i:^ ^ o^ 2^ ^^^ s:^. "^2-
OF TUF.
AT
PRINCETON, N. J.
x>o::v_'VTzo:v ois-
■ SAMUEL AGNE\V,
OF PHILADELPHIA, PA.
Q^.
Case,
Shelf,
Jiook,
Divisior
Section s
N
."...Hj.
3
•<^£c^^ef<:
i^_3e^^^c^^c.c.^^>e ^
#«
T H E
Certainty and Necefity
O F
Religion in General :
Or, the Firft
Grounds and Principles
o F
umane ^Vitv
EftabliflVd ;
[a Right Sermons Preach'd ac S. Mar-
lins in the Fields at the Lecture foi
tiic Year 1(^9", founded by tht
Honourable ^hcrt Boyle^ Efquire.
Hy ^ trar7cis CLifhell, D. D. Canon ot
ChrtpXhurch^ and Preacher to the
Honourable Society o^i Lincolns-lnn.
Tf.>e' StcO'/id Edi:iij;i ( orn-iled Tvith fome JJdhh'vs.
L 0 N D O jY^
I'rintcd by T. W. for Tho. Bemtt^ at the Half-
Mooa in St. Paul\ Charch-Yard, i ycj .
/
TO THE
Moft Reverend Father inGodTlmmts
Lord Archbiiliup of Canterbury.
Sir Henry JJljurJl^ Baronet 5
SiYjohn^)theram, Serjeant atLaw3
JoJ?n Fyelyn Senior. Efquire,
Trufl-ees bv the Appointment of the Hono-
rable/<() li £ R 7^ BOTLE, Efquirc
Mojl Reverend and Honoured^
HAving, by Your Appointment,
prcachM the follov/ini^ Sermons,
and publifli'd them, by your Command;
I humbly defire, this Dedication of them
to You may be accepted as fome Ac-
knowledgment for tliat great Trufb you
have been pleafed to' honour me with.
I have notliing to fay for the Perfor-
mance, but that I have endeavoured, all
I could to proportion my Care to the
Subjecl, and DefignofthcLeclurc; and,
where the Management is faulty, I have
A 2 reafon
The Epiftle Dedicatory,
reaibn to hope that the Evidence of the
Truths, I defend, will bear me out.
I have taken the Liberty to Print my
Sermons all together, inacontinu'd Dif-
courfe, that the Strength of the Proofs
there given may appear more plainly
from th.eir Connexion.
If it fliall pleafe God to render what I
have done, in any degree, or meafure,
ferviceable towards the raifmg, or pro-
moting a Senfe of Religion among us, I
fiiall extreamly rejoyce at my Succefs;
and, I am fure, I fhall have my Satisfa-
0:ion encreafed by Your Approbation of
my Endeavours, and by your farther
Protection and Defence of the fame
Caufe, in which I am now particularly
eng'iged, and which ought to be the
general Concern of Mankind.
lam,
Mofl Reverend and Honoured,
Tour mqfi faithful and obedient Servant^
Franck GaJlrelL
T H E
PREFACE.
i\ every Age of the World^ of which ive
have Any Account left us^ the Wicked^
ncfs of M-tnkind has much the large ft
/hare tn their Htjlory : and. if we inttrely
credited the Complaints of the fever d Ht'
jlortans^ who acquaint tu with what paffed
m their days, we fhould be difpofed to con-
clude^ that thofe particular ttmcs^ of which
they write f were certainly much wor/e, than
any that went before^ and^ confequently that
Vice^having been always grow ing^and gat her -
i/igStrength^ as the JVorld advanced in years ^
the Prefent Generation of Men mufi far ex-
ceed all their Predecejforsin Wtckednefs. But,
tho* I have a very ill Opinion of the Age we
now live m, I cannot look upon this Reflex-
ion as jufl, and well-grounded.
The true Occafion both of the Obfervation^
and the Complaints grounded upon ity I take
to be, that variety of Wickednefs, whereby
the fever al Ages^ and Countries of the World
have been difiinguiflfdfrom one another. For
there have been as many different Metheds^
A J and
ii The Preface.
and, Fajhiom of finning^ among Men^ asForfns
of Goziernment \ and as many Changes and
Revolutions in Vice^ as in Empire, Some
Feriods of Time have been remarkable for
open Cruelty^ Rapine^ and QppreJJton ; fome
for Treachery^ and private Revenge^ and all
thefecret ways of DeJtruBion ; others for
Luxury^ and Riot, and all manner rf extra-
vagani Lufi, and Debauchery ; At fome Sea-
fins Profanfs, and a publtck contempt of Re-
ligion have prcvaiPd; at other tiw.es Indif-
ference^ and an utter Neglect of all that^s
good andfacred ; fo?netimes Hypccrify^and an
open pretence to Piety and Virtue have been
generality ufedfor a Cover to a clofe andfccret
practice of all fort of Vice ; a-nd Jometimes
Men have had the Impudence to defend the
worfi Actions, by endeavouring to make them
appear conftflent with Religion.
Thefe, and manyfuch Differences as thefe
are ohfervable in the Htfiory of former
times ; hut the peculiar, dijiinguijhing Cha-
racter of This Age, is a publick Denial of
Religion, and all the Obligations of it, with
an. Endeavour, to difprove the Evidences
brought for it, and to offer a more rational
Scheme of Libertzn/fm. ^Tis true indeed,
this ought to be the Plea of all rvicked Men
who are refolved to continue in their Vices
and
The Preface. iii
and^ upon that account^ it may be jufily
wonder'^ d at^ that the number of Atheijisy
and profej} Libertines has not been much
greater injormer Ages^ than in this^ in which
we pretend to jujter yiews , and Jironger
Proofs of Religion than were heretofore
known : But ^tisplam^ there never were more
than there are now^ to whom thofe Characters
do truly belong , what ever jbfter Names
they are pleaftd to diflingutflj themfelves
by ; and this 1 apprehend to be the reafonoftt.
The Scriptures of the new Tejlament^
which are ^ generally^ tn this part of the World,
believed to contain the Revelations of God^
are fo plain and particular^ fif^^ and ex-
prefsy m the Account they give of the Duties
required of Men ^ and of the future Rewards
and PunijbmeiUs annexed to the obfervance
or breach of them 'j and the World is fo in-
light ned now by the great Improvements of
Kjiowledge which have been lately made^ f-
fpecially by a critical and exact Search into
the Defign, and Meaning of the Sacred Wri-
tings^ that "^tis tmpojjible for Men of Senfe
to reconcile a Profligate Life with thofe Ide-
as of God and Religion which they meet with
m the Scriptures ; and therefore they find
themfelves obliged^ in defence of their Vices ^
('which they cannot perfvade themfelves to part
A 4 with^)
IV The Pretace.
wtth^^ to deny^ not only KcveUtion^ hut all
wanner of Religion loo ; (ince^ if there he
Any Religion at all, they are forced iO ac-
knowledge that rve have the fairefiy and mofl
rational Draught of it frefented us in the
Writings of the New Tejlament,
This Method of reafonin^ is, noiv^ found
to have a Jlronger Influence in quieting the
Confcience, and making an til Manfatisfied
rvith hitnfelf than any Plea formerly u fed',
hecaufe it has a greater fhew of Fairnefs and
Sincerity in it : "^tis fo very reafonahle, and
honour ahle a thing for a Man to act up to his
'Principles, that wicked Men are eafily difpo-
fed to eniertam agood Opinion of the Princi-
ples of Irreligion, hecaufe the confrant Agree-
uhlenefs of theirPracttce to them makes their
Character confiftent, and all of a piece, and
gi''^ e them a great Advantage hot h in point
of 'Judgment, and Honour, over thoje, who
toretend to other Principles, and yet acljufl
/ts they do.
But, whatever Preference may he due to
fhefe Men upon a companfon of them with
tricked Profejfors of Religion J and whate-
ver Eafe, and Sat is faction K may afford
them, in a continued Courfe of Vice, that
sheir 'Judgment and Practice agree together ;
Jihmkit may he made very evident, tha(
ihey
The Preface. v
they hive only (ou?id out a rew Artifice to de-
ceivethtr/jffh'es ; and r oat all their Reafcnings
an KOt only vain a//d froundhjs^ but direlilf
oppoftteto the clear e/l Conceptions of Truth^
and Happine/Sy whicij Mankind is capable of.
This is the plain Drfign of the follorving
Dtfcourfe ; and^ to render it more effectual
for the checkings andputting fame flop to: he
reigi'ing Corruption ojthi< Jge^l have focon~
tnvcd it^ as to make it hear with enual Force
agatn^ all the Principles nhich can he made
ufe of^ tojupport Irrtligton.
I know very well^ that the Folly and Vk-
reafonahlemjs of downright Atheifni are fo
ma,*itell^ and the pernicious Confeqnences of
no Retioion-nt-all^ fo vifih/e in thenfelves^
an.i h.ive^ hefidcs^ been fo j^tflly and largely
expojcd alrcaJy^ in many late Difcourfes, that
no body will dare to own the Title or Character
of an Atheiii, whatever his private Semi-
ments may he ; afjd therefore^ 1 have enden-
vourcd togive fuch a Proof of Religton^ ai
will overthrow all the loofe Principles and Ob-
jecfions now commonly made ufe of to eva-
cuate the practical Force and Power of it : all
which may properly be ranked under the Style
of Irreligion, if they will not be allowed to
comeundtr that c?/ AthcifiT) ; which ^ as far
as we are cjncerri'd to know or do any thing
irk
vi The Preface.
it$ the World^ I take to be much the fame
thing '^ as v.' ill more fullj he made out in the
Dijcourfe it felf,
'The Beliig of a God u not , indeed^
openly and dincHy queJlio?^'d^ becmfe the The-
ory of the 'VfJiverfe camjot he jo eafdy^ and
sonvemently explained , without fome fuch
Not ten y to which the Nunie of God may be
gtusn\ hm^ if what fame Philofophcrsvotich'^
ffitocaiiby the Naj9Je of God be not An in-
telligent Iking, or be not the Govemour
of the World, or do's not particularly con-
cern himfelf with the Adions of Men ; V^
£^ one to m^ whether there be £ny fuc-j Being
as God or no : all Hjfothejes concerning the
Ori^in^ Duration^ and frefent ftate of the
Vi'^orld are then altke^ that is^ they are all e-
qualiy ft to entertain our Im agin. it ion s^ and
to hel^ us to be infenfible of the Tedioufnefs of
livitjg : ivhich^ if the notions of God^ here^
AftiY laid dewn are not true^ is all the Bufnefs
we have to do here,
Birtjiill it vpillbe urged^ that, aUomng that
Notion of God which 1 have given ^ there are
fea\ if any who can properly be f^/Zf ^ Atheifts,
bccaufe the generality at leall^ of thofewho are
com?nonly thought to dejerve this Name do
proftfs to beluve a God. of all thofe Attributes
I have ajcnbed to htm^ And to acknorv ledge
that
The Preface. vii
that Men are under jome Obligations of Reli-
gion; but^ if we examine all thiir Vri/iciples
together , and conf/der the necejfary Confe-
qur'fices of thern^ we f\ jail find that they are
dtjlin^yuijlfd from Athcifts, by Title and
Vrofjjion only^ and riot by any real Difference
in their Faith: For the Religion of thcfe
Men is nothing clfe^ but a few hone f Princi-
ples relating to Jf^ficc^ Friendlhip, and So'
ciety^ which are whelly owin^ to their Com"
plexion, or Education, and net to their Be-
lief of a God ; and the praBical Influence e-
've?i of Thefe coynmonly reaches no farther^
than that particular Set of Mrn^ tn v.}i}ofe
Company or hittreds they are mofi ingagedy
and is intirely bour> ' d and regulatea by their
prefent Eafe , Advantage , or Reputation,
and not by any Future Profpecis in another
Life ; and thofe of them who feem to admit a.
fllture State , when they come to explain,
themfelvesy make it fuch a one as Men need
have very little regard for in This.
Thefe are all the Principles which the ge^
neraltty of thoje who have lately infulted the
Chrijhan Faith do really believe, and aci
upon ; thus i4: the fum both of their Faith ^
a,nd Praciice^ however they are pleafed to
magnify the Excellence and Perfection of
natural Religion , and whatever regard
they
viii The Preface.
they pretend to have for the clear Md, eajie
farts of the Chiiftian Revelation.
By Religion, therefore^ I would here be
under flood to mean that ivhole Scheme of Hu-
mane Duties^ ivefnd delivered in the Wri-
tings of the New Tefiament^ as recom?nen-
ded and inforced hy ftich a Future State as
is there defcnhed ; which may properly he
calPd , with refpe^ to the Author of it^
Chriftian Morality. "^Tis tn this Senfe and
Extent of the Word that I have endeavou-
red to efiablijb the Certainty and Necefli-
ty of Religion \ and "^tis pUin^ that the
Argument Sy made ufe of for this purpofe^
wiUft no other Scheme hut this^ there being
no other Draughty or Model of Life to be
conceivedj that would he capable of produ-
cing fuch a noble Scene of Happinefs^ as I
have fhewn, would be the certain effect oj
an univerfal Practice of the Chrifitan Mo-
rality.
I have not defended to a particular Defence
of fever d Duties^ commonly infijled upon as
Principles of n at ur al Religion^ the Reafona-^
blenefs^ and natural Obligtition of which is
quefiioned byfome who are willing to lye under
45 few Refiraints as they can ; this^ ^ fy-i ^^
not done^ both becaufe tt was neceffary to give
<t general Idea of Religion frjl^ and a parti-'
cular
The Preface. ix
ctiUr ExaminAtion of the fever d Parts of
ity ivas too long a Task to come withtn that
com^afs of Writing which I tvas confined to ;
And becauje I am fully fatisfed^ that it is a,
jhorter and better way of reafoning to prove
the Truth of the Chriftian Revelation,
which being throughly proved^ it ivill follow y
that we are to fubmit entirely to the Autho-
rity ofit^ and to regulate all our falfe andim-
perfect Views of Religion by that mojl per feci
Plan which God him felf has given of it in the
Scriptures,
^Tisfor the fame Reafon that I have made
no particular inquiries into the Condition,
^W Duration (?/o^r Future State, and the
Nature ofthofe Rewards and Punifhments
which we are to expect hereafter^ nor have
offered at any explication of the fever d Diffi-
culties which occur in the Doctrine of Divine
Providence ; becaufe a full and Satisfactory
Account of thefe things can be had no other
way than from Revelation ; and in general^
"'tis a fujficient Anfwer to /ill the Objections
which may he ra fed from hence^ that t\\Q\'Q is
a God ; that there are Marks and Tokens
of Wifdom , in the whole Oeconomy,
and Courfe of the World ; that Man is
made and defigned for Religion, here,
\vhile he lives , and for a future State,
after Death. //'
X The Preface.
If any of thefe Principles hold^ they all
hold ; and no particular Difficulties which do
not evidently overthrow the whole Scheme^ can
have any force at all. If there be no future
State^ there^s no Religion ; // there be no
fuch thing as Religion^ there is no fuch thing
as Wifdom^ or Deftgn in the Frame and Con-
Jiitution of Man ; and if the Jppearances of
Wifdom here have no Reality under them^ we
jh all have more reafon to dijhufl all the Signs
anc\ Tokens ofit^ which any other Parts of
Nature can afford ^, and confcquentlj, we
can have no proof of fuch a wife and intelligent
Being as God. In this Proce/s of Reafoning,
we argue upon a full and com^rehenfive I^now-
ledge of I he Principles we argue from ^ Lecaufe^
if there be no future Life after this^ we know
the utmoft that can he known of the State and
Condition of Man : But the fee?/nng Inequa-^
lities of Providence^ in the Condu^i of the
Univerfe^ can be no Argument againjl any of
the Principles before advanced ; hcc.tufe,
while we k^^zve certain Tokens of Wifdom re-
maining^ no doubtful Jppearances of the con-
trary will be fufjicient to overthrov th€77i ;
and all thofe mu'l needs bijj^ rJjcre we c.innot
carry our Obfer: at ions to the fart h( ft end of
things^ in all the different Points of dijLmce
from us ; which is theprefent Cafe.
For
The Preface. xi
For except we were able to take a full and.
'?xaII View of the whole Vniverje^ ami all the
Relations which the fever al parts of it hear
to one another^ "'tis irnpojfihle for us to know^
that fuch or fuch athirig was ill contrived in
it\ If we are not fare that there is no fuch
thing as a future State^ we cannot condenai
the pre font Courfe of Humane Ajjairs as une-
qual , or fortuitous ; and mdefs we were
throughly acquainted with all the Circumjlan-
ces of our Condition in another IVorld^ the
jufl Proportion of future Rewards and Pu-
nijhf'/jents to the Aclions cf this Life^ and
the exact Manner and Methods of God'^s deal-
ing with us hereafter^ we can never make it
appear from Reafon^ that the Scripture-Ac-
count of God's future Appoint fnents for U6 is
contrary to the Rules offuflice or Wifdom^
and confequently that our Expectation of a.
future State is vain^ fince the moft prohalle
Reprefentation we can have of it^ which is
that we find in the New-Tejtajnem , is til-
grounded.
If therefore^ the General Proof of Reli-
gion hereafter nivenfla^sd good^ no p^trti*
culat Dijjiculties either in the real Rhccno:ne-
na of Nature^ or in the arbitrary Schemes
and Hjpothifes of Men ought to hive any
weight with us* The next and the only t Li^g
whtcj
xii The Preface.
which remains to he done by us^ is^ that tve
fhould fearch md ex Amine into the Scriptures^
and bemg convinced of their Trnth^ {hould
fmcerdy endeavour to jorm both our Opinions
and Practice upon that moft ptrfect Model of
Religion which is there laid down.
!By the fame Author,
TH E Certainty of the Chriftian
Revelation, and the NecefTity of
behevingit, EftabUfhed j in oppofition to
all the Cavils and Infinuations of fuch as
pretend to allow Natural Religion, and
rejetl: the Gofpel.
Some Confiderations concerning the
Trinity, and the ways of managing that
Controverfie , The Second Edition, to-
gether v-itha Defence of them againil the
Objedions of the Dean of St. Fratls,
THE
Certainty and NeceJJfty
O F
RELIGION
In General, isc.
HEB. xi, 6.
He that cojucth to God muft bcliCVe that
he w, and that he is a ^warder of
them that ddt^ently Jcek^ htm.
F.Hglon has been fo long in Pof-
fellion, fo powerful hath been
its Intiuence, and fo univerfal
its Autho. ity, fo nearly is Man-.
adconcern'din all it promifes, orthreat-
.s, and liich mighty Confcquences attend
'B tjie
2 . The Certainty and Neceffity
the Truth, or Falfhoodof its Pretenfions,
that I have often wonder'd, how the Men
of thefe latter days, who are at fuch a di-
ftance from the firft Rife of things, durft
difpute a Title fo well owned and atteft-
ed ; the Denial of which is fo dangerous,
and which, if it had at firft been falfe,
they have no pofTible means left of difpro-
t^ing : whereas, on the contrary, the Evi-
dences of its Truth are ft ill in being, ftill
frefh, and in all their ftrength of Convi-
clion : as I hope in fome meafure to make
good in the following Difcourfe.
I am very fenfible that I engage in a
Subject, which feveral great and learned
Men have already, and fome of them very
lately, treated of, with the wifeft Refle-
£lions, and jufteft Pvcafoning imaginable.
But, befides that Truth it felf is fruitful,
and a Subject of this nature is hardly ever
to be exhaufted ; the fame Objecl may ad-
mit of different Views ; there may be new,
and more fuitable ways of offering the
fame things to the Underftanding ; or old
Arguments maybe ftrengthen'd and fenc'd
in from the Ob'ieftions which have been
formerly raisM againft them, by fome ad-
ditional Supports : or, fliould there be no-
thing of all this in what I have to fav, vet
of ^lu^ton hi Gaieral. ^
1 think I am juftitvablc in repeating the
fame things once more, to the Sliamc and
Confufion of thole, who have hitherto
been unable to anfwer them , and yet
continue in their Sins and Unbelief.
But fince it is not fo much Their Convi-
d:ion, (wjiicli nothing, I fear, but unpro-
mis'd, irrefiftible Grace can effect) as
the fecuringand confirming Others in the
Truth that I chiefly aim at ; fmce the en-
creafmg and propagating a true Senfe of
Religion among Vien, is my principal De-
fign, and not a learned Triumph over an
Adverlary, I have ordered my Method
accordingly, and confequently have made
Choice of fuch a one as in the general Ma-
nagement of it is different, tho', in feve-
ral of its parts, it will be found to fall in
with that of others.
The Cert ami j and NccvJJity of Reliyiori^
is, what I undertake to prove, and there-
fore I fliall confider Religion in the full
Latitude and Extent of the Notion, as it
takes in all thofe Obligations which refult
from the Nature of Man^ the Bei/jg and
ylttrthntcs of God, and the ReUtton in
which the one ftands to the other. In tiie
profecuting of which Subie6l , I ihall
B 2 cliieflv
/\, Tl?e Certainty and NeceJJity
chiefly make Choice of fuch Arguments,
as, being taken from what we know, of
our felves, and of fuch Objects without us,
as we are beft accjuainted with, are moft
eafily perceiv^ed by us, and entertain'd
with the leaft Pvcfiftance or Sufpicion.
All nice and philofophical Reafonings I
fhall forbear, as much as I can ; but, where
the Nature of the Subject, or the particu-
lar Prejudices of the Perfons to be fatisfied
require a more fpeculative and metaphys-
eal Account of things, I fliall chufe out
iiich Arguments of this kind, as the Un-
derftanding may with the leaft difficulty
comprehend, and fhall but lightly men-
tion fuch, which, tho' convincing to fome,'
who are already well ufed to Speculation,
may chance to be fufpected, by others, of
too much Finenefs, and fo will probably,
tho' very unjuftly, create in them a Dif-
guft to all the reft. And I fliall all along
take a due care to diftinguiOi between
fuch Notions and Opinions as are abfolute-
Iv necelTary to the Beh^g of Religwa^ and
thofe others, which, tho' oftentim.es ufed
in the Defence of it, and earneftly con-
tended for, are of that nature, that Reli-
gion would no waysfuffer, if they fliould
prove to be falfe*
* Now,
of ^li^ion in Generd. 5
Now, in order to purfuc my intended
Method, with tlie more Clearncfs, I think
my fcif obHged in this pkicc togive an ac-
count of wdiat I mean by Religion ; a right
Notion of which being firft laid down,
it will afterwards be eafier to judge,
whetlier there be any fuch thing ; and if
there be, whether it be reafonable and
neceflary, that Mankind fliould be influ-
enced by it.
By ReUgion then, in general, I mean
all that IVorjhip^ Service^ or Obedience^
which we, who call our felves Men^ ought
to pay to Gd?^ ; or whatever we are, in
any refpe6l, obliged to upon the Profpect
of his Favour, or under the Penalty of
his Difpleafure, in this or ^future State,
From whence 'tis plain, that, in order
to make it appear, that there is fuch a
thing as Religion, we muft prove that
there is a God^ or fome fuperior Being,
who can, and does c^^^t' M.t?2 to live af-
ter fuch a particular manner ; and that
M.t;^ is capable of, and a6lually under fuch
an Obligation ; the Performance, or Neg-
lecl of which, will be attended with very
different Confequences, and thofe, fuiH-
cient to determine him to act one ^ray,
r?tlicr than another.
B 3 D?
6 The Certainty and TSlecelJiiy
But if a Man were defirous of convin-
cing fuch Perfons as denied all this, where
fliould he firft fet out in his Proof? What
Order fliould he give his Thoughts ?
Whence muft he take his Rife to prove
original Founda don-Truths ? What Evi-
dence will be powerful enough to prevail
upon thofe, who love a l.ye, and hate to
be reform'd ; How are they to be attempt-
ed who are ftrongly fortified with their
Prejudices, and have liardly left a Man,
who would attack them, any Ground to
ftand upon ? Such an unreafonable Defi-
ance of the common Senfe of Mankind,
is juftly thought by the Wifeft Men, to
deferve Punifhment, rather than Confata-
tion. However, fmce thofe, who are yet
innocent, or indifferent, may be corrup-
ted ; and thofe who are juft entring upon
the ways of Irreligion may be farther ad-
vr.nc'd and confirm'd in them by more fet-
tled Atheifis^ the fame Care is to be taken
for the Security of the former, as fhould
be applied to the Convi6lion of the latter,
were they judged capable of being con-
vinc'd ; and therefore, the Method to be
ufed upon this Occafion muft be fuch, as
will moft furely deftroy the Pretences of
jitheijm^ as well as give the eafieft Ac-
county
of^li^ion In General, y
count, and moft undeniable Proof ofT^f-
ligion\ that fo the Arguments, made ufe
of by the Pcrverters of Mankind, may
lofe all their Power and Force upon others,
by lofing the Advantage of coming unan-
fwer'd.
In order, therefore, to fatisfy thofe who
have not quite renounc'd their Reafon of
the Truth of Religion, according as I have
before defcribed and ftated it • and of the
Falfliood of thofe Grounds upon which it
is oppofed, I fhall proceed, in tliis man-
ner.
F/>/, I fhall give fome Account of the
Nitttire of Man, the Nature of God., and
that ReUtion which there is between
them ; fo far as is necelTary to eftablidi the
Notioiu>f Religion,
Secondly, I fhall prove that there is a,
God, or a Being of fuch a Nature as is be-
fore fuppofcd.
Thirdly, From the Knowledge which,
under the former Heads, ic will appear,
that we have, or are capable of having,
concerning the Jhmmne and Divine Na^
B 4 tures,
8 Tlje Certainty and Neceffity
tures, I ihall deduce a pofitive and direct
Proof of Religion,
Fourthly^ I fhall farther evince the
Truth of Religion^ from a Comparifon of
it with Irreligion^ and the necelTary Con-
fequences arifing from thence.
Fifthly^ I fhall confider the Grounds
and Pretences of Ir religion ; what can be
offered in Defence of it, and what are the
ufual Pleas for it •, and from thence fhew
the Abfardityand Folly of their Conduct
who have no better Reafons for what they
Beheve, and Do, than thofe, which they
allege, upon Examination, will be found
to be.
Sixthly^ I fliall make fome Enquiries
into the Caufes of Athetfm and Irrehgion^
or the Reafons which induce Men to take
up fuch Opinions. '
Andfliali conclude with a fhort Expli-
cation of the different Notions oi Atheifm
^nd Deifm.
L Ftrf^
of ^Itgion ill Gaieral. p
I. ¥trfi then, I am to give fome Account
of the Nature of Man, the Nature of God,
and the Relation which is between them,
fo far as is necefTary to eftabhfli the NotioQ
of Religion.
The Knowledge of Rf//^/^;/, as of all
other Things whatfoever, muft begin from
"the Confideration of our Selves. Now
our Exifience being granted , the fame
Confcioufnefs which fatisfies us of this, if
we carefully attend to what pafTes within
us, will farther inform us, that we are ca-
pable of T/'Z/^/.v/^g, Perceiving, d.nd /(^noiv-
tng ; which Capacity is ufually ftiled Vn-
derjlanding : And that we have likewile
a Power of A5ling, or not Acting ; that
is, we can entertain a r/^c?//g///, ordifmifs
iti caufe a Motion, or hinder it, when
we have fo determin'*d with our felves,
and that barely by determining fo to do ;
which general Power, as it relates, botli
to thinking and moving, is called the
Will.
'Tis plain alfo from the fame Experi-
ence, that we are capable of Fleafure and
Pain : by which I mean all manner of ^-
greeable 2.nd difagrteable Sentiments what-
ever, whether caufed by our felves, or
occafioned by anv thing without us.
And
I o The Certainty and Neceffity
And upon farther refledion we may
find, that Pleafure and Paw, of fbme fort
or other, are the firft, and only Springs of
AHiofi, which fet all our Powers on work,
and give Rife to all our Determinations ;
(The obtaining the one, and avoiding the
other, being the • continual imployment of
the Soul.)
But the particular Reafon., Motive^ or
End of any Aftion being always fome-
tliingfuture^ and the Views and Profpefts
we a£l upon being commonly remote,
we are farther convinced, that we may,
and often do aft foolifhly, and to our own
Prejudice, either by ieffening or difconti-
nuing our prefent Satisfaftion, or by
bringing more Pain and Trouble upon our
felves, than what we already feel ; and
that the only caufe of this, is, the diffe-
rent reprefentation of things /«/^«r^, fi-om
what they are perceiv'd to be when fre-
fent^ both in themfelves and in their Con-
iequences. From whence we infer, that
there is no other way of remedying this
Evil, and preventing our being accelTory
to oiu' own Mifery, but by reftifying out:
Notions of fuch things, as, being future,
do not, by immediate Imprellions, afTure
us, that they really are, what to us they
appear to be. Nov/
of ^ligion in General, 1 1
Now as to the K.nowledge we are capa-
ble of in this kind, we are to coriider,
what every Man may be fenfible of that
will refleft , t'iz. That there are fomc
things, which appear with fuch a Light
and Clearncfs toourunderftandings, that
we cannot poffibly deny our AfTent to
them : That in many Cafes, there is not
Evidence enough to command our Aflfent,
but fo much only, as inclines us to give it
one way, rather than another; and
this in different degrees. That fome-
times we are held in fufpence, by e-
qual motives of Credibility, fo that we
find it difficult to determine our felves
either way: And that many things there
are, whereof we have no manner of No-
tions at all, and fo can determine nothing
concerning them.
And here 'tis farther to be obferved,
that what is in its own Nature certain,
may appear doubtful to us at one time,
and probable at another; and what we
AiTent to as probable now, may after-
wards command our AiTent as certain :
And that in fuch matters, where we can-
not certainly determine what is True or
Falfe, we may oftentimes be fure, that
we
1 2 Tl?e Certainty and Neceffity
we know as much as can be known of thenij
by the Strength of our prefent Facuhies.
But, befides thefe general differences in
the ' appearance of things to us, with
reipeO: to Truth or Fdjhood^ as Qertcim^
Frohahle^ Doubt ful^ o\' Exceeding our pre-
fent reach ; We are moreover to take no-
tice of another difference in the appear-
ance of things to us, with refpe^l to
Aciion^'2i.\\A the confequences of it, Happi-
nefs or Mifery, For, it often lb happens,
that, where the Truth o^^ thing feems
doubtful to us, it plainly appears to be
fafer, and more to our Prefent Advantage,
or affords a better profpe8: of Future
Happincfs, to A61 one way, than another.
And abundance of Inftances there are, in
which,, we find our felves under a mcelfity
di Aciing oneway, or other, where nei-
ther fide appears certainly true^ and there
the confiderations of ^Mety and Danger
muft determine us.
But after all, when we know as much
as v^'e can, we find that we are not £-
i^u:itl^ dffpofed to clofe with whatevei" is
otFered to our (yjotce ; bur that fometimes
we are under a nece/Jity of prefer r/ng one
tiling, dndrejeciing'dnothQT -^ And, when
itij^in our Poorer to deterrnirje our {elv^es^
either
of ^hgion in General. i 5
either way, we cannot always <^(? what
\vc IV illy either for want oi^ K.'^owl^^gf^ and
.Strength to elfecl what wc defu'c, or be-
caufe we are Forced and Overruled, by
fome Extrtnftck Violence^ to Acl contrary
to what we would, and could have done,
ifwe had not been under that Force.
This is all the Account of Humane Na-
ture, wliich I thought neceffarytomy pre-
icnt Defign of cftabli filing the Truth of
Religion : And I perfwade my felf, I liavc
faid nothing upon this Subjecl, which any
Man, who fairly confults himfelf, can
pofTibly call in queftion.
All Qucllions concerning the Origine^
and Sub fiance of the Sout^ its Vnion with
the Body^ and fe par ate Extjlence^ I have
purpofely waved ; as things which do, in
a great meafure, ly out of the Reach of na-
tural Reafon^ and, confequently, admit of
no certain Proof from the:^^ e \ arc, as com-
monly handled, involved in great Ambi-
guity of Terms, and, which way foever
explain'd, I think, as for as I have hitherto
fecn, make no manner of change, either as
to the Truth ^ or Nature of Religion.
Whether the Soul be tnfufed^ or deriz'cd^
material^ or immaterial'^ whether it de-
pends upon the Body^ in all its A6lions, or
fome-
1 4 TJ^e Certainty a)id TSkceJJity
Ibmetimes a^s ofitfelf\ is dtffolved with it,
or exifts after it ; if, what I have faid before
concerning our own Experience, be true,
it will be found, that Religion has a very
good bottom to ftand upon, whichfoever
of thefe Opinions be admitted. But, if
the Soul came from without the Body^ is
of a different Nature from it, can A^i in-
dependently of it^ and Exift after its Dif-
Iblution, as is extreamly frohable from
Reafon^ and very certain from Revelation •
then here are fo many additional Argu-
ments, for the Truth of what may be mf-
ficiently prov'd , without 'em , from
plainer and more undeniable Principles ;
as I fhall endeavour to make good in the
following Difcourfe.
The next Thing I am to do, is to con-
fider the Nature ofGod^ or, what that No-
tion, or Idea is, to which I affix that Name:
which in fhort is this ; An Eternal Being,
of all pojjtble Perfe^ions in himfelf, and
from whom every thing elfe deriv'd its
Being, and whatever belongs to it.
But, to give a more particular Account
of my Thoughts in this Matter : I conceive
God to be One unchangeable Being ; of an
intelligent Nature ; who always nectffarily
Ex'
of Religion in General. \ j
£jc//?f^ofhimrelf; whoKnows every tiling
that can be known •, and oin Do every
thing that is pofTible to be done ; who does
every thing that he Wills, and nothing but
what he Wills himfelf ; who enjoys an un-
alterable State of the greatefl: Happinels
that can be enjoy'd ; who never Wills, or
Does any thing inconfiftent with thisStatc-
who makes fjtmfe/f the ultimate end or
all he does ; and next, to that, the Good^
or Havptnefs of ?i\\fuch Beings^ as are ca-
pable of it ; which, together with all other
Beings, and every thing that belongs to
them, had their Original from him, and
depend upon liim for their Continuance •
and, lallly, who brings about \\'hatevcr
he Wills, orDcfigns by the fittefl: and mod
proper Means.
Tliis feems to me to be the eafiefl: No-
tion of God that we are capable of concei-
ving: and, if it canbeproved, that there
really is fuch a Being as is here defcrib'd,
I think 'tis all that's necefliiry upon this
Subjed, with refped to what I have un-
dertaken.
For, whether we reprefent God to our
Thoughts as 2Lpire andfimple acf^ ^.Jhiritu-
iil6ubfia/7ce^ Qvfubtle Matter \ ^is ihcw/jo/e
niAfs^ or Suhfiame of the World^ taken all
to-
1 6 The Certainty and TSleceJJlty
together, or as the Soul and aciive Prin^
ciple of it ; as confirPd to the Heavens^ or
dtjfufed through the whole extent of Being ;
^s.thQ Maker and Creator of all things, or
as the Principle and Fountain from whence
they flowed ; or whether we confider
him under any other Idea that our Rea-
fon, or Imagination can frame ; if we
allow all the Charafters of a Deity before
mentioned, 'tis the fame thing, as to Re-
ligion, which foever of thefe Opinions
we embrace; as will hereafter appear.
But, if any of them are urged to over-
throw that Notion of a Deity which I
have given ; the Proof of fuch a Being,
to which that Notion belongs, will be a
full and fuflicient Anfwer to them.
Now, as to the Relation which is be-
tween God anrl Man, we thus conceive ;
That-God is our Creator, and Parent, the
Author of our Being and Nature, and of all
the Powers and Capacities belonging to
it ; and that we are his Creatures^, thojjfue
of his Power, and the Workman/hip of his
Hands ; that God is our ProteBor, Gover-
j7our, and Mafter, and that we are his De-
pendents,Subje^^ts, 2.ndSerz>ants ; that God
is our Benefa^or and the Author of all our
Happi-
oj l^ligioii in General. \y
Hcippincfs, and wc obliged and indebted
o him for whatever we enjoy. All which
Relations do necelHirily refult from the
Natures of the Beings related ; as will
plainly appear, upon a juft Comparifon of
them together •, and will be farther ma-
ni felled, when we enter upon the particu-
lar Proofs of Rchgion.
Sup[X)rmg therefore that I have given a
true Account of the Nature of]\Un^ (whicli
being taken from Experience, can admit
of no other Proof, nor of any greater Cer-
tainty : ) the^'SnTy thing remaining to bo
done, before I come to the main Argu-
ment I proposM, is, to prove,
II. That ihtre is a, God^ or a Being of
fuch a Nature as I have endeavourM to
rcprefent; whicli is the fecond Thing I
undertook.
In difcourfing on which Subje^t^ that t
mayexprefs my Thoughts with the more
Clearnefs, give every Argument its due
weight, and everywhere ^proportion my
Building to my Foundation ; I iliall conii-
der the Being of God under the differenr
Degrees of Poffible^ Probahls, andOr/4///*
<^ Firfl,
1 8 Tlye Certainty and Keceffity
Firft then, As to th^Poffthility offuch
a Being ; I cannot imagine any Man of
fuch an irregular Make of Underftand-
ing, as to apprehend that Defcription I
have given of a Deity to be ahfurd^ and
chimerical^ or to have any Inconftjlency^ or
Contradiciion in it. I am fure I have faid
nothin,^ but wJiat I very well conceive
mv ^t\^\ and what I think, isaseafily con-
ceivable by any Body elfe ; and I have u-
fed the plaineR: and mofl: intelligible Ex-
prefHons, I could, upon this Occafion.
But fluther to aflift the Weaknefs of
cur Underftandings, in framing a more
diflinft Conception cf God, we will confi-
der thefeveral Idea's, of which this com-
plex Notion is made, and fee whether they
will not fuit very well together.
Now, 'tis plain to any Man who refleds
upon the Ideas which are lodged in his
Mind, that he has a Notion of T/W and
of the feveral Periods of it, which he can
place at what t'iftance hepleafesto mea-
fure the DLratioFi of any thing by them^
but never, at liich a diftanc e, by all the
Addition liis Imagination is capable of,
but that he can ftill fuppofe fome Being
to exift, both before^ and after • and the Be-
ing
of ^li^ion in GencraL i p
ing, before and after which he cannot
conceive any Time, or other Being, he
calls Eternal.
In like manner, when we confider the
Variety of Beings in the World, we are
not able to imagine, or fuppole fuch a
number of any ofthem, as that there can-
not ftili be a greater : and this poffible Va-
riety of Things, never to be exhaufted,
is ftiled Infinite, And if we can conceive
fuch "^n Infinity o^ Things foffihle^ we can
conceive alfo a Power proportionable
which can produce whatever we fuppofe
pofTible to be produced, and a Kjioivledge
anfwerable to it, wliich takes in whate-
ver can be known ; and ^/^^^ is, whatever
can he.
Thus it is that we conceive an eternal^
intelligent Being, of I'jfinite Kjiotv ledge
and Power.
And this \Ve do very cafily, witliout
fuch Intenfnefs of Thought, and nicety
of ALjhncfion^ as may be imagined necel-
laryon this Occafion : for v/e find Infinity
almofl: in every Thing ; All our Studies,
and Enquiries, lead us to this Notion.
As for mftance : When we coniider the
Dimenfions o^ Matter^ we lelTen,and mag-
nify them, till we are loll: either way:
C 2 ^).\^
2 0 T7;e Certainty and Necefjity
and ftill we find our felves as far from
any Bounds as when we firft fet out up-
on the Search.
In Uke manner, when we turn our
thoughts to obferve the Various ktnds
of Natural Bodies in the World, the far-
ther we advance our Inquiries, tlie more
ftill do the Species or Sorts Multiply upon
us ; and the pofTible variety of more does
proportionably increafe, till, confounded
with the growing profpeft, we are con-
tent to admire, what, invain, we tried
to Reach.
'Tis the fame thing if we contraft our
View, and keep within the compafs of
o/^e Kjnd or Dtutfwn of Bodies only as
Vlants^ Minerals^ and the like, the more
differences we perceive in them, the
more we comprehend pofiible, every new
Mode^ Quality^ OY Relation^ that we take
notice of affording an inconceiveable
variety of Combinations with thofe ob-
fcrved before.
'Tis thus, alfo, in the intelleciual Na-
ture. The different Degrees of Kjiowledge^
Porver^ and Happinefs^ which we are con-
fcious of, do fufficiently affure us, that
we are capable of greater, and greater
ftill; and, whatever Notion we can
frames
of ^ligion ui General, 21
trame of our own State, with refpccl to
any of thefcQiialiHcations ; from the ut-
moft top of what we are arrived to, we
can look faither Itill, and conceive }ii2;her
Advancements of each kind pofTible,
cither in our felves, or in other Men, or
at leall in other Beings of larger Capaci-
ties; and this, in a continual Rife, with-
out any thing to terminate our View.
From whence we are farther enabled to
conceive, that God is in(nittely happy ^ as
well as infinitely h^nowino and Powerful ;
that is, that he enioys all the Happinefs
which can pofTibly be enjoyed by any Ca-
pacity of being.
Having got thus far into the Notion of
a Deitj^ I think, we may with lefs Diffi-
culty conceive, that fucti a Being as this
(.lid necejfanly exifl ofhimfelf\ that is, that
an eternal Being had nothing ^e/(?r6' it, to
be the Cd:(fe or yluthor of its Exiflence ;
And farther, that he is unchangeable^ or
always the fame ; that is, that an eternal Be-
ing always is ; and a Being oi" infinite Kjiow-
l^^ge^ Power ^ and Happinefs^ is always a-
like^ K^nowing^ Powerful^ and Happy,
The actual Produchon of all things^
which arc not God, hy him^ and their De-
pendance 'upon him for their CQUtinuancc,
C I and
2 2 Tl^e Certainty and TSLeceffity
and all other Circumftances of their being,
are not Things hard to be conceived by
thofe who acknowledge that he can do
all things pofTible ; and he who knows
every thing, tliat can be known, may as
eafily be fuppofed to efFe£l whatever he
defigns, by the fittefl: and moft proper
means ; and that is, to be infinitely
Wife.
