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CAVALRY

FRI E DRIC H
VON BERNHARDI

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GAVALRY

A POPULAR EDITION OF
"CAVALRY IN WAR AND PEACE"

BY

GENERAL FRIEDRICH von BERNHARDI

Author of " How Germany Makes War"
WITH A PREFACE BY

FIELD-MARSHAL SIR J. D. P. FRENCH

G.C^., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G.

THIS EDITION EDITED BY A. HILLIAKO

ATTERIDGE FROM THE TRANSLATION BY
MAJOR O. T. M. BRIDGES, D.S.O.
4TH ROYAL (IRISH) DRAGOON GUARDS

NEW YORK
GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY

COPTBIOHT, 1914, BT

GEORGE H. DORAN COMPANY

EDITOR'S NOTE

General von Bernhardt is best known in England
as a writer of the "Jingo" School which has done so
much to produce the war, but this is only one side of
his literary activity. He is also a writer of recognised
ability on the theory and practice of modem war.
Sir John French's introduction to the present work is
sufficient testimony to the value which is set upon his
purely professional writings.

General von Bemhardi is a distinguished cavalry
officer, and he writes with remarkable independence
ggon the special work of his own arm, never hesitating
g to criticise the regulations of the German Army, when
~ he considers that they do not correspond to the actual
z conditions of war. The book, though written in the
^ first instance for cavalrv officers, will be found of in-
^ terest to all who wish to understand what cavalry is
-^ called upon to do and how it does it in the war of to-
day. It will be found to be full of useful instruction
for not only officers of the regular cavalry and the yeo-
manry, but also for officers and non-commissioned of-
ficers of our cyclist battalions, whose work brings them
into such close relation with our cavalry in war and
manoeuvres, and who have to perform much the same
work as that of the cavalry in reconnaissance, screen-
ing, and outpost duties.

General von Bernhardi's work deals with cavalry
in war and peace, but much of the second part, dealing
with peace duties and training, is made up of a mass

5

345549

6 EDITOR'S NOTE

of detail on parade and riding-school work, as carried
out in the German Army. This has been omitted, but
his remarks on cavalry training at manoeuvres are in-
cluded in an appendix. Sir John French's introduc-
tion gives us the views of the greatest of our own
cavalry leaders, who is now commanding our Army in
France.

PREFACE

All British soldiers will welcome this excellent trans-
lation by Major Bridges of a new work by General
von Bernhardi, whose intimate knowledge of cavalry
and brilliant writings have won for him such a gjeat
European reputation.

Some prominence has lately been given in England
to erroneous views concerning the armament and tac-
tics of cavalry. General von Bemhardi's book con-
tains sound doctrine on this subject, and will show
to every one who has an open mind and is capable
of conviction by reasoned argument how great is the
future role of cavalry, and how determined are the
efforts of the great cavalry leaders of Europe to
keep abreast with the times, and to absorb, for the
profit of the arm, every lesson taught by experience,
both in peace and war.

In all theories, whether expounded by so eminent
an authority as General von Bernhardi or by others
who have not his claims to our attention, there is, of
course, a good deal that must remain a matter of
opinion, and a question open for free and frank dis-
cussion. But I am convinced that some of the reac-
tionary views recently aired in England concerning
cavalry will, if accepted and adopted, lead first to the
deterioration and then to the collapse of cavalry when
next it is called upon to fulfil its mission in war. I
therefore recommend not only cavalry officers, but
officers of all arms and services, to read and ponder

7

8 PREFACE

this book, which provides a strengthening tonic for
weak minds which may have allowed themselves to be
impressed by the dangerous heresies to which I have
alluded.

:(c H: :K H< H^

Is there such a thing as the cavalry spirit, and should
it be our object to develop this spirit, if it exists, to
the utmost, or to suppress it? General von Bern-
hardi thinks that this spirit exists and should be en-
couraged, and I agree with him. It is not only pos-
sible but necessary to preach the Army spirit, or, in
other words, the close comradeship of all arms in bat-
tle, and at the same time to develop the highest quali-
ties and the special attributes of each branch. The
particular spirit which we seek to encourage is dif-
ferent for each arm. Were we to seek to endow
cavalry with the tenacity and stiffness of infantry, or
to take from the mounted arm the mobility and the
cult of the offensive which are the breath of its life,
we should ruin not only the cavalry, but the Army be-
sides. Those who scoff at the spirit, whether of
cavalry, of artillery, or of infantry, are people who
have had no practical experience of the actual train-
ing of troops in peace, or of the personal leadership
in war. Such men are blind guides indeed.

Another reason why I welcome this book is because
it supplies a timely answer to schoolmen who see in
our South African experiences, some of which they
distort and many of which they forget, the acme of
all military wisdom. It is always a danger when any
single campaign is picked out, at the fancy of some
pedagogue, and its lessons recommended as a panacea.
It is by study and meditation of the whole of the long
history of war, and not by concentration upon single
and special phases of it, that we obtain safe guidance

PREFACE 9

to the principles and practices of an art which is as
old as the world.

It is not only the campaigns which we and others
have fought which deserve reflection, but also the wars
which may lie in front of us. General von Bern-
hardi does not neglect the lessons of past wars, but
he gives the best of reasons for thinking that the
wars in South Africa and Manchuria have little in
common with the conditions of warfare in Europe.
We notice, as we read his book, that he has constantly
in his mind the enemies whom the German Army must
be prepared to meet, their arms, their tactics, and their
country, and that he urges his comrades to keep the
conditions of probable wars constantly before their
eyes.

It passes comprehension that some critics in Eng-
land should gravely assure us that the war in South
Africa should be our chief source of inspiration and
guidance, and that it was not abnormal. All wars are
abnormal, because there is no such thing as normal
war. In applying the lessons of South Africa to the
training of cavalry, we should be very foolish if we
did not recognise at this late hour that very few of
the conditions of South Africa are likely to recur. I
will name only a few of them. The composition and
tactics of the Boer forces were as dissimilar from
those of European armies as possible. Boer com-
mandos made no difficulty about dispersing to the four
winds w^hen pressed, and re-uniting again some days
or weeks later hundreds of miles from the scene of
their last encounter. Such tactics in Europe would
lead to the disruption and disbandment of any^army
that attempted them.

Secondly, the war in South Africa was one for the
conquest and annexation of immense districts, and no

lo PREFACE

settlement was open to us except the complete sub-
mission of our gallant enemy. A campaign with such
a serious object in view is the most difficult that can
be confided to an army if the enemy is brave, enter-
prising, well-armed, numerous, and animated with un-
conquerable resolve to fight to the bitter end. I am
not sure that people in England have ever fully grasped
this distinctive feature of our war with the Dutch Re-
publics. Let me quote the opinion of the late Colonel
Count Yorck von Wartenburg on this subject. In his
remarkable book "Napoleon as a General," Count
Yorck declares that if, in the campaign of 1870-71, the
absolute conquest and annexation of France had been
desired, German procedure would not have been either
logical or successful, and that the Germans would have
failed as completely as Napoleon failed in Spain. But
Count Yorck shows that when plans have a definite
and limited object in view — namely, to obtain peace
on given conditions — the situation is altered. Count
Yorck shows that the German plans in 1 87071 were
perfectly appropriate to this limited aim, and that they
were therefore successful. The very serious task
which British policy imposed upon British strategy in
South Africa must never be forgotten.

Thirdly, we did not possess any means for remount-
ing our cavalry with trained horses, such as we are
endeavouring to secure by our new system of cavalry
depots and reserve regiments. After the capture, in
rear of the army, of the great convoy by De Wet, our
horses were on short commons, and consequently lost
condition and never completely recovered it.

Lastly, owing to the wholesale and repeated release
of prisoners who had been captured and who subse-
quently appeared again in the field against us, we were
called upon to fight, not, as is stated, 86,000 or 87,-

PREFACE II

000 men, but something like double that number or
more, with this additional disadvantage, that the en-
emy possessed on his second or third appearance
against us considerable experience of our methods, and
a certain additional seasoned fitness.

Nevertheless we are now invited to throw away our
cold steel as useless lumber owing to some alleged
failures of the cavalry in South Africa. Were we to
do so, we should invert the role of cavalry, turn it
into a defensive arm, and make it a prey to the first
foreign cavalry that it meets, for good cavalry can
always compel a dismounted force of mounted rifle-
men to mount and ride away, and when such rifle-
men are caught on their horses they have power
neither of offence nor of defence and are lost. If, in
European warfare, such mounted riflemen were to sep-
arate and scatter, the enemy would be well pleased, for
he could then reconnoitre and report every movement
and make his plans in all security. In South Africa
the mounted riflemen were the hostile army itself,
and when they had dispersed there was nothing left
to reconnoitre; but when and where will these condi-
tions recur?

Even in South Africa, grave though were the dis-
advantages under which our cavalry laboured from
short commons and overwork, the Boer mounted rifle-
men acknowledged on many occasions the moral force
of the cold steel, and gave way before it. The action
at Zand River in May, 1900, was a case in point, and

1 only quote a personal experience because the venera-
ble maxim that an ounce of practice is worth a ton of
theory has still a good deal to be said for it. The
role of the Cavalry Division on the day to which I
refer was to bring pressure to bear on the right flank
of the Boer army in order to enable Lord Roberts to

12 PREFACE

advance across the river and attack the main Boer
forces. Having crossed the river to the west of the
Boers, we determined, with the inner or easterly bri-
gade, to seize an important kopje lying on the right
flank of the Boer position, and, pivoting upon this,
to throw two brigades against the right flank and rear
of the enemy.

The Boers told off a strong force of picked mounted
riflemen to oppose this movement, which they ex-
pected. The kopje was seized by the inner brigade,
and the brigade next to it made some progress; but
the Boer mounted riflemen attacked the flank brigade
to the extreme west, and began to drive it back. I gal-
loped from the kopje to the outer brigade with the
thought that either every idea which I had ever
formed in my life as to the efficacy of shock action
against mounted riflemen was utterly erroneous, or
that this was the moment to show that it was not.
On reaching the outer brigade I ordered it to mount
and form for attack. All ranks were at once electri-
fied into extraordinary enthusiasm and energy. The
Boers realised what was coming. Their fire became
wild, and the bullets began to fly over our heads. Di-
rectly the advance began, the Boers hesitated, and
many rushed to their horses. We pressed forward
with all the very moderate speed of tired horses,
whereupon the whole Boer force retired in the ut-
most confusion and disorder, losing in a quarter of
an hour more ground than they had won during three
or four hours of fighting. A cavalry which could
perform service like this; which held back, against
great numerical odds, the Dutch forces at Colesberg;
which relieved Kimberley; which directly made possi-
ble the victory at Paardeberg by enclosing Kronje in
his entrenchments; which captured Bloemfontein,

PREFACE 13

Kroonstadt, and Barberton, and took part successfully
in all the phases of the long guerilla war and in count-
less drives, can afford to regard with equanimity the
attacks of those who have never led, trained, nor un-
derstood the arm to which I am proud to have be-
longed.

*****

I have already, in an introduction to another book
by General von Bernhardi, expressed my high sense
of the general soundness of his teaching. Were I to
do full justice to the merits of this new work, I should
be compelled to make long extracts and to repeat
matter which every reader will perhaps do better to
search for and select for himself. But I would in-
vite particular attention to the General's remarks on
the subjects of reconnaissance, the cavalry fight, the
combination of fire and shock, the divisional cavalry,
the role of the strategical cavalry, training, and or-
ganisation. The masterly summary of the qualifica-
tions which should be possessed by squadron and pa-
trol leaders is, in particular, an extremely valuable
contribution to the study of a most important sub-
ject.

The General does not always agree with the Regu-
lations of his own Army, and he is specially in con-
flict with them when he recommends raids by cavalry
corps against the enemy's communications. My
opinion upon this point is that every plan should be
subordinate to what I consider a primary necessity —
namely, the absolute and complete overthrow of the
hostile cavalry. So long as that cavalry remains in-
tact with its morale unshaken, all our enterprises must
of necessity be paralysed. The successful cavalry fight
confers upon the victor the command of ground, just
in the same way that successful naval action carries

14 PREFACE

with it command at sea. For effective enterprises in
either sphere command is absolutely necessary, and
can only be obtained by successful battle, whether on
land or sea.

I agree generally with the German Regulations
when they suggest that raids against communications
should not divert cavalry from their true battle ob-
jective, and consequently I must venture to differ from
the author on this point, though I do not approve
of all that the German Regulations say concerning
the employment of cavalry in battle. The opinion
which I hold and have often expressed is that the
true role of cavalry on the battlefield is to reconnoitre,
to deceive, and finally to support. If the enemy's ca-
valry has been overthrown, the role of reconnaissance
will have been rendered easier. In the roles of decep-
tion and support, such an immense and fruitful field
of usefulness and enterprise is laid open to a cavalry
division which has thought out and practised these
roles in its peace training and is accustomed to act
in large bodies dismounted, that I cannot bring myself
to believe that any equivalent for such manifest ad-
vantages can be found even in the most successful raid
against the enemy's communications by mounted
troops.

I entirely agree with General von Bernhardi's con-
clusion that very important duties will fall to the lot
of the divisional cavalry in war, and that the fulfil-
ment of these duties has become more difficult of late
years. The necessity for, and the value of, divisional
cavalry are often not properly appreciated. What
the strategical cavalry is to the Army in the greater
sphere, the divisional cavalry is to the division in the
lesser.

Most cavalry soldiers of good judgment will agree

PREFACE 15

with the lucid arguments of the author on the sub-
ject of cavalry armament. It is suggested to us, by
critics of the cavalry, that the lance is an impediment
to dismounted action. If this difficulty ever existed, it
has been overcome by the method of carrying the lance
which has been adopted and practised with marked
success for the past two years. It is also objected
by the same critics that a thin bamboo pole, carried
by the side of a mounted man, will hinder him in
reconnaissance and reveal his position to the enemy.
The mere statement of this argument absolves me
from the duty of replying to it.

General von Bemhardi very wisely says that it is
not a question whether cavalrymen should fight
mounted or dismounted, but whether they are pre-
pared and determined to take their share in the de-
cision of an encounter and to employ the whole of
their strength and mobility to this end. In our train-
ing during the last few years I have endeavoured to
impress upon all ranks that when the enemy's cavalry
is overthrown, our cavalry will find more opportuni-
ties of using the rifle than the cold steel, and that
dismounted attacks will be more frequent than charges
with the arme blanche. By no means do I rule out as
impossible, or even unlikely, attacks by great bodies of
mounted men aga.inst other arms on the battlefield.
But I believe that such opportunities will occur com-
paratively rarely, and that undue prominence should
not be accorded to them in our peace training, to the
detriment of much more solid advantages which may
be gained by other means.

I think that every one who reads this book will
understand that the sphere of action of cavalry is
steadily widening, and is, at the same time, making
increased demands as the years go on upon all ranks

i6 PREFACE

of the arm. Those who wish to recall what cavalry
has done in the past, should read and reread "The
Achievements of Cavalry," by Field-Marshal Sir Eve-
lyn Wood, one of the very few soldiers in the Army
who has taken part as a combatant in European war-
fare. Sir Evelyn Wood's war record probably sur-
passes that of any other officer in the Army. His
knowledge of horses and his horsemanship are sec-
ond to none, and though seventy-two years of age,
he is still one of the hardest and straightest riders
to hounds in England. It should be a constant en-
couragement to the cavalry that such an experienced
and sagacious leader should entertain such a firm faith,
in the destinies of an arm with which he is so thor-
oughly conversant.

*****

A few words in conclusion. We hear it said, and
see it written, that we ought not to accept any guid-
ance from military Europe, because our own experi-
ence of war has been so considerable that we can
learn nothing from Europe which we do not know
better ourselves. The truth is, that since the Crimean
War we have had little or no experience of the kind
of effort which will be required of us when next we
meet the trained army of a European Power. In de-
luding ourselves with the false notion that our cam-
paigns of the last fifty years represent the sum of
military wisdom, we merely expose our ignorance and
conceit, and do our utmost not only to cause disaster,
but to invite it.

The cavalry soldier must not be misled by these
appeals of ignorance to vanity. Let him continue to
study profoundly the training, tactics, and organisa-
tion of the best foreign cavalry. Let him reflect long
and deeply upon the opinions of such acknowledged

PREFACE 17

authorities as Field-Marshal Sir Evelyn Wood and
General von Bernhardi. Let him keep himself abreast
with every change in the tendencies of cavalry abroad,
so that he may help us to assimilate the best of for-
eign customs to our own. Finally, let him realise
the great intellectual and physical strain that modern
war will impose upon the cavalry, and let him preserve
the mens sana in corpore sano, that equable balance
between study and action, which alone will enable him
to rise superior to every difficulty in the great and
honourable calling to which he belongs.

J. D. P. French.

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

In placing this translation of General von Bernhardi's
work at the service of the officers of the Army, I take
the opportunity of drawing attention to the educa-
tional value of the large quantity of military litera-
ture published abroad, particularly in France and Ger-
many. Translations into English of works of this
kind are rare, and often so belated as to have lost much
of their value by the time they are produced.

Modern developments in means of communication
and intercourse are daily bringing us into closer touch
with the Continent of Europe, and there can be no
doubt that the rising generation of officers would do
well to make themselves masters of the not over-dif-
ficult art of reading French and German, that they
may be able to appreciate such works and keep them-
selves abreast of the times. They will find such knowl-
edge of the greatest service, not only in the profession
of arms, but in the course of everyday life.

My thanks are due to Major W. H. Greenly, D.S.O.
1 2th Lancers, for his kind and able assistance in cor-
recting proofs.

T.B.

CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION 25

EMPLOYMENT IN WAR THE BASIS FOR

TRAINING 33

A. Reconnaissance, Screening, and Raids:

I. reconnaissance by the army cavalry . . 40

1. The Main Body of the Army Cavalry . . 40

2. Reconnoitring Squadrons 51

3. Distant Patrols 64

4. Close Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance dur-

ing the Fight * 7^

II. reconnaissance by the divisional cavalky . 82

III. THE SCREEN 9I

rv. RAIDS 97

21

22 CONTENTS

B. The Action of Cavalry :

PAGE

I. GENERAL IO4

II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE II3

III. CAVALRY IN COMBAT AGAINST THE VARIOUS ARMS,

MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED IIQ

IV. THE FIGHT OF THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY . . I37

1. The Battle of Encounter 138

2. Attack of Localities . ... . . . 155

3. The Defence . . . » . . . 164

4. Breaking off the Fight, Retreat, and Pursuit 166

V. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE . . .173

1. The Army Cavalry on the Flank of the Battle 178

2. The Army Cavalry as a Reserve behind the

Front 185

3. Pursuit and Retreat 190

4. The Role of the Divisional Cavalry . . . 196

CONTENTS 23

PAGE
VI. DEPTH AND ECHELON I98

VII. FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENTS .... 208

VIII. THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT . . . 213

APPENDIX: Cavalry at Peace Man(euvres . . 221

INTRODUCTION

The great changes which have taken place in military
science since the year 1866 have forced all arms to
adopt new methods of fighting. It was, first and
foremost, the improvement in the firearm which
wrought the transformation of the battlefield and
called forth an increased demand for cover against
the murderous effect of fire. The infantry sought
safety in sparser formations and in utilising the
smallest accidents of the ground for cover, while the
artillery adopted armoured shields, covered positions,
and indirect methods of fire. It was only the cavalry
that could not keep pace with these developments.
Forming a conspicuous target, capable of being con-
cealed only behind considerable inequalities of the
ground, it could indeed seldom find cover within the
range of the enemy's fire. As, at the same time, its
strength in comparison to that of the great armies
of the present day has sensibly diminished, it might
be concluded that its particular value in battle had
decreased considerably in possibility and importance.
This conclusion is thoroughly justified, but not al-
together in the way that one is inclined to assume.
For one reason, the cavalry is now supplied with an
excellent firearm, which its mobility enables it to em-
ploy against the most sensitive parts of an enemy's line
of battle. For another, the composition of modern
armies offers, as I have frequently said, many new
possibilities of success. Newly raised levies, such as

25

26 CAVALRY IN WAR

will often have to take their place in the great armies
of the day, cannot possess the same steadiness as
standing permanent troops. They are, according to
experience, very sensitive to moral impressions, and
will often enough, when shaken in battle, offer a
tempting and suitable object of attack to the cavalry.
At the same time, the fact remains that, by reason of
its relative numerical weakness, cavalry can no longer
retain its former importance in the battle, and that
the manner of its intervention in the fight must often
be of a very different nature from what it has been
in the past.

On the other hand, the duty of cavalry in the sphere
of reconnaissance has increased in importance. For
all strategical movements the main body of the mod-
ern army demands considerably more time and, gen-
erally also, comprehensive preparatory measures. If,
therefore, intelligence as to the disposition of the en-
emy is to be of use in operations, it follows that it
must be procured at the earliest possible moment.
Whoever gets the earliest and best information pos-
sesses nowadays a far greater advantage than for-
merly, when, with the small armies of the day, move-
ments and combinations of force could often be suc-
cessfully carried out in the immediate presence of
the enemy's army. These are indeed still possible in
occasional cases and where sufficient depth of forma-
tion is maintained, and it is this circumstance that
has made early and full intelligence, combined with
successful screening of one's own movements, one of
the most important factors of success.

There are people who, in fancy, already see cavalry
replaced in this role by an air fleet. Such prophets
cannot, however, be treated seriously. The air cruisers
will not be designed for all the possibilities of war. In

INTRODUCTION 27

the period of concentration and in fortress warfare
they would doubtless be able, even in their present
condition, to render excellent service. Whether they
can be adapted for use in a war of movement remains
to be seen; but, even if they can in time be of more
service for war than at present appears to be the case,
their capabilities in this direction will always be lim-
ited. They can only observe at night under favour-
able conditions — such things, for example, as large
detrainments of troops or bivouacs with fires burning.
They are under all circumstances dependent upon the
weather. By day the air fleet of the enemy will seek
battle with them in order to hinder their reconnais-
sance. Hostile artillery will be particularly danger-
ous to them, and will be able, thanks to the develop-
ments in modern ordnance, to wage successful war
against them. All detachments cannot possibly be sup-
plied with airships, owing to the great cost and enor-
mous apparatus entailed, and their usefulness will
therefore only be realised with the larger formations.
Finally, one or the other of the air fleets will be driven
from the field, or rather from the air, and that side
which meets with defeat will be deprived of all means
of reconnoitring unless it can rely on its cavalry. So
in the most modern war the cavalry remains the prin-
cipal means of reconnaissance. Its activity may in-
deed be supplemented by airships, but will never be
replaced by them.^

^ This was written five years ago, at a time when, though
considerable progress had been made with airship work, the
aeroplane was still in the pioneer stage of development,
though Bleriot had just made his record flight across the
Channel. Since then flying corps provided with aeroplanes
of improved construction have been introduced into every
great army, and the flying men have proved in actual war-
fare (Tripoli, Morocco, the Balkans, France) the utility of

28 CAVALRY IN WAR

These circumstances, however, necessitate a new
role for cavalry. It must drive the hostile cavalry
from the field, a cavalry which will do all in its power
to secure its own army against intrusion. It will find
this cavalry reinforced not only by horse artillery and
machine-guns, but also by cyclist battalions, mounted
and other infantry, and will therefore have to be pre-
pared, in order to properly carry out its service of
exploration, to fight against detachments of all arms.
But the same thing will also happen when it seeks
to veil the movements of its own army, or to under-
take some enterprise against the enemy's communi-
cations, or to defend its own against similar hostile
raids. Our cavalry thus finds itself face to face with
totally new duties of a most real kind, towards the
carrying out of which it has no previous experience
to help it.

In the wars of Frederick the Great and of Napo-
leon, as well as in the German war of Unification,
there is a total absence of analogy from which to
draw conclusions that can be practically applied. The
wars in South Africa and Manchuria, on the other
hand, reveal conditions which have very little in com-
mon with those of a European war such as the Ger-
man cavalry will have to fight. Nowhere can the
few experiences of cavalry action gained in these wars
be immediately applied, and there are but few bases

the new means of reconnaissance. But though aerial recon-
naissance can do much more than General von Bernhardi
anticipated, it is still true that the aviators cannot entirely
supersede the cavalry. The two arms have to work together.
There are cases where the aviator can accomplish very little.
Thus, for instance, we are told that during the French ad-
vance into the Vosges and Alsace in the present war, the
wooded character of the country led to aerial reconnaissance
giving very disappointing results. — Editor.

INTRODUCTION 29

for the formation of judgment as to what is practi-
cal and possible under modem conditions. The same
may be said to hold good of the Russo-Turkish war.
The most interesting and instructive campaigns for
the service of modern cavalry appear to be those of
the American War of Secession, which are, however,
almost unknown in Germany, where there is a lack
of opportunities to study them.*

There is, therefore, for our cavalry a want of any
sort of tradition for that role which it will be ex-
pected to carry out in the next war, and this want will
be the more felt as it will in the future be expected
to deal with a number of technical methods of com-
munication which are, as a whole, still almost un-
known, and as to the actual war value of which no
judgment can yet be formed. Up to now, also,
cavalry training as carried out since the war of 1870-
71 has been unable to create a sound foundation for
preparation for war. Left far behind in the march
of military progress, in tactics as well as reconnais-
sance, it has been led so far from the right way that
it would have been unable to stand the test of serious
war. Nor have we yet fully extricated ourselves from
these trammels of the past.

For the moment, therefore, our cavalry finds itself
in a state of transition. The demands which modern
war will make upon it have not yet penetrated into its
flesh and blood, that is to say, their extent and range
have not yet been clearly grasped by the arm, nor have
we yet by any means succeeded in breaking loose from
the fetters of the past. Views based on antiquated

* In England these campaigns have been very carefully
studied and our cavalry have learned the lessons they sug-
gest.— Editor.

30 CAVALRY IN WAR

assumptions are often apt to survive and to influence
training as well as leading.

This is particularly the case as regards reconnais-
sance. In tactics, too, the cut-and-dried methods of
bygone days are clearly not yet forgotten, while for
enterprises against the enemy's communications there
is a want both of practical training and theoretical
instruction.

This state of affairs must be regarded as a great
evil, as at the outbreak of a war there will no longer
be time to collect experiences. From the very first
day onward the greatest demands will be made upon
the cavalry, not only as regards intentions, but per-
formances. On the achievements of the cavalry in
the early days of the war will depend to a consider-
able extent the success of the first great decisive en-
counter.

We must therefore be prepared to meet these great
demands when war breaks out. Only a clear recog-
nition of the necessities and the possibilities of ma-
noeuvre and training can secure us this preparation.
There remains, then, nothing for us — with no practi-
cal war experience to go on — but to create the ground-
work of our methods of training from theoretical
and speculative reflection. With all the means of
intellect and foresight, we must endeavour to dis-
cern the probable course of the war of the future and
regulate the methods of training accordingly.

Peace exercises based upon such clearly defined
principles must serve as a further guide to what is
possible and practical. They cannot, it is true, afford
realistic results, as they lack the effect of weapons,
the hostile country, the thousand causes of friction,
and the moral factors of serious war. They can, how-
ever, be regarded as practical guides in many direc-

INTRODUCTION 31

tions and will help us to evolve methods unattainable
by pure theory: for instance, in increasing the capa-
bilities of the troops, improving the practical arrange-
ments for communication, the transmission service,
the patrol system, and the like. Only these peace ex-
periences must not be overrated, but subjected to con-
tinual criticism by the light of what would be practical
in war.

It thus remains our chief duty to get a clear and
just idea of the role that cavalry will play in a future
war, in order to clear the mind fully on this point, and
so be able further to build upon the foundations of
sound reasoning.

The new Cavalry Drill Regulations,^ in which I had
the honour and pleasure of collaborating, have under-
taken the creation of these fundamental principles of
the independent role of cavalry. Their teachings, how-
ever, have as yet by no means penetrated into the
ranks. The new Drill Regulations have endeavoured,
to give new rules for the tactical employment of cav-
alry, which have not yet sufficiently established their
value, even on the manceuvre-ground. As yet the
troops are only endeavouring to get accustomed to
them.

It is also obvious that practical drill instructions,
at least for tactics, can only give general principles,
and cannot be too definite, lest they should thereby
tend to limit the independence of leaders in the thou-
sand varied happenings of war.

It is quite another matter for him who is not called
on to make regulations, but whose task is rather to

^ "Exerzier-Reglement fiir die Kavallerie," part of which
has been translated and published by the General Staff,
War Office. These Regulations are frequently referred to
throughout this work. — Trans.

32 CAVALRY IN WAR

clear the understanding, to stimulate independent
thought, and to encourage the troops themselves to
form correct judgments. Thus will be moulded the
efficiency which will enable the soldier to act in the
presence of the enemy according to the Regulations,
with full freedom of thought, not after the letter,
but the spirit, and even perhaps, in many cases, the
intention of them.

From this point of view I have set forth my views
and reflections. It seems to me, above all things, im-
portant to discuss those points which will be new to
cavalry in a future war, and in so doing to touch on
many matters of training which long years of experi-
ence have convinced me are practical. May I by these
hints contribute towards the formation of fresh tra-
ditions for the training of the arm that will march
with modern conditions, that will break away for
good from all half -measures and obsolete views, and
thereby clear the way towards a proper conduct of
the cavalry in war, and to the winning of fresh and
imperishable laurels!

Where I have occasion to touch on views formerly
expressed and set forth in my various writings, I find
no reason to retract any of them. In certain direc-
tions they have naturally developed further, and have
become more progressive under the impress of the
whole of modern development and the latest experi-
ences of war. On the whole, however, I adhere to
my opinions, and only seek to supplement and develop
them in order to suit them still better to the practical
needs of the arm. I hope they may act as a stimulus
and serve as a guide to many a comrade in difficulties.

EMPLOYMENT IN WAR THE BASIS FOR
TRAINING

There can be no doubt that the value and significance
of cavalry in a future war will be chiefly demonstrated
in the action of the army cavalry.^ The army cavalry-
alone, by virtue of its fighting strength, will be able to
carry out the larger services of reconnaissance, to op-
erate against the enemy's communications, to take part
in the tactical decision with a force commensurate
with modern conditions, or to carry out a pursuit.
Reconnaissance occupies a prominent position
amongst these various duties. There will not be a bat-
tle every day. Not in every fight will considerations of
ground and other circumstances allow of the cavalry
taking part in a great decision as a mounted arm. Not
always will an effective pursuit by the cavalry mass
be possible. It must be remembered that in order
not to render itself too weak to carry out its proper
role cavalry must not expose itself to heavy loss in
battle without sufficient reason. Only the possibility
of a very great success can justify the risk of stak-
ing the whole cavalry force in a decisive charge dur-
ing the battle. It is true that efforts will have to be
made to drive the hostile cavalry from the field to
facilitate operations against the flank and rear of the
enemy's line of battle. But such operations will gen-

^ The army cavalry corresponds with our independent cav-
alry.— Trans.

33

34 CAVALRY IN WAR

erally be limited to fire action, and in a decisive battle
the weakness of the cavalry would probably debar it
from such undertakings. Engagements, also, that are
fought with a view of opening a way for reconnais-
sance will not be of frequent occurrence, and must
only be expected during occasional crises. They will,
however, be of decisive value for the whole future
conduct of the arm and its operative success. The
same may be said of raids against the enemy's com-
munications. Such undertakings may exercise the
greatest influence on the course of a campaign, but
can only be undertaken under specially favourable con-
ditions.

On the other hand, the everyday task of the cavalry
which goes hand in hand with all these various en-
gagements and enterprises is reconnaissance proper
carried out by reconnoitring squadrons and patrols.
This is the daily bread of the cavalry, a duty that
throughout a war should never cease to be performed,
even if the main body of the cavalry has been driven
from the field by the enemy. It demands, therefore,
the highest training, the wisest economy of force and
systematic arrangement, if it is not to become inef-
fective or useless.

In close and continual relation to the above is the
further task of safeguarding and screening the army.
Reconnaissance itself provides a measure of security,
but it is always liable to miscarry, and can never se-
cure the army against hostile observation. Reconnais-
sance must therefore be supplemented by a special
system of security and screening which, however,
demands the most careful organisation, and greatly
increases the difficulty of husbanding limited forces
and of keeping the troops fit by not overworking them.

Intimately connected to the services of security and

THE BASIS FOR TRAINING 35

reconnaissance is that of communication, which, owing
to the great distances to be traversed in modern war
and the necessity of early transmission of intelligence,
has become, at the same time, of the highest im-
portance and of the greatest difficulty. Here also is
a daily duty for the cavalry in which a thorough train-
ing is necessary.

All these considerations must be kept in view in
arranging the training, and a clear conception should
be formed as to what is to be aimed at in great as well
as small matters. Only thus will results be obtained
which will stand the test of war.

It is only natural that in our army the greatest stress
is at present laid on the duties of the army cavalry.
These are so obviously new and important for the arm
that it is easy to understand how more time is devoted
to them in peace training, and how the task of the
divisional cavalry has come to appear of less import-
ance. It might indeed be contended that the training
which the latter has hitherto received in garrison and
at manoeuvres would suffice for its needs.

It is my opinion, on the other hand, that such a
conception is faulty. The importance of the divisional
cavalry has in no way diminished, and one is not
justified in assuming that any lesser demands will be
made upon its efficiency than on that of the larger in-
dependent formations. The exact contrary is the case,
and I consider it opportune now, when all interest
is centred in the army cavalry, to lay particular stress
on the extraordinary importance of the divisional
cavalry.

As in the newest phases of military development, the
general value of cavalry, according to my opinion, par-
ticularly in the organism of an army, has increased,

36 CAVALRY IN WAR

so also has that of the divisional cavalry. Higher
demands are made of it, and it must therefore be capa-
ble of greater performances.

The circumstances of modern war demand that
great masses of mounted men shall be used as army-
cavalry and concentrated in the decisive direction, thus
weakening a great part of the front of the army in
cavalry, in order to ensure superiority at the decisive
point. It is in accordance with the universal law of
military success that a concentration of force at the
decisive point can, under most circumstances, only
be ensured by a corresponding weakening of force in
other places. The front of the army, therefore, can
never be covered throughout its whole length by the
army cavalry, but at the same time it will never be
possible to entirely denude of cavalry that front or
flank in front of which no army cavalry may lie. This
would be simply impossible, for every body of troops,
however disposed upon the strategic front, requires
cavalry for the service of close reconnaissance, of
security, and of screening against surprise or against
hostile observation.

Furthermore, even those bodies of troops in im-
mediate advance of which the great cavalry masses
are on the move require their own cavalry, not only
for the purpose of ensuring and maintaining commu-
nication with the army cavalry, but also that they may
not be entirely denuded of cavalry when, as the hos-
tile armies approach each other, the cavalry masses
clear the front and concentrate towards a flank.

Finally, it will not always be possible to detail por-
tions of the army cavalry to detached forces, because
it has other duties to fulfil and other claims made
upon it. Thus, for example, the army of Manteuffel

THE BASIS FOR TRAINING 37

in the campaign against Bourbaki had at its disposal
none other but the divisional cavalry.^

The weak divisional cavalry, therefore, must be
prepared to carry out all the cavalry duties which may
arise from these conditions. Amongst them particu-
lar mention must be made of the outpost service,
which, although shared with the infantry, imposes a
heavy burden on the divisional cavalry. Any one who
has once been through manceuvres knows how great
the demands of this service are, even in peace, in the
exertions involved and the time expended. In war
these exertions become at times considerable, if less
frequent, for the critical days do not follow each other
so closely as in manoeuvres.

If we consider, moreover, how every cavalry under-
taking has increased in difficulty owing to the greater
size of modern battlefields and the improvement in
firearms, it will become clear that the sphere of use-
fulness of the divisional cavalry, even from the purely
tactical point of view, which up to now we have alone
considered, is a very extensive and important one.

This tactical activity is closely dependent upon the
whole interior economy of the division. These few
squadrons must furnish orderlies and despatch-riders,
which, in the case of the conduct of so large a force as
an infantry division, must mean a considerable drain
on their strength. They will often be deputed to col-
lect supplies in villages away from the roads, when
the supply columns fail and the places occupied do not

^ Though military readers will need no such explanation, it
may be well to explain to the general reader that the divi-
sional cavalry is a small mounted force attached to each
infantry division. When the author speaks of "army cav-
alry" he refers to the masses of cavalry and horse artillery
organised in "cavalry divisions." — Editor.

345549

38 CAVALRY IN WAR

afford sufficient for the troops. Although It is possi-
ble that other troops, such as infantry in carts and
bicyclists, may be used for this service, it will never
be possible to relieve the divisional cavalry entirely
of it. The relay service also makes a greater demand
on the strength than is generally supposed. In the
campaign of 1870-71 this cause contributed largely to
the weakening of the squadrons at the front. Nowa-
days every effort is made by means of technical ap-
paratus to relieve the cavalry, at least partially, from
this service. It would, however, be a mistake to as-
sume that the relay service of cavalry can be every-
where replaced by telegraph, telephone, signalling, bi-
cycles, or motor. Circumstances will occur in war ia
which all these methods of transmission, which are
already in themselves partially unreliable, must fail
us, especially where they are exposed to destruction
from the hand of the enemy. The proper performance
of these interior services must never, however, mis-
carry throughout the whole campaign, and imposes
therefore still higher and more continuous demands on
the efficiency of the troops.

As the result of these reflections we may conclude
that a series of very important duties will fall to the
lot of the divisional cavalry in war, which cannot be
carried out by any other troops or in any other manner
than by the divisional cavalry. Further, that these
duties have, on the whole, increased in importance,
and that their fulfilment has become considerably more
difficult by reason of the conditions of modern war.

According to these conditions the importance of the
divisional cavalry must be judged. If the decisive role
in war falls essentially to the lot of the army cavalry,
yet must the duties of the divisional cavalry be re-
garded as just as necessary for the good of the army.

THE BASIS FOR TRAINING 39

Methods of training must be adopted with these points
in view, and it must be quite clearly understood that
in this direction modern conditions have to be reck-
oned with which demand thorough innovations.

As to the role of cavalry in the fight, we may con-
clude from the above that it may be sharply divided
into two separate groups : firstly, in those encounters
where cavalry is acting as an independent body, and
will have to carry out reconnaissance, the service of
security and raids; and secondly, where cavalry will
take part in a battle in conjunction with the other
arms. It is obvious, after what has been said, that the
first group is by far the more important, and will re-
quire particular attention as regards training. We will
endeavour in the course of this work to prove that this
is the direction where the most friction is to be over-
come, and where by far the most difficult part of our
task will lie.

The chief considerations for training are naturally
evolved from the duties to be performed in war itself.
The services of reconnaissance and security come first.
The technique of these services and the method of
fighting necessary for carrying them out must be
fully mastered by the troops right down to the indi-
vidual soldier. Next in importance come undertakings
against the enemy's communications, and the partici-
pation in the battle which war will demand of our
arm. These are the matters which must be studied
by those who undertake to discuss methods of train-
ing. We must be perfectly clear in our minds what
duties in the various spheres of action will fall to the
lot of the arm as a whole, to its sub-divisions, or to its
single members. The relative importance of these
duties must be our guide in considering the essentials
of training.

40 CAVALRY IN WAR

A. RECONNAISSANCE, SCREENING, AND

RAIDS

I. RECONNAISSANCE BY THE ARMY CAVALRY

The very essence of cavalry lies in the offensive.
Mounted it is incapable of tactical defence, but, in
order to defend itself, must surrender its real char-
acter as a mounted arm and seize the rifle on foot.
The service of reconnaissance, therefore, must neces-
sarily be carried out in an offensive sense.

The idea of the offensive is not, however, meant
here in a narrow sense, such as seeking a tactical bat-
tle, but rather that the reconnoitring army cavalry
must under all circumstances maintain the initiative,
use its activity against the enemy, and impose its will
upon him. It is by no means its duty under all cir-
cumstances to seek out the enemy's cavalry in order
to defeat it. By such conduct it would allow the en-
emy's cavalry to dictate its movements. It must rather
subordinate all else to the particular objects of recon-
naissance, and advance in those directions which prom-
ise the best fulfilment of the reconnaissance needs of
the Army Head Quarters. Should it thus meet with
the enemy's cavalry it must naturally attack and over-
throw it. On the other hand, it can safely reckon
that the more decisive the direction in which it moves
for the purposes of reconnaissance, the more chance
there will be of meeting the enemy.

