile was making his own preparations for
the passage. He had collected from friendly tribes
on the right bank of the river a number of small boats.
These he used for his infantry. Larger vessels and
rafts constructed by his own men were reserved for
the cavalry, and were put higher up the stream, to
break the force of the current against the lighter craft.
When all was ready he gave the signal to start. The
enemy, though startled by his boldness in thus crossing
in face of their opposition, would doubtless have stood
firm, and, perhaps, successfully resisted him, but for the
force which had already made the passage higher up
the river. At the critical moment they saw behind
them the smoke of the fires which, by a concerted plan,
Hanno and his infantry had lighted. They found
themselves taken in the rear, a danger which no un-
disciplined troops can brave. Hannibal, familiar with
this fact, pushed boldly on. He was himself in one of
the foremost boats, and, leaping to shore, led his men
rSS ftm STORY OF cartHagu.
to the charge. The Gauls broke and fled almost with-
out striking a blow. He had still to get his elephants
across. A large raft was covered with earth and
moored firmly to the bank, and to this again a smaller
raft, similarly disguised, was attached. The elephants,
led by two females, were taken first upon the larger,
then upon the smaller raft, and, fancying themselves
still upon dry ground, made no objection. Then the
smaller raft was detached, and propelled across the
stream. The great beasts were frightened when they
found themselves afloat, but their very terror kept
them quiet ; and two that plunged into the water,
though their unfortunate drivers were drowned, got
safely to the opposite shore,
Hannibal marched up the left bank of the Rhone
till he reached the Iscrc. Here he made a valuable
ally in a chief of the Allobroges, whom he supported
against a younger brother that was claiming the
throne. This prince supplied his army with stores of
all kinds, among which shoes are especially mentioned,
and escorted him as far as the foot of the Alps.
But, it will be asked, were the Romans doing
nothing to defend themselves against this invasion ?
They had other work on their hands, for they were at
war with the Gauls in what is now Northern Italy,
but was then called Cisalpine or Hither Gaul. The
first armies they could raise were sent against them ;
but Publius Cornelius Scipio (a name of which we
shall hear much hereafter) was despatched with a
force to the mouths of the Rhone. Had he moved
up the river at once he might have hindered Hanni-
bal's passage, but he sat still. A proof that the
ROUTE OVER THE ALPS. 189
Carthaginians were near was soon given him. Han-
nibal had sent a squadron of African horse to recon^
noitre, and this fell in with some cavalry which Scipio
had sent out for the same purpose. A sharp skirmish
followed. It was the first occasion on which the two
enemies crossed swords, and the Romans won the day.
When his cavalry had returned, Scipio marched up
the river ; but he found Hannibal gone, and did not
think it well to follow him. Returning to the sea, he
sent the greater part of his army under his brother
Cnaius into Spain, and sailed back with the rest to
Italy. This policy of strengthening the Roman force
in Spain, in face of what seemed a greater danger
nearer home, was masterly, and was to bear good
fruit in after time.
Hannibal's route across the Alps has been the sub-
ject of much controversy, into which I do not intend
to enter. The view which seems to me the most pro-
bable is that he marched up the left bank of the Rhone
as far as Vienne ; then, leaving the river, struck across
the level country of Upper Dauphiny, and met the
river again at St. Genix. Thence he marched up the
valley of the Upper Iscre, and crossed by the pass of
the Little St. Bernard, descending into the Valley ol
Aosta.
The dangers and difficulties of the passage are
described in vivid language by the historians, and
indeed they must have been terrible. To take an
army, with all its stores and baggage, the horses, and
the elephants, across the Alps, was indeed a wonder-
ful task ; still more wonderful when we consider how
late it was in the year when the attempt was made
rgo THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
It was almost the end of October before the summit
of the pass was reached, and the seasons, there is
little reason to doubt, were colder then than they are
now.
If Hannibal had only had natural obstacles to con-
tend with he would have had plenty to do; but he
found the mountain tribes fiercely hostile. They
resented the intrusion of this formidable force into
their country, and they saw an excellent opportunity
for plundering. Their attacks began as soon as he
commenced the ascent, and were continued till he
had nearly reached the highest point. The first stage
of the march was at the pass which leads to the
Lake of Bourget. Every mile of this had to be won
by hard fighting. The road was steep and narrow,
and the barbarians attacked the army from points of
vantage. It was only Hannibal's foresight in occupy-
ing a still higher position, which the enemy had left
during the night, that prevented a most serious loss.
When the plain at the upper end of the pass was
reached, the disciplined army had nothing to fear.
The mountaineers' fortified town was stormed, and
much of the property that had been lost was regained.
The next three days' march was made without oppo-
sition; and then the mountain tribes, seeing that force
had failed, tried what treachery could do. Their chiefs
came into the camp, offered hostages, sent in supplie?.,
and promised to guide the army by the best and
shortest route. Hannibal did not wholly trust them,
and took precautions against a sudden attack. But
he allowed the guides to lead him into a dangerous
defile, where the longer road would have been safer.
>o
ROCKS SPLIT WITH VINEGAR. I93
At the most critical point of the march the enemy
attacked, rolling down great rocks or sending showers
of stones from the cliffs. The loss was great, but the
army struggled through. The elephants, difficult
as they must have been to drive up those narrow
and slippery roads, were of great service. The moun-
taineers were terrified at the sight of them, and
wherever they were visible did not venture to
approach.
The story of how Hannibal split with fire and
vinecfar the rocks which his men could neither remove
or climb over is so famous that it cannot be omitted,
though it is not easy to imagine how the vinegar
came to be there. Had his foresight, wonderful as it
was, extended so far as to provide this most unlikely
kind of store ? But without further criticism I shall
quote Livy's own word-.. " Having to cut into the
stone, they heaped up a huge pile of wood from great
trees in the neighbourhood, which they had felled and
lopped. As soon as tlicrc was strength enough in
the wind to create a blaze they lighted the pile,
and melted the rocks, as they heated, by pouring
vinegar upon them. The burning stone was then
cleft open with iron implements."
Livy represents this incident as occurring in the
course of the descent. By- that time the work, of
course, was really done. The army took nine days,
we are told, to make its way to the top. That once
reached, they were permitted to rest two days.
When they resumed their march a fall of snow almost
reduced them to despair. But Hannibal told them
to keep up their courage. He would show them the
Id
194 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
end of their toils. And indeed, a little further on,
they came to a point from which they could look
down on the rich plains of Italy. " You are climb-
ing," he cried to his men, " not the walls of Italy only,
but of Rome itself. What remains will be a smooth
descent ; after one or, at the most, two battles, we
shall have the capital of Italy in our hands."
Six days sufficed for the descent. It was more
than four months since Hannibal had started from
New Carthage, His losses on the way had been
terrible. He brought down with him into the plains
of Italy not more than twenty thousand infantry
(three-fifths of them Africans and the remainder
Spaniards) and six thousand cavalry ; and he had
left thirty-three thousand, most of them victims of
disease and cold, upon his road. This was the force,
if we are to reckon only his regular troops, with
which he was to undertake the conquest of Italy.
The numbers rest on the authority of a Roman who
was a prisoner in the Carthaginian camp, and who
heard them from the lips of the great general himself
VII.
THE FIRST CAMPAIGN IN ITALY.
Hannibal gave a few days' rest to his troops.
They greatly needed it, for their toils and sufferings
had given them, we are told, a look that was " scarcely
human." Then he struck his first blow. If he was
to succeed he must have the people of the Italian
peninsula on his side against Rome. In one way
or another they must be made to join him. Accord-
ingly, when the Taurini, a tribe of Gauls, refused
his proposals of alliance — they were at feud with
another tribe which was friendly to him — he attacked
and stormed their stronghold.^ After this almost all
the tribes of Hither Gaul joined him. They furnished
him with supplies and with a number of excellent
recruits.
Meanwhile Publius Scipio had landed his army at
Pisa, had marched over the Apennines, and, crossing
the Po at Placentia, was advancing against the in-
vaders. Hannibal scarcely expected to meet him so
soon ; Scipio had never believed that the Carthaginian
army would be able to make the passage of the Alps.
Both made ready for battle. Among the preparation?
' Probably the town afterwards called A ii::usta Toiiriiui' uni and now
kopwn as Turir.
lyG THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
of Hannibal was a spectacle which he exhibited to
his army. Some of the mountaineers who had been
taken prisoners in crossing the Alps were matched to
fight against each other. The conquerors were to
have a set of arms and their liberty ; the conquered
would, at all events, be released from their chains by
death. All the prisoners eagerly accepted the offer
when it was made to them, and fought with the
greatest courage, whilst those who had not been
chosen looked envyingly on. Hannibal meant the
exhibition as a parable to his own men. *' This," he
said, " is exactly your situation. You have this same
choice — a rich reward and liberty on the one side, and
death on the other. See how gladly these barbarians
accept it. Do you be as cheerful and as brav'C as they
are."
Scipio crossed the Ticinus by a bridge which he
had built for the purpose. Both armies were now on
the north bank of the Po, the Carthaginians moving
eastward and having the river on their right, the
Romans coming westward to meet them. At the end
of the second day's march both encamped, and on
the morning of the third the cavalry of both advanced,
Hannibal and Scipio commanding in person. The
Romans had their light-armed troops and their G.illic
horsemen in front, and the rest of their cavalry in the
second line. Hannibal had skilfully arranged his heavy
cavalry in a solid body in the centre; while the light and
active African troopers, men who rode their horses with-
out a bit, were on either wing. The Roman light-armed,
after a single discharge of their javelins, retired hastily
t;hrough the spaces of the squadrons behind thern.
ITALIA
SEPTENTRIONALIS
SCIPtO RETIRES TO THE TREBtA. Igg
Between the heavy cavalry on both sides there was
an obstinate struggle, the Romans having somewhat
the advantage. But the clouds of Africans had out-
flanked the Roman line, and had fallen first on their
light-armed troops and then on the rear of the heavy
cavalry. A general rout followed. Not the least
serious disaster of the day, as we shall see, was that
Scipio himself received a disabling wound. Indeed,
it was only the bravery of his son, a youth of
seventeen, of whom we shall hear again, that saved
his life. A body of horsemen formed round the
consul, and escorted him off the field.
Hannibal waited awhile to see whether his antago-
nists meant to risk a general engagement. As they
made no sign, he advanced, and finding that they had
left their camp, crossed first the Ticinus, and after-
wards the Po, where he captured six hundred men
who had been left behind by the Romans. Scipio
was now encamped under the walls of Placentia.
Hannibal, after vainly offering him battle, took up a
position about six miles off The first result of his
late victory was the crowding into his camp of the
Gallic chiefs from the south side of the Po. Before
long he had a stronger proof of the change of feeling
in this people. A Gallic contingent that was acting
with the Roman army left the camp at night, carry-
ing with them the heads of a number of their comrades
whom they had massacred, and took service with him.
Scipio was so alarmed by this general movement
among the Gauls that he left his camp, and moved
southward to the Trebia, where he could find a strong
position and friendly neighbours. Hannibal imme-
200 THE STORY OE CARTHAGE.
diately sent his African horse in pursuit ; and these,
if they had not stopped to plunder and burn the
deserted camp, might have greatly damaged the
retreating army. As it was, all but a few stragglers
had crossed the Trebia before the Africans came up.
Scipio took up a strong position on the hills, and
resolved to wait till his colleague Sempronius, who
was on his way northward, should join him. Hannibal,
who had followed with his whole force, pitched his
camp about five miles to the north. He had received
meanwhile a most welcome gain in the surrender of
Clastidium, a fortress near Placentia, where the Romans
had accumulated great stores of corn. The place was
given up to him by the commandant, a native of
Brundusium, who received, it is said, four hundred
gold pieces as the price of his treachery.
It was not long before Sempronius and his army
arrived. The numbers of the Romans were of course
greatly increased by this reinforcement ; but the result
was really disastrous. Scipio was a skilful general ;
Sempronius was nothing but a brave man, whom the
accident of being consul for the year had put in com-
mand of the army. And, unfortunately, Scipio was
disabled by the wound which he had received at
Ticinus. His colleague could not believe but that the
Romans must win a pitched battle, if the enemy should
be rash enough to fight one ; and he was anxious to
get the credit of the victory for himself. If he was
to do this he must force a battle at once. Winter was
coming on, and before the beginning of another cam-
paign he would be out of office.
If he had any doubt about success, it was dispersed
sEMPRoNWs Eager to fight. 201
by the result of a skirmish which took place between
the Roman and Carthaginian cavalry. Hannibal had
sent some horsemen, Africans and Gauls, to plunder
the lands of a tribe which had made terms with Rome.
As these were leturning, laden with booty, some
Roman squadrons fell upon them, and drove them to
their camp with considerable loss.
Sempronius was now determined to fight, and
Scipio could not hinder him. As Hannibal was at
least equally anxious for a battle, which was as much
to his interest as it was against the interest of his
antagonists, the conflict was not long delayed. Sem-
pronius had forty thousand men under his command,
and Hannibal's army, reinforced as it had been by the
Gauls, was probably equal.
Hannibal's first care was to place an ambuscade of
two thousand men, picked with the greatest care, in
some brushwood near the river. Mis brother Macro
had chosen a hundred foot-soldiers and as many
troopers ; and each of these again had chosen nine
comrades. They were to play, we shall see, an im-
portant part in the battle. Early the next morning
he sent his African cavalry across the river, with
orders to skirmish up to the Roman camp, and pro-
voke an engagement. Sempronius eagerly took the
bait. He sent out of his camp, first his cavalry, then
his light-armed, and finally his legions, and he sent
them before they had been able to take any food. It
was now far on in the winter ; the snow was falling
fast, and the Trebia, swollen by rain, was running
high between its banks. The water was up to the
men's breasts, as they struggled, cold and hungry,
20^ THE STORY OP CARTHAGE.
across it. The Carthaginians, on the other hand,
had had their usual meal, and had warmed them-
selves before fires. With ample time on his hands
and perfectly at his ease, Hannibal drew up his army.
Twenty thousand infantry, Africans, Spaniards, and
Gauls, formed the centre ; the cavalry, numbering ten
thousand, were on the wings, with the elephants in
front of them. The light-armed troops had been sent
on in advance to support the African horse. The
Roman line of battle was similarly arranged.
And now again, as before at the Ticinus, the weak-
ness of the Romans in cavalry was fatal. This arm
was inferior both in numbers and in quality. The
Carthaginian horse charged on both wings, and
routed their opponents almost without a struggle.
The flanks of the great body of infantry which formed
the Roman centre were thus uncovered, and were
exposed to fierce attacks both from the cavalry and
from the light-armed troops of the enemy. Still
they held their own for a long time with all the courage
and tenacity of Romans. But everything was against
them, and when Mago's ambuscade leapt out from
the watercourse, in which it had been hiding, and fell
furiously upon their rear, the day was lost. If any-
thing was still wanting to complete their rout, it was
found in the elephants, strange and terrible creatures
which few of the Romans or their allies had ever seen
before. The rear of the army suffered worst. Indeed
it was almost destroyed. The front ranks cut their
way through the Gallic and African infantry that was
opposed to them, and made their way to Placentia.
These numbered about ten thousand. Some stragglers
( % !:' !f^
THE CARTHAGINIANS VICTORIOUS.
205
from the rest of the army afterwards joined them.
Others made their way back into the camp, for the
conquerors did not pursue beyond the river. But it
is probable that the Romans lost nearly half their
force in killed, prisoners, and missing.
The Carthaginians did not win their victory without
some loss. But the slain were chiefly from among
the Gauls, whom Hannibal could most easily spare.
His best infantry, the Spaniards and Africans, suffered
little, except indeed from the cold — which the latter,
of course, felt very much. The cold, too, was fatal to
all the elephants but one.
With the battle of the Trebia the first campaign of
the Second runic War came to an end.
'"^^'y^W^^
VIII.
TRASUMENNUS.
Hannibal spent the winter among the Liguri'an
Gauls. They had welcomed him among them as the
successful enemy of Rome, but grew weary, we are
told, of his presence, when they found that they had
to support his army. He was even in danger of
being assassinated, and had to protect himself by
frequently changing his dress and even his wig. The
winter was scarcely over when he took the field,
making his way through the marshes of the Arno
into the heart of Etruria. This way was the shortest
that he could have taken, and by following it he
avoided the Roman armies that were watching for him.
But it cost him and his army dear. The floods were
out everywhere, and not a spot of dry ground could
be found on which his men could rest themselves.
All that they could do was to pile up the baggage in
the water and to rest upon that, or even upon the
heaps of dead horses. Weary, without food, and
without sleep, for this was their worst trouble, num-
bers perished on the march. Hannibal himself, who
rode upon the one elephant that was left, to keep
himself as far as possible above the water, was
attacked with ophthalmia, and lost the sight of one of
LAKE TRASUMENNUS. 207
his eyes. When he reached the higher ground he
gave his troops a short rest, and then marched boldly
towards Rome, wasting the country, which was one
of the richest parts of Italy, most cruelly as he went.
One of the Roman Consuls, Flaminius, was at
Arretium with about thirty thousand men ; the other
was at Ariminum on the east coast with as many
more. Hannibal ventured to leave them in his rear,
and now there was no army between him and Rome.
Flaminius, who had found it hard to sit still and see
the country of his allies wasted with fire and sword
before his eyes, could not allow Rome itself to be
attacked without striking a blow for it. He broke
up his camp, and followed the Carthaginians. This
was exactly what Hannibal expected and wished.