And what Other i^f^y^;^, ov Motive can
we Imagine that an intelligent Being, of
infinite Happinels, flioiild aB upon, but
his own free Pleajure ? and who can hin-
der the Almighty from doing what he
will ; But that the Hai^pinefs of all fuch
Beings, as are capable of it, fo far as it is
confiftent with the Wifdom of God to grant
them the Enjoyment, fliould be very a-
greeable to his Good Will and Pleafure, we
are not, I believe, difpofed to doubt.
And this compleats the Account of the
NAttrre of God which I gave before in
fliort,and liave now examined over again,
more particularly.
From all which, I think, it may fafely
be concluded, that the Ide^^ we have
form'd of a God^ is no Chimera^ or extra-
vagant rvork of the Imagination^ but a very
fojjible confiflent Notion ; and that thofe,
who
of %itgion in General. i ^
who aiTlnTithat there islbmcfuch Btinp^^
to which this Ida belongs, cannot be cen-
fu red for vain incoherent Thinkers, who
have put things togetlicr without any
Ground, or Warrant from Reafon.
How far the bare Conception of fuch an
Ide^^ as that, which we liave framed of
God, or the meer Poffibilityoi (\xch.2i Be-
ing, does, without the Affiilance of other
Principles, prove the Reality of his Ex-
ijlcf/ce, I fhall not here examine. The
Arguments drawn from hence, tho' in
themfelves, perhaps certain^ to feveral
Perfons coHvi/icnjf^ and not to be Mfp.^o-
•ved by any, do not fit every Undcrftand-
ing ; nor have that regular unit ''r.-a F^ce
of Truth, which takes at firft fight, is well
as pleafes after firther Examination : on-
ly thus much I fhall alledge, in their De-
fence, that the grcai:e{V, and commoneil:
Objection, made againft this kind of Proof,
is very ill grounded.
It is not true indeed that whatever is
poffible, or whatever we have any Idea of,
for that Reafon .zf///.f^V is; and therefore
'tis urged, that the ^c?//^/ Eje//?^';^^^ of a
God docs by no means follow from the
Poljibihty or Conception of fuch a Being:
But then it is anfwered that the Conclu-
C 4 fion
14- The Certainty and 'Keccffity
fionmay and does hold in this Cafe, and
in no other whatfoever. Becaufe Con-
cepion Aippoies Fcjlbiltty^ and Poffibtltty
a CorrefpO'^'Avif Power \ and a Poiver of
E:>cijhir^y when applied to fuch a Being as
God, muft neceilariiy infer JB-ual Ex-
ijlence ; but the unufual Nicenefs of fuch
a Proof as this being likely to raife fome
Prejudice againft it, I fhall wave the Pro-
lecution of it ; and, to cut off all Colour
of Advantage from fuch as are difpofed to
cavil, I fhall content my felf at prefent
with having fliewn that 'tis i^fr^poffible
and conceiveable^ that there may beTnGod ;
and pafs on to the next Enquiry I am to
make, whether it be not very probab/e that
there ii one.
4- comj^on Argument for the Being of a
God, (and 'tis never the worfe for being
common) is the generd Concurrence and
Agreemcrit ofMankind'm the Acknowledg-
ment of this great Truth. We will con-
fider the Argument it felf, in its full
Strength, and then fee, what fairly follows
from it.
The Sum ofwhatrnxsy be faid upon die
firil, is this : That all Accounts and Rela-
tions ohhii trefint- State ofthe Workl, and
of ^Itgion In GnicraL 15
all the Hiftories o^'pafi Ages which are now
extant do agree in alTiiring us, that, fmce
the firft Memory of Things was preferv-
ed, till now, there was no periodot Time,
nor any Nation under the Sun, in which
the Being of a God was not acknowledg'd
and believed by a 'vaji Generality of all
who were then and /^//erc living.
And farther, that not onh' the gi*eateft
part o^ Mankind^ taken in grcfs, and the
grcateft part of every Nation^ confidered
asadiilincl Society of Men, were of this
Belief, but the greateft pi;v of every Se^
or Divtfion^ as they ftand diftinguifli'd by
their different Opinions in other things ;
their different Capacities ; Inter efts ; i'^^ajs^
and Manners ofThinkin({ ; as, the Learned
and /(^^or^^//^ ; thofe who had exrjnined
the Point, and confider'd the Reafons for
and againft it, and thofe who had it only
propofed to them, without any proof
either way, but wliat was imrnediately
offerM from the nature of the thing ; the
Mahometan^ and Idolater^ who add abfurd
things to tlie Nature of God, as w^ell as
the Jew^ and Chnftian^ who think more
confilf ently of him ; thofe who hold the
fVorld to be Eternal^ or made by Chance^
a* well as thofe who look upon it as the
Eftecl
l6 The Certainty and TSleceJJhy
Effect of Wifdom ; thofe who explain the
Works of Nature by Mechmicd Powers^
and thofe who in their Account of the Sy-
ftem of things make ufe of Intelligences^
2iT\A Ahfir acted Notions : not only the i^f-
Ugious and Superflitious^ and fuch as ex-
peO; that any good or ill Confequences
Ihould attend their Belief of a God, but
thofe, whofe other Opinions declare that
they have nothing at all, or very httle, to
hope or fear from a God, as the Epicurean^
tlie Sadducee^ the Hobbift^ and the Deiji :
and laftly, all {oiXso^rvtckedMenj who are
uneafie under the Thoughts of a God,
and endeavour to jTiake them off.
Thofe few who in different Ages of the
World, have oppofed the common Belief^
have had no Folic wers ; and feveral of
them, at the Se?f-^»as of greateft Seriouf-
nefs and Recolledion, liave renounc'd the
Opinions which they maintain'd at loofer
hours : fo univerJ^Hy has the Opinion of a
God obtained amonc; Men 1
From whence I think thus much at leaf]:
may be fairly inferr'd, That fuch a Per-
fwafion, as this, is VQvy frttable to the
Vnderfimding^ and agrees very well with
all the Principles of our K^norvledge : and,
therefore, tho' it could not be certatnly
proved
of ^ligwn in Gcuenil. 2 7
proved to fcHow from tho{c evidef^t Per-
cepttons that we have oK other Truths ;
ycL, h-.^ing rcadilv entertained by our
Reafon, without any OppoHtion from
them, it muft, upon this Account Oiily,
be extreamiy probaLle^ and worthy of
belief.
For fuppofe it to be an Error ; what can
we aflign tor the Cau/e of fuch an umverjal
Error ?
'Tis pofTiblc indeed, that the Generality
of JSUnkrad may be deceived, in a Judgment
founded upon the Reports of »S>;2/^, or Ima~
gindtton ; they may beheve that the Sun is
very near oftheHune bulk in which it ap-
pears to the Eye, when 'tis many times
bigger than the Earth ; or that it moves,
when it ftands (Hll ; or, if they do not be-
heve Wrong, in either of thefe JPoints, there
may be fomething elfeoffuch a Nature
fuppofed, in which all Mankind m.ay be
miftaken ; as moft of tiie Learned think
that the rell: of the World are, in both
thefe Judgments. But the Notion of a,
God, is Matter of pure Thought, and
Reafon, in the Conception of which
Senfe, and ImAgtncLtion have no fhare : and
therefore, it can never owe its Original
to them.
There
iS The Certainty and ISlecefflty
There is nothing in the Idea of God, as
I have endeavoured to defcribe it, v/hich
falls under the cognizance of our Se?ifeSj
nor is any Man confcious to himfelf, that
he has perceived God at any time this
way. For v/hich reafon, xh^fenfible re-
prefentations that are made of the Detty
may occafion a great variety of Errors
concerning him ; but it cannot be inferred
from hence, that thofe Notions and Opi-
nions of a God, which are purely intelk-
Bual^ and in which all Men agree, pro-
ceed from the fame Fountain as thefe ad-
ditional Errors do, in which they differ
very 'much, and confequently that thofe
may be, in their own nature, as falfe as
thefe, tho' they are not yet difcovered to
be fo. This I fay, will by no means fol-
low, becaufe the difference of the repre-
fentation, in this latter cafe, proves an
incapacity in the Faculty^ to perceive the
objecls about which it is employed ;
whereas in the other fuppofition, where all
Men conftantly think alike, concerning
Objefts not perceivable by Se-rife^ 'tis a
certain fign that their Ideas are fuitahU
And proportionate to the Faculty which per-
ceives them ; and therefore, 'tis very pro-
bable alfo, that they are truly forted, and
put together, 'Where-
of^ligion in GeneraL 29
Wliere-ever there is '3igemrdjgreeme?it
in the Perception^ there is certainly an V-
mformity in the Affetimnce ; whicli is as
necelTary to make an univerfd Error^ as
an umverfd Truth ; and, therefore, fup-
pofinganMcnmiftaken, about the Bulk^
OY Motion o'ithi^ Sun, it neceffarily follows
from hence , that, whatever appears to
the Serije^ in this Cafe, appears the fame to
all Men : But then we need not have made
any Judgment at all concerning ihcCc Jp^
peara/iceSy oftered to our Se^/e ; becaufe
fcvcral Rcquifites to a jufl Ser/fation are
wanting , without which , we know,
that we are incapable of judging with Al-
furance ; and tho' we aredeceivM for the
prcfent, by judging too haftily ; our Opi-
nions concerning thefe things may be af-
terwards altered, and correfted by Rea-
jon ; which, being a Faculty fuperior to
Senfe^ may preferve us from the lUufions
of it.
But when all Men agree in Matters of
pure Refiec^ionAnd Reajon^ we have all the
Ailnrance wh.ich we can have, that they
are in the right, Becaufe, in this Cafe,
we are certain, not only that the J/'/>f4r-
a//ce Ls uniform^ but that the Faculty is
employed about its proper Object And
if.
^o The Certainty and TSleceJJlty
if, the Underftanding fhould be deceived
in fuch things as fall within its own imme-
diate cognizance -, there is no higher FncuL
ty to coiTe8: the Miftake : How, then,
can we imagine the Minds of Men to be
fo difpofed as to be under a Neceffity of he-
ing deceived ? which they muft be, if a
conflant nniverfd AffenrAnce of Truth
fhould be only the Veil of Faljhood,
But here, perhaps, it may be faid, that
where the Evidence is not fo ftrong as to
conm^and our Affent ^ Error may carry
the Face of Tr/ah^ tho' we have not yet
been able to difcover the Cheat ; and
therefore, 'tis our own Fault if we are;
deceived in fhts inftance, as well as in
thofe of Serfe, fince we are not under a
heceffhy of giving our Judgments accord-
to the Appearance. To wliich I anfwer,
that, allowing a We Poffihilityo^ Erring^
in the prefent Cafe, all that I defign'd to
prove from this Argument o^ General Con-
/e;?/^ holds good ftill; which is, that, be-
caufe all People have agreed to acknow-
ledge a God, 'tis therefore very probable
that there is one, and very^ agreeable to the
Reafon of Mankind to believe there is : fo
that, altho' a Man is not from hence/////v
convinc'*d of the Certainty of it, he cannot
help
of Religion in General 3 i
help believing that it is a very reafonable O-
pinion, and that thtrc's verj/grrat iikelu
/^f^^^of its being built upon /'^re Founda-
ttons^ tlio' lie has not yet fearch'd fo far
as to difcover them. For he cannot give
an Account, how all Men fhould come
to be miftaken in a mruter of this Nature-^
and, if they were, how they could ever
be undeceived ; which may be done, in
all the Inftances of ^enfe^ or Imagination^
in which any Error can be judg'd fof-
fible.
All that can be farther fuppofed to
countenance a Sufpicion, is, that, pofli-
bl}', there was a time when Men believed
ot'herrvife ; but, fome People having ftart-
ed fuch an Opinion, and drefi: it up very
plaufibly, it took mightily in the World,
and fo was handed down from one, to a-
nother, and, in fucceeding Generations,
fpread and prevaiPd, 'till it became um-
verpil. But there is no manner of ground
for fuch a Suppo futon,
I. Becaufe, let us look as far back as
we can, there are no M/irks or Footjleps to
be found of the Rtfe and Onginal of this
Opinion, no gradual Propagation of it dif-
coverablc, it being, in every Age^ that we
hav^e any account of, as umvirfally belie-
ved, as it is nvn\ 2. Be-
^ 2 The Certainty and TsleceJJity
2. Becaufe no fardllel Inflame can be
afligned, which might give any colour
for a fufpicion in this ; no Perfwafion of
the hke nature, having ever been detected
to be an Error ^ after fo long, and fo wide
an Eftablifliment.
I do not know of any Opinion whatfo-
ever which ciciudly obtained fo umverjd
a Belief 'ds that of a God, and afterwards
was proved to be falfe ; and 'tis very dif-
ficult to imagine how fuch a thing fhould
cciiie to pais : However, I can conceive
and allow it to be polhble, that a mifta-
ken matter of Fa^l^ or a con]eciural Hyfo-
thesis of fomething belonging to natural
Kjiowled(je^ may, atfomediftanceoftime
from its firft appearance in the World, be
pretty generally beheved as certain ; and
aftCi "wards by a Difcovery o? frejh Ctr-
cumfiance. la the one, or making ne^v Ob~
fervations about the other ^ a great part of
Mankind may come to be of another Opi-
nion, of the Truth of which they may be
much furer : but an Error in matters of
this nature cannot prove the Poffibility of a
Mijtake in the Cafe in quiflion, Becaufe the
notion of a God refults from common Refle-
xion and Reafoning, and does not depend
upon any, fuch Particular Circumftances of
Time^
df ^ligion in General, > ^
Time or Fl^tce^ or any other External
hell^s^ and tnlhuments of Kjiojv/edge^ by
wliich the Learned have fometimes made
new dilcoverics in the Cafes before
mentioned.
All the Objervaiions of Senfe^ upon
which the Beliefof aGod is founded, lie
open to every ALtri^ and are the fame now
that they ever were ; and the Inferences
drawn from them arc "very eajie^ and with-
in the reach of common Capactucs. If
fomc h.ave refined upon them, and carried
their Rcafonings much farther than o-
thers, it has been only to fatisfie the un-
warrantable Scruples^ and Sufpicions of a
few Pretenders to Lejtrntng^ who make
ufe of that little Knowledge which they
have, to argue, themfelvcs out o^ all. But
the Generality of Mankind^ both Learned^
and Ignorant, have {o firmly believed, a God
upon the fir ft plain obvio.'is grounds of Af-
fent,as not to require^ orfband in need of
farther Satisfaction ; and, therefore, their
J'aith cannot be owing to the plaufible Co-
lours, ov jpdcious Keafoning^, of any//y?
Inventors o^faljd Notions and Opinions.
But, after all, allowing the Suppofitioii
to be true, (which I think impoflible )
that there was a time, in M'hich God was
D ;?<»
54 77;f? Certainty and Neceffity
no jvhere acknovi^ledged in the World ;
whoever invef/tedtliQ Notion^ whatever
were the occafions of its beiftg firfi: Started
or the Arguments^ upon which it was
jirfl beheved, the Propagation of it after-
rvardsy and the Conflancy and Vniverfality
of the Belief ever fwce^ muft have Sprung
from the Agree ablenefs of fuch an Opinion
to the common Reafon of Mankind^ and to
all their other Knowledge, and from the
Strength and Sufficiency of thofe Reafons^
upon which it \^norv^ and has been^ long
received. For all ^^ fir ft Arguments and
Grounds of believing it, if they were any
other than what we Jiave now, and which
have been tlie fame in all Ages, whereof
any Knowledge is left us, have been all
loir, and, confequently, their Influence
hath been fpent,long ago: neither, in any of
the ancient Diilourlesj)'^/^ extant^ concern-
ing the Being of a Gody is there any Ap-
peal made to Authority ^ or Antiquity ; as
if Men were obliged to believe this Truth,
bec'aufe it was foantient, or becaufefuch,
and fuch eminent Ferfons had firfl: recom-
mended, or enjoyned the Belief of it : But
all the Arguments made ufe of are wholly
built upon the Nature and Neceffity of
ths things which are always the fame ;
and
of ^li^ion in General, 3 5
and therefore have the fame plain Rea-
JToiii for the Being of a God, always hat!
the fame Influence, and they will upon
Examination, be found to have no Art
or Sophillry in them, and every body
that pleafesmay examine them.
Nothing then remains, but to enquire
into the Force, and Validity of thofe Rea-
fons, upon which our Belnf of a God is
originally founded.
I fuppofc it now but a probable Perfira-
fto?2^ arifing from that Readincfs and Af-
furancc of AlTent, with which we em-
braced this Truth, and yielded to the
firjl obvious Proofs of it, upon a bare Pro-
pofal of them to the Underftanding ) in
which Perfwafion we are very mucli con-
firm'd by knowing, that all Mankind have
conllantly agreed with us in it ; being
fully fatisfied from hence, that no Peculiar
Temper of Mind^ or Scheme of Thoughts^ no
private Intereft^ or national Byajs^ has
difpofed us to make this judgment, but
fomcthing corn?no?t to the ivholc humane
Nature,
Upoa thefe grounds have the Geyierality
of the World always believed in God ; and
tho', to a nice Examiner of things they
D 2 ma^'
J 6 Tl?e Certainty and TSleceJfUy
may not appear Strong enough to Create
certain irreftjlible Conviction^ yet are they
fufficient to juftify 2ifull and entire Ajfent^
and to warrant our ^c?/;^^ according to it.
For to fufpe6l a thing to be falfe, and to
a^ as if it were fo, upon a bare imaginable
Foffibility that it may be fo ; or rather,
becaufe we have not received the highefi
degree of Proof which the thing is, in its
own Nature, capable of, when, at the
fame time, w^e have no manner of Rea-
{qw to diftruft that evidence we have ; can
be i\Qii\\tv rational^ prudent^ novfafe.
However, fmce there are Perfons, whofe
Aciions^ and (at leafb, fret ended) Opinions
come up vo ^his Character^ we will confi-
der the common Proofs of a Deity more
clofely and throughly^ and fee if, what up-
on the iirft View appears fo probable^ and
makes f^ftrong an Impreflion upon the
Mind, may not, upon farther Examina-
tion, iirike us with fuch Certainty and
Power of Conviction as we cannot refifl:,
without queftioning all our other Know-
ledge, and difclaiming all manner of Di-
ftinciioii between Truth and Falfhood :
which is,
The
of ^hgion in General, 57
The Third Confidcratlon I propofcd in
treating of this Argument : Whether it be,
not only2.pofJible^ or probable Opinion that
there may be a God ; but a certain and
infallible Truth that there is one.
All the common natural Arguments and
Reafons; upon which the general Belief of
a God is founded, are taken from thex^///-
hle frame of things^ called the Worlds and
from thofe {Q\cx2i\ parts of it,which fall un-
der every man's Notice and Obfervation ;
upon a flight Survey of which, any man
who is in the Icafl: capable of Refle8:ion,
where ever his Thoughts light, will /'er-
t^/i/f or imagine that he perceives, plain
Marks, andTokens o'tPower^ and ]Vifdom^
much of the fame kind, tho' in proportion
far greater than ever he has obferv'd in any
of the moft wonderful Effects of /^aw^//^
Skilly and Stre}7gth'^ the immediate Re-
fult of which, I believe, would be this
Conclufion, That certainly there is /^wp
Beings exceedingly more powerful^ and
knowing than Man^ who w^as the Author^
a,nd Contriver of this fl:upendous Fabrick.
And, if Admiration^ and Curiofitj^ in-
yirchim to farther Enquiries, (as'tisdif-
D I ' ficult
j 8 Tl^e Certainty and Ncaf/ity '
ficult to fuppofe they fhould not,) the
Compafsy and Extent of the whole Work,
the Variety of Obje£ls in it, the Ccnfi.ixcy^
and Vmformity of fome Appearances, and
the regular Changes^ and Revolutions of
others; the Connexion^ and Dependance
of the feveral parts ; the Vnion^ and Con-
federacy of multitudes, of different kinds,
towards fome common Production ; and
the 'various^ particular^ Ends and Vfes
of things, all ajfiflant to one another, and
Juhfervtent to fome opener al Defign ; all
tbefe, I fay, well confiderM, and weigh'd
together, would ftrengthen, and confirm
his former Judgments, and farther dif-
pofe him to conclude, That the Author of
all thefe Inftances of Power is able to do
whatever elfe can be conceived /'^y^^/f,
nothing elfe conceivable feeming more
difficult to this Inquirer than vv^hat he
fees already done ; That a Being of fo
much Knowledge, as his Works declare
him to be,fo vaftly exceeding.^V/'s, is able
to do Things, which are far above Man'^s,
Reach, and Comprehenfion to conceive
at all ; And that he who has fo wifely Or-
dcr'd and difpofed every thing he has
made to the mofl: proper Ends, has there-
fore excrcifed jiis Power^ fo far, and no
farthei\,
of^ligion in General. 59
fiirthcr, becaufe It was moft agreeable to
his Wifdom fo to do.
There Is nothing, I think, in all this,
but what is eafie, and natural, and what
may very well be imagined to be found
out, without the help of much Learning,
or an extraordinary Talent of Reflexion ;
and yet, this is what has conftantly, in all
Ages, fatisfied both the Learned, and the
Thoughtful^ and ftood the Teft of T/wf,
s.nd Sophiflry^ and Malice,
But fuppofe,y^wf extravagant Thinkers^
entirely under the Government of their
^enfes and Lu(ls, (hould diftruft all their
reafonings of this kind, and, becaufe they
were not bye, when the World was
made, and do not fee tiic Hand which
fupports the Frame, and moves all the
feveral Wheels of it, fhould therefore
doubt of the Being of a God, notwith-
ftanding t\\Q.Teflimony of Nature ; is there
no certain Proof to be given, that we arc
not miftaken who believe a God upon thefe
Grounds? Several have already ffiewn
that there is, and this is what I fhall
at prefent endeavour to make good,
in the clcarefl: and mod: unexceptionable
manner that I can.
D 4 No\^
^o Tl?e Certainty and KcceJJity
Now, Certainty or Evidence (which 1
fhall all along take in the fame Senfe) is
fuck a frm well-grounded Jffent^ to the
Truth of what we perceive, as excludes,
not only all manner of doubt, but all con-
ceivable poffihi lay oj a Mijlake : And thus,
I fuppofe, and take it for granted, that
we are certain of all our own Perceptions
and Senjations, whatever we feel or ai'e
confcicus to our felves of; and that we
are fully, and undecivably allured of a
great many of our 'Judgments, founded
upon the juft, and well-regulated Reports
of our external Senfes^ to the fame degree as
we are of the Agreement and Difagree-
ment o{ 2inY pure intellectual Ideas.
Except this be allowed, we have no
JPrinciples to reafon from, nor indeed any
I^norHedge at all, not fo much as Scepti-
ctfm ; but univerfal Darknefs and Confu-
fion cover humane Nature : But he who
grants thus mucli, and is true to his own
lieafon^ mull acknowledge that /"Atr^ is a
God ; as will appear from the following
Coniiderations.
Being then, as I fuppofe, by an infalli-
ble Conjctoufnefs, fatisfied of our own Ope-
rations^ and Extjhnce, and, by various,
Inzfreljions^ made upon certain Organs of
'' ■ ' ' the
of ^U^ion in General, 4 1
the Body, fully convinced of the reality of
things without us ; upon fartlicr Ohferva-
tion and Reafomng wc come to thcfe cer-
tain Conclufions :
That there are a great many Changes in
the World; That a great m^Luy new Appea-
rances prefcnt themfelvcs to us, which,
before, were no where to be found ;
and that others go off, and difappear,
the rife and original o: which we never
knew ; That, under all thefe Changes,2.nd
Varieties of Appearance, there is fome-
thing, confiantly the fame, which we call
Matter, or folid extended Suhjlance ; That
the different Appearances in Matter, which
our Senfes inform us of, proceed imme-
diately from the Differences of Bulk,
Number, Figure, Motion, or Reft ; That
we are confcious of feveral things in our
felres, which we perceive to be different
irom all thefe ; Tliat we were not always
thus confcious, but that there was a time,
when this Confcioufnefs began, and when
all that we percerje in our felves as di-
ftinci from Matter, (which we call Mind
or Spirit,) v/2isRr(]: joined d.nd united to a
certain portion of Matter, called humane
Bddy ; That , when this humane Body
changes its Appearance , and fuch a partis
cular
42 T7;^ Certainty and Nccepty
cuh-vVnion of the parts of it is dtffolved^
then that Confcioufnefs^ and all thofe in^
ternal Operatiom^ which are now the Ob-
je8: of it, ceafe to be joined with that
Matter which they were juft before united
to.
Being well affured of the Truth of all
thefe Conclufions^ we are immediately
led to thefe following Enquiries.
' From whence arife all thefe things?
How came there to be fach a thing as Mat^
ter ? When and by what means , did
It begin to exift f What is the Caufe of
all thofe {wccf^i^QChanges in it? And why
does it exilt after fo many dtffere-nt man-
ners'^ Whence are we our felves ? What
was it that gav: us fuch confctous Beings ;
Hq)v are they united to our Bodies ? what
limits the Cc fitinuance, and afterwards
diffolves the Bond of this wonderful V-
nion ?
Now, in purfuit of thefe Enquiries,
we find it utterly inconceivable^ and />/-
foffihle that any thing fliould make it felf-^
that a Beings which once did not exift,
fhould begin to be, of it felf\ without
the A0iftaace oH fame other Being which
<^xifl:ed hefcre it : From whence we are
irre^
of (^cli^ion in General /j. ^
irrefipbly conviiic'd that fomcthing miift
be eternal \ fuice otherwifc , nothing
could ever have been : for, if any Time
can be fuppofed, in which Toothing did
exift, nothing would ever have exifted
unlefs tljAt^ wliich once was 7iot^ could
raife it Jclf into Being ; but this is im-
foj/tble^ and 'tis certain that fomething now
really />, therefore fomething muft be e-
ternal.
And, as, from hence 'tis evident that
fomcthing muft he eternal^ fo, 'tis plain
from tht/e ver/il Changes which wc obferve
in the World, from the SuccefTion o^new
confctous Beings^ and from the different
Difpofitions of Matter^ that Every thing
IS not eternal ; now, if fomething be eter-
nal, and a great many things are not eter-
nal, then it plainly follows, that every
thing which is not eternal^ was derived
from that which is ; ( /. e. ) originally re-
ceived its Beings and whatever belongs
to it, from fome eternal Author or Cauje :
becaufe, if it had not, we muft fuppofe,
either that fomething made it jelf\ which
before is fhewed to be impoffthle-^ or,that one
temporary Being produced an other^ which
it could not do, but by the Force and
Efficacy o'ijuch Powers, which, together
witii
44 ^*^^ Certainty and Nchffity
with its Exijlcnce^ it received from fome
other temporary Being, and fo on, till we
come to fome eternal Fountain o^ all Power,
and Being,
The only Queftion then is, What is e-
ternal ? for upon this depends the Refo-
lution of all our other Doubts and Enqui-
ries : and for our better and m-ore certain
Satisfaction in this point, I fliall,
Firft, Confider all the Claims and Pre-
tensions that are made to tliis glorious Pre-
rogative oi eternal Exiftence :
Afterwards, I fliall examine what thofe
Attributes are which muft necejfarily be-
long to an eternal Being :
And then fhew that that Being to which
thefe Attributes agree, is what v/e call
Gody and that there is no other Being
which /^, or can he veiled with the like
Characlers.
I. Firft then. As to the Claims dind
Pretenfions to eternal Exiftence : thele, I
think, are all the Suppojlttons that can be
made.
Eeitherthat Matter alone is eternal.
Or that Mind alone is eternal.
Or that Mind and Matter are both eter-
nal. But
of^h^ion hi General. 45
But Matter may be confidcred under
tliree different States.
For either we imagine it as having con-
tinued from all Eternity in one entire folid
M.ifsy without any Dijtinciion^ or Motion
of its parts.
Or we confider it as loo[e^ and dnjtded
into innumerable little Particles^ all in
conftant Agitation or Motion. Out of
which quiet Majs, or Moving Atoms^
the prejent frame of things was, in time,
ftruckout, T^vAfornPd.
Or eife we muft fuppofe that it has eter-
nally exilied under tliat for?nj which we
now call the World^ which, mth^ princi-
pal parts of its Struciure^ was always the
fame, with a confiant Succeffion of feveral
of the chief Species^ or forts of things
in it.
There is nothing elfe imaginable^ but an
eternal iSttccejfion of nerv Worlds^ and r.e^v
Species of Beings in them ; which is an
Opinion too extravagantly abfurdto be
owned by any body : Bccaufc, who ever
affirms tliis, muft be obliged to grant,
either that every new World makes itfelf^
(wh'ch IS a contradi6lion already explo
dedj or that what he (alls 7i€w lVorld\ are
only
46 7l^c Certainty and NeceJ/Jty
only fo many ^eiv Forms, all owing their
produ^lion to fome common pimt^le^
which is Eternally the fame ; and fo tlie
notion falls in with fome of the other be-
fore mentioned.
2. But, which of thefe Hypothefes has
Truth and Certainty of its fide, is the next
thing to be enquired into ; and the beft
way to determine it will be by confider-
ing the neceffary Attributes, and Chara6:ers
ofan eternal Being .
It has been proved already, from the
frefent State of things, that all Beings,
which exift in Time, muft be made by
fomething which was eternal, becaufe
vit was impoffible that they fhould have
exited any other way : The fame will
now appear a priori from the Nature of
an eternal Being, the infeparable CharaB-
ers of which are, neceffary Exifience, and
all pqffible Ferfeciion ; both which are in-
cluded in the A^c)?/^;? ofan eternal Being,
and do evidently infer each other ; For
an eternal Being muft exift necejfanly, and
have all pofjible VerfeUion ; and whatever
exifls necejifarily muft alfo have all poffible
Ferfeclton ; as whatever has all poffible
Ferfe^ion rnuft extfi neceffarily.
An
of Religion in General. 47
An eternal Being mnft exifi Kecejfariiy
bccaiife it exifts ofitfelf\ for it ahv/iysrvas
what it //, it aln-nys had the fame Nature
wliich it has, and therefore tlierc dwAjs
was the fume Reafo^, that is to lay, the
fawe necelJity for its cxifting. This is too
evident to need a farther Proof.
The otlier neceffary Charafter of an
eternal Being is, that it has nllpofjible Per-
fc[iiofi \ that is, that there is nothing con-
cervable^ or in the Nature oi^thmgs poffii?le
whieh added to it would give it any Jd-
uantagey or, in any hw^c^ render it mar?
perfeii than it is.
This is plain fi'om the very Notion of
Foffihtlity which implies is a Power fome-
where correfpondent to the utmoft Ex-
tent^2.ndCap.uny o^thingspo/fible •, (6 that
to fay a thing is pofJibU, is to fay that
there is fome Power capable oi produci/i&
or having it ; and, therefore, if you fup-
pofe an eternd necejfary Being to wan/- anv
Perfection, what is imagln'd to be w.tnti//a
to it muft be, for that very realbn, iw-
poffible ; for, it cannot be conceived to want
what it is in its own Power to have, and
it can receive nothing which it has not
from my other Being ; becaufe no other
Being oi'f^reater Power is conceiz-ab/e, not a
Umpo^
48 The Certainty and Neccffity
temporary Beings becaufe the Extftence and
Terfeciion of all temporary Beings are de-
rived from that which iseterndy not an
eternal neceffary Being, becaufe this which
is fuppofed imperfeci^ is us much an eternal
neceffary Being as the other^ and therefore
muft have all the fame PerfeBions, For
why fhould the Perfedions of the one be
limited and thofe of the other not ? And
whence fhould this Impotence proceed
in one eternal neceffary Being which was
not in another, when neither of them
has any other Principle of its Exifience
and Ptrfecfion but its felf ? There can be
no difference afligned or imagined be-
tween one eternal necejfary Beings and
another ; and therefore wherever thele
attributes are found they muft be ac-
companied with all pffihleferfe^ion.
5. Now i^ fome thing certainly hceter-
naly and necejjary Exifience^ and allpojjible
Ferfe6lwn^ be the ejfential Characters of
an eternal Beings (as has been proved,) then
this eternal Bemg muft be what we call
God -J the CharaBers z.nd. Attributes o{ an
eternal Being belonging to Him^ and to no
other^ as will eafily appear, by applying
them fir ft to that notion which we have
framed
of ^ligioii in Gcncvdl. ^c^
Framed of God and afterward'* to tlic
fcvcral Hypothiffs before mentioned.
That knowledge Paver, and P/f.if//re^
are Perfections, cannot by us Men be
doubted of, who can frame no Notions
o'i any other, and who meafurc the /;6?(?^-
^^efs and perfection of every thing cije by
its Almijtry and Subftrviency to tljefe, fo
^ti to conclude that, were there no ik'ings
wiiich in joyed tijefe PerfeBtons, there
would be no diflerence between a regutar
Wortd, and a Chaos ; or between Mul-
tiplicity, and Variety of iieing, and eter-
nal unfjcr fat Nothing.
Thefe, therefore, muft be t\\{iPri?icip.il
Characters of an eternal Being ; and lu^
Kjw)v ledge. Power 3.nd Happinejs, mullbj
copnn/enjurate to his Exi/tence, that is, e-
tcrnal ;^£'C(?//'^r)/(^ialifications,boi.iKled on-
ly by /j/^-y^/t-//; and, whatever elfe is ynade
by this eternal Being, as 'tis proved that e-
ofe Beings w hicii a re capi
being no other end, upon which Jiich a Be-
ing, as we here fuppofe, cdn ac7 ; and all
iiis iVorks mull cany the Marks of their
Afithor upon them, that is,- be fuch a>
arc lit for a Being of thofe glorious ^a-
V. UficatioK^
^o Tl^c Certainty- and Kcccjfity
lifcAtions to make , and defign for fudj
Ends.
Thus rnay the whole Idea of God, as it
is before defoibed, be eaGly made out, by
fofitive direci confec^uence, from the Prwct-
pies juft now laid down, and prov'd ; as
plainly appears from the nature, and extent
of the Frtnciples themfelves, and from //'(^
Inftances which I have given, in the chief,
and moil: dijlinguijhing, moft contefied
CharaO:ers of the Deity.
But I am fenfiblc that this way of pro-
ving a God, tho'in it felf the truefl:, and
moil: direct, is not like to meet withy^
general ?in Acceptance, or convince Men
fo effectually, as a lefs degree of Evidence
m another kind', becaufe, the Demonfira*
tion confifting of many parts , and the.
Ideas upon which it is founded hzm^^pire-
ly intellectud, and not admitting of any ^
fenfihle Reprefentation, there are but few
who are capable of fo much Steadmefs,
and Attention of Mind, as is required to
perceive the whole for a of the Proof.
But dien 'tis certain, that tho[e, who de-
ny a God, muft not own themfelves to be
of the number of thofe, who are incapa-
M?of ccmp'.chcnding fuch an Argument
as this,, becaufe they will, from hence, be
proved
of ^Itgion in CeneraL 5 i
proved to a6l very unrcafonably, in de-
nying^ what, by their own ConfclTion,
they do not underfiand^ and confcqucntly
are not //> j^id^^es of; which is as iiblurd^,
as to deny a Provofuion in M^ttbem.tticks^
without being aoleto imderftand the De-
monllrdtum given of it : and, here, it will
be allowed by all, that the Demonfiratio/i
is never the lefs true and concluding^ be-
caufe there are but few, who have made {q
great a progrcfs in this Science, and are fo
well vcrsW in. t h is fori of re ^fon/ng J as to
perceive the Vdidity of it.
And therefore, it cannot be altogether
improper to offer, what may becalPd a
inetaphyfcal nhjlrncfed proof o^ 1 Deny ^ for
\.\\Q Satisfaction o{{ud\ as by fteady Re
flexion, and a juft: Ufe of their Reafon,
will eafdy underftand it; and, for the
Shame and Confufion of thofe, who re-
nouncing common Opinions and Jrgu^
mcntSj upon no Grounds, pretend to ne^r
Difcoz'eries, in Matters which they do not
iif/dcrfiand^ and confcqucntly cannot dif
prove,
Hov/ever, I have been as fhort as I pof-
fible could be, upon the pofitive part of
the Argument, and as pljiin as the Sub-
jedl would give me leave to be, liaving
£ 2 made
5 5 Tl^c iertixinty and Ncceffhy
made ufe of the commo^iefi^ eajkjl Terms,
which the Language would furnifli. me
with, upon fuch Matters as I have had oc-
cafion to fpeak of: fo that, all the Diffi-
cuhy lean imagine in the Apprehenfion
of what I have fa id, mufb arife from the
r/auireo^ the Idea's^ and from th.Q connex-
ion^ and I'AYiety of Confeo^uences^ which
are not eafjy to be comprehended in one
t'iejv , efpecially without any Affilliance
from Scnje, But this could not be a-
voided.
Havint^ therefore, as clearly and intelli-
gibly as I could, in ^Lpofith-e direct man-
ner, proved, that //;fr^^^//?Go^, byfiiew-
ing. That there certainly is fom.e eternal
Being ; that all the Characters and Attn-
hates of an eternal Being do agree 2.sm\ be-
long to that Idea we have conceived of
God ; and therefore that that eternal Beings
which certainly u^ is as certainly what we
call God: Having, I fay pofitively^ and
directly proved this, I proceed to make
good the fame Truth neg^atively^ or by way
ofCjyijecj^itence-^ which, taking this for pro-
ved That there is fame eternal Bei/ig^ I do,
by fiiewing, that the Characlcrs and Attri-
hutes of an eternal Being can agree to no-
thinz
of ^Itgion In Gcncrd, 5 5
ihiug elfe but what we call Go i, therefore
tliev muft agree to God^ th.erefore that
ftcrnd Herng^ which certainlv is, muft
as certainly be God,
111 the Profecution of which Argument,
tho' I make iife of the i^rh:ct^)U-i infilled
upon ill the tormer, and the' the Conclu-
ions from them, not being direB^ have not,
m their own n.xturt^ the fi^.-n^ der^ree of li-vi-
dence as pojiti-vc direct Dedaiiion^ have,
yet I quefHon not but <" fhi'il be befter,
and more <i;enerally underllood, and fhall
more f.itisraclorily prove what ihave un-
dertaken, to a great many Peribns, thii
way, than the other.
For, befides that the, fa/fhood of all wrong
//y/'6?^/;fy^/is,generally,much eafier demon-
jlrated^ and perceived^ than the certainty
of the true one, T fhall have frequent
rccomih to fen fih/e in/htnces^ w^hich, rend-
ring the things prefent to our Minds, feem
Clearer, to moll People, than /'//re intel-
lectual Ideas ^t\id' owv reafon allures us tliat
they are not.- And therefore, that I may
not be wanting to niy Snhjecl., and my
Defign in treating of it, I think my felf
obliged to accommodate my felf, to all
irnderjlandings^ and to all manner of^ Preju-
dices,
E : Tt
^4 *^^'^ Certainty and Necefjity
It has been proved already, from the
prefent Extjhnce of things, that ibmething
muft be eternal', we have rcckon'd up
the feverai Pretenfions that can be made
to Eternal Exigence ; and have confider'd
the Characfers and Attributes of an eter-.
nal Being
Now, if that which is eternal be not
God^ and the Characters and Attributes
of an eternal Being do not belong to him^
then fomething elfe mufi: be eternal, and
fome other of the fore-mention'd Suppo-
fitions muft be true ; but, upon Exami-
nation, I beUeve, it will be found, that
none of thofe Siippofitions, which exclude
the being of a God, can be true ; and,
therefore, what I have proved concern-
ing God muft ftand Good,
This it is my prefent Bufinefs to fliew :
and, moreover, I iliail endeavour to
make it appear, that, as Gc).^/ is certainly
eternal^ and nothing elfe can be eternal,
exclf/fve of him^ fo likewife he is the on-
ly eternal Beings and whatever ipi anv of
tiie other Hypothefes' ts conceived to Se e-
tcrnal, if it really be fo, mufl:, in fome man-
nerj entirely belong to him,
Firfr
of ^I'lgion in General. 5 5
Firft then, Let us frame to our felves a
]<[otion o't Matter nlor^e^ with its Parts 'dll
umted, and .r/ re/l : and when we liave
done fo, we fliall eafily judge, how im-
poffible it is to conceive , tliat matter
fhould have fo exifted, neceffanlj of ttfelf^
from all Etermty^ and that, tn time, the
World, and all things in it, in the man-
ner we now behold them, fhould \\ivq pro-
ceeded from or have been frodnced by it.
For, without running overall the Cha-
ra6lers of an eternal Being, the abfurdity
o^this Stippofition will fufficiently appear,
by what we flainly perceive, and know,
and what conllantly, and trrefifltblj offers
itfelfto oury^"/?/^^, ^iwd. under Jhndings, in
tiie prefent frame of things.
Solidity, Extent ion, Figure, Motion, Per-
ception, AndJVill, are the c/z/^fof allour
Ideas, and what we are the befl: acquaint-
ed with; and, fo£ir as we perceive them
diflincf from one another. Separately exift-
ing, or necejfarilj connected, our Reafo-
///;7g5 about them arc they//r<?/?of any we
have; fo that, iiwc ^vc??/ijial:en'mthefe,
I cannot fee how we have, or are capable
ot having, any /knowledge ^td\\.
E 4 ^&^^'
5^ J he Certainty and 2\cceJJity
Solidiij^ Exterifwn^ and Figure^ I do
not only perceive to be confiantly united.^
but /?ccejfar/ly^ and i^?-Jet?arahly toco-cxift
together in the fame Suh]eci^ which I call
Matter or Body -^ fo that we cannot
conceive any fort of Body, or Portion of
Matter^ without thefe tliree Quahties be-
longing to it ; but it dees not follow, that,
where-cver thef three QLialities co-exift
together, there is either Motio'n, Percepti-
on, or Will, there being no neccjfary Con-
nexion betvvxen ciny oithife latter ideas and
the other before mentioned ; as is plain,
not only from the Natures of the Ideas
themfelves, but from then' ffarate £.x-
ijlence aclually perceived by us.
