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THE CASE OF
REQ [JISITION
OXFOED UNIVERSITY PRESS
LONDON EDINBURGH GLASGOW NEW YORK
TORONTO MELBOURNE CAPE TOWN BOMBAY
HUMPHREY MILFORD
PUBLISHER TO THE UNIVERSITY
THE CASE OF El^UiSlTION
',' /'\ ]■>. H^ *'>' i*^'. i' » i-^ ''
In re a PETITION OF RIGHT of
DE KEYSER'S ROYAL HOTEL LIMITED
DE KEYSER'S
ROYAL HOTEL LIMITED
THE KING
By LESLIE SCOTT
Of the Inner Temple, formerly Exhibitioner of New College, one of His
Majesty's Counsel, and Member of Parliament for the Exchange Division of Liverpool
And ALFRED HILDESLEY
Of the Inner Temple, Barrister-at-Law, formerly Scholar of Pembroke College
With an Introduction
By the Right Honourable SIR JOHN SIMON
Of the Inner Temple, Fellow of All Souls College, one of His Majesty's Counsel
and sometime Attorney-General to His Majesty
OXFORD
AT THE CLARENDON PRESS
1920
JFMS
S&53
CONTENTS
CHAP. PAGE
TABLE OF STATUTES CITED . . . vii
TABLE OF CASES CITED .
INTRODUCTION.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE CASE .
II. THE DEFENCE ACTS
III. THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN
IV. THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM CON
SOLIDATION ACT .
V. THE EFFECT OF STATUTE UPON THE
PREROGATIVE
VI. PETITION OF RIGHT
X
XV
1
10
42
79
105
114
EXCURSUS
I. NOTES ON THE RIGHT TO COMPENSA-
TION IN RESPECT OF REQUISITIONED
PROPERTY OTHER THAN LAND . • 136
II. THE INDEMNITY ACT, 1920 . . .158
APPENDICES
A. JUDGMENTS IN ATTORNEY-GENERAL
7. DE KEYSER'S ROYAL HOTEL,
LIMITED 168
B. STATUTES NOT PRINTED IN RUFF-
HEAD'S EDITION 220
C. DOCUMENTS RELATING TO VESTING
ACTS AND COMMISSIONS, INQUISI-
TIONS, PROCEEDINGS, AND DECREES 229
vi CONTENTS
PAGE
D. EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT OF
BRUCE IN 1798 ON THE ARRANGE-
MENTS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE
KINGDOM AT THE TIME OF THE
SPANISH ARMADA 247
E. WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT
RELATING TO SALTPETRE . , .261
F. EXTRACTS FROM WAR OFFICE RECORDS 277
G. EXTRACTS FROM BOTULI PARLIAMEN-
TORUM RELATING TO THE IM-
PRESSMENT OF SHIPS .... 296
INDEX . . . . . . .305
TABLE OF STATUTES
PAGE
Magna Carta, 1215 . . 43, 61, 106
9 Hen. Ill (Magna Carta, 1225) ... 61, 209
3 Edw. I, c. 32 (1275) Purveyance .... 62
8 Edw. I (1280) Statute of Petitions . . .116
12 Edw. I (1284) Ordinance of Petitions . .116
13 Edw. I, Stat. 2, c. 6 (Statute of Winchester, 1285) View of
Arms 137
25 Edw. I, Stat, i, c. 1 (1297) Confirmatia Cartarum . . 106
25 Edw. I, Stat, i, c. 5 (1297) Confirmatia Cartarum . . 53
1 Edw. Ill, Stat. 2, c. 5 (1327) Military Service . . .137
14 Edw. Ill, Stat, i, c. 19 (1340) Purveyance ... 52, 63
18 Edw. Ill, Stat, ii, c. 7 (1344) Purveyance . . . .137
25 Edw. Ill, Stat, v, c. 8 (1356) Military Service . . .137
34 Edw. Ill, c. 2 (1360) Purveyance ... 53, 54
36 Edw. Ill, Stat, i, c. 2 (1362) Purveyance ... 63, 64
46 Edw. Ill (1372) {Rot. Pari.) Impressment of
ships 149, 296
47 Edw. Ill (1373) {Rot Pari.) Impressment of
ships . . . . . 149, 297
2 Ric. II (1397) {Rot. Pari.) Impressment of
Ships 149,297
9 Ric. II (1385) {Rot. Pari.) Impressment of
Ships 149,298
4 Hen. IV, c. 13 (1402) Military Service . . .137
4 Hen. IV ^ (1402) {Rot. Pari.) Impressment of
Ships 149,298
5 Hen. IV (1403) {Rot. Pari.) Commissions of Array 138
3 Hen. V (1415) {Rot. Pari.) Impressment of
Ships .... 149, 152, 300
20 Hen. VI (1442) {Rot. Pari.) Impressment of
Ships 150,299
4 Hen. VIII, c. i (1512) Bulwarks . 12, 50, 211, 220
4 & 5 Pb. & M., c. 2 (1557) Military Service . . .138
13 Eliz., c. 4 (1570) Receivers .... 73
1 Jac. I, c. 25 (1604) Statute law revision . . .138
21 Jac. I, c. 3 (1623) Statute of Monopolies . . 58
16 Car. I, c. 14 (1640) Shipmoney declared unlawful . 62
16 Car. I, c. 21 (1640) Importation of gunpowder . 58
12 Car. II, c. 24 (1660) Abolition of Knights Service and
Purveyance . 58, 138, 153, 210
13 Car. II, Stat, i, c. 8 (1661) Royal Progresses . . .139
14 Car. II, c. 20 (1662) Royal Progresses . . 140, 222
18 & 19 Car. II, c. 8
(19 Car. II, c. 5, Ruff) (1666) Rebuildmg of London . . Ill
22 Car. II, c. 11 (1670) Rebuilding of London . . Ill
22 & 23 Car. II, No. 23 (1672) Fortifications ... 13, 226
1 Jac. II, c. 8 (1685) Importation of gunpowder . 58
1 Jac. II, c. 11 (1685) Transport for Navy and Ordnance
140, 228
vm
TABLE OF STATUTES
1 Will. & M., c. 5
1 Will. & M., Sess. 2, c. 2
2 Will. & M., Sess. 2, c. 6
4 Will. & M., c. 13
4 WiU. & M., c. 24
11 Will. Ill, c. 13 (11 & 12
Will. Ill, c. 13, Ruff.)
12 & 13 Will, m, c. 2
7 Anne, c. 26
4 Geo. I, c. 7 (Ireland)
13 Geo. II, c. 17
la Geo. II, c. 3 (Ireland)
23 Geo. II, c. 2 (Ireland)
31 Geo. II, c. 38
31 Geo. II, 0. 39
32 Geo. II, 0. 26
32 Geo. II, 0. 30
33 Geo. II, c. 11
2 Geo. Ill, c. 37
7 Geo. Ill, 0. 6 (Ireland)
20 Geo. Ill, 0. 38
22 Geo. Ill, 0. 80
34 Geo. Ill, c. 54
37 Geo. ni, c. 2 (Ireland)
38 Geo. Ill, c. 23
38 Geo. ni, c. 27
38 Geo. Ill, 0. 46
41 Geo. ni, c. 45
41 Geo. Ill, c. 66
43 Geo. Ill, c. 55
43 Geo. in, 0. 96
43 Geo. Ill, 0. 120
44 Geo. in, c. 95
1 & 2 Geo. IV, c. 69
3 Geo. IV, c. 108
2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 25
5 & 6 Vict., c. 94
8 & 9 Vict., 0. 18
17 & 18 Vict., c. 67
18 & 19 Vict., c. 117
20 & 21 Vict., c. 44
21 & 22 Vict., c. 106
22 Vict., c. 12
'23 & 24 Vict., c. 24
23 & 24 Vict., c. 106
23 & 24 Vict., c. 112
27 & 28 Vict., c. 57
28 & 29 Vict., c. 65
33 & 34 Vict., c. 71
36 & 37 Vict., c. 72
36 & 37 Vict., c. 69
(1688) Mutiny • . . .
(1688) Bill of Rights .
(1690) Mutiny . . . .
(1692) Mutiny . . . .
(1692) Expiring laws continuance
(1700) Expiring laws continuance
(1700-1) Act of Settlement .
(1708) Fortifications . . 13,
(1717) Fortifications .
(1740) Impressment .
(1745) Fortifications .
(1749) Fortifications .
(1757) Fortifications .
(1757) Fortifications . 15, 16, 74, 173
(1758) Fortifications .
(1758) Fortifications .
(1760) Fortifications .
(1762) Fortifications .
(1767) Fortifications .
(1780) Fortifications .
(1782) Fortifications .
(1794) Habeas Corpus Suspension
(1797) Fortifications .
(1798) Mutiny . . . ,
(1798) Defence . 22, 24, 26, 31, 142,
(1798) Impressment .
(1801) Mutiny .
(1801) Indemnity
(1803) Defence . 22, 142, 172, 213
(1803) MHitary Service . . 33,
(1803) Military Service
(1804) Defence . . 11, 23, 29, 174
(1821) Defence . .
(1822) Defence .
(1832) Defence .
Defence Act, 1842 . 10, 35-41, 81,
109, 174, 182, 183, 184, 186, 193,
209, 215
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act- 1845
38:
Defence Act, 1854 ....
Ordnance Board Transfer Act, 1855
Crown Suits (Scotland) Act, 1857
Government of India Act, 1858 .
Defence Act, 1859 ....
Petitions of Right Act, 1860 . 117,
122,
Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1860
Defence Act, 1860 . . . .
Admiralty Lands and Works Act, 1864
Defence Act, 1865 .
National Debt Act, 1870 .
Defence Acts Amendment Act, 1873
Petitions of Right (Ireland) Act, 1873
PAGE
. 141
43, 141
. 141
. 141
. 140
. 140
. 106
20, 173
. 23
. 153
. 23
23
. 15
229
15
16
16
18
23
19
14,20
. 169
. 23
. 142
173,215
. 153
142
159
215
174
34
215
35
35
35
108,
195,
133
10
36
117
118
10
120,
134
38
10
10
10
73
10
117
TABLE OF STATUTES ix
PAGE
42 & 43 Vict., c. 33 Army Discipline and Regulation Act,
1879 141
44 & 45 Vict., c. 58 Army Act, 1881 . 98, 140, 142, 145
54 & 55 Vict., c. 54 Ranges Act, 1891 ... 10, 38
55 & 56 Vict., c. 43 Militaiy Lands Act, 1892 ... 10
10
10
10
10
10
58 & 59 Vict., c. 35 Naval Works Act, 1895
59 & 60 Vict., c. 14 Short Titles Act, 1896
60 & 61 Vict., c. 6 Military Lands Act, 1897
63 & 64 Vict., c. 56 Military Lands Act, 1900
3 Edw. VII, c. 47 Military Lands Act, 1903
7 Edw. VII, c. 9 Territorial and Reserve Forces Act,
1907 10
8 Edw. VII, c. 25 Naval Lands (Volmiteers) Act, 1908 . 10
3 Geo, V, c. 2 Army (Annual) Act, 1913 . . .145
4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 26 Army (Supply of Food, Forage, and
Stores) Act, 1914 ... 98, 146
4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 29 Defence of the Realm Act, 1914 . . 84
4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 63 Defence of the Realm (No. 2) Act, 1914 85
4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 65 Articles of Commerce (Returns, &c.)
Act, 1914 147
4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 70 Naval Billeting, &c. Act, 1914 . 98, 145
5 Geo. V, c. 8 Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act,
1914 . 40, 78, 104, 169, 174, 182, 184,
186 192 199 201 217
6 Geo. V, c. 26 Army (Amendment) Act, 1915 ' . ' 98', 146
5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 58 Army (Amendment) No. 2 Act, 1915 . 146
6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 63 Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of
Land) Act, 1916 . 85, 176, 188, 196, 218
6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 68 New Ministries and Secretaries Act,
1916 .... 99, 103, 148
8 & 9 (^o. V, c. 59 Termination of the Present War
(Definition) Act, 1918 . . .103
10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 48 Indemnity Act, 1920 . 89, 90, 101, 121,
130, 158-67
TABLE OF CASES
PAGE
Adams v. London and Blackwall Railway Co. (1856) 2 Mac. & G. 118 ;
2 Hall. & Tw. 285 ; 19 L.J.Ch. 557 ; 14 Jur. 679 ; 42 E.R. 46 134
Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co. Ltd. v. The King (1920)
2K.B. 214; 89 L.J.K.B. 570 122
Att.-Gen. v. Brown (1920) 1 K.B. 773 ; 122 L.T. 558 ; 36 T.L.R. 165
97, 107
Att.-Gen. v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd. {see under De Keyser's
Hotel, Ltd. V. R.).
Att.-Gen. v. Donaldson (1842) 10 M. & W. 117; 11 L.J.Ex. 338;
152 E.R. 406 108
Att.-Gen. v. Homer (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 245; 54 L.J.Q.B. 227; 33
W.R. 93 ; 49 J.P. 326 92,218
Att.-Gen. to Prince of Wales v. Grossman (1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 381 ;
4 H. «& C. 568 ; 35 L.J.Ex. 215 ; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 712 ; 14 L.T.
856 ; 14 W.R. 996 78
Bamford v. Turley (1862) 3 B. & S. 62 ; 31 L.J.Q.B. 286 ; 9 Jur.
/ (N.S.)377; 10 W.R. 803 ; 122 E.R. 25 .... 68
v/Bankers' Case (1700) 14 How. St. Tr. 184 ; 5 Mod. 29 ; Skinner 601 ;
1 Freem. 337 114, 129
Blundell V. R. (1905) 1 K.B. 516 ; 74 L.J.K.B. 91 ; 92 L.T. 53 ; 53
W.R. 412 ; 21 T.L.R. 143 38
Boaler, In re (1915) 1 K.B. 21 ; 53 L. J.K.B. 1629 ; 24 Cox C.C. 335 ;
111L.T. 497; 30T.L.R. 580; 58S.J. 634 . . . .102
Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Maclay (1920)
The Times, July 15, 1920 123
British Cast Plate Manufacturers v. Meredith (1792) 4 T.R. 794 ;
100 E.R. 1306 68
Broadmayne, The (1916) P. 64; 85 L.J.P. 153; 114 L.T. 891;
32 T.L.R. 304 ; 60 S.J. 367 136
Camden (Marquis) v. Batterbury (1856) 7 C.B. (N.S.) 864; 28
L.J.C.P. 335 ; 5 Jur. (N.S.) 1405 ; 7 W.R. 616 ; 141 E.R. 1055 180
Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic) v. Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd.
(1919) A.C. 744 ; 88 L.J.Ch. 464 ; 121 L.T. 361 ; 35 T.L.R. 552 ;
17 L.G.R. 569 93
Chester v. Bateson (1920) 1 K.B. 829 ; 89 L. J.K.B. 387 ; 18 L.G.R.
212 ; 122 L.T. 684 ; 84 J.P. 65 ; 36 T.L.R. 255 . . 97, 102
China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. v. Maclay (1918) 1 K.B. 33 ; .
87 L. J.K.B. 95 ; 117 L.T. 831 ; 14 Asp. M.C. 175 ; 34 T.L.R. 81 \
95, 123, 136, 155
Churchward v. Ford (1857) 2 H. & N. 446 ; 26 L.J.Ex. 354 ; 5 W.R.
831 ; 157 E.R. 184 178
Churchward v. Reg. (1865) L.R. 1 Q.B. 173 ; 6 B. & S. 807 ; 14 L.T.
57 ; 122 E.R. 1391 130
Commercial and Estates Co. of Egypt v. Ball (1920) W.N. 172 ;
36 T.L.R. 526 72
Commissioner of Public Works (Cape Colony) v. Logan (1903)
A.C. 355 ; 72 L.J.P.C. 91 ; 88 L.T. 779 ; 19 T.L.R. 545 . . 92
TABLE OF CASES xi
PAGE
Coomber v. Berks. Justices (1884) 9 A.C. 61 ; 53 L.J.Q.B. 239
50 L.T. 405 ; 32 W.R. 525 ; 48 J.P. 421 .. . 113, 172
Cooper V. Hawkins (1904) 2 K.B. 164 ; 73 L. J.K.B. 113 ; 89 L.T. 476
52 W.R. 233 ; 68 J.P. 25 ; 19 T.L.R. 620 ; 1 L.G.R. 833 . .113
/Oooke's Case (1691) 1 Shower K.B. 208 ; 93 E.R. 540 . . . Ill
De Bode (Baron) in re (1838) 6 Dowl. 776 ; I W.W. & H. 332 . . 134
De Bode (Baron) v. Reg. (1840) 2 Ph. 85 ; 41 E.R. 874 ; 1 Coop, t
Cott. 143; 47 E R. 786. (1845) 8 Q.B. 208; 115 E.R. 854,
(1848) 13 Q.B. 364; 116 E.R. 1302. (1851) 3 H.L.C. 449
10 E.R. 176 117, 123, 129
De Dohs6 V. Reg. (1886) 66 L. J.Q.B. 422 n. ; 3 T.L.R. 114 . . 124
De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd. v. R. ( 1918) 34 T.L.R. 329 (Peterson, J. )
(1919) 2 Ch. 197 ; 88 L.J.Ch. 415 ; 120 L.T. 396 ; 63 S.J. 445
35 T.L.R. 418 (C.A.) . . . Sub nomine. Att.-Gen. v. De Keyser'
Royal Hotel, Ltd. (1920) A.C. 508; 122 L.T. 691 ; 64 S.J. 513
36 T.L.R. 600 passim
Doss V. Secretary of State for India in Council (1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 509
32 L.T. 294 ; 23 W.R. 773
Dunn V. Reg. (1896) 1 Q.B. 116; 65 L.J.Q.B. 279; 73 L.T. 695
44 W.R. 243 ; 60 J.P. 117
Dyson v. Att.-Gen. (1911) 1 K.B. 410 ; 80 L.J.K.B. 531 ; 103 L.T
707 ; 55 S.J. 168 ; 27 T.L.R. 143
/Ellis V. Earl Grey (1833) 6 Sim. 214 ; 2 L. J.Ch. 181 ; 58 E.R. 574
/Entick V. Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1030; 2 Wils. 275
95 E.R. 807
118
124
123
129
125
Feather v. Reg. (1865) 6 B. & S. 257 ; 35 L.J.Q.B. 200 ; 12 L.T. 114
122 E.R. 1191 124, 125, 130
V^ox, Ex parte (1793) 5 T.R. 276 ; 101 E.R. 155 . . . . 153
Fox, The (1811) Edw. 312 ; 2 Roscoe E.P.C. 61 . . . .212
Gorton Local Board of Health v. Prison Commissioners (1887) (1904)
2 K.B. 165 n. ; 73 L. J.K.B. 114 n. ; 89 L.T. 478 n. ; 68 J.P. 27 ;
1L.G.R. 838n 113
Guaranty Trust Co. v. Hannay (1915) 2 K.B. 536 ; 84 L.J.K.B. 1465 ;
113 L.T. 98 ; 59 Sol. J. 302 ; 21 Com. Cas. 67 . . . 122
Harding v. MetropoUtan Railway Co. (1872) L.R. 7 Ch. 154 : 41
L. J.Ch. 371 : 26 L.T. 109 : 20 W.R. 321 .... 134
Hawkins v. Gathercole (1857) 6 De G.M. & G. 1 ; 24 L.J.Ch. 332 ;
3 Eq. Rep. 348 ; 1 Jur. (N.S.) 481 ; 3 W.R. 194 ; 43 E.R. 1129 107
Haynes v. Haynes (1861) 1 Drew. & Sm. 426 ; 30 L.J.Ch. 578 ; 4 L.T.
199; 7 Jur. (N.S.) 595; 9 W.R. 497; 62 E.R. 442 . . .134
Hellier v. Silcox (1850) 19 L.J.Q.B. 295 ; 14 Jur. 573 . . 179, 181
Henley & Co., In re (1879) 9 Ch. D. 469 ; 48 L.J.Ch. 147 ; 39 L.T. 53 ;
, 26 W.R. 885 113
vHeydon's Case (1584) 3 Rep. 7 ; 76 E.R. 637 ... . 107
Hodge V. Att.-Gen. (1839) 3 Y. & C. Ex. 342 ; 8 L.J.Ex.Eq. 28 ; 160
E.R. 734 123
Hole V. Barlow (1858) 4 C.B. (N.S.) 334 ; 27 L.J.C.P. 207 ; 4 Jur.
(N.S.) 1019 ; 6 W.R. 619 ; 140 E.R. 1113 . . 68, 210, 212
Hosier v. Earl of Derby (1918) 2 K.B. 671 ; 87 L.J.K.B. 1009 ;
119 L.T. 351 ; 34 T.L.R. 477 123
xii TABLE OF CASES
PAGE
Howard v. Shaw (1841) 8 M. & W. 118 ; 10 L. J.Ex. 334 ; 151 E.R. 973 179
Hudson's Bay Co. v. Maclay (1920) W.N. 170 ; 36 T.L.R. 469 99, 101, 136
Incorporated Society v. Reg. (1900) 1 I.R. 464 . . . .29
Irwin V. Earl Grey (1862) 3 F. & F. 635 120
Islington Market Bill, In re (1835) 3 CI. & F. 513 ; 6 E.R. 153 ;
12 M. & W. 20 n. ; 152 E.R. 1094 112
Kirk V. Reg. (1872) L.R. 14 Eq. 558 130
Leaman v. R. (1920) 36 T.L.R. 835 124
Levi V.Lewis (1859)6 C.B.(N.S.) 766; 28 L.J.C.P. 304; 5Jur.(N.S.)
1408 ; 141 E.R. 652 ; (1861) 9 C.B. (N.S.) 872 ; 30 L.J.C.P. 141 ;
7 Jur. (N.S.) 759 ; 9 W.R. 388 ; 142 E.R. 343 .. . 180
Liptonv. Ford(1917)2K.B. 647; 86 L.J.K.B. 1241 ; 116 LT. 632;
15 L.G.R. 699 ; 33 T.L.R. 459 96
Lobitos Oilfields v. Admiralty Commissioners (1917) 86 L.J.K.B.
1444 ; 117 L.T. 28 ; 33 T.L.R. 472 90
London and North Western Railway v. Evans (1893) 1 Ch. 16 ;
62 L. J.Ch. 1 ; 2 R. 120 ; 67 LT. 630 ; 41 W.R. 149 92, 186, 218
VMacbeath v. Haldeman (1786) 1 T.R. 173 ; 99 E.R. 1036
vjlagdalen College Case (1616) 1 Rep. 746 ; 77 E.R. 1247
^Maleverer v. Spinke (1537) 1 Dyer 36 ; 73 E.R. 81
Markeyv. Coote(1876)Ir. R. lOC.L. 149 . . .
Mitchell, In re (1896) 12 T.L.R. 324
Mitchell V. Reg. (1896) 1 Q.B. 121, n. ; 6 T.L.R. 181, 332
Monckton v. Att.-Gen. (1850) 2 Mac. & G. 402 ; 42 E.R. 156 .
V Money v. Leach (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 ; 3 Burr. 1692 ; 97 E.R,
/ 1050 ; 3 W. Bla. 555 ; 96 E.R. 320 ... .
^Monopolies, Case of (1602) 11 Rep. 84b ; 77 E.R. 1260 .
130
120
68
179
119
124
121
125
58
38
Ned's Point Battery, In re (1903) 2 I.R. 192 ...
Newcastle Breweries Ltd. v. R. (1920) 1 K.B. 854 ; 89 L.J.K.B. 392
123 L.T. 58 ; 36 T.L.R. 276 . . 97, 98, 100» 136, 147, 165, 175
New Windsor Corporation v. Taylor (1899) A.C. 41 ; 68 L.J.Q.B. 87 ;
79 L.T. 450 ; 63 J.P. 164 113, 202
Oldham v. Treasury Commissioners (not reported) . . .129
Petition of Right, In re a ('Shoreham Aerodrome Case') (1915)
3 K.B. 649 ; 84 L. J.K.B. 1961 ; 113 L.T. 575 ; 31 T.L.R. 596 ; 59
S.J. 665 (1916) W.N. 311 xix, 5, 66, 69, 169, 171, 172, 173, 200, 205, 218
'Phillips V. Homfray (1883) 24 Ch.D. 439 ; 52 L.J.Ch. 833 ; 49 L.T.
5 ; 32 W.R. 2 ; affirmed (1886) 11 A.C. 466 . . . 178, 181
Postmaster-(^neral, Ex 'parte : In re Bonham (1879) 10 Ch.D. 595 ;
/ 48 L.J.B.K. 84 ; 40 L.T. 16 ; 27 W.R. 325 . . . 110, 182
*" Proclamations, Case of (1611) 12 Rep. 74 ; 77 E.R. 1352 . 43, 47
R. V. Abbott (1897) 2 I.R. 362 32, 35, 38, 92
R. V. Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Co. (1850) 15 Q.B.
634 ; 20 LJ.Q.B. 304 ; 117 E.R. 599 134
V^. V. Broadfoot (1743) Foster, Cr. Cas. 154 . . . . .152
R. V. Casement (1917) 1 K.B. 98 ; 86 LJ.K.B. 467 ; 115 L.T. 277 ;
25 Cox C.C. 480 ; 60 S.J. 656 ; 32 T.L.R. 667 .. . 56
R. V. Doutre (1884) 9 A.C. 745 ; 53 LJ.P.C. 84 ; 51 L.T. 669 130, 189
TABLE OF CASES xiii
PAGE
R. V. Halliday (1917) A.C. 260 ; 86 L.J.K.B. 1119 ; 116 L.T. 417 ;
y 81 J.P. 237 ; 61 S.J. 443 ; 33 T.L.R. 336 . . 96, 102, 104
v4l. V. Hampden (1637) 3 How. St. Tr. 825 . xxiii, 59, 67, 138, 139, 147,
148, 151, 170, 210
R. V. Inland Revenue Commissioners: In re Nathan (1884) 12
Q.B.D. 461 ; 53 L.J.Q.B. 229 ; 51 L.T. 46 ; 32 W.R. 543 ; 48
/ J.P. 452 121
^. V. King (1694) Comb. 245 ; 90 E.R. 456 153
R. V. Leman Street Police Station Inspector: Ex parte Venicoff
(1920) 3 K.B. 72 '97
R. V. London and North Western Railway Co. (1894) 2 Q.B. 512 ;
63 L.J.Q.B. 695 ; 10 R. 359 ; 58 J.P.'^719 . . . .134
R. V. Powell (1841) 1 Q.B. 352 ; 113 E.R. 1166 . . . . 134
R. V. Secretary of State for Home Affairs : Ex parte Venicoff (1920)
3 K.B. 72 97
R. V. Treasury Commissioners (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 387 ; 41 L.J.Q.B.
y 178 ; 26 L.T. 64 ; 20 W.R. 336 ; 12 Cox. C.C. 277 . . . 134
VK. r. Tubbs(1776)2Cowp. 512; 98E.R. 1215 . . . .153
R. V. Wormwood Scrubbs Prison Governor (1920) 2 K.B. 305 ;
84 J.P. 94 ; 36 T.L.R. 432 96, 103
Robinson & Co., Ltd. v. R. (1920) 36 T.L.R. 773 . . . . 101
Robson, In re (1846) 2 Ph. 84 ; 16 L.J. 105 ; 41 E.R. 873 . . 117
Rodgers v. Maw (1846) 15 M. & W. 444 ; 4 D. & L. 66 ; 16 L.J.Ex.
137 ; 153 E.R. 924 147
Rolt, Inre(1859)2DeG. & J. 44; 45E.R. 18 . . , .117
Rooney v. Department of Agriculture (1920) 1 I.R. 176 . .93
Russian Bank for Foreign Trade v. Excess Insurance Co. (1918)
2 K.B. 123 ; 87 L.J.K.B. 872 ; 24 Com. Cas. 55 ; 63 L.T. 40 ;
35 T.L.R. 42 ; aflBrmed (1919) 1 K.B. 39 . . . .136
Ryves v. Duke of Wellington (1846) 9 Beav. 579 ; 15 L.J.Ch. 461 ;
10 Jur. 697 ; 50 E.R. 475 119
Saltpetre, Case of (1606) 2 Rep. 12 ; 77 E.R. 1294 47-59- 170, 206, 210
SanspareilH.M.S.(1900)P. 267; 69 L. J.P. 127 ; 82 L.T. 606 : 9 Asp.
M.L.C. 78 ; 16 T.L.R. 390 .126
Sarpen, The (1916) P. 306 ; 85 L.J.P. 209 ; 114 L.T. 1011 ; 32 T.L.R.
575; 60 S.J. 538 136
Sheffield Conservative and Unionist Club v. Brighten (1916) 85
L.J.K.B. 1669 ; (1916) W.N. 277 ; 32 T.L.R. 598 . . . 96
Shenton v. Smith (1895) A.C. 229; 64 L.J.P.C. 119; 11 R. 375;
72 L.T. 130 ; 43 W.R. 637 124
Shotts Iron Co. v. Inglis (1882) 7 A.C. 518 68
V^mith V. Hodson (1791) 4 T.R. 211 ; 100 E.R. 979 .. . 198
i/Stradling v. Morgan (1684) 1 Plow. 199 ; 75 E.R. 305 . . . 107
Thomas v. R. (1874) L.R. 10 Q.B. 31 ; 44 L.J.Q.B. 9 ; 31 L.T. 439 ;
23 W.R. 176 129
Tiverton and North Devon Railway Co. v. Loosemore (1884) 9 A.C.
480 ; 53 L.J.Ch. 812 ; 50 L.T. 637 ; 32 W.R. 929 ; 48 J.P. 372 134
Tobm V. R. (1863) 14 C.B. (N.S.) 505 ; 32 L. J.C.P. 216 ; 9 Jur. (N.S.)
1130 ; 8 L.T. 392 ; 11 W.R. 701 ; 143 E.R. 543 . . . 120
Tobin V. R. (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.) 310; 33 L.J.C.P. 199; 10 Jur.
(N.S.) 1029 ; 10 L.T. 762 ; 12 W.R. 838 ; 143 E.R. 1148
115, 125, 130, 135, 189
xiv TABLE OF CASES
PAGE
Von Frantzius, In re (1858) 2 De G. & J. 126 ; 27 L.J.Ch. 368 ; 44
E.R. 936 117, 130
Wheaton v. Maple (1893) 3 Ch. 48 ; 62 L.J.Ch. 963 ; 69 L.T. 203 ;
41 W.R. 677 113, 172, 182
*^ilkes V. Lord Halifax (1769) 19 How. St. Tr. 1076 . . .125
-Wilkes V. Wood (1763) 19 How. St. Tr. 1153 : Lofft. 1 ; 98 E.R. 489 125
viVillion V. Berkley (1560) Plowd. 223 ; 75 E.R. 339 .. . 108
Windsor and Annapolis Railway Co. v. R. (1886) 11 A.C. 607 ; 55
• L.J.P.C. 41 ; 55 L.T. 271 ; 51 J.P. 260 . . . . 130, 189
Y.B. 8 Edw. IV, H. 41 (1469) 49
Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, T. 27 b (1506) 49
Y.B. 3 Hen. VIII, fo. 115(1512) 211
Y.B. 14 Hen. VIII, T. pi. 16 (1522) 49
Zamora (1916) P. 27 ; 113 L.T. 649 ; 31 T.L.R. 513 ; 59 S.J. 614 ;
13 Asp. M.L.C. 144 ; 1 Brit. & Col. P.C. 309 ; 4 Lloyds P.C. 1 72
Zamora, The (1916) 2 A.C. 77; 85 L.J.P. 89; 114 L.T. 626; 32
T.L.R.436; 60 S.J. 41 6; 13 Asp. M.C. 330; 2 Brit. & Col. P.C. 1 ;
4 Lloyds P.C. 1 . . 6, 70, 95, 102, 203, 204, 206. 210, 212
INTRODUCTION
Leading cases in Constitutional Law are chiefly
concerned with establishing the rights of individual
citizens in the face of exceptional interference by
the Executive, and a heavy crop of judicial decisions
on this subject might, at first sight, have been
expected in the years 1914-19. But in fact the
instances in which such questions were raised and
decided by Enghsh Courts are few. It is instructive
to observe the reason for their scarcity ; certainly
the explanation is not to be found in the slightness
or infrequency of official interference with private
rights within these islands during those anxious
years.
The Great War necessarily involved such action
in an unprecedented degree. But public opinion
and the House of Commons generally recognized
as inevitable the claim of the Authorities to interfere
drastically in the interests of national defence with
individual rights, and the conduct of the Crown's
advisers was not regarded as opposed to the interests
of citizens but rather as representing the claims of
the whole body politic against some individual
member.
In the seventeenth century, on the contrary,
constitutional rights were fought for in the Law
Courts and insisted upon in Parliamentary debate
because the Crown on the one side was felt to be
opposed to Parliament and people on the other.
The jealousy and suspicion of Executive interference
which were thus engendered profoundly affected
xvi INTRODUCTION
the course of constitutional practice in times of
crisis thereafter. Claims by the Crown to disregard
private rights on the plea of the needs of national
defence were jealously scrutinized. Even in a year
of disaster like 1757 the authority of Parhament
was invoked to provide (and, be it noted, to pay for)
lands urgently needed for the fortification of Ports-
mouth, Chatham, and Plymouth. The powers of
taking lands which Pitt exercised to protect the
realm against the danger of Napoleon's projected
invasion were based upon express ParHamentary
sanction. But in the century which followed
Waterloo there was little occasion to analyse the
extent of the powers which the Crown might employ
without Parliamentary authority in disregard of
private rights for the purpose of national defence ;
and when in August 1914 the emergency arose the
Government could count with confidence on general
acquiescence in the steps it felt bound to take on
behalf of a united people.
Moreover, Parliament in the early days of the
war rushed through a piece of emergency legislation
which authorized the Executive, without further
reference to the Legislature, to make and enforce
regulations ' for securing the pubHc safety and the
defence of the realm '.^ The original regulations
^ The original Defence of the Realm Bill was introduced on
Friday, August 7, 1914, and was passed through all its stages
at that sitting of the Commons without discussion. As no printed
copies were available (for Bills are not officially printed for the
use of Members till they have been read a first time) the Home
Secretary read the terms of the Bill to the House {Pari. Debates,
vol. Ixv, col. 2192), and announced a special Saturday sitting
next day when the Royal Assent might be given to the Bill
after it had passed the Lords. The limited scope of this first
INTRODUCTION xvii
were few in number and were addressed to obvious
risks of danger to national safety arising from the
conditions of such a war. But these Regulations
multiplied so fast and soon touched upon so great
a variety of topics that lawyers as well as laymen
found it almost impossible to ascertain whether
official claims, alleged to be based on one or other of
these Regulations, were legally justified. It was
not until the actual fighting was over, though the
operation of many of these Regulations continued,
that a challenge as to their scope and vaHdity began
to be commonly heard.
In the meantime administrative convenience and
patriotic acquiescence combined to encourage the
belief that prerogative powers in time of war were
practically without limit. The correction which the
Law Courts could have applied was not sought, so
that the few cases on this subject which have
recently come up for judicial decision have a special
value and importance because they have helped to
re-establish the true constitutional view. Amongst
these cases, the litigation which the authors of this
volume have called ' The Case of Requisition ' may
fairly claim to be the chief. In the com?se of that
case the official contention that the Crown could
acquire compulsorily the use of a subject's land for
the purposes of national defence without incurring
any obligation to pay for it was shown to be without
enactment was indicated by the Minister's remark that summary
Courts jnight be needed for ' cases of tapping wires or attempts
to blow up bridges '. Yet it was from this modest beginning
that there developed, during the next four years, under the
unprecedented conditions of war, the portly volume of nearly
four hundred pages known as the ' Consolidated Defence of the
Realm Regulations '. Parturiunt mures, nascetur terribilis mons.
2388 ^
xviii INTRODUCTION
historical or legal foundation, and the House of
Lords by a unanimous judgment laid it down
that while public necessity may justify expropriation
it cannot destroy the subject's right to be paid
for the land so taken.
The-actual question raised in the litigation which
is the subject of this book was simple enough. The
War Office, desiring to house the Head-quarters
Staff of the Royal Flying Corps, decided that a well-
known hotel building on the Thames Embankment
was suitable for the purpose and took possession of
it from the owners. In thus acting, the War Office
was following a course which had repeatedly been
taken during the war by Government departments
in London and elsewhere. The duration of such
occupation by the Crown was indefinite and would
depend upon the exigences of the Pubhc Service,
of which the department would be the sole judge.
The department were willing that payment should
be made out of public funds for the use of the hotel
as a matter of grace, and proposed to refer the matter
of the amount to be paid to a Commission which
had been set up to advise the Crown what payments
should ' in reason and fairness ' be made in respect
of direct and substantial loss incurred through the
exercise of the Crown's rights and duties under
the Defence of the Realm, in cases where the subject
had no other remedy. But the Crown denied that
the Hotel Company had any ' right ' to compensation.
The Hotel Company insisted that it had, and the
question was therefore precisely raised whether when
the Crown requisitions property in time of war for
the Defence of the Realm there arises any legal
obligation to pay for the property thus requisitioned.
• INTRODUCTION xix
The Suppliants in launching their Petition of
Right were faced with the difficulty that this
que^ion appeared to have been already answered in
favour of the Crown's contention in a previous
decision. This was the Shoreham Aerodrome Case/
in which the Court of Appeal had unanimously
affirmed the view expressed by Mr. Justice Avory
that the Crown, both by virtue of the Royal Pre-
rogative and under the Defence of the Realm
Regulations, was entitled to take possession of and
occupy land and premises for the purposes of the
defence of the realm without making any com-
pensation therefor. It seemed fairly clear that
this decision would apply to the question raised
in connexion with the requisition of De Keyser's
Hotel, but advocates faced with a decision which
is opposed to their contention struggle to find
a ground of distinction and are sometimes assisted
in these refinements by a sympathetic Judge.
The Shoreham Aerodrome case, like the De Keyser
Hotel case, was concerned with the requisition
of real property for purposes connected with the
Air Services of the Crown, but it was suggested
that there might be a distinction between the
compulsory taking of land to accommodate a fight-
ing unit on the coast, and the requisition of
a building in the MetropoUs for the purpose of
housing an administrative body. Mr. Justice Peter-
son, before whom the De Keyser Hotel case first
came, having come to the conclusion that the occupa-
tion of the hotel was necessary for the purpose of
securing the public safety and the defence of the
realm, considered the question of law which he had
^ In re a Petition of Right [1915] 3 K.B., 649.
XX INTRODUCTION
to decide as answered for him by the Court of
Appeal in the Shoreham Aerodrome case : ' There-
fore,' he said in his judgment, ' it is not my opinion
which I am expressing when I come to the conclusion
that the present Petition must be dismissed. What-
ever may be the ultimate decision on the rights of
subjects as against the Crown in cases of this
description, for the present purpose I must recognize
that I am bound by the decision of the Court of
Appeal and accordingly I must dismiss the Petition.'
The Suppliants thereupon appealed to the Court
of Appeal and endeavoured to distinguish the present
case from its predecessor by urging that the
Shoreham Aerodrome case was analogous to an
entry upon land by the sea .coast to dig trenches,
and was not analogous to the taking of lands or
buildings for purely administrative purposes. The
attempt thus to distinguish the two cases gained
in piquancy from the circumstance that one of the
Lords Justices had also been a party to the earlier
decision. When the judgment came to be given
the Master of the Rolls insisted upon the suggested
distinction and said of the Shoreham Aerodrome
case : ^ ' Whether rightly decided or not — and it
is of course still open to review in the House of Lords
— ^it has no application to such a case as the present,
namely, taking possession of land and buildings for
administrative purposes.' Lord Justice Warrington
also found it possible to draw the required distinction,
and thus the Suppliants succeeded in obtaining the
support of the majority in the Court of Appeal and
the Crown became Appellants in the House of
Lords. It is amusing to note that in the supreme
1 (1919) 2 Ch., 229.
INTRODUCTION xxi
tribunal (where the previous decision of the Court
of Appeal in the Shoreham case could not cojitrol
the issue) the attempt to find distinctions which
advocates and judges had been driven to draw in
the Courts below, did not find much favour. ' I am
bound to say ', observed Lord Dunedin,^ ' that
I do not think that this case can be distinguished
from that in essential particulars. The existence
of a state of war is common to both. As to the
necessity for the taking over of the particular
subject, the Crown Authorities must be the judge
of that, and the evidence as to the necessity for the
occupation of these premises in the opinion of the
Crown's advisers is just as distinct and uncontradicted
in this case as it was in that. I confess that had I
been sitting in the Court of Appeal I should have
held the same view as was expressed by Peterson, J.,
— ^namely, that it was ruled by the case of In re
a Petition of Right.''
Here then is a pretty illustration of the working
of precedents in EngHsh Case Law ! The majority
of the Court of Appeal and all the Judges in the
House of Lords arrived at the same conclusion — but
by different means. In the Court of Appeal where
the earlier decision mattered, the Court reached
the correct result by drawing a distinction between
the two cases ; in the House of Lords where the
earher decision created no obstacle, the distinction
was declared not to exist, the earlier decision was
overruled, and the Court of Appeal's later view was
approved.
But it may be safely asserted that the real reason
for the view taken by the Court of Appeal is to
1 App. A, p. 171.
xxii INTRODUCTION
be found in the historical researches which had
taken place since the Shoreham case, and in the
light which these threw upon an obscure and almost
forgotten corner of constitutional law. The Sup-
pHants were the first to institute a search and they
presented such material as they had to the Court
of Appeal in the course of their argument. The
Master of the Rolls thereupon decided that the
hearing should be adjourned in order that a more
complete examination of the records might be made
with the resources which the Crown had at hand.
The conclusion was a remarkable one : ' The result
of the searches which have been made ', said the
late Lord Swinfen/ ' is that it does not appear
that the Crown has ever taken the subject's land
for the defence of the realm without paying for it ;
and even in Stuart times I can trace no claim by
the Crown to such a prerogative.' Lord Justice
Warrington similarly observed, in reference to the
many ancient records which were brought to the
notice of the Court of Appeal,^ ' There is no trace
in any of them of an assertion on the part of the
Crown of a right to take and hold possession of the
subject's land without paying for it '. Lord Dunedin,
in his speech in the House of Lords, analysed the
effect of the records as follows : ^ ' There is a uni-
versal practice of payment resting on bargain before
1708, and on statutory power and provision after
1708. On the other hand, there is no mention of
a claim made in respect of land taken under the
Prerogative for the acquisition' of which there was
neither bargain nor statutory sanction. Nor is
1 (1919) 2 Ch., 221. 2 (1919) 2 Ch., 232.
3 App. A, p. 171.
INTRODUCTION xxiii
there any proof that any such acquisition had taken
place.' The decision in the Shoreham case was
given before this investigation of ancient records
had been made and it is useful both for historians
and for lawyers to observe how greatly the historical
inquiry assisted the conclusion ultimately reached
as a matter of law.
The analogy to this instance of history coming
in to correct the first impressions of some lawyers is
to be found in the famous case of Ship-Money,^ and
in the course of the argument for the Suppliants
in the Court of Appeal it was thought not unseemly
to remind the Lords Justices, who were troubled
by the Shoreham decision, of the parallel. Sir
George Crooke was one of the Justices of the Court
of King's Bench who upheld the side of Hampden,
but he was also one of the Judges who previous to
Mr. St. John's two-days' argument in that trial — ' the
finest argument that had ever been heard in West-
minster Hall ' as Lord Campbell reminds us — had
signed an opinion for the King asserting the legality
of ship-money. Sir George Crooke in his judgment
explains that»he signed the Opinion because it was
the view of the majority of the Judges though he
did not himself share it, — ^thus acting in the same
way as a dissenting member of the Judicial Com-
mittee would act to-day when reporting to the
Crown the advice of the supreme Imperial tribunal.
But Mr. Justice Crooke was not content to justify
his apparent change of view by drawing a distinction
between his advisory and his judicial functions,
for he is at pains to add : ' And if I had been of
that opinion absolutely, now having heard all the
1 3 How. St. Tr. 825.
xxiv INTRODUCTION
arguments on both sides, and the reasons of the
King's Counsel to maintain this writ, and why the
Defendant is to be charged; and the argument
of the Defendant's counsel against the writ, and their
reasons why the Defendant should not be charged
to pay the money assessed him, and having duly
considered the records and precedents showed unto
me, especially those of the King's side, I am now
of an absolute opinion that this writ is illegal, and
declare my opinion to be contrary to that which is
subscribed by us all. And if I had been of the same
opinion that was subscribed, yet upon better
advisement being absolutely settled in my judgment
and conscience in a contrary opinion, I think it
no shame to declare that I do retract that opinion,
for humanum est errare, rather than to argue against
my own conscience, and therefore none having, as I
conceive, removed those difficulties, I shall proceed
to my argument, and show the reasons of my opinion,
and leave the same to my lords and brothers. Not
one precedent nor record in any precedent time,
that hath been produced or showed unto me, that
doth maintain any writ, to lay such a charge upon
any county, inland or maritime.'
This curious extract from the 3rd volume of the
State Trials^ is from a judgment pronounced in
1637. But the judgment in the Case of Requisition
283 years later teaches the same lesson, — the lesson
that the foundations of constitutional law He deeply
embedded in ground which is in the joint occupation
of historians and lawyers, and that the protection of
private citizens against unfounded claims by the
Executive is one of the most valuable functions of
the judiciary. JOHN SIMON.
1 p. 1146.
CHAPTER I
THE HISTORY OF THE CASE
The following statement of the facts is taken
from the judgement of Lord Dunedin ^ :
* In April 1916 the Army Council finding it
necessary to have accommodation in London for
the head- quarters personnel of the Royal Flying
Corps and for the design section of the same, com-
municated with the Board of Works with a view to
their finding a suitable building. That Department,
which had previously had some tentative offers
from the Receiver and Manager in possession of the
premises belonging to the De Keyser Hotel Com-
pany, Limited, came to the conclusion that the
building known as De Keyser' s Hotel would suit.
They communicated with the War Office to that
effect on the 18th April 1916, and on the same date
applied to the Receiver to see on what terms he
would let. After a short period of ineffectual
negotiation, the Board of Works, on the 29th April,
informed the Receiver that " after full consideration
of the matter the Board are of the opinion that it
will be to the advantage of all concerned to refer
the question of the amount to be paid by the
Government for the use of such of the hotel premises
as will be required to the Defence of the Realm
Losses Commission. In these circumstances the
Board have no option but to communicate with the
War Office with a view to the hotel premises,
excluding the shops, being requisitioned under the
Defence of the Realm Acts in the usual manner."
Following on this communication the War Office,
1 See App. A, p. 168.
2388
B
2 ' / '' CASE' OF REQUISITION
on'tiie^ist' May* 'wrote as follows to the Receiver :
" De Keyser's Royal Hotel, E.G. I am instructed
by the Army Council to take possession of the
above property under the Defence of the Realm
Regulations, excluding the shops, the other portions
sub-let, and the wine cellars. ... I enclose forms of
claim for submission to the Defence of the Realm
Losses Commission. Compensation, as you are
probably aware, is made ex gratia and is strictly
limited on the actual monetary loss sustained."
On receipt of this letter the Receiver expressed his
willingness to facilitate the taking possession, but at
the same time he safeguarded his position by the
following letter on May 3rd : "I write to inform
you that I have instructed Messrs. John Barker
& Son, Limited, to represent me at the making of
the inventory of the contents of this hotel, and
also to meet your representative, there to-morrow
and to render every facility in order that the
necessary work may be done with the utmost expe-
dition. I desire, however, to inform you that the
steps that I am taking are without prejudice to the
question as to whether the Army Council are within
their rights in acquiring possession of the above
property under their notice dated 1st May 1916,
as to which I am being advised." This was followed
up by a letter of 5th May to the following effect :
" Referring to the letter of the 1st instant from
Captain Cole of the Lands Branch, War Office, it
does not seem to me that the acquisition of this
building as offices is necessary for the purpose of
securing the public safety or the Defence of the
Realm, or that such an acquisition is within the
powers conferred by the Defence of the Realm
Consolidation Regulations, 1914. I must, therefore,
enter a protest against the notice contained in the
letter if acted upon, and you must understand that
anything which I am doing in the matter is without
prejudice to the rights of all parties interested in
THE HISTORY OF THE CASE 3
the hotel. I think that a fair rent might be fixed
by a personal negotiation between the representative
of the authority acquiring the building and myself,
but failing this I would ask you to agree to submit
the question to arbitration." To this the Office of
Works replied on the 9th May : " With regard to
your letter of the 5th instant, the premises having
been commandeered by the Military Authorities
under the Defence of the Realm Acts, the amount
of payment to the Applicants out of public funds
in respect of direct and substantial loss incurred and
damage sustained by them by reason of interference
with the applicants' property or business through
the exercise of the Crown of its rights and duties in
Defence of the Realm will be determined by the
Defence of the Realm Losses Commission. Having
regard, therefore, to paragraph 4 of your letter it
would seem advisable for a claim to be made on
a form prepared for the purpose, a supply of which
I believe, you have, as soon as possible." As no
settlement was arrived at and the Receiver declined
to go before the Losses Commission there was
presented a Petition of Right by the De Keyser
Company.'
The prayer of the Petition claimed :
(1) A declaration that your Suppliants are entitled
to payment of an annual rent so long as your
Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for the War
department of Your Majesty's Army Council or any
>ther person or persons acting on your Majesty's
>ehalf continues in use and occupation of the said
)remises.
(2) The sum of £13,520 lis. Id, for use and occupa-
tion of your Suppliants' said premises by your
Suppliants? permission from the 8th day of May
1916 to the 14th day of February 1917.
(3) In the alternative an inquiry as to .what is
a fair rent of the said premises and payment of the
sum to be found.
B2
4 CASE OP REQUISITION
(4) A declaration that your Suppliants are
entitled to a fair rent for use and occupation by-
way of compensation under the Defence Act, 1842.
(5) Further a declaration that your Suppliants
are entitled compensation pursuant to the Defence
Act 1842 for such other losses and injurious con-
sequences as aforesaid.
(6) Such other declaration as to your Suppliants'
rights in the premises as Your Majesty's High Court
of Justice may deem right and proper.
By his Answer and Plea His Majesty's Attorney-
General raised the following contentions :
(4) On or about the 29th April 1916, in conse-
quence of the state of war then and still existing
between His Majesty and certain Foreign Powers,
it became necessary for the purpose of securing the
public safety and the defence of the Realm that
possession of the Suppliants' land and premises
known as the De Keyser's Royal Hotel should be
taken by the Competent Military Authority on
behalf of and for the use of His Majesty.
(5) By reason of the aforesaid necessity possession
was on or about the 1st May 1916 taken of the said
lands and premises by and under the authority of
the Competent Military Authority on behalf of and
for the use of His Majesty. Such possession was
properly and lawfully taken by virtue of His Majesty's
Royal Prerogative as well as by virtue of the powers
conferred by the Defence of the Realm Consolidation
Act, 1914, and of the Regulations issued thereunder
by His Majesty in Council.
(6) The Attorney-General further gives the Court
to understand and be informed that His Majesty
has acquired from the Suppliants no right in or
over the said lands and premises, and that beyond
the right to take and use the same for so long as
may be necessary for the purpose of securing the
public safety and the Defence of the Realm during
the continuance of a state of war between His
THE HISTORY OF THE CASE 6
Majesty and any Foreign Power His Majesty claims
as against the Suppliants no right or interest in the
said lands and premises.
(7) No rent or compensation is by law payable to
the Suppliants in respect of the matters aforesaid
or any of them either under the Defence Act, 1842
or at all. The Suppliants have been offered on
behalf of His Majesty payment of such sum as in
the opinion on the Defence of the Realm Losses
Commission ought in reason and fairness to be paid
to them out of public funds in respect of direct and
substantial loss incurred and damage sustained by
them by reason of interference with their property
or business in the United Kingdom through the
exercise by the Crown aforesaid of its rights and
duties in the Defence of the Realm.'
The Petition was heard before Mr. Justice Peterson
on March 20, 21, and 22, 1918. A considerable body
of evidence, both oral and documentary, was adduced
for the purpose of establishing that the Suppliants
had voluntarily allowed the officers of the Crown
to occupy the hotel in circumstances from which an
agreement to pay rent for the occupation of premises
arose by implication. This question of fact was
decided by Mr. Justice Peterson in favour of the
Crown,^ the learned judge being of opinion that it
was impossible to come to the conclusion that
possession was voluntarily delivered, or that the
Crown was using and occupying the hotel with the
Suppliants' permission. Having regard to what
was said in In re a Petition of Eight ^ and in The
1 De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Ltd., v. The King, 34 T.L.R. .329.
2 (1915) 3 K.B. 649. Reported under this title for the reason
that it was inexpedient at the time to refer to the property and
locality (an aerodrome at Shoreham in Sussex) which was the
subject of the litigation. The Shoreham case was fully argued
6 CASE OF REQUISITION
Zamora ^ he felt bound to come to the conclusion that
the occupation was necessary for securing the public
safety and the defence of the Realm. While ex-
pressing no opinion upon the questions of law argued
in In re a Petition of Right ^ (which were not argued
before him), the learned Judge held himself bound
by the decision of the Court of Appeal in that Case
and gave judgment for the Crown. ^
The arguments in the Court of Appeal were
mainly directed in the first instance to a detailed
examination of the legislation relating to the taking
of land for purposes of defence, which culminated in
the Defence Act, 1842.* Another line of historical
investigation was, however, developed as the argu-
ment proceeded. In preparing themselves to argue
the Case the Suppliants had commenced to make
investigations at the Record Office into the practice
in the House of Lords but no judgment was given, the Attorney-
General (Sir Frederick Smith) stating on the fourth day of hearing
that there were grounds in the special circumstances of the
case for treating the matter as being one which in the original
contemplation of the parties was to be dealt with under the
^Defence Act, 1842, The Appeal was accordingly withdrawn,
the Crown consenting to pay compensation as provided by the
Defence Act, 1842, and the acts amending the same, to be settled
by arbitration— (1916) W. N. 311. The decision of the Court
of Appeal was therefore regarded as binding. For the effect
upon this decision of the judgment in the Case, see p. 69, post.
1 (1916) 2 A, C, 77. 2 (1915) 3 k. B. 649.
^ The counsel appearing were : For the Suppliants, Mr. P, O.
Lawrence, K.C., Mr. Leslie Scott, K.C., M.P., and Mr. W.
Copping ; for the Crown, the Attorney-General (Sir Frederick
Smith, K.C., M.P.), the SoUcitor-General (Sir Gordon Hewart,
K.C., M.P.), Mr. Austen-Cartmell, Mr. Lowenthal, and Mr.
Giveen (for Mr. Branson).
* 5 & 6 Vict,, c. 94. For the amending statutes, see p. 10,
post, note (1).
THE HISTORY OF THE CASE 7
which had prevailed in former wars with regard to
the occupation of fand for the purposes of defence.
Having regard to the wealth of material which is
available these inquiries were necessarily incom-
plete, but the Suppliants were in a position, by
reference to documents which had been transcribed
from the public records, to state that no instance
had been found in which the Crown had claimed,
as a matter of right, to take and occupy the land
of the subject free from an obligation to make
compensation.
The evidence produced was of such a character
as to satisfy the Court that further inquiry ought to
be made. The argument on appeal, which had
occupied the 18th, 19th, 22nd, and 23rd of July,
1918 was therefore adjourned by direction of the
Master of the Rolls, in order that a more complete
search might be undertaken by the Crown. On
October 22, 1918, the matter was mentioned to
the Court by the Attorney-General who suggested
a further adjournment on account of the complexity
and number of the documents which required exami-
nation. On December 3, 1918 Mr. Austen-Cartmell
informed the Court that, while the search might
proceed indefinitely, the time had come when it would
be right to say that no advantage would be gained by
continuing the investigation, it being reasonable to
anticipate that nothing more would be found beyond
what was in pari materia with what had already
been discovered. The Court assenting to this view,
a selection of typical documents was made by
Junior Counsel for the parties and included in an
Appendix of Documents printed for use in the Court
of Appeal and in the argument of the Case in the
House of Lords.
8 CASE OF REQUISITION
The arguments, in the course of which this his-
torical evidence was considered, were resumed in
the Court of Appeal on January 21, 1919 and heard
on that and the two following days.^
Judgment was delivered on April 9, 1919 ^
allowing the appeal. The Master of the Rolls
(Sir Charles Swinfen-Eady) ^ and Lord Justice
Warrington delivered judgment in favour of the
Suppliants, while Lord Justice Duke * dissented.
The following declaration was made :
' That the Suppliants are entitled to a fair rent
for use and occupation of De Keyser's Royal Hotel
on the Thames Embankment in the City of London
by way of compensation under the Defence Act,
1842.'
1 Mr. P. 0. Lawrence having on November 6, 1918, been
raised to the Bench as a Judge of the Chancery Division, Sir John
Simon, K.C.V.O.^ K.C., was instructed to appear as leading
counsel for the Supplants. The Great Seal having on January 30,
1919, been delivered to Sir Frederick Smith, who on being raised
to the peerage took the title of Baron Birkenhead in the County
of Chester, Sir Gordon Hewart was on January 30 appointed
Attorney-General, Mr. Ernest Pollock, K.C., M.P., at the same
time succeeding him in the office of Solicitor-General and being
subsequently knighted.
2 (1919) 2 Ch. 197. In the opinion of the majority, the premises
were occupied and taken by the consent of the owners in such
circumstances as to raise an implication of a contract to pay for
the use of the property. This view of the facts was not put
forward by the Suppliants on the appeal to the House of Lords,
their case being based on an implied obligation of payment either
at Common Law or by statute where property is taken for
purposes of defence.
3 Sir Charles Swinfen-Eady (who had resigned his office on
October 31, 1919, and had been raised to the peerage on
November 1, under the title of Baron Swinfen of Chertsey in
the County of Surrey), died on the 15th of November of that year.
* Appointed President of the Probate, Divorce, and Admiralty
Division, October 31, 1919.
THE HISTORY OF THE CASE 9
The Crown appealed to the House of Lords, the
Case being argued before Lords Dunedin, Atkin-
son, Moulton, Sumner, and Parmoor ^ on March 1,
2, 4, 5, 8, and 9, 1920. Their Lordships took time
for consideration, and on May 10, 1920, unanimously
delivered judgment dismissing the appeal.^
1 Lord Wrenbury sat as one of the Lords of Appeal on the
first and second days, but did not attend during the remainder
of the proceedings. The possibility of an equal division of
opinion was thereby obviated.
2 The Judgments (which are reported sub nomine Attorney -
General v. De Keyser's Royal Hotel, Limited (1920) A. C. 508) are
set out in full, App. A, p. 168. The documents printed in Appen-
dices C, E, and F have been selected from those which were
printed for use in the Court of Appeal and in the House of
Lords.
CHAPTER II
THE DEFENCE ACTS
At the outbreak of war in August 1914 there
were in force in relation to the acquisition and user
of land for purposes of defence the Defence Acts,
1842 to 1873 ^ of which the principal act is the
Defence Act, 1842. In the submission of the Sup-
pliants these acts applied equally in peace and in
war and provided for the payment of compensation
for the temporary use and occupation of lands
taken by the Crown for purposes of defence, and
also for such loss and injurious consequences as
follows from such occupation.
The advisers of the Crown claimed a right on
1 5 ife 6 Vict., c. 94 ; 17 & 18 Vict., c. 67 ; 22 Vict., c. 12 ;
23 & 24 Vict., c. 112 ; 28 & 29 Vict., c. 65 ; and 36 & 37 Vict.,
c. 72. These statutes may be cited by the collective title of
' the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1873 ' (Short Titles Act, 1896, 59 &
60 Vict., c. 14). Reference may also be made to the Military
Lands Acts, 1892 to 1903, which comprise the Military Lands
Acts, 1892 (55 & 56 Vict., c. 43) ; 1897 (60 & 61 Vict., c. 6) ;
1900 (63 & 64 Vict., c. 56 ; and 1903 (3 Edw. VII, c. 47) ; to the
Territorial and Reserve Forces Act, 1907 (7 Edw. VII, c. 9,
s. 4), and to the Ranges Act, 1891 (54 & 55 Vict., c. 54) which,
as repealed in part by section 28 of the Military Lands Act, 1892,
provides for the settlement by arbitration of the compensation for
land acquired under the Defence Acts. As regards Admiralty
Lands, vide the Admir£(,lty Lands and Works Act, 1864 (27 & 28
Vict., c. 57) ; the Naval Works Act, 1895 (58 & 59 Vict., c. 35,
s. 2) ; and the Naval Lands (Volunteers) Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII,
c. 25).
THE DEFENCE ACTS 11
behalf of the Executive Government to enter into
temporary occupation of land in time of national
emergency free from any legal obligation to pay
compensation. That claim was based on the alleged
powers of the Crown at Common Law in virtue of
the Royal Prerogative existing in time of war, such
powers being (it was contended) independent of
and neither abated, abridged, nor curtailed by legis-
lation. The existence and extent of the prerogative
powers of the Crown ; the effect upon such powers
of statute ; and the right to take possession under
the powers conferred upon the executive by legisla-
tion passed to meet the emergencies, arising out of
the war, are reserved for consideration in later
chapters after first examining the statutory pro-
visions relating to the occupation of land which were
in force at the outbreak of war. The Act of 1842
is by no means the first statute dealing with com-
pulsory acquisition of land for purposes of defence
either in peace or in war. So far is this from being
the case that the Act will be found to be a con-
solidating and amending statute founded upon
earlier statutes and particularly the Defence Act of
1804 ^ enacted in the emergency of the Napoleonic
wars. This Act was in force when the Act of 1842
was passed and is repealed by that Act.
An historical examination of the earlier statutes
throws considerable light not only on the origin of
the existing acts, but on the conceptions which
underlay the action of the Executive and of Parlia-
ment in regard to the prerogative powers of the
Crown at Common Law to enter upon the land of
the subject in time of war. The practice during the
1 44 Geo. Ill, c. 95.
12 CASE OF REQUISITION
Napoleonic wars of relying solely on powers expressly
conferred by statute, taken in conjunction with
a uniform practice dating from still earlier times of
making compensation, and with the absence of the
assertion of any claim to act by virtue of Prerogative
powers derived from the Common Law, if estab-
lished, renders it difficult to accept the existence of
any such prerogative. It is from this point of view
as well as by way of illustrating the history and
position of the Defence Act, 1842 in our constitu-
tional system that it is necessary to consider the
earlier statutes.
Although the statutory history of the modern
Defence Acts may be said to commence in the reign
of Anne, references to legislation on the subject
of the acquisition of land by the Crown for purposes
of defence are to be found in the reign of Charles II.
Thus in 1681 an Ordnance Minute relating to the
fortification of Hull, records an order that a state-
ment be prepared, after inquiring as to ' what
measures were taken and what course was used
aboute takeing in of the lands for the new works
at Plymouth and after what method the owners of
those lands were satisfied and paid for the same '
and gives a direction ' to see what statutes there
are concerning takeing up of peoples lands for
building of fortifications upon '.^ In this instance
the question arose in time of peace and was confined
to the permanent acquisition of land. The only
^ Ordnance Minutes (War Office Records), App. F, p. 284.
The only statute dating from earlier times which has been dis-
covered is an Act of 4 Hen. VIII (1512), authorizing entry on
land for the making of bulwarks by every one of the King's
subjects in anticipation of an apprehended invasion of Cornwall,
see p. 50, post, and App. B, p. 220.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 13
statute which has been traced in this period is an
Act of 1672 ^ which confirms an agreement for pay-
ment of the purchase money and for vesting and
setthng in the Crown the fee simple of lands ' which
have been taken into and spoyled by makeing new
fortifications about the Towne of Portsmouth '. The
land was apparently taken in time of peace although
possibly in anticipation of the outbreak of the second
Dutch War which commenced on the 17th March
1672, and continued until 1674.
II. Legislation before the Defence Act, 1798.
In 1708 a statute was enacted ^ in a form which
was employed with modifications throughout the
eighteenth century. This Act was passed during the
war of the Spanish Succession (the battle of Oude-
narde was fought on the 11th of July of that year).
The Act of Union with Scotland in the previous year
had aroused the adherents of the Pretender, who
put to sea from Dunkirk in March but failed to
effect a landing, his fleet being dispersed by Admiral
Byng. Whatever may have been the emergency,
the Act relates only to the compulsory acquisition
by purchase, the preamble being as follows :
' Whereas for the better securing her Majesty's
docks, ships of war and stores, 'tis highly necessary
1 22 & 23 Car. II, no. 43. This Act is not printed in any
edition of the Statutes and is taken from the Parliament Roll,
see App. B, p. 226. The object of the Act was merely to give
effect to an agreement. It is referred to as an early instance of
a statutory agreement for compensation following upon a taking
of land which may or may not have been unlawful, and as the
first statute of the kind which has been traced ; and also for its
form, which is to some extent followed in the later Acts.
2 7 Anne, c. 26.
14 CASE OF REQUISITION
to enlarge or strengthen the fortifications at or near
Portsmouth, Chatham, and Harwich, and in order
thereto to purchase several lands, tenements and
hereditaments, some of which are or may be the
estates of infants, femes covert, ecclesiastical cor-
porations, or other persons who by law are disabled
to make any contracts or conveyances ; in all which
cases, as likewise where any proprietors designing
to obstruct the public service or to make any
unreasonable gain to themselves, insist on extrava-
gant rates, 'twill be necessary to have recourse to
the usual methods that have been taken in such
like cases.'
The reference to the ' usual methods that have
been talien in such like cases ' (which occurs also
in a later Act of 1782) ^ is obscure, but would seem
to point to some settled form of procedure for
assessing compensation in default of agreement.
This no doubt involved an inquisition and verdict
by a jury, an early instance of which is to be found
in 1664, albeit in time of peace, when one Clark,
the storekeeper at Portsmouth, was directed by
the Office of the Ordnance to ' treat once more with
the proprietors ' of ground at Portsmouth ' and
bring them if possible to reasonable terms ' and in
the event of his failing to arrive at an agreement to
' desire ' the Mayor or Aldermen to appoint a jury
to value the property.^
Many similar statutes were passed from time to
time, some in peace and some in war, all of which,
although in form public acts, relate to particular
localities and are in this sense ' local '. Thus
statutes were passed in 1757 and 1758 during the
1 22 Geo. Ill, c. 80, p. 20 post.
2 Ordnance Minutes : War Office Records, Class 47, vol. vi,
fo. 16, see App. F, p. 279.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 1,5
Seven Years' War dealing with fortifications at
Milford ^ and at* Portsmouth, Chatham, and Ply-
mouth.2 The state of affairs in 1757 presented,
in the words of Pitt, ' a gloomy scene for this
distressed disgraced country ' ^ while, according to
Burke, ' the Nation trembled under a shameless
panic too public to be concealed, too fatal in its
consequences ever to be forgotten.'
The constitutional lawyer, faced with the fact
that in a year of extreme national peril, it was
thought necessary to invoke the aid of Parliament,
in order to acquire private property for the urgent
needs of national defence, is driven to ask himself
whether this does not indicate that the prerogative
powers of the Crown were regarded as more limited
in scope and application than was sometimes sup-
posed during the late war. Why should the Ord-
nance department procure statutory authority to
take over land needed to resist a threatened invasion,
if the Crown had a right quite independently to
do what it pleased with private property without
making compensation so long as this was necessary
for the defence of the Realm ?
The gloom of 1757 was soon dissipated by the
glorious successes, both in the new world and in
the old, of 1759, but the fact remains that at a time
when it could hardly have been anticipated how
1 31 Geo. II, c. 38 ; 32 Geo. II, c. 26 ; 32 Geo. II, c. 30.
2 31 Geo. II, c. 39 ; 32 Geo. II, c. 30. Ancillary provisions
relating mainly to the application of moneys payable for com-
pensation are contained in an Act of 1760 (33 Geo. II, c. 11),
which also provides for taking down and removing a magazine
at Greenwich and for the erection of a new one at Purfleet.
3 For a full account of the military and political situation,
see Worsfold, Life of Pitt, i. 337.
16 CASE OF REQUISITION
the tide of the national fortunes would turn at
Quebec, at Plassey, and at Quiberon Bay, Parlia-
mentary authority should have been required to
secure the ground necessary to fortify the arsenals
at Chatham and Portsmouth.
The emergency is recited in the pream.ble to the
Act of 1757 ^ providing for fortifications at Ports-
mouth, Chatham, and Plymouth in these terms :
' Whereas by the unjust and hostile invasion
lately made on his Majesty's Dominions in America
and the Mediterranean and by great preparations
made in France for invading these Realms, it
became absolutely necessary for the Security of
his Majesty's Docks Ships of War and Stores to
erect and raise Fortifications and Intrenchments
near the Docks of Portsmouth Chatham and Ply-
mouth : And whereas certain lands herein after
particularly mentioned lying near the said Docks of
Portsmouth Chatham and Plymouth have been
made use of in making Intrenchments and raising
Lines and Fortifications, for the Defence and
security of the said Docks : And whereas some part
of the said Lands made use of for that purpose lies
open and in common to many Owners and Pro-
prietors of Lands near adjoining, for which they
claim a Right of Common of the said Lands and
other parts of the said Lands so made use of are
so limited by Settlement that the Owners thereof
cannot make a clear Title and Conveyance, without
the authority of Parliament and other parts of the
said Lands may be the Property of Ecclesiastical
Persons, or Persons not capable of making a legal
Conveyance thereof ; and all the said Lands may
be subject and liable to Quit-Rents, Tythes, and
other small Outgoings, from which the Owners
thereof may not, without the Authority of Parlia-
1 31 Geo. II, c. 39.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 17
ment be able to discharge the said Lands : And
whereas many of the Owners and Proprietors of the
said Lands so niade use of (to make an unreasonable
Gain to themselves) may insist on large and ex-
travagant Demands for the damage and injury they
may pretend to have sustained by means or reason
of erecting the said Fortification : And whereas
many Persons may pretend or claim to have Title
to the same Lands so that it may be doubtful to
whom a Compensation ought to be made which
cannot be determined without the aid of Parliament :
To the end therefore that the true and real value
of the said Lands may be ascertained and the actual
and real Owners and Proprietors may have a just
and reasonable satisfaction for the said Lands or
for any claim or Right thereto. . . .'
From this recital it would appear that works
were actually carried out before the passing of the
Act. It may be that this points to possession having
been taken either under a general power of the
Crown by virtue of the prerogative to enter for
purposes of defence, founded on the necessity for
immediate action, the emergency being such as to
justify the entry without awaiting Parliamentary
sanction ; or to a recognition that the entry was
unlawful and required confirmation by an Act of
Parliament. At all events the preamble contains
no reference to any entry on lands having been
made by virtue of prerogative powers, while the right
of the subject to compensation is clearly recognized.
A noteworthy feature of the Act is the distinct
recognition of the rights of adjoining owners who
' have received any damage, by making and raising
the said intrenchments, lines, and fortifications '.^
1 31 Geo. II, c. 39, s. 10. For the method of assessing
damages under this section, see App. C, pp. 229, 236.
2388 Q
18 CASE OF REQUISITION
The coasts of Sussex, Kent, and Southampton
are dealt with in the following reign, during the war
with Spain. An Act of 1762 ^ recites that :
' Whereas the Coasts of Sussex Kent & South-
ampton lay open and exposed to the hostile inva-
sions of His Majesty's Enemies : And whereas our
late most Gracious Sovereign Lord George the
Second out of his paternal Affection, tendering the
Welfare and Protection of his dutiful and loyal
Subjects did order and direct the Master General
Principal Officers of his Ordnance, to erect and build
several Forts and Batteries, at convenient Distances
upon the said Coasts : And whereas in pursuance of
such Orders, Forts and Batteries have been erected
by and with the consent of the Owners and Pro-
prietors of the several Lands herein after mentioned
on which the same are respectively erected.'