And he laid an ambush for his pursuer. The road
from Cortona to Perusia, along which he was march-
ing, passed close to the northern shore of the Lake
Trasumennus. Near the north-west corner of the
lake the hills on either side of this lake approach
close to each other ; at the north-east corner again
there is a still narrower passage formed by the hills
on the north, and the lake itself on the south. Be-
tween these two is a level plain, somewhat like a bow
in shape, if we suppose the edge of the water to be
the string, and the retreating hills the bow itself. In
front of the hills which commanded the eastern end
of the pass Hannibal posted his African and Spanish
troops ; and here he himself remained. At the end
of the pass itself, behind some rising ground which
conveniently concealed them, he stationed his Gallic
cavalry. The rest of his army he placed on the
208 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
further slopes of the hills which enclosed the plain
upon the north.
Flaminius reached the western end of the lake at
sunset, and pitched his camp there for the night.
The next morning, while the light was still dim, and
without, it seems, attempting to reconnoitre his route,
he continued his march. When his whole army had
passed through the defile into the plain beyond,
Hannibal gave the signal which had been arranged,
and the Numidian cavalry with the Gallic infantry
descended from the hills, and occupied the western
outlet. The Roman army was hemmed in. They
were surrounded, too, with mist, which rose from the
lake and lay thick upon the level ground, while the
sunshine was bright upon the slopes down which the
enemy was moving to the attack. Before they could
form their ranks in order of battle, almost before they
could draw their swords, the enemy was upon them.
Flaminius did his best, but it was very little that
he could do. There was no scope for a general's
skill, even if he had possessed it. It was a soldiers'
battle, where every man had to fight for himself ; but
the soldiers of Rome, newly recruited ploughmen
and vinedressers, were scarcely a match for the
veterans of Carthage, and were now taken at a
terrible disadvantage. Still, for a time, they held
their ground. For three hours the battle raged, so
fiercely that none of the combatants felt the shock
of an earthquake which that day laid more than one
Italian city in ruins. Then the Consul fell. Con-
spicuous in his splendid arms, he had kept up the
Roman battle, till one of Hannibal's troopers, an
SLAUGHTER OF THE ROMANS. 20g
Insubrian Gaul, recognizing his face (for Flaminius
had conquered the Insubrians eight years before),
fiercely chargetl him. " See ! " cried the man to his
comrades, " this is he who slaughtered our legions
and laid waste our fields. I will offer him a sacrifice
to the shades of my countrymen." The Consul's
armour-bearer threw himself in the way, but was
struck down ; and Ducarius (for that was the trooper's
name) ran the Consul through with his lance. Then
the Romans ceased to resist, even as the English
ceased at Senlac when Harold was slain. Some
sought to escape by the hills, others waded out into
the lake, which is shallow to some distance from the
shore. Men weighted with heavy armour could not
hope to escape by swimming ; yet some were
desperate enough to try it. These were either
drowned In the deeper water, or struggling back to
the shallows were slaughtered in crowds by the
cavalry, which had now ridden into the water. About
six thousand of the vanguard cut their way through
the enemy at the eastern end of the pass, and halted
on the high ground beyond to watch the result of the
battle. When the mist lifted, as the sun gained
strength, from hill and plain, they saw that their
comrades were hopelessly defeated, and, taking up
their standards, hurried away. But without pro-
visions, and not knowing which way to turn, they
surrendered themselves next day to Hannibal. About
ten thousand contrived to escape from the field of
battle. These made the best of their way to Rome.
Nearly fifteen thousand fell on the field or in the
flight. The Carthaginians lost two thousand and
15
210 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
five hundred, a proof that for a time at least the
Romans had not sold their lives for nothing. The
body of the Consul was never found, though Hannibal,
anxious to give so brave a foe an honourable burial,
ordered a careful search to be made for it.
A few days afterwards Hannibal had another suc-
cess. Maharbal surprised a body of cavalry which
Servilius was sending to help his colleague, killed
half, and took the other half prisoners. He then
marched south, but not, as one might expect, on
Rome, though it had no army to protect it. He was
afraid of undertaking the siege of such a city ; indeed,
when he attempted to take Spoletium, a colony, or
military settlement, in Umbria, he was beaten back
with great loss. He marched on in a south-easterly
direction, wasting the country as he went, and gather-
ing an immense booty, till he came to the eastern
sea near a town called Hadria. There he took a feu-
days rest and refreshed his army, for both men and
horses were terribly exhausted with toil and privation.
We are told that the horses, which were covered in
ulcers, were bathed in old wine, and that this treat-
ment cured them. From this place, too, he sent
despatches to Carthage with an account of what he
had done. They were the first that he had written
since he crossed the Ebro. Soldiers say that the most
dangerous thing that a general can do is to cut him-
self off from his base, to launch himself into the air,
as it is sometimes called — that is, to leave nothing be-
hind him on which he can fall back. Hannibal had
done this so boldly that he had never been able even
to send a messenger back with a letter. Now he was
HANNIBAL'S POLICY. 211
at the sea. and letters could be sent to and fro without
hindrance. He is also said at this time to have armed
some of his African infantry with arms of the Roman
fashion. From Iladria he moved still southward,
ravaging the eastern part of Italy as far down as
Apulia, but always showing that it was with Rome
and not with the Italian subjects of Rome that he
was waging war. Any Roman citizen, or child of a
Roman citizen that was of age to carry arms, he
ordered to be slain.^ The Italians that fell into his
hands he not only spared, but treated with the utmost
kindness.
■ So goes the Roman story, but the frequent mention of Roman
prisoners seems to prove that it was false.
IX.
FARIUS AND HIS TACTICS.
At Rome, after the first feeling of grief and terror
had passed away, everything was being done to carry
on the war with vigour. No one spoke of surrender,
or even of peace. The chief command of all the
armies of the State was given to a veteran soldier,
Quintus Fabius Maximus by name, who had won the
honour of a triumph nearly twenty years before.
Fabius' first act was to consult the books of the Sibyl. ^
They were found to prescribe various acts of worship
of the Gods, as the offering of prayers and sacrifices,
the building of temples, and the celebrating public
games. These were either done at once or promised
for some future time. The Dictator (for this was his
title) then ordered the levying of two new legions,
and of a force which was to defend the city and man
the fleet. He also directed that everything in the
line of Hannibal's march should be destroyed. The
Carthaginians were to find nothing but a desert
wherever they came. He then marched north. At
' Books of prophecy, snid to liave been written l)y one of the Sibyls,
sold to Tarquinius I'riscus, fifth king of Rome, and afterwards preserved
in the temple of Jupiter of the Capitol, to be consulted in any great need
of the State. See "The Story of Ronw," p. 59.
HANNIBAL A MASTER OP STRATAGEM. ±t^
Ocriculum in Umbria he met Servilius, who was on
his way to Rome, and took over his legions from him.
Servilius he sent to command the fleet, which was
being got ready at Ostia for the defence of the Italian
seas. He himself, with an army numbering about
fifty thousand men, followed in pursuit of the
enemy. Hannibal found that he gained no friends in
Apulia, and marched westward into Samnium, which,
less than a hundred years before, had been the fiercest
enemy of Rome. But here again he met with no
success in making strife between Rome and its allies.
He moved on into what was, perhaps, the very richest
part of Italy, the great Falernian plain, where wines
were grown that were to become famous over all the
vi^orld. Fabius still followed him, watching every
movement, cutting off stragglers, and harassing him
in every way that he could devise, but always refusing
a battle. When he saw his enemy below him in the
Falernian plain— for Fabius kept his own army on the
hills — he believed that he had him in a trap. To the
north, the passes into Latium and the way to Rome
were barred ; the sea was in front of him ; and to the
south the deep stream of the Volturnus. On the east
the hills, with their passes held by Roman troops,
seemed to shut off his escape. Then Hannibal showed
what a master of stratagem he was. He not only
escaped, but carried off the booty which he had
collected. His plan was this. About two thousand
oxen were chosen out of the vast herds which had
been collected out of the plundered districts. To
their horns were fastened bundles of dry twigs. Then
one day, as the dusk of evening came on, he silently
214 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
struck his camp, and moved eastward towards the
hills, the oxen being driven a little in front of the
vanguard. When the army reached the foot of the
hills it was dark ; and then Hannibal ordered the
bundles to be lighted. The drivers of the oxen
started them up the slope of the hills ; the animals,
maddened by fear and pain — for the light flashed all
about them, and the heat reached the flesh at the
roots of their horns — rushed wildly on. The four
thousand Romans who had been posted to guard the
principal pass were dismayed at the sight. What it
meant they could not understand ; but that it meant
danger they were sure. Probably they fancied that
they were being surrounded — for this is always the
first fear of all but the very best and bravest troops.
Anyhow they left their post, and made for the heights.
Fabius, in his camp, saw the strange sight, and was
equally puzzled ; nor did he venture out till it was
light.i Meanwhile Hannibal had quietly marched
his army through the pass, taking all his plunder with
him, and pitched his camp next day at Allifae, on the
other side of the hills. Fabius followed him. He
marched northwards through Samnium, as far as the
country of the Peligni, ravaging as he went. Fabius
still moved along, keeping his army between him
and Rome.
' " This story of Livy," says Niehuhr, " represents the Romans in a
foolish light. The truth is tnld hy Polyl)iiis. Nothing was more com-
mon among the ancients than the marcli by night with lanterns ; and
when the ]\.oman outposts saw the lights between themselves and the
unoccupied district, they thought that the Carthaginians were forcing
Ihcir way, and quickly advanced towards the supposed danger to shul
the road against the enemy " (Lecture Ixxiv.).
FABIUS AND MINUCIUS. 215
The effect of Hannibal's escape was twofold. Not
only did he get out of a difficult position, carrying
the greater part of his plunder with him, but he
made it very hard for Fabius to carry out his policy
of delay. This policy of course had many enemies.
The allies, who saw their country ravaged without
being able to strike a blow for it, were furious ; and
the wealthy Romans, whose estates were suffering in
the same way, were loud in their complaints. And
Hannibal's cunning plan of leaving Fabius' estates
untouched, while all the neighbourhood was plun-
dered, increased their anger. This change of feeling
soon became evident. Fabius had to go to Rome on
business for a time, and left his army in the charge of
Minucius, Master of the Horse (this was the title of
the Dictator's second-in-command), with strict orders
not to fight. Minucius did fight, and won something
like a little victory. When news of his success came
to Rome, the opponents of Fabius persuaded the
people to divide the army, and give the command of
one half to the Dictator, and of the other to the
Master of the Horse.
There were now two Roman armies encamped
about a mile apart. Hannibal, who knew what
had happened, immediately took advantage of the
situation. Minucius, if he wished to satisfy his friends
was bound to fight, and Hannibal soon gave him
what looked like a favourable opportunity. He occu-
pied some rising ground between his own camp and
that of the Romans with what looked like a small
force. The Romans hastened to dislodge it. But
there were five thousand men in ambush, who, wiicn
2l6 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the fighting had been going on for some time, fell
upon the Roman rear. This gave waj', and another
great disaster would have been the result, had not
Fabius, who was on the watch, led out his troops, and
changed the fortunes of the day. After all no great
harm was done ; and there was this good result, that
Minucius confessed his error, and gave up his com-
mand. The rest of the year passed without any
further disasters, except that the Consul Servilius,
landing on the coast of Africa, and ravaging the
country, was attacked by the Carthaginians, and lost
a thousand men.
Hannibal spent the winter at Geronium, in the
north of Apulia. It was a mountainous country ; and
it was close to the sea. (This part of Apulia, indeed,
is like an elbow projecting out into the Adriatic.)
He had ample supplies, and he was in communication
with Carthage. Probably new troops were sent to
him. Anyhow, when the next year came (216) he
was stronger than ever. It was late in the spring
when he took the field. His first movement was to
march round the Roman army, which had been
watching him during the winter, and to seize a great
magazine of stores which the enemy had collected.
It was still his policy to provoke them to fight a
battle, and this successful movement helped him.
The Romans had gathered a great force, but found it
difficult to feed it. They were afraid, too, lest they
should lose their allies, if they allowed Hannibal to
march up and down through Italy and plunder as he
pleased. And the party of fighting had had a great
success at the elections. C. Tercntius Varro, a man
VARRO AND PAULLUS IN COMMAND.
217
of the people, after loudly proclaiming that the nobles
were prolonging the war for their own purposes,
had been chosen Consul by an immense majority.
It was resolved to fight, but not to do so till the
newly-levied legions should have joined the army of
the year before. This was done about the beginning
of June ; and the whole army, now numbering about
ninety thousand men, marched in pursuit of Hannibal,
who was gathering in the early harvests on the sea-
board of Apulia. The two consuls (Varro's colleague
was a noble, iEmilius Paullus by name) had command
on alternate days, ^milius, an experienced soldier,
was doubtful of the result of a battle, and anxious to
put it off. Varro, on the other hand, was confident
and eager, and on his first day of command brought
matters to a crisis by taking up a position between
Hannibal and the sea.
X.
CANN^,
The great battle was still delayed for a few days.
But when Hannibal's cavalry cut off the Roman
watering -parties from the river, and left the army
without water at the very height of an Italian summer,
the impatience of the soldiers could not be restrained.
On the morning of the ist of August,^ Varro, who
that day was in command, hoisted on his tent the red
flag as a signal of battle. He then ordered the army
to cross the river Aufidus, and to draw up their lines
on the right bank. Hannibal at once took up the
challenge, and fording the stream at two places, drew
up his army opposite to the enemy. "His army was
but half as large ; if he should be defeated his doom
was certain ; but he was confident and cheerful.
Plutarch tells us a story — one of the very few which
show us something of the man rather than of the
general — of his behaviour on the morning of the battle.
He seems to have been one of the soldiers whose
spirits rise in danger, and who become cheerful, and
even gay, when others are most serious. " One of his
chief officers, Cisco by name, said to him : ' I am
' The Roman reckoning was six or seven weeks in advance of the
real year, and the time was really about midsummer.
HANNIBAL'S ARMY. 2ig
astonished at the numbers of the enemy.' Hannibal
smiled and said : ' Yes, Cisco ; but there is something
more wonderful still' * What is that ? ' said he. ' That
though there are so many of them, not one of them is
called Cisco.' The answer was so unexpected that
everybody laughed." And he goes on to tell us that
the Carthaginians were mightily encouraged to see
this confident temper in their chief.
The Aufidus, bending first to the south, and then
again, after flowing nearly eastward for a short dis-
tance, to the north, makes a loop. This loop was
occupied by Hannibal's army. The left wing con-
sisted of eight thousand heavy cavalry, Spaniards and
Cauls. Hasdrubal (who must not be confounded
with Hannibal's brother of the same name) was in
command. They had the river on their left flank and
on their right. Behind them was one half of the
African infantry. " One might have thought them a
Roman army," says Livy, " for Hannibal had armed
them with the spoils of Trebia and Trasumennus."
Next in the line, but somewhat in advance so as to
be about on a level with the heavy cavalry, were
posted the Spanish and Callic infantry, with their
companies alternately arranged, and under the imme-
diate command of Hannibal himself and his brother
Mago. These troops were still armed in their native
fashion. The Spaniards wore white linen tunics,
dazzHngly bright, and edged with purple. Their chief
weapon was the sword which they used, of a short
and handy size, and with which they were accustomed
to thrust rather than strike. Nevertheless it was
fitted for a blow, for it had, of course, an edge. The
220 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
Gauls were naked from the hips upwards. They used
very long swords, without a point. Both had oblong
shields, and both seemed to the Romans and Italians,
whose stature seldom exceeded the average height of
men, to be almost giants in size. Still further to the
right, but thrown back somewhat so as to be on a
level with their countrymen on the left wing, stood
the other half of the African infantry. And then on
the extreme right wing of the whole army, were the
African light horsemen under the command of Mago.
These, to use the military phrase, " rested upon
nothing ;" that is, they had nothing to support their
right flank. There were but two thousand of them,
for they had had some of the hardest of the fighting
since the army had entered Italy ; but they were con-
fident of victory. The whole army numbered fifty
thousand, but ten thousand had been detached to
guard the camp. The right wing of the enemy con-
sisted of the Roman horse, who thus fronted the
heavy cavalry of Carthage ; next to these came the
infantry of the legions, more than seventy thousand
strong, yet drawn up in so dense an array — in column,
in fact, rather than in line — that they did not overlap
the far smaller force of their adversaries. On the left
wing were posted the cavalry of the allies. It was
here that Varro commanded. Paullus was on the
right of the army. The whole force numbered about
eighty thousand, allowing for the detachment which
had been told off to guard the camp. Their faces
were turned to the south. Tiiis was a great disad-
vantage to them, not so much on account of the glare
of the sun, for it was yet early in the day, but because
THE STRUGGLE. 221
the hot wind, which the country people called Vul-
turnus, rolled such clouds of dust in their faces that
they could scarcely see what lay before them.
The battle began as usual with the skirmishers.
Here the Carthaginians had the advantage. The
slingers from the Balearic islands * were more expert
and effective than any of the Roman light-armed
troops. The showers of stones which they sent
among the legions did much damage, wounding
severely, among others, the Consul Paullus. Then
the heavy-armed cavalry of Carthage charged the
Roman horse that was ranged over against them.
The Romans were some of the bravest and best born
of their nation ; but they were inferior in numbers, in
the weight of men and horses, and in their equip-
ment. They wore no cuirasses ; their shields were
weak ; their spears were easily broken. Probably
they had no special skill in cavalry tactics ; had they
possessed it, there was no opportunity of showing it,
for there was no room to manoeuvre. It was a fierce
hand-to-hand fight ; many of the Spaniards and
Gauls leapt to the ground, and dragged their opponents
from their horses.
In the centre of the field where the Roman legions
met the Gallic and Spanish infantry, Hannibal seemed
for a time to be less successful. He had advanced
these troops considerably beyond the rest of his line.
When charged by the heavy columns of the enemy
they were forced to fall back. The Romans pressed
' Majorca, Minorca, and Ivica. Tlie reailcr must not be templed by
the plausible derivation from the Greek /^dWu) (ballo), to throw or
Strike. The name seems to have been derived from some form of Baal.
