/
CHILE AND PERU
The causes of the War of 1879
BY
DON GONZALO BULNES
Senator; Ex-Plenipotentiary Minister and ex-Extraordinary Ambassador
of Chile in the Argentine Republic.
(From his History of the War of the Pacific)
e^
SANTIAGO DE CHILE
IMPRENTA UNIVERSITARIA
ESTADO 63
1920
o
CHILE AND PERU
CHILE AND PERU
The causes of the War of 1879
BY
DON GONZALO BULNES
Senator; Ex-Plenipotentiary Minister and ex-Extraordinary Ambassador
of Chile in the Argentine Republic.
(From his History of the War of the Pacific)
e^
SANTIAGO DE CHILE
IMPRENTA UNIVERSITARIA
ESTADO 63
1920
IMP.UNIVERITARIA
Estado 63
INDEX
HAUK
Relations between Chile and Bolivia before 1879 1
The Treaty of 1866 7
Lindsay-Corral Agreement in 1872 18
Quevedo's Expedition 22
The Treaty of 1874. 30
Concessions to the Antofagasta Nitrate Company ,36 ,
General Survey of relations between Peru and Chile . . 44
The Pardo Administration and the Nitrate Question 49
Bolivia asks the alliance of Peru o4
The attitude of Peru between Chile and Bolivia '-6
President Pardo seeks war in 1873 71
The President of Argentine favours the secret Treaty 74
The attitude of Brazil H2
Godoy needed great patience 8")
The Argentine Senate and the secret Treaty 'S7
The secret Treaty was unknown in Chile until 1879 97
The conflict with Bolivia 101
.The diplomatic reclamation 105
Discussion between Chile and Bolivia 109
Acts of violence in Antofagasta and La Paz 115
Lanza replaced by Mendez 118
The last steps 120
The Chilean Cabinet and the occupation of Antofagasta 121
Peru and the occupation of Antofagasta The Lavalle mission 124
VIII
PAGE
Peru sends Lavalle to gain time for arming herself 127
Chilean opinion divided about war 133
First steps of Lavalle 140
Preparations of Peru 145
Energet attitude of Chile 147
Sotomayor goes north 151
Last considerations 157
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CHILE AND PERU.
THE CAUSES OF THE WAR OF 1879.
(By Don Gonzalo Bulnes).
Relations between Chile and Bolivia before 1879.
1810. wiien the Ainericau peoples freed themselves
frora Spain, their territorial boundaries were not well
determined.
The mother country had no political interest in fixing
the outlines of the sections forming its colonial Empire,
save in the part where they touched Portuguese posses-
sions, because such divisions were for them merely ad
ministrative and internal. At most, care had been taken
to define the jurisdiction of authorities in order to avoid
competition and disagreement, but even so much was
rendered difficult by reason of the backwardness of
American geographical knowledge in unexplored regions.
Since, later on, each of these sections formed an indepen-
-^ 2
dent Republic, frontier disputes arose as soon as the
border territories acquired importance.
Tlie new Republics adopted as a common principle of
frontier demarcation the administrative limits existing
at the moment of separation from Spain. This was ter-
med the Uti possidetis of 1810, a formula devised,
mainly to prevent European nations from setting foot
in America, on the plea that between one heritage and
another there were vacant regions susceptible of being
occupied by title of res nuUius. The uti possidetis ot 1810
was the juridical principle of territorial delimitation of
the American States between themselves.
The Bulnes Government has the merit of having
established the northern and southern boundary lines of
the Chilian Republic, anticipating in this all the other
American countries, thus, with admirable foresight pre-
parijug for the future Chilian race a territory adequate
to their aspirations of industry and expansion.
i^-- In the period of one year, between 1842 and
1843, the northern limit of the country was fixed in the
parallel of Mejillones and in the South in the Magellan
Strait, a eolony being founded there called then Fort
Bulnes, now Punta Arenas.
Matters referring to the Straits are outside the scope
of this book, which concerns itself only with the nor-
thern dominion, Mejillones, tliis being the crux of
the boundary question between Chile and Bolivia, the
seed of the cruel and prolonged conflict that I propose
to relate.
In 1842 there were discovered in Peru great deposits
3
of Guano, and although at that time it was not possible
to foresee the enormous importance which this fertilizer
was to assume in the public revenue of that country,
enough was known to appreciate it as a source of natio-
nal income.
The Government of Chile sent a commission to
explore the northern coasts of the country as far as the
parallel of Mejillones with the object of finding whether
or no similar deposits existed. The report of the com-
mission was not very favourable. The guano found
was neither abundant nor of high quality. None the
less, Bulnes took stand on this prospecting expedition
to send a message to Congress introducing a bill which
declared the guano deposits situated to the south of the
23rd. parallel to be National property, as being ivithin
the limits of the territory of the Bepublic.
Mejillones the nor- The message read as follows:
theni boundary. s Fellow citizens of the Senate and Chamber
of Deputies. The utility of the substance known as Guano beinj
recognised in Europe, which substance from time immemorial
has been made use of as a manure in agricultural work on tlie
Peruvian coast, I considered it necessary to send a commission to
explore and examine the coast line between the port of Coquimbo
and the Morro of Mejillones, with the idea of determining whether
tliere existed within the territory of the republic any guano depo-
sits, the exploitation of which might supply a new source of
revenue to the country. Altliough the result of the expedition
has not fully fulfilled the hopes that had been entertained in this
respect, none the less from 29 degrees 35" to 23 degrees 6" of
south latitude, guano has been found in sixteen places on the
coast, and the islands adjoining it, in more or less abbundance
4
according lo the Dature of the localities in which these deposits
exist.
Far from assuming, after the work of this expedition, that
the guano deposits of Chile have the importance that is attributed
to those of Peru, I am inclined to believe that the profit to be
derived from them will be of relatively short duration, but none
the less this does not imply that the exploitation of these deposits
should be left free to foreign commerce, thus depriving the nation
of a resource whicli, without adding any burden to the public,
may serve to supply subsidiary funds that may be applied to
many objects of common utility urgently required.*
This important document bore the signatures of the
President, don Manuel Bulnes and of the Minister of
Finance, don Manuel Rengifo. Both Chambers approved
the Message unanimously, and the project was promul-
gated as law in October 1842. Under the form of an in-
ternal measure it was officially established by the Exe-
cutive and by Congress that the Northern limit of the
Republic was the Bay of Mejillones.
The guano law The law provides that the guano
deposits situated to the South of this parallel were natio-
nal property, and that any ship loading guano without
permission of the Government would be confiscated, and
tliat the President was empowered to impose a customs
duty on its exportation. Bolivia protested, alleging that
its southern limit was not the 23rd. degree of latitud as
the public authorities of Chile had stated, but the 26th.
degree. The difference convered three degrees of latitu
de, and the question turned on these three geographical
degrees from 1842 in which it was started until 1866
when a treaty was signed that was believed to settle
the matter.
5
The second clause of the law says:
A.ny njttional or foreing ship that, without the permission of
the Government of Chile, takes Guano from any places included
in the former clause will be confiscated together with the cargo
on board.
Jurisdictional conflict Froiu that day Oil, coiiflicts of juris-
diction between Chilian and Bolivian authorities were
frequent. Bolivia adquired a small ship, the General
Sucre > to guard the coast and to prevent the loading of
guano under Chilian permission within the three geo-
graphical degrees 23 26 which were claimed as being
Bolivian territory, and this ship took the Ruraenia
under the Chilian flag and carried her into Cobjja.
During the Bulnes Administration these incidents were
repeated. In 1846 the Janequeo, belonging to our
navy, took men to Angamos to establish an industrial
exploitation of guano, an act that further affirmed the
dominion of the Republic in this territory. Bolivia
again protested.
The following year a Chilian ship, the Martina, em-
barked guano in Mejillones. The administrative autho-
rity in Cobija ordered her tho sea; the captain disobeyed,
and, as a diplomatic claim was formulated for this reason
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, don Manuel Camilo Vial,
said in his reply: '<The brigantine Martina has carried
on the exploitation of guano in the territory of the
Republic of Chile, and, in consequence, the persons on
board her were acting within their rights in resisting the
requirements which were made of them in the name of
the public authority of Cobija.
6
Shortly afterwards a commercial company constituted
in Chile began worJ{:s of guano exploitation in Mejillo-
nes, and the Bolivian authorities having sought to impe-
de them, the company obtained the aid of the Chilian
Governement ont its behalf.
The President don Manuel Montt and don Jose Joa
quin Perez continued the policy followed by the Bulnes
Admiuistiation. In 1853 the Esmeralda, commanded
by Captain don Jose Anacleto Goili took in Mejillones a
guano ship, the Sportsman, and carried her into Cal-
dera, and finally, Captain Williams ReboUedo, during
the Perez Government, turned out a guano working in
the same place that was being carried on under Bolivian
permission by the Brazilian don Pedro Lopez Garaa.
Diplomatic efforts Whilst thcse gravc conflicts were
taking place in the north, there was being exchanged
between the two countries a diplomatic mission which
debated the dominion of the three disputed degrees,
putting the conflict on a historic basis, that is to say
discussion of the fact as to whether Spain had confided
the administration of this territory to the authorities of
Charcas or those of the Governor General of Chile. The
Colonial archives were ransacked, proofs were heaped up
and counter proof also, very notable among these labours
being those of the Chilian, don Luis Amunategui, and
of the Bolivian, don Jose Maria Santibanez.
These diplomatic efforts were fruitless. During the
twenty years between 1842-1862, usseless attempts at
conciliation were made by don Jos^ Joaquin Vallejo, the
famous writer who signed himself Jotabeche, and don
Francisco Javier Ovalle; and in Santiago, where the de-
bate was carried on by the Bi)hvian orator and [)uhHcist,
Don Casimiro Olafleta, don Manuel Macedonio Salinas
and the historian already named, don Jose Maria San-
tibailez.
This situation could not be continued indefinitely.
Every day the affair became more acute in consequence
of the greater interest that was being taken in guano in
view of the increase in tlie revenue of Peru due to the
deposits on the Chincha islands. The controversy beca-
me critical in 1873. The Bolivian Congress conferred
power secretly on the Executive to declare war on Chile.
The Treaty of 1866
When the minds of both peoples were in an excited
state, an unexpected situation arose that modified the
political relations of the nations of the Pacific; i.e. the
war declared by Spain on Peru and the reassertment
made by the former country of her claims to the Chin-
cha islands. The Governments of the Pacific were alarmed,
and Chile, Bolivia and Ecuador made common cause
with Peru. Previous differences were considered as being
of secondar y importance, and a breath of fraternity
blew over the Governments in the presence of this atti-
tude of the mother-country, which, in the opinion of the
defenders and apostols of American union as{)ired to the
reconquest of its old dominions and was provoking then^
to a second war of independence,
The union of Ame- ^he sentiment inspiring this policy was
generous but not practical. Spain was
not in a position to undertake an enterprise that was far
beyond her resources; but the nation were the victims of
a fixed idea, and Chile, without taking into account any-
thing other than the possibility of that remote peril,
launched out in a war that cost her great spcrifices.
The first effect of the new international current in
Bolivia and Chile was to bring about the end of the
guano question, which question was identified with that
of boundaries. Bolivia took the initiative in the matter.
Interrupted relations were resumed. Chile accredited
in La Paz don Aniceto Vergara Albano, and Bolivia en-
trusted the same charge in Santiago to don Juan R.
Mufioz Cabrera.
The then President of Bolivia, General don Mariano
Melgarejo, a military leader, had imposed his authority
by force of arras, overthrowing the former president
a procedure sanctioned by the usage of the country,
where hitherto the transference of power had invariably
been made by means of garrison ^pronunciamientos .
Melgarejo expressed his manifestations of delight over
the renewal of relations with Chile almost to excess,
and proposed and arrangement of the existing questions,
which was, with slight modifications, accepted.
Examination of the The proposal of the Bolivian Govern-
'^''^'^- ment was the Treaty of 1866.
This Treaty stipulates:
A. The international boundary will, in future, be
drawn at the 24th parallel, and will be marked out on
9
the ground by means of visible and permanent signals*
from the Pacific to the eastern boundary of Chile by
experts nominated by both countries.
B. Notwithstanding the previous declaration, Chile
and Bolivia shall divide between them the export duties
paid on Guano and minerals in the zone included bet-
ween the 23rd and 25th parallels.
C. For the carrying out of this, Bolivia shall set up a
custom-house in Mejillones which will be ^the only one
authorised to receive these duties on the exportation of
guano and metals* {metales) from the aforesaid zone.
Chile will have the right to nominate fiscal employees
who shalWw^er?;ewe t'w the counting house department
of this aduana with full right of inspection* .
Bolivia will be conceded en equal right in the event
of Chile establishing a custom-house in parallel 24.
D. All exports from the territory situated between the
parallels of latitude 23 to 25, with the exception of
guano and minerals, to be free from taxation, as will
also be the natural production of Chile which may enter
the country through Mejillones.
E. By common accord between the two governments
a system will be adopted in the exploitation and sale of
guano, and a similar agreement must he come to, to deter-
mine the duties on the exportation of minerals.
F. Chile and Bolivia bind themselves to mutual
preference in the event of the renting of the territories
forming the subject matter of the present agreement,
and to abstain from ceding them to any nation, society or
individual.
10
G. Eighty thousand pesos, withdrawn fron ten per
cent, of the production of Mejillones will be granted to
Bolivian concessionaries in guano exploitation whose
workings were suspended by act of the Chilian Govern-
ment.*
I have underlined the stipulations which were produc
tive of the greatest difficulties.
I now propose to examine these difficultiesin the order
of their appearance in the treaty.
A. The fixing of the international limit was to be made
from the sea to the Eastern boundaries of Chile by means
of visible and permanent signals. The lack of precision
in the phrase Eastern limits os Chile* arose from the
fact that it was considered among us as an unsettled
question where the eastern boundary of the country was
along the whole extension of the fron tier of the Argen-
tine Republic. In consequence, the task of the experts
would be to establish the parallel between that unknown
line and the Pacific.
The Treaty did not say whether this work required,
in order to be definite in character, the approbation of
the Govenments. Implicity, such approval was unneces-
sary because it is contrary to the essence of an expert
ofteration to require the intervention of a referee when
the experts are in agreement. The authors of the Treaty
implied this meaning when they laid it down that the
line should be marked out by means ot permanent sign-
als, which expression is out of harmony with the idea of
a provisional and inconclusive delineation.
The Government of Chile understood that the act of
11 ,
the experts did not require its approbation, and acted
accordingly.
The eastern bouri- Further, when the commissioners of both
^^^^ countries, Don Amadeo Pissis for Chile
and Colonel Mariano Mujia for Bolivia presented their
plan to the Chancelleries, both kept silent, which gave
reason for the supposition that the said plan was defini-
tely sanctioned. But some time later on, the mining dis-
trict of Caracoles having been discovered, the interna
tional position of which was infiuenced by the eastern
line traced out by Pissis and Mujia, which placed it
within the zoneof dual jurisdiction, Bolivia asserted that
the plan was without value, not having been approved
by decree, and proposed a new eastern line, so calcula-
ted as to leave Caracoles within its exclusive dominion,
whicli fact would permit Bolivia to receive the whole
revenue derived from the tax on minerals and not have
to divide it with Chile. This point was extensively dis
cussed.
The system of joint B. The secoud article created a halving
admiuistration ^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ included between the
23 north and the 25 south, which rule consisted in the
division by halves between both countries of all the im-
ports to be received for guano and metals. These subs
tances only were mentioned, because it was believed that
there were no others obtainable in that region.
The halving and right of fiscalization which was its
consequence was the seed of discord, since it was impos
sible to reconcile the legal situation of partners in a civil
society with the international individuality of sovereign
12
countries, which considered that to permit extraneous
authority in their laws and administration affected the
national dignity. It was humiliating for Bolivia to accept
foreign custom-house officers in her aduana, and more
so to have her liberty of legislating curtailed.
However absurd the halving agreement appears, it
was logical ad almost unavoidable, because the Treaty
had in view the solution of the proprietary right of the
guano workings, which had hitherto been the chief
cause of disagreement; and as they were situated in Me-
jillones, in the extreme north of the 23, it would not
have been possible to resign the halving of the profits
rendered by them without implying a cession on the
part of Chile and not a business transaction.
Joint control of eus- E. This clausc coutaius variuos stipu-
tom-houses. j^^j^^^^ ^^ ^ different order.
One of them lays down that Bolivia should set up
the custom-house in Mejillones for importation and
exportation, adding that it would be the only one through
which the commercial traffic of the zone divided should
be made. It is true that it stipulates that the same
right of inspection which it conceded to Chile in Meji-
llones would in like manner be granted to Bolivia in
the event of Chile appointing any custom-house in te-
rritory of the 24, but this possiJoility was remote; it was
then considered improbable; and in any case even sup
posing that the unlikely tiling happened, the clause
implied the idea that Bolivia would be under no obliga
tion to appoint other custom-house save in Mejillones,
subjet to Chilian fiscalization.
13
The same clause regulated the sharing agreed upon
in the former article, authorising Chile to appoint em-
ployees in Mejillones, who should oversee the correctness
of the Bolivian administration and receive on her
account the half of the dues.
Finally it lays down that the metal or minerals, terras
which the Treaty considers as being synonymous, pro
ceeding from the common zone should pay a duty
fixed by mutual agreement between Chile find Bolivia.
All went well with respect to the first named point
whilst no nitrate of soda was discovered in the common
territory, but when this discovery was made near Anto
fagasta, commercial necessity obliged Bolivia to take up
this port. Thereupon arose the requirement on the part
o Chile that the right of fiscalization should be exten-
ded to the Antofagasta custom-house, the place where
the minerals liable to payment of duties were embarked.
Bolivia resisted the claim, basing her standpoint on the
literal reading of article 3 of the Treaty, and this attitu-
de, again, was answered by the Chilian argument that
her rights of fiscalization would be annulled if they
were not exercised over all the custom-houses in which
the duties on the exportation of minerals in the common
zone were received.
No less serious were the disagreements originated by
the intervention in the customs, since, treating of goods
owned in common, this fiscalization was extended to all
the acts that might influence the results of the custom-
house.
14
Minerals or metals. The discoverv of salitrc in different parts
of the territory originated a debate between the Foreing
Offices over the meaning and range of the words Mi-
nerals and Metals. Should metalliferous subtances
only be understood by the word minerals, or also the
inorganic substances {sic) like nitrate, borax, sulphur
and iodine?
D. The exportation duty on the minerals of the
common zone was to ve determined by agreement
between Chile and Bolivia. The limitation which this
implied for Bolivia cut off her liberty of legislating on
this point without the consent of Chile, a fact that origi-
nated noisy protests on her part that embittered
diplomatic relations and brought both countries to the
verge of war.
The remaining clauses provoked no difficulties.
In Bolivia this Treaty has been considered as being
the work of Chile effected by means of a tortuous diplo-
macy which abused the ignorance of affairs of the
opportunist General Melgarejo.
If looked at from this point of view, however, it was
not unfavourable to Bolivia, given the situation created
by the events referred to in the preceding paragraph.
With it, Bolivia gained the advantage that Chile should
withdraw hr international boundary from the 23 to
the 24, contradicting by so doing the invariable policy
of its governements, and giving up half the guano pro-
perties that the law of the year 1842 had declared to be
national property.
~ 15
onditionai charai- Tlie gravest defect of this document
ler of the treaty. . . . , t i
lay in its conditional character, which
influences the meaning of all its clauses. If Chile con
ceded to Bolivia the ownership of a part cf the disputed
territory, it was on the understanding that Bolivia should
fulfill her obligation wMth respect to guano and minerals.
If Bolivia did not accept inspectors in the custom houses
or did not reveal the funds produced by the exportation
duties, the Treaty was violated and virtually ceased to
exist. The same thing would occur if Chile denied to
Bolivia the same prerogatives in the territorial zone that
the Treaty declared to be her property. Each difficulty
raised a question of sovereignty, because the injured
country might allege that the pact, which constituted a
concession on its part, not having been complied with,
it would restore its territorial right to the situation in
which it stood before the signing.
Before long, both countries were discontented with
tlie Treaty. Bolivia, basing iier attitude on the historic
claims as expressed by her publicists, considered it as
an unwise concession of a part of her territory, obtai-
ned thanks to the ignorance of an opportunist leader
who trod under foot the popular will. Chile, with equal
conviction, believed herself to have bargained away
territory undoubtedly hers, without obtaining the pacific
solution which she sought to gain by agreeing to it.
^'?o"oce*upVthe ^^ * matter of fact, the Treaty settled
^"^^^ nothing, it left everything pending and
opened the door to difficulties greater than those it at-
tempted to settle. It has been said that the thought ins-
16
piring the Chilian negotiators in celebrating this Treaty
was to prepare a pretext for taking possession of the
coast line; a fixed idea of our policy, it was supposed,
from that time forth; but if Chile had this in view in
1866, Bolivia gave her the means of carrying it out.
General Melgarejo requested our Government to garrison
with Chilian troops the most important port on the
coast, giving as a reason, the lack of cohfidence which
the soldiers of his own country occasioned him (1).
(1) Here follow some hitherto .unknown particulas with regard
to this fact.
Vergara Albano, Minister in La Paz, wrote to Santiago, on June
loth 1866. f Yesterday General Melgarejo called me to ask, that
the Government of Chile should send a garrison of fifty Chilian
soldiers with their respective officers who should reside in Cobija
and be subject to the direct orders of the Prefect General of that
Department. General Melgarejo has very grave motives for not
sending forces from Bolivia to that place and as he has extreme
confidence in the discipline, morality and decision of the Chilian
troops, he prefers that the port of Cobija and the neighbouring
caleta8 should be defended by a Chilian garrison .
The President of Chile, Don Jose Joaquin Perez attended to the
petition of Melgarejo and wrote to hitn privateiy on the matter.
(Note of Vergara Albano, La Paz. July 16, 1866). In consequence
of this, the Bolivian Government increased its request for troops
and officers to one hundred men instead of fifty, and gave orders
for their reception in Cobija.
When it appeared that all was ready for the soldiers to set out
for the Bolivian coast, the Minister of Bolivia in Santiago made
objections to the measure and sought to gain time by saying that
he was waiting to allow the Prefect of Cobija (in agreement with
- 17
Melgarejo was overthrown by a military revolt, and
the partisans that followed the victors opened a cam-
paign of depreciation against his administration.
Congress dictated a law declaring null all acts of the
previous Government. This declaration would have
permited Chile to re-occupy the port of Mejillones and
the territory situated to the south of 23, but instead of
so doing, Chile sought a new means of conciliation.
whom he acted) time to construct barracks to receive the new
garrison.
The Government of Chile to its Minister in La Paz, 2nd August,
1866. We have postponed the sending of a Chilian garrison to
Cobija, notwithstanding your instructions in this respect, in view
(jf certain suggestions made to me by the Bolivian Minister Pleni-
potentiary. The Minister Munoz believes that the matter is a
delicate one, adding that, according to communications received
by him, the Prefect of Cobija shares this opinion.*
Referring to tVie same point, the Chilian Government wrote to
its agent in La Paz, 1st September, 1866 With reference to the
request of his Excellency the President of the Republic of Bolivia
that a hnndred men of the Chilian army should be sent to garrison
Cobija, you are to state that tliis Government is ready to accede
to these wishes, but that Don Mariano Donato Mufioz having
stated that first of all it will be necessary to prepare barracks for
their accomodation in Cobija, the sending of the sai(i troops is
deferred until further advice from the Bolivian Government or
Legation.
Respecting the Chilian garrison for Cobija, replied Vergara
Albano, I have informed the President of this Republic that their
dispatch has been postponed by reason of certain considerations
advanced to Your Excellency by the Bolivian Minister.
I have read to General Melgarejo the paragraph of the note
of Y. Excellency referring to this affair, and he has been quite
disgusted that h's agents have not complied at once with his ins-
18
Lindsay Corral Agreement in 1872
In the previous paragraphs are rapidly recapitulated
the principal features of the bitter controversy that
maintained strained relations between the Govertiments
of Chile and Bolivia, in order to render more easily com-
prehensible the diplomatic solution which is knovsn as
the Lindsay-Corral Agreement*.
The pettyness of the divergencies helped to inflame
the spirit of the disputants. A difference over a matter
of great importance awakens enthusiam and passions,
the war of pin-pricks exasperates and irritates. In
Bolivia tlie idea gained ground that Chile intended to
offend ihe national dignity by tlie abuse of superior
forces; in Chile, that it was impossible to come to any
definite understanding with the long winded Bolivian
doctors. Such was the state of the affairs in one coun-
try and the other, six years after the embraces of Ame
ricau Union in 1866.
The governments made a new effort to facilitate com-
pliance with the existing Treaty, seeking an accomo-
dation, not a new treaty which at that moment was
truotions, The General insists absolutely on the inmediate dis-
patch of ore hnndreil Chilian soldiers to Cobija, witli their res-
pective officers, addin<r that he has only confidence in Chilian
troops to preserve the peace in those parts, so far remove<i from
Governmental vigilance and action.*
The Government of Chile made no attempt to counter the
dilatory procedure of the Bolivian Minister in Santiago, whidi it
could easilv have done as it counted with the goodwill of Melga-
rejo.
19
considered impossible, in view of the wide discrepancies
between the requirements of tlie two countries. With
this object, Don Santiago Lindsay was accredited as
Charge d' Affairs of Chile in La Paz, and Bolivia
nominated as Plenipotentiary ad hoc to treat with
Lindsay, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don Casimiro
Corral.
The negotiators arrived at an understanding expres-
sing their ideas in an agreement dated Dec. 5, 1872.
This agreement left unaltered the international boun-
dary in parallel 24 and the halving arrangement, but
regulated the latter, conceding to Chile the right of
vigilance over the aduanas which should be established
in the 23 24, and to Bolivia those established by
Chile between 24 25. In tliis manner the debated
point of custom house intervention in Antofaga&ta was
solved.
The account of the custom-houses held in common
would be liquidated every two months, deducting the
costs of the employees of the custom houses and of the
legal service. The export tariff on the minerals could
not be modified save with the consent of both parties to
the agreement, and Bolivia would make a separate
account of the amount to be received for taxes not
derived from the common zone.
A very important point of the new agreement was the
recognition, as minerals, of salitre, borax, sulpha-
tes, etc.
Another of the principal understandings of this agree
ment c(>nsisted in the fixing of the eastern limits of the
20
common zone by experts of both countries, and in case
of disagreement, by a third nominated by the Emperor
of Brazil, it being understood that their work would be
definite, not requiring the sanction of the governments.
This is the essence of the agreement. Good or bad, it
was a modus vivendi. a bridge by which to obtain a new
Treaty in place of the existing one.
Bolivia postpones Chile received it with little pleasure,
approval of the i mi t~ i- r^
agreement. but approved it. Ihe Bolivian Congress
adopted the following resolution, taken in the session of
May 19, 1873.
The examination of the Lindsay -Corral Convention and the
resohition to be passed on it is postponed to the next ordinary
Assembly of 1874.