This recital, if it is to be taken as containing any
reference, however indirect, to an exercise of pre-
rogative powers, points to a restriction upon their
exercise of which there is no reflection in the Ports-
mouth Act of 1757.2 The works were erected in
time of war, but ' by and with the consent of the
owners '. The entry on the lands as well as the
execution of the works was purely consensual,
subject to the assessment of the amount of com-
pensation in accordance with the machinery pro-
vided. The right to enter lands otherwise than by
agreement for the purpose of erecting fortifications
is similarly negatived by the preambles to Acts of
1780, 1782, and 1783, passed when the country was
involved in war with the North American Colonies,
and with France and with Spain which was termi-
1 2 Geo. Ill, c. 37. 2 31 Qeo. II, c. 39.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 19
nated in 1783 by the Peace of Versailles. The Act
of 1780 1 recites that :
' Whereas by reason of the hostile Intentions of
the Courts of France and Spain to invade these
Realms and of the great Preparations , made in the
said Kingdoms for that purpose it has become
absolutely necessary for the present and future
Protection and Security, as well of his Majesty's
Docks, Ships of War, and Stores, at Plymouth and
Sheerness, as of the Passage of the River Thames at
Gravesend and Tilbury Fort, to erect and raise
additional fortifications and Intrenchments near the
same : And whereas the lands herein after men-
tioned lying near the said Docks of Plymouth and
Sheerness and also near the Passage of the River
Thames at or near Gravesend and Tilbury Fort
aforesaid, are wanted for the purpose of being made
use of to erect a,nd raise such Fortifications and
Intrenchments : And whereas many of the Owners
and Proprietors of the Land Tenements and Here-
ditaments necessary to be purchased^ may insist on
large and extravagant Demands for the Purchase of
such Lands Tenements and Hereditaments or for
the Damages and Injury they may pretend that
they shall sustain by reason of such Fortifications
and Intrenchments : And whereas many persons
may pretend or claim to have Title to the same lands
Tenements and Hereditaments so that it may be
doubtful to whom a Compensation ought to be
made which cannot be determined without the aid
of Parliament : To the end therefore that the true
and real Value of such Lands Tenements and
Hereditaments may be ascertained and the actual
and real Owners and Proprietors may have a just
and reasonable Satisfaction for such Lands, Tene-
ments and Hereditaments, or for any claim or right
thereto.' . . *
1 20 Geo. Ill, c. 38.
c 2
20 CASE OF REQUISITION
The Act of 1782 i recites that it is
' highly necessary to enlarge or strengthen the
Fortifications at or near Portsmouth and Chatham
and in order thereunto to purchase several Lands,
Tenements & Hereditaments some of which are or
may be the Estates of Infants, Femes-covert,
Ecclesiastical Corporations or other Persons who by
Law are disabled to make any Contracts or Convey-
ances in all which Cases as likewise when any
Proprietors designing to obstruct the Publick service
or to make any unreasonable Gain to themselves
insist on extravagant Rates it will be necessary to
have Recourse to the usual methods that have been
taken in Cases of the like Nature : To the end
therefore that the time and real Value of the said
Estates may be ascertained and the Owners and
Proprietors thereof may have a just and reasonable
Satisfaction for the same.'
The reference in this recital to the ' usual methods '
occurs as has already been pointed out in the Act
of 1708.2 Whatever may have been the precise
nature of the- procedure in 1708, the machinery
has assumed a more or less stereotyped form at the
time of these later eighteenth-century acts. Under
the existing legislation this has been substantially
modified ; it may, however, be useful to examine
the machinery, which was to some extent super-
seded by the Act of 1842 as illustrating the care with
which the observance of somewhat complicated
statutory provisions was enforced in times of
national danger.
The execution of the acts was in all cases en-
trusted to Commissioners appointed by Letters
Patent under the Great Seal. Except in cases in
1 22 Geo. Ill, c. 80, p. 14 ante. ^ 7 Anne, c. 26.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 21
which the lands to be taken are set out in the Act,
the Commissioners are authorized to survey and
set them out, and are given power to hear and
determine in a summary way all the titles and
claims to and controversies concerning such 'lands
and to make such orders and decrees relating thereto
as they may think proper, subject to the right of
parties claiming to be interested to have such titles,
claims, and controversies determined by a jury.
After the making of a survey (or, in cases where the
lands are set out in the Act, upon the passing of
the Act) the lands are to vest in trustees for the
benefit of the parties interested until payment of
the purchase money. The Commissioners are im-
powered to treat and agree with the owners for
purchase. In the event of refusal or neglect to
treat and agree for thirty days after service of notice
in writing or in case of infancy, coverture or other
disability, the Commissioners are authorized to
issue a warrant or warranto to the Sheriff of the
County commanding him to summon a jury to assess
the compensation. All orders, judgments, decrees,
agreements, and verdicts are to be entered and
engrossed and certified by the Commissioners to
the Clerk of the Crown in Chancery and to the
King's Remembrancer in the Court of Exchequer.
Certificates are to be given to the parties interested
containing a description of the premises to which
they relate and stating the amount which they are
to receive. These certificates constitute an au-
thority to the Surveyor-General of the Ordnance to
make out bills to the parties entitled, upon which
debentures are prepared by the Clerk of the Ord-
nance. Upon payment of the amount stated in
such debentures by the Treasurer of the Ordnance
22 CASE OF REQUISITION
the trustees are to stand seised of the premises for
the use of the Crown. In the event of any person
refusing to accept a certificate, such certificate is
to be deposited with the Clerk of the Peace, whereupon
the Lands are to be vested to the use of the Crown
as if such certificate had been received by the party
or parties entitled thereto.
These Acts were in each case followed by a second
Act which, after reciting the proceedings taken under
the original Act, makes provision for the sums
required out of moneys provided by Parliament
and effects a final vesting of the lands in the Crown.
These ' Vesting Acts ', the principal object of which
was to effect a final clearing of titles, follow the
original Acts in every case until the procedure was
simplified by the provisions of the Act of 1842.
The records preserved at the Record Office con-
tain a number of Commissions, Decrees, and Inqui-
sitions under the Acts passed during this period,
including instances in^' which payment was ordered
to be made as compensation for damage to the
lands of adjoining owners as well as on account of
purchase money for lands permanently acquired.
An instance of a Commission issued under the Act
of 1757 followed by Inquisition and Decree is
printed in Appendix C ^ by way of illustration.
III. The Napoleonic Wars.
The Acts thus far considered deal mainly with
the permanent acquisition of land by purchase, and
are restricted to the taking of land in particular
locahties. The legislation of 1798,^ 1803,^ and
1 p. 229, post. 2 38 Qeo. HI, c. 27.
3 43 Geo. Ill, c. 55.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 23
1804 ^ presents several contrasts. In the first
place the Defence Acts of those years are of general
application, the powers conferred being exercisable
under the Act of 1798 throughout England and
Scotland, while the Acts of 1803 and 1804 apply-
also to Ireland, whose affairs had become subject
to the control of the British Parliament since the
Act of Union of 1801.^ In the next place, the
Acts of 1798 and 1803 are temporary, the Act of
1798 (as also that of 1803) providing (sect. 22) that
it should ' have continuance during the present war
with France '. It therefore lapsed on the conclusion
of peace by the Treaty of Amiens on the 27th March
1802. War having broken out again on the
29th April 1803, a statute ^ was enacted in identical
terms (except for a slight verbal alteration in the
preamble) and received the Royal Assent on the
11th June. This Act remained in force until the
Treaty of Vienna in 1815. Thirdly, the Acts of
1798 and 1803 deal with defence generally and not
merely with the occupation of land. Fourthly, as
regards land, the opinion was apparently entertained
that the Acts provided only for temporary occupa-
tion and user. Accordingly the Act of 1804 ^
which is an Act ' to amend certain provisions ' of
the Act of 1803, and recites that ' doubts have
arisen whether the said provision of the said Act
1 44 Geo. Ill, c. 95.
2 The Irish Parliament did not pass a Defence Act. A statute
similar to the English acts relating to particular localities was
enacted in 1717 (4 Geo. I, c. 7) for the fortification of Cork
Harbour and was followed by the Acts of 19 Geo. II, c. 3 ; 23
Geo. II, c. 2 ; and 7 Geo. Ill, c. 6. An Irish Act of 1797 (37
Geo. Ill, c. 2) related only to voluntary enlistment.
3 43 Geo. Ill, c. 55. * 44 Geo. II, c. 95.
24 CASE OF REQUISITION
extends to the purchasing or taking any lands or
hereditaments for permanent purposes ' proceeds
(sect. 3) ^ to remove those doubts. Fifthly, these
Acts provide in terms for payment out of public
funds for the temporary user of land, and contain
elaborate provisions for the method of obtaining
possession and for the assessment of compensation
iji default of agreement. Finally, they contain no
definite recital of any prerogative right of the
Crown, unless the reference in the preamble to the
powers by law vested in the Crown ought to be
read as such. The reference can hardly amount to
more than a general saving in somewhat wide
terms of such powers as may have existed.
It is hardly necessary to dwell upon the emergency
in which these Acts were placed upon the Statute
book. The fear of invasion formed the constant
pre-occupation of all classes from the spring, of
1798 (the year of the Irish rebellion) when Napoleon
commenced to assemble his forces at Boul^ne
until the final collapse of his projects of invasion in
1805 after the battle of Trafalgar.^ The first
general Defence Act " was introduced and read
a first time in the House of Commons on March 27,
1798.^ The 1^111 was read a second time on the
following day and committed to a committee of
^ See p. 29, post.
2 For a detailed account of the French preparations, see
Desbriere, 1793-1805. Projets et Tentatives de Debarquement aux
lies BritanniqueSy published under the direction of the historic
section of the French staff, 1900 to 1902. Napoleon and the
Invasion of England, by Wheeler and Broadley, contains a
lively and accurate account of the preparations and counter-
preparations for invasion, see also Mahan, Infiuemce of Sea Power
upon the French Revolution, chaps, ix and xv.
3 38 Geo. Ill, c. 27. * 53 Com. Journ. 426.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 25
the whole house. ^ The third reading followed on
April 2nd.2 The bill was agreed by the Lords on
April 4th ^ and received the Royal Assent on
April 5th.
Here again, in 1798, the same reflection forces
itself upon the mind of the student of prerogative
law as was suggested by the Parliamentary action
taken in 1757. The recourse to Parliament was
presumably thought to be necessary, and if Par-
liamentary authority was necessary, authority by
the mere exercise of the prerogative cannot have
existed to the same extent and degree. And in this
later instance, the authority sought is not for the
permanent acquisition of private property for the
purpose of national defence but for the temporary
occupation needed.
As we shall see, the statutes then being passed,
though on their true construction perhaps applicable
both to temporary and permanent occupation, were
liable to be construed as authorizing temporary-
occupation only, and were recognized as having this
for their primary purpose in an Act of ParHament
which was enacted a few years later. The objects of
the Act of 1798 ^ are recited in the preamble in the
following words :
' Whereas it is expedient that His Majesty should
be enabled to exercise, in the most effectual Manner
the Powers by Law vested in him for preventing
and repelling an Invasion of this Kingdom by
His Majesty's enemies ; and that for such purpose.
Provision should be made to enforce prompt Obedi-
ence to such Orders as His Majesty shall think fit
to issue for procuring the Information necessary to
1 Ibid. 436. 2 Ibid. 440. ^ 41 Lords' Joum. 528.
4 38 Geo. Ill, c. 27.
26 CASE OF REQUISITION
the effectual exercise of such Powers upon any
emergency ; and for applying in the most expe-
ditious Manner, and with the greatest Effect, the
voluntary services of his loyal Subjects for the
Defence of the Kingdom ; and also to enable His
Majesty to procure ground which may be wanting
for erecting Batteries, Beacons and other Works,
which may be deemed necessary for the public
Service ; and aiso to provide for the Indemnity
(in certain Cases) of Persons who may suffer in their
Property by Measures which may be taken for the
Defence and Security of the Country, and Annoyance
of the Enemy.'
The Act ^ which is entitled ' An Act to enable
His Majesty more effectually to provide for the
defence and security of the realm during the present
war and for indemnifying persons who may suffer
in their property by such measures as may be
necessary for the purpose ' contains the following
provisions with regard to land :
Sect. 10. ' That it shall be lawful for His Majesty
to authorise any General Officer or Officers or other
person or persons commissioned for such Purpose,
to survey and mark out any Piece of Ground wanted
for the Public service, and to treat and agree with
the Owner or Owners thereof, or any Person or
Persons having any interest therein, for the Posses-
sion or use thereof during such Time as the Exigence
of the Service shall require ; and in case the Owner
or Owners of any such Ground or any Person or
Persons having any interest therein shall refuse or
decline to enter into such contract the same as
shall be satisfactory to such Officer or Officers, or
other Person or Persons commissioned as aforesaid
or shall be unable to do so by reason of Infancy,
Coverture or other Disability it shall be lawful for
1 38 Geo. Ill, c. 27.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 27
the Person or Persons so authorised by His Majesty
to require two or more Justices of the Peace, or
Deputy Lieutenants for the County, Riding,
Stewartry, City, or Place, where such piece of
Ground shall be, to put His Majesty's Officers into
immediate possession of such Piece of Ground which
such Justices or Deputy Lieutenants shall ac-
cordingly do, and shall for that Purpose issue their
Warrant, under their Hands and Seals, commanding
Possession to be so delivered, and shall also issue
their warrants to the Sheriff of the County, Riding,
Stewartry, City, or Place, wherein such piece of
ground shall be situate, to summon a jury to appear,
and be on a Day and at a Place on such Warrant
to be mentioned to enquire of and ascertain the
Compensation which ought to be made for the
Possession or Use of such Piece of Ground during
the Time for which the same shall be required for
the Public Service, to the several persons interested
therein, and to whom the same ought to be paid,
the Verdict of which Jury shall be certified by such
Justices or Deputy Lieutenants to the Receiver
General of the Land Tax of the County, Riding,
Stewartry, City, or Place, where such Lands shall
lie, which Receiver General shall, out of any Money
in his Hands pay such Compensation to such Person
or Persons, in such Manner and for such Purposes as
by such Verdict shall be directed, Provided Always
that no such Piece of Ground shall be so taken for
the Public Service, without the Consent of the
Owner or Owners thereof unless the Necessity for
the Same shall be first certified by the Lord
Lieutenants or two of the Deputy Lieutenants of
the County, Riding, Stewartry, City, or Place, in
which such Land shall lie or unless the Enemy shall
have actually invaded the Kingdom at the Time
when such Piece of Ground shall so be taken.'
This section (as well as the corresponding section
28 CASE OF REQUISITION
of the Act of 1803 ^ which is in identical terms)
presents the following characteristics. In the first
place ' use & possession ' are alone specifically
referred to, the section being silent with regard to
permanent acquisition. Secondly, the surrender of
possession is to be consensual, at all events in the
first instance, the authorities being authorized to
' treat & agree '. Thirdly, in the event of the
refusal or disability of an owner to treat, the pro-
cedure for assessing compensation which had already
become usual in the earlier eighteenth-century
Acts is to be followed, but provision is made for
putting the officers of the Crown into immediate
possession. Fourthly, land can only be taken in
the absence of consent either where the necessity
for taking is duly certified by the proper authority,
or in the event of actual invasion.
The Acts of 1798 and of 1803 contain provisions ^
for the requisition of boats, wagons, and other
chattels subject to compensation being made. These
sections are considered hereafter ^ in connexion
with the subject of chattels, but it is important to
note that they provide for compensation for the
destruction of buildings in the event of actual or
of apprehended invasion, such compensation to
be agreed with representatives appointed by the
1 43 Geo. Ill, c. 55.
2 Sections 7 and 11. These sections are not reproduced in
the Act of 1804, which deals only with permanent acquisition.
It should be noted that the Act of 1803 remained in force until
the end of the war in 1815. For the opposition in Parliament
to the policy of ' driving the country ' on the ground of the
doubtful advantage of anticipating damage which an enemy
might ultimately fail to inflict, see 36 Pari. Hist. 142.
^ p. 142, post.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 29
Treasury for that purpose and in default of agree-
ment by two Justices of the Peace.
Before the lapsing of the Act of 1803 at the
conclusion of the War in 1815, it had been amended
by the Act of 1804^ which is the first permanent
Act of general application. That this Act covers
both permanent acquisition and temporary user is
made clear by section 3 which provides :
' And be it further enacted, That it shall be
lawful for his Majesty, or for the Lord Lieutenant
or other Chief Governor or Governors of Ireland for
the Time being in Ireland, from Time to Time to
authorise any General Officer or Officers, or other
Person or Persons Commissioned for that purpose
to survey and mark out any Lands or Grounds
wanted for the publick Service and to treat and
agree with the Owner or Owners thereof or any
Person or Persons interested therein, either for the
absolute purchase thereof for the Publick Service,
or for the Possession or Use thereof, during such
time as the Exigence of the publick Service shall
require.'
Provision is also made by section 11 for the
removal from lands taken for a term of years or
for such period as the exigency of the public service
may require of buildings and other erections which
have been placed thereon before the lands are
restored to the owner and for the payment of com-
pensation by agreement or by assessment by a jury
for all damage sustained by the erection of buildings
' or otherwise in consequence of the same having
been occupied for the public service '.^
1 44 Geo. Ill, c. 95.
2 The section was held by the Court of Appeal in Ireland,
FitzGibbon, L. J., dissenting (Incorporated Society v. The Queen
(1900) 1 l.R. 465), not to impose on the Crown an obligation
30 CASE OF REQUISITION
Reference has already been made to the fact
that the Act of 1804 remained in force until 1842
and that the Defence Act of that year, by which it
was repealed, is closely modelled upon its provisions.
Assuming a prerogative right to have existed at.
any time by virtue of which the Crown was entitled
to the temporary user of lands in times of national
emergency, free from any legal obligation to make
compensation, how far is the existence of such
a right to be traced during the Napoleonic Wars ?
That the Executive in fact acted under Statutory
powers is clear upon an examination of the Defence
Acts and the contemporary records. Whether any
such prerogative right with respect to land could
have survived this legislation is in effect one of the
questions raised in the Case. So far as the modern
acts are concerned that question has now been deter-
mined : the Crown is bound by the Defence Acts and
has no right to elect to proceed otherwise than under
statutory powers. No record is to be found in the
reports of any claim by the Crown to take land under
Common law powers during the Napoleonic wars,
and the historical evidence which will be examined
in dealing with the prerogative at Common Law
discloses no trace of any claim at this period to
act otherwise than by agreement or under the
statutes. It remains to consider how far, if at all,
contemporary statesmen concerned themselves with
the question.
In the light of the contentions discussed in the
Case the conception entertained by the Government
of the day of the executive powers entrusted to it
to restore the land to its original condition, or to make compensa-
tion for damage done. It is respectfully submitted that this
decision is open to question.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 31
by the constitution naturally suggests itself as
a subject of inquiry. That Pitt was not unmindful
of the lessons of the past appears from the fact
that he obtained from John Bruce, the Keeper of
the State Paper Office, a detailed report of the
arrangements for the defence of the Kingdom at
the time of the Spanish Armada. Bruce's report ^
deals mainly with the raising and disposition of the
forces, the protection of shipping in the ports and
the provision of security against the enemy's
approach to the capital. In regard to the execution
of works, full provision is made for payment for
labour and material, but the report is silent upon
the subject of payment for the occupation of land.
Whether or not a practice obtained in the time of
Elizabeth to compensate owners of land in the
circumstances which prevailed in 1586, the question
does not appear to have been discussed two cen-
turies later when the Act of 1798 was before Parlia-
ment. On the contrary the Government proceeded
upon the view that losses incurred by individuals
in the general interest should be made good by the
State, and this was made abundantly clear by the
Secretary of State for the War Department,^ who
in introducing the Bill informed the House that :
' One great provision in the Bill will be to make
compensation to those who shall suffer by the
attempts of the enemy and the measures taken to
resist them ; and in order that no person may be
induced to withdraw his stock from the general
service of the country, or may suffer from any part
his stock being destroyed by the enemy, or appro-
priated by the country for this purpose, the pro-
1 App. D, p. 247. A MS. copy is in the British Museum.
The report was printed for official use.
2 Henry Dundas, afterwards Lord Melville.
32 CASE OF REQUISITION
visions of the Bill go to render indemnification
certain. . . .
It must occur to every one that in the prospect
of an invasion it will become necessary, in particular
districts though it is impossible to point where at
present, to erect covers for batteries, and to raise
works in critical situations where the operations
of the enemy are most likely to be directed, for this
purpose it may be found necessary that pieces of
ground should be appropriated for such erections ;
but if it is expedient to check the attempts of the
enemy by such means, it is no less so that it should
be fully understood that complete indemnification
will be made, and that no man will suffer by any
aid which he may contribute to the public service.' ^
It is apparent, therefore, that whatever reserva-
tions may have been intended by the reference in
the preamble to the powers by law vested in the
Crown for preventing and repelling an invasion,
the right of the subject to compensation was fully
recognized in the clearest possible language. The
prerogative was not invoked either in 1798, or when
the Statute of that year was re-enacted in 1803.
But the assumption that the Governments of the
day were ignorant of their executive powers at
Common Law or unwilling to exercise them in
a proper case cannot be justified in the light of the
1 33 Pari. Hist. 1358. So in R. v. Abbott (1897) 2 I.R. 362
(a decision under the Defence Act, 1842). O'Brien, L. C. J., says
(p. 405) : ' The safety of the State is best secured by a general
average contribution, and not by making jettison of individual
interests.' Presumably the Government took the advice of the
Law Officers. The Attorney-General in 1798 was Sir John Scott,
afterwards Lord Eldon ; the Solicitor-General was Sir John
Mitford, afterwards Lord Redesdale. The fact that Parliament
at this time was composed almost entirely of landowners may
have had some influence upon the policy of the Government.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 33
legislation of the latter year. The Defence Acts of
1798 and of 1803 dealt, amo'ng a number of other
matters, with the enrolment of men who should
be willing to engage themselves for service in the
Defence of the United Kingdom. In 1803 these
provisions were found to be insufficient and the
Government promoted and carried legislation con-
taining elaborate provisions for compulsory enrol-
ment and training. One of the Acts by which this
object was sought to be effected^ is entitled,
' An act to amend and render more effectual, an
Act passed in the present Session of Parliament
intituled, An Act to enable his Majesty more
effectually to provide for the Defence and Security
of the Realm during the present War, and for
indemnifying persons who may suffer in their pro-
perty by such measures as may be necessary for
that Purpose ; and to enable his Majesty more
effectually and speedily to exercise his ancient and
undoubted Prerogative in requiring the Military
Service of his liege Subjects in case of Invasion of the
Realm.'
In the debate on the Bill on July 18, Pitt, in
explaining that the object of the measure was that
when people were e?alled out they should be trained
to military evolutions, claimed for the Crown
a prerogative ' whenever the country is threatened
with invasion to call out all subjects for defence ' —
a position which was not challenged in debate.^
But in 1804 Fox, who had followed Pitt in the
debate on the Military Service Bill of 1803 and had
confined himself to the contention that the measure
would not prove effective, moved that it be referred
to a committee of the whole House to revise the
1 43 Geo. Ill, c. 96. 2 36 parf. Hist. 1642.
2388 Tk
34 CASE OF REQUISITION
several bills for the defence of the country, and
took exception to the recital in the Military Ser-
vice Act of 1803,^ which, he suggested, had been
overlooked.^ Pitt supported the motion (which
was defeated) but maintained his position with
regard to the Common Law right of the Crown to
call for military service for purposes of defence.
' Nothing appears clearer ' (he said) * than the
proposition that the State has the right to call the
people to defend it, and that in the Crown, being
the depositary of the power of the State, is vested
the right of so calling upon the people in a great
emergency. The right is recognized by the Constitu-
tion and custom of the country — a right inherent
in the Crown to exercise this right according to
necessity of such case as may arise and to be limited
by that necessity. ... As such is the undoubted
right and prerogative of the Crown, I should think
that legislative provision should, in the present
juncture, a little anticipate the justifiable necessity
— at least so far as to put every man in the maritime
counties likely to be the seat of the enemy's attempt
under the immediate power of the Crown in case
of actual or imminent danger of invasion.' ^ The
discussion which followed is confined entirely to the
right to demand military service. In relation to
the compulsory occupation of land under powers
not conferred by statute the complete silence which
attended the introduction of the Defence Acts of
1798, of 1803, and of 1804 remains unbroken.
So far, therefore, the statutory law on this subject
^ 43 Geo. Ill, c. 96. The prerogative is recited in identical
terms in an amending act of the saine Session (c. 120).
2 Cobb, Pari Deb. ii. 194. s Ibid. 222.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 35
follows in the first instance the line of authorizing
the specific appropriation of private lands by the
Crown in defined localities, or during a special
emergency, where such lands are required for
national defence. Later it provides by way of
permanent enactment for the exercise by the Crown
under certain safeguards, of a power to take property
for the defence of the realm when and where the
needs of the country justify a requisition. So
matters remained until the fourth decade of the
last century — a period when Parliament devoted
itself to framing a series of consolidating statutes,
each of which would constitute a general and
permanent code. The Defence Act, 1842 is an
instance of the parliamentary activity which fol-
lowed the passing of the first Reform Bill, other
examples of which are the amendment and con-
solidation of the law relating to Municipal Corpora-
tion and of the Poor Law, and the legislation
relating to railways, and to the compulsory acqui-
sition of land for public purposes.
IV. The Defence Act, 1842.^
The Defence Act of 1804 was repealed, together
with Statutes containing minor amendments ^ by
the Defence Act, 1842, which is closely modelled on
the Act of 1804 and is expressed to a great extent
in the same language.^ Both statutes cover the
same ground.
1 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94. For the amending Acts, see p. 10, ^
note 1, ante.
2 1 & 2 Geo. IV, c. 69 (1821) ; 3 Geo. IV, c. 108 (1822) ;
2 & 3 Will. IV, c. 25 (1832).
3 Per Lord Dunedin, App. A, p. 174. See also R. v. Abbott
(1897), 2 I.R., p. 406.
D 2
36 CASE OF REQUISITION
The Act of 1804 was passed in time of war but was
applicable to times of peace ; the Act of 1842 was
passed in time of peace and has now been finally
held to apply in time of war.
The principal provisions are as follows :
Sect. 16. ' That it shall be lawful for the principal
Officers of Her Majesty's Ordnance^ for the
Time being to enter on, survey and mark out, or
to cause to be surveyed and marked out, any Lands,
Buildings, or other Hereditaments or Easements
wanted for the service of the Ordnance Department,
or for the Defence of the Realm, or to stop up or
divert any Public or Private footpaths or Bridle-
roads, and to treat and agree with the Owner or
Owners of such Lands, Buildings, Hereditaments,
or Easements, or with any Person or Persons
interested therein either for the absolute purchase
thereof, or for the Possession or Use thereof during
such Time as the Exigence of the Public Service shall
require.'
Sect. 18. 'It shall be lawful ... to contract and
agree with such principal Officers either for the
absolute sale of such Lands, Buildings or other
Hereditaments, or for the Grant of any Lease, either
for any Term of Years certain therein, or for such
Period as the Exigence of the public Service shall
1 The functions of the Principal Officers of the Ordnance were
transferred to the Principal Secretary of State for War by the
Ordnance Board Transfer Act (1855) (18 & 19 Vict., c. 117).
For the history of the Ordnance Board and of the Barrack
Department, see Clode, Military Forces of the Crown, i. 74, 253 ;
ii. 204, 238-251, 683. The separation of powers between these
two departments is due to the historic fear of a standing army
and the consequent restrictions on the erection of barracks.
Cf . Blackstone, i. 413, ' the soldiers should live intermixed with
the people, no separate camps, no barracks, no inland fortress
should be allowed '. This separation survives in the proviso to
section 19 of the Defence Act, 1842 (which is amended by
22 Vict., c. 12, s. 4).
THE DEFENCE ACTS 37
require, and to convey, surrender, demise, or grant
the same to such principal Officers, in Trust for Her
Majesty, Her Heirs, and Successors, accordingly ; and
all such Contracts, Sales, Conveyances, Surrenders,
Leases and Agreements shall be Valid and effectual
in Law to all Intents and Purposes whatsoever.'
Sect. 19. ' That in case any such Bodies or other
Persons hereby authorized to contract on behalf
of themselves or others as aforesaid, or any other
Person or Persons interested in any such Lands,
Buildings, or other Hereditaments which shall be
so marked out and surveyed as aforesaid shall for
the space of Fourteen Days next after Notice in
Writing subscribed by or on behalf of the said
principal Officers shall have been given to the Chief
Officer or Officers of any such Body, or to such other
Persons hereby authorized to contract on behalf
of others, or interested themselves, as aforesaid,
or left at his, her or their usual Place of Abode,
refuse or decline to treat or agree, or by reason of
absence shall be prevented from treating or agreeing
with the said principal Officers, or shall refuse to
accept such sum of money as shall be offered by
the said principal Officers as the Consideration for
the absolute Purchase of such Lands, Buildings, or
other Hereditaments or such annual Rent or Sum
as shall be offered for the hire thereof, either for
a Time certain or for a period as the Exigence of
the public Service may require, then and in such
case it shall be lawful for the said principal Officers
to require two or more Justices of the Peace or
Three or more Deputy Lieutenants (One of whom
shall be a Justice of the Peace) or two or more
Deputy Governors for the County, Riding, Stewartry,
City or Place where such Lands, Buildings or other
Hereditaments shall be, to put the said principal
Officers, or any Person appointed by them, into
immediate Possession of such Lands, Buildings or
other Hereditaments which such Justices or Deputy
38 CASE OF REQUISITION
Lieutenants or Deputy Governors are hereby required
to do, and shall for that purpose issue their Warrants
under their Hands and Seals commanding Possession
to be so delivered and shall also issue their Warrants
to the Sheriff of the County, Riding, Stewartry, Cit^,
or Place wherein such Lands, Buildings or Heredita-
ments shall be situate to summon a Jury^ . . .
and the Jury on hearing any Witnesses and Evidence
that may be produced shall on their Oaths (which
Oaths as also the Oaths of such Witnesses, the said
Justices, Deputy Lieutenants or Governors respec-
tively are hereby empowered and required to ad-
minister) find the Compensation to be paid either
for the absolute purchase of such Lands, Buildings
or other Hereditaments or for the Possession or
Use thereof, as the Case may be.'
The marked resemblance borne by these sections
to the corresponding provisions of the earlier legis-
lation and more particularly of the Act of 1804
requires no comment, while that resemblance is no
less close when the remaining provisions of the
Act come to be considered in detail. The Act is
built up on the framework of the Act of 1804 and
to a great extent adopts its precise language.^
1 The powers given to promoters of undertakings under the
Lands Clauses ConsoUdation Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict., c. 18)
are by section 7 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act, 1860
(23 & 24 Vict., c. 106) made available in respect of land wanted
for the service of the Admiralty or of the War Department or
for the Defence of the Realm. Section 11 of the Ranges Act,
1911 (54 & 55 Vict., c. 54) enables the acquiring authority to
require compensation to be settled by arbitration instead of
by reference to a jury. For the measure of compensation (which
includes injurious affection of adjoining lands), see Blundell v.
The King (1905), 1 K.B. 516 ; following R. v. Abbott (1897),
2 I.R. 362 ; and In re Ned's Point Battery (1903), 2 I.R. 192.
2 See note (3), p. 35, ante.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 39
The reference to temporary occupation in the
expression ' during such time as the exigency of
the pubHc service shall require ', which is taken
from section 10 of the Act of 1798, furnishes the
best instance of such literal adoption. On what
ground, then, can the Act be said to be inapplicable
to the facts of the Case ? Is there any emergency
left uncovered by the Act and therefore necessitating
recourse to such prerogative powers as may exist ?
That the Act applies in time of war is clear from
the provisions of section 23, which is in the following
terms :
' No such Land, Buildings or other Hereditaments
shall be so taken without the Consent of the Owner
or Owners thereof, or of any such Person or Persons
as aforesaid acting for or on the Behalf of the Owner
or Owners thereof, unless the Necessity or Expediency
of taking the same shall be first certified by the
Lord Lieutenant, or Two of the Deputy Lieutenants,
or by the Governor or two Deputy Governors of
the County, Riding, Stewartry, City, or Place in
which such Lands, Buildings or other Hereditaments
lie, and unless the taking of such Lands, Buildings
or other Hereditaments be authorised by a Warrant
under the Hand or Hands of the Lord High Treasurer
or of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury
of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland,
for the time being, or any Three or more of them or
unless the Enemy shall have actually invaded the
United Kingdom at the time when such Lands,
Buildings or other Hereditaments shall be so taken.'
Actual invasion is therefore provided for: and in
such case the officers of the Crown are authorized
to take possession without observing the prescribed
formalities, such as obtaining an order for possession
under section 19, or a certificate under section 23.
40 CASE OF REQUISITION
These formalities, in fact, have a direct bearing upon
the argument. If they must be compHed with what-
ever may be the emergency, it is possible to imagine
cases in which the duty of compliance might call
for the exercise of powers by which the statutory
duty would be overridden. No such necessity arose
in the Case, for the officers of the Crown were con-
tent to negotiate until they failed to come to terms.
Conceivably an emergency might arise in which the
Crown would be justified in acting without com-
plying with the statutory requirements, more espe-
cially when Parliament is not sitting.^ Such a
case, however, is purely hypothetical in relation to
the conditions prevailing in 1916 for the reason
that it was covered by the express statutory pro-
visions of the Defence of the Realm Consolidation
Act, 1914,2 ]3y section 2 (2) of which power is given
' to provide by regulation for the suspension of any
restrictions on the acquisition or user of land, or
the exercise of the power of making by-laws or any
other powers under the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1875,
or the Military Lands Acts, 1891 to 1903 '. It is
therefore in the words of Lord Moulton ^ ' a sound
inference from the language of subsection (2) that
the Legislature intended that so far as the acquisition
or user of Land was concerned, the Regulations
should take the form of action under the Defence
Act, 1842, facilitated by suspension of some or all
of the restrictions which it imposes '. In fact, ' if
formalities not inconsistent with the exigencies of
a state of war in 1842 would have been prejudicial
to the public service in 1916, the powers given by
1 See p. 66, post. 2 5 Qeo. V, c. 8. See p. 84, post.
3 App. A, p. 193.
THE DEFENCE ACTS 41
subsection (2) of section 1 of the Act of 1914 had
only to be exercised, as in fact they were and all
these difficulties would vanish.' ^
The whole field, therefore, of the prerogative in
the matter of the acquisition of land or rights therein
is covered by the Act,^ and the Act makes full
provision for the payment of compensation for lands
taken.^ Whether in these circumstances the Crown
is entitled to rely on any prerogative powers inde-
pendent of Statute remains for consideration in
a later chapter.
1 Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 201.
2 Per Lord Dunedin, App. A, p. 174. Section 34 contains
a saving of the prerogative with regard only to litigation. See
p. 109, post.
3 The point that the obligation to make compensation is
not a ' restriction ' is dealt with at p. 88, post.
CHAPTER III
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN
The contentions raised on behalf of the Crown
have been set out in outHning the history of the
Case.i It is now proposed to examine the claim
to enter upon and occupy lands by virtue of powers
derived from the Royal Prerogative, that is to say,
under the Common Law independently of Statute.
Lord Sumner in his judgment ^ points out that the
Crown ' throughout purported to act on statutory
rights (whether fully or correctly referred to or not)
and the prerogative has not been vouched except
in argument in the present case. I do not mean
that it is not open to the Law Officers to rely on
the prerogative now or that I assume the writer of
the letter dated 29th April 1916 to have had any
authority to bind the Crown by an election between
its statutory and prerogative rights. If, however,
under the Statutes, including the Defence of the
Realm Acts, which deal with taking buildings for
the public safety and the Defence of the Realm, the
Crown had the power to requisition this building
on terms as to compensating the Respondents,
I think it cannot contend now that by the course
taken the exercise of statutory powers was excluded,
and that none were in fact exercised.'
Such Common Law powers of the Crown there-
fore, as can be exercised under the Royal Preroga-
^ Ante, p. 4. ^ App. A, p. 198.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 43
tive, require to be considered only if the facts of
the case are not covered by Statute binding on the
Crown. In the Supphants' submission the Defence
Act, 1842 appKed and gave a statutory right to
compensation. The advisers of the Crown on the
other hand, while contending that the Defence Act
had no application, relied on the Defence of the
Realm Acts and Regulations as excluding the right
to compensation, and maintained that if that right
was not expressly excluded, it was inconsistent with
a right claimed on behalf of the Crown at Common
Law, not only to requisition private property, but
to do so free from any legal obligation of payment.
It therefore becomes necessary to examine the
nature and extent of the alleged Common Law
powers.
In considering the prerogative in relation to the
questions arising in the Case, it is happily now
unnecessary to review the controversies which
culminated in the great historical documents such
as Magna Carta or the Bill of Rights upon which
our constitutional liberties are based. No one
would suggest in these days that the Sovereign
would incur personal responsibility for any action
of the executive government — still less that the
King himself would claim to be in any respect
above the law. On the contrary ' the King has not
any Prerogative but such as the law allows ',^
a principle which applies both to the personal
status of the Sovereign, and also and in no less
a degree to such powers as are exercised in the
name of the King by the Executive. The Crown
1 The Case of Proclamations (1611) 12 Rep. 74; 77 E.R.
1352.
44 CASE OF REQUISITION
has been aptly described as a convenient working
hypothesis based on the theory that ' while the
making of laws is entirely the work of the legislature,
the circumstances of putting the law into execution
must frequently be left to the discretion of the
executive magistrate '/ The discretion is in fact
delegated and its exercise is largely circumscribed
by statutory enactment. Prerogative is the residue
of that executive power which the King in the
early stages of our history once possessed in all
the departments of Government.^ This power,
reduced in compass and limited in exercise by many
conventional and practical restrictions, remains as
' that discretionary or arbitrary authority which
at any given time is legally left in the hands of the
Crown ' ^ and ' every act which the executive
government can lawfully do without the authority
of an Act of Parliament is done by virtue of this
prerogative'.^ The extent of this authority is not
easy to define.
' We find ', says the late Professor Maitland,^
' that there is often great uncertainty as to the
exact limits of the royal prerogative. Since the
settlement of 1688 very little has been done towards
depriving the King by any direct words of any of
his legal powers. Those powers were great and they
were somewhat indefinite. Very seldom has any
statute expressly taken them away, very seldom has
any statute said in so many words " it shall not be
lawful for the King to do this ". But without
^ Blackstone, Comm., i.v270.
2 Anson, Law and Custom of the Constitution, vol. ii, pt. i
(3rd ed.), p. 3.
3 Dicey, Law of the Constitution (8th ed.), p. 420.
4 Ibid., p. 421.
^ Constitutional History of England, p. 418.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 45
directly destroying these prerogative powers statutes
have created a large number of powers dealing with
the same matters, some given to the king, some
to one or to another of his great officers. Such modern
powers have been definite and adapted to the wants
of modern times, and they have been freely used.
On the other hand the old prerogative powers have
become clumsy and antiquated, and have fallen
into disuse ; the very uncertainty as to their limits
has made them impracticable. Still they have not
been expressly abolished, and to the legal student
the question must often occur whether they are or
are not in existence. Remember this, that we have
no such doctrine as that a prerogative may cease
to exist because it is not used. On the other hand
we shall often find that it would be extremely
difficult to use these prerogative powers without
doing something definitely unlawfid.'
The right of the Crown to take the property of
a subject without his consent can only be justified
on the ground of necessity — Solus reipublicae suprema
lex. The immediate question in the Case was
whether the subject is entitled to compensation for
interference with his proprietary rights, the necessity
for that interference being assumed, rather than
whether the right to requisition itself rests upon
any legal foundation. The argument for the Crown
was constructed on a broader basis. The right to
requisition private property, it was contended, is
a right to take without a corresponding obligation
to pay. The right to take, use, or occupy is not
enough : its exercise is not limited or conditioned
by any such obligation. In order to test this
asserted right, whether in its broader or in its
narrower aspect, it becomes necessary to examine
the authorities upon which the prerogative right is
46 CASE OF REQUISITION
founded, and the limitations set by law upon its
exercise.
Inquiry, it is submitted, has established a practice
on the part of the Crown, uniformly followed down
to 1914, to compensate the subject where his
property is taken for the public service, be it land,
chattels, or ships.
The claim of the suppliants in the Case was to be
compensated for the loss of a piece of land. It is
obvious that the suppliants might endeavour to
make good their claim by the use of a broader
argument, which would apply to movables as well
as to immovables. This broader argument would
take the general form that when the Crown in
an emergency compulsorily deprives a subject of
property of any sort, there arises an obligation in
the Crown on behalf of the whole community
to compensate the individual who suffers this
special loss, and this argument was employed in
arguing the Case. But the suppliants had a
narrower argument which was sufficient for the pur-
pose in hand, namely that the taking of landed
property is exhaustively covered by statutory enact-
ment which secures compensation to the private
owner; with the result that, at all events in the
case of land, there was no room for the application
of the alleged right of the Crown to take without
payment. So far as land is concerned, the Case
decides that the right to compensation now rests
upon statute, and that the Crown cannot, by
vouching the prerogative, take land for national
defence while repudiating the obligation of payment
imposed by statute.
In preparing to argue the case on the question
of prerogative, it became necessary to investigate
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 47
the circumstances under which property generally
was requisitioned in the past in order to ascertain
whether the right claimed by the Crown could be
said to exist at all ; whether it still exists ; the con-
ditions of its exercise ; and the principles upon which
compensation was formerly paid. Except in so far
as they relate to land these inquiries are, perhaps,
not directly in point ; if, however, they lead to the
conclusion that the underlying principles are identi-
cal in all cases, not only is the case with regard to
land fully established, but some contribution is
made to the solution of similar questions arising
out of the requisitioning of chattels and of ships.^
II. The Cases,
The Case of Saltpetre.
The argument for the Crown rested mainly upon
two cases.
The Case of Saltpetre ^ is, like other cases to be
found in Coke's Reports,^ not a decision in any
litigation, but a record of resolutions of the judges
summoned in their consultative capacity as advisers
of the Crown. The judges, having been summoned
to consult what prerogative the King had in digging
and taking up saltpetre to make gunpowder by the
law of the Realm, resolved that the King may
take saltpetre within the Realm subject to the
following limitations :
1. Although •the King cannot take trees of the
subject growing upon his freehold and inheritance
and although he cannot take gravel for reparation
1 See Excursus I, p. 136 post.
2 (1606) 12 Rep. 12 ; 77 E.R. 1294.
3 See for example The Case of Proclamations, (1611) 12 Rep.
74 ; 77 E.R. 1352.
48 CASE OF REQUISITION
of his house, yet he may dig for saltpetre, but the
ministers who dig for saltpetre are bound to leave
the inheritance in as good a plight as they found it.
2. The case of gravel for the reparation of the
King's houses is not to be compared, for the case of
saltpetre extends to the defence of the whole Realm
in which every subject hath benefit . . . When enemies
come against the Realm to the sea-coast, it is lawful
to come upon my land adjoining to the same, to make
trenches or bulwarks for the Defence of the Realm, for
every subject hath benefit by it. And therefore by
the Common Law every man may come upon my
land for the Defence of the Realm, as appears
8 Edw. IV, 23. And in such Case on such extremity
they may dig for gravel, for the making of bulwarks ;
for this is for the public, and every one hath benefit
by it ; but after the danger is over, the trenches and
bulwarks ought to be removed so that the owner
shall not have prejudice in his inheritance ; and for
the commonwealth, a man shall suffer damage : as,
for saving of a city or town, a house shall be plucked
down if the next be on fire, and the suburbs of a city
in time of war for the common safety shall be plucked
down : and a thing for the commonwealth every
man may do without being liable to an action, as
it is said in 3 H. 8, fo. 15. And in this case the rule
is true, Princeps et respuhlica ex iusta causa possunt
rem meam auferre,
3. This taking of saltpetre is a purveyance of it
for the making of gunpowder for necessary defence
and safety of the Realm and for this cause, as in
other purveyances, it is an incident inseparable
to the Crown, and cannot be granted demised or
transferred, but ought to be taken only by the
ministers of the King.
4. The ministers of the King cannot undermine
weaken or impair the walls or foundations of any
houses or other buildings and cannot dig in the floor
of my mansion house which serves for the habitation
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 49
of man or in the floor of any barn employed for the
safe custody of corn, hay, etc. But they may dig
in the floors of stables, or ox-houses, so that there be
sufficient room for horses and other cattle of the
owner, and so that they repair it in convenient
time, in so good a plight as it was before.
What bearing have these resolutions upon the
questions in the Case? How far do they support
the argument of the Crown ? The question before
the judges was the right of the ' ministers ' of the
Crown to enter land and to dig for saltpetre, that is
to say, to enter land for making ' purveyance ' of
this necessary commodity.
The Crown relied strongly upon the passage in
the second resolution which is printed in italics.
To what does this araount ? It is lawful to enter
another man's land in case of invasion, but by what
right ? The reference to the right of every subject
in like case to commit what would otherwise con-
stitute a trespass makes it clear that this right is
in no way to be ascribed to any prerogative of the
Crown, but is merely that of every individual to
make a temporary entry where such entry is
justified by necessity, as in the case of a fire which
threatens to spread to adjoining land or houses.
This right is fully recognized in the Year Books ^
1 A custom in Kent * when the enemy come to the coast '
to enter upon land adjoining the same coast in defence and
safeguard of the Realm and then to make there trenches and
bulwarks for the Defence of the Realm — held to be well pleaded
(Y. B. 8 Edw. IV, H. 41). An entry upon landin time of war * pur
faire bulwark in defence du Roy et le Realm ' — held justifiable
as a thing necessary for the commonwealth though otherwise
illegal (Y.B. 21 Hen. VII, T. 27b). Suburbs ' d'cities seront
plucked down in temps d'guerre : pur ceo que ceo est pur le
commonwealth chescun poit faire sans aver action ' (Y. B.
14 Hen, VIII, T. pi. 16).
2388 jj .
50 CASE OF REQUISITION
and the Statute 4 Hen. VIII, c. i, to which reference
has already been made,^ was therefore declaratory
of the Common Law, or at all events embodied
a recognized principle, and perhaps regulated the
conditions in which that right was to be exercised
in a particular case.
' The profitable prerogative of purveyance and
pre-emption ', says Blackstone,^ ' was a right
enjoyed by the Crown of buying up provisions and
other necessaries, by the intervention of the king's
purveyors, for the use of his royal household, at
an appraised valuation in preference to all others,
and even without consent of the owner ; and also
of forcibly impressing the carriages and horses of
the subject, to do the king's business on the public
roads, in the conveyance of timber, baggage, and the
like, however inconvenient to the proprietor, upon
paying him a settled price. A prerogative, which
prevailed pretty generally throughout Europe, during
the scarcity of gold and silver, and the high valuation
of money consequential thereupon. In these early
times the king's household (as well as those of
inferior lords) were supported by specific renders
of corn, and other victuals, from the tenants of
the respective demesnes ; and there was also
a continual market kept at the palace gate to furnish
viands for the royal use. And this answered all
purposes in those ages of simplicity, so long as the
king's court continued in any certain place. But
when it removed from one part of the kingdom to
another (as was formerly very frequently done) it
was found necessary to send purveyors beforehand
to get a sufficient quantity of provisions and other
necessaries for the household ; and, lest the unusual
demand should raise them to an exorbitant price,
the powers before-mentioned were vested in these
1 Ante, p. 12. 2 Comm. i. 287.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 51
purveyors ; who in process of time very greatly
abused their authority and became a great oppression
to the subject though of httle advantage to the Crown.'
References to purveyance are to be found as early
as Magna Carta of 1215, which forbids any constable
or bailiff of the King to take corn or other provisions
from any freeman without tendering money there-
fore, unless he can have postponement thereof by
permission of the seller,^ and further prohibits the
taking by any sheriff or royal bailiff of horses or
carts for transport duty without the consent of
a free owner. These prohibitions were probably
directed against requisitions by the King's officers
in their own interest and placed no restrictions
upon the practice for the legitimate purposes of
the King's household,^ with the result that the
right of purveyance was grossly abused. The
practice appears to have been universal throughout
Europe.^ Its early history in England is obscure ;
the accounts do not contain any allusions to the
practice before the middle of the reign of Edward II.*
Stubbs suggests ^ that the abuse may have been
of comparatively late origin, or else that its early
traces were submerged in the general oppression.
However that may be, purveyance appears as
a constant ground of complaint when men began
to formulate their grievances in the shape of
petitions by the Commons, upon many of which
statutes were framed.
1 Cap. 28, 30. Similar provisions are found in Magna Carta
of 1225 (9 Hen. Ill), cap. 5, 19, 21.
2 McKechnie, Magna Carta, p. 330.
3 Stubbs, ii. 536.
* Thorold Rogers, Hist, of Agriculture and Prices, i. 117.
^ ii. 536, quoting Archbishop Islip, Speculum Regis, c. 4.
E 2
62 CASE OF REQUISITION
The principal grievances were the taking of
chattels without payment or only in exchange for
exchequer tallies,^ a vexatious anticipation of
taxation since these could only be used in payment
of Crown dues : ^ the corruption of the purveyors,
who made requisitions in excess of what was
required, and exacted payment for the release of the
goods, and the arrogation to themselves by powerful
subjects of a right which was possessed only by
the King and to some extent by his family.^
Historical writers in dealing with the subject are
apt to convey the impression that the exercise of
this prerogative was confined to the taking of
chattels for the personal use of the King and of his
family, such as provisions for his house and horses
and carriages for the conveyance of the King and
of his retinue when on royal progress through the
country, an impression which proves to be inaccurate
upon a detailed examination of the statutes relating
to purveyance. It is true that a number of these
refer in terms only to the furnishing of the King's
house and 'carriage', doubtless because they are
directed to the grievances arising out of that par-
ticular form ,of purveyance ; but there are occasional
references to the garrisons of castles, while a statute
of 1340 deals expressly with purveyance for the
King's house and wars.^ As early as 1275 the
statute of Westminster the First ^ recites the evil
of taking victual and other things to the King's
use upon credence or for the garrison of a castle,
and provides that the lands of those who having
received payment from the exchequer or otherwise
1 e. g. 3 Edw. I (1275), c. 32. 2 McKechnie, p. 330.
3 As in the case of Hugh Spencer ; Thorold Rogers, loc. cit.
4 14 Edw. Ill, Stat, i, c. 19. ^ 3 Edw. I, c. 32.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 53
withhold it from the owners shall be liable to be
taken in execution for the sums due and for damages,
and that those who take horses or carriages for the
King's use beyond what are needed shall be
grievously punished by the Marshals (although no
penalty is specified). In 1360 ^ purveyance is
declared to be properly confined to the use of the
King, the Queen, and the King's eldest son, while
by a statute of 1362 ^ it is restricted to the King
and Queen, and the ' heinous name ' of purveyor is
changed to that of buyer, while commissions to pur-
veyors are to be issued under the great seal and
renewed every half year. At a time when the
King made war out of his own purse, with the help
of such aids, prises, or other assistance^ as he
might be able to obtain, it is hardly surprising that
the distinction between purveyance for his own
personal use and for the purposes of war should
appear somewhat faint. The statute of 1340,*
however, makes it clear that the right of purveyance
was exercisable for either purpose. It provides that
purveyances made for the houses of the King and
Queen, both where they live and where they pass
through the country, shall be made by warrant ;
1 34 Edw. Ill, c. 2.
2 36 Edw. Ill, Stat, i, c. 2.
3 A statute of 1297 (25 Edw. I, Stat, i, c. 5) recites that divers
people are in fear that the aids and tasks they have given towards
the King's wars and other business, of their own grant and good-
will, might turn to a bondage, and likewise for the prises taken
by the King's ministers, and proceeds ' we have granted that we
shall not draw such aids, tasks nor prises into a custom, and
no such aids tasks or prises are to be taken in future except
by the common assent of the Realm and for the profit thereof,
saving the ancient aids and prises due and accustomed '.
4 14 Edw. Ill, Stat, i, c. 19.
54 CASE OF REQUISITION
and only by agreement with the vendors,^ but
that the ' great purveyances ' (an expression which
would seem to point to a distinction between sup-
plies for the domestic use of the King and provision
for his needs in time of war, such as carts, fish, and
other victuals) for the King's wars and to victual
his castles and towns in Scotland, England, and
elsewhere shall be made by certain merchants and
good people deputed by the Treasurer, but without
commission from the King, provided that no one
shall be forced to sell anything without his consent.
Once it is established that the Crown's right of
purveyance covers both the right of the royal
household to be provided with supplies for its own
maintenance and the right of the King as the head
of his people to get material for munitions of war,
such as saltpetre, the inference that the requisition
of chattels for national defence had the authority
of the Common Law and was on a basis of payment
to the subject becomes exceedingly clear. For no
one suggests that the right of the King's household
to take the provisions it needed was a right to take
without payment — the controversy on this subject
arises from the difficulty of making the King's
officers pay what was constitutionally due — and if
this is true of one sort of purveyance it seems
difficult to believe that another application of the
same right of purveyance did not lead to a similar
constitutional right to be paid. Indeed, to the
lawyers of the Middle Ages the two sorts of pur-
veyance would have been indistinguishable. The
^ This restriction, which is inconsistent with the exercise
of the right of purveyance, is not re-enacted in the later statutes.
See for example 34 Edw. Ill (1360), c. 2. 36 Edw. Ill, c. 2 (1362),
provides that none need obey without ready payment.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 55
King was the head of his people in peace and war,
and he provided himself with supplies for his house-
hold and with munitions of war by virtue of the
same title and in the exercise of the same function
as head of the State. If, therefore, payment was
due in one case, it was certainly due in the other.
The statutes had little if any effect in remedying
these abuses, which formed the subject of a com-
plaint in 1604. In that year the Commons presented
a petition setting forth their grievances in respect
of purveyance, in which it was asserted that the
practice had been restrained by no less than
36 statutes. This, among other grievances, was
referred to a Committee in whose proceedings Bacon
took an active part. A conference with the Lords
followed but the matter ultimately dropped.^
Two years later ' upon a grievous complaint ' by
the Commons ' concerning many grievances suffered
in the execution of commissions granted to certain
persons for getting saltpetre', the King replied that
' he had never an intention to make any application
of his prerogative therein further than might stand
with the lawful and necessary use thereof '.^ All
commissions and grants were thereupon revoked,^
and the question of the limits within which the
right might be lawfully exercised submitted for the
opinion of all the judges, whose resolutions have
been already referred to. Coke's report of the case
mentions two commissions in the 31st year of
Elizabeth, one of which, now in the Public Record
Office, was included in the documents in the Case.*
His statement that Elizabeth's commissions were
1 HaUam, Const, Hist.y ed. 1884, i. 204.
2 3 Inst. 82. 3 Ibid.
* App. E, p. 261.
56 CASE OF REQUISITION
the first of their kind is not entirely accurate.^
The first document which has come to Hght is
a warrant in 1492,^ from Henry VII to one Stoke,
Clerk of the Ordnance, authorizing him to provide
so many houses, land, vessels, wood, coal, and other
fuel suitable for making saltpetre for the Ordnance,
' the fee of the Church only excepted, for our moneys
in this behalf reasonably to be paid ' and to arrest ^
and take artificers, labourers, and workmen who are
to 'serve us at our wages'. In I4I5 Henry VIII
having appointed one Wolf to be gunpowder maker
within the Tower of London authorized him to dig
for saltpetre wheresoever found and with such
labourers as should be necessary to dig and labour,
provided always that he first agree and then after
to content and pay such persons where he and his
labourers shall labour and break any ground truly
and conveniently for the harm of such persons or
their grounds.* A warrant ^ of the 3 1st year of
Elizabeth to Evelyn and others (doubtless one of
the two licences referred to in the Case of Saltpetre)
1 With regard to Coke's accuracy, Sir F. Pollock, in a note to
R. V. Casement (1917) 1 K.B., p. 141, points out that his authority
as to the law as understood in his own time must be distinguished
from his opinions in historical and antiquarian matters.
2 Patent Roll, 5 Hen. VII, m. 28 d (8 d) (Record Office).
3 The extension of purveyance to the impressment of labour
is common throughout the Middle Ages. Hallam (Middle Ages,
ed. 1878), iii. 149, cites a commission (Rymer, Foedera,
vi. 417) from Edward III to William of Walsingham empowering
him to collect as many painters as might suffice for ' our works
in St. Stephen's Chapel at Westminster '. Hallam adds that.
Windsor owes its massive magnificence to labourers impressed
from every part of the Kingdom. It is to be observed that the
commissions for the taking of saltpetre provide that all labourers
be paid.
* State Papers Dom., x, no. 79. ^ App. E, p. 261.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 57
directs that letters patent be issued to the grantees
which, after reciting the Prerogative Royal, direct
petre or powder makers to make good all damage,
and that any ' variance ' with owners of land be
referred to two justices of the peace. All persons
assisting are to be paid their reasonable charges,
and carriages are to be paid for at the fixed rate of
fourpence the mile. Similar but more elaborate
provisions are contained in a warrant of 41 Eliza-
beth ^ directing letters patent to be issued to the
same grantees for a term of eleven years, the
grantees being required at their own proper costs
and charges to make up and repair every place
' broken, stirred, digged, or in any sorte decayed
hindered or defaced ', and the letters patent conclude
with a comprehensive clause, ' Notwithstanding any
statute. Act of Parliament, order, proclamation,
ordinance, law, usage, custom, or other matter what-
soever to the contrary.' A warrant was also issued
containing the form of Indenture to be made with
the grantees which incorporates similar provisions.^
An illustration of the manner of making pur-
veyance of saltpetre after the resolutions of the
Judges in 1606 is to be found in a warrant of
Charles I, 1629/ when, as the warrant recites,
there was ' more than ordinary occasion to provide
good and sufficient saltpetre and powder to furnish
stores for the defence and safety of the realm '.
At this time England was actually at war with
Spain (the war with France was concluded in April
by the peace of Susa). After reciting the Hoyal
Prerogative, power is given to enter, break open,
1 (1599) App. E, p. 263.
2 Chancery Warrants, series ii, file 1636 (Record Office).
3 App. E, p. 272.
58 CASE OF REQUISITION
and work for saltpetre as well within the houses,
lands, grounds, or possessions of the King, his heirs
and successors as well as within those of his subjects.
The warrant ^ then makes full provision for payment
of compensation by ' paying to owners or present
possessors of such houses, barns, stables, yards, and
outhouses, reasonable rents and rates for the time
they shall be used for our service '. And if such
owners or possessors ' shall be obstinate and un-
reasonable in their demands ', compensation is to
be assessed by the mayors in boroughs and two
justices in rural places.
Purveyance, then, was a right of pre-emption,
exercisable on definite conditions. A purveyor
required the authority of a warrant or commission,
and must pay a fair price or compensation for
chattels, and for transport, and these conditions
apply equally in peace and in war.
Purveyance was finally abolished in 1660 at the
Restoration by an ' act for taking away the Court
of Wards and Liveries and tenures in capite and by
Knight's service and purveyance, and for settling
a revenue on his Majesty in lieu thereof '.^ The
1 It appears from the warrant of 1599 that the grant con-
stituted a monopoly. Three years later the illegality of monopolies
was affirmed in the Case of Monopolies (11 Rep. 846). The
warrant of 1629 (the Statute of Monopolies (21 Jac. I, c. 3) had
been passed in 1623) does not purport to grant any exclusive
right. An Act of 1640 (16 Car. I, c. 21), after reciting that
the importation of gunpowder has been of late times prohibited,
gives liberty to all persons to import it and also saltpetre. In
1685 the importation of gunpowder was prohibited except by
licence (1 Jac. II, c. 8). There appear to be no documents of
record referring to saltpetre after 1665, or thereabouts, as the
substance was then obtained in increased quantities from India.
2 12 Car. II, c. 24, s. 11.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 59
Act marks the end of the feudal system of providing
supply, founded mainly on tenure and other feudal
institutions, for which it substitutes the modern
constitutional practice of regular taxatioij granted
by Parliament.
At this point the statutory history of Purveyance
as such comes to an end. The subsequent history
of the right to impress chattels and transport is
dealt with hereafter.^
The Case of Ship-money.
B. V. Hampden,^ the celebrated case of ship-
money, occupies a wider field and indeed forms an
almost inexhaustible storehouse for the study of
questions connected with the prerogative of the
Crown in time of war. It will be desirable to give
a short account of the case in order to recall as
succinctly as possible the circumstances in which it
came to be argued, and to make clear the precise
relevance of the citations from the judgments and
arguments upon which reliance was placed in the Case.
That ships were in fact requisitioned by the
Crown for the public service throughout the Middle
Ages admits of no doubt,^ and instances of the
requisitioning of ships had occurred as recently as
1626 during the war with Spain.* Professor Holds-
worth ^ cites instances in which in the Tudor
1 p. 139, post.
2 (1637) 3 How. St. Tr. 826. The report incorporates a
number of documents printed in Rushworth's Historical Collec-
tionSy which are the most authentic source of information.
3 See p. 148, post. * Gardner, vi. 132.
^ See the learned article on ' The power of the Crown to
requisition British ships in a national emergency ', L. Q. R.,
XXXV. 12.
60 CASE OF REQUISITION
period the seaport towns and maritime districts
had found the expense of furnishing their contingent
of ships burdensome and had attempted to obtain
contributions from the neighbouring districts. In
1619 the ports were assessed not in terms of ships,
but in money. The decision to adopt the expedient
of levying money instead of contributing ships was
made in 1634 on the suggestion of Noy, the Attorney-
General, a plan which if successful had the obvious
advantage from the point of view of Charles I of
relieving him of the necessity of summoning Parlia-
ment.^ The first writs, issued in 1634, were confined
to the maritime counties and were followed in 1635
by a second series of writs which laid the whole
country under contribution. In the face of the
opposition which was aroused,^ it was decided to
obtain an opinion of the Judges before the legality
of the writs could be tested in the Courts at the
instance of a subject.^ Accordingly Coventry, the
Lord Keeper, delivered to the Judges a letter
enclosing a Case which propounded the questions
' when the good and safety of the kingdom in
general is concerned, and the whole kingdom is in
danger; Whether may not the King by writ under
the Great Seal of England, command all the subjects
1 Gardner, vii. 356.
2 Particularly in the City of London and in Oxfordshire.
Gardner, vii. 102.
3 In 1636 one Richard Chambers, merchant, commenced
an action for trespass and false imprisonment against Sir Edward
Bromfield, who had imprisoned him for refusing to pay ship-
money during Bromfield's mayoralty of the City of London ;
Knight, J., refused to allow the case to be proceeded with on
the ground that ' many things which might not be done by the
rule of law might be done by the rule of government ', Rushworth,
pt. ii, vol. i, p. 323.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 61
of this Idngdom, at their charge, to furnish and
provide such number of ships, with men, victuals,
and munition and for such time as he shall think
fit, for the defence and safeguard of the kingdom
from such danger and peril ; and by law compel
the doing thereof, in case of refusal or refractoriness ?
And whether, in such a case, is not the king sole
judge, both of the danger, and when and how the
same is to be prevented and avoided ? ' ^ These
questions the judges unanimously answered in the
affirmative. ' If these men ', says Clarendon, ' had
preserved the simplicity of their ancestors in severely
and strictly defending the laws, other men had
observed the modesty of theirs, in humbly and
dutifully obeying them.'
The form of the questions is not without impor-
tance. The principal question assumes the danger
of which, by the second question, the Judges are
invited to declare the King to be the sole Judge.
Thereupon, on October 9, 1637, the third writ
was issued. It was no longer possible to regard
ship-money as a temporary burden to meet a specific
emergency : it was evidently intended to remain
as a permanent tax upon the nation. ^ An assess-
ment of forty shillings having been made upon
John Hampden which he, in common with others
in the county of Buckingham, declined to pay,^
1 3 St. Tr. 844. Coventry's speech to the Judges is at p. 839.
' The Lord Keeper Coventry approved and assisted the project
as far as his learning in these matters did extend, and that was
not far,' Oldmixon.
2 ' For a spring and magazine that should have no bottom
and for an everlasting supply of all occasions,' Clarendon.
3 A facsimile of the return made by the Assessors in the
parish of Great Kimble is printed in Nugent's Memorials of
Hampden. The assessors and constables who signed the return
62 CASE OF REQUISITION
proceedings were taken against him in the Ex-
chequer whereto he demurred as being insufficient
in law. The same judges by a majority of one
decided in favour of the legaHty of the writ, and
ship-money continued to be levied (although in
decreasing amounts) until 1640 when by ' An Act ^
for declaring unlawful and void the late proceedings
against ship-money and for the vacating of all
records and process concerning the same ' it was
declared and enacted ' that the said charge imposed
upon the Subject, for the providing and furnishing
of Ships, commonly called Ship-Money, and the
said extra judicial Opinion of the said Judges and
Barons, and the said Writs, and every of them, and
the said Agreement or Opinion of the greater part
of the said Justices and Barons, and the said Judg-
ment given against the said John Hampden, were
and are contrary to and against the laws and
Statutes of this Realm, the Bight of Property, the
Liberty of the Subjects, former Resolutions in
Parliament, and the Petition of Right made in the
third Yeare of the Reign of his Majesty that now is.'
In these circumstances, for what proposition is
the Case of Ship-money an authority ? The Act
of 1640 recites the main grounds upon which the
had the good taste to include their own names in the list of those
returned as refusing to pay. The amount of Hampden's assess-
ment was 3l5. Qd. The assessment of 205. upon which the
proceedings were founded was in respect of lands in the neigh-
bouring parish of Stoke Mandeville. The sum immediately
in question was therefore assessed only on a portion of Hampden's
lands (Hallam, ii. 17). For the amounts fixed during the reign
of Charles I, the application of the moneys, and the method of
assessment and collection, see Royal Hist. Soc. Transactions,
3rd series, iv. 141 ; Hallam, ii. 17.
1 16 Car. I, c. 14.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 63
majority of the Judges gave their decision. They
are thus formulated : ' that when the good and
safety of the Kingdom in general is concerned and
the whole Kingdom in danger, the King might by
Writ under the Great Seal of England command all
the subjects of this his Kingdom, at their Charge,
to provide and furnish such Number of Ships with
Men, Victuals, and Munition, and for such time as
the King should think fit, for the Defence and
Safeguard of the Kingdom from such Danger and
Peril, and that by Law the King might compel the
doing thereof in case of Refusal or Refractoriness ;
and that the King is the sole Judge, both of the
Danger and when and how the same is to be pre-
vented and avoided.'
The case therefore turned not on the legality of
the prerogative to requisition ships but on the
legality of the right to levy ship-money.
The argument on behalf of Hampden was en-
trusted to Oliver St. John ^ and Robert Holborne.
St. John's argument, apart from its great learning,
is remarkable for the skill with which he made
admissions which did not impair the force of his
case, in order to smooth the way for Judges who
had already in their extra-judicial opinion expressed
themselves adversely to his principal contention.
Thus he made no distinction between the levy of
ship-money in the inland as compared with the
maritime counties. In dealing with the question
whether the King was the sole judge of necessity
1 Lord Campbell, whose appreciation of St. John is far from
sympathetic, characterizes it as the finest that had ever been
delivered in Westminster Hall (Lives of the Chief Justices, i. 453).
' He had not been taken notice of in Westminster Hall till he
argued the case of shipmoney ' (Clarendon).
64 CASE OF REQUISITION
he made the admission upon which reUance was
placed by the Crown in the Case.
' The law,' he admits/ ' hath made his Majesty
sole judge of dangers from foreigners, and when
and how the same are to be prevented ; and to
come nearer, fiath given him power by Writ under
the great seal of England to command the inhabi-
tants of each county to provide shipping for the
Defence of the kingdom, and may by law compel
the doing thereof.'
How does this admission bear upon the argument
in the Case ? It is an admission by counsel made,
perhaps unnecessarily, in order not to put his case
higher than was requisite in order to establish his
proposition. ' Admissions made in such a case do
not constitute precedents, and the arguments appli-
cable to the Royal Prerogative before the revolu-
tionary period must be read subject to the restrictions
which have been subsequently imposed.' ^ St. John
proceeds to show that the necessity being once
admitted, it must be met by constitutional means,
when such means are available, that is to say by
recourse to Parliament. In other words even
admitting that the ordinary means had been all
used, but proved insufficient, the Crown cannot,
without the consent of Parliament, ' alter the
property of the subject's goods '.^ The Crown
can obtain supplies from Parliament, for ' the law
hath foreseen and provides the supplies accordingly
without the way of the writ '.* The danger, it is
true, may be such as to justify the taking of the
subject's goods without his consent, but that can
only be tempore belli — and tempus belli when property
1 3 St. Tr. 862. 2 per Lord Parmoor, App. A, p. 210.
3 3 St. Tr. 881. « Ibid., 877.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 65
ceaseth ' is not upon every intestine or defensive war,
but only at such times whe^i the course of justice is
stopped, and the Courts of Justice shut up ' ^ and for
this Hmited or technical meaning of the expression
' in time of war ' he cites authorities.^
Holborne in his argument goes farther. Having
first denied the danger, which the writ did not refer
to as imminent, he proceeds to consider what
constitutes actual danger. ' If there be an actual
war, the subject may, without any direction do
any act upon any man's land and invade any
property towards defence : it is the law of necessity
that doth it.' ^ But the King cannot charge the
subject out of Parliament and, so long as the resort
to Parliament is open, the King cannot act under
extraordinary powers.*
Of the judgments, it is only necessary to refer
to those of Sir George Crooke and of Sir Richard
Hutton, both of whom had been parties to the
original resolution in favour of the legality of ship-
money and who now, together with Sir John Den-
ham, Sir Humphrey Davenport, and Sir John
Bramston, formed the minority.^ Crooke admits
that there may exist cases ' in which course may be
taken for defence till a Parliament be had ' ^ and
holds that ' royal power is to be used in cases of
necessity and imminent danger when ordinary courses
will not avail, for it is a rule Non occurrendum est
ad extraordinaria quando fieri potest per ordinariaJ
1 3 St. Tr. 903. 2 ibid. 904. ^ ibid. 975.
* Ibid. 971.
^ For the subsequent proceedings in Parliament and the
impeachment of the judges who formed the majority, see
3 St. Tr. 1254.
« Ibid. 1135. ' Ibid. 1162.
2388 V
66 CASE OF REQUISITION
He then proceeds to show that the writ imposed
taxation, and that no such emergency had arisen
as would justify the course adopted. ' If there be
time to make ships, or prepare ships at the charge
of the counties, then is there time enough for his
Majesty, if he pleases to call his parliament, to
charge his commons, by consent in Parliament, and
to have a subsidiary aid, as always hath been done
in such cases. And they are not so long coming or
meeting, but they will make provision for defence,
it being for all their safeties.' ^
Sir Richard Hutton bases his judgment on the
absence of any necessity which would justify the
imposition of a tax. The former opinion of the
Judges was based on the assumption that there
was imminent danger. ' I do agree in time of
war ^ when there is an enemy in the field, the
King may take goods from the subject; such a
danger, and such a necessity, ought to be in this
case, as in case of a fire like to consume all without
help, such a danger as tends to the overthrow of
the Kingdom.' ^ But there being here no such
imminent necessity (and it was not even recited in
the writ, the words quod salus regni pericUtahatur
having been subsequently inserted in the mittimus) *
the law cannot compel subjects to part with their
interest in their goods.
Another passage from Button's judgment was
cited by Avory, J., in In re a Petition of Eight. ^
1 3 How. St. Tr. 1159.
2 Doubtless the phrase is used in the technical sense in which
St. John employed it.
3 3 St. Tr. 1198. * Ibid. 1199.
5 (1915) 3 K.B. at p. 652. See further as to this case p. 69,
post.
THE PRER0GATIVJ3 OF THE CROWN 67
' There are some inseparable prerogatives belonging
to the Crown such as the Parliament cannot sever
from it. . . . Such is the case for the defence of the
Kingdom, which belongeth inseparably to the Crown
as head and supreme protector of the Kingdom.' ^
This passage is but a faint echo of the pretensions to
absolute power advanced by the supporters of the
Royal Prerogative in Stuart times, of which numerous
examples might be cited from the judgments of
the majority of the Court in the ship-money case.
Berkley for example, says ^ : ' The law knows no
such King-yoking policy. The law is of itself an
old and trusty servant of the King's, it is his instru-
ment or means which he useth to govern his people
by. I never heard nor read that Lex was Rex, but
it is common and most true that Rex is Lex, for he
is " Lex loquens " a living, a speaking, an acting
law.' Finch says ^ : ' Acts of Parliament to take
away (the King's) royal power in the defence of his
Kingdom are void . . . for no Acts of Parliament
make any difference.'
Language such as this affords interesting illus-
trations of the attitude of mind which prevailed
among sixteenth-century lawyers with regard to the
Royal Prerogative. It cannot be suggested as
applicable to any legitimate exercise of prerogative
powers at the present day.*
1 3 How. St. Tr. 1194.
2 Ibid. 1098.
3 Ibid. 1235.
* See the passage from the judgment of Lord Parmoor,
cited p. 64, ante.