I. The Main Body of the Army Cavalry

The same principle holds good for the strategical
disposition. The old Cavalry Drill Regulations laid

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 41

down that the strength of the cavalry division was to
remain concentrated until the enemy's cavalry had
been driven from the field. This considerably over-
stepped the bounds of restriction usually imposed by
regulation, and at the same time fettered the freedom
of movement of the cavalry in a way that, under cer-
tain circumstances, might have become most harmful.
The new Regulations have left out these directions
and indeed lay down that, in the "advance to the
fight," efforts must be made to reunite columns that
are advancing separated before collision with the en-
emy takes place (413).^ Here is expressed a principle
which, if rightly understood, is certainly justified, but
which, on the other hand, might give rise to misunder-
standings.

It must first be pointed out that it is by no means
always desirable to unite columns that are separate
before the fight. It may, for example, very easily
happen that a detachment in favourable country will
be able to occupy a superior force of the enemy, and
thus, by remaining dispersed, ensure superiority at the
decisive point. If, however, by the "concentration of
columns" a natural approach is understood, which en-
sures a concentric co-operation of divided groups
against a common enemy whose direction of march is
more or less known, then the principle is an excel-
lent one. If, on the other hand, it is intended that
single columns should be so closely concentrated that
the division as a tactical whole can be thrown into the

^"When advancing in separate columns, special measures
must be taken to insure the cohesion of the forward move-
ment. Every endeavour must be made to unite the columns
before collision with the enemy; for a junction on the field
of battle will seldom succeed, if only on accoimt of the rapid
course of the cavalry combat."

42 CAVALRY IN WAR

fight, it appears to me that it goes too far, and might
easily lead to harmful dogmatism. Thus read, the
regulation appears to me to be the more dangerous,
as exercises in a limited space encourage the concen-
trated employment of the larger cavalry bodies in
the fight, and their approach and deployment from
formations of assembly or intermediate formations,
for which brigade columns are usually chosen.

It must be remembered that it is always much more
difficult and dangerous in the presence of the enemy to
separate a cavalry mass for the fight than to concen-
trate it from a not too wide separation for common
action against the enemy. In the first case the danger
must be run of surrendering "the proud rights of the
initiative" to the enemy, and of being obliged to at-
tack eccentrically; while in the second case one is in
possession of the exterior lines, and, with them, the
most favourable directions for attack.

The regulation quoted should therefore result only
exceptionally in a complete tactical concentration.
The wish, however, to fight concentrated must never
lead to a concentrated advance unless circumstances
dictate such an operation as practical. Leaders of
the large reconnoitring bodies will have, rather, con-
tinually to consider how they may best fulfil the task
of the moment in the most practical way without al-
lowing themselves to be bound by preconceived the-
oretical views. This must be their course of action,
and will often enough lead to the advance in separate
columns. The breadth of reconnaissance-zones will
often demand such procedure.

Along the whole front, troops must be in a position
to support the reconnoitring bodies which have been
pushed forward. This will not always be possible
from a single point on account of the distances in-

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 43

volved. It will at times be necessary to break through
the hostile screen when it is met by force of arms,
without first being able to judge where this can most
easily or most advantageously be accomplished.
Again, complete information will not perhaps be to
hand of the presence and the direction of march of
the hostile cavalry, so that the concentration of force
upon a single road will not appear at all desirable. It
must also be borne in mind that the masses of cavalry
have not only to act as fighting bodies, but at the same
time to play an important part in the system of ob-
taining information. Communication must be main-
tained with the Head Quarters, as well as with the
reconnoitring squadrons and certain independent pa-
trols. In the latter case particularly, great difficulties
will often arise. A cavalry leader must continually
ask himself which is the shortest and safest means
of communication with the reconnoitring organs on
the one hand and with the army following him on
the other, and how it can be maintained when hos-
tile detachments pervade the intervening country. All
these are circumstances which would lead to the adop-
tion of an advance in separate columns.

The universal principle must always hold good for
cavalry, that when a decisive struggle is in prospect
all possible strength must be concentrated for it. On
the other hand, it must be perfectly clearly understood
that in a future war many varied and often contra-
dictory demands will be made upon the arm. It will
not always be possible to meet them all from the
one point of view — that of uniting all possible strength
before the commencement of a fight; the less so as
in reconnaissance the fight is only the means to an
end, the knowledge of the enemy being the essential.
It remains for the genius of the leader to make his

44 CAVALRY IN WAR

preparations in full freedom, and to solve the task
confided to him in his own way. To hamper active
operations by regulation is always a great evil.

The danger which lies in separation of force is not
so great for cavalry as might appear at first sight, on
account of the mobility and adaptability of the arm.
For, although the Regulations lay down that on ac-
count of the rapid conduct of a cavalry fight the con-
centration of separate columns upon the field of battle
can but seldom be successfully accomplished, this view
can only be admitted in the case of the mounted com-
bat. I am of opinion that it cannot be so difficult
under ordinarily favourable circumstances to bring
about such a concentration. With reliable reconnais-
sance early intelligence of the presence of the hostile
cavalry should be to hand. It should then be often
still possible to concentrate the separate columns ac-
cording to circumstances, either forwards, backwards,
or to a flank, and finally to unite them for the fight
with sufficient room and time, and in an effective di-
rection for attack. If, however, a portion of the ad-
vancing cavalry mass should come into unforeseen
collision with superior hostile cavalry, it must fall back
in a direction which will lead to concentration of force.
In order gradually to lead up to, and at the right time
to achieve, such a concentration from a divided ad-
vance, without falling into the error of a too close tac-
tical concentration, presupposes that the leader is an
artist in the conduct of his arm. Such an undertaking
is much easier where not only mounted combat, but
fire action is taken into consideration. In such a case
that detachment which comes first into collision with
the enemy would be able to defend itself in some
strong position or behind some naturally defensible
locality until the rest of the main body came up.

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 45

Good communication between the several portions
is in all such cases an important factor. If necessary-
it must be effected by the help of the guns. Generally
speaking, it will facilitate and prepare communication
if the separately advancing columns are kept informed
as to the rate of march, so that each column can at any
moment calculate where the others will be in a given
time if nothing unforeseen occurs. This also enables
information to be sent by the shortest route to points
which can to a certain extent be previously determined.

The arrangements for the advance form at the same
time the foundation for the action of the actual recon-
noitring organs and the complete establishment of the
reconnaissance system. Directions for this will be
found in the "Field Service Manual." It is laid down
that reconnoitring squadrons will be pushed forward
from the various groups of the army cavalry, and will
be allotted zones of reconnaissance in the direction of
the enemy. The reconnaissance itself will be carried
out by patrols.

The breadth of these zones must continually alter
according to circumstances.

If it be necessary to reconnoitre on a broad front
with a comparatively weak cavalry, very wide zones
will often be necessary. On the other hand, the closer
the system of reconnoitring squadrons can be estab-
lished, the more reliable the manner in which recon-
naissance will be carried out, and the easier will it
be to hamper the enemy's efforts at gaining intelli-
gence. If the "Field Service Manual" lays down a
certain breadth as normal, this naturally only indi-
cates that, under ordinary circumstances, squadrons
on a wider front would no longer be in a position to
carry out their duties to the full ; nothing more. The
frontages laid down shoVlW R^y^r 1^^ either to the

46 CAVALRY IN WAR

perceptible weakening of the fighting value of a force
by sending forward too many reconnoitring bodies,
or, on the other hand, to the inability of the recon-
noitring organs to cover the space demanded by the
strategical situation. A well-considered allotment of
areas is therefore of special importance, and a mat-
ter for the higher leader to decide. For the arrange-
ments for reconnaissance inside the zone apportioned
to him, the squadron leader is, on the other hand, cor-
respondingly responsible. It is at the same time laid
down that no squadron should interfere in a neigh-
bouring zone.

Although in these measures the principles for the
reconnaissance may be sought, it must be clearly un-
derstood that the original allotment of zones cannot
always hold good. This arrangement is only practi-
cable and suitable so long as the opposing armies are
frontally approaching each other. As soon as the di-
rections of march form an angle with each other the
conditions alter.

When information has been obtained as to the en-
emy's position and that the direction of his advance
is not directly at right angles to our front, or if the
direction of march of our own army changes, it may
be necessary to make repeated changes in the zones of
reconnaissance. The manner in which this can best
be done is a matter which experience alone can show
us. The change of zones will often be possible in
conjunction with the recall of detached squadrons and
the sending forward of fresh ones in a new direction,
or during the relief of reconnoitring squadrons.

When the gradual advance of the hostile army takes
place and the army cavalry endeavours to clear the
front and to draw away to a flank, or when the col-
umns of both armies group themselves for the tac-^

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 47

tical decision and concentrate more or less from their
march formations, the allotment of zones must utterly
fail.

An allotment of zones, also, cannot always be
recommended, that is to say, not where it can be fore-
seen that it cannot be carried into operation. Such a
case might happen if an enemy moved across the front
on a more or less distinct flank march. The recon-
noitring squadrons would, perhaps, in such a case be
better employed in keeping touch with the various
groups of the hostile army than by tying themselves
down to a systematic reconnaissance in zones.

The conditions of war are everywhere so changing
and full of movement that a single concrete scheme
will never suffice, but each case must be judged upon-
its own merits. The allotment into zones, therefore,
laid down in the "Field Service Manual" must be re-
garded as but a foundation for the methods to be
adopted, and will perhaps only attain its full effect
during the first concentration of opposing armies,
when the hostile groups deploy along a land frontier
on a wide front. During operations the original
scheme must of necessity be subjected to continual
alterations and transformations.

Let us now further consider the relief of recon-
noitring squadrons. It is out of the question that
such squadrons should remain continually in touch
with the enemy. Such a procedure would very soon
paralyse the strength of men and horses. The relief,
however, cannot, naturally, be arranged and carried
out at any given moment. It requires preparation, as
the whole patrol system must be drawn in and replaced
by a fresh one. The relief will doubtless best take
place after a great tactical crisis. At such times the
reconnoitring squadrons will partly have been driven

48 CAVALRY IN WAR

back on to the cavalry mass, and partly will be in po-
sition with their patrols near them in flank and rear
of the enemy, whence they can be comparatively easily
brought in. A great tactical decision also which cre-
ates a new situation demands fresh measures for re-
connaissance and a different arrangement of the re-
connoitring organs. Whether it will then be possible
to mathematically divide the ground into sections need
not here be decided.

Under certain circumstances it will be advisable to
detail reconnoitring squadrons to watch the various
groups of the hostile army. If we take the campaign
of 1870 as an example of a concrete case, the battles
of Spicheren, Mars la Tour, and Gravelotte afforded
natural periods for the relief of reconnoitring squad-
rons and the fresh allotment of reconnoitring zones
for the First and Second Armies, and later the bat-
tle of Sedan. For the Third Army, first of all, the
battle of Worth. Cases may of course occur when
the reconnoitring period between the battles is too
long, and a relief becomes necessary in the interim.
The case of the Third Army is a good example of
this.

A reconnaissance from Worth to Sedan could never
have been carried out by the same reconnoitring
squadron. A relief was absolutely necessary. Ac-
cording to my judgment, the best time for this would
have been the days during which the great wheel of
the Third Army towards the north was completed.
During these days fresh reconnoitring squadrons would
have had to be thrown forward in the new line of
march, while those which had advanced in the origi-
nal direction could, according to the situation, have
been gradually drawn in. Strong patrols would have
been sufficient in that direction.

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 49

In any case it is clear that the question of the relief
of reconnoitring squadrons is extremely important
and cannot be solved by routine. It is a matter for
consideration whether it would not be of advantage
for the "Field Service Manual" to touch on these
questions as well as on the circumstances under which
a departure from the system of allotment of zones
might be desirable. I am inclined to think this de-
sirable, as otherwise the extremely practical disposi-
tions therein laid down are apt to lead to a lifeless
formalism.

The important service of transmission will naturally
be deeply influenced by all these conditions.

I have already expressed the opinion that the im-
portance of this service with regard to the increased
extent of the reconnoitring rayons may even lead the
main body of a division, for example, to advance in
separate columns, in order to shorten the routes of
information and to afford a not too distant support
for the reconnoitring organs. The Head Quarters
will often be more quickly informed if the news comes
direct from detachments themselves than if it had
first to be collected at one point.

If it has become so necessary to accelerate the ser-
vice of communication, it is all the more so to ensure
that the system of reports should be properly ordered.
In the main body of the army cavalry it is a matter
of keeping up communication on the one hand with
the army following, on the other with the advanced
squadrons. In both these respects the application of
technical means of communication must be considered
before all else.

Communication to the rear is fundamentally the
task of wireless telegraphy. But the system of in-
formation to the front must be otherwise arranged for.

50 CAVALRY IN WAR

Communication with the reconnoitring squadrons
can practically never be carried out by wireless teleg-
raphy. Here efforts must be made to work with the
light-signal apparatus,^ or to employ cyclists or relay
lines to facilitate and accelerate the service of trans-
mission. A combination of all these means, and the
use of the cavalry telegraph, if need be, will be found
advisable. In friendly country the population can
often be used to keep up communication or to send
messages.

The employment of single cyclists or motor-cars is,
on the other hand, not advisable. Without taking into
account the fact that they are tied to the roads, and,
having no fighting value, will often fall an easy prey to
the enemy, technical defects occur so often in the ma-
chines that they cannot be classed as a reliable means
of communication, particularly in hostile country.
Should the distance between the reconnoitring squad-
rons and the main body become very great, or if cir-
cumstances arise which render direct communication
between them too long a matter, or if it is desired
to provide several avenues of communication, a col-
lecting station can be formed for reports: this will
keep up connection, and must be secured by a detach-
ment of sufficient strength. It is erroneous to assume
that such collecting stations must always be used.
They often operate very unfavourably, especially
when armies are on the move, as they are for the
most part very local, and then do more harm than
good.

If there is a sufficient number of apparatus at dis-
posal, and if the collecting stations are sufficiently
secured, an effort should be made to establish wire-

^The lamp used by night and day in the German Army,
combining the functions of our heliograph and lamp.

MAIN BODY OF THE ARMY CAVALRY 51

less communication from them to the rear — a cipher
being of course used to prevent the enemy learning
the contents of messages. Otherwise the various
means available must be suited to the particular case,
and used in combination.

The system of communications thus forms a com-
plicated machine, formed of technical and natural
methods of transmission of great variety, that will be
difficult to maintain in an efficient state, especially
when an army is on the move.

It is obvious that these difficulties must be aug-
mented during the change of reconnoitring zones or
the relief of reconnoitring squadrons. It will often
be worth while to establish the system of intelligence
in a new direction, while the available apparatus and
telegraphs are still in part maintained on the old lines.
Only some "system of auxiliaries" will meet these
difficulties ; only troops to whom this service has been
entrusted down to the smallest detail will be able to
discover these auxiliaries and properly employ them.
Otherwise the service of information must miscarry.

2. Reconnoitring Squadrons

From the above considerations it must be already
clear that a great measure of resourcefulness, a com-
prehensive grasp of the situation, clearness of judg-
ment, and a love of responsibility will be demanded
from the leader of a reconnoitring squadron. Even
in the simple advance in the allotted zone, clear un-
derstanding will be required as to all the measures
for the proper conduct of the troops, and well-cal-
culated boldness when the enemy is met with.

There will, however, be difficulties to overcome
when the main body of our own cavalry changes its

52 CAVALRY IN WAR

direction; when the concentration for battle begins
from the line of march, the cavalry masses draw away
to a flank, unexpected measures of the enemy come
to light, which had not been counted upon when our
reconnaissance was arranged; or when our own cav-
alry is beaten, and touch with it is completely lost.
Under all these circumstances the allotment of zones
completely loses its value, and the whole reconnais-
sance must be arranged and ordered on some other
system. Squadron leaders will often in such cases
act quite independently and according to their own
judgment of the situation, and with an appreciation
of the probable action of neighbouring squadrons,
without, however, losing sight of the main objective.
In such cases they will often report direct to Head
Quarters, and may then have to fall back on the main
army instead of on their own division.

Every squadron commander can conclude from
these reflections what an unusually high standard of
military training, power of judgment, and initiative
will be demanded of him if he is properly and success-
fully to carry out these duties. I hope that all officers
will be stimulated to apply themselves to these mat-
ters, so that a future war may not find them unpre-
pared.

It is a matter of the greatest importance for the
conduct of the squadron in general whether it is acting
in a friendly or hostile country. While in the first
case troops may ride through towns, feed in villages,
and count upon considerable support from the inhabi-
tants, in the service both of security and information,
in the second they must always be prepared against
treachery or surprise, and behave as if they were sur-
rounded by a network of spies. Townships are to be

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 53

particularly avoided, and special precautions for safety
must be taken, especially while at rest.

In other respects the advance itself must in both
cases be carried out according to the same principles.

Squadrons will generally advance by successive
stages, and upon those roads which appear to them to
be the most important for reconnaissance. If they
are provided with the light-signal apparatus, and can
use it for communicating to the rear, they must keep
in mind during the march itself the possibilities of
being able to use it, try it on the ground, and make a
mental note of points that are specially adapted for
connection-stations. The whole plan of the day's
march must then be made with an eye to the establish-
ment of communication by this method. Halting-
places for rest or feeding horses must be selected with
regard either to good cover or to the view which may
be had from them. In order to be independent of the
hostile population, it is advisable for the squadron to
have its ration and forage wagons with it. In case of
an unsuccessful collision with the enemy these may
indeed be lost. In any other case, however, they will
always be at the disposal of the squadron. On the
other hand, in hostile country, if they follow the
squadron at too great a distance, they will often fall
a prey to the enemy. Under such circumstances, if
they are to be really protected, a sufficiently strong
escort must be left with them, and this will react
unfavourably upon the strength of the squadron.

The efforts of reconnoitring squadrons to diminish
the distance between themselves and the enemy as
quickly as possible by undertaking excessive marches,
such as are frequently seen in peace, are misdirected
and unreal, and only tend to wear out the horses. In
peace manoeuvres, which only last two or three days,

54 CAVALRY IN WAR

and which have not to be sustained by a number of
lame and over-tired horses, such proceedings are in-
deed possible, but in war they are pernicious. A
squadron should be able to remain up to strength
throughout a campaign, and it must be remembered
that horses that go lame and are left behind will, at
all events in hostile country, be lost to the recon-
noitring squadrons for good. The patrols, too, must
be able to keep something in hand. But, if the squad-
rons tax their capacity for marching to the utmost,
the patrols, which are required to go still farther in
advance, must be completely exhausted. If the squad-
rons can cover daily 25 miles and the distant patrols
35 to 40 miles, this will, I hold, be quite sufficient.
More than this, on an average, cannot be expected of
them. This does not of course preclude special efforts
to meet particular circumstances. It will only be pos-
sible, however, to demand these efforts when we learn
how to calculate the average length of march during
which men and horses can be kept fresh and efficient.
Although the choice of lines of advance and the
combined action of the reconnoitring squadrons are
often weighty factors of success, yet on the other
hand, in order to obtain early and sufficient intelli-
gence of the enemy, it is of the highest importance
that the patrol system should be properly ordered ac-
cording to the needs and probabilities of the situa-
tion. The "Field Service Manual" gives the neces-
sary principles for their action. They must, it says,
be sent forward along the roads that the enemy is
most likely to use. By so doing, certain results must,
under any circumstances, be obtained. On the other
hand, it is a mistake to send forward single patrols
against a wide front. Under such circumstances a
patrol is always in doubt which way to go, will prob-

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 55

ably divide, and cannot, at all events, be everywhere.
From such procedure, which is unfortunately only
too common, reliable results cannot be expected, and
it is never certain if observation is being carried
out in any given direction. Such a faulty course
of action usually originates from a certain confusion
of thought on the part of the leader as to his own
intentions and his suppositions as to the enemy. A
clear appreciation of the situation ensures at the same
time a clearly defined course of action. If, however,
no sort of idea can be formed as to what the enemy is
likely to do, the patrol system must be extended, not
only in those directions from which the enemy may
be expected, but in others where it is possible that he
may be met with. Any turning movement on the part
of the hostile forces must, in this manner, be con-
tinually guarded against.

The number of patrols sent out will, of course, de-
pend on the importance of the task. If the strength
of a squadron is insufficient to provide them, it must
be supplemented by patrols detailed from other squad-
rons. The relief of such patrols, also, may have to
be carried out by the same means. Cutting down the
number of distant patrols is to be avoided as far as
possible. Economy of force can be better obtained
by careful husbanding of strength in the close recon-
naissance and service of security.

The strength of distant patrols should never be ar-
bitrarily laid down, as in this respect also the circum-
stances must be taken into account. Patrols which
are far distant from the road upon which the squadron
is advancing, and which can only be reached with dif-
ficulty, require a greater degree of independence than
those in the immediate neighbourhood, which can be
rapidly supported or strengthened. The probability,

$6 CAVALRY IN WAR

also, of meeting with superior hostile force demands
a greater proportion of strength. Under certain cir-
cumstances a whole troop may be used as an indepen-
dent patrol. At the same time a wise economy of
force must be practised so that the fighting and march-
ing efficiency of the squadron does not suffer too
much. To this end, quite weak patrols must be made
to suffice in directions of secondary importance. A
second in command must be detailed to every patrol.
There should also be a supply of trained lance-cor-
porals ready to lead such patrols as may be required
to carry information to the rear.

The strength of patrols will depend largely on the
number of messages that they are expected to send
in. As a general rule, in large operations, not more/
than two messages will be required from each patrol
during the day. It is only when the opposing armies
approach each other, and the distant patrols gradually
become close patrols, that it will be necessary to re-
port frequently on tactical events. The distances,
however, will then have so far diminished, that a re-
inforcement of the patrols from the squadrons would
probably be possible if they have become over- weak
through transmission duties.

Like the reconnoitring squadrons, the patrols re-
quire relief from time to time, as the same patrol
leader cannot be expected to remain in continuous
touch with the enemy.

The strength of patrols, therefore, will generally
have to be calculated according to the number of mes-
sages and the number of days during which the same
men are required to be in contact with the enemy. It
is only when a special fighting strength appears neces-
sary that these numbers should be exceeded. On the
other hand, the patrols in friendly country may be

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 57

made weaker than when in the enemy's territory, as,
in the latter case, it will scarcely be possible to send
in messages by single orderlies.

Careful preparation must be made for the relief
of patrols. Every patrol that is sent out must know
when, and approximately where, it can rejoin the
squadron. The relieving patrol should arrive on the
field of exploration before the original patrol returns.
The two patrol leaders should meet where possible.
All the patrols should never be relieved at one time,
as such a procedure would tend to weaken the squad-
ron too much.

The reconnoitring squadron must continually en-
deavour to maintain communication with the distant
patrols which send in reports to it. As the main body
must always be careful to render communication with
the reconnoitring squadron possible and to facilitate
it, so is communication with the patrols one of the
most important duties of the latter. It will often be
necessary, when the distances become great or the
ground difficult, to push forward relay posts to facili-
tate and accelerate the service of transmission. These
posts must have a sufficiency of force assigned to
them. The squadron leader, further, must most mi-
nutely instruct the patrols in anything that can serve
to assist the carrying out of their task, and as to all
arrangements for the transmission of reports.

A patrol's instructions must be short and clear, and
must leave no room for doubt in the patrol leader's
mind as to what is expected of him.

The instructions must contain: all that is known
of the enemy; a statement of the general situation,
and of the system of reconnaissance, as far as it
may concern the patrol in question; an indication of
the proposed march and the objective of the squadron;

58 CAVALRY IN WAR

points where messages as to the position of the squad-
ron may be deposited, in case it should be found
necessary to depart from the preconceived plan ; exact
data as to when and where the relieving patrol will
be sent and also when the patrol is to rejoin the
squadron.

Although such arrangements may not always have
the desired results, as all such dispositions are liable
to be disturbed by the action of the enemy, they yet
form a good groundwork on which to build further,
according to circumstances, and which can be suited
to any alteration of the situation. Such arrangements
should therefore never be neglected.

In manoeuvres, the leaving of such information —
for instance, under stones — in prearranged places or
localities that are easy to find, and which must be
determined by the map according to the expected
situation, will be found a valuable exercise.

Communication will, as a rule, be best secured if
the reconnoitring squadron can succeed in beating the
hostile organs of reconnaissance and security. We
must not, of course, assume that a squadron that has
been thrown back and pursued for a space will be ren-
dered incapable of carrying out its role. It will still
try to support its patrols as before. If, however,
such successful combats become numerous, a superi-
ority will at length be obtained, particularly on the
main avenues of communication, that will considerably
facilitate the task of obtaining and transmitting in-
formation.

It must therefore be the ceaseless endeavour of the
cavalry to attack the enemy wherever found. The
reconnoitring squadrons in particular must undertake
the duty, not only of driving the corresponding hostile
squadrons from the field, but of endeavouring to in-

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 59

tervene and assist wherever the hostile reconnoitring
patrols offer an obstinate resistance. They must take
every opportunity of fighting with the arme blanche,
or of attacking the enemy in some unfavourable situa-
tion, perhaps by night. Dismounted action for single
squadrons advancing in hostile country is generally
dangerous, and, on account of the weakness of the
force, usually leads to failure. It should never be
forgotten that for a successful action on foot great
numerical superiority is indispensable.

Should the reconnoitring squadron come in contact
with the enemy's cavalry in strength, it must be de-
cided whether to fall back, or avoid it by a detour in
order to maintain under all circumstances communi-
cation with the distant patrols. In the latter case,
communication to the rear becomes naturally con-
siderably more difficult, and it can only be hoped that
the hostile cavalry will be beaten by our own. What-
ever decision is made will depend upon the circum-
stances of the case: the terrain, the distance from
our own cavalry and from the enemy's main body,
as well as on what is already known of the enemy, and
on what it is of particular importance to learn. It
will generally be most important, as well as desirable,
to maintain at all costs communication with the dis-
tant patrols, as news must first be procured before it
can be sent back, and it will be possible under certain
circumstances to communicate over the enemy's head
with the light-signal.

In order to maintain the necessary fighting strength
of the squadrons under all circumstances, as few men
as possible should be detached. This does not of
course refer to the distant patrols.

The melting away of the squadron's numbers, so
often seen in peace, is generally a result of the man-

6o CAVALRY IN WAR

ner in which the close reconnaissance is conducted.
The close patrols are sent out 6 or 7 miles, often still
farther, and, having general instructions to remain
in touch with the enemy, seldom rejoin the squadron.
Thus they become lost to the squadron, and as the
squadron leader is not fully aware of their position
he is soon under the obligation of having to send out
a fresh patrol. This patrol is a less useful one than
the first, and if it brings in news of the enemy the
latter will often arrive simultaneously with the news.
The report often enough goes first to the enemy about
whom it is being made. No reproach can be attached
to any one concerned. It lies' in the nature of things
and in the method of apportioning duties.

In contradistinction to such procedure, it is, in my
opinion, in most cases quite superfluous to arrange a
close reconnaissance in addition to the distant pa-
trols. Close patrols weaken the squadron, and can
only, it appears, rejoin it with difficulty, nor do they
effect the necessary reconnaissance. Every squadron
must, on the other hand, be continually surrounded by
local patrols for its own safety, closely connected with
it, and which, being in constant communication with
the squadron, secure it immediately from surprise
and, as far as their strength allows, attack and break
up hostile patrols. This measure will not have the
effect of weakening the squadron too much. These
patrols will require relief from time to time, and ac-
company the march of the squadron in its rayon in
such a manner that a second patrol can be sent out
before the first rejoins. They must, however, never
be drawn so far away from the squadron that they
cannot secure its immediate safety and beat off hostile
patrols.

If, in exceptional circumstances, patrols are sent out

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 6i

in close reconnaissance, it is desirable that they should
work from one locality to another a few miles in
advance, so that it will always be possible to get them
back. Especial attention must be given to this mat-
ter when operating in the enemy's country.

Patrols to connect with neighbouring squadrons are
quite superfluous. They have little prospect of carry-
ing out their task in a practical way, and must there-
fore be regarded as a useless expenditure of force.
The regulation of the movements of the various recon-
noitring squadrons as a whole, and the dissemination
of information regarding them to each other, is a
matter for the Head Quarters of the main body.

Economy in patrols should never go so far as to
allow of cyclists, or indeed a single cyclist or motor-
car, being used for reconnaissance, as unfortunately
repeatedly happens in manoeuvres. Cyclists may be
used for the purpose of maintaining communication
and bringing back reports. It will not be possible to
use them singly for these duties, especially in the en-
emy's country, but several will have to be sent to-
gether. Bound as they are to the roads, they are
quite unsuited to patrol work. It is also inadmissible,
at all events in hostile country, to send bicycles or
motor-cars with patrols. They only become a burden
to the patrol as soon as it wishes to leave the road.
For the motor cyclist the question of petrol is also
an important one. Where will he replenish his sup-
ply in hostile country ? Certainly not in villages with
a hostile population, unless a sufficient show of force
can be made.

The accommodation of reconnoitring squadrons for
the night also demands close attention. Such accom-
modation must be chosen from quite different con-

62 CAVALRY IN WAR

siderations, according as the squadron is operating in
a friendly or hostile country.

In any case, endeavour must be made so to dispose
the squadron that the chief avenues of communication,
at least, will be under observation, and thus closed to
the enemy's despatch-riders. The horses also must be
rested, that they may be ready for the next day's
work, for a tired squadron cannot reconnoitre prop-
erly. In order that the horses may really rest, they
must be off-saddled, and, to do this, the squadron must
be secure from surprise. This will not always be pos-
sible, but endeavours must be made towards that end.
Should hostile detachments be in the neighbourhood,
which is unavoidable during critical days, it will be
necessary to be always ready for possible surprise, and
to so arrange that the squadron can speedily with-
draw from its bivouac on the approach of the enemy.
The measures taken for safety must be directed to
this end. It is also sometimes desirable, in order to
deceive the enemy, to change the halting-place already
occupied, after darkness sets in. In friendly coun-
try, if an attack is expected, it is often better to spend
the night in larger villages, where the inhabitants
themselves will co-operate in the service of security.
In the enemy's country, on the other hand — where
the hostility of the inhabitants is to be reckoned with
— the larger villages must always be avoided, and
accommodation must be sought in single isolated
farms, which, by their position, are in a measure se-
cure from surprise, where the fighting force can be
kept together, where there is nothing to fear from
the inhabitants, and which can be quickly abandoned,
if possible, unobserved.

The service of security in such situations must be
carefully organised and must not consist merely of

RECONNOITRING SQUADRONS 63

guarding the immediate environs. It will rather be
advisable to push forward posts on the chief lines of
approach of the enemy, which will be able to bring in
timely news of his advance. What degree of readi-
ness for movement is maintained in such situations
the circumstances of the moment must dictate.

In this question of accommodation, attention must
also be paid to the service of communication. It must
be possible from the position selected for the night
to pick up communication with our own troops and
to receive the orders and instructions which will nat-
urally be expected at the end of the day.

If the squadron is provided with the light-signal
apparatus it should remain in the neighbourhood of
high ground, from which it is thought possible that
communication may be picked up. If instructions
have been received to establish communication by
mounted orderlies or cyclists, care must be taken that
there are roads easily found, even in the dark, by
which they can reach the main body, the reporting
centre, or the relay posts, as the case may be. The
squadron's own reports, too, will often not be sent off
before evening, in order that all the events of the
day may be collated. This must be done in clear,
concise form, more especially where the means of
transmission is the telegraph or light-signal.

The sifting and collating of information received is
therefore an important and very responsible task, re-
quiring continual practice. The squadron leader must
be able properly to judge which of the reports re-
ceived must be sent to the army Head Quarters or
to the cavalry commander, and all superfluous matter
must be eliminated. All reports received should by
no means be transmitted. This would overburden the
service of transmission to no useful purpose.

64 CAVALRY IN WAR

3. Distant Patrols

The duties of the distant patrols are just as difficult
as those of the reconnoitring squadrons, as they are
continually brought face to face with the necessity of
forming independent decisions, and, in order to act and
report efficiently, require a high degree of strategic
insight. Apart from the personal capacity of the offi-
cer commanding the patrol, a thorough training em-
phasising the essential points in its conduct is neces-
sary for the men.

I have already shown the lines on which silch in-
struction should be conducted, I would here, how-
ever, like to add that the patrol leader, if he is in any
doubt, can clear up the situation in his mind by cross-
questioning himself. It should never suffice to him
that the authority who set him the task veiled his re-
sponsibility by general verbiage. The task must be
definitely determined ; whether negative reports are re-
quired or not, and when and where reports are to be
sent, more especially when touch has been lost with
the squadron. The complete instructions must of
course be confided to the second in command of the pa-
trol, and the general task to be fulfilled to each mem-
ber of it.

For the conduct of the patrol it is a matter of still
greater importance than for the squadron, which has a
certain fighting strength, whether it is acting in its own
or in hostile country. It will have the same points to
consider as in the case of a squadron, but in hostile
country its conduct must be still more circumspect,
while in friendly country, where concealment is more
easy, its action can be correspondingly bolder.

If long distances are to be covered, the patrol should
remain on the road until it reaches country where an

DISTANT PATROLS 65

encounter with the enemy is Hkely. The passage
through large villages peopled by hostile inhabitants is
to be avoided.

Horses should not be fed, at least in hostile country,
in the neighbourhood of villages or on the main road,
but always in a safe place, and a proportion of them
only at a time. In friendly country they may best be
fed in the larger villages, which the hostile patrols will
avoid, but should not halt on the main road.

When the locality is reached where a meeting with
hostile detachments niay be expected, the patrol should
advance in bonds successifs. It must, unfortunately, be
admitted that such methods appear to be quite foreign
to most patrol leaders; at all events, they are seldom
applied in manoeuvres. Most of them ride forward
with praiseworthy speed along the road until they col-
lide with the enemy; then, indeed, they begin to ob-
serve him, without asking themselves whether in war
the result of such tactics would not have already com-
promised their chances of success. For if they are
once discovered by the enemy they may count on being
relentlessly hunted and pursued, so that there will no
longer be, in most cases, any further possibility of
deliberate observation.

Very different indeed are the circumstances when,
from a well-chosen point of view, a patrol is successful
in detecting the enemy before coming into immediate
collision with him. The patrol can then order the
whole of its conduct according to its knowledge of the
enemy before it is discovered, and has a very much
greater prospect of attaining good results.

We must lay down here, once and for all, that the
distant observation with the glass is by far the most
important; it affords the best survey over the general
conditions, and a better possibility of sending back a

66 CAVALRY IN WAR

report safely and quickly. It is just in this method of
observation that, in consequence of our peace condi-
tions, patrols are generally so badly trained. Again
and again they fall into the error of approaching too
close to the enemy and, in order to see as much of him
as possible, let him march past them. They are then
compelled to send in their reports from places which
lie behind the belt of the hostile service of security.
The despatch-riders have then to ride from the rear
through the hostile advance-guard, outposts, and pa-
trol system.

In peace, where there are no bullets, and prisoners
may not be made, these methods lead to the best re-
sults, and to their being employed again and again,
particularly if the superior commanders are inclined
to praise such too complete information instead of con-
demning it. In truth, it is the worst system that could
be conceived. Properly speaking, such protracted ob-
servation is only possible under certain circumstances ;
for instance, if the outer flank of the enemy's advance
has been turned, then perhaps there might be a chance
of sending reports round the flank of the hostile zone
of security. It should, however, be quite inadmissible
for a patrol to remain in this manner between the hos-
tile columns of the enemy's army. Unless it were un-
usually lucky, it would quickly be detected and cap-
tured ; more particularly if the inhabitants were hostile.
It is quite another matter where a hostile screen has
to be broken through. This can generally only be
accomplished by fighting; and it is the first duty of the
reconnoitring squadron to break through the enemy's
screen. Patrols also, which in such a case have suc-
ceeded in getting behind the enemy's outpost-line, can-
not count upon sending back messages as they please.
It will only be a question of a rapid offensive through

DISTANT PATROLS (iy

the screen towards the main body of the enemy. The
patrols will then be surrounded, and must at once pro-
ceed to effect their return, and only report what they
have seen when they have successfully broken back
again through the enemy's screen. Despatch-riders
have, in such a case, small prospect of getting through.
The less it is possible to observe and report, the more
carefully must the points for breaking through be
chosen, and attention must therefore be paid to reach-
ing good points of vantage that command a view of
places of probable importance.

The time chosen for observation is also of great
importance. The enemy can best be observed, and his
strength and intentions appreciated, when he is on the
move. Marches are generally undertaken in the morn-
ing, and towards the evening one may expect to find
the enemy in quarters. Under such circumstances ob-
servation is difficult. The patrol leader must therefore
arrange to reach in the morning those points from
which he expects to be able to observe the enemy on
the march. He will then be obliged in most cases to
fall back before the advancing enemy, and will en-
deavour to ascertain his halting-place and the approxi-
mate line taken up by his outposts. If a distant patrol
should be successful in obtaining such information it
will generally have done as much as is expected of it.
It is for the tactical close reconnaissance to send in in-
formation as to details. From the distant reconnais-
sance it is only required to form the foundations on
which the Head Quarters can base its decisions. This
fact should be borne in mind while reporting on the
enemy.

These duties can for the rest be only carried out
under war conditions and against an enemy who is

68 CAVALRY IN WAR

working to the same end, if undertaken in a regular
and systematic way and with great boldness.

The patrol leader, therefore, should generally make
his plan in the evening for the following day. It will
be desirable for him to study the map very closely,
and to impress on his memory the main roads and es-
pecially points which appear to be suitable for ob-
servation. He can thus obtain an impression of the
succession of stages necessary for his advance, and
judge how he can best spare his horses without preju-
dicing the success of the reconnaissance.

For a patrol to move en masse without scouts, as
unfortunately is often done in peace, is altogether out
of the question. In war such conduct must often be
paid for by the lives of the patrol and the complete
failure of the enterprise. A point must always be sent
so far ahead that the patrol will not come under fire at
the same time with it. , It should never happen that
the point collides unexpectedly with the enemy. A rear-
guard will also in most cases be found desirable. Cir-
cumstances must determine how the flanks can best
be protected.

Should the patrol be obliged to ride through country
where it might be surprised, it will be advisable first to
make a halt and to send on scouts. Manoeuvres have
repeatedly proved that the point is insufiicient in such
a case.

It is in most cases quite inadmissible, especially in
hostile country, to divide the patrol and to arrange a
meeting-place farther to the front. As there will
usually be at most but one map available, the detached
party will find themselves in the enemy's country with-
out means of locating themselves, probably unable to
make themselves understood by the inhabitants, and
in any case will run the danger of being betrayed by

DISTANT PATROLS 69

them. It will not even be of much avail if they are
given some kind of sketch if they meet with and
are chased by the enemy.

I should therefore like to utter a warning against the
custom of such division of patrols in peace which
could not be carried out in the enemy's country. In
friendly country they are possible, but always danger-
ous. The various detachments having insufficient
fighting strength, the possibility of sending back in-
formation will be reduced and a junction will always
be doubtful, while any collision with the enemy may
make it impossible.

There is another error into which patrols frequently
fall in peace manoeuvres, and that is, of leaving the
road assigned to them for observation without suffi-
cient reason, and of using other roads upon which
other patrols are working. Even when a patrol has
sure indication that it will not meet with the enemy
upon the road assigned to it, it should still remain
upon this road, and send back definite negative in-
formation, even if no instructions to this effect have
been received.

On collision with the enemy's patrols, action must
be taken in as offensive a spirit as possible, but after
due reflection. Should a charge promise any kind of
success, the opponent must be attacked in the most
determined way. It will also often be possible to de-
feat an enemy of superior numbers by a carefully laid
ambush. Every success of this kind will increase our
own moral superiority, paralyse the enemy's recon-
naissance, and facilitate the transmission of informa-
tion. Before attacking, however, it should always be
ascertained whether the enemy is followed by any close
support which might turn an initial success into a
worse defeat. Thus it does not, for example, promise

70 CAVALRY IN WAR

success to attack the point of an advancing squadron
under the apprehension that it is a single patrol. Mak-
ing prisoners and carrying them off, or sending them
back under escort from the patrol, is to be deprecated.
They can generally be rendered harmless by depriving
them of their horses, arms, and boots. Good captured
horses, however, should be always used, either to re-
place the tired cattle of the patrol, or lead with it in
reserve.

Should the patrol meet with a superior force of cav-
alry, it must endeavour to extricate itself and to get
round the enemy's flank. Under such circumstances
the ability to ride quickly and safely across country
will be of great service. But it is important, as soon
as the patrol is in safety, that it should again reach
the road detailed to it, and also that the men should
be instructed as to how to avoid the enemy, when
carrying messages to the rear, without losing their
way.

When a patrol has been successful, by judicious
riding, determined fighting, and clever avoidance of
the enemy, in obtaining information as to the enemy,
it is of the utmost importance what information is to
be sent back, and when and how it should be sent.

