129674
THE CASE OF MEXICO
VICTORIANO HUERTA
THE CASE OF MEXICO
AND
THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT WILSON
BY
RAFAEL DE ZAYAS ENRIQUEZ
Author of "The Rise and FaH of President Diat"
Translated from the Spanish
By ANDRE TR1DON
NEW YORK
ALBERT AND CHARLES BONI
% FIFTH AVENUE
1914
CONTENTS
PREFACE 9
CHAPTER 1 18
A LETTER TO FRANCISCO I. MADERO, PRESIDENT OP
THE UNITED STATES OP MEXICO MY ESTIMATE OP
HIS POSITION IN DECEMBER, 1911.
CHAPTER II 85
MADERO THE IRRESPONSIBLE A STRIKING CONTRAST
BETWEEN MADERO AND POHFIEIO DIAZ MADERO'S
ADMINISTRATION THE MANIFESTO OP GENERAL
FEUS DIAZ.
CHAPTER III 60
THE BLOODY TEN DAYS THE CONSPIRACY THE
REVOLUTION GENERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA.
CHAPTER IV 74
CONTINUATION OP THE BLOODY TEN DAYS THE
OPTIMISTIC AND IRRESPONSIBLE MADERO THE DIPLO-
MATIC CORPS THE MISSION OF THE SENATE GEN-
ERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA THE DILEMMA IN
WHICH HE POUND HIMSELF THE DECISION TAKEN
BY GENERAL HUERTA AND THE ARMY THE PALL OP
MADERO*
CHAPTER V 104
THE PACT OF THE CITADEL THE RESIGNATION OP
PRESIDENT MADERO AND VICE-PRESIDENT PINO
SUAREZ THE ORIGIN OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERN-
MENT THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT BECOMES A
GOVERNMENT DE JURE ACCORDING TO THE MEXICAN
CONTENTS Continued
CHAPTER VI 119
GUSTAVO MADEEO AND BASO ARE SENTENCED TO BE
SHOT THE DEATH OF EX-PRESIDENT MADEEO AND
EX-VICE-PRESIDENT PINO SUAREZ.
CHAPTER VII 185
"THE CASE OP MEXICO" PRESIDENT WOODROW WIL-
SON THE AMERICAN POINT OF VIEW.
CHAPTER VIII 146
THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT HUERTA THE "COUP
D'ETAT."
CHAPTER IX 166
"THE MEXICAN PROBLEM" PRESIDENT WILSON'S
ATTITUDE CONSIDERED FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF
REASON AND JUSTICE.
CHAPTER X 184
THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MEXICAN REVOLUTION
THE ATTITUDE OF PRESIDENT HUERTA AND ITS
MEANING ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE.
CHAPTER XI 197
THE WILSON POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE ENTBttE
WORLD HUERTA THE MAN OF THE SITUATION
TIME A SOLUTION SHOULD BE FOUND THE SOLUTION
MEXICO'S VITALITY.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
VICTOR! ANO HUERTA Frontispiece
FRANCISCO I. MADERO Facing page 84
GENERAL BERNARDO REYES " 60
FELIXDIAZ " " 80
GENERAL AURELIANO BLANQUET 100
GENERAL M. MONDRAGON " " 126
i
GENERAL GREGORIO RUEZ " " 188
GENERAL PASCUAL OROZCO " " 152
PREFACE
In writing this book I have not been
prompted by patriotic motives, however
justifiable and reasonable such motives
might appear, nor have I yielded to any
partisan bias. My primary, perhaps my
sole object, has been to acquaint the world
with the real causes of the convulsion
which is now shaking Mexico, my native
country, its intensity and its significance,
and with the actual principles which are
at stake in this hour of agony; I also wish
to show what a distorted conception the
President of the United States has
formed of the Mexican situation and what
harmful consequences his attitude in the
matter may have, not only for Mexico
but for the United States as well.
Unless I possess definite evidence to
the contrary, I always assume that all in-
dividuals are acting in good faith. I be-
lieve, therefore, that President Wilson
has been and is moved by perfectly honest
motives; he has started, however, from
erroneous premises and he has failed to
foresee the consequences of the system he
has endeavored to apply; he has failed to
fathom the abyss towards which he is lead-
ing two neighboring countries which have
nothing to gain from an international
conflict.
A war between the two nations would
be an utter disgrace, and its baneful
effects, which would be felt all over the
American continent, would alienate the
sympathy of all the nations south of the
Rio Grande from the United States.
A Mexican by birth, I have devoted my
life to the study of my countrymen, my
country and its history, and I consider
myself fully conversant with everything
that concerns Mexico. I have also spent
several years of my life on American soil,
studying this country carefully and with-
out any preconceived opinions, and I be-
lieve I have a clear understanding of this
nation which has always exerted a singu-
lar fascination over me.
This book, therefore, is neither an im-
passioned eulogy on Mexico, nor an at-
tempt at justifying the acts of the pro-
visional government presided over by
General Huerta, nor a fanatical attack
on President Wilson or on the people
whose destinies he is directing at the
present time.
Such an attitude on my part would be
both undignified and unprofitable, for it
would only irritate the minds of my read-
ers, instead of pacifying them, and would
cast doubts on my construction of the
facts, instead of "carrying conviction.
I have attempted to be an impartial
observer and to analyze all facts with
equanimity; I have no wish to deceive
anyone, not even myself; I do not, how-
ever, pretend to be infallible.
It is fitting that the world should know
all the facts connected with the present
situation in Mexico. I have written this
book that the world may be cognizant of
the whole truth before passing judgment
upon Mexico.
RAFAEL DE ZAYAS ENHIQUEZ.
New York, January 1, 1914.
CHAPTER I
A LETTEB TO FBANCISCO I. MADEBO, PBESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF MEXICO
MY ESTIMATE OF HIS POSITION IN
DECEMBER, 1911.
I never was a conspirator or a revolu-
tionist, nor did I ever swear unconditional
allegiance to any government. I was a
partisan of General Porfirio Diaz from
the day when he first presented his candi-
dacy to the presidency of the Republic;
I upheld his policy when he assumed the
control of the government, and supported
him until the year 1906, when I separated
myself from him, expressing frankly and
openly the reasons for my changed atti-
tude.
I disagreed with his methods. I tried
to make Mm see that he was heading the
country unavoidably towards a revolu-
tion. I vainly pointed out to him the one
way to prevent that catastrophe and then
I resigned my seat in the legislature and
18
14 THE CASE OF MEXICO
came to this country, a voluntary exile,
and lived in New York until 1910.
In 1911, having been invited to take a
position under the new government, I
considered it my duty before asking for
any post or accepting any appointment to
write to President Madero the following
letter which constitutes the logical intro-
duction to my book.
New York, December 29, 1911.
To FRANCISCO I. MADEK-O, ESQ.,
President of the United States of Mexico.
My Dear Friend : Our country is in danger.
This is so obvious that even the most optimistic
mind must recognize the fact.
When our country is in danger all of us who
call ourselves patriots have a right to speak our
minds and to point out the ways and means
which, according to our experience, are the best
to forestall that danger, and to concentrate our
energies and our good will in an effort to save
her. This conviction and my sense of duty
prompt me to address these lines to you.
I did not approve of ^ the revolution you
headed; I accept it, however, not only as ac-
complished facts have to be accepted, but be-
cause it was the direct outcome of the state of
affairs established and maintained for many
THE CASE OF MEXICO 15
years by General Porfirio Diaz. As I have
proved it elsewhere,* Diaz was the prime factor
of that revolution; he prepared it, made it in-
evitable, caused it actually to break out. Upon
him then must rest all the responsibility for
everything that has happened, everything that
is happening, and not a few of! the things
which the future holds in store.
But this does not relieve of all responsibility
the men who took part in the revolution, the
nation in general, and you in particular, since
you find yourself to-day at the head of the gov-
ernment, to which position you were elected by
a majority of the people to preside over their
destinies.
In electing you they did not me&n to reward
you for your successful leadership of the revo-
lution, but only to voice their confidence in your
future actions and express the hope that you
would regenerate the country, do away with
all that was wrong, promote everything that
would contribute to her final welfare and estab-
lish democracy on a firm basis.
When President Diaz fell from power he left
the country in a precarious predicament.
Things went from bad to worse under the ad-
ministration of De la Barra. Since you have
come into power the situation has become
desperate.
* "Rise and Fall of Porfirio Diaa."
16 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Let us not mention General Diaz. His ac-
tions have been judged and condemned.
As far as the provisional president De la
Barra is concerned, I notice that many people
have absolved him from all blame, have almost
made a god of him, and are presenting him as
an exemplary character, and his administration
as a model for every patriot to admire. Those
who see things more clearly and are less bent
on flattering him concede that many wrongs
were committed during his short term, but they
excuse him on the plea that he was a mere
figure head, carrying out your instructions,
and that, to a certain extent, he succeeded in
averting some of the pernicious consequences
they would have had.
Others see a contradiction in his attitude,
and say that if he was a mere puppet in your
hands and lent himself to such a combination,
he could not be called a strong character or
even a political personality. The man who,
being placed at the head of a nation, obeys
anyone's commands when he knows such com-
mands to be harmful, or even allows anyone to
carry out in his name plans he considers harm-
ful, is neither a statesman, nor a diplomat, nor
a ruler worthy of his nation's respect.
Some people say that his attitude was dic-
tated by a desire to preserve internal peace
and enable the nation to hold orderly elections.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 17
Others assert that he failed to maintain peace
or to assure orderly elections, for his term of
administration was marked by many uprisings
and acts of brigandage which remained un-
punished; the elections, they say, were abso-
lutely one-sided, for rival candidates were not
allowed to attend to their campaign work and
were deprived of the most elementary guaran-
tees. Whether or not these were your doings,
the hand was that of President de la Barra, and
he shall answer for it before the tribunal of
history.
I neither condemn nor absolve Mr. de la
Barra, for I have not the complete knowledge
of all the details of his administration, of his
understanding with General Diaz, who desig-
nated him as his successor, and with you who
accepted him as your champion.
De la Barra's only redeeming grace was the
self-abnegation with which he accepted an un-
usual position which was almost impossible to
hold, and succeeded in maintaining that posi-
tion at the head of the government until such
time when he could turn the control of it over
to his legitimate successor. I render homage
to the honesty of his private and public life,
to his patience, his perseverance, and to the
intelligence he displayed in leaving the country
as soon as he had relinquished the presidency.
18 THE CASE OP MEXICO
I will now review the charges which have
been brought against you.
You are first charged with disturbing the
peace and starting a revolution. I have shown
in my book, "The Rise and Fall of President
Diaz,"* that there never lived a man great
enough to start a revolution. The revolution
was prepared by the government itself; but
you were its spirit incarnate; you gave it life
and blood. President Diaz prepared the revo-
lution for you and forced upon you the role of
an apostle, of a martyr, and of a leader.
We must never forget that it is overweening
ambition, mismanagement, and acts of tyranny
on the part of governments which give rise to
revolutions and call its leaders into being.
The first charge, then, is unfounded, for you
were not responsible for the revolution; but
you are responsible for its consequences, first,
as rebel leader; second, as president.
The second charge brought against you is
that you entered into an agreement with the
government immediately after the fall of
Ciudad Juarez, instead of continuing the fight
until the tyrant was overthrown. To me this
proved only two things: Porfirio Diaz's in-
telligence, for his attitude on that occasion
crowned him with a halo, more apparent than
real, of patriotism, and saved his pride, since
* Published serially in the "Kevista de Merida."
THE CASE OF MEXICO 19
he assumed the part of a ruler who abdicates
rather than that of a tyrant overthrown by
force. It also was an evidence of sound judg-
ment on your part, since the aim of the revolu-
tion was to eliminate Porfirio Diaz and his
Camarilla ; both being willing to step out, there
was no justification for inflicting further losses
on the country by sacrificing more human lives
and spending more money.
Your accusers also say that you should have
retired into private life as soon as the triumphs
of the revolution, giving to the people unre-
stricted freedom in the choice of their repre-
sentatives, had been assured. Such a rare and
noble discretion would have marked you as a
modest and disinterested man ; it remains to be
seen, however, whether it was opportune for
you to assume that attitude, whether your as-
sociates in the revolution would have allowed
you to assume it, and finally what might have
come to pass if all the armed bands which had
supported you had been left to shift for them-
selves without being held together by the per-
sonality of a leader recognized as the only and
necessary one. To me this charge is futile and
does not deserve to be even considered.
You are also charged with assuming im-
mediate control of the government, conducting
yourself as the actual ruler of the nation, using
De la Barra as a patient dummy, and exerting
20 THE CASE OF MEXICO
axi autocratic power the more objectionable as
it only aimed at promoting your own interests,
and at insuring your election and the election
of your proteges to the highest federal and
state offices.
You are also accused of having delivered
speeches of a subversive nature; of having
closed your eyes to the murderous deeds per-
petrated in Puebla and other cities ; of having
been too lenient to Zapata and other rebel
chieftains whose troups have become mere rob-
ber gangs. Some of your critics commenting
on this last charge explain that you had to re-
sort to this expedient to make your election
sure, to hold in check De la Barra, whom you
had begun to suspect, and to protect yourself
against a possible hostile move of the federal
army upon whose loyalty you felt you could
not depend.
You are accused of having forced upon sev-
eral of the States, for the purpose of insuring
your victory at the polls, officials who were not
popular with the people, and some of whom
were greatly disliked; this caused much dis-
satisfaction and endangered the public peace.
Among those unwelcome officials I shall men-
tion in particular Pino Suarez, whom you first
had elected Governor of the State of Yucatan
and whom later you imposed on the Republic
as vice-president; thus you repeated the faults
THE CASE OP MEXICO 21
Diaz had committed, you caused divisions
among the people, provoked the formation of
new local and national factions, and furnished
fuel to the opposition, all of which was the more
unpardonable as it was unneccessary to insure
your election. The support given you by your
creatures added neither strength nor prestige
to your cause.
Those were the principal charges made
against you as presidential candidate. I now
come to those made against you as president.
Your accusers say that after your election
to the presidency you drove the nation to ex-
asperation instead of quieting it; instead of
reuniting your divided fellow citizens you made
their differences more marked; instead of ex-
terminating the brigand bands you allowed
them to gain strength; instead of winning to
your cause the discontented, you spurred them
to more hostility and drove them into rebellion ;
instead of pacifying the country and of rally-
ing around you all the scattered energies, you
kept the country in a state of disorder and
finally became a storm centre; your attitude
has so complicated the affairs of the country
that a foreign intervention has become im-
minent.
I am not justified in passing judgment upon
those charges, for I hare lived too far from the
scene of your activities ; besides, while they are
22 THE CASE OP MEXICO
presented in a rather matter of fact manner,
they are all very complex. Furthermore, those
who formulated them were at too close range
to have a clear vision, and may have been im-
pelled by animus or personal interest. I do not
dare to form a definite opinion of this case until
more light has been thrown upon it.
What the majority of people contend, how-
ever, is that there is no justification for the
present situation, for they feel that the op-
portunity was yours to establish on a firm basis
a government which would have been respected
by natives and foreigners alike. They say, in-
deed, that you could have united the country
instead of dividing it, by calling into the ranks
of your administration men of a conciliatory
turn of mind who would have offered serious
guarantees to all parties, thus nipping in the
bud all germs of discord. To accomplish this
you only had to avoid making General Reyes
your bitter enemy and the leader of the dis-
contented, and to avail yourself of the coopera-
tion of Mr. de la Barra.
When you and Reyes concluded an agree-
ment according to which both of you would run
as presidential candidates, each preparing his
own election in perfect freedom, the one who
would be defeated pledging himself to support
the administration of his fortunate rival, you
made an auspicious beginning. Unfortunately
THE CASE OF MEXICO 28
that pact was not respected. Your followers,
animated by a pernicious fanaticism (fanatic-
ism is always pernicious), directed ferocious
attacks against General Reyes, they threatened
and persecuted him and made attempts against
his life; they treated his partisans as though
they were outlaws, and made you two political
adversaries and personal enemies. Reyes had
to resign his commission in the army and to
leave the country in order to protect his free-
dom and his life.
Mr. de la Barra was also subjected to all
sorts of attacks at the hands of the Maderists
who tried to ruin his prestige and to com-
promise him. They aroused your suspicions
against him, and when his candidcay to the vice-
presidency was announced, the fight directed
against him in order to assure the triumph of
Pino Suarez was so bitter that Mr. de la Barra
decided to leave the capital the very day when
he turned the power over to you, to exile himself
under the pretext of accepting an official ap-
pointment, and to live abroad undisturbed.
If you had respected your pact with Reyes, I
am sure you would have lost nothing and you
would have gained a great deal. You would
have stood high in the nation's esteem; your
popularity would not have suffered in the least
from such an act of generosity ; nor would your
success at the polls have been in any way less
24 THE CASE OF MEXICO
assured; on the contrary, your triumph would
have been more complete and more brilliant, for
everyone would have been obliged to admit that
your electoral campaign had been open and
above suspicion, that you had respected le-
gality, and that you had established the reign
of democracy immediately after overthrowing
tyranny.
You would not only have triumphed but car-
ried away all the honors of a victory honestly
won. Reyes and the Reyists would have had no
cause for complaining of you or for attacking
you. Reyes would have been compelled to abide
by your agreement; and, for personal reasons,
would have been as faithful an ally of the new
president as he had been of Porfirio Diaz. No
one would have objected to your calling him to
your side as your minister of war, and every-
body would have appreciated the magnanimity
of such an act. This would have greatly in-
creased your prestige. Reyes defeated by you
at the polls and then exalted by your adminis-
tration would have brought to you the support
of the military element and of a well organized
party.
De la Barra as vice-president would have
proved a pacifying, conciliatory factor, a guar-
antee to the representatives of conservatism.
It would have established a diplomatic bond
THE CASE OF MEXICO 25
with the foreign powers, with the United States
in particular.
By calling General Reyes to your side you
would have shown magnanimity; by keeping
Mr. de la Barra in Mexico you would have
shown gratitude; in both cases you would have
shown yourself a clever statesman. Those two
men standing at your side as your main col-
laborators would have symbolized PEACE and
HAJRMONY.
Both would have undoubtedly endeavored to
succeed you in the presidential chair at the ex-
piration of your term and, consequently, two
powerful parties would have cropped up under
their leadership; the Maderist party would
have continued, however, to support you as
long as you remained in power. All this would
have meant in the end more stability and a
smoother course for your administration. The
two men would have paid particular attention
to the discharge of their duties and promoted
peace and prosperity for the sake of gaining
greater popularity.
As both of them would have been under your
orders their following would have been unques-
tionably, and without their being aware of it, in
your control; and you would have been, in the
last analysis, the only true leader.
If either of them had shown himself restive
or disloyal it could not have constituted a great
26 THE CASE OF MEXICO
danger for your administration; having him
practically under your thumb you could have
crushed him easily and held him up to the pub-
lic scorn.
You failed to see that, and you let the won-
derful opportunity pass by; instead of the
boon which we expected, we are facing the cal-
amity we feared. The present situation, how-
ever optimistic one may be, can only appear as
chaotic, desperate, and, perhaps, a hopeless
one.
I would sum it up as follows: We have in
Mexico a government which has failed thus far
to establish itself firmly, shaken as it is by the
machinations of anarchistic factions which can-
not be held in check for lack of the proper ma-
chinery. I may add that the foreign nations
regard us with diffidence if not with disgust ; an
intervention is becoming more and more the
logical possibility, and will soon become a fact if
we do not apply the proper remedy in time.
The time to apply that remedy is now.
Some say that the press unrestrained by any
censorship, is to a great extent responsible for
this deplorable state of affairs, and that the
government has only one choice : either to sup-
press the liberty of the press, which would be
suicidal, or to tolerate its present attitude, the
consequences of which will be fatal to the gov-
ernment. The truth is that the government
THE CASE OF MEXICO 27
has never faced such, an alternative. The sup-
pression of the liberty of the press did not pre-
vent the fall of President Diaz. A government
does not succumb to the attacks of the press
unless those attacks are justified by the govern-
ment's deeds. When attacks by the press are
unfounded they are of no consequence and even
defeat their own purpose. Slander may prove
effective, but only for a short time, and when
the first effect has worn off, truth shines
brighter than ever.
Is there a way out of this difficulty? There
must be one. Every political and social prob-
lem has its solution. Our first duty, however,
is to determine where the remedy can be best
applied. Many a ruler trying to solve the
problem has considered that problem not from
the nation's point of view but from his own, and
has endeavored to solve it in a manner favor-
able not to the welfare of the public but to his
own private interests. The nation's and the
ruler's interest are not always identical, but in
the present case I consider that they could
have been easily reconciled.
To imagine for a minute that the problem
could be solved by starting a new revolution, or
as some call it wrongly a counter-revolution,
would be the height of absurdity. A new revo-
lution would only complicate the difficulties and
28 THE CASE OP MEXICO
bring about a consummation to be most feared :
foreign intervention.
What then is to be done? Let us consult our
reason, our common sense: If whatever has
been done to this day has proved disastrous, let
us follow the opposite course and we may ex-
pect gratifying results.
Any attempt to establish an autocracy at
this stage of the game, regardless of whatever
name it might bear, would be a mistake. The
idea of a family oligarchy would be absurd. To
allow the rabble to assume the power would be
a crime. To suppose that one mere magic for-
mula can make democracy emerge triumphantly
from this chaos would be to reveal a deplorable
ignorance of the philosophy of history. De-
mocracy is not a beginning but an end. In no
country in the world has democracy, at the
present day, more than a wished for possibility.
Nowhere has it become a fact. Democracy will
be and is beginning to be the result of a slow
evolution, not of violent revolution.
At this historical stage of our development,
the most crucial that our country has reached,
our first duty is to bring order out of this chaos.