72
68 CASE OF REQUISITION
in
How do the principles to be deduced from the
Case of Saltpetre and the Case of Ship-money
assist the determination of the questions arising in
the Case of Requisitions ^ ? It is scarcely per-
missible to suggest any close analogy upon the
facts. The Case of Saltpetre deals with purveyance
1 A few cases were cited in argument which contain general
expressions — in each case entirely obiter — upon which reliance
was placed on behalf of the Crown. In Maleverer v. Spinke
(1537) 1 Dyer 36 ; 73 E.R. 81 (an action for waste, decided on
demurrer on a point of pleading) it is said ' In time of war a man
may justify making fortifications on another man's land without
licence '. In Hole v. Barlow (1858) 4 C.B. (N.S.), p. 345 ; 140
E.R., p. 1118, Willes, J., says ' Every man has a right to the
enjoyment of his land, but in the event of a foreign invasion, the
Queen may take the land for the purpose of setting up defences
thereon for the general good of the nation.' The action was
for a nuisance from burning bricks. The point decided viz.
the proper direction to a jury, was overruled in Bamford v.
Turley (1862) 3 B. & C. 73 ; 122 E.R. 29 ; and in Shott's Iron Co.
V. Inglis (1882) 7 A.C. 518. In British Cast Plate Manufacturers
V. Meredith (1792) 4 T.R. 794 ; 100 E.R. 1306, BuUer, J., says
* there are many cases in which individuals sustain an injury,
for which the law gives no action ; for instance pulhng down
houses, or raising bulwarks, for the preservation and defence
of the Kingdom against the King's enemies. The Gvil Law
writers indeed say, that the individuals who suffer have a right
to resort to the public for a satisfaction ; but no one ever
thought that the Common Law gave an action against the
individual who puUed down the house.' See also Bac. Abr. Tit.
Prerog. (7th ed.), vi. 434. * The King in consequence of his
power in making war and peace hath a prerogative in the coin
and Royal mines, in saltpetre and gunpowder ; may enter into
a man's land to make fortifications (1 Roll. R. 152) . . . and though
in many instances relating to these matters the strict letter of
the law may be exceeded, yet from the necessity of order,
government and discipline are they countenanced and allowed :
quod necessitas cogit defendit.'
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 69
of chattels, to which the right to enter land —
subject to considerable restrictions — is merely inci-
dental. The Case of Ship-money negatives the right
of the Crown to impose a money charge without
the consent of Parliament. The judicial opinions
upon which reliance was placed in the arguments of
the Crown in the Case assert a right inherent, not
in the Crown in virtue of any prerogative, but in
every subject in the common interest, to enter upon
lands for the purpose of defence in the event of
invasion, and embody a proposition fully covered
by ancient authority.^ They assume an emergency
which would render the ordinary procedure for
obtaining parliamentary sanction entirely nugatory
and inadequate. No such emergency was suggested
to have arisen in the circumstances of the Case : if
it had existed, sufficient provision had been made
under Parliamentary authority to meet it.^
The Case of Saltpetre and the Case of Ship-money
were recently discussed In re a Petition of Right,^
the decision of which in favour of the Crown by
Mr. Justice Avory and by the Court of Appeal was
mainly based upon the passages in the old cases
which have been referred to and discussed in this
chapter. The researches at the Public Record
Office had not been made when this case was argued.
The Master of the Rolls distinguished the present
Case for the reason that in In re a Petition of Right ^
the ground was actually required for the purposes
of hostilities in the air and was analogous to the
erection of bulwarks against invasion. It therefore
had no application to the taking of possession of
lands and buildings for administrative purposes.^
1 See p. 49, ante, note 1. ^ Ante, p. 39.
3 (1915) 3 K.B. 649. * (1919) 2 Ch. p. 229.
70 CASE OF REQUISITION
In re a Petition of Right was taken on appeal to the
House of Lords when the appeal was withdrawn on
the terms of the Crown agreeing to pay compensa-
tion.^ The decision of the Court of Appeal in that
case, although not expressly overruled in any judg-
ment delivered in the Case, cannot now be considered
as binding. Lord Sumner,^ while regarding it as
an exemplification of the ancient rule traced back
in the Year Books ^ that both King and subject
may enter land for the purpose of raising bulwarks,
points out that the case was decided, rightly or
wrongly, upon this analogy. Lord Dunedin ^ goes
farther. He was satisfied upon the evidence that
the custom of payment in former times was estab-
lished, and expressed the opinion that In re a Petition
of Right and the Case cannot be distinguished in
essential particulars.
One other recent decision which was discussed
requires mention. The opinion of Lord Parker in
The Zamora ^ contains a statement that ' the
municipal law of this country does not give com-
pensation to a subject whose land or goods are
requisitioned by the Crown '.^ If this statement is
to be taken as a considered opinion, founded on the
examination of the authorities (the documentary
1 See p. 5, ante, note 2. 2 ^pp ^^ p 205.
3 See p. 49, ante, note 1. * App. A, p. 171.
5 (1916) 2 A.C. 77. '
^ Observations made by judges in the course of an argument
ought not, of course, to be cited as representing a considered
opinion. It may, however, be permissible to state that during
the argument in. In re a Petition of Right in the House of Lords,
Lord Parker appears to have used expressions which seem to
indicate that he did not regard it as by any means clear that
where a requisition was lawfully made the subject had no legal
right to compensation.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 71
evidence produced in the Case had not at that time
been examined) and intended to formulate any
proposition upon the right of the subject to com-
pensation according to the law of England, it must
of course be regarded as directly in point. But
the passage occurs in an opinion of the Privy Council
on an appeal from the Prize Court, the question
being whether it was consistent with the law of
nations that a Court of Prize should release to the
Crown, against deposit of the value in Court, the
property of a neutral held in its custody pending
adjudication, whenever the Crown duly declares that
a requisition was necessary for the defence of the
Realm. The rule of the law of nations that a requi-
sition is lawful, subject to payment of the appraised
value of ship or cargo, was affirmed, in favour of a
neutral, on the ground that such a requisition imposed
no greater burden on neutral than on British subjects.
The passage referred to therefore merely embodies
an assumption upon which, if it be justified, the
requisition of neutral property subject to payment
of compensation constitutes an interference the
burden of which is not greater, and may conceivably
be less, than must be borne by a British subject in
the event of his property being required for purposes
of defence.^ The Royal Prerogative which was in
issue was the right according to the law of nations
to requisition vessels or goods in the custody of the
Prize Court of a belligerent power. The reference
to the prerogative in the domain of English municipal
law was therefore merely incidental and was not
in issue in the proceedings.^
1 Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 205.
2 Per Lord Parmoor, App. A, p. 212. The right in question
in The Zamora is, of course, closely analogous to the right of
72 CASE OF REQUISITION
Upon the authorities it is accordingly submitted
that the Crown has no right by virtue of any pre-
rogative to enter the land of the subject without
consent and that where an entry in the case of an
instant danger is lawful, it is justified, not under
any such prerogative but in accordance with the
right common both to the Crown and to its subjects,
to take what steps are necessary at the moment to
meet the emergency. The element of time is,
therefore, all-important, and it is only in circum-
stances in which recourse to Parliament in order to
obtain powers over and above those which are
recognized by law as being vested in the Crown will
involve such delay as would imperil the national
defence that it can be said that ' the King is the
sole judge of the danger '. For the judgment of
the King, modern constitutional practice has sub-
stituted the discretionary power of the Executive.
The extent to which that discretion is subject to
the control of the Courts will be dealt with here-
after.i
IV. The Historical Evidence,
The time covered by the documents relating to
land which were considered in the Case falls naturally
into three periods. Firstly, before the statute of
Anne of 1708, secondly from 1708 to the first general
angary which is recognized by the law of nations. The authorities
upon this right are collected in the report of the argument in
The Zamora in the Prize Court (1916), P. 30. For a recent
instance in which the right was recognized in the English Courts,
see Commercial and Estates Company of Egypt v. Ball (1920)
36 T.L.R. 526.
1 pp. 82, 94, post.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 73
Defence Act of 1798, and thirdly the period subse-
quent to 1798.
In the first period the following are typical in-
stances. The warrant of Charles I in 1629 ^ authoriz-
ing the entry upon land for the purpose of obtaining
saltpetre, subject to the payment of rent, has already
been referred to.^ Instances in which powder mills
were ordered to be impressed occur in 1664.^
An Ordnance Minute of 1664 * suggests that
a jury be summoned if the proprietors of ground
at Portsmouth persist in their unreasonable demands.
At this time war with Holland was imminent, acts
of war having occurred throughout the year, fol-
lowed on March 4, 1665, by the formal outbreak of
the first Dutch war. During the interval of peace
between the first and second Dutch wars payments
are recorded (in 1668) for the rent of ground for a
battery,^ and for damage done by proving a mortar
piece. ^ In the same year instructions were given to
contract for and buy ground for batteries at Chatham
' for the cheapest rates you or they can agree '.' In
1 App. E, p. 272. 2 p, 57^ ^/iig^
^ App. F, pp. 277, 278. The popular association of the word
' impressment ' with the notion of not pa3dng is fallacious. The
word ' imprest ' is derived from impraestare (Ft. prefer) and is
applied to money advanced for a particular purpose. So ' Im-
prest money ' was the sum advanced to soldiers upon enlistment.
The expression ' to imprest unto ' in the document printed in
App. F, p. 281, is therefore the equivalent of ' authorized by
warrant '. So an Act 13 Eliz., c. 4, refers to ' Receivers of any
sum of money imprest, or otherwise for the use of the Queen's
Majesty '. In the National Debt Act, 1870 (33 & 34 Vict., c. 71,
s. 44) 'money issued for the payment of dividends is to be paid
to the chief cashier of the bank by way of imprest.
* App. F, p. 279. 5 Ibid., p. 285.
6 Ibid., p. 285. 7 Ibid., p. 282.
74 CASE OF REQUISITION
1674, shortly after the end of the second Dutch
war, the storekeeper at Portsmouth is directed to
ascertain what storerooms may be hired : ^ similar
directions are given with regard to Hull in 1682.^
In 1681 directions are given to ascertain what
statutes there are for making fortifications.^ In
1705, the year of the siege of Namur, immortalized
in English literature by Sterne, compensation was
given for the destruction of houses on Tower
Wharf. ^
The second period is marked by the long succession
of local but permanent acts following that of 1708,
the method of carrying out of which has already
been referred to.^ A minute of February 1718
(war with France broke out later in the same year)
records that an owner who is willing to sell has
a tenant whQ is making exorbitant demands, and
instructs the storekeeper at Plymouth to endeavour
to come to an agreement.^ A number of receipts
for rent ' are extant in respect of land on Hilsea
Common (which was included in the Act of 1757 ^
relating to Portsmouth), the amount paid in some
cases including compensation for damage. In other
cases attention is called to the necessity of obtaining
an Act of Parliament : as in 1719 during the war
with Spain. ^ The difficulty in this instance appears
to have been due to the fact that necessary parties
were under disability. This is just such a case as
would call for the exercise of powers under the
prerogative if it existed. In point of fact in a similar
1 App. F, p. 285. 2 Ibid., p. 285.
3 Ibid., p. 284. * Ibid., p. 287.
5 Ante p. 20. « App. F., p. 288.
7 Ibid., p. 288. 8 31 Geo. II, c. 39, ante, p. 17.
» App. F, p. 288.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 75
case in 1804 ^ possession was directed to be
taken under the Defence Act, another instance of
resort to legislation to solve a difficulty which, if
Common Law powers had sufficed, need not have
arisen. A case in which rent was paid for tem-
porary barracks occurs in 1775 during the American
War.2
The principal feature of the documents during
the third period is the constant reference to the
Defence Acts as affording the means for obtaining
possession. One instance in 1804 has just been
referred to.^
A further illustration is afforded by protracted
negotiations which took place in 1805 in connexion
with the Cheshunt Water which the Board of
Ordnance had actually purchased, the object being
to lead it to the Koyal powder mills at Waltham
Abbey. The story begins with a letter dated
August 4, 1805,* from the Comptroller of the
Mills to the Board of Ordnance calling attention to
' the great demand which will soon be made for
gunpowder to replace what has been expended in
the late actions '. The reference is obviously to
the naval operations which were then in progress.^
These demands make the Comptroller ' very anxious
for the Ordnance to avail themselves of the Cheshunt
Water they have purchased '. On August 17,^ the
Comptroller is suggesting an application to the
Government to impower the Ordnance to take
possession of the Water ' for as long a time as the
1 Ibid., p. 290. 2 Ibid., p. 289.
3 Ibid., p. 290. * Ibid., p. 290.
^ Sir Robert Calder's indecisive encounter with Villeneuve
had taken place on July 22.
6 App. F, p. 291.
76 CASE OF REQUISITION
Service may require it ' — a phrase which is borrowed
from the Defence Act of 1804 — allowing a reasonable
compensation to the proprietors of the corn mills
at Cheshunt and at Waltham Abbey. It is then
suggested that ' the exigency of the public service
renders it indispensable' to authorize the mills at
Cheshunt to be taken possession of under the
Defence Act, which will be attended with the
further advantage of removing some legal obstacles
arising from a claim of the poor of the neighbourhood
to have their corn ground at the mills. The Board
of Ordnance approves the suggestion.^ Protracted
negotiations followed with the freeholder of the
mills and with his tenants, whose attitude reflects
little credit upon their patriotism. Possession was
in fact taken under the Defence Act.^ on September 29,
less than a month before the battle of Trafalgar.
The legal significance of this incident in one
of the gravest crises of our history cannot possibly
be exaggerated and calls for no comment, except
that it is difficult to imagine a more appropriate
case for the use of the prerogative power of the
Crown, if such powers were available.
An instance ^ occurs in which compensation
was given in 1 81 3 in respect of damage done by
stopping up gateways by which farmers in the Isle
of Thanet drew up seaweed in order to obtain
1 App. F, p. 291.
2 Terms were ultimately agreed for the sale of the freehold,
but the tenants' demands were considerably in excess of what
the authorities were willing to pay. The offer of the Crown
to submit the question of compensation to arbitration having
been refused, the value of the lessees' interest was ultimately
(apparently not until May 1808) assessed by a jury (App. F,
p. 292).
3 App. F, p. 293.
THE PREROGATIVE OF THE CROWN 77
manure for their lands. The gateways had been
stopped up in 1804 when an invasion was antici-
pated. Money payments were ordered in the case
of each complainant and a recommendation is
recorded for the re-opening of one if not more of
the gateways.
Finally an undated document ^ from the Earl
of Chatham's papers (endorsed September 1819)
would seem to refer to a period before the passing
of the Defence Act of 1804. It records the case of
an owner who is willing to grant a lease of his land
for the duration of the war, but who declines to
sell, and it is suggested that it will be necessary to
introduce a Bill in Parliament to empower the
Board jof Ordnance to purchase the property.
It remains to consider the conclusions to be
drawn from these documents. No instance has
come to light in which a Petition of Right has been
presented or filed in support of a claim to compensa-
tion, a fact upon which the Crown relied as incon-
sistent with the existence of any basis in law for any
such claim, no subject having ever had the temerity
to put forward such a contention.^ On the other
hand the Suppliants argued that the fact that
payments were regularly made, coupled with a
complete absence of instances of refusal or of
payment expressed to have been made ex gratia,
show that the subject never had occasion to resort
to litigation — ^the Crown always paid. As regards
land, then, there was a universal practice of pay-
ment resting on bargain before 1708 and on statu-
tory power and provision after that date. Lord
Dunedin^ declines to infer a customary obligation
1 App. F, p. 295. 2 Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 204.
3 App. A, p. 171.
78 CASE OF REQUISITION
to pay ' for once the taking itself is admitted to be
as of right, the usage of payment is equally consistent
with a payment ex lege and a payment ex gratia \
But he finds an admitted custom to pay, in the
face of which it is not surprising that there should
be consent on the part of the Crown that this branch
of the prerogative should be regulated by statute.^
The conclusion, then, is that ' it does not appear
that the Crown has ever taken for these purposes
the land of the subject without paying for it, and
that there is no trace of the Crown having, even in
the times of the Stuarts, exercised or asserted the
power or right to do so by virtue of the Royal
Prerogative '.^ It is submitted, therefore, that
the alleged prerogative is not established Vy ^h^
evidence, and that the subject has a constitutional
right to the enjoyment of his land, while the Crown
is under a corresponding obligation to pay com-
pensation where in case of emergency that right is
affected.^
1 App. A, p. 171.
2 Per Lord Atkinson, App. A, p. 183.
3 The onus of proof would as between subjects be upon the
party alleging the right, and it is submitted that the Crown is
in no better position. ' It is for the officers of the C5rown to make
out clearly the Prerogative in any case where they claim to be
on a different footing from the subject as regards procedure in
any litigation ' {Attorney -General to Prince of Wales v. Grossman
(1866) L.R. 1 Ex. 386). The prerogative with regard to procedure
is expressly preserved by section 34 of the Defence Act, 1842.
There appears to be no decision which affects the ordinary rules
as to the burden of proof, but in the light of the cases cited in
Robertson, Givil Proceedings against the Grown, p. 595, the
proposition that the onus of proof is on the Crown may be open
to some doubt.
CHAPTER IV
THE DEFENCE OF THE REALM CONSOLIDA-
TION ACT, 1914
The officers of the Crown purported to take
possession under statutory powers conferred by the
Defence of the Realm ConsoUdation Act, 1914.^
Briefly, the contention advanced on behaH of the
Crown was that upon the proper construction of
the Act and Regulations the competent military
authority was authorized to take possession of land
while the subject had no legal right to compensation.
Whatever rights to compensation the Suppliants
might have had under the general law as it stood
in August 1914, those rights, it was argued, were
taken away by the authority conferred by the
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 ^
to make regulations for the suspension of any
restrictions .on the acquisition and user of land
under the Defence Acts 1842 to 1875.2 The argu-
ment, therefore, was that the liability of the Crown
to compensate the subject for land taken for pur-
poses of national defence was a ' restriction ' of
which Parliament authorized the suspension by the
Regulation referred to. The answer to this con-
tention was twofold.
In the first place, the liability to make compensa-
tion when land is taken for purposes of defence is
1 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
2 Ag ^Q which see p. 10, ante, note 1.
80 CASE OF REQUISITION
not a ' restriction ' on the acquisition or user of
land at all. It is founded upon the right of the
subject, correlative to that of the Crown to take
and use the land, and does not in any way limit or
interfere with the acquisition and user. What is
referred to as a restriction is contained in the pro-
visions of the Defence Act, 1842, which impose upon
the officers of the Crown the obligation to comply
with certain formalities before possession can be
obtained. The effect of the Regulation is to enable
the Crown to acquire and use forthwith and without
the authority, previously obtained, of the Lord-
Lieutenant or other officers ; the right of the
subject to compensation remains wholly unaffected.
Secondly, the regulation if, upon its true con-
struction, it purported to take away the right of
the subject to compensation, would be invalid
because it would not satisfy the statutory con-
dition of being a regulation for the ' public safety
and the Defence of the Realm '. It cannot contribute
to the public safety for a subject to be deprived of
compensation to which he is otherwise entitled.
The Defence of the Realm is not promoted by
denying compensation where it is due ; the relief
to the Treasury and the general body of tax-payers
which results if one subject is to bear his own loss
instead of the loss being rateably borne by the
whole community is not what is meant by the
Defence of the Realm.
The judgments in the House of Lords sustained
both these answers, though either of them was
sufficient to destroy the Crown's argument under
this head.
The Defence Act, 1842, has already been shown ^
1 p. 35, ante.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 81
to bear striking resemblances to the Acts of 1798,
of 1803, and of 1804 as regards both matter and
form. The Defence of the Realm Consolidation
Act, 1914^ presents equally marked contrasts.
The earlier statutes not only designate the subject-
matter, they also regulate the manner in which
the powers conferred by them are to be administered.
The Acts themselves prescribe in detail the methods
of obtaining possession and of assessing compensa-
tion in the absence of agreement. The powers of
the Executive are therefore fully defined and regu-
lated by Parliament itself, no power to make
regulations being conferred by the older Acts upon
the Executive or upon any subordinate authority.
Under the Defence of the Realm Act, on the
other hand. Parliament merely marks out the field
within which it delegates to the Executive authority
to frame rules or regulations for giving effect
to its intentions. It is only when a regulation
is outside the ambit of the statute, or, in other
words, when the government in the exercise of its
statutory mandate has exceeded its authority, that
a regulation can be challenged as being ultra vires.
According to strict constitutional theory the
Executive governs, while Parliament legislates ;
the delegation of legislative authority to the Crown
in Council therefore presents a paradox by ap-
parently investing the same authority with both
legislative and executive functions.^ The authority
1 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
2 Upon the subject of subordinate law-making bodies generally,
see Dicey, Law and Custom of the Constitution, c. ii ; Ilbert,
Legislative Methods and Forms, c. iii,. Statutory rules and orders
* stand on the debatable borderland between legislative and
executive action ', Ilbert, The Mechanics of Law-making, p. 139.
2388 Q
82 CASE OF REQUISITION
none the less remains a delegated one. It is therefore
subject to control, and that control takes two
distinct forms.
In the first place Parliament remains supreme ;
it can revoke its authority and — at all events in
theory — can even repudiate it. It can also .declare
that authority to have been exceeded and call its
agents to account. Parliamentary control, however,
tends to become less effective under the increasing
pressure of public business and the corresponding
tendency to restrict the opportunities for parlia-
mentary criticism of the details of administration.
In the second place, the Courts will declare action
under the delegated authority to be invalid and
ultra vires, if the Executive travels outside the area
within which its delegated authority may legiti-
mately range. The grounds upon which the validity
of a particular act of the Executive may be challenged
are twofold. Such an act may be in excess of the
authority conferred by the regulation under which
it is done ; or the regulation may itself be ultra
vires.
In construing the Defence of the Realm Con-
solidation Act, 1914,^ the criterion to be adopted
by the Courts as laid down by Parliament is that of
necessity — the validity, whether of an executive
Act itself, or of the regulation under which it is
performed depending upon whether it be necessary
for securing the public safety and the defence of
the realm. The question therefore arises as to how
far it is open or practicable for the Courts to deter-
mine the question of necessity. In the Constitu-
tional controversies, of the seventeenth century the
1 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 83
question was how far was the King the sole judge of
the danger ; in the twentieth, although assuming
a somewhat different form, it remains in essence the
same.
II
The material provisions of the Defence of the
Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 ^ are as follows :
Sect. 1 (1). 'His Majesty in Council has power
during the continuance of the present war to issue
regulations for securing the public safety and the
defence of the realm, and as to the powers and duties
for the purpose of the Admiralty and Army Council
and of the members of His Majesty's forces and other
persons acting in his behalf ; and may by such
regulations authorise the trials by courts-martial,
or in the cases of minor offences by courts of summary
jurisdiction, and punishment of persons committing
offences against the regulations and in particular
against any of the provisions of such regulations
designed —
(a) to prevent persons communicating with the
enemy or obtaining information for that
purpose or any purpose calculated to jeopar-
dise the success of the operations of any of
His Majesty's forces or the forces' of his allies
or to assist the enemy ; or
(b) to secure the safety of His Majesty's forces
and ships, and the safety of any means of
communication and of railways, ports, and
harbour ; or
(c) to prevent the spread of false reports or
reports likely to cause disaffection to His
Majesty or to interfere with the success of
His Majesty's forces by land or sea or to
prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign
powers ; or
1 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
Q2
84 CASE OF REQUISITION
(d) to secure the navigation of vessels in accordance
with directions given by or under the authority
of the Admiralty ; or
(e) otherwise to prevent assistance being given to
the enemy or the successful prosecution of
the war being endangered.
(2). Any such regulations may provide for the
suspension of any restrictions on the acquisition of
user of land, or the exercise of the power of making
bye-laws, or any other power under the Defence
Acts, 1842 to 1875, or the Mihtary Lands Acts,
1891 to 1903, and any such regulations or any orders
made thereunder affecting the pilotage of vessels
may supersede any enactment, charter, bye-laws,
regulation or provision as to pilotage.'
The form of this enactment calls for some comment.
It is declared that ' His Majesty has power to
make regulations '. Does this point to a recognition
of any existing powers of the Crown under its
prerogative, or does it refer merely to such powers
as are derived from statute ? It was at one stage
of the argument in the Case contended on behalf of
the Crown that there is to be inferred from these
words something in the nature of a recital or recog-
nition of prerogative powers at Common Law.
But this contention loses its force when reference
is made to the earlier Defence of the Realm Acts,
which were superseded by the Consolidation Act in
which their provisions were incorporated. The
first of these Acts,^' which received the Royal Assent
on August 8, 1914, was entitled, ' An Act to confer
on His Majesty power to make regulations during
the present war for the defence of the Realm.' It
was limited to regulations for the prevention of
1 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 29.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 85
communication with the enemy and to securing
the safety of means of communication, or of rail-
ways, docks, and harbours. An amending. Act of
August 28,^ enlarged the scope of the first Act
and contains the earliest reference to the Defence
Acts by the insertion of the provisions which are now
incorporated in section 1 (2) of the Consolidation
Act. Neither the amending nor the Consolidation
Act reproduces the title to the Act of August 8.
The Consolidation Act does not in terms ' confer '
power ; it enacts, that ' His Majesty in Council
has power during its continuance of the present
war to issue regulations for securing its public
safety and the defence of the Realm '. It is perhaps
hardly material to consider whether the omission
from the Consolidation Act of the title of the Act
of August 8, and the rearrangement of the topics
which are enumerated in the Acts which it super-
sedes, justify any inference that the existence of
any prerogative power is given statutory recog-
nition. The Consolidation Act does not purport
to embody in the form of an enactment the Govern-
ment's existing prerogative ; it merely empowers
the Crown to issue regulations — and there is no
prerogative to make Regulations.^ The wording of
the Consolidation Act, therefore, throws no light
upon the existence or extent of the prerogative
powers claimed. Reliance was also placed in the
argument on behalf of the Crown upon the terms
of the Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of Land)
Act, 1916,^ which makes provision for the con-
tinuance in possession by any government depart-
ment for a limited period after the termination of
1 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 63. ^ p^r Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 199.
3 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 63.
86 CASE OF REQUISITION
the war, and for the permanent acquisition of land
of which possession has been taken, subject to the
payment of compensation to be assessed in case of
dispute by the Railway and Canal Commission.
Sect. 1(1) commences ' Where during the course or
within the week immediately preceding the com-
mencement of the present war possession has been
taken of any land by' or on behalf of any Govern-
ment department for purposes connected with the
present war in exercise or purported exercise of any
prerogative right of His Majesty or of any powers
conferred by or under any enactment relating to
the defence of the Realm or by agreement or
otherwise. . . .' The words in italics, it was con-
tended, are a statutory confirmation and declaration
of the power to take under the prerogative. The
ansjver is that (1) if the prerogative does not extend
to thQ taking of land without an obligation to make
compensation, reference to prerogative powers cannot
extend their scope, and (2) the words do not define
the prerogative, but say that if the Crown has de
facto taken, quocunqite modo, it shall be lawful to
continue in possession.^
It would be superfluous to enlarge upon the
extent to which the power to make regulations has
been exercised during the progress of the war.
Regulation 1 lays down the general principles to be
observed. ' The ordinary avocations of life and
the enjoyment of property will be interfered with
as little as may be permitted by the exigencies of
the measures required to be taken for securing the
public safety and the defence of the Realm, and
ordinary civil offences will be dealt with by the
1 Per Lord Dunedin, App. A, p. 176 ; per Lord Atkinson,
ibid., p 188 ; per Lord Moulton, ibid., p. 196.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 87
civil tribunals in the ordinary course of law.' It is
only necessary to peruse the Regulations made
under the power conferred by the Defence of the
Realm Act in order to appreciate how the execu-
tive found it impossible or inexpedient to refrain
from interference with almost every department of
national and private activity.
The occupation of land and buildings is provided
for by Regulation 2 in the following terms :
' It shall be lawful for the competent naval or
military authority and any person duly authorised
by him, where for the purpose of securing the public
safety and the defence of the Realm it is necessary
so to do :
(a) to take possession of any land and to construct
military works, including roads, thereon, and
to remove any tree, hedges, and fences
therefrom ;
(b) to take possession of any buildings or other
property including works for the supply of
gas, electricity, or water, and of any sources
of water supply ;
(c) to take such steps as may be necessary for
placing any buildings or structures in a state
of defence ;
(d) to cause any buildings or structures to be
destroyed or any property to be moved from
one place to another, or to be destroyed ;
(e) to do any other act involving interference with
private rights of property which is necessary
for the purpose aforesaid.'
To revert once more to the alleged prerogative.
It is obvious that if the Common Law Powers of
the Crown had sufficed to meet the emergency,
there could have been no necessity to confer the
same powers by means of regulations. If regulations
88 CASE OF REQUISITION
were required not merely to formulate and declare the
Common Law powers of the Crown — still more if
they were designed to augment them — ^they must be
clearly expressed and intra vires the statute from
which they derive their authority.
In examining the effect of the Act and Regula-
tions two principal matters have to be borne in
mind. Firstly the Act gives power by regulation
to remove restrictions on the acquisition and user
of land, and makes specific reference to the Defence
Acts and the analogous legislation under the Military
Lands Acts.^ Secondly, no regulation has been
made purporting to deal with the question of
compensation for such acquisition or user ; both
the Act and the regulations are entirely silent on
the subject of compensation.
The restrictions imposed by the Defence Acts
have already been referred to.^ So far as the facts
of the Case are concerned, no restriction contained
in the Act of 1842 could have operated to the
prejudice of the national interest. The Suppliants
did not refuse to ' treat and agree '. Had they done
so the provisions of section 19 of the Defence Act,
1842 ^ were available, and it could not be suggested
that the emergency was such as to render compliance
with the formality of giving fourteen days' notice
injurious to the public interest. The Suppliants
did not refuse to give up possession ; there was
therefore no occasion to obtain a certificate under
section 23. But it was suggested that the liability
to make compensation was itself a ' restriction '.
In the broad sense every liability to pay is a restric-
^ As to the Military Lands Acts, see p. 10, ante, note 1.
2 p 4Q^ ^^^g 3 5 ^ e Vict., c. 94.
I
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 89
tion, but the restrictions for which section 1 (2) of
the ConsoHdation Act provide are ' restrictions on
the acquisition or user of land '. ' When those
restrictions are examined,' says Lord Atkinson/
' it is to my mind clear that the legal obligation to
pay for the land or its use, temporarily or per-
manently acquired, is not a- restriction upon the
acquisition of either or a condition precedent to its
acquisition.' 'The obligation to pay might dis-
courage the exercise of the power of acquisition,
but it does not limit that power. The power is
complete independently of payment, and it is fully
exercised before the obligation of payment arises.' ^
In so far then as the Defence Act, 1842, imposed
restrictions, no such restrictions operated to impede
the officers of the Crown in the performance of their
duties. Had it been otherwise the Consolidation
Act gave power to reheve them of the impediment.
Ill
The Crown claimed that the sole remedy of the
Suppliants was to apply to a Commission known
as the Defence of the Realm Losses Royal Com-
mission ^ for a grant by way of compensation for
the loss they would suffer by reason of the occupation
of their premises. The Commission was appointed
by warrant dated March 31, 1915, ' to inquire and
determine, and to report what sums (in cases not
otherwise provided for) ought in reason and fair-
ness to be paid out .of public funds to applicants
1 App. A, p. 185.
2 Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 200.
3 Under the Indemnity Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 48) the
Commission is now styled the War Compensation Court. For its
constitution, jurisdiction, and functions see p. 159, jpost.
90 CASE OF REQUISITION
who (not being subjects of an enemy State) are
resident or carrying on business in the United
Kingdom, in respect of direct and substantial loss
incurred and damage sustained by them by reason
of interference with their property or business in
the United Kingdom through the exercise by the
Crown of its rights and duties in the defence of the
Realm '.^ The Commission therefore administered
the bounty of the Crown. It had no jurisdiction in
cases ' otherwise provided for ' and declined to deal
with cases in which an applicant had or claimed to
have any rights enforceable in a Court of law under
any statutory enactment or under any agreement
to which the Crown was a party.
The Defence of the Realm Losses Commission
was (with certain exceptions) ^ the tribunal ap-
1 The warrant is set out in full in the first Report of the
Commissioners (Cd. 8359/1916). This report should be referred
to for the principles upon which the Commissioners have acted
in executing the terms of their warrant. Further reports have
been published in 1917 (Cd. 8751) ; 1918 (Cd. 9181) ; and 1919
(Cd. 404). See now the schedule to the Indemnity Act, 1920,
for the principles upon which compensation is to be assessed.
2 Claims arising out of the requisitioning of ships are submitted
to the Admiralty Transport Arbitration Board constituted
under a Royal Proclamation dated August 3, 1914 {Manual of
Emergency Legislation, p. 386). See the notification, dated
August 11 (ibid., p. 387) and the amending notification dated
August 31, 1914 (ibid., p. 390). The Board has been held to be
a regular tribunal of arbitration whose members can be ordered
to state a Special Case for the opinion of the High Court under
section 19 of the Arbitration Act, 1889 {Lohitos Oilfields v.
Admiralty Commissioners, 86 L.J.K.B. 1444 ; 117 L.T. 28 ;
33 T.L.R. 472). For the substituted procedure by way of appeal
to the Court of Appeal, see the Indemnity Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Geo.
V, c. 48, s. 2). The Board is also designated under the Defence
of the Realm Regulation, 39 B.B.B., as the tribunal for deter-
mining claims under the extended powers thereby conferred
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 91
pointed under the Defence of the Realm Consohda-
tion Act, 1914, to deal with applications for
compensation where private property had been
requisitioned for purposes of defence.
The tribunal was an appropriate one if, and only
if, the right to requisition extended to the taking of
the property of the subject free from a legal obliga-
tion to make compensation. The Commission had
no statutory authority and could only deal with
claims ex gratia. It was not a legal tribunal, whose
decisions would be subject to review in the Courts,
and the principles which it adopted in carrying out
the terms of the warrant under which it was con-
stituted could not be challenged by way of appeal.
If the subject claimed a right enforceable by law
his remedy was in the Courts. In regard to the
occupation of land that right has been vindicated
by the judgments in the Case.
The majority of requisitions made during the
war purported to be made under powers derived
from Regulations made under the Defence of the
Realm Acts. If the right of requisition be founded
on the Acts and Regulations, the denial of a right
ex lege to compensation can only be justified if, upon
the proper construction of the Acts and Regulations,
upon the Shipping Controller. Provision has also been made
in some cases for the determination of claims by a single arbitrator
to be appointed in manner provided by order of an official or
department ; as in the case of requisitions by the Food Controller
under Regulation 2 F. By Regulation 7, compensation for the
requisition of the output of factories is to be determined by the
arbitration of a Judge of the High Court to be selected by the
Lord Chief Justice (in Scotland by a Judge of the Court of
Session, selected by the Lord President, and in Ireland by a Judge
of the High Court of Ireland selected by the Lord Chief Justice
of Ireland).
92 CASE OF REQUISITION
that right be excluded. If the right survives, the
machinery provided by the Defence of the Realm
Losses Commission is clearly inapplicable.
The Consolidation Act, it has been said, makes no
reference to compensation, while the regulations,
although they contain some provisions for the
assessment of compensation in respect of the requi-
sition of ships and chattels, contain no reference
whatever to compensation for the taking of land.
So far as the questions in the Case are concerned, it
is only necessary to consider whether, assuming
a right to compensation to exist, either at Common
Law or under the Defence Acts, that right is
destroyed by the provisions of the Consolidation
Act. Statutes which affect existing rights, but
make no express provision for compensation for the
loss of those rights or for interference with their
exercise, are to be interpreted according to a well-
known canon of construction :
' It is a proper rule of construction not to construe
an Act of Parliament as interfering with or injuring
persons' rights without compensation, unless one
is obliged so to construe it. If it is clear and obvious
that Parliament has so ordered, and there is no
other way of construing the words of the Act, then
one is bound to so construe them, but if one can
give a reasonable construction to the words without
producing such an effect, to my mind one ought to
do so.' ^
So in London & North Western Railway Co, v.
Evans, '^ Bowen, L. J., says :
^ Per Brett, M.R., Attorney -General v. Horner (1884) 14
Q.B.D. 245, 257.
2 (1893) 1 Ch. 16, 28. See also Reg. v. Abbott (1897) 2 I.R.
362, 405, Commissioner of Public Works (Cape Colony) v. Logan
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 93
' The legislature cannot fairly be supposed to intend,
in the absence of clear words showing such intention,
that one man's property shall be confiscated for
the benefit of others, or of the public, without any
compensation being provided for him in respect of
what is taken compulsorily from him. Parliament
in its omnipotence can, of course, override or dis-
regard this ordinary principle as it can override
the former, if it sees fit to do so, but it is not likely
that it will be found disregarding it without plain
expressions of such a purpose.'
The application of these principles to the facts
of the Case is simplified by the fact that, while the
Defence Act, 1842, expressly provides for the
assessment and payment of compensation, neither
the Consolidation Act nor the Regulations purport
in express terms to negative the existence of such
a right. The position therefore is that certainly in
the case of land, and possibly as regards other
property, the Defence of the Realm Acts and Regu-
lations must be read in the light of existing Statutes
by which the legal right of the subject to compen-
sation is secured. If the Defence Acts entirely
omit to deal with that right, the canon of construc-
tion as laid down in Attorney-General v. Horner^
and London d; North Western Railway v. Evans ^
applies and the right remains unimpaired.
But the argument on behalf of the Crown niay be
tested in another way. Assuming the Regulations
to have provided in express terms that property
may be taken without making compensation, such
a provision, made not by statute, but under the
(1903) A.C. 355, 363. Central Control Board {Liquor Traffic) v.
Cannon Brewery Co. Ltd. (1919) A.C. 744. Rooney v. Department
oj Agriculture (1920) 1 Ir. R. 176.
^ Ubi supra. ^ Ubi supra.
94 CASE OF REQUISITION
authority delegated to the Executive can only
be justified on the ground of such a necessity for the
defence of the Realm as would satisfy the express
terms of the Act. Now that the taking itself was
justified on this ground was not disputed. Can it,
however, be said that it was ' necessary for the
public safety and the defence of the Realm ' that the
property of the subject should be taken free from any
obligation of payment ? Judged by this test, there
can be no doubt that such a Regulation is ultra
vires. ' Neither the public safety nor the defence
of the Realm requires that the Crown should be
relieved of a legal liability to pay for the property
it takes from one of its subjects.' ^ *
IV '
What has already been said in this chapter covers
the ground traversed in the argument and judg-
ments in the case so far as the Defence of the Realm
Consolidation Act and Regulations are concerned.
It may, however, be useful to indicate some of the
more general considerations which are applicable
when the Act and Regulations are examined.
The decision in the Case furnishes an instance in
which the Courts have considered the question of
necessity and decided it adversely to the contentions
of the Crown. The principles to be applied by the
Courts in considering this question are not easy to
formulate. Where the issue is whether a particular
executive act done under the authority of a regulation
which is itself intra vires be necessary, or not, the
duty cast upon the Courts is peculiarly onerous, and
it may be assumed that they will not interfere with
1 Per Lord Atkinson, App. A, p. 186.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 95
the discretion of the Executive, where that dis-
cretion has been properly exercised. Thus in The
Zamora ^ Lord Parker says :
' A judge ought as a rule, to treat the statement on
oath of the proper officer of the Crown to the effect
that the vessel or goods which it is desired to
requisition are urgently required for use in connection
with the Defence of the Realm, the prosecution
of the war, or other matters involving national
security, as conclusive of the fact. . . . Those who are
responsible for the national security must be the
sole judges of what the national security requires.
It would be obviously undesirable that such matters
should be made the subject of evidence in a Court
of law or otherwise discussed in public'
To this, as a general proposition, no one will
demur ; but it is possible to conceive cases in which
an executive act may so obviously fail to be justified
by the emergency that the Courts will interfere.
Apart from cases of this character, the question is
primarily whether a particular executive act can be
justified as being within the authority under which
it purports to be done. Thus in China Mutual Steam
Navigation Company Limited v. Maclay,^ while the
requisition of the plaintiffs' steamers was assumed
to be valid, a direction that they were to be run for
the account of the Government, crediting full earnings
and debiting net charges, was held to go beyond the
powers conferred on the Shipping Controller, inas-
much as the effect was to requisition not only the
steamers, but also the services of the owners and of
their staff.
The doctrine that the validity not merely of an
executive act but of a regulation made by a duly
1 (1916) 2 A.C. 77, 106. 2 (1918) 1 k.B. 33.
96 CASE OF^ REQUISITION
authorized department of government is not open
to review in the Courts receives some support
from the Judgments in R, v. Halliday^ which
dealt with the vahdity of Regulation 14 B, empower-
ing the Secretary of State to order the internment
of any person ' of hostile origin or associations ',
where on the recommendation of a competent
naval or military authority it appears to him
expedient for securing the public safety and
the defence of the llealm. The validity of the
Regulation as justifying the preventive detention of
suspected persons was upheld in the House of Lords
with one dissentient.^ ' It may be necessary,'
says Lord Finlay, ' in a time of great public danger
to entrust great powers to his Majesty in Council
and that Parliament may do so feeling certain
that such powers will be reasonably exercised.' ^
It is submitted that the Lord Chancellor did not
intend to lay down so broad a proposition as that
the method by which the authority conferred by
Parliament is exercised is not open to review in the
Courts. Lord Atkinson indeed,* in suggesting that
a regulation which on its face required something
to be done which could not in any reasonable way
aid in securing the public safety and the defence of
the Realm might be ultra vires and void, expressly
1 (1917) A.C. 260.
2 The Judgment of Lord Shaw of Dunfirmline contains
a powerful vindication of the right of the subject to personal
liberty and of the supremacy of Parliament. See the passage
quoted at p. 104, post.
^ Sheffield Conservative and Unionist Club v. Brighten (1916)
85 L.J. (K.B.) 1669 ; Lipton v. Ford (1917) 2 K.B. 647 ; Bex v.
Governor of Wormwood Scruhbs Prison : Ex parte Foy (1920)
2 K.B. 305.
* (1917) A.C. p. 272.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 97
reserved the point for consideration if and when it
should become necessary to decide it. The question
in such a case would be, not whether the donee of
a discretionary power would exercise the power
unreasonably,^ but whether he has the power at
all,^ and it is from this point of view that the
criterion of necessity has been applied in several
cases in the Courts of first instance, none of which
have so far been argued on appeal.
In Chester v. Bateson^ the validity of Regula-
tion 2 A (2) was successfully challenged on the
ground that it cannot be a necessary or even reason-
able way to aid in securing the public safety and
the defence of the Realm to give power to a minister
to forbid any person to exercise the ordinary right
of citizens to resort to the King's Courts in order
to obtain redress for a wrong.
In Newcastle Breweries Limited v. The King *
two points were decided. The Admiralty having
requisitioned a quantity of rum, claimed that by
virtue of Regulation 2 B the owners were entitled
1 A donee of discretionary power (as for instance the Home
Secretary under Art. 12 (1) of the Aliens Order, 1919, made by
virtue of the Aliens Restriction Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 12,
s. 1, sub-sec. 1 (c)) is an executive, and not a judicial officer, and
is therefore not bound to hold an inquiry, or to give to a person
agaiQst whom he proposes to make an order an opportunity of
being heard. R. v. Inspector of Leman Street Police Station :
Ex parte Venicoff. R. v. Secretary of State for Home Affairs :
Ex parte Venicoff (1920) 3 K.B. 72.
2 See Attorney-General v. Brown (1920) 1 K.B. 773, 791, in which
it was held that the power conferred on the Crown to prohibit
the import of arms, ammunition, gunpowder, or any other goods
by Proclamation or Order in Council does not, upon the applica-
tion of the ejusdem generis rule of construction, extend to goods
of any class other than that specified.
3 (1920) 1 K.B. 829. * Ibid., 854.
98 CASE OF REQUISITION
by way of compensation to be paid less than the
market price ; and further that in the absence of
agreement the claim of the owners to compensation
fell to be determined by the Defence of the Realm
Losses Commission. The decision of Mr. Justice
Salter on both points was in favour of the owners.
With regard to the tribunal, he was of opinion that
a Begulation which takes away the right of a subject
to a judicial decision or transfers the adjudication
of his claim, without his consent, from a Court of
law to named arbitrators, cannot fairly be held to
be a regulation for securing the public safety and
the defence of the Realm, or a Regulation designed
to prevent the successful prosecution of the war
being endangered, within the meaning of these
words in the Consolidation Act. The second point
bears a close analogy to the questions in the Case.
It depended upon the existence, before the enact-
ment of the Defence of the Realm Acts, of a statutory
right to compensation. That right was secured to
the owners of goods under the provisions of the
Army Act, 1881,^ as extended by the Army (Supply of
Food, Forage, and Stores) Act, 1914,^ the Naval
Billeting Act, 1914,^ and the Army (Amendment)
Acts, 1915,^ the effect of which is to give to the
owner of food, forage, and stores of every description
which are requisitioned the right to the fair market
value of his goods, and the further right to have the
value assessed in the event of dispute by a County
Court Judge. In the case of requisitions of land,
the right to compensation and the tribunal by which
compensation is to be assessed depend entirely
1 44 & 45 Vict., c. 58. 24^5 q^q y ^ 25.
3 Ibid., c. 70. * 5 Geo. V, c. 26 & c. 58.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 99
upon statute, and no express provision purporting
to affect either the right or the remedy is to be
found in the Defence of the Realm Acts and Regula-
tions. In Newcastle Breweries Ltd. v. The King ^
the rights of the subject were also defined by statute
and the decision depended upon the extent to which
specific regulations made to meet a particular
emergency were inconsistent with the existing
statutory provisions.
HudsoTi's Bay Co. v. 3Iaclay,^ in which the
validity of Regulations 39 B.B.B. and 39 D.D. was
unsuccessfully challenged, stands upon a somewhat
different footing. The office of Shipping Controller
was constituted under the New Ministries and
Secretaries Act, 1916,^ section 6 of which provides
that it shall be his duty ' to control and regulate
any shipping available for the needs of the country
in such manner as to make the best use thereof,
having regard to the circumstances of the time, and
to take such steps as he may think best for providing
and maintaining an efficient supply of shipping '.
He is to have ' such powers or duties of any Govern-
ment department or authority, whether conferred
by statute or otherwise, as His Majesty may by
Order in Council transfer to him or authorise him
to exercise or perform concurrently with or in con-
sultation with the Government department or
authority concerned, and also such further powers
as may be conferred on him by regulations under the
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, and
regulations may be made under that Act accordingly.'
Under the powers conferred by regulations
39 B.B.B. and 39 D.D. the Shipping Controller
1 (1920) 1 K.B. 854. 2 (1920) 36 T.L.R. 469.
3 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 68.
H 2
100 CASE OF REQUISITION
claimed power to grant or refuse licenses enabling
British vessels to put to sea ; to order vessels to
load such cargoes as he might direct (as, for example,
cargoes carried for the Royal Commission on wheat
supplies), and to order vessels to carry cargoes so
loaded between named ports and to fix the rates of
freight at which such cargoes should be carried.
Mr. Justice Greer arrived at the conclusion that the
regulations in question were not ultra vires. With
regard to the right to regulate the rates of freight,
he founded his opinion mainly upon the view that
it would have been of little use to give to the Shipping
Controller power to direct vessels to carry cargo at
the market rate. Inasmuch as the object of the
Regulations was to assist in the reduction of the
cost of the carriage of food and of raw materials,
that object was difficult if not impossible of fulfil-
ment so long as the market rate was permitted to
obtain. This decision involves the proposition
that a power to fix prices and terms for the carriage
of goods for a government department is within the
powers which may be granted by regulations made
for securing the public safety and the defence of
the Realm. It involves the further proposition that
it is for the King in Council to decide how those
prices are to be ascertained.
Upon the question of the right to designate by
means of regulation the method of ascertaining
compensation the recent decisions disclose some
difference of judicial opinion. It rilay be that with
regard to goods requisitioned for the use of the
Army and Navy the statutory provisions for the
assessment of compensation at the market rate
exclude any power to provide for assessment on
a different principle and by a different tribunal.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM AOF ;;,;,' 101;
If, however, the judgment of Mr. Justice Salter in
Newcastle Breweries Limited v. The King ^ involves
the proposition that the King in Council has not
power to issue regulations which will enable the
country to acquire its necessary stores at less than
current market prices, or at prices fixed by a board
of arbitrators and based on cost and reasonable
profit, Mr. Justice Greer in Hudson's Bay Co, v.
Maclay ^ does not agree, while Mr. Justice Darling
in Eohinson and Company, Limited v. The King ^
(decided under Regulation 2B) is in accord with
Mr. Justice Greer.
The following conclusions may, it is submitted,
be drawn from the decisions upon the Defence of
the Realm Consolidation Act, and the Regulations ^ :
(1) Regulations purporting to be made under the
Act are only valid in virtue of the authority which
Parliament has seen fit to delegate. No regulation,
therefore, can be valid if the authority does not
extend so widely as to cover it. The authority is
in many ways an extremely wide one, but the
limitation that regulations are to be made ' for the
public safety and the defence of the Realm ' lays
down boundaries which cannot effectively be passed.
(2) Where a regulation is of a character which
would, in ordinary circumstances, fall within the
statutory objects and purposes thus defined, the
question may arise whether the regulation is in
fact inside or outside this object and purpose.
There is clear authority to show that in such cases
1 (1920) 1 K.B. 854. 2 (1920) 36 T.L.R. 469. ^ ibid., 773.
* For the effect of the provisions of the Indemnity Act, 1920
(10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 48), vide p. 158, post.
'Jt^ ' ■ ' ; ' ; : ? CASE OF REQUISITION
the Executive must be the judge and that the
Courts cannot conduct an inquiry into the question
whether the pubUc safety and the defence of the
Realm in fact call for a particular regulation.^
(3) But it is quite possible to imagine a regulation
which, having regard to its subject-matter, could
not be regarded as made for the public safety and
the Defence of the Realm, and in such a case the
courts would not hesitate to declare it invalid. For
example, it cannot be within the statutory purpose
to provide by regulation that a subject shall be
barred from recourse to the courts of law ; and
a regulation which attempts to deprive a subject
of his remedy in the courts has been declared ultra
vires,^ In the same way the much-debated question
whether a regulation providing for the internment
of a British subject on the ground of his hostile
origin or associations without previous conviction
or trial could be valid was answered by a majority
of the House of Lords in the affirmative.^
(4) Certain other questions which suggest them-
selves as to the scope of the Regulations must be
regarded as unsettled. For example, the Regulations
themselves could have no operative effect beyond
a period defined by reference to the ' duration of
the war '. But assuming a regulation to have been
made at a time when actual hostilities are still
proceeding and to have been validly made for the
public safety and the defence of the Realm, is it
1 Vide, per Lord Parker in The Zamora (1916) 2 A.C.,
p. 106.
2 Chester v. Bateson (1920) 1 K.B. 829. For the constitutional
right of access to the Courts, see In re Boater (1915) 1 K.B. 21, per
Scrutton, L.T., p. 36.
3 Rex V. Halliday (1917) A.C. 260.
DEFENCE OF THE REALM ACT 103
clear that everything done under such a regulation
down to the time when the war has been technically
determined is valid ? Or can it be successfully
argued that the validity of action taken under
a regulation does not depend solely upon whether
the regulation was valid when originally made and
whether the war is still technically continuing, but
also upon whether the action when taken can in
fact be regarded as done for the public safety and
the defence of the Realm ? This question was
mooted in Rex v. Governor of Wormwood Scrubbs
Prison ^ but was not decided, since the Divisional
Court held that in any event the test suggested was
satisfied by the date of the applicant's internment.
To give another illustration : assuming a regula-
tion relating to the control of the supply of food ^
to have been valid when made at a time when the
food supplies of the country were being threatened
by German submarines, is the regulation necessarily
such as to authorize and justify administrative
action until the technical termination of thp war ? ^
1 (1920) 2 K.B. 305.
2 The office of Food Controller was constituted ' for the
purpose of economizing and maintaining the food supply of the
country during the present war ' (New Ministries and Secretaries
Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 68) s. 3). That of the Shipping
Controller was created ' for the purpose of organizing and
maintaining the supply of shipping in the national interests in
connexion with the present war ' (ibid., s. 5).
3 Under the Termination of the Present War (Definition)
Act, 1918 (8 & 9 Geo. V, c. 59) the Crown may declare by Order
in Council what date is to be treated as the date of termination.
War with Germany was declared to have been terminated on
January 10, 1920, by an Order in Council of February 9, 1920
(S.R. & O. 1920, no. 264). An Order in Council declaring war
with Austria to have been terminated on July 16, 1920, was made
on July 22 (London Gazette, July 23, 1920, p. 7765).
104 CASE OF REQUISITION
The search for positive criteria by which to test
the vaHdity of regulations made under the wide
powers conferred upon the Executive by the Defence
of the Realm Acts induces the reflection that such
interference with the liberty of the subject, whether
in regard to person or property, as may be neces-
sary for the successful prosecution of war should,
as far as possible, be imposed by the direct authority
of Parliament rather than by administrative action.
' The form in modern times ', says Lord Shaw of
Dunfermline in his dissenting judgment in Rex v.
Halliday, ^ ' of using the Privy Council as the
executive channel for statutory power is measured,
and must be measured strictly, by the ambit of
the legislative pronouncement. And that channel
itself, seeing that under the Constitution His Majesty
acts only through his Ministers, is simply the Govern-
ment of the day. The author of the power is Parlia-
ment ; the wielder of it is the Government. Whether
the Government has exceeded its statutory mandate
is a question ultra or intra vires such as that which
is now being tried. In so far as the mandate has
been exceeded, there lurk the elements of a transition
to arbitrary government and therein of grave
constitutional and public danger. The increasing
crush of legislative efforts and the convenience to
the Executive of a refuge to the device of Orders
in Council would increase that danger tenfold were
the judiciary to approach any action of the Govern-
ment in a spirit of compliance rather than of inde-
pendent scrutiny. That way also would lie public
unrest and public peril. On all this there is no
disputing.'
1 (1917) A.C., at p. 287.
CHAPTER V
THE EFFECT OF STATUTE UPON THE
PREROGATIVE
' The word prerogative has been much used,
though seldom understood. The notion the greatest
men of our law have had of it, has been that it is
a power lodged in the Crown for which there is no
law, but not repugnant to any law. The meaning
is, the execution of it being vested in the King,
and it being impossible the legislature should foresee
all cases that may happen, have left a power with
the chief magistrate to use his discretion upon
extraordinary occasions, and to exercise the supreme
authority in all cases where the law of the land has
not directed or limited the execution.' ^
This description of the prerogative powers of the
Crown emphasizes the fact that the prerogative
is a survival — the residue of the discretionary
powders of the Executive which are not definitely
regulated by law. The history of the prerogative
is, therefore, a history of the legislation by which
the executive functions of the Crown have been
declared, regulated, and restricted. The first stage
in this process is mainly if not entirely declaratory.
Constitutional documents such as Magna Carta,
the Bill of Rights, and the Act of Settlement are
often regarded as in their nature contractual,
representing a bargain between King and people
^ Dartmouth's note to Burnet's History of his own Time
(Oxford ed., 1823, ii. 98).
106 CASE OF REQUISITION
arrived at by way of compromise as the result of
negotiation.^ While this view may be accurate in
regard to the Act of Settlement it is perhaps hardly
justified in connexion with the two earlier documents.
Magna Carta, in particular, is in its essence declara-
tory of an assumed or existing body of legal principle.^
The point emerges clearly in the confirmation of the
Great Charter in the time of Edward I.^ ' Our
justices, sheriffs, mayors, and other ministers who
under us have the laws of our land to guide shall
allow the said charters in pleas before them and
judgments in all their points ; that is to say the
Great Charter of Liberties as common law and the
Charter of the Forest according to the Assize of
the Forest, for the relief of our people.' The
Statute Book therefore commences with an affirma-
tion of the common law, embodying a declaration
of existing law rather than an enactment of anything
new. The doctrine that the Crown is not bound by
statute unless specifically named only emerges in
the subsequent history of legislation when the
restrictive operation of statutes becomes more
pronounced.
Modern statutes are, however, assumed to have
an operative effect, and not merely to record
existing rights. ' If a statute merely recorded
existing inherent powers, nothing would be gained
1 Boutmy, Studies in Constitutional Law^ pt. i, s. iv.
2 This aspecj^i of the Great Charter is fully developed in
Professor Mcllwain's paper on ' Magna Carta and the Common
Law ' in Magna Carta Commemoration Essays (193-7). ' The
Common Law has been largely encroached on by Act of Parlia-
ment, and, in our own day, it is possible that it may come to
owe the whole of its binding force to statute ', Maine, Early
Hist, of Institutions, p. 361.
3 25 Edw. I, Stat, i, c. 1.
STATUTE AND THE PREROGATIVE 107
by the enactment, for nothing would be added to
the existing law.' ^ The general principles to be
applied in construing statutes are thus summarized
by Mr. Justice Sankey in Attorney-General v. Brown,^
' In construing an Act of Parliament it is, in my
view, legitimate to consider (1) the state of the law
at the time the Act of Parliament was passed, and
the changes it was passed to effect ; (2) the sections
and structure of the Act of Parliament as a whole ;
see Stradling v. Morgan,^ where it is said, ' The
Judges of the law in all times past have so far
pursued the intent of the makers of statutes, that
they have expounded Acts, which were general in
words, to be but particular, where the intent was
particular. . . . The sages of the law heretofore have
construed statutes quite contrary to the letter in some
appearance, and those statutes which comprehend all
things in the letter, they have expounded to extend
but to some things, . . . which expositions have always
been founded upon the intent of the Legislature,
which they have collected sometimes by considering
the cause and necessity of making the Act, sometimes
by comparing one part of the Act with another and
sometimes by foreign circumstances. So that they
have ever been guided by the intent of the Legisla-
ture, which they have always taken according to the
necessity of the matter, and according to that which
is consonant to reason and good discretion ' : and
see also Hey don's Case ^ and Hawkins v. Gather cole, '^
per Turner, L. J., where he says : ' In determining
the question before us we have therefore to consider
1 Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 202. 2 (1920) 1 K.B. 773, 791.
3 (1560) Plowd. 199, 204 ; 75 E.R. 305, 312.
4 (1584) 3 Rep. 7 ; 76 E.R. 637.
5 (1855)6DeG.M.&G. 1,21.
108 CASE OF REQUISITION
not merely the words of this Act of Parhament but
the intent of the Legislature, to be collected from
the cause and necessity of the Act being made, from
a comparison of its several parts, and from foreign
(meaning extraneous) circumstances, so far as they
can justly be considered to throw light upon the
subject.'
These general principles of construction are,
however, to be applied subject to the rule which is
generally stated in the form that the Crown is nob
bound by a statute unless expressly named, a doctrine
which is thus formulated in Willion v. Berkley^:
' It is usual for the legislature, in Acts of Restraint
which they intend to bind the King, to name him
expressly, and if he is not expressly named, it has
always been taken heretofore that the legislature
intended only to bind the subjects, and to make the
Act extend to them, and not to the King, for he
is favoured in all expositions of acts. And because
it is not an act without the King's assent, it is to
be intended that when the King gives his assent, he
does not mean to prejudice himself or to bar himself
of his liberty and privilege, but he assents that it
shall be a law among his subjects.' ^
It was contended in the argument of the Case
on behalf of the Crown that in case of necessity for
the public defence the alleged prerogative has not
been abated, abridged, or curtailed by any statute.
If, as has been established, the Defence Acts, 1842
to 1873,^ with or without the provisions of the
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Acts, 1914 *
1 (1560) Plowd. 223, 239 ; 75 E.R. 339, 365.
2 Cited Attorney-General v. Donaldson (1842) 10 M. & W.
117, 123 ; 152 E.R. 406, 408.
3 See p. 10, ante, note 1. * 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
STATUTE AND THE PREROGATIVE 109
make all necessary provision to meet the emergency
with which it became necessary to deal, there is
involved in this contention the proposition that the
Crown has a right to elect between proceeding
either at Common Law or under the statutes. If
this proposition can be maintained, it follows that
the Crown may disregard the express provisions
of the legislature whatever may be the restrictions
or limitations imposed by statute upon the powers
which the Crown requires to exercise. The result
would be that the Crown could either act in all cases
independently of the statutes and refuse to make
compensation ; or might conceivably discriminate
as between subject and subject ' enriching one by
electing to proceed under the statute and impoverish-
ing another when it requisitions under the alleged
Prerogative '.^
The only reference to the prerogative which occurs
in the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1873, is in section 34
of the Act of 1842, by which power is given to the
principal Officers of the Ordnance ^ to sue under
their official titles without naming the individuals
who for the time being hold office in that department.
The section contains a proviso that :
' Nothing herein contained shall be taken to defeat
or abridge, in any such Action, Suit, or other
Proceedings the legal Rights, Privileges, and Preroga-
tives of Her Majesty, Her Heirs, and Successors,
but that in all such Actions, Suits, or other Pro-
ceedings, brought or instituted in the Name and on
behalf of the principal Officers of Her Majesty's
1 Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 203.
2 Now the Principal Secretary of State for War, see p. 36,
ante, note 1.
110 CASE OF BEQUISITION
Ordnance, and in all Matters relating thereunto,
it shall be lawful for the said principal Officers to
claim, exercise, and enjoy all the same Rights,
Privileges, and Prerogatives which have been hereto-
fore claimed, exercised, and enjoyed in any Actions,
Suits, or other Proceedings whatsoever in any
Court of Law or Equity, by Her Majesty or Her
Predecessor in the same Manner as if the Subject
Matter of the said Suits or other Proceedings were
vested in the Crown, and as if the Crown were
actually a Party to such Actions, Suits, or other
Proceedings : Provided also that it shall be lawful
for Her Majesty to proceed by Information in Her
Court of Exchequer, or by any other Crown Process,
legal or equitable, in any Case in which such Actions,
Suits, Arbitrations, or other Proceedings might have
been otherwise instituted.'
The object of the proviso is clearly to preserve
the prerogative rights of procedure in litigation,
as for example the right of the Crown to refuse to
give discovery ^ or the right to select the venue. ^
Except to this limited extent the Crown is not named.
Is the Crown none the less bound ?
The test is formulated in Bacon's Abridgement ^ : —
' Where an Act is made for the public good, the
advancement of religion and justice, and to prevent
injury and wrong the King shall be bound by such
Act, though not particularly named therein. But
where a statute is general and thereby any preroga-
1 See Robertson, Civil Proceedings by and against the Crown,
p. 598.
2 Ibid., p. 581.
3 7th ed., p. 462. Cited Ex parte Postmaster -General : In re
BonJiam (1879) 10 Ch. D. 595. See also the Case of Magdalen
College (1616) 11 Rep. 74 b ; 77 E.R. 1247, and the authorities
cited in Chitty, Prerog., c. xv.
STATUTE AND THE PREROGATIVE 111
tive, right title or interest is devested or taken from
the King, in such case the King shall not be bound,
unless the statute is made by express terms to
extend to him.'
These propositions are supported by numerous
ancient authorities, of which the following may be
taken as illustrations. There was undoubtedly an
ancient customary right in the Crown in virtue
of its prerogative to exact contributions from
merchants for tonnage and poundage, and also
charges upon the wool merchants in respect of each
bale of wool, and the like. But as soon as the
Commons have made a grant to the King of a subsidy
which, by the terms of a grant, is derived from one
of these sources, from which the King had by his
prerogative a right to collect a contribution, the
Statutory right is lost and the revenue is thenceforth
to be derived from the grant and is not to be collected
under the prerogative.^
Another illustration is to be found in CrooJce^s
Case ^ in which the question was whether the
King was bound by a Statute ^ by which it was
enacted that two parishes in London should be
united and should be established as one parish.
It was provided that the first presentation should
be made by the patron of the living whereof the
endowment was of the greatest value. The King
being the patron of one living and a subject of the
1 RoUe, Abr. Tit. Prerog. le Roy, p. 180, no. 50. See generally
on this subject, Hall, History of the Custom-Revenue.
2 (1691) 1 Shower K.B. 208 ; 89 E.R. 540.
3 22 Car. II, c. 11, s. 68 (1670) ' An additional Act for re-
building the City of London,' i.e. after the great fire of 1666.
An earlier Act had. been passed in 1666 (18 & 19 Car. II, c. 8 :
19 Car. II, c. 3, Ruff.).
112 CASE OF REQUISITION
other and more valuable one, the King nevertheless
claimed the nomination. The report in Shower only-
gives the argument. ' The King takes a benefit
by this clause ; it is plain that he is bound, for
otherwise he could not have any presentment to
this Church at all, and, if he take it, he must take it
under the mode and qualifications that the act gives
him.' In the result the subject ' had institution and
enjoyed it without further trouble as ever I heard '.^
The Defence of the Realm falls peculiarly within
the province of the Crown.^ ' Where Parliament
has intervened and has provided by statute for
powers previously within the Prerogative being
exercised in a particular manner and subject to
the limitations contained in the statute, they can
only be so exercised. Otherwise what use would there
be in imposing limitations if the Crown could at its
pleasure disregard them and fall back upon the
Prerogative ? ^ And where the whole field is covered
by statute, the subject-matter being identical,
there is ' no room for asserting an unrestricted
Prerogative right as existing alongside with the
statutory powers '.*
Where an Act of Parliament has according to its
true construction ' embraced and confirmed ' ^
a right which has previously existed by custom
or prescription, that right becomes henceforward
1 The report adds ' There were two instances where under
colour of this Prerogative, the King's presentee was first preferred,
though his living was of less value. But this was done by-
Jeffries, and never contested '. ^ Chitty, Prerog., c. iv, s. 5.
3 Per Swinfen-Eady, M. R. (1919) 2 Ch., 216, cited by Lord
Atkinson, App. A, p. 182. * Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 202.
^ Per Littledale, J., In the matter of Islington Market Bill
(1835), 3 CI. and F., p. 518 ; 6 E.R. 153.
STATUTE AND THE PREROGATIVE 113
a statutory right. ' The lower title by custom or
prescription is merged in and extinguished by the
higher title derived from the Act of Parliament '/
The effect of statutory upon prerogative powers
is, therefore, that where the subject-matter is identi-
cal,^ and the whole ground of something which
could be done under the Prerogative is covered by
statute, it is the statute that rules,^ and the
statutory powers alone can be employed. The
Common Law powers are not in the strict sense
merged in the statute ; it is more accurate to
say * that ' when a statute expressing the will and
intention of the King and of the three Estates
of the Realm is passed, it abridges the Royal
Prerogative while it is in force to this extent, that
the Crown can only do the particular thing under
and in accordance with the statutory provisions,
and its prerogative power to do it is in abeyance '.^
1 Per Lord Shand, New Windsor Corporation v, Taylor (1899)
A.C., p. 49.
2 Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 202.
3 Per Lord Dunedin, App. A, p. 172.
* Per Lord Atkinson, App. A, p. 184.
5 The test as formulated in Bacon's Abridgement may also
be regarded as an example of the general principle that the
Crown is bound by statute only when the intention of the
legislature to bind it is clear and unmistakable {Wheaton v.
Maple (1893) 3 Ch., 64). See also In re Henley & Co. (1879)
9 Ch. D. 469 ; Coomber v. Berks. Justices (1883) 9 A.C. 66 ;
Gorton Local Board v. Prison Commissioners (1887) reported in
note to Cooper v. Hawkins (1904) 2 K.B. 164.
2388
CHAPTER VI
PETITION OF RIGHT
The form of procedure by which the Supphants
asserted and vindicated their legal rights involves
the recognition of certain prerogative rights of the
Crown in respect of litigation. ' The King hath
a prerogative not to be sued by writ ' ^ and it is
beyond dispute that an action does not lie against
the Crown at the suit of a subject.^ ' I take it to
be generally true,' says Lord Somers,^ ' that in all
cases where the subject is in the nature of a Plaintiff,
to recover anything from the King, his only remedy
at Common Law is to sue by petition to the person
of the King.'
The remedy by Petition of Right has a long
history which it would be unnecessary to recite in
any detail in this essay.* Its origin, which is
surrounded by some obscurity, has been ascribed to
a statute of Edward I — before whose time it has
been said that claims against the sovereign could be
brought by ordinary action.^ The authority for
this statement is confined to two statements by
1 Staundford, Praerog., p. 42a.
2 Com. Dig. Action, c. 1 ; Chitty, Prerog., p. 339 ; Dicey,
Parties to an Action, p. 5.
3 The Bankers' Case (1700) 14 How. St. Tr. 184.
* See the learned work on Petition of Right by the late
Walter Clode, to which the authors desire to acknowledge their
indebtedness in preparing the following historical summary.
^ Cutbill, Inquiry into the History and Nature of Petition of
Bight (1874). Allen, Essay on the King's Prerogative (1849), p. 95.
PETITION OF RIGHT 115
counsel in argument and two judicial dicta — all in
the reign of Edward III/ No such statute has been
found ; and an unrestricted right to sue the Crown
is hardly consistent with the constitutional position
of the Crown at this time, or with the course of
development followed by English civil procedure.
' It is not probable ', says Erie, C. J., in Tohin v.
The Queen ^ ' that the subject would have a defined
right to the writ against the King when the rights
between subject and subject and the writs for
enforcing them were in an unsettled state.'
Whatever may be the origin of this form of pro-
cedure, the practice of petitioning the Crown in
Parliament for the redress of grievances dates back
to an early period and was regulated and developed
in the reign of Edward I. Petitions were common
in regard to grievances which could only be remedied
by the benevolence of the Crown as well as to matters
of complaint which might properly form the subject
of investigation by legal tribunals. Petitions of
both classes are to be found in great numbers in the
Rolls of Parliament. The great variety of matters
led to a classification of petitions according to the
remedy which was considered appropriate. Thus
if the petition touched the revenue, or was a matter
of account between the subject and the Crown, it
was referred to the Treasurer and Barons of the
Exchequer ; if a pure matter of law, to the ordinary
tribunals ; if a matter of local custom, to the
Chancellor. If no appropriate tribunal existed,
a special tribunal was created in the form of a body
of commissioners, to inquire and report to the
1 Set out, Clode, Petition of Right, p. 3, where the adverse
statements of text writers are also collected.
2 (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.), 310, p. 357 ; 143 E.R. 1148, p. 1166.
12
116 CASE OF REQUISITION
King. In regard to matters which involved a claim
against the Crown founded on legal considerations
the petitions were apparently confined to claims
for the restitution of property. In such cases the
question of title was referred to commissioners in
order that the facts might be ascertained, after
which the petition was remitted to a regular legal
tribunal for adjudication.
Parliament having, as early as the reign of
Edward I, become overburdened with the multiplicity
of petitions, two statutes were enacted to relieve the
pressure. The object of the Statute of Petitions ^
and of the Ordinance of Petitions ^ was to transfer
to the Chancellor, the Exchequer, and the Judges
such petitions as fell within their respective pro-
vinces. But there remained a substantial residue
which continued to be presented to Parliament
until, in the reign of Richard II, a threefold division
of bills and petitions was adopted. Firstly, ' Bills
of Parliament ' were heard in open Parhament, and
on receiving the Royal Assent became statutes.
Secondly, ' Bills of Council ', which included all the
remaining petitions except those for which the
personal answer of the King was necessary, no longer
went before Parliament to be referred to a commission,
but were dealt with by committees of the King's
Council^ — which in course of time developed into such
tribunals as the Court of Chancery, the Privy douncil,
the Star Chamber, and the Court of Requests.
1 8 Edw. I (1280), Clode, p. 15. Not in RufPhead or in the
Statutes of the Realm.
2 12 Edw. I (1284), Clode, p. 15. Not printed in the collec-
tions referred to. For legislation by Ordinance at this time, see
Maitland, Constitutional History, p. 186.
3 Clode, p. 17. Baldwin, The King's Council, pp. 188, 258, 284.
' PETITION OF RIGHT 117
Finally, petitions which contained legal claims
against the Crown, that is to say claims in which
the subject asserted a legal right were classified as
Bills of Grace, and ' baillez au Eoy mesmes '.
These still required an answer or endorsement by
the King. It is this procedure which has survived
in substance, although with considerable modifica-
tions in the direction of simpHcity, to the present
day, in the modern form of a Petition of Right.
II
The old procedure, although not abolished by
the Petitions of Right Act, 1860,^ which merely
provides an alternative, was exceedingly antiquated
and cumbersome, and is not likely to be adopted
in future by any litigant who may have occasion to
present a legal claim against the Crown. The
arcana of the subject may be studied in Baron de
Bode V. The Queen, ^ which was commenced in
1839 and finally decided by the House of Lords in
1851, and is reported in all its stages.
The effect of the Petitions of Right Act, 1860,^
is to apply the existing practice of the Courts to
petitions of right, subject to such prerogative rights
of the Crown as existed at the date when the act
became law.^ Section 7 provides that :
1 23 & 24 Vict., c. 24.
2 (1840) 2 Ph. 85 ; 41 E.R. 874 ; 1 Coop. t. Cott. 143 ;
47 E.R. 786 ; (1845) 8 Q.B. 208 ; 115 E.R. 854 ; (1848) 13
Q.B. 364 ; 116 E.R. 1302 ; (1851) 3 H.L.C. 449 ; 10 E.R. 176.