222 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
on in a dense and unmanageable mass. And in what
seemed the moment of victory they found themselves
assailed on both flanks and in the rear. On either
side the two bodies of African infantry, who had
hitherto taken no part in the battle, fell upon them.
Almost at the same time came Ilasdrubal with his
heavy horsemen. After routing the Roman cavalry
of the right wing, he had charged that of the allies
upon the left. These had been already thrown into
confusion by the stealthy attack of five hundred
Africans, who had pretended to surrender, but came
up in the critical moment and hamstrung their horses.
Hasdrubal completed their rout, and leaving the
Africans to pursue the fugitives, charged the rear of
the Roman infantry. These were now surrounded
on all sides, for the Gauls and Spaniards in their
front had rallied, and checked their advance. Upon
this helpless mass the Carthaginians used their swords
till they were fairly weary of slaying. How many
men lay dead upon the field when darkness came on
it is impossible to say. Polybius gives the numbei
at seventy thousand, and he is probably a bettei
authority than Livy, who reduces it to fifty thousand.
Among them were one of the consuls, the ex-consul
Servilius, twenty-one military tribunes (officers of a
rank about equal to that of a colonel), and eighty
members of the Senate. Varro had fled from the
field with seventy horsemen. Hannibal's loss was
something under six thousand.
The question was, " What was he to do ? " He
had destroyed the enemy's army, for even the force
left to guard the camps had surrendered, and there
WILL HE MARCH ON ROME? 223
was no other army in the field. Most of his officers,
while they crowded round to congratulate him,
advised him to give himself and his army some rest
Maharbal, who was in chief command of the cavalry,
thought otherwise. " Do you know," he said, " what
you have done by this day's victory? I will tell you.
Four days hence you shall be supping in the Capitol
of Rome. Let me go on in front with my cavalry.
They must know that I have come before they know
that I am coming." Hannibal was not so sanguine.
He praised Maharbal's zeal, but must take time to
consider so grave a matter. Then Maharbal broke
out : " I see that the gods do not give all their gifts to
one man. Hannibal, you have the secret of victory,
but not the secret of using it."
It will never be decided whether Hannibal, with
his cautious policy, or the bold Maharbal was in the
right. But one is disposed to believe that so skilful
a general, one, too, who was not wanting in boldness
(for what could be bolder than this whole march into
Italy ?), knew what could and what could not be done
better than anybody else. He could not hope to
succeed unless the allies of Rome deserted her, and
he had to wait and see whether this would happen.
Till he was sure of it he could not, we may well
believe, afford to risk an advance. One defeat would
have been fatal to him. It would have been almost
as fatal to sit down in vain before the walls of Rome.
But, however this may be, it is certain that the op-
portunity, if it was an opportunity, never came back
to him. He did indeed come near to Rome, as I
shall have to tell hereafter, but this was a feint rather
224
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
than a serious attack. That midsummer day in the
year 216 saw the highest point which the fortunes of
Carthage ever reached. Then only, if even then, she
might have been the mistress of the world.
XI.
AFTER CANN/E.
The victory of Cannae had great results, though it
did not make Hannibal feel strong enough to strike
a blow at Rome, First and foremost among these
results was the alliance of Capua, the second city in
Italy. The Capuans, indeed, were not all of one mind
in the matter. It was the people that favoured
Carthage ; the nobles were for the most part inclined
to Rome. It was a noble, however, and one who was
married to a lady of the great Roman house of
Claudius, that took the lead in this movement. The
people rose against the Senate, stripped it of its
power, massacred a number of Roman citizens who
were sojourning in the town, and sent envoys to
invite Hannibal to their city. He was of course
delighted to come ; Capua, which had more than
thirty thousand soldiers of her own, was almost as
great a gain as the victory at Cannai. He was near
to being assassinated, indeed, on the night of his
entering the city, for the son of his entertainer had
resolved to stab him at the dinner-table. The next
day he was present at a meeting of the Senate. He
was full of promises ; he undertook that Capua should
thereafter be the capital of Italy. Meanwhile tie
i6
226 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE,
demanded that a leading citizen who had been
specially active on the Roman side should be given
up to him. The man was arrested, and was sent by
Hannibal to Carthage.
The greater part of Central and Southern Italy
followed the example of Capua. All the Samnites,
with the exception of a single tribe, revolted from
Rome ; so did Lucania and Bruttii, and so did many
of the Greek cities in the south, the chief among them
being Crotona. These cities had passed the height
of their prosperity, but they were still populous and
powerful towns.
It was only the extraordinary tenacity and courage
of Rome that enabled her to hold out. The Senate
never lost its courage, and, after the first panic was
over, the people were ready to stand by their rulers to
the last. When Varro, whose rashness and folly had
almost ruined his country, returned to Rome, the
Senate went out to meet him, and publicly thanked
him that he "had not despaired of the commonwealth."
As he was of the opposite party in politics, this was a
way of saying that all Romans, whatever their way
of thinking, must join together to made the best of
everything. Nothing that could be done to raise an
army was neglected. Bands of brigands were induced
to enlist by promises of pardon for past offences ;
even slaves were recruited. As many as eight thou-
sand soldiers were gained in this way. But when a
proposal came from Hannibal that the prisoners of
Cannae should be ransomed, the horsemen at £1^,
the infantry at ;i^io each, the offer was refused. By
great exertions an army was raised, and put under
MAGO AT CARTHAGE, 227
the command of Marcellus, who was probably the
best soldier that Rome possessed at the time.
Hannibal had sent his brother Mago to Carthage
from the battle-field of Cannae. Introduced into the
Senate, he gave a glowing account of what had been
done, of the four victories which had been gained, of
the two hundred thousand men that had been slain,
the fifty thousand that had been taken prisoners. As
a practical proof of the truth of his story, he poured
out on the floor of the Senate-house a peck of gold
rings which had been taken, he said, from Roman
soldiers that had been slain in battle. It was only
the horsemen, indeed only the upper class of the
horsemen, he explained, that were accustomed to
wear them. But the practical conclusion of his speech
was a demand for help. " The nearer the prospect,"
he said, " of finishing the war, the more you are bound
to support your general. He is fighting far away
from home. Pay is wanted for troops ; provisions
are hard to obtain. And though he has won great
victories, he has not won them without some loss.
He asks, therefore, for help in men, money, and stores."
The war-party was delighted. One of them turned
to Hanno, leader of the opposite faction, and asked
him, " Does Hanno still repent of having made war
on Rome?" "Yes," replied Hanno, "I still repent,
and shall do so till I see peace made again. Your
invincible general makes as great demands upon you
as if he had been beaten. And as for his prospects
for the future, has any Latin city joined him .'' Has
a single man of the thirty-five tribes of Rome deserted
to him .? '
228 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
To these questions Mago could only answer " No ! ''
Hanno asked again, " Has Rome said a word about
peace ? " Mago could only answer that it had not.
Then said Hanno, " We are as far off from the end of
the war as we were when Hannibal crossed into Italy.
I vote that no help should be sent to prolong a war
which can have no good end,"
This protest, of course, was useless. The Senate
resolved to send four thousand African troops, forty
elephants, and a sum of money. And Mago was to
go into Spain and raise 20,000 troops to fill up the
gaps in the armies there and in Italy. As a matter
of fact little was done ; at this crisis the Carthaginian
government showed but little energy, and Hannibal
was left, for the most part, to help himself.
The winter of 216-5 he and his army spent in
Capua. Ever since he had started from New Carthage,
more than two years before, his men had lived in
tents, satisfied with the hard discipline and scanty fare
of the camp. Doubtless, they had lost something of
their vigour by the time that they took the field
again ; but there were other and weightier reasons
why Hannibal's great plans should end in failure than
that his army was spoilt by the luxury of a winter in
Capua.
In the next year little was done. Hannibal gained
some small successes, and met with some small losses.
His chief venture had been the siege of Nola, which,
after Capua, was the chief city of Campania. In this he
failed, owing chiefly to the skill and energy of Mar-
cellus. To have let a year pass without making a
decided advance was in fact to fall back. Still his
tIANNIBAL'S PROSPECTS. 2^^
prospects in some directions had improved. At
Syracuse the wise old King Hiero, who had continued
to be loyal to Rome, without making an enemy of
Carthage, was dead. Hieronymus, his grandson and
successor, was a foolish youth, who thought he could
do better for himself by joining what seemed to be
the winning side. He offered his help to Carthage,
asking as the price the supremacy over the whole of
Sicily. Philip, King of Macedon, again, seemed ready
to join an alliance against Rome. Little advantage,
however, was gained in this way. Of what happened
to Hieronymus I shall soon have to speak. Philip's
action was delayed, first by the accident of his envoys
falling into the hands of the Romans as they were on
their way back from Hannibal's camp, and afterwards
by causes which we have no means of explaining.
Anyhow, at the time when his help would have been
most valuable to Hannibal and most damaging to
Rome, he did nothing.
On the other hand, Carthage suffered a great loss in
the complete conquest by their enemies of the island
of Sardinia, which had again fallen into their hands.
On the whole, at the end of 215 Hannibal, though he
had received no serious check in the field, was in a
much worse position than he had been in at the
beginning.
The next year also (214) had much the same result.
Hannibal made an attempt to seize Tarentum, but
failed. There were in this town, as elsewhere, a
Carthaginian and a Roman party. The latter got to
know what their opponents were planning, and took
such precautions, that when Hannibal appeared before
2^0 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the walls of the city he found it prepared for defence ;
and after vainly lingering in the neighbourhood for a
few days, was obliged to depart. In another part of
Southern Italy he suffered a serious loss. Hanno, one
of his lieutenants, had raised a force of twenty thousand
Lucanians. This was defeated at Beneventum by the
Roman general Gracchus, who was in command of an
army of slaves. Hanno's Lucanian infantry either
perished on the field of battle, or dispersed to their
own homes ; but he escaped himself with about a
thousand African cavalry.
The next great event of the war — its exact date
is uncertain — was a great gain to Hannibal. The
friends of Carthage in Tarentum, though overpowered
for the moment, had never given up their plans ; and
now they found an opportunity for carrying them out.
The city had sent hostages to Rome. These had
attempted to escape, had been captured, and executed.
This act of cruelty roused their fellow-citizens to fury ;
communications were at once opened with Hannibal,
and the ringleaders of the plot were not, as might have
been supposed, popular leaders, but nobles — relatives,
it is probable, of the unfortunate hostages. Hannibal
marched towards the town with a picked force of ten
thousand men, and halted a few miles off, while his
friends within the city completed their preparations.
One party was told off to deal with the governor,
a Roman of the house of Livius. He had been
giving a banquet to some of the citizens ; the con-
spirators paid him a visit after it was over, laughed
and joked with him, and finally left him in such a
state that they had nothing to fear from his watchful-
TARENTUM GAINED. 331
ness. Another party had arranged to admit Hannibal
himself by a gate which opened out of the quarter of
the tombs, which in Tarentum — we might almost say
alone among Greek cities — were within the walls. A
fire signal was given by Hannibal and answered by
the conspirators. The latter fell upon the guards of
the gate, and Hannibal was at hand outside to
support them. A third party was busy at another of
the gates. They had been accustomed for several days
to go out on what seemed to be hunting parties, to
return late at night, to talk over their sport with the
guard, and to give them some of the game. On this
occasion they brought back with them a particularly
fine wild boar. While the animal was actually in the
passage of the gate, and the sentry was busy admiring
it, thirty African soldiers, who had been stealthily
approaching, rushed up, cut the man down, and,
securing the gate, let in a large body of their com-
rades. The city of Tarentum was taken, but the
citadel was hastily secured by the Roman garrison.
The Tarentines were not harmed. It was sufficient if
any citizen wrote over his door, "This is aTarentine's
house." But all the dwellings in which Romans had
been quartered were given up to plunder.
XII.
THE TURN OF THE TIDE.
From Trebia to Cannae the tide of success rose
with Hannibal. For three years or thereabouts after
Cannae it may be said to have remained at its height.
His gains and losses about balanced each other.
This, of course, really meant that his chances of
victory were growing less, for his was an enterprise to
which delay, even without defeat, was fatal.
In 212 the tide manifestly turned. The Romans
felt themselves strong enough to besiege Capua.
The city was already in distress for want of food , for
with the Roman armies so near the rich Campanian
plains could not be cultivated. And Hannibal's first
attempt to provision it failed. A second succeeded ; but
shortly after the place was regularly invested. Three
Roman armies sat down before it, and then drew a
complete line round it with a strong rampart and
ditch, and with forts at intervals. The townspeople
were not strong enough to make sallies with effect,
and all that they could do was to send messenger
after messenger to Hannibal, begging earnestly for
help, if he did not wish to sec them perish. Early in
the year 21 1 — that is, after the siege had lasted some
months — he made a determined effort to relieve the
ATTEMPTED RELIEF OF CAPUA. 233
city. He marched rapidly with a picked force from
Tarentum, where the citadel was still holding out
against him, and took up a position on Mount Tifata,
a hill which overlooked the city. He had contrived
to warn the Capuans of his coming, arranging that
they should make a sortie from their walls while he
was attacking one of the camps of the besiegers. The
sortie was easily repulsed ; Hannibal's attack seemed
at one time likely to succeed, but ended in failure.
His elephants — he had thirty-three of these animals
with him — forced their way into the Roman camp,
and made great havoc with the tents, while they
caused a stampede among the horses. In the midst
of the confusion voices were heard bidding the
Romans make the best of their way to the hills. The
camp, they said, was lost, and each man must save
himself The speakers used the Latin tongue, and
spoke in the name of the consuls ; but they were
really Hannibal's men. This was one of the tricks
with which this great general was always so ready
Ingenious as it was, it does not seem to have had
much effect.
Then he tried his last resource. lie would march
on Rome itself With forces so large engaged in this
siege, the city could have but few to defend it. It
was possible that by a sudden movement he might
get within the walls ; in any case it was likely that a
part of the investing force would be withdrawn for
the protection of the capital. The Capuans were
informed of what he was intending to do, and en-
couraged to hold out. He made his way through the
rich wine-producing region of Northern Campania,
234 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
ravaging the country as he went. At Fregellae he
found the bridge over the Lin's broken down, and
lost some time in consequence. Crossing into Latium,
he passed through the town of Anagnia to Mount
Algidus. After a vain attempt to seize Tusculum, he
continued his march northwards, and pitched his
camp at a distance of eight miles from Rome.
Fulvius, the proconsul, had made his way meanwhile
from Capua with a force of fifteen thousand men.
Marching through a friendly country, and finding all
that he wanted supplied by the towns through which
he passed, he had been able to outstrip the Cartha-
ginian army. Nevertheless the terror in the city was
great. The women crowded to the temples, and, with
their long hair unbound, threw themselves before the
images of the gods and implored their protection.
The next day Hannibal advanced still nearer to the
walls. He pitched his camp on the bank of the Anio,
at the third milestone from Rome ; and then, taking
with him a force of two thousand cavalry, rode up
and reconnoitred the southern wall of the city. On
the morrow he crossed the Anio with his whole army,
and offered battle. But no engagement was fought.
Livy tells us a story of how, that day and the next, so
fierce a storm of rain came on that neither army
could keep the field, the weather clearing immediately
when they returned to camp ; and how Hannibal
exclaimed, " Once I wanted the will to take this city,
and now I want the fortune." We are told that he
was greatly discouraged by two proofs of the indif-
ference with which the Romans regarded his presence.
Soldiers, he heard, were being actually sent away
CAPUA LOST TO HANNIBAL. 235
from the city to reinforce the armies in Spain ; and
the very land on which he had pitched his camp had
easily found a purchaser. By way of retort to this
last affront — for so he is said to have regarded it — he
ordered the bankers' shops round the Roman market-
place to be put up to auction. But he found that his
move had failed, and marcheci back to Campania, and
from thence to the extreme south of Italy.
Capua, thus left to itself, could do nothing but sur-
render. Of its punishment by Rome it is needless to
speak in detail. The nobles were executed ; the rest
of the population sold into slavery. In a play that
was acted at Rome some twenty years afterwards we
find a brutal jest on their cruel fate, " There," says
one of the characters, speaking of some unhealthy
spot, " even a Syrian — and the Syrians are the toughest
of slaves — cannot live six months." "Nay," says the
other, " the Campanians have learnt by this time to
bear more than the Syrians."
The next year (210) passed with little incident, as
far as Italy was concerned (I shall speak of Sicily and
Spain hereafter). The Romans had never been able
to vanquish Hannibal in the open field ; they scarcely
even ventured to meet him. He had shown that he
could march from one end of Italy to the other with-
out hindrance, and that he could send his plundering
parties up to the very walls of Rome ; but he had not
been able to save the great city which had come over to
him ; and there was small temptation to any other to
join him. Not only was Capua a great actual loss to
him, but the fact that it had fallen in spite of all his
efforts to relieve it was a terrible blow to his rcputa-
236 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
tion. For all his skill as a general — and that showed
itself more and more as the war went on — he was
clearly wanting in power.
In Sicily, the course of events went against the
cause of Carthage. Hieronymus, the foolish youth
who had succeeded the wise old Hiero at Syracuse,
had been murdered after a reign of thirteen months
by an assassin who professed to be acting in the
interests of Rome. A series of dreadful acts of
cruelty followed. Here also, as elsewhere, the popular
party favoured Carthage, while the aristocrats were
inclined to Rome, and there was a fierce struggle
between them. In the end the former triumphed,
and Syracuse became the ally of Carthage. As such
it was besieged by the forces of Rome, Appius
Claudius commanding the army and Marcellus the
fleet. The narrative of the siege does not fall within
the scope of this book. The story of how the defence
was prolonged by the engineering skill of Archimedes
is full of interest, but it may be found elsewhere.