This is not the time to better a few details, but
to create a whole system anew. The only sys-
tem that can save us is that which was intro-
duced by the constitution of 1857. The only
political motive likely to bring about the de-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 29
sired results is pure patriotism. The secret
of our salvation is contained in two words:
Constitution and patriotism.
The first step should be the establishment of
peace. Order and morality will be the funda-
mental principles which will lead to an era of
confidence and prosperity. Finally the grad-
ual application of democratic principles will en-
able us to perfect our great work.
Under the exceptional circumstances obtain-
ing at the present day, can the efforts of one
single man, however gifted he may be, bring
forth the longed for results? I answer emphati-
cally: no.
Can those results be brought forth by the
efforts of only one of the parties into which our
nation finds itself divided? I answer again: no.
How then can those results be attained? By
reuniting all the sane elements which are to-
day being separated by a wider and wider
chasm. I call sane elements all those which are
not tainted with brigandage or crime.
What is imperative at the present day is not
to attempt a conciliation of the various parties,
but, frankly speaking, to conclude a transaction
with them; efforts made in common and re-
sponsibilities incurred in common will gradually
instill in the minds a powerful spirit of solid-
arity.
You must bear in mind that to make con-
80 THE CASE OF MEXICO
cessions does not necessarily mean to yield,
and that to yield does not necessarily mean to
be defeated.
You must also bear in mind that political
skill precludes a stubborn disposition and pre-
supposes the capacity to adapt oneself to cir-
cumstances. When circumstances are too
mighty to be overcome we must submit to them,
but only as a good pilot submits to the irresist-
ible force of a current, though taking good
care, until she reaches less dangerous waters
where she can be easily steered, that the ship
does not lose her rudder, nor become grounded
on sand banks, or wrecked against rocks.
No one can deny that you are in all legality
the constitutional president of the United
States of Mexico, for no one can deny that elec-
tions were held, that the people cast their votes,
and that you were elected by an overwhelming
majority; the fact that either fear or caution
or other motives kept other candidates from
running against you is not sufficient to in-
validate your election. It is an obvious, con-
crete, and incontrovertible fact that you are the
constitutional president de facto and de jure,
and that you shall be recognized as such in
Mexico and abroad. Your government as far
as its legal basis is concerned is above criticism ;
so much more so as according to modern legal
THE CASE OF MEXICO 81
conceptions the only lawful governments are
governments de facto.
The legality with which you are invested,
however, the book you published on presidential
problems and to which you owe your first fame,
the San Luis manifesto which you issued when
you assumed the leadership of the revolution,
the proclamations and speeches you delivered
when you were a candidate for the presidency,
the solemn oath you took when you came into
office, to respect and to make people respect the
Mexican constitution with its by-laws and
amendments, with the laws of reform and their
corollaries, to discharge faithfully the duties of
the office of president with which the nation
had entrusted you for the welfare and pros-
perity of the union; all these burden you with
a great, with an enormous responsibility in
your own eyes and the eyes of the whole nation.
Can you afford, in view of such historical
antecedents, after making such solemn promises
and after assuming such sacred duties 'towards
the nation, to repeat the mistakes of the past
administration? Will you violate the constitu-
tion and allow it to be violated, persecute the
press, order arrests without warrant, executions
without trial?
How can you, after starting a revolution and
overthrowing a government which, we must not
82 THE CASE OF MEXICO
forget it, was a government de facto and de
jure, treat as bandits and outlaws those who
rise in arms against you, availing themselves of
a right of which you availed yourself and re-
sorting to the very tactics which enabled you
to gain your present position? How can you
muzzle the press when it resorts to the tactics
to which you resorted when you started the
revolution and when you went on your presi-
dential campaign tour attacking savagely your
political opponents and their supporters?
Are you not courting the charge of using a
double standard? Are you not showing a re-
grettable lack of constancy? Are you not lay-
ing destructive hands upon your own work?
There are only two solutions to the present
situation. You can either conclude the trans-
action I suggested, or, if you cannot govern ac-
cording to the constitution and with the support
of the nation, resign. Otherwise you will
gradually become unpopular and be swept away
by an insurrection; and in your fall you will
drag the country to destruction.
My services are at the command of the gov-
ernment as long as the interests of our coun-
try are being safeguarded; if the government,
however, enters upon the wrong path, I shall
feel compelled to withdraw my assistance in or-
der to continue my work for the cause of the
country, which to me is the most sacred cause.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 88
Do not attribute to vanity and presumption
the attitude I assume. Far be it from me to
think that I am of any weight in the political
scales or can impose any conditions. My only
motive in writing you this long letter is a desire
to express to you my good will towards your
government, pointing out the hidden obstacles
against which it might wreck itself, and disclos-
ing the reasons which might eventually compel
me to separate myself from you and to carry on
the struggle for the realization of my ideals,
perhaps without affiliating myself with any
party, a voluntary exile once more as I was
during the last four years of President Diaz's
administration ; for I am always ready to sacri-
fice my own conveniences when the interests of
my country are at stake.
I do not know whether you will have the time
and the patience necessary to peruse this long
letter, or whether, having read it, you will give
it any consideration; but that does not matter
to me. I feel that I have performed my duty :
as your friend, by telling you the truth and
showing you the dangers that beset your path ;
as a citizen, by trying to save our country from
the terrible danger of a foreign intervention, for
which history would blame the irresponsible
actions of the people and the conscienceless at-
titude of the government.
84 THE CASE OF MEXICO
I remain your sincere friend, who wishes you
the best success, for your own good and for the
good of the country,
RAFAEL DE LA ZATAS ENRIQTJEZ.
FRANCISCO I. MADERO
CHAPTER II
MADERO THE IRRESPONSIBLE A STRIKING
CONTRAST BETWEEN MADERO AND POR-
FIRIO DIA2T MADERO'S ADMINISTRA-
TION THE MANIFESTO OF GENERAL
FELIX DIAZ.
Many considered Francisco I. Madefo
a criminal character. In my opinion
he was merely an irresponsible individual
lacking in balance, harmless as long as he
remained in the obscurity of private life;
dangerous, however, when he took an ac-
tive part in politics, and positively harm-
ful when he assumed control of the gov-
ernment. He personally did little harm,
but he allowed others to do an appalling
amount.
In his egotism he imagined himself to
be an apostle, a prophet, a heroic warrior
and a social redeemer, although he lacked
the ability to perfect any plans, to estab-
lish a system, to fight a battle, to govern
a country, even to carry out orders.
85
86 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Every one of his acts furnished ample
proof of his incompetence.
On countless occasions the press and
the insurgents charged him with break-
ing the solemn engagements he had taken
before the revolution of 1910 and after
its triumph to establish a democratic re-
gime in Mexico. That charge was abso-
lutely unfounded as I shall prove by quo-
tations from the San Luis manifesto, his
revolutionary programme and platform,
from his addresses and messages, and from
the after-dinner speeches he delivered
after his party came into power.
A perusal of those documents reveals
a notable consistency between his words
and his deeds; those who pretend that
Madero failed to come up to their expec-
tations reveal merely their lack of infor-
mation and understanding.
If we read carefully the San Luis
manifesto we will see that it can not in
any way be considered as emanating from
a political party, nor even from a small
group of individuals, and that it is in no
wise national in character. It is simply a
THE CASE OF MEXICO 87
personal document, an extremely per-
sonal one in which the Ts play a promin-
ent part, "we" being used very seldom
and only when Madero refers to Fran-
cisco Vasquez Gomez. Excerpts like
the following will illustrate my point :
"Following the wise custom which ob-
tains in republican countries I visited
various parts of this republic, and appeal-
ed to my fellow citizens. Every one of
my speaking tours was truly a triumphal
march. . . . The day came at last
when General Diaz realized the actual
situation of the republic and understood
that he could no longer combat me with
any chance of success in the arena of de-
mocracy, and he gave orders to arrest
me."
ff l realize that if the people have se-
lected me as candidate for the presidency,
it is because they have found in me not
so much the qualities that constitute a
statesman or an organizer but the virility
of a patriot, ready to sacrifice himself.
. . . When I threw myself into the
fight for democracy I knew well that
38 THE CASE OF MEXICO
General Diaz would never respect the ex-
pressed wishes of the people; when the
noble Mexican nation supported me at
the polls it knew very well also what out-
rages it would have to expect. . . ."
"Besides the attitude of the population
before, during, and after the elections re-
vealed a violent opposition to General
Diaz's government and proved that if the
elections had been held fairly / would
have been elected president of the repub-
lic. On the strength of which, constitut-
ing myself the mouthpiece of the nation's
will, / hereby declare the last election il-
legal, and the Republic finding itself con-
sequently without a legitimate govern-
ment, I assume the provisional presi-
dency of the Republic."
"I declare in all honor that I would
consider it as a weakness on my part and
as treason to the nation which has accord-
ed me its confidence not to place myself at
the head of my fellow citizens who are
calling upon me anaoiously from every
part of the coimtry to compel General
THE CASE OF MEXICO S9
Diaz by the force of arms to respect the
nation's wishes."
The foregoing is amply sufficient to
give an idea of the San Luis Manifesto
and to reveal Madero's psychology.
Pompous, vain, arrogant phraseology, in
which the first person recurs constantly;
misrepresentations and exaggerations.
That a part of the population designated
Madero for the presidency is true, but to
say that the population, or even the ma-
jority of the population did so, is a gra-
tuitous falsehood. Madero could truth-
fully state that the people of Mexico had
had no opportunity to discover his gifts as
a statesman; but neither had it had a
chance to judge his virile patriotism.
The Mexican nation never supported him
personally at the polls nor during the
revolution. The Mexican people never
called upon him (let us pass by the word
"anxiously") to head the revolt. The
truth is that it wasn't Madero who started
or even headed the revolution, but Pascual
Orozco, Jr. and Pascual Orozco, Sr. in
the North, and the brothers Zapata in
40 THE CASE OF MEXICO
the South; to be perfectly accurate I must
say that the first revolutionary move was
made by Aquiles Serdan of Puebla, who
was not acting in concert with Madero
any more than the Zapatas were at first.
In all the addresses and after-dinner
speeches which Madero delivered after the
revolution, when he was a candidate for
the presidency, he showed himself a mere
demagogue, promising to the people what-
ever he happened to think of, without
waiting to be asked for it, and as though
he were absolute master of everybody's
life and property; he corrupted the army
by bribery, alienating the good will of
the commanding officers; in an address to
the inmates of the Monterey Penitentiary
he went so far as to say that many people
were at large who deserved to be im-
prisoned much more than they.
He never carried favor with the nation
itself but with the lowest and roughest
populace whose coarse instincts he arous-
ed, with the bandits serving sentences in
prisons, promising to them a government
by the olocracy, the domination of the
THE CASE OF MEXICO 41
lower classes to the detriment of the
others.
It is a fact that in crises and periods of
disorder, vice and virtue run to extremes,
and human nature reveals itself in its high-
est and its lowest, particularly in its low-
est, aspects. In 1910, a year of crises
and disorder, Madero revealed the powers
for evil that lay in him; egotism, megalo-
mania, hankering for popular applause;
among the roughest element of the popu-
lation there flamed up all the evil in-
stincts which had been kept down for
thirty years by the iron hand of President
Diaz; it was the populace, not the honest
working class population which howled,
"Our day has come," and insulted by
words, gestures and even by deeds of
violence the most respected women in
Mexican society.
These happenings were not the result of
Madero's machinations; his ill-balanced
mind could not cope with the newly cre-
ated situation; therein we find the most
convincing proof of his irresponsible
character.
42 THE CASE OP MEXICO
Madero was not born to be a leader.
Superficial in his judgments, stubborn
in his capriciousness, fettered by many
superstitions, he was not what is called a
personality, he was merely an abnormal
type.
He trusted his luck; and all his parti-
sans always harped on his luck, which
they considered as infallible. Madero
and his followers knew nothing of logic, of
the relation between cause and effect, the
basis of all events, the fundamental prin-
ciple of the universe.
Attempts have been made to establish
a parallel between President Madero and
President Porfirio Diaz. While we ob-
serve between the two a striking contrast
we fail to discover any point of re-
semblance.
If I go into such details it is not for
the sake of making this book more read-
able but in order to visualize better for
my readers the personality of Madero.
An understanding of his psychology fur-
nishes a key to the causes of the revolution
which overthrew him. Besides I consider
THE CASE OF MEXICO 48
biographical information as one of the
most important elements of history.
When I state that there is absolutely
no possible comparison between the two
men, I should not be suspected of any
partisan bias, for I broke openly with the
Porfirists some seven years ago.
One could not find two personalities
more unlike than those of the last two
presidents of Mexico.
Porfirio Diaz came from a poor family
and received all his training in his struggle
for existence and on the battlefield, gam-
ing quite a reputation as a soldier before
he rose to the presidency.
Francisco I. Madero was born to
wealth, spent his life among the business
men and merchants who composed his
family circle, and was elevated to the
highest position in the republic by un-
foreseen events.
Porfirio Diaz brought to the presidency
the vast knowledge of men and of con-
ditions he had acquired during his career
as a soldier, administrator of large dis-
tricts, politician and insurgent leader.
44 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Madero was an improvised politician,
an improvised revolutionist, and an impro-
vised president, lacking entirely not only
in practical but even in theoretical know-
ledge of warfare, politics and administra-
tion, unacquainted even with his associates
and with the conditions of the country.
Diaz is a man of courage, with the quiet
and conscious bravery of one who knows
danger and who instead of rushing into it
blindly, meets it and measures it coolly,
and then devises ways of overcoming it.
Madero displayed the blind and un-
reasoning daring of the irresponsible. He
rushed headlong like a projectile, caring
little where he was to land or what the
effects of his action would be.
Porfirio Diaz can hold his tongue. He
only speaks when he has something to say,
and then he says exactly what he has
made up his mind to say, not a word more,
not a word less.
Madero never knew the value of dis-
cretion and suffered from an incurable
loquacity; he would speak of everything
and everybody; little he knew, when he
THE CASE OF MEXICO 45
rose to speak, what he was to speak about;
he became intoxicated with the sound of
his own voice, going always farther than
he should have gone, and revealing many
things he should have kept to himself.
Diaz hardly ever spoke of himself, and
when he was compelled to do so used "we"
instead of "I."
Madero never spoke except in the first
person singular. He was the everlast-
ing I.
Diaz only informed the public of his
notable actions and valuable accomplish-
ments and left his own personality in the
shadow, knowing well that the public and
his adulators could be relied upon to
throw it into relief and to exaggerate his
personal traits.
Madero made extraordinary efforts to
become the center of interest, a unique
personage, the cynosure of all eyes, as
though he suspected that in no other way
could a man of his small stature command
any attention. Madero was a small
figure, physically and intellectually.
Diaz assumed the power with one am-
46 THE CASE OF MEXICO
bition in his heart : to make himself great
by adding to his country's greatness.
Madero had one pet ambition and also
certain definite plans. It was his am-
bition to witness his own apotheosis. It
is said that his plans were mainly to stave
off the ruin of his family then heavily in-
volved. This was at least generally ad-
mitted.
Plutarch would not have devoted a
chapter to Diaz's life, but Diaz would
have fitted into Machiavelli's Prince.
Madero remained in spite of his tragic
end a Molieresque personage. His life
was a* gruesome farce, ending with a catas-
trophe.
Porfirio Diaz sacrificed many victims in
order to establish and maintain a political
system that would insure peace. A War-
sovian peace it was called by many men
of unbiased minds, an educational peace,
Diaz called it, for he considered it as the
only means of training his fellow citizens
for a life of order and labor.
Madero took as many lives as Diaz did,
or perhaps more, in a shorter period of
THE CASE OF MEXICO 47
time; he inaugurated an era of terrorism,
not for political reasons, not for educa-
tional purposes, but in order to achieve
his personal ends and to further the inter-
ests of his family.
Porfirio Diaz filled the national treas-
ury with a surplus of several millions ; Ma-
dero left it considerably depleted.
Diaz established the credit of the nation
on a firm basis; he himself made use of
that credit for illegitimate ends at times.
The many loans he negotiated through
his minister Limantour enriched consider-
ably the members of the so-called Scien-
tific Party headed by Limantour himself.
It cannot be denied, however, that those
loans enabled him to finance and carry out
large enterprises of national utility.
Madero also floated many loans from
which, however, the country never derived
any benefit ; it was said that they were is-
sued in order to organize a large standing
army; but the army was never organized,
Madero failed to preserve order in Mexico
and to put an end to the anarchistic con-
48 THE CASE OF MEXICO
ditions which became intolerable during
his funest term of administration.
Diaz manufactured out of whole cloth
legends likely to win popularity for his
proteges. Madero was always busy
manufacturing alleged plots which his
police always nipped in the bud; comic
opera conspiracies to kidnap him, to over-
throw him, to assassinate him ; when at last
one real conspiracy was formed, neither he
nor his police had wind of it until the revo-
lution was well on its way.
The chief difference between the two
men, however, was the fact that Porfirio
Diaz always acted after due deliberation,
while Madero acted upon impulse.
Porfirio Diaz had a genius for meeting
emergencies. Madero was a mere ama-
teur without any talent for any definite
kind of work.
At the time of his fall Porfirio Diaz
predicted that Madero could not rule
Mexico unless he adhered to the methods
he had established. The old warrior for-
got that it requires an Alexander to tame
a Bucephalus. ^ ^ #
THE CASE OF MEXICO 49
We give our sympathy to revolutionists
or withhold it according to the cause they
champion, but the results of a revolution
alone justify it or condemn it.
When Madero rose up in arms, he en-
listed the sympathies of all, because he
voiced the people's desire to end the un-
usual term of office of President Diaz and
especially of the men who constituted the
power behind the throne, the "Scientific
Group". The sympathies, however, went
to the revolution itself, not to its leader.
When the battle was won, the nation re-
peating the traditional mistake of nations
relapsed into personalism, worshipped
the victor and marveled at the ease with
which he had triumphed.
Here begins the second act of the
drama, Madero assumed the control of
the government, not as some pretend,
through election frauds, although he re-
sorted, before the elections, to a good deal
of violence and to more or less justifiable
intrigues. By threats and intimidations
he compelled Congress to advance the date
of the elections ; he persecuted other candi-
50 THE CASE OF MEXICO
dates who were to enter the presidential
contest independently. He forced upon
the States functionaries, who were not
only his partisans but his avowed accom-
plices. He imposed upon the nation
Pino Suarez as candidate for the vice
presidency. On election day there was no
candidacy possible besides his own. I am
positive that if he had refrained from such
untoward actions, if he had given the pub-
lic absolute freedom, he would have car-
ried the election just the same. His at-
titude on that occasion harmed him much
more than it helped him.
The nation then found itself in great
suspense. No man with a spark of com-
mon sense ever expected Madero to ful-
fil even one half of the promises he had
made as revolutionary leader or as presi-
dential candidate; it would have been be-
yond the limits of the possible. But he
was expected to inaugurate at least a
regime of order and justice. Madero un-
fortunately was himself caught in the
snares he had set. He failed to surround
himself with men of integrity and of
THE CASE OP MEXICO 51
proved patriotism; he refused to listen to
advice ; he remained the leader of a clique
instead of becoming the leader of a nation;
he gave a free hand in the conduct of gov-
ernmental affairs to a coterie which proved
more predatory than even the Scientific
Group, It is now a recognized fact that
his administration meant disaster for
Mexico from every point of view, political,
administrative and international.
The Madero revolution was not a revo-
lution but rather a scandal and a calamity;
it found no justification in its results and
therefore sentence was passed upon it
without appeal.
The whole'country began anew to mani-
fest its unrest. Revolutionary groups
sprang up in the Northern, in the South-
ern, and in the Central States; they lacked
coherence and leaders of prestige; the
same desire, however, animated them all.
They were all bent on overthrowing Ma-
dero.
In the few months during which Ma-
dero remained at the head of the adminis-
tration, that is from July 1, 1912, to Feb-
52 THE CASE OF MEXICO
ruary, 1913, he squandered (besides the
current receipts and the seventy and some
odd million pesos President Diaz had left
in the treasury when he relinquished the
presidency) $35,000,000 more than the
budget called for.
Bef9re the fiscal year 1910-1911 the lia-
bility account of the nation amounted to
from $300,000 to $400,000. In that year,
on the other hand, that amount was
doubled (exactly $995,521.78), and on
June 30, 1912, it had jumped up to
$19,001.951.34.
Where had all those millions gone to?
To this day that mystery has not been un-
raveled.
After Madero's fall the provisional gov-
ernment disposed of only the $189,098.33
in cash left in the treasury and of $874,-
524.48 deposited by the Treasury with the
National Bank.
Carlos Toro in his essay on "The Over-
throwing of Madero by the Diaz Revolt"
summarizes as follows the conditions ob-
taining at the very time when the Diaz re-
volt was on the point of breaking out.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 53
"At the beginning of the current year
(1913) the (Maderist) party was utterly
discredited. Many positive charges have
been made against it: It had, its enemies
said, organized and was supporting the
Porra.*
"It recruited into its ranks all the inca-
pables of the nation; it displayed an intol-
erant if not terroristic attitude towards
its opponents ; it ignored the excesses and
indecent practices of government officials
in their private life; it persecuted the
press ; it allowed men in authority to com-
mit assassination without process of law;
it permitted the daily slaughter of Mexi-
cans under the pretext that they were
revolutionists ; it demoralized the army by
allowing jail birds, freed illegally, to en-
list. Other charges brought against it
were: failure to comply with the extra-
ordinary promises made to the working
class; the shady, dishonest deals closed
with United States capitalists ; the doubt-
ful origin of the funds with which Madero
*A clique led by Gustavo Madero, the president's
brother, which committed many acts of violence.