How then does Matter, which we now^
fuppofe to exi ft without any A/(?/^/^;2, Per-
^ception, ■ovWill, come to have ilf(5/^/(?;2 ad-
ded to it?
AH the Motion that Vv'e perceive in B^-
dies without us is made by SHccejfi;e ImpuL-
fes from one Body to another, where tviry
/^///tJ/iJof Matter ov%xs Its Motion \.o fome
other ';\hu'i^ this cannot help us to con-
ceive liow Motion: flYould begin whtro, e-
very thing is at reft .- the only Idea that
sve receive fro rii Body, with reibefi; to Mo~
iyon^ is that of a Capacity of being monjed
■■ • when
of ^It^ion m OcneraL 57
when it is at rcil, and not of a tforver of
/riovingit'. felf : this we have rion; vvhat
palTes iVtihn/ us^ wlicn, without any ex-
ternd Impuljl upon us, by a bare Thought^
or Det er mi /iaiio// 0^ ouv felves, we betln
a Motion in our onu Bodies^ anc^ by that
means, commnntcate it to other Bodies ^
which were before at reft ; wX-iich power
of heginuiN'i Motion is included in what
we call Will: but Muter Being fup-
pofcd to exift without Perception and Will^
and confequently without this power of
hcginning Motion in its Jtlf-^ and there
being nothing eljt to ccmirnnnicate Motion
to it; it necelTarily follows from hence, that
it muft et email) continu. in the fame ftate
o'i'union^ I/.dijlinciion^ and Rejh
Tliere needs no more for the over-
throwing this Hjpothtfs^ no ftrefs being
ever laid upon it.
In the next place then, if we imagine
nil the parts of this Material World ^ioofe
from one another, and all in motion ; it
will be quite as irrational to think, that
fo it mult have been eternally and necefjari-
/)', till, dtfome certain time, the featured
Atoms mtt trgether^ Or were dijpojed after
fuch
5 "8 The Certainty and TSleceJJhy
fuch a manner, as produced thtfrefint
Structure^ and Conjlitution of things.
Many are the Abfurdities and Inconfi-
jhnctes with which this Opinion is char-
geable; but I Oiall^at prcfent, inftancebut
in two.
The firft is, the Hippofing an eternal
motion o^ different Particles o'i Matter ^ he-
fore the Produliion of the World ; which
implies an infinite fucceffion of EffeclSyWith-
out ^/fy C^///^ to produce them : For, Mo-
tion^ being fomething difimci from Mat-
ter , does not necefjanly e:s.ifi^ becaufe
Matter exifts, for then, it would always
exift, in every Particle of Matter) which
we fee it does not; nor does it cydftofit/elf^
independently of Matter^ becaufe it cannot
exift without It ; and 'tis plain that Mat-
ter could not produce it in its icWfrom all
Eternity, becaufe it cannot produce it
at all: and therefore there can be no
fuch thing as eternal Motion^ oxfucceffion
of Motion^ m different parts of Matter;
becaufe, every Motion is a meer Effect and
Paffion^ and there is no aciive power any
where aflignable, or conceivable, whicfi
could produce^ ox caufe fuch an Effect : fo
that to fuppofe an eternal Motion with-
out an eternal Power of moving, is one very
great
of ^ligion in Gencrcd. 5 p
great Abfurdity, which thole are guilty
of who let up the Hypothcfis o^^ Atoms.
The other is, the alcribing (nchmw Ef-
fects to Matter af^d Motion together, in
the production of the World, as, for a
n-hole Eternity before^ never proceeded from
them, and could not poffibly, at anytime^
ho, produced by them. For, Matter and
Motion not implying Perception and IVill^
(feveral Bodies in motion being now actu-
ally perceived to exift without them, and
the whole Syjlern of moving Atoms bein^
in tlie prefent Hypothelis, fuppofed fo to
ty^i{\, before the Beginni»^ of the World^ we
fliall never be able, from hence, to ac-
count for the Exiilence of Beings endued
with Perception and IVi!!^ which are Qiia-
lifications, in their own Natures^ utterly
dtjlinci from thofe of Extention^ Figure
and Motion^ and have no conceivable re-
lation to them.
That thefe three latter may be, where
the former are not, is plain : How then
do thnfe other come to be added to them ?
If Matter at reji^ whatever degree of Ex-
tent lon^ or kind of Figure, it is imagin'd
to have, can never make us conceive any
poJfibiUty of Motion in it, without the
lielp oi fomethrng elje befidcs Extent ton
an^
6 o Tl?e Certainty and 'Kecefjtty
and Fi^^ure to produce it (as is provM be-
fore ;) fo neither can Mutter and Motion to-
gether, whatever variety of Bulk^ Tex'
iure^ or Velociiy we reprefent to our felves,
give us any Idea of 'Perception and Wili^
or of a Pomr of -prohcing them : But, Mat-
ter in motion mud eternal^ move on, or refi
and move by turns if you pleafe, without
advancing to any ^^erv Ferfections. For
whether the parts of which it confifts, be
gr offer or finer ; be of this or that Figure ;
or move quicker or flower ; which wav fo-
ever we confider matter^ 'tis, in all Forms,
equally incapable of Thinkings Willing^ or
Moving it fclf. Nor is tliere the leaft
ground to expe8: any Powers of this kind
from FUme or Air^ rather than from Stone
or CUy -, or to fuppoie that the glorious Bo-
dy of the Sun has any nearer refemblance
to what we afcribe to God, than the con-
temptible flock of a Tree hath.
But this Subject has been fo learnedly,
?Aid fully handled already by others, that
T fhall not enlarge any farther upon it,
nor expofe this ridiculousScheme of things,
by fhewing all the peculiar Jnconfiflencies
which attend it ; but fhall proceed to ex-
amine the other Hypothecs concerning the
Beiffg
of ^Ugion 1)1 General. 6 i
Being of the Worlds which is thought, by
fome, to be more defcnfible.
In the third place then it is fuppofed,
that the World has eternal!) extfled, under
the/iwe Form wherein we now behold it,
as to the prtncipd psrts of its Structure,
with a confiant Succtjjion of feveral of the
chief Specks or forts of things in it.
But this (3puiion of the Eternity of the
World has been the moft exploded of any,
tho' moft of the Favourers of it have, at
the lame time, alfcrted the eternal Exifl-
ence of a God too. And the Reafon of this
is, becaufe the greateft part of the r/wjl
ancient Philofophtrs and learned Men
thought that they perceived fuch vifible
Marks and Tokens of the Newnefs of the
Worlds in the Kife^ Propagation^ and In-
crcafe Q^ Societies and Governments^ Langua-
ges and Laivs^ Jrts and Sciences;a.nd theXV^-
dition concerning thcOriginal ^ndBeginning
of Things was, in their time^ Co frefi, and
ib generally received in all Countries, that
few of them were able to reconcile all this
with the eternal exiilence o^ the World :
And thi^ Tradition having all along contin-
ued^ and the Truth oiihoje ancient Ohfer-
vations having been more and more coa-
firm'd
6 1 Tloe Certainty and "KcceJJtty
firni'd by many new Invent torn of things
ftnce^ fome of which were of {uohgeneral
xy^,that 'tis impoflible to imagine, either
that they fhould not have been invented
heforey if the World had been of ^ very long
continuance^ or iliould have been loft again
after they were once invented, the Jame
Objeciions have conftantly lain againft the
Eternity of the World : and thefe have been
ftrengthen'd by feveral other Arguments^
drawn from the many Abfurdities, and
Inconfifiencies^ which feem to be implied in
the Notion q{ eternal Succeffion,
All which, and whatever elfe can be
faid againft the Eternity oftheWorld^ when
aiferted together tvith the eternal Exijlence
of a Gody do more ftrohgly conclude a-
gainft this Suppofition, when the Being of
a God is not taken into it, under which
refpeft I now conlider it ; and thus eon-
fider'd, it is moreover, befides what has
been already alledg'd, attended with the
fame Difficulties, and Chargeable with the
ilime OhjeSiionSy^s thtformerHypothefis was.
For, fuppofmg the main hulk 2ind frame
of the World to have been eternally the fame :
Matter and Motion were no more capable
of eternally producing^ fuch a Succeffion of
various Objecls, as we now perceive in
the
of Religion m General , 6 :^
the World, than they were of producing
them, and the World together, in time ;
and yet, if we fuppofcan eternal Succefjion
of new Obiecls without a God^ they muffc
all be produced by the Power of Matter
and Motion: For, every particular nexf
Ohjecl^ being produced /«^/wf, muilowe
itsBeingtothat which was eternal-^nnd no-
thing, in t his Suppofition, being f/^r;z^/ but
Matter and Motion^ every new Generation
of Beings muft have x.\\q.\v Original from
thvfi\ the precedent Generation having no
othci- Powers nor Differences than thc///^-
ceeding^ but what arife from the various
Difpoji'.ion o^ Matter and Motion.
'Ihisis plain, in relation to all fuch Be-
ings- as want the Faculties of Perception
and ]Vill\ and, upon Fxamination, the
Cafe will be found to be the fame, with
refpecl to fuch as are endued with f/i'?/?
Qualtficattons : For, cvea/-/;f/^ahb, in the
prefent Hypothciis, muil be allowed to
derive their whole Being from Matwr and
Motion ; becaufe they are temporary Beings
which began to be, and there is nothing
elft eternal but Matter and Motion.^ and
confequently there isnootherO/y/fafTio--
nablc for their Frodt^chc??.
Which
64 The Certainty and TSleceJJity
Which need not be proved to thofe,
who hold the Eternity of the World, with-
out a God; becaule, there are none, I be-
lieve, of this Opinion, but fuch as do af-
cribe the Orfgi?/iU o'i Percptiofj 2Lnd Will no
Matity andMo:io:o^ ^Hedging that xhtfor*
mer are only different Modifications of the
Utter: in which they act very confiftent-
ly with them felves, in making an abfurd
Scheme all of a piece , not blending
Truth with Falfjjood^ but taking in/?// the
Ahfurdittes^ which do any way depend up-
on one another, and belong to the main
building.
However, that I may leave no room
for Exception from any fide, I think my
felf obliged to fliew,that,. i^ Percept ion ^nd
Will are not the IJjut ^nd Effects oi Mat-
ter and Motion^ as I have already fhewn
that they are not, the Exiflence o^ifitelU-
(fent Bei?igs^ without a Ged^ is inconceivable^
and impojfible ; becaufe no other Caufe of
their Produftion can be aiTigned.
For, fuppofe it fliould be enquired,how
fuch a particular Man came to exift^ how
he came to begin to be a confciou^ Being ; he
did notput himfelftc^QtheVy in fuch a man-
ner as we now perceive him to exift, he
did not give himfelf thofe Capacities^ and
Power<
of (^cli^ion in GcncrJ. 6j
Powers wliicli he is co?ifcious of, togctlier
with Iiis CovfcioNfrefs of them; this is a
flat Contradiciiony ?.nd granted to l)e fo on
all hands.
Whence then did he derive this mighty
Difference of Beings which we perceive ili
Iiim, by which he is din;inf?;uini'd from all
other things that fall under our Cogni-
zance ? Not from fame intelligent Betng^ of
in finitely j^re^trrr V er feci ions ^h\xt of the like
/•/W with thofe he perceives in himfelf;
nor from any mech:imcal Powers o'i Mitter^
and Motion : both thefe Caufes are fet a-
fidc, in the prefent Enquiry.
Nothing then remains, but that the
Man, who now exijls^ 7\.i\(\ fometiir.e a^o be-
gan to he^ mull: have receiv^edhis Exillence^
and all thofe Qunlificntions which difirin-
guifli him from iMattcr, (vom fo)?:e other
Mm of the like nature with himfeli^ who
exifted before him ; who iikcwife received
his Being from fome other Man, &c. Bat
this is .thfurd^ and irrational ; not only, up-
on tiie account of the infimte Subordina^
lion ofCtv/^j, -dnd EjfccJs^ which follows
from thi^ Suppofition, and which is by
every bD:ly reiect::d as a OiDcking repug-
nant Notion : but, becaufelt is hereby af-
fjrm'd, tliiu one Being may, folcty^ by its
66 7h Certainty and Neceffity
orv» power ^produce amther Being of the/^^/f
Nature and FerfeSiions with its felf; which
I take to be the next Impojjibility to that of
a Bemg^s making itfelf.
For Bodj^ and MW, are the only kinds,
of being, that we know any thing ofj and,
by all that we can learn of Body ^ ov Matter^
we conceive it utterly impoflible that any
fort of body flionld produce the leafi new
T article of Matter : nay, 'tis generally af-
firmed by theLearned, that one Body never
imparts any Motion to another without
lofing itfelfwhat the ^'/^/'^r receives: This
is certain, that J in all the material ProdruJi-
ons obfervable by us, there is only a new
dijpofition of the parts of Matter^ and not
any new Being made ; neither is this new
Difpofition received entirely from fome
other Beingy of the fame kind,or texture with
itfelf, but fl'om nuterial Particles and
Motions^ conveyed from feveral dijlant
parts of Nature.
Thus, v/e fee, that it is not one Seed, or
cne Tree^ that immediately begets another :.
but tlieSf/n, and the Rain^ and the Earth.,
and other Bodies^ contribute their fhare
tovvards raifingthe Seed into a Tree:
which produces new Seed, that muft un-
dergo the like Clianges, and borrow from
the
of ^Uf^ion in General. 67
the fame Caufcs, before it can attain to
the form of another Tree.
And 'tis farther remarkable that none
of thofc different difpofuions of Matter ^\v\\\Q.h
we find in the World, can be conceived to
be the producl o^ Matter and Motion done^
without the AfTiftance and Regulation of
lb me oti)cr Beir^^ o{ higher Perfect torn y as
lias been fhcwn before.
How then is it po{ribIe,that6;2u'A//W,or
conjcwus Beings fhould produce another en-
tire dif{inlty\\\\<\y or Being, of equal per-
fections with it felf, without loling an}^
thing from it felf, or borrowing any Affift-
ance from any other kind of Being cxift-
ing in tlie World ? and, wliat is as ftrange,
do all this, without being as confciom of
fhis it's chief PerfeBion^ as it is of all it?
other ?
This^ I fay, cannot polTibly be ) and,
therefore, If the World be eternal^ without
aGody all the continuAl Changes ^ 7{v\{\neiv
ProducHons^ which have ever been m it,
muft be afcribcd to Matter and Motion',
only, Matter and Motion not being
able to produce fuch Ejjlcis ; from hence X
conclude, that the Eicrnity of the IVorl^^
confidercd as it now is, without the et?y-
^// E -'^t/i'-nfe of .\ God^ is imvoffii^ls,
T 2 * And
68 T7;e Certainty and Neceffity
And thus I have confiderM all the leve-
ral Hyfothefes^ which pretend to give any
account of the prefent Conftitution of
things, called, the World^ exclufively to
the Bein^ of a God. And, from what has
been offered upon thefe Heads, it fuffici-
ently appears, that 7iothing elfe^ which is
fuppofed to be eterml, befides God^ hath
thteffentiai properties 0^ an €ter?tal Bei?igj
Viz, necejfary exiftence^ and all foffihle Per-
fectton ; or can be the cnufe of all thofc
Te?npo)r/iry Beings ^ which iiave been pro-
duced in time.
For, whatfoever is faid to be eternal^
which is not God^ is, at the fame time, faid
to want thofe Pcrfeclions, which we af-
cribe to God, and which are certainly the
chief, if not the only ones, imaginable by
us. And, as 'tis manifeft that, where
thele are wanting, there cannot be aH
po/Jible perfeUton ; fo, 'tis abfurd to fuppofe,
that, what isdeftituteof/C^/^"'^^^?^) ^nd
Will^ fhould nccejfanl) Caufe, and be the
Author of all Temporary Productions^ ra-
ther than fuch a Being, as is indued with
thefe Chara£lers, in the higheft and moft
perfect Degree.
'Tis very plain, then, from hence, that
there is fuch an eternd Being, as we call
God^
of ^li^ion in Genevitl, 69
God; becaufe /wthing eije cwn he Eternal
cxcliijive of hi/tt : all the fiippofitions of
tliis nature, being proved to be falle, and
abfurd.
The next thing, to be inquired into, is ;
Whether God be the only eternd Beings or
Whetlier any thing elfe, that has been for-
merly l'upnored,can hQ.\\kQ.\\'\({^Eternal to-
>' ether rvtth hnn.
But, before I enter upon the Conli-
derationof thofe feveral Hypo thejes, which
do, all, tho'ina different manner, elta-
blilh ^weternal Co-exijlence oi Matter and
Mind ; I think it necelTary to premife
fomething concerning the Nature^ and
Difiinchon of thefe two kinds of Beings,
as far as wc are capable of perceiving
themi that, fo, I may cut otf a great many
Dtfputes^ and MtjLtkes, occafion'd by the
Confufton of our Ideas upon this Sub)e£l,
and, what I have to fay afterwards, may
be better underftood.
I do not perceive any fuch Connexion be-
tween the Ideas of Verception^ and Will,
and tliofc of Extent ion, higure, and Mo-
tion, that, where-ever the former arc,
there mud: the Utter be alfo ; nor, do I fee
any Reaibn, wiiy Verceptiony and li'/ll,'dvc
V ^ nor
70 The Certainty and Neccgity
not as eafily believed to cxifl: feparately
from EiKtenfto??^ Figure^ and Motion ; as
Kxte}7^ton^ Figure^ and Motion are, to exift
feparately from Perception ; and Wt!l only,
becaufe ^/;f/^ are dUudly perceiv'd fo to
exift, and we have not, x^t^h^tn actually
io^ifcious of fuch a feparate Exiftence of
the other. But this does not hinder but
thztV erceptton^ and VVtll^mayfo exijij and
have a Subject ^ or Sub [lance of their own,
difiirict from that which llipports thefe
Qualities of Exter2jioK^ Figure^ and Motion,
Jf Thinhng^ and Willing were common
to ^^'f ?7 JBi'i;?^ that we knew, we could
no more frame an Idea oFzpure material
Suhfiance^ exifting without thefe Qualiji''
cations^ than we can, now,ofa/??/r^ thtnk^
tng Subfiance^ exifting without thofe Qua-
lities ^ which we attribute to Body : but
'tis certain, from an actual Separation of
thefe dijjerent Ideas^ perceivable in dijfe-
re?it Stibjecfs^ tlrdt/ome of them may exift
without the other ^ tho', without this
kclual Separation^ we could not have been
fo certain of it ; and, therefore, tho' the
other have never yet hten perceived to ^^-
tfi fparately from thefe^ it dees not fol-
low from thence, that they cannot fo exift :
but, confideriiig the vaft diftance that
■ . there
of ^ligion in General. 7 i
rliere is between the Natures of the fevc-
ral Ideaf, without any curtceivable Rtfem-
bLuice^ or RtLttion to one another, 'tis
•very prob^bte^ tliat tlicydo Arifeivom dif-
ferent Principles ^ and are founded in dtf~
^'•'rent Sub'^ecls.
However, Iiaving no farther Certain-
ty of it from ncLturd Reafonj (and I piu-
pofely wave all other Proof at prefent,)
let us fuppofe, that Perception and iVi/l^
Extenfion, Figure, and Motion, have all
the f^me common Subject to fupport them,
are radically, and ultnnately founded in
the fdme Subjidnce^ and ilTue from tlic
f/ime Principle., of which Subjecty Suljiance,
or Principle , we know nothing more,
than that it is fomet hi ng, which fifiains
thefe different (Minlities, or whatever
elfe we call tliem, which could not exiji
of themfelves, without tt .- Suppofmg, I
fay, all this, 'tis ridiculoufly, any, with-
out any colour of Reafon, inferred from
hence, that, therefore, P^rt^/'/^/o^/ and Will
are only different Modifications^ or Dif-
po fit ions of Extent ion. Figure, and Mo-
tion ; or do, in fome manner, or other,
wholly refnlt from them : For, why may
not diftinct Qualities co-exi[t together in
the fame Subjecf, without being derived
F 4 one
7 1 TI^c Certainty and Nece/Jity
one from Another '< or, why fhould Ver^
ception^ and Wiil^ be Modificatso/is of jEoc-
tenfio)'?. Figure^ and Motion^ any more
than Extenfiori^ figure^ and Motion are
different Modes o^ Perception^ and J^^f^/Z/f I
cannot fee, what groundThey can have to
beheve otherwife, who affirm, what we
call the Mind or Soul of Man, to be no-
thing elfe but Matter^ under a pecuhar
Dijpofitioii of tt'^s Parts,
But, that Thinkm^^y and WilU}7gy upon
a Suppofition, that they actually exift tn
matter^ and cannot exift vnthout it, are
not, therefore, Modifications^ or Effects of
the <3//?er Qualities of Matter^ which are
in it, antecedently to the Addition of
thefe^ may be farther illullrated by this
In fiance.
Motion is fomething added to the origi-
nd, and effential Qualities of Matter ;
owes it's Capacity ofexifltng^ to it,and can-
not exiil, without it : and yet 'tis plain,
that Motion is no Modification^ or effcft of
Soliditjj Extenfion, or I'lgure; which arc
every thing, that we conceive in Matter,
before Motion is added to it; but is fome-
thing, in its own nature difincf from a/l
. the/e, and not refulting from any con-
cdvable Difference of them : So that k
does
of ^li^ion in General. y 5
does not follow that, becaufc Matter is
fo/iii, or extended^ or of fiich a figure,
thcicforc it mill]: be /;; motion.
And if this be true of Motto-/?, it mud
be much more true o^Thinking^ and Will-
tng. For that Idea we have oi Motion
does involve Matter in it ; we had never
known, what Motion was, had we not
perceived fometliingthat was w^jt'^-^ ; and
we cannot perceive a thing, as moved^
witluDut perceiving it, as extended too ;
and Exter/Jio/; nccefTarily implies the o-
thcr effential Properties of Matter : but I
can form a Notion oi' thought and H^;/I^
and be confcious of fomctliing, which
thinks, and ivills^ without having any
Ideas, at the fame time, o\^ Solidttj^ Ex-
tenfior/^ Figure^ or Motion ; and, there-
fore, \^ Motion may be joyned to the o-
ther Qiialities of Matter^ \v\x.\\o\\\. refuit-
tng from them, tho' in the Idea, we have
of it, it cannot be conceived, without
them;'tis nir{ch more prohakie^thatThot/g^ht^
and I'ViII , may co-exifi with Motion^
and all the rellof the tnaterid Qualities^
without being the ejfelis., or produ^ of
them, when they carry no Marks of fuch
an Original upon them, and, in their
Conception, have no appearance of any
74 ^^^ Certainty and NeceJJhy
ReUtton to them. And, if it does not
follow, that, hQC-mk Matter is of fuch a
nature^ and fo moii^e^^ therefore it moves ;
much lefs can It be inferrM, that, becaufe
Matter is fo and fo difpofed^ and moved^
therefore it thinks^ and Wills.
This being premifed, it plainly appears
from hence, that 'tis ^nucl) more probable
in Reafof^^ that God fhould be the o»ly
Eternal Beings than that Matter^ any way
ccnfidered, fhould be co-eternal with him ;
For, the Not ion o^ God is full and com-
pleat ^ without any Qonfiderationo^ Mat-
ter ; and the Addition of the Idea of Mat^
ter to it, does not add any thing to the Per-
fection of the Divine Being,
The Forver of producing Matter^ and Mo~
. tion^ and of forming an infinite variety of
Beings out of them, is indeed ?iPerfeBion^
very worthy of God^ and what we juftly
attribute to him : but the actual Exi pence
of any of thefe Beings does no way heigh-
ten the Idea we have of him; whom we
conceive to be (U perfect in himfelf^ before
their Exiflence^ as after it.
The actual Communication of ibme of
his Perfections to a particular rank of his
Creatures^ and his giving them the V/e
and
of ^ligion tn General. 7 5
! ncl Enjoymem of his other Works^ do railc
new Idea of liiiii in them^ which they
dl by the name o\^ Goodrjefs ; but this
they look upon only as a njoluntary opening
and difclofing tlie Glory of his orighid
Nature, dnd not a ^eceffarj/ addtt tonal Ad-
vincement of it.
It is, therefore, mofi: Agreeable to our Rsa-
foii^ and to all the Notions we have of
the Divine nature^ that God Ihould have
exited alone^ from all Eternity ; aixl, in
ti'/ne^ Iiave produced the World and all
things in it.
But, if any Man had rather believe,
that Matter at rejl^ or Matter and Mo-
tion^ or the prefent Frame of the (Vorld^
with the feveral kinds of beings in it,
were co-etcrnal with God^ he mult, at the
lame time, hold, that, whatever was co-
eternal with God did either fubfifl: eter-
nally of Its felf nijHnflly from, and inde-
pendently of him ;
Or, is really a necejfary part of the Di-
vine nature^ and lieips to make up the Idea,
of God ;
Or, did eternally proceed from him, be-
caufehe jiad, iternally^ an effUhial will to
produce it.
But,
J 6 The Certainty atid Nece£ky
But, the firft of thefeSuppofitions can-
not be true : for neither Matter alone, nor
Matter and Motion, nor the prefent Com- ,
fihution of things can be eternal, indepen-
dently of God •, becaufe, (as has been fully
proved already,) none of them could have '
e.xijh'd eternmy, rvithout a God.
And, therefore, whatever is fuppofed
to be eternal^ which does not entcA' into
the Ide.i, we have given of God, mu(t be
taken into it; as necejfarily I'elongtnc to the
Divt'ne Nature ; or muft l")e look'd upon,
as tliQ free eternal effect of his eternal \VilL
Thus fome have affirm'd, that the
World, and every thing that we fee, or
know, is God:
Others, that all xbm2^s flowed from God: .
by which Exprellion, if they mean necef-
fary Ema'natwn, .they mult be all referred
to his Be:ng, ^nd Effence-j if froduciiony
to his Will.
So that, however we exprefe our felves J
upon thefe Matters, every f/;//?^ that we f
can imagine, or frame any Notion of,
muft he cither God, or, Ibme way, pro-
ceed from him, be alcribed to his Nature,^
or reckoned among his Works,
The Inference from all which is this;
Thar 'tis mofl ratt-jn^t to think, that no
■ ■• more
fjf ^cU'^iou in GoicrAl. yy
more belongs to tiie Ickd of God, than
what \vc have before attributed to him;
and that he did, tn tnnc^ of his own freq
will, produce evcrj thinly not contained
in that Idea, even origuid Mtittr and
Motion^ as well as the frame and. Structure
of the IVorldy and the Farietj o^pariuttlar
Bet/igs in it.
But, if any Man afTcrtsthe Eter/jity o[
a^jy of thcje^ together witli God^ in the
full extent of that Idea which we have
given of him^whetlicr his Opinion hctruej
or falj'cy it can make rw change in our
Thoughts, witli icgard to Keltgicn -. Be-
caufe, the Idta. of God, being fo far the
fame here as we have cftablifht it, the
fame Cor/fequemes will every where flow
from it; and the AiTcrtorsof any fuch
Opinion will bear the fame Relattcn to
God^ and be under the fame Obligations^
with us , who differ from them, in
fomc other things^ relating to God ; which,
however lield, have no other Jnfiuence
upon us, tliaa as we are obliged not to
Entertain ^.tiy fa/fe iXctlons o^ God, nv//-
i^g^jy when we may have better Infor-
mation : or, where we cannot, yet fomc
Opinions may appear ?norc juitable to our
Reafony and, more for the Honour of God
than
78 'J7;e Certainty and NeceJJity
than others ;which I take to be the prefent
Cafe,and,thereforeyfhall wave any further
Enquiry into thefe Matters, as having no
proipe6l of a Poffibility of knowing any
thing more about them.
Thus have I, with as much Brevity and
Difpatch as the Subject would allow, exa-
mined all the Accounts, which are, or can
be given, of the prefect Exiftence of
things; and, from particular Obferva-
tions upon each of them, (not all that
might be made, but fuch as I judg'd
fufficientfor mypurpofe) have (I think)
made it very evident, that there mufi he
d God^ or Being of fuch a nature as I be-
fore delcribed, who was the true and on^
7y Caufiy or Author of every thing we fee,
or know, or has ever been, befide him \
and, that, without the Suppofition of fuch
a Being , the World could not fojjlhlj
have ever exified^ as, we fee, it does.
I fhallnow add (omc general Reflections ^
to ftrengthen the Doctrine here maintain
ed, concerning the Origiiul of the JVorld^
and fo conclude the Proof of a God.
That the World is, what we now per-
ceive it to be, muft be afcribed either
to
of Rdigton in General. 79
to Chance y' Neccffity ^ or iVifJom : but
Charjce^ is ?iothirig'^Necef!!ty.^\y\l\\ou\i a God,
timntclligiblr^ and, therefore, IVifaom^ or
what is meant by it, God, who is a wife
Beings mxde tlie World^ and all things
in it, in that form., and manner, which we
now behold, and admire.
To Hiy, that the World was mtide hy
chance^ is, to fay, that it was made, \vl' know
not bom^ or without any Caufe ; and is, in
truth, to ufe Words, which have no deter-
mined Meaning.
7 here is no Man, who has made any
Enquiries into the Nature of Things, but
knows, that nothing, which before rvtu
not, can ever be, without owing its Ori-
ginal to fome real pofitive Beings of antece-
dent Exifience, h2 adequate, 2nd infufficient
Caufes are indeed often afligncd for the
Productio?io'i t\\m2^s\ bccaufe, being ;z£j:f
to, and immediately preceding, the Efjecls^
they are, /<9/^//, taken notice of, without
any regard had to their being Subordinate
to, or Directed by other Caufes; and,
oftentimes alfo, fomething is thought to
be the Kcxt, and immediate Caufeot' a thing,
which hath no influence at all upon it :
but, in both thefe Cafes, 'tis fome real
EJfi.
io The Certainty and Meceffity
Efficiency, obfcrved by us, that gives rife
to thefe Judgments; which arc fo far true,
as they fuppofc the Effect to proceed from
fome real Caufe , tho' there may be a
Miftake in attributing it to a wrof2g one^
or to one that had only a ^are in produ-
cing it ; and, therefore , there mufl: be
fomething ycaI aflignM , which was as
much , and as properly , the immediate
Caufe of the meeting of the Farts of Mat-
ter, in order to make a World, as the
parts of Matter, /o met, were the C^^y/^ of
the ProduBion of the IVorld, which can
be nothing elfe, but fuch and fuch par-
tictiUr Dnerminations of Fi^^urej and Mo-
tioNy in the feveral parts of Matter : but
thefe mufl:, either have been eternal, or
have fprang from certain eternal fixt
Rules, refulting from the Natures o^ Mat-
ter, and Motion •, or have been impreffed
by a divine Po vjr : in all which Cafes there
can be nothing cifud^ but every thing
mufl: have been neceffary, or providential.
For, fuppofing the whole Syflem 6[ Matter
fo2indfo figrtred, and moved ; we cannot
confider it as indiffirent to feveral Effecls,
but neceffaril) determined to fome, which
muft inevitably follow upon fuch a fnp-
pofed Difpofuio:^ , unlefs fomething ex-
trinfudl
o/ ^'h^ion in GeneraL 8 i
trip7jicai to Matter fliould refirairt^ ok changi
the origtnul Determination : and if any
thing, extrinfic.il to Matter, or, heftdes
iMatter and Motion, be allowed, it muft
be God. But if there be nothing elfe ex-
illing befldes Matter and Motion^ then
are all the Effe6ls refuking from them
nccejfary^ becaufe, whatever Difpofuion^ or
Mo: ion of Matter we fuppofe, and when^
foever^ in the whole extent* of Eternity,
we fuppofe it, every followmg t/Z^t'/W/^
have been what it z>, and there could
have been no otlier produced in the room
of it.
The Reafon^ wliy certain . Portions of
Matter, /(? and yc» figured and movedy do
jiot a/ivajs neceffarily produce the fame Ef-
fe^^isy is, becaufe, iliQir particular Determr^
/nations are reftrained, or over-ruled by
the necejf.iry hnpuljcs of other extrifificd
Matter ; or by the greater Power of the
DivmeWili: and, this being unperceiv\l
by us, we look upon feveral of thefe/^^ir-
ticular Etfecls as ca\ualy which can, only.
and, that very improperly too, with re-
fptct to our Comprehenfiofiy hz ftiled fb;
whereas in reality , with refpeB to the
univerfal Nature^ and £/y7f/>//i;_; of things,
G thev
8 2 77;6' Certainty and Kcceffity
they mufl: be either mceffary^ or volutin
tary.
But, if we confider the whole Frame and
Colleftion of things together^ we cannot
form any Idea of Chayice^ cither in the
World as it r/orv is^ or in tts original for-
mation ; unlefs we will be fo ridiculous as
to fay, that every thing which is^ is cafual-^
that every thing which has been from all
Eternity happen'd by chance ; and that it
was hy chance that Matter and Motion
WQVQ, eternal^ or that any thing extjled at
all ; Chance having the fame Title to all
the fe Effects as to any one of them.
I need not confider the other Occafion
we take of forming this Notion o^^ Chance^
from the Indifference that we perceive
oftentimes in our felves with regard to
feveral contrary Actions, which makes
our doing one thing rather than another,
when the Mind feems alike difpofed to
both, to belook'd upon as a cafual Rejult^
rather than 2i Proper Effect, This may be
accounted for otherwife, by the Prepon-
derancy of fome motive^ determining us to
a8: this way rather than another ; and the
feeming IndJjference m.ay be fhewed to
have fprung from our ig-norance of the
whole Nature, and all tlie Confequences
of
of ^Itgion in GeneraL 8 5
of the thing in queftion, and the feveral
Reafons and ways of acling ; but there is
no occafion for fuch a Proof, becaufe,
thofe who fa}' that the World was made
hy chance^ cannot be fuppofcd to life the
Word in thii Senfe^ forafmiich ns they do
not acknowledge, that God^ or any in-
telligent Being was concerned in tlie Pro-
duction o'( it : and if they did, yet would
they not entertain fucli low and abfurd
Notions of him, as to think, that fome
Chance-Thought ov ABtono^ hts produced
it.
'Tis plain then, that Chance^ is nothing
elfe but an mfignificant IVord^ and an tg-
nor.-tnt Pretence^ which, Jias no Senfe^ or
/^r.7/?w, under it, and therefore, can give
us no manner of light in our Enquiries in-
to the Nature^ and Original of things.
Neither will Neceffity^ which is the next
thing to be confider'd, give us much bet-
ter Satisfaftion : For, if we examine this
Notion well, 'twill evidently appear, that
there can be no Necefjity for the prefent
Ex I /hn c e oi the World, in the manner we
behold.
For, nothing can be f lid to be ahjolnte-
h r/eceffary^ but what 'tis altogether /w-
G ? fojjihlc
^4 Tl-^' Certainty and 'Kcafjlty
■poffible fliould be otherwife ; but impoJJIhle
it is not that the World iliould never have
exifted^ or that it fliould be deftrojed
now it does exift ; Becaufe it is not im-
pofTible but there may be a Being , of
much greater Perfection and Power than
the World, which could have /^/Wr^^ the
World from exifirng^ or can now dejlroy
it.
But, if any Man Tnall fay that he can-
not conceive luch a Being, as could hinder
}A3.ttei' from ex /Jl;.ng J or dejlroy it now it
does exiflr, becaufe, he cannot conceive
a Power, of making Comethin'S out of no-
thing , or, of reducing j07nething^ to no-
things the lad of which is here luppofed,
and the firfl: muft be allowed , if the
World does not exift neceflarily, but was
made: If any Man, I fay, fliould objed
this, I anfwer that it feems to me con-
cetvabte enough from the Idea I have of
God^ that, what is here afcribed to him,
may fall within the compafsof his Fou'cv^
which, reaching to ^//things /'r?;^/^/^, that
is, to all things which do not imply a
Contradttiton^ may extend to the Acts
o^ Creation and Annihilation ; which, tho'
tfie manner of tlie Performance be incow-
pcht?/f,blty
of- ^iigioji tn General. 8 5
fYeheafible^ cannot be proved to carry any
Coritradicfioii in them.
However, if there be thofe who pre-
tend that they cannot co??/prelje/?d the
Pofjibiltty of thefe A6lions, yet, this is
very coHceivAble by any Man, that there
niaybe/(3Wf Beings offo mncJi Perfection
and Poiver, tliat, tho' he could not Ijuj-
der Matter from exijting^ or reduce it to
nothing now it does exill ; yet he might
have hinder'^d it from being put into any
Motion, Form, or Order, and miglit liavc
continued it in that State, or can reduce
it now to a confujed^ unmoving Chaos , or
Jcatter it mio innumerable incoherent Par-
ticles. Tliere is no manner of Difficulty
for a Man to frame a Notion of thefe
thing'j, Wiio has feen frequent Inftances
of the jame hind of Power, in a lejfer de-
gree^ exercifcd by Men. And this is fuf-
fi-cient to overthrow the Necejfitj of the
prcf'ent Fr.^me dnd Con/litution of things,
which was the thins; deficra'd.
If, therefore, the World, and all things
in it, in the Condition we now behold
them, do not lubnll by a nece/fity of Being,
nov Sivczlic refult of Chance, it unavoida-
bly follows, that thevarethe F.f^ecl, and
G'j Pro-
^6 Tloe Certainty and Kecefjity
Frodu5i of JVifdom, the Workmiinjbtp^ and
Contrivance of a rvife Jgent.
This is certainly the moft rational Hy-
pothefisthatcanbedevifed, or maintain-
ed; for we, who efpoufe this opinion, liave
clear and dtflmcl Ideas of that Power ^ and
Wifdom^ by which wx explain tlie Ori-
ginal of Things ; but thofe who afcribe
the Exijlence, and Stvuciure of the World
to any thing elfe, have no Ideas of what
they afcribe them to. No Man has any
Notion of Chance^ or Neceffity, except he
annexes the Idea o'i Power to them ; and he
can have no Idea o'i Power without Jy.now-
hdge^ all Power proceeding originally from
Mind^ which, by ConJcioufne[sy we are
Senfibleof; and we can frame no Notion
of any other Seat ox Spring of Power but
this, and, therefore, wemakefome Mind
or intelligent Being the Author of every
thing, as being the only conceivable Foun-
tain of all Power.
Our Notions of Wijdom^ Contrivance^
and Defign^ are as clear as that of Power ^
and known the fame way : And if Wifdom
be ever plainly difcoverable in its Works
and Effects^ it is fo in the Frame and Con-
fiitution of the World^ and the feveral
parts of k. If we have any reafon to
con«
of ^'Ir^^ion in GoievAl. 87
vLoncliidc that Towpis and Cnies were l^in/i ,
■ iiid I\jngdo7KS^ and Common-wexlths were
modelH\ by the Thought and Contrivance
oUntelli^ent lietngs, we have much more
Caiife to beheve that tlie Vmverfe was
made, f\tjhwn'*d, and difpofid ^ by the
Cotinfel and iVifdom, of Ibmc more per-
tea and capacious ^V/;?^ ; the Marks and
Prints of H'^z/^f^w beinp; /'/•'«z>i'^^, and wor^^
legible in the f V.twf and Difiofaion of the
IVorld^ than in any of the moft admired
Works of Alan.
And, therefore, if wc allow our felves
to have anv Ideas of Power, and }(j2oir-
ledge, we mudconfefs, x.\v\tPorver\sinfe-
p.tr.ible from J\^./W)vledge ; and, that there
is no Potver, but there is fome IQnowledge
commenjhrate to it, it beinc^ utterly incon
ceivable that any thins^ fhould he, or be
m.tde, and there fhould be no Being that
knows how it came to be, or in wliat man-
ner it was produced.
And this, I think is, of it felf, a fure
Ground of Belief; that there is (i God^
who was the Author of the World, and
every thing in it, without carrying the
Proof any higher ; but , for the fake of
thofe who will not be (Iitisfiefl with thio, I
have given d. farther Demonilration of the
G 4 Be-
8 8 Tl)e Certainty and Neceffity
Being of God, not with any Hopes of
convincing theni, but to make it impofTi-
ble for them to urge any thing to the con-
trary.
Thus have I finifhed the Proof of a God,
and (as I perfuade my felf) made it I'erj
evident^ that there really ?////<:// a Beings
and that, what we call God, is a Being
oiftich a nature as I before defcribed ; who
is vefted with all thoje Characters^ and
Properties^ which I there attributed to
him.
Which Confiderations, together with
thofe plain and eafy Reflexions before
fuggefted upon our felves, and our orvri
Nature , if carefully attended to , will
cer^ainly convince us of the Reality of all
thofe Relations^ which I have fuppofed
between Qod and Man • and furnifli us
with manv direct^ and undeniable Argu^
rnents of the Truth^ and Neajfity of Re-
hgion : which is the third Thing I pro-
pofed, and the principal part of tlie De-
fign which I am purfuing in this Dif-
courfc.
Ill, From
of fj^eli^ioji 1)1 Gmeritl. 85^
TIT. From the Knowledge which I
have fliewn that we have, or are capa-
ble of having, concerning the Humane^
and Divine N.ttures^ I fliall deduce a po-
fitrue and direfi Yvoof oiReiigio/i.
Religion^ in fhort, is, w^hatever we arc
obliged to by God. In order, therefore to
prove that there is fuchathing as Religi-
on, it muil: be fliewn, that iUz;? is capable
of being obliged to att as he is direAed ;
that God has a Power of obliging him to
do what he commands; and that Man is
aclual.'y under fuch an Obligation, or that
God does aclually will and require fome-
thingofhim.