This attitude of the Bolivian Assembly is explained
by the change which took place in the policy of that
country through the secret Treaty celebrated with Peru
and ap[)roved at this time. This is a point which will be
dealt with in full in the next chapter. Novertheless, it
should be noted that the Lindsay-Corral Agreement,
not being a new Treaty, but explanatory of that 1866,
did not require the intervention of the Congresses, and^
that under such understanding President Errazuriz ap
proved and promulgated it. The fact that the Bolivian
Government treated it as a Parliamentary matter was an
indication of the attitude taken up, and a means of ex-
plaining to Congress what it was impossible otherwise,
the secret treaty with Peru having just been celebrated
under its auspices.
Communications between Chile and Bolivia being then
very slow, the dissimulated disap[roval of the Bolivian
Congress was not known in Santia<;o till some time af-
ter, and as Lindsay had resigned his post as soon as the
Agreement was signed, the Chilian Government was
ignorant of the suggestions of Peruvian policy, and
accredited as its agent in La Paz, Don Carlos Walker
Martinez.
Tliis is in broad outline, the unfortunate history of
the Treaty of 1866. It is recapitulated since it shows as
openly as possible the motives governing the actions
of Chile and Bolivia. It can not be said that Chile always
had the right on her side. Historic impartiality obliges
one to recognise that obstinacy was shown now on one
side, now on the other. In general, Bolivia proceeded as
any other nation would have done in her place, desiring
to limit foreign intervention to what had been expressly
agreed upon, that is, to the Mejillones custom-house,
and to reserve the nitrate tax, giving the word mi-
nerals its strict meaning. But it also must be borne in
mind that every demand of Chile involved a reciprocity
onerous enough for her, since the same rights Chile de-
manded in the zone formed between the 23 and 24
she conceded in that of the 24 25, and that undoub-
tedly, the thought that inspired the transaction of 1866
had been to divide the profits, from whatever source, in
the disputed territory.
The declaration of the Bolivian Assembly respecting
the Lindsay-Corral Convention necessarily tended to
bring matters to a head because it was altogether too
clear a refusal to oppose to the considerable diplomatic
effort expended by Chile; but happily, serious results did
not follow. New negotations were started, termina
ting in the Treaty of 1874. Before dealing with this
document, the third step of the rough and dangerous
road traversed since 1866, it is necessary to acquaint
the reader with an incident that created a great deal of
discussion at the time.
Quevedo s Expedition
In consequence of the political convulsions of Bolivia
there lived in Chile a colony of emigres from that coun-
try, among whom figured some who had been members
of previous goveruements. One of these was General
Don Quiutin Quevedo; another, the ex-Minister of Mel-
garejo Don Mariano Doriato Munoz.
It appears certain that both were in collusion with
some Chilians, who lent them resources wherewith to
provoke a change of government in Bolivia, with a
view to the obtaining of considerable profits in money
and in concessions on the coast-line. What is merely
an unfounded supposition is that the Chilian govern-
ment was mixed up in this discreditable aventure.
The proceedings of the emigres were watched by the
Bolivian Legation, in charge of Don Rafael Bustillo. a
noisy diplomat of the autocratic school.
Tiie ropresontative Bustillo was Minister of Foreign Af-
of Bolivia ii) Chi- -T-rk -.n.-r* tn t'
le. fairs in La raz m looo, when Don Jose
Joaquin Vallejo presented himself there as diplomatic
agent of Chile, sent thither by the government of Don
Manuel Moiitt to obtain a settlement of the troublesome
incidents produced at sea between vessels loaded with
guano and the Chilian authorities. Bustillo demanded
as a condition of the recognition of Vallejo in his official
character, that he should as a preliminary give satisfac-
tion for the measures adopted by Chile with the guano
ships that carried Bolivian licences. This occasioned an
energetic diplomatic complaint that bore the signature
of don Antonio Varas. Bustillo, then, was the wrong
man to represent Bolivia in Chile in the incident to
which I am about to refer.
In July, 1872, the Intendente of Valparaiso, Don
Francisco Echaurren Huidobro was informed that a
ship with the Guatemala flag, anchored in the bay, the
Maria Luisa carried a cargo of arms, destination unk
nown.
The Intendente sent on board the Maritime Governor,
Don Patricio Lynch, to take possession of the ship's
papers in order that she might not sail, intending the
following day to search the cargo, a thing impossible to
carry out the same day on account of the hour at which
the matter was denounced. Lynch complied with the
order, but the ship escaped from the bay in the night.
After the flight of the Maria Luisa, the Consul of
Peru in Valparaiso, Don A. Salmon, who had interim
charge of the vice-consulship of Bolivia, warned the
Intendente that another vessel was about to sail for the
Bolivian coast, the Paquete de los Vilos, bearing
armed men and munitions of war. The Intendente
24
repeated what he had done with the Maria Luisa.
The Maritime Governor went on board, took the papers
and the vessel was left under observation. A search
was made, and only twenty first and second-class
passengers were found. There were no arms found.
After taking these steps, the Intendente Echaurren
went personally, accompanied by Lynch, to the residen-
ce of Consul Sahnou and pointed out to him that ab-
though denouncement was not substantiated by the re
suits of the investigation, none the less, he would detain
the steamer by force till further orders if requested to do
so. The Peruvian official, whom the fate of the Bolivian
government did not worry much, answered that he
could not assume such a responsibility.
In view of this reply, the ship sailed. There went,
hidden in it, Quevedo, Muiloz and their associates.
When off Los Vilos, the passengers intimated to the
Captain, revolver in hand, that he should set his course
for a port appointed as a meeting place with the Maria
Luisa*, and from thence both vessels proceeded north-
wards in company.
The raid of Que- The Paquete de los Vilos having
arrived at Antofagasta the authorities
on shore, not knowing what ship it was and still less
her object in putting in', sent out a boat to receive her.
The crew of the vessel took possession of the boat and
went on shore to the number of 46 armed men. The
authorities fied, embarking in a steamer anchored in
the bay. Quevedo made himself master of the town
without firing a shot. A correspondent who was present
25
during these happenings wrote to a Santiago journal
If the blow had fallen at night, no one would have had
any knowledge of the political change that had taken
place in the town.
Bustillo suffered a paroxysm of rage when he heard
what had occurred and wrote to the Intendente of Val-
paraiso saying A11 the immediate responsibility of
this attempt against Bolivia rests with you.
The Intendente complained of this accusation to the
Minister of Foreign Affairs. The Intendente was not
only a high functionaiy but was also connected by ma-
rriage with the President of the Republic.
Bustiiio's insults The Complaint of Echaurren Huido-
bro crossed with an official note from Bustillo, asking
the Government what measures it had taken to punish
the accomplices of Quevedo. In it, the following ideas
are given expression: The immediate promoters and
instigators of the plot are here under the high jurisdic-
tion of the Most Excellent Government of Chile. The pu-
blic conscience points a finger at the infamous and
bloody scheme which set its cunning in action to fit out
and arm the chief of the band in war against Bolivia; a
fact that Chilian diplomacy itself would hold up to the
execration of the world with indisputable documents*.
The Chilian Government demanded that he should
explain to whom his insinuations referred, and after
seven days, as Bustillo did not reply, fortyeight hours
were allowed him in which to define his charges. The
Bolivian Minister returned the note without answering
it. The Minister in Santiago severed his relations with
26
him and denounced his conduct to the Government, of
La Paz.
In the meantime, Quevedo had arrived at Antofagas-
ta with a handful of men. Dominated by the visionary
enthusiasm of the emigre, believing in his own illusions,
he went on shore in the port believing that the coast
would spring to arms like a single man and that this
enthusiasm was shared by the troops.
Unfortunately for him, matters did not fall out thus.
There was a small garrisoh in Mejillones which, on hea-
ring of what had happened in Antofagasta marched
overland to that town. On hearing of its arrival, Que-
vedo reembarked directing his course to Tocopilla and
abandoned his conquest.
Quevedo iu Tocopilla He wcut Oil shore at TocopiHa, and
a Bolivian battalion that garrisoned the place received
him with bullets. At the first threat of resistance, he
fled, taking refuge on two little steamers or rather tugs,
in the bay, the E1 Morro and the Lopez Garaa.
Whether by reason of over haste or some other cause
unknown, these two little steamers collided. Quevedo
took to the boats to save himself, believing that the one
he was in was about to sink, and sought safety on board
the Esmeralda , a Chilian ship that was in the port
under the command of don Luis A. Lynch. Seeing
from the deck of the t Esmeralda* that the Lopez Ga-
ma wast not sinking as he had believed Quevedo
atlempted to re-embark in her, but Commander Lynch
opposed this on the ground of neutrality.
lu such mauner this ridiculous adventure fell to pie
ces of its own accord.
The Bolivian Government requested Chile, through di-
plomatic channels, to deliver up the arms surrendered
by Quevedo to the Commander of the Esmeralda in
Bolivian territorial waters, but the Minister answered
that considering the case to be matter of discussion, he
had referred his decision to the Supreme Court of Justi
ce. The Court ordered the arms to be given up to Boli
via and this was accordingly done. Such in brief was
what happened.
Was there Chilian complicity in the acquirement of
the arms and in their embarkaHon in Valparaiso?
That assault on the Captain of the Paquete de los
Vilos, in which, with a revolver at his head, he was
ordered to proceed to Antofagasta was a comedy enac-
ted between Captain and the conspirators in order to
allege coertion in the judgment to follow?
It seems most probable that both questions might be
answered in the affirmative; but with respect to the com-
plicity of the Chilian Government in this discreditable
adventure, Bustillo presented no concrete proof, nor even
a plausible accusation, and it is sufficient to take into
consideration the fact that if the Government had really
had a hand in it, Quevedo would not have landed in
Antofagasta with fortysix men!
At the time of C^uevedo's expedition, Chile at sea was
disarmed, in contrast with Peru, which pvossessed the
squadron that figured in the war of the Pacific: the Huas-
28
car the Independencia, the monitors Manco Capac and
Atahualpa, as well as other ininor vessels.
Chile, on the other hand, only had available two woo-
den corvettes, the O'Higgins and the Chacahuco, and
two antique specimeuts of naval architecture, best fitted
to be in a museum as relics of former glories, the Es-
meralda and the Covadonga. The Blanco and Cochrane
were not out from the shipyards of Hull, in England,
where they were building.
The Government of Lima and the Peruvian press,
making capital of this naval inequality, exploited the
attempt of Quevedo as a means of alarming Bolivia and
deciding that country to throw itself into her arms,
saying that the prime mover of the attempt was Presi-
dent Errazuriz, and his object the taking of the coast-
line of Bolivia. And this matter, however insignificant
in itself, had much influence on the Secret Treaty and
in this sense forms an incident of great interest in the
history of our relations with Bolivia and Peru.
I repeat, the Government of President Pardo exploited
the suspicions of Bolivia by making Chilian policy and
not Quevedo, responsible for that act in order that Boli-
via should seek her salvation in an alliance with Peru.
A point was made of the circumstance that there was
present in Tocopilla and in Mejillones a portion of the
negligible Chilian squadron, and in its presence a proof
of complicity with Quevedo was deduced.
Threats of Peru Pardo made a naval demonstration in
Mejillones, sending there the Huascar and Chalaco, and
his Minister of Foreign Affairs, don Jose de la Riva
29
Agiiero, wrote to the Legation in Santiago manifesting
the surprise with which Peru saw that Chile had orde-
red the constructions of two ironclads which she did not
need for her defence; the suspicions aroused by the pre-
sence on the Bolivian coast, at the tinae of the arrival of
Quevedo, of Chilian vessels, and that in face of these
evident proofs his Government had made a naval de-
monstration in Mejillones. Giving its true intonation
to this lofty asd defiant policy, the Peruvian represen
tative was charged to call the attention of the Chilian
Governement to the fact that Peru would not view with
indifference the' occupation of Bolivian territory by
foreign forces.
This was the consequence of that ill advised policy of
American Union in 1866. The relations of peoples de
pend on the equilibrium of mutual suspicion, not of
love. Statesmen worthy of the name cannot overdo
manifestations of confidence without falling into ridicule
or into peril. The Nations do not love one another.
They watch one another and direct their curse according
to their permanent interests, not by ephemeral embraces.
Trough having forgotten this principle, Chile in 1866
permitted her ally Peru to acquire a naval power far
outmatching hers and the consequence of this was seen
in the naval demonstration of Mejillones six years
afterwards, and in the Secret Treaty which involved the
})eril of her disappearance as a nation. If anyone had
liad ihe foresight to say this in 1866, he would not have
been listened to. Had not all frontiers been wiped out?
Was not America united in a fraternal embrace?
30
The treaty of 1874.
In the year 1873, Dou Carlos Walker-Martinez went
to Bolivia in the capacity of Chilian Charge d'Affairs.
It would have been difficult to find another diplomat
with a greater desire to reconcile the two countries.
He arrived in Bolivia at the time when public opinion
was most excited against Chile. The country was still
unaware that the Treaty of Alliance with Peru had
been formally concluded, a matter about which I propose
to speak later on, but the public divined what they did
not actually know, and it was sufficient for Bolivia to
suppose that her pretensions would be aided by her
well armed and powerful neighbour to render her atti-
tude still more uncompromising. It is difficult to ima-
gine, says Walker Martinez, the ill-will which at that
time dominated in Bolivia with respect to our country.
The Peruvian press fed the conflagration with baseless
exaggerations. Tiie Government of Lima offered its
ironclads and monitors and the word War was repeated
in private circles and more than once in public meetings.
Our press also woke up and became bitter in its tono^.
, The spirit of the Shortly after his arrival at La Paz,
ea> Walker Martinez heard a vague rumour
that a conspiracy was being hatched against Chile by
Peru, Bolivia and Argentina, and without giving credit
to it but none the less fearful that it might materialise,
he invited the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don
Mariano Baptista to discuss a Treaty which should
31
abrogate that of 1866, taking as a basis the suppression
of the sharing system which had been the cause of all
the di!?{igreenients, and the recognition of Bolivian st)-
vereignty up to parallel 24**; Chile reserving rights over
guano.
Baptista, a good and able man, considered these pro
positions as a refutation of the intentions attributed to
Chile, and accepted the offer. Through causes wieh it
is not neccessary to go into here, the agreement of 1873
was not carried through till 1874.
The Treaty of 1874 is of capital importance in the
understanding of the causes of the War of the Pacific,
because it established the legal position that existed
between both countries when that war broke out.
Walker Martinez expressed the spirit of this treaty
saying that its object was to assure peace, to supress all
motives of discord and to give guarantees to Chilian
capital and industries invested and develo{)ed on the
Coast.
The first object was ol)tained by the following clauses.
The limit of both countries was retained in parallel 24"
and the Eastern boundary of Chile on the Andine Cor-
dillera in the divortio 8quarum> (watershed), a term
considered to be synojiymous with the summit line.
The halving arrangement was abolished except for
guano in process of being worked,- or that might be
found afterwards in the cqmmon zone.
Chile renounced the benefits accruing to her from the
product of the export dues on mineral found between
parallel 23''and 24", and Bolivia promised not to augment
32
the existing taxes for tweuty-five years on Chillian ca-
pital and industry, and to maintain in service as major
ports Antofagasta and Mejillones.
Basis of the treaty. The article is thus worded:
Article 4. The export duties imposed on minerals exploited
in the zone spoken of in the preceding articles, between the
parallels 23 and 24 shall not exceed the quota at present collec-
ted: and the persons, industries and capital appertaining to Chile
shall not be subjected to greater contributions, of whatsoever
class, than those at present existing The stipulation contained
in this article shall rule for the period of 25 years.
This was, according to Wal-ker Martinez, the fundamental basis
of the Treaty. Explaining it, he says:
In my judgement, the principal part of our agreement and its
base, its essence, is this fourth article, because it gives thet great-
est guarantee possible for our Caracoles industry.
He says further: The intention of the Sucre Treaty is this.
Article 4. is its base, the rest are more or less subordinate to it.
This article ensured guarantees to the considerable
amount of Chilian Capital invested in the Caracoles
mineral region and in the salitre concerns of the coast,
and did not signify any imposition on the Bolivian
revenue, because the riches of the coast line were con
centrated in Caracoles and in the salitreras where no
exportation dues could be imposed. Caracoles was si-
tuated in territory of the common exploitation, where
the custom house Tariffs could not be altered without
the consent of Chile, and the salitreras were ruled by
special contracts that conceded them the use of the-
territories they worked in exchange for an invariable
licence fee of 2,000 Bolivianos anually.
Whit the law in hand, Bolivia could not at that
33
inomeat draw any pecuniary advantage from her custom
houses on the coast, and therefore the new Treaty did
not damage her interets, but on the contrary, favoured
them, because in future the tax collected on the coast
on the export of minerals, belonged to her in its entirety
instead of being divided as formerly. In reality, there-
fore, the article 4. regarded under this aspect was a gua-
rantee obtained on behalf of Chilean industry to the effect
that it should be certain that for twenty-five years the
arrangement agreed upon in 1874 should remain unmo-
dified in any manner or for any reason.
The principle of ar- Arbitration was stipulated to cover all
bitration. i . i
differences that might arise in connection
with the Treaty, and within the zone of the former joint
ownership cominerce in the natural productions of one
or other country was declared to be free of duty. These
were the fundamental points. The secondary points
were the following:
The Pissis-Mujia line, prescribed by the Lindsay-
Corral agreement was accepted and ratified. It was
agreed that the position of any other mineral deposit
that might by discovered in doubtful territory should be
marked out by experts and a referee in case of disagree-
ment, the Emperor of Brazil being nominated.
The treaty resisted. The Treaty of 1874 Suffered formida-
ble opposition in Bolivia.
Te .suggestions of Peru had raised the aspirations of
the country to such heights that mere peace would not
suffice to satisfy them. The Legislative Assembly recei-
ved the Treaty with violent hostility. There was a mo
Chile and Peru 3-4
34
raent iu which the Government found itself impotent to
dominate the current of opposition, especially with refe-
rence to Article 4. which wounded the financial policy of
Peru, and among the opposing bands in Congress attempts
were made to make an arrangement on the basis of the
deletion of this Article.
Walker-Martinez stated that if the Treaty were not
approved, he would withdraw from Bolivia, convinced
that his attempts to arrive at concord were useless, and
the President of the Republic. Don Tomas Frias, threa-
tened in his turn to resign.
Finally, after a severe struggle, the Treaty was appro-
ved. Walker-Martinez describes the final scene in the
following words:
The sitting of the Assembly to-nigiit recalled one of those
famous sessions of the French Revolution: tumults, rushes of the
populace, unchained frenzy, bold threats; nothing was lacking.
From my balcony I could hear the dull ruuible of the town below
and there reached my ears the cries of one band or the other
into which opinion was divided Down with Chiles, Long live
Chile Long live Baptista* Down with him .
In Chile, Congress, approved the Treaty without dif
fieulty.
An equitable treaty. At first sight it is difficult to' under-
stand the burning opposition that the compact met with
iu Bolivia. It did not damage her interests, offend her
dignity or affect her sovereign rights. It settled justly
enough a situation which she declared to be as insup-
portable as the halving arrangement, and if she was
obliged for twenty-five years not to alter existing taxes
on the coast and could not impose new contributions of
35
any kind during that period of time upon Chilean in-
dustries, this restriction was already in force, so that the
Treaty did not create a new situation in this respect,
and in exchange it doubled the profit of the maritime
custom houses due to Bolivia, since previously the half
belonged to Chile. And still to regard the document
from a higher stand point, Bolivia could consider that
this sacrifice of twenty-five years was compensated by
the formation of a great source of riches in a province
of her territory, and that, thanks to this guarantee, there
might be built up on her coast line an emporium rival-
ling that of Tarapaca, which would furnish work for her
sons and, in future, revenues to her treasury. To pre-
vent this from happening, however, was precisely the
object of the secret Treaty already signed, because the
financial policy of Peru was thrown out of line if the
Tarapaca Nitrate industry should find a similar indus-
try free of export dues established in the South.
Change of attitude jt jg q^^q Qf curious coutradictious with
of Baptista. i tx- -r
which History is sown that Baptista, the
honest and eloquent parliamentarian who today defied
unpopularity and hostile opinion in order to secure the
approbation of the Treaty, was the same man who had
signed the secret compact with Peru a few months
earlier as Minister of Foreign Affairs of President Balli
vian.
It is difficult to explain this contradiction. Did Bap
tista cede to the influence of a new President like Frias
who held views, on foreign politics differing from those
of his predecessor?
36
Did Baptista believe in 1873 that Chile really desired
to annex the coast line by means of underhand plots
like that of Quevedo's expedition, and was undecieved
later, persuading himself of the reality of the sincere
desire for Peace of the Chilean Plenipotentiary?
Concessions to the Antofagasta Nitrate Company
A bold Chilean Explorer, Don Jose Santos Ossa, in
partnership with Don Francisco Puelma, discovered, in
1866, salitre in the pampas of the Bolivian coastline, in
Salar del Carmen. Both belonged to the bold race of
heroes of the desert; to the men who at the cost of per-
sonal sacrifice which does not lack the element of gran-
deur, dragged from those inclement regions the secret
of their fabulous riches. Salar del Carmen ist not far
from Antofagasta. The town of that name did not then
exist. The enterprising prospector marked out to ship
ping the site of the future Bay of Antofagasta, erecting
a signal on the hills visible from the sea and pitched his
tent on the lonely sands whereon today Antofagasta is
situated.
The first concession. ^he discovefcrs took advantage of the
presence in Santiago of the Minister Plenipotentiary of
Bolivia, charged with the negotiation of the Teatry of
1866, and in this year obtained from him the first of the
concessions inherited later on by the Antofagasta Nitra-
te Company.
This concession recognissed their property over five lea-
gues of salitre lands and four more for agricultural pur-
poses, in exchange for the obligation to construct a mole
in Antofagasta- The Bolivian Government in 1868 or-
dered legal possession of the ceded land to be given to
the concessionaries.
In reality, this cession \ta8 not disadvantageous for
Bolivia because at that time salitre lands were conceded
gratuitously in Tarapac^, whilst on the other hand it
was a bold speculation to sink capital in poor deposits
which could with difficulty compete with those of the
region further north.
The concessionaries probably met with difficulty in
raising funds for this reason. The fact that served as
a counterpoise to this disadvantage was that in Tarapa-
ca the salitre had to pay an export duty. If freedom
from this could be obtained in the Antofagasta enter-
prise, there would exist a base for the development of
a commercial proposition.
ThoseooD.i conros Puelma and Ossa transferred their
rights to a Society bearing the title of the
Compania Explotadora del Desierto de Atacama.
This company raised the question in Bolivia of the
taking oft' of exportation dues and the granting of the
privilege of working the salitre deposits for fifteen
years, all of which the Bolivian Government conceded
in exchange for the payment, once for all, of the sum
of ten thousand pesos and the construction of a road,
from twenty-five to thirty leagues in length, to termi-
nate in Antofagasta.
Furthermore the company was granted a league of
territory on each side of the road, which, in an exten
88
sion of twenty-five or thirty leagues amounted to fifty
or sixty more, permission being given to work in
this additional land the inorganic (sic) substances such
as salitre. borax, etc. (exception being made of minerals)
without paying taxes.
The privilege for fifteen years was extended to the
exploitation, elaboration and free exportation of salitre
in the Atacama desert.
The privilege was so great, the concessions made of
such vast extent that the Bolivian people with reason
protested energetically.
The exclusive The first concession, that which besto-
privilcffG.
wed on the discoverers five leagues of
salitre land, was just. The liberation of taxes for a gi-
ven time as a means of interesting capital in a new sa-
litre zone was just also, but the exclusive privilege of
closing a province in exchange for the construction of a
road that the company itself needed for the transport of
its caliclie that is to say, in exchange for nothing
offended the liberty of labour and the progress of
ihe nation.
In 1870, new discoverers of salitre presented themsel-
ves before the Bolivian Government asking permission
to work their deposits, but the concessionaries of 1868
opposed themselves to every new enterprise. Upon this
point took shape a contradictory administrative opinion,
which the Melgarejo Government solved by declaring
the validity of the exclusive privilege of 1868.
Nullity of the acts jn jgyi^ the Bolivian Asseraby, meet-
ting in Sucre after the triumph of the
39
Revolution that overthrew the Melgarejo Government,
declared null all sales, allocations and pledges made
under the former Government, and among them the te-
rritorial concessions. Tlie Government went further
still hy anulling all the acts of that administration, ex-
cluding the judicial cases on wich verdict had been
passed or in which an action of nullity would not pro-
ceed.
By a decree posterior to 1872 were declared null and
wiihout effect the concessions of salitre lands and of bo
rax de{)Osits which had been made by the former admi
ni^trations.
The Sociedad Explotadora del Desierto de Ataca:na
which, as has been said had succeeded Ossa and Puel-
ma, had dissolved itself and was nowcalled Melbourue,
Clark and C().
In 1871, this Company had made heavy investments
in Aiitofagasta for ihe purpose of working its lands, in
such manner that when the Assembly and the Govern-
ment anuUed the grants of Melgarejo, it excepted this
company, but restricted its privilege.
The restriction of 'pjjg company was restricted to a zone
privilege. cce. \ .1 i
of niteen leagues m the region now known
as Salinas, and an exclusive privilege was bestowed to
work and export the salitre of this area, a right to
construct a railway, subject to certain impositions custo-
mary in this class of licence; and exemption from custom
house dues on the construction material and rolling
stock of the railway to be built.
With this measure the concession of 1868 was modi-
_ 40
fied on the following point: the" privilege was reduced to
fifteen leagues which included the Salar del Carmen zone
and part of La Salinas: In exchange the general privi-
lege covering the whole desert of Atacaraa was anulled.
This was the chief modification.
Melbourne, Clark and Company was afterwards called
the Corapafiia de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagas-
ta. This company did not agree on the reduction of
privilege and raised the question of a more advanta-
geous settlement.
Compromise From all quarters complaints rained on
on873 , T^ ,. . V. 1 1
the Bolivian Government over the arbi-
trary measure anuliing wholesale the acts of previous
governments to the point that the Assembly found itself
under the necessity of authorising the Executive to come
to an arrangement over these complaints. In virtue of
this authorisation, the Government came to an arrange-
ment with the Compania de Salitres de Antofagasta,
conceding to it, in exchange for its lost general privile
ge, fifty estacas moreof salitre land in Salinas, over and
above the fifteen leagues that it already held.
The fourth article of this transaction says as follows:
The Company is conceded for the term of fifteen years, coun-
ting from the 1 January of 1874 the right of free working of the
salitre deposits existing in the land designated under Arts. 1 and
2; that of exporting from the port of Antofagasta the products of
these deposits free of all exportation dues and of any other tax
whether municipal or fiscal.*
This transaction was legalised on the 29th of Novem-
ber of 1873.
I fear lest the details of these concessions granted to
41
the ^<Compafiia de Salitres de Antofagasta may be
found confusing, for the subject matter itself has that
defect, and as this point assumed so much importance
in the declaration of the war of 1879. I consider it
desirable to recapitulate what has been said.
The successive con- j o rjr^Q Compafiia de Salitres possess-
ed then successive concessions of 0s8a
and Puelma of the Compania Explotadora del De-
sierto de Atacama and of Melbourne, Clark and Co.
2.'^ In 1866 the Melgarejo Government conceded it
five leagues of salitre land in Salar del Carmen and four
leagues for agricultural purposes.