54 TliJE CASE OF MEXICO
financed his revolution; the considerable
sums* taken from the public treasury and
lent to the president's brother (Gustavo
Madero) without collateral; the influence
that adventurers and other unconscionable
characters had upon the president; the
mysterious vitality of the Zapatist revolt;
the unspeakable deals of Gustavo Ma-
dero; the police persecution of indepen-
dent citizens; the framed-up conspiracy
cases which excused the jailing of harm-
less persons ; the insults offered to respect-
ably constituted bodies; the direct ap-
pointment by the government of officials
who should have been selected by regular
election; the obstinacy with which the
party supported secretaries of state re-
pudiated by public opinion; the insolence
of the government organs; the clubbing
or stoning of people who were not on
friendly terms with the government, and
the fires that had broken out in their
houses ; the feasts and entertainments co-
inciding with the most painful scenes of
'Estimated at $700,000.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 55
national grief; the orgies indulged in by
certain "Renovators"* in public places of
amusement; finally the scandalous dis-
mantling of Salina Cruz, considered by
everybody as the first step towards a
criminal act of treason.
"So many causes of irritation kept the
nation in a state of mind similar to that of
a patient who, realizing that the amputa-
tion of a limb has become imperative, can-
not, however, resign himself to the opera-
tion and tries to soothe the pain that is tor-
turing him by the use of drugs and opiates.
"While Madero was talking himself
hoarse about legality, the nation as a
whole, and even Madero's worst enemies
had made up their minds to respect legal-
ity to the utmost limit, so as not to estab-
lish in Mexican history the detestable pre-
cedent of a president regularly elected be-
ing overthrown by violence. This is the
reason why the revolts of Pascual Orozco
and of General Bernardo Reyes were not
successful; this is why the country toler-
*An opprobrious epithet applied to Madero's sup-
porters.
56 THE CASE OF MEXICO
ated in silence the ineptitudes of its presi-
dent, the violence and the unbridled license
of his henchmen. If Madero had not pre-
pared his own downfall, this consumma-
tion, both desired and feared, would not
have been brought about."
The truth is that the nation gave no
support to its government because it had
no confidence in that government and re-
sented its shocking machinations ; neither
did the nation support the revolutionists
because it failed to find among them one
striking personality offering positive
guarantees for the future.
On October 16, 1912, General Felix
Diaz, followed by a part of the Federal
garrison, headed an insurrectional move-
ment in the city of Vera Cruz, the main
port of the Mexican Republic. He in-
tended to pacify the country with the help
of justice, and he directed to the army the
following manifesto:
"Noble army to which it has been my
honored privilege to belong since the days
of my youth and from which it is now my
painful duty to separate myself as a
THE CASE OF MEXICO 57
violent protest against the necessity
placed upon us of recognizing as our
equals, and even our superiors, criminals
rescued from the steps of the scaffold,
foreign adventurers or mere relatives of
our ruler. My comrades, and especially
you, my brothers, the alumni of the
glorious Military College, I appeal to you.
As I said expressly before the supreme
authorities which governed our country on
August 21, 1909, in the address I de-
livered on the occasion of the closing exer-
cises of our association, discipline ends
when the supreme interest of the country
begins; the sword which the nation has
given you to be used in its defense has
been transformed by the present govern-
ment into a hangman's axe by means of
which it is trying to impose its tyranny.
I call upon you to join hands with us in
carrying out the work of justice."
The revolt of General Diaz awoke many
sympathies among the Mexican popula-
tion and even in foreign countries. Pleas-
ant hopes were built upon its possible suc-
cess. Unfortunately its young leader,
58 THE CASE OF MEXICO
rich in valor and self-confidence, was lack-
ing in experience and in organizing ability.
He was betrayed and captured by the
Maderist troops which had promised him
their assistance and had entered Vera
Cruz waving white flags and acclaiming
Felix Diaz. The officers involved in this
incident have not been able to deny nor
to explain that stratagem satisfactorily.
Madero ordered that Felix Diaz be
tried by a court-martial extraordinary
before which the rebel leader declared
that he alone was guilty and that he as-
sumed the entire responsibility for the re-
volt. The court-martial sentenced him
to death, but the execution did not take
place, as the attorneys for the defendant
appealed to the Federal Supreme Court,
which suspended the sentence.
Efforts have been made to create the
impression that Felix Diaz had escaped
with his life thanks to Madero's clemency.
There is no evidence to that effect.
Members of the Porra, of which Gus-
tavo Madero was the leader, did every-
thing in their power to bring about the
THE CASE OF MEXICO 59
execution of Felix Diaz; they organized
a popular demonstration in which the
scum of the city, the lowest slum rabble,
took part, carrying posters with sanguin-
ary mottoes and howling at the top of
their voices for the head of Felix Diaz.
A committee of the leading women of
Mexico City and a committee of news-
papermen called upon President Madero
petitioning him to spare the life of his un-
fortunate adversary; the only answer they
received was to the effect that Madero
had made up his mind to put Diaz to
death, for such was the will of the people.
That he did not proceed with the execu-
tion was due only to the energetic atti-
tude of the Supreme Court, whose de-
cree he did not dare to disregard.
Felix Diaz was at first held in the
prison of San Juan de Ulua, then trans-
ferred to the capital and committed to
the penitentiary. At that time General
Bernardo Reyes was also in Mexico City,
an inmate of the military prison of San-
tiago Tlaltelolco.
CHAPTER III
to the soldiers to fire. He was not al-
lowed to write his will nor to send a line
of farewell to his family.
"That act assumed all the features of
an atrocious political assassination for
which Madero and the four ministers
mentioned above will be held responsible
by history. The law of suspension of
guarantees could not be applied in the
Federal district, and General Ruiz should
have been tried by a competent court
with full knowledge of his case." (Op.
cit.)
We may add that General Ruiz, being
a representative to the National Con-
gress, enjoyed thereby legislative im-
munity and could not stand trial unless
the House of which he was a member had
impeached him.
GENERAL BERNARDO REYHS
THE CASE OF MEXICO 61
Vera Cruz chieftain, but they continued
their preparations in secret.
One of the rebel groups was ready for
action at the beginning of December,
1912. It was officered by Generals Ber-
nardo Reyes and Gregorio Ruiz, by Cap-
tains Romero Lopez, Tapia y Mendoza,
the corps of cadets, and Colonel Zozaya,
warden of the military prison, and it com-
prised among other civil personalities Dr.
Espinosa de los Monteros and Rafael de
Zayas, of the Reyes party, Juan Palacios
and Francisco de P. Senties, of the Vas-
quez party, Miguel Mendizabal, formerly
associated with Zapata, Pedro Duhart, a
follower of Mondragon, Mayor Solache,
partisan of Diaz, and S. Savinon, inde-
pendent anti-Maderist.
It was necessary to select a chief who
would conduct the military operations,
and all the unanimous choice of the
rebels fell upon General Victoriano
Huerta, who had recently returned to
Mexico City after winning much com-
mendation for the campaign conducted by
62 THE CASE OF MEXICO
the Northern army division which was
under his orders.
Instead of showing gratitude to Gen-
eral Huerta for the immense service he
had rendered to Madero by holding in
check, driving away, and finally annihil-
ating Orozco's bands which had been ad-
vancing victoriously towards the heart of
Mexico, the Maderists fought the victori-
ous veteran in an underhand way, in
order to offset his increasing popularity.
The official organs did not hesitate to fling
insults in his face, and the government
even began to persecute him,
When General Huerta, suffering from
severe eye trouble, went to Dr. Aureliano
Urrutia's sanatarium to be operated upon,
the Maderists left him in peace for a while.
In his retreat, however, he received many
calls from Joaquin Claussell, a young
lawyer, a brilliant and resolute man and
a good friend of Dr. Urrutia, and from
Fernando Gil, a man of distinguished in-
tellect and of sound judgment, an old par-
tisan of Reyes and related through his
wife's family to General Huerta. These
THE CASE OF MEXICO 63
two men assumed the task of preparing
the hero of the Northern campaign to ac-
cept the leadership of the projected in-
surrection; but they could not make him
break his allegiance to the government.
General Manuel Mondragon had also
organized a group of officers and citizens,
among whom were Rodolfo Reyes, Gen-
eral Reyes's son, and Cecilio L. Ocon, a
daring young man who was the heart and
soul of the Felix Diaz revolt, and who
negotiated with the group mentioned pre-
viously for a joint action which was likely
to be more successful. The alliance was
concluded on the understanding that Gen-
eral Reyes and Felix Diaz would be the
leaders of the revolt, that the former
would be commander-in-chief , assume the
provisional presidency with the attributes
of a military dictator, and issue a call for
presidential elections, after which all
would do their best to assure the election
of Felix Diaz.
Those plans were made quite openly;
but the government, carried away by its
optimism, paid no attention to them, and
64 THE CASE OF MEXICO
never modified its attitude. To those who
warned him Madero answered invariably:
"Nobody can down me ; I represent legal-
ity."
The army was incensed over Madero's
ill-disguised contempt for it. The presi-
dent was busy levying corps after corps
of rurales with a view to making them his
main support, thus gaining the upper
hand over the regular troops, which he
would disband whenever possible. He
created the ranks of honorary colonels
and honorary brigadier-generals, and con-
ferred them indiscriminately upon men
who had never served in the regular army,
for instance upon General Francisco
Villa, a well known brigand chief. Fran-
cisco Villa had been placed under arrest
by General Huerta during the Northern
compaign for grave insubordination and
sent to the capital to be court-martialed.
Madero sent him to the penitentiary,
where he was treated with every possible
regard; after a short period of detention
he received some funds from Madero, who
allowed him to escape. Thereupon the
THE CASE OF MEXICO 65
minister of war and the president tele-
phoned to General Huerta, telling him of
Villa's escape and advising him to be on
his guard, as Villa had sworn he would
kill him. Huerta answered coolly that he
was thankful for the warning, but that
such advice was quite superfluous.
The date of the revolt was changed sev-
eral times ; several times orders were given
and then withdrawn; this caused much
friction between the organizers of the re-
bellion, for everything was in readiness,
and delay alone was dangerous.
On Saturday, February 8, 1913, every-
thing was ready, and it was decided to
take action the following day. General
Mondragon was in favor of waiting until
the 10th. Only it was discovered that one
of the officers admitted into the conspiracy
had betrayed his associates to Gustavo
Madero, and that the rebels would be ar-
rested that night and shot on the spot.
After a long discussion General Mondra-
gon decided to strike the blow on Sunday
morning.
Following the plan agreed upon, the
66 THE CASE OF MEXICO
cadets of the military preparatory school
of Tlalpam, a town near Mexico City,
started out at 5 A. M. and reached the sta-
tion of the electric railway, which they
found deserted. It was arranged then
that the section of cavalry should hasten
towards San Antonio Abad, one of the
gateways of Mexico City. There they
were to wait for the rest of the column,
which marched upon the Huipulco sta-
tion, and commanded trains to carry it to
the rendezvous; the column reformed it-
self and marched upon the national
palace, which it occupied without en-
countering any resistance. Preparations
were also made to occupy the towers of
the cathedrals, and a detachment of
cavalry rode off towards the Santiago
Tlaltelolco jail to assist in liberating
General Reyes.
General Mondragon and Gregorio
Ruiz, commanding another column which
comprised the 1st cavalry and sections of
the 2nd and 5th artillery with their can-
non, left their quarters in Tacubaya
bound for Mexico City via Chapultepec,
THE CASE OP MEXICO 67
where President Madero was at the time.
When they passed Libertad Street they
were joined by sections of the 1st artillery
stationed there. They reached the mili-
tary prison, where they found mounted
cadets and men from the 20th infantry
commanded by General Reyes, who had
been freed without difficulty.
The revolutionary corps then proceeded
towards the penitentiary, from which they
delivered Brigadier- General Felix Diaz
without any bloodshed; some time was
consumed, however, in parleying with the
warden, who yielded only when the rebels
threatened to shell the prison.
General Reyes and Diaz embraced each
other .cordially and took command of .the
rebels, cheered loudly by the soldiers and
by the crowds which had been amassing.
The column in battle formation made
for the national palace, but met with a
bitter disappointment when approaching
the building.
The first person to hear of the uprising
was Gustavo Madero, who, accompanied
by several friends, hastened towards the
68 THE CASE OF MEXICO
palace in an automobile. No sooner had
he arrived there than he found himself a
prisoner in the hands of the cadets who a
short while before had captured General
Angel Garcia Pena, minister of war.
General Lauro Villar, military com-
mander of Mexico City, was informed of
the disturbance directly after the sur-
render of the palace. He went to the
palace, apostrophized the guard valiantly,
persuaded it to obey his orders, and took
as his prisoners the cadets who didn't dare
to shoot at the heroic veteran. He at once
organized the defense of the palace.
A few minutes later General Gregorio
Ruiz, preceding General Reyes's column,
appeared at the head of two squadrons of
cavalry ready to lend assistance to the
cadets. General Villar accompanied by
Messrs. Baso and Salazar, first and
second superintendents of the palace, met
general Ruiz and ordered him to sur-
render, while the two other men leveled
their guns point-blank at the breast of
the rebel chief, who, unable to resist,
complied with the order.
THE CASE OP MEXICO 69
Generals Reyes and Diaz advanced
then at the head of their columns in total
ignorance of what had just taken place.
General Manuel M. Velasquez went to
tell them that the palace had been retaken
by the government, and advised them to
change their plans accordingly. General
Reyes, always haughty and ready to play
his all on one card, disregarded that judi-
cious advice and advanced against the
troops defending the position. General
Villar stopped him, ordering him to sur-
render, and General Reyes, according to
the accepted version of the incident, fired
at him. This fact, however, is denied by
several witnesses to the incident. One
positive fact is that some one shot at Gen-
eral Reyes, who fell dead with a bullet
through his skull. At the same time the
forces within the palace opened a brisk
fire with rifles and machine guns, mow-
ing down the assailants and a mob of
men, women and children, who, attracted
by their curiosity, were crowding the
large square in front of the palace. The
number of innocent bystanders thus
70 THE CASE OF MEXICO
killed was over eight hundred, while fully
as many more were injured.
This untoward development demoral-
ized for a while the rebel column. Gen-
erals Diaz and Mondragon held a brief
conference ; they decided not to train their
artillery on the palace on account of the
terrible damage it would inflict upon the
city; they retreated towards the Agri-
cultural School, then, changing their
minds while on their way there, finally
marched on the Citadel, where they could
secure a large supply of arms and ammu-
nition.
The troops occupying the Citadel re-
sisted for twenty minutes, but capitulated
at one o'clock in the afternoon. When
the rebel forces, which we will henceforth
designate as the Felixists, made their
triumphal entrance several officers were
taken prisoners; among them was Gen-
eral Davila, a member of the court-
martial extraordinary which had sen-
tenced General Felix Diaz to death. Da-
vila unbuckled his sword and offered it to
General Diaz, who said to him:
THE CASE OF MEXICO 71
"Keep your sword, comrade. I shall
grasp with much pleasure the hand that
signed my death sentence in Vera Cruz."
And he actually shook hands with him
and spared his life as well as that of the
other prisoners.
* * *
President Madero was informed by
telephone of the happenings in the capi-
tal, and a little after 7 A. M. left the
Castle of Chapultepec. On his way to
the national palace he rode a white horse
and was escorted by a group of cadets of
the Military College and a few Chapul-
tepec foresters. He was serene and
smiling, and, as was his custom, greeted
with a great display of cordiality every
one he met. His escort prevailed upon
him to stop and take refuge in a pho-
tographer's studio opposite the National
Theatre while they would find out what
was happening. He was met there by
several members of his family, some of
his ministers and General Victoriano
Huerta.
A little later it was decided to resume
72 THE CASE OF MEXICO
the march towards the palace, and the
president, with his everlasting smile on
his lips, rode through the large square
over the victims of the savage butchery
ordered by one of his officers.
"On his arrival at the national palace,"
writes Jose Fernandez Rojas in his
"Mexican Revolution," "Madero was ap-
prised by General Villar of the situation;
a cabinet council was held at once in
which only Hernandez, Ernesto Madero,
General Angel/ Garcia Pena, and the en-
gineer Manuel Bonilla took part. It is-
sued the following orders :
"1. That General Gregorio Ruiz be
put to death at once without trial.
"2. That the legislature be directed to
extend the powers of the executive over
the finance and war departments.
"3. That General Victoriano Huerta
be made military commander of the capi-
tal. ( General Villar had been wounded. )
"Those orders were carried out at once
and General Ruiz was shot in the yard of
the palace, displaying to the end marvel-
ous courage and himself giving the order
THE CASE OF MEXICO 78
to the soldiers to fire. He was not al-
lowed to write his will nor to send a line
of farewell to his family.
"That act assumed all the features of
an atrocious political assassination for
which Madero and the four ministers
mentioned above will be held responsible
by history. The law of suspension of
guarantees could not be applied in the
Federal district, and General Ruiz should
have been tried by a competent court
with full knowledge of his case." (Op.
cit.)
We may add that General Ruiz, being
a representative to the National Con-
gress, enjoyed thereby legislative im-
munity and could not stand trial unless
the House of which he was a member had
impeached him.
With him several of the young cadets
made prisoners in the palace were also
shot to death.
It is imperative to bear all these facts
in mind in order to pass an impartial
judgment upon the administration of
President Francisco I. Madero.
CHAPTER IV
CONTINUATION OP THE BLOODY TEN DAYS
THE OPTIMISTIC AND IRRESPONSIBLE
MADERO THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS
THE MISSION OF THE SENATE GEN-
ERAL VICTORIANO HUERTA THE DI-
LEMMA IN WHICH HE FOUND HIMSELF
THE DECISION TAKEN BY GENERAL
HUERTA AND THE ARMY THE FALL
OF MADERO.
On the evening of the same Sunday,
which was the 9th of February, President
Madero motored to Cuernavaca accom-
panied by some of his trusted friends,
ostensibly seeking General Angeles, al-
though the latter could have been reached
just as easily by telegram. It became
known, however, that Madero's inten-
tion, when he undertook that trip, was to
conclude arrangements with the governor
of the State of Moreles, Patricio Leyva,
who was in his turn to negotiate with
the Zapata brothers in regard to the plan
of campaign to be adopted against Gen-
eral Diaz.
74.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 75
There is not the slightest doubt to$fe that
President Madero always protected the
Zapatist movement. He did it at first,
as I have mentioned elsewhere, for the
purpose of holding in check the pro-
visional government of de la Barra, and
later for purely sordid reasons.
Fernandez Rojas (Loc. Cit.}, echoing
the current opinion, states that the exist-
ence of Zapatism in the prosperous State
of Morelos "had only one meaning for
the Madero family; by keeping that
region in a constant state of hostility it
was possible to lower considerably the
value of real estate, and as the land-
owners were unable to protect their in-
terests in Morelos, the Madero family
found itself in a position to acquire
valuable sugar plantations in that State
at a ridiculously low price."
To sustain his statement that Madero
and Zapata were working in accord to
maintain a state of hostility in Morelos,
Rojas cites the following facts which are
unanimously admitted:
"1. Madero was always opposed to the
76 THE CASE OF MEXICO
annihilation of Zapatism, which could not
have resisted General Huerta's energetic
methods of warfare.
"2. The engineer Patricio Leyva owed
his elevation to the highest dignity of the
State to an electoral fraud abetted by the
Center to the end that the government
and Zapata be kept in close contact
through the intermediary of Patricio
Leyva himself.
"3. The ordinance used by the Za-
patists came, like that used by the army,
from the national arsenal."
Madero spent only a few hours in Cuer-
navaca; he returned to the capitol as hur-
riedly as he had left it, and reached
Mexico City on the morning of the 10th,
displaying more confidence than ever in
the final outcome of the struggle. A few
hours later General Angeles, followed by
a column of over a thousand men, arrived.
I shall not describe in detail the revo-
lution which for ten days made the capi-
tal of the Republic a scene of terror and
desolation. During that time Madero
retained his optimism, assuring Mexico
THE CASE OF MEXICO 77
and the world that in a few hours he
would subdue the rebels holding the ci-
tadel, although they were masters of the
situation and had the support of the whole
country. The inspired press sent out
every day extravagant appeals for help
for the government, and incited the
people to rise against the cultured classes
and the high interests. Pamphlets were
circulated which brimmed over with
threats and misleading information. Day
after day people were shot without trial,
simply on suspicion.
This situation alarmed the diplomats,
who felt called upon to proffer their
services in order to end a warfare waged
in the streets of the Mexican capital in
which the majority of victims were non-
combatants. The American ambassador
and the ministers plenipotentiaries for
Spain and Germany conferred with
President Madero and offered their serv-
ices to bring about through diplomatic
channels an agreement with the Felixists.
Madero answered with a smile that he
would sfurely dominate the situation within
78 THE CASE OF MEXICO
twenty-four hours, or, at the utmost,
thirty-six hours, for the citadel would fall
as soon as Colonel Rubio Navarrete
would assume control of the artillery.
Thereupon the diplomats betook them-
selves to the citadel and conferred with
General Diaz, who recognized the gravity
of the situation and explained that he was
powerless to cope with it, for it had been
created by the government. He would
confine himself, he added, to defensive
action, and expressed his earnest desire
to avoid, as far as possible, further
calamities.
News was received from the United
States which caused a good deal of con-
sternation. It was rumored that an
American army of thirty-five thousand
men was ready to enter Mexico; that ten
warships were in readiness to sail from
Guantanamo bound for Mexican ports,
and that four thousand marines would be
landed any minute from the cruisers
anchored off Vera Cruz, and would
march on the capital,
Then it was that President Madero
THE CASE OF MEXICO 79
cabled on the 14th to President Taft ex-
plaining to him the situation in Mexico,
and stating that the trouble would be over
in a few hours, for the rebels had suffered
considerable losses and were entirely de-
moralized. There was not a word of
truth in that dispatch; but Madero, ir-
responsible as ever, had no doubt as to the
final outcome.