Now 'tis plain to any Man who con-
fults himfelf, that he hath, in feveral cafes,
a Po'.ver of determining himfelf to ^icl^ or
nottoaci\ and a Power oj actings or not
•iciing^ according to ///^// Determination^
that he is influenced to ^cl^ feveral ways,
by different Motives^ and Profpetls ; that
he oftentimes futfers himfelf to be in-
fluenced by certain Confiderattons^ which
lie c:ight not to have a£led by, as he
plainly perceives by condemning himfelf
afterwards for what he has done ; and
that he often neglecis^ or rcfufes to obey
luch
po The Certainty and Neceffity
luch Motives and Incitements to A8:ion,
which he himfelf Judges that he o^ight to
have followed , by Approving of them
both before, and after fuch Neglecl or
Refulal. From whence it evidently fol-
lows, that a Man may be obliged to aft
one particular way rather than any other ;
becaufe, there may be fuch Reafons and
Motives propofed to him for his acting
fuch a jvay^ as, upon a jull: Ballance of
them, with all the feveral Inducements,
which can be offered for his acting any
other way, he muft acknowledge, o^/ght
to determine him ; fo that, fhould he adl
this ivay^ he muft necejfartly approve htm-
felf^ and, fhould he act any other way, he
muft neceffarily condemn himfelf.
That Being, which hath a Power of of-
fering fuch Reafons and Motives as thefe
to any Man, may properly be faid to have
a Forver of obliging him to a6l as he fhall
direft.
And that God hath this Power, is very
manifeft, if we confider, what it is that
influences and determines us to afl ; which
being nothing elfe but fome kind of Pam^
or Pleafure ^ in prefent^ or in profpecl,
God, who can do all things poflible, and,
confequently, who can put us into, and
con-
of ^ligion in General. p i
continue us, to all Eternity, in a ft-ate of
Pairi or Pleafurc^ the greatcft of cither
kind which our Natures are capable of,
can, by annexing thefe to different ways
of acling, offer llich Motives to us, as,
we fhall be forced to acknowledge,
ought to deterynine us to do what he com-
mands ; and therefore, God ccin^ if lie
pleafeth, oZ-Z/^c us to obey him.
The only Qiieltion then is, Whether
we are .xttu.illy under fuch Obligation?
whether God hath given us any Laws,
or Rules to walk by, and annexed /vf/^
diffci'ent Co/jfeque/ices to our Aclions, ac-
cording as we obey or difobey him as,
make it abfolutcly ?jecejfary to our Hap.
pi^cfsy to conform to his Will ?
But, before I enter upon the Refolu-
tion of thib Qiicliion, I think itrequifite
to give a fiillei' Account o^\:hc A. tt/zre^
and Ground of what we call Obligation^
or Duty^ and to be more particular in ex-
plaining the Power and Right of obliging.
Now 'tis plain, from what has been
already faid. That an Obligation^ with
refpecl: to Man^ is nothing elfe but fuch
a Real on , or Motive , as, when duly
offered to him, necejfari/y determines him
to
p 1 ^ 77;^ Certainty and Neccfflty
to ^^■'^/^ one way of a£ling before another;
and this Reafon^ or Motive^ can be no-
thing elfe but a greater degree either of
Happmefs to be obtained, or Mifery to
be avoided by ailing thus, than (all
things confidered) can be obtained, or
avoided by acting a;>-^ other way. Such a
Reafon, or Motive as this, does, in the
:i!tri6lefl: and moft proper Sence of the
Word, oblige us to 3.8: according to it;
that is, we find our felves under a mcef-
fity of Submitting to it, or we are for-
ced to acknowledge that we ought fo to
do, and while theTe thoughts are prefent
to our Minds, we cannot polTibly aft o-
therwife.
There is no other Notion ox Ground o^
Obligation imaginable : or if anv other
be pretended, it will upon Examination,
be found to be ultimately refolvable into
this.
'Tis true indeed, we feldom go fo far
in our inquiries into thefe Matters, as to
Trace the feveral Reafons of our a£ling
up to their Origm&l fprtng\ but are con-
tent to refolve what we do into the next
and immediate motives wliich determined
us, and which, we took, upon publick
Credit, to be Juji and Sufficient grounds
for
of ^li^wn in General. 9 ^
for us to a£l upon, without ever Exa-
mining, our felvcs, trom whence their
force is derived.
Thus for example ; when we are asked
w^hy we did fuch, or fuch a thing ; we
think It a full anfwer to fay ; that we
were obliged in gratitude to do it ; or
that the Laws ot our Country in joined
it; or that we did it in obedience to a
Parent^ or a Goi'ernour^ or the hke ; but
if it fhould be further demanded of us,
what obligation Gratitude lays upon us;
what regard is due to the Laws of our
Country •, why Parents and Governours
are to be obeyed ; we fliould be apt to
look upon fuch Qucftions as thefe as Cap-
tious and Impertinent, and not deferving
a ferious return ; becaufe we take all thefe
Notions of Humane Duty to be fo well
fettled, and agreed upon, that there can
be no room lor a Difputc about them.
But fhould w^e urge the Command of God
for what we did, we fhould be aifo-
niflied to hear it asked , w^hat ground
there was for obeying God.
And yet, fo it is, that, tho' the Rea-
fons here given for our CondutEl have,
(when truly alledged) that direci and im-
wt'^/A/f appearance of Certainty, in them-
felves.
p4 TJ^^ Ccrtn'mty and "KcccJJity
felves, that there is no need of a farther
Proof of them, to any Man who judges
foberly and fah-ly ; yet there are thofe to
be found, to wliom they do not appear fo
ftrong and conclufive, as to command
then' Submiffion to them. Thefe are
thev who endeavour all they can, to re-
move the ancient Landmarks and Bounds
of Duty ^ and to take away all Difi motions
of Good, and Evil ; who ftrike at the
Foundations of Virtue and Religion^ and
queftion the very Being as well as Au-
thority of God : and, to Satiffie the un-
reafonable fcruples. of thefe Men, 'tis ne-
ceiTary to fliew that the Principles before
mentioned, together with many others
of the fame kind, are all founded upon
fuch a Bottom as muft be fufficient to
fupport them, the Enemies of Religion
themfelves being Judges.
The fhortefl: therefore, and fureft way
of convincing the moft perverfe difputers
of this World, that they are obliged to
perform all the particular Duties of Hu-
mane life required of them, is, to prove
to them ; that there is a God who hath
annexed exceeding Happinefs to the Pra-
Bife^ and extream Mifery to the Neglecl: of
thofe things. For here they mutl ftop,
and
of Rtin^ion hi General, 9 5
nnd they can have no further Queftions
to ask; it being utterly impolfible for
them to doubt whether they fliould chufc
to be Hdppy rather than Mtferahle ; and
perfectly abfurd to inquire why they
Ihould feek their own Happincfs.
This is then, in reality, the Tr/^^ and
itltimnte Grourid of Humane OhLiga.tton^
tho' 'tisfeldom that we have anyocca-
fion to fearch fo deep for a Proof of thx
common Rules ^nA Principles of Mordity^
and it would be an unneceflary undertak-
ing now, if we had not to do w^ithfuch
Perfons as obftinately ftand out againft all
the ufualMethods of Reafoning.
The Nature and Ground of obliga-
tion in General being thus fixed; what
is meant by the Right and what by the
Power of obliging^ in what refpect they
are the lame, or, at leaft, only diftindl
Conceptions of the fame thing, and in
what rcfpe8:s they are different, will
plainly appear, if weconfider thefeveral
Inflances to which thefe Notions are ap
plied.
All the Beings capable o? obliging^ or
being obliged^ are thofe that we call in-
telligent Beu>gs ) which, as far as our
Knowledge in thefe Matters reaches
arc only Gody Angels^ and Me>?. Whe-
^6 The Certiiuiiy and tKcceffity
Whether there are any J;/^f/i-, ov mid-
dle Natures between God and Men^ and
how they are determined to afl: them-
felves, or what influence they have upon
other Beings, natural Reajbn does not
fer^^/^/jy inform us : but, in general^ with
refpe^: to ^//the intelligent Beings^ which
we can frame any Notions of, it may be
affirmed, that no one has either a Right
or Power of obin'tng another to a£l accord-
ing to his dire8:ions, any farther than he
hatha Power of contributing to the Happy-
nefs^ or Mifery of that Being,' which he
undertakes to Govern.
Thus are we led to conclude by all
that we know concerning God, and our-
felves ;
For firft, as to God : I am not able to
comprehend, how he can lay Men un-
der an Obligation of Living according to
the Laws and Commandments he gives
them , any other way than by making
them knowy that he hath it in his Power to
render them happy, or miferable^ accord-
ing as they obe^^ or difobey him ; and that
he n'//Z certainly Reward or Punifh them
according to their Behaviour toward
him.
'Tis not his great and fupereminent
Powir
of ^Ugion 111 General', 97
Poivtr in creating Men and giving thcni
Bti»^j \y\ndusyjd!ely in its felj-\ the ground
and foundation of his Title to their Obe-
dience : This, if he had not alfo given
them a cap.u/ij of being happy could never
become a Rcafon or Motive of a£ling to
them, and, confequently, no Obligation
could be founded upon it : For, were they
made and ordained io be miferxble\ and
were they furc that their nnfery was to
have no End, and would admit of no /r-
batement or increap, by what means could
the Author of their Being oblige them to
a6l one way rather than another, when
he could not offer aily thing to tlicm
which would have any weiglit in deter-
mining them fo to a6l ? What, in this
Cafe, could induce them to obey God, ra-
ther than to difobcy him, when 'tis cer-
tain that, which way foever they a6lcd,
they were not capable, either of the plea-
fure of approving, or the pain of Con-
demning what they did, all manner of
pleafure, and all AcLclfion of Mifcrv, be-
ing, in the State of Mankind now fuppo-
{cdy utterly impoflible. They migiit m-
deed, by dn over-ru/i/ig Poiver, b^ forced
to do what was commanded them : but
tliis is not a rational Obligation^ whicli i^
H ackno^v*
9 8 Tl?e drtainfy and Necefflty
acknowledged, and fobmitted to, as/^/-
table and agree.ible to Reafon^ and per-
formed with the full Concurrence of the
Will of thofe who obey it.
In vain, then, and very falfly, do foms
nice abilradcd Thinkers magnify the
Excellence and Perfection o^ pure Beings or
Exifience^ even when joined with the
kig!'e(t degree of Mijcry : a Moment's Ex-
perience woukl foon convince them, tJiat.
to hey was no otherwife the Perfeclion of
a rAtiond Being than as it included a Cd-
j>acity ofbemg tjappji : but if, after fuch Ex-
perience, they fliould iiill think it better to
i>e niifernbley th.an not to he at all ; the S:i-^
tisfdctton of knowing tliemfelves to he^
muif out balance tl;e other M:fery which
they felt j and coniequently, God's Right
of obliging them would then hz founded m
his Power of making them lefs, or more
miferah/e, by continuing, or taking away,
that Satisfa£lion , which they enjoyed :
which coniirms the Truth of what I
alfert.
This will farthv^r appear, if, in the next
place, \vc confidQi' th.2t Righty mid Pom r
if obliging, which Tlif.'^ have, or pretend
to haV'C over one another- for whatever
kind
of ^li'^ion 1)1 Genera!. 99
ki/td or extent it be of, it is ^]]fou?7ded ///,
and commeniuYAte to^ their fo^ver of contri-
hutmg to the H^^fimfs^ or Mtjcry oF one
another.
Many times indeed it fo liappens, that
fome Men demand to be obeyed by o-
thers,and lequiid them to Hve according to
th:;ir();d'ji-sand Directions, when, at the
fame time, they neither have, nor ever
will have , any Power to Reward tlie
obedience, or to Punifh the diibbedience,
ofthofe upon whom they lay their com-
mands ; fo, as to make it more for the
interert: of fueh Perfons to obey than to
difobey them. Upon which account, it
is thought that, in many Cafes, there
maybe a Right of .obliging^ where there
is no Power to oblige: but without any
Ground.
For, if there be a G(?^, who will judge
the Aftions of Men, and will give to
every one accordi/20 to bis work ; and it the
Perfons , requiring Obedience frOm o-
thers, arecommiffion'd bv ^^i^^^ to require
it; then have they a Power :is well as a
Right of obliging i\\c{\\ to it : bccaufe there
arc fucli Rewards and Pumjhmer.is^ an-
nexed bv G^d to the obedience, or dif-
'^V'dience of thofe who arc under anv
loo ll?e Certainty and Kece/Jity
Authority derived from htm^ as are fuffi-
cient to determine them to do what their
refpe8:ive Governours or Majlers require
of them : and, confequently, whoever are
appointed by God to bear Rule over us,
have a certain Power of contributing to our
Haf^intfs^ or Mijery^ tho' it fliould fo
happen that they cannot be the immedi-
ate caufes of either themfeiijes.
But, if there be no God, tlien are there
no Perfons Comm/J/ion^d or Authorifed by
him to command others \ but whoever
take upon them to give Laws to their
Brethren ufurp upon the common Li-
berty, and Equahty of Mankind ; and
liave, in this Cafe, no morea/^^g/^/^than
a Power of obliging thofe, whofe Intereft
it is not to obey tJiem \ as will more
fiillv appear hereafter , under another
Head.
Other Inftances there are among Men,
where the Power of obliging is, or may be
exercifed, without the Right ; and that is,
when fome Men, by the Advantage ot"
a Superiour 6a.'/// and Strength^ do^- without
any Authority from God^ command Obe-
dience from others, upon the profpe^l of
great Rewards, and Punifliments, in fuch
thin<^s, where the Perfons fo commanded',
ar0
of ^li^ion in Generd.
\o\
are left at Liberty by God to a£l either
way, as fliall fccm to tlicm bed, or moll
for their Advantau;c /// this Life : In
which cafe, tfiofe that prercribefuch par-
ticular Acbions toothers, have a Power of
obliging them to obey, becaufe they have
a Power of determining them to nciy by
the Confideratioii of greater Hapj/inefs to
be obtained, by their doing as they are
diret^ted , than could be hoped for , if
they followed their own advice: but
thofe who pretend to fiich an Authority
have no Ria^ot to life that Power, they
have, becaufe they are the?nfeives under
greater Obligations^ with refpecl to Gody
not to employ it^ than thofe y upon whom
it is exercifed, are, with refpeci to them^
to obey it : but if there be no God^ then is
tlieir Powi^r their Right,
Fromall which it follows, that, where-
ever there is a Right of obliging^ there is
likewife a Power of obliging ; and, where
there is an ahfolute uncontroulable Power
of obliging, there is, for that very Rea-
fon, a Right alfo, but, where there is
only a jubordtnate dependent Power of o-
bliging , it may be exercifed without
R^-^htj that is, contrary to fome Obligati-
H j ons^
102 7h Certatnty and Nccejfity
ons^ which the Perfpns, who cxercife if,
owe to a Suferiour Power.
But here, by a Right ofobltging^l would
be underftcod to mean, a Liberty of offer-
ingfuch Motives And Confideratior/s to ra--
t'tond Beings^ as, ivb^n duly apf lied, will
necelTarily determine theni to act accordtno-
^y, with the full Cvnfent , and Appro-
bation of their Mind ; And not ^> title to
order and difvoje of them, and their Acii-
ons, by an irrefiftible Force, accordnjg to
the free and unlimited Pleafure of that
■Being, to whomfuch a Title is fuppofed to
belong,
Hovv^ far it is confiflent with the Na-
ture of God to order and difpofe of his
Creatures thus, is no part of the prefent
Enquiry ; but that he hath fuch a Right
and Poiver of obliging, as I have explained,
is fufficiently proved from the neceflary
■Attributes of God, before fpetiiied ; • and
from the A^ature and Ground of all Obli-
gation, of which I hA've here given a par-
ficular account.
: Whether Cod hath a Right and Title
to our Obedience upon any other Foun-
dation but that of his Power to make us
happy ; whether it be poffible for Man to
a 3: voluntarily upon anv other Reafonor
Motive
of ^'ligion in General, i o j
Motive but that of hii own Hdppinefs ;
and, whether H^xpptfiefs be the tiltmmte
End of all ouv Jcf ions, and the r//t /mate
Ground 0^ ■A\\OhIi(r^ation^ or only ii/uhor-
dtnxte, but nccelfarj and infcpardble Con-
fideration in everv thing wedo, if, what
I have already faid upon thcfc Matters,
does not fatisfy, iHiall no farther difputer.
becaufc lam very well afTui'ed, that, what-
ever other Grounds or Motives for our O-
bcdience toGod may be imagined by fome,
who pretend to act upon more ;^.9^/^ and
difmtereffed Principles than that of their
own Happinefs • 'tis impoHlble to perfuadc
a Man, who does not yet believe any Re-
ligion at all, to become religious, except
it can be plainlv, or probably, at leal]-,
Jiiade out to him, that he fliall better his
Condition by it. This I am fure is the
only Argument w^hich can prevail upon
an Unbeliever to e^nbracc Religion ; and
whoever fah'ly confultshimfelf, will £i\\dj
that he neither dots^ nor can zdi upon any
other ground.
It mull be confelTed, indeed, that, we
often acl without knowing, or confider-
ing what the Confequences of our acting
will be; and we arc fo made and difpo-
fed by nature that we readily acknow-
H 4 ledge
104 7h Certainty and TSleceJJity
ledge our {tlves obliged to fubmit to the
Will ai.cl CoiT.mands of God, nithcut any
exfrefs Co/^(ideyaiton of future Happinefs^
to be obtained by our Obedience : but,
on the other fide, it muft be owned too,
that, if it could be evidently prov'd to
us, that Mifery would be the certain Con^
fequence of thofe Actions, which, upon the
firll: View, we thought our felves obliged
to, we fliould then be forced to ac-
knowledge, that we were miftaken in
our firfc Judgments, and that it would
be more reafonable for us to a8: any 0-
ther way^ which, upon new and better
" Proof, we were allured, would be more
for cur HAppt}7efs.
Tihefe Things being premifed, I return
to the min Qaeftion, "Whether we are
actually under ui-iy Obligations to God^ or,
(which is th.e fame thing, m other terms,)
"Whether there be any Juch thino as Religi-
on ? And, in this manner, I fhall prove
that there is.
,Firft, I fliall fhew, that there \sfuch a
pariicular vjay of actings iueh ^ courfe of
^^Aciions^ or Scheme and Model of livings
which whoever duly and fairly reflects up» j
''' • on, '1
n
of ^ligion in General, i o y
on, w'lWhc forced to ack/iorriedge, that, if
lie did //z^e after That manner, he fhoiild
approve himfilf for fo doing;, and if he It-
I'cd otherivife^ he fliould co»de?> n himjelf
for it; and that he who finds himfelf ne-
ceiTarily dctermin'd to approve fuch a par-
ticular way of living, and to condemn
the contra rv , wufl Acknowledge that he
ought or is ohliged to aft accordingly. From
whence I fliall draw this Inference, that,
all things confidered, it miift be more for
his Hiippinefs to a£l thus than otherwife,
becauie, if it were not, he would not be
under a neceffity of Judging as he does.
And therefore, he r^ rrtdy and really obli-
ged to aci as he judges he ought to act.
Secondly, I fhall prove, that God^ who
was the Author of our Being, gate U6 fuch
a Nature^ by which v/e are neceflarily de-
termined to judge after fuJi a manner,
for this very ?.nd^ that we fliould excr-
cifeand employ all tiie F;rf////;>j and Vow-
ers^ he has furniflied us with, fuitably
hereunto : From whence I infer , that,
what our Reajon tel: > us ought to be dom^
that we are commandtdby God to do ; and
therefore, what God has made to appear
reajonable or unreafonable^ and what he has
difpofed us to approve or condemn, will
ac-
J q6 The Certainty m^l Ncceffity
accordingly conduce to our Happimfs or
Mtferjy and upon that account are we ob-
liged to do the one, and avoid the other.
And that God purpofely created us after
fuch a manner, with a Delign to oblige
us to fuch and fuch Performances, I fliall
farther endeavour to fliew, not only from
the general Confideration of the Make and
Nature of Man^ but from many other To^
kens and Indications of fuch an End, or
Defign, plainly vifible in the World,
Thirdly, I fhall pofitively and directly
prove from the Nature of Religion it felf
that a Regular Practice of all thofe Duties
or Obligations^ of which it confifts, would
certainly conduce to the greatefl Happi.
nefs^ that Man is capable of, confidered
only in his prefent Condition^ as included
within the Bounds of /^/^ Life.
Fourthly, I fhall fhew, that the DefeB
rffuch a Practice^ and the Confluences of
that defed, do neceffarily lead us to the
Acknowledgment of fuch a future State^
as is fufficient to determine us to prefer
one particular way of a6ling before ano-
ther, xv^onfuch Reafons and Motives^ that
!S, fuch Degrees of H.tppinefs and Mffery^
than
of Religion in Gcnewxl. i 07
than which we arc Curcgreanr^ ^nd more
poiverful, cannot bcoftered to us.
From all which Confidcrations , the
Certainty and Nectjjity o^ Religion will be-
plainly and t\illy evinced.
I . Firll then, I am to fhew, that there
is one f Articular ivaji of alltng^which we are
neccfjarily determined to prefer to an)/ other ;
ib that, upon a clear and impartial
View of pure natural Reafon only, we
cannot but thus acknowledge, that' what
we prefer that we o^ght^ or are obliged to
do , and whatever is contrary to it
that we ought , or are obltgea , not to
do ; and conicqucntly , that we are
really obliged to act according to fuch Judg-
ments, becaufe it muft, in the ilTue, be mc^
for our Happmefs fo to a6l.
That there are fome Natural Notions
of Good and E'vily Right and Wrongs or
fome fuch certain DijtinBious^ resulting
from the Natures^ and Re I a: ions o^t\\mgSy
as cannot be altered, or deltroyed by any
arbitrary Agreement or Inftitution what-
foever ; and that thele Notions are per-
ceivable, by the bare uje of our Reafon
the
I o 8 T^^c Certainty and Tslece(pty
the r^.me way that any other part of our
Knowledge is, has been conftantly own-
ed by the^re^^^/ and)r//^//^r/^of Man-
kind, however they may have difFer'd
in affigning, which they were^ and what
rvt"t :he true Grounds and Foundations of
them.
Now, to put thefe Matters beyond all
reafonable doubt, and to cut o!f all occa-
fion of Conteft concerning them, I only
defire this may be granted me^ That there
are fome things fo clearly^ d.nd fully pro-
pofed to the ?4ind, that a Man cannot
deny^ or with-hold hiS A-jent to them ; and
that, wherever this happens, there is the
greatefi Certainty we are capable of: For
then it mull: be granted alfo, that we
may be as certain , that fuch or fuch
Things ought ^ or ou^ht not to he done^ as
that fuch or fuch Thmgs are^^ or are not
after fuch a manner.
For Example ; I may be as fully fatif-
fied, that I ougi^)t to deiire, and endea-
vour after my own Happinefs, and that
I ought not to take away the Kappinefs
of another Man, when I know I /hall
not add to my own by it, as I can be of
the Truth of thefe Propofitions ; that c--
I'cry thing which mo'ues is \ that the jame
thing
of ^f^iiij^ion in Ocntral. \ 09
f^/>g cannot poflibly exifi, and not exifty
At the fame time ; that is, in both thefe
Inftances, the things alTented to, have
an equal Snitablentjs or ylgreeablenejs to
to our Reafon^ and the hke Force or Vto-
lence would be offered to our Under-
ilandings by a Denial of either: Which is
the only Ground^ and Standard oi Certain-
ty aflignable by us.
Several other mord Profojittons might
be brought, which carry fo clear and tlill
a Conviction 2i\on^ with them, as is not to
be over-ruled by any after Confiderations:
But the com7non Rides and Maxims of
MorMiijy which are look'd upon as Laws
of Nature, are not fo generd as thofe be-
fore inllanced in, nor have, in all re-
fpects, the fime degree of Certainty be-
longing to them ; but what they are, how
they are known, and how far they par-
take of Certainty and Evidence^ I Ihall
now give a fhort Account, and from
thence fliall prove, that we are necejjsrily
determined to ajfent to, and approve theje
aljoy and to coridttnn^ and diny the con-
trary of them ; and , confequentl)', that
we have all the Reafon in the World to
believe, that it will conduce more to our
Hap-
1 1 o The Certainty and Islcceljity
Happinefs, to a6l up to thefe Principles^
than to live in oppofition to them.
ThQ highefi and moft general mOYdX Du-
ties commonly inftanced in, are fuch as
thefe ; That God is to be worfhtp^ed ; that
Varents are to be obeyed ; and that all other
natural and civil Relations areproporttona-^
bly to be refpecled ; that vre ought to abjlain
from all forts of Intemperance and Excefs^
and to provide all thtngj necejfary for the
continuance of our Life • that we fbould
not do any other Man an Injury ; but jhould
contribute all rve can to the Happmejs of
Mankind^ and ?nore particularly^ to the
Welfare and Support of that Society we
belong to.
Now thefe, and fuch like Propofitions
as thefe, are known^ or found out^ by the
Vfe2.nd Employment of our natural FactiU
ties^ in the fame way that all other Truths
are ; that is, Men are taught the Ideai
which thefe Terms belong to,or^t?^ them
by their onm Obfervation^ and then, by
comparing them together, they immedi-
ly acknowledge fuch or fuch a Relation
between them, without being influenced
by any other Motive fo to judge but what
refults from the Things t he h^f elves.
The
of ^li^ion in General. i i i
The Relations indeed oiynornl Ideas^ as
well as the Ideas themfelves^ arc, moft of
them, /^.tr;7,Mrom others firft, before we
are capable of hnding them out our felvcs;
but this is no more an Argument, that
our Alfent to fuch kind of Propofitions is
only the EjfeH of Education/, and, confe-
qucntly, a weer Prejudice^ and no right
Judgment ; than it would be an Argu-
ment, to prove, that all the Mithewau-
cd Isjiowltdoe which a Man hath, is no-
thing clfe but a Set offdfe Notions^ thru/1
upon his Underftanding by Educdtiu/i^ be-
caufc lie liappen'd to be tiiught tfie iirft
Grounds and Elements of this Science,
while he was young, before he was capa-
ble of finding them our by his own Ob-
fervation : for, when we aftenvards come
to review the ?rwral IQwwlcdge we goi,.
whilft we were Children ; let us be ne-
ver fo jealous over our felves, and let us
take all the Care we can to deliver our
felves from the Prejudices of Education^ we
fliall ftiU adhere to, and be farther latis-
fied of, moft of thofe Truths wliich we
were then taught ; as is fufliciently pro-
ved by the Experience of feveral, who
being Religiouily Educated, have endea-
^ oured nfter wards todivcft their Minds
of
t 1 1 The Certainty and TSLeceffity
of all thofe found Principles they had been
taught, and yet have found the truth too
hard ibrthem. The Certainty and Impar-
tiality of whofe Judgment , has been
llrengthen'd by the pint Atfent of feveral
of a contrary Education ; who being
loofeiy, or Ignorantly bred, have, upon
fober and mature Reflection, acknow-
ledged tlie Power of Religion.
And, for a farther Illuftration of this
Point, fhoLild we kippofea Y^vion entirely
ignorant of all fuch Matters, but capable
of ynderftanding them, when propofed,
and fhould one of thefe moral Rules or
Maxims be barely explained to him, with-
out any Reafons offered to wove or incline
his AfTent either way ; 'tis very difficult
to imagine, how he could judge otherwiie
than «'f do.
As for Example : Suppofe fuch a Per-
fon were juftly informed concerning his
own Nature^ and the Nature of God^ and
what was meant by iVorfJjip^ and by all
the Notions contrary to it ; and he were
ask'd, which he fliould rather do, perform
fuch Acts as would exprefs this vVorfhip,
or neglect^ (^ight^ and omit them, or elfe
ridicule^difhonoury 2ii\d bla/ph erne th.d.t Be-
ing which we call God: or fjppofe, he
were"
of ^'U^ion VI General. \ i j
were told, what a Parent was , and that
fuch a. Perfon was his Parent^ and that he
himfelf was fenfible of a great many
KindnefTes wliioh he had received from
him ; and it were propofed to him, after
a due ExpHcation o^" What was me?nt by
thefe things, euher to warder him, or
to defend him f'-oni fome imminent Dan-
ger without anv hazard to himfeiP, or to
Jtand jHll and Jo neither ; who is there
that can doubt whether , in thefe
CafeSy fairly propofed and ftated, fuch
an unprejudiced Perfon as this would not
chufe to rvorjhip his God, and defend his
Parent f
We have therefore fufficient Reafon to
conclude that moral Truths concerning
humane Actions are knowable the fame way
that all other Truths are, which terminate
in Speculation only ; and that Men know
more^ or feiver of them, according to the
different C.:rj^tc/ry, and Application ofthofe,
who are employed, in thefe Enquiries.
And, as to the Certainty and Evidence
of fuch Truths as thefe ; 'tis, as in all o-
ther kmd of Knowledge, greater, or lefs^
according as the Propofuions confidered
are nearer to, o^ farther from tlie firfi ge-
^*ral Axioms^ ox Rules of MoraUti, from
1 ^ whence
I 14 Tl^e Certainty and Necefjky
whence all the reft are deduced ; fuch a?
are thofe before mention'd, of feekingo/ifr
owp'/ HappmeJ'Sy unii not taking away another
MarPs^ when we cannot add any thing to
our own by it ; and fuch as immediately
follow from hence, as^ that we ought to
■prefer a greater Goo^^ cr Fleafure^ to a
lejs ; a lejjer E'vily or Pain^ to a greater ;
and the like : The E'uidence of which is as-
great, asthatofanyM^^^'t/^/yy/^^/, orA/^-
r/^f/z/.i^'^/V^/ Axioms whatever.
But the other mord Duties which I had-
occafion to inftance in, concerning the
Worjbip of God^ Obedience to Parents^ &c.
\v\\iQ[\d.rcleJs general^ have not tho, fame
degree of Evidence ; becaufe the Certainty-
and Necejjity of the Connexion of thofe Act-
ions with our own Happimfs^ ( which is
the original Foundation of all Action and
Duty,) isnot fo clearly difcoverable^ that
we immediately perceive it ; but the £-
'vidence of thofe common Principles and
Rules of Morality which I have mention-
ed before, is fo great, that^- when they are
fairly offered to the Underftanding, with-^
out any C^nft deration of our ownHappineJs
being conGcrn'd in them ; (if this may be
fuppofed; as, in feveral Inftances, no
doubt, it mayj) we never refujeour Af-
fenp
of ^ligion in General. \ \ 5
/(?«/• to them : and, if lb, there can be no
reafon alTiguM, why we lliould jndge
wrong, when there is nothing fuppofed
to determine the Mind either way, but
the Nature of the Ideas themfelves which
we judge of; and, when cili Men^ in the
fame Circumfl-ances,^:^^^/?^^/// judge aHke.
But, the truth of all thefe moral Prin-
ciples depending intirely upon the relati-
on which they bear to our Happinefs, we
arc farther to examine, what ground there
is to believe, that afting up to thefe Prin-
ciples is the lurell: way to make our felves
Happy.
Now the Reafon wc have to conclude
that there is a Connexion between fuch
moral Aci'wns and our Happincjs ; and
that the Performance of thofe Actions^
which, without ^.nyvifihle relation to our
Happinefs, we approve, will be attended
with /nore Pleafure, or lejs Pain than fuch
Omifjions^ or ABions^ which, without
any profpeci of Mifery, we condemn ; the
reafon, I fay, we have, thus to conclude,
is this: we lind oar fcKxs under an ahfo-
lute necefflty of defirmg, and en'deavourtng
after our own Happinefs, and every thing
which wc know tends to it ; and o'i jiyifjgy
and Avoiding, whatever mt apprehend
I 2 mav
1 1 6 n^e Certainty and Neceffity
may ^(^Jfe/^, or take it awaj^ or put us into
a contYAYj State of Mtfory : we find alfo,
that Pleafure^ and Paik-^ Ha^pinefs^ and
Mtfery^ are the only Principles^ and Mo-
tives of Aoiion ; and the obtaining the
one, and avoiding the other, the only
Ends of all Endeavour and Purfuit : and
therefore, we cannot conceive it poflQble,
that Beings fo made, oi fnch a Nature
and C on ft 1 1 ut ion as this, fiiould be alfo
contrived after fuch a manner as to be
necejfarily determined to approve thofe An-
ions, and to h^dae themfelves obhs^ed to
do them, wliich would tend to their Mi-
fery^ and to condemn thofe Omiffions^ and
Performances, and j^idge that they ought
not to be guilty of them, which would
procure their Happinefs.
Except then it can be proved from Rea-
fon^ or it be fome other way difcoverable,
that aBing according to thefe moral Ruleii
will certainly be attended with more
Mifery^ or lefs Happmcfi^ than a fling a^
gam ft them ; the prefent Approbation of
our Judgment is a fufficient Argument,
that the Ohfervance of them will conduce
Tnore to our Happinefs^ than tlie NegUcl^
or Violation of them : and if it be impofli-
ble to prove the contrary, as I think it
is.
of ^ligion in General. i 1 7
is, and as it will plainly appear to be here*
after, when I come to confidei* ^futur^
State^ then are we -/leceffarily deter muPd to
m^kc fuch j!/d<^Me;^/tsconccvn\nfi, our Afti-
oiis, as I have mentioned ; and, if we are
ncceflarily^ determin'd to judge thus, we
have they'^w^, or very near the fame Rex-
fon to conclude, that the Obfer'vation of
fuel) moYAl Rules , or Juch x particular
ivay of AcHrig as our Reafo^ approves will
contribute ///^r^ to our flappimfs than that
which it condemns-^ and, confequently,
that we arc obliged fo to a8: ; as we have
to coi.clude, that what we are neceffarily
determined to give, or refule our Affent
to , fliould be true^ or f:'Jfe , accord-
ingly.
For the original Frame and Conflitutio?}
of the Mi?id^ being the only St^a-adard of
Haputnefs as well as Truth ^ and the Mind
being as capable of Happmefsy as Truth ;
(nay, iftlicfc can befeparated, and there
be any Treccdcnce of one to tl..c other, be-
ing made fir ft and principally for Happi.
nej's) there is as tnuch ground to fuppofe,
that iMen are not deceived when thev are
neccjfarily determined to fttdge^ that fuch
a tiling ought ^ or ought not to be done, as
when tliey are determined to judge, tliat
I I fuch
1 1 8 Tl:c Certainty and Necejfity
fuch a thing ^^ or is not : jind, if fo,
then, confequer-tly, fuch a thing as they
have thus neceffarily judgM, ought, or
ought rot to be done, will as certainly
tend to their hUppmfs ^ or Mtfery^ ac-
cordingly , if they a^ agreeably to the
feveral Judgments they have made ; for,
otherwife, they would have been de-
ceived in fo judpj^g : and , when the
Mind is no other way concernM in any
thing elfe than as it has 2i relation to its
felf^ and lias nothing to do to know any
further, whyfhould not it judge as truly
and certainly of the Statahlenefs ^ and
Unfuitaklenejs , of other things , to its
felf\ as it does of their Jgncment^ and
"Difagreement^ among one another f
Since therefore theCcgeneral Frinciples^
or Rules of humane -aUion^ which are com-
monly Icokt upon as the firif foundations
of all Morality or Duty^ are found fo very
agreeable to our pureft and moft impar-
tial Reafon, that, upon a bare propofal
of them, without any /^r^^/^'/^^/^ relation
to our Hapfmefs^ they command, our Jjfent^
and Approbation^ and we cannot but ac-
knowledge , that, what we approve that
\ve ought to do. and what we condemn
that rve o^ight not to do^ it may, I think,
' ' be
of ^lio^ion in General, i 1 9
be very fairly infcrr'd from hence, that
it would conduce more to our Happtnefs
to a£l accordi?ig to them, than to acl 0-
therivije-j and, confequently, that we arc
really , and cffeBuall) obliged , in the
full extent and force of the Word , to
a flricl: and careful Obfervation of thefe
Meafures, in the whole Courfe of our
Lives.
From all which it plainly appears, that
the Certai'/zty of thefe moral Axwms or Pro-
pofttions, which I have placed in thtfecond
rank, falls 'very little fhort of the Evi-
dence of thofe firjl irrcfijlible \jtfdgmentSy
or rather l-fnprejjions concerning our own
Huppimfs , mentioned before : for thefe
latter are known immediately by their
own light, as the former are; and, if it
does not prefently appear to us, with the
fame clearnefs, that fuch Aftions as are
agreeable to thefe moral Rules, have a
neceflfary Connexion with our Happinefs •
yet, that there is fuch a Connexion be-
tween them, is, in t!ie htghefi degree that
can be pr.uable. And this is the leafl-,
that can be inferred, from what has been
alledged, upon this Head ; and I am very
cautious of laying more ftrefs upon any
I 4 Ar^
t 20 Tl:>e Certainty and Neceffity
Argument than it will unqueftionably
bear.
2. The next Step I am to make in the
Twof of ReligioKy is, to fhew, that, what
our Reajon approves , or condemns , and
tells us that we ought, or ought not to do^
that we are commanded to do^ or not id
do^ by God himielf, who gave as ftich
a Nature^ by which we are ;^^ •' ^jjartly de-
termined to judge, and to be dpihd, after
fuch a certain manner -^ for this Und, and
with this Def^gn that we fliould a^i ac-
cording! j ; of which Ettd^ and DeCign he
has given us feveral Tokens, and indica-
tions : which is a farther Confirmation,
that it is more for our Happ/nefs, to ohjtrve
thefe Meafures of acting, than not ; and
confequently, that we ire chliged hy Cod to
obferve them.
That we received our Betngs, together
with all the P ''n^'^^^■, Capacities, and what-
ever elfe belongs to them, from God, is
very evident ircm tlie Account before
given of the Divine Nature ; aad there-
fore, when we are necefjanly determined
to judge, or to he affecied^ after fuch a
riianner, that 'tis plainly out of cuqPower
" ' " to
of ^li^ion in Geneyal. 1 1 1
tD judji,e, or to be affedled otherwife,
we mull conclude, thnt fuch ?. Vetermi-
nation is four. dec' in our very Frame and
Make J and, coivlquently, is the i1 V/C- of
God, who, being dn i^^i'/Iigefit and tp//^
Being, n?i.ll be (iippoied to order every
thing he makes to Ibme End : and, there
being no End \\ hlch he can be fuppofed
to Cizfc^n any thing for, but that which
it is capable of, and whicli it is peculiarly
fitted to attain; what Reafon can be
given, why we fhouldbc capab/e o^ Juch
Actions^ 2Liid peculiarly dijpofcd to them, by
a necejfary Approbation oi them, if it were
not defgned by God that we fhould a5l ac-
cordingly ?
And, farther, Since, by our very A^j-
ture and Confiitutio/i^ we find our felves
irrefijlihly deterr^tKea to feek, and endea-
vour after Happix.efs, and to avoid Mi-
fery ; we have all lIu reafon in the World
to conclude, that Happtnefs is the ultimate
End of our Being, and all our Actions :
and, therefore, God, who made us after
this mnnner, having alfo made it necef-
fary for us t': .ipprovc fuch Aftions, and
to judge them fit to be done ; and to con-
demn others as not fit to be done ; we
• annot conceive itpoljible^ that he fliould
f?}aki
I 2 1 The Certainty and NeceJ/ity
r,:ake it necejfary for us to aim at Happinefs^
in all that we do, and yet at the fame time,
fhould make it ^eceffary for us to approve
fuch A'^ions, and toji^dge ourfe/ves obliged
to do them, as would no tend to our Hap-
pnefs : for this is to deftgn^ and determine
us to a certain End^ and, at the fame time,
to make it neceffa/y for us to approve iuch
means as are contrary to it , and to con-
uemn fuch as would leai us thither ; which
is a perfect Contradidion to all the no^
tions we have of a wife Being, and cannot
be fappofed of God,
As therefore we have reafon to be
throughly fatisfied , that , what we ne-
ceffarily judge ought ^ or ought not to he
\done ^ muf^ be in reality what we have
iudg'd it t^ ^ " becaufe it is impoffible
to conceive, that we (liould h^ fo diJ}ofed^
with relation to our own Happinefs^ as to
be under a neoefftty of being m'jliken^ in
the clearejl and moft vr^mediate Perceptions^
which Vv'^e are capable of, concerning it;
fo, likewife, when we confider our felves,
as made and cortrwed by God^ we are
farther , and more direftly convinced of
the truth of all thofe things which we find
our felvcs necpJarily determined to affent
tor^ becaufe we are fully affured from the
of Religion in General, i 2 j
Nature of God. that we canriot be deceived
by him, and, confcquently, that we are
not mijlaktn in any of thofe Judgments
which we are nectjfan/j determined to make,
when it is God that determines us.
But, if any Sufpicion of a Miftake could
be entertained , there feems to be lefs
ground for it in thofe Judgments, wherein
our Happinejs istmmediate/y concern'd,than
in the Judgments we make upon things
which have no relation to us : for 'tis more
reafonable to think, that Gc><:/ fliould make
us after fuch a manner, as to leave us
under a neceffity of Judging ivrong^ -in
Matters, where the Conftquences would
be the fame to us, wliether we judged
right^ or not ; than to imagine, that he
fhould purpofe/y determine us to judge
wrong, where Hafpinefs^ and Mtjery^ de-
pend upon our Judgment.
Thus it appears, x\nt God d^x^ defign to
oblige us to fuch a particular way of act-
ing, or living, fiom the general Conjidera^
tton of the Nature of Man ; wliereby he is
^ecejfarily determined to approve fome Ani-
ons, and to condemn others, and to judge
thusothimfelf, t\\2Lthz ought to do what he
fo approves, and that he ought not to do what
he lb condemns : and, therefore, we are
obliged
1 2 6 The Certainty and 'KeceJJity
in our Favour, and not to our Difad-
Vantage.