3." In 1868 it was given the exclusive privilege to
work the salitre of the whole desert of Atacama without
fulfilling any obligation other than the payment of ten
thousand pesos down, once for all, which was complied
with.
4.<> In 1872, the Goverment restricted this privilege
to a zone of 15 square leagues in Salar del Carmen and
Salinas.
5.*^ The Company having protested against this reso
lution, the point was compromised in November 1873,
conceding as indemnification for their rights fifty Boli
vian estacas of salitre land in Salinas over and above
the fifteen leagues recognised in the previous resolu-
tion.
6.*' The Article 4 of this compromise disposed that
the Company should remain from 1874 to 1889 free from
all taxation, fiscal or municipal.
Over and above all this, the Treaty of 1874 was cele-
42
brated after the legalisrag of this transaction and dispo
sed, as is already known: that the persons, industries
and capital of Chilean origin should not be subjected to
greater taxes, of whatsoever class than those at present
existing*.
As a consequence, the business of the Compaflia de
Salitres was supported by the contract of die compromise
of 1873 and by the Treaty of 1874, which declared that
no new tax should be imposed for a period of twenty-fi-
ve years.
The law authorising the Government to compromise
the claims pending through the anullment of the acts of
the Melgarejo administration disposed that the Executi-
ve should give an account to the Congress of the com-
promises effected by it. It did so, but the legislature in
74 did not busy itself with this, perhaps because it was
considered useless to do so, since, if it modified the tran-
saction with respect to taxation, the Treaty of 1874 sup
ported it still more strongly.
This was the legal status of the Company.
So far I have recapitulated the diplomatic relations of
Chile and Bolivia, in so far as they are indispensable for
the understanding of the conflict of 1878.
But there is another point to be considered, graver
than these antecedents. This was the development of
Chilean population and of Chilean wealth on the coast
line and the obligation of Bolivia to guarantee one and
the other.
It is calculated that from 93 to 95 % of the popula-
tion of the coast was Chilean.
^ 43
The Chilean popuia The Small BoHviau co-efficient was raa-
tlon of the coast p \ ^
de up of public employees, the police and
the garrison. The capital invested in the ports, in the mi-
ning enterprises and in the salitreras was entirely Chi-
lean. The Caracoles raining centre, which attained its
greatest development between 72 and 75 awakened in
C'hile a movement of speculation and innumerable socie-
ties were formed in Valparaiso and Santiago for many
millions of pesos, in which no small part of the natio-
nal fortune was invested, and which determined a strong
current of immigration to this mining centre.
The Compafifa de Salitres de Antofagasta had ini-
tiated the explotation of the industry on a grand sea
le. It is calculated that before 1879 a million pounds
sterling had been invested in it. In the Southern region,
in that which is known by the name of Aguas Blancas,
there now existed a plant for nitrate refining, and around
that, as in those of the company before referred to,
swarmed a population entirely Chilean.
The Antofagasta Company had put up a great plant,
buildings and moles in the port and had in construction
a railway reaching to Salinas
Chilean capital on The heavy capital invested required
the coast -^ i t
guarantees, the population required jud-
ges, police, administrative authorities worthy of confi-
dence, and Bolivia could not furnish them because she
lacked them herself.
It would be unjust to blame Bolivia for the deficien-
cies of the public services on the coast, since she was
the sport of adventurers who made a jest of her rights.
44
insulted her laws and honour. But none the less it must
not be overlooked that this state of affairs created a per-
manent conflict between the Chileans and the Bolivian
authorities. The Chileans, masters of all, remembered
that the territory had once been Chilean, and had been
ceded in exchange for conditions that had not been com-
plied with, and protested that the nation had left to their
fate her boldest sons.
An undermining work was started, by means of se-,
cret societies, similar to that of the political Carboriari
who flourished in the period of the Independence, and
which had for object the gaining of Governmental
aid in emancipating this region from Bolivia, but Presi-
dents Errazuriz and Pinto rejected the suggestion as an
attempt against peace and the Treaties in force.
Great prudence was required on the part of Bolivia to
avoid a conflict. The dexterous hand of a politician of
unusual skill was needed to prevent an out-break, and
Bolivia had none.
There was another fundamental fact in the relations
of Bolivia and Chile: the Secret Treaty celebrated with
Peru in 1873. I propose to deal with this matter with the
detail which it requires in the next chapter.
General Survey of relations between Peru
and Chile
Liberation of Peru. The history of Chile is closely inter-
woven with that of Peru from the beginning of the XIX
century. There has been no notable event in the life of
45
Peru as an independent nation in which Chile has not
had something to do.
Its emancipation is in great measure the work of Chi-
le and would have been so entirely were it not for
political and strategic mistakes of the general com-
manding her forces. That expedition cost us the pain-
fullest efforts. Chile had to improvise a fleet, without
either ships or money, sailors or naval officers, yet
none the less the expedition was organised and an
array sent to Peru that should have been sufficient to
destroy the Spanish power.
This effort, which is known under the name of the
Liberating Expedition, almost exhausted Chile and as
it did not have the expected result, a second military
contingent was dispatched in 1823, also at incredible
sacrifices, to aid Peru or rather the better informed
portion of the people, to make themselves independent.
Chile protects the Some years later, Bolivia, ruled by
Peruvian Sovereing- i o , /^ j r> -
I \ against Bolivian General Santa Cruz, conquered Peru,
imperialism penetrating into the country with blood
and fire, shooting on the scaffold, ignominiously erected
after the triunph, the President of the conquered coun-
try and its leading chief:?. Afterwards the administration
was organised by Santa Cruz under a political system
called the Peru-Bolivian Confederation, the essence ot
which was to join in his hands the armies and revenues
of both countries.
Chile did not consider the formation of this great
state at her very doors, compatible with her security,
since it had at its head a popular leader profoundly
46
ambitious, a good organiser, with vast plans of Ameri-
can preponderance. Cliile therefore sent to Peru an
army commanded by Blanco Encalada, which failed,
and afterwards another in charge of General Bulnes, to
smash up the political combination of Santa Cruz.
Bulnes traversed Peru as a conqueror and went to seek
and defeat the enemy in the depths of his most distant
mountains, passing and repassing the Andine Cordille
ra through almost inaccesible regions destitute of
wood and forage.
This campaign, made on behalf of Peru, which did
not cost her an inch of soil, nor even a war indemnity,
none the less profoundly wounded her self love and
left in her heart a residue of rivalry which later influen-
ced her policy.
Chile defends Peru Later there occurred a great event
against Spanish , i r-w
attack that SO it was said, put the Peruvian
nationality in peril, and for the fourth or fifth time
Chile sallied out in her defence. Acting with an al-
truism that does honour to her heart if not to her head,
she provoked war with a powerful Spanish squadron
which had taken possession of the Chincha Islands,
though lacking ships, money and fortifications.
The result: Chile paid the broken windows, emptied
her coffers, contracted a loan and watched with folded
arms her chief port knocked to pieces with cannon
shot.
Peru, on the other hand enjoyed a semi-triumph, the
defence of Callao against the squadron commanded by
47
Admiral Mendez-Nufiez, a feat that raised her military
prestige and her desires of predominance.
Peru assumes naval ^j ^^^^^ ti,^^ Pg'rU {,3^ monev, and
supremacy i i
guided by intelligent foresight, bought
the ships that figure in the War of the Pacific, with the
exception of the Union and the Pilcomayo, acqui-
red later. With this fleet Peru took position as the
foremost naval power of the West Pacific coast.
This superiority impressed itself upon her politics,
giving them an arrogant turn that was evidenced in her
relations with Chile, and inspiring the economic projects
of Pardo, founded on the acquisition of the whole of
the salitre, wich found expression in the Secret Treaty
of 1873.
Chile orders iron Chile took notc of what was happen-
clads . ^^
ing and seeing that Peru was ready to
unsheath the sword on the slightest pretext, proposed
to equalise the naval situation by ordering from Europe
two ironclads superior to those of Peru and Argentina,
since at that time she fel pressure from both countries.
These ships arrived at Valparaiso. the first in 1875,
and after that our relations with Peru became more nor-
mal.
During this time the cause which produced most of the
frequent complaints of Chile against Peru, was, the bad
treatment given by the authorities of that country to
our countrymen employed on the salitre p)ampas of Ta-
rapaca, on the Oroya Railway, on that from Moliendo
to Puno and on the line from lio to Moquegua.
48
The Chileans in The Chilean '<pe6n, adventurous and
Peru 1 1 1 1 1 -r>
heroic, had spread over the Peruvian
coast in search of the work for which the emigration
agents offered gold in payment, not taking into account
the endemic sicknesses and the lack of food stuffs, and
finding themselves at the end of a short time poorer
that when in their own country.
The Chillean labourer was the handyman of the pu-
blic works in Peru. He put up the Salitre plants, wor-
ked the Pampas, embarked salitre in the ports and cons-
tructed the Peruvian railways that challenge the most
gigantic feats of contemporary engineering. Hundreds,
if not thousands, of them, filled the hospitals and peopled
the cemeteries.
There was a period in Peru, that of the Guano, which
partakes somewhat of the fantastic character of the
Thousand and One Nights. Millions derived from
guano flowed through the Peruvian marts making sud-
denly colossal fortunes. The locomotive penetrated the
Andine solitudes at two points at once and overcame
altitudes that probably even today have not been sur-
passed.
When the hour sounded for settling the accounts,
the affairs were paralysed and the Chilean workmen
flocked into the towns, sick and hungry.
Hostility against the Jq p^ru there existed a prejudice
Chileans. . i /^n ! i i t
against the Chileans who worked and
died to assist her development and it was necessary to
act whith energy lest they should be made the victims
of still greater outrages The Chilean Minister of Fo-
49
reign Affairs, Alfonso, rendering account of the facts to
Congress, said that <they revealed systematic hostiHty
against our nationalities.
As on the Bolivian coast-line so in part of the coast
of Peru, especially in the Province of Tarapaca, the great
majority of the population was Chilean, and this fact
gave to the war of 1879 a popular character on both
points.
For the reasons above specified the war was a settling
of accounts between the Chilean workman and the coun
try that had illtreated him. The workman of the sa-
litreras* and the Peruvian railways, was also the soldier
of the first regiments organized in Antofagasta.
But these reminiscences do not sufficiently explain
the happenings of 1879. That Peru should regard Chile
with envy and even whith rancour did not furnish a
eul'fieient reason for her to procure the alliance of Ar-
gentina and Bolivia against her, now that nations fo
How rather their interests than their passions. We must
seek elsewhere the explanation of the attitude of Peru,
and the reason will be found in her economic policy.
The Pardo Administration and the Nitrate
Question
In 1872 don Manuel Pardo was elected President of
Peru. Tliecountry was bankrupt. The public revenues
barely sufficed to meet half the budget. Guano, the chief
asset of the State was declining. The rich manure of
the Chincha Islands whith high percentage of nitrogen
50
was almost worked out. The Government had authori-
sation to sell up to 650 thousand tons a year of the
precious fertiliser, but could only find purchasers for
very much less. Pardo considered it necessary to reveal
the whole truth, and did so on a memorable public oc-
casion. A foreign writer who then lived in Lima, said
that in face of the declaration made by Pardo, the coun-
try stood perplexed between incredulity and astonish-
ment>.
One of the causes of this situation was the competition
offered to guano by salitre. Each interfered whith the
other's market. It was indispensable that this great
difficulty should be solved.
Guano and salitre The legal status of the two mauures
was different. Guano was state property and salitre was
worked on private account. The Government might re-
gulate the exportation of guano, but the salitre producers
of Tarapaca produced as much as they could without
troubling themselves about the rival manure, still lees
about the treasury that lived on. it.
One means of correcting the situation would have
been to ,shut down the guano workings and trust the
revenue to the salitre deposits, but this was no real
solution, because the whole value of the Guanowent into
the national coffers whilst salitre only paid an export
duty. Even if this tax had been increased, the pro-
duct would not have amounted to the sum necessary to
fill the deficit left in the budget by the value of four
hundred thousand tons of guano sold at fifteen pounds
sterling per ton. It is true that had the guanera8 been
51
closed the salitre output would have been greater and
the new fertilizer would, little by little, have taken the
place place left vacaut by the other.
But the solution along these lines was long and the
difficulties very serious. An active cure was sought, not
a course of treatment for the invalid.
The reverse operation, to shut down the salitreras and
return to guano its former splendour was impossible.
Great private interests had been created that would have
demanded compensations which the treasure of Peru
would not have been able to support.
Joint monopoly of Pardo cliosc the coursc of joining in
guano and salitre , i.
one hand guano and salitre, or extending
to salitre the rule that governed the guano. This rule
consisted in the Fiscal Monopoly. The State placed it
on the market and sold it for its own account. One head
only dealt with the business. This was what Pardo want-
ed to do with both fertilizers.
The projected fiscal monopoly presented one grave
disadvantage. The nitrate market was established
in Chile. Many workings belonged to Valparaiso com-
panies. The Chileans had been the first industrials in
Tarapaca. Foreign houses had advanced funds and had
the placing of the article and the upkeep of the works.
To take in hand the whole business dealings of the
fertilizers, the Peruvian Congress dictated the Estanco
Law of 1873, which limited the salitre production to four
and a half million Spanish quintals and authorized the
Government to purchase the whole of this production at
a fixed price ($ 2.40 of 44d. the quintal) at the ship's
52
side, and to sell it again with a difference of aproximately
two shillings and sixpence. But the production figures
exceeded those of the consumption. The price of salitre
went down and instead of two shillings and sixpence the
the Peruvian treasury received about sixpence a quintal.
Expropriation of j^ consequencc of this failure the law
Nitrate by Peru . ^ r^-f p
was dictated, in 187o, conferring power
on the Government to contract a loan of seven million
pounds sterling, with the object of buying the salitre
establishments, paying for them with certificates or bonds
at two years. The Government would contract for the ni
trate manufacture with the industrials, paying them a
fixed price per quintal and selling on its own account.
Whilst the negotiation of the loan was in progress, the
business was made over to the Lima Banks, which made
heavy advances of funds in order to complete the outfit
of machinery, mules, forrage, pulperias, etc., reserving
themselves five per cent on the profits. This combination
rested on the loan, which was not effected, but the Go-
vernment got so far as the taking over of the Oficinas
and the emission of the bonds.
The Peruvian Banks J ^q not'propose to analyse these measu-
and the salitre ... . . , ,
res in their economic aspect, beyond
calling attention to the link that they estabished be-
tween the Government and the public through the Banks,
putting these in the position of being either participators
in the profits of the fiscal policy or victims of its ruin.
In this manner the governing class made this policy its
own, and so the salitre problem came to be a national
question for the State and for private individuals also.
53
At the time of this negotiation uitratre was discovered
in Tocopilla, in undoubtedly Bolivian territory, to the
North of parallel 23. Since the combination would fail
unless Peru had the whole of the Nitrate production,
Pardo came to an undeastanding with Bolivia and
managed to get these lands rented to an agent of his in
exchange for a monthly rental and with no obligation
to work them. This agent transferred his contract to
the Peruvian government.
saiitre in Antofa- The Tocopilla peril being averted, it
appeared again in Antofagasta.
Although the Caliches (Crude nitrate-bearing mine-
ral deposits) of Antofagasta are of lower percentage in
value than those of Tarapaca, they had in their favour their
exemption from export dues conceded by the Treaty of
1866 and the contracts with the Bolivian Government.
No Estanco was possible whilst the saiitre producers
of Antofagasta could sell their product freely in the
market.
Saiitre in Taitai ^o the Autofagasta peril, that of Taltal
was added in 1878. The Chilian Saiitre producers of
Tarapaca, dispossessed of their properties by Pardo,
sought for and found others in the Taltal pampa>,
stimulated thereto by the Pinto Government which gave
them whatever they could discover in the hope of return-
ing to V^alparaiso the commercial activity destroyed by
the Peruvian monopoly.
In consequence of all this, the combination, by which
Peru strove to take in hand the whole of the Saiitre in
- 54
order to control its price was an ilusion destined to drag
down to disaster both tlie private and the public fortune.
Bolivia asks the alliance of Peru
origiaof the secret L^t US returs to the period of the dif-
Treaty. ^
ferences between Chile an Bolivia oc-
casioned by the halving rule and Quevedo expedition.
As already stated the latter occasioned great excitement
in Peru and Bolivia against Chile, a current of opinion
which passed from the Lima press to the Government
or vice versa, and resulted in the naval demonstration
of Mejillones.
At that time the Bolivian Deputy Don Jose Mier y
Leon, in October, 1872, interpellated the Minister of Fo-
reign Affairs with regard to the relations of the country
with Chile.
The debate was unfolded in secret sessions and the
Assembly "authorised by a law the solicitation by the
Executive of an alliance with Peru, and the ratification
of the Treaty to be celebrated without the necessity of sub-
mitting it to legislative approbation. This was the origin
of the Secret Treaty between Peru and Bolivia in Fe
bruary 1873.
Lindsay was still in La Paz. Although he never knew
clearly what was being discussed in the Congress behind
closed doors, rumours reached him to the effect that so-
mething was being concocted against Chile, and he
questioned the Minister of Forcing Affairs on the sub-
55
jeet, who madfe answer that what he had heard was mere
talk, devoid of all foundation.
The resolution of the Assembly was conamunicated to
Don Juan de la Cruz Benavente, Minister Plenipoten-
tiary of Bolivia in Lima. Ever3'thing supported the idea
that the attitude of Bolivia resulted from the suggestions
of Peru to pact an alliance and to put into the hands
of the Government the salitre.. without whitch the vast
economic plan based on the Estanco could not be rea
lised.
Peru offers aid to Pardo Feceivcd Benavente's proposal
favourably. On the 10th of November,
1872, the Council of Ministers met in Lima, the Presi
dent being present, and cpme to the resolution of an-
swering the Plenipotentiary that the Peruvian Goveru-
ment would lend its aid to Bolivia to resist the de-
mands of Chile, which it considered to be unjust and
to constitute an attack on the independence of Bo-
livia.
The Peruvian Cabinet undertook to explain the mean
ing of this declaration in a private communication
written the following day to its Minister Plenipotentiary
in Santiago, Don Ignacio Novoa, the essential part of
which I will give further on. Before doing so, however,
I think it desirable to explain in broad outline the ob-
ject of the Secret Treaty.
Aims of tiie secret Peru, starting from the supposition
Treaty ' rr
that Chile was intending to annex the Bo-
livian coast-line, sprang into the arena in the character
of a knight armed in that country's defence. Such sup
56
position was necessary, since without it pretext was lack-
ing to interpose between Cliile and the Governament
of La Paz, offering to the latter tiie guarantee of her
sword.
Since Chile, according to Peru, had this aspiration, it
was convenient for Bolivia to take advantage of Cliile's
lack of maritime forces and of the fact that Peru was
in conditio)! to impede the mobilisation of troops in
defence of the disputed territory. Moreover, she would
have to move quiikly because ChU e was ha ving two
ironclads constructed in England .
Such was the idea. The means of carrying it out
the following.
Bolivia was to declare that she would not respect the
treaty of 1866, then in force, and should occupy the terri-
tory over which she claimed to have rights, that is to say,
the salitre zone. Cliile, naturally, would not accept the
outrage and would declare war. It was necessary that
the initiative of the break should come from Chile. Af-
ter resquesting England to embargo the Chilian ships in
construction in the name of neutrality, Peru and Argen-
tina would come into action with their fleets. I mention
Argentina because the co-operation of that country for-
med part of Pardo's {)lan.
The arbitration The fig-leaf coveHug of tliis policy was
the word arbitration. The allied squa-
drons would oblige Chile to submit to arbitration what-
ever suited them, and when that had been effected it
would leave them with the domination of the Pacific and
with the territory in dispute occupied by Bohvia.
57
No one can form opinions on matters that have not
liappened, but none the less it is not too much to beheve
that if Pardo had effected his object lie would have talked
no more of arbitration. Is it possible to believe that he,
the strong one, hoMing in his hand the salitre region,
his supreme aspiration, would voluntarily deliver it up
to the chances of an adverse verdict?.
Once mistress of the Pacific, would Argentina carry
before a tribunal her pretensions to Patagonia when at
that very moment the great difficulty lay in her tenacious
refusal to include Patagonia in the arbitration?.
Dangers for Chile. Such, roughly expressed, was the sense
of the Secret Treaty. Never was Chile in greater peril,
nor has a more favourable moment been elected for re-
ducing her to the mere leavings that interested none of
the conspirators. The advantage to each of them was
clear enough. Bolivia would expand three degrees on
the coast; Argentina would take possession of all our
eastern terrisories to whatever point she liked; Peru
would muke Bolivia pay her with the salitre region.
The synthesis of the Secret Treaty was this: opportu-
nity: the disarmed condition of Chile; the pretext to
produce conflict: Bolivia: the profit of the business:
Patagonia and the salitre.
I am going now to prove these statements from un-
published and private documents from the Forcing y
Office of Lima.
On accepting the request of Bolivia for an alliance,
the Peruvian Cabinet communicated officially with its
Minister in Santiago, explaining clearly its object.
58
Riva-Agiiero Expia- Tjje comunicatioii related in detail the
ins The Treatv
divergences caused by the application of
the Treaty of 1866 and the resistance which the hal-
ving rule to wliich the coast districk was submitted met
with in Bolivia. The pretensions of Chile to share con-
trol in the fixation of taxes in this zone were recalled.
Basing the idea on these antecedents, the proposition of
Chile to take possession of the coast line was taken for
granted.
The Treaty menaces Althougthe interestH of Chile, it said, appa-
' ' ^' rently counsel the maintenance of peace in or-
der that her increasing commerce maj' continue developing, the
facts, unfortunately inspire doubts with respect to the views of
her Government and make it feared that the plans may be realised
wat for some time past have been attributed to her of taking
possession of the Bolivia coast-line, provoking the Bolivian Go-
vernment by her demands, to break off relations, which would
afford the opportunity to occupy Mejillones and Antofagasta.
If these presumptions are realised, Peru could not remain an
indifferent spectator, and would see herself obliged to support
Bolivia in safeguard of common interests, since she could not
permit that Chile breaking the American equilibrium, should
make herself mistress of a coast line that does not belong to her.
Peru would at once offer to mediate, and in case that the media-
tion was not accepted by Chile and that country coiitinued in her
purpose of occupying the coastline, the necessary and inevi-
table consequence would be on our part an alliance with Bolivia.
It is desirable that once for all, and as soon as possible, the
relations between the two Republics should be defined, because
it is necessary to arrive at an arrangement satisfactory to both
parties. If Chile dealing with this boundary question seizes the
most favourable opportunity to take possession of that coast-line,
it is necessary that their plans develop before Chile is in posses-
sion of the ironclads under construction, in order that in the de
59
finite settlement of this question, the influence, which we are in
a position to exert by means of our maritime preponderance may
have due weight. (Private note of RivaAgiiero to Novoa, Nov.
20, 1872. Godoy papers).
The agreement of the Governments to the secret
Treaty of alliance being now obtained, it was only neces-
sary to give it form and the Plenipotentiaries nominated
ad hoc by Bolivia and Peru signed without difficult on
the 6th February 1873, the pact that gave origin to
the War of the Pacific. When this document saw the
light in 1879, well authorised opinion raised doubts as
to whether or not the text published was a faithful copy
of the original, because the name of Chile did not appear
in it, but decisive proofs are forthcoming that Chile
alone was in view. One of these is the Act issued in
Lima on the 19th of November by Pardo and his Cabi
net; the note just copied and many other declarations of
the Peruvian Government which will appear in the
course of the present narrative. The Treaty published
in 1879 is the same that the Governments stipulated
in 1873 (n.
(1) The Act of the Government of Peru was published by Paz
So) dan in his Narrative of the War of Chile against Peru and Bo
I i via, page 22, note, and reproduced by Ahumada Moreno in the
> War of the Pacijic' volume 1. Appendix, page 545.
The information to which I refer is a note of the Minister Don
Joaquin Godoy which says as follows:
<1 have motives for doubting the fidelity of the copy given to
the press since I have been told that in the i)reface of the
> Treaty and in some of its articles the alliance aga'nst Chile, is
expressely stipulated in case of war between either of the
60
Provisions of the The Text of the Secret Treaty is as follows:
secrettreaty ^^rpj^^ Republics of Bolivia and Peru, desirous
of drawing together in a solemn manner the bonds which unite
them, thus aujimenting their strength and mutually guaranteeing
certain rights, formulate the present treaty of Defensive Alliance;
for which object the President of Bolivia has conferred power
adequate for such a negotiation to Juan de la Cruz Benavente,
Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plonipotenciary in Peru, and
the President of Peru has conferred like powers to Jose de la
Riva-Agilero; who have agreed on the following stipuiations:--
Article I. The High Contracting Parties unite and league toge-
ther mutually to guarantee their independence, their sovereignty
and the integrity of their territories respectively, obliging them-
selves by the terms of the presenttreaty to defend themselves aga-
inst all foreigna ggression, whether emanating from one or several
independent states or from a force without flag and obeying no
recognised power.
Article II. The Alliance will be made effective to preserve the
rights expressed in the preceding article and especially in the
cases of offense which follow:
].o In acts directed to deprive either of the high contracting
parties of a portion of its territory with the aim of appropriating
i}s dominion or of ceding it to another power.
2.0 In acts directed to submit either of the high contracting
parties to protectorate, sale or cession of territory, or establishing
over it any supremacy right or preeminence which diminishes or
contracting parties and our country over question of boundaries
of other interests, a circumstance that does not appear in the
reproduction. Reason and verisimlitude is given to the doubt
by the fact that that Government has obstinately refused to
permit me to take knowledge, even confidentially of the origi-
nal document. Further corroboration of this presumption is
what His Excellency General Prado told me with regard
to this in the interview which I had with him and of which I
gave an account to you.
61 --
offends the ample aud complete exercis eoi itb sovereignity and
independence.
3.0 In acts directed to annul or vary the form of government,
the political Constitution or the laws which the hijth contracting
parties have given or shall give themselves i n exercise of their
respective sovereignties.
Article HI. Both contracting parties, recognising that every
legitimate act of alliance, is based on justice, establish for each
one of them, respectively, the right to decide whether the offense
received by the other is comprehended in the definition of the
foregoing article.
Article IV. A scasus federis* having been declare<l, the high
contracting parties promise inmediately to server their relations
with the offending state, to hand passports to her Diplomatic
Ministers, to cancel the patents of the Consular Agents, to pro-
hibit the importation of her natural or industrial products and to
close their ports to her ships.
Article V. The same parties will likewise name Plenipotentia-
ries to adjust, by protocol, the precise arrangements determining
the subsidies, the coniingents of land and sea forces, or assistance
of whatever class which shouM accrue to the attacked or offended
Republic: to the manner in which these forces shall operate and
the aid to be lent and all measures which tend to the succes of
the defence.
The meeting of the Plenipotentiaries will be effected in a place
decided upon by the offended party.
Article VI. The high contracting parties bind themselves to
give to the offended or attacked party the means of defence which
each one of them considers disposable, in any case considered
urgent, even though the arrangements prescribed in the pre-
ceding article have not been already effected.
Article VII. The ^casus federiss having been declared, the
party offended shall not celebrate any peace agreement, truce or
armistice without the concurrence of the ally which has, in.such
instance, taken part in the war.