As I have already indicated above, the patrol must
be perfectly clear as to what facts are most important
from the Head Quarters' point of view. If the oppos-
ing armies are still so far apart that a collision can-
not be expected, only those matters that are of strategic
importance need be ascertained and transmitted : e.g.
number of the hostile columns, objective of the day's
march, any circumstances that lend themselves to a
conclusion as to alterations in the enemy's direction of
march or the combination of his forces. In such a case
there is no need for information as to details. The

DISTANT PATROLS 71

closer, however, the opposing armies approach one
another, the more does information which is of tactical
significance increase in importance. It is not always
advisable to confine oneself to reporting the bare facts.
It will often be desirable to indicate also the process of
reasoning by which the reporting officer arrives at his
impression, for this originates from a number of im-
ponderabilia which cannot always be detailed in a
report. When this is done, it must be thoroughly and
carefully considered how far this personal impression
is dependent upon facts, or if it does not rather rest
upon certain feelings, as to the cause of which no clear
account can be given. Should the latter be the case,
the personal point of view is best left out. Precon-
ceived opinions originate but too easily in war, and
may lead to a biassed interpretation of reports, and,
consequently, to faulty dispositions. The facts must
always be weighed with sober impartiality. Only
thus can a true and definite appreciation be arrived at.

The same naturally holds good for those reports
which are sent in from the reconnoitring squadrons
or other reporting centres. The method in which such
information is sifted for passing on brings into play,
in a certain sense, personal conceptions. It is there-
fore all the more necessary to reflect seriously over
their preparation.

It is imperative that any important information
should reach the Head Quarters of the army or the
Great Head Quarters as early as possible, at all events,
early enough to allow of the measures rendered neces-
sary by the enemy's movements to be initiated and
carried out. The patrol leader must therefore con-
sider the time requisite for a wheel or other such
movement of a modern army in order to calculate
what is the latest time, under any circumstances, that

72 CAVALRY IN WAR

his information must be sent in. It is obvious, and
has already been demonstrated, that he should be in-
structed as to the advance of his own army in order
that he may be able to appreciate these matters.

As already stated, it will, as a rule, be necessary for
a distant patrol only to send in two messages daily.
The first contact with the hostile infantry must al-
ways be reported. It will generally suffice if the di-
rection of march of the enemy and the march-objec-
tive reached by him are reported. It will often be
desirable to send back only a single report, setting
forth the events of the day. On the other hand, the
method of despatch of such messages must be most
carefully prepared. During the advance of the pa-
trol the leader must call the attention of his men,
more especially from any good look-out points, to
any prominent features passed. He must make marks
at difficult places, and where the main roads have to
be left, to assist them in finding their way back.

Reports should only be sent from some point from
which the despatch-riders have, at least to a certain
degree, a safe route, where they will not have to pass
through any hostile outposts, occupied localities, or
defiles. It is highly desirable to continually instruct
the patrol as to the route to the rear, and as to its
conduct under special circumstances, and to give it a
sketch of the road. The latter should contain not only
names, which will not be of much use to the patrol,
but characteristic marks which may be used as points
of orientation — forked roads and the like — to assist
the men in choosing the right road. Orderlies should
be told the general contents of messages which they
carry.

It is quite out of the question that in war, and
especially in hostile country, despatch-riders will be

DISTANT PATROLS 73

allowed to ride about free from harm, as they are
unfortunately allowed to do in peace. The endeavour
to send many, and often superfluous, messages by a
few men always eventually leads to the sending of sin-
gle horsemen as despatch-riders. Such a custom,
which in war must lead to disastrous consequences,
cannot be too sharply reproved.

Single orderlies, in hostile country, cannot be sent,
except where they know the district, and where col-
lision with the enemy's patrols is out of the question.
When long distances have to be covered, there is also
the danger that a horse may succumb, or that the in-
habitants may stop the man. The fact that, in the
Franco-Prussian War, the custom of sending single
despatch-riders proved itself generally, if not entirely,
sufficient must not be regarded as of great signifi-
cance, as at that time there was no question of hav-
ing to reckon with the opposition of hostile cavalry.
In a modem war it will certainly be different, and we
may be quite sure that the cavalry of each army will
strive its utmost not only to reconnoitre, but also to
prevent the enemy reconnoitring. The distances to be
covered, also, will be very different from those of
1870-71.

The single despatch-rider, therefore, especially in
the case of the distant patrol, must be replaced by
a reporting patrol. This can best be formed of three
men, who can mutually support each other, and, should
they meet with the enemy, have more chance of
escape than a single horseman. For very important
information, and against strong opposition, several
such patrols must be sent by different routes. In
friendly country, where the population will give all
possible support, the single despatch-rider can, for
short distances, be more often used, and the report-

74 CAVALRY IN WAR

ing patrols can be made weaker according to circum-
stances.

These circumstances must determine, as we have
seen, the strength of patrols, and the time which they
can stay out without relief.

Patrols must choose their accommodation for the
night with great care. It is obvious that for them,
as for the reconnoitring squadrons, it is of great im-
portance whether they are in their own or hostile coun-
try.

In their own country it will often be safer to seek
shelter for the night in the larger villages, because
such places will, as a rule, be avoided by hostile troops.
It is, however, not only a question of safety, but also
of keeping the road confided to them in sight during
the night, and of interrupting the transmission of
the enemy's intelligence, which will, like our own, be
most active after dark. His despatch-riders, however,
will most probably endeavour to avoid villages. For
the rest, patrols in their own country can choose their
accommodation freely according to the situation, and
can at least always get under cover, even when in
the neighbourhood of the enemy.

In hostile country, however, the conditions are dif-
ferent. Isolated and far distant from support, the
patrols run great danger, even from the inhabitants
themselves, and should never try to spend the night in
enclosed villages or farms. If they wish to get cover
for the night, they must look for single houses close to
the road, and take measures that the inhabitants do
not betray them to any of the enemy's troops or to
partisans that may be in the neighbourhood. They
must also be careful to keep a good look-out and be
ready to get away at a moment's notice. They should
not, however, as long as it is possible, lose sight of the

DISTANT PATROLS 75

road detailed to them until absolutely forced to, but
should watch it by an advanced post in order to inter-
rupt the enemy's transmission service.

When in the presence of the enemy, it will be ad-
visable not to seek shelter, but to spend the night in
woods, or at all events distant from localities where
forage or food has been requisitioned. Horses may
then be off-saddled and fed, singly or by groups, ac-
cording to circumstances. Special measures of safety
are also necessary under such circumstances.

It is of great importance to establish communication
with the reconnoitring squadron during the night halt
and to adhere closely, when it is at all possible, to any
arrangements made with it. It may very easily hap-
pen, as we have seen, that the task of the reconnoitring
squadron may be changed, and that it may be required
to operate in new directions. It is, therefore, im-
portant that the patrols do not get lost to the squadron,
but are in a position to receive fresh instructions.
The patrols can also utilise this opportunity for re-
ceiving reinforcements if necessary.

The patrol may sometimes lose connection with the
squadron ; it will then be generally most advisable for
it to remain in observation of that portion of the en-
emy which has been found upon the road allotted to it.
If this should entail a change of direction, reports
should be sent direct to that portion of the army which
is assumed to be the nearest according to the general
situation. This must not, however, be regarded as a
hard-and-fast rule. It should rather be left to the
independent decision of the officer how he will act in
the particular case. Independence of judgment and
of character is of the highest importance, especially
when on patrol. These qualities can, however, only
be effective if cavalry officers are instructed as to the

yS CAVALRY IN WAR

conditions of modern armies and are quite clear in
theory as to the duties and methods of conducting
patrols. It is to be hoped that they will in future re-
alise the obligation of applying themselves most seri-
ously to this branch of their important duties, that
they may be thoroughly prepared and capable of the
greatest effort when the call to arms resounds in
bloody earnest through the land.

4. Close Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance during
the Fight

Within certain limits determined by the various
crises of the fight the reconnoitring duties of the cav-
alry are continuous. As the hostile armies approach
one another, distant exploration merges into close
reconnaissance, and from the latter evolves the bat-
tle reconnaissance, when the heavily-charged thun-
der-clouds of war come into collision, and the brazen
dice of battle are thrown.

Within these limits the arrangements made for
reconnaissance should not require fresh dispositions,
but merely supplementing as they gradually develop
from strategical into tactical measures. This is a
matter for consideration when detailing close patrols,
as the tendency is to be too prodigal of the scanty
force at disposal. When the army cavalry concen-
trates towards the flank of the army, the detachments
of it which have been carrying out the reconnaissance
against the enemy's front must be gradually relieved
by the divisional cavalry. The army cavalry will
only be able to assist the divisional cavalry in the
close reconnaissance by the action of those portions
of it which may fall back behind the front of their
own army. In such a case all should be placed under

CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE yy

a single command, to prevent useless expenditure of
force and contradictory orders. Whether the divi-
sional cavalry is to be reinforced by the army cavalry
or vice versa, or whether a separate sphere of action
is to be assigned to each, must depend on circum-
stances.

It will, however, seldom happen that the army cav-
alry will fall back behind the front of its own army.
It will nearly always be most advantageously placed
on the flank of the army, and will therefore only have
to carry out such reconnaissance as is possible from
this position. Such reconnaissance, however, is gen-
erally the most important.

As already indicated, the reconnoitring squadrons
will gradually fall back upon the army cavalry itself,
or upon the advancing columns of the main army
which will now be approaching them. The recon-
noitring squadrons on the outer flank will, however,
be well advised not to join themselves at once to the
main body of the cavalry. They must rather seek
to operate against the rear of the enemy, who is al-
ready deployed, or against his lines of advance, in
order to be able to report the presence of any ap-
proaching hostile reserves as early as possible. As a
single example of this, had the French at Mars la
Tour acted in this manner they would very soon have
discovered the approach of Wedel's Brigade and its
approximate strength. They would not then have
been surprised by the attack of this brigade nor would
they have mistaken it for the advance-guard of the
Third Army. One may well assume that after dealing
with Wedel's Brigade the French would, under such
circumstances, have proceeded to undertake a general
offensive, and that the fortunes Qf the day might have
been with them.

78 CAVALRY IN WAR

The close reconnaissance before the decisive battle
must seek, above all things, to obtain an idea of the
grouping of the hostile forces. Herein lie the con-
ditions of success or failure. To this end endeavours
must be made to get far round the front of the en-
emy and to observe as many lines of approach as pos-
sible. Rapid and distant patrol riding and the strain-
ing of every nerve must be demanded in such cases.

When the whole force is to be employed, the army
cavalry must endeavour to pave the way for these
patrols. If it has been possible to defeat the hostile
cavalry before the decisive battle, this will be compara-
tively easy. Otherwise, every means must now be
employed to bring about this decision and to carry it
to a successful conclusion, as well as to deal with other
troops which may seek to cover the enemy's flanks.

That the position of the army cavalry for such
duties should not be in rear of a flank of its own
army need scarcely be emphasised. It should rather
strive with all energy to Schelon itself in advance of
the wing of its own army and to maintain itself on
the enemy's flank. It will thus be in a position during
the period of close reconnaissance to support its own
reconnoitring organs and either to join the battle, or
operate against the flanks and rear of the enemy. ^

* Compare "Unser Kavallerie im nachsten Kriege" ("Cav-
alry in a Future War," translated by Sydney Goldman), and
paragraph 522 Cavalry Drill Regulations.

"During a battle, it is the duty of the army cavalry to
operate against the enemy's flanks and rear, to attack his
shaken infantry and unprotected artillery, to protect the
flanks of its own army, and to prevent hostile reinforcements
reaching the field of battle. According to the result of the
encounter, it takes up the pursuit or covers the retirement.

"For such activity, the army cavalry will find opportuni-
ties on the flanks of the battle field. A position in front of
the flank of the main body will facilitate the attack and, at

CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE 79

As to the close reconnaissance patrols and the com-
bat patrols, as clear and definite orders must be given
them as to the distant patrols to operate in certain
particular directions or block certain roads. The ar-
rangements for their return or relief must leave no
room for doubt if it is desired to be independent of
the discretion of the patrol leader, and to be con-
vinced that the observation in all important directions
is being carried out.

It will often be necessary, especially during the
period of close reconnaissance in flank or rear of the
enemy, to make the patrols strong enough to be able
to fight their own way, for it will generally be impos-
sible to support them from the rear. Should it be
found impossible otherwise to break through the thick
screen of the hostile service of security, whole squad-
rons may operate as patrols, and must exert all their
endurance and speed to attain their object.

When a decision is impending, it is of the greatest
importance that the service of transmission should be
especially swift and sure, for there will be but little
time available in which to make fresh arrangements
to meet any newly ascertained movement on the part
of the enemy. It will be necessary under such circum-
stances to supply even patrols with the light-signal
apparatus, even though there is a danger that these
may be lost. If they are able somewhere from the
rear of the hostile army to flash back an important
message in time for it to be of use they will fully have
answered their purpose. It will of course be impossi-
ble under such circumstances to establish permanent
stations. Before the departure of a patrol the men
must be carefully instructed as to the point that will

the same time, constitute a threat. This position is also well
adapted for clearing up the situation,"

8o CAVALRY IN WAR

most probably be chosen as a receiving centre, and
must make a mental note of its position on the ground,
and also of those places from which it is hoped to
send back intelligence. They must endeavour to escape
the enemy's notice and to avoid his pursuit. When
necessary, they must be prepared to fight for posses-
sion of that point from which they expect to be able
to transmit reports. That any intelligence transmitted
by signal must also be sent to the rear by a reporting
patrol, goes without saying.

In such situations the activity of the cavalry must
be increased to the utmost, and their action character-
ised by feverish energy. The last drop of blood and
the latest breath of man and horse must be devoted
to fulfilling the task of reconnaissance.

It is obvious that in such periods of crisis cavalry
cannot go into quarters for the night, whether in
friendly or hostile country. It will be best for them
to remain concealed in woods, where they will, as a
rule, be discovered with difficulty. For the rest, the*
night is the time which will generally be used for
transmitting reports. In friendly country the assist-
ance of the inhabitants must be used for this purpose
as much as possible. The enemy must continually
find himself moving in the close meshes of a net of
hostile enterprise. In hostile country it will be neces-
sary to requisition supplies by force, but this should
never be done in the area in which observation is re-
quired. Where requisitions have been made in the
neighbourhood of the enemy, patrols should quickly
move away, in order not to be surprised, as Count Zep-
pelin was in the Schirlenhof, before the battle of
Worth.i

* On June 24, 1870, Captain Count Zeppelin, of the Wiir-
temburg General Staff, with a patrol of 3 Baden officers and

CLOSE RECONNAISSANCE 8i

For the reconnaissance on the battlefield itself — in
contradistinction to the energetic action in the flanks
and rear of the enemy — officers provided with good
glasses must be employed. The scissors telescope,
which no higher cavalry leader should be without,
should also be used for this purpose. Observation
should be made, when possible, from some secure place,
and endeavours made to recognise the moment for ac-
tion and intervention in the battle. Observation carried
out by patrols from the front during the battle of
the measures taken by the enemy is unpractical and
only possible in peace, and is a procedure that is the
outcome of the requirements of leaders lacking in
determination, who wish to be continually informed
down to the smallest details about the enemy, instead
of trusting with self-confidence to the compelling force
of their own measures. Patrol service during the bat-
tle itself is a matter for the infantry, and can be car-
ried out by no other troops.

8 dragoons, crossed the Rhine at Lauterburg, with orders to
ascertain certain of the French dispositions. Reaching Selz-
bach, after various encounters, and finding it occupied by
French cavalry, the patrol took refuge on the 25th in the
little inn at Schirlenhof for a well-earned rest. Here they
were surprised by a squadron of French hussars, who had
received information of their presence from a boy at the inn.
The inhabitants having locked the Germans' horses into the
stable, nothing remained but to fight or surrender. The
brave Germans chose the latter course. Lieutenant Winsloe
here killed was the first casualty of the war on the German
side. The whole patrol was finally killed or captured, with
the exception of Count Zeppelin himself, who escaped on one
of the French hussars' horses. This officer succeeded after
a nine hours' ride in winning his way back across the fron-
tier with valuable information. — Trans. (Count Zeppelin is
the well-known airship constructor.)

82 CAVALRY IN WAR

II. RECONNAISSANCE BY THE DIVISIONAL CAVALRY

Generally speaking, the conduct of the various re-
connoitring organs of the divisional cavalry will be
regulated according to the same principles as hold
good for the army cavalry. As for the latter, so is it
a matter of great importance for the divisional cav-
alry whether it is acting in friendly or in hostile coun-
try. Its methods, too, must be regulated according
to its distance from the enemy. It will also endeavour
to establish a material and moral superiority over the
hostile cavalry. In its relative weakness, however,
and its distribution to the columns of the army there
must lie certain factors which will leave their stamp
upon the conduct of the divisional cavalry.

First of all it is important what part the division to
which the cavalry belongs plays in the general scheme.
Various cases can be conceived which may have no
inconsiderable influence on the character of the recon-
naissance which the divisional cavalry must carry out.

It may belong to a column which is advancing be-
tween others, and where it has but a comparatively
small front for reconnaissance allotted to it. The army
cavalry may be in front of it. Or it may be given
the task of carrying out the frontal reconnaissance
independently. The latter case must be considered
the most usual in a great army, when the concentra-
tion of the army cavalry in the decisive direction
takes place. Or again, it may belong to the flank
column of an advancing army, which may or may not
be covered by the army cavalry. Finally, it may be
part of an independently operating, more or less de-
tached force, and have to perform all the cavalry
duties for it. In the last case it will generally be ad-
visable to strengthen it, if possible, from the army

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 83

cavalry; but in any case its methods will necessarily
be of a different kind.

The most simple case is where the front upon which
the divisional cavalry finds itself is covered by the
army cavalry. It is then most important to keep up
communication with, and to be continually informed
of the intentions of the army cavalry, in order that
the duties of reconnaissance may be taken over when-
ever the army cavalry is compelled to clear the front
by a flank movement or to uncover the flank. The
reconnoitring organs of the divisional cavalry must
then be sent forward early enough to effect a relief
of the corresponding detachments of the army cavalry,
so that the service of observation of the enemy in the
first line will not be interrupted.

Where the divisional cavalry cannot rely upon the
army cavalry for assistance in reconnaissance the con-
ditions are different.

This leads to the question of the strategical explora-
tion. These duties — in contradistinction to those of
the army cavalry — will be distinguished by the fact
that the divisional cavalry cannot advance as an in-
dependent unit separated from the mass of infantry,
but must remain in continual conjunction with the
detachments of the other arms to which it belongs.
It is, on the one hand, too weak to be able to operate
independently, and, on the other, is bound to the col-
umn of the other arms by ties of local service, which
at any moment may make fresh demands upon it.
It will therefore not be denied that the divisional cav-
alry, if it would reconnoitre, must cleave to the in-
fantry. Its method of procedure will rather be to
advance from point to point with those portions of
its strength which can be spared from the local service
of the division. In so doing, it must arrange for

84 CAVALRY IN WAR

support in case of necessity during the fight from
the rear, and can rest at night covered by the infan-
try outposts without being compelled to march to the
rear. To take its own measures for security would
make too great demand upon its strength, and would
quickly deplete it. Only when the distance from the
enemy renders an attack out of the question can the
divisional cavalry remain in advanced positions. This
consideration, also, must have its due influence on
the method of advance adopted.

The advance by stages from one point of vantage
to another, according to the map, or from one defen-
sible locality to another, will be found advisable. The
divisional cavalry, like the reconnoitring squadrons,
should always be surrounded by a close screen of local
patrols, which will ensure its immediate safety and
concealment.

In this lack of freedom in the conduct of the di-
visional cavalry two facts become apparent. Firstly,
that only in very rare cases will the divisional cavalry
be able to clear the way for its patrols, as the army
cavalry will continually have to do. It is generally,
indeed, too weak to fight independently with any
prospect of success. It is also, as we have seen, lo-
cally dependent, and cannot advance with full free-
dom even where hindrances to the reconnaissance de-
mand its intervention. Secondly, only in exceptional
cases will it be feasible for the divisional cavalry to
immediately support its patrols by reconnoitring
squadrons.

If the army corps is marching in two columns, the
cavalry of each is obviously too weak to push forward
squadrons of this kind perhaps several days' march
ahead, and, when necessary, to provide for their re-
lief. Somewhat different are the conditions of the

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 85

advance of a corps upon one road. If it is accom-
panied by columns on each side, it will generally be
possible to mass the greater part of the cavalry of
both divisions at the head of the corps, and it will
then at times be possible to push forward a recon-
noitring squadron. In the case of a flank column,
however, the cavalry of the rear division will generally
be occupied with securing the flank, and will therefore
not usually be available for reinforcing the recon-
noitring cavalry in front.

The divisional cavalry will thus usually be able to
detail only weak patrols for the distant reconnais-
sance, and these will often have to reckon with su-
perior hostile cavalry. At least the conditions which
obtain in the army of our probable opponents compel
us to make these presumptions. The reconnoitring pa-
trols of the divisional cavalry must therefore rely
chiefly on cunning and speed in carrying out their
duty, and will only be able to attack under especially
favourable circumstances, where the enemy whom they
meet has no support behind him, or can be attacked
with obvious advantage. It is far more important
for them than for the patrols of the army cavalry to
gain contact with the enemy unsuspected, and not to
betray their presence. They must always try first to
get distant observation of the enemy, as they will have
no fighting support behind them to help them to break
through the hostile screen of patrols and win their
way to the head of the enemy's columns. Their re-
ports, also, will have to be brought back through the
enemy's cavalry.

The distant patrols of the divisional cavalry will
therefore often be obliged, even in their advance, to
avoid the main avenues of approach of the enemy, as
upon them the enemy's cavalry is certain to be met

86 CAVALRY IN WAR

with. They must use secondary roads, and as secretly
as possible, a matter of considerable difficulty in un-
known hostile country. To avoid possible ambush they
should retire by a different road from that by which
they advanced. They will very rarely be able to get
under cover for the night, especially when in the en-
emy's country.

Such duties can only be successfully carried out, if
at all, where the commander has at his disposal a
number of efficient officers and under-officers, and
horses trained to endurance and cross-country work.
In order to be able to carry out their task properly, the
men must be clever, determined horsemen, well trained
in the use of their weapons and resourceful. They
must also be absolutely reliable men, who will not
shrink from encountering odds when necessary. In
such patrols as these the cavalry spirit must be de-
veloped to its utmost.

It is a somewhat easier matter if the divisional cav-
alry is not confined to a purely frontal and limited
area, but can reconnoitre from the head of a flank
column. It will then get opportunities of obtaining
observation by moving round the enemy's outer flank.
It will, however, only succeed in obtaining and trans-
mitting intelligence by wide detours, and the demands
on the endurance of man and horse will be great in
proportion. It is obvious how necessary it will be,
under such circumstances, that the intelligence so
hardly won should at least be transmitted quickly and
safely. Some detachment must therefore be detailed
to perform the duties of the reporting or communi-
cating station usually formed by a reconnoitring
squadron. I see nothing for it but to devote bodies
of cyclists to this purpose, which can be pushed for-
ward as reporting centres on the main avenues, and

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 87

equipped, whenever possible, with the light-signal ap-
paratus. A few mounted men must be sent with them
for scouting purposes. Without these, they would
be confined to the roads for the close reconnaissance
of the surrounding country, a procedure which would
not suffice in the face of a determined enemy, espe-
cially in difficult country.

Besides the distant reconnaissance, the close recon-
naissance along by far the greater part of the front
of the army falls to the lot of the divisional cavalry.
As we have seen, the army cavalry will only in ex-
ceptional cases be able to support it in this task as,
on the near approach of the enemy, it will probably
have occasion to draw off to a flank. But nowadays
this close reconnaissance appears, by reason of the
increased distances and the greater range of firearms,
to have become considerably more difficult. Hostile
armies move to battle nowadays on a front of 50 to
100 miles.

That it has naturally become much more difficult
under such circumstances to estimate the enemy's
strength and to obtain the necessary knowledge of his
dispositions and of the ground, no further proof is
needed. It thus becomes possible for the cavalryman
in general to get no closer to the enemy than his
rifle will carry, and to be compelled to observe him
from a distance. There should be no mistake about
this.

The importance of observation has grown in pro-
portion to its difficulty. Troops nowadays have to be
deployed for the fight at long ranges, where it is prac-
tically out of the question that a commander will be
able to survey the enemy and the country with his own
eyes, as was formerly almost invariably the case.
Should, for example, the opponents be advancing to'-

88 CAVALRY IN WAR

wards each other and still 5 miles apart, another 134
miles will bring them into effective artillery range of
each other. If they are going to wait to deploy until
they reach this point, the deployment will have to be
completed under the fire of the enemy's guns, a thing
which, of all others, is to be avoided. It therefore
follows that in a battle of encounter deployment
should take place, at the latest, when still 5 miles dis-
tant from the enemy. It is better to begin to draw
the forces apart even earlier, so that the army is
already deployed when it moves into the range of the
enemy's shrapnel.

Under these circumstances it will usually be quite
impossible for the leader to make his dispositions ac-
cording to his personal observations. He is, rather,
almost entirely dependent in his appreciation of the
enemy on the reconnaissance of the cavalry, and may
find himself at a great disadvantage if this should fail
or lead him to erroneous conclusions.

Reports as to the character of the country, suitable
positions for artillery, decisive localities or points, thus
increase greatly in importance, and it is obviously most
necessary for cavalry officers to be able judiciously to
appreciate such matters and to report them clearly
and intelligibly. The tactical conduct, and at the
same time tactical success, will often be as dependent
on the tactical, reconnaissance of the divisional cavalry
as the strategical measures of the commander-in-chief
are upon the results of the strategical exploration of
the army cavalry.

Tactically and strategically the service of the di-
visional cavalry is of equal importance if it belongs to
a force operating independently. In such cases it
will often be obliged to move with more freedom
than when employed in purely frontal reconnaissance

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 89

with the main army. For rest, also, it will not always
be able to seek the protection of the infantry, but will
frequently have to be pushed out for the night on the
flanks, in order to secure the main body while at
rest from these directions, or the better to observe
the enemy. It should, however, never lose its im-
mediate connection with its force, and will therefore
not always be in a position to measure its strength with
any hostile cavalry that may be met during the period
of reconnaissance.

When the tactical decision is in prospect, or when
contact has been gained between the opposing forces,
the divisional cavalry must redouble its efforts in re-
connaissance. It is then a matter for it to reconnoitre
from the flanks, and such reconnaissance can only be
successful, as in the case of the army cavalry, if those
portions of the country are occupied from which it is
possible to observe the movements and dispositions of
the enemy.

It is quite wrong to hang on the flank of the in-
fantry, as is unfortunately often done in peace ma-
noeuvres, and to remain wherever possible under its
protection, and to expect to force reconnaissance
merely by sending out a number of patrols.

In such a situation patrols have generally small
prospect of success. They will most frequently come
in contact with the hostile screen, which will prevent
them gaining the decisive points of the terrain, and
can hinder the despatch-riders but too easily from find-
ing their way to the rear. It is more than questionable
under such circumstances whether it will be possible
to gain any observation at all, or to send back infor-
mation in time to be of use. In these moments of
crisis, which will be of comparatively short duration,
rude force can alone avail, and recourse must be had

90 CAVALRY IN WAR

to the sword. The artillery patrols, too, will only-
find it possible to reconnoitre successfully under the
wing of a victorious cavalry. Their efforts will other-
wise have little prospect of success.

Speaking generally, the reconnaissance must remain
entirely in the hands of the cavalry leader who ar-
ranges it. Should the commander-in-chief interfere
without due cause in his dispositions, he deprives him
of responsibility and interrupts that systematic con-
duct of the reconnaissance which is absolutely essential
if the strength of the divisional cavalry is to be equal
to its task..

Reports, too, should, as a general rule, be sent to
that unit of the cavalry from which the patrol is
found, and which forms the reporting centre of the
patrol. On the other hand, it is the duty of the cav-
alry leader to remain in communication with the Su-
preme Command by using all means at his disposal,
even relays when necessary, so that all reports may
reach the latter by the shortest route. Only excep-
tionally should patrols report direct to the Supreme
Command, that is to say, when to send their messages
through their own cavalry means a useless detour or
a danger.

This particular method can, however, only be car-
ried out in practice if the patrol is in continual com-
munication with the cavalry from which it is found.
This circumstance indicates also the necessity for de-
tachments that are not limited in their zone of opera-
tion to advance during the fight against the enemy's
flank, so that they may remain as close as possible
behind their own patrols, continually prepared to sup-
port them and to hamper the hostile efforts at recon-
naissance.

It does not appear advisable under such circum-

DIVISIONAL RECONNAISSANCE 91

stances to unite all the available cavalry on one wing.
It is certainly obvious that its main strength must
be concentrated in what is considered the decisive di-
rection, in order that it may be as strong as possible
on the field of battle. This desire, however, should
not go so far as to denude one flank wholly of cav-
alry. This flank would then be completely laid bare
to the enemy's observation, and would itself be de-
prived of the possibility of ascertaining what was
going on on the enemy's side. It is much more advis-
able to provide upon each flank a centre of reconnais-
sance, even if such consists of quite a weak detach-
ment of cavalry, which will act as a reserve for patrols
and a reporting centre. The offensive cannot, of
course, be undertaken on the flank where the cavalry
is weak, but reconnaissance must be carried out by
patrols of scouts, and other action limited generally
to keeping the enemy's patrols at a distance.

III. THE SCREEN

The idea of the screen is first touched on in the
"Field Service Manual" of 1908; it is also, however,
demanded by the conditions of modern war. For
however important it may be to gain early intelligence
as to the enemy in order thereby to be able to make
the necessary dispositions, it is naturally just as im-
portant to deprive him of this advantage. Reflection
and experience have shown that although the measures
of reconnaissance considerably assist the screening if
the enemy's cavalry is defeated, they are not of them-
selves sufficient to secure the army from hostile ob-
servation.

The "Field Service Manual" sums up, I think, the
chief considerations as regards screening, for the most

92 CAVALRY IN WAR

part to the point, especially where it deals with the
defensive screen. There are no war experiences in
modern times of this matter, and, according to my
opinion, peace experiences are not comprehensive
enough to allow of any appreciable amplification of
the "Field Service Manual."

At the same time I would draw attention to some
of the points which give occasion for further research
and reflection.

In the first place, I think that what the "Field Ser-
vice Manual" says as to offensive screens requires
some explanation. Strong cavalry will be concen-
trated to keep the enemy at a distance from our own
army. In addition to this, strong patrols and even
cyclist detachments advance along all roads in order
to throw back the hostile patrols. These arrangements
can only apply, as a rule, for portions of the army
cavalry. They presuppose, especially if the front of
the modern army is to be screened, a mass of cavalry
which could with difficulty be found from the di-
visional cavalry. By such methods, moreover, as long
as strong cyclist detachments are not available for
blocking the road communications, a cause of dis-
sension will always arise as to how much strength can
be used for blocking the roads and how much con-
centrated for battle, all the more so as the divisional
cavalry can only with difficulty be used in this kind of
screen.

The latter must, as we have seen, remain more or
less locally tied to the division. The army cavalry,
however, if it will undertake an offensive screen, must
advance against the enemy, seek him out, force him
back as far as possible from our own army, and en-
deavour to defeat him. For this task complete free-
dom of movement is necessary — not only for itself,

THE SCREEN 93

but also for the screen of patrols that will accompany
it. The divisional cavalry will thus generally only be
able to form a second screening line behind the veil
formed by the advancing army cavalry, and will not
be in a position to spare for it patrols for the block-
ing of roads. Nor is it at all clear where the cyclist
troops mentioned are to come from.

I am therefore inclined to think that the procedure
advocated by the "Field Service Manual" can only be
carried out in exceptional cases; and it. would per-
haps be advisable to alter it somewhat.

The principal task of the offensive screen is, ac-
cording to my opinion, to defeat the hostile cavalry;
and for this object all available force must be con-
centrated, for one cannot be too strong upon the field
of battle. Even such cyclist detachments as are avail-
able will be best used by bringing them up for the
fight. The blocking of roads, on the other hand, will,
as a rule, be only undertaken when the enemy's cav-
alry has been beaten and thrown back. The screen
of patrols can then be strengthened. But it must
be quite clearly understood that troops are not to be
simply disposed in a cordon; but that a sufficiently
strong force must still remain in touch with the
beaten enemy in order to prevent him, at all events,
from taking up the offensive again, and breaking
through the screen.

Until this moment of victory over the hostile cav-
alry the duties of screening must be left to the recon-
noitring organs and to the divisional cavalry of the
army which is following in rear of them.

According to the principles laid down in the "Field
Service Manual" it is to the divisional cavalry that the
task invariably falls of screening the movements of
its division. I think that these duties cannot always

94 CAVALRY IN WAR

be clearly regulated according to the idea of an of-
fensive or defensive screen; they will more often be
of a mixed nature. As far as its strength will admit,
the divisional cavalry will endeavour to carry out the
task by pushing back, by fighting, the hostile recon-
noitring patrols and detachments before these have
succeeded in gaining observation. As it is more or
less locally confined to its own front, and will cer-
tainly often have to do with an opponent of superior
strength, it will, on the other hand, frequently be
obliged to join battle for favourable localities dis-
mounted, supported whenever possible by machine-
guns and cyclists from the infantry. In situations
where the divisional cavalry cannot undertake an of-
fensive fight against the superiority of the enemy, and
can find no points d'appui in the terrain, it must try all
the more to block the roads with patrols which will
attack all hostile patrols with the utmost determina-
tion, and endeavour to capture their despatch-riders.
The divisional cavalry must show the greatest bold-
ness and judgment if it will carry out this task. The
great importance of its role in the army here again
becomes obvious.

The army cavalry will only undertake an offensive
screen when the army is advancing, and where the
country does not afford suitable localities for the es-
tablishment of a defensive screen.

Such a screen (defensive), which can eventually be
pushed forward from one area to another, is without
doubt, as is emphasised by the "Field Service Man-
ual," of much more use than an offensive screen.

Of great importance in a defensive screen is, first
and foremost, the nature of the obstacles on which it is
based. Watercourses and canals, which can only be
crossed by bridges, form the best of these. Exten-

THE SCREEN 95

sive woods, however, lend themselves easily to the
purpose. They are doubtless, for cavalry patrols, a
most unpleasant obstacle, as view is restricted in them,
and an ambush may lurk behind every tree. In the
campaign of 1870-71 the German cavalry patrols were,
as far as I could ascertain, quite unable to penetrate
into the wood of Orleans and that at Marchenoir.
These woods, by their mere existence, formed an ef-
fective screen.

To utilise woods for this purpose it will be neces-
sary, according to the circumstances, the depth and
nature of the wood, to post the fighting detachments
of the screening line either at the exit of the defile on
the enemy's side or more towards the defender's side
on the inner edge of the wood, if they can there find
a good field of fire. In any case the opposite edge of
the wood should be occupied by observation-posts; in
order, in the first case, to get knowledge of and to neu-
tralise any hostile patrol which may, in spite of all
diifficulties, have penetrated the wood, as soon as they
emerge; and, in the second, to get early information
of the entrance of hostile detachments into the wood,
and to be able to hinder, report, and observe their
further advance.

I think that penetration of such a screen is generally
considered to be easier than it really is, especially if
the defending cavalry is supported by cyclists, ma-
chine-guns, and even artillery. According to my
opinion, reconnoitring squadrons would only, under
favourable circumstances, be able to break through
such a line that has been well disposed, and, even if
successful in so doing, would find it even more difficult
to return. It should never be forgotten that to over-
come well-placed posts, defending themselves with
fire action, requires a great superiority of force; that

96 CAVALRY IN WAR

a squadron can only overcome quite weak detachments
so placed, and will, if successful, very soon find itself
confronted by a superior force of the enemy's reserves.
Single patrols of picked scouts may perhaps creep
through, but their return will be problematical unless
they are strongly supported from the rear. It will
therefore generally require strong forces of the army
cavalry to break through a well-organised screening
line composed of moderately strong cavalry detach-
ments, and to maintain the breach so made long
enough to carry out the object of the reconnaissance.-
The place where the screen is broken must in all cases,
even where the main body of the victorious recon-
noitring cavalry is obliged to advance farther, be so
strongly occupied that it will under all circumstances
remain open for the service of transmission and for
the eventual retirement.

The greater the advantages of a defensive screen,
the more must the divisional cavalry naturally en-
deavour to avail itself of it, in order to compensate
in some measure for its numerical weakness. It will
always seek, even during the advance of the army, to
choose such favourable areas for an occasional halt,
and to reach them by advancing in bonds successifs.
Such procedure will facilitate at the same time the
carrying out of its duties of screening and of warding
off hostile detachments by defensive action. In order
to secure the greatest possible effect for such action
a similar procedure as regards time and space must
be arranged with the cavalry of neighbouring columns,
or ordered by superior authority.

During the night, when it is not possible to occupy
advanced areas, the divisional cavalry should try to
assist the screen by being so disposed that detached
posts will lie on the main road in advance of the in-

THE SCREEN 97

fantry outposts and at crossroads and defiles, with a
view to capturing the enemy's patrols. The erection
of temporary obstacles, particularly of wire, will con-
siderably assist this action. In friendly country the
inhabitants will be able to co-operate in this, and, by
judicious conduct and the procuring of timely and
sufficient intelligence, may be of great use to the force.
In erecting such obstacles it must always be remem-
bered that- our own advanced patrols should be warned
of them, or that by some kind of pre-arranged mark
upon the road they should be made aware of their
presence when returning with reports through their
own line. It scarcely needs to be emphasised that such
measures should be made use of by the army cavalry
as well as by the divisional cavalry, in order to increase
their own safety at night.

IV. RAIDS

The idea of the raid has been taken from the Ameri-
can War of Secession. Our new Regulations desig-
nate such undertakings as "Streifziige" (527),^ and do
not appear to attach overmuch importance to them.
Their use is only advocated if a superfluity of cav-
alry is at hand. They should not, it is said, distract
the cavalry from their own duties or from co-operat-
ing in the battle (395)-^

^ "Enterprises of long duration by large bodies of cavalry
against the enemy's lines of communication separate them
from their principal duties. Such raids are to be undertaken
only when cavalry is redundant. Sufficient ammunition and
supplies must be carefully arranged for."

* "Attempts on the more distant hostile communications
may produce valuable results ; but they must not distract the
cavalry from its true battle objectives. In the event of an

98 CAVALRY IN WAR

Whether one agrees with this estimation of the
value of such enterprises naturally depends upon the
view taken of the co-operation of cavalry in the bat-
tle and the general conception of the conditions of
modern war. It appears to me that the importance of
such undertakings has increased in the same measure
as the value of cavalry on the main battlefield has
diminished.

The great size of modern armies renders it, gen-
erally speaking, impossible for them to live on the
country. A modern army marching once through the
richest country will nowadays almost completely ex-
haust its resources, and yet the supplies carried will
scarcely suffice to feed the columns during a pro-
tracted movement. Armies are far more dependent
than formerly on the supplies from the rear — more,
indeed, than in the time of Frederick the Great. In
those days, if the bread-wagons ran short, it was pos-
sible to fill up from the country. The armies were
never so great that this became impossible. The cav-
alry, indeed, devoted most of its time to foraging, and
the soldier frequently bought his supplies, all except
his bread, on the spot.

Nowadays the circumstances are quite changed. It
is out of the question for the horses of the modern
army to find the necessary forage in the country it-
self. That the men of the great armies of the present
day can supply themselves when rations run out re-
mains to be proved. On paper it is indeed often pos-
sible, taking into consideration the supplies available
in peace; but these calculations cannot hold good for
a real theatre of war where concentration has claimed
all available resources.

engagement, co-operation with a view to victory must be the
watchword of every formation, whether great or small."

RAIDS 99

Of the straits to which a great army may be reduced
when suppHes really give out, the campaign of 1812 in
Russia is a good example. There, even during the
advance to Moscow, Napoleon's army practically dis-
solved owing to lack of supplies. Only some 90,cxx)
men of the mighty host arrived in Moscow; only these
perished during the retreat. How fearfully the Napo-
leonic armies suffered and melted away owing to want
of supplies gives cause for reflection. In the armies
of millions of the present day such conditions become
still more perilous. Matters appertaining to ammu-
nition are of equal importance. The modern army
carries enormous masses of artillery with it. All the
guns are designed for a vast expenditure of ammuni-
tion, and the rafale from covered positions and against
covered positions will indeed make this necessary.
Modern infantry, too, is armed in a manner that will
entail a prodigious expenditure of cartridges. The
replacement of this expended ammunition is of vital
importance. Railways will have to be laid in rear of
the armies to cope with these demands. Long trains
of wagons and automobiles will move to and fro be-
hind them. On every high-road and in every railway-
station magazines will appear, and all operations must
come to a standstill and miscarry as soon as this great
organisation ceases from any cause to carry out its
functions.