On the 16th, President Taft tele-
graphed his answer explaining that what-
ever measures he had taken were simply
measures of precaution; he denied having
ordered the landing of marines; he con-
sidered it useless to renew the assurance
of his friendly feelings towards Mexico
after the United States had shown for
two years its patience and good will; on
account of the special friendship and of
the relations uniting the two countries,
however, he could not emphasize too much
the vital importance for Madero to re-
store peace and order, which the Ameri-
can government hoped to see firmly
established in Mexico.
The message ended with a significant
80 THE CASE OF MEXICO
warning. President Taft added in con-
clusion that as far as the anxiety ex-
pressed by Madero in his despatch was
concerned, he considered it his duty to
state, sincerely and unreservedly, that the
events of the past two years which had
just culminated in a most ominous state
of affairs were creating a very unfavor-
able impression in the United States, and
had^ convinced many that the most im-
perious duty of the hour was to relieve the
suspense.
Francisco L. de la Barra, who had
served as provisional president at the fall
of President Diaz, endeavored to act as
mediator, and had several confidential
talks with President Madero, giving him
to understand the danger with which the
situation was freighted, and advising him
to compromise with the revolutionists.
The most Madero ever conceded was to
authorize de la Barra to inquire about the
demands of the Felixists. De la Barra
then went to the citadel to confer with
General Diaz, who manifested his willing-
ness to end the hostilities on the sole con-
FELIX DIAZ
THE CASE OF MEXICO 81
dition that the president, Vice-President
Pino Suarez, and the members of the
cabinet tender their resignation. De la
Barra called once more on Madero, who,
after hearing what the Felixists expected,
answered curtly that he would never re-
sign, and that nothing but death could
remove him from the presidency, for he
represented legality.
The following is a resume of the situa-
tion as it appeared to an eye witness :
"The officers, fighting under the orders
of General Huerta, were hostile to the
government; so were the various com-
manders of the army corps and their
soldiers, who were being sacrificed in pro-
tracted and sterile campaigns, and were
beginning to feel a deep hatred for this
ruler whom the press represented as a
ridiculous personage, and whose ad-
versary reminded them of the famous
chief Porfirio Diaz.
"Only the rurales, who were dispatched
to the slaughter house column after
column, were faithful to the government,
82 THE CASE OF MEXICO
bought as they were by the honors
showered upon their chiefs.
"General Huerta felt the terrible
pressure of the hostility which all his sub-
ordinates manifested towards the govern-
ment; at the same time he remembered
all the calumnies slung at him and the
efforts made to exile him by the very man
for whom many army officers, his friends,
were fighting among themselves. He
was unable, however, to take any radical
decision, for the government distrusted
him openly.
"On two occasions General Huerta
was to be arrested, but both times Presi-
dent Madero was prevailed upon not to
confirm the order he had given orally.
"The diplomatic corps contributed to
aggravate the position of the men who
surrounded Francisco I. Madero. The
notes sent by the foreign ministers and
by friendly governments asked more in-
sistently from day to day for a rapid so-
lution of the difficulties.
"More and more complaints were
pouring every day into the national
THE CASE OF MEXICO 88
palace from those whose property was
destroyed in the course of the artillery
duel that was taking place.
"It was idle to expect any action on the
part of Parliament, for the anti-govern-
mental deputies had fled the capital to
avoid being shot; and Madero's partisans,
fearful of the consequences which any
personal action might bring upon their
heads, also remained in hiding.
"The members of the Senate were
equally inactive, for they realized that
they could not cope with the situation
without the help of the Chamber." ("The
Bloody Ten Days," by Gonzalo 1ST.
Espinosa, Joaquin Pina y Carlos R.
Ortiz.)
In the face of such deplorable and
hopeless conditions and in the face of in-
evitable intervention by the United
States, a group of senators met on the
14th at the house of Senator Sebastien
Camacho: Emilio Rabasa, Rafael Pi-
mentel, Tomas R. Macmanus, Carlos
Aguirre, Francisco L. de la Barra, Vic-
tor Manuel Castillo, Luis C. Curiel,
84 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Juan C. Fernandez, Jesus Flores Ma-
gon, Bicardo Guzman, and Guillermo
Obregon. After lengthy deliberations
they decided to call on the military com-
mander General Huerta and advise him
to ask President Madero for his formal
resignation, inasmuch as this seemed to
be the only possible solution of the prob-
lem. Their resolution, however, was not
carried out, for just at that time
Premier Pedro Lascurain sent to Sena-
tor Sebastian Camacho the following
communication:
"Acting upon directions of the presi-
dent of the Republic, I have the honor of
asking you to call a secret session extra-
ordinary of the Senate, at which the
executive will address you in regard to
the present situation. Kindly inform me
of the time at which the honorable sena-
tors will meet in their chamber to the end
that due safety be assured to them and
that the undersigned secretary of state be
able to attend and to address you in be-
half of the executive."
I consider it necessary to reproduce
THE CASE OF MEXICO 85
here in its entirety a most important
historical document, the report of the
secret session of the Senate held the fol-
lowing day, the 15th of February.
After the minutes were read the secre-
tary of foreign affairs, the Honorable
Pedro Lascurain, took the floor to ad-
dress the assembly. The Honorable Las-
curain declared that the Mexican situa-
tion was extremely delicate from the
point of view of international relations
and in particular from the point of view
of the relations with the United States;
he said that telegrams had been received
from Washington revealing the decision,
already partly carried out, of the Ameri-
can government to send warships and
transports with landing forces into the
Mexican waters of the Gulf and the Pa-
cific. The honorable secretary of foreign
affairs added that at one o'clock that
morning the ambassador from the United
States had asked several members of the
diplomatic corps to come and confer with
him at his embassy, informing them of the
impending arrival of the ships and ex-
86 THE CASE OP MEXICO
pressing firmly the opinion that 8,000
marines should be sent to Mexico City to
protect the lives and interests of the
American and other foreign residents.
"There is no time to lose/' the Honorable
Lascurain said in conclusion; "every
minute counts, and in view of the immin-
ence of a foreign intervention with which
we are threatened, I call upon the Senate
to adopt for the sake of the country
measures calculated to avert that danger."
Invited by the vice-president to relate
the facts which had come to his knowledge
while he was acting as mediator, Senator
de la Barra said that on Monday, the 10th
instant, he had written to the president of
the Republic placing himself at his dis-
posal as a possible mediator, if he could
be of any service in this grave conjunc-
ture ; the president had answered that let-
ter at midnight, stating that the govern-
ment was not inclined to treat with the
rebels in the citadel. On Friday, the
14th, General Angeles called at the resi-
dence of Senator de la Barra, inviting
him in behalf of the president to go and
THE CASE OP MEXICO 87
confer with him at the national palace; a
conference took place at which he was en-
trusted with the mission of going to the
citadel and discussing with the revolution-
ary leaders the possibility of a three-day
truce, during which a possible solution
might be agreed upon for the present
situation, so as to stave off, above all
things, the danger of intervention on the
part of a foreign power, which might be-
gin to land troops to protect its subjects
and the other foreigners residing in the
capital.
Senator de la Barra said that he dis-
charged his mission but failed to obtain
favorable results for the revolutionary
leaders. Messrs. Diaz and Mondragon
refused to accept the proposed armistice
and to negotiate on any basis except the
resignation of the president, vice-presi-
dent and secretaries of state; the senator
reported his findings to the president of
the Republic; he considered then that his
mission was at an end, but remained at
the disposal of the first magistrate, ready
to render any service that might con-
88 THE CASE OF MEXICO
tribute to re-establish the peace of the na-
tion.
Senator de la Barra added for the bene-
fit of the senators who were not informed
of that fact, that the vice-president of the
Senate had called to the house of Sebas-
tien Camacho all the senators who could
be reached by telephone. The call for
that meeting was explained by the note of
the secretary of foreign affairs mentioned
above; the meeting did not begin its de-
liberations until the secretary of foreign
affairs had appeared and made a detailed
report upon the gravity of the situation,
especially in regard to the attitude of the
American government. It was decided
that a call be sent out for a meeting of
the whole Senate for the present meeting,
as the group which convened at Senator
Camacho's did not have the necessary au-
thority to make its decisions respected, an
authority which only a majority of the
senators located at the time in the Federal
District possessed.
The Honorable Senator Valdivieso
moved that a commission be appointed to
THE CASE OF MEXICO 89
suggest measures to be adopted by the
Senate.
The Honorable Senator Jose Diego
Fernandez declared that considering the
gravity of this situation, he was opposed
to the preparation of a commission report
and to the usual procedure. The Senate
should approve at once without waste of
time the following resolutions:
First. Resolved that the president of
the Republic shall be advised, in view of
the supreme necessity of saving the na-
tional sovereignty, to tender his resigna-
tion from his high office.
Second. That the same procedure be
followed in regard to the vice-president of
the Republic.
Third. That a commission be ap-
pointed to apprise President Madero and
Vice-President Pino Suarez of the deci-
sions arrived at.
The honorable secretary of foreign
affairs moved that all the senators present
betake themselves to the national palace
to apprise Messrs. Madero and Pino
90 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Suarez of the decisions taken. The mo-
tion was carried unanimously.
Senator Rabaza nominated as spokes-
man of the senators present Senator
Gumersindo Enriquez.
The Honorable Enriquez moved that
Senator Diego Fernandez be selected as
spokesman. Senator Rabaza moved that
both Senator Enriquez and Senator
Diego Fernandez be appointed spokes-
men, no other senator besides them to be
authorized in any way to speak in behalf
of the Senate. This motion and the pre-
ceding ones were carried unanimously.
The twenty-five senators betook them-
selves to the national palace accompanied
by the secretary of foreign affairs, who
went at once to the office of the president
to inform President Madero that the
Senate desired to apprise him of im-
portant decisions it had taken. The
senators waited half an hour or so in the
room assigned to them. They were then
admitted into one of the ante-rooms of
the president's office where, after a wait
of twenty-five minutes, they were met by
THE CASE OF MEXICO 91
the Honorable Ernesto Madero, former
secretary of finances, the Honorable
Manuel Bonilla, secretary of public
works, the Honorable Jaime Gurza, sec-
retary of communications, and the Hon-
orable Pedro Lascurain, secretary of
foreign affairs. The secretary of finances
informed the senators that the president
of the Republic had left twenty minutes
before accompanied by General Garcia
Pena, to visit the military positions of the
government ; that he himself and the other
secretaries of state could not represent
the first magistrate or speak in his behalf;
he considered himself justified, however,
in informing the senators that the gov-
ernment had sufficient resources to
dominate the situation, for it had received
important reinforcements; the citadel
would be retaken within a few days, for
Brigadier- General Felix Diaz did not
dispose of enough troops to resist the gov-
ernment victoriously; the situation of the
Republic in general was satisfactory, for
no uprising had taken place in the States ;
the State of Puebla had remained faith-
92 THE CASE OF MEXICO
ful, and it was said that Colonel Pradilla
had taken charge of it in the capacity of
military commander; he did not consider
seriously the eventuality of an American
intervention; the president was expecting
an answer to a cablegram which he had
sent to President Taft, a cablegram
which he read to the senators and in which
President Madero was asking President
Taft to revoke the order for the dispatch
of warships and of landing troops ; it was
necessary to wait for the answer, as
President Madero could be trusted to do
everything which patriotism would de-
mand; the resignation of the first magis-
trate tendered at this time would only
have dire results, for it would un-
doubtedly be followed by a state of
anarchy; according to information re-
ceived, uprisings would take place at
once in seven or eight of the States;
ninety per cent, of the nation, including
the privileged classes, stood with the
president, the remaining ten per cent, be-
ing only made up of politicians belonging
to the opposition.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 93
The Honorable Gurza, minister of
communications, announced that he had
received telegrams from every State, on
-the strength of which he could affirm that
the situation was perfectly satisfactory.
Senator Enriquez, addressing himself
to the minister of finances, said: "Mr.
Minister, speaking in behalf of the sena-
tors here assembled who have done Sena-
tor Diego Fernandez and myself the
honor to designate us as their spokesmen,
I beg you to tell us whether the president
of the Republic is not going to receive us
when twenty-five of us senators have
come to him to inform him of most im-
portant decisions we have taken under
the most serious and most painful cir-
cumstances of our country's life. You
have told us that the president was out
and had gone to inspect the advance mili-
tary posts of the line investing the citadel ;
you have not told us, however, whether he
would receive us later, and you have given
us no information on the situation in the
country at large and in the capital in par-
94 THE CASE OF MEXICO
ticular; in order to do this you would have
to confer with the president."
The minister answered that the presi-
dent had left twenty minutes before, hav-
ing gone out with General Garcia Pena
for the reasons previously mentioned.
Senator Enriquez added: "If the presi-
dent does not intend to receive us and if
it is to his ministers that we will have to
explain the reasons which caused us to
solicit an audience from the incumbent of
the executive power, I consider it as my
duty to make the following statements.
The president invited the Senate through
the Department of Foreign Affairs to
meet in a session extraordinary for the
purpose of hearing a report made by the
relevant secretary upon grave news re-
ceived relative to the sending of warships
by the United States of America to the
port of Vera Cruz with orders to land
armed forces which would march upon the
capital of Mexico to protect, if necessary,
the interests and the life of Americans re-
siding in our country. It was impossible
to obtain a quorum yesterday when only
THE CASE OF MEXICO 95
twelve senators were present, and to-day
when only twenty-five met in the cham-
ber; this body, although it did not
assume the character of a Senate, heard
a report of Minister Lascurain which
produced the deepest impression, and a
report from Mr. de la Barra upon the
unsuccessful negotiations he had con-
ducted by request of the president of the
Republic with the rebels occupying the ci-
tadel, with the object of declaring an
armistice and appointing a peace com-
mission; after hearing those reports the
senators came to an unanimous con-
clusion (there are with us now three
dissenting members, the Honorable Ma-
galoni, Gomez and Tagle, but they were
not present at the meeting in which we
took the decisions I will now mention) :
It was resolved that the president, vice-
president, and members of the cabinet
should resign their high offices, obeying
thereby the highest patriotic considera-
tions; without that act of abnegation on
their part, considering the attitude of the
rebels as pictured to us by Mr. de la
96 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Barra, there could not be any hope for
peace. It was further resolved that the
senators present at that meeting should
call upon the president in a body and in-
form him of their decisions, which had
been inspired by the purest patriotism
and the most sincere confidence that the
first magistrate of the nation is still ani-
mated by the spirit of which he has given
so many proofs.
"Having come to this place, Mr.
Minister, we face the fact that we cannot
address ourselves directly to the president
to discharge our mission; and the only
thing left to us is to ask you to explain to
the first magistrate the object of the call
which the 'senators present have paid on
him. Tell him how sorry we are not to
have been able to relate to him personally
the resolutions we passed at the meeting
called through the Department of For-
eign Affairs; tell him also how earnestly
this body of senators beg him to render
to his country the service which they ex-
pect of him, a service which will redound
to his glory and entitle him to the grati-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 97
tude of posterity. For it is not only on
the battlefield and through bloodshed
that one acquires glory and fame; the
country can be served more efficiently
through an act of sublime self-renuncia-
tion such as we expect from him, and for
which the country is anxiously waiting.
"Our attitude, Mr. Minister, has not
been modified by the information that you
have kindly given us upon the general
situation of the country, and upon the
armed strife which is taking place in
our capital. It is not those various inci-
dents which have prompted us to take
such a step, but the fear of complications
with the United States, which are likely
to jeopardize our national independence;
this is a danger before which all selfish
considerations must be laid aside, and the
most legitimate rights must be waived,
for the interests of the country must be
held above all human considerations."
The Honorable Diego Fernandez took
the floor to declare himself in entire sym-
pathy with the sentiments expressed by
Senator Enriquez.
98 THE CASE OF MEXICO
The meeting adjourned.
* * *
The senators did not give up their
patriotic purpose, and after many meet-
ings and many useless attempts at con-
ferring with President Madero they were
at last received by him on the morning of
Tuesday, the 18th. To every one of their
remonstrances he answered that under no
consideration would he ever resign; he
would rather be the president of a people
of corpses and of a nation in ruins, rather
than tender his resignation, he said, for he
represented legality.
The senators withdrew from that con-
ference convinced that there was nothing
to be expected from Madero, and they de-
cided upon a final step. They went to the
office of the military commander and
called on General Huerta, trying ,to
overcome his scruples. Huerta once
more denied their request. In taking
leave of him the senators told him that
they had at last the satisfaction of having
done all there was in their power to stop
the useless shedding of blood, and that
THE CASE OF MEXICO 99
history would judge whether the army
had done right or wrong in supporting a
man who had cost his country so many
lives. The only alternative for the army,
they said in conclusion, was faithfulness
to Madero, or faithfulness to the country.
These last words impressed the old
soldier so deeply that, as the senators
were leaving him, he detained them a
while and said:
"Well, gentlemen, I too am greatly
worried over the conditions that prevail in
our country. I have already told you
that I cannot strike such a blow as you
mention, but I could refuse to recognize
President Madero if directed to do so by
the legislative and judicial powers. You
may confer with the men invested with
judicial power, and if the two bodies agree
I will consider it proper to tell President
Madero that he must resign at once."
The senators withdrew, to return soon
afterwards accompanied by a majority of
the justices of the Supreme Court; the
latter assured General Huerta that they
100 THE CASE OP MEXICO
were agreeable to the proposition made
by the members of the legislature.
General Huerta conferred at once with
his subordinates, and finding that two of
them, Generals Felipe Angeles and Jose
Delgado were not in accord with him, he
excluded them from the conference and
later placed them under arrest.
General Huerta gave orders to Gen-
eral Aureliano Blanquet, a valiant and
trusted man, to take possession of the na-
tional palace with the 29th battalion, of
which he was commander, after which he
ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Biveroll and
Major Izquierdo to go to the presidential
palace, where Madero and the members
of his cabinet were at the time, and to re-
quest him respectfully in behalf of the
Legislature and the Army to tender his
resignation. What took place then is re-
lated as follows by Adjutant Fernando
Troncoso of the military commander's
staff, who was an eye witness of the scene:
"Ex-President Madero was seated with
several members of his cabinet in one of
the parlors of the palace when Lieuten-
GENERAL AUREUANO BLANQUET
THE CASE OP MEXICO 101
ant-Colonel Biveroll appeared before him
asking him, in behalf of the Senate and
the Army, for his immediate resignation.
Madero listened to his words, then took a
revolver and fired at the unfortunate offi-
cer, who fell on the floor, never to rise
again; thereupon Major Izquierdo ap-
peared and was also shot dead by Captain
Garmendia. The president, accompanied
by several people, took the elevator, and
when he reached the main entrance to the
palace, seeing the armed forces standing
in front of it, he exclaimed:
"Here is the president of the Republic,
gentlemen."
The valiant General Blanquet, revolver
in hand and leading the greater part of
his battalion, marched towards Presi-
dent Madero and, ordering that no shot
be fired, took him prisoner. What hap-
pened afterwards is known to everybody.
Ernesto Madero, minister of finance,
and Jaime Curza, minister of communica-
tions, escaped in the disorder that fol-
lowed. Rafael Hernandez, minister of
state, was freed on parole. President
102 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Madero, Vice-President Pino Suarez,
and the other ministers were held prison-
ers in various rooms in the basement of
the palace, guarded by sentinels.
The bells of every church in the capital
were tolled to announce Madero's fall,
and every class of the population received
the news with undisguised pleasure.
General Huerta sent out at once the
following manifesto, which was circu-
lated broadcast:
"To THE MEXICAN PEOPLE:
"In view of the difficult circumstances
under which the nation, and within the
last days, the capital of the Republic
have labored, in view of what I may call
the state of anarchy due to the incapable
government of Mr. Madero, I hereby
assume the executive power. Until the
Houses of the Union can meet and de-
bate upon the present situation I shall
hold Francisco I. Madero and the mem-
bers of his cabinet, to the end that this
point being settled and every effort made
to unite all the minds in this historical
THE CASE OF MEXICO 108
moment, we may all work together to re-
establish peace, which for our nation is a
question of life and death.
Issued in the Executive Palace, Feb-
ruary 18, 1913.
The General Military Commander in
charge of the Executive Power.
V. HUERTA."
CHAPTER V
THE PACT OF THE CITADEL THE RESIGNA-
TION OF PKESIDENT MADERO AND VICE-
PRESIDENT PINO SUAREZ THE ORIGIN
OF THE PROVISIONAL GOVERNMENT
THE DE FACTO GOVERNMENT BECOMES
A GOVERNMENT DE JURE ACCORDING TO
THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION.
As soon as Madero and Pino Suarez
were deposed, General Huerta consid-
ered that the hostilities between the fed-
eral forces and the Felixists should come
to an end. His opinion was transmitted
to General Felix Diaz, who agreed fully
with him, since the revolt he had led had
accomplished its purpose. Arrangements
were made for a conference in which the
two leaders would settle formally and
definitely the present situation and decide
upon the course to be followed in the im-
mediate future.
At eight o'clock of the same day
(February 18) General Huerta went to
the Department of State where Briga-
104
THE CASE OF MEXICO 105
dier General Felix Diaz was awaiting him
and the conference took place. General
Huerta was accompanied by Lieutenant
Colonel Joaquin Mass and Enrique Ce-
peda, C. E. General Diaz had with him
Rodolfe" Reyes, Fidencio Hernandez,
General Mondragon, and several of the
officers who had fought with him in the
Citadel. A protracted discussion on the
question of merging the various political
groups gave unsatisfactory results, as
every one present expressed diverging
opinions; the two leaders were the ones
who spoke least.
Finally some one suggested that in
order to shorten the proceedings the two
generals be left together to settle the
question the best they could, with due re-
gard to the interest of the nation.