The efforts which Carthage made to save her new
ally were fruitless. A large army, indeed, was col-
lected under Himilco, and this was reinforced from
various Sicilian cities, which had been enraged by the
savage cruelty which the Romans had shown in their
treatment of such places as fell into their hands. But
the Roman lines could not be broken ; and when
Ilimilco encamped outside them, intending, it is
probable, to blockade them as they were blockading
the city, a pestilence broke out among his troops. So
fearful were its ravages that the army was literally
destroyed. The fleet under Bomilcar did no more.
CARTHAGE LOSES SICILY. 237
It did not even make an attempt at relieving the
city. Though it numbered as many as a hundred
and thirty vessels of war, it declined an engagement
with the Romans, and instead of attempting to enter
the harbour of Syracuse, sailed away to Tarentum.
In 212 Syracuse was taken by Marcellus.
Hannibal, however, was not willing to give up the
island as lost. He sent one Mutines, a Liby-Phoeni-
cian, or half-caste Carthaginian, to take command of
the forces ; and Mutines, fixing his headquarters at
-^grigentum, carried on for many months a guerilla
warfare. Unfortunately his appointment had caused
great annoyance to the pure-blood Carthaginian
officers in the island, especially to Hanno, who was the
commander-in-chief. Hanno at last suspended him,
and handed over the command to his own son. The
loyalty of Mutines did not stand firm under such pro-
vocation, and the Numidians who comprised his force
were furious at his disgrace. Communications were
at once opened with Laevinus, the Roman general.
A force was sent to Agrigentum ; the Numidians cut
down the guards of one of the city gates, threw it
open, and admitted the Roman soldiers, Hanno, who
had come to the place probably to make arrangements
for the change of commanders, saw that something
had taken place, and, supposing that it was nothing
more than some riotous proceedings of the Numidians,
went down to restore order. He discovered the truth
just in time to save himself by flight. Laevinus exe-
cuted the principal citizens of Agrigentum, and sold
the rest of the population as slaves. Of the sixty-
six Sicilian towns that had taken the side of Carthage,
238 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
six were taken by force of arms and twenty were be-
trayed ; the remainder capitulated. Before the end
of 210 Sicily was finally lost.
In Spain affairs had not reached the same point, but
they were tending the same way. Hannibal had left,
we have seen, his brother Hasdrubal in command, and
the war was carried on for several years with varying
success between him and the two brothers, Cnaius and
Publius Scipio. Cnaeus Scipio had been left in Spain
in temporary command when Publius left the country
to face Hannibal in Italy, and he gained some con-
siderable successes, if Livy's account is to be trusted.
We cannot help noticing, however, that the Roman
generals are again and again credited with great
victories which mostly are found to lead to nothing.
Unfortunately we have no other accounts to fall back
upon, and we can only tell the story as it is told to
us, and believe whatever seems credible.
In 218 Cnaeus Scipio fought a battle with Hanno,
who had been left in command of the country between
the Ebro and the Pyrenees,^ vanquished and took
him prisoner, and almost annihilated his army. The
soldiers found a great prize in his camp, for Hannibal
had left with him the heavy baggage which he could
not carry across the Alps. Hasdrubal moved to help
his colleague, but finding himself too late, re-crossed
the Ebro. The next year, after wintering at Tarraco,
Cnaeus defeated the Carthaginian fleet off the mouth
of the Ebro. Shortly afterwards he was joined by
his brother Publius ; and the two generals continued
to act together for several years. Their first step was
to march to Saguntum. The hostages given to the
ROMAN SUCCESSES IN SPAIN. 239
Carthaginian government by the Spanish tribes were
kept in the citadel of tiiis town ; the Scipios contrived
to get possession of them by the treachery of the officer
wlio had the charge of them. They sent them back to
their friends, and of course gained great popularity
throughout Spain by the act. In the following year
(216) they are said to have defeated Hasdrubal on
the banks of the Ebro so completely that he fled
from the field of battle with but a few followers. In
215 they relieved Illiturgis, which Hasdrubal and two
other Carthaginian generals were besieging. The
Romans, we read, had but sixteen thousand men
under arms, the Carthaginians sixty thousand ; but
the result of the battle was a complete victory. The
Romans killed more than their own number, captured
three thousand men, nearly a thousand horses (Livy is
careful not to overstate the number), sixty standards^
and seven elephants. Moving on to Intibilis the
Scipios fought another battle, killed thirteen thousand
of the enemy, captured two thousand, two and forty
standards, and nine elephants. The result of these
brilliant victories was that nearly all Spain came over
to the Roman side. So we read, but find that for all
this it was necessary to win two more great victories
in the following year (214).
We may be sure, however, that during these years
and the two following years (213, 212) the balance of
success inclined to the Roman side. And this supe-
riority became more evident when Hasdrubal Barca
had to be recalled to Africa, where the Numidian
king Syphax had declared war against Carthage.
The Scipios had sent envoys to him, promising him
240 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
immediate help and future reward if he would perse-
vere in his hostility. One of the envoys remained
behind to assist in drilling his new levies. The Car-
thaginians found an ally in King Gala, Syphax's
neighbour and rival. King Gala had a son, Masinissa,
a youth of but seventeen years, but of extraordinary
capacity. Young as he was, he was put in command
of his father's army and of the Carthaginian troops
which served with it, and defeated Syphax so com-
pletely that the war was ended by a single battle.
We shall hear of Masinissa again.
Hasdrudal was now able to return to Spain, He
took with him large reinforcements, two lieutenants,
another Hasdrubal, the son of Cisco, and Mago, the
youngest brother of Hannibal, and Masinissa, After
this the fortune of war changed. The Scipios had
made a great effort to complete the conquest of Spain,
raising a native force of twenty thousand to act
together with their own troops. In view of the fact that
three Carthaginian armies were now in the field, they
determined to divide their own forces, Publius with
two-thirds of the army was to act against Mago and
Hasdrubal Gisco, Cnaeus against Hasdrubal Barca.
Publius, hearing that his opponents were likely to
have their strength largely increased by native allies,
resolved to attack them at once. He was himself
attacked on his march by the African light horsemen
under Masinissa, and when he faced about to receive
their charge, found the Carthaginians assailing his
rear. He was himself killed early in the day, and
after his death his troops soon took to flight. Few
however, could escape when the pursuers were the
DEATH OF THE SCIPIOS. 241
light African horsemen, and an infantry that was
almost as fleet of foot. The camp, however, with its
garrison was still safe.
Cnaeus did not long survive his brother. His native
allies had been bribed to leave him ; and he now
found himself in the presence of the united forces oi
the three Carthaginian generals. He drew his forces
together on some rising ground that was near. The
place was incapable of being defended. The ascent
was easy. There was no timber for a rampart ; no earth
with which the soldiers could make an entrenchment.
All that could be done was to make a poor defence out
of the pack-saddles of the horses and mules and the
baggage. This was almost immediately broken down.
Many of the soldiers made their escape to the camp
of the other army ; but the general perished. He had
survived his brother only twenty-nine days. Lucius
Marcius, the officer left in command of the camp,
contrived to keep together what was left of the Roman
forces, and even to inflict some losses on the enemy.
His command was taken over by Claudius Nero, who
was sent from Rome for that purpose, but who seems
to have effected but little good. Livy tells a strange
story of how Hasdrubal was surrounded ; how he
[)romised to evacuate Spain ; how he amused the
Roman general by conferences about the terms of
agreement, and in the meanwhile contrived to get
his army out of their dangerous situation, so that
Nero, when the negotiations were broken off, found
nothing but an empty camp. The death of the two
Scipios seems to have happened in the year 21 1.
The next year the son of Publius, whom we have
17
242 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
seen saving his father's life at the battle of the Ticinus,
came into Spain as commander-in-chief. It was an
office which no one had desired to hold, for when the
election was held at Rome not a single candidate
presented himself. At last the young Scipio came
forward. He was not twenty-four years old, and
therefore below the legal age for even the lowest
office ; but the people received him with applause.
His high reputation, the beauty of his person, and
his charm of manner, spoke for him. When he pro-
mised that he would conquer not only Spain, but
Carthage itself, what would have seemed in any other
man but a foolish boast was received with delight,
and he was unanimously chosen.
He began his campaign by a great achievement —
the capture of New Carthage, the capital of the Car-
thaginian province. A night march brought him up to
the walls of the city before any one knew that he had
even arrived in Spain. With the keen eye of a great
general he spied the weak spot in the defences, a
place where the sea came up to the wall. Taking
advantage of an unusually low tide — for he seems to
have had the curious good fortune which goes to make
a great general — he led his men through the water,
ivhich was barely up to their knees, and found his way
into the city. Mago, who was in command, retreated
into the citadel ; but, finding it impossible to hold
out, surrendered himself and his garrison in the course
of a few hours. Within four days after coming into
this province, Scipio had thus justified his appointment
by capturing the Carthaginian capital. It will be
convenient if we take this opportunity of finishing
CAPTURE OF NEW CARTHAGE. 243
the story of the Carthaginian rule in Spain, though it
will carry us beyond the time up to which we have
followed the course of events elsewhere.
During the remainder of the year which he had
begun by the capture of New Carthage Scipio re-
mained quiet, but was busy in preparing for future
action. He made friends of the Spanish chiefs. This
was a business which he could do better than any
other man, for no one could withstand the singular
charm of his manner. When he took the field in the
following year (209) the natives joined him in large
numbers. In the course of this campaign he fought
a great battle with Hasdrubal Barca. He is said to
have defeated him, but as he did not hinder him from
carrying out his great plan (of which I shall have to
speak hereafter) of marching into Italy to the help of
Hannibal, the defeat was evidently not serious. The
next year passed with few incidents, but in 207 a
decisive defeat of the Carthaginian armies at Silpia
made Scipio master of nearly the whole of Spain.
Only Gades was left to Carthage. Scipio had not
forgotten his promise that he would conquer not
only Spain but Carthage also. One part of it was
now nearly fulfilled, and he now saw a chance of
fulfilling the other. He crossed over with only a
couple of war-ships to Africa, and presented himself
at the court of King Syphax. His object was to
persuade the king to desert Carthage, and enter into
alliance with Rome. Curiously enough Hasdrubal
Cisco had come on a similar errand. The two
opponents spent several days together, and conversed,
we arc told, in a most kindly fashion. The king
244 5^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
seems to have made promises to both. He was
greatly charmed with Scipio, and even promised to
make the alHance which he desired. But he was still
more charmed with Sophonisba, the lovely daughter
of Hasdrubal, She became his wife, and under her
influence he remained faithful to Carthage.
Things had not gone well in Spain during Scipio's
absence. Mago, who was still at Gades, induced
some of the Spanish tribes to revolt against Rome.
These had to be again subdued. When this was
done, Scipio himself fell ill. During his illness a part
of the Roman army broke out into open mutiny.
Their pay was in arrear, and Scipio's strict discipline
forbad them to make it up by plundering the natives
of the country. But when the general was sufficiently
recovered to be able to deal with them in person, he
contrived to bring them back to their duty. The
Carthaginian cause in Spain was now lost. Mago,
the brother of Hannibal, transported what forces
remained to him into Liguria, and Gades surrendered
to the Romans. This was in the year 205.
XIII.
THE LAST CHANCE OF VICTORY.
In Italy Hannibal still remained unvanquishcd in
the field, though his hopes were gradually growing
less. Early in the year 210 he won at Herdonia
in Western Apulia a victory which may almost be
reckoned with those that had made his early cam-
paigns so famous. Cnaeus Fulvius, who had been
Consul the year before, had made a sudden march on
the town. It was one of those that had revolted
after the defeat at Cannae, and he understood it to
be badly guarded. He was the bolder because he be-
lieved Hannibal to be in the extreme south of Italy.
But Hannibal had heard everything from his spies,
and was there to meet him. Fulvius, as might be
expected, was out-generalled. His army was unskil-
fully posted, and could not resist the attacks which
were directed against it from several points at once.
The end was a complete rout. Even the Roman
camp was taken. Fulvius himself fell in the battle,
and the Roman loss was estimated by some at eleven,
by others at seven thousand. It was evidently a
great disaster. Nothing like an army was left ; only
some scattered fugitives made their way to Marccllus
in Samnium. It was from Marcellus, not from any
246 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
officer who had been present at Herdonia, that the
Senate received a despatch describing what had
happened.
During the rest of the campaign but Httle hap-
pened, though Marcellus is said to have fought a
drawn battle with Hannibal, which was claimed as
a victory when the next day he found that the
enemy had decamped. The following year (209) was
one of disaster to Hannibal, for he lost the second of
the great gains which he had secured in Italy, the city
of Tarentum. It was betrayed to the Romans by the
commander of the Bruttian garrison which Hannibal
had placed in it. The veteran soldier Fabius, now in
his eightieth year and consul for the fifth time, had
the great delight of finishing his many campaigns by
this piece of good fortune. A happy jest which the
old man is, said to have uttered on the occasion has
been recorded. Livius, when his carelessness had
lost the city, had taken refuge in the citadel. The
citadel had never passed out of the hands of the
Romans, and this fact of course made the recovery of
the town somewhat more easy. Livius was disposed
to get some credit for himself out of this circum-
stance. " You may thank me," he said, " Quintus
Fabius, for having been able to recover Tarentum."
" Quite so," replied Fabius, " for if you had not lost it,
I never should have recovered it." Hannibal had heard
of the advance of the Romans, and had hastened by
forced marches to save the city. He was too late.
He pitched his camp close by, and after a few days
returned to his headquarters at Mctapontum. He
made an attempt to entrap Fabius, who might, he
THE DEATH OF MARCELLUS. 247
thought, be tempted, after his success at Tarentum,
into making a similar attempt on Metapontum. A
forged letter, purporting to come from some of the
principal citizens, was conveyed to him, offering to
betray the place into his hands. The old Roman is
said to have been deceived, but to have been deterred
from making the attempt by some unfavourable signs
in the sacrifices. Notwithstanding this loss, Hannibal
seems to have held his own during the rest of the
campaign. Livy tells us, indeed, that Marcellus fought
three battles with him, and that after being beaten in
the first, he drew the second, and won the third.
But as it was made a complaint against him after-
wards that he had kept his troops for the greater part
of the year within the walls of Venusia, and had
allowed the enemy to plunder the country at his
pleasure, we may well doubt whether any victory
was won. Rome was now showing great signs of
exhaustion, for twelve out of the thirty Latin
cities refused to furnish any further supplies ; and
the Etrurians were beginning to waver in their
fidelity.
The next year (208) is chiefly marked by the death
of Marcellus. Chosen consul for the sixth time, he
marched with his colleague Crispinus to act against
Hannibal. He was never content, we are told, except
when he was engaged with the great Carthaginian
leader himself. The two consuls had ridden out of
the camp with an escort of two hundred cavalry, some
of them Etrurians, who had been compelled to serve
to ensure the fidelity of their cities. Some African
horsemen under cover of a wood which was between
248 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
the two camps, crept unobserved to the rear of the
Roman party, and then charged them from behind.
The Etrurians fled ; the rest of the escort, who were
Latins, were overpowered. Marcellus was killed on
the spot ; Crispinus was wounded so seriously that he
died not long afterwards. Hannibal gave honourable
burial to the body of his brave opponent.
And now came one of the critical years of the
war. Hasdrubal, of whose departure from Spain I
have spoken before, was now in Italy. He had found
little difficulty in crossing the Alps ; the native tribes
had learnt that no harm was intended to them,
and probably received some consideration for their
neutrality. And some of the engineering works
which Hannibal had constructed were doubtless still
in existence. Anyhow, Hasdrubal made his appear-
ance in Italy before the Romans, and even, it would
seem, before his brother expected him. Rome made
a great effort to meet this new danger. She had lost
some of her best generals. Marcellus was dead, and
Fabius was too old for active service. Livius, an old
soldier who had distinguished himself twelve years
before, but had since been living in retirement, and
Claudius Nero were chosen consuls, and fifteen
legions were raised to form their armies. Livius
was sent to act against Hasdrubal ; Nero watched
the army of Hannibal.
And now we come to one of the boldest and most
skilful achievements in the history of Roman war.
A despatch from Hasdrubal to his brother, announc-
ing his intention of joining him, fell into the hands of
some Roman scouts and was brought to Nero. It
NERO'S GREAT MARCH. 249
was written in the Carthaginian language, but there
were, of course, prisoners in the camp who could read
it to the consul. He conceived at once a bold design.
He would take his best troops, join his colleague
by forced marches, and crush Hasdrubal before he
could effect the junction with his brother. The force
which he selected numbered seven thousand men.
Even they were not at first let into the secret.
They were to surprise a garrison at Lucania, he told
them. It was only when they were well on their
way that he discovered his real design. He reached
the camp of Livius in safety, and it was agreed be-
tween the two consuls that battle should be given
at once.
But the keen eyes of Hasdrubal had discovered
ivhat had happened. The Romans seemed more
numerous than before ; his scouts noticed that of the
watering-parties which went down to the river some
were more sunburnt than the rest. Finally it was
observed that the clarion was sounded twice in the
camp, showing that both consuls were present. He
resolved to avoid, if he could, an engagement, and
left his camp during the night. But when he
attempted to march southward his difficulties began.
His native guide escaped, and he could not find the
ford over the river Metaurus, which lay in his route.
He thus lost the start which he had gained by his
stealthy departure, and the Romans came up with
him. He had begun to fortify a camp, but seeing
the enemy advance prepared to give battle. He put
his elephants in front. The Gauls, recent levies whom
he could not trust, he posted on his left, protecting
250 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
them as much as he could by the elephants. His
own place was on the right wing. Here he had his
Spanish infantry, veteran soldiers whom he had often
led to victory. The left wing of the Romans which
was opposed to him was led by the Consul Livius.