Now 'tis plain, that, in both thefe Ca-
fes, our Adions are not the Effects of pure
Reafo?ij tho% upon Examination, they
are found to be exaftly agreeable to it :
for, befides that, we do not, immediate-
ly perceive a necefTary connexion bet ween
fuch Adions and our own Happinefs; nor
upon the ftri£left Obfervation of what
pafTes within us, are fenfible, of thofe
Steps, and Degrees, which we are con-
fcious of, in all manner of reajoning : be-
fides all this, I fay, if we afted by rea-
fon only^ what need would there be of
thofe prevtoui Sentiments^ we feel ; when
we might perform all xh^outwaraAciions
that were proper, upon a bare rational
Profpecf of the Advantages, which we
were likely to gain by them : but , if
we look into our felves , we fhall be
convinced , that we cannot help having
thofe Sentiments which we feel upon fuch
Occafions ; that we do not reafon our
felves into them ; and, if, by the Un-
happinefs of our Temper, or any other
way, we fhould want thefe Sentiments
of Gratitude, Reverence , or the like,
we fhould find fome difficulty in reafo-
ning-
of ^Itgion in GeneraL i 27
ning our felves into the ftme outward
Behaviour^ as vv^ould Iiavc followed, if
we had been Jo ajjecied \ and, tho' we
were never fo well convinced, that our
Happiriefs was really concern'd in fuch a
Behaviour, all our A6lions would come
JloweVy be performed with nt^tc Conjlramt^
and lefs Lonformity to one another, than
if they had proceeded h'om a lively nsi^
turd Serije ^ till Hxhit^ had enabled us
to a6l with greater Eafe and Difpatch.
And thus we lliould find our felves ori-
ginally m.ide and difpofed^ with rcfpcO; to
all t\\Q,gef2eral Duties oi Morality^ and Re^
Itgion^ if we entred upon a particular Ex-
amination of our whole Frame and Con-
ftitution : from whence we may con-
clude, that thefe natural and original In-
cltnatwnsy and Propenjions to fbme Ani-
ons, and Rejhaints jrom^ and Auerjions
to others^ which wi:, feel in our felves,
without being confcious of 2iny previous
Deliberation concerning the Reafonable-
fiefs ^ or Vnreafonabientjs of what v/edo;
or, which, alter Judgments of this Na-
ture made, we look upon, as certain
Motions of the Soul, carrying us on to
ad according to fuch Judgments, witli
more Lajcj ^ackntjsy and ^application of
Mind,,
iiS The Certainty and Necefflty
Mindy than we fhould have done, upon
the hare Co/njich^.-a of ouf Reafon^ with-
out them : All thefe Dif^r-fittonsy I fay,
and SeattmeMs of the Soul, being given
us by God , and ^'.-'/^^V^j us^ conformahlj
to the Di£lates of ear ReAJon^ in dif-
charging what we call the Duties of Re-
ligion; we have fufficisnt Caufe from
hence to conclude, that God did defign
us for the Prutice of fucn Duties ^ and
confequently , that an obedient Comi^li^
ance with this Defign will contribute
more to our Happfnefs^ than our Difohe-
dience can ; which is 2. farther Proof, that
rve are aHually under Obligations to God^
or that there really is fush a thing ds Re^
lizior?,
o
Which Obligations^ together with God^s
Right of oblfgi;7/r^ we are conftantly put
in mind of by the Oeconomy and Confiitu-
tion of Humane Society^ and the feveral
Relations arifing from thence.
The different kina^ o^ Government ^ and
SubjeBion^ to be found among Men, are
the chiefejl Marks and Characters , by
which they are difting4.ufli'd from one
another in Society ; thefe take up a
large fhare in theix Thoughts and Dif-
courfesji
of^'Ii^ion in General, 129
courfcs, and a great part of their Ani-
ons are influenc'd and determined by the
Xotions and Opinions they have of them:
I rom whence wc arc led to acknowledge,
that we are under hightr Ohligxtions of
Obedience to God than we can be to any
I'um.Xfie Governour whatfoevcr : for,
w hether we confider our felves as 6Vr-
r.ints^ Children^ ov Suhjech', or any Other
way inferinur to others ; whatever Rea-
I'ons are alledged for our Duty and Obedi-
ence to AhfierSy Parents^ or Princes^ or
for their Right of commanding us^ will
conclude more firongly upon us , w^lien
we confider our felves ivtth Relation to
God.
All tlic Re.tfons which arc given for
our Obedience to Men, and for their right
of obliging us, are Power ^ Goodnefs^ and
Property. When a Perfon has a Power of
contributing to my Htppinejs^ or Mifery^
and I do, Ibme way or other, belong to
him, lb as to he calFd his^ I look upon
my {<A^ ^soblig^ed to obey him, or to att
according to his Will; and if, be/ides
his having tliis Power and Property^ I
confider him ^.s more inclinable to dome
good, than hurt, I conceive my felf un-
K der
1 30 T7;e Certainty and Kecejfity
der higher Ohligatiojis of Obedience to
him.
But now God hath dl thefe Titles to our
Obedience in the highefi degree pjjibLe ;
for, by giving us our intire Being, and
cvxry thing that belongs to our Nature,
^tis plain, that he hath, not only, a
greater Vower of contributing to our Happi-
nefs^ or Mijery than any Man can have,
but alfo, a greater Property in us, by this
Jcl' of Creation^ or Production^ than can
accrue to any Man by Conquejl, Purchafe^
Covenant^ Generation^ or any other way
whereby Men come to have a Property
in one another. And that he has more
Goodnefs towards us, or is more inclina-
ble to contribute to our Hnppimjs than
Mifery ^ is manifeft from the Benefits^
wliicli we have already received from
him.
Tlic inference I draw from hence is,
that, as our Reafon^ and "Judgment^ which
tell us, what ought, or ought not to
be done ; and as our natural Inclina-
tions^ and Jz'erjions, which difpofe, and
excite us to a£l agreeably to our Reafon
were given us by God, with a defign
of engaging us to acl accordingly ', fo,
moreover, were we put into fuch a State
and
of ^lti(wn in General, i J i
arid Condition^ with regard to one ano-
ther, that the nccclTaiy Relations re-
fulting from Society might put us in
mind of our relation to God , and of
the proper pccuUar Anions confequent
upon it ; fo that, by a confiant traditional
Education/ in the exercife of thcfe Duties
of Subjedion, of different forts, to one
another^ we fliould be led to the Ac-
knowledgement of our Obligations to a
Superior Beings more eafily, than if every
Man liad been left to himfelf, to find them
out, by the ufc of hii own Faculties only^
without thefe particular Occasions of
fetting his Reafon and Inclinations 0!i
work.
All which Confiderations concerning
the State of humane Nature ^ and Society^
are at leati very probable Arguments^
that we are actually obliged by God to
fuch a particular way of living as we call
Religion: and confequcntly , we have
Reafon to conclude, tint a careful fra-
(hie of Religion (all things confidered,)
\vill contribute more to our Happinefs^
than a iXeglecf or Tranjgre/fion of it ; be-
caufe the fame God, who defigns us for
Happimfsy defigns us alfo for the Practice
of the D:it.'tfs of Religion^ tho' we do
K ?. not
1 3 2 T}?e Certainly and Neceffhy
not yet perceive an immediate Connexion
between Religion^ and Hdppinefs ; which
is the next thing to be proved.
^. In the third place then I (hall give
fome pofuive and direct Proof from the
Ndture of Religion it felf^ that a reguUr
Practice of all thofe Duties or Obligations
of which it confifls would certainly con-
duce to the greateft Happinefs that Man
is capable of, confidered only in his pre-
fe-nt Coridittony as included within the
Bounds o'i this Life.
'Tis plainly perceived upon a fiiort tran-
fient View and Comparifon of the Hu-
mane and Divine Natures that Man was
?nade and dejigned by God for Happinefs ;
and by the trrefifitble De fires of Happinefs^
and Aver pons to Mijery^ that wx Expe-
rience in our felves, as alio by our conjlant
unalterable Endeavours to attain the one
and avoid the other, we are more nearly
and neceiTarily convinced, that the Enjoy-
ment of the pureft moft unallayed Happi-
nefs that we are capable of, muft be the
iiltifnate End of our Beino and all our jU
clions.
Since therefore God hath made us capa-
ble
of ^ligion in General, 1 5 5
hie of Happ: fiefs, and defigned us for it^
and we jind our felves necejfanly determi~
nedto aim at tliis End ; fince the only way
of attaining this End, is by our Actions^
and we are afTured by Experience that all
our Aclions do not lead to it, but that
Mifery as well as HAppinefs may be the
Effect and Confcque/ice of our Aflions, it
follows from hence, that there muft be
one parttctiLir n\ty of achfig , which , if'
fteadily purfued, will certainly procure
\\s greater Hnppinefs than we can pofTibly
attain b}' any other.
And farther , if we are defigned for
Happinefs^ and this Happinefs be attaina-
ble only by one particular way of ailing,
'tis certain that the fame God who de-
figned us for fuch an End muft defign alfo
that we fhould ufe fuch means as would
condu8: us thither.
In Conformity to which Dcfigns wc
cannot but believe that , as he hath
given us a certain Kjiow I edge of and ne-
ctfjfary Determinations toward our End^ hc
muft have given us ^Kofuffictent Tokens
and hidicatwns of the Means that lead
to it ; and, upon Examination we are
iatisfied that he has done fo ; by framing
K I our
134 T^-^ CeKta'mty and Keceffity
our Mtfids after fuch a manner that we are
necefl'arily determined tc approve fome
Aftionsand to condemn others, and to
judge our felves obliged to do what we
appiove, and to avoid what we con-
demn; by gi'v'tng us fuch natural Prcpen-
fions and Averfwns agreeable to the Judg-
ments of our Reafon, as by a fudden and
unperceivable Influence difpofe us to,
and aflift us in the Performance of the
fame A6lions which Reafon prefcribes ;
and by putting us into fuch a fate or condi-
tion of Life with refpeO: to one another^
wherein the different kinds of Govern-
ment and Subjection, and the Notions
and A6lions refulting from thence un-
avo'dably lead us to the Acknowledg-
ment of God\ Superiority, Power, and
Right of obliging, and of the NecelTity
of our Obedience to him, in all the fe-
veral Inftances of Duty, in which we
conceive our felves bound to any govern-
ing Relation among Men, but in a
much higher and more exalted manner,
as becomes the might\^ Inequality be*-
tween God and Man,
From M'hence we are fartlier hd ta
conclude tliat a!i other Duties and Obli-
gations^ which we apprehend our felves
un-
of ^Ugjoii in General. i j 5
iiidcr, with refpe^l to oar felves^ or 0-
:hi'rs, arc tlic Effc£l of our Obligation
o Cody tlic Supreme Governour of the
ll'or/d^ whofe Poiveraml Right arc over
'•I things^ original^ and independent ; from
u'hom all other Powers and Rights are
i^nvt'd-^ and on whom tlicy ^^/^-W; the
Scnfc of which Obligation renders all
our A6lions that are ducly influenced by
it Religious^ tho' God be not the imme-
di.ite O^jt'cV of them.
And thcfc arc fufficient Marks and E-
videnccs to affurc us that God does re-
quire us to acl fuch a particular way, and
confequently that wc arc n^iudly obliged
to frame our Lives according to thofe
Rules and Meafures which come under
the Name of Rdtgion , unlcfs it can be
ilicwn, from more certain Difcoveries of
the Nature of Man^ and the Defign of
God , that , notwithftanding all thcfe
fair Appearances, Religion is not the
^Vay to Happinefs. But, as 'tis manifcft
li'om what wc have already obfcrved of
the A' at lire of God, and our own Fra/?:d
and ConiHtution, that no higher AlTti •
ranees can be given us of the Trutii oi
uny thing tliiui what we have had in this
K 4 matter
i -^ 6 Tloe Certainty and NeceJ/Ity
mattpr\, from a Concurrence of our Rea^
fon^ ?7£LturAl Inclifiitttons , and externd
Condition , and that we cannot be de-
ceived in afTenting to fuch TelHmony ;
fo, upon farther Experiences, andObfer-
vations, taken from our felves, and the
State of Mankind, with relation to Re-
ligion, we fhall find that Religion is, in
its own Nature^ fo fitted and friited to the
Nature of Man^ and fo proportion'' d to the
original Difpofitions^ and Dejires of the
Souly as by a proper Tendency and Efficacy
to promote his hlappmefs.
This appears firfl: by what we feel in
pur felves. "What jufl: and impartial
Reafcn approves v/e find a Pleafure in
approving; Inclination fuperadded to
Judgment heightens the pleafing Senti-
ment ; citing what Nature inclines to
and Rctfon warrants , is accompanied
with a new and higher Satisfaction, all
which Fieafurcs we repeat and enjoy over
again by Rejiexion. And, if any P^^^^^
or Vneaftnefs either mixes with the Plca-
fjrc , or attends it , that does not arife
from t\icfa??ie T bought s or Actions that this
docs, but from fome contrary Application
c}f M^>^d^ c-ithcr in our felves, or others.
of 'T^cho^ion in GaicraL i 5 7
\ liich obllruQs, and oppofcs us in the
; acticc of Rclis^ion , or from feme o-
tlier extrt?/jic.il Caufe wliich has no De-
pendancc upon, or Connexion with Re-
hgion ; fo that the due Perfoyninme of
any Rchgious Aftion is never proper/ji
tlic Caufe of any Patn or Trouble to him
that performs it , however in fome In-
ftanccs it may feem to be the Occafiou
of it.
But, in order to be farther fatisfied of
the natural Connexion between Religion'
and Happinefs^ and that we may more
dearly perceive that the latter is the true
and genuine EFi'eft of the former, we
fhould take off our Tlioughts from the
prefent State of Mankind^ and reprefent
to our felves another Generation of Men,
Jiving together in a conjiant rfguUr Ob-
fervance of all the Duties and Ohligattons
of Rehgion : for there we fliould behold
fuch a glorious Scene of Happinefs rifing
before us, that, confidering the neceffary
Circumfances of our mortal Condition^ we
could not pofllbly imagine, or form
an Idea of any thing m thui Life be-
yond it.
This would be a State of umverfal
Peace, Safety , Tta^iquillity^ and Love^
Vviiere
1 3 8 77;e Certainty and TSLcccffity
where there would be no Injuries nor
Fears ^ no En'vy nor Difirufi ; where e-
very Man would find all the Pleafures
of Friend fhip in the Company of every
Man , and feel his own agreeable
Thoughts towards others redoubled, by
knowing that others had all the fame
Sentiments for him : all the rmturd Af-
f elites and Defires of the Soul would he
fit is fie d^ without a painful Eagernefs in
the Purfiiit, or Satiety in the Enjoyment ^
and there would be no irregular imagi-
nary Defires to create the Uneafinefs of
Difafpomtment : then every Man would
be plea fed with all that he dtd, and have his
Satisfaftion heightned by a full and en-
' tire AfTurance that his Aftions were ajf-.
proved by the Worlds and accept. ihle to
God.
Was true Religion lb unii/erfal/y^nnd ejc-
acllj pradlifed among Men, they would
engage the Power and Wtfdorn of the fti-
^reme Governour in their Favour^ by the
Honour^ Refpecl, and Obedience which
they paid him ; they would be furc of
all tlie Benefits and Advantages of hu-
Tn&ne Strength and Skill ^ by a mutual
Performance of all t]\Q Duties of Society :
und by an equal rcgi\Iar Conduct;;, ^wd.
Man-
of Religion in General. 1 5 9
Management of their own particular Ca-
pacities and Powers , they w^oiild pre-
ferve themfeives in the fittefl: and moll
proper Condition of cn'oying thofc a-
greeable Satisfaclions, which God had put
within their Reach, and would prolong
the Enjoyment of them, by extending
their Lives to the utmoft Term , to
which by any Endeavours of their own,
they could poflibly carry tliem.
Whoever takes a full and difl:in8: View
0^ Religion^ in all its P^^i^r and £jf/^«/^,
muft acknowledge that thefe are the ^r//e
and nece(j/iry Efjetis of it, where its Influ-
ence is freely difper^fed, without Check
or Oppofition from contrary Caules. And
what greater Hiippt'/iefs than this can we
conceive our felves capable of without a
longer Date of //refect Ltfe, or ^profpecl
of a/iother ? or, at leaft, what greater
is attainable by any other ^t7/o;?j befides
thojeof Religion?
But this, I confefs, is all but an inuigi-
iiAry Scene^ a bare Idea or Pattern drawn
by the Mind , which never was , and
perhaps never will be exemplified /;2///t'
redity of things : and therefore it does
cot necclTarily follow from hence that,
ivhenj^thc GenemUty of Men 3.ci contrary
10
1 40 TJye Certainty and Neccfftty
to Religion, as now they do, thofe few
who are mixt with them, and Hve ex-
A[ily Accordi/Jg to the Rules and Precepts
of it^ iliall enjoy more Happinefs than
any of the reft , much lefs fuch whofe
Pra8:ice is tnconfiant and defective^
which is certainly the Cafe of the heft
and moft careful Obfervers of thofe
meafures of ading which Religion pre-
fcribes.
However, thus much, I think, may
juftly be inferred, That Religion is, inits
own Nature J froducitve o^ HapptnefsyRnd of
nothing elfe, and confequently was de-
figrPd and ord.ttn'*d bj^ God for the obtain-
ing thisEffeclo
From whence I conclude, that if Man
was made for Happinefs^ and was directed
and difpofed to feck it by the means of Re-
ligion^ and if thefe means are found to be
in their o)vn Nature fuffictent , but are
fome way or other, witiiout the Fault of
the Perfon who ufes them, render'^d tnef-
fechial for the prefent ; from hence, I fay,
we may certainly conclude that God^
who in his great WKdom has order'd all
thefe things, did not order th.em in vain,
but has fo contrived them that, Jome timt
or other y the End to which they all point
fh?.U
of ^'li^ion in General. 1 4 1
jiicill be obtained ; and therefore, if a
ftd and exact Obfervance of all the Du-
ties of Religion be not attended with a
fuitabic Happincfs m thU Life , 'tis a
Itrong Proof that there will be a//z///re
State^ in which there will be Rewards
anfwerable to the higheft Performances
and Expectations.
Wc have Reafon alfo, from the Good-
nefs and Wifd.om of God, to hope, that
the (incere Endeavours of thole , whofe
Courfe is fometimcs interrupted with
voluntary Traufgrclfions of the Rules
prcfcribed them, will notwithftanding,
by fome Favour or Grace, procure them
a State of Happt/iefs. But this we may
be fure of, that God will put a mighty
Di/Iinclion between fuch d.s do but Jome-
r/^//f.c deviate from thofe religious mea/ures
which he hath propofed to them, and
fncJi as conjlantly a6l by dtfjerent Prtn-
ciples.
4. The Proof of this Conclufion is the
fourth thing I have undertaken, in order
to tlie Rllablifliment of the Truth and
Necefjitj of Religion^ under which head
I am to ihew, that the Defect of a ge-
neral and regular Pra^icc of Rehgion,
and
1 4© Tlx' Certainty and ^Kcccfflty
to Religio^y as now they do, tho/e few
who are mixt with them, and Hve ex~
aBIj accordti'ig to the Rules and Precepts
of it^ fhall enjoy more Happinefs than
any of the reft , much lefs fuch whofe
Pra£lice is inconftant and defe6iive^
which is certainly the Cafe of the beft
and moft careful Obfervers of thofe
meafures of ading which Rehgion pre-
fcribes.
However, thus much, I think, may
juftly be inferrM, That Religion is, in its
own Nature ypyoduciive o^Happnefs^and of
nothing elfe, and confequently was de^
fign''d and ordmi*d i?j God for the obtain-
ing thisEffeclo
From whence I conclude, that if Man
was made for Happinefs ^ and was directed
and difpofed to feck it by the ?neans of Re-
ligion^ and if thefe means are found to be
in thetr oivn Nature fujficient ^ but are
fome way or other, without the Fault of
the Perfon who ufes them, render'' d inef-
fecfual for theprefent ; trom hence, I fay,
we may certainly conclude that God^
who in his great WHHom has order'd all
thefe things, did not order th.em in vain,
but has fo co^^t rived them that, Jome ttmt
or other ^ the End to which they all point
fii?.'-
of^'li^ion in General. 141
fliall he oOtAined ; and therefore, if a
full and exacl Obfcr Vance of all the Du-
ties of ReUgion be not attended with a
fuitablc Happinefs /« t^Jts Life ^ 'tis a
fttong Proof that there will be a /«/ //re
StAte^ in which there will be Rewards
anfwerable to the higheft Performances
1 nd Expeftations.
We have Reafon alfo, from thcGc?^^-
nefs and Wifdom of God, to hope, that
the (incere Endeavours of thofe , whofe
Courfe is fometimcs interrupted with
voluntary TranfgrelTions of the Rules
prefcribed them, will notwithftanding,
by fome Favour or Grace^ procure them
a State of Happt/iefs. But this we may
be fure of, that God will put a mighty
Viilnniiori between fuch diSdo but fome-
r/^/>!f.f deviate froni thofe religious meafures
which he hath propofed to them, and
fuch as conjhntly a£l by dijjerent Prirj-
ciplti.
4. The Proof of this Conclufion is the
fourth thing I have undertaken, in order
to tiie RrtabliOiment of the Truth and
Necefliti of Religion^ under which head
I am to fhew, that the Defeci of a ge-
ncYAl and rtguUr Practice of Religion,
and
i 4 2 The Certainty and NeceJJny
unci the Confequences of this Defeclj ^o
necefTarily^ lead us to the Acknowledg-
ment of fuch a future State, as is fuffici-
ent to determine us to prefer one parti-
cular way of Life before another, upon
fuch Reafons and Motives, that is, fuch
degrees of Ha^pinejs and Mifery , than
which we are fure greater , and more
powerful cannot be offered to us.
*Tis very plain, that Religion is not
umverfally pra6lifed in the World, nor do
the generality of any Nation or Society of
Men make their Duty to God the go-
verning Principle of their Anions. 'Tis
manifelt likewife, that thofe few who are
fenfible of their Obligations^ and do endea-
vour to difcharge them, do in many In-
ftances neglect them, or aB contrary to
them : upon which Accounts it happens,
that as there is more Mifery in the
World than our mortal Condition, would
otherwile fubjetl us to, fo it oftentimes
falls to the religious Man^s Lot to have the
greateflfuare of it.
Nor is all the Troiible and Uneafincfs
hefuffers the Effecl: of ^'/V/t?»j Habits and
lmp-cffio?is mixing with, and obftrucling
the Performance of his Duty, or carrying
him
of ^Ugion in GeneraL 1 4 j
him to contrary AQ:ions, Ttlio very much
he owing to this Caufe; but a great many
Affli^lions and Calamities are brought
upon him by the MaUce and Hatred of
wicked Men, purely for his being religious \
fo that, did he prfecHy and compleatly
fulfil all his Duty to God, there is Reafon
to believe, that his Mifery would be pro-
port ionably eiicre^fed,
Vxoxvi whence it plainly follows, that
God hath provided fome other fiat e of Hap.
pnefs for fuch as live exactly according to
his Purpofe and Intention here ; which
will be lb full and fufficient a Recom-
pence for all the Mifery they have indu-
!x:dinthis Life, as to juftify tlieir Obedi-
ence to God, notwithdanding their pre-
fent Sufferings upon tluit account.
For, if God de{igrPd Man for Happi-
nejs^ (as 'tis certain he did,) 2.n^ appointed
Religion to be the ?neans of obtaining it<
(as manifeftly appears from his annexing
Pleafure to the purelt and moli unmixE
praclice of Piety and Virtue^ as well as
from fcveral other Indications,) 'tis im-
poffible to fuppofe that, after a due and
proper \}k ot the means, God fliould
iliffer Iiis Ends to be dtftated^ by the den-
Ted^ dcptn(ic>tt Power ^ and Qomrirayice of
other
1 44 The Certainty and Kecefjity
other BeingSy and fliould prder things {o^
that thofe who were mojl diligent and ex-
act in obferving the trueft meafurcs of a£l-
ing, fliould , for that uery reafon^ meet
with the Uajl Succefs,
Should we therefore fiippofe d.fewPer-
fons perfectly religious^ afflicted and tor-
mented by wicked Men, barely upon that
account , fas there can be no other , if
they are what we fuppofe them to be ; j
we miift then conclude, thatGod has migh-
ty Blejfings in Jlore for them, in compari-
fon of which their prefent Sufferings are as
nothing.
From hence alio we may nifer, that
thofe whofe (incere Refolutions and Endea-
njours are not attended with exact and u-
mverfal Performance, and yet, who are
rendred 7nore rmferahle by the Actions of
wicked Men than tliey other wife would
have been, for the fake of thofe degrees of
Religion they have attained to ; 'tis rea-
fonable, I fay, to conclude that thofe will,
fotne time or other, receive more Happmefs,
Oi' lefs Mifery t\\ia others, proportionably
to the difference of their Ohedience, and
Ajfljction now : For , according as they
have purfued the Means, fo will their
Attainments of the Rnd be • or, if no Re-
ward
of (Religion in General. i ^ ^
ward be due but to ^ifull.Difchnyge of all
Ohltg.ittons , it cannot be imagined that
thofe who have Pertbrm'd fome part of
what tliey were obliged to, and endea-
V'oured at (jenerd Obedience^ fliould be
puniflied as highly as thofe who have
beea guilty of a greater^ or of a total
Neglect , VioUtion or Contempt of their
Duty.
However therefore it be as to the man-
ner of it, 'tis very agreeable to the IVifdom
and Dejigns of God, according to all the
Indications of them which he hath afford-,
ed Mankind, to make the Condition of
tIiofe,who ad by t\\Q,Prtnciples of Religion^
preferable, to that of others who acl by
contrary Meafures, whicli it would not
ail ways be, were there no other Sra^e of
Life after this is ended.
From all whicli it plainly follcxc^ hat-
there mull: be a Future State, in whic * Mdii
\Vill be diliinguiflfd from one anothv.r_, by
di^crent degrees of H.tppinefs and Al/fery^
ciccording to rhe different regard they had
to Religion in this Ltfei
The Certainty of which State we arc
^irther convinced of by the general// '^/;/j-,_,
A tifertes , and bnperfecfions of our pre-
t fent
1 46 'Ilje Certainty and ISleceJJItj
ient Nature; which proceed from fome
Principle, or Difpofition within us, c6n-
trary to that of Religion : which Prin-
ciple, or Difpofition is the Reafon of that
umuerfd Wickednefs which reigns in the .
World,
Did Mankind enjoy all the Happinefs
tliey were otherwife capable of in this
mortal Condition^ yet, fo long as they
found in themfelvesC apactties^ and De fires ^
of greater^ unknown, degrees of Pkafure,
which from the prefent Frame and Con-
ilitution of things they had no Hope, or
Profpeft of injoying, and felt an 1)-neafi-
nefs at the Thoughts of p. n ting with
thofe Enjoyments, of which they were
j/cffe/s^dj by the unalterable Decree of
Death ^ which they knew themfelves fub-
ject to ; were thev I fay in fuch a Condi-
tion, they would have great Reafon from
hence to conclude, that God did defign
them for fome other ?r/ord perfecJ State^
where all their Cap/tc/tus would be filled,
all then Dejires fatisfied, and ^0 kind of
Pain or Vneafnefs would check or allay
the Fullnefs of their joy: not that they
themfelves would have any jufl caufe to
Complain, as if God had not dealt kindly
by them, in granting them lefj'er degtets
of
of ^I'lghn ill General. 14/
■ if Happinefs than what thcyArere caps-
i'Uof\ but becaufe, in fuch a cafe as is
fuppofed, ihcii Capacities and Defires
would be given them i^ I'Ain ; which
does not feem confiftent with the JVifdom
of God. And, moreover^ the V?ieafiriefs of
Definr?g what was i?npoffible ^ and the
'i^untul Fears and Apprehensions o'i what
was certain^ which they would then ex-
perience, would appear i/iconfifioit with
God's Dcjl^n of m.iL'i//^ Man for Happi?;efs ;
and therctorc it would be more agreeable
to all the Notions we have of God, and
to all the Obfcrvations we have made
upon his other Works, to fuppofc that,
had this Life been the utmoll: Extent of
Mans Being and Happinefs^ God would
not have given hirri a fenfe, or profpccl
of any other : upon fuch a Suppofition as
this, 'tis highly rational to think, that con-
flant even Co'/itentwent would have bound-
ed all his Thoughts, that his Soul would
always have remained at xh^ftme equal
Poize , and tliat he wouM have lived^
without deliring more than\\'\\dX he aclu-
ally enjoyed^ and have died^ without any
previous Fedrs of hfing what he had in
prefent^
J> 2 And
1 4^ Tl^c Certainty and Kcccffity
And, if there be good ground tobe.^
lieve, that there would be a Sta/e offu-
ture hU^pnefs^ tho' Men er/jojed all that
they were capable of here , according to
t]ie prefent Circumftances of their Na-
ture and Condition ; both becaufe their
prefent Happinefs was not compleat, by
reafon of fome Pain and Uneafinefs mixt
with it, and becaufe their Capacities
and Dcfires exceeded all their aftual En-
ioyments; how much more reafonable
is it to make the fame Conclufion now^
when we, every way, f^Hfo far jhort
e-z-e/i of that Happimfs^ which the condi-
tion of this Life might allow us? as will
plainly appear, if we compare the pre-
fent ^Jtate of the World , with that
Draught and Reprefentation, which we
liave before given of Humane Life, un^
cicr a regular Praftice of the Duties of
•Relif^ion.
We are, now, not only confcious, in gef-
neral, of Capacities greater of Happinefs
tlian what we enjoy ; but there are feveral
kinds , and degrees of it, within our
•Knowledge, and feemingly within our
/^each and Power, which, with alJ the
Endeavours we can ufe, we are not able
to obtain ; and tlie more Wants we are
fcnfi-
I
of ^ligion hi Geney-iil, 1 49
icnfiblc of, and the better and more par-
Licularly wc know wliat they arc, the
llrongcr arc our Delircs to have them fup-
plied, and the greater is our Uncafmcfs un-
der Defeats and Difappointments, which,
Experience alfures us, arc very frequent.
Then the Satisfaclions which wc do meet
with , are commonly very fhort , and
•mixed with Pain, and we have a greac
many other things to iear, bciidcs Death,
But the Troubles and CaLmnties oi'Hu-
7nxne Life are too well known to need be-
ing infifcd upon, and too large a fubic6l
to be particularly treated of in this place.
'Tis fufficient to my purpofe to remark in
general, wdiat I think may very fafely be
affirmed , that , if what falls to every
Man's fliare was, fairly computed , the
Mifery of the great eft part of Mankind
would out-v/eigh their Happinefs.
If, therefore, Man was dejigri^d by God
for Happinefs^ and is fo framed tl/at he
cannot enjoy compleatHappinefs m thid Ufe^
without a mixture of Uneafmefs, and yet
has Capacities^ and Defires of greater tlian
he can conceive belonging to his Nature,
in the necelliiry Circumftances of it here ;
and farther, ii Mankind be now involv'd
ill fuch a State or Condition of Life, in
L ^ whi<h
|)0 T}?e Certainty and TSlaeJftty
which they all achially enjoy much lefs
hliffinefs than they find themfelves by
Nature capable of here^ and the greateji
■pdYt of them have a Urger Jhare of the
Troubles^ than the Jdvmtages of Life ;
ixom hence I think it rnay be truly and
certainly inferrM, that there will be a~
nother State of fure ccmflext Happinefs^
anfwerable, at leaft , to the higheil: No-
tions and Conceptions which wc are able
to frame of it.
But fuice, as has before been prov'd,
God harh not abjolutely and unconditional-
ly determined all Men to be happy, but
harh made Haffinefs and Mffery^to de-
pend upon our Actions^ and conlequent-
ly hath annexed Happinefs to a particu-
lar way of acl'ing, we bave all the Rea,-
ion in the Y/orld to believe, that the
Happnejs of another State will be the
I'Cirdon ot" thcfe , and thofe only , who
li^e according to the Rules of Religion
here : and this, I believe, no body who
(y^ns2L]utnre State^ is difpofed to doubt
of; and therefore I fliall fpend no time in
in unneceifary Frcof of it.
And, tho' tiiere are none to be found
XK'ho. cxacily difcharge all the'Obligations
id Eeligioii, yet 'tis more agreeable to
.1^^.' - ■ ' ' our
of ^ligjon in GoieraL \ 5 i
our rcafbn to conclude that thofe who
fincerely endeavour to do it, fliall, by the
efpecial Grue and lavour of God^ m
fome fuch way or manner as to his
Wifdom fhall fcem fit, be rendred t^i/?^-
hle of future Htpptnefs^ than to believe,
that ali Men fliall be miferxhU^ and none
of them obtain Happinefs, contrary to
all the Marks and Indications we have of
the Defign of God m makiiig Man.
Suppofing therefore what I think has
hecn fufficicntly proved under this Head,
that there will be a. future Si ate, in which
all Men will be f^^p/^y or mrferxble^ ac-
cording as they have befiaved themfelves
here, with regard to what we call Re-
ligion.- this, I lay, being allowed, itma-
nifeltly follows from hence, that it is
more for our H^tpprrtefs to act up to the
Rules and Directions of Religion, than
to purfuc any other Meafurcs, whatever
we may happen to futfer in this Life for
fo doing; becaufe the Happinefs of a
future State will fo far outweigh all die
fufferings of this, that, when we come
to cnioy it, we fiiall be forced to ac-
knowledge , that the end and reward
of our Labours was \(^vy well worth
all the Troubles, and Difficulties we
L 4 found
1 J X 7h Certatnty ami NeceJJky
Wnd ^.n the way to it , and it it be ab^
fo-uttly^ with regard to the whole extent
'^rid dtiratton of eur Being ^ more for
our Happinefs to live Religioufly than
©therwife, then are we in the higheft and
ftrideft fenfe obliged to hve fo, which
was the thing I undertook to prove.
Nay further , if, befides the natural
Tleafure which refults from Religious
ABs^ while we are praOiifrng them here,
God has given us a certain Proffeci^ and
well grounded Hope of a State ^ of greater
Blifs hereafter , I dare venture to
affert that, generally fpeaking , Religion
will prove the fureft way to happnefs^ e-
ven in this Life ; fo that, tWj Jomettmes^
the Sufferings of fome particular IvUn^ upon
that account, may exceed all the noble
Satisfactions which Rehgion can afford
them here, yet, all things being confi-
der'd, and the different Methods of ail-
ing weigh'd together, with all the probct-
ble Confcquences, which , according to
the common courfc of things, m^v at-
tend them, there will be fiifficicnt rea-
fon for a wife Man to prefer the pra-
ctice of Religious Duties to the ways of
Jrreiigion', upon thefcore of the prefenf
'Happt^'/efs which he is likely to cnjpy biV
••■:] that
of ^Itjrion in General!, I 5 j
L!icLt means, reckoning in the Hopes and
l^rofvect only^ and not the Vofftffioyi of a-
f.nther State: as will more plainly ap-
pear under the next General Head of
Difcourfc :
Which is a Proof of Religion, from a
Comparifon of it with Irreligton^ and the
neceflary Confequences arifing from
fhencc.
IV. I have before ^)MQ.n 2.^0 fit iv e di*
reci proof of Religion, drawn from the
natures and relxttons of the 'Beings con
cerned in it, I fliall now endeavour to
confirm the Truth of what I have ad-
vanced, by fliewing, what Ahjurd anvi
Vnreajonake things would follow from
a dental of Religion^ and how PerntcU
Otis and Dejhtutive to Mankind, the
eftabliOiment of a contrary Belief and
Pradliice would be.
In the management of which Subje£l,
I fhall firfl: confider the fezrra/ Steps and
pegreis of Irrel/gton ; and then fhew fiow
far
I 5"4 7l}e Cenatnty and TSlcceJJlty
fer they all led to the fame Ends, and
what are the peculiar Confequences of
each.
Ir religion^ fb far as it confiftsin Ofini'
<on or Beliefs is of three Sorts: for ei-
ther Men deny the hehjg of a God, and
confequently, all Rehgioiis Duty falls of
eoiirle, when this Foundation of it is
taken away; or they acknowledge a
God, but deny that Ala^ is a?2j^ waysObligsct
by him to a6i lb as we pretend that he ought
to a£l ; or elfe they own that they are
m feveral Inftances obliged to Worfbip
God, and to hve according to thofe
Rules and Principles of Aftion, which
we have before mentioned, but they do
not believe that there is any futurs State
sff Rervards and Pumffmnnis after this
life.
Now thefe are very different NotianSj.
confidered barely in themfelves, as mat>
ters of SpecuUtiorfi only ; but^ if we ex-
amine the i^ntcfical Effecfs and Canfequen^
c^i-of them, we f^iali find that they all
aim at the fa.me thing ^ which is, thQ
ejlablifliing a ^^;?t'r^/7i^cTri' ofLiwy^g as
i-very Man fteafes^ upon Piincipk^ con-
trary to thofe of Religion.
This is plain of the two £rft Opinions,
v/hicii
of Religion in GcncrnL \ 5 5
W'hich take away all manner of Religious
obligation^ and, upon flri6l examination,
will be found to be True of the laft;
which fo far Loofins and Weakens the
Influence of Religion^ that it will not be
able to bear up againft the force of con-
trary Motives to A£lion.
But let us confider thefe Notions a-
part, and then we fhall the better per-
ceive what the ^/^t-f^, znA immediate Con-
fequences of each Opinion are, and how
far they /^///^ with one another,
Firfl: then, we will fuppofc that there
is no GoH ; and Confcquently no Religion :
this being fuppofed , what are we to
think ot our Selves r What kind of Be-
ings are we ? How came we firft to ex^
tfiy and what are we to do while we
continue to be ?
ThaL we are^ and that we feel our
felies foand fo jlffecledhis impofliblc to
doubt : And the fame way, that we arc
a (Tured of our own Being, or of any Jimple
perception whatfoever, we are likewifeaf-
{\\x&c.oit\\Q, Jgretment 2Lnd Connexion of
fome things, and the dtfagreement and tn-
con[ijtcncyQ'[ot\\QXS\ viz,, by fuch an tmme-
Uet^t confcioufnefsy as we can neither refifl
nor
I 5 6 The Certainty ami Kecejfity
nor diftruft : but if thefe things, whidi
we necejfarily perceive, as together, or
afunder, and which we cannot poflibly
perceive otherwife, fhould not be Joined
or Separated accordingly, m the Nature
a/zd Reality of things, but only in our
Mind, then do we know nothing certain
beyond J/^pearances,2.nd the Affeci ions of our
own Minds, and yet are invincibly Difpofed
to believe what may be Falfe^ with Ho
ftrong an affent, tliat 'tis extreamly dif-
ficult to entertain the leaft Sufpition of
a bare poffibility of its Faifhood ; as any
Man may experience in himfelf, if he
will but try to Doubt of what we call
a felf-evident Propofition\ which is the
reafon that there are fo few who pretend
to be thorough Scepticks, if there ever
were really any fuch, as, I dare confi-
dently affirm there never were» But,
if it were polTible for us to prevail
with our felves to doubt of the Being of
a God, after a ilill and imoartial Confi-
deration of the Proof beK)re given of this
Trutli, I do not fee where our Doubts,
could ftop , or what could determine
our Affent to any thing el(e: Reafn,
Truth, and Evidence would then be bare
aninformmg Sou-nds^ ; our whole Lite
of ^dij^ion in General. 157
would be nothing but Sufpcncc and A-
mazcmcnt ; Darkncfs and Ignorance
would cover our Underftandings, and
continual Uneafincfs would arife from d
reftlefs SucccfTion of vain, undetermin'd
Thoughts.
If therefore there l^e no God, notwith-
(landing that there is the fame appearance
of Evidence for his Being, as there is for
the truth of any thing elfe ; fas thole
who have fully examined the Proofs of it,
mull allow j then have we the fame Rca-
fon to quclfion all our other Kjioivledq,
The Confequcncc of which would be,
that we fliould then feel in our felves a
continual defuc of Knowing, and a con-
ftant agitation of Thoughts in the fearch
or puriiiit of Knowledge joyn'd with a
continual diftrufl: of all appearances of
Truth, without any manner of Relt or
Acquicfcence, which would be fuch an
'uncafie State as no Man, I believe, could
bear ; and, fuch as no Man was ever yet
fenfible of
But this perhaps is too much to fup
pofe, it being very eafie to imagine, that
there may be Men wIid deny the heing of
God, ^[id all ?n.in/icr of Religion, without
fufpeQing any of their o.'her /yno^v/edg^
and
1 5 8 The Certainty and NeceJ/Jty
and who I in all other matters , Argue
from the fame Principles, and Aft by the
fame Rules as the reft of Mankind do.
'Tis very poflible, that Perfons who never
gave themfelves the trouble of being ac~
quainted with Mathematkks, may think
an the Demonftrations, which are there
pretended to, falfe , and the whole Sci-
ence a Cheat, without calling in qucftion
any other parts of Knowledge which they
have happened to be converfant in: and it is
much more conceivable, that fuch as ne-
ver duly and fairly confidered the Argu-
ments for die being of God and Religio^^
fhould deny both, without diftrufting
their Faculties upon other Occafions;
which is certainly the cafe of all that pre-
tend to fuch a denial.
Now in applying my felf to thefe Men,
I do not think it fufficient to alledg, that
the Proof I have given of thefe great
Truths, is directly and immediately drawn*
from fuch Principles as they own , and
make ufe of in other matters, though
this may certainly be affirmed ; to alledg
this is not fufficient, becaufe they may
have that eafie Anfwer ready which all
People give who are fond of their Opini-
ons, and unwilling upon enquiry to find
them
o/ ^lij^ion in General \ jp
them falfc : thus, I fay, they would be
apt to anfwer ; That Arguments drawn
out to any length are very Uncertain;
that there may be a Miftake in Ibmc part
of the Deduftion ; that confequences^ at
a great diftance from their firft Pn/jcipUs^
may not have all the Force and Strength
of tliofe Principles convey'd to them;
and that therefore, though the whole
Contexture of the Proof feems fpecious,
they have no reafon to change fuch O-
pinions as they are fully perfv/aded of,
for others which they certainly per-
ceive to be Falfe , though they are fei
out fo plaufibly, that it is not eafie to
tell where the Falfhood of tl]em lies.