This advice was heeded and within a
few minutes Huerta and Diaz found
themselves in perfect accord; they called
in their friends, informed them of the
understanding they had arrived at and
asked them to write down the following
protocol:
106 THE CASE OF MEXICO
"In the city of Mexico, at nine-thirty
in the evening, the 18th of February,
1913, Generals Felix Diaz and Vic-
toriano Huerta having met in conference,
the former assisted by Messrs. Fidencio
Hernandez and Rodolfo Reyes, the lat-
ter by Lieutenant Colonel Joaquin Mass
and Enrique Cepeda, General Huerta
stated that the situation created by the
government of Mr. Madero being un-
bearable, he had, in order to prevent the
further shedding of blood and to safe-
guard national unity, placed under arrest
said Madero, several members of his cab-
inet, and various other persons; that he
wished to express to General Diaz the
sincere wish that the political elements
General Diaz represented return into the
fold, and that all parties at last reunited
put an end to this deplorable situation.
General Diaz stated that his only reason
for raising the standard of revolt was a
desire to protect the national welfare,
and that he was ready to make any sacri-
fice that would prove beneficial to the
country.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 10T
After a discussion in which the above
mentioned gentlemen took part, the fol-
lowing resolutions were agreed upon:
1. The former incumbent of the
Executive Power is not to be recognized
henceforth, and the political forces rep-
resented by Generals Diaz and Huerta
are to unite in opposing all efforts to re-
store him to power.
2. The present situation shall be
settled with the least possible delay and
by the most convenient lawful means,
and Generals Diaz and Huerta will do
all in their power to enable the latter to
assume within seventy-two hours the pro-
visional presidency of the Republic with
the following cabinet :
Foreign affairs: Francisco Leon de la
Barraj
Finance: Toribio Esquivel Obregon.
War: General Manuel Mondragon.
Public Works: Alberto Robles Gil,
C.E.
State: Alberto Garcia Granados, C.E.
Justice: Rodolfo Reyes.
Education: Jorge Vera EstanoL
108 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Communications: David de la Fuente,
C.E.
A new department to be known as the
department of agriculture shall be cre-
ated with the purpose of preparing a so-
lution of the agrarian questions and re-
lated problems; the portfolio of this de-
partment is to be held by Manuel Garza
Aldape.
Whatever changes may be introduced
in the proposed cabinet shall be agreed
upon in a way similar to the way the cab-
inet itself was agreed upon.
3. Until such time as the situation
shall have been settled lawfully, Generals
Huerta and Diaz shall remain the deposi-
tories of all authority that is necessary to
give full protection to all interests.
4. General Diaz declines to be a mem-
ber of the provisional cabinet when Gen-
eral Huerta assumes the provisional
presidency, so as to retain his entire free-
dom of action, and to foster the interests
of his party during the coming elections,
an attitude he wishes to make very clear
THE CASE OF MEXICO 109
to everyone, and upon which the under-
signed are fully agreed.
5. An official note shall be sent at
once to the representatives of foreign
nations, mentioning solely that the in-
cumbent of the executive power has been
removed and that steps will be taken at
once to select his successor, and that in
the meantime Generals Diaz and Huerta
shall exert all their authority to assure
full protection to all foreign residents.
6. All rebels shall be invited at once
to cease hostilities, and all the cases shall
be settled separately.
General Victoriano Huerta
General Felix Diaz
Such is the document known to history
as the "Pact of the Citadel", although it
was concluded not in that edifice but in
the department of state.
General Huerta, who, until then, had
only held the title of military commander
in charge of the executive power, consti-
tuted himself the official leader of the
revolution.
110 THE CASE OF MEXICO
He sent through official channels to
the dean of the diplomatic corps, Henry
Lane Wilson, ambassador from the
United States, a full account of all that
had transpired. In that communication
he stated that the only motive of his ac-
tion had been patriotism, and that he was
not actuated by any personal aims; that
his only purpose was to reestablish peace
in the republic and to safeguard the in-
terests of foreigners. He also asked him
to transmit this information to the Ameri-
can government.
The ambassador from the United
States answered in his own name and in
behalf of the diplomatic corps, ac-
knowledging receipt of the note and its
contents, and expressing the hope that
General Huerta would invite all Mexi-
cans without distinction to cooperate in
his work of pacification.
At the same time Mr. Wilson, in his
official capacity of ambassador, sent an-
other note to General Huerta stating
that he had no intention of interfering in
the national affairs of Mexico, but sug-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 111
gested discreetly that General Huerta
and his army place themselves at the dis-
posal of the Congress of the Union. He
added that he would also broach the sub-
ject to General Felix Diaz.
General Huerta stated verbally to the
bearers of those notes that he was fully
conscious of his responsibilities and that
his most earnest desire was to return as
soon as possible to the life of a private
citizen, and that as long as he would be
vested with the supreme authority all
foreigners could count on his friendship
and protection.
The next morning Generals Huerta
and Diaz issued the following proclama-
tion to the Mexican people:
"The unbearable and perilous situa-
tion which obtained in the capital caused
the army represented by the undersigned
to cooperate fraternally in saving our
country, and in consequence of that ac-
tion the nation can now rest in peace.
"All the liberties compatible with order
shall be guaranteed under the personal
responsibility of the undersigned officers,
112 THE CASE OF MEXICO
who will assume henceforth the com-
mandment and the reins of the govern-
ment in so far as this will be necessary in
order to give full protection to natives
and foreigners, and who engage them-
selves to settle the situation on a lawful
basis within seventy-two hours.
"The army exhorts the citizens to con-
tinue in the noble attitude of respect and
moderation which they have preserved to
this day, and invites all the revolutionary
bands to join hands for the purpose of es-
tablishing permanent peace in the nation.
"Mexico, February 18, 1913.
Felix Diaz. V. Huerta."
General Huerta's government became
then a de facto government, and al-
though this was quite sufficient for the
time being, the new incumbent of .the
executive power considered it as impera-
tive to comply at once with the constitu-
tional provisions. He therefore ad-
dressed the same day a message to the
Federal Congress giving an account of
the incidents that had taken place. Fol-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 118
lowing this the Chamber of Deputies met
the same day (February 19) and remain-
ed in session from four in the afternoon
until eleven at night to discuss the resig-
nation of President Madero and Vice-
President Pino Suarez.
The Chamber appointed a commission
composed of Deputies Francisco de Ola-
guibel, Francisco Escudero, and Jose I.
Novelo, whose duty would be to call on
Madero and Pino Suarez, detained in the
National Palace, and to ask them to ten-
der their resignation.
The commission did not find them
readily amenable to reason; Madero re-
peated with insistence that he represented
legality. Finally Madero and Suarez
yielded and tendered their resignation in
a joint note which read:
To the Honorable Secretaries of the
Chamber of Deputies:
In consideration of the events that took
place yesterday in Mexico, and to insure
the peace of the nation, we hereby form-
ally resign the positions of president and
114 THE CASE OF MEXICO
vice-president to which we were respec-
tively elected. We do this under protest.
Mexico, February 19, 1913.
Francisco I. Madero
Jose M. Pino Suarez
At 8.45 the chamber presented that
document to the minister of foreign af-
fairs, Pedro Lascurain. It was referred
to the second committee on state affairs;
and the third committee on constitutional
questions, which issued almost immedi-
ately the following orders :
"1. That the resignation of the Honor-
able Francisco I. Madero as President of
the Republic be accepted.
2. That the resignation of the Honor-
able Jose M. Pino Suarez as Vice-Presi-
dent of the Republic be accepted.
3. That Pedro Lascurain, Minister of
Foreign Affairs, be called upon to oc-
cupy, in virtue of his office, the position
of provisional president.
To be communicated to all the parties
concerned."
The order was approved in toto without
THE CASE OF MEXICO 115
discussion. When the items were put in
discussion the resignation of Madero was
approved by 123 votes against 4 ; that of
Pino Suarez by 119 against 8.
In consequence of which Pedro Las-
curain was declared the constitutional
provisional president of the Republic and
took at once the oath of office.
In the course of the same session a
communication from the new provisional
president was read; in this he informed
the Chamber that he had appointed Gen-
eral Huerta Minister of State. There-
upon Mr. Lascurain tendered his resig-
nation as provisional president. The
relevant committees of the Chamber di-
rected that his resignation be accepted
and that General Huerta, minister of
state, be called to assume, ex offido, the
vacant post. The order having been ap-
proved by the Chamber, General Huerta
took the oath of office at once and became
henceforth de facto and de jure consti-
tutional President of the United States of
Mexico.
The foregoing is ample evidence that
116 THE CASE OF MEXICO
General Huerta did not take the presi-
dency by force and violence. He held
the executive power in his hands for a few
hours only in virtue of his position as
commander of the army and in accordance
with the Pact of the Citadel. He turned
it over immediately, however, in obedience
to the will of the Chamber of Deputies to
the man who was, according to the consti-
tution, its lawful incumbent. When he
again assumed the power he did so in a
perfectly constitutional way, authorized
by a vote of the Chamber of Deputies
convened in lawful meeting in confor-
mity with the legal procedure governing
such cases.
This does away with the main objection
which the government of the United
States has raised to recognizing our pro-
visional government. This objection is
totally unfounded or rather the founda-
tion upon which it reposes is either a mis-
taken notion or a lie.
The press of the United States has on
several occasions expressed doubts as to
whether Madero and Pino Suarez had
THE CASE OF MEXICO 117
actually tendered their resignations. I
read very recently, on December 24, 1913,
in the usually careful New York Times
statements made by Mr. Frederick Im-
man Monsen, from which I may quote the
following lines:
"No one knows," he said, "just when
he was killed, except that it happened
at night. After repeated refusals on the
part of Madero to resign he was removed
one night from his room and taken into
an adjoining one, where his resignation
was placed before him in writing.
"A pen was put in his hand and he was
asked to sign his name. He refused;
whereupon the Mexican leader grasped
the pen and shaking it in his face cried, 'I
will sign your name to this and, Madero,
you shall never live to deny the signature/
"That night Madero and several of his
advisers were killed."
Mr. Monsen did not know of what he
was talking. There is no proof that
Huerta saw Madero, or asked him per-
sonally for his resignation, or that Ma-
dero was killed the night after he had re-
118 THE CASE OF MEXICO
signed (February 19) . He was killed on
the night of the 22nd, that is three full
days after he had tendered his resigna-
tion ; there is no proof that any of his ad-
visers were killed that night.
It is regrettable that the sayings of
persons who have neither the time nor
the desire to ascertain the actual facts
should find such an echo in the American
press. It is still more deplorable that the
government at Washington should lend
an ear to reports of such a nature without
making due efforts to verify their ac-
curacy.
CHAPTER VI
GUSTAVO MADERO AND BASO ARE SEN-
TENCED TO BE SHOT THE DEATH OF
EX-PRESIDENT MADERO AND EX-VICE-
PRESIDENT PINO SUAREZ.
Gustavo Madero was said to be Fran-
cisco Madero's favorite brother. Public
opinion considered him as the power be-
hind the throne, as the instigator of all the
crimes perpetrated by the government;
he was held responsible for every act of
iniquity committed during the Maderist
regime. His friends, on the contrary, pre-
tended that more than once he quarrelled
with Francisco over some of the latter's
frenzied doings, and that the president
would have been much better off if he had
followed some of his advice. I do not
know which of these two views of Gus-
tavo's character is the correct one; one
fact, however, which cannot be gainsaid
is that Gustavo was the organizer of the
"Porra", the most odious and most funest
U9
120 THE CASE OF MEXICO
society ever started in Mexico, a sort of
political black hand whose members were
all visibly and efficiently protected by
Gustavo Madero.
Regarding the circumstances of Gus-
tavo's arrest many romantic stories have
been told. Some say that he was plan-
ning to poison General Huerta at a ban-
quet which he had prepared and which
took place at the very time when he was
arrested, "for the Madero family always
managed to let their rejoicings coincide
with scenes of national mourning."
In fact the banquet took place on
February 18, at the very hour when Presi-
dent Madero was apprehended.
Gustavo Madero was dining at the
restaurant Gambrinus with Generals
Jose Delgado, Agustin Sangines, and
Colonel Francisco Romero, who had just
been promoted to the rank of brigadier-
general and in whose honor the banquet
was given. Of a sudden Lieutenant Luis
Fuentes, accompanied by an escort of
Chapultepec foresters, appeared in the
dining-room, and, addressing Gustavo
THE CASE OP MEXICO 12
Madero, informed him that he was unde
arrest. Gustavo tried to reach his pistol
but the officer foiled that attempt b;
pressing the muzzle of his revolver agains
Madero's forehead, and Madero sur
rendered. He was locked up in a cella
room of the restaurant, guarded by a sen
tinel, and sometime during the night h
was taken to the National Palace amic
expressions of hatred on the part of th
crowd which had learned of the happen
ings and which would have lynched him i
his escort hadn't protected him.
At midnight he was removed from th
Palace to the Citadel, and early the nex
morning was shot to death.
The authors of the "Bloody Ten Days
relate this incident as follows:
"The Felixists, occupying the fortres,
became very excited when they saw thf
Gustavo Madero was in their powe:
The defenders of the fortress shouted, t
the mob had shouted on the streets, dc
manding the head of the prisoner t
avenge the deaths of General Ruiz and c
122 THE CASE OF MEXICO
all the unfortunate victims who had been
sacrificed in the battle waged the first day.
"General Diaz denied his soldiers' de-
mands, for his prisoner was absolutely un-
strung, and shaking with fear at the
thought of being put to death in the
Felixist fortress.
"As the prisoner was transferred from
one part of the fortress to another an in-
cident took place which still appears un-
explainable, but which most people con-
sider as a part of a premeditated plan.
"As Gustavo Madero and his guards
were crossing the small square where the
statue of General Morelos stands, some-
one, probably the adjutant to General
Mondragon, fired a gun at Gustavo. The
latter, hearing the report, tried to flee to
shelter himself in one of the artillery
wagons which stood near by; several
soldiers, however, discharged their guns at
the fugitive, who fell dead, having been hit
and sent rolling on the ground by the first
shot."
The truth is that Gustavo as well as
Adolfo Baso were sent to the Citadel to be
THE CASE OF MEXICO 123
shot. At 2 o'clock in the morning he was
taken out of his cell by an officer leading
a platoon of soldiers, but, on his way to
the place of execution, he begged for
mercy and in panicky terror cried out that
he was only a civilian, that he had never
mixed with politics, and offered all his
fortune in exchange for his life. When he
reached the small square in front of the
Citadel, he tried to run away and the es-
cort opened fire on him, shooting him
through the back.
The attendant of the Palace, Captain
Adolfo Baso of the navy, was also taken
from the Palace where he had been kept
and removed to the Citadel. Baso was
responsible for the terrible slaughter of
the defenseless crowd which occurred in
the first encounter before the Palace; he
was the one who discharged the machine
guns which produced that ^horrible but-
chery.
Baso left the fortress surrounded by
the platoon that was to execute him and
when reaching the small square said:
"What are you going to do to me?
124. THE CASE OF MEXICO
Shoot me? Please notice that I am dying
like a man. I want to look at the sky.
. * , I can't see the Great Bear. . . . Oh,
yes! there it is shining beautifully."
He distributed a few trinkets among
the soldiers, gave a few messages for his
family and exclaimed:
"I am 62. You see that I am dying
like a man."
And opening the large cape which he
wore he threw out his chest and gave the
order to fire. A volley mowed him down.
* * *
As soon as President Madero and Vice-
President Pino Suarez were arrested
there was much speculation as to the fate
that awaited them. Both were the object
of deep hatred; Pino Suarez more per-
haps than Madero. Army officers and
soldiers were in favor of their execution;
the people were greatly incensed over the
slaughter of harmless folk and the many
executions that had taken place without
process of law. The lives of both men
were in great danger, and therefore the
government decided to transfer them
GENERAL M, MONDRAGON
122 THE CASE OF MEXICO
all the unfortunate victims who had been
sacrificed in the battle waged the first day.
"General Diaz denied his soldiers' de-
mands, for his prisoner was absolutely un-
strung, and shaking with fear at the
thought of being put to death in the
Felixist fortress.
"As the prisoner was transferred from
one part of the fortress to another an in-
cident took place which still appears un-
explainable, but which most people con-
sider as a part of a premeditated plan.
"As Gustavo Madero and his guards
were crossing the small square where the
statue of General Morelos stands, some-
one, probably the adjutant to General
Mondragon, fired a gun at Gustavo. The
latter, hearing the report, tried to flee to
shelter himself in one of the artillery
wagons which stood near by; several
soldiers, however, discharged their guns at
the fugitive, who fell dead, having been hit
and sent rolling on the ground by the first
shot."
The truth is that Gustavo as well as
Adolf o Baso were sent to the Citadel to be
THE CASE OF MEXICO 123
shot. At 2 o'clock in the morning he was
taken out of his cell by an officer leading
a platoon of soldiers, but, on his way to
the place of execution, he begged for
mercy and in panicky terror cried out that
he was only a civilian, that he had never
mixed with politics, and offered all his
fortune in exchange for his life. When he
reached the small square in front of the
Citadel, he tried to run away and the es-
cort opened fire on him, shooting him
through the back.
The attendant of the Palace, Captain
Adolfo Baso of the navy, was also taken
from the Palace where he had been kept
and removed to the Citadel. Baso was
responsible for the terrible slaughter of
the defenseless crowd which occurred in
the first encounter before the Palace; he
was the one who discharged the machine
guns which produced that horrible but-
chery.
Baso left the fortress surrounded by
the platoon that was to execute him and
when reaching the small square said:
"What are you going to do to me?
124 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Shoot me? Please notice that I am dying
like a man. I want to look at the sky.
... I can't see the Great Bear. . . . Oh,
yes! there it is shining beautifully."
He distributed a few trinkets among
the soldiers, gave a few messages for his
family and exclaimed :
"I am 62. You see that I am dying
like a man."
And opening the large cape which he
wore he threw out his chest and gave the
order to fire. A volley mowed him down.
* * *
As soon as President Madero and Vice-
President Pino Suarez were arrested
there was much speculation as to the fate
that awaited them. Both were the object
of deep hatred; Pino Suarez more per-
haps than Madero. Army officers and
soldiers were in favor of their execution;
the people were greatly incensed over the
slaughter of harmless folk and the many
executions that had taken place without
process of law. The lives of both men
were in great danger, and therefore the
government decided to transfer them
GENERAL M. MONDRAGON
THE CASE OF MEXICO 125
from the Palace to the penitentiary,
where they would be safe against any at-
tempt on the part of the mob or the army.
This decision was agreed upon by Gen-
erals Huerta, Diaz, Mondragon, and
Blanquet, and Mr. Rodolfo Reyes.
The press of Mexico City published on
February 23 the following item:
"The President of the Republic called
a meeting of his cabinet at 12.30 p.m. to
report that Messrs. Francisco I. Madero
and Jose M. Pino Suarez, who were held
in the National Palace at the disposition
of the secretary of war, were being re-
moved, according to the decision taken, to
the penitentiary, which establishment had
been placed, for more safety, under the
command of an army officer; the automo-
biles carrying them were only a short dis-
tance from the penitentiary when they
were stopped by a group of armed men;
the men of the escort stepped out to de-
fend themselves; the number of the ag-
gressors increased and the prisoners tried
to run away; a shooting affray took place
in the course of which two of the aggres-
126 THE CASE OF MEXICO
SOTS were wounded and one killed and
both prisoners lost their lives.
"The president and his cabinet ordered
the judicial authority to inquire into this
attempt against the life of military pris-
oners (as Mr. Madero and Mr. Pino
Suarez were). A very thorough inquiry
was conducted under the personal direc-
tion of the military attorney general.
The minister of justice has ruled that,
considering the exceptional character of
the case, the Attorney-General of the Re-
public is to take up the case after the pre-
liminary inquiry is terminated.
"The government deplores this inci-
dent; for more safety it had that evening
asked the minister of justice to prepare
the case against the prisoners for the fol-
lowing Monday. As at that time sev-
eral friends of Mr. Madero were endeav-
oring to help in finding a solution for that
difficult and delicate problem, the govern-
ment, to protect itself and to protect its
prisoners, had appointed Colonel Luis
Ballesteros director of the penitentiary
THE CASE OF MEXICO 127
and given him very strict orders to be in
readiness for any emergency.
"The government promises that justice
shall take its course. The officers com-
manding the escort have been held and all
the possible evidence is being collected.
The whole truth shall be known regarding
this disgraceful incident, which, however,
is not unexplainable under the present
painful circumstances."
Major Francisco Cardenas of the 7th
Rurales, who was in charge of the transfer
of the prisoners, informed the press that a
first attack had been made at Lecumberri
Street upon the escort which found itself,
a little later, confronted by a group of
men who opened fire upon the automo-
biles. Those men were in ambush only a
few yards from the prison. The men who
fired the first shots were lying flat in the
gutter.
"The prisoners tried to take advantage
of the confusion and to run away. That
attempt cost them their lives, for the men
who had set out to free them (those who
attacked the automobiles could not have
128 THE CASE OF MEXICO
had any other purpose) fired shots rather
carelessly. The Rurales of the escort also
discharged their guns in self defense. Mr.
Madero and Pino Suarez fell down, prob-
ably struck by bullets from both sides."
Such is the official version.
A different version was circulated, ac-
cording to which the prisoners had been
shot by their escort. The authors of the
"Bloody Ten Days", whom I have quoted
several times, give credence to the popu-
lar version and add: "The news of Mr.
Madero's death did not create much of an
impression, nor did it cause any disturb-
ance. A few people from the lowest
classes and a few workingmen were the
only ones to cheer Madero's body when it
was removed from the penitentiary where
the autopsy had been held."
Carlos Toro in his book "The Fall of
Madero" expressed himself as follows :
"Let us say it quite frankly: nobody
cared to preserve the lives of those dan-
gerous apostles of violence and anarchy,
and their death was considered by their
friends and enemies alike as a national
THE CASE OF MEXICO 129
necessity. The bitterness, the anger, the
feuds so sedulously kept up by those two
men ended with them; it was plain com-
mon sense that demanded their extermina-
tion. There was plenty of deplorable
evidence at hand that those men, in-
capable of governing, were dangerous
agitators.