I hold, therefore, that such circumstances render a
disturbance of the rear communications of an army an
important matter. It will often do the opponent more
damage, and contribute more to a favourable decision
of arms than the intervention of a few cavalry di-
visions in the decisive battle itself.

The one does not, of course, exclude the possibility
of the other. General Stuart, in the campaign of

lOO CAVALRY IN WAR

Gettysburg, rode all round the hostile army, broke up
its communications, drew hostile troops away from
the decisive point, and was yet in his place on the
wing of the army on the day of battle. What this man
performed with cavalry and the inestimable damage he
inflicted on his opponent are worth studying. The
fortune of war, which lay in might and in the nature
of things, he could not turn. Nor could he bring the
advance of an army to a standstill, because at that
period and under those circumstances it was possible
for the army of the North to live, at least for a time,
upon the country. If we regard his achievement by
the light of modern conditions, we shall certainly not
fall into the error of underestimating the value of
such enterprises. If we compare it with the per-
formances of cavalry upon the battlefield in the latest
war, we will be able to obtain a true impression of
the degree of importance of modern cavalry action.

I am inclined to think that such enterprises will be
of altogether extraordinary significance in a future
war; least so, perhaps, during the earlier battles re-
sulting from the concentration, when it will be difficult
to get round the flanks of the enemy, but more so
during the subsequent course of operations. We have
only to imagine what the decisive consequences must
have been if General von Werder, and, later. Gen-
eral von Manteuffel, had been in a position to con-
tinually interrupt the rear communications of the army
of Bourbaki. In all probability the latter must have
capitulated long before it reached the Swiss frontier,
always granting that it was successful in getting so
far as the battlefield of the Lisaine. The whole crisis
of this campaign, which was very nearly ending in
the defeat of the Germans, would thus possibly have
been avoided.

RAIDS loi

There are plenty of examples of this. To indicate
only one from the history of the latest war, I would
call to mind the undertaking of the Russians against
the rear communications of the Japanese army.

If this undertaking had been actually directed
against the only railway at the disposal of the Japa-
nese army, if it had been carried through by throwing
into the scale the whole fighting strength of a really
mobile and efficient cavalry, and if it had thereby suc-
ceeded in interrupting the supplies of the Japanese
army for a period, the whole course of the campaign
might have been changed. Victory in this tremendous
conflict hung continually in the balance, and it needed
but little more weight on either side to turn the scale
of the fortunes of war.

The importance of such raids in modem war should
not therefore, in my opinion, be underestimated. They
are capable rather of exercising enormous influence
on the course of events.

Rules, however, cannot be laid down for their con-
duct. The Regulations indicate, shortly, that atten-
tion must be paid to the transport of sufficient ammu-
nition and supplies, and here, indeed, move in the right
direction. It is absolutely indispensable that a cavalry
mass destined to carry out such an enterprise should
be independent of what it may find in the country
and be perfectly free of movement.

The supply and ammunition columns, however,
which accompany it, must also be so mobile that they
are able to follow the troops closely, even at a rapid
pace, as otherwise they will run the danger of falling
into the hands of the enemy. The whole force de-
signed for the enterprise must be able to advance rap-
idly as a concrete whole, and should not be allowed
to take up too much room. Resources foimd upon

I02 CAVALRY IN WAR

the enemy's lines of communication and magazines
captured must be used for the sustenance of the troops
as far as possible. It will then be able to reserve
the supplies carried for critical times or for a further
turning movement. Any of the enemy's supplies which
are not used must be ruthlessly laid waste. His rail-
ways and magazines, particularly any important en-
gineering structures, must be thoroughly destroyed,
the necessary explosives being carried in sufficient
quantities.

In contrast to Stuart's raids, however, one must
count on meeting not inconsiderable bodies of the en-
emy's communication troops, which will probably be
capable of rapid reinforcement. This entails corre-
sponding preventive measures.

Hostile cavalry sent to secure the safety of the com-
munications will generally have to be attacked in a
determined manner. It may sometimes, however, be
more advantageous to avoid it by rapid marching. For
the rest, the factor of surprise is of decisive impor-
tance. Should the enemy early become aware of the
approach, he will generally be in a position to bring
up fresh forces, often by rail, and thereby imperil the
success of the whole undertaking. Under such circum-
stances a covered approach, perhaps by night, careful
screening, and the interruption of the enemy's tele-
graph-lines and transmission service are matters to
which special attention must be paid. It is also a
matter of consideration in the attack on communica-
tions and railways to destroy them at a sufficient dis-
tance above and below the objective by means of
detachments deflected for that purpose, so that the
enemy may be prevented from bringing up reinforce-
ments. If the direction of the attack is fixed upon
and assured, and if approach and deployment have

RAIDS 103

been successfully effected unobserved, the attack must
from the first be carried through with sufficient fire-
power and energy to allow the enemy no time for
reflection.

It is therefore absolutely necessary that troops en-
gaged in a raid should be of sufficient fighting strength
to be able rapidly to break down any resistance. The
scanty strength of a division of six regiments is much
too small for such an undertaking in modern war.
Stronger divisions must be formed for the purpose,
and strengthened when necessary by cyclist battalions.
An enterprise of this kind also requires thorough
preparation, especially by an extensive system of
espionage which will amplify the results of the cavalry
reconnaissance. Before such a raid is undertaken all
possible information must be to hand as to the condi-
tions in the rear of the hostile army. Mobile light
bridging equipment should accompany the expedition,
with the necessary complement of mounted engineers.
During the advance the cavalry should be surrounded
by a screen of patrols, not too far distant from it,
so that the enemy will not too early become aware of
the expedition, and yet at the same time far enough
to guard against surprise. After a successful surprise
the force should withdraw with the same speed in
order to escape from the enemy's counter-measures.
Finally, the chief safety of such enterprises lies in
their daring.

The leader of such a raid should be minutely in-
structed as to the advance and intended operations of
his own army, so that he may be able to calculate
when and where the decisive collision between the op-
posing armies will take place. He must regulate his
own movements accordingly. As long as the two
armies are still distant from each other he can strike

I04 CAVALRY IN WAR

the enemy's communications far to the rear, destroy-
ing railways and magazines. The nearer, however, the
opponent approaches to his own army, the more closely
must he endeavour to hang on the rear of the hostile
troops and to interrupt the supply of the immediate
necessities, that is to say, to destroy the supply and
ammunition columns of the army corps, and to capture
the provision and baggage wagons of the troops. If
circumstances demand, he must be able to appear
upon the battlefield itself on the day of battle.

Keen perception and foresight, rapid decision, and
relentless energy are indispensable qualities to the
leader of such a raid. The ability to mystify and
mislead the enemy will greatly facilitate the carrying
out of the enterprise. A considerable measure of cav-
alry ability is, at the same time, necessary to ensure
proper horse management. A combination of all
these qualities goes to form the great cavalry leader,
before whom, even in modern war, lie great pros-
pects of distinction, if he but understands how to break
loose from the routine and pedantry of the day.

B. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY

I. GENERAL

As I have already indicated, the action of cavalry in
the fight may be divided, according to its character,
into two quite distinct groups — i.e. the fight of cavalry
acting independently, and to which is detailed only a
small proportion of the other arms ; and the interven-
tion of cavalry in the battle — in the great decision of
the other arms.

It has been proposed, even for the cavalry, to di-

GENERAL 105

vide tactical principles according to the idea of the
prearranged battle and the battle of encounter. I do
not, however, think that this grouping will meet the
case. In a great battle the fighting is always of a
prearranged nature; in the fight of the independent
cavalry it is possible to distinguish between an en-
counter and an arranged affair. On the other hand,
the conditions of prearranged action in a battle and
in an independent conflict of the cavalry are quite
different, and cannot be examined from a single point
of view.

The grouping, then, proposed by me is still that
which best corresponds to the actual circumstances.
In this grouping, in the first case, the cavalry appears
as the chief arm, whose spirit and character set the
tone of the whole nature of the fight; in the second,
it is merely an auxiliary, and must conform to the
law of the other arms in great matters and small.

But the fight is deeply influenced, even in the first
case, by the co-operation of these other arms, and I
believe that only in exceptional cases will a purely
cavalry combat take place, at all events on a large
scale. Where squadrons, regiments, and perhaps even
brigades unassisted by the other arms, come into col-
lision with each other, the charge may still often suf-
fice for a decision. But where it is an affair of larger
masses it will never be possible to dispense with the
co-operation of fire-arms, and in most cases a combina-
tion of cavalry combat, of dismounted fighting and
artillery action, will ensue.

We must not conceal from ourselves the fact that in
a future war it will by no means be always a matter of
choice whether we will fight mounted or dismounted.
Rather, by himself, seizing the rifle, will the opponent
be able to compel us to adopt dismounted action. On

io6 CAVALRY IN WAR

our mancjeuvre-grounds the charge on horseback is
always the order of the day, even against artillery
or machine-guns. The umpires continually allow such
attacks to succeed, and the troops ride on as if noth-
ing had happened. Equally fearless of consequences
do they expose themselves to rifle-fire. But there
are no bullets.

In real war it is different. Even then many a charge
will naturally be successful, but victory will mean such
sacrifices that the troops will often become too weak to
carry out their further tactical and strategical duties.
Such losses will not be incurred without necessity, and
troops will give way, where possible, or themselves
adopt dismounted action. The last will often indeed
be necessary, as space and time will frequently be
wanting for a turning movement, and even if such a
movement were undertaken it would often lead to a
fresh obligation to fight on foot in another place.
This was repeatedly proved by the events of the cam-
paign of 1870-71. Again and again was it necessary
to detail infantry to the cavalry divisions in order to
brush aside by offensive action resistance that hindered
the advance of the cavalry, and which could not be
broken down even by the horse artillery which ac-
companied it.

That the English in the South African war were
finally repeatedly successful in forcing the mounted
Boers back by turning movements without actual at-
tacks proves nothing for European conditions. The
explanation lies in the clumsiness of the Boers, who
were hampered for rapid movement by their wagons
and possessed no offensive strength of any kind, at
least during the decisive portion of the campaign.
Otherwise they could easily have anticipated the ef-
forts of the English at a turning movement by the

GENERAL 107

shortest line, or would have been able by taking the
offensive to punish the dispersion that the turning
movement entailed. We must not fall into any mis-
conception of the fact that turning movements al-
ways contain an element of danger and can often
bring about very unfavourable situations. They lay
bare our own communications or lead to dangerous
dispersion of force. It is necessary too, not only to
see behind the enemy, but also to defeat him, in order
to gain a jree hand for reconnaissance. To this end
we will have to attack, and often on foot, as we may
be quite sure that our possible opponent will use the
rifle.

Circumstances have distinctly altered since 1870-71.
If we had at that time no real cavalry opponent to
face, we may yet be certain next time of having to
deal with a numerous and determined cavalry who
will quite conceivably endeavour to meet us in shock
action with the arme blanche. There will always be
dashing soldierly natures everywhere who will make
a bid for success by risking all. Whether the hostile
cavalry, once beaten, will return to the attack, is more
than doubtful. I do not think so.

It lies deeply embedded in human nature that he
who feels himself the weaker will act on the defen-
sive. Both opponents will often endeavour to exploit
the advantages of the defensive. It frequently hap-
pens during manoeuvres that the cavalry endeavours
to seize some commanding position, and so force the
enemy to attack it under the fire of artillery posted
there. The other side, however, may make correspond-
ing endeavours. An indecisive artillery duel is the
usual result of such efforts. But if such action is fre-
quent in peace, how much more frequent will it be
under the pressure of responsibility which war brings

io8 CAVALRY IN WAR

with it, especially where one side is tactically the
weaker ?

It requires an enormous moral strength, personal
influence over troops, and firmness of character to be
able to maintain the offensive spirit, even after an
unfavourable conflict, and continually to invoke the
ultimate decision anew. In general, it may be relied
upon that defence will be carried out according to tac-
tical defensive principles, and that with the firearm.
There can be no doubt upon that point to those who
have studied human nature by the light of military
history.

Our probable opponents, too, will certainly often ad-
vance dismounted. At all events they are endeavour-
ing to strengthen cavalry divisions by cyclist battalions
and infantry, and perhaps by mounted infantry, and
thereby already show a remarkable inclination to con-
duct the fight, even of cavalry, with the firearm, and
only to use their horses as a means of mobility, as
was the custom of the Boers in Africa.

The role of cavalry in the fight will then apparently
consist of a combination of the various methods of
fighting. In explanation of this view I would cite a
well-known example.

The task of the German army cavalry in the battle
of Mars la Tour was to relieve the left flank of the
German army by a determined attack against the
right of the French, and thus to bring the appre-
hended advance of the enemy to a standstill. It did
not accomplish this task, but was satisfied with trying
conclusions with the French cavalry ; but did not either
win a decisive victory over the latter nor reap the
necessary tactical benefit from the action. It cer-
tainly maintained its superiority over the enemy, but
it made no attempt to interfere decisively in the

GENERAL 109

course of the battle itself. This honour was left to
the 1st Dragoons of the Guard.

But if we assume for a moment that this cavalry,
after driving the French from the field, had made an
attempt to operate further against the right flank of
the French army, Cissey's Division, how would mat-
ters have stood?

The French infantry had occupied the Grey ere Farm
as a support to their right flank. The Chasseurs
d'Afrique, on the other hand, who initiated the cavalry
fight, retired after they had been beaten by the 13th
Dragoons in a northerly direction, and occupied with
dismounted fire the southern edge of a small wood
near Ville sur Yron, which the French call Bois de la
Grange and the German official history Bois de
Greyere. It is bordered on the south by the plateau
of Ville sur Yron. The dismounted Chasseurs here
formed an echelon behind the right flank of the French
infantry.

How should the German cavalry have acted under
such circumstances in order to gain contact with the
right flank of the French infantry so protected? The
strongly occupied Geyere Farm commanded the
crossing of the Fond de la Cuve, which stretches
in a northerly direction from Mars la Tour towards
Chateau Moncel, while to the north the wood occu-
pied by the Chasseurs limited freedom of movement.
What else remained but a determined attack of both
objectives and their capture, and that on foot? Ar-
tillery alone would not have sufficed against the
Greyere Farm, for this point would have had to be
strongly occupied with riflemen, and nowadays also
with machine guns, befoie the crossing of the Fond
de la Cuve which the farm commanded, and which

no CAVALRY IN WAR

divided our cavalry from the French infantry, could
be accomplished.

We can thus see that even in the action of cavalry
in battle the combination of the several methods of
fighting can scarcely, if ever, be avoided. In flank and
rear, also, the opponent will endeavour to secure him-
self by occupying points of support as soon as he be-
comes aware of our intention to operate in these
directions. Our cavalry must thus be continually pre-
pared to pave the way by dismounted action for the
mounted combat.

Our new Regulations mention quite incidentally
(390)* that cavalry will often have to combine
mounted and dismounted action, that "on occasions"
also, in combination with shock action, dismounted
cavalry must be ready to hold supporting points to
cover deployment or to co-operate in the engagement

(438).^

1 do not think that this passing mention of the im-
portance of combination of the two methods of fight-
ing of the cavalry sufficiently emphasises the matter.
After due reflection over all the circumstances apper-
taining to the question, I am, on the other hand, firmly
convinced that the mutual relationship between the

* "By reason of its fire-arms, cavalry is capable also of
dismounted action. It is thus in a position — and especially
so when supported by horse artillery and machine-gxins — to
offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them
serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it refrain
from attack, should the situation require it. It will often
have to combine dismounted with mounted action."

2 "In combination with the cavalry combat, the fire effect
of the carbine may be employed on occasions. Thus the oc-
cupation of points-d'appui by portions of the advanced guard
may often provide favourable and, at times, indispensable
preliminaries to the deployment of a division. The support
of carbin fire may be possible and useful even during contact."

GENERAL in

fight on foot and on horseback will give the modern
cavalry combat its peculiar character. This relation-
ship will always have to be reckoned with, and all tac-
tical considerations must be guided by it.

In my opinion all the principles of cavalry tactics
should spring from this co-operation of the several
methods of fighting and not from its attitude towards
the various arms considered separately. The modem
battle suffers no division of the action of one arm, or
of one manner of fighting from another. As every
kind of country has to be utilised for the fight, so also
must the most varied kind of action of the arms be
taken into account. It must, of course, be clearly es-
tablished how these can best be applied against the
various adversaries — cavalry, artillery, or infantry.
Such reflections, however, can refer only to tactical
formations. On the other hand, as soon as it becomes
a question of tactical leading, such combination of
all arms must, from the first, be taken into account
as war may demand.

Military history affords us vivid examples of such
co-operation of the arms in a cavalry fight, not, in-
deed, in a European theatre of war, but in the Civil
War in America. They are woven, above all, round
the heroic figure of General "]eh" Stuart, and if weap-
ons and other circumstances of the time and place
were different from those obtaining in Europe to-day,
the principle of action has still remained the same.

"Soon after the outbreak of the war Stuart dis-
tinguished himself as a cavalry leader, and his stra-
tegical work in blindfolding the enemy and in en-
lightening his own army has never been surpassed.
As a cavalry tactician he is not only the first, but
hitherto the only, leader of the arm who understood
how to combine the effects of fire and shock, how to

112 CAVALRY IN WAR

render effective service in fighting on foot without
losing the power to strike on horseback when oppor-
tunity offered." ^

There, indeed, was a man worthy of emulation.

We must, I think, be resolute in freeing ourselves
from all old-fashioned conceptions of those knightly
cavalry combats which have in reality become obsolete
owing to the necessities of modern war. We do not
in this need to break with our ancient and honoured
traditions, for the spirit of tradition consists not in
the retention of antiquated forms, but in acting in
that spirit which in the past led to such glorious suc-
cess. But this spirit points to the road of progress and
bids us not allow ourselves to be urged by events,
but, hurrying before them, to gain a start in develop-
ment and therewith a decisive advantage over our
enemies. To maintain in the troops, under modern
conditions, the spirit of discipline and independence,
and of the greatest effort and self-sacrifice, that is the
old Prussian tradition, and not the adherence to dead
forms, which in our history has been bloodily enough
avenged.

This principle has been embraced in all the other
spheres of military development ; it is only the cavalry
that has remained behind the times.

In order to be able to deal with the functions of the
mounted arm in accordance with the old Prussian prin-
ciples, we must try to get a clear and unprejudiced con-
ception of the spirit of the modern cavalry combat.
We must look forward and pierce the veil of the
future uninfluenced by the ghosts of the past. The
probable events and conditions of the modern battle
must be our guiding star, and when we have realised
how the spirit of cavalry may be adapted to them, how
* "The Crisis of the Confederacy," by Cecil Battine.

GENERAL 113

the results of modem technical improvements in arms
influence and strengthen the action of the cavalry
masses, then alone can we lay down principles for the
conduct and tactics of cavalry in the fight.

II. ATTACK AND DEFENCE

Mobility is that prominent characteristic of the cav-
alry on which the justification of its existence is chiefly
based. That it is able to come into action rapidly at
distant points, and to observe the enemy while still
afar off, makes it indispensable in the composition of
an army. Anything that hinders its free mobility mili-
tates against its purpose and its characteristics. Noth-
ing, therefore, is more justifiable or more in accord-
ance with its spirit than that it should endeavour to
preserve its mobility in the fight, and that mounted
shock action, therefore, should be regarded as its
proper role in battle. In this role, cavalry is able not
only to force a decision quickly, but to continue its
m.ovement mounted, even from the fight itself.

These advantages, inherent in the nature of the arm,
must not be expected in dismounted action. Such
action always entails delay and hampers the move-
ments of the troops, not only by the method of opera-
tion, but also by the separation of the men from their
horses. It is therefore natural that cavalry should
only undertake an attack on foot when there is no
prospect of obtaining their object by shock action, or
when the latter would entail such sacrifice that it
might imperil the further successful action of the
troops.

The more, however, the disadvantageous factors of
dismounted action are realised and appreciated, the

114 CAVALRY IN WAR

more, in my opinion, will endeavours be made to give
it an offensive character, in order to remove as quickly
as possible obstacles which hinder the free movement
of the cavalry. All delay and hesitation are in oppo-
sition to the very spirit of the arm. To preserve its
peculiar element of mobility a rapid decision is im-
perative in every situation.

Mounted, the cavalry knows only the charge and has
no defensive power, a circumstance which strengthens
its action considerably in carrying out its offensive
principles, by relieving the leader of the onus of choice.
On foot it is a different matter. The application of
the firearm, under all tactical and topographical con-
ditions, particularly facilitates defence and enables it
to appear, to a certain extent, the stronger form of
action. Herein lies the reason why defensive action
is continually sought. All the more, therefore, must
it be kept in view that it is the offensive on foot that
the cavalry will require. To operate in combination
with shock tactics to assist the offensive, and pave
the way for free movement is, however, the real ob-
ject of dismounted action.

It would perhaps have been better if the new Regu-
lations had upheld this principle a little more definitely.
In them, however, it is the defensive strength which
cavalry has gained in dismounted action which is
chiefly emphasised (390),^ and the attack is only dealt
with as a method of fighting from which the troops
"need not shrink." Attention is certainly drawn

* "By reason of its fire-arms, cavalry is capable also of
dismounted action. It is thus in a position — and especially
so when supported by horse artillery and machine-guns — to
offer resistance to detachments of all arms, or to cause them
serious loss by unexpected fire-action. Nor need it shrink
from attacking, should the situation require it. It will often
have to combine dismounted with mounted action."

ATTACK AND DEFENCE 115

(455)^ to the various cases in which an attack upon
foot may be undertaken. That, however, does not
alter the fundamental utterance that the dismounted
fight will chiefly be undertaken on the defensive. This
interpretation is strengthened on reading in the di-
rections for the action of the army cavalry during
operations that "Especial additions to the force (cy-
clist detachments, infantry in wagons, etc.) are mainly
intended for the duty of strengthening local resistance,
or of overcoming such resistance on the part of the
enemy." The thought involuntarily occurs to the
reader that in the spirit of the Regulations such addi-
tions to the force will be just as necessary in face of
a serious hostile resistance, in order to free the way
for the cavalry. We would, then, again find ourselves
in just the same state which the war of 1870-71 proved
to be so undesirable, and the cavalry would again find
the wings of its mobility clipped.

The Regulations of course only intend to convey on
this point that, if such special additions to the cavalry
were forthcoming, the task mentioned would be their
principal duty. It is, however, a matter of significance
that it is here presupposed that infantry in wagons
may be detailed to accompany the strategic army cav-
alry. If it were but a matter of cyclists, that would
be a quite different matter. But there cannot at pres-
ent be any question of this, as there is no sufficient
number of them in the army.

* "Cavalry will often be obliged to clear the way for fur-
ther activity by means of dismounted attack. Attempts also
on the hostile lines of communication (such as the capture
of railway stations or magazines, the destruction of impor-
tant engineering works, or the capture of isolated posts, etc.)
will certainly involve such attacks. On the battle field, how-
ever, dismoimted cavalry will rarely be pushed forward."

ii6 CAVALRY IN WAR

If the Regulations discuss these kind of possibili-
ties I fear that the demand for infantry will very soon
be heard from the army cavalry when there is any
question of a serious attack on foot, and herewith the
free action of the cavalry will be limited once and
for all.

Military history and theoretical reflection teach us
equally that the great masses of the army cavalry must
under all circumstances be independent, at least for
their offensive undertakings — that they cannot rely, in
any case for these, on the "occasional" support of
infantry. For they would thus find their mobility
hampered, and themselves tied to the very troops from
which they expect support, and would then be unable
to carry out those important duties which fall to their
share. The army cavalry, then, can only preserve its
necessary independence if it can rely upon its own
strength even in an attack on foot. It must at any
moment be prepared to throw all its force into the
conduct of a decisive attack. This is a method of
fighting from which not only should it not "shrink,"
but in which its dismounted role essentially consists.
When an attack on foot has been determined on, it
must, however, be first perfectly clear that the results
will justify the sacrifice which such an attack, under
any circumstances, must mean — that is to say, the
expenditure not only in lives, but also in time, which
must both be regarded as lost in estimating the further
operative value of the force.

The new Regulations take this point of view also
into consideration, but in a manner that gives cause
for serious reflection. They would limit the time ex-
pended in an attack on foot, and during which the arm
is deprived of its free mobility, and therefore demand

ATTACK AND DEFENCE 117

(456)^ that, if such an attack be found necessary, en-
deavour must be made to carry it out with the utmost
rapidity. Here is expressed a desire easy to under-
stand. But I do not think that the object will thus be
attained of limiting the time that a dismounted fight
demands. To carry an attack rapidly through under
modern conditions demands the employment of over-
whelming fire power and numerical superiority.

In so far as the Regulations express the idea that an
attack should only be undertaken when this superiority
is assured, there is great justification for the definition
laid down in paragraph 456. But the cavalry must
then generally confine itself to the attack of quite weak
hostile posts, for even the division contains but an in-
significant number of rifles. But such limitations, on
the other hand, in no way take into account the neces-
sities of grave situations. The army cavalry will often
find itself in a situation where a difficult attack must
be carried through without any overwhelming superi-
ority, unless it means to renounce the accomplishment
of the duties entrusted to it.

I do not think that we should interpret the wording
of the Regulations in this sense. Taken literally, great
danger lies in them — the danger, that is, of seeing in
the wording of paragraph 456, a demand for the has-
tening of the conduct of the attack. We should thus
see ourselves prevailed upon to carry out a necessary
attack in a precipitate manner without the necessary
fire preparation in order to fulfil the demand for haste.
In peace manoeuvres such conduct is but too often seen.

* "Cavalry must endeavour to bring dismounted attacks
to a conclusion with the utmost rapidity, so that they may
regain their mobility at the earliest possible moment. It
may also be of importance to bring the encounter to a de-
cision before the arrival of hostile reinforcements."

ii8 CAVALRY IN WAR

In war it must inevitably lead to defeat. Under mod-
ern conditions of weapons an attack does not allow
of being accelerated by force. It must take its own
time. We must not therefore deceive ourselves into
thinking that voluntary acceleration of the offensive
fight is possible, but quite clear that every decision
to attack on foot signifies considerable loss in time as
well as men.

After considering these circumstances it would al-
most seem advisable to alter the wording of paragraph
456, to make it somewhat more precise, and to elimi-
nate the idea of acceleration of the attack. Every
trooper must be conscious that from the moment he
dismounts for fire action he is no longer a cavalry-
man, but a foot soldier. He must follow the laws of
fighting on foot, and can only reach his horse again
by successful action according to these laws. Then,
certainly, the dismounted troops must strive with all
means in their power to reassume their mounted role
with the utmost celerity.

The same holds good for the defence.

Cavalry will only undertake this when absolutely
obliged. It may be that the conditions of force do not
allow of the attack, or that the maintenance of some
locality is the chief object of the fight. In the con-
sciousness, however, that any hampering of initiative
and free movement is opposed to the spirit of cavalry
action, so must the defence — if circumstances in any
way permit — ^be carried out with the idea of emerging
as soon as possible from the defensive role imposed,
to regain freedom of movement, and then to lay down
the law to the enemy. This can only be attained by
conducting the defence in an offensive spirit, that
compels the opponent to a decision in accordance with
our will.

ATTACK AND DEFENCE 119

This point of view does not, according to my think-
ing, receive sufficient attention in the new Regulations.
Daring and initiative carry in them the seeds of great
success. The cavalry should continually remember
this, even in defence. On the other hand, however, it
must also be ready when occasion demands to defend
itself with the utmost obstinacy to the last man. The
resolute defence of Sandepu by a Japanese cavalry
brigade against heavy odds gives us a good example to
follow. This action made the timely arrival of the
Japanese reinforcements possible.

III. CAVALRY IN COMBAT AGAINST THE VARIOUS
ARMS, MOUNTED AND DISMOUNTED

In the mounted combat against cavalry, every effort
must be directed towards falling upon the enemy at
full gallop in a serried mass, and thus to overthrow
him. It is not sufficient to succeed in coming to blows
with the enemy. His tactical formation must be de-
stroyed, and he must be rendered incapable either of
evolution or battle. And this must be done without
losing cohesion or power of command. The material
damage done to the enemy is a matter for the mounted
pursuit, which need only be carried out by part of the
troops, or, in default of this, by shrapnel.

For the conduct of the purely cavalry fight we
should, in my opinion, rely upon men like Frederick
the Great, Seydlitz, and the prominent Napoleonic cav-
alry leaders. In the relations of cavalry to cavalry,
nothing has altered since their day, and the experiences
of these men are, in their lessons, just as applicable to-
day as at the time in which they lived. And what do
they teach us?

It is the serried formation of the attack that is,

I20 CAVALRY IN WAR

above all else, to be aimed at. Frederick the Great
certainly changed his formation from the three-rank
to the two-rank line. This was owing to his desire to
render the troops more mobile, and in some way to
compensate for the numerical superiority of his op-
ponent. The longer his experience of war, however,
the more did the king insist upon close formation in
the attack, and to the end that the attack should lead
not to a melee, but to the breaking up of the enemy
by the impact of the solid mass. Napoleon, whose
cavalry was not so proficient in the saddle, sought to
obtain this result by greater depth, while in the infre-
quent cavalry fights of the present day it has become
thoroughly apparent that cohesion in the shock is the
deciding factor. At Mars la Tour the French Hussar
Brigade of Montaigu was overthrown by the closely
formed 13th Dragoons, after having made an easy
prey of the loth Hussars, while the other attacks only
led to long and indecisive melees. Frederick the Great,
in order to attain the greatest possible cohesion, finally
abolished all intervals between the tactical units and
required the knee-to-knee riding. As, however, he
was perfectly well aware that, in spite of all regula-
tions, the ranks must open out while crossing country,
he would never allow the enemy's cavalry to be at-
tacked without a second line following the first, not in
echelon, but directly in rear of it, a measure which
repeatedly proved itself necessary, if not decisive. Na-
poleon's cavalry leaders held that a still greater depth
was necessary owing to the looser riding of the French
squadrons. As far as I know, there is no example of
their attacking in large masses without depth of for-
mation. Peace experience teaches us, that riding
across country must loosen cohesion, while the mod-
ern firearm obliges us to take refuge in broken coun-

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 121

try, where the closest touch cannot always be kept,
and to this end riding stirrup to stirrup has been in-
troduced. Is it, however, ordained that we should
attack in this formation and neglect the decisive fac-
tor of the charge in favour of mobility, a proceeding
which is almost always seen in charges at manoeuvres ?

The disadvantages of such methods are certainly not
apparent in peace, as the troops do not come into real
collision, and rapidity and ability to deploy receive
therefore more attention than cohesion in the attack.
At inspections on the drill-ground such cohesion is
certainly demanded, but at manoeuvres it is generally
conspicuous by its absence. In war I am firmly con-
vinced that such habits will be heavily punished.

I think, therefore, that we must return to the princi-
ples of Frederick the Great, which up to now have
been neglected. In approach and deployment we must
indeed ride stirrup to stirrup, and under certain cir-
cumstances in even looser formation. But for the
charge against cavalry we need a closer formation,
knee to knee as of old, which can be effected on the
move by word of command, as in France, where the
order "Serrez les rangs!" is still in use. Besides this,
we require always a second line in the Frederician
sense, to assist, when necessary, in maintaining co-
hesion, and to be ready to meet the vicissitudes of the
attack. This is a matter of experience which allows
of no misinterpretation.

Another point comes under consideration. Com-
manders always seem to be particularly desirous of
retaining close formation throughout the attack, and
of preventing the whole of the troops becoming in-
volved in a melee or pursuit. This originates from
the necessity of having to reckon with the enemy's re-
serves, which may appear suddenly on the field at

122 CAVALRY IN WAR

the decisive moment to extricate their beaten com-
rades. We must always be in a position to meet them,
and the rapid rally from the melee is therefore to-day
diligently practised, in the hope that the troops may
quickly be got in hand ready to be led against a fresh
foe.

It is indeed astounding that we should give way to
such self-deception. Such rallies can only appear pos-
sible if we disregard all the moral forces which the
fight sets loose. Whoever has had experience of a
single charge in war knows what excitement possesses
the men and what time and trouble are required to
tactically concentrate troops that have once been
launched to the attack, and render them capable of
evolution. In peace this is delightfully easy after a
little practice; in war it is an absolute impossibility.

We must therefore be perfectly clear in our minds
that only those troops which have not been engaged
in the melee, those parts of the first and second lines
which have remained formed during the charge, and
the reserve which has been held in rear, will be avail-
able to meet any hostile forces which may suddenly
appear.

Up to now our Regulations have followed the teach-
ings of military history in so far as they provided
for supporting squadrons behind the front line in the
attack against cavalry. The new Regulations, how-
ever, not only retain the "stirrup feeling," ^ even in
the attack against cavalry, but have also greatly lim-
ited the employment of supporting squadrons, and
rendered it exceptional. The Regulations practically
ignore the use of the second line in the attack against
cavalry. To preserve cohesion in the attack in spite

^ "Biigelfiihling," as against "Knie an Knie" (knee to
knee). — Trans.

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 123

of this, the men in the rear rank are to advance into
the front rank in order to fill the larger gaps which
may there occur (106).^ This will lead under certain
circumstances to a loose, almost single-line attack
against cavalry. These measures give ground for some
concern. They can scarcely lead to any other end than
to render steady riding to the charge impossible, to
create disorder, and to deprive the already thin line
of its force of impact.

It appears to me to be very questionable whether
such directions could be carried out at all in practice.
They will most certainly not attain the object which
the Regulations apparently expect, that is to say, of
securing cohesion in the attack, and thereby a victory
for one thin attacking line. The necessity for a second
line under such circumstances appears all the more
obvious. The Regulations in this respect direct (200)^

*As a rule, the squadron attacks cavalry as a single unit
in line. The shock must be affected with the maximum mo-
mentum in two well-defined, well-closed ranks. Cohesion is
above all things necessary for decisive results. Every man
must realize this, must maintain his place in the ranks, and
must keep close touch with his neighbour.

"The two squadron flank glides will hold the squadron in
towards the centre. Small gaps in the front rank may be
filled by closing in, larger gaps by moving up the rear rank
files."

*"When attacking cavalry, the regiments will, as a rule,
be employed in a line formation side by side; this will pre-
vent their personnel from becoming mixed up. The neces-
sary depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and,
in this case, it is usually in the form of echelons. If the
situation demands it, even single squadrons can follow in col-
umn formation.

"The employment of several lines may be useful on occa-
sions when the situation demands rapid action from the lead-
ing regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear
regiments taking ground to a flank."

124 CAVALRY IN WAR

that, "if the situation demands it, even single squad-
rons can follow in column foiTnation," also as an ex-
ception. This indicates a distinct divergence from
the proven results of all experience, and cannot, in my
opinion, be even theoretically justified.

Such dispositions cannot therefore be regarded as
justifiahle. I consider it to he my unavoidable duty to
express myself clearly upon this point. They in no
wise alter the fact that to attack the enemy successfully
our cavalry must, where its comparative strength in
any way allows, be fundamentally formed in two lines,
and be launched to the charge in the closest attack
formation, knee to knee. For it was thus that the
Prussian squadrons gained their laurels in all the splen-
did victories of the Frederician and Napoleonic wars.

At Mars la Tour, also, the success of the cavalry
fight was decided by the i6th Dragoons, who threw
themselves into the melee from the rear, acting as a
second line entirely in accordance with the Frederician
spirit. The loth Hussars also attacked as a second
line; and it was the cohesion of the 13th Dragoons, as
we have already seen, that allowed them on two occa-
sions rapidly to secure a victory.

If the conditions of the fight of cavalry against cav-
alry to-day have remained practically unaltered as
compared to those of the past, it is a very different
matter where the attack is against troops armed
with modern firearms, essentially infantry and artil-
lery.

In the old days, where infantry fought in serried
masses, standing up, and were only able to cover a
short distance to their front with a comparatively slow
fire, the cavalry were able, even as against their own
arm, to ride them down with shock action in close
formation. They were therefore justified in attacking

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 125

infantry in the same formation and with the same co-
hesion as they attacked cavalry. This has now
changed. Nowadays, when infantry can cover the
ground to a distance of 1,500 or even 2,000 yards with
a hot and rapid fire, and offer in their wide extension
no sort of objective for shock action, an attack on un-
shaken, steadily firing infantry, which has any sort of
adequate field of fire, is quite out of the question. Only
infantry whose morale has been shaken, or which can
be surprised at quite close range, can still be charged
with a prospect of success. It is, then, no question of
attack in cohesion, but a matter of crossing as rapidly
as possible the zone swept by the enemy's fire in some
formation which will allow a portion at least of the
cavalry to escape its full effect.

These conditions may be fulfilled by the formation
in lines. The first line must receive the fire, and will
thereby provide cover to some extent to the lines be-
hind and the possibility of reaching the enemy without
suffering too severely. It will usually be no advantage
to form the first line in two ranks, as such a disposition
would but increase losses and the disorder caused by
them. It will be better, generally, that the leading line
or lines should consist of one rank at quite loose in-
terval. This is principally on account of the ground,
as the horses, in order to rapidly cover the necessary
distance, must have room to gallop freely, and to avoid
such obstacles as may lie in front of them or may be
caused by losses in the leading line.

It is obvious, in my opinion, that such attacks can-
not be ridden home according to the same principles
that govern the attack against cavalry. It is an arbi-
trary assumption that a line of cavalry 1,500 or 2,000
jards wide can cross country stirrup to stirrup at the

126 CAVALRY IN WAR

regulation pace of the charge,^ as the Regulations de-
mand. Not only must the leading line ride at quite
loose interval, but the main attack must also have a
looser formation than is here demanded. It is there-
fore indicated that such extension should be laid down
in the Regulations. For it can in no case be avoided,
but is the outcome of the force of circumstances. In
the formation in lines, however, there is always room
to open out, and troops or squadrons may be used in
single rank.

The same principles that govern the attack against
infantry hold good for that against artillery. Here
also it is a matter of crossing the zone of fire at a rapid
pace in widely extended order, or drawing the fire
of the artillery by the advance of the leading line, and
of compelling it to repeatedly alter its elevation. To
this end it may perhaps at first be advisable to expose
only weak portions of the charging first line to the fire
of the guns, in order to disturb it, and to pave the way
for the success of the main attack. This will have to
ride in line, or perhaps better still in squadron column,
in order to make full use of the unexposed portions of
the ground. Thus in this case, also, the leading lines
in single rank extended and loose riding in the chang-
ing formations of the main attacking line are advo-
cated.

The new Regulations arrive partially at the conclu-
sions inevitable from these reflections. The attack in
several lines, and the formation of a first line in single
rank for the attack against fire action have been

^ The German cavalry use two paces at the gallop, 500 and
700 paces per minute, the pace being 80 cm. (32 in.), thus
1454 and 20^ miles per hour. — Trans.

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 127

adopted by them (113 and 174).^ In one point only
according to my view, they do not take sufficient ac-
count of the demands of reality, and this is in the mat-
ter of extension. As before, the attack in close forma-
tion against infantry which the Regulations advocate,
will be carried out and practised according to the same
principles as against cavalry. As before, infantry

^ "A squadron must seek success against infantry, artillery,
and machine-guns by means of surprise and flank attacks.
If a frontal attack is necessary, the zone of fire is best
passed by increasing the pace. The gallop will be resorted
to early in the advance, and the pace increased in the vicin-
ity of the enemy. Breathing spaces can be obtained under
cover of the terrain. As, in these cases, momentum of im-
pact is not so important, it will be sufficient if collision takes
place at a rapid gallop.

"In order to minimize loss, it is advisable to let the ad-
vanced portions of the squadron, or even the whole, adopt
single rank formation with wide intervals. By this means
the hostile fire may be broken up, and, on occasions, the
dust raised by the troops in open order may facilitate the
attack of the portion of the squadron remaining in close
order.

"If it is a question of simultaneous attacks, either on a
single enemy from several directions, or on several distinct
units of the hostile force, action by single troops may be
advisable.

"Hostile skirmishing lines will be ridden through, if there
are other detachments behind them to be attacked. Any
form of attack may be employed against shaken, yielding
infantry. Skirmishing lines are best pursued in open order,
which formation permits of the most effective employment
of cavalry weapons.