Since theretbre the Perfonswho detiy
the Being of God and Religion^ are not
well acquainted with what they deny ;
have very imperfect Notions of thefe
things, and do not trouble themfelve«i
to look into them, or to confider the
Proofs that are brought for them; but
yet are fuppofcd to underftand their own
Principles , which they profefs to be
well perfwaded of, and to adl: by -, it
cannot but be very proper todifcourfe
with them upon this Subiecl, and, fup-
pofing their Principles true, to conlider
them
l6o The Certainty and TSleccJJhy
them in their fiill Extent, and to exa-^
mine into the genuine confcqiiences of
them : and, if when I have given a true
Idea and Re^refemation of Irreltgton^
they will own it ftill, I defire no bet-
ter WitnefTes to confirm the Truth of
\^hat I have urg'd in the Defence of
Religion,
Suppofing then that there is no God, nor
Religion , and that we muft judge^ and
a6l^ as our Reafon prefcribes we fhould
in fuch a Cafe ; thefe two things do ne-
cejfarily and immediately follow :
1. That all Men are equal^ and that
there is no fuch thing as Superiority^
Right, OT Authority o^ Siny kind.
2. That every Man is to acl^ as he him-
J'elf fliall judge moil: convenient for his
own particular Happmefs.
I. That all Men are eq^ual'is very plain,
if we confider the Original Capacities^
and Powers of Humane Nature, without
any external Advantages of B/r///, Educa-
tion , and Society : nor do thefe Diffe-
rences , if there be no God, caufe any
fuch \lnequality between particular Men,
as to make one Man fubject to another,
of^Ugion in Gencrdl. \6\
cr to lay any Obli^dtion upon the one
to a6l according to the Will ot'thc other.
There needs no further Proof of this but
to confider , That no Man , whatever
his Circumllances in tlie World are, can
liave fuch a certain titicontroUhle Power
over any of his Brethren, as to make it
neceffnrj for another Man to obey him in
what he commands. For, whatever a
Man promifes or threatens, be it never
fo great in either kind, may, by fome
fudden unforefeen Accident, be hindred
from taking effed, even in the moment
of Kxccution ; befides, whatever is pro-
mi fed or threatned , being ceitainly of
no longer continuance than Life, be it
never (o great in it felf, it may not,
oftentimes, countervail fome other Mo-
tive wliicii the Fcrfon thus accofted is
g-ovxrn'd by. There may be fome par-
ticular luiioyment that he is polTefs'd
of, which his imagination has fo heightn-
cd , or which Habit has made fo ne-
celfary to him, that nothing pleafant or
grievous in Lite can be ot weipjit e-
nougli to determine him to a contrary
Choice.
Thus have we fcen Men of nj Rel'gion
\{ facri-
1 6 1 Tl?e Certainty and iKeccjjity
Sacrifice all that they Iiad, and bear all
that could be inflifted upon them, rather
than they would renounce their .Ambition
ov Renje^ige^ or do any thing that they
thought would {lain the gior^j^ which
their former A6lions had procured them.
From whence it follows, That, ex-
ccft there he a God^ no Man can have
a tr//e Right of obliging another; • die
Right of obliging being founded in (uch
a Foner of contributing to the Happnefs
or Mifery of others as their Reafon mull:
necejjarily fubinit to ; which no Man
can hav^e, without being fupported by
Divine Authority.
It may indeed fo happen, fometimes,
bv ti)e favour of particular Circumllan-
C€s, that a Ferfon may propofe to me to
■act alter fuch a manner, upon Juch pro-
L-dbie Motives and ReafonSy as may con-
vince me, that 'tis more for ^ny Happi-
mfs to act thus than othenvife-^ but this
is not fuinicient to give any particular
Man, or rank of Mien, a Right to my
Obedience ; becaufe I can never be jure
of iheu" Pojver of enforcing thefe Ado-
fives : and therefore, tho' I do find the
\Vovld at prefent fo conftituted , that
Men of fuch a Char^cfcr^ or Relation^
jiave
of %Aigion in General. i 6 j
have more probable Opportunities of con-
tributing to my Happwejs or Mifery than
others, I am not to look upon them as
having any Kij^ht or Authority over me ;
but fuch whofe Wills and Counfels I fol-
low oftncr than thofe of other Men, be-
caufe I judge it more for my hiterefi fo to
do : but when I judge it more for my par-
ticular Interelt to follow my own^ or my
other Marl's Advice, then am I as much
obliged to aft accordingly ; and in fuch a
cafe, I have as true a Right of my orvn^ or
the Perfon whofe Advice I take has as
much Right and Authority over me, as my
Father^ Majler, or Pri/ice.
All which Titles^ and Re/atiop!., and
whatever elfe are ufed to imply ■ jov-:rn~
ment and ^ubjnlion^ if there be m God^
are falfe trnpofing Names; and, if any
Advantage has been taken in our Infancy
to convey any Notions of Authority^
Duty^ or Obligation by them, we are to
fliake off all thefe Prejudices, as well as
tho/e concerning God and Religioj/, which,
(as we are now to believe} have been
made ufe of, only for ihc better enforcing
^hefe upon us.
We mud: difcard like wife thofe other
/ife Notions of /< (if/-'/, d.nd Property -^ bv
M 2 the
1 64 TI'C Ceytainty and Nccejf/ity
"the means of which, fome Men challenge
to themfelves larger Shares and Portions
of the necefTary Supports and Advanta-
ges of Life, than are allowed to the reft
of Mankind, for which there is no man-
ner of Ground //? reajb?? : For, all Men
being 6'^/Ai/, they have all an equal Rtght
and Title to every Thing which they are
capable of enjoying, or poiTeiling ; nor
can any Priority of PojfelJion^ any Pains
of 'labour of Acquifttton , any Promtfe^
Contract^ or Agreement whatfoever be fuf-
ficient to give a Man, a Plight ^ ov Property m
any thing, to theExclufion of any other
Man ; which will appear very plainly if
we confider,
2. The fecond Confequence arifing
from the Suppofition of no God nor Reli-
gion, which is this ; That e'very particu-
lar Man is to a£l as he hnnjelf fliall judge
moft convenient for his onn Perfonal Inte-
reji or Happinefs,
There is no other Principle^ Reafon, or
Motive of A6\ion im-aginablc in fuch a
cafe. And, if all-Men do, and mujl acf
according to this ?;-/>/!://?/<', they mull: al-
fo, if tliev will be confiftent with them-
felves, j^^dgc, that there is no fuch thing
^ • as-
I
of ^ligm in GoicraL i 65
^is Authority^ or Duty^ i^^^^^^-, or Frofertyy
orany tiling die commonly thought to be
the Ca,ufes o/'thcm, to be implied ?/?tIicm,
or to reft/U from them ; that k, Thac
there can be /20 Action of their otvTf, or <?-
ther MenSy or af^y other Circumfiame or
ReLition whatfocver, wiiich can be anv
bar or hindrance to any Man's Endea-
vours of bettering his Condition, or ad-
vancing his Happinefs, wheTi^ and in Tr/ziT/-
mxfincr faci'sr he fliall think fit.
Now, that this is the /9ece(farjy and on-
ly Frimi^le, which fuch Perfons as den}'
tlic Being of G&dand Religion can be in-
fluenc'd bv in their AQions, is very plain,
if we coniider thefe two thii^gs, wiiicb,
as has before been fnewn, Reajcm and Ex
perience affure usof :
Firfl^ That we are naturally^ and necef-
f^rtly determined to feek, and endeavour
after our own Happinels, whether there
be a God or no^ or v/hatever otlicr No-
tions we Iiave of things; which is too
'[ain to need any Proof.
Secondly^ That, if there he rro God^ no
Man hatli it in his Ponder to contribute fo
iar to die Happiiicfs or xMifery of another,
tiiat it muft needs be unavoidably better
rbr that other to do what he prc-
" M 3 fcrjbcs
1 66 Tl?e Certainty and Ncceffity
fcribes, than to r,8: contrary to his di-
rection, and thrit the Perfon thus pre-
fcrtbed to cannot poffibly help judging fo.
And, if no Man hath fuch a Power,
there ai c no ether higher Betrigs that we
know of; noneatleaft, if there be no
God, to be imagined, who h.2iVQ^ greater
Power over us than one Man hath over
another.
From whence it follows. That every
M^v?., being necejfanly determined to aS:
for his own Happinefs, and no Man ha-
ving Fower enough to make the Obedi-
dience of others to him necejfary to their
Happinefs , no Man is to aH according
to the Will of another^ any further than
he himjelf judges tliat he fhall be the
happier {ov fo doing.
And if, moreover, we confider how
fmali the Differences of Foiver are among
Men , what reciprocal Advantages they
have over one another, how changtahie
all thefe diftinguilliing Circumflances
are, and what different Notions and<S>^/-
ttments Men have of the Happinefs of
this Lfe: If, I fay , we carefully con-
fider anci weigh all this, we fliairbe ifill
more iluisfied, that there can be nofoch
thing as Authority^ ov Subjection^ Cb/iga-
:^ ' r!0P7^
of ^ligion hi General, i 67
tion^ Right ^ or Property ; and fliall better
perceive tlie whole Force and Influence of
the foremeiitioned Principle of AQion.
Suppohng then that, Societies being c-
(lablifli'd as we now find tfiem, due
Care were taken to perfwadc Mankind,
that there was no fuch thing as God or
Religiofi; fo that every Man, having
thronghly worn off thofi Notions , was
prepared to do ^vhatever he judged mod
conducing to his own Happinefs : upon
this Suppofition , it muft needs follow,
that a great many JVTen \v^')uld find
themfelves very uneafie, in the want of
fcveral things, which they fiw others
polTefs'd of, and in the performance of
feveral Anions, by the command of o-
thers, who were free from that Trouble
themfelves ; and what could retrain fuch
Men from feizing upon whattlicy want
ed , and freeing tliemfelves from what
was troublefome to tliem, but the con
fidcration of worfting their Condition by
I fiuitlefs Tryal? But this 'Thought
( OLikl not hold them long , becaufc fo
many would find themfelves in thefe
Circumftances, that they would ibon be
fcnfible of their Strength , • and , being
enraged at the Unrcafonablcncfs ofthofe
M 4 few.
1 6 8 TIpc Certainty and Neccjjity
few, whom they faw diiHngiiiflied from
them by fuch over-propoi tioned Advan^
tages of Life, they would join together
in a Defign of bringing things to a
greater Equality: And thofe who hau
tafted the extraordinary pleafiires of Go-
vernment and Excefs, whofe Imaginati-
ons had been entertained with the Pride
and Elegance of Living , would endea-
vour to fupport the Difference of their
Condition^ and be- , reftlefs under the
Lofs of it , and would employ all their
Art and Strength •to- recover their
Ground , and trampk upon the reft of
Mankind.
This would be th? Effea of a full Efta-
hlijhment of 7rrf//g/cJ';^*in*thet.\Vorld, if
we confider the pre/hit, State^nd Conjlitu-
tion of dl hmmhe [oocieties ; there being
no Nation or Society of Men, in which
the far greatefi Part of the People are
not forced to ufe Abundance of Pains^
and to undergo 2. great many Troubles^ and
Difficulties^ in fupplying their own IVants,
and in mini firing to tht^ Eafe and Pleafure
&f others. .. , •
But, let. us fuppofe Men united toge-
ther upon what Terms or Conditions we
pleafc , however things arc divided a-"
i • ■ ' ' nioiig
m
of d^ligiqn in General, i 6^
mong them, if everj Man be convinc'd
that there is no God, nor Keligwyi^ the
Confusion and Mifery of all will be the
certain Confequence of fuch a Behcf.
For every Man being to purfue his own
Happinefs^ and there being as many fe-
I'eral Notions of Happincls as there are
different Pafjions and Inclinations in the
Soul of Man, all which require different
Methods of Purfuit^ 'tis impofTible but
Men mull clafli and interfere one with
another, and every one's Happinefs be
built upon , or promoted by the Mi-
fcry of others ; which muft end in the
worft State of War imaginable. When
Luft , Ambition , or Revenge is the
ruling PafTion in a Man's Mind, what
fliould hinder him from making the Mi*
fery, or Dcftruclion of a Nation the w^ay
to his Satisfaction , if he can do it fe-
curely, or judges nothing more terribJe
than the Uneafinefs of his prefent Con-
dition? And the fame may be faid oif
any thing elfe^ that a Man places liis
chief Jiappincls in , whatever w^as the
Caufe of fuch a Choice.
All that can be alleged to avoid thefe
dreadful Confeqiiences^ which feem to be
the certain imm^diata Efcch of Jtheifn/^
■ hy
I/O The Certainty and NeceJJity
is, tliat the Advantages of Society and X/-
nion are fo very great, and every Man is
lo fenfible tliat his own particular Happi-
nefs is included in that of the Publick,
that, by vertue of this very Principle,
Men will readily agree to obferve all fucli
things as tend to the common Prefervation^
and Welfare of Society,
To which I anfwer, That this indeed,
to Perfons who have felt or confider'd
the Inconveniencies and Calamities of a
State of Divifion, is a fufficient Motive,
to enter into^ or continue in Society, upon
fuch Terms as do then feem to conduce to
their particular Happinefs ; but if, after-
rvards^ it fliall appear to any of them,
that the breaking of any of thefe Terms
and Conditions will contribute more to
their Happinefs than the keeping them,
they are as much obliged to ad contrary to
their former Promtfe^ Contracf^ or Agree-
ment, as they were at frfi to make it.
And, if we rightly confider things,
we fhall find. That the Generality of eve-
r]i Society are Men of too narrow and
confin'd Underftandings, to perceive all
the ill Confequcnces which the^r particu-
lar Aciions^ may bring upon Society^ and,
if they have fome confafed Notions of
them,
of Religion in General. 1 7 i
tncm, yet the Mifcliiefs do not appear to
I'lcm Co near as to fall in their Dajs^ and
uwolve them^ and they have no concern
bc\'ord tbe/r o-ivn Lives.
Belldcs, the ^^reatelt part both of thofe
who are, and thofe who are not, capable
of fuch Judgments and Reflexions as thefe,
arc too ilrongly afle£led with the Senfe of
I prefent Good or Plenfnre to forego the tm-
I mediate Gratificatio/is of their Defires, up-
on a fair?t Profpeci of uncertain Mi [chiefs
that may attend them ; and which, if
they do happen at all, do not {q^.tcv greater
or TKore difficult to be horn, than their prc-
fent Self-denial.
lie therefore who is a thorough j4theifi^
and will purfue his Principles as far as
thev will carrv him, muft look upon all
the Notions of Government, ^^^^^^y and
Property^ of what kind foever they be,
with all the pretended Grounds and roun-
dattons of them, and the feveral Relations
fuppofed to refult from them, either as
fatj'e Pretences, devifed by fome cunning
Men, by the means of which they would
lay certain reftraints upon others, that fo
they might enjoy their onn Liberty to more
advantage; or as ufelefs infignifcant In-
vent tons
1 7 2 The Certainty and Nccefflty
'ventions , wliich make no manner of
Change in the Condu6l oF Life, but leave
every Man to acl the fame way, as he
would do, if there were no fuch Notions
or Expreflions ever Iieard of :
He muft look upon himfelf as the Su-
freme "^n^ge of his own Happinefs^ and the
Chief Goi'ernour and Director of his own
Actions : and being fully aifured that eve-
ry Man elfe is fo too, he is not to expecl
that any other AUn will contribute to his
Ha^pinefs, any further than as he thinks
he ferves his own Interefi by it ; nor can
he conceive a Defign of contributing to
the Happinefs of another Man^ but upon
thQ fame Con fider at ions: And, being well
convinc'd of thefe things, and refolvM to
aft accordingly, he muft examine where-
in his chief Happmefs confifts, and how
he may beft attain it ; upon which En-
quiry he will find. That he muft place
his Happinefs in the Enjoyment of the
^r eat efiF leaf lire which he is capable of,and
which has the leaf Allay ^ or. mixture of
Pain with It. Now, in pui'fuing what he
thinks the greateft Pleafure, and avoiding
what he judges will be any ways Painful
to him , He muft perform^ or amit^ any
Afiton whatfoever, tlic Perfarmance, or
Omit"
of ^itgion in GcncrnL .175
■Omiffioii of which, hc^r/dges conducive to
'ffofe Ends which he has propofed to him*
(c\^\ and fo he knows miift every other
JSLi/i^ who 'lets upon tlie J'nme Principles
that he docs, be his Notions of Happinefs
or Mifcry never To different from his:
upon which account he cannot but ac-
knowledge , that nil Actions arc altke^
and of the fame Nature^ and that there is
ho ground for any diftinftion of them in-
to lii-ivful and iinlxwful^ yijt and tinjull^
vertuoHs and vittous ; becaufe there is no
Kjnd, or Sort of Action imaginable, but
may contribute indifferently, either to the
H^ppinefs^ or Mifery, of fome Man : and
coniequently, he mult alio grant, that
there can be no certain Rules ^ orPrinciples
of Actings no particular Set of Actions^ or
Scheme of Life^ wliich will certainty pro-
cure, any Man that follows it, more Happt-
nefs^ than he could obtain by any other
weans ; but the fa?/^e Man mufv be obliged
oftentimes to aft contraryWaySy and to pur-
fue the fame End by the mojt oppofite Me^
thods imaginable ; and, if he be utterly
difappointed of his Hopes, by the interfe-
ring Purluits of others, he mull change his
chief Pleafure , and chufe a new Objeft
of his Happinefs, lead he fliould undergo
a izreat
174 "^^^^ Certainty and ISiecefflty
a great deal of Mifery for obftinately
fticking to his tormer Choice :
And further, the Perfon, whofe Cha-
ra8:er we are drawing, if he will be true
to his own Principles , Oiould not be
deter'd from the Pi'ofecution of his Ends,
by any Concern for the Happnefs of others^
or Senfe of their Mifery^ or by any regard
to their "Judgment and Opinion concern-
ing his Aclions, and the Meafures he
takes :
He is never to prefer the public!: Good
of a C/'O', Nation^ or Empirey to his own
private SatisfaBion^ tho' it were to laft
but for a moment , if he cannot be fo
happy without it. Generofity^ Friendfiip^
•.indGr^aitudey muft give place, when they
do not ferve to promote his Attainment
of what appears more agreeable to him
than the doing fuch things as go under
thofe Names ; all Sentiments of Tender-
nefsy Pity, and Companion are to be laid
afide, when the Sufferings and Mifer^es
of others can procure him what he efleems
a greater Happinefs than the Eafe of
complying with thofe foohfli Difpofitions
of his Nature or Temper, which, toge
rbsr with all other Inclinations that he
finds
of ^ligion in GcneraL 1 7 5
finds ill himfclf, his Reafon tells liim are
to be direfted toward liis chief Happinefs ;
whicli coiiilfts in the Gt\tttjication of the
jlrongelt and ?fwjl i,'igorous Pa/Jion of the
Soul, whichfoever it is that happens to be
the uppcrmoll in hisConftitution :
He is to look upon all the Notions of
Praife ^ Horiotir^ and Rcput/itior/^2.s meer
empty Names ^ when afcribed to a Man on
account of any thing but Cunnnig and
Art in the ?nanagi?!g and ndvar/cing his
own Ifjterejl^ and bringing about all his
Defigns of this nature, by the furelt
and moft effectual Means lie can ; and
therefore nothing whicli ferves for the
promoting this end is to be accounted bafe
ov dijhorwnr/ihle-^ but, if the World will,
contrary to Reafon^ and ihcir own Princi-
ples^ agree to call fonie things fo, and
reputation be necefjary to him in the
Profecution of his chief Pleafure^ or the
imaginary Vneajhiefs ot Dijgrace fpoils
his Enjoyment of it, he muft comply
with the e/Uh/ilb^d Error, while it pre-
vails, but lb I'ar only as itjUnds inhu jvay
to Happinefsy or helps to promote it :
And laftjy. The Per/on thus confirm'^d
tn Ir religion^ being fenfible that his Life
is the ut?ncjt Compap and Extent of his
Happi'
i y 6 The Ceitainty and Kecefflty
I{appi/7efsy all his Cares and Endeavours^
all his Concerns and Deftgns are to be
confined within the fame Bounds ; he is
to have no regard to Memory or Pofien-
ty, lie is not to be concerrPd if the whole
Race of Mankind Hiould end with him^
nor to abate any thing Q^his frefent Sa-
tisfaction^ to procure the greatefl: Ad-
Vantages imaginable to fucceeding Ge-
nerations,
This is a fhort Draught and Reprefen-
tation of the Faithy and Practice^ of one
who, upon a full perfuajion of Mind, de-
nies the Being of a God.
'Tis true indeed, there are very few, if
any, fuch thorough Athetjls in the World ^
as come up to this whole Chara6:er. The
Generality of thofe who are ftiled fo, arc
either fuch as never thought any thing of
the matter, or elfe h2.VQ fome fmall Re-
mains of Religion about them , which ^
their Reafon, and Education will not give
them leave wholly to caft off: But, if
the Ignorance of the one, and Prejudices
of the other were removed ; ( as if A-
theifm fliould fpread, and come into a
general Reputation, they foon would be,>
fhen (hould we perceive that the difmal
Effed':
of ^ligion hi General, \yy
Effccls and Coiifequcnces of thefe Prin-
ciples were far greater and moredrcad-
ful than we can now imagine or de-
fcribe. For there's a great deal of Dif-
ference between an ignorant^ ox half per -^
funded Atheift^ and one that is pof.ttvely
and fully fo, upon 'Judgment and Re^
flexion. Should a Nation of People be
duly taught and inftrudled in the Do-^
cirines of Irreligion^ they would be much
more ailonifliingly wicked than thofe
who had neuer heard of God ^ or who
retai-fi'd fome loofe imp erf e^ Notions of
him.
Ahd if God fliould fuffer this to be
the Refult of the bold Talk and Argu-
ing of the prcfnt Atheifts of this Nation ;
they would then repent that they did
not keep their opinions to themfehes^ and
make their Advantage of other Peoples
Credulity : For, if a/l the People, or any
confider able Number of them wQi't of their
perfwafion , they would foon overturn
Goz'ernrm-nt, and bring all things to an
Equality^ and then tarewelall the Plea-
fures , Enjoyments, and Canvcniencies of
Living , when ez^ery Alan mufl labour
'^nd toy I to maintain his oivn Life, and
i/S Tlye Certainty and TSlecelJity
at the fame time be in continud J: ear
of having it taken away by others,
WJiat I have fiid of Atheifm^ is, with
very Uttle Difference, appHcable to all
manner of Detfm^ which is fuch an ac-
knowledgment of a God^ as includes
little or no Religion in it. For, if the
Detfi be of the Eincure<xn !Seciy and makes
God an un-concern*d Spectator oj Humcin
Act ton s^ he muft, as to what concerns
his own Condu6l, ]udge and cici altoge-
ther t\\^fcime way that the Atheift does :
For, if God require nothing of him , if
he be not f leafed or offended wtth any
thing lie does , nor hath annexed any
Rewards or Punijhments to this or that
fort of Life, then has he ///// Liberty to
chufe for himfelf, and to profecute his
own Happincfs in what way or manner
he fhall think fit ; which is exaft ly the
Cafe of the Atheif,
It is the fame thing, in effe£l:, with
tliofe who make God a necejjary Canfe^
and Men necejjary Agents : For , accor-
ding to this Opinion, ^// A6lions are *e///.'t',
as being equaky necejfary, and every Man
muft be guided by his own Determinati-
ons \ and then there can be ;j<3 general
RuLs
o/^'li^^ion ui General. 179
{tiles or Principles for Men to a6t by;
'lerc can be no fuch thing as Obligation:,
I {toward or Ptr,jijhment : nor will any of
ihofe Notions or Di(linciions^ which are
taken away by Athetfmy ha ve any place
or foundation under this Hjpoihcfis.
As to the Perfuafion of thofe who be-
lieve a Gody acknowledge fome fort of
Proz'tde/jce, and grant that fome regard
is due to the fouereign Author and Go-
fer nour of the World , but deny a fu-
ture State : There fecms indeed to be
a confiderable Difference between this
and the 01 her extravagant Suppofitions ;
and fo indeed there is, as to the Credit
htlity of the Opinion , but the Influence
it has tdpon Practice is very near the
fame ; cfpecially with refpe6l to thofe
of thefe latter days^ to whom the Cer-
tainty of a future State hath been more
fully difcovcred. For, if we confider
the prcfent Pofure and Conflituttun of
Human J fairs , and we believe that
things have always gone on in the fame
Courfe from the beginning, without |any
fenfwlc extraordinary Inter pofition of Pro-
vidence , as they who deny all Revela-
tion muO: believe ; if, I lay, we are of
Li' N 2 this
1 8o T7;e Certainty and Ncceffity
this Opinion , and obferve how things
are managed in the World ; how Wick-
edmfs oftentimes thrifts and flourijhes^
and that not only for a fenfon ^ but
fb as to ilrengthen and fix it felf upon
as lading l^oundations as our Happinefs
ftandsupon; and how, on the contrary,
the CaLmnties and Sujjerings of the
Righteous are often commenfurate to
their Lives, and a great many of them
are meerly owing to their being Righte-
ous ; what Force or Power can fome
flight Sentiments of Religion have upon
us, when the frefent Happinefs of thio
Life m.ay be promoted by aQing contrary
to it, and we have nothing to lofe or fear
after Derah^
I fliall not examine liow far we are
pblig'd to a6l in fuch a cafe, upon the ac-
count of the certain irreftjlible Poiver of
God, which he may exert, if he will, tho'
it fliould be granted that he has not hi-
therto done it, or upon the account of
the Benefits we may have received from
him ; but we fhall find this true in fact,
that thofe who are firmly ferfraded that
God will exert his Power no other wife
than he hath done alrea^ly^ vrill not, by
thofe Pumfmnents which they fee light
Pro-
of ^'ligioJi ill GcHC)\iL I 8 I
Promircuony, upon nil forts of Men ^ at
different Ttmes, and in d/ffere/fi- Circum-
fiances^ be dctcr'd from pro fee if: in a, tliC
Dcfigns which tliey have framed for
the Attaintment, or EftabUfliment of
their onm Hdlfpinefs^ by Any means which
they fliall think hkely to fuccecd.
Thus have I endeavour'd to give a
true account, and Reprefentathn of all
kind of Irreltf^ion^ and to flicw the ne-
cejfary Effects of it, with refpedl to the
Happinejs of Mankind,
And now, upon a fair and iufl: compa-
rifon of Religion and Irreligton together,
according to the different Notions^ and
Confequences of them , Religion mud
needs appear, not only more agreeable to
the Reafon and true Interefl of Men tn ge-
neral^ more juitable and proportionate to
the Capacities and Exigencies of Human
Nature ; but more conducive to tlie Hap-
pinefs of particular Men^ in the prefent
Conjlitution and State of humartSociettes
in the World ; fo that, upon a due Ba-
lance of all the ufual Accidents of Life, 'tis
njery probable t\\2i\, a Religjous Man Hiould
cx\)oymore Happinefs \v\\i\c he lives here^
than a Perfon of another Character: as
^ ^ N 5 might
1 8 1 71)6 Certainty and Necefllty
might be fully and particularly made out
if there was occafion ; but this requi-
ring a fet Difcourfe, and not falling di-
reftly within my prefent Defign, I think
it fufFicient to mention fome few general
Confiderations only, which fhew the
Advantages which a Religious Mm has
above another that acls by contrary Prin-
ciples. Such as are thefe following :
He who a6ls upon a true thorough Senfe
of Religion, hath, with refpe8; to all the
external Enjoy/ijents of the "World, more
contracled Defires and fewer Wants than
another; and, confequently, his Happi-
nefs does more feldom interfere with
any other Man's, and he is lefs obnox-
ious to the Aflaults of En;uj, Ambition
or Covetoujnefs, than the Wicked, in their
Profperity are.
He is not eager in the piirfuit of the
f?ecejfary Si/pports^ and lejfer Conveniencies
of Life, and he takes care to avoid all
mianner of Injuyj and Offence of others ;
and therefore he m.uft be freer from the
Efled's of Anger , Malice, and Revenge^
than fuch as advance their own Eaie
or Fortune byj difquieting and robbing
others:
He
of ^li^ion ifi Geneyal. i 8 5
He profeiTcs to contribute all that lie
c.\\\ to the liappff/cfso'i other Me?/, with-
out dcric,ning any Worldly Advantage
to himfclt" by It, up^n which account a
great many will find it their Interefl: to
defend and fecure him, and will perform
levcral Offices of Kmdneft to him, in or-
der to engage his future Endeavours for
tliem when there fhall be occafion;
H'liereas, he that is known to a£l for
limfelfonly, will be trufted and affifted
"0 further tlian liis own prefent Interefi:
IS perceived unavoidably to concur with
another Man's:
And laflly , the Happinefs which a
Religious Man propofes to himfelf in a-
not her Life isfuch, as, he is firmly per-
fuaded, exceeds all Experience^ Imagina-
tion^ or fojfihility of Comprehension \ and
confequently, the Hopes of obtaining it,
being ftrong and vigorous in proportion
to his Belief, mud afford him greater
Pleafure here than the Hopes of any other
Enjounent of this Life could ; and a well
grounded Hope of the greateft and hap-
pielf Condition which a Man can frame
to himfelf here, which is gradually in-
crcafing, by a fuccefsful Advance of the
beii laid Defigns lor the Attaintment of
N 4 it-
184 Tl?e Certainty and Necedity
It; is, I believe, comparM with any /icfual
E'/ijoymem whatfoever, the high eft pitch of
Fleafure that we can be fenfible of, with-
out the Frofpect of a future State, which
mufl: fo far exceed this, as the objed of a
Rehgious Hope is greater^znd more durable
in the PojfeJJion^ than any other, and as
the prefent AiTurance of in joying it is lefs
liable toL'i fappointment 2ind. Defeat ; which
it certainly is in many refpe£ls, there being
no external Accidents^ or Humane Endea-
I'ours \vhich can deprive us of it.
This being the State and Condition of
a Religious Alan J he mull: be generally
inuch happier than the Wicked^ in Truth
and Reality , tho' perhaps not in their
'judgment of him ; as enjoying more Eafe
and Satisfaclion in himfelj\ by a conftant
unalterable Succefs in the purfuit of his
main End \ as being Ujs exfofed to the
Injuries of others^ by reafon of his aflifi:-
ing fome, and his taking due Care not to
intrench upon the Happinefs of any ;
and as being better able to bear thofe real
Calamities and Mi fries which may hap-
pen to him, by a certain, comfortable
expedation offach Hafppinejs as will in-
'fnitely outweigh all that he can fufter
within the Compafs of this Life.
>
(?/ ^U^ion in General, \ 8 5
This I think abundantly fufficient for
the proof and Eftablifhment of Religion :
but , for a further confirmation of it,
and that I may leave no room for the
Enemies of God, and j\Ltnktnd to £^Iory
in their Strength, as if they had as much
to fay for their Opinions, if they might bf
heard , as we have faid for ours ;
V. I fhall, in the next place, confider
the Grounds and Pretences of Irreligion ;
wh-dXcan ^^ urged in defence ot it, and
what are the uj'ual Pleas for it ; and fliall
from thence fhew the ylhj'urdity , and
Folly of their condu6l, who have no bet-
ter Reafons for what they believe, and do
than thofe which they allege, upon exa-
mination, will be found to be.
IntheProfecutionof which Sub jed, I
fliall obfervethefe Steps or Meafures :
1. I fliall enquire how far /;t67/^/o^z is
capable of beitJg proved, what Kjnd
or Degree of proof it admits of.
2. I fliall confider the common Ways
and Mithoiis of defending it.
3- I
lZ6 Toe Certainty and TSLeceJjlty
^. Ifhallanfwer fome of the prt/.'cipal
Ohjeclioiis made ufe of againft Reli-
gion.
4. I fhall make fome general Reflexions
upon the dtfjerent Grour.-is , and
Foundations , wh^ch Religion and
Irreligion ftand upon, and the diffc-.
rent Condii^ of thofe who ad under
the Influence of the one and tlie
other^
I. Ftrft then, I am to enquire how far
Irreligion IS capable of Proof ; that is, how
far a Man is aUe to prove that there is na
God, no Obligation of aEitng juch a way^
if there be, ox no future State of Happt-
siefs, or Mifery.
Were a Mandifpofed to beheve all, or
any of this, or had he a mind to convince
others, of the Truth of any of thefe Pro-
pofitions, what way or Method could he
take to fatisfie either his own , or their
Underftanding ? 'Tis plain, that none of
the things enquired into, are Objeds of
Senfe, or Internal Confctoufnefs ; we can-
not fee with our Eyes, nor feel with any
mtimate'Perception, that there is no God^
no Religion, or Future State ; and there-
fore, no nevo Experiments, or Obfervations
of
of Religion hi Gemrd. \ 87
^\^ this nature, nor any old Tefiimomes^
ov Jathorities , grounded upon fuclu
ive any place upon this Subjecft, any
iirther than they turnifh Matter fori^cft-
'/iing and Rejkxion\ from whence we
mull: immediately derive all the Know-
ledge that we can have of any of the ?ro-
pofitions in queftion ; all which being ne-
gative^ there's no other way of proving
the Truth of them, but by fhewing, ei-
ther their Repugnancy^ or tlieir Dtfagreea-
blenefs to Our Reafon^ and to thofe other
Principles of our Kjmvledge , which we
cannot poffibly doubt of ; the firft way we
denwnjtrate them to be certain^ the latter
we make them appQ^iV probable.
As to Demonjlration ; there's ao Avay
of denwnfirattng a thing not to be^ ^ut ;hy
proving, that 'tis impolTible, and ^ fiom-
tradicHon to be ; and who will und^rti^ie
to convince tlie World, that it is i^npoffi^
ble there fliould be a God r or fuppoljnc
tlierc be, that Religion^ and a hutur'e
State , are downright Contradictions^
What is there in any of thefe Notions
that Ihocks our Reajon^ and rellrains our
Affe'rt f What other more certain Know-
ledge have we, with which our Belief of
thcfc things is inconfiilent } There was
never
1 88 The Certainty ami Ncaffity
never any Proof of this kind offered, or
pretende J to yet ; the Vanity of all fuch
Attempts being eafily difcoverabie, upon
the fir A Tryal of our Underftandings that
way.
All that remains then to be done, is,
to produce fuch Reafons and Arguments
for the Doctrines of Irreltgton^ and to
fhew fuch Marks and Chara8:ers of
Truth upon them, as fhall render them
fuitMe and agreeable to our Minds ; fo
that, upon a fair Propofal, we fhall be
eafily inclined to embrace^ and ajfent to
them, tho' the Evidence be not fo ftrong,
as irrefifiibly to determine us.
This we call arguing from Probability ;
which is nothing elfe, but an Appeal to
the common Keafon of Mankind ; fo that
what the generality of Wife Men^ in alt
Ages, have, upon due examination, af-
fented to, as mofi agreeable to right Rea-
fon^ that opinion is mofi probable ; and,
in matters of pure Rejiefhon , deduced
from the firfi Principles of Knowledge,
which are common to all Men alike, who
have the fame ufe of their Faculties, this
muft: be acknowledged to be a very good
Ruh^ and Meafure of Probability : But
Athetfm and Jr religion will never ftand
this
of ^cU^ion in General. 189
this teft ; the wife, and learned part of
the World having condanr'y rejecled,
and condemned them.
But, fuppofing tlic Dilquii>ion were
to begin /ww , and Men were to chufe
their Opinions again ; how would a
Perfon go about to prove , that 'tis
pwre agreeable to Renjoriy and the Na-
ture of Things^ that there fliould be no
God, no Religion, nor future State, than
that there fiiould be any of thefe
Things ?
All the Arguments that can be made
ufe of upon this occafion, muft be drawn,
either. from our own Exiflence, and Co?i-
jlitution, or from the Exifience, Frame,
and Difpofuion of the World , and all
things )vtthout us. We are certain, that
we are, and we know not our Original^
or by what Faiver we came at firll to be :
We perceive a great many things without
usy the beginning of which we know not,
nor can we tell by what means they came
to exift : Is it therefore moll likely, and
probable, that there Oiould be no fuch Be-
ing^ as that which we fuppofe to be the
Caufe of all thefe things, than that there
really is fome fuch }'erfecl Being ^ as we
f]ave before defcribcd, who was the Ju-
thor
t po The Certainty and TSleceJJlty
thor of all thefe EfFefts which we per-
ceive ? Can we , from the Oeconomy of
the (Vorldy and the iJourfe of Nature^ in-
fer, that there is no governing and dire^-
ing 'Power in the Univerfe} Can we,
from the Fra-me and Dtfpofition of our
own Mends, prove, that we are under
no Law or Obligation ofaQing? or that
Religion is defiructive of our Happinefs?
Can we, from the Circumjlances of our
Nature , or the Conjiituiton of things
without us, make it reafonable to think
that we fhall not live again, be confcious
of all our former Actions, and be happy
or mijerahle according to the different
KJnds of them ? However true thefe
things may, or are fuppofed to be tnthem-
felves, they will by no means /<?//£? »v from
the forementioned Principles ; and there
can be;;^ other but thefe imagined antece-
dent to them: For if God, Religion, and
a TutureState, are all po/fible, (as they muft
needs be acknowledg'd to be,) the real
Extjlenoe of any thing elfe will never fur-
nifh any Argument for their Non-exifience.
2. In vain then do we expect any di-
rt ^i Proof of Ir religion. In t he next place
< there-
of ^ligion in General. i p l
therefore I fliall confider the uf»al Ways
ind Methods of defending it ; which are
vlicfeFour.
Rtdicnling Religion.
Requiring a more certain MathemA-.
//c/t/ proof of it.
Endeavouring to fhew the PoJJiblity
of things fubfilling ivithout tt.
And railing fome looje Objections
againll it, which chiefly aim at the
prefent Profejjion and Pra^iiceoVit'in
the World.
I. As to the F/>y/of thefc ways; 'tig
certain that the G^'/^tr^/z/j of thole who
advance, or profefs any of the foremen-
tioned Opinions, contain'd under the No-
tion of Irreligion^ are fuch as barely derry
the contrary Truths, without giving any
Reafon for their Disbelief: they fpeak a
bold thing againft God^iwd Religion^ and
fo fall to then* Sins, without ever examin-
ing the Truth of what they fay ; a light
Word or Phrxfe applied waferwus Thu^g^
an odd Simile or Lumpanjhn^ a ridiculous
Turn or Allufwn is all they pretend to.
Now, there's notlnng fo well eftablifht,
orconfirm'd, but may he ridtcuPd^ tho*
it cannot be confided : ajid the greater
and
1 p 2 The Certainty and NeceJ/ity
^nd more fublime the Subject is, the fit-
ter it is for Burlefque ; the Boldnefs of
the Raillery heightens the Wit of it. But
I need not fpend time to prove, that a
'Jejl- is no Argument : Befides, I fliall have
occafion to confider the Perfons of this
Chara<?ter in another place, and fo fhall
pafs on.
2. To the Seco}id Way made ufe of by
the Patrons of Irreltgion to juftifie their
I^ifideiity; and that is, by alleging, that
the Doctrines of Religion, and the Proofs
given of it, have not that Degree of Cer-
tainty which they ought to have, in or-
der to their Convi8:i6n. Why, fay they,
are not fuch important Points as' thofe,
in which the Happinefs o^ Mankind is fo
far concern'd, made as plain and evident
to our Underifandings as any Pro^ofition
in Mathe7naticks f prove them to us in
tlitfame manner and we will beUeve them.
The Infujficiency^ and Abfurditj of which
Plea,will manifeftly appear from thefe fol-
lowing Confiderations.
For, firft of all, 'tis very abfurd for
Perfons to call for 7nore and greater Proof
of the Truth of a thing before they have
confuted any one of tholb x4.rguments
that
of ^li^ion tn GoicraL i^r
that are already advanced ; and there
Fore the Proof that has been given of
Rchgion, whatever it he, is fuificient,
till it be overthrown by contrary Alle-
gations.
. In the next place, 'tis ridiculous to ask
for o^her Kjnci of Proof tiian the Nature
of theThi/ig in que ft ion will bear ; it be-
ing the fame as to defire, that the Nature
of things riiould be chang'd : and there-
fore to call for Mathemnticd Demonllra-
:/(7/2 in Points of Religion^ is as much as
10 lay, let Keltgion be turn'd into Mathe-
7nxticks , and we will believe it ; the
Meaningof which is only this, that fuch
Men as thele like Mathematicks better
than they do Religion -. For indeed the
Perfons who call for this kind of Proof in
Religion^ will allow of no fuch thing as
Demorifirntion any where but in Numbers
and Figures ; whereas we have as dear
Ideas of ma?jy other things, and do as evi-
dently perceive the Agreement^ or Difa-
orecment ot them , and make as certain
Deductions from them : particularly, in
the prcfent Subjecl we are upon, we
have as clear and diftincb Notions of
K^/20,vicdge ^ IV til y Rorver^ Duration^ and
all thofc other Original Ideas, from whence
O we
1 94 ^^ Certainty and Neccf/ity
we took our firft Rife in the Proof of jR^-
ligion^ as we have of Number and Yigure ;
we are alfo as certain of the Truth of
thofe Proportions, that Nothing cun make
It felfy that Something m^uft be eternal^
that Motion mujl begin from Will, and fe-
veral other, from whence all our Argu-
ments for Religion are deduced, as wc
are of fuch Mathematical Axioms asthefe,
that the Whole is bigger than any oj its
Parts^ that when equal Nmnbers are added
to equaly the rvhole is equal^ and the like ;
and the Deduction of other Propofitions
from thofe former is, in all the interme-
diate links of Connexion , as evidently
perceived there as here ^ and the main
Conclfifions are as certain as any Mathema-
tical Concliifwn^ at t\\\^ Jhne Dtftance from
the firji Principles of that kind of Know-
ledge, can be.