"Whether this was a genuine assault or
a premediated execution, the nation's will
was done. If a crime was committed it
was a collective crime, for society was de-
manding with insistence the suppression
of the two men mainly responsible for the
disorderly conditions affecting the Re-
public."
Jose Fernandez Rojas, in his "Mexi-
can Revolution," writes:
"That version (the official one) has not
found general acceptance; there is nothing
incredible about it, however, and it is per-
fectly within the limits of the possible. A
group of Maderists may have tried to lib-
erate their chief leader with the only re-
sult that of satisfying the public's greatest
need.
130 THE CASE OF MEXICO
"Madero's and Pino Suarez's deaths
were essential to the welfare of the coun-
try; it is a sorry thought, however, that
only their tragic fate could have insured
permanent peace for our country."
Thus we find two contradictory reports.
The first can be suspected on account of
its official origin, for the government may
have had an interest in misrepresenting
the facts. The second is quite as sus-
picious as the first, for it had no basis of
fact and is little more than gossip told by
one or several persons who had not wit-
nessed the deed.
It may be said in favor of the first ver-
sion that the government did not have to
resort to such stratagems in order to bring
about the execution of Madero and Pino
Suarez; it could have proceeded in their
case as it did in the case of Gustavo Ma-
dero and Baso; or it could have, in order
to avoid responsibilities, sent them before
a drum head court-martial which would
have tried them summarily and ordered
their immediate execution. Moreover, the
case was referred to the relevant courts in
THE CASE OP MEXICO 131
order that a regular inquiry be held; when
the inquiry was completed, the court de-
clared that no one could be held on ac-
count of the shooting. From the point of
view of the courts, the legal truth was
therefore that no crime had been commit-
ted and that the official version was the
truthful one.
I would like finally to add this : an an-
onymous accuser, public opinion, charged
the government with having assassinated
Madero and Pino Suarez. When the case
came to the courts, no one rose to sustain
the charge, no one presented any evidence,
except circumstantial evidence. What
importance can one attach to such anony-
mous accusations?
The most one can do in this case is to
suspend judgment; in the jurisprudence
of all countries the defendant should be
accorded the benefit of the doubt ; nowhere
can any one be put in jeopardy for a deed,
unless it has been demonstrated beyond
cavil that the deed was committed and
that the defendant was guilty of it.
* * *
132 THE CASE OF MEXICO
I shall now sum up this first part of my
book. I believe I have proved to my
readers' satisfaction the following facts :
1. That Francisco I. Madero was a
disturber of the public peace and the
leader of a revolution in which all the ills
for which the Mexican Republic is now
suffering had their inception.
2. That Francisco I. Madero took con-
trol of the presidency merely on the
strength of the revolution.
8. That Francisco I. Madero violated
repeatedly the federal constitution and
the election laws.
4. That the administration of Fran-
cisco I. Madero was positively disastrous
for the country.
5. That the counter revolution, or in
other words, the movement directed
against the Maderist administration, was
a necessity created by the government it-
self.
6. That Francisco I. Madero was re-
sponsible either directly or indirectly for
the slaughter of peaceful people which
GENERAL GREGORIO RUEZ
THE CASE OF MEXICO 188
went on in Mexico City during the
Bloody Ten Days.
7. That Francisco I. Madero was di-
rectly responsible for the execution of
General Gregorio Ruiz, Deputy to the
Congress of the Union, without previous
process of law, although the constitutional
guaranties had not been suspended in the
federal district and General Ruiz was
covered by his parliamentary immunity.
8. That Francisco I. Madero killed
with his own hand Lieutenant Colonel
Teodoro Jiminez Riveroll when the latter
presented himself before him, in compli-
ance with his superior's orders, to ask him
respectfully to tender his resignation.
9. That there is no legal proof, but
merely a chain of circumstantial evidence
to sustain the charge that General Huerta
ordered the assassination of Francisco I.
Madero and of Jose Pino Suarez. If the
declarations of the government are not
sufficient one must either produce evi-
dence or suspend judgment, and in case
of doubt no sentence can be passed.
It may be fitting to repeat here what I
184 THE CASE OP MEXICO
wrote in the concluding paragraph of the
preceding chapter: "This does away with
the main objection which the government
of the United States has raised to recog-
nizing our provisional government. This
objection is totally unfounded or rather
the foundation upon which it reposes is
either a mistaken notion or a lie."
CHAPTER VII
"THE CASE or MEXICO"" PRESIDENT WOOD-
BOW WILSON THE AMERICAN POINT
OF VIEW.
I must begin by confessing that until
recently I had always considered the
Hon. Woodrow Wilson, President of the
United States, as a pure idealist. After
watching him at closer range, speaking
with people who have known him inti-
mately for many years and studying his
political career I have modified my opin-
ion of him.
There are in Mr. Wilson two very well
defined personalities: The philosopher
who in his speculations arrives at idealistic
conclusions, and the positivistic politician,
energetic, unyielding. It seems as
though his political creed was that it is bet-
ter to be difficult to dissuade than easy to
persuade.
He has the ability to impart to his pol-
icy an appearance of idealism and to con-
135
186 THE CASE OF MEXICO
vince his friends, as well as his enemies,
that they are dealing with the most stub-
born schoolmaster instead of with the
most astute politician that the United
States has ever bred.
I have noticed, not without surprise,
that this so-called idealist who is supposed
to know nothing whatever of practical
politics, has forced a recalcitrant congress
to adopt two important measures to which
important sections of the three great par-
ties had previously declared their bitter
antagonism.
If you care to trace his earlier record
as governor of New Jersey, the convic-
tion will grow upon you that Machiavelli
would have been clay in Wilson's hands,
and what is more, that Machiavelli would
never have known it ! If you follow him
still further back, and scrutinize his
career as president of the miniature re-
public at Princeton, you will gather the
most enlightening evidence of all; for
eleven years, facing conditions indescrib-
ably unfavorable to his program, he
so thoroughly dominated the forces align-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 137
ed against him that every one of his plans
was finally carried out. And yet, when
he left, his enemies agreed in saying of
him, with the contemptous pity of the
practical man for the thinker: "Yes, a
brilliant man, a wonderful dreamer, a
great student, but too set in his ways.
He will not give way even in minor mat-
ters in order to get his way in big ones.
He's obstinate, impolitic, impractical.
He's not enough of a politician for a job
like this!"
Whether he is or is not a politician,
whether he is practical or unpractical, the
fact remains that Mr. Woodrow Wilson
made his way to the Presidency of the Re-
public. It is true that he reached that
position by a mere accident, but he reach-
ed it just the same.
Let us now consider the conditions as
Mr. Wilson found them when he assumed
the presidency. He was chosen by a mi-
nority of the voters, and though the op-
position is divided, it is quite unanimous
in wishing him ill. The government at
Washington is an endless game of politics
188 THE CASE OF MEXICO
for polities' sake. If by any trick or
manoeuvre either of the two elements bit-
terly hostile to Wilson and to all he stands
for, could compromise him in the eye of
the country, his power to carry through
the program to which he is pledged,
would come to an abrupt end. For
though he has a nominal party behind him,
it must not be forgotten that his party is
made up of heterogeneous elements so
oddly-matched, that it is laughable to see
them in even a temporary accord. The
Democratic Party, even in its palmy ante-
bellum days, was a house divided against
itself; in those days North against South,
at present East against West in its opin-
ions. It ranges from Bryanism at one
extreme, to the ultra-conservatism of
Parker at the other. It includes the un-
speakable Tammany element in New
York and the blue-blooded aristocracy of
the Southern States. Its present ma-
jority in congress does not correspond to
any majority of the voters, and this acci-
dentally established majority is itself so
heterogeneous that only a master in the
THE CASE OF MEXICO 139
game of politics could possibly hope to
unite it in support of a definite, sane pol-
icy. Let us remember that from 1856 to
1913 the Democratic Party has been very
seldom able either to put itself in power,
or when it has accomplished this, to main-
tain harmony within itself long enough to
carry out even a plank of its program-
Behind the Democratic congress there
stands no real popular force, save the
negative power of divided opposition, an
opposition which may unite at any time
to drive Democracy out of power.
The voter of this country gleans his
political preferences almost entirely from
the newspapers, the majority of which are
opposed to Wilson. Wilson is like a
general, commanding a small force of ex-
ceedingly unreliable troops, officered by
ambitious and jealous subordinates, and
wholly surrounded and outnumbered by
foes, momentarily at odds with one an-
other. Should the opposition press solid-
ly united against him he would fail as
pitifully as Cleveland did.
Such a man in such a situation had
140 THE CASE OF MEXICO
to cope on the very first day of his
administration with a foreign compli-
cation which has not the remotest bear-
ing upon the program which he pledged
himself to carry out. He had to solve a
question upon which it is impossible to se-
cure trustworthy information. His
agents disagree radically in their reports.
He considers the most important of them
Mr. Henry L. Wilson, for whom I have
the greatest esteem, as avowedly hostile to
him personally and politically. What-
ever his final decision may be he knows in
advance that the opposition will condemn
it. If he is not very careful he may in-
volve the country in a war which would
spell disaster in more ways than one.
Mr. Wilson's policy in regard to
Mexico is well summarized in the follow-
ing letter written to me by a clever Ameri-
can journalist:
"Wilson knows that in the country,
among the classes from which he draws
support and to which he must look for its
continuance, there is a strong hostility to
bloody tactics, and a consequent dislike of
THE CASE OF MEXICO 141
those on whom a blood suspicion rests.
He knows, as any newspaper reader must
know, that any appearance of friendship
with Huerta would compromise him in the
eye of the real governing class of the
country. He knows, too, that every op-
position newspaper in the .land is ready to
attack him the instant he takes this course,
and that the attack will find a ready sym-
pathy among the stable element of the
population. Indeed, many of the hostile
papers, surveying the situation, have al-
ready reached the conclusion that the ad-
ministration will be compelled to recog-
nize the de facto government as also the
government de jure, and on this supposi-
tion, have already begun to condemn any
such recognition, and in some cases, even
to demand excitedly that the United
States intervene at once to reestablish the
remnants of the fallen government. This
chorus swells and rises while Wilson waits
and ponders and inquires, a well known
habit of his. He rarely acts until he
knows all there is to know about what he
is doing. The wolves and jackals of the
142 THE CASE OF MEXICO
press are pressing him close, ready to
spring upon him the moment he takes
what they never neglect to call the bloody
hand of Huerta.
"Wilson plays his favorite game. He
takes a lofty stand. He refuses to coun-
tenance Huerta by any formal recog-
nition. Here you have your Puritan. I
believe he followed, as he always has fol-
lowed, the dictates of his conscience, but I
am very sure that in so deciding he knew
that he was outwitting his foes as cleverly
as he always does. He left the opposition
press gasping. It has to commend his
decision, it had to cease howling him down,
and to praise him instead. And the great
majority of sober citizens up here had
nothing but praise for his course. It left
him firmly in control of his destinies, with
a tight grip on his congress and with the
country confident that he might be trusted
to keep us out of warfare, at the worst,
and at the best, might bring us through
the crisis with honor and profit,
"That you and I happen to know how
erroneous the information was as regards
THE CASE OF MEXICO 148
Huerta, that we happen to have a clear
understanding of the actual conditions of
Mexico, is merely our good fortune. You
have no idea of the mass of outrageously
false information on the subject which has
filtered through our press into our public
during the past nine months. The aver-
age citizen here knows nothing more about
Huerta than that it is difficult to pro-
nounce his name and that he is strongly
suspected of having committed a rather
contemptible murder. Carranza, Villa,
Zapata and the rest are only names to us.
We look at the headlines each morning
with a languid curiosity, and if no officer,
smoking a cigarette gaily while the firing
party took aim, has been executed, we
turn to the more diverting debate on our
tariff or our currency.
"Now, in estimating President Wilson's
acumen, please consider it from the Am-
erican point of view, for it is from that
point of view that he had necessarily to
adopt his course. Whatever may be best
for Mexico, however clearly he may recog-
nize it, it is none the less his paramount
144 THE CASE OP MEXICO
duty to do what is best for the United
States. And if we had to reach a con-
clusion as to what is best for the United
States, you and I, following his reasoning,
would both arrive at precisely his conclu-
sion.
"For, first of all, he must at all costs
avoid any entanglement. You will admit
that in recognizing neither of the parties
he played safe in that respect. You will
also admit that there was an undeniable
risk of entanglement in recognizing
Huerta; for once having done so, we
should be under some obligation in the
matter of compelling the rebels, if success-
ful, as they might easily have been, accord-^
ing to the best judgment we could form,
to live up to the obligations assumed by
Huerta in regard to the other nations and
their citizens. Moreover, had we recog-
nized Huerta, we would necessarily have
placed ourselves in a position hostile to
the irresponsible but all-powerful rebel
forces, and thus exposed our own citizens
and their properties, to reprisals which
THE CASE OF MEXICO 145
would have called loudly for interven-
tion."
I have thought it necessary to draw a
picture of President Wilson as I visualize
him today, and to produce all the available
facts in order to explain, not to justify,
his attitude toward the "Case of Mexico"
in order to impart to this study of the situ-
ation absolute impartiality, and to dis-
prove in advance any charge of bias that
might be made against me. My jealous
patriotism could no more excuse or jus-
tify such a mistake on my part than Mr.
Wilson's jealous patriotism, whether we
consider Mr. Wilson as a mere man, or as
President, could excuse his policy toward
Mexico.
To explain the motives of some one's
conduct is not to justify them.
CHAPTER VIII
THE POLICY OF PRESIDENT HTJEKTA THE
"COUP D'ETAT/'
The state of affairs obtaining in Mexico
on February 18, 1913, was similar to that
which obtained in France on February 24,
1848. A historian of that epoch describes
it as follows: "It was a body without a
soul, a ship without a rudder, a fleet with-
out an admiral, a house without a master,
a nation without a ruler, a virgin land
without an owner. In whom should the
Power, the Authority be vested? In the
first occupant. The ground belongs to
the first occupant. If the occupation of
the ground is the origin of property, the
assumption of the power is the necessary
condition for its existence."
With Madero's advent the old order
passed, but no new order was ushered in;
at least we failed to see that new order, no
faintest outline of it appeared on the hori-
zon. Maderism inherited all the debts of
146
THE CASE OF MEXICO 147
Porfirism. Facing terrible difficulties,
many of which it had created itself, it fail-
ed, or did not try, to surmount any of
them. Its task was extremly arduous
and it certainly showed itself unequal to
it. It neither reformed nor reconstructed.
It gave to the people neither the order nor
the freedom promised them, nor the pros-
perity it had led them to expect ; it did not
even lay the corner stone of the democ-
racy it had heralded so loudly.
The Mexican people were not really
revolutionary. Madero made them so,
and they have remained so.
The revolution which resulted from the
San Luis manifesto, like all the revolu-
tions which degenerate into hysteria, led
unavoidably to the coming of a Caesar, a
Cromwell, or a Napoleon. Why not of
a Washington? Simply because revolu-
tions that degenerate into hysteria do not
produce that type of men. Even a Wash-
ington would prove a failure in such cases ;
a Washington could unite into one nation
homogeneous racial elements; he could
not control the heterogeneous elements of
148 THE CASE OF MEXICO
a disorganized society and weld them into
a nation.
After the fall of Madero, Mexico was
no man's land; it was at the mercy of the
first who would dare to take it. No civil-
ian, however, was able to accomplish that
feat. That was a soldier's job. Then
appeared General Huerta, who saw his
opportunity, when so many were hesitat-
ing, so many afraid, and so many indif-
ferent. He felt it was his patriotic duty
to take the situation in hand.
We must remember that at that precise
moment there were only two men fit to as-
sume the supreme power: Felix Diaz and
Victoriano Huerta. Both wanted it,
Felix Diaz for a later date when the elec-
tions would take place, Huerta wanted it
at once, ready as he was to assume all the
responsibilities and to cope with all the
difficulties. Felix Diaz was the theorist,
Huerta the practical man. Felix Diaz
was advised by idealists and amateur poli-
ticians ; Huerta followed only his own ad-
vice. Felix Diaz knew what he wanted;
Huerta wanted what he wanted. Felix
THE CASE OF MEXICO 149
Diaz was hesitating; Victoriano Huerta
never vacillated. Felix Diaz proved to be
a real man; Victoriano Huerta a sterling
character.
The rebels of the citadel thought that
Huerta was the last card they should play
in order to win the game, and they played
it ; they thought that the victorious general
would be a tool in their hands; he became,
instead, the supreme arbiter with well-
defined plans in his head. He had not
longed for the supreme authority, but
when it jbecame his, he had the will-power
to exert jit.
Once established in the presidency, he
set out to remove, without haste, but
quickly and cleverly, whatever constituted
an obstacle to the realization of his
political and patriotic projects. The
pact of the citadel, owing to which he had
become leader of the revolution and ar-
rived at the presidency through the regu-
lar constitutional procedure, was a bind-
ing agreement. He did not break it, but
he saw to it that both parties agreed to let
it remain a dead letter.
150 THE CASE OF MEXICO
The cabinet appointed in compliance
with that pact was preposterous. The
president realized that with such col-
laborators, every one of whom repre-
sented a different political tendency and
had a different origin, it would be im-
possible for him to follow any logical
policy. After cancelling the pact he
eliminated one minister after another, re-
taining only one whom he thought could
work harmoniously with him. Even this
one, however, was eliminated as soon as
Huerta came to consider him as useless
and dangerous.
General Felix Diaz was to him a dis-
turbing element, not as man nor as offi-
cer, but as leader of a political party, in
fact of the only party of real importance.
He prevailed upon Felix Diaz to join
again the army with which he was no
longer officially connected. He restored
him to his rank and conferred upon him
the badge of a military order, thus re-
taining him as a subaltern of the presi-
dent of the Republic. He entrusted him
later with a most flattering mission
THE CASE OF MEXICO 1*1
abroad, which made it difficult for him to
return in time for the general elections,
although he had full authorization to re-
turn whenever he deemed fit. After
Felix Diaz's departure the Felixist
party found itself practically decapi-
tated. Felix Diaz was nothing politically
without his party; the Felixist party de-
rived all its importance in election time
from the presence of its leader. Felix
Diaz gone, the Felixist party and its can-
didate were eliminated from the contest
and President Huerta was able thereafter
to attend undisturbed to his work of re-
construction.
The houses of Parliament proved to
be an obstacle to the pacification of the
country; General Huerta made them
realize that he was perfectly able to do
without them whatever he had set out to
do with them. He tried his best to im-
press his will upon the Chamber of Depu-
ties, which was the more turbulent of the
two, but when he saw that nothing could
be accomplished through suasion and that
the Chamber was becoming a nest of con-
152 THE CASE OF MEXICO
spirators, when he was convinced that the
only alternative was to eliminate Parlia-
ment or be eliminated by it, he resolved
upon a coup d'etat.
The American government was greatly
exercised over the happenings of the
Bloody Ten Days, over the stories circu-
lated by the Maderists, and the protest of
the Madero family, and it assumed from
the first a markedly hostile /attitude to-
wards President Huerta, indeed refusing
to recognize him. It was not possible to
eliminate the American government as
President Huerta had eliminated the
other obstacles; to the impulsive Ameri-
can diplomacy, President Huerta op-
posed the Mexican diplomacy of passive
resistance, thus preserving a status quo
which has lasted over nine months; dur-
ing that time the Americans have ex-
hausted every form of threat; while the
Mexicans, following the maxim which
says: "Do not worry and nothing will
happen," have opposed to them the force
of inertia.
Viewed from the proper angle, the ac-
GENERAL PASCUAL OROZCO
THE CASE OF MEXICO 153
tions of the rebel bands did not trouble
him; on the contrary, they rather served
his purpose; the rebels were such a
burden to the country that the popula-
tion, alarmed, harrassed, humiliated and
covered with ridicule, would finally rise
in anger against them and become the
most powerful weapon for their destruc-
tion. Huerta had shown how indispens-
able he was in warfare against the rebels,
and this made his position more secure.
The government at Washington would
also be driven some time into comparing
the methods of Huerta's government and
those of the rebels, and could no longer
either help them directly as it had been
doing, or help them indirectly as it had
threatened to do. This would first con-
tribute to a pacification of the country
and eventually oblige the American gov-
ernment to recognize the Mexican gov-
ernment, already recognized by almost
every nation in the world. General
Huerta considered that the rebellion,
with its orgy of brutality, carried in itself
154 THE CASE OF MEXICO
its own condemnation and its death sen-
tence.
Such was, in its main lines, the policy
of President Huerta: A rigidly straight
line when it came to laying plans, a series
of bold curves when it came to the ways
and means ; it had, in brief, the essentials
of any clever policy.
* * *
Among the charges brought against
President Huerta, especially in the
United States, we may mention that of
executing a coup d'etat, a thing unknown
in the United States.
Francis Bulnes, a well known Mexican
publicist, who is not connected in any
way with the present government, pub-
lished, a few days after the dissolution
of the Chambers, an article in which is to
be found, if not an approval of that ex-
ceptional act, at least an explanation and
a general justification of it.
"A coup d'etat," Bulnes wrote, "is a
hygienic measure against the demagogic
rabble when it seizes the powers of gov-
ernment and keeps the population terri-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 155
fied by its excesses, or its propensity to
commit excesses. A coup d'etat is also a
weapon against dreamers and deluded re-
formists, who, as soon as they gather
political strength, set out to govern an
absolutely imaginary population or be-
come fanatics and show themselves more
arbitrary, more cruel, more predatory
than the demagogues themselves. What-
ever the case may be, the lowest classes
find themselves in a state of trepidation,
for the government, weakened by its in-
ability to govern with a majority of the
nation, is no longer in a position to pro-
tect them; they are filled with a deep
hatred for the tyranny of the aristocrats,
of the demagogues, and of the impulsive,
unbalanced prophets. A coup d'etat
executed by a liberator, be he sincere or
hypocritical, is always beneficial to the
lower classes which always welcome it
with pleasure and gratitude, and give
their assistance to their liberator, be he
real or false, reserving themselves the
right to hate him when his imposture is
exposed."