62
Article VIIL TJhe high contracting-parties further bind them-
selves.
1.^ To employ, preferably, whenever possible, all means of
conciliation to avoid a rupture or to terminate the war, even if
the rupture has taken place, considering between these means, as
most effective, the arbitration of a third power,
2.0 To neither concede to, nor accept from, any nation or go-
vernment, protectorate or supremacy whicli diminishes their in-
dependence or sovereingty, nor to cede nor lease in favour of any
nation or government any part of their territory save in the cases
of better definition of boundaries.
3.0 Not to conclude boundary treaties or other territorial
agreements without previous knowledge of the other contracting
party.
Article IX. The stipulations of the precent teatry do not extend
to acts commited by political parties or resulting from internal
commotions independent of the intervention of foreign govern-
ments, since the present teatry of alliance, having for its principal
object the reciprocal guarantee of the sovereign rights of both
nations, none of its clauses should be interpreted in opposition to
its primary intention.
Article X. The high contracting parties shall solicit together
or separately, when they so declare by a latter protocol, the ad-
hesion of another or other American States to the present teatry
of defensive Alliance.
Article XL The present teatry will be exchanged in Lima or
in La Paz, as soon as it is rendered constitutionally affective and
will be in full effectiveness twenty days after the exchange. Its
duration will be indefinite, each of the parties reserving the right
of terminating it when considered desirable. In such case the
party will notify its resolution to the other party and the treaty
will be annulled in four months counting from the date of notifi-
cation.
In faith of which the respective Plenipotentciaries sign it in du-
plicate and seal it with their private seals.
63
Effected in Lima, the sixth day of Frebruary of one thousand
eight hundred and seventy three.
Juan de i,a Ceuz Benavkntk. J. de la RivaAguero.
Additional Article. The present treaty of Defensive Alliance
between Bolivia and Peru shall be secret nutil the two high con-
tracting parties by common accord consider its publication un-
necessary.
Juan de la Cbuz Benavente. J. de la RivaAoiJero.
Principal stipuia- This Treaty contains six principal arti-
tions of the secret .
Treaty clcS, VlZ:
1." Object of the Alliance. To guarantee the integrity
of territory, or, what comes to the same thing, guaran-
tee the Bolivian coast-line against Chile.
2. Causes of offence:
a) The attempt to subject one of the contracting par-
ties to any supremacy, right or predominance, which
tends to lessen the full and complete exercise of its
sovereignty*. Read here the demand of Chile to
legislate, conjointly with Bolivia in the halv6d terri
tory.
b) The attempt to obligue one of the parties to vary
the laws which it emits in the exercise of its sovereignty.
That is to say, to obligue Bolivia to modify the laws af-
fecting taxation dictated on the products of the common
zone, without the knowledge of Chile.
Peru the protector B.'> Military Assistance. Peru left the
of Bolivia in all
difficulties with door open to take part in the contest if
Chile gj^g desired to do so, a very important
clause as it affects the responsabilities of the War of the
64
Pacific, since Peru could remain neutral without failing
in her Treaty obligations.
The article says that each party reserves to itself the
right of deciding whether the offence received by the
other is comprehended among those designated in the
preceding article*.
The remaining clauses of the same article dispose
that, the casus foederis being established, a protocol
shall enumerate the subsidies, military and naval ele-
ments, order of superior command, etc.
4." Restriction of the right of celebrating Treaties
affecting Boundaries, or other territorial arrange-
ments*, without previous knowledge of the ally.
Boundary Treaties could only be celebrated between
Bolivia and Chile, because they were the only coun-
tries bordering on one anotiier. Consequently, this
clause had for its object to introduce Peru into any
convention or Treaty of this class that might be
agreed upon.
5. To seek the adhesion to the Treaty of another
or other American nations.
The nation contemplated in this clause is Argentina.
6. The Treaty should remaind secret.
This document left Bolivia in the power of Peru, and
Peru face to face with Chile. Bolivia's hands were
tied, because, even though she desired to and found
jt convenient to do so, she could not fix her boun-
daries with Chile, nor celebrate any new Treaty, nor
establish territorial compensations without the agree-
nient of Peru. If the difficulties resulted in war, Peru
had liberty to abandon her.
~ 65
But it happened with this Treaty, as often falls out
in business of too speculative a character, that the mo-
ment of hurry having passed, there was no way of elu-
ding the obligations incurred in the hour of inmediate
pressure. Bolivia did not submit to the state of servi-
tude to which she was condemned, and celebrated, as a
sovereign nation, new agreements with Chile in 1874.
A very important point was the adhesion of Argentine
to the triple alliance against Chile; the union of the
fleets in order to impose upon her, firstly inaction and
subsequently, mutilation.
In vain one asks, what national interests had Peru in
seeking the part of belligerent between Chile and Bo-
livia.
The possession of the region between parallel 23
and 24 did this affect her sovereignty? She would
not change neighbours, for in any case an intermedia-
te Bolivian zone would remain between her frontiers
and those of Chile, including the ports of Tocopilla and
Cobija. What could induce her to go knocking at the
diplomatic doors of La Plata to bring this nation into
the Pacific, to her own waters, making her the co-part-
ner of her discords, which were matters of absolute in-
difference to Argentina? The reason of the Treaty was
to get possession of the Salitre zone.
The root of this policy is found in that orgie of con-
fidence called the American Union of 1866, which gave
Peru naval predominance and the lustre of triumph at
Callao; exalted with this situation, Pardo believed in
his ability to bring off the vast salitre combination, for
66
which it was necessary to subordinate BoHvia to Pern,
and despoil Chile of her northern territories, takiut^ ad
vantage of the moment when she had no ships.
The attitude of Peru between Chile and
Bolivia
For the better understanding of the Treaty it is ne"
cessary to return to the Negotiation set on foot in 1872
hetwen the Chargd d'Affairs of Chile, Don Santiago
Lindsay, and the Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Don Casimiro Corral, which I dealt with in a former
chapter. I said then that, after various attempts at an
arrangement, the negotiators arrived at an agreement
in a Convention that solved the main difficulties that
had arisen in former years, and which, whilst leaving in
force the Treaty of 1866, prescribed rules for its appli-
cation in a conciliatory form that, however, did not
destroy the root of the mischief, because the halving
rule remained in action; none the less it created a
modus-vivendiio\erah\e enough as a transition stage until
new efforts on one or the ether side should manage to
substitute the 1866 Treaty by another. I added that
these ideas were formulated in a diplomatic instrument
known under the name of the Lindsay-Corral treaty,
signed in December, 1872, and approved by Chile in
January, 1873.
TheLindsav-corra/ '^^"^ pact alarmed Pcru. If Bolivia
conveiitioQ arranged affairs with Chile, what
pretext would Peru have for requi
f)7
ring compliance with the agreement already celebrated
in Lima, in the middle of November, between Pardo
and Benavente, wich is the origin of the Secret Treaty?
I cannot say whether it was at the initiative of Boli-
via, or Peruvian influence alone that suggested the consti-
tutional fomality urged by the Government of La Paz
as a pretext for not ratifying administratively what she
had agreed to, in spite of the fact that Chile had already
done so; but it is a fact that Peru made it her interest
tohinder the carrying out of the agreement. With this
proposition in view, Don Anibal Victor La Torre was
accredited as Diplomatic Agent in La Paz.
The mission of this envoy had a double purpose, to
obtain from the Bolivian Congress the ratification of
the secret Treaty, and to use influence in disapproba-
tion of the Lindsay-Corral convention, offering to Boli
via the Argentine-Peruvian alliance.
The instructions given to La Torre, said:
"We further confide to you, approved by Congress and ratified
" by His Exellency, the President of the Republic, the Treaty of
" Defensive Alliance which was made with Sefior Benavente on
" the Gth of February of the present year, and which is based
" not on the desire to draw closer the ties binding us to Bolivia,
" hut also to add moral force to that Republic, to the end that with
" calm and safety she may sustain her rights."
'' mrl're serlouMheS- ^ ^^^^ '"^gard to the Argentine Allinn-
cuities of Chile and ^e the instructions add.
lioiivia.
"It does not appear to be a matter of difficulty to secure this
" adhesion, taking into account the fact that the Government of
" Chile has also raised difficulties with the Confederation regard-
" ing their respective boundaries in Patagonia. For this reason,
68
if an agreement is come to between the Argentine Confedera-
tion, Bolivia and Peru, any war with Chile would be almost
impossible; or rather, the present question of boundaries would
be arranged in a pacific and equitable manner for all the parties
interested."
Respecting the Lindsay-Corral Conventions it adds:
"Surprise has been occasioned by the publication in the Chi-
" lean newspapers under the unusual form of an international
" agreement, which even if it has been accepted by that Repu-
" blic is very doubtful if it will also be accepted on the part of
" Bolivia. Such, at least, is to be expected, since the said conven-
" tion having to be submitted previously to the approbation of
" the Bolivian Assembly, according to the statement made by
" Sefior Terraza in his communication to the Govvernment of
" Santiago, it is difficult to believe that power is about to author-
" ize and sanction a pact contrary to the sovereignty and national
" dignity, in which are confirmed and consecrated, so to speak,
" the cessions extorted from Bolivia in the original Treaty."
The instructions conclude with the following myster-
ious phrases;
"Such is, roughly outlined, the present state of relations bet-
" ween Bolivia and Chile. As will not be unknown to you, cir-
" cumnstances may soon present themselves of tvhich it is necessary
" to take advantage. (1).
In order to hasten the adhesion of the Republic of
Argentine to the compact of alliance, La Torre was
ordered to solicit the Government of La Paz to autho-
(1) Instrutions of a private character for La Torre, May 3 1873,
signed by Riva-Agiiero. This note and all other private docu
ments of this chapter come from the "Godoy Papers".
69
rjze the Peruvian Minister in Buenos Aires to represent
Bolivia before the Government of La Plata in all mat-
ters relating to this compact. These instructions of so
definite a scope are diluted with a phraseology calcula-
ted to give the impression that the Government dictat-
ing them had no other object beyond the conservation
of peace and of obtaining an equitative arrangement
by means of arbitration.
La Torre obtained complete success in his mission.
The Secret Treaty was ratified by the Bolivian Assem-
bly on the 2nd June, 1873, and on the 16th of the
same month it was secretly promulgated.
The Bolivian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don Ma-
riano Baptista, authorised by a note from the Chance-
llery, the Minister of Peru in Buenos Aires, Don Manuel
Irigoyen, to solicit in his name the Argentine alliance.
The Lindsay-Corral Convention, already approved
administratively in Chile, was postponed or rejected by
the Bolivian Congress.
Success of La Torre j^ the latter part of June, La Torre
sent to Lima the military attache of
the Legation, Sergeant-Major Don Juan L Lizarraga,
carrying with him the original of the secret Treaty, ra-
tified. Riva-Agiiero answered him as follows
"By means of these documents (referring to the communica-
tions of which Lizarraga was the bearer) the Government obser-
ves with extreme satisfaction the success, as rapid as it is fortu-
nate, that you have obtained in the most important part of your
diplomatic mission to this Government, and on this same date
and by the same steamer that carries the present communication,
it has informed Doctor Don Manuel Irigoyen (Minister of Peru in
70
Buenos Aires) of the good news, including a copy of the two above
mentioned communications exchanged between yourself and the
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bolivia, in order that he may prp-
ceed to solicit in the name of that Republic, equally with Peru,
the adhesion that we are seeking. In terminating this official
communication I have pleasure in congratulating you on the tact
and skill wtih which you have carried through this important ne-
gotiation in so short a time, a matter tending to the most impor-
tant results as affecting the peace and prosperity of both Re-
publics." (1).
It will be remembered that in referring to the part
taken by the Congress or Bolivian Assembly in initiating
the Secret Treaty, I said that it authorized the Executi-
ve to form an alliance in Lima, and ratify it without
the necessity of further legislative consultation. Appar-
ently this statement contradicts the part of the instruc-
tions of La Torre, in which it is ordered that the Secret
Treaty should be submitted to the ratification of the
Bolivian Assembly, but this had no other object than
to raise the prestige of the Treaty in the eyes of Argen-
tine, and, to anticipate any objection that might in this
sense be made to it. (2)
As Peru had foreseen, the rejection of the Lindsay-
Corral Convention i)rovoked strained relations between
Bolivia and Chile.
(1) Private note, 1 st July 1873. signed Jose de la Riva Agiiero.
(2) These instructions say: Although as you will see by the
secret law whose copy I enc'^lose, the Executive of Bolivia is
authorized to ratify this pact without need of submitting it to the
approval of the Assembly, it is of importance to obtain such ap-
probation, which is to be obtained under reserve, manifesting at
71
President Pardo seeks war in 1873
In narratiug the relations of Chile and Bolivia I had
occasion to say that Lindsay returned to Santiago imme-
diately after celebrating the Convention that bears his
name whilst Chile confident that Bolivia would proceed
to its ratification as Chile had done, nominated Don
Carlos Walker Martinez Diplomatic Agent in La Paz,
who was able to inspire confidence to Baptista and open
the negotations that liad as their result the Treaty
of 1874.
Peril urges Bolivia to Contemplating tliis Unexpected turn
in the relations of Santiago and La Paz.
the Chancellery of Lima took action to find some means
of provoking the rupture and preventing the Chilean
ships from leaving European waters, qualifying the
conciliatory attitude of Walker Martinez as a blind and
advising to Bolivia break the existing Treaties.
Riva - Agiiero wrote to La Torre as follows:
August 6. So, then, what Bolivia, ought to do is to waste no
more time in time-killing discussions that conduce to nothing
save to permit the arming of Chile. If the Government of Bo
livia understands its own interests, if it does not want to lose
part or the whole of its coast-line, it should utter its last word as
the same time the nessecit}' of keeping it secret in accordance
with the interest of both countries.
As in the treaty is provided that the adhesion of other count-
ries is to be obtained, doctor don Manuel Irigoyen will start very
soon go to the Argentine Republic, where he has been appointed
Resident Minister to the La Plata and Bra3il governments, this
being the main object of his diplomatic mission.*
72
regards the Treaty of 1866 and the Lindsay-Corral Convention:
and it shonld definitely break these compacts wheterby causing the
extraordinary Assembly to disapprove the one and resolve to
substitute the other by reason of the insuperable dificulties which
it has met with in practice, or by adopting some other measure
conducive to the same end: aZt^ays hoicever so arranging matters
that it is not Bolivia that breaks oU re]a.t\ona but Chile that is obli-
ged to do so.
The Chilean Ironclads Relations once broken off and a state
of war. declared, Chile could not obtain possession of her ironclads,
and lacking force with which to attack, advantageously, would
find herself in the necessity of accepting the mediation of Peru,
which could in case of necessity be converted into an armed me-
diation if the forces of that Republic sought to occupy Mejillo-
nes and Caracoles.
To the foregoing consideration you may add others which will
doubtless determine the decision of the Bolivian Government to
adopt the line of conduct indicated. I refer to the practical cer-
tainty we have of the adhesion to the alliance of the Argentine
Republic.
The fixed point of view of Peruvian policy was the
Chilean ships in construction. In Pardo's mind there
was no time to lose, and as Bolivia did not hurry herself
to terminate the questions pending, and October 1873
had arrived without seeing the materialization of the
Treaty negotiated between Walker-Martfnez and Baptis-
ta, Riva Agiiero reiterated his former advise in these
terms;
October 12th.=The confidential note forwarded by you under
date of September 24th last and numbered 89, has been recei-
ved in this Ministry.
The repeated effort < which Sefior Walker Martinez makes in
the attempt to maintain peace between Bolivia and Chile, and the
73
different proposals continually put forward but never carried
into effect to abrogate the Treaty of 1866, under discussion up
to the present date without result, as I have communicated to
you in many dispatches, are in such contradiction to the imperi-
ous and arrogant "policy hitherto observed by the Government of
Chile, that this change can only be explained by the desire of-
the Government to prolong the present state of affairs until it
finds itself sufficiently strong to be able to demand, what at pre-
sent it knows that there is no chance of obtaining.
B61ivia must hurry mat- But if it suits Chile now to show a concilia
ters before the iron-
clads arrive tory attitude, it 18 not only in order to avoid
a premature breaking off of relations that would prevent her
obtaining the ironclads from England; but also in order to make
it appear when the rupture does take place that she has
been dragged to it by necessity, after having exhausted all means
of conciliation.
Bolivia, therefore, should not allow herself to he taken by
surprise, losing in fruitless negotiations an excellent opportunity
for defining her boundary questions. To propose the bases that
may be considered just and equitable for the celebration of a Treaty
would be to the interest of both countries; such a Treaty as would, in
conformity with the desires of both parties, abrogate that of 1866;
but, at the same time, it isdesirable that these negotiations should
not be prolonged indefinitely. In fact a time limit should be fixed
for arriving at a definite agreement which would put a term to the
uncertainty caused by the expectation of a disagreement liable
to bring about a war in which the political interests of all would
suffer,' not only in these two Republics, but in the rest of the
Pacific States.
Peru, animated by this interests and desirous of arriving once
for all at a solution which shallnot affect the honour or interests
of Bolivia, considers, as a necessity, that this government, appre-
ciating the desirability of terminating the said questions which
may later on affect peace, or at least the friendly relations between
two countries, should adopt a determined attitude which would
bring as its result a definite agreement judging by the protesta-
74
tions of the Chilean Charge d' Affairs; hikJ which should be all
the more easy to bring about now than at some later time when
that Republic is in possession of means which may possibly in-
duce her to make greater demands than it does at present.
You xoill accordingly press the Government in accordance ivith
these considerations to the end that it may arrive at a clear and
final understanding in its questions with Chile, before that Republic
has completed the building of her ironclads and their sailing from
England.
Whilst Peru was dealing in this mauer with Bolivia
she was pressing the Argentine Republic to adhere to
the alliance.
The President of Argentine favours the secret
treaty
The Peru- Argentinean negotiation of 1873 is enyolved
in deeper mystery than the Bolivian discussion.
From the secret official documents which I have seen,
it appears that President Sarmiento and his Minister of
Foreign Affairs, Don Carlos Tejedor, adhered to the
Treaty and recommended it to Congress; that the Cham-
ber of Deputies approved it by a great majority and
voted the funds for the war; and it further appears that
the Senate also approved it, requiring that it should be
completed by the addition of certain declarations to form
the matter of a protocol, which propositions, however,
did not modify either the basis or the main intention of
the Treaty. These declarations were resisted by Baptis-
ta; and it failed because the Cochrane put to sea, antici-
pating the calculations of the conspirators.
75
The attitude of presi- At this time doii Domiiigo Faustino
dent Sarmiento o
Sarmieuto governed the Argentine
Repubhc, an erratic but brilliant writer, who had ca-
lled public attention to himself in his own country
and in Chile by his caustic pen and by some literar}'
works of considerable merit. The aggressive and intem-
perate type of his character, and the fact that he took a
warm part in the domestic politics of Chile, had brought
him a host of friends and enemies. To Chile he owed
half his public career. Arriving in Santiago as a fugitive
in the greatest misery, from the Rosas Government he
found a government which employed him in well salari-
ed posts in the department of public instruction. Chile
believed that Sarmieuto would never lend himself to a
conspiracy hatched in secret with the intention of reduC'
ihg her position to thjit of a second class State in South
America.
The Plenipotentiary of Chile in Buenos Aires, in
those days was don Guillermo Blest Gana.
Soon after the signing of the Secret Treaty, Pardo
sent to Buenos Aires don Manuel Irigoyen to raise the
question of the adhesion of Argentine. The instructions
given him are dated May 20th, seventeen days later
than those of La Torre, and in them is repeated the de-
claration that the secret Treaty is directed against Chile,
a statement that appears redundant after what is alrea-
dy known, but which is destined to establish a fact that
was subsequently tenaciously denied.
76
Irigoyen solicits the "You are aware," says Riva-Agiiero to him,
Argentine alliance, "that for some time past grave questions have
arisen between Chile on the one side and the Argentine Confede-
ration and Bolivia on the other, with respect to the demarcation
of boundaries between them and that Republic.
"Bolivia isolated, lacks the strength sufficient to resist the pres-
sure that Chile attempts to put upon her, and understands how
desirable it is to tighten the bonds that unite us to her, solicits
by means of her plenipotentiary and in conformity with the legis-
lative resolution of which I include a copy, the moral and mate-
rial aid she requires in order to permit her to discuss the ques-
tion of her rights with calm and security.
"The Government of Peru cannot remain indifferent to the just
demand of its neighbour, and has signed with her the Treaty of
a defensive Alliance, a copy of which is enclosed, and which, al-
ready approved by the National Congress, will shortly be sub-
mitted to the Bolivian Assembly and made effective by both Go.
vernments.
"Since in the 9th article it is agreed to solicit the adhesion of
other Governments, you will attempt to obtain that of this Repu.
blic, which does not appear to be a hard matter at present, in view
of the difficulties which have beset her recently in her fruitless
attempt to arrive at a definition of boundary lines with Chile."
The fear of Brazil. TejedoF, requested by Irigoyen to
adhere to the secret Treaty, accepted, though expressing
the fear that if the information reached the ears of the
Cabinet in Santiago, an alliance between Chile and Bra-
zil would be formed in opposition.
Brazil was the safety counter poise that Chile had in
the Atlantic.
Irigoyen made every effort he could to dissipate this
fear and Riva Agtiero himself did the same, until Te-
jedor decided to enter into the plan confiding in the
77
assurance that the negotiation would be entirely private.
This first point eliminated, Tejedor exacted in return
for the adhesion to the Treaty, firstly: that Bolivia should
arrange her boundaries with Argentine; secondly that
the rupture of the 1866 Treaty should not be considered
casus foederis, that is to say that such rupture should
not oblige Argentine to corae to the aid of Bolivia with
naval and railitary forces.
Conditions of the Argen- With regard to the first point, Irigo
tine to join the alliance. i i.i j. -n i*
yen gave hnn assurances that Bolivia
would proceed immediately to treat with Argentine on
the question of boundaries, as soon as this country had
signed the triple alliance, proraisi^ng further to submit
to arbitration the points of difference. The boundary
problem between these two countries turns on the eas-
tern frontier of the C'h^co ond on the Province of Tarija.
In order to infuse greater confidence, Irigoyen offered
that this promise should be ratified by the Bolivian Go
vernmeut. President BaUivian and his Minister, Bap-
tista, sent these declarations to La Latorre authorizing
him to bring them to the knowledge of the Foreign Of-
fice of Buenos Aires.
"Having recently arrived at this city (Sucre)" wrote BaUivian,
''and overburdened with things to see to, I have scarcely a few mi-
nutes available which, however, I devote with pleasure to acknow-
ledging your kind and interesting letter of the 19th of the present
month (September) together with the other that I received during
my journey. I have instructed Sefior Baptista to write to you
also; he should forward td you, though in condensed form, our
ideas and views on the subject which you have communicated
to us.
It would be most desirable that netvs ahould soon arrive of some
78
definite resolution being taken hy the Argentine Government, since this
leould put us in a better i)os it ion to carry out ivhatever tvoiild he to
the farthering of our common interests and desires.
Bolivia gives assurances Baptista wrote as follows:
to Tejedor. "I am authorised to inform you that you
may communicate to Sefior Irigoyen the expression of the sincere
desire of my Government to define as soon as possible the ques'
tions of boundaries pending with that of Buenos Aires. I ac-
cept the suggestion of Sefior Irigoyen to enter into this negotia-
tion at once either here or there, althoug I consider that it would
be easier and more expeditious to place the seat of the discussion
here, and I have no objection whatever in accepting arbitration
on points that are not settled within a given time.*
It would appear to follow from these expressions that
Ballivian only waited for the adhesion of Argentine to
provoke the outbreak of hostilities counselled by Peru.
With this Tejedor expressed himself 'satisfied.
His second objection relative to the rupture by Boli-
via of the Treaty of 1866 was much more important, be
cause it upset the whole of the Peruvian policy which
was trying to produce a war with Chile for this very
reason, as the Peruvian Government had expressly stat
ed to its agent in Bolivia.
Irigoyen energetically defended the views of his Go-
vernment, which had cautioned him to make clear the
importance given to this point.
When the Peruvian Government obtained knowledge
of this requirement it replied:
"If it is certain that it is not possible for a nation to fail to do
what it has agreed to in a Treaty, it is also true that war may ari^e
as a consequence of compliance, for this is exactly the position we
have existing between Bolivia and Chile."
79
Tejedor desisted also from further observations on this
point.
SarmieDto's Government had greeted the secret Trea-
ty with sympathy, but hesitated in the moment of facing
the perilous adventure, not seeing what compensation
Bolivia could offer her in exchange for the risks to which
a war with Chile exposed her. Military aid? Bolivia
could not give it because of the enormous distance that
separated her from Buenos Aires. Naval assistance?
She had no ships. The alliance with Peru was quite
another matter, since it would leave the Chilean coasts
and ports dominated by the guns of the allies.
Tejedor proposes an So Tejedor reasoned, and with this in
Argentine-Peruvian ^jj^jj j^^ proposed to Ifigoyeu to elimi"
alliance. t-. i- < i m
nate Bolivia from the Treaty and to
celebrate a direct alliance of Peru and Argentine against
Chile.
The Peruvian Cabinet could not accept the suggestion
because it was necessary for her economic ends that Bo
livia should set fire to the powder, repudiating the Trea
ty of 1866, when the allies would sally out in her de-
fence.
Peru took refuge in the argument of decorum and in
her passed word. (1)
(1) The reply of the Government of Peru was couched in
the following terms: October Ist, 1873: In the confidential note
ol August 25th last, you gave an account of the question put to
you by the Minister of Foreign Affair.^ of that Republic, as to
whether you iwould consider it possible to celebrate a Treaty of
Alliance with the Argentine Confederation, putting on one side
entirely the compact of February arranged with Bolivia, in favour
80
sarmiento adheres ^fter these alternative propositions
to the secret treaty
that for some months delayed the des-
of which you have been charged to obtain the adhesion of that
Government.
However powerful may be the motives of expediency which
have impelled Sefior Tejedor to request the setting aside of the
celebration of an alliance in which Bolivia is included, Peru can-
not follow in the affair any other course than that she has already
embarked upon. Her community of interests with Bolivia and
even more, her international loyalty, will never permit Peru to
seek an ally on the Atlantic at the price of setting aside her
natural friend on the Pacific, union with whom is already con-
secrated by a compact based on the public faith and honour of
both nations.
But even apart from those grave considerations there are
others which, though of less importance, still work against the
project of excluding Bolivia, put forward by the Minister of
Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Confederation. Motives ana-
ogous to those which appear to have inspired the suggestion of
Sefior Tejedor might withdraw us from participation in the ques-
tions which Argentina has pending with Chile. In fact, the
pretensions of both States to Patagonian territory are of interest
to them alone^ and whatever may be the result arrived at in
these questions, the interests of one or other of the two countries
will alone have been compromised.
tYou must insist, therefore, whatever the state of the nego
tiations, in obtaining the complete and frank adhesion of the
Government to the Treaty of February, with no further reserve
than the reiteration of Bolivia's offer to settle within a deter-
mined time her boundary problems with the Confederation and
to submit them to arbitration in case of necessity.
tThis is the only policy that Peru can or ought to follow in
existing South American questions, and from which she cannot
depart if she desires to retain for her honour and public faith the
respect which they merit.