Here the struggle was long and obstinate. The
elephants at first did good service to their side.
Afterwards, maddened by the wounds which they
received, they trampled down friend and foe alike.
After a while, Nero, repeating the same tactics which
had made him leave his own weakened army facing
Hannibal to help his colleague, withdrew some of the
troops from the Roman right wing, and charged
the flank of the enemy. The Spaniards could not
resist this new attack. The Gauls, who had broke^i
into the stores of wine and had drunk to excess, were
cut down where they stood, or lay helpless on the
ground. The rout was complete. Hasdrubal would
not survive so terrible a defeat. He set spurs to his
horse, charged the Roman line, and fell fighting with
the courage that became the son of Hamilcar and
brother of Hannibal. The loss of the Carthaginians
is said to have been 56,000. This is a manifest exag-
geration, for Hasdrubal could not have had so many
in his army. Whatever were the numbers, it was a
decisive victory. There could now be no doubt that
Rome, not Carthage, was to be the conqueror of the
Second Punic War. I may conclude this chapter by
quoting part of the splendid ode in which Horace,
singing the praises of another Nero,^ dwells on the
achievement of his great ancestor.
' Tiberius Claudius Nero, afterwards the Emperor Tiberius.
ODE FROM HORACE. 251
What thou, Rome, dost the Neros owe,
Let dark Metaurus river say.
And Hasdrubal, thy vanquished foe,
And that auspicious day
Wliich through the scattered gloom broke forth with smiling ray.
When joy again to Latium came,
Nor longer through her towns at ease
The fatal Lybian swept, like flame
Among the forest trees.
Or Eurus' headlong gust across Sicilian seas.
Thenceforth, for with success they toiled,
Rome's youth in vigour waxed amain,
And temples, ravaged and despoiled
By Punic hordes profane,
Upraised within their shrines beheld their gods again.
Till spoke forth Hannibal at length :
" Like stags, of ravening wolves the prey,
Why rush to grapple with their strength,
From whom to steal away
Our loftiest triumph is, they leave for us to-day ?
" That race, inflexible as brave,
From Ilium quenched in flames who bore,
Across the wild Etruscan wave,
Their babes, tlieir grandsires hoar.
And all their sacred things to the Ansonian shore ;
" Like oak, by sturdy axes lopped
Of all its boughs, which once the brakes
Of shaggy Algidus o'ertoppcd,
Its loss its glory makes.
And from tlie very steel fresh strenglli and spirit takes
" Not Hydra, cleft through all its trunk,
With fresher vigour waxed to spread,
Till even Alcidcs' spirit shrunk ;
Nor yet hath Colchis dread.
Or Echionean Thebes more fatal monster bred.
253 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
" In ocean plunge it, and more bright
It rises ; scatter it, and lo !
Its unscathed victors it will smite
With direful overthrow,
And Rome's proud dames shall tell of many a routed foe.
" No messenger in boastful pride
Shall I to Carthage send again ;
Our every hope it died, it died,
When Hasdrubal was slain,
And with his fall our name's all-conquering star did wane." '
Nero returned in haste to his army, and ordered
the head of Hasdrubal to be thrown in front of the
Carthaginian outposts. It was carried to Hannibal,
and recognized by him, " I see," he said, " the doom
of Carthage." The next day he retreated into the
extreme south of Italy.
• I have borrowed the version of Sir Theodore Martin.
XIV
THE LAST STRUGGLE.
For more than three years after the fatal day of
Metaurus, Hannibal maintained himself in Italy. It
was only the extreme south of the peninsula, the
mountainous country of Bruttii, that he held ; and
even here, though the Roman generals were con-
tent to leave him alone, knowing well how formidable
he still was in the field, he was obliged to draw his
defences within still narrowing limits. His head-
quarters were at Crotona. Near this place he built
an altar to Juno, and placed on it a tablet with an
inscription in Carthaginian and Greek, giving a sum-
mary of his campaigns in Italy, with the number of
battles won, towns taken, and enemies slain. Livy
bestows hearty praise on his conduct at this time. " I
know not," he says, "whether the man was more ad-
mirable in prosperity or in adversity. For thirteen
years, far away from home, he waged war, and waged
it not with an army of his own countrymen, but with
a miscellaneous crowd gathered from all nations —
men who had neither laws, nor customs, nor language
in common, with different dress, different arms, dif-
ferent worship, I may say, different gods. And yet
he kept them together by so close a tic that they
254 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
never quarrelled among themselves or mutinied
against him, and this though he was often without
money for their pay. Even after Hasdrubal's death,
when he had nothing but a corner of Italy left to him,
his camp was as quiet as ever."
Hannibal was of course unwilling finally to give up
the great scheme of his life. He hoped against hope
that something might yet happen which would give
him a chance of carrying it out. Rome had other
enemies besides Carthage who might yet be united
against her. There was Antiochus in Syria, and
Philip in Macedonia. He lived to see them both
engaged in war with Rome, and both conquered. If
he could only have given them something of his own
foresight, and united them against the common enemy,
he might even yet have succeeded in his great scheme.
But want of wisdom, or want of energy, or want of
courage, made them hold back, and the opportunity
was lost.
One effort, indeed, was made to help him. His
youngest brother Mago, seeing that nothing could be
done in Spain, landed with all the forces that he could
raise, and with what were sent him from home, in
Liguria. On his way he possessed himself of the
island now called Minorca, where Port Mahon (Mago's
Harbour) still preserves the memory of his visit. He
had some success in rallying the Gauls to his stan-
dard, but he accomplished nothing of importance. So
far as his object was to make a diversion in favour of
Hannibal, he failed.
In 204 Scipio crossed over from Sicily to Africa.
His first movements were not very successful. He
SCIPIO AND SYPHAX. 257
began the siege of Utica, but was compelled to raise
it, and to retire to a strong position on the sea-coast,
where he was protected by the united strength of his
fleet and his army. Here he wintered, and early the
following year began again active operations. He
had two armies opposed to him — that of Carthage,
commanded by Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and that
of King Syphax. In his own camp was Masinissa,
who, though he had lost his kingdom, and indeed had
barely escaped with his life, was without doubt a very
valuable counsellor and ally.
King Syphax had conceived the hope that he might
be able to act as mediator between Rome and Car-
thage. He now proposed a peace, in which the chief
condition was that Hannibal should evacuate Italy
and Scipio Africa. Scipio answered that these were
terms which could not be accepted, but gave him to
understand that he was ready to listen to other pro-
posals. Envoys went backwards and forwards be-
tween the two camps. On the part of the king there
was, it would seem, a genuine belief that peace might
be made ; Scipio's envoys were really nothing else
than so many spies. He was waiting for the oppor-
tunity of carrying out a scheme which had possibly
been invented by himself, or, as is more probable,
suggested by Masinissa. This scheme was to set fire
to the camps of the two hostile armies. These camps
consisted of huts which would readily burn, and the
chief thing wanted was to put the enemy completely
off his guard. Scipio can scarcely be acquitted of
something like treachery in this affair. There was
virtually a truce between him and Syphax. While
18
258 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE,
negotiations for peace were going on, the king
naturally supposed himself to be safe from attack.
When all his preparations were complete, Scipio
divided his army into two. With half he was himself
to attack the Carthaginian camp ; the other half he
put under the command of his friend Laelius, who
was assisted by Masinissa. The two armies marched
out of the camp at night, and Laelius and Masinissa
advanced to the camp of Syphax. While the former
of these two remained in reserve, the latter under-
took the work of setting the camp on fire. TIic
scheme succeeded perfectly. " The camp seemed
framed," says Polybius, who doubtless heard the
story from Laelius himself, " for the very purpose of
being set on fire." The flames spread rapidly ; and
no one had any suspicion but that the fire had hap-
pened by accident. Some perished in their tents ;
many were trampled to death in the confusion ; and
nearly all who contrived to escape out of the camp
were cut down by the Romans.
At first the Carthaginians in the neighbouring camp
thought, as their allies had thought, that the fire was
accidental. Some of them ran to help ; others stood
gazing at the sight. None had any notion that the
enemy was at hand ; they were therefore actually
unarmed when the Romans fell upon them. In a
few minutes the second camp was in the same con-
dition as the first. Hasdrubal, with a small body of
cavalry, escaped ; Syphax also contrived to save him-
self, but the two armies were virtually destroyed.
Syphax had thought of reconciling himself to Rome ;
but his wife Sophonisba prevailed upon him to give
HANNIBAL RECALLED. 259
them up. He raised another army, which was soon
joined by Hasdrubal, who had also contrived to get
together a new force, among them being four thou-
sand mercenaries from Spain. A battle followed, in
which Scipio was again victorious.
There was now only one course left to Carthage,
and that was to recall Hannibal and Mago. Mago,
who had been defeated by the Roman forces just
before this summons reached him, set sail with what
was left of his army, but died of his wounds before
he reached home. Hannibal received the com-
mand to return with indignation and grief. Livy
gives — we know not on what authority — the very
words in which, " gnashing his teeth and groaning,
and scarcely able to restrain his tears," he answered
the envoys of the Carthaginian Senate. " They call me
back at last in plain words ; but they have long since
implicitly called me by refusing me reinforcements
and money. Hannibal has been conquered, not by
the Roman people, which he has defeated and routed
a hundred times, but by the jealousy of the Senate
of Carthage. It will not be Scipio that will exult
in the disgrace of my return so much as Hanno, who,
having no other means of overthrowing the power of
my family, has done it by the ruin of his own country."
Hanno, it will be remembered, was the leader of the
peace-party. Wrathful, however, as he was, he made
no delay in obeying the summons. He had his ships,
indeed, ready prepared for this service. " Seldom,"
says Livy, "has an exile left his country with a
sadder heart than was Hannibal's when he departed
from the land of his enemies. Again and again he
26o THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
looked back on the shores which he was leaving,
and cursed himself that he had not led his soldiers
dripping with the blood of Cannae to Rome itself.
' Scipio,' he said, ' has ventured to attack Carthage ;
but I wasted my time at Casilinum and Cumae and
Nola.'"
When the news of his departure reached Rome, a
public thanksgiving was ordered. The veteran sol-
dier Fabius had bestowed upon him the unexampled
honour of a wreath of oak leaves, given, not as was
commonly the case, for having saved the life of a
citizen, but for having saved his country. A few
months afterwards he died, in extreme old age,
having been spared to see the dearest wish of his
heart, Italy freed from the invader,
Hannibal's movements after his landing in Africa —
from which he had been absent more than thirty
years — are not easily followed. Indeed the whole
history of this time is somewhat obscure. We hear
of a truce between Carthage and Rome, which the
former treacherously violated ; of favourable terms of
peace offered by Scipio, and of a fruitless interview
between the two rival generals ; but it is difficult to
make out of our authorities a clear and consistent
account. I shall pass on at once to the great battle
which brought the Second Punic War to an end. Of
this we have full details. It was fought at Zama, on
October 19th according to some authors, according
to others in the spring.^ Scipio arranged his army
" Possibly the discrepancy may be partly accounted for by tlie de-
rangement of the Roman calendar of this time. The months and the
seasons were not by any means in accordance.
ZAMA. 261
according to the usual Roman fashion, but did not fill
up the intervals between the cohorts or companies,^
and he put more space than usual between the lines.
His object was to lessen the danger from the ele-
phants. Lzelius with the Roman cavalry was posted
on the left, Masinissa with the African horse on the
right. The light-armed troops were placed in front,
with orders to retire, if they found themselves hard
pressed by the elephants, through the intervals be-
tween the lines.
Hannibal posted his elephants, of which he had
eighty, in front. Behind these was a mixed multitude
of mercenaries ; behind these, again, the native Car-
thaginian troops, who now, in the extremity of danger,
appear again in the field ; and in the third line the
veterans whom he had brought with him from Italy.
On the left wing he posted his African, on the right
his Carthaginian cavalry.
The battle was begun by the elephants. These
creatures did at least as much harm to friends as
to foes.2 They are said, indeed, to have caused so
much confusion among the Carthaginian cavalry that
Laelius was easily able to rout this part of the hostile
army.
In the centre of the two armies the day at first
(vent in favour of Hannibal. His mercenaries, tried
and skilful soldiers, were more than a match for the
unpractised Romans. If they had been properly
' The intervals of the first line were usually filled v\^ in the second,
and tliDse of the second in the third.
" The trained animals had long since been used up. We hear, not
long before this lime, of one Ilauno being sent to hunt for fresh ones.
262 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
supported by the second line they might have won
the day. But the citizen-soldiers made no attempt to
advance. It was only when they were attacked by
the advancing Romans, and even, Polybius adds, by
the mercenaries, now infuriated at being thus deserted,
that they began to defend themselves. This they did
with the greatest fury, striking indiscriminately at
friend and foe. Hannibal's own force, which had
closed its lines against the fugitives from the routed
divisions, had still to be dealt with. Here the battle
was long and obstinate. The combatants fell where
they fought. But Laelius and Masinissa (for the
Numidian prince had also been successful in his part
of the field) returned from their pursuit of the Car-
thaginian cavalry, and fell upon the rear of Hannibal's
troops, and broke their lines. A general rout ensued.
Hannibal made his way with a small body of cavalry
to Adrumetum. Of the rest few escaped. Twenty
thousand were killed on the field of battle ; as many
more were taken prisoners. The Roman loss was
fifteen hundred. " Such," says Polybius, " was the
battle between Hannibal and Scipio; the battle which
gave to the Romans the sovereignty of the world."
Hannibal collected about six thousand men, the
remains of his army, and with this force made his
way back to Carthage. The government had opened
negotiations for peace, and their envoys had just
returned, bringing back Scipio's terms. They were
briefly these :
I. Carthage was to retain its African possessions ;
was to be independent ; was not to be compelled to
receive a Roman garrison.
TERMS OF PEACE. 263
2. All prisoners and deserters were to be surren-
dered.
3. All ships of war, except ten, were to be given up,
and all elephants.
4. Carthage should not make war on any state
outside Africa ; nor on any within it, without leave
first obtained from the Romans.
5. King Masinissa should have restored to him all
that he or his ancestors had possessed.
6. The Roman army was to be provisioned and
paid till peace was formally concluded.
7. An indemnity of ten thousand talents, and an
annual tribute of two hundred, to be paid.
8. One hundred hostages, to be chosen by the
Roman commander-in-chief, to be handed over as
security.
When these terms were recited in the Carthaginian
Senate, a senator rose to speak. Hannibal laid hold
of him, and dragged him down. The assembly
received this act with angry shouts. " Pardon me,"
said Hannibal, " if my ignorance has led me to offend
against any of your forms. I left my country at nine
years of age, and returned to it at forty-five. The
real cause of my offence was my care for our common
country. It is astonishing to me that any Cartha-
ginian who knows the truth should not be ready to
worship his good fortune, when he finds Rome ready
to deal with us so mercifully. Do not debate these
conditions ; consent to them unanimously, and pray
to all the gods that they may be ratified by the
Roman Senate."
Ratified they were, though not, it would seem, till llie
264 TH^ STORY OP CAkTHAGE.
following- year. We catch a glimpse of the old days
before men had learnt the use of iron, when we read
how the heralds went to Carthage carrying with them
the knives of flint with which the animals offered in
sacrifice were to be slain. The Carthaginians surren-
dered all their ships of war, their elephants, the
deserters who had come over to them, and as many
as four thousand prisoners. The ships of one kind
and another numbered five hundred. Scipio ordered
them to be towed out to sea and burnt. " The sight
of the flames was as terrrible," says Livy, " to the
vanquished people as would have been that of their
city on fire."
When the indemnity came to be paid it was diffi-
cult to find the money ; and there were loud murmurs
in the Senate at the sacrifices which it would be
necessary to make. One of the members complained
to the House that Hannibal had been seen to laugh ;
and this though he was really the cause of all their
troubles. Then the great man spoke out. " If you
could see my heart as easily as you can my face, you
would know that my laughter comes not from a
joyful heart, but from one almost maddened by
trouble. And yet my laughter is not so unreasonable
as your tears. You ought to have wept when our
arms were taken from us and our ships were burnt.
But no ; you were silent when you saw your country
stripped ; but now you lament, as if this were the
death-day of Carthage, because you have to furnish
part of the tribute out of your private means. I fear
me much that you will soon find that this is the least
of the trouble you ^'•iIl have to bear."
XV.
HANNIBAL IN EXILE.
It was true that, as the discontented senator had
said, Hannibal had been the cause of the troubles of
Carthage ; still he was too great a man to be any-
where but in the first place ; and for some years he
practically governed the State. He seems to have
done this new work well. The Court of Judges at
Carthage had usurped a power which did not belong
to them. Every man's property, character, and life
were at their disposal ; and they were unscrupulous
in dealing with it. Hannibal set himself to bring
about a change ; he carried the people with him ;
the office of judge became annual, and it was filled
up by election. It is a change that does not alto-
gether commend itself to us ; but it was probably
required by the peculiar condition of the country.
Another reform concerned the public revenue.
Hannibal made a searching inquiry into what came
in, and what was spent, and he found that a very
large proportion of the whole was embezzled. He
stated these discoveries in a public assembly. The
expenses of the counlr)- iiiii;ht be met, the tribute to
Rome paid, and taxation nevertheless lightened, if
only the revenue were honestly collected and honestly
266 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
spent. It was only too natural that these proceedings
should make many enemies. And besides those who
were furious at the loss of their unjust gains, there
were doubtless some who were honestly afraid ot
what Hannibal was aiming at. If he was making
Carthage richer and more powerful, it was that he
might plunge her again into a war with Rome. So,
from one cause or the other, a strong party was
raised against him. His enemies had, it is said, the
meanness to accuse him to the Roman Government.