See also In re Robson (1846) 2 Ph. 84 ; 41 E.R. 873 ; In re von
Frantzius (1858) 2 DeG. & J. 126 ; 44 E.R. 936 ; In re Bolt
(1859) 2 DeG. & J. 44 ; 45 E.R. 18.
3 The procedure under the Petitions of Right Act, 1860
(23 & 24 Vict., c. 24) is applied to Ireland by the Petitions of
118 CASE OF REQUISITION
' So far as the same may be applicable, and except
in so far as may be inconsistent with this Act, the
laws and Statutes in force as to pleading, evidence,
hearing and trial, security for costs, amendment,
arbitration, special cases, the means of procuring
and taking evidence, set-off, appeal, and proceedings
in error in suits in equity, and personal actions
between subject and subject, and the practice and
course of procedure of the said Courts of Law and
Equity respectively for the time being in reference
to such suits and personal actions, shall unless the
Court in which the petition is prosecuted shall
otherwise order, be apphcable and apply and extend
to such petition of right. Provided always that
nothing in this Statute shall be construed to give
to the subject any remedy against the Crown in
any case in which he would not have been entitled
to such remedy before the passing of this Act.'
The procedure is, therefore, assimilated to that
which governs actions between ordinary litigants.^
But that the Crown can still be sued only if it
consent is made clear by section 2 of the Act which
Right (Ireland) Act, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict., c. 69) with the necessary
modifications. In Scotland the procedure by Petition of Right
is unknown and the Crown may be sued like a subject — see
20 & 21 Vict., c. 44 : 'An Act to regulate the Institution of
Suits at the instance of the Crown and the Public Departments
in the Courts of Scotland,' section 1 of which provides that
suits may be raised in the name and at the instance of or directed
against Her Majesty's Advocate for the time being. Petitions
of Right in the Colonies and Dependencies are regulated by a
number of Colonial Statutes and ordinances which are tabulated
by Clode, App. B. In India suits against the Crown are brought
against the Secretary of State in Council (Government of India
Act, 1858 (21 & 22 Vict., c. 106), s. 65 ; Doss v. Secretary of
State for India in Council (1875) L.R. 19 Eq. 509).
^ For the details of the practice, see Robertson, Civil Pro-
ceedings by and against the Crown, Book III.
PETITION OF RIGHT 119
governs the initial stages of a Petition of Right by
providing that
' The said petition shall be left with the Secretary
of State for the Home Department, in order that the
same may be submitted to Her Majesty for Her
Majesty's gracious consideration, and in order that
Her Majesty, if she shall think fit, may grant her
fiat that right be done, and no fee or sum of money
shall be payable by the Suppliant on so leaving such
petition, or upon his receiving back the same.'
The practice is as follows. The Home Secretary,
in order to qualify himself to advise the Crown
whether the petition shall be allowed to proceed,
forwards the petition to the department of state
concerned — the Admiralty, War Office, or as the
case may be, and obtains from such department
a memorandum dealing with the questions raised
in the petition. The petition and memorandum are
then forwarded to the Law Officers of the Crown
who advise whether the case is one in which a fiat
ought to be granted.
Obviously the Home Secretary ought not capri-
ciously to refuse to consider a petition,^ although
it has been doubted ^ whether in so improbable Un
event any legal remedy is available to the subject.^
1 In Ryves v. Duke of Wellington (1846) 9 Beav. p. 600 ;
50 E.R. 475 (decided in 1846, before the passing of the Petitions
of Right Act) Lord Langdale, M.R., says ' I am far from thinking
that it is competent to the King, or rather to his responsible
advisers, to refuse capriciously to put into a due course of investi-
gation any proper question raised on a Petition of Right. The
form of the application being, as it is said, to the grace and favour
of the King affords no foundation for any such suggestion \
2 In re Mitchell (1896) 13 T.L.R. 324.
3 In Manning's Exchequer Practice (1827) at p. 84 it is stated
that the prayer of the Petition is granted ex debito justitiae.
120 CASE OF REQUISITION
But if section 2 imposes upon the Home Secretary
a duty to the Supphant as well as to the Crown, it
may be that the Courts would enforce it. An
instance of an action in which damages were claimed
against the Home Secretary for failing to submit
a Petition of Right to the Crown is to be found
in Irwin v. Grey,^ in which the Home Secretary
was called as a witness by the plaintiff and gave
evidence that he had submitted the Petition, but
had advised that a fiat be not granted. It was
held that there was no case to go to the jury, and
the action failed upon the facts.
The responsibility for advising the Crown whether
a petition ought to be allowed to proceed rests with
the law officers of the Crown, who are accountable
to Parliament, and to Parliament alone, for such
advice as they may tender. That the granting of
a fiat remains an act of grace is clear from the
wording of the section. ' It is said ', says Erie, C. J.,
in ToUn v. The Queen,^ ' that sect. 7 of 23 & 24
Vict., c. 34 applies, and that the legislature has
taken away the Queen's prerogative and gives
a right of action. I think that the words of the
statute by no means justify that statement. The
words of sect. 2, so far from giving the subject
a right of action against the Queen absolutely,
which every subject has who claims to have an action
against a fellow-subject by suing out a writ, are as
This presumably refers to the granting of the prayer after the
Suppliant has established his right by prosecuting his petition
in the Courts. The statement in Chitty {Prerog., p. 341) that
* a petition is the birth-right of the subject ' cannot be taken
literally.
1 (1862) 3 F. & F. 635.
2 (1863) As reported 32 L.J.C.P. at p. 221. The report in
14 C.B. (N.S.) at p. 521 ; 143 E.R. 549 is not so clear on this point.
PETITION OF RIGHT 121
follows (he then quotes part of the section). The
prerogative is recognised and remains.' ^
It may be urged that some restriction on the
right to bring actions against the Crown is in accor-
dance with public policy, and that in the absence
of some form of control the Courts might be bur-
dened with large numbers of actions in support of
entirely unfounded claims. From this point of
view the survival of the prerogative right of the
Crown is not without its use as providing machinery
for the elimination of frivolous proceedings. It has
been said to exist ' for the purpose of reconciling
the dignity of the Crown and the rights of the
subject, and to protect the latter against any injury
arising from the rights of the former '.^
In practice it is extremely unlikely that a fiat
would be refused in any case in which any real issue
would fall to be determined. ' Everybody knows ',
says Bowen, L. J.,^ ' that that fiat is granted as
a matter, I will not say of right, but as a matter of
invariable grace by the Crown whenever there is
a shadow of a claim, nay, more, it is the constitu-
tional duty of the Attorney-General not to advise
a refusal of the fiat unless the claim is frivolous.'
^ While the appeal in the Case was pending in the Court of
Appeal and in the House of Lords the fiat to numerous Petitions
of Right was refused on the ground that the decision in the Case
would determine the legal rights of the several petitioners and
would render it unnecessary that these petitions should proceed
to trial. The refusal was not absolute, the granting of the fiat
being merely suspended for the time being. Some of these
petitions have received the fiat since the decision of the House
of Lords in the Case. For the effect of the Indemnity Act
(10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 48) see p. 158, 'post.
2 Per Lord Cottenham, L. C, Monclcton v. Attorney -General
(1850) 2 Mac. & G. 402, 412 ; 42 E.R. 156, 160.
3 In re Nathan (1884) 12 Q.B.D. 479.
122 CASE OF REQUISITION
If the procedure by Petition of Right were
abolished, sufficient protection might perhaps be
afforded by extending the jurisdiction of the High
Court to stay actions which are frivolous or vexatious
or which disclose no reasonable cause of action.^
Ill
The Petitions of Right Act ^ relates purely to
procedure and affords little, if any, assistance in
determining the nature of the rights which form
the proper subject-matter of a petition. The
proviso to section 2 makes it clear that ' nothing in
this statute shall be construed to give to the subject
any remedy against the Crown in any case in which
he would not have been entitled to such remedy
before the passing of this Act '. ' Relief ' is by
sect. 16 declared to ' comprehend every species of
relief claimed or prayed for in any such Petition of
Right whether a restitution of any incorporeal
right, or a return of lands or chattels, or a payment
of money or damages, or otherwise ', while the form
of rehef is to be by way of a Declaration of the
SuppHant's right (sect. 9). The procedure under
this section is therefore analogous to that which is
provided under Order 25, rule 5, of the Rules of the
Supreme Court in respect of declaratory .judge-
ments in actions between subjects.^ The right
^ Where a contract, the subject of a Petition of Right, con-
tains a submission to arbitration, proceedings may be stayed
under sect. 4 of the Arbitration Act, 1889 (52 & 53 Vict. c. 49)
but a stay will not necessarily be granted at the instance of the
Crown where a dispute involves an important constitutional
question — Anglo-Newfoundland Development Co. v. R. (1920)
2 K.B. 214.
2 23 & 24 Vict., c. 34.
^ Under this rule * the Court may make binding declarations
PETITION OF RIGHT 123
having been declared, the Crown will cause effect
to be given to it, while machinery is provided for
the satisfaction by the Treasury of a judgment
for any sum of money due, and for costs, upon the
judgment being certified by one of the judges of
the Court in which such petition shall have been
prosecuted (sections 13 & 14).
While the procedure is now regulated by the Act
of 1860, it is necessary, in order to ascertain whether
any particular complaint can properly be prosecuted
by means of that procedure, to inquire whether the
category of claims which can form the subject-
matter of a Petition of Right, embraces all causes
of action which can be prosecuted as between
subject and subject, or whether it is confined
within narrower limits. That the ambit of the
procedure is not wider than that which applies
between subjects is clear, for the remedy is restricted
to claims founded upon a legal cause of action.
of right whether any consequential relief is or could be claimed
or not '. For the principles governing the granting of relief by
way of declaration, which is a matter of discretion, see Guaranty
Trust Co. V. Hannay (1915) 2 K.B. 536. The procedure enables
an action to be brought against the Attorney- General as repre-
senting the Crown, and this offers an alternative (in certain cases)
to proceeding by Petition of Right. It is apparently a condition
that the rights of the Crown be not directly affected — Dyson v.
Attorney -General (1911) 1 K.B. 410, following Hodge v. Attorney-
General (1839) 3 Y. & C. Ex. 342. For an instance in which
a declaration was obtained against an officer of a pubUc depart-
ment as defendant, the Attorney-General not being joined as
a party, see China Mutual Steam Navigation Co. v. Maclay (1918)
1 K.B. 33. An action is, however, not maintainable against
a servant of the Crown for a declaration as to the construction
of a contract, for the reason that substantive reUef can be only
claimed against the Crown itself by Petition of Right — Hosier v.
Earl of Derby (1918) 2 K.B. 671 ; see also Bombay and Persia
Steam Navigation Co., Ltd. v. Maclay, The Times, July 15, 1920.
124 CASE OF REQUISITION
Thus in Baron de Bode v. The Queen, ^ in answer to
a suggestion by Mr. Serjeant Manning that the
proceeding by Petition of Right did not render it
necessary for the Supphant to show a legal right,
and that it was sufficient for him to show that his
claim was founded in justice, Maule, J. is reported
to have observed that neither the Queen's Bench
nor any other Court of Law administers justice in
general ; and that if the Suppliant's claim was not
cognizable by the Queen's Bench in law,, it might
be that the Court had no power to give any judg-
ment at all. Similarly in Feather v. The Queen ^
Lord Coleridge, C. J., says that ' the Petition of
Right, unlike a petition addressed to the grace and
favour of the sovereign, is founded on the violation
of some right in respect of which, but for the
immunity from all process with which the law sur-
rounds the person of the Sovereign, a suit at law or
equity could be maintained. The petition must
therefore show on the face of it some ground of
complaint which, but for the inability of the subject
to sue the Sovereign, might be made the subject of
a judicial proceeding.' In this respect, the ambit
of a Petition of Right is not wider than that which
embraces actions between subjects. Thus a servant
of the Crown, whether civil ^ or military,* who holds
his office only during the pleasure of the Crown has
no right of action, and a Petition of Right, even
if allowed to proceed to trial, would be dismissed.
1 (1848) 13 Q.B. 387 n. ; 116 E.R. 1311 n.
2 (1865) 6 B. & S. 295 ; 122 E.R. 1205.
3 Shenton v. Smith (1895) A.C. 229 ; De Dohse v. The Queen
(1886) 66 L.J.Q.B. 422 n. ; 3 T.L.R. 114 ; Dunn v. The Queen
(1896) 1 Q.B. 116.
* Mitchell V. The Queen (1896) 1 Q.B. 121 n. ; Leaman v.
The King (1920) 36 T.L.R. 835.
PETITION OF RIGHT 126
If, then, a Petition of Right must be founded
upon the assertion of a legal right, it follows that
there may be cases in which the procedure is
inapplicable because the Crown is not legally liable
for acts which, if done by a subject, would give
a good cause of action as between subject and
subject. To this extent, the remedy by Petition of
Right may be said to cover a more limited category
of complaints than is open to a subject when suing
a fellow subject. A familiar illustration of this
limitation may be drawn from the fact that pro-
ceedings founded upon tort cannot be sustained
against the Crown — a point which was finally
decided in Tobin v. The Queen ^ after an exhaustive
examination of the authorities. The principle that
' the King can do no wrong ' does not merely relieve
the sovereign from personal liability for a tort, but
goes further. If the King can do no wrong, it
follows that he cannot authorize a wrong. The
maxim respondeat swperior cannot, therefore, apply
to transfer from an officer to the Crown liability
for a tortious act done by such officer.^ To say
that a Petition of Right • ' does not lie ' in
1 (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.) 310 ; 143 E.R. 1148.
2 See also Feather v. The Queen (1865) 6 B. & S. 257, per Cock-
burn, L. C. J., at p. 296, who points out that it does not follow
that a subject sustaining a legal wrong at the hands of a minister
of the Crown is without a remedy. Instances in which damages
have been recovered against a servant of the Crown who has
acted without or in excess of his authority are numerous. See
e. g. the litigation arising out of the issue of general warrants,
Mcmey v. Leax^h (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1001 ; 3 Burr. 1692,
1765 ; 97 E.R. 1050, 1075 ; 3 W. Blackst. 555 ; 96 E.R. 320 ;
WilkesY. Wood (1763) 19 How.St.Tr. 1153; Lofft 1 ; 98 E.R.489 ;
Wilkes V. Lcyrd Halifax (1769) 19 How. St. Tr. 1076 ; Entich v.
Carrington (1765) 19 How. St. Tr. 1030 ; 2 Wils. 275 ; 95 E.R.
807. The practice of the Crown to indemnify an ofl&cer against
126 CASE OF REQUISITION
respect of a tort is merely to affirm and illustrate
the principle that inasmuch as no legal right
of action arises against the Crown where the
complaint is founded on tort, such a complaint is
not one upon which a right to redress can be asserted
by .means of any form of legal procedure. If the
procedure by Petition of Right were to be abolished,
a subject complaining of a tortious act would be in
no better position, for he would be unable to frame
a cause of action against the Crown which the
Courts would entertain. The exclusion of claims
founded upon tort is not due to any arbitrary or
inherent hmitation upon the classes of cases to which
the procedure by Petition of Right is applicable
but to the fact that a ground of complaint which
may give a good cause of action as between subjects
does not necessarily disclose a cause of action against
the Crown.
Apart from cases of tort, there is now little, if any,
distinction between causes of action which may be
prosecuted between subjects and causes of action
which can properly form the subject of a Petition of
Right ; but it is only in comparatively recent times
that the absence of any such distinction has been
definitely recognized, and the judgments in the case,
as will be seen, contribute to its final obliteration.
A notion that a Petition of Right lies only in cases
in which questions of title are in dispute, or at the
most for the recovery of specific sums of money,
whom judgment is obtained, thereby securing to the Plaintiff
the fruits of his judgment, may be illustrated by reference to
colUsion cases in Admiralty in which a King's ship is involved.
The Navigation officer is sued as defendant, the defence being
undertaken by the Treasury-Solicitor — H.M.8. Sans Pareil
(1900), P. 267.
PETITION OF RIGHT 127
or of chattels, was apparently entertained by the
older text writers, and receives some support from
the fact that there is until recent times an almost
entire absence of claims founded upon contract.
Staundford, writing in the year 1573,^ says : ' Peti-
tion is all the remedy the subject hath when the
King seizeth his lands or taketh away his goods
from him, having no title by order of his laws so to
do in which case the subject for his remedy is driven
to sue unto his Sovereign by way of petition only,
for other remedy hath he none.' Blackstone,
writing nearly two hundred years later,^ expresses
himself in similar terms. Petition of Right 'is of
use where the King is in full possession of the
hereditaments or chattels and the party suggests
such a right as controverts the title of the Crown,
grounded on facts disclosed in the Petition itself '.^
In the early part of the nineteenth century it was
recognized that the remedy by Petition of Right
occupies a wider field. Thus Chitty, in his work
on the Prerogative published in 1820, after quoting
the passage already cited from Staundford, adds * :
' A Petition seems also to be the only remedy where
a King does not pay a debt, as an annuity or wages,
etc., due from him, or in the case of unliquidated
damages occasioned by any breach of contract
with the King himself ; or in case the King, without
any office, take or detain a subject's goods.'
Manning ^ regards the Petition as ' in the nature of
an action against the King, or of a writ of right
against the party, though chattels real, or personal,
1 Praerog., c. xxii.
2 The Commentaries were first published in 1765.
3 Comm. iii. 256. * p. 344.
5 Exchequer Practice (1827), p. 84.
128 CASE OF REQUISITION
debts or unliquidated damages may be recovered
under it '.
The fact that Petitions of Right were until
recently confined almost exclusively to claims for
the restitution of property is doubtless due to the
practice under which money claims were not in
fact prosecuted in the ordinary Courts of law, but
were presented to the authorities of the Treasury,
who secured that money claims, when properly
authenticated were paid under the authority of
Royal Warrants.^ There was thus a special form
of procedure for the payment of debts, initiated by
petition, although not (in the technical sense) by
a Petition of Right. If the claim was not disputed,
authority to pay was given to the officials in the
form of a writ of ' liberate ' which issued under the
Great Seal. Where the claim was referred for
adjudication it was heard before the Treasurer and
Barons of the Exchequer, whose ultimate endorse-
ment of the petition constituted sufficient authority
to the Treasury for payment. There being therefore
a special procedure for the payment of claims pre-
sented to the Treasury the procedure by Petition
of Right was limited to cases in which specific
property was sought to be recovered from the
Crown. The limited category of claims to which,
according to Blackstone, it was appropriate in his
time is thus explained.
It is a remarkable fact that the remedy by Petition
of Right would appear to have remained dormant
from about the year 1550 until about 1800, during
which period there appear to be no recorded cases.^
The explanation suggested byClode is that the class of
1 Clode, p. 21. 2 Ibid., 65.
PETITION OF RIGHT 129
claims to which it was regarded as pecuharly
appHcable was in respect of property which came
into the possession of the Crown through the working
of the feudal system with its fines, forfeitures, and
escheats. The greater proportion of this class of
business came to be dealt with by alternative forms
of procedure known as ' monstrans de droit ' and
' traverse of office ', while the little that remained
was put an end to by the abohtion of feudal tenures
in the reign of Charles II. The revival is explained
as being due ' not to any new necessity for a method
of recovering land, but rather for some means by
which contracts entered into by Crown agents for
the supply of the public service could be enforced '.^
That a Petition of Right will lie for a breach of
contract resulting in unliquidated damages was
finally settled in 1874 by the Court of Queen's
Bench in Thomas v. The Quttn^ in which the
judgment of the Court in favour of the subject
on demurrer by the Crown was given by Black-
burn, J., mainly on the authority of the Bankers'
Case,^ Judicial expressions of opinion that a Petition
of Right will lie for breach of contract are to be
found in modern cases dating from the beginning
of the nineteenth century,* but it was not until
1 Clode, p. 66. 2 L.R. 10 Q.B. 31.
3 (1700) 14 How. St. Tr. 1. Incomplete Reports are to be
found in 5 Mod. 29 ; 87 E.R. 500 ; in Skinner, 601 ; 90 E.R.
270 ; and in 1 Freem. 331 ; 89 E.R. 246. It should be noted
that the proceedings took the form of a petition to the Barons
of the Exchequer and that one of the principal matters of con-
troversy was whether the proper remedy was not by Petition of
Right. For an analysis of the case, see the judgment of
Blackburn, J., in Thomas v. The Queen at pp. 39 to 43.
* Oldham v. Treasury Commissioners (not reported) cited in
Ellis V. Earl Orey (1833) 6 Sim. 214, 220 ; 58 E.R. 574, 576 ;
2388 xr
130 CASE OF REQUISITION
Thomas v. The Queen ^ came to be argued that the
older authorities were considered in their direct
bearing on the point. The decision has since been
followed in numerous cases,^ and the principle
has now received statutory recognition in the
Indemnity Act, 1920.^ It is unnecessary, therefore,
to discuss it in detail. Whether or not the case was
rightly decided is now a matter merely of anti-
quarian interest, which may be gratified by reference
to Clode's criticism.* The learned author of
Civil Proceedings by and against the Crown ^ while
inclining to the view that the decision was wrong,
suggests that had it been to the contrary a remedy
must have been provided by legislation. The
decision has been consistently followed, and having
been twice approved by the Privy Council^ has
now been adopted by the House of Lords in the
Judgments delivered in the Case.
Barcm deBode v. The Queen (1845) 8 Q.B. p. 274; 115 E.R. p. 879,
in which Denman, L. C. J., expresses an unconquerable repug-
nance to the suggestion that the door ought to be closed against
all redress and remedy. See also Tobin v. The Queen (1864)
16 C.B. (N.S.) 355; 143 E.R. 1165; Feather v. The Queen (1865)
6 B. & S. p. 294 ; 122 E.R. p. 1205 ; Churchward v. The Queen
(1865) L.R. 103, 173. In In re von Frantzius (1858) 2 De G. & J.
126 ; 44 E.R. 936, no objection appears to have been taken on
the ground that the claim was for unliquidated damages and the
same observation appHes to Kirk v. The Queen (1872) L.R. 14 Eq.
558. For an earlier dictum, see Macbeath v. Haldemand (1786)
1 Term Rep. 172, per BuUer, J., at p. 176; 99 E.R. 1036, 1038.
1 (1874) L.R. 10 Q.B. 31.
2 See Kirk v. The Queen (1872) L.R. 14 Eq. 558 ; R. v.
Doutre (1884) 9 A.C. 745 ; Windsor and Annapolis Railway Co. v.
The Queen (1886) 11 A.C. 607.
3 10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 48, s. 1 (1) (b).
* Clode, p. 116. 5 Robertson, p. 339.
^ See note 2, supra.
PETITION OF RIGHT 131
IV
In order to appreciate the full bearing of the
Case upon the true scope of the procedure by Petition
of Right, it is necessary to see precisely what the
House of Lords decided. The judgments for the
first time explain the nature of the legal right which
arises out of a requisition of property for purposes
of defence. The SuppHants' right did not rest upon
any consensual foundation, for it was clear upon
the facts that possession was taken in invitum.
The parties having failed to agree upon the amount
of compensation, the officers of the Crown threatened
to take possession under the compulsory powers
with which they claimed to be invested by law.
Possession was in fact given by the Suppliants,
acting as good citizens, in order that the authorities
should not be hampered in the discharge of their
duties in providing for the public safety and the
Defence of the Realm, but the surrender was made
under protest and under full reservation of the
Suppliants' legal rights and remedies.
Clearly, if the possession had not been justified,
the entry by the officers of the Crown would have
been tortious, and would have involved the result
that all remedy by Petition of Right would have been
excluded, although the individual officers who autho-
rized and carried out the taking of possession would
have been personally liable in actions for damages.
But the necessity for taking possession was not
disputed, the only controversy being with reference
to compensation and to the amount. The act of
taking was legal,^ and indeed the Suppliants when
1 Per Lord Dunedin, App. A, p. 169.
K2
132 CASE OF REQUISITION
they alleged a right to compensation undef the
Defence Acts necessarily negatived any wrong done
by the Crown. ^
The notion of tort being excluded, the question
next arose whether the Supphants were entitled to
rely on any right arising ex contractu. If it could
be established that possession was taken by the
Crown under circumstances from which an agree-
ment to pay rent or compensation could be implied,
the difficult questions which were involved in the
assertion by the Suppliants of a right to compen-
sation either by statute or at Common law would
disappear, while the procedure by Petition of Right
clearly covered a claim in the nature of damages
arising out of a contract. It was accordingly sub-
mitted in the Petition by way of alternative conten-
tion that possession was taken by permission of
the Supphants, and that they were entitled to com-
pensation on this ground by way of rent for use
and occupation. Upon the view of the facts taken
by the majority of the Court of Appeal this con-
tention was held to be sound,^ and the Suppliants
were held entitled in that Court to succeed on this
comparatively simple point. ^
In presenting their argument in the House of
Lords, ,this contention was abandoned by the
Supphants, it being recognized that in the circum-
stances no such consent was to be inferred as would
justify the imphcation of any contractual relation,
^ Per Lord Sumner, App. A, p. 198.
2 (1919) 2 Ch. p. 227, per Swinfen-Eady, M. R. ; per
Warrington, L. J. p. 231.
^ For a detailed examination of the authorities on the right
to sue for use and occupation, see the judgment of Lord Atkinson,
App. A, p. 178.
PETITION OF RIGHT 133
and the argument proceeded upon the footing that
the taking amounted to a pure requisition indepen-
dent of the consent of the SuppHants and incon-
sistent with any entry upon their land by their
permission.
The claim of the Crown to take land free from
a legal obligation to pay compensation so far as it
was based on the alleged prerogative was, as has
been seen, not established. Had the right to take
the Suppliants' property depended upon powers of
the Crown resting upon a prerogative at Common
law the Suppliants would, it is submitted, have
been entitled ex jure to compensation. But no
decision was given founded on any right to compen-
sation at Common law, and the Suppliants' right
was held to depend upon statute under which the
requisition was recognized as lawful, the notion of
a liability on the part of the Crown arising ex con-
tractu being expressly negatived.
How is such a right enforceable against the
Crown ? On what ground can it be said that
a Petition of Right does not lie ? That the Defence
Act gives a legal right to the subject to have proper
compensation assessed and paid is beyond dispute.
It is equally clear that appropriate machinery
exists as between subject and subject for enforcing
the analogous statutory right of compulsory acquisi-
tion ; as in the case of a corporation which has
taken possession of land under statutory powers,^
but declines to take the necessary proceedings for
the assessment of compensation. The parties in
such a case are not placed by the operation of
1 As under section 85 of the Lands Clauses Consolidation
Act, 1845 (8 & 9 Vict., c. 18).
134 CASE OF REQUISITION
a notiqe to treat in a contractual relationship,
although their position is analogous to that of
vendor and purchaser/ An owner is not entitled
by the mere fact that his land has been taken under
compulsory powers to be paid compensation ; his
right is to have the amount of compensation
assessed, and that right can be enforced by man-
damus.^ The remedy by mandamus is not, how-
ever, applicable against the Crown. ^ The question
therefore arises whether there be anjrthing in the
law governing the procedure by Petition of Eight
which would exclude a petition praying for a declara-
tion that the Suppliant is entitled to compensation.
The definition of the word ' relief ' in section 16 of
the Petitions of Right Act, 1860,^ is in its terms
sufficiently wide to cover a claim for such a declara-
tion. The proviso to section 7 limits the remedy to
such remedies as existed before the passing of the
Act and would, no doubt, operate to exclude claims
which could not before the passing of the Act form
the subject-matter of a Petition of Right. But if
the procedure by Petition of Right be appHcable to
all cases in which the subject is in a position to
1 Adams v. London and Blackwall Railway Go. (1856) 2 Mac.
& G. 118 ; 42 E.R. 46 ; Haynes v. Haynes (1861) 1 Drew & Sm.
426, 450 ; 62 E.R. 442, 451 ; Harding v. Metropolitan Railway
Co. (1872) L.R. 7 Ch. 154 ; Tiverton and North Devon Railway
Go. V. Loosemore (1884) 9 A.C. 480 at pp. 493, 511.
2 JB. V. Birmingham and Oxford Junction Railway Go. (1850)
15 Q.B. 634 ; 117 E.R. 599 ; Tiverton and North Devon Railway
Go. V. Loosemore (1884) 9 A.C. p. 493 ; R. v. London and North
Western Railway Go. (1894) 2 Q.B. 512.
3 In re Baron de Bode (1838) 6 Dowl. 776 : 1 W.W. & H. 332 ;
R. V. Powell (IS4:1) 1 Q.B. 352; 113 E.R. 1166; R. y. Lords
Commissioners of the Treasury (1872) L.R. 7 Q.B. 387.
4 23 & 24 Vict., c. 24.
PETITION OF RIGHT 135
assert a legal right against the Crown, the absence
of any instance in which that right was founded
upon a statutory, basis does not, it is submitted,
preclude a subject from vindicating it by the only
form of procedure which is open to him as against
the Crown. Indeed, once it is established that
a claim to compensation rests on a legal right it is
difficult to formulate any principle upon which the
remedy by Petition of Right ought to be excluded.
' I can see no valid distinction ', says Lord Atkinson,^
' between a sum due under a contract or grant made
on behalf of the Crown mentioned by Chief Justice
Erie in Tohin v. The Queen,'^ and compensation due
for the lawful and authorized use and enjoyment by
the officer of the Sovereign on the Sovereign's
behalf of the lands or buildings of a subject. Both
seem equally untainted by tort, both equally
untouched by the principle that the King can do no
wrong.'
And so Lord Dunedin ^ arrives at the conclusion
that a Petition of Right will lie ' when in consequence
of what has been legally done any resulting obliga-
tion emerges on behalf of the subject '.*
1 App. A, p. 189.
2 (1864) 16 C.B. (N.S.) p. 355 ; 143 E.R. p. 1165.
3 App. A, p. 176.
* For the effect of the Indemnity Act, 1920 (10 & 11 Vict.,
c. 48), see p. 158, post.
EXCURSUS I
NOTES ON THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION IN RESPECT
OF REQUISITIONED PROPERTY OTHER THAN
LAND
•
The right to requisition property other than
land has not so far been tested in the Hght of historical
evidence in any recent legal proceeding. The recent
decisions of the Courts as regards chattels ^ and
shipping 2 are founded upon the Defence of the
Realm Acts and Regulations, no claim having been
advanced by the Crown to Act under powers derived
from the prerogative. The following notes have
been compiled in support of the general proposition
that, assuming an emergency which justifies the
requisitioning of private property for the purposes
of defence, the right to requisition is conditioned by
an obligation to pay compensation.
1 Newcastle Breweries Limited v. The King (1920) 1 K.B. 854.
2 China Mutual Steam Navigation Go. v. Maclay (1918)
1 K.B. 33 ; Hudson's Bay Co. v. Maclay (1920) 36 T.L.R. 469.
In Russian Bank for Foreign Trade v. Excess Insurance Co. (1918)
2 K.B. 123, Bailhache, J., expressed the opinion that the
Admiralty had no authority to requisition ships otherwise than
within the British Isles or the waters adjacent thereto. The
point was not fully argued. On Appeal the Crown (which was
not a party to the litigation) was prepared to vindicate the
requisition as an exercise of the prerogative, but the Court held
that it was unnecessary to decide this question (1919) 1 K.B. 39.
The prerogative to requisition British ships was not disputed
in The Broadmayne (1916), P. 64 ; The Sarpen, ibid., 306.
Requisitions of ships at present have statutory authority under
the powers conferred by Defence of the Realm Regulation
39 B.B.B. on the Shipping Controller, as to whose office vide
p. 103, antCy note 2.
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 137
The duty to provide arms in early times was
incidental to the obligation of personal service,
which in itself was based mainly on tenure. But
whatever the foundation of the obligation, this duty
was from early times strictly regulated by statute.
Thus the Statute of Winchester of 1285,^ which
provides that ' View of Arms be made ', requires
that every man have in his house harness ' for to
keep the peace after the ancient Assize ', that is to
say that every mrfn between fifty and sixty shall be
assessed and sworn to armour according to the
quantity of his lands and goods, the particulars of
the arms and armour to be provided being set out
according to the value of each man's property.
A statute of Edward III ^ records the King's will
that no man shall be charged to arm himself other-
wise than he was wont in the time of his progenitors.
Kings of England ; and ' that no man shall be
compelled to go out of his shire, but where necessity
requireth, and sudden coming of strange enemies
into the Realm, and then it shall be done as hath
been used in times past for defence of the Realm '.
Later in the same reign it is made clear ^ that no man
shall be constrained to find men-at-arms, hoblers, or
archers other than in accordance with their tenures,
unless by common assent and grant made in Parlia-
ment ; and these statutes were confirmed in the
reign of Henry IV.* It is unnecessary to set out in
1 13 Edw. I, Stat. 2, c. 6.
2 (1327) 1 Edw. Ill, Stat. 2, c. 5.
3 (1356) 25 Edw. Ill, Stat. 5, c. 8.
* (1402) 4 Hen. IV, c. 13, confirming the statutes of 1327 and
1356, and also 18 Edw. Ill, Stat. 2, c. 7 (1344), which deals
with purveyance and provides that men of arms, hoblers, and
138 CASE OF REQUISITION
detail the many enactments which dealt with the
subject of military service, all of which were super-
seded in the reign of Philip and Mary by a consolidat-
ing statute of 1555/ which imposed on owners of
land, according to their estates, an obligation to
keep and sustain within the Realm horses and armour
for defence. The obligation was therefore purely
ratione tenurae, and did not survive the abolition of
military tenures and purveyance in the time of
the Commonwealth by the Act of 1660.^ So far,
then, as military equipment is ccyicerned the right
to demand it was incidental to the obligation of
service which was intimately connected with the
holding of land, or was imposed by Parliament
as a tax upon property.
II
The prerogative of purveyance, which was
primarily exercisable in respect of provisions and
archers chosen to go in the King's service out of England shall
be at the King's wages from the day that they depart out of the
counties where they were chosen till their return.
1 4&5Ph.&M.,c.2. This statute was repealed by a statute -
law revision act of 1604 (1 Jac. I, c. 25, s. 46) and the repeal
was relied on by the opponents of Charles I as reviving the
earlier statutes. St. John in R. v. Hampden (3 How. St. Tr.
877) declines to discuss the question whether the earlier statutes
were still in force in his day. They are enumerated in Rush worth,
iii. 655-722, under the heading ' Commission of Array, the
legality of it controverted and other passages relating to the
putting it in execution '. The claim of Charles I to issue Com-
missions of array under powers alleged to have been conferred
by statute in 5 Hen. IV (Rot. Pari. iii. 526) was one of the
causes which led to the outbreak of the Civil War. For the
Militia, as the constitutional force for the Defence of the ^^ealm
since the Restoration, see Clode, Military Forces of the Crown,
c. iii ; Bruce's Report, App. D, at p. 252.
2 12Car. II, c. 24,'s. 12.
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 139
transport, although it extended to such munitions of
war as saltpetre for the making of gunpowder, was
finally abolished by statute in 1660. The system,
as has been shown,^ extended to making provision
for the needs of the King in time of war as well as to
the supply of his domestic and personal requirements
in time of peace. The statutes, in insisting upon
the restriction of the exercise of the prerogative, were
but giving effect to the principles of the Common
Law that the King ' cannot alter the property of his
subjects' goods except by consent of Parliament '.^
After the Restoration, the right of purveyance
was revived in a limited form by an Act of 1661 ^
' for providing necessary carriages for His Majesty
in his royal progress and removals '. The Act
recites that the Act of 1660 ' may prove very
prejudicial and inconvenient to the King's Majesty
in his Royal Progresses upon his necessary occasions
to several parts of this Realm, in case any person
or persons shall obstinately refuse voluntarily to
provide sufficient carriages for royal service at
ordinary and usual rates for such carriages as are
paid by others of his subjects in such places, contrary
to the true intent and meaning of the said Act '.
Provision is accordingly made empowering the clerk
or officer of the King's carriages by warrant from the
Board of Green Cloth to provide carts and carriages
for his Majesty's use. Penalties are imposed for
refusal to provide what is required, but no horse or
carriage is to be requisitioned for more than a day's
journey, and payment is to be in ready money.
1 Ante, p. 52.
2 St. John, arguendo, B. v. Hampden (1637) 3 How. St. Tr. .881.
3 13 Car. II, Stat, i, c. 8, s. 2. Repealed by Statute Law
Revision Act, 1863 (26 & 27 Vict., c. 125).
140 CASE OF REQUISITION
In 1662 ^ was passed the first of a series of statutes,
the modern counterpart of which is to be found in
the Army Act, 1881,^ as annually re-enacted, by
which the naval and military authorities were
authorized to resort to impressment for the purpose
of obtaining transport. By an Act ^ of that year
for providing carriage by land and by water ' for
the use of His Majesty's Navy and Ordnance ' it
was provided that as often as the service of the Navy
or Ordnance should require carriages might be
impressed under the hand and seal of the Lord High
Admiral or of certain specified officers, directed to
two or more justices of the peace, who were to issue
their warrants accordingly, at rates of hire which
are set out in the act, to be paid in ready money.
Similar powers are given to impress or take up
ships, hoys, lighters, boats, or any vessel as should
be necessary, the owners to receive hire, according
to the rates usually paid by merchants from time
to time and in the absence of agreement to be
settled by the Brotherhood of Trinity House.
The Act was to remain in force until the end of
the first session of the next Parliament. It was
revived in 1685 ^ for seven years and continued by
successive Acts of 1692* and 1698-9,^ until it finally
expired in 1707. It is to be observed that these
Acts (of which the Acts of 1692* and 1698-9^ were
passed in time of war) gave power only to re-
quisition transport. The right of impressment is con-
fined to making provision for the King's Progresses
1 14 Car. II, c. 20, App. B, p. 222, post.
2 44 & 45 Vict., c. 58.
3 1 Jac. II, c. 11, App. B, p. 228, post.
' / 44 Will. & M., c. 24.
s 11 Will. Ill, c. 13 (11 & 12 Will. Ill, Ruff.).
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 141
and for the necessities of the Navy and Ordnance.
Impressment for the transport of troops was not
authorized by statute until 1692 when similar powers
were given to justices of the peace, when authorized
by Royal Order, under section 27 of the Mutiny
Act of that year.i These Acts contain no refer-
ence to any right to requisition victuals, forage, or
any other articles, and indeed the Mutiny Act of
1692, which was passed in time of war (the right of
billeting troops is expressly limited to the duration
of the war) provides in terms for the purchase of
clothes, arms, and accoutrements of war, which
are to be bought only in England, Wales, and the
town of Berwick and not elsewhere, but contains
no suggestion of purchase under compulsory powers.
Similar provisions are found in the annual Mutiny
Acts, which, although passed primarily in order to
render legal the maintenance of a standing force
in time of peace, notwithstanding the provisions
of the Bill of Bights, were passed annually (with
a tendency to increase in length) until 1879, when
the Act^ upon which is founded the Army Act of
1881 (now re-enacted annually with such amend-
ments as may be necessary), came into force.
Passing to the time of the Napoleonic wars, j.t
1 4 Wm. & M., c. 13. The first Mutiny Act (1 WiU. & M., c. 5)
had been passed before the Bill of Rights (1 Will & M., Sess. 2,
0. 2) to deal with the mutiny at Ipswich and the troops favourable
to James I who were to be shipped to the Low Coimtries. The
Act merely provided for the punishment of mutiny and sedition
in the army by courts-martial, and for the constitution of such
courts, while enacting that nothing in the Act should exempt
any officer or soldier from the ordinary process of law. More
elaborate provisions are contained in the Acts of 1689 (1 Will.
& M., Sess. 2, c. 4) and 1690 (2 Will. & M., Sess. 2, c. 6).
2 Army Discipline and Regulation Act, 1879 (42 & 43 Vict.), c 33.
142 CASE OF REQUISITION
should be noted that the annual Mutiny Acts
contained provisions for the taking up of transport
for the conveyance of troops on the march, following
the general lines of the Act of 1692. The power to
requisition transport is entrusted, under these Acts ^
not to the military, but to the civil power. The
concurrent legislation embodied in the Defence Act
of 1798 2 (and re-enacted in the Act of 1803^)
covers a wider field. Section 1 provides that the
County and Deputy Lieutenants shall procure
returns of {inter alia) :
' all boats. Barges, Waggons, Carts, Horses, and other
Cattle and Sheep, and of all Hay, Straw, Corn, Meal,
Flour, and other Provisions, and of all Mills and
Ovens, and all other Matters and Things which may
be useful to an enemy, or applicable to the Public
Service, within the said Counties, Ridings, Stewart ries,
Cities, and Places respectively and which of such
Boats, Barges, Waggons, Carts, and Horses the
owners thereof are willing to furnish, in case of
Emergency, for the public Service, either gratuitously
or for Hire, and with what Number of Boatmen,
Bargemen, Drivers, and other necessary Attendants,
and upon what Terms and Conditions, and of all
such other Particulars as his Majesty shall require,
for the Purpose of enabling his Majesty, and the
persons acting under his Majesty's Authority to
give such orders as may be necessary for the Removal,
in case of Danger, of such persons as shall be in-
capable of removing themselves, and for the Removal
1 See the Acts of 1798 (38 Geo. Ill, c. 23), s. 45, and of 1801,
(41 Geo. Ill, c. 11), s. 45. Section 46 of the latter Act contains
provisions for the requisition in cases of emergency of horses,
carriages, and of vessels used on canals and navigable rivers
similar to those which are now included in section 115 of the
Army Act, 1881.
8 38 Geo. Ill, c. 27. ^ 43 Qgo. m, c. 65.
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 143
of all Boats, Barges, Waggons, Carts, Horses,
Cattle, Sheep, Hay, Straw, Corn, Meal, Flour, and
other Provisions, Matters, and things aforesaid, or
for the Employment thereof in his Majesty's service,
or otherwise, as the Exigency of the Case shall
require, and generally to give such Directions
touching such matters respectively, as may be
deemed most likely to defeat the Views of the
Enemy, and most advantageous for the public
Service.'
Section 7 provides that :
' It shall be lawful for his Majesty, in case of
actual Invasion of this Kingdom, or if his Majesty
shall see special Cause to apprehend that such
Invasion will be actually attempted by the Enemy,
to authorize and empower by Order under his
Sign Manual, the said Lieutenants and Deputy
Lieutenants, or any of them, on any Emergency,
and on the Requisition of the Officer commanding
within the District respectively or of such other
Persons as his Majesty shall specially empower to
make such Requisition, to give all such Orders as
shall be necessary for the Removal of any BtDats,
Barges, Waggons, Carts, or other Carriages, Horses,
Cattle, Sheep, Hay, Straw, Corn, Meal, Flour, or
Provisions of any Kind or any other Things which
may be of advantage to an Enemy, or useful for
the public Service, and to take the same, if necessary,
for the public Service, and also to give such orders
as shall be necessary for the Removal of the Inhabi-
tants of any House, Hamlet, District, or Place,
or any of them, and especially such as by reason
of Infancy, Age, or Infirmity, or other Cause, shall
be incapable of removing themselves in Case of
Danger : and also, in case of Necessity, to destroy
any Boats, Barges, Waggons, Carts, or other
Carriages, Horses, Cattle, Sheep, Hay,' Straw, Corn,
Meal, Flour, or Provisions of any Kind, or any Thing
144 CASE OF REQUISITION
which may be of Advantage to an Enemy ; and to
remove, destroy, or render useless, any House, Mill,
Bridge, or other Building, or any Matter or thing
whatsoever ; and generally to do and act in the
premises as the public Service and the Exigencies
of particular Cases shall require.'
The assessment of Compensation is dealt with by
section 11, as follows :
' That when it shall have been found necessary
to take, for the public Service, remove, or destroy,
any Waggons, Carts, or other Carriages, Horses,
Cattle, Sheep, Hay, Straw, Corn, Meal, Flour, or
other Provisions, or any other Articles whatsoever,
or to destroy or injure any House, Mill, Bridge, or
other Buildings, or any Matter or Thing of Value,
under the Directions aforesaid, the Commissioners
of his Majesty's Treasury shall appoint persons to
inquire into and ascertain the Value of such Articles,
and the Compensation which ought to be made
for the same, by way of Purchase or Hire, or Recom-
pence for Damage, or otherwise, according to the
Nature of the Case ; and if the Owner or Owners,
or Person or Persons interested, shall be willing to
accept the Compensation which shall be so ascer-
tained, the same shall be paid by the said Commis-
sioners of his Majesty's Treasury or such Person or
Persons as shall be appointed by them for that
Purpose, in pursuance of a Certificate under the
Hands of the Persons so employed to ascertain
the same, and if the Owner or Owners, or Person or
Persons interested shall not be willing to accept
such Compensation, it shall be lawful for his Majesty
to order two Justices of the Peace of the County,
Riding, Stewartry, City, or Place, to settle and
ascertain the Compensation which ought to be made
to such Owner or Owners, or Persons interested ;
which Justices shall settle and ascertain the same
accordingly, and shall grant a Certificate thereof
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 145
to the Commissioners of his Majesty's Treasury who
shall order the same to be paid to the Person or
Persons entitled thereto, out of any Money granted
for the Supply of the Year.'
During the Napoleonic wars it is, therefore, clear
that the right to payment for the requisitioning
of chattels was expressly secured by statute.
The Army Act, 1881,^ gives no general power to
requisition chattels, but follows the lines, in regard
to the impressment of transport, of the Mutiny Acts,
upon which it is based. The provision of trans-
port is entrusted to the civil power, the duty of
impressing carriages and horses being delegated to
the justices of the peace. ^ The right of impress-
ment is limited to the provision of transport of
regimental baggage and stores, to be moved in
accordance with a route issued to commanding
officers of regular forces. In cases of emergency
(to be certified by a Secretary of State) a general
or field officer may be authorized to requisition
carriages and animals, whether for the purpose of
carriage or haulage, ' and also vessels (whether
boats, barges, or other) used for the transport of
any commodities whatsoever upon any canal or
navigable river.' ^ Payment for regimental trans-
port under section 112 is to be at the rates set out
in the third schedule to the Act, subject to temporary
^ 44 & 45 Vict., c. 58. Instructions to prepare a bill were first
given to Lord Thring in 1 867 . The various stages in the discussion
and preparation of the measure are described by the draughts-
man in his Practical Legislation at p. 9. The papers written
to explain the law alone fill a folio volume of 1,067 printed pages.
2 s. 112. Aircraft were first included under the Army (Annual)
Act, 1913 (3 Geo. V, c. 2).
3 s. 115. Extended to the Naval authorities by the Naval
Billeting Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 70).
2388 L
146 CASE OF REQUISITION
increases to be assessed, if necessary, by the authorities
specified in section 113. Transport requisitioned
in cases of emergency is to be paid for by the Army
Council, the amount being referred, in cases of
dispute, to the County Court. ^
The right to impress chattels is conferred by the
Army (Supply of Food, Forage, and Stores) Act,
1914,2 which received the Royal Assent on August 7,
1914, three days after the outbreak of war. These
increased powers are conferred by the insertion in
section 113 (2) of the Army Act, of the words ' and
also of food, forage, and stores of every description '.
The jurisdiction of the County Court is preserved
and its exercise regulated by section 3 (1) of the Army
(Amendment) Act, 1915,^ and by the provisions
for determining the amount to be paid contained
in the schedule to that Act. The basis of assessment
laid down by Clause 3 of the Schedule is the fair
market value of the article requisitioned on the day
on which it was required to be furnished as between
a willing buyer and a willing seller. Under Section 1
the decision of a County Court Judge is directed
to be final.
It is hardly necessary to enlarge upon the impor-
tance of these regulations as illustrating the applica-
tion of fundamental constitutional principles in the
exercise of the right of requisition. The right itself
is conferred by statute. The obligation to make
full compensation, not as a matter of grace, but as
1 s. 115 (4).
2 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 26.
3 5 Geo. V, c. 26. A full list of amendments consequential
on the Army (Supply of Food, Forage, and Stores) Act, 1914,
is contained in the Schedule to the Army (Amendment), No. 2,
Act, 1915 (5 & 6 Geo. V, c. 58).
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 147
of right, is expressly recognized. In so far as the
subject's right to free access to the Courts is restricted
by the withdrawal of the ordinary right of appeal,
this restriction is imposed by the direct authority
of Parhament, while the whole machinery for
ascertaining the amount of compensation as well as
the basis of assessment is the subject of specific
statutory provision. In regard to requisitions of
chattels for the use of the military forces, Regula-
tion 2 B, made under the authority of the Defence of
the Realm Acts, which formed the subject of the
discussion in Newcastle Breweries Limited v. The
King ^ seems in direct conflict with these statutory
provisions, and was in that case held to be ultra vires.
But the fact that in the case of chattels required
for the use of the military forces, the method of
requisition is prescribed in detail under direct
Parliamentary authority points to a recognition by
Parliament in the early days of the war of the
principle enunciated by Sir George Crooke in the
Case of Ship-money ^ that the Common Law ' gives
a man a freedom and property in his goods and estate
that it cannot be taken from him but by his consent
in specie, as in Parliament, or by his particular
assent '.^
1 (1920) 1 K. B. 854. 2 3 How. St. Tr. p. 1129.
^ A further instance in which Parliament by direct action
restricted the right of the subject to use his property as he chooses,
free from interference, is to be found in the Unreasonable With-
holding of Food Supplies Act, 1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 51) repealed
and superseded by the Articles of Commerce (Returns) Act,
1914 (4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 65) which gives power to the Board of
Trade to take possession of articles of commerce unreasonably
withheld from market, subject to an obligation to pay such price
as may, in default of agreement, be decided to be reasonable,
having regard to all the circumstances of the case, by the arbitra- /
L2
148 CASE OF REQUISITION
III
That the practice of requisitioning ships prevailed
generally until the Restoration in 1660 admits of
no doubt. ^ To a great extent the obligation to
supply vessels rested upon the foundation of tenure ;
the maritime towns, and more particularly the
Cinque Ports,^ holding their franchises on condition
that they should provide a quota of ships ^ (and
in some cases money) ^ for the King's service. But
innumerable instances may be cited in which ships,
both British and foreign, were ' stayed ' or ' arrested '
when required, independently of any obligation
founded on tenure or on contract.^ That provision
was made for payment is equally clear, the proceeds
of such taxes as the grand customs of the mark
and demy-mark ; upon wool, wood-fells, and leather ;
tonnage and poundage ; and the petty customs,
as well as aids granted on particular occasions,
being specifically allocated to the sea-service.®
The right to payment was constantly asserted
by Parliament and acknowledged by the King.
tion of a Judge of the High Court selected by the Lord Chief
Justice in England (in Scotland by a judge of the Court of Session
selected by the Lord President, and in Ireland by a Judge of
the High Court of Ireland selected by the Lord Chief Justice of
Ireland). The Act is not repealed by or referred to in the New
Ministries and Secretaries Act, 1916 (6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 68).
1 Numerous instances are referred to in Professor Holds-
worth's learned essay on ' The Power of the Crown to requisition
British ships in a National Emergency ', 35 L. Q. R. 12.
2 For a general account of which see Burrows, The Cinque
Ports, London, 1892.
3 See instances cited R. v. Hampden (1637) 3 How. St. Tr.
869, 870.
* As in the cases of Lewes and Colchester, ibid., 869.
^ See Professor Holds worth's essay, passim.
« 3 How. St. Tr. 874.
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 149
Thus in 1372, a petition of the Commons^ complains
of the decHne of ' La Navie ' (namely of merchant
shipping) the principal cause being 'the long " arrest "
often made in times of war ; that is to say a quarter
of a year or more before they have passed from
their ports without obtaining anything for the
wages of their mariners during that time, the
masters receiving no reward for the furnishing of
their ships.' The royal answer is equivocal. ' La
Navie ' is to be maintained and preserved ' a greindre
ease et profit que faire se poet '. This complaint
appears to be directed rather to the loss suffered
by the detention of vessels in port while awaiting
orders to sail, than to the withholding of payment
while, on active service. A similar complaint in
the following year ^ concludes with a prayer that
payment be made from the time of ' arrest ' until
the end of their voyage and calls forth a definite
admission, that ships are only to be arrested when
necessary ; and reasonable payment is to be made.
A definite rate of hire is claimed in 1385 as having
formerly been ordained,^ and the King assents to
a payment of two shillings every quarter for each
tun-tyght ^ until the next Parliament. In 1415 ^
complaint is made that in the time of the King's
predecessors it was accustomed and ordained, that
when the ships of the Kingdom were doing their
service in war or otherwise, owners should have their
1 Eot. Pari. 46 Edw. Ill (vol. ii, p. 311), App. G, p. 296, post,
2 RoL Pari. 47 Edw. Ill (vol. ii, p. 319), App. G, p. 297, post.
See also (1379) Rot. Pari. 2 Ric. II (vol. iii, p. 66), App. G, p.
297, post ; (1402) Rot. Pari. 4 Hen. IV (vol. iii, p. 501), App, G,
p. 298, post.
3 Rot. Pari. 9 Ric. II (vol. iii, p. 212), App. G, p. 298, post.
* This word probably means complete or measured tons.
See Oppenheim, Administration of the Royal Navy, p. 8, note (2).
5 Rot. Pari. 3 Hen. V (vol. iv, p. 79), App. G, p. 299, post.
150 CASE OF REQUISITION
' tonnage ' on the said ships, as well as the wages
of the mariners, which are set out, and that this
tonnage has been duly and loyally paid from time
to which memory runneth not to the contrary
until the time of the King's father. The Royal
answer is that the King will have that done which
right and reason demand. In 1442 ^ a sta-tute
provides that ' purveyance be made to have on the
sea continually from Candlemas to Martinmas eight
ships with forestages each attended by a barge and
a balinger,^ and manned by 150 men, together
with four spynes.' The rates of hire and of pay are
fully set out and the ships which are to be impressed
are named, together with the ports where they are
to be found, and in many cases the owners.
These early statutes, therefore, recognize the right
to impress ships, while insisting upon an obligation
on the part of the Crown to pay for the services
rendered. The exercise of the right of impressment
may be illustrated from the enormous number of
writs and the Commissions to Admirals which were
issued from time to time. Many of these documents
contain no reference to payment, but it is submitted
that the right to compensation is to be implied from
the earlier statutes, while instances of express
directions to make compensation are not uncommon.
Thus a commission^ of Elizabeth (in whose time
1 RoL Pari, 20 Hen. VI (vol. v, p. 59), App. G, p. 300 post.
2 Spanish, ballenere, long low vessels for oar and sails intro-
duced in the fourteenth century by the Biscayan Builders.
Oppenheim, op. cit., p. 13, note (2).
3 Rymer, Foedera (ed. 1742), vol. vii, pt. i, p. 219. This
commission is printed in Prothero, Statutes and Constitutional
Documents, p. 163. Two later commissions of James I (Rymer,
vol. vii, pt. iii, pp. 86, 221) omit all reference to payment, as
is to be expected at this period.
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 151
the regular Navy had attained substantial propor-
tions) in 1599 appointing Thomas, Lord Howard
de Walden ' to be our Lieutenant and Captain
General, leader, governor, and admiral of our said
navy and forces therein serving which we have
set to the seas for the defence of our Realm and
people against the Spaniard ' directs that :
' forasmuch as it may be needed for our service to
take up vessels and other material for the use of
our service, we do hereby give full authority to the
said Thomas to direct his warrants to our treasurer
of our navy or to his deputy in his absence to make
payment of all such sums of money as he the said
Thomas shall find necessary to direct him to lay
out in which case the warrant of our said admiral
shall be to our said treasurer or his deputy sufficient
discharge upon the making of his account.'
In Stuart times, the right to requisition vessels
was admitted by St. John in his argument in the
Case of Ship-money, subject to certain qualifi-
cations. The issue was not whether the Crown
had the right to requisition ships, but whether
the imposition of a tax in terms of the Writ could be
justified. In the course of his argument he sets
forth the constitutional means by which provision
is made for the sea-service,^ in support of his general
proposition that the property of the subject cannot
be taken without the consent of Parliament, unless
it be tempore belli, that is to say when in the agony
of invasion Parliament is not sitting and the Courts
are closed.^ The right to compensation is expressly
asserted by another sixteenth-century lawyer whose
reputation is not inferior to that of St. John. Selden
1 3 How. St. Tr. 869. ^ ^^^g^ p, 54,
152 CASE OF REQUISITION
in his Mare Clausum, published in 1635, two years
before the argument in the Case of Ship-money,
repubUshed in 1652 in EngHsh under the title of
The Dominion of the Sea, asserts : ^
' But what has been alleged about the staying
of ships and lifting them for the King's service you
are always to understand it was so done according
to equity that competent pay was to be allowed
them answerable to the proportion of tons and also
to the number of seamen that were so taken into
employment. Touching which particular, there are
several Testimonies also to be found in the Becords
of Parliament'
In support of this proposition he refers to the
statute of 3 Hen. V,^ already cited. The same view
is expressed a century later by Sir Michael Foster
in his ' discourse ' to the jury in Bex v. Broadfoot,^
on the subject of the right of impressment, which,
although directed mainly to the subject of impress-
ment of sailors, contains a number of references
to the impressment of ships, and cites a large
number of commissions to Admirals. ' Though the
affair of pressing ships is not now before me, yet
I could not well avoid mentioning it because many
of the precedents I have met with and must cite
go as well to that, as to the business of pressing
mariners, and taken together, they serve to show the
power the Crown has constantly exercised over the
whole naval force of the Kingdom, as well shipping
as mariners, whenever the public service required
it. This, however, must be observed, that no man
served the Crown in either case at his own expense.
1 Dominion of the Sea, p. 352.
2 Eot. Pari, iv. 79, App. G, p. 299, post.
3 (1743) Foster, Crown Cases, 154.
f THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 153
Masters and mariners received full wages, and owners
were const antty paid a full freight.' ^
The effect of the statute by which purveyance
was abolished,^ and of the Act of 1662^ with its
subsequent re-enactments is not free from difficulty.
Professor Holdsworth* is of opinion that the preroga-
tive to requisition ships is not affected by these
statutes, on the ground that ' the power to requi-
sition with which they deal refers not to the power
of requisition for purposes of national defence, but
to the power which was in the nature of the power
of purveyance abolished by the Act of 1660 to
requisition for other purposes '. He points out that
inasmuch as the Crown had the power, in the
1 Ibid., p. 160. 'This prerogative, which has been much
attacked and is certainly a blot on English freedom, is founded
on immemorial usage, recognized, admitted, and sanctioned by
various Act of Parliament,' Chitty, Prerogative, p. 47. For cases
recognizing the legaUty of impressment of mariners, see R. v.
King (1694) Comb. 245 ; 90 E.R. 456 ; Ex parte Fox (1793)
5 T.R. 276; 101 E.R. 155; and R. v. Tubbs (1776) 2 Cowp. 512;
98 E.R. 1215. In R. v. Tubbs the return to a Habeas Corpus
was held insufficient and the men discharged ' upon their promise
to go into His Majesty's Service after three weeks respite '. In
R. V. Tubbs, it is said that the right is founded on immemorial
usage, and that there may be a legal right of exemption upon
the same foundation. A usage exempting from impressment
men admitted as watermen of the City of London to attend
upon the Lord Mayor and Aldermen was held not proved.
Similarly in Ex parte Fox a sea-faring man holding the office of
headborough was held not to be exempt. For instances of
statutory recognition of the right, see 13 Geo. II, c. 17 (exemption
of certain seamen and apprentices) ; and 38 Geo. Ill, c. 46 (relating
to apprentices and fishermen who were exempt under earlier
statutes). It has never been suggested that men pressed for the
service were not entitled to be paid.
2 (1660) 12 Car. II, c. 24. ^ ^^^g^ p^ 149.
* 35 L. Q. R., p. 32.
154 CASE OF REQUISITION
Middle Ages, to requisition for both purposes, there
was no need to distinguish the powers, but that the
distinction became apparent as the result of these
statutes, which are not referred to when ships are
requisitioned for other purposes. Whether or not
Professor Holdsworth's conclusion be justified, his
researches are directed rather to the legality of
impressment of ships than to the question whether
the exercise of the right involves an obligation of
payment. As illustrating his argument he cites
an Admiralty Order in Council of 1691, which
recites the Act of 1685 and provides for the taking
up of ships for the ca.rriage of provisions and stores
to the plantations in the West Indies. At this time
England was at war with France, and the requisitions
made under the statute were (and were expressed
to be) subject to an obligation of payment. The
illustrations cited in which no reference is made to
statutory powers cover a period from 1676 to 1689.
In 1676 the commander of a ship ordered to proceed
to Virginia to assist in suppressing a Rebellion is
authorized ' to have or otherwise imprest and take
up in Virginia any one or more ships, vessels, boats,
and what seamen shall be needful for the manning
of the same, for the performance of any service
which shall be judged by him to be requisite for the
suppression of the Rebellion, he paying for the same
upon the place out of the contingent money to be
appointed for that service '. The remaining in-
stances cited by Professor Holdsworth contain no
express provision for payment. He points out that
the practice of requisitioning ships gradually ceased,
and that though barges and hoys were requisitioned,
the warrants tend in general to relate only to the
pressing of men.
\
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 155
In the period of the Napoleonic wars, sea-going
vessels were not requisitioned. China Mutual Steam
Navigation Co. v. Maclay ^ was not decided upon
the prerogative, but the plaintiffs adduced evidence ^
(which was not contradicted or even challenged in
cross-examination) to the effect that all vessels
taken up by the Government were in fact chartered
in the open market. Until 1794 ships were procured
both for the Army and Navy by the Navy Board ;
after that date the requirements were provided for
by a separate Transport Board. No indication was
found of the use of compulsory powers, while ships
were constantly being offered by brokers and
owners. Both Boards operated through agents,
generally naval officers, stationed at the ports,
whose duties were defined by printed regulations
which include instructions that when an order for
a ship is received from any proper authority, the
agent is to take pains to obtain a ship as cheaply
as possible, and as near as possible to the terms of
the charter parties made out in the Transport Office.
No proclamation requisitioning ships was found
in any list of Proclamations either during the
Napoleonic wars or at any later period. In fact,
therefore, no requisitions of ships were made during
the Napoleonic wars either under Common I^aw
powers or under any powers conferred by the Defence
Act of 1795 and of 1803.
1 (1918) 1 K.B. 33.
2 The evidence was given by Marcus Slade, Esq., of the Inner
Temple, who had made a search at the Record Office for that
purpose.
156 CASE OF REQUISITION
IV
The right to requisition ships was asserted at the
outbreak of war in 1914 by a Royal Proclamation ^
' for authorizing the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty to requisition any British ship or British
vessel within the British Isles or the waters adjacent
thereto '. The proclamation is in the following
terms :
' Whereas a national emergency exists rendering
it necessary to take steps for preserving and defending
national interests :
And whereas the measures approved to be taken
require the immediate employment of a large number
of vessels for use as Transports and as Auxiliaries
for the convenience of the Fleet and other similar
services but owing to the urgency of the need it
is impossible to delay the employment of such
vessels until the terms of engagement have been
mutually agreed upon :
Now, therefore, we authorize and empower the
Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty by warrant
under the hand of their Secretary or under the hand
of any Flag Officer of the Royal Navy holding any
appointment under the Admiralty to requisition
and take up for Our service any British ship or
British vessel as defined in the Merchant Shipping
Act, 1894, within the British Isles or the waters
adjacent thereto, for such period of time as may be
necessary on condition that the owners of all ships
and vessels so requisitioned shall receive payment
for their use, and for services rendered during their
employment in the Government service, and com-
pensation for loss or damage thereby occasioned,
according to terms to be arranged as soon as possible
after the said ship has been taken up, either by
mutual agreement between the Lords Commissioners
1 Maniml oj Emergency Legislation, p. 387.
THE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION 167
of the Admiralty and the owners or faihng such
agreement by the Award of a Board of Arbitration
to be constituted and appointed by Us for this
purpose.'
The Proclamation, which was not issued under
statutory powers, while asserting a right to requi-
sition ships, recognizes the principle that the rates
of hire are a matter for negotiation and agreement.
Standard rates of hire as well as standard forms of
charter-party were settled in the early days of the
war by sub-committees appointed to deal with
liners, cargo-steamers and other classes of vessels.^
The right to requisition ships ' in order that they
may be used in the manner best suited to the needs
of the country ' has since been expressly conferred
on the Shipping Controller by Regulation 39 B.B.B.
of the Defence of the Realm Regulations.^ The
power of the Shipping Controller to requisition
vessels for this purpose, as distinguished from his
right to control the movements of ships or to regulate
the rates of freight has not, so far, been challenged
in the Courts.
1 The Reports, under which what are known as < Admiralty
blue-book rates ' were fixed, have been printed, but are not on
sale by the Government printers.
2 Ante, p. 99.
EXCURSUS II
THE INDEMNITY ACT, 1920
At the time when judgment was given by the
House of Lords in the Case there had been introduced
in Parhament a Bill which, after considerable dis-
cussion and amendment in both Houses and before
a select committee of the House of Commons,
received the Royal Assent on August 16, 1920,
under the title of the Indemnity Act, 1920.^
The Act materially affects the legal obligations
of the Crown to the subject in respect of claims
arising out of the war. As a precedent for future
legislation, the Act is of importance — sinister or
benevolent — according to individual views of the
ethical considerations by which its effect upon
established constitutional rights may be either
deprecated or justified.
While embodying the features hitherto associated
with Acts of Indemnity, the Act contains much that
is novel in the history of our legislation. ' An Act
of Indemnity ', says Professor Dicey,^ ' is a statute,
the object of which is to make legal transactions
which when they took place were illegal, or to free
individuals to whom the statute applies from
liability for having broken the law.' Such enact-
ments, he observes, being as it were the legalization
of illegality are the highest exertion of the sovereign
power wielded by Parliament,^ and ' afford the
1 10 & 11 Geo. V, c. 48.
2 Law of the Constitution (8th ed.), pp. 47, 547.
3 Ibid., p. 48. See also Maitland, Constitutional History, p. 386.
THE INDEMNITY ACT, 1920 159
practical solution of the problem which perplexed
the statemanship of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, how to combine the maintenance of law
and the authority of the Houses of Parliament with
the free exercise of that kind of discretionary power
or prerogative which under some shape or other,
must at critical junctures be wielded by the executive
government of every civilized country '/
Numerous instances of Acts of this character are
to be found in the statutes which have followed the
suspension from time to time of the Habeas Corpus
Acts,^ with the usual concomitant of detention bv
the executive of suspected persons without trial.
Many cases suggest themselves in which servants
of the Crown in times of national emergency may
have committed acts which, although clearly done
in the public interest, were either illegal or at all
events of doubtful legality. The form taken by
Acts of Indemnity in the past has been to relieve
from the legal consequences of their action such
persons as may have incurred liability to individuals.
This traditional object of an Act of Indemnity is
one of the two principal provisions contained in
section 1 of the Act of 1920, subsection 1 of which,
provides that :
' No action or other legal proceedings whatsoever,
whether civil or criminal, shall be instituted in any
court of law for or on account of or in respect of
any act, matter or thing done, whether within or
without His Majesty's Dominions, during the war ^
before the passing of this Act, if done in good faith,
1 Ibid., p. 48.
2 See for example 34 Geo. Ill, c. 54 (1794) annually re-enacted
until 1801, and the Act of Indemnity (41 Geo. Ill, c. 66) passed
in the latter year. ^ Defined by section 7 (3).
160 CASE OF REQUISITION
and done or purported to be done in the execution
of his duty or for the defence of the realm or the
pubhc safety, or for the enforcement of disciphne,
or otherwise in the pubhc interest, by a person
holding office under or employed in the service of
the Crown in any capacity, whether naval, military,
air-force or civil, or by any other person acting under
the authority of a person so holding office or so
employed; and, if any such proceeding has been
instituted whether before or after the passing of
this Act, it shall be discharged and made void,
subject in the case of a proceeding instituted before
the twentieth day of July, nineteen hundred and
twenty, to such order as to costs as the court or
a judge thereof may think fit to make : '
But the section has plainly a far wider operation
than would be necessary in order to give to servants
of the Crown the traditional form of relief against
actions founded upon the exercise of illegal or exces-
sive powers/ It provides not only for indemnity
to the servants of the Crown against personal
liability, but prohibits all legal proceedings, of what-
ever nature, against the Crown, in respect of any-
thing done during the war and in terms provides^
that for the purposes of the section a Petition of
Right shall be deemed to be a ' legal proceeding '.
^ The immunity from legal proceedings conferred by section 1
is of course subject to the condition that the Act complained of
was done in good faith and in the execution of duty or for the
defence of the realm or the pubhc safety or for the enforcement
of discipline ' or otherwise in the public interest ' by a person
holding office under or employed in the service of the Crown.
A certificate by a Government Department is sufficient evidence
of authority (s. 1 (3)). Acts done under such authority are
presumed to have been done in good faith, the onus of proving
the contrary being upon the complainant (ibid.).
2 Sect. 1, subsect. (2).
THE INDEMNITY ACT, 1920 161
This prohibition is, no doubt, subject to certain
modifications, of which the most material is the
proviso to sect. 1, subsect. (1) that ' except in cases
where a claim for payment of compensation can be
brought under section two of this Act this section
shall not prevent (inter alia) :
(b) ' the institution or prosecution of proceedings in
respect of any rights under, or alleged breaches of,
contract, if the proceedings are instituted within one
year from the termination of the war or the date
when the cause of action arose, whichever may
be the later.'
But whilst the procedure by Petition of Right is
thus generally preserved as regards actions for breach
of contract the effect of the exception contained in
the proviso is to prevent any petition being brought
for compensation for the requisition of private
property. Such claims are referred to a special
tribunal under the provisions of section 2, sub-
section (1) of which is as follows :
' Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing section
restricting the right of taking legal proceedings, any
person not being a subject of a state which has been
at war with His Majesty during the war and not
having been a subject of such a state whilst that
state was so at war with His Majesty —
(a) being the owner of a ship or vessel which or
any cargo space or passenger accommodation
in which has been requisitioned at any time
during the war in exercise or purported
exercise of any prerogative right of His
Majesty or of any power under any enactment
relating to the defence of the realm, or any
regulation or order made or purporting to
be made thereunder, shall be entitled to
payment or compensation for the use of the
2388 jjj
162 CASE OF REQUISITION
same and for services rendered during the
employment of the same in Government
service, and compensation for loss or damage
thereby occasioned ; or
(h) who has otherwise incurred or sustained any
direct loss or damage by reason of interference
with his property or business in the United
Kingdom through the exercise or purported
exercise, during the war, of any prerogative
right of His Majesty or of any power under
any enactment relating to the defence of the
realm, or any regulation or order made or
purporting to be made thereunder, shall be
entitled to payment or compensation in
respect of such loss or damage ;
and such payment or compensation shall be assessed
on the principles and by the tribunal hereinafter
mentioned, and the decision of that tribunal shall
be final :
Provided that —
(i) The provisions as to the statement of a case
in any enactment relative to arbitrations
shall not apply to any such tribunal, but if
either party feels aggrieved by any direction
or determination of the tribunal on any point
of law, he may, within the time and in accord-
ance with the conditions prescribed by rules
of court, appeal to the Court of Appeal, or
as respects Scotland to either division of
the Court of Session, and the decision of
the Court of Appeal or Court of Session on
any such appeal shall, with the leave of that
Court but not otherwise, be subject to appeal
to the House of Lords ;
(ii) nothing in this section shall confer on Si,ny
person a right to payment or compensation
unless notice of the claim has been given to
the tribunal in such form and manner as
THE INDEMNITY ACT, 1920 16&
the tribunal may prescribe within one year
from the termination of the war or the date
when the transaction giving rise to the claim
took place, whichever may be the later.'
This section it will be observed covers all cases
of requisition, whether of ships, of land, or of chattels.
Under subsection (2) of section 2, compensation is
to be assessed in accordance with the following
principles :
(i) Where under any Regulation or order made or
purporting to be made under any enactment
relating to the defence of the realm, any
special principle for assessment of any pay-
ment (including any price to be paid) or
compensation or the rate thereof, is con-
tained in the Regulation or order, such pay-
ment or compensation shall be assessed in
accordance with that principle or rate :
Provided that nothing in this provision
shall prevent the tribunal in assessing the
payment or compensation from taking into
consideration any circumstances which, under
the regulation in question, it would have been
entitled to take into consideration.
(ii) Where the payment or compensation is claimed
under paragraph {a) of subsection (I) of this
section, it shall be assessed in accordance
with the principles upon which the Board
of Arbitration constituted under the pro-
clamation issued on the third day of August
nineteen hundred and fourteen has hitherto
acted, which principles are set forth in Part I.
of the Schedule to this Act.