81
patch of the Treaty, the Government of Sarmiento
accepted it officially and asked authorization frona Con-
gress to sign it. The Chamber of Deputies hastened
to concede its authority and to vote funds for the war.
It is easy to understand that the Peruvian Government
received the news with great delight.
Riva Agiiero communicated the news of this great
success to his Minister in La Paz.
October 24, 1873. I am glad to inform you of the fortunate
result obtained by Dr. Don Manuel Irigoyen in the important
mission confided to him near the Argentine Government, which, as
you will see from tlie enclosed copy, finally adheres to the com'
pact of defensive alliance of February 6th. I have communicated
this happy result to Senor Terrazas, who in turn transmits the
news to his Government by the present post.
Later than this official note I have received a letter from Dr.
Irigoyen dated September 26th in which he informs me that the
Argentine Government has approved it in tne Chamber of De-
puties by a large majority, and that it has been forwarded to the
Chamber of Senators, where it will undoubtedly meet with the
same reception, since all parties manifest themselves decidedly
in favour of the Alliance.
The aforesaid letter of Dr. Irigoyen, which is of semi-official
character in this respect says: 'that the authority (poder) to act
on the part of Bolivia not having arrived by the steamer, he
interviewed Sefior Tejedor and agreed with him that the latter
should request permission of Congress for the Government of
Argentine to adhere to the alliance; and in fact he did so by
means of a note which the President of the Republic signed also,
reading the said note in the Chamber of Deputies in secret
session, where it produced a great effect, being then passed
to a commission.
September 28th: That the Chamber of Deputies expressed its
approbation by a great majority, and that it has authorised the
6
82
Executive to set aside six million pesos cash in the event of a
casus foederis; that afterwards the matter was brought before the
Senate, where, according to the opinion of influencial members
of that body it is sure of approval.
tAll this it gives me great pleasure to communicate to you
and I expect to be able to ratify the approbation of the Argentine
Senate as soon as the correspondence from our legation in Bue>
nos Aires comes to hand, which sliould be brought by the next
steamer from the South.*
The Argentine Government sent as Ministers ad hoe>
to the allies, Don Manuel Dorainguez to Lima, and Don
Jose E. Uriburu to Bolivia.
The attitude of Brazil
Reports about the se- The Minister of Chile in Buenos Ai.
crct trcfl-tv
res, Blest Gana. was in that city when
the sessions were held in which the Triple Alliance was
discussed, and he transmitted to the Governement in ci
phered communications the scattered, and vague scraps
of information which he managed to pick up. As time
passed, the informations became more definite in charac-
ter and on the Ist. November, 1873, he gave the infor-
mation that the Argentine Government had submitted
to the consideration of Congress the idea of the advan-
tage of celebrating an alliance with the Republics of
Bolivia and Peru, for the probable eventuality of a war
with Chile or with Brazil. Blest Gana added that the
Chamber of Deputies had approved the message of Sar-
miento with one vote only in opposition,
Don Adolfo Ibafif'Z, Minister of Foreign Affairs of
83
President Errazuriz, communicated this information to
the Plenipotentiary in Lima, Don Joaquin Godoy, who
answered on the 21st of November,
Appreciating the extreme gravity of the matter to which this
note refers and the importance of making clear its meaning, ail
my efforts will be directed, as at present, to put myself in a
pobition to forward to you the most trustwothy and complete in
formation as soon as possible.*
Godoy wrote to Walker Maiti'nez that he should try to
discover the truth of the news in Bolivia.
Walker Martinez answered:
December, 1873, Witli regard to the alliance which has been
spoken of between this Republic and the Republics of Argentine
and Peru against Chile, here everybody considers that it is a mere
rumour. The Peruvian Minister, Sefior La Torre, when the matter
was referred to, laughed loudly, and has puhUdy protested against
any such alliance. He has done this in so public a manner and
with such frankness'that it seems to me that he either knows
nothing about it or that up to the present nothing deiinite lias ta-
ken place. The Minister of Brazil has received from liis Govern-
ment more or less the same intelligence which you, and myself
also have received and has talked to me a good deal about the
question in order to arrive at some understanding as to what
should be done. I am awaiting the arrival of the Government in
order to sound the depths and gain more security on the matter.
I will send you tlie result of my investigations as soon as pos-
sible.*
Soon after, the Government of Chile obtained confir-
mation of what Bleat Gana had communicated, through
Brazil, and accordingly made it known to Ibafiez in San-
tiago, and to our Minister in Buenos Aires that a pact of
84
Alliance, against Chile, had been approved between Ar-
gentine, Peru and Bolivia.
Brazil denounces these- March, 1875, The presumed alliance Of
cret treaty. p^^.^ ^^^^^ Bolivia, said IbAnez to Blest Gana
of which you spoke in your confidential despatches of the 19ih
of January, 12th and 26th of February last, has arrived to the
knowledge of my Government by different channels, and have
been confirmed in a confidential manne by the lionourable repre-
sentative of Brazil in this capital. In view of this fact, which
could not be more serious, my Government today sees itself obli-
ged to take no important resolution whilst lacking more precise
information respecting the propositions, means and ends of the
alliance.
It is necesary to know how to read the diplomatic
language of Chile. The time left to Ibariez to investigate
the propositions means and ends of the alliance* was
that which was necessary to allow the sailing from En-
gland of the ironclads in construction.
Through the whole year 1873, President Errazuriz
had lived in continual anxiety, and ordered by telegraph
that they should work on them day and night. He was
certain that there was peril on the horizon. The tone of
the Foreign Office of Lima had assumed a character of
untoward arrogance since the signing of the secret.
Treaty to the point that in P^ebruary, 1873, Don Eulogio
Altamirano, Chief of the Cabinet, feared at any mo-
ment the provocation of Peru.
Fear of war in 1873. 5"or six or eight days more, he wrote to
Godoy, I shall continue to hold tlie honour
of being your chief. I hope that during this time Peru will not
declare war and that I shall not have the painful honour of recei-
ving the ultimatum.*
85
Ibailez, penetratiug the secret of the situation, said to
Godoy.
They fear the coining of our ironclads, and iiave passed the
word to provoke us to quarrel. Meanwhile, we need all the more,
patience and resignation. Have the same, then, also.*
Godoy needed great patience.
The journals which received official inspiration in
Lima, El Comercio and El Nacional, pushed very far
their attacks on Chile.
Godoy and Riva-Agiiero ^^ incident that happened in those
days gave more force still to this'^ bel-
licose tendency. The Chilean Minister in Lima received
orders to request information with regard to a propo-
sition made by Peru to Bolivia, to the effect that she
should subject the nitrate of the coast line to the same
fiscal rules as Peru, without which the Estanco was writ-
ten on water.
Riva-Agiiero received the petition of Godoy in a
friendly manner recognized the fact of the matter, ad-
ding that as Bolivia had stated she lacked the funds ne-
cessary to buy the nitrate in the port and sell it after-
wards for her account as Peru proposed to do in Tara-
paca, he Riva-Agiiero, had offered to advance the money.
Godoy observed that such an agreement should be
discussed with Chile, because the salitre of the part of
the coast line situated to the south of the 23rd parallel
was subject to the sharing rule and the legislation with
regard to it could not be altered without the agreement
of both States. The Peruvian Minister appeared to
86
assent to this observations and agreed that Godoy should
communicate his remarks in written form. This is the
Chilean Minister's version of the incident.
Godoy's communication was answered in so intempe-
rate a manner that many considered war inevitable.
Just then, Pardo considered that the moment was propi-
tious for pushing matters to extremity. The Minister of
Peru in Santiago, don Jose Pardo, received a letter from
his nephew, the President of Peru, in which the latter
announced that he -was disposed to turn Godoy out of
Lima.
Be on the look out Ibanez advised Godoy, counting always
on the security that we will do you complete justice here.
Throughout the whole yeaj: 1873, the atmosphere was
charged with electricity and the air smelt of powder.
The scare lasted till the middle of 1874. Foreign diplo-
mats perceived the unusual tenseness of the atmosphere,
but did not hit on the cause, which was the secret
Treaty. When the incident between Godoy and Riva-
Agiiero happened, Brasil was represented in Lima by
don T. Leal and in Santiago by Baron A. D'Andrade.
Leal was inclined to the Peruvian side. D'Andrade
maintained a more impartial attitude. Leal thought
that the difference might lead to a rupture. By reason
of this the Brasilian diplomats exchanged private letters
in which the one did not hide his leanings in favour of
Riva-Aguero, whilst, on the other hand the other found
the right on the side of the Chilean Minister, but, though
disagreeing on this point, both declared that the affair
87
seemed to them so strange that they were forced to be-
lieve that something more lay behind, at present unseen.
I see in all this*, wrote Leal, an enigma which I cannot und-
erstand.*
I find also, replied Andrade, a riddle that I cannot explain.*
The enigma was the secret Treaty and the desire of
Peru to precipitate hostilities before the arrival of the
Chilean warships.
The Argentine Senate and the secret Treaty.
The countries associated together against Chile, more
especially the Government of Peru, remained in expec-
tation, awaiting the Argentine Senate acceptance of the
Alliance, approved by the Chamber of Deputies of Bue-
nos Aires. They had confidence in the result of the
consultation. The enthusiastic sentiment of adhesion
which had been demonstrated by the Government of
Sarmiento still existed, as Tejedor had verbally assured
Irigoyen.
It appears, as I have said already, that the Senate
approved the secret Treaty, duly requiring that it should
be amplified by a protocol in which some points of detail
were stipulated.
At that moment the term of the sittings was about to
come to an end for 1873, and as there was no hurry,
since according to the most optimistic calculations the
Chilean ships could not leave England before 1875, this
Protocol might be celebrated without inconvenience du-
ring the period of recess.
Meanwhile, Tejedor signified his adhesion to the AUian-
ce, as it would appear when completed whit the modifi
cations treated of in tire complementary protocol, by
means of a note of October 14. 1873. This note is not
available, but its contents may be deduced from the reply
which was given to it by the Peruvian Government.
Modifications asked The modifications asked for by Teje-
y eje or. ^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ these:
1 Boundaries requiring definition between nations
pertaining to different forms of Government (as Argen-
tine and Brazil) not to be subject to the principle of uti
possidetis of 1810.
Peru accepted this modificatioii.
t Uti possidetis^ Peru answered, sis absolutely inadmissible in
treating of distinct dominions between which compacts exist defi-
ning their different territories; the principles of present possesion
cannot be admitted as a valid rule save in cases where the right
of ownership has not been recognised.
This clause had in view the preservation of the rights
of Argentine to the territory of Misiones (ocupied by
Brazil before 1810).
2. Tejedor found that the wording of the article 2.
lent itself to the interpretation that the allies must inter-
vene in certain laws emitted by the others, thus interfe-
ring with their independent sovereignty.
3.*^ Inasmuch as in articles 5 and 6 of the same, it is
stated that the allies are under obligation to lend their
aid to anyone of them who is attacked or aggrieved,* Te-
jedor or the Senate desired that these words should not
be taken as synonimous and that the allies should have
89
the right to qualify each case replacing the word obli-
ged* by may.
4. It was asked that the Alliance should demand the
neutralization of the Straits of Magellan. (1)
(1) The nature of the affair, hitherto completely unknown, and-
the lack of documents which prevents the making of concrete state
ments, obliges me to give in the following note proofs of the sta-
tements made in the text, taking advantage for this purpose of
the answer of the Lima Foreign Office to Tejedor given in a private
document enticled Memorandum of the observations, which in the opi-
nion of the Government of Perti should be made on the note of adhe:
sion of the Argentine Governmet dated the 24th of October last, and
which should be taken into account in drawing up the Protocol establi-
shing the said adhesion^.
To Tejedor's second observation, the Government of Peru re-
plied as follows: The observations made bysefior Tejedor whith
respect to article 2.o, in which i-cases of of fences are specified di-
sappear if the light trouble of putting this article into relation
with the 1.0 is taken, fixing the attention not only on the clause
contained in it but also on the spirit and sense of the Treaty ta-
ken as a whole.*
\Vith regard to the laws alluded to in the item 'dP, these can-
not be other than those referring to sovereignty, independence
and territorial integrity, the only ones that foreign nations can
mutually guarantee one another, and not civil, administrative or
political laws of secondary order.
Qn the words <offended or attacked* the document says: cRes-
pecting the 3.o alteration required by Senor Tejedor, it cannot be
considered that are synonimous the Republics offended or attacked
made use of in articles 5. and 6.o where these treat of the arran-
gements for the determination of the subsidies which the con-
tracting parties owe to one another in case of war. In fact, one
of the Republics might have beefl offended without as yet
90
As I have already had occasion to say, it was to be
noted that in the year 1874 the needle marking the
course of Bolivian politics became uncertain in its indi-
cations. It did not now incline with the same fixity
towards Peru. Baptista was riot the same politician who
the year before had signed the Secret Treaty, He was
not now disposed to accept all the requirements of Peru
or Argentine. It is very difficult for a foreign writer
ignorant of the interior politics of Bolivia to give a sa
tisfactory explanation of this change.
It appears to be a fact that Baptista found the decla-
ration of the Treaty respecting uti possidetis in 1810
too comprehensive and, as a matter of fact, if the com-
pacts existing between Spain and Portugal only, were
excluded, it sanctioned the rule that the sovereignty of
the new Republics should be fixed in accord with the
hetnglit attacked, l>ut if the circuin^ances were pressing and ur-
gent, any delay in determining by protocols between the respec-
tive plenipotentiaries the amount of the subsidies and armed
assistance might place the offended Republic in peril of being
attacked before the aid spoken of was rendered available: in such
case the contracting parties bind themselves to supply the means
of defence to the /offended or attacked*, party to the extent that
each one of them considers itself to have at disposal, although
the agreements spoken of in article 5.o were not concluded. It
would not, therefore, be an advantage to replace the words bind
themselves by the word rriay as requested by Senor Tejedor.
With regard to the article 4.o In complete agreement with
the same idea as the Government of Argentine, Peru considers
favourably the suggestion that an understanding be arrived at
with regard to points of common and perhaps universal interest^
euch as that of the neutralization of the Straits of Magellan.
-- 91
possession at that date. In such case Bolivia would com
promise her rights to Tarija, which she incorporated
later. The case was grave for Baptista and although
Uriburu offered that his country should leave this mat-
ter apart, such offer did not appear to be sufficient and
his [tatriotism rebelled against the idea of signing a de-
claration that might weaken the title of his country to
a section of its territory (1),
In August, 1874, Baptista answered the note of Teje
dor of October of the preceding year in terms which
impressend the Argentine Government very unfavoura-
bly and almost put an end to the Treaty of AUian
ce (2).
"October 'iSrd, 1874. By ineana of the copies forwarded to you
witli the correspondence directed to this office by Sefior Irigoyen
yon will be informed of the manner in which the Argentine Go-
vernment has received the declarations of Sr. Baptista in his
communication of August 8th, directed to our representative in
Buenos Aires, on the observations made by the said Government
before confirming its adhesion to the pact of defensive alliance
of February (ith.
In view of the bad effect produced by the aforesaid explana-
tion it is to be feared that the charge given to Sefior Irigoyen
will be entirely nullified and, abstaining from all commentary, I
limit myself to tlie reproduction of tlie well founded considera-
(1) April 22, 1875. Private document of La Torre who
was Minister in Bolivia in 1874. You will recall certain ideas of
Sefior Tejedor as to uti j)ossidetis and I can assure you that in a
private and confidential interview, sefior Uriburu, Plenipotentia-
ry in Bolivia of the Confederation told me tliat his Government
did not think of raising any question with regard to that terri-
tory.
(2) Private note to the Minister in Bolivia, signed by Riva
Agiiero.
92
tions which our representative in Buenos Aires delivers in the
note herewith included.*
A new difficulty rose soon after. Brazil and Chile were
preoccupied with the secret debates of the Argentine
Congress, each believing that the conspiracy was directed
against herself. Brazil made some manifestations of dis-
pleasure in Lima, because Pardo feared that Brazil would
join with Chile and take possession of the Amazon terri-
tory of Peru which he could not defend.
Fardo fears alliance j^ qj-^q^ j^) q^jet Brazil, he ordered
Between Chile and t '
^^^^*^" the Peruvian Minister in Buenos Aires
the introduce a clause into the Protocol, complementary
to the Treaty, which Tejedor was asking for, making it
clear that the Secret Treaty was not aimed at Brazil but
at Chile.
To Irigoyen. April 14th, 1874. We must*, he said, j:o gently
in this matter^ because under all considerations it is necessary for
us to remain ori the footing of perfect understanding in which to-
day we find ourselves with Brazil. We have valuable interests in
Amazonas and might suffer much on that side, wherefore it is
necessary to prevent the alliance of Chile and Brazil which might,
in case of a war, be very prejudicial to us>,
. The means of making such an alliance impossible, Jtnd in con-
sequence of leaving Chile isolated in all its difficulties in, in my
judgment and in that of the Government, to circumscribe the
alliance with Argentine and Bolivia to the boundary questions
Vjetween them and Chile, and to the questions which may arise
between the contracting countries, stating accordingly in the Pro-
tocol which legalises the adhesion, that the alliance is limited to
these, and not to questions that for political or territorial reasons
may arise between the Confederation and the Empire.*
93
This declaration which was lo be included in the Pro
tocol was expressed by copying the above words. It
says:
The Alliance will not deal with questions which for political
or territorial reasons may arise between the Confederation and
the Empire of Brazil, but will only treat of the boundary ques-
tions between the Argentine Republic, Bolivia and Chile, and
the other questions that may arise between the contracting coun-
tjies.s
In spite of the fact that this explanation was not to
the taste of Argentine Tejedor acepted it, agreeing that it
would furnish matter for compensating conmuuications.
But here, again, another difficulty arose, set on foot by
Baptista. Baptista rejected the Peruvian restriction
mentione above (1).
'^'""fromlngiJnd''""' In this statc of affairs two things
happened which completely modified
the situation: viz. the Chilean-Bolivian Treaty of 1874
and the sailing of the Cochrane from the shores of Eng-
land.
Whilst the allies were differing over the uti possidetis
and over the manner of quieting Brazil, there appeared
(1) In Private communication of August 29th, 1874, Riva
Agiiero manifests his surprise that Baptista proceeded in such
manner when Terrazas, Bolivian Minister in Lima, was in
agreement with Pardo's Government on this point, and confided
in the hope that Baptista would change his opinion and would
permit Peru to avoid the peril of the Chilean-Brazilian alliance
which would begin operations by causing the loss of territories
in the hidrographic basin of the Amazon.
94
over the horizon the bulk of the Chilean ironclads and
everything fell back again into its normal state.
As it is known, the Chilean-Bolivian Treaty of 1874
replaced that of 1866, suppressing the sharing arrange-
ment and imposing upon Bolivia as the sole compensa-
tion to Chile the fact of not fixing any. new tax for
twenty-five years on Chilean capital and industry in
the zone renounced by Chile.
The other fact referred to was the sailing of the
Cochrane fron Europa.
President Errazuriz, seriously alarmed by the bellicose
tendencies manifested by Peru during the incident
between Riva-Agiiero and Godoy with regard to the
Peru Bolivian Convention over nitrate, and Pardo's at-
titude towards Godoy, ordered that the Cochrane should
put to sea whatever her state of completion. As a matter
of fact this was done. The Cochrane sailed fron Europe
without her zinc sheeting, but with herguns ready,
and arrived in so unfinished a state that two years later
it was necessary to send her back to Europe to be com-
pleted,
Change^o^f^poiicy of xhe policy of Pcru changed entirely
from that moment. In tace of the Boli-
vian agitation against the Walker Maitinez Treaty of
1874 she fell into lioe with the peace makers in order to
prevent the rupture which the year before she had
striven to provoke.
Here are the private instructions given to the Peruvian
Minister iuLa Paz:
October, 1874. By previous post I stated to yon the grave
95
dangers which the rejection of the Treaty might bring to the
good feeling with Chile, and if, a year ago it might have been
possible to secure better conditions for Bolivia, now any nego-
tiation set on foot for that end becomes more difficult daily. We
have seen this situation coming, and for our part we have ever
been sufficiently explicit with that Government, making it under-
stood for two years past that it should not let time go by useless-
ly, and advising that the bases of a proper agreement for both
nations should be arrived at by adopting a definite resolution on
the matter.
(At that time much could have been effected, but two years
have been lost in sterile discussions, the present Treaty being
the only result arrived at, when now we find Chile in possession
of means to impose her own conditions and to carry forward any
plan tliat she may have formed with regard to the Bolivian coast-
line.
<If the Treaty is disapproved, it is to be feared that new dif-
ficulties will arise, the result of which it is impossible to foresee;
noiv ihat the Chilean navy is reinforced by this ironclad which she has
brought from English shipyards and which is at present on the way to
the Pacific*
This event and the replacing of Sarraiento by don
Nicolas Avellaneda as President of the Republic, pat
an end, for the moment, to the project of the triple
alliance.
^cocATariefe^atsSe ^rom the arrival of the Cochrane in
secret treaty. q^^ waters, the attitude of the Peruvian
Government changed completely. In April, 1875, it
ordered its Minister in Buenos Aires to modify the word-
ing of that clause which stated that the triple alliance
had Chile only in view, and that he should arrange so
that Argentine should not adhere to the Secret Treaty,
making use of any means for this end.
96
III October, 1875, the Forcing Office of Lima wrote to
Irigoypn.
Peru attempting to pre- ! have pointed ont to you how desirable it
vent Argentine from , , , , , , ^^ , , ,,
adhering to theseeret would be to delay the Protocol of adherence
^^^ ^' and for this purpose the requirements of
Bolivia recently reiterated by His Excellency Senor Baptista to
you in the correspondence which should have arrived at that
Legation after the 6th of September may be made use of. This is
a matter which must be carried through with great care, since it
is to our interest that the Argentine Government should not
believe that we are hanging back, in consideration of the difficul-
ties raised over the Patagonian question.
...I have said to you, 1 have reiterated it in a dispatch of
the same month and in sundry other letters, and I repeat once
more howimportant it is to put off the signing of the Protocol of
adherence to the Treaty of the 6th February. In fact, under exist-
ing circunstances that which best suits us is to preserve our
absolute liberty of action and this we cannot Jiave while bound
to the Argentine Republic by a solemn compact.'
In December he repeated:
The only thing to be done for the present is to postpone all dis-
cussion of this matter (the Treaty) and in the event of the discus-
sionarisingwemustforour part, sustain the declarations madeover
the uti possidetis in the form in which they have been presented;
you will be able to demand a new consultation on the matter
since the meeting of the Argentine Congres is still very far off,
without the approbation of which the negotiation pending cannot
be carried to a completion.))
In such manner died this far reaching intrigue which
might have had a decisive influence on the fate of Chile
if Pardo had been able to carry out his proposal in 1873,
when we had not the means of defending the territory
which it was designed to take from us.
97
The secret Treaty was unknown in Chile
until 1879.
Hundreds of people It is really a matter for surprise that
outside otchiie knew of ^q ^ hundred people at least in each
the secret Treaty. , . i i 1 < ^ j-
of the countries concerned tiie fact or
the Secret Treaty was well known, whilst Chile was abso-
lutely ignorant of the matter until Peru gave it publi-
city in 1879.
There were concerned in this plan four governments,
that of Ballivian, of Pardo, of Sarmiento and of Frias.
All the Diplomatic Ministers of Peru, Bolivia and Argen-
tine had the Treaty in their possession and made men-
tion of it in their correspondence. Three Congresses
gave it their approbation, that of Bolivia twice, in 1872
and 1873, that of Peru and Argentine in the latter year.
All public men who figured in the diplomacy of the time
knew of its existence and the secret passed through the
hands of persons of secondary importance.
Proof exists in official documents that is was known
to Sergeant Major Don Juan S. Lizarraga, Attache of the
Peruvian Legation in La Paz, and that copies were in the
posseesion, not only of Tejedor, Baptista, Riva-Agiiero,
La Torre and Irigoyen, but also of the Peruvian diplo-
mats Don Victor Benavides, Doti Miguel San Roman,
Don Jose Luis Quinoues, Don Aurelio Garcia y Garcia,
and Don L C. Julio Rospigliosi.
There was scarcely a public man of any importance in
Peru who did not know about it, and in regard to this I
98
may be permitted to make a digression. When Lava-
lie, interrogated by Fierro, said that he knew nothing of
it, as we shall see when w^e come to speak of his mission
in Chile, Lavalle was hiding the truth. His literal reply
was as follows: "that he had been President of the Di-
plomatic Commission in '76 and '78 and that in those
years he had not seen any such Treaty."
Well then, even this captious answer was inexact.
The Congress of 1876 had occasion to be informed as
regards to the Secret Ireaty. On the 28th of July of
that year the Peruvian Government sent to Congress a
note in which the following references to it occur.
"Above all," it said, "the Secret Treaty of defensive alliance of
February 6th, 1873, which the Congress approved in April 22nd
of the same year, should be borne in mind. Since the Treaty," it
added, "met with the approval of the Congresses of both coun-
tries and was ratified in June, 1873, the nation is bound to afford
Bolivia assistance of whatsoever kind the case such as that now
occupying our attention may demand, according to the stipula-
tions of article 5. etc."
"If the Bolivian coast-line is taken away from that Republic,
we would see ourselves liable to be involved in a war of terrible
consequences, since, by the terms of the Secret Treaty we are
bound to conserve its territory intact."
This note was directed to the Congress in which,
Lavalle, a relative of Pardo, occupied a prominent posi-
tion as chief of the Diplomatic Commission.
In Chile nobody had On the othcr and, in Chile nobody
seen It knew about this Treaty that was an
open secret in Peru, in Bolivia and in the Argentine:
Godoy, Blest-Gana and Ibafiez had heard rumours of it,
99
but did not know the scope of its stipulations. The men
most famihar with the inner workings of our poHtics did
not beUeve in its existence and the public was assured
of this in the press and in the meetings that were held
in Valparaiso and in Santiago before war was declared.
There are extant declarations of Don Manuel Montt, of
Don Domingo Santa Maria, of Vicufia Mackenna and of
Don Antonio Varas in this sense, and to these may be
added the name of President Pinto, since I have perso-
nal reasons for believing that in March, 1879, he did not
credit the existence of the Secret Treaty.
This explains the wave of indignation which the of-
ficial confirmation of the reality of this compact awake-
ned in Chile, and it would have been still greater if the
evil intentions which the Treaty implied with respect to
our territorial integrity had been understood (1).
It is settled by this statement that the starting point
of the Secret Treaty was the Peruvian naval deraonstra-
(1) In Chile the belief has been general that the Secret Treaty
was set aside in the Argentine Senate by Senator Rawson, bnt the
documents in my possession make no mention of it, which makes
it clear that his opposition did not have the effect attributed to it^
There is no doubt that Rawson spoke against the Triple Alliance
in the secret session in Buenos Aires, because he affirmed the
fact in letters published in the Argentine press, from which the
rumour, persistently credited in Chile, took its origin. The very
valuable documentary authorities wliich have served me in this
chapter are taken from the Godoy papers. They were found by
that distinguished Chilean diplomat in the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs in Lima when he and our army took possession of thQ
town.