In the Proof of a God this is very plain ;
and if the Obligations of Religion^ and a
future State, will not be allowed to have
thcfime degree of E'vidence, as the being
of God hath, yet they have all the Cer-
tainty "* lis conceivable they fljould have, by
way of Dedu8:ion from any Ideas which
our Minds are furnifht with; fo that
fuppofing rhemtiue, they cannot be pro-
ved
of ^Ir^ion in General. ipj
ved any otherwife, than they are from bars
unnjfifled Renfori ; and therefore, 'tis very
iinjuft to require a further Dcmonjlration
of them , when the rational Grounds
which they {land upon, cannot be over-
thrown by contrary Proofs, I do not
mention the additional Advantage of /^c-
uelation^ becaufc that belongs to another
place.
But, befides all this, where we arc
under a necejjity of judging one way, (^as
we are in all iuch matters where it con-
cerns our Happinefs to att^ or not to aB^
'tis contrary to Reafon not to be deter-
mined by that degree of E'Lidence^ what-
ever it be , which appears on one Jide^
when we have nothing on the other fide
to ballance it ; and therefore it mull be
very foolifli and abfurd to take the Party
of Irreiigion^ for no other reafon but this^
that the Proofs of Religion have not all
that Strength and Evidence of Conviction
iiicli fonie other Truths feern to have.
And yet this is the only Defence that
fome Pec^le make for then* Impiety and
'Vnbclicj.
^. But others there are vv^ho pretend
to build their Jrreligjon upon pojitive Prin-
O 2 ciples :
1^6 The Certainty and TSleceJfity
ciples ; and for that end have made neiv
Schemes or Hypothefes^ wherein they en-
deavour to explain the original Difpofiti--
on, and Condu^ of things without a God ;
but all that they prove, is, that they who
only defiled the common Do£lrines con-
cerning God , Providence, Sec, without
advancing any other in their ftead were
the wifer Men ; For all thefe new Noti-
ons of theirs, either fignifie nothing at all,
or they mean the fame thing as we do by a
God, or elfe they are altogether irrational
and contradictory.
What are Fate, Neceffitj, Chance^ and
univerfd Soul, but meer Covers for Igno-
rance, of the fame kind as occult Caufes ?
the true Refult of all which Principles is
a neiv fort of Creation ; where all things
are made by nothing, or nothing is fet up
as the ejjicient Caufe of all things.
But if thofe who ufe any of thefe
Names mean, by the Maker or Cauf of
all tilings,^ a Being dflincl from the things
made • J'uch a Being cannot be^onceived
without dl thofe glorious Attributes which
make up our Idea of God, For, if we
will allow the original Author of the
World the highefl Perfeclions imaginable
hy us^ as his Work certainly required i if
tlie
of ^ligion in GencraL \ p/
the firft great Caufe of all things had the
nobtefl Qudities nv can conctive^ as the
Etfefts produced by it fufficiently declare;
we muff grant this Author^ or C^iufe to be
an intelligent Bcwg, endued witli Kj20]v-
ledge and / Vtll : For 'tis irnpoffihle for Man
to frame a Notion o^ any Powers^ Facul-
tieSy or J^^alnieSj greater or nobler than
thefe y and 'tis eafier to believe, thatfomc
Mano^ more refined. Inlellecitials made the
World, than that any other Caufe^ which
wanted thefe PerfeBtons^ could be the Au-
thor of it.
I fiiall not here enter into a more par-
ticular Diiquifition of any Scheme, or //;-
pothefis , which excludes the Being of a
God ; having confider'd them all before,
in the former part of this Difcourfe, and
fliew'd them to be , in thofe Points,
where they mean any thing dtftnci from
the common Notions which we have un-
dertook to defend, very ahfurd and mcon-
fiftent.
And indeed, the Faljfjoodand Abfurdity
of all thefe Sche?nes and Hjpothefes^ which
pretend to give an account of the Frame
and State of things rvtthout a God, or in-
dependently of him, are fo manifeft and
notorious, that 1 am fully pcrfuaded a
O 3 Man
i 9 8 The Certainty and Neceffity
Man may be able to prove them fo, a-
gainft a great difproportion of Parts and
Learning ; but this is not my bufmefs at
prefent, nor is there any occafion for fuch
an Undertaking now.
For ,. fliould we allow the Jtheijlh
Scheme of things to be poffihle^ and con ft-
flent^ (^which is the moft that is pretend-
ed,) yet we are affured, by the commoyi
Redfon of Mankind, that the Philofophy
of a God is mofi vAtiond^ without the
Help of RevelAtion^ and uninjerj'd Tradi-
tton which confirm the Truth of it : and
therefore the Pcfptbtltty of another Hy-
pothefis cannot juftify the Defenders of
it, unlefs they can alfo make it appear to
be more reafonablej and more fit to he be-
lieved^ than that which obtains \ but the
Athe'tfi will never be able to give an ea,fer.^
]ufier^ and more pit is factory account of dl
the VhoenomenA in the Vmverfe^ than he
can who owns a God^ if he fhould offer at
fiich a thing, which is more than any one
has ventured at yet.
^ And the fame mav be applied to others
who acknowledge a God^ and pretend to
|hew that' there is no fuch thing as Religi-
(^^ and a Future States For they cannot
fav. t}iat Ged^ who made the fVorld. and
*^!^-' ^ •• all
of ^[{'^lon in GaicraL 199
all tilings in it, is not able to over fee and
govern the Works oF liis Hands ; that He,
who ^jtre Man his i^f///!;', and all his Fa-
culties ^nddapacities^ ca-M/rwt require him
to /ff? lifter fuch a manner ivhile he lives ^
or cannot renew him again after Death^
and cofitinue his Life to him, in fuch a
State as he fleafes to make agreeable^ or
di fd.gr ee able to him, and as long as he plea-
fes : This is to bring Weaknefs out of
Strength, to fet Bounds to God within
the acknowledgM Sphere of his Power,
and to fav he cannot do things which are
Itfs than thofe which he can do, and has
done.
Nor can they prove, that 'tis more ^-
greeable to the Nature of God, and to all
thofe Notions we have concerning Him^
and ourfelves, that he (bordd not exercife
liis Power after this manner than that he
(bould. The utmoft they pretend to
prove, is, that 'tis />«y/'7^/£' God may not do
all this that we conceive of him : as will
plainly appear, if we confider the chief
Arguments made ule of upon this oc-
cafion ; which arc taken from the fup-
polcd Mxteriality^ and Mortality of the
S')uL
O 4 Here
20O Tl?e Certainty itmi TSleceffity
Here lies the Principal Strength of Ir-^
religion ; thefe are the fundmiental Prin-
ciples , which the whole Fabrick ftands
upon; and great Endeavours have been
ufed to confirm the Truth of them. Now,
'tis plain to any Man, who duly confiders
thefe Notions , without that Confufion
and Ambiguity of Terms, which they
are commonly delivered in, that 'tis tm-
fojjihle to prove, that the Soul is not fome-
thing perfecHy diftinB from Matter^ and
Motion^ and all the Mod/fcanons of them,
and that it cannot fubfi(t^ and act after
the Dtjfolution of the Body ; nor are there
any Arguments to be produced, which
prove , that 'tis mere probable , that the
Sojtl fhould be fomething material^ and
be dtffolved with the Body^ than that it
fhould be a difiinB Principle and furvive
it. All that can be urged in behalf of
the former Opinions, is, that we cannot^
from the .Knowledge v/e have of the Qua-
lities and Operations which ^v/e attribute
to each, certainly demcnflratej that what
we term Soul and Body^ are t^vo dijhn'ci
Subllanccs) tho', at the fame time, ir
muft be confefs'd, that Men have been,
generdlly , more difpofed to believe.//^ ^^^
than the contrary Opinion j and 'tis r^-'
of (/^/(.^/ou tti Oeneyal. i o i
demon/lrable that the Soul is not zny Mode^
Compofitiori , or Refult of the Qualities^
M'hich we afciibc to Body, as it is that
*ny Idea we have in our Minds is not ayiy
other.
Allowing then that it is poffible ^ that
whatever we afcribc to Body and Soul fe-
farately, may be united in one common Sub^
jecJ; and that this common Subject, doth,
by Death, lofe thofe Capacities, and Poiv-
ersy which we attribute to the Soul^ m
the fame manner as it is divefted of Moti-
on ; fuppofmg, I fay, this, whicii is the
moft that can be fuppofed ; from hence
indeed it follows, that it is pojjible, that
the fame common Subjeci: may never fub-
fift in the fame manner it did before, as
we grant 'tis poflible, that what is now
at reft, may never be in motion again :
But then it is as poffible alfo that it ?nay :
God may, if he pleafes, put us together
again after death, in fuch a manner, that
we fhall feel our felves to be tlic fame
that we were before we died, and fhall
be confcious of all our former Life ; and
that he ivt/l do fo we have a great deal of
leafon to think, tho' we had not any af
furance of it from Rcze/ation, as has be-
fore been proved, And therefore the Ar-
gument?
2 02 The Certainty and Kcceffity
guments which are brought for the Ma~
teridity^ and Mortality of the Soul^ let
them have all the Weight and Certainty,
which they are imagined to have by thole
who urge them, are wholly trifling and
infignificant, with refpe8: "to what they
are brought to prove ; For no new Difco-
series are hereby made of the Will and
Defign of God ; and , confequently , the
Proof that has now been given of Reli-
gion^ and a Future State, will have the
fame Force and Evidence ftill, tho' the
Soul fhould be granted to be Material,
and Mortal : And we fhould ftill have
the fame Reafon to believe, that God does
require us to act after fuch a manner, and
that he rvill reward, or fumjh us, in ano-
ther Life, according as we behave our
felves in this ; becaufe the Arguments here
made ufe of in the Proof of this Point,
are not taken from the Immaterial^ and
Immortal Nature of our Souls, but from
what we certainly, by infallible Confciouf-
nefs, know of our felves, and from what,
by evident Demonfiration we collecl con-
-cerning the Nature of God, which every
Man who owns fuch a Being muft afcribe
to him..
Thus
of Religion in Gaicral. 20^
Thus have I examined the Prcteaces
of thofe Adverfarics of Religion , who
take upon them to eftablifli /?ew Pnj^crp/es
and Hyfjothefcs^ to explain the State and
Condritution of things by ; and have
flicwn, that the utmoil: they aim at, is,
to make it fecm pofjihle^ that thojk JppeA-
ranees in the World, from whence' w«
mfer the Betng of a God, Reli^ioni^ aTid
a Future State, may be othcrwije acc^oimt-
ed for ; and that they do not fo much
<is endeavour, either to defiroy our Scheme;
or, upon a jufl: comparifon in all Points,
to fhew, that theirs is a more rational Sy-
ftem, than ours.
But mod of the Profeflfors and Favour-
ers of Irreltgion, with whom we are now ,
in thefe latterTimes, concerned, arc fuch
as never trouble themfelves with Schemes
and Hjpothefes ; They come by their O-
pinions much eafier, a-nd maintain them
with lefs expence of Argument. Some
/oofe Objectton againft etny Notion, or Do^
ctrtne which goes under the name of Kf-
ItgWfi, or whatever has atjy Relation to
it is enough for their turn ; They never
examine what is the juft Inference that
may be drawn from what they Obje^l, or
>vhat Anfwcr may be given to it, but
im-
2 04 "The Certainty and Nece/Jky
immediately condemn all Religion fortht
&ke of fbme little remote Confequence^
which their Imagination repielents to
them as inconfillent with it.
^. Some of the principal of which Ob-
jedionsl fhall anfwer very briefly^ and
expofe the Abfurdity of them j which is
the Bufinefs I propofed to my felf under
the Third of thofe Heads, into which
I divided my Diicourfe, concerning
the Grounds^ and Pretences of Irreltgt--
T^h.Q chief ^r\d mojl common Objeftions
againii Religion are thefe :
Myfieries^ Imonfifiencies^ and Abfurdi-
ties in Scripture ;
Extravagant Notions , and pernicious
Doctrines^ maintain'd under the
Name of Religion ;
Variety of Opinions^ and Cenfures of
one another, among thofe who pro-
fefs to own the fame common Prin-
ciples of Faith , and argue from
them;
m
of Religion in General, 205
Fooltjh , and ridiculous Arguments^
brought by fome in the Defence of
true Opinions ;
The Scandalous Lives of great Pre-
tenders to Piety and Vertue, and of
fuch as are pecuHarly defignM to
promote the Pradlice of them among
others ;
Religion the Effect of Fear^ and Educa-
tion ;
Religion a meer politick Contrivance,
As to the firft of thefe Obje6lions ; I
fhall confidcr it no farther than as it is
made ufe of, to weaken the Credibility
of all Religt-'n', and 'tis fuificient to ex-
pofethe Weiknefs of it, to fhew the Ar-
gument barely with its Confequences^
which is this ; Such a Paffage m Scripture
I cannot under jhnd^ or reconcile to ano-
ther, or fuch a Story, or Account of Mat-
ter of Fa6l, does not agree with my Know-
ledge of things of the like Nature, there-
fore this Pafjage^ or Account isfalfe, there-
fore the Book in which it was found is
f^lfe, therefore nil the fever al Books m the
wJoole Bible, which were writ by fever al
Men, in fever d Rlnces of the World, and
at feveral Times, during the fpacc of a-
boui
io6 The Certainty and TSiecelJity
bout two thoufand Years, are all falfe ;
therefore there is no God, or no Obligation
of obeying him if there be, or no iuture
State.
Moft of the particular Cavils again ft
Scripture, have been fully anfwered by
thofe who have purpofely undertook the
Defence of Revelation : but it is fuffici-
ent at prefent to fay, that nothing of this
kind proves any thing againft the Truth
of Scripture in general, much lefs againft
the frji Fundamental Principles of Reli-
gion, which I have endeavoured to efta-
bhlh.
The next thing ob)e8:ed againft the
Truth of Religion, is; that there are Se-
vcvRlabfurdznd pernicious Doctrines pro-
pofed to the World, under the Name of
Religion , and warmly contended for,
by thofe who believe , and maintairi
them.
Some Men place all their Religion m
Shew and Pageantry, their Worfhip is all
Theatrical, and a great deal of their
Faith and Difcipline, extravagant and
Romantick ; therefore all Religion is
Priefl -craft , and all Scripture Legend^
faith the Jtheift ; but Socrates and Plato
^vould
of ^ligion in GoieraL 207
would not have argued thus ; thofe wifer
Heathens, tho' they laught at the Gods,
and Devoito'fio'i the People of t/jtir Times ^
ciid not therefore turn Atbeifts^ but em-
ployed the Strength of their Reafon in
icarching out higher Notions of God^ and
in framing to themfelves a more rtitiond
Religion.
litgotry and Super [lition have oftentimes
produced as dreadful and pernicious Con-
iequcnces to a Country or Nation, as the
wild Liberties and Extravagancies of A-
theifm could do : but what's that to Re-
ligion^ which luffers equally both ways,
and is no more the Cmfe or Occafwn of
the onc^ than the other ? Cruelty and Re
'venge, and all Actions tending to the mifi
chief o\' Dejl ruction of Mankind, are aji
contrary to the Nature of Religion whe n
exercifed by a fuperfi^tious Zjalot ^ a.s
when praftifed by an Atheifi ; tho' the
former covers them with tlie name of Re-
ligion, and the latter does not : and there-
fore true Religion is very unjulliy and
unreafonably condcmn'd upon this ac-
count.
Another foolifli Objection is taken from,
that variety of Opinions which is found a-
mong
20 8 The Certainty and TSleceJJity
ftiong the Profeffors of Religion , and
thtir peremptorj Cenjures of one another,
for holding falfe and abfurd Do6lrines.
What a ftrange DifAgreement is there
among Men in Pomts of Religion } Say
thofe that have none at all. Some believe
one thing , and fome another ; fome ex-
pound Scripture in this Senfe, and fome in
that ; Creed is fet up againfl Creed^ and
Jltar againft Jltar ; what one Man
thinks his Duty, another apprehends Dam-
nation from. Suppofing then we have
our Opinions to chufe, what is to be done
in fuch a Cafe ? fhall we take the Jlrongefi
Side, what the mofi, or what, we think
the wifcft believe ? or fhall we examine
the Reafons of all Sides impartially, with-
i)ut Prejudice, and let our Judgments be
determined by the great eft Appearance of
Evidence ? No, we will do none of ail
this ; but, without examining their feve-
ral Pleas, we will take up Opinions quite
Aifferenti\om all of them : and becaufe one
Man denies one thing, and another ano-
ther, that we may be fure to be free
from thofe Errors which they condemn
one another for, we will t^eny what no
Bo dj elf e dots, what ail the different Par-
ties fubfenbe to, and agree in. Thefe
are
of^'li^iofi in General, 209
are the Refolutions of the Irreligious ;
and what a ftrange Contradi£lion is this,
to make V/^ny of Coujhn^ the Character of
Truth, and yet to allow no Opinions to
be tiiie, but thofe that have the /eafi pre-
tence to it ?
Neither is it more juft and reafonable,
to condemn all Religion upon the account
of the weak Defence, and Patronage of
fome of its Frofejfors, What if the Athe-
ifts fhould be able to defeat fome trifling
Argument of ignorant iv ell-meaning Hone-
ft) , or fii^erjtitious Zjal ? to triumph
prefently, and cry out that Ignorance, or
Phrenjj was the Mother of all Devotion^
would be as foolifh a Boaft, as for a Ge-
neral to defpife the Weaknefs and Cowar-
dice o( his Enemy, becaufe he had plun-
dered two or three fmall open Villages,
when all the G reat Towns, and the chiet
Strength of the Kingdom had been unaf-
faulted, or attempted in vain.
The fcandalous P radices of Men of great
Pretences to Piety, and fuch as, by their
peculiar manner of Life, are look'd upon
to be wholly in the Inter efls of Riligtcn, is
another very unwarrantable Occaflon of
P fome
210
77;e Certainty and Kccefjity
fome Mens disbelieving every thing that
goes under that Name ; who infer from
hence, that fuch Perfons as thefe do not
beheve ReUgion them/elves^ and confe-
quently there's no more Reafon to think
that others do, tho' they difguife their
Notions better, in order to ferve their
prefent Interefl: ; efpecially if they be
Men of fuch Senfe as is fufficient to put
them above the fufpicion of vulgar Cre-
dulity. But this Argument is frlfe, and
unconcluding in aH its Parts,
For, Firit of all , it does not follow,
That fuch Men as thefe believe nothing
them/elves of what they profefs ; the truer
Inference is. That corrupt Nature^ vicious
Habits^ and a loofe Education are often-
times too hard for Conference and Reafon,
it being very plain that the fame thing
happens in feveral other Cafes. For
there's f^o Man whatfoever, be his Prin-
ciples never fo loofe and wide, and his
Reafon never fo much deprav'd, but fliall
many times do what he himfelf fhall con-
demn himfelf for doing, and which con-
tradicls the Principles which he refolv'd
to ftand by : and therefore , for a Man
to infer [romfofne grofs Sins of a Pretender
to Religion y that he does not believe any
thing
of ^•li^ion in General. 2 i i
thing ofwhat he profcircs, is as abfurd as
to prove, tliat an ^thc:Jl docs certainly
believe a God, wliatevei" he fays to the
contrary, becaufe he often frears b) hitn^
and invokes him in his Curfes,
Befides, fuppofe this true o^ fome Men
who pretend to a great Senfe of Rehgion
themielves, or undertake to promote it
in others, that they do -not believe any
thing of it ; as there are fometimes Pre-
fumptions ftrong enough to induce us to
judge fo; what reafon have we from
hence to conclude, th^t othersy of a more
unfufpeded Conduft, are all of the fame
mind, if we could but fee to the Bottom
of them ? or, what if there be a great
many f'^lfe Frete/iders to Religion ? how
is t\\\s ^w Argu?nent againft thelV///^// of
it ? we have no reafon indeed to believe
it upon their Word ; nor does tlieir con-
tradicting what they fiy by their PraQice
giv^e us any more reafon to disbelieve it.
Nor, a fame of thofe, whole peculiar Em-
ploywent it is, and whofe prefent biterefi
it ferns to be, to propagate and advance
the Belief of Reltgiou in the WoJd,
fhould be fuppofed to believe nothing of
it themjtlvesy would it follow from hence,
that their Unbelief was occafion'd by
• P 2 know
2 I 2 The Certainty and TieceJJJty
knowing more of it's falfhood than ,o-
thers, and by being better acquainted
with the whole My fiery and (lontnuance :
this is evidently proved to be falfe by the
Experience of thofe, who have thought
more, and enquired further concerning
thefe things than the reft of the World
have done •, for the more they have confi-
der'^d the fundamental Dodrines of Re-
ligion, and the more jtifi and exdi they
have been in tracing, and examining all
their Reafonings about them, tho, firo^ger
have they been confirm'd in the Belief
of them. But if there rf^/Zy ^r^ any fuch
Men, as, for argument's fake, we have
now fe^ppofed , they were certainly Jl-
theifis before they put on the Garb of Re-
ligion: and what fliould hinder an A-
theifi from taking up this Difguife, and
preparing himfelf for it by a clofe Difli-
mulation, who thinks all Means lawful
for the promoting his prefent Intereft in
this World ; and 'tis not every Atheift's
good fortune to be better provided for
in another Condition of Life , than he
might probably be hy acting a Religious
Part.
But.
of ^ligion in General. 1 1 j
But, if the Generality of dll forts of
Men mult be allow'd really to believe the
Rei/giou they prof tfsy this, fliys the i;-??^?-
Itever^ is the Kcafon of it ; A llrange
prevalence of Fear^ and ftrong Imprefli-
ons of Education have captivated their
Underftandings, and difpofed them all
to the fame way of Reafoning. Upon
this account it is that there have been fo
few true Philofophers, who were able to
think rightlv, and ludgc clearly of things;
But now and then fome bold Genius has
ventured to fhake off his Chains , and
alTert the Liberty and Prerogati-vc of /;«-
?nan Nature ; and as one Alexander^ or
C^efar^ fo one Epicurus^ or Lucretius is
enough for an Age : fuch Spirits are not
of the connnon Alike^ and appear in the
World but feldom, and are therefore to
be admired. To whicli it may be fufficir
cnt to anfwer, that I have already prov-
ed Religion to be the ntcejjary Ijjue and
Froduci of Reafon^ and of the jirfi un-
queftionable Principles of all our J\ji07v-
ledge ; and therefore, )vhatever elfe is af-
iigned as a Caufe of it muft bcfalfe.
But I have thefe further Confiderati-
ons to add, viz. tliat the Effeds of Fear
r 5 and
2 1 4 Tl^e Certainty and NcceJ/Jty
and Education never are fo uniform,
lading and univerfal as the Belief of Re-
ligion is obferved to be, efpecially when
they operate contrary to the Truth and
Reafofi of tilings, as they arefuppofed to
do in this cafe ; That Men are as much,
and as often, difpofed to der/y, as to he-
licve what they/I'^r, when the Grounds
and Reafons for (ear are the fame, and
are more inchn'd to the former, when
the t1:ings feared are reprefented at a
greac Diftance; That fenfud Appetites ,
Habits of iridul^ing them, frefent Enpy-
ments, or near ProffeBsof Pleafiire, and
Ctifioms of living contrary to the Rules of
Religion, have a much ftronger and m^ore
powerful Influence upon the Judgments
of Men, than fuch ImprefTions of Eear,
or Edtuation which contradiQ all thefe;
efpecially if Reafon be o{ the jame fide
with tliem, as the Patrons of Irreligion
muft fay; And therefore, neither iear^
nor Education, nor both together, can
be the true Cauje of fuch 2igenerd heltef.
of Religion as is profefs'd in the World ;
nor any thing elie but the Reafon and
Evidence of tht things believed.
The kil: Objedion I fhall mention,
which
of ^ligion in General, 1 1 j
which the Atheifl thinks tlic mofl: fotmi-
dablc of all, and a pciTe£l Diftovcry of
the whole My ftery, is, That Rei/gw/^i is
a Politick Contrti'Ance,
Now, tliat which gives occafion for
fuch a Sufpicion, is, That all the eminent
Pohticians, in their wife Precepts of Ad-
\'ice, have thought it neceflary for every
Prince to encourage and promote Religion
m liis Country, and to have a Shew of
't himfelf, whatever his inward Senti-
ments were. But /A^- is fo far from be-
mg any Plea for Atheifm, that 'tis a very
flrong Argument for the Truth^ Reafo}7a'
blentj's , and A'eceffity of Religion : For
that is certainly highly rational, which
is moil fuitable and agreeable to the
publick Reafon of Mankind^ confidered to-
gether in Soctetj ; without which there
would be little Ufeof K^-.tyc^/^atall. And,
if Men are bornfonable Creatures, if they
naturally defire 'jociety, and Society can-
not poffibly fubfifl: without Religion, as
the Objedi^lion it felf fuppofes, then is
Religion as agreeable to the Nature of
Man, and as necejfary to his Happinefs as
Conz'erfition, and living together. And
were it not for other Mens having Religt-
V ± on.
2 1 6 Tloe Certainty and Nece/JIty
on^ the Athetfl would find it very uncom-
fortable living in the World.
Thefe are the chief Fleas , Defences^
a.nd Oijecfio/is commonly urg'd and mfi-
fted upon, by the Enemies of Religion,
And, if there be any other, which have
not been here particularly confidered,
they admit of the fame Anfwers as are gi-
ven to thofe which are here mentioned,
or they may be as eafily accounted for
out of the Proofs before laid down, con-
cerning the Truth and Certainty o^ Religi-
on ; and therefore, without fpending more
time in making little Cavils , and ground-
lefs Sufficions^ look confiderable by a for-
mal Examination and Anfwer of them,
I fhall pafs to the
4. Next thing I propofed to do, in or-
der to fliew the Abfurdity and ¥olly both
of the Principles and Praclice of thofe,
who reject the great , and important
Truths of Riliown ; and that is to make
ibme general Repawns upon the different
Grounds and Foundations^ which Religi-
on and Jrreligion ftand upon, and the dif-
ferent Conduct of thofe, who act under
the Influence of| the one and the Jother.
Now.
of (J^eli^ion in Gencrah 1 1 7
Now, upon a drift and impartial Re-
view of what has been offered in this
Caiifc, wc fliall find, that all the fevcral
Fropofitions, contained under the Notioa
of Rfligio?i^ have been proved to be /r«e,
and agreeable to our Reafon^ by a dire^
Dedtdhon from the frfi Principles of our
K^nowledge ; which Deduction, in moft
of the Parts of it, has all the Certainty
that any confequential Truths can have,
and where there is not ahfolute Certainty^
there is as much Evidence as the Nature
of the things proved is capable of, in the
prefentCondition andCircumffanccs of our
Being, and fuch as the Mind fully affents
to, without being able to entertain the
leafl: Sufpicion of a Miftake, 'tho it can-
not prove there is not a bare PofTibility of
Error.
It will likewife appear tliat Religion is
in all the particular Branches and Duties
of it, admirably pted for the promotincr
the H-ipl'inefs of Mankind tn general^ COn-
iidering their prefent State and Condition
in the World .- And further, it will be
found to be very probable at leaft, if not
evident, that the grcateft degree of Hap-
pinefs, \\\\\d\Q\Qxy panic uUr Man is ca-
pabl<?
2 1 8 The Certainty and iSleccJJity
pable of, will be the Confequence of his
regular Difcharge of all the Obligations
of Rehgion, and that fro^ortionMy to a
Man's Behaviour^ in this refpecl^ while
he lives, flnall his Reward be in another
State-, but in every proportion greater
than can be conceived, or imagined by
us now.
And as the Truth of thefe Matters
will appear to be made out from the Rea~
fon and Nature of things ; fo will it be
further manifefl:, that the general Opinion
of the World has always gone the fame
wav : and , if Te(itmony , or Authority
could be of anv ufe here, that the beft,
and the greateft is on this Side.
Befides, we fliall not only be fatisficd
of thefe things by a pofmve direct Proof-,
but we fhall fee the contrary Hypothtfes
proved abfurd and mipoffible ; or, where
any thing foffihle is advanced , we fhall
perceive it to be lefs prohcihle in // fef\ and
the Confequence^; drawn from it , to be
falfe and ridiculou:>.
We fhall likewife be convinc'd, that
Libertinifm, and IrreLgion, do evidently
and dire&ly tend to the Mtfery of Man-
kind in general^ with refpeft to the ^tate
they are now in^ and that every Man who
acts
of Religion hi General, i \ 9
at^ls by thefe Principles, will very proba-
bly , if not certainly , be inconceivably
mifcrable in n?wthtr State of Life, in pro-
portion to his Neglect^ or VioUtion of the
Duties prefcribed by Religion.
On the contrary, we fhall find, That
the Docirims of Irreligion have none of
thofe Grounds of Credibility^ nor are^ or
can be defended by any of thofe Ways^
or Methods, by which Religion is efta-
blifhM ;
That they confift wholly in the Denial
and Contradiction of other Propofitions,
and therefore do not admit of any pofi-
tiz'e direflYvoo] but m Lift be proved by
a Confutation of the Aflertions deni-
cd;
That the Jjfertions denied by the Irre--
ligious , cannot be Oiewed to be f^lfiy
either from their Repugnancy , or their
DiJ agree ablenefs to our Reafon^ and the
antecedent Principles of our Knowledge ;
or from their Inconfiftence with our Happi^
7ief ; or from the common Suffrage^ and
Teflitnony 0'' Mankind-^
And that the negative Principles of Ir-
religion^ and the practical Confequences of
them cannot, upon ^ ju ft Comparifon, be
proved to be more fu it able to our Reafon,
or
2 2 o Tf:>e Certainty and ISlecelJity
or Happinefs^ than the contrary DoBrines
are.
We fhall likewife, upon a flight Re-
view of the common Arguments^ and 'PUas
that are brought for Irreligion^ be eafily
fatisfied , that notliing of all this is fo
much as pretended to ; but that the
ftrongeft EflPort of human Invention that
way, reaches no further than an Ofer at
explaining the Original^ Order ^ Courfe^
and Event of things, either without a God^
or independently of him^ or with Exclusion
to thofe particular Confequences refpeft-
ing Men, which go under the Name of
Duty and Sm^ Reward and Pumjhment ;
and that the moil: which any Endeavours
of this kind can amount to, is, to fhew,
that 'tis pojjihle things may be^ after that
particular manner in which they are ex-
plained to be.
Thefe are the different Grounds^ and
Proofs o^ Religion 2ind Irr el igion : And if
we carefully compare them together, it
will eafily appear, that they do not only
differ as /^i'^^rt', or lefs rational \ but that
all the Reafon lies on the fide of Religion ;
the Conception^ or Proof of a bare Poffibi-
l}ty of the World's fubfifting without any
fuch thing , being no manner of Argu-
ment
of ^cli'rioji in Goiernl. 1 1 \
ment that there is none. And therefore
It mud be very abfurd to deny all the
Principles of Religion , and every thing
that is offered in defence of them, upon
thi6 account only.
But allowing that there may be a great
deal more than this faid for hreligion^ lb
as to render it fomething probable to be be-
lieved ; yet if the pojiti've direci Proofs
for Religion ftand good, without confide-
ring thofe which pretend to fliew the Jb-
furditj , and Impoffibility of a contrary
Scheme^ the former cannot ftand upon fo
fure and frm a bottom as the Latter^ nor
be advanced XOifo high a degree of Credibi-
lity \ and therefore it muft be very unrea-
fonable to give our aiTent on that fide,
where there is the leafl Appearance of Pro-
bability,
Nay further, fliould we fuppofe the
Proof on both fides to be equal^ yet fuch
different Conftquences do attend the Belief
of the one and the other^ that 'tis the Ex-
tremity of Madnefs and Folly, to prefer
the Party of Irreligion : Wiiich, befides
the prefeiJt Pains ^ Troubles^ and Dij advan-
tages it is laid to bring upon the Perfons
who make this Choice, and the Mifchiefs
and Inco?iveniencigs which Mankind will
cer-
2 2 2 The Certainty and TSLecefJity
certainly fuflPer from one another upon
this account ; befides all this, I fay, it is
threatned with eternal^ imxprejjible Mife-
ry to come after this Life, And this is a
Confequence fo concerning and dreadlxil,
that it muft be a 'vaft Preponderancy of
Proof thsit can juftifie our running the ha-
zard of it ; which I am fure, is more than
any Man that makes the venture, can
pretend to.
I do not here argue, that a Man ought
to prefer Religion before Irreltgion meerly
becaufe 'tis f^fer fo to do ; becaufe, by
the Confp.jfioii of nil Parties, a Man fhall
not faffer any thing in another ftate by
fuch a Choice, whereas he that chufes /r-
religion has only his own Optmon for his
fecurity, and is threatned by the Perfons
of a contrary Perfuafion with eternal Mi-
fery after Death : I do not think this alone^
a fufficient reafon to determine a Man's
Choice to one fide, againft all other Ar-
guments to the contrary ; for then a Man
might be threatned out of any thing : but,
if the Evil threatned be very conftderabley
and 'tis full as probable , that it fhould
happen, as it is that it fhould not, which
is the Cafe now fuppofed, he a£l:s very
rationally and wifely, who chuies rather
tQ
of ^ligion in General. 22 j
to undergo fome Icjfer Inco)7ventencies at
prcjern^ than to put himielf i/i danger of
greater. Now, that the Mtfery annex'd
to Irreligio» is very confiderable^ cannot be
denied , it being reprefented as much
greater than can be imagined or conceived
by us : and t!iat this ^hjlry jhould be the
Portion of all thofe who believe and act
by fuch Principles, is as likely, as it is that
it fliould not be fo, whatever Hypothecs
be allowed.
For if the World were made by chance,
notwithllanding all the Characters oflVif-
dom we behold in it, why may it not as
well happen, that there fliould be a »/-
tare State^ and that thofe whom we call
Irreligious fliould be mtjcrable in it, and
the Religious Happy ? It looks indeed like
Wtfdorn^ and fo does the Regularity of the
World^ and a great many conjtant Dif-
crtmtnaiions made there. Why fhould
the Wind blow down the roLten Fruit,
and leave the jnuna ? Why fhould the
Plague fweep :x\vd.y fomey and \Q2iWQ others
in the fame City or Houfer but (\t may
be anfwered) there are natural Reafons
and y.aufts for thefe things : And fo there
may be for the other, for ought we know;
the i^^icked may be peculiarly citjpojed to
be
2 24 -^^-^^ Certsimty and TSlecejJlty
be miferable ; the fame Temper and Con^
fiitution of Bo^ or Soul^ whicli inclined
them to be wicked^ may render them mi-
ferable alfo when they live again ^ and
there is as much Chance for their living
Again , as their was for there frjt Be-
mg.
But if all things exift by Neceffity^ then
a Future State may be neceffary too, and
the Wicked may be necejfarily miferahle in
it, for any thing there is in this Hypothefis
to the contrary »
Where e^ery thing is fuppofed cafual^
ox every thing neceffary^ 'tis impolTible to
give any reafon^ wJhy any thing that may
be conceived to h^^ jhould^ ov jhould not
exifi', or JJjould, or jhould not be, after
fuch^ or fuch a manner ; and therefore all
things of this nature muft be equally pro-
bable ; becaufe nothmg can be alleged to
determine the Mind one way, rather than
another.
But, if there be a God^ and the World^
and all things that are^ have been^ or are
to be^ arp acknowledged to be the Effects
Q^his W^tll, there are no Reafons to per-
fuade us, that 'tis ?7wre probable that God
rvill not punijh the Wicked in another State
than
of ^li^ion in General. ii<^
thcin that he ivill ; at leaft they have not
yet been produced.
From whence it follows, That, it be-
ing equally probable in every Hyfothefis^ that
tlie Irreligious will be extrcamlj jniferabley
tliey have by their own Confejfiou^ and Ac-
count of things^ no more reafon to chufe
that fide they are of, than the other ; and
therefore, in this Cafe, a Man muft not
acl- at all^ or, if he does, the general 0-
pinionof or/'^rj concerning the fafefi fide^
iliould dired him which way he is to
aa.
But moreover, it is not only as proba-
ble, that the Irreligious iliould be mifera-
ble in a Future flate, as not, allowing any
of their orvn Hypothefes to be true ; but^
by their own way of Proofs it appears,
tliat our Hypothefis is as likely to be true,
as any other advanced by them^ nothing
further than a PcJJihiUty of theirs being
aimM at.
And not only {o \ but rve do alfo
pretend, by jnany direci andpofitive yirgu-
ments, to evince tl>e Certainty odours ; and
atthcnmie timetofhew all theirs to be
jtbfurd and i^npof/iLIi.
Wlierefore, if, upon an ejual Probabi-
//*^ we ought to take ih^ fajefl mcafure^^
Q. much
2 2 6 Jl?e Certainty and Necefftty
much more are we obliged fo to do, when
Redfon and Happi/iefs are both of the fame
Side. '
Nay farther, He who chufes that Fatth
and PracHce^ againft which Eternal Mife-
ry in another State is denounced, ought to
have, not only more Grounds of Prohabtii-
ty, but Certaifvty and Evidence of Convi-
ction o'[ his fide ; he fliould ho, fully fatis-
lied, from certxin direct Principles^ that
his own Opinions are right ^ or that the
contrary are ah fur d and irrational : becaufe
the Confequences are of that vaf irnpor-
tance , that tlie prefent Inconveniencies
whicli we are li<ke to fuftain, by ading a
contrary ivay^ can bear 'no proportion to the
hazard or likelihood of Mifery that attends
our acting this way.
Thus do we of the Proteflant Faith^
defend our felves againft the Papfh,
when tliey peremptorily condemn us to e-
'verlafing Mifcry , for being of contrary
Opinions to theirs^ without meeting with
the fime Returns from us, and then urge
us to take t he /^/f////^^': Thus, I lay, do
we anfwer ; did we beheve their Opinions
or Cenfures tohc probable^ tho' 'twas pofji-
bU^ and to us perhaps feem'd as probable^
cyvmorefo^ that they might ho falfe, we
^ would.
of T{clr^ion in General. 227
would thcfi allow fomc Weight in tlie Ar-
gument : But we do not rjow go over to
them upon the account oi\Safefj, becaufc
we not only thi/zL- our O^imois certain^
7\wA their s tmfojfihle^ abfiird^ OV /rrationa/^
and are fully perfuaded that we Invcpro-
"^ed them lb ; but, fuppoling our felves
to err in all the Points in controverfie be-
tween us, we think it derf^onJhabU fi'oni
common Principles^ own'd on both fidcs^
that none of tliefe Errors if they fliouid
be fuch, which, upon due care taken to
inform our felves better, are believed by
us r.s Truths^ can expofe us to the ha^zard
of D.i?nnAtion^ if in all things clfe we live
tip to the Principles of our Religion.
And if t lie Jthcifi can make the fame De-
fence lor himfelf ; if the Dochmes cf Re/i-
yjon^ and the fuPpofed Confequences cf Ir re-
ligion feem ^s abjurd and conirarj to ail the
principles of hi'! K^ponled^^e ^ Owned by
him, as the Popijh Tenets do to a nrott-
fiiint ; or as ridiculous and unrrayrantable
■^^ the yifons , Rtfi'eries , O'C Predictions
of every little EnthufJ.iJl , or Fortune:
teller^ to a Man oi calm^ fid.%te Senf ; and
if he be able to make this good in the u-
Ju.tl JVAjf and ?nethods of Re-ifontn^, tlien '
mav he defpilc our 'Unedtmngs , and
Q, - lau^h
2 2 8 Tl?c Certainty and KcceJJhy
laugh at th.Q Mifery of d FuPure Stale fc
curely.
But for Men to deny all tliefe impor-
tant Truths , without offering at any
Proof of their Falfliood ; to fay thev are
doubtful and uncertain Points, and yet
to a6l with the fame AlTurance and Se
curity , as if they were certainly falfe ;
to refute their Aflent to them for want of
greater and more evident Proof, without
confuting the Arguments already advan-
ced, or producing ftronger on the contra-
ry lide ; to laugh at the Terrors- of the
Lord, without proving them firrt to be
vain or refilfible ; to contradict the gene-
j-al Beliefof the World, without making
any new Difcoveries, or Obfervations ;
to lay alide a whole Scheme and Syllcm
of things, which has been proved and
ciiabliflied in all the principal Brandies
and Connexions of it, bccaufe they are
not able to comprehend, or account for
Ibme httle remote Conf^quence; and- to
venture eternal Mifery upon a feeming
PolTibihty of an Efcape, which very few
perceive or allow : Thefe are all egregi-
ous Inllanccs of tlie ahjurd Faith ^ and
■.foolijh Conducl o'iih^z Enemies of Religion ]
and confequcntly gpod Proofs ot the
Judg-
of ^ligion VI GenerJ. 229
Judgmentand Wifdoin of thole, who be-
lieve and acl upon co^Jtrarj Groufids and
Me,ifures.
There's another thing alfo wliich the
Atheiji commonly difcovers his Folly in,
and tliat is the piblijhing and jir op Abating
liis Opinions : For, 'tis more the Jtheifi\
Interel]-, that othtr People Hiould have
Re/igfo»y than it is any Religious Man\.
For, ^Jis whole Hafpinefs being in this Life^
the more other People are rclirain'd, and
tlie better they are periliaded, that he acts
by the Hune Rules which they do, the lar-
ger will his Liberty and Advamnges be,
and the lefs he will fufter from their De-
figns and Purfuits ; whereas the Religi-
ens jSU'fPs Reverfw?i is not endangered,
but confirm'd by what he lofes, or luticx'ii
here.