He was planning, they said, a new war in concert
with Antiochus, king of Syria. The Romans were on
the point of war with this prince, and were ready to
suspect their old enemy. An embassy was sent to
Carthage, in spite of the opposition of Scipio, to
demand that he should be given up. Ostensibly the
object of their invasion was to settle a dispute between
Carthage and Masinissa.
Hannibal knew the truth, and resolved to fly. To
put his enemies off their guard, he showed no kind of
alarm, but walked about in public as usual. But he
took horse at night, reached the coast, and embarked
in a ship which, in anticipation of such a need, he
had kept in readiness, and sailed to Cercina (Kerkena).
It was necessary to conceal the fact of his flight, and
he gave out that he was going as ambassador to Tyre.
But the harbour of the island happened to be full of
merchant-ships, and the risk of discovery was great.
He resolved accordingly to escape. The captains were
invited to a great entertainment, and were asked to
lend their sails and yards for the construction of a
tent. The revel was loner and late. Before it was
HANNIBAL WITH ANTIOCHUS. 267
over Hannibal was gone, and the dismantled ships
could not be made ready for several hours. From
Cercina he sailed to Tyre, where he was received
with great honours, and from Tyre again to the
port of Antioch. Antiochus had left that place
and was at Ephesus, and thither Hannibal followed
him.
Antiochus of Syria, fourth in descent from Seleucus,
one of the Macedonian generals who had shared be-
tween them the empire of Alexander, has somehow
acquired the title of the " Great." He had little that
was great about him except, perhaps, his ambition.
His treatment of Hannibal, whether it was the result
of weakness or of jealousy, was foolish in the extreme.
He did not take his advice, and he would not employ
him. His advice had been to act at once. Rome at
this time (195 B.C.) had to deal with many enemies.
The Gauls especially were giving her much trouble.
If Antiochus could have made up his mind to attack
her immediately, the result might have been different
to what it was. As it was he lingered and delayed,
and when at last, two years afterwards, he made up
his mind to act, the opportunity was lost. In 192 he
crossed over into Greece, and was defeated with heavy
loss the following year at Thermopylae. Hannibal
was not employed in this campaign. But he was sent
to equip and to command a fleet. There was nothing
strange in this variety of employment ; for then — and
indeed the same has been the case till quite recent
times — the same men would command fleets and
armies indifferently, lie was attacked by a greatly
superior fleet belonging to the island of Rhodes, then
268 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
a great naval power, and, though successful where he
commanded in person, was defeated.
In the same year (190) was fought the great battle
of Magnesia. Whether Hannibal was present at it
we do not know ; but an anecdote is told of him
which belongs to this time. Antiochus had collected
a great army — some sixty or seventy thousand in
number — to do battle with the Romans. It had been
gathered from the cities of Greece and from Western
Asia, and their dress and armour was as splendid as
it was various. The king looked with pride on the
ranks glittering with gold and silver. " Will not this
be enough for the Romans ? " he asked of Hannibal
who was standing by his side. " Yes," said he, with
a grim jest, " yes, enough even for them, though they
are the greediest nation on the earth ! " But it was
of the spoils, not of the fighting strength of the army,
that he was speaking.
The battle of Magnesia ended, as Hannibal had
expected, in the utter defeat of the Syrian army.
Antiochus was advised to sue for peace. Two years
afterwards (188) it was granted to him, one of the
conditions being that he should give to Rome such of
her enemies as he had received at his court. He ac-
cepted the condition, but gave his guest an opportunity
of escaping.
Various stories are told of Hannibal's movements
after his flight from the court of Antiochus. Accord-
ing to one account he sought refuge for a time in
Crete. A story is told of him here which very likely
is not true, but which shows the common belief in his
ingenuity and readiness of resource. He suspected
HANNIBAL IN BITHYNIA. 269
the Cretans of coveting the large treasure which he
carried about with him. To deceive them he filled a
number of wine-jars with lead, which had over it a
thin covering of gold and silver. These he deposited
with much ceremony in the presence of the chief men
of the island in the temple of Diana. His real treasure
meanwhile was hidden in some hollow brazen figures
which were allowed to lie, apparently uncarcd for, in the
porch of his house. From Crete he is said to have
visited Armenia, and to have founded in that country
the city of Artaxata. It is certain, however, that he
spent the last years of his life with Prusias, king of
Bithynia. Prusias was at war with Eumenes of
Pergamus, a firm friend of Rome, and Hannibal
willingly gave him his help. We need not believe
the story which he tells us how he vanquished enemies
in a sea-fight by filling a number of jars with venomous
snakes and throwing them on board the hostile ships.
For some years he was left unmolested in this
refuge. But in 183 the Romans sent an embassy to
Prusias to demand that he should be given up. The
demand was one which the king did not feel able to
resist, and he sent soldiers at once to seize him.
Hannibal had always expected some such result.
He knew that Rome could never forgive him for what
he had done, and he did not trust his host. Indeed
he must have known that a king of Bithynia could
not refuse a request of the Romans if it was seriously
made. The story of his end, ornamented as such
stories commonly are, tells us how he made seven
ways of getting out of his house, and that finding
them all beset with soldiers, he called for the poison,
270 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
which was kept always ready for such an emergency,
and drank it off. Some writers say that he carried
the poison with him in a ring — the ring which
Juvenal, when he uses the example of Hannibal to
show the vanity of a soldier's ambition, describes as
"the avenger of the day of Cannae." Livy gives us
what profess to be his last words. " Let me free the
Roman people from their long anxiety, since they
think it tedious to wait for an old man's death.
Flaminius [this was the Roman ambassador] will gain
no great or famous victory over a helpless victim of
treachery. As to the way in which the Roman
character has changed, this day is proof enough. The
grandfathers of these men sent to King Pyrrhus, when
he had an army fighting against them in Italy, warn-
ing him to beware of poison ; but they have sent
an ambassador to suggest to Prusias the crime of
murdering a guest." He was in his sixty-fourth or
sixty-fifth year when he died.
Of Hannibal's character, as of the history of his
country, we have to judge from the narratives of
enemies. His military skill is beyond all doubt. In
that, it is probable, he has never been surpassed. His
courage also was undoubted, though he is expressly
praised for the discretion with which he avoided any
needless exposure of his life. The testimony to the
temperance of his habits is equally clear. The chief
charges brought against him are treachery, cruelty,
and avarice. From personal avarice he was certainly
free, but a general who has to make war support itself,
who has to feed, clothe, and pay a great army in a
foreign country, with but rare and scanty supplies
CHARACTER OF HANNIBAL. 27I
from home, cannot be scrupulous. About the charge
of cruelty it is not easy to speak. What has been
said about Hannibal's alleged avarice applies in a way
to this other accusation. A general situated as was
Hannibal could not but be stern and even merciless
in his dealings with enemies. As to treachery, we
know that " Punic faith" passed among the Romans
into a proverb for dishonesty ; and " faithless " is the
epithet, as we have seen, which Horace applies to the
great general. But we find no special grounds for
the charge, while we may certainly doubt whether the
Roman generals showed such conspicuous good faith
as to be in a good position for censuring others.
There was no more honourable Roman than Scipio,
but Scipio's treacherous attack on Syphax during the
progress of the negotiations is at least as bad as any-
thing that is charged against Hannibal.
XVI.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END.
The death of Hannibal did not remove the sus-
picion of Rome that Carthage might be plotting some
mischief The conditions imposed upon her by the
Peace of Hannibal (as the treaty made after the
battle of Zama was called) had not permanently dis-
abled her. She had lost her dominions but not her
trade ; her war-ships had been destroyed, but not the
ships of her commerce ; and she had always in her
treasury the gold with which to hire new armies.
Only twenty years had passed since the conclusion of
the peace, when she offered to pay up at once the
balance of the indemnity which was to have been
spread over fifty years. The Romans preferred keep-
ing this hold over their ancient enemies to receiving
the money, but they were alarmed at this proof of
how completely the wealth of Carthage was restored.
Some ten years later, when war with Macedonia was
threatening, news came to Rome that the envoys of
the Macedonian king had been received at Carthage.
Doubtless the envoys had been sent ; and it is prob-
able that they found some powerful persons ready to
listen to them — for there was still a war-party in
Carthage — but there is no reason to believe that the
CATO'S HOSTILITY TO CARTHAGE. 273
government had had any deaHngs with the enemies
of Rome. There was one Roman statesmen by whom
these suspicions were very strongly felt. This was
Marcus Porcius Cato, commonly called the Elder
Cato, to distinguish him from his great-grandson, Cato
of Utica, the republican who killed himself sooner
than live under the despotism of Caesar. Cato had
served throughout the campaigns of the Second Punic
War, and had not forgotten his experiences of that
time. He had been sent to inquire into the causes of
a war that had broken out between Carthage and
King Masinissa, and he had been much struck by the
proofs of wealth and power that he saw' during his
visit, the crowded population of the city and territory,
the well-appointed fleet, and the well-filled armouries.
Returning to Rome, he related in the Senate what he
had seen. " This people," he said, " is stronger than
ever. They are practising war in Africa by way of pre-
lude to war against you." As he spoke, he threw down
from a fold in his robe a bunch of ripe figs. " The
country that bears these," he cried, as the senators
admired the beautiful fruit, " is but three days' jour-
ney from here." One is not certain whether he meant
that it was so near as to be dangerous, or that it could
be easily reached. Anyhow, from that time he never
ceased to take every opportunity that occurred of
expressing his opinion in the Senate. Whatever the
matter might be that was being voted upon, he added
the words, " And I also think that Carthage ought to
be blotted out." With equal pertinacity one of the
Scipios (surnamed Nasica, or " Scipio of the Pointed
Nose), a near kinsman of the conqueror of Zama,
274 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
added to every vote, " And I also think that Carthage
ought to be left."
Carthage had a dangerous enemy at home in King
Masinissa. He had begun life, as we have seen, by
serving with Hasdrubal Barca in Spain, had then
changed sides, and fought on the side of the Romans
at the battle of Zama. He had been handsomely
rewarded for these services. His father's dominions
had been restored to him, and to these had been
added the greater part of the kingdom of Syphax.
For more than fifty years he was continually engaged
in enlarging his borders at the expense of Carthage,
and he always felt that he could rely on the help, or
at least the countenance, of the Romans. Carthage
was forbidden to make war on her neighbours in
Africa without the leave of Rome, and all that she
could do in return for Masinissa's aggressions was to
send to appeal to that power to protect her against
the wi'ongs that she was compelled to suffer. More
than once the Romans sent commissioners to inquire
into her complaints. Once, indeed, possibly oftener,
these commissioners decided against Masinissa, but
they generally left the matter unsettled. Anyhow, the
king went on with his encroachments, and generally
contrived to keep what he had laid his hands upon.
In 1 5 1 this quarrel broke out into open war. Masi-
nissa had a party of his own in Carthage. The demo-
cratic or war party expelled forty of its principal
members, imposing at the same time an oath upon the
people that they would never allow them to return.
The exiles fled to the king and urged him to make
war. He was willing enough, for he had his eye on a
AFRICANUS THE YOUNGER. 275
town which he particularly coveted ; but he first sent
one of his sons on an embassy to Carthage to demand
redress. The prince was not admitted within the
works, and was even attacked on his v/ay home.
Masinissa then laid siege to the town. The Car-
thaginians sent Hasdrubal, their commander-in-chief,
against him. They were joined by two of the king's
chief officers, who deserted, bringing with them as
many as six thousand horse. In some slight engage-
ments that followed Hasdrubal was victorious ; and
the king made a feint of retreat, and drew Hasdrubal
after him into a region where supplies could not easily
be obtained. A battle soon followed. The old king
— he was eighty-eight years of age — commanded in
person, riding after the fashion of his country, without
saddle or stirrup. No very decided result followed,
but the king, on the whole, had the advantage. There
was present that day, as spectator of the conflict, a
young Roman who had much to do with the conclu-
sion of the story of Carthage. To give him the full
title which he bears in history, this was Publius
Cornelius Scipio yEmilianus Africanus Minor. He
was a son of a distinguished Roman general, iCmilius
Paullus, the conqueror of Pydna,^ and grandson of
the ^Emilius Paullus who fell at Cannae. He was
adopted by the elder son of the Scipio Africanus, the
conqueror of Zama, whose weak health prevented
him from taking any part in public affairs.^ He had
' Pydna was the great battle (fouglii in 169) hy wliich ilic .Maccdtmian
kingdom was brought to an end. Sec "The Slory of Rome," p. 163.
^ The young reader may observe that he took the names of tlie
family into which he was adopted, a(UHng to tlicin that of his own /;fiti,
shered from /limilius into /I'.niiiianus, according to tlie practice in cas<
of adojUion.
2'^() THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
been serving with a Roman army in Spain, and had
come to Masinissa for the purpose of purchasing
elephants. He had privilege of seeing the battle
from a hill that overlooked the plain, and afterwards
said (we probably get the story from his friend Poly-
bius) that, though he had been present at many
battles, he had never been so much pleased. " I saw,"
said he, " one hundred and ten thousand men meet in
combat. It was a sight such as two only have seen
before me, Zeus from the top of Ida, and Poseidon
from. Samothrace, in the Trojan war."
Scipio undertook to arbitrate between the two
parties. The Carthaginians offered to give up the
country round Emporia, or the Markets (now Gabes
and Terba), and to pay two hundred talents down
and eight hundred more in instalments ; but when the
king demanded also the surrender of the fugitives,
the negotiations were broken off. Hasdrubal ought
now to have taken up a position which it would have
been possible for him to hold, but he neglected to do
so. He expected another offer from Masinissa, and
he also had hopes that the Romans would interfere
in his favour. His delay was fatal to him. Famine,
and the fever that always follows on famine, wasted
his army. In the end he was obliged to accept the
most humiliating terms. The exiles of Masinissa's
party were to be taken back into the city ; the fugitives
were to be surrendered ; an indemnity of five thou-
sand talents was to be paid, and he and his soldiers
were to pass through the hostile camp, unarmed and
with but a single garment apiece. The helpless
fugitives were attacked by one of the kings sons at
fi.XF EDITION AGAINST CARTIIAGll. zy^
the licad of a force of cavalry, and cruelly slaughtered.
Only a very few, among whom was Hasdrubal him-
self, returned to Carthage.
But worse remained behind. The Carthaginian
government condemned to death Hasdrubal and
those who had been most active in promoting the
war. But when the ambassadors whom they sent
to Rome pleaded this proceeding as a ground for
acquittal, they were asked, " Why did you not con-
demn them before, not after the defeat ? " To this
there was no answer ; and the Roman Senate voted
that the Carthaginian explanation was not sufficient.
" Tell us," said the unhappy men, " what we must
do ? " " You must satisfy the Roman People," was
the ambiguous answer. When this was reported at
Carthage, a second embassy was sent, imploring to be
definitely told what they must do. These were dis-
missed with the answer, "The Carthaginians know
this already." Rome had accepted the pitiless counsel
of Cato, and Carthage was to be blotted out. If there
was any doubt, it was dismissed when envoys came
from Utica offering the submission of that city. The
consuls of the year, Manilius and Censorinus, were
at once dispatched with a fleet and an army. Their
secret instructions were that they were not to be
satisfied till Carthage was destroyed. The forces
which they commanded amounted to nearly a hundred
thousand men. The expedition was popular ; for the
piospects of booty were great, and volunteers of all
ranks thronged to take part in it. The news that the
fleet had sailed was the first intimation that Carthage
received that war had been declared.
278 TIIR STORY OF CARTHAGE.
The Carthaginian government still hoped that ar.
absolute submission might save them. They sent
another embassy to Rome with full powers to grant
any terms that might be asked. The answer that
they received was this : " If the Carthaginians will give
three hundred hostages from their noblest families,
and fulfil all other conditions within thirty days, they
shall retain their independence and the possession of
their territory." But secret instructions were also sent
to the consuls that they were to abide, whatever
might happen, by their first instructions.
The hostages were sent, after a miserable scene of
parting from their friends. But few believed that
submission would be of any avail. And indeed it
was soon seen to be useless. The consuls demanded
that the arms in the city should be given up. The de-
mand was accepted. Two hundred thousand weapons,
more darts and javelins than could be counted, and two
thousand catapults were given up. Then the consuls
spoke again. " You must leave Carthage ; we have
resolved to destroy this city. You may remove your
furniture and property to some other place, but it
must be not less than ten miles from the sea." And
they added some reasons, which must have sounded
like the cruellest mockery, why they should be con-
tent with this decision. " You will be better away
from the sea," they said in effect ; " it will only re-
mind you of the greatness which you have lost. It
is a dangerous element, which before this has raised
to great prosperity and brought to utter ruin other
countries besides yours. Agriculture is a far safer
and more profitable employment. And," he added,
WAR DECLARED. 279
" we are keeping oui promise that Carthage should be
independent. It is the men, not the walls and build-
ings of the city, that constitute the real Carthage." *
The return of the envoys had been expected at
Carthage with the utmost impatience. As they
entered the gate of the city they were almost
trampled to death by the crowd. At last they made
their way into the Senate-house. Then they told
their story, the people waiting in a dense throng out-
side the doors of the chamber. When it was told,
a loud cry of dismay and rage went up from the as-
sembly ; and the people, hearing it, rushed in. A fearful
scene of violence followed. Those who had advised the
surrender of the hostages and of the arms were fiercely
attacked. Some of them were even torn to pieces.
The envoys themselves were not spared, though their
only offence had been to bring bad news. Any un-
lucky Italians, whom business had happened to detain
in the city, fell victims to the popular fury. A few
more wisely busied themselves with making such pre-
parations for defence as were possible, for of course
there was but one alternative now possible. Indeed
the Senate declared war that same day.
' It is difficult to believe that these abominable sojiliistrics were evci
really uttered. But we have good reason for sujiposing that Appian,
from whom we get tlie report of the Consuls' speech, coi;ied it from
Polybius, an excellent authority. The historians of antiquity, however,
had a passion for jiutting speeches into the mouths of (licir chuiaeters,
and were nut always particular about their authenticity.