100
tion in Tocopilla during the Quevedo expedition, and
the subsequent official declaration on the part of Peru
that she would not permit the occupation of the Bo-
livian coast line by a foreign country. Bolivia took her
stand on this to sohcit the alliance, to which request
Pardo agreed instantly and joyfully.
The object of Bolivia in taking this step was to dispute
to Chile the dominion of the coast line and, with the
aid of Peru, to recover what she called her frontiers ,
that is to say, the 26th parallel. Baptista modified his
judgement and instead of pushing matters to extremes,
inclined towards conciliation.
Peru gave the Treaty its full international range.
The reader is now in a position to comprehend the
efforts she put forth with Bolivia to precipitate a rupture
in 1873, and with Argentine that she should make com-
mon cause with them against Chile.
The shade of Banquo in this great conspiracy was the
Cochrane. When the vessel made ist appearance in
the Atlantic, shaping its course for Chile, Peruvian
diplomacy, that had cast so much fuel into the furnace
of war, suddenly reversed engines.
Brazil and the Secret Jj; jg curioUS tO obscrVC in this iuci-
^^^ ^' dent the attitude of Brazil. When Iri-
goyen proposed the alliance to Tejedor, his first obser-
vation referred to the fear of the formation of a Chile-
Brazil alliance. He had to be dissuaded of this, security
being given that such would not come to pass. After-
wards, when Brazil discovered something of the shady
plan, Peru, fearful also of this alliance, proposed the
101
declaration that the Treaty was against Chile only, in
no case against Brazil.
The friendship of Chile and Brazil, founded on the
harmony of their permanent interests, was a guarantee
of security for Chile as regards Peru and Argentine, for
which there was no necessity to celebrate treaties, it
being sufficient to do nothing injurious to the friendly
tendency of the two peoples who had no rational occa-
sion for disagreement. This is one of the chief lessons
taught by the history of the Secret Treaty.
The conflict with Bolivia.
The Nitrate Company. Ju i\^q fi^st chapter I poiuted OUt the
position of the Companfa de Salitres
de Antofagasta, after the celebration with the Bolivian
Government of the Transaction of 1873 as to the conces-
Eions granted by Melgarejo. I stated also that, after
this transaction was arranged, the Treaty of 1874 was
signed, in virtue of which the Chilean industries estab-
lished on the coastline were exempted from taxes of
whatsoever kind*.
The Compafiia de Salitres believed that these stipu-
lations placed it beyond the range of any trick of
the Bolivian Treasury, and that the hateful question
debated since 1871 had been disposed of. The capitalists
who were at the head of the business took courage and
made heavy investments.
The Bolivian Government carried through the tran-
saction in due legal form, placing the parties interested
102
in possession o the territories; the document was
pubHshed in the Oficial Annual of the Laws of Bolivia*
and it was communicated to Congress, with congratu-
lations on having settled a matter that, as it was said,
had compromised the good name of the Government
before pubhc opinion.*
Five Years Without ^t that time the Company enioyed
Law-Suits. f J J J
exemption from taxes, and if it had
any complaints to make, they were of minor impor-
tance. The MunicipaHty of Antofagasta considered
itself authorised to claim local taxes, over which matter
the company appealed in order not to weaken the privi-
lege stipulated in the Treaty of 1874, but these diffe-
rences gave rise to no trouble worthy of being recorded.
It was another matter when the Assembly of 1878 put
on a tax of ten cents per quintal of salitre.
General Daza. ^j; (his time General Don Hilarion
Daza filled the post of President of the Republic of Bo-
livia. Later on in this work we shall give some informa-
tion respecting his military and political past.
Public men who have studied in Switzerland say that
one of the most difficult things for a school teacher in
that country is to make his pupils understand what is
meant by an absolute king, because liberty is so much
a part of their atmosphere that a child cannot com-
prehend the monstrosity of one man taking away the
rights of others. The reader of the histoy of a country
governed by laws; governed by parties which are repre-
sented in the public authorities, can no more easily give
himself a clear idea of the situation of the BoUvian peo-
103
pie under the rule of its tyrants, one of whom was. Daza.
Imperial Rome, in the description of Suetonius and Ta-
citus cannot show caprices of moral perversity which
these men did not permit themselves to exercise, nor
liberty left on foot; virtue, security of life being no shield
against them.
The basis of Daza's power was a pretorian guard which
imposed itself on the country and the rest of the army
by superiority of armament. The people did not exist.
What was called such was a submissive populace of In-
dians, inured to despotism by the Incas, whose tea-
chings, folk like Belzu, Morales and Daza turned to their
own advantage.
The Populace Inured The tiranny of these men was the
to Despotism. i? ,i , j
consequence of the system organised
by the Inca rule. They could never have existed without
a submissive horde of Indians, no more than the histo-
ry of Paraguay would have recorded the names of Doe-
tor Francia or of Lopez the First if the Jesuits had not
prepared the ground for them by organising the despo-
tism of which those men were only the continuers and
the heirs.
Daza had Bolivia dominated in 1879. It was not allo-
wed to anybody to have a different opinion, so that
whatsoever denomination au organization had: Assembly,
Ministry, or Council of State, these bodies were only the
Dictator under another name or form.
The Bolivian Ministry. The Ministry that expressed Daza's
will was made up of the following per-
sons in 1878, Foreign Affairs: don Martin Lanza, an
104
illustrious uame in the history of Bolivia; Minister of
Finance: sefior Salvatierra; Justice and Instruction: Se-
rapio Reyes Ortiz; War, General don Oton Jofre. Salva-
tierra was replaced within six months by Eulogio Doria
Medina.
The Chilean representa- Chile was represented in La Paz by
tives Videla and Valdes , -n^ixTi xt--,i ^
vergara. dou Fedro Nolasco Videla as Charge
cC Affairs, and he had as his secretary
a young raan of talent, don Francisco Valdes Vergara,
who had already shown indication of the notable quali-
ties as a writer which he developed later on. Videla
was very ill and the weight of the work in that ticklish
time with which I am about to deal, fell on the secretary.
The Assemblv of 1878 exhumed from its archives
the transaction celebrated in 1873, and stirring up again
an affair that was supposed to be terminated, dictated
on the 14th of February 1878, the following resolution.
The Law That Brought The agreements celebrated by tlie Execu-
About The War. tive on the 27th November 1873 with the re-
presentative of the Compania de Salitres y
Ferrocarril de Antofagasta, is approved on condition of the pay-
ment of a minimum tax often cents per quintal exported.
The Government ordered this Law to be published in
Antofagasta and notified the Manager of the Company,
Mr. George Hicks. The Directorate of the Company,
established in Valparaiso, solicited the Government to
give them diplomatic assistance.
Looking at the matter from the point of view of the
amount of the tax ten cents per quintal the case
seems a mere nothing, but the question was to maintain
the integrity of the stipulations of 1874, the only gua-
105
rantee agaiust authorities which found its excuse in the
necessities which were the daily experience of Bolivian
Dictators. To let pass without protest a tax of ten cents
would be to authorise one of any amount later on.
The nitrate industry of Antpfagasta could not exist if
put on a parallel level of taxation with Tarapaca. Its
poor caliche could only support the competition thanks
to the exemption from taxes which the Treaty in force
assured. At this time Tarapaca was exploiting ist rich-
est deposits and put the product on the market at .a
lower price than Antofagasta. That which harmonised
the commercial conditions of the rival zones was the Pe
ruvian export duty. Accordingly, the threat of the dis-
appearance of the guarantee assured by the Treaty of
1874 meant death to Antofagasta, and ruin to the Com-
pafiia Chilena. In Santiago the Government considered
these fears to be justified and ordered Videla to support
the claims of the Company.
This was the beginning of the grave conflict of 1879.
The diplomatic reclamation
^'^''trvMehl.''''" I" ^P"^ 1^"^^ Videla interviewed the
Minister of Finance Sal vatierra, who agreed
to leave the law in suspense until some prudent solu-
tion of the difficulty could be found. A short time after
he gave up his post to Doria Medina, who reiterated
this promise to Videla.
But time went on, the interviews were verbal only,
106
and apprehensive capitalists demanded a declaration
which should have more value than words only, a defi
uite recognition of the exemption from taxes conferred
by their concessions and by the Treaty of 1874 Know-
ing how business was then conducted in Bolivia, under
the leadership of unscrupulous adventurers, the fears of
the shareholders of the company were not unfounded.
Against the securities which Videla had to show, the
promises of Salvatierra and Doria Medina, the Compa-
ny and the Chilean Banks received alaiming reports of
another character, in which it was stated that the tax
was indeed about to be imposed, and by means of the
thin edge of a the wedge of the cents, the taxation of the
dictatorship would be introduced bodily.
Lack of Confidence in The Government ordered Videla to
Chile. First note of Vi-
dela, July 2nd. treat of the matter in writing, with
out abandoning a tone of perfect courtesy; and he did
so in a dispatch dated July 2nd, 1878, in which he invi-
ted, in a friendly manner, the Bolivian Government to
comply with the agreement of 1873 and the Treaty
of 1874.
Daza, however, had resolved to annull the concessions
of the Company, and, to make use of his own terms,
pitch the English out of Antofagasta,^ so saying be-
cause the Manager, George Hicks, and some of the em-
ployees were English.
Threat to annull the xhe uote was not answcFcd for a
concessions
whole mouth, and in an interview which
Videla had with Doria Medina, he heard from his lips.
107
with profound alarm, that the concessions of the Com-
pany had no legal base and might be annulled. (1)
For three months the Government in Santiago waitfd
before taking up the complaint of the Company in a de-
cided manner. It wished to give Bolivia time for reflec-
tion, but the Dictator, once launched on the incline by
his unrestricted will, showed himself each time more
opposed to any equitable agreement. In the meantime
the Company used its influence with the Government
through the medium of Don Francisco Puelma, the for-
tunate partner of Ossa, in 1866.
Whilst this was happening in Santiago, the Ministry
in La Paz, shutting itself up in deliberate pilence, left
unanswered the note of July 2nd, referred to above.
Note of Government of ^he three moutlis allowcd by the
Chile November 8th. '
Chilean Government having gone by,
a more decided attitude was adopted, imposed by reason
of the threatening declaration made by Doria Medina
to Videla, and on the 8th of November a despatch was
sent to the latter pointing out that the obstinacy of Bo-
livia might lead even to the abrogation of the existing
Treaty.
(1) August Ist I have had two interviews,* wrote Videla,
with the Minister of Finance respecting what steps were going
to be taken in tiie business, and I have met with opposition to
the recognition of the justice of the claim. Going back to the time
of the celebration of the transaction that put an end to the dif-
ficulties in which the Compafiia de Salitres found itself after the
fall of Melgarejo's Government, the Minister believes that this
act was not properly carried out and that it suffered from such
grave legal defects that it might be annulled.
108
It is to be remembered that the suppression of the
sharing rule over territory south of parallel 23 had
been a concession compensated by exemption from all
duty for 25 years, Chilean persons, industries and capi-
tal, and that, taking into consideration the growth of
the Chilean population on the coast-line, it was danger-
ous to provoke a controversy that put in doubt the va-
lidity of the Treaty. In other words, if the Treaty were
annulled, no Chilean Government would cede this ter-
ritory over again. The note terminated with these words:
The negative of the Bolivian Government to a claim so just,
as has been demonstrated, would place my Government in the
necessity of declaring null the Treatry of boundaries that unites
us to that contry, and the consequences of this painful declara-
tion, justifiable and necessary, however, would be the responsabi-
lity on the side that had failed to comply with the compact.*
When Videla received tliis despatch he had celebrated
several interviews with Lanza and with Doria Medina
who had stated that Daza was resolved to enforce the
law that had caused our protest. He now requested a
new interview, and as he saw that nothing was being
advanced, he read the communication just cited to the
Bolivian Minister. This took place on November 28th.
From that moment we can see the inflexible determi-
nation of the Bolivian Government to enforce the tax.
The note read by Videla, of which he left a copy, Daza
looked on as a threat, not as a warning of the consequen-
ces that might arise from his refusal.
Before continuing, allow me to make a digression.
The references I make to the personnel of the Chilean
J09
Cabinet oblige me to enumerate the opponents of Boli-
vian dictation.
Ministry of Chile at that The Minister of Interior was don Be-
date
lisario Prats, a man eminent for intelli-
gence and character; the Minister of Foreign Affairs was
don Alejandro Fierro; of Justice, Instruction and Eccle-
siastical Affairs, don Joaquin Blest Gana; of Finance
don Julio Zegers; of War and Marine, Colonel Corne-
lio Saavedra. There were two tendencies in the Go
vernment. One determined to make itself respected,
headed by Prats and comprising the majority of his col-
leagues; the other more moderate in tone represented by
the President. *
Discussion between Chile and Bolivia
Bolivia's reply to the Qu December 13th. the reply of the
notes of July 2(1. and y^ , . . . ^
November 8th. Bolivian Foreign Office to the note of
July 2nd arrived in the Chilean Legation. It was in two
parts: one from Minister of Foreign Affairs, Reyes Or-
tiz, very short: the other, very long, from the Finance
Minister, Doria Medina, who appeared as having been
consulted on the legality of the measure by the first
named.
Doria Medina recapitulated the legal arguments then
invoked by the Government and by Bolivian writers,
in such a way that this document is the classic thesis
on whicli the Foreign Office of that country bases its de-
fence.
no
Reyes Ortiz says, with the brevity of a defiinite reso-
lution:
I have the honour of sending vou a certified copy of the re-
port which, with yesterday's date, I received from the Finance
Minister, in which you will see the weighty reasons obliging th^
Government of this Republic to take a different view from that
advanced by you on the claim of the Compania Chilena de Sa-
litres, and to order, in consequence, the faithful execution of the
law dictated by the National Assembly of February 14th of present
yearr>.
Doria Medina sustained the view that the question
raised by the tax law was not one of public right, but of
private order, founded upon the fact that the Company
lost, with the fall of Melgarejo, the concessions granted
to it by him, because an Assembly elected by the chief
of the successful muting declared all his acts null.
Bolivia states that it ^^he transaction, he said, cele-
is internal, no diplo- , , , , ^^
matic matter. brated by the Government that succe-
eded Melgarejo was a new, private act, in which the
Government, owning the nitrate lands, freely fixed the
conditions in ceding them to a private person. In order
to celebrate this, the Government had the authorisation
of the Assembly, but within limits and subject to the
obligation of rendering an account of the agreement arri-
ved at. On being informed of the transaction, the As-
sembly, making use of its rights, approved the transac-
tion, always on the understanding that the Company
should accept the duty of ten cents per Spanish quintal.
This arranguement, he added, was in no way con-
nected whit the Treaty of 1874, because it was a bargain
Ill
between two parties, voluutary on both sides, the price
of renting the ground being fixed by the owners. The
base of all Doria's argument rested an the scheme of
giving the Company's claim the character of an incident
wihin the range of the Courts, not of the Foreign Office
But was it really of a private character? Are the acts of
a Government private that annull rights that have ema-
nated from the public authority?
President Melgarejo ruled Bolivia in the same man-
ner as bis forerunners and those who succeeded him,
and a mutiny was not a sufficient cause for saying that
his had not been a government, and to qualify his acts as
being of a private character.
If the concession granted by Melgarejo to the foreign
companies compromised the good faith of the state
the specious argumentation of the Bolivian Minister
fell to the ground. If the doctrine of Doria Medina
was accepted, the Treaty of 1874 excluded from ita
protection the Compafiia de Salitres de Antofagasta*,
from which it followed that all the Chilean interests
were covered by it saving this only, whereas the Treaty
was made on her behalf and for the mineral district of
Caracoles.
useiessness of the Trea- The exemption from taxes covered
ty of 1873. . , , . , ,<./-,!
persons, mdustries and capital ot Chi-
lean origin* and now by means of sophisms it followed
that there should be excluded from this category the
biggest aserably ef Chilean individuals; the chief indus
try and most important amount of invested capital. Was
112
it worth while making Treaties if they were to he respec-
ted after this fnshion?
Daza orders the tax to As the Note of Lanza Said that the
be collectecl
Government was resolved to collect the
tax, Videla wrote to him officially asking whether it
was his determination to require compliance instantly or
if he would have the prudence to wait to see if Santia-
go would consider the argument of I>oria Medina, to
which enquiry Lanza answered that he had ordered the
Prefect of Antofagasta to carry out the collection. It was
impossible to have proceeded in a manner less diplo
matic.
Videla then complied with his instructions, stating in
a mild but firm manner that the execution of the law*
meant the rupture of the Treaty of 1874.
The reply of Daza was to order the Prefect of Antofa-
gasta to oblige the Chilean Company to pay the tax from
February 14th, 1878, the date of the resolution o the
Assembly.
When this order was received on the coast nothing
was known there of the diplomatic action in La Paz,
but it was known that a negotiation was pending, so
that when the Prefect, Colonel Don Severino Zapata, set
to work to collect by force the tax from the Company,
the Consul General of Chile, Don Salvador Reyes, re-
quested him to postpone the measure for some days until
the Government had arrived at some agreement.
The Chilean Consul fears jjc begged him not to rcsort to vio
a rising of Chilean o
Workmen. leutmcasurcs which might bring about
a very grave situation for both Republics. The consul
113
alluded to what might occur in Antofagasta, where the
Bolivian authorities had only few policemen available to
deal with a population of thousands of Chileans.
The Prefect, however, was inflexible. One can unders-
tand the agitation occasioned throughout Chile by the
turn which Daza gave to the claim. The country felt
itself insulted...
The Compania de Salitres brought all its influence to
bear to stir up public opinion, and as that which in the
beginning had been a controversy over matters of right
became a question of respect, of honour, the Government
was unable to remain indifferent or maintain a luke-
warm attitude without leaving it established that its
word and influence merited no consideration in La Paz.
In face 'of these considerations a definite lesolution was
taken.
Chile proposes arbitra- rpj^^ Order of the Bolivian Govern-
tiou, Jauuary 3rd, 1879
meut to Zapata was dated December
17th; the resolution of Chile bears date January 3rd. In
this Chile proposes for the last time that they should
continue to debate the point, or submit it to arbitration,
meanwhile postponing the execution of the law.
Arbitration is provided for in the Treaty.
A11 questions'), it says, to which the understanding or execu-
tion of the Treaty may give rise shall be submitted to Arbitra-
tion.
Lanza invoked arbitration in a note dated the 26th of
December, which crossed another of the same tenor
from Chile dated a few days later. The note of January
8
114
3rd already cited was written with no knowledge of the
other, because no telegraphic communication existed be-
tween Santiago and La Paz.
The Telegraph Exten- ^or this reasou there is a discrepaiv
ded only from Santia- '
gotocaidexa. Qy between what was done in Bolivia
and in Antofagasta and that which was resolved upon
in Chile, which would not have happened if there had
been telegraphic communication between the two points;
for then the Government, in touch with what was taking
place in one or the other place, would have instructed
its representatives to act simultaneously, with one ac-
cord and would have controlled events from Santiago-
Due to this however, there were three centers of action,
La Paz, Santiago and Antofagasta, a fact which intro-
duced a certain confusion into affairs.
In this manner is explained why Lanza, having indi
cated Arbitration to avoid conflict, on December 26th,
the Government of Chile, en its own initiative, asked for
it on the 3rd of January.
The Government of Chile accepted the idea that an
arbiter with the facts before him should say whether it
was allowable to burden the Company with the proposed
tax, and Daza imposed as a preliminary condition that
the law should be put in action before the arbitration
took place. Apparently this difficulty brought to naught
the hopes of those who still thought that the conflict
tould be settled by such means. I say, apparently, be-
cause Daza was seeking war in order to break the trea
ties and to recuperate, with the aid of the Peruvian fleet
the nitrate region up to the 26th parallel.
115
Acts of violence in Antofagasta and La Paz
The Blanco jn Antofa- ^jje diplomatic debate degenerated
Into acts of violence. The Government
ordered our ironclads which wera in Lota to proceed to
Caldera, an one of them, the Blanco Encalada, was dis-
patched to Antofagasta where its presence prevented
many evils, because the Chilean population, seeing that
it was protected, remained quite tranquil.
On the 6th of January Zapata notified the Salitre
Company to pay the tax dating from the emission of tlie
law, but, as the order was not complied with, on the
11th he proceeded to embargo the company's efects, is-
suing the following decree:
The financial official, Jo86 Felix Valda will arrest and conduct
to the public prison George Hicks, Manager and representative
of the Corapafiia de Salitres y Ferrocarril de Antofagasta, debtor
to the Treasury of the ^um of 90,848 Bolivianos 13 centavo8.
Order of^arrest against Tj^^ manager fled inland. The Com-
pany stopped working, leaving 2,000
men out of work. The measures adopted in La Paz were
no less grave.
The Chilean Charge d' Affairs formulated his propo-
sition of Arbitration on the 20th of January, stating his
wish that matters should return to the condition prior
to the execution of the law, and he asked for an imme-
diate reply because the affair was now on a footing
which could not be prolonged without affecting the
dignity of Chile.
116
In the acute period of the debate, Peru had accredited
as Minister to Bolivia don Jose Luis Quiilones, who Hved
in close contact with the President as is known by his
secret correspondence, which has been published. (Vol II
Guerra del Pacifico. Ahumada Moreno).
'^^^ ^QuSones**'"''*^' ^^^ Videla made his last efPort of
a friendly character, Quiflones wrote
to his Government respecting Daza's attitude at that
moment:
^Through various members of the Government and trustworthy
persons, especially Sefior Doria Medina, I know that His Excel-
lency General Daza and his Cabinet are resolved not to cede a
point in the course which they have given to the question, even
if the Chilean Government forcibly occupies all the coast-line
of this Republic, because they wish to take advantage of the fact
that Chile would have declared the Treaties broken and the mat
ter would remain in the same state as before 1866, in order to
obtain, whether by diplomacy or by force, a Treaty which would
take into account Bolivian sovereignty and rights on the coast-
line, sovereignty and rights which according to the Treaties of
1866 and 1874 are a mere mockery: counting for this on the
justice of their cause and on the loyalty of the Peruvian Govern-
ment in complying with the secret Compact of Alliance of
February 6th, 1873.
Pushed on, probably, by the Peruvian Minister, Daza
began a policy of attacks, agreeable to the procedure
made use of in his domestic government, and dictacted
a decree, signed by all his Ministers on February 1st
saying, in substance that supposing that the Company
failed to accept the transaction celebrated in November,
1873, it was cancelled and the Salitre lands retained hi/
117
the Company tvere reivindicated.^ The claim turned on the
question of a tax, and now the whole of the effects were
confiscated.
sixniflcative letter of 'pjijg game day Daza wrote a letter
to Prefect Zapata which gives some
idea of his grade of culture, the letter being intercepted
by Colonel Sotomayor in Antofagasta.
I have good news for you. I have diddled the Gringos (refer-
ring to Mr. Hicks) decreeing the reversion of the nitrate grounds,
and they can't take them away from us if they stir up the whole
world. I don't think that Chile will intervene in the matter,
but if she declares war on us we count on the aid of Peru, from
whom we shall demand compliance with the Secret Treaty. With
this object I am going to send Reyes Ortiz to Lima. Now you see
I am giving you good news that you will have to thank me for
eternally, and as I tell vou, the Gringos are completely diddled
(completamente fregados) and the Chileans can only bite and
shout. (morder y reclamar nada mas). (1)
The decree was kept private for some days whilst the
journey of Reyes Ortiz to Lima was arranged, this
diplomat going, as announced in this letter, to require
of Peru compliance with the Secret Treaty, which once
obtained, he would return to Antofagasta to take pos-
session of the Company's property.
The confident of Daza, Quinones, relates a curious
(1) Colonel Sotomayor sent the letter to the President with this
comment: 0n the arrival of the steamer from the north the letter
herewith fell into my hands. This document is of great impor
tance and an absolute proof of negotiations with Peru. 18th Fe-
bruary, 1879.
118
incident that occurred before ihe publication of the
decree. He states that the Minister Lanza called hira
to his office and with the Secret Treaty in hand made
him this proposal which renders evident the fact that
he understood well enough the range of Peru's economic
policy.
Always the nitrate He said*, writes Quinones, that the desire
question . ; '
of the Bolivian Government was to give pre-
ference to her sister and ally, the Republic of Peru, in the exploi-
tation of her nitrate grounds on the coast-line, with the object of
avoiding competition in the working of those which she pos-
sessed.
I returned thanks*, adds Quinones. with all the effussion
which patriotism inspired for the benevolent ideas expressed in
favour of Peruvian interests.*
With regard to the journey of Reyes Ortiz to Lima,
he confirms the idea that it was to ask the adhesion of
Peru in the war against Chile, and he further adds:
Once he knows what to expect with regard^to the attitude of the
Peruvian Government, Reyes Oitiz will proceed to the Bolivian
coast in order to organise the forces necessary to throw the
Hicks' Company out of Antofagasta and Recover the nitrate
grounds*.
Lanza replaced by Mendez
The Minister Lanza communicated to the Chilean
Charge d' Afjiairs the Decree of resumption of the
Nitrate grounds, adding that the law which gave rise to
the controversy being derogated, recourse might be had
119
to arbitration as stipulated in the Treaties in force. The
Dictator fell into a fury over that postscript and depriv-
ed Lanza of his post, naming as Minister in his place a
journalist named Don Julio Mendez, who owed his
notoriety to the virulence of his attacks on Chile.
The Chilean Government, ignorant of what had hap-
pened in La Paz owing to the incoherence resulting from
the lack of telegraphic communication of which we have
spoken, expected still the 5th of February to find some
honourable solution of the imminent conflict, and issued
instructions in this sense to Videla, recommending him
to renew the negotiation or resort to arbitration, making
this decorous road as easy as possible to Bolivia since
she was a weak country (1).
(1) February 5th. Guided by a sincere spirit of conciliation and
having before us the fact that Bolivia is relatively a weak nation,
we have believed that by suspending the collection of the taxes
still, we may open and continue the diplomatic discussion inte-
rrupted by that Government in order to arrive, by this method, at
an amicable settlement, or, if this course is not open, to constitute
an arbitration according to the protocol annexed to the compact.
In this manner we shall show most eloquently that Chile, so far as
is conducive with her honour, prefers pacific solutions and is dis-
posed to comply faithfully and nobly with her international com-
promises.
I desire that you should fully comprehend the spirit of my
Government in order that Bolivia may retrace her steps and
comply strictly with the obligations of the pact of 1874. You will
do all in your power to open the road in a honourable and satis-
factory manner that will lead to this happy result.
This note, which I have never seen published, can be found in
the Copiador de Relaciones Exterior es.
120
Two days after the dispatch of this document, a tele-
gram was received from our Consul in Antofagasta, sent
on from Caldera, giving warning that the authorities were
about to proceed to the sale by auction of the goods of
the Compania de Salitres.
The acquisition of the property of the Company by
citizens of a foreign power was an eventuality that the
Government of Chile had to prevent at all costs, has
instead of a conflict with Bolivia we would have had one
with a great nation.