"If, during an attack, a squadron breaks into a battery or
machine-gun detachment, a portion of the men will be em-
ployed against the personnel, a portion against the limbers.
Captured guns or machine-guns should be carried off; but,
if this is impossible, they will be made unserviceable, or, at
any rate, incapable of movement. Led horses should also be
made the objective in attacks on dismounted cavalry.

128 CAVALRY IN WAR

firing lying extended under cover, as also artillery, are
to be charged in the same method as cavalry advancing
in close formation.

I think we have proved that the attendant conditions
of the two cases differ widely. If the Regulations
had but taken them into consideration, the difference
between the two methods of attack would have there-
by been made more intelligible to all officers from
the first than could be done by general instructions of
this nature.

The cavalry has now a demand made upon it by
Regulation which, although it can be met on the drill-
ground, will be impossible of fulfilment in war. It will
therefore be necessary to discard in war what we have
taken such pains to learn, a thing which frequently
happens in manoeuvres, and even on the exercise-
ground.

In the formation for attack and the deployment, the
Regulations follow the logical sequence of their point
of view that, in the attack upon cavalry, no second line
is necessary, and in this matter adhere to the directions
laid down in the old Regulations. From my point of

"The principles laid down for action against cavalry can
be applied, mutatis mutandis, in the matters of pursuit, melee,
and rally."

"Such attacks are carried out in accordance with the prin-
ciples of para. 113.

"The strength of a regiment renders it impossible to attack
the objective in several lines. The officer commanding will
give orders as to whether the front line is to be in single
rank, and as to whether the rear lines are to be in a similar
formation or in closed double rank.

"In attacking infantry, the lines must not be at too great a
distance from one another. In attacking artillery, the dis-
tance between lines is determined by the effective area of the
burst of shrapnel (300 metres = 330 yds)."

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 129

view, this does not seem to correspond at all with the
necessities of the fight.

In my "Reflections on the New Cavalry Drill Regu-
lations" I laid down "that it should always be possible
for cavalry to change from the manoeuvre column
straightway into attack formation with flank protec-
tion, without first forming line, as hitherto has been
deemed necessary." In opposition to the Regulations
I still hold fast to this principle.

We have seen that the formation in lines is the
necessary one for all charges, and that an attack in one
line will only be possible in exceptional cases where
weakness forbids the formation of several lines, or
where the surprised and demoralised condition of the
enemy appears to render a second line superfluous.

The logical conclusions resulting from these reflec-
tions are that all column formations employed in the
approach march must keep in view first and foremost
the rapid adoption of the attack formation, and that
deployment must in principle lead to the formation in
lines for attack. The complete deployment in line of
any units from the regiment upwards can only be nec-
essary in exceptional cases. It can be formed from
the attack formation or direct from column when spe-
cially ordered.

Taking into consideration the rapidity with which
approach, deployment, and attack will often follow
each other, I would even advocate that a trumpet-call,
"Form for attack!" should be laid down in the Regu-
lations. The strength of the various lines will gener-
ally have to be ordered according as the objective con-
sists of cavalry or troops using fire action. It will
not always be possible to find time for detailed arrange-
ments, particularly during the rapid vicissitudes of a
cavalry combat. The trumpet-call would then justify

I30 CAVALRY IN WAR

itself, and the lines would be formed by the inde-
pendent action of squadron leaders, according to the
formation the troops were in and the expected breadth
of frontage of the enemy. It should be laid down as
a guide that of four squadrons one at least should form
a second line, and that an unprotected flank should,
when possible, be covered by a squadron in echelon.
The squadrons nearest the enemy would form a first
line, and the remainder would act according to circum-
stances, and either follow the first line, echelon them-
selves in rear of it, or, when necessary, prolong it.
For the deployment into one line a special call could
be used.

For the conduct of the fight on foot the same prin-
ciples hold good as for the infantry. The duties and
conditions of the fight are similar, and demand simi-
lar general tactical directions. The arrangements for
the led horses, however, render the introduction and
the conduct of the fight considerably more difficult.
There is also a certain difference according as the op-
ponent is infantry or cavalry.

For, in the first case, there is generally no danger of
a further turning movement, or of threats against
the led horses from the flank or rear. In the greater
number of cases when arranging for the position and
safety of the led horses, only small hostile patrols need
be expected. An action may therefore generally be
conducted with more boldness under these circum-
stances than when opposed to cavalry which might
seriously threaten the led horses by a mounted reserve.

These circumstances must be taken into considera-
tion when dealing with the principles for the conduct
of the led horses.

In defence, the measures required are comparatively
simple. The conformation of the ground usually

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 131

chosen with a view to the peculiarities of defensive ac-
tion will ofen allow of the led horses being kept close
to the firing-line, where it will also be possible to
mount out of the enemy's range and to withdraw from
his fire under cover of the ground. The led horses
should only be left to the rear if the position is to be
maintained until the enemy comes to close quarters,
and then should be, if possible, behind some fresh posi-
tion, where it seems likely that resistance may be re-
newed. In defence, the led horses will generally be
left quite immobile,^ though this method should not
be considered imperative. For even in defence the
led horses must be sometimes kept mobile ; for instance,
when it is necessary to rapidly occupy on foot some
locality in the neighbourhood of which there is no suit-
able position for the led horses. In such a case they
will have to be sent behind cover, which can only be
done if they are mobile. The horses will only be kept
in the immediate neighbourhood when it is intended
merely to bring off a fire surprise, and not when carry-
ing out an attack or making an obstinate resistance
(471-473). 2

* i. e. with insufficient men to lead them. — Trans.

2 "Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments
considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a
surprise appearance combined with an unexpected and simul-
taneous opening of fire. By means of skillful use of ground
and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear
and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained
the desired results."

"As many carbines as possible must open fire simul-
taneously. The leader must do his best to select such ground
for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept un-
der cover close at hand."

"Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to pro-
duce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of
the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while

132 CAVALRY IN WAR

For the attack the conditions are different. The
troops must then be often completely separated from
their horses. It is therefore all the more necessary that
the latter should be secured against all hostile attack.
If, for instance, hostile cavalry threatens, they must
have a special escort. The possibility of a reverse must
be taken into consideration when selecting the position
for led horses, and the retiring troops must be able not
only to mount, but to withdrav/ under cover.

It is of especial importance that the troops should
regain their mobility after an attack has been carried
out. When the led horses can be moved, this is an
easy matter. Where, however, they are immobile, as
will generally be the case where full force has to be put
into the fight, there will be considerable loss of time
unless it be possible for the led horses to be brought up,
part at a time, by any mounted reserve that may have
been left in the rear. In spite of this disadvantage, the
desire to render the led horses mobile should not be
allowed to lead to the undertaking of a dismounted
action with insufficient numbers.

This desire to regain the horses as rapidly as possible
is frequently to be observed at manoeuvres, and not
only leads to dismounting and leaving the led horses
mobile, but is sometimes allowed to exercise too
much influence on the question of where the horses are
to be left. In war this consideration should never in-
fluence the conduct of the fight, nor lead to the under-
taking of a dismounted fight in a half-hearted manner,
or precipitately, and thus paralysing the energy of the
attack. It should never induce a commander to keep
his horses too close to the battlefield and thereby ex-
posed to danger, in order that he may more quickly re-
taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid
fire on the enemy."

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 133

gain them. If dismounted action has been determined
on, the main condition is that the attack should be
successfully carried out, and all other matters must be
subordinated to this end.

The precepts of the new Regulations do not, to be
sure, harmonise with this view. According to them,
even when led horses are not required to be mobile,
only three-quarters of the men dismount, and each man
will hold four horses (366).^ The number of rifles
will be greatly diminished by these measures (by about
a quarter) ; and it is not quite clear, at least to me,
what corresponding advantage is to be gained. The
measure is, however, so far-reaching that it merits
special criticism — the more so as the Regulations them-
selves lay stress upon the rapid energetic conduct of
the fight, and at the same time make such action more
difficult by weakening the numbers in the firing— line.

Will the horses thus retain a certain degree of mo-
bility? This would be a mischievous delusion. Even
if such measures allow of short distances being covered

* "At the command : 'Dismount for dismounted action 1'
the squadron dismounts. If the carbines are not already
slung across the back, they will be taken from the buckets.

"When double rank has been formed, the horse holders
will take charge of the horses. The horse holder of either
rank is the left flank file of each section (excepting the left
flank guide). If there is only one man in the rear rank of
the left flank section of the troop, he will hand over his
horse to his front rank horse holder; or, if the latter is
already in charge of four horses, to his neighbour. The
horses in charge of a horse holder will be linked. OflScers'
horses are held by trumpeters.

"Lances are laid on the ground — if in line, in the front
of the ranks; if in column, on the flanks — in such a manner
that they cannot be damaged by the horses.

"In the absence of a contrary order, the sergeant-major
and the left flank guides will remain with the led horses, in
addition to the horse holders."

134 CAVALRY IN WAR

at a walk on the level drill-ground, such a thing is out
of the question in the field and in the proximity of a
fight. How will one man lead four horses, and at the
same time carry four lances? A practical impossi-
bility.

The Regulations also give no clear directions as to
how the lances are to be carried during these evolu-
tions. On the other hand, the number of men formerly
detailed fully sufficed for holding the horses when it
was not required to move them. There seems there-
fore to be some other reason for this measure.

I have asked myself the question as to whether the
fact that more men are to be left with the horses than
formerly will perhaps make it possible to defend the
led horses by dismounted patrols. The directions con-
tained in the Regulations (368) ^ that hostile patrols
must be kept at a distance by single sentries posted by
the commander of the led horses indicates that such
was perhaps the intention. But it appears to me that
even this object cannot be obtained in such a way. The
sentries, if they are to defend the led horses from
long-range fire in open country, must be pushed for-
ward in considerable numbers, and very far, almost at
rifle range. With single sentries close at hand, no
proper protection is afforded, nor can posts be sent out
1,000 yards without giving them a strength which the
force cannot afford. If, however, the protection of the
led horses in difficult country is to be provided for, a

^ "The led horses will remain in the original troop forma-
tion. Their leader must keep himself informed of the course
of the encounter, he must remember to keep off hostile
patrols by means of single sentries, and he must facilitate
the rapid remounting of the dismounted men by placing the
horses in orderly formation, with the troops and ranks sep-
arated."

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 135

few sentries will most assuredly not suffice to prevent
hostile patrols approaching unobserved.

In order to properly protect the led horses they must
either be so disposed that they are actually covered
from the view and fire of the enemy, or else secured by
an escort strong enough to prevent hostile action
against them. There is no third course.

Taking these things into consideration I cannot re-
gard the limitation of the number of rifles in the firing-
line imposed by the Regulations as justifiable. It seems
to me that here a sacrifice is made with no correspond-
ing advantage resulting.

This anxiety seems also to have influenced, to a
certain degree, the text of the Regulations. In para-
graph 367 ^ the attempt is made to compensate in some
measure for the danger created by the weakening of the
firing-line. That is to say, the squadron leader is
allowed in either method of dismounting (with half or
three-quarters of the men) to reinforce the firing-line,
if the situation demands, by diminishing the number of
horse-holders. But it seems to me that this arrange-
ment is not quite practicable, and does not sufficiently
take into account the difficulties that will continually
result therefrom in the conduct of a real fight.

First of all, it must be regarded as extremely haz-
ardous to leave such measures altogether in the hands
of squadron leaders. Only consider, for example, the
case of a brigade commander who dismounts half his
men in order to keep his led horses mobile, and during
the attack makes the discovery that the horses cannot

^ "If, with due regard to the tactical situation, it can be
done without risk, the squadron leader is at liberty, when
employing either method of dismounting, to increase the
number of his dismounted men by decreasing the number
of his horse-holders."

136 CAVALRY IN WAR

follow because the squadron leaders have reinforced
the firing-line from the horse-holders! Throughout
the Regulations there are no sort of directions for lim-
iting the initiative of the squadron leader in such mat-
ters in the case of the larger bodies of troops.

But if this is to be disregarded, what becomes of the
whole measure? Is it to be determined when dis-
mounting that the number of horse-holders is to be
diminished, or are these men only to be brought up in
the course of the fight? Against the first method there
is naturally nothing to urge. But the second, also, is
quite allowable according to the letter of the Regula-
tions. It will, however, result in grave disadvantages.

If in defence the led horses are close to the firing-
line, such procedure is certainly possible, but only, it
seems to me, in this one case. If fighting a defensive
action where the horses must be left far to the rear, or
indeed in an attack, how and when are these reinforce-
ments to be brought up? It is generally in the middle
of a fight that the discovery is made that the troops are
insufficient. How is the order then to be sent to the
squadron leader that the few men who can still be
spared from the led horses are now to advance ? How
will these men be led to the front, perhaps 1,000 or
1 ,500 yards, or still farther ? How long will the squad-
ron wait for their arrival ? And in the end will it not
only be a matter of comparatively few men for each
squadron which will dribble gradually into the fight?
These cannot be regarded as reserves, but, at best, weak
supports far in rear, which can only be employed in the
fight with difficulty and loss of time, if at all.

I think, therefore, that what the Regulations pre-
scribe in this matter is not suitable for real war, and
that it would be better from the commencement to
employ all the men that are considered necessary, and

CAVALRY IN COMBAT 137

rather to dismount, as before, and leave the led horses
quite immobile, than afterwards to allow single men to
dribble into the fight. As reserves, formed detach-
ments must be directed against the decisive points, and
not a few troops brought up to reinforce the whole
length of the line at the discretion of the squadron
leader.

IV. THE FIGHT OF THE INDEPENDENT CAVALRY

Such fights will occur during the offensive recon-
naissance of the cavalry, in screening, and in enter-
prises against the enemy's communications and lines of
approach. Cavalry may also be entrusted with the
task of dispersing gatherings of hostile partisans, of
levying contributions on a large scale in the enemy's
country, and of carrying out other similar undertak-
ings. Serious encounters must often be expected under
such circumstances.

It is naturally impossible to give tactical guides and
directions for all these various cases; each problem,
rather, will demand its own solution. At the same
time certain typical phenomena continually repeat
themselves in all such combats, for which general
principles and rules for guidance may be profitably set
forth.

The fight will be either offensive or defensive. In
the offensive it will either be a matter, if the enemy is
also pressing forward, of the battle of encounter, or
else the attack against localities or positions. In fight-
ing against partisans, also, it will more frequently be a
case, as it was in France, of a struggle for localities.
In the defence, on the other hand, localities, positions,
or defiles will have to be defended. Beyond these
groups no real fight can be considered with the excep-

138 CAVALRY IN WAR

tion of surprises, which merit separate consideration.
It is therefore, in my opinion, advisable to develop
the tactical principles according to some corresponding
grouping of the material. Only thus can clear and
reasoned conclusions be arrived at. For if we take all
the various principles evolved from different tactical
situations and jumble them illogically together, or dis-
cuss them from points of view which are not closely
based on the probable happenings of reality, we run a
danger of confusing the judgment instead of clear-
ing it.

I. The Battle of Encounter

When lesser bodies of cavalry, unaccompanied by
the other arms, meet during a mutual advance, it is
essentially a matter of endeavouring to deploy more
quickly than the adversary, of surprising him if pos-
sible while still deploying, and of seizing the advan-
tages of the terrain. It is by good screening of the
approach, superior reconnaissance, a quick eye for the
possibilities of the ground, and rapid decision that
here, as before, superiority can be maintained.

It may happen in exceptional cases, under modern
conditions, that the larger bodies of cavalry, accom-
panied by a proportion of other arms, are unable at the
moment of collision to employ them — e.g. in close
country. There may then be a purely cavalry fight on
a large scale, and action must of course be taken
according to the tactical principles involved. Early
deployment, maintenance of exterior lines, rapid de-
cision, are, as regards the leading, the important fac-
tors of success.

It is quite another matter where co-operation of the
other arms can be seriously counted on. It is then
chiefly the artillery which will set its stamp upon the

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 139

development of the fight, and it will no longer be
possible to act according to purely cavalry tactical
principles. A brigade or division, in column of route,
or even in several formed columns, if exposed to the
enemy's artillery fire, will suffer such material and
moral loss that such formations, unless compelled by
circumstances, are particularly to be avoided. Who-
ever is obliged to effect the deployment of his force
under the enemy's guns casts from him one of the
most important elements of success.

It will therefore be necessary, when advancing
against the enemy, to adopt the approach formation,
and to seek cover as soon as it is calculated that the
hostile artillery are within effective range. In order
rightly to calculate this moment the enemy's probable
advance must of course be taken into consideration,
and, as this may vary greatly according to the pace
adopted, it is advisable in this respect not to be too
optimistic, but to be deployed rather too early than
too late.

Taking into consideration the range of modern ar-
tillery, the deployment should commence, therefore, in
open country, at latest when some 6,500 yards from
the enemy.* As this distance will diminish very
quickly when the opponents are both rapidly advanc-
ing, it will certainly be advisable, if the knowledge of
the situation in any way allows, to take up the required
breadth of front still earlier.

I would here lay down that a too rapid advance of
our own troops, unless rendered necessary by the situa-

^ If I lay down that the deployment in the case of in-
fantry columns marching towards each other should begin
at 8,500 yards, and in the cavalry only at 6,000 yards, the
reason is that the mounted arm effects the necessary de-
ployment much more quickly. The depth of the column, also,
is not such a decisive factor as in the case of infantry.

140 CAVALRY IN WAR

tion, is in no way advantageous. It is not generally a
question of striking the enemy as far to the front as
possible, but of striking surely, and of having sufficient
strength in hand to annihilate him in the pursuit.

A steady and well-thought-out advance should there-
fore be undertaken; for a precipitate forward move-
ment distresses the horses quite unnecessarily, ren-
ders an appreciation of the situation more difficult, and
generally allows of no well-considered action. There
is also another reason for avoiding a too rapid advance.
This is the fact that in such a case the most important
reports generally come in when the force is already
in the immediate proximity of the enemy. This dis-
advantage increases with the rapidity of the advance,
as a rapidly moving force will follow more closely on
the heels of its reconnoitring patrols. To ride slowly
forward and to give the patrols time to send back
reports will generally lead to better information as to
the situation, and will allow of a better and quicker
decision being made.- The enormous advantage may
then be gained of being deployed earlier than the
enemy, and of gaining exterior lines ^ from the begin-
ning.

In spite of this, most cavalry leaders, especially at
manoeuvres, regard their task as a matter of rapidly
covering a certain distance, and see in this the essence
of the cavalry spirit. This is, however, by no means
so. Coolness, reflection, economy of force in approach
and deplo)anent, but that lightning-like decision and
action at the proper moment, which .can only result

^ "Exterior lines." The' author uses an expression familiar
to soldiers. In popular language the meaning is to gain a
front wide enough to deliver a converging attack, and w^ork
round upon one or both of the enemy's flanks, from outside
of them. — Editor's Note.

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 141

from a clear appreciation of the situation, alone make
the great cavalry leader. It is just because such op-
posite qualities must be united in the soul of one man
that such leaders are so rare and so difficult to recog-
nise in time of peace.

When a collision with the enemy is in any way in
prospect, the commander must in principle remain,
during the advance, with the foremost detachments
of the advanced guard, in order that reports may reach
him* as early as possible. When in close proximity
to the enemy he will often be obliged to advance
with a sufficient escort from point to point, in order
that he may be able to study the ground from good
points of view, and, where possible, himself observe
the movements and dispositions of the enemy. He
will thus be in a position to make his preliminary
arrangements rapidly and effectively, to spare his
troops unnecessary marching, and to counteract any
unsuitable dispositions made by his subordinates. He
must not, however, conceal from himself that even the
most effective measures of reconnaissance may fail,
and that he may be faced by the necessity of coming to
a decision without- full knowledge as to the enemy.

In such cases, when it can be estimated that deploy-
ing distance from the enemy has been arrived at, fur-
ther reconnaissance should not be waited for to assist
decision; but the initiative must, under all circum-
stances, be maintained. The leader, then, must act ac-
cording to his own judgment, and impose the law upon
his opponent, and yet be ready, by careful dispositions,
to meet unforeseen events.

It may happen that the opponent is unexpectedly
met with, and has gained an advantage in deployment.
In such a case a forward deployment generally leads to
the dribbling up of the force, hampered, as it will be,

142 CAVALRY IN WAR

by the proximity of the enemy. The deployment
should therefore be made either on the existing line of
front or to the rear, according to the distance from the
enemy, and should be covered, where necessary, by
the dismounted action of the advanced guard and by
artillery fire. Only thus can the lost freedom of action
be regained, as superior breadth of deployment is the
first and perhaps the most important step towards the
maintenance of the initiative.

We must not, however, assume that this deployment
— in a cavalry division, for instance — requires that the
various brigades shall draw away from each other at
regulation intervals, and that the division will, in this
formation, advance towards the enemy. This will gen-
erally be impossible; first, because it is usually advis-
able to seek the cover of the ground in order to be se-
cure from possible hostile fire surprise, even when the
enemy's artillery is not yet located ; secondly, because
the regulation frontage* of deployment of a cavalry-
division is much too narrow to allow it to gain exterior
lines, or to affect a concentric attack. The deployment
must rather be carried out according to the demands
of the situation at the moment, without regard to regu-
lation intervals. The division commander will first
of all detail a reserve for himself. To this he will
then give the orders necessary for its conduct as well
as to the advanced guard, the various groups of the
main body, and the artillery and machine-guns. The
direction of march of the various subdivisions will
thus be determined according to the ground and the
intentions of the commander, and it will also usually
be necessary, in order to keep the troops well in hand,
to order the advance by stages, and to regulate the
pace.

If the advance has been carried out in separate

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 143

columns, the action of the' smaller columns must be
regulated before the deployment of the main column.
A certain loss of time will here generally be found
inevitable. The necessary preparations must therefore
be made early enough to ensure that, if the junction of
a detachment with the main body is intended, it will
be possible to carry it out before contact with the en-
emy is made. It is a matter for especially careful and
well-considered action if one of the lesser columns is
to intervene from a flank direction in a fight which is
already raging, an operation which may be of the most
decisive importance, but difficult to effect in the rapid
course of cavalry action. If, however, it is desired to
reap the benefits of such action, an endeavour must be
made to gain time by dismounted action for the arrival
of the column which is to strike the decisive blow.
Such measures will always be risky, but may lead to
glorious results.

The orders for the concentration and for the deploy-
ment form the framework on which the whole fight
develops. They are therefore of the highest impor-
tance. Faults committed here can seldom be rectified
later, and yet such orders will generally have to be
issued before touch with the enemy is gained, except by
patrols, and at a moment when the main features at
most of the enemy's situation are known. Particular
attention must, as we have seen, be paid to his artil-
lery. No one will deny that herein lies the possibility
of misapprehension and failure, and that many a leader
will shrink from the necessity of such a decision. He,
however, who, in spite of the uncertainty of the situa-
tion, succeeds in making up his mind betimes has an
obvious advantage. For it is just in such a battle of
encounter that success will fall to him who knows how
to avail himself with rapidity and determination of the

144 CAVALRY IN WAR

favourable moment, who quickly possesses himself of
important points and localities, and who anticipates the
enemy, as advocated above, in broadening the front,
and thereby in deployment.

Under such circumstances the dispositions made for
the advanced, guard will be of the greatest importance.
Its conduct has often a deciding influence on the issue
of the whole fight.

If it be carelessly handled, this circumstance may
mean the loss of the initiative, and the commander may
find himself compelled to turn his attention to the
situation forced upon him by the advanced guard, and
to conduct the- fight otherwise than his own intentions
and the general situation demand. 'On the other hand,
a too careful employment of the advanced detachments
is apt to entail loss of advantages which might be of
decisive importance. The proper conduct of such an
advanced guard demands, therefore, an unusually sure
military instinct. Its commander must always be in-
structed in a detailed manner as to the intentions of the
general, if he is expected to handle his detachment
successfully according to them.

It will often be advisable for the advanced guard to
occupy some point of support dismounted, in order
that the deployment and the further tactical develop-
ment may be undertaken under cover of it. In such
circumstances there is no reason to shrink, when neces-
sary, from bringing the advanced guard back to some
suitable locality, if thereby full cover can be afforded
for the rear detachments or for separated portions of
the force that may be rejoining. It will often be" found
desirable also, in the critical moments of deployment,
to strengthen the resisting power of the advanced
guard by machine-guns. It may, however, on the other
hand, be equally advantageous for the advanced de-

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 145

tachments, on collision with the enemy, to charge him
recklessly in order to reap full benefit from some fa-
vourable opportunity.

The handling of the artillery, particularly at the
moment of deployment, is of especial importance. It
may be a great. advantage to bring it into action before
the enemy's artillery, in order to profit by any careless-
ness of the hostile troops in deployment and approach,
and to surprise their artillery when coming into posi-
tion. The conduct of the advanced guard must there-
fore be influenced by the fact that a suitable position
must be assured to the artillery. Its fire will often
suffice to induce the enemy to show his strength or to
evacuate localities which he has occupied.

As long as the strength of the enemy is unknown,
and the possibilities of superior force have to be reck-
oned with, it would be a great error to stake the whole
force -as soon as contact has been gained. This is
often done on training-grounds in quite a systematic
way, because there is always a tacit understanding that
the enemy is no stronger than one's own force. In
war such action might lead to the gravest disasters.

If, therefore, complete uncertainty reigns as to the
enemy's strength, it will be better at first to operate
tentatively with a portion of the force until an opinion
can be arrived at as to whether the decisive attack can
be ventured on. Energetic contact with the enemy by
fire action will generally soon clear up this point.

The view that a gradual and judicious employment
of force is not in accordance with the principles of cav-
alry action (430) ^ can only be justified in the case of

1 "An attack in which troops are sent gradually into action
in small detachments, one* after the other, is not in accord-
ance with the spirit of cavalry combat. A force large
enough for the attainment of the objective must, therefore.

146 CAVALRY IN WAR

the pure cavalry combat mounted. This, however, in
my opinion, should only be determined upon if the
enemy's strength is known, at all events to some de-
gree. I do not share the view of the Regulations that,
if uncertainty reigns as to the strength and intentions
of the enemy, freedom of action can be preserved,
even in the mounted combat against cavalry, by the
use of formations in echelon (424).^ This is only pos-
sible by a protracted action in which gradual rein-
forcements are used, and only in such a manner can
the enemy be forced to disclose his strength and inten-
tions. A protracted fight, however, can only be carried
out by fire action. A mounted advance, whether made
in echelon or otherwise, cannot alter the rapid nature
of a cavalry fight, and will not allow of sufficient time
being gained to form a proper appreciation of the en-
emy. Echelon formations lead at best to eccentric at-
tacks and thereby to unfavorable tactical situations.

If the situation is to be cleared up by fighting, fire
action must be employed, and as soon as this occurs,
whether on the part of the enemy or oneself, a gradual
employment of force is not only no disadvantage, but
is demanded by the circumstances. For at first the
fight must be carried out from depth ; the Napoleonic
"Je m'engage et puis je vois" ^ holds good ; one's own
main force will only be engaged when the strength and

be employed from the very commencement of the engage-
ment. But not a man more ! No squadron must be allowed
to deal a blow in the air. Conversely, it is wrong to com-
mence an engagement with insufficient force, and thus to
leave the enemy with initial success."

* "Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of
battle of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the
strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such
echelon formations as will preserve freedom of action."

•"I get into action and then I see."

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 147

intentions of the enemy become in some measure
known. It will, however, be advisable in all cases to
keep a strong reserve in hand until prepared to ad-
vance to a well-considered and planned attack.

The passage of defiles, also, is scarcely likely to be
undertaken in serious war in the manner so often seen
at manoeuvres. Here the chief matter for considera-
tion is generally to keep one side as far from the defile
as possible, in order that the passage of the other may
be possible. Such tender solicitude is scarcely to be
expected of a real enemy, and it will, I opine, scarcely
occur to anybody in war to attempt a defile without
preparation, and to advance on the farther side against
an enemy whose strength, as is generally the case in
war, is unknown, thereby running the danger of being
thrown back on the defile and of suffering enormous
loss. Such a danger, to which the whole force is
exposed, would certainly only be incurred when the
gravest necessity compelled. What the Regulations
say in this respect (434) * has, to my mind, but a lim-
ited practical significance.

Such directions would only be followed if the enemy
were known to be still far distant and approaching,
where there is time and space sufficient, and where the
force is considered to be at least a match for the enemy.
Even then, preparations should be made for a possible
retirement. In all other cases, however, a defile on the

* "If, on emerging from a defile, the enemy is not so close
as to necessitate an immediate attack with any available
forces, a deployment at the halt offers certain advantages.
It saves space towards the front, and gains time — a matter of
some moment in a critical situation. On the other hand, it
must be remembered that an immediate employment and
advance inspires the troops with enthusiasm. A deploy-
ment at the halt may also take place when the intention
is to make a surprise attack from a concealed position."

148 CAVALRY IN WAR

far side of which the enemy is supposed to be will only
be crossed when the ground for deployment on the far
side is at least commanded with fire in such a way that
the enemy will not be able, in case a retirement becomes
necessary, to pursue right into the defile.

It will therefore generally be advisable to throw
forward a few squadrons at a rapid pace across the
defile in order to occupy with dismounted action strong
points on the far side, from which the foreground can
be covered. This will secure the passage of the main
body and arrest any possible pursuit. It will often be
advantageous to provide such squadrons with machine-
guns. Artillery can most suitably come into action on
the near side of the defile, so that it may be able to
cover the country on the far side with its fire.

Even if a defile occupied by the enemy has been
captured by fire action it is advisable, before the main
body crosses it, to secure a few strong points in the
foreground, in order to secure the passage against
counter-attack by the enemy's reserve.

Such necessary care in the preliminaries of an action,
however, must in nowise lead commanders to allow
themselves to be forced to adopt a defensive attitude or
to abstain from decisive attack. That is not the in-
tention. Such measures are only taken to clear up
the situation, which cannot generally be done in war
without fighting, and to diminish the risks of any
further action which may ensue. If the enemy has so
far shown himself that an appreciation can to some
extent be arrived at as to its strength, if he has brought
artillery into position, if perhaps he has attacked our
advanced guard, or by the action of the latter has been
forced to throw more men into the fight, if, in short, it
can be determined that an attack has prospect of
success, then the decisive offensive must be undertaken,

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 149

with all the force hitherto kept back. Detachments,
also, which have been dismounted can then, according
to circumstances, be withdrawn from the fire fight and
otherwise used. The attack, especially when mounted,
will usually be delivered with greatest advantage from
the flank, and must, as a rule, reach well out in order to
escape as far as possible the artillery and machine-gun
fire of the enemy. Whether it be undertaken mounted
or dismounted will depend upon the attitude of the
enemy and the attendant circumstances. In either case
it will be advisable to husband a reserve as long as
possible to meet the vicissitudes of the fight, or to be
used for a bold stroke, when it is seen where a decision
may be arrived at.

If dismounted action must be undertaken, the prin-
ciples which govern the infantry attack hold good. The
fire of the artillery and, where possible, the machine-
guns must naturally be utilised for the support of the
attacking troops. The dispositions for the action
should, however, never depend upon the possibility of
finding a good artillery position. The artillery must
suit itself to the circumstances, and come into action
wherever it can best co-operate in carrying out the
commander's intentions. It can often be profitably em-
ployed in the protection of an exposed flank. It will
be of advantage to shelter it behind some obstacle in
order to save the necessity of finding a detachment for
its security. Machine-guns may sometimes be advan-
tageowsly used for the protection of the artillery. It
is at the same time advisable that a specially detailed
cavalry escort should be dismounted for this object.

A concentration of the batteries facilitates fire com-
mand and measures for protection. A dispersion by
groups allows a better effect against the hostile artillery
and usually affords a more extensive field of fire.

I50 CAVALRY IN WAR

Machine-guns, which must generally look for positions
as far to the front as possible, or, if they are protected,
to a flank, will usually be best concentrated in a single
fire position. They may, however, be disposed by
sections when occasion demands. This principle holds
good also for the artillery. Hard-and-fast rules must
be avoided if the many and varied demands of a cav-
alry fight are to be met. The line of fire, however, of
artillery and machine-guns should never be allowed to
limit the movements of our own cavalry.

In consequence of the peculiar nature of the cavalry
fight it will often be desirable to keep the limbers with
the guns. It may also be an advantage not to bring
the first-line transport and a portion of the wagons on
to the field itself. For similar reasons the light ammu-
nition columns will at the commencement probably
march with the baggage. Thus too it will often be
necessary for the machine-gun detachments to keep
their teams near the guns, or to shoot from the carriage
and to leave the ammunition wagons in a safe place.
All these measures contain, however, the danger that
ammunition may not be at hand when wanted, or that
these indispensable supplies may fall into the hands of
hostile raiding parties. The failure of ammunition
may, especially in the case of a protracted dismounted
action, be of decisive importance. Such will be espe-
cially the case where the ground favours the use of the
rifle, or where the hostile cavalry is strengthened by
cyclists or mounted infantry and shows an eagerness
(natural under such circumstances) to take advantage
of such methods of fighting.

The cavalry leader will, under these conditions, only
undertake what must be an obstinate combat when he
cannot in any way avoid it, or at least is not compelled
to attack frontally. He will rather endeavour, if the

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 151

general situation allows, to separate the hostile cavalry
from the less mobile infantry by repeated turning
movements and then to attack it when isolated. If the
hostile cavalry and horse artillery can be driven from
the field, the infantry detachments will form an easy
prey for the artillery or can be surrounded. Under
such circumstances, always with due regard to the
general situation, the road on which the advance is
being made may for a time be abandoned and the
turning movement carried out with the whole force, if
such a proceeding affords a favourable prospect of tac-
tical success. Such a movement threatens the enemy's
communications in the same way as it exposes our
own. Victory, however, will secure the latter again,
and will be the more decisive the farther the enemy
can be driven from his natural line of retreat.

Should the cavalry meet a superior force of all arms,
such as might be pushed forward by the enemy's army,
to support the offensive of his own cavalry, or to serve
as a pivot of manoeuvre, for them, a decisive battle
must on no account be undertaken with it.

When the Regulations (519) ^ demand that endea-
vours must be made to force back such detachments or
to break through them, I think that the tactical value
of the arm is over-estimated. I cannot conceive any
real case in which cavalry can break through hostile
detachments of all arms. In my opinion the cavalry
will generally have to be content to make such detach-

1 "During operations, the army cavalry must seek to gain
the earliest possible insight into the situation and disposi-
tions of the enemy. It must endeavour, not only to drive
the hostile cavalry from the field, but also to press back
advanced detachments of all arms, or to break through and
push forward to the vicinity of the main body. Cavalry
screen duties, also, may provide fighting for the army cav-
alry.

152 CAVALRY IN WAR

ments deploy, by means of artillery fire, and especially
by fire action from a flank, and thereby to lose time, to
deflect them from their line of march, and, by threat-
ening their rear and communications, prevent them
from carrying out their intentions. Bold measures are
in such cases the best, and will preserve to the cavalry
the possibility of continuing the distant reconnaissance
in rear of the hostile detachment.

As to the leading, in all such battles of encounter the
commander's place, as has already been indicated, is at
the head of the advanced guard. As soon, however, as
contact has been gained he must, on the contrary, re-
main far enough behind the fighting-line to be able to
watch his own troops and the enemy, and to be easily
found. He should not be wandering about the battle-
field, seeing everything and arranging everything him-
self. Only where it appears necessary to him to make
a moral impression should he place himself at the head
of an attacking force. He might, especially, lead his
last reserve into battle, and by his personal example
endeavour to inspire the troops to an impetuous attack.
Such cases, however, will be very exceptional. It will
always be most important that the supreme commander
retains control over the whole of his troops, and can
receive messages and at decisive moments issue orders
and instructions to the force.

In the greater number of cases the commander will
personally neither reconnoitre the ground whither he is
sending a detachment nor yet the enemy which it shall
engage. He will scarcely ever be able to give to single
small units or even to the directing brigade, if indeed he
has detailed one, the direction of attack. It will often
be impossible for changes in orders to reach troops once
set in motion in time to be of use, especially in a purely
cavalry fight.

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 153

When the Regulations, in spite of this, declare it to
be indispensable that the leader himself must be able to
see if he takes the offensive against cavalry (403),^
this is, under modern conditions and large formations,
in most cases quite impracticable, even in manoeuvres.
As a rule the commander will only be able to indicate
the task, and it must be left to the subordinate leaders
to carry it out to the best of their ability, according to
the situation as they find it on the spot. The situation
during the rapidly changing phases of the cavalry fight
will often be quite different from what was expected
when the tasks were allotted.

On the other hand, before the commencement of the
engagement, all subordinate leaders must be informed
as to the situation and the general idea of the fight, also
as to what duties each one of the larger formations is to
carry out ; so that all may be in a position to act accord-
ing to the views and intentions of the commander if
circumstances should be found different from what was
expected. It will in most cases be desirable to issue the
order for deployment in such a way that at least every
brigade commander is informed of the general situa-
tion, and then to give supplementary orders for the
fight which will be issued to all units. Whether in a
battle of encounter it will be always possible to detail a
directing brigade I very much doubt. One brigade will
often fight on foot, the other mounted, while the change
from the advanced-guard role to deployment for battle

^ "The leader must select a station from which, while keep-
ing his own troops well in hand, he can obtain a good view
of the surrounding country, of the enemy, and of the prog-
ress of the battle. He will either observe himself, or by-
means of officers sent out to observing stations. These
latter must maintain constant communication with him.

"Personal observation is always the best, and is essential
in the case of offensive action against cavalry"

154 CAVALRY IN WAR

will generally render a handling of the division accord-
ing to rule practically impossible. The idea that, with
an independent army cavalry in the battle of encounter,
one division can in some measure be handled as on the
drill-ground, and can be put into the fight in proper
cohesion, must be dismissed. That is an error that has
grown upon the exercise-ground, and which the condi-
tions of modern warfare will not admit.

The more, however, that the method of leading is
compelled by the pressure of modern development to
change from tactical routine and adopt a more or less
strategic form, the more unconditionally is it demanded
of subordinate leaders that they be, even when inde-
pendent, continually conscious of the guiding tactical
principles, and endeavour to act in accordance with
them.

The necessary consideration for the effect of the
enemy's fire should never lead to fainthearted disposi-
tions or paralyse the idea of decisive offensive action.
If the result of the fight appears doubtful, the most
decisive measures must be taken with rapidity and
determination, and the last reserve thrown into the
fight, regardless of consequences, in order to wrest vic-
tory from the enemy. For daring is in itself a mighty
factor of success, and one which exercises enormous
influence on the fickle Goddess of Fortune. The cal-
culated boldness of all, and the greatest initiative within
reasonable limits of subordinate leaders, must give to
the fight of the cavalry mass its peculiar character.

It appears to me that this principle cannot be too
greatly emphasised when considering the cavalry tactics
of the present day.

If the fight takes a favourable course, the com-
mander will make timely preparations for an effective
pursuit, get control of any reserves still intact, and take

THE BATTLE OF ENCOUNTER 155

measures for the concentration of strong_ bodies of his
troops, so as to be prepared for further tactical action.
Artillery and machine-guns advance rapidly — when
necessary, on their own initiative — in order to come to
effective range as soon as possible. Should the fight
take an unfavourable turn, the commander will first
make dispositions for these arms, unless they are to
remain in position and sacrifice themselves to facilitate
retirement. They will generally be sent to the rear in
good time to a previously selected position. Only then
will measures be taken to extricate the troops involved
with the enemy, to concentrate them in a safe place,
and to make fresh dispositions. Should the enemy
pursue with but weak detachments, the offensive should
be renewed.

2. Attack of Localities

The attack of an enemy who takes up a defensive
attitude can obviously only be carried out dismounted.
It must be a matter, therefore, for careful considera-
tion whether such an operation shall be undertaken or
not. Considerable numerical superiority is necessary
to ensure success. A reserve will be needed, which can
be used dismounted, to give the final decision at the
decisive point, or to meet unexpected events. Besides
this, it will be necessary in most cases to make a de-
tachment which shall provide for the security of the
led horses, for reconnaissance, and for operating
against the enemy's flank and rear. It is the task of
such a detachment to seek out and overthrow the en-
emy's mounted reserve, that it may then be able to
co-operate in the main attack. The expression
"Mounted reserve," used in the Regulations to desig-
nate this detachment, hardly corresponds with the role

156 CAVALRY IN WAR

of these troops, which will be offensive from the com-
mencement.

Here also I find myself in disagreement with the idea
of the Regulations that the dismounted reserve can be
frequently detailed from the troops which have re-
mained mounted (460)/ The mounted reserve must,
as we have seen, operate offensively. The Regulations
themselves allot this task to it by laying down that it
shall undertake operations against the enemy's flank,
his led horses, and his reserves (464).^ It is, however,
not compatible with these duties that the mounted re-
serve shall at the same time find a dismounted reserve,
which can only enter the fight from the rear, and until
then must remain behind the fighting-line. Different
troops must be detailed from the first for both these
duties, otherwise neither of them will be properly car-
ried out.