156 THE CASE OF MEXICO
This has been fully confirmed by
history from the famous coup d'etat, the
first in date, executed by Cromwell, to
the one which we are now discussing, not
to forget the many which took place in
France.
After the 23rd of April I came to the
conclusion that a coup d'etat would be
inevitable, and in the various articles
which I published in La Tribuna of
Mexico City, and in La Hevista de Yuca-
tan of Merida, I did my best to show to
the Chamber of Deputies that they were
provoking that step, making it in fact
necessary. Let us cast a retrospective
glance upon what took place in the two
years previous.
On May 26, 1911, General Porfirio
Diaz and Ramon Corral tendered their
resignation as president and vice-presi-
dent of the Republic. The Chamber of
Deputies accepted it, and the 1st of June,
that is a week later, issued a call for ex-
traordinary elections in order to fill the
vacant posts. At the end of the Diaz
regime all the governors of States aban-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 15T
doned their positions, some tendering
their resignations, some asking for in-
definite leave, and being replaced by par-
tisans of Madero.
On February 19, 1913, President
Francisco I. Madero and Vice-President
Pino Suarez tendered jointly their re-
signation, which was accepted at once by
the Chamber of Deputies. The gov-
ernors of States, however, did not follow
their example, nor did the Chamber is-
sue at once a call for extraordinary elec-
tions, as it had done after the fall of
President Diaz. The explanation of this
is that General Diaz's resignation was
final and in good faith, while Madero's
was merely a makeshift, a subterfuge to
save his life and escape jail; but he al-
ways hoped to return to the fight, waving
the banner of legality, Madero was not
the only person to nourish such hopes;
all his followers held the same view, and
even after Madero and Pino Suarez had
disappeared, they clung to the idea of a
restoration that would bring back into
power, if not the leaders themselves, for
158 THE CASE OF MEXICO
that was impossible, at least the system.
Madero was dead but Maderism had sur-
vived him.
The Maderists thought that their over-
throw was only temporary, an accidental
loss easily recouped. They resorted to
conspiracy; they soon raised the standard
of revolt, and the Porra group, which
predominated even in the Chamber of
Deputies, assumed the leadership of all
the intrigues and the rebellion.
President Huerta acted in obedience
to the constitutional provision, according
to which a call must be issued for extra-
ordinary elections as soon as the presi-
dency and the vice-presidency are vacant ;
in March he gave to the permanent com-
mission of the Chamber of Deputies an
order to issue the call so that the elections
could take place on July 27; he con-
sidered that in four months there would
be plenty of time to organize the various
parties, select candidates, conduct cam-
paigns and attend to the various pre-
liminaries of an election. That order
created a scandal among the Maderist
THE CASE OF MEXICO 159
deputies. The minister of State, Alberto
Garcia Granados, was bitterly attacked
for the "haste" with which he had trans-
mitted the order to the permanent com-
mission, only a few days before the
opening of the Chamber.
The regular session of the Legislature
opened April 1st and the Chamber of
Deputies discussed the order of the execu-
tive. On the 23rd of that month I pub-
lished in La Tribuna an article entitled,
"A Grave Problem Must Be Solved," in
which I said among other things:
"A deep divergence of opinions exists
among the deputies to the Federal Con-
gress ; some consider this disagreement as
scandalous, some rejoice over it, but the
greater part of the nation feels very
nervous over it. This divergence of
opinion is due to shady motives, to
political intrigues absolutely foreign to
sane politics, to personal ambitions, to
the desire of a certain group to prolong
the uncertainty in order to foster anar-
chistic designs. The question is not as
to whether it was convenient or not to
160 THE CASE OF MEXICO
issue a call for the elections, but whether
or not the constitutional provisions should
be respected. Viewing the problem from
this angle, and it should not be viewed
from any other, there is only one alterna-
tive: either adhere to the constitutional
principle, regardless of consequences, or
violate the constitution; in the latter case
the Chamber of Deputies would execute
a coup d'etat, that is, usurp the power
arbitrarily, resort to extraordinary and
violent measures and amend the charter
without observing the procedure de-
manded by the law.
"The Chamber is confronted by the fol-
lowing dilemma: Either the constitution
pure and simple, or a military dictator-
ship."
Yielding at last to the insistence of the
executive, of which the reader must make
a mental note, the Chamber resolved to
issue the call, selecting October 23rd as
the date of the elections and hoping that
in the interval some incident would make
this decree void. If the elections had
taken place in July, as President Huerta
THE CASE OF MEXICO 161
wished it, a coup d'etat would not have
been necessary on the part of the execu-
tive.
In a memorandum sent on November 8
to the diplomatic corps, Mr. Moheno,
minister of foreign affairs, outlining the
policy of President Huerta, expressed
himself as follows on this particular
point:
"In order to carry out the second part
of his programme (holding the elections)
the Executive bowed respectfully before
the sovereignty of the other powers; un-
fortunately one of the Chambers vested
with the legislative power, the Chamber
of Deputies, pretended to encroach upon
the privileges of the Executive power and
refused in certain cases to recognize the
judicial power; the attitude of several
deputies, who, protected by their par-
liamentary immunity, were intriguing
openly and even taking part in armed re-
volts, made it impossible for Parliament
to work in harmony with the Executive
power. As no government can accomp-
lish anything without that harmony, the
162 THE CASE OF MEXICO
President of the Republic saw himself
compelled to dissolve the Chamber of
Deputies ; this step was necessary to save
the Republic and to forestall the anarchy
which would have undoubtedly set in if
open rebellion had been tolerated within
one of the constituted powers. As the
Senate could not constitutionally legis-
late alone, the Congress was declared dis-
solved. It never was the desire of the
Executive, however, to govern extra-con-
stitutionally; he therefore issued at once
a call for congressional elections, and he
simply assumed, in the interval, extra-
ordinary privileges in the departments of
finance, state and war, whenever this ap-
peared indispensable. He did this with
the solemn understanding that he would
render full account of his use of such
privileges to the new Congress as soon as
it would be in session. The provisional
government took also very good care to
respect and to sustain the judicial power
which continued to discharge very actively
its august mission to protect individual
guaranties; these guaranties were never
THE CASE OF MEXICO 168
abolished by the administration except on
such occasions when this was made neces-
sary by the condition of civil war which
still prevails in several parts of the Re-
public."
The reader may remark: "This is a
dictatorship I" Well, it is.
In an article I published on May 13,
1913, that is five months before the coup
d'etat, I made the following statements:
"Let us leave aside all fancy concep-
tions, all romanticism; let us not get
drunk on sonorous sentences; let us not
deceive the people with tinsel and idle
speeches; let us face the situation
courageously, call a spade a spade, tell
the truth, nothing but the truth.
"In politics situations are more im-
portant than theories.
"I shall be absolutely frank. I am
speaking in my own name, not in behalf
of any party, nor even of a small coterie,
and I assume the entire responsibility of
my statements. I am opposed to a dic-
tatorship, but I am more strongly op-
posed to anarchy; if it is anarchy we are
164 THE CASE OF MEXICO
facing (and it may be that we are act-
ually on the verge of it) , I prefer a Mexi-
can dictator to a foreign invader and con-
queror; for it is a foreign invasion which
is being precipitated by the machinations
of the revolutionists, bandits, conspira-
tors, and the miserable intrigues of many
men whose sacred duty it would be to save
their own country.
"If some day a dictatorship succeeds
in saving the country, I, for one, in spite
of my liberalism and of my democratic
instincts, will be the first to acclaim it;
for to me the interest of the country is
the first and most important considera-
tion."
In the address which he read at the
opening of the new Legislature, Presi-
dent Huerta said with his usual frank-
ness:
"Judging the situation calmly, I can-
not see that the constitutional order of
things was interfered with through the
dissolution of the Chamber, except when
the executive power began to invade the
sphere of action of the other powers. Be
THE CASE OP MEXICO 165
it as it may, however, it will always be a
high and noble duty, or at least a com-
mendable attitude to save a nation at the
cost of all principles; what is the good of
preserving, at the cost of the nation's life,
rigid and inert theories whose fairness
and usefulness will always remain sub-
ject to discussion; the ultimate truth is to
be found in that saying of Bonaparte's:
'In saving the country one does not vio-
late any law/ "
CHAPTER IX
"THE MEXICAN PROBLEM" PRESIDENT
WILSON'S ATTITUDE CONSIDERED FROM
THE POINT OF VIEW OF REASON AND
JUSTICE.
If the president of the United States
had merely refused to recognize the pro-
visional government of Mexico, I would
say that he had made use of an impre-
scriptible right. Almost every nation in
the world recognized that government
officially, some immediately, some a
while later, in spite of the implacable
hostility President Wilson has mani-
fested towards President Huerta, a hos-
tility which seems to be the consequence
of a personal dislike rather than that of
a political attitude.
So it is apparently; in reality it is a
part of a programme cleverly thought out
by a man of great ability and of noted
tenacity. "The Mexican problem" is a
convenient excuse for carrying out that
programme; and President Wilson, with
166
THE CASE OF MEXICO 107
the most perfect scorn for idealism, never
misses any opportunity to carry it out.
Instead of keeping his hands off the
national affairs of Mexico he interferes
with them in order to fit them to his pur-
pose. He first sent to President Huerta
emissaries who asked for his resignation,
a request which Huerta roundly denied,
to his honor and to the honor of Mexico.
Had Huerta complied with the orders
sent from Washington he would have
been both a coward and a traitor. A
coward if he had yielded to the threats of
a declared enemy; a traitor if he had
accepted the protectorate of a foreign
nation, the dictatorship of a foreign gov-
ernment. The very minute that crime
would have been committed Mexico
would have lost its political autonomy.
Mexico would have been compelled hence-
forth to apply at the White House for
its powerful host's advice as to who might
be persona grata as president. And any
time that president would have failed to
give satisfaction to the United States an
168 THE CASE OF MEXICO
emissary would have been sent to ask for
his resignation.
After this, not only would the United
States have exerted a direct suzerainty
over Mexico, which is the object of its
ambition, but Mexico would have virt-
ually become an American colony.
Some pretend that Mr. Wilson's atti-
tude was prompted by a desire to help in
a neighborly way the settlement of our
domestic troubles, for a reconciliation of
all the parties could have been brought
about more easily, they say, had Huerta
resigned. This is a pure supposition.
The truth is that when Mr. Wilson de-
cided upon that step the rebellion had
barely begun and had not assumed any
importance. When he threatened Presi-
dent Huerta, however, the rebels thought
they had found an ally in the American
government, they breathed more freely,
nourished greater hopes, and the rebellion
began to spread.
The pretext which Mr. Wilson gave
for not recognizing Huerta was that he
could not sympathize with a man who had
THE CASE OF MEXICO 169
assumed the power to further his interests
and his personal ambition. This is what
he said a few days after his election to
the presidency; in an address he delivered
at Dwarthmore, Pennsylvania, he was
more explicit: "No g&vernment can ex-
ist/' he said, "which is stained with blood
or which is not governing with the con-
sent of the governed."
In August, 1913, Mr. Wilson decided
to take action in regard to the Mexican
problem and entrusted John Lind, ex-
governor of Minnesota, with a confi-
dential mission to Huerta. While Mr.
Lind's mission was of a diplomatic char-
acter, nothing could have in reality less
conformed to diplomatic usage, for Mr.
Lind carried no credentials accrediting
him as official representative of the
Washington government in Mexico, or
as President Wilson's confidential agent.
The instructions he received from his
government had, at least as far as they
are known, the character of an ulti-
matum. ^
Mr. Lind's instructions were to "press
170 THE CASE OF MEXICO
very earnestly upon those who are now
exercising authority or wielding influ-
ence/' that "the government of the
United States does not feel at liberty any
longer to stand inactively by while no
real progress is being made toward the
establishment of a government in the
City of Mexico which the country will
obey and respect." The president con-
tinued :
"A satisfactory settlement seems to us
to be conditioned on:
"(a) An immediate cessation of fight-
ing throughout Mexico; a definite ar-
mistice solemnly entered into and scrupu-
lously observed.
"(b) Security given for an early and
free election in which all agree to take
part.
"(c) The consent of General Huerta
to bind himself not to be a candidate for
election as president of the Republic at
this election, and
"(d) The agreement of all parties to
abide by the results of the election and co-
operate in the most loyal way in organ-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 171
izing and supporting the new administra-
tion."
He added:
"If Mexico can suggest any better way
in which to show our friendship, serve the
people of Mexico and meet our interna-
tiqnal obligations, we are more than
willing to consider the suggestion."
It seems almost incredible that such
suggestions could have been made in ab-
solute earnest. And yet, in spite of their
unusual and humiliating character, the
Mexican government considered them
carefully. In a perfectly courteous note,
containing now and then, however, some
veiled sarcasm, Mr. Huerta answered
that he could not promise to stop the
hostilities nor enter into a definite ar-
mistice with unorganized groups of
bandits; the freedom of elections would
of course be protected, but the govern-
ment could not guarantee that all the par-
ties would abide by their results and co-
operate in organizing and supporting the
new administration. The demand that
General Huerta should not run as candi-
172 THE CASE OF MEXICO
date in the presidential elections could
not be considered, for besides being un-
usual and unjustifiable, such a demand
could appear inspired by personal ani-
mus; the Mexican citizens alone could
decide that question at the polls.
How did President Wilson imagine
that President Huerta could effect a
compromise in behalf of the rebels and
bandits in league against his administra-
tion? And even if Huerta had had the
boldness to make such an agreement,
what confidence could it have inspired to
the United States?
Finally President Wilson did not
know, when he made his third suggestion,
that this point was already settled by the
Mexican constitution, which absolutely
forbids the immediate election of the pro-
visional president.
Mr. Wilson is intelligent and cultured
enough to understand that his suggestions
could not have any favorable effect, as
their wording was offensive. To consider
General Huerta, not as president of the
Republic but as governor of Mexico, was
THE CASE OF MEXICO 178
to offer him an insult. To suggest an
arrangement presupposing impossible
conditions was merely farcical. The
shrewd and illustrious Mr. Wilson never
intended to settle the Mexican difficulties.
He had a different object in view. What
was it?
In the message he read to the Ameri-
can Congress on December 2nd, 1913, he
had the following to say to the Mexican
question:
"There is but one cloud upon our hori-
zon. That has shown itself to the south
of us, and hangs over Mexico. There
can be no certain prospect of peace in
America until General Huerta has sur-
rendered his usurped authority in Mexi-
co; until it is understood on all hands, in-
deed, that such pretended governments
will not be countenanced or dealt with by
the government of the United States.
We are the friends of constitutional gov-
ernment in America; we are more than its
friends, we are its champions; because in
no other way can our neighbors, to whom
we would wish in every way to make
174 THE CASE OF MEXICO
proof of our friendship, work out then-
own development in peace and liberty.
Mexico has no government. The attempt
to maintain one at the City of Mexico has
broken down, and a mere military despot-
ism has been set up whicLhas hardly more
than the semblance of national authority.
It originated in the usurpation of Vic-
toriano Huerta, who, after a brief at-
tempt to play the part of constitutional
president, has at last cast aside even the
pretense of legal right and declared him-
self dictator. As a consequence, a condi-
tion of affairs now exists in Mexico which
has made it doubtful whether even the
most elementary and fundamental rights
either of her own people or of the citi-
zens of other countries resident within her
territory can long be successfully safe-
guarded, and which threatens, if long con-
tinued, to imperil the interests of peace,
order, and tolerable life in the lands im-
mediately to the south of us. Even if the
usurper had succeeded in his purposes, in
despite of the constitution of the Repub-
lic and the rights of its people, he would
THE CASE OF MEXICO 175
have set up nothing but a precarious and
hateful power, which could have lasted
but a little while, and whose eventual
downfall would have left the country in
a more deplorable condition than ever.
But he has not succeeded. He has for-
feited the respect and the moral support
even of those who were at one time will-
ing to see him succeed. Little by little he
has been completely isolated. By a little
every day his power and prestige are
crumbling and the collapse is not far
away. We shall not, I believe, be obliged
to alter our policy of watchful waiting.
And then, when the end comes, we shall
hope to see constitutional order restored
in distressed Mexico by the concert and
energy of such of her leaders as prefer the
liberty of their people to their own am-
bitions."
I may now ask if the situation the
Mexican government is facing is such as
Mr. Wilson pictures it, who is mainly re-
sponsible for it? Who but the man who,
witnessing the failure of his "policy of
persuasion," antagonized the government
176 THE CASE OF MEXICO
(not of Mexico City but of the immense
majority of the Mexican Republic), al-
lowed the rebels to supply themselves
with arms and ammunition, and to raise
money and even recruits in American
territory, the man who established a
"pacific blockade" of all our ports, ad-
vised the European markets to refuse
further loans to the provisional govern-
ment, tried to prevail upon the foreign
powers to break up their relations with
that government and did his best to dis-
credit, to starve, and to ruin Mexico.
Hasn't the Honorable Mr, Wilson
given thereby effective assistance to the
rebels? Hasn't he thus conducted against
the provisional government a campaign
more ruthless, more active, and more effi-
cient than the campaigns conducted by
Zapata, Villa, Carranza, and other rebel
leaders?
That he favors the rebels is obvious.
Last December Rear Admiral Cowles of
the American navy received prominent
Sinaloa rebels on board the Pittsburg
and entertained them as though they were
THE CASE OP MEXICO 177
representatives of a friendly and duly
recognized government. An effort was
made by the secretary of the navy to ex-
plain this partiality to the rebels, which
constituted an insult to the provisional
government, by saying that the honors
accorded to the revolutionary chiefs were
justified by the fact that those men were
the lawfully elected authorities in the
State of Sinaloa. This explanation was
published broadcast in American news-
papers.
The New York Times mentioning the
incident printed a statement made by a
prominent Mexican statesman, member
of a faction which is not supporting
Huerta, but which is not favorable to the
rebels either. It reads:
"This is not the first time that Wash-
ington has gone out of its way to insult
Huerta gratuitously. It seems evident
that the Washington officials want to
provoke Huerta to the point that he will
commit some overt act, thus giving
Washington a way out of the present
muddle.
ITS THE CASE OF MEXICO
"Huerta has thus far abstained, and is
keeping his temper remarkably in the face
of repeated affronts of the United States.
It is improbable that he will commit any
overt act on this occasion. All thinking
Mexicans must realize that the President
is acting for the best good of the country
in this way."
New York Times, Dec. 28, 1913.
Is this really Mr. Wilson's aim? Is he
simply waiting until Huerta gives him a
plausible pretext for a more direct in-
tervention in Mexico? If so, what would
Mr. Wilson and the United States gain
by it? God preserve the United States
and Mexico from a war. It would be a
scandal for humanity, a disaster for every-
body concerned; for Mexico it would spell
ruin, for the United States disgrace.
Mr. Wilson can not drag his country into
such an abyss.
Does he wish to help the triumph of
the revolution? May Mr. Wilson remem-
ber his own statements and think of what
that triumph would entail.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 179
Let us make for the sake of argument
the absurd supposition that President
Huerta, yielding to President Wilson's
demands, might tender his resignation.
Let us first settle two important points:
1. President Wilson stated to the en-
tire world that he would never recognize
any act of President Huerta's. Would
he recognize his resignation?
2. President Wilson also stated that he
would consider as illegal the results of the
elections to be held on October 26, 1913,
not only as far as the president and vice-
president, but also the senators and depu-
ties then elected were concerned.
To whom, then, could President
Huerta tender his resignation? Not to
the Mexican Congress as constituted at
the time of Madero's fall, since it was dis-
solved; nor to the present Legislature,
since it has not been recognized by Mr.
Wilson. Mr. Huerta could solve the
difficulty by tendering his resignation to
the Supreme Court of the nation, which
constitutes the third power. This would
be perfectly legal. Whom could the
180 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Supreme Court, however, appoint as pro-
visional president? Neither the secretary
of foreign affairs, nor the secretary of
state, nor any other member of the cabinet
designated by the constitution, since these
men were all appointed by President
Huerta and are therefore disqualified.
Should the Supreme Court appoint a
private citizen, this appointment would
be illegal. The president thus appointed
would find himself in a position even more
illegal than that of the present president,
who, much as Mr. Wilson may deny it,
was selected in accordance with all the
constitutional provisions. In any case,
wouldn't the private citizen selected il-
legally by the Supreme Court be more or
less directly a creature of the revolution?
We are told that another way of solv-
ing the problem would be to give assist-
ance to the rebels. Since we have been
making many suppositions, let us sup-
pose that assistance given the rebels in
violation of all ethical principles enabled
them to triumph. Would the great jur-
ist, Mr. Wilson, recognize as legitimate
THE CASE OF MEXICO 181
the government raised to power By their
triumph? According to his theories, to
his explicit and final statements, he could
not.
There is still another solution, one
which in certain quarters is regarded as
the most likely to bring definite results:
armed intervention hy the United States.
What would be the consequences of an
intervention? I have already answered
that question: to eliminate the govern-
ment of President Huerta, to put down
the rebellion, and also I suppose to de-
stroy the robber bands, to pacify the
country by suasion and force, and finally
to prepare the general elections which
would be held freely and legally under
the protection of the American military
forces.
How many years would it take to
carry out that plan which both federals
and rebels, in a word, the whole Mexican
population would oppose? Would the
government ushered in by such means be
in any way legal? Would it be in har-
mony with our national laws, with the
182 THE CASE OF MEXICO
rights of the people? Would it not be
merely an emanation of the most odious
oppression?
An intervention would be difficult in
theory, ineffective in practice.
Whether our government is legal or
illegal is a question which it behooves
only ourselves, the Mexicans, to decide.
If we are satisfied with it the foreign
powers are in duty bound to recognize it.