^ (iii) In any other case, compensation shall be
assessed as follows : —
(a) If the claimant would, apart from
this Act, have had a legal right to compensa-
M2
164 CASE OF REQUISITION
tion the tribunal shall give effect to that
right, but in assessing the compensation
shall have regard to the amount of the
compensation to which, apart from this
Act, the claimant would have been legally
entitled, and to the existence of a state of
war and to all other circumstances relevant
to a just assessment of compensation :
Provided that this subsection shall not
give any right to payment or compensation
for indirect loss.
(b) If the claimant would not have had
any such legal right, the compensation
shall be assessed in accordance with the
principles upon which the Commission
appointed by His Majesty under Commis-
sions dated the thirty-first day of March,
nineteen hundred and fifteen, and the
eighteenth day of December, nineteen hun-
dred and eighteen (commonly known as
the Defence of the Realm Losses Commis-
sion), has hitherto acted in cases where no
special provision is made as to the assess-
ment of compensation, which principles are
set forth in Part II. of the Schedule to
this Act.'
Claims for compensation accordingly fall under
three heads. Firstly, the special principles of assess-
ment which have been laid down in the Defence of the
Realm Regulations are to apply, with the result (for
example) that for the existing market price of chattels
there is to be substituted an assessment on the basis
of cost, with the addition of an allowance for profit
usually earned before the war. Secondly, claims by
shipowners are to be assessed in accordance with
the principles hitherto acted upon by the Admiralty
Transport and Arbitration Board. Thirdly, a dis-
THE INDEMNITY ACT, 1920 165
tinction is drawn between cases in which, apart
from the Act, a claimant would have had a legal
right to compensation, and cases in which he would
have had no such right.
The application of the rules laid down under
the third head will, it may be anticipated, give
rise to considerable difficulty. In the first place
compensation on a somewhat more generous scale
appears to be contemplated in cases in which
a claimant can establish a legal right, apart from the
Act, than in those in which his loss is not of such
a nature as would give him a legal cause of action.
An instance of a case in which a legal right to com-
pensation exists is that of the occupation of land, as
laid down in the judgments in the Case, the measure
of compensation being that which is provided by the
Defence Acts, and the Defence of the Realm Regula-
tions lay down ' no special principle for assessment '.
How the Courts will in such cases interpret the
direction that regard is to be had to the war and to
all other relevant circumstances, it is not easy to
forecast. In the case of ships, however, and still
more in the case of chattels the position is even
more obscure. According to the decision in Newcastle
Breweries Ltd, v. The King,^ the right to com-
pensation for goods requisitioned for the Navy or
Army is a statutory right, the compensation being
assessable on the basis of the fair market value.
But for this measure there is now substituted
the principle of assessment upon the basis of cost,
together with an allowance for profit at the rate
usually earned before the war, as provided by Defence
of the Realm Regulation 2 B. Is an owner of chattels
1 (1920) 1 K.B. 854.
166 CASE OF REQUISITION
so requisitioned entitled to the benefit of an assess-
ment under subsection (2) (iii) (a) on the footing
that he is in a position, apart from the Act, to
estabhsh a legal right ? And, further, assuming
a case of requisition in which the claim to compensa-
tion rests entirely on common law principles which
have not been determined by adjudication in the
Courts, is he to undertake the burden of establishing
a legal right to compensation, in order to bring his
claim within the operation of subsection (2) (iii) (a) ?
If section 2 (iii) (a) had provided that the tribunal
shall give effect to a legal right, if and when estab-
lished, without qualification, the ordinary rules of
law for the assessment of damage or compensation
would apply. But the subsection affords no guidance
as to how the tribunal is to ' have regard to ' what
are apparently intended to be modifications of the
ordinary principles of legal assessment.
In the next place claims for ' indirect loss ' are
excluded. If this expression be intended as an
affirmation of the rule that only direct and not
remote damages are recoverable in law, it would
appear to be superfluous. If, on the other hand,
the effect be to introduce the somewhat restricted
principles upon which compensation has been hither-
to awarded by the Defence of the Realm Losses
Commission, the distinction between cases falling
within subsection (a) and those which fall within
subsection (b) would to some extent disappear.
It is not within the scope of this excursus to
suggest solutions of these difficulties, and indeed any
attempt to do so would be premature, until some
indication has been afforded by the decisions of the
tribunal constituted by the Act, of the proper
construction to be placed upon its provisions.
THE INDEMNITY ACT, 1920 167
For the ancient form of procedure by Petition
of Right the Act substitutes special tribunals under
section 2 (4) :
' The tribunal for assessing payment or compensa-
tion shall, where by any of the Defence of the Realm
Regulations any special tribunal is prescribed, be
that tribunal, and in cases where the claim is made
under paragraph (a) of subsection (1) of this section
be the said Board of Arbitration, and in any other
case be the said Defence of the Realm Losses Com-
mission.'
The principal burden will no doubt fall in future
upon the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission
under its new title of the War Compensation Court,
over which a Judge of the High Court of Justice,
or, in cases where the claim is in respect of inter-
ference with property or business in Scotland
a Judge of the Court of Session will preside/
The legal character of the tribunals charged with
the duty of assessing compensation is further empha-
sized by the provisions for appeals on questions of law
contained in proviso (i) to section 2, subsect. (l).^ .
^ s. 2, subsect. (5).
APPENDIX A
Ibouee of Xorb6-
Monday, May 10, 1920.
THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL (on behalf of His
Majesty) ....... Appellant
AND
DE KEYSER'S ROYAL HOTEL, LIMITED . Eespondents,
Lords present :
LORD DUNEDIN.
LORD ATKINSON.
LORD MOULTON.
LORD SUMNER.
LORD PARMOOR.
JUDGMENT 1
LORD DUNEDIN : My Lords, it will be well that I should
first set forth succinctly the facts which give rise to the present
Petition, all the more that as regards them there is no real
controversy between the parties. [His Lordship then stated
the facts as set out at pp. I to 3, ante.] The relief asked was : ' (1)
A declaration that your suppliants are entitled to payment of
an annual rent so long as Your Majesty's Principal Secretary of
State for the War Department or Your Majesty's Army Council
or any other person or persons acting on Your Majesty's behalf
continues in use and occupation of the said premises. (2) The
sum of £13,520 lis. Id. for use and occupation of your suppliants'
said premises by your suppliants' permission from the 8th day
of May 1916 to the 14th day of February 1917. (4) A declaration
that your suppliants are entitled to a fair rent for use and
occupation by way of compensation under the Defence Act,
1842.' To this reply was made by the Attorney-General on
behalf of His Majesty to the following effect : ' (7) No rent or
compensation is by law payable to the suppliants in respect of
the matters aforesaid or any of them either under the Defence
Act, 1842, or at all. The suppliants have been offered on behalf
^ From the shorthand notes of Walsh & Sons, 4 New Court, Carey Street, W.C.
JUDGMENT (LORD DUNEDIN) 169
of His Majesty payment of such sum as in the opinion of the
Defence of the Realm Losses Commission ought in reason and
fairness to be paid to them out of public funds in respect of
direct and substantial loss incurred and damage sustained by
them by reason of interference with their property or business in
the United Kingdom through the exercise by the Crown as
aforesaid of its rights and duties in the Defence of the Realm/
The case depended before Mr. Justice Peterson, who dismissed
the Petition, ^ holding himself bound by the decision of the Court
of Appeal in In re Petition of Right.^ Appeal being taken
to the Court of Appeal, that Court, by a majority, Lord Justice
Swinfen Eady (Master of the Rolls) and Lord Justice Warrington,
Lord Justice Duke dissenting, reversed the decision of Mr. Justice
Peterson and made the following declaration : ' And this Court
doth declare that the suppliants are entitled to a fair rent for
use and occupation of De Keyser's Royal Hotel on the Thames
Embankment, in the City of London, by way of compensation
under the Defence Act, 1842.' ^ Against this Order the present
Appeal has been brought.
My Lords, I shall mention first, in order to put it aside, one
argument put forward by the respondents. It was that the
Crown should pay a reasonable sum for use and occupation of
the premises upon the ground of an implied contract, the entry
of the Crown to the premises having been permitted by the
Receiver, and taken by the Crown in virtue of the Receiver's
permission. The simple answer to this argument is that the facts
as above recited do not permit of its application. In any case
of implied contract there must be implied assent to a contract
on both sides. Here there was no such assent. There was no
room for doubt as to each party's position. The Crown took as
of right, basing that right specifically on the Defence of the
Realm Act.* The Receiver did not offer physical resistance to
the taking, and was content to facilitate the taking. He emphati-
cally reserved his rights, and gave clear notice that he main-
tained that the Crown was wrong in its contention, and that no
case for taking under the Defence of the Realm Act had arisen :
in other words, that the Crown had under these circumstances,
according to their proposals, unlawfully taken. To spell out
of this attitude on either side an implied contract is, to my mind,
a sheer impossibility. Now that the act of taking by the Crown
1 34 T.L.R. 329. ^ 19^5^ 3 k.B. 649. « (1919) 2 Ch. 197.
* Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
170 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD.
was in itself legal is necessarily admitted by both sides. It is
the basis of the case for the Crown, who said at the time that
they took under the Defence of the Realm Act, and now add in
argument that whether that was so or not they took de facto,
and can justify that taking under the powers of the Prerogative.
It must necessarily be admitted by the respondents, for if taking
in itself was purely illegal, then it would be a tort not committed
by the Crown, who cannot commit a tort, but by the Officers of
the Crown, and the Petition of Right would not lie. The question
in the case is therefore narrowed to one point, and one point
only ; the Crown having legally taken, is it bound to pay com-
pensation ex lege, or is the offer to pay compensation ex gratia,
as that compensation may be fixed by the Losses Commission,
a sufficient offer and an answer to all demands ?
My Lords, I have already quoted the letter of May 1, which
shows that the War Office propose to take possession of the
hotel under the Defence of the Realm Regulations, but in the
argument in the Court below, and before your Lordships, the
taking has been justified by the power of the Prerogative alone,
and there has been a very exhaustive citation »of authority on
the powers of the Crown in virtue of the Prerogative. I do not
think it necessary to examine and comment on the various cases
cited. The foundations of the contention are to be found in the
concessions made in the speech of Mr. St. John in Hampden' s
Case} and in the opinion of the consulted Judges in the Saltpetre
Case.^ I do not quote them, for they are fully quoted in the
judgments of the Courts below and in the opinions of the
learned Judges in In re a Petition of Right. The most that could
be taken from them is that the King, as suprema potestas,
endowed with the right and duty of protecting the Realm, is
for the purpose of the defence of the Realm in times of danger
entitled to take any man's property, and that the texts give no
certain sound as to whether this right to take is accompanied by
an obligation to make compensation to him whose property is
taken. In view of this silence it is but natural to inquire what
has been the practice in the past. An inquiry as to this was
instituted in this case, and there has been placed before your
Lordships a volume of extracts from the various records. The
search is admittedly not exhaustive, but it is sufficient to be
illustrative. The learned Master of the Rolls in his judgment ^
has analysed the documents produced. He has divided the
(1637) 3 How. St. Tr. 825. » (1606) 12 Rep. 12. « (1919) 2 Ch 221.
JUDGMENT (LORD DUNEDIN) 171
time occupied by the search into three periods, the first prior
to 1708, then from 1708 to 1798, and the third subsequent to
1798. The first period contained instances of the acquiral of
private property for the purposes of defence by private negotia-
tion, in all of which, it being a matter of negotiation, there is
reference to the payment to be offered for the land taken. With
the second period we begin the series of statutes which authorize
the taking of lands and make provision for the assessment of
compensation, the statutes being, however, of a local and not of
a general character, dealing each with the particular lands pro-
posed to be acquired. The third period begins with the intro-
duction of general statutes not directed to the acquisition of
particular lands, and again making provision for the assessment
and payment of compensation.
I shall refer to the statutes presently, but, generally speaking,
what can be gathered from the records as a matter of practice
seems to resolve itself into this. There is a universal practice of
payment resting on bargain before 1708, and on statutory power
and provision after 1708. On the other hand, there is no mention
of a claim made in respect of land taken under the Prerogative
for the acquisition of which there was neither bargain nor statu-
tory sanction. Nor is there any proof that any such acquisition
had taken place. My Lords, I do not think that from this usage
of payment there can be imposed on the Crown a customary
obligation to pay, for once the taking itself is admitted to be as
of right the usage of payment so far as not resting on statutory
provision is equally consistent with a payment ex lege and a pay-
ment ex gratia. On the other hand, I think it is admissible to
consider the statutes in the light of the admitted custom to pay,
for in the face of a custom of payment it is not surprising that
there should be consent on the part of the Crown that this branch
of the Prerogative should be regulated by statute. It is just here
that the full investigation into the statutory history which has
been made in this case, and of which the Court of Appeal and
your Lordships have had the advantage, serves to dislodge a view
which I cannot help thinking was very influential in determining
the judgment of the Court of Appeal in the case of In re a
Petition of Right. ^ Digressing for the moment to that case,
I am bound to say that I do not think that this case can be
distinguished from that in essential particulars. The existence
of a state of war is common to both. As to the necessity for the
> (1916) 3 K.B. 649.
172 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEY8ER8 HOTEL, LTD.
taking over of the particular subject, the Crown Authorities
must be the judge of that, and the evidence as to the necessity
for the occupation of these premises in the opinion of the Crown
advisers is just as distinct and uncontradicted in this case as it
was in that. I confess that had I been sitting in the Court of
Appeal I should have held the same view as was expressed by
Mr. Justice Peterson, namely, that it was ruled by the case of
In re a Petition of Right. ^ This, however, is immaterial, for
In re a Petition of Right ^ is not binding on this House, and it
would have been equally proper for the learned Master of the
Rolls, Lord Justice Swinfen Eady, and for Lord Justice Warring-
ton who had obviously changed his opinion on further argument,
to give your Lordships the benefit of the opinions they had come
to on the merits, even if, being unable to distinguish between
the two cases, their judgment had been formally given to the
opposite effect from what it was.
Now the view which I think prevailed in In re a Petition of
Right was that the Prerogative gives a right to take for use of the
moment in a time of emergency, that when you come to the
Defence Acts of 1803 and 1842 you find a code for the taking of
land permanently in times of peace as well as of war, and that
consequently the two systems could well stand side by side ; and
then as there was no direct mention of the Prerogative in the
statutes you were assisted by the general doctrine that the
Crown is not bound by a statute unless specially mentioned.
That in cases where the burden or tax is imposed the Crown must
be specifically mentioned, no one doubts. Instances are given
by the Master of the Rolls in the cases of Wheaton v. Maple,^
and Coomber v. Justices of Berks,^ and there are manyothers.
None the less, it is equally certain that if the whole ground of
something which could be done by the Prerogative is covered
by the statute, it is the statute that rules. On this point I think
the observation of the learned Master of the Rolls is unanswer-
able. He says : ' What use would there be in imposing limita-
tions if the Crown could, at its pleasure, disregard them and
fall back on Prerogative ? ' The Prerogative is defined by a
learned constitutional writer as ' The residue of discretionary or
arbitrary authority which at any given time is legally left in
the hands of the Crown.' Inasmuch as the Crown is a party
to every Act of Parliament, it is logical enough to consider that
when the Act deals with something which before the Act could
» (1915) 3 K.B. 649. ^ (1393) 3 ch. 64. ^ (1883) 9 A.C. 61.
JUDGMENT (LORD DUNEDIN) 173
be effected by the Prerogative and specially empowers the Crown
to do the same thing but subject to conditions, the Crown assents
to that, and by that Act, to the Prerogative being curtailed.
I have read very carefully and considered the judgments
delivered in In re a Petition of Right} and it is, I think, apparent
that the view of the series of statutes there presented was that
the general statutes had their inception for the purpose of perma-
nent acquisition in times of peace as well as of war, but in the
fuller citation that has been made in this case we find that this
is not so. It is somewhat significant that in the first statute of
all dealing with the acquisition of land, 7 Anne, c. 26, we have
a reference to ' the usual methods ' that had been taken to
prevent extortionate demands, and the usual methods are said to
be a valuation by jury. It is also significant that in the whole
statutory series there is no trace of any claim to take under the
Prerogative and not to pay. On the contrary, for instance, in
31 Geo. II, c. 39, date 1757, we find during the war (that is the
Seven Years War) land had actually been taken, that extravagant
claims were feared, and then that is followed by a statutory
provision for vesting the lands taken in trustees till the price
may be paid as fixed by assessment by jury, and then on payment
the trustees are to hold for His Majesty. But the real point
seems to me to be that we find that even before the idea of
a general Act, that is to say, when the Acts were limited in time
to the continuance of a war, there is provision made for a tem-
porary taking and for payment, or, in other words, for getting
by statute, with the concomitant obligation of payment, that
very temporary possession which, according to the view expressed
above, was the function of the Prerogative to provide free of
charge, leaving it to statute to provide for a permanent acqui-
sition. Thus in 38 Geo. Ill, c. 27, date 1798, in the middle of
the war with the revolutionary Government of France, which
began in February 1793 and ended with the Peace of Amiens in
March 1802, we find in section 10 powers given to His Majesty to
authorize a general officer to mark out any piece of ground
wanted for the public service, and to treat with the owner thereof
or any person or persons having any interest therein ' for the
possession or use thereof during such time as the exigencies of
the service shall require ', and in case of refusal, to take the land
and get the value assessed by jury. This Act was limited to the
continuance of the war. War again broke out against France on
» (1915) 3 K.B. 649.
174 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSETS HOTEL, LTD.
April 29, 1803, Napoleon being first Consul for life, and
43 Geo. Ill, c. 35, July 1803, repeated the provisions of
38 Geo. Ill, c. 27. It again was limited to the duration of ' the
present hostilities with France '. Then in 1804, there being
still war with France and a prospect of invasion by Napoleon,
44 Geo. Ill, c. 95, was passed. This had no temporary clause.
It recited that doubts had arisen as to whether the Act of 1803
authorized permanent acquisition, and it proceeded to provide
for temporary taking, using the old phrase ' for such time as
the exigencies of the public service may require ', and contained
the old arrangements for assessment of the payment by a jury.
This Act was the forerunner of, and was superseded by, the
existing Act of 1842,^ which again repeats the words ' during the
exigencies of the public service '. This Act was passed in time
of peace. It thus appears that the inception of the legislation
was during that very period and connected with that very
requirement which, if the argument in In re a Petition of Right
was sound, was satisfied by the powers of the Prerogative alone,
that is to say, it dealt with temporary acquisition during a period
of war, and the Act of 1842 only continued that legislation.
It is therefore impossible, in my opinion, to say that the whole
field of the Prerogative in the matter of the acquisition of land
or rights therein was not covered by the Act of 1842. It follows
from what I have said above that there is no room for asserting
an unrestricted Prerogative right as existing alongside with the
statutory powers authorizing the Crown to acquire on certain
terms. The conclusion is that the Crown could not take the
Petitioners' premises by the powers of the Prerogative alone.
I now come to the Defence of the Realm Consolidation
Act of 1914,2 the Act under the powers of which the Crown
professes to take. Now, just as the statutes must be interpreted
in view of what the rights and practices antecedent to them
had been, so we must look at the Defence of the Realm Act in
view of the law as it stood previous to its passing. The Defence
of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, passed on November 27,
1914, declares by section 1, subsection (1), that His Majesty
has power during the continuance of the war to issue regulations
for securing the public safety and the defence of the realm.
Subsection (2) says that any such regulations may provide for
the suspension of any restrictions on the acquisition or user of
land . . . under the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1875. Pursuant to
1 5 & 6 Vict. c. 94. 2 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
JUDGMENT (LORD DUNEDIN) 175
this Act a regulation was issued on November 28, 1914, which
empowered the competent Naval or Military Authority, or any
person authorized by him, * when for the purpose of securing the
public safety or the defence of the realm it is necessary to do so
(subsection (a)) to take possession of any land, and (subsection
(6)) to take possession of any buildings.' It is clear that under
these subsections the taking possession of De Keyser's Hotel
was warranted, but there was no necessity for the public safety,
or the defence of the realm, that payment should not be made,
such payment being on the hypothesis that the views above
expressed as to the Act of 1842 were sound — a necessary con-
comitant to taking. The very structure of the Act points the
same way. Why provide by subsection (2) for the suspension
of restrictions under the existing Act which allowed of taking
land if a mere taking simpliciter was all that was wanted ? The
thing may be tested in another way. Suppose the regulation as
to taking land had had added to it the words ' without making
any payment therefor '. That would have left no doubt as to
the regulation. The question would have been, was it ultra
vires ? It could only be intra vires if it were necessary for the
safety of the realm, and that is the same question over again,
and again the existence of the powers of subsection (2) of the
Act can be appealed to. The argument is practically analogous
to the argument that prevailed, and I think rightly prevailed,
in the judgment of Mr. Justice Salter in the case of Newcastle
Breweries Company v. The King} where the taking of the goods
was held a necessity, but the extrusion of the subject where
goods were taken from the King's Courts in the event of non-
agreement as to value was not. It will have been noticed that
the regulation which authorizes the taking of land says nothing
about doing away with restrictions, or, in other words, does
not specifically purport to be made in virtue of subsection (2)
of the Act. None the less, it may well be held to be virtually so.
There are various restrictions as to the initiation of proceedings,
notices, &c., which I have not thought it necessary to quote.
These may be taken as swept away by the simple authority to
take. There remains the question whether the obligation to pay
can be considered as a restriction and also swept away. I think
it cannot. The word ' restriction ' seems to me appropriate to
the various provisions as to notice, but not at all appropriate to
the obligation to make compensation.
» (1920) 1 K.B. 854.
176 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEY8ERS HOTEL, LTD,
There are two other matters as to which I should say a few
words. The learned Attorney-General laid great stress on the
words of section 1 of the Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of
Land) Act, 1916,^ which, providing for a continuation of powers
after the war, begins thus : ' Where during the course of or within
the week immediately preceding the commencement of the
present war possession has been taken of any land by or on
behalf of any Government Department for purposes connected
with the present war, whether in exercise or purported exercise
of any Prerogative right of His Majesty, or of any power conferred
by or under any enactment relating to the defence of the realm
or by agreement or otherwise, it shall be lawful,' &c. This, he
argued, was a statutory confirmation and declaration of the
power to take under the Prerogative. So it may be, but if the
views expressed in the first part of my remarks are right it
leaves those views untouched. And, further, the words used
really amount to this. They do not in any way define the rights^
which the Crown has to take, but they say if the Crown has de
facto taken quo cunque modo then it shall be lawful as thereafter
provided to continue possession.
The other point is as to the remedy. I am of opinion that
a Petition of Right lies, for it will lie when in consequence of
what has been legally done any resulting obligation emerges on
behalf of the subject. The Petition of Right does no more and
no less than to allow the subject in such cases to sue the Crown.
It is otherwise when the obligation arises from tort, but, as
already insisted on, what was done here, so far as the taking of
the premises was concerned, was perfectly legal.
On the whole matter I am therefore of opinion that the
judgment of the Court of Appeal was right and ought to be
afiirmed, and the Appeal dismissed with costs.
LORD ATKINSON : My Lords, .the facts have been already
stated by my noble and learned friend who has preceded me.
If anything be clear in this important case it is, on the
correspondence already referred to, this : that the Army Council,
acting through their agent Captain R. C. Coles, did not claim
to take possession of the respondents' hotel by virtue of the
unrestricted and unqualified Prerogative of the Crown. On the
contrary, they justified their action and claimed the right to
do what they in fact did by virtue of the power and authority
conferred upon them by the legislative provision of the Defence
1 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 63.
JUDGMENT (LORD ATKINSON) 177
of the Realm Regulations in force on May 1, 1916. It is, I think,
equally clear that the respondents never admitted that the
Crown possessed under these regulations the power it claimed
to exercise. This is apparent from Mr. Whinney's letters of
May 3 and 5, 1916. In only three ways, it would appear to
me, could the respondents resist or oppose the action of the
Crown : (1) by physical force — which is of course impossible ;
(2) by immediate proceedings at law ; and (3) by protest. They
adopted the last-named of these methods, but subject to that
they yielded only to force majeure. Mr. Whinney no doubt
informed Captain Coles that notwithstanding what he had said,
all those interested in the hotel felt that every assistance should
be given to the military authorities and that no steps should be
taken which would cause inconvenience or delay, and further,
that he had caused notice to be given to all the guests in the
hotel and would hand over possession in accordance with the
notice (i. e. the letter of May 1, 1916). Possession was handed
over accordingly on May 8. It appears to me impossible on
these facts to hold that this handing over by the respondents of
the possession of their hotel was not in reality done in invitum.
The respondents having done this and expressly reserved all
their legal rights, they, like good citizens, without prejudice to
those rights, facilitated those oiB&cers in taking over the possession
in order to help the aerial service to be better carried on. If
anything resembling what has taken place in this case had taken
place between two citizens, it is obvious that the most appro-
priate remedy of the party aggrieved would have been to sue in
trespass for damages. The respondents cannot proceed by
Petition of Right to get redress for a tort-like trespass, for the
King can do no wrong, and the principle of respondent superior
does not apply tp the Crown where the wrong is committed by
its officers. It by no means follows, however, that because the
respondents cannot sue in tort by Petition of Right, they can
sue in contract for compensation for the use and occupation of
their premises. It is no doubt quite true that a private person,
or in some instances a public body, can, as it is phrased, waive
a tort and sue in contract, but that can only be true where both
of these remedies are open to him or it. The aggrieved party
may then elect which remedy to pursue, and this though both
causes of action arise out of the same transaction. The familiar
case of a passenger in a railway train who takes and pays for
a ticket to be carried to his destination and is injured in transitu
2388 jq-
178 ATT.-GEN, v. DE KEYSETS HOTEL, LTD.
by the negligence of the company's servants is an instance of
this. He can sue the company in either form of action. That,
however, of course does not apply to a case where a trespasser
enters into and holds possession of a man's land against his will
while purporting to act under a power the existence of which the
owner challenges and against the exercise of which he protests.
The Court of Appeal, as I understand their judgment, held
that the Crown could be proceeded against by Petition of Right
to recover compensation in use and occupation for the breach of
its contract to pay for the use and enjoyment of the respondents'
hotel, and several authorities had been cited to support this view.
Differing as I do on this point from the views of the two learned
Lords Justices who constituted the majority, and entertaining, as
I do, the most sincere respect for the survivor of those two
Lords Justices as well as for the memory of the distinguished
Lord Justice since unhappily deceased, I feel bound to justify
my dissent from their views by an examination of the authorities
on the point at greater length, perhaps, than might otherwise be
excusable. These authorities establish, I think, this proposition,
that in order to recover in the ordinary action for use and
occupation the plaintiff must prove the existence of an agreement,
expressed or implied between him and the defendant, to the effect
that the latter shall at least be the tenant at will of the former
of the lands or premises occupied and shall pay for that occupa-
tion. In Phillips V. Homfray,^ Lord Justice Bowen, as he then
was, at page 461 , said : ' Actions for use and occupation according
to the better opinion have been confined to the class of cases
where the defendant is not a trespasser setting up an adverse
title, and where there are no circumstances that negative the
implication of a contract (see Churchward v. Ford,^ per Pollock
C.B.). No doubt the mere enjoyment by one man of another
man's property, real or personal, may be held under such cir-
cumstances as leave still open as a reasonable inference the
presumption that it is on the terms of payment, just as a man
who takes a bun from the refreshment counter at a railway
station takes it on the implied promise to pay for it.' A familiar
example of the class of cases in which the circumstances negative
the implication of such a contract is where a purchaser enters
with the owner's permission into possession of property sold
under a contract of sale, the purchase of which subsequently
* (1883) 24 Ch. D. 439 : affirmed on the ground that the appeal was out of
time (1886) 11 A.C. 466. ^ (1357) 2 H. & N. 446 ; 157 E.R. 184.
JUDGMENT (LORD ATKINSON) 179
goes off. In Howard v. Shaw,^ Baron Parke, at page 122, said :
* If the defendant had entered into possession under an agree-
ment there is no doubt he would have been a tenant at will
until the lease was granted. Here he, may be assumed to have
entered into possession under an agreement for sale which was
to be carried into effect by a conveyance. ... I quite agree,
however, that while the agreement subsisted, the defendant was
not bound to pay any compensation for the occupation of the
land, because the contract shows that he was to occupy without
compensation, but still he was tenant at will. When the agree-
ment went off he was still tenant at will, but after that there
was nothing to show that he was not to pay compensation
because the stipulated compensation by payment of the purchase
money was at an end. From that time, therefore, he became
liable to be sued in an action for use and occupation.' Baron
Alderson gave judgment to the like effect, as did also Chief
Baron Palles in Markey v. Coote.^
Even on the assumption that the Crown went into possession
of the hotel, not by virtue of a legislative title or by force of
a paramount power, but by the permission of the respondents,
for which the reasons already given I think it impossible to hold,
I am at a loss to see how an agreement binding at law to pay for
compensation for the occupation can be inferred in face of the
distinct refusal of Captain Coles in his letter of May 1, 1916, to
pay any compensation whatever ex debito but merely ex gratia.
Chief Baron Pollock in delivering judgment said, ' There are
authorities to the effect that where nothing appears except that
one person is entitled to land which another has occupied and
enjoyed an action for use and occupation may be maintained
because a contract may be implied. That explains the decision
in Hellier v. Silcox.^ But the taking of possession as of right
by a disseisor could not be turned into a contract on the notion
that the trespass may be waived and some imaginary contract
substituted. Here the defendant was in possession claiming
title under Mrs. Foss with whom he had contracted. It cannot
be implied that there was a contract with the plaintiffs.' It
would certainly appear to me that in this case the position of
the Crown in reference to this matter resembles more closely
that of the disseisor whom Chief Baron Pollock mentions than it
1 (1841) 8 M. & W. 118 ; 151 E.R. 973.
2 (1876) I.R. 10 C.L. 149.
3 (1850) 19 L.J. (Q.B) 295.
.N2 .
180 ATT,-GEN. v. DE KEY8ERS HOTEL, LTD.
does that of a person entering with the permission of the owner
of the premises.
I now turn to the authorities relied upon by the Court of
Appeal. The first of these is the case of the Marquis of Camden
V. Batterhury} reported on appeal from the Common Pleas.
There a certain builder named J. W. Elliott entered into
an agreement with the landlord of certain lands, the plaintiff
in the action, to build certain houses on these lands, the
plaintiff agreeing as soon as one or more of these houses should
be erected to make a lease to Elliott for a term of years upon
certain terms of each messuage upon which a house was built.
By the articles of agreement Elliott contracted that until the
land with the buildings upon it should be leased to him, he
would pay the same yearly rents or sums as were to be reserved
by the lease when granted. Elliott assigned his interest in this
agreement to the defendant, who took possession of the lands,
erected certain buildings upon them, paid the stipulated yearly
sums, and then assigned his interest to one White. The action
was brought for money claimed to be payable by the defendant
(White) to the plaintiff in respect of the defendant's use by the
plaintiff's permission of certain of the latter's lands and premises.
It was held, affirming the judgment of the Court of Common
Pleas, that neither Elliott nor the defendant acquired any interest
in the land under the building agreement, nor was any tenancy
from year to year created thereby, nor by the occupation of the
lands and the payment of the stipulated sums. With all respect,
this case is, I think, an authority rather against the proposition
it was cited to support than in favour of it. The next case is that
of Levi V. Lewis,^ affirmed on appeal to the Exchequer Chamber.^
There Knight, the superior landlord, let the subject of the
occupation to Levi the plaintiff for a term of years. Levi underlet
to Lewis, the defendant, for the whole term, leaving no reversion
to himself. The interest of both having expired together, Lewis
applied to Knight to allow him to become his (Knight's) tenant.
Knight refused and referred to Levi as still his tenant. Lewis
continued to occupy, and Knight, to the knowledge of Lewis,
continued to insist on holding Levi liable. Levi then sued Lewis
for use and occupation of the land since the expiration of the
term, and Levi then paid the rent for that period to Knight, who
accepted it. The trial judge, Mr. Justice Willes, holding that
1 (I860) 7 C.B. (N.S.) 864 ; 141 E.R. 1055.
2 (1859) 6 C.B. (N.S.) 766 ; 141 E.R. 652.
3 (1861) 9 C.B. (N.S i 872 ; 142 E.R. 343.
JUDGMENT (LORD ATKINSON) 181
there was no evidence to go to the jury of the use and occupation
of the premises by Lewis as Levi's tenant, directed a non-suit.
The Court of Common Pleas held that there was evidence to go
to the jury on an implied contract by Lewis to pay Levi for
the occupation of the premises. Mr. Justice Willes in delivering
judgment said, ' Conceding that the relative position of the
parties would not have enabled Levi to bring an action, yet their
conduct was such that we think there was evidence from which
a jury might infer an understanding or implied contract between
Levi and Lewis that Lewis should pay for the occupation of the
premises. . . . The jury might have thought that Lewis might
have known he was not considered tenant to Knight, but that he
was considered tenant to Levi, and that Knight and Levi had
severally shown by their conduct that they severally took that
view, adding, however, that the Court gave no opinion as to the
conclusion to which the jury ought to come.' On appeal to the
Exchequer Chamber Justices Wightman, Crompton, and Hill
held that the decision of the Court of Common Pleas was right
and should be affirmed. Barons Bramwell and Channel thought
it was wrong and should be reversed, Baron Bramwell adding
that Baron Martin when he left the Court was very much of his
(Baron Bramwell's) opinion. If Lewis immediately on the
termination of the term had told Levi that he stoutly refused to
admit that he was under any legal liability to pay for com-
pensation for his future occupation of the premises, there might
possibly be some resemblance between this case and the
present. As matters stand, there does not appear to me to be
any resemblance whatever between them. The next case is that
of Hellier v. Silcox.^ In reference to this case. Lord Justice
Bowen in Phillips v. Homfray,^ at page 461, said, ' There have
been, no doubt, instances in which, nothing further appearing
in evidence, but that one person is the owner of the land and
that another person has taken possession of it and enjoyed it,
an action for use and occupation under the Statute has been
upheld ^ (see Hellier v. Silcox). In such cases the inference,
in the absence of proof to the contrary, has been allowed to be
drawn that the enjoyment was by permission of the rightful
owner.' Then follows the passage as to the more correct view
already cited. The two facts (1) that the Crown in my view
did not enter into possession with the free leave and consent
of the respondents, but by the coercion of a superior power ;
» (1850) 19 L.J. (Q.B.J 295. ^ (1883) 24 Ch. D. 439.
182 ATT, -GEN. v. DE KEYSER8 HOTEL, LTD.
and (2) that the Crown, when it did, through its officers, enter
into possession absolutely refused to acknowledge any legal
liability to pay compensation in respect of their use and enjoy-
ment of the hotel, fundamentally distinguish all these cases from
the present. In my opinion, therefore, a Petition of Right,
not based upon the statutes of 1798, 1842, or 1914, nor the
regulations made under them, but merely on such legal liability
as arises between citizens when one occupies and enjoys the
property of another with the express or implied permission of
that other to pay compensation for that enjoyment, would on the
facts of this case fail. It is an entirely different question whether on
those same facts these statutes and regulations do not imposeupon
the Crown a statutory liabiUty to pay reasonable compensation, in
the form of a rent or otherwise, for the possession, occupation, use
and enjoyment, acquired compulsorily, of the respondents' hotel.
The late Master of the Rolls in the following pregnant passage
of his judgment ^ put a rather unanswerable question. He said :
* Those powers which the executive exercises without Parliamen-
tary authority are comprised under the comprehensive term
" Prerogative ". Where, however. Parliament has intervened
and has provided by statute for powers previously within the
Prerogative being exercised in a particular manner and subject
to the limitations contained in the statute, they can only be so
exercised ; otherwise what use would there be in imposing
limitations if the Crown could at its pleasure disregard them and
fall back upon Prerogative ? ' It was not contended, it could
not, I think, be successfully contended, that the Act of 1842
and the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act of 1914 ^
(hereinafter referred to as the Act of 1914) do not bind the
Crown, seeing that they deal with what is the special trust and
duty of the King to provide for, namely, the defence and security
of the Realm, and prescribe the mode in which and the methods
by which land or its use is to be acquired by the Crown's officers,
the Ordnance Department, the Admiralty, Army Council, the
members of His Majesty's Forces, and other persons acting on
his behalf for these very purposes, whether one applies the test
suggested in Bacon's Abridgement (7th ed. vol. vii.462), quoted
apparently with approval by Sir John Jessel (Master of theRolls) in
Ex parte Postmaster-General ^ or that laid down by Lord Lindley in
Wheaton v. Maple,^ viz. that the Crown is never bound by
1 (1919) 2 Ch. 216. 2 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
» (1879) 10 Ch. D. 595. * (1893) 3 Ch. 64.
JUDGMENT (LORD ATKINSON) 183
a statutory enactment unless the intention of the Legislature to
bind the Crown is clear and unmistakable.
I think these statutes and regulations satisfy both tests.
Before dealing with them, I desire to express my complete con-
currence in the conclusion at which the late Master of the Rolls
arrived as to the result of the searches made by the Crown
touching the nature and particulars of the commissions issued
in early times in order to determine what sums were paid ex
gratia where lands were taken by the Crown or its officers for the
defence of the realm and the occupation of them connected
therewith by the military. The conclusion, as I understand it,
is this, that it does not appear that the Crown has ever taken
for these purposes the land of the subject without paying for
it and that there is no trace of the Crown having, even in the times
of the Stuarts, exercised or asserted the power or right to do so
by virtue of the Royal Prerogative. I also concur with the
conclusion at which that distinguished and learned judge arrived
as to the purpose, object and effect of the body of legislation
passed from the year 1708 to the year 1798, enabling land or
the use of it to be compulsorily acquired by the Crown on the
terms of the owner being paid for it. I further concur with
him in his analysis of the provisions of the Acts passed in 1803,
1804, and 1819 ^ dealing with the public service. I agree that in
all this legislation there is not a trace of a suggestion that the
Crown was left free to ignore the statutory provisions and by its
unfettered Prerogative do the very things these statutes em-
powered the Crown to do, but free from the statutory conditions
and restrictions imposed by the statutes. It is quite obvious
that it would be useless and meaningless for the Legislature to
impose restrictions and limitations upon, and to attach condi-
tions to the exercise by the Crown of, the powers conferred by
a statute if the Crown were free at its pleasure to disregard all
these provisions, and by virtue of its Prerogative do the very
things the statutes empowered it to do. One cannot in the
construction of a statute attribute to the Legislature, in the
absence of compelling words, an intention so absurd. It was
suggested that when a statute is passed empowering the Crown
to do a certain thing which it might theretofore have done by
virtue of its Prerogative, the Prerogative is merged in the
* The reference should be, not to an Act of Parliament, but to the extract
from the Earl of Chatham's papers printed App. F, p. 295 'post, from which it
appears that legislation was contemplated — see per Swinfen Eady, M.R. (1919)
2 Ch. p. 223.
184 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSETS HOTEL, LTD,
statute. I confess I do not think the word * merged ' is happily
chosen. I should prefer to say that when such a statute express-
ing the will and intention of the King and of the three Estates of
the Realm is passed, it abridges the Royal Prerogative while it
is in force to this extent, that the Crown can only do the parti-
cular thing under and in accordance with the statutory provisions,
and its Prerogative power to do it is in abeyance. Whichever mode
of expression be used, the result intended to be indicated is, I think,
the same, viz. that after the statute has been passed and while it
is in force the thing it empowers the Crown to do can thenceforth
only be done by and under the statute and subject to all the
limitations, restrictions, and conditions thereby imposed, however
unrestricted the Royal Prerogative may theretofore have been.
If that be so, as I think it is, then the first question to be
determined is what particular things the Defence Act of 1842,^
which is really the culmination of the legislation passed from 1800
downwards, enacts ; what the Defence of the Realm Consolida-
tion Act of 1914,2 coupled with the regulations issued under it,
empowers the Crown to do, and what are the conditions, if any,
imposed upon the doing of them. By section 2 (1) of the Defence
of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914 (5 Geo. V, c. 8), passed on
November 27, 1914, the two previous statutes 4 & 5 Geo. V,
c. 29, and 4 & 5 Geo. V, c. 63, are repealed, but it is provided
that nothing in that repeal shall affect any orders made there-
under and that all such Orders-in-Council shall until altered or
revoked by an Order-in-Council under this Act (i.e. 5 Geo. V,
c. 8) continue in force and be in effect as if made under this
latter Act. By section 1, subsection (1), it is provided that during
the continuance of the then present war His Majesty may issue
regulations for securing the public safety and the defence of
the realm, and as to the powers and duty for that purpose of
the Admiralty and Army Council and the members of His
Majesty's Forces and other persons acting on his behalf, and may
by such regulations authorize the trial by court-martial or, in
cases of minor offences, by courts of summary jurisdiction and
punishment of persons committing offences against the regula-
tions, and in particular against any of the provisions and
regulations designed for the five particular purposes mentioned.
The regulations must be designed to secure the public safety
and defence of the realm. Section 2 provides that any such
regulations, that is, any regulations issued to effect those two
» 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94. '^ 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
JUDGMENT (LORD ATKINSON) 185
objects, may provide for the suspension of any restrictions on
the acquisition or user of land, or the exercise of the power of
making by-laws or any other powers under the Defence Acts,
1842 to 1875,1 or the Military Lands Acts, 1891 to 1903. There
is no independent express provision in this Act of 1914 enabling
the Crown, in the emergency of the war, to acquire land or the
use of it for the purpose of securing the public safety and the
defence of the realm. It must, therefore, I think, be assumed
that by reason of the provisions of this second section it was
designed and intended by the Legislature that the ample powers
for the acquisition of land or the use of it either by agreement or
purchase compulsorily conferred upon the Crown by the Act of
1842 should be availed of. Whether the land or its use were
presumed to be acquired by voluntary purchase under its
sixteenth section or compulsorily under its nineteenth section,
the owner in each case was to be paid or compensated for what
he parted with. In addition, by its twenty- third section a further
restriction was placed upon the exercise of the power of com-
pulsory purchase. That section enacted that no lands or buildings
or other hereditament should be taken without the consent of
the owner unless the necessity or expediency of taking it should
be certified by the lord lieutenant of the county in which the
land or hereditament lay, or, in the alternative, by one or more
of the other public functionaries named, and unless the taking
of the land or buildings or other hereditament should be author-
ized by a warrant signed by the Lord High Treasurer or one or
more of the Commissioners of the Treasury of the United
Kingdom for the time being.
The methods of modern warfare have so vastly changed since
this Act of 1842 ^ was passed, that if it was availed of as it stood
by the Crown in the course of the late war, the restrictions might
seriously delay and embarrass the Crown in taking through its
officers adequate measures to secure the public safety and the
defence of the realm, while if the restrictions were removed its
amended machinery must be adequate for the occasion. It is
apparently with this view that section 2 of the Act of 1914 is
confined to the removal of those restrictions. There is no
attempt to set up new machinery. The powers conferred by the
Act of 1842, thus unfettered, are to be allowed to remain operative
and available for use. The words of section 2, however, are
* restrictions on the acquisition or use of land '. When those
» See n. 1, p. 10, ante. 25^6 Vict., c. 94.
186 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSETS HOTEL, LTD.
restrictions are examined it is, in my mind, clear that the legal
obligation to pay for the land or its use, temporarily or perman-
ently acquired, is not a restriction upon the acquisition of either,
or a condition precedent to its acquisition. There is nothing in
the statute to suggest that this liability to pay is to be affected
or taken away by the regulations which may be issued, and if
the regulations purported to do that I doubt if they would not,
having regard to the wording of section 2, be ultra vires. Neither
the public safety nor the defence of the realm requires that the
Crown should be relieved of a legal liability to pay for the
property it takes from one of its subjects. The recognized rule
for the construction of statutes is that unless the words of the
statute clearly so demand, the statute is not to be construed so
as to take away the property of a subject without compensation.
Lord Justice Bowen, in London and North-Western Railway
Company v. Evans,^ at page 28, said : ' The Legislature cannot
fairly be supposed to intend, in the absence of express words
showing such intention, that one man's property shall be con-
fiscated for the benefit of others or of the public without any
compensation being provided for him in respect of what is taken
compulsorily from him. Parliament in its omnipotence can
override or disregard this ordinary principle ... if it sees fit to
do so, but it is not likely that it will be found to disregard it
without plain expression of such a purpose.' There is not in the
Act of 1914 2 or in the regulations framed under it any indication
of such a confiscatory purpose. The Regulations 2, 2a, do not
expressly suspend any restrictions on the acquisition of or user
of land imposed by the Defence Act of 1842.^ They commence
with the statement that the enjoyment of property will be
interfered with as little as may be permitted by the emergency
of the measures required to be taken for securing the public
safety and the defence of the reabn, and provide that the
Admiralty, Army Council, and Air Council, and members of the
Naval and Military Forces and the other persons executing the
regulations shall, in carrying them into effect, observe these
general principles. Thus, by section 2> it is further provided
that the Naval and Military Authority (defined in Regulation 62)
or any person duly authorized by him may, when necessary
for the purpose expressly indicated, namely, for securing the
public safety and defence of the realm, do several things involving
the taking possession of land and user of the real property of
i (1893) 1 Ch. 16. « 5 Geo. V, c. 8. ^ 6kQ Vict., c. 94.
JUDGMENT (LORD ATKINSON) 187
the subject without any of the preliminaries prescribed by the
Defence Act of 1842 ; ^ for instance, he may take possession of
any land, construct military roads thereon, remove any trees,
hedges or fences therefrom ; take possession of any buildings or
other property including works for the supply of gas, electricity,
or water, or any sources of water supply ; take such steps as may
be necessary for placing any buildings or structures in a state of
defence ; cause any buildings to be destroyed, and finally do any
other act involving interference with the private rights of property
for the aforesaid purposes^. As to real property, no preliminary
procedure of any kind is prescribed, and no mention whatever is
made as to payment or compensation in respect of it. As regards
personal property, however, it is provided by the last clause of
section 2 that if after the competent Naval Authority has issued
notice that he has taken or intends to take possession of any
movable property in pursuance of that regulation, any person
having control of any such property sells, removes, or secretes it
without the consent of the competent Military Authority he
shall be guilty of an offence against the regulations. Presumably
some such notice should be given in the case of real property,
though that is not expressly provided. Then one finds a most
significant provision in section 2b, namely, that where any goods
the possession of which has been so taken are acquired by the
Admiralty, Army Council or Air Council or the Minister of
Munitions, those regulations on their very face justify an
immediate taking possession of the real property of the subject
without any preliminary formality or procedure. They are in
absolute conflict with the provisions of the Defence Act of 1842,^
imposing restrictions on the acquisition of land or its use and
prescribing formalities. The two cannot be reconciled, and the
irresistible conclusion must therefore be that the earlier provi-
sions have been suspended by the later.
Again, it appears to me to be almost inconceivable that the
Crown should claim the right to do such things as prostrate fences,
take possession of the great industrial works mentioned, or cause
any buildings to be destroyed without being bound at law to
compensate the owners thereof therefor. The fact that no pro-
vision to a contrary effect has been introduced into these regula-
tions touching real property, while one is introduced touching
goods acquired, suggests, I think, that the provisions of the
Defence Act, 1842,^ touching payment or compensation for real
» 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94.
188 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEY8ERS HOTEL, LTD,
property taken or used were left to apply. There is nothing in
these regulations inconsistent with their being so left. Much
reliance was placed by the Crown on the Defence of the
Realm (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1916 ^ : First, because in
its first section it recognizes that possession of land may be
taken by a Government Department for the purposes con-
nected with the war in exercise of a Prerogative Right of His
Majesty, as well as under any statute relating to the defence
of the realm or by agreement or otherwise. And it enables this
Department to continue in possession of the land for any period
not exceeding two years after the termination of the war. And,
second, because by the same section it provides that the Depart-
ment which continues to occupy the lands after the termination
of the war shall pay a rent in respect of this continued occupation .
As the regulations to be issued under the Defence of the Realm
Consolidation Act, 1914, can only be issued and be operative
during the war, of course they could not deal with possession of
land after the war had ended, and therefore further possession
had to be provided for, but it is difficult to see upon what just
or rational principle the owner of land should be paid a rent for
his land in respect of the possession of it while held by a Depart-
ment after the war has terminated (obviously for the purposes of
winding up the business of the Department), and not paid a rent
or compensation for its use and possession by a Department of
the State while the war continued. This last provision, it would
appear to me, hinders rather than helps the contention of the
Crown. I should be sorry to attempt to lay down any rule of
general appUcation by which the limits of the Royal Prerogative
might be determined. That is not necessary, in my view, in
this case. In my opinion in this case a statutory liability is
imposed upon the Crown to pay for the use and occupation of
the respondents' property. I base that opinion upon the facts
of the case and the provisions of the legislation upon which the
Officers of .the Crown justified their action. The Attorney-
General in his able argument relied much on the word ' tem-
porary ' — temporary use, temporary occupation. What does
the word * temporary ' mean in such a connexion ? It might
cover years, yet mean only the duration of the war. In this
case it covered over three years. At the beginning of the early
stages of a war its duration never could be prophetically fixed
even approximately. It has already been decided in your
1 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 63.
JUDGMENT (LORD MOULTON) 189
Lordships' House in several instances that contracts whose
performance is interrupted by war are terminated because the
duration of the interruption cannot be even approximately fore-
told, so that the word 'temporary' would in the result mean in most
cases of this kind the duration of the war, which might be years.
The only remaining point is whether a Petition of Right will
lie in respect of the statutory liability for an unliquidated amount,
not a fixed sum. In my opinion, based on the authority of The
Queen v. Doutre,^ and Windsor and Annapolis Railway Company
V. The Queen and the Western Counties Railway Company,"^ such
a Petition will lie. I can see no valid distinction between a sum
due under a contract or grant made on behalf of the Crown
mentioned by Chief Justice Erie in Tobin v. The Queen, ^ and
compensation due for the lawful and authorized use and enjoy-
ment by the Officer of the Sovereign on the Sovereign's behalf
of the lands or buildings of a subject. Both seem equally
untainted by tort, both equally untouched by the principle that
the King can do no wrong. I therefore think that the Appeal
fails, that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was right and
should be affirmed, and this Appeal be dismissed with costs.
LORD MOULTON : My Lords, the present Appeal is in the
matter of a Petition of Right presented by De Keyser's Royal
Hotel, Limited, the owners of the well-known hotel of that name,
for compensation for the compulsory occupation of certain parts
of their premises by the War Office acting in the name and on
behalf of the CroAvn for purposes connected with the Defence of
the Realm during the late war. The Crown contests the right
of the suppliants to compensation for such compulsory occupa-
tion, and pleads that it was an exercise of the Royal Prerogative
and gave no right of compensation to the subject. The facts
of the case are not substantially in dispute, the real issue being
a question of law of great and general importance. I shall
therefore deal very shortly with the evidence as to what actually
took place at the time when occupation of the premises was
taken by the Crown.
In April 1916 the authorities at the War Office came to the
conclusion that the premises in question were the most suitable
for housing the heads of the Department having charge of the
Army Air Service, and accordingly they, by a letter dated
» (1884) 9 A.C. 745 ^ (1886) 11 A.C. 607.
=» (1863) 16C.B. (N.S.)310.
190 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD.
April 18, 1916, instructed the Office of Works to make immediate
arrangements to acquire them for that purpose. Negotiations
were thereupon commenced between the Office of Works and
Mr. Whinney (who then represented the suppliants' interest) for
such acquisition. It was at first proposed that they should be
acquired voluntarily at an agreed rent, but as the parties differed
as to the amount of this rent the Board of Works abandoned the
negotiations and informed Mr. Whinney that they were about
to ' communicate with the War Office with a view to the total
premises (excluding the shops) being requisitioned under the
Defence of the Realm Acts in the usual manner '. The War
Office agreed to this course being taken, and on May 1 the Office
of Works, by their direction, wrote to Mr. Whinney a letter,
the material parts of which are as follows : ' De Keyser's Royal
Hotel, E.G. Dear Sir, I am instructed by the Army Council
to take possession of the above property under the Defence of
the Realm Regulations (excluding the shops, the other portions
unlet, and the wine cellars). . . . We do not propose to take
possession until the 8th instant, but I shall be glad if you will
accept this as formal notice of the Department's intention to
take possession on that day.' In accordance with this notice
a representative of the War Office attended on the 8th instant
and took possession of the premises, which were forthwith occupied
by the Military Authorities and continued to be so occupied
throughout the period of the war. It is in respect of this occupa-
tion that the suppliants claim compensation.
The representatives of the Crown have throughout insisted that
possession was taken of the premises under the Royal Prerogative,
and that therefore the suppliants were not entitled as of right to
any payment by way of compensation, but that their sole remedy
was to apply to a certain Commission named the Defence of the
Realm Losses Commission, for an ex gratia allowance in respect of
. the losses that they would suffer by the occupation of their
premises on behalf of the Crown. This Commission was appointed
by Royal Order on March 31, 1915, 'to inquire and determine
and to report what sums (in cases not otherwise provided for)
ought in reason and fairness to be paid to applicants ... in
respect of direct and substantial loss and damage sustained by
them by reason of interference with their property or business
in the United Kingdom through the exercise by the Crown of
its rights and duties in the Defence of the Realm '. It is evident
that the existence of the powers of this Commission can have
JUDGMENT (LORD MOULTON) 191
no bearing upon the question raised by this Petition of Right.
Its jurisdiction is restricted to ' cases not otherwise provided for ',
and the whole basis of this Petition of Right is that the case is
already provided for. The suppliants claim that they have a legal
right to the compensation, and it is that right which they are
seeking to enforce by this petition. In the petition the suppliants
put forward an alternative ground for their claim, viz. that the
premises were given up to the Government by them voluntarily
under circumstances which would in law imply a contract on the
part of the Crown to pay for use and occupation of the premises.
Without discussing the conditions under which such a contract
may be implied, it suffices to say that in my opinion it is abun-
dantly clear that the premises were not surrendered voluntarily
but were taken compulsorily. Both parties in their letters
written at the time treat it as a case of commandeering, as it in
fact was, and Mr. Whinney protested strongly against the action
of the Government in the matter. In short, he did everything to
prevent their taking the premises, short of refusing to give them
up unless the Government used physical force to obtain an entry.
Had he gone further in his resistance than he actually did he
would clearly have put himself in the wrong, for whatever be the
suppliants' right as to compensation, the Government were
undoubtedly entitled to commandeer the premises if they needed
them for the purposes of the Defence of the Realm.
In deciding the issues raised herein between the Crown and
the suppliants, the first question to be settled might in the present
case be, to my mind, treated as a question of fact, viz. Was
possession in fact taken under the Royal Prerogative or under
special statutory powers giving to the Crown the requisite
authority ? Regarded as a question of fact, this is a matter
which does not admit of doubt. Possession was expressly taken
under statutory powers. The letter of May 1, 1916, from the
representative of the Army Council to Mr. Whinney says : ' I am
instructed by the Army Council to take possession of the above
property under the Defence of the Realm Regulations.' It was
in response to this demand that possession was given. It is not
competent to the Crown who took and retained such possession,
to deny that their representative was acting under the powers
given to it by these regulations, the validity of which rests entirely
on statute. It was not a matter of slight importance whether
the demand for possession purported to be made under the
statutory powers of the Crown or the Royal Prerogative. Even
192 ATT. -GEN. v, DE KEYSER8 HOTEL, LTD.
the most fervent believer in the scope of the Royal Prerogative
must admit that the powers of the Crown were extended by the
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act and the regulations
made thereunder. It was for that purpose that the Act was
passed and the regulations made. But even if that were not
so, there was a manifest advantage in proceeding under the
statutory powers. It rendered it impossible for the subject
to contest the right of the Crown to take the premises by the
exercise of the powers given by the statute. The statutory
powers of the Grown were formulated in the regulations in
a manner which was beyond mistake. For example, the regula-
tions gave to the Crown the pgwer * to take possession of any
buildings '. Mr. Whinney, therefore, was clearly bound to
surrender the premises when demanded. It would have been
a very different matter had the demand been made under the
Royal Prerogative. This litigation itself is enough to show how
debatable a proposition it would have been if the claim had
been made that the ancient Prerogative of the Crown covered
the taking of an hotel in London for the more comfortable housing
of a military staff and its clerks and typewriters. All such
questions were put at rest by the Legislature giving express
statutory authority by the regulations. There could hencefor-
ward be no doubt that the Crown possessed the powers formulated
in the regulations and this was the object of the legislation.
But when the Crown elects to act under the authority of a statute,
it, like any other person, must take the powers that it thus uses
cum onere. It cannot take the powers without fulfilling the
condition that the statute imposes on the use of such powers.
The Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914,^ com-
menced by enacting that ' His Majesty in Council has power to
issue regulations for securing the public safety and the defence
of the Realm, and as to the powers and duties for that purpose
of the Admiralty and Army Council and of the Members of His
Majesty's Forces and other persons acting on his behalf '. It
then goes on to particularize certain subjects to which these
regulations may relate, and in subsection (2) it deals with the
question of the acquisition of land as follows : ' (2) Any such
regulations may provide for the suspension of any restrictions
on the acquisition or user of land, or the exercise of the power
of making by-laws, or any other power under the Defence Acts,
1842-75, or the Military Lands Acts, 1891-3.' The Defence
1 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
JUDGMENT (LORD MOULTON) 193
Act, 1842 1 (which may be taken to represent the whole of the
Defence Acts, inasmuch as the latter Acts only modify it in
details which do not concern the matter in this case) is the last
of a series of Acts regulating the acquisition of lands and interests
in land for purposes of the Defence of the Realm. These Acts
commence in 1708 and occur at intervals up to 1842. At first
they related only to land for fortifications at places mentioned
in the Act, but later they became more general in their character,
and authorized the Crown to select suitable land and acquire
it. In all cases compensation was given to the owners for the
land taken. But it is not necessary to dwell on their provisions,
seeing that the Defence Act, 1842,^ repealed all such existing
Acts, and laid down general provisions which have regulated
since that time the procedure for the acquisition by the Crown
of land for such purposes. This Act gives very wide powers
to the Crown. It has unrestricted powers of selection of the
necessary lands, buildings, &c., to be taken. It contemplates,
in the first instance, voluntary purchase ; but, if that cannot be
arranged, then the lands, &c., may be acquired compulsorily,
subject to certain certificates being obtained as to the necessity
or expediency of the acquisition, or in case of actual invasion.
I am satisfied that it enables the Crown to acquire either the
property or the possession or use of it as it may need. In all
cases compensation is to be paid by the Crown, the amount to
be settled by a jury. The regulations and the Act under which
they are made must, of course, be read together, and it is, in my
opinion, a sound inference from the language of subsection (2),
that the Legislature intended that, so far as the acquisition or
user of land was concerned, the regulations should take the form
of action under the Defence Act, 1842,^ facilitated by the suspen-
sion of some or all of the restrictions which it imposes. The
particular provisions relating to the taking of land or buildings
are to be found in section 2 of the regulations. They empower
the Military Authorities to take possession of any land or of any
buildings where, for the purposes of the defence of the Realm,
it is necessary so to do. These are very wide powers, but so
general are the powers of the Defence Act, 1842,^ that they
would be attained by simply suspending the restrictions therein
contained, and allowing its powers to be put in force without
them. Reading, therefore, this regulation with subsection (2)
of the Act, I think it is clear that in the case of acquisition and
2388
1 6 & 6 Vict., c. 94.
O
194 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSER'8 HOTEL, LTD.
user of land under the regulations, we ought to consider them as
authorizing action being taken under the Defence Act, 1842,
save that no restrictions therein appearing are to be enforced.
The duty of pajdng compensation cannot be regarded as a restric-
tion. It is a consequence of the taking but in no way restricts
it, and therefore, as the acquisition is made under the Defence
Act, 1842, the suppliants are entitled to the compensation
provided by that Act.
On these grounds, therefore, I am of opinion that the sup-
pliants are entitled to our judgment in this Appeal. But it
would be unsatisfactory in a case of such general importance to
leave unconsidered the question whether, apart from the fact
that the Crown, expressly purported to be acting under powers
given to it by statute, the suppliants' claim could be maintained.
To decide this question, one must consider the nature and extent
of the so-called Royal Prerogative in the matter of taking or
occupying land for the better defence of the Realm. I have no
doubt that in early days, when war was carried on in a simpler
fashion and on a smaller scale than is the case in modern times,
the Crown, to whom the defence of the Realm was entrusted, had
wide prerogative powers as to taking or using the lands of its
subjects for the defence of the Realm when the necessity arose.
But such necessity would be, in general, an actual and immediate
necessity arising in the face of the enemy and in circumstances
where the rule Salus populi suprema lex was clearly applicable.
The necessity would in almost all cases be local, and no one
could deny the right of the Crown to raise fortifications on or
otherwise occupy the land of the subject in the face of the
enemy, if it were necessary so to do. Nor have I any doubt
that in those days the subjects who had suffered in this way in
war would not have been held to have any claim against the
Crown for compensation in respect of the damage they had thus
suffered. It must not be forgotten that in those days the costs
of war were mainly borne by the Royal Revenues, so that the
King himself was the heaviest sufferer. The limited and neces-
sary interference with the property of the subjects of which
I have spoken, would have been looked upon as part of the
damage done by the war which it had fallen to their lot to bear,
and there is no reason to think that any one would have thought
that he had a claim against the Crown in respect of it. Certainly
no trace of any such claim having been put forward is to be found.
This state of things lasted for several centuries. The record
JUDGMENT (LORD MOULTON) 195
of the preparations made by Queen Elizabeth to resist the attack
of the Spanish Armada, which are contained in the papers in
this case,^ show that it was in full force in her time. I am not
surprised that the careful (though necessarily incomplete) re-
searches into the Public Records have found no precedent for
the claim as of right against the Crown for acts done under its
Prerogative in occupying or using land under the stress of such
a necessity as I have spoken of, and I do not think that a com-
plete investigation would have met with greater success. But
in the last three centuries very important changes have occurred
which have completely altered the position of the Crown in
such matters. In the first place, war has become far more
complicated and necessitates costly and elaborate preparations
in the form of permanent fortifications and otherwise, which
must be made in times of peace. In the second place, the cost
of war has become too great to be borne by the Royal Revenues
so that the money for it has to come from the people through the
Legislature, which long ago assumed and has since retained the
command of all national resources. In the third place, the
feeling that it was equitable that burdens borne for the good of
the nation should be distributed over the whole nation, and
should not be allowed to fall on particular individuals, has grown
to be a national sentiment. The effect of these changes is seen
in the long series of statutes relating to the occupation of land
for the purposes of fortifications or otherwise for national de-
fence, to which I have already referred and which cover the last
two centuries. In all these Acts provision was made for com-
pensation to the individual whose lands were taken or used,
and, indeed, there is clear evidence that for many years prior
to the first of these statutes the Crown acted on this principle.
It is not necessary to examine these Acts in detail. They were
mostly local in their operation, and frequently temporary and
usually related to specific fortifications which it was proposed
to erect. But towards the beginning of the last century the
Acts take on a more general and permanent form, and eventually
they culminate in the Defence Act, 1842,2 which gives to the
Crown through its properly appointed officials the widest possible
powers of taking land and buildings needed for the defence of
the Realm under a minutely defined procedure set out in the
Act. It contemplates that the acquisition shall, as a rule, be by
agreement, but it gives ample powers of compulsory acquisition
» App. D, p. 247, post. ^ 5&6 Vict., c. 94.
02
196 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEY8ERS HOTEL, LTD.
if the necessity be duly vouched, or in case of an actual invasion.
In all cases compensation for the taking or using of the land by
the Crown is to be assessed by a jury who (in the words of the
Act) have to find ' the compensation to be paid, either for the
absolute purchase of such lands, buildings, or other hereditaments
or for the possession or use thereof as the case may be '. This Act
was not limited either in time or place, and with small modifications
which are not material for our present purpose, is still in force.
What effect has this course of legislation upon the Koyal
Prerogative ? I do not think that it can be said to have abro-
gated that Prerogative in any way, but it has given to the Crown
statutory powers which render the exercise of that Prerogative
unnecessary, because the statutory powers that have been con-
ferred upon it are wider and more comprehensive than those of
the Prerogative itself. But it has done more than this. It has
indicated unmistakably that it is the intention of the nation that
the powers of the Crown in these respects should be exercised in
the equitable manner set forth in the statute, so that the burden
shall not fall on the individual but shall be borne by the com-
munity. This being so, when powers covered by this statute are
exercised by the Crown it must be presumed that they are so
exercised under the statute, and, therefore, subject to the equi-
table provision for compensation which is to be found in it.
There can be no excuse for reverting to Prerogative powers
simpliciter, if, indeed, they ever did exist in such a form as would
cover the proposed acquisition, a matter which is far from clear
in such a case as the present, when the Legislature has given
to the Crown statutory powers which are wider even than any
one pretends that it possessed under the Prerogative, and which
cover all that can be necessary for the defence of the nation, and
which are, moreover, accompanied by safeguards to the indi-
vidual which are in agreement with the demands of justice.
Accordingly, if the commandeering of the buildings in this case
had not been expressly done under statutory powers, I should
have held that the Crown must be presumed to have acted under
these statutory powers and thus given to the subject the statutory
right to compensation.
In the argument for the Crown, reference was made to the
Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1916.1 This
Act was passed subsequently to the taking of the suppliants'
lands, and, therefore, has no bearing on the question before this
» 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 63.
JUDGMENT (LORD SUMNER) 197
House. There is nothing in it which purports to take away any
right already acquired by the suppliants, and if it modifies in any
way the quantum of the compensation, that is a matter for the
tribunal which will have to assess it and is not relevant to the
present Appeal. I am, therefore, of opinion that the suppliants
are entitled to the declaration in the form approved of by the
Court below, and that this Appeal should be dismissed with costs.
LORD SUMNER : My Lords, the petition alleges in sub-
stance two rights to compensation, one for a rent for the use and
occupation of this hotel, of which the Crown took possession with
Mr. Whinney's permission, the other for a fair rent as compen-
sation because he voluntarily delivered possession, though pro-
testing against the rights then alleged and maintaining his own
claims of right, whatever they might be. The answer and plea,
beside traverses, allege an exercise of the Royal Prerogative for
the defence of the Realm, and also rely on the Defence of the
Realm Consolidation Act, 1914,^ and the Regulations issued
thereunder. Mention is made of an offer to pay whatever the
Defence of the Realm Losses Commission might award, but
I think this topic has no relevance. The payment would have
been none the less an ex gratia payment, though the sum to be
paid had been calculated under the forms of a judicial pro-
ceeding. Its acceptance would have involved a waiver of the
suppliants' alleged right ; its refusal cannot be an answer to
that right, if they can establish it.
Another introductory argument may be mentioned to be put
aside. The appellant, as I understand it, contends that what was
done was done under the Prerogative, and not otherwise. If the
Prerogative was exceeded then every servant of the Crowii who
used the premises would be personally guilty of trespass, and
trespass being the suppliants' real remedy, the Crown succeeds.
It is the typists and the clerks who are liable. If, on the other
hand, the Prerogative was not exceeded, the Crown succeeds
again. The singularity of this result certainly invited criticism,
and I was at first inclined to think that there might be an answer
analogous to the rule of waiving a tort and suing on an implied
assumpsit. When a civil right may be vindicated in more ways
than one, there is a choice of remedies (Rodgers v. Maw),^ nor
does it necessarily follow that this choice only arises between
such remedies as are available against one and the same party.
» 5 Geo. V, c. 8. " (1846) 15 M. & W. 444 ; 153 E.R. 924.
198 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD,
If the servant of a company, acting ultra vires the company,
converts a stranger's chattel and, having sold it, pays the
proceeds into the company's account as its servant, I suppose
conversion would lie against the servant and for money had and
received against the company (cf. Smith v. Hodson).^ I have,
however, come to the conclusion that no real advantage will be
gained by pursuing arguments turning on forms of actions, for
this reason. The suppliants must make out their right, and
when they allege a right under the Defence Acts they negative
any wrong done in the name of the Crown. There was no
trespass by the clerks and the typists. They acted on a possession
lawfully taken by the Crown, but a possession taken upon terms,
and those terms were such as gave the suppliants a right to
compensation. The only question is whether there is a statutory
right against the Crown under the Defence Acts. In terms the
Crown purported to requisition under the Defence of the Realm
Acts, and, on the correspondence, I think that there was no such
request by the Crown for leave to occupy, followed by consent
on the part of the respondents as would support a claim to
a quantum meruit compensation of rent apart from the statutes.
There was nevertheless such assent as prevents the occupation
from having been taken wholly in invitum, so as to leave the
respondents no position but that of the sufferers of a wrong.
Obviously Mr. Whinney's duty and interest alike impelled him
to insistence on compensation, not to resistance to taking posses-
sion. It was money, not the hotel, that he wanted, and it does
not matter whether he knew or not on what legal ground to put
his claim. The question does not legally turn on permission or
submission. On the facts he cannot say that he so gave possession
as to imply a contract for rent, but I see nothing in them to
exclude his assertion of a right to compensation, if he can estab-
lish that right in law.
The Crown has throughout purported to act on statutory
rights (whether fully or correctly referred to or not), and the
Prerogative has not been vouched except in argument in the
present case. I do not mean that it is not open to the Law
Officers to rely on the Prerogative now, or that I assume the
writer of the letter dated April 29, 1916 to have had any autho-
rity to bind the Crown by an election between its statutory and
its Prerogative rights. If, however, under the statutes, including
the Defence of the Realm Acts, which deal with taking buildings
1 (1791) 4 T.R. 211 ; 100 E.R. 979.
JUDGMENT (LORD SUMNER) 199
for the public safety and the defence of the Realm, the Crown
had the power to requisition this building on terms as to com-
pensating the respondents, I think it cannot contend now that
by the course taken the exercise of statutory powers was excluded,
and that none were in fact exercised. To begin with 1914, the
question then arises, whether the premises could have been
acquired simply under the Defence of the Realm Consolidation
Act, 1914,^ and the Regulations made thereunder, to the exclusion
of the Defence Acts, and so to the exclusion of any right to
compensation, or whether if statutory powers were exercised at
all, they must have included the powers (and the obligations)
for which these Acts provided. I think that no real importance
attaches to the re-arrangement of section 1, which was made
when the Statute of November 27, 1914 superseded that of
August 8. The Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914,^
does not purport to embody in the form of an enactment the
Crown's existing Prerogative. The Act empowers the Crown to
issue regulations. Now there is no Prerogative to make regula-
tions, though it may be that some of the things which may be
regulated under the Act might also be done under the Prerogative.
It is, however, also clear that some things which may be validly
ordered under regulations under the Act could not have been
done under the pre-existing Prerogative. Further, under this
Act alone no building could be requisitioned unless and until
some regulation had been issued to that effect. Two kinds of
regulations might be issued, one for the purpose of securing the
public safely and the defence of the Realm, and the other in order
to alter the existing Acts of Parliament for the time being by
providing for the suspension of any restrictions on the acquisition
or user of land contained in sundry named Acts. Section 1,
subsection 1, provides for the first kind ; section 1, subsection 2,
for the second. Of the Regulations, No. 2 is that material to
the present purpose ; it deals with taking possession of any
buildings and with doing any act (other than those specially
described) involving interference with private rights of property.
If the Crown were to exercise the powers of taking buildings,
which are given by the Defence Acts, this regulation could well
be held to dispense with the formalities prescribed by them.
They would be restrictions, which the regulation would have
suspended. The obligation to pay compensation to the dis-
possessed owner, which that Act provides for, is, however, not
» 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
200 ATT. -GEN. y. DE KEYSETS HOTEL, LTD.
a restriction on the acquisition of his land. It might discourage
the exercise of the power of acquisition but it does not limit that
power. The power is complete independently of payment, and it
is fully exercised before the obligation to pay arises.
The next question is, should Regulation 2 be regarded as
having been made in exercise of the powers given by the first
or by the second subsection of section 1 of the Defence of the
Realm Consolidation Act ^ ? In other words, is it to be regarded
as an exercise of a power to requisition under regulations issued
for the purpose, or as an exercise of the power to facilitate
requisitioning already authorized ? It is true that it authorizes
the competent naval or military authority to do the above-men-
tioned things * for the purpose of securing the public safety,
or the Defence of the Realm ', but that is the purpose mentioned
in section 16 of the Defence Act, 1842,^ and the words may only
be a reference to that section. Furthermore, the regulation deals
with many matters beside the acquisition of land and buildings,
and these would in any case require a substantive reference to
the above purposes, which sufficiently accounts for the use of the
words without its being necessary to read them as pointing to
the exercise of a new power of requisitioning. With all respect
to the opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Avory,^ I think it should
be treated as only an exercise of the power of suspending restric-
tions given by subsection 2. If it were held that this regulation
is to be deemed to have been made, so far as the acquisition of
land or buildings is concerned, in exercise of new powers given
by subsection 1, on the ground that the regulations to be issued
are regulations as to the powers of the Army Council from time
to time and not merely as to the exercise of its powers, then
it would follow that the Crown, having full power of accomplishing
the desired acquisition under the Act of 1842,^ and of suspending
any inconvenient restrictions on that power, must be deemed to
have been advised to exercise a new power of accomplishing
the same object, diflPering from the existing power in one respect
only, namely, that it is accompanied by no obligation to pay the
subject anything. I think it should not be assumed that, even
if the Crown has such a power under section 1, it has been advised
to exercise it solely to avoid paying a subject for the exclusive
use of his property. The presumptions must be, both that the
executive action was taken under powers by which it can be
justified, rather than beyond all powers whatever, and that the
1 5 Geo. V, c, 8. " 5 «& 6 Vict., c. 94. ^ (1915) 3 K.B., p. 653.