XVII.
THE SIEGE AND FALL OF CARTHAGE.
The Carthaginian government did their best to
defend their city. One Hasdrubal, the same that had
been condemned to death in the vain hope of pro-
pitiating the Romans, was appointed to command the
forces outside the city ; another had the control of
those within the walls. The manufacture of arms
was carried on night and day, by men and women
alike, even the temples and sacred enclosures being
turned into workshops. A hundred shields, three
hundred swords, a thousand javelins to be thrown by
the catapults, were made daily. The women are said
to have cut off their hair for the cords of the catapults,
for which the horsehair that was commonly used was
wanting.
The wall of Carthage had a circumference ol about
eighteen miles. It was about forty-six feet high, and
thirty-four feet thick. The height is that of what is
called the curtain of the wall, i.e. the portions between
the towers. The towers were of four stories, and much
higher. Where the sea came up to the fortifications —
and as the city was built upon a peninsula, this was
the case with the greater part of the circuit — a single
v\ all was deemed sufficient ; but on the land side, ie.
THE WALLS OF CARTHAGE.
2iil
to the north and
south, the wall was
triple. Appian tells
that the three walls
were of equal heijijht
and breadth. This
is incredible, because
such an arrangement
would have been use-
less. The first wall
once taken would
have given the be-
siegers such an ad-
vantage that the
second would have
soon become unten-
able. No trace of
any such kind of
fortification can be
discovered either at
Carthage or in any
ancient town. Tlic
real meaning of the
author — possibly
Polybius — from
whom Appian quo-
ted, seems to have
been this. There
were three ditches.
Bcliind the inner of
the three, the wall
proper was built.
282 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
Then came the advance wall, much lower than the
wall proper, and in front of this the second ditch ;
possibly there was an outer defence of palisades,
itself protected by a third ditch. The traces of
exactly such a system of fortification are to be
found at Thapsus, Within the casemates of the
main wall there was room for three hundred ele-
phants, four thousand cavalry, and twenty thousand
infantry.
The harbours were so arranged that ships had to
pass through the one to reach the other. The outer
harbour was meant for merchant ships, and its entrance
from the sea was closed with iron chains. In the
inner harbour were kept the ships of war. There was
an island in it, and on this island, as well as round
the sides of the harbour, were slips in which two
hundred and twenty vessels could be placed. The
island also contained the admiral's house. This was
so high that he could get a view of all that was going
on outside. Between the two harbours there was a
wall so high that it was not possible to look from the
outer into the inner. There was a separate entrance
from the town to the outer harbour. The inner or
military harbour was evidently guarded with the
greatest care.
Manilius directed his attack on the landward side
of the wall ; Censorinus attempted a part which,
being partly protected by a lagoon, was less strongly
fortified than the rest. The outer fortifications were
carried, but no further progress was made. Indeed
the besiegers had some serious losses, as Hasdrubal,
with his lieutenants, among whom a certain Himilco,
THE ROMANS LOSE THEIR ALLY MASIMSSA. 285
surnamcd Phamaeas, was conspicuously active, con-
tinually attacked any detached parties.
Things seemed more hopeful when Censorinus,
having filled up part of the lagoon, brought two
battering-rams to bear on the wall, one of them
worked by six thousand soldiers, the other by as
many sailors. The force of these brought down part
of it ; and the Carthaginians built up again tJiis por-
tion in the night. The new work was not very strong.
Then the besieged made a furious sally, set some of
the works on fire, and made the whole, for a time at
least, unserviceable. The next day the Romans at-
tempted an assault by a part of the breach which had
not been repaired, but were repulsed with heavy loss.
Censorinus now found that his crews suffered from
the climate, for it was the height of summer. Ac-
cordingly he transferred his ships from the lagoon
to the open sea. The Carthaginians took every op-
portunity, when the wind favoured, of sending fire
ships among the Roman fleet, and thus did it a great
deal of damage.
The Roman commanders continued to conduct
their operations, with little skill and as little success.
And just at the time when they most needed his help
they had the misfortune to lose their ally Masinissa.
There had been a coolness between the old man and
his Roman friends, he conceiving that he had been
rudely put aside, and that the task of dealing with
Carthage had been unfairly taken out of his hands.
And now when the consuls .sent to ask his help — he
had jDromised to give it u>//ch they asked for it^ and
this they had been too proud to do — they found him
286 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
dying. He had completed his ninetieth year, retaining
to the last his vigour of mind ?.nd body. The other
inveterate enemy of Carthage, the old Cato, had died
a few months before. Scipio, who had been dis-
tinguishing himself during the siege, was entrusted
with the task of dividing the old king's dominion and
wealth between his three sons. One of these, Gulussa
by name, became at once an active ally, and was
found especially helpful in repelling the attacks of
Phamaeas with his light cavalry. It was not indeed
long before Phamaeas himself was induced by Scipio
to desert his friends.
A change of commanders, Manilius and Ccnso-
rinus giving place to Piso and Mancinus, did not
bring a change for the better in the conduct of the
siege. This, in fact, was almost given up, the new
consuls busying themselves with assaults on the
neighbouring towns. Calpurnius was particularly un-
fortunate at Hippo (now Bizx-rta), where all his siege
works were destroyed by a sally of the townspeople.
The spirits of the Carthaginians rose in proportion
to the discouragement of the Romans. Some of
Gulussa's cavalry had deserted to them ; and the two
other sons of Masinissa, though nominally friendly to
Rome, stood aloof and waited for what might happen.
Envoys were sent to them and to the independent
Moors, representing that if Carthage fell they would
be the next to be conquered. Communications were
also opened with the Macedonian pretender who was
then at war with Rome. Unfortunately the Hasdrubal
who commanded outside the walls coveted the position
of his namesake in the city. He accused him of
SCIPIO IN COMMAND. 2O9
treachery — it was his misfortune to be closely related
to Gulussa ; the unhappy man, surprised by the
charge, faltered in his defence, and was murdered in
the Senate-house, his senators striking him down
with the fragments of the benches.
At Rome every one had expected a speedy end
to the siege, and there was great vexation and even
alarm at these long delays. All eyes were fixed on
the one man who had showed real capacity for
command, and fixed the more earnestly on account of
the fortunate name that he bore. It had been a
Scipio who had brought the war of Hannibal to an
end ; it was to be a Scipio who should complete his
work and destroy Carthage itself. The young soldier
went to Rome to stand for the office of yEdile — not,
we may guess, without some notion of what was going
to happen. The people elected him to the consulship.
The consul, who was presiding, protested. Scipio
was thirty-seven years old, and was therefore under
the legal age. The people insisted ; they were the
masters of the elections and could choose whom they
would. The tribunes threatened to suspend the pre-
siding consul, unless he gave away. He yielded ; as
did Scipio's colleague when it came to choosing the
province which each consul should have. This was
commonly determined by lot, but the people was
resolved that Scipio should have Africa, and it was
so arranged.
The new commander's first exploit was to rescue
Mancinus from a dangerous position into which he had
got himself. Anxious to do something before he was
superseded, he led a storming party against a weak
20
290
THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
point in the wall, and actually made his way into the
town. But he was not strong enough to advance,
and could barely maintain his hold of what he had
gained. His colleague Piso, though summoned to
help him, made no movement ; but Scipio, who, on
reaching Utica, had received a despatch describing
the situation, hastened to the spot, and carried off
Mancinus and his party in safety. The two consuls
shortly afterwards returned to Rome, and Scipio set
THE HARCOl'RS OK CARTHAGE (ACCORDING TO BEUI-fi).
himself to restore the discipline and order which the
lax rule of his predecessors had suffered to decay.
He purged the Roman camp of a crowd of idlers and
plunderers which had collected there, and left nothing
but what was manageable and serviceable. His first
operation was to storm a quarter of the city which
went by the name of the Megara, and was, it would
seem the abode of the wealthier class. The assault
HARBOURS OK CARTIIAC.K (ACCORDING TO DAUX)
ATTACK ON THE MEGARA.
293
was made by two parties, one of them led by Scipio
in person. Neither could make its way over the wall ;
but a tower, belonging to some private dwelling,
which had been unwisely allowed to stand though it
commanded the fortification, was occupied, and some
ARRANOKMRNTS OF THE BERTHS (ACCORDTNG TO KEULIi).
of the besiegers made their way from it on to the wall,
and from the wall into the Megara. They then
opened one of the gates, and Scipio with a force of
four thousand men entered. He did not, however, feel
it safe to remain, for the place was full of gardens, and
its hederes and watercourses made it difficult ground
PLAN OK WAI.I. Ar UYRSA.
for the action of troops ; but the operation had its
results, the most important of which was that the
army outside the walls, fancying that the city was
taken, abandoned its camp, and retreated into the
Byrsa or Upper City.
294 ^^^ STORY OF CARTHAGE.
Hasdrubal, enraged at this movement, retaliated
by a barbarous massacre of all the prisoners in his
hands. He brought the poor wretches to the edge
of the wall, subjected them to the cruellest tortures,
and threw them down still alive from the height.
After such an act the besieged would feel that they
had no hope of mercy.
The siege now became almost a blockade. Scipio
burnt the camp which the outside army had deserted
in their panic, and was now master of the neck of the
peninsula on which the city stood. No more food
could be introduced overland, and the supplies which
came by sea were small and precarious. The next
step was to block up the harbour. Scipio constructed
a great wall across the mouth. So huge was the
work that the besieged at first believed it impossible,
but when they saw it advance rapidly, the whole army
labouring at it night and day, they began to be
alarmed. Their own energy was not less than that ol
the besiegers. They dug a new channel from the
harbour to the open sea, and, while this work was
being carried on, they built also fifty ships of war.
The besiegers knew nothing of what was being done,
though they heard a continual sound of hammering.
Their astonishment was very great when a fleet, of
whose existence they had not an idea — for all the
ships had been given up and destroyed — issued forth
from a harbour mouth which had never been seen
before. The Carthaginians, in great glee, manoeuvred
in front of the Roman fleet. If they had attacked it
promptly, they might have done it irreparable damage,
for the ships had been left almost entirely without
E^'GAGEMENTS BETWEEN THE FLEETS. 295
protection. As it was, they contented themselves
with a demonstration, and then returned to the har-
bour. It was an opportunity which never returned. It
was fated, says the historian, that Carthage should be
taken. Two days afterwards the two fleets fought ;
but by this time the Romans were prepared, and
the battle was drawn. The next day it was re-
newed, and then the Carthaginians were decidedly
worsted.
A determined effort was now made on the harboui
side of the city. The rams were brought to bear upon
the walls, and brought down a considerable part of it.
But the Carthaginians made a furious sally. They
plunged naked into the lagoon, carrying unlighted
torches. Some waded through the shallows ; others
swam. Reaching the land, they lighted their torches
and rushed fiercely on the siege works. Many were
killed, for they had neither shields nor armour ; but
nothing could resist tlicir charge. The Romans gave
way in confusion, and the siege works were burnt.
Even Scipio, though he ordered the flying soldiers to
be cut down, could not check the panic. The day
ended in a great success for the besieged.
When the winter with its cooler weather drew on,
Scipio turned his attention to the region from which
Carthage drew what supplies it could still obtain.
His lieutenant Laelius, in concert with King Gulussa,
attacked and defeated with enormous loss (though it
is difficult to credit the figures of seventy thousand
slain and ten thousand prisoners) an army of native
allies. The food supply of the besieged city was
now almost cut off, but Ilasdrubal had still enough
296 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
to support his garrison. Tlie rest of the population
were left to starve.
With the beginning of 146 Scipio prepared for an
attack on the Upper City and the Harbour of the
War-ships, or Cothon, as it was called. The Harbour
was taken first, the resistance of the besieged being
feeble and desultory. From the Harbour Scipio made
his way into the neighbouring market-place. Even
he could not check his troops in the plunder of the
rich temple of Apollo. They are said to have stripped
from the statue and shrine as much as a thousand
talents of gold.
The next thing to be done was the attack on the
Upper City. Three streets led up to it from the
market-place, each of six-storied houses, from which
the garrison and many of the citizen population kept
up an incessant fight with the besiegers. House after
house was stormed, the defenders being gradually
forced back by superior strength and discipline.
Another conflict was going on meanwhile in the
streets, the Romans struggling up each of the three
roads till they gained the Upper City. When that
was accomplished, Scipio ordered the streets to be set
on fire. The scene of destruction which followed was
terrible. A number of non-combatants, old men,
women, and children, had hidden themselves in the
houses that were now blazing. Some threw themselves
on to the spears and swords of the soldiers ; some were
burnt in their hiding places ; some flung themselves
from the windows into the streets. Many were buried
or half-buried under the ruins, for the pioneers were
busy clearing a way for the troops, and did their
FIGHTING IN THE CITY. 297
work careless of the living creatures that came in
their way.
For six days and nights these horrors continued,
described, it must be remembered, by an eye-witness,
the historian Polybius ; for it is from him, there is
httle doubt, that Appian has borrowed his vivid
description of the scene. The troops worked and
fought in rehef parties. Scipio alone remained
unceasingly at his post. He never slept, and he
snatched a morsel of food as the chance came to
him. On the seventh day a train of suppliants came
from the temple of ^Esculapius, which stood con-
spicuous at the summit of the citadels. They begged
that the lives of such as still survived might be
spared. Scipio granted the request, but excepted
the deserters, and fifty thousand men and women
availed themselves of his grace. The deserters shut
themselves up in the temple — there were nine hundred
of them, all Romans — and with them Hasdrubal and
his wife and their two sons. The place was im-
pregnable, but their position was hopeless, for there
was no fighting against hunger.
Hasdrubal contrived to escape from his companions,
and threw himself, humbly begging for life, at the
feet of Scipio. The boon was granted, and the
Roman general showed his prisoner to the deserters,
who were crowded on the temple-roof They bitterly
reproached the coward who had deserted them, and
then set fire to the temple. When the flames were
burning fiercely, the wife of Hasdrubal came forward.
She had dressed herself with all tiie splcmlour that
she could command, and had licr two children 1)\' licr
298 THE STORY OF CARTHAGE.
side. Turning first to Scipio, she said, " On thee, man
of Rome, I call no vengeance from heaven. Thou
dost but use the rights of war. But as for this
Hasdrubal, this traitor to his country and his gods,
lo his wife and to his children, I pray that heaven,
and thou as the instrument of heaven, may punish
him." Then she turned to her husband. "Villain,
traitor, and coward," she cried, " I and my children
will find a tomb in the flames, but thou, the mighty
general of Carthage, wilt adorn a Roman triumph!"
She then slew her children, threw their bodies into
the flames, and followed them herself.
Thus, after seven centuries of greatness, Carthage
fell. The conqueror, as he looked on the awful
spectacle, burst into tears, and murmured to himself,
as he thought of the fate which had overtaken empire
after empire, and which would one day overtake his
own country, the lines of Homer, in which Hector
foretells the doom of Troy.
The soldiers were permitted to plunder the city,
but all the gold and silver and all the treasuries of
the temples were reserved. Military decorations were
liberally distributed, but none of the troops who had
assisted in the spoliation of the temple of Apollo were
thus distinguished. The Sicilian cities were informed
that they might regain possession of the works of
art which the Carthaginians had carried off during
a century and a half of warfare. Agrigcntum regained
her famous Bull of Phalaris ; Segesta her statue of
Diana. The name of Scipio Africanus was long
honoured by the Sicilians for this act of honesty.
Before a hundred years had passed they were to lose
SUCCESSORS OF CARTHAGE. 301
their treasures again, not by the fortune of war, but
by the shameless robberies of a Roman governor.^
The city was razed to the ground, and a curse
was pronounced on any one who should rebuild it.
Notwithstanding this, some twenty years later the
younger Gracchus carried a proposal for founding a
colony of six thousand citizens on the site. It was
never carried into execution. Neither was the simi-
lar plan which some eighty years afterwards was
conceived by Julius Caesar, Augustus, however,
founded a Roman Carthage, which soon became a
prosperous city. But with this my story has nothing
to do. This is finished with the fall of Rome's
great Phoenician rival.
' See the account of Verres in a classical dictionary, and in
" The Story of Rome," p. 202.
INDEX TO
THE TEXT
NOTES.
AND THE
Acerhas, 3, 6
Acra, 96
Adhcrbal, 157
AdruniL'tuin, 162
/Egusa, 163
.•Egates Islands, battle of, 163,
164
/Eschines, 122
/Esculapiiis, temple of, 297
y^thiopians, 97
Ailna, eruption of, 53
^tna (town), 55
Agaihocles, tyrant of Syracuse,
75 ; defeated at the llinicra,
76 ; besieged in Syracuse, 77 ;
escapes, if>. ; lands in Africa,
80 ; defeats the Carthaginians,
82 ; takes Utica, 85 ; returns to
Syracuse, /A. ; conies back to
Africa, 86 ; imprisoned by his
soldiers, 88 ; escapes, 89
Agrigentum, 22, 27 ; taken by
Himilco, 41, 67, 122 ; taken by
the Romans, 132, 133 ; 237,
298
Alalia, battle of, 14
Aleles, 1 17, 180
Alexander the (jrent, 89
Allobroges, 1 88
And)er, 122
Anagnia, 234
Anio, 234
Antiochus, 254, 266, 268
Appian, 128, 279, 281, 297
Arambys, 96
Archagathus, 85-8
Archimedes, 236
Aristotle, 102-108
Armenia, 269
Artaxata, 269
Ashtaroth, 113
Athenffius, 125
Avienus, 100
B
Balearic Islands, 35, 75
Baltic Sea, 122
Beneventum, battle of, 230
Boarding apparatus, 134
15omilcar, Suffete of Carthage, his
treachery, 82 ; attempts a revo-
lution and is put to death, 83
Britain, lOO, 122
Bruttu, 226, 253
Byrsa, 5, 293
Calala, battle of, 66
Camarina, taken by Himilco (i),
43, 158
Camby^es, king of Persia, plans
the concjuest of Carthage, iS
Campanian mercenaries, 37, 129
Cannai, battle of, 218-224
Capua, joins Hannibal, 225; be-
sieged by the Romans, 232 ;
surrenders, 235 ; its severe
punishment, //'.