Should the cavalry commander not have at his dis-
posal sufficient force to meet all these demands, he will
generally be better advised to abstain from the attack,
and to endeavour to carry out his mission in some other

^ "As a general principle, a mounted reserve will be de-
tailed.

"In special cases, the leader may detail a dismounted
reserve, which he can make use of at points where, during
the course of the battle, the enemy's weakness is disclosed,
or which are recognized as decisive objectives for the at-
tack. It is often advisable only to detail such a force, when
it is required, from the troops which have remained
mounted."

2 "The mounted reserve continues the tactical reconnais-
ance and undertakes the protection of the led horses. It
will also assume the offensive against a flank of the hostile
position, whenever it is possible to combine it with the above
duties. When fighting dismounted cavalry, it endeavours to
drive the hostile mounted reserve from the field, and to cap-
ture the led horses."

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 157

manner. An unsuccessful enterprise not only entails
unnecessary loss, but tends to lower the moral value of
the troops. It is only when conscious of great moral
and tactical superiority, or when there is a prospect
of surprising the enemy, that an attack should be dared
without the necessary numerical preponderance.

The more difficult and serious such an undertaking
is, the greater efforts must be made to gain at least a
favourable base for attack, as regards not only the
direction of the attack but also any special advantages
of the ground. The mobility of the troops renders
rapid changes of direction possible, such as are un-
known to the infantry. Unlike the case of the infan-
try, therefore, the line of advance and of attack need
not coincide. If thorough reconnaissance of the en-
emy's position, and the ground in front of it, is made
in good time, it will often be possible to change the
base of attack even at the last moment and to appear
suddenly from an unexpected direction.

Therefore, even in the approach, the deplo5mient, and
the advance to effective range, the ground should be
carefully utilised in order that cover from view and fire
may be secured as long as possible. It is also impor-
tant to clear the country where the approach and de-
ployment will take place of the enemy's patrols, and
to do everything possible to prevent his reconnais-
sance.

Artillery and machine-guns must come into action in
such a way that they will be able to combine with the
firing-line in concentrating an overwhelming fire
against the decisive points of attack. The guns will
generally be able to come into action under cover, and
to fire indirect against the enemy in position. .They
will only engage the enemy's artillery if the latter
;Shows itself in open or half-covered positions with the

158 CAVALRY IN WAR

object of turning its fire on the advancing attack.
Otherwise the fire of the artillery will be directed
against the enemy's firing-line or any mounted detach-
ments that are visible. It is of importance that a suffi-
cient quantity of ammunition should be brought up,
and that it should not be wasted by random fire against
invisible targets.

The orders for the fight must be issued with great
care and clearness, for, once the battle is begun, it will
not generally be possible to make changes of disposi-
tion. The difficulty, also, of changing the front of the
fighting-line increases in proportion to the size of the
units employed. It is therefore of the highest impor-
tance not only to determine the front of attack before
the commencement of a fight, but also to give a clear
order allotting a definite task to each unit, which
should, when possible, be made known to all the troops.
Only if this is achieved will they be able to act inde-
pendently according to the spirit of the orders.

When all preparatory dispositions have been made,
the attack should, if possible, be commenced simultane-
ously, unless circumstances demand that some detach-
ments take up the fire fight before the others are ready
to co-operate. From the moment that the attack is
commenced, but one thought should inspire the troops :
"Forward against the enemy, cost what it inay."
Pressing continually to the front, each must endeavour
to surpass his neighbour. Should further advance be
impossible without reinforcements, the ground won
must be maintained at all costs, even against hostile
counter-attack.

The strength of the first deployment of the firing-
line must depend on circumstances. In any case the
whole breadth of that part of the enemy's front must
be simultaneously engaged which is able to direct its

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 159

fire against the attack, as otherwise the latter will be
exposed to flanking or cross-fire.

If the ground allows of a covered approach to within
efifective range, a sufficiently thick firing-line should be
established at once. On the other hand, where cover
is scarce, it will sometimes be advisable, when sufficient
time can be spared, to deploy at first only a loose,
irregular firing-line, which will offer a difficult target
to the enemy, or to remain at first under cover and
gradually to strengthen the firing-line in the same way
until it attains the strength necessary to commence the
attack. In the further advance, supports must follow
all the firing-lines, to make good losses, keep up the
ammunition supply, and to put new moral strength
into the fighting-line.

Open country in such cases demands increased depth
in order to minimise loss, while close country requires
that depth should be diminished, and it will be found
advisable to act accordingly. Close formation can and
must be maintained as long as the terrain and the
hostile fire admit. It will of course be impossible to
expose such formations within range of the enemy's
fire. The advance will then consist of rushes, with
pauses for breath, of distribution into small units,
and the adoption of extended order. The nearer the
decision of the fight, the closer must the supports
follow, ready to co-operate.

In difficult country the order and cohesion of units
must not be lost. It is especially important for the
supports as well as the firing-line to make use of any
available cover, so that units may be re-formed, am-
munition supply regulated, and that the officers may
regain their influence over the troops. This latter
moral element deserves especial consideration.

When feeling its way forward the firing-line should

i6o CAVALRY IN WAR

avoid regular formation, and its rushes should not be
made in too small bodies, as such a proceeding is apt
to mask the fire of neighbouring detachments. It will
likewise generally happen that some portions of the
line are able to advance under cover of the ground
more rapidly than others. These must then ask them-
selves the question whether their isolated advance
might not lead to a reverse which would imperil the
success of the attack. On the other hand, the unceas-
ing pressing forward of all the various detachments is
conditional to success. If localities exist in the fore-
ground which might serve as supporting points for the
further development of the attack, it should be con-
sidered whether they should not be occupied as rapidly
as possible, and, where necessary, secured against
counter-attack by being placed in a state of hasty de-
fence. The advance of neighbouring detachments may
then be facilitated from such points by energetic fire
action. Such points at the same time secure the pos-
session of the ground won and, under certain circum-
stances, protect those portions of the artillery and the
machine-gun detachments which may accompany the
attack, according as circumstances dictate. In any case
such a measure (the co-operation of artillery and ma-
chine-guns) brings moral support to the attacking-line,
and may at times prevent a defeat.

As soon as the firing-line has arrived within assault-
ing distance its fire must be increased to the utmost.
All detachments in rear press forward regardless of
loss as soon as they become aware that the first line is
preparing for the assault. At the trumpet-call "Rapid
advance" ^ the whole hurl themselves with the greatest
determination and with loud cheers upon the enemy.
Any reserves which may be still to the rear strain
* "Rasch vorwarts."

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES i6i

every nerve to reach the advanced firing-Hne. The as-
sault should, if possible, be simultaneous. But the
effort to secure this should never lead to detachments
waiting for each other. Where a possibility is offered
to single portions of the force to penetrate into the
enemy's position they must advance independently,
and all other detachments must conform.

It is important that the assault should not be begun
too early, but that the firing-line should work its way
forward to the closest range before rising for the final
charge. The Infantry Drill Regulations lay down 150
paces as a guide for this distance in peace. That is a
great deal too much. I do not think that the firing-
line, especially in deep ground or uphill, can "rush"
forward in full marching order 150 paces after having
already carried out a lengthy attack. These instruc-
tions of the Infantry Drill should certainly be modi-
fied. Cavalry, however, should not fall into this error.
A premature assault may imperil the success of the
attack, because physical force may fail, and the enemy's
fire is given a chance of regaining its full strength.
The fire weapon should rather be used up to the last
moment. The assault should take place only from the
closest possible distance, and this will ensure success.
For the rest, I may draw attention to the instructions
laid down in the Cavalry Drill for the dispositions for
the attack and for its conduct. On these points it
coincides with my view, and it would be superfluous
here to repeat what lies therein. If I have gone into
the question of the conduct of the attack rather more
closely, it is to emphasise certain points that are not
prominent enough in the compressed instructions of
the Regulations, and which do not generally receive
sufficient consideration.

i62 CAVALRY IN WAR

As to surprise fire action, also, the Regulations con-
tain all the essentials (471-473).^

I may, however, touch here upon another matter
which is connected with dismounted action, i.e. the
question of armament. It has often been proposed,
and from influential quarters, to replace the cavalry
sword by some kind of a bayonet. If, it is said, with
a certain appearance of justification, cavalry are to
assault hostile positions on foot, they must have some
arme blanche for the hand-to-hand fight, and this can
only be a bayonet. The war in Manchuria, where
such melees repeatedly took place, is cited as a proof
of the necessity of such an armament. I cannot ally
myself with such proposals. As to the repeated hand-
to-hand fights in the Russo-Japanese war, these took
place principally because the Russians found it impos-
sible to evacuate their entrenchments in time, and that
they took such full advantage of cover that they were
in some measure surprised by the attacker. These ex-
amples can certainly not be adapted therefore to the
dismounted action of our cavalry. With them it will

^"Cavalry may succeed in causing hostile detachments
considerable loss, and in upsetting their dispositions, by a sur-
prise appearance combined with an unexpected and simul-
taneous opening of fire. By means of skilful use of ground,
and by reason of their mobility, they can rapidly disappear
and escape hostile fire action, as soon as they have obtained
the desired results."

"As many carbines as possible must open fire simultane-
ously. The leader must do his best to select such ground
for the surprise as will permit of the horses being kept under
cover close at hand."

"Horse artillery and machine-guns are necessary to pro-
duce the full effect of fire. Occasionally the co-operation of
the cavalry may be limited to protecting the artillery while
taking up a position, whence it can suddenly open a rapid
fire on the enemy."

ATTACK OF LOCALITIES 163

never be a question of prepared positions — which cav-
alry will, as a rule, neither attack nor defend — but
of actions resulting from a battle of encounter. In
such cases, however, as the experience of military
history teaches us, a hand-to-hand fight is quite ex-
ceptional. Even the struggle for localities is fought
out almost entirely with the firearm. If the defence
should consist of dismounted cavalry and cyclists, it
cannot as a rule be assumed that such troops will
allow the attack to come to close quarters. They will
more generally, as soon as the decision of the fire fight
has become clear, endeavour to reach their horses or
cycles and to escape the fire of the pursuit. As a
matter of fact, therefore, dismounted cavalry would
really only use the bayonet on foot in quite excep-
tional cases, and it would only be justifiable to intro-
duce it if there were no attendant disadvantages. Such,
however, is not the case. I would regard the abolition
of the present sword as a great danger, calculated to
seriously injure the morale of the cavalry.

Our lance is an excellent weapon for the charge, but
for single combat only in cases where the men have
freedom of movement. In the close turmoil of the fight
it is very difficult to handle with success ; besides which,
it easily becomes unserviceable on striking an object too
heavily. Should it pierce a body at the full speed of a
horse's gallop it will generally bend on being drawn out
(if indeed the rider in his haste extricates it at all), and
then becomes unserviceable. In such a case the man
needs his sword. A short bayonet can never replace
this, and a compromise between a bayonet and a sword
would be of but little service. If the sword is taken
away from the cavalry soldier he will be rendered in
many cases weaponless. There can be no doubt of this.
And the consciousness of this drawback would very

i64 CAVALRY IN WAR

soon be felt by the troops and would damp their eager-
ness for the fight.

The case, then, is this. When confronted by a hos-
tile cavalry of any activity, the mounted combat, the
melee, at least for smaller detachments and patrols,
will be of almost daily occurrence; while, as we have
seen, the hand-to-hand fight on foot must be most ex-
ceptional. To injure the efficiency of the troops for
their daily role for the sake of such isolated occur-
rences I hold to be a great mistake, and therefore hope
that the arm will be spared this fate.

3. Defence

As regards the principles of the defence, I may draw
attention to the instructions laid down in the new Cav-
alry Regulations, which coincide with my views in all
essentials. There are, however, still a few points to be
raised which seem to me of importance.

First and foremost, I think that it follows, from the
above arguments, that, in the case of cavalry operating
independently, engagements may often take place
which, with a generally offensive intention, must be
conducted at times in a defensive spirit and with only
part of the troops — that is to say, where it is not the
intention to act on the defensive with the whole force,
but to use the defence only as a means of resuming the
general offensive later at the most advantageous time.
It will be possible, especially in the battle of encounter,
to defend favourable positions or localities with the
advanced troops, either to gain time for the arrival of
the main body, or else to oblige the enemy to weaken
his reserves, against which the offensive is intended.
This combination of attack and defence will frequently
occur, I am convinced, even in the battle of encounter.

DEFENCE 165

In such cases the defence must endeavour to deceive
the opponent and to provoke the attack. Efforts will
be made, while putting but few men into the fight, to
give the impression of strength in the firing-line, and
yet so to dispose the troops that attack will not appear
impossible, if carried out in sufficient force. Groups
of men on a broad front, a liberal expenditure of am-
munition, and sometimes the holding back of artillery
and machine-guns, are the means whereby the enemy
may be thus misled.

But, even if the defensive on a large scale is adopted
because the force is considered too weak to take the
offensive in the open, the guiding principle will still be,
as I have already indicated, to obtain a decision in the
defensive fight by an offensive counter-stroke, in so far
as the force and the circumstances of the ground in any
way permit. This is a fundamental principle of the
spirit of cavalry.

The force destined for the counter-attack should
accordingly be detailed from the first. Efforts must be
made, by using favourable country for the defensive
front and thus being able to occupy it weakly, to spare
every available man for the counter-attack, and to com-
pensate for the weakness of the force in position by
ample ammunition, well-arranged cross-fire, and simi-
lar measures. The troops designed to play the offensive
role must first be placed in reserve, withdrawn, as far
as possible, from view and fire of the enemy. As soon
as the situation is cleared up, they will be placed in
echelon behind that flank from which the counter-
stroke will take place. Whether this will be a mounted
or dismounted attack depends on the character of the
ground and similar circumstances. In any case a base
for attack outside the limits of the enemy's fire must
be reached, and, where possible, by surprise.

i66 CAVALRY IN WAR

It is therefore of the highest importance that the
enemy shall be prevented from gaining observation as
to the conduct of the reserve, in order that its presence
may eventually come as a surprise to him. Hostile
patrols must be attacked with remorseless energy wher-
ever seen, and, if possible, put out of action. Those
look-out points, on the other hand, from which obser-
vation can be made of the enemy must be occupied
early in the fight.

The cavalry will, as a rule, only undertake a com-
pletely passive defence, where the object of the fight is
to hold the crossing over some obstacle, to defend
isolated, localities, or to gain time. In such a case the
question is one of the obstinate defence of a definite
object, sometimes perhaps, also, of a retirement from
one point to another. Such an operation, however, is
always difficult to carry out on account of the led
horses, and should only be attempted in very favorable
country. It demands that the fight shall be broken off
— always a difficult matter, and, to cavalry encumbered
by their led horses, one of considerable danger. The
horses certainly render it possible, by making a proper
use of the ground, to withdraw more rapidly than
could infantry in the same case. On the other hand,
however, they tie the dismounted troops down to a
definite direction of retreat, and remounting, when
pressed by the enemy, is always a critical matter.

4. Breaking off the Fight, Retreat, and Pursuit

When it becomes apparent during the course of a
fight that success cannot ensue, the commander must
decide in good time whether he will carry the engage-
ment through or break it off. To choose the right mo-
ment for the latter operation is generally extraordi-

FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 167

narily difficult, even when it has been planned from the
commencement. To make the necessary dispositions,
also, demands great tactical skill. To continue the fight
with determination, perhaps till nightfall, will often
cost no greater sacrifice than the breaking off of the
engagement and the attendant retreat.

Generally speaking, such engagements will only be
those which are fought out on foot. The more open
the country, the closer the enemy, and the greater the
number of troops which have already been thrown into
the fighting-line, so much the more difficult will it
usually be to break off the fight. The circumstance
also as to whether the led horses are mobile or im-
mobile, and their position, will naturally influence
the decision. On the other hand, it is easier to ex-
tricate the force after some success has been gained;
whether it be that a hostile attack has been repulsed, or
that our own troops have made a successful counter-
stroke. History teaches us that at such moments there
is generally a lull, during which the opponent is obliged
to bring up fresh troops or to make fresh tactical
dispositions.

Even under such favourable conditions, however, it
will generally be impossible to break loose from the
enemy without suffering heavy loss.

In defence, if the ground is especially favourable, it
will certainly be possible at times to extricate a force
without considerable loss. If it can rapidly withdraw
from the firing-line and retire covered from pursuing
fire, the whole force may under certain circumstances
simultaneously evacuate a position, that is to say, if the
enemy is still so far distant that he is unable to employ
pursuing fire until the defender has reached a place of
safety. How seldom, however, will such be the case!
Small detachments will generally have to be sacrificed

i68 CAVALRY IN WAR

to secure the retreat of the main body. This means
that various especially strong supporting points in the
position will be occupied, and the force will withdraw
under cover of them.

Military history offers us repeated examples where
the attacker makes desperate endeavours to overpower
such points, and in so doing forgets to pursue the with-
drawing masses of the defender's troops. This, for
example, was the part played at the battle of Weissen-
burg by Geisberg Castle and Schafbusch, and the
chateau with its enclosed park at the battle of Coul-
miers. Under cover of these points, against which all
the efforts of the French were concentrated, the de-
fenders were able in both cases to withdraw so slightly
molested that even touch with them was completely
lost.

The defence of such supporting points, which must
be conducted with the utmost obstinacy, frequently
ends in capture, but the end gained is worth the sacri-
fice. If the endeavour is made to withdraw the whole
line of defence simultaneously under circumstances
where it is possible for the attacker to bring to bear an
effective pursuing fire from the captured position, loss
will generally be much greater than that which would
be deliberately incurred in arresting the pursuit.

The conditions are similar in attack. At manoeuvres
certainly we see the attacker when repulsed turn about,
and, in a continuous retreat, lay himself open to a
pursuing fire, which would mean absolute destruction.
I do not think such a manoeuvre possible in reality.
As the advance has been by stages, so must be the
retreat. But, whereas in the advance it was a matter
of pressing forward on a wide connected front, in or-
der to hold the whole of the enemy's position under
fire, and not oi massing together where cover could be

FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 169

obtained, the exact contrary is the case in retreat, and
the troops must seek any cover that will shelter them
from the fire of the pursuit. Various strong points in
the attack which have already been taken and occupied
must be obstinately held during the retirement, and
from them a heavy fire poured into the pursuit to bring
it to a standstill. Care should be taken, even during
an advance, to keep such places well supplied with am-
munition, which can either be taken forward to the
captured position or be at the disposal of the retiring
troops.

I do not think that it will be possible in any other
manner to break off an attack which has penetrated to
within effective range of the enemy, or to carry out a
compulsory retreat without disastrous loss.

The troops must fall back, obstinately contesting
the ground and continually recommencing fire from
any favourable position. The commander must make
careful preparations, even when advancing, that a pos-
sible retreat shall not lead to disaster, but will be able
to find prepared points of support. All detachments,
however, that are outside the effective range of the
enemy's fire, and still capable of manoeuvre, especially
artillery and machine-guns, must from commanding
positions bring fire to bear on those troops which are
harassing the retreat, regardless of the losses they
may themselves incur. In such a moment everything
must be subordinated to delivering the retreating
masses from that destruction which the fire of the pur-
suit portends. Any advance of pursuing cavalry, also,
must be met by heavy fire from such detachments,
regardless of the expenditure of ammunition.

A retreat, then, requires particularly intelligent hand-
ling. The various detachments must be provided with
instructions that are clear and definite. The com-

170 CAVALRY IN WAR

mander must have his troops well in hand, must ar-
range for the occupation of any positions, decide which
detachments shall cover the retreat, dispose of the
artillery and machine-guns, determine the line of re-
treat of the various units, with due regard to the situa-
tion of their led horses, and arrange for the occupation
of the rallying position. He should himself only leave
the field when the force has got clear of the enemy.
He must then, however, straightway attend to the re-
arrangement of the tactical dispositions, and take the
other necessary measures. Any reserve still in hand
must be used to check the pursuit where possible by a
vigorous offensive. It is just in such situations that
a determined counter-attack, even by a weak force,
makes the greatest impression on the enemy.

As to the further conduct of the retreat after a
successful extrication, definite instructions are naturally
impossible. Everything depends on the circumstances
of the moment. The possibilities of resuming the of-
fensive must be borne in mind, even during a retire-
ment. To this end it is frequently advisable to fall
back partially towards a flank. Gneisenau, after the
defeat at Ligny, directed the retreat on Wavre, in order
to be able to take up the offensive again on the follow-
ing day, and thus supplied us with a brilliant example
well worthy of imitation even where the forces engaged
are but small.

If it is a matter of mounted combat, the breaking
off of the actual fight is quite impossible. Troops once
engaged must carry the fight through. Even when
retreating from the melee, fighting cavalry has no kind
of means of extricating itself. It is then entirely
dependent on the enemy, and can only retire at the
most rapid speed. Reserves alone are able to bring
the immediate pursuit to a standstill by intervening in

FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 171

the running fight. Generally, however, this will only-
end when the horses of the victor are quite exhausted,
or when the latter feels the necessity of getting his
troops in hand and forming again for fresh duties.
The further conduct of the vanquished troops must
depend on the condition of the horses and the general
situation. It is of importance to withdraw beyond the
reach of the enemy as soon as possible in order that
full freedom of action may be regained.

If the fire of the hostile artillery is to be feared, it is
advisable to retire extended without regard to tactical
formations, and making the best possible use of the
ground. The troops will then only rally again beyond
the range of the enemy's fire. The same naturally holds
good for the retreat from a dismounted action after
the men have remounted.

The commander will be well advised to inform his
senior subordinates, if not all the troops, before the
fight begins where the troops are to concentrate again
in case of a reverse. The necessity for such disposi-
tions generally passes unnoticed in peace, because pur-
suit is never thoroughly carried out, and the beaten
troops are not so completely broken up as has repeat-
edly happened in war in the past and will happen again.
We should not deceive ourselves in this matter, as
otherwise there is a danger of completely losing control
over the troops. Whoever expects to be able to rally
a beaten cavalry division after a mounted fight by
blowing the divisional call lays himself open to bitter
disappointment. If the enemy is pursuing with en-
ergy, this will only be possible in the very rarest cases.

Before the commencement of the fight, arrangements
must also be made for the rear communication, as there
will otherwise be a danger of losing transport, and
thereby ability to operate. Far to the rear or close at

172 CAVALRY IN WAR

hand are the two only possible positions for it. In the
first case an escort whose strength will be dictated by
the circumstances will always be necessary.

It should also be remembered that wagons should be
able to turn round where they are halted. If single
teams are unable to turn about on their own ground, it
will be better to park the whole of the transport in such
a way that it can easily be moved in any direction. It
is then also easier to protect it against attack. If there
is no fear of attack, the various columns may turn off
the road with intervals corresponding to their length.
It appears to me to be of especial importance to lay
stress on these circumstances because in peace exer-
cises there is no transport, and commanders conse-
quently get accustomed to paying little attention to it.

As regards the pursuit, it is necessary to differentiate
between a tactical and a strategical pursuit. The latter
must crown the success of the former.

In mounted action, the beaten opponent must be kept
at the point of the sword as long as the strength of the
horses hold out. Detachments not immediately pursu-
ing must be concentrated, and must seek to regain their
ability for manoeuvre as soon as possible.

After a dismounted action on the defensive, the pur-
suit will first be taken up by rifle fire. Any mounted
reserve there may be should be launched to the charge
against the retiring enemy as soon as the pursuing fire
begins to cease to be effective. A victorious attack, on
the other hand, must make every endeavour to gain the
position vacated by the enemy, and to occupy ground
from whence an effective pursuing fire is possible. The
bringing up of the led horses will be of special im-
portance in this case. If they are immobile, a portion
of the men must be sent to the rear to bring them up,
while the remainder hold the captured position. Any

FIGHT, RETREAT, AND PURSUIT 173

mounted reserves there may be can often be employed
to bring up at least a portion of the led horses. Gen-
erally speaking, however, all troops not already en-
gaged must, as we have already shown, take up the
strategic pursuit as early as possible. This will sup-
plement and complete the results of the tactical pursuit.
Never to let the enemy rest, even when the tactical
pursuit has ceased, to prevent him regaining his co-
hesion, to capture prisoners, horses, and trophies, and,
above all, to increase to the utmost the moral efiFects of
his defeat, is the task before us. The immediate pur-
suit must therefore be combined, wherever possible,
with a parallel pursuit commenced in good time. The
latter must nip in the bud every attempt on the part of
the retiring enemy to take up rearguard positions, by
turning such positions and pressing forward with reck-
less energy against the actual lines of retreat. It must
also endeavour to anticipate the enemy in the occupa-
tion of any defiles necessary to his retreat. At such
times there must be no thought of sparing horseflesh.
Even in this pursuit, however, the commander must
give a definite object and a rallying point for the de-
tachments following. He will otherwise, by reason of
rapidity of the movements in progress, risk losing con-
trol of at least part of his troops, and of allowing them
to go farther than the strategical situation demands or
admits. For the rest, I may draw attention to the new
Cavalry Drill Regulations, the compressed instructions
of which contain much that is essential and coincide
generally with my views.

V. THE ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE

In the battle of all arms, cavalry must be handled
according to principles which are quite different and

174 CAVALRY IN WAR

almost diametrically opposed to those which charac-
terise its independent action as army cavalry. For, in
the latter case, not only is the defeat of the enemy kept
in view, but another definite object has also to be pur-
sued. This object can only be attained if successful in
the fight, while an unsuccessful battle will paralyse the
activity of the cavalry, and may cost the army the loss
of its organs of reconnaissance. However daring its
conduct then, it should never be engaged in hopeless
enterprises, and should only undertake a fight where
success can be reckoned upon with a certain measure of
probability.

If, therefore, the strength and intentions of the en-
emy are not fully known, it will be better, as we have
seen, to guard against engaging the whole force in such
an uncertain enterprise. Efforts should rather be made,
as I have endeavoured to show, to clear up the situation
by a careful feeling of the enemy and a gradual en-
gagement of force. Once possessed of this knowledge
of the situation, it will be possible either to seek a de-
cision or to break off the fight in time to avoid the risk
of incurring too considerable a loss.

Quite different is the case in the main battle. Here
the objective is contained in the battle itself. It is the
destruction of the enemy that is sought. It is not
expected that each single detachment engaged should
be victorious, but that the net result of the battle should
be a victory. The task of the various detachments is
only to engage and to destroy so much of the enemy's
force as lies within their power. This naturally holds
good for the cavalry. It is not now demanded that
each single action of the cavalry should of itself be
successful, but that the general engagement of the
cavalry should have the greatest possible effect. A
considerable result may often be obtained by the at-

ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE 175

tacking cavalry drawing the enemy's fire upon itself for
a time, and thus affording the infantry the possibility
of gaining ground to the front, or of re-forming and
receiving reinforcements.

To break off the main battle is generally quite out of
the question. The very fact that the battle has been
begun betokens the intention of carrying it through to
a final decision, 'even where the enemy has shown him-
self to be in superior force. The various troops which
advance to the conflict need not therefore reflect
whether they have any special prospect of success, but
must strive for this success with all their power. This
means for the cavalry, in by far the greater number of
cases, always at least where a charge is in prospect,
the simultaneous engaging of its whole fighting
strength, naturally in that tactical formation which the
conditions of weapons demand. If in its independent
operations cavalry must be dealt with as a strategical
body, and thus employed in the fight, it is in the main
battle a purely tactical body, which must be engaged
en masse, and not in detail. This contrast appears, at
least to me, to be an obvious one. There is another
that is equally clear.

In independent operations it is the duty of the cav-
alry, before all else, to defeat the enemy's cavalry.
Victory over the latter creates the possibility of carry-
ing out its proper task, that of reconnoitring and
screening, without being involved in further fighting
on a large scale. In the main battle, however, it would
be taking quite a false view of its duty if it were to
restrict itself to driving the hostile cavalry from the
field. Victory over the latter has indeed a certain
value, as it paralyses its further action, but it will, in
most cases, be comparatively useless for the main issue
of the battle unless further consequences result from

176 CAVALRY IN WAR

it. A victory over the hostile cavalry only receives its
particular importance when by it the possibility is
gained of intervening in the decisive encounter of the
other arms, and of acting unhindered when, in the
course of events, it becomes a matter either of pursuit
or of covering a retreat.

Finally, in independent operations, even small de-
tachments can aim at great results, and a division of
force will frequently be indicated. In the great battle,
however, any considerable effect can only be attained
by the action of the mass. The reason for this lies in
the size of modern armies.

It will be advisable to concentrate the mass of the
cavalry at what are considered the decisive points, in
order to be able to engage it simultaneously. Any
frittering away of force upon the field of battle will
strike the troops with impotence. We have only to
remember the battle of Coulmiers, where the richest
prospects of success confronted a cavalry which
achieved nothing, because it did not act in concert.
Where great tactical units have to be concentrated
which are not under a single command, it will be ad-
visable that the laws of seniority be set aside, and the
command given to that leader from whom the best
performances are to be expected, even though he be
not the senior. In the cavalry, more than in any other
arm, success depends upon the leader. Nothing is
more rare than a good cavalry leader, and it would
therefore be a great mistake to ignore such a one, and
thus perhaps to sacrifice the fortunes of the day to the
Moloch of Seniority. We should rather act like Fred-
erick the Great at Rossbach, when he placed Seydlitz
at the head of his cavalry, and we must expect from
Prussians to-day the same generosity as Frederick's
generals showed in willingly serving under their junior.

ACTION OF CAVALRY IN BATTLE 177

The best of leaders, however, will only be capable
of great performances if he is fully acquainted with
the intentions of the Head Quarters and the idea of the
battle. He must therefore be not only closely informed
before the fight, but must remain throughout its prog-
ress in continual communication with the Head Quar-
ters, and must be made aware of all dispositions and at
the same time must share its observations and be in
touch with its intentions. The German. cavalry would
certainly have been able to fight a more successful and
connected action at Mars la Tour, as at Coulmiers, if
it had been better informed as to the general situation,
and had thus been in a position to appreciate for itself
what was necessary and what was possible.

If, however, understanding between the commander-
in-chief and the leader of the cavalry is established, and
if full confidence in the judgment and energy of the
latter exists, he must be allowed that necessary freedom
and independence which alone ensure successful action.
On the other hand, he should never wait for orders to
intervene, but must himself turn any favourable mo-
ments of the fight to account by rapid and energetic
independent action. Even if he is definitely placed at
the disposal of the commander, he should not shrink at
critical moments from acting on his own responsibility,
informing, of course, his superior officer of his actions.
As an example of the relations between the supreme
command and the cavalry leader I would draw atten-
tion to the conduct of King Frederick and General von
Seydlitz in the battle of Zorndorf . The King felt the
necessity of restoring the wavering fortunes of the day
by launching the cavalry to the attack, but Seydlitz
independently chose the moment for the charge; and
success justified them both. When, however, in the
battle of Kunersdorf, the General was compelled to

178 CAVALRY IN WAR

order the charge against his better judgment, the con-
sequences were a heavy defeat for the cavalry.

I. The Army Cavalry on the Flank of the Battle

I have already repeatedly indicated that the most
favourable position for the army cavalry is to a flank
and in advance of a flank of its own army, and, where
possible, of that flank on which, in the battle of offence,
the decision will be sought, or, when in defence, the
main hostile attack may be expected/ The new Cav-
alry Regulations adopt this point of view. It is there-
fore superfluous to comment further on the advantages
of such a position. Unless the cavalry is going to
resign all claim to offensive action, this position will
compel it to seek battle. This may also happen when
the cavalry masses of hoth sides endeavour to take up
such a position, and thereby naturally come into col-
lision, so that a sort of battle of encounter results, but
one, however, that will bear quite a different character
from the battle of encounter in strategic operations.

There will already be a difference, in the fact that
the strategic approach and the tactical disposition in
advance guard, main body, and reserve, will be want-
ing. In the consciousness, moreover, that, whatever
the relative strength may be, the decisive battle has,
under any circumstances, to be sought, it must be pre-
pared for systematically. The cavalry will therefore
have to adopt a wider front, or even deploy while
farther from the enemy, having to its front only the
necessary bodies for reconnaissance and security. The
reconnaissance must be of a double nature. Timely
measures must first be taken to ascertain whether, on
the probable lines of approach and communication of
* "Cavalry in Future Wars," Part I, chap. v.

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE 179

the enemy, further hostile forces, ammunition columns,
or supply trains are hurrying to the battle-field. Where
the squadrons already pushed forward have received
the necessary further instructions, this reconnaissance
will often develop from the corresponding strategic
measures. It will, however, frequently be necessary to
send forward new organs of reconnaissance, even up
to the strength of squadrons, as is discussed in the
chapter on "Close Reconnaissance and Reconnaissance
for the Fight." Besides this far-reaching exploration,
immediate tactical reconnaissance for the fight must
also be arranged; this will, in general, be directed
against such hostile troops as may be within tactical
reach, and must at the same time comprise reconnais-
sance of the ground. This service must be carried out
by contact patrols and it is obviously impossible to
separate the two duties.

The reconnoitring organs suffice in such a case for
safety to the front. To the flank, however, local flank-
ing patrols must be pushed out during the advance. It
may at the same time be advisable, for the protection
of the main body, and as points of support for the
reconnaissance, to occupy defiles and other important
places to the flank or front by dismounted detachments
up to the strength of a squadron or more.

Screened by these various measures, the cavalry mass
now advances fully deployed for the fight. It must be
echeloned so far from the flank of the army that it
cannot come under the fire of its own infantry, and that
it can, if in any way possible, turn the outer flank of
the hostile cavalry. The latter may then easily become
hampered in movement by its own troops, and will
have to deploy eccentrically, a disadvantage under any
circumstances. Connection with our own army must,
naturally, not be lost, so that in case of an unfavourable

i8o CAVALRY IN WAR

issue of the fight the cavalry may not be completely
severed from it. The tactical dispositions, which
should always be of an elastic nature, must obviate this.

That depth must be maintained in so far as it allows
the necessary frontage, is easily understood. In deploy-
ing concentrically the various groups do not by any
means need to be in touch, as during the advance they
will gradually approach each other. They can, or
rather must, be disposed at wide intervals, and it is
better that these should be too great than that the
necessary depth should suffer. A reserve must always
be detailed and at the disposal of the commander, in
order that he may retain his influence over the decision
and be ready to meet the vicissitudes of the conflict.

Artillery and machine-guns will generally be able
to remain effectively in action longest on the inner
flank, and in this position can also form a cc^necting-
link between the cavalry and the flank of the army.
Special circumstances, however, may, of course, lead to
their employment elsewhere. Their employment on the
extreme outer flank, however, so often seen in peace,
is to be guarded against. From such a position they
can indeed often bring an effective flanking fire to bear,
but are, on the other hand, in great danger, especially
when opposed to a numerically superior enemy. Should
the outcome of the fight be unfavourable, they will
generally not only themselves be lost, but may often
contribute to the difficulties of the beaten squadrons.
Machine-gun detachments must be pushed forward
recklessly to within effective range of the enemy, and
should not shrink from the danger of occasional cap-
ture.

Should the hostile cavalry be driven from the field,
it must be pursued with sufficient force to prevent
its rallying and re-forming, and to complete its material

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE i8i

and moral defeat. Should it seek shelter behind oc-
cupied points of support, farms, woods, and the like,
these must be attacked immediately by employing the
greatest possible fire power. It is a matter of absolute
necessity to gain possession of such points, as they may
otherwise stand in the way of further action.

All portions of the cavalry not required for the pur-
suit should endeavour quickly to regain their tactical
cohesion, that they may be ready for further effort. If
localities are at hand by the occupation of which the
ground won can be secured, they must at once be
garrisoned by dismounted men. Artillery and machine-
guns will, in so far as they are not detailed for the
pursuit, or as they return from it, be brought into
position with a like object in view. Every effort must
be made to utilise to the full the advantages which
the different methods of action of which the arm is
capable confer, and thereby to minimise the chances
of defeat. To reckon with the charge alone is, even on
the field of battle, out of date, and calculated to limit
the effect of cavalry action.

If a position of readiness has at first to be taken up,
as will generally be the case until it is known in what
direction further developments will take place, it must
be as secure as possible from the view and fire of the
enemy, but must be one from which immediate action
can be taken. A disposition in groups of units will
generally be the most suitable formation. What else
is to be done the circumstances of the various cases
must decide; the indispensable condition is that the
cavalry should never be present and inactive through-
out the course of the battle. It must in all cases pre-
vent the enemy's patrols from making observations as
to the disposition of our own army, while, on the other
hand, its own reconnaissance should never cease.

i82 CAVALRY IN WAR

We should, however, be quite wrong to regard such
action as sufficient ; rather must our whole attention be
devoted to participating in the decisive battle, if in any
way possible. With this view the cavalry must be
careful to ensure its own advance to that portion of
the ground where the decisive battle will probably
take place, so that the charge will not meet with
unexpected resistance and obstacles when the moment
comes to ride it home. When this crisis of the battle
approaches, the cavalry must be ready to intervene,
whether it be to complete the defeat of the enemy
and to facilitate the victory of its own infantry, or
to support the latter in difficult situations.

Deployment in masses and depth, if possible in sev-
eral lines, is indispensable for such attacks. The outer
flank must be secured by reserves against the action of
freshly arriving hostile cavalry and the covering troops
of the enemy's artillery. Only when reconnaissance
has clearly shown that there are no more such hostile
troops at hand can the reserves be dispensed with.

The attack will best take place from the flank, and
will then generally find a double objective in the hostile
artillery and any infantry that may be farther to the
front; but both should be dealt with simultaneously.
There may also be a possibility and a necessity of
attacking from the rear. Circumstances must decide
this. In any case, there should be no question of
a gradual engagement of a force, but the charge of
the whole mass must, even when disposed in lines,
be carried out in a simultaneous and preconcerted
manner.

The moment chosen for the attack is also of great
importance. As the crisis approaches, endeavours must
be made to get as close to the enemy as possible, in
order to shorten the distance that will have to be

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE 183

covered in the charge. In so doing, the protection
of the ground must be used as long as possible for
cover, at least from view, without adhering to stereo-
typed tactical formations.

However important and desirable it may be to con-
tribute to the great decision by a glorious cavalry
charge, it should be borne in mind that the possibility
of this will only occur in very rare cases. The more
cultivated and agricultural the country in which the war
takes place, the rarer will be these opportunities, as the
circumstances of the ground offer so many opportuni-
ties for local defence.

If we consider the battles of the Franco-Prussian, the
Russo-Turkish, and the Manchurian wars, we must
soon admit that great cavalry charges were practicable
only in very isolated cases. The peculiarities of the
ground rendered them impossible ; nor can this alter in
the future. If it is to the interests of the defence to
seek open country with a good field of fire, the attacker,
on the other hand, will endeavour to choose ground for
the attack which will give him cover from fire and
view. On the whole, the possible European theatres of
war are but little suitable for charges, owing to the
extent to which they have been cultivated. We must
not be deceived in this matter by the experience of our
peace manoeuvres. For then suitable ground has to
be sought for the operation of the three arms, and con-
siderations of compensation make it necessary to
choose country as free from cultivation as possible.

War, however, knows no such considerations, and
we must not blind ourselves to the fact that the oppor-
tunity for great decisive charges will but seldom occur.
The greatest imaginable error, therefore, which the
cavalry could possibly commit would be to adopt a
waiting attitude and renounce all other kind of action,

i84 CAVALRY IN WAR

in order that the possibility of a great charge might not
slip by unutilised. Besides the decisive attack, there is
another wide field of activity indicated by the condi-
tions of modern war, where cavalry can operate with-
out being compelled to renounce co-operation in the
decisive battle when circumstances will allow.

This sphere of activity lies in rear of the hostile
army. Here columns of supply of every kind are
streaming forward to the fighting-line. Here are
massed the hostile reserves, already waiting for the
decisive moment. Here stands the heavy artillery of
the enemy in action, often without an escort. And it
is here that opportunities for decisive action must be
sought.

If cavalry can succeed, especially in battles of sev-
eral days' duration, in interrupting the hostile sup-
plies from the rear, in surprising the enemy's reserves
with fire, causing him heavy loss and compelling him
to deploy against it, or if any advancing portions of
the enemy's army can be brought to a halt and pre-
vented from reaching the battle-field at the right time,
greater results will probably be obtained than by a
doubtful charge. This is quite apart from the great
moral impression which such action must produce on
leaders and troops when the alarm suddenly re-echoes
from the rear, and the shrapnel of the cavalry carries
confusion and consternation amongst the reserves and
supports of the fighting-line. The enemy's artillery,
also, firing from covered positions, and otherwise so
difficult to reach, may then fall a prey to a bold cav-
alry, and will offer opportunities for a success of far-
reaching importance.