Other Proofs likewife, of tlie V^re^tfo-
ii.xblenefs , and Abfurdity of Irreligio)?^
might be brought from the hico/i(ijhnci
both of the Kt///; and FruHce of tljofe
who arc profefs'd Favourers of it : fuch
as tlieir Credulity and Readinefs of Bgiief
in common indifferent Matters, and tla.nr
embracing abfurd Opinions, wliich are
exploded by all the World befides, when
:at the fame time they are diilruftful of
Q J every
230 Tl^^ Certainty and l\.cceffity
every tiling upon the Subjeft of Religion ;
their believing Matters which concern
their prefent Happinefs v.pon weaker
Grounds; their expofing thcmfelves to
greater Troubles and Inconveniencies,
and running greater Hazards upon a faint
Profpeft of future Happinefs in this Life ;
and fometimes, on the contrary, fearing
and avoiding things upon a lefsAppea^
ranee or Likelyhood of Danger, than
what Religion affords; and laftly, their
aQ:irig contrary to their own Principles^
and denying themfelves what they efteem
fubifantial Pleafure and Satisfaction, out
of a regard to imaginary Notions, wdiich
hive no Foundation but in the Opinion
of Men. But , thefe being Matters of
common Obfervation, and too long to be
fully infiifed upon here, I fliall think it
fufficient to have hinted at thpm, aiid fo
pafs on to the,
VT. Sixth and lafl general Branch of
my Difcourfe propofcd in the beginning
of it, and tliat is, To give forne Account
of the Caujes of Jtleijm and Jrrciigicn^
or the Reajop^s which induce Men to take
lip fuch Opinions*
There
of^li^ion in General, 1 5 1
There is nothing which People are bet-
ter TatisHed of, than oftlie Power and In-
fluence of Prejudices^ and fdfe Motives
of "Judo^ino ; cverv body being apt to rc-
folvc tile Caufc of another Man's dilTei-ing
in Opinion from him, into fome particu-
lar Ihnfs upon his Undcrftanding. But
this we do commonlv, without exami-
ning whether tlie Pcrfon who differs from
us, has not better Reafons for his DifTent,
than we have for our Pcrfuafion; wlie-
thcr the Opinion lie is of be not, in the
Reahty of tilings, true, tho* he believes
uponfalfe Grounds; or whether we our
felves are not difpofed to iadg as wx do,
upon fome of the like Motives that we
fuppofe him to have followed. By which
means we are often, not only guilty of the
fame Partiality which we ciiarge upon
others, but are cither confirm'd in our
Errors, or elfe prevented from making
juft linquiries into the Truth of things ^
fo that, if we are in the right, it is by
chance, and more than we are able to
prove to our felves, or others.
Upon which account, I think it a very
prepollerous and deceitful Method ot
proving a thing falfe, toafTign (omt^ecu-
Q^ 4 llAf
2 5 - T7;c Certainty and Neceffity
har Prejudices and wrong Motives of judg-
ing^ which may foffibly induce Men to be
of fuch an Opinion, the' the Truth iliould
be of the other fide, and which have often
had the Hke Influence upon Men's Ui>
derftandings in other Matters ; and from
thence immediately, without any further
Proof, to infer, that fuch and fuch Per-
fons have no other Reafons for the BeHef
of the point in queftion but thefe, and
confequently, that they are in the wrong :
this, I fay, is not a fair way of arguing.
But, after plain and manifefi Proofs of
the ^Truth of an Opinion, according to
the ftanding Rules and Principles of Rea-
foning^ it is not only proper to enquire hovv^
any Men came to be of a contrary Per-
fuafion, but the Strangenefs and fceming
TJnaccountablenefs of the thing make it
expected^ and in fome refpe^l necejfary ;
in order to a fuller Satisfaclion of thofe,
who, notwithflanding all the apperr.uue
of Evidence to thenfelves^ mav be apt to
have fuch favourable Notions of Man-
kind, as to imagine, that Perfons, who
have the fame Faculties, and all other
Advantages oi Knowledge that they have,
v/eiald not deny whiit appears \o plain to
their
of (J^elig'ton in GcncyaL 25^
them , except tlicy had /'owe rational
Grounds for their Denial.
Having therefore, as I perfuade my
felf, f^f^y-, ^nd evidently proved thcTruth
of Religion ; I think, I may now be al-
lowed to fay ; That Atheifm and Jrrel/gi^
on mull be the EfftB of lPrc]udice and
Prepolfeffion only, if any fuch Caufe of it
be arfignable.
And if we fearch the Heart of Man,
and look into the hidden Myftericsof Ini-
quity lodg'd there ; if weconfidcr what
falfe and corrupt Renfomngs^ and what
other Arts and Methods of Deceit are u-
fed by Men to delude themfclves , we
fliall foon difcover the fecrct Spring and
Origin.ilof all Atheifm and "Unbelief,
Now, the Caifes from whence it pro-
ceeds are plainly thefe two ; The Fear of
an Jfter-reckoning for a ivicked Life, and
The Inanity of appearing^ either greater or
ivifcr than other Alen. The firfl of which
is the principal and niofl powerful Caufe,
and is only allifted, and ftrengthcncd af-
terwards, by the AccciTion of the latter.
And what other account can be ajffigned ?
Or what other Reafon can be given of
the Rife oi Irreli^ioia and ^Ay^»v;r Opini-
ons. Jt
2 34 T^^^'^ Certainty and MeceJJity
It cannot be the Force and Evidence of
Truth which produces Atheifm^ as is mani-
feft, not only from the foregoing Proofs
of Religion^ but from the Confejjion and
Conduct of the Atheills themfelves. It is
not becaufe the Notions of God^ Immor-
tdity^ and a. future State fliock the Un-
derftanding , and contradiQ: the plain
Principles of Reafon , that they deny
thefe Foundations of all Religion, Were
the Being of a God confider'd only as an
Hypothefts , to folve the Difficulties of
Nature by , without thofe troublefome
Confequences of Duty^ Sin and Punijh-
ment^ the Atheiji would not fcruple this
Philofophy ; and Lucretius himfelf would
eafily grant the Soul to be immortal^ to
be feparated from the Body and reunited a-
gain, would you allow him but this Con-
clufion, that neither feparate^ nor reuni-
ted^ it hath any Serfe or Remembrance of
what was done before the Separation. God
fhould alfo enjoy the Fulnefs of Perfection^
he fhould be clothed with all the magnify
cent Attributes that Man could conceive,
fo his whole Employment was the Com-
frehenfion of htmfelj^ and the Contempla-
tion of ht^ own Glory ^ and he was not
un-
of Religion in General. 235
unncccfTarily troubled to take account ol
■vir Aclions. This is the dreadful Appre-
henfion which perverts Mens Reafons,
and makes them deny what they Tear,
when they are refolved to run the hazard
of it.
The quieting and laying thefe fears^
Lucretius confelfes is the rvhole Defig/; ot
his PJiilofophy. Which is a farther Con-
firmation of what I have undertaken to
maintain ; as will appear from thefe fol-
lowing Remarks.
For firft this Fhilofopher obferves, and
feems to wonder at it, that the Fears of
Death were 'very gc nerd ^ and made frotig
Imprejjioris upon the Minds of Men.
2. He affirms that thefe Fears were oc-
cafioned by an Apprehenfwn of fame other
State after this Life.
^. He takes notice only of thofe whom
we ftile H^/VZy^, that were afraid, oi-^ fu-
ture ftate ; they were the chief Ob]e61:s
of his Pity and CompafTion, who, be-
i. 3. V. 1025, CJ-.. ^^^^^ the Fear of Scourges,
Racks J and Pri/ons in this
IVorldy were tortured with the Dread of
^cw , and more terrible Puntjhments , in
fome other ; and all his Arguments ferve
only for the Confolation and Encourage-
ment
■f 1
-^6 Jhe Certainty and ticcejjlty
ment of fuch unhappy Wretches, whoi
through Fe^r of future Fains ^ either de-
nied themfelves {omtfrefent Gratifcattofiy
or were uneafie under the Guilt of ^aji
ABtons 'j none but the Wtcked and Impt-
Lib. 5. ver. ,222. ^f ^ ^aiig Concerned in all
the rahulom, and Poetick
Stories o^ fut tire Torments^ which he de-
rides.
From all which it is very plain, that a
Kefolution to enjoy the Pleafures of Sin^
and to live in them without Check or D/-
jiurbmcey is the reafon why Men deny,
and feek for Arguments to overthrow,
thofe Opinions, which would otherwife
be embraced as moll rational ; as is
manifeft from Lucretiue'^ own Obferva-
tions.
For the univerfd AffrehenCion of fbme-
thing '-i/i^^r this Life^ which he plainly in-
tirnates, is no flight Argument of the
Truth of another State : as, I am fure^
the dijlingui^lbtng Fears of the IVicked^ are
a very flrong Proof of the effenttd Dif-
ference of Good and Evil, and the Duenefs
of Reward and Pumjhment accordingly.
For, otherwife, v/liy fhould the Wicked
condemn themfelves for what they do ? or,
S\v;;^0^\m.di future St xte^ whyfhould they
expeft
of^d'ijyion in Gcncrdl. 257
cxpecl to bi punijlyd in it f Why fliould
they not ratlicr conceive God to be of
t\\t\x Side? Why ihould they not give
him contrary Attributes, and make him
punijb the Righteous and reward the Wicked ?
Or, if tliat be too harfli a Notion of the
Dcity^ why do they not change the Na-
tures of Good and Evil^ and call Evil
good^ and Good evil } The Confcquence
is ftill the {lime. If it be Wifdom to Hve
as they do, if they Jive mojl up to their
A\t<ure^ and r^ojl agree ahlj to their Reafon^
what have they to fear ? if this be their
Cafe tliey may be fure, that Almighty
ll'lfdom and Perfection will approve^ and
be pleas'd ivith their Actions. But if
thelc Opinions offer too great a Violence
to their Reafon to be embraced by tliem,
it is plain that they muH: acknowledge,
not only that there is a Dijfere/ice in . /c//-
o?is^ but that theirs are evil ; not onlv
that foMe Aciiofis defervc Reward^ and
forrie Pu»ijh?^ient , but that the iatta- is
due to theirs^ or clfe what realbn is there
for Fears ? Or why do not all Me?t fear a
future State alike, the Righteous as well
as the Wicked r Now , when Men are
refolv'd to commit what they know to
be /// nnd puntjhaiU'y there is no Refuge
Iclt
238 The Certainty and TSlo<:eJJity
left but to contrive fome means of ImpunU
ty^ fome way of efcaping the Sentence
threatned ; and this they promife them-
felves by denying either the Judge^ or the
FUce of Fumjhment, And this is the true
Caufe and Spring o^ Athetfm, For no Man
ever deny'd a God who thought his Way
and Courfe of Life acceptable to fuch a
Being ; no Man ever queftioned a future
State who could poflibly perfuade him-
felf, that, if there was one, Happtnefs
would be his Portion in it.
As then it is not a Zjal for Truth
which makes Men Jthetjls, fo neither is
it 2igenerof^ Undertaking to free the World
from the Bondage of Religion, For tliey
mufi: needs be convinc'd that it would be
very much for the Advantage o^ Manki-nd
jn general ^ if all Men lived up to the
flrici Rules of Religion, What noble I-
deas doth fuch a Speculation as this af-
ford us ? and how difmal would the Prof-
pe8: be, if Atheifm fhould fpread as faft
as Chrijtiamty did in the frjt Ages of the
Gofpel ? But not 10 purfue this Thought
any farther, what Bondage or Slavery is
there in Religion ? and how is our Liber,"
ty abridged by the I. an) of God ? Thofe
who bear the l^oke think it eafie and plea-
jfant.
of ^li^ion in General. 210
.int, and, withowtix future Rcw/ird^ pre-
ferable \.o Athcifm^ as much as a 7//// and
e.tfie Goz'cryjment is to be preferred to A-
narchy and living Wild. Why then
fhould they who never felt the Burthen
complain of the Weight of it ? but there
are fome Pleafurcs and Enjoyments which
Cuilom hath made them fond of, and
rendred difficult to be left off, and
thefe they are refolved to en)oy ilill .• but
they cannot doit fully and to the height,
without fome Check and Regret till they
have got rid of tliofe hears of a future
Puyiijbme?it w^hich their own Qonj'ciences^
and the general Faith of the World threa-
ten them with : in order therefore to this
Knd, Q^Qxy little Ohjecltun or SuJj>icion is
improved into an Argument againil Reli-
gion-^ and that, by the advantage of
Jirong Wtjbes^ and :i gradual Decay of con-
trary ImpnJjionSj is heightncd into Demon-
(tration ; till, what, at firlf, their Luih
fuggclled to them, with a ferhavs there
maybe no fuch thing as God^ QY a future
State, is, at laR, ripen'd into a lold De-
ntal.
And , when ihzy have once got this
Mallery over themielvcs, then do they
ik free, anddefpiletherell of tiie World
in
240 The Certainty and TSleceJJity
in Fetters, and laugh at what others a-
dore. Then do Novelty and Boldmjs
pafs for Truth ^ and the Pleafure of Be/kv^
zm is made the Ground of Faith, For
how exquifite and trantporting is the Plea-
fure of a new Notion or Invention ? and
how are Men's Wits fet upon the flretch
to find out frefli Opinions, and to drefs
up old ones in a different manner, only
to gettheCharafter of fuch as thtnk out
of the road ? Men fliall hve like Beafis in
the State of Nature^ and devour one ano-
ther, couch in their Dens at Nighty and in
the Morning feck their Prey : Beafis^ on
the contrary, fliall be fo rational as to e-
reft Common- wealths , and Govern-
ments, if fuch Notions as thefe will fervc
to eliablifli th& Reputation of their Au-
thors.
Bcfides , the expofwg and ridiculing
common Opinions^ eipecially the defpiling
what is very much refpei^'ted and admi-
red, carries a peculiar Satisfaction in it ;
there being nothing which recommends
any Notion or Reflexion, any ftroak of
Wit or Reafon fo much as the Boldnefs
of it. From hence it comes to pafs, that
Treafon , and Biafphemy are entertained
with a greater Gull than Private Calumny,
ane"
of l^ligwn in General. 241
and Detr.uHon-j and the fame ExprcfTion
is counted wittier when it llrikes at God^
or the /C^/v'^, than when it is levelPd a-
gainft a Herd of common Mnrtab, For,
to ridicule the grcateft Actions that have
been done in the World, to laugh at the
nobleft and moft celebrated Schemes of
Knowledge that have ever been laid to-
gether, is thought to argue a Spirit capa-
ble of greater Performances. And to
defpife and contemn what the reft of
Mankind ftand in aw of, feemsto fliew
fuch a Superiority ofSenfs^ o\' Courage ^ as
eafily tempts Men to aflecl this Chara-
cter, without confidcring whether they
are able to fupport it.
Thus areMenconfirmM and eftablifh-
cd in Athcifm^ by the f^Anity of appearing
'neater or wiicr than others^ and of being
thought Mailers qS jirier and tnore extra-
ordinary Talents either of H Vr, or Reflexi-
on ; as is plain alfo from another Inftance,
in which Men Ihew themfelves to be ve-
ry much influenced by thefe Motives in
matters of Religion ; and that, is , a
groiindlefs unreafonable D/j'fidencc and
'Jea/oujie of being put or impofed upon :
calling every thing Tnck or Impofhire
^vhich thev donot underftand, or wliich
n aav
242 TJ?e Ceytainfji and Keccffity
any Body elfe gets an Advantage by.
For, by this means, they imagine, that
they eftablifh to themfelves a Reputation
of great Sagaatj and Reach ^ and o^ feeing
far into matters ; whereas , in reahty,
this overmuch Cunning of theirs , only
betrays the Weaknefs of their Judgments;^
and lliews them to be of the fame fizeof
Underftanding with thofe fooHfli Pohti-
cians, who find athoufand Myfteries in
State- Affairs, more than the Managers
themfelves ever knew of, and who think
every the moft natural, and undefigning
Action of a Prince , to be the effea,
of fomc fecret Counfcl , and Contri-
vance.
Now, that thefe before-mentioned are
the true and proper Caufes of Atheifm :
and that the Belief and Patronage of the
Docirines of Jrreligion isfolely the Refult
ol Prejudice^ and not deliberate Reafon^
will further appear from the following
Reflexions.
I. Thofe who go under the Name of
Atheijts or Dei (is, whether real, preten-
ded, or repu/edy are generally Perfons of
no great Reach, or Capacitj, Menofftrong
Lufls*
oj ^ligion in General. 24 j
Lufts, and irregular Imaginations, witli-
out a due Ballall of Realbn ; impatient
of Thinking and Attentiou, and confc-
quently, unable to examine any Variety
oF Pretences, or to diftinguifli betwixt
Colour and Argument. Thofe of them
who are furnifli'd with a better ilock of
n.tturd Se'fife than the red, have it whol-
ly u /I improved and unculthjcited', or, if
they have made any Advances in Know-
ledge by Study, or Induftry, they have
either %^r//? Ute^ and fo have fallen into
the middle of Learning , without the
Affiftance of the firft grounds and Rudi-
ments of it, applying themfelves to fuch
Books they ht upon, or which happened
to be recommended to them , without
due Choice and Dire£lion ; or elfe they
have been cliiefly converfant in fuch Stn-
dits as have by no means qunhficd them
to be Judges out of thetr onm lV,v/.
For a Man may be very well vcrs'd
in Htfioryy Anticjuities^ or Experimental
]yfioiv ledge \ he may be a great Mafter of
Language and Criticijm, and a nice Dif
cerner of the true Aleanmg^ or Reading^
of an ancient Author : he may have a jull
Rclifh for Wit^ and tlegance of ExpreJ/ion^
\n(\ have Skill enough to difcover the
R 2 Beauties
244 '^^■^ Certainty and Neceffity
Beauties and Faults o{ tliQ mo ft celebrated
Models of Writing , and yet , after all,
in matters of general and abfiracled Rea-
foning^ not be able to underlland a ^laiii^
eafte Confequence. For, 'tis not difficult
to obferve how ridiculoufly oftentimes,
Men of known Abilities in fome of thefe,
or the like refpecls, argue and infer in o-
ther Matters ; and how incapable they
are of making, or perceiving a juft Dedu-
ction , in points of ;?^c)r^/, or f/^'// Know-
ledge, and ilich in which the Conduct of
Life^ and ihe H^ippinefs of Mankind is im«
mediately concerned: whereas, on the
contrary, thofe who are acquainted with
the. general Rules, and JL^iri of Reafoning^
and the different kinds and manners of
Froof^ are capable of making true Judg-
ments and Inferences in any Subjecl,
which they have been ever fo little con-
verfant in, upon a bare explication of the
'ferms^ and a jujl Relation of the fafls
belonging to the Matter to be judg'd of.
Now , this is is a piece of Kj^oivledge^
which, I may venture to fay, the Fa^jou-
rers of Ir religion have been always the
greateft Strangers to •, and the lefs any of
them have been acquainted with this kind
"^f Learning, the lefs they have employed
and
of ^li^'ion in General, 245
and exercifcd their rational Faculties,
and the lefs common natural Senfe they
have been born witli , the Itrongcr,
more contident, and more unfcrupulous
Atlicifts have they been.
2. Secondly, as we are ratisfie<:l, from
the Characfer, and Capacities of the A-
theijls^ tliat they are wholly determined
to their Opinions bv Prejudices and falfe
unequal Motives of ^judging ; fo are we
further confirmed in this Perfuafion by
the Manner and Procefs of their Faith.
For they commonly helieve fr/l^ before
they enter upon any Examination ^ or
Proof of their Principles. Wiiatever they
underftand of the matter, all the Argu-
ments and Objcclions they are furnifliM
with are found out afterwards, not to fa-
tisfie and convince themfelves , but to
make a fhcw of Defence againfl the
Charge of others ; they take up their
Opinions hailily and on a fuddain ; they
do not proceed by Degrees, by cautious
and wary Steps, weighing and ballancing
the Arguments on both (ide/, fomctimes
inclining to the one, and fomctimes to
the other, calling in the Advice and Rea-
fcn of other Men to their AfTillance,
R ^ and
2^6 Tl?e Certainty and TSlece^
and all along ihewing a Concern and
Fe-ir of being miftaken, fuitable to the
importance of the thing to be judged
of
Thus indeed do Men commonly be-
have themfelves in a Change from o^e
Sea of Religion to another^ if they fin-
cerely aim at Truth, and are not govern-
by any other undue Motive. But who
ever heard of a Man who took this Me-
thod of turning Atheifi ? Which of them
all can fay he confider'd, and compared
the Proofs of both Opinions before he
left the one , and took up the other ?
When was any body called in to plead
in the behalf of Religion^ before it was
caft off, and to fettle the firft Miftrufts
and Waverings of an Athetjltcd Confcir
ence ? Afterwards perhaps , upon fome
Checks and Relu61:ance of his Mind, an
Atheifi may have had fome faint Defigns
of examining into the Truth of Matters,
and may have difcours'd with others a-
bout it ; but then a long Cuftom of think-
ing and talking one way, r.nd the trou-
blefomeConfsqucnces attending ii Change
of Faith, may have iaciifpofed him to ei>
certain or reliili the Argviments for Reii-
^jo'/f -J not to mention any thing of a judt-
ciaI
of ^It^wn in General. 247
^lal Bttndnefs inflicled upon Iilm from
God^ for his long and iinrcafonablc Op-
pofition to the Truth, But, if an Atheifi
will examine fairlv into the firfl Rife and
Origtnxl o\^ his V^tth^ he will find that it
was cither a haftj Effort^ occafioned by
ht^'h Bloody and a ntts'^d ImiXgt nation ; or
fomc bold Strain of Wtt^ which ftruck
him at a time when he was rightly difpo-
fed to be pleafcd with it. And, if we
fhoiild examine into thefc things more
particularly, I believe, it would appear,
that nil trreligiotis Opinions arc frjl taken
up tn Company ; and that no Man re-
ceives the firfl Impreffions o^ Athetfrn, a-
lone , from his own cdm and fedite Re-
flexions.
And thus, as Irreligion fprings from
Prejudice^ fo is it nourijhed and fed the
Ume way^ viz. byaconftant Application
to fuch Books and Company, as i7,ivc it
any countenance or colour of Defence ;
with an induftrious avoiding and ridicu-
ling the contrary ; picking out fuch things
as minifter mod occaiion for Raillery ;
and magnifying evcrv bold thing which
is faid by any Man, without any regard
to his other Opinions, or the Confcquen-
ces even of that which is liked ; 'tis no
R 4 mar-
248 77?^ Certainty and yicceljity
matter whether it really proves any thins;
againft Religion or no, fo it be thought,
by the ProfeJJors of Religion , to bear
hard, either upon the funddmentd Vrin-
ciples, or Any remote Docfriyies which are
owned by them.
From whence it comes to pafs, that the
^refent Athetfm is a fromifctious MtfcelUny
of all the bold Notions that have ever been
vented by thofe who are ftiled Free-think-
ers • where, whatever feems to be level-
led againft any Point of Religion is em-
braced as the moft fenfible and rational
account that can be given of the thing ;
but thofe Parts of Religion which are e-
ftablifhed by the fame Authors , are
flighted and paft over as weakly done ;
whereas I will be bound to prove, that
there is never an Article^ or Duty of Re-
ligion^ profefs'd by us, but is ownM and
maintain'd by fome or other of thefe bold
Tree-thinking Author s^ which are fo high-
ly approved and commended by the pre"
fent Atheijh. And w hat a grofs Partiality
is this, not to allow thoie, whom they
cry up for unpreindtc^d Men, to talk a
Word of Senfe or Reaibn , but when
Vy'hat they fay makes for their Furpofe 'f
1. Bui
of (}{eli^ion in Gennal. 1 49
I. But Thirdly, we have a more con-
vincing Proof, that the Doctrines oj Irre-
iigton arc the genuine IJfue and Effecfs of
the Cdufes before afTigned, from the o-
pen Confeffion of feveral Atheijls them-
felves ; who, upon luft Convi^lionb of
Confcience , having difclaimed their A-
theifm^ have freely and fincerely owned
that they threw oft* Religion^ without e-
ver examining, or confidering the Proofs
of it ; that they were difpofed and indu-
ced to entertain irreligious Notionb by the
Power and Influence of their Lnfls , or
fuch vicious Habits and Cuftoms of living,
as they thought irreconcilable with a con-
trary Belief; that the Reafons why they
endeavoured to perfuade themfelves, of
what their Courfe of Life inclined them
to believe, were, to defend thofe Liber-
ties of Pra6: ice which they took, againft
the Cenfures of others , and to fccure
their own Minds in an eafie undifturb'd
Enjoyment of them; that, commonly,
che firit and ftrongeft ImprefTions of Un-
belief they were fenfible of, were occa-
fioncd by fome bold Hints and Tnfinua-
tions, or fome witty Ridicule or Raillery
upon the Subjecl of Religion ; that, as
thefe,
2 JO Tl?e Certainty and ISLeceffity
thefe , coming from others , either in
Books , or Difcourfe , gave them very
great Pleafure, and by that means Af^
furance, in embracing their new Princi-
ples , fo were they further pleafed and
confirmM together in the Behef of them^
by applauded Trials , and Exercife of
their own "Wit the fame way ; efpecially,
when the general Difpoftttoyi of the Per-
fons they convers'd with, made this En-
tertainment very agreeable, and very
frequent. All this have feveral Atheifts,
upon their Repent aftce^ acknowledged.
And that which firrengthens the Argu-
ment drawn from hence, is, that thole
who have renounced their Irreligwm
Principles , and given this account of
themlelves , have been , fome of them.
Men of the he^^\^ natural Abilities , and
greateft acquired Iravro'vements , of anv
that ev^er took the Party of Jtheifm\^ and
their Repentance has been free and volun-
tary ^ and not extorted by any frightful
Reprefentations, or importunate Addref-
fes, in the feafons of Fear and Weaknels -,
it has begun from themfelves, and been
wholly owing to the over-ruling Impref-
fions of a Divine Poiver, and not to Hu-^
man Perfuafion ; and their Blindnefs and
Pre
of Religion in General. 1 5 i
Prejudices being, by this means, remo-
ved, the Arguments for Religion have
prevailed upon them hy their own
Strength, as fuggclled to them by their
own Reafon, without receiving any Ad-
vantage from the Management and Art
of others.
And this I think fufficlent to fliew,
that Atheifm proceeds from (hong Preju'
dices ^ ana falfe^ dtfproportioned Motives of
judgingy and is not the rcfult of jAf// Rea-
fonirjgy and impartial Reflexion.
I have now gone through the fevcral
Branches of my Difcourfe, which I pro-
pofed to my felf in the beginning of it ;
and have finifhed tlie FroofI undertook
o'i general ^ or, as 'tis commonly called,
natural Religion.
All that I have further to add upon this
Subjecl, at prelent, is, to give fome ac-
count of the Notions of Atheifm , and
Deifm ; which Words we are forced to
ufe fometimes promifcuoufly , and in a
different Senfe from tlie common accep-
tation, for want of a fit and proper
Word to exprefs a Belit'f\ or Profejfion of
any j'lich 0\^imons which t;ikc away the
p AiitCiXl
252, Tl:'e Certainty and Islecejiity
^Y/tBicd Influence and Power of Religion,
For which reafon I think it convenient
in this place, that I may remedy any
Confulion or Miftake, which the Liberty
I have taken in the ufe of thefe Terms
may have occafioned, to fet down di-
ftinftly what I look upon to be the com^
man Notions di Atheifm and Deifm^ and
what UeAs I fhouid chufe to affix thefe
Words to.
By an Atheift is commonly meant fuch
a one as will own no Being under the
Name and Title of God, And he who
does acknowledge fuch a Being, let his
Conceptions of him be what they will,
is reputed no Acheif, An<\y in this Senfe
of the Word, it may well be made a
qusftioii , Whether there be any fuch
thing as m\Athci{l- m the World? For,
\is hard to meei with a M in w!io has
not fome IdeA in Iiis Mind, which he will
be content to allow the N^me of G 3^' to ;
tho\ upon EKamination, perhaps it will
he found to be nothing elfe but a confa-
fed Notion of fom-e t'ajl Poiver , Fir/l
Caufe, Ongirul Mn-'er^ or Immrnd Be-
ing^ enjoying Eterntl R^fl^j dai Q^iiet.
NoWj
of ^'Ir^ion VI General. 2 5 >
Now, accordi?igtothis Notion of A-
theifm^ he who profcircs to bclitve a, Gody
wJiatcvcr N.ttnre^ Charaffcrs and Jttri-
hutes lie afcribcs to him, and at the fame
time De/iies his Provtdcnce^ or Govern-
ment of Mankind is called a Deifl,
But, in fuch places where the Preten-
ces of /<^ir/.i//(^/i; are acknowledged, and
defended, he that is called a Deifi is one
who owns a God^ and believes fome fort
of Providence , and nMur,iL OhltgMtons^
but denies ^H nLxnner of Revelation ; who
contines his Duty to matters o^ Ctvil Ju-
ftice and Commerce ; makes thefe his chief
Principles^ not to n*jttre /mother^ and to
keep hti Word ; grounds his Pra£lice upon
the Reafon and Interejt of Societies^ and
his o)vn prefent Advantage, not Obedience
to God, or a future Profpccl ; believes,
no future Life^ or only Jucb a one as can
jiave no great Influence upon a Man's
Anions here. I'his is the common Vfc
of thefe Words.
But, by an Atheifi^ I think, may pro^
pcrly, and juftly be meant, not only he
who .ihjhlutcly denies the Bei?fg of a God,,
but whofoever lays there is no God thu
governs the IVorld^ and jud^^cth the Earth ;
there
1 5 4 The Certainty and Neceffity
there is ^o God who hah appointed Laws
And Rules for Men to a6h by •, there is no
God to whom Men are accountable for all
pheir Aciions^ and by whom they jb all be re-
warded^ or punifhed inafutureState, ac-
cording to their Behaviour here ; and, in
general, whoever holds fuch an Opinion
as exempts him from all Obligation of Duty
to a Superiour Beings .or cuts off the Expe-
Bat ton of Rewards and Puniflfments conle-
quent thereupon.
For Atheifm is to be confidersd as a
Vice^ and not a meer Error in Spep^ulation.
And therefore, he who denies Providence^
Natural Law , or a Future State , is as
much an Athetft as he who denies God''s
Being : For, it's all one, with refpeR: to
Praftice, to fay there is no God^ as to fay
there'^s no Obedience due to him^ or no Pu-
nishment for Difohedience , if there be :
It is likewife all one to deny divine Pr/»
mjhment direclly, and to deny the Immor-
tality of the Soiil^ or the Scriptures^ in the
Senle of thofe who at prefent deny thefe
things: For they who fay the Soul dies
with the Body , think hereby to prove,
that God cannot punish ; and they who
deny the Scriptures do it, in order to fhew-
that he will not pf^^^ijh, that is, in another
Lifey
of ^'li^ion in Geneyai 255
Life ; and, as to the prefent^ they per-
ceive that thofc who arc ftilcd IVicked
fare as well, and have as large a Portion
ot the good things of this World, as their
Righteous Brethre^i, The End and De-
ftgn then of all thefe Opinions is the fame ;
namely, to cftablifli a Libertj for every
Man to live ns hepleafes^ and to do whatfo-
ever is right in his own Eyes ; and what is
this , but to fay, there is no God. in the
World.
This is tlie Notion I have of an Athe*
ift ; and accordingly 1 have applied the
word i?idifferently^ as I had occafion, to
any Perfons who denied any of the Princt^
pies of Reiigto^ which I have endeavour'd
to ellabiifli : And the word Deijl is to be
taken in the fime Senfe with that of A-
theifi^ every where, but where we arc
particularly difcourfing about the Being
of God, as diftinguifhed from the o/W
Parts of Rehgton.
But , in oppofition to the Chara6lcr
which I have now given of aii A:heift^
by a Deijl is to be meant, one who ac-
knowledges all the PrinctpUs of Religion
here maintained', who thinks he is obliged
to inform him felf truly of his whole Duty
to
t<^6 The Certainty and Neceff/ty
to God, and to live up to the highefi: and
pureft Rules of Morality that he can form
to himfelf, by the Afliftance of his own
Reafon, and the united Lights of other
Men who looks upon all the moral ^ or
practical Part of the Scriptures as very
ufeful and inftruftive, and confequently
what ought to be read and valued as Tn/Iy
and Artflotle are, upon the fame Subject :
hut does not believe any fuch thing as
Revelation^ orafTentto any of thofe/f^«-
liar matters of Fact ^ or Doctrines , which
are wholly grounded upon that extraor-
dinary way of Conveyance , and are not
level to his Reafon^ oi' difcoverable by it.
And, if a Dei ft be fuch a one as I have
defcribed, it would be as jufl: a matter of
Enquiry, whether there be any Perfons
to whoin this Title belongs, as whether
there be any real Atheifts in the World.
For my part, I will not pofitively fay
there is no fuch thing as a true Deift, in
that fenfe which 1 have now given of the
word , becaufe , I beheve , there hardly
ever was any Opinion known among
Men, which fome body did not efpoufe ;
but this, I think, I may venture to af-
firm, that it would be the moH: difficult
tiling imaginable to find a Man in a Chri-
of^'lii^ion in General. 1^7
jhan Countreyy who was acquainted witli
the Books of Holy Scrif^ture , and the
co?nmon Proofs of Chrifiunity ; wlio was
fully perfuadcd of the Truth of d the
Prifjciples o^ Naturd Religion here Uid
do)v?i^ and who ferioully endeavoured to
conform his Life to the Moral Rules ^ and
Precepts of the Gofpely and yet who deni-
ed Revelation, and all thofe particular
Truths which ftand diftinguifhed by the
.Mamc of Revealed Religion : fuch a Man
as this, I believe, is hard to be met with.
For it is not Propheftes, or Miracles, or
M)feries , which puzzle the Faith of
thofe who now go under the Name of
Deilb ; but a plain and full Difcovery of
a fiitin-e State of Rewards and Punifh-
mtnts. This is the fhocking repugnant
Doclrine, in comparifon of which, the
Trinity, and Incarnation arc eafie Noti-
ons, and very reconcileable to their Rca-
Upon this account it is, tliat 1 nave
mentioned Deijls as Enemies of Natural
Religion, and h properly coming within
my Subject, and not as meer Oppofers of
Revelation , which belongs to another
.A resume m.
"^ S Anct
2)8 Tl^e Certainty and Kccelfity
And now , having pointed out who
tliev are that are particularly concerned
in the foregoing Difcourfe, it might be
expected that I fhould addrefs rny felf
to them to embrace thofe Principles of
Religion which I have there proved, and
to beiiow fome ferious Thoughts about
the Danger of their Unbelief ; but I am
^oo well acquainted w^ith their Chara-
ditv to trouble them with any Advice of
this nature : If they are not convinced^
and bore down by Arguments^ I am fiire
they will never yield to Ferfuafwn ; nei-
ther indeed is it proper to go about to
perfuade Men to heiiete ; they only are
to be applied to in this manner, v/ho are
fatisfied of the Truth of what you
would perfiaade them to, but w^ant
fuilicient Motives and Incitements to
I ihall tlierefore fliut up this whole
Difcourie with my earneft Prayers to
God, tliat he would be plea fed to incHne
?:nd difpofe thofe who are doubtful, and
wavering in the Concerning Points of
Religion, to weigh and confider wcU the
Proof it ftands upon, before they venture
to withdi-aw tliemfelves from under tlie
'[nfiiience and Government of it , that
he
of ^li^ion in General, 255)
he would defend the Innocent, and fuch
as are unacquainted with the Wa)s of
Irreligion , from the falfe Suggeflions,
andlnfinuationsof UnheHevers; that he
would convince the Carelefs and indiffe-
rent of the abfolute Neceffity of having
fome Religion ; and that he would be
further pleafed to enable thole, who are
already convinced of this Trutli, to Hop
the Mouths of Gain-fayers, by a llcady
and uniform Practice ot their Duty, eve-
ry way anfwerable to their Knowledge,
and FrofeiTion.
FINIS.
T H E
Certainty and Necejfity
O F
Religion in General^ dec.
The Contents.
INtrodMon (hewing the defign of the Difcourfe^
and the Method in which it is Profecuted. Page i
uin account of the Nature of A^an, fo far as con-
terns Religion. p. 9
Qf the Nature of God. p. 1 4
Of the Relation there vs hetwixtGod andMan. p. \6
A dire^ proof of the Being of God. p. 1 7
CPoJihle, p. 18
Confidired as*^ Probable^ p. 24
C Certain. p. 37
The certainty of God's Exijlence proved^ Indirettly
and Negatively^ by pjewing that none of thofe
Suppoftttons which exclude the Being of Cod can
be trite. ?• 5-
Matter alone ccnfidercd at refl could not be Eternal^
and in time produce the Prefent frame of the
World. p. 5-;
'Hj impoJTiUc to account for ihs Frcdu^ion of the
Worlds
The Contents.
IVorld, by the jithdfl\ Hy^othefts of moving A-
toms. p. 5y
'Tie abftird to fuplofe that the World has Exijled
Eternally^ under the fame Form we novo behold
tt^ without a Gnd. p, 6 1
T)}e Eternal Coexiflcnce of Matter and Mind^ im-
probable, p, 6^
Suppofmg it probable^ neither Matter alone nor
A^atter and Motion^ nor the prefent ConflitU'
tion of things could have been Eternal Indepen -
dently of Cod. ' p. 75
The Original of all things from God^ further evin-
ced from General Reflexions. P- 78
A po/itive and direct Proof of Religion drawn from
the Natures of God and Man^ and the Relations
there are betwixt them. p. g^
Of the Nature and Ground of Obligation^ together
with the Right and Power of Obhgiyig, i5
That Man is obliged to order hvs Ufe according to
the WiU of Gud^ is proved ^ p. 1 04
From the Natural Judgments we make concerning
our ABions. p. i q-.
From the End and Deftgn of God in making us
which appears by fever al Tokens and Indications.
p. 120
in the Frame and Difpofttion of our Mind^ ib.
and in the 0 economy and Conjlitution of Humane
Society. p. , 28
From the Nature of Religion it felf^ a regular
pradice of which conduces to the greatefi Happi-
nefs we are capable of in this Life. p. i 32
And from the certainty of a Future State which is
proved. p. 141
From
The Contents.
From the defe[i of a General and Regular PraCiice
of Religion here : p. i ^.2
^nd from the General Wants^ Nccejftties and Im-
pyfeCtions of our prefent Nature. p- '45
From all which Confiderations it appears^ that *tw
more for our Happinefs to live Religioujly than
otherwife^ and therefore we are obliged to live fo.
p. 151
'the Certainty^ and NeceJJlty of Relipon further
Jhewn^ from the pernicious effeifs of all kind of
Jr religion J with refpeGt to the Happinefs of Man-
kind. P- ^S3
The ahfurdity and folly of all the Grounds and Pre^
fences of Irreligion^ and whatever is aUedged in
defence of it. P- 185
Jrreligion not capable of any direB proof. p. 1 85
The ufual Ways and Methods of defending it Im-
proper and Jnfufficient. p. 19Q
Ridiculing Religion proves nothing againfl it. p. 191
Requiring a more certain and Mathematical proof of
it umeafonable. p. 1 92
Schemes and Hypothefes to account for the prefent
flate of things^ without God and Religion^ ab-
furd and inconftflcnt. p. 19$
The chief and mofi common Obje{lions againfl Re-
ligion anfwered^ viz.. p. 204
Myfteries , feeming Inconjiflencies^ and jibfurdi-
'ties in Scripture. \). 20$
JLxtravagant Notions^ and Pernicious DoUrines^
matntaiHed under the name of Religion, p. 206
Variety of Opinions among the Profeffors of the
fame Religion. p. 207
Fooli/h
The Contents.
Foolijh and Ridiculous Arguments urged in defence
of it. p. 2Gy
Scandalous Lives of great Pretenders to Piety and
Firtuc. ib.
Religion the cffelt of Fear and Education p. 2 1 3
Religion a politick Contrivance. p. 214
The Abfurdity and Folly of Irreligious Principles^
and Practices dcmonjlrated^ from General Rv-
flc&ions upon the different Grounds^ and Foun-
dations which Religion andlrrcVgionflands upon-^
and the different Conduit of thofe ivho ait under
the Influence of the one and the other. p. 2 1 6"
Irrcligion further cxpofed from the Caufes and Rea-
fons that induce Men to take up Atheifiical and
Prcphane Opinions. p. 230
The chief Caufes of Atheifm fheven to be thefe trvo ^
7lbe Fear of an after-reckoning for a xvickcdLife^
and the Vamty of appearing greater or wifer than
other Men. p. 233
The Doctrines of Irreligion the fole refult of Preju-
dice^ and not deliberate Reafoning more plainly
made out ^ p.' 242
From theChara&cr and Capacities of thcAtheifls. ib.
From the manner and Procefs of their Infidelity.
p. 245
And from the Confejfion of feveral Atbeijls them-
felves. ' p. 249
An account of the Notions of Atheifm and Dcijm
and how they ate to be difiinguifhcd. p. 2 5 1
ERRATA.
PAge6. line 9. read reformed? p. 33. !* 20. r. beJieve
aGody p. 4.7. 1. 16. d. if. p. 51. 1. 27. r.pojjtbly. p.
68. 1. 23. for Cmje r, exz/?, p. 70. 1. 4.r. Perception^ and
wiQ-^ p. 71. 1. 21. for 4;y r. W p. 80. 1. 22. for cm r.
could, p. 109. 1.4. d. to, p. 148.1. 23. r. 0/ greater, p.
181 1. 5. r. Attahment. Id. p. 183. 1, laft. p. 224 1. 6. for
r^sre r. their, p. 23 3 laft line r. ? p. 249 1. 24. r. th
p. 2^6 1. ^.r. Men.
BOO K>S Printed for Thomas Bennet.
PSyche.^ Or Loves Adyjltry^ in 24 Canto's dif-
playing the Intercourfe betwixt Chriftand
the Soul , By Jofe^h Beaumont , D. D. Late
King's ProfeObr of Divinity, and Mafter of St.
FeUr's CoUege^ in Cambridge. The Second E-^
dition, with Corrections throughout, and four
new Canto's never before Printed.
A Conferente with a Theifl., in Five Parts ;
Being a Defence of the Chriftian Religion, a-
gainfl: the Objections of all forts, which are
advanced in oppofition to it by the Unbelie-
vers. By William NichoUs^ D. D.
By the fame Author. A Treatife of Confo-
lation to Parents for the death of Children.
Written upon the occafion of the Death of the
Duke of Gloucejler.
An Ejfay of Self-Murther., wherein is endea-
voured to prove, that it is unlawful according
to Natural Principles. By J. Adams^ Redtor of
St. Alban^ Weodjlreet,
.VA H
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