JUDGMENT (LORD SUMNER) 201
available powers have been exercised so as to prevent and not so
as to cause avoidable injury to the subject. Further, the Defence
of the Realm Consolidation Act ^ by subsection 2 of section 1
gives an express and limited power of altering by regulation
what is enacted by the Defence Acts. I think that no further
power of restricting those enactments is intended to be conferred
by the general words of subsection 1, nor ought that subsection,
couched as it is in general terms only, to be construed as authoriz-
ing the Crown to do by regulation what the Legislature itself has
already fully provided for by statute, least of all when that
regulation would have the effect of taking the subject's property
without comJ)ensation contrary to the intention of the prior
Acts.
The next question must be, is the Defence Act, 1842,2 with
the other Defence Acts, adequate to enable the Crown to effect
such an object for the purpose of the Defence of the Realm
as that involved in the taking of this hotel ? It is true that
the Act enables much more to be done and that the provisions
for a greater or a less exercise of the power of taking lands are
not kept separate. The same series of sections enables the
Crown to take lands under the Act in peace or in war, in
absolute ownership and in perpetuity, or for temporary occupa-
tion only, but there is no difficulty in severing these provisions.
It is true that, except for an express saving in section XXXIV,
the Royal Prerogatives are not named, but the powers of taking
land are such as only the Crown by its proper officers and depart-
ments can exercise, and the restrictions on the exercise of the
statutory powers, which the Act requires, must necessarily be
restrictions upon the powers of the Crown. It is true that some
of these restrictions might in time of war be inconvenient in
moments of extreme peril ; of these the most formidable is the
giving of a fourteen days' notice, though I observe that some
overtures for this hotel were made in November 1915, and when
the officials came to business in 1916, eleven days were passed
in negotiating for a rent, and the parties got as close together
as £19,000 and £17,500 before it was thought necessary to refer
to the Defence of the Realm Act. If, however, formalities not
inconsistent with the exigencies of a state of war in 1842 would
have been prejudicial to the public service in 1916, the powers
given by subsection 2 of section 1 of the Act of 1914 ^ had only
to be exercised, as in fact they were, and all these difficulties
1 5 Geo. V, c. 8. 2 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94.
202 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEY SERB HOTEL, LTD.
would vanish. I see no reason to doubt that the Act of 1842 ^
gave all the powers necessary for the exigencies of the recent war,
subject only to the removal of restrictions contained in it, and
there is, therefore, nothing to rebut the natural presumption
that Regulation 2 is, in so far as it deals with the matters to
which the Defence Acts would apply, only an exercise of the
power of removing existing statutory restrictions, and is not new
legislation by which the Crown takes new and unrestricted
powers in order to obtain the same result.
The appellant further contended that all that was done could
be done and was done independently of any statute by virtue of
the Royal Prerogative alone. I do not think that the precise
extent of the Prerogative need now be dealt with. The Legis-
lature by appropriate enactment can deal with such a subject-
matter as that now in question in such a way as to abate such
portions of the Prerogative as apply to it. It seems also to be
obvious that enactments may have this effect, provided they
directly deal with the subject-matter, even though they enact
a modus operandi for securing the desired result which is not
the same as that of the Prerogative. If a statute merely recorded
existing inherent powers, nothing would be gained by the enact-
ment, for nothing would be added to the existing law. There is
no object in dealing by statute with the same subject-matter as
is already dealt with by the Prerogative, unless it be either to
limit or at least to vary its exercise, or to provide an additional
mode of attaining the same object. Even the restrictions (such
as they were) imposed by the Defence Acts on any powers of
requisitioning buildings in time of war were in no way incon-
sistent with an intention to abate the Prerogative in this respect,
if not absolutely (New Windsor Corporation v. Taylor 2), at
least for so long as the statute operates. In truth, the intro-
duction of regulations so reasonable only strengthens the sub-
stance of the Royal authority by removing all semblance of
arbitrary power. When, however, the matter is looked at, as
it now must be, in the light of Regulation 2, no room for doubt
remains. The Regulation has the force of statute, and under its
amelioration of the Defence Acts everything could be done for
this purpose that could be done under the Prerogative, equally
efficiently and with equal speed. One difference, and one only,
can be found. According to the argument, under the Prerogative
the subject could claim no compensation for losing the use of
1 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94. 2 (1899) A.C. 49.
JUDGMENT (LORD SUMNER) 203
his property ; under the statute he could. Is it to be supposed
that the Legislature intended merely to give the Executive, as
advisers of the Crown, the power of discriminating between
subject and subject, enriching one by electing to proceed under
the statute, and impoverishing another when it requisitions under
the alleged Prerogative ? To presume such an intention seems
to me contrary to the whole trend of our constitutional history
for over 200 years. Nor is it a reasonable interpretation to say
that the object of the Defence Acts was merely to supplement
the Prerogative by enabling the Crown to pay compensation out
of public funds to a subject damnified by the exercise of the
Prerogative, which otherwise it would not be able to do. A Pre-
rogative Right to take without paying must have been a right
to take without paying out of the Royal funds, but, in truth,
Prerogative can at most extend to taking, and stands quite
apart from payment. There is no Prerogative Right to elect
not to pay. Conversely, if there is adequate power to do all that
is required by proceeding under the Statute, where is the
emergency and public necessity, which is the foundation for
resort to the Prerogative ? My Lords, for these reasons I think
that the Executive did not take possession under the Prerogative,
for the Defence Acts had superseded it ; that the Act of 1914
and Regulation 2 did not in themselves enable possession to be
taken ; that the taking of possession must be referred to the
powers given by the Defence Acts ; and that, in consequence,
the suppliants are entitled to be compensated in accordance
therewith. I do not refer to the many statutes which preceded
the Defence Act, 1842, from the time of Queen Anne, because
they only seem to me to justify without altering my reasons for
this conclusion.
This being so, there are only two further matters to which
I wish to refer. They are the search which was made into the
Public Records at the suggestion of the late Master of the Rolls,
and the passages which have been cited from the opinion of the
Judicial Committee in the case of The Zamora.^
That the search for documents relating to the taking of land
for fortifications and similar purposes in times past was left
incomplete and, indeed, was not much more than begun, is matter
of considerable regret. So far as it went, it is said to have been
inconclusive. Probably it will never go any further, for the
result has scarcely been such as would encourage the Executive
1 (1916) 2 A.C. 77.
204 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD.
to proceed with it, and the subject does not greatly attract the
student of history. The records cover both peace and war.
The result, as it stands at present, seems to be this. Many
documents are forthcoming which relate to the taking of land
for such purposes by agreement and on payment of compensa-
tion. None can be found relating to taking land as of right and
without any compensation at all, even in time of war. No
Petition of Right is to be found in which a suppliant seeks to
recover compensation, but whether this be, as the Crown suggests,
because no subject ever had the temerity to put forward such
a contention, or, as the respondents argue, because the Crown
never gave him occasion to do so, is a matter which remains
unknown. There appears to be no reported case which has
decided that the subject is entitled to compensation for lands
taken by the Crown in purported exercise of the Prerogative,
but to this circumstance the same observation applies. The
point that no suppliant has presented a Petition of Right with
such an object seems to me to be of minor importance. Ex-
perience in the present war must have taught us all that many
things are done in the name, of the Executive in such times
purporting to be for the common good which Englishmen have
been too patriotic to contest. When the precedents of this war
come to be relied on in wars to come, it must never be forgotten
that much was voluntarily submitted to which might have been
disputed, and that the absence of contest and even of protest is
by no means always an admission of the right. In a lesser degree,
I see no reason why similar courses may not have been taken in
times of less gravity. At any rate the fact remains that the claim
of Prerogative right maintained by the appellant is one of the
exercise of which history has preserved no record.
As to the judgment in The Zamora,^ I concede what was there
said to have been correct, but I think that it has been pressed
beyond anything for which, truly understood, it is an authority.
What has to be borne in mind is that no issue as to the Royal
Prerogative arose for determination in that case. The question
was, whether it was consistent with the law of nations that
a Court of Prize should release to the Crown, against deposit of
the value in Court, the property of a neutral held in its custody
pending adjudication, whenever the Crown duly declared that it
was necessary for the defence of the Realm to requisition it. As
part of the reasoning of the judgment their Lordships dealt with
1 (1916) 2 A.C. 77.
JUDGMENT (LORD SUMNER) 205
two points : First, that such requisitioning imposed no greater
burden on the neutral than was borne by the subject, but rather
less ; and, second, that, if on comparison of the municipal laws of
different countries the power of requisitioning was found to be
exercisable in some cases with compensation and in some
without (of which latter class this country was an example
(page 100)), this circumstance would only show that the right
contended for was, as against the neutral, as moderate as any
municipal law warrants, and more so than what is warranted by
our own. The legislation on the subject of national defence was
not material, and was not discussed. I think it is plain that the
judgment in The Zamora made and could make no attempt to
formulate an exhaustive definition of the Prerogative as to
requisitioning ; that it took and could only take decisions on
the subject as it found them, in order to draw from them legiti-
mate inferences throwing light on the matter in hand. The
Shoreham case,^ as it is now called, for obvious reasons meagrely
reported as to the facts under the name of In re a Petition of
Right, was the most recent exemplification of the ancient rule
traced back to the Year Books that for the purpose of repelling
invasion the King, and indeed the subject too, may enter
another's close in order to raise bulwarks therein without com-
mitting a trespass. Rightly or wrongly, the facts of the Shoreham
case ^ were assumed to have been analogous to the case of raising
bulwarks. No question arose of the taking of buildings for the
mere use of administrative officials, although employed in one
of the combatant branches of the administration. The statement
about the absence of compensation was an exact statement of
the state of the reported cases then existing. It did not purport
to lay down that no right to compensation could exist in law,
but merely recorded that none had been decided to exist. The
statement that no Court ought, in time of war, to require of the
officers of the Crown proof {ex hypothesi public proof) of the
reasons of State which had led them to hold that — in a par-
ticular case — a certain course should be taken, seems to me to
be an obvious statement. It is not in conffict with what seems
to me to be an equally obvious proposition, namely, that, when
the Court can see from the character and circumstances of the
requisition itself that the case cannot be one of imminent danger,
it is free to inquire whether the conditions, resting on necessity,
which are held to exist in the Shoreham case,^ are applicable to
» In re a Petition of Right (1915) 3 K.B. 649.
206 ATT.-OEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD.
the case in hand. If so, the argument, in the judgment of The
Zamora,^ did not touch such a case. Unless the Court has such
a power, the mere fact that the competent military authority
honestly believed that what he demanded was needed for the
defence of the Realm, would, on the Appellant's argument,
enable everything to be taken and nothing paid. Of course, with
the progress of the art of war, the scope both of emergencies
and of acts to be justified by emergency extends, and the pre-
rogative adjusts itself to new discoveries, as was resolved in
the Saltpetre Case ; but there is a difference between things
belonging to that category of urgency, in which the law arms
Crown and subject alike with the right of intervening, and sets
public safety above private right, and things which, however
important, cannot belong to that category, but, in fact, are
simply committed to the general administration of the Crown.
My Lords, I think that the judgment of the Court of Appeal
was in accordance with the law, and ought to be affirmed.
LORD PARMOOR : My Lords, the question in debate in
this Appeal is whether the respondents are entitled to rent or
compensation for the temporary use and occupation of the De
Keyser's Royal Hotel on the Thames Embankment. Possession
of the hotel was taken during the war by the Executive Govern-
ment as representing the Crown for purposes admittedly con-
nected with the defence of the Realm. It is not necessary to
restate in detail to your Lordships the negotiations and letters
which passed between the representatives of the Executive
Government and the respondents in connexion with taking
possession of the hotel.
On May 8, 1916, Mr. Fane, of the Office of Works, attended
at the hotel to take over possession from Mr. Whinney who
delivered possession by giving the keys to Mr. Fane. Mr. Whinney
protested against the proceedings and only surrendered posses-
sion under protest. It was stated that the Office of Works did
not recognize any claim for occupation rent and required that
any claim for compensation should be sent to them for trans-
mission to the Defence of the Realm Losses Commission, and
that the premises had been commandeered for military pur-
poses under the Defence of the Realm Acts. It is contended
by the appellant that compensation, if payable at all, is only
payable ex gratia at the discretion of the Commission and not as
» (1916) 2 A.C. 77.
JUDGMENT (LORD PARMOOR) 207
a matter of legal claim. This Commission was appointed to
inquire and report to the Treasury with regard to claims for
direct and substantial loss and damage * in cases not otherwise
provided for '. In my opinion the case under appeal is a case
* otherwise provided for ', and therefore a case which the Com-
mission would have no jurisdiction to entertain. On Feb-
ruary 14, 1917, the respondents presented a Petition of Right
alleging that Mr. Whinney had delivered up possession of the
hotel to representatives of the Crown and that the use and
occupation thereof by the Executive Government was by per-
mission of the respondents, and they claimed a sum as rent in
respect thereof. Having come to the conclusion that the
representatives of the Crown took possession under rights
conferred by statute, it is not necessary to determine whether
or not there was any use and occupation of the hotel by per-
mission of the respondents. The respondents further claimed
that they were entitled to a fair rent for use and occupation
by way of compensation under the Defence Act, 1842, and it
is under this head that a declaration has been made by the
Court of Appeal in their favour. On October 15, 1917, the
Attorney-General filed his answer ""and plea on behalf of His
Majesty, traversing the allegation in the Petition that Mr. Whin-
ney voluntarily delivered up possession of the hotel to the
representatives of the Crown and that the Crown's use and
occupation of the hotel was by permission of the respondents,
and pleading that such possession was properly and lawfully
taken by virtue of His Majesty's Royal Prerogative, as well as
by virtue of the powers conferred by the Defence of the Reabn
ConsoKdation Act, 1914, and of the regulations issued there-
under, and that His Majesty had acquired no right in or over the
premises beyond the right to take and use the same for so long
as might be necessary for securing the public safety in the
defence of the Realm during the continuance of the war.
Mr. Justice Peterson dismissed the Petition with costs, but this
judgment was reversed in the Court of Appeal and a declaration
made that the respondents were entitled to a fair rent for use and
occupation by way of compensation under the Defence Act, 1842.
The first question raised and argued at great length before
your Lordships was whether the Executive Government could
justify their action in taking possession of the hotel without
payment of rent or compensation, under the sanction of the Royal
Prerogative. The Royal Prerogative connotes a discretionary
208 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSER'S HOTEL, LTD.
authority or privilege exercisable by the Crown or the Executive
which is not derived from Parliament and is not subject to
statutory control. This authority or privilege is in itself a part of
the Common Law, not to be exercised arbitrarily but per legem
and sub modo legis. In the present Appeal it is not alleged that
if the Royal Prerogative did authorize the taking of possession of
the premises of the respondents for temporary use and occupation
without payment of rent or compensation, the authority was used
improperly or in an arbitrary manner. Under this head no objec-
tion is put forward. The growth of constitutional liberties has
largely consisted in the reduction of the discretionary power of
the Executive, and in the extension of Parliamentary protection
in favour of the subject under a series of statutory enactments.
The result is that whereas at one time the Royal Prerogative
gave legal sanction to a large majority of the executive functions
of the Government, it is now restricted within comparatively
narrow limits. The Royal Prerogative has, of necessity, been
gradually curtailed, as a settled rule of law has taken the place of
an uncertain and arbitrary administrative discretion. A similar
tendency may be traced in the growth of our legal system.
Portions of the Common Law have been systematically incor-
porated in or modified by Acts of Parliament, and in this way
the obligations which the law imposes have become more definite
and more certain in their application. Apart from the implica-
tion from precedents which will be referred to later, the appellant
states that he relied on the Royal Prerogative, because in a case
of necessity for the public defence the Crown has by the Common
Law a Prerogative Right which has not been abated, abridged,
or curtailed by any of the Defence Acts of 1842-73, or by any
other statute, to enter upon, or take possession of, or to occupy
and use the land of any subject without payment of compensa-
tion. It is not necessary to inquire how far in certain cases of
necessity for public defence the Executive has power to act
without statutory authority, but a generalization of thi^ wide
character requires careful analysis in its application to special
conditions such as have arisen in the present Appeal. In this
instance the De Keyser Hotel was required for administrative
purposes. Under modem conditions the use and occupation pf
land for administrative facilities is a matter of necessity for
public defence, but the necessity is not of the same character
and cogency as arise when the use and occupation of land is
required on the occurrence of invasion or during the occurrence
JUDGMENT (LORD PARMOOR) 209
of actual fighting. On this point I agree with the decision of the
Court of Appeal. Assuming that there is a public necessity
to take possession of land for administrative purposes in connexion
with public defence, there can be no reason why this necessity
should be urged as an answer to a claim for compensation. It is
clear on the negotiations and correspondence that Mr. Whinney
did not raise any objection to handing over the hotel for the use
and occupation of the Executive Government, but that his
protest was limited to the claim of the Executive Government
to take this action and at the same time to deny any claim for
compensation except such as might be oJBfered, as a matter of
grace, by a reference to the Defence of the Realm Losses Com-
mission. An illustration of the distinction which arises in the
character and cogency of the necessity when land or buildings
are required for the exigency of the public service is to be found
in section 23 of the Defence Act, 1842,^ which provides certain
safeguards for the protection of the subject unless the enemy
shall have actually invaded the United Kingdom at the time when
the lands or buildings have been taken. It is further noticeable
that the Prerogative Right claimed is limited to an entry upon,
or to taking temporary possession of, or to the temporary
occupation and use of the land of any subject without payment
of compensation. It is not claimed that it can be extended to
a case of disseisin. Since Magna Carta the estate of a subject
in lands or buildings has been protected against the Prerogative
of the Crown. It is not easy to see what the distinction is between
disseisin and an indefinite use and occupation which may extend
beyond the estate of any particular owner. The later statute
law gives the same claim to compensation to the subject in either
case. An analogy arises in the case of taxation. Money is of
primary necessity for public defence during war, but it has long
been established that in order to obtain the requisite supplies
the Executive must follow constitutional precedent and obtain
Parliamentary sanction. If, however, it could be established
that there had been at one time such a Prerogative Right as is
claimed by the appellant, I am unable to accept the further
proposition that such a right has not been abated, abridged, or
curtailed by any of the Defence Acts, 1842-73, or any other
statute. The provisions, however, of the statute law, as they
affect the Royal Prerogative which the appellant claims, will be
considered subsequently.
1 5 & 6 Vict., c. 94.
2388 p
210 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD,
The precedents on which the appellant relies in support of his
Appeal are R. v. Hampden,^ the Case of Saltpetre,^ Hole v. Barlow,^
and The Zamora.^ No one would dispute the high character
of the arguments of Mr. St. John against the Crown in the case
of ship money, but admissions made in such an argument do
not constitute precedents, and the arguments applicable to the
Royal Prerogative before the revolutionary period must be read
subject to the restrictions which have been subsequently imposed.
Lord Justice Duke in his exhaustive review ^ refers to the judg-
ments of two of the Judges whose opinions were given adversely
to the claim of the Crown, and quotes passages from the judg-
ments of Mr. Justice Crooke and Mr. Justice Hutton. The
quotation from Mr. Justice Crooke is : ' The law provides
a remedy in case of necessity and danger, for then the King may
command his subjects without Parliament to defend the king-
dom. How ? By all men of arms whatsoever for the land, and
by all ships whatsoever for the sea, which he may take from all
parts of the kingdom and join them with his own navy, which
has been the practice of all former Kings.' ^ This opinion of
Mr. Justice Crooke would, in any case, be no precedent for the
claim made in the present Appeal, but it is doubtful whether the
Royal Prerogative would at the present time cover so wide an
exercise of authority. During the war a Conscription Act was
passed, and Parliamentary authority was obtained. The quota-
tion from Mr. Justice Hutton is : ' The King is bound to defend
the kingdom.' ' There is no need to question the accuracy of this
general statement, but it cannot be intended to cover the proposi-
tion that the Executive Government is entitled, without regard
to the limitations which have been imposed from time to time,
to take all such steps as in the discretion of the Government
for the time being may be considered necessary for this purpose.
The Saltpetre Case ^ was decided in 1606, at a time when the
claim to act by Royal Prerogative was carried to an extreme
limit. This case, however, is no precedent for the contention
put forward by the Appellant. The saltpetre was taken under
the Right of Purveyance, and payment was made. Purveyances
were abolished in 1660 by 12 Charles II, c. 24. The volume of
extracts from Public Records made for the purposes of this case
by the Record Agent contains warrants for the searching for
» (1637) 3 How. St. Tr. 825. ^ (igogj 12 Rep. 12 ; 77 E.R. 1294.
^ (1858) 4 C.B. (N.S.) 334 ; 140 E.R. 1113. * (1916) 2 A.C. 77.
« (1919) 2 Ch. 238. « 3 How. St. Tr. 1134. ' Ibid. 1195.
JUDGMENT (LORD PARMOOR ) 211
saltpetre, but in every case on the payment of rent or compensa-
tion. The importance of the case consists in the terms of the
resolution of the Judges : ' When enemies come against the Realm
to the sea coast it is lawful to come upon my land adjoining to the
same coast, to make trenches or bulwarks for the defence of the
Realm, for every subject hath benefit by it. And therefore by
the Common Law every man may come upon my land for the
defence of the Realm, as appears by 8 Edward IV, 23, and
in such place on such extremity, they may dig for gravel for
the making of bulwarks : for this is for the public, and every one
hath benefit by it, but after the damage is over, the trenches and
bulwarks ought to be removed, so that the owner shall not have
prejudice in his inheritance ; and for the commonwealth a man
shall suffer damage : as for the saving of a city or town, a house
shall be plucked down if the next be on fire : and the suburbs of
a city in time of war for the common safety shall be plucked
down : and a thing for the commonwealth every man may do
without being liable to an action, as it is said in 3 Henry VIII,
Fol. 15.' A right common both to the Crown and all subjects is
not in the strict sense a Prerogative Right of the Crown. Royal
Prerogative implies a privilege in the Crown of a special and
exclusive character, but in any case the illustrations contained in
the Resolution cannot be relied upon in support of the claim
made by the appellant. To take premises for administrative
purposes is essentially different from an entry upon land adjoining
to the coast to protect the realm from a landing by enemy forces.
The analogy of plucking down a house if the next be on fire for
the saving of a city or town is an apt instance of the restrictive
limitations under which the right referred to in the Resolution
can be exercised, and it would be impossible to suggest that any
subject would have been entitled to take possession of the hotel
of thp respondent for temporary use and occupation. A Statute *
of 4 Henry VIII, c. 1 (1512), which was to endure to the next
Parliament makes special provision for the protection of the
County of Cornwall against invasion from Bretayne and also
the Haven of Brest, and authorizes every one of the King's
subjects under the conditions mentioned to enter upon land for
the making of bulwarks, &c., without any manner of payment to
be demanded or any manner of action, by any manner of person
or persons at any time thereafter to be attempted. This statute
illustrates the nature of a right which is based, not on an exclusive
1 App. B, p 220, post.
P2
212 ATT.-OEN. v. DE KEY8ERS HOTEL, LTD.
privilege of the Crown, but on the duty of all subjects within the
specified area to make common cause in defence of the Realm.
Lord Justice Duke refers to a series of cases between subjects in
which there was no determination of the rights as between the
Crown or the Executive Government and the subject. The
decisions in these cases do not, in my opinion, assist to solve the
questions raised in this Appeal.
The Zamora ^ was a prize case which raised a question of the
authority of Royal Prerogative in International Law and of the
right to requisition vessels or goods in the custody of the Prize
Court of a belligerent power. As regards the authority of the
Royal Prerogative the dictum of Lord Stowell in The Fox ^
was disapproved and it was held that, prior at any rate to the
Naval Prize Act, 1864, there was no power in the Crown by
Order in Council to prescribe or alter the law which Prize Courts
have to administer. So far the case cannot be quoted in favour
of the claim to take possession of the property of the subject
without payment of compensation. In the course of his judg-
ment. Lord Parker does incidentally refer to the authority of
the Royal Prerogative within the domain of municipal law,
but this was not a matter in issue in the case, and there was no
argument addressed to the question now in appeal before your
Lordships. So far as the Shoreham Case is concerned, it need
only be added that Lord Parker was sitting in your Lordships'
House when the arrangement was come to which made a formal
judgment unnecessary. The dictum of Mr. Justice Willes
in Hole v. Barlow,^ is not in favour of the contention of the
appellant. It states the general proposition that every man has
a right to the enjojrment of his land, and then by way of illustra-
tion limits the application of the power of the Royal Prerogative
to the event of a foreign invasion. Apart from legal precedent,
it was urged by the appellant in the Court of Appeal during
the argument, that where lands had been taken over for tem-
porary use and occupation for the purposes of the defence of the
Realm without obligation on the part of the Crown to pay rent
or compensation, special commissions had been issued from time
to time to determine what payment should be made by the Crown
ex gratia. Consequently a search was made, with the result
stated in the judgment of the Master of the Rolls. * The result
of searches which have been made is that it does not appear
1 (1916) 2 A.C. 77. 2 (1811) g^w. 312.
2 (1858) 4 C.B. (N.S.) 345 ; 140 E.R. 1118.
JUDGMENT (LORD PARMOOR) 213
that the Crown has ever taken subjects' land for the defence of
the country without paying for it, and even in the Stuart times
I cannot trace any claim by the Crown to such a prerogative.'
These latter words are important in considering the claim of the
Executive Government in the present case to act under the
Royal Prerogative. If no precedents can be found prior to
the year 1688 of a claim to use and occupy the land of the subject
for an indefinite time without the payment of compensation, it
would be improbable that such precedents would be found at
a later date.
The documents and warrants extracted from Public Records
give no support to the claim put forward by the appellant.
A large number of them are concerned with the acquisition of
estates in land which admittedly could not be acquired com-
pulsorily by the exercise of the Royal Prerogative. In some of
the instances it is difficult to determine whether an estate in
the land was acquired or possession was taken for temporary
use and occupation. The extracts to which the attention of
your Lordships was specially directed during the argument are
as follows : On November 24, 1668, and on December 22, 1688,
there are two Ordnance Minutes ^ ordering in one case the
payment of rent for ground upon which a battery is standing,
and in the other case compensation for damage at the time of
' Ye proveing the Morter Peece nere Bishopps hall '. Both these
minutes appear to relate to a case of temporary use and occupa-
tion. On September 4, 1805,^ a letter was written urging the
necessity of obtaining the mills at Cheshunt for purposes of
increasing the supplies of gunpowder for His Majesty's service.
The Board concurred in the opinion, and recommended to the
Master General to authorize the mills of Cheshunt to be taken
possession of under the Defence Act, which will be attended also
with the further advantage of removing some legal obstacles
arising from a claim of the poor of the neighbourhood to have
their corn ground at the mill. Proceedings were accordingly
taken under the Defence Act to get possession of the mills, in
order that by the acquisition of the water the manufacture of
gunpowder might be increased. The subsequent orders and
minutes relate to valuation for the purchase of all interests in
the premises. At this date the Act 43 Geo.^ Ill, c. 55, was in
force, authorizing His Majesty to survey and mark out ground
wanted for public service and to treat and agree for ' possession
1 App. F, pp. 284, 285, post. ^ Ibid., p. 291, post.
214 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD.
and use of it during such time as the exigence of the public
service shall require ', and in default of agreement compensation
to be paid for possession and use, to be ascertained by the jury.
In the following year a further Act was passed enabling land
required for the exigencies of the service to be purchased absolutely
and for ascertainment of the price by a jury in default of agree-
ment. These Acts were temporary in character, but contained
provisions similar to those which were made permanent in the
Defence Act, 1842. On June 20, 181 3, ^ a report was made on
the claims of a Mr. Cowel, of Margate, and other persons in
reference to damage done by stopping up gateways by which
farmers drew up. seaweed from the beach as a manure for lands,
at a time when an enemy landing was apprehended. A money
payment appears to have been made in each case, with the
further recommendation that the gateway should be reopened
at the expense of the Government. It was stated at the hearing
before the Court of Appeal that the documents which had been
extracted were illustrative, and that there was no reason for
thinking that a further search would disclose documents of
a different import. The conclusion is that the Executive Govern-
ment has not established a right under the Royal Prerogative
to take the hotel of the respondents for temporary use and
occupation during war without payment of compensation or by
referring the respondents to a Commission which could only
make grants ex gratia within the limits of its jurisdiction.
I am further of opinion that the plea of the Appellant that
the Prerogative Right of the Crown, whatever it may have been,
has not been abated, abridged, or curtailed by any of the Defence
Acts, 1842-73, or by any other statute, cannot be maintained.
I propose to examine the main statutory provisions which
regulate the rights of the subject and the obligations of the
Executive when lands or buildings are taken temporarily for use
and occupation on the occasion of a public exigency. The con-
stitutional principle is that when the power of the Executive
to interfere with the property or liberty of subjects has been
placed under parliamentary control and directly regulated by
statute, the Executive no longer derives its authority from the
Royal Prerogative of the Crown but from Parliament, and that
in exercising such authority the Executive is bound to observe
the restrictions which Parliament has imposed in favour of the
subject. I think that the statutory provisions applicable to
1 App. F, p. 293, post.
JUDGMENT (LORD PARMOOR) 215
the interference by the Executive with the land and buildings
of the respondents bring the case within the above principle.
It would be an untenable proposition to suggest that courts
of law could disregard the protective restrictions imposed by
statute law where they are applicable. In this respect the sove-
reignty of Parliament is supreme. The principles of construction
to be applied in deciding whether the Royal Preroggitive has been
taken away or abridged are well ascertained. They may be taken
away or abridged by express words, by necessary implication,
or, as stated in Bacon's Abridgement, where an Act of Parlia-
ment is made for the public good, the advancement of reHgion
and justice, and to prevent injury and wrong. Statutes which
provide rent or compensation as a condition to the right of the
Executive to take over the temporary possession of lands
or buildings on the occasion of public exigency come, in my
opinion, within the category of statutes made for the advance-
ment of justice and to prevent injury and wrong. This is in
accord with the well-established principle that, unless no other
interpretation is possible, justice requires that statutes should
not be construed to enable the land of a particular individual to
be confiscated without payment. I am further of opinion that
where a matter has been directly regulated by statute there is
a necessary implication that the regulation must be obeyed, and
that, as far as such regulation is inconsistent with the claim of
a Royal Prerogative right, such right can be no longer enforced.
In 1798 (38 Geo. Ill, c. 27) power is given to take possession
of land during such time as the exigencies of public service
should require, with a provision for compensation ; but this
Act was limited in its operation to the continuance of the then
present war. In 1803, by 43 Geo. Ill, c. 55, similar powers
are given. This, again, was a temporary Act during the then
present war with France. A doubt arose whether this Act
would enable the Executive to take land for a definite period of
time extending beyond the immediate exigency. In consequence,
it was repealed in 1804, and 44 Geo. Ill, c. 95, enacts that
land may be acquired either by absolute purchase for public
service or for use and possession during such time as the exigence
of the public service may require. Sections 11 and 12 provide
compensation either for purchase of land or for its temporary
use. In 1842 the Defence Act ^ was passed to consolidate and
amend the laws relating to the services of the Ordnance Depart-
5 & 6 Vict., c. 94.
216 ATT.-GEN. v. DE KEYSERS HOTEL, LTD.
ment and the vesting and purchase of lands and hereditaments
for those services and for the defence and security of the realm.
This Act has been subsequently amended, but not on any subject
material to this Appeal prior to 1914. Section 16 empowers the
principal officers of Her Majesty's Ordnance to treat and agree
with the owner or owners of lands, buildings, and hereditaments,
or with any person or persons interested therein, either for the
absolute purchase thereof or for the possession or use thereof
during such time as the exigence of the public service shall
require. Section 19 enacts that if bodies or other persons thereby
authorized to contract on behalf of themselves or others or other
person or persons interested in any such lands, buildings, or
other hereditaments, shall for the space of fourteen days next
after notice in \vriting decline to treat or agree, or shall refuse to
accept such sum of money as shall be offered for absolute pur-
chases, or such annual rent or sum as shall be offered for hire,
or rent thereof either for a time certain, or for such period as the
exigence of the public service may require : the principal officers
may require two or more justices of the peace, or other authority
named, to put them or any person appointed by them into
immediate possession of such lands, buildings, or other heredita-
ments. Then follows a complete provision for summoning
a jury to assess the compensation to be paid either for the
absolute purchase of such lands, buildings, or other heredita-
ments, or for the possession or use thereof as the case may be.
Section 23 provides that no such lands, buildings or other
hereditaments shall be taken without the consent of the owner
or owners or other interested person or persons unless the
necessity or expediency of the taking the same has been certified
as directed or ' unless the enemy shall have actually invaded the
United Kingdom at the time when such lands, buildings or
other hereditaments shall be taken '. This latter provision is
important since it clearly shows that the Legislature was provid-
ing against such an emergency as invasion which might occur
during a period of war and introducing in such a case an excep-
tional procedure. Section 34 empowers the principal officer of
Her Majesty's Ordnance to bring actions, suits or other proceed-
ings, provided that in all such actions, suits or other proceedings,
the legal rights, privileges and prerogatives of Her Majesty,
Her heirs and successors shall not be defeated or abridged. It
is not alleged that procedure by Petition of Right defeats or
abridges the legal rights, privileges or prerogatives of the Crown
JUDGMENT (LORD PARMOOR) 217
if the conditions are such as entitle the respondent to resort
to this form of procedure. If this Act and the amending Acts
prior to 1914 had stood alone it would have been no answer to
say that the statutory conditions were inconvenient or unduly
cumbrous to meet the exigency of the public service in defence
of the realm. It is for Parliament to determine what the exigency
of the public service may require and, if amending provisions are
found to be necessary, to enact them in an amending statute.
It will appear subsequently that this course was followed on the
outbreak of the war in 1914.
It was further argued on behalf of the appellant that, apart
from the Royal Prerogative or from any power vested in the
Executive under preceding statutes, a subject was deprived of
his right to compensation by virtue of the powers conferred by
the Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914,^ and of the
regulations issued thereunder. Under this Act ' His Majesty in
Council has power during the continuance of the present war to
issue regulations for securing the public safety and the defence
of the realm '. There is a special provision that such regulations
may provide for the suspension of any restrictions on the acquisi-
tion or user of land, or the exercise of the power of making by-
laws or any other power under the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1873,
or the Military Lands Acts, 1891 to 1903. The regulations issued
authorize the competent Naval or Military Authority, and any
person duly authorized by him, where for the purpose of securing
the public safety or defence of the realm it is necessary so to do,
to take possession of any land, building, or other property, or to
do any other act involving interference with private rights of
property which is necessary for the purpose aforesaid. The effect
of this regulation is to enable the competent Naval or Military
Authority to take immediate possession of land or buildings where
it is necessary for securing the public safety or defence of the
realm. In Regulation 62 the competent Naval or Military
Authority may be any commissioned officer not below the rank
of a Lieutenant-Commander in the Navy or Field Officer in the
Army or Air Force. There is no provision for compensation
for acts done under the powers conferred by Regulation 2. Nor
is any such provision necessary. Compensation was already
assured under statutory enactment. Regulation 2b does contain
a method of determining the price to be paid on taking possession
of war material, food, forage, and stores in default of agreement,
1 5 Geo. V, c. 8.
218 ATT. -GEN. v. DE KEYSER8 HOTEL, LTD,
and the attention of your Lordships was not called to any-
preceding statute containing a right to compensation. My Lords,
I agree in the view expressed by Lord Justice Warrington, that
the Defence Acts, 1842 to 1873, and the Act of 1914, and the
regulations made thereunder, must be read together. The
power to take possession of land or buildings for temporary use
or occupation is derived from the Defence Act, 1842, and the
Act of 1914, and the regulations made thereunder.. The Act of
1914 and the regulations made thereunder adapt the exercise
of the powers conferred by the Defence Act of 1842 to the
exigencies of modern warfare during a period of war ; but they
do not affect the provisions of the Defence Act which confer
a right to compensation and provide procedure for assessment of
the amount in default of agreement. I think that there is no
difficulty in applying the ordinary rules of construction, but if
there is room for ambiguity, the principle is established that,
in the absence of words clearly indicating such an intention,"the
property of one subject shall not be taken without compensation
for the benefit to others or to the public (Attorney -General
V. Horner ^ ; London and North- Western Railway Company
V. Evans ^). So long as the possession of land or buildings can
immediately be taken for purposes of public safety there is no
inconsistency in subsequently determining under statutory
procedure the amount of payment either by way of rent or
compensation. It is not necessary in your Lordships' House to
distinguish the present Appeal from In re a Petition of Eighty
1915.3 Mr. Justice Peterson thought that the present case was
covered by the judgment of the Court of Appeal in that case,
but when that case came before your Lordships' House an arrange-
ment was made rendering it unnecessary to give a formal judg-
ment.*
The Appellant, in the statement of contentions tabled in the
appellant's case, claimed ' that the Legislature had by the
Defence of the Realm (Acquisition of Land) Act, 1916,^ recognized
the existence of and had confirmed the Prerogative '. Reliance
is placed on the words in section 1, which allows the Government
Department in possession of lands to continue in possession for
the specified time, where possession had been taken whether in
exercise or purported exercise of any Prerogative Right of His
1 (1884) 14 Q.B.D. 245. ^ (1893) 1 Ch. 16.
3 (1915) 3 K.B. 649. * (1916) W.N. 311.
5 6 & 7 Geo. V, c. 63.
JUDGMENT (LORD PARMOOR) 219
Majesty, or of any powers conferred by or under any enactment
relating to the defence of the Realm. This section does not
enlarge or extend the Royal Prerogative in any direction, or
deprive the subject of compensation if, apart from this section,
he would have been entitled to claim it. In the letter of May 9,
1916, the Controller of Supplies states that the premises have
been commandeered by the Military Authorities under the
Defence of the Realm Act, and this statement is, in my opinion,
well founded.
If the respondents are entitled to a declaration in the terms
of Head No. 4 of the Petition of Right, the proper form of
procedure to obtain such a declaration in favour of a subject
against the Crown has been followed. There is no allegation of
any tortious conduct on the part of the Crown. On the contrary,
the claim to compensation assumes that the entry on and the
taking of possession of the hotel are acts which are legally
j ustifiable . In an ordinary case under the Lands Clauses Acts , when
promoters enter into possession of lands in conformity with their
statutory rights and delay or refuse to put in force the necessary
procedure for the assessment of compensation in default of
agreement, the remedy is by Mandamus. The remedy would not
be applicable against the Crown. I did not understand the
Attorney-General to raise any objection to the Procedure by
Petition of Right if the respondents could establish a claim to
compensation, or to the form of the declaration made by the
Court of Appeal.
My Lords, in my opinion, the Appeal should be dismissed
with costs.
Questions put :
That the Order appealed from be reversed ?
The Not Contents have it.
That the Order appealed from be affirmed and this Appeal
dismissed with costs ?
The Contents have it.
220 STATUTES
APPENDIX B
STATUTES NOT PRINTED IN RUFFHEAD'S
EDITION
PUBLIC RECORD OFFICE. PARLIAMENT ROLLS
No. 133. (10.)
{Statutes of the Realm, iii. 48.)
Act of Parliament. 4 Henry VIII. Cap. 1. A.D. 1512
For making Bulwarks
Rotulus Parliamenti de Anno Regni Regis Henrici Octavi
Quarto, A.D. 1512
Prayen the Comons in this present parliament assembled that
for asmoch as the land of Bretayne and also the haven of Brest
lyeth streight ayenst the south see costes of the Countie of Corn-
wall and that the frenchemen our auncien enemy es and Bretaynes
enemy es by reason of their e fysshyng upon the se costes knowe
aswell every haven and creke within the sayde Countie as every
landyng place in as large maner as any subgiectt of our Soveraigne
Lorde the Kyng dooth ; And that the said Countie is thre score
and ten myle in length and the substance thereof right litle more
than six myle in brede from the southsee to the northsee, by
reason whereof they also Imowe that grete multitude of people
can not shortly resort to put theym of at theire landyng ; And that
in divers and many of the seyd landyng places nother pile blok-
house ne Bulwark is made to greve or annoye theym at their
landyng : Whiche consideracions unto our sayd enemyes grete
audacite comfort and corage gyveth to arrive and land in the
same parties, to the grete annoyance of our Sayd Soveraigne
Lorde's subgiettes there and to the utterly undoyng of dyvers
and many of theym oonles a remedie be the soner provyded :
Therfor be it enacted by the Kyng our Soveraign Lord his Lordes
Spirituell and temporell and the Comons in this present parlia-
ment assembled and by auctorite of the same that the Justices
of the Peace and Shiref of the sayd Countie do ride and viewe
all the sayd south cost from Plymmouth westward, to the
Landes end. And that doone incontynent to appoynt within
theym self such boroughes townes and parisshens as they shall
thinke resonable to make bulwerkes brayes walles diches and al
other fortificacions for the same cause in maner and forme and
STATUTES 221
facioii as shalbe thought by theire discrecion in every of the sayd
laridyng places betwene this and the first day of Marche next
now comyng.
And ferder be it enacted by the sayd auctorite that every
Maire and Constable of the sayd countie by the sayd Justiebs
of Peace or Shirief appoynted do comaunde all the inhabitantes
within the precyncte of theire office, to bee at the see side with
such instrumentes as they have or can gett for the makynge of
the sayd bulworkes and other the premisses in such landyng
places as shalbe assigned by the sayd Justices of the Peace or
Shirief, and that the said Maire or Constables do comytte to
warde all such wilfuU persones as will not obey, come nor send
any oder person to the see side to make the sayd Bulworkes and
oder the premisses at the day and tyme by the said Maire or
Constables to be appoynted, and there to remayne. without
baile or maynprise by the space of x daies or lesse at the discrecion
of the sayd Maire or Constables. And if any of the sayd Maires
or Constables do not theire dutie as is aforesayd that then the
Justices of the Peace next adjoyning do comytte to warde the
same Maire or Constable so offendyng, there to remayne without
baile or maynprise by the space of a moneth or lesse at the
discrecion of the Justice of Peace.
And be it also enacted by the sayd auctorite that goode and
substanciall bulworkes brayes walles diches and all oder fortifica-
cions in every landyng place in maner forme and facion as is
aforeseid, as well from Plymouth aforesayd, by the se costes
estward as in all other parties within the realme of Englond,
be made there as the Justices of the peace and Shirief within
that shire where any such landyng places be shall thynke nedefuU.
And that every Justice of Peace Maire and Constable within
every shire where any such landyng places be, have like and as
good auctorite by this present acte to comaunde the inhabitantes
of every borough towne and parisshe adjoynyng to the see side ^
or els where after the discrecions of the Justices of Peace, to make
the sayd bulwerkes and other the premisses and also to comitte
to warde all such wilfuU personnes as will not obeye in like
maner as the Justices of the peace Maires and Constables of
the sayd Countie of Cornwall may do bi any of the actes aforeseid.
And over this be it enacted by the sayd auctorite that it be
laufuU for every of the Kynge's subgiettes within this Realme
of Englond by thadvyse and assignement of the sayd Justices
of the Peace or Shirief to make all maner of bulwerkes and oder
222 STATUTES
the premisses in every mannys grounde of what astate or degree
he be of and also to digge and to delve aswell for erth stones and
turfes as to cutte and to hew heth in any mannes grounde for
the makyng of any such bulworkes and other the premisses as
ofte and as many tymes as nede shall require, and the sayd
erth stones turfes and hethe to take occupie and carrie awey
out of the sayd ground to any oder mannes grounde for makyng
of any such bulwarkes and other the premisses in whos grounde
so ever the sayd erth stones turfes and heth happen to be without
any interupcion or lett of any person or persones beyng lord or
lordes of any such grounde or having any oder interest in the
same, And without any maner of payment to be demaunded for
any of the premisses or any maner of accion bi any maner of
person or persones at any tyme herafter to be attempted or in
any wise mayntened ayenst any of the Kynge's subgiettes for
any such matier or cause. And this acte to endure to the next
parliament.
^ Responsio — ^le Roy le vulte.
[Endorsed]
Rotulus Parliamenti prorogati usque quartum diem Novem-
bris anno regni Regis Henrici octavi quarto et postea de die in
diem usque vicesimum diem Decembris extunc proximo sequen-
tem continuati et extunc usque septimum diem Novembris
proximo sequentem prorogati.
Anno Quarto.
STATUTES OF THE REALM. 14 CHARLES II. Cap. 20
An Act for providing carriage by land and by water for the use
of his Majesty's Navy & Ordnance.
Whereas by an Act entitled an Act for taking away the Court
of Wards and Liveries and Tenures in capite and by knights'
service and purveyance, and for settling a revenue upon His
Majesty in lieu thereof, it was amongst other things enacted,
for the reasons and recompense therein expressed, that from
thence forth no person or persons by any warrant, commission
or authority under the Great Seal or otherwise by colour of
buying or making provision or purveyance for His Majesty or
any Queen of England for the time being, or of any the children
of any King or Queen of England that shall be or for his, their
STATUTES 223
or any of their household, shall take any cart, carriage or other
thing whatsoever of any of the subjects of His Majesty, His
heirs or successors without the free and full consent of the
owner or owners thereof, had or obtained without menace or
enforcement, nor shall summon, warn, take use or require any of
the said subjects to furnish or find any horses, oxen or other
cattle, carts, ploughs, wains or other carriages for the use of
His Majesty, His Heirs and successors, or of any Queen of England
or any child or children of any the Kings or Queens of England
for the time being, for the carrying the goods of His Majesty,
His Heirs or successors or the said Queens or children or any of
them, without such full and free consent as aforesaid, any law,
statute, custom or usage to the contrary notwithstanding. Be
it notwithstanding enacted by the King's most Excellent Majesty,
by and with the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and
Temporal; and the Commons in this present Parliament assembled,
and by the authority of the same, that from and after the four
and twentieth day of June in the year of Our Lord, one thousand
six hundred sixty and two, as often as the service of His Majesty's
Navy or Ordnance shall require any carriages by land within the
Kingdom of England, and dominion of Wales and town of Berwick
upon Tweed, upon notice given in writing by warrant under the
hand and seal of the Lord High Admiral of England for the time
being or under the hands and seals of two or more of the principal
officers or commissioners of His Majesty's Navy, or under the
hand and seal of the Master of His Majesty's Ordnance for the
time being, or under the hand and seal of the lieutenant of [His]
Majesty's Ordnance for the providing of carriages for the respec-
tive service of the Navy or Ordnance unto two or more Justices
of the Peace dwelling near unto the place where the said carriages
shall be required, the said Justices of the Peace may and shall
immediately issue forth their warrants to such of the adjacent
parishes, hundred or divisions as they shall judge fit within their
respective counties or divisions, not being above twelve miles
distant from the place of lading for the sending to a certain place
and at certain times (to be specified and appointed in the said
warrants) such numbers of carriages with horses or oxen sufficient
for the said service as by the Lord High Admiral of England for
the time being or by the master or lieutenant of His Majesty's
Ordnance for the time being, or by the principal officers or
commissioners of His Majesty's Navy respectively as abovesaid
shall be, by writing under their hands and seals, required, the
224 STATUTES
owners of which carriages or their servants shall receive for every
load of timber per mile, one shilling for every reputed mile which
they shall go laden, and for other provisions, the sum of eight
pence per mile for every ton they shall carry.
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid that it
may and shall be lawful for the Lord High Admiral of England
for the time being by warrant under his hand and seal and also
for the principal officers and commissioners of His Majesty's
Navy by warrants under the hands and seals of any two or more
of them as also for the Master of His Majesty's Ordnance for the
time being by warrant under his hand and seal, and also for the
lieutenant of His Majesty's Ordnance by warrants under the
hands and seals of either of them as often as the service of His
Majesty's Navy or Ordnance respectively shall require any
carriage by water, to appoint such person or persons as they shall
judge fitting to impress and take up such ships, hoys, lighters,
boats or any other vessel whatsoever as shall be necessary for
the accommodation of His Majesty's said service, the owners of
which said ships, hoys, lighters, boats or other water carriage
aforesaid, or such as they shall appoint, shall receive for the hire
of every such ship, hoy, lighter, boat or other vessel per ton
according to the rates usually paid by merchants ^ from time to
time, and in case His Majesty's officers and the owners of such
ships, hoys, lighters, boats or other vessels shall not agree on
the said rates, then the rate to be settled by the Brotherhood of
Trinity House of Deptford, Strand.
And be it further enacted by the authority aforesaid that in
case any of His Majesty's subjects of this Realm shall refuse or
wilfully neglect, after reasonable notice, to make their appear-
ance with sufficient carriages by land or to fit provide and furnish
their ships, hoys, lighters, boats or other vessels for the service
of His Majesty's Navy or Ordnance, as is before expressed, or
shall after they shall have undertaken such service, neglect or
delay the same, that then upon due proof and conviction of such
refusal or neglect by the oath of the constable, or other officer
or two other credible witnesses, before the said Justices of the
Peace of the county or Maior or other chief officer of the city or
corporation where he or they inhabit (which oath they shall
have power to administer) for the land carriages and for the
water carriages, by the oath of such person as shall be appointed
by the Lord High Admiral, the principal officers or commissioners
of His Majesty's Navy, the Master of His Majesty's Ordnance,
STATUTES 225
or the lieutenant of His Majesty's Ordnance, as aforesaid, or
other two credible witnesses, before the principal officers or
commissioners of His Majesty's Navy or Master or Lieutenant
of His Majesty's Ordnance respectively (which oath they shall
have likewise power to administer) the party so refusing or
neglecting shall for every such refusal or neglect forfeit the
sum of twenty shillings for the land carriage and for carriage by
wat^ treble the freight of such ship or vessel not exceeding fifty
pounds in the whole, to the King's Majesty's use to be forthwith
levied in default of payment upon demand by distress and sale
of his goods and chattels by warrant from the said Justices of
the Peace, Mayor or other chief officer or from the principal
officers or commissioners of His Majesty's Navy or Master or
lieutenant of His Majesty's Ordnance respectively (rendering to
the parties the overplus upon every such sale if there should be
any) the charge of distraining being first deducted.
Provided always that no horses, oxen, cart, wain or other land
carriage shall be enforced to travel more days journey from the
place where they receive their lading or be compelled to continue
longer in the employment than shall be appointed by the Order
of the said Justices of the Peace and that ready payment shall
be made in hand for the said carriages at the place of lading
without delay according to the aforesaid rates.
Provided always that in case any Justice of the Peace, Mayor,
Chief Officer or Constable or any person or persons which shall
be appointed by the Lord High Admiral, the principal officers
or commissioners of His Majesty's Navy, the Master of His
Majesty's Ordnance or the lieutenant of His Majesty's Ordnance
as aforesaid respectively, shall take any gift or reward to spare
any person or persons from making such carriage by land or by
water or shall injuriously charge or grieve any person or persons
through envy, hatred or evil will who ought not to make such
carriage or shall impress more carriages than the necessity of the
service shall require or than he shall be commanded to impress
by his superiors, that then, upon due proof and conviction thereof,
the parties so offending shall forfeit the sum of £10 to the party
thereby grieved, who may sue for the same to be recovered by
action of debt in any of His Majesty's Courts of Record, wherein
no essoign, protection or wager of law shall be allowed, and in
case any person or persons shall presume to take upon him or
them to impress any horses, o^^en, wains or carriages for land, or
any ships^ hoys, lighters, boats or other vessel for the service of
2388 rk
226 STATUTES
His Majesty's Navy or Ordnance other than the persons so
empowered as aforesaid, then he or they so offending shall upon
due conviction of the said offence, incur or suffer the punishment
in the first recited Act.
Provided always, and be it enacted, that no ship, hoy, barge
or any other vessel whatsoever, that shall be really and bona fide
fraighted by charter party if there be other vessels in the port
fitting for the service, nor any vessel quarter laden with^ any
goods, wares or merchandizes outward bound shall be liable to
be impressed for any the services aforesaid, any thing in this
Act to the contrary notwithstanding.
Provided that this Act and the powers therein contained shall
continue and be in force until the end of the first session of the
next Parliament and no longer, anything herein contained to the
contrary in any wise notwithstanding.
Provided nevertheless that in regard of the more than ordinary
charge and burden which the inhabitants of the New Forest
in the county of Southampton, will be liable unto by reason of
the quantities of timber usually felled and carried thence for the
use of His Majesty's Navy, it shall and may be lawful for the
Justices of the Peace, who shall by warrant summon the carts
and carriages within the division of the New Forest in the county
of Southampton aforesaid, to have power (as to the carriage of
timber only) to allow as aforesaid to the several owners of such
carts and carriages not exceeding fourpence per mile for so
many miles as any cart or carriage so summoned shall go empty
to the place of lading, anything in this Act contained to the
contrary in any wise notwithstanding.
An Act for vesting and setling the Fee Simple of certaine Lands
on his Maty his Heyres & Successors, which haue been taken
into, & Spoyled by makeing new Fortifications, about the
Towne of Portsmouth.
Ann). 22° et 23° Car : 2^1 No. 43.
Whereas his Maiesty hath caused the Fortifications of his
Towne of Portsmouth, in the County of Southampton, to be
enlarged, and new Fortifications to be made there, and about
the Dockyard neere the said Towne, in order to the rendring that
Place more Defensible, for the doing whereof, the seuerall parcells
of ground of, and belonging to the seuerall persons, and of the
particular quantities, qualities, apd yearly values, in a schedule
hereunto annexed, mentioned, and expressed, haue been inclosed,
(
STATUTES 227
Spoyled, and taken away, as well within the said Workes, as by
the Counterscarpes, and forelands belonging to the same, and
other Damages haue been there done ; And whereas the Lords
Comissioners of his Maiesties Treasury, being by Order of his
Maiesty in Councell directed, to purchase the said Lands for his
Maiesties vse, and to make satisfaction for the Damages afore-
said, and being certifyed by his Maiesties Surveyor Generall,
that the Sume of Thirteene hundred and Nynety pounds, would
be a sufficient compensation for the same, haue made an Agree-
ment with Richard Norton of Southwicke in the County of
Southampton Esq. (who is Owner of parte of the said Lands,
and hath authority from the rest of the Owners, and persons
concerned in the same, to make an Agreement, on their behalfe,
for the purchase of the said Lands, and the said Damages)
that in consideration of the said Sume of Thirteene hundred
and Nynety pounds, to be payed to the said Richard Norton,
for the vse of himselfe, and the rest of the Owners, Pro-
prietors, and persons concerned in the said Lands, in full
satisfaction for the purchase thereof, and for their said Damages,
the said Lands shall be conveyed to his Maiesty, his Heyres
and Successors, and that all persons, who haue done any
injury to any of the said Owners of the said Lands, by reason of
the makeing of the Fortifications aforesaid, shall be discharged
of and from the same. And his Maiesty haveing approved of the
said Agreement, hath, by his Letters of Privy Scale, directed the
said Lords Comissioners of his Treasury to give order for payment
of the said Thirteene hundred and Nynety pounds to the said
Richard Norton, for the use aforesaid, when his Maiesty shalbe
Legally vested and setled in the Possession of the said Lands,
and for payment of the Interest thereof, in the mean time. And
they haue thereupon given Order to the Officers of the Receipt
of his Maiesties Exchequer, for payment of the same accordingly,
Now for that the said Lands belong to many seueraU persons,
who live in seuerall Places, some whereof are very remote, and
the haueing particular Conveyances, and Assurances of their
seuerall, and respective Interests in the same, from euery one
of them, will be very troublesome, and a delay to the payment
of the said purchase money, And to the intent the said money
may be speedily paid to the said Richard Norton, for their vse.
And for that the said Richard Norton for himselfe, and the said
Owners, and Proprietors of the said Lands, hath consented, that
the said Lands shalbe setled on his Maiesty, his Heyres, and
.Q2
228 STATUTES
Successors by Act of Parliament, BEE it Enacted by the Kings
most Excellent Maiesty, by and with the Consent of the Lords
Spirituall, and Temporall, and of the Comons in this ParUament
assembled, and by Authority of the same. That his Maiesty his
Heyres and Successors shall, from henceforth, and for euer
hereafter stand, and be seized of a good, sure, perfect, absolute,
and indefeazible Estate of Inheritance in Fee Simple, of, and in
all, and singular the Lands, Tenements and Hereditaments, in
the Schedule hereunto annexed, mentioned, and of, and in euery
part and parcell thereof, with their, and euery of their Rights,
Members, and Appurtenances whatsoever, and that all and euery
persons whatsoeuer (who by reason of the entring upon the said
Lands, to make the said Fortifications as aforesaid, haue done
any Trespasse, Damage, or injury whatsoever to any of the
Owners, Proprietors, or persons concerned in the said Lands, or
to their Corne, or Grasse standing, or growing, or which did
stand & grow upon the said Lands) their Executors and Adminis-
trators and euery of them be, and are hereby acquitted pardoned.
Released, and Discharged of, and from all such Trespasses,
Damages, and injuries whatsoeuer. And of, and from all Actions,
and suites and Cause and Causes of Actions, and Suites, already
had or brought, or hereafter to be had or brought against them,
or any of them, their or any of their Heyres, Executors, or Admin-
ist?"8 for, or in respect of the same.
A Particular of the Lands vested, and setled in his Maiesty,
his Heyres and Successors by virtue of this Act.
(Schedule oj Lands Vested.)
STATUTES OF THE REALM. 1 JAMES II. Cap. 11
An Act for reviving an Act for providing of carriages by land and
by water, for the use of His Majesty's Navy and Ordnance.
Whereas an Act of Parliament was made and passed in the
thirteenth and fourteenth years of the reign [of] His Late Majesty
of Blessed Memory, entitled. An Act for providing carriages by
land and by water for the use of His Majesty's navy and ordnance,
which said Act is since expired.
And whereas the said Act hath been by experience found to be
of necessary use and fit to be revived and continued, be it there-
fore enacted by the King's Most Excellent Majesty, by and with
STATUTES 229
the advice and consent of the Lords Spiritual and Temporal, and
of the Commons, in this present ParUament assembled, and by
the authority of the same, that the said Act and aU and every
the clauses, sentences and articles therein contained shall by
virtue of this Act be revived and continued and have the full
force, power and virtue of a law during the continuance of this Act*
And be it further enacted and declared by the authority afore-
said, that this Act shall continue and be in force during the space
of seven years from the four and twentieth day of June, in the
year of Our Lord 1685, and from thence to the end of the First
Sessions of Parliament then next ensuing and no longer.
APPENDIX C
DOCUMENTS RELATING TO VESTING ACTS AND
COMMISSIONS, INQUISITIONS, PROCEEDINGS,
DECREES, ETC.
(1759.— PORTSMOUTH, CHATHAM, AND PLYMOUTH.)
Crown Office (Chancery) Commissions, Inquisitions, & Decrees
relating to the purchase of land &c for the purchase of land for
Fortifications No. 2.
George the Second by the Grace of God of Great Britain
France and Ireland King Defender of the Faith And so forth
To our Right Trusty and Welbeloved Councillor Arthur Onslow
Esquire Speaker of Our House of Commons Charles Marquis of
Winchester James Marquiss of Carnarvon Lord Harry Powlet
Lord George Sackville Sir William Courtney Baronet Sir John
Barrington Baronet Sir Thomas Hales Baronet Sir Francis
Henry Drake Baronet Sir Richard Warwick Bampfylde Baronet
Sir William Gardiner Baronet Sir George Yonge Baronet Sir
John Molesworth Baronet Sir James Creed Knight Henry Bilson
Legge Lewis Watson Robert Fairfax Charles Yorke Charles
Pratt James West Samuel Martin James Buller John Buller
Richard Edgcombe Jonathan Rashleigh Richard Hussey John
Harris Henry Reginald Courtney George Treby Browse Trist
John Harris of Pickwell John Evelyn John Tuckfield John
Rolle Walter Andrew Wilkinson Nicholas Haddock Isaac Town-
send Charles Frederick Gabriel Hanger Mathew Robinsoil
Morris the younger Charles Whitworth Alexander Thistlethwaite
230 ACQUISITION OF LAND
Job Staunton Charlton Henry Penton Thomas Lee Dummer
Thomas Holmes Major General Holmes Harry Burrard Anthony
Langley Swymmer Charles Cocks Robert Bristow Henry Archer
WilUam Rawlinson Earle Hugh Valence Jones William Glanville
Phillips Gybbon Henry Gould Thomas Stan3rford William Davy
Philip Drake Thomas Bewes Frederick Rohers John Ommanney
William Basturd Thomas Neale John Parker WiUiam Eyre
John Richmond Webb Richard New Richard Hughes Pusy
Brooke John Peachy Thomas Missing John Moody John Gringo
William Yalding William Pescod Thomas Cooper James Best
Joseph Brooke Thomas Fletcher John Russell Roger Pilcher
Thomas Chiffinch Charles Petley John Cockain Sole Samuel
lEyre Charles Taylor Jacob Pickering John HoUis Richard Leigh
Francis Filmer Charles Robinson and William Hay Esquires
Greeting Whereas in and by One Act of Parliament made in
the last Session Entituled An Act for vesting certain Messuages
Land Tenements and Hereditaments for the better securing
His Majestys Docks Ships and Stores at Portsmouth Chatham
and Plymouth and for the better Fortifying the Town of Ports-
mouth and Citadel of Plymouth in Trustees for certain Uses and
for other Purposes therein mentioned It was Enacted that for
the better ascertaining the several Owners and Proprietors of
certain Lands therein particularly mentioned lying near the
Docks of Portsmouth Chatham and Plymouth which have been
made use of in making Intrenchments and raising Lines and
Fortifications for the Defence and Security of the said Docks
and their respective Titles and Claimes thereto It should and
might be Lawfull to and for Us by One or more Commission or
Commissions by Letters Patent under the Great Seal of Great
Britain to Authorize and Appoint any Number of Persons to
be Commissioners to hear and Determine all Titles and Claims
that shall or may be made to the said Lands Tenements and
Hereditaments or to any part or parcel thereof which Commis-
sioners so to be Appointed or any Five or more of them are
thereby Authorized and Required and shall and may in a sum-
mary manner Proceed Act and Determine by and upon the
Testimony of Witnesses upon Oath (Which Oath they or any
Five or more of them are thereby impowered to Administer)
Inspection and Examination of Deeds Writings and Records or
by Inquest of Twelve good and lawfull Men to be Impanelled
and Sworn in manner therein mentioned and directed or by all
or any of the said Ways or otherwise according to their Direc-
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 231
tions all and all manner of Rights Estates and Interests and all
Controversies Debates and Questions which shall happen and
arise between any Person or Persons whatsoever or any other
matter or thing relating to any of the Premisses or any part
thereof as in and by the said recited Act of Parliament amongst
other things therein contained relation being thereunto had
may more fully and at large appear Now Know Yb that we
reposing especial Trust and Confidence in your Great Abilities
Care Fidelity and Circumspection Have Nominated Constituted
and Appointed And do by these presents Nominate Constitute
and Appoint You
{Here follow the names of Commissioners)
or any Five or more of you to be Commissioners for Putting in
Execution the said Act of Parliament And to you or any five or
more of you as aforesaid We do by these Presents Give full
Power and Authority to do Perform and execute or cause to
be done Performed and executed all Powers Directions Clauses
Matters and Things Whatsoever in the said Act contained
Hereby Willing and Requiring you or any Five or more of you
as is aforesaid from time to time to proceed and act according to
the Rules and Directions of the said Act of Parliament and
diligently to Intend the execution thereof in all things as
becometh And these Presents or the Inrollment or Exemplifi-
cation thereof shall be to you and every of you a sufficient
Warrant and Discharge in that behalf In Witness whereof we
have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent Witness
ourselves at Westminster the Twenty Seventh day of July in
the Thirty Second Year of Our Reign
York & York
{Here follow the signatures of six Commissioners)
Inquisition indented had made and taken at the house of
Timothy Bayly Scituate in Plymouth Dock in the County of
Devon the Eleventh day of September in the Thirty Second
year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Second (by
the Grace of God) of Great Britain France and Ireland King
Defender of the Faith and so forth and in the year of Our Lord
One thousand Seven Hundred and Fifty eight Between the
severall Commissioners whose hands and Seals are hereunto set
appointed amcJbg others by his Majesty's Letters Patent under
the Great Seal of Great Britain pursuant to an Act of Parliament
232 ACQUISITION OF LAND
made and passed the last Sessions of Parliament intitled an Act
for vesting certain Messuages Lands Tenements and Heredita-
ments for the better securing his Majesty's Docks Ships and
Stores at Portsmouth Chatham and Plymouth and for the better
fortifying the Town of Portsmouth and Citidel of Plymouth in
Trustees for certain uses and for other purposes therein men-
tioned of the one part and Richard Doidge John Harris Robert
Lake Thomas Lear Waltham Savery Evans Cove John Charles
Hayne William Kitson Rawlin Mallock William Neyle Nicholas
Brooking John Wolston Arthur Tremayne Arthur Kelley Arthur
Champernowne John Hawking John Powell William Strode
and Charles Hale Esquires good and lawfull men Substantial
Gentlemen and Freeholders of the said County of Devon Im-
pannelled and returned, before the said Commissioners by Peter
Comyns Esquire High Sherriff of the said County of Devon
pursuant to a precept from Five of the said Commissioners to
the said Sheriff directed duly Sworn and Charged to inquire
into and present the true and real values of the Messuages Lands
Tenements and Hereditaments in the said Act comprized and
mentioned to be situate within the said County of Devon and of
every part and parcell thereof at the time they were first made
Use of for the purposes in the Act mentioned And who respectively
are the Owners and propreitors thereof and their respective
Estates and Interests therein and all Controversies Debates
and Questions touching or concerning the same or any part
thereof of Whom the underwritten being twelve of the said
Jurors say and present upon their Oath that the True Value of
all the said Messuages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments and
of every part and parcell thereof and who respectively are the
Owners and propreitors thereof and their respective Estates and
Interests therein are mentioned expressed and Sett down in the
Schedule hereunto annexed Signed by the said Jurors In Testi-
mony whereof to one part of this Inquisition remaining with the
said Jury the said Commissioners (partys hereunto) have here-
unto sett their Hands and Seals and to the other part thereof
returned with the said Commission the said Jurors have hereunto
Interchangeably putt their Hands and Seals the Day and year
above written.
(Here follow the signatures of twelve Jurors)
A ScHEDTTLE of the true and reall Value of the Messuages
Lands Tenements and Hereditaments at the time they were
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 233
•
first made use of for the purposes in the Act mentioned and
every Part and Parcell thereof and who respectively are the
Owners and proprietors thereof and their respective Estates
and Interests therein referred to by the Indenture annexed.
Whereas in pursuance of an Act of Parliament made in the
last Sessions Intitled an Act for vesting certain Messuages Lands
Tenements and Hereditaments for the better securing his
Majesties Docks Ships and Stores at Portsmouth Chatham and
Plymouth and for the better fortifying the Town of Portsmouth
and Citadel of Plymouth in Ti'ustees for certain Uses and for other
purposes therein mentioned And by Virtue of a Commission
under the Great Seal of Great Britain issued in pursuance of
the said Act bearing Date at Westminster the Twenty seventh
day of July last past directed to us and others Wee Sir Richard
Warwick Bampfylde Baronet Sir William Courtenay Baronet
Sir John Molesworth Baronet John RoUe Walter John Tuckfield
James BuUer John BuUer Henry Reginald Courtenay George
Treby Charles Cocks Browse Trist Frederick Rogers Wilham
Basturd John Ommanney Charles Taylor Esquires and William
Davy Esquire Serjeant at Law Being Sixteen of the Commis-
sioners thereby named and authorised having taken upon Us the
Execution of the said Commission as to such part of ike Mes-
suages Lands Tenements and Hereditaments in the said Act
mentioned as are situate in the County of Devon did on the
Eleventh Day of September in the two and thirtieth year of the
Reign of our Lord George the Second meet at the House of
Timothy Bayley known by the name or Sign of the Kings Arms
in Plymouth Dock and proof was duly made before us on Oath
and otherwise That Notice in Writing was fixed up at the Dock
Gate of his Majesty's Yard and at the Town Hall of the Borough
of Plymouth and likewise published in the London Gazette
thirty Days and more before this meeting and as well on the
Testimony of Witnesses Inspection and Examination of Deeds
Writings and Records as by and upon the Inquest of Richard
Doidge, John Harris, Robert Lake, Thomas Lear, Waltham
Savery, Evans Cove, John Wise, Charles Hayne, WilHam
Kitson, Rawlyn Mallock, William Neyle, Nicholas Brooking,
John Wolston, Arthur . Tremayne, Arthur Kelley, Arthur
Champernowne, John Hawkins, John Powell, William Stroude
and Charles Hale Esquires good and lawfull Men Substantial
Gentlemen and Freeholders Impannelled Summoned and re-
234 ACQUISITION OF LAND
•
turned by Peter Comyns Esquire Sheriff of the said County of
Devon to take the Inquest Twelve of whom upon their Oaths
duly administred upon the Holy Evangelists did present and
say that Sir John St. Aubyn Baronet is seized in his Demesne
as of Freehold for the Term of his natural Life Remainder to
John St. Aubyn son of the said Sir John St. Aubyn and all and
every other the sons of the said Sir John St. Aubyn in Tail Male
Remainder to John Molesworth Esquire for his life Remainder
to his first and other Sons in Tail Male Remainder to Wilham
Molesworth Esquire for his Life Remainder to his first and other
Sons in Tail Male Remainder to the Right Heirs of Sir WiUiam
Morice deceased of and in the severall par cells of Land herein-
after more particularly described and containing together One
hundred Eighteen Acres three Rood and Eleven Rod and that
the true and real Value of the said several pieces or parcells of
Land at the Time they were first made use of for the purpose in
the said Act mentioned was the Sum of Thirteen thousand One
hundred Twenty six pounds Ten shillings of lawfull Money of
Great Britain Now wee the said Commissioners do on mature
Consideration order direct adjudge decree and determine that
the said Sir John St. Aubyn is Seized in his Demesne as of
Freehold during the Term of his naturall Life Remainder to
John St. Aubyn son of the said Sir John St. Aubyn and all and
every other the sons of the said Sir John St. Aubyn in Tail Male
Remainder to John Molesworth Esquire for his Life Remainder
to his first and other Sons in Tail Male Remainder to William
Molesworth Esquire for his Life Remainder to his first and other
Sons in Tail Male Remainder to the Right Heirs of Sir William
Morice deceased of and in a piece of Land called Little Cliff Field
(Description of property follows) All which said pieces or parcells
of Land contain together One hundred and eighteen Acres
three Rood and eleven Rodd and that the true and reall Value
of the said several pieces of Land and premises at the time they
were first made use of for the purposes in the Act mentioned
was the Sum of Thirteen thousand One hundred Twenty six
pounds and Ten shillings of lawfull Money of Great Britain
And that the said Sir John Aubyn and the persons in Remainder
are intituled to the said Sum of Thirteen thousand one hundred
Twenty six pounds and Ten shillings to be laid out in the pur-
chase of other Freehold Messuages Lands Tenements and
Hereditaments to be settled to the same Uses.
2. Pritchard Esquire. And the Jurors aforesaid upon their
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 235
Oath aforesaid did further present and say that John Pritchard
Esquire is possessed
{Here follow statements of property dk tenure & value)
Now wee the said Commissioners do adjudge decree & deter-
mine that the said John Pritchard is possessed etc. etc.
And that the true and reall Value of the said several pieces of
Land and premises last mentioned at the time they were first
made use of for the purposes aforesaid was the Sum of etc.
{Following finding of Jury)
And Wee do further adjudge decree and determine that etc. etc.
(Here follows apportionment of purchase money and next
follow a number of similar findings etc.)