Caravans, 118, i ig
Carbuncle, see Carllinginian stone
304 INDEX TO THE TEXT AND THE NOTES.
Caricon, 96
Carthaginian stone, 121
Carthalo, 13
Catana, 53
Catapults, newly invented, 49
Cato, the Elder, 273, 277, 286
Catulus (Lutatius), 163
Censorinus, 277-286
Cercina, 266
Cerne, 97, 98
Chretes, 97
Chronos, see Moloch
Cineas, 89, 90
Clastidium, 200
Claudius (Appius), 131, 132
Claudius (Appius), 2, 236
Claudius (Nero) in Spain, 241 ;
marches to join his colleague
Livius, 249 ; defeats Hasdrubal
at the Metaurus, 250-252
Claudius (Publius), 157, 158
Clubs at Carthage, 109
Clypea, 147, 152
Common meals, 106
Corinth, mother-city of Syracuse,
70
Corsica, 25, 122
Cothon, 296
Crete, 268, 269
Crimessus, battle of, 7^-74
Crispinus, 247
Crocodiles, 98
Cronium, Dionysius defeated at,
67
Crotona, 226, 253
Customs-duties, 116, 117
Cyprus, 4
Cyrene, 117
D
Dagon, 113, 1 14
Daphnaus, 38, 39
Deinocrates, 75
Demeter, worship of, at Carlha"e,
60
Dexippus, 37, 41
Dido, 3-8
Diodorus, 117
Dionysius (the Elder), attempts to
relieve Gcla, 43 ; makes peace
with Carthage, 44 ; declares
war against Carthage, 47 ; at-
tacks Motya, id. ; takes it by
storm, 50; defeated by Hiniilco
at Catana, 53 ; retreats to Syra
cuse, 55 ; makes successful at-
tack on Ilimilco, 57 ; allows
Himilco to escape, 59 ; declares
war with Carthage and defeats
Mago, 64 ; renews the war, 66 ;
is defeated at Cronium, 67 ; his
death, 68
Dionysius (the Younger), tyrant of
Syracuse, 70
Drepanum, battle of, 157, 158,
160, 163
Ducarius, 209
Duilius, 137
Ecnomus, battle of, 138-140
Egesta, 28, 29S
Elba, 122
Elephants, 1 21. See also accounts
of battles
Elissa, see Dido
Entellus, 68
Eryx, 36, 68, 159-165
Etruscans, 14, 81, 117
Eumenes, 269
Fabius, appointed dictator, 212 ;
his policy of delay, 212, 213;
outwitted by Hannibal, id. ;
his unpopularity, iO. ; recovers
Tareutum, 246 ; crowned at
Rome, 260 ; dies, ib.
Fair Promontory, 14, 15
Flaniinius, defeated and killed at
Trasumeimus, 207-21 1
Flaminius (ambassador to Prussia'),
270
I'regellse, 234
Fulvius, 234, 245
Gades, 186
Gala, 240
Gauls, 8x
INDEX TO THE TEXT AND THE NOTES. 305
Gela, taken by Himilco (i), 43;
besieged by Hamilcar, 76
Gelon, of Syracuse, defeats Hamil-
car (2), 26, 27
Gisco, 166-175
Gisco, father of Hannibal (i), 29
Gisco, father of Hasdrubal, 240
Gisco, 21S
Gorillas, 99
Gracchus, Tib. S., 230
Gracchus (the Younger), 301
Gulussa, 286, 2S9, 295
H
Halycus, river, 67, 74
Hamilcar (i), son of Mago, con-
quers Sardinia, 17
Hamilcar (2) invades Sicily, 22-27
Hamilcar (3) commands Cartha-
ginian army against Agatho-
cles, 75 ; is victorious at Himera,
76 ; besieges Syracuse, 77 j his
death, 82
Hamilcar (4), commander at
Ecnomus, 138
Hamilcar Barca (5), appointed to
command fleet and army, 160;
holds Hercta, il>. ; holds Eryx,
i/'. ; maintains war against
Romans, 161-164 ; makes fa-
vourable terms of peace, 165 ;
takes command against merce-
naries, 171 ; breaks blockade of
Carthage, 172; defeats merce-
naries, a. ; attacks camp at
Tunes, 176; finishes war with
mercenaries, 177 ; crosses into
Spain, 178 ; his conquests and
death, 179
Hannibal (i) invades Sicily,
28-34 ; invades it again, 35 ;
dies, 38
Hannibal (2), commander inSicily,
132. 133. 134. 137
Hannibal (3), lieutenant in mer-
cenary war, 176, 177
Hannii)al (4) swears hatred against
Rome, 181 ; his character, iSl ;
campaignagainst Spanish tribes,
1S2 ; besieges Sagunlum, id.;
takes it, 184; in winter quarters
at New Carthage, 1S5 ; crosses
the Ebro, 186 ; his dream, 3. ;
crosses the Pyrenees, ib. ;
crosses the Rhone, 187 ; crosses
the Alps, 1 89- 1 94 ; descends
into Italy, 194; his losses, ib. ;
attacks the Taurini, 195 ; con-
quers the Romans at the
Ticinus, 196-199 ; at the
Trebia, 201-205 ; winters in
Liguria, 206 ; in peril of his
life, ib. ; crosses the marshes
of the Arno, ib. ; loses an
eye, 207; defeats the Romans
at Trasumennus, 207-209 ;
repulsed at Spoletium, 210;
rests at Hadria, 211 ; his
policy, ib. ; his campaign with
Fabius, 212-216 ; wintering
at Geronium, 217 ; defeats
Romans at Cannae, 222 ; refuses
to march on Rome, 223 ; gains
Capua, 225 ; sends Mago to
Carthage, 227 ; neglected by
the home government, 228 ;
winters in Capua, ib. ; besieges
Nola, ib. ; attempts to seize
Tarentum, 229 ; gains Taren-
tum, 231 ; attempts to relieve
Capua, 232 ; marches on Rome,
233 ; retires, 235 ; defeats Ful-
vius at Ilerdonia, 245 ; hears
of Hasdrubal's death, 252 ; his
masterly generalship in South
Italy, 253 ; recalled home, 259;
defeated at Zama, 262 ; advises
peace, 263 ; in power at Car-
tilage, 265 ; his reforms, ib. ;
Hies, 266; at the court of An-
tiochus, 267 ; his answer to
Antiochus, 268 ; possibly at
Crete, 269 ; with I'rusias of
Bithynia, 269, 270 ; his death
and character, 270, 271
Hanno (i), SulTete of Carthage,
killed in battle, 82
Ilaiino (2), the navigator, 95-100
Hanno (3), 131
Hanno (4), 132, 133, 139, 140
H»-\no (5), 163, 164
21
306 INDEX TO THE TEXT AND THE NOTES.
Haimo, the Great (6), 1 71-177
Haiino, leader of peace parly at
Carthage (7), 183, 227
Han no (8), 187
Hanno (9), defeated at Beueven-
tuni, 230
Hanno (10), commands in Sicily,
237
Hanno (il), commands in Spam,
238
Hasdrubal (i), sonof Mago, 16, 17
Ilasdiubal (2), (son-in-law of
llamilcar Barca), his campaigns
in Spain, 179, 180; assassi-
nated, 180
Hasdrubal, lieutenant of Hanni-
bal (3), 219
Hasdrubal, brother of Hannibal
(4), left in command in Spain,
186 ; his campaigns with the
Scipios, 23S-241 ; eludes Nero,
241 ; defeated by Scipio Africa-
nus, 243 ; crosses into Italy,
248 ; defeated and slain at the
Metaurus, 250
Hasdrubal, son of Cisco {5), 240-
289
Hasdrubal (6), commands in the
last siege of Carthage, 280-300
Hebrew names, 1 1
Hebrews, their relations to Tyre,
10, II
Helisyki, Volscians (?), 25
Hercta, 160
Hercules, 3, 4. See Melcarth
Hercules, Pillars of, 96, 118
Herodotus, 113, 118
Ilicra, 163, 164
Hiero, 130-132, 176, 229
Ilieronymus, 229, 236
Himera, first battle of, 26, 27 ;
second battle of, 32 ; destroyed
by Hannibal (i), 33; third
battle of, 76
Himilco (i) invades Sicily, 35-45 ;
operates against Dionysius, 48-
49 ; returns to Carthage, 49 ;
again appointed to command,
51 ; takes Massana, marches on
Syracuse, besieges the city, re-
duced to extremities. 52-58 ;
escapes to Carthage, 59 ; com-
mits suicide, 60
Himilco (2), discoverer, lOO, Id
Himilco {3), 154
Himilco (4), 236
Hippo, 168, 286
Hippopotamus, 98
Horn, Southern, 99
Horn, Western, 99
Horace, 149, 250
Human sacrifices, 28, 33, 38, 86.
no
larbas, 6
Iberians. See Spanish troops
Iberus (Ebro), 180
lUiturgis, 239
Intibilis, 239
Iron, 122
Isere, 188
Italian mercenaries, 25, 29, 35,
37> 55> 65. See also Cam-
panian mercenaries
Ivory, 122
Junius, 158
K
Kings of Carthage, 102, 103
Lcelius, 258, 262
La;lius (the Younger), 29S
Laivinus, 237
Leather money, 122, I23
Leontini, 44
Leptines (brother of Dionysius),
53> 54i 57 ; killed at the battle
of Cronium, 67
Leptis, 115
Liby- Phoenicians, 96
Ligyes (Ligurians), 25, 206
Lilybseum, fort of, besieged by
Dionysius, 68, 72 ; attacked by
Pyrrhus, 91 ; besieged by
Romans, 154-165
Lilybaeum, promontory, 72
Li para, 122, 134
INDEX TO THE TEXT AND THE NOTES.
307
Liris, river, 234
Livius (colleague of Nero), 248,
249
Livius (in command atTarentum),
230, 231, 246
Livy (historian), 128, l8l, 184,
193, 222, 234, 238, 253, 259,
264, 276
Lixitse, 97, 98
Lixus, river, 97
M
Macar, river, 171
Macedonia, 272
Magnesia, battle of, 268
Mago (l), king of Carthage, 13
Mago (2), Admiral, 53
Mago (3), Carthaginian general,
attacks Dionysius, 64 ; defeated
by, id. ; invades Sicily, 65 ; is
killed at Cabala, 66
Mago (4), writer on agriculture,
124
Mago (5), brother of Hannibal,
201 ; sent to Carthage with
news of Cannce, 227 ; in Spain,
240-244 ; goes to Liguria, ib. ;
takes IVIinorca, 254; recalled
home, 259 ; dies, id.
Maharbal, 210, 223
Malchus, 12, 13
Malgcrnus, 3
Malta, 17
Mamertines, 130, 131
Mancinus, 286, 289
Manilius, 282, 286
Manlius, 138, 142
Marcellus, appointed to command
army after Cannre, 227 ; re-
lieves Nola, 228 ; besieges
Syracuse, 236 ; takes it, 237 ;
campaigns with Hannibal, 245-
247 ; his death, 248
Marcius, 241
Massilia, 122
Masinissa defeats Syphax, 240 ;
goes with Hasdrubal to Spain,
id. ; with Scipio in Africa, 257 ;
destroys the camp of Syphax,
«57, 258 ; at variance with
Carthage, 266 : encroaches on
Carthaginian dominions, 274 ;
defeated by Hasdrubal, 275 ;
is victorious, id. ; triumphant
over Carthage, 277 ; dies, 286
Matho, 167-179
Megara, the, 293
Melcarth, 110-113, 186
Melita, 96
Menander, 120
Menes, 19
Messana, 44, 130-132
Metaurus, battle of, 249-252
Mines, 117
Minucius, 215, 216
Moloch, 38, 108, 109
Motya, besieged by Dionysius,
47~5'» recovered by Himilco,
51
Mutines, 237
Mylce, battle of, 137
N
Naravasus, 176
Native Carthaginian troops, 66,
72, 74, 75, 82, 85, 146, 262
Naxos (Sicily), 21
Nemausus (Nismes), 186
New Carthage, 180 ; captured by
Scipio, 242
Nola, 228, 260
Olympias, 89
O
Pachynus, 158
Panormus (Palermo), 25, 67, 153,
160
Paul! us (/Emilius) appointed Con-
sul, 217 ; slain at Cannai, 222
Pcloruni, 52
Pentarciiies, 105
Pergamus, 269
Periplus of Hanno, 95-100
Persephone, worship of, at Car-
thage, 60
Pestilence, 38, 44, 56, 67, 236
Phalaris, 298
Phamajas (Himilco), 286
Phidias, 120
308 INDEX TO THE TEXT AND THE NOTES.
Philip, king of Maccdon, 229,
Phoenicians, 10, 11, 18
Phocasans, see Alalia
Pillars of Hercules, 96, 118
Placentia, 199, 202
Plutarch, 109, 218
Politics, the. See Aristotle
Polybius, 128, 146, 153, 222, 258,
262, 279, 281, 297
Prusias, 269
Pyrrhus, 89-91
R
Regulus, commands fleet at Ec-
nomus, 138 ; lands in Africa,
140 ; vanquishes Hasdrubal,
143 ; occupies Tunes, 144; de-
mands impossible terms of
peace, ib. ; conquered by
Xantippus and taken prisoner,
147 ; sent as envoy to Rome,
148 ; his counsel, 149 seq. ; his
death, 151
Rhodes, fleet of, 268
Rhone, passage of, 187, 188
Rome, early treaties with, 14-16
Saguntum, 180 ; besieged by Han-
nil)al, 182 ; taken, 184
Sahara, 121
Samnites, 226
Sardinia, invaded by Malchus,
13 ; belongs to Carthage, 17 ;
supplies provisions to Carthage,
63, 65 ; lost by Carthage, 177
Saturn, see Moloch
Scipio, CnKus, sent into Spain,
189; defeats Hasdrubal, 238;
defeats the fleet, il). ; joined
by Publius, ib. (see Scipio
Publius) ; his death, 241
Scipio (Publius), sent tothemoutli
of the Rhone, 186 ; misses Han-
nibal, 189 ; returns to Italy,
ib. ; marches against IIannil)aI,
195 ; defeated and wounded at
the Ticinus, 199 ; moves to the
Trebia, ib. ; returns to Spain,
258 ; his campaigns in that
country, 239-240; his death, 240
Scipio, Africanus Major, saves
his father's life at the Ticinus,
199 ; appointed to the com-
mand in Spain, 242 ; takes Car-
thage, ib. ; defeats Hasdrubal
(Barca), 243 ; comes into Africa,
ib. ; returns to Spain and com-
pletes conquest, 244 ; comes
again to Africa, 254 ; besieges
Utica, 257 ; burns the camp of
S'yphax, 258 ; vanquishes Sy-
phax and Hasdrubal, 259 ; de-
feats Hannibal at Zama, 261,
262 ; makes peace with Car-
thage, 263
Scipio, Africanus Minor, his de-
scent, 275 ; ar1)itrates between
Massinissa and Carthage, 276 ;
distinguishes himself in the
siege, 2S6 ; administers the
effects of Masinissa, ib. ; ap-
pointed to the command at
Carthage, 289 ; rescues Man-
cinus, 290 ; restores order to
the camp, ib. ; storms the Me-
gara, 293 ; institutes a blockade,
294 ; attacks the Upper City
and captures it, 297 ; his re-
flections, 298; his disposal ol
the spoil, ib.
Scipio, Nasica, 273
Seleucus, 267
Selinus, 26, 27 ; at war with
Egcsta, 28 ; taken by Han-
nibal (I), 48, 67, 68
Sempronius, 200 ; defeated at
Trebia, 201-205
Senate of Cartliage, 104, 105
Scrvilius, 211, 213
Ships built by Rome, 134, 162
Sliophetim, 103
Sikel tribes, 44, 47, 59, 65
Smuggling, 117
Soloeis, 96
Sophonisba, 244
Spanish troops of Carlhngc, 25,
29, 33, 35- 59. '85, 1 86, 202,
205, 219
Spendius, 167- i7Q
INDEX TO THE TEXT AND THE NOTES. 309
Spoletium, 210
Suffetes, 103
Syphax, 239, 243, 257-259
Syracuse, ruled by Gelon, 26; by
Dionysius, 42 ^/ sty. ; besieged
by Himilco, 53-58
Syrtis, 115
Tanit, 113, 114
Tarentum, 229, 230, 246
Taurini, 195
Tauromenium, 64
Terence, 120
Thebes, 119
Thermopylae, 267
Theron, 26, 38
ThymiateriuM, 96
Ticinus, battle of, 196
TiCata, Mount, 233
Timoleon, sails to Syracuse, 71 ;
declares war against Carthage,
ii>. ; defeats Carthaginians at
the Crimessus, 72-74 ; his death,
75
Trasumenniis, battle of, 207-211
Tribute, 115, 116
Triton, 113
Troglodytre, 97
Tunes (Tunis), 12, 60, 144, 168,
172, 176
Tusculum, 234
Tyre, 3, 10, II, 266
U
Utica, 5, 12, 168, 176, 257, 277,
290
V
Varro, 217, 221, 222, 226
Venus. See Ashtaroth
Venusia, 247
Virgil, his legend of Dido, 7-9,
121
X
Xantippus, 145, 146
Z
Zama, battle of, 260-263
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