The last steps
videia's ultimatum When Videla received the decree of
confiscation of the goods of the Company he sent an
ultimatum asking that within a term of 48 hours Boli-
via would decide whether to submit the decision of the
conflict to arbitration as Chile desired.
This document is dated February 8th. Even yet the
confiscation of the nitrate grounds was unknown in San-
tiago. The last news received had been to the effect that
an auction of the goods of the company was about to be
held because it refused to pay the ninety thousand pesos
odd claimed on the salitre exported. The Ministry was
at one in the intention to occupy Antofagasta rather
than to permit such an outrage.
The energetic attitude of Prats had triumphed over
the opinion of the President, who feared to take a step
which opened such grave perspectives to his admis-
tration.
121
Troops sent to caidera. Troops Were Sent to Caldera where
the Cochrane remained in telegraphic communication
with the Government.
Three days later, on the 11th. the news of the decree
confiscating the salitre grounds arrived, a measure that
filled the cup that now ran over on all sides. The Go-
vernment on the same day despatched the following
telegram to Videla: ^Retire inmediately.^
Videla had asked for his passports on the 12l1i of
February and as they had not been sent to him, he
suspended his diplomatic functions on that day and
severed all relations with the Bolivian Government.
Fis last note contains this declaration which embodies
the juridical doctrine over the reocupation of the coast-
line:
The Treaty of August 6th, 1874, being broken, throiijib failure
on the part of Bolivia to comply with her obligations therein
stipulated, the rights of Chile to the territory, whii;h tights had
legitimate value before the Treaty of 186fi, are reborn.
In consequence, the Government of Cnile will carry out all
the acts which it considers necessary for the defence of its rights
and the Government of Bolivia must only see in them the logi-
cal result of the rupture which it has provoked and of its repea-
ted refusal to seek a just solution equitable and honourable to
both countries.
The Chilean Cabinet and the occupation of
Antofagasta
Prats cabinet The Prats Cabinet did not think that
the situation would arrive at its present state. It belie-
122
ved that Bolivia would give way before the justice of
our claim and before the consciousness of her own weak-
ness. In this belief it adjourned for the summer vacat-
ion. The President was in Valpaiaiso, Prats in San
Bernardo.
Attitude of Prats Jq f^^e of the Decree that put the
effects of the Company up to auction, Prats wrote to
the Minister of War the following letter.
February 8th. M\' friend: Today I wrote to Pinto telling him
that we should prevent the auction and, if necessary, occupy An-
tofagasta. Do not give way for anything. It would be a disgrace.
Your friend counsels promptness and energy.
Postscript: Today I wrote to Pinto and to Fierro in the same
sense. You know that Pinto is an optimist. Put yourselves in
agreement. As far as I am concerned, I consider it necessary at
once to devote our whole attention to the occupation of Antofa-
gasta, which should be done unless the embargo is raised and
everything returned to the state it was in before the first requisi-
tion was made by the local authorities.
I told Fierro that we shall have to emigrate from Chile if the
Bolivians get the laugh of us. I also advise the sending of a Char.
g6 d'Affairs to Quito in case of any indication of Peruvian inter-
vention.*
colonel sotomayor is After the couucil of the Ministry to
ordered to land in An- *'
tofagasta. which this letter refers, the confiscation
of the nitrate lands was known, and it was ordered that
the Cochrane and the O'Higgins should proceed to An-
tofagasta carrying two landing parties under the com-
mand of Colonel Don Erailio Sotomayor, Chief of the
Military School, to take possession of the town before
the auction was carried out.
123
In the filial paragraph of Prat's letter an allusion to
the intromission of Peru in the contest will be noticed.
The generality considered that Bolivia would not have
assumed so provocative an attitude without counting on
Peruvian aid.
The Ministry announced the intention of occupying"
Antofagasta in the following telegraphic circular ad-
dressed to all the Intendencias in the country.
cThe Government of Bolivia, taking no heed of our claims has
decreed the expropriation of onr national property, taking pos-
session of the nitrate district without any explanation whatso-
ever. The Government of Chile has withdrawn our Minister and
the troops of the Republic are on their way to occupy Antofagasta
and the other necessary positions. Belisario Prat8>K
Landing in Antofagasta Qu the 14th of February in the mor-
ning a squadron composed of the Blanco, the Cochrane
and the O'Higgins anchored in the Bay of Antofagasta.
At 8 a. m. Colonel Sotomayor sent an emissary to com-
municate to the Prefect Zapata that he was about to
take possession of the port, and as this had only forty
policemen, he limited his action to the formulation of a
protest, and retired to the house of the Peruvian Con-
sul. In the meantime, two companies under command
of Colonel Sotomayor, one of marine artillery and the
other of field artillery, commanded by its captain, Don
Exequiel Fuentes, were landed.
Whilst the launches crossed the waters between the
anchorage and the mole, the town was decorated with
Chilean flags of all dimensions and the people accompa-
124
nied the troops cheering, light up to the barrack that
was to serve as their lodging. The country received the
news with great enthusiasm. Th6 attitude of the Go-
vernment was applauded in the press, in the groups
and in meetings.
The Ministry felt itself strengthened by this warn
support wich hailed a clear policy. Public instinct fore-
saw the trouble with Peru, and understood that the mo-
ment had arrived for the Republic to seek inspiration
in the heroic pages of 1820 and 1838.
Peru and the occupation of Antofagasta
The Lavalle mission
Public opinion in Li- ^^ j^^g beginning of 1879 Don Pe-
ma and Santiago in &
front of the occupa- (jpQ p^j, Soldan y Unauuc represented
tion of Antofagasta. -^ ^
Peru in Chile as Charge d' Affairs, a
distinguished poet who wrote over the pseudonym Juan
de Arona, whilst as Consul General in Valparaiso there
was another well-known literary man, Don Luis F. Mar-
quez.
When the difference with Bolivia arrived at its acute
phase, the Peruvian Agent requested an interview with
the President in which Pinto offered, in case of the dif-
ficulties arriving at the extremity which he foresaw, to
warn him in good time so that he might take the steps
necessary in the name of his country.
The order for the occupation of Antofagasta being
given, Don Alejandro Fierro invited Paz Soldan to his
office and communicated to him the resolution that had
125
been adopted. Paz Soldan offered the good offices of
Peru, asking that the execution of the measure might
be postponed for a few days, which offer, however, Fie-
rro refused with invariable though courteous firmnee8>
pointing out that Chile looked on the decree ordering
seizure of the effects of the Company as an insult to the
just claims of the nation.
On leaving hisn, Paz Soldan sent the following tele-
gram to his Government:
Chile considers the good offices of Peru unaccepta-
ble: she is occupying up to 23.
Beginnings^oi^agitation Up to that time the attitude of the
public in Lima had been tranquil.
The press in general recognised that in the contest over
Antofagasta the right lay with Chile, an opinion that
was confirmed when arbitration was proposed. But on
the receipt of Paz Soldan's telegram public opinion pro
nounced its verdict against us at once in a definite man-
ner, and fury knew no limits when the occupation of
Antofagasta was known.
This anger was peculiar to Lima and to the nitrate
people rather than to the Peruvians. The capital drag-
ged the provinces into the war and communicated its
warlike ardour with difficulty, because the interests at
stake were matters of indifference to them not so to
the Lima gentlemen, who exploited the nitratre districts
in partnership with the treasury.
The movement of hostility towards Chile was headed
by the civilist party formed by Pardo and ruled by him
whilst he lived.
126
The President was a peace partisan, but had at his
side ministers who represented the warhke tendencies
of the higher social ranks, noteworthy exponents of this
tendency being, in the Government, Corrales Meigar;
the Minister of Justice, Don Mariano Felipe Paz Soldan
and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Don Manuel Irigo
yen, ex-Minister in Baenos Aires, where he had been
sent to negotiate the Triple Alliance.
In Chile public opinion recognised from the very first
that the contest with Bolivia would spread to Peru.
Valparaiso, which had suffered so much from Pardo's
measures, sounded the warlike note because it unders-
tood better than any other city in the country the im
portance of the Nitrate question.
The President, on the other hand, vehemently desi-
red peace, and in order to show the falsity of the legerid
that the war of the Pacific was a plan meditated and
prepared by the Chilean Government, I copy here the
private orders which Pinto gave to our Minister Pleni-
potentiary in Lima respecting the occupation of Anto
fagasta, inviting Peru to act as mediator.
cFebruary 2l8t. If Peru in this question*, said Pinto, does
not allow herself to be carried away by the impulse of a hatred
which is in no sense justified, she has the opportunity of exerci"
sing an elevated and noble mission. Whe have not taken posses
sion of the coast-line like flibusters, we have gone there obliged
by the necessity of defending our violated rights^ and because
the outrageous conduct of Bolivia has closed the door to any
other solution. In taking this measure, though an imperious ne-
cessity impelled us, we have ever been ready to accept any solu-
tion that would reestablish good relations between Chile and Bo-
127
livia. To work for this end is the raisaion which falls to Peru by
reason of her geographical situation and close relations with Chi-
le and Bolivia.
Although we are still far from any settlement of the conflict
between this country and Bolivia, I believe that, once established
on the coast-line, it will be impossible for us to abandon it. The
population of this territory, as you know, is mainly Chilean, and
the interests established there are entirely Chilean. To this may
be added the fact that the cession we made of this territory to
Bolivia has never been approved by the public opinion of this
country. To return to Bolivia the territory comprehended bet-
ween the 230 and 24o would be considered here as the delivery
of one of our provinces to a foreign power.
The only arrangement possible would be one in which we
remained masters of this region in compensation of a sum of mo-
ney. Such is the only solution that would re-establish relations
between the two countries in a stable and cordial manner.
This letter, by reason of the high position of the per-
sonage who signed it and of him to whom it was direc-
ted, constitutes definite instructions which reveal how
far the President of Chile was from following out a
treacherously laid plan directed against Peru.
Peru sends Lavalle to gain time for arming
herself
Reyes Ortiz and the Mi- jt ^iU be remembered that the Boli-
nister Qodoy
vian Minister, Don Serapio Reyes Or-
tiz, left La Paz for Lima in order to request compliance
with the secret compact, to return afterwards to Antofa^
gasta to take possession of the goods of the Compafiia
128
de Salitres and to expel its directorate. Tiie news of the
occupation of this town surprised hira in Lima.
Don Joaquin Godoy then represented Chile in Peru,
a man experienced in the finesse of diplomacy, endowed
also with distinguished talent and vigorous patriotism.
If Godoy had rendered no further services to the nation
after this time, they would suffice to assign him the
rank of an eminent citizen.
Godoy discovered the object of the journey of Reyes
Ortiz and the gift which he offered to Peru in exchange
for her alliance. In one of his interesting despatches, he
communicated to Santiago that Reyes Ortiz was in Lima
attempting to gain the aid of the country on the base of
the Secret Treaty, and offering to cede to Peru for a
century the whole nitrate region then in her power and
that which Bolivia hoped to gain with her aid, news that
confirmed what Quifiones, the Peruvian plenipotentiary
in La Paz had commnuicated to his government, as I
made known to the reader in the previous chapter. (1)
(1) "According to revelations which I consider to be worthy of
confidence by reason of their origin, said Godoy, the Bolivian
Government \h stimulating Peru earnestly towards a declaration
against Chile, not only recalling the pact which joins the two
countries, but taking advantage of the covetous interest with which
Peru regards the Antofagasta nitrate district. Previously, Bolivia
had offered Peru the usufruct, gratuitously, for 99 years of the
Toco grounds, now, according to the revelations referred to above,
she promises her in the same terms the usufruct of all the sali-
treras in the territory of which she holds possession, and of those
which she hopes to recover with the aid of Peru!>.
^ 120
The offer of Reyes Ortiz placed the Government of
Peru in a dilemma, because on one side it felt the pres-
sure from and desire to please the directing leaders who
were anxious for war, wliilst on the other hand fears
assaulted it. The maritime superiority of Peru was not
clear. It will probably not liave been forgotten that Par-
do, when he knew that the Chilean ironclads had sailed
from England, altered the course of his policy changing
its former warlike aspect to one as definitely pacific.
Councils of naval men were held in the President's ca-
binet, in whicli were broadly discussed the power of both
fleets and the probabilities of triumph, at which
councils were present Don Aurelio Garcia y Garcia,
Commodore of the Fleet, Captain Don Miguel Grau and
others of less importance
Grau modest and worthy, spoke in favour of peace,
basing his view on the superiority of our vessels and
sailors, though concluding by saying that he would take
whatsoever post of peril was designated to him. Garcia
y Garcia controverted him, saying that to the terrible
Chilean sailors he would oppose the equally terrible Cha-
lacos (inhabitants of Callao) and that in no sense had the
Chilean squadron the superiority that Grau attributed to
it. Singular contrast, as will be seen when the reader
knows more clearly the dilference in the conduct of one
and the other in the defence of their country.
^' MSltel' pie^'"oS Resulting from the pressure brought
tiary in Chile. to bear by the Bolivian Minister, a
meeting took place in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
9
130
between Irigoyeu, Reyes Ortiz aud Don Jose Antonio
Lavalle, in which Lavalle was nominated as Plenipoten-
tiary in Chile, to offer the mediation of Peru, Antofa-
gasta to be first evacuated, Peru promising to declare
war in the event of this demand being refused, taking
stand on the Secret Treaty. (1)
The objet of Lavalle's journey was to gain time to
repair the ships, to purchase others, taking advantage of
the fact that Peru was still at peace, and to obtain the
alliance of the Argentine Republic. His instructions
charged him to offjer to Chile the mediation of Peru
subject to the following conditions:
Evacuation of the coast-line; derogation of the law
which taxed the salitre and of the decree that took over
the property; these measures to be submitted to arbi
tration.
The mission of Lavalle undertaken, I repeat, in
order to gain time, was necessary in order to hide the
Secret Treaty and to foster the doubts which the Chi-
lean Government held as to its existence, since on any
other ground it would have been impossible to reconcile
the double task of mediator and ally.
Haste of prado to Pin- ^pj^g fg^t jg proved, moreover, by the
chase Ships. i n, i . xl i
haste shown by Prado, to secure that
during this mission, the Vice President of Peru, who
was in Europe, should purchase at any price ironclads
(1) The presence of Lavalle in this meeting is proved in his
Instructions, of which I have the originals, and which Ahumiada
Moreno has published in his compilation of documents entitled
Guerra del Pacifico,* Vol. 3., page 3.
131
and torpedoes, contract officers for the ships and as soon
as possible put them beyond the action of foreign go-
vernments (1).
When the Peruvian Government sent off Lavalle it
had already decided on war, and said as much in pri-
vate despatches. It knew very well that the evacuation
of Antofagasta was a demand that Chile could not accept.
Moreover, it was not ignorant of the fact that the Go-
vernment of Pinto could not have done it even had it so
desired. There was in Antofagasta and Caracoles a Chi-
lean working population of from five to six thousand
miners, who were waiting a favourable opportunity to
rise against the feeble Bolivian forces of the coastline,
in case the Chilean Government abandoned them to their
fate, and it would have been sufficient for a single drop
of blood to have flowed to cause the country, on fire as
it was, to make common cause with its compatriots. To
this difficulty. Pinto alluded in his letter of instructions
to Godoy, above cited, when he said that the devolution
of Antofagasta would be looked on in Chile as tlie han-
ding over of one of the Provinces.
(1) I have liere these documents, hitherto unknown.
Febrnary 28th. Buy at once, cost what they may, one or two
ironclads, better or at least equal to those of Chile. Obtain the
funds somehow. Communicate this to Aranibar. Send out via Pa-
nama, per first steamer four first class quartermasters and twelve
Whitehead torpedoes with a man familiar with their use. Pradoi> _
March 4th. If you can find no ironclad ready for sea, better or
equal to the Chilean, in England, have a look at the Italian ones,
the Romeor something better. When purchased fly the Peruvian
flag at once, giving the vessel the name Amazonas. Prado.T
132
^ ResSd^o Declare '^'^^ poHcy of Daza had given a deep
^^'^'- and perilous wound to Ciiilean national
feeling. It is not strange therefore, that Peru, on the
arrival of Lavalle in Chile, gave notice secretly to its
agents abroad that in a few days more war would be
declared (1).
Another of the objects of the Lavalle Mission was
to have time to secure the Argentine alliance, or
in its defect an agreement as to subsidies such as the
loan of some of her warships or a simulated sale of
them, Peru binding herself to return them, and her own
as well when required against Chile. According to the
Peruvian Government, Argentine could effect any of
these operations in conformity with law and without
violation of neutrality.
(1) Private document of Irigoyen, Minister of Foreign Affairs.
March 5th: It is a sure thing that if, as generally feared, Peru does
not obtain from Chile the acceptance of her mediation as propo
sed and this purpose suffers the same fate as the offer of good
offices, the Mission in charge of Sefior Lavalle then resulting
sterile, the Government iv ill have tear bypjuvpdp the time this commu-
nication arrives in your hands.
It is certain, I repeat, that from one moment to another Boli-
via will declare war on Chile. If it is true that such situation
affects only tVie Bolivian diplomatic agents who will try to impede
Chile from arming herself in Europe, and that your attitude can
only he a waiting one, none the less, as I have shown, you should
take advantage of the time to make all preparations to render im-
possible the exportation of all articles constituting contraband of
war, in prevision of the emergency that Peru may see herself
obliged to take part in the conflict. And now 1 may asstire you
that there are poiverful reasons for supposing that emergency may
become matter of fact to-morrow y>.
133
The diplomatic agent who wus to reaHse this miracle
of balancing was La Torre, ex Minister in Bolivia, at
present Peruvian agent in Buenos Aires (1).
Chilean opinion divided about war.
Minister Lavaiie. Dqjj j^gg Antonio Lavalle belonged
to the highest classes of Lima. He
was a brother-in-law of don Manuel Pardo and was rela-
ted to the Argentine family of the eame name. He was
a sagaciuos diplomat, acute, of facile speech and of dis-
tinguished manners.
He had figured in politics, filling important posts as
that of chief of the Parliamentar}' Commission for fo-
reign affairs from the year 74 onwards. Later he re-
(1) La Torre's private instructions. March 7th. I leave it to
your intelligence*, says Irigoyen to him, to make it clear that a
treatry of subsidies does not break neutrality, neither alters in
any respect the international relations of countries celebrating
them with respect to a third power with which one of them may
enter on war, as established by the principles of international
law. Since no state of war exists between Peru and Chile the
Argentine Republic can agree to such a compact without failing
in neutrality if she wishes to conserve it.
If the Government will accept none of these measures, you
may suggest the purchase of one or two of her ironclads, which
would be made through a third party and with the necessary pri-
vacy, consulting always complete reciprocity on the part of Peru
so that if by chance the Argentine Republic sees itself in the ne-
cessity of making use of its fleet later on, Peru will bind herself
to sell her back the same ships and also to place at her disposal
one or two Peruvian ironclads.*
134
presented his country in Berlin and in St. Petersburg.
His skill will be proved in the pages to follow. Lavalle,
during his difficult mission in Chile dealt with all obs-
tacles with sagacity and skill as though juggling with
glasses, breaking none of them.
/^~" Two currents fought in Chile at that time, pushing
\ against one another with violence: on one side the peo-
\ pie, the masses, that entity which cannot be measured,
1 great as the sea, liable like the sea to sudden tempests:
\ on the other the leading persons of the directing class,
jl like Santa Maria, Varas, Montt etc., at the head of them
Uhe President don Anibal Pinto, who contemplated the
possibility of a war with Peru with the profoundest aver-
sion, because the public finances were on the verge of
loankruptcy.
Prats inclined towards ^g j^^ p^ru, the President had at his
war. 1 - 1-1
Side Mmisters who sympathised with
the popular mood. The chief, among these was Prats,
the Minister of Interior, who, with a clear vision of the
situation, 'made no secret of his opinion that Lavalle
should be treated with courtesy, giving him a peremp-
tory time limit in which to declare 'the neutrality of
Peru, and, not accepting this, he should be given his
passports. For this reason it will be seen that the Pre
sident sought his auxiliaries during the Lavalle Mission
outside the Cabinet. In sympathy with the popular
attitude, the clever Minister Godoy, supported it from
Lima with his opportune reports and farseeing warnings.
Lavalle arrived in Valparaiso on the 4th of March.
On this day Godoy telegraphed:
tSquadron, army and batteries in Oallao'^getting ready.*
135
Optimism of President The President dit not believe that
Pinto. Ill -1
reru would take part in the struggle.
He was unable to comprehend what interest could indu-
ce her to attempt such adventure, when her fiscal diffi-
culties were greater than those of Chile. Before the
occupation of Autofagasta, he wrote to Saavedra, the
Minister of War:
February 6th. I find it very difficult to believe that Peru will
take a hand in our contest with Bolivia.
It is not for Peru to think of helping her neighbour. Her
political situation is very precarious, her finances in worse state
than ours.
The point on which the two currents of opinion that
I have mentioned, clashed together was the Secret Trea-
ty. The defenders of the peace policy denied its exis-
tence, and as nobody had seen it, and only vague and
incomplete information was to be obtained about it, no-
body could cathegorically affirm its existence.
Agitation in Chile. ^hc two principal journals of Val-
paraiso headed popular sentiment: hi
Mercurio and La Patria, the latter edited by don Isido-
ro Errazuriz. Daily in its columns the statement was
affirmed that Peru was allied to Bolivia by some compact.
The public, which has its wisdom, divined what was hid-
den, and invaded the diplomatic territory like an angry
sea.
The day of Lavalle's arrival in Valparaiso a meeting
was held terminating in the following farseeing resolu-
tion:
Not to accept the mediation of Peru until its Government has
136 ~
torn up the compact against us which has been signed with Boli-
via arid until, laying aside her warlike preparations, Peru shows
us by her acts her sincere desire to remain neutral in the present
conflict with Bolivia,
Attack on the Peruvian ^ number of people present at the
Consulate in Valparaiso
meeting went to the Peruvian consu-
late and stoned its escutcheon. The Intendente of Val-
paraiso, don Eulogio Altamirano hastened with the po-
lice to defend the Consulate, the Government gave
satisfaction to Consul Marquez, and the Minister of
Justice ordered the criminal judge in Valparaiso to take
due proceedings.
Lavalle was not present at this prologue to his mis-
sion, because he had gone to Santiago directly he came
ashore, but he, as well as Marquez understood perfectly
the sentiment of the populace.
Lavalle atributes the po- t 1 1 p j i r* l
puiarexitement to a Lavallc informed his Government
supposed secret trea- ^j^^^ ^j^-^ Q^t^reak proceeded from the
belief in the Secret Treaty.
They attribute treason to us in presenting ourselves in the
guise of mediators bewteen Bolivia and Chile when we are bound
^0 follow the first in her hostilities against the second.*
Marquez, with respect to the attitude of Valparaiso,
wrote to Lavalle:
Here there is a manifest desire to provoke a conflict with Peru
and a fear that mediation will put it off, giving time for Peru to
arm.
Lavalle received in Santiago, on the day following his
arrival, a visit from don Domingo Santa Maria, an old
friend of his, whom Pinto had charged to get into touch
137 -
with hiin. Santa Maria did not form part of the Govern-
ment, but was an individual prominent by reason of
his talent, his political position and the close relations
which he cultivated with the President, today still closer
on account of their common aversion to war.
Santa Maria and Lava- j^^ ^is first visit Santa Maria noti-
fied Lavalle that before beginning any
negotiation, the Government required a definite assu-
rance with regard to the Secret Treaty. I do not know
what Lavalle answered, but the impression which Santa
Maria gathered in this interview was favourable.
From what Santa Man'a has told me, wrote Pinto, an(i other
persons who have talked with Lavalle, he is animated with the best
spirit^.
Definite report from Go- ^^j^jj^^ ^j^^ ^^-^^^^^ ^^ pcace ' Were
obstinately denying the existence of the Secret Treaty,
our Legation in Lima daily gained new confirmations
and transmitted them to Santiago, so that the conviction
of the country was strengthened and hope proportionally
weakened I might give many details of the informa-
tion, direct or indirect which in this sense Godoy forwar-
ded. In Lima lived ill inmediate contact with him, don
Abelardo Nunez, whose communications might be con-
sidered official and emanating from the office of the Mi-
nistry, since on various occasions when Godoy could
not manage to write personally for lack of time, Nunez
did so in his name.
Such was the certainty that the Legation held as to
the reality of the Secret Treaty that it even offered to
send to the Government a copy which, for payment, a
138
certain foreigner who lived on intimate relations with
the Government would hand over, and although he was
not able to do this the information which he gave was
so exact that one may be certain that he who supplied
it had read the Secret Treaty (1).
''''Sm'cfiTsrate^ The attitude of Godoy, oothwith-
standing, did not succeed in diverting the energetic and
powerful current towards peace. The opposing .tenden-
cies came inct conta in the Council of State, and by a
singular coincidence the President appeared as an oppo-
nent with occasion of a Ministerial measure to organize
the administrative and judicial territory situated south
of the 23 parallel which Chile had announced her in-
tention of recovering, since Daza broke the Treaty of
1874 by imposing the tax on nitrate. Legally, the mea-
sure was exempt from criticism, since if that territory
was Chilean, as the Government had stated in ministe-
rial circulars directed to all the nations, it was right to
organise it, giving it the proper authorities. But to do
so at the moment showed a resolution not to accede to
(1) February 28. I am sorry to say, wrote Nunez to Saave-
dra, ihat up to the present I have been. unable to obtain an au-
thentic copy of the Secret Treaty agreed upon in 1873 between
Peru and Bolivia, but I can give the assurance, from what has
been told me by a responsible person who has read it, that in it
there are these two stipulations. (Ist.) that Peru preserves the
right of declaring when she considers a casus foederis to have arri-
ved, that is to say, a moment to intervene in favour of the ally: (2)
that Bolivia binds herself not to celebrate boundary treaties or
any international pact without informing the Government of
Peru*. (Saavedra papers).
m)
the demands of Peru, and to frustrate the Lavalle Mis-
sion, in which the friends of peace still placed tlieir
hopes.
When the idea was presented to the Council of State,
therefore, Varas opposed it, saying that it would close
the door to any friendly solution, and his opposition was
seconded by Santa Maria, don Victorino Lastarria and
don Melchor de Santiago Concha.
A new session was held with the same object in which
no resolution on the point was arrived at. The first was
on March 7th, the second on the 13th.
'^'"'vented^'h^wl?.''''"' This opposition between the people
and a select portion of the upper class, would have gi-
ven Lavalle a decorous means of preventing the war, if
he had wished to do so, but his mission had no other
object than to gain time to repair ships, buy others and
compact alliances.
In the same days when these incidents occurred. Go.
doy telegraphed. -
Mis8ion Lavalle has for its object to gain time. Government
believes that it can count on Italian ironclad.*
Under such auspices, or rather these contrary courses,
the Peruvian Plenipotentiary initiated his mission (1).
(1) Pinto gave an account to Saavedra of what had happened at
the first meeting of the Council of State. Marcli 9th. On Thursday
th6 Council of State met. There were present don Melchor Concha,
don Antonio Varas, General Godoy, don Jose Salamanca, Santa
Maria, Sotomayor, Lira, Gandarillas, Larrain and Lastarria. The
message calling the Congress to extraordinary session was read
indicating tliat the objet of the convocation was to treat of the
political and administrative organisations of the territory inclu-
ded between the 23 and 24 degrees.