{Here follow the signatures of twelve Commissioners)
Whereas in Pursuance of an Act of Parliament made in the
last Sessions Intitled An Act for Vesting certain Messuages
Lands Tenements and Hereditaments for the better securing
his Majesty s Docks Ships and Stores at Portsmouth Chatham and
Plymouth and for the better Fortifying the Town of Portsmouth
and Citadel of Plymouth in Trustees for certain Uses and for
other purposes therein mentioned and by Virtue of a Com-
mission under the Great Seal of Great Britain Issued in Pur-
suance of the said Act bearing Date at Westminster the Twenty
seventh day of July last past Directed to us and others We
Henry Gould Charles Whitworth Charles Petley Thomas Chiffinch
Joseph Brooke Thomas Cooper Thomas Fletcher James Best
Jacob Pickering Samuel Eyre and John Russell Esquires being
Eleven of the Commissioners thereby named and Authorised
having taken upon us the Execution of the said Commission as
to such part of the Messuages Lands Tenements and Heredita-
ments in the said Act mentioned as are scituate in the County
of Kent Did on the First day of November in the Thirty second
Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord George the Second meet
at the Guildhall of the City of Rochester scituate in Rochester
in the County of Kent and Proof was duly made before us on
Oath and otherwise that Notice in writing was fixed up at the
Dock Gate of his Majesty's Yard at Chatham and at the Town
Hall of the City of Rochester and likewise published in the London
Gazette Thirty days and more before this Meeting and as well
on the Testimony of Witnesses Inspection and Examination of
236 ' ACQUISITION OF LAND
Deeds Writings and Records as by and upon the Inquest etc.
[Here follow the names of Jurors] who upon their Oaths duly
Administered upon the Holy EvangeUst Did present and say
&c. Now Wee the said Commissioners Do Adjudge Decree and
Determine etc. etc. [Here follow findings etc, of Commissioners
in accordance with the findings of the Jury.]
And We the said Commissioners in further Execution of the
said Commission to us Directed do hereby Certify That we have
in pursuance of the said Act of Parliament upon the Complaint
of Thomas Feild the Tenant of Lands adjoyning to the said
Fortifycations of Damages done to his said Lands heard and
Enquired as well by the Oaths of Witnesses as the Inquest of
the Jurors Sworn as aforesaid into the Damages so Done and
do Estimate the Damage sustained by the said Thomas Feild to
his Lands aforesaid at the Sum of Five Pounds of lawful! Money
of Great Britain
{Here follow similar findings as to the damage sustained by
adjoining Owners]
All which damages were sustained by means of making and
Erecting the said Fortifications,
{Here follow the signatures of twelve Commissioners)
[Crown Office (Chancery) Commissions, Inquisitions, and Decrees
relating to the purchase of land &c. for Fortifications No. 4]
Geobge the Second by the Grace of God of Great Britain
France and Ireland King Defender of the Faith and so forth To
{Here follow the names of Commissioners)
Greeting Whereas in and by One Act of Parliament lately
Passed Entituled An Act for taking down and removing the
Magazine for Gunpowder and all Buildings thereto belonging
Situate near Greenwich in the County of Kent and Erectmg
instead thereof a New Magazine for Gunpowder at Purfleet near
the River Thames in the County of Essex and Appljdng a Sum
of Money Granted in this Session of Parliament towards those
Purposes and for Obviating Difficulties arisen upon An Act
made in the last Session of Parliament for making Compensation
for Lands and Hereditaments Purchased for his Majestys Ser-
vice at Portsmouth Chatham and Plymouth It was Enacted that
it should and might be Lawfull to and for Us by One or more
Commission or Commissions by Letters Patent under the Great
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 237
Seal of Great Britain to Authorize and Appoint any Number of
Persons to be Commissioners for Surveying and Setting out all
such Messuages Mills Lands and Tenements and Hereditaments
as it will be necessary to Purchase in Order to Build such intended
Magazine for Gunpowder and other Buildings at Purfleet afore-
said and for executing the other purposes of the said Act in
manner thereinafter mentioned and that it should and might
be LawfuU for the said Commissioners so to be appointed or any
Five or more of them or such Persons as they or any Five or
more of them shall appoint to Enter upon make Surveys of and
set out and Describe by Lines Stakes or other Marks such
Messuages Mills Lands Tenements and Hereditaments at Pur-
fleet aforesaid as they the said Commissioners so to be Appointed
or any Five or more of them shall think Proper to be purchased
in Order for the Erecting and Building a Magazine for Gunpowder
and the Guard House Barracks and other Convenient Buildings
there as in and by the said Recited Act of Parliament amongst
other things therein contained Relation being thereunto had
may more fully and at large appear Now know ye that We
Reposing Especial Trust and Confidence in Your Great Abilities
Care FideUty and Circumspection have Nominated Constituted
and Appointed and do by these Presents Nominate Constitute
and Appoint You
(Here follow names of Commissioners)
or any Five or more of You to be Commissioners for Surveying
and Setting out all such Messuages Mills Lands Tenements and
Hereditaments as will be necessary to Purchase in Order to
Build according to the Directions of the said Act a Magazine for
Gunpowder and other Buildings at Purfleet near the River Thames
in the County of Essex and for Executing all and eyery other
the Purposes of the said Act as far the same doth relate to the
Erecting a New Magazine for Gunpowder at the Place aforesaid
And We do hereby Impower and Authorise You Our said Com-
missioners or any Five or more of You upon the Complaint of
any Owner or Owners Occupyer or Occupyers of any the Mes-
suages Lands and Hereditaments for this Purpose Described and
mentioned in the said Act and adjoining to any part of the Lands
and Hereditaments by that Act Vested in the Trustees therein
mentioned that He She or they have Received any Damage by
bringing Loading or Carrying any Materials necessary to Erect
or Compleat any the Works therein mentioned or by any other
238 ACQUISITION OF LAND
means whatsoever to Examine into and hear every such Com-
plaint and if the same shall be made out to your Satisfaction
then to make such Recompence for such Damages to the Party
or Party s Injured out of the Moneys by the said Act Granted as
to you Our said Commissioners or any Five or more of You shall
from time to time seem Just and Reasonable And We do also
by these Presents Authorize Impower and Direct You Our
said Commissioners or any Five or more of You to do Perform
and Execute all and every the Matters and things whatsoever
which by the said Act such Commissioners are Authorized and
Required to do Perform and Execute Heri^by Willing and
Requiring You or any Five or more of You as aforesaid from
time to time to Proceed and Act according to the Rules and
Directions of the said Act of Parliament and Dilligently to
Intend the Execution thereof in all things as becometh And
these Presents or the Inrollment or Exemplification thereof
shall be to You and every of You a sufficient Warrant and
Discharge in that behalf In witness whereof We have caused
these Our Letters to be made Patent Witness Ourself at
Westminster the Seventeenth Day of September in the Thirty
Fourth Year of Our Reign
YORKE & YORKE
By Writ of Privy Seal
Filed 23 Febry 1761
[Endorsement of execution by six Commissioners]
At a Meeting of the Commissioners appointed by his Majesty's
Commission under the Great Seal of Great Britain bearing date at
Westminster the Seventeenth Day of September in the thirty
fourth Year of his Reign for carrying into execution an Act
passed in the last Session of Parliament intituled An Act for
taking down and removing the Magazine for Gunpowder and all
Buildings thereto belonging situate near Greenwich in the
County of Kent and erecting instead thereof a New Magazine
for Gunpowder at Purfleet near the River Thames in the County
of Essex and applying a Sum of Mony granted in this Session of
Parliament towards those Purposes and for Obviating Difficulties
arisen upon an Act made in the last Session of Parliament for
making Compensation for Lands and Hereditaments purchased
for his Majesty's Service at Portsmouth Chatham and Plymouth
on Thursday the twenty third day of October One thousand
seven hundred and sixty at the Publick House at Purfleet called
the Crown,
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 239
Pbesent
{Here follow names of Commissioners present)
The Commission having been read the said Commissioners being
more than five in number now here Entred upon made Surveys
of and set out and described and caused to be set out and
described by Lines Stakes and other Marks the Messuages Mills
Lands Tenements and Hereditaments at Purfleet in the County
of Essex herein after mentioned which they the said Commis-
sioners think are proper to be purchased in order for the erecting
and building a Magazine for Gunpowder and the Guardhouse
Barracks and other convenient Buildings there.
And it is hereby agreed by all the said Commissioners now
present that the Messuages Mills Lands Tenements and Heredita-
ments by them set out and described and caused and directed
to be set out and described in manner before mentioned are
proper and are hereby Ordered to be purchased for the purposes
mentioned in an Act passed the last Session of Parliament
INTITLED An Act for taking down and removing the Magazine
for Gunpowder and all Buildings thereto belonging situate near
Greenwich in the County of Kent and erecting instead thereof
a new Magazine for Gunpowder at Purfleet near the River Thames
in the County of Essex and applying a Sum of Mony granted in
this Session of Parliament towards those purposes and for
obviating Difficulties arisen upon an Act made in the last
Session of Parliament for making Compensation for Lands and
Hereditaments purchased for his Majesty's Service at Portsmouth
Chatham and Plymouth Which said Messuages Mills Lands
Tenements and Hereditaments so ordered to be purchased with
their several Abuttals and Boundaries are as herein after men-
tioned that is to say
{Here follows description of messuages)
All which said Messuages Mills Lands and Premisses are situate
lying and being in the Parishes of West Thurrock Avely and
Wennington some or one of them in the County of Essex and
are more fully delineated and described in the Plan hereto
annexed
And the said Commissioners do adjourn this Meeting to Thurs-
day the Eleventh day of December next at ten o'clock in the
Forenoon to the Angel Inn at Ilford in the County aforesaid.
240 ACQUISITION OF LAND
At a Meeting of the said Commissioners
at the Angel Inn at Ilford in the County of
Essex the eleventh of December One thousand
seven hundred and sixty.
Present
{Here follow names of Commissioners present)
Some of the Owners and persons interested in the Messuages
Mills Lands Tenements and Hereditaments surveyed and set
out as proper to be purchased for erecting a Magazine for Gun-
powder and a Guardhouse Barracks and other convenient
Buildings at Purfieet appear and offer to treat But make so high
Demands for their respective Interest in the same that the said
Commissioners cannot agree for the Purchase thereof Other of
the said Owners and persons interested appear but are unpre-
pared or unable to treat with the said Commissioners and others
of the said Owners and persons interested do not appear to treat
and agree with them And thereupon the said Commissioners do
order and direct That an Offer be made to the Several and
respective persons Bodys Politick and Corporate Ecclesiastical
or Civil herein after mentioned for their several and respective
Interest in the said Messuages Mills Lands Tenements and
Hereditaments so surveyed and set out the several and respective
Sum and Sums of Money herein after mentioned that is to say.
(Here follow particulars of Claimants and sums offered)
And the said Commissioners do further order and direct that
a Jury be impanelled summoned and returned by the Sheriff of
the County of Essex on Monday the nineteenth Day of January
next at Ten o'clock in the Forenoon at this place .before the
Commissioners who shall then meet on their Oath to inquire into
and ascertain the true and real value of the Messuage Mills Lands
Tenements and Hereditaments of such person or persons Bodies
Politick or Corporate Ecclesiastical or civil as shall then and
there refuse or neglect to treat and agree with the said Commis-
sioners or shall refuse to accept what the said Commissioners
think a reasonable Recompence or Satisfaction for their respective
Interest therein And of such person or persons as through any
Disability by Nonage Coverture or special Limitations in any
Settlement or Settlements or by reason of any controversy in
Law or Equity or any other Impediment cannot treat and agree
with the said Commissioners And that the said Jury do on
f
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 241
Friday the Sixteenth Day of the said Month of January View
the said Messuages Mills Lands Tenements and Hereditaments
so surveyed and set out and intended to be purchased in order
for their better ascertaining the true and real Value thereof
And the said Commissioners do hereby direct a Precept under
their Hands and Seals to the Sheriff of the County of Essex to
impanel summon and return such Jury in the Words and Figures
or to the effect following (that is to say)
(Here follows the form of the Precept)
And the said Commissioners do further Order and direct that
Mr. Thomas Stanyford do give Notice and make the said offers
respectively to the said respective Owners of the said Messuages
Mills Lands Tenements and Hereditaments so intended to be
purchased in writing Thirty Days before the said nineteenth Day
of the said Month of January and that a Jury will be impanelled
summoned and returned and have a View of the said Premises
before that time
And the said Commissioners do adjourn this Meeting to
Monday the nineteenth Day of January next at this place at ten
o'clock in the Forenoon.
«
At a Meeting of the said Commissioners
at the Angel Inn at Ilford on Monday the
nineteenth Day of January One thousand seven
hundred and Sixty one
Present
{Here follows names of Commissioners present)
Proclamation is made for all persons owners of or interested in
the Messuages Mills Lands Tenements or Hereditaments described
and set out by Lines Stakes or other Marks as proper to be pur*
chased for the erecting a Magazine for Gunpowder and a Guard-
house Barracks and other convenient Buildings at Purfleet in
the County of Essex do appear and make out their Title and
Claim and to agree with the said Commissioners now met for
their Estate and Interest therein.
And thereupon the said Commissioners agreed with John Pelly
Esquire for the compleat and absolute Purchase of his Estate
and Interest in the Words and Figures or to the Effect following
(that is to say)
Be it remembered that on the nineteenth Day of January in
2388
B
242 ACQUISITION OF LAND
the first Year of the Reign of our Sovereign Lord George the
Third by the Grace of God of Great Britain France and Ireland
King Defender of the Faith and so forth and in the Year of Our
Lord One thousand seven hundred and sixty one between The
Reverend Doctor William Parker Sir James Creed Kn* John
Hopkins John Peter Desmaretz Henry More Matthew Dove
Joseph Bird and Matthew Bateman Esquires being Eight of the
Commissioners nominated and appointed by his late Majesty's
Commission under the Great Seal of Great Britain bearing
date at Westminster the Seventeenth Day of Septembeo in
the thirty fourth Year of his said late Majesty's Reign for
carrjdng into Execution An Act passed the last Session of Par-
liament amongst other things for taking down and removing
the Magazine for Gunpowder at Greenwich and erecting instead
thereof A new Magazine for Gunpowder at Purfleet in the County
of Essex of the one part and John Pelly of Upton in the County
of Middlesex Esquire of the other part It is witnessed that
the said Commissioners Have Treated Consented and Agreed
And by these Presents Do treat Consent and Agree That the said
John Pelly shall be paid the Sum of One hundred and fifty
Pounds of lawful Money of Great Britain for the compleat and
absolute Purchase of his Interest in and the Freehold and
Inheritance of all that piece or parcel of Marsh Land
{Here follows description oj the property)
as proper to be purchased in order for the erecting and building
a Magazine for Gunpowder and the Guardhouse Barracks and
other convenient Buildings there pursuant to the said Act of
Parliament And the said John Pelly doth hereby consent and
agree to and with the said Commissioners that he the said John
Pelly shall and will accept receive and take the said Sum of One
hundred and fifty Pounds in full satisfaction for the compleat
and absolute Purchase of the said Lands Tenements and Here-
ditaments hereinbefore mentioned And that after Payment of
the said Sum of One hundred and fifty Pounds in manner as in
the said Act is mentioned the said Lands Tenements and Heredita-
ments now vested in the Trustees named in the said Act shall
be and remain to and for the use of his Majesty his Heirs and
Successors free of and from all Charges and Incumbrances what-
soever made by the said John Pelly or any of his Ancestors
In Witness whereof the said Commissioners and the said John
Pelly have hereunto set their Hands.
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 243
And no other person being prepared to agree with the Com-
missioners for any other of the said Messuages Lands Tenements
or Hereditaments the Sheriff is called upon for a return of his
Warrant dii-ected to him in the words and manner herein before
mentioned And thereupon he returns the said Warrant with
the Panel thereto annexed and thereby certified to the Com-
missioners in the said Warrant named That by virtue of that
Precept to him directed he had caused the Places in question to
be viewed by twenty two of the Jurors in the said panel thereto
annexed named and that the Residue of the Execution of the
said Warrant appears in the said Panel which is in the words and
figures following that is to say
Essex to wit The Names of the Jurors
summoned to Inquire upon their Oaths as by
the annexed Precept is directed.
{Here follow names of Jurors)
And after the Owners and other persons interested in the
said Messuages Mills Lands and Hereditaments marked out for
the purpose aforesaid had been informed that if they or any of
them would challenge any or either of the Jury impanelled and
returned they should challenge them as they came to the Book
before they were sworn.
{Here follow names of Jurors)
... appearing took the oath following
You swear that you will well and indifferently without favour
or Affection Hatred or Malice enquire into ascertain and assess
the true and real value of such Messuages Mills Lands Tenements
and Hereditaments as shall be given to you in charge and are
now set out and described by Lines Stakes or other Marks as
proper to be purchased in order for the erecting and building
a Magazine for Gunpowder and a Guard House Barracks and
other convenient Buildings at Purfleet in this County pursuant
to an Act passed the last Session of Parliament Intituled An
Act for taking down and removing the Magazine for Gunpowder
and all Buildings thereto belonging situate near Greenwich in
the County of Kent and erecting instead thereof a New Magazine
for Gunpowder at Purfleet near the River of Thames in the
County of Essex and appl3dng a Sum of Money granted in this
Session of Parliament towards those Purposes and for obviating
Difficulties arisen upon an Act made in the last Session of Par-
R2
244 ACQUISITION OF LAND,
liament for making Compensation for Lands and Hereditaments
purchased for his Majesty's Service at Portsmouth Chatham and
Plymouth and who are the Owners and Proprietors thereof and
of every part and parcel thereof and the true and real value of
their each and every of their respective Rights Estates and
Interest and a true Verdict give according to the best of your
Judgment and Knowledge
So help you God
After the Jury were sworn Caleb Grantham Esq^ by his
Council appears and claims to be seized in his Demesne as of
Fee of and in the Messuages Lands and Hereditaments herein
after next mentioned And Sir Matthew Fetherstonhaugh
Baronet by His Council appears and claims to be possessed of
part of the said Messuages Lands and Hereditaments by virtue
of a Lease to him granted for the Remainder of Sixty one years
And Thomas Keene appears and claims part of the said Lands
as Tenant to the said S^ Matthew Fetherstonhaugh John Pettit
appears by his Agent and claims to be possessed of other part
of the said Messuages by virtue of a Lease thereof granted to
Henry Woodin for the remainder of a Term of twenty one
Years After hearing Councel and an Agreement between the
said Caleb Grantham and Sir Matthew Fetherstonhaugh being
admitted by the Councel on each Side that the said Jurors now
sworn should in the consideration of their respective Interests
ascertain the Rent that should be abated by the said Caleb
Grantham to the said Sir Matthew Fetherstonhaugh in respect
of such Messuages Lands and Hereditaments now purchased and
after examining Witnesses as well on behalf of the said Caleb
Grantham as of the said Sir Matthew Fetherstonhaugh The
said Jurors upon mature consideration had upon their Oath
do present and say
{Here follow findings of Jury)
And thereupon the said Commissioners do adjudge decree and
determine that the true and real value of the said Messuages
Lands Tenements Hereditaments and Premises last mentioned
with the Appurtenances is the Sum of Two thousand two
hundred Eighty six Pounds ninteen Shillings and Six Pence of
lawful money of Great Britain And that etc. etc.
(here follows the apportionment) I
Tuesday the twentieth Day of January One thousand seven
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 245
hundred and sixty one at a Meeting of the said Commissioners
at the Angel Inn at Ilford.
Present
{Here follow names of Commissioners present)
The like Proclamation made as herein before mentioned and
the Jury being called over all appear and Sarah Hallett Widow
appears and by her Councel claims to be seized in her Demesne
as of Freehold for the Term of her Life of and in the Messuage or
Tenement and Hereditaments herein after mentioned Remainder
thereof to Mary Turner an Infant her Granddaughter and her
Heirs for ever Subject to the annual reserved Rent of Ten
shillings payable to Dame Mary Lake for her life and after her
Decease to Sir James Winter Lake Baronet an Infant and
subject to a Mortgage thereof, made to Rachael Dickens Widow
and her Heirs for securing the Repayment of One hundred
pounds and Interest after the rate of Four Pounds per Cent
per Annum and the said respective claims not being controverted
the Jurors aforesaid upon their Oath aforesaid Do present and
say that Sarah Hallett Widow is seized in her Demesne as of
Freehold for and during the Term of her natural life of and in
{Here follows description of parcels)
as proper to be purchased in Order for the erecting and building
a Magazine for Gunpowder and the Guardhouse Barracks and
other convenient Buildings there pursuant to the said Act of
Parliament Remainder thereof to her Granddaughter Mary
Turner and her heirs for ever Subject to a Rent of Ten Shillings
a Year to Dame Mary Lake for her life Remainder to Sir James
Winter Lake in Fee and to a Mortgage thereof made by Indentures
of Lease and Release bearing Date respectively the twenty
fourth and twenty fifth days of October which was in the Year
of our Lord One thousand seven hundred and fifty four between
the said Sarah Hallet and Spencer Turner and Sarah his wife of
the one part and Rachael Dickens of the other part whereby the
said Sarah Halhet and Spencer Turner and Sarah his wife grant
and convey the said Messuage or Tenements and Premises last
mentioned with the Appurtenances by the name and description
of etc.
{Description of parcels)
that the true and real Value of the said Messuage Tenement or
Dwelling house and Premises last mentioned with the Appur-
246 ACQUISITION OF LAND
tenances is the Sum of Foiir hundred and sixteen Pounds ten
Shillings of lawful Money of Great Britain And that the said
Estate and Interest of the said Rachel Dickens of and in the
said Messuage or Tenement and Premises last mentioned with
the Appurtenances is of the true and real value of One hundred
Pounds And the said Estate and Interest of the said Sarah
Hallet and Mary Turner is of the true and real Value of Three
hundred Pounds And that the said Dame Mary Lake and Sir
James Winter Lake's interest therein is of the true and real
Value of Sixteen Pounds ten shillings.
And the said Commissioners do Adjudge Decree and Deter-
mine that the true and real Value of the said Messuage Tenement
or Dwelling house and Premises last mentioned with the Appur-
tenances is the sum of Four hundred and sixteen Pounds ten
shillings of lawful money of Great Britain and that the said
Rachael Dickens for her Estate and Interest thereon be paid
the Sum of One hundred Pounds part of the said Sum of Four
hundred and Sixteen Pounds ten shillings and that the Sum of
Three hundred Pounds other part . of the said Sum of Four
hundred and sixteen Pounds ten shillings be paid to the Deputy
of the King's Remembrancer at the Court of Exchequer at
Westminster for the Estate and Interest of the said Sarah Hallet
and Mary Turner in the same pursuant to the Directions of the
said Act of Parliament And that the Sum of Sixteen Pounds
ten shillings the Residue of the said Sum of Four hundred and
sixteen Pounds ten shillings be paid to the said Deputy of the
King's Remembrancer for the Interest of the said Dame Mary
Lake and Sir James Winter Lake pursuant to the Directions of
the said Act of Parliament.
{Here follow similar proceedings and findings)
At a Meeting of the said Commissioners
on Monday the Sixteenth day of February in
the Year of our Lord One thousand seven
hundred and Sixty one at the Crown and
Anchor Tavern in the Strand in the County of
Middlesex.
Present :
{Here follow names of Commissioners present)
Wee whose names are hereunto subscribed met for the further
Execution of the said Commission pursuant to the said Act of
COMMISSIONS AND PROCEEDINGS 247
Parliament do hereby certify to the Clerk of the Crown in
His Majesty's High Court of Chancery that the said Commis-
sioners have pursuant to the Powers and Authorities to them
given by the said Commission proceeded to carry the said Act
into execution and have caused their Surveys Agreements Orders
Judgments Decrees and Verdicts to be entered in a Book in the
Words and Figures above mentioned.
{Signatures follow)
An exact Survey of the Lands necessary to be purchased by
the Crown pursuant to an Act of Parliament for Erecting
a Powder Magazine and other Buildings at Purfleet in the
County of Essex.
{Here follow particulars)
APPENDIX D
EXTRACTS FROM THE REPORT BY BRUCE IN 1798 ON
THE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE DEFENCE OF THE
KINGDOM AT THE TIME OF THE ARMADA
In 1586 directions were given to the Lord Lieutenants requiring
them to issue orders to the different Captains in their Lieutenancy
to meet at appointed places on or before the 20th of March in order
to make up their musters of men and of arms to Deputy Lieuten-
ants, to mark out to the Captains the posts which they were to
occupy, and to cover these posts by batteries, dig pits, and plant
stakes, to stop the progress of the enemy if he landed : to assign
stations for the horses and field pieces : to fix on places for the
powder magazines : to appoint days for the horses to be trained
and to name the places of rendezvous : taking care to have roads
and fords repaired, and cross-bars ready, to stop the enemy
after landing.
This general instruction was followed up in 1587 by an order
for completing the musters of the forces in the different counties,
and for having them fully accoutred and in readiness to march
on the first notice ; requiring at the same time that returns
should be made of the amount of the musters, both of men and
arms, to Her Majesty in Council.
But that the Queen's orders, in so far as regarded the maritime
counties, might be more fully explained and understood, instruc-
248 BRUCE'S REPORT
tions applicable to each county were sent on the 10th of February
1587 (that to the county of Devon may be taken as a specimen)
requiring — ^that the number of Deputy Lieutenants should be
completed — ^that, under the warrant of Her Majesty, orders
should be issued for putting the men in array and in readiness
at their different stations, that convenient places should be
assigned to five General Captains (as they were termed) who
were made answerable for the effective numbers of 500 each,
and to two additional Captains for 250, making in the whole
a band of regiment of 3,000 foot, to be reviewed and exercised,
and in readiness to go on service on the sea coasts under the
orders of the General Commander of the coast, to be afterwards
named by Her Majesty ; that the five Captains should likewise
muster the bands of horsemen, to be divided into troops of 50,
for each cornet, and appoint places of muster for the same ;
that the whole may be returned in general muster rolls as ready
for service, and exercised at least 25 at a time to qualify them for
duty ; that a survey of the places where the enemy may land
should be taken, and means provided more speedily to convey
under proper leads the forces to resist him, and directions given
to raise ramparts not only against his progress in the country ;
that a proper number of pioneers should be raised to act on this
duty ; that every justice of the peace, being of quorum, should
furnish two horsemen, and every other justice one, that the
towns within the county should provide the necessary store of
ammunition at a reasonable price ; that beacons should be
erected on the sea coast and men placed near them to watch
the motions of the enemy's ships ; and that ports should be in
readiness to carry information of his approach ; that return should
be made to the Queen of the due execution of these instructions ;
and that each band of 500 footmen should be formed into
a regiment and attended by 700 horsemen, besides the horsemen
furnished by the justices of the peace ; the whole properly
arrayed and in good order to withstand any attempt which the
enemy may make to land or to advance.
Notwithstanding these precautions it appears that in some
of the counties, though the lower and middling orders were well
disposed and had made laudable exertions to fulfil Her Majesty's
intention of putting the country in a state of defence, yet that
several of the higher orders, under the pretext that the danger
was not so immediate, had either refused to furnish the necessary
horses and carriages, or postponed their services under the
BRUCE'S REPORT 249
pretext that they were necessary only after the invasion should
actually take place.
These circumstances Lord Sussex, with an honest and loyal
indignation, represents as unjustifiable, because the resistance
was to be made against an enemy ' whose malice and preparations
were great ' ; adding what in every crisis must appear an
evidence of a decided loyalty that to discharge his duty with
effect he must have, without favour or partiality to any man,
the selection of such officers to serve under him as can execute
the great duty of defending his country with credit to themselves
and to their Commander.
In the counties such as Lincoln where an attack was not so
much apprehended as on the coasts more immediately skirting
the seas by which the embarkation from Spain must approach,
the instruction (in December 1587) directed the Deputy Lieuten-
ants to require the inhabitants in the three divisions of Lindesey,
Kesteven, and Holland, to put the coast in a posture of defence
lest the Duke of Parma should land his army when accounts
should reach him of the arrival of the Armada, expected on the
coast of Cornwall and Devon.
The anxiety felt by the Ministers of Elizabeth from the daily
accounts which they received of the preparations of the enemy
induced the Queen's Council on the 2nd April 1588 to address
an Order, in the form of a letter, to the Lord Lieutenants of the
different counties requiring them to obtain returns from their
Deputies of the state of preparations in the different districts,
and to forward the same for the Queen's information that she
might have full knowledge of the strength in each county, and
be prepared to oppose the attack of the enemy.
Of the same date, and strongly marking the anxiety of the
Council at this crisis, were the instructions sent to the Lord
Lieutenants of the different counties requiring them to send
in lists of the names of the officers of every rank and, in case
of proper persons not being found in any one county, to fill
these stations, the vacancy or the defect was to be suppUed by
persons recommended to the Queen as able to discharge this trust.
Not relying, however, on these general instructions, the Queen,
on the 6th of April 1588, appointed Sir John Norris, with full
powers to direct the arrangements for the internal defence of
the maritime counties of Kent, Sussex, Hampshire, Dorset,
Essex, Norfolk and Suffolk ; and addressed a letter to the
Lieutenants or their deputies of these counties, requiring them
250 BRUCE'S REPORT
to give every necessary information and aid to this General,
and to follow all his orders in putting the coast in a state of
defence either to obstruct the landing or progress of the enemy.
Sir John Norris was for this end to fix on stations to which the
guards of the coast might if overpowered retreat and form an
army to harass the enemy's march, or resist his entrance into
the interior of the country.
These instructions were accompanied with topographical
directions given on 30th of April 1588. Those for the county of
Norfolk are so precise and correct that they may be selected as
a specimen applicable (allowing for differences in local situation)
to the other counties during the existing danger.
These directions set out with describing the points on the
east coast where the attack might be expected, viz. Waburne,
Hoope, Cleyhaven, Waaham, Winterton and Yarmouth, at each
of which for the protection of the shipping as well as of the coasts
where the depth of water would admit the enemy's vessels,
ramparts were ordered to be erected, defended by trenches
reaching from one salt marsh to another. The causeways were
to be broken up, parapets to be built, the old Hythe to be
entrenched and defences raised at the distance of a mile from
Lynn where the channel is narrowest, and defended by a propor-
tion of cannon. On the approach of the enemy the bridges on
the Ouse were to be broken down, and the banks cut, to impede
his progress. Bodies of horse and foot were to patrol and obstruct
his march, galling him at the same time with the ordnance from
Winterton and Bromhall.
For the purpose of carrying these measures into execution
the shire was to be divided into districts, and the forces placed
in such stations as might enable them most easily to concentrate
at Yarmouth. The detachments of foot were to consist of 300,
one half trained and the other irregulars, accompanied by 73
pioneers and 20 carriages ; each carriage was to be conducted
by two men, and the whole to be in readiness for forwarding the
necessary works.
The directions, further, miautely specify the commanders and
the proportion of force under them who were to act at successive
times as reliefs to each other, from the 13th of May to the 9th of
July inclusive ; point out the mode of giving the alarm on the
approach of the enemy by beacons on which fires were to be
lighted ; described the lines in which the trained men under the
Deputy Lieutenants were to advance against him, and enjoin
BRUCE'S REPORT 251
the multitude to avoid assembling or creating confusion or
disorder.
In the event, however, of the enemy reaching Waburn such
strength as the county can assemble was to be brought up
against him, but if unable to retard his progress the foot and
horse were to retire for the protection of the important town
of Norwich, take station on the height of Montefurroy which
commands the city, and defend the town till an army can be
marched from the neighbouring counties to the relief of the
place. In the event, however, of the enemy debarking between
Yarmouth and Bromhall, the forces were to take post at Flegge,
defend the bridges, or, if untenable, to break them down ;
should he take the road by Thetford towards London the forces
of Norfolk were to hang on his rear, harass his march and prevent
his foraging parties laying waste the country. The magazine
was to be at Norwich, and on the approach of the enemy the corn
was to be burned down, the cattle drove inland, and bridges
and roads broken up to impede his march. In case the attack
be made on the side of Lynn, the Governor was to take care that
no horses or carriages be left behind to be seized by the enemy.
For all these purposes special commissions were given in the
different districts to particular officers to superintend each branch
of these diversified services, and strict orders issued for keeping
regular guards at the different bridges to stop all suspected
persons, particularly in the night time, and to bring them before
the justices for examination.
These justices were to be assisted by constables, and post-
horses were to be kept in constant readiness to convey intimation
of the appearance or approach of the enemy's fleet to the coast.
Another, and perhaps the most important station to be
guarded, was the coasts bordering upon the mouths of the
Thames as will appear from the accompanying chart. This
subject seems early to have attracted the Queen's notice, as the
charges for the chains and forts guarding the Medway were
made up in the month of January 1588, amounting to 1,470Z.
The defences appear to have had two objects : the protection
of the shipping in the river and security against the enemy's
approach to the capital.
For these purposes a great chain was fixed to cross the river
at the opposite point from Upnore Castle, with a wood- work
to cover two large wheels for moving it ; and lighters were
provided with cables and anchors for buoying it up. St. Mary's
252 BRUCE'S REPORT
and the other creeks were to be protected by batteries, and
Upnore Castle repaired by platform, dykes, &c.
The Queen's exactness in the article of charges appears
to have been more particularly explained by an Order of Council
dated the 25th August 1588, in which she requires from the
different Lord Lieutenants an account of the monies that had
been levied in their counties for her service, and the purposes
to which the sums had been applied, specifying that exact
payments must be made to the soldiery, and prohibiting, under
pain of her displeasure, any money to be accepted in lieu of
services.
A barrier was to be made at Warham Bridge to obstruct the
enemy in case the retreat of the Queen's forces should be neces-
sary, in which case the roads were to be cut and the water let in.
These instructions were followed up in June 1589 with orders
to the Lord Lieutenants to direct their Deputies to publish the
Lord Lieutenant's Commission in the county, to muster and
exercise the men within their districts, and to return lists of all
the men able to serve ; to appoint to every 50 horse a captain
and cornet ; to survey the coasts and make the necessary
fortifications for defending the places where the enemy might
land ; to survey the country inland that in case of his advancing
forward stations might be fortified where his progress may be
checked ; to assign to certain bodies of the trained men the
duty of repairing to these places ; to appoint pioneers to every
general band ; to provide the necessary carriages ; to have at
least 300 or 400 horsemen trained to firearms ; to require every
justice of the Quorum to furnish two petronels on horseback, and
every other justice one, who should attend the Lord Lieutenant
to see that all suspected persons be disarmed ; to administer
the oaths of supreme act to the Captains and trained soldiers ;
to see all farmers enrolled in places adjacent to where the
trained hands meet ; and to take care that the persons having
authority shall have the proportion of powder in store at the
Queen's price.
By the 33 Geo. Ill, cap. 8, provision has been made for
the families of militia men ; by the 34 of Geo. Ill, cap. 16,
Lord Lieutenants are empowered to accept offers to raise
BRUCE'S REPORT 253
volunteer companies, and also additional volunteers to regiments ;
and by cap. 31 corps of volunteers are authorised to be raised
for the defence of counties, towns or coasts, or for the general
defence of the kingdom during the present war and, by cap. 47
farther relief is provided for the families of militia men. This was
farther explained by the 35 of the King, cap. 81 ; and still farther,
by the 36th, cap. 114. By the 37 of the King, cap. 3, the militia
were farther augmented, and by cap. 4, aprovisional cavalry for the
defence of the kingdom was embodied. By cap. 22, His Majesty
was empowered to embody the augmented militia in case of
necessity for the defence of these kingdoms, and by cap. 23
the provisional cavalry was to be embodied ; and farther aug-
mented, by cap. 139. By the 38 of the King, cap. 17, a proportion
of the men in the augmented militia was allowed to enlist in His
Majesty's other forces, and to serve only until six months after
the conclusion of a general peace ; by cap. 18, His Majesty was
authorised to order out a certain proportion of the supplementary
militia and to incorporate them with the several companies of
militia ; and this was farther explained by cap. 19, and still
farther by the Act, more effectually to provide for the defence
and security of the realm during the present war, and for
indemnifjdng persons who may suffer in their property by such
measures as may be necessary for that purpose.
4. That the Crown by its Lord Lieutenant exercised during
the reign of Queen Elizabeth the power of calling on counties,
town bodies corporate, beneficed ecclesiastics and others, to
furnish, in cases of menaced invasion, quotas of arms, ammuni-
tion, military stores, pioneers, artificers, &c., necessary for the
army ; and armed vessels, mariners and a proportion of victuals
for them to assist in repelling the common enemy ; making the
Lord Lieutenant, his Deputies and the Justices judges of
such services. That the Crown, by the like power delegated to
the Lord Lieutenants, could call on all land holders, farmers, &c.,
to furnish carriages, posts to convey information of the approach,
or actual landing of the enemy, and by himself, or by his Deputies
to issue orders for driving away the cattle and horses from the
coast inland ; for burning and destroying the com, or whatever
might be of use to the enemy ; for breaking down bridges,
cutting up roads, and, in general, for doing everything which
might prevent, or might check if he actually landed, his progress
254 BRUCE'S REPORT
in conquest ; measures which the recited Acts of the Legislature
have in part adopted, and in which the general loyalty of the J
subject in the present crisis has happily co-operated. ' *
APPENDIX. No. II
The Points of the Directions given to the Lord Lieutenants of
the Marityme Counties in the beginning of March last 1586
1. The Lieutenants to cause several captaynes to assemble
their bandes, at a place appointed, by the 20th of March, and to
view them, and to supply dead and lame mens' roomes.
2. To muster their bandes, in places neare the sea coasts,
where they are appointed to repair, and to punish or reforme
defects.
3. The Lieutenants, or their deputyes, to lead the captaynes
to the places of descent, to acquaynt them with the ground.
4. To devise how to cover the soldiers from th' ennemy by
nature of the place, sconces, trenches, parapets.
5. To empeach the landing in places of danndger, by making
pits and planting stakes.
6. To appoint a place of keeping, for certain field peeces and
horses and carriages to draw them.
7. To appoint a place for the store of powder and match.
8. To cause the horse to be viewed and trayned, by a day
to be appoynted by the Lieutenant.
9. To appoint places of rendezvous.
10. To appoint gardes to repaire to passages and fords, and to
take order for erecting of turnpykes, uppon landing of th' ennemye.
April 10th, 1789.
Exd. J. Bruce.
APPENDIX No. IV
Instructions for the putting in Strengthe of all Her Ma'ties
subjects within the countie of Devon, for Defence of the same
countrie, uppon anye invasion to be made uppon the same.
February 10th, 1587.
:iC9|ci|::|::i::)c:)::(::i::|c
Itm. The said five persons, or in absence of anie one, the rest
shall newlie consider of the places, where an enemy male
BRUCE'S REPORT 255
descend to lande to the offence of the countrye ; and consider
that impeachment may be devised to withstand theire landinge ;
and thereof to make provision, how the same defences maie
be put in order and executed. And to consider, alsoe, howe
convenient forces maie be spedilie brought to theis landing places,
to withstand the enemy, and to expell him. For which purpose,
according to the orders, the last yere, directed by the Lieutenant,
it would be considered, howe such nombers of pioners maie be
in redines, under conductors and leaders, both with weapons
and toles, fit for work by ditching, trenching, or levienage of
rampiers, to withstand to the accesse or landings of the enemie.
or otherwise, in places of straights, after theire landings, to
impeach theire coming forward.
Itm. Divers other partes of the said orders shall be presently
vewed and prepared in readiness, tending to the impeaching of
the landings of the enemie, which being well forseene, and
diligently followed then tyme should require, maie serve more
to purpose to be done, with few nombres of souldiers trained,
and strong pioners, to be spedilie conducted to the place of
service, under wise and valiant captains, than after the oppor-
tunitie of the tyme omitted, tenne times so manie shall be hable
to remedie the danger.
APPENDIX No. V
Letter from the Earle of Sussex to the Lords of
CouNSELL, 30th November 1587
It maie please yo Hono at my retorne, into the countrie,
I came by Basinge and there having conference with my Lords
Marques, we agreed to viewe the whoU shire o selves ; and
he having taken the one parte, and I the other, we are no we in
accompUshinge the same ; and for my own parte, I wolde not
for anythinge, but that I should have done yt, for so farre
as I have yett passed, I have found neither armour, weapon,
nor shott, nor men, accordinge to my expectacon ; but it falleth
owt, as I have often saied, friendshippe, favour, or somewhat
else, doth make, that the best able be most favored the welthiest
most easilye chardged, and the willinge most pressed and bur-
dened, but at the finishing of this my travelsome jorney, I hope
to write unto yo Hono. of some amendment thereof, as by
certificate of th'increase, shall then more plainlie appeare.
256 BRUCE'S REPORT
Yo Hono wolde thinke these speeches to be strange, if you shold
heare them, the meaner and poorer sort, to sale, he that wold
not sell horse and carte to defend his prince, countrye, famiUe,
and children, it were pittie he had any thinge ; and the higher
and next sorte to sale, we are much chardged. manie waies, and
when the Enemy comes we will provide for him, but he will not
come yett. I am forced to use these kind of perswasions to the
poorer and willinge, who yealdeth more than theire abilitie ;
I promise it shall remayne, but as a thing done of their dewtiful
good wills, for this present, considering the malice and preparacon
of the enemies, and not to remain, as a continual chardge upon
them, and to the better and other sorte, I perswade as they have
most to lose, so ought they, besides their dewtie towards their
Prince and love to their countrie, so to provide and have in
readynes, such store of all thyngs as shall best defende the
same, whereby they male be better thought of, amongst the
best, and also the more beloved of neighbours for theire good
example ; wherein if I shall find them unwilling, as they thereby e
shall geve me greate and just cawse of mistrust in them so shall
they be assured, that in all taxacons, cessments or other im-
posicons, and taking uppe for services, I will burdem them to the
uttermost, which I hope will so take place with them, as there
shall be some amendment.
My goode Lorde, I am most hartelye and earnestlye, not onelie
to require, but also for the better defence of the realme, as
dewty bindest me to chardge your Hono to be a meane, for the
present, sending downe of the gonners, without whom I wish the
ordinance to the tower again, the platformes to be repaired and
that of the round tower to be made new for that it is so owld and
rotten, as on the dale of the Q. Ma' ties coronation, I durst not
shoote of one peece, which place is the onelie chiefest, for the
defence and safe guarde of the haven. The come powder, for
the small shott, and all the other necessaries, are presently to be
sent awaie, if Hir Ma'tie to your Honors do expecte any enemies,
but if you thinke all things doe stand secure and saife, you male
perhappes detract tyme, so longe as it male be to late repented.
Goode, my Lorde, beare with my plaine writinge, for what you
knowe there, I here not, but I can not lerne here, but that it is
most necessarie to be presentlie readie.
It pleased my Lorde Chancell and your Hono and the rest,
that I shold confer with the justices of the circuite, towchinge
the justices of the peace, and leaving a note of my opinion of
BRUCE'S REPORT 257
suche, as I thought most fitt, and specially, in this time, I
nominated three to be newlie put in, viz., Mr. John Seymour,
Sonne to Sir Henry Seymour, Mr. William Uvedall, and Mr. John
White, of Sowthwicke ; the last of them three is, as I am informed
left owt, and yet all kinds of waies most fittest, and by me
thought most meetest, for some parte of my own ease, being
weries, having no helpe, but Mr. Francis Cotton. The man is,
for his good discretion and government, upright dealing, good
hospitalitie, and chargeable service, for his prince and countrie
inferior to fewe or none, hereabowts, and seing, as I am put to
service, I would be gladd to have some in credit, that I might
best trust, of whom he is, besides his abilitie, one of the chiefest,
and I thinck will best discharg the same.
The earthe works will, by the end of this moneths paie, be
very neere finished ; and then must I know her Ma'ties pleasure
what shall farthest be done with the men, and how they shall be
employed. I thinke it very necessarie and most meet, that the
stone wall, from the platforme to the Pointe Gate, be rampared
with earth, which male be done with those labourers and men,
which shall be continued for the guarding of the towne, and so
bothe to be but one chardge. And so, I must humblye comit
your Honor to God.
From Portsmouth, this last of November 1587.
Your Honors Assured,
to his power,
Sussex.
April 10th, 1798.
Exd. J. Bruce.
APPENDIX No. X
Directions lefte by mee, Sr. Thomas Leighton, Knt., for all
Martiall Causes, in the Countie of Norfolk, with Sr. Edward
Clere and Sr. William Heydon, Knights Deputie Lieutenants
of the said Countie, and with Ralph Lane, Esquier, appointed
by their Lordships to assist them in the Execution thereof and
with Captaine Havers, Captain Helme, and Captn. Pepper.
The Last of April 1588
Firste, for as much as Waburne Hoope and Cley Howen,
Waxham, Winterton, and Yarmouthe are the places of greateste
danger, within the said countye, by reason there are good roades
2388 g
258 BRUCE'S REPORT
for shippinge, and also the sea, upon all those coasts, are shoare
deep, so as the enemye may, with greate easse, land his forces,
except good order bee taken to impeache hym ; I do thinke
meete, so followethe :
The sconce at Waburne Hoope to bee inlarged, according to
the platte delivered unto you, withe the trenche adjoyinge,
alonge the Salt Marsh, till you meete with the mayne channell
which comme from the Salthowse.
Also, that the Cawsey, leadinge from Salt howse to the Lodge
in Sr. Willm. Heydon's warren, be cut, upon occasion.
A small sconce, to be made at Black Eye, to gard the entrie
at Cley Haven.
The clyjffes at Sheringham and Cromer to bee cutte sloping
and the passage downe the water to be curved up, and parapet
made upon the toppe.
The old Hythe to be intrenched, impeache the comynge up
of the enemy there.
A skonce to be made at the Crotche, a myle distant from
Lynne, where the channell is narrowest, at the charge of the
inhabitants of the said towne, and to be furnished with ordinance
and munition by them. And for that, the said towne of Lynn,
is a place of great importance, for manie respectes yt is verie
expediente,, that some man, of good experience and sufiiciencie,
bee appointed to have the care of the directinge the towne and
forte, and Bycause Sr. John Peyton is of sufficient skill, and
resident in the towne the thynk him fytte to undertake the same
charges, yf happelie hee shall not otherwise bee employed by Her
Majestis speciall commaundement. And then, the Deputie
Lieutenants to make choise of some other, whose sufficientie is
answerable thereunto.
Also that the governor of Lynne shall, have care to take
speedie order, upon anie offered occasion, for the keepinge of the
bridges, upon the river of Ouse, between Brandon and Lynne to
hinder the passage of the enemye.
Lykewyse, yf the enemy shall happen to approache neare the
same towne, that he geve direction, for the cuttinge of the cawsey
at Estgate, and the cuvreinge up of the posturnes, and the
cuttinge of the bankes, to let in the sea, to inviron the towne
and further to doe whatsoever hee shall hold needful to bee
performed, for the defence thereof.
And, as for the coaste from Bromehall to Eckles, Waxam,
Winterton, and Yarmouth^, being at the least ten myles distance
BRUCE'S REPORT • 259
and, in all places, easie to make discente, I doe not see anie
further meane to fortifie the same, other then, with certaine
bandes of footemen and some horsemen, to bee in redines, to
repel the enemie, and that the ordnance, at Winterton and
Bromhall, be mounted and placed to the beste advantage for
the beatinge of the roade.
And for the towne and haven of Yarmouthe, that present care
be had, for the making suche ravellings and ditches, according
to such directions and plattes, as I leave with the Deputie
Lieutenants.
And for the better execution and perfectinge these fortifica-
tions and strengtheninge the sea coast e, against f orraine attempts,
I have thought requisite, that an equall division of the sheire
bee made, that the one moytie of the bandes of the souldiers
and pioners, of the hundreds adjacent unto Wabume Hoope, may
repaire thether, and the other moytie of the countie, convenientlie
situated for Yarmouthe, may resort thither to be employed as
occasion shall require, according to the forme underwritten.
Everie the captaines of the footebandes to have the one haulf
of their footebandes, where of one hundredth and fiftie to be
of the trained sorte, and the other hundred and fiftie of the
untrained, together with 73 pioners, and twenty carriages ; and
to everie carriage, two able men, with spades, to be at the places
and tymes, under written ; that the souldiers may bee trained
and instructed in matiall discipline, by the officers and to spend
some tyme everie day in f orwardinge the workes of f ortyfication ;
and the pioners and carters to be only employed in those labours,
and dismissed everie Saturday night.
And for that the yt were necessarie, also, the horsement,
might bee there attendinge, as well to joyne, within them in
resistinge the enemye, as also, to be exercised and made apte
for the use of ther weapon ; yt is likewise determined, that
the captaines of the light horses and petronells, with their parti-
cular chargei's, according to the order underwritten, shall observe
the same course.
S2
260 BRUCE'S REPORT
APPENDIX No. XI
A Note of the Charges for the Chajnie Guarding of the
Navye Roy all, &c.
Januarye, 1588.
A note of charges susteyned and paide for the guarding of
Her Mate navye RoyaU, with extra menne residente, as well in
Her Higness shippes, as also in barques, pinnaces, brigandines
and frigats and for the charge of a great chayne to crosse the
ryver, over against Upnore Castle, with a pyece of timber worke
made on both sides the saide ryver ; and for a house, and twoe
greate wheeles, made to the sayde chayne, with lighters anchors
and cables, allsoe to ryde by for the boyinge upp of the chayne
as alsoe for the stopping upp of Sajmte Marye Creeke and other
creekes there ; and for repayer of Upnore Castell, together with
the new makinge of plattformes, flanckers, dyches, &c. requysite
for the better defence of the saide navye, viz. —
For the greate chaine of iron, with the workman-
shippe and other charges, incidents for the bringing
therof from London to Chatham, amounteth to the
somme of ....... £250
For the great pyle and tymberwoorke, sett upp, on
both sides the ryver, as well to fasten the saide
chaine as also a house, and twoe greate wheeles
necessareylye made, for the windinge toughte of
the said chaine and for lighters, anckers, and
cables, also to ryde by, for the boying upp of the
same ; amounteth to the somme of . . . 360
For the stopping uppe of Sajnte Marye creeke, and
sundrye other creekes there, requisite for the more
safety of Her Highnes shippes, amountinge to the
somme of ....... 100
For the repa5rringe of Upnore Castell with tymber,
plancke, bricke, lyme, sande, lead workmannship
&c. together with the newe makings of platformes,
flankers dyches and rampyers, needful for the
better defence of the navye amountinge to the
somme of . . . . . . . 240
For the charges in guardinge of the Navy Royall
w"th ext' ordinarye menne, as well in barques,
pinnaces brigandines and frigotts, as alsoe in Hir
Highness shippes ; and for extraordinarie watche, at
BRUCE'S REPORT 261
sundrye beacons, next adjoininge to the saide
shippes, on both sides the water : amountinge to 420
For rewards unto captaines and others attendinge
the saide servyce, aboard Her Highnes shippes, as
allsoe downe the ryver to and fro' withe barques
pinnaces frigottes &c. dureing the saide service
amountinge to the somme of ... 100
Summa totall . . £1,470
W. Wynter.
John Hawkins.
William Holstock.
APPENDIX E
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT RELATING
TO SALTPETRE
(Record Office)
24 January 1588-1589.
CHANCERY WARRANTS, Series II. Jan. 31 Eliz. File 1497.
Memorand qd xxviij die Januar Anno infrascripto istud bre
delibatum fuit Dno Cancellar Angt apud Westinr exequend,
Elizabeth by the grace of God Queene of England Fraunce and
Ireland defender of the fayth &c. To our right trusty and wel-
beloved Councellor Sir Christofer Hatton Knight our Chancellor
of England greeting We will and commaund you that under
our greate scale of England ye cause our letters patentes to be
made furth in forme following Elizabeth by the grace of God &c.
To all and singular our Justices of peace Maiors Sheriffes Bay-
liffes Constables Headboroughes and to all other our ofl&cers
ministers and subiectes to whom these presentes shall come
greeting. Know ye that in consideracon of a greate quantyty
of good Corne powder yearely to be made and delivered into our
•store within the Tower of London and at a meane rate agreaed
and covenaunted by our welbeloved subiectes George Evelyn
esquier Richard HiUs and John Evelyn gentlemen of our speciall
grace certen knowledge and mere motion and of our prerogative
royall by these presentes do gyve and graunt full power lycence
262 SALTPETRE
and auethorytie unto the said George Evelyn Richard Hills and
John Evelyn their deputies factors and assignes and to every
or any of them to digge open and worke for salt Peter within
our Realmes of England and Ireland and dominions of the
same and all other our dominions where the said Salt peter
without fraude or coven shalbe thought meete and convenient
to be digged for and founde as well within our owne proper lands
growndes & possessions, as also within the landes growndes and
possessions of any our subiects set lying or being in any parte of
these our Realmes aforesaid (except the Cyty of London, and
two myles distant rounde about from the walles of the same City
of London, and the County es of Yorke Northumberland West-
morland Cumberland and the Bishopricke of Durham And the
same Salt peter to trye out and make into powder for our pro-
vision as aforesaid for and during the terme of eleven y^ares
next ensuing the date hereof And further our expresse will and
pleasure ys that the said George Evelyn Richard Hills and John
Evelyn their deputies factors or assignes shall from tyme to
tyme during this our graunte erecte make up againe and lay all
flowers stables walles or any other place that shalbe by them or
any of them stirred digged overthrowen or pulled downe for the
use aforesaid in as good perfection and state as they or any of
them did finde the same And yf any varience shall happen to
arrise betwene the Petermakers and owners of the said growndes
for the causes aforesaid then our will and pleasure is that two
of our Justices of Peace next adioyning shall have power by this
our graunte to here and determyn the same And lykewise our
expresse will and pleasure is that presently upon the sealing of
these our letters of Comission for the making of Peter or powder
aforesaid all former Comissions heretofore made to any person
or persons for the making of Peter or powder to be utterly voyde
and of none effecte Willing and comaunding you and every of
you by these presentes to be ayding and assisting unto the said
George Evelyn Richard Hills and John Evelyn their deputies
factors or assignes in all things that shalbe fytt and convenient
for the making of Peter and Powder aforesaid upon their reason-
able charges having and taking cariages after the rate of four
pence the myle. In witnes whereof &ce. Gyven under or.
pryvy scale at our Mannor of Richmond the f oure and twentyth
day of January in the one and thirtyth yeare of our reigne.
Will. Packer.
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 263
CHANCERY WARRANTS. Series II. File 1636. September.
41 Elizabeth.
Md qd septimo die Septembr Anno Regni Eliz Rne quadragesimo
primo (A.D. 1599) istud bre delibat fuit dno Custod magni
Sigilli Anglic apud Westni exequed.
Elizabeth by the grace of God Queene of England Fraunce and
Ireland defendo' of the faith &c. To our right trustie and wel-
beloved Counsellor Sir Thomas Egerton Knight keeper of our
greate seale of England Greeting We will and comaund you
that under our said greate seale being in your custodie ye cause
our Ires patentes to be made f urth in forme f oUowinge Elizabeth
by the grace of God &c. To all and singular our justices of peace
Maio^s sheriffes bayliffes constables headboroughes and to all
other o^ officers ministers stibjectes to whom these presentes
shall come Greeting Whereas we by our Ires patentes bearing
date the eight and twentith daie of January in the one and
thirtith yere of our reigne for the consideracon therin menconed
did geve and graunt full power licence and authoritie unto our
welbeloved subjectes George Evelyn Esquio^" Richard Hill and
John Evelyn gent, their deputies facto^^ and assignes and to
everie or any of them to digge open and worke for saltepeeter
w^bin our Realmes of England and Ireland and Dominions of the
same, and all other o^ dominions where the said saltepeeter
w'^^out fraude or covyn should be thought meete and convenient
to be digged for and found as well w^^in our proper landes
growndes and possessions as also w^^in the landes growndes and
possessions of any of our subjectes sett lyeing or being in any
part of those our realmes aforesaid (except the citie of London
and two myles distant round about from the walles of the same
citie of London, and the counties of Yorke Northumberland
Westmerland Cumberland and the Bishoprick of Duresme)
And the same saltepeeter to trie out and make into powder for
our provision as aforesaid, for and during the terme of eleven
yeres next ensuinge the date thereof, as by the said Ires patentes
amongest other thinges more at large doth and may appeare
And wheras also we by other our Ires patentes under the greate
seale of England dated the eight daie of January in the two
and thirtith yere of our reigne for the considera(5on therin men-
Coned did geve and graunt unto Thomas Robinson and Robert
Robinson or either of them his or their deputies facto'^ and
assignes or either of them to be allowed from time to time by
264 SALTPETRE
the Master of our Ordenaunce or the lieutenaunt of the same
office full power license and authoritie to digge open and worke
for making of saltepeeter in convenient places for those pur-
poses w*Mn our cities of London and Westminster and either of
them, and w^^in the distance of two myles round about from the
walles of the Citie of London or from our olde pallace of Westm'
w^^ is our citie of Westm', as well w^^in liberties as w%ut and
as well w^^in our owne landes growndes and possessions as also
w*^^in the landes growndes and possessions of any of our loving
subjectes whatsoever sett lyeing and being w*^^in our said cities
or either of them or the places or distances aforesaid To have
hold exercise and enjoy the same authoritie unto the said
Thomas Robinson and Robert Robinson and his or their assignes
to be allowed as is before menconed for and during the terme of
tenne yeres next ensuing the date therof fully to be compleate
and ended as by the said last menconed tres patentes more at
large amongest other thinges doth appeare w^^ said severall
ires patentes and all and ev^y the power and powers licence
and licences authoritie and authorities thereby graunted, and
all and everie thing in them or either of them conteyned are by
due course of lawe by such as had good and full power thereunto
surrendered and yealded up unto us in o' Chauncery to be can-
celled wch surrenders we doe by these presentes allowe and
accept And wheras also we by our ires patents under the greate
scale of England bearing date the six and twentith day of Aprill
in the one and thirtith yere of our reign for the consideracon
therin menconed did geve and graunt full power licence and
authoritie unto our welbeloved subject George Constable
Esquio^ his deputies factors or assignes to digge open and worke
for saltepeeter w^in all or any our counties of York the citie of
York Nottingham Lancaster Northumberland Westmerland
Cumberland and the Bishoprick of Duresme aswell w^^in our
landes growndes and possessions, as also w^^in the landes growndes
and possessions of any our loving subjects sett lyeing or being
within any the counties aforesaid To have hold exercise and
enjoye the same for and during the terme of eleven yeres next
ensuing the date thereof fully to be complete and ended, as by
our said last mengoned Ires patentes amongest other thinges
more at large it doth and may appeare And wheras our loving
subjects John Evelyn Esquio' Richard Harding Esquio^ Robert
Evelyn gent. John Wrenham gent, and Symeon Turner gent,
have undertaken to deliver yerely into our store w^^in our
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 265
Tower of London a greater quantitie of good perfect and service-
able corne gonnepowder meete and serviceable for cannon and
calyver shotte at a lesser and lower price and rate then before
we paid for the like, as by certain indentures bearing the date
of these presentes made betwixt us of th'one pte and the said
John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham
and Symeon Furner of the other part, and in our Court of
Chauncery inrolled or to be inroUed, wherby we shall not be
driven to seek the said proporeon of gonnepowder out of any
foraine con tries but shall buy the same w^^in this our owne
kingdome and at a meaner and lower rate and price then we have
heretofore paid for the same and have also undertaken to furnish
this our realm of England with sufficient store of good perfect
and serviceable gonnepowder for the use and provision of our
subjectes at and for such reasonable price as in the said indentures
is also limited and appointed And wheras our loving subjects
are nowe and of long time have been greately damnified by the
excessive waste and spoyle of woodes and are like to be more
and more endamaged if the same be not prevented : And
wheras also our loving subjects have been excessively charged
and encombred w^^ the carriages of the said woodes and of other
carriages about the making of saltepeeter and gonnepowder,
the said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John
Wrenham and Symeon Furner or some of them have (as we be
informed) [injvented devised and found out by their owne travell
industrie costes and charges a very good and profitable device
and invencon, by meanes wherof in making of such quantities of
saltepeeter, as heretofore have been made, a greate part as well
of such wood and fewell as hath haretofore been wasted and
consumed, as also of such carriages as have been heretofore
employed in and about the making of saltepeeter and gonne-
powder shall and may hereafter be saved to the great comoditie
and benefitt of this Realm, and ease of our loving subjects,
w«^ we principally respect : Nowe Knoew Ye that we of our
speciall grace certen knowledge meere moCon and of our pre-
rogative Royall for divers good consideracons us especially
moving have given and graunted and by these presents do for
us our heires and successors giye and graunt full power licence
libertie and authoritie unto the said John Evelyn Richard
Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and Symeon Furner
and every of them their and every of their executors adminis-
trators and assignes that they the said John Evelyn Richard
266 SALTPETRE
Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and Symeon Fumer
and every of them their and everie of their executor's adminis-
trators and assignes and their and everie of their deputies factor's
workmen and servantes only and noe others shall and may make
and worke for w^^in our Realms of England and Ireland and
either of them and all other our dominions all and all manner of
saltepetter and gonnepowder according to the true intent and
meaning of these presentes And shall and may have the use and
only making and working of all and all manner of saltepeeter
and gonepowder w^^in our said Realmes and either of them and
other our said dominions according to the true intent and meaning
of these presentes And also that they the said John Evelyn
Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and Symeon
Furner their executors administrator's and assignes and their
and every their deputies factors workemen and servants and
every of them and noe others shall and may according to the
true intent and meaning of these presentes enter search digge
open and worke for saltepeeter in all convenient places and in
due and reasonable manner aswell w^Mn the landes growndes
or possessions of us our heires and successor's that now be or
hereafter shalbe in the handes possession or occupacion of any
the farmers or tenantes of us our heires or successor's as also
nv^^in the landes growndes or possessions of any the subjects of
us our heires or successor's aswell w'^Hn liberties as w^^out
w^^in any of our realmes or dominions where it shalbe meete and
convenient w^^out fraude or covyn for working and digging for
saltepeeter And the same saltepeeter to have take and enjoy
to their and everie of their owne uses and to the use and behoofe
of their and everie of their executors administrator's and assignes
during the terme of tenne whole yeres by these tres patentee
menconed to be dismised and graunted To have holde exercise
and enjoy the sole and only making of saltepeeter and gonne-
powder, and the said power licence libertie and authoritie and
other the premisses in and throughout or* said Realmes of England
and Ireland and all other our Dominions (Except the countie of
Yorke the citie of Yorke the counties of Nottingham Lancaster
Northumberland Westmorland Cumberland and the Bishoprick
of Duresme) unto the said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert
Evelyn John Wrenham and Symeon Furner and to everie of them
their and every of their executor's administrator's and assignes
from hencefurth for and during the terme of tenne whole yeres
from hence next ensuing and fully to be complete and ended
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 267
And to have holde exercise and enjoye the sole and only making
of salte-peeter and gonnepowder and the said power license
libertie and authoritie in the said countie of Yorke citie of Yorke
counties of Nottingham Lancaster Northumberland Westmerland
Cumberland and the Bishoprick of Duresme unto the said John
Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and
Symeon Fumer their and every of their executors administrator's
and assignes from the last Day of Aprill next ensuinge the date
hereof for and during the residue of the said terme of tenne
whole yeres then next following and fully to be complete and
ended And our will and pleasure is and we straightlie charge
and comand that the said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert
Evelyn John Wrenham and Symeon Furner their and everie
of their executor^s administrators and assignes and their and
everie of their deputies factors workemen servantes and assignes
shall from time to time during the said terme of tenne whole
yeres at their owne proper costes and charges well and sufficientlie
erect make up againe laye and repaire all and everie such place
and places thing and thinges as shalbe by them or any of them
broken stirred digged or in any sorte decayed hindered or
defaced for the use or uses aforesaid in as good sorte as the
same convenientlie may be And if any variance strife or debate
shall happen to arrise or growe betwene any person or persons
hereby authorised or having or pretending to have authoritie by
or under these our tres patentes and any of the owner or owners
possessor or possessor's of the place or places thing or thinges
that shalbe or may be digged or used for the occasion aforesaid
by vertue of these presentes for or about the same or for or
about any other clause or graunt article libertie or authoritie in
these our tres patentes conteyned or menconed touching or
concerning the digging opening or working for saltepeeter or
for the erecting making up layeng or repairing of any of the said
place or places thing or things, then our expresse will and
pleasure is and we doe hereby for us our heires and successors
geve full power and authority unto two Justices of the Peace
dwelling next the place where any such variance shall happen
if the same be out of any citie or towne corporate being a countie
of it self, and if it be w*^^in any citie or towne corporate beinge
a countie of it self, then to the principall officer or officers of
such Citie or towne corporate upon complaynte made unto them
to call the parties before them, and to heare and determine the
controversies betwene them according as they shall in their
268 SALTPETRE
wisedomes and discreeons thinke and judge to be just and fitt,
and shalbe according to reason equitie and justice w^^ to doe and
execute we straightly charge and comaund them and everie of
them upon such peines and penalties as belonge to such as
obstinately contemne our comaundement royall And we
straightly charge and comaund that such orders and deter-
minacons as shalbe sett down in that behalf shalbe firmely
observed and kepte upon the peines and penalties aforesaid :
And yet, if noe order shalbe sett downe and taken by them in
that behalfe, or if they cannot ende and determine the same,
then we hereby for us our heires and successors do geve full
power and authoritie to the Master of the Ordenaunce for the
time being or to his deputie or in their absence to the Lieutenant
of the Ordenaunce for the time being to heare and determine the
same w"^ also we will and comaund to be likewise duely and
firmely observed and kept as is aforesaid And wheras in regard
of the troublesomenes of this age it is necessarie that a great
quantitie of saltepeeter and gonne powder should be made for
the better furnishing of our store and defence of our realmes and
dominions w^^ would be to the greate damage of the said John
Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and
Symeon Fumer their executor's administrator's and assignes if
they should be compelled to keepe the same in their handes and
not to have any utterance for the same ; We therfore not
mynding that the said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert
Evelyn John Wrenham and Symeon Furner their executor's
administrator's or assignes or any of them should receave any
losse or hinderance in that behalf and yet w^^all providing for
the profitt and ease of our loving subjectes of our speciall grace
certen knowledge and mere moSon do by these presentes for us
or' heires and successor's geve and graunt unto the said John
Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and
Symeon Furner and every of them their and everie of their
executors administrator's and assignes full power license libertie
and authoritie that the said John Evelyn Richard Harding
Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and Symeon Furner their and
everie of their executor's administrator's and assignes and their
and everie of their deputies factor's gervantes and assignes from
time to time and at all times for and during the said terme of
tenne whole yeres before by these presentes graunted (our owne
provision of gonnepowder being duely delivered into our store
w^Mn our Tower of London according to the purporte and
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 269
meaning of the said indentures, and excepting so much being
good perfect and serviceable come gonnepowder as together
w^ the said store for the time being of us our heires or successors
shalbe sufficient for the defence of these o' Realmes and
Dominions, and over and above the same, as much also as any
merchant or merchantes or any other of our loving subjectes or
of our heires or successors will buy w^^in any of our Realmes or
Dominions for tenne pence a pownde, as in the said indentures
is menconed, and not above, w^^ they and everie of them shall
and may buy at their will and pleasure) shall and may (payeng
to us our customes subsidies and other duties whatsoever in
that behalf) by license of the lord Trer of England for the time
being under his hand and scale in writing, transporte carry and
convey out of this our Realm of England or any other our
Dominions into any of the partes beyond the seas or other places
wc^ at the time of such transportaCon carriage and conveyance
shalbe in league or amitie w^^ us our heires or successors, only
such and so much of the residue and overplus of all such salte-
peeter and gonnepowder wherof they shall have such license,
as together w*^ our said store there shalbe sufficient of corne
gonnepowder, and that perfect, good and serviceable, for the
defence of our Realmes and dominions, and over and above the
same, as much also as any merchant or merchantes or any other
of our loving subjectes or of our heires or successors will buy
w*^^in any of our Realmes and Dominions for or at the rate of
tenne pence the pownde, as in the said indentures is mengoned,
and not above, w^^ they and every of them shall and may buy
at their will and pleasure. And to the ende that the said John
Eveljm Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John Wrenham and
Symeon Fumer and every of them their and everie of their
executors administrators and assignes, shall and may have and
enjoye the full and whole benefitt of this our license and privi-
ledge to them before in these presentes graunted according to
the tenor an(j f,j>^Q meaning of these our tres patentes We doe
hereby for us our heires and successors of our speciall grace
certen knowledge and meere mocon straightlie charge and
comaund aU and every person and persons whatsoever of what
estate degree or condidon soever he or they be (other then the
said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn John Wren-
ham and Symeon Fumer their and everie of their executors
administrators deputies factors and assignes and everie of them,
and other then the said George Constable his deputies factors
270 SALTPETRE
or assignes, during the residue only of the said terme menconed
to be graunted unto him, and that only in the said countie of
Yorke citie of Yorke counties of Nottingham Lancaster North-
umberland and Westmerland Cumberland and the Bishoprick of
Duresme that they or any of them do not at any time hereafter
during the said terme of tenne whole yeres presume or attempt
either to make any saltepeeter or gunnepowder w*^in any of our
realmes or dominions, or to transport, bring or send or to cause
to be transported brought or sent out of any foraine contrie into
any of our said realmes or dominions any saltepeeter or gonne-
powder made or to be made w^^out our said realmes or dominions
upon peine that everie person and persons offending in any of
these respects shall incurre our high displeasure and suffer such
fyne punishment and imprisonment as by any laws or statutes
heretofore made or hereafter to be made w^^in our said Realmes
of England or Ireland or any of them can or may be imposed or
inflicted upon them and every or any of them for their contempt
and disobedience in w^^^tanding our comaundement and
prerogative royall Provided alwaies that if at any time here-
after the said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn
John Wrenham and Symeon Furner or some of them or their or
some of their executor's administrator^^ or assigns or their or some
of their deputie or deputies factor or factor's shall not have so
much good perfect and serviceable corne gonnepowder as is
hereafter limited expressed menconed and appointed, that is to
sale, as much as together w^^ our store of good perfect and
serviceable come gonnepowder shall be sufficient for the service
and defence of our said realmes and dominions and also over and
besides the same, as much as any merchant or merchantes or any
other of our loving subjectes or of our heires or successo^^^ wilbe
willinge and desirous, and shall require to buy bona fide, at the
price or rate of tenne pence the pownd and not above, according
to the true meaning of the said indentures to be solde bartred
exchanged or otherwise disposed w^Mn any of the realmes or
dominions of us our heires or successor's that then it shall and may
be lawfuU to and for all and everie subject and subjectes of us
our heires and successor's to transport into any part beyond
the seas and to bring in into this realm of England and Ireland or
any other of our Dominions from any the partes beyond the
seas, and to bargaine sell exchange and barter all and all manner
of saltepeeter and gonnepowder aswell w^^in our said realmes and
dominions as w%ut payeng therefore to us our heires and sue-
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 271
cessC's the customes subsidies and other dueties therefore due
and accustomed These presentes or any thing therein conteyned
to the contrarie not w*^tanding And we do hereby will and
comaund you our said Justices of Peace Maio^^ sheriffes bayliffes
constables and headboroughs and all and singular other our
officers ministers and subjegtes whomsoever that you and
everie of you shall from time to time and at all tymes during the
continuance of this our graunt be ay ding helping and assisting
unto the said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn
John yVrenham and Symeon Turner and every of them their
and every of their executo^^ administrator's and assignes and
their and everie of their deputies factors servantes and workemen
and every of them in the due execucon of the premisses according
to the true intent and meaning of these presentes, and for the
having and taking of convenient carriages after the rate of fower
pence the myle for everie carte or wayneloade after the rate of
twentie hundred to the loade, for the carryinge of such thinges
as have been heretofore accustomed to be carried in or about the
pr'emisses or any of them And our further will and pleasure is
and we doe by these presents for us our heires and successor's
graunt to the said John Evelyn Richard Harding Robert Evelyn
John Wrenham and Symeon Furner their executor's adminis-
trator's and assignes and every of them, that these our ires
patentes, and the power licence libertie and authoritie hereby
graunted, and all and everything and thinges herein conveyned
shalbe good and effectuall in lawe to them and every of them
their and every of their executors administrators and assignes
according to the true intent and meaning thereof Notw^^standing
the misrecitall of the said before recited ?res patentes or of the
term or termes of yeres or any thinge therin conteyned And
notw^*^tanding the misrecitall or non-recitall of any !res patentes
or graunt of the premisses or any part thereof at any time here-
tofore made And notw Standing expresse mencon be not made
of the thinges hereby menConed to be graunted or of the true or
yerely or other value thereof. And notw^^standing any statute
acte of parliament order proclamacon ordenance lawe usage
custome or any other matter whatsoever to the contrarie. In
witness &c. Gyven under our Privy Scale at our Manno^ of
Nonesuch the seconde dale of September in the one and fortieth
yere of our reigne.
Will Packer,
Evelyn et at : licence. /
272 SALTPETRE
28 April 1629.
Chancery Warrants
Series II. 5 Charles 1
Bundle 2042. No. 33
M^. qd vicesimo octavo die Aprilis Anno quinto
Caroli R : ista Billa deliBat fuit Dno Custodi
Magni Sigilli Anglie apud Westm exequend.