One may argue that at present one part
of the population is satisfied with it, while
another part is proclaiming its dissatis-
faction, arms in hand. This does not
give foreign nations any right to inter-
fere in our affairs. On one side there
stands a government de jure and de facto,
on the other various rebel factions ; in in-
ternational law the former only is to be
considered; of course, the latter could be
recognized as belligerent, but this can
only be done for serious reasons and ac-
cording to certain precedents.
I have not mentioned thus far any of
the numerous and weighty arguments ad-
vanced by a part of the North American
THE CASE OP MEXICO 188
press in condemning Mr. Wilson's policy,
nor the opinions expressed by Latin
Americans and European authorities
which are also adverse to the course fol-
lowed by the illustrious President of the
United States in regard to the "Mexican
problem". I did not see the necessity of
mentioning them; the personal argu-
ments I have presented are amply suf-
ficient to prove that President Woodrow
Wilson may not have overstepped the
limits of a very special policy of his own.
He strayed, however, beyond the limits
of reason and justice. He is one of the
men, perhaps the man, whom history
will hold responsible for the situation
with which the Mexican Republic is con-
fronted to-day.
CHAPTER X
THE VARIOUS PHASES OF THE MEXICAN
REVOLUTION THE ATTITUDE OF PBESI-
DENT HUERTA AND ITS MEANING ITS
INTERNATIONAL IMPORTANCE.
Few people, especially in the United
States, realize the various aspects which
the Mexican revolution has successively
taken, and the actual meaning of Presi-
dent Huerta's attitude.
When Francisco I. Madero began his
fight against President Diaz he was ac-
tuated by democratic motives.
The dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz had
in the long run become unbearable, for
the "Scientific Group," headed by Min-
ister Limantour, opposed the introduc-
tion of any new elements into govern-
ment circles.
Francisco Madero was unknown in the
political world. He suddenly blossomed
forth as a writer and a politician. He
published a book, the "Presidential Prob-
184
THE CASE OF MEXICO 185
lem," in which he expressed rather timid
views. He had been born and raised in
the atmosphere of Porfirism and he didn't
presume to revolt against tradition. That
book, however, gave him a certain meas-
ure of notoriety.
Thereupon our new author went into
active politics, organized clubs, and start-
ed on a series of speaking tours, preach-
ing the democratic gospel ; and finally ac-
cepting the nomination for the presi-
dency of the Republic.
The hostility he encountered on the
part of the government transformed the
timid writer into a daring political lead-
er, and the political leader into a revo-
lutionary chief. He was arrested by
order of the government, released on bail,
issued a revolutionary manifesto in San
Luis Potosi, and then fled to the United
States.
Madero's first activity was actuated
by hostility to President Diaz. He
wished to overthrow him. Later on he
thought of assuming the presidency him-
self. When he issued his manifesto he
186 THE CASE OF MEXICO
broadened his democratic ideas so much
that they actually verged on socialism.
To win partisans to his cause he pander-
ed to the lowest classes and especially to
the Indian population. In the third para-
graph of his San Luis manifesto he said:
"Through a vicious interpretation of
the unimproved land law, many small
land owners, most of them Indians, have
been dispossessed, either by decrees of
the secretary of public works or by judg-
ment of the Courts of the Republic. It
is elementary justice to return to their
owners or to the latter's heirs the land
of which they were despoiled through
such immoral practices, besides indemniz-
ing them for the losses thereby incurred."
The lower classes placed an exagger-
ated construction upon this promise and
expected that all the land be divided up
among them after the landlords had been
expropriated. The rabble turned Ma-
derist, and our country had to face one
of the most appalling social problems.
Madero preached the theory; the deplor-
able Zapata brothers put it into practice.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 187
Such is the origin of Zapatism as it ex-
ists today.
Madero triumphed. As it is one thing
to be a pretender and another to be a
ruler, Madero realized what consequences
the fulfilment of his hastily made
promises would have, and be broke his
word. The rabble, however, would not
be satisfied, and instead of socialism we
had anarchy.
There were then two revolutionary
factions; one was opposing Madero be-
cause he had not kept his political
promises and established a true democ-
racy, and had, on the contrary, disre-
garded scandalously the expressed will of
the people and installed a family olig-
archy in power; another faction was hos-
tile to every form of government and de-
clared its intention to take possession by
violence of all land, killing of the land-
lords, and resorting to pillage and arson.
This was the advent of the olocracy.
Madero convinced himself that while a
revolution can be accomplished with the
help of the rabble, one cannot govern it.
188 THE CASE OF MEXICO
What Pancho Villa, the rebel leader, is
now doing is the consequence of the
promises Madero once made.
The fall of Madero was only a na-
tional incident, and so was the Pact of
the Citadel. When Huerta triumphed
he had to cope with the anarchistic condi-
tion created by Madero, and with the in-
trigues and agitations of the Maderists.
The latter were rising everywhere to
avenge Madero's death, and they failed
or refused to realize that to avenge one
man's death they would have to sacrifice
thousands of innocent lives, and com-
promise the dignity of their country, if
not jeopardise its independence.
When General Huerta became pro-
visional president he had few illusions
about the situation. He realized the
magnitude of the task which he had un-
dertaken and the responsibilities he was
assuming. He had, however, to pacify
the country at any cost, without wasting
time on metaphysical speculations.
Unfortunately the newly-elected gov-
ernment of the United States headed by
THE CASE OF MEXICO 189
President Woodrow Wilson, actuated by
motives which no one has explained satis-
factorily and in which some see very
wrongly an exaggerated form of puri-
tanism, made plans for overthrowing
Huerta and extending an American
protectorate over Mexico. From that
time on the fall of Madero assumed an
international importance; it ceased to be
a purely Mexican question and became
an issue between the United States and
the government of Mexico.
I must repeat that any concession
made by President Huerta under the
pressure of President Wilson's demands
would have been prejudicial to Mexico,
as it would have implied the acceptance
of a tutelage, the * first phase of an actual
protectorate which would have fatally
resulted in the destruction of Mexico's
national autonomy.
President Huerta understood that very
clearly from the very first; besides he
saw in the attitude of the United States
a first attempt at establishing the Am-
erican domination over the entire North-
190 THE CASE OF MEXICO
ern half of the continent, whence it could
later be extended to South America.
The Mexican problem became henceforth
a question affecting the entire American
continent.
In an address he delivered at Mobile
in October, 1913, President Wilson en-
deavored to appear as an idealist; who-
ever watches him closely, however, will
find under the idealist a politician follow-
ing a very practical line of conduct.
Mr. Wilson began by stating that the
United States would never acquire an-
other square foot of land by conquest.
Did he imply that all other means were
legitimate in acquiring the lands of neigh-
boring countries, such means for instance
as were employed in Panama or are, at
present, in Nicaragua?
In the course of his address Mr. Wil-
son said that for motives of "morality"
and a "love of constitutional liberty",
not "for expediency", the United States
desired to help the Latin- Amercian re-
publics to an emancipation from "hard
THE CASE OF MEXICO 191
bargains" forced on them by foreign con-
cessionaries and money lenders.
He added: "What these states are go-
ing to see, therefore, is an emancipation
from the subordination which has been
inevitable with foreign enterprise. In-
terest has been exacted of them that was
not exacted of anybody else, because the
risk was said to be greater, and then se-
curities were taken that destroyed the
risks. An admirable arrangement for
those who were forcing the terms.
"I rejoice in nothing so much as in the
prospect that they will now be emanci-
pated from these conditions, and we
ought to be the first to take part in as-
sisting in that emancipation.
"We must prove ourselves their friends
and champions on terms of equality and
honor."
I will then ask with Mr. George Har-
vey: "KTow, what can this mean? That
literally we shall forbid South American
Governments to make further conces-
sions to European capitalists? Or merely
192 THE CASE OF MEXICO
that we shall insist upon supervising the
trades and fixing the terms?"
Neither of those things is within the
reach of the United States, and every
nation on the American continent would
revolt against such pretensions, which
clearly reveal the United States' desire
to exert a suzerainty over all the Latin
Amercian countries.
Mr. Wilson is not bhe originator of
this doctrine; he is only one of its expon-
ents and one of those who are trying to
put it into practice. This is only one
phase of the imperialistic policy with
which all Latin- Americans are perfectly
familiar, which they have analyzed close-
ly and which they all condemn unreserv-
edly; it is not the spoken word to which
they pay much attention but the designs
back of the words; they remember that
^whoever would harm us, glibly assures
us that it is all done for our own good.
In refusing to comply with President
Wilson's demands, President Huerta
not only upheld the interests of Mexico
THE CASE OF MEXICO 193
but made himself truly the champion of
all the nations south of the Rio Grande.
The Mexican problem, however, is
much more than a continental problem;
it is actually an international problem; it
is bound to interest every civilized nation
of Europe and America, since the Presi-
dent of the United States has formally
declared his intention to pry into every
financial deal, and every possible conces-
sion contract entered into by Latin Am-
erican Republics with a citizen or a cor-
poration of the Old World. If that plan
were carried out, the United States
would be absolute master of the situa-
tion, it would gradually control every en-
terprise, perhaps even every industry in
our various countries.
And yet Americans are the first ones
to obtain onerous concessions and to in-
vest capital in foreign countries. Mexico
has seen them at work. Mexico has had
a painful experience with its oil indus-
try, in which American and English
capitalists are in open rivalry, a rivalry
which the rebels have cleverly taken ad-
194 THE CASE OF MEXICO
vantage of since the first day of the Ma-
dero uprising, a rivalry of which the
provisional government is still bearing
the brunt.
Thus it is that President Huerta, by
opposing the encroachment of a monopo-
listic imperialism, is upholding not only
the interest of Mexico and of the Latin
American nations but those of the whole
world.
Why has Mr. Wilson abandoned so
completely the traditional policy of the
United States? This policy had always
accorded with the definition which Presi-
dent Franklin Pierce gave of it on May
15, 1856, in his message to Congress:
"It is the established policy of the
United States to recognize governments
without question of their source of or-
ganization or of the means by which the
governing persons attain their power,
provided there be a government de facto
accepted by the people of the country. . . .
It is the more imperatively necessary to~
a PP*y this rule to the Spanish- American
peoples in consideration of the frequent
THE CASE OF MEXICO 195
and not seldom anomalous changes of or-
ganization or administration which they
undergo and the revolutionary character
of most of the changes."
Times have changed; so have this coun-
try's aspirations, and consequently its
traditional policy has been cast aside.
What is at the bottom of the personal
and implacable hatred for Huerta which
the Honorable Mr. Wilson reveals even
in his official acts, as one can see from the
various statements of his which I have
quoted in this book? It is due to the fact
that General Huerta proves an obstacle
to the fulfilment of President Wilson's
designs; Mr. Wilson is also prompted by
an extremely human feeling: Nothing is
more aggravating for a strong man than
to see a man he considers as weak resist-
ing him openly, and showing himself in-
tractable.
The more I study the Mexican prob-
lem the more I am convinced that it lacks
intrinsically the international character
which we are attributing to it. It is
nothing more than a conflict between the
196 THE CASE OF MEXICO
Wilson Doctrine, successor to the Mon-
roe Doctrine, and the indomitable atti-
tude of Huerta, patterned after the atti-
tude of our immortal patriot Juarez.
Between Wilson and Huerta the world
will decide.
CHAPTER XI
THE WILSON POLICY CONDEMNED BY THE
ENTIRE WORLD HUERTA THE MAN OF
THE SITUATION TIME A SOLUTION
SHOULD BE POUND THE SOLUTION
MEXICO'S VITALITY.
The Wilson policy has been con-
demned by the entire world. The Am-
ericans residing in Mexico, who are
well qualified to speak of what is taking
place there, what is to be feared or hoped
for, have protested against it. Promi-
nent members of the American colony
called upon Mr. Wilson in a body for the
purpose of conferring with him and sup-
plying him with accurate information;
those men told me, however, that the
president refused to receive them, on the
plea that he was not soliciting opinions re-
garding Mexico. Many newspapers of
the United States have published very il-
luminating articles showing the mistake
which President Wilson is making.
All over Latin America, from Cuba to
197
198 THE CASE OF MEXICO
the Straights of Magellan, the problem
has been discussed from every angle, and
the conclusions reached have been uni-
formly adverse to the Wilson policy.
The majority of the English, French,
German and Spanish papers have con-
demned it ; some have even gone so far as
to prefer grave charges, which I consider
unfounded if not slanderous, against Mr.
Wilson, accusing him, for instance, of
venality, an absolutely inadmissible
charge.
The conservative papers of all those
countries are unanimous in stating that,
considering the anomalous conditions
through which our country is passing,
General Huerta is the indispensable man
of the hour, the only man perhaps who
has the necessary qualifications to re-
establish order, the only one, in any case,
who can protect fully the lives and inter-
ests of foreign residents.
I admit that every man should be
guided in the accomplishment of his task
by idealistic motives; his feet, however,
should remain on the ground.
THE CASE OF MEXICO 199
I also believe that a faith which is not
constructive is a negation, a delusion, or
a form of hypocrisy.
The future does not belong to those
who would impose their ideas through
violent gestures, violent epithets, or viol-
ent deeds; but to those who can reor-
ganize society on a better basis, and unite
men in order and harmony.
I cannot believe that President Wil-
son is planning to precipitate a war be-
tween the United States and Mexico. If
the Wilson policy has not as its sole aim
an armed intervention and the conquest
of Mexico, or of a section of it, Mr. Wil-
son should direct all his energies towards
the resumption of an harmonious modus
vivendi with Mexico; he should abandon
his hostile attitude and avail himself of
the best diplomatic assistance.
When Mr. Wilson sent Mr. Lind as
his confidential agent, or in whatever
capacity it may have been, a thing which
has never been definitely ascertained, to
present to President Huerta the inadmis-
sible requests I have previously men-
200 THE CASE OF MEXICO
tioned, President Huerta was tactful
enough to offer a counter proposition
which, if it had been accepted, would
have solved the difficulty.
The perfectly dignified suggestions
made by the Mexican statesman covered
two points:
1* That the Mexican Ambassador to
Washington be received.
2. That the United States send a new
ambassador to Mexico without any prior
conditions.
Those two points encompassed a vast
program; to enter into relations and to
discuss the situation through diplomatic
channels, with due regard for good form.
Mr. Wilson must be aware of the fact
that in international negotiations good
form is indispensable for the arrival at a
perfect understanding.
Sympathies and prejudices 'should be
set aside for the sake of convenience,
reason, and justice.
In politics there is no worse adviser
than self-conceit.
It is high time an end should be put to
THE CASE OF MEXICO 201
the present situation, which is anomalous,
dangerous, and inexcusable, and greatly
prejudicial to both Mexico and the
United States.
Mr. Wilson must not be blind to the
facts. He must realize that, notwith-
standing his attitude of hostility to Presi-
dent Huerta, the latter has remained in
power and has by this time completed his
first year in the presidential chair. He
must realize that, notwithstanding the
boycott directed against the provisional
government, it has succeeded in supply-
ing itself with arms and ammunition, en-
listing men and raising money; money has
been contributed voluntarily in Mexico
and abroad, for the patriotic endeavors
of President Huerta are inspiring more
confidence than the inexplicable doings of
the American Government. He must
realize that notwithstanding the direct
assistance the rebels have found in the
United States, and the moral help the
American Government has given them
indirectly, they are less than ever likely
to triumph; a few victories won in the
202 THE CASE OF MEXICO
frontier states where the American in-
fluence is the most effective, mean little
or nothing. In the rest of the country
the government retains the upper hand,
and Huerta has succeeded in limiting and
localizing the insurrection, Mr. Wilson
must realize that the triumph of the
rebels would prove disastrous for Mexico
and would imperil its institutions, its
social order, and the legitimate interests
of all foreign residents, not excluding the
American residents.
The Honorable Mr. Wilson has only
one alternative; either order an armed in-
tervention, a course which he pretends he
does not contemplate and which I con-
tend he has neither the right nor the
power to resort to; or rely entirely upon
diplomatic action. An attitude of watch-
ful expectancy does not constitute a so-
lution. It constitutes a real danger; it
is in the last analysis, inaction due to ig-
norance of whatever action should be
taken.
Of all the sensible suggestions which
have been made in connection with the
THE CASE OF MEXICO 208
Mexican problem, the most judicious and
practical are to be found in a brilliant
article published by Colonel George Har-
vey in the North American Review.
Mr. Harvey has reached the conclu-
sion that the policy inaugurated and car-
ried out by Mr. Wilson can only lead to
a war as odious to the Americans as to
the Mexicans "to whom we are anxious
to show our good will".
"The only alternative, apparently,"
Mr. Harvey writes, "is that indicated
above, namely, a reversal of the attempt
at dictation by means of an unworkable
Imperialism.
"Is not that possible?
"Nobody here or abroad, and nobody
in Mexico who needs be considered ques-
tions the high purpose which has actuated
President Wilson. Nobody suspects his
good faith, the purity of his motives, or
the pacificatory nature of his methods.
Nobody doubts that he has done his best,
and nobody can demonstrate that another
could have done better.
"But the policy which the preside&f
204 THE CASE OF MEXICO
sincerely believed to be the wisest has
failed. Why could and why should he
not now address the de facto Government
of Mexico substantially as follows :
" 'We have exerted our best endeavors,
according to our best judgment, to aid in
restoring peace and prosperity to you,
our neighbors, and our friends. We have
been disinterested, as you know; but our
suggestions, having failed to meet with
the approval of either the provisional
government or of the commander of the
insurrectionary forces, have necessarily
proved unavailing.
" 'Deeply as we regret this circum-
stance, we frankly admit it to be a fact.
But it is the accomplishment, not the
method, that we still regard as vital.
" 'We have tried our way in vain.
Now we stand ready to try yours.
" 'Your Ambassador will be received
in Washington. We will accredit a new
Ambassador to you "without previous
conditions."
" 'We shall hold your government re-
sponsible for the lives and properties of
THE CASE OF MEXICO .205
all foreign residents, and shall notify
other nations to that effect. All of our
dealings with your Administration will
be in the open, in good faith, and in sin-
cere hope that a truly representative and
stable Government may soon be estab-
lished, to the end that, within a reason-
able time, peace and prosperity may be
regained in all parts of your distracted
land.'
"We hear the objections to this new
policy. It would be unfair to the Con-
stitutionalists and rebels. But, since
their leader has repulsed our attempts at
mediation, what further claim have they
upon our consideration?
"It would strengthen Huerta, or
Blanquet, or Moheno, or whoever may be
in control when these words reach the
public ear and mind. That cannot be
helped. We must strengthen somebody,
and apparently there is little room for
choice.
"It would be inconsistent with our de-
clared attitude, would be a recession on
the part of the president, would humiliate
206 THE CASE OF MEXICO
us as a nation in the eyes of the world.
Perhaps, yes; and for that very reason it
would live forever as a performance and
an example, as the noblest act ever done
by a great and powerful nation in the in-
terest of a weak and suffering people.
"And it would avert war at least for
time sufficient to allow for adjustment
and mutual understanding. That is the
overpowering consideration which should,
and, we hope, may influence a president
who surely must realize that he is not
merely the tribune of a people, but is also
the head of a nation which should set the
pace for all the world in works of self-
abnegation tending to universal peace."
If I or some other Mexican had put
forward such arguments, they would lose
much of their value; they would appear
inspired by personal bias, by national
preferences; the writer might give the
impression that he was begging for
mercy. Coming from an American, a
democrat, and a sincere patriot, from one
of the most illustrious figures in Am-
erican journalism, they have an inestim-
THE CASE OF MEXICO 207
able value, and should make a deep im-
pression on Mr. Wilson. If he disre-
gards such advice he may some day have
a heavy conscience.
If any one insinuates that by making
those arguments mine I assume the atti-
tude of one begging for mercy, I shall
not repudiate the charge. I am ready to
sacrifice anything for my country's sake,
be it my life or even my honor, which is
dearer to me than my life.
Mexico is now in the throes of terrible
convulsions, but it is not dying, far from
it. All the events that have taken place
in my country since 1910 are only evi-
dence of its prodigious vitality. Not-
withstanding all the efforts we have made
to divide ourselves into ferocious factions,
which like tornadoes sow desolation
wherever they pass, Mexico is living,
striving, and has faith in itself; not only
will it regain the prestige and prosperity
it enjoyed until recently, but its future
will prove greater than its past.
This terrible period of disorder has been
208 THE CASE OF MEXICO
fertile in lessons by which we will profit
in the future.
Let us beware in politics of stagy atti-
tudes and of well sounding platitudes.
The former mean nothing, the latter
prove nothing.
We will have to rebuild upon our ruins,
and we shall build a new edifice accord-
ing to new plans. In the mental realm
we are always building upon disillusion-
men ts, but we generally use our disap-
pointment as cement.
We must proceed according to the or-
der of the creation; first there must be
light, that is peace; then out of the eth-
nical clay we hold in our hands we must
mould a nation and breathe into it a
national soul. Such is the task we will
consummate, thus we will discharge our
sacred duty as patriots and members of
the human race.
Will the Honorable Mr. Wilson, the
enlightened president of the powerful
American Republic, collaborate in this
work of pacification, of redemption, and
of uplift of a nation? Will he do it as an
THE CASE OF MEXICO 209
idealist, a puritan, a philosopher, a poli-
tician, a practical man, or as what? May
he do it very soon for the weal of Mexico,
for the honor of the United States, and
for his own glory. He has only to take
one step backward, I mean a step for-
ward, and confirm by deeds what he
promised by word of mouth.
If he can devise a way better suited to
his nation's temperament and to his own
personality, more effective and more dig-
nified as far as Mexico is concerned, he
may speak out; we shall surely find that
solution agreeable, and General Vic-
toriano Huerta will be the first to recon-
cile himself to it; as a man, as a citizen,
as a soldier, and as president, he has only
one aim: the salvation of the country.
I state this fact before the entire world
with the deepest conviction of its truth.
New York, January,