140
First steps of Lavalle
Pinto interviews Lava t ii --jirk-ii
lie. Lavalle was invited by riiito to a
private conference. Afterwards, on the same day, he cele-
brated his first interview with the Minister of Foreign
Affairs, don Alejandro Fierro. This took place on March
11th. Theconversation of Lavalle withPinto was tranquil,
lofty in tone, in accord with the character and perfect
education of the protagonists. Pinto had most correct man-
ners, suitable to the social medium in which he had been
born and had lived. He revealed frankly his ardent desire
to find some peaceful solution. He referred to the manifes-
tations of adverse opinion, considering them as extrava-
gances of popular lack of information, as opposed to the
feelings of sensible men, a name given by govern-
ments to those who think the same as they do.
Lavalle was profus in the same ideas of the Presi-
dent without hiding that the insuperable crux of the dif-
ficulty was the taking possession of Antofagasta, that Peru
Don Antonio Varas observed that the -forra of the Message
might occasion difficulties Avith neighbouring nations, since it
might be deduced from it that we proj)Osed to organise this terri-
tory in a definite manner and that* we were closing the door
against any approximation. He was supported by Concha, Lasta-
rria and Santa Maria. I observed that it was customary to de-
signate the pi'ojects witli which the Congress was to deal, but as
these projects were not yet drawn up, the message had indicated
their general object. Finally, after some discussion it was agreed
that the projetcts should be drawn up and should be indicated in
the convocation in order to avoid the inconvenient to which don
Antonio Varas had drawn attention.
141
made a preliminary point of evacuation, that Bolivia could
not treat, nor Peru advise her to, whilst a portion of her
territory was invaded. It was in vain that Pinto observed
that the 23 degree, the on!/ part of the coast-line occu-
pied by Chile up to that moment was not Bolivian, but
ceded suh conditione and now recovered by its first
owner. Lavalle entrenched himself in his instructions
which ordered him not to cede in this respect. In the first
conference it could be seen that there was an insuperable
obstacle in the way of peace. Pinto referred transparently
to the fear of a revolt in Antofagasta and in Chile, en-
That the withdrawal of Chilean forces from the coast would
bring about complicaliona which, instead of facilitating an arran-
gement, would create new, and possibly insuperable difficulties.*
personai^propo|ition of gut Lavallc had not attained the ob
ject of his journey, if in view of the
impossibihty manifest in the first moment he had put a
termination to his mission and had not half opened the
door to pacific hopes. As Pinto pressed him to seek a
means of agreement, he proposed as a personal sugges-
tion, warning him that he was proceeding without the
authorization of his government, the following:
1.*^ Evacuation of the coast line and the question of
its dominion to be submitted to arbitration, and that it
should be settled as to whom it belonged in virtue of
the Uti possidetis of 1810.
2 The evacuatedterritory to be ruled by a municipal
administration undei* the joint protection of Bolivia,
Chile and Peru.
142
3.<> The cost of administration having been paid, the
fiscal revenue should be shared between Bolivia and
Chile.
""^'"Jionfpii'To^''^'" "T^ conference made an unfavoura-
ble impression on Pinto. Lavalle tried
to sound the impression he had made asking if he could
advise Lima that the questions initiated presented a
satisfactor}' aspect. Pinto, with the gravity peculiar to
him, answered that he should limit himself to saying
that he had found the greatest good will in his govern-
ment to arrive at a pacific solution.*
After this conversation with Pinto, Lavalle had his
first conference with Fierro, who asked* him about the
Secret Treaty.
.1 have seen nothing. Lavalle, like St. Francis of old looked
at the sleeve of his gown saying he has not passed by
here and answered that he was not able to say any-
thing certain because he had not been in Congress since
187G, when he was President of the Parliamentary com-
mission of Foreign Affairs. Why should it be presented
in 1876, when it Wiis definitely approved in 1873?
Lavalle did not lie, but he failed to tell the truth-. He
did not lie because as a matter of fact, the Treaty was
not the work of the Congress of 1876, but he concealed
the truth when putting in doubt the existence of a di-
plomatic act which he knew in all its details. Fierro,
though making no reference to the subtlety of the reply,
did not express himself as being satisfied, and the same
day he ordered Godoy that he sould ask for a declara-
tion on the part of Peru as regards her present attitude.
March 11th. If Peru, he said, ha8 no desire to maintain the
143
attitude of common friendship which sacred obhgations impose
upon her i*^ wil be necessary that she should say so and assume
the responsibility of her acts.*
A very suggestive detail. Lavalle had armed himself, before
celebrating his first interview, with a despatch for his
government which he read to his intimates, in which he
asked What is the truth as to-a certain Secret Treaty
said to have been celebrated between Peru and Bolivia
in 1873?
What better argument than this could have been given
whereby an advocate of peace might maintain with
blind faith fist that there was no such Secret Treaty r*
The first of the propositions made by Lavalle to Pinto
was to evacuate the coastline and afterwards submit the
question of dominion to arbitration. Pinto and Santa
Maria accepted the arbitration, but without previous
evacuation. They agreed that Chile should leave Anto-
fagasta by verdict of an arbiter, but not at the demand
of Peru.
These conferences still left a bad impression on the
negotiators. Lavalle, Pinto and Fierro believed that the
conflict was at hand. The unalterable demand of Peru
that Chile should abandon the coast-line was, as Pinto
said, an impossibility.
Proposal to Lavalle to Lavallc tells that ou the day follow-
gain time >
ing these ocurrences, Santa Maria came
to see him, bringing with him a project, combined with
the President and other influential men, to avoid war.
This project was to gain time: precisely what he desired
in order to give an oportunity, said Santa Maria, for
144
passions to cool and the fury of the press to die down.
With the most wonderful skill Lavalle refused to
accept the proposal on the ground that it deeply wound
ed his patriotism, saying:
13th and 14th of March. Having been assured by the press
that the object which my Government had in view in sending me
to Chile was to gain time to arm itself, I do not wish that in the
end, if relations are broken off, there should be any pretext for
saying that Peru has pursued a perfidious policy, nor that I have
been the instrument of it.
I do not wish to exaggerate the diplomatic skill of
Lavalle, still less do I wish to throw doubt on the clear
intelligence of men like Santa Maria and others. I must
declare that these versions emanate from Lavalle but
none the less bear the stamp of truth, for they do not
form a narrative written post facto but are the very notes
in which he gave daily account to his government of
what was happening.
It may be asked: in the comedy which was being
represented may not these advances have been plum-
mets with which the Chilean statesmen sought to sound
the spirit of their opponent, in orcler to find the full depth
of the pretentions of Lima? Or were they suggested by
their own desires to turn aside from the country a great
calamity which took it by surprise, without an army,
without preparation and without money?
Whilst these spider webs were being spun in Santiago,
the bomb shell exploded in Lima.
145
Preparations of Peru
feru rushes armaments. The patriotic agitation was daily
growing in Lima. The attack to the Peruvian Consulate
in Valparaiso greately excited the spirits and the warli-
ke spirit of the directing classes passed to all circles of
that nervous population raised among revolutions. The
press filled her colums with warlike writings and the
tone was made more ardent in answer to the heat of the
Chilean press, specially that of Valparaiso. President
Prado like Pinto felt himself carried out by the opinion
of his Ministers and popular exaltation. The populations
all over the Republic held meetings demanding imme-
diate war. Government movilized an army of G to 7,000
men, leaving in Lima the raw recruits and sending- the
best to Iquique under command of colonel Velarde.
Transports were travelling between Callao and Iquique
with weapons, guns and soldiers, collecting in all the
ports the sea board garrisons and the conscripts from
inland.
The fleet concentrated in Callao. The naval authori-
ties dismissed the Chileans that were serving in the
ships and began enrolling foreign volunteers at high
premiums.
Military preparations. Gunuers aboard and in the forts had
daily gunnery practice encouraged by the president who
went every day to see the exercises. The warships were
docked in the iron dock that belonged to the english
steamship company at Callao, and were cleaned and
overhauled, but as they were in sad disrepair, this work
could not go as fast as the Government wished. A big
10
146
gun was changed in the Indepeudeucia and also new
boilers were put in, made in the port workshops. While
this ebullition of activity went on in the port, the people
of Lima paraded the streets asking for war and Lavalle
went on in Santiago gaining time with his subtle flexibili-
ty and manners above reproach.
Godoy kept the Government posted up to everything
that happened and although his informations were kept
from publicity, popular sentiment that had invaded all
services permitted the news to leak. The telegrams of
Godoy being the expression of the truth served to
undo the task of those that laboriously pushed the rock
of peace.
Bolivia declares war. j^ ^hese circumnstances Bolivia de-
clared war and precipitated the events. Reyes Ortiz, Boli
vian Minister in Peru communicated the declaration of
war to the Diplomatic Corps in Lima, taking an unusual
step as he was neither accredited to the Governments of
his colleagues nor to them personally.
Irregular declaration rpj corrCCt thing WOUld haVC bceU
of war ^
for Bolivia to have made known her,
resolution to the foreign agents accredited in La Paz, or,
in ist defect, to the Governments, but as the diplomatic
representation in that town was of very minor character
and the notes of the Foreign Office were slow in arriving
at their destination, it was attempted to give publicity
to the act by this means, and so give Peru a way of
communicating, urhi et orbe the state of war with Chile
and close the markets of arms and ships.
Godoy, always well informed telegraphed:
"March 14 th. The object of the BoHvian circular is to prevent
the sailing of new ships for Chile."
147
The Peruvian Government sent by cable the declara-
tion of Reyes Ortiz to the United States. The diploma-
tic Ministers in Lima did not reply to the circular of
Reyes Ortiz. The gravity of the matter did not rest in
this, but in the fact that Bolivia rendered it possible for
Oiiile to ask the neutrality of Peru so that the Bolivian
declaration ressembled a stick thrust between the wheels
of the car that Lavalle was pushing in Santiago with
such skill and safety.
The case had been discussed between Santa Maria and
Lavalle. The demand to remain neutral in an unde-
clared war was anticipated, and would have placed
Chile in a bad position, but this inconvenience over-
come, the demand was natural enough in the presence
of a mediator who was hurriedly preparing his means of
fighting.
Fierro replied to Godoy's telegram cited above:
"March 14th. Ask for immediate neutraUty."
Energetic attitude of Chile
Neutrality ^demanded jfc ^qqq j-^q^ appear that the Chilean
Government attributed to this telegram
its real importance. It did not think probably, that
the Peruvian resistance was ansurmoiintable, because,
if it had so believed, is incomprehensible that negotia-
tions should be continued with Lavalle over topics of
relatively secondary importance.
Godov, who was in the firing line understood that
war would come of this and before carrying out the
148
order, asked confirmatiou of it by telegraph, which,
being given by Fierro, he sent to the Minister of For-
eign Affairs in Lima a note of the highest and most im-
pressive eloquence.
Brilliant note of Go- jjg relates the hurricd warlike prepa-
rations of Peru on land and sea, her
zeal to acquire ships in Europe, the military display in
the ships and forts of Callao, the sending of troops to
the points where the Chilean and Bolivian forces were
gathered, the historic services of Chile to Peru, and in
the nkme of those just fears and these glorious memo-
ries, demanded of the Government of Lima that it
should declare its neutrality.
He said, "my Government has communicated to me special ins-
tructions, to deal with this question to which I am giving faithfol
obedience, asking your Excellency to have the goodness to put
a quick end to this question by giving it the preferential atten-
tion that its character demands, and which is necessary in order
to dissipate at once the pernicious effects of the alarm dominant
in all minds".
The Peruvian Foreign Office did not hasten to answer
this note, as it was probably studying the means where-
by to turn aside the blow which should define the
situation, and during these days of waiting, the nego-
tations in Chile continued.
Santa Maria declares Godoy's uote was dated March 17th.
that such situation '
cannot continue Qu the 18th, Santa Maria, who continu-
ed to serve as Pinto's intermediary with Lavalle, visit-
ed him and made it clear that the situation could not
continue. He stated that the President had consulted a
149
group of infiuential persons who had answered that the
evacuation of Antofagasta was impossible, and that,
in face of this statement no other course was open save
that Peru should declare her neutrality. Lavalle, seeing
the situation so strained, suggested to Santa Maria an
idea which flattered his pride as a negotiator, and in-
directly Pinto's also, pointing out that the only person
who could prevent war was he. Go yourself to Lima,
said he, and there, in conversation with the Bolivian
plenipotentiary, settle in a moment what can never be
aranged by means of notes and interviews*.
As in times of great excitement the walls speak and
news circulate privately from ear to ear, it is not
strange that the rumour had 'reached Lavalle that thia
idea had been suggested to Pinto by Saavedra and that
Pinto had accepted it.
March 16th. Your idea of sending a special commissioner to
Lima, said. Pinto to Saavedra, "does not seem a bad one."
On one side the desire for peace and on the other the
disgust felt no less by those who fought for it against
the Minister in Lima, who continually undid their work
with his prophetic announcements, made them desire
that a person animated by a different spirit should go
to Peru. (1)
(1) Pinto, in spite of being very discreet and reserved, be-
trayed his displeasure with Godoy, revealing it to Lavalle. This
is what the latter told his Government. "March 25th. Before
parting, His Excellency told m^ that Senor Godoy wrote that he
was greatly alarmed with the preparations in Peru and with the
spirit reigning in the country; that for his part he bore in mind
150
Pressure was brought to bear on Santa Maria that he
should embark for Peru, but lie refused to do so, well
understanding that the opportune moment for such a
journey had gone by. Pinto then took in hand the
question directly with Lavalle and asked him that Peru
should declare her neutrality. Lavalle refused, diluting
his reply with amiable phrases sugared with his love of
peace.
Pinto, realising that the moment of inevitable conflict
had arrived, made one last attempt, proposing:
1.0 The statu quo on the coast-line, without deriving
benefits from the occupation.
2. Put back the boundary question with Bolivia to
the point in which it was found before the Treaty of
1866.
3. Submit the questions of dominion to arbitration.
In exchange he offered that Chile would not fortify
Mejillones and would "come to an understanding as to
the nitrate."
Pinto's direct propo- Lavallc, fortunately did not acept. The
sals to Lavalle ' -^ '^
point about Mejillones was excessive; (o
come to an understanding about nitrate, a seed of diffi-
culties in the future. The first would have left Chile
in a specialised condition, her extremities inert with Me-
jillones and Magellan Straits neutralised, the ports of her
the character of Senor Godoy and the atmosphere that
surrounded him of Chileans in an excited state who saw vi-
sions on all sides. I told him that I was gratified that he should
judge his representative so correctly and the circumstances in
which he found hinaself."
151
great spheres of action disarmed. The seoond required
the agreement of three governments in the fixing of
the tax in zones of differing quaHty, that of Tarapaca,
of Tocopilla and AntofagastaTaltal in which the type
of tax that suited one would ruin the other.
This was the final proposal emanating from the Go
vernment made to Lavalle.
Intervention of Las- Afterwards, at the eleventh hour,
tarna ' '
one of the most influential friends of
the Santa Maria circle, and at that time most closely in
touch with him, the jurist and publicist Don Jose Vic-
torino Lastarria, got into touch with Lavalle to arrange a
solution conceived in the following terms:
Withdrawal of Chilian forces to the south of 23.
Suspension on the part of Bolivia of the measures
against the Compaflla de Salitres.
Suspension of armaments in Chile, Peru and Bolivia.
Verdict on the matter by a congress of Plenipotentia-
ries assembled in Lima.
Lavalle seeing that the ground was sinking, accepted,
not so the Ministry which rejected the proposition of
Lastarria.
Let us' see what fate befell Godoy's note requesting
neutrality.
Sotomayor goes north
Prado and Godoy in Prado was exceedingly alarmed by
chorriiios. ^j^^ ^^^^ ^^ Godoy, and invited him to
a private interview to trauquilize him arid to avoid war,
152
which he saw approaching with giant strides. Godoy's
official version of this conference gives a pale idea of
what happened at it. The rigid Minister did not permit
himself to relate what happened otherwise than in broad
outline.
Dramatic scene be- Prado was ilervous and highly exci-
tween Prado and Godoy. . j j. n l i i i
ted at the prospect of a war which he
did not desire. He received Godoy at night in the fa-
shionable summer resort of Chorrillos, where the breezes
perfumed by the flowers mingle with those from the sea,
an agreeable place that was destined to suffer more than
any other from the terrible sentence that was going to be
pronounced that night. Prado walked up and down in
an agitated manner. When Godoy entered the room, he
said to him, with vehemence:
What do you mean to say in that note of yours that
I have read today?*
Neutrality or war, General,* answered Godoy in a
friendly tone.
How is it possible for us to go to war?;- replied Pra-
do and in a burst of confidence he recalled that he Was
bound by ties of friendship of the strongest kind to Chi-
lean society.which had welcomed him kindly in the days
of his exile.
He added that his own fortune was invested in a coal
mining establishment in Chile, to show that he desired
peace not only on grounds of gratitude but even of self-
interest.
Prado was sincere in talking in this manner. He had
travelled to the verge of the abyss, pushed forward by
153
invisible forces beyond his will and intelligence, and
only at the last moment saw the reality which he had
helped to materialise, thoughtlessly, instigated by is Mi-
nisters and by the public.
Godoy observed that he had it in his power to avoird
the war: Say one single word, General, Say: I will
remain neutral; and all will finish between Chile and
Peru.
I cannot I cannot*: answered Prado in an agitated
manner, not pausing in his walking to and fro.
As he continued to repeat this phrase I cannot* Go-
doy said to him And why not, General?*
I'rado reveals the exis- Prado auswered Pardo has left
teiice of the secret treaty. . t- i i n
me tied up to Bolivia by a becret
Treaty of Alliance: I cannot*.
This was the first official revelation respecting this
compact. Later, Prado now calmer, added, that since
it was not possible to get away from the Treaty, he would
cite Congress to hold sessions in order that it might pro-
nounce upon the question, which was all that could be
expected of him; and further, that having a Minister in
Chile charged with this negotiation, he would make over
to Lavalle the petition of neutrality.
Godoy was far too intelligent not to understand the
meaning of this interview. He understood that these
outbursts appertained to Prado, this open door towards
delay and time to his Ministry. The citation of Con-
gress was for a month later. The reference to Lavalle
a new extension of time. Congress, representing pu-
blic feeling, would have voted for war with acclama-
154
tion after Peru had had time to run through the Foreign
and the naval yards, and pushed forward the pending
question of alUance with the Argentine Republic
After that memorable interview, Godoy, telegraphed:
March 21. President tolds me last night that he cannot
decide as he has a Treaty of Alliance with Bolivia; he must con-
voke Congress for a decision and charge Lavalle to explain mat
ters to our Government. The coraission to Lavalle is an evasion
for the purpose of gaining time. The warlike preparations and pu-
blic clamour continue. I believe it necessary to insist on an im-
mediate declaration and, not obtaining it, to ask for my pas-
sports.*
In view of this very grave despatch, a decisive resolu-
tion was taken in Santiago. The Secret Teatry could no
longer be put in doubt. The hopes of peace were woun-
ded to the heart.
Fierro answered Godoy's telegram to the effect that
the petition of neutrality must be answered in Lima, that
the immediate abrogation of the Secret Treaty should
be demanded, tringyto get knowled of it. At the same
time another telegram was sent to the Minister of War
who was in Antofagflsta, saying:
March 25th. Have fleet ready, report if anyting is lacking*-
The President sent anew for Lavalle and told him that
Prado had revealed the existence of the Secret Treaty.
Lavalle only remarked:
tit must be so if His Excellency says so.
Lavalle believed still that it was possible to gain time
and asked Lima:
155
March 26th. In the possibility of prolonging negotiations or
of hastening tlie rupture. I ask Wliich suits best?
He was auswered:
Fr along .
The sagacity of Lavalle failed him this time. The rea-
Hty of the Secret Treaty being revealed, the shield of
peace fell to earth. Up to then what had held it up was
the doubt of its existence. Here ended the diplomatic
mission of Lavalle. From that moment events were pre-
cipitated.
'"'Tppr^J'^^e t^ ^>" the 28th of March, the Council
declaring war. Qf gtate in sccrct scssion approved a
message in which tiie Government solicited from Con-
gress permission to declare war on Peru and Bolivia. On
coming out from this sitting, at which Don Rafael Soto-
mayor was present, the President and Prats asked him that
on the following day he should embark for the North,
carrying instructions to the Admiral that he should sail
at once for Callao. On the same day a decree of secret
character was issued, nominating Sotomayor the Secre-
tary General of the Admiral and of the General-in-Chief
with faculty to assist in warlike operations as well as in
the administrative department. The Government pro-
posed to maintain in reserve the authorization that he
was about to receive until Sotomayor should advise by
telegram that he was on board the flagship, in order that
the declaration, of war might coincide with the opening
of operations. Later on, I will deal with this matter in
156
full. Lavalle knew nothing of this resolution of the
Council of State till some days later.
Pinto called Saavedra who was in the North. Fierro
ordered Godoy to ask for his passports, and telegraphed
to the Minister of War:
Have all the fleet concentrated and ready; do not send
any ship to Peru.
On the 2ud of April Congress authorised the President
to declare war on Peru and Bolivia, and the declaration
was made on the 5th of the month, the anniversary of
the Battle of Maipo. Lavalle left on the 3rd for Valpa-
raiso Post-Captain Patrick Lynch acting as his adjutant.
Don Rafael Sotomayor ^hc biography of Don Rafael Soto-
mayor will be written in the pages of this work. It would
be difficult for the public confidence to place itself in
the hands of a man more worthy of the trust. Seldom
has a country had a more honest servant, a more level-
headed patriot, or one more prudent and intelligent.
It is a glory for the Prats Ministry to have delegated
its powers to a man of such value. Sotomayor had been
intimately in touch with his work. The extra-official
meeting celebrated in preparation of these arrangements
took place in the office that he had intheMoiieda Palace,
of which he was the superintendent. Sotomayor, before
hurriedly departing for the scene of his future glories,
confided his immediate charges to the care of his inti-
mate friend Belisario Prats, whose decided and clear-
seeing attitude had influenced the incidents hitherto
narrated. I shall say no more for the present about this
157
voyage that had so great an influence in the campaign
that was about to commence.
Energy of the country The country responded with all the
energy of its vigorous patriotism to the declaration of
war. Rich and poor hastened to the barracks. Past dif-
ferences were forgotten and on all lips was heard one cry
only, that acclaimed Chile and the President. Godoy
embarked in Callao after terminating his long and skil-
ful mission, and he was sent to Ecuador satisfving the
desire of Prats that we should have a Legation in that
country. Lavalle, from Lima, went as Minister to Rio
de Janeiro.
Last considerations
Many men have traversed the stage during the Lavalle
Mission. Pinto, Santa Maria, Varas, Lastarria, sincerely
desired peace. Varas said in the Senate that if he had
known that there was a Secret Treaty he would always
have been for war and it is certain that the same would
have been said by Santa Maria and Lastarria had they
had occasion to have spoken. As regards Pinto the idea
of war horrified him, and he did all that a man in his
position could do to avoid it.
The President and the A difference will havc bccu uotcd in
the attitude of Fierro and that of the
President. Comparing the negotiations of Lavalle with
Pinto and the telegrams of Fierro to Godoy, two distinct
policies can be traced. The President could not see war
coming, even when it was upon him, and to the last
158
moment went on believing that Peru was playing with
the idea but neither desired it nor would carry it out.
On the 24thof March, at the end of theLavalle Mission,
Pinto wrote to Saavedra:
Peru is joking. She cannot decide to declare neutrality. Prado
does not want war and I believe that very few people in Peru
want it, but all carry on the farce of a warlike attitude.*
Neither did he believe in the Secret Treaty, led astray
by informations given to him by a very respectable Chi-
lean whom he, having no confidence in Godoy's news,
had charged to investigate for him. He had the illusion
of arriving at an arrangement with Lavalle, and his
pacificism ran parallel with the warlike note of the Val-
paraiso streets, for in his correspondence are found
violent expressions blaming the attitude of those who
were preaching the necessity of declaring war.
None the less, it must be said in his honour that he
did not attempt to impose his opinion on the country or
on the Ministry, that he judged the situation by a cri-
terion other than theirs and did not consider himself
authorised to disdain any measure of safety in face of a
war in which he did not believe.
Pinto's respet for Mi- Before Lavalle's arrival in Santiago,
nisterial responsibility , ^ i i
the Government received a telegram
from Godoy saying: I recommend vigilance to naval
forces stationed in the North. > Pinto sent on the tele-
gram to Colonel Sotomayor at Antofagasta, and ordered
the Admiral to concentrate the whoie of the fleet
in Mejillones. Nothing mortified his wishes more than
to have to attend to a warning of such a hature, but he
159
had no harmful behef in his own infallibihty, which is
the measure of small souls and inferior minds.
The Ministry looked at matters in a different light.
It had no confidence in Lavalle's Mission. On the con-
trary, it was persuaded that his negotiations were a mere
comedy in which he was the chief actor, not in benefit
of Peace, but of War, of a war more certain to be crow-
ned with victory than any that Peru could make at
that moment. The difference in view-point to which
I have referred redounds to the praise of Pinto, since,
although so far from seeing eye to eye with his Ministers
in the events of the day, he did not pretend to contradict
them or to impose his own judgments. This cons-
titutional and parliamentary tendency does him high
honour.
manrrelS^by Chi ^^^ Optimism indirectly served . the
1 country well, since it allowed him to
push peace propositions to an extremity and so render
evident the fact that Chile was doing all that was possi-
ble to avoid war.
I have sought to emphasize the attitude of Pinto, of
Santa Maria, of Varas, of Lastarria, of Concha and
others in order to place on record the circumstances of
the duel that took place between the public and a consi-
derable proportion of the governmental body, in order
that writers who seek to express the truth may not re-
peat that the War of the Pacific was a deep laid plot to
take possession of Tarapaca and the Bolivian coast-line,
whereas as a matter of fact it was a war prepared by
Peru in 1873, accepted and decided on by her in Fe-
160
bruary 1879, but resisted and vigorously combatted among
us by men who occupied the first posts in the Govern-
ment, in the front line of politics and of society.
It remains for me to say that Canevaro could neither
obtain in Europe the ironclads which he was in search
of, nor the Minister La Torre effect in Buenos Aires the
Argentine alliance, nor even the compact of subsidies
which he was charged to negotiate. With this double
failure the combatants entered the conflict with the same
naval equipment that they possessed at the beginning
of the year.
It is scarcely necessary to speak further about tlie
attitude of Lavalle, since every move he made in Chile
has been criticised in the course of my narrative of
events. The mission that he discharged was not a con-
genial one to a man of honour. It rested on subterfuge,
and his vessel's sails were filled neither with a frank
desire for peace nor a frank demand for war. None the
less, Lavalle was a Peruvian citizen who undertook this
difficult task in the service of his country. He sacrificed
himself in order that his country should have time to
arm herself and to obtain alliances. Within the spirit
of this thought he acted as any man who loved his coun-
try would have done in bis place.
Diplomats of ail the world:
Which among you would cast the first stone at him?
JliNDING SECT. AUG 3 tSRL
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Bulnes, Gonzalo
Chile and Peru