Charles R.
Charles by the grace of God kinge of England Scotland
Fraunce and Ireland, defendor of the faith &c. To our right
Trustie and right welbeloved Councellor Richard Lord Weston
or. high Threr: of England and to our right trustie and right
welbeloved Cozens and Councellors Robert Earle of Lindsey our
Great Chamberlen of England, WiUiam Earle of Pembrooke,
Lord Steward of or. househould, Edward Earle of Dorsett Lord
Chamberlen to or. dearest Consorte the Queene, Dudley, Viscount
Dorchester one of our principall Secretaries of State, to or.
trustie and right welbeloved Horace, Lord Vere, Master of or.
Ordinance, and to or. right trustie and welbeloved Councellor
Sir John Coke knight one of or. principall Secretaries of State.
And to all and Singuler our Justices of peace, Maiors, Sheriffs
Bailiffs, Constables, Headboroughs, and to all other our officers
and subjectes to whom it shall appertyne or to whom these
presentes shall come, Greeting. Whereas at this present time
we have more than ordinarie occasion to provide good and
sufficient saltpeeter and powder to furnish or. stoares for the
defens and safetie of or. Realmes and dominions, And reposing
especiall truste and confidence in the understandinge fidelities
and care of you the said Lord Threr : Earle of Lindsey Earle of
Pembrooke, Earle of Dorrsett, Viscount Dorchester Lord Vere,
and Sir John Coke, Of or. especiall grace certen knowledge meere
mocion and of or. Prerogative royall, doe by these presents give
and graunte full power licence, libertie and authoritie unto you
or anie thrie or more of you, your deputies, factors, workmen and
servantes and everie of them, to enter break open and worke for
Saltpeter as well within the houses, lands, grounds or possessions
of us our heires and successors that nowe be or hereafter shalbe.
As also in the houses, lands, grounds or possessions of anie of
our subjects within or. kingdome of England and dominion of
Wales and in all priviledged places within them or anie of them.
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 273
and there to have take and use all such ground, earth, walles
and water as shalbe thought good, meete or convenient for the
making of good and serviceable saltpeeter, and to make the
same saltpeeter into gunpowder for or. onlie and speciall service,
without fraud or covin, also to have and take cartes and
carriages of any of or. loving subjects for the carrying and
transporting of all such thinges as are to be used in or about or.
said service at and for the pryse of fower pence the myle for
everie myle that everie such carte shall goe laden so long as the
Saltpeeter men shall and doe performe their undertakings to us,
the myles to be accompted as hath been accustomed from place
or place, and the emptie vessell to be recaried gratis as f ormerlie
hath bene used and accustomed And wee doe hereby give full
power and authority unto the said Lord Threr. Earle of Lindsey,
Earle of Pembrooke, Earle of Dorsett, Viscount Dorchester,
Lord Vere and Sir John Coke or anie three or more of you and
to yor. deputies factors and servants and everie of them to have
and take of anie of or. loving subjects Seacoles at and for
a reasonable pryse to be given for everie chaldron of coles soe
taken, and also to have and take of anie of our subjects Ashes
at and for reasonable pryses to be given for the same And also
to have and take workhouses for or. said service, and howese
and stables outhowses and yards of anie of our subjectes and
therein to set up vessels and to bestow their servantes, cattell
and other necessarie provisions for the effecting the same or.
service paying unto the owners or present possessors of such
houses, barnes, stables, yardes and outhouses, reasonable rents
and rates for the same for the tyme they shalbe used for or.
service, And if it shall happen that the owners or possessors of
such houses, outhouses, barnes, stables and yardes shalbe obsti-
nate and unreasonable in their demands for or concerning the
same, then our will, pleasure and commaund, is that the Maior
or other principall officer of anie Cittie Towne Corporate, or anie
other priviledged place where such controversie shall aryse doe
view and see the places and upon consideracion had thereof and
of the tyme the same shalbe used, to set such reasonable and
indifferent pryses as they shall thinke meete to be given in
satisfaction. And if it shall happen to be out of anie Cittie or
Towne Corporate or privileged place then or. pleasure and
command is that the next Justice of peace doe upon like con-
sideracion taken, set reasonable pryses of all such places so
desired to be had and used as aforesaid, according to which
2388 rp
274 SALTPETRE
pryses so set downe we likewise command that paiement be
trulie made by the said Lord Threr. Earle of Lindsey, Earle of
Pembrooke, Earle of Dorsett, Viscount Dorchester, Lord Vere
and Sir John Coke, or anie three or more of them, their deputies,
factors or servantes or by some of them, And or. will and
pleasure is and wee doe hereby straightlie charge and command
the said Lord Threr. Earl of Lindsey, Earle of Pembrooke,
Earle of Dorsett, Viscount Dorchester, Lord Vere and Sir John
Coke or anie three or more of them their deputies, factors, work-
men and servantes and everie of them, that they do from time
to time with all convenient speed erect, make up againe, lay and
repaire all such place and places, thinge or thinges whatsoever
as shalbe by them or anie of them open, digged, stirred, hindred
or defaced for any of the purposes aforesaid, in as good sort as
convenientlie the same may be. And if anie controversie, variance,
stryfe or debate shall happen to aryse or grow betwixt anie of
the deputies of the said Lord Threr. Earle of Lindsey, Earle of
Pembrooke, Earle .of Dorsett, Viscount Dorchester, Lord Vere
and Sir John Coke, or anie three or more of them, or anie the
workmen or servantes of the said deputies and anie of or. lovinge
subjectes about the digging or working for Saltpeter, or about
the having or taking of anie cartes, carriages or other things
whatsoever fitt and necessarie and before granted or intended
for the better execucion of this service, or about the making up
againe, laying or repayring of anie floores, grounds or walls
digged, broken or used for the same, if it be in anie cittie, Towne
Corporate, or other privileged place. Then or. will, pleasure
and command is that the Maior, Sheriff, Bayliff or other principall
officer of anie such place, or if it be out of anie such Cittie, Towne,
Corporate or other privileged place, that then the next or nearest
Justice of the Peace Upon complaint made to them or anie of
them, call all such persons before them and doe heare, decyde and
determine all and everie such controversies in such sorte as they
in their discrecions shall thinke to be agreeable to the true
intent and meaninge of these presents And for the furtherance
of or. said service we straightlie charge and command all and
singular our Justices of Peace, Maiors, Sheriffs, Bayliffs and
other principall officers whom according to the true intent and
meaning hereof it shall or may concerne, to do and execute the
premises with effect as they tender or. royall commandement
and the furtherance of this or. so great and waightie service, and
what order or orders shalbe by them or anie of them soe made
i
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 275
and sett downe being according to the true intent and meaninge
of these presents, We straightlie charge and command to be
observed and kept And if no order shalbe by them taken or
sett downe, Then wee doe hereby give full power and authority
unto the said Lord Threr. Earle of Lindsey, Earle of Pembrooke,
Earle of Dorsett, Viscount Dorchester, Lord Vere and Sir John
Coke and to the rest of the Officers of or. ordinance for the time
being or any three or more of them (whereof the Master of the
Ordinance, the Lieutenant, Master Surveyor or Clerk of or.
said ordinance to be alwaies one) by their warrantes directed and
delivered to anie the messengers of or. Chamber to call before
them all such person and persons as shalbe nominated unto them
to disobey or. authoritie and royall commandement herein, or
to deny unto the deputies of the said Lord Threr. Earle of Lind-
sey, Earle of Pembroke, Earl of- Dorsett, Viscount Dorchester,
Lord Vere and Sir John Coke, or anie three or more of them as
aforesaid or unto the factors workmen or servantes of the said
deputies or anie of them, such things as are hereby required to
be allowed unto them for the better execucion of this or. Service,
or shall delay the doing thereof or be partiall therein and to
examine, heare, decyde and determyne all such controversies or
causes as shall aryse thereupon and to inflict punishment upon
every such offendor and offendors by imprisonment or otherwise
as contemnors of or. royal authoritie and command, or otherwise
to certifie unto the Lords of or. Privie Councell, such offendors
with their offences that such further course may be therein taken
as shalbe thought most fitt. And for doing of all and singuler the
premises these or. letters patents or the inroUment of them
shalbe unto all men whom it shall concerne a sufficient warrant
and discharge without any other commission or further warrante
to be had procured or obteyned, And or. will and pleasure is
that all such orders as shall according to or. pleasure herein
declared be made and sett downe shalbe inviolablie kept observed
and fulfilled. And or. further will and pleasure is, that all and
everie one of the deputies, factors, workmen and servants afore-
said, and everie of them and everie of their horses, cartes and
carriages used or employed in about or conceminge this or.
service be exempte and freed from all other service or services
whatsoever to be done or performed for or to us or. heires or
successors and from paying any taxes or towle in anie place or
places within this or. jiingdome or from being pressed or taken
by anie of or. officers for any other service whatsoever. And
T2
276 SALTPETRE
whereas wee are given to understand that divers persons doe
pave or gravell their dovehouses or use other devises therein
whereby the verie generacion of the myne of Saltpeeter is in
danger to be destroyed and that few doe take care to preserve
and increase the mynes thereof, wee therefore, for the preser-
vacion of the said myne which is so usefull and necessarie for
the safetie of or. kingdomes, doe by these presentes for us our
heires and successors give unto you or anie three of you power to
contract with any of your deputies for making of saltpeeter for
a certain term under such conditions as yee shall thincke fitt
for our service, and doe straightlie charge and command all and
everie person and persons whatsoever within or. said Realmes
and dominions that they nor anie of them doe at any tyme or
tymes hereafter pave or gravell their dovehouses or use anie other
meanes whereby the said myne or growth of saltpeeter may be
prejudiced but shall permitt and suffer the said Lord Threr.
Earle of Lindsey, Earl of Pembrooke, Earl of Dorsett, Viscount
Dorchester, Lord Vere and Sir John Coke or anie three or more
of them their deputies, servants, factors and workmen and
everie of them to digg and open the sames in convenient manner
and at convenient tymes of the day and to lay the same earth,
which they digged and took from out of the said dovehouses,
into the said dovehouses againe, after they have wrought the
same, to the ende the myne of Saltpeeter may be the sooner
renued, upon paine of contempt and of or. high displeasure in
that behalfe And wee do hereby further charge and command
all Justices of peace, Maiors, Sheriffs Constables and other
officers within and thorough or. kingdom of England and
dominions of Wales, that they and everie of them doe from tyme
to tyme aide and assist or. saltpeeter makers and Gunpowder
makers their factors and servants and everie one of them in
their doing of this or. service, And in taking of undelayed order
concerninge all controversies that shall aryse that or. service
may not be hindered or delayed therebye, nor the doers thereof
unjustlie vexed or molested in or for the doing thereof. And or.
will and pleasure is that this or. commission and all the liberties,
priviledges and authorities therein And thereby given and
graunted unto the said Lord Threr. Earle of Lindsey, Earle of
Pembrooke, Earle of Dorsett, Viscount Dorchester, Lord Vere
and Sir John Coke, or anie three or more of them, their deputies,
factors, workmen and servants shall be effectuall to all intents,
efects and purposes, anie law, statute, acte, proclamacion,
t
WARRANTS AND LETTERS PATENT 277
restraint or provision to the contrarie hereof made notwith-
standing.
In Witness, &c. Witness &c.
Exr. per Ro. Heath.
Maie it please your most excell. Ma**e.
This conteyneth your Ma*^ Commission to the Lord Threr. and
other the Commas, for the Admiraltie and to the Maister of your
Ordinance, authorising them or such as they shall appoint to
digge and take earth in anie place or places for the making of
Saltpeeter and making the same into Gunpowder for yor. M"es.
speciall service And is done with the like clauses conteyned
in a commission heretofore made to the Duke of Buckingham
and Earle of Totnes for the execucion of this Service.
Signified to be yor. Ma^^s. pleasure
by Mr. Secretarie Coke,
Ro. Heath.
Recept 28 April 1629
(Endorsed)
Charles R.
Our will and pleasure is
That this Bill pass by imediate warrant.
APPENDIX F
EXTRACTS FROM WAR OFFICE RECORDS
(Record Office)
WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Class 55, Vol. 331
(Entry Books of Warrants and Orders in Council)
At ye Court at Whitehall ye
13th day of Janu'y, 1664 (-65)
Present :
The King's Most Excellent Ma"e.
His R.H. ye Duke of Yorke
L^ ArchbishPP, of Canterbury
Lord Privy Scale
Duke of Buckingham
278 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Duke of Ormond
Marquesse of Dorchester
Lord Chamberlaine
Earle of Bathe
Earle of Lauderdaile
Earle of Carberry
Lord Bpp of London
Lord Wentworth
Lord Berkeley
Lord Ashley
M^ Vice Chamberlaine
M'" Treasurer
M^ Secretary Bennett
M.^ Secretary Morrice
M^" Chauncellor of y^ Dutchy
WHEREAS his Mate by his Warr* under his Royall Signe
Manuell and Privy Signett to us directed hath Comanded us to
make contractes w^^ powder-makers for y^ bringing to his Male's
stores good and serviceable powder And whereas Josias
Dewye powder-maker hath made a contract w^^ us for makeing
of gunpowder and bringing y^ same into his Male's stores in y®
Tower soe long as his Ma^^ findes him Petre, In pursuance of his
Mate's comande (and y* his Male's service may noe wayes bee
hindred) Wee have thought fitt and doe hereby authorize and
appoint you the said Josias Dewye to take into yo^ possession
and custody ye powdr mills and workes now at Chillworth and
att Casshalton in y^ county of Surrey or any other place y*
belongs.
Class 47, Vol. 6, FoUo 106
(Ordnance Minutes)
(Vol. endorsed.) — ' A Journall begining the 8** of June 1664
& ending the 21 ^^ Febry. 1664[-5].'
' At ye Court att Whithall the 2^ of January 1664[-5].
Present
The Kings most excelent Maj"®
His R. Highess ye Duke of Yorke.
Lord Privy Scale.
Duke of Albemarle.
Duke of Buckingham.
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 279
Lord G* Chamberlaine.
Lord Chamberlain.
Earle of Berkeshire.
Earle of S*. Alban.
Earl Beath.
Earl of Lauderdaile.
Lord Bpp of London.
Lord Berkeley.
Lord Ashley.
Mr. Treasureur.
Mr. Vice Camberline.
Mr. Secretary Morrice.
Mr. Secretary Bennett.
Mr. Chanceller of y« Dutchy
S^ Ed. Nicholas.
His R. Highnes this day representeing to his Ma"^ in Counceil
ye great want of Mills to be imployed for y^ makeing of gunn-
powder his Ma"e necessarily requireing the same att y^ season
It was therupon ordered That y® Commas for Ma' of his Ma"®
Ordnance and y^ Officers of y® same are authorized to impreste
soe many Mills for y® makeing of gunnpowder for his Ma"®
Service as they shall think fitt.''
7° January 1664
(Fol. 109.)
4c :ic :(c 4: He * 4( * * 4c
Memorand. — Delivered to y® Lord Berkley 2 Estimates y®
one for providing 1500 Ordnance of Iron Shott carriages and
two C. tonne of Copper Mettle amounteing to The
other for providing of peetre, building of powd"^ Mills and stoneing
and repaireing of powd'.
21 July 1664.
Class 47, Vol. 6, Folio 16
(Ordnance Minute)
(Vol. endorsed.) — ' Journall beginning the 8th of June 1664
& ending the 21st Febry. 1664[-5].'
' Mr. Clark.'
' Wee have reed. yors. both, ye one dated 9 ye other 17 July
1664. Ye former informes us of ye unreasonable demands of
ye proprietors, of ye Ground at Portsmouth which is intended
280 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
to be built upon for his Maties Service. Our desire is yt. you
would upon ye receipt of this treat once more w^^ them and
bring them if possible to reasonable Termes wch. if they will
not bee perswaded to wee would have you repaire to ye Mayo^
and Aldermen of ye towne and acquaint them wth. his Ma^^^.
pleasure of purchaseing yt. ground to build Storehowses upon
for his service, and desire them yt. they would appoint a Jury
to make a reasonable value thereof betweene ye King and them
and to retume this Accompt to us wth. all convenient speede,
By ye latter of yors. wee understand Sr. Phillip Honyi^^ood is
upon cleaning the Dock and that hee offers to furnish ye Clay
and soyle if wee can agree for the filling up the Gun wharfe
wch. wee intend to build. Wee desire you would treat wth.
him and know his lowest Rate yt. hee will afford ye same by ye
yard for fiUing up a Gun wharfe and as for ye timber wch.
Sr. Wm. Penn proposed to you wee would have you not to make
any further mencion of it till you receive directions from us
wch. is all at present from
Yor. loveing freinds '
' Ofi&ce of the Ordnce.
21st July 1664.'
Class 55, Vol. 332, page 137
(Warrants and Orders of the Privy Council)
At ye Court at Whitehall
the 3d of April, 1667.
Present :
The King's Most Excellent Ma"e
His Roy" Highness ye Duke of Yorke '
Lord Arch Bpp of Canterbury
Lord Chancellor
Lord Privy Scale
Duke of Albemarle
Marques of Dorchester
Lord Chamberlain
Earle Bridgwater
Earle of Berkshire
Earle of Anglesey
Earle of Bathe
Earle of Carlisle
Earle of Craven
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 281
Earle of Lauderdaill
Viscount> Fitz Harding
Lord Arlington
Lord Berkeley
Mj Comptroller
M^ Vice Chamberlaine
Mr Sec^y Morrice
Sr. W™. Coventry-
After our hearty Comendations Whereas ye King's most
Excellent Ma"e by his Warr* to us directed hath thought fitt
to erect and make new Fortes at Harden ^nd alsoe to fortifie
his Guarrison of Landguard Fort, for y^ better carrjdng on of
yt service, and for ye paying of workemen and likewise for
provideing of severall provisions, as Timber, Bricke, Stone,
Lime and other Materialls for y® same Wee have thought fitt
to imprest unto M^" Francis Nuby, storekeeper for us at Harwc^
ye sume of 100^*, These are therefore to pray and require yo",
forthw*^ to make an allowance unto y® y® [sic] said Francis
Nuby by way of imprest and upon accompt of y® s<^ sume of
100* for ye use aforesaid, yo" placeing y® same upon y^ Privy
Scale now pasing for 20000*. for new fortificacons &c. hee giveing
an accompt to us whenever required how and w^^^ way hee shall
lay out and pay y* sume, and for soe doeing this shal bee your
Warr*. Soe bidding yo" heartly farewell Wee rest
Yo^ loving freinds
J. Berkeley
J. DUNCOMBE.
To our honor** freiend Collo" Legge
L* Gener** of his Ma*y Ordnance &c.
Class 47, Vol. 19, Part 1.
(Ordnance Minutes — Series I)
' 20tb March 1668-9
' Present
Lord Berkley
S^ John Duncombe
L* Generall
all ye Ofi&cers but
ye Gierke of y®
Deliveries '
* Memd. a signification from y® Rt. hono*'*^ ye Com^^ for execute-
ing ye Office of Ma^^ of His Mats Ordnance appointing ye building
282 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
2 new Forts att Chatham by Gillingham and Cockham Wood
S^ Bernard De Gome Jonas Moore Esq'" and Major Mathew Baylie
to oversee ye same. Signed — J. Duncombe Tho. Chicheley '
' Tower 20*^ March 1668-9 '
' To our honored Freind Coll. W™ Legg L* Gene^i of his Ma*^
Ordnance and to our Loveing Freinds y® rest of y* 0£&cers of y®
same.'
Instructions for S^ Bernard de Gome K* his Mats cheife
Engineer Jonas Moore Esq'^ Assistant Surveyor and Major
Mathew Bayley Governour^ of Upnor Castle appointed Com^^
for y6 Manageing and lookeing after y® Building 2 new Betteryes
or Redouts neere Gillingham for y^ better security and safety
of his Mats Navy in y* Harbour In pursuance of a signification
from ye R* Hono^ie ye Coma's for Ma^^ of His Ma^^ Ordnance
beareing date y^ 20^^ day of this instant '
' You are forthwith to repair downe to Gillingham and on
yt side as alsoe at Cockham Woodend (where two new Batteryes
or Redoubts are designed to bee erected and Built y* is owne at
each place) and there to sett out or stake out at each of y^
aforesaid places soe much ground as will bee necessary for this
Service w^*^ Batteryes or Redouts are to be built according to
y® Demensions and designs of S'" Bernard de Gome exprest and
sett downe in his two severall draughts of y^ same presented to
ye Com'^s at ye stakeing and setting out of w^h ground two of you
at least are to bee alwaies present whereof Jonas, Moore Esq'
to bee one '
' You are to Contract for and buy such and soe much parcell
of Ground at each of ye aforesaid places of ye Owners and Pro-
prietors thereof as will serve to Build ye said Batteryes or Redouts
upon, and at ye cheapest rates yo^ and they can agree for att all
w°^ contracts and Bargaines makeing two of you at least are
alwaies to bee present and to sett your hands to all such Contracts
and Bargaines made whereof Jonas Moore Esqr alwaives to
bee one '
* You are to Contract for and provide all such Timber Bricks
Stone Lyme or any other necessaries as shall be requisite and
fitting for ye carrying on and performance of ye said workes
accordingly and to hyer and employ such and soe many Worke-
men as you shall judge requisite and fitting'to bee employed for
ye more speedy and effectuall dispatch thereof in ye doeing
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 283
and performeing of w^h two of you are alwaies to bee present and
signe to all Contracts agreements or bargaines made on this
behalf e whereof Jonas Moore Esqr. is alwaies to be one '
' You are two of you at least whereof Jonas Moore Esq' alwaies
is to be bee one to signe and Drawe Bills from tyme to tyme
upon such persons as y^ Rt hono^i® ye Com^^s for Ma' of his Ma*^
Ordnance and y« Board shall appoint for ye payment of such
moneys as you shall informe y^ Board will bee requisite for
carrying on y® same you causeing an Accompt to bee kept how
and w^** way y® said Moneys are disbursed and for what, w^^
Accompts yo are to cause to be sent up to y^ Board from tyme
to tyme soe 'often as it shall be required '
* and you are alsoe by vertue of this Press Warrant herewith
sent you to take up and imprest such and soe many Vessells,
Barkes, Boates, Carts, horses and workemen as there shall bee
occasion to bee employed about y^ said Ports untill such tyme
as they be finished.
F.N. E.S.'
' Office of Ordnance
20th March 1668-9 '
' To S' Bernard De Gome K* his Mats cheife Engineer Jonas
Moore Esq'^ Assistant Surveyor, and Major Bay ley Governour
of Upnor Castle or two of them, provided Jonas Moore Esq^^ bee
alwaies one
These.'
* Memd. a Press Warr* for S'^ Bernard De Gome Jonas Moore
Esq' and Major Mathew Bayley Com'^ to presse workemen for
ye Fortificacons and Redouts to bee new made at Gillingham
and Cockham Wood F.N. E.S.
* To S' Bernard de Gome Jonas Moore Esq' or Major Mathew
Bayley or two of them provided alwaies Jonas Moore Esq'
be one.'
1 Sept. 1681
Oass 47, Vol. 10, Folio 78
(Ordnance Minutes)
' 1st September 1681 '
' Present
S' John Chicheley
S' Christop. Musgrave
L* Generall
284 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Surveyo'
Storekeeper
Gierke of the Deliverys
Ordered
That a State be drawne up, fitt to be presented to Councill
by the Cornish's for Ma'. Generall of his Ma*^ Ordnance of the case
represented by Maj', Beckman in his Lre. and Certificate from
Hull touching the purchase of some ground there for a Fortifica-
con to be built for the better Strengthening the said Towne to
enquire of S' Bernard De Gome, what measures were taken and
what course was used aboute takeing in of the Lands for the
new worke at Plymouth, and after what method the owners of
those lands were sattisfied and paid for the same '.
' To see what Statutes there are concerneing takeing up of
Peoples Lands for building of Fortificacons upon '
* Coppy of Maj' Beckmans Lre. and Certificate from Hull
touching the Demand of the Owners of the Ground for the
purchase thereof for a new Fortificacon to be built thereon to
be sent to the Lord Mulgrave Governo' desireing his LordP
would please to give such effectual Orders for promoteing the
dispatch thereof as his LordP. should thinck fitt, to prevent
the Obstruction of the goeing on therewith \
' 10 Septemb. 1681 '
(FoUo 81)
' Present
S' Chris. Musgrave
L* Generall \
' Ordered
That a Bill and Debentur be forthwith made unto M' John
Suffeild for the sume of 22^ 10^ 00^ for his charge and paines
in procureing Coppies of the Deedes for the Land taken in at
Gosport '.
Class 47, Vol. 19, Part 1.
(Ordnance Minutes — Series I)
* 24th November 1668 '
* Present
Com' Chicheley
L* of y® Ordnance
All y^ Officers
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 285
Ordered
That Major Mathew Bayly Governor of Upnor Castle pay unto
John Norwood the Sume of twenty shillings for a yeares rent for
his ground upon w^^ Middletons Battery stands w^h yeare ended
att Middsumer last and that he likewise pay 30 shillings more to
y« owners of y® Land whereon James's Sconce stands for a yeares
rent ending att y® same tyme '
Class 47, Vol. 19, Part 1. Mmutes— Series I
(Ordnance Minutes)
' 22th December 1668 '
* Present
Com^ Chicheley
All y^ Officers except y® Clerke of the Delyveryies
Ordered
That y6 Sume of f ourty shillings be allowed and Debenture made
to M'' John Burnsted for damage done to his Ground &c. Fence
in ye time of y® proveing the Morter peece nere Bishopps hall '
30 July 1674
aass 47, Vol. 19, Part 11.— Minutes.— Series I
(Ordnance Minutes)
Present
M^ Genii Ordnance
Lt. Genii
Clarke Ord.
Storekeeper
Treasurer
Ordered
That M^ Perkinns att Portsm^ be writt to, to finde out what
convenient Store Roomes are to be hyred there for lodgeings his
Mats stores for this Office and y* he send up word to y® Office
att what Rent per annum y® same may be had.
Class 46, Vols. I & II.
(Out-letters — Master General, Board and Commander-in-Chief.)
FoHo 214d
A.D. 1660 to 1684
CHARLES R.
WHEREAS Wee have thought fitt for the better defence and
Securitye of Our Towne of Kingston upon Hull to strengthen
the same with a New Fortification (Besides the Blockhouses and
286 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Castle, Which Wee have Ordred likewise to be Repaired against
any Hostile Attempts) According to a designe drawne & Pre-
sented to us by Major Martin Beckman One of our Engineers
and by us well approoved of, and Confirmed under our Signe
Manuall OUR WILL and PLEASURE is, and Wee do hereby
Authorise and require you, that you doe Forthwith take course
to beginn, and with what convenient speed may be. To cause
y® said Fortification to be Erected, and Built according to the
above mentioned Designe By us already approoved of. AND
if any Ground *which is not our pwne shall be found Necessary
to be taken in for this Service Wee doe hereby authorise and
Impower you to cause the same to be contracted for and bought
of the Owners at the cheapest Rates the same may be had AND
Wee doe hereby Further Authorise and Impower you (in case you
shall Judge it requisite and Necessary for the better and more
Effectuall carryeing on of the Said Intended Fortification) to
Nominate, Constitute, And appoint Such Comission'^ or Officers
as you shall thinck Fitt. (Our Governo' Lieu* Governor or
Comander in chief e for the time being, And Majo'* Martin Beck-
man, or one of them to be alwayes of y^ QUORUM) to See y^
worke duely Performed according to Undertaking and Contract,
and to make unto the Officers Such Salaries, Allowances,
&. Wages for theire Care, Paines and Attendance therein, and
incident charges as shall by you be thought reasonable, AND
for Soe doeing this shall be yo^ Warrant. GIVEN at Our Court
at Windsor the Tenth day of August One thousand Six hundred,
Eighty & one, And in the Three and Thirtieth yeare of our Reigne.
By his Maj *» Comand
CONWAY.
TO our Trusty and Wellbeloved Our Comission^'s for Executing
ye Office of Our Ordnance, Or to Our Master of y® Ordnance
for ye time being.
Class 47, Vol. L
(Ordnance. Out -letters — ^Master General, Board and Commander-
in-Chief.) Folio 288d
Mr WATKINSON
In pursuance of an Ord^ this day of y^ Board You are hereby
desired Forthw**^ to take Care y© all his Maj* Stores Lyeing out
in hyred Warehouses or Cellos for w^h his Maj^y is at charge of
payeing rent be Forthw^^ Remooved and Carried into y® South
Blockhouse according to Former Ord^ and there layd as well
as you can for y^ present ; till Such tyme as y® Said Storehouses
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 287
be compleated & Fitted up That you may lay y® Stores in bett'
Ord^ hereafter, The Dept^ Gov^ of Hull hath now ord's from
ye Rt Hon^ie ye L^ Mulgrave to make Roome in y^ South Block-
house for ye S^ Stores accordingly, w^i^ is all att present From
Yo'-^ &ca
190 Septemb' 1682.
Att Hull.
Class 47, Vol. 22 (Ordnance Minutes — Series II, page 249)
Sabbati 7° Die Julii, 1705.
Present :
Clke Ordnance]
Storekeeper h Ordered.
Clke Delies )
That upon reading a petit on of Mary Clarke, wife of Patrick
Clarke, setting forth that in cons of the great loss her father and
self had suffered by having 3 houses, &c., pulled down w^^ stood
on Tower Wharfe which he had purchased, and that others who
had suffered in the like kind, had received a valuable considera-
tion, and her father and she only the liberty of a small shedd
built on his ground, That the office of Ordnance having occasion
for the same peice of ground to build a Plumbery on for the
office service the s^ shedd was pull'd down and another allotted
her in compensaSon by the Rt. Honble. the L<i Dartm^ and the
then Principal Officers of ye Ord^e over against where ye other
stood, all weh allegation being attested by Joseph Hone a gunn'
and John Robins a labourer belonging to the office who had
lived for many years upon ye s<i wharfe, It is ordered that upon
ye af d cons the s^ M''^ Clarke do keep in posson of ye s<* shedd by
right from ye office of Ord^e.
Class 47, Vol. 30
(Ordnance Minutes — Series III)
Old Palace Yard Westminster— Martis 20° die Mali 1717.
Present
Lieut Gen^
Surveyr Gen^
Clk of the Ordnance
Storekeeper
Clk of the Deliveries
&
Chief Engineer
Order'd
288 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Coll° Lilly informed ye Board that Mr. Edgecumb can not
grant or convey the ground to build the storehouses upon at
Plym« without an Act of Parliament, whereupon Mr. Ash was
desired to speak to him about ye same and to give one Mr. Moyle
agent f or . . . notice to attend the next board.
Class 47, Volume 32
(Ordnance Minutes — Series III)
Old Pallace Yard Westminster — ^Martis 10° Die Februarii 1718-9
Present
Surveyor Generall
Clerk of the Ordnance
Storekeeper \- Ordered
Clerk of the Deliveries
Chief Engineer
(A letter) to Mr. Dixon, storekeeper at Plym^ advising him,
that just as the Board was concluding an agreem* with S^
Nicholas Morrice for the ground whereon to build a gunwharfe
and storehouse near the Dock, one Mr. Kent demands an
exorbitant value for his house and interest of part of that ground
let to him upon lease by S^ Nicholas to go to him and immediately
offer his right and pretension the sum of £180 — which is more
than formerly he offered to sell it for and if accepted, to gett
Articles of Agreement drawn up to confirm the bargain.
And another to him with private instructions upon that head.
Class 44. Vol. 242
(Ordnance Minutes)
Received this 13th day of April 1758 of the Right Honble and
Honble the Principal Officers of his Majesty's Ordnance by the
hands of Farmer Thomas Hopkins the sum of Twenty one
pounds and eight Pence being for one years Rent and Damage
sustained for the enclosed March Land I occupy adjoining Hilsey
Common whereon the Line & Batteries are erected near Portsea
Lake.
"""^~ Witness my hand
WiLLM. Hopkins
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 289
Class 30, Vol 54 No. 21
General Roy's Papebs
23rd September 1775
Dimensions of Mr. Le Marchant's buildings proposed to
Colonel Roy to be rented to Government for barrackS; with
the conditions of such rent
Particulars of Building
Mr. Le Marchant's terms are to receive £150 down, to be subject
to no alterations or repairs, for one year's rent of the above
mentioned buildings and ground, and if kept longer than a year
the rent to be reduced to £100 per year, to be advanced every
half year, at the beginning of each half year, but if the rent is
not advanced, then Mr. Le Marchant's demand is £160 for one
year certain, payable £80 after the first six months, and the
other £80 at the year's end
And after the first year the rent to be continued by the half
a year at £100 a year, payable half yearly
If Government thought proper to allow £20 towards making
a pump to the well, as it is so deep, Mr. Le Marchant, for the
greater conveniency, would pay the surplus, the pump remaining
afterwards his property, the use of the said well or pump in either
case to be also preserved, in common with the soldiers, to his
people and tenants on the premises
Government to be at liberty to make chimneys, doors, windows,
and partitions in any of the premises, and to erect any building
on the ground as far as the road, but if necessary the same to
be placed at such a distance from the road as not to incommode
the persons passing through the same
That as to any fixtures of beds or wooden partitions or floors
within the said buildings, that Government shall have a right
to take any the same on quitting the premises, but not any
doors, windows, masonry work or the rails that may be made
to enclose the premises
Guernsey the 23rd September 1775
Will Le Marchant
P. Emil Irving ^
Lieut. Governor) Witness
Dorse : — I accede to these proposals made by Mr. Le Marchant
except the pump for the well, which may not be
thought necessary
W. Roy D.Q.M.G1.
2388 XJ
290 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Also on Dorse : — ^Mr. Le Marchant's dimensions of his build-
ings, and conditions with respect to the
hiring of them by Government for tem-
porary barracks
Class 47, Vol. 2565, page 817. (Ordnance. Extracts of Minutes
Series II)
From 25th May to 31st December 1798
At Westminster 18th July 1798
Mr. Henry Simmonds having transmitted his Bill for three
months hire of Barton Bam for use of the Park of Artillery at
Canterbury, and requested that his last BiU amounting to £84
might be paid.
Ordered to be referred to the Surveyor General for allowance
according to Agreement and that John Simmonds be acquainted
when the leist Bill be sent and which he describes will be paid.
Class 47, Vol. 2580, page 2313. (Ordnance. Extracts of Minutes
Series II)
(Ordnance Minute)
At Westminster, 20th August 1804
Rt. Smith Esquire Assistant to the Solicitor having by letter
of the 18th inst., stated that he had perused General Morse's
letter of the 15th Inst., accompanying Brigadier General Evelegh's
letter regarding the Lands at Stamshaw Point near Tipner, and
Little Horsea Island near Porchester, that belong's to Captain
Farhill and to the trust Estate of the late Mr. Ridge and as the
Price demanded by Captain Farhill was very extravagant and
there was some legal obstacles to the purchase of Mr. Ridge's
Estate he conceived it would be expedient to take Possession
of these Lands under the Authority of the defence Act.
Ordered that Mr. Smith be directed to take possession of this
Land under the Authority of the defence Act ; and that Brigadier
General Eveleigh be acquainted.
Class 44. Bundle 679. Ordnance. In-letters
Minute
(In pencil) 'All has been done that is
possible on ye Part of the
Mast. Genl. the business is
fully before the Board.
Dear Sir, ^ 4th August 1805.
The great demand which will soon be made for Gunpowder
to replace what has been expended in the late Actions make
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 291
me very anxious for the Ordnance to avail themselves of the
Chesshunt Water they have purchased. I therefore beg you will
let me know the instant your Solicitor enables the Ordnance
to lead the Water in question down to the Royal Powder Mills.
I found very short water when I was at Waltham Abbey on
Friday last. I am very sorry I had not the pleasure of meeting
you thereat. The People at the Mills having told me you was
there the day before.
I am, dear Sir,
Faithfully yours,
W. CONGREVE
P.S. — ^The Ordnance has a Comptroller.
very small stock of
New Gun Powder in
Store at PurfleetW.C.
Colonel Hadden,
&ca. &ca. &ca.
Powdr.
Minute Charlton 17 Aug. 1805
(In pencil) Refer to Mr. S. Reed. 17th.
Report
Rt. Honble.
and Hoble. Gentn.
At this Crisis, I beg to suggest if it might not be advisable to
apply to His Majesty's Ministers to impower the Ordnance to
take possession of the Cheshunt Water for as long a time as the
Service may require it, allowing a reasonable compensation to the
Proprietors of the Corn Mills at that place and Waltham Abbey.
I have the honor to be
Rt. Honble.
&
Honble. Gentn.
Your most obedient Servt.
W. CONGREVE
The Rt. Honble. Comptroller.
& Honble. The Board of Ordnance.
4th September 1805
Ordered that a Letter be written to L' Colonel Neville,
desiring that he wiU acquaint the Master General that in conse-
quence of the urgent Representations from Major General
U2
292 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Congreve Comptroller of the Royal Laboratory of the necessity
of obtaining Possession of the Mills at Chestunt for the Purpose
of increasing the Supply of Gunpowder for His Majestys Service,
the Board have had a Conference with Mr. Smith, Assistant to
the SoUcitor, upon the Subject, and finding from Mr. Smith
that it is extremely difficult to settle the Interests of all the
parties concerned in the Cheshunt Mill Property and that the
most advisable Measure will be to have recourse to the Defence
Act to obtain possession of the Property. And the Board con-
curring in Opinion with Major General Congreve that the Exigency
of the PubUc Service renders it indispensable to secure an ample
Supply of Water to increase the Stock of Gunpowder, beg leave
to recommend to the Master General to authorise the Mills at
Chestunt to be taken Possession of under the Defence Act [remainder
in pencil] which will be attended also with the further Advantage
of removing some legal obstacles arising from a Claim of the poor
of the Neighbourhood to have their Corn ground at the Mill.
Letter wrote to Col. Neville.
[Minute in ink]
Powder Reed. 3 May
Right Honourable and Honourable Gentleman.
The business of the Cheshunt Mill came on yesterday before
a jury under the Defence Act when after an examination of
witnesses on both sides the jury assessed the value of the Lessee's
interest at seven thousand five hundred pounds.
This sum carrying interest from yesterday until payment of
the money, I shall lose no time in preparing the necessary assign-
ment of the Lease from Messrs Bridgman and Rust and their
Mortgagee, Mr. Corrie.
I have the honour to be
With the greatest respect,
Right Honble, and Honble Gentln.
Your most obedient humble servant,
RoBT. Smith,
Assist, to the Solr.
Basinghall St.
3<i May 1808
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 293
Class 47 (Board), Vol. 269
(Ordnance Minutes)
In Pall Mall— Monday 20th January 1812
Present
Lieutenant General
Surveyor General
Clerk of the Ordnance
Mrs. Elizabeth Bayly having by letter dated 18th instant in
reply to the Board's reference of the 8th with respect to the land
for the Battery at Weymouth and the road leading to it from
the Barracks observed that she would [be] willing to grant
a lease for the same for twenty one years provided all the buildings
and fences which might be erected were at the expiration of the
lease left standing
Ordered that Mrs. Bayly be acq^ the Board cannot accede to
the condition that the fences should remain at the expiration of
the lease ; but the Board are willing to execute a lease for twenty
one years renewable on a fine certain to be agreed upon And
that if Mrs. Bayly declines to grant a lease the Board will be under
the necessity of taking possession of the land under the Defence
Act.
Class 44, Vol. 516
(Ordnance Minutes)
Engr. Isle of Thanet
Ramsgate,
June 20th 1813
Reed. 21
Sir,
In obedience to the Boards orders of the 8th inst. I have to
report upon the claims of Mr. Cowel of Margate, Mr. Tomlin
of Northdown and Mr. Bristow of this Island.
About eight years ago when a landing was apprehended on this
Coast it was propos'd among the means of defence to stop up
the Gateways by which the farmers draw up the Seaweed from
the Beach as a manure for their lands, these openings being
the only ones for several miles, by which an Enemy could
penetrate.
294 WAR OFFICE RECORDS
Mr. Pitt assembled the Proprietors at the Townhall of Margate,
and proposed the measure, when it was settled, that as the total
Stoppage of the Gates would occasion serious loss and inconveni-
ence to the Farmers, a few should be left open at certain intervals
to procure the Weed, and the others be fill'd up. This was
accordingly done, I believe under the direction of the Royal
Staff Corps, and the openings continued shut till the alarm
subsided. It appears that some of the Gates were then open'd
without application to Government and some with their per-
mission ; but I could not obtain any satisfactory account of this
part of the transaction.
It is however perfectly clear to me that the measure was under-
taken by order of the Government to the loss and inconvenience
of the owners of ground in the neighbourhood ; and as the
necessity for keeping them shut no longer exists, it is but just
that they should be reopen'd at the expense of the Public, and
a fair compensation allowed for the time they have been deprived
of their use. The Sketch I now send will shew the Position of
these Gates, and the reference list, the Names of the Proprietors,
with the expense of opening, compensation &c.
The reopening of Mr. Cowel's Gate No. 1 has been estimated
by a man at Margate at £75, but as I think it can be done for
much less than this sum, I would propose to send a party under
an Officer for this purpose. The loss has been much more con-
siderable to this Proprietor than to the others from the great
distance he has been obliged to go for the Weed, and I have there-
fore put down £10 a year as a moderate sum by way of com-
pensation.
Should the Board determine that the Ordnance discharge this
account, the Proprietors will have to receive as follows ; Viz.
Mr. Cowel . . . 80£ and his gate to be reopen'd at the
expense of Government
Mr. Tomlin . . . 55£
Mr. Bristow . . . 15£ 15sh
But it is proper to state that the Service was preformed under
the direction of another Department, (I presume the Q.M.
generals) and therefore it may perhaps be thought right to refer
the account for settlement to that Quarter. With this view
I collected all the information that two days of examintion
afforded me, so as to give as little trouble as possible to those
WAR OFFICE RECORDS 295
who have to make the compensation, in case they may think
proper to act upon my opinion.
I have the honor to be
Sir,
Your very obedt. Servt.
Hby. L. Ford.
Lt. Colonel R. Eng.
R. W. Crew Esq.,
&c., &c., &c.
[In pencil] Collect the applications. Refer to Q.M.G.'s Depart-
ment, stating our opinion that the expence belongs
to them, & asking their resolution on Col. F's State-
ments
[Endorsed] 25 Jime 1813. Ordered that a Reference be made
to the Quarter Master General's Department and
that the Boards Opinion be stated that the Expence
belongs to them and that the Quarter Master
General be requested to signify his resolution on
Lt. Col. Ford's statement
R.W.
Letter wrote to Co. Gordon
[Plan]
LIST OF REFERENCE to accompany the Sketch of the
GATEWAYS on the North side of the Isle of Thanet.
June 19th 1813
(Here follow particulars of the several claims and of the compensation
awarded in each case)
Earl of Chatham's Papers (deposited at the Public
Record Office)
Bundle 243
Endorsed September 1819)
Mr. H. Jeffery J
' Mr. Hunt Jeffery has a farm between Sandgate and Hythe
nearer to Sandgate, some of the lands adjoin the high road near
the sea. The Duke of Richmond, as Master- General of the
Ordnance, has applied to Mr. Jeffery to purchase the land near
the sea and at the cliff adjoining, for the use of Government, and
to erect batteries and to form a camp there, the land he wants
of Mr. Jeffery is about one hundred and forty acres, besides the
same quantity from adjoining proprietors, who refuse to give
it up. Mr. Jeffery is willing to grant a lease of the land for the
296 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM
benefit of the country during the war, which has been mentioned
to his grace, but that his grace declines, as it will be wanted
in a future war, and alleges that then it will be an additional
expense to Government to renew the works, and therefore
expresses himself determined for the benefit of the country, as
he alleges, to purchase the land in question, and in case Mr. Jeffery,
persisting in the refusal to sell, to bring in a bill in Parliament
to empower the Board of Ordnance to purchase the land in
question and to have the value ascertained by a jury, as is usual,
Mr. Jeffery hopes that it may be sufficient to have the land in
question during the war, as probably in future wars it may not
be necessary, and submits that if he give the present accommoda-
tion it is all that may be wanted. He is ready to give any tem-
porary accommodation, and the fear of being materially injured
by the sale of his estate has made him desist from any contribu-
tion in support of any volunteer companies, or by personal
service, which he is otherwise induced liberally to support.'
APPENDIX G
EXTRACTS FROM ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM
Rot. Pari., 46 Ed. Ill (1372)
Vol. II, p. 311, No. vi
Item prie la Commune, qe come les Marchantz & Mariners
d'Engleterre q xx aunz passez & toutdiz a devant la Navie de
dit Roialme estoit en touz Portz & bones Villes sur Mier & sur
Ryvers si noble & si pleintinouse, q touz les pays tenoient &
appelloient nre a van dit Si"- le Roi de la Mier, & lui & tout son
pays dotoient le pluis par mier & p terre par cause de la dite
Navie : Et ore il est ensi desencrescez & anientyz par diverses
causes, q a poy yl i a demure suffisientis a defendre la dite pays,
si grant mestier estoit, encontre Roial Poiar y fuisse a grant
perille coement de tout la Roialme, lesqeux causes serroit trop
longe des touz escrivre. Mes une cause est principal, la longe
Arrest q sovent ad este fait sur les Niefs en temps de Guerre ;
c'est assavoir, par un quarter d'an ou pluis avant q'ils passent
hors de lour Portz sanz rien prendre pur les gages de lour
Mariners durant cell temps, ou les Si's des Niefs rien prendre de
ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 297
guerdon pur les Apparailementz de lour ditz Niefs & Custages.
Dount ils priont, en eovre de charite, covenable remedie.
Y plest au Roi q la Navie soit meintenue & gardee, a greindre
ease & profit q faire se poet.
Rot. Pari., 47 Ed. Ill (1373)
Vol. 11, p. 319, No. xvi
Item monstront les Seignrs de Niefs par tut Engleterre, qe
come ils ont sovent foith' avant ses houres sywes en Parlement
par Petition de lour anienticementz de lour avoir & destrudlion
de la Navie, en la Manere q'ensust ; C'est assaver, q come lour
Niefs sont arestuz par divers temps a servir iire Sr le Roi, &
demuront sur eel arest, ascun par demy an, & les autres par un
quarter de Tan, ou plus, avent q'ils passeront en lour Viages ;
issint qe durant eel temps les Seignrs de Niefs, ne Mariners
d'ycels, rienz ne preignont des gages ne lowers, en grant anien-
ticement & empoverisement de lour estates par cause q remedie
sur ceo n'est ordeigne. Pur qi ils priont a nostre Sr le Roi
& a son Conseil, en eovere de charite, ordeiner & graunter en
cest present Parlement, qe les Seignrs des Niefs puissont estre
paiez de lour gages del comencement de lour arest des Niefs
tan q a fin de lour Viage, en reconfort des Seignrs de Niefs,
& encrees & amendement de tut la Navie.
Areste de Niefs ne serra fait mes quant il busoigne, paiement
lour serra fait come ad este use resonablement.
Rot. Pari., 2 Ric. II (1379)
Vol. Ill, p. 66, No. xxiv
Item prie la Coe, pur ce q en temps passe la Terre d'Engleterre
estoit Ibn repleine de Navie, auxi tin des Niefs grosses come des
petites, par quiel Navie la dee Terre estoit a celle heure grande-
ment enrichez, & des toutes Terres environ grandement redoutez.
Et puis la comencement de la Geurre les ditz Niefs ont este si
sovent arestuz pur diverses Viages sur la Meer, p ont les posses-
sours du dit Navie ont suffertz si grant damage & perde, si t»n
des Niefs & Batelx come des autres attilementz a ce appur-
tenantz, sanz avoir aucun regard du Roi ou de Roialme : Et
auxint leurs Mariners les unes armez, & les autres archiers, ne
preignent q IIII d. le jour ; quelle prise leur semble si petite
q grande partie des Mariners sont retretz des ditz offices, issint
par une voie & par autre les possessours des Niefs, & la Navie
est 15n pres gaste & destruit. Sur quoy pleise ordeiner, par
advys du Conseil, q les possessours des Niefs aient regard pur
298 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM
lour Niefs & les Marineres lours gages oweles as autres archiers,
comenceant les dees gages a lour monstre : quelles amendement
ferront si grant esploit en temps a venir, q'il toumera a grant
profit du Roi & du Roialme.
Soit usez come devant ent ad este usez.
Rot. Pari., 9 Ric. II (1385)
Vol. Ill, p. 212, No. 28
Item priont les Goes en cest present Parlement come autre
foitz fuist ordeigne, q les Niefs armez sur la Mere pur la sauve-
garde des Marchantz, & en defense du Roialme, duissont prendre
pur chescun tun-tyght trois soldz quatre deniers en la quarter,
pur Tapparaille del Nief : Vous plese ordeigner, q la dite Orde-
nance soit tenuz defore en avant pur salvation & sustenance
des Niefs avant ditz, pur I'apparaill & omement de les ditz
Niefs lesquels demandent grantz costages ; Considerantz q autre-
ment la Navie ne poet autrement en nuUe manere endurere.
Eient pur Fapparaill' & ornement des Niefs per Chescun
tun-tyght II s en le quarter, tan q'al prochein Parlement.
Rot. Pari., 4 Hen. IV (1402)
Vol. Ill, p. 501, No. 56
A TRES excellent, tres redoubte, & tres gracious Sr fire Sr le
Roi suppliount voz poverez Communes, cj I'Estatut fait I'an
primer du regne luy noble Roi E. vre aiel, contenant, Qe null
soient destreintz d'aler hors de lour Countees sinoun p cause de
necessite de sodeigne Venu des estraunges Enemys en Roialme :
& I'Estatut fait I'an xviii de regne du dit aiel, Qe Gentz des
Armes, Hobelers, & Archiers, esluz pur aler en le service le Roy
hors d'Engleterre, soient as Gages le Roi de jours q'ils deptirent
hors des Countes ou ils feurent esluz ; & ensement I'Estatut fait
I'an XXV du regnele dit aiel, Qe nul soit arte de trover Gentz
d'Armes, Hobellers, ne Archers, autres q ceuz q tiegnent p tieux
services s'il ne soit p commune assent & graunt fait en Parlement ;
soient firment tenuz & gardez en toutz pointz, saunz estre en-
freintz en ascun manere. Et q null de voz ditz Communes soit
destreint d'aler en Gales, ou aillours hors du Roialme countre la
fourme de les Estatutz a vaunt ditz. Et q toutz les Commissions
& Briefs faitz a contraire des ditz Estatutz, & toutz les endite-
mentz & acusementz, obligations, & liens faitz par colour des
ditz Commissions ou Briefs, ove toutz les dependences & cir-
ROTULI PARLIAIVIENTORUM 299
Gumstances d'icell, soient revokez, cancellez, cassez, & adnullez
pur toutz jours, come choses faits encountre la Ley, & q ne
soient trehez en ensample en temps a venir. Et si aucunes de
voz lieges soient emprisonez p force des ditz enditementz ou
acusementz, q'ils soient maintenant deliverez, & les ditz Endite-
mentz tenuz pur nuUes.
Le Roy le voet ; p ainsi toutes voies, q par force ou colour de
la dite supplication, ne d'ascun Estatut sur ceo a faire, les
Seignrs, n'autres qi ount Terres & Possessions en Pays de Gales,
ou en la Marche d'icelle, ne soient en ascun manere excusez de
lour Servicez & Devoirs de lour ditz Terres & Possessions duez,
ne d'ascuns autres Devoirs ou chosesa lesquelles ils, ou ascuns de
eux, sont a nre dit Sr le Roy especialment obligez ; comBn q
yceux Seignrs & autres aient autres Terres & Possessions deintz
le Roialme d'Engleterre ; ne q les Seignrs ou autres, de quele
estate ou condition q'ils soient, qi tiegnent p Escuage ou autres
Services duez au Roi ascuns Terres ou Possessions dedeinz le
dite Roialme, ne soient ascunement excusez de faire les Services
& Devoirs des ditz Terres ou Possessions duez, ne q les Seignrs,
Chivalers, Esquiers, n'autres persones, de quele estate ou con-
dition q'ils soient, q tiegnent & ount de le Graunt ou Confirmation
de nre dit Sr le Roi Terres, Possessions, Fees, Annuitees, En-
pensions, ou autres Profitz annuelx, ne soient, n'ascun de eux
soit, excusez de lour service a faire a nre dit Sr le Roy, p tiel
manere come ils sount tenuz par cause des Terres, Possessions,
Fees, Annuitees, Enpensions, ou Profitz suis ditz.
Rot. Pari., 3 Hen. V (1415)
Vol. IV, p. 79, No. viii
Item suppliont tres humblement voz poveres Communes, Qe
come en le temps des tres nobles Progenitours nre Sr le Roy
accustume & ordeine estoit, q a quell temps q les Niefs du
Roialme fesoient a eux service en lour guerres ou autrement, les
Possessours de mesmes Niefs, aueroient lour tonnage de lour ditz
Niefs, outre les gages des Mariners de mesmes Niefs ; c'est
assavoir, a chescun tonneau de quell portage q la Nief furent
111 8, 1111 d., pur le quarter d'an, durant le temps q'ils firent
service au Roy, en ascune manere come desuis est dit, le quell
tonnage ad estee duement & loialment paie, de temps dount
memoire ne court tanq a temps de vre Pier, q Dieu assoile ;
puis quell temps tanq en cea, le dit tonnage ad este detreei &
300 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM
abatu des Possessours du Naveye de vre Roialme, a lour tres
graunt anientisment : p quell encheason ascunes des Possessours
du dit Naveie sount outrement anientisez, & la greindre partie
du dit Naveye destrutz, & lessez desolate, a tres graund damage
de Vous, tres soveraigne Sr, & anientisment de vre Roialme.
pur taunt q la dit Naveye est la greindre substance du Bn, profit,
& prosperitee du vre dit Rioalme. Pleise a vre tres hautisme
magnifence Roialme, considerent les premisses, si t)n pur le
bien & proufit de Vous, tres soveraigne Sr, & de vre dit Roialme,
come pur I'encrees & renovellure du dit Naveye, ordeiner,
ena6ler, & establir en ycest present Parlement, q des ore en
avaunt les Possessours du dit Naveye eient & preignent lour
tonnage, pur lour ditz Niefs & Vesselxs, durant le temps q'ils
ferrount service a Vous, tres soverain Sr le Roy, & a voz heirs,
en voz guerres ou autrement, come il ad este accustume devaunt
ces heures, saunz ent estre forbarrez ou precludez.
Le Roy vorry f aire ceo q droit & reson demandent ceste partie.
Rot. Pari., 20 Hen. VI (1442)
Vol. V, p. 59, No. xiii
Prayen the Communes, that hit please the Kyng our Soverain
Lord, for the saufE kepyng of the See, to ordeyn and auctorise
by the auctorite of this Parlement, certains Articles and appoynt-
mentes, contained in a Cedule to this Bill annexed.
Tenor vero Cedule predicte sequitur in hec verba.
For as muche as it is thought be alle the Communes of this
Lande, that it is necessarie the See to be kepte, there moste
purviaunce be made for certeine Shippes defensablez in maner
and fourme after oloWyng.
First, it is thought, that the lest purveaunce that can be made
for the worship of the Kyng our Soverain Lord and welfare and
defence of this Roialme of England, is for to have upon the See
continuelly, for the sesons of the yere fro Candilmes to Marty-
messe, viiie Shippes with forstages ; ye whiche Shippes, as it
is thought, most have on with an other, eche of hem CL men ;
c
summa, xii men.
Item, every grete Shippe most have attendyng opon hym
XX
a Barge, and a Balynger ; and every Barge most have in iiii
c
men summa, vi and XL men.
Item, the viii Balyngers most have in eche of hem XL men ;
summa, CCCXX men.
ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 301
Item, there most be awaytyng and attendaunt opon hem
nil Spynes, in eche Spynes XXV men ; summa, C men. Summa
of the men, MMCCLX men. Every man takyng 11 s be the
month, amomiteth in the month CCXXVI li.
Item, XXIIII Maisters, eche of hem overe this in the Month
XL d ; summa IIII ii.
Item, over their reward for the quarter Maisters be the
month IIII li. ; summa of the Wages, CCCXXXIIII ii.
Item, Vetaillyng for a month, drawith atte XIIII d. the man
c
in the weke, summa v XXVII li. vi s VIII d. ; summa for the
c
month, in Vitaillyng and Wages, vii LXI li. VI s. VIII d. ;
M C
summa for VI moneths for this yere. IIII D LXVIII li. ; summa
for VIII monethes yerely f olowyng duryng the graunte of Tonage
and Poundage, VI IIII X ti. XIII s. IIII d.
Item, it is to be remembred where the saide Shippes shulle be
hadde ; First, at Bristowe, the Nicholas of the Toure and
Katerine of Burtons. Item, atte Dertemouthe, the Spaynyshe
ship that was the Lord Pouns. Item, atte Dertemouth, Sir
Phelip Courteneys grete Ship. Item, in the Porte of London
II grete Shippes, one called Trinite, and that other called
Thomas. Item, atte Hull, a grete Ship called Taverners, ye
name Grace Dieu. Item atte the New Castell, a grete Shippe
called the George. Item, VIII Barges to be had ; first, of Herry
Ruffell of Weymouth, a Barge. Item of Phelip Courteney
Knyght, 1 Barge. Item at Plymouth, the Barge called Mange-
leke in the water of Saltasshe. Item, atte Wynchelse, II Barges,
one of Morefores called the Marie, and that other pratte Barge
called Trinite. Item, of London, a Barge of Beaufitz and
Bertyns called Valentyne. Item, of Saltasshe, a Barge called
Slugge Barge. Item, of Falmouth, a Barge. Item, VIII
Balingers First, atte Newcastell, with the grete Ship there,
1 Balinger. Item, of Sir Phelip Courteneys, 1 Balynger. Item,
atte Fowy, of Sir William Bonviles, a Balynger called Palmer.
Item, atte Dovyr, a Ballynger called Pigfygge, of Wardes and
Cooks. Item, atte Sandewych, a Balynger of Hay wardes.
Item, atte Hampton a Baljmger of Clyfdons called Jaket. Item,
atte Seynt Ofes, in Essex, a Balynger. Item, of London p
Chirch, a Balynger. Item atte Falmouth, a Balynger. Item,
there most be hadde IIII Spynes ; First, one of Henry Russell.
Item, atte Hastyng a Spynes. Item, atte Dertmouth, II Spynes.
302 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM
Item, it is thought that there shulde be chosen and nempned,
viii of Knyghtes and worthy Swyers of the West, of the South,
and of the North, so that no Cuntre shulde be dispesid ; and
yerof the Kyng oure Soveraigne Lord chiefe suche on as hym
liketh to be a chief Capytayne, and other VII as the Kyng likoth
of the saide VIII, for to attende the saide chief Capytayne ; so
that every grete Shippe have a Capytayne withy nne borde.
Item, it is to be remembre, that the Kyng will gyfif hem in
charge, be his Officers to hem sent, yt aU these saide Shippes
stuffed and arrayed make their first assemble in the Caumbre,
there to obey suche rewle and governaunce, as be their Capitayne
and undre Capitayns shall to hem be ordeyned, and there moustre
of every Shippe to be sene by suche persones as the Kjmge will
depute therto be his Commission.
Item, there suche Proclamation and Ordenaunce to be made
and established amongs and in the saide Navie, that none Shipp
or Shippes, harme ne hurt none other Shippe of oure Freendes ;
where thorough any trouble or brekyng of pees myght falle
betwene the Kyng our Soveraigne Lord, and other of his Freendes.
Item, it is thought necessarie, that if any Shippe or Shippes
be taken as Ennemyes, whenne the goodes in the saide Shippes
be brought into any Port of this Land ; that the godes ne the
Shippes be nat 4isperbled ne devided, into the tyme that it be
duly knowen, wheder it be Enemyes goodes, or Freendes godes :
Forfene alwey that ye presse be made withinne VI wekes after
the landyng or havenyng of the seide Shippe or Shippes and
Goodes so taken.
Item, it is to be remembred, how in tyme passid awners of
divers Shippes, that have, be commaundement of the Kynges
Counseill, sent their Shippes to the See, and they nought sette
in their Shippes Maisters ne Mar3niers, for their mesprision on
the See were putte in grete trouble and disease. Wherfore be it
nowe ordejmed by authorite of this Parlement, that noone suche
awner of any Shippe at this tyme goyng to the See, or here after
shall goe to the See, for kepyng therof, be endaungered or
disseised, lesse thenne he be in the See with his Shippe in his
persone, or ellis be partyner of such goodes mistaken ; and if he
so be founden, yan' he to answere to the partie that the goodes
be mystake of, to the value thereof that comes to his hands, and
in that caas he to be beleved be his othe, and II or III of his
credible neyghbours with hym swome, and so to be acquitte.
Forthermore it is avised, yat if it so be that any of the saide
ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM 303
Shippes in this Ordenaunce appoynted be nat in England, ne in
the Portes afore named, or mowe not be had, yt yanne it shall
be lefuU to the said chief Capytayne, for to chefe be his wisdome,
an other Shipp or Shippes like to hem that lakketh of thoo that
afore ar named ; and that every under Capitayne, in the absence
of the chief Capitayne, have power in the same fourme, and in
caas like, for suche Shippes as shall be necessarie.
Item, it is thought, that the Goodes and Shippes that mowe
happe to be taken by hem, or by any of hem, in the See of our
Enemys, shall be departed in the fourme aftre sewyng. That is
to say, the Maisters of the Shippes, Quarter Maisters, Shipmen
and Soudeours, shul have half the Shippes and Goodes so taken
and oyere half of the Shippes and Goodes, shall be departed in
three, of the whiche the awners of the Shippes, Barges Balingers
and Spinaces, shall have II partes, and the chief Capitain and
the under Capitayns the third parte ; of the whiche thrid parte,*
the chief Capitayne shall have double that oon of the under
Capitayns shall have.
Item, that the IIII the parte of the half XV me now graunted,
after the fourme of exception and deduction in the same Graunt,
and after the rate therof according the deduction of suche perte
of a XV me by Knyghts of the Shire last made and after the
afferaunt of the exceptions in this Graunt, be arrerid by the
CoUectours therto to be nevend, and by hem payed into the
Kings receipt, at the moys of Estre next comyng ; and that
somme to be delivered by the Tresourer of England, to the
Chief Capitayn and undre Capitayns by the Kyng to be nevend
by Endenture bitwene the Kyng and the seid Capitayns yerof
to be named, for the seid Governaunce and keping of the See,
and to noon oyere use ; whiche kepyng shal begynne the XVth
day of May next comyng and endure to the XVth day of
November yan next sewing. And yan, at ye first day of March
next aftre the said XVth day of November the keping of the
See begin in manere and fourme as is aboveseid, to endure for
the term of VIII monethes yan next f olwyng ; the paiement
therof to be made of the Tonage and Powndage in this Parlement
graunted, by the Tresorer of England for the tyme beyng, to
such Capytayne and Capitaynes as by the Kyng shall be nevend,
after the rate of the seid VI monethes, by Endenture bitwene
the Kyng and the seid Capitayns to be made ; and so forth ye
next yere folowyng in slembable wise alwey forsayn, thatyf ye
seid Capitains or any of theym or any of their meyn undre them,
absent himself out of the See any of the monethes or part of hem
304 ROTULI PARLIAMENTORUM
aforesaid, that yanne he or they be disalowed so moch of their
Wages as the rate comes to for the tyme oi her absenc' ; lesse
yan the seid Capitain or Capitains or ony man under yeym so
absent leve a suffisaunt man, or so many suffisant men in there
stede, for the tyme of their absence.
Item, that noon of the seid Vesselles, nor noon oyere Vessel
to be had in stede of any of hem attending to the same Viage,
be arrested for any Viage of oure Soveraign Lord ye Kyng,
appoynted or to be appoynted, nor in no oyere use, during the
yeres aforeseid.
Soit fait come il est desire, durant le temps de la sauf garde
de le Meer deins especifie.
INDEX
Angary, 71 n.
Anson : on Prerogative, 44.
Abms, duty to provide, 137.
Army : see under Transport.
Barracks, 36.
Berkley : in shipmoney case, 67.
Blaokstone : on Prerogative, 44 ;
purveyance, 50 ; Petition of
Right, 127.
Bruce's Report, 31, 138, 195, 247.
Bulwarks, 12, 49, 50, 68, 69, 205,
211, 221.
Burke : on crisis of 1757, 15.
Chatham : on crisis of 1757, 15.
Chattels, requisition of, 28, 97,
146, 165.
Cheshunt Water, 75, 290.
Chitty : on Petition of Right, 127.
Clarendon : on shipmoney, 61.
Commissions for executing Acts,
20, 229.
Compensation under local Acts,
17, 21 ; for removal of buildings,
29 ; for disturbance of access,
76, 214 ; under Defence Act,
1842, 36-8; refusal not * neces-
sary ', 80, 175 ; right to deter-
mine tribunal by Regulation,
100 ; mandamus to enforce,
134 ; right foimded on Statute,
17-41, 135, 188 ; property other
than land, 136-57 ; imder In-
demnity Act, 161 ; liability not
a ' restriction ', 88, 194, 199.
Consent : taking land by, 18, 27,
39 ; in relation to purveyance,
54, n. ; no consent in Case, 132,
191.
Courts : functions, xv, 82, 94, 96 ;
exclusion of jurisdiction, 102.
Coventry : address to Judges, 60.
Crooke: on shipmoney, xxiiij65,147.
Crown : contentions formulated, 4 ;
when bound by statute, 108, foil.
See Prerogative.
Damage : by erection of buildings,
29; stopping gateways, 76;
assessment under Act of 1767,
236. See Compensation.
Dartmouth : on Prerogative, 105,
Defence Act, 1798: 22, 24, 25.
142, 173, 215, 253 ; proceedings
in Parliament, 24, 31 ; provi-
sions, 25-8.
Defence Act, 1803 : 22, 142, 172,
213, 215 ; provisions, 25-8.
Defence Act, 1804: 11, 23, 29,
35, 174, 215 ; provisions, 36.
Defence Act, 1842 : 35-41 ;
amendments, 10 ; provisions,
36 ; applies in time of war, 39,
172, 184, 193, 196, 201, 216;
compared with legislation of
1798 to 1804, 23, 38; with
Defence of the Realm Act, 81 ;
reference to Prerogative, 109.
Defence of the Realm Act,
1914 : xvi, 78-104, 175, 184, 192,
199 ; provisions, 83 ; ' restric-
tions ', 40, 79, 88, 175, 184, 193,
199, 217; regulations, xvii, 79, 83,
87, 91, 97, 99, 101, 184, 186, 192,
199 ; compensation not referred
to, 92, 217 ; general considera-
tions, 94 ; conclusions, 101-4.
Defence of the Realm Losses
Commission, xviii, 89, 190, 197 ;
under Indemnity Act, 164.
Dicey : on prerogative, 44 ; on
Acts of Indenmity, 158.
Documents : see Historical Evi-
dence.
Dutch Wars, 73.
Executive : delegation of powers
to, XV, 81 ; discretion, 95, 97, 102.
Facts of Case, 1-9; Suppliants'
case not founded on consent, 132.
Fiat to Petition of Right, 120.
Finch : in shipmoney case, 67.
Food Controller, 103.
Fortifications : Chatham, 14, 15,
16, 20, 73, 229, 281 ; Greenwich,
15 ; Harwich, 14, 281 ; Hull, 12,
74, 284, 285, 286; Kent, 18,
295; Milford, 15; Plymouth,
306
INDEX
13, 15, 16, 19, 74, 229, 279;
Portsmouth, 13, 15, 16, 20, 74,
226, 229, 279;. Sandgate, 77,
293 ; Sheemess, 19 ; Southamp-
ton, 18 ; Sussex, 18 ; Thames,
19 ; Ireland, 173.
Foster, Sir M. : on impressment,
152.
Gunpowder : Greenwich and Pur-
fleet magazines, 15, 236 ; Chil-
worth Mills, 278; Cheshunt
Water, 75, 213, 290 ; mills im-
pressed, 73, 278, 279 ; importa-
tion, 58.
Hampden : assessed for shipmoney,
61.
Historical Evidence, xxii, 72-8 ;
conclusions, "77, 171, 204, 213 ;
onus of proof, 78.
HoLDSWORTH : on right to requi-
sition ships, 153.
Home Secretary : duties in rela-
tion to internment, 96 ; Petition
of Right to be submitted to,
119.
HuTTON : on shipmoney, 66.
Impressment : does not exclude
payment, 73 ; ships, 59, 148,
152, 296-304; men, 56, 152;
transport, 140, 222, 228; chat-
tels, 142, 145, 146.
Indemnity Act of 1920 : 158-67 ;
object and scope of former Acts,
159 ; effect on Petition of Right,
161 ; measure of compensation,
163.
* Indirect Loss ', claims for, 166.
International Law, requisitions
in, 71, 204.
Invasion : Cornwall, 12, 220 ;
Spanish Armada, 31, 195, 247 ;
Seven Years' War, 16; Napo-
leonic Wars, 19, 24 ; provided
for in Defence Act, 1842, 39, 174,
193, 201.
Ireland : fortifications, 23.
Lands Clauses Acts, 38, 133, 219.
Magna Carta, 51, 106, 209.
Maitland : on prerogative, 44.
Mandamus : not against Crown,
134.
Manning : on Petition of Right,
127.
Mariners : impressment, 152.
Military Service : debate in
1803, 33 ; right to call for, 137,
253.
Militia, 138, 252.
Monopolies, 58.
Napoleonic Wars, xvi, 12, 30, 33,
174 ; legislation compared with
Defence Act, 1842, 23, 38;
ships not requisitioned, 155 ;
prerogative during, 30-4.
Navy: transport for, 140, 222,
228.
Necessity : King as Judge, 65,
194 ; criterion of validity of
regulations, 82, 93, 94, 101, 109.
NoY : suggests shipmoney, 60.
Ordnance Department, 36, 222,
228. 8ee Defence Acts.
Parliament : authority necessary
for requisitions, 25, 64, 74 ;
delegation of functions, 81 ;
executive action when Parlia-
ment not sitting, 17, 72.
Petition of Right : history, 114-
17 ; procedure, 117 ; granting
fiat, 120; in what cases, 123,
176; tort, 125; title, 126;
breach of contract, 129 ; statu-
tory obligations, 131, 189 ; effect
of Indemnity Act, 161.
Pitt : on military service, 33.
Prerogative, 42-78 ; not referred
to in statutes, 17, 109, 171 ; in
Napoleonic wars, 30, 34; mili-
tary service, 33 ; defined, 44,
105 ; onus of proof, 78 ; under
Defence Acts, 86; effect of
statute, 105-13; in litigation,
111.
Purveyance, 50 ; Statutes, 51 ;
in relation to war, 54 ; petition
against, 55 ; abolished, 58, 139 ;
later history, 139 ; effect on
right to requisition ships, 153.
Restrictions : see Defence of
Realm Act.
St. John : argument in shipmoney
case, 63.
INDEX
307
Saltpetre : a purveyance, 48 ;
reference to judges, 55 ; resolu-
tions, 47 ; Commissions, 65, 57,
73, 261-77.
Selden : on impressment, 152.
Shipmoney : first writs, 60 ; ques-
tions submitted to judges, 61 ;
Clarendon on, 61 ; third writ,
61 ; declared unlawful, 62 ; St.
John's argument, 63 ; judg-
ments, 65, 66, 67, 147 ; conclu-
sions, 68.
Shipping Controller, 99, 103,
157.
Ships : requisitions in early times,
59, 148 ; Holdsworth on right to
requisition, 153; Selden, 152;
Foster, 152 ; Royal Proclama-
tion, August 1914, 156 ; assess-
ment of compensation, 163 ;
references in Rot. Pari., 296-
304.
Spanish Armada, 31, 195, 247.
Spanish Succession, War of, 13.
Statutes : interpretation where
existing rights affected, 92, 186,
218 ; effect on Prerogative, 105-
13, 182, 203, 214 ; not a mere
record, 106 ; when binding on
Crown, 108, 172, 182.
Staundford: on Petition of Right,
114, 127.
Temporary Occupation, 10, 188,
209, 213.
Tort : Crown not liable, 125, 177 ;
excluded where requisition law-
ful, 131, 198.
Transport : in Stuart period, 140 ;
Napoleonic Wars, 141 ; Mutiny
Acts, 141 ; Army Acts, 145 ;
Statutes, 222, 228, and see
Purveyance.
Use and Occupation, 132, 169,
178-82.
Vesting Acts, 22, 229.
Vienna, Treaty of, 23.
War Compensation Court, 167.
War Office Records, 12, 73-7
277-95.
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