Such action must, of course, be conducted with a
due co-operation between mounted and dismounted
action.

ON THE FLANK OF THE BATTLE 185

Against intact hostile reserves the firearm will be
principally used, and endeavour must be made to sur-
prise them in the formation of assembly or on the
march. Against columns of wagons, also, it will be
well to commence with fire action, by shooting down
the horses of the leading teams, and so bringing the
columns to a halt. They must then, however, be
actually taken possession of and taken away or de-
stroyed, in so far as this cannot be done by artillery
fire.

The cavalry must therefore endeavour to be ever
active, and to co-operate unceasingly by damaging the
enemy and shaking his morale. Great results can,
however, only be obtained if antiquated views, handed
down from time immemorial, are discarded, and the
demands of modern war and the capabilities of modem
cavalry are recognised. It is not a question as to
whether we cavalry men are to fight mounted or dis-
mounted ; but that we must be prepared and determined
to take part in the decision, and to employ the whole of
our great strength and mobility to this end.

2. The Army Cavalry as a Reserve behind the Front

The same principles hold good for those portions of
the army cavalry which find themselves behind the
fighting-line, and not on the exposed flank. Such a
position is generally, indeed, undesirable, but may be
the outcome of circumstances.

The task before the cavalry is here naturally quite a
different one from when on the flank of the army. The
necessity, or even the possibility, will in this case
scarcely ever occur of having to deal with hostile
cavalry, and of opening thereby a way for intervention
in the decisive battle. It is much more likely in this

i86 CAVALRY IN WAR

case to happen that the cavalry will have to adopt a
waiting attitude, and see whether its engagement as a
mounted arm will be necessary. During this period of
waiting, the cavalry must remain beyond the range of
hostile fire, but as near the fighting-line as intelligent
use of the ground will permit. Its position should
never be chosen so far to the rear that it cannot arrive
on the spot at the right time for the attack; for the
moments which offer a favourable prospect for a
charge are often fleeting — they depend upon the tacti-
cal situation and the moral condition of the opponent.
These conditions may, however, quickly change if, for
instance, reinforcements should arrive on the field.

Thus, at Mars la Tour, when the 6th Cavalry Di-
vision advanced in order to attack the obviously shaken
and retiring 2nd Corps of the French, it struck, accord-
ing to the account of the German General Staff, not
this corps, but the intact Guard Grenadier Division of
Picard, which had already advanced in support, and
the charge was frustrated.^

To be prepared to meet such conditions, it will
generally be advisable not only to remain as close be-
hind the fighting-line as possible, but to prepare for a
rapid deployment to the front, so that a disposition in
groups, with the necessary deploying intervals, may be
adopted behind that part of the fighting-line where the
ground is especially adapted to a charge of large
masses. If it can be seen that the crisis of the fight is
approaching, and that the intervention of the cavalry
may be necessary, the latter should advance still closer
to the fighting-line, making, of course, full use of the

^ According to the French General Staff history, this cav-
alry met a battalion of the 25th Regiment of the 6th Corps,
as well as the 3rd Chasseur Battalion and a battalion of the
27th Regiment of the 2nd Corps. At all events, the attack
met, not retiring, but unshaken troops.

AS A RESERVE BEHIND THE FRONT 187

ground for cover, but no longer taking heed of small
losses.

The cavalry will advance to the charge in order
either to complete the defeat of an already wavering
enemy, and to capture his artillery, or to relieve its
own infantry, exhausted in the fight or suffering from
want of ammunition, when other reserves have been
used up, or have not yet arrived on the spot. The
attack will probably always have to be conducted
against an extended front. Flanking and surprise at-
tacks will rarely be possible under such circumstances.
It will scarcely ever be practicable to carry out separate
attacks against the hostile infantry and artillery, as in
the case of a flank attack. The charge will rather, in
by far the greater number of cases, first strike the hos-
tile line of infantry, and must endeavour to ride
through this and then to fall upon the enemy's artillery.

The formation for attack must be chosen to corre-
spond with this point of view. A considerable exten-
sion will be necessary for the first line, so that, although
the wings of the attacking-line may be exposed to flank-
ing fire, the main portion of the front of attack will
only have to reckon with frontal fire, and the enemy
will not be in a position to direct a concentric fire
against it. The great range of modern weapons de-
mands a very considerable extension for this purpose
if success is to be ensured. Suitable ground, also, must
be chosen for this deployment. It will often allow, if
rightly used, of one or other flank finding cover. A
previous close study of the ground over which the at-
tack is to be made is therefore imperative for the cav-
alry leader, even though it may entail personal expo-
sure to the enemy's fire.

Necessary, however, as this extension is, a formation
in depth in two or three lines is also imperative if de-

i88 CAVALRY IN WAR

cisive results are to be gained — this is, as I have already-
pointed out, the formation especially necessary against
firearms. To lay down the distances which must be
taken up between the lines according as infantry or
artillery is the objective, as is done in the Regulations,
will naturally be impossible in most cases, as both arms
will have to be reckoned with simultaneously. A mean
distance of about 250 paces would generally meet the
case.

It is obvious that not only the preliminary deploy-
ment, but the formation for attack must take place
beyond the effective range of the enemy's fire, for, once
inside this zone, flank movements can no longer be
carried out, and nothing else can be done but to gallop
straight to the front. As, however, our own infantry
will have to be ridden through in the charge, it is im-
possible in such a case to attack in close order. The
first lines should therefore be of loose single-rank
formation, with wide intervals from man to man. This
is also to be recommended on the ground that it will
allow a greater breadth of front for the same strength.
Behind the leading lines squadrons can then follow in
column of troops, which can easily ride through their
own infantry, and adapt themselves to the ground,
utilizing for their advance the less exposed portions of
the terrain. In such dispositions there can naturally
be no talk of regular distances, and the circumstances
of the case must decide.

If sufficient force is available, reserves must follow
behind the centre and in echelon behind the flanks.
Their duty will be to to turn against hostile cavalry
and other troops which may take the advancing mass
in flank or may threaten a charge.

The batteries and machine-guns belonging to the
cavalry will usually remain at the disposal of the cav-

AS A RESERVE BEHIND THE FRONT 189

airy commander, even during the great battle. If a
charge is launched it will sometimes be advantageous
to use them for flank protection, for which purpose
they may be temporarily held back. Such cases, how-
ever, will be rare. The commander will therefore have
to consider whether it is not more advisable to let them
take part in the general engagement, even when the
cavalry is not yet called upon to intervene. For it
must be clearly understood that in this case, as in the
other, where the cavalry is on the flank of the army,
there will seldom be an opportunity for the charge, for
reasons already given.

As, however, the cavalry in the former case should
not remain inactive even if there is no opportunity for
the charge during the decisive battle, the same holds
good where the cavalry is placed behind the front of
the army.

Having a less extensive field of action than in the
case of the cavalry on the flank, it is all the more neces-
sary, if there is no chance of a charge, for it to act
in the manner of a reserve. The cavalry must not
shrink, when necessity demands, from employing its
whole force in the fire fight, disregarding for this pur-
pose its purely cavalry role, which may, perhaps, be
resumed later. The first essential is that victory shall
be won. To this end all available forces must co-oper-
ate. We will find a good example to follow in the bat-
tle of Fredericksburg and the manner in which Stuart
threw the whole of his cavalry into the fight. The
employment of cavalry in the War of Secession in
North America, the study of which I have urgently
recommended, can here again serve us as a guide to
follow.

iQO CAVALRY IN WAR

3. Pursuit and Retreat

In critical study of military history there is con-
tinual cause for complaint that after a victorious bat-
tle no effective pursuit, with a few brilliant excep-
tions, has ever taken place. These complaints are justi-
fied. It must, however, be conceded that a failure of
the pursuit may be traced in most instances to the
force of circumstances.

As the day of battle draws to a close and the de-
cision has taken place, the victorious attacker has gen-
erally accomplished a long march to the battlefield and
carried out an exceedingly exhausting attack. The
troops have perhaps all been employed in the battle,
down to the last reserve. Ammunition, food, and
water are often lacking. It is therefore quite natural
that the mere physical energy required for a pursuit is
wanting. If, on the other hand, the defender is suc-
cessful, it is generally against a superior enemy, or one
that is thought to be superior. With the greatest ex-
penditure of moral and physical force he has held his
own. In the evening of the day of battle, when the
attacks cease, he is still perhaps scarcely conscious of
his victory, and still imagines that the enemy is en-
deavouring to turn his flank. He awaits renewed on-
slaughts, and will be fearful of imperilling his success
by leaving the positions which he has maintained with
such difficulty, in order, on his side, to take up the
offensive. It is therefore but natural that a pursuit
should at first remain in abeyance. If, however, it is
not carried out at once, the favourable opportunity is
generally lost forever.

The beaten defender, on the other hand, has often
still a surplus of fresh troops. On the day of battle
he will generally have had no exhausting marches to

PURSUIT AND RETREAT 191

undertake. The battle has not imposed nearly such
heavy physical demands upon him as upon the at-
tacker. He has also been able to supply himself dur-
ing the fight much better than the latter. To these
factors of advantage must be added the instinct of
self-preservation of the individual, which continually
induces afresh the desire to escape from the grasp of
the enemy. What can be more natural for the beaten
defender after a lost battle than to march long dis-
tances, and thus successfully to evade pursuit, unless
it be immediately undertaken? General von Goeben
gave orders on the evening of the battle of St. Quentin
that all troops must march five miles ^ the next day.
But the French had already covered a similar distance
during the night, and were no longer within reach.

The beaten attacker also may, after the battle, no
longer have at his disposal sufficient physical force to
carry out a further immediate march, but, as before
the fight he was in superior force, or considered him-
self to be so, it will not be necessary for him to with-
draw from the enemy as quickly as a beaten defender.
The reason for this lies in the difficulty which exists
for the latter of taking up the pursuit. The attacker
can then utilise the time after the battle to secure him-
self in the terrain and to re-form his units. He falls
back on his reserves of supply and ammunition. Un-
less he has suffered a destructive defeat, the pursuer
will generally find him the next morning again in a
condition to offer some resistance.

The factors of weakness, therefore, which allow but
seldom of an effective pursuit have their origin in the
nature of circumstances, and are exceedingly difficult
to cope with.

Energy and activity sufficient to this end are only to
^Five German miles = 23 English miles.

192 CAVALRY IN WAR

be found in moments of the greatest moral excitement,
under the influence of overpowering personalities, or
under special conditions, such, for example, as resulted
after the battle of Waterloo. In the future, however,
we shall generally have to reckon that these factors
of weakness will prevail and the pursuit fail unless it
is prepared with conscious intention in good time, and
initiated with energy.

Here will certainly be required careful leading, good
tactical judgment, and rapid decision.

Before all things, it is essential that any reserves
still available should be sent forward in the directions
important for pursuit as soon as it is judged that the
battle is won, and that their supply should be arranged
for before the pursuit begins.

I may cite the battle of Woerth as an example. The
4th Cavalry Division stood at the disposal of the com-
mander. Observation troops were sufficient in the
direction of Hagenau and Zabern. This cavalry mass
was, however, only brought up late in the evening,
and arrived on the field too late to take up the imme-
diate pursuit, although it had long been realised that a
pursuit would become necessary.

The infantry pursuit failed for different reasons.
At the end of the day, when success inclined to the
Germans, a fresh Wiirttemberg brigade arrived upon
the battle-field. Hot fighting still raged about Frosch-
weiler, in which the whole of the Vth and Xlth Corps
were involved. The Crown Prince, with a right appre-
ciation of the situation, sent forward this brigade in
a parallel pursuit against the right wing of the French
in the direction of Reichshofen, where it could have
denied the exit at Zabern to the French. This brigade,
however, allowed itself to be deflected from its ob-
jective, and involved in the fighting round Frosch-

PURSUIT AND RETREAT 193

weiler, the capture of which was no longer of any-
real importance from the point of view of the Head
Quarters.

If the affair is practically decided, as was the case
at Woerth, the reserves still in hand should no longer
allow themselves to be drawn towards the various foci
of the battle, but must be sent forward by the Com-
mander-in-Chief with boldness and determination in
the now more decisive directions of the pursuit.

The same reasons and principles hold good for the
pursuit by the cavalry.

The cavalry commander must continually keep his
finger on the pulse of the battle, and not watch only
that portion of the great drama which is being played
under his own eyes.

Should the scales of victory incline in favour of his
own army, if he considers that the intervention of
his cavalry will no longer be necessary to complete
the victory, he will often be well advised to renounce
his share in the decisive battle, at least by a charge
which would entail heavy loss, and to husband all his
force for the pursuit, and to prepare and make dis-
positions for it. This consideration is of especial im-
portance for that portion of the army cavalry which
is concentrated on the flank, as to it must chiefly fall
the task of pursuit.

Great attention should be paid, even during the
battle, to nursing the horses. They should be fed,
not from the small reserve of forage carried on the
saddle, but from wagons, which can be easily sent to
the flank of the army, emptied, and used later for the
transport of the wounded. It is of great importance
that these measures should be taken in good time.
The forage carried will be needed during the pursuit,
for supplies for the horses cannot be reckoned upon

194 CAVALRY IN WAR

in country where armies have been on the move. It
will even be advisable to take forage wagons with the
pursuing force itself. When the maintenance of physi-
cal strength has thus been cared for, the next step is
to push patrols and squadrons rapidly forward to
reconnoitre the outer lines of retreat of the enemy.
While these have been ascertained, the march in pur-
suit must be undertaken without hesitation, and con-
tinued even during the night. While daylight in any
way allows, attempts will naturally be made to attack
the withdrawing enemy in flank, and to carry disorder
into his columns. As soon, however, as darkness falls
and puts an end to the fighting, the march should be
continued on parallel lines throughout the whole night,
if possible in constant touch with the enemy, in order
that he may again be attacked at dawn the next morn-
ing, or that his retreat may be barred at defiles or other
favourable places. The trophies of pursuit will rarely
fall into the hands of him who shrinks from spending
the night after the battle marching, or neglects to pre-
pare in every way for such an operation.

Direct frontal pursuit by the cavalry will generally
yield but meagre results against the masses of the
modern army and the firearm of the present day.
Only when completely demoralised troops are retreat-
ing in the open, and cannot be reached by fire, will a
charge be feasible. Generally, however, the frontal
cavalry pursuit will be soon brought to a standstill by
the hostile occupation of localities, woods and the like.
Frontal pursuit is essentially a matter for the infantry,
who must press the retreating enemy to the utmost.
On the other hand, it is of course the duty of the
cavalry to maintain touch with the enemy under all
circumstances. With this object in view it must con-
tinue the frontal pursuit, sometimes even without seek-

PURSUIT AND RETREAT 195

ing to draw on a fight, by day and night. When
the strength of the infantry fails, it is the imperative
duty of the cavalry to continue to harass the foe. In
conjunction with the artillery it should be able to in-
flict considerable losses on the opponent. In the face of
modem conditions, however, too great results must
not be expected from such action.

When the army cavalry undertakes a frontal pur-
suit, it will be advisable to divide it by brigades, to
which must be allotted the various roads along which
the enemy is retreating. To each column must be
assigned artillery, to enable it to be continually at grips
with the enemy. Cases may also occur where, if the
enemy's lines of retreat are not too close together, it
will be possible to penetrate between them, and thus
strike all the terrors of a parallel pursuit to the very
heart of his army. The results that might thus be
gained will justify great risks.

As to the covering of a retreat, I may draw atten-
tion to paragraph 518 ^ of the new Regulations. All
the essentials are here set forth in compressed form.
Under such circumstances the cavalry must never re-
nounce the offensive, as the maintenance of morale
when things are going badly is imperative. Continual
efforts must be made to confront the enemy, and to
attack him whenever possible with the cold steel. De-
fensive fire tactics, however, will of course be em-

^ "Should the issue of the battle prove unfavourable, the
cavalry must strain every nerve to facilitate the retreat of
the other arms. It is just in such cases that they must as-
sume a relentless offensive. Repeated attacks on the flanks
of the pursuing troops will produce the best results.

"Even temporary relief for the retreating infantry and a
short gain in time may avert utter defeat. The cavalry
which effects this will, though it gains no victory, retain the
honours of the day."

196 CAVALRY IN WAR

ployed whenever circumstances demand such action.
Thus, when it becomes no longer possible to show a
front to the pursuing cavalry in the open, measures
must be taken to block the routes upon which his par-
allel pursuit is operating by barricading roads and oc-
cupying important points and defiles, especially during
the night, and thus to secure the retreat of the army.
Detachments to which these duties are confided must
be despatched from the battle-field in good time, so
that they may be able, if possible, to arrange their
defensive measures by daylight. The more obstinately
they hold well-chosen points, even at the risk of being
cut oflf and captured, the better will they have done
their duty.

4. The Role of the Divisional Cavalry

The numerical weakness of the divisional cavalry,
and the variety of duties that fall to its lot, consider-
ably limit the development of its fighting power. It will
scarcely ever be able to seek battle with the enemy's
cavalry in an offensive sense, nor in defence will it
possess the requisite numbers for an effective counter-
stroke. It is therefore all the more important that
such isolated favourable opportunities for the charge
as some fortunate chance may place in its way should
not be allowed to slip by. Every tactical success raises
the self-confidence of the troops, and operates towards
the attainment of moral superiority over the enemy.
even though he may be numerically the stronger force.

In the battle of all arms, as soon as fighting contact
has been established with the enemy, and the close and
combat reconnaissance is thus probably at an end, the
divisional cavalry must endeavour to gain touch with
the army cavalry, in order to strengthen the latter for

ROLE OF DIVISIONAL CAVALRY 197

the battle. In so doing, it must not of course lose all
connection with its own infantry division. When this
cannot be done, and when no other chance of mounted
action offers, the divisional cavalry must seize the
rifle and act as an immediate support for the infantry.
Opportunities for such action will occur more espe-
cially in defence, as was proved by the cavalry of
General Stuart.

After the battle it is the duty of the divisional cav-
alry to advance in frontal pursuit, even though no
great results are to be expected from such action.
During a retreat after the battle it will be continually
in action as the rearmost detachment, and must en-
deavour to arrest the pursuit by occupying favourable
positions with fire action. Frequent opportunities for
a charge on a small scale may here occur.

Should the infantry division to which the cavalry
belongs be operating independently without army cav-
alry, the divisional cavalry must act in accordance
with the principles laid down for the army cavalry,
as far as they apply and in so far as its strength and
other circumstances will allow. Parallel pursuit may
be possible under such conditions.

In retreat, every effort within the power of the
cavalry must be made to protect the flanks of the retir-
ing division, and to arrest the pursuer by sudden bursts
of fire on every possible occasion.

There is for the divisional cavalry no such wide field
of possibilities as is open to the army cavalry : it will be
less often mentioned in despatches. The tasks which
fall to its share, however, are certainly immeasurably
more arduous and call for greater sacrifices. It will
often be confronted by the most important and danger-
ous duties, for the fulfilment of which its means are
quite inadequate. Such duties can only be carried out

198 CAVALRY IN WAR

if the troops are capable of the greatest efforts and
determined to do great deeds, without the impulse
that the prospect of distinction promotes.

VI. DEPTH AND ECHELON

It is an astonishing fact that the echelon,^ and espe-
cially the rearward echelon, should have won for itself
an importance in our cavalry tactics which, in my opin-
ion, is quite undeserved and contradictory to the es-
sence of cavalry action. It is the more astounding
when we consider that this principle of echelon forma-
tion is said to be based on the tactics of Frederick the
Great, which have no connection whatever with the
echelon in its present form.

Frederick the Great arranged his cavalry in two
lines, and within these lines the tactical units were on
the same line of front. Detachments destined to turn
the enemy's flank were attached in column to the outer
flank of the leading line. As far as I know, a mention
of echelon can only be found in one place. In a sketch
that accompanies one of the Regulations of July 25,
1744, a squadron of the second line is shown thrown
forward at half the distance between the lines and
echeloned on the first line, with the obvious intention
of securing the outer flank of the first line against local
turning movements. Out of this one squadron the
whole of our echelon system has grown. Here is the
only justification for claiming that the echelon of the
second line is of Frederician origin.

^fichelon formations are those in which lines or bodies of
troops are placed not directly in rear of each other, but
with the second line to the right or left of the first and the
next similarly placed — "like steps of stairs" — hence the
name, "fichelon" means literally a "step" or the "rung of a
ladder." — Editor's Note.

DEPTH AND ECHELON 199

Nor, as far as I know, in the tactics of the Napole-
onic cavalry is there any trace of echelon in the mod-
ern sense. We would do well to seek, in this period
of experience in great cavalry battles instruction for
the conduct of cavalry against cavalry, and not to sacri-
fice its lessons for imaginary advantages.

According to all appearances, our modern echelon
is but the offspring of peace requirements. The troops
were required to be mobile and capable of manoeuvre,
and a division was required to perform the same
stereotyped evolutions as a regiment or a brigade. In
the division the echelon of brigades met this require-
ment admirably, favouring as it did the change to line,
a manoeuvre which, on its part, was well suited to the
necessities of drill in a limited area, and was regarded
as the piece de resistance of all cavalry divisional ma-
CEUvres. Many a time have I assisted at these tactical
orgies !

We must not neglect the warning that, even in
manoeuvres, as soon as there is any kind of approach
to service conditions, such necessity for change of
front never — literally never — occurs. Besides this, the
echelon formation has shown itself to be quite unprac-
tical where any real tactical deployment is required
off the drill-ground. The question, then, of the cir-
cumstances for which it is particularly designed does
not appear as yet to have been definitely asked or an-
swered. We have been content with general repre-
sentations that it increased the power of manoeuvre,
and thus added to our beloved stereotyped formations.

For years I have striven to clear up these views and
to establish their true worth. As long ago as 1903, in
-my book "Cavalry in Future Wars," I wrote as fol-
lows: ". . . It is obvious that the formations for
approach and attack prescribed by the (old) Regula-

200 CAVALRY IN WAR

tions are as unpromising of success as they well can
be. While affording a possibility of quickly presenting
the same formation in any direction, a feat of no pos-
sible advantage for war, they seriously impede any
deployment to the front. If it is required to launch
the first line against the enemy's flank because this is
its shortest line, one at least of the following brigades
will be masked, and will be hampered in its movements.
If, again, it is desired to utilise one of the rear bri-
gades for a flank movement or any similar purpose,
the first line has to be checked until the others reach
the required position, or else they will certainly arrive
too late to co-operate. Furthermore, the formations
advocated render it more difficult to derive full benefit
from the configuration of the ground."

These deductions have remained, up to now, uncon-
tested. In spite of this, however, the new Regulations
uphold the point of view of the old as regards echelon
formation in every way, and even vest it with increased
importance by confiding to the echelon the duties of
the real second line, i.e. of the supporting squadrons of
the old Regulations. In the regiment, as in the bri-
gade, depth is to consist in echelon formation, and only
exceptionally is a real second line to be formed. The
echelons are not only to protect the flank of their own
units, and turn against any portions of the enemy's line
that may break through, but are also to turn the en-
emy's flanks (170 and 200).^ In the division, also,

* "As a rule, a single regiment attacks in line. It may, or
may not, be in echelon. Only on exceptional occasions
should one of the squadrons follow as a second line.

"The officer commanding will bring the directing squadron
into the direction of the attack. The squadrons, each in
close formation, must be led so as to ensure combined
action.

"The echelons will envelop the hostile flank or ward off the

DEPTH AND ECHELON 201

during the advance to attack cavalry, echelon forma-
tion will, "as a rule," be ordered. The transition
formation thus remains with us not only in name, but
in fact, only with the difference that brigades provide
for their own depth and flank protection, thus, in fact,
being again in themselves echeloned (223, 424, 425).*

enemy's flank attacks; they can also be used to prolong the
front of the regiment, or they can turn against portions of
the enemy which have broken through."

"When attacking cavalry, the regiments will, as a rule, be
employed in a line formation side by side; this will prevent
their personnel from becoming mixed up. The necessary
depth will be supplied by the regiments themselves, and, in
this case, it is usually in the form of echelons. // the situa^
Hon demands, even single squadrons can follow in column
formation.

"The employment of several lines may be useful on occa-
sions when the situation demands rapid action from the lead-
ing regiment, and circumstances will not permit of the rear
regiments taking ground to a flank."

^ "When advancing to attack cavalry, the divisional com-
mander will, as a rule, order the brigades into echelon forma-
tion. Brigades will make independent arrangements as re-
gards formation in depth and for flank protection.

"As soon as the divisional commander has decided to at-
tack, he will arrange for the employment of the artillery and
machine-guns; he will give the brigades their attack orders;
if necessary, he will give the directing brigade the line of
attack; and he will detach his reserve.

"The further execution of the attack will rest with the
brigade commanders."

"Collisions of cavalry partake usually of the nature of bat-
tles of encounter. In such cases, uncertainty as to the
strength and intentions of the enemy renders necessary such
echelon formations as will preserve freedom of action."

"The formation of the echelon will vary according to the
objective and to local conditions.

"Shrould no certain information as to the advance and
formation of the enemy be forthcoming, a double echelon is
possibly the best. But, should a flank rest on impassable, or

202 CAVALRY IN WAR

Only when a closer knowledge of the enemy is at-
tained may the brigades come into the same alignment
from the commencement, and assume the requisite
frontage (426).^

In close connection with this modified transition
formation, the "change to lines" has also been retained
in fact, though no longer designated as such. That is
to say, the possibility of a change of front "to the
complete flank," i.e. at right angles to the direction
of march, is still contemplated (220), ^ and to this end
a fresh formation of the division will generally be
required, as well as a fresh directing brigade, which
takes up the new line of march, and to which the
remainder conform in the desired manner. It is ap-
parently a matter of indifl^erence whether the brigades
are called lines or brigades. It is, and remains, a
purely drill evolution of the division in close forma-
tion, a complete change of front to a flank, and is
therefore something that would certainly not occur in

on very open, country, which is, however, covered by the
fire of friendly artillery, only single echelon is necessary,
fichelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the ad-
vanced guard situation. The above cases are given merely
as examples.

"As the situation is gradually cleared up, the flexibility of
echelon formations renders it easy to attain the formation
in which the attack will be delivered."

* "Should it be possible to ascertain the hostile disposi-
tions with approximate certainty, the cavalry leader can
have his front rank units in line from the start, and de-
ployed on the frontage upon which he intends to attack. The
advantage thus gained, if combined with rapidity of move-
ment, will often render it possible to deliver an enveloping
attack during the hostile deployment."

*". . . for greater changes of front, e.g. to the com-
plete flank, it will generally be necessary to re-form the
division."

DEPTH AND ECHELON 203

war if any reasonable sort of information were to
hand. H it did occur, it would presuppose the entire
failure of reconnaissance and the corresponding in-
capacity of the leader.

My cavalry instinct forbids me to share the tactical
principles that these views entail, and I will therefore
again endeavour to make clear that conception of the
matter which I hold to be correct.

First, as regards the demands of the Regulations
that echelon is to replace depth. In my opinion, the
conditions of reality have not in this matter been taken
into account. To be able to meet a hostile squadron
that has broken through the line, the echeloned squad-
ron, if still in column, must wheel into line, or if, as is
probable, already in line, must wheel, and then charge
behind the front of its own attacking-line. I con-
sider this, of itself, to be impracticable in the excite-
ment of the fight, a manoeuvre that can only be carried
out on the drill-ground. We have only to consult any
one who has had experience of a cavalry attack to
learn how difficult it is to perform such evolutions
immediately before the charge.

Then, again, what is our conception of such a hostile
squadron breaking through? It may be expected to
be accompanied by a simultaneous rearward movement
of a corresponding portion of our own line, so that no
clear objective for attack from the flank would be
likely to offer itself. Such retirements of single por-
tions of the line can only be met and counteracted by
throwing in fresh forces from the rear; such has al-
ways been the experience in cavalry fights, as far as
the teachings of history show.

But there are other matters for consideration. How
can the squadron, echeloned, for instance, on the outer

204 CAVALRY IN WAR

flank of a brigade, intervene when this so-called rup-
ture of the line takes place on the inner flank ? In the
dust and excitement of a cavalry fight, will such a
rupture, especially in undulating country, be even no-
ticed? What if there is a simultaneous threatening
of the other flank, which the echelon is obliged to
meet? What if the echelon has advanced in an en-
veloping movement? Who is then to deal with the
rupture of the line?

To go on trying to prove that the duties devolving
on depth and echelon cannot be met by one and the
same detachment, is like carrying coals to Newcastle.
The formation of a second line in the fight against
cavalry, regarded as exceptional by the Regulations,
should be made an invariable rule, from which de-
parture is allowed only in exceptional cases, while
safety for the flanks must be arranged for independ-
ently of this.

Here again we come into collision with paragraph
170 of the Regulations, which lays down that an of-
fensive flank attack may be undertaken from a rear-
ward echelon; as if such a manoeuvre could possibly
be carried out! Detachments which are to turn the
enemy's flank must, during the approach, advance into
alignment with their own line separated from its flank
by the necessary interval, or else must be echeloned
forwards from the commencement.

Forward echelon will generally be found to corre-
spond with the offensive spirit of cavalry better than
the more defensive rearward echelon. It is usually
more practical and protects the flank better, while at
the same time threatening the enemy's flank and lay-
ing down the law to him. Forward echelon is a
very useful tactical cavalry formation, and deserves

DEPTH AND ECHELON 205

more attention than the Regulations bestow upon
it.i

On its offensive importance I need scarcely enlarge.
Troops in forward echelon are already in a position
which can only be reached after an exhausting gallop
by those in rearward echelon, the position prescribed
by the Regulations. They will be in a position to
frustrate any offensive intentions of the hostile re-
serves, and will obtain quicker and surer information
as to the enemy than will ever be possible at such a time
by patrols alone. That they may at times come in
contact with hostile troops in rearward echelon is
obvious. If the flank of these cannot be turned, they
must be dealt with frontally. Local dispositions and
a vanguard must provide security against the action
of hostile reserves.

Even in a defensive sense the forward echelon will
often be more useful than the rearward. The latter
formation surrenders the initiative to the enemy, and
confines itself to parrying attacks, always a disad-
vantage in a cavalry fight. Forward echelon, on the
contrary, seeks to forestall the enemy in the offence.
As to how it may often be better adapted to warding
off hostile attacks than the rearward echelon I will
give an example.

A body of cavalry, in the approach formation, is
advancing against the enemy, with blind ground on a
flank, which would allow of the enemy's covered ap-
proach, and which perhaps it has been impossible to
reconnoitre. Attack or fire surprise is feared from
this quarter. How will the cavalry protect itself ? The
modem tactician would in most cases reply: "By an
echelon to the rear." I do not think this would be

* "fechelon to the front may be rendered necessary by the
advanced guard situation."

2o6 CAVALRY IN WAR

suitable. How is such a formation to give safety from
fire surprise, and to locate the enemy's advance and
arrest it until the main body can take counter-mea-
sures ? The forward echelon can here alone avail. It
comes to close quarters with the enemy, attacks him
before he can reach the flank of the main body, and
thus gains time for defensive measures or retirement.

It is quite obvious that the cases for employment of
the forward echelon do not allow of being formulated.
I think, however, that we should make much more use
of this formation than is at present the fashion. Prop-
erly applied, such methods will ensure to us consider-
able superiority over our opponents.

If we turn from this narrower tactical point of view
to the formations on a large scale where echelon is to
be found — namely, the divisions — here too the ex-
amination leads to no more favourable conclusions. I
ask myself, when and under what circumstances will
such a formation be advisable ?

During the approach to the battle of encounter it is,
as I have endeavoured to prove, quite superfluous, and
may even operate to our disadvantage. In this case,
when total uncertainty reigns as to whether the combat
will be carried out mounted or dismounted, or both,
there can be no question of any stereotyped tactical
formation, either of units as a whole or of smaller
bodies within them. Here, as we have seen, the battle
will generally develop gradually, and the fighting-line
be fed from depth, until the necessary information as
to the enemy has been gained and the decisive attack
can be embarked upon. Under such circumstances the
brigades advance according to the tasks allotted them,
and make their dispositions as circumstances dictate.
The depth that will be necessary can obviously not
be laid down, and can be attained by echelon neither in

DEPTH AND ECHELON 207

the division nor in its subdivisions. If the division
should advance under such circumstances in close
formation echeloned within itself, the unnecessary dan-
ger would be run of offering an ideal target to the
enemy's artillery (which must always be taken into
consideration), and at the same time of hampering
movement where circumstances demand the greatest
freedom in all directions.

If, on the other hand, the enemy's dispositions are
known before a collision occurs, the Regulations them-
selves (426, see p. 172) allow that echelon formation
is superfluous, and that the advance may be made in
the deployed formation desired, brigades being on the
same frontage, if the country and the character of
the adversary offer the probability of a charge.

And will it be different in the battle of all arms? In
that case, if the army cavalry advances from the wing
of the army with the intention of attacking the enemy's
flank, what need will it have of echelon formations?
It is known that an attack must be made under any
circumstances. Further information as to the com-
parative strength of the enemy cannot and must not
be waited for. All available forces will be engaged in
order to wrest a victory, and must from the beginning
be so disposed that the enemy will be compelled as
far as possible to conform to our movements, and that
we may prepare the most favourable deployment for
attack in the manner discussed above. Must we, then,
advance with the division in close formation, echeloned
within itself, in order to afford the greatest possible
target for the enemy's artillery? Are we to choose
the pusillanimous formation of the defensive echelon,
that we may perhaps be obliged to approach and to
deploy under the enemy's eyes, incapable in this un-
wieldy formation of turning the ground to account?

2o8 CAVALRY IN WAR

I cannot think that this is practical and believe that
modem artillery fire of itself suffices to make the
echeloned division an impossibility and to banish it
for ever from the battle-field.

It must be added that should the unexpected ap-
pearance of the enemy on a flank make it necessary,
rearward echelon is much easier to assume from a
formation of brigades on the same front than is the
line or attack formation from rearward echelon. It is
only necessary for that part of the line which is to be
echeloned to halt or decrease the pace, and the echelon
is soon formed. To push forward units from depth
while on the move means, on the other hand, a con-
siderable and indeed unnecessary expenditure of force.

VII. FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT

As the brigades in a modern division must, on ac-
count of the effect of artillery fire, be disposed accord-
ing to completely different principles from those of
the past, so, too, must the formations adopted by the
various groups be chosen to suit modern conditions.

Our new Regulations lay down that, if the cavalry,
after its preliminary deployment, has to cross an ex-
tensive fire-zone, the subordinate leaders are to choose
such formations for their units as will minimise the
effect of the hostile fire, and that, for this purpose,
the configuration of the ground must be turned to the
best advantage, even though it should involve tempo-
rary departure from prescribed intervals.

I do not consider these instructions, which, in con-
tradiction to the general principles of the Regulations,
give free play to the initiative of all subordinate lead-
ers, are sufficiently definite. They appear to try to
avoid giving a distinct designation to this manner of

FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT 209

advance. Before the publication of the Regulations
it was known as "extended formation." As such I
have characterised it in my brochure, "Reflections on
the New Cavalry Regulations," published in 1908, and
it is to be regretted that this title was not maintained
in the Regulations, and with it also the real essence of
the whole formation. This would, I think, have made
the matter clearer. I hold it to be of great importance
that the adoption of such formations should be or-
dered by higher authority, as otherwise there must be
a danger of the troops getting out of hand.

In adopting these extensions it is not only a question
of ground actually under artillery fire, but also of
areas during the crossing of which fire may be ex-
pected, to which, of course, the troops should not be
exposed. Whether such is the case or not, the cav-
alry commander, who is observing and receiving in-
telligence as the troops hurry forward, is alone in a
position to judge, and not each subordinate leader.
For this reason alone, unity of action is absolutely
necessary. So is it also from another point of view.
I need scarcely enlarge on the picture of what would
occur if each subordinate commander, each squadron
leader, according to his individual judgment, were to
suddenly regulate the pace and formation of his own
volition, while it would be a matter of difficulty to
maintain proper control of the troops if it were left to
the squadron leaders to regain alignment in their own
time.

It is therefore imperative, to my mind, that such
extensions should not be left to the discretion of the
squadron leader, but ordered by superior authority.
Instructions as to pace should be given at the same
time, and the area indicated where troops are to regain
the formation ordered and decrease the pace. These

2IO CAVALRY IN WAR

are points that have escaped the notice of the Regula-
tions. Orders must also be given as to whether several
lines will eventually be formed. These will then gen-
erally have to follow each other at shrapnel distance.
Only the choice of formation and line of advance
must be left to the subordinate leaders, as they alone
are in a position to judge of the local effect of the hos-
tile fire.

If such dispositions are to be made, all commanders,
down to squadron leaders, must be instructed in time,
so that they may have already adopted the necessary
formation on reaching the dangerous zone. They must
at the same time be informed, in so far as can be as-
certained, from which direction artillery fire — for this
alone can be in question — is to be expected.

Should the artillery fire come from the front, col-
umn of route will often be a suitable formation. It
affords but a small frontage of target, and facilitates
use of the ground. If the artillery fire is expected
from a flank, the adoption of a single-rank line will
often commend itself. In any case, in the larger
formations, distances and intervals must be adjusted
so that one and the same burst of shrapnel will not
strike two squadrons at once.

As the Regulations do not touch on these points, I
do not see how a proper understanding of them can be
awakened and cultivated in the troops, imperative
though this may be.

As a rule it will be by no means sufficient to adopt
formations for minimising the effect of artillery fire
only in special cases where such fire is to be expected.
The great range of modern guns, and their capabilities
of indirect fire induced by improved means of observa-
tion, and the possibility of bringing fire to bear on
large unseen targets with the aid of the map, make it

FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT 211

absolutely necessary, when entering within possible
effective range of artillery, to adopt formations which
will offer no favourable mark. If this tends on the
one hand, as already remarked, to a premature de-
ployment, it forces us, on the other, to adopt forma-
tions which can cross country easily and afford no
easy target for the artillery.

I have already shown in a former work ^ how well
the double column ^ answers this purpose, and in what
a comprehensive manner the principle of independent
squadron columns allows of elaboration, to procure
for the cavalry the greatest imaginable freedom of
movement.

The Regulations do not agree with these views.
They hold fast to the principle that deployment must
always be in line, and not in a succession of lines,
and that before this deployment the squadron columns
hitherto employed will generally be replaced by some
other formation.

The above remain the chief formations for move-
ment and deployment of the cavalry. The employment
of the "regimental mass and brigade mass" ^ has been
limited, but the Regulations give us nothing in their
place. Nor, on the other hand, is the flexibility of the
double column particularly emphasised ; its use, indeed,
is in a certain sense limited. I see such limitation in
the fact that the trumpet-call "Double column!" has
been abolished. As, on the other hand, the call "Form
regimental m>ass!" has been retained, it does not ap-

1 "Reflections on the New Cavalry Regulations."

2 Two squadrons abreast in squadron-column at six paces'
interval, followed by two more at troop- frontage distance.
When there is a fifth squadron, it follows in the same forma-
tion in rear of the left. — Trans.

^ "Regiments- und Brigadekolonnen."

212 CAVALRY IN WAR

pear as if the use of double column is to be further
developed, or allowed to replace the regimental and
brigade mass on the field of battle.

It is further laid down that the regimental mass is
to be used when beyond the range of the enemy's fire,
the brigade mass when concealed by the ground, even
on the battle-field, A deployment is even allowed for
from the brigade in mass towards the flank, and that
by a wheel of the head of the columns. This presup-
poses that such a column can be used in a flank move-
ment, which I regard as an impossibility. A deploy-
ment from regimental mass to squadron columns is
also provided for. In view of the great effective range
of the modern gun, I cannot think that movements in
such close formation right up to the moment of de-
ployment can go unpunished upon a modern battle-
field.

All these instructions contained in the Regulations,
and many others that take effect in the same sense,
cannot be regarded as practical. They lead us to fear
that the regimental and brigade masses, in spite of all
modern conditions, will retain more or less their old
importance. They will serve as a pretext for many a
hidebound drill enthusiast, of which, alas! there are
still many among us. Upon the battle-fields of the
future, however, we will no longer dare to appear in
such formations, but only widely deployed and in thin
columns, in such dispositions indeed as will allow of a
rapid adoption of the attack formation, such as we
have discussed in detail above. I can only hope that
these views will, in the not too far distant future, come
to be more generally recognised and will find their way
into the Regulations.

Finally, I would once again draw attention to the

FORMATIONS FOR MOVEMENT 213

idea of the "vanguard." ^ It receives but a passing
mention in the Regulations, and no explanation of
what is thereby meant. My opinion is that it is indis-
pensable to all flank movements, and must continually
be used, especially in the offensive. It should therefore
be provided for by regulation in all deployments, and
the troops should be fully conversant with its use.

For the rest, the present Regulations, in spite of all
actual progress made, can only be designated as pro-
visional, and give rise to the hope that it will be found
possible to re-edit them soon, above all as regards the
stereotyped parts, so that, fully prepared and up to
date, we may go forth with confidence to meet the
events of any future war.

VIII. THE VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT

Having in the last chapter endeavoured to elaborate
tactical principles, and to give practical hints, I will
now shortly deal with the duties of the various units,
and endeavour to form an impression of the perform-
ances that may be expected of them in the fight.

When a squadron, acting independently in recon-
naissance, as advanced guard, flank guard, or divisional
cavalry, finds itself obliged to attack, it will, as a rule,
employ its whole force simultaneously, whether it
charges in line, knee to knee, or uses a troop in single
rank as first line. If a troop has been thrown forward
as advanced guard, it must quickly clear the front, and
endeavour to join the squadron, so as to strengthen it
before the collision, and not to become prematurely
involved in a disadvantageous fight.

The squadron is generally too weak to carry out an
offensive fight on foot. There is also no means of
1 "Tetenschutz."

214 CAVALRY IN WAR

guarding the led horses but by patrols. If they should
become isolated during the attack, there will be a dan-
ger of losing them, especially in hostile country. A
squadron must therefore only determine on a dis-
mounted attack when such action is absolutely un-
avoidable. For dispersing hostile patrols or armed in-
habitants, about a troop dismounted will generally suf-
fice, where there is no opportunity of surprising them
in the charge, or of enveloping them. A defensive
fight on foot must not be undertaken by a single squad-
ron unless absolutely necessary, or whch the led
horses can be disposed in a safe place in the imme-
diate neighbourhood, where the flanks cannot be turned,
or where the arrival of reinforcements can be relied
upon.

A squadron attacking knee to knee is stronger than
a numerically superior enemy who charges in looser
formation and is not armed with the lance.

The regiment of four or five squadrons is numeri-
cally too weak a body to be able of itself to carry out
the larger strategical missions. It will therefore op-
erate in more or less close co-operation with other
troops, and will seldom be called upon to fight inde-
pendently. It may, however, find itself for a time
obliged to rely upon its own fighting strength, whether
acting as divisional cavalry, as advanced guard, or as a
detachment from a larger force of cavalry.

If a fight is in immediate prospect, column of troops
must first be formed from column of route, and a
broader front, which will allow of a rapid assumption
X)f the attack formation, must then be adopted accord-
ing to the ground.

In the charge against cavalry the regiment should
only on rare occasions deploy all its squadrons into
line, but must, whenever practicable, detail one squad-

VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT 215

ron to follow in second line, and another in forward
echelon, to protect the more exposed flank and to turn
that of the enemy.

It will also be possible for the regiment to operate
dismounted against weaker hostile detachments. If
relative strength allows, at least a squadron should be
detached to guard the led horses and to carry out
reconnaissance duties. In the defence on foot, with
ample ammunition and every available rifle in the
firing-line, the regiment represents a formidable fight-
ing force, even when obliged to detach one, or even
two squadrons, for reconnaissance and for the protec-
tion of the flanks and the led horses.

In the fight of smaller bodies of all arms, a regiment
will frequently be able to intervene in a most effective
manner by a timely charge, from which considerable
results may often be expected, especially during pur-
suit of a retreating and shaken enemy. In such cases
the formation of lines for attack will frequently be
superfluous, and a broad enveloping formation may be
adopted.

The brigade of two regiments is numerically too
weak of itself to carry out strategical missions, and to
be able to engage in the independent actions they de-
mand. The heavy drains on its strength which such
missions generally entail will usually weaken the fight-
ing power so much that the brigade will no longer be
in a condition to engage an opponent of any strength
who may have to be dealt with by mounted or dis-
mounted action, or the two in combination.

At the same time, circumstances may lead to a bri-
gade being forced to carry out an independent role.
It will then have to reconnoitre with great care, so
that it may only embark on a decisive encounter with
a full knowledge of the situation. Otherwise, in view

2i6 CAVALRY IN WAR

of its small offensive power, it will run a great risk
of suffering defeat, especially when dismounted.

In the defence on foot, on the other hand, a brigade
may be regarded as an important factor of strength,
capable of successfully resisting an enemy of consider-
able superiority, as long as its flanks are protected
and the led horses do not require too large an escort.

On approaching the enemy, the brigade must form
column of troops from column of route in good time
and the regiments must be deployed on the frontage
and in the formations demanded by the situation. In
such cases a reserve must always be detailed. The
allotment of different roles in the fight to the various
regiments or groups will form the framework for the
tactical deployment. In all attacks the brigade or its
component parts must always adopt the formation in
lines. Where there is blind ground to a flank, a for-
ward echelon must be formed which will co-operate
concentrically in the charge. In the attack on foot,
too, it will often be advantageous to echelon detach-
ments forward under due protection, in order to en-
velop the enemy's position.

In the combat of detachments of all arms, and
especially in pursuit, considerable performances must
be expected of a brigade. A timely charge or the em-
ployment of its fire power in an effective direction may
bring about a decision.

The division of six regiments, under circumstances
where its full strength can be employed in the charge,
represents, even against troops using the rifle, a very
considerable fighting power, which can, if judiciously
handled and launched at the right moment, have a
decisive effect, even in a battle of armies.

In independent missions it must be remembered that
a complete regiment of four squadrons with 15 files

VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT 217

per troop will represent 400 rifles at most. In war,
however, this figure will never be reached. Wastage
on the march and the provision of the necessary de-
tachments and patrols, weaken squadrons very consid-
erably. We must further remember that in every great
battle a mounted reserve will always have to be de-
tailed, while, in addition to this, detachments such as
reconnoitring squadrons, escorts to transport, report-
ing centres, and signal stations, will generally fail to
rejoin in time for the battle. Thus the division will
seldom actually be able to reckon on more than 1,000
to 1,500 rifles in the firing-line.

Even counting on the co-operation of artillery and
machine-guns, which the enemy will also have at his
disposal, this represents no great offensive strength. It
is therefore necessary to be quite clear in our minds
that only weak detachments can be attacked with pros-
pect of success.

A cavalry division is greatly handicapped by these
circumstances in carrying out the role which may be
assigned to it in the course of operations. The resist-
ance of a body of equal strength where circumstances
demand a dismounted attack can thus never be over-
come.

Mounted, however, it is quite another matter. A
well-trained German cavalry division, handled accord-
ing to sound tactical principles and schooled to charge
in close formation, may attack even a stronger enemy
regardless of consequences.

Should the task at issue demand a larger force, sev-
eral divisions must be united in a cavalry corps. In
the battle of all arms such a corps, either by the charge
or by employment of its fire power, may aim at decisive
results. For the conduct of independent strategic mis-
sions fire power is an important factor. As in this

2i8 CAVALRY IN WAR

case the number of men detached, etc., will be divided
between the divisions, a strength of 3,500 rifles can at
times be reached in a corps of two divisions.

For the division, as for the corps, the framework of
the tactical deployment depends upon the commander's
tactical plan, as too does the allotment of duties in the
fight to the various units, divisions, brigades, and regi-
ments, or to the tactical groups, advanced guard, main
body, reserve, etc., and any attempt at retaining the
command in one hand is obviously out of the question.
Stress has already been laid on the necessity for early
deployment, and once this is effected, the various sub-
divisions of the force must take their own independent
measures for carrying out the roles that devolve upon
them.

On the other hand, neither in the fight of the inde-
pendent cavalry nor in the great battle should a unit
be allowed to become isolated in the combat. The nec-
essary combination must always be preserved. United
action, however, is only possible if subordinate leaders
never lose sight of the general purpose of the fight,
and continually bear in mind the necessary interchange-
able relations of the various tactical methods.

In war it will seldom be possible either to undertake
or to carry out the very best course of action, but will
generally be unnecessary, for we may certainly count
on numerous errors and vacillations on the part of the
enemy, especially in the case of cavalry warfare.

It is of far greater importance that any plan once
undertaken should be energetically carried through to
a conclusion.

Success in war is first and foremost a matter of
character and will. The indomitable will to con-
quer carries with it a considerable guarantee of
success.

VARIOUS UNITS IN THE FIGHT 219

The determination to win, cost what it may, is there-
fore the first and greatest quaHty required of a cavalry
leader — and the offensive is the weapon with which he
can best enforce his will.

APPENDIX

CAVALRY AT PEACE MANOEUVRES

If manoeuvres are to be of real value to the cavalry, care
must be taken to demand nothing of the troops but what
would be required of them in war. This is most apparent
in outpost duty, where demands are made on the outpost
cavalry, especially in regard to reconnaissance, that in no-
wise correspond to the teachings of the "Field Service Man-
ual"; and this is the more unfortunate, as the economy of
strength demanded in the "Manual" is absolutely necessary if
the divisional cavalry, in particular, is to be prevented from
failing soon after the commencement of a war.

The duties of outpost cavalry are limited to watching a
strip of country to the front, and possibly on the flank, of the
line of infantry outposts, and to carry messages between the
different sections of the latter.

Standing patrols are the most useful for observation work.
In the case of an enemy close at hand, they should be in
touch with him, and should, if there be no close recon-
naissance patrols, watch his flanks as well; however, with
proper dispositions this should be unnecessary. The stand-
ing patrols would, in any case, have to be in a position to
detect and report any advance on the part of the enemy's
outposts and any movement of the enemy denoting an ad-
vance or retirement. If the enemy, however, is so far away
as to be out of touch with the cavalry cordon, reconnais-
sance work beyond this line should be carried out by those
portions of the divisional cavalry that are not assigned to
outpost duty. If, on the other hand, the outposts on either
side are in close touch, reconnaissance to the front should
be carried out by infantry patrols. It may, however, be
advisable under certain conditions to let weak mounted pa-

221

222 CAVALRY IN WAR

trols follow such infantry patrols to covered positions for
carrying messages, or to employ them dismounted in the
place of the infantry.

If these arrangements are not strictly adhered to, it very
easily happens, during manoeuvres, that reconnaissance work
is carried out by the reconnaisance patrols in the daytime,
but at night by the outpost cavalry. In the morning the
latter is then scattered in all directions and cannot be col-
lected again. Such dispositions are also entirely opposed to
the teachings of the "Field Service Manual," and are un-
suited to conditions of real warfare.

In time of war the reconnaissance patrols naturally con-
tinue their work of observation during the night, and con-
sequently they need not be relieved by patrols of the outpost
cavalry. In peace time, on the other hand, it is still con-
sidered remarkable if the patrols remain in touch with the
enemy at night, and those that do so have been dubbed
"sticky patrols." Those, also, which should really be in
touch with the enemy throughout the night usually get under
cover, and have been known to spend a comfortable night
in excellent quarters.

In making arrangements with regard to outpost cavalry,
attention should be paid to reducing the distance which mes-
sages have to be carried. In this respect, horses are not
always sufficiently considered. When outpost companies are
pushed out far to the flank, it would usually be well to
observe the instructions of the "Field Service Manual," and
to detail small detachments of cavalry to the companies for
their independent use, as this will prevent considerable waste
of strength. It will often be necessary, on the other hand,
to protect unsupported flanks of a line of infantry outposts
by special detachments of the divisional cavalry that do not
form part of the outpost cavalry. Such detachments would,
if possible, find housing for themselves and be self-protect-
ing, though they might, under certain circumstances, be
given a small force of infantry for local security.

It is most important that the outpost cavalry should be
concentrated in good time in the morning before the com-
mencement of the march or of the engagement, and that
they should retire in formed order on the divisional cavalry.
This requires careful preparation and instructions; some
practical method must be found which will overcome the

APPENDIX 223

difficulties that now present themselves. The various squad-
ron commanders must act in conjunction with the officers
commanding the outposts. All the higher officers, and those
directing the manoeuvres, must, however, always keep this
matter in mind, so that the present system, which offers
such serious disadvantages, may not become so customary as
to be carried on in time of war.

Having examined the flaws still to be found in our outpost
system, and which are likely to adversely affect the arm in
war, we find, on turning to the sphere of reconnaissance,
that such defects are even more prevalent.

The arrangements that are usually made in this matter
often draw on the strength of the cavalry in a manner quite
out of proportion to the demands of actual war, and weaken
the squadrons to such an extent as almost to destroy their
fighting value. The weak point is, in the main, as follows:

It is usual for every order given by a commanding officer
to direct that a reconnaissance should be carried out, even
though the previous order may have given instructions for
one in the same direction. The cavalry obeys these orders,
and sends out fresh patrols each time the order is repeated.
As the patrols are always told to keep in touch with the en-
emy, and as, on account of peace conditions that obtain, no-
body thinks of relieving them, they collect in one direction,
whilst the squadron becomes weaker and weaker.

I consider that every effort should be made to combat this
bad habit. Care should be taken not to send out unnecessary
patrols, and to call in, from time to time, those that have
been sent out, or where necessary, to relieve them. I be-
lieve that this would be possible if the following rules were
observed.

If an order has been given which entails a reconnaissance
in a certain direction, it is unnecessary that this should be
repeated in a subsequent order. Other directions rather,
which are indicated by reason of the altered conditions,
should be brought to notice, and reference made to the
reconnaissance already despatched. Under no circumstances,
however, should a cavalry commander be induced, on re-
ceiving instructions to reconnoitre in a certain direction, to
send a patrol to a point where he knows his patrols to be
already in touch with the enemy. The necessary economy
of strength can only be effected by leaving the command

224 CAVALRY IN WAR

of the patrol service entirely in the hands of the cavalry
commander, who must be responsible to his superior officer
for the carrying out of the reconnaissance work entrusted
to him. The superior officer should only interfere if he
discovers obvious mistakes, or if other circumstances render
such a step absolutely necessary. He must, for his part,
see that orderlies and reporting patrols that come in remain
with his staff, and that they are sent back to the squadron
when opportunity offers, so as to be available for fighting
purposes. This should be made a standing order at manoeu-
vres.

All patrols that are sent out must receive definite orders
as to how far they are to advance in any given direction,
how long they are to reconnoitre in that direction, and
when they are to return. If, at the expiration of such a
period, renewed reconnaissance is found necessary in the
same direction, relieving patrols should be despatched in
good time, i.e. before the first patrols have returned; and
these fresh patrols should, if possible, meet the returning
ones, in order to exchange notes regarding the enemy. For
this purpose the outward and homeward routes of the pa-
trols should be prearranged as far as circumstances permit.

In manoeuvres, when one officer takes over command from
another, he must inquire as to the arrangements made for
reconnaissance work, and must take measures accordingly.

When a fresh squadron is sent out on reconnaissance, due
notice must be given to the squadron to be relieved. The
two officers commanding must act in conjunction, so that the
officer being relieved can draw in his patrols and the re-
lieving patrols of the new squadron be sent out in good
time.

It should also be remembered that, in time of war, close
reconnaissance would gradually develop from distant recon-
naissance, and would not, as a rule, require any fresh dis-
positions such as are usually found necessary at manoeuvres.

During all exercises, especially when a long advance is
being made and distant patrols are not actually sent out,
the commanding officers should be furnished by the directing
staff with such information as these patrols would in all
probability have obtained. They should also be told which
of the distant patrols may be assumed to be in touch with
the enemy, and which have either returned or been cap-

APPENDIX 225

tured or wiped out. The distant patrols, which are to be
in touch with the enemy, might with advantage be des-
patched by the directing staff, before the manoeuvre com-
mences, in time to procure quarters and receive instructions
as to the situation. The troops should, of course, be in-
formed of the despatch of these patrols, and all further
reconnaissance will be furnished by the cavalry commander.
Every cavalry detachment must also know exactly what area
it is to reconnoitre, and what reconnaissances have been,
or are assumed to have been, carried out by neighbouring
detachments.

It is a mistake to indicate the direction in which a near
reconnaissance should be made, without limiting the dis-
tance of it. It is the duty of the distant reconnaissance to
locate an opponent who is advancing from a distance. As
long as the enemy is under the observation of the distant
patrols, the close reconnaissance should not be pushed for-
ward to meet him, but should be advanced from one posi-
tion to the next, within definite limits. When these limits
have been reached, the close patrols should be drawn in
by the squadrons furnishing them, and fresh patrols be
despatched to the next position.

It would also be well if the directing staff were to lessen
the work by stopping and sending back to their units such
patrols as, by reason of their direction, cannot possibly come
in contact with the enemy; or it may even suffice, for the
purposes of the manoeuvre, to assume the despatch of pa-
trols in such directions. They might also be given sealed
orders, only to be opened at a certain place, containing the
data necessary for negative reports and instructions regard-
ing their return to their unit.

I believe that if such methods were adopted, and if the
patrol leaders confined themselves to sending such reports as
would be sent in real war, which would include a clear and
concise statement regarding the configuration of the coun-
try, it would be possible to avoid the unwarrantable weaken-
ing of the squadrons now in vogue, which does not even
produce a correspondingly efficient service of communica-
tion. It is, however, true that the art of sending a few,
but good reports, and of sending them at the right time
requires, in the leader of the patrol, sound tactical judg-
ment, and a training that is nowadays but seldom obtained.

226 CAVALRY IN WAR

Senior officers also are often to blame for the frequency
of reports. Appointed to a command at manoeuvres, they
want to know every detail about the enemy, and the exact
minute in which an advance or a movement is made. Every
little detachment must be reported, and the slightest move-
ment watched. The result is that they encourage patrols,
not only to send as many detailed reports as possible, but,
if necessary, to obtain the information in a manner incom-
patible with service conditions. This is a deep-seated evil
that is to be seen at all manoeuvres, and one that command-
ers should consistently endeavour to eradicate.

Such procedure reacts upon the commanding officers them-
selves by exercising a harmful influence on their individual
training. If everything is known about the strength, the
line of advance, and the distance of the enemy, generalship
descends to the level of the solution of an arithmetical prob-
lem, decisions of the commanding officers being based on
complete and established data. What a difference is there in
actual warfare ! But meagre information is available re-
garding the enemy, and decisions must, as a rule, be based on
a certain knowledge of one's own plans and a rough idea
of the numbers, intentions, and fighting strength of the en-
emy. In the former case, decisions of commanding officers
are the result of calculation; in the latter — i.e. in actual
warfare — they are a matter for military skill, or the intui-
tion of genius, which is a very different thing. These are
the decisions that officers should be encouraged and trained
to make; but, unless the malpractices that have crept into
the reconnaissance work are rooted out, this valuable train-
ing for actual warfare is likely to be lost.

But all that is only by the way. We are now discussing
the cavalry and not the generals, and I should like to point
out the great importance of training units themselves to re-
port in a manner suited to service conditions, i.e. to report
only important matters, and these at the right time, so that
the commanding officer may receive information regarding
tlfe enemy in time to make the necessary dispositions, while
at the same time the reconnoitring detachments need not
unduly weaken themselves by the too frequent despatch of
messages. On the field of battle reports could be carried
by individual horsemen instead of by patrols, but of these
only a limited number should be drawn from the squadron,

APPENDIX 227

as it is not possible to rely on their return. They must
also be taught only to take reports to such places as they
could actually reach in war. At manoeuvres and other ex-
ercises they are often to be seen riding about behind the
firing-line in the most exposed places, having apparently no
idea of the dangers which they would run in real warfare.
This habit, acquired in peace, may in time of war entail
the loss of many riders, horses, and reports.

The best means of counteracting these bad habits is to
tell the despatch-riders exactly where to go, and to prevail
on the officers concerned to remain in certain fixed places,
as in real warfare, instead of moving about on the field
of battle, even within the zone of the enemy's fire. It is
true that, by moving about and exposing themselves, com-
manders can get a better idea of the engagement, and can
make dispositions more rapidly and better than they could
from the rear; but, at the same time, such procedure spoils
their own training by removing difficulties that would exist
in time of war. Making suitable dispositions from the rear,
with hardly anything but reports to go by, is quite a differ-
ent matter from conducting the fight from the front, where
a clear view of the situation can be got.

As regards reconnaissance and screening, the principles
evolved in the chapter on these subjects hold good for the
conduct of cavalry at manoeuvres.

First of all, we must see whether the cavalry attached to
the different divisions should, according to its strength, be
only classed as divisional cavalry, or whether its total
strength is such as to entitle it to be considered as army
cavalry.

Units detailed to act as divisional cavalry should not move
about independently in the manoeuvre area, as this would be
in opposition to the essence of their duties, nor should they,
on the other hand, remain tied to the infantry, as they un-
fortunately so often do. They must learn to advance from
point to point, to reconnoitre by areas, to observe from a
distance with glasses, to judge correctly which flank is of
most importance for reconnaissance, and, finally, to occupy
during the engagement such ground that may be valuable
or essential for successful reconnaissance. Regiments and
squadrons detailed as army cavalry should, on the other
hand, act according to the principles involved.

228 CAVALRY IN WAR

When army cavalry is taking part in manoeuvres, the
leaders should be recommended to include in the exercises
reconnaissance and screening problems on a large scale.
This can generally be done. Then the merging of the dis-
tant into the close and battle reconnaissance should be prac-
tised, the gradual withdraw^al of reconnoitring squadrons on
the approach of the enemy, the evacuation of the areas al-
lotted to them, and the independent action necessitated by
the fresh conditions. This stage is instructive, not only
for the reconnoitring squadrons and patrols, but also for the
cavalry division itself. They will have to decide on which
flank of the troops in rear to concentrate, and in this matter
must act in conjunction with any divisional cavalry there
may be; at the same time, they must take into account the
ground and the general strategical situation. The final de-
cision will, as a rule, have to be made after duly weighing
many varied and often conflicting considerations.

If a general engagement of all arms should result, it is
important, even though the ground should not be suitable
for a charge, that the best use should, in any case, be made
of the fighting value of the troops. Nothing is more incor-
rect and more opposed to the principles of warfare than
an attitude of inactivity in anticipation of the possibility of
an attack. If echeloned" forward on the flank of the force,
the cavalry should make every endeavour to develop an
attack against the flank or rear of the enemy by fire or shock
action, and to threaten and harass his artillery. The heavy
artillery of the field army will often afford a suitable object
of attack, more so, perhaps, in manoeuvres than in actual
warfare. It is undoubtedly wrong, whatever the conditions
may be, to remain inactive and watch the other arms strug-
gling for the palm of victory. "Activite! activite! activitc!"
cried Napoleon to his generals, and this, too, should be our
first demand from our cavalry leaders.

It would also be a useful exercise if pursuits could occa-
sionally be arranged for at manoeuvres, so that the cavalry
may learn how to initiate them in good time, and to push
them home with energy. The difficulties of pursuits, and
the principles to be observed in their conduct, are dealt with
elsewhere.

If the cavalry endeavours to carry out the tasks I have
sketched above, and at the same time effects the necessary

APPENDIX 229

economy of strength, it will reap benefits from mancEUvres
that will materially assist its training for war, provided the
antiquated ideas that still prevail are discarded.

LARGER RECONNAISSANCE EXERCISES

Under this head I should like to draw attention to the
importance of frequent practice in screening. In a war of
operations, which includes the encounters resulting from
strategical concentration, the functions of screening are, in
my opinion, most important. The American War of Seces-
sion showed in a surprising manner what could be done
in this respect. Stuart's screening of the left wheel of the
Confederate army, after the battle of Chancellorsville, for
instance, was a masterpiece, and the reconnaissance carried
out by Mosby's Scouts during the same period was equally
brilliant. I would recommend the study of these features of
the war, as they are remarkably suited to the present day,
in spite of the great change in conditions.

Our cavalry keep, as a rule, but little in touch with such
matters. The new "Field Service Manual" introduces the
idea of offensive and defensive screens, but the cavalry lack
experience in them. Offensive screening is usually accepted,
it appears, at all events, at the outset, as being somewhat
similar to reconnaissance duties. Real screening is but sel-
dom practised, as operations only last a short time, and
usually end with a cavalry encounter, entailing a lapse into
the usual set piece.

With regard to these exercises, I would point out that de-
fensive screening, combined with natural obstacles, and
possibly with the assistance of the other arms, is much more
effective than the offensive method, and therefore deserves
more attention, and, further, that there is a considerable
difference between a reconnaissance and an offensive screen.

In a reconnaissance an advance is made in the direction
which the army commander considers to be most important,
and it is left to the enemy's cavalry to oppose this advance.
In offensive screening, on the other hand, the enemy must
be found before he can be attacked and beaten. An advance
would naturally not be risked in a direction that would avoid
the enemy's cavalry, and thereby afford it the opportunity

230 CAVALRY IN WAR

of approach against the main army. This should be pre-
vented at all costs. An advance must consequently not be
made until information has been obtained from patrols or
scouts regarding the position and the line of advance of the
enemy's cavalry. Then a determined attack should be made
on the cavalry, the force being concentrated as much as
possible for this purpose. It is only after this attack has
been successfully carried out that the real screening work
begins.

The two main points that should be observed when carry-
ing out such exercises are therefore : ( i ) no advance should
be made until the enemy's line of advance has been dis-
covered; and (2) the forces should be distributed, after the
defeat of the enemy, on a broad front, in accordance with
the requirements of the screening duties, while the enemy's
beaten cavalry must be carefully watched, to prevent its
further activity.

With regard to defensive screening, it is necessary above
all, first, to occupy with sufficient strength all passages over
the natural obstacle that has been selected, and to effect
a tactical disposition of the forces that will enable them to
do a maximum of work with the expenditure of a minimum
of strength, making the greatest possible use of field en-
trenchments; secondly, to so dispose the reserves that they
will be quickly available to strengthen any threatened point ;
and lastly, to arrange a system of communication along the
whole screening-line, employing any suitable technical ap-
pliances in such a manner that the system will continue to
operate even though the enemy's patrol should break through
the line. It must be possible also to communicate quickly
and safely to the troops in rear, so that any detachments of
the enemy that might break through the line may be in-
tercepted. The cavalry telegraph, in fact any kind of tele-
graph, is the least sure method of communication, particu-
larly in the enemy's country, owing to the ease with which
it can be cut. There must, at any rate, be other means
of rapid communication besides the telegraph, such as flag
signals or the light-signal.

In screening work, balloons are often very useful for
discovering the direction in which the enemy is advancing;
they are more suited to stationary work, especially behind a
protected area, than to active operations. The reconnais-

APPENDIX 231

sance and the action of the cavalry could then be based
on the information received from the balloons. It will,
unfortunately, seldom happen during such manoeuvres that
a balloon is available, but all the necessary technical ap-
pliances for communication should certainly be at hand.

The value of all these exercises, especially in the case of
reconnaissance, is largely dependent on the manner in which
the enemy is represented. The best plan is, of course, to
place real troops at their full strength opposite to one an-
other, but this is scarcely practicable, on account of the
expense entailed. Even the Imperial Manoeuvres do not
faithfully represent modern armies and distances, but only
reproduce portions of great operations on a reduced scale.
The fact of the matter is that it is impossible, in time of
peace, to set on foot anything approaching the number of
men, or to cover anything like the extent of country, neces-
sary to at all correspond with the conditions of modern
warfare. The only feasible plan is to indicate columns of
the army, and even large bodies of cavalry, by flagged
troops; but it is well to place real troops at the head of
these columns, so that they may form the vanguard and
may send out the full number of patrols and outposts, at all
events to the front. The reconnoitring organs would thus,
at any rate to the front, be confronted by an enemy dis-
posed as in real warfare. I need hardly say that both
sides should send out these reconnoitring detachments, as
far as possible at full strength; no advantage can possibly
be derived from the exercises if this is not done.

It is also very important to put the divisional cavalry into
the field, where possible at full strength, as the difficulties
that beset the reconnoitring patrols will only then become
apparent. This divisional cavalry need only send out a
limited number of these patrols, as they are, as a rule, not
absolutely necessary in such exercises, but the work of
screening should receive careful attention. The division
should therefore be surrounded by a screen of security po
trols, and all points from which the enemy's patrols might
observe the columns should be occupied. If these columns
are on the march, the security patrols should advance in
"bonds successifs," together with the divisional cavalry,
from one line of observation to the next, and thus prevent
any possible reconnaissance on the part of the enemy.

232 CAVALRY IN WAR

If the ground on the line of advance is suited to defensive
screening, this method should be adopted, and all the en-
emy's patrols and despatch-riders seen should be hunted
down. When the hostile reconnoitring patrols have been
driven back behind their own screens or outposts, measures
should be taken to prevent their re-issue. If the enemy's
patrols endeavour to remain for the night in the vicinity
of the troops they wish to keep under observation, they
should, if possible, be attacked and captured. When opera-
tions are being carried on in friendly country, it will be well
to ensure the co-operation of the inhabitants in obtaining
information regarding the movements of the enemy's troops.
There are always old soldiers to be found among the civil
population, who would interest themselves in the matter if
called upon by the local magistrates to assist, and who would
certainly do their utmost to help their own countrymen and
to hamper the enemy. Care should, of course, be taken not
to go too far in this direction, as unfortunate consequences
might possibly result.

It will also be well to send numerous umpires with the
army columns and their vanguards, and with the divisional
cavalry, and also along the main roads, whose task it will
be to conduct the manoeuvres as nearly as possible on the
lines of real warfare. Umpires should also be attached to
reconnoitring patrols and squadrons, at any rate to those of
one side, so that there may be an impartial witness of any
encounter. The appointment of these umpires would have
the further advantage of providing work at the important
points for a larger number of officers, who would thus learn
more than they would do when simply marching with their
units.

When the various portions of the army are to be repre-
sented by flags, each flag should be made to represent a
company, a battery, or a squadron, but the flags should be
so disposed as to oblige patrols to estimate the strength of
the columns by their length, as in war there would not often
be time or opportunity to count the separate tactical groups
of the enemy. Too few flags should not, however, be used,
but rather as many as possible, so as to produce the effect
of a continuous column on the move, infantry and artillery
being clearly indicated. The detachments of cavalry that
would in actual warfare be stationed at different points along

APPENDIX 233

the column might with advantage be represented by real
cavalry, v^^ho would be able to pursue the enemy's horsemen.
Artillery patrols might also relieve the cavalry of this duty,
and, in difficult country, march on the flanks of the column,
thereby making matters more difficult for the hostile scouts.
All measures of this description would greatly assist in
giving to manoeuvres the character of real warfare, and in
increasing the difficulties in the way of the far-too-easy
peace-time reconnaissance.

Umpires need not confine themselves to deciding the re-
sults of engagements. They might very well draw the at-
tention of patrols that act in a manner incompatible with
service conditions to the hostile spirit of the population, or,
if necessary, bring about real or assumed attacks that would
inflict such losses or damage on the patrols as they would
probably have suffered in war. They can, in short, do much
to give the manoeuvres a semblance of reality.

The role of umpire is also a useful training for regimental
officers. Regimental and squadron commanders cannot form
a correct idea of the possibilities and functions of their
reconnoitring detachments unless they have accompanied
patrols as umpires.

It is, in my opinion, impossible to go too far in the direc-
tion of making conditions resemble as much as possible those
of actual warfare, as one of the greatest difficulties to be
faced consists in sustaining the interest of the troops and
the semblance of reality.

Goethe, in his "Wilhelm Meister," remarks how rare it is
to find among men "any kind of creative imagination."
Nothing, indeed, is more difficult than to take a keen interest
in hypothetical conditions. This truth applies particularly to
soldiers, and the difficulty is one from which most peace
exercises suffer.

Some very powerful incentive is required to induce troops
to really enter into the conditions presupposed by the general
idea of the manoeuvres. They must continually imagine the
existence of real warfare, with all its exactions and influ-
ences, and they must act consistently according to the spirit
of purely imaginative conditions. It is during the recon-
noitring exercises of the cavalry that the men's powers of
imagination are most heavily taxed, and that most mistakes
and unnatural situations result in consequence. Even the

234 CAVALRY IN WAR

officers display a lack of imagination in their inability to
conform to service conditions, to appreciate the difficulties
and dangers of any situation, and to take them into account
when making their dispositions, and in their general con-
duct.

During the last decade, reconnaissance at our smaller field-
training exercises and manoeuvres has suffered greatly from
red-tape methods and the consciousness of peace conditions.
I refer mainly to the transmission service. Times without
number, single horsemen arrive with messages from points
behind the enemy or his outposts, so that the messenger must
ride right through the enemy, thus entailing the certain loss
of the report. It should be unnecessary to point out that the
best messages are quite useless if they do not reach their
destination.

It is a vital mistake in our army, and one to which I have
frequently drawn attention, that these single orderlies are
sent with messages, and that even for long distances. Grant-
ing that the improbable might happen, and they were suc-
cessful in finding their way without maps, often at night and
in foggy weather, through a strange country, single horse-
men would, in the enemy's country, be often captured or fall
a prey to the hostile population. In spite of all this, every
one is opposed to sending a patrol with a message, and,
when it is done, the patrol's strength is cut down most un-
warrantably. I am afraid that only bitter experience will
teach us the folly of this procedure.

It also frequently happens that technical appliances for
transmission are use in a most illegitimate manner. Tele-
graph-lines belonging to both sides have before now actually
been laid peacefully side by side, and had their respective
termini within the cantonment area of the opposing armies.
Until quite lately, telegraphic messages were often sent
through the enemy's lines.

In these exercises both sides, as a rule, find considerable
difficulty in remembering the assumed hostility of the popu-
lation, and in making corresponding dispositions. When
selecting quarters, this point is frequently forgotten, and
patrols spend the night in villages in hostile country, and in
close proximity to the enemy's cantonments, where escape,
in time of war, would be practically out of the question.
On such occasions the prospect of comfortable quarters.

APPENDIX 235

where the horses can be well cared for, has probably
more influence on the patrol leader's plans than military exi-
gencies, and the protective measures taken would probably
prove correspondingly inefficient. The exercises should
therefore be so arranged that the patrols and, if possible,
the reconnoitring squadrons of both sides, advance into the
enemy's country, thus placing themselves in difficult situa-
tions ; and the umpires should have instructions to interfere
immediately if anything were done that would entail serious
consequences in war time, as the lesson that should be
learnt is how to act in the enemy's country.

Particular stress should be laid on the method of writing
reports. If instruction in this direction is to bear fruit, all
the details as to contents, time and place of despatch, and any
other important points must be thoroughly discussed. Our
cavalry still suffers from bad habits contracted during peace
training. It has not learnt to reconnoitre on a large scale,
and consequently pays too much attention to details of the
drill-ground, while it is unable properly to distinguish be-
tween strategical exploration and tactical reconnaissance.
Even in larger exercises, where stress should be laid on
ascertaining merely the strategical dispositions of the en-
emy, the tendency is always to report in detail, and as often
as possible, while the relative importance of such reports is
seldom assessed at its right value.

The question of economising strength is often entirely ne-
glected, especially in the case of reconnoitring squadrons,
just as it is with forces of all arms during manoeuvres. The
force is unwarrantably weakened by making too many de-
tachments, and is then called upon to perform tactical evo-
lutions which it cannot possibly carry out satisfactorily. The
commander must learn to husband his force, even though
his sphere of reconnaissance may be large. He must arrange
the strength of his distant patrols according to the impor-
tance of the mission upon which they are despatched, and
must reduce the number of close patrols to a minimum, while
being particularly careful to draw in his patrols at the right
time. He must, on the other hand, realise the value of fight-
ing as a means to the attainment of his object. It appears
to me that there is some confusion of thought as to the
use of engagements, particularly in reconnaissance work.

Formerly, the idea prevailed that cunning and speed were

236 CAVALRY IN WAR

the important features of reconnaissance, and that the en-
emy's scouts should, if possible, be avoided. Now, however,
the new "Field Service Manual" enunciates the principle that
even patrols should attack the enemy's cavalry wherever met
with. It is rightly represented that by pushing back the
enemy's patrols and other reconnoitring organs his recon-
naissance is hampered, whilst our own service of transmis-
sion is assisted, and that only by a ubiquitous offensive can
an appreciable moral superiority be attained.

I should certainly be the last to oppose the idea of bold,
self-confident, offensive tactics; but the question is whether
such tactics would always be sound policy. In reconnais-
sance work, the first object of an engagement is to facili-
tate scouting; the second, to inflict losses on the enemy. Al-
though the "Field Service Manual" is undoubtedly correct
in principle, it should not be taken too literally, especially
when the attainment of the object in view — viz. to obtain
information regarding the enemy — might depend on the re-
sult of a fight. If any doubt exists regarding the result, it
may be better to abstain from attack; while, if it is evident
that a victory can only be gained at so heavy a loss as to
adversely affect further reconnaissance, an engagement
should, if possible, be avoided. Every effort should be made
to render the tactical conditions as favourable as possible.
A fight on foot is to be avoided, as entailing waste of time
and considerable loss. A defensive action dismounted
should only be undertaken when there is a defile to be held
that cannot be turned. Mobility, on the other hand, must
be exploited in every possible way, in order that, if a fight
is to be brought on, it may take place under the most favour-
able circumstances. In such a case, if an enemy is en-
countered who is either weaker or only slightly superior
in strength, and who is known to be without support, he
should always be boldly attacked. Stratagems, or creeping
up to the enemy and avoiding his outposts and patrols, should
only be resorted to when it is necessary to avoid discovery
in order to attain the object in view. During training great
stress should be laid on a proper appreciation of these prin-
ciples, as our cavalry still lacks sound traditions with regard
to reconnaissance work.

Thus no greater error could be made during reconnais-
sance exercises than to attach the most importance to en-

APPENDIX 237

counters between the main bodies, but this mistake is un-
fortunately frequently committed. It is on the exercise
grounds that these mass engagements can and should be
learnt. During reconnaissance exercises, however, the strate-
gical conduct of detached columns, and, above all, the han-
dling of reconnaissance organs, should receive most at-
tention. These matters would, of course, be largely in-
fluenced by the result of the main action between the
masses of the cavalry on either side, and this should be
made clear to all concerned; but the manner in which such
an engagement is actually conducted by the main bodies is
of lesser moment, and all attention should not be centred
in it.

It is, however, essential that the exercises should be so
planned that the mass of cavalry does not advance in close
formation in one group, and that the reconnoitring organs
are not obliged to carry on the prescribed reconnaissances
throughout the manoeuvres within the area originally allotted
to them, as would usually be the case where the armies, or
their cavalry divisions, advance directly towards one an-
other. This entails but a very elementary form of recon-
naissance, and is mainly of use as an exercise in co-opera-
tion between the different units. The real difficulties only
commence when, during the course of the manoeuvres, the
detached columns of the cavalry have to act in concert;
when they endeavour to co-operate after one of them has
come into collision with the enemy ; when, perhaps, the areas
allotted to reconnoitring squadrons have been changed; or
a success achieved by the cavalry of one side or the other
produces entirely new conditions, to which the reconnais-
sance organs have to adapt themselves independently. These
are moments that call for great powers of judgment on the
part of the officers, and for skill and resourcefulness on the
part of the men, and they are consequently very valuable
for instructional purposes. The relief of the reconnaissance
organs, hitherto never practised, but highly important, also
presents many difficulties of a practical nature. An at-
tempt should be made when arranging exercises to bring
about situations of this nature, which will be of great service
to the troops, and afford an opportunity of bringing to light
cavalry talent among the officers. Though such talent is
often to be found amongst the best horsemen or instructors,

238 CAVALRY IN WAR

such is not always the case, and every effort must be made
to discover and foster it.

The cavalry service is no place for mediocrities, and it is
important that the directors of the exercises should be fully
qualified to carry out their task, and be free from all de-
pendence upon Regulation or prejudice. The personal equa-
tion plays a greater part in the cavalry than in any other
arm, yet in no other arm is it, as a rule, so indifferently
solved.

I should like, in conclusion, to draw attention to two more
points.

First, I would insist on not more maps being distributed
among the troops at these exercises than would actually be
available in an enemy's country. The fact of being the whole
time in one's own country, where the inhabitants are ready to
give any information required, renders the work very much
easier, and if, perhaps, in addition, every man has a map, the
difficulties that would crop up in time of war are not ade-
quately represented.

The second point is of equal importance, though of quite
a different nature. The movement of large bodies of cavalry
in time of war entails considerable difficulties in the way of
transport, and it would be well if these could, somehow, be
made apparent during the exercises. The expense might
certainly be heavy, but would be well justified, for it is in
the cavalry, more than any other troops, that the drag of a
transport column is most felt.

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